Britain and the Balkan Crisis 1875–1878 9780231879132

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STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW Edited by the FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

NUMBER 407

ERITAIN AND THE BALKAN CRISIS, 1875-1878 BY

WALTER G. WIRTHWEIN

BRITAIN AND THE BALKAN CRISIS

1875-1878

BY

WALTER G. WIRTHWEIN, PH.D. Department of History New York Univtrtily

NEW

YORK

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON : P . S. KING & SON, L T D .

1935

COPYRIGHT,

1935

BV COLUMBIA UNIVERSITV

PRESS

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ca MY MOTHER

PREFACE A N U M B E R of years ago the author chose as subject for research the "interminable" Balkan crisis of 1875-1878. Somervell wrote of it: " Dozens of historians, scores of biographers, have trembled as they drew near and saw it blocking the pathway of their narrative." Despite the warning contained in his pages, the novice plunged in and floundered to the further shore along with the rest. He feels, however, that his approach is from a neglected angle. Public opinion, perpetually invoked and frequently maligned, played an important role in the affairs of Britain during those years. The national mind was throughout in a state of hectic flush. Though ever swaying like reeds before each cross-wind, the British public, nevertheless, left their imprint on the course of events. The writer's chief purpose is to recount and survey their activities. Little is owed to secondary works. Source material was almost alone of value. Since such material was available primarily in the stacks of the British Museum, a full year was spent in its rather chilly interiors. True, there was compensation. Officials and clerks never once failed to contribute willingly their assistance and services. Another summer may bring a renewal of friendship with several members of its staff. Considerable ransacking of the catalogues and shelves of the New York Public Library and of the Columbia Library resulted in the acquisition of supplementary information. For the many courtesies extended by both, the writer is also indebted. Similarly, he wishes to thank Miss Clara Maetzel and Mr. Jo Chamberlin for their helpful criticism of manuscript in its immature stages. 7

PREFACE

8

Professor Charles Downer Hazen very kindly read the completed manuscript. His encouraging comments will be remembered. Dr. Shepard B. Clough, also of Columbia, generously rendered a service through the reading of proof. Important touches were contributed by Professor Robert L. Schuyler. Corrections suggested by each were gratefully incorporated in the t e x t Many have paid tribute to Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes; none could place a higher appreciation than the writer upon his inspiration and aid. Originally submitted to Professor Hayes as a crude seminar essay, this study gradually acquired a vastly improved form under his patient direction. Finally, the author wishes to place in print an acknowledgment of the material assistance rendered by his wife, Janet. W . G. W . FEBBUABY,

1935.

CONTENTS FACE

INTRODUCTION

n

CHAPTER I Insurrection in Herzegovina

13

C H A P T E R II The Concert of Powers

33 C H A P T E R III

The Atrocity Crusade

63 C H A P T E R IV

The Serbian Campaign

103 CHAPTER V

The Constantinople Conference

129

C H A P T E R VI The Failure of Diplomacy

177 C H A P T E R VII

The Russo-Turkish War, First Phase

217

C H A P T E R VIII The Russo-Turkish War, Second Phase

281

C H A P T E R IX Strained Relations

328 CHAPTER X

The Congress of Berlin

390

BIBLIOGRAPHY

416

INDEX

421

9

INTRODUCTION DISRAELI once stated: " The public mind is the creation of the Master-Writers." Before the Crimean war, the praises of Ottoman valor, politeness, justice and mercy must have been embarrassing to the Turks themselves. With such avowals of esteem swaying the people, England had plunged into that struggle not in any grudging spirit but with positive enthusiasm. " Independence and integrity " had been the slogan which had caught the fancy of Britain. A f t e r the victory, the Congress of Paris rigidly affirmed those principles in its peace. T w o decades later, the concert of Powers was again grappling with the Eastern Question. The Porte had made its capacities clearer by additional years of misrule, by a rich collection of broken promises, by goading the subject nationalities into insurrection, by bankruptcy and by massacre. The change of English feeling can be measured by a comparison of the former extravagant eulogies with the caustic maledictions expressed during the " atrocity crusade " o f 1876. Ottoman obstinacy soon lost the Porte its opportunity of further appeal to the Powers. National self-assertion caused Russia to war. Britain proclaimed her neutrality yet stood ready to guard " British interests." The ensuing chain of events created a situation which might easily have led to a repetition of the Crimean war. Latent hostility to Russia burst forth anew. The Turks were alternately caressed and abused until they did not know what to make of it. Britain willed energetically enough but could not decide what she willed. The climax saw Lord Beaconsfield extricating the nation from its dilemma and bringing home " Peace with Honour " from Berlin. With that epitaph to the Balkan crisis of 1875-1878, the national mind was content. " Opinion," according to Shakespeare, was " a sovereign ii

12

INTRODUCTION

mistress of effects." Those words attest to its power. T h e term, " public opinion," is loosely interpreted as meaning the opinion of the majority. More strictly defined, it means " the views and sentiment" prevalent in a community as a whole. Some would narrow that to " the sentiment of the masses." Huxley labeled public opinion " the chaos of popular prejudice." His words suggest its imperfections and the narrow definition attests to its elusiveness. That elusiveness naturally limited the writer, in the main, to the more articulate groups of the British public. It follows that journalistic opinion has been recorded in considerable bulk in this study, and that journalistic fonts supplied the approach to other material. Expressions of opinion were not lacking. The chief difficulty lay in selection and organization. Editorials, articles in periodicals, letters to the press, private correspondence, songs, poems, cartoons, pamphlets, books, tirades from the pulpit, charitable projects, formation of committees, demonstrations o f partisans, debates in Parliament, platform speeches, resolutions of public meetings and groups, signed petitions, circulars, memorials of deputations, etc., supplied an almost inexhaustible wealth of source material. A semblance o f order has been given to that chaos. Although this study is essentially a narration of opinion (opinions) in Britain, British policy had, perforce, to be fully treated because of the interaction of the two. Therefore, government publications, ministerial statements, memoirs and biographies o f cabinet members and their associates were carefully culled. Further, slight liberty was taken to weave into the theme evidences of the launching of Britain upon the path of the new imperialism. The limits of an introduction make it well-nigh impossible to single out the master writers, political leaders and representatives of other walks who formed, guided or mirrored public opinion. However, the author holds the hope that their dissonant trumpetings have been harmoniously assembled within the broader confines of his volume.

CHAPTER I INSURRECTION I N

HERZEGOVINA

AFFAIRS in the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire had been progressing quite smoothly for a number of years, but with the outbreak of revolt in Herzegovina early in July, 1875, the smoldering embers of discontent were soon fanned into a blaze. Disturbances first occurred in a few villages on its Dalmatian frontier, due, it was stated, to the opposition of the inhabitants to the tax-gatherers. The rebellion rapidly spread throughout all of Herzegovina and into the neighboring district of Bosnia proper, which by the latter part of August was as well in full revolt. Herzegovina was the southern section of the province of Bosnia and lay to the north of Montenegro. Bosnia, the most northwesterly province of the Turkish empire in Europe, also contained the districts of Bosnia proper and Turkish Croatia. T o the northwest and north of it lay the Austrian provinces of Croatia and Slavonia; to the east, Serbia; to the west, Austrian Dalmatia, cutting Bosnia off from the Adriatic. The sandjak of Novi-bazar to the southeast linked Bosnia with Turkish Albania. The populations of those districts were thus encircled by territories inhabited in the main by Slavic peoples, sympathetic to their aspirations for freedom, kindred to them in blood, speaking closely related dialects, cherishing common historical traditions, and united even more closely by their common hatred of the Turk. The insurgents were to draw their chief strength from those extraneous sources; and the success of the insurrection, realized from the start, was dependent solely upon the probability of aid from the sur13

14

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rounding peoples and the possibility of the future embroilment of the bordering semi-autonomous states, Montenegro and Serbia. Under the above circumstances it is not a matter of wonder that the revolt grew rapidly in its proportions, especially as the Turks made no hurried efforts to suppress it. A t the outset, England took little notice of the insurrection since in the course of the two previous decades the Christian subjects of the Porte had so frequently indulged in bootless revolt that most people declined to notice telegrams from that peculiarly disappointing quarter of Europe. A few days after the outbreak, however, news-items in telegraphic form found their way regularly into the journals. The Standard as early as July 8 reproduced in its columns a telegram from its Vienna correspondent reporting that the banner of revolt had been raised and that Turkish troops commanded by Dervish Pasha were marching against the rebels. Not until almost a week later, on the 14th, did the Times make its first mention of the uprising and that merely in the form of a single paragraph in its " Latest Intelligence" columns. Thereafter, for a month, while all the journals faithfully reproduced the bulletins coming from different sources, Vienna, Budapest, Constantinople, Ragusa, etc., and gave, sometimes in extenso, the letters of those correspondents bearing on the causes, origin and extent of the insurrection, no leading articles appeared on the subject, showing it was at the outset regarded as an unimportant affray which would soon be suppressed. In European circles the Russian and Austrian press regarded the insurrection in a somewhat more serious vein, whereas the German and French journals treated it more as a pretext for anecdote than as an incident which deserved to be watched. Sir Stafford Northcote, chancellor of the exchequer, abroad in the early autumn, could recall but a

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single reference to the matter, in the Figaro, in which the writer described the Parisians as wondering whether la Herzegovine was the name of a new ballet-dancer or of a musical instrument invented by Herz.1 During the first month of the insurrection the various European governments were apparently unconcerned. Accounts of the progress of the revolt were received by the foreign offices from their consular representatives but no diplomatic action was felt necessary. The Porte, in midJuly, had sent commissioners to investigate the uprising; these reported that the insurgents had no real grievances and merely advocated that more energetic measures be taken to suppress them. On August 2 the sultan issued an imperial hatt pointing toward administrative reform in the empire.2 However, a feeling of uneasiness was becoming manifest in diplomatic circles. Press accounts had become more grave and reported growing excitement among the neighboring Slavic peoples. Subscriptions were being raised in the Austrian provinces of Dalmatia and Croatia. Agitators and volunteers from Montenegro and Serbia were crossing the borders and joining the insurgents. A tale that the Turks intended to extirpate all Christians added to the bitterness in Herzegovina. Slavonian papers of Dalmatia were demanding Austrian interference on behalf of their co-religionists. A proclamation was being circulated recommending that the rebellion be protracted as long as possible to force Serbia and Montenegro to interfere. As the agitation increased the revolt grew in proportions and the Powers could no longer remain entirely inactive. The Sublime Porte, which previously in soothing messages had characterized the insurrection as a mere riot of 1

Andrew Lang, Life, Letters, and Diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote, First Earl of Iddesleigh (London, 1891), pp. 284-85. 3

Standard, Aug. 5, 1875, has text.

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local dimensions and had twice announced its suppression, now admitted for the first time, on August 10, that the revolt had a somewhat serious aspect by asking the English government, through its ambassador in London, Musurus Pasha, to urge Austria " to take serious and efficacious measures upon its frontiers " in order to facilitate the quelling of the insurrection.* As the result of that appeal the English government gave official heed to the revolt, instructing its minister at Vienna to represent to the Austrian cabinet that Her Majesty's Government would be glad to learn that steps had been taken " to secure the peace of the frontier, and to prevent the disturbances in Herzegovina from receiving support or encouragement from Austrian territory." * A similar despatch was sent to Belgrade. On the same day, August 12, the British ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, was directed to advise the Turks to " rely on their own resources to suppress the insurrection." They should "deal with it as a local outbreak of disorder rather than give international importance to it by appealing to other Powers." 8 From those initial despatches it is evident that the British government desired the suppression of the revolt as rapidly as possible, and that it was hopeful none of the other Powers would feel forced to intervene. Its hopes were soon to be rudely shattered. Austria, because of the disturbances on her frontiers and her own huge Slav population, was naturally the most interested of the Powers and was anxious that tranquility be restored in Herzegovina. It was becoming evident that Turkish procrastination had permitted the revolt to assume serious proportions and Count Andrassy, minister for foreign affairs, felt called upon to tender counsel to the Porte. 8

House of Lords, Journals of the, 1876, vol. cviii, Turkey # 2, no. 11. *Ibid., Turkey #2, no. 12. 6 Ibid., Turkey #2, no. 13.

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T h e Russian and German governments declared their willingness to give their " warmest support " to his counsels. 4 W i t h the diplomatists and governments finally showing some signs of activity, the Times of August 14 blossomed forth with its first leading article on the subject of the insurrection. Its tone, thoroughly anti-Turkish, foreshadowed the future stand of the " Thunderer." T h e article summarized the events since the outbreak of the revolt and expressed deep sympathy with the insurgents, the victims of " Moslem rapacity." Still, peace in the east of Europe was valued as " immeasurably g r e a t e r " than the welfare of Herzegovina. T h e insurgents would do well, therefore, " to lay down their arms, and trust even to the Turks, tempered as their severities will be by the interference of the Christian States." T h e other London journals soon followed the Times in devoting leading articles to Herzegovina. T h e Standard, a Conservative party organ, loyal to the interests of Disraeli, stated views different from those given in the Times. In commenting sarcastically upon the make-up of the insurgent bands, the Standard pictured them as " burning and plundering defenceless villages, slaying the peaceful Mussulman inhabitants, and, after their usual civilized custom, mutilating the dead." 7 It echoed the opinion of the government in hoping the cabinet would not be induced to adopt any course which might hamper the action of the Porte, although it considered that the government had the " right to offer advice " to the sultan. O n the suggestion of Count Andrassy the ambassadors of the three northern Powers, Russia, Austria and Germany, had long interviews with the grand vizier on the 18th, 6

Times, Aug. 13, 1875, " Latest Intelligence," Vienna.

Standard, Aug. 17, 1875. James Johnstone was proprietor of the Standard and James Johnstone, junior, was its editor. 7

18

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counseling the despatch of an imperial commissioner to the insurgents, furnished with full powers to examine and, if necessary, redress their grievances. At the same time the Powers proposed that they give instructions to their consuls in Bosnia to make known to the insurgents by every possible means that they must not expect any aid or intervention on their behalf from the Powers, or from Serbia and Montenegro. The Porte expressed the wish that England join with the other Powers and Lord Derby reluctantly authorized Sir Henry Elliot, on the 24th, to act in concert with the other ambassadors.* Disraeli, at Weston on that day, had wired Derby there was no alternative but added, " I don't like it." 8 France and Italy joined as well, and on the representation of the six Powers acting in concert the Porte accepted this scheme of consular mediation but could not be induced to suspend hostilities unless the insurgents first laid down their arms. This action of the Powers was not termed intervention, merely modified mediation, in the language of diplomacy. In the meantime in the latter part of August various changes had occurred which augured ill for the success of the project. The revolt had assumed more formidable dimensions, having spread over all of Bosnia. The rebels had occupied the defiles of Novi-bazar and thereby cut off the only land route of attack from the south. In addition the roads from Suttorina and Klek, 10 ports on the Adriatic giving access to Herzegovina, were being blocked, rendering 8

House of Lords, Journals of the, 1876, vol. cviii, Turkey #2, no. 16. • George Earle Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield (London, 1920), vol. vi, p. 12. Hereafter the volume number will no longer be cited, as vol. vi was alone of value for reference. 10 Suttorina and Klek were both Austrian ports as Austria controlled the Dalmatian coast. The land behind them was known as the Turkish enclave. Austria permitted the disembarkation of Turkish troops at Klek for a time, but Suttorina was kept closed.

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the sending of Turkish reinforcements extremely difficult. A s the result of elections in Serbia, a new ministry under Ristich supported by the Young Serb party, extremely sympathetic to the insurgents, had been formed and Serbia assumed a warlike attitude. A t Constantinople a new grand vizier, Mahmoud Pasha, a Turk of the old school and hostile to the insurgents, was appointed. He felt that the revolt should be suppressed before reforms could be discussed and opposed any interference by the Powers. Turkish finances were, however, in such a lamentable shape that reinforcements could not be sent to the scene of the insurrection. Turkish bonds were steadily dropping on the European exchanges during those weeks, foreshadowing the complete collapse of Turkish finances early in October. Under those circumstances and with the encouragement of Slavic, Russian, and a few English journals, it is not strange that the insurgents refused to lay down their arms and submit to the tender justice of Server Pasha, the Ottoman commissioner. The press prognosticated the failure of consular mediation before the commission ever arrived in Herzegovina. Shortly before mid-September the consuls made their way to Mostar, its capital, where they invited the insurgent chiefs to meet them. They were met by a refusal, whereupon the commission divided into two groups and went to meet the insurgents. All attempts to influence the rebels to lay down their arms were ineffectual. The insurgents placed no faith in Turkish promises and refused to stop fighting until the Powers should guarantee the granting of certain reforms. The English consul, Holmes, returned to Mostar on the 22d and in a despatch of the 24th acknowledged the lack of success of the mission. 11 The other consuls reported to their ambassadors in a similar vein. Consular mediation had proven a complete failure. 11

House of Lords, Journals of the, 1876, vol. cviii, Turkey #2, no. 28.

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W i t h diplomacy active in an endeavor to bring the insurrection to a rapid end, lest complications result, and counseling the Porte to remedy its evils of administration, the London press devoted considerable space to the task of roundly lecturing the Turks. T h e Daily News, a Liberal journal, was sympathetic to the insurgents and stated firmly that the Turkish government must be made to understand that it had to apply itself in earnest " to reform a system of administration which has become intolerable." 12 The Economist, highly regarded commercial and financial weekly, felt, however, that sympathy for the insurgents should be qualified with a cautious distrust as the character of the Christian rayah inspired no more confidence than that of the Turk. 1 8 T h e Times, from the start, took up the cudgel against the Turks, denouncing them in scathing articles. A s its solution, it repeatedly advocated throughout the latter part of A u g u s t and September the granting of autonomy to the insurgent districts. It felt that Server Pasha, if empowered to make the best settlement possible, should " readily consent " to the transformation of Bosnia into a tributary principality as " the self-government of the Herzegovina and of Bosnia is a thing that must come," and ventured to state that it would be " a great relief to the Porte and an advantage to Europe " if that were at once arranged. In concluding that article in which it first put forth those views, it asks " who can doubt that the best solution of the Turkish difficulty is to be found in the gradual breaking off of Province after Province from the dead hand of Constantin o p l e ? " 1 4 The Moscow Vedomosti decided it followed inevitably from the arguments employed by the Times that 12

Daily News, Aug. 21, 1875.

18

Economist, Aug. 21, 1875.

14

Times, Aug. 23, 1875.

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the Powers should act in concert at this present period of unprecedented harmony to introduce a more solid and stable state of things in European Turkey, and considered decentralization with the granting of local autonomy to the Christian subjects to be the remedy.18 The Times thereupon commented very favorably on the opinions expressed in the Vedomosti.18 The Standard, though not outspoken in its antagonism to consular mediation since the English government had given its support, was nevertheless cool toward the project, terming intervention an " ugly word " and seeing in the plan only the " influence of the three great military empires." It took the occasion to warn in particular against the danger to British interests in India if Russia were supreme on the Bosphorus and visualized that England, in that event, would not only be forced to possess Egypt but would " be obliged to conquer Asiatic Turkey also, in order to prevent Russia from doing so." 17 The stand of the Times brought forth a renowned champion of the cause of the rayahs in the person of the octogenarian Earl Russell, who, in a letter to its editor, professed himself " ready to subscribe £50 " on behalf of the insurgents against Turkish misrule.18 The Observer, Tory in its principles, regretted that an ex-premier and foreign minister should take it upon himself to write " so ill-advised, mischievous a letter " as it would certainly create a false impression abroad. It remarked that Lord Russell's inordinate love of letter writing had always been his besetting sin and seemed to have so grown upon him with increasing 15

Times, Aug. 26, 1875, contains the extract in a lengthy telegram from its Prussian correspondent in Berlin. 10 Issue of Aug. 26, 1875. " Standard, Aug. 26, 1875. 18

Letter to the Times dated Aug. 27, in its issue of Aug. 28, 1873.

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years that the Observer questioned " whether it would not be practically safer, on the whole, to trust him with the command of the Channel fleet than to leave him alone for ten minutes with unlimited control of paper and ink." 19 The Times itself considered the offer to subscribe to a fund a " little hasty." 20 The opinions of various law officers of the crown were cited by the Pall Mall Gazette to show that such subscriptions were inconsistent with neutrality and forbidden by international law.21 The Standard considered sympathy for " dirty, brutal savages " whose real objects were " plunder and murder," with cattle-lifting an " especially favourite amusement," as rather misplaced.22 Despite the unfavorable comments of the press, a committee, organized by J. Lewis Farley, late a consul to Turkey, was soon formed in response to Lord Russell's appeal. It called the first conference of " Friends of the suffering Rayahs of Bosnia and Herzegovina," which was held in the City on the 9th of September. The chair was occupied by J. J. Merriman, solicitor; among those present were the Rev. Wm. Denton, vicar of St. Bartholomews, Rev. Mr. Fothergill of St. Clement Danes, and Mr. Baxter Langley. Lord Russell could not attend but penned a second letter. The speakers spent their time in denunciations of Turkish misrule over their Christian subjects. Although the Times had come in for its share of praise for enlightening the public, in its leading article of the following morning it questioned the utility of the display. Nor was it impressed by the achievements of the committee which had succeeded in opening up communications, not with the insurgents themselves, but with persons of distinc19

Observer, Aug. 29, 1875.

20

Times, Aug. 30, 1875.

Edward Dicey was its editor.

21

Pall Mall Gaeette, Aug. 31, 1875.

22

Standard, Sept. 6, 1875.

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tion in Belgrade and with the Ladies' committee in Ragusa, near the seat of the outbreak. T h e Times also doubted whether the conditions of effective intervention by England in the case of Herzegovina would be advanced by the demand of an ex-prime minister that Thessaly and Albania should be added to the kingdom of Greece, or by the prediction of his admirer that the day was not far distant when the crescent would disappear from the minarets of St. Sophia. T h e Glasgow News considered Lord Russell's proposal virtually to abolish the Ottoman Empire as " unpardonable," 23 and the Globe suggested " that the painful operation ought to be deferred until its proposed subject is really defunct." 24 T h e Standard felt that nothing had happened during the past twenty years to make it less desirable to maintain the independence and integrity of Turkey than when England went to war under Lord Russell's auspices, stating flatly that the true policy for England was to leave Turkey alone: " to spare her both our sympathy and our counsel." 25 W i t h the failure of consular mediation recognized, the English government fell back on the principle of nonintervention and permitted the three northern Powers to confer among themselves. A t the moment they, however, were not inclined to resort to further interference. Both the German and Russian chancellors disavowed the further pursuit of an active policy through official organs. In an article in the Imperial Gazette,29 the German foreign office stated its concern in the Herzegovina affair was only to the extent of " supporting the wishes of the friendly Powers directly interested in the matter." 27 Its Russian comple23

Glasgow News, S e p t 11, 1875.

24

Globe, Sept. 10, 1875.

25

Standard, Sept. 11, 1875.

24

Deutscher Reichsanseiger

27

Times, Sept. 24, 1875, " Latest Intelligence," Berlin.

und Königlich

Preussischer

Staatsanzeiger.

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ment appeared within a week. Foreign cabinets " should abstain from any ostensible diplomatic pressure." " They could thus prove their confidence in the intentions of the sultan who had decided to inaugurate reforms. The foreign journals which had been urging intervention were rebuked. In England, the Times came in for its share of criticism both official and at the hands of the Conservative press. In a letter to Lady Bradford, Disraeli wrote: " Ct. Andrassy says that, had it not been for The Times leaders, Herz. wd. have been settled." 29 He continued that the insurgents felt they indicated the English policy but remarked himself that they indicated the policy of " stock-jobbers and idiots." The idea of autonomy for Bosnia was " absurd." Lord Derby, in a speech at Liverpool on the 7th, expressed the same opinion in milder language. He felt the insurrection had been " grossly exaggerated " in press accounts and would soon be over. The foreign secretary humorously remarked that one of the chief difficulties of the consuls sent on the mission of conciliation had been " to find the insurgents whom they were to conciliate." 30 The Powers, it seemed, desired the speediest possible restoration of peace lest their serenity be disturbed, or the least practicable disturbance of a state of things which Europe was agreed to accept. Events were to dictate, however, that the Powers soon drop their attitude of disinterested contemplation, and in little over a month's time the three imperial governments were purported to be concocting some new scheme of intervention. For a few days in early October the press professed some slight faith in the imperial irade 31 proclaiming sweeping 28

Ibid., Sept. 30, 1875, " Latest Intelligence," St. Petersburg.

29

Buckle, op. cit., p. 13.

so Standard, Oct. 8, 1875. S1

Of Oct.

2,

1875.

Letter to Lady Bradford dated Oct. 1.

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administrative reforms to Ottoman subjects and advised that Turkey be given time to put the reforms into effect. A t that moment the Porte made the announcement that f r o m the 1st of January of the following year it would, for five years, pay the interest and the amortizement of its public debt half in cash and half in five per cent bonds.' 2 T h a t simple acknowledgment of virtual bankruptcy placed a different complexion on the entire situation and brought forth loud protests from Turkish bondholders and the press. Expressions of faith in the Ottoman promises were now singularly lacking and the T u r k s were wholeheartedly censured by the Conservative as well as by the Liberal journals. T h e Standard termed the decree an " act of dishonesty of the very worst kind," 83 and felt that it explained the slight progress made in the suppression of the Herzegovina insurrection, as the strange inactivity of the Porte was due to the " same vulgar want of cash which afflicts the shabbygenteel, out-at-elbows individual " one passes in the street. T h e partial repudiation of the Turkish debt hastened the steady drop of the previous few months of Turkish and Egyptian bonds on the European exchanges. A s the French investors suffered from the repudiation and slump almost as heavily as the English, dismay and irritation were evinced in the Parisian press as well. T h e French government proposed a note of collective protest to be sent to the Porte by the Powers, but L o r d Derby declined to be a party to the plan. Numerous crowded meetings of holders of Turkish bonds were held in the City in the latter part of October at which speeches advocating that the English government and 8 2 Announced in journals of Oct. 8 (decree of Oct. 6 ) . T h e Ottoman E m p i r e had contracted a consolidated debt, calculated, in round numbers, a t £200,000,000, involving an annual charge of £14,000,000, and it labored, besides, under the burden of a floating debt amounting to between £12 and £20,000,000. Cf. the Times, M a r c h 17, 1876.

»» Standard,

Oct. 9, 1875.

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the Powers interfere were loudly applauded. Yet the foreign secretary held to his refusal, affirming that " any support he could give them must be wholly unofficial in its character, and that no direct demand would be made upon Turkey to satisfy her English creditors." 84 The London newspapers, although generally sympathizing with the aggrieved creditors, had followed the government and frowned upon interference. The Standard felt that " intervention would be injurious to the lasting interests of the country by generating a belief that the Government would protect rash investors from the consequences of their own folly." 8 5 The Daily News was rather harsh in its views, stating that the creditors of Turkey had " no special claim of any kind upon England or France to interfere, and that being so, the rule of non-interference on behalf of lenders to foreign States is absolute." It hoped " to hear no more of the proposition." 89 During October Herzegovina was almost forgotten as leading articles, letters to the editors, and communications of foreign correspondents dealt chiefly with Turkish insolvency. Telegrams of alleged successive triumphs of Turkish troops, regularly reported from Constantinople, went unnoticed. The bondholders had had a busy month, however, and it almost seemed as if the pocketbook outweighed the suffering rayahs. Attention was again drawn to the insurrection by a remarkable article in the Official Gazette of St. Petersburg 87 of October 29, which seemed to indicate a change of front on the part of Russia and was interpreted by the English journals as meaning that Russia contemplated some form " Times, Nov. 8, 1875. 80

Standard, Oct. 21, 1875.

84

Daily News, Oct. 20, 1875.

81 The Russian title was the PraviteUstvcnnyi official organ or herald of the government.

Vestnik which was the

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of interference on behalf of the insurgents. The article voiced its deepest sympathy for them and suggested that the cabinets take steps to end the " sad condition of the Christian population of Turkey." 38 T h e tone of the editorial betrayed a wish to keep the direction of the matter wholly in the hands of the three empires. This new note, struck by the Russian official organ, brought forth veiled expressions of suspicion of Russian policy in the London journals. The Morning Post, the oldest of all London journals and ultra-Conservative, commented unfavorably on intervention by the three empires and insisted on the sacredness of treaties. 89 A few days later information came from Vienna that Count Andrassy, upon the invitation of Russia and Germany, was undertaking the elaboration of a proposal respecting the guarantees to be given for insuring the realization of the reforms promised by Turkey. 4 0 T h e Times, which for several days had wondered whether Russia intended suggesting a conference to review the Treaty of Paris and to examine the state of the Turkish Empire or merely intended verbal pressure through a note to the Porte, pointed out the obstacles in the way of either plan, and felt that the present position of Turkey eminently suggested Lord Melbourne's question: " Cannot you leave it alone?" 41 Greater interest in affairs in the East was gradually becoming manifest in England as it became evident that there was a possibility of the reopening of the Eastern Question. Parliament had been out of session for three months; ministerial utterances had been rare; no cabinet councils had been 08

A r t i c l e was published in the Times,

39

Morning

Post,

Nov.

1, 1875.

Oct. 30, 1875.

W i l l i a m H a r d m a n was its

editor but A l g e r n o n Borthwick, proprietor, dictated its policy. 40

Times,

41

Issue of N o v . 5, 1875.

N o v . 5, 187s, " Latest Intelligence " columns.

titular

28

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

held during that time, Lord Derby and the prime minister having jointly conducted foreign affairs without having felt the urgency of cabinet assistance. Despite the apparent calm, there was note of uneasiness in the press and English interests in the East were receiving a seemingly disproportionate amount of newspaper space. The Prince of Wales, who early in October had left England for a prolonged visit to Egypt and India, was naturally eagerly followed. His trip drew considerable comment and directed attention to those lands. The state of Turkish finances and the insurrection as well were constantly elaborated upon, possibly due to the dullness of the times, but the greater interest seemed focused on the attitudes of the various Powers toward each other, and in particular on conjectures as to what their stands would be in the event of the reopening of the Eastern Question. A subdued air of anxiety, of disquiet, pervaded the political horizon, sensed and fostered by the press. Constant fears were expressed that any disturbance of the state of affairs in the east of Europe would lead to international complications and trouble. Disraeli, in his Guildhall speech on Lord Mayor's Day, the 9th of November, echoed none of those fears, yet he uttered a word of warning to the three northern Powers in briefly touching upon conditions in European Turkey. Admitting that the interests which the imperial Powers had in the question were no doubt " more direct" than those of Great Britain, he warned that they were " not more considerable " and assured the nation that the cabinet was " deeply conscious of the nature and magnitude of those British interests " which they were " resolved to guard and maintain." 42 The speech was well received, being termed " moderate," " judicious," and " reassuring," by various London journals. The shafts directed against it by the 42

Times, Nov. io, 1875, contains speech.

INSURRECTION

IN

HERZEGOVINA

29

Liberal press lacked sting and can be attributed solely to party bias. Following the original announcement of early November that the imperial Powers were concerting a plan to bring about effectual reform in Turkey, little was heard of its progress for over a month. An almost complete lull occurred in diplomatic agitation. News from Constantinople was scarce except for almost daily notices of a rapid and perplexing shuffling of cabinet portfolios with individual pashas repeatedly bobbing up in different posts. The English press devoted its attention to elaborating on the interests of Britain of which the cabinet was so "deeply conscious," and as if by intuition, considerable solicitude was evinced for Egypt and the Suez Canal. In reply to some English papers pointing out the importance of Egypt in the pending questions of the East, the Moscow Vedomosti begged to ask whether " Russia, Austria, Italy, France, Greece, and Spain, surrounding as they do the Mediterranean, have not a right, too, to vindicate their interests on the Nile." 43 The Times felt rather hurt and considered suspicion of English motives as uncalled for, deploring the old habit of others of believing that England always had a selfish end in view, the fact being " that no country is less swayed by selfish motives." 44 T w o mornings later the editor of the Times, Delane, was the first to make the startling announcement that the " British Government has bought from the Khedive shares of the Suez Canal to the amount of £4,000,000 sterling, and the Egyptian Government is authorized to draw on Messrs. Rothschild at sight for the amount." 45 Delane, as noted in his diary, had received the news on the previous day, 43

E x t r a c t cited by the Prussian correspondent of the Times

issue of N o v . 23, 1875. 44

Times,

«Ibid.,

N o v . 24, 1875. Nov. 26, 1875.

in its

BRITAIN

3°

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

probably from New Court, and its early publication was his last great journalistic scoop." Disraeli, elated over the coup, had made it known to the Queen and then romantically scribbled a note to Lady Bradford on the 25th informing her of the important secret.47 The audacity of the act was generally accredited to the skilled hand of the prime minister who could well, although admittedly egotistically, say to Lady Bradford, " I " have purchased for England the khedive of Egypt's interest in the Suez Canal.48 That some doubts had been expressed by members of the cabinet as to the appropriateness of the purchase is evident from a letter to Disraeli from the chancellor of the exchequer, who wrote on the day of its announcement that the English procedure had not been one to gain her much credit for magnanimity as she had blocked the Suez project from the start. Northcote feared that suspicion would be excited that England meant quietly to buy herself into a preponderating position and then turn the whole thing into an English property.4® The English press and the public greeted the purchase with unanimous approval and enthusiasm. The Times, Daily Telegraph and Pall Mall Gazette, all expressed admiring surprise and approbation. Even the Daily News, invariably critical of any decision of the government, termed it a " bold and timely act." 50 For several days the London journals devoted their time to refuting criticisms of the foreign press. They naturally stressed the nobler motive 4 8 Sir Edward Tyas Cook, Delane of "The p. 252.

Times"

(London, 1915),

" Marquis of Zetland, The Letters of Disraeli to Lady and Lady Bradford ( N e w York, 1929), vol. i, p. 400. «Ibid. 48

Lang, op. cit., pp. 274-75.

80

Daily News, Nov. 27, 1875.

Chesterfield

INSURRECTION

IN

HERZEGOVINA

31

back of the transaction and reassured foreign critics that England desired no change in the status of Egypt. The Times struck a particularly noble chord in disclaiming any selfish motive on the part of England, — " We have no desire for an extension of territory; we do not covet the land of the Nile, even with the magnificent extension into unknown regions which it has acquired through the courage and endurance of British travellers,"—and trusted the effect would be " to arrest the financial mismanagement of the Province, to introduce order and economy, to husband its resources, and to elevate its submissive and oppressed population." 61 It naively stated there could be no ground whatever for any feeling of resentment as " the shares belonged to the Khédive; he offered them for sale, and they found a buyer. He might have sold them to any other European Government, and we should have had no right to complain." 82 In France the deal produced a kind of melancholy admiration. The Parisian press was rather cool in its attitude but vented its annoyance chiefly on Decazes, the French minister for foreign affairs, for having permitted England to steal a march on France. The Journal des Débats did not let Britain off so easily. In an article written by John Lemoinne, inveterate and scathing critic of England, although English by birth, he sarcastically remarked : " If they think they will make the world in general believe that they are buying shares and not conquering territory, they place too much credit on public credulity." 53 The Times countered with : So far from employing the Canal for selfishly political purposes, we are the only nation which can be absolutely trusted to 81

Times, Nov. 26, 1875.

62

Ibid., Nov. 27, 1875.

63

Journal des Débats, Nov. 28, 1875.

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

prevent such a misuse of an international highway. No party in this country—Tory, Liberal, or Radical—has the slightest intention or wish to add Egypt to our overgrown dominions. The House of Commons has set its face against nothing more than conquest.64 The Daily Telegraph felt no anxiety about the judgment of foreign journals and considered that " enough is known when England is convinced that the policy was wise and legitimate; and enough is said when English public opinion applauds and endorses that policy." " A s a matter of fact the foreign press as a whole expressed but little actual hostility to the purchase. It voiced more envy than anything else and was decidedly complimentary to Disraeli for having carried through such a splendid coup. The foreign press sensed also that England, under Disraeli, intended displaying resolution in foreign and imperial affairs in the future, and meant no longer to be flagrantly disregarded in settling European problems. The Suez Canal purchase marked the brilliant reappearance of England on the stage of foreign politics. " Times, Dec. 2, 1875. 55 Daily Telegraph, Nov. 29, 1875. policy.

Edwin Arnold directed its editorial

CHAPTER

II

T H E CONCERT OF POWERS

CONSULAR mediation had been entirely unsuccessful in effecting its aims. Within three months from the outbreak of the insurrection the Turkish government had found itself compelled to publish a disastrous confession of weakness. N o other occurrence had done so much to create a belief in the early disruption of the Ottoman Empire, and an immediate result had been the revival of the hopes and activity of the insurgents in Herzegovina. A f t e r five months the revolt was still unsubdued and it seemed evident that the prolongation of the struggle would involve the Turks in constantly new embarrassments. T h e Turkish repudiation and the Suez episode had been primarily dwelt upon in the columns of the press in October and November and practically nothing had been heard of the scheme of reforms to be presented to the Porte, which Count Andrassy, on behalf of the imperial governments, was said to be drawing up as necessary for the pacification of the disturbed districts. Protracted negotiations finally resulted in agreement and in mid-December it was known that the note would shortly make the rounds of the chief European cabinets f o r their assent to the plan. Doubts were expressed in some quarters as to whether the Turks would accept the program of the Powers. It was feared that the Porte would reject the forthcoming note, justifying its course by referring the foreign governments to the firman of the sultan ordering the execution of judicial and administrative reforms, which was promulgated in midDecember. 1 T h e publication of the firman, containing only 1

Firman of Dec. 12, 1875. 33

34

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

general provisions and vague promises, did not, however, deter the military monarchies; and the Andrassy Note,2 finally completed late in December, was sent to Rome, Paris and London for approval. The note was communicated to the British government on January 3. Italy and France gave their unreserved concurrence almost immediately but a period of two weeks passed before the English cabinet gave its grudging acceptance. The English government clearly did not want to intervene but was drawn in by the action of the three empires. The contents of the note had been kept secret, but certain English journals, before adherence was made known, found bases for criticism on the grounds that the note constituted unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of a friendly nation, and as well because the imperial chanceries had deliberately gone ahead with its preparation without consulting the western Powers and had then merely invited them to give their accord. Such assumption of leadership in Eastern affairs was resented. On the other hand, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the English ambassador at Constantinople during the Crimean period, deplored the possible inaction of England and went so far as to suggest that the six Powers in conference should place Turkey under their tutelage.® His proposal met with little commendation at the time. The Manchester Examiner considered the central idea of Redcliffe's project to be " effete " and deprecated the idea of the other three Powers joining the three empires at council.4 The Daily Telegraph supported the Andrassy Note and in friendly approbation of Austria as " the near and constant ally of England " felt 2

Dated Budapest, Dec. 30, 1875.

3

Letter to the Times in issue of Jan. 3, 1876.

* Manchester Examiner, Jan. 4, 1876.

Henry Dunckley was its editor.

THE CONCERT

OF

POWERS

35

that she " could not wish the question in better hands." • The Times had urged acceptance and therefore voiced its approval in announcing that the cabinet, on the 18th, had resolved to give a " general support" to Count Andrassy's note.' The following day it found it " difficult to conceive how so reasonable and moderate a course could ever have been doubtful." British Liberal journals generally stated that the cabinet had acted wisely; the Conservative press, not too enthusiastically, followed the lead of the government and merely acquiesced in adherence to the note. Several exceptions might be cited. The Pall Mall Gazette, ordinarily Liberal, objected to the proposals as leading to armed intervention/ The Morning Post, staunchly Conservative, denounced the action of the cabinet as abandoning England's " safe and insular position " and entering " on the lines of intervention at the tail of the Holy Alliance." Had England rejected the note, France and Italy would have followed its lead. The cabinet should have " stood forth as the defenders of the good faith of treaties," its position would have been unassailable, and " the concocters of this cunningly-devised torpedo would have been hoist with their own petard." The Morning Post felt that nothing would come of the note, but acceptance could only land England in a series of difficulties, the one great danger consisting in England's assisting " by even an unwilling puff, in raising up the little cloud, no bigger than this Note, which may develop into the stormy and angry proportions of the Eastern Question." 8 The Economist, edited and owned by Walter Bagehot, well-known political economist, considered that if Turkey were doomed to collapse it would be better to permit her to " break up in a natural way — that there should be 8 7

Daily Telegraph, Jan. 4, 1876. Pall Mall Gazette, Jan. 19, 1876.

4 8

Times, Jan. 19, 1876. Morning Post, Jan. 19, 1876.

36

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

the usual struggle to see which party, which race, which religion is the stronger, so that a new system may emerge which is likely to last, because it has been settled by real internal forces." It therefore deprecated foreign interference as creating " an infinite series of shifting substitutes." " Disraeli had hesitated in giving his assent to the plan and penned his objections to Lord Derby, which were overcome by the direct request of the Porte that England join with the other Powers in presenting the note. 10 T h e E n g lish cabinet did make certain reservations as to the details of the project in giving its support and also reserved to itself full liberty of action in case the proposals were not carried out. Five points of reform were stressed by the Powers in the note. They recommended:—the granting of full religious liberty; the abolition of the farming of the taxes; a law which should guarantee that the product of the direct contributions of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be employed in the interest of the province itself; the institution of a special commission composed of an equal number of Mussulmans and Christians to supervise the execution of the reforms; and, finally, an improvement of the position of the rural population. 11 Disraeli had particularly stressed the necessity of agrarian reforms in bettering the conditions of the Bosnian peasants. 12 It is also of significance that the Andrassy Note 9

Economist,

Jan. 22, 1876.

10

Buckle, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

T h e full text of the A n d r a s s y K o t e first appeared in the Kölnische Zeitung and w a s reprinted in the Times, Feb. 5, 1876. T h e Vienna Abendpost of Feb. 7 published the official version. S i r E d w a r d Hertslet, 11

The Map of Europe by Treaty 2418-2429, has the full text.

since

1814

(London, 1909), vol. iv, pp.

1 J F o r an interesting description of agricultural conditions in Bosnia, see the memorandum of the superior of the Trappist monastery located there, published in Catholic Opinion, Feb. 9, 1876.

THE

CONCERT

OF POWERS

37

contained no demands of guarantees nor any mention of further collective action in the event that the reform program was not carried through by the Porte or failed in its object of pacifying the insurgents. The ambassadors of the Powers communicated the contents of the note to Rachid Pasha, Turkish minister for foreign affairs, on January 31. T h e informal assent of the Porte was given on February 6 but a few days' delay occurred before the sultan could sign acceptance on the n t h as he was slightly indisposed. Four of the five points were accepted without change but a customary slight modification was made; namely, in the article dealing with the taxes to be used for public improvements. A new irade, granting the reforms proposed in the note, was signed by the sultan on February 13 and communicated to the insurgents in Bosnia. In the meantime Parliament was again in session. Queen Victoria for the first time in several years, despite the miserable weather and bleak winds, opened Parliament in person on the 8th. The acts of the government were briefly reviewed in the Address from the Throne. Lord Derby in the Upper and Disraeli in the Lower House defended the course of the government in not standing " aloof " in the case of the Andrassy Note, stressing, however, that England would be free in regard to all future steps. The Liberal leaders, Lords Granville and Hartington, in touching on the subject of the note, offered no censure in their speeches. Though not loquacious, Gladstone spoke also of Turkey and the oppressed Christians. H e heartily approved of the cabinet's adhesion to the Austrian note and stressed the question of reforms, remarking: It is not possible to go on with a mere repetition of promises. Europe, the Christian conscience, and the conscience of mankind will expect some other sort of security for the redress of

38

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

great and dreadful grievances than mere words can afford; and however desirous we may be to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, that integrity and independence never can be effectually maintained unless it can be proved to the world—and proved not by words, but by acts—that the Government of Turkey has the power to administer a fair measure of justice to all its subjects alike, whether Christian or Mahomedan. 13 Northcote remembered Disraeli's wondering " what he meant by his rather curious speech, which at the moment seemed somewhat uncalled f o r , " but felt it worth looking back to as containing the germ of much that Gladstone later said. 14 N o criticisms of the policy of the government were thus made by the Opposition in Parliament at the opening of the session. T h e British journals as a whole had been surprised at the mildness and moderation of the language of the Andrassy Note and from their tone it was evident that they expected little to come of it. Even the Morning Post termed it a " weak and halting " instrument." T h e Scotsman doubted that the imperial governments themselves had " faith in the success of their plan." 16 Y e t they all advocated that Turkey be given sufficient time to give effect to her new engagements and pointed out that Austria and Russia, if sincere, must exert their influence on the border populations to insure the success of pacification. F r o m mid-February until early in April there was a dearth of news from Herzegovina that was not contradictory and few leading articles appeared on the subject. The ia

Times, Feb. 9, 1876, contains the speech.

Lang, op. cit., p. 285. Sir Stafford drew up " Some Notes on the Foreign Policy of the late Government" shortly after leaving office in 1880, of which memorandum Lang makes use. 14

15

Morning Post, Feb. 7, 1876.

18

Scotsman, Feb. 7, 1876.

THE

CONCERT

OF

POWERS

39

Porte, on February 22, granted a general amnesty to the insurgents and refugees who would return to their homes within four weeks, placarding Bosnia and Herzegovina with that proclamation and with the irade of reforms. The insurgents merely posted them over with death's heads and continued fighting, reporting several victories. Their chiefs published a manifesto refusing the Turkish concessions as illusory and demanded complete liberty. General Rodich, governor of Austrian Dalmatia, met with little success in a series of conferences with the rebel leaders throughout March. The schemes of pacification were failing before the obstinacy of the insurgents. Negotiations for an armistice were, however, reported to be progressing, and one was finally arranged to last from the 1st to the 12th of April. General Rodich continued his conferences with the insurgent chiefs and the Turkish officials, the former demanding the complete withdrawal of Ottoman troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the latter merely restating that the rebels must rely on the promises of the Porte, admitting no other guarantees. The insurgent demands were such as to be considered " inadmissable" by the English and Austrian governments also." The temporary truce was not prolonged and Rodich's mission of pacification ended only in increased suspicion and hostility on the part of the combatants. With the advent of spring, reports of more serious fighting again appeared in the press bulletins. Late fall and winter had seen only intermittent guerilla warfare and infrequent raids on the part of the insurgents entrenched in the mountains. The Serbs and particularly the Montenegrins were becoming restless and assuming a warlike attitude once more despite the remonstrances of the Powers. The Turkish government could no longer pay its bond17

Duke of Argyll, The Eastern Question (London, 1879), vol. i, p. 180.

BRITAIN

AND

THE BALKAN

CRISIS

holders what it had promised them in October last and defaulted completely in its payments due on April i . In making a recent loan the Porte had been forced to pay as high as 24 per cent interest. Its treasury was so empty that the Ottoman Bank requested that salaries of Ottoman diplomatists abroad be suspended. Turkey owed back salaries to most of its lower officials as well. T h e Times could but wonder whether mulcting its creditors or its own officials was the more fatal policy. 1 * With Turkey seemingly unable to suppress even a minor outbreak and her financial difficulties increasing, it is small wonder that the Serbs and Montenegrins were beginning to feel the moment an opportune one to come to the aid of their kinsmen. Incidentally, the Serbs might strike off their own last chains of fealty to the sultan. T h e Russian Slavophil organs, such as the Moscow Vedomosti, the Golos and Russki Mir of St. Petersburg, again changed their tone and abandoned the hope of reforms being carried through with Turkish troops in Herzegovina and the Porte penniless. They became more outspoken in their sympathy for the insurgents, now urging the necessity of peaceful intervention by the European Powers on behalf of the Christian population. That encouragement tended also to give to the insurrection an obstinate vitality. The English dailies had concerned themselves but little with events in the Balkans of the last few months except for occasional tirades against the utter faithlessness of the Turks, as on the announcement of their default in payments due on the April coupons, and constant repetition of the idea that the revolt would long before have been suppressed had it not been for aid and encouragement from extraneous sources. In certain quarters the whole Turkish imbroglio was considered due to a distinct and deliberate design on 18

Times, March 22, 1876.

THE

CONCERT

OF

POWERS

41

the part of the three empires to reopen the Eastern Question and settle it in their own interests. The Morning Post and Standard never varied in that fixed opinion, merely presenting it in seemingly unlimited forms. The Herzegovina sympathizers were comparatively inactive. A Bosnian and Herzegovinian Fugitives and Orphans Relief Fund under the patronage of the archbishops of Canterbury and Y o r k and the earl of Shaftesbury was organized in late February and asked for subscriptions. Merely one meeting of any importance was held, in the Free Trade Hall at Manchester on the last day of March, to which Earl Russell wrote a letter announcing another £50 in support of the insurgents. T h e bishop of Manchester, Dr. Fraser, joined Russell in denouncing the Turk. A single resolution calling for the practical sympathy of the people of England was passed. With Parliament in session, the journals dwelt upon the debates held at Westminster on the Suez Canal Purchase Bill and in particular on the Royal Titles Bill in which the public showed an unusual interest. Bitter attacks were made in Parliament and by the press on the appropriateness of the title of Empress, which Victoria favored. Disraeli had introduced the bill merely to gratify a personal wish of his Sovereign and succeeded in having it passed only after long debates and considerable agitation. A slight flurry of hostility to Russia occurred in late March following the belated announcement of the imperial government that it had been forced to annex Khokand in Central Asia. Disraeli took advantage of the occasion to hint an additional reason for the pertinency of the new title as constituting a defense against the Russian advance on India.18 Certain Conservative journals took it up as almost 19 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, vol. ccxxviii (third series), pp. 500-501. Third reading of Royal Titles Bill, March 23.

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

a challenge to Russia, whereas the Liberal press sarcastically termed the prime minister's actually rather harmlesssounding statement as rhetorical exaggeration. Curiously enough the Saturday Review, generally Conservative, derisively dubbed the task of the ministry as consisting in " finding very bad reasons for a very bad measure." 20 A s a matter of fact, there was little objection to granting Victoria an added title but most people preferred that it be " Queen of India." The term " Empress " was felt to convey a set of ideas alien to English history and traditions. Attention was again drawn rather sharply to the insurrection and threatened complications, in late April, with the acknowledgment of the Powers that the Andrassy Note had failed to produce the slightest effect by way of pacification or reform. The Times finally dismissed the note as " a memorial of good intentions." 21 True, nothing much had been expected of it as, on appearance, it had been thought too long delayed and had contained no means for the Powers to force their will on either the Porte or the insurgents. Still, acknowledged failure brought disquietude and rumors in its train. The imperial governments were discomfited and it was realized that they could not under the present circumstances merely retire and let the combatants settle their controversy among themselves, even though England seemed to desire just that. The Conservative newspapers in discussing the future policy to be pursued were already decrying possible further intervention. Delay would undoubtedly increase the difficulty of a merely diplomatic settlement as events were moving on more quickly than diplomacy. Serbia and Montenegro were still not desirous of open war, fearing that Turkish resources were not yet sufficiently exhausted and 10

Saturday Review,

21

Times, April 18, 1876.

March 25, 1876.

Philip Harwood was its editor.

THE

CONCERT

OF

POWERS

43

preferring the continuance of unacknowledged yet effective hostilities. The patience of the Sublime Porte was, however, rapidly becoming strained and it was thought that war might be brought about by some sudden resolve on its part. The ambassadors at Constantinople thereupon cautioned the Ottoman government not to pursue any ideas of aggression. The Porte answered in a circular note of the 27th by denying any intention of war but called the attention of the Powers to the support afforded by Montenegro to the insurrection. In the meantime, rumors were in circulation that the three empires were once more making an effort to agree on more drastic proposals to be submitted to the Turks; these same rumors contained the idea that serious discord between the aims of Russia and Austria hampered agreement. The Times renewed its suggestion of six months previous that " the best way to prevent the rebellion from becoming a really great danger would be for Austria to send a sufficient force into Herzegovina " and occupy the disturbed districts until reforms were carried through.22 But, it admitted greater difficulties in the way of intervention at the present moment. The Observer, the leading Sunday journal, usually Conservative, had long opposed that suggestion as it felt that " the entrance of an army of occupation at all would be but as the ' letting out of waters.' Repressed in one part, the flame of the insurrection would only leap out afresh in another." 23 The proposal of the Times met with scant consideration in most of the influential British dailies, almost the entire press rejecting the idea of armed intervention. Agreement on the part of the three imperial courts was hastened by events of early May in Turkey. On May 6, during a riot between Christians and Mohammedans, the German and French consuls at Salonica were brutally 22

Times, April 26, 1876.

23

Observer, April 9, 1876.

44

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

murdered in a Turkish mosque by the mob. A collective demand for complete satisfaction for the outrage was immediately presented to the Porte which forthwith promised redress. Despite that, a week later found quite a fleet of foreign warships in the waters of Salonica, among them two British gunboats, the Bittern and Swiftsure. A t the same time the news seeped through that a new outbreak which might prove troublesome to suppress had occurred in the vicinity of Philippopolis in Bulgaria. The three imperial chancellors, Gortchakoff, Andrassy and Bismarck, met in Berlin and following a few brief conferences drew up a set of demands calling for fresh guarantees from the sultan. These demands were embodied in a memorandum which was signed on May 13. The object of the agreement was the pursuit of a more energetic policy with a view to pacification and the eventual protection of foreign subjects and Christians against Mussulman fanaticism. All the rumors about armed intervention were unfounded but that fact did not exclude stipulations about measures of precaution in case of certain eventualities. Its last clause contained the threat of future intervention, as, if the proposed armistice failed to bring peace, the three imperial courts were of opinion " that it would become necessary to supplement their diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement with a view to such efficacious measures as might appear to be demanded in the interest of general peace to check the evil and prevent its development." 24 This memorandum was then communicated to the other Powers. France and Italy immediately gave their complete concurrence to the decisions of the Berlin conferences and The full text of the Berlin Memorandum was first published in the journals of July 4. The despatch of Lord Odo Russell to Lord Derby enclosing the memorandum was received in London on May 15. Cf. House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, Turkey # 3 , no. 248. 24

THE

CONCERT

OF

POWERS

45

it was expected that England would probably receive and approve the memorandum as it had the Andrassy Note, leaving it then to time and experience to demonstrate its value. Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe took the occasion to reiterate his views on the subject, again suggesting the necessity of a conference of all Powers which should extend its views to the full range of the Eastern Question.25 The Berlin Memorandum upon its communication to the British government made a very unfavorable impression and but a few days' consideration was required before it was completely rejected. The hint of contemplated future " efficacious measures " was enough to bring about its rejection. No alternative course of action was proposed by the cabinet. Disraeli held strong objections to giving English assent to the memorandum, feeling its detailed proposals impracticable and injudicious. The prime minister feared that England was being drawn " step by step, into participating in a scheme, which must end very soon in the disintegration of Turkey." 26 Sir Stafford Northcote stated the government's reasons for not adhering to the memorandum as being that " it seemed to demand impossibilities, and was not in our judgment well qualified to attain its object." Sir Stafford felt at the time that some alternative proposal should be made but nothing came of his proffered scheme.27 The cabinet came to a unanimous decision not to adhere to the Berlin proposals 28 and formally notified its ambassadors abroad to that effect on the 19th. The press had sensed rejection and had prepared the public for its definite announcement in both Houses of Parliament on the 22d in answer to questions of Granville and Bruce. The London journals found no fault in the position 26

Letter to the Times in its issue of May 18, 1876.

48

Buckle, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

48

Buckle, op. cit., p. 26.

27

Lang, op. cit., pp. 285-86.

46

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

assumed by the government. The Times thought rejection was " in accordance with a foreign policy which has been praised and practised by each Party in succession," namely, that of non-intervention; and remarked that the " prevailing impulse of the country will be to approve it, and those who question it must be very ingenious if they can change the public opinion." Its leading article contained a fairly authoritative version of the demands of the memorandum which, " though Austrian in principle, is Russian in detail, and the suspicions with which a British Minister may regard it arise from the probability that the details will overmaster the principle." 29 The Pall Mall Gazette considered the project of the memorandum as either " a nullity or a snare." It would either lead to nothing at all or would carry England to a point much further than she was prepared to go and Pall Mall was therefore " satisfied with a policy of holding aloof." 4 0 The Globe employed almost identical language, believing that England could in the future " speak with all the more effect by holding aloof from ill-considered experiments and by selecting her own time for the exercise of her influence." 81 The Morning Post had nothing but praise for the cabinet's " wise and prudent discretion." 82 Not a word of criticism was voiced by the Liberal leaders in or out of Parliament at the moment. Lord Granville, in delivering a speech at the opening of the Liberal Club in the City on the 29th, offered no objections to the English rejection and on the contrary expressed as much confidence in Lord Derby as it became an opponent to avow.83 Lord Hartington, on June 9, in rising to ask for papers regarding the government's policy in the East, did not believe there existed in the country " any distrust of the proceedings of Times, May 23, 1876.

80

Pall Mall Gazette, May 23, 1876.

« Globe, May 24, 1876.

82

Morning Post, May 24, 1876.

29

85

Standard, May 30, 1876.

THE

CONCERT

OF

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47

Her Majesty's Government." 84 Gladstone maintained complete silence. It seemed that the leaders of the Opposition considered that the negative attitude was, under the present circumstances, their highest wisdom. The murder of the consuls at Salonica, rumors of foreign intervention, and uneasiness over the uprising in Bulgaria had occasioned considerable excitement in Constantinople; the ambassadors there had become apprehensive as to what might happen to the foreign residents in case of further outbreaks of fanaticism. Under those circumstances the ambassadors took the initiative, asking for protection from their respective governments. Sir Henry Elliot, as early as May 9, telegraphed Vice-Admiral Drummond, commander of the Mediterranean fleet, at Jaffa, urging him to send ships to Besika Bay. The cabinet delayed its assent to the request, but finally on May 24 gave orders to the fleet which, on the 28th, anchored in Besika Bay just outside the Dardanelles. That step was not taken by the English government alone as the other Powers acted as well. It did happen that the British fleet which was anchored in Turkish waters was considerably the biggest and it was therefore, that later, more attention was called to its having been brought up than to the others. A t the time no definite mention of the sending of the fleet to a place of vantage near Constantinople was made by the government in Parliament. The prime minister did, however, assure the Commons, just prior to the Whitsuntide recess, that " Her Majesty's Government have taken such measures of precaution as they thought were necessary to maintain the honour and the interests of this country." 35 Casual notices of the presence of the fleet at Besika Bay found their way into the telegraphic columns of the journals .M Times, June io, 1876, " Parliamentary Intelligence " columns. 88

Ibid., June 2, 1876, " Parliamentary Intelligence " columns.

48

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but elicited few comments. T h e Times first referred to the despatch of the fleet in a leading article on June 12, and avowed that it had been " prompted only by the natural desire to protect British subjects and British interests in a disturbed country." The apprehensions of the ambassadors were fulfilled in part, as on M a y 30 Sultan Abdul A z i z was deposed, chiefly through the instrumentality of the Softas, a fanatical nationalistic group in Constantinople both anti-Christian and anti-foreign, who drew their strength from the more intelligent classes, professional and student. They desired reforms from within and opposed any form of foreign interference. Murad Effendi, nephew of Abdul A z i z , was proclaimed Commander of the Faithful as Murad V , pledging himself to a constitutional government. Constantinople was to be en fête for three days and Murad immediately announced an imperial hatt containing reforms on June 1. Several days later, on the 4th, Abdul A z i z was reported to have committed suicide, the news being received with general incredulity by the foreign press. The approval of the English journals on the rejection of the Berlin Memorandum, naturally enough, turned to exultation as it became evident that the other five Powers would probably not even present the proposals to the Porte. The effect of rejection was regarded as a diplomatic triumph for England and a check to the ambitions of the three northern Powers, in particular to those of Russia. The Conservative ministry had by that spirited act shown that England must not be disregarded in the councils of Europe. The continental press represented the sending of the fleet to Besika Bay as emphasizing the rejection of the memorandum and as a demonstration meant to encourage the Porte to do likewise. Certain it is that the British government, through its silence, did nothing to dispel that interpretation.

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The Times, over a period of several weeks, criticized the program " so hastily settled at Berlin." 88 It flatly stated that " the world, on consideration, is inclined to rejoice that the proposals have not found unanimous acceptance." In its opinion, England had done the other nations a great favor as the French and Italian public had been " enlightened " by the British refusal and even Austria had been " aided " by the check on excessive Russian influence. The Times took its cue from public opinion as a month before it had proposed armed intervention by Austria " whereas it now grew wroth at the mere hint of such a step. The London press assumed an optimistic view of the change of sultans, the Conservative dailies even hailing the Softas movement as one which, if wisely directed, might inaugurate a " new era " in the Ottoman Empire. Liberal journals of the north of England, though, expressed small hopes of reform. Quite a few journals interpreted the dethronement of Abdul Aziz as an act of defiance to Russia or to the three empires, as the Softas considered that Abdul had permitted too much interference in the internal affairs of Turkey. He was also felt to have been too much under the influence of the crafty Ignatieff, Russian ambassador at Constantinople for years. The new sultan was regarded as more anti-Russian. The presentation of the Berlin Memorandum was delayed as the result of the palace revolution, leading Disraeli to express his hope that it might not be necessary " that it ever should " be brought before the Porte for consideration.38 No further information could be elicited from the ministry for a week as Parliament adjourned until the 9th for its Whitsuntide recess. 88

Times, May 26, 1876.

88

Times, June 2, 1876, " Parliamentary Intelligence " columns.

81

Supra, p. 43.

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The fore part of June saw considerable excitement in London. Gladstone, writing in September, was somewhat prone to exaggeration in stating: " The expectation of a rupture pervaded the public mind. The Russian Funds fell very heavily, under a war panic; partisans exulted in a diplomatic victory, and in the increase of what is called our prestige . . . Foreign capitals were amazed at the martial excitement in London." *• Still, there was abundant antagonism to Russia manifested in the British press, and decided exultation did follow the announcement of the definite withdrawal of the Berlin Memorandum. Tension between the two countries undoubtedly existed as Disraeli's letters show his anxiety. 40 The country at large was little affected, however, and to the writer it seemed that the press, through magnifying the incident, was largely responsible for reviving the slumbering hostility to Russia. English newspapers were not alone to blame. The PanSlav journals felt Russia balked by England and accused the English of inveterate hostility to any Russian project. London papers fanned the antagonism by viewing the Russian policy and designs with unveiled suspicion. The continental press elaborated on the growing rift between the two Powers. Numerous rumors and accusations were printed which could only tend to create ill-feeling and increase suspicion. The czar's government was charged again with encouraging Serbia and Montenegro to war, as well as with placing money and stores at the disposal of the insurgents. The English cabinet in turn was suspected of encouraging the Turks to resist the demands of the Powers and of giving orders to British ships to prevent the landing of ammunition for the heroic Herzegovinese. 88 William Ewart Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (London, 1876), pp. 39-40. 40

Cf. Buckle, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

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T h e tension rapidly eased following the announcement by the prime minister in Parliament just after Whitsun that the ministry had been notified that the Berlin Memorandum had been " withdrawn." Disraeli, with justifiable pride, could assert that England had concurred entirely with the other Powers, or rather the other Powers may be said to have concurred entirely with us; but at any rate there is complete understanding between us and the Great Powers that there should be no undue pressure put upon the new Sovereign of Turkey; that he and his counsellors should have time to mature their measures and the policy which they mean to pursue. 41 H e informed the Commons that representations were also made by the Powers to impress Serbia with the importance of a temperate conduct on her part. T h e Times congratulated the government in achieving the laying aside of the " ill-conceived and ill-drawn document." T h e Globe and Standard, Conservative organs, gloated over the diplomatic success of the ministry and over Russian isolation. The Daily Telegraph, supposedly Liberal, but at all times strong in its support of the Disraelian foreign policy, found it difficult to exaggerate the happy influence which had been exercised in the direction of international justice by the refusal of England to join in the memorandum. " History will perhaps see one of the decisive turning-points of modern civilization in this quiet and fearless act, which has re-established equity and open dealing in the Eastern Question, and restored our country to her necessary place as the champion of pacific reforms." 42 T h e government did not entirely escape party censure. Certain Radical journals found reasons for criticism. The 41

Times, June 10, 1876, " Parliamentary Intelligence " columns.

43

Journals quoted in above paragraph are issues of June 10, 1876.

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Newcastle Daily Chronicle, an influential journal in the north of England and the property of Joseph Cowen, Liberal M . P . , felt it evident that the cabinet preferred " the postponement of the final catastrophe to saying a word on behalf of the oppressed nationalities." T h e Northern Whig of Belfast, leading Liberal organ in Ulster, accused the premier of defying Russia ever since he spoke at the Mansion House in November last and feared he was pushing England to war. It had only contempt for " official braggadocio " and commented very unfavorably on the recent tone of the London journals animated as they were " with all the Russophobia of twenty-three years ago." 43 In the latter part of June the chief efforts of the cabinet were directed " to bring the influence of the Powers to bear on Servia to induce her to keep the peace." 44 From the time the insurrection in Herzegovina acquired strength Serbia had been preparing for war, yet its government had never ceased to represent its intentions as pacific. In the press accounts of the previous few months Serbia had in alternate weeks been represented as pacifically inclined and as on the verge of war. According to rumor, ratifications of a war treaty between Montenegro and Serbia had been exchanged late in May. A f t e r the laying aside of the Berlin Memorandum Russian Slavophil journals were actively employed in stirring up the Serbs. Northcote, chancellor of the exchequer, held agents of the English Liberal press also to be guilty of inciting Serbia to action. 45 T h e Spectator, one of the better weekly reviews, which seldom had a kind word for any act of the ministry and never one for the Turks, would certainly have to answer to that charge. It had from the outset championed the cause of the Christian insurgents and now desired a confederation of Christian «Ibid. «Ibid., p. 288.

" Lang, op. cit., p. 286.

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States under Prince Nikita of Montenegro. The Spectator argued that, but for Lord Derby, the insurrection tending to secure the confederation would already have broken out; " and in impeding or preventing it, Lord Derby has sacrificed the alliance of the people who, whatever he may do, must ultimately rule Turkey in Europe, — that is to say, has endangered our whole future in the East." 48 On the counsel of the British ambassador the Porte had once more proclaimed an amnesty and proposed an armistice of six weeks to permit negotiations, but the Bosnian insurgents continued to turn deaf ears to all overtures coming from Stamboul. The new Turkish reform ministry was constantly encountering fresh obstacles. As a sequel to the palace revolution and suicide of the sultan, in mid-June an assassin broke into the ministerial council and killed both the war and foreign ministers, wounding the minister of marine as well. The culprit, Hassan, was summarily hanged two mornings later. The Standard implied that Russia was responsible for the crime in order to bring discredit upon the new system in Turkey. 47 Exaggerated reports of the atrocities committed in the suppression of the Bulgarian rising in May were floating around the European capitals toward the close of June. Those tales were being used with telling effect in Serbia and Montenegro to incite the populace further against the Turks, and their military movements indicated that war was imminent. Last-minute efforts of diplomacy failed to restrain the excited and headstrong peoples and the two nations joined in an attack on Turkey. Magazinovich, the Serbian agent, had, on the 29th, presented an ultimatum to the Porte in the form of an autograph letter of Prince Milan, addressed to the grand vizier, 44 Spectator, June 17, 1876. Meredith W . Townsend and Richard H. Hutton were its joint editors and co-proprietors. 47

Standard,

June 17, 1876.

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Mehemet Rushdi, and signed by all the members of the Serbian government. The Ottoman government contented itself with declaring Serbia a rebel and waited for the attack. In making the rounds of the diplomatists at Pera after the ultimatum had been delivered, the Serbian agent was told rather bluntly by Sir Henry Elliot that " he could wish him no success." 48 On July 2 Montenegro declared war, the rhetorical Serbian proclamation of Milan was read and both armies crossed the frontiers. The English ministry and press deprecated the appeal to arms as a rash act likely to meet with grievous disaster. Disraeli felt the action of Serbia nothing less than a wanton attack. She had no grievances; " what Servia wanted was provinces." " Early in July he was sanguine enough to believe that before the month terminated " the infamous invasion of the Servians will have been properly punished."50 The Times was disappointed over the turn of events and considered that Serbia had blundered.51 Conservative journals such as the Standard, Globe, Birmingham Daily Gazette and Sheffield Daily Telegraph inveighed against the treachery of Serbia as did the Liberal Daily Telegraph and Pall Mall Gazette. They all, moreover, bitterly attacked Russia as the real instigator of the war, Serbia merely being her tool. The Morning Post accused Serbia of having gone to war without a " single bona fide grievance " and without any " provocation" on the part of Turkey. Serbia and Montenegro attacked their recognized and sovereign Power 48

Times, July 12, 1876.

Letter of its special correspondent at Therapia,

dated 2d. 48

Times,

Aug.

1,

1876,

" Parliamentary

Intelligence"

columns.

Disraeli in H o u s e of Commons, July 31. 50

Marquis of Zetland, The

and Lady Bradford, 51

Times,

Letters

vol. ii, p. 69.

July 5, 1876.

of Disraeli

to Lady

Chesterfield

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" simply and solely because they have been incited from without to do so, and because the Sclavs generally are working f o r independence and empire." 52 T h e Westminster Gazette, an influential Catholic weekly, was vitriolic in its hatred of Russia. It felt that Russian diplomacy had " surpassed itself in d u p l i c i t y " during the last f e w months. Russia had but one object, " the destruction of the Ottoman Empire," and had now loosed Serbia and Montenegro on Turkey as a step in her design. T h e Westminster Gazette particularly objected to Russia's assuming the title of defender of Christian liberty. " H o w can Russia have the unblushing effrontery to appear before Europe in such a character, when its hands are still red with the blood of the Catholics of Poland?" 53 T h e Homeward Mail, a colonial weekly summarizing Indian and Eastern news, asked in a practical w a y : " I f England were to stand coldly by and see injustice wrought upon T u r k e y in the name of Christianity, what faith could our Mahommedan fellow-subjects repose in our promises of fair play towards them?" 54 T h e Whitehall Review, a recent venture in the field of society journalism under the editorship of E d w a r d Legge, pointed out that the English army was in excellent shape for war. 5 ' Prior to the outbreak of the war in the East, L o r d Derby, in answering a question on the Treaty of Paris in the House of Lords on June 15, made it clear that the government intended to enforce respect for old engagements. T h e English policy was to be one of non-intervention in the " internal quarrels arising between the authorities at Constantinople and the populations within the limits of the Turkish de52

Morning

53

Westminster

Post,

01

Homeward

65

Whitehall

July 4, 1876. Gazette,

July 7, 1876.

Mail, July 10, 1876. Review, July 8, 1876.

S6

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pendencies." " But, England intended maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey " against external aggression." The determination of the cabinet, echoed as it was by the entire press, served as a warning to Russia that a policy of strict neutrality and non-interference in regard to the belligerents must be pursued. The emperors of Austria and Russia met at Reichstadt in Bohemia on July 8 in an effort to arrive at an understanding concerning their Balkan aims. Press accounts of the meeting reported that rigid and absolute non-intervention was agreed upon for the present.57 The English journals thereupon softened the anti-Russian tone of their articles. Even the Morning Post felt justified in drawing " favourable auguries " from the imperial consultation.88 Lord Derby could therefore be very reassuring to a large deputation, headed by John Bright, which he received at the foreign office on July 14. They presented a memorial signed by numerous M.P.'s, ministers, manufacturers, merchants, Reform and Liberal associations, chiefly representing the midlands and the north of England. It called for a strict and honorable neutrality on the part of Great Britain during the coming recess of Parliament. Among the signers are found Joseph Chamberlain, Sir Wilfrid Lawson, Joseph Cowen and A . J. Mundella, all prominent Liberal members of Parliament. Bright told Lord Derby that the deputation had no disposition to express suspicion of the course of the government or to blame them for what had been done, but 68

Times, June 16, 1876, " Parliamentary Intelligence " columns.

Actually the two emperors had come to an understanding so sweeping in its scope as to lend truth to the frequent chargcs of collusion to bring about the complete dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. For the official account of the stipulations of the Reichstadt Agreement cf. A l f r e d Franzis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary (Cambridge, 1921), vol. ii, pp. 188-91. Cf. also infra, pp. 170-71. 67

68

Morning Post, July 10, 1876.

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57

merely desired to state their own feelings in favor of neutrality and to express a sentiment " that the country should not, by armed force and in any way whatever, give support to the continued dominion of the Turk in that portion of Europe which is the scene of the insurrection." The foreign secretary assured the deputation that although England had undertaken to guarantee the " Sick Man " against murder twenty years ago, she had never undertaken " to guarantee him against suicide or sudden death." He thought a European war " scarcely worth while to speculate upon " and stated that the cabinet had no intention of intervening in the present war, adding significantly that the government would do its utmost, if necessary, " to discourage others from intervening." 19 Lord Derby took advantage of the occasion to answer certain criticisms of recent acts of the government which the Opposition press had finally managed to think up in preparation for the debate on its Eastern policy about to take place in Parliament. His words were well received. The Daily News, the leading Opposition newspaper, approved of Derby's language as toning down " any attempt at a policy of fantasy " although it challenged certain of his explanations regarding the acts of the government.80 Various requests during the past month for papers relating to the Eastern policy of the cabinet had been frowned upon as untimely. With the Powers substantially agreed upon non-intervention and merely waiting on events, the government was willing to give the Opposition the opportunity of examining the official correspondence and of testing its strength in debate. Ten days prior to the date set aside for the discussion in Parliament, a " Blue Book " of 59 60

Titnes, July is, 1876, contains a report of the speeches. Daily News, July 15, 1876.

58

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376 pages," 1 filled with diplomatic correspondence, was placed before the Liberal leaders for digestion. T h e Times read in the despatches a " rooted indisposition " on the part of England against intervention but found it difficult to be sure that the policy of Russia had any other motive for reserve " than an inability to discern how to interfere effectively." T h e Standard commented on the statesmanship, the firmness of purpose, and breadth of mind of Lord Derby as shown by the character of his despatches. 62 Debates on the general Eastern policy of the government took place in both Houses of Parliament on July 31. Several motions were placed before Parliament on the eve of the discussions but only one, that of Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, ventured to reprove the government seriously. H e gave notice of the motion that the House, " while approving the course adopted by Her Majesty's Government in refusing to join in the Berlin Memorandum, regrets that Her Majesty's Government did not submit a counter proposition to the Powers having Treaty engagements with Turkey, with the object of securing the benefits of selfgovernment to the Insurgent Provinces." 83 Gladstone chose to regard that particular motion as one of censure but Lord Fitzmaurice so altered it under party pressure that " under no circumstances could it be supposed that he wished to offer a vote of censure on the Government." 64 The debate really assumed the character of a vote of confidence in the government. The mere fact that it lasted but a single night is proof of the slight opposition that existed in Parliament to the cabinet's Eastern policy. n House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, Turkey # 3 , presented (by command) July 21. Turkey # 4 was issued on the 24th. 62

Issues of July 22, 1876.

68

Times, July 29, 1876.

64

Ibid., Aug. 1, 1876, " Parliamentary Intelligence " columns.

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The majority of the speakers voiced but little criticism of the government but almost all flayed the T u r k s and spoke in behalf of the oppressed Christian nationalities under their yoke. Lord Granville, in the House of Lords, found little fault with the conduct of Eastern affairs. Although he thought it quite impossible for the government to have accepted the Berlin Memorandum, he believed they should have endeavored to keep up the Concert of Powers f o r the purpose of seeing whether some better proposal might not have been agreed upon. Gladstone alone was rather hostile in his remarks. He was grieved to find " a disposition in some quarters to attempt to set up the old Russian bugbear." H e found fault, not with the actual sending of the fleet to Besika Bay, but with the government for permitting, through its silence, the construction of menace to Russia and of a demonstration in favor of the Porte to be placed on that measure by the press and by Conservative followers. The late premier admitted that the rejection of the memorandum had met " with a great deal of approbation," but he considered it an " error " to reject it " instead of making it the basis of communication with the other Powers." A s for the future, he urged that no time be lost in resuming concerted action; even though the European Concert might not succeed, " everything else must fail." 45 Disraeli remarked that Gladstone's speech " amounted to a vote of censure " on the government and wondered why he did not take the opinion of the House on the subject. The fleet was sent to maintain the interests of the British Empire, to let the world know that whatever might happen, " there should be no great change in the distribution of territories in that part of the world without the knowledge 85 Extracts of the speeches of Granville, Gladstone, Disraeli and Hartington are taken from the "Parliamentary Intelligence" columns of the Times, Aug. i, 1876.

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and consent of England." It was not sent " to bolster up any Power that was falling from its own weakness." He was thus rather unmindful of the interpretation placed on the sending of the fleet as a warning to Russia but was most careful to deny that it was meant to encourage or support Turkey. The prime minister felt that a counter project " would have been a great mistake," since nothing could be more unwise than " for a country like England to make proposals which it has not the means of carrying into effect." He ingeniously asserted that England had not broken up the Concert of Powers nor was she in a state of isolation as the six Powers were now " acting in concert on the principle of non-interference." In concluding his explanations Disraeli could truthfully assert that despite the criticism of Gladstone " the general opinion of Parliament, and, I believe, the general opinion of the country, is that we have not been remiss in our duty." The marquis of Hartington, the Liberal party leader since Gladstone's retirement, admitted that the views of the government " were in the main, just," and their objects " such as the country would be disposed to approve," although he offered a few mild objections to the means by which they carried out their policy. He then recommended the withdrawal of the motion and the amendment before the House and a division was not even taken. The criticisms offered in Parliament were not strikingly original as all had been voiced at one time or another by the Liberal press during July. In the months to follow as the atrocity agitation came into full swing, they were to be repeated so incessantly in Liberal organs and by Liberal speakers and atrocitarians, themselves mostly Liberals, that they became monotonous. Press comments on the debate were mainly favorable to the government. Gladstone's lengthy address was described

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by the Times as " tedious " and " feeble," as if he had " exhausted himself in the examination of the Blue Book." London Conservative dailies such as the Morning Advertiser, Morning Post, Hour, and Globe, all praised Disraeli's speech and censured the Opposition's utterances, centering their attacks on Gladstone. The Standard stressed the contrast between the language of Lord Hartington and that of Gladstone. The Daily Telegraph, which of late was seemingly attempting to outdo its Conservative rivals, expressed its complete confidence in the government. A few Radical organs showered praise on Gladstone. The Daily News asked with Mr. Gladstone: " on which side is the strength of the future—on which side is time—on that of the Christian or the Mahommedan populations?" It particularly censured the prime minister's explanation of the sending of the fleet to Turkish waters and pointed out the difference between his and Lord Derby's recent statement.6® The Edinburgh Daily Review felt that Gladstone's words had a ring "characteristic of the man who opened the prisons of Naples, and exposed the horrors of a Christian Government only less odious than that of the Ottoman Porte." 67 The session of Parliament soon came to a close in midAugust. Just prior to its ending it was announced that Disraeli was to be raised to the peerage and would take the title of the Earl of Beaconsfield.98 The British press took the opportunity to praise his services to the nation and felt the reward fitting. Almost all regretted his loss to the House of Commons, generally believing that through re89 Derby had stressed that the fleet had been brought up solely for the protection of British subjects and other foreign residents in Constantinople, and had repudiated other constructions placed upon it in his remarks to the deputation on July 14. 67 68

All journals cited in above paragraph were issues of Aug. I, 1876.

In journals of Aug. 12. Aug. 18, 1876.

Officially announced in the London

Gazette,

62

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tirement he could no longer be the power in the future he had been in the past. Conservative journals naturally eulogized his achievements and most of the respectable organs of Liberalism were graceful in the homage they paid him. Yet, there were some few revilers. The Spectator was scornful but moderate in its language, remarking that Disraeli " has but taken ermine as comfortable flannel for his old age." 69 The Economist, punctiliously respectable except on the subject of Disraeli whom it fervently disliked, was almost vulgar in its remarks, terming the prime minister a " ninth-rate " leader who had merely charmed Parliament but had no influence in the nation itself.70 In the Queen's Speech proroguing Parliament, the ministry intimated that it would tender its good offices in the interests of peace in the East at the proper moment: "Should a favourable opportunity present itself, I shall be ready, in concert with my allies, to offer my good offices for the purpose of mediation between the contending parties, bearing in mind alike the duties imposed upon me by Treaty obligations and those which arise from considerations of humanity and policy." 71 With that declaration the country was satisfied and little anxiety was felt over the fact that Parliament was not to meet for another six months. Disraeli, at the end of his third session as prime minister, could well have boasted over leaving his original majority in the Commons without the loss of a single vote. The ministry enjoyed the confidence of Parliament and had the satisfaction of knowing that in the conduct of foreign affairs it stood high in the opinion of the British public. A storm, however, was soon to break. 49

Spectator, Aug. 19, 1876.

71

Extract from Queen's Speech in the Times, Aug. 16, 1876.

70

Economist, Aug. 19, 1876.

C H A P T E R III T H E ATROCITY

CRUSADE

IN the early part of May an uprising occurred in Bulgaria which was suppressed with frightful brutality by the troops of the Porte. Foreign agitators had fomented a conspiracy among the ignorant peasants and they, at the signal for revolt, had murdered certain of the Turkish officials, the number of Mussulmans losing their lives not exceeding 200 in all. The Porte, having learned a lesson as to the dangers of delay from the events of the preceding summer in Herzegovina, decided on the instantaneous and forceful suppression of this new outbreak. The measures of reprisal taken were so energetic that no less than 12,000 Bulgarians were massacred in the sandjak of Philippopolis where the insurrection had broken out. Batak, a town of 7,000, suffered the greatest loss of life, some 5,000 perishing there. Peaceable villages were destroyed and their inhabitants slaughtered. Women were ravished and young girls carried off to harems. Thus, " the manner in which the rising was suppressed was inhuman in the last degree, 50 innocent persons suffering for every guilty one." 1 Those deeds were committed primarily by irregular troops of the sultan, Bashi-Bazouks and Circassians, but regulars were guilty of misdeeds as well, the Arab soldiers in particular distinguishing themselves by their licentiousness and their ferocity. Similar crimes were committed in the sand1 T h e official report of Baring is drawn upon for the account of the massacres. It was first published in the form of a Supplement to the London Ga3ette on September 19, 1876, and fills about twenty-five pages. Reprinted in House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. x c , Turkey # 1 , inclosure 1 in no. 220.

63

64

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AND THE BALKAN

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jak of Tournova, north of the Balkans, though in a lesser degree as only 600 were slain. The Ottoman government rewarded the leaders who perpetrated the worst atrocities for heroic exploit, while those who endeavored to protect the Christians from the f u r y of the Bashi-Bazouks and others were passed over with contempt. Europe was long in ignorance of that outburst of Moslem fanaticism. Telegraphic accounts of the outbreak of the insurrection appeared in the press in early May, 2 but little news other than of a reassuring character seeped through thereafter for well over a month. Official advices from Constantinople in the latter part of May and early June treated the outbreak lightly and reported it completely under control. The Turkish government considered the term " insurrection," as applied to the " disturbances," a misnomer. The English government had but little inkling of the extent of the outrages committed in Bulgaria. During May consular reports from Turkey were infrequent and the few despatches received in the early weeks of June did not prepare the ministry for the later exposures of the excesses that had actually taken place. Reports of Vice-Consul Dupuis stationed at Adrianople and of Consul Reade from Rustchuk, received on June 2, merely expressed mild alarm and the fear of a greater rising in Bulgaria. Ambassador Elliot shortly thereafter informed Lord Derby that the insurrection had unquestionably been put down, although, he regretted to say, " with cruelty, and, in some places, with brutality." He added briefly that " there was evidence that the employment of Circassians and Bashi-Bazouks had led to the atrocities which might have been expected." 3 2

First mentioned in " Latest Intelligence " columns of the Titties, May

9, 1876. 8

Elliot to Derby, received June 16. House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, Turkey # 3 , no. 443.

THE

ATROCITY

CRUSADE

65

A rather curious prediction of the Evening Standard, made in its columns just after the first meagre news-items telling of the uprising had appeared in the press, came true. It had commented on the rumors in circulation at the time that the sultan was contemplating a " Holy W a r " and oddly enough its fanciful apprehensions were at that particular moment being verified. It felt that the true cause for the alarm prevalent among the Christians of Turkey lay in the danger that the government would lose its control over its own Mohammedan subjects: No one fears a Holy War, if the word ' war ' is used in its technical sense; but there may be reason to apprehend an attempt at a ' holy massacre.' That the result would show such a move to be beyond measure disastrous to Turkish power we may very well believe, but that fact is not a guarantee against its being made by an ignorant and fanatical mob.4 The " holy massacre" that actually occurred was made worse by the fact that the troops of the sultan, and not a fanatical mob, were responsible. The Daily News in its issue of June 23 gave the earliest intelligence of the Bulgarian atrocities." Its resident correspondent, Edwin Pears, a well-known barrister at Constantinople, was responsible for the original disclosures. His letter of the 16th, published in the Daily News, cited such specific information that it at once arrested the public attention. Several days later, on the 26th, the government was questioned in both Houses of Parliament as to the accuracy of the exposures. Disraeli and the foreign secretary in answering Forster and the duke of Argyll expressed their disbelief in rather careful and almost identical statements. Lord Derby, of the two, seemed more incredulous. * Evening Standard, May 13, 1876. B

A general statement had appeared in its issue of June 10, 1876.

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He felt that in the absence of official confirmation the House " should be slow to believe " the account published in the Daily News. Disraeli admitted that such outrages might possibly have occurred but averred that " the information which we have at various times received does not justify the statements " made in the journal named by Forster.* The Daily Post of Liverpool, an influential Liberal journal, in commenting on the ministerial utterances considered the reply of Disraeli as intending " to distort the truth," while that of the foreign secretary made " as little of it as possible." It implied its belief in the disclosures of the Daily News by remarking, " where there is so much smoke there must be some fire;" and feared that the government would drag the nation into a most " humiliating position " by minimizing such atrocities.7 The special correspondent of the Times 8 had stressed the danger of the atrocities as a weapon in the hands of Russia, available against the Turks and as well against their western allies. In his letter published on June 2 1 , prior to the revelations of the Daily News, he had made a general statement that the reality of the accounts in circulation concerning the atrocities would " be impossible for the utmost stretch of imagination to exaggerate," but he included no statements of substantiation.® In the Times of July 8 he submitted a letter which he had received, as verification of his original assertions. In that letter it was related that 100 Bulgarian towns had been destroyed, some 25,000 had been massacred in cold blood, children had been sold into slavery, tortures had been inflicted on those not murdered, outrages had been committed on women more brutal than usual and more 8

Times, June 27, 1876, " Parliamentary Intelligence " columns.

7

Liverpool Daily Post, June 28, 1876.

8

In all probability Gallenga.

9

Times, June 21, 1876, "Latest Intelligence" columns.

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terrible. Possibly 10,000 Bulgarians had been thrown into prison and refugees in the towns were starving to death. Pears in several long letters attested to the accuracy of all the main facts which he had first revealed. He affirmed that nowhere had the estimate of killed been put " lower than 12,000," that " at least sixty villages " had been utterly destroyed, that " the most terrible scenes of violence " had been committed, and that a district among the most fertile in the empire had been " ruined for many years to come." 10 In its leading article of the same day the Daily News emphatically asserted that England was under no obligation to lend any indirect moral support to the employers of Bulgarian assassins. English diplomacy ought not to compromise itself one hair's breadth for the sake of the shell of an Empire. It may surely even see with sympathy the efforts of the insurgents to throw off a yoke to which centuries have not reconciled them, and which every advance on their part in the paths of Western civilisation renders more intolerable. Liberal leaders again questioned the ministers on the press accounts on the 10th of July. The foreign office still had no direct information according to Lord Derby but he informed the Lords that he had wired Elliot that morning requesting that it be sent without delay. Disraeli made a longer statement on the subject which later brought considerable criticism on his head as the public was given the impression that he treated the horrors lightly. He never for a moment doubted that there had been proceedings of an atrocious character in Bulgaria as wars of insurrection were always atrocious: but that girls were sold into slavery, or that more than 10,000 persons have been imprisoned, I doubt. In fact, I doubt 10

Daily News, July 8, 1876. Further statements appeared in its issues of July 10 and 13.

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whether there is prison accomodation for so many, or that torture has been practised on a great scale among an Oriental people who seldom, I believe, resort to torture, but generally terminate their connection with culprits in a more expeditious manner.11 T h e House greeted his quip with laughter and the public took up the phrase. Liberal leaders and atrocitarians later charged him with flippancy for that and other sallies. 12 Forster considered it " humiliating to the honour of the country and revolting to the consciences of Englishmen to think it possible that their moral support would be given to a people that could perpetrate such atrocities." Mundella believed that they had not yet heard the whole truth and did not doubt " that the real facts of the case were so horrible that they could not be recited in the English newspapers." Sir E. Watkin suggested an emissary be sent by Elliot to make an inquiry on the spot. 13 The Liberal press followed its leaders in pounding in the idea that the government must no longer support Turkey with even a semblance of moral support. T h e Daily News in particular severely indicted the government. It wished to impress on the prime minister " that the outcry raised against these Turkish atrocities is not by any means that mere groan of the humanitarian or the philanthropist which to many persons seems so contemptible." Moreover, Hill's organ disliked the " charming quaintness" of Disraeli's expressions, feeling that if ministers remained silent or spoke in ambiguous language it was time for the nation, "through other channels, to make its voice heard in indignant protest 11

Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, vol. c c x x x (third series), p. 1182.

Northcote, sitting next to Disraeli at the time, states that the laughter rather angered the prime minister and defends him from the charge of flippancy. Cf. Lang, op. cit., p. 287. Cf. also Buckle, op. cit., pp. 44-45. 12

18

Times, July 11, 1876, "Parliamentary Intelligence" columns.

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and rebuke." 14 Invective against the Turks seemed to call for similar censure of the ministry with Disraeli most frequently the target because of his known pro-Turkish tendencies. The Liverpool Daily Post railed at both, arguing that if the Turks " have not been carrying on their antiChristian, peasant-crushing war in a manner which excludes them from the pale of civilization and would justify the most horrible reprisals, Mr. Disraeli, their apologist, should be able authoritatively to deny it." 15 In the opinion of the Spectator it was " almost a national disgrace " to have a premier who treated evidence of atrocities in such a flippant tone.14 The Economist attacked the " cold and almost sneering manner" adopted by the prime minister as decidedly unwise.17 The Newcastle Daily Chronicle was another constantly carping critic of every act of the government from the very start of the atrocity agitation. On the other hand, Conservative journals followed the government, generally treating the tales as exaggerations likely to be disproved to a great extent. The pro-Turkish Morning Post discounted the wild stories as the products of the fancy of those who had the fixed idea that the Crescent was arrayed against the Cross in Turkey, that infidel fanaticism was being let loose against Christian meekness and virtue. If the whole truth were known, it would be seen " that the Turks have been far more sinned against than sinning." 18 On the same day that Lord Derby had received Bright's deputation, he had been presented with a memorial signed 11 Daily News, July 11, 1876. Frank Hill was its editor. McCarthy was on its staff of leader writers. 15

Liverpool Daily Post, July n , 1876.

19

Spectator, July 15, 1876.

17

Economist,

18

Morning Post, July 11, 1876.

July 15, 1876.

Justin

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by Earl Russell in the name of the " League in A i d of the Christians in Turkey." It condemned English support of Turkey, either moral or political, complaining that " at the present moment all Europe sympathizes with the oppressed Christians of Turkey, while England stands alone in support of their oppressors." 19 The government was once more questioned on the 17th and Disraeli now produced Elliot's despatches to point out that authentic information in its hands did not warrant the ministry in accepting the statements of the public press. Distressing scenes had occurred in consequence of the reprisals taken on the Bulgarians for their earlier attacks. Elliot's letter of July 6 was read, in which he admitted that the atrocities committed had unquestionably been very great, as was inevitable from the nature of the force which the Porte was, in the first instance, obliged to employ, but it is equally certain that the details which have been given, coming almost exclusively from Russian and Bulgarian sources, are so monstrously exaggerated as to deprive them of much claim to attention.20 His latest telegram was the same in substance. Lord Derby on receipt of Elliot's despatch had on the 14th ordered ViceConsul Dupuis himself to proceed to Philippopolis and to Tatar Bazardjik to procure the truth as to the extent of the outrages. The Times, which previously had published numerous statements of its Constantinople correspondent 21 in its "Latest Intelligence" columns, had rather curiously remained entirely silent in its editorial columns on the subject of the atrocities. Its first leading article appeared in the issue of 19

Times, July 15, 1876, contains an account of the deputations.

80

Times, July 18, 1876, " Parliamentary Intelligence " columns.

31

Gallenga.

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the 18th and was decidedly mild in its tone. While it believed that the story had been " softened down in the official communications," it at the same time admitted that probable exaggerations had crept into other accounts. Worthy of attention because of its rapid shift within the course of a month are its concluding remarks that it granted the Christians to be " as vindictive as their enemies " and that it did not particularly indict the Porte or its ministers for the outrages. Continued Parliamentary interpellations over the press accounts compelled the government to inquire more closely into the alleged outrages in order definitely to ascertain the truth. Accordingly it instructed Baring, secretary of the British embassy at Constantinople, to investigate the tales on the spot and to report minutely to the ministry his findings. Baring left for the affected districts on the 19th of July. Various of the other Powers as well sent representatives into Bulgaria to report on the outrages. The newly arrived American consul-general at the Porte, Mr. Eugene Schuyler, was one of the first to make a trip through the desolated districts.22 He was accompanied part of the time by Dr. Schneider of the Kölnische Zeitung and by J. A . MacGahan, special commissioner for the Daily News, sent out in July by that journal to verify the disclosures of Pears. MacGahan was to spend four weeks in Bulgaria. Just prior to the debate in Parliament on the 31st the " League in Aid of the Christians in Turkey " held another meeting. Among the speakers were E. A . Freeman the historian, Arthur Arnold, author, and George Dawson, noted Birmingham pastor. The Pall Mall Gazette remarked that " the meeting was too obviously conscious of the nobility of its own sentiments, and of the lofty spirit of humanity ' 2 He left Constantinople on July 23 with MacGahan.

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which inspired it." " It trusted that they had separated not again to reassemble. The Standard reserved most of its fury for Freeman, terming him and the other pretended philanthropists as pro-Russian.24 The Saturday Review described them as " passionate partisans " and considered that the Turks would have some excuse for defending their faith against agitators who seemed to think it a " sacred duty to exterminate them, or to drive them into Asia." 28 Only mild criticism of the government had been offered in the debate of the 31st on its general Eastern policy, and no vote had been taken.2* Gladstone and several other Liberals had spoken for the Christians in the Balkans but had comparatively little to say about the atrocities. The duke of Argyll, later a leading atrocitarian, had maintained complete silence in the House of Lords. Argyll himself admits that the language of the Opposition in Parliament was not such as " could inspire the country with any adequate sense of its duties." He explained that " accidental circumstances " prevented his reading the Blue Books until after the close of the session but that on seeing them he " felt as if the influence and the power of England had never been exerted in a spirit so unworthy, or in support of a policy at once so blind and so unjust." 27 Disraeli maintained his same attitude regarding the atrocities. In the course of his remarks, Gladstone had complained to the House that the foreign office had earlier withheld a report of one of its consuls respecting the massacres. Disraeli, evidently annoyed at the ex-premier's picayunish observation, pointed out that the consul apparM

Pall Mall Gazette, July 28, 1876.

*« Standard, July 28, 1876. 86

Saturday Review, July 29, 1876.

2a

Supra, pp. 58-60.

K

Duke of Argyll, op. cit., vol. i, p. 257.

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ently had employed a Bulgarian to go to a coffee-house, who made a report according to which 5,000 persons were slain, while in another the report was set down at 35,000. He could not adopt " that coffee-house babble " brought by an anonymous Bulgarian to the vice-consul as " authentic information" which the government ought to receive.28 His derisive expression was shortly to be coupled with his previous unfortunate quip.28 Earl Russell, in a letter to Lord Granville, the Opposition leader in the House of Lords, complimented him and Gladstone on their speeches although he confessed there appeared in them " a want of earnest purpose." It seemed to him that England ought, with its fleet at Besika Bay and its ambassador at Constantinople, to insist upon the instant termination of the atrocities. A thousand men landed from our fleet would accomplish the object; and, if they fail, they might be reinforced. Ultimately if we cannot keep the Turks from being barbarous and cruel, we might ally ourselves with Russia, and concert means to accomplish our objects. The Whig Party toast is, ' Civil and religious liberty all over the world.' From this cause I shall not depart.*0 Because of the increasing opprobrium heaped upon it the Sublime Porte submitted its own report, drawn up by Edib Effendi, to the European governments. Blame for the outbreak was placed upon foreign agitators, the alleged atrocities were practically denied and the Porte made counter-charges of barbarities committed by the Bulgarians. The Times, which for the week past had gradually been placing more credence on the tales, called the report " acres 28

Times, Aug. I, 1876, " Parliamentary Intelligence " columns.

29

Supra, pp. 67-68.

i0

Published in the Times, Aug. 4, 1876.

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of loose rhetoric." 81 The Daily News felt the Turkish government was still impudently trying to hoodwink Europe." MacGahan had written from Philippopolis to the Daily News describing the horrors of Batak, the scene of the worst atrocities. " I saw many little hands, heads, and feet of children of three years of age, and girls, with heads covered with beautiful hair. I never imagined anything so fearful. There were three thousand bodies in the churchyard and church. . . ." 83 His testimony occasioned a rather damaging attack on the government in the House of Commons that night. Numerous M.P.'s arose to express their indignation and indicted the government for its stand. Elliot was stated to be pro-Turkish; Disraeli was charged with having treated the atrocities with a degree of levity, and even Baring was criticized. Under-Secretary Bourke ably defended the government from the various charges, but in reading a letter of Baring to the House he officially verified the greater bulk of the newspaper exposures. Baring, after only two days in Philippopolis, would voice as his opinion that about 1 2 , 0 0 0 Bulgarians had perished, that some sixty villages had been wholly or partially burnt, perhaps ten by the insurgents. The depredations of the irregulars still continued. He did, however, deny as pure fables certain specific tales about the sale of women and children and the parading of cartloads of heads in the streets of Philippopolis.3* Lord Hartington censured Elliot severely and desired that the government remonstrate with Turkey, remarking that " unless there be some complete defense against these terrible allegations, the Turkish Government 81

Times, Aug. 7, 1876.

32

Daily News, Aug. 8, 1876.

83

Ibid., Aug. 7, 1876.

Baring to Elliot, dated Philippopoli, July 22. Commons on August 7. Times, A u g . 8, 1876. 84

Read in House of

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has the prospect of losing, and is rapidly losing, all traces of the sympathy which has hitherto been felt for it." 85 Disraeli could compliment Bourke on his " adroit and ingenious" defense but considered it " l u c k y " that the session was dying. He himself now felt that Elliot had shown " a lamentable want of energy " and that he had been " misled " by the foreign office.86 The " Thunderer" swerved sharply and turned atrocitarian. In its leading article of August 8 it, for the first time, trenchantly condemned both the Turks and the government. It did not doubt that England was on the verge of revelations surpassing anything that the imagination of civilized men could have conceived. The barbarities of Tartar conquerors, the wild and senseless destruction of human life which modern students of history have been disposed to look on as fabulous, find a parallel in the deeds perpetrated within the last few weeks at a few days' journey from our shores. Pained by the prime minister's " frivolity" and Elliot's apathy, the Times found it inconceivable that " such ignorance was possible in Pera and in Westminster." On the demand of Hartington a new set of papers was presented to Parliament, bringing the information on the massacres almost to date.37 Edib Effendi's " impudent romance" was included, which, according to the Times, explained in effect that " if the Bulgarians were murdered, they must have murdered each other." 88 It felt that British diplomacy had perhaps arrived at the same conclusion and now classed its ignorance as " invincible." For the next six weeks the Times was to rant against the Porte, and was 35

Times, Aug. 8, 1876, " Parliamentary Intelligence" columns.

88

Disraeli to Derby, Aug. 7.

" Turkey #5, 1876.

Buckle, op. cit., p. 46. 88

Times, Aug. 11, 1876.

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as well to indict severely the ministry which up to this moment had been cordially supported. Even the Daily News was to be outstripped in the blasts of fury leveled at the Sublime Porte and the two journals were to be greatly responsible for the vehemence of the atrocity agitation which reached its peak in September. The presentation of the papers containing official verification of the extent of the massacres brought a final attack upon the government in the House of Commons just before the close of the session. Mr. Evelyn Ashley, son of Lord Shaftesbury, called attention to the delay in obtaining information and complained that Lord Derby had not remonstrated strongly enough with Turkey. Sir Henry Elliot, he thought, ought to be recalled.88 Forster voiced less criticism of the ministry but vigorously denounced Turkish misrule, hoping that if the same atrocities were practised in Serbia England would view with satisfaction an occupation by Russian and Austrian troops to preserve order.40 UnderSecretary Bourke defended Elliot by pointing out that the Austrian and Russian ambassadors had been equally ignorant. Sir William V. Harcourt, representing the city of Oxford, traveled through the papers with extreme minuteness. He accused the Porte of deliberately intending to exterminate the Bulgarians and practically suggested a union of England and Russia to drive out the Turk.41 Disraeli ridiculed Harcourt's suggestion and denied that the Turks were the especial proteges of England. She was merely one of the guaranteeing Powers. The prime minister again stressed English imperial interests in the East in concluding his '»Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, vol. ccxxxi (third series), p. 1088. Ibid., p. 1107. Derby had already instructed Elliot on the 9th to impress on the Porte that it avoid any repetition of the Bulgarian outrages in Serbia. 41 Ibid., pp. 1133-37-

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speech. England was not upholding T u r k e y f r o m " blind superstition" or f r o m a " want of s y m p a t h y " with the aspirations of eastern Europe. T h e duty of the ministry was, however, " to maintain the Empire of England " and they would never agree to any step that hazarded the existence of that empire. 42 L o r d Hartington had had nothing to say and Gladstone was not in the House 43 on the occasion of this last discussion of the session. The former premier went into the country and had mentally postponed all further action to the opening of the next session 44 before it dawned on him in late A u g u s t that the question was truly alive. In a letter to Argyll, he suggested the possibility of imperialistic design as being behind Disraeli's policy. Dizzy's speech . . . in the Turkish debate gave me a new light on his views. He is not quite such a Turk as I had thought. What he hates is Christian liberty and reconstruction. He supports old Turkey, thinking that if vital improvements can be averted, it must break down; and his fleet is at Besika Bay, I feel pretty sure, to be ready to lay hold of Egypt as his share. So he may end as the Duke of Memphis yet.45 Ambassador Elliot was made the center of numerous attacks at this time. Disraeli himself complained in several instances of the carelessness of the foreign office in supplying him with information. T h e premier considered Sir Andrew Buchanan, Her Majesty's ambassador at Vienna, " a hopeless mediocrity " and, although he chivalrously defended Elliot in Parliament and in his later speeches, he 42

Ibid., p. 1146.

43

Lang, op. ext., p. 287.

4 4 John Morley, Life of William Ewart Gladstone vol. ii, p. 550. 45

Ibid., p. 551.

( N e w York, 1903),

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was even now contemplating sending Layard from Madrid to the post at Constantinople. 44 Late A u g u s t and early September, with Parliament adjourned, saw the atrocity agitation rapidly being fanned into a blaze. W i t h the full glare of publicity turned on the horrible events of M a y , the T u r k s were condemned to the very depths of Dante's Inferno. A caricature in Le Charivari excellently illustrates the attitude of the P o w e r s in early A u g u s t which public opinion was so profoundly to alter. A furious-looking Bashi-Bazouk is represented in the act of cleaving a child in twain with an uplifted sword. Another child lies flat upon the ground just beneath. In the distance a pole, or lance, is being driven through the breast of some one else on the ground by another BashiBazouk. Europe is looking on quite calmly with a pair of spectacles in her right hand, which she, however, holds behind her. Beneath are the words: " M y dear Madam, it is really high time for y o u to put on your glasses." 47 The English Liberal dailies and weeklies railed against the Porte; the Conservative journals admitted that atrocities had been committed. A warning was issued by the Saturday Review that " in England public opinion is greatly modified by moral feeling, and if the maintenance of Turkish dominion is associated in general belief with plunder and persecution, Governments and political parties will be compelled to conform to the general sentiment." 48 Even the Daily Telegraph, which had said when the first letter appeared in the Daily News that it was utterly impossible the tales could be true, and that the villages " did not even ••Buckle, op. cit., p. 49, Disraeli to Derby, Aug. 15. mately replaced Elliot in April, 1877.

Layard ulti-

47 Le Charivari, Paris, A u g . 11, 1876. Translated f r o m : Madame, il serait grand temps de mettre enfin vos lunettes." 48

Saturday Review, A u g . 12, 1876.

" Chere

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exist," no longer attempted to deny the general truth of the story. Meetings, letters to the press, tirades from the pulpit, and more practical signs of sympathy in the organization of relief committees, are evidences of the increasing interest in the plight of the Bulgarians. Bishop Fraser of Manchester wrote to a well-attended meeting in its Town-hall on the 9th that the account of the desolation at Batak described in the Daily News was " horrible enough to make the blood freeze in the veins." 49 Henry Parry Liddon, canon residentiary of St. Paul's, who was to become the greatest preacher of his day, vibrantly called on " free, humane, Christian England " not to " sacrifice elementary moral obligations to supposed political or commercial necessities." 50 Lady Strangford took charge of a " Bulgarian Peasant Relief Fund " to which Forster donated £100. A demonstration committee was formed for the purpose of holding a workingmen's meeting in Hyde Park to express indignation at the atrocities. Although the ministers of the Crown had barely had time to scatter to all sections of England for their vacations, Lord Russell already felt there was " an urgent necessity " for an autumn session.01 It rankled E. A. Freeman that the " National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War " should contemplate giving help to oppressor as to the oppressed. He could not think that England was " at all called on to organize means for the relief of a gang of brutal murderers, robbers, and ravishers, or ostentatiously to put them on a level with the heroes who are fighting and suffering in *3 Times, Aug. 10, 1876, contains account of meeting. t0 Sunday afternoon sermon, Aug. 13, taken from Pall Mall Gazette, Aug. 14, 1876. Liddon was at St. Paul's for twenty years, from 1870 until his death. 81

Letter to the Times in the issue of Aug. 24, 1876.

8o

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the noblest cause in which man ever drew the sword." 82 Florence Nightingale had contributed to that fund. Freeman, however, felt that the nation was at last stirring, as the day after he wrote to the Times he exulted over the increasing excitement in a letter to James Bryce: Meetings to denounce the Turk and the Jew are getting common. London folk are planning a ' Hyde Park demonstration . . . There has been a grand meeting at Darlington, and I was asked to one at Liverpool last night. I have many approving letters from all parts, and the frantic abuse which I get from the Tories shows that I have hit them hard. In truth, I believe that, as I said in the Daily News just now, ' the Derby windbag has burst.' . . . M Victor Hugo attacked the Turks as savagely as Freeman.04 Over 1,000 workingmen were present at a meeting in Hackney on the 29th called to denounce the ministry " for the support which it has given the Ottoman Government in its unholy attempt to exterminate the Christian population of Turkey in Europe." 85 Letters were read from Gladstone, Russell, and John Holms, its M.P., censuring the indifference of the government.86 Holms spoke at a crowded meeting held in Glasgow. Numerous other letters were being printed in the columns of the press and quite a few indignation meetings were announced for early September, mostly under Liberal auspices. A dissenting voice was heard in the Liberal ranks. Sir Charles Dilke, a prominent Radical representing Chelsea, was swayed more by his anti-Russian sentiment than by this 52

Times, Aug. 28, 1876.

Freeman's letter was dated Aug. 26.

53

W. R. W. Stephens, Life and Letters of Edward A. Freeman (London, 1895), vol. ii, p. 141. Freeman to Bryce, dated Aug. 27. M

Letter to the Times in issue of Aug. 29, 1876.

05

Report of meeting in the Times, Aug. 30, 1876.

09

Gladstone's letter was published in the Daily News, Aug. 30, 1876.

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opportunity to embarrass the government. While he detested the outrages committed by the Turks, he could not give any great sympathy to their opponents. The Montenegrins were " barbarous," the Serbians " intolerant and corrupt." Sir Charles ascribed the present difficulties of the Porte to the " intrigues " of Russia, which were responsible for the rising in Bosnia and the invasion of Turkey by Serbia. Neither did Dilke share the terrors with which many Liberals regarded the present cabinet's Eastern policy." With its new role of leader in the atrocity agitation the Times became increasingly more gentle in its tone toward Russia. In pressing for autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, it expounded at length the right of nationalities to separate independent existence and even showed favor to Pan-Slavism. A s a constructive suggestion on the policy that Britain should pursue, the Times repeatedly advocated in its editorials that England take the place of Russia in aid of the Christians, thereby anticipating supposed Russian designs and increasing British influence. The publication of Schuyler's preliminary report and another long letter from MacGahan in the Daily News of August 30, coupled with a new Turkish version of the insurrection, gave considerable ammunition to the atrocitarians. Schuyler set the number of slain at " about 15,000," 58 whereas the commission of Mussulman and Christian notables gave only 1836. In this official version blame was again placed upon foreign agitators and a Bulgarian plot, with the Porte proudly boasting that " preventive and energetic measures " of the authorities had kept the mischief 67

Speech to his constituents, reported in the Times, Aug. 16, 1876.

Schuyler's preliminary report was mentioned in the journals of Aug. 30. The full report is in the House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xc, Turkey # i , inclosure 2 in no. 220. Schuyler to Maynard, dated Aug. io, 1876. 88

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within the limits of the sandjak of Philippopolis and of Tatar-Bazardjik." The Morning Post challenged Schuyler's report as a faithful representation of the actual facts. 40 That the government realized the changing sentiment of the public is shown by a despatch of Derby to Elliot of the 29th in which he stated that the atrocities had destroyed all sympathy with Turkey and warned that even in the event of war the Turks could expect no aid from England. 81 The Conservative journals busied themselves in warning the public not to believe the Liberal insinuation that the ministry was partially responsible for the outrages 82 and deplored the efforts of Liberals to turn such an unhappy subject to political account.83 The first week of September saw daily indignation meetings with the Times and Daily News carrying full-page reports of the speeches in which the government was always as heartily denounced as the Turk. Meetings were more numerous in the midlands and the north of England, the Liberal strongholds. A t Sheffield, A . J. Mundella told his constituents that " it was unfortunate for the Christians of the Turkish provinces that their insurrection fell on the days of Mr. Disraeli and Lord Derby." M The foreign secretary was a man of " rather glacier temperament" — cold and phlegmatic — whose sympathies were not easily excited. Mundella cited John Morley, at this time editor of the Fortnightly Review, and Carlyle as being more susceptible to Christian emotions. Sir Henry Havelock addressed a 69 First published in Turquie, Constantinople, Aug. 21, and republished in the Times, Sept. 4, 1876. 80

Morning Post, Aug. 30, 1876.

91

House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xci, Turkey # 6 .

42

Globe, Aug. 29, 1876.

6S

Morning Advertiser,

64

Report of speech in the Times, Sept. 5, 1876.

A u g . 30, 1876.

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crowded meeting at Sunderland in Durham in a similar vein. The mayors of Rochdale. Bradford, and Birmingham presided over packed gatherings. In the south, Plymouth, Exeter and Southampton Liberals expressed their horror at the misdeeds. The reproach of being indifferent to human suffering in its most pitiable aspects was removed when the Irish held a meeting at Belfast on the 5th, convened by its Liberal mayor and attended by Protestant clergymen. Censure of the government was, however, not included in the resolution passed, which, as one minister remarked, had been framed in the interest of humanity. Dublin had as yet not become indignant. English churchmen played a prominent role in this new crusade against the Turks. The archbishop of Canterbury, Rev. Dr. Tait, wrote a kindly letter to the suffering Christians in the East. Bishop Fraser of Manchester outdid Lords Russell and Stratford de Redcliffe in his zeal for letter-writing. Canon Liddon of St. Paul's again relieved his soul by insisting that Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria be granted autonomy and compensation for the destruction wrought. He wanted to see the officers that Turkey decorated for committing atrocities brought to justice. It might be necessary in order to enforce those terms to replace Sir Henry Elliot by a diplomatist of human, rather than Turkish sympathies, and " to move the British fleet a little nearer to Constantinople."65 In other churches special prayers were offered up, beseeching God to cause the Turks to be defeated for the atrocities they had committed upon Christian women and children. Speaking in the Metropolitan tabernacle at Newington, the Rev. C. H. Spurgeon added his hope that they 85

Report of sermon in the Newcastle Daily Chronicle of Sept. 4, 1876, which agreed with Liddon and felt the country could not trust the present cabinet.

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might soon be driven out of Europe and the Mohammedan power " wiped away from off the face of the earth." 44 The committee of the " Congregational Union of England and Wales " adopted a resolution censuring the Porte and the ministry. Cardinal Manning, of the pro-cathedral in Kensington, held a different view as to the value of the atrocity agitation than most Nonconformist and certain Anglican clergymen. In declining an invitation to attend a demonstration, he wrote that although he abhorred the atrocities as much as any he was unable to see the benefit of holding public meetings which proposed no definite policy. He as well deprecated the disposition to make of the atrocities a political question.47 The atrocity agitation was thus in full swing when Gladstone placed himself at its helm, feeling the responsibility of silence " too great to be borne." 48 Hence he accepted with alacrity an invitation to talk on Bulgaria to his constituents at Greenwich, writing that he hoped it would be a meeting of the general community and not of Liberals only, as it was requisite " that the great movement now in progress should be nothing less than national, in order to make the attainment of its objects, as far as may be, both certain and safe." 49 Those objects, Gladstone dealt with at length in his pamphlet on the Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East which appeared on September 6. The pamphlet was appropriately dedicated to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. In it Gladstone easily outstripped other atrocitarians in expressing his injured humanitarian feelings and his odium of the Turks and the ministry. 84

Report of sermon in the Times, Sept. 4, 1876.

67

Letter dated Sept. 4, in the Times, Sept. 6, 1876.

William Ewart Gladstone, Bulgarian Horrors the East, p. 33. 48

69

and the Question of

Letter of acceptance published in the Times, Sept. 5, 1876.

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T h e pamphlet is quite interesting to read as Gladstone puts little check on his invective power, terming the consequences of the past acts of the government as deplorable, and raving madly against the Turks. H e inveighs against England's moral complicity " with the basest and blackest outrages upon record within the present century, if not within the memory of m a n ; " 70 and brands the Turkish race as " the one great anti-human specimen of humanity." 71 H e also makes the declaration that: There is not a criminal in an European gaol, there is not a cannibal in the South Sea Islands, whose indignation would not rise and overboil at the recital of that which has been done, which has too late been examined, but which remains unavenged; which has left behind all the foul and all the fierce passions that produced it, and which may again spring up, in another murderous harvest, from the soil soaked and reeking with blood, and in the air tainted with every imaginable deed of crime and shame.72 T h e best known part of the pamphlet consists of Gladstone's wish that the T u r k s clear out bag and baggage f r o m Bulgaria. But I return to, and I end with, that which is the Omega as well as the Alpha of this great and most mournful case. A n old servant of the Crown and State, I entreat my countrymen, upon whom far more than perhaps any other people of Europe it depends, to require, and to insist, that our Government, which has been working in one direction, shall work in the other, and shall apply all its vigour to concur with the other States of Europe in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria. Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their 70

Gladstone, op. cit., p. 9.

72

Ibid., p. 62.

71

Ibid., p. 13.

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Yuzbachis, their Kaimakams and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned. 78 Although the Times was substantially in agreement with Gladstone and had itself long ranted against the T u r k s in a similar vein, it, rather inconsistently, felt his anathemas to be too strong. The question was also p u t — " whither are they to carry themselves?" 74 Gladstone felt himself immediately called upon to explain in a letter to its editor, Delane, that his desire that the T u r k s should carry off themselves from Bulgaria was " strictly limited to military and official T u r k s , " 75 as he showed in the lines following that passage by enumerating their titles. T h e pamphlet was reviewed at length in the London press, drawing high praise from such Radical organs as the Daily News, the Spectator and the Examiner. Most of the journals, however, including the Morning Post, the Standard, the Daily Telegraph and the Pall Mall Gazette, railed at Gladstone's excesses, commenting on the vagueness of his suggestions and the airy way in which he eliminated practical difficulties. The Saturday Review remarked that " when the present excitement has subsided, it will perhaps be understood that the English Government is as fully exempt from responsibility for the events in Bulgaria as Austria, France, or Italy." 78 Strangely enough, even the cultured Athenceum, the great literary censor, ordinarily free from political bias, attacked Gladstone in its review of the pamphlet. Gladstone's words were to be widely read. A s indicative of the interest in the atrocities, it need only be stated that within five days the sale of the large-type edition had 78

Ibid., pp. 61-62.

74

Times, Sept. 8, 1876.

" Published in the Times, Sept. 9, 1876. 78

Saturday Review, Sept. 9, 1876.

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reached 50,000 copies. A sixpenny edition was then announced by the publishers. Later Russian and French translations were to have a fair sale. Within three months Gladstone had realized £12,000, 77 a substantial return for his hurried effort. The Daily News profited considerably from the atrocities as well, as they gave a great lift to its circulation. By mid-September the Daily News was printing over 200,000 copies a day, exceeding even the Daily Telegraph which was generally credited as having the largest circulation. Numerous other pamphlets, suggesting solutions of the Eastern Question or making a party attack, rapidly followed that of Gladstone. One in particular, that of Alfred Austin, a future poet laureate of England, which appeared about a week later, had considerable sale. In it the writer suggests that the former premier should have entitled his pamphlet " Tory Horrors," or the question between Lord Beaconsfield and himself. The appeal on behalf of outraged humanity had one word against the Turk to twenty against the Tory. 78 Gladstone insured his leadership in the agitation by holding spellbound an assemblage of 10,000 gathered in the rain at Blackheath on the 9th to hear his address. His speech was necessarily a repetition of the substance of the pamphlet, stressing in more vigorous language that a " good settlement " of the question depended " not upon a mere hollow truce between England and Russia, but upon their concord and their hearty and cordial co-operation." 79 He took the occasion as well to condemn the attitude of the Morning Post and other Conservative journals. 77

Public Opinion, Dec. 16, 1876. " Nolabilia Literary." 78 Alfred Austin, Tory Horrors: 1876), p. 4. 79

Amount taken from column headed or, The question of the hour (London,

Times, Sept. 1 1 , 1876, gives a report of the speech.

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Lords Hartington and Granville, the Liberal leaders in Parliament, were not so enthusiastic over the turn of events. In speaking at the Cutlers' feast at Sheffield on the 7th, Hartington had offered very mild criticisms. That Granville would not join in the agitation is shown by his refusal to attend a meeting at the Guildhall80 requisitioned for by Gladstone, the duke of Westminster, Samuel Morley, editor of the Contemporary Review and one of the proprietors of the Daily News, Dean Church of St. Paul's, etc. Some 1,000 signatures were attached to the requisition asking for the use of the Guildhall for the 18th. The Rt. Hon. Robert Lowe, Gladstonian chancellor of the exchequer, followed the lead of his former chief, as at Croyden on the 13th he called for an autumn session. Speakers were being hard pressed to devise new expressions to vilify the Turks, but at Croyden the Rev. C. H. Spurgeon hurdled the obstacle by declaring that " the criminals whose likenesses in wax were to be seen in the Chamber of Horrors at Madame Tussaud's were a set of gentlemen compared with those wretches whose deeds in Bulgaria they had met to execrate that night." 81 The Morning Post hoped the country would see its danger and " decline to follow Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Lowe in all their exaggerated sentimentality and unacquaintance with the Eastern Question." They must see that the Turkish government " had nothing to say to the committing of the ' atrocities,' which were possible only because the Empire was out of joint through the machinations of its ' arch-enemy,' with whom they are now asked to join hands." 82 No official utterances had been made since the closing of the session. Disraeli had defended himself from the charge 80

Letter of refusal published in the Times, Sept. 13, 1876.

81

Report of the meeting in the Times, Sept. 14, 1876.

M

Morning Post, Sept. 15, 1876.

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of " misplaced f r i v o l i t y " 8 3 in a letter to the Times by stating that he never sought to raise a laugh in Parliament through his remarks on the more primitive and speedy methods used by Orientals to get rid of their enemies. His statement was in answer to one that 10,000 Bulgarians had been submitted to torture and he was perfectly grave when he replied that he was skeptical as to such occurrences, as massacre, not torture, was the custom of an Oriental people. " Unhappily," writes Disraeli, " it has turned out that I was correct;" and he hoped that the misplaced laughter of another was no proof of levity on his part.84 Disraeli also resented Gladstone's " impudence " in sending him a copy of the pamphlet.85 The premier had hoped that his ministers could avoid public meetings, but, as both Northcote and Derby were already scheduled to speak, he could only caution them not to convey the idea that the government was hysterically modifying its policy in consequence of the excited state of the public mind.89 The foreign secretary thereupon weighed his words of reply to two large deputations which awaited him at the foreign office on the n t h . The first deputation represented the London trades' unionists and the second group, headed by Mr. Evans, editor of the English Labourer, consisted of delegates from various Working Men's Peace associations. Gladstone disliked the tone of the speeches and felt the .circumstances demanded the early reassembling of Parliament.87 The chancellor of the exchequer exercised 85

Made in the Times, Sept. 6, 1876.

Letter to the Times dated Sept. 6, published in its issue of the 7th. It may possibly have been a rebuke to a similar charge made on page 24 of Gladstone's pamphlet which appeared on the 6th, probably early in the day as it was reviewed in the Pall Mall Gasette that afternoon. 84

80

Buckle, op. cit., p. 6o, letter to Derby.

89

Ibid., p. 61, letter to Northcote.

87

Letter to the Times in issue of S e p t 16, 1876.

9°

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similar caution in addressing the Conservative Working Men's Association at Edinburgh on the 16th, advising them to follow a policy of the head rather than of the heart. He remarked that the people as a rule did not understand foreign policy, warning against meetings which might have the effect of weakening and embarrassing rather than of strengthening the government in its action.8* The Daily News marveled at Northcote's diplomatic feat of speaking and saying nothing.89 The flood of meetings continued however. T w o enthusiastic gatherings took place in London on the 18th. In the afternoon at the Guildhall, Mr. Alderman Cotton, Lord Mayor and a staunch Conservative, presided, but the meeting was soon taken out of his hands. Both Disraeli and Salisbury refused to attend although a fair sprinkling of Conservatives were present. Their very courage served to bring to light the hostility of the audience to the ministry as well as to the Turks. The lord mayor at the outset struck a discordant note on suggesting faith in the government. R. N. Fowler, president of the City Conservative Association, was heard patiently so long as his unimpeachable Conservatism did not hinder him from heartily denouncing the abomination of Turkish misrule, but he was put down the instant he said a word in defense of Lord Derby and the prime minister. Neutrality was ended when a motion was put forth expressing confidence, in the government. Not only was it rejected by a great majority but the proposers were absolutely denied a hearing and a counter resolution calling for the early reassembling of Parliament was overwhelmingly passed. Just outside the hall, those who could not get in passed a more vehement resolution that Parliament should not be summoned but dissolved. 88

Report of speech in the Times, Sept. 18, 1876.

89

Issue of Sept. 18, 1876.

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That call for a general election marked perhaps the highest pitch of practical hostility that public indignation had yet reached. In the evening, Exeter-hall was crowded from floor to ceiling with workingmen who had been invited to attend in the name of humanity " to express their horror at the diabolical outrages of the Turks in Bulgaria, and proclaim to the world their indignation that the Government of England should be found supporting so foul a system." Professor Fawcett, Radical M.P., occupied the chair, and the bitterest foe either of the Porte or the ministry would have been well satisfied with the fervor of the denunciations. Among those present on the platform were Sir John Bennett, J . Lewis Farley, Charles Bradlaugh, prominent Radical, and several members of the Workingmen's Demonstration committee. From their tone the speakers would indeed have made short work of the traditional policy of England in the East. 90 On the following day a crowded and excited audience of over 3,000 workingmen acclaimed the strictures of the duke of Argyll and the earl of Shaftesbury at Glasgow." 1 The earl of Shaftesbury felt it intolerable that amid the universal cry of grief and horror there were " newspapers and individuals to defend, to deny, to palliate, to be silent on these atrocities." 82 Prominent Radicals voiced their disapproval of the policy of the government at Southplace chapel in Finsbury on the same day. The chairman, Mr. P . A . Taylor, M.P., deplored the government's terror of Russia and challenged the opinion of " society" and the 80

Accounts of meetings in the Times, Sept. 19, 1876.

B1

Duke of Argyll, What the Turks are, and how we have been helping them (Glasgow, 1876), contains his full speech. It was reprinted as a penny pamphlet. 92

Report of speech in the Times, Sept. 20, 1876.

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Pall Mall Gazette for their view that the English people were letting a mad humanitarian sentimentalism disguise from them the real aspect of English interests in the East. Taylor wanted the recall of Elliot, the summoning of Parliament, and the resignation of the ministry. On the platform were such well-known Radicals as G. J. Holyoake, J. E. Ellis, Mrs. Besant, M. E. Marsden, and Charles Bradlaugh. Sir Charles Dilke found himself unable to attend. The Times took peculiar pride in the fact that England was so absorbed by a generous impulse whereas in France and Germany public opinion seemed hardly aroused. It ascribed the indignation of England to a " deep-seated sense of national remorse " at its long complicity in Turkish misrule. Sentiment in England was not prompted by selfish interests as in France and Germany, still ruled by the doctrine of national interest. The French were chided for being " apparently listless and indifferent," while the attitude of Germany was described as one of " calm and almost cold-blooded apathy." 88 During the latter days of September largely attended public meetings continued to be held in the north of England. Gladstone unexpectedly spoke at Staindrop in South Durham on the 23d. Although other Liberals had steadfastly maintained that the atrocity agitation was in no sense a party movement, Gladstone felt that it should be associated with the Liberal party which, as everyone knew, was " unanimously engaged in it." He had found only " one single Liberal" who was not heart and soul associated in " this great national movement," and considered it only natural that Liberals should draw advantage as a party from a question on which they were unanimous.84 »» Times, S e p t 20, 1876. 94

Report of speech in the Times, Sept. 25, 1876.

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In summarizing the September atrocity meetings," they, as a rule, set on foot subscriptions, organized committees for the purpose of collecting them, and determined how the money should be appropriated. They all adopted resolutions expressing horror and indignation at the atrocities, and hoped that effective measures would be taken to prevent their recurrence and to compensate the surviving sufferers. In some instances the opinion was recorded that nothing short of the administrative independence of the provinces— Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria—would afford reasonable security for good government and the maintenance of peace. In others no opinion was expressed, but Her M a j esty's Government was urged to cooperate with the other Powers for the attainment of that result by such measures as might be most practicable and expedient. Absolute confidence in the government found expression in the speeches of Conservatives and in the resolutions adopted at the few meetings of Conservatives, but not in resolutions adopted by large majorities at public meetings. Elliot, Derby and Disraeli were frequently censured and the early assembling of Parliament was demanded in many cases. In numerous instances votes of thanks were passed to the press, the Times and Daily News coming in for most of the praise, to MacGahan and Schuyler for their efforts, and in particular to the Constantinople correspondents who exposed the atrocities. Much practical sympathy was given by the English public as shown by the number of relief funds organized and heavily contributed to. In addition to the Bosnian, Herzegovinian, and Bulgarian Fugitives and Orphans Relief Fund, the League in Aid of the Christians of Turkey Fund, Viscountess Strangford's Bulgarian Peasant Relief Fund, and 8 5 More than 400 public meetings had been held since July. Gladstone, After Thirty Years (London, 1928), p. 131.

Cf. Lord

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the Fund of the National Society for Aid to Sick and Wounded in War, already alluded to, there had sprung up a Bulgarian Relief Fund in connection with the Turkish Missions Aid Society, another sponsored by the Universal Alliance, and Mrs. Gladstone's Shilling Bulgarian Relief Fund for the borough of Greenwich. By far the most important was the Mansion House Eastern War Sufferers' Relief Fund opened by the lord mayor the second week of September. A s its title denotes its contributions were not to go to the Bulgarians alone. Over £6,000 had been contributed to it by the end of September. Florence Nightingale had early sent in f 10 to that fund designated, however, for the innocents of Bulgaria who in the midst of their " rose-garden industry " were all at once attacked.96 By the latter part of September a reaction to the atrocity agitation was already setting in. At the height of the outburst Lord Beaconsfield had sensed that public opinion would change as quickly as it had formed. In a letter to Northcote he thought it best, generally speaking, when the country went mad, to wait till everything had been so frequently said in one direction that the country, tired of hearing the same thing over and over again, would begin to reflect." Baring's painstaking report, verifying the previously circulated accounts of Turkish misdeeds in all except certain details, was published by the government on the 19th. It was not, however, conciliatory in its reference to Slavic Powers. Lord Derby immediately instructed Elliot to demand a personal audience of the sultan and communicate in substance the result of Baring's inquiries. Elliot was to " call for reparation and justice " and " urge that striking examples should be made on the spot" of those who had " L e t t e r published in the Times, Sept. 18, 1876. 97 Buckle, op. cit., p. 62. The letter was dated Sept. 11.

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connived at or taken part in the atrocities, mentioning by name Shefket Pasha, Hafiz Pasha, Tossoun Bey, Achmet Aga, and other officials whose conduct the future Lord Cromer had denounced.98 At Aylesbury on the 20th the prime minister addressed his former constituents of Bucks in his first speech since the closing of Parliament. He admitted that the cabinet was not backed by the country at the moment, but challenged its conclusion which, if carried into effect, " would alike be injurious to the permanent and important interests of England and fatal to any chance of preserving the peace of Europe." Enthusiasm and sympathy were good traits but " the danger at such a moment is that designing politicians may take advantage of such sublime sentiments, and may apply them for the furtherance of their own sinister ends." Lord Beaconsfield denounced such conduct in rather strong language as it might bring about general havoc and ruin worse than that of the Bulgarian atrocities in case a European war should result. He termed Gladstone's scheme as " absurdly incongruous," and described his adversary as a " humanitarian politician." A very excellent touch of Disraelian humor and sarcasm was injected into the speech in his reference to Gladstone's letter to the Times 89 explaining certain passages of his pamphlet. He commented on the " magnanimous manner " in which Gladstone had said that he did not mean the expulsion of the Turkish nation, but only the Turkish ministers, and then remarked: " Well, I myself have no doubt that Mr. Gladstone did not mean the expulsion of the Turkish nation, but with regard to the expulsion of the Ministers, I doubt whether they are Turks whom he wishes to expel." 100 08

Derby to Elliot, dated Sept. 21, published in the Times, Oct. 7, 1876.

89

Supra, p. 86.

100

Times, Sept. 21, 1876, contains the speech.

gS

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In Beaconsiield's private letters the condemnation of Gladstone's conduct was not so reserved. In letters to Lady Bradford, Gladstone is frequently called the Greenwich " Tartuffe," a " willing victim of every delusion that may bring him power." T o Derby, Beaconsfield wrote in October : " Posterity will do justice to that unprincipled maniac Gladstone—extraordinary mixture of envy, vindictiveness, hypocrisy, and superstition; and with one commanding characteristic—whether Prime Minister, or Leader of Opposition, whether preaching, praying, speechifying, or scribbling —never a gentleman!" 101 The Daily News railed at the words of the premier whereas the Standard and Morning Post expressed their approbation. The Daily Telegraph regarded his speech in the light of a rebuke to public opinion. The country had so allowed itself to be carried away by its strong emotions that it had become unreasoning and even handicapped the action of the government.102 T w o other speeches by prominent members of the cabinet followed up the Aylesbury address. The Guildhall deputation was received by Lord Derby at the foreign office on the 27th, while on the same day Sir Stafford Northcote addressed an enthusiastic assembly of Yorkshiremen. The foreign secretary pointed out the difficulties facing the government of any hurried solution of the Eastern Question and dismissed Liberal propositions set forth within the last few weeks as outside the range of practical politics. The Porte would not of itself commit " political suicide," which necessarily meant that force would have to be employed, and its use Derby strongly deprecated. He did feel it quite possible, however, " to accept the idea of local or administrative autonomy " for the disturbed districts and looked in that direction for a practical solution. Although the chan1»1 Buckle, op. cil., p. 67.

102

Issues of Sept. 21, 1876.

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cellor of the exchequer spoke in the same vein, he could indulge in a few taunts at the expense of the Liberals, who, though they never tired of declaring that they did not look upon the agitation as a party question, were extremely apt in edging in " a few little remarks of something very like a party character." Northcote spoke before a Conservative group, numbering some 25,000, that had gathered despite the rain.103 The government and the Conservative press were not alone in their censure of the atrocity agitation. Other dissentient voices were raised. In Ireland the few previous attempts to hold indignation meetings for the suffering Bulgarians had resulted in indignation of England and the bringing forth of the " Irish Question," not the Bulgarian. The Dublin corporation met on the 25th to consider the holding of a meeting. Alderman M'Swiney felt that the corporation should not be made a political forum for the advancement of a particular party and advised against joining an agitation " got up by Mr. Gladstone " now " stumping the country." He maintained that the movement was not supported by the Catholics of England and went on to say that the Catholics of eastern Europe were not favorable to the idea of throwing in their lot with Russia. A resolution of sympathy was passed by the corporation but it endorsed the policy of the government. On the following day Cardinal Manning decried the " clamorous agitation " in speaking to a group of Roman Catholic clergy and laity at Leeds. He resented that Catholics had been taunted in public prints because of their passive attitude. They did not lack sympathy but were passive because " they believed it was easier to light fires than to quench them." He referred as well to the calmness of Catholics in Ireland " who had not lost their heads." Man103

Reports of both speeches are in the Times, Sept. 28, 1876.

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ning felt that " the duty of every loyal Englishman, at the present time, was to lend the whole of his support to H e r Majesty's Government." 104 T h e silence of the Jewish leaders was in itself decisive. It clearly indicated their stand. Prominent English Jews, of all parties in politics, as Baron Rothschild, Sir Moses Montefiore, Sir Julian Goldsmid, Sir Benjamin Phillips, Baron Henry de W o r m s , Sampson Lucas, Arthur Cohen the eminent jurist, all maintained an attitude of reticence. Gladstone had earlier voiced his strong suspicion to the duke of A r g y l l that the prime minister's crypto-Judaism had to do with his policy. " T h e Jews of the east bitterly hate the Christians; who have not always used them well." 100 Somewhat later Gladstone openly wrote his decided disapproval of the Jewish point of view to the author of a pamphlet which had just been published on The Eastern Question and the Jews. H e deeply deplored " the manner in which what I may call Judaic sympathies, beyond as well as within the circle of professed Judaism, are now acting on the question of the East." 108 In answer to Gladstone, A . L . Green, one of the heads of the Jewish clergy, explained the Jewish position. T h e y lacked no sympathy with sufferers but the Jewish body, acting implicitly under their approved leaders, have been anxious to avoid the fatal mistake of confounding two questions totally distinct—viz., the Bulgarian Atrocities and the Eastern Question . . . Christian? populations of the Turkish Provinces have held, and continue to hold, my co-religionists under every form of political and social degradation. . . . Although Jews may not yet have perfect equality before the 104

Report of speech in the Times, Sept. 27, 1876.

105

Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 552.

Letter to Mr. L. Gluckstein, dated Oct. 6, and published in the Times, O c t 13, 1876. 106

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law under Mahommedan rule, yet, in comparison with what they have suffered at other hands, so rare has been the scourge of fanaticism, that it has become a national proverb, centuries old, that, " It is better to live under Ishmael than under Edom," and that, " The rulers of Ishmael are merciful." How cruelly our fathers must have otherwise suffered to have drawn so favourable a character of the Ishmael we know through history. 107 L o r d Derby had been active throughout September in an effort to bring about an armistice between the Porte and Serbia as a prelude to a peaceful settlement of questions of dispute in the Balkans. A temporary suspension of hostilities had been the only result. T o w a r d the close of September English diplomatic efforts seemed doomed to imminent failure as Serbia became more recalcitrant and renewed hostilities, which deeply disappointed the government. Russian society had become more outspoken in its expressions of sympathy toward the cause of the subject nationalities as anti-Turkish sentiment grew in England, hitherto the chief support of the Porte. Political writers, poets, novelists and songsters seemed to experience, at the same moment, the same impression, and vibrated, as it were, in unison, ardent in the pursuit of a single object—the deliverance of the Balkan Christians from the oppressive rule of the Ottoman. T h e language of Russian journalists and statesmen became decidedly warlike. It was feared by the cabinet that Russia might take this opportune moment to strike since the atrocity agitation was interpreted by many in the light that England had definitely deserted her traditional policy. The marked increase of articles in the Russian press, seemingly inspired, in favor of intervention, and a constant pouring of Russian officers and soldiers into Serbia, were looked upon with suspicion 107

Letter of Green was published in the Times, Oct. 14, 1876.

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by the government. Serbian recalcitrancy, in rejecting a further suspension of hostilities at this time, seemed to indicate high expectancy of aid in the near future. Prince Gortchakoff, the Russian chancellor, chose that moment to communicate, through Count Schouvaloff and General Sumarokoff to the British and Austrian foreign offices respectively, a series of proposals involving a military occupation of Bosnia by Austria, a similar occupation of Bulgaria by a Russian force, and a naval demonstration in the Bosphorus by the united fleets of the Powers. 108 Those steps were regarded as desirable by Russia in order to force the Porte to accept an armistice and the bases of pacification which Derby had himself drawn up and to which the other Powers had agreed. Rumors of the Russian proposals filtered into the press within a few days, bringing in their train disquietude and uncertainty. As noted before, signs of a reaction to the atrocity agitation were already evident as warnings sounded in the ministerial utterances had produced considerable effect. Other voices opposing the intensity of the agitation were now being raised. Some resented the charge of being indifferent and callous and turned on the humanitarians. In general, the right-wing Liberals, as naturally the Conservatives, had come to regard the agitation as having too much of a party flavor. It was feared by many that Russia might be misled and take action that could only be detrimental to English interests. Indications of a changing sentiment were not lacking in the press. The " Thunderer " itself showed definite signs of trimming. During the last ten days of September its columns no longer contained the usual lengthy reports of atrocity meetings, its leading articles were much milder in 108 Communicated to Derby Sept. 26. Published officially in a Supplement to the London Gasette, Nov. 10, 1876.

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their criticisms of the government, and it frowned on the vehemence of both Gladstone and Lowe. T o Russia the first words of warning were issued, cautioning the Russian government that it would " incur a heavy responsibility if it should not use all the power it may still possess over the excitement of its subjects," as all the efforts of diplomacy " may soon be baffled " if it should permit the agitation to grow at the present rate.109 Conservative organs became bolder in the vituperations directed against certain of the Liberal leaders and in their denunciations of Pan-Slav activities. Radical journals of the north as well as the Daily News and Echo of London ignored warnings and rumors, however, and continued their scathing attacks on the Turks and the ministry. Although the Powers were officially to maintain silence on the Russian proposals for a short period, definite knowledge of their content, in somewhat exaggerated forms, circulated freely in the foreign and English journals during the first few days of October. Curiously enough, the expression of indignation and hurt humanitarian feelings had seemed justifiable and truly noble when evinced by Englishmen, but as the same type of agitation grew in Russia it was interpreted as having sinister motive behind it. The Russian proposals, Serbian recalcitrancy, and shortly afterwards the complete failure of English diplomatic efforts to secure an armistice were to bring about a renewed wave of anti-Russian sentiment in England during the months of October and November. Inversely, the publication of the proposals and the fear of contemplated Russian action in the near future brought about an immediate and decided check to the atrocity tempest. Public opinion was to swerve rapidly under the counter-attack of anti-Russian propaganda. The atrocity crusade had spent its force. 108

Times, Sept 30, 1876.

CHAPTER THE

SERBIAN

IV

CAMPAIGN

WAR had been going on in the Balkans since the early days of July. A t its outbreak both the ministry and the English press had strongly deprecated the action of Serbia and Montenegro in resorting to arms, but once that step had been taken nothing remained for the government but to wait on events. It was expected in English circles that Serbia would undergo a rapid defeat. 1 A t the end of the first month of hostilities the failure of the Serbian plan of campaign was generally manifest and the Turks under Osman Pasha had assumed the offensive. The first two weeks of August saw an unbroken string of Turkish victories which dispirited the Serbs. Prince Milan resigned his command of the army and placed General Tchernaieff, a Russian officer, in charge.2 Many Russian volunteers had joined the Serbian forces in July and August. The English press was beginning to pronounce the funeral oration of Serbian arms although sympathizers held the hope that the war would prove too great a drain on the Turkish treasury. The Porte was already issuing paper money to carry on its campaign. The foreign office was busily engaged at this time in obtaining the exact details of the atrocity stories floating about. Upon substantial verification Derby saw fit to warn 1

Supra, pp. 52-54, for review of the outbreak of the war.

Philip Salusbury, Two Months with Tchernaieff in Servia (London, 1877), gives a good account of the later events of the campaign. 2

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the Porte through Elliot that any repetition of such outrages in Serbia would prove disastrous to the Porte as " the indignation of Europe would become uncontrollable, and interference in a sense hostile to Turkey would inevitably follow." 8 The government as well took the precaution to appoint a military attaché, Sir Arnold Kemball, to accompany the Turkish army into Serbia. With Serbian defeat impending, Her Majesty's Government took the first preliminary step toward bringing hostilities to a close by informing Consul-General White at Belgrade on August 14 that, " though they would not propose mediation unless it were asked for, he might suggest to Prince Milan that an application from him to the Powers for their good offices would be favourably received by England." * An open announcement to that effect was made on the following day in the Queen's Speech proroguing Parliament.5 On the 24th of August Prince Milan appealed to the Powers for mediation, necessitating European diplomatic action. England immediately communicated with the other Powers and procured their assent to mediation. Montenegro's formal adhesion to the Serbian request was also obtained after a slight delay. Ambassador Elliot was instructed to " point out to the Porte the extreme importance of not losing this opportunity of restoring peace; since, if hostilities continued, the interference of some of the Powers seemed probable, and the consequences might be fatal to the Turkish Empire." 6 Terms of peace were being elaborated »Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, vol. ccxxxi (third series), p. 1091. •House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xc, Turkey # 1 , no. 800. Hereafter, the heading House of Commons will be omitted and extracts will be cited under the caption Sessional Papers. 5 Supra, p. 62. « Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xc, Turkey # 1 , no. 800.

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by the ministry. Lord Beaconsfield felt that as a result of the unhappy atrocities the cabinet would have to work from a new point of departure and dictate to Turkey since she had forfeited all sympathy. A t the same time he doubted whether any arrangement would be practicable, voicing his fear to Derby that affairs would linger on till the spring, " when Russia and Austria will march their armies into the Balkans, either simultaneously and with a certain understanding, or one following the other's example from jealousy and fear." 7 In line with this new point of departure England took the initiative, on the ist of September instructing its ambassador at Constantinople to press the Turkish government to accept " an armistice of not less than a month's duration, with a view to the immediate discussion of terms of peace,—the armistice to include all combatants." * The ambassadors of the other Powers at Constantinople conferred at the English embassy on the following day and agreed to support Sir Henry Elliot in his mediatory proposals. A n aide mémoire was thereupon presented to the Porte by Elliot on the 3d and by his colleagues on the 4th. The Porte objected to the proposals despite the strong representations of Elliot, which resulted in several weeks of delay. Marked changes had occurred at Constantinople in the meantime. The outlook was considerably brighter for the Porte, causing it to assume dilatory tactics and to suggest terms of peace which England and the other Powers held to be too harsh. Sultan Murad V had been a cipher since his elevation and rumors of his possible abdication had been current in news-items since the early days of August. On August 31 he was deposed and his brother Abdul Hamid T

Buckle, op. cit., p. 52.

•Sessional

Papers, 1877, vol. xc, Turkey # 1 , no. 134.

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was proclaimed Sultan in his place by the council of ministers. No disturbances resulted in the Turkish capital but the change offered an opportunity for delay. Of more importance in determining the stand of the Ottoman ministry was a signal defeat administered to the Serbs by Abdul Kerim Pasha at Alexinatz on the ist of September. Turkey naturally desired time to follow up its advantage in the hope of obtaining better peace terms. Consequently the Porte demanded agreement on the preliminaries of peace prior to the granting of a formal armistice. Under pressure the Porte gave way to the extent of promising a temporary suspension of hostilities. In the same memorandum of the 14th, it submitted six conditions of peace expected from Serbia to the judgment and equitable consideration of the mediating Powers. With regard to Montenegro the Porte held to the status quo. A ten-day suspension of hostilities was granted by an irade of September 15. Her Majesty's Government was satisfied that the demands of the Powers had been practically complied with and sent instructions to Consul-General White to press Serbia, if necessary, to give similar orders. In so doing it was understood that the English government considered some of the peace proposals to be " quite inadmissable." Several days later the Porte was informed that the ministry " accepted the suspension of hostilities as equivalent to an armistice, in the confidence that it would be further extended in case of necessity." 9 Lord Derby then gained the assent of the Powers to an English basis of pacification which, as finally communicated to the Porte after delays on September 25, included provisions for the reestablishment of the status quo in Serbia and Montenegro; the granting of a system of local or administrative autonomy in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria; the carrying out of the reforms 9

Ibid., no. 800.

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promised in the Andrassy Note; and an early arrangement for a formal armistice to enable peace negotiations to be carried on. Strenuous effort had been made in the interim to obtain the sanction of the Porte to an armistice but the Turkish government stubbornly refused to yield. It did, however, consent to prolong the suspension of hostilities until the 2d of October. Prince Milan rejected that offer, professing himself ready to conclude a regular armistice, but not an arrangement like the one hitherto in operation which he considered ill-defined. Despite a direct rebuke by England, hostilities were resumed in the last days of September, Serbia attacking. Russia had also advised Serbia not to renew hostilities, yet would not press the matter as she had from the first required the conclusion of a regular armistice. A s early as September 13 Schouvaloff had communicated to Derby the opinion of his government that the European Powers ought to insist categorically on an immediate armistice without allowing the Porte to attach any conditions to it.10 With the Porte stubborn and Serbia ready to renew hostilities, Russia tossed in its bomb in the form of the proposals to march Austrian and Russian troops into the Balkans and send the united fleets into the Bosphorus in the event the Turks refused the bases of peace.11 A s the situation had suddenly become perceptibly more serious, Lord Beaconsfield recalled members of the ministry from their vacations and cabinet councils were held commencing October 4. On the day previous, Derby had suggested to Count Schouvaloff that in case the Porte replied unfavorably to the terms of peace the Powers should fall back on their original demand for an armistice. The Rus10

Ibid., no. 212.

11

Sept. 26. Supra, p. 100.

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sian chancellor, Prince Gortchakoff, thereupon proposed that it be of six weeks' duration. Lord Derby immediately assured Schouvaloff of English support to an armistice of not less than a month. The two governments were thus seemingly in agreement on that point. A t the same time the Russian ambassador was informed that England was " unable to concur " in the earlier proposals involving military and naval demonstrations.12 With the sanction of the cabinet, Lord Derby instructed Elliot (Oct. 5 ) , in the event of a refusal by the Ottoman ministry of the peace terms, to press upon the Porte as an alternative the grant of an armistice of not less than a month. The armistice concluded, a Conference should immediately take place. The British ambassador was to intimate that if the armistice were refused he was to leave Constantinople. On being advised of England's action, the other Powers unanimously supported the plan of an armistice but were rather cool to the suggestion of a conference. While exerting pressure upon the Porte, the English ministry also felt called upon in the interests of peace to rebuke Russia for permitting the influx of Russians into Serbia, as the presence of Russian officers and soldiers in the Serbian army had assumed proportions little short of national assistance. It was now the turn of the Porte to surprise the Powers. On October 12 the Turkish ministry suddenly offered a six months' armistice with but few conditions attached," at the same time promulgating a general scheme of reform for the whole Ottoman Empire. The English government was 18

Oct. 5. The opposition of Austria was limited. While declining to support a military occupation, Count Andrassy was willing to consider the employment of naval means to attain the object in view. 18 Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xc, Turkey # 1, no. 614. Announced unofficially through Reuter's, Constantinople, on the 10th.

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delighted and the foreign secretary immediately pressed on Schouvaloff and Beust the necessity of their governments urging Serbia to accept. Derby reminded Schouvaloff that Russia herself had earlier proposed a three months' armistice and mentioned that if Russia rejected the present offer the conclusion of the public would be that she meant to go to war. Schouvaloff was rather apprehensive of the view that would be taken at Livadia. 1 4 Prince Gortchakoff showed no hesitation in rejecting a long armistice and insisted on one of four or six weeks as originally proposed, with the possibility of prolongation." Lord Derby deeply regretted that Russia should take that stand and in a quandary appealed to the German chancellor. On the day of his conversation with Count Schouvaloff, Lord Derby had requested the German ambassador to press strongly on his government " the importance of the acceptance by Russia of the armistice." He pointed out to Miinster " that the influence of Germany may be most useful at the present moment, when the Russian Government, by its hesitation and apparent disposition to refuse the armistice, is preparing serious complications, as the refusal could not fail to involve serious danger to the peace of Europe."18 The foreign secretary directed Lord Odo Russell to speak in the same sense to von Biilow at Berlin. F o r several days Lord Odo found it difficult to procure a definite answer from the German chancellor. Finally, after repeated inquiries, on October 17 he was informed by the acting minister for foreign affairs that Prince Bismarck, 14 Ibid., no. 619. The conversation took place on Oct. 13. Livadia, in the Crimea, was the setting of Alexander's court during the autumn months. 15 Gortchakoff to Schouvaloff, dated Livadia, Oct. 14, and communicated to Derby on the 16th. The refusal was known through other sources on the 15th. 16

Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xc, Turkey # 1 , no. 620.

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" without g i v i n g any decided opinion, had, however, admitted the explanations of Prince Gortchakow against a long armistice." 17 On the same day Lord Derby had telegraphed Russell to inquire as to the possibility of Germany coming forward with a new proposal. O n the 18th, another appeal was sent to Bismarck to exert his great influence " to procure the acceptance of some compromise, and avert the danger, which now seemed imminent, of an open rupture between Turkey and Russia." 18 Prince Bismarck immediately replied that Germany could not deviate from the reserve it had hitherto maintained. Although he thought a six months' armistice to be apparently acceptable he did not feel justified in exercising any pressure on the resolution of Russia. In turn Bismarck suggested that a six weeks' armistice " might, perhaps, offer some chance of a solution." 19 T h e frantic appeals to the " Iron Chancellor " were then dropped. One can read in the letters of Lord Beaconsfield during those days a transient desire for a formal treaty with Germany to maintain the status quo, but the astute Bismarck was not yet disposed to weaken the bonds which united Germany to Russia. 20 A cabinet council was held on the 19th at which it was decided to inform Russia that Her Majesty's Government would make no more propositions and reserved its liberty of action to protect its interests. The English ministry held no objections to a shorter term but would no longer press the Porte to accept. Schouvaloff was informed of that decision on the following day. 21 Thus, two months 17

Ibid., no. 698.

Ibid., no. 713. hour on the 18th. 19

18

Ibid., no. 706.

Transmitted to Derby through Munster at a late

20

Buckle, op. ci'/., pp. 81-82.

21

Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xc, Turkey # 1 , no. 716.

n o

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of painstaking effort on the part of Lord Derby to bring about a settlement through the ordinary channels of diplomacy had come to naught.22 The atrocity agitation had to a great extent eclipsed the efforts of diplomacy and the events of the war in the columns of the press during August and September. Liberal journals gloated over the atrocities, condemned the Turks to the realms of darkness and censured the government. Conservative journals decried the extent of the agitation, diverted attention to Pan-Slav machinations, and defended the ministry against the insinuations and charges of the humanitarians. The press was, however, well informed as to the course of diplomacy, alternately reflecting optimism and despair as the negotiations for peace continued. The government, through the medium of ministerial speeches in September, had pointed out the pitfalls in the way of settlement of the Eastern Question and the modifications it could sponsor. Conservative organs merely echoed its opinions, urging minimum changes and reforms in the Turkish Empire. From the Liberal ranks were offered more radical solutions. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe advocated the restoration of the Concert of Europe to press reforms on the Porte. Rapprochement with Russia was the first necessary step. A chain of semi-autonomous provinces free from Turkey but still under her shadowy sovereignty was to be attained. Thus, Redcliffe was in practical agreement with Gladstone, though more moderate in his phraseology. A conference should be held and a mixed commission of the Powers appointed to execute the terms of peace.23 His For a brief summary of English diplomacy during that period see the despatch of Derby to Loftus dated October 30, published in a Supplement to the London Gazette, Nov. io, 1876. A similar summary can be found in Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xc, Turkey # 1 , no. 800. 22

24

Letter to the editor of the Times in issue of Sept. 9, 1876.

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plan now met with considerable more approval than the somewhat similar suggestions he had offered in January and May.2* The Times praised Redcliffe for advocating views akin to its own.25 The Economist, however, maintained that a congress of the Powers to settle the question would be " something like a congress of cats to settle which shall have the cream." 29 Grant Duff, a Scottish M.P., thought it would be comparatively easy to persuade the sultan to retire on a handsome pension to Broussa, after which the European provinces of Turkey could be ruled by the duke and duchess of Edinburgh.27 In that way England and Russia could work in harmony as the duke was Victoria's son and the duchess a daughter of the czar. Editorials in the Daily News and Echo of London and in sundry Radical journals of the north, such as the Newcastle DaUy Chronicle, York Herald, Leeds Mercury, etc., could be interpreted as advocating an Anglo-Russian alliance to drive the Turks out of Europe. At least an Anglo-Russian understanding was urged by the Radical press as most desirable. John Bright condemned the entire Conservative press, specifically the Standard of London and the Manchester Courier, for being "thoroughly Turkish." He would let Turkey " flounder."— " The blood and treasure of England should never again be wasted on behalf of the Turks." Bright decried interference of any kind as it was no business of Englishmen " to be sending ships and troops nearly 3,000 miles to effect territorial changes " in which they had no direct interest.28 2

* Supra, pp. 34 and 45-

28

23

Issue of Sept. 9, 1876.

Economist, Sept. 23, 1876.

27 Advanced by Duff in speech and pamphlet. H e had earlier contributed articles to the Contemporary Review, July and Sept., 1876. 28 Speech to the Manchester Reform Club on Oct. 2, reprinted in the Times, O c t 3, 1876.

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A s the prospects for peace became gloomy the London journals assumed a mournful tone and berated Serbia. W h e n the knowledge of the extreme Russian proposals became current, decided anti-Russian sentiment immediately manifested itself and the atrocities faded into the background. The Pall Mall Gazette hoped the humanitarians would now perceive what they had been clamoring f o r and wanted to see Russia put back into the place of isolation she had occupied a f e w months before. 29 In a similar vein the Standard considered that it was chiefly as a result of their handiwork that Russia was now proceeding as though she had been formally entrusted with a commission for avenging the wrongs of Christendom on T u r k e y : It is an impertinence to talk of Turkish atrocities. There is an atrocity vastly surpassing any which Turkey has committed now being prepared. The Servian war, if it is not a mockery to speak of a Servian war which has been conducted entirely by Russians, has itself fallen into the background. It was but the lever du rideau to the greater drama which was in preparation. W e trust the entertainment will be as pleasing to our Liberal friends as they have been expecting—that the pamphleteers, protesters against atrocities, denouncers of the Turk, and preachers of the new policy will have cause to admire their own righteous and spirited conduct as it will be mirrored in the performance. 30 The Daily Telegraph ranted at Russia and desired her to issue that " imperative rebuke to Servia which she will obey like a hound whistled back to heel." 31 T h e Morning Post was even more bitter. Europe might be spared the 29

Pall Mall Gazette, Oct. 2, 1876.

110

Standard, Oct. 4, 1876.

« Daily Telegraph, Oct. 4, 1876.

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paralyzing fear of impending disaster if only it would decide that, instead of taking common counsel with the burglar for the security of the house, the true wisdom would be to hand him over to the police. " Let the real offender, the promoter of all the mischief, be stripped of his assumed garb of Christian sympathy, and compelled to attend to his own legitimate affairs, and the Eastern Question will be almost solved." "2 The Times practically boxed the compass from its former stand. The tone of its leading articles became distinctly anti-Russian. Serbia had " gone mad." 8i Russia could not be too emphatically warned that in proposing to occupy Bulgaria she had " misread the mind of Europe." The scheme was a masterpiece of audacity and if insisted upon Russia would lay herself open to the " darkest suspicions." ** English interests were now placed first and the cause of the suffering Christians was relegated to a secondary position. English statesmen should not take undue risks. They must not " hand down the Empire of England less secure " than they had received it. The Powers were compared to helpless firemen " looking on at a conflagration which has got beyond control" and the English public to " a crowd of spectators becoming more and more excited," who, without any adequate appreciation of the difficulties to be encountered, clamored for instant and successful interposition." The atrocities were no longer unprecedented, as according to Schuyler's recently published book the Russians had practiced cruelties " still more deliberate, and scarcely less atrocious " under the direct orders of General Kauffmann against the Turcomans of Central Asia. The agitation in 32

Morning Post, Oct. 5, 1876.

« Times, Oct. 2, 1876. " Ibid., Oct. 3, 1876. 85

Ibid., Oct. 5, 1876.

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England had been so far exaggerated as to charge its own government with indifference to atrocities, whereas the worst charge that could fairly be made against them was that of " too great reticence." Though they might have relieved the pressure of public excitement had they spoken more warmly on the subject, it ought to be acknowledged that " they erred on the right side." " It cannot but have been remarked that their reserve in this respect has been exactly imitated by the more responsible leaders of the Liberal Party—Lord Hartington and Lord Granville." "6 Several other prominent Liberals were not so reticent. Among them, curiously enough, was Lord Russell. The old fear of Russia from Crimean days still had its hold on him, as in his refusal to attend an atrocity meeting at S t James's hall he penned his hearty disapproval of Russian designs.'7 The youthful Lord Rosebery felt that the agitation had been carried too far. There was " too great a tendency to interfere with the foreign policy of the existing Government." 88 Before a large gathering of his constituents at Bradford the Rt. Hon. Wm. E. Forster voiced his decided support of the policy Lord Derby was pursuing and repudiated Gladstone's propositions as leading to war. Lavish praise was heaped on his speech by the Conservative Globe and Turcophil Daily Telegraph as well as by the Times. The Globe considered it the ablest exposition that had emanated from the Opposition. For once the Eastern Question had been taken above the confusing din of party strife.'® The Daily Telegraph interpreted his words as " a n energetic hint to Russia that she must not aim at Constantinople under pretence of reforming Turkey." 40 Sir Henry ««Ibid., Oct. 6, 1876. 87

Letter reprinted in the Times, O c t 6, 1876.

88

Speech to Liberals of Dumfries in the Times, Oct. 6, 1876.

»» Globe, O c t 9, 1876.

40

Daily Telegraph, Oct. 9, 1876.

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M. Havelock, Bt., was apprehensive of the consequences of allowing Russia to cross the Danube, yet naively proposed that England might well undertake the pacification of Bulgaria by landing a force of 15,000 men, for which he innocently suggested that the Turks be made to pay/ 1 The staunch Gladstonians were not easily intimidated by the attacks directed against them. T w o Bulgarian delegates had made their way to London and various love feasts were arranged for them by interested clergymen such as Canon Liddon of St. Paul's, the Rev. Dr. Parker of the City Temple, Rev. Wm. Denton, Rev. Newman Hall, etc. A demonstration was held at Hyde Park on the afternoon of the 9th with the Bulgarians exhibited on the main platform. In the evening Mr. Stansfield was in the chair at St. James's hall supported by E. A . Freeman, Hillary Skinner, a former special correspondent of the Daily News, Dr. Baxter Langley, J. J. Merriman and others. A long letter from Gladstone was read in which he reiterated his former views and added a few more charges against the administration. Stansfield would not admit that a turn of the tide of public opinion had taken place, but did note a counter wave. H e maintained that English public opinion upon the Eastern Question had undergone a revolution. The unexampled movement had already changed the policy of the government and was not a kind of temporary insanity of an amiable character as averred in society, in the clubs, and in a portion of the press.42 The Daily News was the sole metropolitan newspaper of standing to voice its praise of the speeches. It had practically ignored the Russian proposals and had continued to denounce the Turks as vehemently as before. It asserted « Letter to the Times in its issue of Oct. 6, 1876. 42

Accounts of meetings in the Times, Oct. io, 1876.

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that no consideration was due the Turkish government. The policy of England must contemplate not its maintenance, but its extinction, gradual and pacific if possible, but in any case certain, for it is sinking from inward exhaustion under the weight of its crimes. No folly could equal that of attempting to found an Eastern policy upon the assumption of the permanence of Ottoman rule in southeastern Europe.** The influential Manchester Guardian had veered and now observed that the stress of Mr. Gladstone's feelings " is becoming rather alarmingly great." ** The Times dismissed the resolutions of the clergymen as " mere declamations of demagogues in Hyde Park." Stansfield was described as a " sentimental politician " and Gladstone's language as that of " passion and excitement." It condemned Gladstone's conduct in no minced phrases. When ministers were straining every nerve to secure a peaceable discussion of the situation, " they should be supported by every man of influence in England." " Sir Edward Cook in his biography of Delane offers an explanation of the stand of the " Thunderer " during this period in an effort to clear its editor from the charge of a vacillating and constantly shifting policy. Delane, subject to illness during the year, had taken several weeks' rest in the Highlands at Dunrobin in September. His hope had been that Great Britain might secure sweeping internal reforms in Turkey while at the same time preventing singlehanded intervention by Russia. He was afraid that under the impulse of Mr. Gladstone's agitation his writers were committing the paper too far toward sympathy with the « Daily News, Oct II, 1876. 44 Manchester Guardian, Oct 11, 1876. 46 Times, Oct. io, 1876.

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idea of Russian intervention and hurried back to steer his craft into a middle course. The " gentle art of curvature " was employed and Delane executed a skilful retreat from a false position. 4 ' Lord Beaconsfield termed it " ratting." 47 Gladstone was disgusted and wrote in that vein to Abraham Hayward on the ioth of October, the day of its latest attack on him. " T h e Times appears to be thoroughly emasculated. It does not pay to read a paper which next week is sure to refute what it has demonstrated this week. It ought to be prohibited to change sides more than a certain number of times in a y e a r . " — " After reading the Times of to-day," replied Mr. Hayward by return post (Oct. n ) , " y o u will be tempted to improve upon your proposal, and prohibit them from changing sides more than once in twenty-four hours. The first article is anti-Russian, and the second still more decidedly anti-Turk." 48 Cook remarks that the two articles together expressed Delane's views: He was strongly anti-Turk, in the sense that he was resolutely set against any policy of intervention to bolster up Turkish misgovernment; he was anti-Russian, in the sense that he mistrusted the policy of the Russian Government. He was antiDisraeli, when he thought that the Prime Minister's policy was secretly tending in the former direction; he was anti-Gladstone, when he thought Mr. Gladstone's agitation tended to encourage the development of the crisis in the latter direction. He pinned his faith upon Lord Derby and Lord Salisbury, and hoped for a peaceful solution of the crisis which should reconcile British interests with the effective release of oppressed nationalities from Turkish misrule.48 Sir Edward Tyas Cook, Delane of " The Times",

pp. 254-5S.

" Buckle, op. cit., p. 794 8 H . E . Carlisle (editor), A selection from the Correspondence Abraham Hayward (London, 1886), vol. ii, p. 267. 49

Cook, op. cit., p. 256.

of

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Sir Edward admitted that the advocacy of a middle line such as that was open to question on the point of feasibility and necessarily presented an aspect of inconsistency, as first one side of the case and then the other was expounded. A ray of hope was seen on the announcement by the Porte of a prolonged armistice. The entire English press welcomed it and expressed its complete satisfaction. 60 The relief was, however, premature, as Russia rejected the offer. The refusal was profoundly disappointing and English editors voiced their bitterness. The Standard attacked Russia as the one Power " not desirous of a pacific solution of the Eastern Question " and felt that the Russian action should even " sober some of the most rabid of our Slavophils." Russia was referred to as England's " adversary " by the Morning Post. In bitter jest it also termed the atrocity agitation " the national disaster." The Daily News could think of nothing better than to criticize Derby's diplomacy. " It is not that he cannot make a beginning, but that he cannot make an end." 01 The Times was either rewarded for its recent support of the government and used to ascertain continental opinion regarding an Anglo-German understanding or it gained its knowledge of the contemplated English appeal to Germany through other friendly sources. A t any rate, out of a clear sky, in its leading article of October 16, the Times expressed its fervent hope that Bismarck counsel Russia: One plain word from him would stop Russia even on the brink of the abyss . . . What England preeminently seeks is Peace. . . . The best security for Peace is, in the first instance, the firm attitude of a great military Power like Germany, and, in the next, a cordial alliance between her and England for the purpose of making the requisite changes in Turkey. 30

Issues of Oct. 12, 1876.

61

Issues of Oct. 16, 1876.

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The Times feeler met with a cool reception in Berlin newspapers. The semi-official Norddeutsche allgemeine Zeitung of that evening remarked that the Times appeared to overlook the existence of the alliance of the three imperial Powers, and added that nothing debarred England from joining the alliance if she so wished. The National-Zeitung, mouthpiece of the National Liberals, observed that the power of Germany neither gave her the right nor imposed upon her the duty of placing her own peace in jeopardy for the advantage of others. T h e Russophil Nord of Brussels stated that, in reality, Russia was being reproached for seriously entertaining the program put forward by England.52 On the following morning the Times mildly repeated its suggestion of the previous day, then dropped the matter. The Standard considered the frantic appeal to Prince Bismarck " absurd," " which was rather strange as it emanated from the government. Following the complete breakdown of diplomatic negotiations, English journals radiated despair and their hostility to Russia increased. It was believed merely a question of time until the inevitable war would occur. Conservative newspapers now took their revenge on their Liberal contemporaries for having sponsored the atrocity agitation, thereby inciting Russia. A n article in the current number of the Edinburgh Review, the historical organ of W h i g principles, drew the highest praise from Conservative critics. The Edinburgh reviewer singled out Forster and Hartington as the two Liberal statesmen who had kept in the true path of Liberal traditions. H e deprecated the atrocity agitation as having forwarded the aims of Russia and weakened the diplomatic action of the government. A f t e r reminding the public that " the maintenance of peace, " Ibid.

« Standard, Oct 17, 1876.

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the strict observance of treaties, and absolute religious toleration, be it to Christian, Mohammedan, Buddhist, or Hindoo— are permanent principles, not only accepted by the nation, but imposed by the nation on those who would govern it," he argues that they are " not lightly to be thrown aside under any amount of temporary excitement or even provocation." " Gladstone noted an undoubted rally on behalf of Turkey in the metropolitan press but dubbed it in the main representative of the ideas and opinions of what were called the upper ten thousand." The Times could find no fault with the cabinet in the late conduct of its negotiations. England had worthily fulfilled the duties which belonged to her as the one great Power which could not be suspected of ambitious designs. She could now await even the outbreak of war with equanimity, but it was her duty to watch with sufficient preparation the march of events. It seems that the other Powers had " designs," whereas England had " interests "—in Constantinople, in Egypt, and along the entire route to India— which she was forced to protect. In a novel way the Times now also explained that it was the patience, the political tolerance, and the justice of England that interposed in time to restrain the atrocity agitation.68 Delane was consistent only in the view that England should not war for Turkey. That would be folly." 57 The Times, further, always stressed the necessity of reforms in the Ottoman Empire. As the result of the failure of negotiations and the warlike rumors in circulation, the stock exchange became very unsteady and a slight panic resulted. There was much ex54

Edinburgh Review, Oct., 1876, " Bosnia and Bulgaria."

85

Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 557. Times, Oct. 18, 1876.

88

" Ibid., Oct. 19, 1876.

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citement, which was taken advantage of by speculators for the fall; in consequence there were heavy declines in those classes of stocks which would be primarily affected by a war in eastern Europe. Many holders of Russian, Hungarian, Turkish, Egyptian and other bonds, being genuinely alarmed, were anxious to sell at all hazards. Other securities shared in the general depreciation and the stock exchange was for a time in the hands of the " bears," who had everything their own way. Newspapers contributed to the fall by spreading " Panic in the Stock E x c h a n g e " across their pages in large type. The long suspense on the Eastern Question, the protracted waiting for definite news of peace or war, the sensitiveness and susceptibility consequently engendered, and the special reasons that existed for distrust of the financial stability of Russia, all combined to prepare for the sharp decline which took place on the announcement of the failure of negotiations. In the public mind was held the fear that war was inevitable. In the previous May the first shock had been felt. The rejection by England of the Berlin Memorandum had caused considerable depression, but the deposition of Abdul Aziz and the postponement of the Berlin scheme sine die were the signals for a complete recovery. Although the outbreak of the Serbian campaign and the influx of Russian volunteers during the summer months had caused many minor fluctuations, it was not until mid-October that the second crash came. Within three days Russian and Hungarian stocks fell around twenty per cent. The Economist later compiled an interesting table in which a measure is taken of the two periods of panic referred to; the second, that of October, being by far the more violent: 58 88 Economist, June 22, 1878, " The Effect of the W a r upon the Prices of Securities."

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Jane, 1876 May, Highest Price Consol* . . . . Hainan S%, '73Hungarian, '74. Turkish . Egyptian, 1873. French 5% . . . Italian Rente . .

96 u 99* 86 «3 4S 106 % 72

Fall

-

June, Lowest Price

I H 93 H X «4* X —11 75 3 * 9X —11 34 3 * 102JÌ — 2 70

CRISIS October, 1876

Rise

+ 4*

+ 6* + 10 + +6 + + 3%

T»iy. Highest Price

97* 91 13* 40 106 73*

Oct., Highest Price

Fall

96 % - *H 93* - 1 9 * 86 —20 1 3 * - 3% 44 — 6 106« 2* 74* — 8

October 18

Rise

+

96* 87 81 »K Si 106 6 * 73

93« 74 + 13 66 + 1S 10 38 + «3

+ +

66* +

W i t h i n several weeks a large portion of the fall was to be made good, the bourse reflecting rising hopes of peace as a barometer. T h a t rise w a s to be checked again by a warlike speech o f the czar at M o s c o w and news of an order issued f o r the mobilization of the Russian army just prior to the middle of November. D u r i n g the succeeding few months there were to be only minor variations. Domestic issues fell and rose with the foreign. T h e marked interest shown by the English public in E g y p t i a n securities was to make itself even more manifest as it became more evident that Egyptian security was to be identified with " English interests." A t the time of the market crash the Pan-Slav Golos trenchantly attacked L o r d Beaconsfield's imperialism and accused him of having, in conjunction with the firm of E r langer, amassed a colossal fortune by speculating on the various phases of the Eastern Question. In commenting on the stupidity of the article the Glasgow News regarded the statement as incredible " were it not that we have a Spectator at home." 69 T h e English press as a whole considered the 89

Glasgow News, O c t 25, 1876.

Nov., Highest Price

THE

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CAMPAIGN

123

charges to be ridiculous and, if believed, proof of the credulity and simplicity of the Russian mind. Shortly thereafter, at the desire of the czar, Count Schouvaloff called on the premier to express the imperial government's utter repudiation of the calumnies of the Golos. Vanity Fair, the earliest of the modern society papers, which claimed to be the especial journal and accepted organ of the wealthy classes, placed the blame for the panic on an announcement that an alliance had been made between Russia, Germany and Austria to act together in the East. 40 Russia was to be allowed to fight Turkey while her co-conspirators, bought off " by a promise of territorial ' compensations ' for themselves out of the new map of Europe," were to " keep the ring." Vanity Fair believed such an arrangement might be possible for Germany but it could not be lasting for Austria, since Hungary also existed. The Magyars would not hear of adding more turbulent Slavs to the monarchy. Curiously enough Vanity Fair saw no cause for panic in all that, as, if Russia goes to war with Turkey, Russia will be beaten, unless Turkey is held back and prevented from putting forth her strength by England. What is required now is what always was required—plain speaking and honest dealing. The one demands that we should break off diplomatic intercourse with a Power so perjured and faithless, so plundering and lawless, as Russia has shown herself to be; the other that we should leave Turkey free from our paralysing counsels to fight her own battle, without troubling ourselves about alliances, and without, above all, undertaking any such adventures of neutral engagements as we did on the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war. 60 The Bullionist of Oct. 21 mentions the announcement on the afternoon of the 18th as further depressing the market.

124

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War would not even result if England spoke plainly since Russia knew the strength of Turkey and her own weakness."1 Other rumors had been in circulation as well—of warlike preparations being made by England; that Ignatieff had an ultimatum in his pocket to deliver to the Porte; and even that the Russians had crossed the Danube, which would have been quite a feat On assurance that the rumors were untrue and as it became generally believed that the government would remain neutral as long as English interests were not interfered with, the flurry of excitement subsided and the market rapidly improved. English diplomacy rested during the latter days of October, resulting in somewhat of a lull. It was now the turn of the platform demagogues to review the events of the fore part of October. Both Conservative and Liberal speakers actively engaged in verbal skirmishes. Numerous Conservative meetings were held at which the speakers voiced high praise of the part played by the government in the recent negotiations, warned Russia to proceed slowly, and caustically criticized the Radicals for having encouraged Russia. A t several of the gatherings cabinet members addressed large audiences. The home secretary, Richard Assheton Cross, spoke rather mildly at the opening of a new Conservative club in Manchester on the 26th, but Lord John Manners, at Edinburgh on the last day of the month, threw reserve to the winds in attacking the Power that had " annihilated Poland." He scored the conduct of Gladstone, Lowe and the duke of Argyll, contrasting their language with that of Lords Granville and Hartington. The postmaster general also pointed out that many Liberal journals had refused to follow Gladstone in his attacks on the government and he knew of only one Conservative of 41 Vanity Fair, Oct. 21, 1876. Thomas Gibson Bowles was proprietor and editor of Vanity Fair.

THE

SERBIAN

CAMPAIGN

125

any great eminence who supported Russia in its " malignant enterprise." " Numerous Liberals rallied to the defense of Gladstone. George Otto Trevelyan, M.P. and man of letters, had earlier voiced strong charges against the policy of Her Majesty's Government. He had remarked that Lord Derby, had he been a Russian agent, " could not have played more completely into the hands of Russia" as his diplomacy had caused the Christian populations of the Balkans to regard England with distrust, with the result that they turned to Russia. His statements drew the ire of Conservative speakers. Writing in defense of his views, Trevelyan sought to correct false interpretations. He had censured the government for not having taken strenuous enough measures at the favorable moment. " It should have been the object of British diplomacy to win the confidence of the Christians of the East, and teach them to look to us, as well as to Russia, for assistance and protection." 88 E. A. Freeman, never long silent, also attacked the foreign secretary. He wrote that Derby's doings toward Crete, of ten years back, " ought to have shut him out for ever from the pale of civilized society." Lord Derby had not learned his lesson from history and, through his more recent encouragement of Turkey to massacre, he had now " dyed his hands in the blood of Bulgaria." " For further enlightenment Freeman referred his readers to his recent letters published in the Daily News and to his article in the current Fortnightly Review. In an address to Birmingham Liberals, Joseph Chamberlain hoped that, whatever happened, " the English people would not be led away by the scare of 6 2 Speech in the Times, Nov. 2, 1876. referring to the marquis of Bath.

Lord Manners was probably

M

Letter to the Times in its issue of Oct. 21, 1876.

64

Letter to the Times in its issue of Oct. 23, 1876.

126

BRITAIN

AND THE BALKAN

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Russian aggression or the bugbear of Russian ambition." M Sir Henry James, attorney-general in Gladstone's ministry, was quite moderate in reviewing the recent steps of the cabinet to his constituents at Taunton. He felt that public opinion had definitely shaped the policy of the government so that it was now in practical accord with the feeling of the nation.6' Earl Fitzwilliam, a staunch Liberal, refused to follow Gladstone and went so far as openly to condemn his language. He wanted it made clear that " a vast and influential portion of the Liberal Party is resolved to lay aside all personal and party feeling." His lordship held no doubt as to the cruel and deceitful character of the aggressive policy of Russia—" a policy which at the present time seriously imperils British interests, and which it will require unanimity in England to hold in check." Conservative organs singled out Fitzwilliam's letter 87 as worthy of especial praise. The Globe utilized his words to contend that the outcry against the government " originated with and was maintained by one section of the Liberal party, and that not the wisest." 68 The Radical Echo and the Daily News viciously attacked his statements. While waiting on events, some attention was being directed by the press to the question of the future policy of Britain. Radical organs continued their anti-Turk tirades, urging more strongly that England cooperate with Russia in the interest of the enthralled Christians. The Examiner contended that cooperation with Russia on the basis of the complete removal of Ottoman administration from Europe would 45

From summary of his speech in the Times, Oct. 24, 1876. Ibid., Oct. 37, 1876. 67 Of Oct. 21, in the Sheffield and Rotherham Independent, Oct. 23, 1876. «» Globe, Oct. 24, 1876.

THE

SERBIAN

CAMPAIGN

12 7

serve a double object as it would also eliminate the pretext for Russian intrigues.49 The Spectator had no doubt that Lord Beaconsfield would endeavor, as soon as opportunity offered, " to work the spell contained for the imagination of Englishmen in the word ' Constantinople.' " 7 0 Conservative journals contented themselves with fiery blasts against Russia, marking time until the cabinet should see fit to show its hand. Moderate Liberal newspapers of influence, such as the Manchester Guardian and the Scotsman of Edinburgh, were steering a middle course similar to that of the Times. They were both anti-Turk and anti-Russian, urging non-intervention and peace. In the words of the Scotsman, British policy as indicated by the country " demands better administration for the Turkish provinces, it imposes a firm front to Russian aggression, and seeks in the best and only true sense to uphold British interests." 71 A f t e r the English refusal to press Turkey further, Russia had continued to haggle with the Porte in an effort to obtain the desired armistice. In the meantime the Turks had been gradually pushing back the Russo-Serbian forces and were attacking Djunis, the key to all Serbia. Djunis fell on the 29th of October. Prince Milan thereupon assembled his ministers in council and an urgent appeal was wired to the czar at Livadia to obtain an immediate armistice, or failing that, to intervene on behalf of Serbia. On the following evening Ignatieff was instructed by the czar to demand of the Porte the acceptance of an armistice and the cessation of hostilities within forty-eight hours. He was to inform the Porte that in the event it refused, diplomatic relations would be broken off. The Russian ambassador pocketed the 69

Examiner,

70

Spectator, Oct. 21, 1876.

Oct. 21, 1876.

William Minto was its editor.

71 Scotsman, O c t 24, 1876. Rev. Dr. Robert Wallace had a few months before been installed as its new editor.

128

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ultimatum for a day as he held high hopes of concluding the armistice without its presentation. Alexinatz was occupied by the Turks on the 31st, the Serbs having evacuated it. Ignatieff presented the Russian ultimatum to Safvet Pasha at seven that evening. Deligrad was occupied at noon on November 1. That same evening Turkey accepted the ultimatum. The Russian ultimatum was taken rather calmly by the English press and public since the armistice would give an interval for peaceful negotiations. The stock market was indicative of the relief felt as general buoyancy asserted itself immediately after the conclusion of the armistice. Serbia was looked on with disdain as having howled before having been well beaten. Conservative journals took the stand that Turkey could have gained nothing by refusal and showed further proof of moderation by acceptance of the armistice so rudely pressed upon her. Radical organs utilized the success of the ultimatum to contend that force was the only method with which to persuade the Turks. Thus, Serbia had been saved from the consequences of its own folly by the action of its protector.

CHAPTER THE

CONSTANTINOPLE

V CONFERENCE

ENGLISH diplomacy did not long remain inactive. Immediately following the acceptance of the ultimatum by the Porte the czar held a long conversation with Lord Loftus, the English ambassador, at Livadia on the second day of November. In the course of the interview the czar expressed his deepest regrets that " there still existed in England an ' inveterate ' suspicion of Russian policy and a continual fear of Russian aggression and conquest." His Majesty could not understand, when both countries had a common object—namely, the maintenance of peace and the amelioration of the condition of the Christians—and when he had given every proof that he had no desire for conquest or aggrandizement, why there should not be a perfect understanding between England and Russia. He regarded the intentions attributed to Russia of a future conquest of India and of the possession of Constantinople as absurd. The former would be impossible, and in regard to the latter Alexander gave his " most solemn assurances " that he entertained " neither the wish nor the intention " to possess Constantinople. He also expressed his desire that a conference should meet with the least delay, taking as a basis the earlier proposals submitted by Lord Derby. 1 On the following day the foreign secretary evidenced the " greatest satisfaction " over the czar's assurances.2 1 Loftus to Derby, dated Yalta, Nov. 2, published in a to the London Gasette, Nov. 21, 1876. 2

Supplement

Ibid., Derby to Loftus, dated Nov. 3. 129

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A cabinet council was held on November 4 at which it was decided to renew the suggestion of October 5 that a conference should take place at Constantinople, " in which all the Guaranteeing Powers and the Porte should take part." T w o plenipotentiaries were to be appointed by each Power. The bases for the deliberations of the conference were also stated.' Lord Salisbury was appointed as the Plenipotentiary Extraordinary for England a few days later. Russia accepted the idea of a conference on November 8, but Prince Gortchakoff favored the holding of a preliminary conference from which the Turks should be barred; to be followed by a formal conference later, possibly at some other capital. The English press voiced its approval of a conference and all organs, Liberal as well as Conservative, expressed only the highest praise over the appointment of Lord Salisbury. Nothing was known of the czar's disavowals at Livadia as the government had as yet not published that conversation. The bases of peace were, however, being discussed and some optimism was manifested. Enlivening the first week of November was a spirited controversy engaged in between Gladstone and the Pall Mall Gazette. Anti-Russian newspapers had long been countering the effects of the Turkish atrocities by citing examples of Russian methods along the same lines. They constantly quoted from Schuyler's recently published volumes. 4 Attacks on the Serbs and Montenegrins had also become more frequent. In that venerable organ of Tory orthodoxy, the Quarterly Review, it was affirmed that the Serbs had beer so cowardly and cold-blooded as to shoot down their Russian officers as they led them in attack. Before Alexinatz a «Ibid., Derby to Elliot, dated Nov. 4. 4 Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan, Notes of a Journey in Russian Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja (London, 1876), 2 vols.

Turkistan

THE

CONSTANTINOPLE

CONFERENCE

Serbian regiment went into the conflict " with twenty-two Russian officers, of whom only four came out alive, and all those who were found on the field were shot in the back!" * Serbian bullets were extracted from their wounds. It seemed the Montenegrins indulged in the pleasant custom of cutting off the noses o f the T u r k s in battle, as Montenegrin chiefs paid their clansmen for the number of noses produced. Gladstone bitterly attacked the Pall Mall Gazette in an article in the November Contemporary Review, accusing it o f misquoting and garbling Schuyler's words in order to palliate Turkish misdeeds. 8 Pall Mall took up the accusations and returned Gladstone's compliment of the lie in its editorials. 7 Other journals participated in the controversy as well. Schuyler evidently considered it necessary to make his own views more clear as he wrote to the Daily News from Constantinople that he did not think Russian officers and soldiers to be habitually brutal, cruel, or savage. He considered the Turkoman and Khokand campaigns to be very exceptional. " Personally, Russian soldiers are goodhearted fellows, and I would not for a moment compare them to Bashi-Bazouks, as has o f late been very unjustly done." 8 Schuyler, however, added that he saw no reason for concealing the ill-conduct of Russian officers, such as General Kauffmann, in matters like that, any more than that of Achmet A g a or Shefket Pasha. T h e Pall Mall Gazette, though it avowed independent Liberalism, had all along acrimoniously attacked Gladstone. 5 Quarterly Review, Government."

• Contemporary Turkistan."

Oct.,

Review,

1876, " The

Eastern

Question and

the

Nov., 1876, " Russian Policy and Deeds in

7

Cf. Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 4, 1876.

8

Letter dated Constantinople, Nov. 4, in the Daily News, Nov. 15, 1876.

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It was anti-Radical on all questions of foreign policy and, while it did not openly hoist Tory colors, it steadily insisted on the observance of imperial responsibilities, therefore opposing Gladstonian opinion. Under its editor, Frederick Greenwood, its tone was so anti-Russian that it was considered by many to be Turcophil. The Daily Telegraph, the Morning Post and the Standard were regarded in the same light by their critics. Prospects of serenity were rudely dissipated within the next few days. It seemed that it was necessary for both England and Russia to enter the peace conference in shining armor. Lord Beaconsfield breathed defiance to Russia at the Guildhall on November 9. The czar retaliated with warlike utterances at Moscow on the following day. Several days later Russia announced the partial mobilization of her army and her intention to float a huge loan. War fever rapidly spread in both countries and the likelihood of a successful issue resulting from the coming conference was clearly not promising. A t the Guildhall, as was the custom on Lord Mayor's Day, the premier reviewed the events of the past year. Lord Beaconsfield described the two great objects which the government had sedulously pursued in the course of the last twelvemonth. The first was the maintenance of the general peace of Europe which could best be realized by observance of the treaties of 1856 and 1871. Those treaties were not antique and dusty obsolete documents—they still provided for the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire. The second was to secure such an amelioration of the condition of the subjects of the Porte as, by their increasing prosperity and welfare, would add in the surest manner to the independence and integrity of the country, and prevent the occasion of future disturbances.

THE

CONSTANTINOPLE

CONFERENCE

A f t e r acquainting his hearers with the stand of the cabinet in regard to past occurrences, the premier turned to the more recent events. He voiced his satisfaction over the procurement of the armistice, yet cautioned his audience that an armistice " is certainly not peace, any more than courtship is wedlock," although in general it could be regarded as the auspicious harbinger of a happy future. T h e " ultimatum " by which the armistice had been obtained was termed " an ugly word " when endeavoring to bring about a peaceful settlement. H e was, however, happy to announce that all the Powers had agreed to attend the coming conference which had been proposed by Her Majesty's Government. In conclusion he uttered the words that many were to interpret as a dire warning and threat to Russia: I am hopeful, in the present temper of Europe, we shall be able to accomplish the objects we have in view without those terrible appeals to war, of which, I think, we have heard too frequently and too much. A s the Lord Mayor has told us tonight, there is no country so interested in the maintenance of peace as England. Peace is especially an English policy. She is not an aggressive Power—for there is nothing which she desires. She covets no cities and no Provinces. What she wishes is to maintain and to enjoy the unexampled Empire which she has built up, and which it is her pride to remember exists as much upon sympathy as upon force. But, although the policy of England is peace, there is no country so well prepared for war as our own. If she enters into conflict in a righteous cause—and I will not believe that England will go to war except for a righteous cause—if the contest is one which concerns her liberty, her independence, or her Empire, her resources, I feel, are inexhaustible. She is not a country that, when she enters into a campaign, has to ask herself whether she can support a second or a third campaign. She enters into a campaign which she will not terminate till right is done.9 9 Times, Nov. 10, 1876, contains a full report of the Guildhall speech. Cf. also Buckle, op. cit., pp. 90-92.

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Delane sought to take the edge off the premier's speech. In its leading article o f the ioth, the Times considered Lord Beaconsfield's remarks liable to be misconstrued as they were too dramatic. A s usual the flights of fancy of the prime minister caused him to envelop his statements in a " haze of grandiloquent mystery." Delane pared down what appeared to be too fanciful and in particular softened his threat to Russia. Conservative organs had only praise for his words. Even the Globe, usually more mild in its tone than the other London Conservative journals, commended to the Continental friends of England who still believed that she was in favor of a policy of " peace at any price " the noteworthy fact " that the most warlike portion of L o r d Beaconsfield's speech met with the greatest applause." 10 T h e Spectator bitterly remarked that from the beginning to the end of the premier's speech there were nothing but "false trails." 1 1 In general, Radical and most Liberal journals attacked his language as far too boastful. O n the day after the Guildhall gathering the czar addressed the Nobles and Councillors of Moscow in a similar vein. " I am determined," he said in effect, that those who are the kinsmen in blood and brethren in creed of the mass of my fellow-subjects shall be protected for the future from the tyranny and oppression of which they have been the prey. . . . Give me surety that these results shall be secured, and no one will be more thankful than myself. I care not how the end is gained, so long as it is gained; and I enter the Congress ready to discuss all plans and to adopt any that can be trusted. But if my hopes are disappointed . . . and I may be disappointed, I shall act alone, and I am bound to prepare for that alternative from which I recoil. 1 ' 10

Globe, NOT. IO, 1876.

« Spectator, Nov. n , 1876. 11

Times, NOT. 16, 1876, contains the speech.

THE CONSTANTINOPLE

CONFERENCE

The general impression produced by the czar's address was that, in case Russia was not granted the guarantee she asked of the Porte at the conference, she would resort to war. Some termed it the czar's ultimatum to Europe. Others toned down the minatory phrases and stressed the passages of the speech which indicated a desire for peace. The Manchester Guardian saw no reason to doubt the " perfect sincerity " of that aspiration on the part of the emperor, a sincerity which in itself constituted " the best reason for not attaching an exaggerated importance to the singular manner in which he has in this speech seen fit to express it." " The Globe took his words serenely : Had war actually been intended, who can suppose that language of this kind would have been used? Diplomacy has not yet been wholly forgotten in Russia. . . . If we had been on the eve of a vast conflict, we should have been treated to all sorts of reassurances; the amiable designs of Russia would have been set forth in glowing colours. Having no thought of going to war, the czar feels he can afford himself the luxury of dazzling his subjects by a slight gleam of his sword.14 Many interpreted the speech as a direct retort to Beaconsfield's language at the Guildhall. The Standard stated that theory to be " as monstrous an invention as any which has come from the atrocity warehouse." 18 The Times considered that interpretation to be " at least hasty." 16 Queen Victoria expressed her feelings strongly though somewhat inaccurately. " What an infamous lie," she wrote to her premier, " to say the Emperor Alexander's speech at Moscow was in consequence of Lord Beaconsfield's excellent one at the Mansion House." 17 la

Manchester Guardian, Nov. 13, 1876.

" Globe, Nov. 13, 1876. 18

15

Standard, Nov. 14, 1876.

Times, Nov. 15, 1876.

1 7 Buckle, op. cit., p. 93. Buckle states definitely that the czar had no cognizance of Beaconsfield's words but that is rather doubtful. Whether they influenced the czar's language can only be conjectured.

I36

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

The Pall Mall Gazette feared the effects of the czar's words on the enthusiasm of the Russian people. It apprehended that a cry for war for the Slavonian cause would now be heard over the entire land.18 Pall Mall's misgivings were realized as the Russian press abounded in warlike intelligence. The Moscow Vedomosti, in the true Byzantine style befitting the ancient capital, declared all Russia convinced that in confronting Europe she was carrying out the behests of God. The Novoye Vremya (New E r a ) indulged in visions of the glorious self-assertion of the Slavonic race. The St. Petersburg Bir2hevyya Vedomosti (Exchange Gazette) adopted a more secular tone, being convinced that England would leave Turkey to her fate could a guarantee be given her for the punctual payment of the interest on the Turkish debt, and for the indefinite continuation of English free-trade robbery of what now formed the territory of the Ottoman Empire. The Golos, with that happy mixture of enthusiasm and diplomacy which distinguishes a ministerial organ, delighted in the prospect of a sacred war but represented it as fortunately improbable. England was taunted as wanting in military resources and the cabinet as restrained by the popular opinion of its own countrymen. A s to Austria, its Slavonian subjects would render it impossible for the Emperor Francis Joseph to fight against Russia. Europe would yield before the mere sight of the dread Muscovite legions. 18 Europe was not kept in long suspense over the meaning of the Moscow declamation. Confirmation of the rumors in circulation that Russia had ordered partial mobilization was soon forthcoming. On the 13th Prince Gortchakoff, simultaneously with that menacing demonstration, addressed a 18

Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 13, 1876.

Extracts from Russian journals in the Times, Nov. 15, 1876, as translated by its Berlin correspondent. 19

THE CONSTANTINOPLE

CONFERENCE

circular of a reassuring character to the Russian representatives abroad. Russia did not wish for war but at the same time demanded " efficacious guarantees." Russian mobilization occasioned new tirades in the Conservative press and gloomy forebodings in Liberal journals. The market again dropped in sympathy. Russian bonds in particular were sold heavily by their English owners. The Morning Post included the Times in its philippics—" which might well change its name for that of the Golos or the Russki Mir." 20 The Daily Telegraph in a similar vein lashed the " unholy alliance between English agitators and Russian crusaders." A clear line must be drawn between " justice and aggression." 21 Delane took for granted that the alternative of the success of the conference was war.22 He was desirous above all else of peace and reform in the Ottoman Empire. Delane therefore had attempted to dissociate the speeches of Beaconsfield and the czar, having minimized the warlike threats contained therein. Always mindful that the Porte was imbued with the idea that English support would be forthcoming in the final reckoning, Delane had continually pounded out the idea of "non-support" and had expostulated against any language that might tend to encourage the Turks in their obstinacy against reforms. Spirited language had best be left unsaid as it would " unwittingly deceive the Turks themselves." 23 Turkish obstinacy could only lead to the failure of the coming conference and to war. In the event that war finally ensued, " non-intervention " was outlined as the British policy to be pursued until such a time when Russian pretensions might possibly necessitate an active defense of British interests. Intervention as envisioned would not be from any love of the Turks.24 It was because of those views 20

11

22

M

Morning Post, Nov. is, 1876. Times, Nov. 18, 1876. "Ibid., Nov. 14, 1876.

Daily Telegraph, Nov. 16, 1876. Ibid., Nov. 21, 1876.

I38

BRITAIN

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CRISIS

that the Times was attacked by " jingo " organs and was once more praised by the Gladstonians as improving in consistency.25 By the close of November minor difficulties standing in the way of the conference had been ironed out. The Porte had finally accepted it on the 18th 28 after the usual period of delay and objections. Turkey had especially objected to the barring of its plenipotentiaries from the preliminary conference. A f t e r pourparlers with the other ambassadors at Constantinople, General Ignatieff had drawn up the demands concerning reforms which were to be presented at the conference. The Russian government thereupon officially communicated the program of eleven points fixed upon to the other guaranteeing Powers. Elliot had earlier transmitted an unofficial version to the foreign office.27 Lord Salisbury left London for Constantinople as early as November 20. However, it was planned for him to engage in conversations at Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Rome before proceeding to the Turkish capital. His mission was to be eagerly followed in the columns of the press, with leading articles generally devoted to the views of the particular country he happened to be in at the moment.28 The Times greeted Ignatieff's program with hope, observing that it furnished a " tolerable basis for discussion." 29 Pall Mall found it difficult to discover where that observation 28 " Delane is greatly improved in health and the Times in consistency." Cf. letter of Hayward, dated Nov. 20, in A selection from the Correspondence of Abraham Hayward (edited by H. E. Carlisle), vol. ii, p. 373. Cf. also Cook, op. ext., p. 257. 26

Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xc, Turkey # 1 , no. 1013. On the 18th.

Ibid., no. 1078.

For an interesting account of his trip and conversations, cf. Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury (London, 1922), 28

vol. ii, pp. 9S-107. 28

Times, Nov. 20, 1876.

THE

CONSTANTINOPLE

CONFERENCE

had been made outside of " the political circle of Printing House-square." It referred to the Times as " the great organ of Panslavism in England." Despite the fact that the conference was soon to open, rumors of war were still prevalent and the Conservative press was more abusive than ever toward Russia. On the request of Schouvaloff the foreign office now published Lord Loftus's report of his conversation with the czar at Livadia. 31 The Russian government desired publication " as it contained assurances which were of a nature to tranquilize public feeling." Lord Derby immediately carried out the suggestion, adding that he thought it might be opportune, " since the last few days had brought us the intelligence of the mobilization of a considerable Russian force M and of the emission of the new Russian loan for 100 million of roubles." 81 Lord Derby's curt explanation of his assent to publication was interpreted in several opposite senses. The obvious interpretation was that the Russian acts following the czar's professions showed how unworthy of trust they were. Conservative organs, such as the Standard, Globe, Morning Advertiser, etc., seized upon that meaning.' 4 While most journals acknowledged the czar to be personally sincere, they placed no faith in his ability to curb Panslavism and habits of aggression. The English public was reminded that the Russian government had in the past frequently given " solemn assurances" and had then later under the plea of 80

Pall Mall Gazette, Nov. 20, 1876.

sl

Supra, p. 129.

Russia had mobilized six corps d'armee, 160,000 men. House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xc, Turkey # 1 , no. 1008. 83

88 Above citations from despatch of Derby to Loftus, dated Nov. 21, published in a Supplement to the London Gazette, that same day.

« Issues of Nov. 22, 1876.

140

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" necessity" added territories. Khiva had only recently been seized in spite of the czar. On the other hand, the Times and certain Radical organs chose to interpret Derby's words as an attempt to reduce to their real significance recent acts the purport of which had been misconstrued. The Times felt that Lord Derby would not " needlessly utter an offensive sneer." " The events of November were now recast in their " true l i g h t " by the Radical press, leading to bitter attacks on Lord Beaconsfield. He had pocketed the czar's peaceful assurances and then in utter bad faith had answered them in words of boastful defiance. " Never was language more unfortunate" was the view taken by the Times.** The Daily News considered that the prime minister owed an " apology " to the czar and added that Beaconsfield's premiership was " a European calamity." 31 The Spectator, Examiner and Echo agreed. A s the time for the opening of the Constantinople Conference approached various plans of solution and expressions of opinion on the Eastern Question were offered. Public feeling ran very high as the controversy of opinions went on. Dean Church of St. Paul's humorously describes how " everybody was very savage with everybody about Turks and Russians: I think I never remember such an awkward time for meeting people (until you know you are on the same side)." 88 Grant Duff visioned in more detail his former dream of placing the duke and duchess of Edinburgh on the throne of Turkey. That solution would be more convenient to most of the Powers than anything else. In outlining how the « Times, Nov. 24, 1876. s*

Ibid., Nov. 23, 1876.

17

Daily News, Dec. 1, 1876.

38

Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 560-61.

THE

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scheme could be worked Duff believed that he could at a month's notice lay his hand upon thirty Anglo-Indians, who, if they were once established in European Turkey with a very moderate force behind them, would, in ten years, give that country a new start, and would before the end of the century turn it into a veritable garden. No more violent change would be required than the razing of the great fortresses and the sweeping away of all Turkish administration.89 A pamphlet along the same lines had appeared just a few days before, entitled The Eastern Ogre; or, St. George to the Rescue. It described the Eastern Question somewhat after the fashion of a penny romantic tale. Mr. Turko, Squire Romanoff, Ben Beakan, Will Greatheart, Squire Brandyberg, etc., were the characters. The settlement of the Ogre's business was followed by giving Mr. Turko's estates to the son of the Lady of S t George who had married the daughter of Squire Romanoff. Another pamphleteer vehemently combatted the idea that any other Power than England should control the Dardanelles and urged, on the principle of " first come, first served," that England should seize the Straits before Russia did so.40 Lord Grey, who originally had thought it inexpedient to interfere in Turkey, now regretted that decided action had not been taken. In writing to Lord Hartington in midNovember he advocated interference as " indispensable." The former colonial secretary proposed the definite limitation of the authority of the sultan by treaty with the Powers, which should supervise the appointment of his officials. If good men were found to be scarce in Turkey, Europeans »»Speech at Inverurie on the 14th. 15, 1876. 40

The Dardanelles for England. Question (London, 1876).

Account in Daily News, Nov.

The True Solution of the Eastern

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could be employed. Lord Grey suggested that the plan be tried out for a period of ten years.41 John Bright made another characteristic speech at Llandudno on the 22d in which he repeated his favorite 3,000 mile argument against interference. It appeared that he had been invited to attend a lecture on international arbitration, and after it was over, Bright proceeded to lecture the government, Parliament, the nation, and the world at large at very considerable length on the blessings of peace and the evils of war. The Rev. C. H. Spurgeon outdid Bright According to a correspondent of the Liverpool Daily Post, in his second prayer on Sunday morning the 26th, he thus expressed himself: " A n d , O God, give our senators wisdom, especially at this critical time. Let not the extraordinary folly of our rulers lead our country into war, and change our rulers, O God, as soon as possible." Gladstone writes that on the previous night in Liverpool where Othello was being acted, as the words were reached, " ' The Turks are drowned,' the audience rose in enthusiasm and interrupted the performance for some time with their cheering." *2 W . E. Forster, who had just been elected Lord Rector of Aberdeen University, was now more outspoken in his criticism of the government than in his speech immediately following his return from Constantinople. A t Aberdeen he strongly advocated cooperation with Russia, only regretting that England was not " the champion of the Christian races instead of Russia." He termed the premier's Guildhall utterances " tall talk," and voiced his hearty disapproval of the tone of certain newspapers, as the Standard and Pall Mall Gazette. Forster particularly attacked an article in 41

Letter published in the Times, Nov. 18, 1876.

« Morley, op. cit., vol. ii, pp. 558-59.

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Pall Mall of a few days back which suggested " taking the same action as we did 25 years ago, by declaring war when Russia crossed the Pruth." *' The octogenarian, Thomas Carlyle, overcame great reluctance in expressing his " own poor private views." He restated his clear belief of 50 years that the Russians were " a good and even noble element in Europe, . . . called to do great things in the world, and to be a conspicuous benefit, directly and indirectly to their fellow men." T o undertake a war against Russia on behalf of the Turk would be " nothing short of insanity." It seems to me that something very different from war on his behalf is what the Turk now pressingly needs from England and from the world—namely, to be peremptorily informed that we can stand no more of his attempts to govern in Europe, and that he must quam primum turn his face to the eastward, for ever quit this side of the Hellespont, and give up his arrogant ideas of governing anybody but himself. Carlyle suggested that Prince Bismarck, " a magnanimous, noble, and deep-seeing man," be appointed as " arbiter " to attain concord among the three great Powers. In conclusion he reiterated insistently that " the unspeakable Turk should be immediately struck out of the question, and the country left to honest European guidance." " Carlyle's diatribes were dismissed as the ravings of senility by Conservative journals. The Times considered it an ungrateful task to enter into argument with a " veteran." 45 On the other hand, Radical organs, being funda" Account of speech of 27th in the Times, Nov. 28, 1876. Letter to George Howard, dated Nov. 24, sent to the Times for publication by Howard and appearing in its issue of Nov. 28, 1876. 48

Times, Nov. 28, 1876.

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mentally in agreement with the sage of Chelsea, admired his frankness and took the occasion to launch new tirades against the Turks. Echo spoke of the " ringing force " of Carlyle's views.4" The Liverpool Daily Post remarked that " almost all England outside the pale of the Conservative party " favored summary expulsion whether " practical or not." 4T The Daily News felt that the world need not be " too squeamish and too much alarmed when a venerable philosopher declares that, if the Turkish despotism is some time to go from Europe, it would be as well to begin our preparations at once for the speeding of the parting guest." 48 Frederick Harrison, the Positivist, gave his views as working only toward peace in an article in John Morley's Fortnightly Review. Although he held a hatred of all forms of race oppression and believed that Ottoman rule combined every evil in its worst form, Harrison felt the Turks to have incredible powers of recuperation and to be still capable of fighting. It followed, therefore, that " those who call for the extinction in Europe of the Ottoman Empire, for the expulsion of its civil and military officials, bag and baggage, across the Bosphorus, are simply calling for a most bloody and most widespread war." 49 Harrison loathed mere militarism and repudiated the tinsel imperialism of blatant demagogues, yet never joined any kind of peace society.60 Most of his political friends ranged themselves with Gladstone in supporting Russia and the Christian races of the Balkans, but he objected to that policy as it seemed to him to partake 48 47

Echo, Nov. 28, 1876.

Liverpool Daily Post, Nov. 29, 1876. editor. 48 Daily News, Nov. 28, 1876. 49 80

Edward R. Russell was its

Fortnightly Review, Dec., 1876, " Cross and Crescent."

Frederick Harrison, National and Social Problems 1908), p. xiv.

(New York,

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of a religious crusade which he feared would lead to an era of general confusion and war.' 1 Many writers urged that England should take Russia's place in supporting the Christians of the East. England had a vantage ground over Russia in the coming conference. She came into it, as concerned the treatment of subject-races, comparatively unstained. Russia was " not clean-handed enough " to justify her in the part she now assumed to play —that of the disinterested advocate of humanity in the pursuit of a sacred mission.82 Gladstone saw no reason to doubt the sincerity of Russia until cause appeared for taking a different view. " The Emperor and his people are open, certainly not less than we are, to the generous emotion which has recently, and I believe effectively, thrilled through this island." A s a safeguard against any possible future selfishness, he suggested that " more enduring means than vaunting menace " be taken. Those means were to be found in the working out of Canning's Eastern policy of placing England in the position of the champion of freedom. A s a step in that direction Gladstone advocated aiding the Greeks to secure Thessaly and Epirus. The development of a Greek state would form the most effectual obstacle to Russian acquisitions. In the event that England did not aid the Greek cause, Gladstone virtually suggested that the Greeks cast in their lot with Russia in order to wrest the desired provinces from the Porte. 63 The Times thought it better that Englishmen " should not have the responsibility of prompting a warlike course." 54 The 6 1 Frederick Harrison, Autobiographic Memoirs (London, 1911), vol. ii, pp. 119-20. 83 Contemporary Review, Dec., 1876, " The Eastern Question: Turkey and Russia." 88

Ibid., " The Hellenic Factor in the Eastern Problem."

84

Times, Dec. 2, 1876.

j46

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ultra-Conservative Glasgow News chose to interpret the expremier's words as meaning that the Greeks should have Constantinople as the capital of a new empire and stated the idea to be " one of the wildest chimeras that ever entered Mr. Gladstone's brain." " The Quaker, John Bright, had nothing new to say in the Birmingham town hall on December 4. He held no objection to Russian ships of war going freely through the Dardanelles. The straits were not made by Turkey or by England. They were " made by Nature " and were intended to be a passage open to all the world between the Mediterranean and Black seas. Mr. Pettifer, a workingman, could see no reason for allowing the country to be led, driven, or dragged into war. Whichever side won, the workers would be sure to lose. " They were the people who would have to do all the fighting, their wives and children would have to do all the starving, and when it was all over they would have to do all the paying." As he saw it, only Lord Beaconsfield, the Turkish bondholders, and the fighting newspaper editors favored war and they would not have to fight themselves.88 The Times ridiculed Bright, remarking that there was " no necessity of crying ' Peace' in notes so loud, so harsh, and so provocative as to amount to an interruption of peace." " The Standard doubted " whether Prince Gortchakoff himself, could he appear on a Birmingham platform, would have the assurance to claim for the Russian Government all those pure and virtuous motives with which it is credited by Mr. Bright." There could not be a sillier way of measuring the interest of England in Turkey than by computing the number of miles between London and Constantinople. " We are nearly 3,000 miles from Canada, we are 10,000 M

Glasgow News, Dec. 2, 1876.

56

Account of speeches in the Times, Dec. 5, 1876.

" Times, Dec. 7, 1876.

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miles from India, we are 14,000 miles from Australia. Are we, then, by Mr. Bright's rule, to be indifferent to these countries in the ratio of these distances ? " asks the Standard.™ The Birmingham Daily Gazette found itself unable to trace in Bright's speech " one single good reason why he should call upon the people of this country to regard Russia as the saint and Turkey as the sinner." w On the other hand, both the Manchester Examiner and Scotsman approved of his words. 40 It was a rather curious fact that similar arguments were employed by both the Turcophils and the Russophils. Whatever was said against the Turk was said by the friends of the Turk to be an encouragement of Russia in her aggressive designs, whereas everything said against Russia was interpreted by the Russophils as an encouragement of the Porte to make a perverse resistance and to believe in English support. In general the sentiment of the public was both anti-Russian and anti-Turk. A s a group Radicals could be classed as anti-Turk and, strangely, pro-Russian. For years Radicals had been the enemies of Russian autocracy. The majority of Liberals were both anti-Turk and anti-Russian, while the majority of Conservatives were anti-Russian and therefore somewhat pro-Turk. Ultra-Conservatives were anti-Russian and Turcophil. With opinion so divided, the government and press were stressing more and more the doctrine that above all else British interests must be safeguarded. The last great anti-Turk demonstration was held at St. James's hall on the 8th of December. It was termed the " National Conference on the Eastern Question " and preceded the opening of the more practical conference at Con58

Standard, Dec. 5, 1876.

88

Birmingham Daily Gazette, Dec. 5, 1876.

80

Issues of Dec. 5, 1876.

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stantinople by only a short period. Many well-known names of lords, clergymen, men of letters, artists, labor leaders and politicians, of whom quite a few ordinarily kept themselves free from the entanglements of party, are to be found in the list of conveners. Among the host of conveners were Earl Russell, Lord Acton, the marquis of Bath, the bishops of Ely and Exeter, Dr. E. A. Abbot, Rev. M. MacColl, Rev. J . Parker, Robert Browning, Charles Darwin, J . A. Froude, J. R. Green, Wm. Lecky, C. E. Maurice, Justin McCarthy, Thorold Rogers, Goldwin Smith, Wm. T. Stead (editor of the Northern Echo), Edward Miall (editor of the Nonconformist), W. R. W. Stephens, G. O. Trevelyan, Anthony Trollope, John Ruskin, Wm. Morris, Burne-Jones, Joseph Arch, Henry Broadhurst (secretary of the Parliamentary committee of trades' unions), F. W. Campin (president of the Labor representation league), Auberon Herbert, G. J. Holyoake, Sir Charles Trevelyan, Abel Hey wood (mayor of Manchester), G. C. Warr (secretary of the Cobden club), etc.®1 The conference was representative in a fairly broad sense as can be seen from the list of conveners, the crowd of delegates numbering over a thousand from all parts of the country, and those present on the speaker's platform. Every available space was filled at the two sittings. The duke of Westminster presided in the morning and the earl of Shaftesbury in the afternoon. Gladstone sat at the right of the chairman. Stansfield, George Howard, Canon Liddon, Fawcett, Herbert Spencer, Freeman and Bryce were but a few of the notables on the platform. Proceedings were opened by the duke of Westminster. Letters were read from the duke of Argyll, Lowe, the bishop of Manchester, and the Rev. Dr. Pusey, stating their inabil6 1 Individuals mentioned below in connection with the conference are as well to be found in the list of conveners.

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ity to attend but expressing their cordial approval of the object of the meeting. There followed speeches by Sir G. Campbell, Rev. Wm. Denton, the bishop of Oxford, Evelyn Ashley, James Bryce (professor of civil law at Oxford), and the Nonconformist Rev. Dr. Allon, editor of the British Quarterly. Bryce, who had been in Russia in August, remarked on the sincere and justifiable sentiment which then pervaded all classes. In Constantinople all believed that England would support Turkey. The Porte should be at once undeceived and told that not only would England not support her but that she was prepared to " coerce " her. In the afternoon meeting Liddon also called for a " military occupation " which he hoped England would undertake. Freeman was decidedly pro-Russian, extravagantly proclaiming : " Perish the interests of England, perish our dominion in India, rather than that we should strike one blow or speak one word on behalf of the wrong against the right." After a lengthy speech, Gladstone stressed in conclusion the past complicity of England and its clear moral duty to assist the oppressed in the future. The consensus of opinion was that reforms could only be carried out through coercion, and cooperation with Russia was urged as the best means. References to the ministry, and in particular to Lord Beaconsfield, were neither few nor flattering. The Eastern Question Association arose out of a resolution of Fawcett " for the purpose of watching events, of giving further expression to public opinion, and of spreading correct information throughout the country." It soon published a Report of Proceedings of the National Conference at St. James's Hall in convenient octavo form 62 and later 62

The National speeches tracts of

Eastern Question Association, Report of Proceedings of the Conference at St. James's Hall, London (London, 1877). The had of course been summarized in the daily press, but the exthe preceding paragraphs are taken from the above.

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issued numerous Papers on the Eastern Question.91 The duke of Westminster was president of the association which included in its group of officers the earl of Shaftesbury, A. J. Mundella, M. P., Wm. Morris, George Howard, F. W. Chesson, J . W. Probyn, and E. S. Price. With the exception of Radical organs, which approved, press comments on the " National Conference " were mostly derisive. The Daily News stated that " such a declaration of opinion as was made yesterday is almost like the recording of a national vote." The Morning Post remarked that it " only recorded views of anti-Turks," while Pall Mall termed it merely another " indignation meeting " and ridiculed the idea of cooperation between England and Russia. The Times considered the meeting to be representative of the educated classes but, judging from the speeches and the enthusiasm with which they were greeted, it was disposed to charge the cultivated part of the community " with a rash eagerness to emulate the threats which Russia had addressed to the Porte." Later, it recorded the opinion that nothing substantial and positive had emerged from the babel of utterances. The Standard attacked the " soi-disant men of intellect and conscience " for damaging the very cause which they pretended to have at heart, namely, the cause of peace. In a similar vein the Daily Telegraph, which prior to the holding of the conference had scornfully dubbed it a caucus of clergymen, spinsters and poets, commented on the ferocity of the philanthropists. The road marked out by them could only lead to reformation " by dreadful carnage and by hateful conflict of races and creeds. The very extravagance, however, of the speeches may prove their antidote." 64 •» Nos. I to 12 by A. Arnold, Sir G. Campbell, M.P., F. W. Chesson, Rev. J. L. Davies, Rev. W. Denton, W. E. Gladstone, M. G. Fawcett, J. Holms, M.P., Miss Irby, J. W. Probyn, H. Richard, M.P., and J. H. Skinner. M Above extracts are all from issues of Dec. 9, 1876.

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Queen Victoria was quite upset by the proceedings at S t James's hall. Lord Beaconsfield paid ' the F a e r y ' a brief visit at Windsor in mid-December and found her " most indignant" The attorney general " ought to be set at these men," suggested Victoria; " it can't be constitutional." T o Lord Beaconsfield it seemed that she now really hated Gladstone. He assured her, however, that she might look with confidence to Lords Granville and Hartington." Interest was being centered on the approaching conference at Constantinople. Little hope of its success had been held by either the press or the public throughout November, but as its opening drew nearer the press assumed a somewhat more optimistic note. All journals praised Salisbury but they interpreted his mission in different fashions. It almost seemed from reading the so-called English organs of the sultan that his object in going to the conference was to checkmate the wily Ignatieff and leave Turkey as nearly as possible untouched. On the other hand Radical newspapers, which attributed to the Turks the single virtue of being endowed with a genius for misrule, hoped that coercion was included in his instructions. News items made more frequent mention of the labor and care bestowed by the commission under Midhat Pasha in finishing the draught of the new Turkish constitution which had been announced several months before. It seemed that the Porte was hastening to anticipate the action of Europe by a repetition, with a modern coat of paint, of the charters of liberties formerly resorted to on occasions of European intervention. Several brief statements by Bismarck on the situation in the East drew considerable attention. At a Parliamentary dinner the German chancellor spoke of a Russo-Turkish war 88 Marquis of Zetland, Letters of Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield and Lady Bradford, vol. ii, p. 117.

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as " inevitable." Germany would remain neutral and would exert herself on behalf of " localization." " Should Austria be vitally injured by the progress of events, Germany would possibly deem it incumbent on her to offer to assist Austria." The time would come when the disinterestedness of a policy of friendly neutrality toward all parties concerned would be generally recognized, and " when European affairs would be adjusted by the weight which Germany, if her interest required it, was able to throw in the balance." 88 Various versions of the speech were reported but the major portion of the English press deduced a tone of hostility and a warning to Russia in the chancellor's words. Certain ultra-Conservative organs exulted over the " isolation " of Russia. A few days later, on December 5, in answer to an interpellation in the imperial diet, Bismarck repeated the substance of his first statement 87 but significantly assured " that the alliance of the three Empires is still entirely deserving of its name, and continues to exist." 84 Lord Salisbury had been instructed to adopt a tone of firmness and resolution in his language to the Turks. Guarantees for the efficacious execution of reforms were to be demanded. However, Salisbury went to the conference " not to coerce but to persuade; " yet peaceable persuasion was to prove insufficient in breaking down the obstinacy of the Porte. A preliminary conference, with the Turks excluded, had been decided upon by the Powers in order to come to some e s Account of speech as reported by the Berlin correspondent of the Times in its issue of Dec. 4, 1876. 87 His rather memorable words, later often recalled though frequently garbled, were uttered at this time: " I shall not advise Germany's active participation in any way so long as there is involved no German interest which would be worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier." William Harbutt Dawson, The German Empire ( N e w Y o r k , 1919), vol. ii, p. 129. 88

Times, Dec. 6, 1876.

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distinct agreement as to the exact demands to be presented to the Porte. The first meeting of the preliminary conference was held on December 1 1 at the Russian embassy under the presidency of Ignatieff as dean of the diplomatic body; the last took place on December 22, the day before the opening of the plenary conference. Diplomatic reserve allowed little to escape from these preliminary meetings, but it was generally known that the major question around which the discussions revolved was that of military occupation which Russia contended could be the sole efficacious guarantee. Russia was, however, unable to convert the Powers to the principle of occupation and hence modified her views to the extent that the Salisbury program was agreed upon almost intact. Although Ignatieff proposed armed occupation and the creation of tributary states, after protracted discussions those features of the Russian plan were dropped and other Russian suggestions were somewhat pared down. The proposals to be laid before the Turkish plenipotentiaries, as finally agreed upon by the six Powers, included the maintenance of the status quo in Serbia and Montenegro, the granting of a large measure of administrative autonomy in Bosnia and Bulgaria, and acceptance of the principle of effective guarantees for the carrying out of the promised reforms by the Porte. On the day of the last preliminary meeting the English cabinet arrived at the clear decision that England " would not assent to, or assist in coercive measures, military or naval, against the Porte; but the Porte, on the other hand, was to be made to understand, that it can expect no assistance from England in the event of war." 68 Salisbury was so informed but was permitted to use his own discretion as to the language he should employ in attempting to persuade the Porte to accept the will of the Powers. 49

Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xci, Turkey # 2 , no. 78.

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Rumors of the various schemes and counter-proposals in regard to the mode of occupation as a guarantee for the execution of reforms found their way into the press as the preliminary meetings proceeded. At one time or another the suggestion that Russian, English, Belgian, Swiss, or Dutch troops be used to occupy Bulgaria had been made and either declined or abandoned as not feasible. The Times guardedly reserved its opinion on occupation, merely holding that the principle should not be hastily laid aside. It devoted most of its space to grave warnings to the Turks should they prove obstinate and refuse to accept the dictation of the united Powers. Radical journals busied themselves with devices for the occupation of Bulgaria, whereas the Conservative press deemed any form of occupation objectionable. The character of vagueness about these preliminary meetings was never entirely dispelled. The plenary conference was opened at the Turkish admiralty on December 23 under the presidency of Safvet Pasha. In full council eleven plenipotentiaries represented the six Powers and Turkey. In the midst of the opening proceedings the boom of 101 cannon floated across from the other side of the Golden Horn, which, Safvet Pasha ostentatiously explained, announced the promulgation of the new Ottoman Constitution. An analysis of the labors of the preliminary conference was afterwards presented to Safvet Pasha. Thus was enacted the first scene of what was to prove a very solemn farce. Midhat Pasha's interesting document proclaimed the indivisibility of the Ottoman Empire. The sultan was henceforth to be a constitutional sovereign, alike irresponsible and inviolate, and was to rank with the western sovereigns. The entire administrative machinery was reformed, incorporating only the best of western institutions of government. In addition, this unique charter contained a declaration of

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rights, pledging religious freedom and inviolable individual liberty to all Ottoman subjects. Liberal and Radical journals greeted the new Turkish constitution with derision. The Times remarked that if words were identical with deeds it should be inclined to restrain the impetuosity of Midhat's reforming zeal since it doubted whether the Ottoman Empire was quite strong enough " to endure such a shock as it would sustain from the practical application of the best parts of the British and French Constitutions." T0 The Daily News considered it " a defiance of the Great Powers," but placed the major blame for the reckless and suicidal course which the Porte was pursuing on the encouragement offered it by a " blind and wilful" minister and his " carelessly acquiescent colleagues." 71 The York Herald believed that the Ottoman Power had by its obstinance forfeited all rights of protection by England, which " ought to leave it to the mercy of fate and its new Constitution." " On the other hand, most Conservative journals were willing to place considerable faith in the new document which promised such broad reforms. Although dubious of its success, the Standard sincerely hoped " that foreign war will not deprive it of the chance of a fair trial." " In the eyes of the Morning Post the constitution was most satisfactory as it granted " ten times as much as any of the Powers ever thought of requiring." The even more pro-Turkish Daily Telegraph painted a glowing picture of the repentance and regeneration of a nation: At the moment when the shameful danger of a New Crusade was threatening the nineteenth century, there dawned in this 70

Times, Dec. 25, 1876.

" Daily News, Dec. 25, 1876.

71

York Herald, Dec. 26, 1876.

" Standard, Dec. 25, 1876.

T

* Morning Post, Dec. 25, 1876.

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charter the opportunity of closing the era of crusading for ever. . . . ' Assistance,' therefore—and no longer ' coercion,' occupation, or any other vindictive phrase—is the right word for the Powers now to use.75 The Morning Advertiser was hardly animated by the same Christmas spirit as that which seemingly inspired the Daily Telegraph. It curiously reverted to the rabid anti-Turkish stand which it had taken when the atrocity agitation was in full swing. The constitution was described as " a sham; " and in hostile vein the Morning Advertiser hoped that, if another war resulted between the Crescent and the Cross, it would not close " until these barbarians are expelled, once for all, from the Western quarter of the globe." 79 The vacillating policy of this journal was probably due to editorial changes. Colonel Richards, its former editor, had died the previous June. After considerable indecision Mr. N. de la Fleuriere had been appointed to fill the place in September. His views were evidently not those of the committee of the "Incorporated Society of Licensed Victuallers" as he was relieved of his post in January. In the latter part of January the committee elected Captain Hamber, for many years editor of the Standard and only recently editor of the defunct Hour, as chief editor. Thereafter the Morning Advertiser was again to be a staunch supporter of the government. The Globe most accurately reflected the attitude of the ministry. It voiced disappointment over the obstinacy of the Turks and placed but slight faith in the success of the constitution: The Plenipotentiaries have met at Constantinople to secure a definite end; and no counter-movement on the part of Midhat ™ Daily Telegraph, Dec. 26, 1876. 79 Morning Advertiser, Dec. 25, 1876.

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Pasha and his colleagues will prevent them from striving to attain it. If, however, the Porte resist, it is hard to see how war can be avoided. The Czar can hardly draw back from the position he rashly took up, and England—although she will know how to defend her own interests—will assuredly do nothing to protect a Government which absolutely refuses to conform itself to the most elementary needs of its subjects.7' Following the opening sitting of the conference, Lord Salisbury obtained an audience of the sultan on December 26 in which he strongly advised him to accept the proposals of the Powers. He was informed by the sultan that it no longer lay in his power to do so as he was now limited by the constitution. Salisbury thereupon carried out his instructions and transmitted the grave warning to the sultan that he could " expect no assistance from England in the event of war." 78 A t the close of the interview he added that he would be compelled to withdraw the British fleet in order to obviate any erroneous idea that the fleet supported Turkey in resisting the will of Europe. On leaving the sultan's presence Lord Salisbury telegraphed to Vice-Admiral Drummond to withdraw his fleet immediately from Turkish waters. The admiral asked authority to winter at Salonica, but his lordship not consenting, part of the fleet sailed for the Piraeus, while the remainder proceeded to Malta. The British fleet had been anchored at Besika Bay since the previous May. Lord Beaconsfield was quite distressed over Salisbury's language at Constantinople and feared that he had been duped by Ignatieff. He felt that Salisbury had " unnecessarily bullied the Turks." " Sal. seems most prejudiced, and not to be aware, that his principal object, in being sent to Const., is to keep the Russians out of Turkey, not to create an ideal existence for Turkish Xtians." 78 " Globe, Dec. 26, 1876. 79

Buckle, op. cit., p. i n .

78

Supra, p. 153.

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Ministerial organs at first expressed their absolute disbelief over the telegraphic reports of Salisbury's activities, then, following definite confirmation, vented their annoyance by accusing him of exceeding his instructions. The Standard and Morning Post were quite wroth over his " haughty " and " menacing " language. It was later explained by them that the fleet had been authorized to proceed to the Piraeus solely because the exposed anchorage of Besika Bay was dangerous to its safety in the tempestuous weather which prevailed in January. The Sheffield Daily Telegraph emphatically censured Lord Salisbury for entering into " momentary partnership " with the state " whose official professions of zeal for humanity and holiness constitute her the one towering and overshadowing Hypocrisy of modern times." He had " drifted away from the Treaty of Paris on to the ice of Muscovite manoeuvring " and had pleased only " the English party of ' theological malice.' " 80 The disapproval of Conservative journals caused their opponents to shower the highest praise on the " ultimatum " of Salisbury. The Times, Daily News, Echo, Scotsman and the Morning Advertiser, all took especial delight in pointing out how widely the views of the so-called inspired organs differed from Salisbury's own. The Daily News considered that the " conduct of the Queen's representative has reflected honour upon his Sovereign and his country, and nothing that can possibly happen . . . can ever make his mission a matter of regret." 81 Hopeful interpretations were placed by the Conservative press on the Porte's abrogation of the decree of October, 1875,82 and on its willingness to renew the armistice for another two months.88 In a published circular the grand »0 Sheffield Daily Telegraph, Jan. 6, 1877. 81

Daily News, Jan. 11, 1877.

M

Renewed on Dec. 38 until March 1.

82

Supra, p. 25.

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vizier stated that the government intended to present a bill as soon as the chambers met, calculated to give the greatest possible satisfaction to the interests of the holders of the public debt The Porte evidently fancied that Turkish bonds played a role in determining opinion. This prospective legislation was, however, considered by the Times as " a poor hope for those who do not even receive the halfdividends which the decree of last October left them." 84 The inauspicious opening of the conference had brought gloom in its wake which the few hopeful signs of conciliation on the part of the Porte could not dispel. A t its second sitting on December 28, counter-proposals were presented by the Turkish plenipotentiaries, which the representatives of the Powers then took under deliberation. The sole question of importance which the conference had to settle upon was the " nature of the guarantee " to be exacted from Turkey. The difficulty of its solution became more apparent as the conference dragged on. The New Year, thus, opened on gloomy prospects. Still, many an Englishman must surely have experienced a glow of virtuous pride as he was carried in fantasy by the Times to far-off India, with which English destinies had been so mysteriously associated. There, on the plains before Delhi, on this day, were gathered native princes and their retinues, arrayed in the picturesque and varied costumes of the East, to present their homage to the Empress Victoria as the rightful occupant of the forfeited throne of the Great Mogul. It was to be a scene of unwonted brilliancy and splendor, the most impressive spectacle that British India would ever witness. The Times indulged in lengthy reverie on the salutary and creative beneficence of English rule in India, made possible by national genius and that true imperial instinct 81

Issue of Dec. 29, 1876.

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which conquers to conciliate, which chastises in kindness, which comforts the weak, tames the strong, and makes it a rule that the triumphs of peace shall adorn or hide those of war. . . . Since the days of Rome no power has so combined the gifts of war and of peace, of policy, of material improvement, and of enterprise by sea and land, and, above all, the art of dealing with discordant races, as our own.85 True, the reader's satisfaction over being an Englishman and of sharing in the possession of such a glorious Empire may have given way to annoyance as he continued. A second editorial dealt with the anxieties of the Eastern Question and disquieting thoughts may have entered his mind. Could not the terrible Turk be less obstinate and lead a decent, civilized, sane life? W h y should the greedy Russian bear be constantly menacing his inheritance? It might be necessary after all to enter Egypt and guard Suez. The Egyptians could only benefit. India, at any rate, must never be threatened. The Turks were to become more obstinate as the Powers reduced their demands to a minimum. A t every turn of the discussions the constitution and the treaty obligations were to be set before the plenipotentiaries. Salisbury's energetic language had but little effect Ignatieff seemed to be testing the extent of the Porte's perversity as he moderated his tone at each successive session. Bismarck had a fit of natural impatience, and, in that mood, sent Baron von Werther a very curt despatch criticizing the slowness of the conference. He declared that the plenipotentiaries had gone too far in their concessions to the Porte, and regretted that Werther had joined in those concessions. A n identical note was sent to Count Miinster at London and communicated to Derby. The German chancellor thought this series of modifications contrary to the dignity of Europe and liable 8S

Times, Jan. I, 1877.

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ifa

to impair seriously the force of its collective action. By his intervention, Bismarck drew sharp attention to the process of reduction which the European terms were undergoing. Public opinion was beginning to regard the state of affairs as almost ridiculous and Constantinople was made the theme of humorous satire. The conference, it was realized, was monotonously dragging to its close with the Turks yielding substantially nothing. The press correspondents had immediately commented on the unexpected change in the attitude of Russia from the roaring bear of October and November to the cub of Constantinople. Radical and Liberal journals voiced their disappointment over this changed front and in effect incited Russia to take up the cudgel again. As if by signal, however, the Russian press remained silent. Russia appeared the more pacific in proportion as Turkey showed herself the more resolute in her resistance. Some construed that as deception, feeling that Russia was willing to make apparent concessions as she was anxious to conciliate opinion to have Europe morally with her. She could thus throw the blame of provocation on Turkey in the event of war. Others stressed the idea that Russia was hesitating merely because the season was unfavorable for military operations. The appointment of war correspondents by leading London daily newspapers at this time was indicative of their judgment on the probabilities of war.8" Despite those presentiments the Conservative press could not resist the temptation of gloating over the discomfiture of Russia and now ascribed Russian moderation to her lack of preparedness for war. Russian financial and military weaknesses were pointed out and elements of Turkish strength were magnified. In an article which drew considerable comment, the Edinburgh Review condemned the conference entirely as placing •• Public Opinion, Jan. 6, 1877, " Notabilia Literary."

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England in a position in excess of its rights toward Turkey and committing her to courses that might advance the deceitful policy of Russia. The unalterable sanctity of the treaties of 1856 was stressed by the W h i g organ as in its issue of the previous October.87 Progressive annexation was the single object of Russia. Reforms were advocated simply as a pretext for occupation by way of guarantee, and occupation was in itself a cloak for annexation. The evident desire of the czar to avoid war and the concessions of Ignatieff at Constantinople were explained as diplomatic manœuvres which could not alter and would not arrest the permanent and traditional policy of the Russian Empire. The Edinburgh reviewer cautioned, however, that war between the two empires would be scarcely less perilous to Russia than to Turkey. It was evident to the writer that Hebrew support would be given Turkey and the Jews exercised an enormous influence over the money market and the press. They could prevent Russia from raising a loan abroad ; they could also direct against her the myriad voices of the daily journals of Germany, of France, and even, to some extent, of England. " It is by finance and by public opinion that armies are set in motion, and some Sidonia in the council-chamber or the counting-house may baffle the will of the lord of many legions." 88 The views of the Edinburgh were sarcastically attacked in the Times as " obsolete." The Daily News remarked that it had " long ceased to have any claim to represent any shade of Liberal opinion." In the eyes of the Daily Telegraph, however, it was considered " a thoughtful and cogent essay." 88 Conservative journals were naturally delighted 87

Supra, pp. 119-20.

88Edinburgh

Review, Jan., 1877, " T u r k e y and Russia." terly appeared on Jan. 13. Henry Reeve was its editor. «» Issues of Jan. 15, 1877.

T h e quar-

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163

with the article which betrayed such a decided rift in the Liberal ranks. It was felt by the Morning Advertiser that the " ostentatious efforts " made by the Times and Daily News to prove the utter weakness and uselessness of the article were in themselves " tolerably conclusive evidence of the quarterly reviewer's success." The complete failure of the conference, which was now flickering faintly before dying out, was recognized by all organs prior to its actual disbandment. Every suggestion of material guarantees had vanished. The Powers had attempted to coerce without force and such an attempt necessarily failed. In Salisbury's final rebuke, in reply to Safvet Pasha who insisted on the excellent intentions of the Porte, failure was admitted. The task of the conference had been " to establish administrative autonomy and sound guarantees against bad administration in the revolted Provinces. From the moment that a refusal to furnish such guarantees was officially established its mission was ended." 91 The conference was disbanded on January 20. As agreed, all ambassadors left Constantinople shortly after its final session. Sir Henry Elliot lingered a few days, until the 25th. Both Salisbury and Elliot leisurely proceeded back to England, arriving on the evening of February 6, in time for the opening of Parliament. In contrast to his outgoing, when busy agencies had chronicled his every move, Salisbury's whereabouts were scarcely mentioned except in casual Reuters'. Press comments on the collapse of the conference were diverse. In general, Conservative dailies exulted over the revelation of strength shown by the quondam " Sick Man," and termed the result of the conference a humiliation to 90

Morning Advertiser, Jan. 16, 1877. Protocol of the 9th session of the conference, published in the Times, Feb. 8, 1877. n

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Russia. Radical and Liberal journals decried the obstinacy of the Turks, who had flaunted the will of the Concert of Europe and set public opinion at defiance. The Russian press took that view, or, inversely, Pan-Slav organs represented its failure as a signal defeat for England. Russia had accepted the conference solely to give England an opportunity of effecting reforms through her own method. Now that England had failed to effect anything, she had better leave the three northern Powers to deal with Eastern affairs. In reviewing the outcome of the conference similar conclusions were expressed in the weekly journals. The Bullionist considered it fortunate for England that " the firmness of the Turk " had robbed Russia of triumph. It stood by Britain's " traditional policy " and saw no reason for chagrin at the result " If the Conference is a failure, as we see it very often stated, the failure is only to be seen through Russian spectacles." " Europe " was upbraided by the Spectator for having " recoiled before a barbarian Power." " By shrinking from coercion," the pseudo-diplomatists had " inflamed the pride of Turkey, humiliated the pride of Russia, and aggravated the position of all Turkish Christians." In a like vein the Examiner contended that the upshot of the conference had been " to put Force in the right." The official attitude was reflected rather closely by the Saturday reviewer. He found it " difficult to understand why the Porte should have hesitated to accept the modest substitute for the original demands of the European Governments." The Porte was cautioned that it had little reason to congratulate itself on a temporary triumph, as, if the good will of Austria and England were alienated, it would not be prudent " to rely too confidently on their interests." John Bull berated the " utter recklessness " that had guided Turkish statesmen during the crisis. " That Russia will offer to the Sublime Porte harsher terms than those suggested by

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the Conference, with the alternative of war, is more than probable." 92 The public had followed the progress of the conference through its various stages with considerable interest and news of any type coming from Constantinople had been avidly read. Columns of material had been supplied daily by the special correspondents sent out by the leading English and foreign newspapers to cover its incidents. The proTurkish Daily Telegraph had three graphic writers at the scene. G. A . Sala, one of the most popular of journalists, sent the Telegraph social sketches full of characteristic liveliness and humor. Sala so far did as the Turks did, while in Constantinople, as to don a fez. Campbell Clarke, Paris correspondent-in-chief, and Drew Gay, a younger lion of the Telegraph, were also there. The Morning Post and the Standard were capably represented by Sir George Thomas and Mr. Scudamore. Pears and MacGahan, of atrocity fame, supplied scathing columns on the Turks for the Daily News. Signor Gallenga bitterly attacked Ambassador Elliot and had praise only for the dogs of Constantinople in his numerous Pera letters to the Times. M. Camille Barrère, a clever young Frenchman, covered the conference for the Pall Mall Gazette, the Manchester Guardian and the République Française. Dr. Carl Schneider of the Kôlnische Zeitung and M. Le Chevalier of the Journal des Débats diagnosed the delicate manœuvrings of the diplomatists for their organs. Melton Prior, the youngest of the group, forwarded specimens of his skill to the Illustrated London News. His sketches in the Illustrated of the city of mosques and minarets, of turbaned Turks, and of veiled sultanas were among the most vivid published in the London pictorials. Indicative of the general interest aroused in England over the Eastern Question were the numerous articles, pamphlets, 93

A l l weeklies cited in above paragraph are issues of Jan. 20, 1877.

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and books dealing with its different phases, that regularly appeared in print. The curiosity of the public led to the publication of seemingly everything that could be linked up even remotely with it. The newspapers carried encyclopedic information on the races, the geography, the climate, the products, and the population of the Balkan peninsula. Historical details, odd customs, and incidents of travel were narrated in the periodicals. Religious magazines depicted the virtues of the Bulgarian peasants and the simple life of the Montenegrins. Anonymous pamphlets solved the difficulties of the Powers in facile manner. Peace Society's Papers deplored the possibility of war. Blackwood's issued a revised edition of Kinglake's Invasion of the Crimea. Captain Burnaby's Ride to Khiva went into its fourth edition. Atrocitarians contributed lengthy books vilifying the Turks. The average Ottoman gentleman, had he been able to read the accounts, must indeed have thought himself a strange and terrible creature. Russia was not let off lightly. The Anglo-Jewish Association drew up a memorial which was read to Lord Derby and then presented to the conference, calling for justice to the Jews, particularly in Roumania and Serbia. In commenting on the memorial, the Jewish World asked why the " whole question" of the unjust treatment of the Jews should not be brought forward, as persecution was " carried on under the sanction of Russia within her own dominions." It was quite as urgent as the topic of the " alleged persecution " of the Christians by the Mussulmans. The answer was not difficult as the insistence of justice " would not promote the aggrandisement of the Northern Power." " These are fiendish monsters who claim to be the protectors of the Christians of Turkey! " 93 " Jewish World, Dec. 29, 1876.

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Numerous journals, both Liberal and Conservative, recognized that those grievances should be redressed. Even the Spectator admitted that the Jews had a case in Russia as in the principalities, and ought to receive protection, which, however, Spectator thought, " their own capitalists could have extorted from the Governments." A t the same time the Jews should remember " that the passionate devotion to the Turks manifested in their newspapers, in their speeches, and in their politics at this crisis," was not likely to be " a recommendation " to the Christians from whom they were asking justice.84 Funny Folks considered the ill-treatment of the Jews in the East indefensible, " since no race has taken so much interest in those countries which ungratefully oppress them." 95 T w o noted poets entered the lists against Russia with savage charges. In his Russia before Europe Alfred Austin was, however, unable to match Swinburne's vituperative talent: I see nothing holier in a Sultan than in a Czar, . . . but if we were compelled to choose between a waxing and a waning evil, between a tyranny which at its utmost can but cling to the fast narrowing limits of its possible power and a tyranny which in the fullness of its triumph would threaten the very light and life of liberty and justice, of righteousness and of reason upon earth—in that case I confess myself unable to understand how any but the lovers of darkness could bid us cast in our lot with the stronger.96 In another tirade he added: " If the hands be the hands of Russia, though the voice be the voice of deliverance," he would " have exactly as much reliance on the good intentions 9*

Spectator,

95

Funny Folks, Jan. 27, 1877.

Dec. 30, 1876.

8 6 Algernon Charles Swinburne, Note of an English Republican on the Muscovite Crusade (London, 1876), p. 18.

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of the Czar as on the lachrymal gland of a crocodile." The Public Leader, a product of the atrocity agitation, in reviewing the pamphlets, inferred that Swinburne's effort was a direct answer to the sage of Chelsea's recent letter.87 The tract was described as a " fiery blast against Carlylism." 98 With the conference doomed and the opening of Parliament not far distant, Liberal speakers, silent since the demonstration at St. James's, returned once more to the attack. A trio of M. P.'s enlightened their constituents on the evening of January 9. Sir William Vernon Harcourt, recently returned from his honeymoon, evidently had had little time to entertain new ideas as he merely repeated all of the old charges against the " misguided " administration. Fawcett could find no language strong enough to glorify Russia. Sir Charles Dilke, although critical of the ministry, wanted it borne in mind that among those who had concurred in opposing their policy every variety of opinion was also to be found. Dilke desired reforms in Turkey but they were to be obtained through the Concert of Powers and not by Russia acting alone. So strongly did he hold that view, and so greatly did he deprecate any attempt on the part of Russia to act by herself, that he would welcome " a European ultimatum enforced by a demonstration at Constantinople by the English fleet."98 Conservative journals naturally lauded Dilke's anti-Russian expressions. The Standard was delighted to see at least " one Radical leader with statesmanship enough to discern the danger to European civilization and European freedom by Russian aggression." 100 •T Supra, p. 143. 98

Public Leader, Jan. 13, 1877.

»• Account of speeches in the Times, Jan. 10, 1877. 100 Standard, Jan. 10, 1877. W m . Henry Mudford had succeeded James Johnstone, junior, as editor of the Standard but its policy was to remain unchanged.

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Numerous other Liberals aired their views.

i6g

Baxter, who

earlier had wondered whether it might " produce an excellent effect if a dozen Pashas were hanged in B u l g a r i a , " in the same vein at

Forfar.102

101

ranted

Gladstone took the oppor-

tunity afforded by railway stops to condemn the ministry f o r not openly declaring the policy it intended to pursue, without divulging what, in his opinion, that future policy should be. 10S S i r George Campbell did not mince the matter in suggesting that another " less bloody N a v a r i n o might be necessary."

104

D r . Sandwith, relief agent in Serbia, gloried " in being a Russian intriguer in so sacred a cause as that of the Christians in T u r k e y . "

105

Conservative speakers were more reticent a t their meetings.

Inconsistencies

in

the

speeches

of

Liberals

pointed out and distrust of Russia was expressed.

were

Cabinet

policy needed no defense as Conservatives had but to await that issue without the slightest fear in Parliament. one official utterance was made. spoke at Liverpool on the 24th.

Only

S i r S t a f f o r d Northcote A spirit of " caution," but

not of " hesitation," had guided the ministry.

T h a t had

been the principle which L o r d D e r b y had laid down and maintained throughout: that we must be cautious how far and within what limits we should carry the principle of sympathy to the principle of intervention ; and looking again to the step which comes beyond intervention, the longer step between intervention and coercion, the principle upon which the Government have proceeded was to confine as far as possible the intervention of this country 101

B e f o r e his constituents at Brechin on D e c . 21, 1876.

loa

O n Jan. 19, 1877.

103

A t Frome on Jan. 22 and at Taunton on the 27th.

1 M

A t K i r k c a l d y on Jan. 26, 1877.

103

In Bloomsbury on the 27th.

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within due and proper limits, and to avoid and to abstain from that which we feel to be a false policy of coercion.104 A f t e r its disbandment the English press had immediately relegated the conference into the background. Leading articles now speculated on Russia's next move and the probability of war. Defied by the Porte, after minimizing her demands again and again, would she eat the words of the Moscow speech, withdraw her mobilized regiments, and preserve peace? From Berlin faint rumors had reached English circles that the Russian government was renewing negotiations with the two imperial courts from the point where the Berlin Memorandum had left off. Russia was next reported to be making overtures to Austria to secure her neutrality preparatory to embarking on a bona fide campaign. Then it was rumored that she was striving to induce Austria to join her in an occupation of Turkish territory, and that the German government was ready to approve anything its imperial allies agreed to. For the most part those rumors were rejected by English organs without much comment, although they gave journals inspired with Russophobia renewed opportunity to voice their hostility. Actually, even prior to the final collapse of the Constantinople Conference, Russia and Austria had drawn up at Budapest on January 1 5 a formal treaty with an additional convention appended, of which Europe was long in ignorance. In the event of war, Austria was to maintain a benevolent neutrality. A t its successful conclusion, Russia was to claim only Bessarabia in Europe, while Austria was to be permitted to extend her influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Muscovite Power might also, if necessary, acquire better frontiers in the region of the Black Sea and in Turkey in 109

Account of speech in the Times, Jan. 25, 1877.

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Asia. Other views exchanged at Reichstadt between the t w o emperors were as well recorded unchanged in the present articles: the establishment of a great compact Slavic or other State is excluded; in compensation, Bulgaria, Albania, and the rest of Rumelia might be constituted into independent states; Thessaly, part of Epirus, and the island of Crete might be annexed to Greece; Constantinople, with a territory of which the limit remains to be determined, might become a free city. If a Congress resulted, the two Powers were to render each other " mutual assistance" in the diplomatic field. T h e agreements were to be kept secret. 107 Within a few days it was known that Prince Gortchakoff was preparing a circular with the object of obtaining a statement of the intentions of the Powers in view of the Porte's refusal to meet their wishes. The anouncement of the circular, with its seemingly mild request, 108 brought out various interpretations as to its purpose. Many interpreted it as the second act of the escape from Moscow. The czar's government found itself in an untenable position due to the unexpected resistance of the Porte and, totally unprepared for war, had to extricate itself. Curiously, those same journals that viewed the aggressive 107 Cf. A l f r e d Franzis Pribram, The Secret Treaties of AustriaHungary, vol. ii, pp. 191-99 for the treaty, and pp. 199-203 for the additional convention. Andrassy and Novikow were the signers. Cf. also supra, p. 56 for the meeting at Reichstadt. The Russian text of the Reichstadt agreement is at variance with the Austrian text on several points. For details, cf. William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments 1871-1890 ( N e w York, 1931), pp. 92-93. 1 0 8 The gist of the contents of the intended circular were known before its appearance, which was delayed. Actually, it was dated January 31 and was received at the English foreign office on February 5. T h e full circular is contained in the House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xci, Turkey # 8 , no. 1.

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designs of the " Colossus of the North " with the greatest suspicion now painted the blackest pictures of her weaknesses. Her military strength was an illusion.109 Secret societies undermined the very structure of her institutions. She was on the eve of bankruptcy and even of revolution. Pall Mall outstripped the others in dolefully summing up that " altogether, the position of Russia is so bad as to be nearly hopeless." 110 Some took the view that the czar sought the aid of European opinion merely as a relief from his own indecision. The third interpretation was based on the belief that the czar had never flinched, and was not disposed to flinch, from the declaration made at Moscow in November. The purpose of the circular was to ascertain how far the European cabinets would continue to cooperate with the czar in pursuing the object he had laid down for himself. Meaning to go to war, the Russian ministers were " studious to put themselves diplomatically in the right." 111 They could thus prevent any of the Powers from complaining that Russia had broken the European concert, and, as well, have an excuse for the delay which, on military grounds, Russia required "before entering upon the war which she is evidently bent upon waging." l i a After the exact contents of the circular were 10» Colonel Wellesley, English military attache at St. Petersburg, reported lamentable shortcomings of the Russian army respecting mobilization to his government In January, not 400,000 Russian troops were mobilized, but only 118,000 "with a large deficit of officers and a very inefficient and inadequate commissariat." His disparaging reports leaked out and he soon found himself boycotted in Russian society. Cf. Colonel the Hon. F. A. Wellesley, With the Russians in Peace and War (London, 190S). PP- 166-73. Wellesley's reports may have been responsible for the tone of the anti-Russian newspapers. 110

Pall Mall Gazette, Jan. 30, 1877.

111

Examiner, Jan. 27, 1877.

112

Scotsman, Feb. 5> 1877.

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known the Times was inclined to consider its " precision " as more in accordance with the last interpretation than with either of the others.113 The Sublime Porte, in the meantime, had sent out its own circular," 4 communicated through its ambassadors to the several foreign offices, explaining its stand at the conference and asking for time to carry out its program of reforms. Evidences of its zeal were not lacking as employees of the various Turkish ministers were already being taught shorthand in order to be able to report fully the debates of the projected parliament. Direct negotiations with Serbia were also entered into, looking toward the establishment of a definitive peace. Strangely, however, Midhat Pasha, author of the recently proclaimed charter of liberties, was unceremoniously dismissed on February 5 by his newly created " Constitutional Sovereign " and immediately bundled off into exile. Two weeks later, in Naples, the ex-grand vizier attributed his downfall to the intrigues of hostile ministers supported by Mahmoud Pasha, a brother-in-law of the sultan. As usual, for a number of days prior to its assembling, the press commented on the great interest with which the country awaited the opening of Parliament. Debates on the Eastern Question would alone occupy its attention. The nation, however, would soon weary of the mere repetition of past negotiations, but would eagerly welcome the discerning reflections of its leaders on the prudent policy to pursue in the future. Spectator, though, expected little from Parliament, " the worst ever elected since the Reform Bill." It implied that the House of Lords would think the massacres of Eastern Christians mere " manifestations of misdirected energy " with which England had no concern. In 113

Times, Feb. 7, 1877. Signed by Safvet Pasha and dated Jan. 25, 1877. The circular was never answered by Lord Derby. 111

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the Commons, the government, lacking debating capacity, could not obtain an " intellectual victory." I t could only hope " for a victory in the voting lobbies." 1 1 5 Certain Conservative journals sarcastically remarked that such a victory should prove convincing. T h e English public had greeted the failure of the conference with a considerable degree o f apathy. I t had not been expected that the Turks would yield to the demands of the Powers. The ineradicable antipathy to Russia had continued but had been in some degree moderated by the obvious demerits of the Turks. In analyzing opinion, one cannot draw too heavily on the divisions of Party. The palpable efforts o f Radicals to classify all opponents of their views as pro-Turk, and of extreme Tories to dispose o f those who disagreed with them as pro-Russian, did not apply. The majority of both Liberals and Conservatives were not pro-anything except English; they were anti. F o r political purposes they were either anti-Turk without being pro-Russian or anti-Russian without being pro-Turk. Liberals expounded their antiTurk sentiments more readily whereas Conservatives expressed their anti-Russian convictions more vehemently. At heart, the majority were anti-Russian and to a lesser degree anti-Turk. They sympathized with the Ottoman Christians but, as behooved patriotic nationals, English interests came first. One is more at a loss in searching for the influences that inclined particular groups or schools of thinkers to adopt the views they held. In Society circles a philo-Turk and anti-Gladstonian feeling prevailed. Ritualists and Nonconformists alike had from the first most ardently espoused the cause of the oppressed Christians. Catholics and Jews had not been so moved. The small but active band of Positiv115

Spectator, Jan. 27, 1877.

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ists, though Radical in politics, were prominent among the philo-Turks, probably because of their acceptance of the doctrine of the guide and founder of their faith that Mohammedanism should be maintained in Europe to mitigate and qualify what would otherwise be a universal Christendom. It is more difficult to explain the singular circumstance that the few who were Protectionists in fiscal policy were among the apologists of Turkey, a free-trade country, whereas the most zealous disciples of the principles of Cobden were apparently ranged on the side of Russia where a policy of protection had long been pursued. That situation is even more contradictory when one regards those same manufacturers and merchants of the Manchester school as holding an undisguised aversion to war, which Russia threatened to bring about. The various newspapers, according to their politics, had been fairly consistent in their stands. Leading Radical and Liberal journals as the Daily News, Echo, Leeds Mercury, York Herald, Newcastle Daily Chronicle and Liverpool Daily Post never contained a kind word for the Turks and were once more advocating coercion. Conservative organs as the Morning Post, Standard, Yorkshire Post, Sheffield Daily Telegraph, Chronicle and Mail of Bradford, and Glasgow News offset the badly damaged reputation of the Porte by painting an even blacker picture of Russia. They never varied in their formula that British imperial interests must be protected. That could best be accomplished, it seemed, by maintaining the sanctity of treaties and by being constantly on the alert to check the designs of Russia. Non-intervention was at the moment the best policy to pursue. The Turks might be capable of reforming themselves if given time; if not, in the event of a wanton Russian attack they could very probably take care of themselves. In any case, Britain would be able to defend her rights and liberties if they were infringed upon.

176

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The supposedly Liberal Daily Telegraph and Pall Mall Gazette were in complete agreement with their anti-Russian associates. The Liberal Scotsman of Edinburgh issued grave warnings to the Porte and to Russia on alternate days. The interests of all Europe could best be served through the maintenance of peace. The Times took the same stand. It still held a lingering hope that the Powers, if they remained in accord, could somehow miraculously effect an improvement in the lot of the Christians. On the other hand, it was decidedly averse to the idea of single-handed intervention by Russia. Recognizing the hard facts of the situation, the Times was swinging around to the views of the ministry. The future policy of the government would naturally be determined by the chain of events. Northcote had decisively stated that the cabinet was unalterably opposed to coercion.11* For the moment, then, it seemed content again to withdraw into its shell of non-intervention and to wait upon events. The ministry could only hope that Russia would not act precipitately and indications pointed that such was not her intention. The most perplexing question, thus, remained to be solved. Would the Russian bear maintain his recent cublike demeanor ? T o the writer it occurred that the public, the press, and the ministry were in accord in believing war inevitable, though still thinking peace quite possible. The answer lay in the future. 114

Supra, pp. 169-70.

CHAPTER

VI

T H E F A I L U R E OF D I P L O M A C Y

THE plenipotentiaries had steamed away from the Bosphorus leaving Europe on the brink of war. A circular had been despatched pointing to the fact that Russia was desirous of averting war for the present. Midhat Pasha, the reforming Turk, had fallen. A n air of expectancy gripped the public. Would Parliament determine the course of the nation? The date for its opening had arrived. 1 Queen Victoria, for the second successive year, graced Parliament with her presence. In the Address from the Throne the outstanding events of the previous six months were all briefly touched upon. The address, read by the lord chancellor, referred to the diplomacy of the preceding autumn, to the reprobation of the Porte for the massacres, and to the part played in the conference. In taking those steps, " my object has throughout been to maintain the peace of Europe, and to bring about the better government of the disturbed provinces, without infringing upon the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire." 2 In the debates which took place upon the Queen's Speech, the center of interest was in the House of Lords where the earl of Beaconsfield had just been introduced with the usual formalities. Lord Granville, leader of the Opposition in the Lords, was neither inclined to be sensational nor too specific in his views. He was not one of those who thought that the Treaty of Paris was gone or " ought to go," * but, ' Feb. 8. 3 Hansard,

Parliamentary Debates, vol. ccxxxii (third series), pp. 3-4.

»Ibid., p. 20.

177

iy%

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by that treaty, the Powers had the right and the obligation to see justice done to the Christians. The influence of the government should be exercised in persuading " Europe as one body" to come forward and insist that Turkey perform her promises. Granville acknowledged that meant " coercion," but added: Logically it may mean coercion ; but will anybody tell me that if once the Turks got into their heads the belief that not only England, but the whole of Europe, was absolutely in earnest in this matter, they would resist the united voice of Europe? I believe it would then be unnecessary to have recourse to coercion.4 Lord Derby deprecated interference in the internal affairs of a foreign country. The only " threat" the government had made was that of withdrawing its moral support. The foreign secretary wanted peace and the " decision " rested with a single Power—" almost with a single man." 8 The duke of Argyll, as expected, oratorically condemned the inactivity of the cabinet. Coercion was essential to aid the Christians. " And if you have sent one of your most distinguished Members to Constantinople, declaring beforehand your guns to be loaded with blank cartridge, I say you might just as well have sat still, twiddling your thumbs, as you did for three months before." 6 Argyll's burning words elicited a brief retort from the premier who had not intended to speak.7 Beaconsfield inquired whether he was to understand from the noble Duke that in his mind the only element of this great Eastern Question was the condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte? Other interests were im4

Ibid., p. 31. • Ibid., p. 37. * Ibid., p. 491

Buckle, op. cit., p. 119.

THE FAILURE

OF DIPLOMACY

179

portant; political considerations and even the " existence of Empires" were involved.8 Lord Salisbury naturally attempted to dispel the thought that he had exceeded his instructions at Constantinople. His words " were fully authorized by the Cabinet." One can believe, however, that Salisbury was not entirely convinced at the time that noncoercion was best. He strenuously objected to the use of " threats of coercion," but curiously tagged on, " while we are hazy in our own minds as to whether we shall follow them up or not." * In the Commons, the speeches bordered on dullness. The marquis of Hartington was extremely mild in his censure, feeling the moment inconvenient for going into details in the absence of Parliamentary Papers containing definite information of the policy the cabinet had pursued. It was therefore unnecessary for Northcote to put up a spirited defense. He admitted that the government attached little importance to the Turkish constitution, but, on the other hand, desired to give credit to Turkey for the " willingness " she had shown to reform herself.14 Gladstone expressed his regret that the ministry should still think they could persuade the Turks to mend their ways. He maintained that by her refusal to yield to the demands of the Powers, Turkey had " placed herself entirely outside the Treaty of 1856." 1 1 One can easily read in those opening skirmishes the lines of attack and defense that were to be pursued in the later more general debates. The divergence in the views held by the official leaders of Opposition in the two Houses and those of the more fiery Argyll and Gladstone is also manifest. The staunchly Whig Lords Granville and Hart8

9

Hansard, op. cit., p. 51.

Ibid., p. 54. " Ibid., p. 106. 11 Ibid., p. 119.

l8o

BRITAIN

AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

ington would offer the necessary parliamentary criticism, in itself a tacit acquiescence of the wisdom of ministerial policy; whereas the ex-premier and his associate in the Upper House would cavil against the government and lead the Radicals in their condemnation of the past conduct and present drifting tactics of the cabinet. It naturally followed that they would urge the government to turn to a policy of coercion, which, as pointedly stated, the ministry had resolutely set its face against. Press comments on the tone and meaning of the speeches followed party lines in most instances. Conservative organs stressed the moderation of the language of Hartington and Granville in particular, while Radical journals conveyed the impression that their utterances were almost Gladstonian. Among the weeklies, John Bull, organ of constitutional Toryism and foremost defender of imperial interests, which had, however, consistently avowed its sympathy for the Christian sufferers during the previous fall, now disapproved of passionate oratory and intimations of coercion on the grounds of expediency. When the duke of Argyll proclaims that every insurrection against the government of the Porte is a legitimate insurrection, " we feel that the statement requires Lord Salisbury's qualification that an insurrection to be legitimate must have a fair prospect of success. Otherwise, as Lord Beaconsfield well pointed out, it does but produce fresh horrors and greater misery." 12 The Liberal Economist, which had constantly maintained that " peace " was England's prime interest, opposed coercion because of the risk involved. It was pleased to note that the feeling of the majority on both sides of the House of Commons was " entirely pacific " and that any attempt even to propose coercion " would be hopeless." 13 Spectator, of course, desired coercion. 12

John Bull, Feb. io, 1877.

13

Economist, Feb. io, 1877.

THE

FAILURE

OF

DIPLOMACY

The Daily Telegraph called on Liberals " to reject" a policy which was " really Russian, and not English." It was a duty of " imperious necessity " to maintain unimpaired " the priceless interests of England in the East." 14 The Daily News counseled that interest as well as duty pointed out that the Powers should deal with the Eastern Question in concert.15 It was found curious by the Morning Post that, at the very moment " when the pro-Russian party in this country is calling upon England to join with Russia in a policy of coercion, the Russian newsapers should be declaring that coercion is not merely not necessary, but would be highly imprudent." After decrying that quite a few Englishmen seemed more Russian than the Russians themselves, the Post admonished " Messrs. Gladstone, Freeman, and company " to reconsider their position and to " ask themselves whether they are really bound to talk Russia into a war which she declares that she desires to keep out of." 18 The Times had earlier taken its stand in proclaiming that " the practical decision of the nation " would oppose coercion.17 The government had laid before Parliament its case in the shape of two " Blue Books," containing between them more than a thousand pages. The first brought the diplomatic correspondence down to the eve of Constantinople; the second carried it through the conference.18 In the light of the " Blue Books," Opposition leaders attempted to prove to the country that the cabinet had actually taken over what was purported to be the Liberal policy on the Eastern Question. Jibes were cast at the ministerial press whose stock arguments had been so thoroughly repudiated by the ministry 14

Daily Telegraph, Feb. 14, 1877.

15

Daily News, Feb. 14, 1877.

18

Morning Post, Feb. 14, 1877.

" Times, Feb. 9, 1877. 18

Turkey # 1 and Turkey # 2 , 1877.

182

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

itself. " The simple fact is that ever since September last, under the stress of public opinion, the Government have actually adopted the policy, the reasoning, and the conclusions of their opponents," contended Sir William Vernon Harcourt in boasting of the completeness of their conversion. The member for Oxford desired coercion as the inaction of Europe could only mean war by Russia against Turkey. " I f a new treaty of Adrianople is to be averted, it can only be by that policy which Mr. Canning had the sagacity to inaugurate, and which Lord Aberdeen wanted the courage to achieve." 1 9 Shortly after the publication of the " Blue Books " a series of questions with reference to them was put to the government by various Liberals. A s a result, Parliament was informed that Baring had only a few days before been recalled from attending the commission at Philippopolis because of the lenient punishment meted out to certain of the Turkish culprits on trial for their part in the earlier atrocities in Bulgaria. Tossoun Bey, one of the most deserving of punishment, had been entirely exonerated.20 It also learned that Elliot had not been recalled from Constantinople to mark the displeasure of Her Majesty's Government at the conduct of Turkey in the conference, but had been directed to return to England solely to report on the state of affairs. 21 Little information could be elicited, however, on the mission of Royal Engineers officers which had been sent to Constantinople as well as to other parts of European and Asiatic Turkey durLetter to Times in its issue of Feb. 12, 1877. It is rather curious that Dilke should have written in his diary on Feb. 1 1 : " Harcourt has got frightened and has gone back." The member for Oxford thus placed party unanimity before his own convictions. Cf. Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude Tuckwell, The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke (New York, 1917), vol. i, p. 216. 20

Hansard, vol. ccxxxii, p. 170.

«Ibid.,

p. 387.

THE FAILURE

OF

DIPLOMACY

ing the recess.13 The government was also reticent on its intended reply to Prince Gortchakoff's circular. He considered it desirable that, before expressing their own views, " they should know something of the views entertained by the other Courts of Europe." M Gladstone had given notice in the House of Commons on February 12 that he intended to make inquiries with regard to the treaty engagements of the country, referred to in a despatch of Lord Derby of the previous September." The consequence was a debate as nearly general as possible four days later. The gist of the ex-premier's volubility was that the Treaty of Paris contained no engagement by which the Sublime Porte could call upon England for aid in the event of war, albeit it gave England the right to intervene in the affairs of the Porte. Gathorne Hardy, Secretary of State for War, was not so ambiguous. He acknowledged that Turkey could not call upon England to go to war on her behalf under the Treaty of 1856, but, it did obligate England to guarantee the independence and integrity of Turkey conjointly with the other Powers. Moreover, the Tripartite treaty bound England, if called upon, to go to war with Austria and France. Hardy was quite emphatic in summing up that, " without being obliged to go to war for Turkey," England was pledged, " not to Turkey alone, but to Europe at large, to maintain the faith of Treaties " which she had " no right to violate." 28 Leonard Courtney, one of the most brilliant and effective writers on the staff of the Times and rumored as a possible 32 Ibid., p. 260. Colonel Home headed the mission. For an account of its activities, cf. Dwight Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878 (Cambridge, 1934), pp. 32-42. 23

Ibid., p. 462.

Derby to Elliot of Sept. 5, 1876, in House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xc, Turkey # 1 , no. 159. 84

25

Hansard, vol. ccxxxii, p. 499.

184

BRITAIN AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

successor to Delane, held that the obligations of treaties could not be regarded as permanent. England did not have to abide by " immoral engagements." He therefore urged the government to notify France and Austria at once that England no longer considered herself bound by the Tripartite treaty.2* It was Courtney who had contributed many of the leading articles during the atrocity campaign of the Times. He evidently aspired to a political career as he had just entered the Commons as a Liberal member from Liskeard. Following Courtney, a host of Conservatives spent their time in defending Constantinople, censuring Gladstone's unintelligent remarks, and in calling upon the Opposition to declare its policy. On one occasion Gladstone grew quite wroth and entered into a spirited argument with Chaplin, the Speaker restoring order. Northcote regretted the heat displayed in the later stages of the debate but was not surprised that some impatience was manifested over the tactics of the Opposition. He considered it neither dignified nor useful to the public interest that they should confine themselves to fishing questions and notices which insinuated much but committed them to nothing.27 Harrington weakly responded that the government might yet have its policy challenged, and shortly thereafter the House adjourned for almost a week. The mode of attack of the Liberals was severely condemned by most journals. Nevertheless, that constant critic of the government, the Daily News, was able to find comfort in asserting that Her Majesty's ministers, who in the fall had talked of a war in favor of Turkey, had now come " to deprecating a war of coercion against her." 28 Its South Wales 24

Ibid., p. 510. *> Ibid., p. 561. 2t Daily News, Feb. 17, 1877.

THE FAILURE

OF

DIPLOMACY

namesake was particularly eloquent in praising Gladstone's " scathing invective " in " overwhelming " Chaplin, " until one began almost to feel pity for the unfortunate man who had brought down such a castigation upon himself."

It

seems that Lord Hamilton, who attempted to stem the torrent, was also brushed a s i d e — " as one would a troublesome insect which comes buzzing about his head when he is seriously engaged."

29

The Leeds

the episode in the same vein.

Mercury

had commented on

Spectator

was unfavorably

impressed by the temper of Parliament which, however, was liable to be altered by the influence of events and " by a divergence not yet proved, but strongly suspected, between the House of Commons and the people who elect it." *0 Despite the disparaging attitude evinced toward irregular combats with no precise aim in view, the duke of Argyll, that " most uncompromising of humanitarians " and " most watchful of W h i g s , "

31

forced another drawn-out debate

in the House of Lords on the 20th.

The prospect of ora-

torical display packed the galleries.

A r g y l l did not shrink

from the freest censure of the government in reviewing in detail its " unhappy " policy from the very outbreak of revolt in the disturbed provinces to the present moment.

H e then

appealed eloquently to L o r d Beaconsfield to use his power in the cause of humanity " to secure liberty for the Christian subjects of the Porte."

Concluding, A r g y l l desired to know

of the ministry: not " what measures," but whether they had " any measures " in contemplation " for the fulfilment of the promises " which they had " held out to the people of Turkey to protect them from further cruel oppression." 39

South Wales Daily News, Feb. 19, 1877.

ao

Issues of Feb. 17, 1877.

81

Times, Feb. 21, 1877.

iz

Hansard, vol. ccxxxii, p. 659.

M

i86

BRITAIN

AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

Lord Derby pointed out that the conference had averted war for the time being and stressed that the Ottoman government had asked for a " reasonable time " to work out reforms in its own way. I f , after that reasonable time, nothing should be done, the European Powers would then " have a right to demand guarantees." " A touch of Bathism," and an injection of the old Palmerstonian spirit by the earl of Kimberley followed. The marquis of Salisbury was more outspoken than on the occasion of his return from Constantinople. He still considered the refusal of the Turks to accept the moderate demands of the conference a " mystery." That gave him the opportunity to score his earlier critics in suggesting that one of the causes for their " unfortunate resolution " had been the belief, so sedulously fostered by " irresponsible advisers," that " the power of Russia was rotten, that the armies of Russia were suffering from disease, that the mobilization of the army had failed, and that, consequently, the fear of war was idle." " Speeches by Lords Granville and Beaconsfield brought the seven-hour debate to a close. The Opposition leader was quite conciliatory in his remarks. He did wonder why the government had not, at the time, corrected the impression held by ministerial organs that Salisbury had exceeded his instructions at Constantinople." The premier pointed out that vituperative articles had frequently been directed at him without the necessity of defense. Yet Salisbury was " supposed not to have had the confidence of his Colleagues because he seems to have been attacked in some newspapers generally supporting the Administration," and because his 18

Ibid., p. 670. Lord Bath was a Tory who had been a prominent atrocitarian the previous fall. 88 Hansard, p. 693. "Supra, p. 158. 84

THE FAILURE

OF

DIPLOMACY

187

colleagues had " not written leading articles in his defence." He therefore felt that " the principal argument" of the noble Earl—to which Granville immediately objected, expostulating that he had not used those words. " Then there must have been a ventriloquist in the House," retorted Beaconsfield, as on his side they were under that impression." The premier continued by stating that Lord Salisbury had fallen Jnto only one error, which all would have done: he had given " too much credit to the Turks for common sense." " In the concluding words of his speech, the last he was to make on Eastern affairs during the entire session, Lord Beaconsfield naturally struck the imperial note: It has been said that the people of this country are deeply interested in the humanitarian and philanthropic considerations involved in it [the Eastern Question]. All must appreciate such feelings. But I am mistaken if there be not a yet deeper sentiment on the part of the people of this country, one with which I cannot doubt your Lordships will ever sympathise, and that is—the determination to maintain the Empire of England." The attitude of the press was that the oratory in the Lords, following so closely that displayed in the Commons, was entirely superfluous. The Morning Post was hard put even to imagine anything " more useless." The Times was little impressed with the achievements of the debate, which dealt only with the past. " But as the battle of Blenheim was a famous victory, so this was a famous debate." It particularly admired Argyll's " successful oration " which, however, had one defect. " It lacked the element of practical importance." The Daily Telegraph had no love even for Radical oratory. In its eyes the duke's effort was merely 17

Hansard, p. 723. Ibid., p. 726.

"Ibid.

188

BRITAIN AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

an " aimless exercise." T h e oft-termed " organ of the s u l t a n " exulted, however, that the feeble policy of cooperative coercion, " which has never dared to come out into the light of a motion and division," could be regarded as put out of its m i s e r y . " T h e House of Commons had not met since the debate brought up by Gladstone, which had been adjourned. In the meantime the Liberal leaders had evidently decided not to resume it, as, when the House convened on the 22d, the discussions were not renewed. Hartington, curiously, felt called upon to defend their criticism and examination of the policy of the cabinet. That was the legitimate function of Opposition. Moreover, it was not their duty to suggest an alternative policy to the government. 41 A t the time of the opening of Parliament the Liberal leaders had been prepared or were at least disposed to bring forth a resolution distinctly calling upon the government to act in concert with the other Powers in enforcing the recommendations of Constantinople. That was so f a r decided upon that the speeches of Hartington, Granville, Gladstone, and more emphatically of the duke of Arygll, on the opening night, might well have been delivered in support of such a resolution actually before Parliament. A f t e r that determination of the leaders became apparent, or was authoritatively communicated to the rank and file of Liberals, there evidently was much heart-searching with a view to ascertain how f a r this course agreed with convictions arrived at around the domestic hearth. Within a f e w days communications reached the marquis of Hartington which clearly demonstrated that the introduction of any resolution absolutely affirming anything whatever would be fraught with disaster to such harmony as existed on the Opposition benches. In 40

Journals quoted in above paragraph are issues of Feb. 2 1 , 1877.

41

Hansard, p. 840.

THE FAILURE

OF DIPLOMACY

189

the case of the Home Rulers in particular, it had been decided that they could agree upon no common line of action in anticipation of the issue coming to a vote.*' That divergence of opinion among the Liberal ranks explains the irregular tactics employed by the Opposition in the debates on the foreign policy of the government. Spectator was bitter as a result of the desertion of coercion by the Liberals. In its eyes, the duke of Argyll was the sole Parliamentary speaker who had as yet even risen " near the height" of the present emergency. Spectator, therefore, called on the English people to speak out in order to strengthen the weak knees, " not only of her Majesty's Government, but of her Majesty's Opposition." Giving the Turks " time " in which to test their brand-new virtue, when they had never shown a trace of virtue, was not the policy which the English people desired. " And if the Liberals do not heartily oppose it, the Liberals will not be, more than the Tories, the representatives of the popular feeling of England." A conventional tone was struck in the emperor's speech opening the German imperial diet on the 22d. Constantinople, the Christians, and the hope for peace were all brought in. Although Germany was less threatened by the crisis in the East, her interests would be protected by the government. Those interests prescribed no definite line of conduct except the preservation of its good relations with allied and friendly Powers.44 Conservative organs were attracted by the pleasant sound of the hope for peace, which they stressed 42

An article in Mayfair, Feb. 20, 1877, is the authority for certain of the above statements. Henry W. Lucy, a well-known writer of Parliamentary articles, was its editor. Members of the Daily News staff almost exclusively contributed to its columns. 43

Spectator, Feb. 24, 1877.

** Account of speech is in the " Latest Intelligence" columns of the Times, Feb. 23, 1877.

igo

BRITAIN

AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

as the keynote of the address. The Standard remarked that it might have been by Lord Derby himself.*5 The language irritated the Daily News, however, as it indicated that the German government had " no more comprehensive grasp of the situation than our own Ministers." That last annoying thought must have been sufficient to bring on the leader writer's following disparaging passage: " In his desire that the life of no German soldier shall be risked on behalf of the Eastern Christians, Prince Bismarck has apparently lost sight of the strain of preparation which an unsettled Eastern Question must entail upon the country whose interest he has so exclusively at heart." 46 Although almost daily philosophizing took place in Parliament during the latter days of February and early March, only one discussion need be mentioned. Lord Stratheden and Campbell moved an address in the Lords praying Her Majesty to adopt measures calculated to secure adherence to the treaties of 30 March and 15 April, 1856, so far as the Conference of 1871 had re-established them.41 Those treaties " were still binding " on England and all signatory Powers in the opinion of the ultra-Conservative peer. The debate which followed elicited a statement from Earl Grey who, in a manner peculiarly his own, opposed the motion yet heartily approved its contents. The aged Whig statesman deplored the strange departure of the Opposition from the policy associated with it in the days of their power. Argyll of course attacked the motion on the ground that it could only further encourage the Porte to resist the advice of Europe. Lord Derby felt the motion inopportune and asked that it be withdrawn. Despite that request, Lord Stratheden heroically nailed his colors to the mast and resolutely declined. When " Standard, Feb. 23, 1877. Daily News, Feb. 24, 1877. 4 1 On Feb. 26. Hansard, vol. ccxxxii, p. 98a.

THE FAILURE

OF

DIPLOMACY

191

the time for a division came, there remained in the House only four peers to vote against the motion and its proposer to vote for it. At any rate a motion had finally been persisted in, even though it was formally negatived by the overwhelming proportions of the majority described. The controversy over the past seemed to have exhausted itself in Parliament, yet it was kept alive on the outside, largely by the frantic atrocitarians. True, the public could no longer be induced to attend meetings, or to read derogatory pamphlets on the Turks; still, they could hardly avoid the deluge of letters to the press and articles in the periodicals. Freeman repeatedly denounced " the wild beast" and advocated frank and cordial union with Russia. James Bryce wrote in the same vein. He considered that " inaction " might, in the long run, prove " far more dangerous than the most energetic coercion could be." 48 Arthur Arnold termed the pretended confidence of the ministry in Turkish promises " a policy of hypocrisy " and demanded guarantees.4' Sir John Lubbock and Grant Duff, Liberal M. P.s, contributed milder articles to James Knowles' first issue of the Nineteenth Century. Rev. M. MacColl was still harping upon the well worn theme of impalements. Gladstone was occupied in writing another pamphlet, soon to appear. On the other hand, the anti-Russians added their fair share of comment and advice. William H. Russell, former famed war correspondent of the Times and editor of the Army and Navy Gazette, republished a rather interesting book on a subject in which he had played a leading role. In a slightly revised edition of The British Expedition to the Crimea, Dr. Russell added his regret that England had not the inclination or, perhaps, the power to embark again in ** Letter to the Times in its issue of Feb. 20, 1877. «» Letter to the Times in its issue of Feb. 27, 1877.

192

BRITAIN

AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

a similar enterprise as that of the Crimean war. Edmund Gaisford, in that ancient favorite among the monthlies, the St. James's Magazine and United Empire Review, sharply attacked Gladstone for his share in the recent political agitation.80 James Lowther, the under secretary for colonies, remarked at Portsmouth that the behavior of the Turks had been so misrepresented that " a clergyman had mistaken a fagot of beans for a Christian martyr." 81 Hobart Pasha, the English admiral of the Turkish fleet, called for " a little kindly, generous feeling from Europe " for the Porte. 62 Another group of the English public, rather well-known because of the fame of their founder, tendered their counsel to the sultan. The Foreign Affairs committees, consisting of a fairly large number of workingmen organized in close to seventy societies scattered throughout England, had all along published tract after tract, blaming the sinister conspiracies of Russia for practically all of the world's evil. They had been organized by David Urquhart during the Crimean war and had followed his violently anti-Russian views ever since. Urquhart's Diplomatic Review, a quarterly, and Diplomatic Fly Sheets, published when the spirit moved, were the mediums by which the results of their deliberations enlightened the general public. They also indiscriminately sent petitions to Parliament, the Queen, Beaconsfield, the grand vizier of Turkey, etc., unveiling the dark designs of Russia and proffering advice as to the proper course to pursue under the circumstances. In the petitions of the previous fall, it had been stated that Russia had contrived all of the Balkan insurrections and that reports of the massacres could not be believed as the 60

March issue, article entitled " Recent Political Agitation."

51

Account of speech in the Times, March 2, 1877.

Letter published in the Times, March 12, 1877. Hobart Pasha was still on the retired list of the English navy drawing half pay. 82

THE FAILURE

OF

DIPLOMACY

193

Bulgarians as a race were notoriously untruthful. Prior to the conference, the English cabinet had been counseled to withdraw from the Concert of Powers. Russia should be called to account, and not Turkey. A f t e r its failure, the sultan was congratulated on his refusal to permit the Powers to violate Turkish independence and was informed that the English ministers were the agents and accomplices of Russia. In the present state of things, advised the Foreign Affairs committees, there was only one remedy to free his domains from constant interference. The sultan should immediately send an ultimatum to the czar, demanding that his army be disbanded and sent home. If the czar failed to comply with that demand, His Majesty could then declare war against Russia and close the Bosphorus to her commerce, leaving Russia powerless to attack him.88 The sultan was later to reply with profuse thanks for their good wishes and excellent advice, although it rather puzzled him as to why they should include the British government as an enemy of Turkey. A n anonymous pamphleteer offered a somewhat less practical solution of the difficult problem. The shades of the past were called in. " O h ! that in 1812 we had fought by the side of Napoleon, that we had repaid with shot and shell the perfidy of Tilsit, and avenged by levelled strongholds and blazing fleets the inhuman barbarities of the Czars." M Gladstone's second pamphlet, Lessons in Massacre, carries one to the other pole. In the motto to the pamphlet, the ex-premier solemnly adjures the Liberal party to: Away, with me, all you whose souls abhor The uncleanly savours of a slaughterhouse; For I am stifled with this smell of sin. 63 Foreign Affairs Committees of England, Diplomatic Fly Sheets, "Address to the Sultan" (March 4, 1877). The sultan's reply was also published with the above. 84 The Northern (London, 1877).

Question, or Russia's Policy in Turkey Unmasked

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

There followed an eighty-page indictment of the conduct of the Porte since the previous May. He accused the Turkish government of a deliberate intention to cover up iniquity, to baffle inquiry, to reward prominence in crime, to punish or discourage humanity among its own agents, and to prolong the reign of terror. The Turkish government was the " incarnate curse " of the subject races' existence.58 In decided contrast to Bulgarian Horrors which had netted such a neat profit," Gladstone's second effort fell still-born from the press. " Atlas," of the World, wrote: I fear that the public are growing tired of Mr. Gladstone's pamphleteering. . . . The Times dismissed it in a small-type paragraph; some of the other papers did not notice it at all; and one of the Press agencies, having sent out an offer to telegraph a summary of the pamphlet on the day of issue at a very low price to the provincial newspapers, received instructions to do so from four out of something over 200 journals addressed.6' Gladstone himself admits that the tract " produced no great impression," the sale not going beyond six or seven thousand copies." Some comments were of course made. The Daily News, Echo, and Leeds Mercury, along with other Radical organs, gave it their highest praise. Most journals, however, if they referred to the brochure, merely made it a subject for ridicule. The new contribution was dismissed by the Birmingham Daily Gazette as mere rhetoric, " and often very bad rhetoric." The Glasgow News marveled at the conduct of Gladstone in now eschewing Parliament after he had only 55

William Ewart Gladstone, Lessons

in Massacre

(London,

P. 79Supra, p. 87. 87

World, March 21, 1877.

M

Morley, op. cit., p. 560.

Edmund Yates was its editor.

1877),

THE

FAILURE

OF

DIPLOMACY

195

the previous fall joined in the clamor for an autumn session. " He harangued the people in order to compel the assembling of Parliament, now he stalks away from Parliament with his indictment in his pocket, and appeals again to ' the people.' " The Globe was unable to understand how an English statesman could, in view of the delicate negotiations going on and chances of European peace hanging in the balance, pen such a tract. Its leader writer was hard put to find language " sufficiently strong in condemnation of the mischievous proceeding," yet he succeeded fairly well." Prince Gortchakoff's circular had drawn no answer from Her Majesty's Government although it had been the subject of conversation on several occasions. On February 14, Lord Derby informed the Russian ambassador, Count Schouvaloff, that the ministry had determined to defer their reply until events should have developed. A statement to that effect was made in the House of Commons two days later.80 On the 19th, the foreign secretary was informed that if the other Powers refused to act, " Russia must act alone," although she was desirous of maintaining the European Concert. The collapse of the debates in Parliament was in itself conclusive evidence that England was in no mood for coercion. There followed various despatches stating that Russia was desirous of a pacific solution but its government must have some serious grounds to justify their disarming. That point was stressed in conversations of Schouvaloff with Derby on the 21 st and 26th.*1 A draught reply to the circular was 62 then actually prepared, but in consequence of a communication made verbally by the Russian ambassador to Lord Derby soliciting the answer to be deferred until further " • A l l journals in above paragraph are issues of March 13, 1877. 40

Supra, p. 183.

61

Duke of Argyll, The Eastern Question, vol. i, p. 384.

M

Buckle, of. cit., p. 127.

I96

BRITAIN AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

communications were made, no answer was sent. The announcement was made in the Commons by Bourke on March 8.M In the meantime events were shaping themselves. Negotiations for peace between the Porte and Serbia had finally been concluded. A special session of the Skuptschina was formally opened by Prince Milan, the conditions of peace were read by Ristich, they were agreed to, and the Serbian assembly was dissolved, all within two hours. On the following day, March i, definite peace was signed at Constantinople. Montenegro, however, was to remain obstinate. Prince Nikita was considerably annoyed that Serbia had concluded a separate peace in violation of their agreement. Still, the Porte consented to prolong the armistice for another twenty days and Montenegrin delegates were shortly thereafter sent to the Turkish capital to enter into negotiations. Those accomplishments, along with the pacific news coming out of Russia, produced a more cheerful, albeit more boastful tone in the press. The Economist considered the aspect of affairs as " certainly more pacific than any which we have seen for a long time." Similarly, the Civil Service Review regarded the situation as " considerably more hopeful." The Bullionist seemed to think that isolation would compel Russia to withdraw her army from the frontier and consequently the outbreak of war would be put off " for some time to come." The Graphic hoped that every week of delay would make it easier for the czar " to retreat from the position he has taken up." ** Most journals were spreading the thought that Russia was desirous of having Europe construct a golden bridge over which she could retreat from her untenable position without •* Hansard, vol. ccxxxii, p. 1569. M

Issues of March 3, 1877.

THE FAILURE

OF DIPLOMACY

197

dishonor. One wonders therefore at the anomaly that the very organs which had long cried most loudly for peace, which Russia threatened and which could be maintained only through a Russian retreat, now, the instant that the czar's government took what they interpreted to be a backward step, should gloat over its humiliation, a procedure which could only incense the pride of Russia and defeat the object they so clamorously desired. Realizing that, some newspapers thereupon occupied themselves in manufacturing pretexts for that retreat. However, their suggestions involving no humiliation sounded rather unconvincing. Russian diplomacy had again become active, bringing speculation and rumors in its wake. On March 1 the various London journals carried the information that General Ignatieff, who had long suffered from a complaint of the eyes, was going abroad to consult the chief oculists. That curious telegram out of St. Petersburg was to be taken as an announcement that the czar's government had exhausted its patience in waiting for replies to its month-old circular, and intended collecting them by special messenger. Ignatieff arrived in Berlin on the 4th and during his stay engaged in conversation with both the Kaiser and his chancellor. Comment on his tour of diplomatic opthalmia naturally filled the columns of the press correspondents. In turn, the direction of Russian diplomacy and the comments of their foreign correspondents occupied the attention of the English editors. The rumors in circulation indicated that the czar's government, with the other cabinets obviously unwilling to take the initiative, was once more offering its own plan of solution for their acceptance or rejection. Guarantees, of course, were as before the core of the Russian suggestions. English ministers, in Parliament, had expressed their desire that the Porte be given " time " to carry out reforms in its own way. Lord Derby had, however, added

I98

BRITAIN

AND

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that, if after a " reasonable time " nothing should be done, the European Powers would then " have a right to demand guarantees."" What Russia evidently desired to know was the exact length of a " reasonable time," and whether after that period of grace coercion could be applied. The rumors seemed to indicate that Russia was suggesting one year as the period of grace. The one-year plan was given a very hostile reception by the English press. The Times considered it " inexpedient for any State which will not use coercion now to give a pledge that it will be bolder a year hence." 88 Ignatieff's mission could be " of little value." However desirous of making a gilded bridge for the retreat of the Russians, England ought not to seek to attain that end " by entering into engagements which must be embarrassing and might at any time become dangerous." 81 Such an agreement would mean the abrogation of the Treaty of Paris, according to the Standard and Pall Mall Gazette. " General Ignatieff has really no need to give himself the trouble of coming to England," abruptly remarked the Daily Telegraph."8 " What Russia is seeking to obtain at the present moment," observed the Standard on the following day, " is a general right of interference in the affairs of Turkey, in exchange for abstention from attacking Turkey at once." The Daily Telegraph continued in its challenging tone: We are all ready to build a more or less ornamental bridge for her, and all anxious that the ' diplomatic opthalmia' of her emissary should be speedily relieved; but England will stand firm upon the Treaty of Paris, which cost a war to make, and would cost a still more extensive one to unmake.88 65

Supra, p. 186.

T

• Ibid., March 7, 1877. •• Daily Telegraph, March 8, 1877.

48

Times, March 5, 1877.

98

Issues of March 6, 1877.

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199

On the other hand, the Daily News was practically urging the Slavic Power to war on behalf of the Christians. " Russia is not building for herself the bridge, of which so much has lately been said. She is rather burning her boats." A s far as Russia was concerned the Treaty of Paris was dead. The Radical organ stated with assurance that, in the event of war, England would not interfere. " It is not the beginning of a war between Russia and Turkey, but the end of it, and the demands made by the victor, which might bring the Tripartite Treaty into operation on the theory of those who hold that it is still valid." 10 It was only natural that, holding such views, the Daily News was subjected to constant attacks by the other journals. The Russian " feeler " was thus unceremoniously greeted by England. Britain was quite willing to employ moral force in any form or quantity, to exhaust her vocabulary of advice, persuasion, entreaty, indignation, and rebuke, but she was decidedly hesitant about going further. Still, in the interest of peace, which was the best insurance for the protection of British interests, she was desirous of discovering the least that might content Russia and would then attempt to prevail on the Sublime Porte to acquiesce. It was rather curious that most journals had recently dropped all mention of reforms, as though distasteful, and now interpreted the role of England to be that of a mediator only in order to prevent war.71 In view of the pending negotiations, silence was practically maintained in Parliament in order not to embarrass the cabinet. True, O'Clery succeeded in raising considerable laughter in the Commons by asking whether it was intended by Her Majesty's ministers to urge upon the czar 10

Daily News, March 8, 1877.

T1

That was Beaconsfield's point of view.

Cf. Buckle, op. cit., p. 127.

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the desirability of effecting such reforms and ameliorations in the Government of his Polish subjects, by the introduction of representative and constitutional institutions as may serve by way of precedent for the guidance of the Government of the Sultan in the work of regeneration in the Ottoman dominions, so earnestly desired by the Emperor of Russia in the cause of humanity and civilization.7* On March 9 the Russian emissary, who had proceeded to Paris, called on Lord Lyons and represented that Russia could not disarm unless its government could show the people that something had been obtained in return for the expense incurred in mobilizing the army, that Russia and the rest of Europe had not been set at naught by the Porte, and that some security had been obtained for the Christian populations. The conference had separated without a final protocol. That omission might now be remedied.78 Two days later a draft of the proposed protocol was placed in the hands of Lord Derby by Schouvaloff, who had gone to Paris to converse with Ignatieff. On the 13th, after a cabinet council, the Russian ambassador was informed that " Her Majesty's Government were ready to agree in principle to such a protocol, provided they could come to an understanding as to its terms." 74 On the same day and apparently as part of the same conversation, Schouvaloff was requested to mention that English assent would be subject to three provisos: ( 1 ) some formal pledge of the intention of Russia to disarm must be given, ( 2 ) the Porte should not be asked to sign it, ( 3 ) the terms of the document must be settled by agreement with the other Powers. 75 72

Hansard, vol. ccxxxii, p. 1760. Duke of Argyll, The Eastern Question, vol. i, pp. 386-87. 71 Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xci, Turkey # 1 5 , no. 278. 73 Ibid., no. 280. A brief summary of the diplomacy leading to the signing of the London Protocol is published in the Times, May 21, 1877. Argyll reviews the history of the negotiations in the summary, in which 71

THE FAILURE

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20I

In welcoming the new effort of diplomacy, the Times felt called upon to deliver a funeral oration for the old: " When the Conference at Constantinople came to an end, the disappointment of those who regretted the failure most was alleviated by the feeling that all things had been done decently and in order." England especially had performed " every duty." Looking back, the leader writer could feel that it was held too much under " the glare of publicity " which, together with the mob of Stamboul, influenced the Porte to resistance. Ignatieff's conversations would, at least, not suffer from any such hindrances. " So far, then, the form of the new negotiations gives a certain earnest of success." 78 One marvels at the whims of the " Thunderer " in delivering this final cuff to the conference, when it had only the previous fall so constantly complained that the devious path of secret diplomacy left the public too much in the dark and had therefore welcomed the conference with open arms. Reports of the mildness of the Russian suggestions had soothed the English press. It appeared that contingent coercion had been dropped and that Prince Gortchakoff would be content with the mere signature of an international protocol. All organs commented on their apparent harmlessness. The Times remarked there could be no doubt that the Russian ambassador " brings with him a strong desire to find a way of honourable retreat." 77 If Russia could be contented with such a settlement, England need not grudge her assent, for it binds her " to nothing against the Turkish Power, while it gives that Power at least a respite." 78 The he draws on the despatches in the " Blue Book," Turkey #15. A similar account is contained in his first volume on The Eastern Question, pp. 386-400. ™ Times, March 10, 1877. ™ Ibid., March 14, 1877.

" Ibid., March 12, 1877.

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Daily Telegraph asked whether Russia was to promise that she would at once and loyally demobilize her armies. " Without a declaration of the most categorical kind to this effect, all that is now being sought might simply look like the working out of a policy of delay." The moderation of the Russian proposals must have stunned the Daily Telegraph, as it generously conceded that, if the promise to demobilize was faithfully executed, Russia should be aided in her honorable retreat." Pall Mall was not to be lulled into security, even for the moment. The proposal was " a snare, or as dangerous as a snare. That it asks little is an acknowledged affectation; that it means much is plain." 80 The proposed protocol was considered useless by the Daily News which thought it far too mild. It " would have welcomed an agreement with Russia, and with the other European Powers, which had for its object to introduce a genuine and substantial change for the better in the condition of the Turkish provinces;" but it could not see " any particular advantage in a Protocol designed to express our sentiments and leave things as they are." 81 Spectator termed the whole proceeding " disgraceful." In that sweeping statement it included the plan of a year of grace, the negotiations going on, and even demobilization.82 During the week that followed, all organs, except the ultra-Radical, continued to press for demobilization in characteristic articles. No official overture was made to General Ignatieff to come to London, yet he accepted the personal invitation of the marquis of Salisbury to visit him at Hatfield and as a result was to take part in certain of the negotiations being conducted with Lord Derby. The Russian emissary arrived in 79

Daily Telegraph, March 13, 1877.

80

Pall Mall Gazette, March 13, 1877.

81

Daily News, March 20, 1877.

82

Spectator,

March 17, 1877.

THE

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203

London the evening of the 16th and was to remain in England practically a week before proceeding to Vienna. The day after his arrival he was entertained at dinner at the foreign office. Subsequently the General and Madame Ignatieff were received by the Queen at Windsor Castle and a banquet was held in their honor by Beaconsfield himself. T o the premier the special envoy's visit came as " a thunderbolt," being regarded as most " inopportune," yet he felt forced, for propriety's sake, to entertain him." Delane of the Times did not feel called upon to be so polite as he declined even to meet Ignatieff. In private the renowned editor confessed that he did not understand the protocol—" except that it is a ' do,' and I think in such matters it is always we who are ' done.' " 84 In print, however, the Times constantly urged its acceptance, although in reading between the lines one can readily see that it was quite dubious of the sincerity of Russia and of the possible effectiveness of the protocol. Its leading articles repeatedly referred to the Russian policy as one of " mystification." With the exception of occasional outbursts, the " Thunderer," ever since the opening of the conference at Constantinople, had supported the policy of the government, and it was to continue to do so. While in London, Ignatieff accompanied Count Schouvaloff to the foreign office in order to discuss the exact terms of the proposed document. Lord Derby considered it inexpedient to discuss the wording until an understanding had been reached regarding demobilization. The czar's representatives, however, refused to concede that the English signature should be contingent on Russian demobilization. The foreign secretary then asked whether there were «' Buckle, op. cit., pp. 127-28. 8 4 Arthur Irwin Dasent, John Thadeus Delane, Editor of " The his Life and Correspondence (London, 1908), vol. ii, p. 333.

Times,"

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any conditions under which Russia would undertake to demobilize, the inquiry producing the first sketch of what afterwards became the Russian Declaration. The opinion was expressed that the czar's government would disarm on three conditions: ( i ) the Porte should take the initiative in disarming, (2) peace must be concluded with Montenegro, (3) Turkish reforms should be seriously taken in hand.85 Two days later, on March 23, Schouvaloff was informed that the cabinet could not accept the Russian conditions. Derby inquired, though, if Russia would consent to disarm simultaneously with Turkey. The Russian ambassador still insisted that Russian demobilization could not be included in the protocol, which must be signed first. Schouvaloff then, in turn, countered with a compromise of his own. If the Porte was willing to listen to the advice of the Powers as stated in the protocol, it could then send an envoy to St. Petersburg to treat directly with Russia on the question of demobilization. In that event, the two Powers would disarm simultaneously." On the following day Schouvaloff proposed that his suggested proceeding should take the shape of a " separate Declaration to be made by Russia before the Protocol was signed." M In the meantime the hitch in the negotiations had occasioned fresh suspicions of the sincerity of Russia in the journals supporting the ministry. Russia was merely dangling the sham protocol before Europe solely to gain time until the weather cleared. Ignatieff's tour was a farce as war was clearly intended. A cartoon by Proctor on the cover of Funny Folks admirably hit off the situation. Lord Derby was caricatured as an oculist looking in Ignatieff's eye with a magnifying glass. The Russian circular was in a waste basket at his side. Underneath in parenthesis was 85

Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xci, Turkey # 1 5 , no. 330.

84

Ibid., no. 366.

81

Ibid., no. 369.

THE FAILURE

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205

written: " General Ignatieff, whose eyesight has been injured by the scorching glare of the sun on the Bosphorus, is visiting the European Capitals in search of a competent Oculist." The following conversation supposedly was engaged in: General Ignatieff.—" D o you see anything in my eye ? " Consulting Oculist D e r b y . — " Oh, yes, perfectly. I see —Constantinople.'' The cartoon was entitled: ' All My EYE.' 88 The enforced silence in Parliament, lengthened by the delay, also irked the Radicals and atrocitarians, who therefore felt justified in voicing their suspicions of the intentions of the ministry and in breaking the so-called united front. In the Upper House, on the 22d, Lords Dudley and Bath attacked the protocol as too mild. The maintenance of peace was a secondary consideration, as the main object to be obtained was some effective guarantee for the fair government of the Christian subjects of the Porte. The ministry was severely censured as well for its announced intention of sending Elliot back to Constantinople. Lord Derby was quite wroth that peace should be considered of secondary importance. " It must be obvious to any one that a single month—I might almost say a single week—of a European war would bring in its train far greater horrors than any which have occurred in the Turkish Provinces." 89 On the following day a more acrimonious squabble took place in the House of Commons. Fawcett precipitated the controversy by refusing to acquiesce in the policy of silence which had been urged on him. " I f they were silent now, what justification was there for the attitude which many of them took up during the autumn." 90 He therefore moved the resolution that, 88

Funny Folks, March 24, 1877.

89 Hansard,

"Ibid.,

Parliamentary Debates, vol. ccxxxiii (third series), p. 312.

p. 395-

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in the opinion of this House, any promises of reform made by the Porte, without guarantees for their execution, will be fruitless; that the Powers have a right to demand, in the interest of the peace of Europe, adequate securities for better government in Turkey; and that the misrule which has brought such misery on the Christian subjects of the Porte will continue unless the European Powers obtain some such guarantees for improved administration as they agreed on at the Conference.81 Hartington rose immediately after Fawcett to express his opinion that the present was not an opportune moment for proposing such a resolution. Censure was not justified with negotiations still going on. I f , however, Fawcett persisted in pressing his motion, or if the ministry pressed the House to meet it with a direct negative, he could neither support nor take exception to it. If a division is taken, " I shall simply be compelled to abstain from recording my vote at all." 91 The words of the leader of Opposition would probably have put a stop to the debate had Gladstone not risen and given it new vigor. He repeated Hartington in deprecating a forced division and in stating that he would decline to vote, but he then proceeded caustically to indict the government because it had not emphatically repudiated the language of the Conservative press, which indicated that the ministry had " set aside entirely the question of guarantees " and had again returned " to the barren and unprofitable region of promises and plans upon paper." " Rylands bitterly attacked Elliot and criticized the policy of the government toward the Bulgarian massacres in a lengthy harangue. Northcote commented sarcastically on the manoeuvrings of the Opposition. They taunted and implied censure yet had not the courage of their convictions. The chancellor of the 81

Ibid., p. 407. •* Ibid., p. 412. M Ibid., p. 419.

THE FAILURE

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20J

exchequer defiantly desired a distinct opinion of the House on the conduct of the ministry.*4 Various subterfuges were then employed by the Opposition to escape a division. Fawcett offered to withdraw his motion which the Conservative leader refused to permit. The majority of the Liberals next followed Hartington's advice and walked out of the House in an effort to deprive the vote of significance. Among them were Gladstone, Harcourt, Forster and Ashley. Three separate motions for adjournment of the debate and of the House were then decisively negatived by the Conservatives. Among those remaining to vote with Fawcett were Anderson, Sir George Campbell, Joseph Chamberlain, J. C. Clarke, Joseph Cowen, Sir Charles Dilke, W . H. James, Wilfrid Lawson, Mundella, Samuel Morley, Rylands, and G. O. Trevelyan. A s the Radicals threatened to discuss the motion for the rest of the night, Northcote finally permitted adjournment and a division was averted. Had they continued the wrangling a few hours longer the remaining members could have witnessed a similar, bitterly fought out dead heat between the crews of Oxford and Cambridge without the necessity of retiring. One more afternoon was spent by the Liberals in rehashing their previous criticisms before the House adjourned on the 27th for a week in order to enjoy the Easter festivities. The Lords required a longer siesta as they were not to meet again until the 13th of April. The gloom over the seeming failure of the negotiations was rapidly to be dispelled. The cabinet evidently gave encouragement to Schouvaloff's recent proposal" as he telegraphed it to his government for approval on the 26th. The following day the Russian ambassador informed Derby that he had ** Ibid., p. 470. 95

Supra, p. 204.

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been definitely authorized to make the suggested Declaration " at the time of the signature of the Protocol." 96 The proposals were then fully deliberated upon by the English cabinet and accepted, subject to the condition that if peace and reciprocal disarmament were not obtained the protocol " should be regarded as null and void." 97 In accordance with the agreement thus arrived at, the protocol was signed in London on March 31 by the representatives of all the Treaty Powers. The accompanying declarations of Russia and England were made at the same time.' 8 The final clause in the protocol was vaguely similar to that of the Berlin Memorandum of the previous May, which had been so unceremoniously rejected by the English ministry because of the threat of contemplated " efficacious measures." 99 A s a result, the government was later to be again subject to post mortem criticism for that earlier rejection. The cabinet must have had that in mind in adhering to the innocuous phraseology of the last passage in the protocol which stated that, in the event the Porte failed to carry out its promises of reform, the Powers reserved " to themselves to consider in common as to the means which they may deem best fitted to secure the well-being of the Christian populations, and the interests of the general peace." 100 The signing of the protocol was received with acclaim tinged with doubts. The Times credited the cabinet with " a considerable diplomatic success." Its value, however, depended entirely on the disposition of Russia herself. So »«Turkey # 1 5 , no. 405. 91

Ibid., no. 409.

• s For the complete Protocol of London and appended Declarations, cf. House of Commons, Sessional PaPers, 1877, vol. xci, Turkey # 9 . 99Supra, p. 44, for the wording of Memorandum.

™ Turkey # 9 .

the final clause in the Berlin

THE

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209

harmless a document, commented the Morning Advertiser, " seems at first sight hardly worth the amazing amount of trouble it has given." Still, " it is a step in the right direction." The Daily Telegraph stressed the idea uppermost in the mind of the greatest portion of the press that England consented to sign as a mode of retreat for Russia. In emphasizing the English declaration it merely repeated its familiar formula: " No demobilization, no Protocol." The Standard sounded less happy. " All turns, as heretofore, on Russia's sincerity. . . . If Russia be sincere, the voidable Protocol will not be voided, and conditional disarmament will be effected by Russia's discovering that the conditions are satisfied. On any other supposition the Protocol is mere leather and prunella." 101 Radical organs held different views. Lord Derby's " diplomatic success" was greeted with an outburst of sarcasm by the Echo. " He would not accept the Berlin Memorandum nearly a year ago; but Prince Bismarck is much more amiable, and accepts the English Protocol, which does just as much as was proposed at Berlin. Lord Derby has taken the lead of Europe, and has led it round a circle." In similar vein the Daily News exulted over the triumph of the diplomacy of St. Petersburg. The past interference, motives, and conduct of Russia had been " whitewashed " by the action of the Powers. It saw no retreat in the protocol which will afford Russia the moral justification she needs for not demobilizing her forces." l o a Current with the acceptance of the protocol had been the announcement of the appointment of Layard as temporary ambassador to the court of the sultan. The Morning Post felt that he would be welcomed as " an old tried friend " in Constantinople.103 He was considered by the Daily Tele101 Journals quoted in above paragraph are issues of April 2, 1877. 102

Ibid.

Morning Post, March 31, 1877.

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graph as the " very best substitute " the cabinet could have named for Elliot. Layard's " resolute John Bullism " led the Morning Advertiser to anticipate that English interests would be perfectly safe in his hands. The Times did not register particular enthusiasm over the known " Turkophile " leanings of the newly nominated ambassador, yet it did not openly condemn the appointment as did the Daily News. In its eyes, Layard's admiration of the Turk and dislike of the Greek made his appointment quite undesirable.104 English diplomacy had aided in constructing a " golden bridge " for Russia but it had failed to read the temper of the Ottoman Porte as accurately as Russia. The inflamed pride and sheer obstinacy of the Sublime Porte were to enable Russian diplomacy to utilize the protocol as a pretext for war. Warnings of the temper of the Porte had not been lacking in the advices from continental sources. The commission at Philippopolis trying " the murderers of innocent Bulgarians " merely reposed. After the recall of Baring 108 no more trials were held, and up to the present no sentences had been carried out. Neither were the current rumors of fresh atrocities investigated by the commission of inquiry.104 Negotiations with Montenegro had proceeded at snail's pace, the only accomplishment being the further extension of the armistice every few weeks. The present armistice was to expire on April 13. The promised Ottoman parliament, after delays, had been solemnly opened on March 19. The tone of the debates pointed to a decisive refusal to entertain even the thought of permitting further intervention by the Powers in its own sovereign affairs. 101

Issues of March 30, 1877.

106

Supra, p. 182.

106

Tales of current atrocities were being printed in the Daily News, Times, and Manchester Guardian. They were made the subject of questioning in Parliament on several occasions.

THE FAILURE

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211

The task that now confronted the ministry was to persuade the Porte to accept the protocol, send its envoy to St. Petersburg, and seriously undertake reforms. On the 5th of April, L o r d Derby, in a despatch to Mr. Jocelyn at Constantinople, strongly urged upon Turkey compliance with the demands thus made upon her. He added emphatically: " Y o u will state that a contrary course of action will have the appearance of a reckless refusal by Turkey of the overtures made by Russia, and will have the effect of putting her in the wrong in the eyes of E u r o p e . " 1 0 7 On the same day the foreign secretary heard from Constantinople that the Ottoman government especially objected to the Russian declaration, and was willing to make additional promises if it were withdrawn. 108 On the following day L o f t u s had an interview with Prince Gortchakoff, being abruptly informed that if the Porte did not accept, or replied in evasive language, Russia's only alternative was war. The English ambassador objected on the basis of the final paragraph of the protocol which stated that the Powers reserved " to themselves to consider in common as to the means . . . " to be employed,109 whereupon the Russian chancellor cleverly pointed out that the separate declaration made by England automatically rendered the protocol " null and void " in the event of the objects proposed not being attained. 110 That language gave to the Russian declaration the character of an ultimatum. A few days later in conversation with Musurus Pasha, Lord Derby was told that the Porte considered the contents nf the protocol derogatory to its dignity and independence, and, rather than accede to the demands, it would be better 10T

Sessional Papers, 1877. vol. xci, Turkey # 1 5 , no. 468. log [bid.., no. 471. 109 Supra, p. 208, for full passage. 110 Turkey # 1 5 , no. 518.

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for Turkey to face the alternative of war—even an unsuccessful war resulting in the loss of one or two provinces. 111 Despite continued exhortation the Sublime Porte remained resolute. Accordingly, on the 12th of April its answer in the form of a flat rejection of the protocol was communicated to the Powers. 114 Lord Derby could then only forlornly state that " it did not appear what farther steps Her Majesty's Government could take to avert a war which appeared to have become inevitable." 11S The English press had unconvincingly placed hope in the protocol for several days after its signing and had faithfully admonished the Turks to accept its provisions. O n the realization that the Porte intended to reject the document as incompatible with its sovereignty and in view of the Russian interpretation of that rejection, the journals that followed the ministry and those desirous of peace at any price first exuded gloom, then rapidly became more hostile to Russia than ever before. The Standard rallied to Turkey which had met the wishes of Europe " in every way." She had exhibited "remarkable forbearance " in the face of the Russian resolve that all independence should be " lectured, protocolled, and menaced out of her." The Porte would gladly disarm and would push forward her reforms on her own initiative. " But Turkey will not prostrate herself in the mire in order to satisfy the arrogant fanaticism of the Slavs; and unless Russia recedes from such a summons the guilt of war will lie at her door, and at hers alone." 114 Editorials in the 111

Turkey #15, no. 503.

Turkey #15, no. 519. In the circular Turkey refused to accept the protocol as admitting the right of intervention and supervision by the Powers. Sending a special envoy to St. Petersburg was a reflection on her equality as a Sovereign State with Russia. She, however, promised the execution of the desired reforms. 11J

118

Ibid., no. 520.

114

Standard, April 12, 1877.

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Daily Telegraph and Pall Mall Gazette were of the same tenor. The Economist complained of the " conspicuous bad faith " shown by Russia in the whole of the protocol negotiations. 115 The Times maintained that the Powers still had a claim on Russian forbearance, whatever the provocation of the Porte. Nevertheless, a few days would probably see " the tidal wave of Russian ambition once more on its southward course." The deliverance and the improvement of Christian races have been put at the front of this cause, and already it must be admitted these high-sounding titles hang somewhat loose upon it. What would Europe say if the first victory was celebrated by the victor throwing off a mask, and proclaiming a conquest in place of a crusade? The " Thunderer " concluded in a Disraelian vein. " Our part is to watch events, and to see that no breach is made in our Imperial strongholds, which we hold in trust, not for ourselves alone, but for civilization." 1 1 9 The stock market had been quite firm during March, and the signing of the protocol had caused actual buoyancy as the public mind had been so imbued with the idea that Russia was effecting a retreat. The warlike tenor of the news following the Turkish rejection had an immediate depressing effect upon all bourses, and securities rapidly underwent a severe depreciation. In fact, the fall was to be more severe than at any time during the entire period of the Eastern crisis. As far as Russian and Hungarian securities were concerned, however, the decline had been practically as great in mid-October of the previous year. 117 Within a short period Russian, Turkish, Hungarian, and Egyptian bonds 115

Economist, April 14, 1877.

118

Times, April 12, 1877.

117

Supra, pp. 121-22.

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dropped to new lows. Russian 1873s, which a year previous had been selling at 99, dropped as low as 68, while Turkish 5 per cents were to sell for almost half of what they had been quoted during the first days of April. Even English consols were affected. Military intelligence predominated over the political in the columns of the foreign correspondents. The campaigns on the Danube and in Asia Minor were already being fought in leading articles and in lecture halls. Guarded debates in Parliament after the Easter recess merely showed the antiRussian feeling that prevailed in that body. Queen Victoria was quite upset and wrote to Beaconsfield that he might inform the cabinet that, " if England is to kiss Russia's feet, she will not be a party to the humiliation of England and would lay down her crown." 1 1 8 Ambassador Layard arrived at Constantinople on April 20 to protect British interests. The last lingering hope that Russia might revert to a pacific policy vanished with the knowledge that Prince Gortchakoff had despatched couriers with a circular to the Powers announcing the czar's resolve to war. English editors divided their energies into delivering tirades against Russia and pointing out the prudent policy for England to pursue, once war was declared. Most organs were agreed that a policy of patriotic inactivity would be best. England would neither war for Turkey nor would she join in coercing Turkey, although there were some advocates of both of those extreme courses. Lord Derby had declared in the House of Lords on the 19th that the ministry did not desire to intervene in the coming war, but, as they were bound to do, they reserved to themselves " the right of protecting British interests if we see those interests threatened." 1 1 9 118

Buckle, op. ext., p. 132.

118

Hansard, vol. ccxxxiii, pp. 1437-38.

The letter was dated April 17.

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215

The English editors thereupon busied themselves in defining just what those sacred interests were that must never be threatened by a Russian advance. The czar should renew his earlier pledge of Livadia that he contemplated no annexations. England had no direct interests in the Turkish provinces north of the Balkans but Constantinople could not be occupied. The campaign in Asia Minor would more immediately and more directly affect England's position as a commanding Power in the East, and Russia, as the prize of success, could make no serious additions of territory there. England, it seemed, had imperishable interests in India, Persia, Asia Minor, Suez, and Egypt in the eyes of most editors. Constantinople was the lock to those interests which Russia must never threaten. The czar's government rapidly completed its preparations for war. A convention was signed on April 1 6 with Roumania, granting unhindered passage of the Russian troops to the Danube, for which the czar pledged himself to maintain and defend the integrity of that principality. 120 Gortchakoff's circular, announcing and defending the intention of Russia to war, was completed on the 19th and despatched to the various Russian ambassadors, to be delivered on the day war was declared. 121 Notice was given on the 23d of the interruption of relations with Turkey, and the Russian embassy at Constantinople embarked for Odessa. W a r was officially proclaimed by Russia on April 24. A formal notification to Turkey, the communication of the contents of the circular to the Powers, a manifesto, several lao Sir Edward Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty since 1814, vol. iv, pp. 2576-85, contains the full convention. It was published in English newspapers toward the close of May. Cf. the Times, May 30, 1877. lal

Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xci, Turkey # 1 8 , no. 1.

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proclamations, and the crossing of the Pruth marked the occasion. Prince Gortchakoff observed the niceties of diplomacy in addressing a note to the Turkish chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg requesting him to be " so kind " as to inform his government that from that day Russia considered herself in a state of war with the Porte. At Jassy, Grand Duke Nicholas issued a proclamation to the Roumanians announcing the passage of the Russian armies and calling for their cooperation. The imperial manifesto was issued at Kischeneff where the czar reviewed his troops. Alexander couched his manifesto in that tone of chivalric self-sacrifice and lofty altruism which every nation attributes to itself and denies to others. In concluding, the czar proclaimed to his subjects that the moment had arrived which he had foreseen at Moscow. " We expressed an intention of acting independently of the other Powers when we should judge that this was necessary and the honour of Russia required it. Today, invoking God's blessing on our brave Armies, we order them to cross the frontier." 122 Muscovite troops had already crossed the Pruth that morning. The season for campaigning had arrived. Diplomacy, after almost two years of incessant effort, had failed. 1M

The czar's manifesto was published in the English journals on the following day.

C H A P T E R

VII

T H E R U S S O - T U R K I S H W A R , FIRST P H A S E

THE declaration of war, although anticipated for several weeks, occasioned fresh tirades against Russia in the majority of English journals. Russia had broken faith. Their conviction that the Slavic Power, under cover of her philanthropic cloak, contemplated ulterior designs of aggression was expressed in bitter articles. Britain should adopt a position of vigilant neutrality, should set the limits of invasion, and should stand prepared to have those limits respected. Radical organs, on the other hand, maintained that the Porte by its own actions had incurred the responsibility of war, and was deserving of just retribution. They called for a perfect and exemplary neutrality on the part o f England. The ministry was naturally disappointed over the turn o f events and placed blame on both Turkey and Russia for not having truly desired to reach an understanding. O n the evening of the day that war had been declared, Lord Derby commented in that vein in the House of Lords. Throughout the transactions the foreign secretary had found on the part of the sultan and his advisers " a deeply-seated conviction t h a t — d o what they would—make what concessions they would—sooner or later war would be forced upon them." Under those circumstances, it was Derby's belief that the ministry had been " throughout engaged in the solution of an impossible problem." 1 A week later, the foreign secretary formally rebuked Russia for having taken recourse to arms without further consultation with the other signatories 1

Hansard, vol. ccxxxiii, p. 1738.

217

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BRITAIN

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of the London Protocol. B y that step Russia had separated herself from the European concert hitherto maintained. Her decision was " not one " which could have the " concurrence or approval " of Her Majesty's Government. 2 The proclamation of neutrality was seemingly delayed as it was not officially signed until the 30th of April. 8 The cabinet then occupied itself in drawing up a despatch to the czar's government defining the English interests which they were " determined to defend " should they be imperiled. The terms were settled on May 5, and the despatch was given to Count Schouvaloff on the following day. Foremost among Britain's interests was " the necessity of keeping open, uninjured and uninterrupted, the communication between Europe and the East by the Suez Canal." A n " attack " on, or " occupation " of Egypt could certainly not be regarded with unconcern. Her Majesty's Government was not prepared to witness with indifference " the passing into other h a n d s " of Constantinople. In its judgment, there would be serious objections to the alteration " in any material particular " of the existing arrangements regulating the navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. There were " still other interests, as for instance, on the Persian G u l f , " which must be protected. The foreign secretary trusted that they had sufficiently pointed out " the limits " within which they hoped that the war might be confined. Attention was also called to the czar's Livadia pledge, that he had no intention to acquire Constantinople, and if forced to occupy Bulgaria, it would only be provisionally. 4 2 House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. xci, Turkey # 18, no. 2. The despatch was dated May 1. 8 It was published in the London Gazette Extraordinary that same night. * Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. lxxxix, Russia # 2. The despatch was dated May 6. Its contents were soon known by the press and it was to be published openly in their columns on June 25 along with Gortchakoff's reply of May 30.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

WAR, FIRST

PHASE

The Radical wing of the Opposition in Parliament, under the lead of Gladstone, took advantage of the outbreak of hostilities to introduce a series of resolutions in the House of Commons, which, had they been sustained, would have meant the utter condemnation of the Eastern policy of the government. The resolutions, five in number, were specified by the former premier in the Commons on the evening of April 30. They were long and marked by an ambiguity from which widely different meanings could be drawn. The first three were comparatively harmless, but the fourth called on the House to declare itself in favor of the coercion of Turkey by the Powers in concert. The fifth merely combined the other four in asking that an Address to the Crown, embodying them, be prepared and presented. Gladstone's action threw his party into confusion. The Liberal chiefs immediately pressed him to withdraw his resolutions or, at least, to change their wording, with the result that a compromise was agreed upon in order to maintain some semblance of unity in the Liberal ranks. The debate, which was to be drawn out over five nights, opened on May 7. The scene in the House, before Gladstone moved the remains of his resolutions, was described by the Times as " one of the most extraordinary " and " certainly one of the least creditable " that had been witnessed " within living memory." 8 Astonishment and uproar greeted the ex-prime minister's announcement that he proposed to move only the first of his resolutions and would not object to an amendment of the second. While he personally adhered to all of the resolutions, he did not intend to press the others on the House. Thus, Gladstone secured the support of his colleagues, although it was hardly " becoming conduct" on the part of a statesman who believed himself to be charged with such " a high and solemn mission " « Times, May 8, 1877.

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to " change front for party purposes." " Echo found it a source of regret that he had " agreed to modify " his resolutions, " even to please his Parliamentary friends." 7 Other Radical organs, such as the Daily News, Leeds Mercury, and York Herald, touched on that phase rather lightly, preferring to stress the implications of Gladstone's passionate eloquence.8 The Sheffield and Rotherham Independent heralded that the support given the resolutions had raised another barrier against the dangerous tendencies of Lord Beaconsfield, and had added " yet another decoration to the fair name of England in the eyes of Christendom and the world. While Beaconsfield grovels among selfish interests, Gladstone proclaims the nobler cause of right and justice." 9 It was the admirable speech of the secretary of state for home affairs, however, that engrossed the attention of the entire press. His definition of the points of commanding imperial interest which might not be endangered 10 was a condensed version of Lord Derby's despatch to Russia of the day previous. Cross asserted that the policy of the government was plain. Conscious of their strength, they would watch the course of events, and, if an opportunity offered for interposing their good offices in the interest of peace, they would not allow it to pass. Scarcely an organ, Conservative, Liberal, or Radical, with the possible exception of the Spectator, dissented from the convincing statement of policy of the home secretary. The great majority showered high praise on his words. Pall Mall acquiesced in a policy of watchful neutrality on condi«Morning 7

Post,

May 8, 1877.

Echo, May 8, 1877. and editor.

John Passmore Edwards was both its proprietor

8

Issues of May 8, 1877.

9

Sheffield

10

and Rotherham

Independent,

Hansard, vol. ccxxxiv, p. 468.

May 9, 1877.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

WAR, FIRST

tion that the czar's Livadia pledge be kept. be no territorial acquisitions " anywhere."

PHASE

221

There were to

If, later, we find conquest substituted for liberation, provinces or strong places retained by Russia, or that any demands are made for such ' concessions' as are already rumoured, then we shall look to Mr. Cross to declare that our interests are concerned, and to the Government to take steps for their protection. 11 In similar vein the Daily Telegraph pointed out the " other interests," not definitely specified, that might also be imperiled. I f Russia " be allowed to remedy Bulgarian wrongs by Asiatic annexations—which have nothing to do with them—the penalty will be paid by us hereafter for our craven weakness of to-day." The " energetic protestation of British neutrality " was considered a " great gain " by the Liverpool Daily Post. Still, later " incautious utterances " on the part o f the home secretary's colleagues in the ministry might " counterbalance his pacific assurances." In the opinion of the Leeds Mercury, it served to bring the policy of the government into something like sympathy with the feeling of the nation more than any other ministerial utterance since L o r d Carnarvon's famous speech of the previous autumn. T h e Mercury interpreted the speech as a strong rebuke to the philo-Turks and chauvinists, who, with " insolent swagger," had for months past tried to plunge E n g land into an unnecessary war with Russia. In that category were included the " swash-bucklers of the clubs and the Pall Mall Gazette." 12 Spectator objected to the " enormous security " given to the sultan by the public assurances that the government could not possibly afford to pass over the temporary occupation of 11

Pall Mall Gasette, May 9, 1877.

12

Journals quoted in above paragraph are issues of May 9, 1877.

222

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Constantinople by Russia without interfering. The ministry's neutrality was " not i m p a r t i a l " as it had virtually informed the Porte: " Constantinople is secured to you, and with Constantinople the sceptre of the Caliphs." 13 The debate was prolonged over four more nights, seemingly in order to give every M . P. an opportunity to state his views for the benefit of his constituents. Nothing new and nothing startling was voiced. T h e greater part of the time was spent in taunting and passing recriminatory remarks. T h e tone of the Radical and Liberal speakers implied severe censure of the ministry but in no other sense were they united. Leonard Courtney, among the most uncompromising of the coercionists, admitted that the voice of the Opposition was not one " expressing one will, or one policy, or even one opinion." 1 4 H e personally maintained that there was no justification for jealousy of Russia, and held that the coercion of Turkey, in alliance with Russia, was E n g land's duty. 15 In later speeches Fawcett and Jenkins took the same stand, whereas the more responsible leaders, as Hartington and Forster, thought that coercion might have been possible at any earlier date but it was now too late. They could support the first two resolutions but not the others, which would unnecessarily bind the hands of the government. T h e peace-at-any-price group contributed their share of oratory as well. Conservative speakers in general expressed themselves as favoring a state of strict, albeit armed, neutrality, with Britain determined to abstain from interference as long as her interests permitted. The House eventually divided on Mr. Gladstone's first resolution. The result was 223 ayes, 354 noes, a majority " Spectator, May 12, 1877. 14

Hansard, vol. ccxxxiv, p. 626.

" Ibid., p. 636.

THE RUSS0-TURK1SH

WAR, FIRST

PHASE

of 1 3 1 against the resolution." Wolff's amendment, declaring the inexpediency of embarrassing the ministry by passing any resolution, was then agreed to without a division, and, following Gladstone's announcement that he would not press his second resolution, the debate ended. An analysis of the Parliamentary division throws but partial light on the actual diversity of opinion in the Opposition ranks, as the majority voted with Gladstone solely in the interest of unanimity of party. Hartington's forces would not have supported the more forcefully worded resolutions. The division was thus almost entirely a party one; still, despite the patched-up compromise, some twenty-five of the Opposition voted with the ministry, and others refused to cast their votes. S i x Liberals voted with the government—Mr. H. A. Herbert, W. H. Foster, N. G. Lambert, the marquis of Lome, Roebuck, and Sir N. Mayer de Rothschild. Of the Home Rulers, nineteen voted in the majority, eleven voted with Gladstone, and about twenty-three took no part in the division. Among those who voted with the ministry were Sir George Bowyer, Owen Lewis, Sir Joseph M'Kenna, Lord Robert Montagu, Captain Nolan, and Mr. Shaw. Some who voted with Gladstone were Blennerhassett, E. Collins, Lord F. Conyngham, Mitchell Henry, D. O'Conor, the O'Conor Don, and O'Shaugnessy. Among the absentees were Butt, Biggar, Parnell, and A. M. Sullivan. Every member of Gladstone's administration holding a seat in the Commons voted with his former chief. A single Conservative, Mr. Charles Newdigate Newdegate, representing Warwick county, cast his vote in the minority. The ministerial ranks were thus unbroken despite rumored cabinet dissensions, whereas the ranks of the Opposition had been badly split by Gladstone's belated effort to sponsor a policy of coercion. The debate was to be the last truly 14

Ibid., p. 973-

224

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important one of the entire session, although later skirmishes were frequent A few days after its conclusion the Commons adjourned for a lengthy recess over Whitsuntide. The ex-premier was being derisively dubbed " Gladstonovitch " in the comics, while the popular name of the London mob for him and the Liberal front bench had come to be " Bag and Baggage Billy and his long-eared crew." Coercion had become a dead issue. The fears of the public, allayed to a great extent during the early spring by the thought that Russia was seeking a road of retreat, had immediately flamed anew with the issues at stake to be settled by war. Antipathy to Russia was general as has been shown by the tone of the press, the ministerial warnings to Russia, and the sentiment of Parliament That hostility had naturally communicated itself to the public, and the feeling between the anti-Russians and the anti-Turks ran high. The more warlike section of the press undoubtedly encouraged those fears by their constant repetition of the danger to British interests and the need of precautionary measures. More moderate organs, of the type of the Manchester Guardian, the Times and the Globe, sought to allay those misgivings by ridiculing many of the imaginative designs attributed to Russia by the alarmists. They steered a middle course in their desire to maintain the neutrality of England and to localize the war. Russia should be permitted to carry on the crusade without undue interference until such a time as she overstepped and truly threatened Britain's imperishable interests. Radical organs continued their tirades against the Turks and opposed any utterances being voiced which might encourage the Porte to expect English aid, or any action being taken which might involve England in war with Russia.

THE

RUSS0-TURK1SH

WAR,

FIRST

PHASE

Numerous meetings had been called, largely under Radical auspices, in response to Gladstone's move in Parliament They favored his resolutions and as usual protested strenuously against England's being dragged into war in support of Turkey. The meetings gave opportunity to all the old atrocitarians once more to call forth their choicest epithets from their armory of abuse. The Eastern Question Association met at St. James's hall on the same evening that the Commons first debated on the resolutions. Letters were read from the duke of Westminster, the duke of Argyll and Dean Church of St. Paul's, expressing their sympathy with the object of the meeting. Dean Church commended the " daring" of Gladstone for bringing the true state of affairs before Parliament amid so much discouragement. He also strongly censured the " deplorable policy " of the government which had thrown the East into the arms of Russia. John Morley spoke in the same vein, as did other anti-Turks, among whom present one naturally found Arthur Arnold, Parker and MacColl. Those admirers of Gladstone cheered his name on every occasion that offered. 17 Carlyle took the occasion to pen another of his rambling letters to the Times, in which he opined that it was Beaconsfield's design to plunge all Europe into war. 18 Mathew Arnold was merely one of the many who considered the sage of Chelsea quite " mad." 18 Freeman's strictures required an entire volume. Its aim was to hold the Turks up to the view of England in their true light—that they were simply " a horde of robbers of alien race and religion," who had intruded themselves into Europe and remained for five centuries a curse and a scourge to the Christian populations. 17

Account of meeting in the Times, May 8, 1877.

18

Published in its issue of May 5, 1877.

19

G. W . E. Russell, Letters of Mathew Arnold (London, 1895), vol. ii,

P- 139-

226

BRITAIN

AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

Ottoman rule could be " best summed up in the proverbial saying, ' Where the Sultan's horse-hoof treads, grass never grows again.' " 1 0 A sonnet to the brave Montenegrins sufficed as Tennyson's contribution, to which Gladstone added a glowing commentary in prose in the same issue of the Nineteenth Century. The laureate was somewhat extravagant in the use of poetic license in describing the valiant combats of the small band of mountaineers against the swarms of the Turk, whose inroad nowhere scales Their headlong passes, but his footstep fails, And red with blood the Crescent reels from fight Before their dauntless hundreds, in prone flight By thousands down the crags and thro' the vales.21 A pacific chord was struck by the noted journalist and veteran war-correspondent, G. A. Sala, in his comments on the anti-Russian panic which had seized the nation. Writing in the graveyard at Scutari, surrounded by some 8,000 English dead of the Crimean campaign, Sala could well become reminiscent on the horrors of war. He hoped that the remembrance of their deaths might moderate the frenzy of the politicians who seemed bent on hounding England on to a fresh war with Russia. They must be mainly young men, or they must have very short memories. Glory might be a fine thing, but, to him, war represented only madness and wickedness, famine and slaughter. Sala could but think that if " the warlike politicians were to witness just half an hour of actual warfare," as he had witnessed it in America, in Italy, in Mexico, in France, in Spain, " their martial ardour would cool down a little, and they would not be quite so prompt to blow the bellicose trumpet." 22 20

E. A . Freeman, The Ottoman Power in Europe (London, 1877), p. 312.

21

Nineteenth

32

Illustrated London News, April 21, 1877.

Century, May, 1877, "Montenegro."

THE

RUSSO-TURKISH

WAR,

FIRST

PHASE

In an event second in importance only to the Derby, John Bright, Chamberlain and Gladstone joined at Birmingham during the Whitsun holidays for a huge Radical demonstration. They succeeded very well in giving Birmingham to understand that it was a near approach to millennial beauty and, incidentally, repeated their known views on the Eastern Question. Bright still opposed the Crimean war. Gladstone was particularly wroth with the ministerial press which was subtly preparing the way for intervention in the war going on, " not in the name of supporting the Turks, but in the name of supporting British interests, and with the distinct effect of supporting Turkey and of rendering hopeless the condition of oppressed and afflicted subjects." He inquired how it happened, if they were a school of sentiment as was so often stated, that " every historian in the country" was strongly on their side. Freeman, Froude, Carlyle, Stubbs and Green were singled out as among the gentlemen representing the historical school who shared his views. Florence Nightingale, Miss Irby and Miss MacKenzie were others who could attest to the superior virtues of the Balkan Christians in comparison with the Turks. 2 3 Gladstone might well have inquired how it happened that most organs, many Liberal as well as Conservative, along with the majority of the public, did not share his views. Why had Parliament rejected even the mildest of his resolutions by the largest majority that had been gained in some years by a ministry on an important issue? Anti-Russian sentiment undoubtedly dominated; hatred of Russia, engendered by the Crimean campaign, was still strong. Hatred of the triple creed of Panslavism—autocracy, orthodoxy and nationality—influenced many Liberals, Catholics, and Jews. Panslavonic oppression and designs were regarded with unveiled hostility and suspicion. The shortcomings of the 33

Account of speeches is in the Times, June I, 1877.

228

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Turk, while not overlooked, were in the eyes of the majority somehow bettered by the sins of his foe. A natural sympathy with the underdog must have had its influence. Traditional policy, national jealousy, which regarded even the thought of possible gain to another Power as a loss to itself, and a growing imperialistic sentiment in England, somewhat moribund under the long Liberal regime, were other factors that fanned the growing hostility to Russia. It is small wonder then that Gladstone and the Radicals had become decidedly unpopular, that anti-Russian tirades had become the order of the day in leading articles in the press, and that anti-Russian pamphlets flooded the market. Urquhartism seemed to have transfused itself into large sections of the English public just at the moment of the death of its chief exponent. David Urquhart died in Nice in the latter part of May. In his theory Russia was not merely a State, but an all-pervading influence—the Power of darkness embodied in political form. His morbid hatred of Russia and unbounded love for the institution of the Turkish bath, which he had made popular in England, were the twists which had motivated his entire career. Curiously, every English statesman whose opinions were less extreme than his own had been regarded as little better than a traitor to his country, if not in Russian p a y . " A sonnet by Edmund Oilier, a well-known popular historian, evidently in answer to Tennyson's effort, entitled " Strike Hard O Islam," would certainly have pleased Urquhart. Its first stanza ran: Since war must be, strike hard, O Moslem blade, Against that monstrous eagle of the North Which from its distant eyrie issues forth, Death in its beak, and from its wings a shade! 2

* Supra, pp. 192-93, for extracts of Urquhartism.

THE

RUSSO-TURKISH

WAR,

FIRST

PHASE

For in her dotage Europe stands dismay'd; The night above her closes heavy and swarth; Her heart is faint; she has but little worth; The ravening eagle makes her soul afraid.26 Manifestations of the waxing imperialism were not wanting, stimulated without a doubt by the constant repetition of the magic formula, " British interests." On the 12th of April the British flag had been hoisted at Pretoria in South Africa, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone had proclaimed the annexation of the Republic of the Transvaal to the Crown. The announcement of that step was not made in the press until May 7. England, which at the moment was so bitter over the prospect of future aggrandizement on the part of Russia, found the measure justified by a clear necessity. Even the Daily News, in one of its few articles sanctioning any act associated with Beaconsfield's ministry, favored the annexation and prattled at length in the same vein as the Conservative organs on the heavier responsibilities of empire incurred by the annexation.28 It seemed, according to the consensus of opinion of the press, that " annexation was forced upon England." The measure was " unavoidable." It was done " in the interests of order and civilization in South Africa " and " increased English responsibilities in that quarter of the globe." To England it would be an " onerous burden" but it would be " a blessing for the people of the Republic." No aggrandizement of empire could repay England for the " onerous obligation of ruling a discontented and irreconcilable people." The Transvaal had to be annexed, however, as " a native rising of Kaffir and Zulu tribes against the Boers of the Republic threatened the peace of the rest of South Africa." The Boers would 35

Reprinted in Public Opinion, May 12, 1877.

24

Issue of May 8, 1877.

BRITAIN

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soon g e t over their ill-feeling, once they had " experienced the material advantages o f British rule."

In that tone, the

act w a s commended by the entire English p r e s s . " More

far-reaching enterprises were also being written

about and taking root.

Numerous articles in the news-

papers and reviews advocated the seizure o f E g y p t , Suez, Crete, Cyprus, Mitylene, the Syrian coast, Trebizond, the Euphrates valley, etc., as precautionary measures to protect the road to India and to check possible Russian aggrandizement.

E v e n prior t o the declaration of war, the Whitehall

Review had d r a w n all o f the European nations into the conflict and outlined the steps England must take.

I f Russia

were at all successful in A s i a where the T u r k i s h forces were weak, Britain would " be compelled at once to land a force at Trebizonde f r o m England, and to march another f r o m India to meet it."

Persia must be compelled to give up her

Russian alliance.

Should the Muscovite forces reach the

Balkans, E n g l a n d would further " have to occupy Constantinople."

28

Captain P i m , a Conservative M . P., suggested the possibility o f an advantageous arrangement between T u r k e y and her English creditors: Let the Ottoman Parliament offer a concession for a railway from Alexandretta on the Mediterranean to Kowait at the head of the Persian Gulf, a distance of 920 miles, and let the Ottoman Parliament annex to this concession a belt of land on each side of such railway, which will take the course so well known as the Euphrates Valley route. 27

Cf.

the issue of almost any English daily of M a y 7 or 8.

tracts w e r e taken f r o m the Daily Times 28

and Daily

Whitehall

News,

Telegraph.

Review,

A p r i l 21, 1877.

Standard,

Morning

T h e exAdvertiser,

THE

RUSS0-TURK1SH

WAR,

FIRST

PHASE

231

Having settled her debt by that happy method, Turkey could undoubtedly again count on her old friend, John Bull." Edward Dicey, writing in the June issue of the Nineteenth Century, considered it both a matter of necessity and a moment of unparalleled opportunity to seize the Isthmus route to India. " We, too, have our manifest destiny, which we have no choice save to follow." And, if a want of resolution, a shirking of responsibility, "should cause us at this crisis of our fate to hesitate about establishing our right of way across the Isthmus, then I can only say that as a nation we have lost those imperial qualities by which our forefathers created the England of to-day." 80 Dicey's bold suggestion was to be widely commented upon, and a running controversy was engaged in for several months between the imperialists and the " Little Englanders." In fact, it was to continue through the Congress of Berlin. An able article followed in the July issue of Fortnightly from the pen of the noted Belgian professor of political economy, M. fimile de Laveleye. He asked why London so agitated itself at the idea that Russia would seize " this or the other petty place in Armenia." If she did, England might then occupy Egypt and Cyprus. That occupation could only result in " a great blessing to the Egyptians, and a great gain to civilisation in general." 31 A protectorate over Egypt as compensation to England ought sincerely to be applauded by every true friend of humanity. The writer even suggested the Cape to Cairo plan. Laveleye had the reputation of being Bismarck's spokesman in Belgium. He was violently anti-Turkish. Considerably later, in the same 29

Captain Bedford Pim, The Eastern Question: Past, Future (London, 1877). The pamphlet appeared in May. 30

Nineteenth

Century,

Fortnightly Crisis."

Review,

81

Present,

and

June, 1877, " Our Route to India." July, 1877, "British Interests in the Present

232

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CRISIS

review, Laveleye argued for the complete dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. " Pull," he said in gist, " Pull Turkey to pieces, Turkey is dead." 82 A second article by Dicey appeared the following month in which practically the same views were set forth. He felt that the rule of the Ottoman was coming to an end and assumed that there was going to be a general scramble for his possessions. Under the circumstances Egypt must fall to England and Dicey advocated " immediate " occupation.83 Gladstone entered the lists against all proposals for a possible annexation either of Egypt or of her suzerainty. He relied on reasoning which was somewhat novel in view of his previous speeches and pamphlets on Bulgaria. Gladstone considered it established that the Turks were not fit to govern Christians; but that did not at all show that they were not capable of governing Mohammedans. The expremier therefore argued that England had no " moral r i g h t " to seize Egypt. In addition, France would be alienated." Spectator's emphatic comments on the two views definitely place its fixed stand on the Eastern Question. It was even more anti-Turk than pro-Gladstone. Spectator confessed itself " sadly disappointed " with Gladstone's essay. " When he says that France will be vexed by the acquisition, he merely repeats an assertion which would be equally true of any other advance of British power." That difficulty could be removed by supporting, as Mr. Dicey hinted, " the very beneficial claim of France to Syria or Tunis." Spectator admitted that it would be " very advantageous " to possess Egypt and thought it " indispensable " that it should not fall into the hands of any Power save England. The writer 82

Ibid., Feb., 1878, " England and the War."

88

Nineteenth

84

Ibid., " Aggression on Egypt, and in the East."

Century, Aug., 1877, " The Future of Egypt."

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

WAR, FIRST

PHASE

then pointed out the " moral argument" which Mr. Gladstone had failed to see. " By what moral right do we deny to Egypt, and, with Egypt, to the whole Valley of the N i l e — to Eastern Africa from Alexandria to the Lakes—the inconceivable advantage of being conquered and governed, say for a century or two, by a first-class European Power? " 85 Dicey returned to the charge in the September issue of the now exceptionally popular Nineteenth Century. He reasoned that if Britain had no right to acquire Egypt, she had no right to hold India.36 Another writer, Edward D. J. Wilson, justified the accomplished annexation of the Transvaal on the broadest grounds of colonial policy.87 Professor Goldwin Smith, although at heart strongly opposed to further imperialistic ventures, took Dicey's stand that the Ottoman Empire was doomed and predicted that, in the present mood of the nation, aggrandizement would carry the day. " In the course of empire, one act of aggrandizement leads to another. The conquest of a small territory round the British factories in India has led to the conquest of the whole country." This again " leads to the occupation of Egypt," as it is on the high road to India."8 George Von Bunsen made it a special point to show that it was highly improbable that Germany would object to an occupation of Suez and Lower Egypt. His sympathies, however, were with the " Little Englanders," as he deprecated the dreams of the imperialists whose scheme of seizing Egypt must inevitably lead to the creation of an African Empire that could hardly avoid stretching in an unbroken line from Alexandria to Cape Town. 38 " Spectator, Aug. 4, 1877. 84

Nineteenth Century, Sept., 1877, " Mr. Gladstone and our Empire."

" Ibid., " England and South Africa." 88

Fortnightly Review, Sept., 1877, " The Policy of Aggrandizement."

"Nineteenth

Century, Sept., 1877, "Germany and Egypt."

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Thus, constant repetition of the necessity of maintaining an aggressive regard f o r British interests, kindled by the thought of the Russian threat to the road to India, brought E g y p t to the fore in the minds of Englishmen. Annexation was conjectured by enterprising spirits. Keen speculators bought heavily of various Egyptian stocks as they saw clearly that it was becoming more than ever the policy of England to identify itself with Egyptian interests. E g y p tian bonds rose in value late in 1 8 7 7 in the face of an almost general decline in other foreign bonds. Curiously, British speculation and a spendthrift khedive, rather than the Muscovite menace, were later to furnish the actual pretext f o r intervention. Beaconsfield, through buying shares, had truly embarked Britain on the path of the new imperialism. The war itself had progressed rather slowly during the spring and summer months. Roumania had cast in her lot with Russia in early May, 4 0 shortly thereafter, on June 3, declaring the sovereignty of the sultan abrogated. Actual hostilities commenced in Armenia and contradictory telegrams of paper victories soon poured in from Turkish and Russian sources. A s military action took place on two fronts, in Asia Minor and along the Danube, it is convenient to separate the two campaigns. Practically no naval engagements occurred throughout the war. The Russian army assembled at Alexandropol under Grand Duke Michael, the governor general of the Caucausus, f o r an intended lightning campaign in A s i a Minor. It crossed the frontier on the outbreak of war and advanced simultaneously against K a r s and Batoum. Ardahan, after two days' bombardment, was taken by assault on M a y 16. Only feeble resistance was met, which later brought on 40 The Roumanian assembly did not actually declare war, but on May 1 1 merely considered Roumania in a state of war due to Turkish aggressions on the Danube.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

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charges of corruption and treason on the part of its governor. General Loris Melikoff, commanding under the grand duke, had originally advanced on Kars but had rapidly swerved aside in order to capture Ardahan. He then turned back to Kars which was laid siege to with part of his forces; with the remainder he advanced in the direction of Erzeroum, the Turks being in constant retreat. Melikoff was attempting to effect a junction with another Russian column under Tergukassoff at Kupri-Kui so that they could jointly march on Erzeroum. The Russian column, under Tergukassoff, had crossed the frontier at another point and taken Bayazid a few days after the outbreak of war without a shot being fired. It then headed toward Kupri-Kui. A victory was gained at Taghir on June 16 but the Turks retrieved themselves a few days later on the 21st at Eshek-Khaliass. The energy and personal gallantry of the Turkish commander-in-chief, Mukhtar Pasha, served to check the Russians in a drawn battle. Melikoff's column, as well, was decisively repulsed in an attempt to storm a strong Turkish position at Zewin Doos on the 25th. The contemplated junction and attack on Erzeroum had failed miserably and could have been turned into a rout had the Turks followed up their advantage rapidly enough. Assaults on the port of Batoum in late June and early July were, with the assistance of the fleet, more easily repelled. A Turkish force, partially consisting of Circassians, then occupied Soukhoum Kale with the object of inciting an insurrection in the Caucausus. The diversion probably caused some embarrassment to the Russian generals, but, as few of the mountain tribes responded to the appeal, the expedition was eventually recalled after a useless waste of resources which had been urgently needed in other quarters.

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Tergukassoff's force retraced its steps and retreated across the Russian frontier. Bayazid was reinvested by the Turks but its garrison was rescued through a gallant feat of arms on the part of the Russian general. Ismail Pasha, with a force consisting chiefly of his Kurdish countrymen, crossed the frontier in pursuit, in early August, and occupied a position in Russian territory for several months. The other Russian column under Melikoff had retreated in disorder. The siege of Kars was raised on July 9 and the entire force fell back to within five miles of the border, where it entrenched. No serious engagement resulted for over a month as the Russians were demoralized and the Turks, lacking that intelligence, feared to attack. A Russian sortie was repulsed on August 18, followed by a Turkish victory of slight proportions on the 23d. A n effort to recapture Ardahan failed in September, since the Russians, informed of the plan, had strengthened the garrison. The whole of Turkish Armenia, except Ardahan, had thus been evacuated, and the campaign of the Muscovite legions in Asia Minor had resulted in complete failure. The rapid advances of the spring had been followed by a series of disappointing reverses to the Russian arms during the early part of the summer. The campaign then languished through the early autumn.41 Preparations for invasion of the Ottoman territories in Europe had been made the previous fall and a large Russian army had been massed along the Pruth. The Grand Duke Nicholas was commander-in-chief of the Danubian forces. Inefficiency, constant rains, and consequent poor roads delayed the crossing of the Danube and the collision of the 1 1 For details of the campaign in Asia Minor, cf. C. B. Norman, Armenia and the Campaign of 1877 (London, 1878), or Charles Williams, The Armenian Campaign (London, 1878). Captain Norman was the special correspondent of the Times and Williams of the Morning Advertiser.

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hostile armies for two months. B y late June the Russian preliminary operations were finally completed, the rain ceased, and their forces swung into action. On the 22d of June they succeeded in crossing the river at several places, at Galatz and between Ibraila to Matchin, meeting with little resistance as the Turks had contented themselves in merely laying waste the Dobrudja. A few days afterwards the main army commenced its passage from Simnitza and occupied Sistova on the right bank on the night of June 26. Slight loss of life resulted. The Turkish commander-inchief, Abdul Kerim, scarcely attempted to impede the movements which had been regarded by military critics as difficult and dangerous experiments. 42 For three weeks after the successful passage of the Danube the Russians encountered no serious resistance. Biela, commanding an important center of roads to the southeast, was seized, and cavalry under General Gourko took the old Bulgarian capital, Tirnova, on the 7th of July. A n imperial proclamation, addressed in severe terms to the Mussulman population, was understood to imply the definitive detachment of Bulgaria from the Turkish Empire. Shortly after the occupation of Tirnova, Gourko with a flying column effected the passage of the Balkans (July 1 1 - 1 4 ) by the difficult Khankoi pass, which had been left practically undefended. He had been guided across it by a friendly 43 Excellent accounts of the Danubian campaign and later military action on all sectors are included in The War Correspondence of the Daily News (London, 1877), vol. i. In it are published the letters of its various correspondents, as Forbes, MacGahan, Pears, V . Julius, F. D. Millet, J. H. Skinner and others, from the commencement of the war through the fall of Kars in November. For other works containing interesting details, cf. The Narrative of an Expelled Correspondent (London, 1877) by Frederick Boyle, special correspondent of the Standard; Valentine Baker, The War in Bulgaria (London, 1879), and W . V . Herbert, The Defence of Plevna (London, 189s), narratives of the personal experiences of Englishmen in the Turkish army.

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Bulgarian peasant. Having descended into the plain, he next took the Shipka pass in reverse, aided by a joint attack from the northern side by another force under Skobeleff. The Shipka pass was in Russian hands on the 19th. 43 Gourko's cavalry then proceeded to raid the valley of the Maritza, spreading terror. Shortly thereafter, tales of Cossack atrocities and Bulgarian reprisals on the Turks filled the press. It was feared that a rapid advance on Adrianople would bring about a total collapse of the Turkish defenses in Roumelia, but Gourko's slight column was not reinforced and he was soon compelled to retreat, contenting himself with holding on to the two passes so brilliantly gained. The Turks under Suleiman Pasha then slaughtered Bulgarians. A n additional passage over the Danube had been secured through the capture of Nicopolis by General Kriidener. A single assault on July 1 6 had sufficed. Thus, the first four weeks of actual campaigning in Europe were marked by continued Russian successes. It seemed as if the direful prophecies of a section of the English press, that seven weeks after the crossing of the Danube would see the Muscovite legions before Constantinople, were to be realized. The string of comparatively easy victories, however, was suddenly snapped by Osman Pasha at Plevna where the czar's forces were sharply checked after severe fighting. Osman Pasha, in marching to the relief of Nicopolis, had seen the importance of the position of Plevna and its neighboring heights, which the Russians in their haste to seize Nicopolis had imprudently overlooked. Occupying Plevna, Osman at once began the construction of defenses which afterwards grew to the dimensions of a great fortress. 48

Colonel Brackenbury, military expert of the Times, accompanied Gourko on his dash across the Balkans and contributed interesting articles on the feat to its columns.

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Soon a f t e r his earthworks were begun, the Russians, aware too late of the value of the position, were repulsed and routed in an attempt to storm it on the 20th of July. A few days previous, under the pressure of popular indignation, a ministerial revolution had been brought about in the city of mosques. The sultan recalled Abdul Kerim and dismissed his incapable patron, R i z a Pasha, the minister of war. Mehemet Ali, a renegade of North German birth, was appointed to command the eastern army on the Danube; but Osman Pasha at Plevna and Suleiman Pasha, transferred from Montenegro to Roumelia, were practically independent of any commander-in-chief. The division of authority, which was probably suggested by the jealousies of the government at Constantinople, was to produce its natural result in want of concert and in failure of reciprocal support. Y e t , after the dismissal of Abdul Kerim, the conduct of the war displayed no want of vigor. Grand Duke Nicholas and his staff, in spite of wellfounded remonstrances of Kriidener, ordered a renewal of the assault on Plevna, now provided with strong fortifications. There followed a two-day attack on J u l y 3 0 and 3 1 , resulting in a second repulse and near disaster. Osman, however, failed to follow up his advantage and remained entrenched at Plevna. Late J u l y and early August had seen Gourko's column bottled up in the Shipka pass, which became the scene of the fiercest fighting throughout the month. The Turks, under Suleiman, charged valiantly in their efforts to dislodge the Russians, incurring useless sacrifices in view of the almost impregnable position and grim determination of the Cossacks to hold the pass. Radetzky emerged as the hero of Shipka. A u g u s t was a period of crisis f o r the Russians on all sectors. However, the Ottoman generals neglected to follow

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up their advantages. A s a result, except at Shipka pass, active operations were practically discontinued and the imperial staff waited for large reinforcements, the bulk of which arrived in September. O n the L o m sector before Shumla and Biela, the eastern army under Mehemet A l i remained strangely inactive. Concerted action would probably have driven the czar's forces back on the Danube. Roumanian cooperation of a more serious nature was to prove of considerable aid to the Russians as well. Prince Charles had refused to place his troops under the command of the imperial staff, but in early September, after the Grand Duke Nicholas waived that claim, he led some 35,000 troops across the Danube. They were to render valuable service to their more powerful ally before Plevna. 44 Russia resumed the offensive with the storming of Lovatz by Skobeleff on September 3. It was important as a center of communication mid-way between Plevna and the Balkans at Shipka pass. Plevna was assaulted for the third time on the emperor's birthday, September 11, with the emperor viewing the combat. A m i d scenes of terrible carnage Skobeleff, hero of Khiva and Khokand, took several redoubts, but all except Gravitza, held by the Russians and Roumanians at terrible sacrifice, were retaken on the following day. The two days of fighting cost the allies some 18,000 men killed and wounded, and they had gained one redoubt. 45 A n imperial council-of-war was held on the 13th, at which the czar personally decided that his forces should remain in front of Plevna and not retire to the Danube as suggested by the 44 Cf. Reminiscences of the King of Roumania (London, 1899), edited by Sidney Whitman, for an account of Roumanian participation in the war. 4 5 Archibald Forbes was the first to send through a vivid telegram to his paper, the Daily News, announcing the virtual defeat of the Russians. He had also viewed Radetzky's defense of the Shipka pass. Wellesley wrote the accounts for the Times.

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grand duke. 48 In consequence of that rankling setback the Imperial Guard was hurried to the seat of war, and General Todleben, who, it appears, had previously not enjoyed court favor, was summoned to undertake the reduction of Plevna by siege. I t was to require three full months before Plevna was completely invested and its heroic garrison finally starved out. During the stirring events of the summer campaign, the obscure struggle in Montenegro and adjacent Turkish provinces had not excited much attention. T h e withdrawal of Suleiman Pasha and his forces in J u l y had enabled Prince Nikita to besiege Niksich which was eventually occupied on the 9th of September. Neighboring territory also fell into his hands. The Mirdites took the opportunity to withdraw their doubtful allegiance f r o m the Porte and some Albanian tribes threatened disturbances. T h e insurgents in Bosnia and Herzegovina had made little effort, knowing, perhaps, that their fate would depend on the general result of the war rather than on their own local exertions. The Russian navy played a very inglorious role in the struggle. Its Mediterranean squadron had been sent to American waters in order to escape capture by the Turkish fleet. Colonel Wellesley states that great indignation was expressed in St. Petersburg, for, considering the enormous amount of money which had been spent on the navy, and the credit which Admiral Popoff had claimed for the production of that wonderful battleship, Peter the Great, it was of course considered a national scandal that as soon as war became probable the Mediterranean fleet should seek to evade the enemy, while the Peter the Great was locked up in icebound Cronstadt, and the defence of the Russian littoral of the Black Sea was intrusted to the two Popoffkas, which took care to remain under cover of fortress guns.47 48

Wellesley, op. cit., p. 283. Wellesley, op. cit., p. 164. His work has many interesting, though disparaging, anecdotes of Russian inefficiency and malpractices. 47

BRITAIN

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On the other hand, the Turkish gunboats which ought to have commanded the navigation of the Danube had been as inefficient as the land forces. However, the Turkish fleet gave them command of the sea and enabled the easy transportation of their troops to certain of the seats of combat. Hobart Pasha had, though, no opportunity to perform any brilliant exploits. The course of the war had been followed with absorbing interest in England. Attention had naturally been drawn first to the Asiatic successes of the czar's crusaders, and tirade after tirade followed each Russian victory in the columns of the hostile press. Quite a few organs called for an armed neutrality on the part of England and pressed for an alliance with Austria. Those journals which had taken the greatest delight in gloating over Russia's inability to war, in March, now shrieked loudest about curbing her insatiable ambition which, it seemed, threatened Europe and Asia from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf, with India as the eventual goal. The press and public viewed the Muscovite campaign in Asia Minor with the utmost distrust. The delay on the Danube with the war being pushed in Armenia was interpreted as throwing uncomfortable doubts upon the real purposes of Russia. The Daily Telegraph invited Prince Gortchakoff to " cease alarming British patriotism by this advance to the Euphrates," advising him to spill human blood " for the glory of God and the love of man " in places where it could be " more plausibly called pious carnage." 48 The Daily News and the Times occupied themselves in refuting the rumors of the alarmists and calming the public. In their eyes, English interests in Asia Minor had been made the theme of extravagant exaggeration. The Times was consistent in its desire for peace, setting forth that the best « Daily Telegraph,

May 26, 1877.

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way to solve the Eastern Question under the present circumstances was " to let it solve itself." " W e shall be the better able to use our influence at the proper moment if we keep our hands free." 49 The fears of the alarmists were aired even in the House of Lords, 50 where Lord De Mauley called attention to the "slow, silent, and certain" advance of Russia in Central Asia and consequent danger to India. 51 His words brought forth a reply from Lord Salisbury, couched in a spirit of cynical common sense. The Indian secretary could not help thinking that a great deal of misapprehension had arisen " from the popular use of maps on a small scale. A s with such maps you are able to put a thumb on India and a finger on Russia, some persons at once think that the political situation is alarming and that India must be looked to." 52 It was " inexpressibly satisfactory " to Delane's journal that the government, in the words of Lord Salisbury, did " not mistake panic for real danger or phantoms for realities." In a similar vein, the Daily News viewed the " cool good sense " of his answer as a decided rebuke to the alarmists in general. The Daily Telegraph, however, saw nothing to become enthusiastic over in the Indian secretary's " banter on the subject of big and little maps." While Russia might not hold the intention of invading India, the feat was not impossible. She would naturally exercise every available means of annoyance against England in the event of interference with her schemes in Europe and Asia Minor. A t the present moment it was as a " disturbing influence " that the Slavonic Power was dangerous to India, and she had " fought her way south " expressly to become that disturbing influence in a time of need.53 49

Times, May 25, 1877.

50

On June 11.

81

Hansard, vol. ccxxxiv, p. 1561.

82

Ibid., p. 1565.

53

All journals cited in above paragraph are issues of June 12, 1877.

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The cabinet, early in May, had defined the British interests it would be forced to protect," and Count Schouvaloff had conveyed the despatch to his government On his return to London in the fore part of June, the Russian ambassador brought with him Prince Gortchakoff's rather vague assurances that those interests would not be infringed upon. Suez and Egypt would not be brought " within the radius of their military operations." The " acquisition " of Constantinople was " excluded " from the views of the emperor. The question of the Straits " should be settled by a common agreement on equitable and efficiently guaranteed bases." A s to the " other interests " alluded to by Lord Derby, " such as the Persian Gulf and the route to India," the imperial cabinet declared that it would " not extend the war beyond what is required for the loudly and clearly declared object for which His Majesty the Emperor was obliged to take up arms." The occupation of Bulgaria was passed over with the statement that the Christian populations of Turkey must be placed " in a position in which their existence and security will be effectually guaranteed against the intolerable abuses of Turkish administration." 55 The contents of the reply were known to the English press from foreign sources at the time they were communicated to Lord Derby and were therefore commented on in leading articles of the following day. The Standard stressed the ambiguity of the Russian response on Constantinople, as did all Conservative organs. " There is a difference between permanent acquisition and temporary occupation. The first is out of the question, without a European struggle of the first magnitude. Is the second to be regarded with less « Supra, p. 218. 55 Sessional Papers, 1877, vol. l x x x i x , Russia # 2. The despatch was dated May 30 and was transmitted to Derby on June 8. It was published openly in the journals of June 25, 1877.

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jealous e y e s ? " The Morning Advertiser suggested that Russia, if honest in her intentions, should draw a line somewhere outside the defenses of Constantinople. If she refused to consent, England " must man them." On the other hand, the statements were considered " very assuring " by the Times which thought silence on the question of Constantinople, perhaps, " inevitable." It expressed the hope, however, that peace would be concluded before the contingency of occupation arose. The Radical Echo was " perfectly satisfied " with the tenor of the assurances. Czar Alexander should be permitted to complete his great w o r k — " the political redemption of the Slavs of Turkey "—unmolested. Russia might seek compensation from the sultan in Armenia, but that was " no concern " of England, and " to object would exhibit Englishmen in a plight of selfishness and pitiable fear." A t the other extreme, nothing " more profoundly unsatisfactory " could be imagined by the Daily Telegraph. The czar might occupy " Bulgaria " as far as the Mediterranean, demolish all the forts north of the Balkans, garrison Stamboul, and remain in possession of his conquests for years " without infringing the letter of his promises." The reservations in the reply plainly meant that the Grand Duke Nicholas designed, " with malice aforethought, to hoist the Imperial standard of Holy Russia on the Mosque of St. Sophia." As usual, the ultra-Whig organ pounded in that once the Russians were in Constantinople, it would be impossible to turn them out. England must " prepare " for contingencies.58 In a series of confidential conversations, held after the communication of Prince Gortchakoff's despatch, the true texts of which were kept secret until mid-February of the following year, Lord Derby and Count Schouvaloff rather 58

Journals quoted in above paragraph are issues of June 9, 1877.

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frankly discussed the conditions of peace which Russia intended to exact in view of a successful issue to the war. T h e foreign secretary was informed of the terms and asked, a f t e r learning their precise nature, whether England would remain neutral and if she would urge the T u r k i s h government to accept them. Count Schouvaloff gave an assurance that, if the Porte should sue for peace before the Russian armies crossed the Balkans, the emperor " would consent not to press the operations of war any further."

Bulgaria, up to the Balkans,

should then be made an " autonomous vassal province under the guarantee of Europe."

Bulgaria, south of the Balkans,

as well as the other Christian provinces should be assured by the P o w e r s the " best possible guarantees for a regular administration."

Montenegro and Serbia should get an in-

crease of territory, with Serbia remaining under the sultan; those arrangements and the claim of Roumania to independence were to be determined by Europe.

Bosnia and Herze-

govina would be more difficult to deal with as they lay close to Austria which should have the right to a preponderating voice in any settlement of their future organization, although they as well should be provided with suitable constitutions. Schouvaloff added that Russia would demand certain special advantages for herself as " compensation f o r the costs of the w a r ; " but, they " would not exceed " the " cession of Batoum, with adjacent territory," and the recovery of that " portion of Bessarabia " taken from her a f t e r the Crimean war.

I f Austria demanded compensation in her turn, she

was free to look f o r it in " Bosnia and partly in Herzegovina." either

Roumania,

independence

for or

losing the

Bessarabia,

Dobrudja."

should

Those

get

terms

On April 16 Russia had guaranteed to Roumania the integrity of her territory in a formal convention. Supra, p. 215. 6T

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" might be altered " if the war rolled to the south of the Balkans. 58 In the earlier part of the conversation, Schouvaloff had stated that his government could not pledge itself to make its military operations stop short of Constantinople as it might be compelled to advance on the capital by the obstinacy of the Turks themselves, especially if they knew that some foreign Power would help them to defend the city. He, however, assured Derby that the Russians should " under no circumstances remain at Constantinople." The Russian ambassador also remained firm on the question of the Straits, which must be settled by a general agreement of the Powers. Lord Derby, several days later, could not promise that the cabinet would give any sanction to the Russian proposals, and refused to urge Turkey to accept them.8* The foreign secretary did, though, invite Layard to give his opinion on the probability of the Porte making such a surrender of its power.80 In a third conversation on June 14, Derby was informed that Prince Gortchakoff had sent word that the change in Bulgaria would have to be more sweeping as he had come to the conclusion " that the separation of Bulgaria into two provinces would be impracticable." Were it not to be treated as a whole, the " most laborious and intelligent" of the Bulgarian people, and those who had suffered most severely from Turkish rule, would not get the benefit of self-government.61 The above was also communicated to the British ambassador at Constantinople. Lord Derby would still 68

Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 15, no. 1. " Memorandum of a Confidential Conversation" of Count Schouvaloff with Lord Derby which occurred on June 8, 1877. The tenor of the Russian terms of peace was as well communicated to Germany and Austria. 59 Turkey # 15, no. 4. Conversation of June 11. 60 Ibid., no. 5. Derby to Layard, dated June 12. 81 Ibid., no. 6.

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express no formal opinion on the proposals as a whole to Count Schouvaloff, but he stated as his personal judgment that it seemed impossible to expect that the Porte should consent to them " until reduced to the last extremity." 82 Layard, in answering the communications addressed to him by the foreign secretary, strongly deprecated any attempt to induce the Porte to accept the Russian terms, since English influence at Pera would be greatly lessened if she supported such a change. Besides, the sultan could not think o f making concessions as he would lose his throne and life. 08 Layard was thereupon immediately informed that the cabinet had no intention of instructing him either to propose those conditions of peace to the Porte or to support them. His observations alone had been desired.6* A longer denunciation, in which he made no effort to conceal his sympathies, had already been penned by the ambassador and was received several days later at the foreign office. 66 The entire matter of the peace proposals was then dropped for over a month, awaiting the outcome of the Danubian campaign which had just commenced. Russia had thus at the very outset of the war refused to promise that Constantinople would under no circumstances be threatened or occupied. She had also given warning that the question of the Straits would be reopened, but it would be referred to the Powers for decision. Further, the English cabinet had been acquainted with the terms of peace which Russia intended to exact from the Porte. A s one proceeds through the events and maze of diplomacy of the following twelvemonth, one can see how persistently the czar's 62

Ibid., no. 7.

Conversation of June 18.

Ibid., no. 8. Layard to Derby, dated June 13 and received at the foreign office, June 23, 1877. 68

64

Ibid., no. 9. Derby to Layard, dated June 23.

85

Ibid., no. 10.

Dated Therapia, June 19, and received on June 28.

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government adhered to its own program and how precisely the English cabinet held Russia to its earliest promises and plan. A s stated before, the contents of Prince Gortchakoff's assurances in regard to British interests were known at the time. Consequently the questions of Constantinople and the Straits, which the Russian promises did not cover, were stressed by the press. It is also doubtful whether the tenor of the peace proposals was kept such a rigid secret. A t any rate, the press had fairly accurate forecasts of the concessions Russia had in view, commenting on them in characteristic vein. Armenia was naturally in the foreground due to the early campaign being carried on there, and, because it was either known or assumed that Russia intended to seek compensation in Asia Minor, the press became more threatening in its language with every Muscovite success. Repeated warnings were issued emphasizing Kars, Batoum, and Erzeroum as prizes which the czar could not hope to retain. Changes in European Turkey were expected, but they were not to be drastic. Moreover, there could be no expansion on the part of Russia into Europe. The czar's Livadia pledge, that he had no desire for conquest or aggrandizement, was frequently cited.88 The Russian claim to Bessarabia, alone, seemed to have been kept a dead secret, since there was no mention or divination of it in the press. Beaconsfield was hard put to preserve harmony in the cabinet during this period as there were considerable differences of opinion among its members relative to the steps England should take in order to maintain that prudent regard for her interests demanded by the situation. Northcote declared in his later memorandum that the peace party may be said to have consisted, under Lord Derby, of Cairns, Cross, the Duke of Richmond, Salisbury, Carnarvon, and my68

Supra, p. 129.

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self. A s time wore on, Cairns, Cross, and Richmond seemed somewhat to modify their views . . . Carnarvon was strongly impressed with the belief that the Prime Minister was desirous of war. Derby, judging more correctly, said to me: ' I don't think he desires war; he desires to place England in a "commanding position."' e T The premier no longer admired the foreign secretary's " purely passive " attitude and desired action, not despatches. A n unsuccessful attempt was made to secure an active alliance with Austria, but she had already defined her interests and come to an understanding with Russia. Beaconsfield's secret correspondence with Layard indicates the particular action he most desired: " Is it impossible for the Porte to invite the presence of our fleet at Constantinople, and for us to accede to the invitation, still asserting our neutrality, on the ground, that we are taking a material guarantee for the observance of existing treaties ? " A military occupation of the peninsula of Gallipoli was also suggested. The proposal, however, would have to emanate from the Porte. 88 Queen Victoria's alarm was far greater than that of her obedient servant. Beaconsfield himself informed Lady B r a d f o r d : " The Faery writes every day and telegraphs every hour." 99 Her Majesty was particularly indignant at the three L o r d s — D e r b y , Salisbury and C a r n a r v o n — f o r their pacific utterances. Derby ought to resign, as, really, " his views and language make him a danger to the country." L o r d Lyons was mentioned as the successor who would follow out Victoria's desire for a " firm, bold line." Delay in taking precautions would prove " fatal " to the prestige of England, which would so humiliate the Queen that " she thinks she would abdicate at once." 70 6r

Buckle, op. cit., p. 139.

68

Ibid., pp. 142-43.

69

Zetland, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 156.

70

Buckle, op. cit., pp. 148-49.

Beaconsfield to Layard, dated June 6. Letter to Lady Bradford of June 14.

Victoria to Beaconsfield, dated June 27.

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The premier was, however, unable to persuade his discordant cabinet to advocate the extreme measures he had set his heart upon. Nor could Layard influence the sultan to invite the English fleet into the Bosphorus, unless England consented to become his avowed ally. The situation had become more acute in the latter part of June after the Danube had been crossed. Rumors were flying about that the government intended to ask the House for a supplementary vote of credit for from two to five million sterling to be devoted to provision for warlike contingencies. Radical organs bitterly attacked the necessity and unconstitutionality of such a step, which they attributed to the sympathies of the prime minister.71 Conservative organs were quite cautious in pronouncing that the proposal would be made at the moment but heartily endorsed the thought that precautionary measures should be taken in the near future. On July 3 it was announced in both Houses of Parliament that the fleet had been ordered to return to Besika Bay. No explanation for the move was offered. A chorus of exultation greeted the action in the anti-Russian journals. The sending of these great warships, intoned the Daily Telegraph, is merely an " admonitory demonstration " showing that England, free, resolute, and powerful, does not intend to leave the settlement of immense questions to the arbitrament of the Russian sword.72 " They go to Besika Bay because the Russian army has crossed the Danube, without any clear pledge being simultaneously obtained from its master that he does not mean to go on to Constantinople." 78 The Times did not question the propriety of the act but feared its effect on the Turks.74 The demonstration was " at least premature." 75 To refrain from taking a wise and necessary 71

Cf. issues of Echo, June 25, or Daily News, June 27, 1877.

72

Daily Telegraph, July 4, 1877-

7

* Times, July 4, 1877.

73

Ibid., July 9, 1877.

75

Ibid., July 7, 1877.

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measure of precaution because the T u r k s might misunderstand it would be an abstention of idiocy, remarked Pall Mall in rebuking the Times.7' In the opinion of the Radical Daily News, however, the " histrionic display " was liable to prove in its ultimate results " as pernicious as an open declaration of w a r . " 77 T h e vote of credit w a s not to be proposed during the session of 1877, but a second measure o f precaution was to be taken in the latter part of July. T h e apparent success o f the Russian campaign along the Danube, coupled with G o u r k o ' s startling dash across the Balkans and seizure of the Shipka pass, seemed to indicate that the Russians would soon be approaching Constantinople. W i l d rumors o f contemplated action were again being spread by the press. Gallipoli w a s to be occupied as a material guarantee. England was about to join with Austria in an immediate occupation o f Constantinople in order to prevent its ultimate surrender to the czar. Crete was to be seized as a naval base. E g y p t was to be purchased or annexed. Once more the rumors were set at rest with the announcement in Parliament, on July 23, that orders had been given to strengthen the Mediterranean garrisons. T h e garrison at Malta was to be raised to its full complement and the Mediterranean squadron was to be reinforced. T w o ships, the Euphrates and the Crocodile, with some 3,000 troops, sailed f r o m Portsmouth a f e w days later. T h e majority of organs cordially approved the step. As one could expect, the exponents of a spirited p o l i c y — t h e Daily Telegraph, Morning Post, Pall Mall Gazette, Standard, etc.—considered it highly necessary, and all gave their blanket approval to the contemplated occupation of Gallipoli. T h e Daily Telegraph urged " immediate occupation." Serious indeed " would be the absurdity of seeing Gallipoli T9

Pall Mall Gazette, July 4, 1877.

77

Daily News, July 4, 1877.

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seized while we were here discussing the limitation of correct neutrality." T o the Morning Post it seemed requisite " for the vindication of the public law of Europe." The Times and Scotsman did not object to a watchful neutrality but disliked the misapprehensions and sense of danger created in the public mind by the secrecy surrounding the act "If the Government would take what they conceive to be necessary precautions in an open way, without appearance of haste," stated the Scotsman, " they will do a real service to the country, and materially increase the chances of peace being preserved." The need of recruiting the garrisons was regarded by the Radical Manchester Examiner as " pure flam." The destination of the troops was Gallipoli or Constantinople if the further progress of the Russians seemed to render such a step desirable. Such an occupation would be in defiance of European public opinion and would be still another instance of the " all-engrossing selfishness" of English imperial policy.78 Anti-Russian journals devoted considerable space during July and August to proving the brutality of the Russian mode of warfare. In fact, a miniature " Atrocity Crusade " was waged by the press, directed this time against the opponents of the Turks. Incidentally, the tales of Muscovite atrocities that came floating in from the seat of the war gave the ministerial organs a splendid opportunity to revenge themselves on the anti-Turkish newspapers for the attacks directed against them the previous autumn. Punch struck off the situation admirably: When Tartar meets Turk, With their mutual ferocities, Then—horrible work!— Comes the tug of atrocities." 78

All journals cited in above paragraph are issues of July 24, 1877.

™ Punch, Aug. 4, 1877.

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In reading the accounts of the Danubian campaign in the Daily Telegraph, Morning Post, and Pall Mall Gazette, it appeared that Russian batteries generally directed their shells at hospitals, consulates and foreign flags, especially the English. Girt with priests and artillerymen, brandishing the knout and the crucifix, the czardom descended upon the Balkans amid the glare of burning hospitals and homesteads.80 The Daily Telegraph stated that " the worst scenes of the Middle Ages never furnished a more cruel illustration of the religion of Christ glorified by human gore and vindicated by massacre." 81 Official confirmation was desired by the Daily News and the Times, which maintained discreet silence, merely remarking that both sides had probably not rigidly observed on all occasions the laws of war.82 Pall Mall was shocked by the levity with which the charges were disposed of. What an encouragement must it be to the Russians when they find that the very men who went mad over the Bulgarian atrocities " are ready to dismiss all complaints of Russian cruelties with a mere shake of the head over ' the inevitable horrors of w a r ! ' " 83 The Daily Telegraph marveled in like vein that all mention of the widespread atrocities of the Cross were suppressed " by those who were so greedy for ghastly details of ' atrocities ' committed under the crescent" 84 The Morning Post was savagely severe upon the barbarous Muscovites. In striking contrast to its own mere abuse, however, it published in a telegram from Berlin the satirical intelligence that rinderpest was most virulent among the Russian troops in Bulgaria. " How much better," remarked Punch, " than bluntly calling the Russian soldiers brutes it is delicately to announce that they are troubled with the rinderpest! " 85 80

81

82

83

Morning Post, June 30, 1877. Issues of July 1 1 , 1877. « Daily Telegraph, July 1 1 . 1877.

85

Daily Telegraph, June 30, 1877. Pall Mall Gazette, July 1 1 , 1877 Punch, Aug. 4. 1877.

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The accounts were verified in a statement signed by numerous representatives of the English journals assembled at Shumla. Russian and Bulgarian "acts of cruelty" had definitely been committed in Bulgaria " against the inoffensive Mussulman population." A m o n g the correspondents signing the statement were representatives of the Standard, Daily Telegraph, Illustrated London News, Times, Manchester Guardian, Morning Post, Morning Advertiser, Manchester Examiner, Scotsman, and prominent foreign papers.88 Nevertheless, the Daily News refused to accept the charges because of their sources. " T o put the cruelties imputed to the Russians on the same level with those established against the Turks is to confound accusation with proof." 87 Spectator, however, admitted that all of the charges were not pure inventions and felt forced to contemplate the question of " comparative atrocity." " W e do hear of gross barbarity, of savage cruelty, amounting to murder; but we have not heard yet of any such deeds of savage lust as covered the T u r k s with infamy." Russian barbarities were not equal to one-tenth of what had taken place the year before. " Even murder—cruel but honest murder—is not ' worse,' but better infinitely, than foul and promiscuous dishonour." 88 The Times, as well, gradually admitted that barbarities had been committed, but it placed the blame on the Cossacks and the Bulgarians, exonerating the regular troops of the czar. Its stand was particularly attacked by the Daily Telegraph and by the Pall Mall Gazette which always took especial delight in leveling sarcasm at its morning adversary. 89 A " Blue Book " on the Russian atrocities, 86

The statement appeared in the journals of July 23, 1877.

87

Daily News, July 25, 1877.

88

Spectator, July 28, 1877.

Cf. the Daily Telegraph, Aug. 9, 1877, and the issues of the Times and Pall Mall Gazette of the 10th and 17th. 89

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issued in the latter part of August, added fuel to the controversy which was to continue unabated throughout the fall. A n abortive suggestion that peace might possibly be concluded had been made by the czar in the latter part of July, which, though it was to be followed through, was to bear no direct results. Just prior to the severe check registered to the Russian advance at Plevna, Alexander had authorized Colonel Wellesley, British military attaché at the imperial headquarters, to inform the English ministry of his readiness to treat f o r peace if the sultan would make suitable propositions.* 0 T h e emperor's statement elicited satisfaction from L o r d Derby, who informed Count Schouvaloff that the cabinet would lend its influence toward a salutary settlement. T h e foreign secretary thereupon instructed Layard " to sound the Sultan on the subject of possible terms of peace." 91 A t Biela, where the imperial headquarters were located for the moment, Colonel Wellesley engaged in several conversations on the subject with General Milutin, the minister of war, and with the czar. The conversations, put in memorandum f o r m by Wellesley and confirmed by the emperor, resulted in a hurried and practically useless trip to London on the part o f the military attaché in order to convey confidentially to the British ministry a rehearsed text of the Russian terms and the personal desire of Alexander for peace in the near future, if " suitable propositions " were made by the Porte. 82 The imperial conditions were merely 90 House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 9, no. 1. Wellesley to Derby, dated and received July 20, 1877. 81

Ibid., Turkey # IS, no. 11.

Derby to Layard, dated July 28, 1877-

Milutin hinted at mediation in conversing with Wellesley on the 29th. His interview with the czar was on the 30th and he left for Bucharest that same night on his mission. Wellesley's memorandum was commenced the evening of his conversation with the minister of war and is therefore dated Biela, July 29. For the complete memoran92

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a repetition of those communicated in June to Her M a j esty's Government by Count Schouvaloff ; 9 8 and the momentary desire for peace was to pass even before the military attaché was well on his way, since the entire situation was changed as the result of the disastrous Russian reverse before Plevna on the following day. 94 Layard's interview with the sultan portrays the renewed confidence held at Constantinople as regards the ultimate issue of the war. " His Majesty could not, under present circumstances, either propose or listen to any conditions of peace." The ambassador reported the sultan's ministers and the war group to be so much encouraged by the recent successes over the Russians at Plevna and in Asia Minor that " they feel confident that the enemy will be ultimately repulsed and driven out of Bulgaria and Roumelia, as he has been out of Armenia." A t the close of the interview, Layard offered the good offices of England for the future." Under the altered circumstances, it did not appear to Her Majesty's Government that the present juncture was one which offered a favorable opening for the commencement of negotiations. The above reply to the czar's suggestion was included in an official memorandum which in its other statements was equally cool.®' Beaconsfield availed himself of the opportunity of Wellesley's visit to discuss matters quite openly with the Queen's representative and entrusted him on his return to the imperial headquarters with a personal communication to the emperor behind the back of the foreign dum, cf. Turkey # 9, no. 3, inclosure, p. 2. Wellesley gives an account of the incident in his recollections, With the Russians in Peace and War, pp. 200-205. 83

Supra, pp. 245-47.

95

Turkey # 15, no. 12. Layard to Derby, dated Aug. 2, 1877.

98

94

Supra, p. 239.

Memorandum for Colonel Wellesley, dated Aug. 14, in Turkey # 9, no. 4.

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secretary, in which the premier threatened that England might be forced to take part in the war as a belligerent"' A frank exchange of views seemed to be the sole fruit of Wellesley's London mission. Prudent reticence had been maintained in both Houses of Parliament during the closing weeks of the session which ended in mid-August. Earnest humanitarians and immovable champions of British interests alike acquiesced in the ministerial policy of maintaining a vigilant neutrality. The fears of the public had been considerably allayed as the result of the series of Turkish victories and a conviction was growing that the Turks might yet prove to be a match for the Russians. Awaiting the issue of arms, the country remained comparatively calm during the latter part of the summer and early autumn. A passage in the Queen's Speech proroguing Parliament, possible knowledge of the object of Wellesley's mission, and a more direct statement by the chancellor of the exchequer at Plymouth in the latter part of August evidently led Delane of the Times to broach the question of an armistice. Northcote had once more pledged the government to neutrality— " though a neutrality somewhat on the watch for a favourable opportunity of interposition." 88 Thereafter for a week, leading articles in the Times insistently counseled peace. Delane's views at the moment are set forth in his request to the Rev. Henry Wace, Oxford scholar, to write an article recommending the adoption of the earliest opportunity for a mediation in Turkey; the terms indeed must be altogether reconsidered since the ' bag and baggage' policy was advocated. 07

Buckle, op. cit., pp. 173-77.

93

Account of speech in the Times, A u g . 28, 1877.

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The Turks have shown that they are second to no European Power in the field, and have justified the boasting which seemed so out of place during the Conference.89 Wace promptly responded with an excellent editorial entitled " The L a w of Nations " 100 which Delane liked " exceedingly." 1 0 1 In its following issue the " Thunderer" thereupon boldly asked: " Is it impossible for England, with the concurrence of some other neutral powers, to interpose ? " 102 The foreign secretary, however, cherished no illusions on the subject of peace, as that same evening at Liverpool he curtly stated that it was " not the business of England to offer good offices without some reasonable prospect of their being accepted." 103 Delane, thoroughly piqued at Lord Derby's " cold expressions," 104 thereupon dropped the subject and no further suggestions appeared in the columns of his journal for some weeks. Members of Parliament, vacationing, loosed their usual September flood of rhetoric for the benefit of constituents. Gladstone's interminable volubility on the theme of atrocities continued unabated. The Circassians, it seemed, had taken over the methods of the Turks. 1 0 5 Sir Charles Dilke had not changed the views he had expressed at Notting-hill the previous year 108 and at Kensington in January. 1 0 7 Dilke harbored the hope that the " three emperors ' league " might be dissolved and Russia weakened as a result of the war. Should, however, the break-up of the Turkish dominions in 88

Arthur Irwin Dasent, John Thadeus Delane, Editor of " The Times," his Life and Correspondence, vol. ii, p. 334. 100

Times, Sept. 5, 1877.

102

Times, Sept. 6, 1877.

101

Dasent, op. cit., p. 334.

10s Account of speech in the Times, Sept. 7, 1877. 104

Times, Sept. 7, 1877.

105

He spoke at Hawarden on Sept. 1, and at Nottingham on the 27th.

10

« Supra, pp. 80-81.

107

Supra, p. 168.

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Europe come, he " trusted the claims of Greece might not be overlooked, and—in the interests not so much of England herself as of the Egyptians—the claims of England to hold rule in Egypt." 108 The ultra-patriotic Roebuck, speaking at the annual Cutlers' feast at Sheffield, regarded England as the good genius of the world. She would scatter her benefits even more widely if other nations would only be sensible enough to receive them. British interests, if followed through one after another, were " the interests of humanity." The aged M. P.'s magnanimity extended even to the ex-premier, who, he confessed, though " a bad statesman," was, perhaps, " a good woodcutter." 108 The lone ministerial utterance of the latter part of September aroused the ire of the anti-Turks. Albeit he carefully couched his statements on the policy being pursued by the cabinet in the language of his colleagues, Northcote and Derby, the Right Hon. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach nevertheless imparted his true sympathies in alluding to " the courage and tenacity of those who had been fighting to maintain their empire against a wanton and unnecessary aggression." 110 Numerous other oratorical performances engaged in by lesser lights resulted solely in the repetition of ministerial phrases and Opposition platitudes. The public and press were, however, more interested in the events of the war than in the haranguing politicians. The considerable number of relief funds organized in England during the latter part of the summer attest to the generosity and solicitude of the nation. Demands of the humanitarians met with prompt and liberal response. The ordinary claims of the National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War were supplemented by sundry rival 108

At Chelsea on Sept 4. Account of speech in the Times, Sept. 5,1877.

109 Account of speech in the Times, Sept. 7, 1877. 110 At Winchcombe, Sept. 21. From account in the Times, Sept. 25,1877.

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26l

organizations; a m o n g the more important being the T u r k i s h Compassionate Fund, sponsored by the Baroness BurdettCoutts, and the F u n d for the S i c k and W o u n d e d Russian Soldiers, promoted by J. L e w i s Farley and Canon Liddon. Viscountess S t r a n g f o r d ' s committee had closed its Bulgarian F u n d and now appealed f o r donations in aid of the suffering Turks. T h e Stafford H o u s e committee and Slade's Hospital and Ambulance F u n d also sought contributions on their behalf. Collections to assist the Bulgarians, Bosnians, and Montenegrins, even one f u n d dedicated to the W a r Victims in Palestine, found liberal patrons. England seemed to be emptying her purse in her benevolence. T h e actual campaigning was followed with rapt concern as is evidenced by the marked amount o f space devoted by all journals to news and anecdotes f r o m the scenes of combat. D u r i n g the early stages of the w a r despatches had been most unreliable, emanating as they did f r o m Russian or Turkish sources. A stronghold would be reported captured and recaptured on successive d a y s ; eventually it would turn out that it had never been f o u g h t over at all. Colonel Wellesley relates that the St. Petersburg public were continually regaled with elaborate descriptions of engagements in which thousands of T u r k s lost their lives, while only a f e w Russians were wounded. Such incidents led a humorous editor of a Paris newspaper to give place in its columns to a fictitious telegram, stating " there had been a great battle in which ten thousand T u r k s had been killed, whereas in the Russian camp a little Cossack had been b o r n ! " 1 1 1 However, news despatches came to be somewhat more accurate once the exodus of special correspondents sent out by the leading English dailies had commenced. 1 1 2 T h e provincial papers were not far behind their metropolitan con« 1 Wellesley, op. cit., p. 163. lla

There were to be over 70 with the Russian army in Bulgaria.

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temporaries in respect to the lavishness of their arrangements for chronicling the events of the war. Three of their number, the Newcastle Chronicle, the Glasgow Daily Mail, and Freeman's Journal of Dublin, subscribed a joint purse of £10,000, which they were prepared to spend in obtaining news from the centers of interest. Their action was but a sample of what was being done by the principal newspapers of the country. The struggle going on served as a great boon to provincial journalism. 11 ' The Daily News easily outstripped all its rivals and proved to be the most enterprising of journals. Spirited and detailed accounts of major engagements frequently appeared first in its columns and were often reprinted in whole or in part by the London press, as well as by a vast number of Irish, Scottish, and other provincial papers. A t one time or another certain of its correspondents, Archibald Forbes, J. A. MacGahan, F. D. Millet, V . Julius, etc., all scored personal triumphs over their colleagues in the field due to their unparalleled exertions, keen insight in military matters, and intelligent criticisms. Julius was to be the sole English representative with the Russians at the fall of Kars in November. The gruesome recital of the horrors of the siege of Plevna, which he compared to a vast charnel-house, was to come from the pen of Millet. MacGahan was to write the account of the actual fall of Plevna in December. The most brilliant coups, however, must be accredited to Forbes. His descriptions of scenes of carnage, written under every disadvantage of hardship and personal fatigue, telegraphed to and published in the Daily News within a few hours of the occurrences they related, were models of picturesque, forcible narrative. Forbes, on his return to London in November, was to be presented with a purse of £2,000 in 113

Bourne, H . R. Fox, English Newspapers

P- 359-

(London, 1887), vol. ii,

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recognition of his brilliant services. 114 A m o n g the better known of the special correspondents of other journals one finds Colonel Brackenbury and Captain Norman of the Times, Charles Williams of the Morning Advertiser, Frederick Boyle of the Standard, James D o w of the Sheffield Daily Telegraph, and Murray of the Scotsman. All diligently consigned graphic recitals to their organs for the consumption of the public. Vivid sketches of the principal theatres of action, portraying the crossing of the Danube, the passage of the Balkans, the valiant charges in the Shipka pass, and the stubborn fighting before Plevna and Kars, were contributed by capable artists to the London pictorials. Frederick Villiers, representing the Graphic, generally accompanied Archibald Forbes, the pencil of the former depicting the scenes that the facile pen of the latter described. Villier's best studies were later reproduced in an illustrated narrative of the struggle issued as the War Number of the Graphic in the latter part of September. Melton Prior and J. Bell, special artists of the Illustrated London News, the chief rival of the Graphic, supplied the vigorous sketches appearing in its pages. A collection of their drawings was later exhibited at the Westminster Aquarium, attracting interested spectators. The Penny Illustrated Paper vied successfully with its more expensive competitors. It published a Pictorial Chronicle of the war, which amply illustrated record was so fully appreciated by the public that it became necessary to erect a new machine—the " Ingram " 1 1 5 — t o meet the greatly increased circulation. A new venture in the same field, the 114 Macmillan's Magazine, March, 1878, describes his feats in an article entitled " The W a r Campaign and the W a r Correspondent." 1 1 5 The management of the Penny Illustrated had been taken over by the Illustrated, London News which was mainly under the proprietorship of Mrs. Ingram. John Lash Latey was the editor of the Illustrated London News.

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Pictorial Penny Paper, which made its initial appearance in September, evidently desired to share in the profits of catering to the public taste. Other signs of the interest with which Britain was following the struggle were not lacking. Several metropolitan newspapers issued extra " war editions " with supplementary information each evening. Maps of the arenas of battle and pamphlets designed to meet every opinion, however jaundiced, were sold at railway stations and news-stands in great quantities. Attentive audiences followed the lectures of military experts and returned correspondents. Virtually every English periodical contained editorial comments or articles dealing with the different phases of the war. Thus, through varied channels, was the English public kept well informed. Accounts of the carnage before Plevna filled the columns of the press in mid-September. Following a period of uncertainty, it became definitely known that the Russians had met with a disastrous repulse. The knowledge that the Muscovites had been checked occasioned an immediate chorus of exultation in the majority of English organs. The fighting qualities of the Turks were now extolled, alarmist fears were practically forgotten, and the press as a whole turned to an analysis of the causes of the failure of the Colossus with feet of clay. For an entire month one read articles devoted almost entirely to the incompetence of such a political system as the Russian autocracy. Its military and financial defects became the theme of all newspapers. The Muscovite weaknesses were ridiculed beyond measure. It seemed that bad generalship, inconceivable tactical blunders, undue haste, sluggishness in bringing up reinforcements, an inadequate commissariat service, miserable sanitary arrangements, and the pinch of financial adversity, had each in turn contributed

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to the conspicuous failure of the czar's armies. Russia should sue for peace. Although profound disappointment was expressed in certain Radical newspapers, the pro-Turkish press made no attempt to restrain its jubilation over the turn of events. The Daily Telegraph, Morning Post and Pall Mall Gazette, all performed extraordinary war dances in print. Pall Mall in particular exulted over the Russian reverses in a series of vitriolic articles. In one editorial entitled " The Hand of Providence," the English humanitarians also came in for their share of almost profane execration. Pall Mall gloated over the humiliation of the advocates of a religious crusade for having urged Russia on to a holy war, whereas now it seemed that Providence was on the side of the infidel. Their work had caused the death of tens of thousands of brave men, " and strangely wasted indeed, if the work they had to do was what our enthusiasts declare it to be—a holy work, done for God's sake and in God's cause." 116 Gladstone, prime humanitarian, was made the object of the abuse of the Daily Telegraph. He could not undo the valiant facts of Plevna, or of the campaign in Asia Minor by rhetoric, and he labored in vain to rob the sultan's brave soldiers of the admiration and sympathy of the English people, " who know that in winning victories for their Sovereign those soldiers have won them for treaty law, for European order, and for the freedom of Eastern commerce and the peace of the Eastern world." 117 A meeting of Prince Bismarck and Count Andrassy at Salzburg 118 occasioned renewed speculations on the subject of mediation as September waned. Foreign correspondents diligently pursued the rumors in their columns. However, 117 118

Pall Mall Gazette, Sept. 18, 1877. Daily Telegraph, Sept. 28, 1877. Sept. 19.

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they must be considered as mere expressions of the wish of their sponsors in the English press. British editors seemed to have completely overlooked the preliminary difficulty in the way of mediation, in that, at the moment, neither of the belligerents had sought or was likely to seek the good offices of a mediator. At the close of the month, the rather confident reports on the arrangements for intervention entered into by the two statesmen were succeeded by the equally positive information that the proposal had not even been touched upon at Salzburg. The statement brought forth sarcastic comments in English organs which could not understand the German chancellor's reluctance to risk the life of his favorite Pomeranian recruit. The Russian reverse at Plevna was followed by a prolonged period of lull in military action. The Turkish commanders failed to take advantage of their opportunity following victory and remained strangely inactive. Their lack of mobility and defensive tactics gave the Muscovite forces a highly necessary breathing spell, enabling the Russian staff to bring up the reinforcements essential to a second campaign. The czar's army remained intrenched before Plevna and awaited the advent of General Todleben, military engineer and hero of Sebastopol, before commencing their new plan of taking Plevna by siege. Todleben appeared on the scene at the end of September but it was to be another month before Plevna was completely invested. The arrival of Todleben was greeted by friends of Russia with acclamations, although military experts evinced little faith in a " pick and shovel " campaign. The consensus of opinion was that winter would intervene before the Russian forces could successfully embark on a second campaign. It was hoped also that diplomacy might then find its opportunity for intervention. The recall or voluntary return to England of the majority of the special correspondents attests to the strength of that prognostication in English circles.

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The brief moment of tranquility was, however, soon shattered. It had been thought that the campaign in Asia Minor had ended for the year,11* but in the early autumn the Russians had been quietly and largely reinforced, while Mukhtar Pasha had been deprived of some of his best regiments to assist in the action in Bulgaria. Mukhtar's position between Kars and the Russian frontier was too extensive for the force at his disposal and a skilfully executed attack in midOctober 120 succeeded in driving the Turks out of their positions at Aladja Dagh in disastrous rout. Their loss in killed and wounded was enormous. In addition, three entire divisions, seven pashas, and an immense quantity of war material fell to the victors. Mukhtar and Ismail Pasha retreated in two columns to Erzeroum, leaving Armenia open to the Russians. Kars was rapidly invested and was to fall in a month's time, on November 18. The news of Aladja Dagh, 121 which came as a complete surprise, caused little rejoicing in England. Of the London newspapers, Radical organs alone held high praise for the " brilliant victory" of the Russians; the others commented solely on the seriousness of the Turkish defeat. The Times, which only a week before had ridiculed all alarmists as " geographical humorists," 122 remained discreetly silent, enabling it to remark the ensuing week that the public had received the news " with perfect calm." 128 Such a reception could scarcely be accredited to the Daily Telegraph which bemoaned the fact that the Turks had staked too fearlessly on Mukhtar Pasha's diminished command their chance of defending Asia Minor. With that eliminated, " the Rus119

Supra, pp. 234-36, for account of the earlier campaign in Armenia.

12°

Oct. 14 and 15.

121

Announced in the journals of Oct. 18, 1877.

122

Times, Oct. 9, 1877. Ibid., Oct. 24, 1877.

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sian ought to prove master of the entire country from Lake V a n to Batoum, from the spurs of Ararat to the last defensible pass behind Trebizond, if, indeed, these limits can now be said to content him." 124 Few organs, however, engaged in the rhetorical hysterics of the Daily Telegraph. The majority merely greeted the intelligence rather glumly and awaited events. Circulation of the tales of the ludicrous inefficiency of the Russian commissariat service in Bulgaria 1 2 5 continued, affording crumbs of comfort to some; but reports of the slow retreat of Suleiman Pasha on the Lom sector added to the gloom. Still, Osman Pasha was stubbornly holding his own at Plevna, and it was generally realized that the issues of the war had, perforce, to be decided on the European side of the Straits and not in Armenia. Moreover, most journals continued to pin their hopes of a drawn struggle and mediation on the advent of winter. N o brilliant victories could possibly be gained " in mud and snow." 126 T w o clever lines in Punch capitally strike off the situation at the moment. Under the caption, " Russia's Most Formidable Foes," Punch lists: " In the Camp—General Corruption. In the Field—Winter Pasha." 127 That England was regarding the struggle with subdued anxiety is shown by the relatively few Opposition speakers who took to the stump during October and early November. Gladstone occupied himself in rediscovering the Irish Question. The ex-premier spent almost a month touring the emerald isle, but, with a reserve in decided contrast to his usual spontaneity, delivered merely a minimum of speeches. Daily Telegraph, Oct. 18, 1877. Buckle, op. cit., p. 190, contains information transmitted to Lord Beaconsfield verifying accounts of that type. 126

128

Standard, Nov. 5, 1877.

127

Punch, Nov. 10, 1877.

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N o t one word was uttered on the subject of the war during his entire visit, rather definite proof of the sympathies of the Irish and o f the expedient humanitarianism of Mr. Gladstone. True, it must have been somewhat of an ordeal as, even with a stormy passage tossed in, hardly had his foot touched the British shore than his tongue was denouncing the Turkish proclivities of L o r d Beaconsfield. 128 L o r d Hartington chose Scotland as the scene for a similar display o f reticence. Bright and Chamberlain, who remained at home, touched solely upon domestic problems. The Opposition, still badly divided, evidently considered a policy of silence as best. Indecision was, likewise, the m a j o r difficulty of the ministry. Commencing November 5, regular cabinet meetings were being held, but no concerted action could be agreed upon. T h e opportunity for such an experiment as proffering mediation had not yet arisen; and, although a notification to Russia that British neutrality could not be depended upon in the event of a second campaign without a written engagement that she would under no circumstances occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles was determined upon, it was shelved. In a confidential communication to Queen V i c toria, 129 L o r d Beaconsfield reveals the diversity of views with which he had to contend. There were seven parties or policies in a cabinet consisting of but twelve m e n : 1 , 0 1st, the War Party pure and simple: which is of opinion that the time has arrived when material assistance should be afforded to the Porte. This party is headed by Mr. Secretary Hardy, 1 2 8 A t Holyhead, a Welsh packet station. from mid-October until November 12. 129

Gladstone was in Ireland

Dated Nov. 3, 1877.

The following extract is taken from Buckle, op. cit., pp. 194-95. Cf. Lord Gladstone, After Thirty Years, pp. 138-39, and Lang, op. cit., pp. 288-89, for somewhat similar versions. 180

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supported by L o r d John Manners, Sir M . Beach, and, before his untimely end, by the late First L o r d of the Admiralty [ W a r d Hunt], 2nd, the party which is prepared to go to war, if Russia will not engage not to occupy Constantinople. The party consists of the L o r d Chancellor, M r . Secretary Cross, the present First L o r d of the Admiralty [ W . H . Smith], and the Duke of Richmond. 3rd, the party that is prepared to go to war, if, after the signature of peace, the Russians would not evacuate Constantinople. This party consists of the Marquis of Salisbury. 4th, the party of ' peace at any p r i c e ' represented by the E a r l of Derby. 5th, the party, which disapproves of any policy avowedly resting on what are called ' British interests,' which is considered ' a selfish policy' (almost as selfish as patriotism), and is in f a v o r of an address to the four other neutral Powers, inviting them to join us ' in making some kind of appeal to the belligerents.' These are the views, very briefly, of the Chancellor of Exchequer. They are utterly futile, and assuming as they do that Prince Bismarck, who is master of the situation, would join with the other neutral Powers in such a step, they approach silliness. T h e 6th policy is represented by Lord Carnarvon, who did not conceal, at the last meeting of the Cabinet, his inclination, that Constantinople should be permanently acquired by Russia. These are the views of Lyddon, Freeman, and other priests and professors, who are now stirring in favor of the ' freedom of the Dardanelles.' T h e 7th policy is that of your Majesty, and which will be introduced, and enforced to his utmost by the Prime Minister: . . . 1 S 1 A t the Guildhall on L o r d M a y o r ' s D a y the premier g a v e no hint of the contemplated action of the cabinet.

True,

he did strike the heroic vein in stating that the ministry had 141

Lord Beaconsfield desired that the notification to Russia be sent.

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never swerved from its stand of conditional neutrality—a neutrality to be maintained solely until the interests of Britain were assailed or menaced. That policy had been decried by cosmopolitan critics as a selfish one. " My Lord Mayor, it is as selfish as patriotism." On the whole, however, his remarks, though punctuated with unstinted praise of the virtues of the Ottoman, were quite guarded and temperate.182 Hardy, Smith, and the new Lord Mayor, Thomas S. Owden, almost outstripped their party chief in the same type of panegyric upon the " gallant Turk," which refrain had become very popular among the denizens of the musichalls and caves of harmony.133 Musurus Pasha, sole foreign ambassador to make his appearance at the banquet, must have been greatly cheered by such a friendly atmosphere. Lord Beaconsfield's words were well received by all organs, which naturally interpreted them to their own liking. The philo-Turk Daily Telegraph regarded his language as " a spirited admonition to Russia." His peculiar rhetoric was considered " ironical " in spots by the Times which, however, was well " satisfied " that he had contented himself with a more or less " pleasant demonstration." Both the Daily News and the Daily Chronicle, London's two important Radical dailies, did the justice to the prime minister to note his " reasonable attitude." The Daily News was evidently taken aback by the lack of anything startling in his peroration since it felt it necessary to head its editorial with the warning: " B u t his reserve must not be mistaken." Leading provincial newspapers read as their metropolitan contemporaries. The anti-Beaconsfield and anti-Turk Leeds Mercury and Liverpool Daily Post had no sympathy with the general tenor of his remarks, yet they considered them fairly " moderate " and fairly " discreet." Thus, even the 18J

Accounts of speech are to be found in the journals of Nov. 10, 1877.

183

The Gallant Turk was the title of a popular song.

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Opposition journals held praise for the mildness of his speech, contrasting it favorably with the bellicose effusion of the previous year on the same festive occasion. 1 " One other speech of mid-November attracted considerable attention. The Rt. Hon. Wm. E. Forster, a "Front Bench" Liberal, speaking before the Anchor society on Colston Day at Bristol,188 found little fault with the conduct of the government since the outbreak of the war. He did, however, express as his present belief that Gladstone was perfectly right in charging the ministry with not having fully and effectively maintained the European Concert at the time war might have been averted. The Times roundly criticized Forster for not having voiced that belief the year previous,188 and added: We are much afraid that, when the history of English opinion during the last two years comes to be written, it will be put on record that nothing did more injury to the unity and strength of the national judgment in the later Autumn of 1876 than the speech delivered by Mr. Forster at Bradford after his return from the East: and that it was the hesitating way in which eminent Liberals recoiled from the practical consequences of the policy they professed to urge which encouraged those members of the Cabinet who wanted no pressure to be put on Turkey to reduce to inefficiency what was undertaken.137 Leader writers on the " Thunderer " might well have turned to their own columns of October, 1876, and they could very easily have blasted out the same charges of inconsistency and hesitancy against themselves.138 144

A l l extracts in above paragraph are from issues of Nov. 10, 1877.

185

On Nov. 13.

1 8 9 Forster had stated just the opposite and had drawn high praise from the Times for his stand. Supra, p. 114. 187

Times, Nov. 15, 1877.

138

Supra, pp. 113-18.

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Numerous changes were being made at the moment in the editorial staff of that leading English newspaper which as a result was gradually to become more ministerial in its general tone. Delane, who had long guided its policies, had set foot in Printing House Square in an official capacity for the last time on November 8. 1M William Stebbing, assistant editor, who had done most of Delane's work during the previous fall as the noted editor's health grew steadily worse, was also shortly to sever his connection with the Times. Delane was succeeded by Thomas Chenery, professor of Arabic at Oxford, who, however, had for many years been associated with the staff of the journal he was now to head. Hostile criticisms were later to be leveled at the distinguished scholar as he was more and more to support the Beaconsfield ministry, and the Times was to lose its characteristic independence. Those charges, though, could not be applied until the ensuing spring, when the " Thunderer " at least became more consistent. Startling news greeted the English public on the morning of November 19. A Reuter's despatch of four lines had announced the fall of Kars to the world. The great stronghold of Asia had been carried by storm the day previous. The announcement was not taken calmly by Britain. Numerous jingo organs called for war before it was too late. A bold course was the highest wisdom. They argued that England ought to strike while Plevna still held out. The Morning Post saw no logic in delay. Neutrality may have been ' wise ' while a number of people were still foolish enough to believe in the humanitarianism of Russia, and while a far larger number of people fancied that Turkey was a Power incapable of striking a blow for itself, and consequently of small account in international counterpoise; but to continue to belaud the ' wisdom ' of neutrality when it is clearly 136

Dasent, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 336.

Cf. also Cook, op. cit., p. 260.

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admitted in the same breath that neutrality means the abandonment of a valuable ally to a formidable and treacherous enemy, this is to push political folly quite too far. Surely the fall of Kars will awaken this country to a sense of the dangers of inaction.140 The general anxiety is more clearly shown by the somewhat frantic demands of the anti-Turkish journals f o r the inauguration of mediation. The Ottoman Power was insistently warned that not a finger would England lift on her behalf. She should sue for peace before the inevitable conquest of other of her territories occurred. Oddly, in the same breath, those organs cautioned Russia not to press her campaigns too far nor hope to exact harsh concessions through victory. The emperor had pledged that he sought no annexations. Those appeals betray the grave uneasiness of many that future events might yet force the hand of Britain. The clarion of victory had already been sounded by the Russian press which just as rapidly inaugurated a campaign of " compensation" for the sacrifices which that philanthropic Power was making in the interest of the enslaved Christians under the yoke of the Ottoman. The Novoye Vremya of St. Petersburg had announced: " W e have now taken K a r s for the third time; a thing that has cost us such sacrifices cannot be given back. Henceforth K a r s is a Russian town, a Russian fortress, and one of our firmest barriers in A s i a Minor." 141 In what was interpreted as an inspired article in the Seventy Vestnik (Northern Herald), Prince Wassiltchikoff, well-known author and president of the Slavonic committee at St. Petersburg, set forth the " compensation " which Russia had a right to demand at the conclusion of the war. A m o n g the demands was the 140

Morning Post, Nov. 19, 1877.

141

Reprinted in the Times, Nov. 28, 1877.

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275

cession of a section of Armenia including K a r s and Batoum. T h e Bessarabian riverain taken from her in 1856 was to be given back to remove that last relic of the humiliation of the Crimean campaign. T h e Ottoman fleet was to be surrendered to Russia. Naturally, the Straits were to be opened, but the surprising proviso was added that only Russian and Turkish ships of war should have the right of entrance. In addition, an autonomous Bulgaria, stretching south of the Balkans, must be created. M . Katkov in his Moscow Vedomosti and editors of other Pan-Slav organs were advocating similar concessions. 142 A s a result, probable conditions of peace immediately became the topic of the day in all English journals, which for the most part viewed the unofficial Muscovite terms with unfeigned alarm. T h e Standard, a recognized ministerial organ, considered talk of peace when such were to be its conditions as " an idle mockery." 148 T h e transfer o f the Turkish ironclads was ridiculed by the Times as " a play of fancy." English bondholders might just as seriously suggest the sale o f the fleet to the Powers in order to pay off a small portion of the Turkish debt. T h e ingenious assumption that the Black Sea was the czar's private lake was looked on as similarly " visionary." 1 4 4 T h e Daily Telegraph greeted the proposals with less sarcasm and more bombast. Bulgaria could not be turned into a " Muscovite outpost." T h e cession of Batoum and K a r s would give Russia the reputation of complete victory among Asiatics. T o E n g land it would mean " the loss of a safe overland railway 142

MacKenzie Wallace was the St. Petersburg correspondent of the Times at the moment. His letters to its columns frequently included extracts from the Russian press. The best statement of the proposals, however, is to be found in a pamphlet by O. K. (Kireeff), Is Russia Wrong? (London, 1877). J. A. Froude penned its preface, dated Dec. 143

Standard, Nov. 26, 1877.

144

Times, Nov. 23, 1877-

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route to India; the final gravitation of Persia to R u s s i a ; diminished influence in the G u l f , in the A r a b and frontier S t a t e s ; and g r o w i n g perils f o r Britain in India and C h i n a . " Batoum, " the natural emporium of future trade to the whole central and southern continent of A s i a , " especially, was a port " so commanding and valuable," that the Daily Telegraph knew not where to find " a geographical or political suggestion which could j u s t i f y her M a j e s t y ' s Government in countenancing the surrender of it to the uses of R u s s i a . " Bessarabia, though, might be tossed " as a sop to the pride o f St. Petersburg." T h a t change alone w a s not pronounced as " necessarily fatal " by the so-called English " organ of the sultan." 145 Radical journals, however, argued that some degree of compensation was due Russia. A c c o r d i n g to the Daily News, T u r k e y had turned loose the Circassians and K u r d s on the poor Armenians w h o had been massacred by the thousands, which made it " simply impossible" f o r the friends of the Porte to urge that the voice of England be raised for the restoration of Ottoman authority in those parts of A s i a where it had been overthrown. O n the other hand, that most staunch supporter of the Christian subject nationalities considered the czar's government definitely " bound " to ask f o r no accession of territory in Europe. It would, though, be free to insist upon a practically independent B u l g a r i a . " 8 Spectator's view was almost identical. Like the journalists w h o were trying to excite Great Britain to declare w a r f o r T u r k e y , it did not believe that the Russians would ever let g o their grasp upon A r m e n i a ; yet it could not see that English interests would thereby in any w a y be compromised. It was through E g y p t , not Armenia, that England must as Daily Telegraph, Nov. 26, 1877. «« Daily News, Nov. 26, 1877. 148

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a maritime Power defend India. Spectator could understand a war for Egypt, but to replace one of the most hopeful of Christian races inhabiting a province on the Black Sea under the most oppressive of all existing despotisms, at a cost of some hundreds of millions sterling and half the British army, seemed " the most villainous as well as the most childishly sentimental piece of quixotry ever seriously suggested." 147 Inversely, the Tory Observer could not comprehend the motives and feelings of Englishmen who rejoiced " in the triumph of unscrupulous ambition." 148 The misgivings of the jingoes led certain of their spokesmen to present a memorial to the foreign secretary 149 urging that the government depart from its policy of inaction and pursue a bolder course. Delegates from three organizations— the Society for the Protection of British Interests against Russian Aggression in the East, the Turkish Defence Association, and the Polish Society of the White Eagle—made up the deputation. Both the suggestions offered and their reception were marked by considerable vehemence of language. Strengthening the Mediterranean garrisons would merely be adopting " an attitude of menace," while sending the fleet to the Bosphorus might be difficult to construe as an act " compatible with the maintenance of neutrality" from which the government did not intend to deviate. Lord Derby also ridiculed other of their statements as idle fears. His " strong shower-bath of common sense " 150 drew the highest praise from the Times, the Daily News and the Daily Chronicle.™1 A n analysis of the division of opinion in the metropolitan daily press reveals the above organs as consistently antiTurkish. The Daily News and the Daily Chronicle were 147

Spectator, Nov. 24, 1877.

148

Observer, Nov. 25, 1877.

14B

On Nov. 28.

150

Daily News, Nov. 29, 1877.

1S1

Issues of Nov. 29, which also contain accounts of the speeches.

278

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frequently branded as pro-Russian. The Times was willing to place some faith in the professions of Russia. Foremost among its desires, however, was peace. It looked askance at any repetition of Crimea. The Morning Post, the Morning Advertiser, and the Daily Telegraph—described irreverently by a clergyman as the World, the Flesh, and the Devil 1 6 2 — together with the Standard, were all decidedly anti-Russian, shivering at every Muscovite victory. The Morning Advertiser, though, should not be termed Turkophil. Among the evening journals, the Echo was ultra-Radical and thus voiced views similar to those of its Gladstonian contemporaries ; the Evening Standard was but a pendant of its higher priced morning associate. The ministerial Globe was more mild in its expressions than the violently Russophobe Pall Mall Gazette. All had their counterparts in the provincial press. Despite the Turkish collapse in Armenia, England still pinned its fading hopes on winter and the capable generalship of Osman Pasha at Plevna. In the opinion of Archibald Forbes, however, expressed in a lecture before the Royal United Service Institute the last day of November, if Plevna fell before Christmas and weather conditions were favorable, there would be " n o serious obstacle to prevent the Russians from crossing the Balkans immediately afterwards by the Shipka Pass." 153 That belief and the fear of a resultant rapid march on Constantinople were soon to be generally entertained in the public mind. The tirades of English editors were, at least, exceedingly discomfiting to Her Majesty's military attache at the Rus1 5 2 The terms were very appropriate as the Morning Post was a journal of fashionable society, the Morning Advertiser of the licensed victuallers, and the Daily Telegraph was generally referred to as the " organ of the sultan." 153 Account of lecture in the Times, Dec. 3, 1877.

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sian imperial headquarters in Bulgaria. O f all the disagreeable ordeals which Colonel Wellesley had to endure, the worst, on account of its frequency, was La Lecture. As the siege of Plevna dragged its weary way, the long evenings after dinner became most monotonous and, unfortunately for him, the emperor devised a plan for rendering them less irksome. This consisted of reading aloud, in French translations, extracts relating to the war from the principal foreign newspapers. The plan was originally welcomed by everyone as a brilliant idea, but Wellesley was completely disillusioned the first evening. Reading from a large portfolio, Count Adlerberg commenced with extracts from the German press, which were rather inoffensive, then proceeded to the English papers, where there was such an array of denunciatory rhetoric that the military attache could have " sunk into the ground." " The faces of the audience were a study—a mixture of stupefaction at the audacity of such things being written about their sovereign, and of wonder as to what would be done to me as the representative of the country whose press could be guilty of such sacrilege." The possibility of hearing such attacks had evidently not entered into the head of the emperor but, after the first objectionable passage, he bade Count Adlerberg to continue. Subsequently, having recovered from his original surprise, he simply smiled and, giving Wellesley a bow after each particularly insulting passage, politely remarked, " Je vous remercie." Although by degrees the occupants of the mess-tent became accustomed to hearing English views of Russian policy, and generally received them with roars of contemptuous laughter, Colonel Wellesley relates that the emperor never forgot to acknowledge them by giving him the same little bow, as if he had penned the horrid things himself, whereas

280

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in reality he " was devoutly wishing that the editors, writers, and printers of the papers producing them had never been born." His Austrian colleague did not go scot-free, and to his great delight he had more than one opportunity of joining in the laughter caused by equally offensive remarks culled from Vienna newspapers. 1 " Plevna finally capitulated on December 10 after a valorous and obstinate defense. The Turks were obliged to venture a last desperate sortie or starve pitifully behind their earthworks. The attempt to pierce the enemy's lines failed and Osman Pasha was forced to surrender unconditionally. The eagle of victory had exultantly perched upon the banner of the Muscovite. How would Britain react to such an omen! 154 Wellesley, op. cit., pp. 215-18.

CHAPTER

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THE fall of Plevna intensified the alarm of the English public and occasioned immediate diplomatic action on the part of the government. It was feared that Britain would involuntarily be drawn into the struggle unless a cessation of hostilities were at once arranged. December and January, with the Muscovite host surging forward on the crest of victory, were to see an ever-waxing tension in AngloRussian relations. In the opinion of practically the entire press the long sought after opportunity for mediation was now at hand. T h e majority of organs strongly urged the Porte to seek peace without delay rather than to imperil the remainder of its empire in a last desperate c a s t T h e Scotsman could not contemplate the negotiations which would follow such a request with any degree of pleasure, but they would be " infinitely more pleasant than a continuance of the w a r . " 1 Moderation should be the role of Russia. Great Britain would gladly afford its good offices. Similar views were set forth by the Times and the Globe.2 More minatory language was employed by many journals. Britain must act, as her " interests " would be at stake if Russia crossed the Balkans. T h e Standard considered the day past for controversies upon the merits of the quarrel between the two foes. " Let the T u r k s be ever so incapable of ruling, let the Bulgarians be ever so fit for freedom, and 1

Scotsman, Dec. II, 1877.

2

Issues of Dec. 11, 1877. 281

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the Russians ever so qualified to bestow it, these questions must give way to another "—Constantinople must not be menaced! It was because the Standard would not have that question raised that it desired " an intervention " to bring about a peace between the combatants. 8 A n immediate demonstration to save the city of mosques was called for by the Pall Mall Gazette. W h a t " anchorage " had England? T h e Morning Advertiser sarcastically scored the timorous friends of T u r k e y who rejoiced in her victories and mourned over her misfortunes, " but who have at any rate given up fighting, except against Galekas and Jowakis." T h e Morning Post enjoined that hostilities cease instantly or that England declare war. 4 Such demands on the part of the press clearly indicated that the " conditional neutrality" of Britain was on the verge of becoming more conditional and less neutral. Diplomacy was the first resort of Her Majesty's Government. England had secured no pledge from Russia that the Turkish capital would not be occupied. 5 The foreign secretary was accordingly charged by the cabinet to express " their earnest hope " that, should the Russian armies advance to the south of the Balkans, no attempt would be made " to occupy Constantinople or the Dardanelles." Such an occupation, " even though it should be of a temporary character and for military purposes only," would be " most desirable to avoid." I f such an occupation appeared imminent, public feeling in England, founded on a just appreciation of the consequences to be apprehended, " might call for measures of precaution " on the part of Her Majesty's Government from which they had hitherto felt justified in abstaining. In making the com« Standard, Dec. ia, 1877. •Issues of Dec. 11, 1877. s Prince Gortchakoff had solely given the assurance that " acquisition " of Constantinople was excluded from the views of the czar. Supra, p. 244.

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munciation they thought it right to add that they would be willing, as they had been from the first, to avail themselves of any suitable occasion that might present itself for assisting in the work of mediation and in the restoration of peace. That memorandum was put into the hands of Count Schouvaloff on December 13.® Prince Gortchakoff's reply was received three days later. It was friendly but " left the point where it was." 7 Russia reserved to itself " that full liberty of action which is the right of every belligerent." In turn, the czar's chancellor requested a clearer definition of the English interests likely to be affected by a Russian advance.8 There the matter hung for almost a month, awaiting the expected victories south of the Balkans. In the meantime a Turkish circular note had been addressed to the Powers inviting their good offices and offering the proposals of the Constantinople Conference as a basis of settlement.9 It soon became evident that the majority of the Powers thus addressed could not usefully comply with the request and the definite refusal of the German emperor, on the 16th, 10 to accede to the sultan's plea " rendered it impracticable " 1 1 at the moment. Cabinet meetings were being held regularly, commencing the 14th. Stormy controversies concerning the immediate steps to be taken and more particularly over the policy to be pursued in the event of future contingencies were engaged 6

Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 3, no. 1. Northcote in the Commons, Jan. 28, 1878. Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, P- SSI. 8 Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 3, no. 2. 8 It was dated Dec. 12, 1877. For the full circular ef. House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 2, no. 1. 10 Ibid., Turkey # 2, no. 3. 11 Northcote in the Commons, Jan. 17, 1878. Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, P- 947

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in. 12 Several threatened resignations, including one of a rather theatrical nature by Lord Beaconsfield, failed to materialize. Harmony, however, was never thereafter to be fully restored. O n the 18th it was definitely decided that Parliament should be summoned earlier than usual. T h e date for its meeting was fixed upon as January 17 although the premier had desired an even earlier opening. T h a t step was shortly thereafter officially announced in a supplement to the London Gazette of December 22. It was also determined to ask Parliament for a Vote of Credit looking toward an increase of forces, and to continue their efforts to initiate negotiations of peace. The British press had at all times quite definite knowledge o f every step taken or contemplated by Her Majesty's Government and actively commented thereon in characteristic vein. T h e Times played its usal role of attempting to allay the fears of the public lest England be drawn into the struggle. Nothing but " supreme necessity " could j u s t i f y England " in taking any steps which might involve forcible interposition," and nothing but " excitement" could suggest " that any such necessity " had as yet arisen or could reasonably be expected to arise. 18 Friendly interposition was highly desirable but it was " imperative " that the cabinet should not accompany its interposition " with menace." Such being the case, the Times could not but " r e g r e t " the " rumours of Ministerial projects and Ministerial dissensions " which prevailed at the moment. 1 * In its columns on the 19th its editor curtly announced that he had reason to believe that Parliament would meet on the 17th of January. Perusal of its leading articles of the following week leads one to draw the conclusion that the " Thunderer " consid12

Buckle, op. cit., pp. 200-207, gives a detailed account of the wrangling.

18

Times, Dec. 14, 1877.

" Ibid., Dec. 18, 1877.

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ered the step unfortunate, an empty demonstration, liable to be misconstrued, and fraught with the danger that the Turks might be encouraged to further resistance deluded by the hope that England intended coming to their aid. Curiously, less objection to the measure was offered by the Daily News than by its morning competitor. That pro-Russian journal was of opinion that, as public deliberation ordinarily served as a check on warlike policy, the schemes of the war party would at least " have to go through a far heavier ordeal when Parliament was sitting than while it was in recess." 15 The majority of organs warmly applauded the move and conjectured on the motives of the cabinet in taking it. The ministerial Standard flatly asserted that a " vote of money " would be asked in order to defray the expenses of such an increase of armament as the altered state of the Eastern Question required.18 Pall Mall interpreted it as " a warning " that England did not propose to allow the three emperors to dispose of " her own future." 17 Reports of the indifference of Germany and Austria toward the English desire for immediate mediation occasioned that and other bitter attacks against the supposed diplomatic accord of the Northern Powers. The fear was again growing that England was isolated. Consequently, the step was generally regarded as a highly necessary precaution, aimed solely toward protecting Britain's priceless imperial interests. Similar explanations accompanied by abuse and patriotic chicanery were set forth in practically all journals supporting the government. A mass of speculation was provoked by the general expectancy that a vote of credit would be demanded and many a fanciful design was attributed to the premier as to its 15

Daily News, Dec. 19, 1877.

18

Standard, Dec. 19, 1877.

17

Pall Mall Gazette, Dec. 19, 1877.

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purpose. Among the rumors in circulation were that war was to be declared, an ultimatum was to be sent to Russia, Gallipoli was to be occupied, troops were to be sent from Malta to Constantinople, the British fleet was to enter the Bosphorus, and Lord Beaconsfield contemplated buying the Turkish ironclads, annexing Crete and seizing Egypt. The Whitehall Review was in possession of official information that Queen Victoria had counseled and induced her ministry to lay before Parliament the proposal " to purchase from Turkey the Suzerainty of Egypt for England." The conditions and terms of that purchase had already been discussed with and accepted by both the sultan and the khédive. Whitehall contended that it would be " far cheaper for the country " to lay out its money in that way than to expend English blood and a far larger amount of treasure in driving the Russian out of Asia. Such a purchase would be a splendid coup as it would aid the Porte with the necessary millions to continue its struggle with the Muscovite and would secure to Britain the road to India.18 In his own inimitable fashion, " Mr. Punch " assembled a remarkable assortment of reasons for calling Her Majesty's representatives into council at such an early date, but stopped short of divulging the authentic grounds of the cabinet: Because England may find it necessary forthwith to despatch an ultimatum to Russia. Because England is anxious to utter a distinct reiteration of her neutral policy. Because England purposes the immediate annexation of Egypt. Because England wishes to reassure the KHEDIVE against reported intentions of aggression on his realm. . . . Because Austria has expressed her determination to go hand and glove with England. 18

Whitehall Review, Dec. 22, 1877. It was issued for sale on the 21st.

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Because Austria has revealed herself as the uncompromising ally of Russia. Because India is in danger. Because it is necessary to prove that India was never safer than at the present time. Because it will annoy Prince BISMARCK. Because it will relieve Prince BISMARCK of an overwhelming sense of responsibility . . . 18 Evidences of the widespread public credence placed in such fantastic rumors were not lacking. Considerable editorial space was devoted by the more sober journals to branding the tales as incredible and mischievous. Speculators bought heavily of E g y p t i a n bonds, which experienced a sharp rise. Imperialistic sentiment flowed freely. Whitehall's romance afforded the Spectator another opportunity to restate its well known view. 2 0 " O u r position f r o m the beginning has been that England ought to assist Russia in terminating the dominion of the Ottoman caste, . . . and we have no more reluctance to terminate it in E g y p t than in Bosnia, or A r menia, or Constantinople." England's possession of the valley of the Nile " would be for the benefit of the inhabitants, of civilisation, and o f the great permanent interests of humanity." Britain's " i n t e r e s t " was Cairo, not Constantinople, " and to Cairo we ought to g o . " 21 H o w e v e r , the " A s i a n mystery " was not to be solved by such outbursts of visionary mania. Queen V i c t o r i a ' s visit to the country residence of L o r d Beaconsfield at Hughenden on the 15th had probably occasioned considerable of the gossip centering around her name. Such a signal mark o f the royal f a v o r had thereto19

Punch, Jan. Parliament."

5,

1878,

20

Supra, pp. 232-33.

21

Spectator, Dec. 22, 1877-

" Reasons

for

the

Early

Meeting

of

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fore been bestowed on only two of her premiers, Lord Melbourne and Sir Robert Peel, and it had been over a generation since Peel had been thus honored. The afternoon têteà-tête was rightly interpreted by organs supporting the premier as a demonstration of the Queen's approval of Lord Beaconsfield's views on the Eastern Question. Her Majesty held strong opinions and her prime minister shared them. While no direct criticism of Her Majesty was expressed, Liberal and Radical journals took pains to explain away the interpretation of sympathy with the reckless projects of her premier. The ultra-Radical Echo frankly termed the royal call " ill-timed." Its chief shafts were, however, directed against the war scribes and orators who had utilized the visit in an attempt to coerce public opinion by representing that Her Majesty was inimical to Russia and friendly to Turkey. Such " conjuring with the Queen's name must cease." 22 The effect of the circular had not been encouraging to the Porte as the Powers had considered mediation on their part to be inadvisable. Her Majesty's Government was, however, most unwilling merely to let affairs take their course. The cabinet, therefore, utilized the note as a point of departure and instructed Ambassador Layard, on December 24, to ask if the Turkish ministry wished England, acting alone, to use her good offices to communicate its desire for peace to Russia. 23 In his interview with the grand vizier it developed that the Turkish ambassador in London had already been directed to request English mediation.24 On making the appeal, Musurus Pasha was informed by Lord Derby that England must decline to assume the rôle of mediator, but she would gladly apprise the czar of the Porte's willing22

Echo, Dec. 22, 1877.

24

Sessional

24

Ibid., T u r k e y # 2, no. 8.

Papers,

1878, vol. l x x x i , T u r k e y # 2, no. 6. T h e wires had crossed.

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ness to conclude peace. The offer was accepted. Accordingly, Lord Loftus was charged by the foreign secretary to ascertain if Russia were disposed to entertain peace overtures and to state her terms of peace.25 Prince Gortchakoff received the British ambassador on the 29th, informing him that the Porte must address itself directly to the imperial commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia, who would state the conditions on which an armistice could be granted.28 The Queen's government remonstrated with that reply,27 but nevertheless advised the Turkish ministry to open direct communications with the Muscovite headquarters, which step was subsequently to be taken. English journals were cognizant of the unabated activity of the foreign office in the latter days of December. They consequently stressed its desire that the czar's government receive the overtures of England favorably and frankly formulate the conditions upon which it was prepared to make peace. The Daily Telegraph warned that a great Power deciding to recommend peace could not be answered with " empty diplomatic phrases." Similar menace was voiced by the Morning Advertiser. " I f Russia meets our offers with a rebuff, or with extravagant claims, then we shall have committed ourselves too far to recede with honour, and having unmasked the conspiracy against the Turkish Empire and British interests, we must signify our intention to defeat it." Leading articles in the Morning Post and the Standard expressed the same thought.28 Immediately following the rejection of the English tender, those same shrieking extremists leveled lengthy diatribes at the Muscovite Power. In the opinion of the Daily Tele25

On Dec. 27. Ibid., Turkey # 2 , no. 11. Ibid., Turkey # 2, no. 15. 27 Ibid., Turkey # 2, no. 16. 38 All journals cited in above paragraph are issues of Dec. 31, 1877. 28

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graph Her Majesty's Government had been " abruptly repulsed." Prince Gortchakoff's reply was an " absolute a f f r o n t " to the nation. England had been contemptuously answered " after the fashion of Gengis Khan or Genseric." Pall Mall pursued different tactics in order to arouse the public. Its editor jibed bitterly at the lack of national spirit which could receive such an amazing insult so mutely. The Turks might just as well throw themselves into the arms of Russia. " In these days honour is not supposed to concern Englishmen." Other journals saw no rebuff even though the answer was considered unwelcome. The Times attempted to smooth over the situation and recommended that Turkey open the direct negotiations suggested in order to obtain the settlement for which she was so desirous.2* Cabinet dissensions broke out afresh when the colonial secretary felt impelled to stray from the subject of the Kaffir War in an address to a deputation of South African merchants 30 and took it upon himself 81 to comment emphatically upon the more pressing subject of the day. Lord Carnarvon could not see that " any material change in the situation " had been brought about by the fall of Plevna or by more recent events to cause England to swerve from her policy of strict neutrality. He put aside as entirely unreasonable the idea that the Russian reply to Lord Derby's peace tender conveyed " any affront or insult" to England. It was his hope that the English public would not lash itself up " into a nervous apprehension of so-called British honour and British interests." Nobody, remarked the colonial secretary, could be " insane enough " to desire a repetition of the 29

Ibid., Jan. 1, 1878.

»« O n Jan. 2, 1878. 8 1 L o r d Carnarvon had not consulted his colleagues. Cf. Marquis of Zetland, The Letters of Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield and Lady Bradford, vol. ii, p. 197.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

WAR, SECOND

PHASE

2gi

Crimean campaign.82 Carnarvon's extemporaneous utterance evoked the gravest censure of his chief in the cabinet meeting of the ensuing day. The premier thought his expressions " worthy of Gladstone." The colonial secretary thereupon proffered his resignation but later withdrew it on the persuasion of other members of the ministry, who feared the injurious effect of his secession upon the country." The summoning of Parliament had taken the Liberal party leaders by surprise but they rapidly swung into action to combat the expected rash projects contemplated by the ministry, or rather by Lord Beaconsfield. The premier was, almost to the exclusion of other members of the cabinet, to be made the target of Opposition attack. A s might be expected, Gladstone was among the first to desire that steps be taken " to obtain a declaration of national opinion." 34 A t the same time, demonstrations of protest against the government departing from its policy of strict neutrality were called for by the committee of the National Federation of Liberal Associations. Other organizations issued similar pleas. On Christmas Eve an earnest appeal for peace was sent forth from the headquarters of the Peace Society in London, signed by its president, Henry Pease. The society exhorted all friends of peace to use their influence in demanding that Britain remain on the path of strict neutrality. It urged that the public voice manifest itself through public meetings, petitions to Parliament, memorials to the Queen, and pressure on individual members of Parliament by their constituents. Peace was the greatest of British interests. Several days 82

Account of speech in the Times, Jan. 3, 1878.

Cf. Buckle, op. cit., pp. 213-15, for accounts of cabinet meetings held during the early part of January. 88

84

24.

Letter to the Sheffield Liberal Association, dated Hawarden, Dec. Reprinted in the Times, Dec. 29, 1877.

BRITAIN

29 2

AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

later the Eastern Question Association advocated vigilance.

similar

Its committee, headed by the duke o f

West-

minster and L o r d Shaftesbury, deplored the summoning of Parliament as an unexplained proceeding begetting the suspicion of a change of purpose on the part of the government and having the effect o f agitating the country.

Evidences

of the public will were imperative, lest the ministry embark the nation on enterprises which might lead to war. A s a result of those promptings, chambers of commerce, t o w n councils, committees o f numerous organizations, and public meetings in more than one hundred and fifty places, 33 g a v e expression during the next three weeks to the feeling of that section of the nation which dreaded the prospect of war.

The

ministerial

press,

which

along

with

Lord

Beaconsfield would drag E n g l a n d into conflict, came in f o r its share of abuse.

Bodies in the midlands and the north o f

England, in particular, responded actively with resolutions of every description.

T h o s e mercantile communities feared

that a period of continued uncertainty would tend to prolong indefinitely nation.

the

industrial

stagnation

which

gripped

the

In its manifesto, the National R e f o r m U n i o n con-

sidered the trade depression as sufficiently disastrous without courting the cost and misery of a war. terests were peace, retrenchment and reform. chester also came the protest of tration

Association.

England's inFrom Man-

the International

Nonconformist

ministers

Arbi-

engaged

themselves in f o r m i n g vigilance committees in the various centers.

T o w n gatherings were held in practically every

Radical stronghold.

T h e B i r m i n g h a m meeting drew

the

most press comment because of the prominence of the speakers.

Bright, as usual, chanted peace, whereas his younger

associate, Chamberlain, even more vigorously decried the 8 5 J. E. Ellis, The Sequence (Nottingham, 1878), p. 28.

of

Events

in the Eastern

Question

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

WAR, SECOND PHASE

293

efforts of Lord Beaconsfield " to juggle " England into the Eastern war.86 In London the former atrocitarians, spurred on by seeming failure, redoubled their activities. Canon Liddon aided in the preparation of a declaration for neutrality to be signed by the clergy. The clerical address had affixed to it the signatures of the Rev. Wm. Denton, Dr. Pusey and Dr. E . A. Abbot, head-master of the City of London School, along with those of other prominent churchmen. A London Vigilance committee was selected of leading representatives of various denominations of Nonconformists at a meeting in which Samuel Morley, M.P., Dr. Allon, Dr. Raleigh, and J . G. Rogers took part in the discussions. Copies of the resolutions adopted were to be forwarded to every congregation of Nonconformists throughout the country. After a conference of delegates of various Radical and Liberal workingmen's clubs held in the offices of the Labour representation league, a Workingmen's neutrality committee was formed, which resolved to hold a huge demonstration in Exeter-hall on the eve of the assembling of Parliament. Instrumental in its creation were Henry Broadhurst, a power in the London Workingmen's committee, and F. W. Campin, president of the Labour representation league. The cooperation of the Eastern Question Association was sought in order to insure its success. The ever growing list of committees may well be terminated with the " Committee in favour of the free navigation of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus," viz. —Mr. Freeman, Canon Liddon, Dr. Humphrey Sandwith, and the Hon. Auberon Herbert, brother to Lord Carnarvon. They issued the following appeal for signature: " We, the undersigned, in view of possible misunderstandings with 86 On January 12, 1878. in the journals of the 14th.

Accounts of the speeches are to be found

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

Russia concerning the neutralization of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, wish to declare publicly that we think that such neutralization would be a benefit to the world at large." " Friendly relations with Russia ought to be encouraged. The circular gained a large number of adhesions, among them John Morley, Thomas Carlyle, Arthur Arnold, Robert Browning, J. A . Froude, Thorold Rogers, Leonard Courtney, and Sir Charles Trevelyan. The sponsors called a meeting at Willis's Rooms for the afternoon of the 16th, when a resolution in favor of opening the Straits to the vessels of all nations was carried amid confusion. In commenting on the folly of such an act, Financial Opinion sarcastically recalled an earlier quip of a prominent M. P. that: " if Piccadilly were a canal we might as well ask that the enemy's men-of-war should have the right to sail up and down it at pleasure." 88 Exeter-hall was jammed with workingmen that same evening " to protest against England being dragged into war." On the platform were A . J. Mundella, M. P., who presided, E. F. Leveson-Gower, M. P., Broadhurst, Campin, Auberon Herbert, Arthur Arnold, Rev. Malcolm MacColl, and Rev. Newman Hall. A n overflow meeting was attempted in Trafalgar-square. Members of the " Neutrality " party took possession of the platform but were dislodged by a numerous Turkophil contingent just come from Exeter-hall which they had failed to storm. Reinforcements enabled the " Peace " speakers to carry on their proceedings in dumb show for a time, but eventually the gathering broke up in turmoil.38 Although Opposition and neutrality demonstrations greatly outnumbered those held under Conservative auspices " Quoted in the Times, Jan. 7, 1878. «8 Financial Opinion, Jan. 17, 1878. 88

Accounts of the meetings can be found in the Times, Jan. 17, 1878.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

WAR, SECOND PHASE

295

during the weeks prior to the assembling of Parliament, the conclusion should not be drawn that they represented the true pulse of the nation. That pulse was decidedly anti-Russian and became more intensely so as January wore on. The general hostility to the Muscovite Power long evinced by the majority of English journals had increased in tempo to such an extent that the charge leveled against them of inciting to war was not entirely unfounded. Numerous organs had truly set up a veritable war-chant The white-gloved Pall Mall and the " Daily Turkophil " were the worst offenders. Russia was being daily denounced as England's vindictive and unresting enemy, a grasping and hypocritical Power. Such extraordinarily bitter epithets were not reserved for the despotism of the North alone. The same slurs of cant and hypocrisy, with the added accusation of lack of patriotism, were applied to those whose only crime was that they wished to prevent their countrymen from engaging in a repetition of Crimea. The public was rapidly being whipped up into a state of excitement as the result of having the theme song, " British interests," constantly dinned into their ears by the press and overzealous jingoes. Even the holiday programs arranged for the enjoyment of Londoners were interspersed with allusions pertinent to and incidents drawn from the topic of the day. At the Surrey theatre, Mr. Richard Whittington and his famous grimalkin furnished the material for entertainment. It is not, however, on record that during either of Dick Whittington's occupancies of the lord mayoral chair the Russian and Turkish peoples were at close grips, or that the furor between Lord Beaconsfield and his political opponents created much stir in the municipal world over whose destinies he presided. Sanger's circus was brought to a close with a huge military spectacle entitled the " Bombardment and Fall of Plevna." The public taste had been

296

BRITAIN AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

judged well at Madame Tussaud's, where the most recent additions to the " chamber of historic personages " included the emperor and empress of Russia, the former " as on the field of battle," the Grand Dukes Michael and Nicholas, the sultan, Osman Pasha and Hobart Pasha. The writer found it curious that Shefket Pasha had not been granted a niche in the " chamber of horrors." A pantomine presented at the Aquarium theatre, entitled in part " A F r o g He Would a Wooing G o , " gave the shifting mob a more favorable opportunity for voicing their sentiments. During the course of the performance a number of children dressed as French soldiers were warmly cheered as they marched on to the stage; they were followed by unmistakable Russian troops, who were received with a storm o f hisses. T h e youthful Turkish warriors were greeted with loud applause, which swelled into universal " hurrahs " when the British Grenadiers and Jack Tars marched in playing the strains of Macdermott's catchy ballad: W e don't want to fight! But, by Jingo, if we d o — We've got the ships, We've got the men, We've got the money too! T h e words were sung by a gaily decorated field-marshal of some three years of age, who drew and flourished his sword in a most valiant and inspiring manner. T h e number was tumultuously encored. The ballad was just attaining its full popularity and during the next few months was to be invoked so frequently as virtually to replace the national anthem. 40 40 Spectator, April 13, 1878, contains an article on the war songs which took hold on the public caprice. Justin McCarthy states that the term " Jingo " was first applied as one of ridicule and reproach but was later adopted by chivalrous jingoes as a name of pride. Cf. Justin McCarthy, History of Our Own Times (London, 1880), vol. iv, pp. 472-73.

THE RUSS0-TURK1SH

WAR, SECOND PHASE

297

It was a rather curious fact that the music-halls and the west-end clubs were akin in their Turkophilishness. Among the journals representing those establishments, the Era, chronicle of the enterprises of " the profession," Vanity Fair, the Whitehall Review, London, and the Queen were all inspired by Russophobia. On the other hand, the keen and gossipy World, Labouchere's satirical Truth, and Henry Lucy's smart Mayfair were all oppositely inclined. They and the sprightly little Entr'acte consistently denounced the parrot-cry of Macdermott's refrain. Organs of " the four million " engaged in a similar tilt of opinions. Among the penny papers moulding the popular will, Ashton Dilke's Weekly Dispatch, the Weekly Times, and Reynolds's Weekly Newspaper, all abused the Crescent in forcibly written articles in which rhetoric and sentiment were more frequently employed than logic. Inversely, Lloyd's Weekly London Newspaper, by far the most widely circulated of the ilk appealing to the multitude on the principles of quantity and cheapness, vehemently distrusted the " Bear " and staunchly approved of the foreign policy of the ministry. Those radical journals vied with each other for the favor of the reading public on the Sabbath. For those who preferred a pictorial record Arthur Locker's Graphic exposed Russia, whereas the Illustrated London News along with its cheaper adjunct, the Penny Illustrated Paper, denuded the Turk. The comics indulged in more or less indiscriminate satire, yet their leanings were evident. Tom Taylor's Punch held Liberal tendencies while Judy remained Conservative.41 Under their respective editors, William Sawyer and Henry Sampson, Funny Folks and Fun, less expensive sheets, had long directed their buffoonery against " Dizzy" and the Ottoman, but Fun was just going through the throes of a 41

Charles Ross was its editor.

298

BRITAIN

AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

turncoat and emerged anti-Muscovite.42 A particularly ghastly effort of the transition period caricatured the czar as a demon with bayonets for finger-nails, and the eagle on his breast clutching a book of hymns in one talon. Britannia, clad in armor rendered indistinct because of her shield, was depicted as advancing toward him with olive branch extended. The caption read : " The Demon of Slaughter declines to disappear at the bidding of Britannia, the Spirit of Peace." " Anti-Russian demonstrations were being held. Maltman Barry occupied himself in organizing meetings of workers in opposition to those of the Neutrality committee. A T r a f algar-square gathering of December 29 resulted in violence as did the later Exeter-hall episode.44 Barry was chairman of the " National Society for the Resistance of Russian A g gression and the Protection of British Interests in the East." A large audience of the élite of London roundly sanctioned the strictures of Algernon Borthwick, the proprietor of the Morning Post, at St. James's hall on January 10. Both the lecturer and the duke of Sutherland, who presided, denounced Gladstone as a " Russian agent " in the category of Ignatieff. It seemed that the noble duke was well acquainted with agents of their type, as, according to his own admission, he had " met " the species " in England, in Egypt, in India," in fact, " all over the world." If he might make a vulgar comparison, they were very like snakes licking their victims before swallowing them. Among others on the platform were the earl of Abergavenny, Sir Charles Russell, and Mr. A . D. W . R. Baillie Cochrane.45 4 2 Sampson severed his connection with Fun in February rather than prove untrue to his Radical convictions. Certain of his chief contributors quit with him.

« Fun, Jan. 9, 1878.

** Supra, p. 294.

From accounts of the meeting in the Morning Post, Jan. 11, 1878, and Financial Opinion, Jan. 17, 1878. Cf. also Reginald Lucas, Lord Glenesk and the "Morning Post" (New Y o r k , 1910), pp. 261-62. 45

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

WAR, SECOND PHASE

299

The rank of Conservative speakers was also fairly active in expounding the ministerial policy and maligning the Opposition agitation. Patriotic claptrap flowed glibly. At their annual dinner the Licensed Victuallers of Brierley Hill were served with the specious wish of Stavely Hill, Q. C., that the " whole world " were " a strait through which England could prevent any vessel of war passing, so that the great militarism and navyism of the world, which opposed industry and devoted so many human lives to destruction, might be put down." " Sir Henry Drummond Wolff informed the Volunteers of Christchurch, his constituents, that he was no alarmist but, if war were to be avoided, " the best way was to be prepared for it." If war were then " forced " upon England she would be ready to do " her duty, and fight for her hearths, homes and prosperity." 47 Complete confidence in the government was expressed by the " London and Westminster Working Men's Constitutional Association " which met at the Westminster Palace hotel on the 14th. Sir Charles Russell was in the chair and supporting him were Captain Pim, Baron Henry de Worms, Anderson Rose, and Coates. The report of its executive committee scathingly condemned the " un-English conduct of the Radical Party." The nation was heartily sick of the " huge f r a u d " perpetrated under the " disguise of religion and humanity." However desirous the nation might be for the preservation of peace, the moment that could be purchased only by the sacrifice of " national honour," it would rally to the defense of the " just rights " of Great Britain.48 A typically Irish view prevailed in the land of Home Rule. The Constitutional Club, principal Conservative society in the country, held its high festival in Dublin on the 7th. Sir 46

Account of speech in the Times, Jan. 7, 1878.

" Ibid., Jan. 9, 1878. 48

Account of the proceedings in the Times, Jan. 15, 1878.

3°°

BRITAIN

AND

THE

BALKAN

CRISIS

Arthur Guinness presided. Staunch admiration for the aggressive stand of Lord Beaconsfield was expressed by G. W . Maunsell, who felt that the time might come when the Russian policy of " plunder and spoliation " would cause England to interfere. Mr. Gamble, Q. C., eulogized the bravery of the Turks. The Hon. David Plunket advocated war if the " paramount interests " of Britain were threatened.49 The war-at-any-price cohorts were joined by Joseph Biggar at Greenoch. It seemed to him that the present prospect of England was that she would entirely cease as a Power unless she shortly proved what she could do by entering into a contest. " Other nations would soon begin to think she could not defend herself if she did not fight." 50 Henry Owen Lewis bordered on the vulgar in addressing his constituents at Carlow. Russia was a " barbarian and hypocritical Power " whose hands dripped with the blood of unhappy Poles, Latins, and Uniate Greeks. " Russian Christianity was a sham, her humanity a mockery, her civilization a whited sepulchre, her clergy a body of degraded and drunken sots. . . ." A s if that were not sufficient to move his Catholic audience, the ranting Irishman yet invoked the " direct antagonism " of Russian to British interests." Other prominent individuals, without close party affiliations, betrayed their anti-Russian emotions and attempted to sway the public. Tennyson, the poet laureate, " hated R u s s i a " 8 2 as he abhorred all despotisms. A pamphlet, England's Policy and Peril,63 marked another vehement at49

Account in the Times, Jan. 9, 1878.

50

Account of speech in the Times, Jan. 10, 1878.

81

Ibid., Jan. 12, 1878.

5 3 O. K . ( K i r e e f f ) , Is Russia Wrong? (London, 1877), p. 82, a pamphlet with a preface by J. A . Froude which had just made its appearance. M A l f r e d Austin, England's Policy and Peril: a letter to the Earl of Beaconsfield (London, 1877), published in late December.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

WAR, SECOND

PHASE

301

tack on the Muscovite Power by Alfred Austin, later rewarded by Victoria with the post of honor held by his fellow poet. Swinburne had turned from pamphlet writing to dashing off sonnets furiously bitter against the " White Czar." The war had rolled to the south of the Balkans. The hope held in English circles that the Russians would have an arduous task in forcing the second line of Turkish defense—that of the Balkan passes—had not materialized. Even with that accomplished, it had been thought doubtful by many that the czar's forces could rapidly push south as a winter campaign was scarcely deemed practicable. The Turks, however, fell back with little show of resistance. General Gourko crossed the Etropol Balkans and took Sofia on the 3d of January with the loss of but a handful of men. Within a week the egress of Shipka and the entire Turkish force which had long held Radetzky in check in that pass were in Muscovite hands. The brilliant feat was terminated on the 9th, following the silently skilful manoeuvring and concerted onslaught of the Russian divisions under Prince Mirsky, Skobeleff, and Radetzky. The Montenegrins took Antivari on the 10th while the Serbians, who had flagrantly joined in the conflict several days after the fall of Plevna, occupied Nish. The army of Suleiman Pasha still blocked the further advance of the Muscovite horde, but all signs pointed to the general anarchy which prevailed and it almost seemed a conjecture as to whether the Turks or the Russians would first reach Adrianople. The British government had continued diplomatic exchanges in its effort to bring about a speedy close to the strife. The Porte had been advised to open direct communications with the imperial commanders as Russia desired." That step was not taken until the day of the Shipka disaster when a wire was addressed to the Grand Duke Nich54

Supra, p. 289.

302

BRITAIN

AND THE BALKAN

CRISIS

olas at Lovcha requesting an armistice, which application met with a decided rebuff. Instructions had not been received from S t Petersburg. That surprising intelligence reached the foreign office on the following day. 58 Lord Derby immediately instructed L o r d L o f t u s to ascertain the cause as he had previously been informed that the conditions had been despatched. The answer given to the inquiry was to the effect that the necessary instructions had been despatched, as earlier stated, a week before, but they had been considered of too serious importance to be confided to the telegraph and had therefore been sent by special messengers. I t might take eight or ten days for them to arrive at army headquarters in Europe and possibly fifteen days f o r A s i a . " In the meantime, on the ioth, the Grand Duke Nicholas had abruptly informed the Porte that there could not, " at this moment," be any question of an armistice " without bases of peace." That reply to the Turkish advances was also known by the English foreign secretary on January n . " Under the above circumstances, it is not surprising that H e r Majesty's Government thought the czar's ministers to be deliberately delaying the possibility of negotiations in order to grant time to their generals to seize coveted and strategical places of vantage. Distracted cabinet councils ensued. The desirability of sending the fleet through the Dardanelles and forces to Gallipoli, the sultan permitting, was discussed on the 12th but no decision was reached. From council-chamber, however, were sent two important messages. Lord L o f t u s was 56

Layard to Derby, House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 2, no. 29. 69 Loftus to Derby, dated and received Jan. n . Turkey # 2 , no. 35. Cf. also Northcote in House of Commons, Jan. 17, 1878. Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, p. 100. 87

Turkey # 2, no. 32.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

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instructed to reopen his conversation with Prince Gortchakoff on the subject of Constantinople and the Dardanelles." He was to inform the Russian chancellor that " any operations tending to place the passage of the Dardanelles under the control of Russia would be an impediment to proper consideration of terms of the final settlement between Russia and Turkey," and he was to request an assurance that no Russian force would be sent to the peninsula of Gallipoli.68 In turn, Layard was to advise the Porte to inquire of Nicholas " the nature of the conditions demanded " as the bases of peace.90 The grand duke's reply to that query was delivered on the 13th. The bases of peace would be communicated " to a person sent to him with full powers to accept them, and to conclude thereupon the principles of an armistice," which would afterwards be carried out. On the same day a prolonged council of ministers was held in Constantinople at which Server Pasha and Namyk Pasha were designated to negotiate with Nicholas at Kezanlik." 1 The fear that Russia and Turkey might conclude a separate peace and refuse to submit its terms to the judgment of Europe led Her Majesty's Government to bring to the attention of Prince Gortchakoff that no modification of the existing treaties of 1856 and 1871 could be regarded as valid without the assent of all the signatory Powers.82 A rather misplaced direct plea for peace was naturally resented at the northern court. Determined to fulfil the 88

Supra, pp. 282-83.

59

Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 3, no. 3. Cf. also Northcote in the Commons, Jan. 28, 1878. Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, p. 552. 60 Turkey # 2, no. 37. 51 Layard to Derby. Turkey # 2, no. 40. 62

Derby to Loftus, dated Jan. 14, and communicated on the 15th. Turkey # 3, no. 6.

304

BRITAIN

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sultan's personal appeal for Her Majesty's mediation, Queen Victoria, with the approval of the cabinet, expressed her hope to the Czar Alexander that he would " accelerate the negotiations for the conclusion of an armistice." 83 The Russian sovereign's reply was somewhat sarcastic and quite c u r t — " rude " and " vulgar " in the opinions of the Queen and L o r d Beaconsfield. 84 Victoria had given better expression to her pent-up emotions only a few days before. She had written her premier that the Queen was " really distressed " at the " low tone " which she considered the nation inclined to hold. She could not remain the sovereign of a country that was " letting itself down to kiss the feet of the great barbarians, the retarders of all liberty and civilisation that exists. . . . Oh, if the Queen were a man, she would like to g o and give those Russians, whose word one cannot believe, such a beating! " In addition, Victoria was " utterly ashamed " of her ministers, among whom Lord Derby was termed " the real misfortune." 65 T h e cabinet renewed its discussions on the 15th relative to the sending of the fleet. It was agreed that orders should be given, whereupon Lord Carnarvon tendered his resignation subject to its sailing. 89 The foreign secretary, as well, strongly objected to the proposed step.87 A n attempt was to be made to draw Austria into association with England in entering the Dardanelles. Subsequent telegrams induced a change of purpose on the very next day and the 6 3 The wire was dated Jan. 14 and its answer arrived the next day. Northcote announced the contents in the House of Commons on the 22d. Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, p. 321. M

Buckle, op. cit., p. 220.

Victoria to Beaconsfield, Jan. 10, 1878. Buckle, op. cit., p. 217. also Lytton Strachey, Queen Victoria (London, 1928), p. 231. 65

6 9 Carnarvon in the House of Lords, Jan. 25, 1878. ccxxxvii, pp. 438-39. 67

Buckle, op. cit., pp. 220-21.

Cf.

Hansard, vol.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

WAR,

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305

order was held in abeyance. Lord Beaconsfield casually pocketed the colonial secretary's resignation for the time being. Advices from Vienna had not been promising; the sultan had objected to the course proposed; and an assurance from Prince Gortchakoff that the Russian government had " no intention of directing their military operations on Gallipoli unless the Turkish regular troops should concentrate there," 88 brought about that deviation. The czar's chancellor further trusted that the British ministry did not, on their part, " contemplate an occupation of Gallipoli, which would be a departure from their neutrality and would encourage the Porte to resistance." 89 The upshot of the numerous diplomatic exchanges and cabinet councils of the previous few days left Her Majesty's Government suspended in mid-air. Divided counsels still prevailed and the ministry was threatened with secessions. No firm decisions had been resolved upon, nor had any forward steps been taken. Such was the situation when Parliament convened on the 17th of January. The representatives of the Crown met amid unusually serious circumstances and a tense atmosphere prevailed. Expectancy gripped the host of distinguished guests in the crowded Strangers' gallery as the lord chancellor commenced reading the Address from the Throne. The progress of the war and of the Queen's efforts to bring about a pacific solution of the points at issue between the combatants was first narrated. Her Majesty's conditions of neutrality had as yet not been infringed upon. Then was delivered the ominous message: " But I cannot conceal from myself that, should hostilities be unfortunately prolonged, some unexpected occurrence may render it incumbent on me to adopt 68

House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 3, no. 8. Loftus to Derby, dated and received Jan. 15. 69 Ibid., Turkey # 3, no. 8, inclosure 4-

306

BRITAIN

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measures of precaution." Such measures could not be effectually taken without " adequate preparation," and the Queen trusted to the liberality of her Parliament " to supply the means " which might be required for that purpose. 70 Lord Wharncliffe moved, and Earl Loudoun seconded, the address in answer to the Speech that evening in the House of Lords. T h e former stressed the warning uttered in the Address, remarking significantly that at the present moment the whole danger lay " in respect of Constantinople and the passage of the Dardanelles." 71 In the debate which ensued, Earl Granville was quite moderate in his criticisms of the past acts of the government. It was to be expected that the Opposition leader should choose to praise the conduct of Lords Carnarvon and Derby. Lord Beaconsfield noted the moderation of his opponent's words and studiously answered his strictures in a tone of whimsical taunting. In concluding, however, the premier chose to translate the Queen's message into his own peculiar style, which was reminiscent of his Guildhall peroration of two years previous. T h e policy o f the ministers of the Crown was still one of conditional neutrality; but if their present hopes and prospects of peace were baffled, if there should be circumstances which demanded that they should appeal to Parliament " again and again " for means " to vindicate the honour of the realm and to preserve and maintain the interests of the Empire," Lord Beaconsfield was sure that Her Majesty's Government would " never hesitate to take that course." 72 The duke of Argyll delivered his usual tirade against everything even remotely connected with ministerial policy or the Turks. In particular did the Highland chief dislike warlike allusions to " drums and fifes " on his native heath. 7 ' 70

Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, vol. ccxxxvii (third series), p. 5.

71

Ibid., p. 10.

72

Ibid., p. 40.

He was referring to the speech of Hardy at Edinburgh shortly after the fall of Plevna. 73

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Ministerial journals drew his ire as well. The noble Lord implied that the Russophobia which existed was akin to an epidemic—" everyone has it more or less." In his mind, Russia was " justified" in undertaking war. England should " not attempt to prop up the phantom of the Turkish Empire; " rather should she " devise some scheme for the just government of its subject populations." Argyll was " not ashamed to own humanitarian sentiments." He would drive the "Turkish Government" from every inch of ground in Europe. 74 The attack of the associate of Gladstone was ably answered by the marquis of Salisbury in bringing the debate in the Lords to a close. Although deeply sympathetic to the subject races of the East, it was his opinion that the war in progress had " accumulated into nine short months more misery than would result from generations of Turkish government." The remedy was worse than the disease. Linking up newspaper comment with ministerial policy was ludicrous. The Opposition had studied leading articles until they had come to believe them to be State papers. The Indian secretary still considered Alexander to be actuated by sincerely religious motives, but he found it difficult to entertain that same faith in the czar's advisers and generals. The wave of war was approaching localities vital to Britain and the imperial will might not be sufficient " to control the caprice of armies in the flush of victory." 75 The unexpected mildness of the ministry's announcement in the Queen's Speech evidently stunned Her Majesty's Opposition in the Commons, as their criticisms were lethargical. Lord Hartington's words might well have come from the ministerial benches. If there was sufficient justification for the suggested vote of credit, it appeared to him " to have 74

Hansard, op. cit., pp. 49-54.

«Ibid., pp. 54-57-

308

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been a grave mistake of the Government not to have made their preparations before this." ™ Gladstone had little to say, reserving his opinion on the future contingency which he, however, hoped would never arise. Press comment on the declaration of policy in the Address from the Throne and on the tone of the numerous speakers varied. Disappointment over the apparent indecision of the cabinet was expressed by many journals associated with the ministry. The Times and Daily News, however, heard with satisfaction that, at the moment, there existed no imperative demand for additional supplies.'7 The " Thunderer " rather caustically concluded that, so far, Parliament had only been called together to prove " there was no very urgent need for summoning it." Praise was held for the judicious remarks of the responsible Liberal leaders by the Saturday reviewer. Even Gladstone " was for once moderate." Of all the speakers in both Houses, " the Duke of Argyll departed furthest from prudent reserve." 78 In opposite vein, Spectator would see England guided by " the noble and generous views " of that statesman.79 The Conservative Globe, exponent of Northcote, most concisely interpreted the ministerial declaration and most accurately forecasted the immediate future. Great as had been the change wrought by the fall of Plevna in the prospects of the campaign, it could not be said that any British interest was as yet directly imperiled. All depended upon the use Russia might make of her unexpectedly sudden triumph, and, until that point was cleared up, Great Britain could well afford to wait. 7

« Ibid., p. 86. Issues of Jan. 18, 1878. 78 Saturday Review, Jan. 19, 1878. 79 Spectator, Jan. 19, 1878. 77

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Should the Court of St. Petersburg show evidence of insincerity during the progress of the armistice negotiations, or should the Russian armies appear determined to make a swoop on Constantinople before hostilities are suspended, a perilous situation will arise, fully justifying this country in adopting the ' measures of precaution' mentioned in the Queen's speech. When this moment comes, and not until then, Parliament will be asked to provide whatever amount of money the Government may consider necessary for adequate preparation against an at present' unexpected occurrence.' The Globe considered that the feeling displayed the previous evening in Parliament afforded every assurance that, in such an emergency, " the appeal would meet with a cordial and liberal response." 80 The indecision of England was made the subject of considerable taunting by its foreign critics. Le Charivari of Paris caricatured the situation in its customary admirable style. It contained a large sketch of the British lion " preparing to show his teeth." 81 The noble beast is sitting up like a poodle, displaying a pair of utterly toothless jaws into which an adroit dentist (Lord Beaconsfield) is in the act of introducing a most formidable-looking set of false teeth.82 The Berliner Wespen, one of the best of the German comics, offered a similarly descriptive though somewhat more vulgar version of the plight of the premier. In a cartoon entitled " English Telephony," Lord Beaconsfield is represented as a gunner shouting into the mouth of a cannon to frighten the Cossack away from Constantinople. The Cossack replies by the familiar gesture of applying his thumb, with fingers extended, to the tip of his nose and continues his march onward. The Wespen advises the 80

Globe, Jan. 18, 1878. Captain Armstrong was its proprietor and editor.

81

Translation from: " s e proposant de montrer les dents."

82

Le Charivari, Jan. 19, 1878.

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premier to turn the telephone (the gun) if he wishes to be understood.88 From foreign sources as well were being circulated in rapid succession rumors of serious import. Various exaggerated versions of the contemplated Russian peace conditions were afloat. Advices from Constantinople looked especially black. The two peace envoys were still attempting to locate the imperial headquarters. There were evidences of insurrection in Thessaly and the outlook in the Turkish capital itself was none too promising. The precipitous retreat of Suleiman's forces had continued and Europe was suddenly informed that Adrianople was in the hands of the Russians. The Muscovite vanguard had entered it on the 20th. The news of Adrianople afforded the occasion for the Russophobe press of the metropolis to return to the attack. " Thanks to the trustfulness of England," sarcastically commented the Morning Post, " the Russian armies are now at Adrianople, and the terms of peace are still unknown to the British nation." Pall Mall announced that the eventuality which was to have made it incumbent on the Queen to take measures of precaution was in progress—" ' hostilities ' are ' unfortunately prolonged.'" The Morning Advertiser stated flatly that, " with this important military success, the war ought, according to precedent and general conviction, to end." It forewarned the imperial government against rash actions or immoderate demands, " lest England at the eleventh hour be compelled to draw the sword." The Daily Telegraph worked itself into a frenzy over the " whole European and Asiatic world wondering at our idle fleet and our paralysed diplomacy." Was England to wait to learn the Russian conditions of peace when they should be tardily vouchsafed to her " from a palace on the Golden Horn ? " " T a k e n from Financial Opinion, Jan. 17, 1878.

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Was she to discuss the question of the Straits and of the Treaty of Paris with Prince Gortchakoff when the forts of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were manned by Russian soldiers, and Turkey had signed away everything in her despair? If not, " the interval for saving the waning honour and influence of Great Britain must be estimated by days, or rather hours." The Eastern Question was, in short, " Constantinople." 84 The alarming rumors in the columns of press correspondents and in news-items from foreign sources continued. In addition, Layard was pouring telegrams loaded with apprehensions into the foreign office. Suleiman Pasha had been badly defeated in the vicinity of Philippopolis, then had retreated to the base of the Rhodope Balkans where his forces had been dislodged and widely scattered amid terrible carnage on the 18th. The British ambassador punctuated his accounts of the three-day rout with ghastly details of the misery of the fleeing Mohammedan population and with tales of brutal excesses being committed by the Russian soldiery in their advance. The vengeful Bulgarians were exultantly consummating the slaughter. Philippopolis was deserted. Out of a total Turkish population of 15,000, barely 100 remained. 85 Tens of thousands of refugees were joining the remnants of Suleiman's army in the fastnesses of the heart of the Rhodope range. On the 23d came a telegram from the vice-consul at Gallipoli, stating that the Russians were advancing in that direction and expressing his fear that Gallipoli would be cut off from direct communication with the capital.86 The most 84

All journals quoted in above paragraph are issues of Jan. 21, 1878. Vice-Consul Calvert to Layard, dated Philippopoli, Jan. 20. Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 42, no. 7, inclosure I. 86 The telegram was dated the 22d and was forwarded by Layard that same day. Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 3, no. 29. 85

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recent crop of rumors appearing in the journals of that morning must have increased the alarm of cabinet members. The Muscovite advance had already penetrated far beyond Adrianople, with their course set straight for Constantinople. Slight hope was entertained in S t Petersburg for the success of the armistice negotiations and the public was clamoring for peace to be dictated in Stamboul. In the cabinet council of two days previous, it had been decided to make overtures to Austria in an effort to induce her to join with England in an identic note of protest to the Russian court. The Austrian reply, which arrived that day, " was of an indecisive character." 87 Added to all that, the ministry had as yet received no word from Prince Gortchakoff relative to its communication of a full week back 88 concerning the intention of Russia as regarded the submission of the preliminary peace terms to the signatory Powers of the treaties of 1856 and 1871. Those terms were, likewise, still unknown. Lord Beaconsfield pressed for decisive action in the session of the cabinet that very afternoon. He had obtained the Queen's authority to accept resignations beforehand.88 It was determined that the fleet should proceed immediately to Constantinople, and announcement of the vote of credit was set for the morrow. The sum to be asked was fixed at £6 million sterling. Orders to Admiral Hornby to sail were wired to Vourlah 80 at 7 P. M. His instructions were to stop at Besika for further orders; if none were there, he was to proceed through the Dardanelles to Constantinople. If necessary, he was to force the Dardanelles. No open mention of the decisions of the afternoon was made by the 87

Buckle, op. cit., p. 227.

88

Supra, pp. 302-303.

88

Buckle, op. cit., p. 227.

90

The fleet had been stationed in the Gulf of Vourlah, near Smyrna, since late in December. Previously, it had been in Besika Bay.

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first lord of the admiralty or the postmaster general in their after-dinner speeches before the assembled Company of Shipwrights that evening. Both Smith and Manners, however, betrayed their anxiety by the undisguised menaces strewn through their utterances. The expected resignations of Lords Carnarvon and Derby were in the premier's hands the following morning. Lord Beaconsfield thereupon immediately requested Her Majesty to transfer the marquis of Salisbury to the foreign office and to permit the t w o retiring ministers to make their parliamentary statements without delay. 81 Northcote gave Notice in the Commons that afternoon that on the 28th in Committee o f Supply he would move a " Supplementary Estimate for the Naval and Military Services." Called upon to explain the reasons for the step, the chancellor o f the exchequer offered a brief observation but refused to elaborate upon his remarks. While Northcote was occupied in the House, an important telegram from Ambassador Layard was delivered at the foreign office, the contents of which considerably upset the dignity of Her Majesty's ministers. T h e wire announced that the bases of peace had been agreed to, and that the last of them was that the question of the Straits should be settled between " the Congress and the Emperor of Russia." 92 In his later recollections of the incidents which ensued, Northcote narrates : This fell amongst us like a bombshell. Our justification for sending up the fleet was, that we feared that a private arrangement would be made about the Straits between the Turks and the Russians, to the exclusion and the detriment of other Powers, and here were the Russian terms of peace, by which this question 81

Buckle, op. ext., p. 229.

92

Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 3, no. 34.

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was to be reserved to be settled by a Congress! What could we say to justify ourselves? And how much would not the difficulty of the situation be increased by the emphatic dissent and resignation of Lord Derby? A f t e r a little hasty consultation with those of our colleagues who were in the House of Commons, I went up to Downing Street, taking Smith with me. W e found Lord Beaconsfield in bed, but quite able to talk the matter over with us. The result was that we agreed to stop Admiral Hornby before he entered the Dardanelles, where he had been led to expect that he might find orders.98 Smith despatched an admiralty telegram at once. A s it was stamped 7 : 45 P. M. and the Commons had first been called to order at four o'clock, the ministers had truly deliberated rapidly. T h e annulment was, however, not received in time to stop the fleet. It had pulled up anchor from Vourlah at five and proceeded to Besika Bay. Finding no further instructions and in possession of the sultan's firman of permission, Hornby gave command to sail through the Dardanelles. Morning saw the fleet in the straits steaming toward the Golden Horn. It came abreast Fort Sultanieh about sixteen miles from the entrance, turned around, and made its way back to Besika Bay where anchor was cast shortly before six that evening. The order of annulment had finally overtaken Hornby, depriving him of the pleasure of viewing the city of mosques from its harbor. Considerable gnashing of teeth had been indulged in by the " Council of T e n " earlier that day on the arrival of a second telegram from Pera correcting a serious error in the original. In the wire as first received the word " Sultan " had been incorrectly transmitted as " Congress." u* T h e last 88 Andrew Lang, Life, Letters, and Diaries of Sir Stafford pp. 292-93. 94

Footnote of Turkey # 3, no. 34.

Northcote,

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clause ought to have r e a d : the question of the Straits should be settled between " the Sultan and the Emperor of Russia." T h e ministry had, though, succeeded in drawing important statements f r o m Count Schouvaloff, probably in consequence of its action of the previous day.

T h e Russian ambassador

handed L o r d Derby a version o f the bases of peace which, however, were to be regarded as strictly unofficial. 95

A t the

same time he communicated Prince Gortchakoff's assurance that Russia did not intend to settle by herself " European Questions." ®8 accepted, 97

Carnarvon's resignation had already

been

but the recall of the fleet gave an opportunity to

the other cabinet members to press on the premier the desirability of retaining L o r d Derby. but to yield.

Beaconsfield had no choice

T h e foreign secretary was thereupon requested

to abstain f r o m any announcement of his decision in the H o u s e of L o r d s that afternoon, 9 8 to which he acceded. Carnarvon,

however,

exercised his privilege, and that

evening gave a detailed account o f his recent disagreements with his colleagues.

T h e peace-loving lord had resigned be-

cause he doubted the expediency of the vote of credit and opposed the sending o f the fleet as " a distinct step in the direction o f w a r . "

89

H e quitted his post with regret but

his conscience left him no alternative.

Both Beaconsfield

and Northcote rendered spirited defenses of the ministry's decisions in their respective Houses, during the progress o f which were revealed the f o r w a r d developments of the day just drawing to a close. 95 House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 3, no. 38. Cf. also Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, p. 540. 96 Ibid., Turkey # 3, no. 39. That was Gortchakoff's delayed answer to Derby's communication of Jan. 14. Supra, p. 303. 97 On the 24th. 98 Buckle, op. cit., p. 232. 99 Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, p. 443.

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The anxiety of the country was somewhat eased but scarcely dissipated by reason of the official declarations which, though, did set at rest certain of the many wild rumors current during the previous forty-eight hours. The vacillations of the cabinet then became the topic of considerable criticism in the press. Every step of the " discredited and ridiculous " administration was boldly censured by the Daily News and other Radical journals. The above organ advised the foreign secretary, if he had regard for " his own fame," to " imitate the firm and dignified conduct of Lord Carnarvon." The government should reconsider its intention to ask for the supplementary vote. The sum was " absolutely worthless for serious warlike preparation," and just large enough to give England " the appearance of an ambition to buy on cheap terms a reputation for heroic resolve." In driving out the colonial secretary, affirmed the Daily Chronicle, the cabinet had sacrificed a minister who had obeyed the popular will to a minister who despised it. The premier, " knowing his country to be heartily resolved upon peace," had spent " months and years in unflagging efforts to plunge it into war." The Liberal Scotsman attacked in the same vein. It was impossible to have any further confidence in a ministry under the " malign leadership " of Lord Beaconsfield. " The country wants peace, and he insists on war." The " Thunderer," in possession of the purported bases of peace,—considered " very moderate " by that newspaper—was persuaded that Her Majesty's ministers had acted with " unreflecting haste " in sending the fleet, as they had taken for granted assumptions the hollowness of which had not been tested. Their resolution was " altogether unjustifiable." Decided opposition to the demand for additional funds was also expressed by Chenery's organ. 100 100 Journals quoted in above paragraph are issues of Jan. 26, 1878.

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The Tory Observer, motivated by a strong desire for peace, departed from its usual support of the government It questioned how far the honor of England was safe in the hands of a ministry which adopted such momentous decisions with " indiscreet haste " and abandoned them with " undue precipitancy," which, moreover, had forfeited the services of " the wisest and most cautious of its members." 101 More friendly journals were hard put to explain away the waverings of those to whom they looked for leadership. Many also found it difficult to conceal their own disappointment over the recall of the fleet. Serious doubts were expressed in regard to the truth of the reported moderation of the Russian bases of peace. All regretted the colonial secretary's act as a political blunder at a time when the cabinet should present a united front. The Morning Advertiser even resorted to the hoary anecdote of the Irish juryman who was asked how it was that the jury had disagreed, he himself being the one dissentient. " ' Begorra,' replied Pat, ' I niver met elivin gentlemen so obstinate before as them elivin jurymen.' " That, in the opinion of Captain Hamber's organ for the enlightenment of the licensed victuallers, seemed " something like Lord Carnarvon's position." 102 The breach with Derby was patched up largely through the persuasive efforts of the chancellor of the exchequer. In withdrawing his resignation, however, the Lancashire peer made it clear to Nortlicote that he did so " rather in the hope of preventing mischief, . . . than from sympathising with the views " of his colleagues.108 He rejoined his confreres at their session of the 27th, a Sunday cabinet. At that council the foreign secretary gave marked evidence of his dark temper by occupying the vacant chair of Lord 101 102 105

Observer, Jan. 27, 1878. Morning Advertiser, Jan. 26, 1878. Buckle, op. cit., p. 237.

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Carnarvon, far apart from his usual place at the side of L o r d Beaconsfield. 1 " Although reconciliation had been effected, Lord Derby was thereafter to assume merely a secondary role in the conduct of foreign affairs, the premier relying almost entirely upon the judgment of the marquis of Salisbury who, within a few months, was officially to replace Derby at the foreign office. The cabinet decided to press its demand for additional funds and to place it in the light of a vote of confidence. Layard had wired more detailed information concerning the bases of peace, at the close of which he could not resist summarily stating his own view that they amounted to the destruction of the Turkish empire in Europe. 105 T h e ministry's alarm over the progress of the armistice negotiations had not been allayed, enshrouded as they still were with almost complete mystery. T h a t silence had enhanced their already strong suspicion of intentional delay on the part of the imperial commanders-in-chief. T h e y further had as yet no definite assurance in regard to the exact questions which Russia would consent to place before the bar of the Powers. Consequently, it was considered the policy of wisdom to continue with their preparations in order to enter the expected conference armed with the strength of a united nation, v i z . — a vote of confidence and six million pounds. Considerable opposition to the vote of credit had already been manifested and more was brewing. T h e evening of Northcote's original announcement saw a renovated circular of protest issue from the headquarters of the National Federation of Liberal Associations in Birmingham, instructing the various affiliates to use every effort to oppose its passage. A s a result a new series of town-meetings were held within Ibid., p. 238. 105 Layard to Derby, dated Jan. 25 and received Jan. 26. House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 3, no. 40. 104

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the next few days. T h e Eastern Question Association conveyed its thanks to L o r d Carnarvon for resigning rather than concurring in the contemplated armed intervention. Fresh resolutions were passed by the City neutrality and peace committee, the Workingmen's neutrality committee, the Nonconformist committee of vigilance, and the many others. In Parliament, Opposition leaders were attempting to solidify their ranks. O n the afternoon of the 28th the chancellor of the exchequer formally moved the resolution asking for additional supplies. He accompanied the request with a detailed review of the diplomatic endeavors and acts of the ministry during January and gave an elaborate exposition of the situation confronting the government at the moment. The most important section of his statement dealt with the bases of peace communicated by Schouvaloff, which were read and commented upon to the House. T h e terms read: Bulgaria, within the limits of the Bulgarian nationality, not less than that of the Conference, to be an autonomous tributary Principality, with a national Christian Government, a native militia, and no Turkish troops, except at some points to be determined. Independence of Montenegro, with an increase (of territory) equivalent to the military status quo; the frontier to be decided hereafter. Independence of Roumania, with a sufficient territorial indemnity. Independence of Servia, with rectification of frontiers. Autonomous administration, to be sufficiently guaranteed, to Bosnia and Herzegovina; or similar reforms for the other Christian provinces of Turkey in Europe. Indemnity to Russia for the expenses of the war; in a pecuniary, territorial, or other form to be decided hereafter. A n ulterior understanding for safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits.

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These being accepted, a Convention, an Armistice, and the despatch of Plenipotentiaries to develop them into preliminaries of peace. 109 Northcote described them as " conditions of a very sweeping character." In commenting on the changes outlined f o r Bulgaria, he cited L a y a r d as scarcely doubting that the limits proposed would mean its extension to the ^Egean seaboard. One glance at a map would reveal the serious nature of that proposal. The vagueness of the indemnity and Straits clauses was particularly stressed by Northcote. H e cautioned that those terms, although communicated in authoritative form, and said to have been agreed to by the Porte, were not strictly official. Several days had elapsed and there was as yet no news of an armistice being signed. The reasons for that delay could only be conjectured. A s the bases were quite elastic there was a possibility that the terms of the actual armistice might differ from them. 107 Following the formal motion of the Conservative leader of the Commons, adjournment f o r three days was suggested by the marquis of Hartington, as the vote was now represented to be one of confidence and was based on papers which were not yet before the House. His contention was supported by other leaders of Opposition, with asides. Bright questioned whether it was necessary that England go into conference " with shotted cannon and revolvers." Ministerial members urged against any longer delay, which drew a protest from Harcourt against their attempt " to snatch a verdict." The chancellor of the exchequer agreed to adjournment until the 3 1 s t and ended thé squabble. Press observations followed closely along the lines of the speeches. The Times remained hostile, remarking that 109 107

Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, p. 540. Ibid., pp. 540-44-

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Bright's interpretation of the policy of the government appeared " a sufficiently accurate, if rough, description of it." The day previous had seen that newspaper publicly burnt in the centre of the stock exchange for using its power to blind the country to the designs of the Muscovite Power. The Morning Advertiser felt the official statement would put an end, once and for all, to the foolish and short-sighted talk regarding the " alleged exceeding moderation of the terms of peace offered by Russia to Turkey." Leading articles in the Morning Post and the Standard were in the same vein. T h e latter journal emphasized the " ulterior " understanding for safeguarding the rights and interests of Russia in the Straits. Eloquence was resorted to by the Daily Telegraph in bitterly condemning the " revolutionary " conditions. It warned that the " imposing catalogue of pretensions," which " elicited last night the clamorous glee of a few fanatics," was merely " Count Schouvaloff's minimised edition of his master's programme." 108 In Parliament that evening an amendment to the motion for the vote of credit was presented by Forster. That notice should, according to custom, have been given by Hartington as leader of Opposition. The amendment was carefully worded in an attempt to unite Liberals of all shades of opinion for a strictly Party vote. It steered clear of matters of controversy between the Liberals themselves and of any definite statement of policy. In addition it was so worded that it could be withdrawn at any moment. An accurate forecast of its future progress was made in the columns of the Standard. Mr. Forster's amendment was one which the news of the next twenty-four hours might refute. " It is based on the ground t h a t ' no sufficient information ' has yet arrived of anything having been done to the prejudice of British interests, though the very next tele108

A l l journals cited in above paragraph are issues of Jan. 29, 1878.

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^ram from Constantinople or St. Petersburg may bring that sufficient information." 109 A t Oxford on the 30th, Gladstone broke loose and delivered a peroration which was to react very unfavorably against him. He was accompanied to the university town by Granville, Harcourt and Goschen. The ex-premier delivered speeches at a noon meeting held in the corn exchange and at the dinner of the Palmerston Club that evening. Professors Green, Bryce and Rogers also attended the undergraduate function. Gladstone's Oxford audience was granted an excellent specimen of his self-avowed talent in tenacity. The ex-premier's steadfast " purpose " had been to the best of his power, " for the last 18 months, day and night, week by week, month by month," to " counterwork " as well as he could what he believed to be " the purpose of Lord Beaconsfield." 110 Radical journals alone cheered on his attack. In the opinion of the Daily Chronicle, Gladstone was " more than justified " in addressing his observations to gatherings outof-doors because, on the present issue, Parliament and the government did " not represent the people." 1 1 1 Conservative organs found him a disgruntled agitator. Even the Times questioned the " opportuneness " of his railings. It was not " worthy " of the great statesman " to announce himself to the world as the opponent and accuser of Lord Beaconsfield." 112 The premier, in private correspondence, termed him " a vindictive fiend." 113 Papers, bringing the official correspondence of the government up to date, were laid before Parliament 114 in prepa108

Standard, Jan. 30, 1878.

110

Account of speech in the Times, Jan. 31, 1878.

" i Daily Chronicle, Jan. 31, 1878.

113

Issue of Jan. 31, 1878.

118

Beaconsfield to Lady Bradford, in Zetland, op. cit., vol. ii, p. 205.

114

Turkey # 3 and # 4 were presented on the 30th, Turkey # 5 late

the 31st, and Turkey # 6 on Feb. 2, 1878.

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ration for the forthcoming debates on the vote of credit Turkey # 4 contained a single despatch, a wire from Layard dated the 29th, stating that the Turkish plenipotentiaries had received definite orders six days before to agree to the bases of peace and sign an armistice. A s yet, the Porte had received no reply on the progress of the negotiations. Those negotiations were presumably going on at Adrianople, the imperial headquarters having been moved from Kezanlik. A n interchange of telegrams with St. Petersburg had resulted in the intimation of Prince Gortchakoff that he had abandoned that article in the bases of peace which referred to an understanding between Russia and Turkey in regard to the Straits, and, moreover, " had no objection to suppress it altogether." 1 1 5 Numerous despatches from Constantinople covering the last days of January depicted the continuous advance of the Muscovite forces on the Turkish capital. The British ambassador viewed that approach with increasing alarm in every successive telegram. 118 News-items contained similar information on the continued activity of the victorious armies. In addition to the rapid forward strides of the czar's forces, the Serbian, Roumanian, and Montenegrin divisions were eagerly pushing their conquests. Scutari was the prize sought by Prince Nikita's hardy mountaineers. The most widely circulated current rumor attributed the recent delay over the signing of the armistice to the demand of the Muscovite generals for at least a temporary occupation of the city of mosques. Attention was also called to the massing of troops on the frontiers of Afghanistan, and forcible warnings were sounded in alarmist journals against any continuation of intrigue in that quarter of Asia. 115 lle

Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 5, no. 15. The telegrams are scattered through Turkey # 5 and Turkey # 6.

324

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The Thursday set f o r the opening of debate on the vote of credit had arrived. It soon became increasingly evident that shoals were ahead of the Liberal party leaders sponsoring the amendment to the vote. The Irish Home Rule bloc went into caucus during the day and resolved to " decline by vote or otherwise to identify itself on either side." T h e decision was held to be binding on every member of their group. Only three attending the caucus openly announced their adhesion to a policy of unfettered individual action by voting against the resolution. 117 That evening Forster moved his amendment calling upon the House not to add " to the burthens of the people by voting unnecessary Supplies." 1 1 8 Strangely, his own contention that funds were not needed lacked conviction. Home Secretary Cross ably defended the ministerial policy. Supplies were essential to strengthen Britain's hands in diplomacy. Until it actually happened he could not believe that Forster would bring his resolution to a division, but if he did, Cross felt confident it would suffer a worse fate than the " celebrated Ir-resolutions " of Gladstone of last session. 119 Sir W i l f r i d Lawson, whose fame has been immortalized in statue and inscription in the gardens of the Victoria E m bankment overlooking the Thames, contributed his customary sarcastic wit and oratory to the occasion. He strongly censured references to the opponents of the vote as " the agents of R u s s i a . " Such styles of controversy had best be dropped. H e added his surprise that ministerial speakers did not conclude their utterances with the Jingo refrain. L a w s o n also brought up the disorderly conduct of the London war-party, which only the day before had broken up a neutrality meeting at which Samuel Morley was to have 117

Account in the columns of the Times, Feb. I, 1878.

118

H a n s a r d , vol. ccxxxvii, p. 729.

"»Ibid., p. 766.

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played a leading role. " Ruffians invaded the place, broke the windows, and smashed the furniture, and what had become of the hon. Member for Bristol he did not know." A voice volunteered the information that Morley was in the Commons, whereupon Sir Wilfrid " congratulated the House on the escape of the hon. Member for Bristol." 120 In conclusion, Lawson defiantly promised resistance to the utmost by a considerable number of men below the Gangway. Bright and other Radicals expatiated along similar lines and eventually the debate was adjourned until the following night. An air of unreality pervaded the second night of the debate. The opening announcement by the chancellor of the exchequer alone produced effect. Musurus Pasha had the previous morning communicated the information that an armistice would be signed some time during the course of that day. However, confirmation of the actual signature was still lacking. Ensuing speeches were for the most part merely mechanical. Lowe, advocate of " Reform and Retrenchment," was the sole speaker of prominence to attack with any degree of vehemence. If the government desired to go into conference with the support of an united people, it had only to " muzzle " the prime minister and let the world know that it had no bent to perpetuate the misgovernment of the Eastern Christians.121 His philanthropic refrain was echoed by other Liberals. In the main, though, they devoted their allotted time to protesting against the attempts to misrepresent the Opposition as guilty of unpatriotic conduct. Their Conservative foes ridiculed the assumed monopoly on Christian charity but contented themselves largely with patriotic fanfare. Ibid., p. 7711 21 Ibid., p. 856.

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Extracts from the two most ultra of the Radical journals can best be cited in summing up the progress of the debate thus far. The Examiner, recently become the property of the earl of Rosebery, remarked: The speakers on both sides of the House are hampered by the difficulty that they cannot say exactly what they think. The real argument for the Vote is to be found in a belief that the country is likely to be involved in a war with Russia; the substantial argument against it is that there is no reasonable probability of our being, under any circumstances, obliged to go to war. Yet the champions of the Ministry deem it essential to repudiate any idea of war as an imputation against their personal good faith; while the Opposition feels under a constant obligation of professing its readiness to fight for British interests. It was expected by the Examiner that the air of unreality would, no doubt, pervade the proceedings until their end.12® " I f it were not advisable that it should at least endure until we are thoroughly assured of the signing of the armistice," stated the Daily Chronicle, the debate " might well have closed without further adjournment." The decision of the House was " a foregone conclusion." 12S That companion of Lloyd's Weekly124 singled out Lowe's lines as " entirely and indisputably true." The Daily Chronicle, since its conversion to a political penny paper less than a year before, had been staunchly Gladstonian.125 The expremier, in later private correspondence, voiced the highest praise for the tone of its articles and evidently preferred it to the Daily News.12' 123

Examiner, Feb. 2, 1878.

128

Daily Chronicle, Feb. 2, 1878.

124

The proprietor of the Daily Chronicle was Edward Lloyd.

Robert Boyle was its editor.

Curiously, Lloyd's Weekly London Newspaper strongly supported Beaconsfield's foreign policy. 125

126 A selection from the Correspondence of Abraham Hayward (edited by H. E. Carlisle), vol. ii, p. 298.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH

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327

Late editions of February 2 and Sunday newspapers contained flashes that the armistice had been concluded at Adrianople. The proposed bases of peace had been accepted by the Porte, a convention signed, and the signature of the Grand Duke Nicholas along with those of the Turkish emissaries had been affixed to the armistice at 7 P . M., January 3 1 . The sultan was to despatch plenipotentiaries to develop them into preliminaries of peace. Orders to stop military operations had been sent to all detachments in Europe and Asia. Actual combat had ceased. W h a t would result from the peace negotiations ?

CHAPTER

IX

STRAINED RELATIONS

A N armistice had been arranged but the period of crisis rolled on. Dire forebodings were still held that Russia was not sincere. Alexander's generals might yet occupy Constantinople or seize Gallipoli. Her Majesty's ministers ought to continue with their measures of precaution. A t tention shifted immediately to the actual conditions imposed by the armistice and to the terms the czar contemplated exacting from the sultan in their forthcoming peace negotiations. T h e fate of the Crescent should not be determined without consulting Europe. England could not permit the Muscovite Power to reap a rich harvest from her victory unchallenged. Britain's voice must be heard in the final settlement. News-items were far from reassuring. The Russian forces were in dangerous proximity to the Tchekmedje lines of defense protecting Constantinople and to the lines of Bulair guarding Gallipoli. The T u r k s were retiring from those positions which would eliminate all possibility of future resistance. A n overnight raid could easily accomplish occupation. The Serbs and Montenegrins were still active and the prophesied insurrection in Thessaly had materialized. Greek troops had crossed the frontier on February 2 in order, as the Hellenic government stated, to prevent any attempt at massacre by the Turks. The Greek provinces of Turkey were to be occupied until such time as they should be placed in a position consistent with the tranquility and the rights of the Greek race. 328

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329

The tactics of Greece were unreservedly condemned by all English organs. Though sympathizing with her national claims to Thessaly and Epirus, the Daily News considered it clearly to the interest of Europe that the armistice should not be allowed to become the signal for a new outburst of war. The Great Powers could " fairly impose peace upon the combatants." 1 The Daily Chronicle and the Times took the same stand, respectively designating her procedure as a wilful "indiscretion" and a "misguided enterprise." 2 A deputation to enlist sympathy for the Hellenic cause received no encouragement from Lord Derby. Immediate pressure by the Powers induced the Greek ministry to order the withdrawal of the troops on February 6,' but the insurgents were to continue their efforts, adding fresh embarrassments for future solution. Other affairs as well engaged the attention of the British cabinet. Sir Henry Elliot, recalled from Constantinople the year previous, had replaced Buchanan as ambassador to Austria, presenting his credentials to Francis Joseph on the 4th of February. That same day saw the issue of a formal invitation to the Powers by Austria to hold the suggested conference at Vienna. 4 All shortly agreed to the proposal, but Russia offered objections to the place of meeting, which augured delay. A more hopeful interpretation was placed on the words of the German emperor in opening the Reichstag on the 6th. Germany, " not being directly concerned in the East," was enabled " to co-operate disinterestedly in the pending transactions, with a view to facilitate an understanding between the Powers and to promote the welfare of 1

Daily News, Feb. 4, 1878.

2

Issues of Feb. 6, 1878.

s

Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxii, Turkey # 19, no. 193.

* Ibid., vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 2 4 , no. 1.

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the Christian populations." 5 Support of the claims of the Dual Monarchy was intimated, which could only result in a r i f t with Russia. Opposition to the vote of credit was rapidly melting away in home circles. Huge demonstrations expressing confidence in the ministerial policy were now the order of the day throughout England. " Rule, Britannia " was being overworked. Gladstone was fast losing popularity even in the midlands and the north. A t Manchester, more than 20,000 approved of the measure of precaution. A n effigy bearing the inscription, " Gladstone, England's traitor," was carried about some time and ultimately destroyed amid great cheering.® The ex-premier seemed to have lost much of his ferocity as in the renewed debate in the Commons on the 4th his utterances were exceptionally mild. H e had changed f r o m " a lion to a lamb " within a week. A similar conciliatory spirit was manifested by other leading Liberals on the following evening. T h e procrastination of Russia in accepting the proposed conference at Vienna and uncomfortable rumors of a continued advance of her troops despite the armistice brought on a new period of crisis. Prince Gortchakoff drew a distinction between the bases f o r the preliminaries of peace, which had been signed, and the preliminaries themselves. Russia was now intent upon concerting the more detailed preliminaries to be founded on the bases. Only after the completion of the preliminaries did she intend to go to a conference. General Ignatieff was on his way to Adrianople to negotiate that new instrument with the Turkish plenipotentiaries. T w o telegrams from Ambassador Layard, received at the foreign office within an hour of each other on the evening 8

Account of speech in the Times, Feb. 7, 1878.

•Account of demonstration in the Times, Feb. 4, 1878.

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331

of February 6, precipitated the crisis. Both arrived via Bombay. The first, though it made mention of the Russian advance and consequent alarm in Constantinople,7 was of less serious import than the second, dated that same day and received shortly after 6 P. M.8 Tchataldja, an outpost of the Tchekmedje lines, had been occupied " in considerable force." Those lines were to be abandoned by the Turks as one of the conditions of the armistice, " leaving Constantinople quite undefended." Layard further emphasized that it was evident the Russians were consolidating their advance during the armistice " with a view of greatly improving their military position." Garbled leakage of the above information and misinterpretation of Count Schouvaloff's French caused a near panic in the metropolis. That very night exaggerating and excited rumor-mongers were relating that Constantinople itself had already been occupied by the Muscovite forces. Impetus to their tale had indirectly been given by the czar's ambassador. Count Schouvaloff, in conversation with a lady at a party in London that evening, had observed casually, " ' Oh, mon Dieu! quant a Constantinople, nous sommes dedans,' " a colloquial French expression meaning, " We have been taken in or deceived." It passed from mouth to mouth and was construed as a positive announcement by the Russian diplomat that the imperial army had entered the Turkish capital.® Morning journals contained inflammatory leading articles giving added momentum to the alarming assertions. The Morning Advertiser had reason to believe that Her Majesty's Government had received information of the entry of the 7

Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 7, no. 10. Ibid., no. 11. 8 O. K. (Kireeff), Russia and England from 1876 to 1880 (London, 1880), p. 163. The book contains a preface by J . A. Froude. 8

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Russian army into Constantinople. " At any rate, if the Government are not in the possession of this news, the Russian Embassy is, and Count Schouvaloff's expression, ' Nous sommes dedans,' ' We are in,' is likely to become historical." No news of such serious import had reached the country within " the last half-century," and all must stand aghast. That entry was an " insult" to the ministry and a " menace " to the British people. After that it seemed straining a point to ask for the six millions. " We have been alternately bullied and cajoled, and we may as well throw up the game. It must be left to the Great Powers of Europe—there appear to be only two—to settle the Eastern Question." 10 The Morning Post announced: " The Russians are in Constantinople." That was last night the news current in London, and Borthwick's paper was inclined to think it " based upon official and authentic intelligence." The telegraph lines were mostly cut, but the message had come by way of Bombay and Alexandria. " Our pottering over the trumpery six millions will probably cost us ten times that sum. But, whatever the cost, it is still to be hoped that the country will see that its honour is vindicated." The Times, without definitely committing itself, strove to keep the public calm. It did " not altogether share Mr. Gladstone's confidence " that Prince Gortchakoff had entirely renounced by his despatch of December the entrance into the Turkish capital of any Russian troops. Whether or not such occupation had been or was about to be effected, at the utmost, it could only be " of the nominal character of the German entrance into Paris. There is, in short, every apparent ground for confidence in the prospect before us, and no solid reason for alarm." 11 10 11

Morning Advertiser, Feb. 7, 1878. Issues of Feb. 7. 1878.

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333

As the day advanced the excitement became more intense. Stocks, especially the Russian, tumbled heavily on the exchange. Huge throngs centered in the neighborhood of Parliament. The palace-yard was so crowded that the gates had to be closed and the entrances guarded by large bodies of police. In the afternoon, when the Houses were to convene, Lord Beaconsfield had a difficult time making his way under escort from Downing Street to the Lords. The majority of the members of the ministry were enthusiastically cheered as they arrived, and the immense concourse of Londoners amused themselves, in the intervals, by singing patriotic songs. The Commons met under the influence of the prevailing flush and under the consciousness that, if the rumors were true, the conditions under which the debate upon the vote of credit had hitherto been carried on were totally changed. On being questioned as to their truth by L o r d Harrington, the chancellor of the exchequer simply read Layard's two telegrams and added the czar's distinct assurance, personally given to Colonel Wellesley the previous July, that His M a j esty would " not occupy Constantinople for the sake of military honour," but only if such a step were " rendered necessary by the march of events." Considering that the Turkish resistance had ceased, it did not appear that " any such necessity " could now exist. 12 The Liberal leaders sponsoring Forster's amendment to the vote had evidently determined beforehand that the moment was very favorable for finally claiming that the " sufficient information" which would enable them gracefully to drop their opposition had arrived, 18 as, following Northcote's announcements, Forster asked 13 Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, pp. 1211-13. Turkey # 9 containing Colonel Wellesley's various conversations was first laid before Parliament at this time. Supra, pp. 236-57. 13

Supra, 321-22.

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leave to withdraw his amendment, reserving to himself the fullest freedom of action in committee.14 Harrington approved of his colleague's action and deplored any effort to force a division, stating flatly: " I f the House tries to force us to vote on the question which we wish to withdraw, we shall, instead of withdrawing the Amendment, withdraw ourselves." 15 Hardy, as spokesman for the ministry, thereupon announced that the government would not oppose unconditional withdrawal. John Bright concurred and the matter appeared settled. A t that point Northcote, out of order, read a communication from Prince Gortchakoff just placed in his hands to the effect that there was " not a word of truth " in the rumors in circulation.18 A dramatic moment ensued, followed by quandary and wrangling. The Liberal leaders were thrown into confusion and, after attempting adjournment, persisted in withdrawal. Continued opposition of the Irreconcilables, however, prolonged the debate, finally forcing the government to demand a division on the main question—that the Speaker leave the Chair. In the course of the renewed debate a forceful speech by Mr. John Walter, 17 proprietor of the Times, stood out. He regarded the early summoning of Parliament, the vote of credit, and the amendment as all extremely " unfortunate." It would have been a " far wiser course " had the ministry decided to maintain its attitude of watchfulness, " ready, if necessary, to make a spring at once in taking the money they wanted," and then later to have claimed an indemnity from the House. That would have relieved them from the awkward position in which they now found themselves, with the 14

Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, p. 1214.

15

Ibid., p. 1222.

18

Ibid., p. 1226.

17

He was an independent M. P. from Berkshire.

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RELATIONS

335

vote having the appearance of an act of defiance toward Russia and of an act of retaliation against the Opposition for certain injudicious speeches delivered during the recess. Cordially approving the results of the war, Walter would not consent to the spending of a single shilling of English money to curtail the liberties to be granted to the Eastern Christians. The government should go into the conference prepared to fulfil their claims as generously as possible. Whatever else might be the result of the conference, he believed that the present settlement could not be final. The best chance for its being lasting for a certain time—lasting in the sense that when the next stage came, it might come without another dreadful w a r — " would be in leaving to Turkey only such an amount of territory and importance as should be consistent with its preservation as a territorial Power in Europe, and for the sake mainly of keeping Constantinople open till a worthier successor might be found." The best settlement would also place what remained of European Turkey " under the protection of the European Powers, with such guarantees for good government as could be obtained." Further, his hope for the future was that " the time might come " when even that fertile section " would be inhabited by a free and Christian population." 1 8 The division on the main question resulted in utter rout of the Opposition. There were 295 ayes to but 96 noes, a majority of i99- lfl Analysis of the lists showed the Conservative ranks unbroken, with several Independents and Liberals supporting the government. Curiously, Joseph Cowen and John Walter went into the lobby with the majority. The Irreconcilables included Sir G. Balfour, W . E . Clarke, Leonard H. Courtney, Sir Charles W. Dilke, Henry Fawcett, Sir Henry Havelock, Mitchell Henry, John Holms, 18 18

Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, pp. 1297-1301. Ibid., p. 1310.

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Edward Jenkins, G. J . Shaw Lefevre, A. J . Mundella, J . W. Pease, H. Richard, Serjeant Simon, and G. O. Trevelyan. Sir Wilfrid Lawson and Anderson were tellers in the division, which also found Dr. Lyon Playfair, Peter Rylands and Whalley not voting but paired as noes. The Irish, almost en masse, abstained from voting as did the leaders of Opposition and numerous of their followers. Adjournment of the House did not occur until after midnight, ending a very hectic day. Ministerial and Radical organs alike roundly taunted the Liberal leaders for their unvalorous tactics in withdrawing both the amendment and themselves. Only the Ultras " had the courage of their opinions." 20 The Globe did not doubt that Lord Hartington and his consulting committee " felt a profound sense of relief when patriotism was at last seen pointing in the same direction as party interest." 21 Disappointment was expressed by the Daily News. " Men who take in charge the deliberate policy of a party ought to be very careful how they abandon it." Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Harcourt spoke yesterday of the too great facility with which Mr. Layard adopted rumors, yet they themselves rather absurdly assumed that his " hasty, alarmed, and unconfirmed despatch had so altered the condition of things as to render it impossible to stand by the position of the amendment for an evening, or even for an hour." 22 The Echo and other Radical journals sarcastically chided the Liberal front bench in like vein. Not so the Times, which swung violently back of the ministry in line with its proprietor and public opinion. The present situation was eminently one of those in which the only proper course was " to throw the whole responsibility of action on the Government, and to give them a generous 20 Daily Telegraph,

Feb. 8, 1878.

" Daily News, Feb. 8, 1878.

" Globe, Feb. 8, 1878.

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RELATIONS

337

support." It ought, indeed, " t o be a re-assuring consideration that they must have foreseen the possibility of some such anxiety as the present," quite an admission for the " Thunderer." " To occupy the defences of Constantinople and at the same time to claim to be fulfilling an engagement that Constantinople itself should not be occupied is a course which approaches to the nature of an evasion." It was evident that was the feeling yesterday of the more independent Liberal members, and there could be no question but that it would be the general feeling of the country. It was for Russia " to restore confidence." The Times hoped that the division of the previous night would close a controversy which, " however properly raised at the outset," was now " wholly out of place." 23 Chenery's organ was thereafter to caution Russia repeatedly in rather strong language that she was courting disaster, and, except for rare lapses, was to stand staunchly back of the ministerial policy. The definite terms of the armistice, communicated by Layard, were for the first time known by Her Majesty's Government on February 8.24 The Russian advance had not been in contravention of its articles but in pursuance of them. In accordance with its provisions, the Porte had agreed to dismantle the Tchekmedje lines and retire its forces from those defenses. Russia could occupy them at three days' notice. She had as yet not carried occupation through to completion. The cabinet discussed the situation and once again made the decision to send the fleet through the Dardanelles. Immediate orders were despatched to Hornby to have a detachment of six ships proceed to Constantinople, if possible, the next afternoon, " to protect life and property of British subjects." 25 Lord Derby also notified Russia 23

Times, Feb. 8, 1878.

34

Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 11, no. 2.

25

Hansard, vol. ccxxxvii, p. 1331.

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and other Powers of that intention, at the same time inviting the neutral Powers to join England with a similar proceeding. Those steps were announced in both Houses that same afternoon. T h e foreign secretary carefully explained that the movement of the fleet should not be construed as a hostile demonstration. It was to proceed to the Turkish capital solely to prevent disorders. Fear of Russian occupation might tend to produce disorder, and such disorder might afford Russia a reason for occupation. 28 Granville, Hartington and Gladstone found no fault in sending up the fleet, but the ex-premier announced his continued opposition to the demand for funds. He had left the House before the division the previous night due to a slight " indisposition " and had therefore not voted. 27 T h e procedure of the leaders of Opposition drew sharp criticisms from numerous of their own cohorts in the debate which followed the Commons going into committee of supply on the vote of credit. Fawcett, Sullivan, and D a vies were particularly bitter. The latter, in unvarnished language, denounced the desertion of their leaders, who had drawn them into this scrape and " left them in a mess." 28 The committee divided into 328 ayes and 124 noes, a majority of 204. 29 Hartington and Forster still abstained from going into the lobby but the number of Irreconcilables had been swelled by others who had gained more courage overnight, including Campbell-Bannerman, John Bright, and Gladstone. T h e publication of the articles of the armistice aroused Britain to a far greater extent than ever before. The public and the press, almost compactly, voiced their support of the MIbid„

pp. 1319-20.

"Ibid.,

p. 1361.

28

Ibid., p. 1416.

28

Ibid., p. 1417.

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339

ministry. Parliamentary criticism was to be reduced to a minimum. A united front was to be maintained in the face of the dangers of the situation. T h e armistice had placed Russia in practical possession of the whole of the Ottoman empire in Europe except the straits, and those, so far as Turkey was concerned, were at her mercy. The T u r k s were to evacuate the last lines of defense before their capital, with the Russians occupying both sea coasts of the peninsula of Constantinople. Gallipoli was similarly enclosed as they occupied the coasts of the Sea of Marmora and of the Gulf of Saros. The Muscovite forces were within approximately twenty miles of Constantinople and fifteen of Gallipoli. The military positions of the imperial armies would enable them to seize those invaluable strategic points almost at will. By the terms of the armistice the Porte had surrendered itself helplessly into the hands of its foe. T h e czar had pushed his military conquests in Europe to their furthest possible point within the bounds of his pledges and within the limits plainly prescribed by Her Majesty's Government. A rash move would probably result in war. Diplomatic exchanges became more threatening. Prince Gortchakoff's reply to the English contention that the fleet was to enter Turkish waters for the protection of life and property in the event of disorders in the city of mosques was very adroit. In a circular telegram to the czar's ambassadors in the capitals of Europe, the Russian chancellor announced in effect that, if the presence of a detachment of the English fleet in the Bosphorus were necessary for the protection of the Christians, the right of protecting appertained equally to the Russian troops. The czar's government was contemplating " the entry of a portion of its troops into Constantinople." 30 The English press received that inThe circular was dated February io and its gist was communicated to Derby by Schouvaloff on the nth. House of Commons, Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 14, no. 1. 80

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telligence from foreign sources, as it had been current in issues of continental journals on the n t h . Some chagrin was expressed over the trap into which Lord Derby had placed himself but the majority of organs utilized this new evidence of diplomatic astuteness to cavil further against the Muscovite Power. A n additional embarrassment had arisen over the refusal of the Porte to grant permission for the entrance of the fleet. It had proceeded to the Dardanelles where, finding no firman, Hornby had declined to take the responsibility of passing the forts without authorization and returned to Besika Bay. The press considered the refusal dictated by Russia as the Porte withheld its consent on the ground that if the sultan permitted entrance Russia would probably carry through its projected occupation. Many journals advocated a resolute stand. The straits should be forced if necessary. The Standard was so wroth that it would seal them both up " in their narrow and useless seas." 11 The Morning Post vented considerable of its spleen on the foreign secretary. For the second time a British fleet had been turned back from the path of honor, and " from the gallant Admiral downwards every sailor must have cursed the author of such degradation." Were the Jonah in their hands, could anyone doubt that they would have pitched him overboard into the distasteful element! " Lord Derby's career as a Minister ought to terminate, and ' The Dardanelles ' ought to be engraved as an epitaph on his political tomb." 82 A more formal reply to the ministry's notification to Russia in regard to the proposed sending of the fleet was placed in the foreign secretary's hands on the 13th. Prince Gortchakoff had in view the " temporary entry " of a part 81

Standard, Feb. 12, 1878.

" Morning Post, Feb. 12, 1878.

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341

of the imperial troops into Constantinople " with exactly the same object" as set forth by Lord Derby, " with the distinction that our protection, if required, will be extended to all the Christians. The two Governments would thus be fulfilling a common duty of humanity. It follows that this task, being of a pacific nature, could not assume in any way the character of mutual hostility." 18 Lord Derby could not admit that the case of a military occupation of the city itself and that of sending men-of-war into a harbor below the city were parallel. The entry of Russian troops was " not justified." 14 In the course of his conversation with the Russian ambassador that afternoon on the situation at the moment, the foreign secretary took occasion to express an earnest hope, on the part of the ministry, that the imperial government would " not make any movement of troops towards Gallipoli, or of such a nature as to threaten the communications of the English fleet." Any such movement, he continued, " would be regarded in England as compromising the safety of the fleet," and, in the actual state of public feeling, he " could not answer for the consequences, which might be most serious." 85 Parliament was almost daily kept rather well informed on the state of affairs. On the 14th came the announcement that a detachment of the fleet had finally made its way through the Dardanelles despite the formal protest of the Porte. No other steps had, however, been taken to oppose its passage. The ships had that day anchored off Prince's Islands, a few miles below the city. They had, thus, stopped short of the Bosphorus. In the Commons, the Irreconcilables took the occasion of the second reading of the Consoli83

Sessional Papers, 1878, vol. l x x x i , T u r k e y # 14, no. 5.

«Ibid., 45

no. 6.

Ibid., no. 7.

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dated Fund Bill (£6,000,000) to show that they had not been entirely cowed into silence, but, in the main, Parliament acquiesced to the demand for a united front. Russia continued to advance her forces, even beyond the lines fixed by the armistice, holding her new positions despite the remonstrances of Her Majesty's Government. However, on reflection, she did not order her troops to enter Constantinople itself. The British fleet, on the advice of Layard and for the purpose of better anchorage, was moved further from the entrance to the Bosphorus in the direction of Moudania Bay. It remained in the Sea of Marmora but out of sight of the population of the capital. A compromise was rapidly effected by the two Powers in an effort to eliminate possible causes of friction. Count Schouvaloff, on the 18th, informed Lord Derby that he had been authorized to promise that Russian troops would not occupy Gallipoli nor would they enter the lines of Bulair. The imperial cabinet expected in return that " no English troops should be landed on the Asiatic or European coast." 88 The foreign secretary received the communication with satisfaction, agreeing " not to land troops on the European side of the Straits." He would extend that engagement to the Asiatic side if the czar's government would do likewise."7 Prince Gortchakoff pledged in turn, on the 21st, that Russia had no intention of occupying " the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles," if England abstained.38 The complete negotiations were announced in Parliament that same evening by ministers of the Crown and tension eased to a degree. The vast majority of British journals approved of the arrangement as a step in the direction of peace. The Daily News viewed the agreement with " unmingled satisfaction," 84Sessional

Papers, 1878, vol. lxxxi, Turkey # 17, no. 1.

87

Ibid., no. 2. Memorandum to Schouvaloff, dated Feb. 19.

88

Ibid., no. 3.

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343

as did the Echo, the Scotsman, the Times and the Standard, along with numerous of its ministerial associates. A few of the more ardent supporters of Lord Beaconsfield, whose motto seemed to be " strokes must arbitrate," considered the compact humiliating. Many a contingency was possible which might render it " highly inconvenient" and " even dangerous." Such " haggling and bargaining " was a hazardous game to play at with Prince Gortchakoff, who should have been told, in the judgment of the Daily Telegraph, that the best way to obviate any landing of British forces on or about the Chersonese " would be to furnish no cause for such a step." Pall Mall's comment was more sarcastic: " Russia maintains her threatening position at every point, and in twenty-four hours can use it to full advantage; while we, knowing nothing of Russia's programme, nothing certain of her relations with Turkey, put on a pair of fetters by way of equalising conditions." The Morning Post was bitter over this new exhibition of England as an " emasculated nation.'' " A s we have made ourselves contemptible, Russia, wise in her generation, treats us with contempt." 88 Queen Victoria, as her letters to Lord Beaconsfield show, shared the convictions of the Morning Post in regard to the conduct of foreign affairs under the head of the house of Stanley. The country should know who had " dragged them down." Her impulse would be " to lay down the thorny crown " if the position of England remained one so humiliating." The Queen desired " a bold, firm, decided course.'' A policy of neutrality was " fatal." 41 39

A l l journals cited in above paragraph are issues of Feb. 22, 1878.

Victoria wrote those lines on Feb. 9, with the knowledge that the fleet had just been ordered through the Dardanelles. Buckle, op. cit., P- 245. 40

41

Ibid., p. 247.

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Primroses f r o m Her Majesty's island home were, however, the reward for the Queen's favorite minister. Several weeks before, Victoria had offered Beaconsfield the dignity of the Garter but the premier had graciously declined the offer, writing that no reward could " ever equal " the possession o f his Sovereign's " kind thoughts." 4 2 Mayfair contained a neat sketch on the offer by its redoubtable little editor, Henry L u c y : T o make our Prime Minister sprucer and smarter Her Majesty offered to give him ' the Garter;' But he said, ' T o decline I respectfully beg, Let some other great Peer wear that badge on his leg. The nation gives all that I want, if I speak, And has promised to pay me six millions next week, A proof most distinct—if of proof there were dearth— Of how wide is my fame and how sterling my worth. But no more is required from you, it is clear; I made you an Empress—you made me a Peer. I need nothing further in dignity's w a y ; Oblige me by taking that Bauble away.' 4 8 Despite the prevailing sentiment, there were some who were still courageously raising their voices in favor of peace. A stormy meeting had taken place in the Birmingham town hall on the 12th. It had been convened by the Conservative Association for the purpose of passing a vote of confidence in the government; but the Liberal Association also issued placards calling upon the adherents of peace to attend. Banners bearing the words " Vote for Bright " and " Vote for Gladstone " were raised during the proceedings, with disastrous result as they were torn to pieces by the more warlike partisans." They were, however, more successful *»Ibid., p. 226. 45

Mayfair, Feb. 12, 1878.

44

Account of meeting in the Pall Mall Gazette, Feb. 13, 1878.

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in passing a resolution approving of the course taken by the 124 members of the Commons in voting against the grant for military and naval purposes at their own more secluded meeting in the Queen's hotel on the following day. John Ruskin, who would exchange every sword for a ploughshare, occupied himself in writing his monthly sermon for Fors Clavigera," that unique miscellany satirizing the faults and follies of the age. Ruskin decried the evil war-spirit stimulated by such excessive expenditure of type in British newspapers. " All that counsel," he called to the attention of his readers, " you have bought with a price. Mr. Carlyle and Mr. Froude gave you theirs gratis, as all the best things are given." 48 His followers were advised, by proverb and vision, after the master had first washed the caterpillar out of the cabbage, to look for guidance in some of the past words of Argyll, Gladstone, and the late George Dawson, rather than in the columns of the diligent but untrustworthy gentlemen of the press.47 In London, the Workingmen's neutrality committee 48 persuaded Gladstone to address a public gathering set for the 21 st in Agricultural hall. Bright, Lawson, and Mundella were expected to accompany him. Another group of workers, headed by Auberon Herbert, resolved to hold a mass demonstration in Hyde Park on Sunday the 24th. Punch felt called upon to offer up a " parody for the Prudent: " We don't want to go to war; for, by jingo, if we do, We may lose our ships, and lose our men, and what's worse, our money too.4' 41

He was writing in raid-February for the March issue. Ruskin was referring back to the " National Conference " of Dec., 1876. 4T John Ruskin, Fors Clavigera (Orpington, 1896), vol. iv, Letter 87— " The Snow Manger." 48 4 Supra, p. 293. » Punch, Feb. 23, 1878. 48

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Gladstone reconsidered his promise to address the gathering set for Agricultural hall and the meeting was abandoned as inexpedient in view of the temper of the public. Not so the leaders of the more radical group, who exhorted their adherents " at every cost to maintain the rights of free meeting and free speech." Unfortunately, an anti-Russian demonstration was called for the same hour in Hyde Park, under the chairmanship of Lt. Armit, R . N., to point out to their " mistaken fellow-countrymen " that they did not truly represent English opinion. A huge throng, numbering between 60 to 70 thousand, gathered to view the proceedings, leaving few places of shelter for those who sought the normal quietude of a London Sabbath in Hyde Park. The anti-Russian cohorts, assembled at Marble Arch, commenced their deliberations somewhat earlier than expected and hurriedly carried their resolutions on the news that the Peace party had started its demonstration. They then moved bodily to the other end of the park to propose counter-resolutions at the rival meeting. Herbert, Bradlaugh, the Rev. Mr. Staunton, and other workingmen leaders were on the platform encircled by the advocates of peace. The chairman had opened the meeting and managed to convey his opinion that the government seemed unaware of the peaceable disposition of the greater part of the English nation of which their group was representative. They were assembled to warn the ministry against embarking upon an " unjust and unnecessary w a r , " to assert and maintain the rights of free speech and free meeting, which they were determined " should not be taken from them " — a t that point occurred a rush of the equally confident partisans of a more bellicose policy, and Herbert, Bradlaugh and the clergyman were swept away along with the platform. The mêlée became general, resulting in the extreme discomfiture and utter rout of the lovers of peace.

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The jubilant victors then formed in procession and marched through Piccadilly, Arlington and St. James' streets to Pall Mall. Cheers were delivered at the Guards' and Carlton clubs, whereas at the Reform Club the reverse of a pleasant demonstration was made. They made their way to Downing-street, tarrying there until a lusty welcome could be given the arrival of Lord Beaconsfield, and ultimately ended up in Trafalgar-square where eloquence and milling continued until late in the evening.60 One section of the mob had headed for the town-residence of Gladstone in Harley-street, where it proceeded to hoot, howl, and stone the windows until driven off by a detail of police.51 It was now the turn of the Radical journals to decry such untimely gathering of mobs of " roughs," while the ministerial press pointed to the monster demonstration as impressive evidence of the will of " the people." No one " save the most accomplished sceptic " could doubt " the opinion of the metropolis." 52 Gladstone prudently resorted to the pen to inform the public that a " war undertaken without cause is a war of shame, and not of honour." 68 The same issue of the Nineteenth Century contained an article, fairly bristling with statistics, asserting that England never had been " so strong in a military sense " as at the present time." The writer, Sir Garnet Wolseley, had only recently been selected along with Lord Napier of Magdala to head a proposed expeditionary force to the East in the 60 Accounts of the demonstration are to be found in the Times and other newspapers of Feb. 25, 1878. 51 Cf. Lucy Masterman (editor), Mary Gladstone, Her Diaries Letters ( N e w York, 1930), pp. 133-33. 52

Daily Telegraph, Feb. 25, 1878.

Nineteenth Shame." 53

01

and

Century, March, 1878, " The Paths of Honour and of

Ibid., " England as a Military Power in 1854 and 1878."

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event that circumstances required i t Their selection was confirmed in Parliament on the last day of February. 68 The cabinet had been busily engaged for several weeks in pushing the military preparations of the nation and in hypothetically concluding the Austrian alliance, buying the Turkish fleet, or occupying some desirable place of arms in the Levant. es The acute phase of the crisis had passed with the agreement concerning Gallipoli and the lines of Bulair, but grave anxiety continued regarding the peace negotiations in progress and over the uncertainties of the conference. Prince Bismarck had as well aided in bringing about that somewhat more rational state of mind. Although patriotic editors resented his attitude of cynical indifference to the particular interests of their country, the very serenity of his statement to the Reichstag on being interpellated augured peace."7 The German chancellor intended holding strictly aloof from the quarrels of the other Powers. However, he foresaw no serious obstacles in the path of the proposed congress,58 which he anticipated would meet about the middle of March, possibly at Baden-Baden. The role of the Reich would be confined " to the modest task of a broker who settled a bargain between different parties." 09 More satisfactory to the majority was the news that the Austrian ministry had resolved in principle to ask the Delegations for a vote of credit.80 That was interpreted to betoken a decision on the part of Austria to range herself with England in curb65

Hansard, vol. ccxxxviii, p. 453.

Cf. Buckle, op. cit., pp. 248-53, for the details of cabinet meetings held during latter February. 84

87

Made on Feb. 19.

The suggestion had been made that the conference become a congress, but it was not yet official. 88

88

Account in the Times, Feb. 20, 1878.

60

On Feb. 24, as of news-items of the 25th.

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ing any exorbitant pretensions which might be set forth by Russia. Muscovite ambition could scarcely prevail against Britain allied with Austria. The later prolonged controversy over the questions to be laid before the congress for deliberation was foreshadowed by occasional references to the subject in ministerial organs during February. England in conference or congress, stated the Standard, would not refuse to ratify a particular engagement entered into by Russia and Turkey merely because she had not been consulted. " W e shall be ready to deal with each proposal on its own merits." 81 The Daily Telegraph pressed for a peace consonant with the dignity and safety of the empire. " Such a peace may be made in the Conference if Russia takes there the entire question, without any provocatory advances, and without any useless devices to elude the existing force of the Treaty of 1871." 42 A f t e r the usual delay, formal negotiations for the preliminary treaty between Russia and the Porte had commenced in mid-February, two weeks after the signing of the armistice. The English public was soon made cognizant of the general tenor of the terms the czar's government intended exacting by publication of the confidential conversations on the subject of the conditions of peace carried on by Derby and Schouvaloff the previous June.™ The reaction of the Radical Daily Chronicle should alone suffice to indicate the changed temper of even those groups most willing to place some faith in Russia. " Every line of Count Schouvaloff's memorandum suggests a scheme of aggression and conquest, and the poor Christians are made the mere pretext for gratifying the overweening ambition of Russia." Her most 81

Standard, Feb. 18, 1878.

82

Daily Telegraph, Feb. 18, 1878.

Supra, pp. 245-48. Feb. 18. 88

Turkey # 1 5 was laid before Parliament on

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devoted adherents must now realize " how hollow and untrustworthy " are her statements." Rumors of wrangling and imminent breakdown of the negotiations, due to the harsh terms which the Turkish plenipotentiaries refused to sign, soon found their way into the press. Russia, it was stated, threatened occupation of Constantinople if the Porte continued its hesitation. A m o n g the intimated concessions demanded were the cession of the Turkish ironclads, the payment of an excessive money indemnity, the creation of a huge Bulgaria under Russian influence, and territorial awards of an extravagant nature in Asia Minor. Britain's newspaper belligerents thereupon redoubled their threats and exhausted their vocabularies. T h e Daily Telegraph considered the present program " more monstrous and exacting " than any hitherto proposed. It was " so offensive " to England that acceptance by the Porte must oblige the conference, if it ever met, " to begin by disallowing almost all that had been done." 68 The conditions were of " a most crushing character " in the opinion of the Daily Chronicle,88 " Philanthropic Russia," raved the Standard, " has at length shown her hand, and it is one of undisguised conquest, greed, and avowed rapine. . . . A harder bargain was never driven by the most pitiless of devastators." 87 T h e Times found Europe scarcely prepared for the " startling severity of such a " sweeping series of demands." 98 Even the Daily News objected to the " secrecy " and " reserve " of Russian diplomacy, remarking that under such circumstances the czar's government had no right to comDaily Chronicle, Feb. 19, 1878. 85

Daily Telegraph, Feb. 25, 1878.