Brazil: An Economic and Social History from Early Man to the 21st Century 9781009391924, 1009391925

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Brazil This book is the first modern survey of the economic and social history of Brazil from early man to today. Drawing from a wide range of qualitative and quantitative data, it provides a comprehensive overview of the major developments that defined the evolution of Brazil. Beginning with the original human settlements in pre-Columbian society, it moves on to discuss the Portuguese empire and colonization, specifically the importance of slave labor, sugar, coffee and gold in shaping Brazil’s economic and societal development. Finally, it analyzes the revolutionary changes that have occurred in the past half century, transforming Brazil from a primarily rural and illiterate society to an overwhelmingly urban, literate and industrial one. Sweeping and influential, Herbert S. Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna’s synthesis is the first of its kind on Brazil. Herbert S. Klein is Gouverneur Morris Professor Emeritus of History at Columbia University, the former director of the Center of Latin American Studies and Professor of History, Stanford University. Specializing in the social, demographic and economic history of Latin America, he has published over thirty books and 190 articles in several languages. Francisco Vidal Luna is Professor of Economics in the Faculty of Economics and Administration (FEA) at the Universidade de São Paulo. He served as Secretary of Planning in the state government of São Paulo. He is co-author (with Herbert S. Klein) of numerous books on Brazil and has published over thirty-five articles in English and Portuguese.

Brazil An Economic and Social History from Early Man to the 21st Century

HERBERT S. KLEIN Columbia University and Stanford University

FRANCISCO VIDAL LUNA Universidade de São Paulo

Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8EA, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia 314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India 103 Penang Road, #05–06/07, Visioncrest Commercial, Singapore 238467 Cambridge University Press is part of Cambridge University Press & Assessment, a department of the University of Cambridge. We share the University’s mission to contribute to society through the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence. www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009391924 DOI: 10.1017/9781009391948 © Herbert S. Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna 2024 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment. First published 2024 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library A Cataloging-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the ­Library of Congress ISBN 978-1-009-39192-4 Hardback ISBN 978-1-009-39197-9 Paperback Cambridge University Press & Assessment has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

To Frank Smith

Contents

List of Graphspage ix List of Mapsxiii List of Tablesxv Prefacexvii 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil The Peopling of Brazil to 1700 The Colonial Economy and Society The Nineteenth-Century Economy Nineteenth-Century Society Industrialization and Urbanization Liberalization and Globalization

1 23 67 107 149 192 248

Bibliography299 Index353

vii

Graphs

1.1 Sources of electricity in the world page 11 1.2 Source of electricity in Brazil 12 1.3 The world’s major petroleum producers, BPD, 2021 (% world total) 14 2.1 Estimated origin of slaves arriving in Brazil 1561–1700 62 2.2 Estimated arrival of African slaves by principal region in Brazil 1561–1700 63 3.1 Estimate of sugar production in Brazil in selected years 1560–183470 3.2 Estimates of gold production 1699–1799 79 3.3 Estimated Brazilian diamond imports to Europe 1729–1791 (tons) 79 3.4 Brazilian sugar production in selected years 1839–1909 98 3.5 Share of sugar exports from the principal exporting regions of Brazil 1796–1830 99 3.6 Cotton exports from Maranhão in selected years between 1760 and 1807 100 3.7 Average annual tobacco exports from Brazil by quinquennium 1671–1830 101 3.8 Cuban and Brazilian coffee exports 1804–1850 101 3.9 Sugar and coffee exports from Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in selected years between 1825 and 1848 102 3.10 Estimated volume of the African slave arrivals in Brazil by quinquennium 1701–1705 to 1845–1850 105 3.11 Share of African arrivals by major Brazilian port 1701–1705 to 1826–1830 105 ix

x

List of Graphs

4.1 The value, quantity and average price of coffee in pounds sterling 1821–1913 119 4.2 Value of Brazilian sugar exports 1821–1900 120 4.3a Brazilian exports of cotton 1862–1887 (in metric tons) 124 4.3b Import of Brazilian cotton to Great Britain 1860–1884 (in bales of cotton) 124 4.4 Composition of the value of exports from Minas Gerais 1818–1884134 4.5 Brazilian exports, imports and trade balance 1821–1913 (revised series) 135 4.6 Fiscal income and expenditure of the Empire 1823–1889 137 4.7 Arrival of slaves and foreign immigrants to Brazil 1781–1785 to 1906–1910 143 5.1 Infant mortality rate for selected countries in the mid-nineteenth century 163 5.2 Life expectancy of all males and females in 1872 (upper bound estimate) 167 5.3 Life expectancy at birth of selected Latin American countries around 1900 167 5.4a Age and gender of total slave population in São Paulo province 1829 (n = 72,748) 174 5.4b Age pyramid of African-born slaves in São Paulo province 1829 (n = 53,536) 174 6.1 Brazilian coffee production and world consumption of coffee 1890–1939206 6.2 Prices, production and destruction of coffee and Brazilian participation in the world market 1924–1952 208 6.3 World production of coffee and Brazilian coffee exports in volume and as a share of world production 1815–2019 209 6.4 Relative importance of Brazilian states in coffee production 1931–2019209 6.5 Variation in GDP and GDP by industry 1926–1947 211 6.6 Variation in GDP 1958–1990 216 6.7 Fiscal deficit and annual change in M1 and inflation 1950–1982217 6.8 Average life expectancy by gender 1939–1941 and 1995–2000231 6.9 Crude birth (CBR) and death rate (CDR) and natural increase 1881–2000 231 6.10 Age-specific fertility 1903 and 2000 233

List of Graphs

xi

6.11 Age pyramid of Brazilian population in 1900 and 1995 235 7.1 Balance of trade and current transactions 1990–2019 252 7.2 GDP, primary fiscal balance result and unemployment 2003–2010258 7.3 International reserves of Brazil 1980–2020 (US$ billions) 258 7.4 Exchange rate, effective exchange rate for manufacturers and salary exchange ratio 1991–2019 261 7.5 Cumulative change in general and sectoral GDP 1990–2019 (1990 = 100) 261 7.6 Rate of investment and % industry in GDP 1995–2019 267 7.7 Infant mortality rate by region 2000–2016 269 7.8 Life expectancy by gender and region 2000 and 2020 270 7.9 Total fertility rate by region 2000–2022 271 7.10 Age pyramid of Brazilian population in 2000 and 2020 272 7.11 Labor force participation of Brazilian men and women aged fifteen and older in selected years between 1960 and 2021 274 7.12 Percentage of persons aged between eighteen and twentyfour attending university by gender and region, Census 2010 276

Maps

1.1 South America and Brazil, including the Brazilian statespage 2 1.2 Biomes of Brazil 3 1.3 Main river basins of Brazil 8 1.4 Main mineral and hydrocarbon centers of Brazil 13 1.5 Current regions and states of Brazil 15 2.1 Coastal Brazil, c. 1560 44 2.2 Donatary captancies and founding dates of sixteenth-century towns 54

xiii

Tables

1.1 Areas destined for the protection and preservation of native vegetation and other land uses in Brazil 2018page 16 1.2 Area, population and population density of Brazil (census 2010) 19 3.1 Composition of the population of Minas Gerais from 1767–183373 3.2 Cane and sugar beet production by region in selected years 1791–1842 (in metric tons) 99 3.3 Estimated population of Brazil, enslaved and free in 1818 104 4.1 Ratio of Brazilian coffee in world commerce 1881–1930 109 4.2 Arrival of immigrants to major importing countries 1870–1930112 4.3 Importance of principal products exported by Brazil 1821–1939 (value in £1,000) 126 4.4 Brazilian imports by product and country 1849–1850, 1872–1873 and 1904 129 4.5 Nationally produced merchandise imported from the provinces into the port of Rio de Janeiro 1849–1850 131 4.6 Nationally produced merchandise imported and exported nationally and internationally from the port of Rio de Janeiro 1888 (in milréis) 133 4.7 African slaves disembarked to major Brazilian regions 1801–1860140 4.8 Distribution of the Brazilian population in 1872 by gender, color and condition 140 4.9 Arrival of free immigrants by country of origin 1870–1915 142 xv

xvi

List of Tables

4.10 Population of Brazil by region and gender in 1890 5.1 Occupations in Brazil in 1872 census 5.2 Mortality by age in the capital of São Paulo 1894–1929 5.3 Estimates of crude birth, death and natural growth rates in Brazil 1798–1900 5.4 Arrival of Major Immigrant Groups to Brazil, 1870–1930 5.5 Annual average growth of the population of Brazil by regions and provinces (states) 1819, 1872, 1900 5.6 Pre-1872 census population of selected provinces by color and legal status 5.7 Marriage rates among adults by gender, color and status in two provinces 1830 and 1842 5.8 Origin of free Immigrants to Brazil 1835–1969 5.9 Growth of state capitals 1872–1900 6.1 Brazilian industry in the censuses of 1907 and 1920, by state (values in milréis) 6.2 Brazilian industry in the censuses of 1907 and 1920, by type of product (values in milréis) 6.3 Civil status of Brazilians aged eighteen and older 1960–2010 7.1 Principal economic indicators – 1991–2002 7.2 Cultivated areas, production and productivity of the principal crops of Brazil, harvests of 1976–1977 and 2022–2023 7.3 Trade balance of agribusiness in Brazil 1994–2021 7.4 Principal economic indicators – 2003–2010 (government of Lula) 7.5 Ratio of children enrolled in school as percentage of their age cohort by residence, gender, color and income 2018 7.6 Distribution of basic household services by urban and rural residence 1960–2010

145 155 165 169 170 171 173 175 182 188 198 200 237 256 262 264 266 277 289

Preface

The aim of this book is to provide a synthesis of the economic and social evolution of Brazil from the arrival of the first humans until the present day. It is based on three decades of collaborative research on the economic and social history of this fascinating nation. Brazil is one of the largest and most important nations in the world today. Its current population of 213 million people makes it the fifth most populated nation in the world and its 8 million square kilometers of territory makes it the sixth largest country in the world. It accounts for half the population and area of South America and it has become one of the most powerful agricultural economies on the planet along with having the largest industrial establishment in the region. It was the home of some of the earliest domestications of plants in America and also the first American region to create an African slave plantation system, which became the norm for most of the rest of the Americas. Brazil was also the only non-republican nation created in America in the nineteenth century and its imperial government was a mark of stability in a particularly violent period in the region. Brazil was known for its primary products which had a major impact on world markets, from sugarcane, gold and diamonds, and rubber, to cotton and most of all for coffee. It was coffee which dominated the economy until the middle of the twentieth century. Since then, Brazil carried out one of the more successful import substitution industrializations in the world as well as modernizing its agriculture, all done within a closed economy. Until the 1970s, Brazil experienced one of the world’s most rapid economic growth processes, which continued for forty years and allowed the per capita income to be multiplied by five between 1940 and 1980. xvii

xviii

Preface

Unfortunately, like other developing countries, the country was profoundly affected by the international crisis of the 1980s. That external crisis led the country to declare a moratorium, and demonstrated the exhaustion of the model of forced industrialization, protected and financed by the state. But all this changed in the 1990s when the economy was liberalized and Brazil was opened to the world. With that opening has come a relative decline in industry and a massive growth of agriculture to such an extent that Brazil is one of the most important granaries in the world today and now dominates world markets in numerous animal and grain products. There have also been massive social changes as the country moved from being an overwhelmingly rural and illiterate society to a literate and urban one beginning only in the second half of the twentieth century. There have also been profound changes over this period in its social composition. Even before abolition, Brazil had the largest free black population in the Americas. Like all European settlement colonies there were wars against Amerindians but many of these Indian groups survived to the present day. Brazil was one of the few American countries to integrate millions of European immigrants in the late ninteenth and early twentieth centuries and has been unusual in effectively acculturating Amerindians, Africans, Europeans and Asians into a coherent society which is increasingly self-identifying as a brown nation. Brazil was one of the earliest American countries to create a modern welfare system. Despite having only established a modern university in the 1930s, much later than in the rest of Latin America, it has since established a modern world ranking university system which is considered the best in Latin America. From being a predominantly rural society today, it is one of the most urbanized in the world. For all its profound economic inequality, Brazil has also experienced very rapid social mobility as well as a massive reduction of poverty in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Despite still being the largest Catholic country in the world today, it has also seen the increasing secularization of society along with the emergence of numerous Brazilian based Christian and Pentecostal churches. It is now the world’s largest Pentecostal nation, and is considered the world’s second largest Christian country. It has one of America’s most powerful environmental movements which supported the creation of one of the most modern legal systems for the protection of the environment. At the same time, recent governments have been indifferent to Amazonian destruction which has become a world concern.

Preface

xix

But in many ways Brazil was a late developer among the South American nations. It was only quite late in the twentieth century that it finally provided universal free primary education; it was also one of the last to go through the demographic transition which accounts for its extraordinary high natural growth in the late twentieth century. But since 1960, Brazil has experienced a demographic transition which has brought down birth rates dramatically, and since the turn of the century it has provided universal education for all with women finally outpacing men in years of education. This has led to their increasing participation in the labor force and has led to profound changes in the role of women, and the nature of families in the society. Yet Brazil still suffers from profound inequality, with one of the worst distributions of wages and wealth in the world despite all the mobility, universality of education and urbanization that has occurred. At the same time in the past few decades its economic growth has slowed and has been below that of the other rapidly advancing middle-income countries. These are the themes we will explore in this general history. In carrying out this synthesis we have had the support and assistance of Matiko Kume Vidal and Judith Heiser Schiffner. Bruno Oliva assisted with our maps and preparing our data files. In turn conversations with Simon Schwartzman, William Summerhill, Boris Fausto, Stuart Schwartz, Edmar Bach, Flavio Versiani, Carlos Antônio Luque, Simão Silber, Sonia Rocha, and Roberto Zagha have helped us refine our arguments and challenged our assumptions.

1 The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil

What is the land like in which the history of modern Brazil takes place? How do its soils, climates and relief influence its evolution? To understand this, we need to have a basic idea of the natural features of this enormous territory. To begin with, Brazil as it exists today is one of the largest states in the world in terms of territory. Brazil with its 8.5 million square kilometers of land area is the fifth largest country in the world, surpassed in area only by Russia, Canada, China and the United States. It also accounts for a fifth of the American continent and half the territory of South America. Due to its outstanding position on the continent, it has a coastline of 7,400 kilometers and borders with ten of the twelve South American countries, covering over 15,800 kilometers of land borders. Only Chile and Ecuador do not share borders with this Portuguese speaking nation. Brazil is divided into twenty-six states and a federal district. Some of the states, such as Amazonia (1.6 million square kilometers) and Pará (1.3 million square kilometers) have dimensions equal to or greater than the sum of the areas of France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom (1.3 million square kilometers). The so-called Legal Amazon has an area of 5 million square kilometers, which represents 80 percent of the total area of Europe, excluding Russia. The state of São Paulo, the richest and most densely populated, has an area similar to the United Kingdom and half of France or Spain. Brazil extends for more than 4,000 kilometers from north to south and from east to west. Although the Equator crosses Brazilian territory, 93 percent of its territory is in the southern hemisphere, most of it between the Equator and the Tropic of Capricorn. This means that, 92 percent of Brazil is in the tropics and 8 percent in the southern temperate zone (see Map 1.1).1 1

For a general characterization of Brazilian geography, see Aroldo de Azevedo, Brasil, a terra e o homem, vol. I (São Paulo: Cia Editora Nacional, 1968).

1

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

2

Trinidad and Tobago Panama Venezuela Guyana

Colombia

Guyane

RR

AP

Equator

Ecuador PA

AM

Peru

MA

CE RN PB PE AL

PI AC

RO

TO

Brasil

BA

MT GO DF

Bolivia

MG

MS

Pacific Ocean Paraguay

ES SP PR

RJ

Tropic of Capricorn

SC RS

Chile

Argentina

Uruguay

Atlantic Ocean

Falkland Islands/Malvinas

Map 1.1  South America and Brazil, including the Brazilian states

Brazil’s frontier was finally settled with the treaty of Petrópolis, de 1903, which annexed the state of Acre from Bolivia. Due to its large territorial extension, Brazil has a rich diversity distributed in six major biomes: the Amazon, the Atlantic Forest, the Cerrado,

The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil

3

Main Biomes

Amazônia Caatinga Cerrado Mata Atlântica Pampa Pantanal

0

250

500 km

Map 1.2  Biomes of Brazil. Source: IBGE, Bases Cartográficas – Biomas Brasil

the Pantanal, the the Pampa and the Caatinga (see Map 1.2).2 The Amazon is today the largest tropical forest in the world, covering about 5.4 million square kilometers. Approximately 80 percent of this forest is in 2

On biomass in general see José Bueno Conti and Sueli Angelo Furlan, “Geoecologia, o clima, os solos e a biota,” in Jurandyr L. Sanches Ross, eds., Geografia do Brasil (São Paulo:

4

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

Brazil, and 60 percent of the protected part of this tropical forest is in Brazilian territory. Due to its size and characteristics, the Amazon is a great reservoir of the planet’s biodiversity, which is home to around 20 percent of the known species of plants and animals. It is also recognized as a reservoir for the ecological needs not only of indigenous peoples and local communities, but also the rest of the world. According to the NGO WWF-Brazil, of all the tropical forests on Earth, the Amazon is the only one that still has its size and diversity preserved. Therefore, deforestation in the Amazon has a crucial impact on global warming. In addition, studies show that global warming could have drastic consequences for the forest, as it would reduce the timing and volume of local rains.3 The Cerrado has an area of approximately 2 million square kilometers. It is the second largest biome in South America and occupies about a quarter of Brazilian territory. Its area is contained in the states of Goiás, Tocantins, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Bahia, Maranhão, Piauí, Rondônia, Paraná, São Paulo and the Federal District, in addition to having enclaves in Amapá, Roraima and Amazonas. In the Cerrado are the headwaters of the three largest hydrographic basins in South America (Amazonas/Tocantins, São Francisco and Prata), which results in great availability of water resources. From the perspective of biological diversity, the Brazilian Cerrado is recognized as one of the richest savannas in the world. It houses more than 11,000 species of plants, 4,400 of which are native to the region. In 2018, the Cerrado had a native vegetation cover of approximately 1 million square kilometers, occupying 52 percent of the biome’s area.4

3

4

Edusp, 2019): pp. 67–208. On the biomass of Brazil, see Azir Ab‘Sáber, Os domínios de natureza no Brasil, Cotia (SP), Ateliê Editorial, 2021, www.wwf.org.br/natureza_brasileira/ areas_prioritarias/amazonia1/bioma_amazonia/porque_amazonia_e_importante/. Peter H. Raven, “Tropical floristic tomorrow,” Taxon, 37(3) (1988): 549–560; Yadvinder Malhi, J. Timmons Roberts, Richard A. Betts, Timothy J. Killeen, Wenhong Li, and Carlos A. Nobre, “Climate change, deforestation and the fate of the Amazon,” Science, 319 (2008): 169–172. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1146961. On the Amazon forest see André de Arruda Lyra,“Estudo de Vulnerabilidade do Bioma Amazônia aos cenários de mudanças climáticas,” PhD thesis, Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, São José dos Campos, 2015. Governo do Estado da Amazônia, A floresta amazônica e seu papel nas mudanças climáticas (Manaus: Secretaria de Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Sustentável, 2009); Maria Alice Dias Rolim Visentin, “A floresta Amazônica e as mudanças climáticas: proteção da biodiversidade,” Revista CEJ (Brasília), XVII (60) (2013): 96–102; Carlos A. Nobre, Gilvan Sampaio e Luís Salazar, “Mudanças climáticas e Amazônia,” Ciência e Cultura, 59(3) (2007): 22–27, http://siscom.ibama.gov.br/ monitora_biomas/PMDBBS%20-%20AMAZONIA.html. http://siscom.ibama.gov.br/monitora_biomas/PMDBBS%20-%20CERRADO.html.

The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil

5

The Mata Atlântica, is the Brazilian biome with the smallest percentage of original natural vegetation cover, but it still harbors an important part of the country’s biological diversity, with several endemic species and water resources that supply a population of more than 120 million people. Its remaining area is restricted to fragmented stretches, which unfortunately continue to be destroyed to extract exotic species and flora. Of the 1,103,961 square kilometers of this biome, only 17 percent of the original area is inhabited by more than two-thirds of the Brazilian population.5 The Pantanal, another important Brazilian biome, is one of the largest wetlands in the world with a plain that periodically floods. The region has been declared a Biosphere Reserve and a World Natural Heritage Site by UNESCO. It is spread over two states, Mato Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul, and crosses the border into Bolivia. It occupies an area of 151,313 square kilometers – about 2 percent of Brazil – and still preserves 88 percent of its biome.6 The Pampa is located in the extreme south of Brazil and also extends into Uruguay and Argentina. One of the smallest Brazilian biomes, it occupies about two-thirds of the area of Rio Grande do Sul. It is a rural ecosystem with predominantly herbaceous and low-lying vegetation. The vegetation becomes denser, with trees in the vicinity of water courses and on the plateau slopes. The Banhados, wetlands close to the coast, are also part of this biome. In 2018, 45 percent of it was covered by native vegetation.7 The final major biome within Brazil is the Caatinga, located in the semiarid region of Brazil, which contains 20 million inhabitants and is among the most populated semiarid regions in the world. The term “caatinga” denotes a dominant vegetation that extends over almost all the northeastern states and part of Minas Gerais. This ecosystem is extremely important from a biological point of view because it houses unique flora and fauna. It is estimated that at least 932 species have already been recorded in the region, of which 380 are endemic. Among the Brazilian biomes, this one is least studied, despite being one of the most threatened due to the inadequate and unsustainable use of its soils. The Caatinga occupies 844,453 square kilometers. In 2018 it had an area of native vegetation 5 6 7

http://siscom.ibama.gov.br/monitora_biomas/PMDBBS%20-%20MATA%20ATLANTICA .html. http://siscom.ibama.gov.br/monitora_biomas/PMDBBS%20-%20PANTANAL.html. http://siscom.ibama.gov.br/monitora_biomas/PMDBBS%20-%20PAMPA.html.

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Brazil: An Economic and Social History

covering 546 thousand square kilometers, equivalent to 64 percent of the biome’s area.8 From an economic point of view, it represents one of the areas with the highest concentration of poverty in the country and the poorest farms and farming land. The Brazilian landscape is characterized by level plains with only modest elevations and without large mountain formations. The plateau corresponds to the largest portion of Brazilian territory, including a large part of the Amazon region. The highest point in Brazil, at around 3,000 meters, is located in the state of Amazonas, on the border with Venezuela.9 Nevertheless for most of its post-1500 history, the population has been concentrated on the coast, and intense occupation of the interior plains only occurred from the twentieth century onwards. But even today, a large part of the population and the generation of wealth is concentrated in the eastern Atlantic coastal portion of the territory. Most Brazilian state capitals are located on the coast or close to the coast, like the city of São Paulo, just over 50 km away from the sea.10 Brazil has about 12 percent of the fresh water available on the planet, but it is irregularly distributed in the territory and its availability is influenced by a wide variety of local climactic conditions. The average annual precipitation in Brazil is 1,765 millimeters, ranging from 500 millimeters per year in the Northeast to 3,000 millimeters per year in Amazonia. The Amazon basin, the Rio de la Plata Basin and the São Francisco Basin are the main Brazilian hydrographic basins, with the Brazilian Central Plateau which contains these important river basins.11 8 9

10

11

http://siscom.ibama.gov.br/monitora_biomas/PMDBBS%20-%20CAATINGA.html. For an analysis of the geographic characteristics of Brazil and its regions, see Aroldo de Azevedo, Geografia do Brasil (São Paulo: Cia Editora Nacional, 1976); O Brasil e suas regiões (São Paulo: Cia Editora Nacional, 1972); Brasil, a terra e o homem, 2 vols. (São Paulo: Cia Editora Nacional, 1968, 1970); Jurandyr L. Sanches Ross, ed., Geografia do Brasil (São Paulo: Edusp, 2019); Azir Ab‘Sáber, Os domínios de natureza no Brasil (Cotia, SP: Ateliê Editorial, 2021). In contrast to the Andes, which are relatively narrow, elongated in a north-south direction and exceeding 4,000 meters in many areas, terrain in the center and east of South America, where Brazil is located, is low, and mostly under 1,000 meters. For further geographical information, see Jurandyr L. Sanches Ross, “Os fundamentos da geografia da natureza,” in Geografia do Brasil, 13–65. The Brazilian central plateau and the plateaus of the center-west are the main dispersing centers, separating the Amazon and Tocantins-Araguaia basins, from the Paraná and Paraguay basins and also from the São Francisco basin. In terms of area of the different basins, the Amazon represents 57%, Paraná 10%, São Francisco 7%, Paraguay 4% and Uruguay 2%. The groups of isolated basins represent 20 percent. See Ruth Simões Bezerra dos Santos, “Aspectos da hidrografia brasileira,” Revista Brasileira de Geografia, XXIV(3) (1962): 327–375.

The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil

7

There are also important underground water resources, such as the Guarani Aquifer in southern Brazil.12 In terms of soils, there is enormous variety in the country, with predominance of Latosols, Argisols and Neosols, which together account for approximately 70 percent of the national territory. Latosols and Argisols occupy approximately 58 percent of the area and are deep, highly weathered, acidic soils with low natural fertility and, in certain cases, with high aluminum saturation. Soils of medium and high fertility also occur, but are generally shallow due to a low degree of weathering.13 The Amazon basin is the largest river in the world in area and in volume of water and extends over seven countries, although it is predominantly in Brazil. It discharges into the Atlantic a volume of water that represents approximately 15 percent of water contributions to the oceans.14 The Amazon River, rises in the Peruvian Andes and flows into the Atlantic through the states of Pará and Amazonas.15 Its tributaries many of which are quite large include the Madeira, which starts in Bolivia and flows into the Amazon (3,300 kilometers), the Purus which originates in Peru (3,200 kilometers), the Tocantins and the Araguaia, which rise in Central Brazil, both longer than 2,500 kilometers. The river network is essential for life in the Amazon and its main means of transport. Cargo transport and human mobility depend on the fluvial network, from the region’s large rivers to the smallest water courses, such as streams, navigable by small canoes.16 The region has 12 13 14

15

16

José Galizia Tundisi, ed., Recursos hídricos no Brasil: problemas, desafios e estratégias para o futuro (Rio de Janeiro: Academia Brasileira de Ciências, 2014): 4–7. Embrapa, Solos brasileiros, www.embrapa.br/tema-solos-brasileiros/solos-do-brasil. The basin extends across Brazil (63%), Peru (16%), Bolivia (12%), Colombia (6%), Ecuador (2%), Venezuela (0,8%) and Guyana (0.3%), and covers 6,112,000 square kilometers, approximately 5% of the emerged lands. Michel Moliner et al., “Hidrologia da bacia do Rio Amazonas,” Ciência e Tecnologia, https://horizon.documentation.ird .fr/exl-doc/pleins_textes/pleins_textes_6/b_fdi_35-36/41720.pdf. From new measurements carried out by the National Institute for Space Research (INPE), it was concluded that the Amazon is also the longest river in the world, with 6,992.06 km, exceeding the length of the Nile by 140 km. INPE, accessed at www.inpe .br/noticias/noticia.php?Cod_Noticia=1501. On the formation of the Amazonic basin, see Tacio Cordeiro Bicudo, “Estudo da formação da bacia hidrográfica do rio Amazonas através da modelagem numérica de processos tectônicos e sedimentares,” Master’s thesis, USP, São Paulo, 2017. The Amazon region is irrigated by large rivers and water courses of varying size and flow volume, which makes water transport the basic part of the Amazon transport network and all other modes of transport complement this water system. José Alex Sant’Anna, Rede básica de transporte da Amazônia (Brasília: Ipea, TD 562, 1998): 11. Also see BNDES, Transportes na Amazonia. Informe Infraestrutura 22 (BNDES, maio/1998);

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Brazil: An Economic and Social History

Amazônica

São Francisco Main River Basins Amazônica Tocantins/Araguaia Atlântico Norte São Francisco Atlântico Leste Paraná Atlântico Sul Uruguai

Paraná

0

500

1000 km

Map 1.3  Main river basins of Brazil. Source: CPRM

also become important in power generation, with large power plants such as Belo Monte (the fourth largest in the world), the one at Tucuruí (the seventh largest in the world), the two at Jirau and Santo Antônio (see Map 1.3).17

17

Juliana Terezinha da Silva Medeiros. “O transporte fluvial e o direito à dignidade da pessoa humana na Amazônia,” Master’s thesis, Universidade do Estado da Amazonia, Manaus, 2012. The construction of hydroelectric plants in the Amazon basin, despite its high potential in terms of energy, faces opposition from environmentalists due to their perverse effects on the environment. Mayane Bento Silva, Mario M. A. G. Herreros and Fabrício Quadros Borges, “Análise dos aspectos econômicos e socioambientais no projeto hidrelétrico Belo Monte, Pará,” Revista de Ciências Ambientais, 8(1) (2014): 15–27; Savannah Tâmara Lemos da Costa et al., “Usina Hidrelétrica de Belo Monte: Análise Multitemporal da produção de energia e impactos ambientais,” Revista Brasileira de Energias Renováveis, 8(1) (2019): 224–237; Lorena Candido Fleury and Jalcione Almeida, “The construction of the Belomonte Hydroeletric power planta: environmental conflict and the development dilemma,” Ambiente & Sociedade, 16(4) (2013): 141–156; Greenpeace, Hidrelétricas na Amazonia. Um mau negócio para o Brasil e para o mundo (São Paulo: Greenpeace, 2016): 68, www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-brasil-stateless/2018/07/ relatorio_hidreletricas_na_amazonia.pdf. The source for Map 1.6 CPRM is http:// siagasweb.cprm.gov.br/layout/visualizar_mapa.php.

The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil

9

The Rio de la Plata basin, the second largest in Latin America, occupies 17 percent of the region’s territory. Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay share the basin, formed by large rivers such as the Paraná, Paraguay and Uruguay. The Rio de la Plata which flows into the South Atlantic is formed at the confluence of the Paraná and Uruguay rivers.18 The Brazilian portion of the basin corresponds to approximately 1.4 million square kilometers, and includes the Federal District and the states of Minas Gerais, Goiás, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, São Paulo, Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. The Paraguay River, born in Mato Grosso, is a tributary of the Paraná River and has a length of 2,550 kilometers, of which 1,683 kilometers is in Brazil. It occupies part of the Brazilian Cerrado and the Pantanal. The Uruguay River starts in Santa Catarina, is 2,200 kilometers long and flows into the Rio de la Plata, also bathing areas in Argentina and Uruguay. The largest river in this basin is the Paraná, which is some 4,880 kilometers long and mainly in Brazilian territory, with stretches in Argentina and Paraguay.19 This basin concentrates the richest and most densely populated region in South America, and plays a fundamental role in various economic and social aspects in this area. It is the basin with the largest installed capacity for electricity in the country. There are fifty-seven large reservoirs in the basin, including the multinational Itaipu reservoir, and contains the second largest hydroelectric plant in the world, with a generation capacity of 14,000 megawatts.20 The La Plata basin also represents a fundamental means of transport in the region and links the countries and regions (the Brazilian states of São Paulo, Paraná, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goiás and Minas Gerais) on its periphery via the Tietê-Paraná waterway, connecting production areas to sea ports and serving the main centers of Mercosur. It is 2,400 kilometers long, compising 1,600 kilometers on the Paraná River and 800 kilometers on the Tietê River.21 Another important basin is formed by the São Francisco River, located entirely in Brazil, consisting of an area of 650 thousand square kilometers. The São Francisco River in its long course of 2,700 km crosses 18 19 20 21

Vera Lucia Fortes Zeni, “Bacia do Prata: o território das águas,” PhD thesis, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis, 2018: 13, 55–56. Zeni, “Bacia do Prata,” 58. Itaipu Binacional, www.itaipu.gov.br/energia/bacia-do-rio-parana. Hidrovia Tietê-Paraná, Departamento Hidroviário do governo do Estado de São Paulo, www.dh.sp.gov.br/hidrovia-tiete-parana/. The Tietê, 1,150 km in length, rises less than 30 km from the coast and moves inland, east to west, flowing into the Paraná River.

10

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

five Brazilian states: Minas Gerais, where it starts, Bahia, Pernambuco, Sergipe and Alagoas. It flows into the Atlantic Ocean on the border of these last two states. The São Francisco is called the river of national integration, as it links the northeast to the southeast. Since the beginning of European colonization, it has played a fundamental role in the economic and social life of a large portion of the Brazilian territory. It was traditionally the main means of transport in the region, as it is navigable for around 1,300 kilometers. In addition to being a source of water for all types of use, the São Francisco River basin has become, throughout the twentieth century, essential for the generation of energy. Hydroelectric plants exist at Três Marias, in Minas Gerais, Paulo Afonso (4,279 megawatts), Xingó (3,162 megawats) and Sobradinho (1,050 megawatts). Of the great Brazilian rivers, the São Francisco is probably the most environmentally affected by the intensive use of water, uncontrolled deforestation and urban, agricultural and industrial pollution released into its waters, directly or brought by tributaries, degrading river waters and decreasing its flow.22 In addition to the problems directly related to the pollution of the river, attempts to divert its water to drier regions such as the Caatinga biome are major areas of contention.23 Given its vast territorial extension, Brazil has different precipitation and temperature regimes. The north of the country has a rainy equatorial climate, with practically no dry season; in the Northeast, the rainy season, with low rainfall, is restricted to a few months, characterizing a semiarid climate. The Southeast and Midwest are influenced by both tropical and mid-latitude systems, with a well-defined dry season in winter and a rainy season in the summer with convective rainfall. Southern Brazil, due to its latitudinal location, is more influenced by mid-latitude systems, where frontal systems are the main cause of rainfall throughout the year.24 22

23

24

Andrea Zelhuber and Ruben Siqueira, “Rio São Francisco em descaminho: degradação e revitalização,” Cadernos do CEAS, Salvador, n. 227 (2007); César Nunes de Castro and Caroline Nascimento Pereira, “Revitalização do Rio São Francisco,” IPEA, Boletim regional, urbano e ambiental, 17 (2017). André Tomé de Assis, “A transposição do Rio São Francisco na voz dos diretamente atingidos em Cabrobó (PE),” PhD thesis, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, 2015; Zelhuber and Siqueira, “Rio São Francisco”; Carolina Jessica Domschke, “A Transposição do rio São Francisco: contradições da presença-ausência da obra ao longo de seus eixos,” Master’s thesis, FAU-USP, São Paulo, 2019; Francisco Jácome Sarmento, Transposição do Rio São Francisco: custo da água, www.academia.edu/8941808/ TRANSPOSI%C3%87%C3%83O_DO_RIO_S%C3%83O_FRANCISCO_Custo_da_ %C3%A1gua. Mario F. Leal de Quadro et al., “Climatologia de precipitação e temperatura,” INPE, http://climanalise.cptec.inpe.br/~rclimanl/boletim/cliesp10a/chuesp.html.

The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil

Hydraulic 16%

11

Petroleum 3%

Biomass 3% Coal 38%

Solar, Wind, etc 7%

Nuclear 10%

Natural Gas 23%

Graph 1.1  Sources of electricity in the world

The abundance of water resources in Brazil has influenced the formation of the Brazilian electrical matrix, which is radically different from the world standard. While 16 percent of the world’s electricity is generated through hydraulic sources, in Brazil the figure is 66 percent. Adding solar and wind sources to water, brings these non-carbon sources to 76 percent of total electricity generated (see Graphs 1.1 and 1.2). By opting for the intensive use of electricity from hydraulic sources, the country took advantage of the varieties of the Brazilian climate to reduce climate risk, through the implementation of a large and interconnected electrical system throughout Brazil. With the variety of climates, large reservoirs and an interconnected system, shortfalls in power generation in one region can be compensated by other regions. This was the way to base the electrical system on a source that depends on uncontrollable climatic variations. The current global intensification of climatic change jeopardizes the Brazilian position, and encourages the discovery of other alternative renewable energy sources. This is the case of biomass and solar/ wind energy.25 Brazil, for its size, diversity and geographical position, 25

EPE (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética), www.epe.gov.br/pt/abcdenergia/matriz-energeticae-eletrica.

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

12

Petroleum, 2%

Coal, 3% Natural Gas, 8% Nuclear, 2% Solar, Wind, etc, 11%

Hydraulic, 65% Biomass, 9%

Graph 1.2  Source of electricity in Brazil

presents excellent conditions to significantly expand the participation of these new renewable sources in its energy matrix, a challenge faced by all the countries of the world today. Brazil, due to its size and physical diversity, is rich in mineral products, being one of the producers and exporters of several important minerals.26 It is the second largest producer of iron ore in the world and has niobium (90 percent of reserves and 80 percent of world supply),27 bauxite (second largest producer in the world), and magnesite (fifth largest producer). The mineral deposits are situated in the regions known as the Quadrilátero Ferriferro, in south-central Minas Gerais, the so-called Carajás Mineral Province in Pará and the region of Corumbá (Mato Grosso do Sul).28 In addition, Brazil has significant coastal and undersea 26

27 28

Onildo João Marini, “Potencial mineral do Brasil,” in Adolpho José Melfi, Aroldo Misi, Diogenes de Almeida Campos and Umberto Giuseppe Cordani, eds., ­Recursos minerais no Brasil: problemas e desafios (Rio de Janeiro: Academia Brasileira de Ciências, 2016): 18. Jairo Yunis and Elmira Aliakbari, Survey of mining companies 2020 (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2021): 12–14, www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/ files/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2020.pdf. Brasilminingsite, accessed at: https://brasilminingsite.com.br/producao-recorde-de-niobioem-2019-posiciona-o-brasil-como-lider-mundial-neste-tipo-de-exploracao/. IBRAM: Setor Mineral 2020, https://ibram.org.br/publicacoes/page/2/#publication. On iron mining, see Pedro Sergio Landim de Carvalho et al., Minério de ferro. BNDES, https://web.bndes.gov.br/bib/jspui/bitstream/1408/4802/1/BS%2039%20min %C3%A9rio%20de%20ferro_P.pdf. The Carajás mineral province is one of the most important in the world, and the second largest producer of iron ore in Brazil. It is also rich in gold, copper, manganese, nickel-chromium and other products. About Carajás,

The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil

RR

13

AP

PA

AM

MA

Carajas

CE PI

AC

PE

TO

RO

BA

MT

RN PB

AL SE Production Centers

GO DF

MG

ES Quadrilater Ferrifero SP RJ

Corumba MS PR

SC RS

Bacia de Santos

Bacia de Santos (Oil, Gas) Carajás (iron ore; gold; coppe; manganese) Corumbá (Iron ore; manganese) Quadrilátero Quadrífero (iron ore; manganese)

Map 1.4  Main mineral and hydrocarbon centers of Brazil

deposits of petroleum (Graph 1.3) in the pre-salt region in the Santos Basin, which includes the coast of the states of São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo (see Map 1.4).29 Brazil, due to its continental size, contains a diversity of climates, reliefs, rainfall and biomes, which is reflected in the special economic and demographic characteristics of its various regions. Over the years, the Brazilian government has divided the country into what are assumed to be coherent and separate regions. The latest of these regional definitions

29

see Vale, Projeto Ferro Carajás, www.vale.com/brasil/PT/initiatives/innovation/s11d/ Documents/Final-Book-S11D-PORT.pdf; Sérgio Marguilis, O desempenho do governo brasileiro e do Banco Mundial com relação à questão ambiental do projeto de ferro Carajás (Brasília: Ipea, TD 193, 1990); Marcio Zonta and Charles Trocate, Projeto grande Carajás. Trinta anos de desenvolvimento frustrado (Marabá: Editorial iGuana, 2015); Gilciandro Prestes de Andrade, “A Amazônia e o Projeto Grande Carajás: entre as tentativas de desenvolvimento da região e os problemas causados às populações indígenas,” Mundo Amazônico, 6(2) (2015): 5–19. Petrobrás, Pré-Sal, https://petrobras.com.br/pt/nossas-atividades/areas-de-atuacao/ exploracao-e-producao-de-petroleo-e-gas/pre-sal/?gclid=Cj0KCQjw8p2MBh CiARIsADDUFVEQMPPYaElpfEGLh4EO7WU7WArJbKgtQ1EbccmeOLwgeUwQfH3_JEaAiscEALw_wcB.

14

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

Iraq 6%

UAE 5%

Brazil 5%

China 7%

Iran 5% Kuwait 4% Norway 3%

Canada 8% United States 27%

Russia 15%

Saudi Arabia 15%

Graph 1.3  The world’s major petroleum producers, BPD, 2021 (% world total). Source: US EIA International.

occurred in 1970.30 Since then the country has been divided into five coherent regions: the North, the Northeast, the Southeast, the South and the Center-West (Map 1.5).31 The North region, with an area 3,853,676 square kilometers represents 45 percent of the Brazilian territory and has an area greater than the sum of the ten largest European countries, excluding Russia, or 91 percent of the total area of the European Union. The seven states which form the North Region are Acre, Amapá, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins. More than 80 percent of the territory of the Northern region is part of the Amazon Biome, with portions of Cerrado on the periphery of the Amazon valley, in several states, such as Tocantins, Amapá and Roraima. The physical characteristics of the region have influenced the occupation and economic activities in the region and explain the reduced population density. Some 20 million people currently live in the region, representing only 9 percent of the Brazilian population, with a 30

31

According to the IBGE, the regional divisions differed over time. In 1942, these were grouped into eight regions. Then in 1970 came the current five-scheme regional division: North Region, Northeast Region, Southeast Region, South Region and Central-West Region, www.ibge.gov.br/geociencias/organizacao-do-territorio/divisao-regional/15778divisoes-regionais-do-brasil.html?=&t=o-que-e. The classic study of the regions is Azevedo, O Brasil e suas regiões.

The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil

RR

AP

PA

AM

MA

CE PI

AC

15

PE

TO

RO

AL SE

BA

MT GO DF

Brazil Regions MG

Centro Oeste Nordeste Norte Sudeste Sul

ES

MS SP

RN PB

RJ

PR SC RS

0

500

1000 km

Map 1.5  Current regions and states of Brazil. Source: IBGE, Bases Cartográficas

population density of 4.9 inhabitants per person, against 25.1 in Brazil.32 The most populous state is Pará; the least populated is Roraima, and from an economic point of view, the region represents only 6 percent of the national GDP.33 Roraima and the Northeast region are the nation’s poorest regions.34 From an economic point of view, it is a region devoted to agriculture and extractive activities.35 The regional transport infrastructure is poor and river transport is important.36 32 33 34 35

36

IBGE, Estimativas da População, www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/ 9103-estimativas-de-populacao.html?=&t=resultados. IBGE, Estimativa do IBGE para o ano de 2020, www.ibge.gov.br/explica/pib.php. IBGE, Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano (IDH), 2010, https://cidades.ibge.gov.br/ brasil/ac/pesquisa/37/30255?tipo=ranking&ano=2010. The Free Zone, created in 1967, was designed to create an industrial hub in the interior of the Amazon using important tax incentives, Suframa, www.gov.br/suframa/pt-br/zfm/ industria. There are permanent criticisms of the existence of this free zone, vigorously defended by the region’s community. See Ricardo Nunes de Miranda, “Zona Franca de Manaus: desafios e vulnerabilidade” (Brasília: TD 126, Senado Federal, 2013). On the system of transport in the region see Joel Castro de Nascimento and Ocileide Custódio da Silva, “Análise da logística e infraestrutura de transporte de carga do pólo industrial de Manaus,” XXXII Encontro Nacional de Engenharia de Produção, Bento

16

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

Table 1.1  Areas destined for the protection and preservation of native vegetation and other land uses in Brazil 2018 Categories Areas for the preservation of native vegetation registered in the CAR (rural world – cattle raising, agriculture, forestry, extractivism…) Full conservation units Indigenous lands Native vegetation on unregistered vacant land Native pastures Planted pastures Crops Planted forests Infrastructure, cities and others TOTAL

Area (hectares)

Percent of area of Brazil

218,245,801

25.6

88,429,181 117,338,721 139,722,327

10.4 13.8 16.5

68,022,447 112,237,038 66,321,886 10,203,367 29,759,821 850,280,589

8.0 13.2 7.8 1.2 3.5 100.0

Source: Embrapa, Sintese Ocupação e Uso das Terras no Brasil (2018), www.embrapa .br/car/sintese#:~:text=O%20mundo%20rural%20brasileiro%20utiliza,nacional %20(25%2C6%25)

The Northeast region, with an area of 1,554,292 square kilometers, represents 18 percent of the Brazilian territory (see Table 1.1). Nine states form the Northeast region: Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte, Sergipe. Three different biomes the Mata Atlântica, the Caatinga and the Cerrado are part of the Northeast. The original European occupation of Brazilian territory was initially consolidated in the Mata Atlântica, where the sugar industry was established by the Portuguese colonizers. The Northeast, although containing 27 percent of the Brazilian population, represents only 14 percent of the national GDP.37 Within the Northeast region the Caatinga area has a semiarid climate, and was gradually occupied by cattle ranching as a subsidiary of coastal

37

Gonçalves, 2012; Cristianne da Silva Macêdo, “Infraestrutura de transporte hidroviário de carga no estado do Amazonas: um diagnóstico a partir de políticas públicas de investimento,” Master’s thesis, Universidade Federal do Amazonas, Manaus, 2012; Thiago Oliveira Neto, “Rodovias na Amazônia e as mudanças recentes na circulação regional,” Revista Tamoios, 16(3) (2020): 63–84. On investment project see ABDIB Forum: Infraestrutura Regional (Belém: Edição Norte, 2020). IBGE estimates for the year 2020, www.ibge.gov.br/explica/pib.php.

The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil

17

activity. Due to its climatic conditions and poor water resources, it is one of the poorest areas of the country to date and is densely populated, representing about 12 percent of the Brazilian population, but 43 percent of the population in the Northeast region. It has a population density of 23.05 inhabitants per square kilometer, “which characterizes it as the most populous semiarid region in the world. The high population density for a semiarid region imposes strong pressure on natural resources.”38 The Cerrado area contained in the Northeast occupies parts of the states of Maranhão, Piauí, Bahia, Ceará, Pernambuco and Sergipe. There is a sub-region of the Cerrado called Matopiba, made up of parts of the states of Maranhão, Piauí and Bahia (in the Northeast region) and Tocantins (in the North region), which has become one of the main poles of modern, large-scale, high productivity agriculture and a world grain producer.39 The Southeast region, the richest and most populated zone of the country, has an area of 924,511 square kilometers, representing 11 percent of the Brazilian territory, but accounts for 42 percent of the population. It contains four states, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo. The Tropic of Capricorn passes through the region, so all the states in the region are found in the tropical area. But its breadth in terms of latitude from the north of Minas Gerais to the south of São Paulo (latitude 14 degrees and 25 degrees respectively), incorporates various climatic conditions. São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Espírito Santo are located in the Mata Atlântica biome. Minas Gerais has areas divided between the Mata Atlântica and the Cerrado, with a small portion of the Caatinga as well. The region contains excellent soils as well as major mineral deposits.40 The South region, with an area of 576,774 square kilometers, is located entirely in the temperate zone, below the Tropic of Capricorn. It 38

39

40

Iana Alexandra Alves Rufino and Simone Tavares da Silva, “Análise das relações entre dinâmica populacional, clima e vetores de mudança no semiárido brasileiro: uma abordagem metodológica,” Boletim de Ciências Geodésicas, 23(1) (2017): 171; Aziz Nacib Ab’Sáber, “Sertões e sertanejos: uma geografia humana sofrida,” Dossiê Nordeste Seco, Estudos Avançados, 13(36) (1999): 7–59. Embrapa, www.embrapa.br/tema-matopiba/sobre-o-tema. Also see Caroline Nascimento Pereira, Gabriela Lanza Porcionato and Cesar Nunes de Castro, “Aspectos socioeconômicos da região do Matopiba,” Boletim Regional, urbano e ambiental, 18 (2018); Clovis Caribé Menezes dos Santos, “Matopiba: uma nova fronteira agrícola ou um reordenamento geográfico do agronegócio e dos espaços produtivos de ‘cerrados’,” Cadernos CEAS, 245 (2018). IBGE, Censo Agrícola de 2017, Sidra, tables 6904, 6955 and 6957.

18

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

is made up of just three states: Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul, and borders on three countries, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina and shares many of the soils and biomes of these nations. Here the Mata Atlântica predominates in its northern portion. The Pampa is another biome which Brazil shares with Paraguay and Uruguay, which is the broad plains of the extreme southern region of the continent. It was lightly populated by the Portuguese in the colonial period and in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries European immigrants established smallholdings. This colonization process and the terrain and climate conditions led to the formation of a different economic and social structure from the rest of the country. Smallholdings in the northern portion and extensive livestock in the south defined the region.41 The last major region is the Center-West which represents the most recent frontier of territorial occupation in the country. With an area of 1,612,000 square kilometers, slightly smaller than Mexico, and representing 19 percent of the national territory, it comprises the states of Goiás, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul and the Federal District, Here the Cerrado is the predominant biome along with portions of the Amazon and Pantanal biome. Located in the center of the country, it represents the cradle of the main Brazilian hydrographic basins. Little explored until the middle of the twentieth century, it has become the main grain production center in Brazil and one of the most important in the world.42 In spite of intense use by agriculture and cattle ranching, most of the land area consists of native flora preservation regions, conservation units, indigenous lands and native vegetation on vacant and unregistered land, totaling 563 million hectares, which represents 66 percent of the national territory. This untouched area is equivalent to forty-three countries and five European territories. Native and cultivated pastures represent 21 percent, crops only 8 percent and planted forests only 1 percent of the total land area of Brazil (see Table 1.1). The population of Brazil today is obviously not evenly distributed across the country. The Southeastern and Southern regions are the most 41

42

Vicente Eudes Lemos Alves, “A mobilidade sulista e a expansão da fronteira agrícola brasileira,” Revista de Saúde Pública, 2 (2005): 40–68; Fabiano André Marion, “Expansão da fronteira agrícola e reordenação territorial,” III Simpósio Nacional de Geografia Agrária, 2005; Pedro Simon, A diáspora do povo gaúcho (Brasília: Senado Federal, 2009). Data from January to September 2021, Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento, www.gov.br/agricultura/pt-br/assuntos/politica-agricola/valor-bruto-daproducao-agropecuaria-vbp.

The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil

19

Table 1.2  Area, population and population density of Brazil (census 2010) States and regions

Area (km2)

Population

Density (Persons/km2)

Brazil

8,502,728

190,755,799

22.4

North Rondônia Acre Amazonas Roraima Pará Amapá Tocantins Northeast Maranhão Piauí Ceará Rio Grande do Norte Paraíba Pernambuco Alagoas Sergipe Bahia Southeast Minas Gerais Espírito Santo Rio de Janeiro São Paulo South Paraná Santa Catarina Rio Grande do Sul Center-West Mato Grosso do Sul Mato Grosso Goiás Distrito Federal

3,853,576 237,591 164,122 1,559,162 224,301 1,247,950 142,828 277,622 1,554,388 331,936 251,577 148,921 52,811 56,470 98,146 27,779 21,918 564,831 924,596 586,520 46,099 43,780 248,197 563,802 199,317 95,704 268,782 1,606,367 357,146 903,330 340,104 5,788

15,864,454 1,562,409 733,559 3,483,985 450,479 7,581,051 669,526 1,383,445 53,081,950 6,574,789 3,118,360 8,452,381 3,168,027 3,766,528 8,796,448 3,120,494 2,068,017 14,016,906 80,364,410 19,597,330 3,514,952 15,989,929 41,262,199 27,386,891 10,444,526 6,248,436 10,693,929 14,058,094 2,449,024 3,035,122 6,003,788 2,570,160

4.1 6.6 4.5 2.2 2.0 6.1 4.7 5.0 34.1 19.8 12.4 56.8 60.0 66.7 89.6 112.3 94.4 24.8 86.9 33.4 76.2 365.2 166.2 48.6 52.4 65.3 39.8 8.8 6.9 3.4 17.7 444.1

Source: IBGE, Sidra tables 1301, 1378 and Censo Demográfico de (2010)

densely populated regions of Brazil, with the North and Center-West the least populated (see Table 1.2). The country as a whole has half the world population density level of 53.3 persons per square kilometer in 2010. Even in South America, its population density is comparable to

20

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

Peru and Chile, but well below Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, but double the rate of its neighbors to the South – Uruguay and Argentina.43 Thus Brazil covers an enormous variety of lands and climates being both a tropical and semi-tropical country and is moderately populated by world standards. The majority of its lands are open plains with relative few mountain ranges and it has a long coast facing the Atlantic. It was these physical features which defined and limited the economic and social evolution of Brazil. Most of its geographic space is relatively flat, made up of plains and plateaus, without obstacles such as the Andes mountain range that extends from north to south on the west side of the South American continent. A fundamental characteristic of Brazil is its wide Atlantic coast, more than 7,000 in length. It appears that early man entered the region from the Andean range moving slowly from west to east, extensively exploiting the Andean eastern foothills and the central floodplains as they moved toward the coast over several centuries. One group even used the Amazon basin as a base to settle and explore the major Caribbean islands before the arrival of the Europeans in the late fifteenth century. For Europeans, the movement was in the opposite direction. The European conquerors came from east to west and remained close to the coast to maintain their ties to the metropolis via control over the Southern Atlantic. Despite the relative ease of movement into the interior, with few dense forests and an abundance of open plains, for centuries the Europeans kept to the coast. Their ties to Europe via the sea were closer than their connection to the interior lands. Most of the frontier remained unexplored and unexploited except for cattle ranching in the Northeast. Until the end of the seventeenth century, except in the northeast of the country, the European and mestizo population was limited to little more than 100 kilometers from the coast as in the case of the São Paulo plateau. The opening up of gold mines and demand for gold in the Center-West region in the eighteenth century was the first really important movement inland by Europeans. Even then the majority of the population and economic activity remained close to the coast and its natural and deep ports, such as Salvador, Recife and Rio de Janeiro. Even then such harbors as Santos were of little importance until the nineteenth century since the 43

United Nations, Population Division, table POP/6: Population density by region, subregion and country, 1950–2100 (persons per square kilometer), https://population.un.org/ wpp/Download/Standard/Population/.

The Setting – Climate and Soils of Brazil

21

population was concentrated to the north of the paulista littoral. The region south of São Paulo was not effectively settled by colonists until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but was inhabited by both nomadic and seminomadic Amerindian tribes, as was the case for most of the interior regions of Brazil. It was only gradually that these groups were incorporated into Brazilian society. But even the discovery of gold in the hinterland, in territories of the current states of Minas Gerais, Goiás and Mato Grosso, brought intense exploration of Brazilian territory to only a part of the hinterland in the eighteenth century. Mineral extraction and livestock would be the main activities to explain the territorial expansion in the central regions of the center south of Brazil. This was the first great moment of national integration, uniting, by cabotage and inland routes maintained by mule trains the coast with these new interior zones. But the quality of frontier lands in the Southeastern region, above all those of the province/state of São Paulo, provided the incentive to open up new regions, largely driven by sugar and coffee plantations which maintained their productivity primarily via exploiting ever new virgin frontier lands. The post-1870 construction of railroads permitted the exploitation of these lands and the final settlement of the southeastern frontier. It was only after the railroads came into being that the settled territory of São Paulo finally reached the Paraná River, more than 500 kilometers from the coast. But the northern and Amazonian frontiers would not be settled, even partially, despite the expansion of modern paved roads in the middle of the twentieth century. There were also numerous regions with poor soil, such as the Cerrado, which in turn would not be exploited until the late twentieth century through modern scientific agriculture and the application of new nutrients to the arid soils. Much of Brazilian agriculture is defined by temperature, soils and altitude. Given the dominance of agriculture in the contemporary Brazilian economy, these geographic factors have determined the location and development of individual crops. Permanent crops like coffee and oranges for example are confined to given soils, altitudes and temperature conditions, while until recently only a limited area of Brazil was viable for the production of wheat, the only grain imported into Brazil. Geography has also defined and limited urban settlement. First came the harbors, then interior rivers and finally railroads and paved roads which have influenced the location of cities. Some places along the coast were only modestly inhabited due to local diseases, which only ended with modern sanitation and inoculations and enabled their full development. Clearly the western frontier is still far from the coast and has still to be

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fully inhabited. But there has been a new population movement to the North and the Amazon, as Brazil attempts to both expand the modern agricultural frontier to the Northern region’s rich soils, and open up the Amazon estuary as a modern shipping center for the Center-West, which still sends most of its products through the Southeastern port of Santos. Recent trends in climate also have a profound effect on Brazilian populations and economies. Whole sectors of agriculture have been forced to move to warmer or wetter climates. This is especially the case with permanent crops. In turn weather conditions over large areas of agricultural production have been influenced by changes in the Amazonian biome which has been steadily reduced. More and more the geographical possibilities and restraints define the current and future evolution of Brazil, especially now as it has just recently become one of the largest grain producers in the world.

2 The Peopling of Brazil to 1700

The Amerindians There has been a fundamental change in the past quarter century of our understanding of the origin, date of arrival and subsequent settlement of early man in the Americas. It is now agreed by most scholars that the Western Hemisphere was the last major geographical region settled by Pleistocene humans and that their origin was from Northeastern Asia via the Bering Strait in the Beringia region (the temporary land bridge which existed in what is now the Bering sea).1 But the date for this migration and the subsequent settlement of South America are in much dispute. Before genetic studies of human populations began, only archeological, linguistic and anatomical studies were used to analyze this theme. Based on then available evidence, it was assumed that the arrival date of humans to the Americas was around 13,500 BPE and that the first wave of migrating humans was blocked in the far north by the Laurentide glacial ice shield until ca. 12,000 BPE when a possible ice-free corridor opened up in the glacial barrier.2 It was assumed that the first to arrive through this opening of the glaciers were big game hunters who occupied the southeastern part of the North American continent between 11,000 and 1

2

The Beringia land bridge – as the connection between the two continents was called – first appeared 5.5 to 4.8 million years ago and was intermittently flooded in the following centuries. The land bridge in the period of human migration was still viable as of 12,900 BPE, see John F. Hoffecker and Scott A. Elias, Human Ecology of Beringia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). David J. Meltzer, First Peoples in A New World: Colonizing Ice Age America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009): 4–5 and Hoffecker and Elias, Human Ecology of Beringia: 11.

23

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10,000 BPE.3 These so-called Clovis hunters (named after one of the largest of their archeological sites) were thought to be the founding population and their big game culture was assumed to have slowly spread by land to the rest of the Americas. It was thus believed that humans did not arrive in South America until 10,000 to 9,000 BPE at the earliest. There were also alternative models which suggested migrations of humans crossing the Pacific or Atlantic oceans coming to America, which could not be rejected. Finally it was assumed, on the basis of linguistic data, that there must have been three major migrations of humans since there were supposedly only three large groups of distinct language families in the Americas. With the revolution in genetic analysis of present and past populations, along with new archeological, geological and linguistic research, it is now believed that humans did arrive in America exclusively via the Beringia bridge from Northeastern Asia, and they came sometime between at least 20,000 and 16,000 BPE. After a pause in the Northeastern Asian-Alaska region of several millenniums the migrants then advanced very rapidly along the Pacific coast (not waiting for any glacial openings), peopling the Americas as they went along and reached the Pacific coast of South America sometime around 14,000 BPE. Then several groups branched out to the Eastern and Southern Atlantic regions and in turn became isolated from the main groups along the Pacific coast.4 It is now believed that these first settlers were not big game hunters, but were primarily small game hunters and seed collectors who also consumed shellfish and fish. All these new findings about the dating, timing, culture and origin of this human arrival to South America are based on new genetic studies of human DNA which only began in the 1980s. This new research was also supported by linguists and archeologists who challenged the linguistic analysis used to create the supposed three language groups,5 and who discovered pre-Clovis non-big game 3

4

5

On the dating of these Clovis materials, see Meltzer, First Peoples in a New World: 3–4. On the many reasons for the rejection of this older model see Thomas D. Dillehay, The Settlement of the Americas, A New Pre-History (New York: Basic Books, 2000): 3–6. This scenario is based on the genetic analysis of the latest pre-Columbian remains from South America. See Bastien Llamas, Lars Fehren-Schmitz, Guido Valverde, Julien Soubrier, Swapan Mallick, Nadin Rohland, Susanne Nordenfelt et al., “Ancient mitochondrial DNA provides high-resolution time scale of the peopling of the Americas,” Science Advances, 2(4) (2016): e1501385. See Deborah A. W. Bolnick, Beth A. S. Shook, Lyle Campbell and Ives Goddard, “Problematic Use of Greenberg’s Linguistic Classification of the Americas in Studies of Native American Genetic Variation,” American Journal of Human Genetics, 75(3) (2004): 519–523 and sources cited in footnote 16.

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hunter human sites in North America and all along the South American coastline dating from at least 14,000 BPE or before.6 All of these developments have revolutionized the field and changed what is now agreed by most scholars in numerous disciplines as to the origin, timing, size and nature of this migration. It has also led to a complete rejection of the various trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic migration models, some of which had been supported by some physical anthropologists, but which have now been rejected by the genetic studies.7 Geneticists and physical anthropologists use the unique female inherited mitochondrion DNA (known as mtDNA) as the single most important marker to define origins of population. This genetic marker is abundant in humans. It is even easily found in skeletal remains, and it mutates very quickly. Unlike nuclear DNA, these mtDNA markers do not recombine and thus all changes in their makeup are the result of accumulated mutations which can be estimated and a rough time sequence proposed based on the pace of these changes.8 All genetic studies of Amerindians throughout the Americas show that the mtDNA haplotypes of Native Americans belong to one of four ancestral lineages that

6

7

8

For a review of these new archeological sites see Ted Goebel, Michael R. Waters and Dennis H. O’Rourke, “The late Pleistocene dispersal of modern humans in the Americas,” Science, 319 (March 14, 2008). A new variant of the Clovis model, which argues for a late 18,000 BPE Iberian migration of hunters across the North Atlantic to the new world is the strange book by Dennis J. Stanford and Bruce A. Bradley, Across Atlantic Ice: The Origin of America’s Clovis Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). See the total rejection of their basic data for this hypothesis in Metin I. Eren et al., “Refuting the technological cornerstone of the Ice-Age Atlantic crossing hypothesis,” Journal of Archaeological Science, 40 (2013), 2934–2941 and the devastating critique of this model in the review published by Juliet E. Morrow in Lithic Technology, 59(1) (2014): 76–78. The only genetic data showing such a migration comes from the Botocudo Indians in Brazil with a date in the European contact or post-European period long after the peopling of the Americas had occurred. See Anna-Sapfo Malaspinas et al., “Identification of Polynesian mtDNA haplogroups in remains of Botocudo Amerindians from Brazil,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110(16) (2013): 6454–6469. Conversely some Native American markers have been found in the genetic makeup of one of the Polynesian islands. See J. Víctor Moreno-Mayar et al., “Genome-wide ancestry patterns in Rapanui suggest pre-European admixture with Native Americans,” Current Biology, 24(21) (2014): 2518–2525. There was initially some thought that the infrequently found mtDNA haplogroups might have indicated non-Asian origin, but this has been rejected, see footnote 11. On the utility of this marker and its evolution in the Americas see the summary article by Jason A. Eshleman, Ripan S. Malhi and David Glenn Smith, “Mitochondrial DNA studies of Native Americans: conceptions and misconceptions of the population prehistory of the Americas,” Evolutionary Anthropology, 12 (2003): 7.

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were subsequently labeled A, B, C and D, with a smaller X found later. Approximately 97 percent of Native American peoples everywhere had them.9 They are also found in ancient skeletal remains.10 These four mtDNA haplogroups are common to all Native American populations but only found in central Asian populations and nowhere else in the world. Moreover these four haplogroups have mutated from the founding Asian populations showing that they were now independent of their origin source.11 Finally recent studies of the male derived Y chromosome indicate both Asian origin and a migration date of 17,000 BPE,12 and studies of the less well distributed X mtDNA are now found to have been from a founding lineage from Asia and are not European in origin.13 Initial morphological studies of surviving skeletal remains by some physical anthropologists seemed to reject these initial findings and held out for direct trans-Atlantic and/or trans-Pacific migrations. But even these physical anthropologists have now accepted the model of a single Asian source, but have argued for a four migration model to explain what they see as two alternative types of human remains.14 Thus almost all 9

10

11 12

13 14

Michael D. Brown et al., “mtDNA haplogroup X: an ancient link between Europe/ Western Asia and North America?” American Journal of Human Genetics, 63 (1998): 1852. See for example Anne C. Stone and Mark Stoneking, “mtDNA analysis of a prehistoric Oneota population: implications for the peopling of the New World,” American Journal of Human Genetics, 62 (1998): 1153–1170. Eshleman et al., “Mitochondrial DNA Studies of Native Americans”: 7. Connie J. Mulligan, Keith Hunley, Suzanne Cole and Jeffrey C. Long, “Population genetics, history, and health patterns in Native Americans,” Annual Review of Genomics Human Genetics, 5 (2004): 295. Mulligen et al., “Population genetics”,: 299. The only group of scholars differing from these models are those doing limited cranial studies of pre-contact skeletal remains in Brazil and North America, whose initial results were at odds with all genetic studies. See for example Walter A. Neves and H. M. Pucciarelli, “Morphological affinities of the first Americans: an exploratory analysis based on early South American human remains,” Journal of Human Evolution, 21 (1991): 261–273; Walter Neves and Mark Hubb, “Cranial morphology of early Americans from Lagoa Santa, Brazil: implications for the settlement of the New World,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 102(51) (2005): 18309– 18314, 139 and Richard L. Jantz and Douglas W. Owsley, “Variation among early North American crania,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 114(2) (2001): 146–155. Their findings, as they themselves note, have had little impact on the field of early American studies. In a more recent work they have accepted the unique Beringia origins from Northeastern Asia and the dating of archeologists and geneticist, no longer pushing for alternative migration origins. They have instead argued for a four migration model which brought two distinct types of humans – mongoloid and non-mongoloid – and both resided together with the mongoloid groups arriving a bit later than the non-mongoloid ones. See Mark Hubbe, Katerina Harvati and Walter Neves, “Paleoamerican morphology in the

The Peopling of Brazil to 1700

27

reputable scholars in all fields now believe that the founder populations for the native populations of the Americas came from Asia.15 At the same time, this genetic data as well as new archeological evidence have challenged older estimates of the time of migration and have suggested new and earlier arrival dates of 18,000 to 20,000 BPE, which now seems to be acceptable to many scholars. But the number and size of the migration and how humans spread through the Americas have raised other debates. It was originally assumed that there were three different migrations, mostly based primarily on linguistic analysis. But this analysis has been rejected by linguists. Given that the Americas contained an estimated 108 languages of the world’s 420 languages,16 it has been suggested that such a linguistic diversity can be explained only by a single migration and later dispersal or by innumerable migrations that account for all the languages. Moreover both the method of historical linguistics used and the assumption of only three language families in the Americas have been rejected as proving anything about timing or language families.17

15

16

17

context of European and East Asian late Pleistocene variation: implications for human dispersion into the New World,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 144 (2011): 442–453; and Walter Neves, “Origens do homen nas Américas: fósseis versus moléculas?” in Hilton P. Silva and Claudia Rodrigues-Carvalho, eds., Nossa origem. O povoamento das Américas, visões multidisiciplinares (Rio de Janeiro: Viera & Lent, 2006), 45–76. On the early pre-genetic studies of this Bering Straits model see Stuart J. Fiedel, Prehistory of the Americas, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): chapter 2, and Joseph F. Powell, The First Americans Race, Evolution, and the Origin of Native Americans (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004): chapter 1. The new genetic work is well summarized in Goebel et al. who concluded that “All major Native American mtDNA and Y chromosome haplogroups emerged in the same region of central Asia, and all share similar coalescent dates, indicating that a single ancient gene pool is ancestral to all Native American populations. Similarly, all sampled native New World populations (from Alaska to Brazil) share a unique allele at a specific microsatellite locus that is not found in any Old World populations (except Koryak and Chukchi of western Beringia), which implies that all modern Native Americans descended from a single source population. This history is further supported by ancient DNA studies showing that Paleoamericans carried the same haplogroups (and even sub haplogroups) as modern Native groups.” Goebel et al., “Late Pleistocene dispersal”: 1498. On the DNA analysis of pre-Columbian skeletons, see the recent massive study by Llamas et al., “Ancient mitochondrial DNA,” On hematological and dental analysis results which supports this model see Michael H. Crawford, The Origins of Native Americans: Evidence from Anthropological Genetics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Loretta O’Connor and Vishnupriya Kolipakam, “Human migrations, dispersals, and contacts in South America,” in Loretta O’Connor and Pieter Muysken, eds., The Native Languages of South America, Origins, Development, Typology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1. The major proponent for these three language families and ultimately three migrations was Joseph H. Greenberg, Language in the Americas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), which in turn was used as a model in the classic study by L.  Luca

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Although there is a growing consensus on the origin and timing of the first migrants to America, there is still much debate about the number of migrations and their subsequent movement to the southern hemisphere.18 Some genetic evidence has been used to suggest a more complex three migration model then originally proposed. Other genetic data have suggested that the first migrants remained in the Alaskan area for many generations and then a branch of the original group migrated to the south. That is an original separation of part of the migrant population from its founding group in Northeastern Asia, was followed by a prolonged period of isolation – probably in the Bering Strait region – and then a rapid expansion of a new group peeling off from these original settlers into a new migrant stream heading southward. Recent linguistic approaches have proposed that much of the surprising complexity and number of separate languages in America is also due to an original migration rhythm of “pulse and pause” – that is periods of separation and rapid movement followed by stability.19 Along with the number of migrations and there is also an ongoing debate about the size of the original migrations. Some estimates assume that this migration consisted of some 1,000 to 2,000 individuals,20 but others have proposed a much smaller band of hunters and gatherers, while genetic evidence also suggests a small original population.

18

19

20

Cavalli-Sforza, Paolo Menozzi and Alberto Piazza, The History and Geography of Human Genes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) and numerous other genetic studies afterwards. The best single analysis of why this schema does do not work linguistically and why it cannot predict neither the age of migrations or how many occurred is found in Lyle Campbell, American Indian Languages: The Historical Linguistics of Native America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997): chapter 3. Also see J. Nichols, “Linguistic diversity and the first settlement of the New World,” Language, 66 (1999): 475–521; R. A. Rogers, L. D. Martin and T. D. Nicklas, “Ice-Age geography and the distribution of native North American languages,” Journal of Biogeography, 17 (1990): 131–143; and D. Nettle, “Explaining global patterns of language diversity,” Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, 17 (1998) 354–374. A good review of these competing models of number and direction of the migrations based on the genetic evidence is found in Dennis H. O’Rourke and Jennifer A. Raff, “The human genetic history of the Americas: the final frontier,” Current Biology, 20(4) (February 23, 2010): R202–R207. For an early defense of the single migration model see Sandro L. Bonatto and Francisco M. Salzano, “A single and early migration for the peopling of the Americas supported by mitochondrial DNA sequence data,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, USA, 94 (March 1997): 1866–1871. This is the model proposed by Loretta O’Connor and Vishnupriya Kolipakam, “Human migrations, dispersals, and contacts in South America,” in O’Connor and Muysken Native Languages of South America: 31. See Connie J. Mulligan, Andrew Kitchen and Michael M. Miyamoto, “Updated threestage model for the peopling of the Americas,” PLoS One, 3(9) (2008): e3199.

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A summary of the genetic findings found that “The reduced level of genetic diversity among Native Americans, with both classical and molecular markers, is consistent with the expectation of small founding populations.”21 One estimate is that it consisted of about seventy persons and then grew by a factor of 10.22 How rapidly this founding group could have expanded over the two hemispheres has been estimated from demographic and anthropological data on known hunters and gatherers. If the founding group consisted of a small band of just twenty-five persons, and assuming a low growth rate of 0.25 percent per annum, which is half the usual estimate for contemporary hunters and gatherers, after 4,500 years the population could have filled all the spaces in the Americas and would have reached 3 million persons. But this was assuming all spaces were filled including ice sheets, lakes, rivers, deserts, jungles, and so on. Thus it is more than possible that even before the end of the Pleistocene ice age humans could have populated the entire surface of the Americas from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego in half that time.23 It should also be noted that recent genetic studies calculating rates of change of both mitochondrial and Y-chromosomal markers show no significant difference by gender.24 Not only has the timing of the migration now been questioned, but so has the route they took been challenged. The traditional argument of a northern ice-free corridor opening between the glaciers has now been rejected. A recent geological survey of the Alaskan and Canadian Pacific coastline has concluded that the western Cordilleran Ice Sheet had retreated by 16,000 BPE and was immediately replaced by productive marine and terrestrial ecosystems along the entire coastline, thus opening up an actual coastal corridor for human migration long before the Laurentian ice sheet opening.25 But there were also alternative possibilities as well. There is little question that humans were aquatic by the 21 22 23

24 25

Dennis H. O’Rourke and Jennifer A. Raff, “The human genetic history of the Americas: the final frontier,” Current Biology, 20(4) (2010): R206. Jody Hey, “On the number of New World founders: a population genetic portrait of the peopling of the Americas,” PLoS biology, 3(6) (2005): 0967. David G. Anderson and J. Christopher Gillam, “Paleoindian colonization of the Americas: implications from an examination of physiography, demography, and artifact distribution,” American Antiquity, 65(1) (2000): 43–66. Mark Seielstad, “Asymmetries in the maternal and paternal genetic histories of Columbian populations,” The American Journal of Human Genetics, 67(5) (2000): 1064. Alia J. Lesnek, Jason P. Briner, Charlotte Lindqvist, James F. Baichtal and Timothy H. Heaton, “Deglaciation of the Pacific coastal corridor directly preceded the human colonization of the Americas,” Science Advances, 4(5) (2018): eaar5040: 1–8.

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time of their arrival in America. It is now assumed that they could have bypassed any coastal glacier blockages by boating along the coast. It has also been suggested that there was a common “kelp highway” all along the coast from the Bering Strait to well below the glaciers with a common resource base of seals, sea otters, shellfish, seaweeds, and so on, especially at key river estuaries. Thus as early man moved south, they could have done this with little need for drastic change of diet or foraging.26 Also all the archeological sites associated with these coastal settlements show that these early humans were small game hunters, shellfish and seed gatherers and mostly exploited their access to the sea. These were not the Clovis type big game hunters, who now are assumed to have occurred in a more limited area and appeared at a much later date. Thus, despite some holdouts, most scholars now agree that the Clovis culture was a late developing culture, rather than a foundational one.27 The most recent genetic studies support this assumption,28 as well as more detailed linguistic and geological information.29 New archeological evidence also shows the existence of settlements along all the Pacific coastline of America long before the Laurentide barrier had melted enough to open up a supposed ice-free land passage.30 Even in North America, 26

27

28

29

30

For this hypothesis see Jon M. Erlandson et al., “The kelp highway hypothesis: marine ecology, the coastal migration theory, and the peopling of the Americas,” Journal of Island & Coastal Archaeology, 2 (2007): 161–174. On the intellectual rigidity of the Clovis model and its dominance for most of the twentieth century see Jon M. Erlandson, “After Clovis first collapsed: reimagining the peopling of the Americas,” in Kelly E. Graf, Carline V. Ketron and Michael R. Waters, eds., Paleoamerican Odyssey (College States, TX: Texas A & M Universty, 2013): 127–132. For a leading scholar still questioning some of these results and still not willing to completely abandon the “Clovis first” model, see Stuart J. Fiedel, “The peopling of the New World: present evidence, new theories and future directions,” Journal of Archaeological Research, 8(1) (2000): 39–103 and his article “Kennewick follies: ‘new’ theories about the peopling of the Americas,” Journal of Anthropological Research, 60(1) (2004): 75–110. See Nelson J. R. Fagundes et al., “Mitochondrial population genomics supports a single pre-Clovis origin with a coastal route for the peopling of the Americas,” The American Journal of Human Genetics, 82 (2008), 583–592; and Jason A. Eshleman et al., “Mitochondrial DNA and prehistoric settlements: native migrations on the Western edge of North America,” Human Biology, (2004): 55–75; and Sijia Wang et al., “Genetic variation and population structure in Native Americans,” PLoS Genetics, 3(11) (2007): e185, 2049–2067. See K. R. Fladmark, “Alternate migration corridors for early man in North America,” American Antiquity, 44(1) (1979): 55–69 and the supporting linguistic argument in Ruth Gruhn, “Linguistic evidence in support of the coastal route of earliest entry into the New World,” Man, New Series, 23(1) (1988): 77–100. E. James Dixon, “Human colonization of the Americas: timing, technology and process,” Quaternary Science Reviews, 20 (2001) 277–299.

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pre-Clovis sites have now been validated.31 The consensus now seems to be that humans began to migrate by from the Bering Strait region at least by 17,000 BPE and that they reached Patagonia by at least 14,000 BPE if not before.32 At the same time, recent excavations along the Uruguay River close to the Brazilian border, suggest that humans had reached the Atlantic coastal region of South America at least by 13,300 BPE.33 But this coastal migration was just one part of the history of human migration in the Americas. It is evident that several subsequent river and interior migration routes emerged, with blockages along the way and also new continental to island movements would later occur in the Atlantic coastal region.34 All of these differences show up in the genetic data. These studies suggest that those peoples who remained farther north retained more genetic markers similar to Asian populations than the southern Native Americans, and that the Pacific coastal populations differed from the eastern interior ones. There is a marked genetic similarity between Andean and Mesoamerican populations, and they in turn differ from eastern South American groups, all suggesting easier coastal migrations and more difficult interior travels.35 In the Andean area, dense

31

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33

34

35

For a review of some of these major pre-Clovis sites see J. M. Adovasio and Jake Page, The First Americans: In Pursuit of Archaeology’s Greatest Mystery (New York: Random House, 2002). See the classic revolutionary study for early American pre-Clovis sites, Tom D. Dillehay, Monte Verde, a Late Pleistocene settlement in Chile (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989). Recent work on the much debated Brazilian site of Pedra Furada suggests a very early human occupation of 22,000 BPE which is questiomable given all the other data we have for this region. There is some question about the limited nature of the remains available but the site has been studied many times. See Eric Boëda et al., “A new late Pleistocene archaeological sequence in South America: the Vale da Pedra Furada (Piauí, Brazil),” Antiquity, 88(341) (2014): 927–941 as well as the commentary “Standards and Expectations,” by Dillehay, Monte Verde: 941; and C. Lahaye et al., “New insights into a late-Pleistocene human occupation in America: The Vale da Pedra Furada complete chronological study,” Quaternary Geochronology, (2015): 445–451. Rafael Suárez, Gustavo Piñeiro and Flavia Barceló. “Living on the river edge: the Tigre site (K-87) new data and implications for the initial colonization of the Uruguay River basin,” Quaternary International, 473 (2018): 257. Genoveva Keyeux et al., “Possible migration routes into South America deduced from mitochondrial DNA Studies in Colombian Amerindian Populations,” Human Biology, 74(2) (2002): 211–233; C. Lalueza-Fox et al., “Mitochondrial DNA from Pre-Columbian Ciboneys from Cuba and the prehistoric colonization of the Caribbean,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 121 (2003): 97–108. Wang et al., “Genetic variation”: 2049. This differentiation between eastern and western South America has subsequently been challenged by Cecil M. Lewis Jr and Jeffrey C. Long, “Native South American genetic structure and prehistory inferred from hierarchical modeling of mtDNA,” Molecular Biology and Evolution, 25(3) (2008): 478–486.

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populations based on the emergence of complex peasant societies tended toward homogenization of the gene pool. The Amazonian, Central Brazilian plateau and Chaco plains Amerindians show “higher rates of genetic drift and lower levels of gene flow, with a resulting trend toward genetic differentiation.”36 These genetic differences are also evident in the linguistic data as well, though there is considerable debate on how to date the evolution of distinct languages and how they correlate with the genetic and archeological data.37 While scattered early sites of human occupation in South America date to the Pleistocene era (at least 14,000 BPE), extensive settlement by humans over most of the continent is evident by the post-ice Holocene period. By 11,000 BPE, hunters and gatherer groups could be found in the Colombian highlands, most of the Pacific coast,38 and along the Atlantic region in Eastern Brazilian highlands and southern Patagonia plains.39 Population in the Amazonian basin was still sparse.40 More permanent settlements could be found near rich food sources, such as coasts, rivers, estuaries and highland basins. There is also some evidence of moderate big game hunting, though the South American continent had far fewer such large mammals left than North America, with horses 36

37

38

39

40

Eduardo Tarazona-Santos, “Genetic differentiation in South Amerindians is related to environmental and cultural diversity: evidence from the Y Chromosome,” American. Journal of Human Genetics, 68 (2001), 1485. On this problem see the latest work of Johanna Nichols, “Language spread rates and prehistoric American migration rates,” Current Anthropology, 49(6) (2008): 1109–1117. For a survey of early southern coastal Pacific fishing sites see Philippe Béarez, Donald Jackson and Noémy Mollaret, “Early Archaic Fishing (12,600–9,200 cal yr BP) in the Semiarid north coast of Chile,” Journal of Island & Coastal Archaeology, 10(1) (2015), 133–148. For the recent finding of a human skeleton dated from 11,2000 BPE in the same area, see César Méndez and Eugenio Aspillaga, “Human remains directly dated to the Pleistocene- Holocene transition support a marine diet for early settlers of the Pacific coast of Chile,” Journal of Island & Coastal Archaeology, 7(3) (2012), 363–377. The earliest well studied site is the Cave of Pedra Pintada on the floodplains (várzea) of the Amazon basin near the city of Monte Alegre on the coast which dates from 11,700 to 9,800 BPE. See Anna C. Roosevelt et al., “Paleoindian cave dwellers in the Amazon: the peopling of the Americas,” Science, 272.5260 (1996): 373–384. The site is famous for its rock paintings and the Pleistocene remains show that these foragers hunted turtles, fish and small game and collected fruits and seeds. One such early pre-ceramic Amazonian forest site is found on the Colombian-Brazilian border at Peña Roja and is dated from 9,000 to 8,000 BPE. See José R. Oliver, “The archaeology of forest foraging and agricultural production in Amazonia,” in Colin McEwan, Cristina Barreto and Eduardo Neves, eds., Unknown Amazon: Culture in Nature in Ancient Brazil (London: British Museum Press, 2001): 57–58.

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and elephants having disappeared in earlier periods.41 All of these very large animals called megamamals (weighing over 1 metric ton) and most of the large animals (weighing over forty-four kilograms) did not long survive the era of human settlement in South America. The megamamals were totally extinct by 6,000 BPE and 80 percent of the large animals had disappeared including horses, camels and the elephant-like Gomphotheres.42 It has been estimated that all the megamammals (some seventy species found in South America) were open range animals and they suffered from both the loss of habitable areas due to changing climate conditions, and possibly some moderate human hunting which finally pushed them into extinction. The only survivors after 6,000 BC were some fourteen moderate-weight mammals that made their home in water, jungles or isolated mountain areas.43 Whatever big game hunting may have existed, and the only record of this is for Patagonia, it was undoubtedly far less important in South American than in North America. Small animals, fish, crustaceans, tubers and nuts were the basic food stock of early humans, and by 10,000 BPE agriculture and plant domestication had already begun in a few places in the Central Andes and possibly in the Brazilian Eastern lowlands.44 Along the Pacific coast and the Andean highlands now occurred the most systematic food gathering, collection and herding cultures. Numerous Pacific coastal middens (or waste mounds) have now been excavated and it is clear that early humans were systematically fishing along the coast and exploiting edible mollusks.45 It is estimated that these coastal 41

42

43

44

45

Horses were present in northern Uruguay from 50,000 to 30,000 BPE. Elizabeth Morosi and Martin Ubilla, “Feeding and environmental studies on late Pleistocene horses in mid-latitudes of South America (northern Uruguay),” Quaternary Science Reviews, 225 (2019): 106025. For gomphotheres in Chile see Michael Buckley, Omar P. Recabarren, Craig Lawless, Nuria García and Mario Pino, “A molecular phylogeny of the extinct South American gomphothere through collagen sequence analysis,” Quaternary Science Reviews, 224 (2019): 105882. Alberto L. Cione, Eduardo P. Tonni and Leopoldo Soibelzon, “Did Humans cause the late Pleistocene–early Holocene mammalian extinctions in South America in a context of shrinking open areas?” in Gary Haynes, ed., American Megafaunal Extinctions At The End of the Pleistocene (New York: Springer, 2009): 139. Far less convinced of any serious human hunting of the megamammals except possibly in Patagonia is the study by Luís Alberto Borrero, “The elusive evidence: the archeological record of the South American extinct megafauna,” in Haynes, American Megafaunal Extinctions: 145–168. Tom D. Dillehay, “Profiles in Pleistocene history,” in Helaine Silverman and William H. Isbell, eds., The Handbook of South American Archaeology (New York: Springer, 2008): 33. Daniel H. Sandweiss, “Early fishing societies”: 150.

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Brazil: An Economic and Social History

peoples then moved up into the Andean highlands around 10,000 BPE just after the disappearance of ice from the northern and southern altiplano or high plateau.46 In turn, these high altitude foragers apparently domesticated the llamas and alpacas by 6,000 BPE.47 On the Pacific coast, local populations had domesticated several plants by 10,000 BPE and by 6,000 BPE farming was replacing the hunting, fishing and gathering economy.48 At the same time complex stratified societies also began to emerge in these Andean highlands and coastal valleys, exemplified by major irrigation works and permanent settlements.49 By 5,000 to 4,500 BPE the first sedentary and complex societies developed along the Peruvian coast as defined by the construction of large state built monuments. A thousand years later, these monumental archeological sites could be found in the Andean highlands. By 2,900 BPE the Andean area shows the first multi-region art designs with Chavín cultural forms appearing throughout the highlands and coastal valleys. All this has suggested the emergence of either pan Andean religious centers or political empires. But whatever these early multi-village state formations may have been, it is clear that imperial states which systematically engaged in warfare were emerging in western South America. The Moche civilization which began on the northern Peruvian coast came into existence by 1,700 BPE and is now considered one of the earliest of such empires and the earliest highland states were Tiawanaku and Wari both located near Lake Titicaca which emerged by the second half of the first century in the Christian era.50 From that time until the Spanish conquest, the coast and highlands of Peru were dominated by densely populated ever expanding states with complex class structures and professional armies. Most of these larger states would eventually be incorporated into the Inca empire which dominated most of the western South American highlands and coast by the fifteenth century AD. This socio-economic and political evolution in the west was different from the historical evolution in eastern South America. At virtually the same time as the Pacific coast was being first occupied by humans, early 46 47 48

49 50

Mark S. Aldenderfer, “High elevation foraging societies”: 135. Peter W. Stahl, “Animal Domestication in South America:” 128. Steven L. Goodbred Jr, Tom D. Dillehay, César Galvéz Mora and André O. Sawakuchi. “Transformation of maritime desert to an agricultural center: Holocene environmental change and landscape engineering in Chicama River valley, northern Peru coast,” Quaternary Science Reviews, 227 (2020): 106046, 1–13. D. H. Sandweiss and J. B. Richardson III, “Central Andean Environments”: 95. Charles Stanish, “The origin of state societies in South America,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 30 (2001): 41–64.

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35

foragers were settling various parts of the enormous Amazonian basin, the largest such river basin in the world. From possibly 13,000 BPE, small bands of semi-nomadic humans living as hunters and gatherers slowly began to occupy this region from the Mojos llanos (flood plains of eastern Bolivia) to the Amazonian estuary. They also settled in what are today the Amazonian parts of Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela in the west and north eastern interior regions, and from the Guianas to the southeastern pampas and Patagonian plains along the Atlantic coast. It is now evident that the forests, rivers and flood plains of the Amazon were important areas of early human settlement equal in time to the Pacific coastal developments.51 The first eastern South American settlers were drawn to the rivers and coast because of the abundant supply of food. But they also used rock shelters whenever they were available on the coast or in the interior.52 All along the coast were established communities of fisherman and shellfish gathers who have left major coastal, riverine and underwater shellfish mounds or middens (called sambaqui in Portuguese) which show long -term settlement. Along the 8,000 kilometers of Brazilian coastline, close to a thousand such shellfish mounds have been registered.53 Another fifty smaller shellfish mounds have been found along the interior rivers. Both share a similar culture and time period. Given the remains of ocean fish bones in some of these interior riverine sambaqui, it is assumed that they were settled by coastal populations.54 The large coastal mounds from the Center-South coast of Brazil, as well as several in the Northeastern coast of Pará and Maranhão, have been well studied to date. The community 51

52

53 54

Michael Heckenberger and Eduardo Góes Neves, “Amazonian Archaeology,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 38 (2009): 253. There are serious claims for extremely earlier human settlements in Amazonia based on analysis of the rock paintings and other artifacts studied by Brazilian and international scholars mostly at sites in Piauí. At the moment, these extreme findings of 30,000 years or more have not been accepted by other archeologists (see footnote 33). See Niéde Guidon, “As ocupações pré-históricas do Brasil (excetuando a Amazônia),” in Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, ed., História dos índios no Brasil (São Paulo: Cia das Letras, 1992): 37–52, and for one of the more recent of such datings see G. M. Santosa et al., “A revised chronology of the lowest occupation layer of Pedra Furada Rock Shelter, Piau, Brazil: the Pleistocene peopling of the Americas,” Quaternary Science Reviews, 22 (2003) 2303–2310. Over a hundred of these rock shelters have been studied. See Renato Kipnis, “Early hunter-gatherers in the Americas: perspectives from Central Brazil,” Antiquity, 72(277) (1998): 584–585. Maria Dulce Gaspar, “Considerations of the ‘sambaquis’ of the Brazilian coast,” Antiquity, 72(277) (1998): 592. S. Eggers et al., “How does a riverine setting affect the lifestyle of shellmound builders in Brazil?” HOMO – Journal of Comparative Human Biology, 59 (2008): 405–427.

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of fisherman, gatherers and hunters at São Luís Maranhão, for example, was established around 6,000 BPE and was still in existence until 900 BPE.55 Studies of hundreds of such sambaquis have shown that most came into existence by around 5,000 BPE and were occupied until 2,000 BP.56 Not only were these local refuse mounds created by shells, broken pottery, animal and fish bones, charcoal and other refuse, they contain human burials, hearths and even habitation structures and were always strategically located near rich sources of fish and mollusks.57 Extensive excavations of skeletal remains in a lakeside sambaqui in southern Brazil found a relatively healthy population with excellent food resources and low levels of political violence.58 None of these mound communities had walls and the surviving human bones show a lack of warfare wounds.59 Given their common features, it was assumed that the sambaqui communities shared a common culture and had considerable interaction among other coastal peoples, while having little interaction with inland hunters and gatherers or ceramic producing peoples until 2,000 BPE.60 While generally small, some of the Brazilian Sambaquis, especially those in the far south in Santa Catarina, are quite impressive structures often 30 meters in height and 500 meters in length suggesting that some of them were not just refuse dumps but well-constructed settlements.61 55

56

57 58

59

60 61

Arkley Marques Bandeira, “Pesquisa arqueológica no sambaqui do bacanga, São Luís, Maranhão: reflexões sobre a ocorrência de cerâmica em sambaquis do litoral equatorial amazônico,” Amazônica-Revista de Antropologia, 1(2) (2009): 486. Central south coast shell fish mounds also date from this period, see the latest results in T. A. Lima, K. D. Macario, R. M. Anjos, P. R. S. Gomes, M. M. Coimbra, and D. Elmore, “The earliest shellmounds of the central-south Brazilian coast,” Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research Section B: Beam Interactions with Materials and Atoms, 223 (2004): 692. The overall dating for the Sambaqui culture is that given by Gaspar et al., “Sambaquis (shell mound) societies”: 324. The best description of these shell fish mounds is found in Gaspar, “Considerations of the ‘sambaquis’”: 592–593. This is based on a study of the health status of eighty-nine individuals buried in the shellmound in Lagoa Camacho in Santa Catarina. See M. M. M. Okumura and S. Eggers, “The people of Jabuticabeira II: reconstruction of the way of life in a Brazilian shellmound,” HOMO, Journal of Comparative Human Biology, 55 (2005): 263–281. This pattern of little local violence as seen in the skeletal remains is also found in other sites in the region, see Paulo DeBlasis et al., “Sambaquis e paisagem dinâmica natural e arqueologia regional no litoral do sul do Brasil,” Arqueologia Sul-Americana, 3(1) (2007): 29–61; and Eggers et al., “Riverine setting?” HOMO – Journal of Comparative Human Biology, 59 (2008) 405–427. Gaspar et al., “Sambaqui (Shell Mound)”: 323. An extensive review of numerous such shellfish mounds along the coast from Rio Janeiro to the southern end of Santa Catarina, showed that many were quite large size mounds of impressive width and height. See R. Scheel-Ybert, et al., “Novas perspectivas na

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37

The Brazilian Central Plateau, through which runs the São Francisco River, and consists of the Cerrado and Caating biomasses, appears to have been settled by humans in the late Pleistocene period in successive stages from 13,000 to 7,000 BPE. Sites in Piauí and Northern Minas Gerais show settlement from around 13,000 to 11,000 BPE and are found primarily in rock shelters. The paleoindians seem to be small game and plant consumers using the same lithic instruments of scrapers and projectile points. In the next phase from 11,000 to 9,000 BPE, there were far more archeological sites found, many along other river systems (Tocatins and Upper Paraná). Moreover there now appear both openair sites as well as the rock shelters and these show more continuous occupation, which suggests more sedentary populations. In this period also, many more botanical remains were found suggesting a much higher dependence on plant collecting and the first rock paintings appear.62 One of the better sites in this period is Lagoa Santa in Minas Gerais, close to the capital city, which was occupied by hunters and foragers who relied heavily on medium- and small-sized animals as well as fruit bearing trees and small coconuts along with seeds and tubers.63 In fact, given the level of cavities in the local skeletons (dated from the early Holocene), it is assumed they consumed more seeds, vegetables and fruits than typical hunters and gatherers, and thus probably were more sedentary than the typical hunter and gatherer groups.64 In this period, the paleoindians were already carrying out elaborate secondary burials after processing the bones in a first burial.65 A third phase occurs from 9,000–7,000 BPE defined by more regional variations in artifacts and more intense settlements in places like Lagoa Santa. In this period, there are abundant rock

62

63

64

65

reconstituição do modo de vida dos sambaquieiros: uma abordagem multidisciplinar,” Revista Arqueologia, 16 (2003): 114; and Gustavo Wagner et al., “Sambaquis (shell mounds) of the Brazilian coast,” Quaternary International 239 (2011): 53. This dating comes from Lucas Bueno and Andrei Isnardis, “Peopling the Central Brazilian Plateau at the onset of the Holocene: building territorial histories,” Quaternary International, 473 (2018): 144–160. Astolfo G. M. Araujo, Walter A. Neves and Renato Kipnis, “Lagoa Santa revisited: an overview of the chronology, subsistence, and material culture of Paleoindian sites in Eastern Central Brazil,” Latin American Antiquity, 23(4) (2012): 533–550. Pedro José Tótora da Glória, “Health and lifestyle in the Paleoamericans: early Holocene biocultural adaptation at Lagoa Santa, central Brazil,” PhD theis, Ohio State University, Columbus, 2012). André Strauss, Rodrigo Elias Oliveira, Ximena S. Villagran, Danilo V. Bernardo, Domingo C. Salazar-García, Marcos César Bissaro, Francisco Pugliese et al., “Early Holocene ritual complexity in South America: the archaeological record of Lapa do Santo (east-central Brazil),” Antiquity, 90(354) (2016): 1454–1473.

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paintings throughout Brazil. The final phase begins 7,000 BPE with better defined art styles,66 as well as more variation in lithic industries, and more cultural diversity.67 The caves in the Monte Alegre in present-day Pará near the city of Santarém, reveal ceramics dated from 6,000 BPE, among the earliest known ceramics in the Americas.68 In the Amazonian lowlands between 4,500 and 3,500 BPE, pottery became plentiful and by 4,700 BPE maize and manioc were being grown in this region and slash and burn agriculture was already widespread.69 It is also assumed that the basic language organization of these Amazonian, Central Plains and Pantanal groups were also defined in this period and that by 4,000 to 3,000 BPE Tupi-Guarani, Carib, Arawak and Jê, had become four separate major language families spoken in the region. These languages had begun to spread throughout the area around 3,000 BPE and were to be the main languages encountered by the Europeans thousands of years later.70 Early nomadic humans also settled along the rivers in the Amazon basin. These small communities of forests hunters and gathers also were major fishermen of the rivers as well as seed gatherers and even harvesters of domesticated and non-domesticated plants. It was these groups which slowly created the “black earth” soils scattered throughout the Amazonian forests.71 These were soils unusually rich in nutrients due to the existence of basic refuse heaps generated by these semi-sedentary groups in otherwise poor soil regions, and they represented accumulations of agricultural waste which fertilized the soils and created unique “islands” throughout the rainforest region. Other early groups of small mobile bands occupied the Pantanal region in this early period living both in caves and in the open plains.72 66

67 68 69 70 71 72

See for example, Christopher S. Davis, Anna C. Roosevelt, William Barnett, and J. P. Brown, “Paleoindian solar and stellar pictographic trail in the Monte Alegre hills of Brazil: implications for pioneering new landscapes,” Journal of Anthropology and Archaeology, 5(2) (2017): 1–15; and Carolina Guedes, Eric Robert and Caroline Bachelet, “New rock-art data from the state of Mato Grosso, Brazil: a graphical analysis of rock-art shelters between the Vermelho and Gavião rivers,” Quaternary International, 510 (2019): 133–147. Bueno and Isnardis, “Peopling central Brazilian plateau”: 152–157. Roosevelt et al., “Paleoindian cave dwellers”: 373. Oliver, “Archaeology of agriculture in Ancient Amazonia”: 206, 209. Greg Urban, “A história da cultura brasileira segundo as línguas nativas,” História dos índios no Brasil, 2nd edn (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1992): 90. A survey of this theme is provided in William I. Woods et al., Amazonian Dark Earths:Wim Sombroek’s Vision (New York: Springer, 2009). Jorge Eremites de Oliveira and Sibeli Aparecida Viana, “O centro-oeste antes de Cabral,” Revista USP, 44 (1999–2000): 157.

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Two thousand years after these small mobile bands of forgers entered this western floodplain region, the largest inundated plains in the world, there emerged a new sedentary civilization in most of this region. Communities of permanent agriculturalists who were sophisticated constructors of earthen mounds and causeways now became the norm beginning around 2,500 BP with many communities lasting for a century or more. In these open savanna floodlands of the eastern Amazonian basin – which extended to the Andean foothills – farming groups constructed small local raised platforms as well as multi-kilometer long raised causeways and canals. These impressive, raised fields and causeways kept their crops and communities dry in the wet season but also provided a far richer soil in their raised agricultural fields than was normally available in these regions. These settled village agriculturalists also established islands of small forests in the savannas. There are probably well over a thousand such earthwork constructions in western Amazonia and the Bolivian Madeira river basin region known as the llanos of Moxos. In Acre alone there are 281 such constructions dating from 2,000 BPE. This complex agriculture and aquatic culture would slowly decline after a century, but some communities survived into the early Portuguese colonial period. These extensive and complex earthen works included raised agricultural fields, canals, highways and causeways, along with circular village constructions. Construction differed from region to region, but the ceramics seem to have been fairly uniform across the region. Many constructions involved canals and hydraulic works regulating water flows, as well as raised fields. The existence of walled villages indicated that by this time warfare had become a major aspect Amazonian life.73 73

Denise Schaan et al., “New radiometric dates for pre-Columbian (2000–700 B.P.) earthworks in western Amazonia, Brazil,” Journal of Field Archaeology, 37(2) (2012): 132–142; Sanna Saunaluoma and Denise Schaan, “Monumentality in Western Amazonian formative societies: geometric ditched enclosures in the Brazilian state of Acre,” Antiqua, 2(1) (2012): 1; Góes Neves, “Ecology, ceramic chronology and distribution”: 359–380; Martti Parssinen, Denise Schaan and Alceu Ranzi, “Pre-Columbian geometric earthworks in the upper Purus: a complex society in western Amazonia,” Antiquity, 83 (2009): 1084–1095. On the distinctive local ring villages of Central Brazil which date from 800 AD see Irmhild Wüst, “Continuities and discontinuities: archaeology and ethnoarchaeology in the heart of the Eastern Bororo territory, Mato Grosso, Brazil,” Antiquity, 72(277) (1998): 663–675 and Irmhild Wüst and Cristiana Barreto, “The ring villages of central Brazil: a challenge for Amazonian archaeology,” Latin American Antiquity, 10(1) (1999): 3–23. For the massive earthen constructions on the Bolivian border with Brazil see the survey article by Walker, “The Llanos de Mojos”: 927–940.

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What is most interesting about these sedentary communities is that they clearly manipulated their environments and thus scholars have come to challenge the idea that the tropical rain forest prior to 1,500 was a pristine one untouched by man. Just the opposite has now become a  major theme among archeologists, geographers and ecologists, who see a large share of the Amazonian forest, especially of the southern and western fringe, being significantly changed by fairly dense pre-Columbian populations.74 At the same time, the sophisticated raised field systems in western Brazil can also be found in the western fringes of the Amazon basin bordering Colombia, Ecuador and Peru to the west and in the Guianas and Venezuela to the north.75 Along with ceramics, these earth builders grew manioc and maize and harvested many domesticated and non-domesticated seeds, along with a significant diet of fish. The increasing structural sophistication, growing population density and the multi-village organizations permitted both the creation of full time specialists in various crafts and multi-community political entities which have been called chiefdoms.76 But in sharp contrast to the Andean developments in this same period of the first century AD, these chiefdoms did not further develop into highly stratified states and empires as they did in the Pacific coastal valleys and Andean highlands. Why this is the case, it is most likely due to a combination of limited resources, relatively low population densities and 74

75

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Michael J. Heckenberger et al., “Amazonia 1492: pristine forest or cultural parkland?” Science 301 (2003): 1710–1714; and the study by William Balée, Cultural Forests of the Amazon, A Historical Ecology of People and Their Landscapes (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013). It is suggested that there was a gradient of impact by humans, from intense ecological changes along rivers and floodplains and in well-defined regions of settlement and less of an impact in dense tropical forest sfar from river resources. See Jos Barlow et al., “How pristine are tropical forests? An ecological perspective on the pre-Columbian human footprint in Amazonia and implications for contemporary conservation,” Biological Conservation, 151 (2012): 45–49. See for example, Charles S. Spencer and Elsa M. Redmond, “Prehispanic causeways and regional politics in the llanos of Barinas, Venezuela,” Latin American Antiquity, 9(2) (June, 1998): 95–110. For the Guianas see the overview by S. Rostain, “The  archaeology of the Guianas”: 279–302; and the detailed studies by Doyle McKey et al., “Pre-Columbian agricultural landscapes, ecosystem engineers, and self-organized patchiness in Amazonia,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107(17) (2010): 7823–7828; and on the Guianas. The agricultural potential of these fields is discussed in José Iriarte et al., “Late Holocene Neotropical agricultural landscapes: phytolith and stable carbon isotope analysis of raised fields from French Guianan coastal savannahs,” Journal of Archaeological Science, 37(12) (2010): 2984–2994. See Anna Curtenius Roosevelt, “The rise and fall of the Amazon Chiefdoms,” L’Homme, 33(126/128) (1993): 255–283.

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changing climatic conditions. Although more complex stratified societies did not evolve in this period of major earthworks construction, these communities developed sophisticated farming and gathering practices. Aside from their earth constructions in the flood plains of the western Amazonian basin, in the Amazonian tropical forest itself they created new ecological black earth zones on which they created settled villages. It also suggests that there was a complex ecological interaction between humans and their environment which created new ecosystems in the Amazonian region.77 Over several centuries these interior forest and plains dwellers created ever more developed societies. In the Upper Xingu valley (in Mato Grosso) which is at the southern end of the Amazonian tropic forest area, permanently settled “plaza” villages of several thousand inhabitants surrounded by earthen walls appeared. With numerous households radiating from a central plaza, these sedentary communities of agriculturalists, hunters and fishermen began to appear in the late pre-historical period. Often located in open plains (várzeas) on the edge of the tropical forest with good access to rivers, these villages based their economy primarily on fishing and manioc farming. The extensive farming plots were outside the town walls and their importance to the local economy is seen in the fact that some 85 percent of the diet of these village dwellers was made up of cultivated plants. These plaza towns are from 20 to 50 hectares in size and with their accompanying external garden plots and road networks can encompass a territory of some 250 square kilometers. In turn, many of the larger plaza towns are connected to each other by road networks.78 It would appear that these more advanced civilizations in the central and western regions of Brazil seemed to peak at 1000 AD and then slowly declined so that most of them had disappeared by 1500 AD. Thus neither the sambaqui communities, which had disappeared earlier, nor the later mound-builder cultures, created the powerful states typical of the coastal Pacific and Andes regions. Nevertheless, both village 77

78

Sanna Saunaluoma, “Pre-Columbian earthwork sites in the frontier region between Brazil and Bolivia, southwestern Amazon,” PhD thesis, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, 2013: 11; and L. Rebellato, W. I. Woods and E. G. Neves “Pre-Columbian settlement dynamics”: 15–31. Michael J. Heckenberger, “Manioc agriculture and sedentism in Amazonia: the Upper Xingu example,” Antiquity, 72(277) (1998): 633–648; and Michael J. Heckenberger et al., “Pre-Columbian urbanism, anthropogenic landscapes, and the future of the Amazon,” Science, 321 (2008): 1214–1217.

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agriculturalists and semi-nomadic hunters and gatherers could be found throughout Brazil at the time of the arrival of the Europeans in the early sixteenth century. The coast, the floodplains and the rivers of the region were then the most densely populated areas. The latest estimate to date of the population of Amerindians for the Greater Amazonian area – which includes most of present-day Brazil – suggests a total of some 5 to 6 million persons in 1500,79 out of a total estimated Amerindian population of 54 million persons.80 This compares to an estimated 2 million Native Americans residing in the far less densely populated regions of North America.81 Central Mexico and Andean Peru were of course far more densely populated than either open plains and forested lowland regions, with the former having some 14 million persons and another 12 million in the Central Andes.82 Although several of these population centers had disappeared by the time that the European arrived, other settlement patterns had emerged. Nomadism had been replaced by palisaded villages all along the coast, with agriculture now as important as hunting in the local diet. Multi-village chiefdoms were now to be found in many areas, and warfare was a constant in the life of these peoples. The Tupi language speakers were the first indigenous peoples to be encountered by the Portuguese. They inhabited the coast from the Amazon basin down to the south-central coast. These groups had only recently migrated to the coast and had come from Andean foothills of Bolivia, passing through Paraguay and then slowly moving up the coast. The coastal Tupi and Jê speakers were sedentary agriculturalists organized into large villages and often in chiefdoms of multiple villages with significant regional trade. These settlements had a dense population. But the largest language group within the Macro-Tupi language family, was the Tupi-Guarani

79

80

81 82

William M. Denevan, “The aboriginal population of Amazonia,” in William M Denevan, ed., The Native Population of the Americas in 1492, 2nd edn (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1992), table 7.3 and postcript, 218–219. The best review of these very widely differing numbers is found in William Denevan, “Native American populations in 1492: recent research and a revised hemispheric estimate”: table 1, xxviii. Most recently Massimo Livi Bacci has proposed a figure of 30 million Native Americans in 1500, but with little serious effort to support this new low estimate. Massimo Livi Bacci, Conquest: The Destruction of the American Indios (Cambridge: Polity, 2008): 5–6. Douglas H. Ubelaker, “North American Indian population size, AD 1500 to 1985,” American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 77 (1988): table 1, 291. All these estimates come from Denevan, “Native American populations in 1492”: table 1, xxviii.

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who occupied an extensive territory in the far southwestern regions of Brazil spreading well into the southern pampas. They practiced swidden or rotational agriculture by clearing an area, usually through burning, growing crops for a few years before allowing reforestation to occur with corn being the primary crop. This involved periodically moving their multifamily villages throughout a large region of the tropical and subtropical forests along the major rivers of the Parana-Paraguay system. In the Eastern and Central Brazilian plateau, the dominant language groups were Jê speakers who were small bands of hunters and foragers living nomadically and engaged in significant amounts of warfare. In the Amazon basin the dominant language groups were Carib speakers along with some Tupi groups. Here too there were densely population agricultural communities with chiefdoms which engaged in both trade and warfare with other stratified societies. Finally the Arawak language groups were scattered along all the Northern Coast of South America above the Amazonian estuary and were to be found in the larger West Indian islands along with Arawak speaking groups, having migrated in the late pre-colonial period (see Map 2.1).83 It was thus a complex and densely populated region that the Portuguese discovered when Cabral landed in Bahia in 1500. It was a densely population coastal region with numerous important villages and complex cultures, though nothing like the high stratified societies of the Pacific Andean region. Initially the early contacts would prove peaceful, but once the Portuguese decided on direct settlement, wars, migrations, village destruction and slavery became the life of the post-contact Indian population which would eventually be forced ever westward.

The Portuguese Approximately 4 to 5 million Brazilian Native Americans would be conquered by just 50,000 or so Portuguese who crossed the Atlantic in the two centuries after Cabral. Despite this extraordinary conquest and the incredible expansion of Portugal throughout the world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Portugal with its 1 million residents, was a small country by contemporary European standards. In 1500, Spain 83

Urban, “A história da cultura brasileira segundo as línguas nativas”: 90–97; Robin M. Wright, and Manuela Carneiro de Cunha, “Destruction, resistance, and transformation – southern, coastal, and northern Brazil (1580–1890),” in Frank Salomon and Stuart B. Schwartz, eds. The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas: South America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 287–381.

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

44

São Luis Island TUPI

NAM BÁ

TREM

EMB

É

POT

IGU AR

I

RIR

A TOBAJAR

Olinda (1537)

KA

RI RI

CA E

TÉ

KA

Á MB

INA

TUP

RÉ

MO

AI

Salvador (1549) Ilheus (1536)

TEMEMINO

Espírito Santo (1551)

WAITAKÁ AMBÁ IN B GUAIANÁ TU São Paulo (1554) Rio de Janeiro (1565)

N

KI

N PI

TU NI RA

A GU

São Vicente (1532)

A Oc tlan ea tic n

TU

PIN

KIN

Porto Seguro (1535)

Santa Catarina Island

Map 2.1  Coastal Brazil, c. 1560. Source: Based on John M. Monteiro (1999: 973–1023, Mapa 13.1, 976)

had 7 million inhabitants, France 14 million and even England had 3 million persons. Although Lisbon had an estimated 65,000 to 70,000 persons in 1500 and was the seventh largest urban center in Europe, it was nevertheless only a third the size of Paris. Only two other Portuguese

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towns had over 10,000 persons: 13,500 lived in Porto and 12,600 in Évora. Even adding to these urban centers any communities containing over a thousand persons meant that only 13 percent of the Portuguese lived in towns according to the first household count made in Portugal in 1527–1531.84 Portugal of course, had an especially innovative group of international merchants, a dynamic monarchy less dependent on the nobility than most European states and an extensive merchant fleet with Atlantic experience. In fact, it was probably the most advanced such maritime society in Europe at that time and was able to generate a surprising amount of capital for sustained imperial expansion. But for all this dynamism, Portugal itself was a rather traditional rural society. It was also an illiterate society with high rates of mortality and relatively low rates of fertility.85 The Portuguese in the sixteenth century married late and most experienced little geographic mobility in their lifetimes. The crude birth rate was estimated to be in the relatively low 30s per thousand resident population,86 and since this rate only modestly exceeded the death rate for most of the century, the population grew at a modest 0.23 percent per annum between 1500 and 1580, and was just 0.38 percent per annum for the two centuries between 1500 and 1700.87 This low rate of fertility, compared to what would later occur in Brazil, was due to tight control over non-marital fertility. Births to unwed mothers were between 2 and 5 percent of all births registered, and even premarital conceptions were only on the order of 10 percent of all births.88 Age of first marriage thus had a major impact on fertility. Women first married at around twenty-six to twenty-seven years of age which reduced significantly their potential number of children, while men contracted their first marriage at between twenty-six to twenty-eight 84 85

86

87

88

Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, A estrutura na antiga sociedade Portuguesa (Lisbon: Editora Arcadia, 1971): 12–13, 26. Even as late as the 1750s only 14 percent of the population lived in towns with a population of 5,000 or over. João Pedro Ferro, A população portuguesa no final do antigo regime (1750–1815) (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1995): 45. As late as the census of 1878 some 80 percent of the population aged six and older was illiterate. Massimo Livi Bacci, A Century of Portuguese Fertility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971): 24. This is the rough estimate given in Teresa Ferreira Rodrigues, História da população portugesa, das longas permanências á conquista da modernidade (Porto: CEPESE and Edições Afrontamento, 2008): 197 n. As late as 1801, it has been estimated that the crude birth rate was only 33 births per 1,000 of the resident population. Bacci, A century of Portuguese fertility: table 2, 19. These rates are calculated from data provided in Teresa F. Rodrigues, “A população portuguesa. Das longas permanências à conquista da modernidade,” População e Sociedade [Porto], 18 (2010): 24. Rodrigues, História da população portuguesa: 199, 202.

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years of age. The variations in age spread among spouses depended on rural and urban residence, northern or southern location on the mainland and on class. The richer men tended to marry younger wives, while among poorer couples there was greater equality of age.89 It was estimated that the peak of fertility for women was twenty-five to twenty-nine years of age, a disadvantage to those who married late. Moreover poor health conditions meant that some 20 percent of married couples had no children and another 20 percent had only one who survived into adulthood.90 The existence of dowries and complex land tenures and inheritance meant that marriage tended to be delayed until the couple had economic independence, which explains the rather late age of marriage. Given these consideration it is no surprise there were was also a relatively high percentage of celibate women.91 Some 80 percent of the married couples came from the same parish, and in one sixteenth-century parish two-thirds of married couples completed less than 15 years of marriage before the death of one spouse.92 This mortality pattern and the low rates of remarriage for women, explains why a fifth of all households was headed by a widow.93 The basic nuclear family seems to have been the 89

90 91

92 93

Rodrigues gives a range for women of between 23 and 26 years for first marriage, Rodrigues, História da população portugesa: 208–209. But detailed parish studies of the period suggest a constant 26–27 years of age model. In a Portuguese parish involving 247 marriages from 1581 to 1779 the mean age of marriage for women was 27.5 years. Cândido Martim López Juncal, “Vidas através das gerações: comportamentos demográficos de uma comunidade rural do Baixo Minho: Santiago de Antas 1581–1910,” Master’s thesis, Universidade de Minho, Guimarães, 2004: 77. Another parish found that of 227 women marrying between 1670–1719, the average age at first marriage was 26. Maria da Conceição Reis, “São Pedro da Ericeira de 1622 a 1855,” Master’s thesis, Universidade do Minho, Guimarães, 2005: table 3, 6. For 318 marriages contracted between 1638–1749 the median age of first marriage for women was 27 in an Alto Minho parish. See Carlota Maria Fernandes dos Santos, Santiago de Romarigães, comunidade rural do Alto Minho: sociedade e demografia, 1640–1872 (Porto and Guimarães: Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade do Minho, 1999): tables xvii and xviii, 122,126. Finally a survey of over a thousand marriages in one Portuguese Parish from 1770–1880 showed that women even at this late date contracted their first marriage on average at 26.3 years of age. See Maria Norberta Amorim, Ribeiras do pico (finais do século XVII a finais do século XX): microanálise da evolução demográfica (Gumarães: Cuadernos NEPS, Univerisdade do Minho, 2001): table II, 13. Rodrigues, História da população portuguesa: 197. While no data exists for the sixteenth century, it was reported in the first Portuguese census of 1864 that an extraordinary 22 percent of women aged 50–54 were single. Livi Bacci, A Century of Portuguese fertility, table 13, 49. Rodrigues, História da população portuguesa: 207, 209. Rodrigues, História da população portuguesa: 215. An analysis of a Portuguese parish in 1646–1649 shows that only 17 percent of the widowers remarried and just 8 percent of the widows. Maria Aurora Botão Pereira do Rego, “De Santa Marinha de

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norm for the majority of the population. Thus 40 percent to 50 percent of all households contained only two adults or parents with children, and another 30 percent consisted of a basic nuclear family with either relatives, servants or apprentices living in the household. Thus only a third or so had either multiple families in one household or were single-person households.94 There is some debate among historians about household size, a major issue given that all the Portuguese censuses from this period were household (fogos) counts rather than population counts, with most studies of the sixteenth century suggesting a size of between 4 and 4.5 persons per households. Estimates from the eighteenth century suggest a multiplier of four persons per household, and an estimate for the early nineteenth century suggesting a norm of only 3.8 persons per household.95 It is difficult to establish a correct number, although four persons per household would seem to be a reasonable count. Life expectancy at birth was around twenty-five to thirty years of age, which suggests an infant mortality above 200 deaths per 1,000 live births. Together such a rate of infant and child mortality meant that around 40 percent of those born did not reach their fifth birthday.96 Maternal

94 95

96

Gontinhães a Vila Praia de Âncora (1624–1924): demografia, sociedade e família,” PhD thesis, Universidade do Minho, Guimarães, 2013: table 23, 91. Rodrigues, História da população portuguesa: 210. Rodrigues, História da população portuguesa: 200; Ferro, A população portugesa no final do antigo regime: table 1, note, 32 and Livi Bacci, A Century of Portuguese Fertility: table 2, 19. The only rough estimate of life expectancy for Portugal in this period is given in Rodrigues, História da população portuguesa: 164. But her suggested range of 28 to 35 seems too wide and the upper end too high. In Spain, life expectancy for both genders in 1863–1870 was estimated at 29.8 years, and in the census of 1900, life expectancy was given at 35 years for men and 34 years for women. See Fausto Dopico and David Reher, El declive de la mortalidad en España, 1860–1930 (Madrid: Asociación de Demografía Histórica, Monografías ADEH, 1998): table 2.2, 27 and table 2.5, 32. These figures are close to levels 5 and 6 of the South Model Life tables developed by Coale and Demeny which were based on Portuguese, Spanish and Italian data. If this was the norm in sixteenth century Portugal, it would mean – using South Level 5 – the life expectancy of women was 30.0 years and 29.3 years for men, with a female infant mortality rate of 228 deaths per thousand live births and male infant mortality 251 deaths per thousand live births. It would have meant that over 40 percent of those born had died by their fifth birthday. Ansley J. Coale, Paul Demeny and Barbara Vaughan Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations: Studies in Population, 2nd edn (New York: Academic Press, 1983): 386. One estimate puts infant mortality in a Portuguese parish at 160 deaths per thousand births in the late sixteenth century. See  Maria Herminia Vieira Barbosa, “Reconstituição de paróquias e aprofundamento dos estudos de mortalidade de infanto-juvenil da comunidade de Esporões (séculos XVV–XX),” Revista de Demografía Histórica, 16(1) (1998): table 1, 31.

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mortality was high which left more men than women of working age, though women who survived past their fertile years tended to outlive men in these older age groups. Mortality in the cities was higher than in the countryside due to communicable “crowd diseases” but there were also differences in mortality rates by class and social status. In the rural areas, there was a marked seasonality with the fall and winter months having the highest morality.97 Given Portugal’s intense international commerce, it is no surprise that the during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Portugal was smitten by plagues which struck every decade or so.98 Yet from this small and slow growing population, Portugal would colonize the Atlantic islands of the Azores, Madeira and Cape Verde, equip major fleets to take control of the south Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and place soldiers in garrisons from Africa to India.99 It also succeeded in establishing small merchant communities in Angola and Mozambique and by 1550 had 20,000 immigrants residing in Brazil. This American colony was expanding quickly, with 32,000 Portuguese in 1600 and it was home to 50,000 Portuguese and 120,000 Indian and African slaves by 1620. By this date it was the largest overseas colony of Portugal.100 Overall it is estimated that from the million resident in Portugal at least 3,500 migrated overseas annually for most of the sixteenth century, and that by the end of the century some 300,000 to 360,000 Portuguese had emigrated overseas, an impressive volume for so small a country. The rate of migration was thus 2.5 per thousand residents in the sixteenth century which rose to 3.5 per thousand residents in the early seventeenth century and would reach 4.5 emigrants per resident population by the twentieth century, making Portugal the second most intense emigrant country in Europe after Ireland.101 97

Rodrigues, História da população portuguesa: 221–223. Rodrigues, História da população portuguesa: 228–229. The Black Death struck in 1569 and caused major loss of life. New epidemics occurred in 1579–1580 and 1599. The later epidemic had followed war and earthquakes, thus having an even greater impact than usual. Maria Hermínia Vieira Barbosa, Crises de mortalidade em Portugal desde meados do século XVI até ao início do século XX (Guimarães: Núcleo de Estudos de População e Sociedade Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade do Minho, 2001): 11. 99 From 1505 to 1522 it built and maintained fortresses in Sofala in East Africa, Cochin and Goa on the east coast of India, Malacca on the Malaysian peninsular, Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and on the Moluccas islands in what is today Indonesia, and was then the major source of pepper and many other spices. See James Boyajian, Portuguese trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580–1640 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007): 3. 100 Rodrigues, História da população portuguesa: 241. 101 Rodrigues, História da população portuguesa: 239, 246; and for the twentieth century Livi Bacci, A Century of Portuguese Fertility: 35 and table 5, 33. Though Portugal in 98

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It also should be stressed that the emigration was somewhat compensated by the immigration of African slaves. Already by the last decade of the fifteenth century Portuguese royal and private traders were taking 2,500 slaves off the African coast, which rose to almost 4,000 African slaves by the 1510s.102 While many of these African went to Cape Verde and the other Atlantic islands, a large percentage of them arrived in Portugal, which became the largest slave using country in Europe in the sixteenth century. It is estimated that at least 1,000 to 1,500 African slaves entered the Lisbon market each year from 1515 to 1521,103 and at least 2,000 to 3,000 annually in most of the rest of the sixteenth century.104 By the 1550s, Portugal had some 32,000 African slaves and another estimated 2,500 free persons of color.105 As late as 1693, 9 percent of the households in Lisbon’s most populated parish had slaves.106 Why Portugal was the first of all the European powers to expand across the oceans has to do with its long history as a major fishing and shipbuilding country, its relative isolation from Mediterranean developments and its dynamic expansion under a more pro-merchant government. It was part of one of the richer regions of Europe, center of an international wool trade and a major center of a North Atlantic shipping and fishing industry. With the disruption of traditional Asian trade routes due to the rise of the Ottoman empire and subsequent changes in North Africa in general, the Portuguese kings saw Africa as a natural area for expansion. Basques were building ships on the Bay of Biscay from the twelfth century, and it was Galician shipbuilders who built the first royal naval vessels in Portugal in the thirteenth century. By the early

102 103 104 105 106

later centuries had higher rates, and individual European countries in given periods had higher rates, this rate of 3.5 per thousand was greater than the emigration rate for any decade for all European countries from 1801 to 1915, Chesnais, Jean-Claude. The Demographic Transition: Stages, Patterns, and Economic implications (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992): tables 6.7 and 6.8, 172–173. Ivana Elbl, “The volume of the Early Atlantic slave trade, 1450–1521,” Journal of African History, 38(1) (1997): 74. Antonio de Almeida Mendes, “Les réseaux de la traité ibérique dans l’Atlantique nord (1440–1640),” Annales, 63(4) (2008): 739–768. Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial, 2nd edn, 4 vols (Lisbon: Editorial Presença, 1984): IV, 168. A. C. de C. M. Saunders, A Social History of Black Slaves and Freedmen in Portugal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): 60. Delminda Rijo, Fátima Aragonez and Francisco Moreira, “A freguesia de Santa Justa na Transição para o século xviii,” História, Demografia e Sociedade. Presented at the first CITCEM Congress, November 2010: 106. Interestingly even as late as the early eighteenth century, 18 percent of the slaves were non-Africans. Delminda Rijo, “Os escravos na Lisboa Joanina,” CEM Cultura, Espaço e Memória, 3 (2012): 114.

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fourteenth century, three centers of advanced shipbuilding and naval technology existed in the Iberian Peninsula, in Gupúzcoa along the Bay of Biscay, at Cadiz and in the ports of Portugal. But except for a small movement of Castilian ships to the Canaries, it was only the Portuguese who engaged in systematic Atlantic merchant activity. Portuguese salt was fundamental for the North Atlantic fishing industry of Northern Europe. At the same time, Portuguese merchants participated in the Mediterranean and North African trades.107 Thus the Portuguese had both naval experience and trade knowledge and were perfectly aware of both Asian and African products arriving on the European market and their origin. Portugal, it has been stressed, did not produce enough grain for national consumption and this was apparently one of the key reasons they expanded into North Africa and the Atlantic islands. Clearly religious wars and Christian proselyting were a sub-theme, though the Portuguese were less violent on this score than the Castilians. It thus promoted expeditions not only to North Africa but also to the Southern Atlantic in search for new trade routes and also opened up new Atlantic islands to European exploitation. Most date the age of discovery to the Portuguese conquest of the Moroccan city of Ceuta in 1415. This was followed by the colonization of the Azores and Madera in the 1420s and 1430s and by the 1440s they were actively trading in the Senegambia region of West Africa for gold, ivory and slaves. Several more expeditions moved down the African coast in the following decades. By the 1470s, the Portuguese were trading in the Bight of Benin and had constructed a fort at Elmina in 1492. Finally, in 1488, Portuguese ships rounded the Cape of Good Hope. In 1497, Vasco de Gama left Portugal with three ships and reached India in less than a year, returning to Lisbon in 1499. The Crown now funded a major fleet of thirteen ships and 1,200 men under the direction of Pedro Álvares Cabral to undertake a new voyage to India which left in March 1500. It was this voyage that landed in Brazil on the way to India and thus incorporated the new colony into the growing Portuguese area of commercial activity. All of its colonies (the Atlantic islands, Ceuta, Angola and eventually Brazil) as well as the forty forts or trading posts they had built in the Pacific, from Sofala in Mozambique to Nagasaki in Japan, were integrated into a complex maritime and trading economy by 1571. Morocco and the islands supplied grain to the homeland and for trade in 107

Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, A economia dos descobrimentos henriquinos (Lisbon: Livraria Sá da Costa, 1962): chapter 2.

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Africa. Moroccan products were used to buy gold and slaves since these were well known and desired products in sub-Saharan Africa. Sugar from Madeira and the Azores was used to obtain silver in Europe for the purchase of Indian pepper, spices and silks and Brazil wood would prove to be a highly profitable import for European dye makers. Portugal not only dominated the Asian water route to Europe for a century, but it also tried to control intra-Asian trade through its domination of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In all these efforts it enlisted the aid of local groups and created mestizo merchant communities along with its forts and trading factories. Portugal itself had only a modest input into this international trade, serving rather as an entrepôt and re-export center for goods which it traded from all the continents of the world.108 Private and royal shipping expanded rapidly in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries as the Portuguese opened up these new lands for colonization or trade. Between just 1501 and 1550, for example, it sent 477 ships into the Pacific Ocean to engage in Asian trade, and another 259 ships by the end of the century, all to import pepper and spices, or to remain in Asia to engage in intra-Pacific and Indian Ocean trade, which it now controlled through its domination of the seas.109 This new trading wealth created a golden age for Portugal. By mid-century it dominated the water routes to Africa, Asia and a large part of the Americas and its merchants now dominated the trade between Asia and Europe. As early as 1457, Portugal was importing African gold, and by 1506 some two-thirds of royal revenue came from taxes on foreign trade with state revenues doubling between 1500 and 1530.110 By the end of the century, Lisbon’s population had expanded to 130,000 and was now the sixth largest city in Europe, and would climb to fifth place and 180,000 108

109

110

There are numerous surveys of this expansion. The most complete work is the key books of Vitorino de Magalhães Godinho, especially his A economia dos descobrimentos and Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial. A good review of these developments is found in Michael Naylor, The Portuguese in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): chapter 1; and the survey by A. J. R. Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, 1415–1808: A World on the Move (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). Jan de Vries, “Connecting Europe and Asia: a quantitative analysis of the Cape-route trade, 1497–1795,” in Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giraldez and Richard Von Glahn, eds., Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470–1800 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003): table 2.2, 40. For its extraordinarily dominant role in intra-Pacific trade in the sixteenth century, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500– 1700: A Political and Economic History, 2nd edn (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012). A. R. Disney, History of Portugal and the Portuguese Empire, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): I, 147–149.

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persons by 1700.111 It was in this period that Brazil would be completely brought into the Portuguese empire as the leading colony. But this dynamism had ended by the last two decades of the century. The loss of independence in 1580 with the incorporation of Portugal into the Spanish Crown and the arrival of Dutch and English traders in Asia and America in the following two decades would end the monopoly which Portugal had enjoyed for almost a century. Along with its expansion in Africa and Asia, the Portuguese also began in the early fifteenth century to explore and settle the uninhabited islands of Madeira, the Azores and Cape Verde. By the second half of that century these islands were colonized and had become agricultural producers, first of wheat and then of sugar in the case of Madeira. The second expansion east into the Atlantic occurred when Pedro Álvares Cabral’s fleet was blown westward and landed in Brazil near Porto Seguro in present-day Bahia on April 22, 1500. He stayed six days cruising along the coast and sent back a ship loaded with local woods to Portugal reporting on the discovery. The Portuguese Crown was quick to notify Spain of this discovery and to send an exploration fleet to Brazil in 1501 which was the first to export brazil wood to Lisbon. While accepting Brazil’s claims, Spain was not slow in responding, sending a fleet to the Rio de la Plata in 1515 to close off Portuguese expansion southward. Initially faced by dense Tupi Indian settlements all along the coast and finding little of potential agricultural value, Portugal decided to simply open commercial “factories.” These were fortified trading posts designed to trade with the native population, a system which it used in Africa and in most parts of Asia. In fact trade without settlement was the dominant Portuguese pattern for all except its Atlantic islands. Thus for the first thirty years trade, with the native populations, defense of these trading areas against European interlopers, and control over Brazil’s trade with Europe were the basic policies practiced by the Portuguese. The Crown promoted these factories either through exclusive trading grants (the first was to Fernando Noronha) or at times taking direct control itself. The factories paid the Tupi Amerindians with iron tools, arms and other European goods for food and to cut the brazil wood, which was exported 111

On the extraordinary growth of colonial trade and its failure to vitalize the metropolitan economy, see Leonor Freire Costa, Nuno Palma and Jaime Reis, “The great escape? The contribution of the empire to Portugal’s economic growth, 1500–1800,” European Review of Economic History, 19 (2014): 1–22. On the population of Lisbon see Paul Bairoch et al., La population des villes européennes de 800 à 1850 (Geneva: Droz, 1988): table B.14, 278.

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to Europe to make a red dye much appreciated in the European market, along with some Indian slaves and exotic animals.112 But the factory system was replaced by a direct colonization policy in 1530. Faced with constant French interlopers who worked all along the Brazilian coast from the first decade of the century, Portugal finally decided on colonization after its warships failed to stop French activity. But unable to totally fund the enterprise, the Crown resorted to granting private individuals exclusive rights to colonization. Some fifteen donatary captaincies were created incorporating almost all the Brazilian coast. By the end of the century all but two of the captaincies had been settled, with São Vicente (the region around Santos) and Pernambuco being the most successful (see Map 2.2). But the new era brought profound changes in Indian-European relations. Settlement and the adoption of forced Indian labor broke the traditional pattern of relatively peaceful coexistence. Conflict and warfare ensued. In the 1540s Amerindians were able to wipe out all but three major Portuguese settlements on the coast. But there were only limited alliances among the Amerindian tribes due to significant intertribal wars and resistance dwindled in the second half of the century. Once the Portuguese were determined to settle and hold the colony, the eventual subjugation of the coastal Indian communities was inevitable. The Jesuits were granted exclusive evangelization among the Amerindians, and in Brazil they adopted closed communities (aldeias) of Indian penitents as their model. This was in contrast to the open preaching of the Franciscans in New Spain. There were five such Jesuit controlled aldeias within Guanabara Bay in 1689 with some 2,500 Amerindians, but they seem to have been abandoned by the end of the century.113 Others were forced to move because of slave raiding or hostilities from colonists. Several aldeas were established by the Jesuits on the inland plateau in the mid-1550s in what would become the city of São Paulo and by 1560 they had some 1,400 Amerindians.114 But only 112

113

114

Harold Johnson, “The Portuguese settlement of Brazil, 1500–8,” in Frank Salomon and Stuart B. Schwartz, eds., The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas, vol. 3, part 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1999): 249–286; and Harold Johnson and Maria Beatriz Nizza da Silva, “O imperio luso-brasileiro 1500–1620,” in Joel Serrão and A. H. de Oliveira Marques, eds., Historia da expansão Portuguesa (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1992). Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida, “Os índios aldeados no Rio de Janeiro colonial – novos súditos cristãos do império português,” PhD thesis, Universidade de Campinas, 2000: 80. Pasquale Petrone, Aldeamentos paulistas (São Paulo: Edusp, 1995): 181, and map, 157.

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Linha do Tratado de Tordesilhas

CAP. DO PARÁ CAP. DO MARANHÃO CAP. PIAUÍ CAP. DO CEARÁ CAP. DO RIO GRANDE CAP. ITAMARACÁ CAP. DE PERNAMBUCO

Olinda (1537) an

CAP. DA BAHIA Salvador (1549)

tic

ce

O

n CAP. DE ILHEUS la Ilheus (1536) At CAP. PORTO SEGURO Porto Seguro (1535) CAP. DO ESPÍRITO SANTO Espírito Santo (1551)

CAP. SÃO TOME CAP. SANTO AMARO Rio de Janeiro (1565) CAP. SÃO VICENTE Sâo Vicente (1532) CAP. SANT’ ANA

Map 2.2  Donatary captancies and founding dates of sixteenth-century towns. Source: IBGE, Bases Cartográficas

a few thousand Amerindians ever participated in these coastal missions in the sixteenth century, and most were closed by the beginning of the seventeenth century. It would be in the inland zone inhabited by Guarani Amerindians of the Paraguay River region, which was under Spanish control, where the Jesuits developed most fully their aldeia or mission model. Although the Paraguayan Jesuits would become hostile to Portugal in the next decades, Jesuits did help mobilize Indian tribes to fight the French and their Indian allies in Guanabara Bay.115 115

On the so called Tamoio wars in which the Tupiniquim (from the Santos area to the south) and the Temiminó to the north of Guanabara Bay allied with the Portuguese against the Tamoio (ou Tupinambá) and their French allies in the war to retake Rio de Janeiro from the French in 1563. Beatriz Perrone-Moisés, and Renato Sztutman. “Notícias de uma certa confederação Tamoio,” Mana, 16(2) (2010): 401–433. On the role of renegades, castaways and other Portuguese who married into indigenous tribes throughout Brazil, see Alida C. Metcalf, Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500–1600 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005); and John Monteiro, Negros da terra, índios e bandeirantes nas origenes de São Paulo (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994): 29–30.

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In 1595, the Jesuits published a grammar of the Tupinambá language, one of the most spoken of Tupi languages on the coast. A simplified version of this language quickly became the “língua geral” in Brazil much as Quechua did in the Andes and Nahua in New Spain. This common language could be used among the sixty-five different language groups on the coast, and in turn coastal Amerindians that spoke other languages could be used as interpreters in the interior. Two subsets of this general language were Manu in the Amazon and the Língua Geral Paulista spoken by the mamelucos (mestizos) in the south. Although there were only four major language groups then as now, there were in total over a thousand separate languages spoken by the peoples of Brazil in 1500.116 As the colonization proceeded in the sixteenth and seventeenth century Indian-Portuguese relations became ever more violent. This was due to systematic Indian slave raiding expeditions carried out by the Portuguese throughout the interior of the country. Indian slave labor was the fundamental labor power of the new Portuguese communities being founded. It could be obtained either through sale by other Amerindians, but more typically through warfare and enslavement. With the enslaved Indian survival rates low due to labor exploitation and new European diseases, a constant replenishment of Indian slaves occurred and these Indian slaves remained the primary source of forced labor until well into the seventeenth century. These Amerindians were obtained by the famous bandeiras or mixed-race slaving and exploring expeditions organized from all over the coast, but most especially from the inland village of São Paulo in the Capitania of São Vicente which was settled in 1554. From here the slave hunting expeditions often followed the old Indian paths into the interior. Some of these raiding parties from São Paulo could become quite large incorporating some 100 mamelucos and Portuguese with a thousand Indian allies. Even despite the unification of the Iberian monarchies from 1580 to 1640, a large number of these expeditions were made against the Jesuit Guarani missions over a thousand kilometers inland from the new settlement at São Paulo. Asunción was founded by 116

See the essays of Aryon Dall’Igna Rodrigues, “Sobre as línguas indígenas e sua pesquisa no Brasil,” Ciência e cultura, 57(2) (2005): 35–38; “Línguas indígenas: 500 anos de descobertas e perdas,” DELTA: Documentação e Estudos em Linguística Teórica e Aplicada, 9(1) (1993), http://200.144.145.24/delta/article/download/45596/30129; and “As línguas gerais sul-americanas,” PAPIA-Revista Brasileira de Estudos do Contato Linguístico, 4(2) (2010): 6–18.

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the Spaniards in 1536, four years after the Portuguese founded the Capitania of São Vicente, and the missions began in the 1580s and were finally organized into the Province of Guairá along the Paraguay River under Spanish rule in 1609. The first raids on these missions began in 1629 and ended in the 1640s when the Mboboré Amerindians defeated a bandeira from São Paulo. It is estimated that in this two-decade period some 60,000 Guarani Amerindians were extracted from the region and the few Spanish towns in the area were destroyed. It appears that most of these slaves obtained were used in the local paulista economy due to the steady decline of the Tupi Indian workers in the region.117 Along with their relations with Amerindians, the Portuguese in the sixteenth century also had to deal with the aggressive French who wanted to colonize Brazil. This required the sending of two fleets to destroy France Antarctique, the French colony that had been established in Guanabara Bay in the 1550s. It was only with the second fleet in 1565 that the Portuguese not only expelled the French but also finally created a permanent settlement of Rio de Janeiro, thus eliminating the French attempt at colonization in Brazil. But other European nations did not desist in challenging Portuguese domination, from the Spaniards to the south and the Dutch in the Northeast in the following century. Given these threats, the second half of the century involved a major investment by the Crown and private individuals in building up a viable export economy to sustain the colony. Given the quality of the Northeastern lands around Bahia (the Recôncavo district) and in Pernambuco, their easy river connections to the coast, and the century-long experience of the Portuguese with sugar production in Madeira, now the leading sugar producer for Europe, it was inevitable that the Portuguese turned to sugar production in Brazil as a possible export to Europe. Thus the Portuguese had the skills necessary to produce and export the sugar with ready markets in Europe. What they needed was 117

This is the important conclusión of Monteiro, see, Negros da terra: chapter 2; and Fernanda Sposito, “Santos, heróis ou demônios? Sobre as relações entre índios, jesuítas e colonizadores na América meridional (São Paulo e Paraguai/Rio da Prata, séculos XVI–XVII),” PhD thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2013. Groups that adopted the horse were almost impossible to conquer until the nineteenth century. The first to adopt the horse were the Abipon a Guaykuru language group in the Chaco according to Francismar Alex Lopes de Carvalho, “Etnogênese mbayá-guaykuru: notas sobre emergência identitária, expansão territorial e resistência de um grupo étnico no vale do rio paraguai (c. 1650–1800),” Fênix – Revista de História e Estudos Culturais, III(4) (2006): 5.

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57

capital, and after the first successful investments, major funding was provided by Portuguese, Italian and even German investors.

The Africans The third key necessity for successful colonization was labor and this was a difficult issue to resolve. Few migrants were willing to leave Portugal in this period of major economic growth and so the colonists turned toward enslaving Amerindians. This then created significant conflicts despite the growth of slaving expeditions and the lack of royal interest in protecting the Indian tribes. Indian rebellions and raids destroyed many of the early sugar mills and the Indian frontier was always a direct threat to the stability of the coastal enterprises. But until the end of the sixteenth century Amerindians remained the primary labor force because of the costs of alternative labor were too high. But as the sugar economy matured, funds were finally available to import African slaves to replace the Indian workers. Thus as early as the second half of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese began importing ever more African slaves. Given the initial Portuguese control of the African Atlantic coast and Asian trading routes, Portuguese merchants were to initiate what would become the largest single slave trade to America. Africans were first purchased from the Senegambia region on the Northern African coast and then later from the Congo-Angola area in the Central-South coast. Although the movement of enslaved Africans increased yearly, the costs were still high enough that until the end of the century Indian slaves were dominant in the Northeastern sugar plantations. The arrival of the Portuguese explorers on the sub-Saharan African coast in the early 1400s represent a major new development in the history of the slave trade from Africa in terms of its intensity, the sources of its slaves, and the usage made of these slaves in America. Initially the new sea trade started as an extension of the older overland trades. The Portuguese even carried out extensive slave trading along the African coast to supply the internal African slave market in exchange for gold, which they then exported to Europe. The first shipments of African slaves via the Atlantic were to Europe along with cargoes of gold and ivory.118 118

Vicenta Cortes Alonso, La esclavitud en Valencia durante el reinado de los reyes católicos (1479–1516) (Valencia: Ayuntamiento, 1964): 57–60; and Alfonso Franco Silva, La esclavitud en Sevilla y su tierra a fines de la edad media (Sevilla: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1979). For the latest survey of the different groups enslaved in the Iberian peninsular see Alessandro Stella, Historie d’esclaves dans la peninsula Ibérique (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 2000).

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By 1573, Portugal was said to contain over 40,000 slaves, a large number of whom were sub-Saharan Africans.119 Slaves were sometimes to be found in rural occupations but never as a significant element in the local agricultural labor force because of their high costs, and the availability of cheap peasant labor.120 Also Africans mixed with slaves of numerous other nations, from Eastern Europeans to Jews and Muslims who had been enslaved in the wars of re-conquest.121 It was only with the introduction of sugar production to the eastern Atlantic islands and the opening up of the Western Hemisphere to European conquest at the end of the sixteenth century that a new and important use was found for these African slaves. Once again slaves became a major factor in agricultural production within the European context as they had in the era of the Roman empire.122 The first slaves transported to the Iberian American colonies were acculturated and Christianized blacks from the Iberian Peninsula who were brought in the households of the conquistadores and colonizers. But soon a direct Africa to America movement of slaves began to Brazil and Spanish America. After 1500, the volume of this Atlantic trade slowly rose from an annual few hundred slaves in the first half of the century, to over 1,000 per annum by the 1550s, and to over 3,000 per annum by the 1580s.123 Non-Christian and 119

120

121

122

123

Frédéric Mauro, Le Portugal et I’Atlantique au XVIIe siècle, 1570–1670, étude économique (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960): 147; Charles Verlinden, L’Esclavage dans l’Europe médiévale (Bruges: De Tempel, 1955): 837. Saunders, A Social History of Black Slaves, provides the most complete study of Africans in Portugal, with chapter 3 covering their demography and chapter 4 their occupations. The Lisbon population estimates are given on pp. 54–55. Also see the recent survey by Stella, Historie d’esclaves dans la peninsula Ibérique. The standard analysis of Portuguese world trade in the first three centuries of exploration is Godinho, Os descobrimentos. The best single interpretation of the early Portuguese slave trade is found in Elbl, “Volume of the early Atlantic slave trade”: 75. It estimates that “Europeans exported approximately 156,000 slaves from Atlantic Africa between 1450 and 1521.” In turn Godinho estimated that a total of 140,000 to 150,000 slaves were taken from Africa to 1505, Godinho, Os descobrimentos, IV: 161. These figures are higher than the current estimate for Europe found in the new Atlantic slave trade database. Also see Luís Felipe de Alencastro, O trato dos viventes: formação do Brasil no Atlântico Sul, séculos XVI e XVII (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000). The history of sugar production in Mediterranean Europe is discussed in J. H. Galloway, The Sugar Cane Industry: An Historical Geography from its Origins to 1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): chapter 3; and Noel Deer, The History of Sugar, 2 vols (London, Chapman and Hall, 1949–1950). This and all subsequent estimated numbers come from the most recent project on the Atlantic slave trade directed by David Eltis. This project began with David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson and Herbert S. Klein, The Transatlantic Slave Trade: 1562–1867: A Database (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University

The Peopling of Brazil to 1700

59

non-Romance-language speakers taken directly from Africa, whom the Portuguese called boçais, now made up the overwhelming majority of slaves coming to America. It was thus sugar and African slaves which would resolve the problem of maintaining the Brazilian colony. All the eastern Atlantic sugar islands (the Canaries, the Azores, Madeira and São Tomé) went through a boom and bust cycle of sugar production that rarely lasted more than a century. But all the major sugar-producing islands established functioning plantation slave regimes which became the models of such institutions transported to the New World.124 It was the establishment of the Portuguese colony of Brazil after 1500 which was to mark the beginnings of the modern slave plantation economy of the Americas, which so influenced hemispheric developments for the next four centuries. Although large slave plantations producing sugar had temporarily appeared in the first decades of the sixteenth century in Santo Domingo, by the middle decades of the century when Brazilians began to establish their own slave plantations, those of the Spanish Caribbean were in decline and would not revive again until the late eighteenth century.125 What distinguished these American plantation slave societies from most previous societies

124

125

Press, 2000); was again revised by David Eltis, in “The volume and structure of the transatlantic slave trade: a reassessment,” The William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 58(1) (2001), which supplements the original estimates given by Philip Curtin in The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969) with the new Cambridge dataset, plus further additions. For the most recent revisions and additions to the old Cambridge slave voyage dataset of 2000 see the The trans-Atlantic slave trade database, voyages, Emory University at www.slavevoyages .org/tast/index.faces. The “estimates” are under a separate heading and are the numbers used throughout this volume. These can be found at www.slavevoyages.org/tast/ assessment/estimates.faces. The Portuguese Atlantic experience is analyzed in John L. Vogt, Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast, 1469–1682 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1979). The background chapters in Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of a Brazilian Society (Bahia, 1550–1835) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) provide a good general survey of the Madeira and Azorian experience, while a detailed study of the Madeira sugar industry is found in Alberto Vieira, “Sugar islands: The sugar economy of Madeira and the Canaries, 1450–1650,” in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., Tropical Babylons: Sugar and the Making of the Atlantic World, 1450–1680 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004): 42–84. The standard studies of slavery on these islands is found in Alberto Vieira, Os escravos no arquipélago da Madeira: séculos XV a XVII (Funchal:Centro de Estudos de História do Atlántico, 1991), and Manuel Lobo Cabrera, La esclavitud en las Canarias orientales en el siglo XVI (negros, moros y moriscos) (Las Palmas: Cabildo Insular de Gran Canaria, 1982). Genaro Rodríguez Morel, “The sugar economy of Española”: 85–114.

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Brazil: An Economic and Social History

which had slaves was in the domination of slaves as agricultural workers, their vital importance in the production of goods for the international market and their importance within the local societies. There has been an intense recent debate in the literature about why Africans became the primary group enslaved in the Americas, which would eventually cause Americans to equate skin color with slave status for the next four centuries. Some have suggested a special cultural or racial bias of the Europeans which allowed them to enslave Africans. But this seems a very strange argument, given the long and intimate contact that Europeans had with Africans from pre-classical times to the early modern period, and the integration of these African slaves into a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-colored slave population in continental Europe and the eastern Atlantic islands well before the opening of the Americas to European conquest and colonization. But the increasing cost of non-African slaves does offer a possible explanation. The rise of the Ottoman empire in the eastern Mediterranean and the consolidation of a powerful independent Moroccan state in North Africa closed off, or made more costly, traditional sources of slaves from these regions. At the same time, the opening up of water transport to sub-Saharan markets, made African slaves considerably cheaper than they had been via the Saharan caravan routes. Enslavement of non-Africans did not end, as the famous existence of Christian slaves in North Africa well into the eighteenth century demonstrated, but they were no longer significant in the European slave markets by the middle of the sixteenth century. Given the steady export of West African gold and ivory, and the development of Portugal’s enormous Asiatic trading empire, the commercial relations between Asia, western Africa and Europe now became common and cheap. Western Africans could be bought with Asian textiles and European iron products now much in demand in the recently opened Atlantic coast of Africa. Thus by the middle of the sixteenth century most other ethnic and religious groups in the European slave markets had been replaced by Africans. Although Iberians initially enslaved Canary Islanders, these were later freed, as were the few Amerindians who were brought from America. The Muslims who had been enslaved for centuries were no longer significant as they disappeared from the Iberian Peninsula itself due to the closure of the trade in Muslims to Christians by powerful Muslim states in the Magreb region. In turn, the expansion of the Turks in the eastern Mediterranean closed off traditional Slavic and Balkan sources for slaves to Western Europeans, a move supported by the Roman Catholic Church which sought the end of enslavement of Christians by other Christians.

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61

Along with creating the largest sugar-producing center in the western world in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese in Brazil also established the largest Afro-American population in the Americas. By 1700, Portuguese and other Europeans only represented an e­ stimated third of the total Brazilian population, with the m ­ ajority of the residents being of African origin.126 It is estimated that some 800,  000 African slaves arrived to these shores from the earliest days until the end of the seventeenth century.127 These Africans, along with several ­thousand Indian slaves and Amerindian Christian converts ­occupied almost all the coast of Brazil, but had penetrated only a few hundred miles inland. From there to the Andean foothills in the west resided numerous ­independent Amerindian tribes only minimally ­connected to the ­developments on the coast. The Africans arriving in Brazil came primarily from the central western Atlantic coast of Africa and especially from posts established by the Portuguese at Luanda (1576) and Benguela (1617). Although Senegambia was the first region contributing African slaves, initially to the Iberian Peninsula and then to Brazil in the first half of the sixteenth century, by the end of the century it was mostly closed to slavers for most of the duration of the slave trade. Both the Bites of Biafra and Benin shipped some slaves to Brazil in the 1640s and 1650s but they did not become significant suppliers until the end of that century. It is the West Central African Region, essentially the Congo-Angolan area, which was the primary region for arriving slaves, accounting for 88 percent of the estimated 814,000 slaves coming to Brazil in the period up to 1700 (see Graph 2.1). While the Slave Voyage database only lists Africans arriving after 1561, documentary evidence suggests important arrivals of African slaves from before that date. At the same time, it is evident that by the seventeenth century the volume of slaves arriving in Brazilian ports was steady at between 5,000 to 10,000 Africans per year from 1611–1615 to 1680–1695. It then doubled to almost 20,000 per year in the last five years of the century. If the major source of African slaves was mostly one region in Africa, the arrival ports were more numerous. There were three main regions 126 127

Maria Luiza Marcílio, “The population of colonial Brazil,” in Leslie Bethell, ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. II (Cambridge University Press, 1984): 47. The Slave Voyage database estimates 761,000 Africans arriving up to 1700, but only begins in 1561–1565. Abundant documentation suggests a not insignificant number of slaves arrived before this data, so 800,000 would seem a reasonable number.

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

62 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000

West Central Africa

5

5

–9

16

91

–8

5 16

81

–7

5 16

71

5 16

61

–5

–6

5 16

51

5

–4

16

41

–3

5 16

31

5 16

21

–2

5

–1

16

11

–0

5 16

01

–9

5 15

91

–8

5 15

81

–7

71

15

15

61

–6

5

0

Total

Graph 2.1  Estimated origin of slaves arriving in Brazil 1561–1700. Source: Slave Voyages Estimates, www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates

receiving slaves. These were Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. They each varied their intake of arriving slaves over time, with Pernambuco dominating in the sixteenth century but declining significantly in the Dutch period. Bahia and Rio de Janeiro grew steadily from the mid-sixteenth century and by the 1690s all three had reached a basic equilibrium in slave arrivals (see Graph 2.2). Most of these arriving slaves went directly into plantation agriculture. It has been estimated that in the seventeenth century in Bahia and Pernambuco engenhos (or sugar mills) owned an average of sixty to seventy slaves and that including the associated work force of the lavradores (planters without mills) in the surrounding area, the whole complex employed 100 to 120 slaves. Assuming that these two provinces accounted for three-quarters of the 500 or so engenhos in Brazil, this meant that they used between 37,500 and 45,000 slaves.128 Assuming the 120 average also occurred in the Rio de Janeiro region as well would lead to an estimate of 50,000 to 60,000 slaves working in agriculture. But already slaves probably numbered 150,000 to 180,000 thousand by this time. Out of the total population of 300,000 estimated for 1700, there were at most 100,000 Portuguese. After all the Indian wars and deliberate genocide carried out by the governors and settlers and the abandonment of most of the “civilized” Indian aldeias under Church control, assuming a slave population of at least 150,000 to 180,000 seems more than reasonable. Thus a significant number of slaves 128

Schwartz, “A Commonwealth within Itself”: 180.

The Peopling of Brazil to 1700

63

100% Rio de Janeiro

80% 60%

Pernambuco

40% 20%

Bahia 1561–65 1566–70 1571–75 1576–80 1581–85 1586–90 1591–95 1596–00 1601–05 1606–10 1611–15 1616–20 1621–25 1626–30 1631–35 1636–40 1641–45 1646–50 1651–55 1656–60 1661–65 1666–70 1671–75 1676–80 1681–85 1686–90 1691–95

0%

Graph 2.2  Estimated arrival of African slaves by principal region in Brazil 1561–1700. Source: Slave Voyages Estimates, www.slavevoyages.org/ assessment/estimates

would be involved in occupations outside of sugar production. As the cities grew, they became ever more dependent either on slave or free African and Afro-American workers. With Brazil having few Portuguese master artisans and a weak guild system, these slaves and free colored of both African and native born were soon being rented out as apprentices and then journeymen in all the skilled and semi-skilled occupations. They were also the primary force in the urban unskilled labor market. New Social Classes Along with the Portuguese and Africans, a middle grouping of mixed ancestry people began to emerge. From the beginning of contact, castaways and runaway sailors and even sailors deliberately left on the coast were melded into all the major coastal tribes of coastal Brazil. These men learned the local languages and became interpreters for the Europeans who were trading with the Amerindians. This was done by both the French and the Portuguese. They also fathered children which gave rise to the mamelucos, those of mixed Indian-European origin. Given that the Portuguese migration was heavily male, the strict European rules of marriage were abandoned and informal unions between European men and Indian women became the norm throughout the colony. The availability of Indian slave women in the settled areas also led to the increase in this mestiço group. It was estimated that at the end of the seventeenth century, a third of the population in the Northern captaincies were mestizos and that they made up the majority of the population of São Paulo. The wills and testaments of the period are filled with fathers granting

64

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

worldly goods to their illegitimate children, and the first generation of mamelucos were almost always illegitimate since few Portuguese men married their concubines. But the second generation of mestizos tended to marry Portuguese men and formed part of the Portuguese dominant class. But with ever more African and European immigrants arriving, this  class lost its predominance and soon melded into a general mixed origin class, in which the predominant group were now the pardos or children of European and African origin. The growth of the pardos (or mulattos) was a later process as the massive replacement of Indian slave laborers by imported African slaves was a late sixteenth and early-seventeenth century phenomenon. Like the mamelucos, the first generation of pardos tended to be illegitimate, but by the second generation illegitimacy rates were falling and they were appearing in wills, testaments and baptismal records as Portuguese fathers recognized their pardo children. Many of these pardos soon blended in with the Portuguese, although probably more slowly than did the mamelucos. Over time these mestizos of whatever origin blended into a general mestiço or brown population forming a rough middle group between the Portuguese and the slaves. Thus the New World created a whole new class of peoples aside from the original migrants and settlers. Although initially the smallest group in the colonial population, the mestiços grew quickly through manumission, miscegenation and intermarriage so that by the eighteenth century they were the majority in most of the captaincies of the colony.129 It also elevated lower-class Portuguese into a higher status as members of the conquering all powerful group. Population Distribution by the Late Sixteenth Century For most of the century, the Portuguese and Africans primarily settled along the coast. The largest concentration of slaves of African origin would be concentrated in the coastal regions most directly involved in sugar production. But gradually other areas of the colony were occupied, with less economic density and with limited use of slaves of African origin. Here it was a few Portuguese along with mestizos and some Indian laborers who settled the regions and kept pushing the frontier northward and westward. One of these areas, would be the interior 129

For a useful survey of this theme see Stuart B. Schwartz, “Brazilian ethnogenesis: mestiços, mamelucos, and pardos,” in Serge Gruzinski and Nathan Wachtel, eds., Le Nouveau Monde. Mondes nouveaux L’expérience américaine (Paris: ERC et Ed. EHESS, 1996): 7–27.

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Northeastern region, where livestock was bred both for their meat and for the creation of work animals for use in the coastal plantations and their mills.130 This grazing industry initially was concentrated along the banks of the São Francisco River, in areas of Bahia, Pernambuco and Sergipe. Later it expanded beyond this region and penetrated through the hinterland, into the current states of Ceará, Maranhão and Piauí.131 In fact, this type of extensive farming with low economic density, largely using indigenous labor, was most adaptable to grazing. However, the systematic penetration of the hinterland in regions occupied by independent Indian tribes provoked violent confrontations and the extermination of many tribes.132 In turn, free labor could be paid with cattle which allowed the occupied area to be systematically expanded, the only limit being the distance from markets, which led to less dense settlement the farther from the coast the frontier expanded.133 A few special areas of production also drew settlers to the Northeastern region. One was cotton which already existed in Brazil before the arrival of the Portuguese, and the second was tobacco which also predated the Portuguese arrival. These two crops were cultivated by small peasant farmers of all races with tobacco farming initially concentrated in Bahia. But these crops were primarily produced by small farmers and occupied a territory and engaged a population much smaller than was dedicated to sugar production or livestock.134 Finally one unusual zone of settlement in the sixteenth century was the village of São Paulo in the interior plateau. The Captaincy of São 130

131

132

133 134

According to the Jesuit Jácome Monteiro, in 1616 a trapiche (sugar mill using animal traction) needed 100 oxen, whereas a water-driven mill needed only 30 to 40. Johnson and Nizza da Silva, O Império luso-brasileiro: 269. On this theme see J. Capistrano de Abreu, Capítulos de história Cclonial (1500–1800) (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1976): chap ix; João António Andreoni (José João Antonil), Cultura e Opulência no Brasil, 2nd edn, 4th part (São Paulo, Companhia Editora Nacional, n.d.); Roberto Simonsen, História econômica do Brasil (1500–1820) (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1977): chapter vii; Anônimo, “Roteiro do Maranhão a Goyaz pela capitania do Piauhi,” Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro, 62(1) (1900). According to Simonsen, Indian labor in the engenhos was difficult and there was high mortality of the Indian workers. At the same time the alliances with various tribes had taken place, but did not prevent them from expelling and exterminating tribes that opposed the expansion of the area occupied by livestock. Simonsen, História econômica do Brasil: 151–152. Celso Furtado, Formação econômica do Brasil (São Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1968), chapter 10. Tobacco represented a tenth of the value of sugar in this period, Antonil. Cultura e opulência no Brasil: 231.

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Brazil: An Economic and Social History

Vicente (in what today is the São Paulo region) was one of the first areas to be occupied and local farmers produced some sugar on the coast, as in other colonial areas.135 But its isolation from major production centers of sugar and ranching made it a marginal producer and a zone with a highly mixed Amerindian-European population. The geographic situation of the São Paulo region was quite peculiar: a long but narrow coast and a natural barrier constituted by the Serra do Mar mountain range which isolated the coast from the major interior plateau. But the hunt for Indian slave labor was a major factor in opening up the interior paulista region. The area of the current city of São Paulo became the first to be explored on the interior plateau because of its open plains, temperate climate and rivers.136 In addition, the settlement concentrated several indigenous allied tribes, who were gradually incorporated into the service of the colonizers. With limited resources and few exports, the colonists in the territory of São Paulo depended on compulsory labor for their survival and largely used the work of the indigenous people in this period. Thus by the end of the first century of colonization by the Portuguese, Amerindians were still the dominant group in the population of the territory of Brazil with the majority living free of Portuguese control. African slaves were also appearing in these coastal regions by the end of the century, but for most of the early settlement period it was the Portuguese and their Indian slaves who occupied the coast and a mixed population made up mostly of Amerindian-Portuguese extraction lightly occupied the interior. There were some lightly settled areas inland from the coast, especially in the Northeastern region and to a lesser extent in the south in the region of São Vicente. Sugar and cattle were the dominant products, with small enclaves of settlers producing such crops as tobacco and cotton, along with hides and wood products which entered the European market. Outside of the plantations, subsistence farming and ranching were the predominant occupations of the settlers. Finally the only significant cities were the key ports of Recife, Salvador and Rio de Janeiro, with urban populations smaller than most of the ports of Portugal. 135

136

At the time of Gandavo (approximately 1570), there were four sugar mills in the Captaincy of São Vicente. Pero de Magalhães Gandavo. Tratado da terra do Brasil. História da província Santa Cruz (Belo Horizonte: Itatiaia; São Paulo: Ed. da Universidade de São Paulo, 1980): 40. On the settlment of the Planato see Caio Prado Junior, Evolução política do Brasil e outros estudos (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1972); Petrone, Aldeamentos paulistas; John Manuel Monteiro, Negros da terra.

3 The Colonial Economy and Society

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a time of major expansion throughout the entire Brazilian area, with the settlement of the coast from the banks of the Amazon to the Rio de la Plata in the far south, and a major push into the interior of the country with the settlement of Minas Gerais and the central-west provinces of Mato Grosso and Goiás. The small coastal regions now became flourishing centers of commercial agriculture and international trade, with the sugar industry providing the first major source of wealth and commerce. This would be followed by a whole new mining industry which emerged at the beginning of the eighteenth century in the central interior of the country, which created a whole new south eastern economic area to balance the Northeastern sugar and cattle economy. Finally in the late eighteenth century would come the definitive settlement of the Southern Pampas region stretching to the northern banks of the Rio de la Plata. This would be a period of major town and city construction, of the shift from extensive to intensive agricultural production, and would end with the Portuguese monarchy moving to Brazil and abandoning Portugal as it recognized the vital importance of this former colony. The driving force for this colonial development of the colony for most of the period until the eighteenth century was sugar. As early as the 1510s, some sugar was produced in Brazil, but the big growth of plantations came after the 1540s. Sugar mills were built all along the Northeastern coastline. By the 1570s, there were sixty mills operating in Bahia and Pernambuco which in turn accounted for two-thirds of the mills in the colony. By 1585, these two regions had double that number of mills. The growth of these mills was continuous everywhere so that by 67

68

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

1629 the colony had 346 engenhos (sugar mills) in operation and it was said that already by 1600 the colony was providing the Crown with more tax income than it spent in the colony. Along with these mills with their own fields of sugarcane, many engenhos also milled the sugarcane of independent producers, called lavradores de cana who had no mills but who produced sugarcane in their own or in rented fields with their own slave workers. These independent farmers were usually required to sell their products to the given mill if they rented their lands from the senhor de engenho (mill owner) and were free to sell to other mills if they owned their own farms.1 This growing sugar production was exported to Europe in what was essentially a free trade. Although the primary carriers were the Portuguese and the Dutch, a large number of other northern European traders shipped Brazilian sugar to Europe, with Antwerp being one of the largest importing ports.2 But the Dutch decision to break their trade connections with Portugal in 1621 led Dutch fleets to seize Bahia in 1624 and close down its trade with the Portuguese colony. Though forced out by a Spanish Armada, they returned and seized Recife and most of the Northeast in 1630 and would remain there for some twenty-five years. Much of the international and local fighting had a negative impact on the sugar trade in this period, but by the late 1630s prices on the international market rose again and remained steady until the end of the century. The processing of sugar in Brazil in the sixteenth century remained the same as it had been done in Madeira in the fifteenth century. The cane used was the traditional cane produced in Asia, the Mediterranean regions and the Atlantic islands and was less fibrous than cane caiena introduced in the late eighteenth century. Thus the early mills used wood rather than bagaço (bagassa) to boil the sugar, a process which had a major impact on deforestation in the northeast and was a significant cost of production.3 But the introduction of the vertical three roller mills in

1

2 3

Schwartz, Sugar Plantations: chapter 11; and his more recent survey “A Commonwealth within Itself: The Early Brazilian Sugar Industry, 1550–1670,” in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., Sugar and the Making of the Atlantic World, 1450–1680 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004): 158–200. Also see Vera Lúcia Amaral Ferlini, Terra,  trabalho e poder: o mundo dos engenhos no Nordeste colonial (São Paulo: Brasilense, 1988). On the international sugar trade in this period see Christopher Ebert, Between Empires: Brazilian Sugar in the Early Atlantic Economy, 1550–1630 (Amsterdam: Brill, 2008). Also considerable numbers of trees were felled to make sugar chests used to ship the sugar to Europe. It is estimated that this resulted in 1 million board feet being exported as of

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the 1610s and 1620s was an innovation that produced far more juice from the cane, eliminating the traditional complex two step grinding. It apparently also permitted smaller producers to build smaller and cheaper engenhos. This innovation initially had its most impact in the Rio de Janeiro region which grew more rapidly than the Northeastern mills in this period. Cane was a permanent crop and could be cut for an average of seven seasons, though fields were defined by the number of cuttings. The milling process for producing sugar was the most organized industrial activity in colonial Brazil and the safra (harvest) and the accompanying milling and boiling and purification process went on for eight to nine months.4 The volume of Brazilian cane production while rising over the two first centuries, did experience several production crises. By the 1690s, Brazil was again at full capacity producing 18,000 to 20,000 metric tons per annum from over 500 engenhos, up from just 10,000 metric tons per annum in 1610. As early as the last quarter of the sixteenth century Brazil had replaced the Atlantic islands of Madeira and São Tomé as the leading sugar producer in the western world. But the high returns for sugar production and the growing domination of European mercantilist trade restrictions slowly drove Brazilian sugar out of the northern European markets. These favorable conditions created new competitors in the French and English controlled islands of the West Indies at the end of the seventeenth century. By 1710, Jamaica and Barbados were already producing 13,000 tons and when the other British West Indies are added, along with the incipient production in the French West Indies, all the Caribbean islands were already producing 28,000 tons, a figure greater than 22,000 tons being exported by Brazil. The growth of the French and British sugar islands after 1700 did not eliminate Brazil as an important world sugar producer. Its monopoly position was overturned, but the continued growth of European consumption, the excellent quality of its best grades of clayed white sugar, and the growth of demand in the home and imperial markets guaranteed that the Brazilian plantations would remain a major force in the world market. In 1760, Brazil was

4

1700 and 8 million board feet by the 1820s. See Shawn William Miller, Fruitless Trees: Portuguese Conservation and Brazil’s Colonial timber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000): 95. A good description of the plantings in the northeast are found in Theresa Cristina Zavaris Tanezini, “Os industriais do açúcar na ‘plantation’ colonial (um estudo da agroindústria açucareira no nordeste),” Master’s thesis, Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 1994: chapter 5. On the milling of the cane see Schwartz, Sugar Plantations: chapter 5.

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100 80 60 40

1834

1823

1822

1821

1820

1812

1809

1806

1796

1776

1760

1710

1670

1650

1640

1630

1600

1580

20

1560

Thousands of Metric Tons

120

Graph 3.1  Estimate of sugar production in Brazil in selected years 1560–1834. Source: Noel Deer, History of Sugar, II: 113

still ranked as the world’s third largest producer behind the British and French West Indies, and accounted for 17 percent of world production.5 Although Brazil continued to grow in the nineteenth century, the total production of these islands grew more rapidly than Brazilian production (see Graph 3.1).6 The concentration of the sugar industry in the Northeastern region of Brazil during the first two centuries of Portuguese exploration, attracted to that region most of the population, wealth and political power of the colony, including the colonial administration in Salvador. The dynamics of the sugar economy formed two distinct areas of economic occupation. The coast, which primarily included Bahia and Pernambuco, was directly influenced by sugar production. In the vast hinterland, cattle raising reached areas of the current states of Piauí and Maranhão. Although there was an important demand for cattle and cattle products on the coast, as cattle raising moved away from the main coastal markets, its mercantile value was reduced but it continued to expand, strengthening its characteristics as a subsistence activity. 5

6

Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio: complexo económico social cubano del azúcar, 3 vols (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978): I, 42. Though Brazil’s relative position would decline in the last half of the eighteenth century, by the period 1815–1819 it had doubled production to some 79,000 tons per annum and now accounted for 20 percent of world sugarcane production. Fraginals, El Ingenio: II, 173. All these numbers are from Deer, History of Sugar, vol. I. On the expansion of sugar production in the Caribbean islands see Alice P. Canabrava, O açúcar nas Antilhas (1697–1755) (São Paulo: USP, Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas, 1981).

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But the relative decline of Brazil as a dominant world sugar exporter also occurred as the colonial economy was to be revitalized and transformed by the opening up of new slave based industries at the very end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century. The discovery of gold and diamond mines in the interior of Brazil guaranteed that the volume of the African slaves in Brazil would continue at an ever increasing rate and would both revitalize the colonial economy and open up a new area of settlement. Among the many attempts to develop new resources, the Crown began to explore the interior with hopes of finding mineral wealth. It turned toward the marginal region of what would be São Paulo (the Captaincy of São Vicente) and its unique population of mixed Portuguese and Amerindians to explore the interior regions of the colony. This was a relatively isolated interior region which had developed a whole system of armed expeditions known as bandeiras organized to supply local and other regions with Indian slaves by the mid-century. The royal government now subsidized such bandeiras to do mineral surveys of the interior.7 Some small gold deposits had been exploited in Jaraguá earlier in the seventeenth century in an area close to São Paulo, but the big gold discoveries occurred far from their home region. In the last decade of the seventeenth century, mineral deposits were found in a region that would become known as the captaincy of Minas Gerais. This inhospitable hinterland had no Portuguese settlers when the mines were discovered.8 The rush by the coastal whites with their slaves to these gold deposits was immediate. By the 1729 there were more than 50,000 African slaves in the province, and that number reached 100,000 by the 1730s. 7

8

During the last thirty years of the seventeenth century the Crown directly involved itself in the question of gold production. It furnished some resources, sending some mining specialists, offering prizes to the discoverers and establishing the legal norms in mining, but it aimed to have the paulistas invest most of the capital and effort. See Pedro Taques de Almeida Paes Leme, Notícias das Minas de São Paulo e dos sertões da mesma capitania (São Paulo, 1954). For the contract written by Bartolomeu Bueno da Silva with the Crown to discover gold in Goiás in 1720, see Alida C. Metcalf, Families of Planters, Peasants, and Slaves: Strategies for Survival in Santana de Parnaíba, Brazil, 1720–1820 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983): 57. At the end of the eighteenth century, the territory was practically unexplored, with only a few huge sesmarias granted in the extreme north close to Bahia. On the occupation of Minas and the distribution of sesmarias, see Angelo Alves Carrara, Contribuição para a história agrária de Minas Gerais – séculos XVIII–XIX (Ouro Preto: Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto, 1999); Ângelo Alves Carrara, “Antes das Minas Gerais. Conquista e ocupação dos sertões mineiros,” Varia História [Belo Horizonte], 23(38) (2007): 574–596.

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While white colonists doubled their numbers between 1776 and 1821, by 1833 they reached 238,000 persons. Already by the census of 1776, there were 109,000 free Afro-Brazilians and by 1808 they had overtaken the slave population in total numbers. While the slave population continued to grow, reaching eventually some 383,000 by 1872, the free Afro-Brazilians remained the dominant population group in the province from 1808 to the end of slavery (see Table 3.1).9 All of this growth led to the emergence of major urban centers in this interior province by mid-eighteenth century. Ouro Preto alone had 20,000 persons, which was only some 10,000 fewer persons than those residing in the key port cities of Salvador de Bahia and Rio de Janeiro in this period.10 In the initial period the rapidly expanding slave population of Minas primarily came directly from Africa. In a sample of early-eighteenth century censuses from the principal districts of the province, Africans consistently made up over 95 percent of the total Afro-Brazilian slave population with native-born or creole slaves making up 5 percent. There were also a number of Indian slaves, who made up 2 percent of the total slave labor force. By the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, the slave population was growing naturally through births exceeding deaths and was no longer dependent on the Atlantic slave trade and native-born Afro-Brazilians now dominated the slave population.11 The free population also grew rapidly in the eighteenth century which meant that by the time of the general imperial census of 1818, Minas Gerais was the largest captaincy of the empire, with a population of 632,000 persons, followed by Rio de Janeiro with 510,000 as the second largest province. With the inclusion of the 238,000 people of São Paulo this regional complex included close to 1.4 million persons.12 9

10

11

12

Laird W. Bergad, Slavery and the Demographic and Economic History of Minas Gerais, Brazil, 1720–1888 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): table 3.2, 91. A good survey of the available census data for Minas Gerais in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is found in Eduardo França Paiva, Escravos e libertos nas Minas Gerais do século XVIII (São Paulo: Annablume, 1995): 67–78. For a rather detailed census of Minas Gerais in 1814 with births and death listings see ANRJ, cod. 808, 1, fols. 130–132. Dauril Alden, “Late colonial Brazil, 1750–1808,” in Leslie Bethel, ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America, 11 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984): II, table 3, 605. Francisco Vidal Luna, “Estrutura da posse de escravos em Minas Gerais (1804),” in Iraci del Nero da Costa, ed., Brasil: história econômica e demográfica (São Paulo: IPE/ USP, 1986): table 6. Tarcísio Rodrigues Botelho, “População e espaço nacional,” Cadernos de História [Belo Horizonte], 7(8) (2005): 67–83.

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Table 3.1  Composition of the population of Minas Gerais from 1767–1833 Years

1776

1786

1808

1821

1833

161,800 177,274 64,695 241,969 403,769

237,653 236,617 85,321 321,938 559,591

23,215 153,801 177,017 580,786 418,986

33,238 175,837 209,075 768,666 531,013

Free Whites Free browns Free blacks Total free colored Total free

75,800 70,093 38,764 108,857 184,657

71,248 87,217 46,379 133,506 204,754

106,684 129,656 47,937 177,593 284,277 Slaves

Brown slaves Black slaves Total slaves Total population Total population of color

17,764 139,448 157,212 341,869 266,069

22,104 166,840 188,943 393,698 322,449

15,737 133,035 148,772 433,049 326,365

Source: Bergad (2004: 156, 173) and Almeida (1997: 63)

The population of Minas shared many features with the entire Brazilian population, but because of its intense use of slaves and high incidence of free colored persons, it had some unusual features. It contained the highest ratio of freed colored persons in Brazil and the majority of the population was black or brown. In a detailed local census for nine mineiro munícipios in 1804 it was estimated that 42 percent of the homes containing slave workers, though this level would decline in a later census to a more standard one-third of households having slaves.13 Nevertheless despite the decline in mining activity, Minas Gerais was still able to import slaves in the 1830s. In the southern agricultural zona da mata and the traditional mining centers the African born slaves constituted close to half the captive population. There is strong evidence that a large part of Minas Gerais during the late eighteenth century and part of the nineteenth century had slave populations that reproduced themselves, as occurred in the poorer Paraná region in the Captaincy of São Paulo.14 13 14

Luna, “Estrutura da posse de escravos em Minas Gerais (1804)”: 157–172 In our study of the population of São Paulo in 1804, we identified possible indications of a positive natural growth in the slave population of the Paraná region in that year. See Luna and Klein, “Características da População”: 71–91 and Herbert S. Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna, Slavery in Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): chapter 6.

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In response to the declining of gold mining in the late eighteenth century, there was a significant internal migration as slave and free workers shifted into other activities such as agriculture and handicrafts. The influx of Africans was reduced, the population stabilized and the regional diversity in the province became more pronounced. The south and southeast of Minas, on the border with São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, became important agricultural areas that included the production of sugar and coffee. The old mining centers, with the largest and oldest urban centers, remained as centers for artisans and traders, although agriculture also penetrated these regions. The high proportion of slaves in the region and the high level of miscegenation resulted in the largest free color population of all Brazilian regions. In the North and Northeast, with low population densities, an extensive livestock economy developed, of little economic importance due to the great distance from consumer markets. The region of Rio das Mortes, the southeast region of Minas on the natural road to Rio de Janeiro was a rich agricultural zone called the zona da mata which would develop a major coffee economy in the nineteenth century. The metropole knowing the potential of the gold mining area, tried to impose its dominion over all aspects of mining activity. It immediately sought to impose restrictions on the population migration to the mines. Uncontrolled immigration and the massive purchase of slaves, in addition to the possible economic and military weakening in other regions, could constitute a serious obstacle to royal control over the emerging wealth. It was necessary to slow the gold rush while establishing a solid administrative structure in the new captaincy, one more imposing and capable of effectively carrying out its main role, that is, collecting the taxes due to the Crown, in particular the famous fifths on gold output.15 In 1695, a Minting House was established in Taubaté and another in Rio de Janeiro in 1703, and in 1702 a new royal mining law was decreed.16 In 1709, the Captaincy of “São Paulo and Minas do Ouro” was created, separate from the Captaincy of Rio de Janeiro. The Crown also insisted that the administrators of this captaincy be located close to the mines. Then in 1720, Minas Gerais was dismembered from São Paulo and turned into its own autonomous captaincy.17 The Paulistas, 15 16 17

Raymundo Faoro, Os donos do poder: Formação do patronato político brasileiro, 2nd rev. edn (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1975): 163. Reproduced in Leme, Notícias das Minas. Francisco Iglésias, “Minas Gerais,” in Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, ed., História geral da civilização brasileira. O Brasil monárquico part II, vol. 2 (São Paulo: Difel, 1985): 366.

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who had exercised a de facto and legal power in the mines region in the early years, lost this privileged position. This was the result of the so called War of the Emboabas in which the original paulista explorers were ousted from control of the gold fields by new Portuguese and Northeastern migrants in a series of ongoing conflicts that lasted from 1707–1709. This loss of control was definitive when a revolt in Minas Gerais was repressed also in the same year as the independent captaincy of Minas Gerais was established.18 This rapid exercise of royal authority represented a major change in colonial-metropolitan relations. The structure of colonial domination in force in the first two centuries of colonization which was often indirect or only of modest control compared to the Spanish colonial empire in the Americas, now gave way to the centralization of state power and expansion of royal bureaucracy in Brazil.19 Such administrative structure, essentially focused on the collection of the royal fifths of gold production, ended having the Crown influence the organization of mining production as well as controlling the society being formed in Minas Gerais throughout the eighteenth century.20 Alluvial deposits of gold were found in the banks and beds of rivers. Initially simple panning was used. But as more capital became available, more sophisticated techniques were developed. The work of extracting metal from rivers varied, depending on the physical condition of the sites explored and the availability of resources. This went from faiscadores with 18

19 20

About the rebellions in Vila Rica, see Carla Maria Junho Anastacia, Vassalos rebeldes: violência coletiva nas Minas na primeira metade do século XVIII (Belo Horizonte: C/ Arte, 1998); Luiz Alberto Ornellas Rezende, “A camara municipal de Vila Rica e a consolidação das elites locais, 177–1736,” Master’s thesis, FFLCH-USP, São Paulo, 2015; Carlos Leonardo Kelmer Mathias, “Jogos de interesses e estratégias de ação no contexto da revolta mineira de Vila Rica, c. 1709–1736,” Master’s thesis, IFCS-URFJ, Rio de Janeiro, 2005; Márcia Almada and Rodrigo Bentes Monteiro, “Discurso e a notícia: manuscritos sobre a revolta de 1720 atribuídos a Pedro Miguel Almeida, terço Conde de Assumar,” Tempo, [Niterói], 25(1) (2019): 1–25. Faoro, Os Donos do Poder: 163–165. On the royal administraton in Brazil see Laura de Mello e Souza, O Sol e a sombra. Política e administração na América portuguesa do século XVIII (São Paulo: Cia das Letras, 2006); Faoro, Os donos do poder: chapters 5–6; A. J. R. Russel Wood, “O governo local na América Portuguesa: um estudo de divergência cultural,” Revista de História, 55(109) (1977): 25–79; Ângela Barreto Xavier and Antônio Manuel Hespanha, “A representação da sociedade e do poder,” in José Mattoso, História de Portugal (Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1998), IV: 113–140; Jorge Caldeira, História da riqueza no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Estação Brasil, 2017). On the administration in Minas Gerais see João Teixeira Coelho, Instrução para o governo da capitania de Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte: Fundação João Pinheiro, 1994).

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simple pans working in river beds,21 to sophisticated and costly forms of extraction, such as those that required major civil construction works. The work of faiscadores always existed and under certain conditions, such as in slow-moving rivers or in places with low gold content, their yield was comparable to or supplanted that of expensive mines. Miners with funding and a significant number of slaves built large-scale sluices as well as complex constructions which altered the course of rivers or streams. They also worked in dry areas where there was sedimentary material containing gold. Over the years the work became more complex, both in terms of civil construction as well as with the instruments and equipment used to extract gold from sedimentary material in old water courses.22 The mining code of 1702 and the numerous decrees which followed aimed primarily to serve the interests of the Crown; in fact, the exploitation of gold, silver and precious stones constituted, so to speak, a business of the king. Instead of direct extraction by the Crown, the government granted mining rights to private individuals to encourage new discoveries. However, once a new area was located, the Crown exercised control of the activity in order to guarantee that the gold was minted at the Royal Mints and that the royal fifth was paid. The most important feature of the 1702 legislation was in the way it allocated mining land. Abandoning the criterion of defining mining rights by fixed land grants, which had characterized previous mining laws, it used the workforce as a determining factor in defining extraction rights.23 Under the 1702 mining code, when the discovery of an exploitable area was reported, the Superintendent of Mines was to allocate ownership by a lottery among the miners who were present, in proportion to the number of slaves they owned. Whoever had twelve slaves would receive an area of data of thirty braças (about sixty-six meters).24 Those who had less than twelve slaves would 21 22

23 24

Caio Prado Junior, Formação do Brasil contemporâneo (colônia) (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1969): 179. On the location of gold and the mining processes employed, see the classic early-eighteenth century study of Antonil, Cultura e opulência do Brasil; Francisco Eduardo de Andrade and Dejanira Ferreira de Rezende, “Estilo de minerar ouro nas Minas Gerais escravistas, século XVIII,” Revista de História de São Paulo, 168 (2013): 382–413; Andréa Lisly Gonçalves, “Escravidão, herança ibérica e africana e as técnicas de mineração em Minas Gerais no século XVIII,” in Anais do XI Seminário sobre a Economia Mineira (Cedeplar: Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 2004): 1–23. Alice P. Canabrava, “João Antônio Andreoni e sua Obra,” in Cultura e opulência do Brasil: 98. As the mining grants were distributed along the riverbanks, the measurement was linear along the watercourse. Francisco Vidal Luna, Minas Gerais: escravos e senhores (São Paulo: IPE-USP, 1981).

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receive a smaller data, in proportion to the number of slaves they owned. Moreover those who had more than twelve slaves could participate again in the lottery after all interested parties had finished getting their share.25 Although Minas Gerais represented the first mining center and the largest gold producer, gold was also found in Goiás and Mato Grosso. The discovery of gold in the current state of Mato Grosso, in the far west of the colony was discovered by paulistas in 1719.26 The gold discovery in Goiás was also made by paulistas, in 1725, on the banks of the Rio Vermelho.27 The two areas had similar trajectories as those for Minas Gerais, with a strong population influx, and supply crises even more serious than in Minas Gerais due to the difficulty of access in the center of the continent. In addition, the two areas faced serious conflicts with the indigenous people who occupied those areas.28 25

26

27

28

The miner who had communicated the discovery would be entitled to two datas (or mining grants), regardless of the slaves owned. The Crown would also receive a date. The law prevented the sale of the data and stipulated a period of forty days for the start of exploration. On the exploration of the mines of Mato Grosso, see Joseph Barbosa de Sá, “Relação das povoações do Cuiabá e Mato Grosso de seus princípios até os presentes tempos,” Anais da Biblioteca Nacional, 23 (1901): 4–77. Affonso de E. Taunay, “Monções cuyabanas no século XVIII,” in História Geral das Bandeiras Paulistas (São Paulo: Imprensa Oficial, 1950); Tiago Kramer de Oliveira, “Descontruíndo velhos mapas, revelando espacializações: a economia colonial no centro da América do Sul (primeira metade do século XVIII),” PhD thesis, FFLCH-USP, São Paulo, 2012; André Nicacio Lima, “Caminhos da integração, fronteiras da política: a formação das províncias de Goiás e Mato Grosso,” Master’s thesis, FFLCH-USP, São Paulo, 2010; Nauk Maria de Jesus, O governo local na fronteira oeste: a rivalidade entre Cuiabá e Vila Bela no século XVIII (Dourados: Editora UFGO, 2011); Maria Gabriela de Araújo Guimarães, “A América portuguesa vista de Mato Grosso. Os diálogos de José Barbosa de Sá (segunda metade do século XVIII),” Master’s thesis, Universidade Portucalense, Porto, 2013. On gold mining in Goías, see Luís Palacin, O século do ouro em Goiás: 1722–1822 estrutura e conjuntura numa capitania de minas, 4th edn (Goiânia: Editora da UCG, 1994); Buarque de Holanda, Monções; W. L. von Eschwege, Pluto brasiliensis (Belo Horizonte: Itatiaia; São Paulo: Ed. Da Universidade de São Paulo, 1979), 53–66; Boxer, Golden Age of Brazil, chapter 10; Deusa Maria Rodrigues Boaventura, “Urbanização em Goiás no Século XVIII,” PhD thesis, FAU-USP, São Paulo, 2007; Martha Victor Vieira, “A conquista dos povos indígenas e os discursos de decadência nas narrativas de Goiás oitocentista,” Métes, História e Cultura, 17 (34) (2018): 169–185. According to Pinto, one of the characteristics of the mines in Goiás was their spread over a vast area, unlike Minas Gerais and Mato Grosso. Virgílio Noya Pinto, O ouro brasileiro e o comércio anglo-português (São Paulo: Ed. Nacional, 1979): 99. Mary Karach, “Catequese e cativeiro: política indigenista em Goiás, 1780–1889,” in Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, ed., História dos índios no Brasil (São Paulo, Fapesp/Cia das Letras, 1992): 397–412; Andrey Cordeio Ferreira, “Conquista colonial, resistência indígena e formação do Estado-Nacional: os índios Guaicuru e Guana no Mato Grosso dos séculos XVIII–XIX,” Revista de Antropologia [São Paulo], 52(1) (2009): 97–136; Affonso de E. Taunay. “Monções Cuyabanas”: vol. 11, 29.

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There is no reliable record regarding the production of gold and diamonds in Minas Gerais and other mining areas such as Goiás and Mato Grosso. There are several primary sources that present estimates of gold production and the collection of the royal fifth tax.29 Although these sources present divergent data, all the contemporary reports emphasize the high level of illegal gold deviation and tax evasion with a consequent underreporting of actual production. But the trends clearly indicate a rapid and an intense rise in production in the first half of the eighteenth century and a fall with the same intensity in the second half. In the case of Minas Gerais, the peak of production would have occurred in the 1730s, but production continued to rise in the colony due to the contribution of gold extracted from Mato Grosso and Goiás, which reached their greatest production in the middle of the century (see Graph 3.2).30 Although there are divergences in the shape of the curves, data on the arrival of gold in Portugal presents the same format, showing an ascending phase until the 1740s, and a systematic decline until the end of the century.31 Although the gold mining boom lasted well into the second half of the eighteenth century, it was also sustained by a boom in the export of diamonds in the later eighteenth century (see Graph 3.3). In 1727, diamonds were found in the Serro do Frio region, an area with significant gold mining. Given the economic importance of diamonds, gold mining was soon banned in the region with the cancelation of all private mining rights. In contrast to gold mining, diamond mining would remain directly under the control of the Crown. The 1730 diamond mining law 29

30 31

On the production of gold and tributes in the eighteenth century in Minas Gerais see: Calógeras, As minas do Brasil e sua legislação (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1905): chapter XIV; Coelho, Instrução para o governo da capitania de Minas Gerais; Eschwege Pluto brasiliensis, 197–206; Noya Pinto, O ouro brasileiro; Kenneth Maxwell, Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750–1808, 2nd rev. edn (New York: Routledge, 2004) Statistical appendix. Michel Morineau, Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux métaux: les retours des trésors américains d’après les gazettes hollandaises (XVIe–XVIIIe siècles) (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Gustavo Acioli Lopes e Leonardo Marques, “O outro lado da moeda: estimativas e impactos do ouro do Brasil no tráfico transatlântico de escravos (Costa da Mina, c. 1700–1750),” CLIO: Revista de Pesquisa Histórica [Recife], 37 (2019). To this end, we use the classic work of Noya Pinto for Minas production (O ouro brasileiro: chapter 2) and Morineau for the arrival of Brazilian gold in Europe. Morineau, Incroyables gazettes: 135–137 and 157. On the organization of the shipments to Portugal, see Leonor Freire Costa and Maria Manuela Rocha, “Remessas do ouro brasileiro: organização mercantil e problemas de agência em meados do século XVIII,” Análise Social, XLII (182) (2007): 77–98.

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18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4

1699 1703 1707 1711 1715 1719 1723 1727 1731 1735 1739 1743 1747 1751 1755 1759 1763 1767 1771 1775 1779 1783 1787 1791 1795 1799

2

Minas Gerais

Goiás

Mato Grosso

total

Graph 3.2  Estimates of gold production 1699–1799. Source: Pinto (1979: 76–79, 114, 218–222)

200 160 120 80

Estimate of Pinto

1789

1786

1780

1783

1777

1771

1774

1768

1762

1765

1759

1756

1750

1753

1747

1744

1741

1738

1732

1735

1729

40

Estimate of Morineau

Graph 3.3  Estimated Brazilian diamond imports to Europe 1729–1791 (tons). Source: Pinto (1979) and Morineau (1985)

stipulated that diamond mines were royal property. A formal Diamond District was demarcated a year later which included the northern part of Minas Gerais and centered on the municipality of Diamantina, and access to the extractive areas was restricted. In 1734, all exploration in the area was prohibited and eventually the Crown in 1739 made the extraction a royal monopoly which it granted to one contractor or consortium of contractors, who bought the right to exploit the entire demarcated territory. Contractors acquired great wealth and power, and

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apparently withheld much of what they extracted from the Crown.32 This regime prevailed until 1771, when the government decided to take over direct control and created the Real Extração organization which in turn lasted until 1845.33 The Real Extração exercised rigid administrative control over both the mines and the local region.34 Diamond exports were substantial throughout the eighteenth century with a peak in the 1730s and another major growth in the second half of the century (see Graph 3.3) In the eighteenth century, Minas Gerais represented the colony’s most dynamic center. Already by the 1720s there were close interconnections between Minas Gerais merchants and the metropolitan market which was the result of the great consumption capacity of the newly founded and growing city populations of Minas Gerais. The local mining elite as well quickly identified and seized opportunities to trade in a wide range of goods, both from the mining sector and the agro-pastoral sector.35 All this explains the steady growth of a national market as more and more regions supplied goods to the gold mining areas. Despite the growth of vibrant export markets from the Northeast and Rio de Janeiro in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the internal market was until then quite undeveloped. But in the first half of the eighteenth century, complex market connections were established from all the coastal settlement regions to this newly developing the interior far from the coast. This new interior center had a high purchasing power due to its population density and to the relative dispersion of the mining wealth among its inhabitants. This new network of connections directed toward the interior of the country came to constitute the first truly national market. It contributed to the connection of regions and captaincies hitherto closed to regional markets. 32

33

34 35

Junia Ferreira Furtado, O livro da Capa Verde. O regimento diamantino de 1771 e a vida no distrito diamantino no período da real extração (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra e Annablume, 2012): 25–27. Joaquim Felício dos Santos, Memórias do distrito diamantino (Belo Horizonte: Itatiaia, and Edups São Paulo, 1976); Furtado, O livro da Capa Verde; Ângelo Alves Carrara, “Desvendando a riqueza na terra dos diamantes,” Revista do Arquivo Público Mineiro, XLI (2005): 40–59; Régis Clemente Quintão, “Sob o ‘régio braço’: a real extração e o abastecimento no Distrito Diamantino (1772–1805),” Master’s thesis, UFMG, Belo Horizonte, 2017; Junia Ferreira Furtado, “O distrito Diamantino,” www.fafich.ufmg .br/pae/apoio/distritodiamantino.pdf. Furtado, O livro da Capa Verde, 25. Joaquim Felício dos Santos, Memórias do distrito diamantino: chapter XLII. See Laird W. Bergad, Slavery and the Demographic and Economic History of Minas Gerais, Brazil, 1720–1888 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 7–14

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But Minas was not the only region to grow in this period. The eighteenth century also saw the expansion of the cattle industry in the southern regions of the colony. Cattle were introduced by the Europeans in the early days of colonization. Extensive, low-productivity livestock ranching was traditionally practiced with immense herds occupying a large part of the Brazilian territory. Many of the colonial and republican latifundias were essentially large cattle ranches with limited agricultural activity with a mix of free and slave labor.36 The first area concentrating on cattle raising was the Northeast and its breeding penetrated deep into the sertão, far from the coast and the market. Some of the animals were slaughtered for their hides and to produce beef jerky, but a large proportion was shipped hundreds of kilometers to the coastal sugar regions and slaughtered there for their meat.37 The free population of the sugar regions consumed the beef and the slaves were given animal parts of lesser value and beef jerky for their consumption. Brazil also initially produced salted beef in Ceará and later in other Northeastern areas along the coast.38 The availability of coastal salt led to preserved beef processing units, but the output was locally consumed or sent to other Brazilian population areas by coastal shipping.39 But it was the Southern Brazilian region which would become the most important Brazilian producer of salted and dried beef in the eighteenth century. Cattle were introduced by the Jesuits and expanded into the southern grasslands in large numbers and were hunted by Brazilians for their leather. Slowly, the Portuguese established ranches in the region which by the late eighteenth century became known as charqueadas, or ranches which produced charque or sun-dried beef. Most of them were developed in the province of Rio Grande do Sul, which also produced hides, tallow and grease with African slave and free labor. These 36

37 38 39

Luiz R. B. Mott, “Os índios e a pecuária nas fazendas de gado do Piauí colonial,” Revista  de Antropologia (1979): 61–78; Abreu, Capítulos de História Colonial: 106–108; and Maria Yedda Leite Linhares, “Pecuária, alimentos e Sistemas agrários no Brasil (séculos XVII e XVIII),” in Arquivos do Centro Cultural Calouste Gulbenkian, Le Portugal et l’Europe Atlantique, le Brésil et l’Amérique Latine. Mélanges offerts à Fréderic Mauro (Lisbon, Paris, 1995): 5–16 Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz, “Pecuária e vida pastoril: sua evolução em duas regiões brasileiras,” Revista do Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros, 19 (1977): 55–78. The charqueadas of Ceará date from the period prior to 1749. Raimundo Girão, Evolução histórica cearense (Fortaleza: Etene/BNB, 1986): 139. Valdelice Carneiro Girão, “As charqueadas,” Revista do Instituto do Ceará (1996): 72–92; Almir Leal de Oliveira, “As carnes secas do Ceará e o mercado Atlântico no século XVIII,” www.humanas.ufpr.br/portal/cedope/files/2011/12/As-carnes-secas-doCear%C3%A1-e-o-mercado-Almir-Leal-de-Oliveira.pdf.

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products along with beef jerky accounted for more than three-quarters of the province’s exports, driving the regional economy and guaranteeing the continuous demand for cattle raised in the region’s ranches.40 Thus by the eighteenth century these processed meat exports had become a serious source of income for ranches from Santa Catarina to the Argentine pampas region. Dried beef was destined mainly for American markets, above all for Cuba, the United States and Brazil. In all regions the ranching economy was involved in international trade through the export of hides, and by the end of the colonial period hides and skins represented around 10 percent of Brazilian exports.41 Also developing in this period was the raising of mules in the southern grasslands of the province of Rio Grande do Sul. Mules were raised in the south of Brazil and brought in large numbers to the São Paulo captaincy, particularly to the town of Sorocaba, which became the great center for supplying mules to São Paulo itself, as well as the mining districts of Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso and Goiás.42 In fact the basic form of transport in the interior was by mule trains, and thousands of animals were used throughout Brazil to bring products to market. By the end of the colonial period it was estimated that tens of thousand of mules per annum were moved through the Sorocaba market. It was estimated that Minas in the 1830s alone used some 53,000 mules to move goods to the coastal provinces. In turn, it imported 50,000 to 70,000 mules a year from São Paulo and had a total working stock of some 260,000 of such animals used for internal transport as well as farm labor.43 40

41

42

43

Jonas Moreira Vargas, “‘A aristocracia do sebo’ riqueza, prestígio social e estilo de vida entre os charqueadores de Pelotas (Rio Grande do Sul, 1850–1890),” Revista Digital Estudios Historicos [Uruguay], VIII(17) (2016): 23. Estatística Commercio Maritimo do Brazil, Exercicio de 1872–1873, organizado pelo Dr. Sebastião Ferreira Soares, vol. II, 2nd part (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1884), second part. Herbert S. Klein, “A oferta de muares no Brasil central,” Estudos Econômicos [São Paulo], 19(2) (1989): 347–372; Alice P. Canabrava, “Uma economia de decadência: os níveis de riqueza na capitania de São Paulo, 1765/67,” Revista Brasileira de Economia, 26(4) (1972): 95–124; Renato Leite Marcondes and Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak, “Movimentação de tropas no centro-sul da colônia: aspectos estruturais do mercado de animais na segunda metade do século XVIII,” Estudos Históricos [Rio de Janeiro], 40 (2007): 47–69; Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak and Cristiano Corte Restitutti, “Os muares e as minas: realções entre a demanda mineira e o mercado de animais de carga nos séculos XVIII e XIX,” Anais do XII Seminário sobre Economia Mineira (2006): 1–18. Johann Jakob Sturz, A Review, Financial, Statistical, & Commercial, of the Empire of Brazil and Its Resources: Together with a Suggestion of the Expediency and Mode of Admitting Brazilian and Other Foreign Sugars Into Great Britain for Refining and Exportation (London: E. Wilson, 1837), 113–114.

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The area north and northeast of the mines also felt the dynamic effect of mining as the São Francisco river route became an important way of supplying the mines, as well as a diversion for gold escaping taxation. The difficulty in controlling this route led the Crown to prohibit its use, but this was ineffective as this route continued to be widely used. Along this road an important cattle breeding area was established, essentially focused on supplying the mines to the south.44 The Crown was so concerned about the possible smuggling carried out by this route that, by Royal Letter of 1703 it sought to stimulate cattle breeding in the gold zone itself with the aim of avoiding commercial contacts with the areas further north.45 Although São Paulo lost population in the initial moments of the occupation of Minas Gerais, its privileged position in the supply routes to the mining regions provided the opening of an effective market for the captaincy’s products, basically foodstuffs. These supplies not only went through the traditional old road route, but also via the new road with its coastal villages sending their supplies to Rio de Janeiro. A clear indication of this boom in the economy was the major importation of African slaves who had been practically nonexistent until the end of the eighteenth century. Thus, in 1765 of the 84,000 people who resided in the captaincy, some 23,000 were African slaves.46 Nevertheless São Paulo’s total population was still small compared to the traditional sugar plantation captaincies of Pernambuco and Bahia, which had an estimated combined population of over half a million persons by the late 1770s, though Minas Gerais was now the largest captaincy with 320,000 persons at this time.47 Using detailed local censuses from twenty-five towns in the captaincy of São Paulo in 1777 we can see in greater detail the distribution of this new African slave population. Slaves were present in almost a quarter of the homes and represented 19 percent of the total population. The average number of slaves per owner was five slaves. Owners with up to five slaves represented over two-thirds of slave owners and they owned 44

45 46 47

Márcio Roberto Alves dos Santos, “Fronteiras do sertão baiano: 1640–1750,” PhD thesis, FFLCH-UP, São Paulo, 2010; Carrara, “Antes das Minas Gerais”: 574–596; Raphael Freitas Santos, “Minas com Bahia: mercados e negócios em m circuito mercantil setecentista,” PhD thesis, Insituto de Ciências Humanas e Filosofia da UFF, Niterói, 2013. Carta régia de 7 maio 1703 cited in Zemella, O abastecimento: 235. Silva, Joaquim Norberto de Souza, Investigações sobre os recenseamentos da população geral do império (São Paulo: IPE-USP, 1870, reproduced 1986). Dauril Alden, “The population of Brazil in the late eighteenth century: A preliminary study,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 43(2) (1963): 191, table II.

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30 percent of the slaves. Over half of the slaves were owned by masters who held up to ten captives. In other words, São Paulo had become a slave society, with a wide distribution of captives among households. Both heads of households and slave owners were men and were primarily white. This population structure reflected an agrarian society, dedicated to livestock and subsistence products for self-consumption and for the market. With the depletion of the easily exploited gold deposits, miners were forced to carry out larger works; mining activity itself became more stable and this fact contributed to the establishment of villages, towns and finally districts. Soon churches were erected and royal authorities were installed in all these settlements.48 The parishes formed the bases for the subsequent growth of villages, which then grew into royal towns, and then the towns were grouped into regional districts.49 Already by 1711, the first towns were created with Vila Rica (Ouro Preto) becoming the capital of the new province when in 1720, the mining area was separated from the captaincy of São Paulo and made into an independent captaincy. But the region which experienced the most growth due to its connection to the mining market would be Rio de Janeiro. Strategically located, from the opening of the new road at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Rio de Janeiro and its port would soon become the main center of trade with mines.50 From he port of Rio de Janeiro came the slaves and other imported goods from Portugal, Africa, Asia and Europe in demand in Minas Gerais. Also gold, at least the metal legally exported from Minas Gerais, flowed through that port. By 1740, merchant income surpassed agrarian income in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In 1769 the city already had around 30,000 inhabitants which would grow to around 50,000 by 1808. In that same year, the entire capitania had some 183,000 persons, making it the fourth largest region in the colony, after 206,000 in 48

49

50

According to Fonseca certain villages gave proof of stability, not only through mining, but also through the progressive development of agriculture and trade which justified the establishment of parishes. Claúdia Damasceno Fonseca, Arraiais e vilas d’el rei. Espaço e poder nas Minas setencentistas (Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2011): 90–91. Fonseca, Arraiais e vilas: 138–139; Caio César Boschi, “Nem tudo que reluz vem do ouro,” in Tamás Szmrecsányi, ed., História econômica do período colonial (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1996): 59. Fernando Gaudereto Lamas. “Para além do ouro das Gerais: outros aspectos da economia mineira no setecentos,” Revista de História Econômica & Economia Regiona Aplicada, 3(4) (2008); Antonio Carlos Jucá de Sampaio, “Na curva do tempo: a economia fluminense na primeira metade do século XVIII,” Mnemosine Revista, 1(1) (2010): 133–142.

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Pernambuco, 336,000 in Bahia and Minas Gerais being the largest with an estimated population of 350,000.51 Equally merchants and planters produced the food from its own farms in the Capitania de Rio de Janeiro which would be consumed in the capital as well as in the interior captaincies. The size of these local farms and mills was impressive in terms of slave labor. Thus in 1759, Jesuits owned three engenhos in the Capitania with an average of 311 slaves per mill. Their smallest fazenda of the five it owned had 190 slaves and the largest one had 1,016 slaves.52 The port also furnished supplies to the rest of Brazil. Thus between 1802 and 1812 Rio exported European goods as well as manioc flour, sugar and coffee to the ports of Rio Grande do Sul. Even Pernambuco participated in this trade with Recife also trans shipping European products and American produced food to the southern colony.53 In turn, Rio Grande exported hides, dried meat (charque) and tallow to Rio de Janeiro with most of the hides re-exported to Portugal. Up to 1808 the charque went primarily to Salvador de Bahia and to a lesser extent Recife and Rio de Janeiro and was a staple food used for feeding the slaves. But with the expansion of Rio de Janeiro, the capitancy itself became the primary importer of charque after 1815.54 The enrichment of Rio de Janeiro, as well as the Crown’s desire to centralize the colonial administration closer to the gold-producing zone, explains the transfer of the colony’s headquarters from Salvador to Rio de Janeiro in 1763. It was the principal Atlantic port of the South-Central and Southern Region and the most active one on the Atlantic coast. It had contact with Europe as well as other parts of the Americas. This growth and prominence of Rio de Janeiro was an indication that the Northeast was slowly losing the position of prominence that it had occupied in the first two centuries, in favor of the Southern region, which until then had played a secondary economic and political role. 51

52

53

54

Botelho, “População e espaço nacional”: 75, table 1; and the estimate for the port city in 1760 comes from Carlos A. M. Lima, Artífices do Rio de Janeiro (1790–1808) (Rio de Janeiro: Apicuri, 2008): 59, table 2. Marcia Amantino, “A escravidão negra e a Companhia de Jesus no Rio de Janeiro, século XVIII,” in Maria Rosario Pimentel and Maria do Rosario Monteiro, eds., Senhores e escravos nas sociedades Ibero-Atlânticas (Lisbon: CHAM, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2019): 232. Maximiliano M. Menz, “Entre dois impérios: formação do Rio Grande na crise do antigo sistema colonial (1777–1822),” PhD thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2006), chapter 2. Rudy Bauss, “Rio Grande do Sul in the Portuguese Empire: The Formative Years, 1777– 1808,” The Americas, 39(4) (1983): 523–524.

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As other studies have shown, the possession of slaves in Brazil was widespread, with a presence in 20 to 30 percent of the households. Even in the Northeastern sugar region, there was a similarity in the slave ownership structure, with a large number of smallholders, reducing the average far below what would be expected in an area of large-scale export farming based on slave labor. Thus Minas already was beginning to look like the rest of Brazil, with a wide distribution of slaves as domestics, artisans and workers skilled and unskilled in all industries, agriculture, transport and commercial activities. Here as elsewhere slaves exercised low-skilled occupations, such as in agricultural gangs, but also were in high skilled jobs in sugar mills, in manufacturing, in trades, including exercising the functions of sailors. Furthermore, despite the oppressive regime of slavery, in certain activities or occupations, slaves had more autonomy, such as when they were rented out or when they served as gold prospectors or muleteers. In activities of this type and in domestic services, there would be greater opportunity for manumission. Without doubt, the single most important occupation in colonial Brazil was agricultural labor as it was for the nineteenth century and well into the second half of the twentieth century. Even as late as 1920, some 71 percent of the Brazilian population worked in agriculture.55 Most of the slaves and most of the free population produced food crops. Most agricultural units were small, did not employ slaves or servants (agregados) and many were just subsistence farms. But it would seem that the majority of even these non-slave owning farms produced a modest surplus for sale at the local market. Next there was an intermediate group of middle-sized farmers with a few slaves who did produce both for consumption and for the market. Then there were of course large commercial plantations run by slaves as well as large ranches of over 1,000 hectares which were market oriented. Within this world there were numerous distinctions and levels of stratification. While the number of slave owners varied from place to place, most studies now accept that approximately 30 percent or so of the free population households owned slaves.56 Thus taking a hypothetical 55

56

Thomas William Merrick and Douglas H. Graham, Population and Economic Development in Brazil, 1800 to the Present (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979): 153, table VII-2. This is the approximate overall rate that Costa found in his detailed study of regions all over Brazil in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, though regional variation was quite large. Iraci del Nero da Costa, Arraia-miúda: um estudo sobre os não-proprietários de escravos no Brasil (São Paulo: MGSP Editores, 1991): 1.

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agricultural zone of say 1,000 households, it can be assumed that they contained four persons per household, for a population of 4,000 free persons. Some 300 slave-owning households held an average of four slaves, which meant that they totaled 1,200 slaves as well as 1,200 free persons. This left the remaining 700 non-slave owning farming households with 2,800 free persons. Thus the non-slave owning households accounted for 70 percent of the households but only 54 percent of the total population. While no single region precisely fits this description, and several contained small villages with populations not engaged in agriculture, the majority of the population almost everywhere was engaged in farming. It is evident that the poorest of the farms were the non-slave owning ones, which represented the majority of the farm households. It can be assumed that these were all quite small and mostly subsistence units with at best modest contact with outside markets. Initially, many of these early farm families engaged in an itinerant agriculture in the frontier forests practicing an extensive slash and burn agriculture and constantly moving their homes depending on land fertility.57 These were mostly subsistence farmers who were quite migratory and formed the lowest rung of the social classes, and often included forros (liberated slaves) as well as free persons.58 As towns developed and the frontier receded, the next stage was more intensively farming a fixed parcel of land and producing a minimum surplus for sale. This eventually led to land titles and a land market. A minority of the non-slave owning farms added agregados, or single male workers to the family group and were more consistently able to produce surpluses for the market. But all farms produced the basic staples of corn, beans, manioc and rice.59 Also a significant number of these non-slave households were made up of free persons of color.60 57 58

59

60

Maria Luiza Marcílio, Crescimento demográfico e evolucão agrária paulista 1700–1836 (São Paulo: Hucitec, 2000): 256–263. Sheila de Castro Faria, A colônia em movimento: fortuna e família no cotidiano colonial (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1998), 108–114. There also seems to be landless vagabonds who did not engage in agriculture, but the available data on this is so limited it is difficult to say if they were a significant population except in the ideology of the elite. See Mello e Souza, Desclassificados do ouro: chapter IV.2. Costa, Arraia-miúda, tables 6.1 to 6.9; and Francisco Vidal Luna and Herbert S. Klein, Slavery and the Economy of São Paulo, 1750–1850 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003): 80–81. This varied from a dominance in the southern states, to just 15 to 20 percent in other regions. Costa, Arraia-miúda, tables 4.23 to 4.28.

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At the next level were the farmers that owned slaves who had larger farms and were able to produce large surpluses since slaves were only bought with cash and or saleable goods in the local market. These went from those who owned a few slaves to the large commercial plantations with large numbers of them. But everywhere the land was unequally distributed. One of the few studies available on late colonial land distribution shows that even a frontier region like the province of São Paulo, which at the time still had relatively few slaves had a land distribution equal to the high inequality levels found in Brazil in the twentieth century.61 Although agricultural activities were predominant throughout the colonial territory, there was a significant portion of the free and slave population not directly related to agricultural production. These in turn were divided into unskilled and skilled laborers. Much of the unskilled manual labor was done by slaves, who were as well represented in rural as in urban areas. Above them were the skilled artisans, in which all types of free and slave, white and colored could be found. But in most cases where examination was required to practice a craft, whites were the only ones to hold master positions. This was because the Portuguese brought their guild system with them when they settled in Brazil and they held that other color groups could not hold these key positions. Called corporations, these guilds were organized by craft and were run by a master elected by other masters in that corporation. The masters elected a judge (juiz do povo) and notary for their profession on an annual basis. The judge had to be a master and the notary had to be able to read, write and do arithmetic. Their role was to establish the rules for training in the profession, and they were the final judges who certified candidates who wished to practice their profession. They also represented the interests of the guild before the local government which in turn established standard prices for all artisan products.62 The corporations required that the master’s workshop had to have at least two apprentices. They were also organized in a hierarchical order. First came the apprentices (aprendizes) then the journeymen (oficiais) and finally the masters (mestres) who owned the shop. They also could contain auxiliary workers called servants or day laborers (jornaleiros) 61

62

The gini index for land distribution was 0.86. The GINI distributionof agricultural lands in 1920 was 0.83 and in 2006 it was 0.87. Herbert S. Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna, Feeding the World: Brazil’s Transformation into a Modern Agricultural Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018): 26–27. Maria Helena Ochi Flexor, “Os oficiais mecânicos em duas regiões brasileiras: Salvador e São Paulo,” Universitas, 37 (1986): 39.

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who did not participate in examinations or have the possibility of moving up the hierarchy but were part of the master’s labor force. Most of these servants/day laborers were pretos and pardos, free and forros as well as slaves. All masters, apprentices and journeymen were white and non-whites could not participate in the examinations or occupy any of these positions.63 But this system of artisan corporations was more limited in the colony than in the metropolis. By the early eighteenth century, the corporations had lost their right to membership in the city councils (câmaras). Also only the largest cities like Salvador and Rio de Janeiro had a full examination system and a large complement of crafts. In contrast the minor cities such as São Paulo had only a few crafts registered and did not undertake any exams. Here whites predominated as blacksmiths and potters and the mulattos in the trades of tailors, carpenters and shoemakers, and blacks as masons. In occupations which did not have examinations, persons of color and both free and slave were dominant. In the major towns as well, Afro-Brazilians dominated in land and sea transport, as street vendors (usually a female occupation), in those occupations requiring heavy labor and specialized crafts such as barbers/surgeons. There were also occupations which required high skills, such as sailors, musicians, painters and sculptors which had no examinations and were not exclusive in terms of color and status. Even in early mining activity and in sugar production there were master craftsmen who were not examined. But as those economies matured, a more powerful guild system was established.64 Thus the artisans who were bidders for the construction of the town of Mariana in the eighteenth century were all master craftsmen and all were of Portuguese birth. Between them, these carpenters and masons had 101 slaves of whom twenty-four were skilled in their respective trades. One of these master builders provided after his death for four of these slave craftsmen to be freed so long as they completed the buildings they had been working on.65 In Vila Rica in 1764, some 594 63 64

65

Flexor, “Os oficiais mecânicos em duas regiões brasileiras”: 38. It was only in 1725 that the Minas Gerais town of Vila Rica adopted the formal examination system for all artisans, though it also gave out short-term licenses to practice a profession without examination. Luiz Antônio Cunha, O ensino de ofícios artesanais e manufatureiros no Brasil escravocrata (São Paulo: UNESP, 2000): 35. Danielle de Fátima Eugênio, “Labor mecânico: oficiais mecânicos arrematantes de obras junto ao Senado da Câmara de Mariana, século XVIII,” Primeiro Encontro de Pesquisa histórica da UFMG, (2012): 89–93; and Fabrício Luiz Pereira, “Vivendo da arte mecânica: a importância social dos artífices em Mariana no século XVIII,” Primeiro Encontro de Pesquisa histórica da UFMG, (2012): 141.

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workers were listed as meeting specialized construction demands, such as carpenters, masons, saddlers, blacksmiths. In the case of the builders, of the 38 masons (11 were freedmen), of the 56 carpenters (30 were freedman), and of 34 carpenters (21 were freedman).66 Another study on eighteenth-century Vila Rica shows that many of the great builders (master builders, bricklayers, construction supervisors and carpenters) had African slaves and free browns working with them. Some of these slaves held positions of recognized responsibility.67 Even areas which had no formal examination, such as church painters (of panels and ceilings) were at first dominated by Portuguese and even their apprentices were either Portuguese or native-born whites. Here, as well, artists owned slaves who did all the laboring tasks. Only after a generation or two did native-born whites appear as master painters or builders and even a few free Afro-Brazilians as well. Most notable among these artists was the famous pardo mineiro sculptor and architect Antônio Francisco Lisboa (called the “Aleijadinho”) who was the son of a Portuguese master craftsmen and a slave.68 Also some of the brotherhoods of artisans toward the late eighteenth century began to admit free Afro-Brazilians. In 1775, the Recife brotherhood Confraria e Irmandade de São José do Ribamar dos Quatro Ofícios permitted brown and black master artisans to enroll.69 But in the smaller and less developed town these crafts were open from the beginning and soon Afro-Brazilians appeared as masters with most of them being free, though skilled slave masters were not uncommon. Thus for example, in the construction of the city jail (cadeia) in the town of São Paulo in 1789–1791, the work was carried out by nine master craftsmen (carpenters, masons, etc.), of whom four were slaves listed as master artisans. They employed forty-four free 66

67

68 69

Fabiano Gomes da Silva, “Pedra e Cal: os construtores de Vila Rica no século XVIII (1730–1800),” Master’s thesis, FFCH-UFMG, São Paulo, 2007; see also Geraldo Silva Filho, “O oficialato mecânico em Vila Rica no século dezoito e a participação do escravo e do negro,” Master’s thesis, FFLCH-USP, São Paulo, 1996; Ribeiro de Oliveira and Buchidid Loewen, “As condições de produção do mobiliário”: 149–169; and Siqueira Bueno, “Sistema de produção da arquitetura”: 321–361. See the two essays Fabiano Gomes da Silva, “Chafarizes e macaras: pequena referência à participação africana na produção artística mineira,” and Camila Fernanda Guimarães Santiago,“Cativos da arte, artífices da liberdade: a participação de escravos especializados no Barroco Mineiro,” in Eduardo França Paiva, ed., Escravidão, miscenagem e histórias comparadas (São Paulo: Annablume, 2008); and Fabiano Gomes da Silva, “Viver honradamente de ofícios: trabalhadores manuais livres, arantias e rendeiros em Mariana (1709–1750),” PhD thesis, UFJF, Juiz de Fora, 2017. Martins, “Aprendendo o ofício da pintura”: 163–177. Siqueira Bueno, “Sistema de produção da arquitetura”: 336.

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workers and forty-seven slaves in the construction.70 Throughout the colonial period there were conflicts about maintaining the color line even in the major cities, but all this ended by 1830. Examinationss were abolished, price listing ended and all the crafts were opened to all the various laboring and color/status groups in the society.71 One of the most important and diverse class of persons in colonial Brazil was the merchants. This group included everyone from highly capitalized merchants engaged in long-distance, international and even intercontinental trade, to shopkeepers and small-scale itinerant venders selling goods on urban streets or to rural households (mascates, viandantes dos caminhos). It included wholesalers and retailers, those who owned stores and those who lent money. There were others who produced goods in a workshop or on a farm and sold them to the public, as well as merchants who carried goods and slaves throughout the colony. There were others who maintained inns, way stations for tropeiros along all the major trade routes through which the trains of pack animals passed. Inns and eating places, bars and dry goods stores, all were run by the merchant class. Also most merchants engaged in numerous and diverse activities: being both importers, store owners, providers of credit and engaging with other merchants in short-term companies for a given objective. The wealthiest merchants were often as wealthy as the leading landowners, while some could be as poor as a day laborer. They often dominated the local municipal government, provided loans to the state, bought monopoly contracts and even acted as tax farmers. What is equally impressive is that the merchant class was the class with probably the most mobility. Of some 260 merchants active in Lisbon in the second half of the nineteenth century, 34 percent of them had merchant fathers, but 21 percent of their fathers were artisans. The rest came from rural backgrounds. Going back two generation, most of their grandfathers on both sides came from a rural background.72 In Brazil the 70 71

72

Amália Cristovão dos Santos, “Em obras: os trabalhadores da cidade de São Paulo entre 1775 e 1809,” Master’s thesis, FAU, USP, São Paulo, 2013, 101, table 2.4. This discussion of the corporations and crafts is based on a series of studies by Maria Helena Ochi Flexor including: “Os oficiais mecânicos na cidade notável do Salvador,” in Artistas e artífices e a sua mobilidade no mundo de expressão portuguesa, actas do VII colóquio luso-brasileiro de história da arte (2005): 373–383; “Os escravos e os ofícios mecânicos na Bahia-Brasil,” in Natália Marinho Ferreira-Alves, ed., Artistas e artífices no mundo de expressão portuguesa (Porto: CEPESE, 2007): 323–342; and her book Mobiliário baiano (Brasília, DF: Iphan / Programa Monumenta, 2009), chapter 3. Jorge Miguel Pedreira, “Os negociantes de Lisboa na segunda metade do século XVIII: padrões de recrutamento e percursos sociais,” Análise Social, 27(116/117) (1992): 427, table 6.

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long-distance traders were usually Portuguese and they often established stores in different urban areas of the colony with their relatives to sell their transported goods. The traveling merchants or small shopkeepers in the rural areas were usually Brazilian born and some were persons of color, free and slaves. The Portuguese often gave these traveling merchants credit as well as the goods which they sold.73 The long-distance merchants were tied closely together by reputation and family. These two factors were crucial in their ability to create long-distance networks that kept the internal and international markets functioning.74 It was typical in this pre-modern age to have a company based on family members scattered throughout the empire with a lead person in Lisbon or Porto and with relatives set up in all the major metropolitan and colonial cities. Typical of these were the Pinto de Miranda brothers: Baltazar remained in Porto; his brother António set up shop in Rio de Janeiro in 1739 and João another brother established a firm in Vila Rica in Minas Gerais.75 By necessity, almost all these merchants in these overwhelmingly illiterate societies could read. A survey of seventy-seven merchants operating in Minas Gerais in the first half of the eighteenth century found that seventy-three could correctly sign their name, two wrote their name badly and only one needed to use a symbol.76 Merchants could be found everywhere since they were the fundamental group moving products from food and clothes to gold, sugar, cotton and coffee. It was the merchants who shipped goods from Europe and who imported all the products made in the colonies. They used letters of credit, set up trading houses in Lisbon and Salvador, and often hedged their bets by organizing a collective venture with other merchants in short-term companies (known as sociedades). Thus, in 73

74

75

76

Júnia Ferreira Furtado, “As redes de comércio entre Portugal e as minas do ouro na primeira metade do século XVIII,” Revista Populacao e Sociedade [CEPSE], 16 (2008): 252–253. The classic studies on this of long distance trust are those by Avner Greif, “Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: the Maghribi traders’ coalition,” The American Economic Review, 83(3) (1993): 525–548; and Avner Greif, “Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: evidence on the Maghribi traders,” The Journal of Economic History, 49(4) (1989): 857–882. Furtado, “As redes de comércio”: 247–248; and Jorge Caldeira, O Brasil dos empreendedores (São Paulo, Mameluco, 2009). On one wealthly merchant in São Paulo, Jorge Caldeira, O banqueiro do sertão: Padre Guilherme Pompeu de Almeida, 2 vols (São Paulo: Mameluco, 2006). Júnia Ferreira Furtado, Homens de negócio: a interiorização da metrópole e do comércio nas minas setecentistas (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1999): 110–111.

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the slave trade, as in all the major trades in goods, almost all ships had multiple merchants investing in a given voyage, and creating new companies for each voyage. There were also very wealthy merchants who were able to establish these joint ventures for multiple voyages.77 In most cases, these larger merchants had relatives scattered throughout the empire as agents of the mother house in Lisbon. Often these relatives would marry locally and then establish their own separate trading companies. It was also these leading merchants who loaned funds to the royal government and they were often tax farmers as well. Groups of them set up companies with which obtained some type of monopoly from the Crown by providing loans to the government, or by agreeing to provide certain goods such as slaves for the development of colonial outposts. Finally they were a powerful political class especially at the level of municipal government. Almost all the câmaras (town councils) of the municipalities were filled with merchants and they set up guilds as well to protect their interest. Easily mobilized, they were often able to effect government policy. Clearly the impact of gold mining on the colony was profound and marked the economic evolution of Brazil in the eighteenth century as much as sugar production in the Northeast did in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was gold mining which finally promoted a major population move away from the coast. It also promoted the economies of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo which created a whole new powerful center of economic and population growth in the South-Central region and which was recognized by the move of the viceregal capital from Salvador to Rio de Janeiro in 1776. As Rio de Janeiro became the capital of the colony in the mid-eighteenth century and then the seat of the Royal Court in 1808, it emerged as the most important economic center in Brazil. The city had the largest urban population and an excellent port and was the primier international trade center of the colony and empire. It was the port of Rio de Janeiro through which the mineiro region of the zona da mata shipped its coffee to overseas markets and where São Paulo shipped all its sugar and coffee to overseas markets until the arrival of rail transport in the 1870s. Of all the exports from Minas Gerais, 80 percent were sent to Rio de Janeiro, 15 percent were sent overland to Bahia and Pernambuco. Products from 77

Antonio Carlos Jucá de Sampaio, “Relações mercantis entre a praça carioca e Portugal na primeira metade do século xviii,” Revista Populacao e Sociedade, 16 (2008): 237–238.

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all over Brazil went to Rio de Janeiro. Three-quarters of both types of cotton and, 95 percent of coffee produced, and also half the sugar produced as well left from this port. Horses and animals of all kinds went mostly overland to the Northeastern provinces.78 The history of the province of São Paulo in the eighteenth century was strongly influenced by the dynamics of the mineiro mining economy. The wealth generated by the exploration of Minas Gerais, which coincided with the development of an active domestic market and later with the consolidation of Rio de Janeiro as the new imperial capital, created an important market for São Paulo’s products. This provided a slow but steady economic and population expansion in the province. At the end of the eighteenth century even a commercial production of sugar appeared in the province. At first this production was sold only on the local market, but the improvement in the quality of the sugar produced allowed it to be exported to the rest of Brazil and to Europe. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the commercial cultivation of coffee arose in Rio de Janeiro, and at the end of the first quarter of that century coffee became an important product also in São Paulo, spreading through the Paraíba Valley which straddled both provinces. The loss of the mining markets in Minas was then offset by the successful export, first of sugar and then of coffee, to national and international markets. As in the case of Minas Gerais, a significant export of foodstuffs went to the imperial city of Rio de Janeiro.79 Just as the opening up of the gold fields expanded the populated space of the Portuguese American empire to the west, in 1750 the newly installed government of the Marques de Pombal in Portugal also developed plans to expand imperial control along the coast, from the sugar colony of Pernambuco north to the Amazon River in lands that were still precariously held by Portuguese, and to expand the borders to the Rio de la Plata in the South via new settlements. Whereas gold had been the factor which opened up Minas Gerais and Goiás to European settlement, such a resource was not readily available in the rest of the colony, and direct government action was needed. For the Northeastern region, the decision was to use private and public capital to create economically viable and well settled captaincies. The government of 78

79

Carl Maria Carvalho de Almeida, “De Vila Rica ao Rio das Mortes: mudança do eixo econômico em Minas Gerais colonial,” Locus: Revista de história [Juiz de Fora], 11(1 and 2) (2005): 157. Francisco Vidal Luna and Herbert S. Klein, “Slave economy and society in Minas Gerais and São Paulo, Brazil in 1830,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 36 (1) (2004): 1–28.

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Pombal decided to accomplish this through the creation of two major joint private and government monopoly companies which would bring in colonists and slaves and exploit all the potential Brazilian products which could be consumed in the European, Asian and African markets after being shipped to Portugal.80 The first of these chartered monopoly companies was the Companhia Geral de Comércio do Grão Pará e Maranhão established in 1755 with a twenty-year monopoly, which was modeled on the contemporary French Dutch and British East India companies. Its control stretched from Ceará up the coast to the Amazon and west into Mato Grosso.81 In all the company purchased some 124 ships whose average size was 350 tons, though some of the largest ships went as high as 859 tons, most of which were built by the company itself and only two of which were lost at sea.82 Between 1760 and 1778 when the company was disbanded it exported from Maranhão port of São Luís some 363,000 arrobas of cotton, a product that had never before been shipped from this region. The company was also the first to ship rice from Maranhão, after having introduced its own new milling machines and the latest technology from Europe. Thus the company was able to ship some 607,000 arrobas of rice to Europe and some 464,000 leather skins from the interior ranches in this same period. It also exported cacao, woods, cloves and numerous tropical products, for a value of 1.7 million contos de réis, while importing goods for sale to the colonists valued at 2.2 million contos de réis.83 The company also had an exclusive contract to bring in African slaves and sold over 30,000 African slaves to local merchants and farmers.84 There is little question from the records that fraud and trading with foreigners was always a problem for the company, but in general the 80

81

82

83

84

For the ideas shaping Pombal’s on these companies see Kenneth R. Maxwell, “Pombal and the nationalization of the Luso-Brazilian economy,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, 48(4) (1968): 608–631. Lúcia Lima Rodrigues, Alvaro Ricardino and Sofie Tortelboom Aversari Martins, “‘Corporate governance regulations’: a new term for an ancient concern? The case of Grão Pará and Maranhão General Trading Company in Portugal (1754),” Accounting History, 14(4) (2009): 409. Manuel Nunes Dias, “Fomento ultramarino e mercantlismo: a Geral do Grão-Pará e Maranhão 1755–1778,” published in fourteen parts from 1964–1966 in the Revista de Historia [São Paulo]: Part IV: 141–145. Dias, “Fomento ultramarino”: part VI: 91–93, 99; Manuel Nunes Dias, “As frotas do cacau da Amazônia (1756–1777): subsídios para o estudo do fomento ultramarino português no século XVIII,” Revista de História, 24(50) (1962): 365. Maximiliano M. Menz, “A Companhia de Pernambuco e Paraíba e o funcionamento do tráfico de escravos em Angola (1759–1775/80),” Afro-Ásia, 48 (2013): 49.

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local economies seemed to have expanded greatly in this period and Maranhão cotton became a staple Brazilian export.85 The rational for the Companhia Pernambuco e Grão Pará created in 1759 was a bit different. Pernambuco was a thriving sugar plantation area and fully settled. But it seemed to lack enough slave laborers. It originated in a proposal from the sugar planters in Pernambuco who wanted to form a monopoly company to import slaves, with the ownership being primarily local. But Pombal changed this plan to a company primarily based in Portugal and over 90 percent of its shares were held by Porto and Lisbon merchants.86 There is little question that this monopoly company had a major impact on the slave trade, with 98 percent of the 48,000 Africans shipped from Angola, Benguela and the Costa da Mina in the period 1761–1786 going to Pernambuco.87 Along with the chartered companies, the Crown also responded to both planter complaints and its own concerns about the Jesuit missions not only in the Northeastern region but throughout Brazil. The result was that the order was expelled from all of Brazil in 1759.88 The royal government also made a significant effort to settle and control the southern frontier as well. This involved the settlement of Azorean families in Rio Grande do Sul,89 the re-enforcement of the Colonia de Sacramento on the Rio de la Plata and constant conflict with Spain over the borders of the entire southern region. It also involved the move of the capital of the colony from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro in 1763. While the gold boom was a spectacular event in the evolution of Portuguese America, the well-developed sugar industry in the Northeastern provinces and in Rio de Janeiro continued to grow throughout the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth century. Although their relative share of world production progressively declined in this 85

86

87

88 89

An interesting essay on the level of profitability and viability of the company is found in Cláudio Djissey Shikida, “Apontamentos sobre a economia política da Companhia Geral de Comércio do Grão-Pará e Maranhão,” Revista de Economia e Administração, 6(2) (2007): 175–190. Lúcia Lima Rodrigues and Alan Sangster, “‘Public–private partnerships’: The Portuguese General Company of Pernambuco and Paraíba (1759),” Business History, 54(7) (December 2012): 1142–1165. António Carreira, As companhias pombalinas de navegação, comércio e tráfico de escravos entre a costa africana e o nordeste brasileiro (Porto: Imprenta Portuguesa, 1969): 261–263. On the conflict with the Jesuits see Maxwell, “Pombal and the Nationalization of the Luso-Brazilian Economy”: 622–629. Luiz Henrique Torres, “A colonização açoriana no Rio Grande do Sul (1752–63),” Biblos [Rio Grande], 16 (2004): 177–189.

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period, actual production increased over the entire period. Although some scholars have suggested that there was a crisis at the end of the colonial period, Brazil in fact was on a long-term positive secular trend of growth from early in the eighteenth century until well into the nineteenth century. Unlike the rest of the Americas there were no wars of independence in Brazil and no destruction of properties or infrastructure. Thus local planters were able to quickly respond to market incentives which included higher European prices for almost all of its exports after the Napoleonic wars. Also from early in the eighteenth century these planters were well integrated into the British economy, with local English merchant houses having a major stake in the gold and diamond trades as well as other Brazilian exports. Thus the post-colonial decision to formally open up virtually free trade with England in the treaty of 1810, had little impact on changing the movement of goods overseas.90 There were of course temporary periods of crisis, one of which was the Napoleonic invasion of Portugal in 1807 which severely affected shipping until 1813, but in general all the crises were international rather than local. Thus exports grew steadily in this transition period. In fact the thirty years after independence were the period of the most rapid growth of Brazilian exports. An estimate, using the income terms of trade (value of exports deflated by costs of imports) shows that exports rose at 4.2 percent per year in the 1822–1847, and were at 3.3 percent for the rest of the century.91 With the steady decline of gold and diamond exports, again the single most important export in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was sugar. There is no doubt that Brazil’s relative position in the world sugar market had changed with the growth of the West Indies and after the beginning of Asian production in the early eighteenth century. This suggested for many scholars that Brazilian sugar production had gone into a secular decline in the nineteenth century. The reality is that the Northeastern sugar economy continued to grow and expand over the next two centuries, especially after the British sugar law of 1845 (see Graph 3.4), which allowed for the import of non-British sugar into England and the continued growth of sugar consumption. Its 90

91

Stephen Haber and Herbert S. Klein, “The economic consequences of Brazilian independence,” in Stephen Haber, ed., How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays in the Economic History of Brazil and Mexico in the Nineteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997): 243–266. Nathaniel Leff, Economic Structure and Change 1822–1947 (London: Allen & Unwin 1982): 93, table 5.3.

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98 350

thousands of metric tons

300 250 200 150 100

1909

1905

1907

1901

1903

1899

1895

1897

1891

1893

1889

1885

1887

1881

1883

1879

1875

1877

1871

1873

1869

1865

1867

1861

1863

1859

1855

1857

1853

1841

1843

1839

50

Graph 3.4  Brazilian sugar production in selected years 1839–1909. Source: Deer (1949: II, 113)

production grew steadily, though of course not as spectacularly as that of Cuba, which in the nineteenth century became the principal world producer of cane sugar. Sugar exports continued to grow through the 1830s from the principal exporting zones, which were Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro (see Graph 3.5). Although Rio de Janeiro exports began to shift toward coffee production after the 1830s, total sugar production continued to grow through the rest of the century. Moreover the size of the sugar mills was impressive. On the nine engenhos for which data exist in 1739, the average number of slaves per mill was sixty-seven. Of the total number of slaves on these estates, an impressive 78 percent of them were African born.92 The entrance of West Indian sugar production after 1700 and the beginnings of beet sugar production in Europe in the early nineteenth century did significantly reduce the relative importance of Brazilian sugar in the world market. First, British and French West Indian production though all of the eighteenth century came to dominate the world market, and in turn these islands were slowly replaced by Cuba in the middle of the nineteenth century. The Haitian Revolution of 1790 wiped out the biggest French producer leaving only Martinique and Guadeloupe as minor producers and exporters of sugar and the abolition of slavery in the British islands in 1833 would lead to the decline of British West Indian production (see Table 3.2). 92

Schwartz, Sugar Plantations: 348.

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Table 3.2  Cane and sugar beet production by region in selected years 1791–1842 (in metric tons) Zone British colonies French colonies Cuba Brazil – estimated Dutch colonies Danish colonies USA (La) France – sugar beet Germany – sugar beet Total

1791

1815–1819 (av)

1838–1842 (av)

100,015 102,891 16,731 21,000 13,550 9,429

173,822 39,279 44,734 75,000 8,140 26,000

263,616

366,975

160,046 84,414 150,603 82,000 64,256 9,000 51,712 30,536 11,688 644,255

Source: Fraginals, El Ingenio, I:40–42; 2:173 100% 90% 80%

Pernambuco

70% 60% 50% 40%

Bahia

30% 20% 10%

Rio de Janeiro

0% 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811

Graph 3.5  Share of sugar exports from the principal exporting regions of Brazil 1796–1830. Source: Absel (2020: 312–313)

But sugar was not the only international export from the Northeast. Thus cotton exports from Maranhão, the principal zone of cotton production in the colony, was on a secular trend of growth right up to the Napoleonic period and beyond (see Graph 3.6). By the 1820s, it represented 21 percent of the value of all Brazilian exports, compared to 30 percent for sugar.93 Although Brazilian cotton would also experience a relative decline in the nineteenth century due to the competition of United States exports in that period, actual production kept growing and would experience a second boom in the mid-nineteenth century as well. 93

Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco: 6, table 1.

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100

200 150 100 50

1760 1762 1764 1766 1768 1770 1773 1775 1777 1779 1781 1783 1785 1787 1789 1791 1793 1795 1797 1799 1801 1803 1805 1807

thousands of arrobas

250

Graph 3.6  Cotton exports from Maranhão in selected years between 1760 and 1807. Source: Alden (1984: 636–637)

The same occurred with tobacco exports that came primarily from Bahia. Not only did this tobacco go to Lisbon, but increasing shares of these exports went to Africa (the coast of Mina being the primary zone), Asia and even more to foreign consumers (see Graph 3.7). Bahian tobacco even became important in the Canadian fur trade, as Native Americans became major consumers along with Africans and even those in Asia.94 For all its growth, tobacco averaged only 2 to 3 percent of the total value of Brazilian exports in the nineteenth century. Moreover the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century saw the entrance of a new crop in Brazilian exports. By 1821, coffee was being exported from Rio de Janeiro. Although coffee had been grown and exported from the French and British West Indian islands in the eighteenth century, the Haitian Revolution of 1790 reduced Saint Domingue’s production, and the growing importance of Cuban coffee production was eliminated by the hurricanes of the mid-1840s. But already by the late 1820s coffee exports from Brazil were double those coming from Cuba (see Graph 3.8). When the hurricane of 1845 decimated many of the Cuban coffee trees and led to the long-term decline of Cuban production, Brazil was already the leading American coffee exporter. 94

Linda Wimmer, “African producers, European merchants, indigenous consumers: Brazilian tobacco in the Canadian fur trade, 1550–1821,” PhD thesis, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1996. In the early eighteenth century it was estimated that imported Brazilian tobacco was the most important luxury good purchased by Indians in Hudson’s Bay and accounted for 15–20 percent of the total of goods used to pay Indians for furs, Ann M. Carlos and Frank D. Lewis, “Trade, consumption, and the native economy: lessons from York Factory, Hudson Bay,” The Journal of Economic History, 61(4) (2001): 1049.

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101

700

thousands of arrobas

600 500 400 300 200

1671–75 1676–80 1681–85 1686–90 1691–95 1696–00 1701–05 1706–10 1711–15 1716–20 1721–25 1726–30 1731–35 1736–40 1741–45 1746–50 1751–55 1756–60 1761–65 1766–70 1771–75 1776–80 1781–85 1786–90 1791–95 1796–00 1801–05 1806–10 1811–15 1816–20 1821–25 1826–30

100

Graph 3.7  Average annual tobacco exports from Brazil by quinquennium 1671–1830. Source: Nardi (1996: 338, table XI.2)

140 120 100 80 60 40 20 1804 1806 1808 1810 1812 1814 1816 1818 1820 1822 1824 1826 1828 1830 1832 1834 1836 1838 1840 1842 1844 1846 1848 1850

thousands of metric tons

180 160

Brazil

Cuba

Graph 3.8  Cuban and Brazilian coffee exports 1804–1850. Source: Pezuela (1863: 29) and IBGE, AEB (1939–1940: 84)

Brazilian production by the 1840s and 1850s dominated world output and was greatly aided by the lowering of tariffs on coffee in the United States, its leading consumer. In contrast to sugar of which production was widely distributed along the Brazilian coast, coffee tended to be concentrated in the southern province of Rio de Janeiro and then slowly spread to the neighboring states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, whose exports also moved through the port of Rio de Janeiro. By 1825, Rio exported over 13,000 metric tons

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

102

thousand metric tons

100

96

Rio de Janeiro

80

53

60 40 23 20

18

13

9

1825

1836 Coffee

1848 Sugar

thousand metric tons

25 São Paulo

20

20

15 9

10 5

8

5

4

2 1825

1836 Coffee

1848 Sugar

Graph 3.9  Sugar and coffee exports from Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in selected years between 1825 and 1848. Source: Absell (2020: 143, table 5.1)

of coffee, and 23,000 metric tons of sugar. A decade later these amounts were reversed, and by the 1840s São Paulo province was also becoming a serious exporter as well of coffee, and some sugar (see Graph 3.9). Along with the growth of the export economy, there was also an explosive growth of population in this same period. Although population data are relatively scarce for the eighteenth century, the few data we have indicate a significant growth. Thus the population of Maranhão went from just 47,000 in 1777 to some 200,000 persons by 1819,95 95

For the population in 1777 (IHGB/CU Arq 1-1-5, folio 81v) and for that in 1819 see Souza e Silva, Investigações sobre os Recenseamentos: 33.

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Piauí in 1777 had a population of 26,000 and by 1826 it reached 85,000.96 The city of Bahia grew from 39,000 in 1780 to 49,000 in 1830.97 By the end of the colonial period, the impact of the various commercial activities had a major impact on population distribution. From census of 1818 the Northeast with its sugar economy and the Southeast with its mining base and growing sugar and initial coffee economy were the most populated regions in Brazil. Some 87 percent of the free persons and 88 percent of the slaves lived in these two regions. Minas Gerais was now the largest province, followed by Rio de Janeiro and then Bahia (see Table 3.3). The majority of this growth was due to births exceeding deaths, both quite high compared to Europe, rather than from immigration. The average number of children per women in their fertile years was probably seven, and while infant mortality was well over 200 deaths per thousand live births resulting in a life expectancy of under thirty years, the crude death rate was well below the birth rate, all of which promoted a rapid population growth.98 There was also a steady growth of slave imports. These imports only modestly increased the population residing in Brazil, but it well reflected the growth in the economy which could support this high-cost labor force. Thus between 1750 and 1830, for example, imports were growing at an annual rate of 1.4 percent per year (see Graph 3.10). The collapse of imports in the period between 1831 and 1835 had nothing to do with the growth of the economy, but was concerned with the first attempt to legally abolish the slave trade. But this attempt failed and growth was reaching pre-1830 levels when the British abolished it in 1850. Another indication of the dynamism of the Northeastern sugar industry in the eighteenth century is also revealed in the African slave arrivals.

96 97 98

For the 1771 population, IHGB/CU Arq 1-1-5, f 81v; and for 1826 Souza e Silva, Investigações: 29. Anna Amélia Vieira Nascimento, Dez freguesias da cidade do Salvador Aspectos sociais e urbanos do século xix (Salvador: EDUFBA, 2007): 107. One estimate for the colonial period suggests an infant mortality rate in the city of São Paulo between 1796 and 1809 of 239 deaths per thousand live births. Maria Luiza Marcílio, La Ville de São Paulo: peuplement et population (1750–1850): d’après les registres paroissiaux et les recensements anciens (Rouen: Presses universite de Rouen, 1968): 201. She also suggests for the entire province crude birth rates of the mid-1950s and crude death rates in the early 1940s per thousand of the resident population and an average life expectancy at birth of twenty-five years for both genders combined. Maria Luiza Marcílio, Crescimento demográfico e evolução agrária paulista, 1750–1836. (São Paulo: Hucitec and EdUSP, 2000): 88–89.

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Table 3.3  Estimated population of Brazil, enslaved and free in 1818 Region/Province North Amazon Pará Northeast Maranhão Piauí Ceará Rio Grande do Norte Paraíba Pernambuco Alagoas Sergipe Bahia Southeast Minas Gerais Espírito Santo Rio de Janeiro* São Paulo South Paraná** Santa Catarina Rio Grande do Sul Center-West Mato Grosso Goiás Totals

Total

Free

Enslaved

143,251 19,350 123,901 1,703,111 200,000 61,226 201,170 70,921 96,448 368,465 111,973 114,996 477,912 1,453,053 631,885 72,845 510,000 238,323 196,153 59,942 44,031 92,180 100,564 37,396 63,168 3,596,132

104,211 13,310 90,901 1,135,900 66,668 48,821 145,731 61,812 79,725 270,832 42,879 88,783 330,649 1,040,511 463,342 52,573 363,940 160,656 148,537 49,751 34,859 63,927 59,584 23,216 36,368 2,488,743

39,040 6,040 33,000 567,211 133,332 12,405 55,439 9,109 16,723 97,633 69,094 26,213 147,263 412,542 168,543 20,272 146,060 77,667 47,616 10,191 9,172 28,253 40,980 14,180 26,800 1,107,389

Notes: * Includes Corte (city of Rio de Janeiro). ** Paraná arbitrarily separated from São Paulo here. Source: IBGE, Esta Hist do Brasil, rev ed. (1990: 32, table 1.4)

The Northeast dominated the purchase of African slave arrivals until the early nineteenth century. Except for the late 1785–1790 quinquennium, the Northeast took over half the slaves until the second decade of the nineteenth century. It was only then that the sugar and coffee complex of the Rio de Janeiro region came into full development and was able to take the majority of slaves (see Graph 3.11). In the census of 1809 the slave population of the Northeast, the basic labor force in the production of export crops, had grown to half a million persons. Even the lightly populated far Southern region grew in this period. The area from the region of Paraná (then part of the province of São Paulo) south to the border with the Spanish empire

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105

300 250 200 150 100 50 1701–05 1706–10 1711–15 1716–20 1721–25 1726–30 1731–35 1736–40 1741–45 1746–50 1751–55 1756–60 1761–65 1766–70 1771–75 1776–80 1781–85 1786–90 1791–95 1796–00 1801–05 1806–10 1811–15 1816–20 1821–25 1826–30 1831–35 1836–40 1841–45 1846–50

thousands of persons

350

Graph 3.10  Estimated volume of the African slave arrivals in Brazil by quinquennium 1701–1705 to 1845–1850. Source: Slave Voyages Estimates, www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates

Rio de Janeiro Pernambuco

Bahia

1701–05 1706–10 1711–15 1716–20 1721–25 1726–30 1731–35 1736–40 1741–45 1746–50 1751–55 1756–60 1761–65 1766–70 1771–75 1776–80 1781–85 1786–90 1791–95 1796–00 1801–05 1806–10 1811–15 1816–20 1821–25 1826–30

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Graph 3.11  Share of African arrivals by major Brazilian port 1701–1705 to 1826–1830. Source: Slave Voyages Estimates, www.slavevoyages.org/ assessment/estimates

on the Rio de la Plata which included the provinces of Rio Grande de Sul and Santa Catarina, also grew in this period through systematic government support. Thus Brazil entered the nineteenth century with a thriving export economy which included a significant number of exports in demand from Europe which in turn allowed it to purchase imported goods from Europe and slaves from West and even East Africa. The creation of the mining economy in the interior regions allowed the Portuguese to effectively settle most of the colonial territory and through the special

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companies created by Pombal in the Northeast, guaranteed its possessions both against competing Spanish territorial claims in the south as well as other Europeans in the Amazonian area. The mining boom and subsequent settlement of Minas Gerais also had a major impact in creating a national market with food chains that stretched from the Amazon River to the banks of the Rio de la Plata. These value chains were maintained by a very complex mule transport system supplemented by intense coastal shipping. At the same time, slave labor deeply penetrated the colonial world, with no region free of of these workers who formed the basic labor force behind market activities. It would enter the new century with an unusual level of political and territorial stability unique among the new American nations on the continent.

4 The Nineteenth-Century Economy

Brazil in the nineteenth century was to experience sustained growth in its exports and in its internal market, as well as a major growth in population and a political stability unmatched in the Americas. Unlike any other Latin American country the Brazilian empire paid its debts and never defaulted on its internal or external loans. It thus obtained European capital on the best of terms.1 Yet for all the growth and export success, there was little investment outside the export sector. African slaves were purchased in significant numbers, railroads and ports were built, but all of this was for the dynamic export sector. Few provincial or imperial funds were invested in roads connecting the internal markets to each other and most interprovincial trade was carried on the backs of mules or via coastal shipping (cabotage). Even less funding went for primary education and only a minimum amount was invested in secondary or tertiary education, and then only for a small elite. Slavery was fundamental to the economy, and there was even investment in the training of slaves in all types of skills. But for the vast majority of the non-slave population there was little private or state investment in human capital. By the end of the century the literacy rate was little different than it had been at the beginning of the century. In 1872 for example only 16 percent of this population six years of age and older could read and write and this was the same rate in 1890. Literacy rose 25 percent according to the census of 1920 and even as late as 1960 only 53 percent of the population 1

On nineteenth-century public debt see William R. Summerhill, Inglorious Revolution: Political Institutions, Sovereign Debt, and Financial Underdevelopment in Imperial Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).

107

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could read and write.2 With the high returns for investment in agricultural export industries, and with a large share of workers in the advanced export sector being slaves, there was little incentive to invest in industry. Thus for all the growth of the economy in the nineteenth century, per capita income was only modestly growing. This was due to the fact that probably two-thirds of the population lived on subsistence agriculture and even a higher percentage lived in rural areas. Land was cheap and food relatively plentiful, thus the population increased rapidly. But few lived in cities and few had access to education or health services. There were only four or five significant cities in in the empire and the rural population stood at 90 percent of the total population even as late as the census of 1900. Without education and with few urban centers creating dynamic centers of growth there was little change in the highly skewed distribution of income among the free population. For these reasons, Brazil fell behind many of the other countries in the Americas in this century. It was only the abolition of slavery and the massive arrival of European immigrants which would change the dynamics of Brazilian development at the end of the nineteenth century. Only with the massive increase of a salaried labor force did the fundamental dynamics of Brazilian growth change. There were of course many other crops besides coffee and sugar. There was an important livestock industry which exported some leather products and several crops were produced throughout Brazil, such as corn, manioc and beans, the food staples of the Brazilian population. There were also modest exports of special products in various periods such as tobacco, rubber and cotton. But by the second half of the nineteenth century, no product or economic activity could match coffee. Introduced in Brazil at the end of the eighteenth century coffee was consolidated as an important commercial crop at the beginning of the following century and would be the main Brazilian export product until the second half of the twentieth century. Brazil to this day is still the world leader both in the production and export of coffee even though it has lost its importance within Brazilian exports. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries however, coffee represented around half the value of national exports and about 1 percent of total world trade (see Table 4.1).3 2

3

IBGE, Estatística do Século XX, table “pop_1941_45aeb_001”, www.ibge.gov.br/ seculoxx/arquivos_xls/populacao.shtm. Directoria Geral de Estatistica, Recenseamento realizado em 1 de Setembro de 1920, vol. IV, part 4 “População,” ix; and IBGE, Censo Demografico de 1960, Serie Nacional, vol. I: 16, table 10. According to Absell, despite the importance of coffee, compared to sugar for Brazil, its international performance during the nineteenth century was modest. He estimated that

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Table 4.1  Ratio of Brazilian coffee in world commerce 1881–1930

Period 1881–1890 1891–1900 1901–1910 1911–1920 1921–1930

Brazilian Brazilian Primary coffee as coffee exports products as a Coffee as a Coffee as a % of world % of world % of primary % of world as % of world commerce coffee market commerce commerce products 66.0% 68.0% 67.1% 64.6% 64.6%

1.2% 1.4% 0.9% 1.0% 1.1%

1.8% 2.1% 1.3% 1.5% 1.8%

0.9% 1.1% 1.1% 1.0% 0.8%

46.7% 52.0% 69.2% 57.4% 51.4%

Source: Martins and Johnston (1992: 347–350)

Although export industries were undeniably the most dynamic sector of the Brazilian economy in the colonial and imperial period, over time an important domestic market was created involving intense transactions between regions. The population was growing, urban centers were being formed, and the wealthier exporting centers needed numerous products that could be supplied for the domestic market. This involved mainly food products, such as cereals and processed meats, and raw materials such as cotton. Not only is this indicated by the movement of mule trains throughout the empire and by the large volume of coastal shipping, but also by the use of slaves to supply this market. Throughout the slavery period, captives were used in all areas of activity and in all regions, not only in export activities, which suggests an internal economy with a relative high level of commercialization and monetization. If Minas Gerais was the most dynamic center of this domestic market in the eighteenth century, Rio de Janeiro assumed this role in the nineteenth century. The initial expansion of coffee took place in Vale do Paraíba, first in Rio de Janeiro in the region of Vassouras. From here it spread to the Zona da Mata in southern Minas Gerais and then into the São Paulo part of the Paraíba valley, around the municipalities of Areias and Bananal. The Paraíba Valley would become the main coffee producing center in the world, as by 1850 Brazil accounted for about half between 1823 and 1913 world coffee consumption “increased by a factor of 11 and sugar by an astounding factor of 44.” In 1913, he estimated that an average of 22.2 pounds per capita was consumed in the world, compared to 1.3 pounds of coffee per capita. Christopher David Absell, “The bittersweet century: slavery, tariffs and Brazilian export growth during the nineteenth century,” PhD thesis, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, 2019: 4.

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of the world production of coffee. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, Brazilian production responded satisfactorily to the rapid growth of world consumption, as is evident in its growing share in world production which reached around 70 percent in the last five years of the century. In view of the availability of land, initially in the Paraíba Valley and later in the western interior of São Paulo,4 labor was the main factor limiting the expansion of coffee farming. Since production essentially depended on slave labor, the end of the Atlantic slave trade in 1850 put coffee expansion at risk. Although there was at that time a significant slave population throughout Brazil that could be mobilized for coffee growing, the end of the trade put into question slavery itself. It was also clear after several years of experimentation that free immigrant labor could not be mixed with slave labor on the coffee plantation.5 Nor could enough squatters on the open interior lands be attracted to work in coffee production. The situation became acute with the definitive abolition of slave labor. This had already begun by the 1870s. Realizing that the institution could not survive in the nineteenth century world, especially after the American Civil War eliminated slavery in the United States, Brazil slowly moved toward emancipation of all slaves. In 1872 a free womb law was passed and funds were set up to purchase the freedom of slaves.6 In 1885 all slaves over sixty-five were freed,7 and final abolition came sixteen years later. Although abolition would come as a shock to the sugar and coffee economy of the southeastern region in 1888, the transition to a new form of wage labor based on new immigrant groups would be relatively quick with only a minimum of disruption in the export sector. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, there was a systematic search to solve the question of labor. The gradual transfer of slaves from 4

5 6

7

The traditional west of São Paulo state includes the regions of Campinas, Jundiaí, Piracicaba, Itu, Mogi Guaçu, and Mogi Mirim, which in the second quarter of the nineteenth century enabled the sugar activity to be concentrated in São Paulo. Luna and Klein, Slavery and the Economy. On these experiments see Warren Dean, Rio Claro: a Brazilian plantation system, 1820–1920 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976). On the debate about the law see Martha Abreu, “Slave mothers and freed children: emancipation and female space in debates on the ‘free womb’ law, Rio de Janeiro, 1871,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 28(3) (1996): 567–580. On the so called “Lei dos sexagenários” see Joseli Maria Nunes Mendonça, Entre a mão e os anéis: a lei dos sexagenários e os caminhos da abolição no Brasil (Campinas: Editora da UNICAMP, 1999).

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other activities and from other regions to coffee production temporarily met the demand. The province of São Paulo was to take the lead in the initiatives to solve the problem. In 1871, a law was approved by the São Paulo government authorizing the issue of bonds to support the financing of planters wishing to bring immigrants.8 The creation in the city of São Paulo of a temporary residence and labor exchange known as the Hospedaria dos Imigrantes in 1881, represented another step towards making immigrant labor viable. The same law stipulated that the travel expenses of immigrants using the railroad between between Santos and Paulo would be refunded, as well as the difference between the cost of the ticket from Europe to Brazil in relation to a ticket to the United States.9 But this was insufficient to attract sufficient workers. In the 1880s, the process of disintegration of the slave system accelerated and the problem of labor became more acute. Then in 1884, under strong pressure from coffee growers, the São Paulo provincial government fully assumed the cost of the passage of the European immigrant who came to work in the coffee economy finally making Brazil attractive to European immigrants. With this law, the foundations were finally laid that enabled the massive arrival of European immigrants to São Paulo and the abolition of slavery in 1888 removed the last obstacle.10 Although other states received immigrants in the same period, the majority went to São Paulo. Thus, in the period between 1884 and 1903, there were 1.7 million immigrants who arrived in Brazil, of which 60 percent went to São Paulo. In the next thirty years, more than 2 million people entered, and of these, two-thirds came to São Paulo. Of the immigrants who entered São Paulo, almost half arrived through subsidized immigration.11 Between 1870 and 1913, more than 3 million immigrants entered, making it the third most important American destination for European workers (see Table 4.2). Despite the gradual collapse of the slave system from the middle of the nineteenth century, there was no discontinuity in the Brazilian coffee supply. In the last twenty years of slavery there was a steady decline in the 8

Law 42 of March 30, 1871 authorized the provincial government to subsidize the transatlantic tickets and other expenses for the colono until he or she arrived at the coffee fazenda, www.al.sp.gov.br/portal/site/Internet/. 9 Law 123, of July 16, 1881. The law permitted the colono-immigrants to remain in the hospedaria for a maximum of eight days, www.al.sp.gov.br/portal/site/Internet/. 10 Of the 2.3 million immigrants who came to São Paulo between 1887 and 1928, half were subsidized. 11 IBGE, “Repertório Estatístico do Brasil.” Quadros Retrospectivos, (1): 17–18 (Separata of the Anuário Estatístico do Brasil).

112 1,796,000 11,896,000 10,100,000

1,132,905 3,266,651 1,750,595 6,150,151 1,775,000 6,469,000 4,694,000

699,497 1,285,645 1,397,624 3,382,766

Australia

9,797,000 33,568,000 23,771,000

755,192 2,336,564 1,141,348 4,233,104

Brazil

3,781,000 10,488,000 6,707,000

1,150,415 3,203,429 1,846,485 6,200,329

Canada

Source: Madsen and Andric (2017: 165–188); DEMIG TOTAL database for corrections to Argentina and Brazil

Population in 1870 Population in 1913 Change in Population

1870–1890 1891–1913 1914–1930 Total

Argentina

NZ

291,000 1,493,000 1,202,000

355,865 673,996 292,858 1,322,719

Table 4.2  Arrival of immigrants to major importing countries 1870–1930

40,240,629 123,668,000 83,427,371

8,445,937 15,397,601 6,928,369 30,771,907

USA

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number of slaves in Brazil but at the same time there was an increasing concentration of them in the coffee regions.12 The end of slavery and the immediate implementation of free labor was said to be the reason for the move of coffee production into the western Paulista region and further into the undeveloped frontier region of the far northwest and western part of the state. The displacement of the dynamic center of coffee to west Paulista had begun in the 1870s, with the gradual depletion of soils in the Paraíba Valley and the limitation of land in the region. Without resources for expansion or capital to replace its aged coffee plantations, the Paraíba Valley was unable to compete with the highly productive coffee plantations in the newly developing areas with their extremely favorable soil and climate conditions for coffee cultivation.13 But labor was not the only obstacle to be faced for the expansion of coffee production. The other was transport. Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the transport sector of the international and national markets was defined by distinct although not exclusive systems. Until the arrival of the railroads, mules represented the essential means of internal transport and remained essential until the early twentieth century. As the great mule-producing center was concentrated in the south of the country, an extensive and dynamic route was created through which the mules were brought from the breeding areas in the Southern provinces to São Paulo and then re-shipped to the rest of the empire. In the period 1825 to 1880, over 1.5 million mules arrived in the city of Sorocaba, the major market for mules. Many of the provinces with a large pastoral industry also produced mules and almost all plantations of coffee and sugar had pack mules and also engaged private mule trains to move their 12

13

In the census of 1872 slaves numbered 1.5 million, but by 1886/87 on the eve of abolition, their numbers were down to 723,000. Pedro Carvalho de Mello, “Aspectos econômicos da organização do trabalho da economia cafeeira do Rio de Janeiro, 1850–99,” Revista Brasileira de Economia, Rio de Janeiro, 32(1) (1978): 61. On the internal slave trade, see R. W. Slenes, “Grandeza ou decadência? O mercado de escravos e a economia cafeeira da província do Rio de Janeiro, 1850–1888,” in Nero da Costa, Brasil: história econômica e demográfica: 103–155; José Flávio Motta and Renato Leite Marcondes, “O comércio de escravos no Vale do Paraíba paulista: Guaratinguetá e Silveiras na década de 1870,” Estudos Econômicos, 30(2) (2000): 267–299; J. M. dos Passos Subrinho, “Comércio de escravos na província de Sergipe (1850–1888),” III Congresso Brasileiro de História Econômica, ABPHE, 1999; Moreira Varga, “Das charqueadas para os cafezais?” 275–302; Luana Teixeira, “Comércio interprovincial de escravos em Alagoas no segundo Reinado,” PhD thesis, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Recife, 2016. On coffee in São Paulo in the nineteenth century see Luna and Klein, Slavery and the Economy: chapters 1 and 4.

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products to market. In the 1830s, it was estimated that 53,000 mules, driven by 7,200 muleteers (one muleteer for every seven pack animals) were needed to bring in the total volume imports into the province. In 1855/56 harvest, some 28,000 mules made 166,000 trips to carry the exports of coffee from the west Paulista region to the port of Santos. Each animal carried 120 kilos and it is estimated that each one made six trips in that year. These mule trains were the basic system for goods transport until the last quarter of the nineteenth century.14 Almost all of the taxes on local production were collected on the main roads used by these pack trains at provincial tax posts.15 In addition to the extensive routes which developed, these mule trains promoted the creation of a support and supply structure along the way, which developed many of the cities that currently exist in the country.16 The second major system was coastal shipping which was the essential means of moving cargo along the coast given the poor quality of the national road network in most regions. Cabotage transport served both for the interprovincial exchange of goods, supplying the domestic market, as well as for the centralization of exportable products in some key ports, giving greater density to transatlantic transport. Even after the construction of the railroads, coastal shipping remained fundamental since the rail networks were restricted and primarily served as export corridors. There were also differences between railroad gauges in the different regions and thus the railroad system did not constitute an effective national cargo transport network. The real pillar of the national transport system between the ninetennth century and the first half of the twentieth century, therefore, was coastal shipping.17 It was not until 14 15

16

17

Herbert S. Klein, “The supply of mules to Central Brazil: the Sorocaba market, 1825– 1880,” Agricultural History, 64(4) (1990): 1–25. In the period 1835/36 to 1845–1846 the tax on these mule trains and sale of animals in Sorocaba represented 27 percent of the income of the province of São Paulo. Luna and Klein, Slavery and the Economy: table A.2.2. Adriana Fraga da Silva, “Estratégias materiais e espacialidade: uma arqueologia da paisagem do Troperismo nos Campos de Cima da Serra/RS,” Master’s thesis, PUC-RGS, Porto Alegre, 2006: 103. Maria Thereza Schorer Petrone, O barão de Iguape (São Paulo: Cia Editora Nacional, 1976): 15–16; Nilson Thomé, “Caminhos de tropeiros nos séculos XVIII e XIX como fatores pioneiros de desbravamento do Contestado,” DRd, 2(1) (2012): 5–30 and Antonio Carlos Frasson and Silvestre Alves Gomes, “Tropeirismo, processo civilizatório da região sul do Brasil,” www.educadores.diaadia.pr.gov.br/ arquivos/File/2010/artigos_teses/2010/Historia/artigos/frasson_artigo.pdf. Cássio A. N. Teixeira, Marco Aurélio R. Rocio, André P. do Amaral Mendes and Luís André S. d’Oliveira, “Navegação de cabotagem brasileira,” BNDES setorial, 47: 398; Maria Lígia C. Prado and Maria Cristina Z. Luizetto, “Contribuição para o estudo do

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modern roads and truck transport developed in the second half of the twentieth century that cabotage finally declined as an essential transporter of national goods. Coastal shipping remained a national industry until 1866, when barriers were finally eliminated for foreign investment, and freight rates finally were reduced.18 Given these high-cost transportation systems, there was a demand for the rail transport system to handle the growing coffee production that increased throughout the nineteenth century. The first attempts to construct railroads in Brazil in 1835 failed. Only after 1852, with a law that guaranteed interest on railroad investments did actual construction begin. Subsidies were needed to attract investment in cases where investors feared that high fixed costs and high capital and tariff regulation would result in little profit or even negative returns. With subsidies, railroads could be built into underdeveloped land even before demand existed.19 The D. Pedro II Railroad, which left from Rio de Janeiro and reached Cachoeira, in São Paulo, was the first railroad to be constructed, and did so with a 7 percent interest guarantee, of which 2 percent was to be paid by the Province of Rio de Janeiro. The railroad served the coffee area of the Paraíba Valley and allowed the harvest to be exported through the port of Rio de Janeiro. But the west Paulista coffee regions in São Paulo, whose natural outlet would be through the port of Santos, were without an efficient transport system. The solution came in 1867, with the inauguration of the São Paulo Railroad, a railroad that connected the port of Santos to the city of Jundiaí, the gateway to the traditional west Paulista region. The company, created with British capital, had a 7 percent interest guarantee, of which 2 percent was paid for by the province of São Paulo. These railroads promoted the growth of the previously minor port of Santos, which at the end of the century would

18

19

comércio de cabotagem no Brasil: 1808–1822,” Anais do Museu Paulista, XXX: 159– 196; Renato Leite Marcondes, “O mercado brasileiro do século XIX: uma visão por meio do comércio de cabotagem,” Revista de Economia Política, 32(1) (126) (2012): 142–166; Renato Leite Marcondes, “Desigualdades regionais brasileiras: comércio marítimo e posse de cativos na década de 1870,” Habilitation thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, Ribeirão Preto, 2005; Bruna Iglezias Motta Dourado, “O comércio marítimo brasileiro no século XIX,” História e Economia, 22 (2019): 102–124. Bastos severely criticizes the monopoly as being very costly, as Brazil did not have adequate conditions for maritime transport. Aureliano Cândido Tavares Bastos, Cartas do solitario: estudos sobre reforma administrativa, ensino religioso, africanos livres, tráfico de escravos, liberdade da cabotagem, abertura do Amazonas, communicações com os Estados Unidos, etc. (Typ. da Actualidade, 1863, Cartas XX e XXI). William R. Summerhill, Order against Progress: Government, Foreign Investment, and Railroads in Brazil, 1854–1913 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003): chapter 7.

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become the main port in Brazil for the export of coffee, as well as an important commercial and financial center of the state.20 Constructed with British and Brazilian planter capital, a major railroad network was created in São Paulo, which spread over the entire province.21 The rail system made available land of exceptional quality conducive to coffee cultivation and coffee plantations quickly penetrated the interior of the state. The railroads also promoted the development of the city of São Paulo, which interconnected the interior to the port of Santos, as four railroad lines crossed the city, favoring its role as the main financial and commercial center of the state. The Brazilian railroad system was still relatively small during the empire, especially when compared to the United States. In 1890 for example, the US railroad network reached 166,000 kilometers; whereas in Brazil, only 10,000 kilometers were constructed. Under the republic, the network was expanded, reaching 26,000 kilometers in 1913 and now extended beyond the limits of the export agricultural zones.22 But since then, the closing of uneconomic lines has meant that despite new railroad construction only 30,000 kilometers of railroad lines currently survive and they are insufficient to transport current agricultural harvests to Brazilian ports. Despite the reduced size of the railroad network, it nevertheless played a fundamental role in the Brazilian transport system, due its lower transport costs, enabling new extensive productive areas to be incorporated into the national economy. Not only were railroads crucial for the export sector, but they were instrumental in the rapid 20

21

22

Ana Lúcia Duarte Lanna, Uma cidade na transição. Santos: 1870–1913 (São Paulo: Hucitec-Prefeitura Municipal de Santos, 1996); Maria Lúcia C. Githay, Ventos do mar (São Paulo: Ed. Unesp, 1992); Roberto Perosa, “Comércio e financiamento na lavoura de café de São Paulo no início do século,” Revista Administração de Empresas (Rio de Janeiro), 20(1) (1980): 63–78: Maria Apparecida Franco, “O comissário de café no Porto de Santos: 1870–1920,” Master’s thesis, FFLCH-USP, São Paulo, 1980: 243. The standard work on the Brazilian railroads is Summerhill, Order against Progress; see also Flávio Azevedo Marques de Saes, As ferrovias de São Paulo, 1870–1940 (São Paulo: Hucitec-INL-MEC, 1981); Célia Regina Baider Stefani, “O sistema ferroviário paulista: um estudo sobre a evolução do transporte de transporte de passageiros sobre trilhos,” Master’s thesis, FFLCH-USP, São Paulo, 2007; Odilon Nogueira de Matos, Café e ferrovias: a evolução ferroviária de São Paulo e o desenvolvimento da cultura cafeeira (São Paulo: Alfa-Omega, 1974); Robert H. Mattoon Jr, “Railroads, coffee, and the growth of big business in São Paulo,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, 57(2) (1977): 273–295; Adolpho Augusto Pinto, História da viação pública de São Paulo (São Paulo: Governo do Estado de São Paulo, 1977). Nathaniel H. Leff, “Economic retardation in nineteenth-century Brazil,” The Economic History Review, 25(3) (1972): 500.

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growth of internal markets after 1900.23 They also played an important role in the development of complementary activities, including manufacturing, for the implementation, operation and maintenance of the railroad network. The railroads were often unprofitable and the costs to the state and central government were considerable given the commitments to guarantee returns.24 In some cases, the financial conditions were so severe that the state was forced to take over the railroads.25 Perhaps it was these poor returns on Brazilian railroad undertakings that explain the modest expansion of the network throughout the nineteenth century, even though Brazil had a good credit reputation in the main financial centers, and was more efficient at paying its debts than all other Latin American countries. There is little question however that aside from directly benefiting the exporting areas, the railroads represented an important element in the further expansion of the domestic market, complementing the other existing transport systems. Eventually the railroads were linked to the coastal shipping system of cabotage, and traditional transport by mules. These mule trains not only survived in areas without a railroad but also were integrated into the rail system as a capillary supply network for railroads. It was only in the mid-nineteenth century that the imperial government was able to build roads of sufficient quality to start replacing the pack mules with horses and ox-drawn carts, but even then, the mules predominated until the arrival of the first trains to the Paraíba Valley and the plains of western São Paulo until the 1870s.26 23

24

25

26

Summerhill, Order against Progress: 1, 189. According to Summerhill, the gains to the Brazilian economy with the introduction of the railroad, were greater than in most other nations. On the quality of the construction of the railroads see Vitor Pires Vencovsky, “Sistema ferroviário e o uso do território brasileiro. Uma análise do movimento de produtos agrícolas,” Master’s thesis, UNICAMP, Campinas, 2006: 19. From the 1950s onwards, the railroad system was transferred to the public sector. Subsequently, lines were segregated in urban areas and transformed into metropolitan train lines which was the case with São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The cargo system was later privatized. See Ricardo Petrillo Fici, “As ferrovias brasileiras e a expansão recente para o centro-oeste,” Master’s thesis, FFLCH, São Paulo, 2007; Newton de Castro, Privatização do setor de transporte no Brasil (BNDES Digital Report, 2000): 221–278; Armando Castelar Pinheiro and Kiichiro Fukusaku, A privatização no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: BNDES digital Report, 2000): 222–277; Rodrigo Vilaça, Evolução do setor ferroviário brasileiro nos últimos 15 anos (Brasília: ANTF, 2012). Klein, “The Supply of Mules”; Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak, “O mercado de animais de carga no centro-sul do Brasil imperial: nova evidências,” Estudos Econômicos, São Paulo, V(38) (2) (2008): 319–347; Luiz Adriano Borges, “Mulas em movimento: o mercado interno brasileiro e o negócio de tropas, primeira metade do século XIX,” Anos 90,

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Once the railroads penetrated a large interior agricultural frontier with abundant virgin lands, the Brazilian coffee supply could accompany the strong and persistent growth in world demand. Between 1852 and 1900, the annual growth rate of consumption was 2.5 percent per year. During this period, world production increased from 4.6 to 18.14 million bags, some 73 percent of which were produced in Brazil.27 The peculiar characteristics of coffee supply and demand created a lot of market instability and large price fluctuations.28 As coffee is a perennial tree plant, which starts to be productive four years after planting and produces coffee beans for 30 years, the market signals which are reflected in the amount of new plantings will have delayed effects and will be influenced by the stock of existing coffee trees. In addition, frosts occurred in Brazil, a climatic phenomenon that seriously affected the year’s crop or, depending on its intensity, could affect coffee production for several years. Thus, the causes of the various price fluctuations and production response in the market would have a similar characteristic over several cycles of boom and bust developments. The cycle began with prices rising on an upward movement in consumer demand for coffee, and ended with an economic crisis in Europe and the United States which led to a decline in prices and consumption and a subsequent delayed response within producer countries because of the constraints of coffee production. Another factor for the delayed response to the fall in demand and prices was a devaluation of the national currency which was the usual Brazilian response to the same world crisis, which offset part of the producers’ losses in national currency. Thus, despite the fall in international prices and demand for coffee, there could be an actual increase in the quantity produced and exported for some time since the devaluation reduced part of the impact of the crisis on the value of Brazilian exports. But eventually, there would be a balance achieved as the secular trend in consumption increased along with prices and production, and demand reached a new balance.

27 28

23(44) (2016): 207–230; Maria Lúcia Lamounier, “Ferrovias, agricultura de exportação e mão-de-obra no Brasil no século XIX,” História econômica and história de empresas, 3(1) (2000): 43–76 and Maria Thereza Schorer Petrone, O barão de Iguape: 361. Marcelino Martins and E. Johnston, 150 anos de café (Santos: Marcelino Martins & Johnston Exportadores Ltda, 1992): tables 1.1 and 1.2. On the history of coffee production in Brazil, see the seminal work of Antonio Delfim Netto, O problema do café no Brasil (São Paulo: IPE-USP, 1981); and Edmar Lisboa Bacha, “Política brasileira do café. Uma avaliação centenária.”

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119 £/sacas 6

1821=100 14,000 12,000

5

10,000

4

8,000 3 6,000 2

4,000

1

0

0 1821 1823 1825 1827 1829 1831 1833 1835 1837 1839 1841 1843 1845 1847 1849 1851 1853 1855 1857 1859 1861 1863 1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893 1895 1897 1899 1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913

2,000

Average Price per Bag (£)

Quantity-1821=100

Value -1821=100

Graph 4.1  The value, quantity and average price of coffee in pounds sterling 1821–1913

This cycle occurred three times in Brazil in the second half of the nineteenth century.29 Thus despite these cyclical crises, the Brazilian coffee market functioned well until the beginning of the twentieth century, with production adjustments occurring when market signals occurred even if somewhat delayed (see Graph 4.1). Although coffee represented the most important Brazilian export product for more than a century, other products were exported with some success throughout the nineteenth century. Although Brazil had lost its primacy in the world sugar market for new producers in the Caribbean in the eighteenth century, it still produced a significant amount of sugar in the following century. When the Haitian revolution eliminated the main world producer of sugarcane, new incentives for Brazilian industry emerged. The resulting increase in world sugar prices initially stimulated local production and, with the introduction of new varieties of cane and some improvements in local sugar mills, Brazil exported refined sugar in ever increasing volumes.30 The emancipation of slaves in the British empire reduced Caribbean contributions and the British sugar act of 1846, which allowed non-British sugar imports into the country, were both significant stimulants to Brazilian producers.31 29 30 31

According to Delfim Netto, there existed three price cycles of coffee prices between 1875 and 1907, Delfim Netto, O problema do café no Brasil: chapter I. On the nineteenth-century sugar industry see Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco; Absell, “The bittersweet century.” According to Absell, between 1827 and 1853, the emancipation of the slaves in the British West Indies increased the participation of Brazil in the world sugar market by 5 percent. Absell, “The bittersweet century”: 4.

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4.0 3.5

Millions of £

3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5

1821 1823 1825 1827 1829 1831 1833 1835 1837 1839 1841 1843 1845 1847 1849 1851 1853 1855 1857 1859 1861 1863 1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893 1895 1897 1899

0

Graph 4.2  Value of Brazilian sugar exports 1821–1900. Source: IBGE, Estatísticas históricas do Brasil, v. 3

In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, Cuba and other new producing centers introduced innovations more quickly and, when prices dropped again, Brazil gradually lost its competitiveness in the international market. In the same way, the local sugar industry faced two other problems that delayed its modernization. The first was the end of slave labor and the consequent increase in the cost of labor; the second was the expansion of the sugar beet industry in Europe. In 1853, beet sugar had a 14 percent share of the world sugar market, which rose to 25 percent in 1860 and, finally, reached half of the world sugar consumption in the 1880s.32 This considerably reduced world demand for sugarcane and lowered prices on the world market which had a major impact on Brazilian sugar exports by the late 1880s (see Graph 4.2). These negative factors discouraged local farmers from investing in new technology. In turn, low productivity and inferior quality of Brazilian sugar reduced its competitiveness in the world market.33 In the mid-1870s, when world sugar production reached 2.5 million tons, Brazil produced only 5 percent of the refined sugar and 8 percent of the sugarcane.34 Despite facing a long-term crisis, the sugar industry 32 33 34

Indústria Assucareira. Produção e consumo mundial do assucar (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1907): 2–3. Absell, “The bittersweet century”: 5. Gileno de Carli, Gênese e evolução da indústria açucareira de São Paulo (Rio de Janeiro: Irmãos Pongetti Editores, 1943): 21. Data from 1874 is found in Carli, Gênese e evolução da indústria açucareira: 24. In that year Brazil produced 21 percent of Cuban sugar production.

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in Brazil was the main economic activity in the Northeastern provinces. Other agricultural crops in this region could be expanded, such as cotton, but none was more appropriate to the soil and climate of the region than sugarcane. Sugar production in the Northeast had the same role as coffee in the provinces of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, with its multiplier effect for other activities and for the government’s tax base.35 Given the difficulties that Northeastern producers faced on the international market, most of the sugar they produced was sold on the national market by the end of the century. In 1904, for example, 72 percent of national production was consumed internally.36 Thus, while coffee went mainly to the international market, sugar became the main agricultural product in interprovincial and interstate commerce. Although São Paulo continued to be a major producer, it was unable to supply local demand, and remained dependent on imports from the states of the Northeast. While other American producers built modern steam mills, in Brazil few mills were upgraded, and it was only later, with the adoption of the modern central mills that the yield and volume of sugar finally reached world standards. In some countries, the emergence of this new processing system led to the separation between sugarcane planters and sugar mill owners, due to the size and cost of the new steam powered central mills. Often, these large and modern units, with production capacity beyond their own planted cane production capacity, purchased cane from autonomous suppliers. In the 1870s, the idea of building these mills was widely debated in Brazil, and the imperial government created a program to stimulate construction. Although numerous concessions were issued for the installation of these central mills, few of them were built in that period.37 35 36 37

Henrique Augusto Milet, A lavoura da cana-de-açúcar (Recife: Typografia do Jornal do Recife, 1881): IX. Gileno de Carli, “O açúcar na formação econômica do Brasil,” in Annuario Açucareiro (Rio de Janeiro, 1937): 30. On this theme see Alice P. Canabrava, “A grande lavoura,” in Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, ed., História geral da civilização brasileira, Brasil monárquico, part II, vol. 4 (São Paulo: Difusão Europeia do Livro, 1971): 85–137; Roberta Barros Meira, “Banguês, engenhos centrais e usinas,” Master’s thesis, FFLCH-USP, São Paulo, 2007; Carli, Gênese e evolução da indústria açucareira; Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco; Jonas Soares de Souza, “O engenho central de Porto Feliz: subsídios para o estudo dos engenhos centrais do Brasil no século XIX,” in Anais do museu paulista, vol. XXV (1971–1974): 25–43; and Alcides Ribeiro Soares, “A experiência dos engenhos centrais,” in Nilo Odalia e João Ricardo de Castro Caldeira, História do estado de São Paulo. A formação da unidade paulista, vol. 1 (São Paulo: UNESP, 2010): 161–187.

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In  1890, the Minister of Agriculture reported that of the eighty-seven projects approved since 1875, only twelve were in operation and even those that were successful never reached the quality of advanced Caribbean producers. Given these failures, Brazil was still not able to implement a modern sugar refining industry in the period of the empire. This failure was due to the refusal of independent producers to provide cane for the new mills, the lack of viable roads and the lack of interest by national and foreign capitalists given the high costs and lower quality of Brazilian production. It was only in the second half of the twentieth century that modern central mills (usinas) were finally established, which then led to Brazil becoming again the leading world producer and exporter of sugar and other sugarcane products such as ethanol. In the Brazilian case, this meant that they predominantly used their own sugarcane, with the occasional use of third-party sugarcane.38 Cotton was another important crop in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the American Civil War (1861–1865) profoundly altered the international market. The United States, the main supplier of the world market for this product, practically stopped exporting it after 1861, which created a serious crisis for large cotton mills, especially in Britain, which at that time was the main world manufacturer of cotton cloth.39 American exports, which reached more than 4.9 million bales of cotton (500 pounds each, totaling 101,854 tons) in 1859, decreased dramatically during the war. Although Brazil, Turkey, India and other Asian producers significantly increased their exports in the 1860s, global exports fell to half pre-Civil War quantities, as other producers were unable to supply the same quantities as the antebellum United States. This global crisis in the supply of cotton explains the expansion of this crop in São Paulo during this period. In the 1860s, Brazil managed to double its exports, to an average of 29,000 tons, and the value of these exports quadrupled due to the significant increase in prices. During this 38

39

On the Engenhos Centrais see the works previously cited by Gileno de Carli as well as his essay “Geografia econômica e social da cana-de-açúcar no Brasil,” Brasil Açucareiro, V(10) (1937); Milet, A lavoura de cana-de-açúcar; Canabrava, “A grande lavoura”; Meira, “Bangues, engenhos centrais e usinas”; Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco; Ruy Gama, Engenho e tecnologia (São Paulo: Duas Cidades, 1979); Evaldo Cabral de Mello, O Norte agrário e o Império 1871–1889, 2nd ver. edn (Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks, 1999); José Evandro Vieira de Melo, “Café com açúcar: a formação do mercado consumidor de açúcar em São Paulo e o nascimento da grande indústria açucareira paulista na segunda metade do século XIX,” Seculum, Revista de História, 14 (2006). James A. B. Scherer, Cotton as a World Power (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co, 1916).

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period, cotton replaced sugar as the second most exported product in the country. Brazil, which in 1860 had a share of less than 1 percent of the world market, increased its share to 5 percent in the 1870s. In terms of the crucial English import market, it went from accounting for 3 percent of English raw cotton imports in 1869 to 19 percent of those imports in 1872, and slowly dropped to 6 percent of imports by 1884 (Graphs 4.3a and 4.3b). Although prices fell after the end of the American Civil War, and Brazil lost competitiveness in the international market, the birth of an important national textile industry generated a constant demand for the product in the national market.40 Rubber represents another important product in Brazil’s export basket in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Native to the Amazon region, rubber became valuable to the world economy in the second half of the nineteenth century when methods were developed to process it for use in industrial activities. But the main growth came with the use of rubber in tires in the nascent automobile industry in the late nineteenth century. With the expansion of vehicle production, demand for rubber grew exponentially. As the natural rubber was collected from rubber trees scattered in the forest, the production was based on individual workers and required a large number of these rubber tappers (seringueiros) who worked in terrible conditions and with low productivity.41 In  addition, it was necessary to bring in these workers from other regions. It is estimated that the Amazon rubber zones received approximately 260,000 workers from the Northeastern states.42 The government stimulated production in the Amazon and, for a brief period, Brazil had the monopoly of world production. But every attempt 40

41 42

The classic study on cotton in São Paulo is Alice P. Canabrava, O algodão em São Paulo – 1861–1875 (São Paulo: T.A. Queiroz, 1983); “Uma fazenda-modelo na província de São Paulo (1863),” in Anais do IX Simpósio da ANPUH, vol. IV (São Paulo, 1979): 1173–1219; Maria Regina C. Mello, A industrialização do algodão em São Paulo (São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1983). For the English imports in the civil war period see Gavin Wright, “Cotton competition and the post-bellum recovery of the American South,” The Journal of Economic History, 34(3) (1974): 610–635. For an analysis of these workers see Barbara Weinstein, The Amazon rubber boom, 1850–1920 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983). Furtado, Formação econômica: chapter 23. Also see Maria Ligia Prado and Maria Helena Rolim Capelato, “A borracha na economia brasileira na primeira república,” in Boris Fausto, ed., História geral da civilização brasileira, vol. 3, no. 1: 285–307; Zephyr Frank and Aldo Musachio, “Overview of the rubber market, 1870–1930,” in Steven Topik, Carlos Marichal and Zephyr Frank, eds., From Silver to Cocaine: Latin American Commodity Chains and the Building of the World Economy, 1500–2000 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006): 271–299.

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

124 Tons 90,000 80,000 70,000 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000

1886

1884

1882

1880

1878

1876

1874

1872

1870

1868

1866

1864

1862

0

Graph 4.3a  Brazilian exports of cotton 1862–1887 (in metric tons). Source: IBGE, Estatísticas Históricas Thousand Bales 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884

1860

0

Graph 4.3b  Import of Brazilian cotton to Great Britain 1860–1884 (in bales of cotton). Source: Wright (1974: 611, table 1)

to plant the trees in close approximation in a plantation arrangement resulted in severe tree loss because of disease. However, the development of new varieties of rubber in the 1910s allowed Asian producers to create large plantations of these trees. In the late 1910s, East Asian producers began to export rubber and quickly supplanted Brazil’s production which continued to be supplied by the traditional method of forest extraction. When prices fell on the international market, Brazilian rubber lost its market share to its East Asian rivals who produced rubber more cheaply. In the 1920s, Henry Ford tried to break the increasing

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125

British colonial Asian monopoly on rubber and tried to develop rubber plantations in the Amazon.43 But the project failed as the Brazilian rubber trees were destroyed by parasites when planted in large concentrations. Although modern rubber plantations were finally established in Brazil in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, even until today Brazil still imports rubber.44 Cacao represented another important product in the nineteenth century, and was also native to the Amazon. Like rubber, cacao was initially extracted from the forest plants, and like rubber it was done at high cost and with low productivity. Brought from the Amazon to the south of Bahia in the second half of the nineteenth century, and cacao started to be systematically planted and harvested, allowing Brazil to become an outstanding player in the world market. This development of cacao activity in southern Bahia generated a great social transformation in the region. In the period from 1890 to 1930, cocoa production grew annually at rates above 6 percent. Prices remained stable until 1929, when they started to fall and the sector was plunged into a serious crisis. Despite the mix of these various products in Brazilian exports during the nineteenth century, it was coffee which remained the undisputed leader in the value of Brazilian exports. Sugar was important until the second decade of the nineteenth century, while cotton had two big phases of growth, the first during the Napoleonic wars, the second during the American Civil War. The history of rubber exports was even shorter, and it practically disappeared from the list of Brazilian exports by the second decade of the twentieth century. But there was also a small but steady export throughout the century of leather products from all regions of Brazil, of tobacco produced primarily in Bahia and of yerba mate which came from the Southern provinces (see Table 4.3). Throughout the nineteenth century, there were few changes in Brazilian imports, in terms of value, composition or countries of origin. There was a continued concentration on manufactured products, which primarily consisted of clothing and textiles, and on food. In the 1840s for example, Britain accounted for half of the value of all imports, followed by France, the United States and Portugal. Two-thirds of imports corresponded to manufactured articles and a quarter to food articles. Textiles alone 43 44

See Greg Grandin, Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s Forgotten Jungle City (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009). Currently there is a significant production of rubber, principally in the state of São Paulo, but Brazil still imports half of its internal consumption, see http://borrachanatural .agr.br/cms/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25710&Itemid=10.

126

18% 44% 41% 49% 46% 57% 61% 65% 51% 53% 70% 56%

1821–1830 1831–1940 1841–1850 1851–1860 1861–1870 1871–1880 1881–1890 1891–1900 1901–1910 1911–1920 1921–1930 1931–1939

32% 24% 27% 21% 12% 12% 10% 6% 1% 3% 1% 0%

Sugar 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 3% 4% 3% 4%

Cacao 0% 0% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3% 3% 3% 2%

Erva mate

Source: Estatísticas históricas do Brasil: v. 3 (Rio de Janeiro, 1990)

Coffee

Years 3% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% 2% 2%

Tobacco 21% 11% 8% 6% 18% 10% 4% 3% 2% 2% 2% 12%

Raw cotton 0% 0% 0% 2% 3% 5% 8% 15% 28% 12% 3% 1%

Rubber 14% 8% 9% 7% 6% 6% 3% 2% 4% 6% 5% 4%

Leather and skins

13% 10% 12% 9% 10% 5% 8% 4% 5% 14% 11% 19%

Others

Table 4.3  Importance of principal products exported by Brazil 1821–1939 (value in £1,000)

39,097 49,205 54,680 101,997 149,433 199,685 220,725 291,017 476,172 688,088 805,848 345,058

Value of exports

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127

accounted for almost half of imports, largely supplied by Great Britain; next, but well below that percentage, came wheat flour, wines and cod. It is worth mentioning that there was also a very significant contraband trade that was unrecorded in the government accounts. Thus in the list of imports in the 1840s there is no mention of the importation of slaves from Africa, which was carried out through illegal landings since the formal but ineffective abolition of the trade in 1830. It is estimated that the average number of slaves arriving in Brazil in the five-year period 1846–1850 was 52,909 slaves per annum.45 If we accept the known average price of an adult African slave as between 250,000 and 339,000 réis, it means that 13.2 million to 17.9 million mil réis is missing from the trade balance.46 This would correspond to between 22 percent and 30 percent of Brazilian imports. This import from Africa would correspond to the sum of imports from France and the United States, or alternatively about 40 percent of imports from Great Britain, the country’s main supplier.47 Data from 1872/1873 show similar patterns in Brazil’s international trade. Great Britain maintained its position, as did France and Portugal, but the United States was supplanted by Germany, which represented 7 percent of imports. The fabrics continued to account for a high participation of imports, followed by meat, dried fish and cod, and by drinks in general, represented mainly by wines, along with flour and cereals. But by 1904, there were significant changes in these imports and their origin. Just over quarter of Brazil’s imports were from Great Britain, followed by Germany with 13 percent, the United States and now Argentina being significant. Argentina by this time had become an important supplier of wheat, both as grain and flour to Brazil which represented four-fifths of its total exports to the country. Germany 45 46

47

See “Disembarked slaves” for Brazil 1846–1859 in the estimates of the Slave Voyages database, accessed July 2, 2020, www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates. Mello presents the average price of 339,000 réis for an adult slave in Rio de Janeiro in 1850. To calculate the amount spent on importing slaves that year, we use the number of 40,000 slaves, which represents the average number of African slaves who entered Brazil in 1840s and the price of 339,000 réis per slave. We made an alternative value using a price 10 percent lower, since the price obtained by Mello corresponded to the average of transactions in the Rio de Janeiro market. This lower value could correspond to the value of a slave at the time of disembarkation. Pedro Carvalho de Mello, “The economics of labor in Brazilian coffee plantations, 1850–1888,” PhD thesis, Chicago University, Chicago, 1977: 60, table 16. Collecção de Mappas Estatísticos do Commercio e Navegação do Império do Brazil, com suas províncias e paizes estrangeiros no anno financeiro de 1849–1850, segundo os parciais organisados pelas alfandegas e mesas de consulado (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1855): 2–31.

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exported raw materials such as cement and manufactured articles such as machinery to Brazil. In general, by 1904, there was an increase in wheat imports at the expense of textiles. The significant reduction of fabric imports of all kinds was due to the increase in local production of textiles which by now were satisfying an important share of national demand (see Table 4.4).48 Traditionally, Brazilian imports and exports were handled by a few specific ports where cargo was often concentrated, and from there would either be loaded on to coasters bound for other Brazilian provinces or be shipped overseas to international markets. Usually, the sugar from the Northeast was concentrated in the ports of Salvador de Bahia and Recife, while coffee from the southeast provinces was exported via the port of Rio de Janeiro. These three ports also took most of the international imports as well as most of the coastal shipping. It was only with the arrival of the railroads in the 1870s that coffee from parts of Minas Gerais and most of the west Paulista plantations could use the newly expanding port of Santos. Nevertheless the port of Rio remained Brazil’s dominant port for all international trade throughout the century. But significant change was evident by 1904. Two-thirds of coffee exports now moved through the port of Santos. The displacement of coffee production to the interior of the state of São Paulo and the extensive network of railroads that connected these production areas to the port of Santos redirected the flow of coffee exports. In that year, Santos became the largest port for Brazilian exports, in terms of value, representing onethird of Brazilian foreign trade. Rio de Janeiro’s participation was now reduced to one-fifth of the value of all Brazilian exports. The great consumers of Brazilian international exports in the nineteenth century were the United States and Great Britain. The concentration on a few products and countries generated high instability in the value of 48

Colleção dos Mappas Estatísticos do Commercio e Navegação do Império do Brasil. Exercido por meio de Importação, Exportação, Reexportação e Baldeação sob a inspeção e fiscalização das Alfandegas e Mesas de Consulado, no ano financeiro de 1841–1842 (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1848); Colleção de Mappas Estatísticos do Commercio e Navegação do Império do Brazil, com suas Províncias e países estrangeiros, no anno financeiro de 1849–1850, segundo os parciaes organizados pelas alfandegas e mesas do consulado (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1855); Estatística Commercio Maritimo do Brazil, Exercicio de 1872–1873, organizado pelo Dr. Sebastião Ferreira Soares (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1884) segunda parte, vol. II; Serviço de Estatística Commercial. Importação e Exportação. Movimento marítimo, cambial e do café da República dos Estados Unidos do Brazil, em 1904 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional, 1906).

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129

Table 4.4  Brazilian imports by product and country 1849–1850, 1872–1873 and 1904 Years and products

Countries Imports 1840–1841

Primary materials used with crafts and industries Manufactured products Food and fodder items Value in milréis Principal products Manufactures and textiles Wheat flour Wines Cod

14.8% 61.2% 24.0% 56,040,800 47% 7% 5% 5%

Great Britain

49%

France USA Portugal Hanseatic towns Rio de la Plata states Belgium Spain Sweden and Norway

15% 12% 8% 4% 4% 1% 1% 1%

Imports de 1849–1850 Primary materials used in crafts and industries Manufactured products Food and fodder items Value in milréis Principal products Manufactures and textiles Wheat flour Wines Cod

9.1%

Great Britain

52%

USA France Portugal Hanseatic towns Unknown Rio de la Plata states Belgium Spain

12% 11% 9% 4% 2% 2% 2% 1%

Great Britain

52%

France Portugal and colonies Germany USA Uruguay Belgium Argentina Spain

15% 8% 7% 6% 4% 2% 2% 2%

17.5%

Great Britain

28%

47.6%

Germany

13%

66.8% 24.1% 59,006,408 43% 7% 5% 2% Imports 1872/1873

Primary materials used in crafts and Industries Manufactured products Food and fodder items Value in milréis Principal products Textiles and clothing Meat, fish and oils Drinks in general Vegetables, flour and cereals

16.2% 61.9% 21.9% 156,730,588 44% 9% 8% 4% Imports 1904

Primary materials used in crafts and industries Manufactured products

130

Brazil: An Economic and Social History table 4.4  (continued)

Years and products Food and fodder items Value in milréis Principal products Textiles and clothing Wheat grains and flour Stones, earth and minerals, including coal Wines

Countries 34.8% 512,587,889 16% 11% 6% 6%

USA Argentina France Portugal Uruguay Italy Belgium

11% 10% 9% 7% 5% 4% 3%

Source: Relatórios e Mapas de Importação e Exportação de 1840–1841; 1849/1850; 1872–1873 e 1904

Brazilian exports, largely caused by the behavior of the coffee market, and reflecting its weight in exports. Changes in the economies of the United States and Great Britain, which absorbed 70 percent of Brazilian coffee exports in 1849/1950 and 1872/1973 had a major impact on Brazil. As late as 1904, coffee represented half the value of Brazilian exports and rubber about a quarter. In other words, the two products accounted for three-quarters of Brazilian exports. And that year, the United States was the destination of half of Brazilian exports. If we add Great Britain and Germany, these three countries accounted for 85 percent of exports. These results demonstrate Brazil’s extreme dependence on few products and buyers. And the instability in exports was directly reflected in the capacity to import products that were fundamental for the country and in tax collection, which was highly dependent on taxes on foreign trade flows. The ports that did most of the exporting in the nineteenth century were also the ports that accounted for most of the international imports. In 1849/1859, Rio de Janeiro received practically half of direct imports from abroad. A large part of the goods that entered through these three ports were distributed to the other provinces. There was thus an important movement of imports by cabotage from these major ports to all the small coastal ports from the Amazon to Rio Grande do Sul. In addition to goods re-exported to the provinces, there was an interprovincial trade in national goods. Rio de Janeiro itself was an important importer of national goods from other provinces, as were Salvador, Recife and the ports of Rio Grande do Sul. In 1849/1850, leather products were the most important cabotage products in terms of value, followed by tobacco, cigars, grease and tallow (see Table 4.5).

131

4,059 7,257 5 300 10,097 77,122 249,781

22,517 76,643 51,781

Bahia

24,496 180,789

82 10,282 95,687 195,553

400

105,810 26,605 20 165

Pernambuco

22,753 150 20 370

47,854 40,804

844

R. Grande do Sul

17,532 91,872

13,064 1,190

200 29,901

6,034

23,951

São Paulo

7,272 26,762

309

400 80

18,701

Santa Catarina

17,398 28,688

1,535 1,272 7,932 8 523

20

Others(1)

105,810 91,774 77,507 58,000 47,854 41,404 31,436 28,484 15,419 13,179 12,974 10,097 239,507 773,445

Total

Notes: (1): Maranhão, Pará, Ceará, Alagoas, Sergipe e Espírito Santo. Source: Mappas das Mercadorias Nacionais Importadas e despachadas para consumo nas Alfandegas do Império do Brasil, no ano financeiro de 1849–1850: 3

Thin leather Leather soles Tobacco Cigars and cigarettes Grease, fat Raw tallow Tea Cotton wool Cotton yarn Various cheeses Candles Cotton cloths Other products Total

Products

Table 4.5  Nationally produced merchandise imported from the provinces into the port of Rio de Janeiro 1849–1850

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In the 1870s, Rio de Janeiro continued to represent the main port of entry and exit of goods for long-distance shipping, both for international markets, but also for a significant quantity of national products being shipped or re-exported to other Brazilian ports. Next in importance were the ports of Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio Grande do Sul, Pará and São Paulo (which still dealt with only modest exports of coffee and mainly going to Rio de Janeiro for re-export). Coastal shipping represented a third of the value of total long-haul exports from these ports. Rio de Janeiro was the largest cabotage importer and exporter, reflecting its key role of goods redistributor among ports, particularly those of the South-Southeast (Table 4.6). Coffee was the main product in the cabotage trade received by Rio de Janeiro, followed by leather, cotton, tobacco and sugar which were re-exported to both the national and international markets. The three largest provinces trading with Rio de Janeiro were São Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul,49 and Espírito Santo, basically for coffee. Finally, by 1900 the port of Santos had become Brazil’s premier coffee port, with coffee dominating its exports and including coffee grown in Minas Gerais as well as São Paulo Minas, now the largest province in the country in terms of population, was also a large market for national products, as well as being a coffee exporter. Minas Gerais throughout the process of consolidation of mineral extraction and intense urbanization required an increasing supply of products for its survival which led to the development of a wide system of production destined for its domestic market.50 In this sense, Minas Gerais, particularly its southern region, was in a privileged position for the production and shipment of its goods to Rio de Janeiro, first via mule trains, and later by railroad. Considering the flow of mule trains that passed through the tax posts along the roads to the coast, there

49

50

Rio Grande do Sul developed an important cattle industry producing hides and dried beef or charque, the latter being fundamental to the slave diet and thus an important product on the internal imperial market. See Jonas Moreira Vargas, “Abastecendo plantations: a inserção do charque fabricado em Pelotas (RS) no comércio atlântico das carnes e a sua concorrência com os produtores platinos (século XIX),” História, 33(2) (2014): 540–566; Jonas Moreira Vargas, “Um olhar no Atlântico, outro na fronteira. Os charqueadores de Pelotas, o comércio de carne-seca e as suas propriedades na fronteira com o Uruguai (século XIX),” CLIO – Revista de Pesquisa Histórica, 30(2) (2013): 1–23; and Sandra Jatahy Pesavento, República Velha Gaúcha (Porto Alegre, Movimento, 1980). Lidiany Silva Barbosa and Marcelo Magalhães Godoy, “Uma outra modernização. Transportes em uma província não-exportadora, Minas Gerais, 1850–1970,” Economia e Sociedade, 17(2) (2008): 159–186.

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Table 4.6  Nationally produced merchandise imported and exported nationally and internationally from the port of Rio de Janeiro 1888 (in milréis) National products Interprovincial trade Products Coffee Gold Tobacco, etc. Leather and hides Sugar Rosewood Rough diamonds Flours Sweets Fruit Mangabe gum Brandy Erva mate Raw cotton and yarn Lard Beans Prepared meats Rice Tallow or grease Construction wood Salt Woolen fabrics cereals – corn Cotton textiles Onions Hats Other products Total

Exported

Imports

Exports

overseas

3,207,551

4,568,039 350 714,072 101,267 578,650

92,163,339 829,849 815,539 782,156 566,768 93,342 88,768 76,981 68,546 65,211 43,769 12,351 2,233

319,542 703,278 1,494,233 60,620 9,308 626,511 5,806 2,903 1,803 140,274 26,223 1,136,471 749,309 633,656 518,040 425,358 374,002 303,123 268,931 237,720 231,631 181,280 128,890 116,831 773,557 12,676,851

105,303 82,898 13,440 33,088 2,315 2,277 5,079 61,944 406,883 12,962 131,210 50 49,085 31,116 22,924 1,763,711 13,931 409,662 2,666,636 11,776,892

144,067 95,752,919

Source: Mapas estatísticos do Commério e Navegação do Porto do Rio de Janeiro

was an expressive growth over the period 1839 to 1884. By 1879–1884 coffee represented 87 percent of Minas exports.51 In addition to coffee, cattle and livestock products, gold and diamonds were also exported (see Graph 4.4). 51

Cristiano Corte Restitutti, “As fronteiras da província: rotas de comércio interprovincial, Minas Gerais, 1839–1884,” Master’s thesis, Araraquara, UNESP, 2006: 96.

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Coffee Cattle Gold Meat Products Diamonds Tobacco & Derivatives Cotton & Derivatives Other Agricultural Products Other Minerals 0%

5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

Graph 4.4  Composition of the value of exports from Minas Gerais 1818–1884. Source: Restitutti, “As fronteiras da província: rotas de comércio interprovincial, Minas Gerais, 1839–1884,” 79

The long series of official foreign trade statistics of the nineteenth century has been questioned by researchers,52 and a recent study has reconstructed these data using international prices to modify the official statistics for the value of Brazilian foreign trade in the nineteenth century.53 These new data show a strong instability in the period 1821–1913, particularly from the 1870s onwards, probably due to greater dependence on a single product. But this new series shows an extremely favorable result of the trade balance, positive in almost every year from 1830 onwards. In addition, when calculating the annual growth rate of exports over the period 1821–1913, there are two periods of significant growth. The first was from 1821 to 1850, with an exceptional average growth rate 52

53

Lago argues that the appendix of the 1939 Statistical Yearbook of Brazil which published statistics on the import and export of goods is inadequate for the correct analysis of Brazil’s trade balance, at least for much of the second half of the nineteenth century. Also see Luiz Aranha Correa do Lago, “Balança comercial, balanço de pagamentos e meio circulante no Brasil no segundo império: uma nota para uma revisão,” Revista Brasileira de Economia, 36(4) (1982): 489–508. Also see Gustavo H. B. Franco, “O balanço de pagamentos do Brasil, 1870–1896: novas estimativas,” Discussion paper 201, Departamento de Economia Puc-Rio, https://ideas.repec.org/s/rio/texdis.html; and Gustavo H. B. Franco, “Setor externo,” in Estatísticas Históricas do Brasil. Séries Econômicas, Demográficas e Sociais de 1550 a 1988, 2nd edn, vol. 3 (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1990): 557–600. Absell, “The bittersweet century” and the articles by Christopher David Absell and Antonio Tena-Junguito, “Brazilian export growth and divergence in the tropics during the nineteenth century,’ Journal of Latin American Studies, 48 (2016): 677–706; “The reconstruction of Brazil’s foreign trade series, 1821–1913,” Revista de Historia Económica – Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 36 (2018): 87–115 and their “The Brazilian export economy, 1822–1913,” in Sandra Kuntz-Ficker, ed., The First Export Era Revisited: Reassessing its Contribution to Latin American Economies (London: Springer, 2017): 113–152.

The Nineteenth-Century Economy Exports & Imports in Millions of English Pounds 80

135

Trade Balance in Millions £ 35 30

70

25

60

20

50

15

40

10

30

5

20

0

10

–5 –10 1821 1823 1825 1827 1829 1831 1833 1835 1837 1839 1841 1843 1845 1847 1849 1851 1853 1855 1857 1859 1861 1863 1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893 1895 1897 1899 1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913

0

Trade Balance

Exports

Imports

Graph 4.5  Brazilian exports, imports and trade balance 1821–1913 (revised series). Source: Absell, “The Bittersweet Century: Slavery, tariffs and Brazilian export Growth during the nineteenth century” 2019, 274–283

of 5.9 percent and the last, between 1890 and 1913, when the percentage reached 4.3 percent annual growth. The remaining periods 1850/1870 and 1870/1890 were more modest average rates (Graph 4.5). To understand these nineteenth-century patterns in foreign trade, it is essential to go back to the eighteenth century. By the rules of commercial exclusivity, colonial Brazil was closed to foreign trade, carrying out its foreign trade exclusively through Portugal, which in turn had as its preferential partner Great Britain. Thus, a large part of the manufactured products imported by Brazil were produced in Great Britain and re-exported to Brazil from Portugal.54 With the Napoleonic wars and the occupation of Portugal, the court moved to Brazil opening its ports to friendly nations and practically breaking the colonial pact. The famous 1810 Trade and Navigation and Peace and Friendship treaties can be seen as the symbol of a new direct relationship between Brazil and Great Britain.55 54

55

This was why most of the Brazilian gold legally and illegally ended up in England. See Leonor Freire Costa and Maria Manuela Rocha, “Merchant networks and Brazilian gold: reappraising colonial monopolies,” in Nikolaus Bottcher et al., eds., Redes y negocios globales en el mundo ibérico, siglos xvi–xviii (Berlin: Instituto Ibero-Americano de Berlin y el Colegio de México, 2012): 143–169; and Christopher Ebert, “From gold to manioc: contraband trade in Brazil during the Golden Age, 1700–1750,” Colonial Latin American Review, 20(1) (2011): 109–130. The best analysis of the treaty and its background is found in Alan K. Manchester, British Preeminence in Brazil, Its Rise and Decline (Chapel Hill, 1933): chapter 8.

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The independence that occurred in 1822 was the outcome of the process of transferring the court to Brazil, and was carried out without major conflicts, unlike much of Spanish America.56 The new government validated the diplomatic, commercial and financial arrangements with Great Britain, including the signing of a commercial treaty that maintained a preferential tariff of 15 percent, but which was extended in 1828 to all countries. This remained the norm until the Alves Branco tariff of 1844, which replaced the trade agreement with Great Britain. The tariff change was clearly aimed at improving the competitive conditions of national production and also at increasing tax revenue, which was heavily dependent on customs revenues, and seriously affected by the restriction imposed by the trade agreement with Great Britain. But the idea often found in traditional historiography that the establishment of the general customs rate at 15 percent until the middle of the nineteenth century delayed both growth and the potential industrialization of Brazil and made Brazil dependent on Great Britain has been challenged.57 The conditions for industrialization were not in place in the first half of the century, and despite the new tariffs imposed on imports, it was not until the end of the century that industrialization became more dense in Brazil.58 If there are doubts about the impact that a less liberal tariff structure could have on domestic production, particularly on manufacturing production, there is no question about its direct impact on the finances of the empire which depended on taxation of foreign trade. Of the total imperial receipts, customs duties accounted for between 50 percent and 60  percent from the 1830s until the end of the empire. There was a high correlation between the tax revenue from the empire and imperial finances between 1823 and 1889. Thus from 1823 to 1889, the empire’s revenue expanded by 4.8 percent per year, in pounds. Despite this, the imperial treasury had a deficit in most years, modest until the mid-1860s, and in increasing amounts until the end of the empire. In the 1870s, for example, the accumulated deficit amounted to 25 percent of total revenue in the same period (Graph 4.6). 56

57 58

Compared to other Latin American countries, the independence process was relatively calm and did not divide the Brazilian territory. In some provinces, particularly in the north and northeast, there were conflicts between the supporters of independence and the defenders of the link with Portugal. See Haber and Klein, “The economic consequences of Brazilian independence”: 243–266. The initial processing industry was limited to the production of thick-cotton cloth, hats and shoes, and cast-iron articles which began in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Wilson Suzigan, A industrialização brasileira. Origem e desenvolvimento (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986).

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25

millions of English £

20 15 10 5 0 –5

1823 1825 1827 1828/29 1830/31 1832/33 1834/35 1836/37 1838/39 1840/41 1842/43 1844/45 1846/47 1848/49 1850/51 1852/53 1854/55 1856/57 1858/59 1860/61 1862/63 1864/65 1866/67 1868/69 1870/71 1872/73 1874/75 1876/77 1878/79 1880/81 1882/83 1884/85 1886/87 1889

–10

Surplus or Deficit

Income

Expenditure

Graph 4.6  Fiscal income and expenditure of the Empire 1823–1889. Source: Finanças do Brasil, Quadros synópticos da receita e despesa

The ministries of war and the navy accounted for about half of all government expenditures until 1864. There was a sharp increase during the Paraguayan War, decreasing significantly from the 1870s onwards.59 It was only after 1870 that the expenditure of the Ministry of Agriculture became significant. As Finance Minister Alves Branco said, the insufficiency of tax revenue from the empire, given the demands from the Treasury, created budget deficits and increased public debt, which was basically financed by external loans. But despite rising tariffs, the imbalances continued and became greater in the years of the Paraguayan War, but did not disappear throughout the imperial regime. All this began with the first loan of 1824 which created this non-ending dependence on foreign loans instead of generating income from internal and trade taxes to pay for the growing expenses of the empire.60 This first loan from bankers Bazeth, Farquhar, Crowford Wilson & Co. and Nathan Mayer Rothschild was £3,686,200, charged with 5 percent interest at 30 years and with a 4 percent commission for Brazilian bankers and representatives. At the 59 60

Amaro Cavalcanti, Ex-império do Brazil em 1889 (Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Oficial, 1890): 1–7. José do Nascimento Brito, Economia e finanças do Brasil, 1822–1940 (Rio de Janeiro e São Paulo: Livraria Editora Freitas Bastos, 1945): 15.

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same time Brazil, took on a loan that Portugal had arranged in London in 1823, of £2 million.61 Over the course of  the century, numerous loans were obtained on the international market, which were quite costly, not so much due to the  interest rate of the loans, but mainly due to the difference between the loan amount and the effective funds obtained. Throughout the nineteenth century, the export debt ratio fell systematically between 1840 and 1880/1881, reaching 57 percent of the export debt ratio, which is the value of the debt divided by the value of exports in this final year, growing systematically since then, mainly in the twentieth century. Debt service as a proportion of exports remained at around 10 percent to 15 percent in the nineteenth century, then rising systematically in the following century.62 Throughout the nineteenth century and until the funding loan of 1898 Brazil systematically paid off its foreign loans, practically the only Latin American country to do so.63 Just as profound economic transformations occurred during the nineteenth century, so did the population and its geographic distribution. Even more than the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century was a period of extraordinary population growth. At the beginning of the century, Brazil’s population was smaller than France and Great Britain, and second in Latin America to Mexico. By the end of the century, it had surpassed Mexico and by the middle of the twentieth century it would overtake the populations of France and Great Britain. The continued dynamism of the Brazilian economy through the sugar, gold and coffee cycles led to the massive introduction of African slaves over the three centuries of colonial settlement and in turn led to an almost equal number of Europeans arriving in the post-1888 period after slavery was abolished. In total, some 4.3 million Africans arrived before 1850 and some 3.4 million Europeans arrived from 1880 to 1914. This massive immigration was important in defining the nature of the national population, but had a relatively modest impact on population growth, which was primarily driven by natural increase of native-born births exceeding native-born deaths. It has been estimated 61

62 63

Brito, Economia e finanças do Brasil: 21–22. This loan is usually classified as the price Brazil had to pay for independence. See Amaro Cavalcanti, A vida econômica e financeira do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Oficial, 1915): 12. Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, “Brasil, 1824–1857: bom ou mau pagador?” Discussion paper 403 (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Economia PUC, 1999): 2–3. Abreu, “Brasil, 1824–1857”: 3. Also see Carlos Marichal, A Century of Debt Crises in Latin America (Princeton University Press, 2000).

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that in the century from 1850 to 1950, that only 8 percent of the population growth was due to immigration.64 Nevertheless immigration was profoundly important in increasing the economically active population, as almost all immigrants of whatever their origins were in the active working age group. It was also fundamental in shifting the color population of the nation. Brazil by 1850 had a majority non-white population. Over the course of the Atlantic slave trade, Brazil absorbed more African slaves than any other single region in the Americas and some 42 percent of the estimated 4.8 million Africans coming to Brazil arrived in the nineteenth century. As could be expected the booming sugar and coffee economy of the Southeast took even larger shares of the Africans arriving in Brazil. Whereas the Southeastern ports accounted for 41 percent in the first quinquennium of the century, by the second they took half and overall 63 percent of the Africans brought to Brazil came to this region (see Table 4.7). Since the age and gender of the arriving African slaves was biased towards adults and males, the first generation of slave immigrants had a negative growth rate as the one-third who were females could not produce enough children to replace or even expand their fellow immigrant totals. But the native-born slaves did have a positive growth rate as they produced a more balanced number of females as well as males. So long as Africans were more numerous than creole slaves, the growth rate of the slave population would be negative. But in regions like Minas Gerais and Paraná, the increased the local slave population had already turned positive by the nineteenth century as the slave population was mainly creoles. Brazil was also unusual by American standards in that it also had a very rapidly growing population of free persons of color well before the end of slavery in 1888. Like most of the Latin American countries, there was support for self-purchase by slaves as well as an active system of masters freeing slaves, for a multiplicity of reasons. Fathers freed their children. Some masters gave freedom for good service, and others for reasons of piety. Some slaves purchased their freedom. The flow of these slaves into freedom was constant, and in turn the free persons of color also had a positive rate of growth especially as the majority of persons being freed were women.65 So fast was the expansion of this class, that by the first 64 65

Giorgio Mortara, “The development and structure of Brazil’s population,” Population Studies, 8(2) (1954): 122. On the demography of the slave population see Klein and Luna, Slavery in Brazil: chapter 6.

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Table 4.7  African slaves disembarked to major Brazilian regions 1801–1860 Amazonia Bahia Pernambuco 1801–1810 1811–1820 1821–1830 1831–1840 1841–1850 Totals

31,938 21,229 11,776 2,285 2,169 69,397

101,933 115,337 97,926 34,133 65,022 415,332

53,869 81,460 69,092 35,158 19,475 259,404

Rio de Janeiro

Brazil unspecified

Totals

140,860 223,161 337,888 265,909 308,114 1,281,500

12,549 9,892 7,619 697 5,236 35,993

341,149 451,079 524,301 338,182 400,016 2,061,626

Source: Estimates as of March 2009, www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates

Table 4.8  Distribution of the Brazilian population in 1872 by gender, color and condition Men

Women

Total

1,813,107 1,649,865 448,940 186,173

3,779,279 3,328,068 919,417 387,150

223,446 481,501

470,231 1,039,108

Free Whites Pardos Pretos Caboclos

1,966,172 1,678,203 470,477 200,977 Slaves

Pardos Pretos

246,785 557,607

Source: 1872 Census/CEBRAP recalculations

national census of 1872 the free persons of color were the most numerous group in the national population with 4.2 million of them far surpassing the 3.8 million whites and the 1.5 million slaves (see Table 4.8). The abolition of slavery in 1888 occurred in the midst of a massive expansion of coffee production. In the need to replace the slaves who abandoned the plantations to work as squatters on frontier lands or as urban workers, there was a major effort to attract an alternative free labor force. Since free workers would not work alongside slaves, the entire organization of production changed from gang labor to piece-work arrangements. Given that Brazilian wages and work conditions were less attractive than other American importing regions, Brazil could only attract workers by paying for their complete transportation costs to America. This was enough to start a major movement of European workers to Brazil.

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This emigration of Europeans occurred as Europe itself by the end of the nineteenth century had begun to experience relatively high population growth rates due to death rates declining faster than birth rates. At the same time, European industry and urban centers could not absorb this growing population and almost all the European countries favored emigration as a resolution to their growing social difficulties. The classic provider of immigrants in this period was Italy, whose migrants went everywhere, including Brazil. But there was also ongoing Portuguese migration, as well as large-scale emigration from Spain directed to South America in general. Of these migrants in the period from 1875 to 1915, Italians were the dominant group followed by the Portuguese and Spaniards, with smaller contingents of Germans, Japanese and Eastern Europeans and Middle Eastern migrants (see Table 4.9). While the Portuguese tended to go to the cities, all the other groups primarily worked in coffee production. The volume of this migration soon surpassed that of the earlier forced migration of African slaves (see Graph 4.7). Given the abundant availability of land and the benign climate of Brazil, mortality remained relatively stable over the first two-thirds of the century while the birth rate in and outside of marriage was high by European standards. Mortality nevertheless was quite high due to the poverty of most of the population and the lack of infrastructure in the areas of health and sanitation. This meant that in 1872 an estimated 39 percent of those born alive died before their fifth birthday and the average life expectancy at birth was only in the upper twenties for both males and females. In fact, this was probably still the average life expectancy in 1900 when 37 percent of newborns died before their fifth birthday.66 It took another two decades for the infant and child deaths to fall to 33 percent of all live births and life expectancy at birth to finally reach the early thirties for men and women, a figure long surpassed by the most advanced states in the hemisphere.67 It has been estimated that the crude death rate was 31 to 32 deaths per thousand 66

67

In contrast, it has been estimated that in 1905 life expectancy in Argentina, probably the best in Latin America, had already reached 39.4 for men and 40.7 years for women – a good 10–15 years more than in Brazil at this time. Zulma Recchini de Lattes y Alfredo E. Lattes, eds., La población de Argentina (Buenos Aires: C.I.C.R.E.D. Series, 1974): 49, table 2.7. Eduardo E. Arriaga, New Life Tables for Latin American Populations in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Population Monograph Series, No. 3 (Berkeley: University of California, 1968): 29–35, tables III-3 to III-6.

142

34,155 47,058 57,632 121,347 98,006 59,813 135,773 259,516 58,965 872,265

Portuguese

Notes: *Austrians included with Germans. Source: Levy (1974: 71–73)

1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 Total

Quinquennium 43,654 54,295 222,829 312,074 378,291 137,478 83,916 115,290 22,878 1,370,705

Italians 2,665 11,283 18,783 89,609 74,684 23,146 90,086 143,485 38,166 491,907

Spaniards 10,705 10,107 8,794 13,055 4,029 2,676 11,172 24,701 1,201 86,440

Germans* – – – – – – 861 14,682 12,750 28,293

Japonese

Table 4.9  Arrival of free immigrants by country of origin 1870–1915

30,865 6,338 11,503 64,650 42,582 25,929 51,557 110,104 13,715 357,243

Others

122,044 129,081 319,541 600,735 597,592 249,042 373,365 667,778 147,675 3,206,853

Total

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143

700,000 600,000 500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000

17

81 17 –8 86 5 17 –9 91 0 17 –9 96 5 18 –0 01 0 18 –0 06 5 18 –1 11 0 18 –1 16 5 18 –2 21 0 18 –2 26 5 18 –3 31 0 18 –3 36 5 18 –4 41 0 18 –4 46 5 18 –5 51 0 18 –5 56 5 18 –6 61 0 18 –6 66 5 18 –7 71 0 18 –7 76 5 18 –8 81 0 18 –8 86 5 18 –9 91 0 18 –9 96 5 19 –0 01 0 19 –0 06 5 –1 0

-

African Arrivals total

Immigrant Arrivals

Graph 4.7  Arrival of slaves and foreign immigrants to Brazil 1781–1785 to 1906–1910. Source: IBGE, 500 anos de povoamento, 224–225

of the resident population in the late nineteenth century, and still an estimated 29 deaths per thousand residents in 1900.68 But Brazil also experienced very high levels of fertility which fueled its high rate of natural growth. It has been estimated that as late as 1903 the average number of children being born to women in the age cohort of 14 to 49 years was 7 children.69 This meant that the crude birth rate was something like 46 to 47 births per thousand of the resident population, which was well above the crude death rate. This difference guaranteed that the population was growing at a very impressive 2.3 percent in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and up to 2.9 percent per annum by 1900–1910.70 In fact few countries in the world in the nineteenth century grew as rapidly as Brazil. On average, Brazil was growing at 2.3 percent per annum for 100 yeaers after 1870, which meant that the population was doubling every thirty years.71 68

69

70 71

The first estimate comes from Mortara, “The development and structure of Brazil’s population”: 122, and the second from Elza Berquó, “Demographic evolution of the Brazilian population during the twentieth century,” in David Joseph Hogan, ed., Population Change in Brazil: Contemporary Perspectives (Campinas: UNICAMP, 2001): 15, table 2. Mortara estimated the crude death rate at 31–32. Cláudia Júlia Guimarães Horta, José Alberto Magno de Carvalho, Luís Armando de Medeiros Frias, “Recomposição da fecundidade por geração para Brasil e regiões: atualização e revisão,” presented at Anais do ABEP 2000, table 6. Mortara, “The development and structure of Brazil’s population”: 122; and Berquó, “Demographic evolution of the Brazilian population”: 13, table 1. Merrick and Graham, Population and Economic Development: 30–31.

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There was also a redistribution of population largely driven by changing economic conditions. Thus the overwhelming majority of sponsored and self-paying immigrants went to São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro while throughout the nineteenth century there was a steady stream of European agricultural workers going to the Southern colonies. This meant that the previously lightly populated Southeastern and Southern regions now grew impressively while Northeastern regional growth slowed (see  Table  4.10). The population of the Northeast where half the population in 1819 lived, decreased to 42 percent in 1890; the  Southeast and South was now home to over half the population, with  the Southeast region increasing from 35 percent to 43 percent and the South from 5 percent to 10 percent. The North and the Midwest were still of little consequence in terms of population.72 Given the lack of systematic data on the economy and its functioning in the nineteenth century, it is difficult to accurately measure the general performance of the economy, with indicators such as gross domestic product or per capita income. In Brazil, the system of national accounts would only be instituted in the 1940s, and has required numerous revisions due to the precariousness of information still persisting in the middle of the last century. Thus, the various existing estimates of long-term economic performance for the nineteenth century were built from poor quality and discontinuous indicators, which makes their results merely indicative of trends.73 Despite this, several researchers, adopting different statistical procedures, estimated these values, for different periods of the nineteenth century, obtaining results that are not always similar. Some of the best known estimates are those made by Celso Furtado, in his seminal study on the economic formation of Brazil. He estimated that there was stagnation in the first half of the nineteenth century and then vigorous growth in the second half, as a result of the dynamism of the coffee economy.74

72 73

74

IBGE, Estatísticas Históricas do Brasil: 31–33. On the establishment of the National Account System in Brazil, see Eduardo Pereira Nunes, “Sistemas de contas nacionais: a gênese das contas nacionais modernas e a evolução das contas nacionais no Brasil,” PhD thesis, Unicamp, Campinas, 1998; João Hallak Neto, “A distribuição funcional da renda e a economia não observada no âmbito do sistema de contas nacionais no Brasil,” PhD thesis, UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 2013; and João Hallak Neto, “O sistema de contas nacionais: evolução histórica e implantação no Brasil,” Revista Econômica, 19(1) (2016). Furtado, Formação Econômica.

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Table 4.10  Population of Brazil by region and gender in 1890 Region/State North Amazonas Pará Northeast Maranhiio Piaui Ceará Rio Grande do Norte Paraíba Pernambuco Alagoas Sergipe Bahia Southeast Minas Gerais Espírito Santo Rio de Janeiro São Paulo South Paraná Santa Catarina Rio Grande do Sul Center-West Mato Grosso Goiás TOTAL

Men

Women

Total

247,278 80,921 166,357 2,956,944 212,586 133,707 394,909 130,712 219,833 503,555 250,480 150,892 960,270 3,144,615 627,461 69,813 739,330 708,011 729,316 128,209 141,989 459,118 159,779 47,196 112,583 7,237,932

229,092 66,994 162,098 3,045,103 218,268 133,902 410,778 137,561 237,399 526,669 260,960 160,034 959,532 2,959,769 556,638 66,184 660,205 676,742 701,399 121,282 141,780 438,337 160,620 45,631 114,989 7,095,983

476,370 147,915 328,455 6,002,047 430,854 267,609 805,687 268,273 457,232 1,030,224 511,440 310,926 1,919,802 6,104,384 1,184,099 135,997 1,399,535 1,384,753 1,430,715 249,491 283,769 897,455 320,399 92,827 227,572 14,333,915

Source: IBGE, Esta Hist do Brasil, rev ed. (1990: 33–34, tables 1.6 and 1.7)

There are more recent estimates available for the nineteenth century GDP in Latin America and Brazil.75 In general, these studies suggest that Furtado’s estimates for the second half of the nineteenth century may be too optimistic.76 In general, they all show a trajectory of low growth throughout the nineteenth century. Contador and Haddad estimated 75

76

Coatsworth, “Obstacles to economic growth”: table 1; Goldsmith, Brasil 1850–1984: 20; Haddad and Contador, “Produto, moeda e preços”; Engerman and Sokollof, “Factor endowments”; Haddad, Crescimento do produto real; Leff, Underdevelopment and Development; Maddison, The World Economy; Tombolo and Sampaio, “O PIB brasileiro nos séculos XIX e XX”: 181–216; Paiva Abreu et al., A passos lentos. See Leff, Economic Structure and Change, 1822–1947; and Marcelo de Paiva Abreu and Luiz Aranha Correa do Lago, “A economia brasileira no Império, 1822–1889,” in Marcelo de P. Abreu, ed., A ordem do progresso (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1992): 1–28.

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national income and per capita income between 1861 and 1900 which suggest a modest growth of per capita income in the order of 0.4 percent per year.77 This compares to rates of 1.3 percent in the United States, 1 percent in Great Britain and 1.8 percent in France in the nineteenth century. Goldsmith, in his important book on the Brazilian economy, estimates that the GDP would have grown at an annual rate of 2.04 percent in the period 1850 to 1889, but declined thereafter to only 0.34 percent.78 Leff, one of the most important and influential scholars of Brazil of the nineteenth century, estimated national income and income per capita, based on monetary data for the period 1822 to 1913.79 He presents a range of probable growth rates of GDP, but considers the most likely estimate to be only 0.1 percent per capita income growth per year. While the GDP growth kept pace with population growth, it does not seem to have exceeded it and thus the low per capita GDP rate. With a per capita growth rate of just 0.1 percent per year, Brazil could only increase its income by 10 percent between 1822 and 1933.80 Leff points out a very unusual characteristic of the Brazilian economy. He finds it surprising that the high land/labor ratio of Brazil did not lead to a high-wage economy which one would have expected. The basic explanation lies in the slave trade, which maintained an abundant labor supply, which in turn made it possible to maintain low labor costs, vis-à-vis capital. This is the crucial aspect of the low capital intensification in the Brazilian economy, consequently reduced by low labor productivity. When the slave trade finished, this supply of labor for the dynamic coffee sector was provided by the interprovincial slave trade, reducing slave usage in other regions. With the end of slavery, the slaves could be replaced by less costly immigrants who were mostly subsidized by the state. Unlike other immigrant importing nations, such as the United States, which attracted foreign immigrants by paying higher wages than Europe, in Brazil, it was the public subsidy that made immigration feasible, allowing planters to maintain low labor costs, with little stimulus to productivity. 77 78

79

80

A rate of 0.4 percent per year represents an increase of only 16.8 percent in per capita income between 1861 and 1900. Goldsmith, Brasil 1850–1984: 20. The growth of 0.34 percent per year would have been positively influenced by the years 1851–1869, since between 1870 and 1889, the performance would have been negative: less 0.52 percent between 1870 and 1879 and 1.13 percent less between 1880 and 1889. In the period 1822 to 1913 the nominal stock of money increased by 3.8 percent per year and 2 percent per year in the per capita concept. Using an available deflator, an increase is estimated in the deflated stock of currency per capital by 1 percent per year in the period 1822 to 1913. Leff, Economic Structure and Change, 1822–1947: chapter 3. Leff, Economic Structure and Change 1822–1947: 33.

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The issues to consider in this question of low labor costs, as suggested by Leff, is how slavery is an important cause for maintaining a low productivity economy. But he does not suggest an incompatibility between slave labor and economic modernization. The question posed is the capacity of the slave system, with the continued supply of new slaves brought from Africa, to meet the domestic demand for labor. In addition, studies on slavery in Brazil have shown the existence of slave labor in all areas and regions, whether in agricultural activities aimed at the foreign market or in domestic supply, as well as in crafts, in commerce, in transport of all kinds and in domestic service. Thus, when there was a shortage of slave labor in coffee farming, it would attract not only slaves dedicated to other exportable crops, such as sugar, that could be moved to more dynamic economic activity, but also from other sectors with less added value. As for productivity, in a study that was based on an agricultural census carried out in 1905 in the state of São Paulo, the most important center of coffee production in Brazil, showed that very few coffee producers made use of machinery and equipment even after the end of slavery, because they now had access to abundant foreign immigration that probably discouraged investments to increase productivity.81 Leff also points out another paradox. That is in societies with chronic inflation such as the Brazilian one in the nineteenth century, there should be a stimulus for the allocation of resources into capital stock. That this did not happen in Brazil was probably due to the alternative application of capital to land. This idea can be complemented by the additional application of capital in slaves. The land issue is easily identified in the disproportion between the size of large farms and the reduced proportion of their use for production. Until the twentieth century, land represented a reserve of value and power, in substitution for productive capital. In the case of slaves, inventories show that they represent a high percentage of personal wealth, with high liquidity and therefore with easy financing.82 Recently, new studies have critiqued older estimates of the dynamics of the Brazilian economy in the nineteenth century most of which 81 82

Francisco Vidal Luna, Herbert S. Klein and William R. Summerhill, “Paulista agriculture in 1905,” Agricultural History, 90(1) (2016): 22–50. Flávio Versiani and José R. O. Vergolino, “Posse de escravos e estrutura da riqueza no agreste e sertão de Pernambuco: 1777–1887,” Estudos Econômicos [São Paulo], 33(2) (2003): 353–393; Renato Leite Marcondes, “A arte de acumular na gestação da economia cafeeira: formas de enriquecimento no Vale do Paraíba Paulista durante o século XIX,” PhD thesis, FEA-USP, São Paulo, 1998; and Zélia Maria Cardoso Mello, Metamorfoses da riqueza, São Paulo, 1845–1895 (São Paulo: Hucitec, 1990).

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suggested low rates of per capita GDP growth.83 The difficulties in evaluating GDP and GDP per capita are due to the limited statistics that exist and also because of the large nature of the informal market composed of both the subsistence economy and activities that served the internal market. But when we see the extraordinary growth of the coffee plantations accompanied by the construction of an extensive railroad network, with the massive import of African slaves, and the expansion of urban centers such as Rio de Janeiro, it seems to indicate growth of the domestic product throughout the nineteenth century. Since the foreign trade series is fundamental to estimating the GDP in the nineteenth century, the recent revision of the foreign trade series has allowed scholars to better estimate the GDP and the GDP per capita in the nineteenth century. This new estimate of the per capita GDP, suggests that it probably grew at 0.9 percent per year over the 1820–1890 period. This is a far higher rate than previously estimated and would be equivalent to the rate that developed in Western Europe in the same period.84 If there was undoubted growth of production for internal and external markets in the nineteenth century, the use of slavery and then the use of subsidized free labor kept costs down for the planter class and abundant virgin land reduced their interest in mechanizing agriculture. While that class was ready to invest in banks and railroads, it was not ready to invest in industry until the very end of the century. The nineteenth century was also a period of relative stagnation for Brazil in terms of human capital that would only be resolved in the following century. But there was significant population growth, the coffee economy was consolidated, and Brazilian coffee production would maintain its world importance until the middle of the twentieth century. There was a gradual but significant occupation of Brazil’s vast frontier, including the development of important economic activities there from the rubber boom in the North and Northeast to the expansion of cattle ranching in the south of the country. Finally there was the gradual expansion of the domestic market, both through the boom in railroad construction and accelerated by the arrival of free wage laborers replacing the manumitted slaves in the final years of the century.

83

84

It is these older estimates which were used in the Maddison Project estimates. See Maddison Project Database 2020, University of Groningen, www.rug.nl/ggdc/ historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2020?lang=en. Edmar L. Bacha, Guilherme A. Tombolo and Flávio R. Versiani, “Secular stagnation? A new view on Brazil’s growth in the nineteenth century” (Unpublished manuscript version November 6, 2022): 13, 22 table 2.

5 Nineteenth-Century Society

The society which evolved under the empire from 1822 to 1889 differed only moderately from the colonial society. The total population was estimated to be only 4.4 million persons in 1820 and its cities were few and their population was small.1 The largest cities, such as Salvador de Bahia and Rio de Janeiro contained between 40,000 and 60,000 persons on the eve of independence. There were no other capital cities of this size and some, such as São Paulo were small towns of some 25,000 persons.2 Brazil in fact was far less urbanized than Portugal or most European countries which by then had 10 percent or more of their population living in urban centers.3 Portugal which only had an estimated 3 million people in the same period was more densely populated and its capital city of Lisbon had 180,000 persons. Madrid had 160,000 inhabitants and these two Iberian capitals were small cities compared to the half a million people living in Paris and the 1.4 million in London.4

1 2

3 4

IBGE, Estatísticas do Século XX (2003), table pop_1936aeb-01. Salvador was estimated to have a population of 46,000 and Rio de Janeiro around 60,000. See Vieira Nascimento, “Dez freguesias da cidade do Salvador”: 104, table 4, and Luís Carlos Soares, “O povo de Cam” na capital do Brasil: a escravidão urbana no Rio de Janeiro do século XIX (Rio de Janeiro: 7Letras, 2007): 25. The estimate from São Paulo in 1822 is from Saint-Hilaire. Muller estimated a population of some 22,000 in 1836. Odilon Nogueira de Matos, “A cidade de São Paulo no século XIX,” Revista de História, 10 (21–22) (1955): 93. Leonor Freire Costa, Pedro Lains and Susana Münch Miranda, An Economic History of Portugal, 1143–2010 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016): 169. R. B. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750–1970 (London: Macmllan, 1975): 71, 77 tables B3 and B4.

149

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Brazilians primarily lived in the rural areas and most of the population lived on the Atlantic coast with only the interior mining state of Minas Gerais having a significant population. Most of the interior consisted of unsettled frontier lands mostly inhabited by independent Indian groups. But even counting the modest population of Amerindians in the interior provinces, Brazil was one of the world’s least densely populated regions with an estimated density of one person per square kilometer in the mid-nineteenth century.5 The population was overwhelmingly illiterate. The majority worked in agriculture and for most of the century only the elite had stable or legally secure land ownership. Many small farmers and ranchers had precarious title to their lands and were usually squatters. In turn, the state granted enormous tracts of land to the elite in the colonial period and these formed the basis for a landed elite in the colonial and imperial periods. These “sesmarias” land grants were often ill defined in terms of territory and were only partially exploited if at all. Typically, they could be anywhere from one to three leagues, or 16.7 to 50.1 square miles (43.2 to 129.8 square kilometers) or even larger if they were just cattle ranches.6 Although the sesmaria system was formally abolished in 1822, along with primogeniture, no effort was made to redraw any grants and a new land law was not established until 1850. In fact, elites with capital simply seized vacant lands and then proceeded to take possession of them without formal title. In 1845, it was stated that 44 percent of the lands were held without formal title. This of course led to endemic violence over land ownership in many of the rural areas.7 Nor was this violence confined to just the rural areas. In the early part of the century, there were numerous slave, regional, peasant and farmer revolts throughout Brazil which challenged the authority of the central government.8 But by the second half of the century an internal peace had 5

6 7

8

This was based on an estimated size of 8.3 million square kilometers, and the 1872 census total population. J. E. Wappäus, A geographia physica do Brasil: refundida (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia de G. Leuzinger & filhos, 1884): 396. Warren Dean, “Latifundia and land policy in nineteenth-century Brazil,” Hispanic American Historical Review, 51(4) (1971): 607. Nelson Nozoe, “Sesmarias e apossamento de terras no Brasil colônia,” Revista Economia, 7(3) (2006): 587–605; Ruy Cirne Lima, Pequena história territorial do Brasil. Sesmarias e terras devolutas (São Paulo: Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo, 1935 [1991]) and Alberto Passos Guimarães, Quatro séculos de latifúndio, 4th edn (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1977). These included the revolt of the Malês slaves in Salvador, the Cabanagem peasant revolt (1835–1840) in Pará, the Farroupilha rebellion (1835–1845) in Rio Grande do

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been achieved. Although international wars would be fought, with the major one being the Paraguay War of 1864–1870, there were no more popular uprisings after 1850, Nevertheless conflict over land remained constant throughout the century. The mere possession of such large estates did not in itself bestow power, but with a functioning fazenda (or plantation) and slaves or free workers, the capitalized large landowner was without question the elite of the colonial and imperial period, though they shared political power with an independent monarchy and a royal bureaucracy. Also part of this elite were the wealthy merchants involved in international exports and long-distance traders. Below the mostly white elite was a middle multi-colored sector. This consisted of both whites and a new and ever expanding class of free colored persons. This free African originated working class was made up primarily of pardos (browns) with a significant minority of pretos (blacks), who would surpass the number of slaves by mid-century. The white and free colored middle sector was made up of local merchants, small farmers and ranchers and the skilled and semi-skilled labor force in the rural and urban areas. In the urban sector and transport, there was also a limited number of slave artisans who lived semi-autonomous lives. This middle sector, a relatively small segment of the population, probably accounted for 20 percent of the imperial population. The majority of the population, an estimated three-quarters of the total, consisted of whites, free colored and mestizos (of both European, Amerindian and African extraction) who were unskilled or semi-skilled laborers, squatters, migrant workers and urban poor. It also consisted of most of the slaves, the majority of whom were unskilled or semi-skilled manual laborers. Here illiteracy was the norm, and legal rights to land and property were limited, with the majority working in agriculture.9 There were no schools for this population and only limited government and health services. This free and slave population, had high rates of mortality and low life expectancy, which given their numerical importance, dominated national longevity rates. The elite of imperial Brazil consisted of a nobility nominated by the emperor which incorporated many of the largest landowners and a good number of merchants and entrepreneurs. Unlike their European equivalents,

9

Sul, the Sabinada rebellion in Bahia (1837–1838), the Balaiada uprising in Maranhão (1838–1841), the so called Liberais revolt in Minas Gerais e São Paulo (1842) and the final revolt was the Praieira Revolt of 1850 in Pará. See the discussion of imperial class structure in Faoro, Os donos do poder: chapter IX.

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these titles were not hereditary, involved no land grants or right to political participation or a seat in parliament. They were granted by the emperor to gain regional support for the monarchy or support for imperial projects and tended to re-enforce local elites. Thus initially the northeastern sugar elite obtained a large share of the titles but soon the  coffee elite of the Southeast progressively increased their share over the course of the century. Just under 1,000 men and women were granted these non-hereditary titles. The elite was also made up of the non-titled wealthy families even if they owned no large estates. Finally, there was an independent royal bureaucracy which played a key role in imperial society. Thus for all the titles and other aspect of a monarchy, Brazil was most definitely a capitalist society where money equated status and power.10 The size of the Brazilian elite in the nineteenth century, which included the planters, sugar mill owners, major merchants, exporters and the liberal professional classes, probably amounted to less than 5 percent of the total population. The sugar planters (fazendeiros) and later the coffee planters were at the top of the economic structure, but they depended on merchants, commissionaires, importers and exporters to survive. If the major land owners, merchants and government officials made up a small percentage of the elite, most of the rest of this class was made up of liberal professionals, who themselves were a relatively small group. During the whole imperial period only between 12,000 to 15,000 persons graduated from Portuguese and Brazilian medical and law schools. Lawyers were especially prominent politically, and an estimated 70 percent of all the imperial ministers and senators were law school graduates.11 Moreover most of these legal professionals to the mid-century were graduates of the University of Coimbra in Portugal, thus creating what some have seen as a cohesive legal elite which formed the backbone of the imperial government.12 10

11

12

Eul-Soo Pang, In Pursuit of Honor and Power: Noblemen of the Southern Cross in Nineteenth-Century Brazil (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988). Even in the colonial period, when governors were usually nobles, the monarchy did not distinguish between those born in Portugal from those born in Brazil and there was no real metropolitan colonial distinction. See Maria Beatriz Nizza da Silva, Ser nobre na colônia (São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2005). Roderick Barman and Jean Barman, “The role of the law graduate in the political elite of imperial Brazil,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 18(4) (1976): 426; and José Murilo de Carvalho, Teatro de sombras: a política imperial (São Paulo: Vértice, 1988): 19, table 2. Coimbra trained 1,242 Brazilians from 1772–1872, while the first Brazilian-based law schools were only founded in 1828. José Murilo de Carvalho, “Political elites and state building: the case of nineteenth-century Brazil,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 24(3) (1982): 383–384.

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The nineteenth century voting lists offer some of the best information we have on the class structure of the imperial society. The vote was indirect and based on property qualifications. The first tier of voters consisted of those who only needed an annual income of 200 mil réis to participate. This was actually a low qualification. It has been estimated that a common soldier made 432 mil réis and a carpenter 480 mil réis per annum. Porters, coachman, butlers, gardeners and agricultural laborers made between 200 to 400 mil réis per annum. Literacy was not a requirement, and a good quarter to a half of the first tier of voters in any district was illiterate.13 One study of the last of the open elections, that of 1880, showed that some 40 percent of the males twenty-one years of age and older in the urban districts of the city of São Paulo were eligible first tier voters, and the rate was 38 percent in the rural parishes. Their respective average income was 831 mil réis in the urban district and 254 mil réis in the rural ones.14 It has been estimated that the 1 million primary voters in the election of 1872 represented 13 percent of the total population or more than double that ratio if only adult males are included. Though low, this was no different from most European countries in this period.15 The voting lists in which occupations have been reconstructed suggest that the males who could vote in the first round, were primarily agricultural farmers and laborers, with a very small participation of skilled workers and of elite and liberal professionals. Thus in twenty-two years of voting records in the city of Curitiba from 1850s to the 1880s, some 86 percent of first-level voters were lavradores, or agricultural field workers or small farmers, and just 2 percent were skilled workers. The rest were the elite groups of landowners, merchants and liberal professionals.16 The census of 1872 gives a more complete overview of the class and occupational structure of the Brazilian population. Excluding slaves, only 6.5 percent of the population could be considered as part of the elite. These were landowners, capitalists, merchants, government workers and members of the liberal professions. The skilled and semi-skilled 13 14

15 16

Jairo Nicolau, “A participação eleitoral no Brasil” (Working Paper CBS-26-200, University of Oxford Centre for Brazilian Studies, 2002): 6, 9. Herbert S. Klein, “A participação politíca no Brasil do século XIX: ss votantes de São Paulo em 1880,” Dados. Revista de Ciéncias Sociais [Rio de Janeiro], 38(3) (1995) 530, 533, tables 1, 2. Murilo de Carvalho, Teatro de sombra: 141, table xiii. Jayme Antonio Cardoso, “A população votante de Curitiba 1853–1881,” Master’s thesis, UFP, Curitiba, 1974.

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labor force was relatively small, accounting for 16.6 percent of the total of workers and free unskilled workers made up over three-quarters of the total population of workers and 89 percent of the slaves whose occupation was known (see Table 5.1). The 345,000 of the economically active slaves in 1872 not directly engaged in agriculture were often closely allied with plantation life. The most obvious example were the 95,000 slaves listed as day laborers, some of whom were probably employed in the fazendas alongside the resident slave forces. Some of the 7,000 artisans listed as working in wood and metal crafts, especially carpenters and blacksmiths, may also have been employed on plantations. But, as the example of Minas Gerais reveals, there was also within the slave labor force a significant proportion of slaves who were not directly related to export agriculture yet still played a significant economic role in the economy. Thus slaves made up 10 percent of the 126,000 workers found in the textile factories, which were then coming into prominence as Brazil’s first major industrial activity. The 175,000 slaves who were in domestic service accounted for 17 percent of all persons employed in that activity and made up 15 percent of the economically active slaves. Slaves also exceeded their 15 percent share of the laboring population in such activities as construction (4,000 of whom made up 19 percent of all such workers), in masonry, and allied crafts (18 percent), just as they held more than their share of day laborers (23 percent). Finally there were some occupations in which, even though slaves represented a small share of all workers, the absolute number of slaves was impressive. This was the case with seamstresses, in which the 41,000 slave women only represented 8 percent of the total workers in this occupation. A great many slaves also lived in cities, in which, like the country at large, formed a minority of the total Afro-Brazilian population. A much higher percentage of the 4.2 million free coloreds than of the 1.5 million slaves lived in urban centers. Nevertheless slaves were important in the labor force of every city. Of the 785,000 persons who lived in cities of 20,000 or more in 1872, a minimum of 118,000, or 15 percent, were slaves. This was probably not the highest number of urban slaves ever reached, since such urban based slaves were in decline at this time, just like the total slave population. In 1849, for example, the city of Rio de Janeiro had 78,000 slaves, whereas in 1872 there were only 39,000 left. But slaves in Rio still represented over one-fifth of the city’s 183,000 people. Salvador, the second largest center in 1872, with 108,000 residents

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Table 5.1  Occupations in Brazil in 1872 census Categories

Free

Slaves

Total

Elite Clergy Jurists medical professions Teachers Public employees Ranchers Military Capitalists and property owners Factory owners Merchants, etc. Sub total

2,586 7,643 5,132 7,196 12,628 103,692 21,367 35,474 18,623 95,727 310,068

479 121 704 991 26 1296 5863 2017 2641 43,130 57,268

3,065 7,764 5,836 8,187 12,654 104,988 27,230 37,491 21,264 138,857 367,336

9,683 7,982 57,167 12,213 1,672 119 4,622 745 6,093 5,822 7,458 15,194 9,129 137,899

45,113 45,555 509,347 138,929 8,042 505 22,631 1,961 27,152 13,623 31,541 57,750 27,975 930,124

172,834 314,046 626,582 1,113,462

576,905 1,347,761 2,843,382 4,768,048

1,294,491

6,065,508

Skilled and semi-skilled workers Artists and entertainers Sailors and fishermen Seamstresses Cloth workers Leather and cloth workers Dye makers Clothing makers Hat makers Shoe makers Miners Metal workers Wood workers Construction workers Subtotal

35,430 37,573 452,180 126,716 6,370 386 18,009 1,216 21,059 7,801 24,083 42,556 18,846 792,225 Unskilled workers

Servants (criados) and day laborers Domestic servants Farm workers (lavradores) Subtotal

404,071 1,033,715 2,216,800 3,654,586

Total working population Total

4,771,017

Source: Recenseamento Geral do Império, 1872 CEBRAP recalculation

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had 13,000 slaves, and Recife ranked third with 57,000 persons, of whom 10,000 were slaves. Even the still quite small city of São Paulo had 3,000 slaves out of a population of 28,000.17 Urban slavery in Brazil emulated both the standard forms of rural master-slave relationship with direct ownership and resident employment along with direct ownership and rental to a third party. But there were also a fairly large number of slaves who were self-employed, or, as the Brazilians called them, escravos de ganho.18 These slaves spanned the occupational spectrum from the least skilled and most dangerous of jobs to the most highly remunerative occupations. Such slaves even had multiple occupations. In the city of Salvador in the 1850s and 1870s, several cases of multiple skills or occupations held by one slave were noted.19 This same pattern of multiple occupations was found in the rental slaves of the city of Salvador in the mid-nineteenth century.20 All information indicates that these escravos de ganho porters, vendors, semi-skilled and skilled artisans were not only self-employed and paid a fixed income to their owners, but they also took care of their own housing or lived as apprentices in the homes of master craftsmen who were not their owners. Studies of the major cities indicate that local municipal records constantly show the existence of independent slave households.21 Artists and musicians were often self-employed slaves, though some of these resided with their masters.22 Many slaves were also hired by factory owners. In 1840, José Vieira Sarmento, for example, had a small tortoiseshell-comb factory in the city 17 18

19 20

21

22

See Table 6.3 and its sources. On the self-renting slaves see, among others, the works of Luiz Carlos Soares, “Os escravos de ganho no Rio de Janeiro do século XIX,” Revista Brasileira de História, V(16) (1988): 107–142; and Leila Mezan Algranti, “Os ofícios urbanos e os escravos de ganho no Rio de Janeiro Colonial (1808–1822),” in Tamás Szmrecsányi, ed., História econômica do período colonial (São Paulo: Ed. HUCITEC/FAPESP, 1996): 195–214. Maria Cristina Luz Pinheiro, “O trabalho de crianças escravas na cidade de Salvador, 1850–1888,” Afro-Ásia, 32 (2005): 162. As Katia Mattoso noted, “…é difícil distinguir entre escravos de ganho, os que vão para as ruas mercadear, e escravos domésticos, pois seus proprietários utilizam seus serviços ou os alugam de acôrdo com suas necessidades do momento: um mesmo escravo pode, muito bem, ser ganhador e doméstico ao mesmo tempo,” Katia M. de Queirós Mattoso, “Sociedade escravista e mercado de trabalho: Salvador – Bahia, 1850–1868,” Bahia Análise & Dados [Salvador], 10(1) (2000): 17. See e.g. Leila Mezan Algranti, O feitor ausente. Estudo sobre a escravidão urbana no Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1821 (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1988); and Ynaê Lopes dos Santos, “Além da senzala: arranjos escravos de moradia no Rio de Janeiro (1808–1850),” Master’s thesis, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2006). Zephyr Frank, Dutra’s World: Wealth and Family in Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004).

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which employed eleven of his own slaves (four journeymen and seven apprentices) and also nine rented slaves.23 In the city of Niterói in Rio de Janeiro state in 1855, for example, there were 130 slaves employed in the local factories, of which eighty-five were owned by the individual factory which employed them and forty-five were rented. In the neighboring city of Rio de Janeiro half (527) of the 1,039 workers employed in the local factories were slaves, though there is no corresponding breakdown into rented and owned. The largest textile firm in Brazil, the Companhia da Ponta D’Arêa in late 1855 had a work force of 622 workers, of whom 181 were slaves.24 Moreover, despite the steady increase of foreign-born free workers in industry, as late as 1872, the census listed 2,135 slave industrial workers, compared to 9,458 foreign born in a total industrial workforce of 18,091.25 A detailed unpublished census of Minas Gerais in 1831–1832 showed that there were some 23,000 slaves who worked in such activities. These represented 17 percent of the provinces slaves (compared to 41 percent of free persons who were working in manufacturing activities). Half of the slaves and half of the free workers were listed as working in manual and mechanical activities, but slaves were above their provincial average among metal workers, construction workers and textile workers, with 95 percent of the textile slave workers (or 9,998 of them) being women.26 All this flexibility made for a quite complex pattern of slave activity and for a much more pronounced intervention of the slave in the market economy as a consumer and earner of income. Though municipalities often complained about the relative freedom and lack of financial support for self-employed slaves, they proved so lucrative an investment for their masters that the practice was never abolished. Estimates from both urban and plantation slave rentals suggest that rented out slaves – after paying for their own upkeep of housing and food (estimated at 20 percent of their gross income) – provided an annual profit of some 23 24

25

26

Luiz Carlos Soares, “A escravidão industrial no Rio de Janeiro do século xix,” Anais do V Congresso Brasileiro de História Econômica ABPHE (2003): 4. Artur José Renda Vitorino, “Operários livres e cativos nas manufaturas: Rio de Janeiro, segunda metade do século XIX,” in I Jornada Nacional de História do Trabalho (Florianópolis: Laboratório de História Social do Trabalho e da Cultura, 2002): 7. Luiz Carlos Soares, “A manufatura na sociedade escravista: o surto manufatureiro no Rio de Janeiro e nas suas circunvizinhanças (1840–1870),” in F. Mauro, ed., La préindustrialization du Brésil (Paris: CNRS, 1984): 42. Marcelo Magalhães Godoy, “Uma província artesã: o universo social, econômico e demográfico dos artífices da Minas do oitocentos,” Anais do XII Encontro Nacional da ABEP: 4.

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10 percent to 20 percent to their masters on their initial investment.27 They were, however, only moderately used in the rural area and so were one of the major features that distinguished urban from rural slavery in Brazil. There was even a strike organized in Bahia in 1857 of the porters known as ganhadores. These haulers of objects, water, sedan chairs, and innumerable other cargoes, were organized into work groups usually along African nationalities. They also included both slave and free Africans, as well as creoles both slave and free, though the dominant element were Nagôs or Yorubas. In that year, an attempt by the municipal government to tax their labor and create other forms of limitations on their freedom of contract led to a week long strike of all active workers which effectively caused the urban government to abandon most of its tax and control efforts.28 Finally slaves could be found in all parts of Brazil’s complex transportation network, from muleteers who formed the basis of interior transport until well into the second half of the nineteenth century29 to sailors in both long-distance oceanic trade and coastal trade and among local fisherman. As we previously noted, slaves were to be found aboard slave ships bound for Africa as members of the regular crew, and were vitally important in the costal trade in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.30 Even in the nineteenth-century slave sailors remained a fundamental part of the shipping industry. For example, in the port of Rio de Janeiro in the period 1815 to 1826 officials issued passports for 2,463 slave sailors engaged in the coastal trade with southern ports.31 In the southern Brazilian port town of Porto Alegre in 1857 there were 3,193 27

28 29

30

31

The best estimates of profitability of slave ownership in the nineteenth century comes from Carvalho de Mello, “The economics of labor in Brazilian coffee plantations”: chapter 4. João José Reis, “The revolution of the ganhadores: urban labour, ethnicity and the African strike of 1857 in Bahia, Brazil,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 29(2) (1997): 355–393. African-born slaves seem to have been over-represented among the tropeiros, and slaves made up a third of the labor force raising pack animals. See Marcelo Magalhães Godoy, Mario Marcos Sampaio Rodarte and Clotilde Andrade Paiva, “Negociantes e tropeiros em um território de contrastes; o setor comercial de Minas Gerais no século XIX,” Anais do V Congresso Brasileiro de História Econômica, ABHPE (2003). Also see Jaime Rodrigues, “Cultura marítima: marinheiros e escravos no tráfico negreiro para o Brasil (sécs. XVIII e XIX),” Revista Brasileira de História, 19 (38) (1999): 15–53. There are even cases of fugitive slaves claiming to be free and enlisting in the Brazilian navy and serving aboard warships for many months. Álvaro Pereira do Nascimento, “Do cativeiro ao mar: escravos na Marinha de Guerra,” Estudos Afro-Asiáticos, 38 (2000): 1–25. Fábio W. A. Pinheiro, “Tráfico atlântico de escravos na formação dos plantéis mineiros, Zona da Mata, c.1809–c.1830,” Master’s thesis, UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, 2007: table 6, 75.

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sailors listed as working in the port involved in either coastal trading, fishing and or local rowboat transport, of whom 1,157 were slaves. Of these slave sailors, almost half were engaged in coastal trade, and they accounted for 30 percent of the sailors engaged in long-distance oceanic trade, 27 percent on the river and the port and only 10 percent were fisherman.32 Over a decade later, in 1869 there was only a modest decline in the ratio if not the number of slave sailors. In that year, the government listed 3,638 sailors as working from the port involved in oceanic and coastal trading, fishing and local rowboat transport, of which 1,168 – or almost a third – were slaves.33 They also formed a significant part of the boatyard workers in the same year, accounting for 72 of the 247 workers making and repairing ships in the port’s naval yards.34 But the end of the slave trade and the decline of the slave population, along with the growth of coffee plantations led to a relative decline in urban slavery, if not of the urban Afro-Brazilian population. On the eve of abolition in 1887, almost three-quarters of the remaining 751,000 slaves could be found in the three provinces of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, the center of the coffee plantation region. A recent attempt at a national evaluation of slave ownership throughout Brazil in the 1870s shows both how widely distributed was slave ownership, but also how unevenly distributed were the slaves among the agricultural communities.35 Sugar and coffee municípios had the highest average number of slaves per unit and the most unequal distribution of slaves, but everywhere else slaves were fairly widely distributed in smallholdings in a host of agricultural, grazing and other rural activities. Thus slavery in the end was most heavily concentrated in the most dynamic regions of Brazil on the eve of emancipation. Although slavery ended, the forced migration of 4.9 million Africans had a lasting effect on Brazil. It was now a nation dominated by Afro-Brazilians who made up 58 percent of the national population by 1872, and still make up 51 percent of the population in the census of 2010.36 32

33 34 35 36

Vinicius Pereira de Oliveira, “Sobre o convés: marinheiros, marítimos e pescadores negros no mundo atlântico do Porto de Rio Grande/RS (século XIX),” IX Encontro Estadual de História – ANPUH-RS (Porto Alegre, 2008): 3–5. Paulo Roberto Staudt Moreira, “Os cativos e os homens de bem. Experiências negras no espaço urbano, Porto Alegre 1858–1888” (Porto Alegre: EST edições, 2003): 74. Moreira, Os cativos e os homens de bem: 75. Renato Leite Marcondes, “Desigualidades regionais brasileiras: comércio marítimo e posse de cativos na década de 1870,” Habilitation thesis, FEA, USP, Riberão Preto, 2005. IBGE, Censo Demográfico 2010, Características da população e dos domicílios resultados do universo (Rio de Janeiro, 2011): table 1.3.1.

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In terms of general demographic structure the nineteenth century population differed little from the colonial population. Both fertility and mortality were extremely high and probably changed little over most of the century. The fertility rate, as can be constructed for this pre-census period, was extremely high by European standards. This may be due to two factors which were different in Brazil from the Portuguese norms of the period. In Brazil, church control over marriage was relatively limited given the high percentage of non-marital unions and of illegitimate births which occurred throughout the country over the course of the century. Also given the abundant lands available legally or as squatters, the usual land restraints on marriage were of little importance. But mortality was also quite high. Infant and child deaths probably made up a third or more of the total deaths with a resulting low average life expectancy in the twenties for men and women for most of the century. There are provincial censuses before 1872, but these census and their accompanying lists of births and deaths rarely produced viable crude birth and death rates. What they have usually shown however is that the free persons had higher birth rates and lower death rates than the slave populations. But the actual rates obtained have not been consistent or reliable enough to produce overall rates of births and deaths. The only exceptions to this have been a few studies which provided data on fertility rates by age cohorts of legally married couples. But given the high rates of consensual unions, these rates of legally married women cannot be used to generate total fertility rates.37 Given these problems, calculating the dynamics of the pre-1872 population – its births, deaths and the resulting life expectancy – had been based either on estimates from later periods used retrospectively for the pre-census period, or based on theoretical model life tables developed for world populations.38 A fairly reliable estimation is a broad multi-municipal study of the region of Paraná in 1822 which resulted

37

38

In the rural dominated society of Ubatuba the illegitimate births (plus abandoned children) reached 17 percent of all births at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In turn, these rates are probably half the rates in the city of São Paulo in the same period. Marcílio, Caiçara, terra e população: 197. Maria Luiza Marcílio in her detailed analysis of the São Paulo census materials in this period notes the consistent under-reporting of both deaths and births and thus relies on model life tables prepared by Coale and Demeny to estimate the birth and death rates for the province. Maria Luiza Marcílio, Crescimento demográfico e evolução agrária paulista, 1700–1836 (São Paulo: EdUSP, 2000): 84–95.

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in an estimated total fertility rate of 7.4 children (with whites having 7.6 children, free colored 7.3 children and slaves 5.2 children) for women who had ceased to be fertile at age fifty. The crude birth rate was estimated to be fifty-seven births per thousand resident population.39 These rates seem much more reasonable and in fact are quite close to the black population of the United States which is estimated to have had a total fertility rate of 7.9 children and a crude birth rate of 58.6 per thousand of the resident population in 1850–1859.40 Given the under-registration of births and infant deaths, it is difficult to determine basic trends in mortality. Baptisms, which recorded births in the parish, often occurred several days if not months after the actual birth, thus missing any deaths which occurred beforehand. Clearly with this delayed registration of births, a great deal of infant mortality was lost. Thus for example, in the province of Sergipe in the year 1842, only 32 percent of the baptisms of children in the province were registered within the first eight days of birth, while 65 percent were registered from one month to one year after birth and 3 percent from one to two years after birth. Moreover this pattern was the same for both free persons and slaves.41 This delayed registration of births seems to have increased over time. A study of the parish of Rio Grande in the province of Rio Grande do Sul saw an increase in average time between birth and registration (baptism) steadily increase from just under two months (53 days) in the mid-eighteenth century to just over eight months (or 249 days) by the middle of the nineteenth century.42 Clearly then, almost all eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century parish registers under recorded infant deaths and still births. Thus the resulting infant mortality rates generated from the raw data in most studies is incomplete.43 The only 39 40

41

42 43

Louis Henry and Altiva Pilatti Balhana, “La population du Parana depuis le XVIIIe siècle,” Population, 30(1) (1975): 175, 177. Ansley J. Coale and Norfleet W. Rives Jr, “A statistical reconstruction of the black population of the United States 1880–1970: estimates of true numbers by age and sex, birth rates and total fertility,” Population Index, 39(1) (1973): 26, table 10. Falla com que abrio a 2a sessão da 5ª legislatura da Assembléa Provincial de Sergipe, o excellentissimo presidente da provincia, doutor Anselmo Francisco Peretti, em o dia 21 de abril de 1843 (Sergipe: Typ. Provincial, 1843). Mappa no. 12 (s/n). Maria Luiza Bertulini Queiroz, “Paróquia de São Pedro do Rio Grande: estudo de história demográfica,” PhD thesis, História, UFP, Curitiba, 1992: 164, table 42. In a careful reconstruction of some 17,000 births registered in the parish of N.S. da Luz of Curitiba from 1801 to 1850 an infant mortality rate of 80 per thousand births was generated from the surviving data, but as noted, the rate should have been around 240 deaths per thousand live births, Elvira Mari Kubo, “Aspectos demográficos de Curitiba: 1801–1850,” Master’s thesis, Historia, UFP, Curitiba, 1974: 31.

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reconstruction which arrives at a probable rate is a study done of Vila Rica in Minas Gerais in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which obtained a rate of 252 deaths per thousand live births in 1800, with class color and status creating major differences.44 In fact this is close to the infant mortality rate of 260 deaths per thousand live births estimated for the total population of several major municipalities in Paraná in 1822.45 Using the 1872 census, Arriaga has constructed life tables which suggest an infant mortality rate of 267 deaths per thousand live births for males and 249 infant deaths per thousand live births of females. In the model life table west level 4, the resulting estimates of infant mortality rates are close to the averages suggested in the Paraná study.46 These estimated infant mortality rates are quite high by most European and North American standards in the 1860s, but equal to the Italian rates and better than those of Chile in the same period (see Graph 5.1). But this infant mortality rate only declined modestly in the following decades. Even as late as 1900–1905, the average in the state of São Paulo (excluding the capital city) was 200 deaths per thousand live births for 63,000 births in this period.47 Mortality in this period was heavily weighted towards the younger ages. Numerous historical lists of the ages of all persons who died in a given locality permit us to examine what percentage of all deaths occurred in these early years, even if we cannot directly generate a large sample of infant and child mortality rates. What is evident is that between a third to half of all deaths recorded in most eighteenth- and nineteenth-century communities occurred to infants and children under five years of age, even despite the under-reporting of stillbirths and deaths to infants before baptism. Typical of these results is the study of the city of São Paulo, where 51 percent of the over 3,000 deaths recorded between 44

45 46

47

Iraci del Nero da Costa, “Vila Rica: mortalidade e morbidade (1799–1801),” in Iraci del Nero da Costa, ed., A moderna história econômica (Rio de Janeiro: APEC, 1976): xxx, table 8. Henry and Balhana, “La population du Parana”: 183. Ansley J. Coale, Paul Demeny and Barbara Vaughan, Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations: Studies in Population, 2nd edn (New York: Academic Press, 2013): 43, 44. Even as late as 1920 the infant mortality rate for the city of Rio de Janeiro was calculated at 154 infant deaths per thousand live births. Grigorio Mortara, “A mortalidade no primeiro ano de idade no distrito federal,” Revista Brasileira de Estatística, 2 (1941): 271. Statistics generated from data provided in the Anuario Estatístico do Estado de São Paulo, 1950, vol. I: 74

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Chile Italy Holland France USA Spain Finland Canada Belgium UK & Wales Sweden Denmark Australia Norway New Zeland 0

50

100 150 200 250 Infant deaths per thousand live births

300

350

Graph 5.1  Infant mortality rate for selected countries in the mid-nineteenth century. Source: Moreda et al. (2015: 209–210)

1796 and 1809 were to infants and children under five years of age, of which 35 percent were the deaths of infants under one year of age.48 In the Paraná municipality of Castro in 1806, those dying before five years of age represented two-thirds of all deaths.49 In the Paraná municipality of Lapa there were 1,235 deaths registered between 1769 and 1818, 44 percent of which were infants and children under five years of age.50 In a tally of deaths in the province of Minas Gerais in 1850, infants and children less than nine years of age accounted for 42 percent of the over 1,000 deaths reported.51 In the municipality of Guarulhos in São Paulo in the mid-nineteenth century, 53 percent of the 1,423 deaths recorded in a local parish whose age was known were persons under eleven years of age.52 One of the largest samples of deaths is from 1905 and comes from a listing of deaths by age for 171 interior municipalities in the state 48 49 50 51

52

Maria Luiza Marcílio, A cidade de São Paulo: povoamento e população, 1750–1850 (São Paulo: Editora da Universidade de Sâo Paulo, 1974), annexes, table VII. Elisabete Alves Pinto, “Vila de Castro: população e domicílios (1801–1830),” Master’s thesis, História, UFPR, Curitiba, 1992: 327. Marília Souza do Valle, “Movimento populacional da Lapa, 1769–1818,” Master’s thesis, História UFPR, Curitiba, 1974: 88. Relatorio que á Assembléa Provincial da provincia de Minas Geraes apresentou na sessão ordinaria de 1852, o doutor Luiz Antonio Barboza, presidente da mesma provincia (Ouro Preto: Typ. do Bom Senso, 1852). Mapa s/n Sheila de Castro Faria, “Família e morte entre escravos,” XI Encontro Nacional de Estudos Populacionais da ABEP, 2016: 1280, table 2.

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of São Paulo. The lists contains a total of some 49,704 deaths, of which 57 percent occurred to infants and children under five years of age.53 There is also more systematic published data for the city of São Paulo from select years between 1894 and 1920. It should be stressed that death rates were usually higher in urban versus rural areas in Brazil at this time, as it was in much of contemporary Europe and America due to urban crowding. This “urban penalty” probably lasted until well into the twentieth century. Even in 1920 when the city was developing piped water and sanitation facilities, over half of all the deaths registered in the city were accounted for by infants and children under five years of age (see Table 5.2). Thus it would probably be accurate to say that in the nineteenth century overall at least 40 percent of deaths were to infants and children less than five years of age. This assumption is based on the use of model life tables which several scholars have suggested would fit well the early-nineteenth century Brazilian population.54 The best models bracket most estimates of life expectancy so far generated for nineteenth-century Brazil and would suggest the model west levels 4 and 5 generated by Coale and Demeny, which are closest in life expectancy to Arriaga’s reconstruction of a life table for the first national census of Brazil in 1872.55 Using a level 4 model life table would give a child and infant (under five years of age) a mortality rate of 45 percent for males and 42 percent for females (with a life expectancy at birth for males of 25.3 and for women of 27.5 years). Using the higher life expectancies of the level 5 model would give 42 percent deaths for males under five years of age and 39 percent deaths for females before the age of five.56 There also exist some data for this period which estimate the time of death of infants of less than one year of age. This is important since it 53

54

55

56

Calculated from the data in São Paulo, Annuário Demográphico, Anno XII, 1905: 58–69; “Estatística Demographo-Sanitária do Interior do Estado…1905, Obitos por edades e sexo.” See the discussion in Marcílio, Crescimento demográfico: 56, 88. Apparently she was able to create estimates for some Paulista census data using specialized runs from the Princeton model life tables datasets and generated numbers close to the model 5 life table – though with higher youth mortality and lower adult mortality than found in model life table West Level 5. Also see Merrick and Graham, Population and Economic Development: 35. We have selected the model life table West Level 5 which is the closest to Arriaga’s estimated life table for the census of 1872 which lists an average life expectancy at birth for males of 27.08 years and for females at 27.61 years. Arriaga, New Life Tables for Latin American Populations: 29–30. Coale et al., Regional Model Life Tables: 43, 44.

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Table 5.2  Mortality by age in the capital of São Paulo 1894–1929 1894 Ages 0–5 5–10 10–20 20–50 >50 Total

Men

Women

Total

Cum%

1,180 53 114 728 262 2,337

1,092 51 83 408 219 1,853

2,272 104 197 1,136 481 4,190

54.2 56.7 61.4 88.5 100.0

3,067 139 195 1,184 818 5,403

56.8 59.3 62.9 84.9 100.0

4,956 220 372 1,787 1,249 8,584

57.7 60.3 64.6 85.4 100.0

5,569 266 562 2,252 1,900 10,549

52.8 55.3 60.6 82.0 100.0

1906 0–5 5–10 10–20 20–50 >50 Total

1,614 74 108 687 451 2934

1,453 65 87 497 367 2469

0–5 5–10 10–20 20–50 >50 Total

2,634 113 192 1,066 723 4,728

2,322 107 180 721 526 3,856

0–5 5–10 10–20 20–50 >50 Total

2,910 127 312 1,316 1,118 5,783

2,659 139 250 936 782 4,766

1912

1920

Source: Anuario Demografico several years and Boletin Annual de (1894: 10–11)

indicates what deaths were related to gestation or genetic problems and what were caused by social and economic conditions. It is usually assumed that infant deaths twenty-eight days after birth (post-neonatal) are caused by malnutrition, poor water and sanitation conditions or other societal issues. In two very detailed studies of neonatal and post-neonatal deaths in the early nineteenth century, we can see typical patterns of mortality for these pre-modern populations. As expected, there is a higher ratio of

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deaths in the post neonatal period (after twenty-eight days) than in the pre-natal period. Thus in the Paraná municipality of Castro in 1801, only 21 percent of the 140 infant deaths occurred in the first month of life.57 In the case of the parish of Antonio Dias in the mining town of Vila Rica, only 38 percent of the 208 recorded infant deaths occurred in the first month of life in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.58 As late as the 1970s, well over half of all infant deaths under one year were post neonatal in all the states of Brazil.59 Thus life expectancy at birth was quite low throughout the nineteenth century. It has been estimated that life expectancy at birth was in the upper twenties for both genders (27.1 for men and 20.8 for women). If one survived to five years of age, average life expectancy rose considerably. In a life table built on the census of 1872, it rose to 35.7 years if a male reached the age of five, and to 36.4 years for girls who reached that age (see Graph 5.2). It would appear that life expectancy changed only moderately from the late eighteenth until well into the nineteenth century. For the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century municipalities in Paraná, the estimated life expectancy at birth was around twenty-five years of age.60 In  the census of 1900, Arriaga estimated a life expectancy of just 29.0 years for men and 29.7 for women – essentially adding just two years more to the estimate for the 1872 census.61 Although this was not that different from other Latin American countries (see Graph 5.3), it was worse than even poor European countries. Thus Spain in the period 1863–1870 already had a life expectancy of 29.3 years for men and 30.1 years for women, and by 1900 it had risen to 34.4 for men and 35.6 for women.62 Given these estimates for births and deaths, it is possible to determine natural growth rates which are another key index of population change. 57 58

59

60 61 62

Pinto, “Vila de Castro: população e domicílios”: 327. Iraci del Nero da Costa, Vila Rica: População (1719–1826) (São Paulo: IPE/USP, 1979): 105, table 19. There are some exceptions to this pattern in a few local studies but the difference from the general norm is not explained. See Paulo Eduardo Teixeira, A formação das famílias livres: Campinas, 1774–1850 (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2011): 116, table 36; and Maria Aparecida Cezar Gonçalves, “Estudo demografico da paróquia de Nossa Senhora Sant’ana de Ponta Grossa, 1823–1879,” Master’s thesis, Universidade Federal do Paraná, 1979: 144, table 45. Celia Landmann Szwarcwald, Maria do Carmo Leal, Euclides Ayres de Castilho and Carla L. Tavares de Andrade,“Mortalidade infantil no Brasil: ou Bulgária?” Cadernos de Saúde Pública, 13(3) (1997): 512, table 7. Henry and Balhana, “La population du Parana”: 184. Arriaga, New life tables for Latin American populations: 32–33. Vicente Pérez Moreda, David-Sven Reher and Alberto Sanz Gimeno, La conquista de la salud: mortalidad y modernización en la España contemporánea (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2015): 63, table 2.3.

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45

Average Years to Live

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

0

1

5

10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 Men

Women

Graph 5.2  Life expectancy of all males and females in 1872 (upper bound estimate). Source: Arriaga, New Life Tables, 29–30

34.5 33.4

Honduras

30.9 30.4

Costa Rica (1892)

30.5 29.7

Chile

29.7 29.0

BRAZIL 26.1 25.6

Guatemala (1921) Bolivia

25.7 25.2

Mexico

25.6 25.0 24.6 22.7

Paraguay (1899) 0.0

10.0 Females

20.0 Males

30.0

Graph 5.3  Life expectancy at birth of selected Latin American countries around 1900. Source: Arriaga and Davis (1969: 237–238)

40.0

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Gregorio Mortara has the standard estimates for 1870–1890,63 and in turn the Mortara rates were broken down by Merrick and Graham in terms of the influence of immigration and its impact on growth, with the IBGE providing estimates for years 1881–1900 (see Table 5.3).64 These estimates show a fairly high natural growth rate of the population by nineteenth-century European standards. In all European countries for which longevity rates exist for 1850, all are under forty births per thousand of the resident population, and the highest, which is Ireland, had a crude birth rate of just thirty-eight. Equally, no European country in 1850 had such high death rates, though the difference was not so dramatic. In this case, Spain in 1850 had the highest rate which was 27.8 deaths per thousand of the resident population.65 Finally it is worth recalling that while free immigration to Brazil in the period up to the census of 1872 was quite small, the volume of slave immigration was substantial. It is estimated that the arrivals to Brazil were in total some 4.8 million Africans from 1576 to 1856 (see Graph 4.7). Between 1820 and 1850 when 1.7 million Africans arrived, a total of only some 19,000 free immigrants came to Brazil.66 It would thus seem as if the Merrick and Graham’s estimate for immigration for 1840–1870 is too low and was probably at least double or more of that rate. Whatever the re-evaluation of the impact of African immigration was in the pre-1850 period, there is no question of the impact of free immigration in the post 1880 period. Already by the 1872 census there were 385,000 foreign-born residents in the country, the majority being free persons and this was just the early stages of this migration.67 Like Argentina, Canada and the United States, Brazil became a major destination for European immigrants to the Americas, in this particular case primarily 63

64

65 66 67

Giorgio Mortara, “Estudos sôbre a utilização do censo demográfico para a reconstrução das estatísticas do movimento da população Brasil,” Revista Brasileira de Estatística, 2 (1941): 68, 80. Graham and Merrick estimate lower overall rates, with a native growth rate of about 13 per thousand resident native population in the period 1798 to 1872 (17 for the European population and 11 per thousand for the native born black and brown populations) which gives roughly an estimated an annual growth rate of 1.2 percent of the native born in the late eighteenth century (with an estimated birth rate of around 50 and a crude death rate around 30), rising to 1.56 percent per annum in the 1800–1850 period. Merrick and Graham, Population and Economic Development in Brazil: 26–31. Franz Rothenbacher, The European Population, 1850–1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): 23, 27, tables 3.2 and 3.3. The data on free immigration comes from 1820–1871 from Directoria Geral de Estátistica, Boletim Commemorativo da Exposição Nacional de 1908 (Rio de Janeiro, 1908): 82–85. IBGE, Table “CD105, Migrações – estrangeiros e naturalizados nos censos demográficos,” https://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br/lista_tema.aspx?op=0&de=36&no=10.

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Table 5.3  Estimates of crude birth, death and natural growth rates in Brazil 1798–1900

1798 1808 1818 1828 1881 1890 1900 1840–70 1871–90 1891–1900

CBR

CDR

Total growth rate

Immigration rate

Natural growth rate

53.7 54.7 53.3 56.7 47.0 46.5 46.0 46.5 46.6 46.0

42.0 42.2 42.2 42.7 32.5 30.2 27.8 32.3 29.5 27.8

11.7 12.5 11.1 14.0 14.5 16.3 18.2 15.2 19.1 24.2

1.0 2.0 6.0

14.2 17.1 18.2

Source: 1798–1828 Marcilio (2000: 89); 1840–1900 Merrick and Graham (1979: 37); for single years 1881, 1890, 1900 IBGE, “CD109–Taxas brutas de natalidade e de mortalidade,” https://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br/lista_tema.aspx?op=0&de=36&no=10

from the Mediterranean region. In contrast to the other countries, however, a large share of the 3.4 million migrants who arrived had their passage subsidized by the government and also had a higher share of families in the migration stream. This massive migration was undertaken by the state and federal governments to replace slave labor in the coffee fields of Brazil and the only way to compete with the other major American destinations was to offer subsidized passages. The two most important groups to arrive were the Italians followed by the Portuguese and the Spanish (see Table 5.4). Given the birth, death and immigration figures, a rough estimate can be calculated for the annual growth of the imperial population in the nineteenth century. Using just the 1818 estimate and the 1872 and 1900 censuses, it would appear that the population was growing at 2 percent in the first period and 1.9 percent in the second period, with an overall growth of 2 percent in the annual growth rate for the period 1818–1900 (see Table 5.5). The Southern provinces/states along with São Paulo had among the highest growth rates in both periods and were the biggest receptors of slaves and free immigrants in the nineteenth century. This explains how they increased their share of the national population from 47 percent in 1819 to 58 percent by 1900, mostly at the expense of the Northeast which fell to 39 percent in 1900. Between foreign immigration and high birth rates, Brazil in the nineteenth century came to replace Mexico as the Latin American country

170

Source: Levy (1974): 71–73

1870–1890 1891–1913 Subtotal 1914–1930 Total

1,97,473 6,21,346 8,18,819 4,07,555 12,26,374

Portuguese 3,55,499 9,80,232 13,35,731 1,49,508 14,85,239

Italians 46,014 3,90,057 4,36,071 1,42,260 5,78,331

Spaniards 38,340 48,010 86,350 83,993 1,70,343

Germans

Table 5.4  Arrival of Major Immigrant Groups to Brazil, 1870–1930

– 11,868 11,868 88,785 1,00,653

Japanese

1,12,041 2,50,948 3,62,989 2,64,063 6,27,052

Others

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Table 5.5  Annual average growth of the population of Brazil by regions and provinces (states) 1819, 1872, 1900 Census year Province

1819

1872

Annual growth rate 1900

North 143,251 332,847 695,112 Amazonas 19,350 57,610 249,756 Pará 123,901 275,237 445,356 Northeast 1,703,111 4,638,560 6,749,507 Maranhão 200,000 359,040 499,308 Piauí 61,226 202,222 334,328 Ceará 201,170 721,686 849,127 Rio Grande do 70,921 233,979 274,317 Norte Paraíba 96,448 376,226 490,784 Pernambuco 368,465 841,539 1,178,150 Alagoas 111,973 348,009 649,273 Sergipe 114,996 176,243 356,264 Bahia 477,912 1,379,616 2,117,956 Southeast 1,453,451 4,016,922 7,824,011 Minas Gerais 631,885 2,039,735 3,594,471 Espírito Santo 72,845 82,137 209,783 Rio de Janeiro 509,998 1,057,696 1,737,478 São Paulo 238,723 837,354 2,282,279 South 169,098 721,337 1,796,495 Paraná 32,887 126,722 327,136 Rio Grande do 92,180 434,813 1,149,070 Sul Santa Catarina 44,031 159,802 320,289 Center-West 100,564 220,812 373,309 Goais 63,168 160,395 255,284 Mato Grosso 37,396 60,417 118,025 Total 3,569,475 9,930,478 17,438,434

1819–1872 1872–1900 1.6% 2.1% 1.5% 1.9% 1.1% 2.3% 2.4% 2.3%

2.7% 5.4% 1.7% 1.3% 1.2% 1.8% 0.6% 0.6%

2.6% 1.6% 2.2% 0.8% 2.0% 1.9% 2.2% 0.2% 1.4% 2.4% 2.8% 2.6% 3.0%

1.0% 1.2% 2.3% 2.5% 1.5% 2.4% 2.0% 3.4% 1.8% 3.6% 3.3% 3.4% 3.5%

2.5% 1.5% 1.8% 0.9% 1.9%

2.5% 1.9% 1.7% 2.4% 2.0%

Note: For these censuses Paraná separated from São Paulo and city of Rio de Janeiro is included in state. Source: For 1819, Botelho (2005: 76, tabela 2) (corrected); For 1872, IBGE, Sidra, 1286

with the largest population in this century. Moreover, its growth was so rapid that it increased its share of the total Latin American population from 24 percent in 1850 to 34 percent in 1950, a century later.68 This growing population was both multi-racial and with a changing makeup 68

The comparative data for 1900 comes from SALA, vol. 27, 102 and for 1950 from CELADE, Boletim Demográfico, no. 51:13, table 1.

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of free and slave, and of native and foreign born. For most of the century, Brazil was a major slave based society and one of the most fundamental defining characteristics of the population was that it was primarily non-white for most of the century. Furthermore, unlike North America, Brazilians divided their population into at least three well defined color categories of whites, blacks (pretos) and browns (pardos), with Amerindians settled in villages and mestizos (caboclos) being important in the northern provinces and along the frontier. Browns and blacks were not equally distributed among the resident populations. The pardos were predominantly free and the pretos predominantly slave. This meant that pardos were a minority of the slaves everywhere and that pretos were a minority of the free colored population in almost all districts we have been able to reconstruct (see Table 5.6). The causes for these systematic variations are many, but most obviously there was elite race prejudice which ranked the population based on skin color. Elite prejudice influenced the brown/black division in relation to who was liberated, and also influenced the gender division and age of the free population of color. Though pardos were mostly free, they tended to have more women than men than any other group in society, with a gender ratio of only 85 men per 100 women. Voluntary manumission initiated by the masters tended to free far more women than men, as well as far more pardos than pretos. Although self-purchase initiated by the slaves tended to be more used by pretos and African-born slaves, this route produced a minority of the manumissions. Among the slaves, however, males predominated. This reflects the impact of the ongoing Atlantic slave trade which was bringing in predominantly adult males until the trade ended in 1850. Among the best data we have on age and gender come from local censuses (mappas) from the province of São Paulo in the 1820s. The total slave population had a gender ratio of 153 males per hundred females, but the creoles slaves were just 102 males per hundred females. The major factor influencing the gender ratio of the total slave population were the African-born slaves in the province whose gender ratio was 215 males per hundred females (see Graphs 5.4a and 5.4b). In terms of rates of marriage, there were only modest differences in color among the free persons. What is unusual however is the existence of a small number of slaves who had ever been married (widowed or married). This is found in all provinces of the empire, and can be seen in

173

1811 1808 1838 1843 1838 1824 1838 1826 1844 1858 1851 1836

Paraíba Minas Gerais Santa Catarina Alagoas Maranhão Paraná Pernambuco Piauí Rio Grande do Norte Rio de Janeiro Sergipe São Paulo

Source: Norberto de Souza e Silva (1870)

Date

Province 45,208 106,684 45,596 15,249 41,986 18,488 72,379 21,945 48,157 139,779 48,150 172,879

Brancos 47,735 129,656 2,375 22,503 35,309 7,869 105,137 32,034 64,770 66,307 83,045 59,454

Pardos

Free population

8,426 47,937 1,861 2,964 13,782 675 21,671 5,755 11,207 16,130 32,851 6,811

Pretos 3,910 15,737 1,884 2,111 16,279 1,731 7,381 5,976 5,883 25,383 10,014 14,722

Pardos

Pretos 13,723 133,035 11,774 7,475 95,056 4,124 50,483 19,193 12,260 158,860 46,550 71,211

Slaves

92% 89% 56% 91% 68% 82% 93% 84% 92% 72% 89% 80%

Free

% Pardos

Table 5.6  Pre-1872 census population of selected provinces by color and legal status

38% 26% 14% 28% 13% 14% 30% 23% 48% 9% 41% 9%

Free

% Pretos

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

174 75+ 70–74 65–59 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–59 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 0–4 15

10

5

0 Males

5

10

15

Females

Graph 5.4a  Age and gender of total slave population in São Paulo province 1829 (n = 72,748) 75+ 70–74 65–59 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–59 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 0–4 15

10

5

0 Males

5

10

15

Females

Graph 5.4b  Age pyramid of African-born slaves in São Paulo province 1829 (n = 53,536)

detail in these two provincial censuses of 1830 and 1842 (see Table 5.7).69 This was a rare occurrence in other major American slave societies. Finally, it is worth remembering that all the current estimates of life expectancy show that slaves in this society, as in all slave societies, tended to have a life expectancy lower than the free persons. In the 69

For a detailed analysis of these marriages in Minas Gerais in the 1830s which are approximately the same ratio of married as in Parana and Alagoas, see Jonis Freire, “Escravidão e família escrava na zona da Mata Mineira oitocentista. 2009,” PhD thesis, UNICAMP, Campinas, 2009: 175, table II.

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Table 5.7  Marriage rates among adults by gender, color and status in two provinces, 1830 and 1842 Paraná 1830

Alagoas 1842

Color/Status Males % Married Females % Married Males % Married Females % Married Whites Free pardos Free pretos Slave pardos Slave pretos

6573 2468 2011 811 1592

56.4% 55.4% 56.7% 18.2% 19.5%

7147 3017 212 846 1407

59.7% 50.3% 47.6% 20.7% 22.6%

3381 5825 674 314 2581

63.3% 63.6% 57.3% 30.6% 24.7%

3696 7787 798 354 1903

61.7% 62.3% 57.0% 28.2% 29.5%

Notes: Married is defined as having ever been married. Source: Falla da Presidente Alagoas, 1842, mappa 8 and Costa and Gutiérrez (1985: 155–185)

1872, census it is estimated that slaves had a life expectancy of 23.4 years at birth for males and 25.5 years for women, in this case 3.7 and 2.1 years less than the population as a whole. In the United States in 1860 both the male and female slaves had a life expectancy at birth of 4.9 years less than whites.70 Not only did Brazil differ from Portugal in having a large nonfree and non-white population, but it also differed in such fundamental institutions as marriage and the family. These had evolved in forms distinct from European patterns and this is clearly evident in the nineteenth-century data. In general, fewer Brazilian adults were legally married than was the norm in the metropolis, and if they married, they usually married at younger ages. One of the few studies to provide the ages of marrying couples in a given year was supplied by the president of the province of Minas Gerais in 1844 who listed the age of all spouses marrying in the province in the year. As expected, we can see a difference in ages between the spouses, with men on average being five and a half years older than their spouses. Men married at 29.3 years of age and women at 23.9 years. This most definitely reflects the necessity of men to obtain resources before marriage, and only in societies where this was not a necessity, as in Amerindian communities, do we find little difference between marrying couples in terms of age.71 There were some differences by color and status. White and free pardo women who 70

71

Arriaga, New life tables; and Robert Evans Jr, “The economics of American Negro slavery,” in Aspects of Labor Economics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962): 212, table 16. See for example, Herbert S. Klein, “Familia y fecundidad en Amatenango, Chiapas, 1785–1816,” Historia Mexicana, 142 (1986): 273–286.

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made up 71 percent of these marriages, married at 21.9 years (white women) and 23.5 years (brown women).72 Studies of earlier periods suggest even lower rates. A family reconstruction of some 700 marriages in the Paulista port city of Ubatuba, between 1799 and 1834 found that the average age for women marrying was 20.8 years.73 Another study done for first marriages of women in the southern parish of Rio Grande in what is today Rio Grande do Sul, found that for 251 women marrying between 1800 and 1809, the average age was 17.9 years, although it increased to 20.4 for the 148 women marrying in 1820–1829.74 These Brazilian ages of marriage for women are relatively low by mid-nineteenth-century European standards. In the Portuguese city of Porto, women in 1881–1882 married at 26.5 years of age. The average age of the 1,533 women marrying for the first time in the Azorian island of Pico from 1850–1899 was 27.5 years of age.75 In fact twenty-seven years of age was the average age of marriage for women in the Portuguese districts of Aveiro, Braga, Coimbra, Leira, Vila Real, Viseu and Lisbon in the nineteenth century.76 In Great Britain in 1861, women were 25.4 years at first marriage, and in 1871 in Germany 26.3 years.77 All of this suggests that the abundance of land and resources in America removed the usual restraints which delayed marriage in Europe. Several studies also suggest that Brazilian men were more mobile than their Portuguese counterparts. In this period, very high proportion of persons got married in a parish far from their parish of birth. Thus a study of almost a thousand marriages in the mining town of Vila Rica in the eighteenth century noted that while two-thirds of the women marrying had been born in one of the two parishes of the city, only 38 percent of the men had been born in the city.78 Of the 1,140 marriages registered 72

73 74 75

76 77

78

Falla dirigida á Assembléa Legislativa Provincial de Minas Geraes na sessão ordinaria do anno de 1846, pelo presidente da provincia, Quintiliano José da Silva (Ouro Preto, Typ. Imparcial de B.X. Pinto de Sousa, 1846), mapa 17, n.p. (s/n). Marcílio, Caiçara: terra e população: 158. Queiroz, “Paróquia de São Pedro do Rio Grande”: 85, table 13. Gaspar Martins Pereira and Luís Grosso Correia, “Casamento e condição social no Porto oitocentista,” História: Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto, 13 (2019): 483; Carlota M. Santos, “Nupcialidade e fecundidade na região da Madalena (ilha do Pico). Um estudo de demografia diferencial,” Antropológicas, 10 (2008): 418. Robert Rowland, População, família, sociedade Portugal, séculos XIX–XX, 2nd ver. edn (Lisbon: Etnográfica Press, 2017): 88–89, table 3.4. Michael R. Haines, “The white Population of the United States, 1790–1920,” in Michael R. Haines and Richard H. Steckel, eds., A Population History of North America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 317, 319. Costa, “Vila Rica: casamentos”: 207.

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in the N.S. da Luz parish in the city of Curitiba, between 1751 and 1800 in which the origins of the spouses were known, some 46 percent of the males had not been born or had resided in the parish. For women the figure was only 7 percent.79 In the Paraná parish of N. Senhora Sant’Ana de Ponta Grossa between 1823 and 1879, 35 percent of the over one thousand males who married in the parish came from outside, and 18 percent of the new wives were not born in the parish.80 Of the almost 430 marriages which took place in the Paraná parish of N.S. de Lapa in which the origin was known, only 36 percent of the husbands and 66 percent of the wives were born in the municipality of Lapa.81 This situation was probably even more distinct in large urban centers as the city of São Paulo where 43 percent of the males who were married in the parish of N.S. da Sé in the first decade of the nineteenth century were from outside the city itself, whereas only 20 percent of the women marrying came from at least forty kilometers beyond the city.82 In fact, geographic mobility of the poorer population, and especially the forros (or liberated slaves), was a constant from the colonial period to the end of the nineteenth century.83 All this suggests a highly mobile society especially compared to Portugal. A study of marriages in the western Portuguese frontier town of Marvão near the Spanish border, some 83 percent of those marrying were from the same small town.84 While Brazil differed from Europe in the existence of large slave plantations, and even households with a few slaves present, the predominant organization of the household was the nuclear family. Local Brazilian censuses of the late colonial and the nineteenth-century periods show that the majority of households were overwhelmingly made up of a nuclear family even in this slave society. Few households held just one person and fewer still held multiple families, of servants and or slaves. In most regions of Brazil, only about 30 percent of households held slaves, and an even smaller share contained agregados or servants. This pattern could be found in the Paraná municipality of Castro between 1801–1830, where 73 percent were nuclear family 79

80 81 82 83 84

Ana Maria de Oliveira Burmester, “A população de Curitiba no século XVIII (1751– 1800) segundo os registros paroquiais,” Master’s thesis, Universidade Federal de Paraná, 1974: 69, table 9. Gonçalves, “Estudo demografico da paróquia”: 122, table 32. Valle, “Movimento populacional da Lapa”: 81. Marcilio, A cidade de São Paulo: 172 table 35. Castro Faria, A colônia em movimento: 108–114. Raquel Tovar Pulido, “Nubentes e mobilidade geográfica em Portugal no século XIX (1800–1830): o concelho de Marvão,” História. Revista da FLUP [Porto], 9 (2019): 178.

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households and just 22 percent had augmented households with unrelated members.85 In Vila Rica in 1804, the nuclear household also dominated, and accounted for 78 percent of the 1,135 families found in the municipality at this time.86 In the coffee producing Paulista municipality of Guaratinguetá in 1840, 90 percent of the over one thousand free households were nuclear, and even among whites only 11 percent were large extended households.87 Clearly then, the dominant pattern in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was for the household to be primarily defined as a nuclear family residence. Excluding slaves, the extended households of either multiple families, or numerous unrelated persons, was a distinctly minority institution throughout Brazil in this period. If in household structure colonial and early imperial Brazil looked little different from Portugal or other European countries in the same period, there is no question that marital arrangements in Brazil differed significantly from European norms. Cohabitation of couples with children who were not married was far more the norm in Brazil than in Europe, with resulting higher levels of illegitimate births. Thus of the 17,374 births which were registered in the Minas Gerais parish of São João do Rei between 1736 and 1854, some 44 percent of the births were illegitimate.88 These rates for Minas Gerais seem to be the rather high compared to a rate of 20 percent to 25 percent of births being illegitimate in most other nineteenth-century municipal studies.89 Nevertheless even these lower rates were extraordinarily by European standards. In Portugal, which had a relatively high illegitimate birth rate by European standards, the average for illegitimate births was 12.2 percent for selected years from 1886–1901.90 For France, ratios 85 86 87 88 89

90

Pinto, “Vila de Castro”: 143, table 28. Iraci del Nero da Costa, “A estrutura familial e domiciliária em Vila Rica no alvorecer do século XIX,” Revista do Instituto de Estudos Brasileiros, 19 (1977): p22, table 1. Lucila Herrmann, Evolução da estrutura social de Guaratinguetá num período de trezentos anos, 1st edn, 1948 (São Paulo: Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas, 1948 [1986]): 158. Silvia Maria Jardim Brügger, “Legitimidade, casamento e relações ditas ilícitas em São João del Rei (1730–1850),” IX Seminário sobre a Economia Mineira, 2000: 40, table 1. Gonçalves, “Estudo demográfico da paróquia”: 106 quadro 25; Queiroz, “Paróquia de São Pedro do Rio Grande”: 224–225, annex, table 12, post 1800 data; Myriam Sbravati, “São José dos Pinhais, 1776–1852: uma paróquia paranaense em estudo,” Master’s thesis, Universidade Federal de Paraná, 1980: 95; Maria Luiza Marcílio, A cidade de São Paulo: 159; Burmester, “A populaçao de Curitiba”: 78–79; Kubo, “Aspectos demográficos de Curitiba”: 73–74. Teresa Rodrigues Veiga, A população portuguesa no século XIX (Lisbon: Edições Afrontamento, 2004): 40, table 1.

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179

of illegitimacy increased from 4.8 percent in 1801 to 7.2 percent in 1851, and reached only 8.8 percent in 1900. In Hungary in 1848 they were 3.4 percent of births, and in Great Britain by 1900 they reached 8 percent of births, their highest.91 Thus, the free migrants who arrived in overwhelming numbers in the late nineteenth century encountered a country quite different from what they were accustomed to in Europe. Not only did they encounter a multi-colored population, but one in which cohabitation rather than marriage was a significant element. This immigration first began with modest government support for European agricultural colonies in the nineteenth century. These were established primarily to guarantee the settlement of its southern frontiers which by 1875 had brought in some 328,000 Italian, German and Polish agriculturalists to Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina.92 But with the successful abolition of the Atlantic slave trade in 1850 and the law of free birth in 1871, planters began experimenting with using European immigrant sharecroppers in the coffee fields. But this failed due to poor wages and the co-existence of slave labor.93 On the eve of the final abolition of slavery in the 1880s, came a third policy of government subsidized immigration to replace the departing slaves in the coffee fields. From then until the 1930s, Brazil was a major recipient of European and later Asian immigrant labor receiving 3.6 million free immigrants from 1875 to 1924, with the majority arriving before 1900 The planter class had to develop a new immigrant labor regime known as the colonato system. This involved the replacement of slave gang labor with family piece work payments plus use of legally recognized lands for farming. It also involved the paying the fares of immigrants from Europe to the farm gate in São Paulo. This all was occurring as São Paulo was becoming the dominant coffee producer. Thus the late-nineteenth century growth of the coffee economy in the frontier regions of São Paulo as well as the growth of the state industrial and 91

92 93

Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux and Guy Brunet, “L’enfant illégitime et ses parents. Tendances européennes et coloniales au xixe siècle, au sein des modèles séculaires d’illégitimité,” Annales de démographie historique, 127 (2014): 10; and Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux, “European Illegitimacy Trends in Connection with Domestic Service and Family Systems (1545–2001),” Romanian Journal of Population Studies, 5(2) (2011): 11. Imre Ferenczi and Walter F. Willcox, Internation Migrations, 2 vols (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929): I, 236–237, table 6. Sérgio Buarque de Hollanda, “As colônias de parceria,” in Sergio Buarque de Holanda, ed., História geral da civilização brasileira part V (São Paulo: Difuso Européia do Livro): 245–260.

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urban economy would spur a further flow of voluntary international migrants as Brazilian wages began to approximate European ones. These self-paid migrants would outnumber the subsidized immigrants by the first decade of the twentieth century. From 1889 to 1900, some 878,000 immigrants arrived in São Paulo alone, of which over three-quarters were subsidized. Fearing these immigrants might become temporary migrants, as had occurred with the golondrina migration of European males to Argentina, the planters supported only family migrations. Subsidies for passage were offered only to families which had at least one working-age male.94 Although there is a debate about the ability of the immigrant workers to profit from the system, it would seem that the majority of colonos would end after one or two multi-year contracts with sufficient savings to invest in land or in an urban property. By this new and complex system of piecework, annual wages, day labor and free lands and housing, the planters hoped to hold down costs, guarantee labor stability, make labor as mobile as possible, and still make the work attractive to European immigrants by providing sufficient income that savings could be generated.95 The large number of strikes, complaints and surveys regarding local conditions undertaken by foreign consuls, which led for example to formal prohibitions of subsidized immigration to Brazil from Prussia, Italy and Spain, implies that contracts were not always fulfilled.96 But recent systematic studies suggest that net savings for these colono workers was sufficient to make it a viable and attractive work arrangement. Most likely, the majority found it necessary to sign on for more than one year in order to accumulate the desired income to purchase lands, as well as seeds, supplies and implements to begin life as independent farm owners.97 But there is little doubt that savings and upward mobility were possible and that the overwhelming majority did not remain on the 94

95 96 97

Thomas H. Holloway, Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in São Paulo, 1886–1934 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980): chapter 3; and Warren Dean, Rio Claro, A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820–1920 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976): chapter 6. Verena Stolcke, Cafeicultura, homens, mulheres e capital (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986): 35ff.; Holloway, Immigrants on the Land: chapter 4. Zuleika M. F. Alvim, Brava gente! Os italianos em São Paulo, 1870–1920 (São Paulo: Brasiliense 1986): 102ff. A typical family of two adults and two children could generate net savings in one year of 343,000 réis. With good land at a high 60,000 réis per hectare, it would that 5.7 hectares of prime land per annum, or some 28.6 hectares in five years could be purchased (Alvim, Brava gente! 93–95).

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181

coffee fazendas for more than a few years and that for many their goal of upward mobility was satisfied by their migration to Brazil. The economic opportunities offered by coffee and the lack of competition from native-born workers helps to explain why immigrants went primarily to the states of the center and south. São Paulo was overwhelmingly the dominant attraction accounting for 70 percent of all immigrants after 1880,98 though lesser streams of Europeans went to Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Paraná and the two southern provinces of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina. Minas Gerais, one of the three great coffee producing zones and the home of the largest slave population, had more than enough native-born people to maintain its coffee fields without resorting to immigrant labor. Moreover, the high rates of natural increase of the native-born population guaranteed that the foreign-born migration stream would be a relatively small part of total population, though an important segment of the Southern and South-Central regions. By 1900, people born outside Brazil represented 7 percent of the national population, but were now a very substantial 21 percent of the population of the state of São Paulo and in 1920 the city of São Paulo still had 36 percent of its population listed as foreign-born. In Paraná and Rio Grande do Sul they were 12 percent of the total population, 10 percent in Espírito Santo and 9 percent in Santa Catarina. Although the growing poverty of Rio de Janeiro agriculture meant that the ratio of foreign-born was less than the national average, the city of Rio de Janeiro, like that of São Paulo, had between a quarter and a third of its residents listed as foreign-born in 1900.99 By 1899, some 2 million European and Middle Eastern immigrants had arrived in Brazil, of which 1.6 million arrived in the last two decades of the century. Though Portuguese immigration was steady over time, it was the Italians who were the largest group of migrants, with just a quarter of whom came from Portugal with Spaniards being the third group in importance (see Table 5.8). This volume guaranteed that in the 1890s Brazil was second in importance in America only to the United States as a destination for European migrants. Argentina bound immigration did not surpass Brazil until the first decade of the twentieth century. Nor did Brazil confine itself to southern and eastern European 98 99

Merrick and Graham, Population and Economic Development in Brazil: 92. Merrick and Graham, Population and Economic Development in Brazil: 94; EMPLASA Reconstituição da Memória estatística da Grande, 2 vols (São Paulo: Secretaria dos Negócios Metropilitanos, Empresa Metropolitana de Planejamento da Grande São Paulo, 1983): II, tables 1–13, 1–14, 1–16.

182

1835–1839 1840–1844 1845–1849 1850–1854 1855–1859 1860–1864 1865–1869 1870–1874 1875–1879 1880–1884 1885–1889 1890–1894 1895–1899 1900–1904 1905–1909

Quinquennium

141 413 78 16,175 47,007 27,516 24,102 33,454 34,155 47,058 57,632 121,347 98,006 59,813 135,773

Portuguese

5 24 0 2,523 2,393 3,446 43,654 54,295 222,829 312,074 378,291 137,478 83,916

180

Italians

144 37 83 550 1,275 2,665 11,283 18,783 89,609 74,684 23,146 90,086

10

Spaniards 207 586 1,553 5,324 10,491 10,597 5,917 3,922 10,705 10,107 8,794 13,055 4,029 2,676 11,172

Germans

861

Japonese

Table 5.8  Origin of free Immigrants to Brazil 1835–1969

1,921 1,077 1,270 7,685 21,158 19,573 14,933 29,785 30,865 6,338 11,503 64,650 42,582 25,929 51,557

Others

2,449 2,086 2,906 29,352 78,693 60,292 47,895 71,882 122,044 129,081 319,541 600,735 597,592 249,042 373,365

Totals

183

259,516 58,965 137,619 164,296 54,818 47,925 19,396 26,208 144,768 96,811 58,471 15,658 1,787,121

115,290 22,878 61,744 45,091 13,749 8,421 507 15,312 60,668 31,263 9,167 3,247 1,628,445

143,485 38,166 44,906 37,025 9,571 3,175 610 4,092 55,874 38,819 25,495 2,902 716,475

24,701 1,201 47,495 28,306 14,883 12,614 1,619 5,188 12,010 4,633 3,120 2,539 257,444

14,682 12,750 6,646 51,638 77,810 21,412 2,816 12 4,774 28,819 21,089 4,003 247,312

110,104 13,715 74,716 147,165 42,846 25,544 8,765 29,560 57,030 47,599 31,746 20,150 939,766

667,778 147,675 373,126 473,521 213,677 119,091 33,713 80,372 335,124 247,944 149,088 48,499 5,576,563

Notes: Austro-Hungarian Empire immigrants included in the others category. Source: For period to 1871, Directoria Geral de Estatistica, Boletim Commemorativo da Exposicão Nacional de 1908 (1908), 82–85 and Levy (1974) for post 1871

1910–1904 1915–1919 1920–1924 1925–1929 1930–1934 1935–1939 1940–1944 1945–1949 1950–1954 1955–1959 1960–1964 1965–1969 Total

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migrants, being the first Latin American country to open its doors to Japanese migrants in 1908 just as the United States was closing its borders to these Asian migrants. Spaniards and Japanese migrants stand out in this migration as the most family oriented migrants with an equal flow of women and men and the highest ratio of children. Even Italians going to Brazil, for example, were more than likely to be married and brought more children than any other group of Italian emigrants going to other nations of America.100 Spaniards and Japanese were also distinguished by being more likely to be categorized as farm workers, which may explain why they later proved to be the mostly rural and resident in towns in the interior in all post-1900 Brazilian censuses. In turn, given the longevity and autonomy of the Portuguese migration – which nevertheless did not surpass the total of Italians until the 1960s – it is no surprise that the gender and age division of the Portuguese immigrants differed from the rest. The Portuguese tended to arrive as single adult males, with few accompanying wives or children. They were also less likely to go to São Paulo or to work in coffee, though large numbers of them did so. It should be stressed, however, that overall in all state and national censuses, the foreign-born still had a higher ratio of males to females than native-born. This was due to the fact that voluntary migrants were more typical of general European immigrant trends – being more likely to be young single males. Among all these migrants, even the Jews and the Japanese, there was also return and intra-American out-migration. In this, the Italians and the Spaniards stand out as the most mobile. All studies have shown that any fall in coffee prices, was immediately reflected in increasing rates of return migration to Europe and corresponding declines in arriving immigrants. Recent estimates suggest an overall 36 percent return rate, with the Spanish and Italians having the highest such rates.101 Although there is little doubt that coffee fazendeiros exploited the subsidized workers and that many families had negative experiences during their years of labor as colonos there is also little question that significant numbers of colonos succeeded in saving money and ceased to be landless. From census to census, their relative shares of foreign-born ownership of coffee trees and total farm values increased, until immigrant farmers 100 101

Herbert S. Klein, “A integração dos imigrantes italianos no Brasil, na Argentina e nos Estados Unidos,” Novos Estudos CEBRAP, 25 (1989): 95–117. Maria Stella Ferreira Levy, “O papel da migração internacional na evolução da população brasileira (1872 a 1972),” Revista de Saúde Pública, 8(Supl) (1974): 62–67.

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became serious competitors to the native-born fazendeiros. As early as 1905, immigrants held 22 percent of the estates in the planalto ocidental, São Paulo’s central coffee zone, though their lands were only worth half the value of the native-born owners.102 At the national level by 1920 when they accounted for only 5 percent of resident males, the foreign-born owned 16 percent of the farmland and the average value of these lands was double those owned by native-born farmers.103 In a special São Paulo state agricultural census of 1934, foreigners had increased their control of the state’s 1.5 million coffee trees to 42 percent and they now dominated foodstuff production as well as the growing urban markets of the state. By 1940, the foreign-born in São Paulo had a very high state-wide participation – owning almost a third of all farms, with the average value per farm was almost 1.5 times greater than Brazilian-owned farms.104 Although the Japanese and the Spaniards in the state of São Paulo remained primarily in the rural areas and in agriculture, in contrast to all other immigrants, even they began to migrate to the cities. By the time of the state census of 1934, 50 percent of the foreign-born residents lived in urban centers where they represented 20 percent of the total population, compared to only 35 percent of the native-born state population who lived in its cities.105 Though their mobility in the rural area was impressive, it was in the expanding urban sector where immigrants did best. They formed the basis for both the unskilled and skilled labor force and were often the first industrialists and merchants in these often newly established and/or recently expanding cities. In 1911, for example, 82 percent of São Paulo’s 10,204 textile workers were foreign-born, and of the 2,299 manual workers employed by the state in this same year, foreign-born workers represented 62 percent of the work force.106 Foreign-born workers in the industries of the city of Rio de Janeiro were much less important – being on the order of 37 percent in 1920.107 But by 1919 the state of São Paulo contained 32 percent of all Brazilian 102 103 104 105 106

107

Holloway, Immigrants on the Land: 148, 150. Directoria Geral de Estatística, Recenseamento do Brazil, III, lxiii: 312–315. Directoria Geral de Estatística, Recenseamento Geral do Brasil (1 de Setembro de 1940) (Rio de Janeiro, 1941): III, 14–17. “População urbana e rural do estado segundo as principais nacionalidades”: I, 76–77. “Condições do trabalho na industria textil do estado de São Paulo,” Boletim do Departamento Estadual do Trabalho 1911–1912, I: 1–2, 35–80; “Pessoal operario occupado pelo estado de São Paulo,” Boletim do Departamento Estadual do Trabalho 1911–1912, I: 1–2, 109–124. Claudio H. de Moraes Batalha, “Le syndicalisme ‘amarelo’ a Rio de Janeiro (1906– 1930),” 2 vols. Doctoral thesis, Université de Paris-I, 1986: I, 75.

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industries, and this concentration would only increase in the coming years.108 This may explain why, of the some 760,000 male workers employed in all of Brazilian industry in 1920, 23 percent were listed as foreign-born – though in the population as a whole they represented only 5 percent.109 Foreign immigrants also did well in ownership of industry and commerce. By the time of the state census of 1934, they already owned 44 percent of São Paulo’s factories and shops.110 All available materials point to the first generation immigrant being endogamous and sharing few of the characteristics of the native-born population. Foreign-born males tended to marry native-born Brazilians more readily than did foreign-born women. But initially intermarriage rates with native-born people were low for all groups, though most extreme for the Japanese. Of the Japanese marrying between 1908 and 1962, only 3 percent of the 38,729 males and less than 1 percent of the 30,205 Japanese women chose non-Japanese partners. Even children of immigrants maintained this characteristic, with a survey of 1958–1962 reporting only 18 percent of the male children of Japanese parents marrying out, and only 8 percent of second-generation women doing so, though this had changed dramatically by the third generation.111 At the same time, immigrant women initially had higher birth rates than nativeborn women and they also had much lower ratios of illegitimate children.112 Of the half million births registered in the state of São Paulo from 1906 to 1910, immigrant women had an overall illegitimacy rate of 2.8 percent, compared to 12.3 percent for native Brazilian women.113 In crime, however, immigrant males in both Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in the 1910s and 1920s tended spend more time in prison than their ratio of the local populations would have warranted.114 Finally, all immigrant communities developed complex local, regional and national welfare and 108 109 110 111 112 113 114

Wilson Cano, Raízes da concentração industrial em São Paulo, 2nd edn (São Paulo: T. A. Queiroz, 1983): 192. Directoria Geral de Estatística, Recenseamento do 1920, IV, part 5, vol. I: xv. São Paulo Secretaria da Agricultura, Indústria e Commercio, Directoria de Estatistic, Estatistica industrial do estado de São Paulo, anno de 1934 (São Paulo, 1936): 28. Comissão de Recenseamento da Colônia Japonesa, The Japanese Immigrant in Brazil: 356. Levy “O papel da migração internacional”: 67. Repartição de Estatística e Archivo do Estado, Annuario estatístico de São Paulo, 1906–1910. Boris Fausto, Crime e cotidiano, a criminalidade em São Paulo (1880–1924) (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1984); Herbert S. Klein, “The social and economic integration of Spanish immigrants in nineteenth and twentieth-century Brazil,” Journal of Social History, 25(3): (1992), 505–530.

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social institutions to cater to their needs. The Portuguese and the Italians stand out in the importance of their hospitals, educational institutions and benevolent societies. Though even for these communities the end of steady immigration after 1920, and the increasing intermarriage with other ethnic groups and native-born, diluted their importance within Brazilian society by the 1960s.115 With the arrival of these millions of European and Asian free wage workers, the majority of whom went to São Paulo and the southern provinces, there were some significant changes in the social development of that part of Brazil. The arrival of free wage workers created a demand for more products than were available to slaves. It also encouraged the development of primary industrial activity to meet these demands and led to the growth of key urban centers. This was also a period when Southeastern and Southern regions developed faster than the rest of Brazil slowly creating a socially more disarticulated empire and republic. It was this immigrant labor which permitted São Paulo to triple its coffee output in the decade after abolition, and there was a parallel growth in its urban centers. This led to major increases in spontaneous European immigration to this frontier zone where most of its cities were founded in the late nineteenth or early twentieth centuries. Thus coffee towns such as Casa Branca, Dois Corregos, Jaboticabal, Matão, Ribeirão Preto, Ribeirãzinho, São Manoel do Paraizo and Jahú, where more than half of their agricultural workers were foreign born in 1905, were established in this period.116 Also there was the growth of the state capitals in different ways between 1872 and 1900. In the Northeast, most cities increased modestly if at all, with the only exception being Salvador. But in the Southeastern and Southern states the urban population grew impressively in this period. Rio by 1900 was almost three times its 1872 size, and São Paulo went from a village of 32,000 to a population of almost a quarter of a million persons (see Table 5.9). Although fertility remained high throughout the century and probably differed only modestly from the colonial period, this was not the case with mortality. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Brazil 115

116

Herbert S. Klein, “The social and economic integration of Portuguese immigrants in Brazil in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 23(2) (1991): 309–337. These data are taken from the São Paulo, Secretaria de Agricultura, Comércio e Obras Públicas, Estatistica Agricola e Zootechnica no Anno Agricola de 1904–1905, 4 vols (São Paulo: Carlos Gerke & Rothschild, 1906) with dates of funding from São Paulo, Instituto Geográfico e Cartográfico, Munícipios e distritos do estado de São Paulo (2011).

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Brazil: An Economic and Social History Table 5.9  Growth of state capitals 1872–1900 City/State Manaus – AM Belém – PA São Luís – MA Teresina – PI Fortaleza – CE Natal – RN João Pessoa – PB Recife – PE Maceió – AL Aracaju – SE Salvador – BA Vitória – ES Rio de Janeiro – RJ São Paulo – SP Curitiba – PR Florianópolis – SC Porto Alegre – RS Cuiabá – MT

1872

1900

29,334 61,997 31,604 21,692 42,458 20,392 24,714 116,671 27,703 9,559 129,109 16,157 274,972 31,385 12,651 25,709 43,998 35,987

50,300 96,560 36,798 45,316 48,369 16,056 28,793 113,106 36,427 21,132 205,813 11,850 811,443 239,820 49,755 32,229 73,674 34,393

Source: IBGE, CD79-População dos municípios das capitais, https://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br/lista_tema.aspx?op=0& de=58&no=10

underwent some fundamental changes in the delivery of purified water and sanitation to the major cities of the country, above all those in the southern region. Influenced by the sanitation movement in Europe and affected by waves of cholera and yellow fever epidemics, the state of São Paulo led the attempts to control these epidemics and improve urban living conditions. The result was that mortality slowly began to decline from its very high colonial and nineteenth-century levels by the beginning of the twentieth century. The crude mortality rate slowly declined to the low thirties per thousand of the resident population by the last decades of the nineteenth century and to the upper twenties in the first decades of the new century. In contrast the nineteenth century, the crude birth rate slowly declined to the mid-forties per thousand of the population and remained virtually unchanged until the 1950s.117 The vaccination campaigns, the slow provision of clean water, and the beginnings of modern urban sanitation for the leading urban centers, along with the 117

IBGE, “CD109-Taxas brutas de natalidade e de mortalidade,” https://seriesestatisticas .ibge.gov.br/lista_tema.aspx?op=0&de=36&no=10.

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introduction of pasteurization caused of this declining mortality.118 São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro were the leaders in this movement. Research and serum institutes were created and public health received significant funding, especially after numerous outbreaks in the port of Santos and a significant yellow fever outbreak in Campinas in 1889.119 Especially significant were the smallpox and yellow fever vaccination campaigns in the first decade of the twentieth century, along with major sanitation works in the port cities and leading state capitals.120 For the Brazilian population in the nineteenth century, there were only modest changes in the basic structure of the native-born population which maintained its high levels of fertility and its system of informal family alliances and high rates of illegitimate births. The imperial government in 1834 decided to leave primary and secondary education to the provinces, and most of them did little to promote education. Although the first teacher training college was established in 1835 in Niterói,121 it was only in the second half of the century that woman began to study at these schools and women teachers only became predominant in the 1880s.122 Although more and more municipalities and private associations were creating schools, formal education involved only a minority of school-age children by the end of the century. As late as 1871, there were 134,000 students matriculated in the country, only 7 percent were in secondary schools, and only 28 percent were women, for a population of over 10.1 million. This represented barely 13 children matriculated in schools for every 1,000 inhabitations.123 By 1889 the ratio was 18 children per 1,000 residents, and by 1907 it was still 29 children matriculated for every thousand residents. This explains why literacy advanced only 118 119

120 121

122

123

Gilberto Hochman, The Sanitation of Brazil: Nation, State, and Public Health, 1889– 1930 (Campaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2016). For surveys of this movement see John Allen Blount III, “The public health movement in São Paulo, Brazil, a history of the sanitary service, 1892–1918,” PhD thesis, Tulane University, New Orleans, 1971; Rodolfo dos Santos Mascarenhas, “História da saúde pública no Estado de São Paulo,” Saúde Pública, 40(1)(2006): 3–19. Gilberto Hochman, “Priority, invisibility and eradication: the history of smallpox and the Brazilian public health agenda,” Medical History, 53(2) (2009): 229–252. Ângela Maria Souza Martins, “Breves reflexões sobre as primeiras escolas normais no contexto educacional brasileiro, no século XIX,” Revista HISTEDBR on-line, 9(35) (2009): 175–176. Heloisa de Oliveira Santos Villela, “Normalistas histéricas, professoras comportadas: a construção das representações sobre a profissionalização da docência feminina no século XIX,” Dimensões 23 (2009): 70. Data from Relatório do Ministério dos Negócios do Império 1871 Apresentado Em Maio De 1872, 27–36.

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modestly in this century, going from 16 percent in 1872 to 26 percent in 1900 and why women were far more likely to be illiterate than men.124 Secondary education was even more of a minority occurrence and while medical, engineering and law faculties were created by the imperial and provincial governments, even this form of tertiary education was quite limited in the nineteenth century. Despite the massive migration of southern Europeans and the early growth of industry, the formal labor movement and radical socialist and anarchist parties were slow to develop in Brazil. Although the so called social question, with its conflict between labor and capital, would become important by the early twentieth century, there were few strikes before 1900 and few working-class movements of any importance in this century even among native-born workers. This was despite the fact that voting had become ever more undemocratic over time. Until the reform of 1881, some 10 percent of the total population could vote. This dropped to 1 percent after the Saraiva law reform of 1881 which though creating a unified system, centralized the voting process and created more impediments to voting.125 The establishment of the republic also led to the introduction of a literacy requirement which reduced voting even further. Thus while voluntary associations and benevolent societies became important among the immigrant communities, their political voice would not be heard until the following century. This was to say that Brazil did not have significant rebellions, a major war and political conflicts throughout the century, but that the ideas and movements which were agitating for change in Europe in the late nineteenth century were slow to develop in Brazil. The impact of emancipation produced different outcomes in the different regions of the country. In the southeastern coffee plantations in 1888 the ex-slaves abandoned the coffee fields as they no longer were willing to work under the gang organization of the plantation regime. Given the availability of frontier lands, it was not uncommon for them to move into subsistence agriculture as squatters, or move to the growing urban centers of the region. This was a pattern in many ex-slave regimes when alternative land resources were available to ex-slaves.126 It was only in 124 125

126

IBGE, Estatísticasdo Século XX (2003), table “pop_1941_45aeb_001.” Alexandre de Oliveira Bazilio de Souza, “Perto da justicía, longe do cidadão: a administração judicial das eleições no Brasil (1881–1932),” PhD thesis, Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, Vitória, 2017: 119. For a survey of the different ex-slave responses, of which the United States was the most extreme, see Herbert S. Klein and Stanley L. Engerman, “The transition from slave to

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the northeastern sugar plantations where they tended to remain on the old estates. In this industry, the use of slaves had declined well before the abolition of slavery and a more seasonal labor organization allowed ex-slaves to both work some of their own land as well as enter sugarcane production on a seasonal and part-time basis.127 Thus the nineteenth century was both a period of major change and surprising stability. Over the course of a century, some 2 million Africans arrived, and after the abolition of slavery came a new migration of close to 2 million Europeans which changed the color divisions within the imperial society. Yet by the standards of the American states of the nineteenth century, Brazil was most similar to the United States, and the West Indian societies in the predominance of African and Afro-American populations. It was also one of the few American countries which successfully integrated large numbers of free European immigrants, only comparable to Canada, the United States and Argentina. Thus its population between natural growth and immigration was among the fastest growing populations in the southern hemisphere, which explains why Brazil ended the century as the largest country in Latin America. But it was also one of the poorest and most illiterate of the American nations with one of the highest levels of mortality.

127

free labor: notes on a comparative economic model,” in M. Moreno Fraginals et al., eds., Between Slavery and Free Labor: The Spanish-Speaking Caribbean in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985): 255–269. Eisenberg, The Sugar Industry in Pernambuco: chapter 8.

6 Industrialization and Urbanization

The 100 years between the 1880s and the 1980s would be the period of the greatest changes in the Brazilian economy and society. For most of the nineteenth century, Brazil was still sparsely populated, rural and with the majority of workers involved in an agricultural economy of low productivity. There was little urbanization and only modest industrialization. Social conditions were still influenced by 400 years of slave labor, which was only abolished in 1888, with Brazil being the last country to maintain such a perverse system of work, and its influence persists to this day. According to all the usual social indices Brazil was one of the more backward nations of South America. It had few schools, and the majority of the population was illiterate. Infant mortality was extremely high and life expectancy quite low. Fertility was also high and a high natural population growth continued throughout the century. The arrival of masses of European immigrants and the continued expansion of the coffee economy in the Southeast was beginning to have a major impact on the nature of the national population and its internal market. It would also begin to create even larger differences in social and economic conditions among the various regions of the nation. The last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the new century brought ever more rapid changes. With the abolition of slavery, the process of transformation intensified, beginning with massive immigration of foreign workers brought to replace slaves. This led to the reorganization of the economy now based on free wage labor. Manufacturing activities were expanded to meet the demands of this new labor force. This sector was given a boost by the trade crisis of World War I and eventually was supported by an active government policy towards 192

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import substitution and industrial growth in the middle decades of the century. During this period, until the industrialization process was completed, the country experienced one of the most rapid rates of growth internationally. But this spectacular growth ended in the 1980s as inflation ravaged the national economy and debt overwhelmed government resources. In 1987, Brazil was forced to declare an external debt moratorium and resorted to IMF support. Eventually this would result in a major shift of government policy in the 1990s as Brazil promoted an opening of the economy and consequently major economic reforms and abandoned its traditional ISI model. There is little question that the period between the late 1880s the late 1980s was defined by the growth of a major industrial sector complex in the nation and the urbanization of its population. It was this industrial sector that would attract most of of the population to the cities and it was all the old state capitals which first drew the rural populations to the cities for jobs, education and access to basic services. The ever expanding railroad system and the new system of asphalt roads seriously changed internal transport, and now allowed for the systematic occupation of the frontier territory of the nation as well as the creation of a large domestic market. Massive rural to urban migration and to  the frontier regions, especially in the second half of the period, changed the distribution of the population and created new regional economies. The shift of population from the Northeast to the South and Southeast, was matched by migrations from all regions of Brazil to the states of the Center-West. The century also saw the late occurrence of the demographic transition, with a dramatic fall in fertility beginning in the 1960s, which profoundly altered the demographic structure profile of the population. The steady creation of a modern welfare state in the second half of the twentieth century also led to declining mortality and the transition from an infectious disease mortality regime typical of a pre-modern society to that of a modern one where generative diseases were the prime killers. It also resulted in life expectancy reaching close to those found in modern industrial countries. By the second half of this period, expanding access to education and health was finally reducing inequalities in gender, color and region as a more uniform society was slowly emerging. This rapid urbanization and industrialization also led to an extraordinary period of high levels of social mobility. But despite these developments, income and wealth distribution changed little. The concentration of income was the worst of any modern country in the world, comparable to only a few impoverished African countries.

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Coffee for most of the twentieth century was the dominant export product of Brazil as it was for most of the nineteenth century. The world demand for coffee grew steadily in the growing populations of the most developed countries of the western world. Given Brazil’s exceptional physical conditions for coffee cultivation, the country quickly assumed the position of world leader in supply, and it was easy to increase production to meet growing demand. The concentration of coffee production on the axis formed by the provinces of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Minas Gerais gave this region an economic and political supremacy within the nation, which remained unchallenged until 1930. In 1889, the monarchy was replaced by a republic, and the state of São Paulo emerged as the country’s main economic center. As coffee production moved west from the Paraíba River Valley towards the interior of São Paulo, the state became the leading center in the national economy. The emergence of the republic led to the domination of the coffee elite in national politics as the locus of national power now shifted from a centralized state to a federative nation.1 The expansion of coffee in turn was the driving force into the expansion into virgin frontier lands. Even in 1900, there was a major open frontier in all states. There was also the incorporation in 1903 of one large eastern area purchased from Bolivia and in what is today the state of Acre. Nevertheless Brazilians throughout most of the twentieth century were still concentrated along the coast, with little presence in the Amazon and in the central states of the country. The overwhelming majority of the population lived in the countryside, and there were only four cities with a population over 100,000 in 1900. These were Rio de Janeiro with 811,000; São Paulo with 239,000 residents; Salvador de Bahia with 206,000; and Recife with just 113,000. The Southeast and Northeast regions were the most populous, concentrating 84 percent of the population, with the Southeast holding 7.8 million persons and the old sugar regions of the Northeast some 6.7 million which was a reverse of their positions in the late nineteenth century. Three-quarters of residents were listed as illiterate in the census of 1900, and the total birth rate was close to eight children per woman in her childbearing years. Thus, despite high infant and crude mortality rates, the population was still growing at 1.9 percent per annum between the census of 1872 and 1900, and would increase at that rate as the century progressed both 1

Furtado, Formação Econômica do Brasil; Renato Perissinotto Monseff, Estado e capital cafeeiro em São Paulo (1889–1930) (São Paulo: Fapesp; Campinas: UNICAMP, 1999).

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through continued immigration and because death rates declined more rapidly than birth rates.2 Of the 17 million persons resident in Brazil in 1900, the majority were still non-white, but the 3.8 million international migrants arriving from the late 1880s to the 1930s would eventually lead to whites becoming the dominant group in 1940. But their demographic preponderance would decline thereafter as the native born population became ever more mixed race in origin, returning to being primarily a non-white society by the end of the century, just as it had been in the mid-nineteenth century. The economy in 1900 was still essentially agricultural, based on traditional low productivity farming. The main domestic consumer products were the traditional ones of corn, rice and beans, which along with various meat products supplied the domestic market. That market now expanded with the arrival of European immigrants to include rice, wheat, oils and wines. At this point, coffee was the principal agricultural export and alone accounted for two-thirds of national exports, followed by rubber, sugar, cacao, cotton and tobacco. Sugar, despite the loss of its previous status in international markets and the relative decline of traditional areas, was still significant in exports. Rubber in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became an important export product. Native to the Amazon, natural rubber was tapped from virgin forests, and expanding world demand in the period from 1870 to 1913 was basically met by Brazilian production. But with the development of cheaper and more abundant rubber produced in plantations in the Southeastern Asia, Brazilian exports declined as did its share of the international market. Cacao, also native to the Amazon, adapted well to being planted in farms in Bahia and became a significant export until well into the century, when fungus destroyed local production. Cotton represented an expanding product in this period. It was first principally destined for international markets, but increasingly during the early twentieth century it was consumed nationally as it became an essential raw material for the emerging textile industry, which would become the main manufacturing activity of Brazil in the early days of industrialization. But there is little question that the driving force in the economy at the beginning of the twentieth century was still coffee. It was the main product of Brazilian agriculture and the main Brazilian export and dominated world markets. Brazilian coffee exports accounted for more 2

Francisco Vidal Luna and Herbert S. Klein, The Economic and Social History of Brazil since 1889 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

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than 70 percent of total world exports. In turn, the state of São Paulo in this period produced about two-thirds of Brazilian production, followed by Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais. But given the rudimentary nature of Brazilian agriculture, landowners constantly abandoned older, exhausted lands and opened up virgin territories for new coffee plantations. There was a gradual movement westward of the coffee plantations from the Paraíba Valley, where the soils were depleted, to new areas in São Paulo state, which benefited from richer soils and an expanding railroad network linking the main producing regions with Santos. That port soon replaced Rio de Janeiro as Brazil’s leading coffee port. At the center of this network was the city of São Paulo. Its geographical position was fundamental in its consolidation as the main urban center of the country and it would be transformed into one of the largest urban agglomerations in the world. Whereas the empire had been extremely conservative in terms of monetary policy and public debt, and was unique among the Latin American countries in paying off its external debts throughout the nineteenth century, the new Brazilian Republic followed the other Latin American republics in fiscal recklessness. There was an initial euphoria and the republican government made radical changes in monetary policy and finally permitted the legal creation of corporations with new rules for banking and the abandonment of the gold standard in monetary policy. All these reforms were made in the name of a liberal economy that was expected to expand rapidly. These changes resulted in an initial euphoria called the “Encilhamento” (1889–1894) in which capital expanded rapidly and numerous companies were founded. But a crisis ensued due to considerable financial speculation and there followed a period of currency and monetary crises, inflation and the collapse of many of the new companies. There was an uncontrolled expansion of the money supply and fiscal deterioration of the treasury and thus a dramatic decline in the value of the Brazilian mil réis currency, which lost about 70 percent of its value between thhe late 1880s to the late 1890s.3 Thus the founding of the republic marked the beginning of balance of payment crises which plagued Brazil throughout the twentieth century. This issue would be a crucial element for understanding Brazil throughout the century. 3

Gustavo Franco, “Reforma monetária e instabilidade durante a transição republicana,” Master’s thesis, PUC/Ri, Rio de Janeiro; Gail Triner, Banking and Economic Development: Brazil, 1889–1930 (New York: Palgrave, 2000); John Schulz, The Financial Crisis of Abolition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).

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But for all its financial problems and excesses, the period of Encilhamento clearly had real consequences in the economy and led to major machinery imports and the growth in investment in industry from 1890 to 1896. Finally, the inflow of immigrants and the expansion of the wage market generated a climate conducive to new businesses, with the creation of hundreds of companies in all sectors. Although many of these companies did not survive, this phase represented the first intensification of investment in industry. This was the period that saw a major expansion in the cotton industrial sector with many of Brazil’s largest firms being founded in the period of easy credit and abundant capital.4 The period from 1905 to 1912 was a particularly active period of industrial growth. Although there was an abrupt industrial decline during World War I, recuperation occurred in the early 1920s. It was the textile industry that led the industrial process. Its impact can be seen in the decline of foreign-produced cloth imports. Between 1870 and 1875, imported textiles made up 29 percent of Brazilian imports. By 1911 this was down to 18 percent and by 1914 such textiles accounted for only 7 percent of imports as the national industry now satisfied almost all the basic textile needs of the country. In the first national census of industry which occurred in 1907, the Federal District (the city of Rio de Janeiro) was the most important manufacturing zone of the country, containing between 25 percent and 30 percent of all national factories in terms of capital, production value and number of workers. São Paulo was in second place, with half of the factories of the Federal District.5 Rio Grande do Sul, the state of Rio de Janeiro, and Pernambuco were other important states in terms of manufacturing production. Although Minas Gerais had a significant number of factories, the state had little influence on the value of national production. Nationally there were about 136,000 factory workers, 53,000 of whom were employed in 222 textile factories. The cotton weaving industry was the most significant sector in textiles, employing 46,000 workers and representing 18 percent of the value of industrial production (see Table 6.1).6 4 5 6

Wilson Suzigan, Indústria nrasileira. Origens e desenvolvimento (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986). The Federal District, where the present city of Rio de Janeiro is located in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Along with Suzigan, Indústria Brasileira, see Rabelo Versiani and Maria Tereza R. O. Versiani, “A industrialização brasileira antes de 1930: uma contribuição,” in Flavio Rabelo Versiani and José Roberto Mendonça de Barros, eds., Formação econômica do Brasil: A experiência da industrialização (São Paulo: Saraiva, 1977): 121–142; and Cano, Raízes da concentração industrial.

198

314 652 126 314 528 72 297 70 615 2,988

199 3,187 6%

São Paulo Distrito Federal (city of Rio) Rio de Janeiro Rio Grande do Sul Minas Gerais Pernambuco Paraná Bahia Other states Total

Sugar usinas (Central Mills) Total with usinas % of usinas

1907

233 74,061,589 13,569 654,752,663 2% 11%

4,145 25.5% 1,541 29.0% 454 10.6% 1,773 8.5% 1,243 4.6% 442 6.9% 623 3.6% 491 0.0% 2,624 11.2% 13,336 580,691,074

1920

1920

1907

1920

Number of workers

217,124,103 2,032,280,114 11%

13,136 18,161 149,556 293,673 9% 6%

29.6% 21,355 83,998 24.3% 35,104 56,229 7.0% 11,900 16,791 13.8% 15,426 24,661 4.9% 9,307 18,522 5.0% 7,155 15,761 2.4% 4,724 7,293 2.7% 8,753 14,784 10.2% 22,696 37,473 1,815,156,011 136,420 275,512

Capital

Source: Recenseamento Geral do Brazil, 1920, vol. V, 1a. Parte, Indústria: VIII

1907

States

Firms

1920

67,257,368 211,494,575 736,100,740 3,200,670,856 9% 7%

16.6% 33.0% 33.1% 22.3% 6.7% 6.2% 14.9% 11.8% 4.8% 5.8% 4.1% 4.6% 4.9% 3.4% 3.3% 2.4% 11.5% 10.6% 668,843,372 2,989,176,281

1907

Value of production

Table 6.1  Brazilian industry in the censuses of 1907 and 1920, by state (values in milréis)

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By the census of 1920, Brazil had over four and a half times as many industrial companies than thirteen years previously. Now there were some 13,000 industrial firms, 31 percent in the food sector, 15 percent in clothing and linens, 12 percent in ceramics, and the remainder mostly in the textiles and woodworking. The firms that produced food accounted for 43 percent of the total value of the country’s industrial production, and textiles was next with 26 percent of total production. By contrast, the largest employer of industrial workers was in the textile industry (41 percent), followed by food and clothing (see Table 6.2). In terms of size, the preponderance of the textile industries was evident, averaging ninety-three workers per mill, compared with an average of fifteen workers per firm in all other industries. Until the 1920s, the industry produced mainly low-value-mass consumer goods, but also began to produce some high-volume, hard-to-import products. The two censuses show the continuing importance of sugar mills, which in 1907 and 1920 represented a significant portion of Brazilian industry. In 1920, Pernambuco accounted for more than two-thirds of the value of sugar mill production and Rio de Janeiro, for a quarter. São Paulo was still of less importance, accounting for about a tenth of production. The Pernambuco usinas had an average of 128 workers, those in Rio de Janeiro, less than a hundred.7 But for all the growth of industry, the economy still depended on coffee exports well into the century and these exports were beginning to enter a period of high instability. Periodic bouts of coffee overproduction which had been successfully resolved by free markets in the nineteenth century would destabilize the market and create a crisis in funding the external debt in the twentieth century. Declining coffee sales along with falling government taxes forced the government to resort to the renegotiation of its external debt and would eventually force it to control the coffee production and market as well, as the market could no longer balance demand and supply. In 1898, President Campos Salles enacted a rigid stabilization program through a refinancing loan, the so-called funding loan, which allowed the government to make no payment of its foreign debt for thirteen years. This was the first time, after almost a century as an independent country that a crisis in Brazil’s external debt occurred and which forced the governments to renegotiate its obligations. Until then, the country had adequately served its foreign debt and 7

Ministério da Agricultura, Indústria e Commercio. Recenseamento do Brazil, Realizado em 1 de setembro de 1920.

200

Flour mills Sugar mills Charque Frozen meats (1) Tobacco products Beer Lard Others Sub-total Sugar usinas Total food industries

Products

104 186 34 623 1,095 199 1,294

100 22 26

1907

478 88 49 8 296 214 126 2,710 3,969 233 4,202

1920

Firms 1920

1907

1920

Workers

2.9% 1.1% 3.2% 5.0% 2.5% 4.0% 0.7% 6.4% 25.7% 10.7% 36.3% 7,407 2,912 587 12,541 29,182 13,136 42,318

1,499 454 3,782

4,598 1,112 2,796 4,264 14,510 4,939 1,215 18,437 51,871 18,161 70,032

Food industries (including sugar usinas) 2.5% 1.6% 1.0% 0.0% 2.0% 4.2% 0.7% 5.9% 17.8% 11.3% 29.1%

1907

Capital

5.3% 2.1% 5.3% 0.0% 2.8% 3.1% 1.8% 8.5% 28.9% 9.1% 38%

1907

6.9% 3.2% 3.5% 4.5% 3.3% 3.0% 1.9% 11.1% 37.5% 6.6% 44%

1920

Value of production

Table 6.2  Brazilian industry in the censuses of 1907 and 1920, by type of product (values in milréis)

201 343 255 1,915 1,073 3,187

29 222

163 15 5 10

1,988 950 8,118 5,218 13,569

266 26 6 10 736 167 1,211

92,462 4,000 1,765 2,820 641 1,533 10,507 52,656 112,195

46,102 1,957 244 2,820

Other industries

28.5% 2.1% 0.7% 0.6% 1.4% 1.4% 34.8%

18.4% 1.5% 0.1% 3.0% 0.0% 0.6% 23.7%

18.2% 1.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.4% 4.5% 25.8%

4.8% 5.0% 14,807 28,248 8.2% 7.7% 7.7% 7.4% 8,776 15,350 9.1% 7.4% 71.5% 72.9% 105,421 207,664 69.8% 78.4% 17% 16% 30,999 67,848 21% 15% 654,752,663 2,032,280,114 149,556 293,673 736,100,740 3,200,670,856

35.9% 2.3% 0.1% 2.4% 0.0% 0.5% 41.3%

Source: Recenseamento Geral do Brazil, 1920, vol. V, 1a. parte, Indústria: VIII

Clothing and linens Chemicals Sub-total Other industries Total

Spinning and weaving cotton Wool spinning and weaving Silk spinning and weaving Jute spinning and weaving Cotton processing (2) Others Sub-total

Textile industries

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enjoyed excellent credit in the international market. To make negotiation feasible, the government agreed to eliminate the budget deficit and to withdraw from circulation a quantity of currency equivalent to the total of the loans. Customs receipts served as collateral for the loans. In order to obtain revenue to honor its external obligations, the government instituted the collection of customs duties in gold thus easing its necessity to acquire the foreign currency needed to pay the foreign debt. This retrenchment program worked, budget deficits were reduced, prices declined and the value of the national currency appreciated, but these policies led to the bankruptcy of numerous banks and companies that had been created in that decade. This monetary and exchange turbulence had a direct impact on the coffee market and in turn fluctuations in that market affected national policies. That market had normal fluctuations in supply and demand throughout most of the nineteenth century without any severe disruptions.8 But in the twentieth century, overproduction became a serious problem for the sector. The periodic crisis now occurring in the coffee market caused sharp declines in world coffee prices and devaluation of the Brazilian currency through its impact on the balance of payments. Although the devaluation itself represented a partial compensation to the growers, who received their income in milréis, the net effect was a fall in the profitability of the coffee industry and the decline in new coffee tree plantings. As demand revived, the market responded with a return to new plantings of coffee often in excess of international demand. In 1892, the international price of coffee began a long-term secular decline, but its impact was muted given the strong devaluation of local currency which kept up the profits of local planters and in turn stimulated the continuity of new plantings and increased production. As Brazil was the world’s major producer, this behavior of national producers tended to further erode coffee prices in the international market. Lower international prices combined with the falling value of the national currency may have still been remunerative for producers, but it led to less revenue for Brazil’s exports, worsening the external sector of the economy. Thus the impact of falling international prices did not lead to a decline in national production or stop new plantings. This created a structural excess of supply which was evident in the middle of the last decade of the century and which led to a further decline in international prices. Moreover the success of the stabilization policy carried out by 8

As in studies of Delfim Netto, O problema do café no Brasil.

Industrialization and Urbanization

203

Campos Salles, resulted in the recuperation of the exchange rate, but dramatically reduced the income of planters in local currency. But even despite this decline in coffee profitability, production still increased each year. This paradox of continued expansion and falling prices and profitability was the result of earlier coffee plantings gradually entering into production at this time thus leading to overproduction well into the twentieth century. From the end of the 1890s there was increasing pressure for the government to intervene in the market, especially given the coffee overproduction crisis which was resulting in the accumulation of unsold stocks of coffee. The government of Campos Salles, was against any type governmental intervention,9 but the crisis became ever more acute, with world stocks reaching dramatic levels, thus increasing pressure on the government to intervene. Coffee now entered the market from the trees planted in the 1890s and by 1902 the state of São Paulo was forced to prohibit the planting of new trees for a five-year period. Given the importance of the coffee economy for São Paulo, it was the most active state seeking a solution to the crisis of overproduction.10 Although the coffee economy continued in crisis, the relative stability of production in the years 1904 to 1905 reduced pressure for intervention. The policy of intervention was discussed in congress with no success, since the opponents of intervention would not accept a policy of what is called “valorization” just for coffee. Nevertheless the second semester of 1906 saw an even more serious crisis as stocks reached high levels and as estimates for the harvest of 1906/1907 suggested a very large output.11 By now Brazil in one year only produced more than the world consumed in that year. At a meeting of Brazilian producers in 1906, the 9

10

11

Joaquim Murtinho, Relatório apresentado ao presidente dos Estados Unidos do Brazil pelo Ministério de Estado dos Negocios no anno de 1900 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Nacional): iv. The importance of coffee in the São Paulo economy is evident in a number of areas. For example, in the decade of the 1900s more than half the income of the state railroads came from the transporting of coffee (Saes, As ferrovias de São Paulo: 92–93); in 1905 coffee represented 64 percent of the total agricultural production of the states. Maria Sílvia C. Beozzo Bassanezi and Priscila M. S. Bergamo Francisco, eds., Estado de São Paulo: estatística agrícola e zootécnica, 1904–1905 (Campinas, NEPO/UNICAMP, 2003, CD-ROM); in 1905 as well some 60 percent of export taxes collected by the paulista government came from coffee exports (Anuario de Estatístico São Paulo, 1905: 148–153 and 190). The stockpile of coffee bags was 11 million bags for a consumption of 16 million. And the initial estimate of the harvest 1906/1907 was 16 million, but production reached 20 million bags. There was no place to offer a crop of this magnitude.

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Taubaté Convention was signed which proposed that the government buy the excess coffee production at a minimum pre-established price; should restrict the production of low quality coffee, stimulate internal consumption and promote the product abroad.12 By the harvest of 1906, the federal government was forced to enter the coffee market.13 It decided to create a fixed exchange rate for the national currency, and if this policy was successful it would lead to the increase in the price of coffee and the value of exports. But its success would also result in an increase in the value of the milréis, which would be prejudicial for planters who exported their coffee. Therefore the government created a currency board, whose aim was to limit the increase in value of the milréis if the market controls were successful.14 The board was authorized to buy foreign currency at 15 pence for 1,000 réis and would then emit convertible currency. The national congress also authorized the president to establish negotiations with the states to regularize the commerce of coffee and stabilize its price, being able to endorse credit operations needed to accomplish this. Because of the gravity of the situation and both the inertia of the federal government and the relative indifference of other coffee producing states, the government of São Paulo initiated its own program.15 But this policy could not continue only at state level when it was known that the harvest of 1906/1907 was going to produce 20 million sacks of coffee. To service this coffee purchasing loan the state instituted a tax on each sack exported, in accordance with the previous Taubaté Convention. At the end of the 1906/1907 harvest, the world stock of coffee was 12

13

14 15

Delfim Netto, O problema do café no Brasil, chapters 2 and 3. In various parts of this section devoted to interventions in the coffee market, we have used the work of Delfim Netto. On the Convênio de Taubaté, see Lefevre, A administração do Estado de São Paulo. Topik, The Political Economy of the Brazilian State, “The evolution of the economy role of the Brazilian state, 1889–1930,” Latin American Studies, 11(2) (1979): 329. Although both Mexico and Brazil were dominated by liberalism, they were forced by international conditions to adopt interventionist policies in the commodities market, in tariffs and the railroads. Carlos Marichal and Steven Topik. “The state and economic growth in Latin America: Brazil and Mexico, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,” in Alice Teichova and Herbert Matis, eds., Economic Change and the Building of the Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Teixeira Vieira, Evolução do sistema monetário brasileiro, vol. 13 (São Paulo: IPE, 1981): 238–274. Eugênio Lefevre, A administração do estado de São Paulo na República Velho (São Paulo: Typ. Cupolo, 1937); Sérgio Silva, Expansão cafeeira e origens da indústria no Brasil (São Paulo: Editora Alfa-Omega, 1995): 60.

Industrialization and Urbanization

205

16.4 million tons, half of which pertained to the state of São Paulo.16 In 1907 and 1908 the federal government obtained new external loans and passed the funds on to São Paulo. The state government now had the financial ability to retain the coffee stocks for the time needed to balance the market. After falling to its lowest price in more than fifty years, coffee prices recuperated on the international market. The smaller harvests in the following years allowed for the gradual sale of the stockpiled coffee in the market. Impressive were the results of this first “valorization” program. Restriction on planting established in 1902 maintained production at a relatively stable level in the following years, much below the exceptional production of the harvest of 1906/1907, and internationally prices continued to rise until 1912. With rising coffee prices and rising exports, along with income coming from foreign loans, there was a great inflow of foreign capital in this period. The result would have been for the milréis to rise in value, but the currency board bought this foreign exchange at a fixed price, and this led to stability in the exchange rate and continued benefit for exporters. The limitation on new plantings and the gradual sale from the stockpiled coffee, guaranteed the stability of the market. But the outbreak of World War I led to falling coffee prices and capital outflows and a sharp devaluation of the milréis. The conversion board with its convertibility at the same fixed rate soon exhausted its funds and the board was forced to close its doors in 1914. But the positive results of this first state intervention in the coffee market would lead to two other state interventions in times of crisis in the market, those of 1917–1920 and 1921–1924, both of which were also carried out successfully in terms of price stability and the successful liquidation of stocks bought by the government.17 The success of these three market interventions led the federal government to implement a permanent defense of coffee, to be conducted by the government of the state of São Paulo. To finance this operation, the state of São Paulo took an external loan, which would be offset by a tax on each bag of coffee circulating in the state. In 1927, the other producing states joined the program, and a single criterion was established to control the movement of coffee to the 16

17

Given the large stock of coffee purchased, financed largely by short-term funding, the state government of São Paulo was forced to rent Sorocabana Railway Co. Ltd., to secure new loans. Delfim Netto, O problema do café no Brasil, chapters 1–4.

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

206 35

Millions of coffee bags

30 25 20 15 10 5

1890 1892 1894 1896 1898 1900 1902 1904 1906 1908 1910 1912 1914 1916 1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938

0

Brazilian Production

World Consumption

Graph 6.1  Brazilian coffee production and world consumption of coffee 1890–1939. Source: IBGE, Estat Hist and Bacha and Greenhill

ports of shipment. As in 1906, an organization was created that would make the currency convertible, now called the stabilization fund, which functioned like the old conversion board. If previous interventions were aimed solely at balancing supply and demand for coffee, the intervention practiced in the 1920s was different and represented an effective policy of price appreciation. The government controlled coffee supply at the ports of shipment, thus promoting limited supply which raised international prices, but without restricting coffee production in Brazil. In practice, Brazil regulated its supply to the market residually, complementing the existing demand after the placement of the production of the other producing countries, which benefited from high prices. Thus, both domestic producers were stimulated to increase their plantations, as well as growers in other producing countries. The result would be overproduction. Even before the crisis, the exceptional Brazilian harvest of 1927 produced about 30 million bags of coffee, at a time when world consumption barely reached twenty-three million (see Graph 6.1). Overproduction, falling world prices due to the Great Depression, and capital flight all led to the inability of the government to purchase coffee for stockpiling and led to the liquidation of the stabilization fund. The stage was set for the most serious crisis in the coffee sector which in turn affected all other sectors of the economy.

Industrialization and Urbanization

207

In 1930, the constitutional government was deposed by a military uprising led by Getúlio Vargas.18 The regime was initially hostile to the old paulista coffee elite which even led an unsuccessful rebellion against Vargas in 1932. Despite the loss of political control by the São Paulo coffee elite, government support for the coffee sector could not be abandoned given its importance in the balance of payments and in domestic economic activity. Thus in 1933, coffee farmer debts were cut in half and the rest funded over a period of ten years. The government implemented a harsh new program of planting restrictions, and instituted export controls. It created a program that divided the coffee produced into three portions, each with a distinct destination: 30 percent was to be exported, 30 percent stocked, and 40 percent destroyed. This process resulted in the burning of 78.2 million bags of coffee, equivalent to three times the annual worldwide consumption (Graph 6.2). Given the seriousness of the international crisis, which directly affected the balance of payments, the government was obliged to exercise permanent control over the foreign exchange market. It used this control to favor economic activities directed at the domestic market, particularly industry. Despite the severity of the international crisis and the critical coffee situation, which lasted throughout the 1930s, GDP (gross domestic product) declined moderately in the first two years of the crisis and maintained consistent growth in subsequent years. This reflected the fact that the agro-exporting economy, which was the dynamic element of the Brazilian economy since the beginning of colonization, was being replaced by the internal market. Given the external restrictions on trade and credit and the new orientation of the economy, there was a clear trend toward support for industrialization, a policy that would be maintained throughout the Vargas period.19 18

19

On the government of Vargas see Boris Fausto, A revolução de 1930 (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1975); Sonia Draibe, Rumos e metamorfoses. Estado e industrialização no Brasil: 1930– 1960 (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1985); Lira Neto, Getúlio (1930–1945): Do governo provisório à ditadura do Estado Novo (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2013); Thomas Skidmore, Brasil: de Getúlio Vargas a Castelo Branco (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1976). Furtado, Formação Econômica do Brasil: 30–34; Albert Fishlow, “Origens e conseqüências da substituição de importações no Brasil,” in Flavio Rabelo Versiani and José Roberto Mendonça de Barros, eds., Formação econômica do Brasil. A experiência da industrialização (São Paulo: Saraiva, 1977): 7–41; Annibal Villanova Villela and Wilson Suzigan, Política do governo e crescimento da economia brasileira – 1889–1945 (Brasília: IPEA, 2001); Carlos Manuel Peláez, História da industrialização brasileira. Crítica à teoria estruturalista no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Apec, 1972); Simão Silber, “Política econômica: defesa no nível de renda e industrialização no período 1929– 1939,” Master’s thesis, São Paulo, FEA-USP, 1973.

NY Prices US cents and Millions of Sacks of Coffee

208

Brazil: An Economic and Social History 70%

60

Brazil in World Coffee Trade 50

40

30

50%

Coffee Destroyed in Brazil (sacks)

40%

NY price-Santos 4

20

10

60%

30% 20%

Brazilian Coffee Production (sacks)

10%

0 0% 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19

Graph 6.2  Prices, production and destruction of coffee and Brazilian participation in the world market 1924–1952. Source: Bacha et al., Secular stagnation?

Over the years, Brazilian policies usually restricted supply in order to sustain international prices, has led to the country losing participation in the international market. In the 1910s and 1920s Brazil accounted, on average, for two-thirds of world coffee exports, which declined to a little over 50 percent in the following two decades; 43 percent in the 1950s and 36 percent in the 1960s (see Graph 6.3). In the 1920s, São Paulo represented the main center of coffee production in Brazil and in the world. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, São Paulo accounted for approximately two-thirds of Brazilian production, followed by Minas Gerais, with a little less than onefifth. But gradually there was a shift in production to the state of Paraná, which overtook the state of São Paulo in the early 1960s, and accounted for approximately half of production and São Paulo for about a quarter. This situation lasted until 1975, when a devastating frost practically destroyed the coffee plantations in Paraná. From then on there was a rapid northward displacement to Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo, which began to lead the national production (see Graph 6.4). The arrival of Vargas to power generated important changes in government organization as well as basic policies. The old decentralized federalist and liberal system was replaced by an authoritarian, centralizing and modernizing regime whose aim was to promote industrialization and the development of a modern welfare state. Whereas the old republic was based on an alliance of regional oligarchies and the coffee elite, the new government had a more complex and heterogeneous structure, and it was controlled by groups of military men, technicians and young politicians,

Industrialization and Urbanization

209 90% 80%

120

Brazilian % of World Exports

100

70%

World Exports

60%

80

50%

60

40% 30%

40

% of World Exports

Brazilian and World Exports in millions of sacks of 60 kg

140

20% 20

10% Brazil Exports

0%

1851 1855 1859 1863 1867 1871 1875 1879 1883 1887 1891 1895 1899 1903 1907 1911 1915 1919 1923 1927 1931 1935 1939 1943 1947 1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019

-

Graph 6.3  World production of coffee and Brazilian coffee exports in volume and as a share of world production 1815–2019. Source: IBGE, Estatisticas Históricas Retrospectivas; Bacha and Greenhill (1992)

100% Bahia

90% 80%

Espírito Santo

70% 60%

Paraná

50%

Minas Gerais

40% 30% 20%

São Paulo

10%

Outros

Rio de Janeiro

Rondônia

2019

2016

2013

2010

2007

2004

2001

1998

1995

1992

1989

1986

1983

1980

1977

1974

1970

1967

1964

1961

1958

1955

1952

1949

1946

1943

1940

1937

1934

1931

0%

Minas Gerais

Graph 6.4  Relative importance of Brazilian states in coffee production 1931–2019. Source: Conab and Ipeada

although many of these men, like Vargas himself, had participated in the old regime.20 Later the industrialists were incorporated into this new power structure. This type of transition was in fact occurring in many 20

Vargas already had been Minister of the Treasury in the government of Washington Luís and governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul. On Getúlio Vargas see Richard Bourn, Getúlio Vargas of Brazil, 1883–1954: Sphinx of the pampas (London: Knight, 1974); John W. F. Dulles, Vargas of Brazil: A Political Biography (Austin: Universtiy of Texas Press, 1967) and Lira Neto, Getúlio 1882–1830. Dos Anos de Formação à

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Latin American countries as a result of the Great Depression. According to most scholars, this new authoritarianism signified the transition from an oligarchic state grounded on the landed elite to a new political structure based on compromise between competing groups. But initially none of the newer power groups provided the legitimacy and commitment to a state that was required. Thus the style of government inaugurated by Vargas sought to gain support by manipulating popular aspirations. The leaders of the 1930s reform movements believed that only institutional authoritarianism or the paternalistic authoritarianism of charismatic leaders of the mass democracies could undertake industrialization and modernization of their respective societies with an essentially top-down reform, which was the model adopted by Vargas.21 By acting to address specific infrastructure bottlenecks and the need to provide basic raw materials, the government became a major participant in the industrial sector. With the creation of national manufacturing and infrastructure companies, such as the steel producing Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional and the iron ore Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, the federal government implemented a new form of direct intervention in the productive sphere of the economy, acting where the private initiative had no interest in applying the necessary capital, either because of risk, low profitability, or the large quantity of resources needed. This policy required a great economic effort on the part of the Brazilian state, which used fiscal resources and external loans to finance these new industries and a large part of the revenue from exports to import the products needed to establish these large state-owned industries. Thus, while the GDP showed a favorable performance of 4 percent per year between 1930 and 1945, industry grew at an impressive 6.2 percent per year, against 2.1 percent of agriculture (see Graph 6.5).

21

Conquista do Poder (São Paulo: Cia. das Letras, 2012), Pedro Paulo Zahluth Bastos and Pedro Cezar Dutra, eds., A era Vargas. Desenvolvimento, economia e sociedade (São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2012). Weffort, O populismo na política brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1978), 61. Populism in Brazil has been the object of innumerable studies since the 1960s. Recently there have appeared critical studies on this theme, among them: Ângela de Castro Gomes, “O populismo e as ciências sociais no Brasil: notas sobre a trajetória de um conceito,” and Jorge Ferreira, “O nome e as coisas: o populismo na política brasileira,” in Jorge Ferreira, ed., O populismo e sua história (Rio de Janeiro: E. Civilização Brasileira, 2000); Ângela de Castro Gomes, A invenção do Trabalhismo (São Paulo: Vértice, 1988) and Boris Fausto, “Populismo in the past and its resurgence,” presented at the Conference in Honor of Boris Fausto, Stanford, May 21, 2010; Claucir Roberto Schmidtke, “O populismo econômico em questão: a política econômica do Estado Novo (1937–1945),” PhD thesis, UFRGS, Porto Alegre, 2017.

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211

20% 15% 10% 5% 0% –5%

GDP

1947

1946

1945

1944

1943

1942

1941

1940

1939

1938

1937

1936

1935

1934

1933

1932

1931

1930

1929

1928

1927

1926

–10%

GDP Industry

Graph 6.5  Variation in GDP and GDP by industry 1926–1947. Source: Ipeadata

A major issue facing Vargas, as it did all the other twentieth-century governments was the social question. With the resolution of the slavery question, the decades from the 1890s to the 1920s were filled with an ever-increasing confrontation between workers and management and between the elite and the working classes. Initially the major centers of strike activity were the cities with the largest industries, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo and the key port of Santos. From the beginning anarcho-syndicalist, socialist and “bread and butter” unionism (variously referred to as trabalhismo or sindicalismo reformista) competed for control of the embryonic labor movement. The evolution of the Brazilian Labor movement moved in the traditional trajectory from mutual aid societies and multi-occupational and district associations to craft and then industrial unions and eventually to labor confederations, though the formation of a Brazilian confederation was slow compared to other labor movements in the Americas. Because of their higher ratio of native workers, the labor movement in the federal capital (Rio de Janeiro) tended to be more ameliorative, while the more foreign immigrant dominant work force in São Paulo tended toward more radical solutions. The demands for an eight hour day was the basic issue from 1900 onward, along with wages, working conditions and the right to strike were constant themes as these local unions became ever more powerful and allied themselves with middle class intellectuals in the socialist, anarchist, Catholic movements and eventually with the new communist movement after World War I. The boom period from 1905–1913 produced the first major wave of significant strikes throughout the country. The response

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Brazil: An Economic and Social History

of the government was a repressive law in January 1907 expelling foreigners who “compromised national security and public tranquility,” which was modified in 1913 to give the government unrestrained power to expel foreign-born workers. An estimated 556 foreign-born persons were expelled from 1907 to 1922. The leaders of these early strikes were workers in the skilled trades, railroad and port workers and typographic workers – the elite of the labor movement or those who worked in key transport infrastructures. After limited attempts in 1910 to control the labor movement, the government resorted to repression which greatly reduced strike activity. But this period of quiescence after the end of World War I and the period from 1917–1920 would be the time of the first major industrial unions being formed, with a consequent increase in very large strikes. These strikes now involved the textile and metallurgical workers – the largest industrial labor force in the country. The assassination of a labor leader in July of 1917 led to a general strike for all workers in the city of São Paulo. In this period strikes and protests spread throughout the country. In fact this was the most intense period of strike activity in the history of Brazil until the 1940s. This active period ended with a general strike in Rio de Janeiro in 1920 which led the government to imprison 2,000 strikers and take over many of the unions. The last decade of the old republic was a period of violent repression as the government desperately attempted to destroy the labor movement. During most of the decade the government in fact operated in a state of siege, and the “social question” and the “dangerous classes” became a major theme among the political elite.22 The arrival of Vargas was another response of the elite to this question and this time with a top-down labor reform designed to reduce the radical participation in the labor movement. Although it was consistent with previous regimes in violently suppressing movements on the left, the government also carried out a new policy of co-opting urban workers through modern labor legislation, namely the Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT) in 1943, which is still in effect today.23 These codes involved the right to unionize, basic worker rights to bargaining and social security. This was a 22

23

For a chronology of this period see Vito Giannotti, História das lutas dos trabalhadores no BrasiI (Rio de Janeiro: Mauad X, 2007). The standard analyses of these movements is that of Boris Fausto, Trabalho urbano e conflito social (São Paulo: DIFEL, 1997) and Claudio Batalha, O movimento operário na Primeira República (Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar editor, 2000). The CLT was finally modified in significant ways in 2017.

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fundamental change from the old republic.24 While this cooptation diminished the autonomy of labor organization, leading to government controlled unions, these organizations now became an important part of the Vargas political base.25 The charismatic figure of Vargas derives in large part from his control and manipulation of the labor movement harnessed to the state. Another major part of Vargas’s social policy was the established of social welfare institutions. As was the norm in the majority of western nations, the first formal retirement plans (the caixas de pensões) began with small groups of workers in well defined sectors of the economy in the decade of the 1920s and 1930s. In the case of Brazil, as in most of Latin America, there had always been very limited retirement plans for public servants going back to the colonial period. But in the independence period most of these funds disappeared and in the case of Brazil, it was only in 1931 under Vargas that retirement and pension funds, known as CAPs (or Caixa de Aposentadoria e Pensões) were extended to public servants and this was expanded in 1932 to mine workers. Eventually, each sector of the formal economy had its own CAP and they were organized with tripartite financing of workers, employees and government through obligatory contributions. In turn the government rationalized the system by integrating local CAPs into institutes (IAPS) which ensured pensions for entire sectors of the economy. As many have noted, the move to IAPS represented a significant shift in the social insurance system from essentially private to primarily public administration and from individual companies to whole classes of workers. The first retirement institute was created for all maritime workers in 1934, and then for commercial and bank workers in 1936. In 1938 it was the turn of transport workers and by 1939 there were ninety-eight CAPS and five institutes insuring some 1.8 million workers, all under the control of the Ministry of Labor.26 24

25 26

See John D. French, “Proclamando leis, metendo o pau e lutando por direitos,” in Hunold Lara Silva and Joseli M. N. Mendonça, eds., Direitos e justiças no Brasil, ensaios de história social (Campinas: Ed. Unicamp, 2006): 379–416. Fausto, A Revolução de 1930: 107–108. James Malloy, The Politics of Social Security in Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979): 40–50; Celso Barroso Leite, “Da lei Elói Chaves ao Sinpas,” in Celso Barroso Leite, ed., Um século de previdência social: balanço e perspectivas no Brasil e no mundo (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1983): 39–44; Herbert S. Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna, Modern Brazil. A Social History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020): chapter 5; Herbert S. Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna, “Creando um estado de bienestar en un régimen autoritário: el caso del Brasil,” Economía y Política [Santiago], 1(1) (2014): 29–73; Francisco Eduardo Barreto de Oliveira, Kaizô Iwakami Beltrão and Antonio Carlos de Albuquerque David, “Dívida da união com a previdência social: uma perspectiva histórica.” Discussion paper 638 (Rio de Janeiro: Ipea, 1999); Eli Iôla

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At the end of World War II, Vargas was deposed and a democratic period took root for the next two decades. The immediate post-Vargas regimes (1945–1951) tried to impose a more liberal economic orientation, but were constrained by wartime agreements which limited its purchasing power. The Dutra government decided to eliminate exchange control, but imports skyrocketed. There was an increase in imports of items that had suffered the greatest shortages during the war, such as machinery and equipment. But Brazil’s accumulated reserves, which could have been used to resolve its commercial balance, were not composed of convertible reserves but rather of funds formed mainly by British pound rights, which could only be used in imports from Britain. While Britain continued to buy Brazilian products, Brazil imported most of its merchandise from the United States, the only country that had abundant supplies at the end of the war. This led to a bottleneck, and exchange controls were resumed in July 1947.27 The return of Vargas as a legally elected democratic president in 1951 turned the government policy back toward an ever more systematic import substitution policy by using exchange controls and import licenses to stimulate the national industrial sector. The government was also able to take advantage of a new international era of government to government loans, in which government entities such as the Export and Import Bank of the United States now made loans available to Brazil. Based on the new ideas of the US government regarding foreign aid, the United States-Brazil Joint Commission (CMBEU) was established with the objective of creating conditions for the increase in the flow of public and private investments, national and foreign, necessary to accelerate the economic development of Brazil. As part of this development plan, several entities were created under Vargas’s democratically elected successor Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–1961). These included the National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE), which helped to develop a master development plan known as the Plano de Metas (Goals Plan) that guided his administration’s actions in the following years.28

27 28

Gurgel Andrade, “Estado e previdência no Brasil: uma breve história,” in Rosa María Marques et al., A previdência social no Brasil (São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2003): 69–84; Amélia Cohn, Previdência social e processo político no Brasil (São Paulo: Editora Moderna, 1981). Sérgio B. Vianna, “Política econômica externa e industrialização: 1946–1951,” in Marcelo de P. Abreu, ed., A ordem do progresso (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1992): 105–122. José L. de M. Dias, O BNDES e o Plano de Metas (Rio de Janeiro: BNDES, 1996), https://web.bndes.gov.br/bib/jspui/bitstream/1408/2381/3/O%20BNDES%20e%20 o%20Plano%20de%20Metas-final_P.pdf; see also Luiz Orenstein and Antonio Claudio

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When Kubitschek assumed presidential office, he found a country in serious structural and economic difficulties. Although the process of industrialization had advanced, above all in the production of consumer goods and to a lesser extent in heavy industry, the country still faced serious bottlenecks, especially in the areas of energy and transportation. At the same time, there were strong inflationary pressures, public deficits and balance-of-payments problems. To address these problems, he rejected a traditional stabilization plan and opted for an ambitious spending plan which was the most coherent and well-developed policy to develop a complete industrial structure ever proposed for Brazil. It gave absolute priority to building the upper levels of the industrial pyramid, and vertically integrated the entire sector from basic inputs to advanced heavy goods production. By opting for growth, the government co-opted large social groups, including industrialists and workers. Even the opening of the economy to foreign capital, although attacked by nationalists, was accepted by the main forces supporting the government, including the military.29 This period of building basic infrastructure with state financing was crucial for the Brazilian economy. The industrial growth that had occurred from the end of World War II had not been matched by corresponding growth in infrastructure, thus creating increasing inefficiencies and costs. Also the stimulus given by the exchange rate system allowed the expansion of consumer goods industries without corresponding growth in the production of a capital goods sector. Recognizing these problems, the government’s plan proposed investments in all sectors of the economy. There was expansion in the production of electricity and in oil refining, with all investments mainly directed to public companies. The state railroads modernized their rolling stock and increased their capacity. Ports, merchant shipping, airports and air transport all received state aid. At the same time, the construction and paving of highways was the most ambitious and successful part of the transport initiative resulting in a

29

Sochaczewski, “Democracia com desenvolvimento, 1956–1962,” in Marcelo de P. Abreu, ed., A ordem do progresso (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1992): 171–195; Celso Lafer, “O planejamento no Brasil: observações sobre o Plano de Metas,” in Betty Mindlin, ed., Planejamento econômico no Brasil (São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1973): 29–49; Maria V. de M. Benevides, O governo Kubitschek. Desenvolvimento econômico e estabilidade política (Rio de Janeiro: n/p, 1977); Leonardo Dias Nunes, “Progresso, planejamento e desenvolvimento no Brasil de JK (1956–1961),” PhD thesis, Unicamp, Campinas, 2018. Maria da Conceição Tavares, “Auge e declínio do processo de substituição de importações no Brasil,” in Maria da Conceição Tavares, ed., Da substituição de importações ao capitalismo financeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1973): 27–115.

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20% 15% 10% 5% 0% –5%

–15%

1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

–10%

Change in GDP (Positive)

Change in GDP (Negative)

Change in GDP Industry

Graph 6.6  Variation in GDP 1958–1990. Source: Ipeadata

75 percent increase in tripling the length of federal paved roads. The national automotive industry, which until then had only produced trucks and utility vehicles, was now expanded to produce automobiles, which was developed with foreign capital. There were also significant government investments in companies producing steel, cement, alkali, paper and cellulose, aluminum, non-ferrous metals and rubber. Finally the city of Brasília was constructed from the ground up to serve as the new national capital and to promote settlement of the Center-West region. The program was successful in terms of the proposed goals, and of increasing capital spending significantly. This investment effort resulted in strong GDP growth, which reached an average of over 9 percent in the period 1957–1961 (see Graph 6.6). However, as most of the resources came from fiscal budget sources, without sufficient revenue coverage and without the existence of a public debt market in the country to fund these works, there was a significant fiscal deficit, financed by monetary emissions, which would create strong inflationary pressures over the following years (see Graph 6.7) This would be the price to pay for the success of the Goals Plan, which undeniably put the country on a new level in terms of industrialization. The impact of these investments can be seen in the census of 1960. By then Brazil had 110,000 industrial firms employing on average 1.5 million workers. The light industry sector, which in 1950 accounted for half the value of industrial production in the country, now accounted for only a third of that value. The metallurgy, transportation, communications and chemical industries, along with the machine tools factories increased their relative share to a third of the value of industrial production, compared to

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120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% –20% –40% 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982

–60%

% Fiscal Defict/Revenues

M1

Inflation - IGP-DI

Graph 6.7  Fiscal deficit and annual change in M1 and inflation 1950–1982. Source: Ipeadata

just a fifth in the census of 1950. Most of this new heavy industry, such as car manufactures, was promoted by foreign capital in contrast to the role of national capital in the early industrial process. Although agriculture was not a government priority in this period, this sector managed to supply the basic food needs for an expanding population, by increasing production through traditional means of using more virgin lands and workers. The demographic explosion that occurred in this period, as the crude death rate declined dramatically while the fertility rate remained high, allowed the rural sector to release labor to the urban area while maintaining its production and without putting pressure on rural wages. The still abundant supply of land suitable for agriculture also did not encourage the intensive use of capital in the form of plows, tractors, fertilizers and pesticides. The government which was elected in October 1960 responded to the critical economic situation it inherited by adopting a classic stabilization program, devaluing the national currency, and reducing both public expenditures and the money supply. But the Janio Quadros government lasted only six months and was replaced with a complicated set of negotiations with the army by João Goulart, whose government lasted another three years. Goulart essentially wanted to expand the Vargas program of a welfare state and state induced industrialization. The Goulart period would be marked by growing mobilization of the unions, students, organized peasants in new peasant leagues, and the rise

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of new left groups within the Catholic Church. In a coalition between leftists and nationalists came ideas for comprehensive structural reforms, dealing with land, education, urbanization and even for voting rights for illiterates.30 But in April 1964, the army overthrew the Goulart government and established a military dictatorship which would remain in power for twenty-one years.31 The military regimes exhibited unique characteristics. On the one hand, they were repressive, fiercely anti-communist and were engaged in the Cold War as staunch allies of the United States. On the other hand, they were determined to organize a powerful centralized state, dominated by the executive branch. They retained elections and congress remained in session. But the powers of the legislature were greatly reduced and its members were controlled by the purge of the legislators of the left and center who opposed the regime. Fearing the emergence of a personalist regime under the domination of one of the general presidents, the military adopted fixed presidential terms and formal “elections.”32 From the beginning, these repressive governments concentrated on growth policies and the expansion of services to generate popular support despite the violence, forced exile, torture campaigns and executions. The government claimed that it was aggregate demand, high public deficits financed by expansion in the money supply, excessive expansion of credit to the private sector and higher wages that caused the recession and continued high inflation. In their view, 30

31

32

On the Janio Quadros government see Maria Victória de Mesquita Benevides, O governo Jânio Quadros, 2nd edn (São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1999) and for the Goulart period see Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964. See Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military rule in Brazil, 1964–85 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) and his essay “Politics and economic policy making in authoritarian Brazil, 1937–1971,” in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Philippe C. Schmitter, “The ‘portugalization’ of Brazil,” in Stepan, Authoritarian Brazil; Juan J. Linz, “The future of an authoritarian situation or the institutionalization of an authoritarian regime: the case of Brazil,” in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Bolivar Lamounier, “O ‘Brasil autoritário’ revisitado: o impacto das eleições sobre a ditadura,” in Alfred Stepan, ed., Democratizando o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1985); Maria Helena Moreira Alves, Estado e oposição no Brasil, 1964–1984 (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1984); Herbert S. Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna, Brazil: The Military Regimes of Latin America in the Cold War, 1964–1985 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). See Elio Gaspari, A ditadura envergonhada (São Paulo: Companhia da Letras, 2002), A ditadura escancarada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), A ditadura encurralada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2004) and A ditadura derrotada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2003), and for the Castelo regime, see Lira Neto, Castelo: a marcha para a ditadura (São Paulo: Contexto, 2004).

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economic recovery required the reduction of the public debt, control of private-sector credit and imposition of limits on wages. The economists who designed this program also claimed that distortions in the pricing structure of the economy resulted in Brazil’s inadequate fiscal structure and its rudimentary financial system. Only with modernization of this sector could economic growth occur. With this diagnosis, the government unilaterally put in place a program of stabilization and reforms. The government was very successful in the fiscal area, creating new taxes and instituting monetary indexation. The indexation was initially deployed in the correction of tax arrears, increasing fiscal efficiency even with high inflation. This procedure was also used for indexing the federal debt, enabling, for the first time, the sale of medium- and long-term government securities. Indexing in fact explains the formation of a relatively sophisticated capital market in Brazil from the 1970s onward, even though inflation never completely disappeared. If this was a positive aspect of the creation of the monetary correction program, the experience of the 1980s and 1990s shows that fighting inflation would be impossible as long as indexing existed. But these changes in the fiscal area resulted in the deficit being sharply reduced and now funded primarily by the placement of national bonds, unlike the previous practice of financing via monetization.33 The new government also created a Central Bank, giving it the functions of monetary policy coordination and supervision of the financial system. Furthermore, it completely reorganized the financial market and created a capital market, which had been virtually nonexistent until then in the country. Through the reorganization of the financial system and indexing there surged a market for medium- and long-term credit and for public debt which now enabled real interest rates.

33

André Lara Resende, “Estabilização e reforma,” in Marcelo de P. Abreu, ed., A ordem do progresso (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1992); Simonsen and Campos, A nova economia brasileira; Celso Furtado, Um projeto para o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Saga, 1968), Análise do Modelo Brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1975); Albert Fishlow, “Algumas reflexões sobre a política econômica brasileira após 1964,” Estudos Cebrap, 6 (1974); Mario Henrique Simonsen, Inflação, gradualismo x tratamento de choque (Rio de Janeiro: Apec, 1970); Albert Fishlow, “A distribuição de renda no Brasil,” in R. Tolipan and A. C. Tinelli, eds., A controvérsia sobre a distribuição de renda e desenvolvimento (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1975); Paul Singer, A crise do “Milagre” (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1977); Antonio Delfim Netto, Análise do comportamento recente da economia brasileira: diagnóstico (São Paulo: mimeo, 1967); and Regis Bonelli and Pedro Malan, “Os limites do possível: notas sobre balanço de pagamentos e indústria nos anos 70,” Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 6(2) (1976): 353–406.

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Mortgages were now financed by a new National Housing Bank (BNH, Banco Nacional da Habitação) whose funds were generated through a national system of forced savings. Until 1963, dismissed employees were compensated by payment of one month’s salary for each year of service. After ten years of employment, the employer was required to double this compensation. This tended to limit the mobility of labor. This system was abolished in 1966 and replaced by the Guarantee Fund for Length of Service (Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço, FGTS) with funding by a payroll tax of 8 percent paid by the employers. The fund was to be used as a type of unemployment insurance for any dismissed workers – under the now much looser forms of labor tenure being enacted – or could be used as a reserve fund for the worker for retirement or housing purchases. In fact, most of the monies collected went to the National Housing Bank (BNH) to promote a major expansion of home construction.34 These funds became crucial in developing urban housing as the cities of Brazil expanded massively in this period and banks became the main source of funding for the construction of housing and sanitation.35 There was also a new wage law which corrected the wages according to a formula that took into account not only past inflation, but also inflation estimated to occur for the next twelve months.36 Since future inflation was traditionally underestimated, the new wage law caused systematic wage loss, with negative distributional effects. This deliberate reduction in real wages, the so-called “wage squeeze” restricted both aggregate demand and the cost of manpower to the private sector. The government’s policies of control and wage freezes were finally opposed by independent unions. Since the early days of the authoritarian regime, the military had kept the urban and rural unions under strict government control, intervening in the majority of them and annulling the rights of most active union leaders. All peasant leagues were abolished and replaced by government controlled rural worker unions. A strike of mostly steel workers at Osasco and Contagem in Minas Gerais 1968 was violently suppressed. Nevertheless, there appeared new union leadership in the 1970s along with the growth of the auto industry. Ten years after the violent repression of the 1968 strikes, the automobile 34 35 36

Malloy, The Politics of Social Security: 125–126. Francisco Vidal Luna and Herbert S. Klein, Brazil since 1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): chapter 3. Simonsen, Inflação: gradualismo × tratamento de choque: 26–27.

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workers in the ABC district in the greater São Paulo metropolitan area went on strike and through complex negotiations the strike demands were mostly met without violence. The leader of the strike movement was Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, or Lula, then president of the Metalworkers Union of São Bernardo do Campo and Diadema who would later become President of the Republic.37 The need for growth became the fundamental objective of the military regimes of the 1970s. Unlike most of the military governments of the Cold War era in Latin America, the Brazilian military both rotated their leadership in “presidential elections” to prevent a Pinochet-type coup and were committed to economic and social reform as a justification for their rule.38 The government immediately carried out a frankly expansionary economic policy, but at the same time implemented a complex system of price controls. It also created an extensive system of subsidies mostly for agriculture and for exports. To avoid the traditional crisis in the balance of payments, the government introduced mechanisms to encourage the export of manufactured goods, which hitherto had little weight in Brazilian exports. In addition to the usual credit, subsidies and abundant tax incentives, exports now relied on a realistic and relatively stable exchange rate thanks to a system of periodic mini devaluations linked to the differential between internal and external inflation, which provided protection to exporters against large swings between the local and international prices. In the 1960s and 1970s, significant changes occurred in the stock market as well. The stock exchanges were reorganized, and there now emerged investment banks and brokerage firms. There was also established in 1976 the Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), with functions similar to the United States institution. Also a new corporate law code promoted the rights of minority shareholders. Private pension funds appeared in 1977 and by the end of the military era they would 37

38

For a survey of these developments see John D. French, The Brazilian Workers’ ABC: Class Conflict and Alliances in Modern São Paulo (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Ricardo Antunes and Arnaldo Gonçalves, Por um novo sindicalismo (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1980); André Luís Corrêa da Silva, “‘João Ferrador na República de São Bernardo’: o impacto do ‘novo’ movimento sindical do ABC Paulista no processo de transição democrática (1977–1980),” Master’s thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, 2006; and French, The Brazilian Workers’ ABC. For a detailed analysis of this period see Herbert S. Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna, Brazil, 1964–1985, The Military Regimes of Latin America in the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).

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become increasingly important as investors in the local capital market, by buying significant holdings in the capital of several public and private companies. The federal government also began to act more intensely through its public enterprises, especially in the areas of infrastructure. The increasing fiscal resources allowed the government to participate in a decisive way in the new investments required by the expanding economy. Through the control and management of prices, the broad system of incentives and subsidies and direct action by the government, the state began to exercise considerable control over key decisions in either the public or private economic sectors. Finally, the state was the major producer of electricity, steel, minerals, fuels, fertilizers and chemicals, among other inputs, controlled port services, telecommunications and railroads, and exercised a key role in the credit market. The production of durable consumer goods grew strongly, both through the increase of the consumer market (particularly as a result of the growth of the middle class) and by creating a new system of consumer credit, which allowed for the sale of a wide range of products, including cars by long-term payments. Although the expansion of employment entailed rapid increase in the number of employees, maintenance of the wage squeeze and the repression of trade unions meant that wages remained controlled.39 Between 1967 and 1973, GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10 percent, and industry exhibited an even higher rate of growth.40 The economy was modernized, and given the rapid growth there was significant incorporation of new workers into the formal labor market and the consolidation of a middle segment of consumers. Besides the success of the economic policy adopted domestically, Brazil benefited from a period of strong international growth, when during this period most Latin American countries grew at very high rates. But this growth was accompanied by a process of concentration of income that prevented the productivity gains in the economy being transferred to the workers.41 The increasing foreign debt represented 39 40 41

In fact, the real value of the minimum wage decreased by 34 percent between April 1964 and April 1973. Ipeadata. Salário-mínimo real, mensal, valor real em réis. Ipeadata, IBGE/SCN: PIB, variação real anual, e PIB da indústria de transformação, valor adicionado, valor real anual. On the extensive debate about the concentration of income see Carlos G. Langoni, Distribuição de renda e desenvolvimento econômico no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Expressão e Cultura, 1973); Albert Fishlow, “Brazilian size distribuition of income,” American Economic Review, 62 (1972); Edmar Bacha and Lance Taylor, “Brazilian income

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the other downside of this growth policy. Brazilian economic crises were typically generated in the external sector. Fearing that the country was vulnerable to such a crisis because of its low level of reserves the government greatly stimulated exports and opened the country to foreign capital in the form of both direct investment and foreign loans. This policy fundamentally changed the structure of the Brazilian external debt. Until then, this debt had been based on official sources of credit which were obtained at fixed interest rates. Now there developed a new type of debt based on international private bank credit with floating and high interest rates compared to those charged by international agencies. This meant that the country would become more vulnerable to future changes in the international financial market. Already in the decade of the 1970s, there were signs of problems in the international markets which would profoundly impact the “economic miracle.”42 The oil shock of 1973 greatly affected the country since it imported 73 percent of its petroleum needs. The trade balance that had been relatively stable and positive until 1973, turned negative due to the importation of about US$ 3 billion in oil and oil products, generating a deficit of more than 6 percent of GDP in balance of trade. Meanwhile, inflation peaked at 30 percent annually. Most countries affected by the oil crisis adopted recessionary programs, seeking to constrain domestic demand and adjust the economy to the new situation of expensive energy. These importing countries also had to transfer a considerable part of their income to oil-exporting countries.

42

distribution in the 1960s: ‘Facts’, model results and the controversy,” in Lance Taylor et al., eds., Models of Growth and Distribution for Brazil (Nova York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Lauro R. A. Ramos and José Guilherme Almeida Reis, “Distribuição da renda: aspectos teóricos e o debate no Brasil,” in José Marcio Camargo and Fabio Giambiagi, eds., Distribuição de renda no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 2000): 21–45; Werner Baer, A economia brasileira (São Paulo: Nobel, 2002): 98. There occurred an intense debate for and against the model of growth adopted in the period of the “economic miracle.” Some of the principal works produced in this period are Delfim Netto, “Análise do comportamento recente”; Simonsen, Inflação, gradualismo; Regis Bonelli and Pedro Malan, “Os limites do possível: notas sobre balanço de pagamento e indústria nos anos 70,” Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 6(2) (1976); Maria da Conceição Tavares and José Serra, “Mais além da estagnação,” in Maria da Conceição Tavares, ed., Da substituição de importações ao capitalismo financeiro (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1973), 155–207; Maria da Conceição Tavares, “Sistema financeiro e o ciclo de expansão recente,” in L. G. M. Belluzzo and R. Coutinho, eds., Desenvolvimento capitalista no Brasil: ensaios sobre a crise; Luiz Aranha Correa do Lago, “A retomada do crescimento e as distorções do ‘milagre’: 1967–1973,” in Marcelo de P. Abreu, ed., A ordem no progresso (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1992): 233–294, Antonio Barros de Castro and Francisco Eduardo Pires de Souza, A economia brasileira em marcha forçada (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1988).

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The Brazilian military government followed an alternative path, stimulating the economy and developing an ambitious investment program aimed at increasing the domestic supply of capital and basic consumer goods in order to reduce its dependence on imports. The abundance of foreign capital from the recycling of resources generated by oil-exporting countries made it possible for Brazil to follow that path through international borrowing. This was, however, at the cost of an increasing internal and external debt, accelerating inflation and depleting the financial capacity of the state through the administration of a generalized system of subsidies. The Second National Development Plan, which had established these investment programs, led to major advances in Brazil’s production base, resulting in the creation of a complex sector producing capital goods and basic inputs. This allowed Brazil not only to replace imports, but also export part of its manufacturing output. Some industries such as pulp and paper, showed excellent growth, becoming important export items.43 In other cases, there were delays in implementation of projects or errors of industrial planning. With the critical opinion and the opposition muzzled, there was no effective way to challenge the viability of these projects.44 In agriculture, the military sought to modernize a conservative agriculture without changing the structure of land ownership. Agriculture was seen as a major source of inflationary pressure because of its deficiencies in cheaply supplying the domestic market. In an underdeveloped country like Brazil, food was a basic component of the cost of living and therefore had a strong impact on the formation of real wages.45 In the 1950s 43 44

45

See Herbert S. Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna, “The development of a modern cellulose industry in South America,” Latin American Research Review, 57,(4) (2022). There occurred an intense debate for and against the model of growth adopted in the period of the “economic miracle.” Some of the principal works produced in this period are Delfim Netto, “Análise do comportamento recente Simonsen,” Inflação, gradualismo x tratamento de choque; Furtado, Análise do modelo brasileiro; Bonelli and Malan, “Os limites do possível”; Maria da Conceição Tavares and José Serra, “Mais além da estagnação”; Maria da Conceição Tavares, “Sistema financeiro e o ciclo de expansão recente,” in Belluzzo and Coutinho, eds., Desenvolvimento capitalista no Brasil: ensaios sobre a crise; Correa do Lago, “A retomada do crescimento”: 233–294; Barros de Castro and Pires de Souza, A Economia Brasileira em Marcha Forçada. On the debates concerning the factors which influenced the evolution of Brazilian agriculture see José Pastore, Guilherme L. Silva Dias and Manoel C. Castro, “Condicionantes da produtividade da pesquisa agrícola no Brasil,” Estudos Econômicos, 6(3) (1976): 147–181; Charles Mueller and George Martine, “Modernização agropecuária, emprego agrícola e êxodo rural no Brasil – a década de 1980,” Revista de Economia

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and 1960s the deficient structure of agriculture was identified as a major constraint to development since it restricted the expansion of productive forces and allowed the survival of a conservative and outdated power structure. From 1950 until the military coup of 1964, the proposed solution to the problem was land reform. The military governments ended the debate on land reform and began to encourage instead the modernization of agriculture. The goal was to have plenty of food at low cost, to free rural labor for urban industry and to open up international markets for agricultural production, using it to generate the foreign exchange needed for growth. The military support for agricultural modernization included abundant and subsidized credit. In 1965, the creation of the National Rural Credit (SNCR) provided substantial funding to farmers and represented the government’s main instrument in promoting agriculture. It also implemented a policy of guaranteed minimum prices and the purchase of buffer stocks, which were used to avoid large fluctuations in prices for producers and consumers. In 1973 the government created the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) which played a key role in the modernization of Brazilian agriculture through research on seeds, crops and soils.46 The subsidy in agricultural credit came from the setting of interest rates in nominal terms, usually below inflation. During the 1970s, the volume of credit multiplied by four, having its best year in 1979. This abundant and cheap government credit allowed producers to purchase equipment and supplies. In the 1970s, an industrial complex was established which supplied machinery, tools, fertilizers and pesticides to farmers. The demand generated by agricultural modernization was an important factor in the rapid industrial development of that period. Between 1960 and 1980, cultivated lands almost doubled from 25 million to 47 million

46

Política, 17(3) (1997): 85–104; Rodolfo Hoffmann, “Evolução da distribuição da posse de terra no Brasil no período 1960–80,” Reforma Agrária, 12(6) (1982): 17–34; Carlos Nayro Coelho, “70 anos de política agrícola no Brasil, 1931–2001,” Revista de Política Agrícola, 10(3) (2001): 695–726; Affonso Celso Pastore, “A resposta da produção agrícola aos preços no Brasil,” PhD thesis, USP, São Paulo, 1969; Alberto Passos Guimarães, Quatro séculos de latifúndio (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1977); and Ruy Muller Paiva, “Reflexões sobre as tendências da produção, da produtividade e dos preços do setor agrícola no Brasil,” in F. Sá ed., Agricultura subdesenvolvida (Petrópolis: Vozes, 1968); Lima, Pequena história territorial. José Garcia Gasques et al., Desempenho e crescimento do agronegócio no Brasil. Discussion paper 1009 (Brasília: Ipea, 2004); and Eliseu Alves, A Embrapa e a pesquisa agropecuária no Brasil (Brasília: Embrapa, 1980).

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hectares, and this was accompanied by increased mechanization. The performance of Brazilian agriculture in the period 1960–1980 represented the first leap into modernity, with increasing yields per hectare and a 2.6 multiplication in the volume of crops produced.47 Although the agricultural sector faced periods of crisis at the end of the twentieth century, growth continued. There were ongoing investments in new technology, and the continuous process of research and adaptation of crops to Brazilian conditions, led to new regions and new crops being exploited. Both production and productivity kept increasing decade after decade, and finally a new cereal zone, the Cerrado, came into full production. These changes would place Brazil in a prominent position in the international market of agricultural products from the early years of the twenty first century. But sustaining industrial and agricultural growth by subsidizing economic activity, produced high deficits in the current account balance which were financed by international resources that were still abundant. The result was a dramatic increase in foreign debt, which multiplied by four. The international interest rates exceeded 10 percent in 1979 and continued to rise for years to come. The annual service on the external debt went from less than US $1 billion in 1973 to US $5 billion in 1979 and doubled again in 1981. By then interest payments of foreign debt accounted for half the value of all exports. This set the stage for a Brazilian foreign debt crisis in the context of an international financial market crisis. Inflation resumed its upward trend, rising past 50 percent per annum in 1979. To stimulate the search for external financial resources, the government greatly increased the domestic interest rates. As the state was the main investor, it also became the largest receiver of resources from abroad. Already the private sector, despite the more favorable credit conditions abroad, gradually reduced its liabilities in foreign currency, decreased its investments and avoided taking on a currency risk in a period of strong external fluctuations. When the last military government was installed in 1979, the country was already extremely vulnerable, as it was about to face the second oil shock. In this second oil shock of 1979, the international markets drastically reduced their supply of resources to debtor countries. In late 1979, the government decreed a devaluation of 30 percent and adopted 47

On the process of the modernization of agriculture see Klein and Luna, Feeding the World.

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227

a heterodox policy of fixed exchange rates and monetary correction. There was rapid and considerable growth, but inflation soon reached 100 percent. The deficit in current accounts exceeded 5 percent of GDP and reserves declined. By the early 1980s, the government was finally forced to reduce domestic consumption in a traditional conservative retraction in the context of the Mexican debt crisis of 1982. It was the beginning of the “debt crisis” that would last the entire decade and affect almost all Latin American countries, which were forced to restructure their foreign debt. This broke the long trajectory of growth which these countries had experienced during most of the second half of the twentieth century. By the late 1980s, Brazil tried to reduce domestic demand, to balance external accounts and contain inflation. It reduced bank lending, used real interest rates and restricted public investment. Numerous subsidies were eliminated and tougher legislation was used to correct salaries. These measures provoked a deep recession, with GDP falling by 4.3 percent. This was the first negative growth rate of this type in the post-1945 period. The trade balance was again positive, but the balance of payments was still badly affected by debt servicing and Brazil’s net reserves were exhausted. The country could be characterized as insolvent in external terms. Brazil was forced to sign a formal agreement with the IMF in February 1983, but the economic situation continued to worsen. High inflation and indexing made it almost impossible to meet the demands of the IMF. The government was forced to deepen the recession, devalue the currency and GDP declined by 2.9 percent. The strong domestic adjustment combined with favorable international conditions helped Brazil attain the external goals agreed to with the IMF until 1984. Inflation, however, reached a new level, exceeding 200 percent in that year.48 These were the problems inherited by the democratic government which came to power in 1985. The economic crisis deepened and inflation became explosive under the new civilian rule. The end of 48

Dionísio Dias Carneiro and Eduardo Modiano, “Ajuste externo e desequilíbrio interno: 1980–1984,” in Marcelo de P. Abreu, ed., A ordem do progresso (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1992): 323–346; Mario Henrique Simonsen, “Inflação brasileira: lições e perspectivas,” Revista Brasileira de Economia, 5(4) (1985): 15–31; Winston Fritsch, “A crise cambial de 1982–83 no Brasil: origens e respostas,” in Carlos Alberto Plastino and Roberto Bouzas, eds., A América latina e a crise internacional (Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1985); Rogério Werneck, “Poupança estatal, dívida externa e crise financeira do setor público,” Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 16(3) (1986).

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military rule and democratic openness made it difficult to maintain recessive measures and the wage squeeze. The public accounts were in poor condition and both the federal government as well as the states had difficulties in honoring their commitments. Monthly inflation was now above 10 percent. These facts led the implementation of monetary reform of February 28, 1986, known as the Cruzado Plan, which changed the system of national currency, froze all prices, including exchange rates, and eliminated indexing. The plan was initially successful. But stability lasted only a few months, as the plan had been carried out without the previous solution of economic issues, such as fiscal imbalance, trade deficit and a crisis in the balance of payments. By 1987, Brazil was forced to suspend foreign debt service and to enforce a moratorium. The crisis which began in the mid1970s thus ended one of the most extraordinary periods of growth in Brazilian History.49 The years between the 1880s and the 1980s also saw profound changes in the health and structure of the population of Brazil. Cholera, yellow fever and plague epidemics hit the country in waves throughout the nineteenth century and finally forced the elite to commit to updating the major ports, and modernizing the principal cities. A new modern city, Belo Horizonte the capital of Minas Gerais, was created by Brazilian engineers and architects along European lines in 1896, and in the first decade of the new century both Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were modernized in the sense of rebuilding the colonial and imperial cities by creating avenues, canalizing rivers, building plazas and public buildings and effectively rezoning the cities and its suburbs. Many of the ideas behind these reforms were oriented towards public health, with the aim of reducing disease and involved the destruction of slums and inadequate housing.50 This was especially seen as an urgent necessity as the public health problems of Brazil increased with the massive 49

50

Eduardo Modiano, “A ópera dos três cruzados: 1985–1989”: 347–386; João Sayad, Planos cruzado e real: acertos e desacertos. Seminários Dimac (Rio de Janeiro: Ipea, 2000); Maria Silva Bastos Marques, “O Plano Cruzado: teoria e prática,” Revista de Economia Política, 8(3) (1983): 101–130; Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, “Inflação inercial e o Plano Cruzado,” Revista de Economia Política, 6(3) (1986): 9–24; Bacha, “Moeda, inércia e conflito”: 1–16; J. M. Rego, Inflação inercial, teoria sobre inflação e o Plano Cruzado (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1986). Several articles of the Plano Cruzado are found in Revista de Economia Política, 6(3) (1986): 121–151. Juliana de Souza Fonseca, “Capitalidade e civilização na reforma urbana de Pereira Passos (1902–1906),” Master’s thesis, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2007.

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influx of European and Asian immigrants, just as it had a half century earlier with the arrival of African slaves.51 The final acceptance of both the germ theory and the programs of the sanitation movement combined with ideas of modern urban planning led to these changes and to the adoption of mass vaccinations against yellow fever, smallpox and other diseases.52 Even before the end of the empire, the imperial government in 1886 required the sending of sanitary inspectors to all the provinces. Under the republic, the state of São Paulo developed institutions and practices in public health well ahead of the other states and even most countries of Latin America.53 There was also a major advance in the scientific institutions in Brazil. As a response to the outbreak of bubonic plague in the port of Santos in 1899, the Instituto Butantan was established there to develop serum and vaccines and to undertake investigations.54 Two biology laboratories were created in 1892, which today form the research center Instituto Adolfo Lutz.55 In turn, the federal government set up another laboratory to prepare serum and a vaccine in Rio de Janeiro which in turn was expanded into the Instituto Manguinhos in 1903 and Oswaldo Cruz eventually became its director.56 All of these activities in Brazil were similar to developments in most of the European and North America port cities in the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth century. Provision of clean drinking water, control of sewage, elimination of slums, mass inoculations, education about hygiene and the pasteurization of milk, 51

52 53

54 55

56

Tamás Szmrecsányi, “Origens da liderança científica e tecnológica paulista no século XX,” Revista Gestão & Conexões [Vitória], 2(2) (2013): 181–206. Mascarenhas, also affirms that an epidemiological crisis faced the new republican leaders of the state and required immediate response. Mascarenhas, “História da saúde pública”: 3–19. Jaime Larry Benchimol, “A instituição da microbiologia e a história da saúde pública no Brasil,” Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 5 (2000): 265–292. Blount, “The public health movement in São Paulo”: 2. Also see his essay “A administração da saúde pública no estado de São Paulo”: 2; Rodolpho Telarolli Junior, “Poder e saúde. A república, a febre amarela e a formação dos serviços sanitários no Estado de São Paulo,” PhD thesis, Faculdade de Ciências Médicas da Unicamp, Campinas, 1993: 263–264. See Regina C. Gualtieri, “Instituto Butantan e a saúde pública (São Paulo: 1911–1927),” Master’s thesis, FE-USP, São Paulo, 1994. Adolfo Lutz was the pioneer to the Instituto Bacteriológico de São Paulo. See “Contribuição à história da medicina no Brasil, segundo dos relatórios do Dr. Adolpho Lutz,” www.scielo.br/pdf/mioc/v39n2/tomo39(f2)_177-189.pdf. Henrique de Beaurepaire Aragão, “Noticia histórica sobre a fundação do lnstituto Oswaldo Cruz (Instituto de Manguinhos),” Memórias do Instituto Oswaldo Cruz, 48 (1950): 1–5; Jaime Larry Benchimol, “A instituição da microbiologia e a história da saúde pública no Brasil,” Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 5 (2000): 265–292.

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all helped reduce infant mortality and thus extended the average life expectancy of the population throughout this period. In the case of Brazil, with life expectancy lower than Europe, this change proceeded at a much slower pace and took longer to have an impact on the national population. By the beginning of the twentieth century Brazil still had a high crude death and infant mortality rate compared to western Europe and even to some of the advanced countries of South America.57 For most of the century, the infant mortality rate had the most impact on life expectancy. In 1872, that mortality rate was 257 deaths of infants under one year old per thousand live births and it took another two decades for the infant mortality to fall below 200 deaths per thousand live births.58 By 1910, IBGE estimates that life expectancy for the population was 34.6 years, which increased to only 37.3 years in 1930, a time when infant mortality was still 162 deaths per thousand live births. For most of the twentieth century, primary mortality occurred in the earliest ages and was largely due to infectious diseases and malnutrition. Before the widespread use of antibiotics in the 1930s and 1940s, vaccination, pasteurization and modern water and sewage systems were the cause of the steady mortality decline in all of Latin America.59 By the end of the century, cardiovascular diseases and strokes had replaced dysentery and infectious diseases as the main causes of death in the nation and began to affect adult mortality rates as well.60 All these changes had a dramatic impact on life expectancy as can be seen in the changes from 1939/1941 to 1995/2000 (see Graph 6.8). For all their improvements, these rates were below those in Argentina and Uruguay.61 In a classic pattern, mortality declined at a faster rate than fertility which remained quite high until the 1960s. This pre-demographic

57

58 59 60 61

In contrast, it has been estimated that in 1905, life expectancy in Argentina, probably the best in Latin America, had already reached 39.4 for men and 40.7 years for women – a good 10 to 15 years more than in Brazil at this time. de Lattes and Lattes, La población de Argentina: 49, table 2.7. Arriaga, New life tables: 29–35, III-3–III-6. Also see Elza Berquó, “Demographic evolution of the Brazilian population”: 13–33. Eduardo E. Arriaga and Kingsley Davis, “The pattern of mortality change in Latin America,” Demography, 6(3) (1969): 226. Mortality data at http://svs.aids.gov.br/dantps/centrais-de-conteudos/paineis-demonitoramento/mortalidade/gbd-brasil/principais-causas/. In 1905, life expectancy in Argentina for both sexes combined was already 40 years an increase of 7.2 years since 1883, de Lattes and Lattes, eds., La Población de Argentina: 40, table 2.4.

Industrialization and Urbanization 80 70

71.88

73.52

64.13

66.39

Years of Life to Live

60 50 40

52.19 45.21 46.62

231

69.97

Males 1995–2000

62.83

Females 1995–2000

54.51

Males 1939/41 Females 1939/41

48.54

39.71

30 20 10 0 0

1

5

10

15

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

YEAR OF CURRENT AGE

Rates per 1,000 resident population

Graph 6.8  Average life expectancy by gender 1939–1941 and 1995–2000. Source: IBGE, Estatística do Século XX, Table “Saúde1952AEB-02” and CELADE, Boletin Demografico, no. 74 55 50

47

47

46

46

45

45

45

44

44

44 38

40 35 30

33

30

32 28

27

26

26

25

21

20

24 20

21

15

15

9

10

9

7

7

5 1881 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1945 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Natural Increase

CBR

CDR

Graph 6.9  Crude birth (CBR) and death rate (CDR) and natural increase 1881–2000. Source: IBGE, CD 109 and POP 201 and 261, https:// seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br/lista_tema.aspx?op=0&no=10

transition pattern had the effect of increasing natural population growth to even higher levels during the mid-twentieth century even as birth rates fell dramatically (see Graph 6.9). It was these very high levels of fertility along with declining mortality, which fueled the population’s high rate of natural growth. It has been estimated that in 1903 the average number of children being born to

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women in the 14 to 49 age cohort was close to seven children.62 This meant that the crude birth rate was something like 46 to 47 births per thousand of resident population, which was well above the crude death rate.63 This difference guaranteed that the population was growing at a very impressive 2.3 percent in the last quarter of nineteenth century and up to 2.9 percent annually by the 1960s.64 Few countries in the world in the nineteenth century grew as rapidly as Brazil. An average growth rate of 2.3 percent per annum after 1870, meant that the population was doubling every thirty years.65 Given the high and relatively stable level of fertility in the first half of the century, Brazil had one of the youngest populations in the world. Already in in the census of 1890 those under 19 years of age represented 51 percent of the total population, and their share rose to 55 percent of the national population in 1900 and 57 percent by the census of 1920.66 By 1950, the average age of the population had declined to eighteen years of age as ever more infants and children survived early mortality. Because of this high native fertility, European immigration to Brazil had only a moderate impact on national population growth, as compared to its impact in Canada and Argentina in the same period.67 Brazil was more like the United States in this respect, since immigration accounted for less than 10 percent of the total growth in both countries in the century from 1841 to 1940.68 The mid-century 2.99 percent growth rate would have meant that the national population would double in the next twenty-three years, but this did not occur. The rate of growth declined to below 2 percent per annum between 1980 and 1990 and by the end of the century it was down to 1.17 percent per annum.69 The cause for this dramatic drop in the growth rate was the abrupt decline of fertility after 1960 which was due to the introduction of contraceptives. In 1903 the peak age for births was the 62

63 64 65 66

67 68 69

Cláudia Júlia Guimarães Horta, José Alberto Magno de Carvalho, and Luís Armando de Medeiros Frias, “Recomposição da fecundidade por geração para Brasil e regiões: atualização e revisão.” Paper presented at Anais do ABEP 2000, table 6. Mortara, “The development and structure of Brazil’s population”: 122. Mortara, “The development and structure of Brazil’s population”: 122; and Berquó, “Demographic evolution of the Brazilian population,” 13, table 1. Merrick and Graham, Population and Economic Development in Brazil: 30–31. Calculated from IBGE, Estatísticas históricas do Brasil, vol. 3, “Séries Econômicas, Demográficas e Sociais de 1550 a 1988” (2nd rev. edn and updated), 31, table 1.6 “População presente, segundo o sexo e os grupos de idade – 1872–1920.” All figures are only for the population whose age is known. Merrick and Graham, Population and Economic Development: 37. Merrick and Graham, Population and Economic Development: 38–39. IBGE, Pop 209 at https://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br/lista_tema.aspx?op=0&no=10.

Births per thousand women in age cohort

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0.4 0.35

1903

0.3 0.25 0.2 2000

0.15 0.1 0.05 0 15 to 19

20 to 24

25 to 29

30 to 34

35 to 39

40 to 44

45 to 49

Graph 6.10  Age-specific fertility 1903 and 2000. Source: Horta et al., “Recomposicao da fecundidade por geração para Brasil,” Anais XII, ABEP 2000; 2000 from DATASUS, http://tabnet .datasus.gov.br/cgi/idb2012/a06.htm

cohort of women aged 25 to 29, and the second highest was the 30 to 34 years age cohort, and significant levels of births occurred to women in their forties especially given the average number of children. This was the pattern for most of the century. But all this changed in 1960 with the introduction of oral contraceptives. By 2000, the leading cohort of women giving birth dropped to 20 to 24 age cohort with the 15–19 age cohort now increasing their relative share of births. The total fertility rate in 1903 was 6.9 children, one of the highest in the Americas at that time and by 2000 it was 2.4 children.70 This was a typical pattern in this early phase of demographic transition, as it was older women who often had several children who first used these methods to cut down on unwanted pregnancies (see Graph 6.10). But this decline in fertility did not stop and affected all age groups. By 2003, the total fertility rate had fallen to less than 2.1 births, meaning births were no longer outpacing deaths, and by 2020 the fertility rate was down to 1.7 births, a rate not that different from the United States and the northern European countries.71 With fewer births, the average age of the population progressively increased to twenty-three years of age in 1995, and correspondingly the share of the population fourteen years of age and younger went from 65 percent of the population in 1900 to just 33 percent of the total national 70

71

The Total Fertility Rate for 1903 was calculated from table 6 of Horta et al., “Recomposição da fecundidade,” https://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br/series.aspx?no=10&op= 0&vcodigo=POP263&t=taxa-fecundidade-total. World Bank, World Development indicators, at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=BR.

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population in 1995.72 These patterns of transition from high mortality and high fertility to low fertility and lower mortality which occurred over the course of this crucial century are reflected in the perfect pyramid shape of the population in 1900 and the more truncated base and slower decline of population in all adult ages of the Brazilian population in 1995 (see Graph 6.11). These basic alterations in fertility and mortality, which were intense in the last half of the twentieth century, and were also accompanied by basic changes in the law in this period which eliminated the concept of illegitimacy for births, legalized cohabitation and expanded the grounds for divorce which further had an impact. All of these developments would have a profound effect on education, marriage, household organization and the role of women in Brazilian society. Although civil marriage was established in Brazil in 1891 and divorce was made legally possible, the conditions for such a divorce were quite limited. Only in 1977 was full divorce granted, but remarriage was only permitted one more time for the now officially “separated” partners. Finally in the Constitution of 1988 full rights to divorce and remarriage were established which were then incorporated into the Civil Code of 2002.73 Consensual unions received legal recognition in the Constitution of 1988 and in the so-called stable union law of 1996.74 This guaranteed to these “stable couples” all the traditional rights of inheritance and legal separation held by legally married couples which also included all property arrangements. As important was the equating of the legal rights of illegitimate children with all legitimate children, which only occurred in 1977 and was expanded in the Constitution of 1988.75 72 73

74

75

UN, Population Division, table “POP/5: Median age by region, subregion and country, 1950–2100 (years),” https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/. “A trajetória do divórcio no Brasil: a consolidação do estado democrático de direito,” https://ibdfam.jusbrasil.com.br/noticias/2273698/a-trajetoria-do-divorcio-nobrasil-a-consolidacao-do-estado-democratico-de-direito. The constitution of 1988 was the act which finally recognized the legality of consensual unions, www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicaocompilado.htm. This was further amplified in 1996 in the so called União Estável law (lei 9.278), www .planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L9278.htm. See also Jamil Salim Amin, “A união estável no Brasil a partir da constituição federal de 1988 e leis posteriores,” Master’s thesis, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina – UFSC, Florianópolis 2001. On the rights of children born outside of a formal marriage, the big change came in 1977 with the recognition and inheritance rights of such children which was further re-enforced by the Constitution of 1988 (art. 227, § 6º). Mafalda Lucchese, “Filhos – evolução até a plena igualdade jurídica,” www.emerj.tjrj.jus.br/serieaperfeicoamentodemagistrados/ paginas/series/13/volumeI/10 anosdocodigocivil_231.pdf.

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235

1900 80 + 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 0–4 10

8

6

4

2

0 Men

2 Women

4

6

8

10

4

6

8

10

1995 80+ 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 0–4 10

8

6

4

2 Men

0

2 Women

Graph 6.11  Age pyramid of Brazilian population in 1900 and 1995. Source: CEBRAP (1974: 77), https://statistics.cepal.org/portal/cepalstat/dashboard .html?lang=es

The consequence of all these demographic and legal changes has also been matched by changes in attitude towards what constitutes a traditional family and what the role of women should be in the labor force. Household size for example declined, from 5.1 persons in 1950 to just

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3.8 persons in 2000, a decline which would continue into the next century which was due to declines in fertility.76 But also what constituted a traditional family also changed. In 1950, households were still predominantly formed by a married couple, but by 2000 they were no longer the norm. Between the middle and the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century, there was dramatic changes for both genders in the civil status of persons eighteen years of age and above in terms of marriages, and consensual unions. The traditional married family by 2010 was a minority institution among both men and women and consensual unions have increased dramatically (see Table 6.3). The societal changes are also reflected in who is head of household. In 1960, only 8 percent of households of any type were headed by a woman. But in each subsequent census this increased steadily with women in 2010 heading 37 percent of all households. Of these female-headed households in 2010, a surprising 24 percent were living with a spouse, up from 4 percent in 2000, clearly indicating the increasing importance of women in the labor market, and another third were either single or widowed. Another major demographic trend in the twentieth century was a massive internal migration and a shift from rural to urban residence. An expanding industry and agricultural mechanization were the factors which explain these internal migrations and the rise of cities throughout the nation. While the European and Asian migrations slowed considerably after the 1930s an even greater migration began from the 1920s onward of native-born Brazilians migrating to cities and to other regions of the country. Rural workers, the predominant labor face until almost the end of the century, began moving off the land from the poor states of the Northeast to those of the Southeast. The expanding urban and industrial economy of the southeastern states sought an everlarger number of workers after the 1940s. Slowly but steady the North and Northeastern states lost population to all the other regions of the country. They even lost migrants to the North and Center-West regions as roads were opened up to these fertile virgin lands77 These regional 76

77

Recenseamento Geral de 1950, Serie Nacional, vol. 1, 280; and IBGE, Sidra, table 156. By the census of 2010 the number dropped to 3.3 persons. Whereas 5 percent of households were single-person households, by 2010 15 percent were in this category. Here and elsewhere we are using the current definition of regions, which was adopted with the 1970 census. The major difference from earlier regional definitions is that Bahia and Sergipe are now part of the northeast region, and the new southeastern region now included the states of Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais and São Paulo. All the states included in each region can be seen in Maps 1.1 and 1.2 in the preceding text.

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Table 6.3  Civil status of Brazilians aged eighteen and older 1960–2010 Year

Men

Women

Total

59% 55% 53% 50% 42% 39%

59% 56% 54% 51% 44% 40%

Married 1960 1970 1980 1991 2000 2010

58% 56% 55% 53% 45% 41%

Consensual union 1960 1970 1980 1991 2000 2010

2% 2% 5% 9% 14% 17%

2% 2% 5% 8% 13% 16%

2% 2% 5% 8% 13% 16%

Source: Ipums sample of Brazilian censuses

immigrants were joined as well by intrastate migrants who moved from the rural areas to the cities in ever-increasing numbers. Between 1890 and 1950, the population of the capital cities of the states rose from 1.3 million to close to 8.2 million persons, and the two leading cities of the country grew rapidly in this same period.78 Rio de Janeiro, the federal capital, went from half a million to 2.4 million, but even more rapid was the expansion of the city of São Paulo, which went from 65,000 in 1890 to 2.2 million in 1950.79 As late as 1950, the census estimated the urban population of Brazil was still a minority, accounting for only 36 percent of the total population. By 2000, the ratio figure rose to 81 percent.80 Not only did the largest capital cities grow, but so did secondary cities in all the states. In 1992 for example, there were twenty-seven cities in Brazil with over a half a million population of which eleven had over a million persons. By 2021, there were 78 79 80

IBGE, Estatística do Seculo XX, Table “pop_1976aeb-009.” IBGE, Estatística do Seculo XX, Table “pop_1976aeb-009.” IBGE, POP122, http://seriesestatisticas.ibge.gov.br/series.aspx?vcodigo=POP122&sv= 33&t=taxa-de-urbanizacao.

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now forty-eight cities with over half a million population, of which seventeen now had over a million residents.81 The leading coffee exporting and immigrant importing states at mid-century were São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Paraná which between them absorbed 2 million native-born immigrants in 1950 and steadily increased their intake to 7.2 million by 1980. In turn, the leading out-migration states of Bahia, Pernambuco and Minas Gerais between them lost 1.5 million residents in 1950, with emigration increasing in each subsequent decade and reaching 5.8 million by 1980. Besides these North to South migrations, there was a major movement of southerners from Rio Grande do Sul to new agricultural lands opening up in the far North and Center-West, and these regions steadily gained population in this period especially after the construction of Brasília.82 By the census of 1980 it was estimated that 46 million Brazilians out of the 119 million resided in a municipality other than the one they were born in – or some 39 percent of the total population.83 This reflected the fact that there was a massive movement of rural workers to urban centers even within regions. It is estimated that 27 million rural workers migrated to urban centers between 1960 and 1980 and another 5.5 million rural persons migrated in the 1990s. Because of this migration, the ratio and then the total numbers of rural workers steadily declined. The number of rural persons grew throughout most of the twentieth century, and reached a peak of 41 million persons in 1970 (when they accounted for 44 percent of the total population). In the next decade, the rural population declined to 38.5 million persons and by 2000 it was down to 31.8 million, and now represented just 19 percent of the national population.84

81 82

83 84

IBGE estimates found at www.ibge.gov.br/en/statistics/social/population/18448-estimatesof-resident-population-for-municipalities-and-federation-units.html?=&t=downloads. A useful survey of this vast movement and its changing patterns and numbers is found in Fausto Brito, “Final de século: a transição para um novo padrão migratório?” Paper presented at the XII Encontro Nacional de Estudos Populacionais, ABEP (2000); and Fausto Brito, Ricardo Alexandrino Garcia and Renata G. Vieira de Souza, “As tendências recentes das migrações interestaduais e o padrão migratório,” XIV Encontro Nacional de Estudos Populacionais, ABEP (2004). IBGE, Censo Demográfico de 1980, vol. 1, part 4, 1 “Dados gerais-migração-instrução-​ fecundidade-mortalidade” (Rio de Janeiro, 1983): table 2.4 IBGE, Estatísticas do Século XX (2003), table pop_S2T03ab; and Ana Amélia Camarano and Ricardo Abramovay, Êxodo rural, envelhecimento e masculinização no brasil: panorama dos últimos 50 anos, Texto para discussão no. 621 (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 1999): 3, table 2.

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Aside from reducing the importance of rural labor in the national labor market, this migration also had a profound effect on reducing the inequalities between urban and rural areas as well as the differences between regions, and as these regional and urban/rural inequalities declined, migration slowed. Opportunities for a better life became more equal among the regions, a pattern especially marked in social and educational conditions if not in salaries in the last quarter of the century and the beginnings of the new century.85 Although the migration was driven by opening up of unskilled and skilled jobs in the cities of Brazil and the introduction of machinery in agriculture, migrants were also attracted by the services available in the cities. One of the most important of these services was education. Brazil by the standards of the Americas was one of the least educationally developed countries in the hemisphere, on a par with the poorest. This was because Brazil for most of its imperial and early republican history provided little public education for its population even by Latin American standards. But after the founding of the republic in 1899, there was a major investment in primary schooling in Brazil. Brazil thereafter experienced the most rapid change in its literacy rates between 1899 and 1933 of any Latin American country.86 But it was not until 1960 that both men and women were predominately literate (56 percent of the men and 51 percent of the women) and it was not until 2000 that women equaled men in literacy.87 But despite this impressive growth, Brazil’s literacy rate was only 86 percent of persons nineteen years of age and older in 2000, the same as that of Bolivia.88 Although there had been slow but steady progress in the development of primary and secondary education before 1964, it was during the 85

86

87 88

On convergence of wages, see Cézar Santos and Pedro Cavalcanti Ferreira, “Migração e distribuição regional de renda no Brasil,” Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 37(3) (2007): 405–426; Ricardo Paes de Barros, Samuel Franco, and Rosane Mendonça, Discriminação e segmentação no mercado de trabalho e desigualdade de renda no Brasil. Discussion paper 1288 (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 2007); and Rodolfo Hoffmann, “Transferências de renda e a redução da desigualdade no Brasil e cinco regiões entre 1997 e 2004,” Econômica, 8(1) (2006): 55–81. On the debate over regional convergence see André Braz Golgher, Lízia de Figueiredo and Roberto Santolin, “Migration and economic growth in Brazil: empirical applications based on the Solow-Swan model,” The Developing Economies, 49(2) (2011): 148–170. André Martínez Fritscher, Aldo Musacchio and Martina Viareng, “The great leap forward: the political economy of education in Brazil, 1889–1930,” Master’s thesis, Harvard Business School, Cambridge, MA. Working papers 10-075 [2010]:2, www .hbs.edu/research/pdf/10-075.pdf. IBGE, Censo Demografico de 1960, Serie Nacional, vol. I: 16, table 10. CEPAL, Anuario Estádistico, 2001: 42, table 33.

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military period that major investments occurred in these two educational areas. In 1960, 73 percent of the children aged five to nine attended primary school, and this figure rose to 89 percent by 1968.89 But it was secondary and university education which received major investments and whose enrollments were growing faster than the national population in the period from 1960 to 1980.90 Between 1963 and 1984 the number of secondary school enrollments increased from 1.7 million to 3 million students. There was also a big change in the role the government now played in secondary education. In 1963, some 60 percent of the secondary students were enrolled in private secondary schools, but by 1984 this was reversed and now 65 percent of the students were enrolled in public schools.91 These approximately 3 million secondary school students now made up 22 percent of all children aged fifteen to nineteen, up from just 12 percent of this age group enrolled in 1972.92 This was also a period when the government invested heavily in science and technology for the first time in its history. CAPES and CNPQ both expanded and sent thousands of students for advanced training abroad all of which would greatly improve the quality of national universities. The expansion of the secondary schools also led to a slow expansion of university students. By 1984, there were sixty-seven universities in Brazil, thirty five federal ones, ten state universities, two municipal ones and twenty private institutions and the university student population expanded from 142,000 in 1964 to 1.3 million in 1984, with women slightly outnumbering men.93 The percentage of youths aged between twenty and twenty-four years of age who were in tertiary educational institutions – universities and technical schools – rose from just 2 percent in 1965 to 12 percent in 1985.94 The rapid growth of education and industrialization in the second half of the twentieth century had a profound impact on social mobility. There was an enormous increase in skilled and unskilled jobs in the expanding 89 90 91 92 93

94

Ribeiro, “Estructura de classe e mobilidade social”: 309, table 4. Simon Schwartzman, A Space for Science – The Development of the Scientific Community in Brazil (College Station: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991): table 10. These numbers come from Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, 1964: 341–342, and Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, 1986: 174–175. Ribeiro, “Estrutura de classe e mobilidade social”: 309, tabela 4. Carlos Benedito Martins, “O ensino superior brasileiro nos anos 90,” São Paulo em Perspectiva, 14(1) (2000): 42, 43, 48, tables 1 and 4, 43, 48; Schartzman, A Space for Science, table 10; and for the breakdown by gender see Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, 1984: 251, table 2.6. Ribeiro, “Estrutura de classe e mobilidade social, tabelas”: 309, tables 4 and 5.

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urban centers. Whereas mobility had been largely circular before 1960 due to the relatively fixed number of occupational positions, it would become structural in this period due to a major increase in new managerial and other high-status positions and even a vast expansion of urban semi-skilled and unskilled jobs. These were now filled by persons whose parents had been low-status rural workers. It was argued at the time that Brazil had probably the world’s highest levels of elite leaders with low-status parents of any major industrial country.95 The relative stagnation of the economy in the post-1980 period would mean that the nation would quickly return to more standard circular mobility for the rest of the century with each class gaining and losing members at roughly the same rate.96 Moreover, once these upper-level positions were filled, it was possible to maintain them through growth of the elite, rather than from continued recruitment from below, which further restricted mobility. As late as 1973, some 71 percent of the workers had parents who came from rural areas, which meant that the majority of workers came from poor and poorly educated families.97 But this ratio quickly declined in the following decades. Surprisingly women had more mobility than men, in relation to parents’ and children’s occupation (intergenerational) but did less well than men in changing their status from first to last job in their own lifetimes (intra-generation).98 95

Pastore estimated that as of 1973, more than half (58 percent) of all sons had changed their status from their fathers’ occupations. He then estimated that of these changes, 57 percent were due to the expansion of new jobs (structural) and 43 percent to circular mobility, which is the normal movement up and down without being related to any increase in jobs. José Pastore, Inequality and Social Mobility in Brazil (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982): 33. 96 This model of circular and structure mobility is the predominant model used in the literature. Recently, newer studies have begun to use more complex occupational distributions than previously and have replaced this model with a new methodology that is called “social fluidity,” which measures total mobility (intra- and intergenerational) and seeks to measure immobility in a more refined way. But these new measures confirm that after 1982 immobility returned to the upper levels of the occupational structure which had previously seen the most mobility. See Ribeiro, “Estrutura de classe e mobilidade social,” 199. Using this new methodology, Ribeiro also suggests that while elite and middle-rank mobility was high for those with rural backgrounds in this period, overall mobility in Brazil was about average for an advanced industrial country throughout this period. This is because the mobility of urban workers to middle- and upper-class occupations was either very low or just average by advanced country standards. Ribeiro, “Estrutura de classe e mobilidade social”: 251, 253, and 255, 258, tables 18–19. 97 Ribeiro, “Estructura de classe e mobilidade social”: 77, 79. 98 Using an alternative set of occupational categories Maria Scalon estimates that women had far more mobility than men. She finds in the 1988 PNAD survey that a third of the mobility of men was structural and a surprising 46 percent of female mobility

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Not  surprisingly, whites did better than non-whites in terms of both types of mobility, though this discrimination seems to have declined over time.99 Thus while mobility was impressive in this period, at least in the upper levels of the occupational structure, the majority of workers found themselves locked into lower-status positions with relatively lower mobility in later years due to their poor starting position in terms of human capital. Using wages rather than occupations, a recent study found that Brazil now had far less mobility than before. It also found that the greatest mobility occurred at the bottom of the wage scale, largely as a result of universal primary education, which lessened the impact of fathers’ wages on sons’ wages. This favored non-white rates of mobility. But at the top of the wage scale (the top quintile), immobility was more pronounced, with race reversed. Here, the probability of a white man maintaining his father’s level of income was 50 percent compared to sons of rich black fathers whose probability of staying in the elite was only 25 percent.100 With women in the late twentieth century finally equalizing the level of education of males and progressively increasing their share of tertiary education as well, there has been a profound change in women participating in the labor force. Whereas women were less educated than men throughout the imperial and old republican periods, they finally caught up to men in completing primary education by 1970. By 1980, they were ahead of males in completing secondary schooling. By 1991, they were ahead of males at all levels up to university and by 2000 they had a higher ratio of university completion than men.101 But women have been slower to match men in the labor force. Until recently, women were excluded from major areas of the economy and had been concentrated in domestic service and lower skilled jobs with incomes lower than their male counterparts. But the decline of was structural – with total mobility for men being 65 percent and for women 76 percent in this period. She also shows that intrageneration mobility – that is between a person’s first and last jobs – is less flexible than the intergeneration mobility between parents’ and children’s occupations, Maria Celi Scalon, Mobilidade social no Brasil, padrões e tendências (Rio de Janeiro: Rena, IUPERJ-UCAM, 1999): 85, 102. On the findings about intra- and inter-generational mobility and gender, also based on this same 1988 PNAD survey, see Felícia Picanço, “O Brasil que sobe e desce: uma análise da mobilidade socioocupacional e realização de êxito no mercado de trabalho urbano,” DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais, 50(2) (2007): 403, 405, tables 1 and 5. 99 Picanço, “O Brasil que sobe e desce”: 404, 406, tables 4 and 6. 100 Sérgio Guimarães Ferreira and Fernando A. Veloso, “Intergenerational mobility of wages in Brazil,” Brazilian Review of Econometrics, 26(2) (November 2006): 181–211. 101 Data generated from the IPUMS 5 percent sample of Brazilian census 1960–2000.

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fertility after 1960 along with the increasing education and longevity of women offered a potential demographic bonus for Brazil if they could be incorporated into the labor force.102 It was their delaying of childbearing which allowed women both to enter the labor market and also obtain more education and this would eventually lead to delayed births and to older ages of mothers at first births in the following century. In the census of 1950 the female labor participation rate, that is women working as a percentage of all women of working age, was only 14 percent at a time when the male participation rate was 81 percent of working age men. This female participation rate was virtually the same as in the census of 1920 (14 percent) and even in 1970 it had only risen to 18 percent. But by the census of 2000, the female participation rate increased to 44 percent and the male rate declined to 69 percent.103 In the first half of the twentieth century, women primarily worked as agricultural laborers or domestic servants, but by the second half of the century women steadily increased their participation in industry as well as the professions. The ratio of domestic workers among women has significantly declined as they shifted into all the other sectors of the economy. At current trends, all indicators suggest that in the future many prestigious fields will be dominated by women, much as this has been occurring in all advanced industrial societies. Although all educational and demographic indices were changing for all Brazilians in the middle decades of the century, the sharp regional contrasts that reflected class and race differences in access to resources have changed more slowly. The classic pattern of a nation divided between an advanced and retarded region, was what one economist called “Belindia.” That is one area of the country was more like Belgium in its vital statistics while another part was similar to India.104 This 102

103

104

For a discussion of the demographic bonus in the Brazilian context see José Eustáquio Diniz Alves, “Crise no mercado de trabalho, bônus demográfico e desempoderamento feminino,” in Nathalie Reis Itaboraí and Arlene Martinez Ricoldi, eds., Até onde caminhou a revolução de gênero no Brasil? Implicações demográficas e questões sociais (Belo Horizonte: ABEP ebook, 2016): 23. Adriana Strasburg de Camargo Andrade, “Mulher e trabalho no Brasil dos anos 90,” PhD thesis, Universidade de Campinas, Campinas, 2004: 61, table 01. These rates were comparable to other Latin American nations but less than the Western European and North American rates which went from the upper 50s to the lower 70s. See OECD Stat, https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R#. See Edmar L. Bacha and Herbert S. Klein, ed., Social Change in Brazil 1945–1985: The Incomplete Transformation (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989): 3.

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regional variation is quite evident in the data on life expectancy even as late as 1980.105 Thus the difference in life expectancy from the worst region to the best region was a startling 7.9 years for men and the same for women. This regional difference reflected class differences that even within regions clearly marked differential life experiences for Brazilians. In this same year, the difference in life expectancy for those with one minimum salary and those who received five minimum salaries or more was a startling 14.8 years.106 Like gender, color was another major factor defining the Brazilian population since the introduction of African slavery in the sixteenth century. For all the mobility of African and Afro-Brazilians which occurred before and after the abolition of slavery in 1888, color still remains an important, if not always a precise, marker of class and status in Brazil. To confuse things even more, Brazil went from a primarily non-white society in 1872 to a primarily white society in 1900 after the massive immigration of millions of European and Asian immigrants. It remained a predominantly white nation until the latest census of 2010 when it once more became a primarily non-white society and will continue to be primarily a non-white society for the foreseeable future. Clearly the census of 1940 was the peak year for whites and the nadir for the browns (or pardos). Since that time there has been a steady rise of browns (pardos) and a relative decline of whites – with no significant differences in fertility accounting for these changes. Of course increasing racial inter-marriage would have an impact on the growth of the brown population. But it also appears that changing attitudes toward color and the generalized acceptance of brown as the normal color for Brazilians, combined with both a rising Afro-Brazilian consciousness and the recent movement for affirmative action for nonwhites, have all led to this profound change of color self-identity.107 Does color matter as much as class in Brazil in defining a person’s place in Brazilian society? This is one of the most debated questions in contemporary Brazil. It is clear that the three-color distinction of blacks (pretos), browns (pardos) and whites (brancos) which define Brazilian 105

106 107

A good survey of the regional differences in this period can be found in Charles H. Wood and José Alberto Magno de Carvalho, The Demography of Inequality in Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). IBGE, Estatísticas do Século XX, table “População1981aeb-043.1.” The Amerindian population was 4 percent of the population in 1872, but only 0.4 percent in the census of 2000 and was not counted in the twentieth-century censuses until 1991. Equally race was not listed in the censuses of 1920 and again was dropped from the census of 1970. Asians represented about 0.5 percent of the population in 2000. IBGE, Sidra, table 136.

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society allows for a more integrated system then simply black and white, and is a far more ambiguous in terms of defining a person’s color. While discrimination against blacks is more clearly cut, discrimination against browns – the largest of this color class in Brazil today – is far less precise. This is because defining who is brown is not a simple definition of skin color or features, but may also include a host of class and educational characteristics. In fact there is even confusion among Brazilians as to their actual color definition.108 One of the crucial debates among scholars is the question of whether discrimination over time has changed. The earlier quantitative materials available on race show much higher rates of disadvantage in income, education and health of non-whites.109 Initially blacks and browns did much worse than whites in terms of health. In general the heavily nonwhite region of the Northeast was systematically worse off in all health indices, from infant mortality to life expectancy, and from diseases to health outcomes, than the mostly white population of the Southern region.110 But of course this introduces an ecological bias, since it is difficult to separate out poverty from color in these data. It has been estimated that blacks (in this case defined as both pretos and pardos) nationally had a 40 percent higher rate of infant mortality than whites in the late twentieth century.111 Although the difference between whites and non-whites (blacks and browns) in life expectancy has fluctuated by census year, it was still a minimum of six years difference between 1950 and 2000.112 Almost all studies find some health differences by race, but not always in a similar pattern by region and gender. All such studies also indicate that the differences between the groups are slowly declining as all states close in on a common national pattern.113 Much 108

109 110 111

112

113

Rafael Guerreiro Osório, “O sistema classificatório de ‘cor ou raça’ do IBGE,” Discussion paper 996 (Brasília: IPEA, 2003). On these intergenerational boundary-crossing among families see Luisa Farah Schwartzman, “Does money whiten? Intergenerational changes in racial classification in Brazil,” American Sociological Review, 72 (2007): 940–963. IBGE, Sidra, tab 136; and Censo Demográfico 1950, Série Nacional vol. 1, 69, table 39. See Luna and Klein, Economic and Social History: chapter 4. Estela Maria Garcia Pinto da Cunha, “Mortalidad infantil segundo cor: os resultados da PNAD 84 para o nordeste,” Anais do XX Encontro Nacional de Estudos Populacionais 2016: 203, table 1. Charles H. Wood, José Alberto Magno de Carvalho and Cláudia Júlia Guimarães Horta, “The color of child mortality in Brazil, 1950–2000: social progress and persistent racial inequality,” Latin American Research Review, (2010): 126, table 2. Alaerte Leandro Martins, “Mortalidade materna de mulheres negras no Brasil,” Cadernos de Saúde Pública [Rio de Janeiro], 22(11) (2006): 2477, table 1; Paulo Andrade Lotufo and Isabela Judith Martins Bensenor, “Raça e mortalidade cerebrovascular

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of this decline has occurred since the late 1990s and especially in the twenty-first century with the expansion of SUS – the national health system with data showing whites and non-whites having the same access to services and often with the same outcomes.114 If things have improved in terms of the narrowing of health disparities by race, the differences in income have changed only modestly over time. Average monthly income has increased for both whites and nonwhites, but there has been only a modest decline in the distance between their salaries.115 The PNAD household surveys consistently found the same spread in income between whites, blacks and browns in all occupations and all regions. In 2003, for example, whites earned twice the income of blacks and browns, and this was consistent across all regions, with the only exception being the North where they earned two-thirds of an average white salary. Moreover there was no major difference by gender, with men of color doing only modestly better than women of color. Years of education made little difference, with blacks and browns earning less than whites with the same years of education.116 Nevertheless a much cited IPEA study shows that while differences still exist, gender differences in income are far worse than by race, with the average white salaries being around 11 percent to 12 percent higher than black salaries, but that male salaries in general were two-thirds to more than half as much as female wages, though the difference is declining fast.117 Clearly then, well over a century after emancipation, the African descendent population of Brazil remains overwhelmingly poor and underrepresented in the higher-level occupations and among the wealthiest

114

115 116 117

no Brasil,” Revista de Saúde Pública, 47(6) (2013): 1201; Nathalia Modenesi Fiorio, “Mortalidade por raça/cor em Vitória/ES: análise da informação e das desigualdes em saúde,” Master’s thesis, Universidade Federal de Espírito Santo, Vitória 2009: 79, table 14; Marilisa Berti de Azevedo Barros, Chester Luiz Galvão César, Luana Carandina and Graciella Dalla Torre, “Desigualdades sociais na prevalência de doenças crônicas no Brasil, PNAD-2003,” Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 11(4) (2006): 915, table 2; Ana Luiza Braz Pavão, Guilherme Loureiro Werneck and Mônica Rodrigues Campos, “Autoavaliação do estado de saúde e a associação com fatores sociodemográficos, hábitos de vida e morbidade na população: um inquérito nacional,” Cadernos de Saúde Pública, 29(4) (2013): 731. All of these indices of access to healthcare can be found at IBGE, Sidra, Pesquisa Nacional de Saúde, https://sidra.ibge.gov.br/pesquisa/pns and especially Saúde de mulheres in vols. 4 and 1. IBGE, Sidra, table 1173. IBGE, Síntese de Indicadores Sociais 2004, table 11.11. Barros et al., “Discriminação e segmentação”: 14.

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classes. Just as there has been a major migration out of indigence and poverty in the last quarter century, occupation, income and education have also improved for this part of the national population. The differences in health between whites and non-whites have narrowed considerably and the gap in average years of education has been declining.118 Even on questions of mobility, blacks and browns have had the same high rates as whites and there seems to be little impediment for non-whites reaching high-status positions, if not passing their status on to their children. For all the social progress made in Brazil until the last decades of the century, the economy by the 1980s entered what has been called the “lost decade.” Brazil was not the only developing country to experience poor economic performance in those ten years and few countries in the region managed to balance their external accounts and regain their ability to grow. But at the same time the last two decades of the century opened up a new democratic era in Brazil. In the long struggle against Cold War dictatorships in Latin America, there emerged a series of new ideas and new political positions which would become dominant themes in the post-1980 period. The failure of armed struggle by the far left, combined with the major campaign of torture and assassinations carried out by the military regimes, led to a basic re-evaluation of the importance of what came to be called “human rights” and even environmental issues. This involved a new commitment on the left to the need for democratic institutions, the rule of law, and a host of basic rights which had been considered of no great importance by the traditional radical and revolutionary movements. The combination of the failure of armed revolt, and the need to obtain international support for pro-democratic groups created a new set of goals and ideals on which the Center and Left movements could finally agree, and which even attracted interest on the Right. The nation thus reached 1990 with a vibrant democratic system but with an economy in crisis and with serious questions about its whole economic organization. With the largest industrial park in Latin America, this protected industry was a high-cost producer of goods with relatively low levels of productivity. Was this system the cause of Brazil’s relative decline and could this system be changed? These were the big questions as indebtedness and inflation overwhelmed the country.

118

This can be seen in the school enrollment figures for 2003, which show little difference in primary education by color in the school enrollment ratios, IBGE, Síntese de Indicadores Sociais 2004, table 11.4.

7 Liberalization and Globalization

The 1990s would bring the shock of opening the economy to the world market and an end to the import substitution model which had been the basis of national policy at least since the Vargas era. This opening would cause a major disruption in the economic evolution of the country. Industry would stagnate and become uncompetitive in the international market, while agriculture became a world producer able to compete successfully against the United States. This was also a period of extraordinary vibrant democracy complete with the rise of an important third sector of voluntary organizations and the coming to power of a radical labor party. It would also be a period when income transfer programs along with economic growth massively reduced poverty and indigence in the country. These transfers and the dispersion of industry throughout the county also resulted in a major reduction of regional disparities in health and education that had plagued the nation since the nineteenth century and the rise of the coffee economy. But the return to democratic politics after 1985 introduced a new level of division due to the weak party system which emerged in the post-military era.1 The fragmented party system required large coalitions for governance and often led to weakened governments. Thus both the international economy and local developments would lead to a period of conflicting developments which have left the country in a state of slow growth, increasing partisanship and with a loss of a sense of direction. 1

It was only in 2016, the Supreme Court (STF) prohibited the receipt of funds from companies to finance campaigns. Financing henceforth can only come from individual and public resources.

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The first democratic regime of the post-military era faced the consequences of massive public debt and runaway inflation. Despite multiple plans of stability, heterodox or orthodox, inflation inherited from the boom years of state capital investment in the economy could not be controlled. Fernando Collor, a conservative populist president whose government began in 1991, implemented a radical plan of freezing all financial assets, which negatively affected economic activity. But it had no impact on the public debt.2 The government then decided to reverse almost a half a century of national industrial policy and introduced the program of what has been called the Washington Consensus. It took the first steps towards opening the market to international competition, promoting foreign investment, privatizing the economy and eliminating state monopolies in the production of goods and services. The protection of the industrial sector, which had remained unchanged for forty years, was significantly reduced. The liberal ideology of the Washington Consensus was already implemented in the rest of Latin America, when it was finally put in to operation in Brazil. The delay was due to the existence in Brazil of the largest and most sophisticated industrial structure of any country in Latin America. The strong presence of a state-owned productive sector and a robust industrial business community enabled the implantation of a broad and complex industry that had survived the crisis of the 1980s. But the deep fiscal crisis which the democratic governments inherited from the military era weakened the ability of the state to sustain this system and reduced the opposition to a program of economic liberalization and privatization. The rapid opening of the market to foreign competition and globalization were the focus of the government’s program. Customs tariffs were drastically reduced and most non-tariff controls were eliminated. The tariff reduction began in the sectors of capital goods and raw materials and was extended to consumer goods.3 The argument used to sustain this 2

3

See Carlos Eduardo Carvalho, “O Plano Collor no debate econômico brasileiro,” Pesquisa & Debate, 11(1)(17) (2000): 112–151. Alexandre F. S. Andrade, “Quem afinal, apoiou o Plano Collor,” Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 38(4) (2018); Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira and Yoshiaki Nakano, “Hiperinflação e estabilização no Brasil: o primeiro Plano Collor,” Revista de Economia Política, 11(4)(44) (1991): 89–11; and the articles by Antonio Barros de Castro, Mario Henrique Simonsen and Affonso Celso Pastore in the special issue of the Revista Brasileira de Economia, 45 (1991). These include the essays of Affonso Celso Pastore “A reforma Monetária do Plano Collor”: 157–174; Mario Henrique Simonsen, “Aspectos Técnicos do Plano Collor”: 113–128; Antonio Barros de Castro, “O Plano como Resposta e Trégua”: 175–179. Regis Bonelli and Armando Castelar Pinheiro, “Abertura e crescimento econômico no Brasil,” in Octavio de Barros and Fabio Giambiagi, eds., Brasil globalizado (Rio de

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change was that protection generated cost structures incompatible with the reality of the international market, and that protection and isolation from the international market discouraged productivity, technological advancement, economies of scale and cost savings. In the same period, Mercosur was created, a regional trading association between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, which led to further tariff reductions among these states.4 Despite the impeachment of President Collor for corruption, the administrations which followed him decided to maintain the new liberal agenda. It also attempted to resolve the never ending inflation and the indexed economy. In May 1993, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, took over the Ministry of Finance and enacted the Plano Real, a successful stabilization program, which made it possible to overcome the chronic inflationary process that has lasted for decades. The Real Plan took place in distinct phases. The first phase consisted of a set of fiscal measures to ensure balance in public accounts before implementing new monetary reform. By eliminating inflation, the government would lose the inflation tax. The budget, supposedly balanced in an inflationary regime, could become negative with the elimination of inflation. The stability achieved with the Real Plan was based on three fundamental points: an exchange rate anchor, the maintenance of an overvalued real and the wide opening of the economy. Unlike the previous plans, it was possible to use the exchange rate anchor because Brazil had renegotiated its external debt, allowing it free access to the international financial market, which had an abundance of resources at low interest rates. In the domestic

4

Janeiro: Campus, 2008): 89–124; José Luiz Rossi Jr and Pedro Cavalcanti Ferreira, Evolução da produtividade industrial brasileira e a abertura comercial. Discussion paper 651 (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 1999); André Averbug, “Abertura e integração comercial brasileira na década de 90,” in Fabio Giambiagi and Maurício Mesquita Moreira, eds., A economia brasileira nos anos 90 (Rio de Janeiro: BNDES, 1999): 43–84; Maurício Mesquita Moreira, “Estrangeiros em uma econômica aberta: impactos recentes sobre a produtividade, a concentração e o comércio exterior,” in Fabio Giambiagi and Maurício Mesquita Moreira, eds., A economia brasileira nos anos 90 (Rio de Janeiro: BNDES, 1999): 333–374; C. R. Albuquerque, “A liberalização comercial brasileira recente: uma leitura a partir das matrizes de relações intersetoriais de 1985, 90 e 95,” Master’s thesis, Cedeplar/UFMG, Belo Horizonte, 1999; R. Fonseca, M. C. Carvalho Jr and H. Pourchet, A orientação externa da indústria de transformação brasileira após a liberalização comercial. Discussion paper 135 (Rio de Janeiro: Funcex, 1998). On Mercosul, see Sérgio Abreu e Lima Florêncio, Trajetória do Mercosul e mudança de paradigmas e de posições da política externa brasileira: começo virtuoso e crise recente – possíveis interpretações. Discussion paper 2125 (Brasília: Ipea, 2015); Renato Baumann, O Mercosul aos vinte anos: uma avaliação econômica. Discussion paper 1627 (Rio de Janeiro: Ipea, 2011).

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market, real interest rates were extremely high, which attracted foreign resources, generating an abundance of dollars that increased the value of the national currency.5 The success of the Real Plan made possible the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso who accepted that new neoliberal ideology. State monopolies on oil, electricity, telecommunications and coastal shipping were abolished. There were also several successive reforms, including Social Security.6 In addition, the government continued to privatize stateowned companies, some of which were emblematic of the old system, such as the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional and also the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, one of the largest mining companies in the world. Ironically, President Itamar Franco, a dedicated nationalist and in favor of public monopolies, and Cardoso, a respected leftist intellectual and one of the proponents of dependency theory, ended up promoting the privatization and liberalization of the national economy. The rapid opening of the economy, its exposure to international competition and the maintenance of an overvalued currency had a positive effect on price stability. The integration of Brazil into important value chains increased the degree of internationalization of national production and reduced the vertical integration of Brazilian industry. Exposure to international competition did increase productivity with greater intensity in the use of foreign technology. At the same time, the participation of international capital in the industrial productive sector increased. The continuity of this policy was supported by the significant inflow of foreign capital, which made it possible to finance the trade and current account deficits. As in all other plans, there was an explosion in demand due to the immediate elimination of the inflationary tax and the reduction in the 5

6

The extensive bibliography on this subect includes Sayad, Planos Cruzado e Real; the discussions in Seminários Dimac, 30 set. 2000, 16 pages; Luiz Filgueiras, História do Plano Real (São Paulo: Boitempo, 2000); Aloízio Mercadante, ed., O Brasil pós-Real: a política econômica em debate (Campinas: Unicamp, 1997); Maria da Conceição Tavares, Destruição não-criadora (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1990); Gustavo Franco, O Desafio Brasileiro: ensaios sobre desenvolvimento, globalização e moeda (São Paulo: Editora 34, 1999). On Brazil’s social welfare system and its evolution see Paulo Tafner and Fabio G ­ iambiagi, eds., Previdência social, debates, dilemas e escolhas (Brasília: Ipea, 2007); Pedro H. G. F. de Souza, Fábio M. Vez and Luiz Henrique Paiva, Efeitos distributivos da reforma da previdência. Discussion paper 2324 (Brasíla: IPEA, 2018); Maria Ines Nassif, ­“Previdência social,” in Bolivar Lamounier and Rubens Figueiredo, A era FHC. Um ­balanço (São Paulo: Cultura Associados, 2002): 569–598; Giambiagi and Barros de ­Castro, ­“Previdência social”: 265–292.

Brazil: An Economic and Social History

252 80 60 40

US$ Billions

20 0 –20 –40 –60 –80 –100

19

9 19 0 9 19 1 9 19 2 9 19 3 9 19 4 9 19 5 9 19 6 9 19 7 9 19 8 9 20 9 0 20 0 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 0 20 4 0 20 5 0 20 6 0 20 7 0 20 8 0 20 9 1 20 0 1 20 1 1 20 2 1 20 3 1 20 4 1 20 5 1 20 6 1 20 7 1 20 8 19

–120

Balance of Trade (FOB) US$ Billions

Current Transactions-US$ Billions

Graph 7.1  Balance of trade and current transactions 1990–2019. Source: Ipeadata

prices of domestic and imported goods. With all this, the level of activity accelerated and there was strong growth in GDP.7 But this major expansion in demand reversed the trade balance (see Graph 7.1). In this context of expansion and market opening with its increasing dependence on external resources, the Mexican crisis occurred in December 1994. This caused a flight of capital and the government increased interest rates to more than 60 percent per year, which represented a real rate of more than 40 percent, significantly increased banks’ reserve requirements and restricted consumer credit. It raised taxes on numerous imported products and instituted quotas for importing cars. In addition, it changed the exchange rate regime to promote a gradual devaluation of the real, which still remained overvalued. Finally, it reduced the investment budget of stateowned companies. All of these measures restricted liquidity and reduced economic activities. Companies went bankrupt and even large financial institutions were affected. To avoid a systemic crisis in the financial sector, the government created the program to encourage restructuring and strengthening the national financial system (PROER, Programa de Estímulo à Reestruturação e ao Fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro Nacional). The program greatly strengthened this sector, which in turn reduced the impact on the Brazilian economy of the successive Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises and the 2008 collapse of the real estate market in the United States.8 7 8

GDP grew 4.9 percent in 1993 and 5.3 percent in 1994. Geraldo Villar Sampaio Maia, Reestruturação bancária no Brasil. O caso do Proer. Technical notes 38 (Brasília: Banco Central, 2003).

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The government’s privatization program was one of the foundations of the process of fiscal adjustment and transformation of the state structure. Due to the size of the companies and the volume of resources involved, the program can be considered successful. The amount obtained from the sale of state-owned companies between 1990 and 2002 reached the extraordinary sum of US$ 87 billion, and buyers took on more than US$ 18 billion dollars in debt from the acquired companies. Foreign capital was responsible for half the amount spent on the purchase of companies, which greatly helped the current account balance and a large share came from pension funds of non-privatized state monopolies such as Petrobras. The state monopoly of telecommunications was ended.9 Privatization was a success in some segments, such as steelmaking and telecommunications. In the electricity sector, it was initially problematic, due to the lack of good government regulation. Despite the success of the Real Plan, the fiscal adjustment and the successful privatization program, the successive international crises of the 1990s compromised the Brazilian economy. The adjustment process for each crisis was similar, with the government raising domestic interest rates, cutting expenditure, raising taxes and adopting fiscal adjustment programs. But this did not resolve the flight of capital and the declining international reserves of Brazil. As the crisis worsened, Brazil ended up receiving emergency aid from the IMF and developed countries in late 1998. Due to the size of Brazil and its debt, it was feared that the deterioration of its reserves could compromise its payments on its external debts, and this in turn would cause the crisis to spread to other emerging countries. The agreement with the IMF involved commitments regarding the behavior of several important indicators, such as the public deficit, the need for a positive balance in the current account and the approval of fiscal reforms. In response the government launched the Fiscal Stabilization Plan, which allowed for the privatization of state-owned banks and instituted new controls on the indebtedness of states, municipalities and state-owned companies.10 To help them and avoid a deepening of the crisis, the federal government

9

10

Licínio Velasco Jr, Privatização: mitos e falsas percepções (Rio de Janeiro: BNDES, 1999); Armando Castelar Pinheiro, A experiência brasileira de privatização: o que vem a seguir. Discussion paper 87 (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 2002). On the Plano de Estabilização Fiscal, see: www.fazenda.gov.br/portugues/ajuste/ respef.asp.

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assumed the debts of the federated entities.11 To honor the debt service of the states and municipalities these subnational entities had to pay a percentage of their annual revenue to the union.12 However, it was necessary to create rules to maintain fiscal balance in the long term, which was done through the approval of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, which represents one of the most innovative and important instruments of public governance in Brazil, giving transparency to these accounts and requiring fiscal targets.13 Finally in January 1999, the government was forced to allow the exchange rate to float freely. Thus, the country abandoned the exchange rate anchor and the real fell more than 60 percent against the dollar. In 1999 the government began to adopt the so-called macroeconomic tripod. This involved a floating exchange rate, fiscal and inflation targets, and an economic policy management system that remains in place today.14 The insistence on maintaining an overvalued currency, an appropriate measure at the time of the launch of the Real Plan but not afterward, restricted the country’s growth, increased unemployment and led to the deterioration of public finances and a large increase in foreign debt, and

11 12

13

14

Called the Programa de Apoio à Reestruturação Fiscal e Financeira, established by Law 9496/1997. Cristiane Kerches da Silva Leite, Federalismo, processo decisório e ordenamento fiscal: a criação da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal. Discussion paper 1593 (Brasília: IPEA, 2011); Fernando Álvares Correia Dias, O Refinanciamento dos governos subnacionais e o ajuste fiscal 1999/2003. Discussion paper 17 (Brasília: Consultoria Legislativa do Senado Federal, 2004). See Jose Roberto Afonso, Responsabilidade fiscal no Brasil: uma memória da lei (Rio de Janiero, FGV Projetos, 2010); José Serra and José Roberto Afonso, “Mais prática do que discurso,” Valor Econômico (2010), www.joserobertoafonso.com.br/index .php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1187:mais-pratica-que-discursos-valor&catid=36:assuntos-fiscais&Itemid=37. José Roberto Afonso, Guilherme L. N. P. de Carvalho and Kleber Pacheco de Castro, “Desempenho comparado dos principais governos brasileiros depois de dez anos da LRF,” Revista Técnica dos Tribunais de Contas [Belo Horizonte], I(0) (2010): 13–48, www.joserobertoafonso.com.br/attachments/ article/1429/ATRICON-10AnosLRF.pdf. The inflation targeting regime delegates to the Central Bank the responsibility to act to preserve the inflation targets established by the government. See Fabio Giambiagi, Alexandre Mathias and Eduardo Velho, O aperfeiçoamento do regime de Metas de inflação no Brasil. Discussion paper 1183 (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 2006); Alexandre A. Tombini and Sergio A. Lago Alves, The Recent Brazilian Disinflation Process and Costs, WPS 109 (Brasília: Banco Central do Brasil, 2006); Philip Arestis, Luiz Fernando de Paula and Fernando Ferrari-Filho, “A nova política monetária: uma análise do regime de metas de inflação no Brasil,” Economia e Sociedade, 18(1) (35) (2009): 1–30; and the study from the Banco Central found at www.bcb.gov.br/ controleinflacao/historicometas.

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this ended up leaving the country economically vulnerable. Exchange rate appreciation has been a recurring error since the Real Plan, which occurred even with floating exchange rates, as the maintenance of extremely high real interest rates were used to attract speculative capital. If this had positive effects for the external currency balance, it had perverse effects on local industry, compromised growth and seriously burdened public accounts. The commercial balance in fact grew increasingly positive in the following years. But this had little to do with national industry. The most important factor was the massive entrance of Brazilian agricultural products into international exports. Rural production, traditionally protected against foreign competition, now felt the impact of that competition in the midst of successive international crises, when the government was forced to reduce its subsidization of agricultural activity and at the same time maintain high interest rates. Since the late 1980s, agriculture lost access to subsidized credit and began to operate in competitive markets. Its competitiveness thus depended on productivity. Given all the years of previous government support and technical help, agriculture was in fact increasing productivity and output during this entire period. The policies developed in the 1960s and 1970s of subsidized credit, minimum prices and regulatory stocks and the establishment and strengthening of Embrapa, allowed agriculture to adapt efficiently to competition, developing modern financing and hedge instruments, and integrating fully into the main national and international value chains. Equally the major expansion of the agricultural frontier into the Center-West was made possible by the development of appropriate technology for its exploitation.15 Nevertheless the last decade of the century was still a difficult economic time for Brazil due to the various international crises one of which involved Brazil. All this affected economic growth with GDP growing at just over 2 percent per year, with better performance of agriculture than of industry and services. Although inflation was now under control there was a weakness in the main external indicators which included government debt, low international reserves and their relationship to national exports and GDP. The internal adjustments of the 1990s and external instability did not allow Brazil to improve its international conditions, which had traditionally been the main cause of the various crises Brazil suffered in the twentieth century (see Table 7.1). 15

See Klein and Luna, Feeding the World.

1992

1993 1994

11 56% 27% 3.4 9

15 58% 26% 2.8 24

13 61% 23% 2.6 32

1.0% –0.5% 4.9% 1.4% 4.9% 1.0% 0.3% –4.2% 8.1% 2.0% 1.5% 3.2% 7.2% 6.8% 475% 1149% 2489%

10 57% 16% 2 39

929%

5.9% 7.4% 8.1% 4.0%

Collor and Itamar Franco government

Source: Ipeadata; Banco Central do Brasil, Tesouro Nacional

GDP – annual variation GDP agriculture – annual variation GDP industry – annual variation GDP services – annual variation Unemployment rate – (%) – IPEA INCC – index of consumer prices – (% per annum.) – IBGE Primary fiscal balance – % GDP Total central government income – % GDP Current transaction balance/GDP (%) Commercial trade balance – billions of dollars Manufacturing exports as % of total exports Net external debt/GDP (%) Net external debt/exports International reserves – total – annual – US$ (billions) Foreign direct investment in Brazil/GDP – % annual change Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil – Annual – US$ (billions)

Indicators

1991 1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2.2% 3.0% 1.0% 2.3% 7.6% 9%

1.3% 11

0.6% 4

4.4% 1.4% 2.7% 5.2% 4.4% –0.6% 3.9% 2.1% 10.1% 5% 9%

3.1% 8.0% 3.8% 3.1% 9.9% 15%

2002

19

2.2%

29

3.3%

28

4.7%

33

5.0%

23

4.2%

17

3.3%

–0.2% 0.5% 2.1% 1.7% 1.7% 2.1% 16.7% 18.3% 19.2% 19.6% 20.6% 21.5% –3.5% –3.9% –4.3% –3.8% –4.2% –1.6% –8 –8 –2 –2 2 12 55% 57% 57% 59% 57% 55% 15% 22% 32% 30% 29% 33% 2.5 3.6 4 3.5 2.8 2.7 52 45 36 33 36 38

3.4% 0.3% 0.5% 0.8% 3.4% 6.5% 4.4% –2.1% –2.6% 2.5% 1.4% 1.8% 8.5% 9.7% 10.4% 4% 2% 8%

Fernando Henrique Cardoso government

1996

–2.4% –2.8% –5 –7 55% 55% 12% 12% 2 2.1 52 60

4.2% 5.7% 4.7% 3.2% 6.7% 22%

1995

Table 7.1  Principal economic indicators – 1991–2002

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The twenty-first century would finally see the Workers Party (PT) gain the presidency of the country under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. In order to win the presidency, Lula changed his electoral strategy, forming a coalition with a center-right party, which nominated the candidate for Vice President. He also presented himself as a candidate who would continue the Cardoso reforms, and maintain macroeconomic stability.16 In addition, in May 2002 Lula defended the agreement between the Cardoso government and the IMF.17 Lula and his party also stressed their historic commitment to social issues. Nevertheless there was capital flight from the country, resulting in a sharp devaluation of the real, greater inflation and the need to tighten monetary policy. Lula honored his promise and to reaffirm his commitment to economic stability, intensified the policies of fiscal and monetary contraction, which calmed the local and international markets. These measures had a positive effect. In addition, the exchange rate devaluation that occurred during 2002 led to a positive trade balance in 2003. The result was a slow but persistent appreciation of the real. The overcoming of this crisis and the resumption of confidence allowed for a rapid growth of the economy from 2004, when it reached 5.7 percent (see Graph 7.2). The Lula government benefited from a period of stability in the international market, and from the sharp rise in commodity prices, reflecting the entrance of China into the world market and its high and continuous growth. The increase in international prices benefited Brazil both in exports of iron ore and in agribusiness products. The combined effect of high interest rates, which attracted capital, external stability and the return of confidence to the international community, as well as the high trade surpluses generated by commodity exports, maintained the appreciated real. This allowed Brazil to accumulate exceptional historical reserves, which made the country less vulnerable in the external area and to pay down its external debt (see Graph 7.3). It was in this favorable environment that the so-called “monthly allowance” scandal emerged which involved government payments for the votes of opposition congressional deputies. This was the first of the great scandals of the PT government, which directly or indirectly affected an important part of the main party leadership. Taking advantage of the 16 17

See Lula’s Carta ao Povo Brasileiro, dated 22 June 2002, www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/ brasil/ult96u33908.shtml. Fabio Zanini, “Lula aceita fazer novo acordo com FMI,” Folha de São Paulo, May 21, 2002, Caderno Brasil, www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc2105200214.htm.

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258 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0%

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 GDP Annual Variation Unemployment Rate -IBGE

2008 2009 Primary Result -% GDP

2010

Graph 7.2  GDP, primary fiscal balance result and unemployment 2003–2010. Source: Banco Central and IBGE 450 400

US$ Billions

350 300 250 200 150 100 50 1980.01 1981.03 1982.05 1983.07 1984.09 1985.11 1987.01 1988.03 1989.05 1990.07 1991.09 1992.11 1994.01 1995.03 1996.05 1997.07 1998.09 1999.11 2001.01 2002.03 2003.05 2004.07 2005.09 2006.11 2008.01 2009.03 2010.05 2011.07 2012.09 2013.11 2015.01 2016.03 2017.05 2018.07 2019.09

0

Graph 7.3  International reserves of Brazil 1980–2020 (US$ billions). Source: Ipeadata

adjustments made under the previous Cardoso government and expanding on them, Lula’s first term can be considered exceptionally positive. Inflation dropped to 3.1 percent; GDP, which had been on average 2.3 percent in the eight years of the Cardoso government, averaged 3.5 percent in the first four years of Lula’s term. Although unemployment still remained high, there was a strong accumulation of reserves, which allowed a reduction in half of the net external debt which now represented only 63 percent of the value of goods exported.18 Despite the success of the first four years, the PT government now decided to return to an active “developmentalist” model with a fundamental role for the state in direct economic activities. Fiscal policy would 18

IPEA, www.ipea.gov.br/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=26196 &Itemid=3.

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include both public investments and support to private investments, in the form of financing, subsidies and incentives.19 The concept of a regulatory state was abandoned to expand the role of the state as a promoter of development. But the program was not a success in domestic investment, although it did create several successful multinational Brazilian companies in the areas of cellulose, meat packinghouses and food and drink. Goals for domestic industries, however, were never achieved and delays were constant. The international crisis of 2008 gave the government the justification it needed to completely commit to the new policy. Brazil, unlike other countries, was relatively little affected by the crisis. The maintenance of the fundamental indicators of the Brazilian economy, the high international reserves, the existence of a solid financial system, were fundamental in avoiding the crisis. Although there was no growth in 2009, in 2010 GDP increased to 7.5 percent, demonstrating the rapid overcoming of the crisis. The conduct of economic policy was not just a cyclical, anti-crisis policy, but now involved a profound change in the foundations of the fiscal regime.20 Growth became its main objective. The role of the BNDES in financing the public and private sector was strengthened. With its own resources and state support, it started to act aggressively towards finance infrastructure, including private investments through the consolidation of national companies into ever larger groups, seeking to create companies which could compete in the international market. In addition, the government changed the way of accounting for important fiscal indicators, starting what would be called “creative accounting.” In the area of oil exploration, the potential offered by the exploration of the so-called “pre-salt” coastal water deposits led the government to change the role of the state in this activity. The concession model in oil exploration, which in the view of the specialists presented positive results, was replaced by the sharing model. In this new model, Petrobras, in addition to becoming the only operator in exploration activity, had to participate with at least 30 percent in all auctioned blocks. This meant a major participation of Petrobras in the exploration process, requiring the mobilization of large amounts of resources. In addition, as a way of stimulating production and national technology, it was necessary that some of the purchases made by Petrobras had to be sourced from local 19 20

F. L. C. Lopreato. Aspectos da atuação estatal de FHC a Dilma. Discussion paper 2039 (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 2015): 18. R. L. F. Werneck, “Alternância política, redistribuição e erescimento, 2003–2010,” in Marcelo de P. Abreu, ed., A ordem do progresso (Rio de Janeiro: Campus, 1992): 357–397.

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suppliers, regardless of their technical capacity and their cost differential from international sellers. These measures and others that followed represented the resumption of an active industrial policy. The pro-growth policy, through massive public investments in the energy sector and infrastructure, and various incentives to the national industry invested in the supply side of the economy had less impact on internal productive capacity. There was an expansion of credit in general, particularly from public financial institutions such as BNDES, Banco do Brasil and Caixa Econômica Federal. This was directed toward production, housing and consumption. In addition, public spending in general increased particularly on such income transfer programs as the Bolsa Família and the house construction program Minha Casa Minha Vida Program.21 The minimum wage was raised which increased demand among the poorer parts of the population. Despite incentives that were offered to national industry, through credit, subsidies and government purchases, there occurred a reduction in competitiveness of national industry, one of the causes of which was the tendency to overvalue the national currency. Between 2003 and 2010 there was an accumulated GDP growth of 37 percent, but industry expanded only at 31 percent. Most importantly, manufactured exports, which accounted for 54 percent of the total value of exports in 2003, declined to 39 percent of the value of all exports in 2010, and would continue to decline in the following years (Graphs 7.4 and 7.5). The performance of the Brazilian economy in the period was largely influenced by the international commodities boom due mainly to China. The extraordinary growth of that country influenced the price of commodities in the international market. While Brazilian manufactures were unable to respond to these conditions, Brazilian agriculture benefited greatly. The changes which Brazilian agriculture had undergone since the late 1980s now bore fruit. The agricultural productivity data show this extraordinary growth. Between 1976/1977 and 2022, most of the major products showed extraordinary productivity and volume increases, for 21

Launched in 2009, the program aimed to build 1 million homes, with 400,000 homes for families with an income below three minimum wages. The program required a major contribution from public subsidies. Raquel Rolnik et al., “O programa Minha Casa Minha Vida nas regiões metropolitanas de São Paulo e Campinas: aspectos socioespaciais e segregação,” Cadernos Metrópole, 17(33) (2015): 127–154. M. R. Loureiro, V. Macário and P. H. Guerra, “Democracia, arenas decisórias e políticas públicas: o programa Minha Casa Minha Vida,” in A. Gomide and R. R. C. Pires, eds., Capacidades estatais e democracia. Arranjos institucionais de políticas públicas (Brasília: IPEA, 2014): 113–136.

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70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

0%

% GDP industry in GDP

% Manufacturing in Exports

Graph 7.4  Exchange rate, effective exchange rate for manufacturers and salary exchange ratio 1991–2019. Source: Ipeadata 300 280 260 240 220 200 180 160 140 120

19

9 19 0 9 19 1 9 19 2 9 19 3 9 19 4 9 19 5 96 19 9 19 7 98 19 9 20 9 00 20 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 0 20 4 0 20 5 0 20 6 0 20 7 0 20 8 09 20 1 20 0 11 20 1 20 2 13 20 1 20 4 1 20 5 1 20 6 1 20 7 1 20 8 19

100 GDP Industry-accumulated rate

GDP Services-accumulated rate

GDP Agriculture-accumulated rate

GDP-accumulated rate

Graph 7.5  Cumulative change in general and sectoral GDP 1990–2019 (1990 = 100). Source: Ipeadata

example, with seed cotton, maize, soybeans and wheat (see Table 7.2). Brazil by 2000 had become one of the largest and most competitive suppliers of agribusiness products on the international market.22 Agribusiness exports, which represented US$ 25 billion in 2002, reached US$ 77 billion in 2010 and reached US$ 120 billion in 2021. Since imports from 22

According to the Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicada (Esalq/USP), agribusiness has a participation of 21.4 percent of the GDP in 2019. See www.cepea .esalq.usp.br/pib/.

262

4,096 222 5,992 40 94 4,539 11,797 6,949 178 3,153 37,060

1976/1977

1976/1977 1,176 314 8,993 37 95 2,215 19,256 12,145 435 2,066 46,732

2022/1923 1,642 212 1,517 498 119 2,782 22,325 43,242 1,054 3,052 76,828

4,254 802 10,640 1,176 497 2,900 126,397 153,538 2,968 9,501 313,036

2022/1923

Production (1000 tons)

287 1,413 1,501 940 1,018 488 1,632 1,748 2,450 655 1,258

1976/1977 2,590 3,782 7,012 2,359 4,182 1,043 5,662 3,551 2,815 3,114 4,075

2022/1923

Productivity per hectare (kg/ha)

0.4 1.0 0.3 12.5 1.3 0.6 1.9 6.2 5.9 1.0 2.1

Area

3.6 2.6 1.2 31.8 5.2 1.3 6.6 12.6 6.8 4.6 6.7

Production

Change 1976/2022

Notes: * Seed cotton. **Total for two harvests per crop year. ***Total of irrigated and dry rice. ****Total of three harvests per crop year. Source: CONAB, www.conab.gov.br/info-agro/safras/serie-historica-das-safras; CONAB, Boletim da Safra de Grãos, September 11, 2022

Cotton * Peanuts** Rice*** Oats Barley Beans**** Maize – total Soybeans Sorghum Wheat All grains

Product

Area (hectares)

Table 7.2  Cultivated areas, production and productivity of the principal crops of Brazil, harvests of 1976–1977 and 2022–2023

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the agricultural sector are relatively low, a large part of the Brazilian trade balance can be explained by the performance of the agricultural sector. In 2021, for example, the net balance of the agribusiness of exports over imports was positive at US$ 105 billion. On the other hand, the balance of the other sectors was negative at US$ 44 billion (Table  7.3). Brazil is today one of the world’s main exporters of soybeans, coffee, animal proteins, sugar and orange juice and second largest exporter of corn and cotton after the United States. Its biggest customer is China, which purchases about a third of Brazilian agribusiness exports, with significant exports to countries of the Middle East as well. The importance of the international economic environment for Brazilian development is fundamental. External vulnerability has accompanied the country’s economic history throughout the twentieth century, in which external shocks created acute internal crises. International debt and a shortage of reserves generated continued instability, resulting in exchange and export controls that for decades represented the most relevant aspect of Brazilian economic policy. In addition, external debt servicing accounted for a significant part of the value of exports. But that changed from the mid-1990s, when the success in negotiating the foreign debt, along with the successful elimination of chronic inflation, and the expansion of the domestic market through the rise of a new middle class (class C) transformed Brazil into one of the favorite destinations for foreign investors. These investors injected capital into the country in the form of foreign direct investments or through short-term capital, attracted by differential interest rates. The inflow of foreign capital into Brazil resulted in a large accumulation of reserves, which at the end of the Lula government reached US$ 288 billion, an amount that exceeded the total amount of foreign debt.23 With low inflation and the maintenance of a relative fiscal balance due to the fiscal responsibility law and a positive primary budget surplus (income above expenses before the debt was paid), increased Brazil’s attractiveness to foreign investments. The flow of foreign direct investments went from the annual average of US$ 21 billion in the late 1990s to US$ 52 billion in the first decade of the new century. On the 23

M. Bueno and M. D. Carcalholo, “Inserção externa e vulnerabilidade da economia brasileira no governo Lula,” in J. P. A. Magalhães, ed., Os anos Lula: contribuições para um balanço crítico 2003–2010 (Rio de Janeiro: Garamond, 2010): 109–132; Adhemar S. Mineiro, “Desenvolvimento e inserção externa: algumas considerações sobre o período 2003–2009 no Brasil,” in J. P. A. Magalhães, ed., Os anos Lula: contribuições para um balanço crítico 2003–2010 (Rio de Janeiro: Garamond, 2010): 133–160.

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Table 7.3  Trade balance of agribusiness in Brazil 1994–2021

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Agribusiness trade balance in US$ billions

Commercial balance

Exports Imports Balance

Total

19.1 20.9 21.1 23.4 21.6 20.5 20.6 23.9 24.8 30.7 39.0 43.6 49.5 58.4 71.8 64.8 76.4 95.0 95.8 100.0 96.7 88.2 84.9 96.0 101.2 96.8 100.7 120.5

5.7 8.6 8.9 8.2 8.0 5.7 5.8 4.8 4.5 4.8 4.8 5.1 6.7 8.7 11.9 9.9 13.4 17.5 16.4 17.1 16.6 13.1 13.6 14.2 14.0 13.8 13.1 15.5

13.4 12.3 12.2 15.2 13.5 14.8 14.8 19.1 20.4 25.9 34.2 38.5 42.8 49.7 60.0 54.9 63.0 77.5 79.4 82.9 80.1 75.2 71.3 81.9 87.1 83.0 87.6 105.0

10.5 –3.5 –5.6 –6.8 –6.6 –1.3 –0.7 2.7 13.2 24.9 33.8 44.9 46.5 40.0 25.0 25.3 20.1 29.8 19.4 2.6 –4.0 19.7 47.7 67.0 58.0 46.7 50.4 61.2

Trade balance

Agribusinesses’ % of total trade

Excluding agribusinesses Exports Imports –3.0 –15.7 –17.8 –21.9 –20.1 –16.1 –15.6 –16.4 –7.2 –1.0 –0.4 6.4 3.7 –9.7 –35.0 –29.6 –42.9 –47.7 –60.0 –80.3 –84.1 –55.5 –23.6 –14.9 –29.1 –36.4 –37.2 –43.8

43.9% 44.9% 44.3% 44.1% 42.1% 42.7% 37.4% 40.9% 41.1% 41.9% 40.4% 36.8% 35.9% 36.4% 36.3% 42.3% 37.9% 37.1% 39.5% 41.3% 43.0% 46.2% 45.9% 44.1% 42.3% 43.2% 48.1% 43.0%

17.2% 17.2% 16.8% 13.7% 13.9% 11.6% 10.3% 8.6% 9.4% 9.8% 7.7% 6.9% 7.3% 7.2% 6.9% 7.8% 7.4% 7.7% 7.4% 7.1% 7.3% 7.6% 9.9% 9.4% 7.7% 7.8% 8.2% 7.1%

Source: AgroStat Brasil, Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento

other hand, by the early 2000s, the Brazilian internal investment rate only reached around 19 percent in the final years of the decade. This represents a significant increase, but the percentage was still too low to support high rates of GDP growth. In addition, despite the significant public resources, the infrastructure was still deficient and restricted the country’s growth and external competitiveness. Although the Lula governments achieved higher growth than the previous regime, it did not

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take adequate advantage of the economic boom that occurred in the first decade of the twenty-first century (see Table 7.4). This can be confirmed by the comparison between the average Brazilian growth rate of 3.2 percent and the average growth rate of the other Brics (considered to be Brazil, Russia, India and China). Between 1995 and 2010, Brazil grew less than any of the other Brics.24 The third Labor government under Dilma Rousseff proved to be a disaster. Their new model assumed that growth in demand would be met by local production, and this demand would be the engine of growth. The necessary fiscal effort would be offset by the increase in revenue from growth. But the lack of coordination in the investment program, operational difficulties and conflicts with control bodies, such as the Federal Audit Court, the delay in obtaining environmental licenses, the political rigging of public bodies and companies responsible for the main investments, and prejudices about private participation in projects, delayed investments, preventing the country from overcoming its main bottlenecks in terms of infrastructure. The most dramatic issue probably occurred in the area of oil. The criticized sharing policy, delayed the investment program since Petrobras needed extraordinary resources to carry this out and local producers, were not always prepared to adequately and competitively meet the demand from the sector. The government also practiced unrealistic containment of administered prices especially with petroleum. The pre-sal program was delayed and the goals were never achieved. At the end of 2014, Petrobras’ problem became more acute due to a corruption scheme of immense proportions, which involved numerous company leaders and politicians. Even prudential measures taken in the years 2009 and 2010, were gradually abandoned. The goal of the new program was to increase investments in fixed capital and increase the share of industry in GDP. Neither goal was achieved (see Graph 7.6 and Table 7.4). The impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and the corruption scandals of the government were initially restricted to government parties, but soon spread to important politicians from other traditional parties, such as the PSDB. The depth of the denunciations, investigations, condemnation and arrests of those involved in these scandals, deeply scared the traditional political class, and gave rise to radical groups that preached morality, order and authoritarianism. The resulting government under Jair Bolsonaro dramatically changed direction and appointed an ultraliberal 24

World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG.

266

Source: Ipeadata; Banco Central do Brasil and Tesouro Nacional

2006

2007

2008

1.1% 5.8% 3.2% 4.0% 6.1% 5.1% 8.3% 2.0% 1.1% 4.6% 3.3% 5.8% 0.1% 8.2% 2.0% 2.0% 6.2% 4.1% 1.0% 5.0% 3.7% 4.3% 5.8% 4.8% 10.5% 9.7% 10.2% 9.2% 8.9% 7.8% 10% 6% 5% 3% 5% 6% 2.3% 2.7% 2.6% 2.1% 2.2% 2.3% 20.7% 21.4% 22.5% 22.5% 22.7% 23.0% 1% 2% 2% 1% 0% −2% 24 33 43 45 38 24 54% 55% 55% 54% 52% 47% 27% 20% 12% 7% −1% −2% 2.1 1.4 0.9 0.5 −0.1 −0.1 49 53 54 86 180 194 2% 3% 2% 2% 3% 3% 10 18 15 19 45 51

2005

GDP – annual variation GDP agriculture – annual variation GDP industry – annual variation GDP services – annual variation Unemployment rate – (%) – IPEA INCC – ìndex of consumer prices – (% per annum) – IBGE Primary fiscal balance – % GDP Total Central Government Income – % GDP Current transaction balance/GDP (%) Commercial trade balance – billions of dollars Manufacturing exports as % of total exports Net external debt/GDP (%) Net external debt/exports International reserves – total – annual – US$ (billions) Foreign direct investment in Brazil/GDP – annual change % Foreign direct investment in Brazil – annual – US$ (billions)

2004

2003

Indicators

Table 7.4  Principal economic indicators – 2003–2010 (government of Lula) 2010 −0.1% 7.5% −3.7% 6.7% −4.7% 10.2% 2.1% 5.8% 9.1% 4% 6% 1.3% 2.0% 22.1% 23.6% −2% −3% 25 18 44% 39% −4% −2% −0.4 −0.3 239 289 1.9% 3.7% 31 82

2009

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22 20 18 16 14 12

Rate of Investment

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

10

% Industry in GDP

Graph 7.6  Rate of investment and % industry in GDP 1995–2019. Source: Ipeadata and IRBE-FGV

Chicago trained economist as his economics minister and thus endorsed a frankly liberal economic policy. It was also the most military dominated administration since 1985. In the first year of his mandate, Bolsonaro was successful in approving a comprehensive reform in social security, but any further reforms were compromised by the COVID-19 pandemic which affected the world from March 2020. The sharp reduction in tax revenues, due to the decline in the level of activity and the need to practice compensatory policies, generated an uncontrollable, but necessary fiscal imbalance to mitigate the loss of income. In addition, the government showed little administrative capability, disparaged science in general, and responded poorly to the Covid pandemic. It abandoned the country’s solid environmental agenda and isolated itself in international relations, compromising Brazil’s own commercial interests. The government’s lack of major party support finally forced it to rely on the most corrupt part of the national legislature to achieve even a minimal legislative program, which in turn was mostly populist and anti-democratic. Although the Bolsonaro government represented a step backwards in cultural and environmental terms and posed a serious threat to the democratic process, directly affronting the judiciary, it still presented itself as competitive for a new term. Only a process of democratic unity around Lula made his third election possible. The country nevertheless still faces serious fiscal problems, low growth and is confronted with an international crisis which includes energy problems and high inflation of the usual staples. Today there is uncertainty about the new Lula government within this framework of internal and international difficulties. But there is little doubt that Lula will maintain the rules of democracy and will reposition the country in the international context. He will also carry

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out a radically different policy in relation to the environment, a sensitive issue both for the Western world and for national agriculture. While the quality of presidential administrations has declined in the past few decades, much of the government’s welfare system is still evolving and has been reaching all regions of the country. The past three to four decades have been a period when new social norms and human capital development have become common throughout the nation, whether talking of fertility or of education. Where the Northern regions looked like a completely different country in contrast to the Southern regions in the late twentieth century, they no longer looked that different by the second decade of the twenty-first century. Thanks to better health and sanitation everywhere, mortality patterns are much more equal among regions. The big overall change was the decline of infectious disease deaths and their replacement by generative diseases as primary killers. By 2007 some 72 percent of all deaths in Brazil were due to non-communicable diseases.25 To this can be added the increasing availability of cheap food and the state subsidization of medical care for pregnant women from the late 1990s onward, all of which, had a profound impact on both reducing infant mortality nationally and reducing the differences between regions. From early in the twentieth century, the highest infant mortality was found in the Northeast, with the lowest mortality region being in the South. The difference between the two has declined impressively in the twenty-first century. In 1930, the difference between these two regions for infant deaths under one year old was seventy-two deaths per thousand live births which declined moderately through the century but even in 1990 the distribution was still forty-seven deaths by 1990.26 By 2000, the difference between the highest and lowest region was 28.3 deaths per thousand live births and declined further to just 7.3 deaths in 2016 (see Graph 7.7). Although deaths of infants and the corresponding deaths of children aged one to five years declined dramatically throughout the country and have moved toward a national norm everywhere in Brazil, regional differences still persist in overall life expectancy. Although all regions have increased their life expectancy for both genders, the North and Northeast have not changed more rapidly than the richer regions and thus the gap has even widened recently. This is clearly related to class and income differences among adults. In 2010 for example, life expectancy for 25 26

Maria Inés Schmidt et al., “Chronic non-communicable diseases in Brazil: burden and current challenges,” Lancet, 377 (2011) (9781): 1949. IBGE, Table Série: CD100 – Taxa de mortalidade infantil.

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Infant deaths per thousand live births

50 45 40

Northeast

35 30 25

North

Southeast South Center-West

20 15 10 5 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Graph 7.7  Infant mortality rate by region 2000–2016. Source: IBGE, Sidra, table 3834

persons living in urban favelas in every region of Brazil were lower than for urban dwellers living outside favelas.27 But the higher poverty rates in the North and Northeast has led to a persistence of difference in life expectancy from the Southern and Western states of the federation. While regional differences declined rapidly in the late twentieth century,28 they have changed little in the current century. Thus the highest rated region for life expectancy, the states of the South region, had 4.9 years more of life for men and 4.4 years of life for women than in the lowest region, which was the North in 2000. But twenty years later, life expectancy for both genders actually increased to 6.0 years for women and 5.3 years for men as the richer states of the South increased their life expectancy faster than those of the North region (see Graph 7.8). All regions of course had higher life expectancy for women than for men at approximately the same rates. This difference by gender was also reflected by mortality arising from non-communicable diseases. In the period 1991–2010, for example, a national study found that the higher mortality for men at all ages for these generative diseases was greater than for women and this difference was increasing over time even as both experienced declining mortalities.29 27

28 29

Fabiano Neves Alves Pereira, “Geografia é destino? Diferenciais de mortalidade por local de moradia no Brasil dentre moradores de áreas urbanas de favela e não favela,” XXI Encontro Nacional de Estudos Populacioanais ABEP 2019: 16, table 2. Jose Alberto M. de Carvalho and Charles H. Wood. “Mortality, income distribution, and rural-urban residence in Brazil,” Population and Development Review, (1978): 405–420. Antony Stevens, Maria Inês Schmidt and Bruce Bartholow Duncan, “Gender inequalities in non communicable disease mortality in Brazil,” Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 17(10) (2012): 1949–1961; also Daisy Maria Xavier de Abreu, Cibele Comini César and Elisabeth Barboza França, “Diferenciais entre homens e mulheres na mortalidade evitável no Brasil (1983–2005),” Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 25(12) (2009): 2672–2682.

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2000 71.1

North

65.1 71.4

Northeast

63.6 75.6

Southeast

67 75.5

South

68.5 74.3

Center-West

67.7 50

55

60

65 Females

70 Males

75

80

2020 76.9

North

69.6 78.3

Northeast

70.2 81.5

Southeast

75.5 82.2

South

75.6 79.5

Center-West

72.7 50

55

60

65 Females

70

75

80

85

Males

Graph 7.8  Life expectancy by gender and region 2000 and 2020. Source: www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/9109-projecao-dapopulacao.html?=&t=resultados

While life expectancy still shows strong regional differences, fertility rates are now a national norm with little differences between regions. Thus for example, the difference between the highest and lowest fertility regions (the North and the Southeast) was still a full child different (1.17 children) in 2000, but the faster decline of fertility in the North since then meant that the difference in the total fertility rate by

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Births per women 14–49

3.3 3.1 2.9

North

South

2.7 2.5

Southeast Center West

Northeast

2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022

Graph 7.9  Total fertility rate by region 2000–2022. Source: IBGE, Sidra, table 3727, plus estimates for 2017–20 table 7360

2022 was estimated to be just .027 children difference (see Graph 7.9). Everywhere in Brazil, fertility was declining to a rate below replacement (which is 2.2 children per women in their fertile years) which is estimated to occur in the third decade of the century. In turn it is projected that deaths will exceed births and that the population will actually start to decline by 2047.30 This decline in the number of births, along with declining mortality among infants and children all had a profound impact on the demographic structure of the Brazilian population everywhere. Lower fertility and higher life expectancy meant that the population of Brazil was aging. Whereas as late as 1980 the average age of the Brazilian population was eighteen, by 2010 it had risen to thirty-one and by 2020 it had reached thirty-five years of age.31 Thus Brazil was becoming identical to all the advanced societies of the world with an age distribution of the population changing from the classic pyramid of the pre-demographic transition period to the now standard jar shape. This can be seen in the different age and gender breakdowns in 2000 and 2020 (see Graph 7.10). In the earlier period the lower fertility was beginning to show at the base (in the years below fifteen), and in 2020 it becomes evident in the under-thirty age groups, just as increasing survival rates above that age group influenced the shape of the distribution. 30 31

Population projections of IBGE made in 2018, www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/ populacao/9109-projecao-da-populacao.html?=&t=resultados. Calculated from the “População total – idades simples” tables of the 2018 population projections of IBGE, www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/9109-projecao-d a-populacao.html?=&t=resultados.

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2000 85+ 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 0–4 6

4

2

0 Men

2

4

6

2

4

6

Women

2020 85+ 80–84 75–79 70–74 65–69 60–64 55–59 50–54 45–49 40–44 35–39 30–34 25–29 20–24 15–19 10–14 5–9 0–4 6

4

2

0 Men

Women

Graph 7.10  Age pyramid of Brazilian population in 2000 and 2020. Source: CEPALDATA

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These changes in fertility, mortality and life expectancy had an impact in many other aspects of Brazilian society. As we noted earlier, they affected family structure and household sizes. Households were getting progressively smaller and traditional families less important among households. It also affected everything from women in the work force to their changing role in education. In December of 2014, the female participation rate in the national employment survey (PME) of those who were employed in that month reached a high of 47 percent. In the PNAD National Household Survey of 2015, at the height of the depression, women’s participation rate (persons in the economy both employed and unemployed as a share of the total population in that age group) reached 55 percent. By 2019, the WB/ILO, using Brazilian data, estimated that the participation of women aged fifteen and over had reached 53.6 percent, while for men it was at 74 percent. Even during the pandemic of 2020 the female participation rate was 48 percent and for men it was 70 percent.32 These female participation rates were not that different from the United States which had reached 57.4 percent of women aged fifteen and over, and those for US men in the same period only 68 percent were economically active.33 But of course these employment rates for women in Brazil and the United States were well below those of Canada and most of Western Europe. Nevertheless the rate of change has been dramatic from 1960 when it was just 18.5 percent, to today (see Graph 7.11). As might be expected, the higher the level of education that women possessed the more likely they were to be active in the labor force. Thus the PNAD household survey of 2018, found that only one-third of working-age women who had not completed primary (fundamental) education were to be found in the labor force. But women’s ratio of labor force participation increased with each level of education. Thus almost two-thirds of all secondary school leavers and 79 percent of university graduates were working. Like men, the peak age for working women was 30–49, when 73 percent of the women of that age cohort were in the labor force. The largest sectors employing women was public administration, education, health and human services (26 percent of all women workers), with commercial activity second (19 percent) and domestic service third (at 14 percent).34 32 33 34

Data for the first trimester of 2020 from the PNAD Continuo is found at IBGE, Sidra, table 4093. World Bank’s data, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.NE.ZS. IBGE, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Continua, 2o trimestre, 2018, tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4, www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/9221-sint ese-de-indicadores-sociais.html?edicao=25875&t=resultados.

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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

Males

2020

2018

2016

2014

2012

2009

2007

2005

2003

2001

1998

1996

1993

1991

1989

1987

1985

1973

0 1960

% of Workers to Total Pop of 15+ Years

274

Females

Graph 7.11  Labor force participation of Brazilian men and women aged fifteen and older in selected years between 1960 and 2021. Source: World Bank/ ILO found, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.MA.NE.ZS

What is impressive is that once employed, women have the same ratio of workers with formal work permits as men. Thus, in 2012 some 59 percent of the economically active males were legally employed, while the figure was 58 percent for economically active women. The same distribution could be found in the PNAD survey of 2018 in which the ratio of workers in the formal labor market was the same for both men and women.35 Of course, the last hired, meant that the first fired would be women. This was in fact the case, with the unemployment rate for women going from 41 percent in the boom year of 2001 to 45 percent in 2015 because of the depression. While the male unemployment rate increased from 2001 it went to only 23 percent in 2015.36 Surprisingly the 2018 household survey shows that the average income of employed women was only 2 percent less than that of men. But this was due to poorly educated women on average making more than poorly educated men (those with no education or had not completed primary 35

36

IBGE, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Continua, 2o trimestre, 2018, table 1.18, www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/9221-sintese-de-indicadoressociais.html?edicao=25875&t=resultados. IBGE, Síntese de indicadores sociais. Uma análise das condições de vida da população brasileira 2016, “Table 1, Indicadores estruturais do mercado de trabalho para a população de 16 anos ou mais de idade, por sexo, com indicação da variação percentual – Brasil – 2005/2015.”

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education). With each higher level of education (fundamental education complete and above) women increasingly obtained less on average than men, and the average income of female university graduates women was 17 percent less than the average income of men.37 This increasing participation of women in the labor force is a result of the profound change in levels of woman’s participation in education which began in the late twentieth century. Women had traditionally received less education than men from colonial times until the middle decades of the twentieth century. This changed in the second half of that century when they finally began to catch up with male education rates. But recently women have begun to surpass men at all levels from secondary education through advanced university and professional training and this pace has slowly and steadily increased every decade. In 1992, women had 4.9 years of schooling compared to 5.0 years for men. It was not until 1996 that women in Brazil had the same 5.4 years of schooling as men. By 2001, they had surpassed men with 6.0 years compared to 5.9 for men and by 2009 the difference had reached an average of 7.3 for women and 7.1 years for men.38 Not only had women slowly exceeded men in average years of schooling nationally in 2015, or 8.4 years for women compared to 8.0 years for men, but this difference was consistent in all regions of the nation in that year.39 When we examine post-primary levels of education, the differences becomes far more pronounced. Thus the census of 2010 found that 15 percent of women aged eighteen to twenty-four were attending university compared to just 11 percent of men. Moreover, this difference is found in every region of Brazil with the higher difference between women and men occurring in the three richest regions, the Southeast, South and Center-West (see Graph 7.12). Moreover the future will see this advantage of women over men increase. Women are progressively outpacing men in post-primary levels of education. But while women have forged ahead, other factors still influence success in education for Brazilians. This is evident when we 37

38 39

IBGE, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Continua, 2o trimestre, 2018, table 2.10, www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/9221-sintese-de-indicadoressociais.html?edicao=25875&t=resultados. IBGE, Sidra, table 1189. The region with the highest female average years of education was the center-west, where woman had 8.9 years of education compared to 8.4 for men. IPEA, “Retrato das desigualdades de gênero e raça–1995 a 2015,” Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (2017): table 3.1, www.ipea.gov.br/retrato/indicadores_educacao.html.

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10.6

North

7.2 10.6

Northeast

7.5 17

Southeast

13.2 20.3

South

14.9 19.2

Center-West

14.4 15.1

BRAZIL

11.3 5

10

15 Women

20

25

Men

Graph 7.12  Percentage of persons aged between eighteen and twentyfour attending university by gender and region, Census 2010. Source: IBGE, Estatísticas de Gênero … Censo 2010 (2014: Graph 30)

examine the ratio of students to their total age cohort in the population at all the post-primary levels of education. Though almost all children participated at the same very high rate in fundamental (or primary) education despite their differences in residence, gender, race or family income, at the level of secondary and tertiary education major differences still occur. Here the dominance of women increased with each level of education, as it does for urban, white children from wealthier families as well, as can be seen in the PNAD household survey of 2018 (see Table 7.5). Although two-thirds of all Brazilians aged eighteen to twenty-nine had at least twelve years of schooling, there were differences between whites, blacks and browns (60 percent of browns and blacks compared to 72 percent for whites). But the greatest differences were by residence, as only 45 percent of rural persons had reached this level of education compared to 70 percent of the urban dwellers. It was equally as severe by income class, with only 41 percent of young adults in the poorest 20 percent compared to 92 percent in the upper 20 percent who had reached this level.40 It was also evident by gender as only 61 percent of the men reached this level compared to 72 percent of the women. 40

IBGE, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Continua, 2o trimestre, 2018, table 3.8, www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/9221-sintese-de-indicadores-­ sociais.html?edicao=25875&t=resultados.

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Table 7.5  Ratio of children enrolled in school as percentage of their age cohort by residence, gender, color and income 2018 Level of education

Characteristics Women

Men

Fundamental (6–14 years) Middle (15–17 years) Superior (18–24)

97.6 74.4 29.3

97.2 64.5 21.2

Fundamental (6–14 years) Middle (15–17 years) Superior (18–24)

Rural 96.8 57.5 9.4

Urban 97.5 71.7 27.8

Fundamental (6–14 years) Middle (15–17 years) Superior (18–24)

Brown-black 97.2 64.9 18.3

White 97.7 76.5 36.1

Fundamental (6–14 years) Middle (15–17 years) Superior (18–24)

Lowest 20% income 96.9 54.6 7.4

Top > 20% income 98.4 89.9 63.2

Source: PNAD, Estatísticas Socais (2018, tab 3.2), www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/ populacao/

This gender difference has developed over the most recent generations, as the same survey showed that for all adults (those aged twenty and older), some 18 percent of the women were university graduates and only 14 percent of the men. Also, white adults were double the number of university graduates than browns and blacks. But the most severe difference here as well was the distribution among urban residents, of whom 19 percent were university graduates, compared to only 3 percent of rural residents.41 Thus while there are increasing differences in education by gender and a troubling, continued difference by race that seem to be declining, the more severe differences especially for future development are those disparities related to residence. 41

IBGE, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Continua, 2° trimestre, 2018, table 3.7, www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/9221-sintese-de-indicadores-­ sociais.html?edicao=25875&t=resultados.

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If the demographic transition finally enabled the nation to control its growth and opened up the labor force and the educational system to women on an impressive scale, it was the transformed state which finally distributed the resources needed to educate and provide the health and income support for the entire population. For all its limitation as a welfare state in a developing economy, Brazil nevertheless succeed in reducing many of the regional and income disparities and effectively reducing both indigence and poverty in the nation.42 The beginnings of the modern welfare state in Brazil started with the government of Getúlio Vargas and was not that different in timing from many European countries which began to elaborate the modern welfare state before World War II and which came to full development in the decades after it ended. In most other nations, these reforms were enacted slowly under democratic regimes after arduous negotiations between different factions and classes.43 But in the case of Brazil it was created by series of authoritarian regimes and was imposed from above. Almost all of the basic structure of the welfare state was developed under two authoritarian regimes, that of Vargas and the governments of the Brazilian military from 1964 to 1985. Though that structure would be modified, universalized and reformed in the post-1985 period of democratic rule, the structure itself and many of its basic features are still operative today when the state spends 42 percent of its budget on social welfare.44 42

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These are two distinct categories. Indigence is defined as a family or person that cannot “purchase the cheapest food basket that meets the estimated nutritional needs.” Poor persons can purchase such basic caloric needs, but do not have adequate income to pay for decent housing or have access to basic services. See Sonia Rocha, “Opções metodológicas para a estimação de linhas de indigência e de pobreza no Brasil,” Paper given at the IBGE, ECLA, INE-Portugal sponsored Third Meeting of the Expert Group on Poverty Statistics (Rio Group), Lisbon, November 22–24, 1999, found at https://ww2 .ibge.gov.br/poverty/pdf/sonia_rocha_brazil.pdf. See Gosta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (London: Polity Press, 1990); Peter H. Lindert, Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Peter Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class bases of the European Welfare sState, 1875–1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Isabela Mares, The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). This is the estimated average for central government expenditures in Brazil on social security programs, health and education for the period 1973–2000. This compares to 45 percent and 46 percent in the United States and Canada, but is below the 50–60 percent range of the Nordic countries. In turn, this represents 13.5 percent of GDP. See Alex Segura-Ubiergo, The Political Economy of the Welfare state in Latin America: Globalization, Democracy, and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 14–15.

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The governments that followed the Vargas period expanded the policies initiated during his rule, but the military were able to successfully fund these programs even though they were especially hostile to labor and popular mobilizations. The rise of a strong labor movement allied with radical political leaders was one of the main factors that led the military to seize power in 1964. But instead of abolishing the unions, the Vargas legislation was used to control and neutralize them. With the need to reduce labor conflict and win support of the growing middle class, it also committed itself to expanding the welfare system and modernizing its administration. The military carried out a massive expansion of free primary and secondary education, as well as university and technical education. The government also compensated for its repressive wage and salary policies with social welfare policies, which led to important advances in healthcare and the expansion of the national pension system, and even developed a massive housing and sanitation program. In this respect, the military period was a time when Brazil finally laid the foundations of a modern welfare state. Even though it was based on authoritarian and technocratic models, the democratic regimes after 1985 kept the basic structure even as they continued to modify it. The return to democracy in 1985 opened the nation to new movements and ideas. In relation to the welfare state, the most significant reform was a move toward a decentralized and more democratic structure. Most of these reformist ideas found expression in the new Constitution of 1988. The integrated system of social insurance and social assistance established in the 1988 Constitution now included all federal government workers, and all private workers were put into one unified social security system. Financing of the system was put on a more solid tax base, and the value of pensions was linked to inflation. Finally, pension rights were now made universal for all women and men in rural areas, whether registered with work cards or not, and regardless of whether they had paid into any previous pension schemes. At the beginning of the 1990s, these reforms were finally enacted into an organic social security law. The assistance and insurance programs were reorganized into a new National Social Security Institute (INSS or Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social), which replaced both the INPS and FUNRURAL and other separate sectors of social assistance, and also involved the transfer of all health activities to a separate Ministry of Health.45 45

Kaizô Iwakami Beltrão and Sonoe Sugahara Pinheiro, Brazilian Population and the Social Security System: Reform Alternatives. Discussion paper 929 (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 2005): 5–6.

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By 2004 it was estimated that some 42 million Brazilian workers (aged sixteen to fifty-nine) were contributing to the INSS and state and municipal pension systems (some 29.7 million through the RGPS, another 7.7 million rural workers covered by RGPS, and 4.8 million through state employee pension plans), and some 22 million persons were beneficiaries. Although approximately 27 million active workers were still not covered,46 it was estimated that a significant 59.3 percent of the economically active population was now included in a pension plan.47 By 2020 some 36 million persons were receiving pensions of one kind or another from INSS, up from 29 million in 2011.48 There was also a new commitment to rural workers and the elderly who had no previous pension plans.49 Although these rural pensions were originally quite small, they have progressively become ever more important. In the Constitution of 1988, the basic pension for rural retirees was raised to the minimum wage.50 It is estimated that such pensions for rural workers have not only reduced rural poverty but have also significantly reduced inequality in rural Brazil.51 Brazil, in fact, is among the most advanced countries in the developing world in reducing levels of poverty among its rural population.52 Thus, for the first time, being elderly and of residing in rural areas was no longer automatically correlated with poverty in Brazil. 46

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Ministério de Trabalho e Prêvidencia, Informe de Previdência Social, 16(5) (2004): 1, 18. This growth in the number of beneficiaries was quite fast. Beginning in 1995, only 15.7 million people were benefiting from the system, and by 2003 this number had risen 40 percent, to 21.7 million beneficiaries. Ministério de Trabalho e Prêvidencia, Informe da Previdência Social, 16(2) (2004): 1. This was up from 53.8 percent in 2002. IPEA, Políticas sociais: acompanhamento e análise, 19 (2011): 18, table 1 “Evolução da cobertura previdenciária – 2002–2009.” Ministério de Trabalho e Prêvidencia, Informe da Previdência Social, 32, no. 3, table 3 and graph 7. In 1999, approximately 79 percent of Brazilians aged 60 and over were receiving pensions. Helmut Schwarzer and Ana Carolina Querino, Benefícios sociais e pobreza: programas não contributivos da seguridade social brasileira. Discussion paper 929 (Brasília: IPEA, 2002): 7. Beltrão and Pinheiro, Brazilian Population and the Social Security System: 6. It is estimated that in 2002 the Gini index for income distribution, excluding pensions, would have been 0.56, falling to 0.52, when pensions are included. Beltrão and Pinheiro, Brazilian Population and the Social Security System: 12. Approximately 35 percent of the persons who received pension in 2003, with residence declared, lived in the rural area, a much higher proportion than the actual total population. Ministério de Trabalho e Prêvidencia, Informe da Previdência Social, 16(2) (2004): 1. The unusual form adopted by Brazil in the provision of retirement for the rural elderly, even by Latin American standards, can be seen in CELADE, Los adultos mayores en América Latina y el Caribe datos e indicadores (Santiago de Chile: Boletín Informativo, Edición Especial, 2002): graphs 8, 9, 16, 18.

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In the 1990s, the modern income transfer programs began which have had a major impact in Brazil as in many other developing countries in the world. The Cardoso government established several such income transfer programs, which were expanded and consolidated into one program by the Lula government and today benefit an important part of the national population. First came the establishment of the Program to Eradicate Child Labor (Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil or PETI) – which was expanded in 2001 into a more complete Bolsa Escola (school grant) – which was a national program designed to eliminate child employment and encourage school attendance through payment of a conditional cash payment from the state to poor families with school-age children if they kep these children at school.53 There was also a Bolsa Alimentação which provided food for poor families with children. The school grant benefited low-­income families with children aged six to fifteen years and the food grant helped families with children up to seven years of age. The structure of the two programs was relatively similar, with direct payments to beneficiaries by magnetic ATM cards.54 In the Lula government, many of these programs were combined into the family grant program (Bolsa Família),55 which was now based on the average household income, as well as the number and ages of children. At its peak, there were 13.8 million families benefiting from Bolsa Família,56 which was one of the most popular programs enacted by the Lula government.57 Already by 2005 at least half of all Brazilian families received some type of funding from the state, either the Bolsa Família or funding 53 54 55

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Schwarzer and Querino, Benefícios sociais e pobreza. Sonia Rocha, “Impacto sobre a pobreza dos novos programas federais de transferência de renda”: n.d., www.anpec.org.br/encontro2004/artigos/A04A137.pdf. Then, on assuming the government in 2003, Lula launched with great acclaim the Zero Hunger Program (Programa Fome Zero), but given the difficulties in its implementation, it was also incorporated into the Bolsa-Família program. Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social, www.mds.gov.br/bolsafamilia. In addition to the income criteria, there are conditionalities in the area of education (as a minimum frequency of school attendance) and in health, such as taking the children to health clinics for monitoring and participating in vaccination campaigns. Marcelo Medeiros, Tatiana Britto and Fábio Soares, Programas focalizados de transferência de renda no Brasil: contribuições para o debate. Discussion paper 1283 (Brasília: Ipea, 2007): 8. In June 2020, 14,283,507 families benefited, reaching 40,854,556 people, 19.85 percent of the population. Informações estatísticas, acessed 30 julho 2020, at https://aplicacoes.mds .gov.br/sagi/ri/relatorios/mds/index.php. For an analysis of these programs see Rocha, “Impacto sobre a pobreza dos novos programas federais” and Medeiros et al., Programas focalizados: 9–10.

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for others in need.58 One of these more significant needs programs was the BPC (the renamed RMV) or monthly life benefits for handicapped persons and those over sixty-five without pensions. By 2018, this program was almost double the size of the Bolsa Família.59 Moreover all these income transfers were based on the same minimum wage scale which has increased its value over time. The results of these income transfer policies and of the provision of health and pensions to all Brazilians in all regions, and the increasing participation of all workers, from domestic servants to service professionals in the formal labor market, finally broke the long-term pattern of poverty which affected between 40 percent and 45 percent of the population in the 1970s and 1980s, and another 20 percent of those who were reduced to deprivation in these two decades.60 These levels of poverty were still evident at the beginning of the 1990s, but by the 2010s both poverty and indigence were half these rates. Almost as important was the systematic decline of food prices over this period as Brazilian agriculture became ever more productive and the food distribution system even more efficient. It is estimated that over 15.9 million families moved out of poverty (that is those living in extreme poverty, as well as the poor and those earning above the minimum wage but considered vulnerable) 58

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Ricardo Paes de Barros, Mirela de Carvalho, and Samuel Franco, “O papel das transferências públicas na queda recente da desigualdade de renda brasileira,” in Edmar Lisboa Bacha and Simon Schwartzman, eds., Brasil: a nova agenda social (Rio de Janeiro: LTC, 2011): 41. These authors emphasize the causal importance of both the Bolsa Família and the BFC cash transfers. The latest data for BPC recipients is from 2015 and lists the total of 4.2 million persons obtaining such benefits of which 2.3 million were living with disabilities and 1.9 million were elderly retirees who had not contributed to social security. Boletim BPC 2015: 12, table 2, www.mds.gov.br/webarquivos/arquivo/assistencia_social/boletim_BPC_2015.pdf. As of 2017, 13.2 million families were receiving a Bolsa Família. See http://mds.gov.br/ area-de-imprensa/noticias/2017/junho/bolsa-familia-governo-federal-repassara-r-2-4bilhoes-aos-beneficiarios-em-junho. In the proposed budget of 2018, BPC and Bolsa Familia would cost an estimated 83.1 billion reais (or US$ 23.8 billion at the official rate of 3.50 reais per dollar): the breakdown of these programs is 31 billion reais (US$ 8.8 billion) for the disabled (Benefícios de Prestação Continuada (BPC) à Pessoa com Deficiência e da Renda Mensal Vitalícia (RMV) por Invalidez) for the pension part of BPC (Benefícios de Prestação Continuada (BPC) à Pessoa Idosa e da Renda Mensal Vitalícia (RMV) por Idade) the amount is 23.9 billion reais (or US$ 6.8 billion) and the amount for for family transfers (Transferência de Renda Diretamente às Famílias em Condição de Pobreza e Extrema Pobreza) was 28.2 billion reais (US$ 8 billion). Orçamento fiscal e da seguridade social exercício financeiro de 2018, annex I, www.planejamento.gov.br/ assuntos/orcamento-1/orcamentos-anuais/2018/orcamento-anual-de-2018#LOA. The data for the 1970s and 1980s comes from Ricardo Henriques, ed., Desigualidade e pobreza no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, 2000): 24.

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in the period from 2004 to 2009 and that malnutrition was no longer a significant problem for the national population. This resulted in the percentage of non-poor families climbing from 35.8 percent of all families in 2004, to 51.5 percent of the 56.8 million families in the nation five years later.61 A recent study shows that by 2005 a quarter of family income came from non-labor sources, and 90 percent of this non-labor income came from government pensions and income transfers. Of these government sources, the largest single program in coverage was the Bolsa Família which grew from 2.6 million persons in 2001 to 6.5 million in 2005 and to 14.3 million in 2020.62 Not surprisingly, given the modernization and mechanization of agriculture and the efforts of the government to reduce rural poverty, traditionally the poorest areas of Brazil, it is now the metropolitan regions and their favelas which have the highest levels of poverty. All of these changes have had a major impact in reducing the traditional levels of income inequality, especially after the beginning of the new century. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the GINI index of the distribution of income was in the lower .60s,63 one of the worst rates of income inequality in the world. This rate only began a slow decline at the end of the century. As late as the census of 2000 the GINI of income was 0.60, but by the census of 2010 it had declined to 0.536, a rather dramatic decline.64 This was a significant change but is still high even compared to most of the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America, where the GINI is usually in the upper .40s and averages at 0.47.65 Moreover recent economic developments, especially the rise of world food and fuel 61

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Rafael Guerreiro Osorio, Pedro H. G. F. de Souza, Sergei S. D. Soares and Luís Felipe Batista de Oliveira, Perfil da pobreza no Brasil e sua evolução no período 2004–2009. Discussion paper 1647 (Brasilia: IEPA, 2011): table 2:17. Barros et al., “O papel das transferências públicas”: II, 46–49; and for 2000 numbers see www.gov.br/pt-br/noticias/assistencia-social/2020/07/bolsa-familia-atende-14283-milhoes-de-familias-no-mes-de-junho. The IBGE currently uses working people aged fifteen years or older as the basic category, but previously used a ten years or older base, or as in the censuses of 1991 and 2000 just listed the GINI for heads of households regardless of income. But all these GINIs are rather close and can give an approximate idea of trends. Thus the GINI in the census of 1991 was at 0.64 for all Brazil, and 0.61 for the census of 2000, IBGE, Sidra, table 155. IBGE, Sidra, table 2907. As of 2018, the GINI distribution of income per capita was estimated at 0.545. IBGE, Síntese de Indicadores Sociais Uma Análise das Condições de Cida da População Brasileira2019: 52, graph 4. Giovanni Andrea Cornia, “Income inequality in Latin America: recent decline and prospects for its further reduction,” ECLAC – Macroeconomics of Development Series No. 149 (Santiago: CEPPAL, 2014): 30.

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prices in the third decade of the current century, have reversed the trends in poverty reduction and brought back problems of malnutrition to part of the national population. But how long and how far this relapse will go on and how it will affect the index of inequality is difficult to estimate at this point in time. The most important change to pensions in the current century has been to fund these disparate schemes by unifying these systems and putting in “pay as you go” arrangements. The 1988 Constitution and the Organic Social Security Act of 1991 created two types of pension schemes: allocation and capitalization. In its origin this system was constituted by the capitalization system, that is fully funded by workers and employees. But already by the middle of the twentieth century, the accumulated reserves were expended and the system gradually became an underfunded as far as allocation and distribution were concerned. Changes in the structure between assets and retirees, in the age and dependency ratios, or the proportion of formal and informal jobs, have direct effects on the balance of the system. Although there are important capitalization regimes in the Brazilian pension system, as is the case of the pension funds, for the most part the majority of the paid out benefits are from distribution on unfunded allocation.66 There are also private pension programs which are capitalized and function as in most other societies. But this is not the case with the public ones. In each decade of the current century, reforms of the public pension systems have changed contributions and retirement benefits. But the system has still not been put on a viable basis and is ultimately sustained by ever higher government funding leading to the increasing indebtedness of the federal government. Like pensions, modern public health programs began in the 1920s associated with differing professional and worker pension funds and institutes which in the postwar period became ever more tied to the national pension schemes of the Social Security Institute. By the 1970s, a new model was elaborated, much influenced by the British Beveridge 66

Meiriane Nunes Amaro and Fernando B. Meneguin, A evolução da previdência social após a constituição de 1988. Senado Federal, https://www12.senado.leg .br/publicacoes/estudos-legislativos/tipos-de-estudos/outras-publicacoes/volumev-constituicao-de-1988-o-brasil-20-anos-depois.-os-cidadaos-na-carta-cidada/seguridadesocial-a-evolucao-da-previdencia-social-apos-a-constituicao-de-1988; Christiano Ferreira, “Mudança do Regime Previdenciário de Repartição para o Regime Misto: uma perspectiva para o Brasil,” Master’s thesis, PUC-RGS, Porto Alegre, 2012; Luciana Caduz da Almeida Costa, “O custo de peso morto do sistema previdenciário de repartição: analisando o caso brasileiro,” FGV, 2007, https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ dspace/handle/10438/310.

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Report of 1942, which sought to universalize healthcare for all citizens. First was the provision of emergency care for persons not covered by health plans under social security. Then in the Constitution of 1988 it was declared a right of all citizens to have healthcare provided by the government. Article 198 of the constitution called for the establishment of SUS a unified health system which would both cover all citizens no matter what their formal work status was, and in turn would be decentralized to states and municipalities which could best determine local needs, though funding would come primarily from the federal government. In the 1990s, most of the SUS reforms were instituted, including new funding from local and regional as well as federal government sources.67 There was also a concentrated effort to establish basic health clinics to provide primary care to all citizens and in 1994 these primary-care clinics were integrated into a family health program (PSF) under SUS. Coverage in the smaller towns and rural areas seems to have been successful, though these primary clinics have been slower to evolve in the larger cities.68 By the end of the twentieth century, the SUS employed close to half a million health professionals and was responsible for over 5,000 hospitals containing 430,000 beds, and maintained some 63,000 local care centers in all parts of the country.69 The number of hospital beds has remained stable since then and in 2009 there were 2.3 beds per thousand of the population, a reasonable rate by Latin American and world standards.70 Popular usage of 67

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A detailed history of this complex evolution toward a universal system is found in Otávio Azevedo Mercadante et al., “Evolução das políticas e do sistema de saúde no Brasil,” in Jacobo Finkelman, ed., Caminhos da saúde pública no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Fiocruz, 2002): 235–313. In 2009, over 80 percent of the population in municipalities of less than 20,000 persons were covered, while in large cities with over half a million persons such clinics covered only 30 percent of the population. IPEA, Políticas sociais: acompanhamento e análise, 19 (2011): 95. For a history of the evolution of primary care clinics see Allan Claudius Queiroz Barbosa, Júnia Marçal Rodrigues and Luís Fernando Rolim Sampaio, “De programa a estratégia: a saúde da família no Brasil em perspectiva. Um comparativo da década de 2000.” Paper presented at Anais do XIV Seminário sobre a Economia Mineira, 2010. Paulo Eduardo M. Elias and Amelia Cohn, “Health reform in Brazil: lessons to consider,” American Journal of Public Health, 93(1) (2003): 46. In the first decade of the twenty-first century WHO estimated that Brazil had 2.4 beds per thousand inhabitants, while all lower-middle income nations averaged 2.2 beds per thousand and most Latin American countries were below the Brazilian rate. As an example of a well functioning national health system, Canada had 3.4 beds per thousand inhabitants, which was well below the average for the richest countries of 5.9 beds, World Health Organization, World Health Statistics 2011 (Geneva, 2012), table 6, “Health workforce, infrastructure and essential medicines,”: 116–125.

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the system has increased over time. By 2009, the national average was 2.7 medical consultations per inhabitant at the SUS,71 and 90 percent of the women who gave birth in Brazil in 2009 had four or more pre-natal medical consultations and only 2 percent had none.72 By 2009, the country had 352,000 doctors (62 percent of whom were men), or 1.8 doctors per thousand inhabitants, which was also a reasonable rate by world standards.73 But Brazil still has not completely resolved all questions about financing its healthcare system.74 SUS and its organizations mostly cater to poorer people, while private plans and hospitals cater to mostly middleand upper-class clients. Moreover, it only devotes 29 percent of its financing to primary-care facilities and the rest to intermediate and advanced centers.75 Along with a state health system, the 1988 Constitution permitted the use of supplementary private health insurance plans in Brazil, though the ideal was for the use of non-profit providers. Quickly some 40 million persons signed up for these plans. Despite its minority status in Brazil, this system of private health insurance is the second largest private medical insurance market in the world today.76 All told, this multi-tired

71 72

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DATASUS, table F.1 “Número de consultas médicas (SUS) por habitante … por região, período:2009,” http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/deftohtm.exe?idb2010/f01.def. DATASUS, table F.6, “Cobertura de consultas de pré-natal proporção de nascidos vivos(%) por região e número de consultas, período:2009,” http://tabnet.datasus.gov .br/cgi/tabcgi.exe?idb2010/f06.def. This is a relatively good ratio by world standards. On average from 2000–2010, Canada had 1.9 doctors per thousand inhabitants with the majority of Latin American countries having less than 1.5 doctors and only Uruguay, Argentina and Cuba exceeding this rate with Cuba being an outlier with a very high ratio of 6.4 doctors per thousand inhabitants. Lower-middle income countries averaged 1.0 doctors and upper-middle income ones just 2.2 doctors per thousand inhabitants, WHO, World Health Statistics 2011: table 6. On the Brazil numbers see DATASUS, table E.1 “Número de profissionais de saúde por habitante… região, período:2009,” http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/deftohtm .exe?idb2010/e01.def. See, for example, Jairnilson Paim, Claudia Travassos, Celia Almeida, Ligia Bahia and James Macinko, “The Brazilian health system: history, advances, and challenges,” The Lancet, 377(9779) (2011): 1778–1797. DATASUS, table E.21 “Gasto do Ministério da Saúde com atenção à saúde per capita (em reais correntes), por componente, segundo ano Brasil:2004–2009,” http://tabnet .datasus.gov.br/cgi/idb2010/e21.htm. Mônica Viegas Andrade and Ana Carolina Maia, “Demanda por planos de saúde no Brasil,” ANPEC, Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia, 106 (2006): 3. In 2009, some 65 percent of the 430,000 hospital beds in the country were private and only 153,000 beds were available in public hospitals, DATASUS, Tabela “E.2 Número de leitos hospitalares por habitante – AMS/IBGE … por região, período:2009,” http:// tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/tabcgi.exe?idb2010/e02.def.

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and private and public healthcare system is still evolving, but there is little question that Brazil now has in place a decentralized healthcare system that is providing at least basic service to the entire population. If one had predicted the pattern of urbanization in the middle of the twentieth century it would be assumed by today that Brazil would be dominated by two large mega cities, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. In 1960, less than half of the Brazilian population lived in urban areas which was below the average even in Latin America, and well below the European and Central Asian average (of 55 percent).77 But the twenty-first century has brought a surprise change. First of all, Brazil in the period from 1960 to 2010 has gone from being one of the most rural societies in Latin America to one of the most urban ones. By the latest census of 2010, the urban population accounted for 83 percent of the national population, one of the highest in the Americas.78 Even more surprising is the change in the role of the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. They have not stopped growing, but by 2019 they represented only 13 percent of the cities with 50,000 or more inhabitants. The reason for this change has been the extraordinary expansion of secondary cities in the interior of all the states. By 2010, state capitals only contained 24 percent of the broadly defined urban population. By 2019 of the seventeen cities which had over 1 million persons, three of them were secondary cities (Guarulhos, Campinas and São Gonçalo). São Paulo alone had six secondary cities with populations listed as between 680,000 and 840,000 persons, while Minas Gerais had three secondary cities between half a million and 700,000.79 This massive rural-urban migration while often positive for the migrant, had serious consequences for the urban centers to which they arrived since the municipal governments were often unprepared or incapable of providing the housing and services needed to integrate these migrants. The migration accelerated the formation of the great urban conglomerates and the beginnings of the metropolitan regions with their satellite towns and cities. The lack of an adequate urban infrastructure and housing to accommodate the massive arrival of poorly educated migrants stimulated the establishment of poverty belts around the centers 77 78 79

UN, Population division, table “WUP2018-F02-Proportion_Urban.xls” https://esa .un.org/unpd/wup/Download/. IBGE, Sidra, table 202. IBGE, “Estimativas da população residente no Brasil e unidades da federação com data … de 1º de julho de 2019,” www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/9103estimativas-de-populacao.html?=&t=resultados.

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of towns and cities which usually grew in a disorderly, precarious and irregular way. This explains an essential characteristic of all the major Brazilian metropolitan regions. They are formed with an active, organic center where employment is concentrated, and poor peripheries with inadequate urban infrastructure which are often dormitory cities far from the urban center and requiring long daily commutes for workers to reach their jobs.80 But for all the difficulties this chaotic urbanization created for the migrants, their relocation improved their lives. The overall improvement of almost all social indicators in Brazil was influenced by urbanization. Cities provided more educational and health services than was available in the rural areas as well as far more jobs. Thus, this urban and regional migration transferred people from areas of lower economic productivity to the main dynamic poles of the country, where industry was concentrated and a broad labor market developed in manufacturing and services, capable of absorbing workers with extremely diverse levels of skills and education, including a major market for unskilled labor.81 It was only in the 1980 census that most rural homes finally had electricity and they did not catch up to the ratios in urban areas until the census of 2010. The same occurred with water piped into the home, which did not come close to urban levels until 2000. Although connection to a public sewage system in rural areas never caught up to the cities, in almost all other indices the biggest differences in services were eliminated (see Table 7.6). By 2010 for example cell phone ownership was little different in the two areas, and even with the Internet, over half of rural homes had an internet connection (53 percent) compared to 83 percent of urban homes.82 But the Internet is used by almost everyone. A study by Google in September 2020 found that 97 percent of cell phone users in Brazil connect to the Internet via a smartphone, and that 51 percent navigate the Internet exclusively via such phones. Moreover, exclusive cell phone use is higher among poorer people. Among the D and E (lower-middle and poor) classes, the ratio is 83 percent.83 If the migrants found services in good supply in the cities to which they migrated, the cities themselves were unprepared to house them. 80 81 82 83

Brito and Pinho, A dinâmica do processo de urbanização no Brasil: 13–14. Paul Singer, Economia política de la urbanización (Mexico: Siglo Ventiuno Editores, 1978): 44. Ipums 5 percent sample of Brazilian censuses. Mateus Camillo, “Relatório inédito do Google no Brasil mostra tendências de usuários de smartphones no país,” Folha, September 21, 2020.

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Table 7.6  Distribution of basic household services by urban and rural residence 1960–2010 Electricity

Piped water in home

Connected to public sewage system

Year

Rural Urban Total

Rural Urban Total

Rural Urban Total

1960 1970 1980 1991 2000 2010

29% 92% 68% 31% 90% 78% 69% 97% 94% 90% 100% 99% 96% 100% 100% 99% 100% 100%

11% 18% 44% 79% 90% 93%

69% 68% 86% 97% 98% 98%

47% 58% 81% 95% 98% 98%

0% 2% 5% 7% 15% 7%

42% 27% 60% 79% 85% 89%

26% 22% 53% 72% 79% 84%

Source: Ipums 5% sample of Brazilian censuses

Fiscal limitations prevented the major investments that would be needed to provide adequate infrastructure for the population that reached the main metropolitan centers. The lack of a long-term credit market to finance housing was coupled with laws that prevented the adjustment of rents for inflation.84 There were also serious legal issues concerning which institutions were to deal with these developments. Key areas of metropolitan transportation, sanitation, the environment, waste management and security, for example, still do not have the legal and institutional frameworks that allowed for the coherent management of these issues. This led to conflicts of interest between municipal and state authorities and hindered the creation of institutions and systems to deal with these issues.85 84

85

According to Santos, the Brazilian housing sector is in crisis. There is explosive growth in demand for urban housing (due to the intensification of the country’s urbanization). But capital is in short supply due to inflationary pressure, fixed nominal interest rates and populist laws in the rental market. He estimates a deficit of 8 million housing units, Cláudio Hamilton M. Santos, Políticas federais de habitação no Brasil: 1964/1980 (Brasília: Ipea, 1999): 10. Also see Sérgio de Azevedo and Luís Aureliano Gama de Andrade. Habitação e poder: da fundação da casa popular ao Banco Nacional de Habitação (Rio de Janeiro: Centro Edelstien de Pesquisas Sociais, 1982); Sérgio Azevedo, “Vinte e dois anos de política de habitação popular (1946–1986): criação, trajetória e extinção do BNH,” Revista de Administração Pública, 22(4) (1988):107–119; José Maria Aragão, Sistema financeiro da habitação. Uma análise juridica da gênese, desenvolvimento e crise do sistema (Curitiba: Juruá Editora, 2000). Lucia Camargos Melchiors and Heleniza Ávila Campo, “As regiões metropolitanas brasileiras no contexto do Estatuto da Metrópole: desafios a serem superados em direção à governança colaborativa,” Revista Política e Planejamento Regional, 3(2) (2016): 181–203; Joroen Johannes Klink, “Novas governanças para as áreas metropolitanas.

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Housing was the first fundamental issue to be faced by the immigrants. But it was also a major issue for long-term urban residents. There was a serious government attempt to meet housing need. In the 1960s, a new source of financing came through the Working Time Guarantee Fund (FGTS) which was created through a tax on salaries for employers and workers used to fund unemployment. The new system was an important long-term savings instrument, and its resources became the main source of financing for urban housing and sanitation works.86 This system for housing undoubtedly had an important role in the major expansion of middle-class housing and in publicly funded working-class housing. From the 1960s to the 1980s approximately 4.5 million homes were built, with just under half in the so-called average or middle-class market. The remainder consisted of traditional COHAB (metropolitan housing company), favela eradication programs, self-construction programs, cooperatives and programs developed by trade union associations. But only one-third of households were allocated to the poorest segment. Construction for these large projects was carried out in peripheral areas where land was cheaper but where little infrastructure existed, creating large housing complexes without adequate transportation and far from job-generating centers. This was the norm in the main Brazilian cities, and especially in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.87 Finally with inflation controlled with the Plan Real, two new government housing programs were created in 1997. The first was the System of Real Estate Financing (Sistema de Financiamento Imobiliário), which provided for the securitization of real estate loans mostly for commercial properties.88 The second was initiated by of the new Ministry of Cities in 2005, and eventually became the Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House My Life or MCMV).89 The second Lula and the Dilma

86

87

88 89

O panorama internacional e as perspectivas para o caso brasileiro,” Cadernos Metrópole (São Paulo), 11(22) (2009): 415–433; Sol Garson Braule Pinto, “Regiões metropolitanas: obstáculos institucionais à cooperação em políticas urbanas,” PhD thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2007. On the history of the formation of the BNH, including legal aspects see Aragão, Sistema financeiro da habitação: parts 1 and 2; and Claudia Magalhães Eloy. “O papel do sistema financeiro da habitação diante do desafio de universalizar o acesso à moradia digna no Brasil,” PhD thesis, FAU/USP, São Paulo, 2013. For a review of social and racial tensions in this and similar projects see Reinaldo José de Oliveira, “Segregação urbana e racial na cidade de São Paulo: as periferias de Brasilândia, Cidade Tiradentes e Jardim Ângela,” PhD thesis, PUC-SP, São Paulo, 2008. Fundação Getúlio Vargas, O Crédito imobiliário no Brasil: chapter 2 Law 11.977 of 7 July 2009.

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Rousseff governments decided to use the MCMV program to serve the various segments of the housing sector and to reduce the estimated deficit of 7.2 million dwellings. It was intended to meet the needs of the poorest segments by producing 400,000 units for the families earning up to three minimum wages, which would be developed with a massive contribution of fiscal resources from the federal government which proposed to provide 70 percent of the investment in housing for poor families.90 Between 2009 and 2016, some 4.5 million dwellings were contracted and 3.2 million of them were finished and delivered. Of the units which were built and delivered, around 40 percent were allocated to the poorest families with the government providing 90 percent of the cost of the housing.91 But even this effort has not resolved the urban housing crisis. The failure to fulfill housing needs has led to illegal occupation of undeveloped urban areas or empty buildings in the central areas of cities, and has created a major alternative housing arrangement. These settlements are broadly known as favelas or shantytowns.92 The municipal and federal governments initially adopted favela eradication programs, displacing their inhabitants and relocating them to the peripheral regions of 90

91

92

Caio Santo Amore, “Minha Casa Minha Vida para iniciantes,” in Caio Santo Amore, Lúcia Zainin Shimbo and Maria Beatriz Cruz Rufino, eds., Minha Casa … e a cidade? Avaliação do programa Minha Casa Minha Vida em seis estados brasileiros (Rio de Janeiro: Letra Capital, 2015): 11–28. Avaliação de politícas públicas, Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida, Brasília, Congresso Nacional, Consultoria de Orçamentos, Fiscalização e Controle, 2007, http://www2 .camara.leg.br/orcamento-da-uniao/estudos/2017/InformativoAvaliacaoPoliticas PublicasPMCMV_WEB.pdf. There is an enormous literature on the establishment and organization of the favelas and life within these centers, mostly for those in Rio de Janeiro. See the classic studies of Janice E. Perlman, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979) and Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). On the early evolution of the Rio favelas see Brodwyn Fischer, A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio De Janeiro (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). Recent studies on these Rio favelas include Bryan McCann, Hard Times in the Marvelous city: From Dictatorship to Democracy in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); Robert Gay, Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: A tale of Two Favelas (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010); More specific studies include Enríque Desmond Arias, “Faith in our neighbors: networks and social order in three Brazilian favelas,” Latin American Politics and Society, 46(1) (2004): 1–38. On the role of crime in the favelas and how this relates to the wider society see Enrique Desmond Arias, Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: Trafficking, Social Networks, and Public Security (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

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the cities and building new housing estates without infrastructure and far from the places that generate employment, income and services. But more recently local governments have decided to regularize and incorporate the favelas into city life through intensified programs of urbanization of favelas and regularization of land titles. But the location of the majority of favelas is still a major issue. The residents of these favelas and poor metropolitan suburbs live in areas far away from their workplaces, requiring long journeys which consume daily hours for millions of people and using a slow and low quality polluting transport system. Moreover, the census of 2010 showed a serious housing deficit in favelas and nonfavela areas alike, with substandard housing in terms of construction and access to modern sewage systems. In the 2010 census, only 54 percent of the urban population was served by a general fluvial sewage network.93 Another major problem facing all urban areas is the steady increase in crime and violence. Brazil has experienced increasing penetration of drug trafficking which greatly affects the urban poor and leads to high and increasing levels of crime. Moreover, the long delays common to the Brazilian judicial system create both a sense of insecurity for the population as a whole and a sense of impunity for the criminal class. At the same time, the penitentiary system itself is broken. According to the National Penitentiary Department of the Ministry of Justice, the prisons are overcrowded, violent and controlled by criminal gangs. Brazil as of June 2017 had a prison population of 726,000 people with space for only 423,000 prisoners. The imprisonment rate is 350 prisoners for every 100,000 inhabitants which puts it among the countries with the highest rates, though less than half the rate of the United States.94 One response to the problems of new urban living, such as poor housing, crime and other areas of stress on families and relationships especially from a rural background is religion. The Pentecostal churches are an example of one of the more more spectacularly growing private associations of Brazil and for a time even the Catholic Church was a major player in organizing popular associations, aside from its usual charity organizations.95 Since the end of the military era, there has been a relative 93 94 95

IBGE, Sidra, tables 3370, 3217 and 3382. Levantamento Nacional de Informações Penitenciárias. Infopen – junho 2017, Departamento Penitenciário Nacional, Ministério da Justiça (Brasilia, 2019): 6, table 1. These Church founded base communities or CEBS (comunidades eclesiais de base) were established in the 1970s and were of great importance during the military era, with many adopting the ideas of liberation theology. But the end of the dictatorship and the move toward the right in the Roman Catholic Church reduced their social activism

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decline of the Catholic Church in such activities and in its role in society in general. In contrast, there has been an extraordinary expansion of Pentecostal religious associations in this formerly overwhelmingly Roman Catholic country. In 1950, some 93 percent of Brazilians identified themselves as members of the Roman Catholic Church.96 Sixty years later in the census of 2010, only 65 percent identified themselves as such. Although Brazil remains the largest Roman Catholic country in the world in the twenty-first century, it is now the world’s fourth-largest Protestant country and has the largest Pentecostal population in the world.97 This makes it the one of the largest Christian countries of the world, second only to the United States.98 The major change was not in the increase in traditional Protestant religions which had arrived in the nineteenth century, but was due to the rise of evangelical Protestantism in the twentieth century.99 By 1964, Pentecostals represented 65 percent of all Protestants and the formerly

96 97 98 99

considerably and their relative importance in the urban centers of Brazil after 1990. See Ana Jacira dos Santos, “As comunidades eclesiais de base no período de 1970 a 2000,” PhD thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, Natal, 2002. IBGE, Recenseamento Geral de 1950, Série Nacional, vol. 1, table 8: 30. Paul Freston, “‘Neo-Pentecostalism’ in Brazil: problems of definition and the struggle for hegemony,” Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 44(105) (1999): 145. These are estimates for all the world’s countries from the Pew Religious Census of 2010, www.pewforum.org/2011/12/19/table-christian-population-in-numbers-by-country/. Historians of Protestantism in Brazil usually divide the movement into two groups, those religions introduced by immigrants (protestantismo de imigração) who brought their religion with them, and those which were introduced by missionaries from Europe or North America (protestatismo de missão). The German Lutherans are an example of the first, but almost all the other traditional Protestant religions were introduced either by immigrants or missionaries coming from their home countries to minister to their nationals as well as seeking Brazilian converts. IBGE has defined all of these traditional churches as Missionary Evangelicals (Evangélicas de Missão). All were introduced in the nineteenth century and they include the Lutheran Church (which was established in Brazil in 1823) and is the largest of traditional churches followed by the Presbyterians in 1859, the Methodists (1867) and the Baptists (1882). Finally coming only after 1900 are the Pentecostals (called by IBGE Evangélicas de origem Pentecostal), which have both missionary and indigenous origins. The first were missionary founded Pentecostal churches such as the Congregação Cristã no Brasil (1910) and the Assembleia de Deus (1911) – both are still the largest of the Pentecostal churches and both were founded just a few years after the birth of the Pentecostal movement in 1906 in Los Angeles. This first wave of Pentecostal churches was followed by numerous immigrant missionary-, and finally native-founded Pentecostal churches throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. See Carl Joseph Hahn, História do culto protestante no Brasil (São Paulo, 1981), Antonio Gouvêa Mendonça and Prócoro Velasques Filho, Introdução ao protestantismo no Brasil (São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 1990); and Paul Freston, “Protestantes e política no Brasil: da constituente ao impeachment,” PhD thesis, UNICAMP, Campinas 1993: 41.

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dominant Baptists now account for just 9 percent.100 From 1991 to 2010, all Protestants groups went from 9 percent to 24 percent of the population, but it was the Pentecostal churches which increased their share from 6 percent of the population in 1991 to 20 percent in 2010 leaving just 4 percent observing the traditional Protestant religions. What is impressive about all these developments is that these Pentecostal churches are essentially based in Brazil, and although many originated from foreign missionaries or have some international connections, they are now fully staffed by Brazilian ministers. The two largest, the Assembly of God and the Congregation Church of Christ were both born at the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States and both were immediately implanted in Brazil in 1910 and 1911 respectively, just a few years after their original foundation.101 The fourth largest was the Evangelical Quadrangular church also founded in the United States in 1922 and brought by missionaries to Brazil only in 1951. But the third largest group was the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, or IURD) which was only founded in 1977 in São Paulo by a Brazilian pastor, and is uniquely Brazilian national church. It has been a leader among the Pentecostal churches in sending missionaries overseas and promoting televangelism.102 But Brazilian society has also recently shown a surprising growth of modern voluntary associations on a vast scale, especially since 1985. Brazil, like most Latin American countries, is thought to have a limited civil society compared to such countries as the United States. Some scholars have argued that this supposed lack of voluntary institutions is somehow 100 101 102

Candido Procópio Ferreira de Camargo, ed., Católicos, protestantes, espíritas (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1973): 121, table 2. Ricardo Mariano, “Expansão pentecostal no Brasil: o caso da Igreja Universal,” Estudos Avançados, 18 (52) (2004): 123. Cecília L. Mariz, “Missão religiosa e migração: ‘novas comunidades’ e igrejas pentecostais brasileiras no exterior,” Análise Social, XLIV(1) (2009): 163. The Assembleias de Deus (AD) and the Pentecostal “Deus é Amor” (IPDA) have also begun to send missionaries. By 2015 it is estimated that the Pentecostal Churches of Brazil – most them of native origin – had missionaries in 180 countries in the world. Carmen Rial, “Neo-Pentecostals on the pitch: Brazilian football players as missionaries abroad,” in Jeffrey D. Needell, ed., Emergent Brazil: Key Perspectives on a New Global Power (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2015): 150–151. In 1990 the IURD church bought the TV Record channel and started a new age of TV evangelism. See Patricia Birman and David Lehmann, “Religion and the media in a battle for ideological hegemony: the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God and TV Globo in Brazil,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, 18(2) (1999): 145–164. The IURD owns the enormous Templo de Salomão, in São Paulo, measuring 100,000 square meters.

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detrimental to the evolution of democratic institutions in the region.103 But in this, Brazil is more like the majority of nations in the world, in that the government often provides many of the social and cultural needs of its citizens, which is far less common in the United States. Like most democratic societies, however, Brazil does have a vibrant civic culture made up of a complex mix of voluntary associations which range from private non-profits to semi-autonomous public-private organizations. It also has a tradition of mass popular protest movements. These voluntary organizations can be found in everything from religious associations to musical societies, from samba schools to football fan clubs and to relatively well organized protest movements of all kinds. The country has innumerable non-profit non-governmental organizations defending, teaching, promoting or analyzing everything from the poor to industrialists, from children to the elderly, from Amerindians to homosexuals, from animals to rain forests. There are probably as many associations defending women, children or sexual minorities as there are pressure groups defending the interests of cooperatives, producers, consumers or industrialists. In addition, it has strong and powerful corporate advocacy groups, representing segments of the civil service, such as teachers, tax officials, or judges. Even neighborhood associations are now to be found everywhere. Although many scholars date the rise of these non-profit organizations and social movements to civil opposition to the military era (1964–1985), some of these foundations and entities were created long before. At the same time in the post-military era there has been an ever increasing number of these organizations established every decade, numbering several hundred thousand today, with volunteers and employees reaching over 2 million persons.104 In a somewhat unusual arrangement the lines between voluntary organizations and the state are not an either or situation. That is some voluntary associations 103

104

See the survey of these opinions in Leonardo Avritzer, “Democratization and changes in the pattern of association in Brazil,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42(3) (Autumn, 2000): 59–76. For a survey of the major areas in which these private non-profit entities operate (officially called “Fundações Privadas e Associações sem Fins Lucrativos”) see Aldino Graef and Valéria Salgado, Relações de parceria entre poder público e entes de cooperação e colaboração no Brasil (Brasília: Editora IABS, 2012). In the pre-military era, these social movements were viewed in a certain way as unlawfi, since they substituted political parties. But the military regimes prevented the parties from functioning and thus opened the space for these new actors. Often cited as typical of these new movements were the CEBs – or comunidades esclesias de base. Céli Regina Jardim Pinto, “As ONGs e a política no Brasil: presença de Novos Atores,” Dados, 49(3) (2006): 650–651.

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receive funds or legal support by the state and others had no connection to the state and still others perform services for the government but are autonomous. These are called in Brazil Fundações Privadas e Associações sem Fins Lucrativos (FASFILs), or simply NGOs (non-government organizations or ONGs in Portuguese). The hundreds of thousands of voluntary non-profit private associations, institutions and research centers which have filled the public space between citizens and the state have represented different classes and also crossed class boundaries. These have included everything from research groups studying crime to NGOs protecting the environment.105 Recently these social movements expanded and evolved into a whole world of associations, organizations and institutions which have been labeled as the so-called third sector – that is the world of autonomous organizations dealing with policy and socio-economic issues that are neither government controlled or directly market related.106 According to the PNAD continuous survey of 2016 there were 6.5 million people who did voluntary activity, which corresponds to 3.9 percent of the population aged fourteen older, and by 2017 the figure had increased to 7.4 million persons or 4.4 percent of the total population over the age of fourteen.107 Thus, the country that is Brazil today is a far different place than it was some sixty years ago when it was still mainly rural and illiterate. It is now primarily urban, literate and with a large middle class. It is no longer monolithically Catholic as it was then and is now the largest Pentecostal country in the world with Brazilian Pentecostal churches now playing a major role in politics as well as in religion. From one of the world’s highest fertility rates, it has now joined the rest of the world with low fertility which in a few more decades will lead to the negative growth of the

105

106

107

It has been suggested that the ONG designation only came into common use in Brazil in the 1990s as these organizations experienced a major spurt of growth. See Ana Claudio Chaves Teixeira, Identidade em construção: as organizações não-​ governamentais no processo Brasileiro de democratização (São Paulo: A ­ nnaBlume, 2003): 17. For a useful breakdown of the major areas where these entities operate and their activity, see Maria da Glória Gohn, Movimentos sociais e redes de mobilizações civis no Brasil contemporâneo (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 2010); and Nathalie Lebon, ­“Professionalization of women’s health groups in São Paulo: the troublesome road towards organizational diversity,” Organization, 3(4) (1996): 589. Taken from PNADct (continuous), https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/ agencia-noticias/2012-agencia-de-noticias/noticias/20913-voluntariado-aumentou-em-8 40-mil-pessoas-em-2017. On the volunteers see also Luisa de Azevedo Senra Soares, “A oferta de trabalho voluntário no Brasil,” Master’s thesis, FEA, USP, São Paulo, 2014.

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population. Women today are now significantly participating in the work force, and like most of the advanced countries of the world they are the majority in secondary and tertiary education and well represented in the professional classes. There is also the recent evolution of voluntary organizations which further support an open and democratic society even as the political class has fractured and right-wing populism has come to dominate the federal government. For all the gains there have been loses. Cities have grown chaotically. Housing deficit is still significant. Modern sanitation is far from universal and urban crime and drugs are almost uncontrollable in many areas. But despite the serious urban problems, the social changes which have occurred over these last two decades have confirmed and solidified longterm changes. Fertility is down. Women are now better educated than men and are increasingly found in all sectors of the labor force. Mortality has declined at all ages and longevity is now reaching developed-world standards. Most importantly of all Belindia has become a unified Brazil. Decentralization of industry, universal health and welfare, and the growth of modern agriculture in all the Northern and West-Central states have moved the country to a common standard. During this period, the Center-West has emerged as equally wealthy and advanced as the older Southeastern and Southern regions. Both the North and Northeast are quickly catching up with these centers in most indices. Brazil entered the twenty-first century as a far more coherent and modern nation with a standard of life now equal or above the most advanced of its neighbors in South America. In economic development, there have also been many positive achievements as major obstacles were overcome, such as chronic inflation and external fragility. As we have already emphasized throughout this work, Brazil’s crises for 100 years, from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the 1990s, were mostly crises caused or amplified by external debt and negative or declining balance of payments. Since the external debt was negotiated, and given the good performance of the trade balance along with the intense inflow of foreign capital, an exceptional volume of reserves has been accumulated, which allowed Brazil to overcome the 2008 crisis and the post 2020 crisis with the pandemic and the Ukraine war. The functioning of the economy, despite rising inflation levels, which became explosive in the 1980s and early 1990s, depended on the instrument of monetary correction. After several unsuccessful, orthodox and heterodox attempts, the Real Plan effectively stopped the inflationary

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process, which despite fluctuations over the past twenty years has remained at adequate levels. At the same time that agriculture has achieved an exceptional level of performance, industry lost its dynamism growing less than the rest of the economy, losing competitiveness and declining exports. Among the many causes of this crisis of industry are the maintenance of the persistently valued exchange rate and the so-called “Brazil cost” due to poor infrastructure and chaotic taxes at state and federal level. But it does not explain all the failure, as agriculture suffers form the same problems and overcame them to become a world leader in this most recent period. Finally, and perhaps most significant is the loss of growth momentum. Since 1980, Brazil has grown at an average rate of only 2.3 percent per annum, slightly more than the average population growth in the period which was 1.5 percent. The crisis caused by the world pandemic has further prejudiced this growth while rising world food and fuel prices have even threatened to increase poverty levels. In addition, the fiscal effort to overcome the crisis has significantly increased the public deficit and stoked inflation, which is a worrying trajectory. If the past is history, the future is problematic without a coherent government plan to promote economic growth. If economic stability is essential, there is no evidence that stability alone will result in sustainable and adequate growth for a country that is still relatively poor and still with unresolved issues of inequality. Lula’s return to power still represents an uncertainty, since during the fourteen years of the Workers’ Party government many different and often conflicting economic policies were implemented. The fight against inequality will be a central point of his policy, but there is not the same certainty about financial stability and the capacity for growth.

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Index

African immigration impact of, 168 African slaves, 57 immigration of, 49 major source of, 61 market, 57 plantation system, xvii agregados, 87 agribusiness exports, 261 agricultural credit subsidy in, 225 agricultural labor, 86 agricultural modernization military support, 225 agricultural productivity data, 260 agriculture, xvii, xviii, 217, 224, 298 growth of, xviii modernization of, 225 subsistence, 108 agro-exporting economy, 207 Amazon, 2 basin, 7 deforestation, 4 Amazonian forest pre-Columbian populations, 40 artisan corporations system of, 89 Atlantic Forest, 2 Atlantic slave trade end of the, 110 Bahia, 56, 62, 65, 70, 98, 100 balance of payments, 196, 207, 227

bandeiras, 55, 71 Belindia, 243, 297 black earth, 38 BNDES, 259 Bolsa Alimentação, 281 Bolsa Escola, 281 Bolsa Família, 260 Bolsonaro, Jair, 265 Bolsonaro government, 267 Brasília, 216 Brazil, xvii biomes, 2 electrical system, 11 geography, 21 hydrographic basins, 6 mineral products, 12 national integration, 21 population, 18 precipitation and temperatures, 10 regions, 13 territory, 1 Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), 225 budget deficits, 202 building basic infrastructure period of, 215 Caatinga, 3, 6 Cabral, Pedro Álvares, 50, 52 caixas de pensões, 213 câmaras (town councils), 93 cane production volume of, 69

353

354

Index

cane sugar, xvii CAPES, 240 capital market, 219 CAPs (or Caixa de Aposentadoria e Pensões), 213 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 250, 251 Cardoso government, 281 Catholic Church, 292 cattle, 70 economy, 67 industry, 81 cattle ranching expansion of, 148 Ceará, 65 Center-West, 18, 20, 22, 297 Central Bank, 219 Cerrado, 2, 4, 17, 21, 226 charqueadas, 81 China, 260, 263 entrance into world market, 257 city of São Paulo, 66 Clovis hunters, 24 CNPQ, 240 coastal shipping, 114, 132 cocoa, 125, 195 coffee, xvii, 94, 100, 263 characteristics of supply and demand, 118 expansion of, 194 initial expansion of, 109 as main export product, 108 market, 130, 202 overproduction crisis, 203 towns, 187 coffee production, 199 the concentration of, 194 COHAB (metropolitan housing company), 290 Collor, Fernando, 249 colonato system, 179 colonial and imperial period elite of, 151 colonial domination structure of, 75 colonization policy, 53 colonos, 180, 184 color definition, 245 color self-identity change of, 244 commercial balance, 255 Companhia Geral de Comércio do Grão Pará e Maranhão, 95

Companhia Pernambuco e Grão Pará, 96 Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional, 210, 251 Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, 210, 251 concentration of income process of, 222 consensual unions, 236 Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT), 212 Constitution of 1988, 279, 285 corn, 263 corruption scheme, 265 cotton, xvii, 65, 99, 108, 121, 122, 195, 263 supply of, 122 cotton industrial sector major expansion in, 197 crime and violence, 292 crisis of the 1980s, xviii Cruzado Plan, 228 currency board, 204 D. Pedro II Railroad, 115 decade of the 1990s, xviii demographic and legal changes consequence of, 235 demographic structure, 160 demographic transition, xix, 193 Diamond District, 79 diamonds, xvii, 71 Dilma, 265, 290 the impeachment of, 265 domestic market, 109, 114, 117, 148 creation of, 193 donatary captaincies, 53 Dutra government, 214 early man migration routes, 31 original population, 28 the route, 29 settlement of, 23 economic growth, xvii, xix economic inequality, xviii economy and society changes in, 192 education, 107, 239 level of, 273, 275 primary, xix primary and secondary, 189, 239 university system, xviii electricity, 215

Index Embrapa, 255 Encilhamento, 196, 197 engenhos (sugar mills), 62, 68 environmental movements, xviii escravos de ganho, 156 Espírito Santo, 132 ethanol, 122 European immigrants, xviii, 181 arrival of, 108, 111 exchange rate devaluation, 257 external debt moratorium, 193 renegotiation of, 199 structure of, 223 factories, 52 faiscadores, 75 favelas, 269, 283, 291 fazendeiros, 185 Federal District (the city of Rio de Janeiro), 197 female labor participation rate, 243 fertility, 143, 160, 187, 193, 270, 296 decline of, 232, 243 first generation immigrant, 186 fiscal regime, 259 Fiscal Responsibility Law, 254 foreign capital the inflow of, 263 foreign debt, 226 foreign loans dependence on, 137 foreign trade taxation of, 136 foreign trade series, 148 forros (liberated slaves), 87 Franco, Itamar, 251 free Afro-Brazilians, 72 free immigration impact of, 168 free persons of color, 140 growing population of, 139 free population of color. sexual division and age, 172 free wage labor, 192 Fundações Privadas e Associações sem Fins Lucrativos (FASFILs), 296 Furtado, Celso, 144 Gama, Vasco de, 50 ganhadores, 158

355

GDP (gross domestic product), 207, 265 global warming, 4 Goals Plan, 216 Goiás, 78 gold, xvii, 71, 94 opening up of mines of, 20 gold and diamond exports decline of, 97 gold mining declining of, 74 impact of, 93 Goulart, João, 217 government’s privatization program, 253 Great Depression, 210 growth momentum loss of, 298 Guarantee Fund for Length of Service (FGTS, Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço), 220 Hospedaria dos Imigrantes, 111 households, 236, 273 organization of, 177 human DNA genetic studies of, 24 studies of, 25 humans arrival date to the Americas, 23 IMF, 193, 227 agreement with, 253 immigrants mobility in the rural area, 185 immigration, 139 import substitution policy, 214 imports, 125 Inca empire, 34 income concentration of, 193 income inequality levels of, 283 income per capita, 146 income transfer policies the results of, 282 income transfer programs, 260, 281 indexed economy, 250 Indian slave laborers, 55 replacement of, 64 Indian-European relations, 53 Indian-Portuguese relations, 55 Indians, 53

356 industrial activity development of, 187 industrialization support for, 207 industrialization process, 136 industry, 108, 148 crisis of, 298 growth of, 199 national automotive, 216 inequality, 298 infant mortality, 162, 230, 268 inflation, 147, 193, 196, 223, 226, 227, 250, 255, 258, 290, 297 inflationary pressures, 216 Instituto Adolfo Lutz, 229 Instituto Butantan, 229 Instituto Manguinhos, 229 internal migration, 236 international economic environment the importance of, 263 Janio Quadros government, 217 Kubitschek, Juscelino, 214 labor movement, 190, 279 evolution of, 211 land reform, 225 lavradores, 153 lavradores (planters without mills), 62 Leff, Nathaniel H., 146, 147 life expectancy, 141, 160, 193, 230, 244, 268 life expectancy at birth, 166 Lisboa, Antônio Francisco (called the “Aleijadinho”), 90 literacy rate, 107, 239 livestock industry, 108 low labor costs, 147 Lula government, 263, 267, 281 macroeconomic tripod, 254 mamelucos, 63, 64 Maranhão, 35, 65, 70, 96, 99 Marques de Pombal the government of, 94 marriage, 175, 179 Mata Atlântica, 5 Mato Grosso, 78 merchant class, 91 Mercosur, 250

Index mestizos, 63 migration rural to urban, 193 military dictatorship, 218 military period, 279 military regimes characteristics, 218 fundamental objective, 221 Minas Gerais, 37, 71, 78, 94, 109, 132, 194, 287 Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House My Life or MCMV), 290 Minha Casa Minha Vida Program, 260 mining activity, 84 mining code of 1702, 76 mining industry, 67 mobility, xix Moche civilization, 34 modern central mills (usinas), 122 adoption of, 121 modern welfare state, 278 creation of, 193 monetary correction program creation of, 219 monetary indexation, 219 moratorium, xviii mortality, 141, 160, 187, 193, 230, 268, 297 movement of rural workers to urban centers, 238 mule trains, 114 national accounts system of, 144 National Bank for Economic Development (BNDE), 214 National Housing Bank (BNH, Banco Nacional da Habitação), 220 national income, 146 National Rural Credit (SNCR), 225 National Social Security Institute (INSS or Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social), 279 non-Africans enslavement of, 60 North, 268 North region, 14 Northeast, 85, 103, 187, 245, 268 Northeast region, 16 Northeastern sugar economy, 97

Index Northeastern sugar industry dynamism of, 103 Northern, 22, 268, 297 oil refining, 215 opening the economy to the world market, 248 orange juice, 263 Pampa, 3, 5 Pantanal, 3, 5 Pará, 35 Paraguay War, 151 Paraíba Valley, 196 Paraná, 208 pardos, 172 pardos (browns), 151 pardos (or mulattos), 64 party system, 248 pension funds, 284 Pentecostal churches, 292, 294 per capita income, xvii, 108, 146 Pernambuco, 56, 62, 65, 70, 96, 98 Petrobras, 253, 259, 265 Piauí, 37, 70, 65 Plan Real, 290 Plano de Metas (Goals Plan), 214 Plano Real, 250 plantation slave regimes, 59 population class and occupational structure, 153 free black, xviii growth of, 102 Portugal expansion of, 43, 49 fertility, 45 household, 47 life expectancy, 47 merchant activity, 50 migration, rate of, 48 mortality, 45 pre-historical period communities of, 41 pre-sale program, 265 President Campos Salles, 199 President Collor impeachment of, 250 pretos (blacks), 151, 172 primary and secondary education, xix, 279 private health insurance system of, 286

357

Program to Encourage Restructuring and Strengthening the National Financial System (Proer), 252 Program to Eradicate Child Labor (Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil or PETI), 281 public health programs, 284 rail transport system, 115 railroad system, 193 Real Extração organization, 80 Real Plan, 253, 297 republic emergence of the, 194 republican government monetary policy, 196 Rio de Janeiro, 56, 62, 69, 84, 98, 109, 130, 189, 194, 287 capital of colony, 93 transfer the colonies headquarters, 85 Rio de la Plata basin, 9 Rio Grande do Sul, 81, 132 mules, raising of, 82 rubber, xvii, 108, 123, 148, 195 rural workers, 280 rural-urban migration, 287 sambaqui, 35, 36 communities, 41 Santa Catarina, 36 Santos port of, 114, 115, 132 São Francisco River basin, 9 São Paulo, 88, 132, 181, 187, 189, 194, 197, 287 the city of, 53 province of, 94 the state of, 1 Second National Development Plan, 224 second oil shock of 1979, 226 Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), 221 Sergipe, 65 seringueiros, 123 sesmaria system, 150 Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da, or Lula, 221, 257, 290, 298 slave labor, 110, 154 abolition of, 110 ownership structure, 86

358 slave population growth rate of, 139 slave trade, 146 slavery abolition of, 108, 140, 179, 191 social changes, xviii, 297 social mobility, xviii impact on, 240 social question, 190, 211 Sorocaba, 82, 113 South, 144 South America, xvii South American settlers first eastern, 35 South region, 17 Southeast, 103, 144 Southeast region, 17 Southeastern, 187, 297 Southern, 187, 268, 297 soybeans, 263 stabilization fund, 206 stock market, 221 strike activity centers of, 211 sugar, 56, 67, 94, 263 sugar industry, 67 concentration of, 70 sugar market, 119 sugar production, 121 introduction of, 58 occupations outside of, 63 SUS, 246, 285 System of Real Estate Financing (Sistema de Financiamento Imobiliário), 290

Index Taubaté Convention, 204 tobacco, 65, 100, 108 trade balance, 134 transport sector, 113 transport system, 116 tropeiros, 91 Tupi language speakers, 42 Tupi-Guarani, 42 university students. expansion of, 240 urban slavery, 156, 159 urbanization, xix, 193 Vale do Paraíba, 109 Vargas, 211, 214, 279 arrival of, 212 return of, 214 Vargas, Getúlio, 207, 278 Vargas social policy social welfare institutions, 213 voluntary organizations, 295 voting lists, 153 voting process, 190 War of the Emboabas, 75 Washington Consensus, 249 welfare system, xviii West Central, 297 women in the labor force, 273 participation of, 275 Workers Party (PT), 257 Working Time Guarantee Fund (FGTS), 290 zona da mata, 93, 109