Bringing sociology to international relations: world politics as differentiation theory 9781107039001

Citation preview

Bringing Sociology to International Relations World Politics as Differentiation Theory

EDITED BY

Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan and Michael Zürn Cambridge

Functional differentiation has long been at the heart of sociological thought, and as such has become a defining feature in the evolution of modern society- one that distinguishes it from pre-modern societies which have instead typically differentiated by means of segmentation, or by stratified social Systems such as class. Drawing on the latest developments on differentiation theory in international relations and sociology, this book brings together contributions from leading IR scholars and sociological theorists to offer a unique interdisciplinary synthesis in which contemporary world politics is discussed as a differentiated social realm. Bringing Sociology to International Relations is an illuminating and innovative new resource for scholars and students, which strives to respond to a significant question across all its chapters: what happens when this well-established framework based on sociological theory is transposed from the domestic level, for which it was originally designed, to the larger and more complexsubject of international relations?

Bringing Sociology to International Relations World Politics as Differentiation Theory

Functional differentiation has long been at the heart of sociological thought, and as such has become a defining feature in the evolution of modern society - one that distinguishes it from pre-modern societies which have instead typically differentiated by means of segmentation, or by stratified social systems such as class. Drawing on the latest developments on differentiation theory in international relations and sociology, this book brings together contributions from leading IR scholars and sociological theorists to offer a unique interdisciplinary synthesis in which contemporary world politics is discussed as a differentiated social realm. Bringing Sociology to International Relations is an illuminating and innovative new resource for scholars and students, which strives to respond to a significant question across all its chapters: what happens when this well-established framework based on sociological theory is transposed from the domestic level, for which it was originally designed, to the larger and more complex subject of international relations? albert is Professor of Political Science at Bielefeld University and Honorary Professor at the University of Arhus.

mathias

is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, and Honorary Professor at the Universities of Copenhagen and Jilin. barry buzan

ZÜRN is Director at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlín and Professor of International Relations at the Free University of Berlín. michael

Bringing Sociology to International Relations World Politics as Differentiation Theory

Edited by

Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan and Michael Zürn

gg Cambridge UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge UNIVERSITY PRESS University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge. It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www. Cambridge. org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107039001

© Cambridge University Press 2013 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2013

Printed in the United Kingdom by Clays, St Ives pie A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Bringing sociology to international relations : world politics as differentiation theory / edited by Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan, Michael Ziirn pages cm. ISBN 978-1-107-03900-1 (hardback) 1. International relations - Sociological aspeets. I. Albert, Mathias. JZ1251.B75 2013 327.101 - dc23 2013015316 ISBN 978-1-107-03900-1 Hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any contení on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Contení s

Notes on contributors Preface

1

page vii ix

Introduction: differentiation theory and international relations

1

MATHIAS ALBERT, BARRY BUZAN AND MICHAEL ZÜRN

Part I

2

Sociological perspectives Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

27

GEORGE M. THOMAS

3

The history and systematics of functional differentiation in sociology

50

RUDOLF STICHWEH

4

Functional, segmentary and stratificatory differentiation of world society

71

RICHARD MÜNCH

Part II On the differentiated structure of the international system

5

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches

91

JACK DONNELLY

6

Stratificatory differentiation as a constitutive principie of the international system 112 LORA ANNE VIOLA

V

Contents

vi

7

Some quanta of solace: world politics in the era of functional differentiation

132

STEPHAN STETTER

Part III On the interplay of (global) function Systems

8

Functional differentiation and the oughts and musts of International law

159

OLIVER KESSLER AND FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL

9

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world society

182

MATHIAS KOENIG-ARCHIBUGI

10

Functional differentiation, globalization and the new transnational neopluralism

205

PHILIP G. CERNY

11

Conclusión: differentiation theory and world politics

228

MICHAEL ZÜRN, BARRY BUZAN AND

MATHIAS ALBERT

Bibliography Index

246 274

Contributors

is Professor of Political Science at Bielefeld University and Honorary Professor at the University of Arhus. He is currently one of the editors of the Review of International Studies and Associate Editor of Geopolitics.

mathias albert

is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics ánd Honorary Professor at the Universities of Copenhagen and Jilin. He is a fellow of the British Academy.

barry buzan

Philip G. cerny is an independent political analyst based in York, United Kingdom. He is Emeritus Professor of Politics and Global Affairs at the University of Manchester (UK) and Rutgers UniversityNewark (USA). is the Andrew Mellon Professor at the Joseph Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver.

jack donnelly

is Professor of International Relations at Erfurt University and International Scholar at Kyung Hee University, Korea.

oliver kessler

is presently International Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul (Korea). He previously held positions at the EUI (Florence), the LMU (Munich), at Columbia (New York) and Penn (Philadelphia).

friedrich kratochwil

is Sénior Lecturer in Global Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

mathias koenig-archibugi

Richard münch is Professor of Sociology at the University of Bamberg and a member of Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences.

Professor of International Relations and Conflict Studies at the Universitát der Bundeswehr, Munich, and is also co­ editor of the Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen.

stephan stetterís

vii

viii

Notes on contributors

is Professor for the Theory of Modern Society at the University of Bonn, Director of the Forum Internationale Wissenschaft at Bonn, and a permanent Visiting Professor of Sociology at the University of Lucerne.

rudolf stichweh

is Professor of Politics and Global Studies at Atizona State University.

george m. thomas

is Professor of US Foreign and Security Policy at the John-F. Kennedy-Institute at the Free University of Berlin.

lora anne viola

is Director at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and Professor of International Relations at the Free University of Berlin.

michael zürn

Preface

This book has been rather long in the making. That is not at all uncommon for academic books, often due to mundane matters such as deadlines not being observed. But in the present case the long maturing has mostly been due to the fact that, first, it took time for three people walking different intellectual paths in International Relations (IR) to converge on the same spot and, second, that we allowed ourselves and the group of authors assembled in this volume a number of revisión rounds for the texts, including two authors’ workshops. Convergence on the subject of social differentiation in IR originated in a joint discussion, starting in 2005, between two of the editors (Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan) on the relation between the notions of sectors and functional differentiation. Rather than being a one-off discussion, this led to further exchanges, the results of which have now been published in two articles (Buzan and Albert, 2010; Albert and Buzan, 2011). The dúo expanded into a trio when Mathias Albert pushed Michael Zürn to look at his dieses about a ‘legally stratified multi-level system’ from the point of view of differentiation theory. This discussion led to a debate about the interplay between different forms of differentiation. In common discussions we then soon found out that differentiation theory provides a useful way of focusing the thoughts of contributors from different backgrounds in both theoretical and empirical work in IR; and, indeed, that differentiation theory provides a promising basis for substantive discussions and exchanges between sociological and IR approaches. This book would not have been possible without the engaged participation of its contributors. We would like to thank the Social Science Research Center in Berlin (WZB) and the Institute for World Society Studies for each sponsoring one workshop which allowed us to bring the contributors together. Thanks for very helpful substantive input go to

ix

X

Preface

Peter Haas, who served as discussant at one of these workshops, as well as to two anonymous reviewers for Cambridge University Press. Valuable research assistance at various stages of the project has been provided by Julia Lohr and Thomas Müller, both at Bielefeld, and Georg Simmerl at the WZB.

1

Introduction: differentiation theory and International relations Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan and Michael Zürn

Bringing Sociology to International Relations (IR) sounds like an endeavour doomed to failure. One might object in the first place that it has been always there. Some of the most influential figures in IR in the 1960s and 1970s such as Hedley Bull (1977; ‘International society’), Karl W. Deutsch (1969; ‘communication’ and ‘community’) and Morten Kaplan (1957; ‘systems analysis’) used key concepts from Sociology. In Germany and France, many prominent figures working on IR like Dieter Senghaas (see Senghaas, 1971) and Raymond Aron (see Aron, 1966) were even considered (Senghaas), or explicitly figured (Aron), as sociologists. And today the term sociological institutionalism points to a school of thought which - as opposed to rational institutionalism - prefers constructivist theorizing and covers a significant share of IR scholarship. One might also object that it is impossible to bring the whole richness of approaches and thinking in Sociology to IR. The ambition to bring Sociology to IR thus would per se be in vain. Both objections are correct. What this book does is, indeed, much more modest, though still ambitious: it argües that the understanding of IR can benefit from taking into account a specific sociological theory - differentiation theory - in order to grasp the dynamics underlying structural change in the global social realm. ‘Differentiation’, in the broadest sense, refers to the form and structure of a large-scale social entity, traditionally ‘society’:1 that is, how and on the basis of which structuring principie, are the main units within a social system (or subsystem) defined and distinguished from one another. More specifically, we can discrimínate at least three forms of this process (Buzan and Albert, 2010: 318): segmentary dif­ ferentiation is where every social subsystem is equal, and functionally similar, to every other social subsystem; stratificatory differentiation is1

1 Although the term ‘functional differentiation’, in particular, is quite prominent in research on rather small-scale units, especially in biology. For links between biological and sociological thought during the inception of differentiation theory thought, see the contribution by Stichweh in this volume.

1

2

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

where some persons or groups raise themselves above others, creating a hierarchical social order; functional differentiation is where the subsystems are defined by the coherence of particular types of activity and their differentiation from other types of activity, and these differences do not stem simply from rank. With these conceptual tools to hand, two general reasons for an engagement with differentiation theory in IR become obvious. First, differentia­ tion theory is probably the most general theory of social change, and this is needed in IR; second, international politics cannot be treated in isolation from its broader social environment. Once that is acknowledged, then it is plausible to look more closely at what concepts the sociological toolbox might have to offer. More specifically, the attraction of using an approach based on differentiation theory is that it allows one to analyse changes on a macro level by using the coherent and highly durable framing of an interplay between various forms of differentiation. Such an analytical language immediately overcomes some of the conceptually barren debates that currently confuse IR on whether the international system is ‘Westphalian’ or ‘post-Westphalian’ (it is both, in that both segmentary differentiation into territorial States as well as other forms of differentiation play a role in ordering the global political system), or on whether the nation-state is ‘out’ or ‘in’. Differentiation theory is not only helpful for understanding change within an international system of States, but also in studying the historical and contemporary changes of such a system in its social environment. The term differentiation theory requires some explanation as it desig­ nares two different, albeit closely related, things. On the one hand, there is a relatively small set of sociological approaches which are more or less explicit theories of the differentiation of society. This would particularly inelude much of Talcott Parson’s and Niklas Luhmann’s work - and in the tradition of the latter a significant chunk of theorizing in contempo­ rary Germán Sociology (see the chapters by Münch and Stichweh in this volume) - as well as an important Anglo-Saxon strand of sociological research - Jefffey Alexander and Shmuel Eisenstadt may serve as reference ñames - which aimed to intégrate actors and conflicts into the theory (see Eisenstadt, 1963; Alexander and Colomy, 1990). On the.other hand, much of classical Sociology has always been about the (mostly functional) differentiation of society, without the term being used explicitly. Differ­ entiation thus has always been at the core of sociological thought about the emergence and evolution of modern society. The movement fforn Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft is, in Sociology, almost constitutively associated with functional differentiation. The forms and pathways of what, in various guises, appears as the ‘división of labour’, ‘specialization’, ‘role

Differentiation theory and international relations

3

differentiation’ etc., point to the recognition that some kind oífunctional differentiation is a deíining feature of modern society. In this view, modern society is distinguished from pre-modern societies in that segmentary differentiation between families, clans and local communities, and stratificatory differentiation marked by hierarchies of class, caste or race, are superseded as the dominant form of social structure by functional differentiation (into politics, the economy, law etc.) that encompasses society as a whole. In this account ‘society’ is essentially national society.2 This also means that approaches in classical Sociology were primarily concerned with the question of what holds society together despite the disintegrating forces exerted by functional differentiation - a guiding question in sociological theorizing. The answers to this question differ, but invariably focus on some variation of the Gemeinschaft theme, that is, a shared identity or common norms and valúes (e.g. Parson’s ‘societal community’ or Habermas’s ‘lifeworld’; see Habermas, 1981; Parsons, 1999). Unfortunately, sociological theory has only rarely transposed thinking about differentiation and its consequences explicitly to the global level, although it has taken up issues of globalization in various ways. The main exception here is Luhmannian Systems theory, which relies on a strong and explicit differentiation theory for analysing world society. However, even here, thinking through world society in terms of differentiation theory has remained more of a theoretical postúlate and has not been translated into extensive forms of empirical analysis. Moreover, these analyses have never tried to relate to concepts used in IR theory.3 This is all the more a pity as thinking in terms of differentiation promises to provide a powerful conceptual tool to analyse the current form and the evolution of both world society and the international political system. We understand world society here not in the sense of a particular theoretical tradition, but as referring to a global social realm broadly conceived, of which the political system is an important, but by no means the only, part. Such a broad notion involves both understandings of society, based either on the potentiality of communication or on some commonality of norms and/or cognitive Scripts. However, it is important to point out at the beginning of this book that while the functional differentiation of the social world - into politics, economy, law, art, sport etc. - forms an obvious part of social reality (independent of the precise understanding of world society), there can be no doubt that other 2 Of course, there are suggestions for another reading of, for instance, Durkheim (see e.g. Inglis and Robertson, 2008). 3 See the contributions in Albert and Hilkermeier (2004) for a detailed discussion.

4

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

forms of differentiation, most notably stratification (bosses, leaders, great powers, nuclear weapon States, cores, empires) and segmentation (family, clan, tribe, nation, State) play an important role too. This being the case, utilizing a differentiation theory perspective requires us not only to debate the primacy of a specific kind of differentiation, but also to inquire into the specific ways in which different forms of differentiation overlap and internet with each other. It would be wrong to claim that differentiation has so far played no role at all in IR, even though the assertion by Kenneth Waltz that the International political system is not differentiated functionally may make it seem so. Beneath the discipline’s founding idea that the international system is essentially a system of States, lies the claim that a segmentary differentiation into States is more important than functional differenti­ ation. Yet functional differentiation implicitly plays an important role when, as is commonly done, an international legal or an international economic system, or an international or world society, are distinguished from an international political system. Similarly, although the segmentary signifier of anarchy is privileged in IR discussions of political structure, there is no escape from the stratificatory differentiation of great powers and hegemons from the ordinary run of other States, a distinction cen­ tral to all forms of realist and English School thinking, and many liberal ones too (see e.g. Hurrell, 2007: chap. 7). The distinction between core and periphery common to dependeney theory, and to some historical Sociology and International Political Economy (IPE) also refleets a key stratificatory differentiation.4 How these three forms of differentiation can be thought of together - and what it is exactly that is differenti­ ated - has, however, largely escaped the attention of the otherwise lively theoretical debates in the discipline. This book, therefore, starts from the assumption that IR has a lot to gain from thinking in differentiation theory terms. We think, moreover, that sociological analyses of world society also have something to gain: first, by taking into account empirical analyses of the changing structures of world politics and the varying forms of differentiation expressed therein, and, second, by confronting the issues that in IR are dealt with as levels of analysis. This book also starts from the bbservation that the debates about a ‘primacy’ of this or that form of differentiation in world society, while being heuristically useful in describing long-term 4 Luhmann adds some accounts of the core-periphery differentiation as a fourth type of differentiation (see Luhmann, 1990b: 423; see also both Münch, this volunte, and Kessler and Kratochwil, this volume: footnote 1). We see the core-periphery differentiation, however, as a subtype of stratificatory differentiation without denying that it may be useful for some purposes to consider it separately.

Differentiation theory and International relations

5

historical trends in the evolution of modern (world) society, have not proven very useful in guiding more specific analyses of the changing forms of world society. Rather than pursuing the question of which (if any) form of differentiation reigns primary in world society, we argüe that the analytical strengths of the vocabulary of differentiation theory can be played out most effectively if it is used in order to ask how different forms of differentiation emerge, become more or less important, change over time, and interact with each other.5 Asking this question moves one away from overly abstract and agency-free structural-functionalist theorizing and brings actors and resistance to functional differentiation into the picture as well. Part of the attraction of using differentiation theory thought in the context of IR is that it challenges the traditional state-centric definition of what the International system is, while not eliminating the role of clearly demarcated sovereign territorial States. A differentiation framing allows for a double constituency of the International system consisting of States and society and the simultaneous presence of different forms of differentiation alongside, and even within, the political system of world society. A differentiation approach allows one to think more thoroughly about the question of the basis on which such a political system is differentiated from other (e.g. economic, legal, scientific etc.) Systems within a broader social context. If one conceives the political system as the realm of collectively binding decisions, how does it relate for instance to the economic sphere? Of course, answers here can vary widely according to the underlying social theory used (e.g. Marxism or pluralism, or whether the whole is integrated by a public sphere or not). But, irrespective of these underlying theoretical positions, it seems clear that functional dif­ ferentiation means that different, functionally defined systems work to a significant extent according to their own (economic, political, legal etc.) ‘logic’. If the international system is understood as consisting of múltiple function systems rather than just one (the political), this opens the way to the conclusión that such a system will require an extensive and possibly increasing amount of coordination across these function systems if it is to remain coherent.6 5 This also means that, in general, we would not make such a strong distinction between ‘type’ and ‘dimensión’ approaches as Jack Donnelly does in his contribution to this volunte. Even in ‘type’ approaches there is no hiding the fact that historically different forms of differentiation always existed at the same time. 6 In the remainder, we use the term ‘system’ in ‘function system’ to refer to sectoral settings like economy, politics, law etc. We thus follow the Luhmannian terminology. In this theory, each of these systems is autonomous and autopoietic and thus not part of a larger system. Those who see function systems as part of a social whole (i.e. society), which is based on at least some minimal form of normative and cognitive integration, tend

6

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

In addition, as much as the notion of functional differentiation helps and requires one to address the relation between different function Sys­ tems of society, it also helps to conceptualize developments within single function systems, namely, in our case, the political system. Thus, while no one would dispute that segmentation continúes to play a very important role as the form of differentiation of the political system of world society into territorial States, other forms of differentiation also play an important role within the political system. World politics is stratified, both in a formal sense through the prime responsibility of the UN Security Council for the preservation of peace, and in an informal sense through the claims of great powers to transíate the unequal distribution of powers into special roles and privileges. It is functionally differentiated, both in the more narrow sense of role differentiation (some States serving as leaders or providers of collective goods, others as followers or neutral States etc.) and in a more general sense in that political communication and decisión making are increasingly structured along functionally defined issue areas in the form of international regimes such as the climate regime, the free trade regime etc. In fact, one could argüe that most of the process of ‘global governance’ can be understood in terms of a restructuring of the political systems in terms of functionally defined problem solving. Some speak in this context of fragmentation (Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 2004; Benvenisti and Downs, 2007). The purpose of this book is to take up a recently begun debate on dif­ ferentiation theory in IR (see e.g. Zürn, 2007a; Donnelly, 2009; Buzan and Albert, 2010), enlist some additional sociological input for this pur­ pose, and explore what this vocabulary can add to our understanding of IR. This is not merely an exercise in ‘importing’ sociological insights into IR. What is required is a dialogue between IR and Sociology about what is actually being studied, that is, how notions of an ‘International system’ or ‘International relations’ or ‘International society’ relate to notions of ‘(world) society’, ‘world polity’ etc. These very general issues form the background for the following chapters, and we will return to them more explicitly in the concluding chapter. In this context, the contributions to this book pursue three main themes, each led by a guiding question: 1. In what relation do the three basic forms of differentiation stand to each other? Classical social theory suggests that one form should

to use the term ‘subsystem’. While we use the Luhmannian terminology here, where a ‘subsystem’ could only be a subsystem of a function system, we do not necessarily follow the conceptualization of social systems as autopoietic and not part of a social whole; see Albert et al. (2010) on the varieties of systems thought in IR.

Differentiation theory and international relations

7

normally be dominant, and that segmentary, stratificatory and func­ tional differentiation can therefore be used to identify fundamental types of social order. Applying this theoretical framework to the large and relatively lightly integrated subject matter of an international system/society suggests that all three basic types of differentiation are strongly in play, and that what matters is the mixtures and dispositions among them. For example, as just argued, one finds segmentary, stratificatory and functional differentiation within the functionally differentiated realm of politics. For IR, modernity, therefore, cannot just be about the displacement of stratification by functional differentia­ tion as the dominant social form. Moreover, the question arises about the relationship between detailed differentiation within individual sectors and general differentiation between them. Is a growing división of labour within the political system a consequence or a cause of growing functional differentiation in the international system/society overall? 2. Assuming that functional differentiation is in play, what is the rela­ tionship of different functionally defined subsystems/sectors to each other? Are function systems/sectors autonomous and equal? Or do some have special features that put them somehow above the others: e.g. law (as argued for by global constitutionalists), politics (as argued for by realists), or economy (as argued for by Marxists)? Is the political system different from others in that it coordinares the different subsystems? In this view, the political system not only interacts with other social Systems, it aspires to regúlate all social systems. Or does the collective interdependence among functionally differentiated realms mean that they cannot be thought about in either of these ways? What actually constitutes the political subsystem and how does it relate to the legal system? 3. Since differentiation theory is a logic of división, what is it that inte­ grares a social whole sufficiently for it to be thought of as a whole: a system or a society? This is particularly important for the subject mat­ ter of international relations, where, in contrast to the domestic realm, it is generally easier to think of the whole as being emergent rather than something pre-existing and primal. The domestic realm comes with a sense of community because it is assumed to have emerged from a process beginning with segmentary differentiation. The inter­ national realm has no such starting coherence, instead coming into being as a result of rising interactions, and this raises several questions. Is the integration merely mechanical connectedness? Is it, as the English School would claim, somehow framed by an ideology or set of valúes that legitimizes particular forms of differentiation, just as liberalism supports functional differentiation, aristocratic rule supports

8

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

stratificatory differentiation and sovereigntism supports segmentary differentiation? Does it arise as a natural product of the interdependence created by differentiation when mechanical connectedness is in play? Or, indeed, is it justified to speak of integration at all here, or is society a ‘social whole’ which is characterized by a multiplicity of heterogeneities without a common denominator? The next section will introduce some basic notions of differentiation theory and examine how it has fared so far in IR theory. We will then show how much of what has been analysed in terms of institutionalization and globalization in IR can, through the lens of differentiation theory, be interpreted as a weakening of segmentary differentiation within the political system of world society. In the next two sections, we raise the issue to what extent the weakening of segmentary differentiation gets translated into the increasing importance of functional and stratificatory differentiation. Moreover, a particular analytical challenge is posed by functional differentiation, because it requires the making of a clear distinction between processes within the functionally differentiated realm of politics and processes in other functionally defined realms of society (and of course their relation to each other). This introduction will conclude by giving a brief overview of the chapters that follow this one.

1

Differentiation theory and the theory of International politics

As Jeffrey Alexander (1990: 1) aptly observed, differentiation plays a major role in the evolution of the social world, though ‘[o]bviously, not all social change is differentiation’. Differentiation, and particularly func­ tional differentiation (or, in traditional parlance, the ‘división of labour’) has been and continúes to be a running theme of sociological theory and, more specifically, of theories of society. From its inception as a systematic academic endeavour, and particularly through Herbert Spencer’s (1966) and Auguste Comte’s (1975) observation that complexification and differentiation form driving dynamics of modern society, Sociology has concerned itself with issues of (functional) differentiation, as well as the corollary question of what holds a differentiated society-together. In this context, classical Sociology has been largely concerned with the impact of modernity on national societies and the consequential shift from stratificatory to functional differentiation within them.7 These analyses presupposed segmentary differentiation at the global level in that the 7

This section in part borrows from and expands the argument found in Buzan and Albert (2010).

Differentiation theory and international relations

9

separation of the world into politically and socially distinct and independent territorial units was taken as given. In this framing, society was something that existed befare functional differentiation became dominant. The marker for society was the existence of shared beliefs and sentiments, Durkheim’s collective conscience, that both gave social cohesión to a par­ ticular group of people and differentiated them from other cultures. This concept of society leaned strongly towards Gemeinschaft (community), understanding it as something evolved, historie and oíd. From that starting point, the problem was how the cohesión of such societies could survive the ever more pervasive impact of modernity as functional dif­ ferentiation. What unites the classical works of Sociology, ranging from Herbert Spencer (1966) and Emile Durkheim (1933), through Georg Simmel (1908) and Max Weber (1968a), to Talcott Parsons (1967; 1999) and Niklas Luhmann (1997b), is that modernization and the evolution of society in general are seen in terms of a continuing specialization of tasks and the división of labour in society. The puzzle was whether the increasingly elabórate división of labour in modern societies would destroy the traditional (mechanical, identity) cohesión that defined what society was, or would itself serve as the basis for a new type of (organic) social whole that was defined by the interdependence of its división of labour. The responses to this puzzle went in two directions: decomposition and emergence. Some saw functional differentiation as meaning a process of the decomposition of society in which the stability of a pre-existing cul­ tural entity is compromised by an evolution that decomposes it into ever more specialized units, subsystems and roles. If society was viewed as community and shared culture {Gemeinschaft), then functional differen­ tiation was corrosive. The importance of the organic, evolved identity in Sociology underpinned the concerns of those such as Tónnies (1887) and Gellner (1988: 61) who worried about the loss of Gemeinschaft in the transition to modernity and Gesellschaft (society as something instru­ mental, contractual and constructed). Crucial to this view is an account of what it is in the first place that makes society hang together as a whole despite ongoing processes of differentiation. This social glue is variously referred to as ‘collective conscience’ (Durkheim), a ‘societal community’ (Parsons) or a ‘lifeworld’ (Habermas), all of which point to the realm of shared valúes and norms. These cultural bonds act as the counterforce to the centrifugal tendencies of functional differentiation that were perhaps most graphically captured by Marx’s idea of class war. Others, most notably Weber and later Luhmann, saw functional dif­ ferentiation as a process of emergence (see Schimank and Volkmann, 1999: 8ff.). In other words, it is the process of functional differentiation itself - the emergence of recognisably different spheres of politics, law,

10

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

economics, religión etc. - which accounts for the existence of modern society as a ‘social whole’ in the first place (see Nassehi, 2004). If society was viewed as Gesellschaft, then functional differentiation was integral to its existence, not antagonistic to it. Durkheim is in the middle, seeing decomposition as a necessary condition for emergence. Functional dif­ ferentiation, then, does not mean that an integrated whole is somehow decomposed, but rather that, as society evolves into functional differen­ tiation, it undergoes a process of newly emerging structures and systems. These systems build ‘global accounts’ of the world, that is, the functionally differentiated political system reconstructs the world in terms of power, the legal system reconstructs it in terms of legal/illegal, the scientific system in terms of true/false etc. Luhmann completes this turn by asserting that society (which for him cannot be anything but world society) can only appear as such because it is internally differentiated, in other words there is no ‘integrating’ forcé in addition to the form of functional differentiation itself. While ‘classical’ sociological approaches almost invariably focus on national societies, the approaches to forms of society which are not nationstate societies, for instance theories of ‘world’ or ‘global’ society, vary greatly regarding the degree to which they draw on differentiation theory thought. One extreme here is marked by Luhmann’s theory of world society, which is based on differentiation theory through and through. Following Luhmann’s claim that world society is primarily differentiated functionally (and notwithstanding that this allows for secondary forms of differ­ entiation), it is only fairly recently that a number of studies have started to empirically assess (see, e.g., Stetter, 2008) the actual global range of Luhmann’s theory, which was designed as a theory of world society, but arguably mostly had the Western world in mind (see Stichweh, 2000; also Stichweh, in this volume). A notable example here would be the notion of a world characterized by (and differentiated into) various ‘scapes’, for example financescapes, technoscapes, mediascapes etc. Such scapes are understood as delocalized global spaces in which globalization takes place (see Appadurai, 1996) and quite aptly exemplify the situation in much bf contemporary ‘global’ Sociology: it often thinks in terms of differentiation, yet barely lays open or reflects upon the theoretical and empirical bases for the specific kind of differentiation identified (and mostly avoids addressing the issue of what it is that is differentiated; see the arguments in Albert, 2007a; 2009 and Robertson, 2009). Another, more implicit, use of the concept of differentiation is marked by the neo-institutionalist world-polity approach which shuns notions of differentiation and focuses

Differentiation theory and international relations

11

on processes of ‘rationalization’ instead (but see Thomas, 2010; also Thomas, in this volunte). In this account, world society is emerging but is based on the diffusion of a Western script which provides a glue in addition to the mere interdependence of different Systems. The forms and the driving forces of differentiation as discussed in Sociology are usually not addressed or reflected upon in IR theory. There may, however, be a reason behind this relative neglect: arguably, functional dif­ ferentiation and the ‘international’ do not go together well because the very notion of the international rests upon a semantic of levéis, and not one of functions. Thus, every functionally differentiated realm of society (i.e. politics, law, the economy etc.) can have ‘the international’ attached to it. Within IR, approaches such as Burton’s (1972), Luard’s (1976; 1990), Shaw’s (1992; 1994), and the functionalists’ (Mitrany, 1943; 1975) and neofunctionalists ’ (Haas, 1964; 1968) all carry an implicit commitment to functional differentiation, but keep their differentiation aspects unspecified and unproblematized. They use it mainly to combat statecentrism by arguing for wider, more inclusive approaches to international relations that combine the political, economic and societal spheres. The English School of IR (Bull, 1977; Buzan, 2004) features international and world society as its core concepts, and has been described (Krasner, 1999: 46) as the ‘best known sociological perspective’ in IR. Yet English School writers make almost no reference to Sociology at all and have largely developed their ideas out of political theory, law and history. A more recent sociological turn in IR has been the rise of constructivism, but this has its main roots in issues about ontology and the philosophy of knowledge. Its most widely read exponent (Wendt, 1999), in common with much of mainstream IR, confines himself to the political sphere. Differentiation itself is not featured, or even much discussed, by constructivists. There is some irony in the fact that mainstream IR’s most explicit engagement with functional differentiation was initiated by Kenneth Waltz, the founding father of an approach to IR which is about as far from ‘sociological’ as one could get: neorealism. Although Waltz borrowed some arguments from Durkheim, his main inspiration was microeconomics, and his main aim was to build a materialist, not a social, theory of international politics. This orientation explains much about why Waltz’s explicit engagement with differentiation theory transferred so little of its potential wealth into IR. Waltz’s theory is entirely one of international politics. Using Durkheim as authority, and levels of analysis as a weapon, Waltz first confines functional differentiation to the functions of government (making it

12

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

essentially, therefore, about sovereignty). He then adopts a definition that relegates this exclusively political functional differentiation to hierarchic systems, and banishes it from anarchic ones (Waltz, 1979: 104, 115, 197; 1986: 323-30; 2004a: 98-9). In this thinking, anarchy puts the issue of security and survival on top of everything, which, in turn, explains the dominance of the political system over all others and justifies their subordination and neglect. This move privileges territoriality along the lines of segmentary differentiation: the ‘like units’ on which Waltz (1979: 97) builds his visión of anarchic structure. The prominence Waltz accords to the absence of functional differentiation in the international system of States reinforces Parson’s (1999: 241) view of the international domain as a ‘social system’, not developed enough to be a proper society. By removing the social element, Waltz reduces the status of the whole to a mere system (Larkins, 1994: 249—53; Barkdull, 1995: 674—76). By driving functional differentiation exclusively into domestic politics, Waltz’s theory explicitly removes it from IR theory. Yet, despite the limited use of notions of (functional) differentiation in IR, differentiation is far from an entirely alien way of thinking in the discipline. Quite the contrary: what we argüe in the following is that, actually, many diagnoses regarding the evolution of international institutions, legalization and, more broadly, the emergence of ‘global governance’ can be read as dealing primarily with a weakening of segmentary differentiation of world politics.

2

The weakening of segmentary differentiation

Most theories in both Sociology and IR are based on a notion of the primacy of segmentary differentiation between distinct territorial units. Stratification and functional differentiation then happen primarily within the segments. Morgenthau’s definition of sovereignty points exactly to this relationship between different forms of differentiation: sovereignty, in this view, denotes ‘the supreme legal authority of the nation to give and enforce the law within a certain territory and, in consequence, independence from the authority of any other nation and equality with it under international law’ (Morgenthau, 1967: 305). Théempirical correspondent to this conceptual notion was the development of nationally bounded societies which transformed local communities and which were governed by a centralized State with a monopoly of the legitimare use of forcé - a process roughly starting in the fourteenth century (see e.g. Elias, 1976) and accelerating in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (see e.g. Polanyi, 1973). According to the principie of congruence, terri­ tory, people and effective government go hand in hand (Jellinek, 1880),

Differentiation theory and international relations

13

and State sovereignty spans the territory in which the individuáis of a community of people interact with each other, most vividly in the economic sphere. Territorial units constituted thus must, to use the words of Cari Schmitt (1950: 53), be separated from each other ‘with mathematical precisión’. This congruence of social - including economics, the arts, culture etc. - and political space was constitutive for the notion of segmentary differentiation between different societies. It is precisely this congruence of social space with political space that is challenged by what has been commonly labelled globalization. Globalization describes a process in which the share of crossborder transactions grows relative to transactions within borders and thus the significance of national borders decreases (Beisheim et al., 1999; Held et al., 1999). In more general terms, it is assumed that the technological and politi­ cal developments, particularly over the past two or three decades, have resulted in an unprecedented decline in the significance of space as an obstacle to social interaction. A longer-term view locates the origins of this transformation in the nineteenth century, stemming from both tech­ nological revolutions in transportation and communication, and sociopolitical ones that unleashed the power of civil society - in Rosenberg’s memorable phrase ‘the empire of civil society’ (Rosenberg, 1994; North et al., 2009). As transactions become less place-bounded, the identity of spatial and social proximity no longer holds. To the extent that the newly emerging spaces are not always global in reach, but rather of regional scope, the term societal denationalization (Zürn, 1992) or debordering (Albert and Brock, 1996) may more aptly describe this change than glob­ alization. The term denationalization takes up the classic works of Karl W. Deutsch (1969), James Mayall (1990) and Eric Hobsbawm (1990) on nationalism, according to which a nation is a political community for which dense societal transactions within the national territory and a sharp reduction in the frequency of social transactions at the borders are constitutive components. One of the effects of societal denationalization is the undermining of the congruence principie and thus of the prerequisite of segmentary differentiation between different nation-states. Two causal pathways are responsible. On the one hand, the increase in transborder transactions means that societal subsystems move beyond political borders. The emergence of global markets leads to a situation in which the economic subsystem can no longer be understood as circumscribed by political borders. Science and sport have gone transnational as well. The production and distribution of culture has become globalized, and the national coinage of cul­ tural products has weakened. In other words: globalization means that

14

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

the potential global reach of any communication (on which Luhmann based his diagnosis of the existence of world society) is supplemented by a significant increase in actual global connectivity (see also section 4 below). On the other hand, the movement of societal subsystems beyond national borders creates a demand for the international or transnational regulation of denationalized subsystems. In this way, international and transnational institutions have developed that create a political level beyond the State. As a result, a global polity has emerged which spans across the sovereign nation-states representing the primacy of segmentary differentiation.

3

Political authority beyond the nation-state and stratificatory differentiation

Segmentary differentiation was inscribed in the concept of sovereignty (see Morgenthau, 1967 and also Krasner, 1988). The regulative idea of sovereignty involved two major components:8 first, that the ruler of a State exercises solé authority over the territory of that State and State parties are not subject to any law other than their own, unless they consent to be bound in that way; secondly, that all States are legally equal. In this view, international institutions are considered as instruments of the State, without possessing a political authority in their own right (Kahler, 2004). Moreover, these international institutions function with the presumption of equality of States. Accordingly, sovereignty is the institutional pillar on which segmentary differentiation between different political units is built. The last two to three decades, however, have brought changes that transformed sovereignty and can be described as global governance via supra- and transnationalization of international institutions.9 Supranationalization describes a process in which international institutions develop procedures that contradict the consensus principie and the prin­ cipie of non-intervention. In this way, some international norms and rules create obligations for national governments to take measures even when they have not agreed to do so. Supranationalization thus leads to political authority beyond the nation-state (see also Ruggie, 1998: 64; Cooper et al., 2008; Rittberger and Nettesheim, 2008: 3; Kahler and Lake, 2009: 246). An international institution has authority when the 8 See Deitelhoff and Zürn (2614) for a more extended discussion of changes in meaning of the regulative idea of sovereignty. 9 This section partly borrows from and expands the argument made in Zürn (2010).

Differentiation theory and international relations

15

direct and indirect addressees recognize in principie or in practice that that institution can make competent judgements and binding decisions (Zürn et al., 2012: 18). Political authority beyond the nation-state does not necessarily require autonomous international organizations. Both international institutions that have been delegated autonomous power to make decisions (e.g. the International Criminal Court) and international institutions without such a formal delegation of power (e.g. majority decisions in the United Nations Security Council) can possess authority in the defined sense. In the former case, one can speak of delegated authority, the latter is a case of pooled authority (Moravcsik, 1998: 67; Hawkins et al., 2006). The authority of international institutions thus points to another feature than the autonomy of international organizations. The new, authority-generating quality of international institutions shows at different phases of the policy cycle. Focusing, first, on the negotiation or decisión phase, maj Grifarían decisión making in interna­ tional institutions indicates the authority shift. There is a growing need for regulation at the international level, and there are growing demands on international institutions to accommodate this need. Majoritarian decisión making increases the ability of international institutions to act by cancelling the vetoes of individual States and overcoming blockages. Today, roughly two-thirds of all international organizations with the participation of at least one great power have the possibility to decide by majority (see Blake and Payton, 2008). Monitoring and verification of international rules are, likewise, increasingly carried out by actors who are not directly under the control of States. In general, the need for monitoring is greater if international norms no longer just apply to the borders between countries but, instead, begin to regúlate activities within the boundaries of sovereign territories. Thus, the need for independent actors who process and make available Information on treaty compliance is steadily growing. Such information could be provided by autonomous organizations established as part of a treaty regime’s safeguards. Two prominent examples of such organizations are the International Monetary Fund (for the global financial system) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, see Dai, 2007: 50-3). In addition to such bodies, the role of international secretarí­ ais in regulatory monitoring has increased notably in recent years (see Siebenhüner and Biermann, 2009). Equally important in this regard is the growing significance of transnational nongovernmental organizations (see below). Regarding disputed cases of rule interpretation, there has been a sig­ nifican! increase in international judicial bodies. To the extent that the

16

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

quantity of international obligations has grown, so too have the number of collisions between international and national regulations and the num­ ber of conflicts between different international regulations. The establishment of court-like proceedings is one possibility for dealing with such problems. In 1960 there were only 27 quasi-judicial bodies worldwide; by 2004 this number had grown to 97.10 So far as rule enforcement is con­ cerned, we can observe an increased readiness to levy material sanctions against violators. Especially since 1989, the international community has begun to respond to cases of gross violation of ius cogens increasingly with military forcé and economic sanctions (Binder, 2009: 340). After 1989, in some cases (like Kosovo or East Timor) the United Nations even set up transitional administrations with far-reaching executive, legislative and judicial powers (Caplan, 2004). Finally, other actors have begun to compete with States in the field of policy evaluación and related agenda setting. The set of organizations that evalúate the effectiveness of existing regulations and place new problem areas on the international agenda has widened in accordance with the extern to which the addressees of international regulation have become societal actors. Again, international secretariats and transnational NGOs are the actors who have increas­ ingly taken up these governance functions. In conjunction with this tendency, so-called knowledge bodies affiliated with the secretariats of international organizations, like the International Panel for Climate Change, have gained in importance (Haas and Stevens, 2011). To a comparable extent, those NGOs that identify international problems and cali for international regulation have also clearly taken on greater significance. The role of Transparency International in the development of the Anti-Bribery Convention (see Metzges, 2006) is just one example. In addition, a transnationalization of governance, defined as a process in which transnational non-state actors develop political regulations and activities without being formally authorized by States, points to sites of political authority beyond the State. Such regulations are based on the principie of self-governance and create prívate authority (see Cutler et al., 1999; Biersteker and Hall, 2002). Examples are codes of conduct, which are agreed upon between MNCs and possibly contain obliga­ tions not liked by all the governments affected by thém (Scherer and Palazzo, 2008). They have multiplied since the 1990s (Kolk and Van Tulder, 2005). Other examples of private forms of transnational gov­ ernance inelude the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and certificación Sys­ tems (e.g. Forest Stewardship Council, Rugmark, etc.). The informal 10

See Project on International Courts and Tribunals (2000); see also Alter (2009).

Differentiation theory and international relations

17

adoption of functions through NGOs within international institutions is another case of transnationalization. For instance, transnational NGOs often collaborate with societal actors who have been negatively impacted by rule violations. Together they have undertaken informal, independent regulatory monitoring. For example, the monitoring of internationally standardized human rights has long since been transferred informally to human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The transnationalization of governance can lead as well to a de facto circumvention of the consensus and non-intervention principie. Overall, a dense network of international and transnational institu­ tions of unprecedented quality and quantity has developed in recent decades. Many of these new institutions are far more intrusive than conventional international institutions. They can circumvent the resistance of most governments via majoritarian decisión making and dispute settlement procedures, through the interaction of monitoring agencies with transnational society, and by dominating the process of knowledge interpretation in some fields. With the - most often consensual - decisión to install international institutions with such features, State parties become subject to a law other than their own, which they have either not agreed to (mission creep) or do not agree with any more (costly exit option). Given the extent of the intrusión of these new international institutions into the affairs of national societies, the notion of delegated, and there­ fore controlled authority (Kahler 2004) no longer holds. At least in some issue areas, the global level has achieved a certain degree of authority and has thus partially replaced the consensus principie of the traditional international system. This is the core of the rise of global governance. The changes in global governance described above have a number of implications for differentiation processes in international relations. First, an increasing importance of global governance challenges the nationstate’s position as the prime site of political authority. By establishing and strengthening additional layers of authority, global governance chal­ lenges the primacy of segmentary differentiation within the political system in the sense that it undermines the absolute sovereignty of States. Global governance refers to the entirety of regulations put forward to solve specific denationalized problems or provide transnational common goods. By requiring a common-goods-oriented justification of norms and rules, the concept of global governance refers to a certain quality of interna­ tional regulation. Accordingly, global governance ineludes more than just simple coordination between States to achieve a modus vivendi of inter­ action. Rather, international regulation often aims actively at achieving normatively laden political goals in handling common problems faced by

18

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

the International community. In this sense, governance presupposes some common interests and goal orientations beyond the nation-state, at least in a rudimentary form, without - of course - denying the persistence of fundamental conflicts. Moreover, it requires that the global level indeed possesses some authority of its own. It must be more than just intergovernmental coordination with no delegation of powers to spheres outside the member States. Therefore, the rise of political authority7 beyond the nation-state implies a weakening of segmentary differentiation in the first place. Second, political authority beyond the State reinforces inequalities between States and thus adds stratificatory differentiation among stares. According to the traditional notion of sovereignty, States not only exercise solé authority over their territory, but are also legally equal. The notion of sovereignty thus implied sovereign equality. Some have argued that this norm always has been full of loopholes and never existed in any puré sense (Krasner, 1999; Viola, 2009; this volume). While this is certainly true, it did not undermine the role of sovereign equality7 as a core primary institution of internacional society. Whatever derogations from it in practice there might have been, sovereign equality as a regulative idea remained in place. The rise of political authority beyond the nation-state may have changed this (Zürn, 2007a). It leads to the institutionalization of inequality that works both formally and in less formal but still important matters of practice. In the more formal sense, some States get assigned privileged roles within internacional inscicutions. Prime examples are che veto powers in the Security Council, the differentiation between nuclear and nonnuclear States in the Nuclear Proliferation treaty or weighted voting in the International Monetary Fund. In these cases, power inequality is an integral part of International institutions exercising authority, and thus ties into the arguments above about the accumulation of authority beyond the State. Sovereign equality is undermined and accompanied by institutionalized forms of stratificatory differentiation between States. In the less formal sense, more related to practice than to formal right, several English School writers have drawn attention to the tensión in contemporary International society between (although they do not use the terms) segmentary and stratificatory differentiation. They argüe that, although the legitimacy of contemporary International society is based on the prin­ cipie of sovereign equality and, up to a point, the equality of people and nations, it is still riddled with the hegemonic/hierarchical practices and inequalities of status left over from the period of Western world domination and empire (Gong, 1984: 7-21; Clark, 1989; Watson, 1992: 299-309, 319-25; 1997; Hurrell, 2007: 13, 35-6, 63-5, 71, 111-14).

Differentiation theory and international relations

19

This problem got worse with the shift to unipolarity, in which the United States became the principie representative and exponent of the hegemonic practice by which the West continúes to dominate international society. The explicitly unilateralist and exceptionalist claims made for the United States by the Bush administration almost took the country out of international society, declaring a kind of lex unis based on the United States’ role and responsibilities as the solé leading power (Dunne, 2003). As Clark (2005: 254) notes, there is no ‘satisfactory principie of hegemony - rooted in a plausibly wide consensus’ with which international society might bridge this gap between its principies and its practices.11 A concentration of power in one actor, as Clark (2005: 227-43), echoing Waltz, observes, disrupts the ideas of balance and equilibrium which are the traditional sources and conditions for legitimacy in international • 19 society. 4

Functional differentiation beyond the nation-state

Another implication of the shift of political authority is a división oflabour betzveen differentpolitical units. Global governance in our understanding by no means indicares a demise of the nation-state. Nation-states are needed even in strongly denationalized issue areas in order to achieve governance goals. For instance, the elimination of the problems relating to global financial markets, organized crime or global environmental risks is hardly conceivable without nation-states. Especially for the implementation of policies, the nation-state seems to be indispensable. This is due to its control of resources based on its legal monopoly on the use of forcé and its capacity to raise taxes. Moreover, with respect to many issues the nation-state remains the first address for political demands. In this sense, global governance can be conceived as multi-level gov­ ernance. Each of the involved levels exercises authority, that is, can take decisions and carry out measures in a given issue area, which cannot be unilaterally reversed by other levels without violating accepted procedures. Authority beyond the nation-state means that some governance tasks are taken over on the supranational or transnational level and that this arrangement cannot be hindered by single States affected by these decisions and measures. Authority on the lower level means that some11 12 11 In later works Clark (2009; 2011) goes on to argüe that in principie (much less so in practice), hegemony could become a legitímate institution of international society. 12 Of course, on a global scale stratification is not something which happens only between States in the political system. However, issues of global inequality which come to mind here usually refer to stratification mostly within the economic system, which then itself also exhibits some degree of segmentation into national economies.

20

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

governance tasks can be carried out by decentralized units without a legit­ ímate possibility for the higher levels to intervene. If more than one level exhibits authority, then there is a need to coordínate decisions between different levels and one can speak of a multi-level governance (Benz, 2004; see also Hooghe and Marks, 2003). In a multi-level constellation, nation-states will not relinquish their resources such as the monopoly of the use of forcé or the right to exact taxes in a given territory. Nevertheless, while the nation-state will play a significant role in multi-level gover­ nance, it will no longer be the paramount political institution able to perform all functions, but only one among others carrying out some of these tasks (Zürn and Leibfried, 2005). The nation-state has lost its monopoly of political authority. The State remains pivotal, however, playing increasingly the role of an authority manager (Genschel and Zangl, 2008). In denationalized issue areas, effective and legitímate governance thus depends on the interplay of different political levels. It often requires transnational recognition of problems, decisión making in global forums and the implementation of these decisions at the national level. Global governance thus does not run parallel to other levels of governance: rather, it is constituted by the interplay of different levels and organizations, whereby no level or organization can work unilaterally. In this sense, the Westphalian system of segmentary differentiation has transformed into a multi-level entity characterized by a división of labour or functional differentiation within the global political system. Finally, in this way, the new international political system with its inter­ nal functional differentiation arguably also drives functional differentiation between other social systems. Thus, one could argüe that a lack of func­ tional differentiation within the political system (as conceived by Waltz (1979)), combined with its residual claim to supremacy over other realms of society, for a long time slowed down the globalization of other function systems such as economy, law, Science, art etc. The lack of any checks and balances within the political system and the exclusive focus on power as the decisive means to prevail has, in fact, led historically to some degree of dominance of the political system over other function systems. Extending this argument, the lack of functional differentiation within the political system may for a long time have prevented the fullscale development of other function systems as global systems. In this perspective, it is the growing differentiation and interdependence in the political sphere which allows the globalization of function systems such as the economy, Science, art and law, which are each driven by their specific inner logic.13 Cases in point here would inelude, for example, 13

With this ‘specific inner logic’ we hint at the fact that, under the condition of func­ tional differentiation, social meaning is not established primarily according to where one

Differentiation theory and international relations

21

the autonomization of the global financial system since the 1980s or the exponential growth of extra-state legal arrangements (7ex mercatoria’; see Albert, 2007b). Against this background, a functionally differentiated multi-level governance makes the arbitrary intervention of the political system into other systems much more unlikely than in a system of competing, territorially defined political units. Therefore, functional differentiation within the international political system may be seen as a driver of functional dif­ ferentiation of the international system as a whole. Yet, of course, this is a two-way Street. An increasing functional differentiation within the political system of world society also allows for further functional dif­ ferentiation between different systems. Thus, for example, the economic and legal systems have to deal with the fací that they face a political system characterized by a multiplication of governance structures. Conversely, increasing functional differentiation can also be attributed to the important role which functional differentiation plays within world society as a whole. To sum up these observations. We have hinted at the transformation of the political system of world society: segmentary differentiation is becoming less, functional differentiation more important; stratification appears in new forms (global governance), while oíd forms (e.g. great powers, hegemons) continué to exist. Of course, the increasing functional differ­ entiation of the political system is partly due to the fact that the political system is itself functionally differentiated against other function systems in world society (e.g. law, the economy etc.) and internally reflects the differentiation of its environment.

5

Outline of the book

This brief sketch sets up both what we understand by ‘differentiation the­ ory’ and how we see differentiation manifesting itself both explicitly in the practices and structures of world society, and implicitly in the modes and fashions of thinking within the disciplines of IR and Global Studies. stands in a hierarchy (stratification) or is located spatially (segmentation), but according to how the specific language and the codes of a function system are used. Thus, for example, within the legal system meaning is established by reference to notions of legality/illegality and not according to the possession of money (the ‘code’ of the economic system). Equally, power (as the ‘code’ ofthepolitical system) should not be held because somebody is rich or a famous scientist etc. These examples already show that the inner logics of functionally differentiated realms of society are not necessarily entirely correct descriptions of empirical realities, but rather circumscribe deeply entrenched norma­ tivo expectations (thus, for example, many people prevail in the legal system precisely because they have money, but there could never be a reference to this fact in a verdict as in that case this would tender it ¡Ilegitímate).

22

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

It also underlines the point made above that we are more interested in studying the coexistence and interaction of different types of differenti­ ation than we are in arguing about whether one of them is dominant. The very act of considering all three types together makes the question of possible dominance of one very difficult. It might easily be that dif­ ferent types of differentiation are stronger or weaker in different sectors. From an IR perspective, it is already apparent that the standard Westphalian construction of international politics is in deep trouble. Within the political sector alone, all three types of differentiation are in play and are generating fundamental questions about the nature of political order. Political legitimacy still hangs on segmentary differentiation, and that type of differentiation is still a major presence, but it is increasingly challenged by both stratificatory (hegemonic) practice, and by the seeping away, whether authorized or not, of political authority and specific political functions to non-state actors. If this process is also feeding a more general functional differentiation at the global level, then we could be looking at a major process of structural transformation in the organization of humankind. We think that the concepts and vocabularies of differentiation theory may offer better lenses and sharper tools for look­ ing and cutting into this process than those so far available within either IR or Global Studies. The book probes this thesis. The chapters that follow will show in various ways how this might be so. They make up three parts, each containing three chapters. In the first part we present some general perspectives from sociolog­ ical theory on how differentiation theory plays out at the level of world society. The first chapters lay the groundwork by developing differentia­ tion and especially functional differentiation more extensively as one of the most important basic defining schemes in sociological thought. In his contribution, George Thomas asks whether functional differentiation is merely a descriptive term or an explanatory concept. While many of the traditions of sociological thought would opt for the latter, Thomas introduces neo-institutionalism as a prominent form of sociological theorizing, which, at least since the late 1970s, has departed from this view and identified rationalized cultural processes as the driving forcé in the formation of world society, with functional differentiatiómbeing an apt description of its ensuing form. Surveying the history of sociological thought on the subject, Rudolf Stichweh argües that there are basically two broad, but markedly distinct, traditions of thought about functional differentiation in Sociology, and that these traditions need to be kept sepárate in current debates. This is particularly the case since the first tradition sees functional differentiation largely in terms of a decomposition of society, while the other sees it in terms of the emergence of new

Differentiation theory and international relations

23

kinds of social system. Which versión one chooses is, however, extremely significant for the concept of world society. Stichweh also argües that globally there is a multiplicity of forms of functional differentiation and that functional differentiation in fact leads to an increase rather than a reduction in (global) inequalities. He provides a concise account of the constituents of function systems in world society, a systematic enumeration of which has not been attempted in the sociological literature thus far. Richard Münch in his chapter agrees with the diagnosis that func­ tional differentiation becomes more important relative to segmentation and stratification in the evolution of world society. Yet there is, in his view, a danger in underestimating the latter two forms of differentiation in the way that they support existing structures. Moreover, he emphasizes the interplay of different function systems. This leads him to argüe that the structures of world society can be better described in terms borrowed from the theory of action and a theory of institutions than in those taken from systems theory. After the first part has laid the sociological ground, the second then uses various readings of differentiation theory as a background for an account of the structural evolution of international relations. This part focuses especially on the interconnections between different forms of differentiation. Jack Donnelly introduces two approaches to differenti­ ation and argües for a ‘multidimensional approach’ (in contrast to a type approach) which helps to shed light on the substantial structural diversity of international societies and nondirectional change. Lora Viola challenges the claim that States are ‘like units’, not by pointing to an increasing functional differentiation, but by arguing that, in fact, stratifi­ cation among political units has always been a constitutive principie of the international system. She thus uses differentiation theory to assess the common claim that sovereign equality is a defining feature of the system. Stephan Stetter then argües that, in contrast to classical accounts in sys­ tems theory, stratificatory rather than segmentary differentiation should be considered as the prime mode of internal differentiation in the world political system. Thus, the code of ‘power’ constantly produces stratifi­ catory divisions of inequality between the powerful and the powerless. However, in order to avoid a ‘freezing’ of contingent power distributions, the political system is at the same time based on the principie of full inclu­ sión, which ensures that power remains a dynamic capability, subject to change and contestation. The final part focuses on specific function systems as units of analysis. Oliver Kessler and Friedrich Kratochwil focus on the legal system and analyse its evolution as resulting from both an ongoing functional differentiation within the legal system as well as influences emanating

24

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

from the political system. They argüe that the functional differentia­ tion approach provides a powerful vocabulary for describing processes of constitutionalization and legal fragmentation not as contradictory, but rather as complementary processes. Mathias Koenig-Archibugi uses the case of international sanitary conferences to inquire into the role played by international institutions in the relationship between different functional subsystems. His argument is that international institutions medíate between conflicting demands stemming from those subsystems and thus serve an integrative purpose. So, while international institutions may foster functional differentiation between subsystems, they may also promote coordination between them. Phil Cerny looks at the economic system and strongly argües that the concept of functional differentiation plays a key role in dissolving the distinction between national and global levels of analysis so deeply rooted in traditional IR thought. He proposes a ‘paradigm of complex linkages across space and time, along with the reordering of governance and politics along multi-level and multi-nodal lines’ (Cerny, in this volume: 224). In concluding chapter, we reconsider the three questions set up above in light of the arguments in the chapters, and reflect on what the overall development of differentiation means both for world politics, particularly the remaining role of the State, and for the study of IR.

Part I

Sociological perspectives

2

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation George M. Thomas

1

Introduction

Globalization is the nominalization of our time, and both popular and scholarly views are that it is comprised essentially of increased interconnections and faster and more interdependent exchanges, all driven by new technologies. Globalization gives rise to power and resource inequalities, whether in terms of powerful States and corporations or a more structural core-periphery hierarchy. Greater complexities require actors, even pow­ erful States and corporations, to adapt. States, like individuáis and firms, must adapt to complexity and uncertainty, and, it is further reasoned, those most able to quickly implement objectively effective responses will flourish and those who do not will decline or be left behind. International Relations (IR) as a field is marked by this view: according to prevalent IR theory, functionally differentiated global governance institutions are responses by States to increased political and economic complexity. Sys­ tem theories such as modern systems theory bring substantial light to the field by suggesting that we examine globalization as functional dif­ ferentiation within the world as a whole-world society. Not reducible to actors’ responses, functional differentiation increases in world society as an adaptation to complexity. When considering other forms of differenti­ ation, systems theory has shared assumptions with most sociological and IR theories: functional differentiation dominates because it is an objective response to complexity. Now there is increased attention to, and a rethinking of, the other forms of differentiation, as evidenced by this volume. Introducing cultural aspects to our theorizing expands and changes our interpretation of globalization as functional differentiation. Robertson (1992) pioneered conceptualizing global cultural processes, arguing that globalization is not just greater interconnectedness but also an emergent consciousness of the world as one place. More recently, theoretical and empirical work that has furthered a theory of functional differenti­ ation in the USA (e.g. Alexander, 2006) and Europe (scholars working 27

28

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

within Luhmann’s modern systems theory, e.g. Albert and Hilkermeier, 2004) have in their different ways focused on culture (symbolic codes, semantics and discourse). World culture theory (Meyer et al., 1997) highlights the importance of instrumental rationality as a worldwide cultural order: a cultural structuration in which practical actions are oriented to universal abstract knowledge and evaluated in terms of their effectiveness as practical means. The processes of functional differentiation found throughout the world occur within a context of global instrumen­ tal rationalism (Thomas, 2010): functional differentiation is constituted as rational action associated with the identities of rational actors. The mechanism of change, thus, is not adapting to complexity but rather developing and enacting cultural Scripts of a particular type of ratio­ nality, and the emphasis shifts from whether or not stratificatory and segmentary differentiation decline to how they are constituted. In what follows I take up the challenge to interpret global processes in terms of the distinct types of differentiation by suggesting that functional differentiation, other types of differentiation and their interrelationships are interpretable in the context of how they are constituted by instru­ mental rationality. I first describe briefly important developments in conceptualizing functional differentiation and the recent cultural turn and assess the presumed link between functional differentiation and complex­ ity. The argument is that functional differentiation must be interpreted in the context of instrumentally rationalized culture: global rationalism not complexity per se is the dynamic mechanism. I then take up the themes of what constitutes a social whole (world culture), the interrela­ tionships of functionally differentiated systems within it, and the nature of other types of differentiation in world society. I sketch the processes by which functional differentiation occurs within a systemic whole and how differentiated, bounded systems are interrelated. Following this line of analysis, I then explore within a world society characterized by ratio­ nalized cultural structures the nature of segmentary and stratificatory differentiation and their relations to functional differentiation. 2

Functional differentiation, social theory, and the cultural turn

Despite its reputation for abstract theorizing, Parsonian structural functionalism was associated with much empirical work in the United States. It is true that the empirical work largely took the form of conceptualizing and classifying; yet it was, in fact, constructed on expansive empirical work in Anthropology, economic History, comparative-historical Sociol­ ogy, and both ethnographic and survey research studies of contemporary societies. Empirical work ranged from the very abstract to the concrete.

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

29

At the abstract end of the continuum there was a search for univer­ sal structures that met universal societal needs or functions. Toward the more concrete end of the continuum were studies of professions, institutions and communities that were designed to show that practices, norms and institutions (that is, ‘structures’) were institutionalized because they fulfilled some need - they served some crucial function. Functionalist interpretations were not unique to structural functionalism and were pervasive in Marxist and critical theorizing as well as in much micro-theory; yet, it was most explicit in the agenda of structural functionalism. As empirical studies resulted in cumulative knowledge, it became apparent that researchers needed to qualify the presumption that a par­ ticular structure universally meets a specific universal need. Schools, for example, were interpreted as meeting many of the same socialization functions in modern societies as the family in traditional, kin-based societies. Thus, one could not presume that families, and only families, meet the societal function of socialization. This culminated in Robert Merton’s (1968) concept of functional alternatives or functional equivalents: a function could be fulfilled by different structures in different times and places. What became apparent is that this theoretical move, necessary to account for empirical evidence and eminently reasonable in its own right, made the theoretical apparatus tautological and theoretical inter­ pretations of empirical studies somewhat vacuous. In short, to argüe that a structure fulfils a function does not explain its institutionalization because one must further explain why it, and not a structural alternative, is present. Empirical studies increasingly laboured under this logical fallacy, being reduced simply to attempting to document that a structure serves a function, leaving the theoretical apparatus and its flaws implicit. Other theories, neo-Marxist in particular, laboured under the same logi­ cal fallacy, but because the functional reasoning was more implicit it was not as obvious. The problems were hidden somewhat by relying on actor agency: it was presumed that elites or ‘those who benefit’ figure out what structure fulfils what necessary function. In general, across theoretical paradigms, functional interpretations became viewed as tautological and not sensitive to empirical research.11 1 There is a large literatura in the philosophy of Science on the adequacy of functional or genetic explanation. It is out of the scope of this chapter to engage these arguments; and it is not crucial because I am not arguing that functionalist explanations are impossible only that their use in Sociology developed in this way. Still, to add to the discussion, what seems required for an adequate, empirically relevant theory is a commitment to an exhaustive list of structures and a theory of correspondence that links functions with structures under identifiable conditions. This seems insurmountable, and while there

30

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Three results of these developments are relevant here. First, functional integration became extensively questioned. Second, functional differen­ tiation (and its predominance over stratificatory and segmentary differ­ entiation) became an empirical descriptor rather than an explanation, and this was true in many different fields and theories. Third, partly as a default theoretical mechanism, it became simply presumed that func­ tional differentiation is a natural, instrumental response to complexity, unlike stratification and segmentary differentiation. These results were reflected in criticisms of structural functionalism and in alternative theories. One set of criticisms revolved around phenomenological meanings and institutions (e.g. Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Parsons paid much attention, at least in laying the foundations of his paradigm, to phenomenological processes; a reading of the first several chapters of The Social System is enough to document this. How­ ever, the elaboration of the paradigm and the use of the theory in social Science practice toward the systems level make the criticisms reasonable (cf. Alexander, 1984). These criticisms carne to centre on the problem of integration. Berger and Luckmann, for example, argued that societies are not functionally integrated, but rather that integration is a cultural claim: higher-order legitimations depict society as functionally integrated. Ironically, they retain the idea that individuáis internalize these meanings and higher-level legitimation systems - ‘ironically’, because internalization is what Parsons meant by integration. Functional differentiation is the centrepiece of Berger and Luckmann’s (and almost everyone’s) description of the modern world: modernity is characterized at its core by functional differentiation and complexity, in contrast to the relatively simple stratificatory society and even simpler segmentary society. They do not give an explanation as such for it but alinde to pragmatic attitudes toward everyday life leading to increased división of labour, technical developments and complexity. They focus on functional differentiation’s effects on culture. They use this description to debunk the concept of integration, arguing that the disparate differentiated spheres have their own ‘cognitive styles’ (Berger et al., 1973). They do, however, argüe that these cognitive styles exhibit a common instrumental rationality and that overarching legitimations are constructed. These legitimations inelude intellectual and folk theories of society that, again, depict integration. In short, a lack of functional integration does not preelude cultural elements across differentiated spheres or overarching cultural structures. have been a few attempts none have been consistently pursued. Mary Douglas (1986) attempted to link the creation of structures by rational actors to their institutionalization through their functions, yet did not address issued raised by structural alternatives.

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

31

Post-structuralists such as Mary Douglas also deal with integration and functional differentiation. Douglas (1966) argued for retaining the idea of ‘primitive worlds’ to refer to societies that have a low división of labour in contrast with tnodern societies, which are characterized by a high división of labour or functional differentiation. Yet, there is, according to Douglas, no strong relationship with integration. She emphasizes that cultural contradictions and messiness of classifications (that is, lack of integration) are found even in primitive worlds. In highly functionally differentiated systems, moreover she argües (Douglas, 1973), implicit rules opérate that make it extremely difficult to keep differentiated spheres distinct in practice: classifications, codes and categories are routinely applied across spheres. Although she does argüe, similar to Durkheim, that they lose moral intensity because of functional differentiation, she points to the cross-cutting cultural structures. Recent treatments of culture in the face of globalization reflect similar themes. Appadurai (1996) conceptualized globalized social sectors as not internally integrated, but rather as like landscapes littered with diverse cultural elements. While not conceptualizing them as functionally dif­ ferentiated, he argües that they are highly disparate, characterized by disjunctures and differences. He argües further, unlike Berger and Luckmann and Mary Douglas, that these disparate cultural spheres preelude a broader (world) culture. Theoretical work on functional differentiation illustrated by Alexander and by Luhmann (2000b) has emphasized the importance of culture. In Alexander’s seminal work on civil society (2006), a combination of theoretical conceptualization and empirical studies, he delineares the cultural underpinnings and the associated tensions, contradictions and conflicts of the civil sphere. The civil sphere is functionally differentiated and identifiable by its cultural codes and discourse. It is, however, fraught with tensions, contradictions and conflicts. We do not get a sense of a tightly bounded and integrated system; rather it is, as Alexander argües, a project. Luhmann’s modern systems theory argües that world society is not integrated, and sees functional differentiation within it as a system of strongly bounded closed systems. They are defined in terms of media of communication and are semantically constituted; the use of semantic codes is crucial in the development of functional differentiation. 3

Instrumental response to complexity or global cultural enaetment?

Given the strong cultural turn in theorizing functional differentiation coupled with the problems with the structural-functional apparatus, it might be expected that there would be less presumption that functional

32

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

differentiation predominares because of its effective adaptation to complexity. Most theorists and observers, however, assume that functional differentiation is prevalent throughout the world because it is a natural, effective response to objective conditions of complexity.2 The most prevalent theorizing across the social Sciences is rationalactor theory illustrated in the field of IR by neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane and Nye, 2000).3 In this approach, rational actors (stares) in bilateral exchange relations under simple conditions can attain a social optimum - a situation in which each and every actor is able to optimize their outcomes. Under more complex conditions, which increasingly characterize the world, they cannot attain a social optimum and thereby demand and eventually produce effective norms (including international institutions and organizations) that coordinare and control actors to pro­ duce social óptima (Coleman, 1990). This perspective reduces interna­ tional institutions to ‘norms’ and formal organizations that function to meet the coordination and control needs of rational actors. As far from this theorizing as one might imagine, Luhmann also interprets functional differentiation as a natural adaptation to complexity, but he conceptualizes it as systemic adaption. In the face of complexity, sys­ tems are differentiated through discourse and the semantic construction of bounded communication. It is a cultural or communicative process and might be conceived as a ‘discursive adaptive technique.’ Types of differ­ entiation are associated with types of discourse (Jaeger, 2010); functional differentiation is associated with a discourse of instrumentality that orients action to abstraer knowledge, defines problems as technical with technical, practical Solutions, and evaluares actions in terms of measurable efficiency. Empirical patterns raise issues with the presumed relation between functional differentiation and complexity. Empirical studies of global patterns of modernization, formal organization, and particular sectors such as religión show less of a relationship between functional differ­ entiation and complexity than would be expected by either rationalactor or modern systems theories.4 Drori et al. (2006) show that formal 2 Using the adjectives natural, effective and objective is meant to convey-the assumption that actors adopt functional differentiation as a solution to the problem of complexity because it, in fact, is the solution to it. We need no further explanation or theorizing: it works. The approach adopted here is to suspend this assumption and to ask why, if the assumption is inaccurate, actors adopt functional differentiation. 3 Rational-actor theory is formulated in Sociology by Coleman (1990) and in Economics by the new institutional Economics (e.g. North and Thomas, 1976), but its reach and general approach are felt in state-centred theories in political and comparative-historical Sociology (e.g. Tilly, 1990) and in social movements theory (e.g. McAdam et al., 2001). 4 This interpretation of empirical patterns is developed more fully in Thomas (2010).

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

33

bureaucratic organizations spread throughout the world in countries at even very low levels of complexity. There seems to be a near universal increase in formal organization and elaboration of specialized organizational offices in all nation-states, regardless of economic development and location in the core or periphery. Non-governmental organizational forms diffuse throughout South Asia, for example, with scores of thousands of community, kin-based associations taking on NGO forms (Thomas et al., 2008). That organizations throughout the world exhibit functional differentiation even in the absence of complexity makes it problematic to interpret the former in terms of the latter. There are, of course, issues with how to measure complexity, but there are more fundamental problems of defining complexity independent of functional differentiation and of imprecisión in what is meant by ‘simple’. What are classified as ‘simple’ societies are actually very complex. His­ torie empires such as China and Byzantium and other civilizations such as India are more complex than many nation-states in the twenty-first century. Trade within markets embedded in múltiple authorities (guilds, monasteries, municipalities and the imperial administration) and under social obligations is not obviously simpler than free markets. Many soci­ eties classified as traditional or simple, moreover, have high levels of qualitatively different functional differentiation, as discussed below. Most empirical studies are at the organizational level, and it is more difficult to assess spheres, but evidence points to similar processes at the level of spheres or sectors. Alexander’s work on the civil sphere, for exam­ ple, illustrates that while identifiable as a distinctly differentiated sphere, its coherence and relationships to other spheres and to the institutions associated with other spheres (such as the State) suggest that it is not a finished product. It is an ongoing project. Civil society is viewed as being threatened by such interpenetrations, reflecting the idea that functional differentiation and boundedness are normative imperatives embedded in moral order and not simply an instrumental response to complexity. The functional differentiation of the modern bureaucratic State and religión is one of the most studied sets of societal spheres, and functional differentiation remains a prominent frame for understanding religión in the modern world (e.g. Casanova, 1994). I have elaborated elsewhere (Thomas, 2010) that, although the functional differentiation of religión and the State is nearly universal in Western democracies and prevalent throughout the world, the actual rules constituting that differentiation and the formal organizational rules and practices vary to such a degree that rules of differentiation in one national polity would count as violations in others. Dramatic differences are not limited to cases across civi­ lizations but are apparent in very simple comparisons of, for example, the

34

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

United States, France and the Netherlands. If functional differentiation is an objective solution to objective, systemic problems, then either one, and only one, structure meets the required function or there are func­ tional alternatives. Clearly, the first option is not possible if all forms of separation of State and religión are interpreted as functional differentia­ tion, and the second given the logical problems involved with functional equivalents is descriptive rather than explanatory. This suggests, I argüe, that rather than an objective adaptation to complexity, it is a culturally prescribed model of rational organization: separation of State and religión is a culturally constitutive characteristic of the nation-state and is defined normatively as the solution to religious conflict. The formal rules and practices of different national polities understandably vary by the local historical, cultural and material conditions, but the fact that such diverse local arrangements are all categorized as the functional differentiation of State and religión suggests cultural classification. The presence of functionally differentiated spheres and of formal organizations is associated with decoupling (Meyer et al., 1997) that reinforces a cultural interpretation. The adoption of formal functionally differen­ tiated structures often is decoupled from actual practices.5 The lack of implementation on the ground makes it difficult to explain the adop­ tion of functional systems as arising endogenously to solve organizational problems and to produce practical outcomes. It makes more sense - and is what one would expect - if global, universal models are adopted in local situations in which the models are reasonably assessed to be inappropriate. Functional differentiation including the creation of identifiable subsystems and expansive formal organization and agency specialization is pervasive throughout the world, but a lack of precisión in definitions of complex and simple and ambiguity in identifying functional differentia­ tion, as well as decoupling, undermine the argument that it results from objective instrumental responses to complexity. We thus are left again with the problem of functional differentiation as description rather than explanation. Lacking both a mechanism for overcoming the logical prob­ lems of functional explanation in the face of functional alternatives and the lack of evidence that complexity is the driving forcé behind functional differentiation, it is reasonable to question attempts to explain structures in terms of functional adaptation to complexity. 5 These gaps are often depicted as failures in implementation and attributed to corruption or to cynical actors who adopt these structures with no intention of implementing them. Reform is demanded, resulting in further elaboration of specialized, differentiated offices and organizations. Decoupling is pervasive beyond cases of cynicism and corruption, for example when decoupling actually increases the functioning of an organization, but these very attributions reflect cultural processes (see Thomas, 2010).

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

35

These same observations, when coupled with cultural approaches, suggest instead, I argüe, that functional differentiation is culturally prescribed ‘rational action’ that is worked out through political processes. Putting it in modern systems theory terms, the discourse of instrumentality associated with functional differentiation is not merely an epiphenomenal result; rather, instrumental discourse is determining in the expansión of functional differentiation. In terms of world culture theory, function­ ally differentiated spheres arise as enactments of a rationalized cultural context. World culture theory (referred to sometimes as world polity theory and sociological neo-institutionalism) has developed this interpretation most fully, arguing that functionally differentiated spheres are created and constituted within a cultural context and thus exhibir similarities in rationalized structures and similar trends over time toward increased instrumental rationalization. Culture in this usage refers to institutionalized structures comprised of categories (identities) of things (people, things, events) and their interrelations. These elements are woven into narratives and models of organization and action. Culture thus has both cognitive and evaluative/moral aspects. All cultural structures have a rationality or logic to them, and increased rationality in this generic sense denotes increased systematization and elaboration, both in specificity and abstraction. Of special interest is the culture of modernity now worldwide that is characterized by a particular type of rationality, termed instrumental rationality (Weber, 1968a) and technique (Ellul, 1964). It has been referred to by world culture theorists (e.g. Boli and Thomas, 1999) simply as rationalized culture, rationalistic authority and global rationalism, but only in the context of instrumental rationality, for which it is shorthand. Instrumental rationality is the cultural structuration of standardized, universal, impersonal rules, principies, models and identities legitimated in terms of efficient means to abstract ends. Within instrumental ratio­ nality, problems are identified and framed discursively as technical problems, technical Solutions are delineated and measurable, controllable criteria for success are institutionalized. Sovereignty is located in humanity, and actors are constituted as rational actors with agency to pursue ends through the most effective means. Actions are modelled as rational means to ends and are subject to universal, abstract knowledge and specialized expert agents. Intellectual activity is organized by experts to produce abstract knowledge expected to result in advances in technique. It is in this cultural context that abstract knowledge and experts focusing on rational action - efficient means - flourish. Rationalization of the sys­ tem breaks down means-ends links into smaller, more precise units.

36

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Means-ends chains are elaborated and specified with more focused, highly specialized experts and abstraer knowledge. As a cultural order, instrumental rationality is a moral system: it is a moral obligation for actors to use their ageney to rationally create and adopt efíicient means to ends. As action defined as means is increasingly oriented to abstract models of rationality and as actors increasingly adopt rationalized identities and associated Scripts of rationality, gaps increase between models of action and situated practices. These tend to be interpreted by local actors, experts and scholars as social problems such as problems of implementation, of capabilities or of corruption. These interpretations demand rational reform and increase pressures to elabórate, specify and conform to rationalistic means. The sociological institutionalist emphasis on culture is consistent with the general cultural turn in functional differentiation theorizing. It agrees with views such as modern Systems theory that functional differentiation is not merely decomposition of societies but rather an expansión and creation of new structures through discursive models. There is agreement with phenomenologists and modern Systems theorists that the world cul­ tural context of functional differentiation is not integrated and that institutionalized cultural structures are marked by contradiction and conflict characterized as a project. Contemporary world culture dominated by instrumental rationality has as its theory of itself a functionalist, instru­ mental interpretation, including intellectual (including social Science) formulations and folk theories found in everyday discourse and popular media. Despite this consistency with the broader cultural turn, there are stark differences in conceptualizing the global cultural context and in theo­ rizing the relationship between instrumental rationality and functional differentiation. In the world cultural interpretation, instrumental rationalization is analytically prior to functional differentiation. This line of argument, rooted in the empirical pattern of isomorphic rationalized structures, calis into question the interpretation that functional differen­ tiation is an objective instrumental response, whether actor-centred or systemic, to complexity. Rather, functional differentiation is a result of the intellectual and folk theories that are part of instrúfnental rationalization. These are cultural imperatives that carry moral obligation: ratio­ nal actors (individuáis, formal organizations, States) follow and modify culturally constituted ‘instrumental action’ by identifying and solving problems through a general style of functional differentiation. Actors are oriented to identities and adopt discourse and Scripts (Epstein, 2008). Identities and Scripts 'of (instrumentally) rational actorhood are found

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

37

worldwide, and thus it is appropriate to theorize that it crosscuts or overarches differentiated spheres. If it is accurate that a world culture characterized by global rationalism stipulates rational action as a moral imperative and actors oriented to rationalized identities follow and elabórate increasingly rationalized actions, then it is important to work out implications for understanding differentiation in world society. Two sets of questions are pursued here. First, what are the processes by which functional differentiation occurs within an imagined whole and how, within that whole, are functionally differentiated and bounded spheres and organizations created and interrelated? Second, how does a culture of instrumental rationality constitute other types of differentiation and what implications does this have for understanding the relationship among the different types?

4

Processes of functional differentiation in rationalized contexts

It is instructive to think through the construction of a functionally differ­ entiated sphere, its relationship to rationalized cultural contexts and the role of professionalization. It seems uncontroversial that a differentiated sphere is created out of a whole and the process is thus in the context of the whole. The cultural structures, codes, semantics, discourse and médium of communication, out of which new structures are produced, are, at some prior point, not differentiated. Controversy is added, how­ ever, when considering a global whole or world society. Beyond this there appears to be substantial disagreement about the nature of ‘boundedness’: How are functionally differentiated spheres bounded from others? How are formal organizations bounded from their environments? At issue is how they come to be bounded, that is, how are they created through rational action and what are their relationships to the external context? Historically, functional differentiating often takes the form of a movement and is often resisted. Resistance is not surprising: functional differentiation undermines or at least limits undifferentiated authority and identity. Familial, political authority, for example, is confronted with attempts to differentiate and free political authority from kinship. Political-religious establishments are confronted with movements to sep­ árate them. It thus is understandable that it might be experienced as a ‘decomposition’ of society or community (Gemeinscha.fi) even as it is a project of creating new institutional structures and expanding soci­ ety. Acknowledging this does not reduce the process to the interests of the State versus corporate groups, but it displays the political process

38

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

and cultural conflicts involved. While actors mobilize around entrenched interests and their relative power factors into historically contingent outcomes, the stakes are embedded in different cultural orders, different cultural logics. Central State authority freeing itself from kinship and religious authorities historically articulated an instrumentality and imper­ sonal authority that relocated the place in society of family and religión, reconstituted the human person as individual and depicted nature as a rationalized field of action (e.g. Eisenstadt, 1999). Rationalistic culture is distinct from, and at odds with, substantive rationality associated with less functionally differentiated systems.6 Functional differentiation and an instrumental rationality that defines it as progress and as the rational solution to diverse social problems are intimately related. Indeed, Weberian scholars (e.g. Schluchter, 1981) use functional differentiation to indicate, if not define, rationalization. Jaeger (2010) shows that types of differentiation and types of discourse tend to be associated. According to modern systems theory, functional differenti­ ation is a semantic creation of a distinctly rationalist discourse. World cul­ ture theorists argüe that this is consistent with the view that instrumental rationality is analytically prior to functional differentiation: rationalized culture worldwide consists of structures of symbolic codes, semantics and discourse out of which functional differentiation is constructed across the globe (Thomas, 2010). Instrumental rationalism is substantially elaborated and ‘embodied’ in functional differentiation. This fine of argument need not rely on phenomenological micro-mechanisms, although it is more consistent with them than with rational actor mechanisms. The point is that action and system differentiation, whatever the microdynamics, result from rationalistic cultural processes. The creation of professions and professionalization is one process by which functional differentiation occurs, and it illustrates the relationship between functional differentiation and rationalized contexts. In his definitive study of the system of professions, Andrew Abbott (1988) presents evidence that differentiation of a professional sphere is never an isolated process, but rather occurs in the context of other differentiated spheres that is within a system of professions - and in the context of a broad instrumental rationalism. The central aspect of professionalization, like 6 This is an example of functional differentiation’s reflecting the emergence of rationalized culture, thus I use the language of different cultural orders. The conflict over functional differentiation can equally be among actors within a rationalized context with some pressing for and some resisting increased rationalization and differentiation. A modern profession or faction within it might, for example, resist ñirther differentiation and thereby loss of authority. Often, already rationalized actors (e.g. entrenched professionals), resisting further rationalization, adopt a somewhat traditionalist discourse.

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

39

functional differentiation, is to create a boundary that defines a unique identity and a field of discourse and action. Professionalization involves creating bounded specialized abstract knowledge and practice (Abbott, 1988), and in terms of modern systems theory, an emergent médium of communication and associated semantics. Bounded identity, knowl­ edge and media constitute and support the interests of a profession, as individual professionals and as a corporate organizational actor, in being autonomous from other actors. And once a profession is institutionalized, professionals routinely become entrenched, often resisting further rationalization. Neither instrumental rationalism ñor the professionalization process is, however, reducible to entrenched interests because, for example, instrumental rationalism’s dynamism produces waves of reform to further rationalization. It takes much political power if not forcé to slow down, resulting in the observation that reform and continued change are often marked by conflict. What we draw from this is the importance of understanding the systemic and cultural contexts in which professionalization takes place and, to the extent that professionalization is a global phenomenon, the impor­ tance of understanding the rationalism of world culture. Built into this process across all professions is an instrumental rationality that justifies, if not compels, the creation of a profession and constitutes the identities, discourse and rules governing it. The profound role of Science in professionalization throughout the world across nearly all professions illustrates the importance of original and ongoing ‘external’ cultural influence (Drori et al., 2003; Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000). Universities, the home of puré Science since the late nineteenth century, elabórate science-based knowledge across all types of degrees and professional programmes. Academic intellectuals scientize and elabórate the ground, standards and rules of particular spheres and professions. Moreover, all sorts of professionals claim expertise and press applications in diverse spheres and organizations. Psychology and psychologists are one of the most pervasively active throughout the world in business, law, education, family and religión, to ñame just a few. Management experts, many academics but also many practitioners with appropriate degrees, tell organi­ zations in diverse spheres how to manage: law firms, schools, nonprofits and religious organizations. Economists frame within scientific discourse knowledge about global markets, national economic development and consumer behaviour. This panoply of professionals is consulted by, and often runs, agencies of nation-states, international organizations such as the World Bank, multinational corporations and international nongovernmental organizations. It is true, as described by modern systems theorists, that each functionally differentiated profession or system has its

40

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

own médium of communication, and thus this influence involves translation or possibly transposition, but the influence is nevertheless there. Thus, both culturally and organizationally, professionalization illustrates that the creation and maintenance of functionally differentiated spheres involves an elaboration and enactment of rationalization within a whole. The creation of a functionally differentiated profession both elab­ órales the scope and composition of world society’s abstract knowledge and expands the system of experts. A bounded, differentiated profession and its abstract expertise are located within a system of experts and bod­ ies of rationalized knowledge. This can be understood as a cultural theory of knowledge and of the agents who have access to that knowledge, all theorized to contribute to the collective good of an imagined whole. The ongoing functioning of a profession, moreover, reaches outward to other social sectors, that is, to other functionally differentiated spheres, and to an imagined whole within which the system of experts and abstract knowledge are understood to contribute to the collective good - local, national or global progress and development. An important example is mass schooling: professionalization of educators played a key role in the creation by States of public mass schooling and in the secularization of education. The interrelations of the State, religión and professions vary, of course, by world-historical context and local conditions. In the United States at the turn of the twentieth century, for example, Progressive reformers built a system of bureaucratized public schools by professionalizing educators, by rationalizing educational theory and pedagogy and by adopting pragmatic administrative and management principies (Thomas et al., 2003). These projects were greatly advanced by international developments including the creation of psychology as a Science and the emergence of the modern research uni­ versity. These distinct developments legitimated each other and exhibited interrelated networks of players. Broadening further, we see that in the United States and Europe at this time many distinct fields were being rationalized and professionalized, from law to religión itself. This happened across levels of complexity as professionals carried their doctrine into rural, less industrialized areas in the ñame of individual citizenship and development. After World War II, with the institütionalization of mass education as a global project, these interrelations among profes­ sionalized experts, and their bounded spheres of abstract knowledge, are evident within and among international organizations such as UNESCO, the World Bank and myriad international professional associations. Thus, although the process creates a bounded sphere, corporate actors and specialized knowledge, it continúes to exist within a larger environment. In this case, professional educators and rationally administered

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

41

schools want to affect their environment, even as they are affected by it the environment including international organizations, the State, law, psychology and others. The result is the empirically observed increase in instrumental rationalization that ineludes increased functional differenti­ ation, the diffusion of formal organization, and increased specialization, even in regions and locales marked by relatively low levels of complexity. In the creation of nation-state mass schooling, functional differentia­ tion, professionalization and rationalization were related to that other great nominalization: secularization. The creation of an autonomous functionally differentiated sphere historically meant autonomy firom reli­ gión. Putting education in the hands ofprofessionals with scientific, ratio­ nalized knowledge and practices meant freeing education from religious organization, clergy, religious imperatives and religious discourse. None of this is inevitable or essential to ‘education’, but is culturally embedded. The discourse that is generated in the professionalization process elabo­ rares the grand narrative of modernity in which humanity comes of age, gaining new knowledge and leaving behind superstition, ignorance and religión. And it elaborares the more technical social Science versión of moving from simplicity to complexity. This is the rationalized discourse that maintains and legitimares functional differentiation. The presumptioh of inevitability, that functional differentiation is a natural adaptation to objective conditions of complexity, is called into question by the fact that the actual forms of differentiating education from religión vary dramatically across national polities. There is tremendous variation in what separation means, even among those nation-states that strongly espouse the rationalized discourse of separation. Moreover, when there are mixtures of religión and schooling, the outeries are not always that religión cannot do a good job; in many cases it is known that religious schools do a better job relative to a variety of accepted standards. Rather, just as often the concern is a moral one - religión should not be involved in mass education. Functional differentiation is a moral project. The functional differentiation process is paradoxical: bounded, rel­ atively autonomous and in this sense autopoietic spheres are constituted and reproduced within a wider whole and influenced by the actors and discourse of other spheres, and in this sense they are open sys­ tems. Bounded functionally differentiated systems are open systems, at the very least embedded in a rationalized discourse that initially gave rise to them. If functionally differentiated spheres are created out of a common cultural context, they are encoded with an organizational DNA, if you will, that guides them in the same direction. The rationalistic symbolic codes and semantics, while taking distinct forms in

42

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

functionally differentiated spheres, drive them in the same general direction toward higher levels of instrumentality. Functionally differentiated spheres and organizations created in one world-historic context at one ‘level’ of instrumental rationality continué over time to look similar to each other relative to those constituted in other world-historic contexts. We know that this is true of organizations, in that the organizational environment in which an organization is first created has influence throughout its history. Evidence also suggests, as illustrated above, that once differ­ entiated and bounded, they remain open to further rationalization, are influenced by the technical and moral input and imperatives from other spheres and pursue influence in other spheres. We know that organiza­ tions are highly sensitive to their environments (Meyer and Scott, 1983), and we also know that functionally differentiated spheres continué to influence each other. The particular pattern of influence among identifiable spheres varíes over time and across situated places. Professions com­ pete over which should be the external authoritative influence for a partic­ ular sector. Academic humanities disciplines, for example, have recently made extensive attempts to inform the nature of sustainable development, while economists attempt to maintain their dominance in this field even as many move beyond Economics to inelude Sociology, Anthropology, and the humanities in their advice. World-historical arrangements are embodied in international organizations such as UNESCO, the World Bank and myriad international professional associations. Expertise, authority and influence within and among these international orga­ nizations are contested, and particular patterns of relationships within nation-states vary, but all reflect the pattern of a bounded sphere influ­ enced by others and embedded in a broader institutional context.

5

Functional differentiation and segmentary and stratified differentiation in the context of global rationalism

If functional differentiation is embedded in rationalized global cultural contexts, it is reasonable to expect these rationalized contexts to shape its relationships with other types of differentiation. We explore in turn how rationalized cultural contexts affect the relations betWeen functional differentiation and segmentary and stratificatory differentiation.

Segmentary differentiation

Social theorists since at least the classical Sociology and Anthropology theorists at the turn óf the twentieth century define a segmental unit as one that can disappear without crucially affecting the functioning of

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

43

society because the whole and any of the other segments are not dependent on the functioning of any one segment. The shortcoming of this conceptualization is that the assessment of the loss of a segment is made only relative to functional differentiation. Segmental units exist within a cultural order, a classification system in Douglas’s (1966) terms, which defines their relationships to each other. In tribal societies moieties, from clans down to families, are interrelated according to institutionalized rules and elaborated within a narrative. Norms of reciprocity, for exam­ ple, link families and clans in religious and economic exchange, embed­ ded in narrative myths of the cosmic meaning and origins of the rela­ tionships. Because each clan does the exact same thing as other clans, there is no functional interdependence, but the loss of that clan is a serious threat to the institutional order. Segmental units take on sacred valué. The segmentary differentiation of world society into nation-states similarly is embedded in institutionalized structures that place great valué if not sacredness on them, making their disappearance historically rare and crisis-ridden. The segmentary differentiation of the Interstate system into nation-states is traceable to the Westphalia system of sovereignty and has, of course, been studied extensively and conceptualized within the field of IR. While IR theory tends to focus on the interrelations of States as organizations, many scholars have examined the institutional cultural context that constitutes the interstate system. The English School, in particular, has identified deep cultural elements constituting the State, what they term international society (e.g. Buzan, 2010). World culture theorists expand their conception of the cultural context to inelude more than the constituting of sovereign States using concepts of world polity or world society (Meyer et al., 1997) and global rationalism (Boli and Thomas, 1997). World culture or international society constitutes more than simply the sovereign State as organization. States were constituted as embodying a people, and state-directed constructions of the nation followed (Strayer, 1970; Thomas etal., 1987; Geary, 2002). The segmental units are ‘societal’, defining identities, language, families, ethnicities, religions and corporations relative to national society, within the narrative of progress and modernization. The nation-state is the segmental unit that the classical social Science theorists reified as Society and saw as evolving from complexity to complexity. Globalization as increased rationalization and functional differentia­ tion across national borders undermines the nation-state as the fun­ damental segmental unit; yet, this marks neither the decline of the nation-state ñor that of segmentary differentiation. It decreases the congruence among territory, a nation (people), and government (see the

44

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

introductory chapter to this volume), resulting in a decline in the sacredlike qualities of nation-states and more frequent dissolutions and boundary changes. The institutional contení of this change, however, also ineludes the emergence of new identities. The rationalization of identities deconstructs actors such as the nation into smaller units that are, in turn, constituted as actors. It expands the number of segmental units within the nation-state and thereby undermines the nation as a unitary whole and thus as a segmental unit even as it multiplies other segmental identities. Cultural rationalization is an integral part of globalization resulting in ‘denationalization’ (Zürn, 2010). Identities are elaborated through both intellectual deconstruction and bureaucratic management, as illustrated by the multiplying of identities promulgated by the bureaucratic State and demanded by mobilizing groups. The resulting segmental units (ethnic or linguistic or religious) are not presumed to be functionally differentiated internally, although, as with all rationalized actors, they are pressured to adopt formal organization that imposes an internal functional differenti­ ation. Multiculturalism, as both post-colonial narrative and bureaucratic policy, is highly rationalistic, embedded in institutionalized categories of rights, justice and development; ‘cultures’ formally organize in part to mobilize action and in part as a response to pressures. In many cases, indigenous peoples, nations within nations and newly identified groups press for independent statehood, but peoplehood is a world cultural classification based on cultural claims, not primarily on internal functional necessity. There is no clear relationship between state­ hood and complexity or internal functional differentiation (McNeely, 1995). The proliferation of island societies becoming nation-states, for example, is not driven by the needs of internal complexity, but rather by world cultural classifications that institute statehood as a natural and morally obligatory expression of peoplehood. This too, like the construction of nations in Europe and in post-colonial settings, results in the implementation of world society mandates by States reconstituting their societies, largely through rationalized State organization and projeets (Anderson, 1991; McNeely, 1995; Meyer etal., 1997). Increasingly, there are cases in which instead of demanding indepen­ dent statehood a people demands proper recognition by the national staté or negotiates a semi-autonomous status. Thus, nation-states, historically constructed as a unitary segmental unit, can be comprised explicitly of a number of different types of subunits that are not internally functionally differentiated ñor interrelated in a functional way: nations-within-nations and ethnic, linguistic, religious and kin groups.7 7

The historical reality is that nations were rarely unitary or homogenous and all States directed the construction of a unitary nation (e.g. Geary, 2002). Scholars have noted

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

45

While worked out in the particulars of a local situation, world cul­ tural institutions co-inherent with the Interstate system constitute and shape national identities and structures; what is external shapes the inter­ nal, and this is increasing in scope and intensity. It is, thus, not just that globalization involves more and faster interactions across segmental boundaries; after all, this would not necessarily change the definitions of the boundaries. Institutions beyond the nation-state are denser and make more demands on States and in substance define new segmen­ tal groups. Also, transnational institutions, rooted in social scientific, philosophical and psychological knowledge and expertise, specify the interrelations among these non-nation-state units. States increasingly are reactive responders, implementing and managing these agendas (see the introductory chapter to this volume; Krücken and Drori, 2009). Conceptualizing these processes through the lens of types of dif­ ferentiation in rationalized contexts, suggests the importance of more empirical studies of the relationship between the articulation, elaboration and expansión of multiculturalism and globalization. Robertson (1992) argües that they are of a piece, neither reducible to the other but clearly mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, globalization (functional differen­ tiation across national borders) makes national identities and narratives problematic. On the other hand, rationalized cultural pressures on actors to express particular identities are felt worldwide (what Robertson terms universal-particularism) and are mobilized to gain recognition by States and transnational institutions.

Stratified, hierarchical differentiation: bureaucracy

These rationalized cultural contexts have significant implications for interpreting stratificatory differentiation. Rationalized segmental units are defined as equal: all States have equal valué, no ethnic group can claim greater intrinsic valué than others, and, of course, all individu­ áis everywhere whatever their group identities are equal. Differences in valué are not legitímate bases of stratification or hierarchy, only rational­ ized actions and associated qualities of particular actors are legitímate bases of stratification, and even then in many versions it is suspected that irrational power sources are at play producing inequality. The princi­ pie of equals among all types of segmental units is the foundation for great variation, from the somewhat more homogenous northern European nations and England to the more ‘mosaic’ nations such as France and Italy (Strayer, 1963; Badie and Birnbaum, 1983). The point is that, by the turn of the twenty-first century, the ‘mosaic’ nation, while still viewed as potentially a problem (e.g. Iraq), is explicitly celebrated as an ideal of multiculturalism. And if it is a problem the solution is not a ‘melting pot’ or homogenization but diversity.

46

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

rationalized social organization: international governmental organiza­ tions are routinely based on one State, one vote; associations, whether of States, corporations or individuáis, are voluntary. Illicit stratification reflecting evaluations of segmental units or actors are analysed by experts (many academic social scientists) with the goal of identifying social problems and proposing policy Solutions to States. The system of experts and abstract knowledge are important in the elaboration and diffusion of these principies of stratification.8 Rationalized cultural contexts are also important for understanding the relationship between functional differentiation and hierarchical orga­ nization, and in particular distinguishing types of bureaucracy. Modern bureaucratic hierarchies - organizations - such as States or corporations are quite different from traditional imperial and tribal bureaucracies, but, while this statement is commonplace, closer examination can make the differences much less obvious (on nation-states and empires see Kumar, 2010). Both modern and traditional bureaucracies are func­ tionally differentiated, and the difference is not essentially the degree of complexity: small business organizations are considered modern and the Chinese imperial bureaucracy is not. Even sociologists and political sci­ entists might hesitate to suggest that the imperial Chinese or Byzantine bureaucracies were ‘simple’. The difference has to do instead with the type of rationality in which the functionally differentiated bureaucracy is embedded. What we cali modern bureaucracy is embedded in instrumental ratio­ nality, whereas traditional bureaucracy is embedded in substantive valué. In the former, different structures are created and maintained in terms of functions that in turn are legitimated solely in terms of instrumentality bureaucratic structures are designed to enable the organization as actor to accomplish something. If a function is not deemed instrumentally necessary, then a corresponding structure should not be created or an existing one should be disestablished. In contrast, functions within tra­ ditional bureaucracies, from very complex empires to small-scale tribes, carry their own intrinsic valué. The bureaucracy is a hierarchy of valué. Charles Taylor (2007: 11-12) puts it this way: 8 An exhaustive treatment of the relationship of functional and segmentary differentiation to stratificatory differentiation, whether core-periphery, class or status, is beyond the scope of this chapter. The explanation of stratification in terms of its functions has a long history in structural-functionalism (e.g. Davis and Moore, 1945; cf. Tumin, 1953) and neo-Marxist theorizing such as world-system theory (e.g. Wallerstein, 1979; ChaseDunn, 1989). In the former, functional analysis tends to justify stratification. In the latter, world-systems theoiists analyse the core / semi-periphery / periphery hierarchy as ñinctioning to reproduce unequal exchanges rooted in alienated capital accumulation. Both associate modern stratification with complex functional differentiation.

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

47

In pre-modern cultural orders ‘. some functions were in their essence higher than others . .. the distribution of functions is itself a key part of the normative order.. . the hierarchical differentiation itself is seen as the proper order of things.’ In modern cultural orders ‘. whatever distribution of functions a society might develop is deemed contingent; it will be justified or not instrumentally; it cannot itself define the good... the particular functional differentiation they need to take on to do this most effectively is endowed with no essential worth’.

Both types of bureaucracies are embedded in institutionalized structures but ones that embody different types of rationalities and moral orders. These differences are evidenced in the contení of global rationalism. Within a rationalized cultural context, traditional bureaucracy is depicted as both inefficient and immoral relative to the modern organization as rational actor. The very word bureaucracy takes on stigmatized qualities of being archaic, static, inefficient and associated with inaction, whereas a modern organization is legitimated as dynamic, efficient and actionoriented. Traditional bureaucracies are administrations, mere enactors of the will of some other actor such as a monarchy or family - a will that is non-rational, arbitrary or sacred. Meyer, Drori and Hwang (2006: 39) note that the modern organization is just as much culturally embedded in an ontology, but the difference is one of ‘sovereignty: the modern orga­ nization is an actor, not an instrument’ or enactor of some other’s will. To introduce intrinsic valué, especially religión or kinship, into a modern organization is viewed as introducing inefficiency; it also is depicted as corrupt and immoral (Fallers, 1965). Modern organizations, functionally differentiated internally and from each other, are of course stratified and hierarchical, but the distinctive aspect of instrumental rationality is that this stratification is legitimated in terms of instrumentality and sovereignty of actors, not by intrinsic differences among the strata. There thus seem to be different types of functional differentiation based on different types of rationality constituting hierarchical differenti­ ation, and what is needed is a rigorous research program in comparative bureaucracies. It would require recognizing important nuances between the two broad poles of modern and traditional. For example, the bureau­ cracies of the early modern State and, in particular, those of the absolutist monarchs, were neither a static embodiment of an order of being ñor an actor. They were instruments of a sovereign and thereby embodied valué, but their mándate pressed toward instrumentality. As another important example, in imperial China the Confucian emphasis on learning, merit and virtue is not easily fitted into the stereotypical view of traditional bureaucracy. The research agenda also ineludes analysing ways in which

48

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

instrumentality in modern organizations often, if not routinely, is sacralized. Adding a particular office or agency or adopting particular ‘best practices’ or policy are deemed essential, promising goal attainment. Sometimes there is substantial empirical evidence for these promises, but often there is little empirical evidence of their actual effectiveness; and, in any case, they are adopted in locales throughout the world, in many of which they are grossly inappropriate. Thus, contrary to Taylor’s analysis, particular instrumental actions and structures can come to embody intrinsic valué, albeit the ritualized valué of the action rather than the actor. This happens often, even though it makes these struc­ tures vulnerable to claims of inefficiency and thus of illegitimacy. These lines of thinking suggest a comparative bureaucracy project that brings together the different strands of Weberian Sociology on bureaucracy and on religión.

6

Differentiations in world society

One conclusión is that scholarship should reframe functionalist explanations by not presuming that functional differentiation is a natural adaptation to complexity. The chapter further argües that, consistent with the cultural turn, globalization and functional differentiation increase in the context of a rationalized culture that is global in scope. In this view, and consistent with empirical observations, functionally differentiated spheres, although bounded, are created within a whole and are influenced by their environment comprised of other institutional spheres. Global rationalism, moreover, affects other types of differentiation. It constitutes segmental units, foremost nation-states but increasingly nonnation-state segmental units; it defines these units as equals. It delegitimates value-laden bureaucracy and instead views proper organizations as actors; it delegitimates the stratification of segmental units based on intrinsic valué. Segmental units, increasingly defined as actors, are to be organized within functionally differentiated systems and stratified only on the basis of instrumentality. All of this takes place within a whole, and, however we might conceptualize it, the whole is af njinimum com­ prised of cultural structures that constitute rational actors, rational action including functional differentiation, and equal segmental units thereby legitimating stratification and hierarchy solely in functional, instrumental terms and delegitimating justifications rooted in intrinsic valué. There are important implications for understanding the nation-state and the interstate system. Within global rationalism, functional differen­ tiation is the rational basis of social organization. Within the imagined

Rationalized cultural contexts of functional differentiation

49

whole of world society, functional systems, from economic and politi­ cal spheres to professions to formal organizations, are differentiated and bounded. A system of abstract knowledge, experts, and associated discourses characterize world society. The nation-state remains the primary actor in the world political sphere, and the exercise of power and forcé remain important, but to focus on conventional IR state-centric mechanisms and debates misses the social-cultural reality in which nation-states are embedded. Nation-states remain the primary political segmental unit, but they act within this increasingly dense global web of institutional structures that define diverse non-national segmental units, many subnational identities and groups and many transnational ones. This does not replace the nation-state, but puts increasing demands on it to recognize and negotiate these identities. Much of the responsibility of the State is to ensure that valué is instrumental and to free equal segmental units such as ethnic and religious groups from illicit stratification. To reduce global­ ization and global processes generally to increased interconnections and faster flows through networks misses the cultural contexts that constitute both rational actor and rational action. Understanding global processes through the lens of functional differentiation and its relationship to seg­ mentary and stratificatory differentiation is helpful, but presuming that the primary mechanism is adaptation to complexity tends to reproduce the tendency in political and IR theory to see only networks of units and flows of Information, facts and data. Yet, given its embeddedness in instrumental rationality, functional differentiation is highly cultural and symbolic - and full of content.

3

The history and systematics of functional differentiation in sociology Rudolf Stichweh

1

Early modern Europe and ideas on functional differentiation

The origins of the concept of functional differentiation are to be found in early modern Europe. There is, first of all, the concept of vocation (Berufsstand) This, in its strong Protestant and Germán versions, signifies a professional specialization, thought to be lifelong, within a restricted sphere. One was bound to this vocation not only by professional competences, but also by ethical obligations to the professional sphere to which one belonged, which were thought to be binding on individual practitioners. Their binding nature could imply that one’s whole style of life was expected to be penetrated by these - possibly very extensive and encompassing - obligations (Conze, 1972;LaVopa, 1986; 1988). The order of vocations and professions was strongly linked to macrosocietal classifications which, in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought, still looked to estates as the basic unit of societal structure formation. From this coupling of vocations and estates aróse the idea that, besides the estates that people were born into, there were estates of another kind, based on vocations. In your vocation you are a specialist. You are separated from other specialists. But the vocational estates of early modern Europe were thought of as a macro-societal feature which counteracted these separating effects.1 There are good reasons to claim that the vocational estates of early modern Europe were the first structural variant in which functional differentiation was accepted as a macro-societal feature.12 In the second half of the eighteenth century, in the sodial theory of the Scottish Enlightenment, the first explicit differentiation theory was 1 See a very interesting formulation in Mendelssohn (1981). 2 Cf. Stichweh (1991: 28-37) on estates and professional corporations as a kind of historical experiment in functional differentiation; and Scott (1988: 49-58), for a succinct analysis of the génesis of a society of estates from a non-specialized, nearly classless farmer (bonde) society in Sweden between 1100 and 1400.

50

History and systematics of functional differentiation

51

formulated, especially in the writings of Adam Srnith and Adam Ferguson. It is obviously a theory of professional specialization - more precisely, it is a theory of the subdivisión of complex tasks which brings about ever more professional specializations. But this thinking could never produce a theory of functional differentiation because it primarily perceived in dif­ ferentiation processes the loss of collective agency and therefore did not conceive of differentiation as a macro-societal property. This is clearly articulated in a passage in Adam Ferguson: ‘Where shall we find the talents which are fit to act with men in a collective body, if we break that body into parts, and confine the observation of each to a sepárate track?’ (Ferguson, 1773: 47). A different understanding aróse in the Germán reception of Scottish enlightenment thinking (see Pascal, 1962). This reception was concentrated in the years between 1790 and 1810 and gave a new and peculiar twist to the Scottish idea of división of labour. Among Germán thinkers too there existed a fear that specialization would result in one-sidedness and isolation and loss of collective consciousness, but some prominent theorists - Wilhelm von Humboldt and Friedrich Wilhelm Schleiermacher probably being the most well-known among them - chose another path. They interpreted specialization not as restriction and one-sidedness but as a process of individualization (see, interestingly, Eck, 1908). And they perceived the individual as somebody who, by the process of spe­ cialization, succeeded in concentrating all of his or her forces on a limited field. On the basis of this concentration, the individual was able to expand and to take ever more of the contents of the world into the domain of his or her experience. In this interpretation, specialization is no longer a comparatively limited phenomenon that consists in doing something simple ever more precisely and intensely. It is, instead, an oscillatory movement of restriction and expansión, of mastering extensive contents by looking at them from a very specific perspective. And one has to add one more point from the earlier literature on vocations. Just as accepting one’s vocation had to be understood as a kind of ethical obligation, the same could be said of the interrelation of individualization and specializa­ tion. To be an individual, to concéntrate all of one’s forces on some spe­ cific perspective on the world, is a normative expectation and an ethical demand addressed to all of us. That point of view articulares something completely different from the fear of one-sidedness formulated by earlier observers of specialization (see Stichweh, 1994; 2012). How does such an analysis of the interrelation of specialization, indi­ vidualization and ethics relate to functional differentiation? Only one step has to be added, and this step is already evident in the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher, among others. The concept of individuality is not

52

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

limited to natural persons. There are higher-level individualices, arising from the plurality of specialized and individualized perspectives concentrated on one and the same domain of meaning. And on the basis of the diversity and the convergence of these individual perspectives the emerging domains of meaning become visible as higher-level individualices of this type. One can then address these meaning domains as if they were historical individuáis. A good early example of such a fagon de parler is in Johann Joachim Winckelmarm’s History of the Art ofAntiquity of 1764. In the last sentence of the preface he writes: ‘I devote this history of art to the art, to the time and especially to my friend Antón Raphael Mengs’ (Winckelmann, 1763-8: 32, italics in the original). There seems to be no categorical difference between functional abstractions such as ‘the art’ and the individuality of a natural person such as Winckelmann’s painter friend. Furthermore, it can be said that these phenomena of collective individuality, the functional domains or areas of meaning, can claim the same ethical dignity that, in the first instance, had only been attributed to individuáis as natural persons. More than a hundred years later the first great Germán sociologi­ cal theorist of functional differentiation, Georg Simmel, carne back to these developments and, especially, to Friedrich Schleiermacher. Sim­ mel points out that it is a novel world historical idea that not only the equality of human beings but also the differences between them represent demands of equal ethical dignity. What is unique to Schleiermacher, Simmel concludes, is the idea that universals or absolutes only exist as individuáis and, by this argumentational turn, the seemingly trivial social principie of the división of labour, for the first time in history, acquired a foundation in a metaphysics of being (Simmel, 1917: 94). One final remark has to be made regarding the first part of the argument of this chapter. Parallel to the developments described here, the first theorists of globalization or theorists of - in contemporary terms ‘global civil society’ (Weltbürgergesellschaft in the Kantian original) are already making an appearance. They inelude Immanuel Kant, Georg Forster, Cari Gottlieb Suarez, Johann Wolfgang Goethe and, last in the same line of argument, Karl Marx, whose differentiation and global­ ization theory formulated 1847 in the Communist Manifestó is a clear extensión of the line of argument beginning in Kant. All these authors make use of functional abstractions such as ‘the art’, ‘learning’, ‘Sci­ ence’, ‘trade’, ‘industries’, ‘literature’; and all of them describe the social realities analysed by these functional abstractions as ‘linkages’ (Verkettungeri) which tie the most distant regions of the world together.3 This is 3

In 1829 Goethe is already speaking about a worldwide free trade in concepts and feelings (Stichweh, 2008: 41, footnote 68).

History and systematics of functional differentiation

53

the reason why, in the years immediately after 1800, the composites of ‘world’, such as Goethe’s coinage ‘world literatura’, became so frequent in Germán language texts (Koch, 2002) and already at this point in time the indissoluble link between functional differentiation and the global domestication of space was well established. Functional differentiation became visible as a división of labour on a global scale compatible with ongoing individualization as the other core trend of modern society.

2

Embryology and nineteenth-century ideas of functional differentiation

All this was still proto-Sociology. Looking at these early formulations of the interrelation between functional differentiation and globalization to be found in the Germán literatura between 1780 and 1830, there was still approximately a century to go before the discipline of Sociology as we know it today aróse. But in nineteenth-century social thought a second paradigm of thinking about functional differentiation emerged, which was tied to the nascent discipline of embryology. Early nineteenth-century embryology was based on the use of observation by microscopes. A new perspective on differentiation, derived from the process of observing histological and morphological differentiation in individual organisms, can be found in authors such as Johann Friedrich Meckel and Karl Ernst von Baer (Meckel, 1811: 64ff.; von Baer, 1828: 153-9, 206-8, 225, 263-4). This perspective conceived functional dif­ ferentiation as the transition from homogeneous States in a system to increasing heterogeneity. Homogeneity was thought to be the State of a still incoherent and therefore unstable system. Heterogeneity was supposed to arise from the specialization of the individual parts of the system (i.e. the individual organism in embryological development) and implied the more intensive coordination and cooperation of the specialized parts. It was a fateful event for Sociology that Herbert Spencer read Karl Ernst von Baer in an English translation and coined from this reading the for­ mula which then became the core metaphor of his differentiation theory: differentiation as the transition from ‘indefinite incoherent homogene­ ity to definite coherent heterogeneity’. This heritage is still present in contemporary Sociology and may still function, in some respects, as an obstacle épistemologique for sociological thinking. What resulted from the adoption of this nineteenth-century paradigm was that the sociological idea of functional differentiation became tied to biological concepts of individual development. This happened despite development being a concept designed for analysing growth and dif­ ferentiation processes in the life histories of individual organisms, not for describing collective, macro-societal trends. Consequently, Sociology

54

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

became connected to organisms as an analogue for social systems even though organisms need much stronger mechanisms of coordination and integration than could ever be expected or needed in a society. From this metaphor carne the idea of an invariable catalogue of necessary functions and organs, again something plausible for living organisms but implau­ sible for much more loosely coupled systems such as societies. A much better alternative might have been available only a few years after Herbert Spencer’s reading of Karl Ernst von Baer. In 1859 Charles Darwin published The Origin of Species. This was a theoretical venture much closer to eighteenth-century theories of división of labour and to the sociology and metaphysics of individuality conceived by Germán neohumanism and romanticism. In Darwin we have populations of individ­ uáis who are described as individuáis on the basis of their differences and diversity. Such populations of individuáis are - as is the case in Schleiermacher - higher-level individualities in their own right. In the biological case, these higher-level individualities are called species, and an ecology of life can be described by a multiplicity of species being loosely connected among one another and by new species incessantly arising and oíd species continuously being extinguished. Speciation obviously would have been a much better paradigm for functional differentiation than the developmental processes occurring in an individual organism. The advantages of speciation are to be seen in the fact that speciation concepts leave more room for contingency, for dependence on ecological circumstances, for loose coupling among species, for historicity instead of developmental needs, and finally for systems as populations of individ­ uáis in which individuáis conserve new developments that may be useful if ecological circumstances demand adaptations.4 3

Organicist versus individualist theories of functional differentiation: the twentieth-century situation

It was in 1890 and 1893 that the modern sociological theory of differen­ tiation really took off. In 1893 Emile Durkheim published De la división du travail social (Durkheim, 1973). This book is basednn the distinction between ‘mechanical solidarity’ and ‘organic solidarity’ as two types of societal differentiation. ‘Mechanical solidarity’ means a horizontal order of similar or homogeneous parts which can be aggregated as well as separated from one another without major consequences for social order. 4 For this line of argumént the most important author in twentieth-century biology is Ernst Mayr (1999; 2004). But he never had any influence on the path of sociological differentiation theory; cf. Wortmann (2010), who writes interestingly on Mayr.

History and systematics of functional differentiation

55

Perhaps the most important difference from Herbert Spencer is that Durkheim tried to demónstrate the stability of such an order based on similarities (Béjin, 1974). Functional differentiation is conceived by Durkheim as ‘organic solidarity’, which is based on differences arising in processes of individualization. Durkheim was a strong advócate of individualism (Durkheim, 1898), but in differentiation theory he did not opt for a populationist theory of individuáis. Instead, his theory of functional differentiation was very much based on the idea of the Corporation (which ineludes many individuáis who opt for similar specializations) as the basic building block of society. The family, which functioned in a society with mechanical solidarity as the building block which guaranteed continuity, is much weakened in modernity by the fact that it has to be established as a ‘new family’ in every new generation. By this circumstance the Corpo­ ration becomes ever more important as it is not an intermittent social system but exists continuously and is, therefore, supposed to function as the institutional guarantee of the stability of functional differentiation provided by the continuity of corporations.5 In 1890, three years before Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel presented in ‘Über sociale Differenzierung’, the other major theory of social and functional differentiation (Simmel, 1989).6 Once more the focus was on functional differentiation and individualization. Functions formúlate claims on individuáis; they imply an expectation addressed to individuáis to bring all their varied competences and forces into highly specialized activities. But in Simmel this interrelation of functional specification and individualization was conceived as an ongoing struggle. Individuáis will not be willing to subordinare themselves to functional totalities; each individual tries to be a complete world in himself or herself- and therefore we are confronted with two totalities incessantly fighting one another.7 5 See Durkheim (1973: xix), on this argument: ‘Comme elle (la famille RS) se disperse aujourd’hui á chaqué génération, l’homme passe une notable partie de son existence loin de toute influence domestique. La Corporation n’a pas de ces intermittences, elle est continué comme la vie.’ 6 See also his other major statements on differentiation in Simmel (1917; 1977). 7 ‘Society strives to be a whole, an organic unit of which the individuáis must be mere members. Society asks of the individual that he employ all his strength in the Service of the special function which he has to exercise as a member of it... Yet the drive toward unity and wholeness that is characteristic of the individual himself rebels against this role. The individual strives to be rounded out in himself, not merely to help to round out society... This conflict between the whole, which imposes the onesidedness of partial function upon its elements, and the part, which itself strives to be a whole, is insoluble. No house can be built of houses, but only of specially formed stones; no tree can grow from trees, but only from differentiated cells’ (Simmel, 1950: 59). Likewise this very interesting remark on Athens by Simmel: ‘The... unique colourfulness of Athenian life

56

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

And for the first time in history, the diversity of individuáis is not only a factual reality but becomes an ethical demand addressed to individuáis for whom their individuality functions as a paradigm of higher order individualities such as friendship, marriage, family and State (Simmel, 1917:94). From this divergence of differentiation theory arising at the starting point of sociological thinking two theories of functional differentiation can be derived which define a space of conceptual possibilities still relevant today. The first is a kind of organicist theory which can be understood as a decomposition paradigm'. differentiation is always thought of as the división of an antecedent unity into two new parts/systems deriving from this unity. It is probably fair to mention Talcott Parsons as the most important protagonist of this decomposition paradigm in twentiethcentury Sociology. Differentiation in his writings was mostly considered as ‘separation’ of two functions and the subsequent ‘inclusión’ of the separated functions into one encompassing system, which then had to become more generalized in its constitutive valúes.8 Louis Dumont went so far to cali this hypothesis of the ongoing inclusión of separated subsystems into one supervenient system ‘Parsons’ law’ and to postúlate that it is the only law the discipline of Sociology has ever brought about (Dumont, 1980: 245, cf. 19-20). The other analytical option, which might be called the individualist ver­ sión, does not look at separation/decomposition but at a process of system formation which is based on the génesis of new system/environment distinctions in the history of social systems. In this perspective, separation from other systems which the rising system was near in earlier phases of its development may be an important part of the story of a new social system, but it is only a part. The focus clearly rests on the novelty of a new system and on the múltiple synthetic and integrative effects which are preconditions of system formation. Niklas Luhmann is the most important contributor to this tradition (see Luhmann, 1977). In this variant there is no supervenient unity which somehow holds together dif­ ferentiated units (besides the much more general unity, ‘society’.)9 The is perhaps explained by the fact that a people of incomparably individualized personalities were in constant struggle against the incessant inner and external oppression of a deindividualizing small town’ (Simmel, 2010: 107). 8 For a characteristic formulation, see Parsons (1970: 204ff). 9 Society is here understood as the totality of all Communications from which function systems select some that they partially internalize. But even these internalized Commu­ nications are endowed with a potential for further meaning that one function system can never deal with exhaüstively. An esoteric scientific publication in a highly specialized journal might seem to be a communicative event exclusively belonging to the sphere of Science. But the same publication might play a wholly different role in the communi-

History and systematics of functional differentiation

57

differentiated system is much more individualized in its achievements, and this perspective may be - but need not be - combined with an individualism which looks at human individuáis contributing to system processes both as a population of individuáis and as a reservoir of variants functioning as a microdiversity inherent to the system and enabling ongoing processes of adaptation and refashioning of the system.10 A good example of this synthetic logic in functional differentiation is the rise of sport as a function system in nineteenth-century society, a remarkable example of three sepárate traditions, which had never been part of the same system or the same cultural understanding, converging. The first of these was athletics (primarily boxing and wrestling - only much later were track and field athletics added), two thousand years oíd, very competitive and violent, shaped by professionals and addressed to a public looking for a spectacle. Then there was gymnastics (with a Scandinavian and Germán background and a Greek pedigree), a noncompetitive training of the body,. very much inspired by ideas about health, body culture and discipline, and beauty. Finally, there was sports (a late medieval term, perhaps from Latin de-(s)-portare, i.e. going elsewhere to do something different), a term coupled with the pastimes (passetemps') of early modern European nobility. From this coupling carne a cióse link to what one could do with horses and dogs (racing, hunting). The synthesis of these three traditions was a very complicated process (extremely abbreviated here), from which, finally, one function system in world society aróse which reconstituted all these historical divisions and then added ever new disciplines of sport, which still is the dynamics in which we all are involved (Cachay, 1988; Stichweh, 1990). This second perspective, which looks at systems as ‘historical indi­ viduáis’ resulting from complex processes of system formation, has a clear advantage if one really seeks to understand the rise of function systems in society and history. The Parsonian decomposition paradigm with its binary logic has always had - and will continué to have - difficulties in looking at more than a few function systems (in Parsons’ AGIL catión processes of a family system where it might symbolize success, social ascent and differential status among family members. Society is the system that guarantees the unity and consistency of this communicative event to which the different function systems connect in many different ways. And then there are many Communications to which none of the function systems will ever connect. These Communications are clearly internal to society but not to one of the function systems. NB: The argument I present here has to be distinguished from the Parsonian argument regarding highly generalized valúes spanning differentiated societal spheres. 10 Luhmann discovered this connection between functional differentiation and the micro­ diversity of individuáis late in his career and therefore did not have the chance to elabórate on it. See Luhmann (1997a).

58

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

(adaptation, goal attainment, integration, latency) perspective there is a clear place for the ‘economy’ and the ‘polity’ but not for the other function systems). A theory looking for synthetic processes of system formation knows no inherent limits to the number of function systems it will be able to describe. It only needs an abstract catalogue of (necessary) constituents of any function system to be able to do historical analyses on the basis of that catalogue, which, in itself, has a provisional status. It can be enlarged and corrected on the basis of new analytical insights or new insights won in historical studies of individual function systems. I will explore and describe such a provisional but systematic catalogue of the constituents of function systems in the next section. This will be followed by a conclusión looking at the three core questions formulated by the editors of this volume.

4

Constituents of function systems in contemporary world society

If one seeks to understand functional differentiation in contemporary world society one has to start with an adequate idea of the pluralization of function systems. It is no longer a good idea to limit one’s interest in functional differentiation primarily to politics and the economy and to have only a residual idea of other functional complexes (a very vague concept of‘culture’ often occupies this ill-defined space).11 This will not result in an interesting and instructive picture of world society. Instead, one has to accept that more than ten global function systems definitely exist in world society (among them, religión, law, the economy, the polity, the arts, Science, education, intimate relations and families, sport, the health complex, the mass media, perhaps tourism and perhaps leisure). If one then adds to this primary level the internal differentiation of function systems into subsystems, one will often find thousands of subsystems which are differentiated along complex mixes of hierarchical, segmentary and functional lines.11 12 In order to analyse this plurality and diversity of function systems one needs an abstract theory covering the constitutive properti.es of a function system in society. In what follows, I shall propose an OverView of those constitutive properties I consider to be most important on the basis of the available historical and comparative research on the differentiation 11 Cf. on this problem the discussion between Richard Münch (2010a; his chapter in this volume) and myself (Stichweh, 2010). 12 For example, in Science thousands of subdisciplinary research communities can be easily identified.

History and systematics of functional differentiation

59

of function systems. Such a systematic overview of the constituents of every function system has never been tried in the sociological literature on functional differentiation. From my point of view, it is necessary as a starting point for comparative and historical research on the génesis and diversity of functional differentiation, which probably is the most important event in the génesis of modernity and world society.

Unity of structure formation and semantics A function system is a unity in terms of social structure formation as well as of self-descriptive semantics; it is based on a convergence of these two perspectives in identifying the boundaries of the respective system. The same convergence was probably not given in the society of estates of early modern Europe. There the estafes formed a multiplicity of societal subsystems, but at the same time a unifying societal semantics was produced in the higher estates or strata with the expectation that it would be authoritative for all the estates in society. As a result of this, there were estates or strata which were not the authors of the descriptions by which their place in society was identified. I take the convergence of the identification of boundaries via structures and semantics (self-descriptions) to be one among many indicators of the reality of function systems. I consider it as an analogue to what elsewhere in the methodology of the social Sciences is called ‘triangulation’ (cf. Campbell, 1988): The reality of a statement is somehow confirmed by our ability to íind congruent supporting evidence on the basis of very different methods of observation. In general, it seems to be the case that functional differentiation as the primary form of differentiation of society favours monothetic selfdescriptions as a characteristic form of semantics. We then deal - to refer to one relevant example only - with a semantics which postulares the existence of ‘the economy’ and adds supporting evidence - for example our strong interest in ‘utility’. In this way, the differentiation of society as it is described in structural terms is reproduced in all its facets in the semantics of society’s self-description. From this arises the question as to whether a society of this type can still produce self-descriptions which look at society as a total social system including all the different meaning complexes and function systems and their interrelationships together, finally, with the zones of sociality which are not defined in terms of functional differentiation. If we look at ‘globalization’ as a selfdescription of society and not as a scientific theory, it might serve as one potential candidate for such a totalizing self-description.

60

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Specification in terms of the material dimensión ofmeaning A second constitutive characteristic of any function system consists in its consistent specification in terms of the material dimensión of meaning.13 Specification is a never ending process working on a certain material focus, a process from which the communicative and conceptual core of a function system finally arises. The historical switch or transfer from a society of estates to a society of function systems means, in one respect, a shift in the societal relevance of the meaning dimensions. A society of estates is very much concentrated on social distinctions: on one social group having more honour and reputation than another. In a functionally differentiated society material distinctions somehow push back questions of social rank and relevance. The most important societal distinctions relate to material or factual matters and the alternatives given by them. Where does a certain sequence of Communications belong: to the economy, the polity, the educational system, the law, the system of Science and so on? The most important problems with regard to the structure of society are problems which have to be decided by looking at material distinctions.

Functional autonomy My third argument regards functional autonomy. The word ‘autonomy’ will probably come as no surprise in this context. Autonomy is about selfregulation of the system, and this self-referential regulatory autonomy should be an attribute of a function system. But what is functional auton­ omy? What does the concept of function mean in looking at macrosystems in society? Functions are normally producís or achievements generated in a system which is conceived as part of a bigger, encompassing system. These producís and achievemenís are generaíed repeaíedly and íhey coníribuíe in a recursive loop ío íhe ongoing ideníiíy and síabiliíy of the sys­ tem whose producís and achievemenís íhey are.14 Funcíionaliíy, then, means this recursive loop between the continuous generation of these Products and achievements and the identity and stability of the system (and its parts). One has to distinguish microfunctions, which opérate in small localized spaces and incorpórate the embeddedness of something in 13 The conceptual basis for this argument is Niklas Luhmann’s theory of meaning, which distinguishes three dimensions of meaning: the temporal, social and material dimen­ sions. ‘Material’ points to certain facts distinguished from certain other facts which for this moment have a claim to our attention; cf. Luhmann (1971b; 1984: 92-147). 14 Cf., for an instructive evolutionary understanding of function, Millikan (1984).

History and systematics of functional differentiation

61

these spaces, from macrofunctions. Macrofunctions point to the worldwide concentration of a specific type of communication in one global function system. And ‘functionality’ then speaks about the systematic differences which sepárate this communication type from alternatives realized in other comparable societal subsystems. The reference context for a function system is, obviously, the most extensive societal context which in contemporary society is defined by the system of world society. Everything else which can be said has to be worked out in historical studies on individual function systems and the self-referential trajectory which established their macro-functionality. Is it correct, as Parsons and Luhmann maintained, that the function of politics consists in the production of collectively binding decisions (Luhmann, 2000b: 81-8) - and how does the functional autonomy in the generation of this ‘product’, collectively binding decisions,15 arise? What about sport? It has been postulated that the societal function of sport consists in isolating the achievement complex (and in sport this always refers to achievements of the body) with a purity which is not attained or tried in any of the other function systems of society (Stichweh, 1990). Is Science that function system which succeeds in giving to ways of experiencing and describing the world as a causal forcé which strongly selects against alternative ways of understanding the same facets of the world (Luhmann, 1990b)? Such attributions of societal functions have to be examined separately for each of the function systems of society and in each individual case it has to be established that a system really succeeds in establishing a monopoly or at least primacy for a specific type of Communications.

Purity and disembedding

‘Purity’ and ‘disembedding’ are two terms in social theory which arise in the conceptual neighbourhood of functional differentiation. Purity is related to ‘thematic specification’. Whereas thematic specification points to thepositive concentration ofattention on ever more closely circumscribed circumstances, purity functions as a complementary idea which accentuates the negations which are part of processes of specification. Negations identify those aspects of the world which are seen as foreign intrusions 15 ‘Collectively binding decisions’ are only binding as long as you act in a role that involves political inclusión. In other societal spheres you will, for example, say ‘I am a scientist’ (and in this way negate the bindingness of these political obligations on the role you presently assume); or in the words of a Peruvian trader from the textile conglomérate Gamarra (Lima) who looks to China as a paradigm: ‘El Chino te dice, el gobierno no me interesa porque la economía soy yo’ (Burch, 2012: footnote 14).

62

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

into function Systems.16 In some function Systems we find explicit selfdescriptions which make this point: knowledge of law has to be based on a ‘puré theory of law’ (reine Rechtslehre — according to the jurist and legal philosopher Hans Kelsen - implies separation from metaphysics and ethics). In a similar way, since around 1800 mathematicians have been striving for ‘puré mathematics’ (implying separation from its applications); and in the arts the demand for reine Kunst has been formulated via an intensification of self-references, as, for example, in ‘art for art’s sake’ (Egan, 1921). A semantics which is somehow parallel to purity is formulated by the terms ‘embeddedness’ and ‘disembedding’. These concepts come from the economic anthropology of Karl Polanyi (1973), where they func­ tion as a formulation of the autonomization of a capitalist economy. It was Mark Granovetter (1985) who transferred the concept of embed­ dedness into network theory. There, in the context of a theory which emphasizes the transsystemic status of networks, the concept of ‘embed­ dedness’ accentuates the continuing as well as the newly added external links of economic institutions. Finally, the concepts became an important part of globalization theory (cf. Giddens, 1990: esp. 21-9, 53). There, disembedding means the ongoing separation of systems from contextual conditions and the delocalization of sociality (i.e. the separation of sociality from spatial conditions). In this understanding, disembedding can be conceived as a constitutive achievement of each of the function systems of world society.

Self-substitutive orders

Function systems are self-substitutive orders. In this idea of Niklas Luhmann’s (1981) another aspect of the monopoly established by function systems comes to the fore. Function systems are not only monopolies inasmuch as they occupy a particular field of societal experience (e.g. psychic and physical illness in the health system) and allow less and less of a complementary role to competitors in the field claimed by them. They also establish monopolies because function systems^ in contrast to other societal institutions, cannot be replaced by functional equivalents. Take as an example the system of (visual) arts. One can, of course, be an opponent of any type of formal invention practised by artists in this 16 An interesting usage of purity is to be found in Andrew Abbot’s theory of professions (Abbott 1981; 1983): Purity is seen as a kind of retreat to the core problems of a profession, and this retreat is coupled to a prestige hierarchy which rewards those who opt for the negation of foreign elements.

History and systematics of functional differentiation

63

system and can try out other artistic forms and inventions which are to be identified as alternatives and oppositional acts. These are substitutions of alternatives internal to the system of the arts. But there is no functional equivalent to art. Of course, one can ignore the system and opt for self-exclusion from the system as a system. But then one lives in a world without art (or without religión, without Science, without polit­ ical participation etc.) and there are no substitutes for these voids. The behaviour described is plausible and possible on the level of individual biographies and enhances the diversity of individuáis in society. And then there is one further possibility at the level of function Sys­ tems and their subsystems: they could come to an end. The visual arts might cease to be (as Hegel predicted), or physical Science might cease to produce new discoveries (as many nineteenth-century physicists certainly believed). Communism even predicts the end of the economy as a system. But in all these cases no substitute is offered for the system that is presumed to have demised.17 At jnost, a communicative void can be felt or experienced.

Binary codes

All social systems, and this ineludes function systems as a particularly prominent type, are based on Information Processing. As systems of information Processing, they opérate on the basis of differences which are binary distinctions which they project onto States of the world. By these projections they try to collect and generare new information about the world.18 Systems make use of these distinctions as codings of information and the only way a State of the world can be thematized in a system is in a form based on codings (language being the most elementary form of coding). Things will never ‘speak’ for themselves. Sometimes codes give a continuous representation of realities they refer to (e.g. a temperature scale). But in most systems there exists an inbuilt preference for reductive representations, particularly for binary codes. As Barry Schwartz formulated it, ‘there is a tendeney for binary categories to stand out as “figure” against a “ground” of continuous coding’ (Schwartz, 1981: 161). What is characteristic of function systems is that they base their identity on the operations of only one binary code, which they succeed in 17 It is interesting that all these theories are nineteenth-century theories. 18 Cf. Bateson (1973: 290): ‘ideas are immanent in a network of causal pathways along which transforms of differences are conducted. The “ideas” of the system are in all cases at least binary in structure. They are not “impulses” but “information”.’

64

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

establishing as a world universal code. The world then only comes into view, from the perspective of the respective function systems, in terms of the basic distinctions of this system code: Statements are only interesting if they are either trae or false (science); behaviour can be either lawful or unlawful (law); the same behaviour can in different contexts be either an indicator of love or of its waning (intimate relations, love); unlawful sex may be paid for or fail to attract a willingness to pay and in either case it belongs more to the realm of economic behaviour than to intimate relations or law. Even in the Communications of the function systems there exists a basic knowledge of an underlying continuity of the codes. But function systems need and use the binarity of the codes as a technique of reinforcing identities and thereby for establishing the boundaries of a system which demonstrares its singularity by the somehow dramatic application of its code. A practising scientist knows that the strong preference of Popper for the refutation of scientific knowledge claims (which comes from a strict interpretation of binarity) is completely unrealistic. But it is a way of dramatizing the identity of science. Generalized symbols

Function systems based on binary coding choose the code valúes they use as symbols which allow for a máximum of symbolic generalization. As is always trae of symbols, they are used for making visible the fact that two divergent and heterogeneous aspects of the world really belong together.19 This meaning was already attached to the concept ‘symbol’ in preclassical Greece (sixth to fifth century BC): a symbol meant an object which had been torn into two parts, which, at a later point of time (persons meeting again after many years), allowed the connectedness of the two parts of the object to be demonstrated and by transference the connectedness of their owners (Gauthier, 1972). The same understanding of symbol was present in the Greek law of evidence, which was based on two pieces of evidence showing a cióse fit to one another, thereby allowing an interpretation of past events which was only thought to be reliable on the basis of this kind of duality. In a second respect the constitutive symbols of function systems have to be understood as generalized symbols, Generalization normally refers to all three dimensions of meaning (as described in systems theory). That means generalizations have to bridge distances in time, differences in the 19 Cf. the definition of symbol in Berger and Luckmann (1967: 40): ‘Any significative theme that thus spans spheres of reality may be defined as symbol.’

History and systematics of functional differentiation

65

material circumstances to which Communications refer, and intersubjective diversity in looking at subjects. A characteristic case of a generalized Symbol is the category ‘interesting’, as used in scientific Communica­ tions. Its main achievement probably consists in leaving many things open regarding scientific statements. One says, ‘that is interesting’, and by this statement one primarily proposes to continué the examination of a hypothesis which has been proposed in a scientific discussion. The attribution of one of the two code valúes ‘true’ or ‘false’ is temporarily deferred and this is consistent with social dissent regarding the respective hypothesis.20

Self-decomposition into elementary acts

Their self-decomposition into elementary acts is one of the most prominent properties of function systems. The emergence of a function sys­ tem happens by constituting elements which, as elements, define what the function system is all about. This is a self-referential process which can only start near to the core of the emerging function system and then defines the boundaries of the system by further specifying and respecifying the identity of the elements of which the system consists. The constitution of elements is that process by which the system brings about internal unity and closure towards the outside of the system. Any communication arising in the system is confronted with constraints which enforce adaptation to the elements characteristic of the system. Any com­ munication in the function system of Science has to adopt one of the relevant forms of scientific publication (cf. Stichweh, 1987). If it does not succeed in doing this, it is not a part of Science even if the claims it favours turn out to be true. A communication can only become a part of the economy if payments are clearly related to it. If one only has knowledge about instances of economic intervention from which no decisions regarding payments arise, such (private) knowledge is no part of the eco­ nomic system. Any statement about your obligations made in a dispute with other participants in Communications only becomes a part of the system of law if one explicitly gives to these statements the form of a legal supposition. In all of the function systems, this self-decomposition into elementary acts ensures the homogeneity of the communicative form of these elements, which is compatible with a máximum diversity of substantial claims which can be communicated in the respective form. 20 On the understanding of‘interesting’ in Science cf. Davis (1971); Weick (1989); Tracy (1993).

66

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Operative closure

Vis-á-vis that which is outside the system, this self-decomposition into elementary acts has the effect of an operative closure. On the basis of its elementary operations the system is closed to external interventions. If somebody wants to have influence on the system or within it, they have to transpose their communicative intentions into the communicative forms constitutive of the respective function system. But that means that they opérate on the inside of the system and do not exert influence from the outside. Any other form of external intervention only produces irritations or perturbations of the respective function system which will never be able to specify the effects they want to bring about within it. To mention one potential case: if politics tries to reduce the financial resources it gives to scientific research, it will never be able to anticípate the cognitive reactions and displacements by which the system of Science works these disturbances into its internal operations. Openness by Progressive inclusión of societal addresses A function system that realizes closure on the level of its most basic oper­ ations, practises openness by the constitution of new addresses for the inclusión of persons and groups into the system. There is no contradiction in this, as the inclusión of persons (and groups) is only realized via operations which are part of the operative repertoire of the function sys­ tems. All of the function systems during their histories develop a culture and semantics of inclusión - and in all the function systems it is possible to identify indicators which point to a long-term tendency to the com­ plete inclusión of all those addresses to which the status of personhood (which can sometimes happen indirectly via group membership) can be attributed. Inclusión means the way persons are factored into the processes of function systems by the constitution of addresses specific for the respec­ tive function system (Stichweh, 2005b; Bohn, 2006; Stichweh and Windolf, 2009). These inclusión addresses are coupled to two alternative role patterns available in function systems (cf. Stichweh, 20Ó5b: 13-44). In some cases inclusión means that one contributes to system processes in an achievement role, for example as a political leader, a research scientist, a musician in public performances or someone who publicly participates in competitive sports events. But, of course, these achievement roles are always limited to a small number of members of society. This does not mean that all others are excluded from participation in the respective function system. Rather, all the others are included as part of the public

History and systematics of functional differentiation

67

of a function system and, as such, are recipients of Services generated by achievement roles, while, in a second respect, they observe, comment on and criticize system processes. To be in this way a member of the public of a function system is a universal status which even ineludes peopie in achievement roles, whereas access to achievement roles is highly selective. In looking at individual function systems one will register numerous variants of the interrelation of achievement roles and public roles. In intí­ mate relations the distinction of the two role types collapses (everybody playing both roles), the same is sometimes true in religión (universal priesthood in Protestantism) and this collapse has even been claimed for the arts (Joseph Beuys believed everybody could be an artist). And, of course, there are exclusions, some of them invohintary (democratic polit­ ical systems with incomplete lists of voters; a demographic lack of marriageable partners), some of them voluntary and institutional (exclusión of disabled persons from sports; exclusión of women from education), some of them due to the incomplete global reach of emerging function systems. From this results a clear understanding of globalization as an exten­ sión of the communicative spaces in which function systems define their inclusión addresses. It would be somehow naive to read this as a simple accumulation of ever more inclusión addresses. For all of the function systems of world society it is more plausible to conceive globalization as the rise of new spatial and regional distributions of inclusión and exclu­ sión. This is the way in which world society brings about the structures of inequality germane to it. The génesis of inequalities (redistributions of inclusions and exclusions) happens in an autonomous way in each of the different function systems (cf. Stichweh, 2005a) - and it is a different question whether or not these múltiple inequalities somehow coalesce to patterns of inequality that transcend the boundaries of function systems.

Dynamics of transgressing boundaries From the functional abstractions, symbolic generalizations and purifying negations on which function systems rest one further consequence can be deduced: all these properties delocalize and disembed function sys­ tems. The result of this is that, for function systems, the only boundaries they know are the boundaries of communication - and, of course, the boundaries of communication are the boundaries of the world which is the world of the function systems. This world may either be described as one world which ineludes all meaning and all communication - or alternatively as a plurality of worlds, which is a way of taking into account

68

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

the enormous cultural distances which sepárate functional contexts of communication from one another. All the function systems constitute cultures of their own (eigencultures), and this enables them to transcend the traditional boundaries of the historical cultures (i.e. regional and ethno-linguistic cultures) of the world. An ethnography of world society therefore will take the form of an ethnography of function systems (cf. Geertz, 1983).

Collective singulars as self-descriptions A final feature of function systems and a feature by which they recognize their identity and separateness is the emergence of collective singulars for their self-designation. A case in point is science as a very general term of self-description which ineludes humanities and natural Sciences under an umbrella term by which the idea of the unity and separateness of the Sciences is formulated in a non-contradictory way. Another interesting candidate are the arts which for centuries were circumscribed by many collective plurals such as beaux arts, liberal arts, arts and Sciences, artes mechanicae - and many other terms. Then, in the second half of the eighteenth century, there was the surprising emergence of the term die Kunst (i.e. ‘art’ in the singular as opposed to ‘die Künste’ in the plural; Winckelmann, 1763-8: 32). This represented a remarkable case of perceiving a new functional unity in society which would have been improbable only a few decades before. And this perception was still a regional phenomenon which had to be globalized. In England, for example, it needed nearly a further hundred years before the new term took hold. A remark­ able demonstration of this is the ‘Inaugural Address’ John Stuart Mili, then Lord Rector of the University, gave at St. Andrews on 1 February 1867: ‘It is only of late, and chiefly by a superficial imitation of foreigners, that we have begun to use the word Art by itself, and to speak of Art as we speak of Science, or Government, or Religión: we used to talk of the Arts ... by them were vulgarly meant only two forms of art, Painting and Sculpture, the two which as a people we cared least about - which were regarded even by the moré cultivated among us as little more than branches of domestic ornamentation, a kind of elegant upholstery.... To find Art ranking on a complete equality, in theory at least, with Philosophy, Learning, and Science - as holding an equally important place among the agents of civilization... to find even painting and sculpture treated as great social powers; and the art of a country as a feature in its character and condition, little inferior in importance to either its religión or its government; all this only did not amaze and puzzle Englishmen, because it was too strange for them to be able to realize it’. (Mili, 1867: 42-3)

History and systematics of functional differentiation

69

This analysis, particularly when the whole passage in Mili is read, is a remarkable analysis of the valué shifts and recombinations of cultural material which go into the emergence of an unexpected new function sys­ tem in society, and at the same time it makes visible the symbolic focusing given to this process by the invention of a radically new collective singular.

5

Conclusión

As a conclusión I try to reflect on the three questions that the editors of this volume have addressed to all the authors. This allows me to examine once more the results of this essay. 1. Functional differentiation is only one among several forms of differ­ entiation. The other major candidates are the differentiation of social segments characterized by identical structures and identical functions; the differentiation of social strata which form a hierarchy of social strata into one (and only one) of, which every person is born and to which he or she normally belongs to for a whole lifetime; the differen­ tiation of centres and peripheries that organizes the spatial distribution of society. Among these very oíd social forms functional differentia­ tion is the most recent invention and it is that social form which is nearly equivalent with world society as all the function systems are world-systems. Internal to the function systems we again find realizations of all the forms of differentiation, which is a good indicator of the complexity of contemporaneous differentiation patterns. But the other differentiation forms no longer opérate on an organizational level which transcends functional differentiation. There exists no regional segmentation of the world which institutionalizes regional variants of world society; there are no world strata which transcend functional boundaries; and no centre/periphery structure exists for the whole world, instead there are only centres in individual function systems. This can be seen as a kind of structural proof of the prevalence of functional differentiation. 2. Since functional differentiation aróse, there has been a kind of beauty contest in which each of the systems has tried to advance claims to being the most important - while, on the other hand, all the systems have had their enemies what have tried to conceive a world without them: anarchists a world without the State, communists a world with­ out the economy, atheists a world without religión, rationalists a world without the arts, fundamentalists a world without Science. All of this is a negation of the plurality and diversity constitutive of world society. It is much more interesting to look at the self-sufficiency and closure of

70

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

the meaning worlds of the function systems and of many of their subsystems. A biologist will never say elephants are more important than snails (though elephants and snails probably would) but will instead appreciate and study the immense richness of a diverse world. 3. The whole of which function systems are a part is society, the system which ineludes all Communications in the world and exeludes everything else. From society function systems do not arise by división (or decomposition) but by selection or selective sampling. Systems emerge by the selection of Communications that are incorporated into system processes and they emerge by the selective inclusión of those Com­ munications which, even after having become part of the processes of a specific function system, still can be claimed by other systems and can be included into these other systems from other points of view.21 The most important insight here is that society and other social sys­ tems share communicative elements. Each communication can be an element of a plurality of social systems. Therefore, even individ­ ual Communications are multi-referential. Differentiation is a selective build-up of complexity internal to society. It is always simultaneous with many other similar processes going on at the same time. The internal differentiation of society, then, is the primary mechanism for the integration of society - and this operates via múltiple and diverse claims on the same communicative elements of society. 21 See footnote 9 above for an example.

4

Functional, segmentary and stratificatory differentiation of world society Richard Münch

1

Functional versus segmentary differentiation of world society

Functional differentiation1 forms the core of Niklas Luhmann’s theory of modern society, which should, ultimately, be considered a world soci­ ety. It is, according to Luhmann, a society lacking a top and a centre and without any central control. Politics, law, economy, Science and art form autopoietically operating partial systems of society following their own particular codes (Luhmann, 1988; 1990b; 1993; 1995; 2000b). The evolution of society moves from the primacy of the segmentary dif­ ferentiation into families, clans and tribes prevailing in tribal societies, via the primacy of stratificatory differentiation into estates in traditional estáte society, right through to the primacy of functional differentiation in modern world society. This does not mean, however, that segmentary and stratificatory differentiation are, or will be, removed completely in modernity. Nevertheless, they decrease in importance in view of the pri­ macy of functional differentiation (Luhmann, 1997b: 595-865; Tyrell, 1998; Stichweh, 2000, 2007; Nassehi, 2006). A particular form of segmentary differentiation, which has likewise developed in modern times only, is the differentiation of world society into nation-states (Schimank, 2005a). In Luhmann’s functionalist view, the emergence of nation-states copes with insecurity through the construction of national identity. National identity replaces the oíd local and estáte identities in the light of Progressive functional differentiation and an accompanying rise in insecurity. If we look at the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we have to recognize that segmen­ tary differentiation into nation-states has indeed set narrow limits to the functional differentiation of world society. Despite the beginnings of the capitalist world system in the sixteenth century (Wallerstein, 1976) and 1 The argumenta in this chapter broadly follow the lines of an article by the author in Ger­ mán (Münch, 2010a), commented on by Rudolf Stichweh (2010) and in turn defended by the author (Münch, 2010b). See also Stichweh’s chapter in this volume.

71

72

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

a first climax of the global economy between 1870 and 1914, sufficient attention needs to be paid to the segmentary differentiation of world society into nation-states if we are to arrive at an appropriate assessment of functional differentiation. We can even justifiably claim that functional differentiation was so dominated by the segmentary differentiation into nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that its own developmental dynamics could only unfold within narrow limits (see also the introduction to this volume). This implies, however, that the nationstate has served as a sort of organization centre for a national society, being based on sovereign rule over a strictly limited territory, exercising the legitímate monopoly of forcé, as well as possessing a bureaucratic administration, national law, a national educational system and a national media system determining the public formation of opinión. Compared to this organizational power of the nation-state, world society and the dynamics of its functional differentiation have played only a subordínate role. In the system of national societies, world society merely forms a potential for generating economic resources and for selling economic goods, for obtaining a workforce, information and knowledge, and for ensuring the global diffusion of valúes embodied in the legitimation of the institutions of the nation-state. Realistically, the research approach represented by John Meyer and his colleagues considers world society as the carrier of a world culture - represented by international institutions, governmental and non-governmental organizations, consultants as cultural others - which constitutes and structures the nation-states as legitímate actors (Meyer et al., 1997). Accordingly, world society is, as before, primarily differentiated in a segmentary way and only secondarily in a functional manner. Luhmann (2000b) himself has noted that the political system of the world society is characterized by segmentary differentiation into States (cf. Albert, 2002). If we carry on this idea and link it with the strongly organized character of the nation-state, we even have to admit that - theoretical claims to the contrary notwithstanding (Willke, 1992) national societies possess a top and a centre. The exercise of sovereign territorial rule by means of legislation, jurisdiction and bureaucratic administration made it possible fórmational governments to intervene in national societies to an extern where the internal dynamics of functional systems were kept within far narrower limits than would have been the case without the primacy of the world society’s segmentary differentiation into national societies. It is only in this way that both the taming of capitalism and the social partnership between capital and labour in the national welfare State can be explained. The terms Fordism, organized capitalism, welfare capitalism, the Keynesian

Differentiation of world society

73

intervention State, Rhenish capitalism and neo-corporatism express the institutional arrangement which set narrow limits to the complete functional differentiation of the economy (Streeck, 1999; Windolf, 2002). The economy could be regarded as a national economy that needed to be controlled in economic-political terms, to be relied on in financial terms, and to be formed in social-political terms. This included border Controls on the movement of capital as well as protective tariffs and subsidies for endangered and promising branches of the economy. In Germany, businesses were closely entwined with the banks, the trade unions and the State and acted in accordance not only with economic rationality, but also with public responsibility. Henee, they could be sure to receive public support and assistance from the banks and the government in the event of a crisis. In Luhmann’s (1988) view, the economy is a system in which economic transactions take place according to the principie of profitability. Organized capitalism, however, was determined by an extraordinarily large number of payments carried out without any direct profitability, that is, payments meant for consumption only. Collective agreements concerning the remuneration of the workforce, limited wage dispersión, statutory sick pay, social security contributions and taxes are determined by law or the collective agreements of the social partners and enforce payments without any direct profitability for the contributors. One way to account for these payments is to see them as politically legitimated as an investment in maintaining a solvent population. Yet, this is a political process, not a directly economic one, and it is part of political decisión making. Following this account, the economic system is autopoietic, that is, the operation of the economy pays off exclusively according to the prin­ cipie of profitable investment. All the payments conditioned by politics or social partnership are, therefore, not part of the economic system, but rather of the political system and/or the solidarity system of civil society. Yet too much redistribution prescribed by the State or the social partners may cause decreasing economic prosperity in the end, namely in the form of insolvent businesses, falling tax income and the overindebtedness of public households. Given such an impact of the political system on the economy, the claim that the economy is functionally differentiated in modern society loses empirical substantiation. From this point of view, even the Soviet command economy would have been operating autopoietically in that politically administered payments, in the end, brought about insolveney. If the theory of the functional differentiation of the economy is to receive empirical substantiation, it should say more than the mere truism that any kind of payment is subject to the law of scarcity. This statement

74

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

applies to all historical epochs, and not only to the modern, ‘functionally differentiated’ society. The theory of functional differentiation possesses empirical content when it is in a position to predict the terms under which economic transactions (payments) exclusively serve the purpose of re-establishing liquidity and to explain the causes responsible for increas­ ing the volume of transactions (payments) made to this end only. In this sense, the theory of functional differentiation could be understood as being able to identify such conditions and causes. It is also assumed to show that a differentiation of the economy as an autopoietically operating functional system can be observed in modernity (i.e. since the eighteenth century) due to the circumstance that the volume of transactions (pay­ ments) made with the purpose of re-establishing liquidity has increased considerably. This development can be accounted for either by abstract, functionalist explanations based on evolution theory or by historicalcausal ones. Although we find hints of both in Luhmann’s work, the functionalist explanation is given priority there. From this viewpoint, functional differentiation is extremely unlikely; henee, it only emerged in a particular región of the world and during a particular historical epoch. It expanded in Europe from the eighteenth century onwards on a basis formed as early as the late Middle Ages. Once institutionalized, however, it offered the advantage of organizing higher complexity and was advanced by the internal augmentation dynamics of functional systems. We can, therefore, assume that the legal protection of private property and free use of the latter, along with the protection of contractual freedom, trigger an economic growth dynamic that becomes increasingly self-supporting and moves toward the comprehensive institutionalization of the principie of transaction (payment) with the re-establishing of liquidity in mind. The evolutionary advantage of this development would be an ongoing, more comprehensive ability to cope with scarcity, which, however, would entail a spiral-shaped progression in the generation of scarcity and the means of coping with it (Luhmann, 1988: 177-229). The functionally differentiated economy produces new demands and, henee, new scarcities by launching offers which are then coped with by even more offers. This evolutionary-functionalist argumentation explaiñs, neither the improbable step toward the functional differentiation of the economy, ñor its restriction by the nation-state’s organization of the economy. Luh­ mann does, however, offer some explanatory approaches which can be used to this end. As regards the step from an estáte society to a function­ ally differentiated society made since the eighteenth century, Luhmann notes, more or less in passing, a crucial structural change, namely the expansión of markets beyond local boundaries:

Differentiation of world society

75

The local and/or regional differentiation of markets has a goods-specific (i.e. a merely economic) differentiation of the markets for silk, crops, and eventually even for pictures, graphics and sculptures superimposed on it, or is even replaced by the latter. Accordingly, the term ‘market’ is detached from denominating certain places freed for transactions and becomes the forming term denominating the particular logics inherent in transactions that do not depend on any other social features. This is the start of the economy’s orientation toward consumption (i.e. toward itself), which has persisted ever since... The economy learns to regenérate by using system-inherent means, i.e. prices (including the price of money — interest). (Luhmann, 1997b: 724-5)2

The financing of investments via loans, which are offered by the interna­ tional financial markets, plays an essential part in detaching the economy from local and regional markets (Luhmann, 1997b: 727). The flourishing of the economy in a country like the Netherlands, which has few natural resources, was enabled by the invention of new financial tools for cash generation (Luhmann, 1997b: .726). According to Luhmann, the increase in insecurity that goes hand in hand with the extensión of mar­ kets beyond local boundaries, along with their release from estáte and local protection, created a need for new securities, which was satisfied by Identification with the collectivity of the nation. Luhmann does not conclude from this process, however, that the functional differentiation of the economy will be kept within strict limits. Instead, he refers to the fragility of this construction, which, he says, is proven by the weak emergence of national identities in post-colonial States. Accordingly, he considers the national limitation of functional differentiation as an arrangement of limited duration, which bears the seed of its dissolution in itself, since evolution tends in another direction (Luhmann, 1997b: 1052-5).

2

The limitation of segmentary differentiation through the functional differentiation of world society

The question arises as to how stable the previously described structure really is. To Luhmann it is clear that the primacy of functional differ­ entiation counteracts spatial differentiation into regional societies and/or nation-states: A primarily regional differentiation would contradict the modern primacy of functional differentiation. It would fail because it is impossible to tie all functional systems to uniform spatial limits that apply jointly to all. (Luhmann, 1997b: 166) 2 All translations in this chapter are by the author.

76

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

When emphasizing the primacy of functional differentiation, he does not overlook segmentary differentiation into States, whose core is formed by the combination of the political system and the legal system: It is only the political system that can be differentiated regionally in the form of States and, with it, the legal system of modern society. All other systems work independently of spatial limits. (Luhmann, 1997b: 166)

He even sees that the interdependence of politics and law in the State allows for the state’s direct intervention in the economy, education and the regulatory regimes for the professions (Berufsordnungen) by means of state-controlled central banks and the use of currency differences and educational certificares: The significance of spatial limits can be found in the interdependence between the political system and the legal system on the one hand, and the other functional systems on the other. Through the influence of currency differences and central bank systems, they affect the economy; through educational certificares, they affect education and professional orders. (Luhmann, 1997b: 167)

In Luhmann’s eyes, this regional or segmentary differentiation does not change the primacy of the functional differentiation of world society. He thinks that it can certainly be strengthened or weakened by politics. Nevertheless, this would not make regional/segmentary differentiation a principie of world society because the dynamic of functional differentia­ tion can only be slowed down and restricted by segmentary differentiation into nation-states; it cannot ultimately be kept completely under control. Henee, we can conclude that Luhmann ascribes a dominant dynamic favoured by evolution to the functional differentiation of world society. He does not, however, explain the consequences of this situation for historical development. His principie of the primacy of the functional differentiation of world society can be applied to almost any condition of reality and is, therefore, empty in empirical terms. Luhmann is not perturbed in his diagnosis of the primacy of the functional differentiation of world society by the more than 30 years in which welfare States have reined in the dynamism of the autonomous economy. But, in fací, the dynamics of a functionally differentiated world society‘h^ve been subjected to a forcé strong enough to control them, and this forcé could continué to exist for an indeterminate period. Luhmann deais too little with this tensión between functional and segmentary differentiation, especially as he carries segmentary differentiation along in his theoretical construction as a merely residual category. He is, therefore, not prepared to make any more precise statements as to what terms provide the func­ tional - or rather, purpose-related - differentiation of world society with

Differentiation of world society

77

so much supremacy that the nation-states’ forcé of counter-control is visibly shrinking. For that reason, Luhmann’s tools do not help us to recognize a difference between the epoch of empowered welfare States in the Bretton Woods system (embedded liberalism), and the current situation of their obviously dwindling capability to act (disembedded liberalism). Luhmann’s failure to deal adequately with empirical questions and the challenges they pose means that he misses an opportunity to sharpen his theoretical tools. The result is that he has an inadequate comprehension of the system of nation-states and how it has changed and developed in our present time. One striking misjudgement concerns the extent to which the democratic legal and welfare States have kept the internal dynamics of the different functional areas of society under control (cf. Münch, 1980; 1990; 1994). This ineludes, for instance, the central thesis stating that the functional differentiation of society sees to it that - in contrast to estáte society - there is no accumulation of inequalities across the func­ tional areas. Accordingly, everyone would have equal access to the func­ tional areas, and function-specific inequalities would be created within the functional areas only in line with their own operations (Luhmann, 1997b: 624-30). In empirical terms, this is simply wrong, and would not become correct even if class differences - or a ‘meta-difference’ of inclusion/exclusion in the case of the developing countries - were taken into account as a residual category (Luhmann, 1997b: 631-4). First of all, to this day - or rather, once again today - increasing class differences exist with regard to access to politics, economy, education, art and even to law. Second, their levelling does not result from the operation of the func­ tional systems, but rather from the promise of equality provided by the modern democratic legal and welfare State and its anchoring in national constitutions. Citizens can sue for equality to a substantial degree. When both employees and employers enjoy equal treatment in the labour court, this is not a result of the working of the legal system as such - as we can see in a historical and global comparison - but of the linkage between jurisdiction and the basic principie of equal treatment, which is guaranteed by the constitution. Wherever this equality is not guaranteed and binding, employees turn out to be inferior to employers in the long run. Likewise, equal access to the economic system can only result from a comprehensive education guaranteed and enforced by the State. Access to the educational system will be roughly equal only when the state targets inequalities in family background - starting right from birth. This means that equal access to the functional systems and the exclusión of the transmission of inequalities from one functional area to another cannot be attributed to functional differentiation as such, but rather to a

78

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

comprehensive State policy aimed at producing equality. The latter does not refer to equal opportunities alone, but to a certain extent also to an equality of results. It is a matter of fact that, for instance, a lower income dispersión enforced by powerful trade unions, state-operated redistribution and educational institutions raises the level of equal opportunities in relation to access to politics, law, education and the economy. Without this profound intervention by the State into functional areas, the latter’s own dynamics would produce growing inequality and, above all, support the transmission of economic inequalities, and their consolidation in class differences, to other functional areas. It is interesting to note that Luhmann sees this when he glances at the purpose-related and/or functional differentiation of the global economy: Under the regime of the functional systems, rational ways of selection strengthen the level of deviation (instead of levelling it). Whoever possesses money or income will be granted a credit more easily. Minor differences in achievement at the beginning of school education augment in the course of ongoing education. Those who do not work in the centre of economic research having the latest means of Information at hand will lose ground. It is only with substantial delay that they will be able to learn what has been elaborated elsewhere. Nobel prizes show a clear regional distribution in the scientific subjects. The consequence of this is a pattern of centre/periphery, which will, however, not remain stable necessarily, but whose focus may shift. (Luhmann, 1997b: 167-8)

Luhmann goes on to explain that regional cultures are selected according to their economic benefit in the context of the global economy and that inequalities in participating in global economic growth will also involve inequalities in power. Henee, in the peripheral regions, the mass of the population will neither have a share in growing global affluence ñor be able to expect equal treatment under the law (Luhmann, 1997b: 168-71). However, he goes too far in speaking about the functional differentiation of world society when, in fact, what he is describing is the differentiation of the global economy for particular purposes, which advances along with the simultaneous persistence of segmentary differen­ tiation into nation-states. More precisely, he observes how the economy in peripheral regions is destroyed by the emerging global economy without these regions participating in the growing global social product, and how inequalities sharpen and accumulate within the marginalized developing countries. The reason for the peripheral regions falling behind is their lack of counterforces acting against the inequality-producing dynamics of the global economy, since on this level there is nothing that could be compared with the state’s intervention in the economy and society on the national level. The increased inequality within developing countries is mainly due to the lack of State intervention in the economy and society in

Differentiation of world society

79

accordance with an idea of civic equality resembling that of the Western welfare States. Henee, the reasons can be discerned very specifically in an imbalance of powers between the purpose-bound global economy and the non-purpose-bound nation-states that follow normative principies. They cannot be found in the functional differentiation of world society. The question still remains as to what causes the state’s powers to intervene in society to shrink (if, for the time being, we accept this as a correct empirical diagnosis). This covers both intervention in world society and intervention in national societies. The first is a matter of cooperation between individual States, the latter a matter for the individ­ ual States themselves. The complete purpose-related and/or functional differentiation of world society is obviously not the cause, since the cen­ tral functional areas of politics, law and administration remain tied to nation-states and, at best, have increasingly become a matter of crossnational cooperation. The causes should, instead, be sought in the fací that the globalization of the economy.has gone further than the globaliza­ tion of the other functional subsystems. Luhmann’s preliminary decisión as to the primacy of functional differentiation implies that the nation-state should be considered a residual category anyway. As such, it can exercise only a delaying power in the context of world society, not a forcé resulting from its basic structure and, henee, not one that can be continually confirmed. Therefore, to him, the weak capacity of post-colonial developing States to form homogenous units similar to the European nation-states, is sufficient proof of the fact that the model of a nation-state cannot be a permanent phenomenon in world society (Luhmann, 1997b: 1054-5). We can thus explain why State intervention in the economy and society following the normative principies of the democratic legal and welfare State is not feasible in post-colonial developing countries. This does not mean, however, that Western welfare States will necessarily lose this capability to act in the context of world society. In contrast, approximations to the European model of the democratic legal and welfare State have been observed even in newly industrialized countries over the past three decades. In the global implementation of civil and human rights, progress has undoubtedly been made. The world culture, its implementation by international institutions, regimes and conventions and its being brought to the awareness of the global public by humanitarian non-governmental organizations are beginning to take effect, even if much of this is still a facade far removed from actual practice (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Nevertheless, the decreasing power of Western welfare States to inter­ vene in the economy and society according to historically marked nor­ mative principies cannot be ignored. Strikingly, this contrasts with the catch-up movement on the part of the newly industrialized countries.

80

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Maybe, this is not happening by chance but is due to systematic causes (cf. Münch, 2012). The extensión of free trade in the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) offers the newly industrialized countries increasing chances for development, while forcing the indus­ trialized countries to undertake economic adjustments by removing oíd industries without being able to guarantee that jobs lost in this way can be replaced. The democracies in the newly industrialized countries are being stabilized by economic growth while the Western welfare States are being transformed into competition States (Hirsch, 1995; Cerny, 1997) that have to prepare their citizens for fiercer economic competition by lifelong learning instead of guaranteeing them overall provisión independent of individual achievement (Streeck, 2009). Moreover, the competi­ tion State is unable to levy sufficient taxes on mobile capital because of the global opportunities for investment. Instead, it depends increasingly on the taxation of the immobile production factors, above all labour and consumption (high income taxes and high VAT). We have reached a crucial point here. Why does the welfare State transform into a competition State and why does the latter replace interventions in the economy with adjustment to it? Is this due to the functional differentiation of world society? It certainly cannot be explained in functionalist terms through the stabilization of higher complexity. Luhmann himself refers to the high transaction costs of this development and the accompanying fundamentalist counter-movements: The universalism of the functional systems operating in world society does not exelude the most varied kinds of particularism, but instead inspires them. (Luh­ mann, 1997b:170)

Here, too, Luhmann remains far too general when he puts the emphasis on functional differentiation and registers ‘particularism’ as a resid­ ual category instead of identifying the cause, more specifically, as the contradiction between the purpose-oriented differentiation of the world economy and the segmentary differentiation of world society into nationstates. To be able to explain more thoroughly the current boost given to the global economy at the expense of world society, we have to update the model for the present day, a procedure which has proved helpful before in explaining the purposive differentiation of modern capitalism in the transition from the traditional estáte society to the modern class society. In the former instance, it was a liberation of economic activity from local and regional bonds - first by an avant-garde of long-distance traders and bankers and, later, by an avant-garde of industrial capitalists; now it is a new boost to the liberation of economic activity from national markets controlled by the intervention State through globally

Differentiation of world society

81

acting financial institutions and businesses. Crucial steps along this path included the dissolution - inl973 -of the system established at Bretton Woods in 1944, which tied exchange rates to the US dollar; the removal of Controls to capital movement; and the increasing dismantling of trade barriers. All this happened worldwide in the framework of the GATT and its conversión into the WTO, and, in regional terms, in the framework of the EU and, following it, NAFTA, ASEAN and SADC. Added to this is the acceleration of transport and communication by new technologies. The economic opportunities opened up in this way are used by an avant-garde that is establishing an ever increasing global network of production, distribution and consumption. States promote this process of purpose-bound differentiation of economic activity solely on the principie of maximizing utility and profit by creating international organizations (IOs) through cross-national agreements guaranteeing an economic flow that is free from barriers and frictions as much as possible. Such is the role of the WTO on a global level and that of the EU and the other aforementioned organizations on a regional level. The level of autonomization of the IOs, establishing their own decisionmaking bodies and bureaucratic machineries which focus on a special purpose, is of crucial importance. At issue, in this case, is guaranteeing the free flow of economic transactions as a specific purpose and the independence of IOs from individual States. This independence or authority (see the introduction to this volume) is even more marked, the more the decisions are taken by bodies that move away from the intergovernmental level toward the supra-national level, and the larger the bureaucratic machinery on which the IO can rely (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). The EU is the IO that has advanced farthest along this path (Münch, 2010c). Crucial features are the Commission’s right of initiative; the Council’s qualified majority decisión making in all questions relating to the extensión of the single market; and the strict implementation of the EU treaty’s guidelines aimed at promoting free economic movement and the dismantling of any discrimination by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Nevertheless, the WTO, too, has made a substantial step away from the intergovernmental level toward the supra-national level when compared to GATT (Münch, 2005). This applies, above all, to the conflict-settlement mechanism. While many commentators, in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, have urged the EU to complement the purposive facilitation of economic movement with social components and to undertake an extensión toward a political unión - though without any success so far or any likely success in the near future - it is quite clear that the WTO is focused on one single goal, namely the liberation of global trade from economically unjustified restrictions. This means that

82

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

responsibilities at the level of world society are transferred exclusively to IOs with a special purpose in mind. The same goes for the World Bank (economic development) and the International Monetary Fund (economic stability). There is no mistaking the fact that this has been done largely to promote global trade, but, as far as other purposes are con­ cerned, the process has got stuck at a rudimentary stage. In the latter case, regulations have remained at the level of conventions or regimes and have thus been subject to specific interstate cooperation, as, for example, in the increasingly important field of environmental and climate protection regimes. The social-political formation of world society has advanced far less than global trade. Since its foundation in 1919, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has passed no fewer than 188 conventions. On average, the member States have ratified a mere 41 of these. Currently, the focus is on the global implementation of the basic rights of the workforce (core working standards), that is, the freedom of association and the prohibition of forced labour, child labour and discrimination. NGOs have started to make the World Bank, but also the WTO, enter a dialogue about the social-political sustainability of their economic programmes. They have also made transnationally acting enterprises join the dialogue and have contributed to corporate social responsibility (CSR) becoming a major image factor (Hifi, 2006; Curbach, 2009). This has ensured that the Global Compact, for instance, obliges companies to respect elementary labour rights (freedom of association; no forced labour; no child labour; gender equality). In this context, the enterprises act as moral pioneers. They can celebrare the extinction of jobs in industrialized countries and the creation of jobs in developing, newly industrialized and transformation countries as a social compensation in accordance with global standards. Also, they can proudly point to their moral achievements in the global diffusion of basic employment rights. In parallel to global trade, a global public formed by NGOs and scientist networks has emerged in a rudimentary form alongside a global discourse about the implementation of human rights and basic civil and employment rights. This means that the public is a platfortn for agenda setting and the critical discussion of politics that approaches a worldsocietal level more strongly than the major part of legislation with national - or European - ties. The global public opens up a far wider horizon for discussing moral questions of normative validity and ethical questions about living a good life. Against this backdrop, the access of develop­ ing countries to the sales markets for agricultural and labour-intensive industrial producís in the industrialized countries is given priority over

Differentiation of world society

83

the protection of agriculture and labour-intensive industry in the industrialized countries. Henee, the pressure on incomes and jobs in the industrialized countries, which is created by free world trade, is not merely of an economic nature, but may also appear justified in moral terms in the light of global standards. An elevation of political legislation to the level of world society would change nothing about this situation. Therefore, social-political change in the industrialized countries is due not only to a discordance between the global economy and national social policy, but also to a differentiation of moral discourses from the nation-state’s ingroup morality. The distinction between in-group and out-group morality is abandoned. The globally (out-group) and nationally (in-group) valid morality is more abstract and approaches, far more than ever before, a guarantee of equal opportunity and justice of achievement in the market by way of a policy of empowerment. It is in a homologous relationship with global trade. To understand all this, we have to apply a different notion of differentiation from systems theory. We should not see it as the differentiation of autopoietically operating pardal systems meeting spe- ; cial functions, but as the liberation of action, fields of action, institutions and discourses from local, regional and national restrictions. This implies that we can consider this act of liberation as a conflict between global and national fields of action, horizons and discourses and their representatives. While the associations of scientists and NGOs want to highlight global standards of environmental and climate protection, of morality and justice, parties and associations representing a national clientele are still used to thinking in national categories. They can pursue a global programme only at the expense of alienation from their clientele. This is most easily feasible for the representatives of the new global elites. In Germany, for instance, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) has traditionally represented the ruling global economic and knowledge elites, while the Green Party represents the non-ruling, globally thinking alternative elite. On the other hand, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) - and even more so the Social Democratic Party (SPD) - stand for the shrinking national middle class, while the Left Party sees itself as the mouthpiece of the newly emerging, ethnically heterogeneous lower class.

3

Functional, segmentary and stratificatory differentiation as structures constituting world society

We see, therefore, that world society is not marked by a complete func­ tional differentiation, but rather by a well-advanced, purposive globalization of the economy, complemented by a far weaker global development of environmental and climate protection, basic employment rights,

84

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

and human and civil rights. Simultaneously, the globalization of eco­ nomic and environmental law is taking place. Given the primacy of the global economy, the globalization of education ensues as the production of human capital under the leadership of the OECD (Münch, 2009). The characteristic feature of the functional differentiation of the econ­ omy, education and environmental and climate protection is its purposeoriented nature, which allows decisions to be taken on the basis of the discourse of specialized experts according to the principies of true/not true or effective/not effective. In this context, no harmonization with other purposes takes place on the level of the world society, as this used to be the role of the sovereign nation-state. It is replaced by a fragmentation into purposes pursued independently of each other and an adjustment of non-economic purposes to the dynamics of the global economy. Above all, social integration by the national competition State does not achieve a global dimensión in the sense that it could enter into negotiations with the economic constraints of adjustment on an equal footing. Instead, adjustment proceeds under the regime of global trade only. This means that strong social integration within nation-states and simultaneous weak global integration are replaced by a growing global integration. Under the regime of global trade, the latter promotes its own standards of equal opportunity and justice for achievement, accompanied by tolerance for the inequality of results stemming from market achievement. The antagonism inherent in world society between functional and seg­ mentary differentiation shifts toward the purpose-related differentiation of the economy at the expense of segmentary differentiation. Ultimately, this results in a mutation of the intervention State into a competition State. The consequence of this development is a newly accentuated class dif­ ferentiation. The oíd middle class, which used to represent the national society in its entirety, is shrinking, compressed between the strengthened global elite and the ffagmented new lower class (Münch, 2012). The class structure of national societies is having the differentiation of world society into centre, semi-periphery (newly industrialized countries, transformation countries) and periphery (developing countries) superimposed on it. The Crossing of these two axes of stratification involves á nine-field matrix showing the mixing of class positions and regional positions. In world society, we witness a double stratification, a stratification into regions and a stratification into classes (see Table 4.1). Another consequence of the more far-reaching globalization of the economy in world society is the economization of those functional areas that had been kept in balance with the economy under the auspices of the intervention State. This economization of functional areas that have not

Differentiation of world society

85

Table 4.1 Stratification in classes and world regions Stratification of world regions

Stratification of classes Global elite National middle class Local lower class

Centre

Semi-periphery

Periphery

Central elite Central middle class

Semi-peripheral elite Semi-peripheral middle class Semi-peripheral lower class

Peripheral elite Peripheral middle class Peripheral lower class

Central lower class

Source (in Germán): Münch (2010a: 296)

been considered economic so far comes on the heels of the economization of the economy (Deutschmann, 2008). The latter results from the liberation of economic activities from the nation-state’s embrace. Since the competition State can no longer act in an autonomous manner, but becomes an agent of the world culture - and henee, primarily, of the global economy - it has to introduce the laws of the economy into all other functional areas so as to keep the society competitive in economic terms. Utility and profit maximization and/or payment to maintain liq­ uidity - to put it in Luhmann’s terms - become the secondary code of all functional areas. Investments are made in education, partnerships, love, research, art, sports, entertainment or welfare so as to achieve as high a profit as possible. As far as scientific questions are concerned, decisions are still made according to the criterion of true/not true. Nevertheless, the decisión about what kinds of questions are asked at all is based on the economic criterion of profitability. In the case of the less affluent Ameri­ can universities, it is important for appointment procedures whether the research an applicant is pursuing is fundable or non-fundable, that is, whether he/she can obtain sponsorship money. In Germany, too, it is cru­ cial for entrepreneurially managed universities to count on the amount of third-party funds earned by a professor’s research. Under the regime of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), all those components of education tend to disappear that cannot be converted into competitive human capital. If this convertibility cannot be proven in scientific terms for Latin - contrary to the doctrine fostered by the classical philologists - Latin lessons will be dropped from the curriculum. In art, it has long been established that the public valué of a piece of art is measured by the price it attains on the global market. What we can observe in our present time is not the primacy of func­ tional differentiation in modern world society and the retreat of the

86

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

stratificatory and segmentary differentiation. Instead, we recognize a particularly conflicting constellation of all three types of differentiation forming the constitutive parts of world society. The functional differentiation of world society is ruled by a purposive differentiation of the economy. In the context of the similarly constitutive segmentary differentiation, the purpose-related differentiation of the economy urges the intervention State to adopt the role of a competition State carrying the logic of the economy into the other functional areas that are more strongly tied to the national level. At the same time, a new class structure emerges, which is also constitutive and features a global elite, a shrinking national middle class and a fragmented lower class alongside a superimposed stratification into centre, semi-periphery and periphery. A theory that only backs the functional differentiation of world society, that lists segmentary differ­ entiation into nation-states and stratificatory differentiation into classes and regions as residual categories only and does not inelude them systematically in its set of tools, is unable to see, understand or explain this particular feature of the world society, ñor can it comprehend its effeets. The functional differentiation of world society is generally restricted to the purpose-bound globalization of the economy. The nation-state is not withering away, but rather changing its form and transforming from an intervention state to a competition State that is an agent of world culture. Neither is stratification into classes disappearing or losing its significance. Instead, it is being re-accentuated and involves class conflicts that seemed to have been overeóme long ago. Further, the national society’s stratification into classes is part of a wider stratification into central, semi-peripheral and peripheral regions worldwide.

4

Concluding Remarks

The structures of world society can be better described in terms borrowed from the theory of action and a theory of institutions than in terms taken from systems theory. Systems theory is far too restricted in its description and, henee, treats far too many things as residual categories. It raises claims that lack empirical confirmation. Instead of using terms like systems, codes and programs, we would do better to speak of fields, insti­ tutions, guiding ideas and norms (Lepsius, 1990; Bach, 2008). Instead of functional differentiation of the economy, we would do better to speak of the purpose-related differentiation of economic activities; instead of autopoiesis, we should rather refer to institutionalized autonomy and the professions as its bearers (Mayntz et al., 1988; Bourdieu, 1998; Kieserling, 2008). Using this language, many interesting ideas launched by Luhmann can be conceptualized more precisely, with stronger empirical

Differentiation of world society

87

substantiation and greater closeness to reality; moreover, they can be formulated in statements that can withstand empirical tests. In this way, Luhmann’s work could be referred more easily to current research on the transformation of society in the field of conflict between functional, stratificatory and segmentary differentiation. If we do not consider economy, law, Science, the arts etc. as functional systems, but as specific fields of social practice, then their autonomy with regard to traditional bonds and external interests is not just a result of the self-organized reduction of world complexity by functional differ­ entiation, but a historically contingent result of material and symbolic struggles between more or less powerful actors. After its liberation from traditional bonds in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the modern capitalist economy experienced a far-reaching limitation of the free exercise of profit maximization through social security provisions, redistributions brought about by the social partnership of industrial federations and trade unions, and in the twentieth century by the interventions of the welfare State within a framework of embedded liberalism. In contemporary times, we observe a new stage in the disembedding of liberalism, which is, again, mainly driven by processes of transcending boundaries in the global economy. These processes are fuelled by economists working for the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank who conceive that the world must be organized in categories of liberalized markets as a precondition for economic growth and the worldwide rise of living standards. While the nation-state kept the economy in balance with the requirements of social integration, there is no equivalent governmental organization that can do the same at the transnational level, but rather a multiplicity of different regimes. This institutional fragmentation gives de facto primacy to the economy. Contrary to the assumption of the primacy of functional differ­ entiation in world society, segmentary and stratificatory differentiation do not disappear, but remain major structural features of world soci­ ety. They only change their character. Nation-states persist but change their role from welfare States to competition States. The stratification of society into classes continúes to determine people’s lives. Stratification within national societies has the stratification of world society into centre, semi-periphery and periphery superimposed upon it.

Part II

On the differentiated structure of the international system

5

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches Jack Donnelly

1

Differentiation: types and dimensions

Social differentiation is the process by which ‘social groups become dissociated from one another, so that specific activities, roles, identities, and symbols become attached to them’ (Yoffee, 2005: 32). Differentiation, which ‘refers to the unequal arrangement of goods and Services within and among social groups’ (Yoffee, 1979: 28), establishes the ‘relations and mechanisms that constitute social categories and structure social boundaries’ (Juteau, 2003: 7). Through differentiation ‘the main social functions or the major institutional spheres of society become disassociated from one another, attached to specialized collectivities and roles, and organized in relatively specific and autonomous symbolic and organizational frameworks’ (Eisenstadt, 1964: 376). Differentiation, although rarely spoken of explicitly in IR, references what we commonly cali system structure. Understanding social struc­ tures as ‘multidimensional spacefs] of different social positions’ (Blau, 1977: 4), differentiation creates and filis the positions that comprise structures. If ‘a structure is defined by the arrangement of its parts’ (Waltz, 1979: 80) then differentiation defines structure. If structural the­ ories provide a ‘purely positional picture of society’ (Waltz, 1979: 80) then differentiation is what structural theories depict. Social structures are networks of differentiated social positions. Social structures exercise their constitutive and regulative effects, ‘shaping and shoving’ actors (Waltz, 1986: 343), through differentiated social positions. Different patterns of differentiation define different types of societies. And the prin­ cipal dimensions of differentiation delinéate a typology of elements of structure. The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology identifies two senses of social differentiation: ‘(1) the tendency of social systems to become increas­ ingly complex as they develop, in particular through specialization... (2) the general social process of distinguishing among people according to the social statuses they occupy’ (Johnson, 2000: 88-9). These senses are associated with what I will cali ‘type’ and ‘dimensión’ approaches. 91

92

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Type approaches assume that ‘different types of social structure can be classified according to their dominant principie of differentiation’ (Buzan and Albert, 2010: 317). Dimensional approaches, by contrast, see societies as differentiated along múltiple dimensions that often do not coalesce into a small number of types. And even where a single dimensión of differentiation predominares, other dimensions may be of vital analytical importance. I will argüe for the necessity of dimensional approaches - although not to the exclusión of type approaches, which also have considerable interest for IR. The next section looks at the attractions and limitations of type approaches. Section three argües for the necessity of a multidimensional approach, using Hobbesian States of nature and great-power State sys­ tems to demónstrate the inadequacy of IR’s standard Waltzian argument that the ordering principie and distribution of capabilities are the solé elements of structure/differentiation in international systems. Section four outlines a particular multidimensional account. Section five applies it to the cases of post-World War II international society and contemporary processes and globalization. Section six explicitly addresses the editors’ three general questions and indicares my understanding of ‘differentia­ tion theory’.

2

Type approaches: attractions and limitations

Type approaches to structure predominare in contemporary IR. The Waltzian argument that all international systems are of a single type (anarchic/international orders) is adopted far beyond structural realism. Alexander Wendt (1999: chap. 6) identifies three types of anarchic orders, differentiated by their rules on the legitímate use of forcé. And Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert (2010), in an important programmatic article on differentiation in IR, adopt the popular sociological typology that distinguishes segmentary, stratificatory and functional differentiation. This typology, which the editors of this volume also deploy (somewhat differently) in their introduction, will be my focus here. The segmentary-stratificatory-functional differentiation (S-S-F) typol­ ogy views all societies as segmented. They differ with respect to the importance and character of their stratification and functional differen­ tiation. ‘Segmentary’ societies have comparatively little stratification or functional differentiation. The principal social units thus are largely ‘the same’. ‘Stratified’ societies are organized around vertical differentiation. Social groups are also horizontally differentiated, both functionally (e.g. members of different castes characteristically perform different functions) and on a variety of other grounds (e.g. birth, gender or age).

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches

93

Their hierarchical arrangement, however, is the society’s predominant feature. In ‘functionally differentiated’ societies, functional differentia­ tion is central, extensive and substantially de-linked from stratification. Stratification, which can be extensive, is a relatively secondary, rather than a deñning, feature. All three types in the S-S-F typology are differentiated along all three dimensions. Types present unidimensional simplifications of multidimensional realities. Whether such simplifications are analytically fruitful is ultimately an empirical rather than a theoretical question (and, in significant measure, a matter of interest and analytical purpose). Nonetheless, there are a number of clear attractions to type approaches. The S-S-F typology undoubtedly marks a major advance on IR’s stan­ dard argument that all international societies have the same anarchic structure (read, are segmentary societies; that is, not in significant mea­ sure either stratified or functionally differentiated). This allows us not only to acknowledge but to begin tp address systematically at least a few fundamental variations in international societies. Types also facilitare comparative analysis. Being able to, as Waltz put it in a different con­ text, say ‘a small number of big and important things’ (1986: 329) about international societies is, at the very least, likely to be a useful starting point for more in-depth analysis. Types allow IR to draw on a substantial body of prior work in Anthropology and, especially, Sociology. In addition to the particular substantive insights to be gleaned, more substantial engagement with these disciplines should be valuable to IR, which in recent decades has drawn principally from Economics. Type approaches have particular power when a new type is in the process of establishing its predominance. In such instances prediction is possible. And where a type is well established, the model helps to illuminate mechanisms of system maintenance and reproduction. Finally, type approaches draw our attention to the whole (characterized in type terms). Dimensional approaches have the danger of placing excessive emphasis on the parts; on the combination of different dimensions of differentiation (rather than what a particular combination adds up to as a whole). Three major limits of type approaches, however, should be noted. It is an empirical, not a theoretical question, whether a single dimensión of differentiation predominates (and often, in fact, it does not). Type analysis obscures variations within types (which often are analytically important). And type approaches often are associated with evolutionary accounts (which are, at best, highly contentious). We cannot simply assume that ‘the key question [is] which form is dominant in shaping the social structure as a whole’ (Buzan and Albert, 2010: 319). We must first determine whether there is a dominant form. And

94

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

often there is not. For example, in surveying New World non-state sedentary societies Gary Feinman and Jill Neitzel (1984: 78, 72) found that ‘no simple modal patterns were present. Instead the observed variation was multidimensional and continuous,’ suggesting that ‘serious inadequacies characterize the typological approach to societal diversity’. Similar problems face the S-S-F typology. For example, medieval Europe, in one standard interpretation (Duby, 1980), was organized around functionally differentiated orders: those who prayed, those who fought and governed, and those whose labour provided material sustenance. But each of these domains was hierarchically ordered. Largely autarkic manors gave soci­ ety, and the economy in particular, a substantially ‘segmentary’ character, especially in the early centuries of the period. And other forms of dif­ ferentiation were also important, including distinctions based on birth (noble versus common), lineage (dynasty), feudal allegiance and type of polity. States systems, when addressed in IR with the language of types of differentiation, are typically considered segmentary (e.g. Waltz, 1979: 95; Buzan and Albert, 2010: 318ff.). But great-power systems are in significant measure defined by a double stratification: States are differen­ tiated from, and formally superior to, non-state actors and the leading States are (at least informally) differentiated from and superior to lesser States. In addition, States and non-state actors have different functions, rights, liberties and duties. And great powers are functionally differenti­ ated from other States; as Waltz puts it, they are ‘specialists in managing system-wide affairs’ (Waltz, 1979: 197). These examples do not, as Buzan and Albert would have it, reflect the ‘co-presence... [of] all three types of differentiation in simultaneous operation’ (2010: 319). Rather than three ideal types being partially present - which amounts to admitting that none of the types fits the cases particularly well - three dimensions of differentiation happen to be analytically important. Analysis thus must be in terms of dimensions. The issues at stake here are analytical, not merely terminological. For example, Albert, Buzan and Zürn note that ‘[c]lassical social the­ ory suggests that one form should normally be dominant and that seg­ mentary, stratificatory and functional differentiation can jherefore be used to identify fundamental types of social order1 (in this volume: 229, emphasis added). In the next sentence, though, they note that in most international systems ‘all three basic types of differentiation are strongly in play’ (in this volume: 229J. ‘Types’, however, refers to very differ­ ent things in these two sentences. It would be much clearer to say that where one dimensión of differentiation predominates we have a type of social order (defined by the predominance of that dimensión (‘type’) of

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches

95

differentiation) but that, whether or not a particular dimensión predom­ ínales, all societies are segmented and most are (to varying degrees) stratified and functionally differentiated. Types, in the sense of idealized representations of forms of social order, arise from the interdependence of their elements (e.g. ‘segmentary differ­ entiation’ understood as a type involves much more than segmentation which is a universal feature of societies). A particular combination of particular elements defines a type, which exists only in and through that combination of those elements. When disassembled, the type disappears, leaving us with the elements out of which it was constructed. Adding or subtracting significant parts - often even recombining the existing parts differently - creates something new, not a partial approximation of the original. The analytically central co-presence of all three dimensions cre­ ates a new type - or, rather, many new types, depending on the particular combinations. Even where one dimensión of differentiation predominares, immense diversity exists within the type. In fact, the standard sociological types tell us surprisingly little about the behavioural logic of systems. Consider segmentary societies. The subclass of hunter-gatherer societies varíes in form from ‘the Calusa of Southern Florida, who had substantial material wealth and a fully developed class system... [to peoples with] almost nothing in the way of material possessions and minimal social stratification’ (Burch and Ellanna, 1994: 3). And tribal societies, another major subtype, both vary considerably from one another and have little in common with hunter-gatherers (beyond the limited stratification and functional differentiation that make them segmentary societies). In addition, societies ‘have the annoying habit of possessing traits of [two or more] types’ (Yoffee, 1993: 64-5). Both patterned subtypes and individual variations, based on ‘secondary’ dimensions of differ­ entiation, may be of considerable, even decisive, analytical significance. ‘Mixed’ systems, whether one dimensión predominares or not, require (multi)dimensional analysis. For example, Buzan and Albert contend that the contemporary international system is ‘a mixture of segmentary (sovereign equality) and stratificatory (hegemony) differentiation’ (2010: 327). But hegemony undermines segmentary type analysis, which relies on a particular combination of elements that does not exist in substantially hegemonized systems. Modern international relations combines two dimensions in a particular way that is not adequately captured, even in a first approximation, by any model in the S-S-F typology. And I suspect that such cases are more the norm than the exception - as suggested by the fact that when Buzan and Albert address particular societies they usually talk about dimensions and hybrids rather than types.

96

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Buzan and Albert also claim that ‘differentiation assumes general, but not inevitable, evolution up the sequence from segmentary to functional’ (2010: 331). In fact, though, there is no logical connection between types and stages: some sociologists and anthropologists link types to stages but at least as many do not. And dimensional accounts of differentiation have no connection at all with theories of social evolution. Adopting an evolutionary approach to differentiation is a matter of choice - and a deeply contentious choice at that. An ‘evolutionary sequence’ exists in the sense that the first stratified societies appeared after segmentary societies; functionally differentiated societies first appeared still later; the percentage of segmentary soci­ eties has declined over the past few thousand years; and over the last few centuries the percentage of functionally differentiated societies has increased sharply. This sequence, however, has absolutely no relevance to the development of any particular society. Most evolutionary theorists adopt Marshall Sahlins’ (1960) distinction between ‘general evolution’, the emergence of more complex forms of society, and ‘specific evolution’, the path of change of a particular society. These are different, and unconnected, processes. Ordered stages exist only in the context of general evolution. Not only can social evolution ‘follow different courses’ - there is simply no ‘intrinsic perfecting tendency’ (Johnson and Earle, 2000: 6). Types and stages ‘are important guides for identifying the crucial break-throughs at which different spheres of social and cultural activity are freed from various ascriptive frameworks ‘... [but] these concepts neither describe ñor explain the concrete crystallizations that appear at these junctures’ (Eisenstadt, 1964: 386, emphasis added). These are the judgements of leading proponents, not critics, of theories of social evolution. Particular segmentary or stratified societies, rather than move to the next stage through internal evolutionary dynamics, are at least as likely to remain the same, die or be transformed through external pressure, intru­ sión or conquest. And those that do ‘evolve’ into a more complex type are not ‘evolutionary successes that move up the differentiation ladder’ (Buzan and Albert, 2010:319)- ñor are those that remain segmentary or stratified ‘evolutionary failures’ (as if apes were somehow failed humans). They are simply societies that have developed along one ofmany possible paths. For example, do we really believe that eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury Chinese international society, which had been stratified for most of the preceding two millennia, was evolutionarily ‘more advanced’ than segmentary Western international society? Is there even a point to such questions? Each ‘successive’ type is more complex. But what this has to do with ‘success’ - other than success at becoming more complex - is, at best, obscure.

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches

97

Evolutionary schemas would seem especially inappropriate for inter­ national societies because even a general evolutionary sequence is not clear. As far as I am aware, no historical international societies have been functionally differentiated. And if, as is standard in IR, we define international societies as lacking significant hierarchy and having mini­ mal functional differentiation then even stratified international societies are problematic. Buzan and Albert (2010: 333) also suggest that an evolutionary account of types provides insight into the ‘driving forces’ of fundamental structural change. But evolutionary theorists disagree vehemently about what those forces are. And most sociologists and anthropologists reject all such accounts. Furthermore, Buzan and Albert’s claim that Durkheimian dynamic density is ‘the driving forcé pushing societies from a segmen­ tary to a functionally differentiated form’ (2010: 319) contradicts their claim earlier on the same page that segmentary societies evolve into strat­ ified societies (with functionally differentiated societies evolving out of stratified societies). They also claim that ‘as the numbers of people in a society increases... the basis of social solidarity automatically shifts from mechanical (collective consciousness) to organic (functional differ­ entiation)’ (2010: 319). This, however, flies in the face of history. For example, China in the early eighteenth century had a population more than ten times greater than Britain’s roughly ten or eleven million inhabitants - a figure that China had surpassed some two millennia earlier but Britain, not China, was in the process of becoming a functionally differentiated society. And the suggestion of an automatic process is quite indefensibie. None of these problems suggests abandoning type approaches. When a particular dimensión of differentiation happens to predominare, type analysis is likely to be particularly powerful. And I suspect that additional interesting types will be discovered through comparative analysis. Nonetheless, I agree with Albert, Buzan and Zürn that the most promising general path forward is dimensional; that is, ‘to inquire into the specific ways in which different forms of differentiation overlap and interact with each other’ (in this volume: 4). In other words, we should treat types as special cases in which particular interrelations between dimensions are already ‘known’ (or assumed for the purposes of analysis).

3

The differentiation of international societies

Turning to dimensional approaches, the obvious question is which dimensions belong in a typology. Mainstream IR offers one prominent answer, namely, Waltz’s ordering principie, functional differenti­ ation, and the distribution of capabilities conception of the elements

98

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

of structure. In this standard account, international systems are neither stratified (hierarchical) ñor functionally differentiated and thus largely wndifferentiated. 1 This reading, however, perversely ignores obvious and striking fundamental differences between international societies - as is immediately evident from comparing two widely discussed simple anarchical systems, Hobbesian States of nature and great-power State systems. In Hobbes’s ideal-type State of nature, men live without government or any other ‘common Power to keep them all in awe’ (Hobbes, 1991: 88). There is no functional differentiation; capabilities are distributed evenly (Hobbes, 1991: 86-7); and actors are driven by competition, diffidence and glory, which generare conflict for gain, safety and reputation (Hobbes, 1991: 88). Conflict is intensified by an ‘equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends’ (Hobbes, 1991: 87) that is frustrated by greed, vanity and scarcity. Furthermore, ‘notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice, have there no place’ (Hobbes, 1991: 90); there are no normative constraints on or justifications for behaviour. The Hobbesian war of all against all arises (only) where equal, com­ petitive, fearful and vain egoists with equal hopes of attaining their ends interact in a world in which goods and respect are scarce and where rules do not exist (and could not be enforced if they did). Other anarchic orders have different structures with different behavioural logics as great-power systems make clear. In great-power systems, capabilities are distributed highly unevenly and States are functionally differentiated from, and formally superior to, non-state actors and the leading States are (at least informally) differenti­ ated from and superior to lesser States. Great-power systems, again unlike States of nature, are rule-governed. For example, in standard structural realist accounts the ‘units’ are sovereign States (e.g. Waltz, 1979: 95-6, 116; Mearsheimer, 2001: 30-1) - with different rights and responsibilities from other actors. Sovereignty is also essential to the formal stratifi­ cation of great-power systems and strongly influences the distribution of capabilities, which in great-power systems (in contrast to ‘rule-less’ States of nature) cannot be measured by material resources alone; the norma­ tive and institutional resources of sovereign States are an important part of their capabilities. Finally, in contrast to States of nature,. where largely undifferentiated actors behave in essentially the same wáys, in greatpower systems differentiated actors behave very differently. Great powers 1 Distribution of capabilities is a decidedly minor element in standard structural accounts. ‘Anarchy’ does virtually all the analytic work, being responsible, on its own, for the security dilemma, self-help balancing, the pursuit of relative gains, and other ‘effects of anarchy’. As Waltz puts it, ‘the logic of anarchy does not vary with its content’ (Waltz, 1990: 37).

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches

99

practise self-help balancing - among themselves. In relations with nonstate actors they exercise sovereign rights and prerogatives. In dealings with lesser powers they often establish hierarchical domination. Weak States, however, typically bandwagon (or hide). And non-state actors are largely precluded from self-help action. Certain analytical purposes may be served by ignoring these differences. For the purposes of depicting differentiation, however, ‘abstracting from’ them cannot be justified as a potentially fruitful analytical simplification. It simply misrepresents how the system is differentiated; its structure; the way that the parts are in fact arranged; the actual positioning of the actors.

4

A framework of dimensions of differentiation

A typology of dimensions of differentiation (a framework of the elements of structure) should provide the concéptual resources to identify the prin­ cipal ways in which social boundaries are drawn and social positions are arranged. At least five elements are required to differentiate Hobbesian States of nature from great-power States systems - and, I suspect, most other social and political systems as well. 1. Stratification (vertical differentiation): the layered arrangement of social positions that establishes equalities, inequalities, and super- and subordination. 2. Functional differentiation, which defines social functions and allocates them to social positions. 3. Unit differentiation (segmentation), which generates social actors and distributes them across positions. 4. Norms and institutions: rules, roles and practices that constituíe actors and regúlate their relations. 5. A material basis or substrate of social positions and relations, which I suggest is best conceptualized in terms of geography and technology. Elsewhere I have elaborated and illustrated this framework (Donnelly, 2009: 51-78; 2012: 156-62). Here I focus on how each element is necessary to depict the differentiation (arrangement; structure) of States of nature and great-power systems. Our two simple anarchical societies are stratified - that is, arranged in layers or levels. States of nature are single-layered: ‘fíat’, ‘egalitarian’, without formal or informal super- and subordination. This distribution of authority and resources, it must be emphasized, is a kind (rather than the absence) of stratification. (The root sense of ‘stratum’ is something spread in a layer.) Great-power systems, by contrast, have three layers.

100

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

And the particular placement of States above non-state actors and great powers above lesser powers is essential to their character. Elsewhere I have developed a three-dimensional typology of stratifica­ tion: unranked systems; singly ranked systems, where one principie or dimensión of stratification predominares (as in caste systems or empires); and multiply ranked or ‘heterarchic’ systems (such as medieval Europe; Donnelly, 2009: 58-69). The essential point for us here is that stratifica­ tion is a universal feature of social and political systems - and hierarchy a standard feature not just of great-power systems but most historical international societies. Functional differentiation is also, pace Waltz, a universal feature of social and political systems. Great-power systems are distinguished from States systems without great powers in part by the management tasks that great powers perform. Even in the rare cases where all actors perform the same functions, as in Hobbesian States of nature, we have a form (rather than the absence) of functional differentiation. Functional differentiation is a feature not of the actors but of the system, the structure of which is characterized by however functions are defined and distributed across social positions. Units of a particular type are central to the characteristic functioning of both States of nature and great-power systems. And it is the common sense wisdom of even leading realists that unit type is central to system structure. Robert Gilpin argües that ‘the character of the international system is largely determined by the type of state-actor’ (1981: 26). Even Waltz claims that ‘international political structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of an era’ (Waltz, 1979: 91, emphasis added; cf. 1979: 94, 95; 1990: 37). Waltz, of course, is much better known for arguing that ‘the logic of anarchy obtains whether the system is composed of tribes, nations, oligopolistic firms or Street gangs’ (1990: 37) and insisting that structures be defined solely in terms of ‘third image’ features at ‘the system level’ (1979: 100). In fact, though, systems, rather than being composed of undifferentiated pieces, arise from integrating in a particular way parts of a particular character. Entities without specific properties - let alone property-less ‘units’ - cannot be parts of a system. Conversely, those ‘properties that enable them to fill the positions which áre required for the system’ (Angyal, 1939: 35) are central to the system’s differentiation: its organization, arrangement and ordering - its structure. So far, my account has roughly paralleled the S-S-F typology, treated not as ideal types but as dimensions or elements of social and political structures. But these three elements simply are inadequate to depict

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches

101

how international (and national) societies are in fact differentiated. For example, great-power systems rest centrally on norms and institutions, especially sovereignty and alliances. That in IR we usually take these for granted does not make them any less important to the system’s structure. If anything, it attests to their structural centrality. Structures produce patterned behaviour by variously encouraging, enabling, constraining and ignoring certain types of actions. In social and political systems this is done, above all, through norms and institu­ tions. More than that States are ‘differently placed by their power and differences in placement help to explain both their behavior and their fates’ (Waltz, 1990: 31), they are differently placed - and their behaviour and fates are shaped - by their authority, status and roles, by the rules that apply to them (and do not apply), and by the institutions and practices in which they particípate (and do not particípate). ‘Norms and institutions’ is a vast and varied category. Those that establish super- and subordination, differentiate functions and constitute units are, I suspect, best treated as 'matters of stratification, functional differentiation and segmentation. In that case, ‘norms and institutions’, understood as a distinct element of structure, are system-wide rules, roles and practices that regúlate relationships between (occupants of) social positions. This too, though, is an unmanageably large and diverse category. Elsewhere (Donnelly, 2012: 161-2) I have outlined a conception of what I cali the constitutional structure of international societies, which I briefly sketch and illustrate in the following section. Whatever the details, though, norms and institutions are as essential to the differentia­ tion (structure) of international societies as they are to national societies. Even Albert, Buzan and Zürn, despite ostensibly restricting their account of differentiation to segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation, make central use of institutions and norms. For example, they argüe that ‘sovereignty is the institutional pillar on which segmen­ tary differentiation between political units is built’ and that ‘sovereign equality [i]s a core primary institution of international society’ (in this volume: 18). In other words, the modern international system is not símply segmentary, in some generic sense, but based on the (Westphalian) sovereignty of its units. And most of the rest of their section three is about norms and institutions: for example, the ‘authority-generating quality of international institutions’, the ‘significant increase in international judi­ cial bodies’, and the development of ‘political regulations’ by non-state actors, producing ‘overall, a dense network of international and transnational institutions of unprecedented quality and quantity’ (in this volume: 17).

102

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Social and political systems are also differentiated materially.2 I want to suggesí that ‘material conditions’, understood as a sepárate dimen­ sión of differentiation, are best conceptualized in terms of geography and technology; what Daniel Deudney (2007: 39) usefully calis ‘geotechnics’. Although excluded from IR’s dominant account of the elements of struc­ ture, geotechnics is important to the analysis of even structural realists. For example, John Mearsheimer emphasizes ‘the primacy of land power’ and ‘the stopping power of water’ (Mearsheimer, 2001: chap. 4) and Waltz argües that ‘among States armed with nuclear weapons peace prevails whatever the structure of the system may be’ and that military and industrial technology ‘may change the character of systems’ (Waltz, 1990: 37; 2004b: 5). And Albert, Buzan and Zürn depict globalization in terms of ‘technological and political developments... [that] have resulted in an unprecedented decline in the significance of space’ (in this volume: 13). Elsewhere I have suggested thinking of segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation as comprising the ‘form’ of differentia­ tion and norms and institutions as providing its ‘contení’ (2012: 156). For example, most tribal societies and many States systems are usefully described as segmentary societies, a largely ‘formal’ categorization. But the ‘substance’ of the units (tribes vs. States) is also central to their structure/differentiation. Furthermore, States systems based on sovereignty (such as the modern system) are very differently differentiated from those that are not (such as Classical Greece). Those that emphasize sovereign equality (such as the decolonized post-World War II international sys­ tem) and those that give a central role to sovereign inequalities (such as the modern system in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries) are differ­ ently differentiated. And the particular rights associated with sovereign statehood, which have varied considerably, even in twentieth-century international relations, can also lead to very differently differentiated States systems. Whether or not one adopts this language of form and contení, íhe normaíive-insíiíuíional and geoíechnical coníení of íhe sírucíure/differeníiaíion of iníernaíional sysíems is crucial. To repeaí a poiní made above, íhe sírucíure of a sysíem is a function of parís of a partic­ ular type being placed in particular kinds of relations. In social sysíems, norms and insíiíuíions are almosí always esseníial ío defining boíh íhe

2 This extends well beyond ‘distribución of capabilities’ (which is best understood not as a sepárate element of structure but as the informal dimensión of stratification). And it has nothing to do with polarity. Multipolar systems, for example, can exist in wildly different material circumstances.

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches

103

parts and the relations in which they stand. And in many (most?) inter­ national systems there is also an important geotechnical dimensión as well. We simply cannot depict the structure/differentiation of interna­ tional systems with anything even cióse to tolerable accuracy in terms of segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation alone. We also need to inelude norms and institutions and geotechnics. 5

Applying a multidimensional approach to differentiation

Structural analysis in contemporary mainstream IR focuses on what international systems share, namely, anarchy. Buzan and Albert (2010) introduce variation - but limit it to three types. A multidimensional approach, by contrast, fundamentally reorients our attention towards the differences between international systems. Rather than talk about ‘the international system’ - (almost) all international systems or international systems in general - we address international societies in their consider­ able variety.3 To draw a biological analogy, ‘International systems’ becomes a relatively high-order taxonomic category; more like a class (e.g. mammals) than (as Buzan and Albert and Wendt would have it) an order (primates) or family (great apes; Hominidaé) or (as Waltz would have it) a genus (humans; Homo). A typology of dimensions of differentiation (elements of structure) provides the analytical resources to delinéate these different structures and to compare them systemically. In this section I illustrate both the extent of international structural diversity and the utility of a multidimensional approach by applying my framework to the period since the end of World War II, which I divide into post-war and globalization eras.

The transformarían of post-war international society In IR’s standard structural account, although the decades following the end of World War II saw a shift from multipolarity to bipolarity, the deep structure of anarchy remained constant.4 For Buzan and Albert (2010) even less changed; the order remained segmentary, period. These readings obscure a wide range of profound structural changes that become 3 A Google Scholar search in October 2011 for ‘the international system’ and ‘international relations’ produced a staggering 53,100 results. Focusing instead on the structures of international societies, in the plural, really would radically reorient IR. 4 This reading is by no means restricted to realists. For example, John Ruggie (1983a: 281) talks of ‘the deep structure of anarchy’ and Robert Keohane (1986: 27) of ‘the basic structure of anarchy.’

104

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

striking when, using a multidimensional framework, we decide to look for them. International societies have what I think is aptly described as a ‘constitutional structure’, composed of four principal elements: principies and practices of international legitimacy (which regúlate membership in international society);5 principies and practices of internal legitimacy (by which the dominant actors understand and justify their rule);6 hegemonic cultural valúes;7 and fundamental regulative practices (including prominently practices regulating the legitímate use of forcé).8 All four were fundamentally transformed in the decades following World War II, as symbolized by the rise of principies and practices of self-determination, non-aggression and territorial integrity. Although States remained predominant in international society, mem­ bership rules were radically transformed (cf. Philpott, 2001: part 3). Modern international relations, through World War II, were dominated by imperial States formed primarily through dynastic ties and military contests. Lesser powers retained their independence, and varying degrees of autonomy, largely due to the limited military reach of great powers and the unintended consequences of their power balancing. From the early sixteenth century through to the late nineteenth century, the number of Europe’s independent polities was steadily reduced from several hundred to a couple of dozen. Most of the rest of the globe was formally incorporated into, or semi-formally subordinated to, European empire-states. And the newly independent States of the Americas continued to pursue policies that forcibly incorporated or destroyed indigenous peoples and polities. Beginning with India (1947) and Indonesia (1949), however, decolonization swept across Africa, Asia and the Pacific (and the still colonized parts of the Americas). ‘Self-determination’ - understood to mean that Western colonial empires were to be dismantled and new States created following the principie of uti possidetis - became central to international 5 The idea here is very similar to what Daniel Philpott (2001: 12) calis the first two faces of sovereignty: ‘Who are the legitímate polities? What are the rules for becoming one of these polities?’ 6 This is very similar to what Christian Reus-Smit (1999) calis ‘the moral purpose of the State’. 7 In IR these have been addressed by the ‘Stanford School’ of‘world culture theory’ (Meyer et al., 1997; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000) and in works such as Adda Bozeman’s (1960) classic Politics and Culture in International History. 8 Compare work on fundamental international institutions by Hedley Bull (1977), Barry Buzan (2004: chap. 6), and Kalevi Holsti (2004). On the structural centrality of rules on the use of forcé, see Wendt (1999: chap. 6).

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches

105

legitimacy. Processes of largely peaceful, norm-governed political devolution (with major violent exceptions in Indonesia, Vietnam and Algeria) increased the membership of the United Nations from 51 in 1945 to 76 in 1955, 117 in 1965, and 144 in 1975; thatis, byhalfin each ofthe first two post-war decades and by a quarter again in the following decade. Principies and practices of internal political legitimacy were no less profoundly transformed. ‘Democratic self-rule’ and ‘welfare and development’ became hegemonic, replacing principies such as monarchy, a history of imperial association and laissez-faire. The details and implications of these valúes certainly were contested. Liberal democracies competed with peoples’ democracies. Three worlds of development were defined by competing visions of welfare and how to realize it. The mix between freedom from external rule and internal democracy varied con­ siderable Nonetheless, the legitimacy of post-San Francisco States was quite different from that of early modern dynastic States, the monarchies of the first half of the nineteenth century and even the empires of the early twentieth century. Equality and reason replaced hierarchy, religión and tradition as hege­ monic cultural valúes, not just in a privileged white Western core but across the globe. Racial, ethnic and gender equality carne increasingly to the fore in all regions. In international relations, centuries of for­ mal sovereign inequalities were largely swept away and sovereign equality ‘attained an almost ontological status in the structure of the international legal system’ (Kingsbury, 1998: 600). Perhaps the most profound changes concerned the legitímate use of forcé. Classical international law recognized a ‘right of war’ - the right of each sovereign to decide what to fight over, when - and treated coerced territorial changes as normal and legitímate. Arricie 2, Section 4 of the United Nations Charter, by contrast, States that ‘All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of forcé against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State’. And these idealistic words, penned in a moment of post-war optimism, rapidly became firmly established practice with respect to terri­ torial integrity. At most one State (Tibet) has been eliminated by forcé since the conclusión of World War II (cf. Fazal, 2007). Even coerced ter­ ritorial changes have been largely abolished. Before 1945 about 80 per cent of wars produced territorial changes. The percentage dropped to 30 in the half century after 1945 - and to zero after 1976 (Zacher, 2001). Territorial war, a characteristic practice of most historical international systems, was largely eliminated - with profound human and political consequences.

106

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

If this does not count as fundamental structural change (as it does not in either mainstream IR’s standard account or Buzan and Albert’s alternative) then we need a different conception of structure (which I have tried to provide). And this changed constitutional structure was paralleled by, and interacted with, changes in other dimensions of differentiation. Decolonization brought the demise of formal empire, a venerable type of great-power unit, and the dramatic proliferation of what Robert Jackson (1990) has called quasi-states (whose only substantial power resource is international recognition). Dozens of new weak States altered the distribution of material capabilities. And the near complete elimination of formal sovereign inequalities reshaped patterns of stratification and spawned new practices of informal inequality (e.g. ‘neo-colonialism’ and ‘informal empire’). With few States facing serious threats to survival, substantial space opened for the pursuit of absolute gains (cf. Waltz, 1979: 71; Wendt, 1999: 282). This facilitated new forms of cooperation and interdependence (functional differentiation), evidenced in the rise of international economic and security regimes and the emergence of ‘new issues’ such as the environment and human rights. International economic relations became increasingly differentiated from international security relations - and of steadily growing importance, eroding the oíd distinction between ‘high politics’ and ‘low poli­ tics.’ In the West, ‘embedded liberal’ welfare States created a new interna­ tional economic architecture (designed in significant measure to protect employment and social benefits). In the Second and Third Worlds, the focus on welfare and development took different forms but had a com­ parable impact on international relations. A world marked by the declining utility of forcé and the rise of interna­ tional functional differentiation had much more space for transnational and supranational actors. And their actions reinforced and helped to deepen functional differentiation and peaceful conflict resolution. Postwar changes had a technological dimensión as well. For example, nuclear weapons facilitated a status quo orientation towards territorial boundaries, and improvements in Communications and transportation helped to make indirect economic and political influence a viable alternative to direct rule. It is neither untrue ñor without insight to say that international rela­ tions remained anarchic and segmentary. Such accounts, however, miss even obscure - fundamental changes in the post-war international order. ‘Sovereign States’ remained predominant actors. But these were not the same sovereign States of earlier eras. And the ‘anarchic/segmentary order’ they inhabited was profoundly transformed.

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches

107

Globalization and differentiation Consider now ‘globalization’ understood as a process that decouples social relations from sovereign States and reorganizes them on increasingly functional and deterritorialized bases. For mainstream structural IR, globalization involves no structural change: the international order remains anarchic and globalization has no special connection with polarity. This analysis, to me at least, vividly illustrates the need for a more intelligent conception of structure - which differentiation pro­ vides. ‘Functional differentiation’ seems an appealing model for glob­ alization. I thus begin by briefly sketching a transition of types scenario. My emphasis, however, is on a multidimensional account that problematizes assumptions of a relatively constant segmentary international society giving way to a more or less coherent functionally differentiated order. Let us stipulate a ‘late modern’ baseline for comparison; say 1815 or 1848 to somewhere between the early 1970s and late I980s. In type terms, late modern international society was segmentary. Late modern States were omnifunctional entities that aspired to perform all important functions for themselves (and their citizens). They increasingly asserted a monopoly not only on the legitímate use of forcé but also on law, finance, social Services and even identity, striving to control an evergrowing proportion of social and political life. In a transition-of-types scenario, non-state actors, both public and prí­ vate, provide goods, Services, opportunities and protections previously provided by States (or not previously provided at all). Initially occurring for varied, largely unconnected, reasons, such changes become interrelated and reinforcing. As the re-parceling of functions (and with it author­ ity) expands and accelerates, a tipping point is reached and state-centric segmentary international society gives way relatively quickly to function­ ally differentiated international or world society. The directionality of this account - functional differentiation generates cascading functional differentiation that reshapes segmentation, stratification, and rules, roles and practices - gives it considerable bite, even predictive power. But why should we believe globalization to be directional? It seems to me prudent to explore non-directional scenarios - which requires mul­ tidimensional analysis. Dimensional approaches see change as normal, varied and open-ended (rather than rare, radical and directional). This suggests challenging the idea of a typologically coherent and relatively constant late modern baseline - yielding a very different perspective on globalization. In the late modern era, great overseas empires were built - and then torn apart. Large land empires were broken into smaller and more unitary

108

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

nation-states. And States were transformed from composite polities with limited capabilities into unified national or territorial States increasingly entwined in the lives of their citizens. In addition, commercial and noncommercial transnational actors acquired new prominence in the later twentieth century, as did regional and global intergovernmental organiza­ tions and international regimes ofvarious sorts. Truly national economies were created and Consolidated in Europe in the first half of this period, driven by and driving the political consolidation of territorial nationstates. They also increasingly penetrated, and gradually integrated, the rest of the globe. But by the end of the late modern period a new international división of labour pointed to a global, rather than international, economy. The concert system instituted after Vienna reverted, within a couple decades, to a more familiar multipolar great-power order. After World War II, how­ ever, functional and regional regimes increasingly overlaid heterarchic multiple-rankings on the classic two-dimensional great-power stratifica­ tion. We have already discussed the far-reaching normative transformations of the post-war period. Nearly comparable transformations took place in the mid-nineteenth century under the pressures of nationalism and industrialization. Geotechnical transformation was almost as striking. A European international society, whose members acted in only lim­ ited ways outside the continent’s boundaries, became global and increasingly integrated. For certain analytical purposes one might prefer models of ‘anarchic international orders’ or ‘segmentary international societies’. A multidimensional perspective, however, deserves at least equal attention. A structural framework should not prejudge questions of continuity and change or uniformity and diversity. The structural coherence of a stable system may lie not in approximating a typological ideal but in the mutual adjustment of múltiple elements driven by no particular teleology or ordering principie. And even where a dominant dimensión of differentiation does organize a society, a multidimensional framework of the elements of structure is essential to drawing all but a few broad substantive structural observations. In this light, globalization appears as a complex combination of new elements with the persistence, intensification and transformation of existing patterns and trends. Rather than the unfolding of a typological ideal (such as ‘functional differentiation’ or ‘the logic of capitalism’) it is a contingent, path-dependent process arising from the interaction of múltiple structural (and non-structural) forces. Dimensional approáches to differentiation provide a systematic frame­ work for exploring the possible consequences of changes in individual

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches

109

elements and their interactions across the network of social positions. For example, the continued growth of a truly global economy is likely to reduce the capabilities of many States to provide social welfare benefits to their citizens. But will guaranteed welfare provisión decline, be redefined or become shared with other actors? Which other actors? In what mix? How will this affect the privileged position of States in international soci­ ety? What impact will it have on patterns of stratification? Treating these as open, empirical questions seems to me a fruitful analytical strategy. 6

Conclusión

In their introduction, the editors identified three main themes in the vol­ unte: the relations between dimensions of differentiation; the relations of functionally defined subsystems; and the integration of differentiated societies. My analysis has dealt centrally with the relationship between dimensions. And my multidimensional account suggests a particular perspective on system integration.9 I reject the assumption of much of classical social theory ‘that one form should normally be dominant’ (Albert, Buzan and Zürn, in this volume: 229) and that therefore type analysis lies at the heart of the study of differentiation. I also reject the assumption that segmentation, stratification and functional differentiation are the only major dimensions of differentiation. As a result, I adopt an open-ended approach to the relationship between dimensions of differentiation - which I would insist is an empirical not a theoretical question. There has been very little comparative historical analysis of differentiation of international systems. Therefore, little can be said at this point about common patterns. My two historical cases, however, had no dominant organizing principie. And I suspect that that is the norm. For example, Albert, Buzan and Zürn assume that modern interna­ tional relations have until very recently been primarily segmentary (they title Part 2 ‘The weakening of segmentary differentiation’ and pursue that theme in the following two sections as well). My account of great-power systems, however, suggests a strong and central element of hierarchical stratification, which classical international law recognized formally. They argüe that the recent creation of ‘political authority beyond the State reinforces inequalities between States and thus adds stratificatory differentiation 9 On the question of relations between functional subsystems, my historical cases are compatible with the standard expectation in Sociology that functional differentiation tends to foster further functional differentiation - although my account of globalization suggests that we should be careñil not to overestimate the forcé or the cumulative impact of this tendency, at least in the time frame of many decades.

110

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

among States’ (in this volume: 18). In fact it adds another dimensión of stratification. Modern international relations since Westphalia have not only stratified States (and other sovereign and semi-sovereign entities) but rested on the stratification of States and non-state actors.10 Viewed as a States system, stratification is no less important than segmentation in great-power systems. The most striking features of these cases, to me at least, is the mutual shaping of elements to produce a coherence that simple talk of segmen­ tation, stratification and functional differentiation obscures rather than clarifies. This suggests a particular answer to the question of system integration. Albert and Buzan approach integration largely through the Durkheimian dichotomy of mechanical solidarity in segmentary soci­ eties, which are integrated by shared ideas, and organic solidarity in functionally differentiated societies, which are integrated by functional interdependence (2010: 318-24; cf. also Albert, Buzan and Zürn, in this volume: 1-21). It should be no surprise that I reject this depiction. If the forms of differentiation of international societies are many and varied it seems on its face implausible to imagine that there will be just a few forms and mechanisms of integration. More promising, I would argüe, is to return to the idea of a system as a whole composed of parts of a particular type arranged in partic­ ular ways. The forms of differentiation themselves define the system as a complex unity or whole. Differentiation is not simply a principie of división. The systematic character of the differentiation of a society also establishes an integration of a particular sort. Consider ideal type stratificatory differentiation, in which a society is as much integrated as differentiated by hierarchical stratification. And systemic coherence may be as much a matter of relatively subtle mutual adjustments of múltiple elements and relations (as in the case of the post-World War II transformation of international relations) as the pervasive presence of a single dominant principie or dimensión of differentiation (as in a model of the development of globalization as the unfolding of the type of functional differentiation). Finally, I want to draw attention to the fact that my acCount suggests a particular perspective on ‘differentiation theory,’ to which Albert, Buzan and Zürn in their introduction refer repeatedly. This notion is unused

10 One might plausibly argüe that segmentation predominares when one looks at the dominant actors, great ppwers. But then we should not talk about States systems but about qualitatively different kinds of States systems, the character of which is defined by the particular types of units and the particular relations in which they stand.

Differentiation: type and dimensión approaches

111

in Anthropology and rare in Sociology.11 And I am very sceptical that there is any such thing. Differentiation is an analytical concept. And a multidimensional conception is an analytical framework, not a substan­ tive theory. It provides a disciplined strategy for depicting dimensions and pathways of both continuity and change. It helps us to ‘describe and understand the pressures States [and other international actors] are subject to’ (Waltz, 1979: 71). It provides a comparative framework for analysis. But it offers no ‘theory’ in any strong sense of that term. Differentiation, in my reading, points above all to the variety of inter­ national structures rather than to transhistorical similarities or the recurrence of particular types. Multidimensional approaches help to reveal the pervasive presence of structural diversity and nondirectional change. They also provide a powerful, if limited, set of tools to analyse the struc­ tures of International societies. And where a well-theorized type model does not apply - which I suspect is usually the case - multidimensional comparison, for all its limitations, is likely to be our most powerful ana­ lytical tool. 11 A JSTOR search in February 2012 in all 90 Anthropology journals produced 7512 results for ‘differentiation’ but only 4 for ‘differentiation theory’. The same search in all 122 Sociology journals produced 18,707 and 84 results (and the greatest number of the results for ‘differentiation theory’ were connected with neo-functional differenti­ ation theory, which addresses only functional differentiation in modern societies).

6

Stratificatory differentiation as a constitutive principie of the international system Lora Anne Viola

1

Introduction

International Relations (IR) scholarship has a dominant narrative about the creation of the international system. According to this account, the breakup of Christendom and the decline of the Holy Román Empire gave rise to political actors with complete domestic control over a well-defined territory - independent States. These States now existed in a space no longer dominated by a superior overarching authority. In the absence of this superior authority, each recognized and accepted the other’s achievement of independence, thereby acknowledging formal equality. The new international order that resulted was thus organized around the core prin­ cipies of territoriality, autonomy and equality, and considered to have been codified in the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia (see Krasner, 1993; Lesaffer, 2004). While most debates about the origins of the interna­ tional system have been about the validity of taking Westphalia as its historical starting point or about the empirical robustness of the sovereign autonomy principie (see Wight, 1977: 135; Krasner, 1999: 20; Buzan and Little, 2000; Osiander, 2001), I argüe here that we need to reassess the extern to which sovereign equality was ever a defining principie of the system.1 It is conventionally accepted that the major development of the mod­ ern international system is that the unity and hierarchy of medieval Europe was replaced with a system characterized by, in Luhmann’s terms, segmentary differentiation. Modernity led, in the international system as elsewhere, to the displacement of stratificatory (iifferentiation by segmentary and functional differentiation. Segmentary (or egalitarian) 1 Several recent works have begun to question the principie of sovereign equality. See, for example, Kingsbury (1998); Hurrell (2003); Donnelly (2006); Viola et al. (2013). More generally, while most of IR has accepted the existence of a sovereign equality norm, the English School has been.important in bringing to light the stratification concealed within sovereign equality. See Bull and Watson (1984); Buzan and Little (2000); Keene (2002). On the role of the English School more generally, see Dunne (1998). 112

Differentiation as constitutive of the international system

113

differentiation denotes a system composed of ‘like units’, equal and functionally similar to one another (see Buzan and Albert, 2010; see also Waltz, 1979). As Suganami (1992: 221) writes, ‘[t]he doctrine of the equality of sovereign States is one of the central postulares in the theory and practice of international law and international relations in the contemporary world’. Efraim (1999: 48 and appendix) shows that the principie of sovereign equality is referred to in nearly all international institutions. This is exemplified in Arricie 2 (1) of the UN Charter, which States that the ‘Organization is based on the principie of the sovereign equality of all its members’. In Resolution 2625 the UN clarified that sovereign equality guarantees that States ‘have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community’. Overall the pieture is of an international society in which segmentary differentiation is the rule and stratificatory differentiation exists, if at all, only informally. The notion of sovereign equality, which can be traced back to the earliest theorists of the international system,2 was built upon the logic of like kinds: system units (stares) are all térritorially contained and politically independent actors and these shared attributes make them like kinds, and because they are like kinds they are equal. But, given the many obvious ways in which States are not alike, given the diversity of their material power and internal characteristics and given the manifest ability of some to domínate others, a number of questions emerge. How are States constructed as like units in the first place? What does it mean to be a like kind and what consequences does it have? If it does not refer to material equality, what kind of equality does likeness confer? In this chapter I deconstruct the logical underpinnings3 of the sovereign equality claim, an exercise that reveáis sovereign equality to be a precarious concept reliant on the imposition of inequalities. I argüe that the international system itself emerges as a result of the stratifica­ tory differentiation between included and excluded actors and, fiirthermore, that stratificatory differentiation also characterizes the relationship among system insiders (i.e. supposedly equal sovereign States) to a con­ siderable extent. My argument proceeds in five sections. First, I argüe that States are not self-evidently like kinds, but that like kinds must be constructed. Essentially, this means that the equal­ ity among States is an artífice of categorization. But, perhaps more 2 Although scholars disagree over who first articulated the idea of sovereign equality, Grotius is traditionally awarded this distinction for his 1625 treatise De Jure Belli ac Pacis. See the discussion in Efraim (1999: 66-9) about disputes concerning the first treatment of sovereign equality. 3 As opposed to its historiographical underpinnings. For a recent historiographical account of sovereign equality, see Stirk (2012).

114

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

importantly, like kinds cannot be constructed without simultaneously constructing unlike kinds. In other words, there is no sovereign equal­ ity without sovereign inequality. The system, therefore, is constituted by a continuously reproduced stratification between the included and excluded. Second, I discuss the normative criteria and strategic motives by which system inclusión and exclusión have been determined as the system evolved. Third, I argüe that the distinction between like and unlike kinds, or equals and unequals, is not trivial but has significant distributional consequences. Fourth, system insiders do share a kind of equality, but only in a very limited sense which provides no guarantee against other forms of institutionalized inequality. Fifth, and finally, not only is recognition of sovereignty no guarantee of equality, but the more inclusive the system becomes, the more likely that stratification within it will increase. 2

The logic of like kinds and stratificatory differentiation

According to the reasoning first introduced by early modern jurists in thinking about relations among sovereigns, and still traceable in much modern IR scholarship, sovereign States are formally equal because they are ‘like kinds’ distinguishable from other kinds. Classical jurists grounded the equality argument in an analogy between States and peopie, which remains a foundation of IR theory even today (see Beitz, 1979: 36, 54-6).4 The most direct inspiration for the analogy comes from Hobbes’s Leviathan which begins with a detailed description of the State as an ‘artificial man’. The early jurists transferred Hobbes’s domestic analogy to the International level where they used it to think about the relations among States. If States are like people, they reasoned, then the relations among States must be like the relations among people. Conceptualizing States as individuáis made it possible to extend natural law, understood as rules given by nature (or God) and ascertainable through human reason rather than as constructs of human imagination, to the International level.5 One of the basic principies of natural law is that all people are equal, since we observe individuáis to have roughly 4 The analogy between State and person is still a critical part of IR scholarship today. See for example Alexander Wendt’s (1999: 215; 2004) claim that ‘States Are People Too’ in which he argües that States are not just analogous to people, but States are people. 5 Dickinson argües that a comparison of the classical treatises on international law shows that the idea of equality did not come directly through the idea of sovereignty but ‘through the theories of natural lavv, natural equality, and the State of nature... The doctrine of sovereignty was offered later as an analytical explanation and justification; it was never an historical reason for the origin of the principie’ (1920: 56).

Differentiation as constitutive of the international system

115

the same faculties of body and mind.6 The analogy between States and people permits the conclusión that all States are also equal. This idea is captured in a widely and favourably cited quote from Vattel: ‘A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a small Republic is no less a sovereign State than the most powerful Kingdom.’ He continúes: Since men are by nature equal, and their individual rights and obligations the same, as coming equally from nature, Nations, which are composed of men and may be regarded as so many ffee persons living together in a State of nature, are by nature equal and hold from nature the same obligations and the same rights. Strengths or weaknesses, in this case, count for nothing.7

We can trace this same logic throughout contemporary IR, where Vattel’s point is habitually reiterated. It was endorsed by influential inter­ national lawyers of the early twentieth century, such as Lauterpacht and Oppenheim,8 and is echoed in the UN Charter Preamble.9 Even more influential for current IR theory is that the same idea became part of Waltz’s structural theory of international politics. Waltz argües that, unlike the differentiated agencies inside a State, States are functional equivalents of each other - they all perform the same functions and so duplícate one another’s activities (see Waltz, 1979: 96-7). Just as people are functionally equivalent, so too are States. The functional equivalency argument is broadly accepted across (structural) theories of IR.1011 A fundamental problem with this logic, however, is that, while it may plausibly be argued that people are natural beings and therefore can be the subject of natural law, we cannot argüe that States are natural, or biological, beings and therefore it is unclear that natural law can be applied to them.11 In any case, as I argüe below, it is logically impossible to ascertain which politically constructed actors are like kinds on the basis of anything but subjectively developed criteria. Especially in the specific 6 Hobbes, for example, reasoned that the differences between people are not so significant since ultimately even the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest. It is possible to argüe that this is not true of States; that the differences among States are simply much more significant. 7 The Vattel quote is cited in Shinoda (2000: 68) among many other works. 8 Oppenheim says ‘Whatever inequality may exist between States as regards their size, population, power, degree of civilization, wealth, and other qualities, they are nevertheless equals as International Persons’ (quoted in Dickinson, 1920: 102). 9 The Charter Preamble makes a point of asserting equal rights and duties for ‘nations large and small.’ 10 This is true even of constructivists. See for example Wendt and Friedheim (1996: 248). 11 Note that, on the first point, feminist philosophers have contested the naturalness of human biology and emphasized its constructed nature. The second point, that States are social constructs, is more conventional, although note that Wendt (2004) rests his claim that States are people too on physicalist grounds.

116

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

case of the international system, evidence points to the social construction of criteria for determining what counts as a State and therefore a system member. Given these reservations, in the following discussion I make three points. First, which attributes are the relevant ones for deciding like kinds is not a natural question but a social one as evidenced by the variable criteria that can be, and have been, developed by great powers and institutional practices of recognition over time. Second, the equal treatment of kinds determined to be alike rests on a normative claim and not on any inherent qualities of sameness. Third, and most importantly, determining like kinds itself imposes an inequality between insiders and outsiders and this, in turn, has significant distributional consequences. The first thing to notice about the like kinds logic is that it leaves open the ontological question it is supposed to answer: how do we determine like kinds? How is the boundary drawn in the first place? The apparently sensible nature of like kinds reasoning obscures the critical point that the equality conferred by likeness is based on an artífice of categorization. Vattel, for example, could believe without contradicting himself that all men are equal and that slaves ought to be treated differently. This is because slaves were not considered to belong to the category ‘men’ and so were not like kinds. By the same logic we could argüe that all citizens are equal because they are all citizens, but this only raises the question: who counts as a Citizen? The same is true of sovereignty. Even if the criteria have a material quality - such as property ownership or monopolization of power over a territory - what counts as an appropriate criterion is itself necessarily socially determined and historically contingent. Waltz argües that all States are like kinds and therefore equal by virtue of their func­ tional equivalence. But among ‘equivalent’ States it is possible to carve out further like kinds - industrialized States, colonial States, Christian States, European States, democratic States, rogue States.12 In fact, IR theorists regularly do so. Waltz and other neorealists, despite their emphasis on functional equivalence, take for granted that great powers are like kinds different from other kinds of sovereign States (Waltz, 1979: 72; Gilpin, 1981). This implicit hierarchy of great powers over other sovereign States is accepted by the English School as well, with their focus on the institution of great-power management (Bull, 1977) and their more recent concern with hegemons (Clark, 2009). Liberáis similarly point to the importance of hegemony for maintaining order, and thus implicitly distinguishing subsets of like kinds among States (Keohane, 1984). If we 12 For a discussion of sovereignty and the formal inequality it created in the colonial world, see Mongia (2007). Mongia emphatically rejects the idea that sovereignty is neutral.

Differentiation as constitutive of the international system

117

can regroup like kinds in this way, then any number of material, identity or institutional characteristics can be used to distinguish a set of actors as equivalent. Moreover, although the like kinds argument claims to provide an objective basis for treating certain actors equally, equal treatment is not logically implied by like kinds. Instead, the argument that like kinds are equal is based on the normative claim that a certain set of cases ought to be treated alike. Vattel, for example, did not consider slaves different from men because of any natural difference. That slaves and men are not like kinds is a normative decisión that they ought not to be treated equally. Similarly, the claim that independent States are equal rests on a norma­ tive judgement that they ought to be treated as equals. But we could also imagine a counter claim that some States (e.g. great powers) ought to be treated differently than other States (e.g. non-great powers). Differ­ ent actors may legitimately hold different views on which cases belong together in a group, or on where the system boundary ought to be drawn. It may be possible to narrow down relevant variables and even come to a consensus on them, but, ultimately, all such judgements are subjective and contestable. Moreover, prior to the creation of the boundary there is no equal way to determine who ought to be included and excluded because there is no equal way of determining who is to particípate in making this original decisión.13 What I want to focus attention on, however, is not the constructed nature of the criteria as such, but that the construction of like kinds is ultimately a decisión to treat some actors as unequal. Choosing like kinds means that discriminating criteria are deployed which exelude other possible cases. Given a universe of cases, choosing like cases necessarily means judging some cases as dissimilar and therefore not subject to inclusión. In other words, ‘like cases ought to be treated alike’ implies that ‘different cases can be treated differently’. In an intrinsic way, then, the like kinds principie of equality is constituted out of creation of an inequality - a structural inequality between insiders and outsiders. These decisions have significant distributional consequences. When slaves are not considered to be human, their human rights need not be respected. When non-European States are not considered to be like European States, they can be excluded from the protection of international law. When non-state actors are not considered to be legitímate members of the 13 This point is related to the observation in political theory that there is no democratic way to establish the boundaries of the State. Boundaries indícate the appropriate scope of participation, but prior to the creation of that boundary there is no equal way to determine who ought to participare.

118

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

international system, they need not be given a governance voice. Thus, the determination of like kinds is not only constructed but also politically powerful and therefore subject to strategic manipulation. 3

The strategic dynamic of system inclusión and exclusión

The kind and number of actors who belong to the international system is determined in practice through norms of diplomatic recognition (primar­ ily as applied by great powers or institutions dominated by great powers). The criteria for recognizing like kinds, and thus for inclusión into the international system, change significantly over time and are normative rather than material in nature.14 A number of authors have studied how these normative criteria have changed since Westphalia, eliciting broad consensus on the basic pattern (see Wight, 1972; Gong, 1984; Barkin, 1998; Clark, 2005).15 The scholarly emphasis has thus far been on identifying the normative criteria by which certain actors are considered to ‘belong’ to the international system or in showing exactly how the justificatory foundations for the organizing principie of sovereignty are socially constructed (Reus-Smit, 1999). In contrast, here I want to turn the spotlight onto a strategic dynamic underlying all normative criteria of belonging: The application of recog­ nition criteria is an attempt by ‘insiders’ to stabilize the group through selective inclusión and exclusión. It is notable that the system’s recog­ nition criteria over time are conservative, in the sense that they favour the political aims, interests and valúes of the dominant members of the system at any given moment. In this way the system boundary stabilizes a coherent international order that promotes the general interests of insiders. Internal coherence can be considered an interest of the group because institutional order and governance can be more easily maintained when underlying norms and interests are shared. The recognition criteria, therefore, exelude those actors that might threaten the group. In addition to excluding those who do not conform to the group, recognition has also been used to coerce conformity to the dominant norms. This 14 This can be easily seen in that not all actors that meet the materiaf requirements of statehood (monopoly control over a defined territory) are also recognized as sovereign members of the system (e.g. Taiwan), and some actors that do not meet the mate­ rial requirements are recognized as sovereign members of the system (e.g. Somalia or Kosovo). 15 Christian Reus-Smit, in The Moral Purpose ofthe State (1999), identifies four societies of sovereign States: ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, absolutist Europe, and the modern. His analysis sees the principie of sovereignty at work even before its early modern articulation. In contrast, I am concerned here only with the modern international system in which sovereignty gets its formal legal expression.

Differentiation as constitutive of the international system

119

happens when recognition is made conditional on outside actors changing their behaviour to comply with internal standards. We can observe these dynamics at work in the changing recognition criteria of the modern system. At the time when the jurists were writing their treatises on sovereignty, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they were pleading for domestic control to be considered the main marker of sovereignty. But at that time domestic control could not in fact be taken for granted. Domestic control was still quite variable and true State autonomy carne only with the rise of the absolutist State. Rather than reflecting an existing reality, the insistence that domestic control could be the only criterion was politically motivated. Early writers such as Hobbes and Bodin argued that authority must ultimately rest at a single apex because they were engaged in a project of resisting empire and consolidating the independence gains made by their States. For these writers, the State is still a highly fragüe construction whose continued existence is ‘inextricably bound up with the legitimacy of the political order itself (Williams, 2005: 47). By presupposing the State as the only type of actor fit for sovereignty, these writers sought to naturalize the domestically Consolidated State and explicitly exelude other types of actors - specifically sub-state actors such as guilds or merchants and super-state actors such as the Holy Román Empire - from this status group. By the nineteenth century, legitímate membership was more specifi­ cally based on rulers’ dynastic claims to kingdoms and territories, particularly in the form of hereditary monarchy. Barkin convincingly argües that dynastic rule - while perhaps an already well-established convention - became an explicit criterion for system inclusión at the Congress of Vienna (see Barkin, 1998).16 This criterion, too, was politically moti­ vated. At the Congress of Vienna decisions about State borders and sys­ tem membership were clearly motivated by the desire to retain dynastic and monarchical rule in the face of the populist threat unleashed by the French Revolution and the subsequent rise of Napoleón. Preserving dynastic rule also had the effect of preserving an aristocratic ruling class and preventing the distribution of power both within and across domestic societies. Moreover, dynastic rule made it difficult for small States to remain independent and dynastic equilibrium promoted the accumulation of smaller States by larger States (see Teschke, 2003: 238). By the beginning of the twentieth century the consequences of the French Revolution could no longer be suppressed, and by the end 16 Compare Wight (1972), who claims that dynastic rule was important up to the French Revolution.

120

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

of World War I popular rule became the new dominant norm of membership.17 The idea of popular rule as the legitimare criterion for membership reached its apex with President Wilson’s endorsement of the ‘self-determination’ of peoples. Self-determination meant that every national group, bound together on the basis of a common culture, language or religión, has the right to its own independent membership in the international community. This principie guided the break-up of the European empires after World War I, especially the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The problem with self-determination, however, is that it raised the danger of limitless claims to independence, the dissolution of many stable States and general systemic instability. Thus, the period of the League of Nations, as Mark Zacher shows, was also ‘the beginning of States’ formal support for the territorial integrity norm’ (Zacher, 2001: 219). The territorial integrity norm privileged historie precedents of ter­ ritorial contiguity over nationalist claims. Self-determination and ter­ ritorial integration were principies that often carne into conflict with one another, but by World War II self-determination was displaced by widespread acceptance of the territorial integrity norm (see Zacher, 2001: 236-7).18 During decolonization this had the effect of denying self-determination to the numerous ethnic groups that made up former colonial States and instead enforced colonial borders. As Wight concludes, ‘the principie which broke up both the Central Empires of Europe in 1918, and the colonial empires after 1945, was invoked for a contrary effect in the successor States of the colonial empires’ (Wight, 1972: 14).19 Since the 1990s it has become popular to argüe that the norm of terri­ torial integrity as a criterion for membership is being usurped. ‘A norm that has begun to replace territorial legitimation as a defining feature of the constitution of legitímate sovereignty in international relations is the norm of human rights,’ including the political rights of citizens against the State (Barkin, 1998: 246). With the end of the Coid War, Western liberal democracies were free to shape the world in their image. This new focus on human rights legitimized interventions made on the 17 Meanwhile, in the transitional period between the French Revolution and 1914, dynastic rule and popular rule fiercely competed with one another for legitimacy. The revolutions of 1848 and the unification movements in Germany and Italy in the following two decades were expressions of this growing nationalist sentiment. 18 Zacher further argües that the territorial integrity norm became mstitutionalized in the mid 1970s. 19 During the Biafran War, to take just one example, the right of the Igbo people to selfdetermination carne into direct conflict with the Nigerian right to territorial integrity.

Differentiation as constitutive of the international system

121

basis of ‘the responsibility to protect’ as well as the morally contentious interventions in Iraq in 1991 and 2003 and Kosovo in 1999. The idea that domestic institutions ought to be democratic and respect human rights became a new criterion which legitimated the inclusión of some and the exclusión of others. According to John Rawls, domestic institu­ tions that respect human rights are a hallmark of ‘well-ordered peoples’. And ‘[i]n this sense they specify the outer boundary of admissible domestic law of societies in good standing in a just society of peoples’ (Rawls, 1993: 59). Up until the middle of the twentieth century, it must be noted, these normative criteria for membership applied to European actors. NonEuropean actors, in addition to meeting these norms, also needed to meet the so-called ‘standard of civilization’. The standard of civilization was a legal mechanism invoked primarily during European colonialism to set the criteria for the ‘ascent’ of non-European peoples to full recognition as members of the international system. According to nineteenth-century conventional scholarship, humankind could be distinguished into three groups: savage, barbarían and civilized peoples. These were thought to be connected by a ‘natural and necessary’ progression from savage to civilized (Bowden, 2002). International lawyers, such as James Lorimer, expressed the common view that the rights and privileges of interna­ tional society cannot be shared with savages and barbarians. Savages and barbarians were marked by their very inability to engage in orderly soci­ ety (see Lorimer, 1883). In his study of the ‘standard of civilization’, Gong lists the criteria a polity had to meet in order to be considered civilized and in order to be eligible for recognition (see Gong, 1984). These criteria reflect the image of the European States that set them. The first four criteria essentially describe the modern European centralized, rule-of-law State: (1) the guarantee of basic rights of life, liberty, religión and commerce; (2) the existence of an organized bureaucracy and the ability to organize its own defence; (3) the ability to adhere to international law; and (4) the fulfilment of international obligations by participation in diplomatic exchange. The fifth condition adds to these a cultural similarity to Europe: (5) conformity to the accepted norms and practices of civilized society - meaning that practices such as polygamy and slavery were unacceptable. Christian fellowship, in particular, was considered to be an important marker of civilization. Thus, the standard of civilization had the effect of keeping non-European and non-Christian States out of the international system (see Alexandrowicz, 1967; Gong, 1984; Simpson, 2004: 233). In this discourse, the transition to statehood and to sovereign equality involves a gradual overcoming of the dark forces of nature (especially tribalism and paganism) and an embracing of

122

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Christian civilization and valúes.20 From the nineteenth century throughout the period of the League, this gradual move towards civilization became a justification for European ‘stewardship’ and ‘trusteeship’ over colonial lands. The explicit justification being that local people were not (yet) capable of entering into equal relations with European States. The political effect, however, was the oppression and exploitation of nonEuropean peoples.21

4

The distributional consequences of system exclusión

In the international system, the process of boundary drawing - that is, of determining like kinds - is not trivial because it has distributional consequences. The international system provides goods and resources to insiders, which are not accessible to outsiders. Thus, boundary draw­ ing is an allocative move that affects the life-chances of both insiders and outsiders.22 Because inclusión confers benefits, the criteria of recognition always have adverse consequences for the excluded. There are three basic types of goods that the international system monopolizes for insiders: spe­ cific goods, governance goods and existential goods. Most obviously, the system provides many and varied types of substantive goods - everything from peacekeeping, to loans, to disaster relief and more.23 Beyond these specific goods, another central benefit of membership is participation in governance, or political agency. Insiders have a ‘seat at the table’ which outsiders do not. Access to governance authority is an essential good because it gives actors a voice in determining the nature and distribution of substantive goods provided by the group. Finally, sovereignty provides actors with an existential privilege; that is, actors recognized as sovereign are accepted by other members as having a right to exist as independent political units.24 Studies have shown that system exclusión does have an effect on the life-chances of political actors. The right to exist is more often violated in 20 Bartelson (1995), in particular, analyses this discourse. 21 The standard of civilization fell into disrepute after World War II and with the beginning of decolonization. By that time international lawyers were claiming that ‘modern inter­ national law knows of no distinction, for the purposes of recognition, between civilized and uncivilized States’ (Lauterpacht, 1947: 31). 22 By ‘life-chances’ I mean to invoke Weber’s reference to the ability of actors to satisfy their material and non-material needs. 23 Many goods provided in the system are available exclusively to members, but this is not true of all goods provided by the system. Although I characterize the system as providing club goods, it does also sometimes provide public goods. 24 This does not mean that actors not recognized as members do not have the right to exist, but that no guarantee of the right to exist has been made.

Differentiation as constitutive of the international system

123

the case of system outsiders than in the case of insiders. ‘A State that does not recognize another as a State, i.e. as a subject of international law, will not respect its territorial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence if a conflict should arise’ (Hillgruber, 1998: 497). Outsiders are unprotected by the norm of non-intervention and the international law undergirding it. From a legal perspective, ‘in order for it to enjoy the protection of the prohibition of the use of forcé applicable in international relations, integration to a greater or lesser extern into the international community is always necessary by way of (collective) recognition’ (Hillgruber, 1998: 498). David Strang argües that States which are not recognized as members of the sovereign States system are more likely to be annexed or occupied (see Strang, 1991). Assessing data on non-European polit­ ical units between 1415 and 1987, he finds that a polity’s survival is strongly associated with recognition of sovereign status. While recog­ nized polities have a stable status over time, unrecognized polities ‘are subordinated and colonial dependencies merge, dissolve, or are transferred between Western powers’ (Strang, 1991: 154). Similarly, several scholars argüe that Bosnia-Herzegovina was actually stabilized through international recognition of its sovereignty, and that without such recog­ nition protection of its integrity would have been even more difficult (see Hillgruber, 1998: 493; Caplan, 2005). Kosovo, meanwhile, was arguably made more vulnerable to attack precisely through its non-membership status (see Caplan, 2005: 137-45). Seeking membership is therefore a way for actors who perceive themselves as a political group to actualize and protect the group’s existence. Gaining system membership is a way to transform a community into a political body with international political rights. The existential privilege of system membership is perhaps the most critical, but the absence of access to the substantive resources available to members or to governance authority can also affect life-chances. Taiwan, for example, was initially denied access to SARS aid from the World Health Organization because it is not recognized as a sovereign State (see Chien, 2003). Somaliland, to ñame another example, is not eligible for the same types of development aid as recognized members of the interna­ tional system. More generally, decisions about system membership affect governance of the system. This is because who is on the inside and who is on the outside will largely determine the interests of the group, the substantive issues that arise, and how they are dealt with. The inclusión of former colonies into the international system as sovereign members, for example, meant that economic development became a major political issue and new Solutions, such as aid and loan policies, got priority on the political agenda.

124

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

One might argüe that the international system has become more inclu­ sive over time and that, therefore, stratification has decreased and the distributional consequences are no longer as significant as they may have been historically. In fact, the international system has broadened since the end of World War II, most notably with the addition of newly independent former colonies. As I discuss in the next section, however, inclusión is no guarantee of equality. Indeed, the post-1945 system has not eliminated stratificatory differentiation, but has, in important ways, imported the historical insider/outsider distinction into the system. 5

The imperfect equality of system inclusión

Thus far I have argued that the international system imposes an inequality on outsiders by determining them to be unlike kinds. It is this sense in which stratificatory differentiation is a constitutive principie of the system. This is a significant consequence that must be taken into account but, to be fair, the sovereign equality principie makes no claim of equality between insiders and outsiders. It does, however, claim equality among like kinds or, in this case, among system insiders. But what does it mean to say that likes ought to be treated alike? What kind of equality is it? It is useful here to return to the logic of like kinds that underpins the original arguments for sovereign equality. Like kinds are guaranteed a basic equality by virtue of being considered alike. In other words, States are equal in that they all share ‘state-ness’. J.R. Lucas (1965: 297) expresses the logic of this idea as follows: If all men are men, then all men are equally men, therefore all men are equal. The kind of equality invoked in this line of argumentation is formal, or legal, equality.25 By virtue of the system boundary, those actors recognized as belonging to the international system are equal in terms of their formal standing. Most fundamentally, being recognized as belonging to the group necessarily entails the right to exist. More formally, it means that like cases will be treated consistently - the equivalent of what on the domestic level is called equality before the law. Equality before the law means that like cases are treated as equals in ffont of judicial organs and are equally able to assert such rights as they have. Acóording to Simpson, ‘[f]ormal equality encompasses the principie that in judicial settings States have equality in the vindication... of rights’ (Simpson, 2004: 43). Suganami further clarifies that ‘nothing more is meant than that [states] are all equally bound by international law, that they all have an equal 25 I follow Simpson (2004) in using ‘formal’ and ‘legal’ equality synonymously to refer to the juridical standing of actors.

Differentiation as constitutive of the international system

125

obligation to obey the Law of Nations’ (Suganami, 1992: 222). There must be no deviations in treatment between similar cases on the basis of whim, fear, or favour unprovided for in the rule itself Formal equality is significant because, by conferring standing, it confirms an actor’s right to be and it protects actors against arbitrary judgements. As I discussed earlier from the perspective of the excluded, this guarantee is not trivial. Nevertheless, formal equality provides only a basic sort of guarantee to sovereign States: it amounts to saying that a rule must be applied to all the cases to which it is applicable - in short that a rule is a rule (see Westen, 1982). Neither the logic of like kinds ñor the idea of equality before the law implies an equal distribution of rights or resources, and neither guarantees against stratificatory differentiation. In the first place, designating like kinds does not logically require their equal treatment. Saying that dwarfs and giants are both people is to contrast them with non-people, but it does not tell us that they are equal to one another.26 Similarly, both people and dogs are animáis, but we do not usually draw the conclusión that therefore people and dogs are equal. Lucas (1965: 297) exposes this faulty logic by replacing ‘men’ with ‘numbers’: If all numbers are numbers, then all numbers are equally numbers, therefore all numbers are equal. There is nothing in the sameness of numbers, animáis, people or States that logically requires equality. We can imagine reasons - whether we judge them to be good or bad - which justify the unequal treatment of like kinds. In the same way, equality before the law says nothing about the contení of rights.27 As Simpson puts it, ‘[f]ormal equality has nothing to say about the substance of these rights or the extent and scope of the rights possessed or the capacity to influence the way rights are distributed’ (Simpson, 2004: 43). ‘When it is said that all sovereign States are equally bound by international law, it is not meant that all sovereign States have equal international legal rights or duties’ (Suganami, 1992: 225). So, although sovereign equality guarantees inclusión into the system and the concomitant standing that entails, it does not prevent the unequal distribution of resources among insiders (material inequality) or the unequal distribution of governance rights (political inequality), and 26 This is where the reliance on natural law carne in - according to natural law, people just are, as we can ascertain through our reason, equal. 27 Dickinson argües that Grotius is much misquoted because his readers often fail to see that his references to equality were limited to equality before the law and do not imply a belief in equality of rights. ‘If all that is meant is the equal protection of the law, then of course equality was a fundamental principie of the Grotian system... It is another matter, however, if equality is taken to mean equality of capacity for rights. Such a principie was not an essential prerequisite to the system of Grotius’ (Dickinson, 1920: 35).

126

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

therefore it does not guard against the creation of a class divide within the international system. Indeed, the rules of the international system often do not provide for equality (see Viola et al., 2013). Empirically, the three types of goods provided by inclusión in the international system - existential, governance and substantive - are not equally distributed among members. The ‘right to exist’ is unequivocally part of membership (even if it is not always respected). In the international system, the right to exist has most often been formulated as the negative right of non-intervention. Early consensus interpreted the norm as protecting against all kinds of interference - including military, political and humanitarian - except in cases of self-defence. However, the meaning of non-intervention has changed over time (see Finnemore, 2003). In the last decades, the consensus has shifted to a norm of non-intervention tempered by the responsibility to protect universal human rights, which might require military and polit­ ical intervention. In essence, this shift has diluted the non-intervention norm for a particular sub-set of actors, namely non-democratic and relatively weak States, underscoring a status difference between types of States. Sovereign States also do not have equal access to the governance of the system. Despite common usage, sovereignty is no guarantee of polit­ ical equality, and it is evident that the international system is marked by considerable political inequality (Zürn, 2007b).28 Hurrell invokes the imagery of deformity to talk about this inequality: ‘there is deformity in terms of who sets the rules of international society. Institutions are not, as some liberáis would have us believe, neutral arenas for the solution of common problems but rather sites of power, even of dominance. The vast majority of weaker actors are increasingly “rule takers” over a whole range of issues that affect all aspects of social, economic, and political life’ (Hurrell, 2003: 41-2). The different rights and duties that fall to members of the Security Council as opposed to members of the General Assembly is just one example of the institutionalization of political inequality among States. Whether it is in the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO or the NPT, voting rights and governance authority are often unequally distributed (Glenn, 2008). Moreover,'those members most affected by the policies decided upon in governance institutions are also often those with the least governance authority (consider, e.g., the IMF). 28 Of course, States can freelv choose to constrain their rights by agreeing to unequal procedures. But there are plenty of examples of procedural inequality that have not been consented to and that are contested.

Differentiation as constitutive of the international system

127

Members in the international system quite obviously do not have equal access to its substantive goods and resources. There are massive social and economic inequalities between States, which international institutions have not radically changed. Economic redistribution happens only on a miniscule scale through aid and loans. Aid and loans, furthermore, are not equally available to States but provided on a differentiated basis. Those institutions whose job it is to provide security only do so selectively - pursuing some security injustices while ignoring others (Binder, 2009). Similarly, at the individual level, human and social rights are only thinly protected by international institutions. Moreover, it has not been a priority of the society of States to attempt to provide material equality to members. Only in the last several decades have we seen growing concern over global inequality spur the international community to develop policies, such as the Millennium Development Goals, to promote economic growth and security in less developed States.

6

The elusive search for sovereign equality

Being recognized as a like kind or a sovereign equal is not a guarantee against stratificatory differentiation. Nevertheless, the recognition of formerly excluded actors into the sovereign States system and its institu­ tions, albeit resulting in only a limited kind of equality, could be seen as an important step in reducing stratificatory differentiation. Certainly, the international system has become more inclusive since the end of World War II - UN membership has grown by an average of 3 new members a year since 1945 - so that exclusión via non-recognition remains an issue for only a limited number of actors.29 There are reasons, however, to be doubtful of the mitigating effects of inclusión on stratificatory differentiation. A more inclusive system creates incentives for core insiders (i.e. the great powers) to impose new forms of hierarchy on the system. As discussed earlier, the system seeks to stabilize itself by being selective about what types of actors are recognized as belonging. The purpose of drawing the system boundary is to keep some actors out and to advance the interests of those on the inside. 29 It is not clear, however, that the process of expansión is anywhere near complete. By some estimares there are thousands more groups which could make claims to selfdetermination on the basis of their national, linguistic or ethnic identity. Numerous stateless peoples, aboriginals, and cultural minorities could demand recognition of their membership in the international system. Moreover, there are non-state political organi­ zations which have cióse ties to the UN, but are not recognized as members, such as the 16 unions and intergovernmental organizations that have permanent observer status. For a discussion see Gellner (1983: 43-50) and Hobsbawm (1990: chap. 6); see also Ayres (2000).

128

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Selective inclusión - through recognition criteria - serves the purpose of promoting the consistency of interests and valúes represented within the system. The post-1945 expansión can be said to have occurred despite insiders’ concern for internal coherence. Whatever the motivations for expanding recognition,30 the result of inclusiveness has been a diversification of economic, security and identity interests represented within the system. There is no doubt that this expansión has had benefits, but if these actors had all been given an equal voice the costs to the core States would be reflected in the difficulty of reaching consensus and the difficulty in pushing forward their agendas. One way of escaping these costs of expansión is to seek new forms of stratification and exclusión within the system, this time differentiating among insiders. A new cycle is begun where actors with the same interests attempt to exelude other (unlike) insiders from sharing in the benefits of membership. I cannot marshal systematic empirical support for this argument here, but we can consider some anecdotal evidence. The internal stratification between core and periphery is reflected in the design of governance institutions. In the face of an expanding system, core actors design governance institutions in such a way as to exelude diversity and to distribute rights unevenly among core and periphery States. Arguably, stratification within the international system followed periods of greater inclusión. The first institutionalized stratifi­ cation within the modern international system, the distinction between great and small powers, occurred at the Congress of Vienna and coincided with the first major expansión of the system. At the Congress it was settled that the system would be divided into the great powers who would manage the system through the Council of Europe, and the other sovereign members who would not have this authority (Clark, 1989; 2005). Over time, as successive waves of actors joined the system, we see more exclusive institutions emerging from the same dynamic. The United Nations, for example, was the first near-universal membership organization and a condition of its forming was that there be a formalized governance inequality in the form of the Security Council. The same logic might explain institutions such as the G-7, G-8, Gj20, and the rise of regional organizations.

30 The decolonization movement, for example, has been described in terms of two possible mechanisms: Strong normative principies promoted opening access to the system and/or fear that the demands for recognition were so great and so threatening to the status quo that insiders needed to allow new members in to preserve the status quo from usurpation (see Strang, 1991; Philpott, 2001; Keene, 2002).

Differentiation as constitutive of the international system

129

Another way in which core States exelude or marginalize other recog­ nized insiders is to discursively delegitimize them. By arguing that certain actors are no longer ‘like us’ because they abide by alternative norms or goals, insiders can be effectively excluded or marginalized. This happens when non-compliant insiders are recategorized as distinctly ‘other’ through labels such as ‘pariah’, ‘outlaw’, ‘recalcitrant’, or ‘rogue’ State (Lake, 1994: 45; Simpson, 2004). The term ‘rogue State’ has been used recently for Irán, Iraq, Libya, Cuba and North Korea (Litwak, 2000: 53), and the ‘axis of evil’ is a variation of this same phenomenon. These labels signal that a member has gone wayward, that it is no longer fulfilling the collective norms and is threatening the stability of the system. The ‘rogue’ label, for example, seeks to put the State outside the bounds of the system on the basis of its alleged support for terrorism and/or pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (see Klare, 1995; Saunders, 2006: 23). Having one’s good standing called into question can be a way to justify the rescinding of certain group benefits and imposing diplomatic isolation. At its most extreme, both non- and de-recognition open the way for the (system-legitimized) use of forcé.31

7

Conclusión

As Michael Wallace has noted, in the international system ‘stratification and hierarchy have received nothing like the attention paid to the corresponding phenomena at the societal level of analysis’ (Wallace, 1971: 23). While across time and across paradigms IR theory has consistently asserted its belief in sovereign equality, real and formalized inequalities exist in the distribution of the system’s goods. Indeed, the notion of sovereign equality overtly conceals the obvious artífice of sovereign inequality and distraéis us from thinking about the stratification of the system. I have argued that inequality and, more specifically, hierarchical strat­ ification are endemic to the international system. First, as the interna­ tional system emerges, some political actors are excluded from participating. Non-state and sub-state actors are eventually stripped of their right to legitímate membership in the international system, while nonEuropean actors remain unrecognized for most of the system’s history. At the boundary, decisions of inclusión and exclusión are made on the 31 Arguably, this is what the United States sought to do with the case of Iraq. By first labelling Iraq a rogue State, the United States called its membership into question on the basis of not complying with the collective norms against human rights abuse, autocracy and terrorism. This was followed by system-wide (UN-sponsored) calis for Iraq to comply with international norms on penalty of losing its sovereignty.

130

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

basis of conformity with the interests of system insiders. These decisions are not trivial but have significant distributional consequences. An actor excluded from the system cannot access the benefits associated with being on the inside. Most significantly, exclusión denies sovereignty’s basic protection against oppression and exploitation. Those who are recognized as members of the international system do enjoy a limited kind of equality with other sovereign States. But this for­ mal equality, or equality of form, does not provide a guarantee against stratificatory differentiation. Indeed, stratification within the system is reflected in the distribution of governance authority, in access to sub­ stantive goods, and in the use of discursive forms of delegitimation. Finally, because recognition of sovereignty does confer a formal equal­ ity, one might think that expansión of the system to inelude more actors might alleviate stratificatory differentiation. But I have argued that the inclusión of highly diverse actors increases the incentives of core actors to pursue forms of hierarchical governance. As more actors seek for­ mal equality, the pressure for internal differentiation increases. Ironically, then, a highly inclusive system does not eliminare the kind of stratification that once marked the boundary between system insiders and outsiders, but winds up importing it within itself. In contrast to the view that the international system is best characterized by functional differentiation, the arguments made here point out that stratificatory differentiation is a constituent element of the system. This is not to say that functional or segmentary differentiation is always completely absent. The recognition of a state’s sovereignty might be the beginning of a sort of functional equivalence, and there are at least some groupings of States that can be described with segmentary differentiation. More importantly, if we understand the system, as I do here, not as a primal and fixed entity but as an emergent one, then the extent to which it can best be described as functionally differentiated or stratified is likely to change over time. And as the system becomes more complex, it is also likely that some aspeets of it will develop towards functional differ­ entiation while other aspeets become more highly stratified. It is useful, therefore, to consider different types of differentiation as coexisting and, possibly, interacting. Nevertheless, if we take stratificatory differentiation as á significant element of the international system, we come face to face with important normative questions. The idea of sovereign equality has been powerful in IR because international institutions and powerful actors have invoked it to suggest the neutralization of material inequality among States. What does the persistence of stratificatory differentiation imply for the existence of justice in the international system? Equality certainly appeals to our

Differentiation as constitutive of the international system

131

contemporary moral sensibilities, and wherever we see inequality we tend to also see injustice. On the one hand, stratificatory differentiation may impede just treatment for peripheral States. On the other hand, in a world in which moral goods sometimes come into conflict, peripheral States might be willing to accept an international system that is kept stable by powerful actors over one that is equal. Giving serious consideration to stratificatory differentiation is one way of opening this important debate on what justice means and how to achieve it within the international system.

7

Some quanta of solace: world politics in the era of functional differentiation Stephan Stetter

1

Introduction

If one were to conduct, say during the annual convention of the Inter­ national Studies Association (ISA), an opinión poli in which the Inter­ national Relations (IR) scholars gathered at this convention were asked to list the five theoretical concepts they consider most central in explaining (dis-) order in world politics, one would not have to be a prophet to forecast that the concept of ‘functional differentiation’ would hardly make it even cióse to the top of the list. While not pursuing the probably illusionary objective of paving the way for a spontaneous mass con­ versión of IR scholars to functional differentiation, the main objective of the present chapter is to show that the more or less benign neglect of notions of functional differentiation in IR - laudable exceptions, many of them assembled in this volume, notwithstanding - is unwarranted, both empirically and theoretically. More specifically, this chapter claims that a deconstructivist understanding of functional differentiation as developed by modern systems theory heralds crucial theoretical advances for the study of order in world politics. IR should not ignore this, even if it might challenge prevalent assumptions in IR and political Science about the somewhat superior role of politics vis-á-vis other social systems. Apart from these more general arguments on the merits of theorizing in IR about functional differenti­ ation, this chapter argües that the limits in the outreach of the theory of functional differentiation in IR cannot be attributed to a lack of systematic engagement with comprehensive social theories in the discipline alone, although this is certainly also the case. It also pertains to a crucial blind spot in the theory of functional differentiation itself, which limits this theory’s ability to address issues of crucial relevance to IR. This blind spot relates, in particular, to the relative absence in functional differentia­ tion theory of a coherent understanding of the interrelationship between

132

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

133

differentiation, on the one hand, and conflict and securitization, on the other. Only if the theory is able to show how functional differentiation relates to a comprehensive theory of social conflicts and securitization will it make a lasting impact on the study of the world political system - that is, a social system in which intensive and violent forms of conflict and secu­ ritization are ubiquitous and expected. This offers at least some quanta of solace to IR, an academic discipline with a well-elaborated vocabulary for the analysis of the interrelationship between conflicts and global order. The next section discusses in detail key conceptual and epistemological dimensions of how functional differentiation is understood in modern systems theory and thereby addresses the question of how this contributes to a better understanding of key features of global politics and international society. It shows, in particular, that addressing functional differentiation from a systems theory perspective requires an empirical approach based primarily on a historically informed perspective on the evolution of world society in general, and the world political system in particular, as well as a deconstructivist epistemology of the funda­ mentáis of world society and world politics as conceived in communi­ cation theory. Building on this analysis, the subsequent section makes the case that future inroads of functional differentiation into IR the­ ory will crucially depend on the ability of differentiation theory to link up to three key research streams in the discipline, namely global gover­ nance research, studies of world statehood and, most importantly, con­ flict and securitization studies. For each of these fields, this section will briefly Alústrate the theoretical and empirical advances that could be triggered by an intensified dialogue between modern systems theory and IR. The chapter concludes with a short summary of how, on the basis of an understanding of functional differentiation shaped by systems the­ ory, the three themes identified in the introduction to this book can be approached. It should be noted that this chapter reflects on (functional) differenti­ ation in world politics on the basis of ideas generated in modern systems theory. For that reason the theoretical vocabulary of this theory necessarily figures strongly in the subsequent analysis. Rather than seeing the chapter as a statement that modern systems theory should replace alternative theories of world politics, or that it is the best theory out there, it should instead be seen as an invitation to readers with or without a sociological background to engage with an alternative, and in parts new, conceptual Outlook - namely a systems-theory-based take on functional differentiation and world politics.

134

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

2

Enter: functional differentiation

Theorizing functional differentiation Theorizing about functional differentiation is not anathema to the social Sciences. Governance theories, to refer to a particularly obvious example, study the institutionalization and legalization processes in functional issue areas within global, regional and national policy arenas. As highlighted in the introduction to this volume, the understanding implicit in gov­ ernance theories - that some form of functional differentiation deeply pervades modern world society - is widespread, particularly in Sociol­ ogy (Heintz et al., 2005). This is not a new phenomenon. Since the late nineteenth century the social Sciences have observed that functional imperatives have had, since the onset of modernity, a tremendous impact on the transformation of social structures in Europe and elsewhere. One need only cite the focus on market logics as studied by Adam Smith or Karl Marx, reflections on the autonomy of the sphere of politics as analysed by Max Weber, not to mention the división of labour highlighted by Emile Durkheim, or the way money and conflicts are integrating society, which has been a central research theme in the work of Georg Simmel. While it is important to note that the understanding of functional dif­ ferentiation in this chapter differs from these classics insofar as modern systems theory does not share their modernist credentials, systems theory nevertheless converges with these early versions of functional differentia­ tion in the viewpoint that functional differentiation is a relatively new, yet highly significant form of differentiation in the history of human civilization. It argües that this, in turn, requires that functional differentiation be approached not only through abstract reasoning on social structures, but - as was the case with the sociological classics as well - through a historically informed perspective. This also is of relevance to IR, since an empirical approach to functional differentiation allows linking at least some of the arguments made in systems theory on key dynamics of world politics to historically informed theories in IR, most notably those of the English School. What distinguishes modern forms of societal differentiation from previous eras in human civilization is the relative decrease, since the late Middle Ages, of the overall structural relevance of stratification as society’s main differentiation principie. Functional differentiation has, according to systems theory, become the dominant and most pervasive form of differentiation in contemporary world society. From a historical perspec­ tive, modern systems theory argües that a decisive structural shift took

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

135

place in (European) world society in early modernity, leading both to a relative decline of the nobility’s capacity to represent society as a whole, and to a parallel rise of wealthy and educated people from outside the nobility who increasingly claimed key societal positions in politics, the economy, the legal professions and academia. Traditional stratificatory orders, which shaped European and other societies until early moder­ nity, have been characterized by the peculiarity that entry into and exit from the subsystems of society, namely the nobility and the third estáte (Stearns, 2009), were by and large based on hereditary properties. In other words, a person was born into a specific subsystem (i.e. stratum) and, with few exceptions, was bound to live his or her entire life as part of this group. This almost automatically ensured that belonging to the nobility meant possessing power, social prestige and wealth, whereas peo­ ple from outside this stratum had virtually no chance of securing equally representative and influential societal positions. In other words, while different forms of differentiation existed in pre-modern eras too, strat­ ificatory differentiation trumped functional differentiation as society’s primary form of differentiation. The decisive change in early modernity, partly resulting from the exponential growth and spread of knowledge and anonymous authorship/readership enabled by the discovery of modern book printing, was that knowledge became increasingly disembedded from hereditary soci­ etal positions. The massive quantitative and spatial spread of ideas triggered by book printing and the parallel process of growing social mobility gradually undermined stratificatory differentiation and also slowly undercut the precedence which person-oriented (i.e. stratificatory) sub­ systems had vis-á-vis function-oriented systems. Indeed, society as a whole became less and less defined by people’s lifelong rank posi­ tions and was, as the mushrooming of trading firms, universities and proto-state bureaucracies throughout Europe in this period attests, increasingly subject to functional imperatives. All this does not, of course, mean that stratificatory forms of differentiation had vanished and that today’s world society is only shaped by functional constraints originating from highly independent social systems such as politics, law, economy, art and education. Of course, oíd and new forms of stratification endure and, on a personal level, for most people, it still makes a difference in relation to income, educational privileges and personal freedom whether one holds an EU, Brazilian, South Korean or US passport or Jordanian, Angolan or Nepalese citizenship. Also, within States and regions it makes a difference whether people come from rich, educated or well-connected family backgrounds or not. Even today oíd and new forms of stratifi­ cation exist within function systems. Thus, in many States key political

136

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

positions are held by members of specific families. This even relates to the West, as the prominence of some ‘aristocratic’ families in the United States (Kennedy, Bush, Clinton) attests. Even more important than this prevalence of families are, however, new forms of internal stratification related to meritocracy in world politics, for example, in the context of powerful technocratic elites. In a way not unfamiliar to neo-functional theories in IR, Luhmann argües that, when it comes to the role of people in function systems, there is a fundamental distinction between those actively performing roles in the system (e.g. leaders, parliamentarians, lobbyists, sénior civil servants) and those constituting the ‘audience’ for this system. It would, however, be premature to equate this stratification between ‘performers’ and ‘audiences’ with medieval forms of hierarchy. Thus, in contrast to pre-modern societies, the divide between performers and audiences is today much more fluid, at least on two levels. First, due to increased upward and downward mobility, there is no guarantee that having a performance role in the political system means that this privileged status can easily and legitimately be extended to family members or future generations. Second, individual persons can today more easily shift between the two roles, a Street social worker from the ‘periphery’ of the political system can move to the heart of it and become US president. And, as the downfall of the Mubarak government in Egypt attests, continued mass demonstrations can turn thousands of individuáis, usually constituting a more or less passive audience, at least for a few weeks, into key political performers. Consequently, the claim systems theory makes is that, even if stratifica­ tion on a personal and group level still exists, this differentiation principie is today neither hereditary ñor any longer the key defining structural fea­ ture of modern society. In that sense, the Marxian understanding of class struggle misses the point insofar as the oíd (stratificatory) order of the Middle Ages has been replaced not so much by a new form of stratifica­ tion between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but rather by a different type of differentiation shaped by the functional features of distinct and highly autonomous social systems, such as ínter alia the economy (see also Luhmann, 1997b: 706; Münch, in this volume). Modern systems theory uses arguments based on coinmunication the­ ory to show that, since the onset of modernity - roughly since the late fifteenth century, world society has become increasingly differentiated by functional divides. The more empirical arguments in modern sys­ tems theory - which are compatible to similar observations made in historically informed IR theories - deserve equal attention. In order to highlight what this chapter considers quite fruitful points of encounter between modern systems theory and IR theory it is useful to start with

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

137

this empirical dimensión of functional differentiation, before turning to the equally important communication theory features below. The following paragraphs offer a historical reading of functional differentiation from a systems theory perspective, thereby focusing in particular on the function system of politics.1

Functional differentiation from a historical perspective

According to modern systems theory, politics is one amongst several highly autonomous functionally differentiated social systems in today’s world society (see Luhmann, 2000b). This does not, obviously, mean that prior to the modern era politics did not exist. Of course, ‘both in empires and in cities political authority has existed for a long time. But it was only between the late medieval period and early modernity that there was a major leap towards differentiation. The main outcome of this leap was that political authority became independent from stratifi­ cation’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 714).1 2 Political offices and, as a result, polit­ ical authority in a more abstract way became less personalized in the sense that both were structurally decoupled from lifelong and hereditary properties belonging to a specific social class. Thus, with the rise of professional political bureaucracies, ‘modern’ forms of administration, ‘popular’ political leaders and growing political audiences, the social field of politics was rearranged in such a way that it was gradually disembedded from its structural linkage to a specific class. The key organizational change in this development was, as IR is well aware, the emergence of territorial (bureaucratic) States and, based on the need to regúlate the relations between these States, the increasing political importance of ter­ ritorial borders and diplomacy. It is on that basis that systems theory claims that ‘like a web this new principie of State borders overarches the oíd order of stratification and forces stratification to get linked to one State or another - if nobility wanted to maintain political influence’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 721; see also Sassen, 2008). In other words, in the field of politics, States performing specific functions rather than a new

1 Note that this chapter does not use the term ‘functional system’ but rather refers to ‘function systems’. Modern systems theory is, like post-structuralism, deconstructivist and puts forward no argument that systems should be functional in any teleological, normative or rational sense. As Luhmann (1997b: 770) rightfully emphasizes, functional differentiation is not to be confused with a división of labour between systems, and systems do not serve any larger societal function, such as prosperity, integration or development. 2 All translations from Germán in this chapter are by the author.

138

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

social class defined by the properties of its members became the heir of the oíd stratificatory order. A systems theory perspective on such dynamics of functional differ­ entiation in early modernity is helpful, since it shows that the replacement of stratification by functional differentiation as the main form of differentiation in society is a multidimensional process, involving the increasing social relevance and autonomy of several function systems. Thus - and notwithstanding the significance of how functional differen­ tiation affected the political system - ‘analyses of this kind could be pursued for other function systems as well. Everywhere we find a change in self-generated dynamics and the replacement of assumptions secured by stratification’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 731). Luhmann’s work, which ineludes different monographs on the history and structures of function systems such as Science, law, politics, economy, art, mass media and religión, does indeed testify not only that such analyses can, in fact, be undertaken, but that there already is a solid empirical basis for understanding how and why functional differentiation has become the key structural principie of world society (see Luhmann, 1996; 2008). It is true that on a semantic level some function systems, like reli­ gión, politics or the economy, cherish ‘hegemonic’ aspirations insofar as the idea is often advanced, in their systemic self-descriptions and in myths cherished in (parts of) society as a whole, that they somehow represent society as a whole or are, at least, in a superior position regarding their overall importance for society when compared to other function systems. However, as the comparative perspective on several function systems in modern systems theory has shown, this tells us more about the dynamics of self-description in function systems and the myths they cultivare - for example, that world politics rules supreme due to its direct link with principies that ‘represent’ the world as a whole such as sovereignty or, alternatively, human rights - but less about their fac­ tual ability to represent and organize society as a whole. In contrast to stratificatory orders with their person-based, hierarchically organized subsystems, function systems are not able to establish a clear-cut ranking order between them. Thus, the global history of the last 500 years is actually characterized by a tendeney of function systenls to increase and consolídate their autonomy from one another. This autonomy must not be conflated with monadism. Function systems are autonomous in the sense that all events and dynamics in these systems are self-generated, which over time is likely to increase both their internal complexity and their structural interdependence. Note, however, that systems are consequently always ’systems-within-an-environment and that they are highly sensitive to what systems theory refers to as ‘irritations’ from this

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

139

environment. The increasing complexity of function systems goes hand in hand with an increase in the interdependence between, and the vulnerability of, function systems, a prime reason why, since the late nineteenth century, society has seen itself increasingly as a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992), and politics is called upon to manage these man-made risks, for example by preventing mutually assured destruction (MAD), overcoming the current financial crisis or mediating negative consequences stemming from climate change. Moreover, being confronted with the need to establish more nuanced internal forms of differentiation in order to deal with this complexity, function systems provide a rather generous umbrella for other forms of differentiation. Take, for example, the exponential increase in the number of organizations in modern society such as bureaucracies, firms and NGOs, which bears testimony to segmentary differentiation within and across function systems. The same could be said regarding the internal differentiation of function systems through segmentation of like units such as markets (i.e. economy), statés and regional organizations (i.e. politics), universities (i.e. Science) or confessional groups (i.e. religión). And it also relates to patterns of inequality shaped by centre-periphery differentiations within function systems, for example between ‘developed’ States and ‘failing’ States (Luhmann, 1997b: 760). These arguments can also be related more directly to the political sys­ tem in which various forms of internal differentiation can be observed, ranging from segmentary differentiation epitomized by the formal equal­ ity of States symbolized most effectively by the UN General Assembly, to forms of stratification such as between States with veto powers in the UN Security Council and other member States, or to centre-periphery rela­ tions such as the one between the West and the (increasingly powerful) rest. Challenging Luhmann’s claim that the political system is internally differentiated primarily through segmentary divides epitomized by States, it should be added, echoing an argument made by Lora Viola in this vol­ unte, that, with its prime function being to produce different statuses of power, the political system is primarily shaped internally by a specific form of stratification, namely the constant production and reproduction of power differentials, such as those between actors or between ideologies and norms. Turning back to a historical analysis of functional differentiation, it is, from an IR perspective, quite interesting to note that Luhmann pays great tribute to Hobbes when discussing the impact which the demise of medieval stratification had on the political system. One of the earliest consequences of this gradual transformation was that new modes of legitimizing political authority had to be invented which allowed the

140

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

notion of hereditary rights belonging to a natural ruler or a specific ruling class to be transcended (Clark, 2007a; Stetter, 2012). It is for that reason that in early modernity the idea of (positive) sovereignty was generated within the political system. That move was decisive insofar as it allowed politics to gradually become structurally independent from stratification. This development can, therefore, be viewed as the key step towards functional differentiation as far as the political sys­ tem is concerned (Luhmann, 1997b: 965). Of course, as Hobbes and Machiavelli had already observed, the problem with sovereignty as a self-generated semantic is that there is no longer any external justification for political authority, such as relying on ancestry or God. Political rule, in other words, became positive rule and had to be justified by principies and ideas generated by the political system itself. Faced with that new phenomenon of self-generated, positive justifications of power referred to by systems theory as an example of autopoiesis (i.e. selfgeneration) - political theory in the early modern era initially resorted to the idea of the arbitrary sovereign (the Leviathan). Over time, how­ ever, the idea of the social contract and, more specifically, of constitutions offered a more enduring institutional umbrella for ‘solving’ what is, in fact, the underlying founding paradox of all political orders, namely the contingent character of positivist political rule. This is a founding paradox insofar as, in order to ensure its legitimacy, any concrete polit­ ical order within a functionally differentiated society has to hide the fact that both its initial inception and its current legitimacy are necessarily characterized by a moment of arbitrariness (Stáheli, 2000). It is for that reason that, from a systems theory perspective, the rise of legitimization strategies such as ‘sovereignty’ and ‘arbitrariness’ in early modernity - or ‘sustainability’ and ‘human rights’ more recently - are a strong indication that the sphere of politics had indeed become subject to ‘a process of decoupling and differentiation’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 967). More precisely, the consolidation of politics as a distinct function system meant that political authority became discormected from hereditary prin­ cipies of stratification (i.e. decoupling) while being increasingly subject to dynamics produced self-referentially within the system, in particular positivist justifications and legitimizations of concrete -manifestations of power. That, then, is the essence of what functional differentiation means when looking at the political system. And the empirical evidence that a move away from hereditary principies and pre-positivist notions of legit­ imacy has taken place, both in the West and globally, is the reason why modern systems theory ultimately concludes that ‘the primacy of func­ tional differentiatiori is the form of modern society’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 776).

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

141

Functional differentiation and its communication theory prerequisites Notwithstanding the significance of historically informed perspectives on functional differentiation, the full potential of modern systems the­ ory can only be exploited when we address the communication-theorybased assumptions that this theory makes when analysing and comparing the evolution of different function systems. The epistemological starting point here is that, very much like other deconstructivist theories in Sociology and IR, modern systems theory comes up with the forceful argument that society is discursively constructed all the way down, including the construction of agency and actorhood (see also Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). Henee, when one takes seriously the communicative turn in the social Sciences (Albert et al., 2008), the analysis of society in general, and world politics in particular, needs to be stripped of all a priori assumptions about which norms and actors matter in these sys­ tems in specific historical periods. Society is not constituted by actors or norms, but rather by the constant flów of and interconnectivity between Communications which generate dominant forms of actorhood and norms. Yet Communications do not flow freely. This would only give rise to a chaotic, structureless agglomeration of zillions of nomadic differences a Communications tower of Babel in which society as a whole or a distinct system such as politics could hardly be maintained. It is here that modern systems theory shows compellingly why single Communications do not live such a confused existence. Thus, if Communications see each other as similar, they establish linkages between themselves and, if such connectivity endures, social systems, ínter alia function systems, emerge and stabilize.3 That is the deeper reason why function systems, such as poli­ tics, are not defined by specific institutional, actor-related or normative properties but merely by the connectivity between those Communications which perceive themselves as belonging to this shared system and gener­ ate these properties in the first place. In theory, the existence of countless systems held together by such discursive umbrellas would be empirically possible. In practice, however, only a relatively small number of function systems have successfully established themselves as ‘anchors of Commu­ nications’ in world society. These range from ‘classical’ systems such as politics, religión and law to historically younger systems such as sport and education. 3 Note that modern systems theory does not argüe that function systems are the only social systems in society. For example, ‘organizations’ and ‘interactions’ are other types of social systems, often cross-cutting function systems.

142

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Being primarily defined by the way they internally process Communica­ tions, function systems ‘base’ Communications on codes operating exclu­ sively within the context of a specific system. In the case of the political system this is the code of power (see in detail Luhmann, 2000b; Stetter, 2008). More precisely, within the political system, all Communications are processed on the basis of the code of power and, subsequently, the distinction between power/powerlessness which the code inscribes into political Communications. Of course, this does not mean that politics is only about power, let alone realist-material understandings of (physical) power. Power may well be understood as an ‘empty signifier’ in polit­ ical Communications. It is the shared point of reference of all political Communications. Yet, in actual empirical situations power has both to be ‘filled’ with concrete content and to be legitimized. According to mod­ ern systems theory, specific ‘programmes’ (Luhmann, 2000b) such as sovereignty, the common good, democracy, human rights or progress and most importantly, ‘the notion of the State’ (Luhmann, 1984: 662) serve this purpose. These programmes in systems theory thus bear some similarity to primary institutions as identified in English School thought (see Buzan, 2004; Stetter, 2012). They allow rightful membership of the system (i.e. membership looks different depending on whether the polit­ ical system is primarily based on sovereignty or on human rights) to be determined and concrete norms guiding decisión making (i.e. legitimating action as contributing to world peace or sustainable development) to be established. To highlight again what is the central epistemological consequence of this observation. The political system is not constituted by rules, insti­ tutions, actor constellations or specific ideologies prevalent in specific past or present orders, but by those Communications in world society which use the code of power, thereby constituting, at that very moment, the political system. The political system ‘is’ - in the sense of ‘always becoming’ - an evolving system defined solely by a specific type of communication. This communication-theory-based understanding of modern systems theory imprégnales against any positivist and essentialist understand­ ing of these codes and equally cautions against the teification of con­ crete structures of world politics implicit in many mainstream IR theories. Codes do not privilege any concrete empirical manifestation. Function systems such as politics are contingent and evolving social orders, since the horizon of possible Communications always transcends actualized Communications, thereby always offering alternatives to the current order. Draw'ing from post-structuralist terminology, the codes of function systems can, therefore, be described as empty signifiers (see

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

143

Stáheli, 1996; 2000). Just like empty signifiers, the codes of function systems help in clustering Communications, but are themselves devoid of any specific meaning. The ensuing social structures emanating from those Communications successfully claiming to represent the code of a specific system never, therefore, constitute the whole identity of this system. This is the case because the code itself has no prior ontological meaning and cannot be fully represented by any concrete empirical order. The focus on this incompleteness of function systems is helpful in order not to overburden them with functionalist expectation. While function systems, as George Thomas has highlighted in this book, certainly are integrated, in the sense that they relate to a shared rationalized world cul­ ture, they do not have a Progressive or modernist purpose, for example in the sense that politics has the function of serving the common good, increasing wealth, facilitating equal treatment etc. In a communicationtheory-based understanding, ‘function’ does not refer to concrete prop­ erties or normative goals such as societal integration or Parsonian goal attainment. It merely relates to the way in which Communications in world society are ordered and how connectivity between different Com­ munications is practically ensured. The ‘function’ of function systems thus lies in a solely operative logic (i.e. to ensure connectivity between Communications) and has no wider normative or modernist credentials. The resulting impossibility of securing a full and final identity of a given system stands in tensión with the social necessity of regarding actualized orders as ‘real’. In order to ease this tensión, function systems like all carriers of identity - develop nuanced strategies for invisibilizing their incompleteness (Campbell, 1998; Stáheli, 2000). These strategies relate, in particular, to self-descriptions and myths cherished within spe­ cific function systems, with the help of which concrete social structures are imagined as ‘natural’. If these myths acquire hegemonic status and are presented as being without alternative, they contribute to a Whole­ sale reification of what are, in fact, contingent realities. Modern systems theory refers to these self-generated myths and reification processes as legitimization strategies. As examples of such self-generated myths, one might instance some of the important self-descriptions of the global polit­ ical system, such as the idea of a bipolar or multipolar system, the idea of the State system or the understanding that the identity of the world polit­ ical system is constituted by primary institutions such as sovereignty, human rights or the difference between democratic and authoritarian States. To summarize, the communication theory credentials of modern sys­ tems theory provide a solid epistemological basis for a better under­ standing of why functional differentiation in general, and code-oriented

144

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Communications in particular, have such a pervasive impact on modern world society. Adopting a communication theory perspective is, then, particularly helpful in understanding why the identity of the function system of (world) politics is not defined by concrete properties such as specific actors (e.g. States, leaders, powerful firms or NGOs), norms (e.g. sovereignty, territoriality or human rights) or other concrete manifestations of power. The world political system is, as has been shown in this section, solely constituted by means of communicative operations, namely the connectivity between those Communications reproducing the code of power.

Bringing together history and communication theory

It is paramount to emphasize that, when studying functional differen­ tiation in general, and the world political system in particular, the full analytical potential of modern systems theory lies in its ability to link the historical and communication-theory-based dimensions of differen­ tiation outlined in the previous paragraphs. Thus, historically informed IR theories regularly stress the fundamental changes which politics as an arena of social action has witnessed at the turn to the early modern period, Ínter alia through the institutionalization processes shaping inter­ national society since the Westphalian Peace Treaties (Hurrell, 2007). However, such theories usually do not attempt to link the history of global politics with a comprehensive social theory. On the other hand, social theories, in particular in their deconstructivist outlook, are quite intriguing when it comes to theorizing about the very dynamics and contradictions of basic social categories such as discourse, communication or identity. They are, notable exceptions such as Foucault’s genealogical writings or Luhmann’s work on social systems notwithstanding, usu­ ally less focused on relating these key theoretical insights to a broader, empirically oriented history of the social. In modern systems theory there are two important theoretical concepts, namely ‘autopoiesis’ and ‘contingency’, which are helpful for joining together historical analysis and social theory and applying this to the study of the world political system. In order to fully. appreciate why modern systems theory lays such emphasis on quite abstract theoretical concepts such as ‘autopoiesis’ (i.e. self-generation) and ‘contingency’, a short recourse to earlier arguments in this chapter on stratificatory systems is in order. Thus, in societies predominantly defined by stratifi­ cation, each subsystem has to define itself by reflecting on its hierarchal position in relation tb other subsystems, for example nobility versus the third estáte or different castes in relation to each other. This changes in a

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

145

functionally differentiated society insofar as there are no static hierarchies between function systems - art is not hierarchically superior to law, and the economy is not inferior to Science. Luhmann rightly makes the point that some function systems - he refers to law and economy, but one needs to add politics as well - can send more powerful shock waves to other systems and society as a whole than, say, sport and the education system, although this is of little comfort after losing a World Cup final. Henee, on a structural level, there is no ranking of function systems which would organize modern world society in a way akin to the hierarchies of strati­ ficatory societies. Function systems are not defined in terms of hierarchy but in terms of autonomy, both in their relations with each other as well as with regard to the different code-oriented functions pursued within each single system. That is why ‘in the case of functional differentiation each system specifies its identity by itself (Luhmann, 1997b: 741). As already hinted at in the previous section, which referred to the legitimization strategies of political authority in the early modern era, the political system of world society' is a case in point when autonomous systems of this kind are being considered. Thus, phenomena of [functional] differentiation typically occur when function-oriented fields acquire high autonomy. From that moment onwards they have to justify their existence self-referentially by means of self-generated reflection theories we have referred to love and money exchange, but could equally have highlighted either the theory of the reason of State [raison d’étai] or the autonomization process of positive law (Luhmann, 1984: 60).

In the case of global politics, one might want to add to that list of selfgenerated reflection theories other powerful notions with which the polit­ ical system attempts to describe its identity, for example ‘world peace’, ‘international order’ or, more recently, ‘sustainability’ or ‘human security’. Even this extended list of reflection theories prevalent in global pol­ itics is certainly not exhaustive. Nonetheless, it underlines why modern systems theory refers to function systems as emergent orders - systems which constitute themselves not primarily on the basis of their relations with other systems (as was the case of systems in a stratificatory order) but on the basis of an ‘internal order of connections of elements’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 135). As outlined above, the function system of politics bases its ‘internal order of connections of elements’ on connections between those Com­ munications using the code of power - and no longer on an external order represented by a specific social class as was the case for politics in the stratificatory society of the pre-modern era. This ‘operational closure’ is a prerequisite for functional differentiation insofar as ‘only operatively

146

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

closed systems can build a high internal complexity’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 68). One only needs to adduce the capacity of the modern political system to both politicize significantly more issues and to inelude many more people (e.g. through suffrage, mass parties, protest movements or the very idea of ‘the people’) compared with the much narrower thematic and personal outreach of politics in stratificatory systems. While the political system is, following this reasoning, operatively closed and produces all its components and dynamics on the basis of internal operations (i.e. Communications using the code of power), this in no way implies that this or indeed any other system cuts off its ‘external’ relations. Quite the contrary, it is precisely the shift to self-generating operations which enables a function system to ‘react to conditions from its environment, while in all other aspeets it can afford indifference thanks to its autopoiesis’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 68). It is on this level that mod­ ern systems theory echoes a claim made by other open-systems theories. Thus, while function systems are operatively closed (i.e. characterized by internal processing of Communications and internal generation of struc­ tures), they are at the same time cognitively open. They are highly sus­ ceptible to environmental irritations, not least because single events can simultaneously be identified as irritations by several function systems and processed according to their respective codes (see Luhmann, 1997b: 753). The nuclear meltdown in Fukujima in March 2011 or the politi­ cal uprising in Cairo in January 2011 are examples of events which are observed simultaneously by the economic system (e.g. the valué of sitares in Tepco Ltd.) and the political system (e.g. the power of the anti-nuclear movement) or the system of mass media (e.g. breaking news from Tahrir Square) and the Science system (e.g. have Middle East studies with their dominant focus on the alleged stability of authoritarian Arab regimes got it all wrong?). That is why ultimately ‘all openness depends on being closed’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 68) and why, in the functionally differen­ tiated world society in which each function system tends to build up increasing internal complexity, ‘dependencies between subsystems [do not] decrease. On the contrary, they increase’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 741). As a result, not only the internal complexity of function systems tends to increase, but so does the complexity of world society at large, with all its myriads of dependencies between subsystems. This internal complexity of, and the external complexity between, function systems is also the deeper reason why functional differentiation in world society is not proceeding in a linear or modernist manner. Func­ tional differentiation is not geared towards a specific end State, be it a universal world State such as Wendt (2003) envisages or a nightmarish apocalypse. But neither has the rise of functional differentiation as the primary

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

147

differentiation principie of today’s world society been predetermined. It is precisely for that reason that Luhmann (1997b: 707) concludes that ‘the orientation of society along the primacy of functional differentia­ tion is an extremely unlikely event. [Once initiated, it,] however, ignites irreversible, self-depending structures’, namely self-generating function systems. Due to the general openness and indeterminacy of the code, the evolution of function systems is characterized by contingency. Remember that the code of power is an empty signifier that carries no essential meaning. Contingency stems from this indeterminacy of the code, since the empirical manifestation of a specific code such as power cannot be determined prior to concrete Communications. The contingency of code-oriented Communications also ensures the ongoing evolution of the system. Seen from that perspective, it is the code’s prime function ‘to ensure the continuation of autopoiesis and to prevent the system... getting locked in, thus ceasing to opérate’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 749). This has immediate empirical consequences insofar as ‘á requirement for rules of decisión’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 750) emerges within function systems. The purpose of these rules, or ‘programmes’ as systems theory calis them, is to transíate broader legitimization strategies into concrete institutional provisions, thus bearing striking similarities to Barry Buzan’s distinction (2004) between primary institutions (i.e. legitimization strategies) and secondary institutions (i.e. programmes). In global politics one could refer to the translation of the primary institutions of international society into concrete institutional frameworks by studying how abstract norms of international society such as ‘sovereignty’, ‘environmental stewardship’ or the ‘equality of people’ are translated into concrete rules of decisión advanced by institutional frameworks such as the UN Security Council, international law, the Kyoto Protocol or the International Criminal Court. Being one amongst several function systems in today’s world society, politics is, of course, confronted with a social environment in which a multitude of self-generating function systems coexist. This creates prob­ lems of synchronization between systems and provokes the question of how integration within a world disaggregated into function systems is possible. One answer, provided by George Thomas in this volume, is that a rationalized world culture provides some degree of integration across systems. The answer ‘evasión’, which systems theory provides to this question, complements the former one: function systems develop narratives which downplay contingency and overemphasize the societal relevance of the respective system. That is why one can find in most func­ tion systems strong‘self-illusionary symbolisms’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 766)

148

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

about the performance capacities of the specific system in question and its ability to affect, regúlate and even represent society at large. This mythology is particularly prevalent in the political system, probably due to its overall societal function of generating collectively binding decisions. Consider only the widespread idea that politics has the ‘responsibility’ and ‘capacity’ to regúlate and represent society at large and to ‘solve’ problems on a societal scale, such as unemployment, violence or environmental degradation. Ultimately such mythologies rhetorically downplay the multi-complexity of a functional differentiation and overemphasize a single system’s relevance to the overall evolution of world society. Seen from that perspective, the problem of integration acquires a new relevance in the era of functional differentiation because the inter­ nal complexity of function systems evolves in parallel to a growing sensitivity and vulnerability of these systems to irritations from its environment.4 More often than not, these irritations stem from the expectations of, and developments in, other equally autonomous func­ tion systems: for example, media reports on crimes against humanity about to be performed by Colonel Gaddafi’s troops (system of mass media), the reaction of banks to the subprime debt crisis in the USA (the economic system), or new legal interpretations of equal treatment provisions by the European Court of Human Rights (the legal system). This high sensitivity of function systems to irritations from their envi­ ronment is also the reason why functional differentiation does not lead to societal disintegration as might be expected if one focused solely on the operative autonomy (i.e. autopoiesis) of these systems. In fact, as Luhmann (1997b.: 618) highlights ‘modern society is over-integrated and, because of that, threatened... Simultaneously, society is much more able to irrítate itself than previous forms of society. A multitude of structural and operative couplings ensure a mutual irritation of subsystems’. To summarize, functional differentiation encompasses two main interrelated dimensions. First, function systems are characterized by self-generated autonomy and a tendency to increase their internal complexity - as witness, considering the political system, the exponential growth of international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations on countless issue-related and manifold territorial scales (Drori et al., 2006) which attests to this complexity. Second, the former 4 On vulnerability and sensitivity in IR see Rosenau (1997). It is not accidental that these terms are used here. They are central concepts in institutionalist theories in IR which, albeit from an actor-centred rather than a communication theory perspective, highlight the importance of interconnectivity between units in a way not unfamiliar to modern systems theory.

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

149

development notwithstanding, this growing internal complexity develops in parallel to a growing vulnerability and sensitivity of politics in relation to other function systems. That is why some of the most pertinent issues in global politics, vividly discussed in IR, can, from a dif­ ferentiation perspective, be understood as a struggle/encounter between different functional logics - such as the debate on the legalization of world politics (politics vs. law) or the debate on the regulation of financial markets in the wake of the US and EU debt crises (politics vs. economy).

3

Linking differentiation theory and IR: global governance, securitization and world statehood reconsidered

As the previous section has shown, there are manifold points of contact between functional differentiation theory in modern systems theory and IR, both on an empirical and theoretical level. Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan (2010) as well as Albert, Buzan and Zürn in the introductory chapter to this volume are therefore correct in suggesting that IR theory is, in theory, well equipped to intégrate functional differentiation into its conceptual vocabulary. Take only Rosenau’s notion of interconnectivity, vulnerability and sensitivity, which, as highlighted above, shares some conceptual similarities with ideas raised in functional differentiation the­ ory or take Waltz’s (1979) systemic Theory of International Politics which advances, all substantive differences notwithstanding, a systemic understanding of politics too. Of course, as the discussion on codes and empty signifiers in the previous section has highlighted, it does not make sense, from a systems theory perspective, to argüe that a system operates under conditions of anarchy. Anarchy might be an important self-description and legitimization strategy of world politics (Wendt, 2003). However, this completely ignores the fact that the fundamental problem every sys­ tem has to solve is how to generate order and ensure evolution. A system based on anarchy would simply not be able to ensure a connectivity of Communications - in other words, if anarchy were the general condition, a world political system would not have come into existence. Other major IR theories, while often sharing the realist idea that States are the central actors of world politics and that the international system is at least to some degree anarchic, make (on other levels) arguments not unfamiliar to functional differentiation theory too. Take, for example, Liberalism’s and Marxism’s focus on the interplay between the economic and the political sector, the focus on primary and secondary institutions of international society in the English School, or the focus on language,

150

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

discourses and contingency prevalent in various critical and constructivist IR theories. However, what renders it difficult for IR theory to explicitly embrace functional differentiation is the legacy in IR of viewing the ‘international’ as an essential ffontier separating the domestic realm from the global. By assuming that there is a difference between domestic and global politics a view untenable from a systems theory perspective - the ‘international’ becomes an amorphous totality without any clear borders. The term ‘International relations’ operates as a rather vague conceptual umbrella covering political, economic, legal and cultural developments without, however, clearly distinguishing between these function systems (see also Walker, 2009). Seen from that perspective, the theory of functional differentiation is indeed an invitation to IR to develop more fully its rather ambiguous view of the ‘international’. It enables IR to specify more clearly how pol­ itics relates to other autonomous and equally powerful function systems, for instance in the context of the co-evolution of politics and law somewhat imprecisely referred to as ‘legalization’ of world politics (Goldstein et al., 2001). By doing so, IR might also be able to emancipare itself from mythologies and self-descriptions of the political system often reified in IR, for example, when cherishing methodological nationalism. Building further on this plea for a greater interconnectivity between functional differentiation and IR, the remainder of this section argües that there are three research streams in IR - namely research on global governance, securitization dynamics and world statehood - which are fruitful loci for such an encounter. The scope of this chapter does not permit me to elabórate in detail on each of these linkages. The purpose of the subsequent discussion is rather to highlight some basic contours of the connection between functional differentiation theory and central research topics in IR and to show how this connection might indeed help to advance IR theory, while, at the same time, enabling functional differentiation theory itself to benefit from important insights emanating from these three research streams. Global governance research has undoubtedly become one of the main research umbrellas in IR. As Nicole Deitelhoff and Klatis-Dieter Wolf (2009) argüe, governance research, which enjoys popularity in Comparative Politics too, has equipped IR with a rich analytical arsenal helpful for studying the complex actor constellations and often fragmented pol­ icy arenas which increasingly shape the international realm (Rosenau, 1997). One of the key achievements of governance research has been its contribution to a better understanding of how knowledge originating from various functional backgrounds feeds into global, regional and

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

151

national governance networks and subsequently shapes political deci­ sión making (Schuppert and Zürn, 2008). By highlighting the relevance of field-specific knowledge and epistemic expertise in decisión making, global governance approaches advance a more nuanced understanding of the multidimensionality of the ‘International’ when compared with many classical IR theories. What they highlight, in fact, is what modern systems theory would refer to as an increasing interdependence between function systems which, on a structural level, fosters structural couplings between different function systems in the form of epistemic, policy-area-specific networks, a claim central to modern systems theory, for example, in Helmut Willke’s concept of lateral world systems (2006). Rudolf Stichweh’s cali for a research agenda focusing on ‘functionally differ­ entiated governance across global policy areas’ (Stichweh, 2007: 35) has thus not gone unheard in IR. However, when looking at research on global governance, the risk is that the autonomy of different func­ tional spheres does not receive the necessary attention, and a somewhat too hierarchical picture of the role of politics in governance arenas is maintained. In contrast, modern systems theory has a well-developed theoretical vocabulary to explain why global governance schemes are, indeed, an intriguing example of how functional differentiation trumps other forms of differentiation in the world political system such as the segmentary or the stratificatory organization of States. Thus, rather than focusing on how and why States collectively decide to create international organizations and binding treaties in various issue-specific regimes such as environmental and health politics, banking regulation, security governance and others - modern systems theory shifts the spotlight onto the wider societal dynamics in which these processes are embedded. In particular, it highlights the fact that the increasing ‘functional compartmentalization ’ of world politics in the context of global governance schemes is, first and foremost, the response of the political system when it needs somehow to mediate between its own drive for autonomy and the unavoidable autonomy of other function systems, coupled only loosely by an overarching rationalized world culture. Moreover, and as a result of this process, heavy pressure is exerted on existing forms of stratification and segmentation within the political system. On the level of segmentation, States increasingly have to share the role of ‘representing’ the world political system with key international organizations, such as the UN, the EU and the WTO, or even NGOs with high moral credibility such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace. On the level of stratification, changes are occurring too - in particular if ‘legalization’ occurs within specific global governance schemes, thereby shifting at least some power away from States and to international bureaucracies or courts (e.g. the

152

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

European Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, the Dis­ pute Settlement Body of the WTO or the International Criminal Court). Interestingly, governance approaches share another, more problematic feature with the theory of functional differentiation - one which weakens both theories’ overall capacity to advance a comprehensive understanding of world politics: the relative neglect of conflict and violence in these research agendas. This is not to argüe that, on a theoretical level, gov­ ernance research and differentiation theory would be unable to consider seriously how conflicts and violence affect the world political system: one need only consider the burgeoning IR literatura on security governance. Nevertheless, when it comes to the larger theoretical underpinnings, the case can be made that conflict and violence do not stand at the forefront of either research agenda. It is on that level that a consideration of the linkages between functional differentiation theory, on the one hand, and theories in IR on securitization and othering has a lot to offer. An obvious point of encounter would be to highlight that securitization theory refers to different ‘sectors’ the political, the military, the ecological, the economic and others. This focus on sectors invites reflection on different, and probably only very loosely coupled, securitization dynamics between the political system and various different function systems (Buzan et al., 1998). Another point might, however, be even more relevant here. By arguing that ‘securitization’ and ‘regular politics’ somehow differ, and by addressing the discursive dynamics at play in securitization processes, securitization theory echoes central claims in systems-theory-based con­ flict theory. In both, conflicts are not a deformation of the social, but rather a highly structured social process subject to specific discursive rules. This closely corresponds with Heinz Messmer’s seminal systems theory study on social conflicts, which shows that all conflicts in society from a confrontational debate in a family on the next holiday destination to war - opérate according to specific communicative dynamics (Messmer, 2003; see also Diez et al., 2006; Stetter, 2007). In both theories conflicts are henee not merely a subeategory of politics or other systems, but opérate according to their own, self-generated dynamics. While not being function systems in the narrower sense, systems theory has shown that conflicts are nevertheless autopoietic systems following their own structural patterns which cannot be subsumed under the logic of another functional field. Taking seriously the autonomy of conflict as a social system in its own right is particularly helpful in addressing the subtle ways by which conflicts aim to ensure - empirically, often with con­ siderable success - th’eir continued existence despite countless political and other forms of intervention and mediation. As Luhmann (1984) has

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

153

elaborated, conflicts might, on that basis, even be able to irrítate specific function systems to the point where the codes of these systems no longer shape system-internal dynamics. If such conflicts were to affect various function systems, as securitization insinuares when arguing that its logic transcends ‘normal’ political communication, then securitization might indeed lead to a gradual ‘de-differentiation’ (Entdifferenzierung) of society. Functional differentiation would be replaced by one or two meta-societal conflict cleavages. Undoubtedly, this is precisely what strong securiti­ zation dynamics do, for example when inscribing an ‘essential’ difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in global discourses in various function systems (e.g. politics, Science, media, religión) after 9/11, or when justifying the encroachment of economic logics into politics in the context of neoliberal deregulation ideologies or, mutatis mutandis, excessive political interventions into markets as they were organized in State socialist regimes. However, only if such de-differentiation dynamics endured for longer periods of time and shaped dynamics in function systems on a comprehensive scale, would a pervasive de-differentiation take place. What seems more likely, both empirically as well as theoretically, is that such intense forms of securitization - often leading to strong dynamics of inclusión and exclusión in world politics (see Stetter, 2008) - would meet stubborn opposition and could not be maintained for longer peri­ ods of time. ‘Re-differentiation’ would then be likely to occur and limit the societal reach of securitization dynamics. In that sense, a functionally differentiated society seems to have some inbuilt mechanisms against a Wholesale replacement of functional logics through conflict and securiti­ zation dynamics. Notwithstanding these comments, addressing the role of securitization in a functionally differentiated world society provokes another question, namely, in which overall political structure, if any, are securitization processes actually embedded? In other words, what is the ‘international’ in securitization processes? It is on that level that, finally, possible linkages between debates in IR on debordering and world statehood, on the one hand, and functional differentiation, on the other, deserve attention. In contrast to mainstream globalization approaches, debordering means more than that territorial borders have decreasing importance in world politics, that is that there is a ‘debordering’ in the world of States (see Albert and Brock, 1996). While this certainly is the case, this process also encompasses a ‘debordering’ of the world of States’ (see Albert and Brock, 1996) in the context of which new political structures ‘above the State’ emerge in international politics. In IR two main candidates representing this new global political structure are currently discussed: various notions of fairly inclusive forms

154

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

of world statehood (Shaw, 2000; Wendt, 2003; Albert and Stichweh, 2007) on the one hand, and more exclusive, particularistic notions of global order which often apply concepts from Foucault’s governmentality theory to the analysis of hegemonic structures in the world politics system (Shani and Chandler, 2010) on the other. Both research agendas are intriguing from a functional differentiation perspective insofar as they show that governance beyond the State is likely to lead to an evolutionary transformation of the very idea of statehood, not least because - as already mentioned above - for reasons to do with communication theory, the function of the political system is not only embodied in the code of power and programmes such as democracy, human rights or development, but, simultaneously and crucially, symbolized in ‘the notion of the “state”’ (Luhmann, 2000b: 220).5

4

Concluding remarks

As this chapter has shown, a more explicit embracing of functional dif­ ferentiation theory and, in particular, a theoretically rigid focus on func­ tional differentiation as the primary and most pervasive form of differ­ entiation in world society in general, and the world political system in particular, can indeed be fruitful for IR, both theoretically and empirically. This certainly requires IR to become ever more rigorous regarding its emancipation both from myths cherished in political discourses and from its own theoretical baggage such as the assumption that politics is a hierarchically and normatively somewhat superior system or that specific actors or norms in that system automatically matter more than others. It also requires understanding the limits of rather vague concepts such as the ‘international’, ultimately replacing this with analyses of a world political system shaped Ínter alia by structural couplings between poli­ tics and other globalized function systems. However, as this chapter has shown both by discussing three important research streams in contemporary IR and by highlighting intellectual linkages between various research traditions in IR and differentiation theory, there is solace for IR insofar as, while the discipline can certainly profit in its theoretical and empirical rigour from a comprehensive social theory such as differentiation theory in modern systems theory, it has a lot to offer to this dialogue as well. In order to highlight again how the arguments made in this chapter relate to the three key themes outlined in the introduction of this book, three concluding remarks are in order. First, as this chapter has shown, 5 The semantic similarity to Manning’s concept of a ‘notionality’ of sovereign States is intriguing hete (see Manning, 1975: 23; Aalberts, 2010).

World politics in the era of functional differentiation

155

contemporary world society in general, and the world political system in particular, are shaped by various differentiation principies. Apart from functional, stratificatory and segmentary forms of differentiation, there are other forms which should receive similar attention, in particular, inclusion/exclusion and centre/periphery. However, and notwithstanding the multitude of differentiation principies, this chapter has, by drawing on historical and communication theory arguments, shown why functional differentiation is the primary form of differentiation in contemporary world society, even if other forms endure. Second, as far as the internal order of the world political system is concerned, different spheres oífunc­ tional differentiation shape key dynamics therein. On the one hand, as global governance research attests, the political system seems to ‘accept’ functional differentiation in the sense that highly specialized networks in different policy areas at least implicitly - though sometimes quite reluctantly - point to an acceptance by politics of the relative autonomy of other social spheres. Moreover, the constitutionalization of global and regional politics, vividly discussed in IR and international law, is another signal that, albeit in a much more fragmented manner than on national levels, structural couplings between law and politics consoli­ dare, thereby respecting the relative autonomy of both function systems. Third, functional differentiation theory is helpful in not overburdening IR with excessive normative expectations about the integration of soci­ ety. Politics, as one amongst several function systems, is unable on its own to ensure societal integration, ñor is integration in any deeper nor­ mative sense (e.g. shared life-worlds) necessary for the political system to opérate. The bridging function of a rationalized world culture seems to suffice (see Thomas in this volume). In that sense, echoing claims in other deconstructivist theories, modern systems theory cautions against too high normative expectations being directed at politics and provides a comprehensive theoretical platform to understand why heterogeneity and diversity are inherent components of a world society fundamentally shaped by functional differentiation.

Part III

On the interplay of (global) function systems

8

Functional differentiation and the oughts and musts of international law Oliver Kessler and Friedrich Kratochwil

1

Introduction

We have long departed from a world where States were conceived of as the solé actors that provided international law with its structure, form, arguments and limits. Similarly, we can no longer point only to States in order to answer questions of legal validity, legitimacy or accountability. Instead, we are witnessing the advept of other actors and supranational processes that are said to signal the emergence of a new world order where human rights and transnational legal regimes have to be taken much more seriously than before. Diverse as the identified changes and insights are, there appears to be overall agreement that we are witnessing systemic changes in international law as a result of an encompassing transformation of global politics and world society. Thus, while it is obvious that questions of statehood, agency and the validity of legal rules need fresh answers, it is far from obvious how the dynamics, role and normativity of law can be conceptualized under these circumstances. In recent years, two at first sight mutually exclusive narratives have emerged. The constitutionalization debate explores whether the UN Charter, jus cogens, community valúes, and obligations erga omnes can provide a new anchor for the legal enterprise ‘beyond’ the nation-state (see e.g. Paulus, 2001). In this context, legitimacy is derived from the protection of those universal valúes whose defence might entail the ‘illegal but legitímate’ use of forcé. Sovereignty is redefined as ‘responsibility’ and jurisdiction over territory has thereby become conditional (see e.g. Etzioni, 2005; Feinstein and Slaughter, 2004). In this view, the hope is rekindled that ‘the law’ will some day replace politics; that human rights will transcend traditional concerns with sovereignty; and that the pathologies of the State system will be alleviated by more cosmopolitan notions, or even by the universal recognition of some ultímate valué, such as ‘human dignity’. fragmentarían debate starts with the contrary observation that more and more regimes are gaining autonomy by creating free-standing legal 159

160

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

systems through their own modes of interpretation and by their capacity to settle disputes. This debate emphasizes not the vocabulary of emancipation based on universal valúes, but the coexisting plurality of technical vocabularies which characterize the discourse on international law (see Koskenniemi and Leino, 2002; ILC Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, 2006). When we look closer at these two debates, we can see that both presuppose that the State system demarcates current changes. Both narratives join the voices explaining the change in the role, function, effectiveness and limits of international law in relation to the State system. Here, ideas of differentiation enter the stage and promise an alternative approach for understanding social change. As the editors highlight in their introduction, a look at differentiation theories raises three interrelated questions: first, what do differentiation theory and the identification of segmentary, stratificatory and functional differentiation tell us about today’s observable changes?; second, what is the relation between law and other functional systems?; and third, what integrates world society if differentiation is said to be based on a logic of división? Our argument seeks to address these questions.1 We argüe that differ­ entiation theories provide a welcome alternative way of thinking about transformative changes in international law. In the context of this debate, the concept of functional differentiation suggests that we are neither on the way to the promised land of a ‘rule of law’ that is logically prior to sovereign autonomy, as the current revival of natural law might indicare; ñor that we are moving towards a simple ‘heterarchy’ or ‘Global Bukowina’ of auto-constitutional regimes (see in particular Teubner, 1996). While constitutionalization and fragmentation are seen today as mutually excluding forces, we argüe that functional differentiation allows us to realize their simultaneous existence: both constitutionalization and fragmentation result from a functional differentiation of world society. This, then, allows us to uncouple questions of law from the State and 1 Taking up these three questions, this chapter pays attention to the juxtaposition of seg­ mentary and functional modes of differentiation. We think that starting from this opposition allows us to assess the promises and pitfalls of thinking about law in terms of differentiation theory. We pay less attention to the centre/periphery mode of differenti­ ation; questions as to whether or how the positions of courts have changed in relation to peripheral voices must be left for another time. The centre in international law is usually associated with courts and the role of judges, the periphery with everyday legal communication. For a discussion see Luhmann (1993: chap. 7) and Dworkin (1986); for a discussion on jurisprudence see Kratochwil (2009). Likewise, the question of an emerging stratificatory system within international law is coextensive with that of con­ stitutionalization. We therefore do not discuss this mode of differentiation in detail. For a discussion of different modes of differentiation see the introductory chapter to this volume and Kessler (2012).

Functional differentiation and international law

161

relocate them in the broader context of world order and conflicting systemic rationalities which provides a new way for inquiring into questions of legitimacy and the ‘oughts and musts of international law’. To support this argument, our chapter is structured in three steps. Steps one and two address the first question above and provide a reconstruction of contemporary changes in terms of differentiation theory. The first recapitulares the transformative changes in international law, showing why the notion of a segmentary differentiation of world society into equal nation-states provides a useful entry point for understanding traditional international law, then examines how the new literature on global governance points to a decoupling of the previously co-constitutive relationship between the State and international law, which is a characteristic of functional differentiation. In the second step, we analyse how ‘sovereignty’ is repositioned and reformulated within the constitutionalization and fragmentation debate which addresses the transformative changes occasioned by different modes of differentiation. The third step explores how such a differentiation approach ‘beyond fragmentation or constitutionalization’ could raise some new questions concerning legiti­ macy not only under conditions of a fluid demos but also in the absence of a Grundnorm, whether ‘nature’, human dignity or whatever. 2

The State, territoriality and the politics of international law

As the editors point out in the introduction to this volume, the seg­ mentary mode of differentiation divides up a whole into parts. Similarly, we are used to imagining the international system as consisting of units with exclusive jurisdiction over some area of territory by virtue of their sovereignty. Thereby we distinguish the national from the international and ascribe certain characteristics and regularities to the world of IR by separating society from anarchy, hierarchy from anarchy or national from international law. International law is often portrayed as being distinguished by its lack of sanctioning power, its collective action problems and its continuous abuse for political purposes. But engaging in these dichotomies falls short of explaining the historical record and under­ standing how the concept of sovereignty functions as a legal concept. A historical discussion seems in order. Of course, the idea that the modern State system suddenly carne into existence in 1648 as a simple ‘territorial’ order has been challenged and somewhat corrected already (see Osiander, 2001; Teschke, 2003). The year 1648 neither constituted a sudden break in the politics of that time, ñor can it be regarded as the onset of the modern notion of sovereignty.

162

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Instead, sovereignty underwent several transformative changes. It originally emerged in medieval political discourse as a claim to superior, but not exclusive, authority. As a relational concept, it mapped the rights and duties of vassal and overlord in relation to each other. Our modern concept of sovereignty took shape and gained its territorial connotation in two further steps. The first occurred when sovereignty was linked with the Román con­ cept of dominium, the bundle of rights going with the land as in real-estate property in which the owner possessed everything ‘down to hell and up to the heavens’.2 The person of‘sovereign authority’ could now claim Landeshoheit, exclusive jurisdictional authority on the basis of his possession (see Kratochwil, 1995). True, feudal politics depended also on ‘land’ and the object ‘out there’ seems to establish a fixed point of reference. But ‘land’ in this context is something completely different from physical nature, as it mediares social relations rather pointing to a ‘brute fact’. In the feudal contract, this amounted to ‘protection’ by the feudal lord holding ‘land’ in exchange for Service. The medieval conception of politics then distinguished between those who shared power and those who were ‘the people’ and were largely excluded from its exercise. No common conceptual space of a ‘public’, of being a member of a res publica located on a given piece of land, was conceivable under such circumstances (see e.g. Bartelson, 2010). The emergence of the State system thus owes much of its existence to Román prívate law (see Lauterpacht, 1970), but this is not the whole story. Nevertheless, the very notion of territoriality on which most contributions in IR base their insights and identify current changes, is thus a legal concept that neither simply refers to physical geography - even though geographical facts might enter via the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ ñor is it ‘describing’ a certain observable behaviour occurring on that space, such as the (in)ability to exelude others. The idea that territoriality as an organizing principie of world politics somehow stands in opposition to international law, or that it can be captured by such terms as ‘organized hypocrisy’ (see Krasner, 1999), is essentially a misconception. However, the development of sovereignty is not only about territorial rule; it is also about functional differentiation of the stat&gnd its counterpart, society. The sovereign who could claim possession and exclusionary jurisdiction over some territory was in the post-Westphalian period increasingly able to face his subjeets directly and without interference from others such as the pope and without the consent of the estates (see Krasner, 1993). Yet he could be absolute only insofar as he was a 2

See Bury v. Pope, Cro. Eliz. 118 [78 Eng. Rep. 375] (1587).

Functional differentiation and international law

163

representative of the State and its social order itself. Thus even Bodin’s ‘absolute’ king could not alter the lex sálico, which governed succession, or tax his subjects without the consent of the estates. Although this is somewhat at odds with the notion of being ‘absolved from all laws’ it does show that even ‘absolute sovereignty’ did not create a space free from all law. There was first the recognition of being subject to God’s law, and, as the above examples show, deference to some socially based customary restraints that had ‘internal’ (constitutional) as well as ‘exter­ na!’ repercussions, such as the ‘mutual recognition’ sovereigns accorded to each other. Thus the second conceptual innovation tied to sovereignty becomes visible. For the full-fledged notion of modern sovereignty to emerge, the State had first to be conceived as an abstraer entity free from personrelated overtones, and the absolute ruler had to become its represen­ tative (rather than being simply the member of a dynasty). Of course it took some time before the latter change worked itself out. But even Louis XIV’s famous dictum ‘L’Etat c’est mof, or Frederick the Great’s self-characterization as the ‘first servant of the State’ are important indications of this change. They capture the new understanding of sovereignty involving representation rather than solely personal rule mediated by status in a feudal hierarchy. The very discourse of raison d’état (that the pope described as the devil’s discourse) that was soon to follow strengthened political against religious legitimation of power and use of forcé - although rule ‘by the Grace of God’ remained a cornerstone of traditional dynastic legitimacy. The discourse of the ‘reason of State’ nevertheless helped to free the political sphere from theological imperatives through recourse to legal categories, including, most importantly, custom (see also Kratochwil, 1982). The State and international law were thus co-constitutive and attempts to reduce their implication to consent or dispute settlement (delegation) is somewhat misleading, as it leaves out this significant dimensión. At this point, it is useful to remember that the global governance literature identifies a structural change at exactly this interface between the State and international law. It is said that we are currently entering a stage where the State is no longer the solé addressee of rights and obligations arising from international norms. When global gover­ nance is broadly understood as the arrangements of various forms of governance at various and quite diverse levels, the traditional system of governance by government is, as Michael Zürn (2006) has aptly pointed out, augmented by governance without government, and governance with government.

164

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Governance without government characterizes a steady thickening of transnational rules whereby social groups regúlate interactions. In this context, the contemporary debates about the lex mercatoria provide a prominent example. But again the interesting feature of lex mercatoria is its origin in medieval times - long before the very concept of sovereignty actually carne into existence. Already in the twelfth century, lex merca­ toria provided a fairly comprehensive legal regime for traders to solve disputes arising from ‘non-local’ trade. Operated by traders themselves, it avoided uncertainties arising from the jurisdiction of different authorities such as guilds by requiring traders to use rather standardized con­ traéis and to have their disputes settled by a ‘court’ of experienced peers (Stone Sweet, 2006; Berger, 1999; 2000). Just like their counterparts today, traders and their lawyers tried to avoid adjudication before formal courts in order to reduce costs and uncertainties by explicitly referring to commonly accepted contract rules. Nowadays there are even attempts to codify and institutionalize transnational contract law, such as those of the ‘International Institute for the Unification of Private Law’ and its ‘Princi­ pies of International Commercial Contracts’ (Berger, 1999: chaps. 3-4). Interestingly enough, efforts to transnationalize the legal framework of interactions are evident not only in the context of trade law, but also in other contexts ranging from the Internet to sports, thus supporting the interpretation of an overall trend rather than just an anomaly (Teubner, 1989; 1996). Governance with government highlights the increasing role of non-state actors, networks or civil society in the development, monitoring and enforcement of international legal obligations (Slaughter, 2004; Bartelson, 2006). NGOs played a crucial role in the drafting of important international conventions such as the Antipersonnel Mines Convention or the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, and it might even be hard to imagine the existence of the International Criminal Court without the particular ímpetus of NGOs. But economic actors too, such as enterprises, banks, financial brokers and rating agencies, actively shape regulations and engage in consultancy rounds or lobbying such as during the preparatory and drafting stages of Basel II or European Competition Law (see, for example, Graz and Nólke, 2008). As a consequence, not only international organizations such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisión, but also ‘prívate’ actors such as credit rating agencies acquire, via a fusión of public and pri­ vate authority, a certain standing in international law. This, in turn, sometimes leads to a hybridization of global processes where - via public-private partrierships - the inter-state order is reconfigured (Zürn, 2005; Sack, 2009). For example, in the particular context of the

Functional differentiation and international law

165

European Union, the European Commission decided to adopt accounting standards developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB),3 and make these standards binding for all exchangeenlisted corporations within the EU. Consequently, European Law will contradict the accounting standards set down, for example, in Germán trade law (the Handelsgesetzbuch) and alter both the role of the banks in governing small and medium-sized enterprises and the time-frame of international investments. Or, in the area of enforcing European Com­ petition Law, authority has moved from the European Commission to international law firms under Regulation 1/2003. They will now deter­ mine whether or not some act violates European Law (see, for example, Perry and Nólke, 2006). This triadic división of global changes already sheds some light on the diversity and even the paradoxical and contradictory dynamics of the associated changes in the meaning of sovereignty itself. Altogether, struc­ tural change is more than just a change from government to governance but, as the notion of ‘governance by, with and without government’ indicates, translates into different, sometimes even contradictory logics.4 As Albert, Buzan and Zürn point out in their introduction, it seems useful to substitute the idea of global governance by social differentiation (see also Kessler, 2009). Changes characterized by the global governance literature could then be recast in terms of a functional differentiation of world society. If we associate territoriality with segmentary differentiation, where the global map is divided up in territorially defined ‘parts’ (i.e. States), global governance points to problems that emerge from the advance of func­ tional differentiation within world society: more and more ‘sectors’ or functional systems that were previously organized nationally are reconnecting on a global scale and thereby developing not only their own rules and authorities, but also their own language and semantics (Buzan and Albert, 2010). Here is not the place to discuss the legal aspect of global governance in detail (see Dekker and Werner, 2004; Schuppert, 2005; Zangl, 2008). Rather, as the next section suggests, functional differen­ tiation results in two kinds of pressure on international law: on the one hand, the direct opposition between law and politics is replaced by a common belief in an increased autonomy of law from political imperatives. This move resembles some familiar natural law arguments and 3 The IASB is funded and dominated by the prívate companies PWC, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche and Ernst & Young. 4 As Susan Marks (2000: 78) remarked: ‘homogenization goes hand in hand with differ­ entiation, integration with fragmentation, centralization with decentralization, universalization with particularization.’

166

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

finds expression in jus cogens, internationalization of criminal law, or the advent of new supranational structures. On the other hand, functional differentiation ‘cuts through’ the legal system: the emergence of other functional systems is supported by the normative expectations that nurture rule making. International law has not only to incorpórate different functional logics, but even becomes the place where these different rationalities collide. The next section will discuss the pressures exerted by these two logics in greater detail.

3

Constitutionalization and fragmentation

The last section pointed out how territoriality, on which our understanding of States and world politics is based, is a legal concept that has its roots in Román prívate law, although, as we saw, the conceptualization of ‘public power’ (analogous to the Román institution of imperium) necessitated thinking about the State as an impersonal sphere sepárate from the sovereign and from society. One of the corollaries of this was the correction of the view that international law is simply a derivative of politics and the will of sovereigns. Instead, we emphasized the customary origins of the mutual recognition of sovereigns and the co-constitution of the State and international law. We pointed to the global governance literature to highlight contemporary changes that alter the role of the State in international law. These observations suggest that we also witness a significant change in the way in which the politics of international law is understood. The notion of functional differentiation appears promising in this context, as it provides us with a different vocabulary to observe current changes. In this section we suggest that functional differentiation allows us to see constitutionalization and fragmentation as two processes which imply each other.

Constitutionalization The constitutionalization debate takes as its vantage point the new role of human rights in world politics. Who can doubt that human rights have become a powerful source for legal argumentatioñ? Increasingly, references to the ‘international community as a whole’ are being used. The community issues appeals, intervenes and even kills in the ñame of the common ideáis that humanity apparently shares. The idea of the emergence of a new global constitution, including a constitution­ alization of international law, goes hand in hand with a resurrection of

Functional differentiation and international law

167

international ethics.5 Law, morality and ethics form a strange unity to foster normative progress (Price, 2008). Interestingly enough, the literature on constitutionalization in international law, including the emergence of jus cogens and universal norms, puts particular emphasis on norms whose violation may legitimize the use of forcé. This became apparent in the notorious ‘illegal but legitímate’ justification for the Kosovo bombings or the general debate on humanitarian intervention and ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). For constitutionalists, therefore, some norms are more important than others - maybe because the duties they impose are owed to the ‘community as a whole’, or maybe because they represent ‘core valúes’. In other words, as Martti Koskenniemi suggested, this approach is based on the hope that ‘universal valúes are overriding the political wills of States. This is often discussed in terms of constitutional prin­ cipies, the assumption the international community will organize itself analogously to the domestic one, as a vertically constraining system of law manifested in notions such as jus cogens, or universal jurisdiction of crimes against humanity’ (Koskenniemi, 2004: 198). Constitutionalization of international law is then coextensive with universal norms that precede particular practices and produces a new kind of natural law (Nardin, 2009). That this move to a constitution is not without pitfalls became, of course, clear with the so-called ‘war on terror’: the very attempt to constitutionalize international law might engender gross violations of basic human rights. Since 9/11, a subcommittee of the Security Council has been compiling lists of ñames of potential terrorists. Persons who find themselves on this list are subject to legal sanctions - they will find, for example, that their accounts have been frozen and they are thus, with­ out due process, deprived of their right to property. The question arises whether these actions viólate basic human rights - and thus to what extent the Security Council was acting ultra vires as it is bound by human rights via Article 24. Interestingly enough, the European Union originally adopted and enforced these Security Council measures,6 though it changed its position later on. Ultimately, a State might find itself in a position where it has to meet its obligations to the Security Council, while at the same time facing the dilemma of being bound by ‘human rights’. 5 For an earlier debate on constitutionalism - primarily focusing on the UN Charter Art. 103, Art. 2 (6), Art. 2 (4) and the preamble - see Ross (1950), Verdross and Simma (1984), Simma (1994), Fassbender (1998), Frowein (2000) and Bryde (2003). 6 It should be noted that already back in 1999, the Security Council decided on countermeasures on terrorist groups, see United Nations Security Council (1999).

168

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

What this example shows is that a ‘constitutionalization’ move cannot resolve the underlying political issue of whether (arguably) a state’s own constitutional order or some world order in the making deserves precedence. The real problem is thus the relationship of a ‘constitution’ to politics, so that ‘the people’ can understand themselves to be the authors of the laws which the courts are supposed to apply. To derive everything from some kind of cosmopolitan justice or the abstract prin­ cipie of ‘human dignity’, as some human rights lawyers seem to suggest, either simply misses the point or engages in an imperial project. Such projects have been popular since Cicero’s time, when, in the latter’s thought, reason and Román law practically became synonymous,7 a move which is paralleled more recently in the ‘best practice’ doctrine so prevalent in the US academy. In that case, the questions as to ‘who shall judge’ (quis judicabif) and in whose ñame the selection and application of those abstract principies to concrete cases takes place, become decisive. The problematic tendency to fill the abstract principies of an almost sacralized human dignity by taking specific interpretations from one’s familiar way of life - because it allegedly instantiates the ideal best - is not an imaginary danger as the the ‘end of history’ argument shows. It seems, therefore, that together with the territorial State and/or the nation, which served in modernity as the ultímate source of legitimacy, we have also eliminated the people or ‘the peoples’ mentioned in the UN Charter as the source of legitimacy. Instead, we increasingly invoke ‘expertise’ and ex post ‘acceptance’ (outcome legitimacy), if we have to make choices and the abstract principies leave us in the lurch. But such gambits are largely an exercise in sweeping the problems under the rug. In most cases, this type of acceptance is based more on the ignorance and powerlessness of the subjects in the face of the entirely untransparent machinations of ‘multi-level governance’ structures, than on a meaningful notion of consent. After all, consent not only implies acceptance, 7 ‘All nations at all times will be bound by this eternal and unchangeable law... and those who have these things in common must be considered members of the same State’ (Cicero, 1990: 113). How quickly this paean of law and eternal-reason mutates into an imperial project can be seen from the following remark: ‘Do wé not see that the best people are given the right to rule by nature herself with the greatest benefit to the weak’ (Cicero, 1990: 73). This is nearly identical with Vergil’s: ‘Tu regere imperio memento Romane, parcere subjectis et debellare superbos’. In the contemporary debate this claim recently emerged (at a conference at the EUI) - mirabile dictu - cloaked in an ‘evolutionary’ garb, as we celebrated Darwin’s anniversary. Consequently, it is argued that ‘Americans are alpha males’ and thus just have to engage in propagating ‘best practices’.

Functional differentiation and international law

169

but does so precisely because it forces the decisión makers to ask for the consent of the governed. Only in this way can the people be ‘obliged’ in tura, because of their choice and the uptake of the commitment. Consent is not simply an acceptance based on acquiescence in things one has no power to change, as in the case of, for example, the ‘financial system’, which is run by ‘experts’ - and what type of ‘experts’ they really are, we can see every day during the continuing crises - who tell us that true freedom increasingly consists in following the ‘logics’ of disembodied ‘systems’. This brings us to the problem of fragmentation.

Fragmentarían In political Science it has been common among some researchers to point to a ‘new medievalism’ when attempting to map the recent developments in international relations. As in the Middle Ages, law seems to escape the territorial caging of the State and to gQ ‘with the person’ rather than with the land. Here the former ‘subject’, who owes allegiance to one sovereign, is often displaced by the person with several passports, paralleling now in a way the complicated rules of attribution that bestow nationality on arti­ ficial persons such as ‘corporations’ (place of incorporations, siége social etc.). Actors might even subject themselves to rules which transnational professional associations have developed or public/private partnerships have codified (e.g. ISO standards, Basel II, ILO standards etc.), thereby undermining the centrality of the State and impairing its capacity to set terms through legislation.8 Thus, the WTO, devoted to free trade, ‘sees’ or phrases an issue in terms of its charter and rules out trade restrictions based on, for example, human rights, labour standards or environmental concerns - any softening in the shrimp turtle and beef hormone cases notwithstanding.9 Similarly, the MOX case - where Ireland sued Great Britain for its placement of a nuclear facility on the shores of the Irish Sea in three forums - showed that whether a complaint falls under general international law, a special environmental regime or is a matter of European Community law, is hotly contested and can give rise to hegemonic 8 Although, of course no regime can be entirely free-standing, since the general norms of treaty law are obviously part of the regime, the term ‘free-standing’ originally meant only that the primary rules regulating the use of the waterway were sufficient for that purpose. The problem of the ‘free-standing regimes’ in more recent times - which fuelled the fragmentation debate - is quite different in that the relative isolation of the regime results from its unity of primary and secondary rules, that is, derives from the existence of autonomous dispute resolution mechanisms). 9 See WTO Dispute Settlement Body (2010) and WTO Dispute Settlement Body (2011).

170

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

claims among different courts.1011 Furthermore, since each court concep­ tuales the problem differently and is also in its rulings more or less ‘free-standing’ - as the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal for Yugoslavia explicitly stated in the Tadic case11 - its rulings fail to provide guidance for future choices. Thus the multiplicity of courts is not only likely to lead to forum shopping and conflicting and incoherent decisions, but law is no longer able to do its job of prospective ordering, despite the existence, or rather precisely because of the existence, of binding dispute settlement. It is in this context that Gunther Teubner and Andreas FischerLescano (2005) have introduced the concept of ‘auto-constitutional regimes’. According to them, relations between regimes are rather disharmonious and the question arises whether the law regulating regimecollisions can still be decided in accordance with the principies of general international law. They argüe instead that the new rules designed to deal with regime collisions represent new structures and functions of law that clearly depart from the idea that sovereignty imposes structure on the variety of legal arrangements.12 However, interesting and stimulating as their account of regime or norms collisions may be, it forces them to deny both the unity of international law in general and the existence of new subordination rules either in the form of jus cogens or of universal jurisdiction (Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, 2005: 104fí). For Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, as well as for the broader literature on fragmentation, the focus on fragmentation negates or is sceptical of any hierarchy of norms in international law. They see, as Teubner has put it, a ‘global Bukowina’ in the offing and consider any attempt at harmonizing existing rules for adjudicating collisions between norms or regimes to be futile. However, it seems doubtful that the imagery of a global Bukowina that part of the territory of the oíd Austro-Hungarian Empire where a variety of ethnic groups coexisted under the aegis of the emperor as the political head of the empire - actually does the conceptual trick. Is this analogy apt for highlighting the distinctive features of modern modes of governance? Is not the process of functional differentiation, 10 For the MOX Plant case see International Tribunal for the Law óf the Sea (2001). See also Court of Justice of the European Union (2006). 11 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: Prosecutor v. Tadic (Judgement), 38 ILM 1518 (1999). 12 At this point, further questions arise concerning the unity of law, its basic operations and structures. For example, for Teubner, international law is not characterized by a hierarchy of norms but interlegality. The ‘unity’ of international law is not determined by substantial consistency between norms of different order, but only procedural - via the particular connectivity of legal operations. We come back to this point in the last section of this chapter.

Functional differentiation and international law

171

such as for example the disembedding of the financial sector from the ‘real economy’, something quite different from the coexistence of several segmented societies sharing the same space? Teubner and Fischer-Lescano rightly highlight the problem that fragmentation cannot be papered over by juristic tricks - as proposed by the proponents of a ‘world administrative law’ - since important issues of legitimacy are touched upon and politics raises its ugly head. But, in order to understand what is going on, we also have to take leave of the optimistic interpretation of early regime theory and legalization literatures. In both approaches the dilemmas are either ‘solved’ through ‘cognitive evolution’ (as for example by Haas, 1991: 190ff), or by the existence of effective ‘dispute resolution mechanisms’. In either case pol­ itics disappears as it becomes a simple administration of issue areas by experts or of the administration of justice through courts. In any case the growth of law creating ‘islands of order’ in the alleged anarchy of interna­ tional relations is simply and unabashedly interpreted as a ‘good thing’, in accordance with the liberal maxim: ‘the more, the better’, without giving much thought to the downside of these developments. Even Petersman’s (2002) proposal to add some human rights to the WTO Charter, in par­ ticular the alleged ‘human right to firee trade’, in order to beef up its constitutional credentials, is very unlikely to succeed, even though the proposed ‘solution’ has a Cartesian’ ring: ‘I shop, therefore I am’ (see also the above discussion on fragmentation and forum shopping). The upshot of our argument is that neither constitutionalization ñor fragmentation provides an adequate understanding of what is going on. Politics does not dissolve itself into ethics; ñor does it give way to expertise and the creation of output legitimacy based on it. Here the notion of functional differentiation provides us with an alternative reading insofar as it neither prefers one over the other, ñor interprets them as conflicting processes. Rather, it leads to a shift in legal reasoning that puts both fragmentation and constitutionalization in a complex relationship (without presupposing what ‘causes’ what). Thus, if it is true that law differs from expectations developed in interactions, and differs even from expectations about expectations because differences in these secondary expectations must be adjudicated by courts, then it is also true that the latter are bound by expectations of how such conflicts are to be decided. Clearly in such tertiary expec­ tations considerations of the salus publica or some overarching purpose of the kind indicated by a constitution do matter. It is no accident that these overarching notions can no longer be formulated in the ‘if - then’ form characteristic of rules. Here abstract principies need to be adduced, and guidance to enable one to decide among competing interpretations

172

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

needs to be sought by reference to the legislative intent of a representative institution. Only in this way can one adjudícate between the competing readings of something as a tax or an environmental case, as a zoning or civil rights issue. But this is precisely the function that cannot be served by free-standing regimes and their adjudicative pronouncements. On the other hand, when it comes to constitutionalization, the ‘consent’ of the governed might always have been more of a myth than an accurate map of the social processes and of the way power is exerted. But it is indeed difficult to fathom how a democratic politics can simply dis­ pense with it and substitute ‘efíiciency’ for it (ridiculous as this turns out to be in view of the billions of misallocations caused by speculation) or adduce the ‘welfare’ provided by a priestly class of lawyers and administrators.

4

The issue of legitimacy

The last two sections have argued that functional differentiation provides an alternative reading of contemporary changes in international law. If fragmentation and constitutionalization are then the two sides of the same coin, we have to rethink some of the concepts we use to give meaning to certain practices. This implies the necessity of taking a step back and asking ourselves what this perspective tells us about the politics of international law. After all, the fundamental issue was how, under conditions of the permeability of the State, the disappearance of traditional publics (Kratochwil, 1997) and the denationalization of politics, binding decisions can still be made and legitimized. As so often, the question of politics is usually reduced to States where the politics of international law could be associated with the politics of indeterminacy, as Martti Koskenniemi (1990: 8) described it: This argumentative structure, however, which forces jurists to prove that their law is valid because concrete and normative in the above sense, both creates and destroys itself. For it is impossible to prove that a rule, principie or doctrine (in short, an argument) is both concrete and normative simultaneously. The two requirements cancel each other. An argument about concreteness is an argument. about the closeness of a particular rule, principie or doctrine to State practice. But the closer to State practice an argument is, the less normative and the more political it seems. The more it seems just another apology for existing power. An argument about normativity, on the other hand, is an argument which intends to demónstrate the rule’s distance from State will and practice. The more normative a rule, the more political it seems because the less it is possible to argüe it by reference to social context. It seems Utopian and - like theories of natural justice manipulable at will.

Functional differentiation and international law

173

For modern international law, sovereignty and the normativity of inter­ national law stand in a paradoxical relationship: one negates the other. Functional differentiation then needs to tell us a different story of how sovereignty and normativity can be understood. It is quite telling that Martti Koskenniemi pointed towards a culture of formalism as a possible solution to deal with fragmentation. Instead of searching for an institutional framework, Koskenniemi hopes to reframe the international legal discourse from within. He intends to show that lawyers are able to counter the current trend towards managerialism, the reduction of the legal enterprise to a technique, devoid of any political project. Instead, he hopes to remind lawyers of their political aspirations, even if these involve the civilization of world politics. It seems that the set of formal rules and political processes provides the most hopeful platform for such a reorientation of law. Seen negatively, one could easily say that Koskenniemi betrays his own pedigree in critical legal theory by putting all his hope in the formal legal process. On the other hand, he wants lawyers to voice their political projects and not stay silent. While it may be doubted that the negative consequences alluded to here can be prevented by enlightening a profession, this issue does raise the question of the legitimacy of legal norms. Two issues in particular merit further attention here. One concerns the idea that legal decisions are ‘judgements’. That means they are not simple singular statements which can be subsumed under a more general norm (even though they might exhibit this logical property). Judgements are arrived at through various steps which foreclose other possibilities by weighing the reasons for or against a particular branching point in the decisión tree (Kratochwil, 1989). Ex post the judgement has to be convincing, in other words it has to be well argued arte legis. Yet this does not mean that it is the only possible outcome putting the deci­ sión beyond doubt, notwithstanding Dworkin’s (1977) arguments about ‘unique’ and ‘right decisions’ which are delivered by the mythical judge ‘Hercules’. Dworkin cannot be correct here as he makes the mistake of taking logically compelling Solutions as implying unique choices in a problem situation (a mistake any elementary course in game theory addressing the equilibrium selection problem could take care of); he also magically assumes that the ‘right’ decisions are always those of supreme or appellate courts. Dworkin is correct in that these higher-court decisions set precedents and provide authoritative interpretations by selecting one alternative from several possible ones. But the rightness here is the result of the institutional fíat and not of the ‘better’ argument. For gaining assent to his choice a judge not only has to show that his decisión is

174

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

compatible with the ‘purpose’ of the law, other regulations and practices in the field, or even the constitutional order itself. He also has to adduce additional and largely extralegal reasons taken from shared understandings of the life world, from historical experiences or even from recognized authorities in other fields in order to justify his exclusions of other readings or evaluations in the case at hand. This is all the more important since, when principies such as due process or good faith are invoked rather than specific rules, most of the support for a decisión results from their abstract and open-ended character, which allows for widely diverging outcomes in concrete cases. One need not be an adherent of Cari Schmitt to see that, under such circumstances, the quis judicabit issue attains critical importance, especially when the role of the judge is juris-generative in Michelman’s (2003) sense, that is, not limited to the selection of one of the ex parte contentions and to considerations of coherence with past decisions. Its quality then hinges upon its capacity to reconcile alternative interpretations or open up a new view of the problem at hand. This ‘reconciliatory’ project of law is opposed to the traditional ‘all or nothing’ selection of a binary choice made by the judge, which informs much of Luhmann’s analysis. In this view, concern with dialogic themes that engage the ‘other’ is what is important, rather than impersonal demonstration or recourse to special or privileged knowledge. In addition, this approach stresses issues of responsibility and autonomy as intrinsic valúes which law has to protect, as opposed to criteria of simple efficiency, professionalism or the allegedly neutral principies of administrative and constitutional law. This leads us to the second problem: the judicial decisión represents a speech act. The judgements are not only particular - all things consid­ erad - rather than simple subsumptions under a norm, they also claim validity when uttered by a court in accordance with the constitutive rules empowering this institution (as opposed to being based on theoretical assertions and their truth conditions). To that extent in whose ñame the speech act occurs becomes all important. Traditionally this authorizing source has been - aside from nature and God - the particular ‘people’ that come together under the law and can consider it ‘their own’ as they commit themselves to it. The necessary element of willing submission is not only to mask the indeterminacy of judicial decisions that always necessitates that law (ius) is not only derivable from iustum, but is part of the iussum, as the oíd controversy highlighted and the above-mentioned problem of equilibrium selection confirmed. Even in the rather technical area of administrative law, where all questions of legitimacy seem to concern issues of legality, the logic of the law requires inputs from a surrogate political process in which hearings and

Functional differentiation and international law

175

the identification of stakeholders and their interests play an important role. After all, adherence to procedures protecting not only individuáis and their interests but also the integrity of the decisión and its acceptance is based on the belief not only that the procedures are not faulty but also that the competency of an agency is being tested on more sub­ stantive grounds. Only in this way can we establish a baseline against which we can assess procedural fairness and legitímate discretion based on competence. In short, the added valué is the recognition that law is characterized not only by processes and formalist criteria, but by its embodiment of substantive valúes; that its function is not only to help a political project along - the hidden or manifest purpose emerging from interpretation and construction - but that, as a system of meaning, it is also formative and transformative, instead of simply being external to the actors and their preferences; finally that it possesses potentially a dialogical element and does not exhaust itself in an empty rhetoric that moves endlessly between an apology and utopia (Koskenniemi, 2005) or by providing an uncertain algorithm for a decisión. It does indeed seem strange that the outlook and sensibilities shared by those who work at the intersection of law and politics often exhibit a distinct preference for the professional ideal and for some type of largely ‘prívate’ legal bureaucratization. As David Kennedy (1994: 336) observed, there prevails a loose melange of cosmopolitan or metropolitan ideas - that more things should be done internationally, that the nation and the State are things of the past, that internationalizing pretty much every endeavour is a good thing, that progress means globalization, that cross cultural contact will advance understanding.. . and so on.

Two further points deserve attention in this context. One concerns the argument of the emergence and effect of new political spaces opening up through transnational professional networks, new forms of public private/partnerships, the inclusión of elements of civil society into the decision-making processes of international organizations, and the new possibilities for ‘e-democracy’ provided by the Internet. The other con­ cerns the question in whose ñame these new oracles speak so that their pronouncements are considered legitímate and can marshal assent from those subject to them. In one way, the discussion of these points focused on different modes of communication is just a reprise of the themes of fragmentation and constitutionalization. But rather than repeating the previous arguments we attempt to look at the problem from a wider per­ spective in which politics and law are not treated as systems with their own codes and logic, but in which the focus on legitimacy zeroes in on

176

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

one crucial intersection of these systems - Luhmann would probably cali it a structural coupling - which is necessary for sustaining both systems. Let us begin with the observation by Kennedy of the common perception that ‘internationalizing every endeavour is a good thing’ (1994: 336), as it will enhance understanding. Underlying such assessments is probably some form of cognitive dissonance that suggests that the actual experience of collaborating with others will lead to new practices and common understandings, as problem solving rather than conceptual purity takes pride of place, and actual practice necessitates changes in the perceptions and interpretative schemes we apply. Wiener’s (2008) work on the contestability of norms and their cultural validation suggests that the effects of intense interactions in trans-national arenas - Risse’s (2000) argument notwithstanding - do not necessarily lead to a convergence of interpretation and a homogenization of the ‘norms in use’. True, professionals working together are likely to develop common views and an esprit de corps, as diplomáis and lawyers have shown even when their societies are at war or they are engaged in propaganda carrying the brief for their government. They learn to go on and agree to disagree, or are even sometimes able to find viable compromises. For them the engagement in transnational negotiations might provide a new ‘life world’ with sufficient shared understandings to sustain their activities. But Wiener’s research seems to suggest that this might be the exception rather than the rule and that interpretations are still heavily influenced by particular traditions and cultural baggage leading to further contestation. But be that as it may. The crucial question for the legitimacy of the law and the assent it can demand is not the capacity of experts or pro­ fessionals in a horizontal network to communicate with each other. At issue is rather how -vertical communication with the ‘locáis’ is managed when seeking their assent. This problem was originally addressed in the process of ratification but now it is bypassed as ‘public and prívate’ actors are ‘working together’. Formerly, status as a member of a public ensured at least residual influence, but now that stakeholders keep to themselves, their differences may be settled with scant attention to the ‘externalities’, as the Basel I and II agreements so strikingly demonstrated. No conception of systemic risk seems to enter the discussion of ensuring the safety of the particular assets. In addition, all of us who are not part of the network invited to the top table have now somehow become voiceless. We thus institutionalize a disparity of power in our midst that earlier was largely observable only in the North-South divide. But while we make this pattern more universal, it is hardly a universality that recommends itself.

Functional differentiation and international law

177

It is indeed coid comfort that the exercise of power is hidden behind the smokescreen of special knowledge or privileged position in the nexus of property rights or the functioning of autonomous self-reproducing systems. As war is perhaps too serious a business to be left to the military, so financial regulation, food safety, pollution abatement and security provisión might also be too serious to be left to the respective industries or the public/private ventures that have emerged to deal with them. As the experience of the financial crisis has demonstrated, expertise was either useless or not acted upon, as rating agencies, security dealers and banks happily cooperated in the creation of the bubble and lived splendidly off it. Thus the question of ‘who elected the bankers’, which Pauly (1999) raised a few years ago, has become ever more relevant, even though we apparently are much better in repressing the memories of the crisis than in learning from them. The traditional answer to these types of criticism has been to point out that new spaces may be opening up where a public debate could occur, where the forces of a transnational civil society get a hearing and demand greater accountability. Here hopes are being placed on new technical means of communication such as the Internet as an enabling mechanism for ‘e-democracy’ and on greater access to, and participation in, the decisión making of international organizations. While not denying that politics, like power, is not necessarily a zero sum game and thus allows for the creation of new modes of exercising influence - as, once upon a time, reading circles, coffee houses and salons constituted the ‘public’ outside the formal political institutions of court and parliaments (if they existed) - the historical record has been rather disappointing. For one thing, while we are called upon to ‘vote’ on virtually all types of issues, declaring our likes and dislikes over a whole range of things from movies to consumer goods, celebrities and national security issues, such demonstrations have little to do with an exercise of actual voting power since they are, at best, indications of a fleeting general mood. They do not even send a signal to the proper addressee as, for example, an exit from the market would - not to mention not providing the mechanisms that the exercise of‘voice’ or ‘loyalty’ (in the sense of Hirschman, 1970) requires. Similarly, being invited to some sessions of the organs of the IMF and being able to see the agenda or even make a statement is not the same as having a right to speak or having to be listened to, quite apart from the fact that the motley crew of civil society organizations that is admitted is not authorized in any meaningful sense and hardly able to go beyond its own specific concerns, laudable as they might be. What is missing is simply the transformation of discrete concerns into a viable political agenda, quite overlooking the fact that those international institutions entrusted with

178

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

the execution of some policies are usually only indirectly accountable, via the pursestrings of States which often abuse their privileged positions in ‘functional’ and allegedly ‘depoliticized’ organizations. The same factors also inhibit the genuine debate so necessary for well-executed political deliberation (euboulia), despite the unprecedented ‘reachability’ of people via the Internet and its innumerable chat rooms. As Cass Sunstein (2007) has pointed out, it is precisely this proliferation of possibilities of communication that inhibits meaningful deliberations. People check in and out of these rooms, mostly in the search of the likeminded. Thus, a tendency to both the radicalization and the homogenization of the users of chat rooms can be found, while the overall picture is one of utter fragmentation. This prevents meaningful debates not only because the opinions in these chat rooms lack the requisite variety to confront people with the fací that a plurality of views is an ineluctable characteristics of politics, but also because the ease of entry and exit inhibits the crystallization of an ongoing and generation-transcending concern that is also part of our understanding of politics. This leads us back to the second point above; the issue of constitutionalism and the role of the judge in these contexts. We said that here lawyers are no longer viewed as ‘professionals’ - although without thereby denying their skills to proceed arte legis. However, we expect them to sit ‘above’ the parties, rendering judgement from a perspective larger than the ex parte contentions submitted by the latter. This might be less so in technical issues where one has to rely on expertise outside the law or in commercial matters where one wants to come to a settlement, cut one’s losses and get it over with. But it is hard to avoid such a sitting ‘above’ the law in constitutional questions, which are by definition of greater gravity and where expertise can no longer mediate the valué conflicts that underlie a case and a controversy. To that extent, the fíat character of the decisión is in need of greater legitimization than in ‘prívate’ disputes that can resort to customary practices or that can be settled by codes like the codex alimentarias or the lex mercatoria. Where expertise does not provide the legitimizing grounds, the people have to understand them­ selves as the authors of their laws - and here law has to refer back to the political process and the consent that created the people as well as the constitution to which they have committed themselves?While such an understanding is obviously based on a political myth, it is difficult to see how a democratic form of government can do without it. These problems are cast in sharp relief when we encounter attempts such, for instance, as making the WTO Charter - enhanced by the alleged ‘human right’ to free trade - the new constitution for a globalized world (Petersmann, 2002). Similar to the observation of

Functional differentiation and international law

179

Anderson (1991) that we find in nearly every society monuments to the ‘unknown soldier’, but not to the ‘unknown Marxist’, a monument to the ‘good merchant’, the ‘lost liberal’ or ‘the clueless free-trader’ simply does not resonate, irrespective of the fact that we encounter many of them and that some of them may even exhibit tragic features. In this context, the controversy between Anne-Marie Slaughter and Judge Scalia, for example, highlights an important issue (even if one disagrees with one or both of them). Slaughter (1995; 1997), being fascinated with networks, proposes that there should also be a network of judges that would cite and use decisions of courts in other jurisdictions and thereby enhance the ‘universality’ of the law. Of course, nobody would think of looking at Iranian courts or even those of China, Egypt or Singapore (although the latter has become a hub for commerce and its concomitant legal Services). As in Rawls’s The Law of the Peoples (1999) only ‘liberal, well-ordered societies’ are invited to the top table in order to determine the constitutional principie of the international order. In a significant Freudian slip, however,' Slaughter suddenly changes from a ‘network’ to the concept of a ‘community’ of courts. Obviously there is something important that the concept of the network does not convey.13 Here the question of legal authority and its roots in the notion of legit­ imacy raises its ugly head. While judges can support their decisions by casting around for persuasive reasons - and have to do so in complicated technical matters where experts are brought in to help - ultimately their decisions will ‘stand’ because they are decisions of a court of law that is bound by the precedents and legislative acts of its legal and political system. Thus, not all authority may be cut from the same cloth, but it is sig­ nificant that Slaughter wants to limit the search for supporting reasons to court decisions from other jurisdictions, and not to the ‘best arguments’ which could be provided by journalists, philosophers or ‘experts’ of many stripes. In the former case, the power of law stems from its institutional standing and from the speech acts to which it gives rise. It thus in a way possesses a content-independent authority, as Frederick Schauer (2008) once suggested. In the latter case, authority is ‘contentdependent’ and connected to a variety of standards and irresolvable controversies even though a ‘best argument’ might emerge. But it is precisely because of the recognition that this is a pious hope rather than a demonstrable truth that courts have been instituted and are bound by ‘their’ law and constitutional order that demands ‘loyalty’ from their subjects. 13 For some further criticism see Kratochwil (2010a; 2010b).

180

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

5

Conclusions

At this point it might be useful (though provocative) to speculate about some of the implications of this analysis. First, instead of expecting more and more of the same, that is, more rules, more arenas for meetings and resolving issues, more tribunals etc., it seems that cutting back on these explosive new developments might be a better strategy. In the case of financial regulation, a stricter separation of normal banking from investment might be necessary instead of only deferring to the self-regulatory measures that attempt to reduce the risks attached to monetary instruments but do not address systemic risks. This implies, second, that instead of speculating about how not to impede ‘frictionless markets’ it is high time to build firewalls and contain the dangers that follow from system-wide panic reactions. In the legal sphere a reduction in the number of tribunals attached to many regimes seems a more promising way of dealing with the problems that surface in the constitutionalization debate than to think that more ‘dispute-settling mechanisms’ are better than fewer. Similarly, it would be helpful if we separated our analysis from unwarranted notions of evolutionary teleology in which the abatement of an ill is treated in isolation but then often celebrated as a harbinger of a universal order which is untainted by the contingencies of politics and its particularistic aspects. True, the Kadi case might be a remedy against an ultra vires act of the Security Council, but it would be indeed kadi-justice in the Weberian sense, if such a modus procendendi became the rule. Besides, we had bet­ ter realize that it might undermine the fragüe institutionalization of the international political order without which we hardly can hope to address our many global problems. Finally, our criticism of the technocratic bias in much of the gover­ nance literatura - including that of international law - and our emphasizing on the dilemma character of politics were intended to cut through the rhetoric of ‘best practices’ and the notion that all of our problems can be solved by more information and expertise. We thus tried to identify opportunities for political action without making the heroic assumption that exchanging messages or indicating preferences is already tantamount to having a ‘voice’, or that the ‘reachability’ of others on a global scale provides already the conditions for meaningful deliberation and the emergence of ‘ongoing concerns’. All in all this might be, for some, a rather sombre analysis whose perhaps disturbing implications can be rebutted by arguing that it is too much beholden to theories and approaches of yesteryear, not ‘Progres­ sive’ in the sense that the futura will be bright when the emancipatory

Functional differentiation and international law

181

project of universal human rights can be realized and that all good things will come together, as they fit like hand in glove. But such a criticism is valid only if we are sure where we are going and that, continuing on this path to an encompassing and universal order, we can dispense in the meantime with the dilemmas and particularities of politics. For all those who are not sure about the ‘end of history’ and who live at the ‘local’ level with its particular problems rather than on the exalted heights of speculation about the ‘global’, the task of going on and making sense of our lives is less certain and, admittedly, more troublesome, but it is at least based on praxis, and a critical reflection on the latter, rather than on armchair philosophy.

9

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world society Mathias Koenig-Archibugi

1

Introduction

In their introduction to this volume, Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan and Michael Zürn suggest that long-term structural change in the interna­ tional system can be analysed in terms of the interaction between, and relative importance of, three different forms of social differentiation: seg­ mentary, stratificatory and functional (see also Buzan and Albert, 2010). IR scholarship traditionally focuses on what sociologists would see as the result of segmentary differentiation, namely systems or societies of States, while paying attention also to stratificatory differentiation because of the role of great powers, superpowers and empires. According to prominent system theorists, this spatially differentiated political system should be seen as embedded in a ‘world society’ that is itself primarily differ­ entiated along functional fines (Luhmann, 1971a). According to Niklas Luhmann, only the political system and the legal system are differentiated spatially in the form of States;1 all other systems ‘opérate independently of spatial boundaries. Precisely the unambiguous character of spatial boundaries makes it clear that they are respected neither by truths ñor by diseases, neither by education ñor by televisión, neither by money (if the need for credit is considered) ñor by love’. Luhmann added that ‘[t]he importance of spatial boundaries lies in the interdependencies between the political and the legal system on the one hand and the other functional systems on the other’ (Luhmann, 1997b: 166-7).12 This chapter examines one specific aspect within this broader theme: the role played by international institutions in the relationship between different forms of differentiation in world society. The focus is on ‘designed’ institutions, or what Buzan (2004: 161-204) refers to as 1 A study that qualifies this position and identifies trends towards a decline in the primacy of territorial-segmentary differentiation even in the political system and the legal system of world society is Albert (2002: specifically 325, 337-8). 2 See also Luhmann (2000b: 220-27). Translations from sources in Germán are by the author. 182

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world

183

‘secondary institutions’. Various arguments concerning that role can be developed. One argument is made by Albert, Buzan and Zürn in the introduction to this volume: international institutions are a reflection of the (growing) functional differentiation of the global political system, which allows the globalization of other functional subsystems such as the economy, science, art and law. This could mean that international institutions reduce barriers to informational or material flows between similar subsystems in different ‘segments’; or, more radically, it could mean that international institutions promote the emergence of certain types of functional differentiation in the first place, specifically by acting as mechanisms of diffusion from world regions where the relevant func­ tional boundaries are already established to the regions where they are fuzzier or absent. A second argument is made by Richard Münch in his chapter in this volume: international institutions such as the WTO pro­ mote the empowerment of actors who pursue the specific interests and valúes of individual functional subsystems, notably the economy, and the disempowerment of actors such as national governments and political parties who pursue more general goals. A third argument is that interna­ tional institutions replícate and ‘internationalize’ tensions between legal norms linked to different subsystems, producing a variety of ‘regime collisions’ (Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 2004). All these arguments deserve careful theoretical and empirical analysis. But this chapter will examine a fourth line of argument: international institutions address, and can contribute to solving, the tensions between the ‘demands’ of different functional subsystems. Sociologists sometimes distinguish between ‘social integration’, which concerns how actors relate to each other, and ‘system integration’, which concerns how different social subsystems relate to each other (Lockwood, 1964). Most research on international institutions focuses on a particular form of ‘social integration’, that is, the role played by international institutions in the interaction between States, for instance as facilitators of bargaining, enforcement and socialization. This is certainly not surprising, since States are crucial in creating ‘secondary’ international institutions and in securing the conditions of their survival. As a result, much is known about how international institutions can reduce conflict and promote cooperation among States; but less is known about how, indeed whether, international institutions may affect the tensions that characterize a func­ tionally differentiated world society. The chapter thus has three aims. The first is to explore what it would mean for an international institution to promote ‘coordination’ between functional subsystems in addition to coordination between social segments in the political subsystem (i.e. States). The second is to suggest some of

184

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

the mechanisms through which that may happen. The third is to illustrate how such mechanisms may opérate in practice by discussing the case of the international sanitary conferences in the nineteenth century. If these mechanisms can be detected at such an early stage of international institutionalization, they can be expected to be even more significant in later periods, when more robust international institutions exist and are managed and prometed by international organizations that are capable of autonomous ageney.

2

International institutions and intersegmentary coordination

Since the late nineteenth century, governments have negotiated and ratified a number of international sanitary conventions aimed at regulating the surveillance and control of infectious diseases spreading across borders. The latest of these sanitary conventions, the 2005 ver­ sión of the International Health Regulations, is a legally binding treaty that obliges States to notify to the World Health Organization (WHO) outbreaks of diseases of potential international relevance, prescribes some measures to limit their spread across borders and proscribes others. Why did States adopt these international sanitary conventions and thereby empower international organizations to perform certain tasks? A standard rationalist explanation in International Relations theory would run along the following lines. Restricting travel and commerce between two or more countries with the aim of preventing or reducing the spread of infectious diseases across borders is likely to genér­ ate economic costs for all countries. However, when an outbreak of an infectious disease is reported in the territory of a State, the authorities of the other countries may believe that the cost to their economies would be offset by the health (and possibly economic) gains of restricting flows of traffic with the affected country. Modern States have regularly employed, and still employ, containment measures such as quarantines for ships, cargoes and passengers, requirements of‘clean bilis of health’, trade embargoes and restrictions on the mobility of peOple, travel advisories against cities, regions or countries. Such measures often create very substantial economic costs. Schematically, States find themselves in the following situation of strategic interdependence: (1) every State prefers to tighten border Controls if an outbreak is reported in another State, but it prefers other States not to tighten border Controls if an out­ break is reported within its own borders; (2) each State has strong reasons to hide disease outbreaks in its territories from the other States or

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world

185

downplay them; (3) knowing this, each State has reason to tighten border Controls as soon as it suspects an outbreak in another State. The costs of reporting and the risks of overreaction place governments in a prisoners’ dilemma: every State would prefer a situation in which restrictions to cross-border traffic are proportionate to the true nature and severity of the outbreak; but every State must assume the worst and take measures that might disrupt cross-border traffic unnecessarily. The outcome is likely to be lack of reporting on the one hand and overreaction to rumours of outbreaks on the other hand, which is not a Pareto efficient outcome. There are ways out of this dilemma. In principie States could reach a mutually beneficial situation by: (1) reaching agreement on what constitutes a proportionate response to an outbreak in another country; (2) committing themselves to reporting outbreaks promptly, truthfully and comprehensively; (3) committing themselves not to take measures that are more restrictive than those previously agreed; (4) possibly agreeing to transfer expertise and resources to countries hit by an outbreak, as such a ‘side payment’ would increase the incentive to report. Crucially, these commitments would need to be credible, that is, governments must be helped to resist the temptation to cheat. This is where global health gov­ ernance comes in. Rationalist authors would argüe that the surveillance system based on the international sanitary conventions and the activities of organizations such as the WHO were created by States as a way to solve the prisoners’ dilemma. Specifically, these institutions and organizations reduce ambiguity about which kinds of behaviour constitute cooperation or defection; they increase the cost of defection by defining it as a breach of binding international law; and they increase transparency and thus facilitate the decentralized sanctioning of defectors. A number of complexities could be added to this basic rationalist explanation. For instance, flexible institutional rules can be explained by uncertainty about the State of the world in respect of such matters as the transmissibility of disease. The centralization of institutional tasks, for example the WHO’s authority to declare a public health emergency of international concern, can be explained by the severity of the enforcement problem (Koremenos et al., 2001). Rationalist approaches can also account for the distribution of the benefits of cooperation: institutions will probably reflect the States’ relative bargaining leverage, which in turn is determined by their inside and outside options. Standard rationalist approaches provide parsimonious and elegant explanations of institutionalized cooperation among States. This does not mean, of course, that they are accurate or complete. They may not be able, for instance, to explain why it took half a century to agree on

186

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

a basic set of rules to deal with outbreaks. Rather than examining the question of empirical accuracy directly, however, it is useful to consider two key assumptions made by the rationalist explanation outlined above. The first assumption is that States know what they want and rank various possible outcomes according to their contribution to an abstract metric, which is often dubbed ‘utility’. In the account of international health cooperation given above, the fact that States pursue health goals as well as economic goals does not require further analysis: States somehow aggregate expected health gains/losses and expected economic gains/losses, and the process of commensuration - understood as ‘the expression or measurement of characteristics normally represented by different units according to a common metric’ (Espeland and Stevens, 1998: 315) - does not need to be theorized further. Within a rationalist perspective, even the loss of State autonomy as a result of adopting a binding treaty can be conceptualized as a ‘sovereignty cost’ (Abbott and Snidal, 2000), which is weighed against possible gains in view of increasing overall utility. Of course the assumption of unproblematic commensurability is common to rational choice theory in general. The second assumption of the explanatory account outlined above is that States engage in negotiations with other States on the basis of goals that are defined prior to interaction and already combine health, economic and political valúes into a coherent utility function. In other words, the commensuration of health goals, economic goals and political goals occurs within individual States, and processes at the International level play no role in it. A more specific implication of this assumption is that international institutions and organizations may help States overeóme various bargaining and commitment problems, and thus promote Pareto efficiency in interest aggregation, but they do not contribute to the process of determining how health and economic valúes are weighed against each other.3 Questioning those assumptions has theoretical and empirical benefits. With regard to the first assumption, the possible tensión between eco­ nomic, health and political valúes in the control of infectious diseases highlights the analytical gains of focusing on functional'differentiation as a key feature of modern society. If the health system and'the economic system are conceptualized as autonomous domains guided by different valúes and primarily oriented at asserting those valúes with little regard for the concerns of other systems, then the ability of the political system 3 Rational institutionalism ‘takes States’ conceptions of their interests as exogenous: unexplained within the terms of the theory’ (Keohane, 1993: 285).

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world

187

to take into account and possibly reconcile those valúes cannot be taken for granted and needs to be assessed explicitly. With regard to the second assumption, it can be reformulated as stating that the political problems stemming from conflicts between the imperatives of different functional subsystems are resolved within each segmentarily differentiated unit (i.e. each State). Beyond the national level, mechanisms of coordination between ‘segments’ (negotiation between sovereign governments) are more important than mechanisms of coordination between functional subsystems (tensions and adjustments between functional valúes and interests, e.g. health and wealth). The starting point of my argument is that this should be treated as a hypoth­ esis rather than an assumption and should be considered together with the opposite hypothesis: politically relevant tensions between different functional subsystems are transposed, and possibly resolved, at the inter­ national level. A more specific hypothesis is that the role of international institutions need not be limited to facilitating agreement between gov­ ernments with clearly defined goals (i.e. ‘intersegmental’ coordination); they can also promote ‘interfunctional’ coordination and limit the negative externalities that subsystems may otherwise produce for one another. The next section elaborares on this hypothesis at the theoretical level, while sections 4 and 5 assess it in relation to infectious disease control in the nineteenth century.

3

Functional differentiation and institution-enabled coordination

I do not take the ‘communicative turn’ (see Stetter, in this volume) and instead, following Max Weber’s (1922) lead, I inelude actors in the definition of functional differentiation.4 Following Uwe Schimank’s (2005b; 2006; 2007) actor theory conceptualization, social subsystems consist of generalized action orientations that constitute reciprocal expectations between actors. Three types of action orientation can be distinguished (Schimank, 2005b: 85): (1) cognitive orientations, which define the ‘what is’ dimensión of social reality through patterns of perception, cognitive 4 The adjective ‘functional’ is unfortunate as it may suggest that the emergence and/or persistence of action orientations are explained by their propensity to promote the reproduction of the system as a whole. ‘Sectoral differentiation’ would be a more neutral term that does not carry such connotations. Buzan and Little (2000: 72-7), for instance, refer to ‘sectors’, and Albert and Buzan (2011) explore the relationship between sectors and functional differentiation. Since the expression functional differentiation is ingrained in scientific usage, even in works that reject the functional explanation just mentioned, it will be retained here, in line with the convention adopted in this volume.

188

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

maps, interpretative frameworks and related mechanisms; (2) normative orientations, which define the ‘what should be’ dimensión of social reality through institutionalized norms and role expectations; and (3) evaluative orientations, which define the ‘what I want’ dimensión through generalized goals and principies of rationality. In each societal subsystem, action orientations can be seen as structured by the binary codes identified by Luhmann (true/false for Science, legal/illegal for law, powerful/powerless for politics etc.). The positive valué of the binary code provides actors with the most general evaluative orientation, which is complemented by subsystemic ‘programmes’ that consist of more specific evaluative components as well as cognitive and normative orientations. Schimank argües that the clusters of cognitive, normative and evaluative orienta­ tions that constitute social subsystems are ‘simplifying abstractions’ of specific social situations. These abstractions are recognized as ‘fictions’ by the social actors themselves, but they are effective as they represent self-fulfilling prophecies that push a specific social situation to conform to the relevant abstract logic of action of a certain societal subsystem (Schimank, 2005b: 88-94). What are the consequences of functional differentiation? Max Weber described them in dramatic terms: functional differentiation results in a ‘polytheism’ in which ‘different valué orders of the world are in an unsolvable struggle with each other’ (Weber, 1988: 603). This struggle unfolds within individuáis, but also at the level of social groups and organizations. In other words, the tensión between social subsystems occurs within actors and between actors. One first basic consequence of functional differentiation is that actors are endowed with roles that induce them to focus on certain cogni­ tive, normative and evaluative orientations and neglect others. An example of this indifference relates to the international trade/health interface discussed in sections two, four and five and is described succinctly by Richard Smith, Kelley Lee and Nick Drager (2009: 770): Those involved in health tend to consider trade from the perspective of health system and population health effects, with the objective of maximising health indicators such as life expectancy, with little regard for indicators of interest to the trade agenda. Conversely, those involved in trade corisider health as a potential barrier to trade, with the objective of maximising economic indicators, such as gross domestic product. Predictably, little attention is given to indicators of interest to the health agenda.

In many cases, we can justifiably talk of ‘tensions’ rather than mere ‘indifference’ or ‘disregard’, because actions oriented to the logics of a certain subsystem may 'interfere and thwart actions oriented to the logics of a different subsystem. For instance, sections four and five will show

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world

189

how, in certain circumstances, policy measures deemed ‘necessary’ from a medical perspective have been perceived as clashing with measures aimed at promoting economic goals. However, the presence and intensity of such tensions is a variable, not a constant. Tensions are not inevitable or irresolvable for two reasons, one of which operates within actors and the other between actors. At the intra-actor level, it should be noted that both the interruption of positive externalities and the production of negative externalities across subsystems depend on actions, and actions are rarely guided by ‘puré’ subsystemic action orientations. Actors are not usually ‘monomaniacally’ fixated on the demands of one of their roles. Individuáis and group agents (organizations) routinely trade off valúes and aggregate different kinds of judgement, although the process can be psychologically demanding because of‘cognitive incommensurability’, ‘constitutive incommensurability’ and other problems (Tetlock et al., 1996; Tetlock, 2000). The capacity to aggregate valúes, norms and judgements and, if necessary, weigh them against each other, varíes significantly across actors and contexts. At the inter-actor level, even if we were to assume that individual or collective actors are exclusively or - more plausibly - primarily oriented towards a particular subsystemic code, this does not entail that actions guided by different normative, cognitive and evaluative orientations will necessarily clash. We can follow Schímank (2005b: 199-219) and distinguish between ‘general orientation agreement’ and ‘specific-interest agreement’.5 Disagreement between actors can have two different causes: one the one hand, the fact that they may observe different aspeets of an issue; on the other hand, the fact that they may assess the same aspect of an issue differently. The first situation produces a disagreement over relevance, the second a disagreement over claims (statements of fact, evaluations or demands). Schimank uses this distinction between disagreement over relevance and disagreement over claims to identify two types of agreement between actors: they may interpret the situation in which they find themselves on the basis of the same general cognitive, normative and evaluative orientations (general orientation agreement); or they may agree on who among them should satisfy which interest to what degree in a given situation of interdependence (specific-interest agreement). Crucially, specific-interest agreements are feasible also among actors who have no general orientation agreement, and specifically among actors that 5 For a different but related distinction between two kinds of agreement see List (2002).

190

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

follow a variety of logics of action that are specific to different functional subsystems. An important aspect that is not noted by Schimank is that, in some cases, actors may find it easier to reach specific-interest agreements with actors with whom they have no general orientation agreement than with actors with whom they share the same cognitive, norma­ tive or evaluative orientation. For instance, section four shows that, in the nineteenth century, physicians oriented to the same medicalscientific code disagreed vehemently on a key substantive issue, namely the transmissibility of cholera, and many physicians denying it cooperated with commercial actors to pursue a shared objective, the elimination of quarantines. Such intersectoral coalitions can be expected to occur frequently, especially when general orientation agreement fails to produce a specific-interest agreement within that subsystem. More generally, there is no reason to suppose that conflicts of interest and contentious action are more likely ‘between’ functional subsystems than ‘within’ them (consider the conflict between workers and capitalists about economic gains or the conflict between religious communities about salvation). Both coordination modalities discussed thus far - the capacity (and willingness) to aggregate and weigh heterogeneous action orientations, and the existence of specific-interest agreements despite general orien­ tation disagreement - can emerge ‘spontaneously’; but they can also be ‘induced’. There are a number of ways in which actions primarily ori­ ented to the logic of a given subsystem can be influenced in such a way as to reduce its negative impacts on the effectiveness of actions oriented to other subsystems. For instance: (1) Forms of‘reflexive self-regulation’ may sensitize actors to the consequences of their actions beyond subsystemic boundaries. This may be facilitated by organizational features of a given subsystem: for instance, a central medical association may increase its members’ interest in the economic consequences of medical interventions; (2) the political system may actively promote - but not impose trans-systemic deliberation and coordination through ‘context steering’ (Teubner and Willke, 1984); (3) the political system may attempt to control subsystemic externalities through the traditionai* Instruments of ‘political steering’, such as coercive regulation and resource transfer (Lange and Braun, 2000; Mayntz and Scharpf, 2005). Moving on to the more specific theme of international institutions, they can affect intersystemic coordination by more than one route: they can promote reflexive self-regulation; they can promote trans-systemic deliberation and coordination; or they can influence how other political actors, notably governments, use their powers of coercive regulation and

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world

191

resource transfer. In other words, they can have intra-actor as well as inter-actor effects. At the micro level, international institutions can modify action orientations and create opportunities for the identification of specific-interest agreements. These two modalities are often combined in practice, but for analytical purposes they will be considered separately. Opportunities for specific-interest agreement can be provided through institutional contexts that facilítate communication and deliberation between actors with different subsystemic orientations. By communicating with each other, these actors can inform each other about what Schimank (2005b: 214-17) calis their respective ‘reflexive interests’, their interests in the general conditions for the realization of specific substan­ tive interests. Actors can then use this information to discover specificinterest agreements and negotiate the terms of coordinated action to realize them. The result of this process can be the emergence of an intersystemic coalition for the pursuit of specific goals. Action orientations do not need to change for this to occur. But international institutions can also modify action orientations themselves. This can be done by (1) increasing the integrative complexity of actors and (2) framing the issues. With regard to the former mechanism, functional subsystems can be seen as ‘islands of low complexity’ (Luhmann, 2005: 147), which address the anthropological need to cope with the extreme complexity of the world - even if this effect of differ­ entiation is not necessarily also its cause (see the chapter by Thomas, in this volume). Pace Schimank (2005b: 210-12), actors normally retain and, in certain circumstances, increase their capacity to take into account múltiple subsystemic logics. Political psychologists define integrative com­ plexity in terms of two cognitive structural properties: differentiation and integration (Suedfeld et al., 2003). Differentiation refers to the number of perspectives, characteristics or dimensions of stimuli (which may be problems, events, theories, policies etc.) that an individual or group takes into account. Integration refers to the perception of connections among those differentiated perspectives, characteristics or dimensions; these connections can take the form of trade-offs between alternatives, a synthesis that combines them or an overarching contextual structure. For our purposes it is crucial that integrative complexity varíes not only across individuáis or groups but also as a result of a wide range of situational factors (Suedfeld et al., 2003). Two related factors are especially relevant. First, integrative complexity is often enhanced when actors feel accountable to an audience for their position, for instance when they expect to have to discuss their ideas with peers whose opinions they do not know, or with experts (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). Second, groups can

192

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

display higher integrative complexity than any of their individual mem­ bers, as a result of discussion and Information sharing (Gruenfeld and Hollingshead, 1993). In sum, certain organizational contexts increase the capacity of actors to intégrate múltiple subsystemic logics in their actions, and international institutions can provide such contexts. Action orientations can also be affected by framing. Partly in contrast to mechanisms that promote integrative complexity, frames facilitare the management of múltiple subsystemic logics by restricting the range of interdimensional connections that actors actually consider. Specifically with regard to the evaluative dimensión of action orientations, this restriction can take the form of valué prioritization or valué hybridization. Frames can promote valué prioritization through at least three mechanisms (Nelson and Willey, 2001): policy labelling and categorization, which consists of the assignment of novel objects to familiar categories; goal ranking, which may create a lexicographic hierarchy among subsystemic valúes;6 and institutional role assignment, which allows for the acceptance of local (organizational) valué hierarchies that may be different from the actors’ global valué hierarchies. On the other hand, frames can promote valué hybridization by highlighting synergies in the pursuit of different subsystemic valúes. While modifying action orientations and creating opportunities for specific-interest agreements can be separated analytically, in practice they are usually combined. This can be illustrated with reference to the history of international health cooperation and the institutions created to promote it since the mid nineteenth century. David Fidler uses the term ‘source code’ to describe the complex of motives that have produced action on global health issues in different periods, and summarizes them as foliows: The initial source code [in the nineteenth century] was State-centric and reflected predominantly trading interests of the great powers. WHO’s establishment after World War II added human rights to the source code in the form of the right to health. Later efforts to address HTV/AIDS deepened the human rights contení of the source code. The last decade has seen health motivations related to security and development, as well as renewed emphasis on health’s importance to the economic interests of States and non-State actors. (Fidler, 2007: 9)

It can be hypothesized that, in each of the periods highlighted by Fidler, 6 Valué prioritization sometimes involves ‘taboo trade-offs’, that is, trade-offs that people refuse to contémplate, which is also known as ‘constitutive incommensurability’ (Tetlock, 2000; 2003).

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world

193

1. a process of valué hybridization took place, which combined cogni­ tive, normative and evaluative orientations from different social sub­ systems; 2. this process depended on a sufficient level of integrative complexity, which allowed actors to perceive that different dimensions could, and should, be synthesized, and on a degree of framing, which allowed for specific modes of synthesis to be selected and accepted by a substantial proportion of relevant actors; 3. the process was intentionally induced in order to stimulate crosssectoral coalitions of actors, such as public health experts and military planners in the case of the securitization of AIDS; in other words, framing strategies were used to highlight specific-interest agreements, and in tum specific-interest agreements promoted framing effects; 4. international and transnational institutions/organizations such as the WHO, the World Bank and the Rockefeller Foundation played a role in creating the conditions for this process to occur, as actors and/or as forums. The rest of this chapter focuses on point (4). Scepticism about the role of international institutions could be based on the argument that the pro­ cesses described under (1), (2), and (3) do indeed routinely take place, but exclusively within the context of individual States. This argument would expect that, through framing and other processes, specific-interest agreements are forged within States, and then State representatives try to promote the ‘national interest’ by bargaining with other State represen­ tatives over the content of common policies. In this view, international institutions have a role in promoting ‘social integration’ (between State actors), but not ‘system integration’ (between functional subsystems). The remainder of this chapter assesses this sceptical argument in the light of the interface between health, trade and politics in nineteenthcentury Europe and the early international sanitary conferences.

4

The health/trade/politics interface in the nineteenth century

This section and the next examine the interface between health, trade and politics in nineteenth-century Europe, at the outset of ‘Westphalian’ international health cooperation. Because of the absence of IOs and relatively low levels of formal institutionalization, nineteenth-century devel­ opments constitute a ‘hard case’ for the hypothesis that international instititutions play a role in promoting not only ‘social integration’ but also ‘system integration’.

194

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

The focal issue of the analysis is mobility of people and goods across borders, and how it was seen in the context of three different social subsystems - politics, economy and health. By the early nineteenth cen­ tury, these three sectors had already attained a high degree of autonomy, and the issue of mobility played an important part in those processes of differentiation. Increased interaction beyond the boundaries of local communities played an important part in the emergence of the econ­ omy as a functionally differentiated subsystem. In closed communities, the exchange of goods and Services is tightly regulated by communal norms of solidarity and respect for social stratification. Contact with strangers unleashes a different dynamic, as with them the key criterion for economic interaction becomes personal utility and the ability to pay (Münch, 1990). Thus, human mobility played a key role in the develop­ ment of the economy as a differentiated social subsystem constituted by the three kinds of actor orientation described in section three (cognitive, normative and evaluative). The 1820s were a ‘watershed’ in the evolution of the world economy. Both commodity markets and factor markets became considerably more integrated, partly as a result of a worldwide transport revolution. Within the economic system, the mobility of people and goods is evaluated in terms of their effect on income opportunities. Classical economic theory developed a positive evaluation of open economies, and this influenced the cognitive orientations of actors in the economic system. But mobil­ ity, both in the form of trade and in the form of migration, generated (and generates) economic losers as well as winners, which explains why significant disagreements persisted within the economic system on the evaluative assessment of mobility. Health can be considered as a distinct functional subsystem based on the binary code ‘ill/healthy’ (Luhmann, 1983a; 1983b; 1990a).7 The differentiation of health as a social system is linked to two interrelated processes (Field, 1973; Bauch, 1996). The first was the separation of the role of physician from that of priest/magician and the professionalization of the former. In fourteenth-century Italy, medicine was already an institutionalized profession based on degrees conferred by universities and organization in guilds (Biow, 2002). The process took-longer in other European countries, but was largely concluded by the early nineteenth century (Bauch, 1996). The second process was the increasing reliance of medical practice on scientific knowledge, which gradually replaced 7 In this chapter I adopt a simplified conception ofthe health system that neglects important aspects of the relationship between medical practice, medical organizations and health Science. On that bundle of issues see Vogd (2005). See also Schimank (2006: 128-30).

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world

195

religión as the key supporting code. The scientification of the health system was a key aspect of its professionalization, as it strengthened physicians in their claim to monopolize key aspects of health care. The result of these processes was a distinctive set of cognitive, normative and evaluative orientations that constituted a differentiated health system. As with the economy, the issue of mobility of goods and people is closely linked to the process of differentiation of health as a social sub­ sector. Medical expertise was institutionalized by having medical doctors as members of boards of health convened after the fourteenth century by Italian princes in response to outbreaks of plague (Salter, 2003: 50-5). A key task of these boards of health was to make decisions about restricting the movements of the population. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, medical opinión was divided over whether the plague was spread by person-to-person contact or carried by ‘bad air’, but belief in the need to isolate sufferers became increasingly widespread. The movement of people was perceived as a threat tó public health, and from the 1420s an increasing number of cities implemented travel bans and quarantines (Carmichael, 1983). However, medical opinión was never unanimous on the question of whether and how interpersonal interaction and mobility contributed to disease, and opinions started to diverge considerably in the eighteenth century. Certain diseases, such as smallpox and syphilis, were widely considered contagious from ancient times, also thanks to the ‘contagionist’ doctrines of the Oíd Testament. But the contagionist perspective was often challenged by ‘localist’ interpretations of the origins of diseases, according to which they were caused by a range of environmental conditions, both natural (e.g. the climate) and subject to human influence (e.g. filthy and crowded living conditions, stagnant water). In the con­ tagionist view of etiology, human mobility was perceived as a primary determinant of ill health, and the best approach to prophylaxis was to break chains of transmission by interrupting the circulation of carriers. In the localist view of etiology, human mobility played a subordinare or no role, and the best approach to prophylaxis was to create hygienic living conditions and, specifically, to improve housing, sanitation, sewerage, drainage, food and personal habits. There was no strict dichotomy between contagionism and localism, however. With regard to the three diseases that triggered most debate in the nineteenth century, plague, yellow fever and cholera,8 most medical experts accepted intermedíate 8 There was wide agreement on the contagious nature of diseases such as measles, smallpox and syphilis.

196

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

positions between the two polar interpretations and combined elements ofboth (Ackerknecht, 1948; Baldwin, 1999: 2-10; Harrison, 2006: 198— 205). The contagionism vs. localism controversy became acute in the nineteenth century mainly because of cholera. This disease had traditionally been limited to areas of the Indian subcontinent, but it spread globally in the early nineteenth century as a result of a number of factors, notably the movement of British troops, improvements in transportation and the intensification of mass migration. The first cholera pandemic took place between 1817 and 1823, and was followed by another five global pandemics in the following 100 years (Lee and Dodgson, 2000). The impact of cholera on mortality differed considerably among world regions. According to Watts (1997: 167), cholera claimed 130,000 lives in Britain during the nineteenth century, while the six cholera pandemics killed more than 25 million people in India. It is noteworthy that most debates at the international sanitary conferences revolved on how to protect Europe from the ‘Asiatic’ disease. Throughout the nineteenth century, physicians and medical experts engaged in intense debates over the etiology and prophylaxis of cholera, displaying a range of opinions between one extreme - cholera is transmissible and can be prevented by restricting mobility - and the other cholera derives from local environmental conditions (poor housing, inadequate sewerage, poverty etc) and specifically from ‘miasma’ (poison arising from decaying vegetal or animal matter), with mobility playing little or no role. The political system plays a privileged role with regard to mobility, as its focus on territorial control traditionally required it to establish borders and determine their porosity, and it Controls the coercive apparatus needed to restrict mobility. In the transition from medieval to modern Europe, States monopolized the right to authorize and restrict the physical movement of people, which previously was diffused among a range of religious and secular authorities (Torpey, 2000). This right was expressed in legal doctrines such as ne exeat regno and concretized in identification tools that gradually evolved into ‘passports’ and ‘visas’. The restrictive trend of previous centuries was reversed during the nineteenth century, which was ‘a period of extraordinary freedom of movement’ in Europe (Torpey, 2000: 56). Between 1843 and 1889, passports were eliminated in France, Belgium, Spain, Germany, and Italy (Salter, 2003: 102). Even though the United Kingdom did not formally abolish the requirement of passports, control was so limited that in 1872 the British foreign secretary, Lord Grenville, could say that ‘by the existing laws of Great Britain all foreigners have the unrestricted right of entrance into and residence in this country’ (Torpey, 2000: 91).

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world

197

Because of the control that the political system claims to exercise on borders, actors who derive their cognitive, normative and evaluative orientations primarily from the health or the economic subsystem often directed expectations and demands to the political system. In the face of the nineteenth-century cholera pandemics, contagionists usually expected political authorities to break chains of transmission through a wide range of measures restricting mobility: forced hospitalization, isolation and sequestration of the ill, quarantines, cordons sanitaires around districts, towns, regions and countries. In order words, they often (but not always) advocated a ‘quarantinist’ position, while their medical opponents pointed at the futility of restrictive measures and supported ‘sanitationist’ measures instead: public programmes aimed at improving per­ sonal hygiene, living conditions and sewage systems, and at alleviating poverty. Actors with an economic interest in open borders and free circulation of goods and people, on the other hand, expected the political system to limit restrictions to mobility to an absolute mínimum. The con­ flict among these contrasting perspectives manifested itself from the first outbreak of cholera in Europe. Russia, Austria and Prussia responded to the first pandemic with a raft of strict quarantinist measures, triggering the opposition of mercantile and commercial interests (Baldwin, 1999: 65). In turn, contagionists attacked ‘the middle and commercial classes, the trading interests whose self-serving ambitions subordinated the common epidemiological good to their own striving for unfettered commer­ cial exchange’ (Baldwin, 1999: 74-5). Commercial interests mobilized against quarantines also in other European countries, notably in France and Britain. In general, commercial circles objected to stringent quarantinist measures, while many - but by no means all - medical professionals favoured limitations to mobility. But the picture was considerably more complex, for three reasons. First, important sectors of both health circles and commercial circles questioned mainstream ‘interpretations’ of the impact of quarantines on health valúes and economic valúes. As noted above, many physicians denied that cholera was transmissible and saw little or no valué in quarantinist policies. Even in Britain, where commercial interests were most vocal in opposing quarantines, some traders realized that the abolition of quarantines in Britain would be detrimental to their interests if other countries responded by restricting access for ships departing from British ports (Baldwin, 1999: 97-8, 120, 205). Divisions among health experts as well as commercial interests increased opportunities for identifying what in section three has been called specific-interest agreements, and building coalitions that cut across subsystemic boundaries. A leading British anticontagionist, Charles Maclean, expressed this motive clearly:

198

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

I am rather at a loss to conceive how their being injurious to commerce could, in a commercial country, be regarded as an argument against seeking the abolition of otherwise pernicious establishments ... For my part, far from thinking it culpable to have availed myself of the support of commerce in combating the ridiculous but very pernicious dogmas of medical schools... I am very free to confess that I have, upon this occasion, diligently sought to range every interest, over which I could exercise the smallest influence, on the side of truth. (quoted by Ackerknecht, 1948: 591).

Second, neither medical ñor economic actors formulated expectations and demands purely with reference to their own subsystemic binary code, but incorporated other valúes in their Communications. For instance, an 1831 report on cholera by the French Academy of Medicine rejected quarantines and cordons within the country also on the grounds that they would have hampered economic activity and increased misery (Baldwin, 1999: 110). The fact that scientists and physicians appealed to com­ mercial arguments, and that commercial interests helped propágate a scientific theory, was not only the result of a desire to identify specificinterest agreements and thus build wider coalitions, but also the outcome of the intrapersonal mechanisms described in section three, notably integrative complexity and valué hybridization. The latter mechanism plays a key role in Erwin Ackerknecht’s interpretation of the clash between contagionism and anticontagionism, which stresses the interaction between the medical beliefs and the political beliefs of the participants: Intellectually and rationally the two [scientific] theories balanced each other too evenly. Under such conditions the accident of personal experience and temperament, and especially economic Outlook and political loyalties will determine the decisión. These, being liberal and bourgeois in the majority of physicians of the time brought about the victory of anticontagionism. (Ackerknecht, 1948: 589, emphasis removed).

In this interpretation, ‘[a]nticontagionists were... not simply scientists, they were reformers, fighting for the freedom of the individual and com­ merce against the shackles of despotism and reaction’ (Ackerknecht, 1948: 567). Third, governments did not regúlate mobility during pandemics sim­ ply in response to the shifting alliances and demands'of medical and commercial circles. A key concern was the maintenance of public order. When cholera made its first appearance in eastern and central Europe, the quarantinist measures hastily put in place by the authorities sparked a wave of unrest, riot and rebellion, which caused the most drastic policies to be abandoned. The British authorities in India refrained from quaran­ tinist regulation of pilgrimages for fear of causing unrest among Muslims as well as Hindus (Baldwin, 1999: 59-65, 121, 236). On the other hand,

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world

199

the need to assuage concerned ‘public opinión’ - specifically the mass of people who neither travelled ñor traded across international borders was often cited by policy makers as an obstacle to the relaxation of quarantine provisions (Baldwin, 1999: 198-201). Also geostrategic concerns played an important role in quarantine policies, which emerged most intensely in the controversy over quarantines requirements for (mostly British) ships transiting the Suez Canal. In conclusión, this section has shown that, despite the general macrohistorical trend towards functional differentiation, the promotion of health goals was always discursively connected to other goals, and that more recent linkages (health as human right, HIV/AIDS as security threat etc.) are continuations of older practices. All the mechanisms presented in section three, notably integrative complexity, valué hybridization and the Identification of specific-interest agreements, played some role in this, although their relative importance varied depending on the context and the circumstances. The net effect of the competitivé and cooperative patterns described in this section was that, throughout the nineteenth century, most European governments adopted more or less stringent quarantine regimes, with disruptive consequences for international traffic. The only coun­ tries that systematically avoided intrusive quarantinist approaches were the Netherlands and Britain, while France was split between generally quarantinist Mediterranean ports and non-quarantinist Atlantic ports. Central and local authorities frequently changed politics and regulations, which added to the discomfort of passengers and to commercial losses. This situation created incentives to coordínate disease control policies at the international level. The extern to which attempts at international coordination of policies also produced the ‘internationalization’ of the social mechanisms described in section three is the theme addressed in the next section.

5

The international sanitary conferences

The first proposal to convene a conference of delegates from various European countries in order to discuss the issue of quarantine arrangements in Mediterranean ports was made by the French government in 1838. Britain responded positively to the proposal and supported successive attempts by the French government. A conference was finally convened in París in 1851, with the participation of delegates from 12 European States. Eleven more international sanitary conferences took place between 1859 and the outbreak of World War I. The fifth

200

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

conference, which met in Washington in 1881, was the first one to involve an extra-European State. Rather than presenting a chronological summary of the discussions and decisions that took places in these conferences, I will highlight the features of these conferences that are most relevant for the relationship between segmental differentiation and functional differentiation in world society.9 To reformulate the questions mentioned in the introduction: did the conferences consist merely of an attempt to coordínate predefined ‘national’ interests in which health, economic and political goals were already reconciled? Or did they also contribute to easing tensions between functional subsystems? At least four considerations support the interpretation that segmentary differentiation was clearly predominant in the international health con­ ferences. First, the international sanitary conferences were very different from the international scientific conferences that also emerged and proliferated in the nineteenth century. Participants were selected by governments according to political criteria, not purely on the basis of scientific reputation or with the aim of representing a spectrum of opinions held by members of the scientific community in each State. In other words, they were not simply members of an ‘epistemic community’. Second, the delegates were authorized and expected to negotiate inter­ national agreements on quarantines, inspections and other policies that may have had an impact on international mobility. In accordance with most sources of international law, such agreements were not binding unless they were ratified by the participating States, and indeed States often failed to ratify sanitary conventions adopted by conference dele­ gates. For instance, the delegates to the 1851 conference adopted a draft Sanitary Convention and annexed draft International Sanitary Regula­ tions consisting of 137 articles, but only France and Piedmont-Sardinia ratified them (and the latter withdrew a few years later; Howard-Jones, 1975: 15). Third, concerns about sovereignty posed a powerful, albeit often implicit, constraint on the range of Solutions that were considered by the delegates. For instance, at the 1881 conference the US delegation proposed that States should have the right to inspect foreign ships not only on arrival, but also on departure from their home ports, through 9 Space restrictions prevent me from addressing the dimensión of stratificatory differentia­ tion, although differences in power and status played an extremely important role in how European governments related to Egypt, Persia, the Ottoman empire and other States during the conferences, as well as the crucial relationship between European imperial metropoles and extra-European colonies. On these aspeets, see Watts (1997) and Aginam (2003).

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world

201

their own consular officials. This form of ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction’ was rejected by the other delegations as an infringement of sovereignty. This caution extended also to lesser ‘intrusions’: when at the 1866 conference it was proposed that an international scientific commission should be sent to study cholera where it originated, the British delegation protested that this would have infringed the sovereignty of States with possessions in India (Howard-Jones, 1975: 31, 43-4). However, European delegations had few qualms about limiting the sovereignty of extra-European countries, such as Egypt, Persia and the Ottoman empire. Fourth, and crucially for the aims of this chapter, the question arises whether the delegares approached the conference with clearly defined ‘national positions’, which reflected a domestically attained weighing and aggregation of different valúes - specifically economic, health and polit­ ical valúes. If this was the case, the conferences may have helped coordination between ‘segments’ (i.e. States), but not between ‘functional subsystems’. There are strong reasons for answering that question in the affirmative. Delegares often defended positions that reflected nationally specific trade-offs between different valúes and other domestic conditions. This can be seen most clearly in the case of the British delegates, who most consistently advocated the abolition, or at least the relaxation, of quarantinist policies (although Britain itself continued to apply them in some circumstances (Baldwin, 1999: 150)). This consistency is explained by the combination of two factors: on the one hand, a high proportion of British physicians and scientists tended towards anticontagionism and thus expressed little or no support for quarantines. On the other hand, commercial interests had a disproportionate influence over the British government compared to most continental States and thus the pressure against quarantines was especially powerful. It is hardly surprising, then, that British delegates pursued a range of antiquarantinist objectives at all conferences.10 Nonetheless, several aspects of the international sanitary conferences suggest that they did not opérate merely as forums for the attainment of interstate cooperation, but also as forums where the concerns of func­ tional subsystems could be considered and possibly reconciled. First, in most conferences delegations were composed of medical scien­ tists as well as diplomats. This arrangement started at the first conference of 1851, to which ‘[m]ost countries sent two delegates, a diplomat and 10 Additional reasons are that Britain was protected by its geographical position and that it had stronger administrative capabilities to control and manage infected individuáis within the country and not only at the borders (Baldwin, 1999: 211-26, 236^43).

202

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

a physician, the former in order to ensure that political and commercial matters were given due consideration’ (Harrison, 2006: 215). The rela­ tionship between diplomáis and scientists was not always smooth. At the opening session of the 1851 conference, for instance, it was stated that scientific discussions had to be avoided, but, in fact, extensive discussions of the causes of diseases took place. ‘The diplomats frequently resented this lack of clarity and the battles between different scientific camps and opinions and criticized the scientists as being long-winded and imprac­ ticable’ (Huber, 2006: 459-60). When a second conference took place eight years later, only diplomats were invited in order ‘to avoid the lengthy and unproductive debates of the 1851 conference’ (Huber, 2006: 461). Medical scientists were allowed to take part in all subsequent conferences. But the relative importance of scientific, commercial and political considerations remained a source of contention. For instance, in 1888 a British observer commented that governments ‘are more easily affected by the impediments to the transport of troops and merchandise in the ships they subsidize than by arguments addressed to scientific minds’ (cited by Baldwin, 1999: 192). Second, the procedural rules of some conferences allowed or even pro­ meted departures from predefined ‘national positions’. Votes on questions of Science as well as questions of policy were frequently taken. In the first and third conference, it was agreed that each State would be entitled to two votes, but that voting should be by individual delegate rather than by country. As a result, it often happened that two delegares of the same country would vote in opposite ways (Howard-Jones, 1975: 12). In the later conferences, however, Huber notes a decrease of freedom of the delegares to express their opinions. In contrast to the earlier conferences, the preparatory period of the conferences of 1892, 1893, and 1894 saw the circulation of questionnaires, meetings of the representatives of different offices well before the conference, the formation and negotiation of alliances, and the issuing of very tight instructions to the delegates. The rise of modern technology not only allowed cholera to cross large distances more quickly, it also made it possible for the ministerial offices and the press to monitor the delegations and the proceedings of the conferences much more closely. (Huber, 2006: 470).

Third, the mode of interaction combined bargaining and deliberation (see Risse, 2000). Deliberative attitudes were particularly evident in the technical committees set up by the general conferences, but they also pervaded contributions to plenary discussions. This required attention to be paid to a number of distinct concerns and objectives. For instance, in 1903 Foreign Office officials retorted to critics that if they had only argued the interests of shipping against quarantine, Britain would never

International institutions in a functionally differentiated world

203

have convinced other States to follow its lead in reducing the burdens of quarantine (Baldwin, 1999: 242). Crucially, deliberation not only con­ cerned the most efficient or equitable way to reconcile conflicts of interests among States, but also how those interests should be defined in the first place, and specifically the weight to be given to a range of medical, economic and other considerations. Fourth, deliberative processes within the international sanitary conferences were one of the factors that produced convergence on specific policies. Since the 1870s Britain and other States increasingly adopted what Baldwin (1999) calis ‘neoquarantinism’: this consisted in replacing quarantines with inspections and surveillance of passengers without symptoms, isolating the ill and thoroughly disinfecting persons, goods, vessels and dwellings. Such revisions were first proposed at the 1874 Vienna Conference and became the object of wide agreement in the conferences of the 1890s (Baldwin, 1999: 189-90). The principies of neoquarantinism finally allowed States to develop a range of regulations that all States could accept, a goal that had eluded them for decades: the conventions that resulted from the conferences of the 1890s were widely adopted and implemented.

6

Conclusions

The type of international institutions considered in this chapter are purposively created and supported by States. It is thus natural that the inter­ action they help structure mainly takes the form of a process of coor­ dination among State interests. However, looking at world society from the point of view of different forms of differentiation, and specifically the relationship between segmentary and functional differentiation, raises the question of whether and to what extern international institutions and organizations perform the additional function of facilitating the coordina­ tion of functional subsystems. This chapter has examined the early stages of international health cooperation and found that segmentary elements were predominant. However, it also found that the international sanitary conferences were not merely a forum where States pursued interests that reflected an already clearly defined trade-off between different health, economic and political valúes. The task of balancing those valúes was to some extern transposed to those international negotiation forums, and partly achieved through deliberative and framing processes. The fact that interest, valué and knowledge coalitions cut across State borders reveáis that an embryonic form of ‘transnational neopluralism’ was already in place (Cerny, 2010b; see also his contribution in this volume).

204

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Future research could consider how the trade/health interface was addressed at crucial moments of the twentieth and early twenty-first cen­ tury. On the one hand, intersystemic coordination is likely to have been facilitated by the emergence of international organizations, at least to the extent that those organizations had an institutional interest in promoting it. On the other hand, as Fidler, Drager and Lee (2009) have noted, today a fragmented, heterogeneous and legally undemanding global health governance complex faces a more structured, formalized and legalized trade governance complex. Whether international institutions are bet­ ter at addressing the tensions stemming from functional differentiation now than in the nineteenth century is a matter that deserves further study.

10

Functional differentiation, globalization and the new transnational neopluralism Philip G. Cerny

1

Introduction: globalization and differentiation

The concept of differentiation is a complex and contested one. Func­ tional differentiation, segmentary differentiation and straficatory differ­ entiation - to take the three main types analysed in this book - are inextricably intertwined, and this is particularly the case with regard to globalization. This chapter argües not only that these forms of differ­ entiation are interlocked in a dynamic process of change, but also that this very process is transforming the character of functional differentia­ tion itself. On the one hand, all three types of differentiation increasingly cut across State borders, enmeshing both State and non-state structures and actors in ‘third-level games’ - political, economic and social - that transform the nature of the State itself, partly bypassing and undermining States as internally relatively self-sufficient systems and partly transforming what States do in response to global challenges. It is not a question of whether, for example, various ‘powers’ - the United States, Europe, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) etc. - are ‘rising’ or ‘declining’. It is rather how they are adapting to a more complex, multilayered, ‘glocalized’ world order. On the other hand, functional differentiation is taking new forms. Differentiation processes involve new, complex and untried forms of sociality, economic interdependence and political action at global and/or transnational levels, which cali into question the very nature of the ‘sectors’ at the core of the concept of functional differentiation. The relatively simple structural distinctions between politics, economics and society have been replaced by a wider range of differently interlocking sectors at micro, meso and macro levels - sectors that each have a distinct dynamic mix of political, economic and sociological dimensions. The ‘organic, evolved entity’ required for social cohesión (see the introduction to this volume) that has historically been represented by the State, is being however unevenly and messily - crosscut, undermined and overlaid by complex, multilayered and multidimensional realities. 205

206

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

The consequence of these changes is that the international - or global system is in uncharted waters, characterized by múltiple equilibria that analysts and actors alike must navigate through without the benefit of the state-centric charts previously available. What new forms of functional differentiation might evolve at global/transnational levels: global gover­ nance (the transnational ‘political sector’)? Domination by a transnational capitalist class or global markets (the transnational ‘economic sector’)? global civil society - or an amorphous ‘neomedievalism’ or ‘durable disorder’ (the transnational ‘social sector’)? The lessons of the recent global financial crisis are not reassuring. At the end of this chapter I elabórate on these stylized scenarios. However, as the proverb goes (variously attributed to at least two dozen people, from Niels Bohr and Yogi Berra to Woody Alien and Confucius): ‘Prediction is difficult, especially about the future’. 2

The concept of functional differentiation in a globalizing world

Functional differentiation is a complex and contested concept, depending on the meaning of the term ‘function’. In traditional sociological structural functionalism, functions were represented by the división of labour among different processes that comprised the overarching ‘structure’ or system. These functions were, by definition, ‘functional’ to the working of the whole. However, ‘function’ also has a broader, more descriptive meaning, derived from the etymological root of the word in Latin fungí (fungar) - to perform or execute a task. The American political scientist Frank Sorauf (1968) defined functions as ‘tasks, roles, and activities’ performed by actors and substructures within a wider system, whether ‘functional’ in the narrow sense or not - that is, they involve what peo­ ple do in practice. Functional differentiation, then, is crucial not only for an understanding of system maintenance and evolution, but also for the emergence, decomposition and transformation of society (see the introduction to this volume). The significance of functional differentia­ tion in an era of globalization is its conceptual capacity to help analyse and explain fundamental processes of change in the World system from a system rooted in distinct ‘levels of analysis’ (Hollis and Smith, 1990) distinguishing between what goes on within the State from that which goes on between States (i.e. the system of State sovereignty ostensibly characteristic of the modern era) - to one that involves the increasing role of crosscutting or transnational tasks, roles and activities characteristic of the twenty-first century and the global era.

Functional differentiation, globalization and neopluralism

207

The structural basis of the ‘modern’ (nineteenth- and twentiethcentury) States system was rooted in the multifunctionality of the State itself, not only welding domestic societies into single, unified political processes - Waltz’s (1979) ‘hierarchy’ - but also creating the kind of unity that enabled States themselves to survive in an international system composed of other State ‘unit actors’. Such a system, lacking a higher level of authoritative governance than the State, in principie enabled States to survive and, hopefully, to prosper through ‘self-help’ in a system where States themselves were the only truly independent variables and the only determining currency in their relations was power - Waltz’s ‘anarchy’. Endogenous and exogenous political processes alike were therefore ostensibly subject to the channelling of decisión making and implementation through the State, giving State actors a privileged position in developing and putting into practice a holistic state-based approach to society construction, domestic public policy and international relations. Pluralism among horizontally stratified actors and socio-economic subsystems was supposed both pragmatically and nofmatively to be limited to the domestic sphere. Politics, as Senator Arthur Vandenberg said in the late 1940s, stopped at the water’s edge. Durkheim stated that there was no such thing as an international división of labour; his analysis was explicitly limited to within the confines of the nation-state (Durkheim, 1933). However, the State as hierarchical ‘unit actor’ was always a frag­ üe political project rather than a fait accompli, as numerous histories attest. Today the globalization process has increasingly exposed the lim­ its of State holism, undermining multifunctionality (Cerny, 1995). Not only are social, economic and political issue areas increasingly being defined in transnational terms, but the State itself is becoming disaggregated (Slaughter, 2004); political and policymaking processes are being integrated across borders; and interest groups and coalitions - both ‘sectional’ and ‘valué’ groups (Key, 1953) - increasingly organize and coordínate their activities transnationally in order to be effective in such an environment. Rather than unitary State actors holding a dominant position in such complex political processes, simultaneously playing and coordinating both types of Putnam’s (1988) ‘two-level games’, we can increasingly identify a broad range of both non-state and disaggregated State actors - material interest groups, social movements and their bureaucratic interlocutors at both domestic and transnational levels - that are being drawn into crosscutting and overlapping transnational webs of power and influence. These webs are increasingly organized around dif­ ferentiated issue areas - differently structured economic sectors, crosscut­ ting social policy issues, regulatory arbitrage, environmental challenges,

208

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

ethnic conflict and the like - rather than bordered territorial spaces. Such issue areas are at the core of today’s functional differentiation, rooted in the distinct ways these issue areas (1) are internally structured and (2) interact at a systemic level with other issue areas. The emerging pattern of functional differentiation in the twenty-first century international sys­ tem, then, is defined here as the growing tendency of social, political and economic action to coagúlate and consolidate around transnationally defined issues, in other words, cutting across borders, giving rise to distinct - differentiated - crosscutting political processes. The form this pattern takes can be labelled transnational neopluralism (Cerny, 2010b). As McFarland (2004) has pointed out with reference to American domestic politics, neopluralist political processes consist of the rela­ tions within distinct issue areas among three types of groups and actors: (1) material interest groups or what V.O. Key (1953) called ‘sectional groups’, today including multinational firms and players in transnational markets of various kinds; (2) social movements and what Key called ‘valué groups’, again organizing across borders and includ­ ing so-called NGOs and ‘transnational advocacy coalitions’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998); and (3) the population of relevant public sector actors within and across States and international public institutions, includ­ ing what have been called ‘transgovernmental networks’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Slaughter, 2004). This neopluralist process of conflict, competition and coalition-building among various constellations of actors (individuáis and groups) with increasingly dense transnational linkages and networks, while still in the early stages of development, involves both the decomposition and restructuring of certain key forms of traditional domestic interest group and pluralist politics, and the emer­ gence, at the same time, of new forms of functional differentiation characteristic of the global era. For example, global-local linkages called ‘glocalization’ - are cutting across nation-state divisions and creating new divisions of their own. These restructured linkages are at the heart of the new functional differentiation. Furthermore, new webs of social, political and economic relationships - usually combining all three of these strands together, rather than seeing them as sepárate ‘functional’ relationships - are thus partly competing with, partly overlaying, and partly replacing the ‘modern^ governmentality of raison d’état (Foucault, 2008) with a globalizing awareness and discourse I have called raison du monde (Cerny, 2010a; 2010b). In this sense, rather than ‘function’ being a function of structure, so to speak, as in traditional structural functionalism, ‘structure’ is a function of func­ tion. It evolves - deco'mposes and emerges - as things that people do, the tasks, roles and activities that characterize social life, transforming

Functional differentiation, globalization and neopluralism

209

the structure in the process. This is sometimes called ‘structuration’ (Giddens, 1979; Cerny, 2000c; 2010b:87-97). ‘Vertical’ borders separating distinct, hierarchically organized nation-states - sometimes referred to as ‘containers’ (see Brenner et al., 2003) - are thus being undermined and overlaid with functionally differentiated ‘horizontal’ or crosscutting borderings. However, what kind of overarching structure or system is emerging is unclear. This process of change can be seen to lead to three possible alternative scenarios (see Cerny, 2010b: 302-6), which I will return to briefly at the end of this chapter: (1) a transnational or inter­ national system that is actually unified by an emerging but now transnationalized Durkheimian división of labour, creating new opportunities for pluralism and a ‘decentralised, non-hierarchical, fluid organisation’ of‘post-bureaucratic governance’ (Eagleton-Pierce, 2011); (2) a newly institutionalized inequality, not between States but rather between groups and categories of people, based on the hegemony of transnational capitalism, whether through transnational class consolidation (van der Pijl, 1998; Sklair, 2000) or a more discursive ‘new constitutionalism ’ (Gilí, 2003); or (3) increased decomposition into a ‘new Middle Ages’ based on more complex, ‘glocalized’ inequalities (Cerny, 1998).

3

Vertical and horizontal borderings

Politics and society have been seen, ever since Plato’s Republic, as involving two kinds of bordering and structural differentiation. The first or vertical dimensión is one of geographical place - of situating and rooting political systems and communities in particular physical or territorial locations. Like other societies of this sort, nation-states are not merely characterized by ‘segmentary differentiation’ based on social linkages; these ‘hard’ geographical places provide the material conditions for the development of the necessary face-to-face contacts, knowledge-sharing networks, resource agglomerations, and organizational synergies neces­ sary for eífective collective action. The second or horizontal dimensión is one of social stratification or functional differentiation, of evolving and rooting that collective life in a división of labour and function among different human tasks, roles and activities. Although often thought of as ‘soft’ or ‘virtual’ spaces, the latter define the boundaries of human life at least as much as, or more than, hard geographical spaces. At the same time they are complex and multidimensional, reflecting the myriad dimensions of politics, economy and society more closely than mere geography. Through most of human history, political actors have sought, for political, economic or socio-cultural reasons, to fuse these two distinct kinds of bordering within the same multifunctional social and

210

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

organizational unit — the politeia or political community, whether at village, regional, city-state, nation-state or imperial level. The multifunctionality of macro-social institutions, however constituted, has since the birth of human society been perceived as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for political, ideological and administrative effectiveness. Nevertheless, deep tensions between these two distinct forms of differenti­ ation (and cooperation) have always constituted a profound source of political instability, economic inefficiency, organizational disorder and social conflict. Historically, those tensions have increased the larger the physical scale of the territorial unit involved, and the more complex the economic and political life meant to be contained within that unit. Multifunctionality and size together bring increased costs as well as benefits. Two sorts of limiting processes are always at work. On the one hand, looser, more diffuse and extended forms of political organization, such as traditional empires and feudal systems, suffer from both local and external centrifugal forces pulling them apart; on the other hand, more localized, city-state-type units cannot benefit from the military and economic economies of scale and scope potentially available to larger units. Thus the role of nation-states as building blocks has always been highly problematic. The modern nation-state has been a political project rather than a fait accompli. It has continually been manipulated, undermined and reshaped, politically, economically and culturally - both from above by formal and informal empires (Appleman Williams, 1972; Subrahmanyam, 2006) and Kotkin’s (1992) global tribes and, of course, from below, by class, ethnic and political divisions. But today’s challenge is not merely one of degree; it is one of kind. The particular form of organiza­ tional fusión that has constituted the modern State is increasingly being cut across and challenged systematically from both above and below by transnationalization and globalization, which bring pressures from both directions together across territorial borders. Out of globalization has come a new, post-nation-state political project of complex, flexible, multilevel fusión, a project in which multifunctionality is pushed increasingly into the background, and a project with its ideological foundations in the spread of neoliberalism, itself driven and shaped'by transnational neopluralism (Cerny, 2008). That transnational neoplurálism is in turn creating new transnational forms of functional differentiation.

4

Disembedding the nation-state and the States system: the^seeds of change

In both traditional realist and neorealist thinking, politics, economies and society have been bifurcated between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’.

Functional differentiation, globalization and neopluralism

211

The ‘inside’ is seen as relatively civilized (or civilizable), characterized by some as ‘hierarchical’ and by others as an arena for the pursuit of col­ lective action and collective valúes such as liberty and social justice. The ‘outside’, in contrast, is seen as either an ungoverned semi-wilderness characterized as ‘anarchical’ and ruled entirely by power balances and imbalances among States mainly constructed through war, or as a quite different sort of society, a semi-governed but often fragüe ‘society of States’ (Bull, 1977; Buzan, 2004). This conceptualization of world poli­ tics is only credible because the actors who have created, Consolidated and built upon the nation-state have seen - and constructed - the nation-state itself as a crucial, Janus-like structural axis of this system. Political actors are compelled by the system’s structural imperatives to be concerned at one and the same time with pursuing projects of political, social and economic improvement at home - what Foucault has called ‘biopolitics’ (2008) - while also paying attention, first and foremost, to constructing and defending the structural ‘bottom line’ of sovereignty - which means securing and defending the homelañd from external threats and pursuing ‘national interests’ abroad. Reconciling these two tasks is at the core of the concept of multifunctionality and raison d’état. The underlying pseudo-material foundation of this schizophrenic political balancing act is territoriality, or what Bob Jessop and Neil Brenner have called the ‘spatio-temporal fix’ (see Cerny, 2006). Eventually, with the decolonization of the European empires in the 1950s and 1960s, the whole globe was ostensibly carved up into discrete nation-states with supposedly clear, internationally recognized territorial boundaries - the last gasp of nation-state development before the current wave of globalization. Nevertheless, the project of establishing sin­ gle, unidimensional boundaries for human societies was a deeply flawed project in the first place. It was always crosscut by transnational con­ flicts, cleavages and connections: whether by political empires, alliances and ideologies; by an increasing economic división of labour as capitalist modernization progressed; and by cross-border of social bonds, patterns of communication, migration and social movements - indeed, by all three in complex feedback circuits. That project could only be taken to its highest level - the ‘high mod­ ern’ nation-state of approximately 1850-1950 - because it coincided and fitted together with the other great organizational project of the modern world, the Second Industrial Revolution. This structural congruence of Weberian bureaucratic politics and Fordist economics - the coming of modern, large-scale hierarchical organizations in both politics and economics - squared the circle of territoriality. The surge of ‘late industrialization’ carne at a time of huge technological change and the growth of economies of scale in such industries as the railways, Steel,

212

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Chemicals, Communications and later automobiles - the source of the term ‘Fordism’. It was only when such large-scale industrial organiza­ tion - what Chandler (1990) called the ‘modern industrial enterprise’, something that passed Britain by at the time (Kemp, 1969; Hobsbawm, 1968) - carne into being that the fusión of Clausewitzian militarybureaucratic statism, economic-industrial statism, and welfare statism could take place. It also fostered two World Wars started by autarchic national empires and, eventually, the Coid War of the mid-twentieth century. At the same time, the United States, because of its special conditions - extensive domestic natural resources and available land; a rapidly growing internal market; huge investment flows from abroad (especially Britain); a large middle class and growing working class rooted in the flow of ambitious, hardworking immigrants; a strong educational system and technological infrastructure; and a liberal political tradition (Hartz, 1955) - was rapidly rising to economic as well as political pre-eminence. And the welfare State, from Bismarck to Lloyd George to Franklin Delano Roosevelt (not to mention its role in Fascism and Communism as well as in the democracies) created the crucial popular base for this mod­ ern State form by incorporating the working classes into both national consciousness and the growth of the national economy. But the requirements for nation-state building were extremely rigorous. Boundaries had to endose or ‘contain’ three basic types of variables political, economic and socio-cultural. In the first place, it required the development of a State apparatus and a political process that could at least to some extern be effectively sovereign: not only an organized bureau­ cracy, especially a military and pólice bureaucracy that could impose order (Weber’s ‘monopoly of legitímate violence’) and the rule of law; but also a policy-making process that sought to shape and ostensibly improve the lives of the people enclosed within those boundaries (Foucault’s ‘biopolitics’). Perhaps even more important was the capacity to get different interests, factions, groups, classes, ethnicities etc., to accept a set of common rules of the game in order to transform their potential for conflict into relatively peaceful competition. The development of political institutions, political systems and, in particular, widely accepted legal systems required a holistic, centripetal form of ofganization that benefited particularly from territoriality. Second, the boundary-setting process required the establishment of national economies - production and market systems to a significant extent rooted and ‘contained’ within national borders. It was only when the economic bureaucracies of large-scale capitalism developed and when industrialization and economic growth became the main objectives of government policy with the Second Industrial Revolution, that State and

Functional differentiation, globalization and neopluralism

213

industrial bureaucracies partly fused (Lenin and Hilferding’s ‘finance capital’: Lenin, 1917) and partly mimicked each other (Galbraith’s ‘new industrial State’: Galbraith, 2007) that a range of key economic activities not all of them, of course - could be enclosed behind national borders and integrated with the political processes discussed above. At the same time, this growth process created sufíiciently large economic surpluses that governments could skim off enough in taxes (Schumpeter, 1991) to build the foundations of industrial welfare States, further integrating a range of ‘domestic’ groups and interests into the political process and giving them stakes in the bordered nation-state (Gallarotti, 2000). Third, of course, was the challenge of creating socio-cultural enclosure. Popular nationalism was a key bulwark against internationalist lib­ eralism and socialism as well as subnational and local particularism. The Kulturkampf (Úie government-led ‘cultural struggle’ to incúlcate a nationalist spirit) in 1870s Germany was not merely a Bismarckian invention, but an inherent part of a much longer-term process everywhere, although it took quite different forms (Curtius, 1962). With regard to religión, the original 1648 Peace of Westphalia was an essential agreement and Sym­ bol of the subordination of religious institutions to the authority of the national State, with other aspects of sovereignty an afterthought. Linguistic integration has been a running battle too. Industrialized warfare crucially brought together bureaucratic political, economic and cultural organization into one cataclysmic experience for ordinary people, fusing them into a technologically advanced fighting forcé and centralized support system, and forging them into seeing themselves as a ‘people’ united in deadly conflict while their other experiences were still much more fragmented (Pursell, 1994). Finally, democracy ostensibly fused political institutions and processes with both economic processes (eco­ nomic growth, capitalist firms, the welfare State) and a sense of belonging or ownership of the nation-state from the bottom up. It would seem understandable, then, to conclude that the whole nationstate project was riddled with exceptions and structural weaknesses. The domestic political development of various countries was often more cen­ trifuga! than centrípeta! in its underlying dynamics, as conflicting groups sought to suppress each other, to exelude their opponents and to demand their complete defeat and often elimination, rather than to inelude them, as in the Iraqi notion of sahel (Wong, 2007). Fear of defeat on the part of particular groups, whether hegemonic or subaltern, led to vicious spirals or negative-sum games where no-one was willing to compromise. All factions were fearful of defeat and ruthless in victory. In many cases, in fact, it was only severe authoritarian measures that enabled the enclosure process to move ahead. Democratization often proved dysfunctional

214

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

rather than functional - leading not to internal compromise on political processes but to intensified conflict between entrenched and excluded groups - until some proto-states reached a later stage when national integration had already developed by other, generally top-down, means, or indeed they had had it forced upon them through defeat in war to already democratized powers (Cerny, 2009a). However, as historians like Kennedy (1987) and Spruyt (1994) have pointed out, what really drove the political enclosure process - its core Paradox — was its reciprocal, mutually Interactive character among States internationally, where States either imitated, or were forced to imitate, each other in order to survive. The kind of unidimensional national boundaries characteristic of the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries were ultimately, and ironically, the by-product of the clash of failed impe­ rial projects within Europe itself. As Spruyt (1994) has argued, certain quasi-empires - Bourbon France being the prototype - succeeded by doing two things at the same time: simultaneously creating strong domestic organizational structures (‘arenas of collective action’) and defending themselves effectively against external predators (allowing them to make ‘credible commitments’ with regard to other States). In this hostile environment, however, the most successful nation-building projects within Europe were precisely those where State actors effectively diverted the imperial project outwards to the rest of the world. The imperative of continually keeping up with the Bourbons ultimately required the conquest of overseas empires in order to generate economic surpluses, involving the increasing power and impact of ‘empire-states’ in particular (Subrahmanyam, 2003). To this was added the ever denser and more profound internationalization of the once European nation-state system, not only through European empires but eventually by Europe’s position at the interface of the competing American and Soviet empires (Deporte, 1979) and the process of European integration. This confrontation of capitalism and communism ironically replaced the political and social valúes maintained through enclosed nation-state borders with those of universal valúes - transnational images of freedom, equality and social justice. At the same time, the entropy characteristic of many of the new postcolonial nation-states of the Thir'd World demonstrated that imitation does not bring success if the political, economic and social preconditions of border-setting are not in place. The development of the nation-state and the States system was therefore a schizophrenic affair, its very success implanted from the start with seeds of decay. On the one hand, the convergence of political, economic and social boundaries led to an embeddednéss of territoriality at the nation-state level, a sense that the locality of human activities had shifted to a higher scale and that

Functional differentiation, globalization and neopluralism

215

village, local región or city-state institutions and the sense of belonging that had characterized family and kinship based societies - what sociologists cali Gemeinschaft (Tónnies, 2003) - had effectively been transferred upwards to the level of the nation-state. On the other hand, however, at the same time the development of a capitalist world economy, the ideologization of politics around universal valúes, and concepts like social ‘modernization’, ‘individualization’, ‘functional differentiation’ and the like - not to mention extended notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘social justice’ created a wider framework of action for individuáis and groups, beginning the process of disembedding the nation-state and creating a discursive underpinning for the extensión of neopluralist politics to the global stage and embedding new forms of functional differentiation. 5

Deconstructing the nation-state paradigm

The boundary-setting process was always contingent, and therefore contained the seeds of its own decay, ás with all Kuhnian paradigms. Of course, that process of decay has not yet smashed the nation-state as such. Rather, it has enmeshed the nation-state and the States system in cross-cutting webs of governance and of transnationally embedded social, political and economic processes, creating complex non-territorial functional-boundaries. In the first place, a trial-and-error process of developing international institutions and regimes has been in place since the late nineteenth century in a range of issue areas and policy domains, starting with Communications (the International Telegraph Union), taking a major if problematic leap with collective security (the League of Nations), and, after the Second World War, being extended to a whole gamut of issues. By the end of the twentieth century a new term, ‘global governance’, was being applied to such regimes taken together. Although for the most part such institutions remained ‘intergovernmental’, that is, subordinated to negotiations among their member governments, they increasingly achieved a certain autonomous legitimacy and authority, given that governments found it more and more difficult to act independently and were in turn subjected to the imperative of seeking cooperative outcomes (Ruggie, 1993). At the same time, issues of public policy increasingly carne to reflect a range of often asymmetric complex interdependencies across borders. Macroeconomic policy, partially shielded from international pressures during the post-war period of embedded liberalism and the expansión of the welfare State, became progressively subjected to ‘embedded financial orthodoxy’ (Cerny, 1994a) and priority was given to anti-inflationary policy, deregulation and privatization. Trade policy was of course a

216

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

particular focus, linking the politics of domestic interest groups, both elite and mass, with the process of reducing trade barriers. The collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime in the early 1970s accelerated the internationalization of financial markets and a process of regulatory arbitrage and competition among governments to retain and attract investment, leading further to discussions of the concept of an ‘International financial architecture’ (Germain, 2010). And the crisis of the welfare State in the 1970s inaugurated a painful process of restructuring social policy around market and business-type organizational prin­ cipies (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998; Evans and Cerny, 2003). Direct outcome-oriented State intervention in the economy was progressively replaced by process-oriented, ‘arm’s-length’ regulatory policies, publicprivate partnerships, and the pro-market approach of the competition State. Transgovernmental networks among policymakers and bureaucrats expanded, cutting across State hierarchies, and processes of policy transfer deepened (Evans, 2005). Of course, although these trends began within and across the more developed States, they also spread rapidly to ‘transition’ (i.e. post-Communist) and developing economies both through the demonstration effect and through pressure not only from the core States of the Group of 7 but also from international economic institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The political dynamics of mass politics and interest group politics have also been transformed. Business interests are increasingly dominated not simply by the interests of multinational corporations, but also by those of small and medium-sized enterprises whose upstream and downstream operations require foreign markets, external sources not only of raw materials but also of component parts and basic consumer Ítems, overseas labour resources and footloose sources of investment capital. People are more and more aware of the constraints of international economic conditions on interest rates, consumer prices, changing labour markets and the like, leading to new patterns of demands and voting. Political debate and party competition are increasingly dominated by the issue of how to deal with so-called ‘global realities’. At the end of the twentieth century it was possible to see domestic political systems them'selves as increas­ ingly becoming a terrain of conflict, competition and coalition-building between those groups, factions and parties that favoured more globaliza­ tion and neoliberalization and those that opposed it, being more in favour of the traditional ‘modern’ national-level politics of protection and redistribution. Today, however, that competition has come to be characterized by an embedded neoliberal consensus, where protection and redistribution are relegated to the periphery and mainstream discourse focuses, on the

Functional differentiation, globalization and neopluralism

217

one hand, on the need to ‘capture the benefits of globalization’ for purposes of rebuilding and rearticulating coalitions and, on the other, on the promise to move towards a more ‘social neoliberalism’ or ‘globalization with a human face’ (Cerny, 2008). Along the second dimensión discussed earlier, the economic dimen­ sión, the blurring and enmeshing of boundaries is even more obvious. There is no need here to expand at length about the roles of international financial markets, trade growth and interdependence, international production chains, multinational corporations and the like in deconstructing the economic borders so painfully erected in the process of nation-state building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. National markets and economic sovereignty are increasingly a fiction. Economic effectiveness, whether on the part of the prívate sector or of governments, today means the capacity to manipúlate international economic conditions in order to improve the profitability, productivity and competitiveness of domestic firms and economic activities vis-á-vis foreign and/or transna­ tional competitors and to obtain benefits from market interdependencies for domestic consumers (Cerny, 2010a). Where economies of agglomeration (or location) do occur, as they do in a number of key sectors, those locational advantages have less and less to do with nation-states as places/spaces per se (big factories, immediate access to raw material supplies, nationally integrated consumer markets etc.). In contrast, they increasingly involve craft industry synergies, knowledge clusters and the like - spaces and places that, like ‘world cities’ and regions like Silicon Valley, possess locational advantages that derive not from where they are physically located within a national territory, but how they are plugged into the global economy. Post-Fordism and the flexibilization of a range of industrial processes, along with marketing and the rapid expansión of Service sectors, imply synergies of ‘glocalization’ across geographically disconnected spaces. Of course, the political clout of ideas such as protectionism and domestic populist redistributionism is still powerful among certain voters and pressure groups, and is seen as a danger - and a possibility — in a world characterized by ‘the rise of the rest’ (cf. Morris, 2010; Moyo, 2011). Nevertheless, the discursive power of an emerging raison du monde - a general crosscutting ‘world-level rationality’ as distinct from the ‘society of States’ at the core of Watson’s raison du systéme (Watson, 1992) - must increasingly be called upon to legitímate collective action, both domestically and internationally. Along the third dimensión, the socio-cultural, the embeddedness of the nation-state and the States system is perhaps more robust. We are all brought up in a world of identity and belonging that privileges national-level social bonds, perceptions and discourses. People in

218

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

developed nation-states do indeed see themselves primordially as Amer­ ican, English (but perhaps not British...), French, Japanese etc. Nevertheless, other bonds, perceptions and discourses are increasingly overshadowing the national in ways that are growing in salience and intensity. This social transformation is even reflected in the rapid disillusionment with foreign military adventures that has been characteristic of recent decades. As with the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’, the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, and the American war in Iraq, empires and potential hegemons are being undermined just as much by opposition at home as by military defeat in the field - the ‘body bag syndrome’. Furthermore, immigrants, diasporas and other mobile individuáis and groups are no longer cut off from their networks of origin. The Internet, for example, creates virtual spaces for transnationally cormected people to maintain their identities in ways that represent neither the national space of their origins (where they may well have been minorities) ñor that of their destination country as such, but instead more complex spaces where both are inextricably intertwined. These are exemplified by remittances, which constitute an ever more significant source of development funding. The nation-state alone is too confining and counterproductive a source for identity formation, although no clear and dominant aiternative focus has yet emerged. In this context, transnational multiculturalism underpins the trend towards new forms of functional differentiation. Socio-cultural boundaries are less and less between fixed physical territories but cut right across individual identity too, like a more complex versión of those who were once derided as ‘hyphenated Americans’. Múltiple hyphenation of identities along different virtual or ‘soft’ borders (locational, ethnic, religious, gendered, occupational, orientation to ‘lib­ eral’ or ‘monistic’ politics etc.: Mostov, 2008) is the norm today. At the local end of the spectrum, some circumscribed but highly self-conscious communities like the Zapatistas of Chiapas in México do not merely make claims on behalf of their own unique political, economic and social autonomy (although many ethnic groups and tribes do). Rather they increasingly claim a universal right for such communities to demand autonomy from what they see as the oppressive centralization of statebuilding elites and the onslaught of multinational corpprations. At the global end of the spectrum, geographically dispersed groups - Kotkin’s ‘global tribes’, not to mention major religious groupings and transna­ tional ‘epistemic communities’ of experts and professionals - play a cru­ cial role across the world in spreading transnational and global knowledge and organizational forms. Of course, much of the present day analysis of the phenomenon 'of terrorism, along with the virtual elimination of inter-state wars and the ubiquity of below-the-border, cross-border and

Functional differentiation, globalization and neopluralism

219

civil wars, takes both its novelty and its significance from examining the organizational flexibility that derives from terrorism’s transnational, non-state character (Cerny, 2005). The ‘new security dilemma’ (Cerny, 2000a) is rooted in the failure of the States system to cope with these non-state security challenges. Finally, groups that might previously have been kept in subjection and ignorance of international and transnational movements have been empowered to demand more far-reaching changes, as with the ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in Tunisia and the subsequent, at the time of writing still unsettled, ‘Arab Spring’. 6

Decomposition and emergence, deconstruction and reconstruction, fusión and coalition-building

Boundaries1 are therefore less and less about distinctions between terri­ torial units and constituencies and more and more about those among: • different economic sectors with different asset structures (see below); • cross-cutting socio-cultural networks and interestgroups that span the local and the transnational; • State agencies (and public-private organizations) with competing dién­ teles and cross-cutting, cross-border (transgovernmental) connections; and • new groups of social and economic ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. What is emerging therefore is a range of attempts to politicize - that is, to (re)claim for the theoretical and normative as well as the practical realm of politics (and Political Science) - what has been seen up to now as a fundamentally economic image of globalization. This involves a reinvention of the social dimensión of politics through new policy and coalition ‘spaces’ populated by a wide range of both new and oíd political actors in both the developed and developing worlds. Although technological and economic structures can alter the parameters and payoff matrix of the playing field of politics and public policy, in the last analysis outcomes of the interaction of politics and economics in a transnational political context are primarily determined by political action and not merely by economic-structural variables. These new political processes are differ­ entiated more by sector and issue area than by physical, geographical and territorial space. They therefore involve the construction of new boundaries between issue areas - a ‘horizontal’ restructuring of functional differentiation - that are just as ‘real’ for the actors bounded by them as national borders. In many cases, they are even more ‘real’, impacting on people’s core interests in fundamental, behaviour-determining ways: 1 This section of the chapter builds upon Cerny (2009b).

220

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

through the distribution of economic opportunities, costs and benefits; through the construction and reconstruction of social bonds, ideologies, cultures and identities; and through changing patterns of politicking, policy making and pressure group activity - indeed in the most cru­ cial aspects of everyday life. Three kinds of bordering dimensions, taken together, differentiate these issue areas and distinguish the forms of governance most likely to develop in each - what are sometimes referred to as ‘policy domains’ (Arts et al., 2009). The first is a mainly economic-structural dimensión, developed primarily in the field of institutional economics - that of asset structure (Williamson, 1975; 1985). Williamson’s key hypothesis is as follows: Where a particular economic activity or process is characterized by assets that cannot easily be disconnected or disentangled from other assets in other words where assets are only ‘fit’ for a specific purpose and lose valué if redeployed for other purposes (‘specific assets’) and it is difficult or impossible to determine their prices through a standard, market-based price-setting mechanism - then they are usually more effectively organized and governed through hierarchical structures and processes, in other words, by decisión making or governance processes that determine the uses for those assets by authoritative pronouncement orfiat or ‘longterm contracting’. However, where an activity or process is characterized by assets that can be separated out and/or divided up without losing valué, especially where there are other uses to which they can be easily redeployed - where they can be bought and sold freely and where there is an efficient price-setting mechanism at work (‘non-specific assets’) then they are likely to be more efficiently organized through markets or ‘recurrent contracting’. In purely economic terms, this means that firms with extensive specific assets are more efficiently organized through quasi-monopolistic, hierar­ chical governance structures. In public policy terms, this means, on the one hand, that where a particular industry or activity is characterized predominantly by specific assets - for example, a large integrated ‘Fordist’ production process with non-divisible technological assets like big fae­ tones, long production fines, low marginal costs and high economies of scale based on economies of agglomeration (traditional cold-rolled Steel production, for example) - then direct government intervention, whether through public ownership, direct control, subsidization, tra­ ditional ‘hands-on’ forms of regulation and/or cióse regulation of prí­ vate monopolies or oligopolies (‘Utilities’), is more likely to lead to relatively efficient outeomes than privatization or marketization, which would lead to prívate monopolistic or opportunistic behaviour. On the other hand, where an industry or activity is characterized predominantly by

Functional differentiation, globalization and neopluralism

221

non-specific assets - say a flexible, post-Fordist Steel mini-mill or an internet firm - then not only will it be more efficiently organized through private markets, but also in public policy terms, arm’s-length regulation concerned with setting general, process-oriented rules for market transactions, ensuring price transparency and preventing fraud in an otherwise privately organized market setting, will be more efficient. This distinction becomes crucial when placed in the context of globalization, especially when applied to intermedíate forms such as networks (see Thompson et al., 1991). If globalization does indeed involve increasing flexibilization and postFordist production and distribution processes, and if a larger (global) market means that more assets can be traded on liquid transnational markets, this implies in economic terms that the specific-asset-dominated Second Industrial Revolution model of domestically based monopolies discussed earlier is increasingly likely to be replaced by a marketized, nonspecific-asset-dominated Third Industrial Revolution model of industrial organization and governance more generally. Public policy in turn is likely to shift its general orientation away from outcome-oriented, direct inter­ vention of the traditional type associated with the Industrial Welfare State towards process- or design-oriented regulation and reregulation. How­ ever, it also implies that public policy itself needs to become more flexibilized and marketized, moving away from what has been called a ‘one size fits all’ hierarchical bureaucratic form of intervention towards promarket regulation, privatization, contractualization and the like (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), if it is to be effective in such a transnational set­ ting. In this sense, globalization, flexibilization and neoliberalism actually open up more spaces for transnational political actors to conflict, com­ pete, cooperare and build coalitions. The traditional interventionist State becomes not only a ‘regulatory State’ (Moran, 2002), but also a competition State seeking to maximize returns from globalization (Cerny, 1997; 2000b; 2010a). In turn, the reconfigured boundaries among economic sectors and issue areas in a globalizing world open up a wide range of complex spaces - some new, some reconfigured ‘oíd’ spaces as political behaviour adjusts to the more complex global playing field - for transnationally linked political actors, especially interest groups that define those interests in their global context. The second dimensión therefore concerns the configurarían of interests characteristic of the industry or activity concerned. For example, where people involved in a particular industry are concentrated in a discrete geographical area and where the impact of competition (whether domestic or foreign) affects the whole interest group and not merely some subgroups, then there will be direct pressure, whether through lobbying

222

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

or electoral behaviour, for governments to promote or protect that industry through traditional outcome-oriented means. However, where those people affected by the fate of an industry are geographically dispersed indeed, this refers mainly to producer groups, as consumer groups are usually geographically dispersed anyhow - then political actors will have a wider set of policy options to deploy (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996). What appear to be the geographical boundaries of the firm or sector become transformed into boundaries between concentrated losers from market competition on the one hand, and both dispersed losers and winners on the other. Political coalitions between the two latter categories can often resist demands for protection from even the most concentrated losers (Milner, 1988). Patterns of cross-border sectional or economic-utilitarian politics of, say, specific agricultural sectors will be very different from those of a rapidly changing Steel industry, var­ ied high-tech sectors, textiles and other consumer goods, or the commercial aircraft industry, based mainly on their asset structures (spe­ cific or non-specific) and on their cross-border geographical integration and interdependence. And at another level, new forms of valué politics on a range of globalizing non-economic issue areas like AIDS prevention, poverty reduction, criminal law and the like, have been growing, where transnational pressure groups, advocacy coalitions and NGOs seek new ways to compete and cooperate in the quest for political influence, economic clout and social relevance (Lipschutz and Rowe, 2005). The third dimensión concerns the relative sensitivity and vulnerability of the industry or activity to international or transnational economic trends, in particular export potential, import vulnerability, position in an inter­ national production chain, exposure to internationally mobile capital and the like. When an industry or activity is insulated from such factors, then lobbying pressure and ‘iron triangles’ in that sector are likely to favour tra­ ditional protective/redistributive policy measures. However, where firms and sectors are highly integrated or linked into such structures and pro­ cesses, especially where there is a ‘world market price’ for a good or asset that determines local prices, then lobbying pressure from firms in that sector and from industry organizations is likely to be otganized through ‘flexible pentangles’ - coalitions that inelude transnational actors from outside the national ‘container’ and which opérate at transnational level to influence ‘global governance’ processes (Cerny, 2001). However, what is perhaps most important in portraying these processes of change is that certain key sectors, sectors that constitute structurally significant nodes of economic activity and thereby impact upon a wide range of other sectors, ‘go transnational’ first, creating a domino effect on others even

Functional differentiation, globalization and neopluralism

223

where they are characterized by more non-specific assets, geographical concentration of interests, and low sensitivity/vulnerability. Finance is a particularly crucial sector, linking together and acting as a ‘crossroads’ issue area and policy domain where most of the others meet (Cerny, 1994b; 2011). This is the case in developed countries and in developing countries too, where it forms the core of both the so-called Washington Consensus, and in a more complex manifestation, the post-Washington Consensus, with its increasingly regulatory focus (Guha, 2007). These dimensions might potentially be applied to assess the likelihood and shape of neoliberal policy innovation and coalition-building across a range of contrasting, differently structured issue areas and pol­ icy domains, and the actors that popúlate them, including: • financial systems and regulation, • international monetary policy and exchange rate management, • macroeconomic - fiscal and monetary - policy, • microeconomic and strategic industrial policy, • public and social Services, • trade policy, • corporate governance, • labour markets, • welfare States, and • the most informal, diffuse and unorganized - but nonetheless increas­ ingly marketized - issue area of all, consumption. This reconstruction of space implies that there exists a wide range of options for social and political action and policy innovation in different issue areas and policy domains even within the parameters of an embed­ ded neoliberal consensus. In some cases, traditional policies of subsidization and redistribution will be appropriate too, especially in times of crisis. However, it is ultimately the mix of policy measures that is at the core of the new transnational political process and neoliberal coalition-building. And it is, furthermore, crucial to examine the process of interaction among these and other issue areas and policy domains. As pointed out earlier, the politics of certain key issue areas like financial regulation can play a distinct catalytic role in reshaping global economics and politics as a whole, imposing their particular market and policy structures on other sectors and issue areas too. This is particularly clear in the wake of the recent global financial crisis. Finally, the emergence and construction of such horizontal borders is, I argüe, overdetermined. The actors and institu­ tions that make up the galaxy of multi-level governance and multi-nodal politics in the twenty-first century can all be seen as pushing more or less in the same direction, towards more transnationally interconnected political processes and market structures. Political, social and economic

224

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

actors in both domestic and international/transnational settings are all playing key - and broadly complementary roles - in reshaping patterns of functional differentiation today. 7

The new spatiality, or from containers to strainers

The oversimplified view of modern space and territoriality as requiring exclusive, multidimensional territorial borders needs to be replaced with a paradigm of complex linkages across space and time, along with the reordering of governance and politics along multi-level and multi-nodal lines. Such a process of restructuring - including, but going beyond, the notion of ‘networks’ to a more complex range of institutional forms, economic structures, social processes and patterns of politicking - is already increasingly organized by, and structured through, processes of transnational functional differentiation. States are no longer ‘containers’ of politics, economics and society, but ‘strainers’ through which each issue area is sifted into the complex politics of a globalizing world. The result is an emerging process of functional differentiation in the form of transnational neopluralism. This new world politics requires not domination and rule but what Presión has called ‘orchestration’ and ‘political choreography’ (Preston, 2000) - a ratcheting upwards of Foucault’s ‘art’ of governmentality to complex translocal, transnational, international and global levels. Political and institutional entrepreneurs must learn new skills, especially the skills involved in operating on several asymmetric playing fields at one and the same time - playing fields that can be within, cutting across, above and below old-fashioned national borders. This will require an increasing focus on new institutional strategies and institutional entrepreneurs as well as new policy strategies and policy entrepreneurs. World politics seems to be approaching a new tipping point - one which will deconstruct those boundaries, reconstruct them and construct new ones, connecting issue areas and policy domains across borders, producing a proliferation of innovative roles for actors in transnational neopluralist political processes, and embedding new patterns of functional differentiation among competing issue areas. Indeed, nation-state ‘strainers’ are not mere ‘constrainers’ but can provide structural opportunities for actors to shape the change process, as explicitly involved in the notions of the competition State, the regulatory State and transgovernmental net­ works, where the State itself is increasingly transnationalized from within as well as from without. This emerging transnational political process could conceivably lead in/to three contrasting directions or scenarios. Of course, given the comments above about complexity and evolution, these

Functional differentiation, globalization and neopluralism

225

scenarios are not zero-sum or mutually exclusive in nature. They are all in play simultaneously, and the particular permutation that emerges will depend not so much on a particular form of path dependency, but on the capacity of actors and, especially, transnational coalitions to shape the ongoing process of structuration - what I have called transnational neopluralism. Therefore, any outcome is likely to be a contingent com­ bination of the three. A first scenario suggests the emergence of a more pluralistic world based on the relatively peaceful competition of interest groups, whether mate­ rial or sectional, and/or valué groups and social movements, and political forces both within and cutting across States. Two linked hypotheses can be raised again here: on the one hand, the development of a ‘global civil society’, based on common transnational norms and valúes; on the other, the emergence of a self-regulating, cross-cutting quasi-institutional pluralism, with a growing consensus on international ‘rules of the game’ and cosmopolitan legal-constitutional practices. Both of these changes imply a rather quicker shift to a raison du monde mindset and would support a more far-reaching transformation. Held (1995), for example, has suggested that some mixture of analogous developments might well lead, especially through the spread of transnational legal norms, to the emer­ gence of a kind of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’, along with ‘good governance’ (Eagleton-Pierce, 2010). However, this remains a ‘rosy scenario’, an idealized State of affairs it might be unwise to expect. Nevertheless, this scenario is compatible with a Durkheimian visión of functional dif­ ferentiation leading not to conflict and instability (i.e. decomposition), but to the emergence of a stabilizing and dynamic ‘complex división of labour’ across borders (Durkheim, 1933). Nevertheless, the dominant image of transnationalization and global­ ization today, as suggested earlier, is still that of economic and business globalization. Economic actors, through the transnational expansión of both markets and hierarchical (firm) structures and institutions, increas­ ingly shape a range of key outcomes in terms of the allocation of both resources and valúes. In this second scenario, the governance structures of the twenty-first century world will be likely to reflect in a more direct and instrumental way the priorities of global capital. Without a world government or set of effective inter-national (cooperative/inter-state) gov­ ernance mechanisms, private economic regimes such as internationalized financial markets and associations of transnationally active firms, large and small, are likely to shape the international system through their ability to channel investment flows and set cross-border prices for both capital and physical assets as well. The shape of the governance structures of such a system would essentially mimic the structures of

226

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

capital itself, rather than leading to what David Lake has called a ‘privatization of governance’ (Lake, 1999) reflecting an unequal distribution of power or representation, for example among different economic sectors, whether multinational corporations or financial markets and, as noted earlier, through transnational class consolidation (van der Pijl, 1998; Sklair, 2000) or a more discursive ‘new constitutionalism’ (Gilí, 2003). In such a scenario, functional differentiation would be far less ‘functional’ in the narrow, structural functionalist sense. It would potentially sow the seeds of transnational class and group conflict along with new forms of repressive transnational class hegemony characterized by growing crosscutting inequalities. A final scenario is, of course, that exogenous pressures on the nationstate/states system, interacting with and exacerbating the tensions within that system, will cause that system to erode and weaken in key ways, but without providing enough in the way of structural resources to any par­ ticular category of actors (or combination of categories) to effectively shape the transnational structuration process. In other words, no group or group of groups will be at the steering wheel of change in the international system, and competition between different groups will in turn undermine the capacity of any one of them to exercise such control. This is the outcome that has been called ‘neomedievalism’: a fluid, multilayered structure of overlapping and competing institutions, cultural flux, múlti­ ple and shifting identities and loyalties, with different ‘niches’ at different levels for groups to focus their energies on. Inequalities would be themselves complex and differentiated, not homogeneous across borders. The medieval world was not a world of chaos; it was a world of ‘durable disorder’ (Mine, 1993; Cerny, 1998). Functional differentiation would lead to further decomposition of the world system at worst, or to a kind of muddling through at best - unless a new sort of global institutional order were to emerge based on networks, cooperation, multi-level gov­ ernance and perhaps a measure of decentralized deliberative democracy (Macdonald and Macdonald, 2010). Which scenario plays out in the long run will depend on how the actors shaping and populating the emerging complex processes of differ­ entiation - functional, stratificatory and segmentary - internet with each other and across a more geographically, economically, socíally and politically complex world. The transformation of the world in the twenty-first century therefore revolves around the contingent interaction and interdependence of actor constellations, oíd and new, whether individuáis or groups, who can simultaneously coordínate their actions across a globalizing world - proactively déveloping transnational issue areas and creating new forms of functional differentiation. They must be able to interpret and

Functional differentiation, globalization and neopluralism

227

take on board fundamental structural changes, growing transnational inequalities, alternative pathways and emerging opportunities creatively; change and refine their strategies; negotiate, bargain, build coalitions and mobilize their power resources in ongoing interactions with other actors; and - both in winning and losing - affect and shape medium-term and long-term outcomes in a globalizing world.

11

Conclusión: differentiation theory and world politics Michael Zürn, Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert

For many sociologists, functional differentiation is the major characteristic and driving forcé of modern societies. For many IR theorists, seg­ mentary differentiation and anarchy are the major characteristics and the driving forcé of the modern international system. How can one reconcile these views? One answer is to resort to a levels-of-analysis approach, which can then neatly isolate national societies dominated by functional differentiation and typologize the overarching interna­ tional society as an anarchical society based on segmentary differentia­ tion. Durkheim’s notion of a functionally differentiated society remained limited to national societies (Durkheim, 1988; see Cerny, in this volume); and both Neo-Realism and the English School described the international system as anarchical (Waltz, 1979), specifically as an anarchical society, albeit not a society in the traditional sense because international society was composed of collective entities (states), not individuáis (Bull, 1977). The problem with this move is that, with glob­ alization, the inside/outside conceptualization begins to dissolve, making the whole framing of levels less convincing. With globalization or denationalization - that is, the declining significance of national borders for societal transactions - functionally defined systems such as the econ­ omy or Science easily reach beyond State borders (Zürn, 1998; Held et al., 1999). At the same time, the international political system has still not developed a legitímate monopoly of forcé and thus remains formally speaking an anarchical society with segmentarily separated political systems. The key question, therefore, is how globalization and func­ tional differentiation relate to each other or, seen frofn another per­ spective, whether they are different ways of talking about the same thing. In the latter case, the point of interest is whether or not dif­ ferentiation theory can provide a more precise and better structured set of theoretical tools for analysis than traditional IR theory. Is glob­ alization best understood as the breakout of functional differentia­ tion from its State cage, and what do we gain by seeing it in that way? 228

Differentiation theory and world politics

229

This volume brings together a number of contributions which address this problem. All of these contributions hold in common that IR the­ ory can gain by using concepts associated with differentiation theory. We also believe that sociological theory could gain a lot by exploring IR and IR theory more systematically. The latter is, however, not our primary purpose; we mainly elabórate the valué of differentiation theory in understanding International Relations. We aim to shed new light on international relations by asking three sets of questions as identified in the introductory chapter. 1. Classical social theory suggests that one form of differentiation should normally be dominant and that segmentary, stratificatory and func­ tional differentiation can therefore be used to identify fundamental types of social order. The subject matter of international relations sug­ gests, however, that all three basic types of differentiation are strongly in play, and that what matters are the specific mixtures and their inter­ play (Donnelly, in this volume). For example, one finds segmentary and stratificatory and functional differentiation within the functionally differentiated realm of politics. For international relations, modernity, therefore, cannot just be about the displacement of segmentary and stratificatory by functional differentiation as the dominant social form. Transposing the apparatus of differentiation theory from the subject matter of Sociology to that of International Relations raises the more general questions about the relationship between different forms of differentiation in the global system. 2. Assuming that functional differentiation is in play (dominant or not), what is the relationship of different functionally defined (sub) systems to each other? Are function systems autonomous and equal? Or do some have special features that put them somehow above the others: for example law (as argued for by global constitutionalists), politics (as argued for by realists), economy (as argued for by Marxists)? Is the political system different from others in that it coordinares the different function systems? 3. Since differentiation follows the logic of división in the first place, what is it that integrales a social whole sufficiently for it to be thought of as a whole: a system or a society? This is particularly important for the subject matter of international relations, where it is generally easier to think of the whole as being emergent rather than to be, as in classical Sociology, something pre-existing and primal. Is the inte­ gration merely mechanical connectedness? Or is it somehow framed by an ideology or set of valúes that legitimizes particular forms of differentiation?

230

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

In the remainder of this chapter, we seek answers to these three sets of questions and explore the implications of these answers for IR theory.

1

The relationships between different forms of differentiation

Classical sociological theorists were theorists of national societies. Emile Durkheim (1988) and Max Weber (1968b) explicitly limited the concept of functional differentiation to modernizing national societies. Yet, by conceptualizing modernity as a shift from a primacy of stratificatory to a primacy of functional differentiation, even early differentiation theorists implicitly pointed to the inherent limits of the territorial organi­ zation of societies. If social organization follows a functional logic, spatial limitations are secondary. They may temporarily hinder the full develop­ ment of the functional logic, but in the long run they are secondary to the needs of different social systems or subsystems or indeed the inter­ ests of the actors working therein. While functional differentiation has featured prominently as a theme from the inception of Sociology as a scientific enterprise, Niklas Luhmann (1982) was the first differentia­ tion theorist who spelled out this shift in its consequences for world society. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight one can argüe that the Westphalian system always was an unstable construction. Its decline was inscribed in the very principies on which it was based. The anarchical society was built on two organizing principies: first, a segmentary differentiation among territorial units; second, the competition between these territorially defined units. The latter organizing principie, however, undermined the former in the long run. It created a permanent pressure to modernize in order to unleash the forces allowed by functional specialization. Without societal modernization in terms of a continuing specialization of tasks and the división of labour leading to a productive economy, States risked falling behind in the competition. To put it dif­ ferently, the international system entailed an evolutionary mechanism as envisioned by Waltz (1979), the decisive criterion forlong-term success was, however, not military strength, as he argued, but economic productivity and wealth creation. While a militarily strong State like the Soviet Union did not survive, a militarily weak, but economically successful State like Sweden is still part of the system. It is, of course, true that the system still contains many economically weak States. But nowadays all States strive for wealth and at least some do not strive for military strength.

Differentiation theory and world politics

231

The side-effect of this competition was to undermine States as independent components in this segmentary system. Function systems economy, Science or art - by their very logic do not stop at national boundaries and thus carry within them a tendency to globalize. Or, to put it in a somewhat less deterministic way, those States that allowed their internal functional differentiation to extend beyond their borders were more successful at generating wealth and power than those that did not. As Richard Münch points out (in this volume), Luhmann there­ fore considers the national limitation of functional differentiation as an arrangement of limited duration, which bears the seed of its dissolution in itself, since evolution tends toward another direction (see also Buzan and Lawson, 2013). To put it bluntly, while the competitive State system that aróse in Europe from the fourteenth century on fuelled modernization and functional differentiation, this very same State system has, in turn, been transformed by functional differentiation. This view is vividly presented in Stephan Stetter’s chapter: ‘while dif­ ferent forms of differentiation existéd in pre-modern eras too, stratifi­ catory differentiation trumped functional differentiation as society’s pri­ mary form of differentiation’ (in this volume: 135). This changes in modernity, where functional differentiation achieves primacy over both segmentary and stratificatory forms of differentiation. While ‘primacy’ here does not mean that the other forms of differentiation disappear, it means that, where ordering principies which go along with different forms of differentiation clash, functional differentiation will usually prevail. The moment in which functional differentiation finally takes over the role of the dominant form of differentiation at the global level is the current wave of globalization. Phil Cerny (in this volume) describes this process in terms of a disembedding of the nation-state leading to transnational networks that are delimited along different economic sectors. Similarly, Richard Münch (in this volume) sees the control of functional differen­ tiation through territorially defined systems that stand in a segmentary relationship with each other as diminishing in the age of globalization, thus disturbing a centuries-old equilibrium. At the time of writing, its most compelling current illustration is the struggle of the Eurozone governments to stabilize their currency in the face of responses by global financial markets. This interpretation may be qualified in two respects. First, George Thomas (in this volume) agrees with the observation that functional dif­ ferentiation became the dominant mode in recent decades. For him, this process does not, however, follow a ‘functional or evolutionary logic’; rather the whole process is embedded in the culture of instru­ mental rationality, which becomes its driver. In fact, all forms of

232

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

differentiation are seen to be embedded in rationalized global cultural contexts. In this view, functional differentiation is not the best response to rising complexity, it is a cultural expression of Western dominance. This view accounts for both the co-presence of different forms of dif­ ferentiation, as well as seemingly paradoxical developments when particularly functional differentiation can be witnessed formally, but not in actual practices (i.e. ‘institutional decoupling’). In this sense, an increas­ ing functional differentiation may be witnessed in world society, but it has not done away with segmentary differentiation. Second, Lora Viola (in this volume) argües that the international sys­ tem, besides segmentary differentiation, always included elements of hierarchy and inequality. In her words: ‘[L]ike kinds cannot be con­ structed without simultaneously constructing unlike kinds. In other words, there is no sovereign equality without sovereign inequality. The system, therefore, is constituted by a continuously reproduced stratifi­ cation between the included and excluded’ (in this volume: 114). Viola thus points to a parallel presence of segmentary and stratificatory differ­ entiation. One may add that the growing relevance of functional differ­ entiation does not necessarily push stratificatory differentiation aside, it seems to coexist with it and can possibly even reinforce it. By establish­ ing and strengthening additional layers of authority, global governance challenges the primacy of segmentary differentiation within the global political system. It also strengthens the element of stratification between levels and a more formalized inequality between States within these insti­ tutions. This parallel rise of two different types of differentiation is due to three reasons. First, international institutions exercising authority cannot be legitimated with the ‘one-state/one-vote’ principie. Differences in size and differences in soft power are increasingly taken into account. Sec­ ond, international institutions exercising authority inelude elements of stratificatory differentiation or formalized hierarchy. It is very likely that the most powerful States will take over the top levels in this hierarchy. Third, if international institutions make decisions against the explicitly stated interests of States, implementation becomes precarious and selective. Powerful States can resist implementation pressures much more easily than smaller States (see Viola et al., 2014). Similarly, Phil Cerny (in this volume) sees a new institutionalized inequality emerging as a result of globalization. All together, the contributions to this volume thus show that the specific form of the interrelationships between different types of differenti­ ation is context-specific. In the age of globalization, this relationship is different from what It was in earlier centuries. This can be depicted as follows.

Differentiation theory and world politics

233

Figure 11.1 The interplay of different forms of differentiation

In overall terms, recent decades unquestionably saw a strengthening of functional differentiation in world society. The growing role of functional differentiation does not, however, preelude the presence or even rise of other forms of differentiation. The interaction between the different modes of differentiation does not follow a zero-sum logic. Against this background, we can identify three interrelationships between different modes of differentiation (see Figure 11.1). First, functional and segmentary differentiation do indeed point to differ­ ent organizing principies in a society. However, they can certainly coexist if the one works as a secondary form of differentiation under the premise of the other form’s primacy. Moreover, they can coexist if they work on different levels or scales. Thus, for example, families which stand in a seg­ mentary relationship to other families can still be a relevant element of a functionally differentiated society. Similarily, segmentary differentiation between large-scale polities on a global level for a long time could go along very well with an increasing functional differentiation within them. Yet, to the extent that functional differentiation has started to assert its primacy on a global scale (though it has by no means fally succeeded in doing so), it challenges the claims of segmentary differentiation and thus terri­ torial demarcation to be the main organizing principie on a global scale. Nevertheless, segmentary differentiation may remain the dominant form of differentiation within functionally differentiated realms, most notably in the political system. In fact, in such a relationship of different forms of differentiation working on different ‘levels’, it may, in fact, be that both can be maximized at the same time.

234

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

Second, segmentary and stratificatory differentiation cannot, formally speaking, coexist on the same level. The whole notion of segmentary differentiation between States is undermined if they stand in a stratifi­ catory relationship. Yet milder, less formalized forms of hierarchy do de facto coexist with segmentation. As Clark (2011) argües, special leadership privileges (and responsibilities) for great powers have long been a feature of classic Westphalian international society, and this logic can be extended to the hegemony of a single State or group of States so long as the rest of the members acknowledge the role as legitímate. Anarchy, in the sense of formal sovereign equality, can up to a point coexist with the stratification implied by hegemony. Finally, it is not at all precluded that stratificatory and functional differ­ entiation should coexist with each other. Quite the opposite: it seems that functional differentiation can increase inequalities on a global scale and thus reinforce stratification. In sum, it seems that the relation between different forms of differenti­ ation and the ordering principies which go along with them, as well as the accompanying establishment and erosión of a primacy of one or the other form, point to relatively long-term historical developments and struggles. While one might suspect, for example, a basic incompatibility between segmentation and stratification within the political system, the history of modern world politics can, to a significant degree, be read as a struggle between and the coexistence of these two forms of differentiation.

2

Dominant systems

When opening up the question of whether one function system predominates over the others, we need to be clear about two restrictions of the argument which follows. First of all, in the systems-theory-based reading of functional differentiation, as provided most notably in Stichweh’s chapter, this question makes little sense at all, since function systems are treated as purely communicative, autopoietic systems. One could, under such theoretical premises, ask whether in specific contexts, or with reference to specific situations, one specific logic is more visible than another (or, to put it in a more theoretically stringent way, which function system deais more intensively with a particular question), but that would never result in any kind of ‘domination’ or ‘subordination’ of a function system.1 Second, we start out in the following from that 1 What could, in a reversa! of the historical development of function systems, be possible hypothetically, however, is that a function system loses its characteristic as an autopoietic system and transforms into a szzósystem of another function system.

Differentiation theory and world politics

235

broad strand of IR thought which operares on the basis of the (explicit or implicit) assumption that the political system (i.e. the State) had some kind of dominance over other function systems in the Westphalian sys­ tem. This means that we discuss the possibility of the dominance of the economic system only as a result of globalization and not as incorporated per se in the capitalist production mode. However, we think our argument would not change significantly if the starting points chosen were approaches operating on the assumption of a dominance of the economic system built into the capitalist mode of production (Marxism). According to Niklas Luhmann (1997b: 166-7), only the political and legal systems are differentiated primarily spatially (i.e. segmentarily) in the form of States as national systems, while in all other function systems spatial boundaries play only secondary roles (see also Koenig-Archibugi, in this volume). From the perspective of political Science, the national political systems utilized this tensión to dominate other (nascent) func­ tion systems for centuries. Other function systems that reach beyond national borders, like the economy and Science, could do so only to the extent that the political system tolerated it. In principie, the political system was able to prevent them. By inserting the logic of the political system into all aspects of society, totalitarian political systems aimed to control other societal systems and kept them in the cage of the national society. On the other side, liberal political systems also established mechanisms to curb function systems. Trade limitations for militarily relevant goods, restrictions on scientific cooperation, and the application of conditionality to membership of various intergovernmental organizations and regimes can be seen as cases in point. Thus, one could argüe that a lack of functional differentiation within the political system - as conceived by Waltz (1979) - combined with its residual claim to supremacy over other realms of society, for a long time slowed down the globalization of other function systems such as the econ­ omy, law, science, art etc. The lack of any checks and balances within the political system and the exclusive focus on power as the decisive means to prevail have indeed led, historically, to some degree of dominance of the political system over other function systems. Extending this argument, the lack of functional differentiation within the global political system may, for a long time, have prevented the full-scale development of other function systems as global systems. With the end of the Coid War, the forcé of functional differentiation however developed its full potential. The prerequisite was the develop­ ment of an internal differentiation of the political system. What we have seen since then is a división oflabour between differentpolitical units. In denationalized issue areas, effective and legitímate governance depends on the

236

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

interplay of different political levels. It often requires transnational recognition of problems, decisión making in global forums and the implementation of these decisions at the national level. A successful international climate regime, for instance, is based on a transnational recognition of human-made global warming and requires international decisions about norms and rules which then need to be implemented on the national level. Global governance thus does not run parallel to other levels of gov­ ernance: rather, it is constituted by an interplay of different levels and organizations, in which each level and organization cannot work unilaterally. In this sense, the Westphalian system of segmentary differentiation of the political has transformed into a complex entity characterized by a división of labour or functional differentiation within the global political system. The example of global governance in this sense also highlights the more general point regarding the issue of ‘levels’ under the condition of functional differentiation and globalization. It becomes increasingly difñcult to imagine ‘levels’ as largely mutually exclusive layers of social reality (and IR theory overall has traditionally had a strong inclination to opérate on the assumption that levels of analysis to some degree mirror such layers). However, functional differentiation and the globalization of function systems cut across images of social reality consisting of exclusive levels. Levels of social reality still matter, but more often than not they have to be analysed as inclusive levels, that is to say that specific structures and processes belong to different levels at the same time, highlighting the complex interdependence between levels.2 As a result, the relationship between different function systems has changed. The global drive of function systems like economy, law, art, sport and Science can now prevail and the political system has no good reason (or the means) to limit this development. In this sense, espe­ cially Richard Münch (in this volume) and Phil Cerny (in this volume) see a power shift in favour of the economic system and to the disadvantage of the political system. To the extent that national political sys­ tems compete with each other for economic resources and wealth and are embedded in the global political system with a certain división of labour, the demands of the economic system have to be, and can increas­ ingly be, met. In this sense, many authors focusing on political economy, the relationship between economy and politics, see an increasing dominance of the economic system in the age of globalization. In the words of Richard Münch (in this volume: 84-5): ‘Another consequence of the more far-reaching globalization of the economy in world society is the economization of those functional areas that had been kept in balance 2

‘Glocalization’ (Rosenau, 1997) would be one quite well-known proposal to express aspects of this inclusivity of levels.

Differentiation theory and world politics

237

with the economy under the auspices of the intervention State. The economization of functional areas that have not been considered economic so far comes on the heels of the economization of the economy’. From the perspective of the theory of functional differentiation, these statements about the dominance of the economic system should be taken with a grain of salt, however. According to Stephen Stetter (in this vol­ unte), who argües in line with Luhmannian theorizing, there are weaker and stronger function systems, but each of them is autopoietic and they interact only via irritations. Along the same line, George Thomas (in this volume) emphasizes that different functional systems stand in a con­ stitutive relationship with each other bound together by instrumental rationality. Based on the notion of interdependence between different systems which in this case are not seen as autopoietic - Kessler and Kratochwil (in this volume) even identify an ongoing feature of politics and law that differentiates them from others. Accordingly, they aspire to regúlate all social systems. This gives the political system a special role. It is the place that is potentially able to coordínate different function systems and intégrate them into a whole. Indeed, Matthias Koenig-Archibugi (in this volume) develops the hypothesis that, within the global political system, international institutions medíate demands from different function sys­ tems, in his case of health and economy, and thus play a privileged role. In sum: globalization has changed the relationship between different function systems. On the one hand, it has certainly limited the power of the political system and helped other systems to develop according to their own logic. As a result, if systems interact, those that easily reach beyond national borders, especially the economy, are now in a privileged position. This leads to a revival of the notion that all systems are dominated and determined by the economic system. In our view, however, each of the systems maíntains a certain level of autonomy and the politi­ cal system remains in a central role. The potential possibility of national political systems striking back cannot be excluded, and that becomes more likely as the costs of uncurbed functional system operation become obvious. As we have seen in the responses to both the global war on terror since 2001, and the economic crisis since 2008, the State can seize back control over areas it had previously conceded to the operation of other function systems. 3

System or society

The question of how different systems relate to each other already points to the mode of integration of a modern society. Do global relations merely interact with each other in an adaptive mode or is the coordination based

238

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

on common core goals and valúes. In other words: do we live in a global system or in a global society?3 The contributions to this volume provide four, partially compatible, answers to this question: international society, world society 1 (neo-institutionalist), world society 2 (based on systems theory), and global governance. The first comes from a perspective that can be labelled the international society perspective. In this view, States and some other relevant collective actors have developed some basic notions of the common good of inter­ national society. These notions are generally much thinner than those associated with nation-state societies, because international societies have sovereignty in parts, whereas nation-state societies have sovereignty in the whole. International societies are thus in Bull’s (1977) phrase ‘anarchical societies’. They are not based on a total design for pursuit of the common good such as that represented by the US, French or Germán constitutions. Rather they seek the ‘common good’ more in ideas about degrees of order within an anarchic structure (e.g. restraints on the use of forcé, rules about diplomacy) and about specific areas, or projects of cooperation on regional or global scales (e.g. trade, finance, human rights, the environment). The norms of international societies reflect mainly the valúes and interests of leading powers, so our starting supposition is that the normative structure of international societies will reflect the dominant mode of differentiation within those leading powers. If the great powers are similar in their internal modes of differentiation, as they were when monarchy was the dominant form of government, or as they are, up to a point, now, when nearly all are some species of a capitalist political economy, then international society might be quite strong and deep. The same would apply if there is a single dominant hegemonic power able to project its own norms as legitímate at the system level. When the great powers are internally different, as during most of the twentieth century, they will fight over whose model is to shape the sys­ tem level. International society will then be either weak, or only subglobal in extern, as was the case during the 1930s and again during the Coid War. On this basis, one would expect monarchical and totalitarian powers to project mainly stratificatory international societies. Similarly, the more dominant functional differentiation is in the leading powers, the more one would expect to find it playing strongly in international society. Since functional differentiation is given most leeway within liberal societies, it 3 Defining society by the presence of some common core valúes is different from the Luhmannian use of the term world society, which is based on communication alone; see also the contributions by Stichweh and Stetter in this volume.

Differentiation theory and world politics

239

is liberal great powers that project it most strongly into international society, albeit with some time lag and with the restraint of resistance from the structure of múltiple sovereignties. When liberal powers project their own concepts of functional differentiation into international society, it generates the necessity for international institutions as coordinators of different sectoral subsystems (the ordering function). It also opens some space for global civil (and uncivil) society to feed into the process of norm formation (Clark, 2007b). Yet, at the same time, it sustains the ongoing relevance of stratificatory differentiation in international society reflecting the power differentials that underlie international society in the first place. Lora Viola (in this volume: 139) shows that the normative core of the system results from ‘the stratificatory differentiation between included and excluded actors... that... also characterizes the relationship among system insiders (i.e. supposedly sovereign States) to a consid­ erable extern’. In this sense, stratificatory differentiation becomes more or less co-constitutive with the rise of the liberal versión of the common good in international society. Withoút denying this stratificatory differ­ entiation, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (in this volume: 183) argües on the basis of an analysis of the international sanitary conferences in the nine­ teenth century that international institutions and negotiations addressed, and contributed to solving, ‘the tensions between the “demands” of dif­ ferent functional subsystems’. In this view, the notion of an (albeit thin) common good of the whole serves as a means to resolve conflicts between the demands arising from different sectors or subsystems in society. The world society 1 perspective is very similar to the international soci­ ety perspective. The Stanford School presumes the existence of com­ mon valúes associated with the culture of instrumental rationality. In this sense, world society is based on common valúes that have diffused from the core to the periphery. Like the international society perspective, it implicitly assumes that hierarchies of reputation, and thus stratificatory diffentiation, play an important role in this process. The whole notion of emulation and mimicry requires role models in the first place. How­ ever, the world society 1 perspective sees these common valúes diffusing with and through the model of the modern State. It is not an interactively created common good - as, at least partially, in the international society perspective - but a culture that exists and is activated in parallel territorial units. According to George Thomas (in this volume), the cultural context is one of instrumental rationality (a legacy of West­ ern dominance) which drives functional differentiation and modernization. It is, therefore, not an objective response to manage complexity, but a culturally determined response. Moreover, while the international society perspective is potentially open to any form of dominant power(s),

240

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

the world society 1 perspective views world society as specifically lib­ eral and thereby supportive of the same mediating role for international institutions and the same logic of stratification. The idea of normative integration of society via common valúes and goods is rejected completely by the systems theory or world society 2 per­ spective. In this view, autopoetic function systems exclusively follow their own logic. The different subsystems adapt to each other via irritation. This Luhmannian view of world society is put forward by Stephen Stetter (in this volume: 137-45). Accordingly, the functional system of politics does not have a Progressive purpose like fostering the common good. ‘In a communication-theory-based understanding, “function” does not refer to concrete properties or normative goals such as societal integration or Parsonian goal attainment. It merely relates to the way in which Com­ munications in world society are ordered and how connectivity between different systems is practically ensured’ (Stetter, in this volume: 143) Functional differentiation is neither purposeful ñor does it serve larger functions, it is contingent and autopoietic. Modern (world) society is not integrated through common valúes and goods (although there are strong integrative semantics), but only comes to be recognized as a soci­ ety through its being functionally differentiated.4 Finally, the global governance perspective empirically shares the view that global society as a whole is, if at all, weakly integrated. Accordingly, the growing differentiation and interdependence in the political sphere allows the globalization of function systems such as economy, Science, art and law, which are each driven by their specific inner logic and seem to develop their own rules and regulations. While global governance consists of countless issue-area-specific international and transnational regimes, the interplay of these regimes seems to be accidental. Global governance happens without a head of government or a world supreme court responsible for the coordination of different policies as in national political systems. Moreover, one of the major functions of the national public (the demos} - namely, to decide in cases of goal conflicts between different sectors such as growth and clean environment, or security and freedom - cannot be fulfilled by sectoral publics which, by definition, are tied exclusively to their single issues: growth, envifonmental protection, security or freedom. Against this background, Richard Münch (in this volume) and Oliver Kessler and Friedrich Kratochwil (also in this 4 Although it should be noted that what systems theory is concerned with is system integra­ tion, while many approaches which see society as integrated through common valúes and goods are concerned with social integration, that is, the ways and means by which many individuáis are included in society; see Lockwood (1964).

Differentiation theory and world politics

241

volume) see an undermining of the oíd institutional equilibrium which provided places of coordination between different sectoral institutions and regulations on the national level. In this view, the institutions of embedded liberalism allowed for crossborder transaction but left the pri­ macy with national governments (Ruggie, 1983b). To the extent that the productive interplay of the systems is dependent on a strong political system, the weakening of the political system relative to the economic system undermines the coordination of the different function systems on the basis of references to common goods (Richard Münch, in this volume). Yet, Oliver Kessler and Fritz Kratochwil (in this volume) point out that fragmentation and reconstitutionalization may be two sides of the same coin. Global governance has indeed informally produced some substi­ tuto institutions which sometimes seem to assume such a coordinating role. The UN Security Council in particular has aspired to such a role by deciding on all those issues in which the goal of peace and the pro­ tection of human rights seem to contrádict each other. Also, the G8 and G20 seem to define themselves as central coordinators by giving other international institutions a sense of direction, and by taking up those pressing issues which are not sufíiciently dealt with by existing interna­ tional institutions and assigning the task to one of them. These attempts, however, have remained limited. Moreover, they generate resistance on the part of many other actors, because membership in these institutions is not only restricted, but also highly exclusive. The members of these institutions are self-nominated to the role of coordinators and lack authorization and legitimacy to act in this function. 4

Implications

The use of new theoretical concepts for the analysis of social phenomena must be justified. At the end of the day, theoretical concepts are valuable when they allow the development of hypotheses that hold true in a large number of circumstances. The midterm criterion for passing the test is more modérate. Do the theoretical concepts utilized shed light on issues that both grasp developments that are in line with our intuitions and existing evidence and are neglected by the dominant theories? In this concluding chapter, we have identified areas which fulfil the midterm criterion and definitely deserve further research. All of these issues have far-reaching implications for IR theories. First, a differentiation theory approach makes clear that international relations have always entailed stratificatory differentiation in addition to segmentation. The discipline of IR, which has been dominated by

242

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

the anarchy paradigm, tended to overlook different forms of hierarchy. There always has been a hierarchy between States, running counter to the notion of equal sovereignty. Membership in the club of States trumped other political units. Those States who were members of the great-power club excluded other States who were not invited to the often most impor­ tant negotiations. Moreover, to the extent that international institutions develop authority of their own, there is a built-in notion that these inter­ national institutions are of a higher order than the States - another form of hierarchy. Finally, big, rich and powerful States accept the authority of international institutions only if they get privileged access to them and, quite often, special voting rights. In international institutions of this sort - like the Security Council or the International Monetary Fund inequality between States gets institutionalized. Taking these developments together, mainstream IR would do well to downgrade the assumption that anarchy (i.e. segmentation) is the single dominant form of differentiation, and thus the defining condition of political structure. It should give equal weight to different forms of hierarchy or stratifica­ tory differentiation. In this matter our conclusions reinforce the recent literature that focuses on hegemony (Hurrell, 2007; Watson 2007; Clark, 2011), hierarchy and authority (Hurd, 2007; Lake, 2009; Zürn et al., 2012). Second, with the rise of globalization and global governance, many function systems have moved easily beyond national borders and thus escaped the regulations of the nation-state. In an area notorious for being under-theorized, differentiation concepts provide a theoretical framing for the emergence of intergovernmental institutions and global gover­ nance, and show how this development reflects a specific form of social structure. To the extent that political regulation catches up with this changed spatial scope, we shall see international and also transnational institutions increasing both in quantity and strength. In general, these political institutions beyond the State are geared towards specific issue areas or sectoral subsystems. This leads to a sectoral fragmentation of political regulation. The question by what means and to what extent does coordination exist or can it be achieved (whether the nature of the coordination is merely mutually adaptive or normatively grounded) seems to be one of high importance for both practical and theoreti­ cal reasons. The conceptual toolbox of most existing theories of inter­ national relations does not shed light on this issue. Interestingly, the dominant mainstream response to this issue in IR is to look to hegemonic powers to provide leadership. This view connects to the point about stratification'above, and makes sense in terms of our argument

Differentiation theory and world politics

243

that, if the leading powers are fiinctionally differentiated within, then they will tend to project their internal structure outward into inter­ national society. If, however, one sees the logic of functional differ­ entiation as being more diffuse and autonomous, reflecting the struggle for power and/or the autonomous logic of function systems, then hegemonic leadership is not necessary for the development of global governance. Third, the study of international relations has, of course, always been about the interaction between different political levels. The differentiation-theory-based perspective highlights, in addition to what we know, that different types of social differentiation interact quite dif­ ferently depending on the mix of political levels involved. For example, stratificatory differentiation and segmentary diffentiation exelude each other on the same level, that is to say that, as long as States are fully segmentarily differentiated, the development of hierarchical relationships among those units is unlikely. However, segmentary differentiation may be a prerequisite and a reinforcing 'mechanism for the development of hierarchy within those units. In this sense, it seems to be promising to look at the interaction between the interplay of the global, regional, national and local levels on the one hand and the interplay of different modes of differentiation on each of those levels. Again, the dominant IR toolbox would not allow us to do this. In addition, because differentiation theory offers an alternative taxonomy, yet one that fits with, and up to a point unites, existing IR taxonomies, it enables us to see familiar things from a new perspective. For example, following the logics of differentiation at different levels against the backdrop of the projection of the mode of international society by the great powers, throws useful light on the contemporary structure and dynamics of international society. The existing normative framework of international society is largely a projection of those Western powers within which functional differentiation (aka modernity) initially took the domi­ nant role. This process was led by northwest Europe from the nineteenth century and, since 1945, by the United States, which added its own twist to the liberal formula. What we have, therefore, is a liberal form of international society in which a whole group of liberal States have both successively and in parallel projected their interior functional differenti­ ation onto international society. This quite substantial group - the West and its various cióse associates - feels relatively comfortable with this arrangement because it is in broad harmony with their domestic arrangements. It is a kind of collective hegemony reflecting their preferred mode of differentiation. For States that do not share this domestic pattern of

244

Bringing Sociology to International Relations

differentiation, an international society featuring functional differentia­ tion is deeply threatening. To give another example, during the nineteenth century, the expansión of this functionally differentiated international society was existentially threatening for both stratificatory States such as China, Japan and the Ottoman Empire, and segmentary tribal societies in Africa and elsewhere. Under a ‘standard of civilization’ defined in terms of functional differentiation, the former were delegitimized as barbarie, and the latter, identified as savages, struggled even to gain recognition as political entities. Both were vulnerable to colonization, and tribal societies, in some cases, to extermination. While the existential threat of colonization has receded, it is still the case that liberal international society and its baggage of functional differentiation threatens those States whose domestic modes of differentiation vary from the Western norm, mainly by being more stratificatory. That, in a quite profound sense, is what the Coid War was about. It is also what the current tensions between Western-dominated global international society on the one hand, and China, Irán, North Korea and many other non-democratic States on the other, is about. The ability to sustain democracy is a marker for a society with a relatively advanced form of functional differentiation. Compatibilities and incompatibilities between differentiation within States, and the dominant mode of differentiation in international society, tell us a great deal about status, legitimacy and power in contemporary world politics. As argued above, this feeds in a significant way into the stratification that accompanies the global spread of functional differentiation as the dominant norm. These examples are, in our view, a sufficient proof that the utilization of a differentiation-theory perspective may be of great use in the study of world politics. What we need is more empirical research along these fines. Of course, there are also relevant themes on which most dif­ ferentiation theories are remarkably silent: identities and rising powers are among them. An approach based on differentiation theory, however, opens up a range of empirical research questions in at least two respeets. On the one hand, this pertains to the actual historical consolidation, and regional variations, of specific forms of differentiation.‘Thus, following Rudolf Stichweh (in this volume), what is needed are ‘historical studies on individual function systems and the self-referential trajectory which established their macro-functionality’ (in this volume: 61). One could in this regard, as Stichweh does, point to Parsons’ and Luhmann’s understanding of the political system and critically ask whether the function of the political system is indeed the production of collectively binding decisions. On the other hand, the empirical research questions pertain

Differentiation theory and world politics

245

to the interrelationships between different forms of differentiation (see particularly Jack Donnelly, in this vohime). To the extent that these interrelationships are context-specific, as we argüe, it can be expected that they can establish a fresh understanding of the historical phases of the international system.

Bibliography

Aalberts, Tanja E. (2010) ‘Playing the Game of Sovereign States: Charles Manning’s Constructivism avant-la-lettre’, European Journal ofInternational Rela­ tions 16 (2): 247-68. Abbott, Andrew (1981) ‘Status and Status Strain in the Professions’, American Journal of Sociology 86 (4): 819-35. (1983) ‘Professional Ethics’, American Journal of Sociology 88 (5): 855-85. (1988) The System of Professions, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal (2000) ‘Hard and Soft Law in Interna­ tional Governance’, International Organization 54 (3): 421-56. Ackerknecht, Erwin H. (1948) ‘Anticontagionism between 1821 and 1867’, Bulletin ofthe History of Medicine 22 (5): 562—93. Aginam, Obijifor (2003) ‘The Nineteenth Century Colonial Fingerprints on Public Health Diplomacy: A Postcolonial View’, Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal 1. Available at: www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/ 2003_l/aginam/ (accessed 24 September 2012). Albert, Mathias (2002) Zur Politik der Weltgesellschaft: Identitát und Recht im Kontext internationaler Vergesellschaftung, Weilerswist: Velbrück. (2007a) ‘Past, Against, or Still Before Globalisation Theory? Studying Globalisation with Social Theory’, International Political Sociology 1 (2): 165182. (2007b) ‘Beyond Legalisation: Reading the Increase, Variation and Differ­ entiation of Legal and Law-Like Arrangements in International Relations through World Society Theory’ in Christian Brütsch and Dirk Lehmkuhl (eds.) Law and Legalization in Transnational Relations, pp. 185—201. London: Routledge. (2009) ‘Globalization and World Society Theory: A Reply’, International Polit­ ical Sociology 3 (1): 126-128. Albert, Mathias and Barry Buzan (2010) ‘Differentiation: A Sociological Approach in International Relations Theory’, European Journal of Interna­ tional Relations 16 (3): 315-37. (2011) ‘Securitization, Sectors and Functional Differentiation’, Security Dia­ logue 42 (4-5): 413-25. Albert, Mathias, Lars-Erik Cederman and Alexander Wendt (eds.) (2010) New Systems Theories of World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Albert, Mathias and Lena Hilkermeier (eds.) (2004) Observing International Rela­ tions: Niklas Luhmann and World Politics, London: Routledge.

246

Bibliography

247

Albert, Mathias and Lothar Brock (1996) ‘Debordering the World of States: New Spaces in International Relations’, New Political Science 18 (1): 69-106. Albert, Mathias, Oliver Kessler and Stephan Stetter (2008) ‘On Order and Conflict: International Relations and the “Communicative Turn’”, Review of International Studies 34 (Special Issue 1): 43—68. Albert, Mathias and Rudolf Stichweh (eds.) (2007) Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit: Beobachtungen globaler politischer Strukturbildung, Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag. Alexander, Jeffrey C. (1984) Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Vol. IV: The Modern Reconstruction of Classical Thought: Talcott Parsons, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (1990) ‘Differentiation Theory: Problems and Prospects’ in Jeffrey C. Alexan­ der and Paul Colomy (eds.) Differentiation Theory and Social Change: Com­ parativo and Historical Perspectives, pp. 1-15. New York, NY: Columbia Uni­ versity Press. (2006) The Civil Sphere, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Alexander, Jeffrey C. and Paul Colomy (eds.) (1990) Differentiation Theory and Social Change: Comparativo and Historical Perspectives, New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Alexandrowicz, Charles H. (1967) An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East Indies, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Alter, Karen J. (2009) The European Court’s Political Power: SelectedEssays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anderson, Benedict (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso. Angyal, Andras (1939) ‘The Structure of Wholes’, Philosophy of Science 6 (1): 25-7. Appadurai, Arjun (1996) Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Appleman Williams, William (1972) The Tragedy ofAmerican Diplomacy, 3rd edn, New York, NY: Norton. Aron, Raymond (1966) Peace and War. A Theory of InternationalRelations, Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Arts, Bas, Henk van Houtum and Arnoud Lagendijk (eds.) The Disoriented State: Shifts in Governmentality, Territoriality and Governance, Berlin: Springer. Ayres, William (2000) ‘A World Flying Apart? Violent Nationalist Conflict and the End of the Coid War’, Journal of Peace Research 37 (1): 105—17. Bach, Maurizio (2008) Europa ohne Gesellschaft. Politische Soziologie der europáischen Integration, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Badie, Bertrand and Pierre Birnbaum (1983) The Sociology of the State, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Baldwin, Peter (1999) The State and Contagión in Europe, 1830-1930, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Barkdull, John (1995) ‘Waltz, Durkheim, and International Relations: The Inter­ national System as an Abnormal Form’, American Political Science Review 89 (3): 669-80. Barkin, Jeffrey S. (1998) ‘The Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty and the Emergence of Human Rights Norms’, Millennium 27 (2): 229-52.

248

Bibliography

Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004) Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Bartelson, Jens (1995) A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­ versity Press. (2006) ‘Making Sense of Global Civil Society’, European JournalofInternational Relations 12 (3): 371-95. (2010) Visions of World Community, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bateson, Gregory (1973) Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution and Epistemology, London: Paladín Books. Bauch, Jost (1996) Gesundheit ais sozialer Code, Weinheim: Juventa. Beck, Ulrich (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage. Beisheim, Marianne, Sabine Dreher, Gregor Walter, Bernhard Zangl and Michael Zürn (1999) Im Zeitalter der Globalisierung? Thesen und Daten zur gesellschaftlichen und politischen Denationalisierung, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Beitz, Charles (1979) Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Béjin, André (1974) ‘Différenciation, complexification, évolution des sociétés’, Communications 22: 109—18. Benvenisti, Eyal and George W. Downs (2007) ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’, Stanford Law Review 60 (2): 605-32. Benz, Arthur (2004) Governance - Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen. Eine Einführung, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Berger, Klaus-Peter (1999) The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria, The Hague: Kluwer. (2000) ‘The Relationship between the UNIDROIT Principies of International Commercial Contracts and the Lex Mercatoria’, Dniform Law Review 28 (1): 153-70. Berger, Peter L., Brigitte Berger and Hansfried Kellner (1973) The Homeless Mind, New York, NY: Vintage Books. Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann (1967) The Social Construction ofReality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge, Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Biersteker, Thomas J. and John A. Hall (2002) The Emergence of Prívate Authority in Global Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Binder, Martin (2009) ‘Humanitarian Crises and the International Politics of Selectivity’, Human Rights Review 10 (3): 327-48. Biow, Douglas (2002) Doctors, Ambassadors, Secretarles: Humanism and Professions in Renaissance Italy, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Blake, Daniel and Autumn Payton (2008) ‘Voting Rules in International Orga­ nizations: Reflections of Power or Facilitators of Cooperation?’. Paper presented at the International Studies Association’s 49th Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, 26 March 2008. Blau, Peter M. (1977) Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure, New York, NY: The Free Press. Bohn, Cornelia (2006) Inklusion, Exklusion und die Person, Konstanz: UVK.

Bibliography

249

Boli, John and George M. Thomas (1997) ‘World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-governmental Organization’, American Sociological Review 62 (2): 171-90. (1999) ‘INGOs and the Organization of World Culture’ in John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds.) Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875, pp. 13—49. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Bourdieu, Pierre (1998) Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bowden, Brett (2002) ‘Globalization and the Shifting “Standard of Civilization” in International Society’. Paper presented at the Jubilee Conference of the Australasian Political Science Association, Australian National University, October 2002. Bozeman, Adda B. (1960) Politics and Culture in International History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Brenner, Neil, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones and Gordon MacLeod (eds.) (2003) State/Space: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell. Brunsson, Nils and Bengt Jacobsson (2000) A World of Standards, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bryde, Brun-Otto (2003) ‘Konstitutionalisierung des Vólkerrechts und Internationalisierung des Verfassungsrechts*, Der Staat 42 (1): 62-75. Bull, Hedley (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Bull, Hedley and Adam Watson (eds.) (1984) The Expansión of International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Burch, Ernest S. and Linda J. Ellanna (1994) ‘Introduction’ in Ernest S. Burch and Linda J. Ellanna (eds.) Key Issues in Hunter-Gatherer Research, pp. 1-8. Oxford: Berg. Burch, Janet (2012) ‘Economic Practices: Modern Forms of Reproduction of Clientelism Using Lima, Perú, as Example’, Soziale Systeme 18 (forthcoming). Burton, John W. (1972) World Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buzan, Barry (2004) From International Society to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­ versity Press. (2010) ‘The English School as a New Systems Theory of World Politics’ in Mathias Albert, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Alexander Wendt (eds.) New Systems Theories of World Politics, pp. 195-219. New York, NY: Palgrave. Buzan, Barry and George Lawson (2013) ‘The Global Transformation: the 19th Century and the Making of Modern International Relations’, Inter­ national Studies Quarterly 57 (forthcoming). Buzan, Barry and Mathias Albert (2010) ‘Differentiation: A Sociological Approach to International Relations Theory’, European Journal of Interna­ tional Relations 16 (3): 315-37. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wsever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

250

Bibliography

Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (2000) International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cachay, Klaus (1988) Sport und Gesellschaft. Zwr Ausdifferenzierung einer Funktion und ihrer Folgen, Schorndorf: Hofmann. Campbell, David (1998) Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics ofldentity, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Campbell, Donald T. (1988) Methodology and Epistemology for Social Science, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Caplan, Richard (2004) ‘International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Global Governance 10 (1): 53-65. (2005) Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carmichael, Ann G. (1983) ‘Plague Legislation and the Italian Renaissance’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine 57 (4): 508—25. Casanova, José (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago, IL: Univer­ sity of Chicago Press. Cerny, Philip G. (1994a) ‘The Infrastructure of the Infrastructure? Toward “Embedded Financial Orthodoxy” in the International Political Economy’ in Barry Gills and Ronen Palan (eds.) Transcending the State-Global Divide: The Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations, pp. 223-49. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. (1994b) ‘The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Struc­ ture and Policy Response’, Policy Sciences 27 (4): 319-42. (1995) ‘Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action’, Interna­ tional Organization 49 (4): 595—625. (1997) ‘Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Glob­ alization’, Government and Opposition 32 (2): 251-74. (1998) ‘Neomedievalism, Civil Wars and the New Security Dilemma: Global­ ization as Durable Disorder’, Civil Wars 1 (1): 36-64. (2000a) ‘The New Security Dilemma: Divisibility, Defection and Disorder in the Global Era’, Review of International Studies 26 (4): 623-46. (2000b) ‘Globalization and the Restructuring of the Political Arena: Paradoxes of the Competition State’ in Randall Germain (ed.) Globalization and Its Critics, pp. 117-38. London: Macmillan. (2000c) ‘Political Agency in a Globalizing World: Toward a Structurational Approach’, European Journal of International Relations 6 (4): 435— 64. (2001) ‘From “Iron Triangles” to “Golden Pentangles”? Globalizing the Policy Process’, Global Governance 7 (4): 397-410. (2005) ‘Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma’, Naval War College Review 58 (1): 11-33. (2006) ‘Restructuring the State in a Globalizing World: Capital Accumulation, Tangled Hierarchies and the Search for a New Spatio-Temporal Fix’, Review of International Political Economy 13 (4): 679-695. (2008) ‘Embedding Neoliberalism: The Evolution of a Hegemonic Paradigm’, Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy 2 (1): 1-46.

Bibliography

251

(2009a) ‘Some Pitfalls of Democratisation’, Millennium: Journal ofInternational Studies 37 (3): 763-786. (2009b) ‘Neoliberalisation and Place: Deconstructing and Reconstructing Borders’ in Bas Arts, Henk van Houtum and Arnoud Lagendijk (eds.) The Disoriented State: Shifts in Governmentality, Territoriality and Governance, pp. 13-40. Berlín: Springer. (2010a) ‘The Competition State Today: From raison d’État to raison du monde’, Policy Studies 4 (1): 1-17. (2010b) Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2011) ‘Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists? Financial Regulation after the Crash’, St. Antony’s International Review 7 (1): 11-29. Chandler, Alfred D. Jr. (1990) Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capi­ talism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chase-Dunn, Christopher (1998) [1989] GlobalFormation: Structures of the WorldEconomy, updated edn, New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield. Chien, Eugene (2003) ‘Beyond SARS: Give Taiwan WHO Status’, New York Times, May 16. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2003/05/16/opinion/ 16iht-edchien_ed3_.html (accessed 24 September 2012). Cicero, Marcus Tullius (1990) On the Commonwealth, translated by E.G. Zettl, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Clark, lan (1989) The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2005) Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2007a) International Legitimacy and World Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2007b) ‘Legitimacy in International or World Society?’ in Achim Hurrelmann, Steffen Schneider and Jens Steffek (eds.) Legitimacy in an Age of Global Politics, pp. 193-210. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. (2009) ‘Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony’, European Journal of International Relations 15 (2): 203—28. (2011) Hegemony in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clayton, Richard and Joñas Pontusson (1998) ‘Welfare State Retrenchment Revisited: Entitlement Cuts, Public Sector Restructuring, and Inegalitarian Trends in Advanced Capitalist Societies’, World Politics 51 (1): 67-98. Coleman, James S. (1990) Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Comte, Auguste (1975) The Foundation of Sociology, New York, NY: Wiley. Conze, Werner (1972) ‘Beruf in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds.) Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Vbl. I, pp. 490-507. Stuttgart: Mohr. Cooper, Scott, Darren G. Hawkins, Wade Jacoby and Daniel Nielson (2008) ‘Yielding Sovereignty to International Institutions: Bringing System Structure Back In’, International Studies Review 10 (3): 501-24. Court ofJustice of the European Union (2006) ‘Judgement of the Court of Justice in Case C-459/03, Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland’,

252

Bibliography

Press Release No 45/06. Available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/ docs/application/pdf/2009-02/cp060045en.pdf (accessed 24 September 2012). Curbach, Janina (2009) Die Corporate Social Responsibility-Bewegung, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Curtius, Ernst Robert (1962) [1932] The Civilization of France: An Introduction, New York, NY: Vintage Books. Cutler, A. C., Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter (1999) Prívate Authority and International Ajfairs, Albany, NY: Suny Press. Dai, Xinyuan (2007) International Institutions and National Policies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davis, Kingsley and Wilbert E. Moore (1945) ‘Some Principies of Stratification’, American Sociological Review 10 (2): 242^49. Davis, Murray S. (1971) ‘That’s Interesting! Towards a Phenomenology of Soci­ ology and a Sociology of Phenomenology’, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 1 (2): 309-44. Deitelhoff, Nicole and Klaus Dieter Wolf (2009) ‘Der Widerspenstigen SelbstZáhmung? Zur Professionalisierung der Internationalen Beziehungen in Deutschland’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 50 (3): 451-72. Deitelhoff, Nicole and Michael Zürn (2014) ‘Internationalization and the State Sovereignty as the External Side of Modern Statehood’ in Stephan Leibfried, Frank Nullmeier, Evelyne Huber, Matthew Lange, Jonah Levy and John Stephens (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Transformations of the State, Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming). Dekker, Ike and Wouter Werner (eds.) (2004) Legal Theory and Global Gover­ nance, Den Haag: Marintus Nijhoff. Deporte, Antón W. (1979) Europe between the Superpowers, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Deudney, Daniel (2007) Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Deutsch, Karl W. (1965) The Nerves of Government. Models of Political Communi­ cation and Control, New York, NY: The Free Press. (1969) Nationalism and its Alternativos, New York, NY: Alfred Knopf. Deutschmann, Christoph (2008) Kapitalistische Dynamik. Eine gesellschaftstheoretische Perspektive, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Dickinson, Edwin (1920) The Equality of States in International Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Diez, Thomas, Stephan Stetter and Mathias Albert (2006) ‘The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration’, Interna­ tional Organization 60 (3): 563-93. '* ■ Donnelly, Jack (2006) ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: Ameri­ can Power and International Society’, European Journal of International Rela­ tions 12 (2): 139-70. (2009) ‘Rethinking Political Structures: From “Ordering Principies” to “Ver­ tical Differentiation” - and Beyond’, International Theory 1 (1): 49-86. (2012) ‘The Differentiation of International Societies: An Approach to Struc­ tural International Theory’, European Journal of International Relations 18 (1): 151-76.

Bibliography

253

Douglas, Mary (1966) Purity and Danger, London: Penguin. (1973) Rules and Meanings: The Anthropology of Everyday Knowledge, London: Penguin. (1986) Hozo Institutions Think, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Drori, Gili S., John W. Meyer and Hokyu Hwang (2006) Globalization and Organization: World Society and Organizational Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Drori, Gili S., John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramírez and Evan Schofer (2003) Science in the Modern World Polity: Institutionalization and Globalization, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Duby, Georges (1980) [1978] The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Dumont, Louis (1980) Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Dunne, Tim (1998) Inventing International Society, London: Palgrave. (2003) ‘Society and Hierarchy in International Relations’, International Rela­ tions 17 (3): 303-20. Durkheim, Émile (1898) ‘L’individualisme et les intellectuels’, Revue bleue 10: 7-13. (1933) The División of Labor in Society, New York, NY: Free Press. (1973) [1893] De la división du travail social, Paris: PUF. (1988) Über soziale Arbeitsteilung, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni­ versity Press. (1986) Law’s Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Eagleton-Pierce, Matthew (2010) ‘On the Génesis of the Concept of “Govemance”: A Post-Bureaucratic Perspective’. Paper presented at the Critical Governance Conference, Warwick Business School, 13-14 December 2010. Eck, Samuel (1908) Über die Herkunft des Individualitatsgedankens bei Schleiermacher, Giessen: Kindt. Efraim, Athena (1999) Sovereign (In)equality in International Organizations, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Egan, Rose Francés (1921) ‘The Génesis of the Theory of “Art for Art’s Sake” in Germany and in England’, Smith College Studies in Modern Languages 2 (4): 5-61. Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (1963) The Political Systems of Empires, New York, NY: The Free Press. (1964) ‘Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution’, American Sociological Review 29 (3): 375-86. (1999) Paradoxes of Democracy, Washington, D.C. and Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press. Elias, Norbert (1976) [1939] Über den Prozefi der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Ellul, Jacques (1964) The Technological Society, New York, NY: Vintage Books. Epstein, Charlotte (2008) The Power of Words in International Relations, Cam­ bridge, MA: MIT Press.

254

Bibliography

Espeland, Wendy Nelson and Mitchell L. Stevens (1998) ‘Commensuration as a Social Process’, Annual Review of Sociology 24: 313-43. Etzioni, Amatai (2005) ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’, Orbis 50 (1): 71-85. Evans, Mark G. (2005) Policy Transfer in Global Perspective, London: Ashgate. Evans, Mark G. and Philip G. Cerny (2003) ‘Globalisation and Social Policy’ in Nick Ellison and Chris Pierson (eds.) New Developments in British Social Policy, pp. 19-40. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Fallers, Lloyd (1965) Bantu Bureaucracy: A Century of Political Evolution among the Basoga of Uganda, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Fassbender, Bardo (1998) ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 36 (3): 529-619. Fazal, Tanisha M. (2007) State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Feinman, Gary M. and Jill Neitzel (1984) ‘Too Many Types: An OverView of Sedentary Préstate Societies in the Americas’ in Michael B. Schiffer (ed.) Advanees in Archaeological Method and Theory, Volume 7, pp. 39—102. New York, NY: Academic Press. Feinstein, Lee and Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004) ‘The Duty to Protect’, Foreign Ajfairs 83 (1): 136-50. Ferguson, Adam (1773) An Essay on the History of Civil Society, 4th edn, London: T. Caddel, A. Kincaid, W. Creech & J. Bell. Fidler David P. (2007) ‘Architecture amidst Anarchy: Global Health’s Quest for Governance’, Global Health Governance 1 (1): 1-17. Fidler, David P., Nick Drager and Kelley Lee (2009) ‘Managing the Pursuit of Health and Wealth: the Key Challenges’, The Lancet 373 (9660): 325-31. Field, Mark G. (1973) ‘The Concept of the ‘Health System’ at the Macrosociological Level’, Social Science and Medicine 7 (10): 763-85. Finnemore, Martha (2003) The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Forcé, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Fischer-Lescano, Andreas and Gunther Teubner (2004) ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’, Michigan Journal of International Law 25 (4): 999-1046. Foucault, Michel (2008) The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collége de France, 1978-1979, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Frieden, Jeffry A. and Ronald Rogowski (1996) ‘The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An OverView’ in Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner (eds.) Internationalization and Domestic Politics, pp. 25-47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frowein, Jochen (2000) ‘Konstitutionalisierung des Vólkefrechts’ in Klaus Dicke, Waldemar Hummer, Daniel Girsberger, Katharina Boele-Woelki, Christoph Engel and Jochen Frowein (eds.) Volkerrecht und internationales Privatrecht in einem sich globalisierenden internationalen System: Auswirkungen der Entstaatlichung transnationaler Rechtsbeziehungen (Bericht der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Volkerrecht, Bd. 39), pp. 427-47. Heidelberg: C. F. Müller. Galbraith, John Kenneth (2007) [1967] The New Industrial State, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Bibliography

255

Gallarotti, Giulio M. (2000) ‘The Advent of the Prosperous Society: The Rise of the Guardian State and Structural Change in the World Economy’, Review of International Political Economy 7 (1): 1—52. Gauthier, Philippe (1972) Symbola. Les étrangers et lajustice dans les cites grecques, Nancy: Armales de l’Est. Geary, Patrick J. (2002) The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Geertz, Clifford (1983) ‘The Way We Think Now: Toward an Ethnography of Modern Thought’ in Clifford Geertz (ed.) Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, pp. 147—63. New York, NY: Basic Books. Gellner, Ernest (1983) Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell. (1988) Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History, London: Paladin. Genschel, Philipp and Bernhard Zangl (2008) ‘Metamorphosen des Staates vom Herrschaftsmonopolisten zum Herrschaftsmanager’, Leviathan 36 (3): 430-54. Germain, Randall (2010) Global Politics and Financial Governance, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Giddens, Anthony (1979) Central Problems of Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis, London: Macmillan. (1990) The Consequences ofModernity, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Gilí, Stephen (2003) Power and Resistance in the New World Order, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Gilpin, Robert (1981) War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Glenn, John (2008) ‘Global Governance and the Democratic Déficit: Stifling the Vbice of the South’, Third World Quarterly 29 (2): 217-38. Goldstein, Judith L., Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds.) (2001) Legalization and World Politics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Gong, Gerrit W. (1984) The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Granovetter, Mark (1985) ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology 91 (3): 481—510. Graz, Jean Christophe and Andreas Nólke (eds.) (2007) Transnational Prívate Governance and its Limits, London: Routledge. Gruenfeld Deborah H. and Andrea B. Hollingshead (1993) ‘Sociocognition in Work Groups: The Evolution of Group Integrative Complexity and its Relation to Task Performance’, Small Group Research 24 (3): 383-405. Guha, Krishna (2007) ‘IMF Plans Currency Crackdown: Global Stability Will Be the Watchword’, Financial Times (19 June): 12. Haas, Ernst B. (1964) Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (1968) Collective Security and the Future International System, Denver, CO: University of Denver. (1991) When Knowledge is Power: Three Modes of Change in International Organizations, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

256

Bibliography

Haas, Peter M. and Casey Stevens (2011) ‘Organized Science, Usable Knowledge and Multilateral Environmental Governance’ in Rolf Lidskog and Góran Sundqvist (eds.) Governing the Air: The Dynamics of Science, Policy, and Citi­ zen Interaction, pp. 125 - 62. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, Jürgen (1981) Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (2 Vbls.), Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Harrison, Mark (2006) ‘Disease, Diplomacy and International Commerce: The Origins of International Sanitary Regulation in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Global History 1 (2): 197—217. Hartz, Louis (1955) The Liberal Tradition in America, New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and World. Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel Nielson and Michael Tierney (2006) Delegation andAgency in International Organizations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heintz, Bettina, Richard Münch and Hartmann Tyrell (2005) Weltgesellschaft: Theoretische Zugángen und empirische Problemlagen, Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius. Held, David (1995) Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press. Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economies and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press. Hillgruber, Christian (1998) ‘The Admission of New States to the International Community’, European Journal of International Law 9 (3): 491-509. Hirsch, Joachim (1995) Dernationale Wettbewerbsstaat, Berlin: ID-Verlag. Hirschman, Albert (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. HiB, Stefanie (2006) Warum übernehmen Unternehmen politische Verantwortung?, Frankfurt/M: Campus. Hobbes, Thomas (1991) [1651] Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1968) Industry and Empire, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. (1990) Nations andNationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hollis, Martin and Steve Smith (1990) Explaining and UnderstandingInternational Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Holsti, Kalevi J. (2004) Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2003) ‘Unraveling the Central State: But How? Types of Multi-Level Governance’, American Political Science Review 97 (2): 233-43. Howard-Jones, Norman (1975) The Scientific Background ofthe International San­ itary Conferences, 1851-1938, Geneva: World Health Organization. Huber, Valeska (2006) ‘The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The Interna­ tional Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851-1894’, The Historical Journal 49 (2): 453-76.

Bibliography

257

Hurd, lan (2007) After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hurrell, Andrew (2003) ‘Order and Justice in International Relations: What is at Stake?’ in Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis and Andrew Hurrell (eds.) Order and Justice in International Relations., pp. 24—48. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2007) On Global Order: Power, Valúes and the Constitution of International Soci­ ety, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ILC Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law (2006) ‘Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansión of International Law’, UN Document A/CN.4/L.682. Available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4J682.pdf (accessed 24 September 2012). Inglis, David and Roland Robertson (2008) ‘The Elementary Forms of Globality: Durkheim and the Emergence and Nature of Global Life’, Journal of Classical Sociology 8 (1): 5-25. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1999) ‘Tadic Case: The Judgement Of The Appeals Chamber’, Press Release TH/P.I.S./419-e. Available at: www.icty.org/sid/7749 (accessed 24 September 2012). International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (2001) ‘Case No. 10: The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures’. Avail­ able at: www.itlos.org/index.php?id=102&L=l%27 (accessed 24 September 2012). Jackson, Robert H. (1990) Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jaeger, Hans-Martin (2010) ‘Modern Systems Theory and/as Historical Dis­ course Analysis’ in Mathias Albert, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Alexander Wendt (eds.) New Systems Theories of World Politics, pp. 69-96. New York, NY: Palgrave. Jellinek, Georg (1880) Die rechtliche Natur der Staatenvertrage, Wien: A. Hólder. Johnson, Alian G. (2000) The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology, 2nd edn, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Johnson, Alien W. and Timothy Earle (2000) The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State, 2nd edn, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Juteau, Danielle (2003) ‘Introducing Social Differentiation’ in Danielle Juteau (ed.) Social Differentiation: Patterns and Processes, pp. 3-24. Toronto: Univer­ sity of Toronto Press. Kahler, Miles (2004) ‘Defining Accountability Up: the Global Economic Multilaterals’, Government and Opposition 39 (2): 132-58. Kahler, Miles and David A. Lake (2009) ‘Economic Integration and Global Governance: Why So Little Supranationalism?’ in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds.) The Politics of Global Regulation, pp. 242—75. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kaplan, Morton A. (1957) System and Process in International Relations. New York, NY: Wiley. Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) Activists beyondBorders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

258

Bibliography

Keene, Edward (2002) Beyond the Anarchical Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kemp, Tom (1969) Industrialization in Nineteenth Century Europe, London: Longman. Kennedy, David (1994) ‘A New World Order: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow’, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 4 (2): 330—76. Kennedy, Paul (1987) The Rise and Fall ofthe Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York, NY: Random House. Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (1986) ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, International Organization 40 (1): 1-27. (1993) ‘Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Coid War’ in David Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, pp. 269-300. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Kessler, Oliver (2009) ‘Towards a Sociology of the International? The Interna­ tional between Anarchy and World Society’, International Political Sociology 3 (1): 87-108. (2012) ‘World Society, Social Differentiation and Time’, International Political Sociology 6 (1): 77-94. Key, Vladimer O., Jr. (1953) Politics, Parties, andPressure Groups, New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell. Kieserling, André (2008) ‘Felder und Klassen. Pierre Bourdieus Theorie der Gesellschaft’, Zeitschrift für Soziologie 37 (1): 3-24. Kingsbury, Benedict (1998) ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’, European Journal of International Law 9 (4): 599—625. Klare, Michael (1995) Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America’s Search for a New Foreign Policy, New York, NY: Hill and Wang. Koch, Manfred (2002) Weimaraner Weltbewohner. Zur Genese von Goethes Begriff ‘Weltliteratur1, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. Kolk, Ans and Rob Van Tulder (2005) ‘Setting New Global Rules? TNCs and Codes of Conduct’, Transnational Corporations 14 (3): 1-27. Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal (2001) ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’, International Organization 55 (4): 76199. Koskenniemi, Martti (1990) ‘The Politics of International Law’, European Jour­ nal of International Law 1 (1): 4-32. (2004) ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfigtfration’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17 (2): 198-217. (2005) Between Apology and Utopia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Koskenniemi, Martti and Páivi Leino (2002) ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxiety’, Leiden Journal of International Law 15 (3): 55379. Kotkin, Joel (1992) Tribes: How Race, Religión and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy, New York, NY: Random House.

Bibliography

259

Krasner, Stephen D. (1988) ‘Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective’, Compar­ ativa Political Studies 2\ (1): 66-94. (1993) ‘Westphalia and All That’ in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane (eds.) Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, pp. 235-64. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kratochwil, Friedrich (1982) ‘On the Notion of Interest’, International Organi­ zation 36 (1): 1-36. (1989) Rules, Norms and Decisions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1995) ‘Sovereignty as Dominium’ in Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds.) Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and Intervention, pp. 21-42. Bal­ timore, MD: John Hopkins Press. (1997) ‘Globalization and the Disappearance of Publics’ in Jin-Young Chung (ed.) Gobal Governance: The Role of International Institutions in a Changing World, pp. 71-123. Seoul: Sejong Institute. (2009) ‘Legal Theory and International Law’ in David Armstrong (ed.) Routledge Handbook of International Law, pp. 55—67. London: Routledge. (2010a) ‘How (Il)liberal is Slaughter’s “Liberal Theory” of the Law’, Comparative Sociology 9 (1): 120-45. (2010b) Of Maps, Law and Politics, Mimeo, Florence: European University Institute. Krücken, Georg and Gili S. Drori (eds.) (2009) World Society: The Writings of John W Meyer, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kumar, Krishan (2010) ‘Nation-states as Empires, Empires as Nation-states: Two Principies, one Practice?’, Theory and Society 39 (2): 119^13. La Vopa, Anthony}. (1986) ‘Vocations, Careers and Talent: Lutheran Pictism and Sponsored Mobility in Eighteenth Century Germany’, Comparativo Studies in Society and History 28 (2): 255—86. (1988) Grace, Talent, and Merit: Poor Students, Clerical Careers, and Professional Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lake, Anthony (1994) ‘Confronting Backlash States’, Foreign Affairs T5 (2): 4555. Lake, David A. (1999) ‘Global Governance: A Relational Contracting Approach’ in Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey A. Hart (eds.) Globalization and Governance, pp. 31-53. London: Routledge. (2009) Hierarchy in International Relations, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lange, Stefan and Dietmar Braun (2000) Politische Steuerung zwischen System und Akteur, Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Larkins, Jeremy (1994) ‘Representations, Symbols, and Social Facts: Durkheim and IR Theory’, Millennium 23 (2): 239-64. Lauterpacht, Hersch (1947) Recognition in International Law, Cambridge: Cam­ bridge University Press. (1970) Prívate Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, Hamden, CT: Anchor.

260

Bibliography

Lee, Kelley and Richard Dodgson (2000) ‘Globalization and Cholera: Implications for Global Governance’, Global Governance 6 (2): 213-36. Lenin, Vladimir Ilich (1917) Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, London: Lawrence and Wishart. Lepsius, M. Rainer (1990) Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Lerner, Jennifer S. and Philip E. Tetlock (1999) ‘Accounting for the Effects of Accountability’, Psychological Bulletin 125 (2): 255—75. Lesaffer, Randall (2004) Peace Treaties and International Law in European History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lipschutz, Ronnie D. and James K. Rowe (2005) Globalization) Governmentality and Global Politics: Regulation for the Rest of Us?, London: Routledge. List, Christian (2002) ‘Two Concepts of Agreement’, The Good Society 11 (1): 72-9. Litwak, Robert S. (2000) Rogue States and US. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Coid War, Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Lockwood, David (1964) ‘Social Integration and System Integration’ in George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch (eds.) Explorations in Social Change, pp. 244-57. London: Routledge. Lorimer, James (1883) The Institutos ofthe Law ofNations, Edinburgh: Blackwood. Luard, Evan (1976) Types ofInternational Society, New York, NY: The Free Press. (1990) The Globalization of Politics: The Changed Focus of Political Action in the Modern World, New York, NY: New York University Press. Lucas, John R. (1965) ‘Against Equality’, Philosophy 40 (154): 296-307. Luhmann, Niklas (1971a) ‘Die Weltgesellschaft’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 51 (1): 1-34. (1971b) ‘Sinn ais Grundbegriff der Soziologie’ in Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann (eds.) Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie - Was leistet die Systemforschung?, pp. 25-100. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (1977) ‘The Differentiation of Society’, Canadian Journal of Sociology 2 (1): 29-53. (1981) ‘Identitátsgebrauch in selbstsubstitutiven Ordnungen besonders Gesellschaften’ in Niklas Luhmann (ed.) Soziologische Aufklarung 3: Soziales System, Gesellschaft, Organisation,pp. 198-227. Opladen: Westdeutscher Ver­ lag. (1982) Differentiation of Society, New York, NY: Columbia University Press. (1983a) ‘Anspruchsinflation im Krankheitssystem. Eine Stellungnahme aus gesellschaftstheoretischer Sicht’ in Phillip Herder-Dorneich and Alexander Schuller (eds.) Die Anspruchsspirale: Schicksal oder Systemdefekt? pp. 28-49. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. '“(1983b) ‘Medizin und Gesellschaftstheorie’, Medizin Mensch Gesellschaft 8 (3): 168-75. (1984) Soziale Systeme: Grundrift einer allgemeinen Theorie, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (1988) Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (1990a) ‘Der medizinische Code’ in Soziologische Aufklarung 5: Konstruktivistische Perspektiven, pp. 183-95. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Bibliography

261

(1990b) Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (1993) Das Recht der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (1995) Die Kunst der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (1996) Social Systems, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (1997a) ‘Selbstorganisation und Mikrodiversitát: Zur Wissenssoziologie des neuzeitlichen Individualismus’, Soziale Systeme 3 (1): 23-32. (1997b) Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (2000a) Art as a Social System, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. (2000b) Die Politik der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (2005) [1967] ’Soziologie ais Theorie sozialer Systeme’ in Niklas Luh­ mann (ed.) Soziologische Aufklárung 1: Aufsatze zur Theorie sozialer Systeme, 7th edn, pp. 143-172. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. (2008) Law as a Social System, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Macdonald, Kate and Terry Macdonald (2010) ‘Democracy in a Pluralist Global Order: Corporate Power and Stakeholder Representation’, Ethics and Inter­ national Affairs 24 (1): 19-43. Manning, Charles A. W. (1975) The Nature of International Society, London: Macmillan. Marks, Susan (2000) The Riddle ofAll Constitutions: International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mayall, James (1990) Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge: Cam­ bridge University Press. Mayntz, Renate and Fritz W. Scharpf (2005) ‘Politische Steuerung - Heute?’, MPIfG Working Paper 05/1. Available at: www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp05-l/ wp05-l.html (accessed 24 September 2012). Mayntz, Renate, Bernd Rosewitz, Uwe Schimank und Rudolf Stichweh (1988) Differenzierung und Verselbstandigung. Zur Entwicklung gesellschaftlicher Teilsysteme, Frankfurt/M: Campus. Mayr, Ernst (1999) [1942] Systematics and the Origin ofSpecies from the Viewpoint of a Zoologist, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (2004) WhatMakes Biology Unique? Considerations on theAutonomy ofa Scientific Discipline, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001) Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McFarland, Andrew S. (2004) Neopluralism: The Evolution of Political Process Theory, Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. McNeely, Connie (1995) Constructing the Nation-State: International Organization and Prescriptive Action, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. Mearsheimer, John (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company. Meckel, Johann F. (1811) ‘Ueber den Charakter der allmáhligen Vervollkommnung der Organisation, oder den Unterschied zwischen den hóhern und niedern Bildungen’ in Johann Meckel (ed.) Beytrage zur vergleichenden Anatomie, Vol. II, pp. 61-123. Leipzig: Cari Heinrich Reclam. Mendelssohn, Moses (1981) [1785] ‘Sonderung der Ámter und Stánde’ in Alexander Altmann (ed.) Moses Mendelssohn: Kleinere Schriften I (Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VI, 1), pp. 149-53. Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann.

262

Bibliography

Merton, Robert K. (1968) Social Theory and Social Structure, New York, NY: The Free Press. Messmer, Heinz (2003) Der soziale Konflikt: Kommunikative Emergenz und systemische Reproduktion, Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius. Metzges, Günter (2006) NGO-Kampagnen und ihrEinfluss auf internationale Verhandlungen, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Meyer, John W and Brian Rowan (1977) ‘Institutionalized Organizations: For­ mal Structures as Myth and Ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology 83 (2): 340-63. Meyer, John W., Gili S. Drori and Hokyu Hwang (2006) ‘World Society and the Proliferation of Formal Organizations’ in Gili S. Drori, John W. Meyer and Hokyu Hwang (eds.) Globalization and Organization: World Society and Organizational Change, pp. 25-49. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas and Francisco O. Ramirez (1997) ‘World Society and the Nation-state’, American Journal of Sociology 103 (1): 144-81. Meyer, John W. and Ronald L. Jepperson (2000) ‘The “Actors” of Modern Society: The Cultural Construction of Social Agency’, Sociological Theory 18 (1): 100-20. Meyer, John W. and W. Richard Scott (1983) Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality, Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Michelman, Frank (2003) ‘Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts’, Mod­ ern Law Review 66 (1): 1-15. Mili, John Stuart (1867) Inaugural Address, Delivered to the University of St. Andrews, 1 February 1867, London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer. Millikan, Ruth Garrett (1984) Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Milner, Helen V. (1988) Resisting Protectionism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni­ versity Press. Mine, Alain (1993) Le nouveau Mayen Age, Paris: Gallimard. Mitrany, David (1966) [1943] A Working Peace System, Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books. (1975) The Functional Theory of Politics, New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. Mongia, Radhika V. (2007) ‘Historicizing State Sovereignty: Inequality and the Form of Equivalence’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 29 (2): 384-411. Moran, Michael (2002) ‘Understanding the Regulatory State’, British Journal of Political Science 32 (2): 391-413. Moravcsik, Andrew (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Morgenthau, Hans J. (1967) [1948] Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th edn, New York; NY: Alfred Knopf. Morris, lan (2010) Why the West Rules—For Now: The Patterns ofHistory, and What They Reveal About the Future, New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Mostov, Julie (2008) Soft Borders: Rethinking Sovereignty and Democracy, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bibliography

263

Moyo, Dambisa (2011) How the West Wts Lost: Fifty Years of Economic Folly-And the Stark Choices Ahead, New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Münch, Richard (1980) ‘Über Parsons zu Weber. Von der Theorie der Rationalisierung zur Theorie der Interpenetration’, Zeitschrift für Soziologie 9 (1): 18-53. (1990) ‘Differentiation, Rationalization, Interpenetration’ in Jeffrey C. Alexander and Paul Colomy (eds.) Differentiation Theory and Social Change: Comparative and Historical Perspectives, pp. 441-64. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. (1994) ‘Zahlung und Achtung. Die Interpenetration von Okonomie und Moral’, Zeitschrift für Soziologie 23 (5): 388-411. (2005) ‘Die Konstruktion des Welthandels ais legitime Ordnung der Weltgesellschaft’ in Bettina Heintz, Richard Münch und Hartmann Tyrell (eds.) Weltgesellschaft: Theoretische Zugange und empirische Problemlagen (Zeitschriftfür Soziologie, SpecialIssue l),pp. 290-313. Stuttgart: Lucius& Lucius. (2009) Globale Eliten, lokale Autoritáten. Bildung und Wissenschaft unter dem Regime von PISA, McKinsey & Co., Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (2010a) ‘Die Weltgesellschaft im Spa-nnungsfeld von funktionaler, stratifikatorischer und segmentárer Differenzierung’ in Gert Albert and Steffen Sigmund (eds.) Soziologische Theorie kontrovers (Kolner Zeitschrift für Soziolo­ gie und Sozialpsychologie, Special Issue 50), pp. 283-98. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. (2010b) ‘Funktionale, stratifikatorische und segmentare Differenzierung der Weltgesellschaft’ in Gert Albert and Steffen Sigmund (eds.) Soziologische Theorie kontrovers (Kolner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Special Issue 50), pp. 307-310. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. (2010c) European Governmentality. The Liberal Drift of Multilevel Governance, London: Rouledge. (2012) Inclusión and Exclusión in the Liberal Competition State. The Cult of the Individual, London: Routledge. Nardin, Terry (2009) ‘Globalization and the Public Realm’, Critica! Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 12 (2): 297—312. Nassehi, Armin (2004) ‘Die Theorie funktionaler Differenzierung im Horizont ihrer Kritik’, Zeitschrift für Soziologie 33 (2): 98—118. (2006) Der soziologische Diskurs der Moderne, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Nelson, Thomas E. and Elaine A. Willey (2001) ‘Issue Frames That Strike a Valué Balance: A Political Psychology Perspective’ in Stephen D. Reese, Jr., Oscar H. Gandy, August E. Grant (eds.) Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World, pp. 245—66. London: Routledge. North, Douglass C. and Robert P. Thomas (1976) The Rise of the West­ ern World: A New Economic History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast (2009) Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

264

Bibliography

Osborne, David and Ted Gaebler (1992) Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector, from Schoolhouse to Statehouse, City Hall to the Pentagon, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Osiander, Andreas (2001) ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth’, International Organization 55 (2): 251-87. Parsons, Talcott (1967) Sociological Theory and Modern Society, New York, NY: The Free Press. (1970) ‘Some Considerations on the Comparative Sociology’ in Joseph Fisher (ed.) The Social Sciences and the Comparativo Study of Educational Systems, pp. 201-20. Scranton, PA: International Textbook Company. (1999) [1961] ‘Order and Community in the International Social System and Polarization of the World and International Order’ in Bryan S. Turner (ed.) The Talcott Parsons Reader, pp. 237-69. Oxford: Blackwell. Pascal, Roy (1962) ‘“Bildung” and the División of Labor’ in Walter H. Bruford (ed.) Germán studies presented to Walter Horace Bruford on his retirement by his pupils, collegues andfriends, pp. 14-28. London: George G. Harrrap. Paulus, Andreas (2001) Die Internationale Gemeinschaft im Vblkerrecht — Eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklung des Volkerrechts im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, München: Beck. Pauly, Louis (1999) Who Elected the Bankers? Surveillance and Control in the World Economy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Perry, James and Andreas Nólke (2006) ‘The Political Economy of International Accounting Standards’, Review of InternationalPoliticalEconomy 13 (4): 55986. Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich (2002) ‘Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a State Centered Approach towards a Human Rights Approach in Interna­ tional Economic Law’ in Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick (eds.) The Political Economy of International Trade Law, pp. 32—67. Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press. Philpott, Daniel (2001) Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Polanyi, Karl (1973) [1944] The Great Transformation: Politische und dkonomische Ursprünge von Gesellschaften und Wirtschaftssystemen, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Preston, Peter W. (2000) Understanding Modern Japan: A Political Economy of Development, Culture and Global Power, London: Sage Publications. Price, Richard (ed.) (2008) Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics, Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press. Project on International Courts and Tribunals (2000) ‘PICT Research Matrix’. Available at: www.pict-pcti.org/matrix/matrixihtro.html (accessed 24 September 2012). Pursell, Carroll W. (1994) White Heat: People and Technology, Berkeley, CA: Uni­ versity of California Press. Putnam, Robert D. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Policy: The Logic of TwoLevel Games’, International Organization 42 (3): 427-60. Rawls, John (1993): ‘The Law of Peoples’, Critical Inquiry 20 (1): 36-68. (1999) The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bibliography

265

Reus-Smit, Christian (1999) The Moral Purpose ofthe State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Risse, Thomas (2000) "’Let’s Argüe!”: Communicative Action in World Politics’ International Organizarían 54 (1): 1-39. Rittberger, Volker and Martin Nettesheim (2008) Authority in the Global Political Economy, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Robertson, Roland (1992) Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, Newbury Park, CA: Sage. (2009) ‘Differentiational Reductionism and the Missing Link in Albert’s Approach to Globalization Theory’, International Political Sociology 3 (1): 119-22. Rosenau, James N. (1997) Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Gover­ nance in a Turbulent World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rosenberg, Justin (1994) The Empire of Civil Society, London: Verso. Ross, Alf (1950) Constitution ofthe United Nations: Analysis of Structure and Func­ tion, New York, NY: Rinehardt. Ruggie, John G. (1983a) ‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis’, WorldPolitics 35 (2): 261-85. (1983b) ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’ in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.) International Regimes, pp. 195-213. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (ed.) (1993) Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, New York, NY: Columbia University Press. (1998) Constructing the World Polity, London: Routledge. Sack, Detlef (2009) Governance und Politik, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Sahlins, Marshall D. (1960) ‘Evolution: Specific and General’ in Marshall D. Sahlins and Elman R. Service (eds.) Evolution and Culture, pp. 12-44. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Salter, Mark (2003) Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Sassen, Saskia (2008) Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Saunders, Elizabeth (2006) ‘Setting Boundaries: Can International Society Exelude ‘Rogue States’?’, International Studies Review 8 (1): 23-54. Schauer, Frederick (2008) ‘Authority and Authorities’, Virginia Law Review 94 (8): 1931-62. Scherer, Andreas G. and Guido Palazzo (2008) Handbook of Research on Global Governance Citizenship, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Schimank, Uwe (2005a) ‘Weltgesellschaft und Nationalgesellschaften: Funktionen von Staatsgrenzen’ in Bettina Heintz, Richard Münch und Hartmann Tyrell (eds.) Weltgesellschaft Theoretische Zugánge und empirische Problemlagen (Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Special Issue 1), pp. 394-414. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius. (2005b) Differenzierung und Integrarían der modernen Gesellschaft: Beitráge zur akteurzentrierten Differenzierungstheorie 1, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.

266

Bibliography

(2006) Teilsystemische Autonomie und politische Gesellschaftssteuerung: Beitráge zur akteurzentrierten Differenzierungstheorie 2, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. (2007) Theorien gesellschaftlicher Differenzierung, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Schimank, Uwe and Ute Volkmann (1999) Gesellschaftliche Differenzierung, Bielefeld: Transcript. Schluchter, Wolfgang (1981) The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber’s Developmental History, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Schmitt, Cari (1950) Der Nomos der Erde im Volkerrecht des fus Publicum Europaeum, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1991) [1918] ‘The Crisis of the Tax State’ in Richard Swedberg (ed.) Joseph A. Schumpeter: The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism, pp. 99-140. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schuppert, GunnarFolke (ed.) (2005) Governance-Forschung: Vergewisserung über Stand und Entwicklungslinien, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Schuppert, Gunnar Folke and Michael Zürn (eds.) (2008) Governance in einer sich wandelnden Welt (Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Special Issue 41), Wies­ baden: VS Verlag. Schwartz, Barry (1981) Vertical Classification: A Study in Structuralism and the Sociology ofKnowledge, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Scott, Franklin D. (1988) [1977] Suceden: The Nation’s History, enlarged edition, Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press. Senghaas, Dieter (1971) Aggressivitát und kollektive Gewalt, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Shani, Giorgio and David Chandler (2010) ‘Assessing the Impact of Foucault on International Relations. Introduction’, International Political Sociology 4 (2): 196-97. Shaw, Martin (1992) ‘Global Society and Global Responsibility: The Theoret­ ical, Analytical and Practical Limits of International Society’, Millenium: Journal of international Studies 21 (3): 421-34. (1994) Global Society and International Relations, Cambridge: Polity. (2000) Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution, Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press. Shinoda, Hideaki (2000) Re-examining Sovereignty: From Classical Theory to the Global Age, Basingstoke: Macmilllan. Siebenhüner, Bernd and Frank Biermann (2009) ‘International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance: Epilogue’ in Frank Biermann, Bernd Siebenhüner and Anna Schreyógg (eds.) International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance, pp. 264—69. Abingdon: Routledge. Simma, Bruno (1994) ‘From Bilateralism to Community Intejest in International Law’, Recueil des Cours 250 (6): 217-384. Simmel, Georg (1908) Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung, Leipzig: Duncker und Humblodt. (1917) Grundfragen der Soziologie, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. (1950) ‘Fundamental Problems of Sociology: Individual and Society’ in Kurt H. Wolff (ed.) The Sociology of Georg Simmel, pp. 3-84, Glencoe, IL: Free Press. (1977) [1900] Philosophie des Geldes, 7th edition, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

Bibliography

267

(1989) [1890] ‘Úber sociale Differenzierung. Sociologische und psychologische Untersuchungen’ in Heinz-Jürgen Dahme (ed.) Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe, Vbl. II, pp. 109-295. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (2010) ‘The Metrópolis and Mental Life’ in Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson (eds.) The Blackwell City Reader, 2nd edition, pp. 103-10. London: Blackwell. Simpson, Gerry (2004) Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sklair, Leslie (2000) The Transnational Capitalist Class, New York, NY: WileyBlackwell. Slaughter, Anne-Marie (1995) ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’, European Journal of International Law 6 (1): 508—38. (1997) ‘The Real New World Order’, Foreign Affairs 76 (5): 183-97. (2004) A New World Order, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Smith, Richard, Kelley Lee and Nick Drager (2009) Trade and Health: an Agenda for Action, The Lancet 373 (9665): 768-73. Sorauf, Frank J. (1968) Party Politics in America, Boston, MA: Little, Brown. Spencer, Herbert (1966) [1874] The Principies of Sociology, Osnabrück: Otto Zeller. Spruyt, Hendrik (1994) The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Stáheli, Urs (1996) ‘Der Code ais leerer Signifikant? Diskurstheoretische Beobachtungen’, Soziale Systeme 2 (2): 257-82. (2000) Sinnzusammenbrüche: Eine dekonstruktive Lektüre von Niklas Luhmanns Systemtheorie, Weilerswist: Velbrück. Stearns, Peter N. (2009) Globalization in World History, London: Routledge. Stetter, Stephan (ed.) (2007) Territorial Conflicts in World Society: Interna­ tional Relations, Modern Systems Theory and Confiict Studies, London: Routledge. (2008) World Society and the Middle East: Reconstructions in Regional Politics, Houndsmills: Palgrave. (2012) ‘Legitimitátspolitik in trans- und internationalen Konflikten: Dynamiken internationaler confiict governance am Beispiel des israelischpalástinensischen Konfliktes’ in Christopher Daase, Anna Geis and Frank Nullmeier (eds.) Der Aufstieg der Legitimitátspolitik: Rechtfertigung und Kritik politisch-ókonomischer Ordnungen (Leviathan: Berliner Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, Special Issue 27), pp. 151 - 70. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Stichweh, Rudolf (1987) ‘Die Autopoiesis der Wissenschaft’ in Dirk Baecker, Jürgen Markowitz, Rudolf Stichweh, Hartmann Tyrell and Helmut Willke (eds.) Theorie ais Passion - Niklas Luhmann zum 60. Geburtstag, pp. 447-481. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (1990) ‘Sport-Ausdifferenzierung, Funktion, Code’, Sportwissenschaft20 (4): 373-389. (1991) Der frühmoderne Staat und die europáische Universitát. Zur Interaktion von Politik und Erziehungssystem im Prozefi ihrer Ausdifferenzierung (16.-18. Jahrhundert), Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.

268

Bibliography

(1994) ‘Bildung, Individualitat und die kulturelle Legitimation von Spezialisierung’ in Rudolf Stichweh (ed.) Wissenschaft, Universitát, Professionen. Soziologische Analysen, pp. 207-27. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (2000) Die Weltgesellschaft. Soziologische Analysen, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (2005a) ‘Erzeugung und Neutralisierung von Ungleichheit durch Funktionssysteme’ in Rudolf Stichweh (ed.) Inklusion und Exklusion. Studien zur Gesellschaftstheorie, pp. 163-77. Bielefeld: Transcript. (2005b) Inklusion und Exklusion. Studien zur Gesellschaftstheorie, Bielefeld: Transcript. (2007) ‘Dimensionen des Weltstaats im System der Weltpolitik’ in Mathias Albert and Rudolf Stichweh (eds.) Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit: Beobachtungen globaler politischer Strukturbildung, pp. 25-36. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag. (2008) ‘Selbstbeschreibung der Weltgesellschaft’ in Jórg Baberowski, Hartmut Kaelble and Jürgen Schriewer (eds.) Selbstbilder und Fremdbilder. Reprasentationen sozialer Ordnung im Wandel, pp. 21-53. Frankfurt/M: Cam­ pus. (2010) ‘Funktionale Differenzierung der Weltgesellschaft’ in Gert Albert and Steffen Sigmund (eds.) Soziologische Theorie kontrovers (Kólner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Special Issue 50), pp. 299-306. Wies­ baden: VS Verlag. (2012) ‘Self-Cultivation as a Variant of Differentiation in Germán Social His­ tory: J.G. Herder (1778) to Max Weber (1918)’, Soziale Systeme 18 (forthcoming). Stichweh, Rudolf and Paul Windolf (eds.) (2009) Inklusion und Exklusion: Anal­ ysen zur Sozialstruktur und sozialen Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Stirk, Peter (2012) ‘The Westphalian Model and Sovereign Equality’, Review of International Studies 38 (3): 641—60. Stone Sweet, Alex (2006) ‘The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Gover­ nance’, Journal of European Public Policy 13 (5): 627-T6. Strang, David (1991) ‘Anomaly and Commonplace in European Political Expan­ sión: Realist and Institutionalist Accounts’, International Organization 45 (2): 143-62. Strayer, Joseph (1963) ‘The Historical Experience of Nation-building in Europe’ in Karl Deutsch and William J. Foltz (eds.) Nation-building, pp. 17-27. New York, NY: Atherton Press. (1970) On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Streeck, Wolfgang (1999) Korporatismus in Deutschland, Frankfurt/M and New York, NY: Campus. (2009) Re-Forming Capitalism: Institutional Change in the Gemían Political Econ­ omy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Subrahmanyam, Gita (2003) Bringing the Empire Back In: Patterns of Growth in the British Imperial State, 1890-1960, unpublished PhD Thesis, London: London School of Economics and Political Science. (2006) ‘Ruling Continuities: Colonial Rule, Social Forces and Path Dependence in British Iridia and Africa’, Journal of Commonwealth & Comparativo Politics 44 (1): 84-117.

Bibliography

269

Suedfeld, Peter, Karen Guttieri and Philip E. Tetlock (2003) ‘Assessing Integrative Complexity at a Distance: Archival Analyses of Thinking and Decisión Making’ in Jerrold M. Post (ed.) The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, pp. 246-72. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press. Suganami, Hidemi (1992) ‘Grotius and International Equality’ in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (eds.) Hugo Grotius and International Relations, pp. 221-40. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sunstein, Cass (2007) Republic.com 2.0, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Taylor, Charles (2007) Modern Social Imaginarles, Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Teschke, Benno (2003) The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations, London: Verso. Tetlock, Philip E. (2000) ‘Coping with Trade-offs: Psychological Constraints and Political Implications’ in Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins and Samuel L. Popkin (eds.) Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality, pp. 239-63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2003) ‘Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Valúes and Taboo Cognitions’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7): 320-24. Tetlock, Philip E., Randall S. Peterson and Jennifer S. Lerner (1996) ’Revising the Valué Pluralism Model: Incorporating Social Content and Context Postulares’ in Clive Seligman, James Olson and Mark Zanna (eds.) The Psychology of Valúes: Ontario Symposium on Social and Personality Psychology, pp. 25-51. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Teubner, Gunther (1989) ‘How the Law Thinks: Towards a Constructivist Epistemology of Law’, Law and Society Review 23 (5): 727-57. (1996) ‘Globale Bukowina: Zur Emergenz eines transnationalen Rechtspluralismus’, Rechthistorisches Journal 15: 255-90. Teubner, Gunther and Andreas Fischer Lescano (2005) Regimekollisionen, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. Teubner, Gunther and Helmut Willke (1984) ‘Kontext und Autonomie: Gesellschaftliche Selbststeuerung durch reflexives Recht’, Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 5 (1): 4—35. Thomas, George M. (2010) ‘Differentiation, Rationalization, and Actorhood in New Systems and World Culture Theories’ in Mathias Albert, LarsErik Cederman, and Alexander Wendt (eds.) New Systems Theories of World Politics, pp. 220-48. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Thomas, George M., John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramírez and John Boli (1987) Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual, Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Thomas, George M., Lisa R. Peck and Channin G. DeHaan (2003) ‘Reforming Education, Transforming Religión, 1876-1931’ in Christian Smith (ed.) Secular Revolutions, pp. 354-94. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Thomas, George M., Nalini Chhetri and Khaleel Hussaini (2008) ‘Legitimacy and the Rise of NGOs: The Global and Local in South Asia’, Journal of Civil Society 4 (1): 1-12.

270

Bibliography

Thompson, Grahame, Jennifer Francés, Rosalind Levacic and Jeremy C. Mitchell (eds.) (1991) Markets, Hierarchies and Networks: The Coordination of Social Life, London: Sage. Tilly, Charles (1990) Coerción, Capital, andEuropean States, AD 990—1990, New York, NY: Blackwell. Tónnies, Ferdinand (1887) Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Leipzig: Fues’s Verlag. (2003) Community and Society, Mineóla, NY: Dover Publications. Torpey, John (2000) The Invention ofthe Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tracy, Karen (1993) ‘It’s an Interesting Article’, Research on Language and Social Interaction 26 (2) 195-201. Tumin, Melvin M. (1953) ‘Some Principies of Stratification: a Critical Analysis’, American Sociological Review 18 (5): 387—93. Tyrell, Hartmann (1998) ‘Zur Diversitát der Differenzierungstheorie. Soziologiehistorische Anmerkungen’, Soziale Systeme 4 (1): 119-49. United Nations Security Council (1999) ‘Resolution 1267 (1999)’. Available at: www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol/S/RES/1267%281999%29 (accessed 24 February 2013). Van der Pijl, Kees (1998) Transnational Classes and International Relations, Lon­ don: Routledge. Verdross, Alfred and Bruno Simma (1984) Universelles Volkerrecht. Theorie und Praxis, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Viola, Lora (2009) ‘Diplomacy and the Origins of the Diplomatic System’, Paper presented at International Studies Association Annual Conference, New York, NY, 1 February 2009. Viola, Lora, Duncan Snidal and Michael Zürn (2014) ‘Sovereign (In)equality in the Evolution of the International System’ in Stephan Leibfried, Frank Nullmeier, Evelyne Huber, Matthew Lange, Jonah Levy and John Stephens (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Transformations ofthe State, Oxford: Oxford Uni­ versity Press (forthcoming). Vogd, Werner (2005) ‘Medizinsystem und Gesundheitswissenschaften: Rekonstruktion einer schwierigen Beziehung’, Soziale Systeme 11 (2): 23670. von Baer, Karl Ernst (1828) Über Entwickelungsgeschichte der Thiere. Beobachtung und Reflexión. 1. Theil, Konigsberg: Gebrüder Borntráger. Walker, Rob B. J. (2009) After the Globe, before the World, London: Routledge. Wallace, Michael (1971) ‘Power, Status, and International War’, Journal of Peace Research 8 (1): 23-35. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1976) The Modern World System. Vbl. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins ofthe European World Economy in théSixteenth Century, New York, NY: Academic Press. (1979) The Capitalist World-Economy, London: Cambridge University Press. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, Boston, MA: MacGraw Hill. (1986) ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics-, A Reponse to My Critics’ in Robert O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 322-346. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Bibliography

271

(1990) ‘Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory’, Journal of International Affairs 4A (1): 21-37. (2004a) ‘KennethN. Waltz’, Tidsskriftet Politik 7 (4): 92-104. (2004b) ‘Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms’, Journal ofPolitics and Society 15 (1): 2-6. Watson, Adam (1992). The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis, London: Routledge. (1997) The Limits of Independence: Relations Between States in the Modern World, London: Routledge. (2007) Hegemony and History, London: Routledge. Watts, Sheldon (1997) Epidemics and History: Disease, Power, and Imperialism, London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Weber, Max (1922) ‘Zwischenbetrachtung: Theorie der Stufen und Richtungen religióser Weltablehnung’ in Max Weber (ed.) Gesammelte Aufsátze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I, Tübingen: J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck). (1968a) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, New York, NY: Bedminster Press. (1968b) [1922] Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. GrundrifiderverstehendenSoziologie. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. (1988) [1919] ‘Wissenschaft ais Beruf in Johannes Winckelmann (ed.) Max Weber: Gesammelte Aufsátze zur Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 582-613. Tübingen: J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Weick, Karl E. (1989) ‘Theory Construction as Disciplined Imagination’, Academy of Management Review 14 (4): 516-531. Wendt, Alexander (1999) Social Theory ofInternational Politics, Cambridge: Cam­ bridge University Press. (2003) ‘Why a World State is Inevitable’, European Journal of International Relations 9 (4): 491-52. (2004) ‘The State as Person in International Theory’, Review of International Studies 30 (2): 289-316. Wendt, Alexander and Daniel Friedheim (1996) ‘Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East Germán State’ in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.) State Sovereignty as Social Construct, pp. 240-77. Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press. Westen, Peter (1982) ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’, HarvardLaw Review 95 (3): 537-96. Wiener, Antje (2008) The Invisible Constitution of Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wight, Martin (1972) ‘International Legitimacy’, International Relations 4 (1): 1-28. (1977) Systems of States, Leicester: Leicester University Press. Williams, Michael C. (2005) The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williamson, Oliver E. (1975) Markets andHierarchies, New York, NY: Free Press. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, NY: Free Press. Willke, Helmut (1992) Ironie des Staates. Grundlinien einer Staatstheorie polyzentrischer Gesellschaften, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.

272

Bibliography

(2006) Global Governance, Bielefeld: Transcript. Winckelmann, Johann Joachim (1763—8) Geschichte der Kunst des Alterthums, republished in 1825 as Vol. III oí Johann Winckelmanns sámtliche Werke, ed. Joseph Eiselein, Donaueschingen: Verlag Deutscher Klassiker. Windolf, Paul (2002) Corporate Networks in Europe and the United States, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wong, Edward (2007) ‘Iraq’s Curse: A Thirst for Final, Crushing Victory’, New York Times (3 June). Available at: www.nytimes.com/2007/06/03/ weekinreview/03wong.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 11 February 2013). Wortmann, Hendrik (2010) Zum Desiderat einer Evolutionstheorie des Sozialen. Darwinistische Konzepte in den Sozialwissenschaften, Konstanz: UVK. WTO Dispute Settlement Body (2010) ‘United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products’, WT/DS58. Available at: www. wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm (accessed 24 September 2012). (2011) ‘European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Prod­ ucts (Hormones)’, WT/DS48. Available at: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/cases_e/ds48_e.htm (accessed 24 September 2012). Yoffee, Norman (1979) ‘The Decline and Rise of Mesopotamian Civilization: An Ethnoarchaeological Perspective on the Evolution of Social Complexity’, American Antiquity 44 (1): 5-35. (1993) ‘Too Many Chiefs? (or, Safe Texts for the ‘90s)’ in Norman Yoffee and Andrew Shermatt (ed.) Archaeological Theory: Who Sets the Agenda?, pp. 60-78. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2005) Myths of the Archaic State: Evolution of the Earliest Cities, States and Civilizations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zacher, Mark (2001) ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Forcé’, International Organizarían 55 (2): 215-50. Zangl, Bernhard (2008) ‘Judicialization Matters! A Comparison of Dispute Set­ tlement under GATT and the WTO’, International Studies Quarterly 52 (4): 825-54. Zürn, Michael (1992) ’Jenseits der Staatlichkeit. Über die Folgen der ungleichzeitigen Denationalisierung’, Leviathan 20 (4): 490-513. (1998) Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaats. Globalisierung und Denationalisierung ais Chance, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (2005) ‘Global Governance’ in Gunnar Folke Schuppert (ed.) GovernanceForschung: Vergewisserung über Stand und Entwicklungslinien, pp. 121-46. Baden-Baden: Nomos. (2006) ‘Global Governance as an Emergent Political Order - The Role of Transnational Non-Governmental Organisations’ in Gunriar Folke Schup­ pert (ed.) Global Governance and the Role of Non-State Actors, pp. 31-45. Baden-Baden: Nomos. (2007a) ‘Institutionalisierte Ungleichheit in der Weltpolitik. Jenseits der Alter­ nativo “Global Governance” versus “American Empire’”, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 48 (2): 680-704. (2007b) ‘Institutionalized Inequality’, Internationale Politik, Global Edition, 8 (3): 10-16.

Bibliography

273

(2010) ‘Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance’ in Henrik Enderlein, Sonja Wálti and Michael Zürn (eds.) Handbook of Multi-Level Governance, pp. 80-99. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Zürn, Michael, Martin Binder and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt (2012) ‘Interna­ tional Authority and its Politicization’, International Theory 4 (1): 69-106. Zürn, Michael and Stephan Leibfried (2005) ‘A New Perspective on the State: Reconfiguring the National Constellation’ in Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn (eds.) Transformations of the State, pp. 1-36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Index

Alexander, Jeffrey, 2, 8, 27, 31 Amnesty International, 17, 151 anarchy, 4, 19, 21, 99, 100, 103, 149, 161, 207,242 ASEAN, see Association of Southeast Asian Nations Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 81 authority additional layers of, 232 content-independent, 179 controlled, 17 distribution of, 99 exclusive jurisdictional, 162 governance, 122, 123, 126, 130 impersonal, 38 legal, 179 of great powers, 128 of international law firms, 165 of States, 101 of the central State, 38 of the nation-state, 213 of the World Health Organization to declare a public health emergency of international concern, 185 or independence, 81 over a territory, 18 political, see political authority prívate, 16 recognized, 174 religious, 196 re-parceling of, 107 secular, 196 sovereign, 162 superior, 112, 162 supreme legal, 12 undifferentiated, 37 autopoiesis, 2, 6, 41, 71, 73, 74, 83, 86, 140, 144, 146, 148,452, 234, 237, 240, see also Luhmann, Niklas

274

borders, 45, 119, 120, 137, 150, 153, 184, 194, 196, 197, 199, 205, 208, 209, 217, 218, 226, 235, 242 capitalism, 72, 73, 80, 87, 108, 209, 212, 214 civil society, 13, 31, 33, 52, 73, 164, 175, 177, 206, 225, 239 class differentiation, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 95, 126,136 code, 4, 23, 31, 37, 38, 63-4, 85, 86, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 149, 153, 154, 188, 189, 192, 194, 198 Coid War, 120, 212, 235, 238, 244 competition, 80, 84, 86, 216, 221, 222, 230 Comte, Auguste, 8 constitutionalization, 24, 155, 159, 160, 161, 166-9, 171, 172, 175, 180, 241 constructivism, 1, 11, 24, 150, see also International Relations (discipline), relationship to Sociology core and periphery, 4 differentiation between, 2, 38, 69, 78, 84, 86, 139, 155, see also Luhmann, Niklas; stratificatory differentiation internal stratification between, 128 structural hierarchy between, 27 uneven distribution of rights among, 128 cultural script, 28 culture, 13, 28, 31,36, 38, 58, 68, 78, 231

Darwin, Charles, 41, 54 decolonization, 27, 29, 104, 106, 120, 211 decomposition, 9, 37, 56, 65, 66, 206, 208, 225, 226, see also functional differentiation, as decomposition of society decoupling, 6, 34, 140, 160, 161, 232

Index differentiation as a concept in political psychology, 191 as a more intelligent conception of structure, 107 as a process by which social groups become dissociated from one another, 91 as an analytical concept, 111 as core of sociological thought about the emergence of modern society, 2 as elective build-up of complexity intemal to society, 70 definition of, 1 definition of type and dimensión approaches, 91-2 Durkheim’s approach to societal, 55 forms of, 2, 4, 7, 22, 27, 69, 134, 135, 139, 151, 155, 161, 203, 229,232 historical and communication theory dimensión of, 144 of health as a social system, 194 Parsons’ approach to, 56 relationship between different forms of, 2, 4-5, 6-7, 9, 12, 23, 28, 37, 38, 48, 71-83, 84, 86, 92-7, 111, 130, 151, 155, 182, 203, 205, 210, 226, 230-4, 243, 245 role, see role differentiation segmentary, see segmentary differentiation Simmel’s approach to, 55-6 stratificatory, see stratificatory differentiation type and dimensión approaches, 5, 23 differentiation theory as a challenge to traditional state-centric definition of the international system, 5 as a logic of división, 7 as a tool for studying change of a system in its social environment, 2 as a tool for studying change within a system, 2, 6 as most general theory of social change, 2, 160 as sociological approach, 1, 2-3, 8-11, 25, 85, 228 brief sketch of, 21 formulated by Scottish Enlightment, 50 implications for IR, 48-9, 111, 132-3, 134, 143-55, 228, 229, 241-5 in IR, 4, 5, 6-8, 11-12, 22, 91, 92-7, 98, 132, 149, 228, see also English school; Waltz, Kenneth of Herbert Spencer, 53

275 división of labour, 2, 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 30, 31, 51, 52, 53, 54, 108, 134, 206, 207, 209, 211, 225, 230, 235, 236 Durkheim, Emile, 9, 10, 11, 31, 54, 55, 97,110, 207, 209,225, 228, 230

ECJ, see European Court of Justice Economies (discipline), 6, 93, 194, 220 economization, 84, 85, 236, 237 emergence decomposition as a necessary condition for, 10 functional differentiation as a process of, 9 of a more pluralistic world, 225 of a new global constitution, 166 of a new world order, 159 of an intersystemic coalition for the pursuit of specific goals, 191 of an unexpected new function system, 69 of global markets, 13 of intergovernmental institutions, 242 of international organizations, 204 of new forms of functional differentiation, 208 of new political spaces, 175 of the economy as a functionally differentiated subsystem, 194 of the State system, 162 empire, 4, 46, 104, 105, 106, 107, 119, 120, 170, 182, 210, 211, 212, 214, see also stratificatory differentiation empire-states, 104, 214 English School, 4, 7, 11, 18, 23, 43, 116, 134, 142, 149, 228 estates, 50, 59, 60, 71, 77, 135, 144, 162, 163 EU, see European Union European Court of Human Rights, 148, 152 European Court of Justice, 81 European Union, 81, 151, 165 Ferguson, Adam, 51 fragmentation, 6, 24, 84, 87, 159, 160, 161, 166, 169-72, 173, 175, 178, 241, 242 function systems, see also code; functional differentiation abstract theory about the constitutive properties of, 58-69 as an umbrella for other forms of differentiation, 139 as emergent orders, 145

276

Index

function systems (comí.) autonomy of, 138, 145, 155 autopoietic, 240 codes of, 143 comparative perspective on, 138 coordination across, 5 defined by connectivity between Communications, 141 definítion of, 5, 59 dynamics of self-description in, 138 equal access to, 77 evolution of different, 141 ‘function’ of, 143 global discourses in various, 153 globalization of, 20, 231, 235, 240 hegemonic aspirations on semantic level held by, 138 history and structures of, 138 identity of, 144 increasing interdependence between, 151 increasing social relevance and autonomy of, 138 internal complexity of, 146 internal differentiation of, 139 logics of action specific to different, 190 new forms of stratificatory differentiation within, 135 no static hierarchies between, 145 of politics, 137 offering alternatives to the current order, 142 operative closure of, 146 pluralization of, 10, 58 plurality and diversity of, 58 relationship between different, 6, 7, 23, 24,229,236 relationship of politics to other autonomous and equally powerful, 150 rise of sport as a, 57 role of spatial boundaries in, 235 segmentary differentiation within and across, 139 self-descriptions of, 143 self-generated autonomy of, 148 self-generating operations of, 146 self-generating quality of, 147 self-illusionary symbolism in, 147 sensitivity of, 148 strategies of invisibilizing the incompleteness of, 143, universalism of, 80 use of the term, 31

within the whole of world society, 48 functional differentiation and its struggle with individualization, 55-6, see also Simmel, Georg as a model for globalization, 107 as a moral project, 41 as a natural, instrumental response to complexity, 30, 232 as a running theme in sociological theory, 8 as a semantic creation of a distinctly rationalist discourse, 38, see also systems theory, modern as a universal feature of social and political systems, 100 as an alternative reading of contemporary changes in international law, 172 as an empirical descriptor rather than an explanation, 30 as an objective response to complexity, 27 as centrepiece of Berger and Luckmann’s description of the modern world, 30 as cultural expression of Western dominance, 232 as decomposition of society, 9, 37, see also Durkheim, Entile; Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as defining feature of modern society 3 as organic solidarity, 55, see also Durkheim, Emile as process of emergence, 9, 225, see also Luhmann, Niklas; Weber, Max as purposive differentiation of the economy, 86 as rational action associated with the identities of rational actors, 28 as systemic adaption to complexity, 32, see also Luhmann, Niklas; systems theory as the core of Luhmann’s theory of modern society, 71 both constitutionalization and fragmentation result from, 160 cascading, 107 consequences of, 188 cultural turn in theorizing, 31 deconstructivist understanding of, 132 definition of, 2 dissolving distinction between national and global levels, 24 each system specifies its identity by itself in the case of, 145 effect on political system, 138

Index emergence of new forms of, 208 empirical evidence against relationship with complexity, 32 examples of, 7 historical analysis of, 139 horizontal restructuring of, 219 in biological thought, 1 in the international system, 7 incomplete in world society, 83 influence of embryology on sociological understanding of, 54 limits of the theory of, 132 new forms of, 205, 210, 218, 226 of religión and the State, 33 ofthe economy, 73 of the legal system, 23, 166 of the State and society, 162 ‘operational closure’ as a prerequisite for, 145 origins of the concept, 50-3 primacy of, 3, 7, 27, 30, 71, 75, 76, 79, 87, 134, 138, 140, 147, 151, 154, 155, 229, 230, 231 processes of transnational, 224 purpose-oriented nature of, 84 rise of, 106 systems theory understanding of, 133, 134, 137, 138 transformation of the character of, 205 two interrelated dimensions of, 148 within the international political system, 20, 21 functionally defined systems, see function systems

GATT, see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, 2, 9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 81, see also liberalismo World Trade Organization global financial markets, 19, 75, 216, 217, 225, 231 global financial system, 15, 21 global governance application of the term, 215 as a challenge to the nation-state as being the prime site of political authority, 4 as a challenge to the primacy of segmentatary differentiation in the international political system, 17 as a perspective on the current State of global politics, 240-1 as multi-level governance, 19, 163, 236

277 as response of States to increased political and economic complexity, 27 as restructuring of the political system in terms of functionally defined problem solving, 6 as supra- and transnationalization of international institutions, 14 as the transnational political sector, 206 development of, 243 emergence of, 12 legal aspects of, 165 research on, 133, 150, 151, 155, 163, 166 rise of, 17, 242 the increasing ‘functional compartmentalization ’ of world politics in the context of, 151 transnational coalitions in processes of, 222 global markets, 13, 39, 85, 206 global political system, see international political system globalization an emergent consciousness of the world as one place, 27, see also world polity theory as a challenge to the congruence of social with political space, 13 as a challenge to the modern State, 210 as a process that decouples socials relations from sovereign States, 107 as a process transforming the character of functional differentiation, 205 as a self-description of society, 59 as a weakening of segmentary differentiation in the political system of world society, 8 as an extensión of the communicative spaces in which function systems define their inclusión addresses, 67 as an issue in Sociology, 3 as functional differentiation, 27 as functional differentiation across borders 45 as functional differentiation within world as a whole, 27, see world polity theory as increased rationalization and functional differentiation across national borders, 43 as the nominalization of our time, 27 as the potential global reach of any communication, 14, see also Luhmann, Niklas

278

Index

globalization (coní.) as the rise of new spatial and regional distributions of inclusión and exclusión, 67 as unfolding of functional differentiation, 110 contemporary processes of, 92, 211 debordering in mainstream approaches to, 153 declining significance of national borders for societal transactions, 228 dominance of the economic system as a result of, 235 economic image of, 219 era of, 103 institutionalized inequality as a result of, 232 of education results, 84 of function systems, 20, 183, 235 of the economy, 79, 83, 84, 86, 236 rise of, 242 with a human face, 217 great powers, 4, 6, 94, 98, 99, 100, 104, 106, 108, 109, 116, 117, 118, 127, 182, 192, 238, 242, see also stratificatory differentiation Greenpeace, 151 Habermas, Jürgen, 3, 9 hegemony, 4, 95, 116, 209, 226, 234, 242 hierarchy among subsystemic valúes, 192 as a standard feature of most historical international societies, 100 between core and periphery, 27 between function systems, 145 between States, 242 bureaucratic, 46 differences in valué are not legitímate bases of, 45 different forms of, 242 elements of, 232 feudal, 163 formalized, 232 in the international system, 129 legitimated by equal segmental units, 48 medieval forms of, 136 new forms of, 127 of great powers, 116 of medieval Europe, 112 of norms, 42, 170 ofprestige, 11 replaced by equality and reason as hegemonic cultural valué, 105

separating anarchy from, 161 Waltz’s, 207 human rights, 79, 82, 106, 120, 121, 126, 127, 138, 142, 143, 154, 159, 166, 167, 168, 169, 181, 199, 241 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 51 IASB, see International Accounting Standards Board ICC, see International Criminal Court ILO, see International Labour Organization IMF, see International Monetary Fund indigenous people, 44 inequality crosscutting, 226 differentiated, 226 economic, 78, 127 elements of, 232 formalized, 128, 129 function-specific, 77 global, 127 glocalized, 209 imposition of, 113, 116, 124 in power, 27, 78 informal, 106 institutionalized, 18, 126, 209, 232, 242, see also great powers; hegemony; hierarchy; empire; sovereignty; stratificatory differentiation material, 125, 130 of familial backround, 77 of results, 84 political, 125, 126 social, 127 sovereign, 102, 105, 106, 114, 129 stratificatory divisions of, 23 structures of, 67 transnational, 227 within developing countries, 78 institutionalism in IR, 36 neoliberal, 32 , rational, 1 sociological, 1, 36 instrumental rationalism, 28, see also rationalization; world polity theory instrumental rationality, 28, 30, 46, 147, 155, 231, 237, 239 interdependence, 7, 8, 11, 43, 106, 110, 138, 139, 151, 184, 189, 205, 215, 217, 226, 237, 240

Index International Accounting Standards Board, 165 international climate regime, 236 International Criminal Court, 15, 147, 152,164 international institutions accountability of, 177 and the principie of sovereign equality, 113 as a reflection of growing functional differentiation of the international political system, 183 as addressees of the demands of different function systems, 183 as Instruments of the State, 14 as modifiers of action orientations, 191 as promoters of certain types of functional differentiation, 183 as promoters of coordination between function systems, 24, 183, 203 as promoters of Pareto efficiency in interest aggregation, 186 as promoters of reflexive self-regulation, 190 as promoters of social integration and system integration, 193 conventional, 17 development of, 14 evolution of, 12 impact on inequality among States, 127 implementation of world culture by, 79 invocation of sovereign equality, 130 mediating role of, 240 protection of human rights by, 127 rise of, 242 International Labour Organization, 82, 169 international law, 27, 105, 109, 113, 117, 121, 123, 124, 125, 155, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 172, 173, 180, 185, 200 International Monetary Fund, 15, 18, 82, 87, 126, 177, 216, 242 international organizations autonomization of, 81 autonomous agency of, 184 creation of, 81, 151 decision-making processes of, 175 emergence of, 204 independence of, 81 transfer of responsibilites on the level of world society to, 82 international political system, 2, 3, 4, 6, 20, 143, 144, 145, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 183, 232, 235, 236, 237

279

international regimes, 6, 108 International Relations (discipline) analogy between States and people as a foundation of, 114 challenge to prevalent assumptions in, 132 dominant narrative about the creation of the international system, 112 focus on interrelations of States as organizations, 43 historically informed theories in, 136, 144 institutionalist theories in, 36 modern, 114 neoliberal institutionalism, 32, 48, 116, 126 notion of territoriality in, 162 prevalent view of global governance as response of States to increased political and economic complexity, 27 reasons for engagement with differentiation theory, 2 reification of concrete structures of world politics in mainstream theories of, 142 relationship to Sociology, 1, 141, 144 standard rationalist explanation in, 184 state-centrism in conventional, 49, 149 international society, see also English School as a perspective on current world politics, 238-9 Chinese, 96 distinguished via functional differentiation from an international political system, 4 European, 108 Hedley Bull’s notion of, 1 in which segmentary differentiation is the rule and stratificatory differentiation exists only informally, 113 institutionalization process shaping, 144 key features of, 133 liberal, 243, 244 membership rules of, 104 norms of, 147 notion of, 6 post-World War II, 92 primary institutions of, 18, 147 privileged position of States in, 109 rights and privileges, 121 stratificatory differentiation, 239 tensión in contemporary, 18

280

Index

international society (comí.) Western, 96 Westphalian, 234 international system as a result of stratificatory differentiation between included and excluded actors, 113 change in the, 226 earliest theorists of, 113 goods and resources provided by the, 122 inclusión into the, 118 inclusión of former colonies into the, 123 increasing inclusiveness of, 127 institutionalized stratification within the modern, 128 justice in the, 130 kind and number of actors who belong to the, 118 members of the, 121, 123, 127, 129 modern, 101 of States, 4, 12, see also segmentary differentiation origins of, 112 post-Westphalian, 2, 162, see also functional differentiation; global governance; political authority, of international institutions; stratificatory differentiation processes of boundary drawing in the, 122 rules of the, 126 standard of civilization keeping non-European and non-Christian States out of the, 121 Westphalian, 2, 20, 22, 43, 193, 230, 235, see also segmentary differentiation international system, political, see international political system IO, see international organizations IR, see International Relations (discipline) jus cogens, 159, 166, 167, 170 Kant, Immanuel, 52

League of Nations, 120, 122, 215 legitimacy, 18, 19, 22, 27, 41, 104, 105, 119, 140, 159, 161, 163, 168, 171, 172-9, 215, 241 liberalism, 7, 77, 87, 149„212, 213, 215, 235, 239, 241, 243, see also functional differentiation

liberalism (IR theory), see International Relations (discipline), neoliberal institutionalism likekinds, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 124, 125, 127, 232 like units, 12, 23, 113, 139 Luhmann, Niklas, 2, 9, 10, 11, 31, 32, 56, 61, 62, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 85, 86, 112, 136, 138, 139, 144, 145, 147, 148, 152, 174, 176, 182, 188, 230, 231, 235, 244 Marx, Karl, see Marxism Marxism, 5, 7, 9, 29, 52, 134, 136, 149, 229,235 Mili, John Stuart, 68, 69 multinational corporations, 39, 208, 216, 217,218, 226

NAFTA, see North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement nation-state as a segmental unit, 43, 44 as container, 209 as the primary actor in the world political sphere, 49 as the prime site of political authority, see also segmentary differentiation; sovereignty disaggregation of, 207 disembedding of, 231 embeddedness ofthe, 217 modern, 210 political consolidation of the territorial, 108 separation of State and religión as a culturally constitutive characteristic of the, 34 social integration within, 84 transformation from an intervención State to a competition State, 86 neo-functionalism, 136 neo-institutionalism, 22, 35, see world polity theory neorealism, 11, 98, 1J6, 210, 228 NGO, see non-governmeptal organizations non-governmental organizations, 16, 17, 33, 39, 72, 79, 82, 83, 139, 144, 148, 151, 164, 208, 222, see also Amnesty International; Transparency International non-state actors, 22, 94, 98, 99, 100, 107, 117, 129, 164, 207, see also non-governmental organizations; international institutions

Index North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, 81 NPT, see Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 15, 126

OECD, see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 84, 216 Parsons, Talcott, 2, 3, 9, 12, 28, 30, 56, 57, 61, 143, 244 political authority attempt to differentiate, 37 becoming independent from stratification, 137 becoming less personalized, 137 beyond the State, 14, 16, 109 external justifications for, 140 in empires and cities, 137 legitimization strategies of, 145 monopoly of, 20, see also international system, Westphalian; segmentary differentiation; sovereignty; Waltz, Kenneth new modes of legitimizing, 139 of international institutions, 14—19, 42, 164, 215, 232, 242 post-colonial States, 44, 75, 79, 214 post-colonialism, 27, 44 professionalization, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 194, 195 rational institutionalism, 48 rationalization, 11, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 44, see also world polity theory Rawls, John, 121, 179 realism, 4, 7, 142, 149, 210, 229 Rockefeller Foundation, 193 role differentiation, 3, 6, 101, 136

SADC, see Southern African Development Community Schleiermacher, Friedrich Wilhelm, 51, 52, 54 Scottish enlightenment, 50, 51 securitization, 133, 150, 152, 153 segmentary differentiation as a separation of the world into independent territorial units, 9, 161, 230 as regional differentiation, 76 definition of, 1 examples of, 3 of the political and legal system, 235

281 of world society into nation-states, 43, 71, 78, 80 primacy of, 4, 12, 71, 72, 200, 203, 232, 242, see also nation-state; sovereign equality; sovereignty; Waltz, Kenneth symbolized by United Nations General Assembly, 139 weakening of, 8, 12-14, 18, 54—5, 109 segmentation, see segmentary differentiation Simmel, Georg, 9, 52, 55, 134 Smith, Adam, 51, 134 social theory, 5, 6, 11, 50, 61, 109, 132, 144, 154, 229 societal denationalization, 13 society as the totality of all Communications from which function systems select some Communications that they partially internalize, 10 based on commonality of norms, 3 based on potentiality of communication, 3, see also Luhmann, Niklas communicative constitution of, 141 hunter-gatherer, 95 internal differentiation as primary mechanism of integration of, 70 international, see international society modern, 3, 29, 31, 139, 148 national, 3, 17 pre-modern, 136, 145 traditional, 29, 33 tribal, 42, 95, 102, 244 world, see world society Sociology (discipline), see also social theory a fateful event for, 53 Anglo-Saxon, 2 classical, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 42, 229, 230 comparative-historical, 6, 28 contemporary, 53 contemporary ‘global’, 10 distinct traditions of thought about functional differentiation in, 22 economists moving into, 42 focus on national societies, 10 general perspectives from, 22 Germán, 2 organism as an analogue for social system in, 53 proto-, 53 rational-actor theory in, 6 relationship to functional differentiation, 134

282

Index

Sociology (discipline) (comí.) relationship to IR, 1, 3, 93, 229 Weberian, 48 Southern African Development Community, 81 sovereign equality, 12, 14, 18, 102, 105, 112, 113, 114, 121, 125, 129, 130, 234 sovereignty as an abstract norm of international society, 147 as a central norm of great-power systems, 101 as a legal concept, 161 as a legitimization strategy, 140 as a regulative idea, 14 as a responsibility, 159 as a self-generated semantic, 140 as an existential privilege, 122 constitution of legitímate, 120 criterion of, 116 development of, 162 economic, 217 equal, 242 essential to the formal stratification of great-power systems, 98 idea of, 140 infringement of, 201 linkage to the Román concept of dominium, 162 losing one’s, 29 modern notion of, 161, 163 Morgenthau’s definition of, 12 of the actor, 35, 47 paradoxical relationship to the normativity of international law, 173 political system based on, 142 primary instítution of, 143 principie of, 138 recognition of, 114, 123, 130 reformulation of, 161 seventeenth- and eighteenth-century jurist treatises on, 119 socially constructed organizing principies of, 118 State as the only type of actor fit for, 119 structural ‘bottom line’ of, 211 traditional notion of, 18, 159, see also international system, Westphalian transformative changes of, 162, 165 two faces of, 21 Westphalian system of, 43 Spencer, Herbert, 8, 9, 53, 54, 55 stratification, see stratificatory differentiation

stratificatory differentiation and rationalized cultural contexts, 45 as constituent element of the international system, 130 as constitutive principie of the international system, 131 axes of, 84 between European imperial metropoles and extra-European colonies, 53 definition of, 2 diffusion of principies of, 45 displacement of, 112 examples of, 3 in international society, 239 in the international system, 113 migitating effects of inclusión on, 127 of great powers and hegemons, 4, see also great powers; hegemony of regions and classes, 84 persistence of, 130 primacy of, 71, 230, 231 three-dimensional typology of, 100 traditional orders of, 135 weakening of, 135, 138 within specific global governance schemes, 151 structural functionalism, 4, 9, 28-30, 206, 208, 226 structural-functionalist theorizing, see structural functionalism supranationalization, 14 systems theory, 23 claims about ongoing existence of stratificatory differentiation made by, 136 classical accounts in, 23 different notion of differentiation from, 83 evasión in, 147 fruitful points of encounter between IR theory and, 136 in IR, 2 Luhmannian, 3, 27, 31, see also Luhmann, Niklas modern, 27, 31, 32) 35, 36, 38, 39, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137,"138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 149, 151, 154, 155 on social conflict, 152 programmes in, 142 restrictions of, 86

transnational institutions, 14, 17, 45, 101, 193, 242

Index transnationalization, 16 Transparency International, 16

UN, see United Nations UN General Assetnbly, 126 UNESCO, see United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations, 16, 28, 29, 105, 113, 115, 127, 128, 151, 159, 168 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 40, 42 United Nations General Assembly, 139 United Nations Security Council, 6, 15, 18, 41, 126, 128, 139, 147, 167, 180, 241, 242, see also inequality, institutionalized vocation, 50, see also professionalization

Waltz, Kenneth, 4, 11, 12, 19, 20, 91, 93, , 94, 97, 100, 102, 103, 115, 116, 149, 207, 230, 235, see also international political system; like kinds; neorealism; segmentary differentiation Weber, Max, 9, 27, 35, 38, 48, 134, 180, 187, 188, 211, 212, 230 Westphalia Treatyof, 110, 112, 118, 144, 161, 213 WHO, see World Health Organization World Bank, 39, 40, 42, 82, 87, 126, 193, 216 world culture, 28, 36, 37, 39, 79, 85, 86, 143,151 world culture theory, see world polity theory World Health Organization, 123, 184, 185, 192,193 world political system, see international political system world polity, 6 world polity theory, 10, 21, 25-49, 72, 147, 239 world society 1 (world polity theory perspective on the current State of global politics), 240

283 2 (systems theory perspective on the current State of global politics), 240 and the system of national societies, 72 antagonism between functional and segmentary differentiation inherent in, 84 Communications in, 142 complexity of, 146 contemporary, 155 definition of, 3 differentiation in, 37 differentiation within the political system of, 5, 21 distinguished via functional differentiation from an international political system, 4 evolution of, 133, 148 formation of, 22 function systems of, 67 functional differentiation of, 58, 76, 107, 136, 138, 144, 146, 155, 160, 165, 182 functionally differentiated social systems in today’s, 137 modern, 134, 145 notion of, 6 political system of, 145 regional variants of, 69 relationship between segmental differentiation and functional differentiation in, 200 segmentary differentiation of, 161 small number of function systems having established themselves as ‘anchors of Communications’ in, 141 social-political formation of, 82 sociological analyses of, 4, see also world polity theory stratification of, 87 structures of, 21, 86 system of, 61 theories of, 10, see also Luhmann, Niklas; world polity theory transformation of, 159 World Trade Organization, 80, 81, 82, 87, 151, 152, 169, 171, 178, 183 WTO, see World Trade Organization

Jacket illustration: © iStockphoto.com/

Aleksandar Velasevic.

Jacket designed by Hart McLeod Ltd PRINTED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

‘This volume brings together major scholars óf sociology and international relations in a deeply thoughtful and intellectually challenging dialogue. The application of differentiation theory to international relations is subtle, ambitious and persuasive. This book is a milestone in the interdisciplinary study of world politics.’

GARY MARKS, Burton CraigeProfessor ofPolitical Scienceat the University ofNorth Carolina, Chapel Hill, and Chair in Multilevel Governance at the Free University ofAmsterdam ‘This superlativo voluble filis a miich neglected area of enquiry- the important role of thinking sociológically about international relations. The authors seek to apply a particular sociological perspective, differentiation theory, to make sense of the complex world around us in a manner that is at once dynamic and not state-centric. Their success in doing so ranks this work as among the most important recent theoretical contributions to the field and as a seminal book that should be required reading for IR scholars. The editors identify and describe three dimensions of differentiation segmentary, stratificatory and functional differentiation - that allow us to compare and contrast social systems as they emerge and evolve in a broad social environment. The effort is ambitious and the result magisterial, and will indeed establish a fresh understánding of the historical phases of the international system.’

RICHARD W. MANSBACH, DepartmentofPoliticalScience, loica State University MATHIAS ALBERT is Professor of Political Science at Bielefeld University and Honorary Professor at the University of Arhus.

BARRY BUZAN is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economies, and Honorary Professor at the Universities of Copenhagen and Jilin. MICHAEL ZÜRN is Director at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlín and Professor of International Relations at the Free University of Berlín.

CONTRIBUTORS Mathias Albert, Barry Buzan, Philip G. Cerny, Jack Donnelly, Oliver Kessler, Friedrich Kratochwil, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Richard Münch, Stephen Stetter, Rudolf Stichweh, George M. Thomas, Lora Anne Viola, Michael Zürn

Cambridge UNIVERSITY PRESS www.cambridge.org