Borderless Worlds for Whom?: Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities [1 ed.] 0815360029, 9780815360025, 9780429427817

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Borderless Worlds for Whom?

The optimism heralded by the end of the Cold War and the idea of an emerging borderless world was soon shadowed by conflicts, wars, terrorism, and new border walls. Migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees have simultaneously become key political figures. Border and mobility studies are now two sides of the same coin. The chapters of this volume reflect the changing relations between borders, bordering practices, and mobilities. They provide both theoretical insights and contextual knowledge on how borders, bordering practices, and ethical issues come together in mobilities. The chapters scrutinize how bounded (territorial) and open/networked (relational) spaces manifest in various contexts. The first section, ‘Borders in a borderless world’, raises theoretical questions. The second, ‘Politics of inclusion and exclusion’, looks at bordering practices in the context of migration. The third section, ‘Contested mobilities and encounters’, focuses on tourism, which has been an ‘accepted’ form of mobility but which has recently become an object of critique because of overtourism. Section four, ‘Borders, security, politics’, examines bordering practices and security in the EU and beyond, highlighting how the migration/border politics nexus has become a national and supra-national political challenge. The chapters of this interdisciplinary volume contribute both conceptually and empirically to understanding contemporary bordering practices and mobilities. It is essential reading for geographers, political scientists, sociologists, and international relations scholars interested in the contemporary meanings of borders and mobilities. Anssi Paasi is Professor of Geography at the University of Oulu, Finland, and the Director of the RELATE Center of Excellence (Academy of Finland). Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola is Senior Research Fellow at the Geography Research Unit, University of Oulu, Finland, and a Docent in Human Geography and Border Studies at the University of Eastern Finland. Jarkko Saarinen is Professor of Geography at the University of Oulu, Finland, and Distinguished Visiting Professor (Sustainability Management) at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. Kaj Zimmerbauer is Docent at the University of Oulu, Finland, and Scientific Coordinator in the RELATE Center of Excellence (Academy of Finland).

Border Regions Series Series Editor: Doris Wastl-Walter, University of Bern, Switzerland

In recent years, borders have taken on an immense significance. Throughout the world they have shifted, been constructed and dismantled, and become physical barriers between socio-political ideologies. They may separate societies with very different cultures, histories, national identities or economic power, or divide people of the same ethnic or cultural identity. As manifestations of some of the world’s key political, economic, societal and cultural issues, borders and border regions have received much academic attention over the past decade. This valuable series publishes high-quality research monographs and edited comparative volumes that deal with all aspects of border regions, both empirically and theoretically. It will appeal to scholars interested in border regions and geopolitical issues across the whole range of social sciences. The Politics of Good Neighbourhood State, Civil Society and the Enhancement of Cultural Capital in East Central Europe Béla Filep European Borderlands Living with Barriers and Bridges Edited by Elisabeth Boesen and Gregor Schnuer Ethnicity, Gender and the Border Economy Living in the Turkey–Georgia Borderlands Latife Akyüz Community, Change and Border Towns H. Pınar Şenoğuz Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities Edited by Anssi Paasi, Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola, Jarkko Saarinen and Kaj Zimmerbauer For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/geography/ series/ASHSER-1224

Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities Edited by Anssi Paasi, Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola, Jarkko Saarinen and Kaj Zimmerbauer

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business. © 2019 selection and editorial matter, Anssi Paasi, Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola, Jarkko Saarinen and Kaj Zimmerbauer; individual chapters, the contributors. The right of Anssi Paasi, Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola, Jarkko Saarinen and Kaj Zimmerbauer to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book. ISBN: 978-0-815-36002-5 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-42781-7 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd.

Contents

List of illustrations List of contributors Preface 1

Introduction: borders, ethics, and mobilities

viii ix xv 1

ANSSI PAASI, EEVA-KAISA PROKKOLA, JARKKO SAARINEN, AND KAJ ZIMMERBAUER

PART I

Borders in a borderless world 2

Borderless worlds and beyond: challenging the state-centric cartographies

19

21

ANSSI PAASI

3

Imagining a borderless world

37

HARALD BAUDER

4

Borders, distance, politics

49

PAOLO NOVAK

PART II

Politics of inclusion and exclusion 5

‘Borderless’ Europe and Brexit: young European migrant accounts of media uses and moralities

63

65

AIJA LULLE

6

Everyday bordering, healthcare, and the politics of belonging in contemporary Britain KATHRYN CASSIDY

78

vi Contents 7

‘Delay and neglect’: the everyday geopolitics of humanitarian borders

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ELISA PASCUCCI, JOUNI HÄKLI, AND KIRSI PAULIINA KALLIO

8

Asylum reception and the politicization of national identity in Finland: a gender perspective 108 EEVA-KAISA PROKKOLA

PART III

Contested mobilities and encounters 9

Tourism, border politics, and the fault lines of mobility

121 123

RAOUL V. BIANCHI AND MARCUS L. STEPHENSON

10

Commodification of contested borderscapes for tourism development: viability, community representation, and equity of relic Iron Curtain and Sudetenland heritage tourism landscapes

139

ARIE STOFFELEN AND DOMINIQUE VANNESTE

11

Contested mobilities across the Hong Kong-Shenzhen border: the case of Sheung Shui

154

J.J. ZHANG

PART IV

Borders, security, politics 12

Trade, Trump, security, and ethics: the Canada–US border in continental perspective

167

169

HEATHER N. NICOL AND KAREN G. EVERETT

13

Ontological (in)security: the EU’s bordering dilemma and neighbourhood

184

JUSSI P. LAINE AND JAMES W. SCOTT

14

An ethical code for cross-border governance: what does the European Union say on the ethics of cross-border cooperation? ELISABETTA NADALUTTI

197

Contents 15

The role of ‘nature’ at the EU maritime borders: agency, ethics, and accountability

vii 212

ESTELA SCHINDEL

16

Afterword: borders are there to be crossed (but not by everybody)

224

NOEL B. SALAZAR

Index

230

Illustrations

Figures 8.1 A survey conducted in Tornio 10.1 The administrative delineation of German–Czech borderlands for the period 1950–1990 with indication of the former Sudetenland 10.2 Impression of the German-German museum in Mödlareuth and information panel in Mödlareuth on the previous border wall

116 143 146

Tables 2.1 Three perspectives on a ‘world without borders’ 14.1 Cross-border governance ethical code

31 202

Contributors

Harald Bauder is Professor of Geography & Environmental Studies and the Director of the Graduate Program in Immigration and Settlement Studies (ISS) at Ryerson University, Canada. Prior to this position he was the inaugural Academic Director of the Ryerson Centre for Immigration and Settlement (RCIS). His research interests are in critical border, immigration, and settlement geographies. Bauder’s new book Migration Borders Freedom (published by Routledge) links open borders and no border concepts with critical perspectives of migration, citizenship, and sanctuary. His past research includes projects on the dialectics of migration and nationhood, migrant labour devaluation, the mobility of academic researchers, as well as emerging geographies of citizenship, borders and mobility. He is a former editor of ACME. Raoul V. Bianchi is Reader/Associate Professor in International Tourism and Development in the School of Business and Law, University of East London. His work focuses on the political economy and politics of international tourism with particular emphasis on southern Europe and the Mediterranean region. Bianchi and Marcus L. Stephenson are the authors of Tourism and Citizenship: Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities in the Global Order (Routledge, 2014). Kathryn Cassidy joined Northumbria University as a Senior Lecturer in Human Geography in September 2013. She holds a PhD from the University of Birmingham and worked as a Senior Research Fellow on the EU Borderscapes project (2013–2016). As a feminist political geographer her research interests relate to everyday bordering, intimacy-geopolitics and the everyday carceralities of asylum. Based on work from work package 9 (Borders, Intersectionality and the Everyday) of the EUBorderscapes, she has recently put together special issues in Political Geography and Ethnic and Racial Studies and a co-authored book, entitled Bordering, will be published with Polity Press in 2018. She is currently completing a monograph on Disciplining (Im)Mobilities, based on her research in Ukraine, Romania and the UK. Karen G. Everett is a PhD candidate in the School for the Study of Canada, Frost Centre for Canadian Studies. The focus of her work is on Canada–US

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Contributors border relations under the Beyond the Border Agreement, particularly in the area of northern border management and security policy. Karen received her MA from Ryerson University in Toronto and she has spent some time working in the area of government policy.

Jouni Häkli is Professor of Regional Studies and the leader of the Space and Political Agency Research Group (SPARG) at the University of Tampere, Finland. He is also the vice director of the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence RELATE. His research focuses on political agency, political subjectivity, transnationalization, citizenship, and border studies. He has recently published his work in the journals Geopolitics, International Political Sociology, Progress in Human Geography, Global Networks, and Citizenship Studies. Kirsi Pauliina Kallio is Academy Fellow and Senior Researcher at the University of Tampere, Finland, and affiliated to the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence RELATE. Her research interests include political subjectivity and agency, political geographies of childhood and youth, transnational children’s rights, mundane forms of citizen participation, and the everyday practice of democracy. She has published widely and edited many thematic books and special issues with publishers such as Routledge, Taylor & Francis, Springer, Elsevier, and Wiley. Jussi P. Laine is Assistant Professor at the Karelian Institute of the University of Eastern Finland. He also serves as the Executive Secretary and Treasurer of the Association for Borderlands Studies (ABS) as well as in the Steering Committee of the International Geographical Union’s (IGU) Commission on Political Geography. His research interests include political geography, geopolitics, and particularly border studies, within which he explores the multiscalar production of borders and seeks to better understand the actual and potential role of civil society in developing new forms of political, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation. His most recent publications have come out in Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, and International Studies and Geopolitics. Aija Lulle is Lecturer in the Department of Geography at Loughborough University. She is a vocal migration scholar in media, providing commentaries and analyses for wider audiences. She was a founder-director of the Centre for Diaspora and Migration Research, University of Latvia (2014–2015) and academic advisor on diaspora policy to the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013–2014). She is a Latvian expert on migration at the OECD, and she acted as an expert for the UNESCO MOST programme on migration and development (in 2016). Lulle has extensive fieldwork experience in the UK, Nordic, and Baltic countries. Most recently Lulle studied youth mobilities in the UK in the H2020 project YMOBILITY (Youth Mobility: Maximising Opportunities for Individuals, Labour Markets and Regions). Her works have been published in, among others, Population, Space and Place, Journal of

Contributors

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Ethnic and Migration Studies, Geografiska Annaler B Series, Women’s Studies International Forum, and Comparative Migration Studies. Elisabetta Nadalutti is Junior Fellow Marie S. Curie FCFP at the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies – FRIAS (Albert-Ludwig-Universität Freiburg). She has studied political integration, European politics, governance, and citizen participation at the University of Bath where she obtained her PhD. Subsequently she was awarded an Erasmus Mundus post-doctoral scholarship and she became a researcher at the Centre for European Studies, at ANU (Canberra) and started a comparative research between different models of regionalism and integration in the EU and ASEAN. She has been a visiting researcher at UNU-CRIS in Brugge (Belgium) and a Marie Curie and Fonds National de la Recherce Luxembourg Post-doctoral Research Fellow, at the Université du Luxembourg. She is presently working on the theoretical elaboration of an ethical code of cross-border governance in order to better understand the ethical dimension of cross-border cooperation within the European Union. Heather N. Nicol is Professor of Geography in the School for the Environment at Trent University, Canada. Her research interests are in the Canada–US relationship and the borders that mediate it. She is also interested in regional integration and geopolitics, indigenous self-governance, and the importance of sustainable development goals in the human security of the north. She has published with Victor Konrad a book, Beyond Walls: Re-inventing the Canada-United States Borderlands. Paolo Novak is Lecturer in Development Studies at SOAS, University of London. His research is concerned with the mutually constitutive relation between borders, migration and development, and is located at the intersection of critical globalization, migration and development literature. His publications engage with diverse disciplinary debates, and he has published in such journals as Geopolitics, Critical Sociology, Transnational Legal Theory, Development in Practice, and the Journal of Refugee Studies. Anssi Paasi is Professor of Geography at the University of Oulu, Finland, and the Director of the RELATE Center of Excellence (Academy of Finland). He has much experience in theorizing and studying empirically regions/territories, borders and spatial identities and he has published widely in geographical, IR and sociological journals. He is a former coeditor of Progress in Human Geography and he serves on the editorial boards of numerous journals. His books include: Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border (Wiley, 1996) and coedited volumes Handbook of Human Geography I-II (Sage, 2014), Regional Worlds: Advancing the Geography of Regions (Routledge, 2017), and the Handbook on the Geography of Regions and Territories (Elgar, 2018). Elisa Pascucci is an Academy of Finland Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Tampere, Finland, affiliated to the RELATE CoE. Her research

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Contributors focuses on the materialities and spatialities of humanitarian aid and migrant and refugee political agency, including practices of transnational citizenship and collective mobilization and protests. She has recently started a project on humanitarian economies and humanitarian innovation in responses to the Syrian refugee crisis, funded by the Academy of Finland. She has a PhD in Human Geography (University of Sussex, UK, 2014), and a degree in Middle Eastern Studies (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy, 2005). Her research has been published in, among others, Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, Area and Territory Politics and Governance.

Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola is Senior Research Fellow at the Geography Research Unit, University of Oulu, Finland, and a Docent in Human Geography and Border Studies at the University of Eastern Finland. She works currently in the wide research consortium, Multilayered Borders of Global Security (GLASE). She has published widely on borders, border management, tourism, and spatial identity with a particular focus on the EU and Schengen borders. Her articles have been published in journals such as Tourism Geographies, Antipode, Social and Cultural Geography, Environment and Planning A, Geopolitics, and Citizenship Studies. Jarkko Saarinen is Professor of Geography in the University of Oulu, Finland, and Distinguished Visiting Professor (Sustainability Management) at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. His research interests include development and tourism, sustainability and responsibility in tourism, tourism–community relations, political ecology, and wilderness studies. He has published widely on these themes. Noel B. Salazar is Research Professor in Anthropology at the University of Leuven, Belgium. He is the editor of the Worlds in Motion (Berghahn) and Anthropology of Tourism (Lexington) book series, coeditor of Methodologies of Mobility (2017), Keywords of Mobility (2016), Regimes of Mobility (2014) and Tourism Imaginaries (2014), and author of Momentous Mobilities (2018), Envisioning Eden (2010) and numerous peer-reviewed articles and book chapters on mobility and travel. Salazar is Secretary-General of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences and founder of the EASA Anthropology and Mobility Network (AnthroMob). Estela Schindel studied Communications at the University of Buenos Aires and obtained her PhD in Sociology at the Free University Berlin. She serves currently as a scientific coordinator within the PhD programme ‘Europe in the globalized world’ and a researcher at the Center of Excellence Cultural Foundations of Social Integration, in the University of Konstanz. Her current project focuses on the imbrications of technology, violence, and nature in the EU border regime. She has coedited the volume Space and the Memories of Violence. Landscapes of Erasure, Disappearance and Exception (Palgrave, 2014). Her recent articles have been published in Journal of Borderlands Studies and Mobile Culture Studies: The Journal.

Contributors

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James W. Scott is Professor of Regional and Border Studies in the Karelian Institute at the University of Eastern Finland. Scott obtained his Habilitation (2006), PhD (1990) and MA (1986) at the Free University of Berlin and his BSc at the University of California, Berkeley (1979). His research interests and numerous publications cover urban and regional development policy, geopolitics, border studies, transboundary regionalism in Europe and North America, changes, and the spatial implications of Eastern and Central European transformation processes. Recently, he coordinated European research projects on borders and cross-border cooperation within the EU’s Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Framework Programmes. Marcus L. Stephenson is Professor of Tourism and Hospitality Management, and Dean of the School of Hospitality at Sunway University (Malaysia). He has published extensively on the sociology of tourism, especially concerning nationality, race, ethnicity, culture, and religion. He is coeditor of International Tourism Development and the Gulf Cooperation Council States: Challenges and Opportunities (Routledge, 2017). Arie Stoffelen is Assistant Professor at the University of Groningen (Netherlands). He is also coordinator of the Master of Cultural Geography and the Tourism Geography and Planning track at the Faculty of Spatial Sciences at the University of Groningen. His main research interest focus on understanding structural delivery mechanisms for tourism-induced region-building and, by extension, regional development in the contexts of rural European borderlands. Correspondingly, he analyses the interactions between tourism landscape commodification, bordering processes, and regional development. Recent publications have come out in Annals of Tourism Research, Current Issues in Tourism, European Planning Studies, Tourism Geographies, Journal of Destination Marketing and Management, Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism, and Journal of Ecotourism. Dominique Vanneste is Associate Professor at the Division of Geography and Tourism at the University of Leuven (KU Leuven, Belgium). Her research focuses on regional and destination development and (cultural) heritage with an emphasis on identity building and preservation. She works on tourism networks and the role of brokers, as well as on heritage tourism as a lever for development. Further, she studies the relationship between war heritage and tourism from a memoryscape perspective. Recent publications have been published in Tourism Management Perspectives, International Journal of Cultural Property, and Development Southern Africa. J.J. Zhang is Assistant Professor in Human Geography at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He obtained his PhD in the field of cultural geography from the University of Durham, UK. Before going to Durham, he completed his M.Soc.Sci in Geography at the National University of Singapore. He also holds a B.Soc.Sci. (First Class Honours) in Geography from the same university. His research interests lie in the intersection of border studies, material culture, and

xiv Contributors tourism. His writings on the cultural-geopolitics of cross-border mobilities and material cultures of memory and identity have been published in international journals including Annals of Tourism Research, Cultural Geographies, Geoforum, Tourism Management, and Tourism Geographies. Kaj Zimmerbauer is Scientific Coordinator in the RELATE Center of Excellence (Academy of Finland) at Oulu University. His research topics include supranationalism and supra-national region-building, regional/territorial (resistance) identities, and territory–network interplay. His most recent publications discuss the deconstruction of borders and manifestations of identities in territorial mergers, and conceptualization and understanding of supra-national identities in planning. He has done extensive research on the Barents region in northernmost Europe, focusing on both geopolitics and geo-economics in cross-border regionalization processes. He has published, for example, in Regional Studies, Geoforum, and International Journal of Urban and Regional Studies.

Preface

Borders and border regions have been popular subjects and contexts in academic research, particularly in political geography, since the beginning of the 20th century. Borders, but also bordering practices, became particularly notable interdisciplinary topics during the 1990s, a period that also witnessed the rise of the borderless world thesis which echoed globalization and optimistic, neoliberal beliefs on the positive effects of expanding global markets. Shortly thereafter, a number of dramatic events led to the rapid politicization of border issues. Particularly critical were the terrorist attacks in the US on 9/11, and later in Europe and elsewhere. These events resulted in massive deliberations on security issues and concomitant investments in practices and technologies related to security, securitization, and border controls. These events also gradually gave rise to wars and conflicts, migrants, refuges and asylum seekers, (right wing) nationalism and racism, and to debates on the nature of citizenship. All these themes show that the current political significance of borders can be ascribed to the fact that borders and bordering practices are mirror images of various forms of human mobility. Today, borders and mobilities are viewed as two sides of the same coin in both academic research and politics, as well as in social movements such as ‘open borders’ or ‘no borders’, which increasingly combine these two realms. In conjunction with these developments, borders and border crossings have become ever more burning political issues around the world. The editors of this book have a long experience of working with research related to borders, border crossings, and the control of such crossings in various forms of mobilities. Borders are critical elements in the debates that challenge the understanding/view of the world as a continuum of horizontally adjacent territorial spaces. This view has been challenged by relational approaches that perceive the world as a dynamic constellation of various forms of spatialities that are constituted in and through complex social relations. This understanding also challenges the essentialist views of national, state-based identities and subjectivities, and of borders themselves. Today ever more often scholars speak about the relational and topologically connected spaces in which we live and move. The preparation of this book has been possible due to the generous support of several funding organizations. Anssi Paasi, Jarkko Saarinen, and Kaj Zimmerbauer wish to thank the Academy of Finland and the University of Oulu for funding the

xvi Preface RELATE Center of Excellence (Relational and Territorial Politics of Bordering, Identities and Transnationalization, project number #307348). Anssi Paasi and Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola also wish to thank the Academy of Finland’s Strategic Research Council for financing the GLASE project, which has focused on borders and security issues (project number #303527). The editors extend their sincere thanks to all the authors for contributing to the book and for their careful responses to the requests and queries raised during the review process. We are also grateful to Routledge for accepting the book to their Border Regions series and for all the help provided by the publishing house. Particular thanks are due to Ms Ruth Anderson from Routledge for supporting editorial work and reminding us about deadlines! The editors also wish to thank Ms Ina Hourula for her careful work in formulating the final manuscript for the publisher. Oulu, Finland, 9 August 2018 Anssi Paasi, Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola, Jarkko Saarinen and Kaj Zimmerbauer

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Introduction Borders, ethics, and mobilities Anssi Paasi, Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola, Jarkko Saarinen, and Kaj Zimmerbauer

Introduction ‘Borderless world’, a catch phrase promoted by Ohmae (1989; 1990; 1995), became highly attractive in border studies in the 1990s. Borders and political cartographies that ‘trapped’ nation-states were, for Ohmae, elements that hindered progress, economic growth, and cooperation in the globalizing market. Even though this idea resonated, especially with the global business economy, Ohmae also saw the borderless world – a geography without borders – as a geopolitical ideal and a valuable model for post-Cold War era politicians and military leaders. He suggested that open cartographies and the ‘opening’ of nation-states would benefit both the global economy and markets. Such cartographies would challenge the dominant state-centric political territories that governments routinely mobilize to control citizens. Supported by Castells’ (1996) ideas of network society, Ohmae’s slogan took on a life of its own after his manifesto. Currently, the idea of a borderless world is associated with many kinds of social issues and contexts (Paasi, 2019). For some, the idea represents the worst kind of idealism or naïve cosmopolitanism. However, for a number of scholars and activists the notion of ‘open borders’ or ‘no borders’ is increasingly significant, and they push the goals of freedom of movement and a borderless world much further than Ohmae suggested. Radical researchers fervently argue and struggle for a freedom of movement on political as well as economic grounds, but they also emphasize the importance of human rights, morals and ethics. The title of this collection and introduction poses a critical question: for whom – beyond economic flows – is or can the world be borderless? Although challenging to answer in practice, this question is justified since it forces us to confront how borders and territorial spaces are organized to control mobilities – how they have become historically materialized and achieved specific meanings, and how bounded spaces transform over possibly discernible time-horizons. Border studies has been a well-established research field for a long time, but a simultaneous expansion and a sort of fragmentation of this research area has occurred since the 1990s (Newman and Paasi, 1998; Johnson et al., 2011; WastlWalter, 2011; Burridge et al., 2017; Novak, 2019). It has become clear during the

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last two decades or so that the significance of borders is, to a greater extent than before, rooted in the relations between borders, bordering practices, and mobilities. Such relations are multifaceted and in constant flux. Borders are not merely lines that divide state spaces from each other. Instead, they are increasingly complex technical and ideological processes and institutions that states mobilize to control all kind of flows, not least of all mobile people. Mobile people, for their part, are extremely heterogeneous; they can be explorers, tourists, international students, highly educated specialists, guest workers, forced labour, regular and irregular migrants, asylum seekers searching for refuge, heads of states and governments, spies and diplomats, soldiers, professional athletes, traders, terrorists, and so on (Bulley, 2017, p. 3). Furthermore, their statuses are often differentiated by nationality, gender, ethnicity, race, religion, linguistic capacities, and others. As Bulley (2017) shows, the questions of hospitability/hostility and hosts/ guests touch upon many kinds of mobile human beings that can have various kinds of subjectivities, roles, and identities, even simultaneously. Whereas business people, elite travellers, and prosperous tourists, for example, cross relatively soft borders regularly without difficulties, migrants and particularly asylum seekers often face the hard side of borders and bordering practices. Instead of hospitality, they frequently face hostility, prejudice, racism, and xenophobia, phenomena that seem to be the order of the day in many states around the world. Suspiciousness towards mobile people has reached a new level in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and the later strikes in Europe. As a result, regressive, nationalistically toned political cartographies have emerged in the US, and in many European Union member states, such as Poland and Hungary, governing nationalistic parties have pushed for stricter migration control. In addition, in the United Kingdom nationalistic voices and purported needs to restrict and control human mobilities have characterized the Brexit process. Tensions between various forms of mobilities and their relations to borders are the key focus in this edited book. In a situation where every year thousands of asylum seekers and migrants drown in the Mediterranean and Pacific or die trying to cross hot, dry deserts, we are forced to reconsider borders and their relations to social and ethical practices and social justice. Ethical issues also emerge from technological developments. The deployment of big data and the introduction of new border surveillance technologies, through which even the biological features and affective expressions of mobile individuals become objects of suspicion, poses fundamental ethical questions regarding human rights, privacy and identity, and the development of future societies in general (Adey, 2009; Amoore and Hall, 2009; Longo, 2018). We argue in this book that while borders and human mobilities are among the most significant research themes across social sciences, the debate on the ethical issues has not been as central in border research as it ought to be. One interesting exception is the book edited by philosopher Allen Buchanan and political scientist Margaret Moore (2003) in which the authors look at seven ethical traditions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, natural law, Confucianism, liberalism,

Introduction

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and international law) in the making and unmaking of state and national boundaries. The conclusion of the book is that since ethical theories are by their very nature universal, they tend to be rather suspicious of borders. Especially liberalism’s emphasis on equal freedom seems to apply to everyone, not merely the citizens of liberal democracies. Geographers Diener and Hagen (2009) note briefly the significance of ethics in their critique of the borderless world thesis. More recently, Espejo (2018) has addressed the moral significance of territorial borders and suggests that the prevailing view among liberal thinkers is that from a moral perspective borders are arbitrary and that borders matter because they differentiate politics on the basis of territorial jurisdictions. Hence state borders are morally relevant and are important because ‘they demarcate places juridically, and because they sustain place-specific rights and duties’ (p. 73). She also makes a useful distinction between the boundaries of belonging and territorial borders. The former mark identitarian memberships, the latter the territorial bounds of legal jurisdictions – a divide that resonates with the current division between migration and border research. Migration scholars have paid considerable attention to ethical questions and these are becoming ever more significant alongside increasing levels of migration (see for example, Hayter, 2000; Pevnick, 2011; Wellman and Cole, 2011; Carens, 2013; Sager, 2016; Bulley, 2017). The growing numbers of migrants echoe complex social and environmental problems, wars and conflicts, natural disasters (droughts, floods), famines, daily amenities, and livelihoods, and also reflect a search for better possibilities in life in the face of often miserable conditions. One additional background factor is population growth, which in many states, especially when combined with conflicts, environmental change, and lack of food, pushes people to migrate across dangerous routes. The lottery of birth seems to determine very profoundly the future life possibilities of human beings. Migration scholars of course also discuss borders, but this rarely seems to be a key theoretical concern or motivation (see the summary by Burridge et al., 2017). For them, borders are usually seen as obstacles embedded in social practices that protect privileges and as instruments that maintain the status quo. Compared to border research, however, migration studies tend to recognize the gendered and intersectional nature of lived mobilities, and how border crossing is an effort that is often dangerous for women and children, for example (Andrijasevic, 2010; Choi, 2011).

Borders persevere Thus in spite of the increased mobilities of the globalized world economy, borders are not disappearing and we are still far away from a borderless world. Obviously, borders do fluctuate and transform, at times hardening, at times softening. Currently, border dynamics are in many cases moving towards a hardening of borders, reflecting the unsecure and unstable global geopolitical and geo-economic situation and increasing distrust between key political leaders. It seems we are witnessing the return of power politics and a strengthening of the

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‘spheres of interest’ thinking in international politics. Although many economic regulations have been removed to boost ‘free’ trade, simultaneously more than a few borders have gained more significance and there has been an unforeseen global tendency to build physical walls on borders between states, often to prevent human mobility (Jones, 2016). Very recently efforts to curtail free trade have also emerged (Nicol and Everett, 2019). Current geopolitical tensions between the EU and Russia, for instance, have again raised borders between the ‘East’ and ‘West’. A good example of this is Barents cooperation in northernmost Europe, where some advocates are concerned that the cooperation might founder or come to an end because of the new, tense political situation (Zimmerbauer, 2018). Yet, while cultural and economic cooperation has in many ways stagnated, post-9/11 security thinking has intensified cooperation in the field of border security, where states are increasingly cooperating with nonnational and non-sovereign actors. This has complicated our understanding of borders and bordering, and of where border enforcement actually takes place in space and time, and by whom (Longo, 2018). Likewise, the borders between Europe and the African continent as well as between the US and Mexico have gained massive attention, not so much as ‘borders’ but as immense fluctuating systems of control and ‘bordering’. The former has become a fuzzy, mobile border that is a graveyard for thousands of immigrants attempting Europe for various reasons related to security, environment, and/or economy. Even nature itself has been put to work in the Mediterranean to create a deterrence and to stop migrants (Schindel, 2019), with the effect that such arrangements blur the boundaries of responsibility in the case of border-related deaths. Efforts to move this border far away from the concrete European state borders and to outsource bordering have been styled as ‘humanitarian borders’ (see Pascucci et al., 2019) in the guise of ‘humanitarian bordering’. Also, the US government has mobilized new ideological dividing lines, most recently manifested in President Trump’s plans to build a concrete wall between the US and Mexico. The wall debate is ideological in the sense that much of this border is already walled and because the wall is used to provoke images of threat, terrorism, crime, and illegality (Nicol and Everett, 2019). The construction of walls is also an example of the fusion of geopolitics and geoeconomics in which populist politics and nationalism are effectively mobilized. Fitting examples of such reterritorialized propensities are Trump’s straightforwardly nationalist Twitter claims: ‘we need a strong border’. . .‘we have no country if we have no border’. As noted above, such anti-migration tendencies are also evident in various European states (such as Hungary, Poland, France, the Netherlands, and the UK), showing that the state-centric world map continues to provide an ideologically dominating, ‘ethically relevant’ moral geography, a map that should be replaced by a more equitable map that incorporates an ethic of respect for difference (Shapiro, 1994). Migration scholars argue that borders actually produce migrants, yet simultaneously acknowledge that researchers need to be aware of ethical dilemmas and of their own positioning. De Genova puts this plainly:

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If there were no borders, there would be no migrants – only mobility. Another way of saying the same would be that the elemental and elementary freedom of movement of the human species necessarily posits a relation between the species and the space of the planet, as a whole. From this standpoint, territorially-defined ‘national’ states and their borders remain enduringly and irreducibly problematic. (De Genova, 2013, p. 253) A historical perspective shows that the bordering of different groups of people is not only a modern phenomenon. Borders in politics are both persistent and dynamic, as an analysis of the borders in ancient Greek cities and the Roman Empire for example displays (Longo, 2018). The analysis of the ‘no borders’ alternative, which is often presented as a more ethical approach, needs to be broadened from the modern state system to other political units and needs to question what potential there is for political life without bordering effects in general. Open borders without an international system of political protection and management is not necessarily a sustainable scenario (Bauder, 2019). Accordingly, what if it is not borders per se that are the main problem but the shifting neoliberal states that appear no longer to protect their own citizens (Longo, 2018, p. 197)? Ultimately, the neoliberal open borders economic policy has benefited only the global elite, whereas the number of people who face expulsion from their professional livelihoods and from the very biospheres that sustain their lives is continuously increasing (Sassen, 2014). The earlier optimism associated with the ‘borderless world’ thesis has thus faded for several reasons. Firstly, instead of seeing borders merely as lines dividing (state) spaces, more nuanced views now prevail in academic debates, regarding what borders actually are and what they do at and across various spatial scales in their capacity to permit some and (selectively) restrict other forms of mobility, sustain national(ist) landscapes and mobilize powerful memories. Secondly, many border scholars suggest that the contextual and geohistorical features of specific borders force scholars to approach borders in more sensitive and multifaceted ways (Paasi, 1996; O’Dowd, 2010; Megoran, 2017). Thirdly, contrary to the seamless borderless world ideal, humans live on an increasingly unevenly structured planet where borders are important, and where critical elements of biopolitical control are carried out by states, which leads to ever more discriminating regulation and control of migrants and refugees. Graham aptly reminds that . . . states are becoming internationally organised systems geared towards trying to separate people in circulations deemed risky or malign from those deemed risk-free or worthy of protection. This process increasingly occurs both inside and outside territorial boundaries between states, resulting in blurring between international borders and urban/local borders. (Graham, 2010, p. 89) Previous tendencies have provided fuel for the open and no borders movements, which are continuously struggling with the idea of a borderless world.

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The multiplicity of mobilities and of ethical dilemmas: the question of hospitability Scholars in the fields of geography, international relations, and anthropology, for example, have challenged state-centrism and methodological nationalism, as well as the ‘self-evidence’ of national states. Similarly, in the context of ethics, Bulley (2017, p. 3) argues that to approach the politics and possibilities of international ethics we must look beyond the ‘statist imaginary’. Yet, he notes, state-based international ethics continues to be important in responding, through humanitarian interventions, to major catastrophes such as genocides, ethnic cleansing, atrocities, and natural disasters. States as institutions are therefore critical in such interventions. Bulley also contends (p. 4) that the practices of hospitability involve not only the construction of ethical subjects (hosts and guests) and their relations (identity/difference, welcome/refusal, safety/threat), but also the production of spaces, a point made also in the context of tourist strategies that generate cities, hotels, cafes, and leisure zones as more or less welcoming. Hospitability for Bulley is the means by which particular spaces are brought into being as ‘homes’, as embodying an ethos, a way of being: an ethic. The concept of hospitality is also germane to both migration and tourism. Recently, the idea (and process) of overtourism has further challenged the hospitality associated with touristic mobilities and also the idea of tourism as a subjective (human) right. Similarly, as in refugee discourses, overtourism as a crisis of tourism refers to a scale of human mobility, in that there are too many visitors to a particular destination, such as Berlin, Barcelona, Venice, and Reykjavik (cf. Dickinson, 2018). In addition to the simple volume of tourists, however, the characteristics and behaviour of tourists have evolved as well. These ‘new’ visitors use Airbnb or other similar sharing economy platforms and are increasingly entering and occupying spaces that are usually seen as nontouristic and as part of the everyday mileu of local people, challenging the bordering between us and them or hosts and guests. Thus, we suggest, there is an acute need to widen the discussion towards the neglected dilemmas that concern the ethical dimensions of borders and how borders are organized and made to work in various forms of mobility. Hence, from the standpoint of ethics it is important to analyse different aspects and layers of borders and issues of citizenship both generally and contextually, not only from the economic and rights perspectives but also from the angle of citizenship participation, gender (in)equality, and national polarization. As far as different types of mobilities and immobilities are concerned, the ethical and moral dilemmas often appear in highly gender specific ways (Prokkola and Ridanpää, 2017; Prokkola, 2019). In tourism, the ethical component is often evident as a form of code of conduct, targeted to both visitors and the businesses serving them. The World Tourism Organization, for example, has created the Global Code of Ethics for Tourism (UNWTO, 1999), which lists ten principles covering the economic, social, cultural, and environmental components of travel and tourism, including

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‘Right to tourism’ (Article 7) and ‘Liberty of tourist movements’ (Article 8). Basically, in tourism, the question of ethics is about the balance between the right to mobility and the protection of vulnerable biomes, regions, and cultures. The rapidly growing numbers of international tourists, especially from China and India, have provoked discussions about the limits of tourism. These discussions have not focused on state borders but on sub-state territories within destinations, particularly urban environments, where political protests against ‘invasive’ tourists are increasingly practiced. Indeed, many popular tourist resorts now restrict the numbers of tourists for political, social, and environmental reasons, and they aim to draw borders between the tourists and the local population – and physically keep them apart (such as Cuba, the Gambia, and Iran) – or between consumers and workers/servants. Thus, while there are deepening economic and cultural relationships and increasing ‘rights of mobility’ in transnational contexts (Gibson, 2010), there are also processes that challenge the fluidity of contemporary societies, bordering, and movement (Turner, 2007). From this perspective, globalization and related networks and flows have not fully displaced human territoriality and bordering practices (Paasi, 2009; Timothy, Saarinen and Viken, 2016); even tourism and tourists’ movements are not ‘free in any absolute sense’ (Britton, 1991, p. 452). Thus, from the perspective of tourism as well, the borderless world thesis is more complex than at first appears. For refugees and many migrants, mobility means above all efforts to leave behind dire, poor social conditions and to start a new life, whereas for affluent tourists mobility denotes experiencing temporarily new, often exotic conditions because they can afford to travel for leisure. Categorization of what is considered tourism and what is termed irregular migration is not as straightforward as it might seem at first. In many cases, people who arrive with a tourist visa become ‘illegal’ migrants if they overstay their visas. In this respect, migration and tourism, in general, should not be conceived of as separate entities but as overlapping processes with potentially changing identities and functions. Migration stimulates the visiting friends and relatives (VFR) type of mobility from and to their original home countries. In addition, migrants do domestic tourism, which is often a highly neglected aspect reflecting an Anglo-Western centrism in research and tourism development policies (see Winter, 2009). Indeed, there remains an underlying and persistent assumption that the activity of tourism remains an essentially Western and white phenomenon, and that ‘tourists’ emanate from and reside in the advanced Western societies of the global North (Gladstone, 2005; Rogerson and Saarinen, 2018). If the tourist is a complex category, similarly the migrant is far from a selfevident status. Some scholars like Johnson and Jones (2018) are not willing to speak of refugees or asylum seekers at all but only migrants. Their approach accentuates that the status of refugee is state-bound and derived from a UN Refugee Convention (1951) that legitimates some forms of mobility (especially those for political reasons) but does not recognize other forms such as migration for environmental and economic reasons. For open borders and especially no borders movements, such dividing lines are not acceptable.

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The current, selective open borders policy inside the EU (Schengen) area, in which EU citizens are allowed free mobility and simultaneously strict regulations are placed on so-called third-country nationals, is often cited as an example of the production of global hierarchies and inequality. Less attention has been paid to regional vulnerabilities and the increasing precariousness of all kinds of workers in the internationalizing labour market, where big companies utilize open borders policies on the one hand and territorial regulations on the other in highly strategic ways. International production networks enable firms and companies to strategically offshore and outsource their labour to countries where labour protection and salaries are lower, thus simultaneously putting pressure on domestic trade unions regarding the lowering of salaries and overall conditions of work. In many states, this kind of strategic use of open borders has produced particular forms of precariousness for both skilled and unskilled workers (Martin and Prokkola, 2017). Accordingly, to function, open borders policy and the withdrawal of state regulation of the labour markets would require internalized global ethics for companies and firms. The open borders question is therefore intimately bound up with the operational logic and responsibilities between public and private spheres, even if they often become blurred. Geographical contexts and state institutions thus matter more than the borderless worlds thesis suggests. It is possible to pose provocative questions about the morality of the state system and divergent citizen rights and responsibilities from the perspective of labour migration. The question of brain drain, usually from poor countries to rich ones, represents a much-debated ethical issue of migration (Straehle, 2018) that problematizes the praise of open borders. From the viewpoint of border ethics, optimistic claims about a borderless world seem rather superficial; the ethics of borders must be evaluated in relation to both citizenship rights and responsibilities. Many citizenship statuses can represent both a burden and an asset depending on the context, and such multiple inducements should not be discussed as separate spheres; they are all part of the life world of an individual who may at times possess the status of a citizen, a tourist, and a migrant. This kind of argumentation points out that how the political and ethical terms of borders are played out is a contested field.

Seeing through penumbral borders Thinking in terms of ethics in the context of the state system is in some ways a paradox. ‘Territorial trap’, a term coined by Agnew (1994), refers to the tendency of modern states to abduct the spheres of the national and international and to divide global spaces in statist terms. The state is the key actor in manufacturing our understanding of inclusion and exclusion and hence also in providing a specific perspective on the boundaries of ethics. This occurs through spatial socialization in which citizens adopt a specific understanding of a national state space, the history, and identity of the national community and its borders (Paasi, 1996). As Shapiro (1994, p. 495) has argued, the ‘state-oriented map continues to supply the moral geography that dominates what is ethically relevant’. Borders

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are key elements in the process of exclusion and states have a monopoly to control mobilities across them and to define the accepted ethical norms and forms of hospitality towards mobile people. In general, many economists have seen borders as obstacles to growth and have argued that their role should be diminished to foster a frictionless flow of not only capital and goods but also people. Many steps in that direction have been taken but often they have had only regional or sub-regional significance. For example, a number of cross-border regions have been established in the context of the European Union and elsewhere. Especially in the EU, one of the most important reasons for deepening interaction across state borders (and to overcome some of the problems borders create) has been the aim to reduce political tensions, increase security, and to ensure stability in border areas (Nadalutti, 2019). More recently, wider supra-state regional entities have been established as a response to – and expression of – the neoliberalization of the world economy (Johnson, 2009). Thus, if borders were earlier seen to cause and maintain tensions, currently they are more often seen as handbrakes to economic performance. It is beneficial to remember that borders are highly contextual, or ‘penumbral’; in other words, they can be quite insignificant (soft) in many practices and instances, and yet at other times and practices they can be (or appear as) meaningful and hard (Paasi and Zimmerbauer, 2016). Thus, borders are penumbral because they are not as such either ‘hard’ or soft but manifest themselves only in certain conditions. They are thus highly selective in terms of flows and closures, or put differently, visible only when the light comes from certain angle. Related to being inherently contextual or penumbral, borders are also multilayered. In this respect, we can analytically distinguish social, legal, economic, political, and cultural ‘layers’ within borders (Zimmerbauer, 2011). While the social layer expresses communication and mobility of people across borders, the legal layer refers to the sovereignty of states and the potential mismatch in legal systems that can have a negative effect on cross-border cooperation, for example. The economic layer accentuates the different economic systems on each side of the border and the resulting conditions for businesses to make treaties to boost trade. The political layer refers to the ability of states to manage their borders in the politico-administrative sense. In this sense, the political layer resonates with the legal layer. The cultural layer is about the traditions, values, and spatial histories that create a sense of (an imagined) community. It also contributes to the idea of regional identity in the sense that cultural narratives contribute to the sense of belonging. However, regional identity is not solely based on cultural awareness but also on delineations of a more administrative (and legal) nature. Current relational approaches to territory and territoriality have not made borders irrelevant. Instead, they have perhaps showed more explicitly that borders are relational constructs, made in multiple and partly overlapping processes in social interaction that cross scales and spaces, and fashioned by a multitude of human and non-human actors (Keating, 1998; Paasi, Harrison and Jones, 2018).

10 Anssi Paasi et al. To summarize, the key motivation for producing this book stems from the observation that contemporary borders can be simultaneously closed and open, have multiple functions, and even locations, as contemporary territories are not merely bounded territorial units but simultaneously also relationally constituted. This is the material and discursive basis for various forms of mobilities and diverging ethical and moral claims that can emerge in relation to rights and responsibilities. In our understanding of what ethics and morality mean, we follow the lead of Lee and Smith (2004), who see ethics as a moral theory and morality as practical action. Thus ethics, as the subject of moral theory, encompasses reflection on moral values, their origin, meaning, and justification. These elements and their contextual meanings are crucial in the case of borders, the practices of bordering and border crossings, but can be fundamental also in debordering practices, when for example claims are made about opening or rejecting borders. The following chapters will address these contradictory developments in relation to various forms of mobility and types of borders that have been typically discussed separately (for example, borders and tourism or migration and borders).

Overview of sections and chapters The chapters of this collection will provide both theoretical insights and contextual knowledge on how borders and bordering practices are mobilized in the case of socio-spatial mobilities. Instead of taking borders (or the pleas to make them to vanish) as normative givens, the articles will consider how the simultaneous ‘geographies’ of bounded (territorial) and open and networked (relational) spaces are realized in various contexts. General perspectives for this approach have been outlined in this introduction, and the three chapters of the first section, ‘Borders in a borderless world’, will raise further theoretical questions. The second section, ‘Politics of inclusion and exclusion’, comprises four chapters that look at bordering practices in various contexts in the framework of migration. The third section, ‘Contested mobilities and encounters’, focuses on another major form of mobility, tourism, which has been for a long time a generally ‘accepted’ form of mobility but which has recently become an object of critique in some contexts/locations because of experienced overtourism. The chapters in section four, ‘Borders, security, and politics’, investigate bordering practices and security issues in the context of the EU, a key context in which the migration and border politics nexus has turned out to be a significant national and European political challenge. An analysis of the US/Canada border, set in a wider continental perspective, offers valuable comparative material for the EU context. Anssi Paasi examines the borderless world thesis outlined by Ohmae (1990, 1995) and compares this with open and no borders approaches. He suggests that beyond his neoliberal economic ideas Ohmae also had an ostensibly ethical emphasis: politicians should follow the models provided by business life and open borders. Critics of this thinking suggest that in contemporary capitalism the borderless world is an illusion since territory and the state have

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continued to be significant for capitalism’s logic, regulation, and control of social relations. This regulation and control of mobilities focuses above all on migrants and labour, whereas the mobility of tourists is embraced virtually everywhere. The open borders and no borders movements push ethical issues much further. Harald Bauder critically studies the arguments proposed in the open borders and no borders discourses. Bauder shows that the idea of the borderless world entails contradictory possibilities: firstly, an open-border world of Westphalian states that allows people to cross state borders: secondly, a no-border world rejecting the national scale and demanding the formation of new subjectivities. He notes how current changing social practices challenge such neat divisions. Sanctuary cities, for example, work within the framework of national states while simultaneously challenging national scale belonging and membership. Bauder pays particular attention to the concept of freedom – a critical argument for the current debates on a world without borders – as well as to the different concepts of citizenship, and how these resonate with such arguments. Paolo Novak examines the spatialities of borders and starts from a distinction between border lines and border functions. He suggests that it is important to refocus border studies around an empirical concern with the place-specific and embodied distance between the two dimensions. In analytical terms, this distinction endeavours to recuperate the significance of border lines, as constitutive of the interstate system, while recognizing the multiple locations in which the social control functions of borders are activated, reproduced, and experienced. Politically, this distinction foregrounds the ways in which lines and functions are articulated to reproduce inequalities that are both systemic and situated. His distinction identifies the contextual distance between what is and what ought to be, posing an ethical imperative for intervention and providing avenues to define such interventions. Aija Lulle studies the migrant accounts in media uses before, during, and after the Brexit vote, pointing out that many young migrants had self-restricted their media practices to protect themselves from the moral panic in the time of Brexit uncertainty. The Brexit decision somewhat changed the everyday moral landscape of Britain, showing that media uses and moralities are not fixed but change over time. Lulle shows the existence of divisions between various people within the state, and how young migrants have to navigate the hardening borders in media and in their daily lives. The study illustrates on the one hand how online and social media cross borders more easily than people, and on the other how everyday bordering occurs in the apparently borderless media space in many ways. Kathryn Cassidy examines everyday bordering in the context of the British healthcare system and provides an analytical insight into the ethics and morality of Britain’s political-economic rationales regarding migration. She builds her analysis on the concept of borderwork, which refers in her article to the spreading of the responsibilities of immigration control and checks from the state sphere to individual citizens, and to the duty of people working in various

12 Anssi Paasi et al. sectors. Cassidy’s analysis shows how healthcare professionals’ decision-making has become a practice of borderwork. Healthcare personnel are required to turn away patients in need of medical care on the basis of immigration status, and when doing so the personnel continuously face specific ethical and moral dilemmas. Cassidy’s analysis shows how the responsibility for conducting the controls in healthcare access for migrants creates friction between the professional caregivers and patients, and subordinates the question of human rights to the state economic rationale. Elisa Pascucci, Jouni Häkli, and Kirsi Pauliina Kallio examine the spatialities of the so-called ‘refugee crises’ that have characterized Europe and its neighbouring regions over the last few years. Following the recent research, they conceptualize both borders and humanitarianism as topological phenomena constituted through relationalities that are at the same time materially grounded and spatially heterogeneous. Pascucci, Häkli, and Kallio advance current understandings of humanitarian bordering by looking at the ways in which aid workers and migrants negotiate aid provision in both transit camps (Greece) and spontaneous, peri-urban refugee settlements (Lebanon). In particular, they show how the interplay of ethical performativity and enactments of security is central to the constitution of these topological spaces. Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola focuses on the 2015 asylum reception in Finland from the perspective of gendered national identity by investigating how particular gendered and morally toned categorizations and images of threat were used in the media debate. In her paper, the categorization of people is used to depict the politicization of national identity and to complicate the understanding of border securitization as a question of state versus migrants. She argues for a relational conception of national identity and belonging that pays attention to the multiplicity of voices and struggles over migration policy within the state. The relational conception of national identity critically includes the question of ethics of recognition. Raoul Bianchi and Marcus Stephenson provide an overview of the evolution and transformation of modern tourism from a privilege to a human right. In the current context they critically focus on the contradictions between the right to the freedom of movement and travel and the right to tourism, and on their intersections. They analyse these rights through the prism of bordering practices and discourses through which different modalities of travel are represented, valued, and policed. By doing so they demonstrate how the unequal geographies of movement are made tangible. The chapter points to a central paradox of global tourism: tourism is often celebrated as an instrument of economic development, peace, and a marker of global citizenship, but securitized border management regimes have increasingly accentuated disparities between those deemed to be lacking the ‘appropriate’ credentials for travel and those whose mobility is defined as ‘legitimate’. They emphasize that tourism should not be seen as an apolitical international phenomenon. Instead, global tourism should be seen as an integral part of the broader realm of mobility politics and structural determinants of immobility. Arie Stoffelen and Dominique Vanneste’s chapter focuses on the ethical components, viability, and community representation of borderland tourism. Their specific

Introduction 13 case is the Iron Curtain Trail and the European Green Belt, located in the German– Czech borderlands. They demonstrate that the analysed tourism projects tend to commodify conflictive borderland histories to gain support for a European-wide cross-border cooperation discourse. However, the Iron Curtain Trail and the European Green Belt projects are contested on local levels, resulting from the selectivity of EU-inspired memory politics and minimal local participation across the border. Similarly to Bianchi and Stephenson, they emphasize the need to see tourism as a political issue in local and regional development contexts. According to them, the recognition of tourism politics highlights crucial questions on equity and regarding whose memory is commodified for which purposes in borderland development projects. J.J. Zhang examines contested mobilities in border town contexts by engaging tourism with the politics of mobility, morality, and materiality. He discusses the cultural politics of cross-border consumption through shopping activities in the border town of Sheung Shui, Hong Kong. The place is characterized by shopping tourists from the neighbouring city of Shenzhen, and these day visitors are seen as a cause of overcrowding, shortage of goods, and higher rental markets. This overtourism has caused public protests, which have divided the town over conflicting views on the consequences of increasing social and economic integration with the mainland. Heather Nicol and Karen Everett focus on the ethical and moral management priorities of North American borders. The focus is on power relations that have effect on both the Canada–US and the US–Mexico borders, yet in particular on the questions of why the state of trade matters to Canada–US relations, and correspondingly to the Canada–US border. By discussing ‘thickening’ and unequal borders – as well as border asymmetry – the authors conclude that the result of the new border policy has been a ‘considerable political indifference to inequitable and unjust border management in North America’. The inequitable and morally dubious outcomes that result, the authors suggest, are constructed by and reinforced through both Canada’s responses to US economic and security hegemony, and American policies and practices. Jussi Laine and James W Scott discuss how ‘identitary bordering’ within the EU is not only fed by social media and populist discourses but is also part of intellectual and philosophical arguments that, for example, interpret liberal, humanitarian understandings of migration and idealistic notions of regional neighbourhood (for example with Ukraine, Russia and the South Mediterranean) as naïve and misguided. At the same time, despite all proclaimed intentions of resetting its Neighbourhood agenda, the EU appears to insist on ‘asymmetric conditionality’ and maintenance of the basic policy architecture that so far has failed to promote genuine partnerships. Laine and Scott argue that one reason for this is related to the maintenance of an EU identity and the fact that the EU’s ontological security is bound up in the continuity and perceived coherence of its policy frameworks. They continue that alternative understandings of Neighbourhood as a context for societal interaction – and not a merely an ‘objective’ policy – are required. In addition, understanding the EU as an integral part of any neighbourhood idea, joint engagement with socio-economic, cultural and group-specific concerns could help

14 Anssi Paasi et al. create a new self-narrative of EU actorness and contribute to a more tolerant and ethical border policy. Elisabetta Nadalutti discusses why it is important to have an ethical code in cross-border governance. She focuses on this question by emphasizing the human ‘layer’ of the borders, which means underlining border zones as spaces for human interaction. An ethical code, she argues, is beneficial in securing a ‘common language’ in cross-border cooperation (CBC). In general an empathic relationship between the border administrators and border people is required for successful implementation of CBC. The ethical-normative approach of the article stems from the ethical values discussed in philosophy by scholars such as Edith Stein, Amartya Sen, and Simone Weil, and the empirical analysis focuses on the Italian–Slovenian border cooperation in the Upper Adriatic Region. Estela Schindel highlights that in addition to or instead of walls, illegalized travellers are confronted with the hardships of precariously crossing deserts or seas. Thus, environmental factors like geography, topography, and weather are part of border assemblages and imbricated in the complex chains of responsibility and accountability for migrants’ deaths, as well as in what Alison Mountz calls strategies of neo-refoulement. The article discusses the role of environmental factors in the context of EU maritime borders, and claims that what we consider ‘nature’ is key for understanding the problem of ethics, responsibility, and accountability for the deaths at the EU borders. Thus, nature needs to be increasingly disentangled and exposed. An afterword for the collection has been written by the anthropologist Noel B Salazar. He reflects the significance of various forms of mobilities and puts the chapters of this collection into a wider historical and methodological framework, accentuating particularly the significance of ethnographic approaches. Salazar argues that borders are here to stay, but so too is the human urge to cross them (if needed). Borders, border-crossings and mobilities are thus not only a present-day issue but will be with us also in the future.

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Introduction 15 Buchanan, A. and Moore, M. (2003). States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bulley, D. (2017). Migration, Ethics & Power: Spaces of Hospitality in International Politics. London: Sage. Burridge, A., Gill, N., Kocher, A. and Martin, L. (2017). Polymorphic borders. Territory, Politics and Governance. Volume 5(3), 239–251. Carens, J. C. (2013). The Ethics of Immigration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Castells, M. (1996). The Rise of the Network Society. The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. Oxford: Blackwell. Choi, EC. (2011). Everyday practices of bordering and the threatened bodies of undocumented North Korean border crossers. In: Doris Wastl-Walter ed., The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies. Farnham: Ashgate, 507—528. De Genova, N. (2013). ‘We are of the connections’: migration, methodological nationalism, and ‘militant research’. Postcolonial Studies. Volume 16(3), 250–258. Dickinson, G. (2018). A timeline of overtourism: key moments in the global battle between locals and travellers. The Telegraph. 17 May 2018. Diener, A. C. and Hagen, J. (2009). Theorizing borders in a ‘borderless world’: globalization, territory and identity. Geography Compass. Volume 3(3), 1196–1216. Espejo, O. P. (2018). Why borders do matter morally: the role of place in immigrants’ rights. Constellations. Volume 25(1), 71–86. Gibson, C. (2010). Geographies of tourism: (un)ethical encounters. Progress in Human Geography. Volume 34(4), 521–527. Gladstone, D. (2005). From Pilgrimage to Package Tour: Travel and Tourism in the Third World. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Graham, S. (2010). Cities under Siege: The New Military Urbanism. London: Verso. Hayter, T. (2000). Open Borders: The Case against Immigration Controls. London: Pluto Press. Johnson, C. (2009). Cross-border regions and territorial restructuring in Central Europe: room for more transboundary space. European Urban and Regional Studies. Volume 16(2), 177–191. Johnson, C. and Jones, R. (2018). The biopolitics and geopolitics of border enforcement in Melilla. Territory, Politics and Governance. Volume 6(1), 61–80. Johnson, C., Jones, R., Paasi, A., Amoore, L., Mountz, A., Salter, M. and Rumford, C. (2011). Interventions on rethinking ‘the border’ in border studies. Political Geography. Volume 30, 61–69. Jones, R. (2016). Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move. London: Verso. Keating, M. (1998). The New Regionalism in Western Europe. Cheltenham: Elgar. Lee, R. and Smith, D. M. (2004). Introduction: geographies of morality and moralities of geography. In: R. Lee and D. M. Smith eds., Geographies and Moralities. Oxford: Blackwell, 1–15. Longo, M. (2018). The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security, and the Citizen after 9/11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Martin, L. and Prokkola, E-K. (2017). Making labour mobile: borders, precarity, and the competitive state in Finnish migration politics. Political Geography. Volume 60, 143–153. Megoran, N. (2017). Nationalism in Central Asia: A Biography of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Boundary. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Nadalutti, E. (2019). An ethical code for cross-border governance: what does the European Union say on the ethics of cross-border cooperation? In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola,

16 Anssi Paasi et al. J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. London: Routledge, 197–211. Newman, D. and Paasi, A. (1998). Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world. Boundary narratives in political geography. Progress in Human Geography. Volume 22(2), 186–207. Nicol, H. N. and Everett, K. G. (2019). Trade, trump, security and ethics: the Canada-US border in continental perspective. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. London: Routledge, 169–183. Novak, P. (2019). Borders, distance, politics. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J.Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. London: Routledge, 49–62. O’Dowd, L. (2010). From a ‘borderless world’ to a ‘world of borders’: ‘bringing history back in’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. Volume 28(6), 1031–1050. Ohmae, K. (1989). Managing in a borderless world. Harvard Business Review. May–June. 152–161 Ohmae, K. (1990). Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Global Marketplace. London: HarperCollins. Ohmae, K. (1995). The End of the Nation State. New York: Free Press. Paasi, A. (1996). Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian border. Chichester: John Wiley. Paasi, A. (2009). Bounded spaces in a “borderless world”: border studies, power and the anatomy of territory. Journal of Power. Volume 2(2), 213–234. Paasi, A. (2019). Borderless worlds and beyond: challenging the state-centric cartographies. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. London: Routledge, 21–36. Paasi A., Harrison J. and Jones M. eds. (2018). Handbook on the Geographies of Regions and Territories. Cheltenham: Elgar. Paasi, A. and Zimmerbauer, K. (2016). Penumbral borders and planning paradoxes: relational thinking and the question of borders in spatial planning. Environment and Planning A. Volume 48(1), 75–93. Pascucci, E., Kallio, K. P. and Häkli, J. (2019). ‘Delay and neglect’: the everyday geopolitics of humanitarian borders. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J.Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. London: Routledge, 93–107. Pevnick, R. (2011). Immigration and the Constraints of Justice: Between Open Borders and Absolute Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Prokkola, E.-K. and Ridanpää, J. (2017). Youth organizations, citizenship, and guidelines for tourism in the wake of mass tourism in Finland. Citizenship Studies. Volume 21(3), 359–377. Prokkola, E-K. (2019). Asylum reception and the politicization of national identity in Finland: a gender perspective. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J.Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. London: Routledge, 108–120. Rogerson, C. M. and Saarinen J. (2018). Tourism for poverty alleviation: issues and debates in the global south. In: C. Cooper, S. Volo, W. C. Gartner and N. Scott eds., The SAGE Handbook of Tourism Management: Applications of Theories and Concepts to Tourism. London: SAGE Publications, 22–37. Sager, A. (2016). The Ethics and Politics of Immigration: Core Issues and Emerging Trends. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Introduction 17 Sassen, S. (2014). Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Schindel, E. (2019). The role of ‘nature’ at the EU maritime borders: agency, ethics and accountability. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. London: Routledge, 212–223. Shapiro, M. J. (1994). Moral geographies and the ethics of post-sovereignty. Public Culture. Volume 6(3), 479–502. Straehle, C. (2018). Justice in migration. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. Volume 48(2), 245–265. Timothy, D., Saarinen, J. and A. Viken (2016). Tourism Issues and International Borders in the Nordic Region. Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism. Volume 16 (1 Supplement), 1–13. Turner, B. S. (2007). The enclave society: towards a sociology of immobility. European Journal of Social Theory. Volume 10(2), 287–303. UN Refugee Convention (1951). [online] Available at: www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-con vention.html. UNWTO (1999). [online] Available at: http://ethics.unwto.org/content/global-code-ethicstourism. Wastl-Walter D. ed. (2011). The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies. Abingdon: Ashgate. Wellman, C. H. and Cole, P. (2011). Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winter, T. (2009). Asian tourism and the retreat of Anglo-Western centrism in tourism theory. Current Issues in Tourism. Volume 12(1), 21–31. Zimmerbauer, K. (2011). Conceptualizing borders in cross-border regions: case studies of the Barents and Ireland–Wales supranational regions. Journal of Borderlands Studies. Volume 26(2), 211–229. Zimmerbauer, K. (2018). Supranational identities in planning. Regional Studies. Volume 52(7), 911–921.

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Part I

Borders in a borderless world

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2

Borderless worlds and beyond Challenging the state-centric cartographies Anssi Paasi

Introduction Does globalization threaten the core institutions of world order, including sovereignty and the nation-state? Are we moving into a borderless world? The short answers to these important questions are ‘probably not’, ‘certainly not’, and ‘quite the opposite’ (Rudolph, 2005, p. 2) The 1990s witnessed a major renaissance in border studies, which had remained rather static since World War II. The socio-technological circumstances behind this revival are well known: the downfall of the geopolitical divide between the capitalist West and the socialist East, the acceleration of globalization, and the expansion of the internet. Scholars began to reconsider how borders should be conceptualized/retheorized after considering them for decades as stable lines that separate and limit states, key political spaces. The territorial trap and methodological nationalism dogmas rooted in the state-centric system (Agnew, 1994) were questioned, which raised queries over what and where borders are, what they do, when, and how. Critics reminded that since the sovereign state has traditionally been a key pillar of exclusion, it is necessary to look beyond the statist imaginary and consider the politics and possibilities of international ethics (Bulley, 2017, pp. 2–3; cf. Diener and Hagen, 2009). And yet while border lines have remained significant for state sovereignty in the context of international law, they are also important sites where border crossings of tourists, migrants, and asylum seekers often occur. Along with these tendencies, the concept of the ‘border’ has broadened. Borders mediate socio-political relations in multifaceted ways at/across various scales and also beyond border areas. Depending on bordering practices, borders may be rigid or mobile, and may stretch across space. Borders are even more: they are contested, multilayered sets of social practices, institutions, symbols, and political objects (cf. Johnson et al., 2011; Paasi, 2011; Paasi and Zimmerbauer, 2016). As Graziano (2018) suggests, their political, legal, social, moral, and psychological footprint fluctuates in both time and space, reflecting ideologies and power. Border-related terms are often contested in ideological discourses. State authorities, security think tanks, and politicians and parties, for

22 Anssi Paasi example, produce and reproduce such terms – often in the media – in the name of security, to govern state spaces and citizens’ minds. The 1990s also witnessed the rise of the ‘borderless world’ thesis that reverberated with the intensifying flows of finance capital, goods, and cultural influences. It was launched by management theorist Kenichi Ohmae (1989, 1990, 1995), one of a new breed of neoliberal ‘globalization enthusiasts’ (Ferguson and Mansbach, 2012). The borderless world thesis reflected both the optimism related to the end of the Cold War and the prospects opened by globalization. Border scholars instantly criticized the thesis, primarily due to its overly general and ‘impossible’ character, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks enhanced such criticism. Critiques notwithstanding, this catchphrase circulated widely in academic texts and in the media, and still maintains much currency. Researchers refer to the idea frequently, but often take it for granted. This chapter will scrutinize critically this watchword, but also moves beyond Ohmae’s economistic visions and onto claims that borders should be open for migrants in the name of freedom of movement, human rights, and economic competitiveness (Hayter, 2000; Carens, 2013). Claims for open borders anticipate much more radical ideas: some have argued that free migration across borders is not enough and that only the removal of all borders will suffice (Anderson et al., 2009). Claims about ‘open borders’ and especially ‘no borders’ are rooted in social movements resisting socio-spatial inequality and violence produced by borders (Jones, 2016); thus they nod towards a genuinely ‘borderless world’, whatever it would ultimately be, and move the focus onto human beings, ethics, morals and human rights. Such claims are highly politicized themes around the world in discursive struggles among political parties and ordinary people, for instance. While the chapter begins with the Ohmaeian notion of a ‘borderless world’, I will also compare this idea with the notions of open and no borders, and the ethical claims embedded in these concepts. Harald Bauder’s chapter focuses on open and no borders arguments in more detail. I begin by scrutinizing the relations between territory, borders and moral concerns, then look at the arguments behind the ‘borderless world’ thesis as well as its current significance. Next I compare the thesis with the claims for open and no borders. Contrasting these three horizons towards a ‘world without borders’ helps to disclose the changing geographies of bounded spaces. Such an analysis is important since, as Shapiro (1994, p. 482) notes, the dominant geopolitical map constitutes a ‘moral geography, a set of silent ethical assertions that preorganize explicit ethico-political discourses’.

Geography and moral concerns Robert Sack (1997; cf. Shapiro, 1994) argues that geography is a basis for moral judgment and that thinking geographically intensifies moral concerns. For Sibley (1995, pp. 39, 77) spatial borders are also in part moral borders, since ‘spatial separation symbolizes moral order’. This is most obvious in the context of state borders that signify territory/territoriality both materially and symbolically.

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Furthermore, state-driven control functions and moral orders trigger and sustain ideologies and emotions related to territories, such as nationalism and racism. Borders typically symbolize and retain ideas and memories of possible hostilities between ‘us’ and ‘them’ or ‘the Other’ that are reproduced in territorial ideologies and identity narratives (Paasi, 1996, 2016). Like maps, borders are key elements of cartographic imagination that bring together the past, present, and future (Wood, 1992) that confrontations often lean on. Today, the fear, prejudice and racial intolerance commonly associated with the mobility of migrants provides motives for building new border walls in Europe, the US, Africa, and Southeast Asia, walls that regularly hide deeply asymmetric economic relations between neighbours. Security concerns ostensibly mobilize a desire to reduce, monitor, and police who arrives in territories, but actually complex cultural and politico-economic geographies are at work. Spatial inequality thus foregrounds moral and normative concerns (Lee and Smith, 2004; Bosworth, 2008) that manifest themselves in struggles over the meanings of key terms related to borders. Borders, their maintenance and policing are also intimately associated with national identities and the ‘national body’ (Rheindorf and Wodak, 2018). State-centric practices and discourses limit our understanding of both international ethical practice and the horizons of its possibility. As Shapiro (1994, p. 495) notes, the state-oriented map tends to supply the moral geography that dominates what is seen as ethically relevant. Migration challenges the national/ist identity narratives that states ideologically link to their territories and population, and that are reproduced in spatial socialization (national education, media). Migration thus raises critical moral and ethical questions about ‘who should be where’, and how inclusion and exclusion are constructed and justified. Smith (2000, p. 115) states that the social construction of national narratives that legitimate state borders of inclusion and exclusion are ‘a normalizing strategy for the status quo, against which may be posited a view which stresses flows of people’. The borderless world thesis and open and no borders movements all imply that state-centric cartographies should be replaced by more equal maps that include an ethic of respect for difference (Shapiro, 1994). Bulley (2017) calls for hospitability, an inevitably ethical practice that both recognizes and indeed pushes for borders that can be crossed.

Crafting the discourse of a borderless world and its ethics Social scientists have noted the power of concepts and ideas to create ‘truth effects’ as part of their articulation, and how such effects may have material consequences, eventually becoming authoritative in governance (Miller and Rose, 1990). Globalization, flows, and networks were doubtless concepts that paved the way to a new, more relational understanding of spatialities. Discussion of globalization amplified during the 1990s and mobility and networks appeared as basic constituents of the emerging spatial formations in which a dynamic ‘space of flows’ would supersede the ‘space of places’ and borders (Castells, 1989). For Galli (2010, p. 103) globalization intrinsically means ‘border-crossing’,

24 Anssi Paasi the rupture of borders and the deformation of political geography in which politics becomes more global. He suggests that the new polycentrism of global space results from the residual but stubborn perseverance of the state-form, the growth of international-transnational organizations, and the birth of a multitude of regional regimes (p. 109). ‘Borderless world’ was also a conceptual novelty, echoing the collapse of the Cold War geopolitical order and the search for a new one. Despite its rosy optimism, it was also thought provoking for border scholars; whether or not they agreed with this idea, they were happy to take a stance on it. It rapidly became an apt illustration of another tendency characteristic of academic discourses: the use of academic terms often mobilizes ‘counter-meanings’. Hence the critique against the borderless world thesis has animated much of border research since the mid-1990s. The idea simply appeared counter-intuitive: the observations of scholars revealed the strengthening power of bordering, nationalism, and racism, which ran contrary to such an optimistic ideal (Newman and Paasi, 1998; Newman, 2006). The notion of a ‘borderless world’ was popularized in Ohmae’s (1989) article in Harvard Business Review, but especially in his book, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (1990) in which he shaped an idea of a new consumption-oriented ‘truly global world’, in which state borders would be transcended. He bemoaned how leading politicians were not able to recognize the facts of the borderless world, because governments simply want to govern, control, and to commit themselves to ethically and morally dubious acts to lead people astray and to cheat them. This generates two competing cartographies: On a political map, the boundaries between countries are as clear as ever. But on a competitive map, a map showing the real flows of financial and industrial activity, those boundaries have largely disappeared. Of all the forces eating them away, perhaps the most persistent is the flow of information – information that governments previously monopolized … Their monopoly of knowledge about things happening around the world enabled them to fool, mislead, or control the people, because only the governments possessed real facts in anything like real time … When information flows with relative freedom, the old geographic barriers become irrelevant. (Ohmae, 1990, pp. 18–19, 22) Ohmae (1990) mentions borderless world countless times but never theorizes in his book. Borders seem to be rigid territorial lines that separate political spaces and ideologies from each other. He repeatedly uses ‘borderless world’ as a synonym for globalizing business cultures, global market, flows, industry, and progress. He also makes some ethical geopolitical claims. First, he criticizes both states and firms that espouse economic nationalism and notes how governments are the major obstacle that prevents people from having the ‘best’ and the ‘cheapest’ from anywhere in the world (p. 11). Things, he argues, should move

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freely. Second, he notes how during the Cold War period government officials had fallen back on arguments that countries always have to be prepared for emergencies, war, and that this situation continued after the Cold War. ‘Are national borders really disappearing’, he asked rhetorically and replied, ‘we are not there yet … Borders still matter and markets are protected’ (p. 211). These ideas about emergency, war, exclusion, and protection are a nod to the modern state system’s physical and symbolic power to regulate the practices of sovereignty, mobilities, and images of threat. In a word, Ohmae contests – or rather gives to business economy an authority to challenge – the statist territorial container model and the ‘emergencies’. Of course, states have gradually asserted rigid jurisdiction beyond their borders and partly unbundled sovereignty from territoriality. As Sassen (2005, p. 535) observes, ‘While the exclusive territorial authority of the state remains prevalent, the constitutive regimes are today less absolute than they were once meant to be.’ Respectively, state-centred border regimes – whether open or closed – ‘remain foundational elements in our geopolity, but they coexist with a variety of other bordering dynamics and capabilities’ (p. 535). From this angle, borders partly represent a permanent ‘state of exception’ that renders possible the ‘normalized’ biopolitical control and governance inside the territorial borders of the state (cf. Salter, 2008, p. 365). Border regimes are, as King (2016, p. 2) notes, productive. In his book The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies Ohmae (1995) again reflects on the roles of nation-states. The state and its borders are once more an example of a cartographic illusion: Public debate may still be hostage to the outdated vocabulary of political borders, but the daily realities facing most people in the developed and developing worlds – both as citizens and consumers – speak a vastly different idiom. Theirs is the language of an increasingly borderless economy, a true global marketplace. But the references we have – the maps and guides – to this new terrain are still largely drawn in political terms. Moreover, as the primary features of this landscape – the traditional nation states – begin to come apart at the seams, the overwhelming temptation is to redraw obsolete, U.N.–style maps to reflect the shifting borders of those states. The temptation is understandable, but the result is pure illusion. No more than the work of early cartographers do these efforts show the boundaries and linkages that matter in the world now emerging. They are the product of illusion, and they are faithful to their roots. (Ohmae, 1995, p. 8) While Ohmae (1995, p. 11) argued that ‘in terms of real flows of economic activity, nation states have already lost their role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy of today’s borderless world’, he noted how physical terrain and political borders still matter but ‘neither – and especially not political boundaries – matters as much as what people know or want or value’ (p. 28).

26 Anssi Paasi Thus, he argued, ‘in a borderless world, traditional national interest … has no meaningful place.’ Yet, in practice (economic) nationalism prevails: ‘For nation states and especially for their leaders, the primary issue remains protection – of territory, of resources, of jobs, of industries, even of ideology’ (p. 64). Ohmae suggested that the model for the future would be cross-border regions (‘regional states’) that he saw as natural economic zones. Both books thus encompass clues of a transnational, if not cosmopolitan, thinking, and about a normative ethical mission: the open borderless world of economy and markets should serve as a substantial geopolitical model for military leaders and politicians. Yet in this world, people’s freedom is above all affluent people’s freedom to consume and cherry-pick across borders. Some scholars have been much more explicit when outlining the possibility of a global civil society that would transcend sovereign-bounded state spaces. This is most evident in critical cosmopolitan thinking, which emphasizes transnational spaces rather than territorial state spaces. Border crossings and local and global forces rise prominently in this global constellation, and diverse peoples should ideally perceive mutual problems in ways that gives rise to self-problematization and releases new ways of seeing (Delanty, 2009). Similarly, borders would in part lose their role and take forms in which ‘no clear lines can be drawn between inside and outside, the internal and external’. In more normative terms, ‘thinking beyond the established forms of borders is an essential dimension of the cosmopolitan imagination’ (p. 7). Ohmae trusted in the blessings of the new information technology (Green and Ruhleder, 1995) which would open ‘fixed’ state borders through expanding capitalist markets and consumption. These views reflected the promise of a seamless cyberspace that had entered into scholars’ and practitioners’ vocabularies (Newman and Paasi, 1998), yet often in national contexts. The internet was at first perceived – often by international relations realists – as a potential threat to the sovereignty of the state. Those coming from the liberal tradition saw it rather as a medium to strengthen national and global governance (Perritt, 1998). Today, especially authoritarian but also many democratic states assert control over the internet (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006). Yet internet connections increasingly cross borders: there was an 18-fold increase in cross-border internet traffic between 2005 and 2012 (Manyika et al., 2014).

From the borderless world thesis to the multiplication of borders Economic geographers and political economists presented the most profound critique against Ohmae’s ideas. For Yeung (1998) the borderless world was more ‘folklore than reality’; it caricatured the complex and multiple relationships between capital, the state and place; the multifaceted tendencies of globalization will neither lead to a borderless world nor to the end of geography; rather than being placeless, capital is territorially rooted in places. Hence, its complex processes and interconnected tendencies operate in local contexts but do not abolish them. Yeung (1998) notes that new forms of local resistance and

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expression may arise which strengthen the links between the local and global as well as the multiplicity and hybridity of social life at various spatial scales that concurrently become relativized. Sassen (2005) proposed that globalization is partly endogenous to the nation rather than external to it; the ‘global’ partly inhabits the ‘national’. Territorial differences and geographical unevenness will remain central to globalization. Massey and Clark highlighted the impact of globalization on borders and stressed the uninterrupted power of territory and place: One of the ways in which a ‘globalized world’ is frequently characterized is in terms of a planet in which all borders and boundaries have dissolved and in which flows of people, money, cultural influence, communications and so on flow freely … Yet, even as this image of a globalized world becomes ever more powerful, it is clear that the world does still have its borders and distances, that it is still in many ways divided up into territories; indeed, that new enclosures are being erected in the very midst of the production of powerful new flow … It may even be that the very process of opening up which is implied in so many stories (and realities) of globalization itself encourages a need to build protective boundaries, to define areas of privacy – territories which can be controlled in some way or other. (Massey and Clark, 2008, p. 3) Yeung (1998, p. 304) succinctly concluded: ‘There comes a point when we must raise our heads from books of ultraglobalists, look around and reconsider whether borders have really disappeared, and whether the world is, in fact, a unified whole’. A critical point was the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. Since then, borders and their control mechanisms have multiplied and become increasingly multilayered, more selective and ethically problematic, and yet border crossings have continued to increase apace. The globalization of finance has continued for decades and new technologies and new markets have pushed crossborder capital flows to new levels. Flows of goods, services, and finance reached $26 trillion in 2012, representing 36 per cent of global GDP (Manyika et al., 2014). People move also: billions of international border crossings take place every year in business and leisure travel; similarly, students, migrants, and asylum seekers move (Koslowski, 2011). The volume of tourism has increased perpetually. In 2014, more than 1.1 billion tourists crossed state borders. New destinations are evolving in both developed and developing countries. Whereas the fairly unregulated migration prior to 1914 was not regarded as a challenge to state sovereignty, and many states supported labour migration until the 1960–70s, the situation has changed. Although some authors argue that borderless economics requires free migration (Guest, 2011), many politicians believe that international migration is a threat to the sovereignty (read: security) of states, especially to their ability to regulate mobilities across borders (Castles et al., 2009, p. 5). The share of people living outside of their country of birth has grown gradually, being 100 million in 1960,

28 Anssi Paasi 155 million in 2000 and 244 million in 2015. This is about three per cent of the world’s current 7 billion population (cf. Castles et al., 2009, p. 7). These figures include about 20 million refugees. These relatively modest numbers nevertheless seem to animate nationalism and exclusive national socialization. Rudolph (2005) notes that after the originally positive attitude towards labour migration that required ceding some sovereignty for the benefit of economy (trade and capital mobility), contemporary control of migration (citizenship issues and border control policies) is intimately related to ‘interdependence sovereignty’ (control over migration flows), domestic sovereignty (the relationship between government and polity), and societal sovereignty (identity). This relatedness accentuates borders, nationalist idea(l)s of a ‘we’, symbolism, and the practices of exclusion. Despite the ongoing construction of border walls, curtailing of free migration, and general criticism, the borderless world thesis persists in academic and policy debates related to global business, management, consumption, innovations, security, taxation, drug problems, and, of course, the present and future roles of borders themselves. In December 2017 Google Scholar finds 23,400 hits for ‘borderless world’ and Google no fewer than 386,000. Yet, the new literature moves beyond the naïve celebration of a borderless world, underlining the power of national laws, traditions, and customs in the control of border crossings, mobilities, cyber-space, and real spaces (Goldsmith and Wu, 2006). Borderless world is also associated with cross-border security threats: climate change, illicit traffic of drugs, ‘illegal’ immigrants, cyber security and computer viruses, microbial threats, and the geopolitics of disease prevention (van Schendel and Abraham, 2005; Relman et al., 2010; Hansen and Papademetriou, 2013; du Plessis, 2018). Some analysts think that states are not relinquishing security structures linked to traditional state-centred images of threats but rather are exploiting simultaneously both traditional and wider complementary security ‘missions’ (Reveron and Mahoney-Norris, 2011). Current borders and bordering practices display some of the varied ways in which different institutions articulate state borders. Sassen (2009) notes how the governance of state borders is increasingly characterized by multilayered, dispersed, and segmented modes of regulation and governance, and how new assemblages of political, legal, and territorial practices signify lasting pressures between new global relationships, national identity, and state security. She notes that bordering is turning into a practice and capability that can be disconnected from traditional ‘border geographies’ (such as international airports and consular offices). One example is the spread of military power in global space across ‘sovereign’ state borders. The United States in particular created a military presence across the globe after 9/11, with over 700 military bases outside of the US in close to 80 foreign states (cf. Johnson, 2004). Similarly, the governance of borders is distributed in global space. The UK border agency (currently UK Visas and Immigration), for example, promotes itself as a global organization operating in local communities, at the UK borders and across 135 countries worldwide.

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We are witnessing the rise of what Sassen (2013) calls transversally bordered spaces: state borders are not simply legal borderlines but rather a mix of regimes with variable contents and geographic and institutional locations and arrangements. She argues that various flows (capital, information, professional, or undocumented migrants) each constitute a bordering through a particular arrangement of interventions, with dissimilar institutional and geographic positions. The concrete state borders matter in some of these flows but not in others. The meanings and functions of borders are fluctuating even though the actual geopolitical and legally defined lines may remain unaltered. Thus borders are influenced not only by the internal forces of states but are ever more related to supra-territorial geoeconomic forces, military conflicts, forced and voluntary mobilities, the transformation and rescaling of security threats related, for example, to terrorism, and the ‘technologization’ of surveillance (Sassen, 2013). This often leads to the externalization of border controls, such as in the case of ‘humanitarian borders’ in Europe and elsewhere (Pascucci et al., 2019). Balibar (1998) once suggested that borders are ‘everywhere’. This is perhaps too vague a statement since state borders come into being in and through a multitude of institutional practices and discourses in specific sites (border areas, cities, airports, and so on) that are mobilized by the strategic thinking of state personnel but may also result from civil society activism and antagonisms. Borders have multiple locations such that the sites for the enforcement of border regimes range from ‘banks to bodies’ (Sassen, 2005, p. 530). Borders have different meanings and effects for different actors. In analytical terms, we can think that borders exist in the form of two ‘landscapes’ (Paasi, 2016). First, the discursive landscape of social power, that is the symbolic and institutional mechanisms of social control, and spatial socialization/subjectification mainly inside states. This highlights the importance of symbolic national landscapes, educational institutions, national literature, media, collective events such as national and independence days, and so on. Nationalism, national identity, and related emotions are critical in the production and reproduction of these landscapes. Second, borders are simultaneously part of the technical landscapes of control, that is, the mechanisms and networks that draw on increasingly technical solutions used in bordering and control practices (biometrics, networks of daytime and infrared cameras, sensors, detention centres, externalization of border control). This nationally adjusted landscape is located as part of wider border regimes with variable contents, geographic and institutional locations, and arrangements (cf. Sassen, 2009). Bordering is increasingly militarized, which can be seen in both its technical solutions and externalization. These two landscapes form a multilayered dynamic and elastic continuum that embraces both national and international elements. Instead of becoming borderless, the current world is blanketed with oppressive border controls; deadly wars and conflicts; xenophobia and racism; intolerance and discrimination. Concrete border walls are also constructed around the world, typically justified by the fear of terrorism but in practice states erect walls and develop bordering technologies to govern and categorize various forms of

30 Anssi Paasi mobility. Along with these developments, bordering and the policies, tactics, and technologies mobilized by states in the control of flows (such as passports, biometric tools, electronic bordering devices, drones, and walls) have turned into complex regimes that penetrate both migrants’ and non-migrants’ daily practices and inflect both national and international policies orchestrated by states. Migration policies affect migrants, potential migrants and those who live among them (Pevnick, 2011, p. 9). In turn, much critical border research focuses today on the control of mobility, the practices of bordering, and the violence generated by such practices. From this vantage point borders are, Anderson et al. (2009) suggest, ‘moulds’, the attempts of states to create certain types of subjects and subjectivities. The figure of the migrant stereotypically carries pejorative labels produced and reproduced by states, such as ‘economic migrant’, ‘illegal’, ‘paperless’, and so on. It should not go without noting here that migratory movements have historically been outcomes of territorial, political, juridical, or economic expulsion (Nail, 2015).

Beyond Ohmae’s thesis: mobility, activism, ethics The ethical and moral concerns related to migration and border crossings have given rise to a growing literature (Fetzer, 2016; Sager, 2016; Bulley, 2017), which has become increasingly important along with the migration crisis in European and Australian contexts. This crisis has witnessed the militarization of bordering and the rise of ‘transnational discourse of compassionate border security that fuse humanitarian and militarized logics – with highly ambivalent ethical and political effects – and defies traditional territorially based understandings of borders’ (Little and Vaughan-Williams, 2017). Part of the new literature suggests that in the name of both human rights, ethical responsibility, and economy there is a grave need to open borders to unrestricted migration (‘open borders’), similar to the freedom of movement across borders enjoyed by capital, goods, and privileged elites (Hayter, 2000). Open borders and freedom of movement can thus be justified by arguments related to economy, human rights, and ethics and moralities rather than merely by consumption and business life as in Ohmae’s ideal world. For others, the claim for open borders is insufficient: the aim should be the removal of borders completely (‘no borders’), which would be a blunt step towards a borderless world. Part of the no borders literature takes a radical, anarchist step further: not only borders but also statehood, citizenship, and nations should be rejected (Anderson et al., 2009; King, 2016). Though morally and ethically justified, for most scholars these ideas are utopian and idealistic. For some proponents ‘no borders’ is a practical political project (Anderson et al., 2009). To summarize the ‘borderless world’ discourse and to take it further I have outlined Table 2.1, which brings together key features and motivations related to achieving or avoiding such a world. The table brings together three discourses and their premises: firstly Ohmae’s ‘borderless world’, secondly ‘open borders’, and thirdly ‘no borders’. The table presents the key contexts and the key ‘flows’

Table 2.1 Three perspectives on a ‘world without borders’ Concept

Borderless world

Open borders

No Borders

Key Institutional context for justification

• Business economy • Finance • ICT

• Liberal political theory • Market economy perspective • Political economy perspective • Egalitarian, libertarian, democratic, and utilitarian case

• Human rights • Injustice and suffering • Migrant in the capitalist economy: negatively racialized, gendered, ‘classed’ • Challenging state sovereignties and the territorialization of people’s subjectivities • Refusal of borders, nation, state citizenship, statehood, ‘illegality’ (= state-based categories) • Internet

Key ‘flow’

Knowledge, goods, capital

Migrants, goods, ideas, capital

Free movement for migrants

Form of Action

‘Business driven’ cosmopolitan idealism

Rationalizing argumentation • Debate • Activism

• The power of the state • Legal/Illegal classification • The power of socialization/ subjectification • Mobilization of hot and banal nationalism • Landscapes of social order and technical control Examples of Ohmae authors Counter practice/ source of critique

•

• • • •

• Social movements • Radical activism, Anarchism • Critical cosmopolitan thinking • Solidarity, responsibility for an open political community • Freedom of migration • Autonomy of migration from the state • Utopian thinking State’s monopoly over • Party politics movement: entry, • Hostile electorate residence, citizenship • Public opinion (Just 3% of world population lives outside • State’s and territory’s continual allure of their state.) • State’s flexible strategies: Coercive social ‘Internal borders’ regulation mobilized in the Delocalization of borders governance of migration; Externalization of policies related to labor controls markets, welfare, and ‘Humanitarian borders’ political participation

Carens Hayter Bauder Wellman & Cole

Anderson King Bauder

32 Anssi Paasi on which each discourse focuses. It also shows the form of action by which the claims have been justified, the criticisms levelled against each approach, and the ‘counter practices’, used mainly by the state, to control these flows. It displays how the claims for a world without borders have become more nuanced and explicit since Ohmae’s economistic manifesto, how ethical issues and migration critically characterize the debates on borders and border crossings today, and how claims related to borders are not merely ‘debate’ but manifest in social activism. ‘Borderless world’ was a call for more porous borders to foster economic flows, but claimed that such porousness should also be extended beyond economy to the political sphere. Claims for open borders have been put forward on more versatile ground. Authors accentuate the importance of free movement by paying attention to macro-economic aspects and human rights, thus stressing both economic and ethical justifications. The open border debate often reflects reasoning based on liberal political theory, market economy, or political economy perspectives (see Bauder, 2019). Wellman (in Wellman and Cole, 2011) recognizes the egalitarian, libertarian, democratic, and utilitarian arguments for open borders. Various arguments have been presented also against open borders (Wellman and Cole, 2011). One example is the ‘greening of anti-immigration’, which manifests itself in a rightist critique of immigration on environmental grounds (Baird, 2011). The anti-nationalist ‘no borders’ movement started in Germany in 1998 and has become an important grassroots social movement (Anderson et al., 2009). It draws inspiration from existing campaigns against immigration controls, incarceration of undocumented migrants and deportation programmes that explicitly call into question the legitimacy of the global system of national states and the interrelated system of global capitalism. No borders politics works against the control of mobility and related activities. It claims the right for all to move freely and sees that the state is deeply involved in creating vulnerability through immigration controls and practices (Burridge, 2014). Counter practices and critiques against the borderless world thesis, open borders and no borders reflect and reproduce state power and the legitimate monopoly of the state over violence and territorial control, as well as their sovereign power over the fates of people inside the territory, the status of citizenship and border crossings. As the table shows, there are also much more nuanced forces and elements that can give rise to counter practices. Such forces may emerge from various forms of nationalism (hot and banal), from politicians’ attempts to please the electorate, as well as from the embedded nature of borders in numerous social spheres related to how labour markets, welfare, and political participation are regulated. States are certainly not merely the big evil for migrants: states also use their power to care for and support those who are granted refugee or asylum seeker status. As Bulley (2017, p. 3) notes, state-based international ethics is important also in responding to major violence such as genocides, ethnic cleansing, atrocities, and natural disasters through humanitarian interventions.

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Conclusion Border studies have advanced quickly since the turn of the millennium and become more versatile, multidisciplinary, and even ‘post-disciplinary’. Research themes and methodological approaches have expanded profoundly. Instead of simply studying border lines or local border landscapes (which are still significant in legal and symbolic terms), border scholars now scrutinize topics that vary from bordering/ boundary-producing practices and discourses mobilized in foreign policies to the externalization of borders and border guarding systems; from the biographies and emotions of border citizens to the exploitation of transnational labour; from performances occurring in borderscapes to the aesthetics of borders and bordering. Some researchers look at mobile borders from the angle of biometrics, human bodies, and affects, whereas others study the border struggles of mobile labour and asylum seekers, raising ethical and humanitarian aspects to the fore. For some, border is an epistemic angle, a method that can offer insights into tensions and conflicts that blur the lines between inclusion and exclusion (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). This chapter has problematized various perspectives on a ‘world without borders’ starting from Ohmae’s economistic thinking and cosmopolitan idealism and then moving onto radical alternatives. Ohmae’s view on borders is narrow, yet more nuanced than criticism often suggests. His ideas exemplify a neoliberal tendency to convert the political rationality embedded in the existing geopolitical territorial order and its dividing lines into a geoeconomic rationality and imagination that stresses networked and fluid forms of spatialities that supersede state borders. This new rationality represents an ostensibly post-political and post-ideological stance that strives to replace the Cold War-era geopolitical order and fixity with a new order in the spirit of consumerism based on the rules driven by technological forces and the capitalist market (Green and Ruhleder, 1995). States are not similar, of course: some are more powerful than others and a few are hegemonic. States control their borders and this control seems to be accelerating both in the physical and emotional sense (spatial socialization). Another problem is that people are certainly not mere equal and happy consumers, but due to ‘geography’ and class position, for example, have dramatically different opportunities in their daily life in the matrix created by states, control, conflicts, global corporations, and banks. In spite of the wide circulation of the borderless world slogan, and claims and activism for open or no borders, borders have not lost their significance and are very unlikely to do so in the near future; they remain critical symbols and expressions of territory/territoriality and state power. In the current transnational world, the most rapidly developing research themes materialize in the relations between borders, mobilities, and identities. Borders and migration have become a critical collocation in social science. Their relations resonate with citizenship, the selectiveness of the (state-based) control of mobility through ever more technical apparatuses, and with the mechanisms and practices of ordering that ‘borders’ both enact and express. Thus, borders are increasingly multifaceted and this complexity will not only provide scholars with an array of research themes but will also raise ethical and moral challenges and spur activism related to the

34 Anssi Paasi politically contradictory processes that ultimately reflect the global uneven development. The ultimate challenge for border scholars is not only to map the multidimensional meanings of borders, their influences on mobilities, and to develop sophisticated theoretical frameworks. A major task is also to think and act beyond the existing theoretical and practical limitations of bordering practices, borders and territory (Agnew, 2008, p. 176); regardless of whether or not this gives rise to open borders/no borders, and regardless of whether this leads towards a world without borders. This task necessitates making continually visible the ethical and moral issues related to both bordering and border crossing, and makes responding to them necessary as well.

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Goldsmith, J. and Wu, T. (2006). Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Graziano, M. (2018). What Is a Border? Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Green, C. and Ruhleder, K. (1995). Globalization, borderless worlds, and the Tower of Babel: metaphors gone awry. Journal of Organizational Change Management. Volume 8(4), 55–68. Guest, R. (2011). Borderless Economics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hansen, R. and Papademetriou, D. G. (2013). Managing Borders in an Increasingly Borderless World. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Hayter, T. (2000). Open Borders: The Case against Immigration Controls. London: Pluto Press. Johnson, C. (2004). The Sorrows of Empire. New York: Henry Holt & Co. Johnson, C., Jones, R., Paasi, A., Amoore, L., Mountz, A., Salter, M. and Rumford, C. (2011). Interventions on rethinking ‘the border’ in border studies. Political Geography. Volume 30(2), 61–69. Jones, R. (2016). Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move. London: Verso. King, N. (2016). No Borders. The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance. London: Zed Books. Koslowski, R. (2011). Global mobility regime: a conceptual framework. In: R. Koslowski ed., Global Mobility Regime. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–25. Lee, R. and Smith, D. M. (2004). Introduction: geographies of morality and moralities of geography. In: R. Lee and D. M. Smith eds., Geographies and Moralities. Oxford: Blackwell, 1–15. Little, A. and Vaughan-Williams, N. (2017). Stopping boats, saving lives, securing subjects: humanitarian borders in Europe and Australia. European Journal of International Relations. Volume 23(3), 522–556. Manyika, J., Bughin, J., Lund, S., Nottebohm, O., Poulter, D., Jauch, S. and Ramaswamy, S. (2014). Global flows in a digital age: how trade, finance, people, and data connect the world economy. McKinsey Global Institute. Report, April 2014. Massey, D. and Clark, N. (2008). Introduction. In: N. Clark, D. Massey and P. Sarre eds., Material Geographies. London: Sage, 1–6. Mezzadra, S. and Neilson, B. (2013). Border as Method. London: Duke University Press. Miller, P. and Rose, N. (1990). Governing economic life. Economy and Society. Volume 9(1), 1–31. Nail, T. (2015). The Figure of the Migrant. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Newman, D. (2006). The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our ‘borderless’ world. Progress in Human Geography. Volume 30(2), 142–161. Newman, D. and Paasi, A. (1998). Fences and neighbours in the postmodern world. Boundary narratives in political geography. Progress in Human Geography. Volume 22(2), 186–207. Ohmae, K. (1989). Managing in a borderless world. Harvard Business Review, May–June issue, 152–161. Ohmae, K. (1990). Borderless World. Power and Strategy in the Global Marketplace. London: HarperCollins. Ohmae, K. (1995). The End of the Nation State. New York: Free Press. Paasi, A. (1996). Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian border. Chichester: John Wiley. Paasi, A. (2011). A ‘border theory’: an unattainable dream or a realistic aim for border scholars? In: D. Wastl-Walter ed., A Research Companion to Border Studies. Aldershot: Ashgate, 11–31.

36 Anssi Paasi Paasi, A. (2016). Dancing on the graves: independence, hot/banal nationalism and the mobilization of memory. Political Geography. Volume 54, 21–31. Paasi, A. and Zimmerbauer, K. (2016). Penumbral borders and planning paradoxes: relational thinking and the question of borders in spatial planning. Environment and Planning A. Volume 48(1), 75–93. Pascucci, E., Kallio, K. P., and Häkli, J. (2019). “Delay and neglect”: the everyday geopolitics of humanitarian borders. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer, eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. London: Routledge, 93–107. Perritt, H. (1998). The internet as a threat to sovereignty? Thoughts on the internet’s role in strengthening national and global governance. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies. Volume 5(2), 423–442. Pevnick, R. (2011). Immigration and the Constraints of Justice. Between Open Borders and Absolute Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Relman, D. A., Choffnes, E. R., and Mack, A. (2010). Infectious Disease Movement in a Borderless World. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Reveron, D. S. and Mahoney-Norris, K. A. (2011). Human Security in a Borderless World. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Rheinford, M. and Wodak, R. (2018). Borders, fences and limits – protecting Austria from refugees: metadiscursive negotiation of meaning in the current refugee crisis. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies. Volume 16(1–2), 15–38. Rudolph, C. (2005). Sovereignty and territorial borders in a global age. International Studies Review. Volume 7(1), 1–20. Sack, R. D. (1997). Homo Geographicus: A Framework for Action, Awareness and Moral Concern. Baltimore: University of Johns Hopkins Press. Sager, A. (2016). The Ethics and Politics of Immigration. London: Rowman & Littlefield. Salter, M. B. (2008). When the exception becomes the rule: borders, sovereignty, and citizenship. Citizenship Studies. Volume 12(4), 365–380. Sassen, S. (2005). When national territory is home to the global: old borders to novel borderings. New Political Economy. Volume 10(4), 532–541. Sassen, S. (2009). Bordering capabilities versus borders: implications for national borders. Michigan Journal of International Law. Volume 30(3), 567–597. Sassen, S. (2013). When territory deborders territoriality. Territory, Politics, Governance. Volume 1(1), 21–45. Shapiro, M. J. (1994). Moral geographies and the ethics of post-sovereignty. Public Culture. Volume 6(3), 479–502. Sibley, D. (1995). Geographies of Exclusion. London: Routledge. Smith, D. M. (2000). Moral Geographies: Ethics in a World of Difference. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. van Schendel, W. and Abraham, I. (2005). Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders and the Other Side of Globalization (Tracking Globalization). Bloomington, USA: Indiana University Press. Wellman, C. H. and Cole, P. (2011). Debating the Ethics of Immigration. Is There a Right to Exclude? Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wood, D. (1992). The Power of Maps. London: Routledge. Yeung, H. (1998). Capital, state and space: contesting the borderless world. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers NS. Volume 23(3), 291–309.

3

Imagining a borderless world Harald Bauder

Introduction The IUAES World Congress 2015 in Manchester featured an interesting debate of the motion that 'the free movement of people around the world would be Utopian’. Although I was unable to attend this event, I was delighted to see that the debate was recently published in the journal Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power (Abram et al., 2016). The organizers of this debate chose a format that apparently put the panellists – all well known scholars in the field of critical migration and borders studies – into the awkward situation of being assigned to speak either ‘for’ or ‘against’ the motion, even if the position they assumed would ‘not coincide with their personal or professional viewpoint’. The ensuing debate meandered between discussions of borders as a battlefield, borders as social constructions, and borders as people; between the meanings and imaginaries of utopia and dystopia; and between themes such as European bordering practices, the hierarchies of mobility among travellers, migrants, and expats, state and political sovereignty, the history of migration and mobility controls, and the politics of freedom. In the end, the motion was defeated in a vote by the audience: free movement of people around the world, it was decided, is not utopian. I wish this debate had been published before I delivered the manuscript of my recent book Migration Borders Freedom (Bauder, 2017a) to the publisher. It would have helped me to make the case that any attempt to ponder a borderless world is an enormously complex endeavour. The seemingly clearcut concept of the border, we know from Ėtienne Balibar (2002, p. 81), is in fact polysemic in nature in that it does ‘not have the same meanings for everyone’. The idea of freedom to transgress or even abolish these borders is equally complex and can be approached from many angles (Moses, 2006; Pécoud and de Guchteneire, 2007). In addition, it is not always obvious in which way these concepts and ideas connect with the material underpinnings, social practices, and spatial relations that underlie them. As in my previous work (for example Bauder, 2011a), I have found that a dialectical method enables me to grabble with this complexity and the contradictions that emerge from it.

38 Harald Bauder In this chapter, I expand on the ideas I developed in Migration Borders Freedom. This book assumes a relatively simple starting position: all human beings possess the freedom of migration and they should be able to exercise this freedom. According to Hannah Arendt (1968, p. 9), this capacity to move is ‘the oldest and also the most elementary’ form of freedom; it is also fundamental for being political (Butler, 2012). In his comments at the debate in Manchester, Nicholas de Genova (Abram et al., italics in original) concurs: To be human is to be mobile . . . Our defining capacity as a species to creatively and purposefully transform our surroundings and productively and consciously modify our circumstances – our existential vocation for labour, if you will – is inseparable from our fundamental freedom of movement. This likewise means that our inherently social character as a species is also contingent upon our mobility. Hence, the freedom of movement of the human species is an absolutely basic and non-negotiable aspect of our most general mode of life. This is not merely a philosophical predilection or a theoretical conceit, much less a dogmatic political position – it is an indisputable and immutable objective fact. To be human and alive, under any semblance of natural or normal or healthy circumstances, is to be mobile. (Abram et al., 2016, p. 22) This position imagines a borderless world. It is not clear, however, whether borders do not exist in this imagined world or if they merely do not present an obstacle to the movement of people: on the one hand, the once heavily-guarded border between France and Germany is still there, but it is mostly open for people to cross freely (although border checks were temporarily reinstated in 2015). On the other hand, the concept of a borderless world may also imply that borders no longer exist, and that a boundary between, say France and Germany, is no longer discernible. It is equally unclear at which geographical scale these borders exist. As Europe’s internal borders have become porous, it has become increasingly difficult to reach European soil, with the European Union recently signing agreements with Turkey and some African countries to prevent Europe-bound migration. At the same time, unsecure status and other mechanisms of distinction exclude many who were successful in reaching Europe from political and social participation and membership. ‘Some borders are no longer situated at the borders at all’ Étienne Balibar (2002, p. 84) noted almost two decades ago. They have morphed into a multi-scalar phenomenon (see Novak, 2019). In this chapter, I explore the possibilities of a borderless world. The complexity of the idea of the borderless world and the polysemy of concepts like freedom and borders requires a dialectical approach that rejects grand utopian visions and instead calls for reflective engagement. But let me first address the immediate problem: what borders currently do that is so detrimental to people’s freedom, prosperity, and – increasingly – survival.

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What borders do When discussing the effects borders have, we must not treat the border as a monolithic concept. The term border regimes describes the complex interplay between various levels of government and their administrations, civic organizations that operate at multiple geographical scales, surveillance, and control technologies as well as discourses of migration and security (Hess and Kasparek, 2010; Heimeshoff et al., 2014). While migrants try to circumvent these institutions and technologies, border regimes, in turn, respond in dynamic ways to migrants’ efforts of evasion. In this way, the term ‘border regime’ captures the dialectical relationships between state, society, technology, and migrants’ autonomy. The main task and accomplishment of border regimes is to order the world in which we live (van Houtum et al., 2005). They not only control where people live but they also determine under which conditions they live and work, who has access to rights and welfare, who belongs to a community and who does not, and who is a ‘legal’ person and who can be denied the right to have rights. Thus ethical issues are deeply associated with bordering and ordering. As Balibar (2002) observed long ago, borders perform this ordering work not only at the physical border, where border guards and immigration officers check traveller’s passports, stamp them with a visa, or deny a person entry; in fact, most of the work of border regimes occurs not at the physical border but inside and beyond bordered territory: at the transit hubs in the Sahara desert and Central America, in the visa offices of Mumbai and Nairobi, the train stations in Como and Cologne, the bus terminals in Calgary and Chicago, and at workplaces and in public spaces. They even operate on the surface of the human body. In his autoethnography of the border, Shahram Khosravi (2011, p. 99) applies Balibar’s (2002) observation that people have become borders to himself and remarks: ‘I am the border’. Subsequently, he unveils the process of how border regimes are ‘making borders of people’ (p. 99). A major component of this ordering work is controlling the mobility and migrations of people, and regulating not only who but also under which circumstances a person is allowed to be within the borders of a territory. These ordering practices are oppressive in that they subordinate some groups of people and elevate others. Increasingly, however, border regimes have also become deadly. Arguably, borders are more deadly than they have ever been. The number of fatalities caused by border regimes is surpassed only by major wars, genocide, and natural disasters like the devastating tsunami that occurred in the Indian Ocean in 2004. Alarming figures from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) illustrate this humanitarian disaster. In 2016, the IOM recorded 7,688 migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers who died or went missing while migrating between international borders (Missing migrants, n.d.). In this chapter, I am interested in how we can tackle this catastrophe. What kind of world can we envision in which people no longer tragically perish when they try to evade border controls, in which they can cross borders freely, and in

40 Harald Bauder which border regimes no longer oppress some people while preserving the privileges of others? I am not interested in immediate policy responses, such as whether a 30-foot border wall can permanently close the Mexican–US border, whether Frontex or NATO should be mobilized to police the Mediterranean Sea, or whether Europe should strike dirty deals with countries in Africa and elsewhere. Rather, I am interested in the broader ethical possibilities we need to unlock to prevent people from dying when they seek to escape war, oppression or poverty, or from being forced to live in subordination after they crossed borders to join loved ones or to pursue a better life for themselves and their children.

Freedom and borders To think beyond the current oppressive and deadly border regimes requires grappling with the underlying concepts of borders and freedom, and understanding the practices and meanings they encompass. The concepts of freedom and border are both polysemic; they possess multiple meanings and can be interpreted in various, creative, and productive ways (Bauder, 2011b). These concepts possess no ‘essence’ (Balibar, 2002, p. 75). The realization that they are the product of human practice and the human imagination, I think, is a fundamental step towards the transformation of current violent and oppressive border practices and imaginations. Take the concept of freedom: it is a central concept of modernity. However, there is no singular meaning of ‘freedom’. The various ethical and moral interpretations range from liberal understandings of the individual’s autonomy to reason and decide, to social-justice views that people should be free from exploitation and oppression by prevailing political and economic structures (Harvey, 2005, 2014). Each interpretation is rooted in particular material practices. The liberal interpretation, for example, has a history that relates to mercantile material interests, while the social-justice interpretation connects to class struggle and practices of resistance. At the Manchester debate, de Genova remarked that ‘freedom is not given, it is taken’ (Abram et al., 2016, p. 25), suggesting that freedom is not something abstract that we possess by virtue of existing, but something that is unavoidably linked to the material contexts in which we live and that denies us certain freedoms. Only when we are denied freedom do we realize that we need it. In this way, freedom is an inherently dialectical concept. I found another interpretation of the concept of freedom particularly useful: Hannah Arendt (1960) suggested that freedom denotes the capacity to begin something new – something that does not yet exist, that is currently not imaginable given existing material circumstances, and that we yet lack the language to describe. This interpretation differs from liberal and social-justice understandings of freedom in that it emphasizes the human capacity to create. The border is an equally ambiguous and polysemic concept as freedom. As a young boy, I was fascinated with borders. At school, I drew maps in my notepads

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depicting shorelines of imaginative islands and borders that delineate rival territories. I imagined the border as a line. In my imagined world, I could decide with the stroke of a pen where borders and thus territories would be. The imperial statesmen at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 seemed to have used a similar approach when they drew the borders of Africa as lines on a map. While the silly exercises in my notepad did not have any real consequences (other than me being distracted from paying attention in class), the borders drawn at the Berlin Conference reflected the geostrategic and material interests of the imperial powers and divided resources and people across the African continent. There are many other aspects of borders (Bauder, 2011b). They can be a marker of identity that distinguish one national community from another. In contemporary politics, borders are also depicted as the ‘last bastion of sovereignty’, where states control their membership after having a sense of losing control over the movement of capital and goods in the wake of globalization (Dauvergne, 2008). Another aspect highlights that borders enforce an international segmentation of labour and devalue the labour of many workers who cross borders, through the denial of rights and the degradation of migrants’ cultural and other forms of capital (Bauder, 2006b). For people in different material situations, borders have very different meanings. The refugee seeking security and the prospect of a future without oppression or violence may encounter the border as a save heaven. Borders also function as a filter, as Khosravi (2011, p. 103) remarked in the context of unauthorized borders crossings: ‘physical strength is required, so it is much more likely that only young, healthy and strong people will risk the journey’ and arrive at the destination. In the Manchester debate, Bela Feldman-Bianco imagines ‘the border as a dramatic battlefield’ (Abram et al., 2016, p. 3). All those different aspects of the border are associated with different material situations. The different border aspects cannot be reconciled but contradict each other. For example, borders simultaneously enable and constrain freedom – but it is unclear whose freedom exactly they enable or constrain: the freedom of sovereign nation-states to protect themselves? The freedom of national communities to define their identity? The freedom of employers to use labour most cost effectively? Or, the freedom of refugees to bring themselves to safety from war? A critical dialectic of the border is not trying to resolve these contradictions within a universal meaning. Rather, it embraces them and recognizes that every aspect is rooted in different material circumstances and driven by different material interests. These aspects are necessarily incomplete, unstable, and provisional. If we do not acknowledge the polysemic nature of borders, then we risk falling prey to ‘border fetishism’, which determines ‘how the world looks’ (Khosravi, 2011, p. 1), denying us the possibility to see other or entirely new aspects of the border.

Open borders The polysemy of the border concept should not deter us from imagining free cross-border migration. I will keep the discussion in this section focussed on the

42 Harald Bauder scholarly literature’s treatment of the idea of open borders. This literature shows that the open-border idea is far from one-dimensional. Rather, calls for open borders are made from a wide range of positions. Liberal theorists have suggested that current border regulations are reinforcing birth privilege (Carens, 1987; Cole, 2000). Today, the fate of a large portion of the global population is determined by the country of birth. All else being equal, a person born in Tijuana in Mexico has very different life prospects than a person born just a few miles further north in San Diego in the USA. This type of birth privilege rests uneasy with liberal ideology that emphasizes human equality. Open borders would mitigate inequality because people would have the option to cross the border and gain access to the same resources that other people have access to through birth. Assuming a perspective of borders as a labour market regulator, a marketeconomy position suggests that border restrictions artificially distort the labour market. They are, simply put, inefficient. Like, increasingly, capital and goods, labour should also be perfectly mobile (Gill, 2009; Basik, 2013). Conversely, a political-economy position argues that current border restrictions enforce the exploitation of workers (Hayter, 2000). Border restrictions ‘are instruments for mobility control of the mob, the working class’, Khosravi remarks in the Manchester debate (Abram et al., 2016, p. 10), enabling capital to divide-andconquer the global workforce and pit workers in different countries against one another. In this way, borders currently enforce the global segmentation of labour (Bauder, 2006b) and should therefore be open. There are numerous other positions from which scholars have questioned border controls. Anti-racist positions suggest that current border practices enforce a system of global apartheid; feminist positions see borders a mechanism of gender oppression; practical political positions highlight the value of remittances and brain circulation; religious and faith-based positions, too, support open borders (Bauder, 2015). All of the positions one can assume to argue for open borders share an important assumption: borders continue to exist. National borders themselves are not questioned; only that borders restrict the free migration of people. Thus, the open-borders scenario embraces – explicitly or implicitly – the notion of the territorial nation-state and the contemporary Westphalian world order. Furthermore, the open-borders scenario does not provide us with a blueprint of a global society in which all people are free to migrate wherever they please. It does not tell us what an open-borders world would or should look like. It merely articulates the negation of the current situation in which borders enforce birth privilege, make inefficient use of labour, segment the world’s workforce, or produce otherwise undesirable outcomes. Joseph Carens (2000, p. 643), an early proponent of the open-borders scenario, astutely remarks that ‘the open borders argument is not really intended as a concrete recommendation . . . Rather, it serves a heuristic function, revealing to us something about the specific character of the moral flaws of the world in which we live.’ In fact, the proponents of the open-borders argument have to be careful what they wish for when they call for

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open borders. They might not like the world after border restrictions have been abolished. The outcome of the open-borders scenario would indeed be uncertain. Daniel Hiebert (2003, p. 189) remarked that such a scenario ‘could just as easily lead to mass harm as mass good’. The proponents of the liberal position may find that tearing ‘down the walls of the state is not . . . to create a world without walls, but rather to create a thousand petty fortresses’, as Michael Walzer (1983, p. 39) warned more than three decades ago. Market economists, too, may one day realize that open borders do not create prosperity for everyone but instigate a global wage-race to the bottom leading to greater income disparity, global poverty, and despair. Proponents of the political-economy position may discover that an open-borders world is also a world in which national welfare systems have been abolished and cross-border migrants are super-exploited based on their status, origin, citizenship, or nationality. The open-borders idea is inherently dialectical, and the dialectical pendulum swings both ways. The progression towards a world of open borders can therefore only occur in a careful, measured, and reflexive way. While borders become more open, political systems, labour market regulations, welfare schemes, and other political and social systems and rules will simultaneously require corresponding modifications. Territorial membership and belonging would be a central question to be addressed with the progression towards a world with more open borders.

Open borders and belonging An inevitable question in this dialectical progression towards open borders is how people who migrate freely will become members of their chosen social and political communities. In other words, the idea of open borders is inherently linked with the question of citizenship and territorial belonging. As borders become open, rules of citizenship and territorial belonging will also need to change. Traditional ways of granting citizenship are insufficient to meet the open borders scenario. The vast majority of the world’s population has acquired citizenship at birth, either by being born on the territory of a country ( jus soli, or law of soil) or through the citizenship of their parents ( jus sanguinis, or law of ancestry/blood). These ‘laws’ ensure that citizenship is a birth privilege for most people of the global north. For most people in the global south, being locked into a particular citizenship at birth exposes them to lower wage and living standards, higher infant death rates, diminished life expectancy, and so on. Under current conditions of closely controlled borders, people with citizenship from the global south tend to be denied free mobility to the countries of the global north where conditions are better. The problem is that even if borders were open, citizens of countries in the global south who migrated to a country in the global north could still be denied rights based on their lack of citizenship. This situation can be observed, for example, in the context of temporary foreign workers programmes that fill labour demands in agriculture, caretaking, or

44 Harald Bauder construction sectors but that deny basic economic rights, such as freely choosing an employer, and other social and political rights. The domicile principle of citizenship ( jus domicilii, or law of residence) would address this problem. This principle suits an open borders world because it is not tied to birth. Rather, according to this principle, people are residents of the country in which they live. The domicile principle would prevent the situation that people may be able to freely cross open borders only to be politically excluded and economically exploited because they lack formal citizenship. Rather, with domicile citizenship, all residents – migrants and non-migrants alike – are equal members in their territorial communities. Illegalized migrants around the world are asserting their domicile right to citizenship. For example, in the USA, millions of protesters marched in 2006 against the so-called Sensenbrenner Bill that would have disenfranchised illegalized migrants even more than they already were. As the protesters marched through the streets of Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, and other US cities, they sang the US national anthem, waved American (as well as Mexican, Guatemalan, and El Salvadorian) national flags, and proclaimed themselves to be Americans. By evoking these national symbols, the protesters validated the nation and demanded to belong to it. In essence, they demanded the domicile right to US citizenship (Bauder, 2006a). In Canada, the UK, and other countries of the global north, too, illegalized migrants assert their right to citizenship because they are de-facto residents in the communities they inhabit (Isin and Nielsen, 2008; Nyers and Rygiel, 2012). An equally important question, I think, is at which geographical scale freely migrating people should acquire membership. Historically, belonging was a local idea and citizenship was often associated with the urban scale. In mediaeval Europe, for example, many cities offered freedom from feudal bondage to residents who lived in the city for a year and one day. In this way, urban citizenship followed the domicile principle: residency rather than ancestry or place of birth was the main criterion for being a member of the urban community. Today, urban political and activist initiatives are again challenging the idea that belonging and non-belonging should be defined primarily at the national scale. An example, is the sanctuary-city movement (Ridgley, 2008; Houston and Lawrence-Weilmann, 2016). This movement has enjoyed considerable success in US cities, including Baltimore, Chicago, New York, San Francisco, and dozens of other cities. These sanctuary cities have passed legislation that supports illegalized immigrant populations by banning the use of municipal resources to enforce federal immigration-related laws, prohibiting city employees from collecting and disseminating information on residents’ national status, and ensuring the delivery of municipal services independent of an inhabitant’s national status or citizenship. Like their mediaeval counterparts in Europe, US sanctuary cities implement the domicile principle at the urban scale. These urban communities reject the illegalization of migrants by the nation-state; instead they treat these migrants as equal members in their communities and grant them entitlements based on their residency in the city.

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Sanctuary cities include more than city legislation. They also involve discursive aspects and seek to change anti-migrant and refugee narratives at the local scale. Furthermore, they engage in identity politics that build solidarity between groups of local inhabitants that the nation-state distinguishes as ‘legal’ immigrants, illegalized migrants, and citizens (as well as other groups such as Indigenous peoples, racialized minorities, and so on). The notion of the sanctuary city, again, escapes a one-dimensional definition (Bauder, 2017b).

No border Identity politics – like those associated with sanctuary cities – are also a feature of the no-border idea. No-border politics evoke new subjectivities that reject national identities, existing political categories, and the national scale of territorial belonging. However, they refrain from articulating concrete counter-hegemonic identities (Nyers, 2010). The idea of no borders differs from open borders: open borders assume that states with territorial borders exists but that people can cross these borders freely; calls for no borders reject the bordered territorial nation-state and the Westphalian order. No borders is thus a much more radical idea than open borders; it recognizes that state borders are instruments of ordering the world and mechanisms of oppression. In the Manchester debate, Khosravi astutely observed that ‘radical utopian thinking does not mean opening borders but rejecting the idea of borders atogether’ (Abram et al., 2016, p. 12). Bridget Anderson and her colleagues describe the no-border project as a challenge to ‘nation states’ sovereign right to control people’s mobility [and signal] a new sort of liberatory project, one with new ideas of “society” and one aimed at creating new social actors not identified with national projects’ (Anderson et al., 2009). A no-border world is a dialectical conundrum. On the one hand, it is impossible to imagine it in concrete terms. It assumes that the political, social, and economic circumstances of and the way to conceive and think about such a world do ‘not-yet’ exist (Bloch, 1985). In this way, no border resonates with Arendt’s (1960) notion of freedom as the capacity to create something new. This idea of no border differs from an open-border world, which seems quite ‘imaginable’ given today’s Westphalian organization of the world. On the other hand, despite the difficulty of grasping it, a no-border world is already practised. It emerges when millions of migrants take the liberty to migrate although the state has not granted them permission to do so (Khosravi and Nicholas de Genova in Abram et al., 2016), and when migrants assert their right to belong although the state denies them this right (Anderson et al., 2009). One could observe this no-border world at the May Day rally in Toronto, when various groups – including citizens, immigrants, illegalized and temporary migrants, and members of Indigenous peoples – shared a political stage in protest and marched in solidarity (Bauder, 2017a). By acting in unity, this coalition rejected the categories of migrants, citizens, and Indigenous that are imposed by the nation-state and that come with different access to rights and territory.

46 Harald Bauder

Conclusion A borderless world entails two contradictory possibilities. The first possibility is an open-border world of Westphalian states that permit people to cross territorial state borders. The second possibility is a no-border world that rejects the national scale and the Westphalian state, and demands the formation of new subjectivities. Political practice, however, does not always make such a neat distinction. Sanctuary cities, for example, operate within the framework of the nation-state while, at the same time, challenging the national scale of membership and belonging. Both open-borders and no-border ideas can be effective tools for critical engagement in the dialectic of mobility and belonging. Although the two ideas are contradictory, both tools can be useful simultaneously and in complementary ways. Naomi Paik (2017) has recently highlighted that sanctuary practices should both be a ‘mode of resistance’ (p. 16) focussing on practical goals and, at the same time, have a ‘radical vision’ (p. 17) assuming an abolitionist perspective that fundamentally challenges all current structures of oppression. Scholaractivist Harsh Walia (2013) highlights how activists in ‘Canada’ also pursue practical and radical strategies simultaneously. Any dialectical process, unfortunately, always requires distinction and thus the drawing or enforcement of social, political, and territorial borders. This situation should not keep us from aspiring to a borderless world. However, we need to pay close attention to and critically reflect on our practices and the borders that these practices create. Pursuing a borderless world can inflict mass harm, create a thousand petty fortresses, and establish a global neoliberal utopia of unconstrained exploitation. Elevating the urban scale of belonging can also have negative consequences; while sanctuary cities are seeking to include all inhabitants independent of their national status, other cities in Europe and North America are using their legal leeway to facilitate the exclusion, illegalization, and removal of migrants (Varsanyi, 2007; Gilbert, 2009; Fauser, 2017). Again, the dialectical pendulum can swing both ways. There is no Archimedean point from which we can contemplate a borderless world. Likewise, the dialectical process will never reach an endpoint of a harmonious world of open borders or a world without borders. History will continue. Moreover, we cannot refrain from the dialectical process; however, we can (and must) engage with it critically. This critical engagement must first respond to the hardship and ethical and moral challenges that borders are currently inflicting: it must reject the violence and death that borders inflict on people when they try to cross the Mediterranean Sea and other borders, and the unjust and oppressive order that borders impose.

References Abram, S., Feldman-Bianco, B., Khosravi, S., Salazar, N., and de Genova, N. (2016). The free movement of people around the world would be Utopian: IUAES World Congress 2013: evolving Humanity, Emerging Worlds, 5-10 August 2013. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power. Volume 24(2), 123–155.

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Anderson, B., Sharma, N., and Wright, C. (2009). Why no borders? Refuge. Volume 26(2), 5–18. Arendt, H. (1960). Freedom and politics: a lecture. Chicago Review. Volume 14(1), 28–46. Arendt, H. (1968). Men in Dark Times. San Diego, CA: Harvest Books. Balibar, É. (2002). Politics and Its Other Scene. New York: Verso. Basik, N. (2013). Open minds on open borders. Journal of International Migration and Integration. Volume 14(3), 401–417. Bauder, H. (2006a). And the flag waved on: immigrants protest, geographers meet in Chicago. Environment and Planning A. Volume 38(6), 1001–1004. Bauder, H. (2006b). Labor Movement: How Migration Regulates Labor Markets. New York: Oxford University Press. Bauder, H. (2011a). Immigration Dialectic: Imagining Community, Economy and Nation. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Bauder, H. (2011b). Towards a critical geography of the border: engaging the dialectic of practice and meaning. Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Volume 101(5), 1126–1139. Bauder, H. (2015). Perspectives of open borders and no border. Geography Compass. Volume 9(7), 395–405. Bauder, H. (2017a). Migration Borders Freedom. London: Routledge. Bauder, H. (2017b). Sanctuary cities: policies and practices in international perspective. International Migration. Volume 55(2), 174–187. Bloch, E. (1985). [orig. 1959]. Das Prinzip Hoffnung. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Butler, J. (2012). Bodies in alliance and the politics of the street. In: McLagan, M. and McKee, Y. eds., Sensible Politics: The Visual Culture of Nongovernmental Activism. New York: Zone Books, 117–137. Carens, J. H. (1987). Aliens and citizens: the case for open borders. Review of Politics. Volume 49, 251–273. Carens, J. H. (2000). Open borders and liberal limits: a response to Isbister. International Migration Review. Volume 34(2), 636–643. Cole, P. (2000). Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Dauvergne, C. (2008). Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law. New York: Cambridge University Press. Fauser, M. (2017). The emergence of urban border spaces in Europe. Journal of Borderland Studies. Early view. doi: 10.1080/08865655.2017.1402195. Gilbert, L. (2009). Immigration as local politics: re-bordering immigration and multiculturalism through deterrence and incapacitation. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. Volume 33(1), 26–42. Gill, N. (2009). Whose ‘no borders’? Achieving border liberalization for the right reasons. Refuge. Volume 26(2), 107–120. Harvey, D. (2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Harvey, D. (2014). Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Hayter, T. (2000). Open Borders: The Case against Immigration Controls. London: Pluto. Heimeshoff, L., Hess, M., Kron, S., Schwenken, H., and Trzeciak, M. eds. (2014). Grenzregmine II: Migration, Kontrolle, Wissen, transnationale Perspektiven. Berlin: Assoziation A. Hess, S. and Kasparek, B. eds. (2010). Grenzregime: Diskurse, Praktiken, Institutionen in Europa. Berlin: Assoziation A.

48 Harald Bauder Hiebert, D. (2003). A borderless world: dream or nightmare? ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies. Volume 2(2), 188–193. Houston, S. D. and Lawrence-Weilmann, O. (2016). The model migrant and multiculturalism: analyzing neoliberal logics in US sanctuary legislation. In: H. Bauder and C. Matheis eds., Migration Policy and Practice: Interventions and Solutions. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 101–126. Isin, E. F. and Nielsen, G. M. eds. (2008). Acts of Citizenship. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Khosravi, S. (2011). ‘Illegal’ Traveller: An Auto-Ethnography of Borders. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan. Missing Migrants (n.d.). Tracking deaths along migratory routes. [online]. Available at: https://missingmigrants.iom.int/. Moses, J. W. (2006). International Migration: Globalization’s Last Frontier. London: Z Books Ltd. Novak, P. (2019). Borders, distance, politics. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. London: Routledge, 49–62. Nyers, P. (2010). No one is illegal between city and nation. Studies in Social Justice. Volume 4(2), 127–143. Nyers, P. and Rygiel, K. eds. (2012). Citizenship, Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement. London: Routledge. Paik, N. A. (2017). Abolitionist future and the US sanctuary movement. Race & Class. Volume 59(2), 3–25. Pécoud, A. and de Guchteneire, P. eds. (2007). Migration without Borders: Essays on the Free Movement of People. New York: Berghahn. Ridgley, J. (2008). Cities of refuge: immigration enforcement, police, and the insurgent genealogies of citizenship in U.S. sanctuary cities. Urban Geography. Volume 29(1), 53–77. Van Houtum, H., Kramsch, O. and Zierhofer, W. eds. (2005). B/ordering Space. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Varsanyi, M. W. (2007). Documenting undocumented migrants: the Matrículas Consulares as neoliberal local membership. Geopolitics. Volume 12(2), 299–319. Walia, H. (2013). Undoing Border Imperialism. Chicago: AK Press. Walzer, M. (1983). Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books.

4

Borders, distance, politics Paolo Novak

Introduction The ‘borderless world’ narrative was, perhaps, nothing more than that: a narrative associated with a specific, and specifically neoliberal, project – that of globalization in the 1990s. Yet, at the turn of the millennium, the idea that state borders were becoming less significant in a globalized world was widely shared across the academic field. Classic texts of the globalization debate deploy a similarly de-territorialized understanding of the transformations associated with neoliberalism. Whether concerned with networked societies, global cities, transnationalism, or, more broadly, with theorizing ‘new’ spatialities of globalization (Amin, 2002), these contributions privileged connections, horizontality, and circulation, over territorial boundedness, verticality, and immobility/immobilization, as explanatory tools for global transformations. In capturing and condensing into a soundbite these complex set of processes, however, Kenichi Ohmae’s (1990) book title became the strawman for those who wanted to contrast the ‘flat world’ depicted by these accounts and to re-emphasize its bordered, unequal and difference-inflected nature. Amongst the many analytical angles in which ‘difference’ was accounted for, a voluminous body of literature coalesced around the study of borders as key institutions of our times. Albeit re-asserting borders’ continuing significance, these contributions did not advocate a return to container-like understandings of the state and its territory. On the contrary, albeit disparate in their analytical insights, empirical attention or political commitment, they all shared a fluid and dynamic understanding of border lines. This was so in the early contributions associated with the renaissance of border studies (see Paasi, 2019) which saw the ‘us/them’ and ‘here/there’ dichotomies defined by borders as dispersed across space, being made real, challenged, or ignored in place-specific ways. It is also so in relation to more recent contributions concerned with border management techniques geared towards the control of migration flows, which render borders mobile and ubiquitous by dispersing their social control functions across space. Indeed, perhaps paradoxically, the ‘borderless’ narrative seems to have been replaced by a ‘borders everywhere’ one.

50 Paolo Novak Both narratives, however, leave several questions unanswered in relation to what seems to be the continuing analytical and political significance of bordered state territories, and of processes, such as nationalism or the construction of fences and walls along border lines, that seemingly reinforce those state-centred cartographies. Borderless-ness and the everywhere-ness of borders seem to focus on ‘horizontal’ encounters between migrants and bordering practices and they may risk missing the ‘vertical’ nature of contemporary border transformations, whether we think of them in terms of hierarchies across the interstate system, or governance regimes within and across countries. This chapter engages with this debate by conceptually distinguishing between border lines and border functions and by suggesting it be refocussed around an empirical concern with the place-specific and embodied distance between the two dimensions. Analytically, this distinction attempts to recuperate the significance of border lines, as constitutive of the interstate system, while accounting for the multiple locations where their social control functions are activated, reproduced and experienced. Focusing on the socio-spatial distance between abstract border lines and their place-specific and embodied manifestations, it is argued, not only captures the ways in which borders are simultaneously open and closed, significant and irrelevant, scaped and linear for different individuals and social groups, but also for the systemic and historically-shaped significance of these selective openings. Politically, this distinction foregrounds the ways in which lines and functions articulate to reproduce inequalities that are both systemic and situated. It identifies the contextual distance between what is and what ought to be, posing an ethical imperative for intervention (de Certeau, 1986) and providing avenues to define such interventions. The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section enters the debate on the location of borders, discussing various attempts to move out of methodologically national understandings of borders and migration, and associated critiques. The following section reframes this debate in terms of competing epistemological understandings of the process of spatial production, by reference to EU border management practices. Subsequently, the distinction between border lines and functions is developed using the works of Balibar (2002) and Paasi (1999). Finally, the analytical potentialities of such distinction are detailed.

Where is the border? In a contribution that perfectly captured the crux of the debate at the time, Jones et al. (2011) interrogated the field through the question ‘Where is the border in Border Studies?’ They wanted to shape the direction of the debate given what they perceived as a marked departure from traditional border studies – namely, the recognition that the exercise of states’ bordering practices increasingly takes place away from the border itself. Indeed, by then, Balibar’s (1998) conviction that ‘borders are everywhere’ had acquired almost hegemonic status within the field. This conviction and the shared concern with moving the study of borders

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and migration out of methodological nationalism and its territorial traps, grew out of, and rested upon, a fertile and increasingly solid intellectual ground. First, two different strands of literature within Border Studies had convincingly engrained the idea that borders are not fixed lines, but rather mobile and fluid. On one side, the so-called processual turn assertively advanced a dynamic understanding of borders as historically contingent, multi-dimensional, and place-specific human fabrications (Paasi and Newman, 1998). As such, they are stretched and scaped across space, or ignored, as they are made real by the situated practices and negotiations of those involved in the process of borders’ construction. On the other side, contributions framing the study of borders as a prism to capture systemic processes of social bordering (see Sidaway, 2011 for an explanation of this distinction) similarly emphasized the dispersed and dynamic ways in which borders appear and disappear to account for their multiplication and heterogenization under contemporary capitalism (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013), or for their being in themselves a form of social motion (Nail, 2016). Whether concerned with the dispersed agency of actors in border zones, or with the ubiquity of border control functions vis-à-vis mobile populations, both strands reinforced the conviction that ‘borders are not where they are supposed to be’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2009). Second, the field of Migration Studies had itself been undergoing something like a renaissance. This field was concerned with ‘remapping migration’ away from state-centred, push–pull, sedentary cartographies, and to account for the vast array of multidirectional and multiscalar social relations defined by/that define migration. Alternative- and counter-mapping exercises aimed at capturing migration’s emergent spatialities, similarly moved away from the methodological nationalism that has traditionally characterized the field to emphasize instead migrants’ transnational connections, agency, and/or emergent political subjectivities (Walters, 2002; Dalton and Deese, 2012; Ferguson and McNally, 2015; to name a few that have engaged in such exercises from radically different epistemological perspectives). Third, and perhaps most importantly, the conviction that borders are everywhere grew out of and rested upon the circumstantial evidence provided by the increasingly sophisticated and complex array of methods deployed in the management of borders for the purposes of migration control. The offshore relocation of detention facilities, the spread of biometric borders, and the extra-territorial projection of migration controls, all seemed to require new theorizations. Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) for example explain borders’ multiplication and heterogenization in relation to their systemic significance as spatio-temporal devices aimed at slowing down the entry of migrants into labour markets. De Genova (2017) uses the dialectic between bordering tactics and autonomous dynamics of human mobility to depict the contours of a planetary regime geared towards the control of human mobility. Others have dissected these processes by unsettling traditional state-centred cartographies through radical counter-mapping exercises (Tazzioli, 2015), by offering heuristic tools and empirical evidence that capture the relationship between mobility and states (Vigneswaran and Quirk, 2015), or

52 Paolo Novak by ethnographically accounting for embodied migrant journeys stretching borders into transcontinental borderscapes (Andersson, 2014). The result of the intersection between increasingly sophisticated border management techniques and such a fertile intellectual set of contributions has been highly productive. Concerned with tracing the emergent spatialities of borders and migration through more imaginative geographies, these contributions have advanced our understanding of the ways in which borders are externalized, internalized, and multiplied, and of their differentially inclusionary nature (Andrijasevic, 2009). Yet, in uncovering the complexity and fluidity with which borders manifest themselves in ways that cannot be subsumed within methodologically national epistemologies, these theorizations have perhaps left many questions open. For example, too expansive understandings of borders, it was suggested (Jones et al., 2011), may have obscured what a border is. Equating borders with borderlands, for example, may insightfully emphasize processes of border construction that stretch and scape borders into frontier zones, but may also risk underplaying the significance of those social forces able to shape such processes within each borderland and to assert their structuring influence across several borderlands at the same time (Novak, 2014). Equating borders with social difference (as in Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013), or with bordering tactics (as in De Genova, 2017), may short-shrift the historicization and significance of states’ territorial construction (Sharma, 2014). It risks disregarding, in other words, the inherited structures that enable, constrain, or channel contemporary border management practices (O’Dowd, 2010). If borders are everywhere then they are also nowhere in particular, as Thomas Nail (2016) suggests, and this may dilute the analytical significance of studying such institutions. Even focusing exclusively on border management techniques and technologies geared towards migration controls leaves several questions unanswered. Do fences and walls built along border lines, for example, confirm the notion that borders are everywhere or do they express the continuing significance of states’ territoriality? Further, how do state-centred legal and institutional categorizations and labels such as ‘refugee’ and ‘economic migrant’, however analytically inaccurate and politically pernicious, play out in relation to borders and migration’s spatiality? To what extent are the emergent spatialities traced by the above contributions useful to capture border management processes taking place outside the EU, the US, or Australia, where externalization and virtualization are far less advanced or non-existent? Finally, conceiving borders primarily in relation to their mobility control functions makes these theorisations too international migrant-centred, replicating dangerous divides of the field of migration (Anderson, 2013) and offering few tools for understanding how borders relate, for example, to internal migrants, or to those that are unable or unwilling to move. To what extent are expansive understandings of borders significant for understanding the spatialities of internal migration or for non-migrants? Indeed, even in light of contemporary transformations, many scholars have recognized the continuing significance of the state-centred territoriality expressed

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by borders. This is so, for example, in relation to the ways in which nationalism and national identity shape their character, functions, and manifestation (Paasi and Prokkola, 2008), or to their functional role within capitalist development (Anderson, 2012). Such recognition may require charting analytical trajectories that recuperate the significance of states’ borders territoriality, at least to an extent (Novak, 2011; Martin and Prokkola, 2017; McGrath, 2017). Even accepting the notion that borders and migration’s emergent spatialities require more imaginative geographies, in other words, many have questioned the extent to which it is possible to completely abandon a conceptualization of borders as lines that delineate a state-centred cartography of world spaces. There is a more fundamental question underpinning these debates, which relates to the different understanding of the social forces and processes defining borders’ location that each of the contributions discussed above advances. The different positions on whether borders are everywhere, are stretched into borderlands, or are ‘still’ precisely where they are drawn in maps, congeal seemingly competing understandings of the spatiality of borders and migration, and of who or what animates it. The point can perhaps be better illustrated through the example of the EU border management.

The EU borders everywhere The emphasis on the portability and ubiquity of borders has been particularly prominent in contributions concerned with the European context. Over the last decade and a half, in fact, the EU has embarked on an ‘unprecedented process of externalisation and virtualisation’ of its borders (De Genova, 2017, p. 23) aimed at the activation of migration controls as far away from the EU as possible. Such multiplication of the locations and forms through which the inclusion and exclusion of bodies in movement is performed, has involved the establishment of new border agencies (such as FRONTEX), the implementation of border controls through networks of surveillance (for example EUROSUR), the establishment of regional governance mechanisms, and the proliferation of everyday forms of bordering. This makes the EU borders seemingly omnipresent. In line with the epistemological turn highlighted in the previous sections, several scholars have dissected this process to assert that ‘new’ spatialities are emerging out of this process. However, first, while sharing a desire to map borders and migration away from methodologically national frameworks, these contributions mobilize a variety of heterogeneous scalar metaphors. For instance, Andersson (2014) asserts that the EU border regime in West Africa constitutes a Euro–African borderland, while Vives (2017) accounts for the same process in the same geographical context by understanding the spatialities of externalization as a set of inter-connected spaces of migration. Others emphasize instead regional imaginaries and the institutionalization of macro-regions in EU Neighbourhood policies (Scott et al., 2017), or the transformation and reconfiguration of sub-national administrative units’ functions at the service of migration management (Novak, forthcoming), thus

54 Paolo Novak recuperating state-centred spatialities to an extent. While some talk of mobile itinerant assemblages (Casas-Cortes et al., 2014), others underline the significance of state-centred jurisdictions in shaping unfree labour mobility, and migrants’ experiences of accumulation by dispossession (Cross, 2013). Still others are concerned with biometrics and conceptualize the ubiquity of EU borders in embodied terms (Ajana, 2013). The spatialities traced by the EU border regime, in other words, are conceptualized through seemingly competing scalar understandings, which offer heterogeneous understanding of the significance, or lack thereof, of state-centred territoriality. Second, and more fundamentally, the wildly different scalar concepts deployed, which involve regional, network-based, state-centred or scaped spatial ontologies, is driven by a profoundly different understanding of the social forces producing the ‘emergent spatialities’ associated with EU borders transformations. Some scholars assert that borders and migration are co-implicated in the process of spatial production. Rather than one working against the other, they coconstitute ‘fluid fields’ (Brambilla, 2015, p. 26) in an ongoing and situated b/ ordering process. Borders are not where they are supposed to be, from this perspective, because they are socially constructed through political, cultural, and economic claims and counter-claims (ibid). Accounts inspired by autonomous understandings of migration assert instead that migrants are not simply coimplicated in the process of spatial production, but rather its constituent force (Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos, 2008), as EU border management reacts to the turbulence of their political subjectivities. Borders are not where they are supposed to be, from this perspective, because they are externalized and virtualized in an attempt to tame the autonomous dynamics of human mobility (De Genova, 2017). Scholars drawing from historical materialist perspectives conceive instead of borders as institutions produced by and reproducing the conditions for capitalist development, as they contribute to the perpetuation of underdevelopment, dispossession, and exploitation (Cross, 2013). Borders are exactly where they appear on maps, from this perspective, as their linear inscription has specific functions under capitalism (Anderson, 2012), and as their management responds to the latter’s imperatives as mediated by powerful states’ strategic interests. The existence of competing understandings of borders and migration’s spatialities and of the social forces driving the process of spatial production is perhaps not surprising. As I argue elsewhere (Novak, 2017), scholars in the field are as much driven by methodological rigour as they are by their attempt to assert their own epistemological projects. Indeed, while radically different in their interpretation of the location of borders and of their constitutive social forces, all these contributions seem to share a social-tospatial analytical trajectory. Their understanding of borders and migration’s spatial manifestation is shaped by a (prior) epistemological understanding of the social forces and processes that define them. They, first, define the social forces, practices and relations that, more than others, shape the process of externalisation, in other words the content of externalization. Second, they find

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in the mechanisms through which externalization takes place, in other words the form of externalization, a spatial confirmation of such (pre-defined) ontology of the social. They resolve the articulation between the social and the spatial, following a social-to-spatial analytical trajectory: they use (their own understanding of) the social as an explanatory tool for the spatial (ibid). Three consequences stem from this, however. First, each of the conceptualizations of the spatial manifestation of the EU borders on offer exposes, but simultaneously obscures, certain social forces and relations. Thus, while epistemology inspired by the autonomy of migration convincingly foregrounds the irreducibility of migrants’ claims and political subjectivities to the order of citizenship and the force of capitalism, they are arguably less convincing in their reading of history, and, perhaps, less attentive to forms of exploitation, subjugations, and unfreedom beyond those specifically related to human mobility. While historico-material readings help us understand the contemporary through their emphasis on long term material trajectories of exploitation and domination and are applicable to migrants and non-migrants alike, they offer few and perhaps too functional tools to capture diversity, turbulence and political subjectivities beyond the realm of surplus value extraction, even if the latter is set in movement. While readings concerned with the situated practices and negotiations that make borders real or imaginary or stretched, alert us about the transnational circulation of everyday practices and dynamics, their lack of structural concerns feels inadequate to address political questions associated with the current conjuncture. Second, it is not clear, on these bases, which of these readings of borders and migration’s emergent spatialities is more analytically accurate or politically useful to move beyond methodological nationalism, and/or the extent to which this is possible at all. Adopting one kind of ‘non-methodologically national’ or, instead, a state-centric reading of borders and migration is not just a matter of academic inclination or intellectual persuasions. It is also a matter of political action, alliances, and claims. How to read migration and borders is thus a crucial analytical and political question too important to be left to a competition between epistemological projects. Indeed, third, the most pernicious consequence of the social-to-spatial analytical trajectory deployed by most of these contributions relates to the definition of their politics away from the border itself. The social-to-spatial analytical trajectory of the above accounts, in fact, for the spatialities of borders and migration function as a confirmation of a predefined ontology of the social (Novak, 2016). On the contrary, as described next, distinguishing between border lines and border functions forces us to investigate, rather than to assume, which social forces, more than others, are significant in producing such spatialities in placespecific and embodied ways.

There and elsewhere The above discussion suggests that there may be the need for an investigative perspective that simultaneously accounts a) for the spatialities engendered by

56 Paolo Novak contemporary border transformations and for those associated to the sediments of long-term historical processes of state formation and state development, b) for spatially mobile and territorialized forms of border controls, and c) for the latter’s differential significance to both mobile and non-mobile populations. To begin tracing the contours of such an investigative perspective, it seems useful to distinguish between border lines and border functions. Border lines are the demarcations that define states’ jurisdictions. They are state institutions, which aim to delimit and demarcate the areal extent of those jurisdictions and, most importantly for this discussion, they are the constitutive pillars of the interstate system, as they delineate a state-centred cartography of world spaces. They express the historical and material processes leading to their emergence and explaining their continuing transformations. Border functions relate instead to borders’ roles as institutions of social control and, most importantly for this discussion, to their management in relation to cross-border flows. Lines relate to the abstract state-centred geography defined by borders. Functions relate to the place-specific and embodied manifestation of that geography. The two are, obviously, inseparable. Neither of them is static, and this is not only about the always incomplete and ongoing geopolitical process of boundary demarcation taking place across the world. Rather, their fluid nature is to be understood in relation to the historically structured but situated meanings associated with border lines and their functions over time and in different places, and to their heterogeneous embodied effects at any point in time and space. The distinction thus does not undermine or contradict any of the views expressed in the contributions discussed in the previous section. On the contrary, it builds upon them as it makes it possible to account for the multiple locations in which border functions are manifested and experienced, while analytically retaining the structural significance of border lines as constitutive of the interstate system. Both concepts possess a spatial connotation. One territorially delimits an abstract (and unstable) state-centred nexus between a national territory, a sovereign authority, and a community of citizens, and linearly inscribes in space the effects of regulatory regimes, such as migration laws, that use it as spatial frameworks. The other reflects the embodied location where the control functions of borders are manifested and experienced, which may or may not be juxtaposed. This may refer, quite simply, to the location of border checkpoints and fences erected a few kilometres ‘inside’ the border, or, in more sophisticated ways, to the process of externalization and virtualization of EU borders described above, or to the differently located manifestation and experience of the same border for different types of migrants. Once again, this distinction does not deny the multiplication and heterogenization of borders but sees it only in relation to their functions, while retaining the significance of state-centred territoriality in relation to legal and institutional regimes concerned with migration management. In making this distinction and asserting its analytical potential I am guided by a series of contributions. In a chapter titled ‘What is a border?’, Balibar (2002) denies the possibility of discovering the essence of borders, but rather identifies

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three dimensions simultaneously constituting them. Overdetermination refers to their world-configuring significance. Borders are the territorial pillars upon which the interstate system is premised, as every inch of every border is sanctioned, reduplicated, and relativized by others. As lines constitutive of the interstate system, borders are ‘distinctly global’ (O’Dowd, 2010, p. 1023), from this perspective. Polysemy refers to the different meanings that they possess for individuals and social groups. Borders manifestations can only be captured, from this perspective, through place-specific and embodied investigations (Novak, 2016). Ubiquity, finally, refers to the falling apart of the coincidence between border lines and the places where border functions are activated. As these functions are multiplied and heterogenized (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013), they render borders seemingly omnipresent. The much-popularized notion that borders are everywhere, usually taken from Balibar’s 1998 essay ‘The border of Europe’, seems to refer exclusively to this third dimension: the dislocation and activation of border controls away from border lines. Yet the imperative that Balibar poses is to account for the three at the same time. Writing at the same time as Balibar, Anssi Paasi (1999), provides a different understanding of the everywhere-ness of borders, one that insists on the continuing analytical significance of border lines. Exploring the significance of borders in the construction, organization, and reproduction of social life, territoriality, and power, Paasi conceives border(line)s as dynamic social processes that ‘extend into society’ (ibid, p. 84). Borders are institutionalized at different scales, as they are produced and reproduced through social and cultural practices. The ways in which they are (re)produced exposes the aims of those attempting to shape their meanings and functions, the ‘landscape of power’, in other words, which animates borders. Borders are everywhere, in this sense, not only because of the ever more pervasive forms of control and surveillance that are manifested throughout the national territory, a ‘technical’ landscape of control akin to Balibar’s understanding, but also because they are reproduced and inserted into everyday life by state-centred institutions, whether at national (for example through education or the media, see Paasi and Prokkola, 2008), regional (Paasi, 2004), or international level. They are thus relationally significant to migrants and non-migrants alike. Once again, the challenge posed by Paasi is to capture the simultaneity through which borders attempt to shape social life across scales, from the international to the everyday. In spite of the profound differences between these two understandings, two points seem to emerge out of their analysis. First, border lines are crucial analytical vantage points that cannot be excluded from the analysis of migration, in spite of the ever more mobile locations where border controls are manifested and performed. This is so, according to Balibar, because they are overdetermined. This is also so according to Paasi, because they express landscapes of power that confer them with meanings. Second, they are ubiquitous (Balibar) as they dynamically extend into society (Paasi). Yet the polysemic reverberations of their spreading across society remains to be discovered. Indeed, both understandings seem to pose an empirical imperative. In what ways is polysemy

58 Paolo Novak overdetermined? In which ways is ubiquity polysemic? How does the multiscalar institutionalization of borders heterogeneously manifest itself in everyday life? To what extent are the attempts to assert social control through borders successful in doing so? Distinguishing between border lines and border functions forces us to investigate, rather than to assume, how the simultaneity between overdetermination, ubiquity and polysemy heterogeneously plays out in place-specific and embodied settings, how and where the attempt to tame human mobility is un/successful, and for whom. Accounting both for borders as lines located where they appear on maps, and for the everywhere-ness of the manifestation of their social control functions shifts the analytical focus from the location of borders, to the tension between state- and non-state-centred cartographies. Such distinction has the potential to harness the insights of the various epistemological perspectives discussed above, as it accounts both for the historical and material trajectories that explain the exact location of border lines and their contemporary reverberations, as much as for the fluid, situated, and dynamic social processes that render the significance of those lines place-specific and embodied. So where are EU borders located? EU borders are both where they appear on maps and wherever their social control functions are reproduced and subjectively experienced. First, border lines and the state-centred cartography that they delineate are significant for EU borders and migration management in many respects. Their overdetermined nature provides the basis for such management. Border lines define the territorialized institutional framework upon which migration management is premised. Distinctions between economic and refugee migrants, for example, or between internal and external migration, express and reproduce such cartography, however inaccurately or perniciously. The institutionalization of these distinctions at multiple scales functions as a systemic regulator of activities and lean on specific ethical codes. This is so through international, bilateral, or regional agreements between states, which reinforce such cartography. It is so through the operationalization of these distinctions in migration management’s laws and procedures, which operate through territorialized forms of migration management. It is also so considering these distinctions in national(ist) contexts as forms of social spatialization that strengthen nationally bordered identities (Paasi and Prokkola, 2008). Border lines are key regulators of economic, political, cultural, and military activity across the interstate system (O’Dowd, 2010). They ‘overdetermine’ social life. Of course, that cartography cannot be taken at face value, but needs to be situated. Indeed, second, the ‘polysemic’ nature of such overdetermination needs to be accounted for. EU’s border management agreements with countries in Africa or in Central Asia, for example, rest on the profoundly unequal ‘landscapes of power’ shaping the interstate system. Considering the contemporary significance of border lines as unequal (polysemic) regulators of those activities continuously returns these agreements back to histories of state formation and state development (Novak, 2016), as it explains the structural conditions that made these agreements possible in the first place, as well as their resilience. It brings the past

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into the present (O’Dowd, 2010) and thus actualizes border lines’ world-making functions in ways that go beyond the ‘primitive accumulation of space’ associated with them (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). Third, perhaps most importantly, the polysemic nature of borders’ ubiquity similarly needs to be situated in relation to the place-specific and embodied manifestations of their social control functions. On one side, the significance of EU borders internalization/externalization is differently configured across space, whether we think about border fences along the so-called Balkan Route in Europe, airport checks across the world, or search and rescue operations across the Mediterranean. Combining both spatially mobile and territorialized forms of migration control, the spatialities of EU border management need to be captured in their articulation (Novak, forthcoming). They are also likely to be shaped by different forces in each of these places, whether we think of networks (ir/ regularly) facilitating migration across the Sahara Desert or (ir/regularly) providing support within Europe to migrants (see, for example, Dimitriadis, 2018), or of police forces in countries collaborating with the EU (Vives, 2017). Even more significantly, in any of these locations, the spatiality of EU border management is polysemically experienced by different types of migrants or indeed by the same group (Sigona, 2012), and extends into society both for migrants and non-migrants alike. It may reinforce nationalist discourses and practices of socio-spatial exclusion and marginalization that affect vulnerable populations, regardless of where they are from. It privileges certain forms of mobility and belonging over others, regardless of who performs them. Distinguishing between border lines and functions suggests that borders are everywhere not only and not so much because they are being relocated and activated everywhere, but because of the social order that they attempt to impose.

Distance and politics The distinction between border lines and functions obviates some of the dilemmas associated with the debate on the ‘where’ of the borders, as it differentiates the dislocated exercise and experience of their functions from the linear statecentred cartography that they inscribe, attempting to capture the socio-spatial significance of both (Novak, 2011). If on one side, border lines define a set of abstract us/them or here/there dichotomies that so significantly shape social life for migrants and non-migrants alike, on the other side, their social control functions are animated by and experienced as deeply contextual and situated processes. Indeed, the distinction is useful because of the place-specific and embodied empirical imperative it imposes. Paraphrasing Balibar, if border lines express overdetermination, and border functions their ubiquity, their polysemy, at interstate level, in place-specific settings and in terms of embodied experiences, is something that can only be captured through empirical research. Similarly, paraphrasing Paasi, if border lines express the landscapes of power that extend into the whole of society attempting to assert particular kinds of spatial order

60 Paolo Novak through their social control functions, the place-specific and embodied extent to which this attempt is successful can only be a matter of empirical investigation. The notion of distance offered here is defined by such empirical imperative and provides the basis for developing a research agenda that attempts to capture the socio-spatial tension between lines and functions. Such an agenda would be concerned, for example, with explaining the different configuration of the ‘same’ EU external border line in different places (such as the Finnish–Russian border or the Spain–Morocco one), with explaining the dispersal across space of its social control functions in terms of similarities (for example airport checks in Russia or Morocco, fences, and border posts) and differences (for example EU borders’ externalisation in Western Africa), with explaining the differential significance of such configurations to different types of migrants (fore example high/low-skilled, men or women, borderlanders, EU or non-EU nationals) and to non-mobile populations. By accounting for situated and contextual manifestation of border functions, yet striving to understand it on the basis of border lines’ systemic significance, such an agenda may expose the ways in which powerful social forces are able to reproduce themselves through both territorialized and mobile spatialities. Accounting for the ways in which lines and functions articulate to reproduce inequalities that are both systemic and situated captures the experiential, agencydriven, and subjective significance of borders in its overdetermined nature. Indeed, the distance between border lines and the manifestation of their functions is full of analytical potential, as it provides place-specific and embodied evidence of inequalities between and across individuals in societies. Those interstices are thus also full of political potential, as they express the unequal and difference-inflected nature of border articulations. They express the distance between what is and what ought to be, an ethical imperative for intervention, as de Certeau (1986) suggests. Empirically accounting for the place-specific and embodied manifestation of such distance, rather than assuming it on the basis of pre-defined ontologies of the social, may provide some practical avenues to define such interventions.

References Ajana, A. (2013). Governing through Biometrics: The Biopolitics of Identity. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Amin, A. (2002). Spatialities of globalisation. Environment and Planning A. Volume 34(3), 385–399. Anderson, B. (2013). Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anderson, J. (2012). Borders in the new imperialism. In: T. Wilson and H. Donnan eds., Wiley-Blackwell Companions to Anthropology. Volume 26: Companion to Border Studies. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 139–157. Andersson, R. (2014). Hunter and prey: patrolling clandestine migration in the Euro-African borderlands. Anthropological Quarterly. Volume 87(1), 119–149.

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Andrijasevic, R. (2009). Sex on the move: gender, subjectivity and differential inclusion. Subjectivity. Volume 29(1), 389–406. Balibar, E. (1998). The borders of Europe. In: P. Cheah and B. Robbins eds., Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 216–233. Balibar, E. (2002). Politics and the Other Scene. London: Verso. Brambilla, C. (2015). Exploring the critical potential of the borderscapes concept. Geopolitics. Volume 20(1), 14–34. Casas-Cortes, M., Cobarrubias, S., and Pickles, J. (2014). Good neighbours make good fences: seahorse operations, border externalization and extra-territoriality. European Urban and Regional Studies. Volume 23(3), 231–251. Cross, H. (2013). Migrants, Borders and Global Capitalism: West African Labour Mobility and EU Borders. London: Routledge. Dalton, C. and Mason-Deese, L. (2012). Counter (mapping) actions: mapping as militant research. ACME. Volume 11(3), 439–466. de Certeau, M. (1986). Heterologies. Discourse on the Other. Translated by B. Massumi. Manchester: Manchester University Press. De Genova, N. ed. (2017). The Borders of ‘Europe’: Autonomy of Migration, Tactics of Bordering. Chapel Hill: Duke University Press. Dimitriadis, I. (2018). ‘Asking around’: immigrants’ counterstrategies to renew their residence permit in times of economic crisis in Italy. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies. Volume 18(3), 275–292. Ferguson, S. and McNally, D. (2015). Precarious migrants: gender, race and the social reproduction of a global working class. Socialist Register. Volume 51, 1–23. Jones, R., Johnson, C., Paasi, A., Amoore, L., Mountz, A., Salter, M. and Rumford, C. (2011). Interventions on rethinking ‘the border’ in border studies. Political Geography. Volume 30(2), 61–69. Martin, L. and Prokkola, E-K. (2017). Making labour mobile: borders, precarity, and the competitive state in finnish migration politics. Political Geography. Volume 60, 143–153. McGrath, S. (2017). Dis/articulations and the interrogation of development in GPN research. Progress in Human Geography. Online first. Mezzadra, S. and Neilson, B. (2013). Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor. Durham, NC, USA: Duke University Press. Nail, T. (2016). Theory of the Border. New York: Oxford University Press. Novak, P. (2011). The flexible territoriality of borders. Geopolitics. Volume 16(4), 741–767. Novak, P. (2014). Tracing connections and its politics. In: H. Alff and A. Benz eds., Tracing Connections – Explorations of Spaces and Places in Asian Contexts. Berlin: VWB, 21–40. Novak, P. (2016). Placing borders in development. Geopolitics. Volume 21(3), 483–512. Novak, P. (2017). Back to borders. Critical Sociology. Volume 43(6), 847–864. Novak, P. (forthcoming). The location of asylum. O’Dowd, L. (2010). From a ‘borderless world’ to a ‘world of borders’: ‘bringing history back in’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. Volume 28(6), 1031–1050. Ohmae, K. (1990). The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy. New York: Harper Business. Paasi, A. (1999). Boundaries as social processes: territoriality in the world of flows. Geopolitics. Volume 3(1), 69–88. Paasi, A. (2004). Place and region: looking through the prism of scale. Progress in Human Geography. Volume 28(4), 536–546.

62 Paolo Novak Paasi, A. (2019). Borderless worlds and beyond: challenging the state-centric cartographies. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J.Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. London: Routledge, 21–36. Paasi, A. and Newman, D. (1998). Fences and neighbours in the post-modern world: boundary narratives in political geography. Progress in Human Geography. Volume 22(2), 186–207. Paasi, A. and Prokkola, E. (2008). Territorial dynamics, cross-border work and everyday life in the Finnish–Swedish border area. Space and Polity. Volume 12(1), 13–29. Papadopoulos, D., Stephenson, N., and Tsianos, V. (2008). Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century. London: Pluto Press. Scott, J. W., Brambilla, C., Celata, F., Coletti, R., Bürkner, H., Ferrer-Gallardo, X., and Gabrielli, L. (2017). Between crises and borders: interventions on Mediterranean neighbourhood and the salience of spatial imaginaries. Political Geography. Volume 63, 174–184. Sharma, N. (2014). Border as method: or, the multiplication of labor by Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (review). Labour/Le Travail. Volume 74(1), 420–423. Sidaway, J. (2011). The return and eclipse of border studies? Charting agendas. Geopolitics. Volume 16(4), 969–976. Sigona, N. (2012). ‘I have too much baggage’: the impacts of legal status on the social worlds of irregular migrants. Social Anthropology. Volume 20(1), 50–65. Tazzioli, M. (2015). Spaces of Governmentality: Autonomous Migration and the Arab Uprisings. London: Rowman & Littlefield International. Vaughan-Williams, N. (2009). Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Vigneswaran, D. and Quirk, J. eds. (2015). Mobility Makes States: Migration and Power in Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Vives, L. (2017). Unwanted sea migrants across the EU border: the Canary Islands. Political Geography. Volume 61, 181–192. Walters, W. (2002). Mapping Schengenland: denaturalizing the border. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. Volume 20(5), 561–580.

Part II

Politics of inclusion and exclusion

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‘Borderless’ Europe and Brexit Young European migrant accounts of media uses and moralities Aija Lulle

Introduction Freedom of movement of persons is one of the fundamental freedoms of the European Union (EU), envisaged from early stages of the EU and fortified legally in the Treaty of the European Union (1992), and legislation and practices afterwards. One may speculate that increasingly less regulated flows of people across borders since the 1990s evokes a mirage sense of a ‘borderless Europe’. Top-down vocabularies prescribing how to talk about internal EU migration have recently been championed: official EU publications prefer classifying intra-EU movement as ‘mobility’, while the term ‘migration’ has been reserved to describe the movement of third-country nationals – those coming from outside of ‘borderless Europe’ (King and Lulle, 2016). However, many migration scholars and the intra-EU migrants themselves, whom I have continuously studied for more than a decade, would doubt such a characterization. People experience borders, are b/ordered (van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer, 2005), and themselves draw divisive lines on an everyday basis. I argue that at the best attempt, and still remaining critical, we could talk about a ‘borderless EU’ for intra-EU mobility. In this chapter, I will examine the experience of 25 young Europeans who were born in Latvia and moved to the UK, or continued moving back and forth between these two (or more) countries. Furthermore, in this chapter I examine the accounts of young migrants living through a highly pertinent political event the UK – the EU referendum in 2016, when the UK voted to leave the European bloc. More specifically, drawing on ideas from geography and moralities, I ask: how did migrants experience boundary-drawing between ‘us’ and ‘them’ while exercising the rights granted by the ‘free EU mobility’ regime, and what kinds of boundaries are migrants drawing in terms of geography and morality? This research was carried out in an uncertain political milieu in which no concrete solutions for the control of movement across state borders had been introduced. Ideas on control, half-formulated at best, became sensational media topics and stirred what Cohen ([1972] 2002) has famously formulated as ‘moral panic’. Accordingly, I want to probe deeper into moralities – self-restricting practices of media usage during political turbulence and uncertainty, when the presumed

66 Aija Lulle ‘borderless world’ was anticipated to become a ‘border-more world’ in light of the coming Brexit. In other words, people expected more strictly controlled mobility across the UK’s borders, and discrimination against European (and other) foreigners who were already in the country. Therefore, I also ask: how does morality as practical action (Lee and Smith, 2004; Paasi et al., 2019) play out in media use by research participants before and after the EU referendum? In order to answer these questions, the rest of the chapter unfolds as follows. First, I provide a concise overview of the methods used, followed by some context for Brexit in terms of geography and moralities that is relevant to my research participants. Second, I sketch out a conceptual approach to boundarydrawing and media use, which is applied in three analytical sub-sections of the reactions of my research participants: before the referendum, immediately after the referendum, and one year after the ‘leave’ vote. Such an approach will give us a new understanding how dynamic the border-drawing process is in the light of political events.

Methodology The data for this study were drawn from semi-structured interviews with 25 migrants in the UK. They were all born in Latvia and were 20–36 years old during the initial interviews, which took place from late-2015 to early-2016. The interviews typically lasted one hour, and were carried out in person. Most of the interviews were conducted in Latvian, while two took place in Russian, and two were conducted partly in English with Latvian and Russian mixed in, as I always follow the language preferences of my research participants. These were part of the large-scale Horizon 2020 research project ‘YMOBILITY: Maximising opportunities for individuals, labour markets, and regions in Europe’, in which 840 interviews were carried out in eight EU countries. The main focus of the project was to understand the life transitions of young people both geographically and socially: the transition from school to work, into full employment, into full adulthood, and, finally, establishing one’s own ‘home’. In this chapter I trace a specific line of inquiry: lived geography with media in the UK before and after the EU referendum. One hundred and twenty-seven of these interviews, including my interviews with the Latvians migrants, were carried out in London and its metropolitan area, and had just been transcribed when the Brexit vote took place. These interviews allowed me to trace media uses – how migrants use media and the way migrants recognize representation of migrants in the media. However, since the vote envisaged profound changes in the ‘free mobility regime’, some of the London interviews were repeated; nine Latvian participants were re-interviewed in 2017. From all interviews conducted before and after the vote, only one participant stated that she was pro-Brexit, while the others expressed their desire for the UK to remain in the EU, although reflecting on negative aspects of the EU as well. Three participants had dual (British and Latvian) citizenship and voted in the referendum.

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Methodologically, the Brexit can be seen as an ‘event’: an atypical, pathological happening, and not part of the process of people’s daily lives (Kapferer, 2010). I gathered interviews before and after the referendum, and they show how the event of such a politically potent re-bordering of Europe also evoked very personal responses to public border-drawing practices. When analysing Twitter, with ‘personal publics’, Weller et al. (2014) noted a phenomenon on social media: political and public events get mixed together, blurring the boundary between the two spheres and bringing together several ‘media plus personal’ actions and reactions. Online sociality (Sotkasiira, 2017; Waite and Bourke, 2015) relevantly permeates state borders, both connecting and disconnecting people. Netnography (Crystal, 2001) as a method to unpack the construction and circulation of news stories, themes, discussions, affects, humour, sarcasm, and so forth (inter alia, Belz and Baumbach, 2010; Sumiala and Tikka, 2013) can be especially useful for understanding changing moralities both in time and across borders. Drawing on ideas from netnography, I will focus on a different element in the interviews: how migrants act online/in public when people identify (or may identify) them as migrants in the UK?

Context: borderless world and Brexit After having become an independent country in 1918, with borders strengthened by international treaties, Latvia lost its independence to the Soviet Union during World War II, but re-established independent statehood again in 1991, after almost half a century. Soon after regaining independence, Latvia, together with the two other Baltic countries of Estonia and Lithuania, embarked on a political course towards joining the European Union. It achieved EU accession in 2004, when 10 countries joined the bloc. With the accession also came rights to fully enjoy access to the UK’s labour market (only two other EU countries – Ireland and Sweden – granted access to their labour markets in 2004, while others gradually lessened restrictions and fully opened their borders in 2011). People from Latvia are often seen and labelled as migrants from ‘Eastern Europe’ – Europe’s own shadow within the continent (Wolff, 1994, p. 4). Stretching flexibly to include people from ‘the north of Poland on the Baltic, to Dalmatia on the Adriatic, and along the Don on that Ukrainian terrain’ (Wolff, 1995, p. 939), the term ‘Eastern European migrants’ began to have a life of its own in the media and in academic writing, and denoted certain meanings invested in this term. While Confino (1994) and Franzinetti (2008) have argued that this orientalisation of Eastern Europe and its people is an incomplete back-projection of Cold War divisions, and not an accurate designation of the historical facts of East–West, and Baltic and Nordic connections, in British discourses the projection of ‘easternness’ has spread its roots prominently and brought into focus regional and nationalist divisions, rather than promoting the ‘border-less’ communality of EU citizenry. East and West boundary drawing within Europe not only raises issues of ‘deep histories and durable afterlives’ (Ballinger, 2017, p. 44), but also influences practical actions in negotiating and restricting access to certain domains of the state, despite formally

68 Aija Lulle open borders for ‘free mobility’ within the EU. Accordingly, when Romania and Bulgaria also joined the EU in 2007, the UK opted for restrictions to the labour market, requiring special registration procedures for EU citizens from these countries and opening the borders fully for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens only in 2014, just two years before the Brexit vote. Parallel to these restrictions, others, less visible, were introduced towards other citizens from the ‘new’ member states in terms of access to social rights and benefits. Special legislation, emphasizing even more restrictions, was achieved between the British Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron and the EU in 2015–2016 (Shuibhne, 2016). Yet, the pro-Brexit slogan ‘take back control of the state’s borders’ – a slogan for the ‘leave’ campaign – was ‘louder’ in media spaces. The result of the 23 June 2016 vote was that ‘leave’ won by 52%, over the 48% of people who voted to ‘remain’ in the EU. The turnout was unprecedentedly high: more than 30 million people, or 71.8% of the population, voted in the referendum. In the meantime, Great Britain was and remains one of the most important destinations in Europe for Latvian citizens. Of all the ~ 300,000 emigrants from this small country with less than 2 million inhabitants in the early 2010s, approximately 100,000 were in the UK (CSB, 2018). Two reasons, highly associated with a borderless world, stand out in case of Latvian migration to Great Britain: firstly, Great Britain opened its labour marked without any restrictions immediately after the EU enlargement on 1 May 2004 when Latvia also joined the union. And second, the English language, which is often perceived as ‘global’ language, has been taught as the main foreign language in Latvian schools since the country regained its independence in 1991. The most recent and biggest emigration wave took place during the economic crisis (2008–2011), creating a distinctive profile of ‘crisis migrants’ (McCollum et al., 2017). The number of migrants from Latvia decreased to around 70,000 per year after the Brexit vote, according to consular data from the Latvian embassy in the UK (2017). The UK has become ‘home’ for many migrants from Latvia, while others contemplate a possible return to their native land, or a continuous circulation if the migration regime permits. Finally, Latvia introduced dual citizenship with EU and NATO countries in 2013 (see the Law on Citizenship, 1994), thus creating a borderless legal basis for dual belonging. In sum: while immediate access to the British labour market in 2004 and the opportunity for acquiring dual citizenship in Latvia may contribute to a borderless process, other practices – restricting access to social rights, continuous boundary drawing denoting ‘Eastern Europeans’, and divisive media spheres during the Brexit events – all point towards more complex moralities guiding such practices.

‘Free’ mobility and moralities in media uses In terms of actual migrant trajectories, to some extent ‘free’ intra-European migration can be captured in a notion of ‘liquid migration’. For the migrants, ‘liquid’ in their trajectories means ‘intentional unpredictability’ and ‘intentional openness’ to future migration under the EU’s open border regime (Engbersen and Snel, 2013).

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Intra-EU migrants may settle in another EU country, or they may move back to their countries of origin, or on to a third EU country, rather easily. However, even in such an open regime, borders matter and shape people’s mobility and belonging. The EU referendum vote was a manifestation of public will against such theoretically easy ‘liquid’ moves (Lulle, Morosanu and King, 2018). More than real, material mobility trajectories, the notion of a ‘borderless world’ better inhabits the information space – media, traditional and online, or a mixture of the two. In the lives of my research participants the information space plays a crucial role. Consciously or not, polymedia – phones, traditional news media, internet-based networks, and more – permeate lived geographies and discourses on migration (Madiou and Miller, 2013). But my research participants did not simply accept such a borderless world (still b/ordered through language knowledge, access to media, and media usage habits). Aware and critical of the paradox that they are at the centre of the debate on ‘uncontrolled immigration’ and calls ‘to take control back of our borders’ – UKIP party slogans during the ‘leave’ campaign – migrants actively self-governed, restricting their own use of the information space. Moreover, such actions were clearly motivated by and reflected through morality, at least in the sense of protecting themselves from moral panic in times of uncertainty. Therefore, instead of tracing ‘borderlessness’, I argue for the greater analytical value of studying practices in which migrants encounter relatively fluid information spaces, interact with, and resist, the flows which make up such spaces. When studying rural young people reflecting on their uses of Facebook, Waite and Bourke (2015) emphasized that instead of accepting a disappearance of geographic boundaries, their research participants were far more likely to reflect on and create self-conscious representations and interactions, therefore engaging in intangible but nonetheless relevant boundary-creation at a time and place of their own choosing. Most recently, Sotkasiira (2017) has analysed how in conflicts (military or otherwise) people govern their own media use in order to create at least a personal sense of security. The insecurity that stems from our relatively borderless social media, is related to the public-personal character combined with the face-to-face interaction in digital spaces. In the ‘moral turn’ in geography David Smith’s (1999, pp. 31–33) emphasis on ‘face-to-face contact in cultivating and fostering moral action and developing empathy, remains important and challenging in the mediatized reality of migrant lives. As Lee and Smith (2004, p. 7) aptly summarise, ‘moralities . . . are constructed through geographically articulated social interactions’. Building on these insights regarding media use and the geographical interpretation of morality as practical action (Lee and Smith, 2004), the remainder of this chapter will describe self-governed and reflexive modes and media use before and during, and after the EU referendum.

Before and during the vote Research participants interviewed in late 2015 and early 2016, especially graduates and highly skilled people, were politically conscious and closely followed British

70 Aija Lulle politics and debates about the possible ‘leave’ vote. Aware of Britain’s changing place in Europe and globally, participants gave insightful, reflexive accounts regarding anti-immigrant, anti-EU, and colonial sentiments. Participants spoke of self-governed media use before the EU referendum. However, these were less reflective and less carefully moulded than post-referendum media use. The most typical moralities noticed by the participants related to media use were deteriorating attitudes towards ‘Eastern European migrants’, searching for practical information in the Latvian media, and conscious avoidance of certain social media group discussions, as Arnis, a dual citizen of Latvia and the UK, explains below: Most of the people in London do not have any idea about Eastern Europe and countries within. And there are some people for whom it is not important whether you are Latvian, Romanian, or Polish – all of them are from Eastern Europe, and their notions of EEs are rather bad. I would say that the media is partly responsible for this situation. When someone from EE commits a crime, the media mentions the country as well. I have noticed an increase of mentioning EEs in a bad light lately. Perhaps the reason is that they are visible and do not speak in English, and to be honest many Eastern Europeans have poor language skills, in contrast to other immigrants from India, Caribbean . . . who speak English. (Arnis, male, 30s, highly skilled) Like Arnis, other interviewees also explicitly referred to negative media coverage of immigration, and so called Eastern Europeans in particular. While his legal status was secure, he did reflect on his impression of Eastern Europeans becoming an increasingly salient target in media coverage in mid-2015 when the interview took place. Moreover, Arnis also reflected on the boundaries between different migrant groups along postcolonial lines. The ‘East’ remains important in constructing notions of ‘Europe’ within popular media geographies (Matei, 2011) and, along with the ongoing so-called refugee crisis, such notions were mobilized in pre-Brexit press coverage. However, most of the interviewees had only Latvian citizenship, and only a few months before the referendum, panic was rising about obtaining resident cards. At that time the card was meant for migrants from the European Economic Area and their spouses. Although it was unclear why such a card would be helpful for peace of mind, my research participants advised each other on how to apply for the card, most often through Latvian-language legal advice websites and social media. Moreover, power asymmetries in media spaces (Lim, Bork-Hüffer and Yeoh, 2016) were shaped not only through language but also the intensity and content. Some participants reacted to these through limiting reading of such sources: I notice new policies if they get into my Facebook or LinkedIn stream. But I have noticed, especially from Russian-speaking people that they are also posting things that are not true, simply wrong, just scaremongering people,

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like with all this Brexit thing. Then I was thinking – I am not going to waste my time reading things that are partially true, not true. I just go to my trusted sources. (Nils, 21, student, spring 2016) The quote from Nils illustrates what I found across all interviews: morality as practical action in regards to media. Namely, reflecting critically and also acting upon one’s own choices of media sources. This echoes Sotkasiira’s (2017) findings on self-governed restriction of reading certain sources in times when almost everything seems tainted with lies. British media have a sharply divided public sphere with Brexit supporters on one side and remain supporters on the other, and proEuropean voices against Brexit pulling ‘a highly personal and emotional trigger: it concerns the grief people express over the loss of EU citizenship rights and transnational, European belonging’ (Brändle, Galpin and Trenz, 2018). Affective responses one day after the referendum streamed through my participants’ social media profiles, proclaiming ‘an uncontrollable urge to swear’, a desire ‘to pack my bags and leave this island’ (as spoken by Veronika, 20s), being ‘shocked, devastated, and heartbroken’ (in the words of Irina, 20s), and disbelief that it had happened. Another typical use of media was to turn to sarcasm, as several participants did: There is no point in being angry. The people have spoken. What comes now is an exciting journey, where promises are not kept, and expectations fall short. Coming from Eastern Europe, I’ve learned one thing – adaptability. No matter under what regime you live in, and what freedoms you have or have not, if you are able to adapt to the situation you will succeed and enjoy life. There is a reason that so many of us have been given jobs in the United Kingdom, and it isn’t because of Brussels. It’s because we are skilled and are able to do more good for the economy that requires a global outlook, languages, and an open mind. I’m not worried. I know that no matter what happens, myself and millions of young Europeans will adapt and succeed, whilst millions will sit and wait for the government to give them jobs that no longer exist. (Nils, male, 20s, 24 June) I interviewed Nils again in conversation regularly until early 2018. In his reflections about the sarcastic entry he wrote, Nils said that ‘a brief period of smugness turned into laughter and then into sadness’. Similarly, others reported divided feelings and reactions in real life on 24 June 2016. As another participant, Niklavs, (a man in his 30s) said: ‘The feeling was surreal a day after the vote: [as a product distributor] I had to go to a large British producer: the workers were thrilled, but the managers were grave, as at a funeral’. Nils further reflected this emotional turmoil through moralities and divisions within the UK. In the next quote, he reflects more broadly on how his personal reactions to the Brexit vote are interwoven with his moral judgements about British politics and his positioning as a Latvian European migrant in the UK:

72 Aija Lulle I was happy that I judged the whole situation correctly even though I wanted the UK to vote Remain. They’ve shot themselves in the foot. I always felt that the referendum was more about retaliation against the leading political elite due to 30 years of negligence from the losers of globalization and neoliberal world order. Taking it out against immigrants, these people voted to be heard. I understood that, and whilst I wanted to feel for these people, I couldn’t. I posted a post on FB where I kind of mocked the Brexit voter. I took to the issue with a sort of cynical humour, I suppose. So, on the day of the results, I suppose I hid my disappointment via humour. (Nils, 20s, in early 2018) Only one of the participants said she supported the ‘leave’ vote, although, as a citizen of Latvia, she could not vote herself. During an interview just after the vote, Inga, who has lived in the UK since 2001, told me that she persuaded her British partner to vote leave, justifying this through her observations that too many immigrants come to the UK and claim benefits – rhetoric intensively amplified in some British media during the leave campaign.

Media uses in continuous uncertainty More than a year after the ‘leave’ vote, uncertainty about migrant status and future mobility continued, mirrored and lived through the media. Drawing on Hegde (2016) I ask: how are the lived geographies of migrants entrenched within media worlds? And, how do research participants reflect upon their own media use in space and time? In Marina’s words, the ‘border-less’ social media space suddenly revealed an intense negativity, which her real place of residence – London – and everyday moralities – face-to-face conversations – did not. After the referendum I was pretty much bummed, shocked, and still couldn’t believe it. I was also angry reading some populist comments on immigrants from the EU and that they will finally have to leave. The fact that London voted against Brexit and tons of very sane comments regretting the decision made me feel more hopeful. Now reading some negative comments makes me think how much those people actually disliked the EU and immigrants and why is that? It makes me sad, as my husband and I have been paying taxes for over 10 years and contributing to the economy . . . Also, I wonder how many people hide their feelings in real life and come clean on social media? Sadly, those comments sometimes reflect the mood in the society much better than just a face-to-face a talk. (Marina, female, 20s, in early 2018) In a similar vein, Brexit drove wedges into ‘border-less’ ‘friendships’ on social media, and interviewees avoided engaging in discussions about Brexit a year on: I was shocked about some of my Facebook friends immediately after the Brexit. They suddenly expressed nationalistic and anti-immigrant views openly. A

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person with whom I was sitting at the next desk and chatting with daily, suddenly wrote to me that I must be grateful that I am allowed to live here, and the fact that my children were born here was a burden to the National Health Service (NHS). I was utterly surprised how people who were so close to me could hide their contempt for so long and could suddenly write something like this on social media. I was very annoyed that many people did not know basic facts about the EU and repeated the same things which were simply absurd. If I could not have a reasonable dialogue with them and they annoyed me with such repetitions, I blocked them about a year after Brexit. I myself do not engage in discussions about Brexit, neither with supporters nor those who oppose Brexit. I believe there is no point in trying to prove anything with facts. I am very picky now and read only a few analytical stories on possible future scenarios, but I take Brexit emotionally no more. (Arnis, male, 30s, early 2018) The ‘utterly surprised’ reaction is revealing: as workmates Arnis and ‘native’ colleague are not sharing only office space. They were also sharing also good work relations, so to speak. The Brexit vote broke such unwritten moralities of positive daily atmosphere in their office. By actively drawing lines of disconnection and guarding how they exhibited themselves through social media (Waite and Bourke, 2015), participants also further reflected on their own political convictions and media use. The following two excerpts come from Niklavs, who emphasized his conservative-nationalist political preferences in Latvian politics, and Nils, who was supportive of Conservative policies in Great Britain. The vote divided people absolutely in two parts: whatever the result would be, it would not be good in a divided society. I am personally worried that it was not said openly what would happen with the EU citizens, and we still do not know. Even if some steps become clearer, I do not believe in the British ‘word of honour’. Even if I myself am a nationalist in my political views, I must admit that the biggest problems in the world stem exactly from this [nationalism]. (Niklavs, male, 30s, in early 2018) I felt that the next two or so years will be filled with paranoia and hysteria. That followed. Very quickly, I became annoyed with my friends posting sensationalist articles. Both sides – the leavers and remainers, shared different articles. Unfortunately, the media love generating clicks so they can continue scaring people. I had to unfollow the Independent [a British newspaper] as their posts became simply ridiculous. I chose not to worry about these things as I feel too many people were scared by the uncertainty. (Nils, male 20s, in early 2018) Further in the interview, he contrasted his media use practice of actively disconnecting from certain people ‘online’, with unwanted disconnections he experienced in his life ‘offline’.

74 Aija Lulle What keeps me in London is a relationship. I’ve had about five friends who have already left. They don’t want to deal with the uncertainty. What Brexit has done to me is remove the presence of many of my friends who now live in Canada, Austria, and Germany. It’s sad. I feel somewhat hopeless . . . (Nils, male 20s, in early 2018) Although most said they do not engage actively with social media regarding Brexit any more, their lives are nevertheless affected. See Veronika’s reflection for example: I was reading what people wrote on social media, but it just made me more and more anxious. This year I am trying to read as little as I can. I read official announcements by the Prime Minister [Theresa May] sometimes. I stick to the hope that life will be fine after the Brexit but only time will tell. I avoid reading news . . . I want to care for myself, I cannot live with such negativity continuously. (Veronika, female, 20s, early 2018) Interestingly, participants somewhat paradoxically have lost faith in the British ‘word of honour’ (Niklavs), but also prefer to read official statements in order to avoid moral panic. Smith (2009, p. 208) has argued that geography’s most fruitful engagement with everyday ethics and normativity can be achieved through attention to the ‘situational ethics of care’. The explanatory power of morality and media use indeed point towards situational ethics – on the day of the referendum there was an urge to proclaim emotions (Veronika), while more than a year later, the need to avoid expressing emotion and engaging with the media. Similarly, Arnis, quoted above, expected that he could discuss his longlasting and disturbing disappointments and uncertainties with his work colleague sometime after the referendum, but the work colleague took advantage of the result and silenced Arnis, hence power relations had changed.

Conclusion As Lee and Smith (2004, p. 7) state, ‘moralities are profoundly geographic products of uneven development of social relations’. In this chapter I asked how young Latvian migrants in the UK experienced and reflected upon boundaries among migrants and between migrants and British nationals, as well as those who supported the ‘leave’ or ‘remain’ votes in the EU referendum. Sotkasiira (2017) reminds us that at times transnational media can turn into a ‘war zone’, and needs to be integrated into security studies. While bringing these two arguments together, the analysis in this chapter adds some nuance to how media uses and moralities change over time. While the EU’s fundamental rights regarding the mobility of European citizens may have created a partial reality and ideation of a ‘borderless world’, my analysis shows that in real lives the divisions between people and within a

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country clearly exist, and the b/ordering of people is a practice that permeates their daily lives. I also suggested that the notion of a ‘borderless world’ better describes the media space, especially online and social media that cross borders much more easily than material things and people. Before the EU referendum, certain divisions emerged, especially the resurrection of the idea of the intra-EU migrant, and in particular of the ‘Eastern European migrant’, drawing on uneven development and geographical hierarchies. Self-reflecting as economically ‘valuable’ migrants – paying taxes and contributing to the economy, and simultaneously as a group of migrants broadly lumped together as ‘Eastern Europeans’ and different from migrants of colonial legacy, my participants exhibited deeply ingrained lines of division both in the media and in interview discourses about their reflections on the media. While during the referendum social media were used to express affects and emotions, sometimes using humour or sarcasm, soon afterwards the moral panic became too overwhelming. Research participants self-governed and selfrestricted their use of media, and of reading news and discussions about Brexit in particular. Brexit, seen as an uncertain but potent turning point towards a ‘border-more world’, analysed together with changing media uses and conscious avoidance of discussing Brexit, poses further questions to border and migration scholars alike. Among such future research avenues are questions about how various actors express distance to each other, thus not only ordering social life in relation to the ‘outside’ – beyond Brexiting Britain – but also within; avoiding, silencing, and disconnecting among people both in their online and offline lives.

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Everyday bordering, healthcare, and the politics of belonging in contemporary Britain Kathryn Cassidy

Introduction In this chapter, I argue that healthcare is not only a key emerging site of everyday bordering in the UK, but also that analysis of controls in access to healthcare for migrants offers an insight into the ethics and morality of Britain’s geoeconomics. Britain has long sought to ‘maximise the benefits of labour migration without incurring its costs’ (Poole and Adamson, 2008, p. 33). Recent shifts in UK immigration policy have greatly extended the internal reach of the border(ing) regime (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018). This internalization has been advancing since the 1990s, but in 2010, the then home secretary, Theresa May, announced the intention to create ‘a hostile environment’ for so-called ‘illegal immigrants’. This environment meant greater controls on access to a range of services, including employment, housing, healthcare, and education. Consequently, residents are being asked to reveal their immigration status in an increasing array of everyday encounters and more and more people are being required to check the immigration status of others. It is clear that as well as extending everyday bordering, these changes also incorporate a considerable de-professionalization of border(ing) regimes, shifting ‘borderwork’ not just informally onto citizen-detectives (Vaughan-Williams, 2008), but making it a formal requirement for those working in particular sectors. This borderwork is informed by the situated gaze (Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis, 2002) of the individuals involved, who will often make decisions based upon their own views of who belongs and who has the right to access state services. In this chapter, I will explore the proliferation of borderwork within healthcare settings, where decisions surrounding rights to access healthcare not only impact upon individuals’ health and wellbeing but could also be life-threatening. The chapter begins with a short theoretical framing, which explores everyday bordering and belonging, before presenting an overview of immigration checks in the National Health Service (NHS). After these introductory sections, I then draw upon a range of materials to analyse the political economy of bordering in healthcare and then its impacts. These materials were primarily drawn from ethnographic data collected in London/South East and on Tyneside as part of research projects on everyday borders, as well as from media (television, online

Bordering, healthcare, and belonging 79 press) and political (parliamentary debates, policy guidelines) sources in the period from 2013 to 2018.

Theoretical background In Britain and elsewhere, everyday bordering has come to replace multiculturalism as the key technology through which states are approaching the governance of diversity (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018). In 2004, Etienne Balibar noted that ‘[t]he borders . . . are dispersed a little everywhere’ (Balibar, 2004, p. 1). Balibar was referring to the dispersal of border functions away from the traditional border zones at the edge of nation-states into the heart of their territories, from airports to train stations. However, since Balibar noted this shift, we have seen a much more extensive de-territorialization of borders or processes of de- and rebordering (Newman and Paasi, 1998; Popescu, 2012; Cassidy et al., 2018) that has moved them increasingly into everyday life. Alongside the internal reach of official border checkpoints, we have also seen a growth in immigration checks within a wide range of services (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018) and more and more people are being asked to undertake ‘borderwork’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2008) as part of their job or ‘citizenship duties’. Whilst this process stretches back to the 1971 Immigration Act in Britain, the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts marked a clear intensification of this trend by extending and strengthening checks in employment, housing, health, banking, and education. Such processes not only bring the negotiation of political projects of belonging into everyday encounters, but also present particular ethical and moral dilemmas for healthcare professionals, who are required to turn away patients in need of treatment on the basis of immigration status. As Martin Luther King (as cited in Loyd, 2014, p. 6) stated ‘[o]f all forms of inequality, injustice in health is the most shocking and inhumane’. For this reason, checks in healthcare settings have been widely contested in Britain and a number of campaign groups have emerged, as well as legal challenges. The UK government’s current political project of belonging is geoeconomic as well as geopolitical. It is framed in public and political discourse that seeks to filter out certain types of migrants (Rumford, 2008), who are framed as being dangerous, ‘undesirable’ or just redundant to the country’s economic needs. This geoeconomic element has been present in UK immigration legislation since it first began to systematically attempt to control immigration in 1905 (Wray, 2006), and, therefore, represents continuity rather than change, in spite of wider shifts in social attitudes. Such framings seek to create a sense of not only who has the right to share ‘the home’, but who has rightful access to the services offered by the state. A connection is created between everyday borderwork and keeping the home as a ‘safe’ space (Ignatieff, 2001). Through everyday practices and social relations (Blunt, 2005), belonging becomes naturalized (Fenster, 2004). Borderwork and territorial integrity relate to geopolitical and geoeconomic stability. As Nayak (2011) has highlighted, the political is emotional and fears surrounding the security of one’s state are often bound up in feelings of personal insecurity (Ahmed, 2014).

80 Kathryn Cassidy Political projects construct not only particular collectivity/ies, which are themselves being assembled in these projects, but also create and maintain boundaries. As such, they are spatial/territorial (Antonsich, 2010) or geopolitical. The technologies of controlling territory and citizens that are based upon particular politics of belonging are supposedly aimed at making people feel safe by keeping those who do not belong out, but can end up undermining these feelings of safety and raising instead a sense of precarity. This is particularly true for minority groups, who are the most likely to be challenged by others to prove their right to belong and access services in their everyday interactions (Jones et al., 2017). Some felt ‘reassured’ by the extension of the state into different arenas to prevent ‘illegal immigration’, others ‘felt concerned that some people were treated with unnecessary suspicion in everyday situations’ (Jones et al., 2017, p. 46). Therefore, such processes are differentially experienced (YuvalDavis et al., forthcoming).

Everyday bordering in the NHS: an overview It is incorrect to speak of a National Health Service in the UK, as since 1999, each of the constituent countries operates their own health service, yet bordering regimes and immigration controls reach across the four separate services. Decisions regarding the governance of the services and their funding are organized differently. In Scotland, 14 different regional boards are responsible for planning and delivering healthcare services and the 32 local authorities provide social care; in Wales there are seven local boards responsible for hospital and community services; and in Northern Ireland there are five regional trusts, which provide secondary and tertiary care and manage contracts for primary care. In this chapter, I refer primarily to the situation in England, where since April 2013 (under the provisions of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act) clinical commissioning groups (CCGs), of which there were initially 211, became responsible for commissioning and providing services for their local areas. So, healthcare in the UK, but also in England in particular, is geographically differentiated. At the same time as being locally fractured and differentiated, the NHS is also dependent upon large numbers of workers from outside the UK. In September 2017, 12.5% of workers in the NHS (for whom nationality was known – nationality was not reported for 6.6% of staff) were not British nationals (Baker, 2018). Of these overseas workers, 5.6% – 62,000 people – were from the European Union (EU). Amongst clinical staff, these figures are higher: 10% of doctors and 7% of nurses are from the EU, and a further 12% of doctors and 6% of nurses are of Asian nationality. In total 36% of doctors gained their medical qualifications from outside the UK (ibid). However, diversity and the transnational make-up of the NHS’ workforce are also not recent developments, but were embedded in the development of the NHS from its inception. The creation of the service in 1946 led to demand for 42,000 new members of staff, which could not be met by the depleted

Bordering, healthcare, and belonging 81 population of post-war Britain (Snow and Jones, 2010). The greatest shortages were in nursing professions and many of the gaps were filled by workers recruited from the Caribbean and Ireland (Ali et al., 2013). Therefore, Britain’s NHS is more accurately understood as both transnational in its dependence on labour and skills, as well as local, in its differentiated organization and commissioning of services. The 1949 NHS (Amendment) Act created powers – now contained in Section 175 of the 2006 NHS Act – to charge people not ‘ordinarily resident’ in Great Britain for health services. The powers were first used in 1982 to create regulations on eligibility for NHS hospital treatment (now consolidated as the NHS (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2011). Historically these charges were only made in hospitals or by hospital-employed or directed staff. This meant that primary care and community care remained free ‘by default’, as well as treatment carried out under the NHS in private hospitals. The regulations state an overseas visitor is someone who is not ordinarily resident in the UK but the term is not defined, either in the 2006 NHS Act or in the regulations. It is, in fact, the Department of Health that defines ordinarily resident as: A person is ordinarily resident if they are normally residing in the UK (apart from temporary or occasional absences), and their residence here has been adopted voluntarily and for settled purposes as part of the regular order of their life for the time being, whether for short or long duration. (Department of Health, 2017) The 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts reduced the entitlements to welfare benefits of EU citizens and compelled NHS employees to carry out ID checks to identify migrants from outside the EU who must pay for most non-emergency or primary care NHS treatments. Previously, hospitals had discretion in charging ‘overseas visitors’. A health surcharge for non-EEA citizens staying in the UK for over six months was also introduced with other extensions of charging planned across the NHS, introducing everyday bordering into the roles of increasing numbers of NHS staff. The surcharge of £200 for those from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) is paid during the visa application stage. Those who come to the UK on tourist visas are not required to pay the levy, but will be fully liable for the costs of any NHS treatment they receive. There has also been a change in the definition of ‘ordinarily resident’, which is used for accessing the NHS (GroveWhite, 2014). Prior to the 2014 Act’s implementation, entitlement to free NHS treatment was based on being ‘ordinarily resident’ in the UK, which was decided upon whether an individual was living here lawfully, rather than upon any minimum time requirement. The 2014 Act changed this definition, so that ‘ordinarily resident’ would require indefinite leave to remain, which is contingent on five years’ residency in the UK. This move clearly removed the right to freely access healthcare for certain sections of the population. In 2014, the Migration Observatory released a briefing giving an overview on the health of migrants in the UK. It found that, whilst it was currently difficult to

82 Kathryn Cassidy gain a comprehensive account of the health of migrants, evidence suggested that health amongst migrants was generally poorer overall compared to UK-born individuals (Jayaweera, 2014). There were already numerous barriers to accessing healthcare for migrants, such as lack of information, language, and transport. Keith and van Ginneken (2015) have argued that particularly in the UK, migrants’ right to life is continuously challenged by limited access to healthcare.

The (geo)political economy of healthcare charging In general, debates surrounding healthcare charges focus on health tourism, framing it as problematic and an issue to be addressed. The health tourism ‘imaginary’ (Bürkner, 2018) is based on the assumption that only those who are resident in the UK will have made a contribution through their taxes and, therefore, should be entitled to access the services provided. [It] is only fair to the millions of hard-working people who pay into the NHS through their taxes that somebody who comes here to live for a period of time should be asked to contribute (Theresa May, Home Secretary, HC Deb, 2013, col. 165) There is an inherent contradiction in such arguments. The logic is economic, in other words based upon a moral economy (in this case fairness) of providing support to those who have paid into the system, yet the focus of the restrictions is upon a different group – non-EEA migrants (with certain exceptions). This moral economy is set to appeal to shared social and cultural values, in particular, associated with notions of ‘reasonable prices’ and ‘just needs’ among the rural and urban poor (after Scott, 1976; Thompson, 1971). However, advice on the government’s own website refutes the narrative of the debates in the press and in the House of Commons. Within England, free NHS hospital treatment is provided on the basis of someone being ‘ordinarily resident’. It is not dependent upon nationality, payment of UK taxes, national insurance contributions, being registered with a GP, having an NHS number or owning property in the UK. (Department of Health and Social Care, 2017) Further analysis reveals different underlying motivations for the introduction of the surcharge, including the inefficacy of current arrangements to recoup costs from overseas visitors, as well as a desire to use the charge as a means by which to filter immigrants and discourage lower paid economic migrants. In 2012, the Department of Health carried out a review of the overseas visitor charging policy, which specifically referenced a lack of detailed evidence relating to the use of the NHS by non-residents, as well as to the costs of this use to the NHS. This was supported by observations made by a worker in a clinic in East London – run by an international charity – in 2015 and also an

Bordering, healthcare, and belonging 83 employee of a large inner-London NHS trust, who worked in the Overseas Visitors’ Office and took part in an episode of the BBC documentary Hospital in 2016, which was aired in 2017. Most of the patients we deal with I would not define as health tourists. They’re not here specifically for . . . to access free medical treatment. They’re here on holiday usually and they have fallen ill or they have an accident (Hospital, 2017) The Department for Health report highlighted inefficiencies in the current arrangements for recouping these costs. At the time of the report, the NHS was recouping around £15–25 million annually, which equated to only 20% of chargeable costs. There were two key reasons given for this: firstly, they estimated that only between 30 and 45% of chargeable costs were being identified; secondly, of the costs identified, 60% were not being recovered. Administering the system was estimated to be costing the NHS £15 million annually, meaning that potentially, no net gain was being made at all in the recovery of these costs. The inefficiencies were also stressed by the same worker in the London trust’s Overseas Visitors’ Office, who referred to the laws and regulations as ‘fruitless’ (Hospital, 2017). In 2013, the government commissioned a further report, which showed that EEA visitors and non-residents cost the NHS £305 million (less than 0.3% of the total NHS budget) in 2012/13, of which £220 million was recoverable under the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) scheme (Prederi, 2013). Of the £220 million, £50 million was recovered, compared to £173 million paid out to other countries by the UK under the EHIC scheme for British visitors to EEA states (ibid). In one of the debates in the House of Commons surrounding the health surcharge in 2013 on the then Immigration Bill, Diane Abbott, the deputy leader of the oppositional Labour Party argued that there was existing legislation to recoup these costs and that new legislation was not necessary (HC Deb, 22 October 2013, col. 222). However, after the introduction of the surcharge, the economic benefits to the UK Treasury quickly became apparent. In the first year the charge was in operation (2015–16), it raised an additional £164 million for the NHS (National Audit Office, 2016). This was more than the £85 million, which the 2014 government report had estimated that overseas visitors cost the NHS in 2012/3. Questions remained about the inequalities relating to the surcharge, particularly certain exemptions. The most controversial related to the ways in which particular groups of migrants were being constructed as more beneficial to the UK because of their potential (not actual) earning capacity. Mark Harper (the then immigration minister) reflected on why the government had extended exemption from the surcharge to information and communication technology (ICT) professionals, saying, ‘We made a judgment to exempt them, based on their value to the UK economy’ (HC Deb, 7 November 2013, col. 288).

84 Kathryn Cassidy The exemption has since been removed (in 2017), but the principle is of exemption based upon ‘their value to the UK economy’. In contrast with ICT workers, employees in the NHS, particularly those not engaged in senior clinical roles, not only paid the charge but actually struggled to be united with their families. In an interview with a senior employee in human resources at a NorthEast England NHS trust in 2016, I was told that the trust had just hired 92 nurses from the Philippines. He commented that the upfront costs per nurse were in the region of £4,500, which included over £1,000 for the objective structured clinical examination (OSCE), visas, three years of the health surcharge (£600), and costs for accommodation. The trust pays these monies but they are then recovered from the nurses. However, there were distinctions being made between how they supported workers from overseas; whereas they would sponsor spousal visas for consultants and even offer work to spouses in some cases, the manager clearly stated they did not get involved in even offering immigration advice to the nurses. So we have a number of them [certificate of sponsorship] allocated, so we can just use them when we need them. We keep them predominantly for the doctor roles because – no disrespect to the band five nurses but we’ve got 4,000 plus walking around the hospital whereas a specialist doctor who we might need in to go through the process could be a lot quicker. So with the nursing ones we apply for certificates of sponsorship separately. Whilst the number of tier two visas for health and social care staff increased from 2,921 in 2010 to 5,287 in 2016 (Hill A, 2018), the number of spousal and dependent visas being issued fell by 73% in the decade up to 2017 (ibid). In attempting to tackle inefficiencies in recouping costs from overseas visitors and countries in the EEA, the government has adopted a system of incentives and also sanctions. NHS trusts are permitted to charge up to 150% of the cost of treatment for overseas visitors and a financial incentive is also offered for identifying and better reporting of EHIC patients. The latter scheme has led to a doubling of reporting of patients covered under the EHIC scheme, but the incentive for overseas visitors has had little impact (National Audit Office, 2016). As part of the most recent changes to guidelines, introduced in April 2017, sanctions have been introduced via clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) to withhold monies from trusts failing to identify overseas visitors. The extension of the UK’s border(ing) regime into healthcare needs to be understood in political-economic context. The surcharge acts as a further barrier to travelling to the UK legally for lower-income migrants, but it also reflects an approach predicated on tackling health tourism, which is not only not supported by the government’s own research but is also inefficient. Overseas visitors who fall ill whilst they are in the UK are not health tourists but simply tourists. They have been issued with a visa because of the perceived economic benefit that their tourism brings, but if they do not pay the healthcare costs, they may be refused permission to enter the UK in the future. This suggests that the UK’s border(ing)

Bordering, healthcare, and belonging 85 regime is not limited to solely maximising the benefits of labour migration without incurring its costs, as proposed by Poole and Adamson (2008), but also extends to maximising the benefits of tourism as well. In fact, figures emerging from even the first year show a clear government intention to profit from the surcharge, with incomes much higher than estimated spend on treatment for nonEEA overseas visitors.

The impacts of bordering in healthcare In this section I explore the ways in which everyday bordering in healthcare impacts upon patients and staff in the NHS. I focus on three key areas emerging from the research: firstly, I posit that clinical decision-making itself has become borderwork, which is impacting upon doctor–patient relationships; secondly, I present arguments relating to the ways in which immigration checks within health care settings increase the need for urgent care; and finally, I explore the difficulties of administering the border for employees attempting to re-coup costs from overseas visitors. Clinical decision-making as borderwork Under the new legislation, doctors must determine whether care is urgent or not. In cases where the care is deemed urgent, treatment is provided and then the hospital must seek to recoup the costs. Where care is deemed non-urgent, payment from overseas visitors not exempt from charges is sought in advance. Many NHS trusts are now requesting that patients whose status is unknown or unclear complete ‘preattendance’ letters prior to routine treatment, so that their details can be checked with the Home Office. In October 2017, the case of a pregnant British woman who had taken her husband’s Polish surname was reported in the press. The letter from the hospital due to provide her care suggested that she would not receive treatment due to a ‘failure to provide proof of identification and residence’ (Pasha-Robinson, 2017). The couple accused the NHS bosses of racial profiling and claimed to have been singled out solely on the basis of the surname. Of course, the fact that this particular woman’s case was reported owed more to the fact that she was white and British. Such checks and threats have become commonplace for minority and migrant communities in the UK (Jones et al., 2017). One of the key areas for borderwork in the NHS is the role of clinicians in determining whether care is urgent or not. More importantly, the urgent/nonurgent distinction effectively turns clinical decision-making into borderwork and gives new meaning to cases in which this distinction is not always entirely clear. Many organizations and individuals highlighted this as a particular area of concern, as it could impact on the relationship between healthcare professionals and their patients. Indeed, this was debated in the House of Commons before the 2014 Immigration Act was passed. Clare Gerada, the Chair of the Council of the Royal College of General Practitioners (2010–2013), raised practitioners’ concerns in a committee debate:

86 Kathryn Cassidy We do not want to turn GPs [general practitioners] into border agents. That is absolutely clear . . . We should not turn people away at the front door because of their inability to pay. (HC Deb, 29 October 2013) Yet in making the decision to demand upfront payment effectively a clinical one, in other words urgent/non-urgent care, the government has, in fact made doctors into border agents. The charity worker in the London clinic was particularly concerned about the impact of bordering on these relationships. The GP–patient relationship should be based on trust, privacy and in the end it should be productive. . . . You can’t have a conversation if you’re worried that the person you’re talking to might be telling the border police about you or your immigration status. That fundamentally breaks the doctor–patient relationship and this will not end in a healthy situation for the patient and will not end in a healthy situation for society. The situation has been exacerbated by the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between NHS Digital, the Home Office and the Department of Health.1 The MoU came into effect at the beginning of 2017 and sets out the terms under which the Home Office can request information from NHS Digital. Confidentiality is the cornerstone of doctor–patient relationship . . . With that broken, I don’t think you can carry on to have such a good relationship . . . I don’t think [the government] has considered enough the damage to public trust that has been done. (Lucinda Hiam, GP with Doctors of the World, cited in Hill R, 2018) One asylum seeker in the north-east of England showed me a pre-attendance letter from a local NHS Trust that sought to establish her eligibility for free treatment prior to even scheduling an appointment. The letter clearly explains the sharing of data with the Home Office and that failure to pay for treatment could impact on a future immigration application. The woman to whom it was addressed told me that she was not going to go ahead with the necessary medical procedure, even though she was entitled to free treatment, because of concerns around personal information being shared with the Home Office. The letter made the specific connection between accessing healthcare and ‘national security’; that non-belonging means certain migrants pose a threat to the UK’s territorial integrity and this is a key element of everyday bordering. For asylum seekers, who regularly have negative interactions with the Home Office and experience the violence of forced dispersal across the country (Darling, 2011), the threat of such data sharing clearly serves to discourage attendance at hospital. The incorporation of clinical decisions into borderwork and the memorandum of understanding have begun to disrupt patient–doctor relationships, and

Bordering, healthcare, and belonging 87 this has implications for vulnerable groups who are discouraged from getting timely medical care, which I will explore in the next section. Bordering in the NHS increases the need for urgent care Concerns over the impact on the health of individuals, but also on minority groups as a whole had been at the heart of the debates surrounding the new legislation in 2013 and 2014. Baroness Manzoor presented these concerns in a debate in the House of Lords in February 2014. . . . having a two-tiered system will create confusion, and could delay and discourage people seeking the most appropriate help . . . This clearly has implications regarding public health (HL Deb, 10 February 2014) As the asylum seeker’s comments in the previous section show, there is growing evidence that even those entitled to access free healthcare are choosing not to do so as a result of the changes. Healthcare workers highlighted that not only were people risking their lives because the uncertainty of their status was deterring them from accessing healthcare, but that this was ineffective for the NHS itself, as it meant people often accessed acute services when the problem became critical. This is a concern not just for the patient who is then not going to access care until they’re much more acutely ill . . . but also that’s a significantly greater cost for the health system. Here we see those opposing everyday bordering in the NHS attempting to frame the debate in the same economic terms presented in political and popular discourse. In doing so, however, the argument is shifted from an ethical or moral basis to an economic rationale, not a moral economy of the public discourses based on fairness, but an economic decision to simply save the UK government money through timely treatment. The problem with such argumentation is that it normalizes economic rationale for decision-making in healthcare, rather than that of individual needs and rights. Administering the UK’s political project of belonging in the NHS The new system has incorporated greater numbers of clinical and administrative staff within the NHS into borderwork. Many of these new borderworkers feel insufficiently knowledgeable and lacking in the training needed to make decisions surrounding entitlements to access healthcare (Yuval-Davis et al., 2018; Yuval-Davis et al., forthcoming). In a meeting with midwives and health visitors in 2016, many admitted that they were not only unfamiliar with the new regulations coming into force but were also opposed to having to implement

88 Kathryn Cassidy and carry out such checks. The list of exemptions was particularly troubling, as it seemed that administrators often had no understanding of who was exempt from the surcharge and classed as an overseas visitor. This was a trend, which charity workers in the clinic in East London had been observing prior to the recent changes in legislation. Frontline staff are ill-informed, are unaware of what patients’ rights are and patients themselves are unaware of their own rights. And so what we see is frontline staff turning patients away from healthcare which that patient has the full right to access. These observations related to regulations on overseas visitors prior to 2014, and there were calls to support bodies within the NHS in administering the border following the changes in legislation in 2014 and 2016. . . . it can be difficult to identify which patients should be charged. Trusts were told there would be further support to implement these changes. We look forward to seeing the full range of measures that will be made available. (Phillippa Hentsch, head of analysis at NHS Providers, cited in Donnelly, 2017) This lack of clarity surrounding the details of the charges was not limited to the new measures, but was also evident in how the overseas visitors offices would approach the right to cancel. This right applied to certain groups, for example refugees, asylum seekers, victims of modern slavery or female genital mutilation (FGM); however, in the guidelines for trusts, there are also details on debts being written off, for cases where someone has died, they have no means to pay, or every effort has been made to recover the debt without success (Department of Health, 2017). The latter does not constitute a cancellation of the debt and the guidance specifically states that such debts could be pursued by relevant bodies in the future. For those administering the invoices and payments in the overseas visitors offices there were options to reduce costs of treatment, but these were often presented to vulnerable patients in confusing terms. The below is a conversation between an overseas visitors’ office employee and a woman from Nigeria from the BBC Hospital documentary. The woman had given birth to her quadruplets in a London hospital after going into labour on a flight back from the US to Nigeria, via London. One child did not survive and the three others were in an intensive care unit at the time of the conversation and the mother, Priscilla, was also still an in-patient TERRY:

I’ve got not great news I’m afraid because I’ve had to raise some invoices for you . . . That’s giving birth and then your time here, OK? And then these are the invoices for the three children. Those are quite high, Priscilla. PRISCILLA: Is it negotiable?

Bordering, healthcare, and belonging 89 ‘I’m afraid they are not negotiable, no. The Trust really does not have a mandate to either cancel . . . I will say this, you know, if a patient is showing willing and is able to make a payment then that could help in reducing the charges. (Hospital, 2017)

TERRY:

So, here we see that in response to Priscilla’s enquiry about negotiating regarding the bill, the employee states the invoices are not negotiable, but then immediately suggests that if she is willing to make a payment then the charges could be reduced. Nicholas de Genova (2013) has argued that such spectacles enact a ‘scene of exclusion’. Here it is not an immigration offence that shapes this ‘illegality’ spectacle (ibid), but instead the inability to pay for life-saving health care. The performance does not involve an immigration official, but a hospital worker. Nonetheless, the worker sets what he does within the wider economic rationale evident in political discourses surrounding health tourism. I recognise it is a small part in terms of money we recoup but it’s a pie, it’s an important part and you have to look at it well – what would four million pounds provide in terms of treatments? It’s a no-brainer? Here the wider scene setting is focused on legal border-crossing, which is based upon a supposition of zero-cost to the British state. It is this assumption that leads frontline staff to turn away those that don’t have settled status in the UK, such as asylum seekers, even when they do have the rights to access health care.

Conclusions In this chapter, I have explored the impact of the extension of the UK’s bordering regime into healthcare, where it presents very particular moral and ethical dilemmas for those increasingly being asked to undertake borderwork, including healthcare professionals and specifically-appointed administrators. I have argued that for the UK government the health surcharge was predicated on the imaginary of health tourism, which although it has been prominent in public and political discourses on the topic, is not supported by clear evidence. However, the introduction of a surcharge has very quickly produced a revenue stream for the UK government, which exceeds previous estimates of the costs to the NHS for overseas patients, and with plans to already double the charge, it is clear that this has become an extra tax on non-EEA nationals visiting the UK for more than six months. A number of impacts emerge from the introduction of the checks within healthcare settings. Firstly, clinicians effectively determine the border, by having to make decisions regarding urgent or non-urgent care, and I have shown that this is not only impacting upon the doctor–patient relationship but that this is compounding existing barriers to healthcare for vulnerable groups. In response to the political-economic arguments raised in relation to health tourism,

90 Kathryn Cassidy a number of organizations have developed economic arguments surrounding refusing urgent care as ultimately leading to higher costs for the NHS in the longer term. However, such framings move the debate away from a moral or ethical question of whether it is right for a state to refuse an ill person treatment on the basis of their immigration status, and reproduce rather than challenge the dominance of the economic rationale. What is becoming apparent is that even when urgent care is offered, in hospitals we find scenes of exclusion in which some people are being approached and asked to make payments that few could and can afford. These scenes are framed by a wider geoeconomic positioning in the UK, which not only seeks to ensure that migrant labour but also tourism can be fully exploited and any related costs minimized, if not complete eliminated.

Note 1 The memorandum of understanding was suspended in May 2018.

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7

‘Delay and neglect’ The everyday geopolitics of humanitarian borders Elisa Pascucci, Jouni Häkli, and Kirsi Pauliina Kallio

Introduction 18 March 2017 was a day of mobilization across Greece. Nearly 8,000 people took to the streets of Athens. In Mytilene, Lesbos, over 2,000 migrants, volunteers, activists, and local residents gathered to demand the end of the ‘EUTurkey Statement’ on refugees – as the European Commission refers to it. According to the organizers of the march, the agreement had transformed Greece into ‘a trap’. In an open letter1 released few days earlier by the ‘People’s Assembly in Lesvos’, refugee community leaders in the Aegean island described the EU-Turkey deal as part of a broader policy of ‘delay and neglect’ through which the European Union governs its external borders. A few months earlier, in November 2016, in the Bekaa Lebanon, local efforts to assist Syrian refugees who had crossed the nearby border appeared similarly chaotic and slow. Not far from the city of Zahle, Syrian informal settlements abounded, some of which were already over four years old. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including groups led by Syrian expatriates and Lebanese activists and professionals, from social workers to architects, were working frantically. Lebanese authorities, on the other hand, were seemingly playing a marginal role. Although not directly related to the EU-Turkey deal, the condition of Syrian settlements in Lebanon’s Bekaa resembled the situation on the Aegean islands in its fragmented, partially ‘informal’, and often contradictory character. These vignettes highlight two aspects of the contemporary entanglements of humanitarian aid and bordering practices. First, they point to the enduring centrality of the refugee camp form, including both spatial technologies ‘of care and control’ (Malkki, 1992, p. 34) set up and managed by states and established humanitarian actors, and informal and precarious refugee settlements in urban and rural spaces. The EU ‘hotspots’ – inter-agency processing centres located in Greece and Italy, aimed at identifying incoming migrants and expediting asylum procedures – offer a prime example of the former, while the latter kinds of camp arrangements can be found in many Middle Eastern and Mediterranean cities and beyond. In some cases, such as those of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the distinction between the two is blurred by the incremental evolution and urbanization of what were originally

94 Elisa Pascucci et al. created as formal refugee camps. Secondly, the vignettes reveal the intersection of different agentic capacities in the constitution of the border constellation, including those of migrants, activists, states and supra-national bodies, private sector and corporate actors, new volunteers, and established non-governmental humanitarian actors and organizations. Drawing on fieldwork conducted by one of the authors between 2016 and 2018, in this chapter we trace these two intertwining elements of the ‘humanitarian border’ (Walters, 2011) in the Eastern Mediterranean, focusing on the cases of Greece and Lebanon.2 We argue that these multifaceted spatialities and agencies are better understood as emerging mundane geopolitics of the humanitarian border – geopolitics characterized by everyday configurations of bordering, care, and transgression. As such, we argue, they constitute governance configurations that work by mobilizing fleeting alliances and emerging solidarities in spaces of proximity and coexistence, but can also operate ‘negatively’, that is, through apparent absences of government as well as acts of withdrawal and neglect (Rose, 2014). In what follows, we first synthetically review existing literature on humanitarian borders, identifying aspects that have so far remained less explored. We also discuss how recent work in the fields of everyday and urban geopolitics can contribute to our understanding of contemporary intersections of humanitarianism and borders. We then move on to examine the delayed temporalities, and omissions and withdrawals of care, in the context of post-EU-Turkey Statement hotspot governance in Lesvos, Aegean Greece. In Lebanon, we look into how new and emerging humanitarian actors – Syrian and Lebanese NGOs, but also what Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2016) has called ‘refugee-to-refugee’ humanitarianism – negotiate control and care provision in Syrian settlements. In conclusion, we discuss the ethical implications of the two cases as examples of localized, ‘polymorphic’ humanitarian borders (Burridge et al., 2017), where multiple agentic capacities constitute heterogeneous models of ‘negative governance’.

The everyday geopolitics of humanitarian borders Less than ten years after the publication of William Walters’s (2011) influential essay, humanitarian borders have become a well-established field of study in critical political geography (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015, 2017, 2018; Stierl, 2017; Williams, 2015 among others). Pallister-Wilkins (2018, p. 3) defines humanitarian borders as spaces ‘where practices of border control and border policing elide with or use humanitarian concerns for life in the policing of mobility’. Existing research has interpreted the ‘practices’ and ‘concerns’ that constitute humanitarian borders in a somewhat limited manner, with attention devoted mostly to visible forms of ‘policing of mobility’. The main focus has been on phenomena akin to what De Genova (2013) has called ‘spectacles’ of exclusion – in this case exclusion through ‘humanitarian inclusion’. These typically take place around migrant acts of crossing territorially-demarcated borders – from search and rescue at sea, to emergency relief and medical aid in land border zones (see, for example, Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Stierl, 2017; Williams, 2015).

‘Delay and neglect’ 95 Yet, as recently highlighted by Jones et al. (2017), the merging of humanitarianism and borders has led to a global expansion of ‘borderwork’ (Rumford, 2008), a notion that points to a diversification of the actors, practices, and discourses involved. Walters (2011, p. 153) himself has addressed this aspect by writing that humanitarianism ‘has made the policing of borders a much more complex, polymorphous and heterogeneous affair’, to the point that it renders ‘transactions and imbrications between official governance and certain moves which contest it’ commonplace. Pallister-Wilkins’s (2018) recent work on Greek hotspots borrows Laleh Khalili’s (2012, p. 239) image of ‘machines of many moving parts’, thus highlighting the constitutive heterogeneity of these spatialized assemblages. These arguments resonate with broader theoretical discussions in border studies. Burridge et al. (2017) move from Parker and Vaughan-Williams’s (2009, p. 584) reflection on the ubiquitous nature of contemporary borders – on ‘what does it feel like to exist as a border’ (emphasis in the original). In doing so, they contest ‘top-down’ conceptualizations of the ‘everywhere border’, which afford states and other governmental actors a level of coherence that they do not necessarily possess. Instead, they build on feminist geographies to advance a theory of borders as ‘polymorphic’. Such a theory is ‘catholic and eclectic in its use of spatial metaphors’, attuned to both networked social ontologies and to feminist scepticism on the ‘inescapability or omnipotence’ of control (Burridge et al., 2017, pp. 244–245). In proposing a critical topology of global borders, Mezzadra and Neilson (2012, p. 59; also, 2013) argue that accounts of their proliferation should not see borders as mere ‘devices that obstruct or block global flows’, but as ‘parameters that enable the channelling of flows and provide coordinates within which flows can be joined or segmented, connected or disconnected’. In doing so, they stress the centrality of temporality, a dimension that has historically characterized the constitution of borders (Tazzioli, 2018; Walters, 2011). While we fully incorporate the temporal element into our approach, in this chapter we take a slight departure from existing literature. Rather than focusing on the temporality of border enforcement, we wish to highlight the peculiar and salient temporalities of the aid and care elements in the humanitarian border. As Feldman (2012, p. 160) remarks, ‘humanitarianism is not the same humanitarianism all the time’, just as it varies significantly across space (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). Its heterogeneous character mirrors, intersects with, and reinforces the polymorphism of contemporary borders. In this paper we thus foreground the polymorphic nature of humanitarian border governance – its spatial and temporal multiplicity and ambivalences between control and transgression, inclusion, and exclusion. In doing so, we build on insights from our previous work on the performative, emotional, and spatial character of refugee political agency (Häkli et al., 2017; Kallio and Häkli, 2018; Kallio et al., forthcoming). Here, however, we shift our focus from the subjectivity of asylum claimants to the other side of the humanitarian border, namely the agencies through which care and control are performed and enacted,

96 Elisa Pascucci et al. also by refugees themselves, and particularly in the case of aid provision in Lebanon (cf. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016). Concurrently, we consider it essential to remain attentive to the ‘imbrications’ between border governance and its countering acts (Walters, 2011, p. 253). In this regard, reiterating our commitment to epistemologies rooted in the ‘political mundane’, we see the work on everyday geopolitics as an essential ally. Its emphasis on ‘affective landscapes’ and the ‘encounters that circulate therein’ (Williams and Boyce, 2013, p. 912) brings forward the motion of feelings, positionalities and agentic capacities that inform contemporary border spaces. Although these insights have already been applied to the study of humanitarian borders (Jansen, 2009; Williams and Boyce, 2013), these efforts have so far been limited to border crossing environments, mostly at the territorial peripheries of Western and Mediterranean Europe, and North America. Our contribution mobilizes the potential of everyday geopolitics for grasping the spatialities and temporalities of humanitarian borders beyond territorial border crossing and enforcement (see also Kallio et al., forthcoming). As already introduced, the first element that our approach wishes to highlight is the displacement, expansion, and recasting of the camp form (see, for example, Agier, 2011). This is evidenced by the growing policy attention to the urban dimension of refuge (which has undergone surprisingly little scrutiny in critical border scholarship) and the urbanization of camps, as well as the emerging camp-assemblages through which the EU hotspot approach operates. Overall, the camp – in both its spontaneous and institutionalized forms – seems to have grown ever more central in the governance of refuge within territorial Europe. In our previous work on the urban geopolitics of refuge in the ‘global south’ we have argued that, in these emerging spaces of care and control, ‘human sociality and political agency are embedded in materialities and forms of incremental presence’ (Rokem et al., 2017, p. 257). Through these everyday relations, ‘connections at multiple scales between different geographies of violence and coexistence’ make refuge an eminently geopolitical phenomenon (Rokem et al., 2017, p. 257). This attention to the displacement of borders taking place through the emergence of new ‘camp geographies’, is also an important move beyond the ‘Eurocentric humanitarian imaginations’ that mark much existing scholarship on humanitarian borders (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018, p. 9). We consider this as central because, as Pallister-Wilkins (2018) has argued, the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ has challenged humanitarian geographies based on the provision of aid to distant strangers in far-away lands, ‘displacing’ refugees to the beaches, supermarkets, train stations, hospitals, and makeshift camps of Europe (see also Schindel, 2019). Moreover, as a result of border externalization policies, displaced people find refuge primarily within Africa, the Middle East, and Asia – Turkey being the country that hosts the highest number of refugees in the world according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2017a). In this regard, recent geographical scholarship has convincingly documented the role played by south-based actors, refugee communities, and Muslim religious groups, among others, in refugee aid (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011, 2016). We thus

‘Delay and neglect’ 97 consider it ethically imperative to look at how these non-Eurocentric forms of aid provision contribute to or challenge bordering practices that unfold in the everyday. The second, related element guiding our exploration of the everyday geopolitics of the humanitarian border is political agency. We define this as the human individual and collective capacity to influence or change matters of importance that are contextually and intersubjectively negotiated. This capacity involves performative, strategic, and emotional elements, which we have explored in our previous work (Häkli et al., 2017; Kallio et al., forthcoming). In this chapter, we want to advance this operational definition by highlighting the conditioning effects of the intertwining of agencies through which bordering spaces are constituted. In the humanitarian border, we argue, political agency is exerted within networks of heterogeneous and dispersed, yet at the same time closely related actors. As already remarked, these include migrants and refugees involved in aid provision, both through institutional NGOs and more or less informal community networks, as well as supra-national governmental bodies like the European Commission and Frontex (as in the case of Greek hotspots), local state authorities, established humanitarian organizations, and private contractors – among others. Building on recent analyses of the mechanisms of care provisions around and within border spaces in the Mediterranean (Mitchell and Sparke, forthcoming; Pallister-Wilkins, 2018), we deem it essential to examine the ways in which these actors exert their agentic capacities in a highly interrelated manner. While in some cases this is evidenced by the presence of formal institutional coordination, in others the interconnection is produced through promixity, coexistence, and the shared necessity to provide care and in conditions of both political uncertainty and material precarity. By arguing for a geopolitics of the humanitarian border that is grounded in the everyday (Pain and Smith, 2008), and located beyond formal camp spaces or immediately visible European border zones, we propose a methodological approach that traces these interconnected capacities. The use of the phrase ‘agentic capacities’ is particularly significant in our approach. Through it, we highlight how the capacity to act in humanitarian border spaces does not mean unconstrained agency and certain efficacy, nor does it necessarily imply the intentionality or possibility of the act. As the next two sections will show, negotiated limitations, strategic omissions, delays, absences, lack of access, and progressive withdrawal of care – all well documented elements of contemporary humanitarian (Dunn, 2012), migration (Belcher and Martin, 2013; Davies et al., 2017), and postcolonial governance (Rose, 2014) – are constitutive elements of contemporary humanitarian borders. As we further discuss in the conclusions, this polyphony of negative agentic capacities has important implications for the ethics and morality of contemporary borders.

Greece Between August and October 2015, as De Genova (2017, p. 12) writes, ‘the apparent front line of European border struggles was repeatedly dislocated’ by

98 Elisa Pascucci et al. the dramatic confrontation between ‘migrant and refugee autonomies’ and ‘tactics of bordering’ that came to be known as the ‘European refugee crisis’. Many countries were interested by this dislocation of border struggles and humanitarian practices, and many resorted to the reintroduction of temporary border controls within the European space in order to face ‘the emergency’ (De Genova, 2017). As we have argued elsewhere, some aspects of the humanitarian border can only be grasped by looking more closely at their spatial and temporal ‘intensities’: the nodal points where the encounters and conflicts that constitute the border are experienced as particularly vivid by the actors involved (Kallio et al., forthcoming). Located at the European entry-point of the so-called ‘Balkan route’, Greece is undoubtedly one such point. According to the UNHCR, by October 2015, over half a million people had arrived in the country, the vast majority crossing the sea from Turkey and landing on the small Aegean islands of Kios and, more frequently, Lesvos. An unprecedented humanitarian effort thus focused on Greece – according to estimates, one of the most expensive in the history of modern humanitarianism (Howden and Fotiadis, 2017). This intervention was marked by delays and a striking lack of coordination, with repeated conflicts between local authorities and international non-governmental actors over the division of emergency labour, the usage of funds collected through international donations, and the management of space for the copious number of volunteers who were reaching the Aegean from all over the world (Howden and Fotiadis, 2017). While this chaotic outlook may be seen as the result of emergency dynamics, exacerbated by the fact that international organizations and the NGO sector were engaging for the first time in such a large-scale operation in a fully sovereign European country, the measures immediately adopted by the ‘international community’ did not curb the confusion that marked Greece’s ‘humanitarian spectacle’. Following the action plan adopted in October 2015, the 28 EU member states drafted the statement of their well-known agreement with Turkey. The statement established the immediate return of all migrants irregularly crossing the border to Greece, and the ‘one to one principle’, according to which, for every refugee returned to Turkey from Greece, the EU committed to resettle another one, selected among the refugee population residing in camps (which excluded non-Syrian refugees), as well as financial aid and accelerated visa procedures for Turkey. The agreement did not amount to a binding international legal treaty: its value was exclusively political. The concrete effects on border and humanitarian infrastructures within Aegean Greece and beyond, however, were immediately highly visible. The statement enhanced and expanded the regulation of identification, registration, asylum claiming, assistance, and repatriation through the hotspot approach that, as such, had a complex and long genealogy in EU border governance (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). This resulted in a reorganization of the camp geographies of Lesvos, and a dramatic precarization and immobilization of migrant life on the island, as the statement made transfer to the Greek mainland a very selective and slow procedure.

‘Delay and neglect’ 99 During our visit in October 2016, local aid workers in Lesvos described Moria – the camp functioning as the hotspot’s main identification and containment facility – as so infrastructurally precarious that it would experience regular water shortages due to the municipality’s inability to settle its bills on time, as well as repeated fires and protests by residents. By then the other main camp in Lesvos, Kara Tepe – the ‘hospitality centre’ for families and asylum seekers in conditions of vulnerability, managed by the municipality – had already seen a decrease in the number of international and local NGOs involved in assistance and infrastructural improvement within its premises. Residents’ everyday lives in Kara Tepe were settling into ingrained precarity. According to local NGOs, the site, originally built to host 1,000 people, was accommodating over 3,000. Due to overcrowdedness, the bathrooms were often in such dire conditions that residents used the surrounding bushes as toilets. ‘Positioned on a hillside with steep inclines’, as the internal note of an international NGO working on shelter improvement described it, Kara Tepe had ‘no basic rain-water run-off drainage system in place, putting some lower areas at risk of flooding’. Residents, the organization concluded, were ‘having their living spaces inundated during heavy rains’. Many families had modified the flat-pack housing units in iron and plastic assigned to them, produced by the Swedish firm Better Shelter, partner of the IKEA Foundation, by adding or taking away components, or opening new windows on the walls to find relief from the heat. Many among locals and camp residents engaged in small economic activities and commercial transactions, from working as barbers to setting up small grocery shops around the camp. These had given rise to a local informal economy of transit and precarity, regarded suspiciously by local authorities, yet mostly tolerated. Although the camp management had arranged a system of meals delivery and formally prohibited the use of stoves, cooking, in the words of a local volunteer, ‘happened all the time’, allegedly increasing safety risks for residents. In early 2017, the UNHCR replaced the Better Shelter-IKEA Foundation housing units in use in Kara Tepe with containers, apparently citing fire risks. The new containers came with pre-installed heating units, which, however, could not be put to use in the winter due to the infrastructural set up of electricity provision on the island (personal communication, Greek NGO worker, 2018; see also Rantsiou, 2017). In March 2017, Dimitris Christopoulos, the head of the International Federation for Human Rights (known by its French acronym, FIDH), described the situation on the island as one of ‘absolute precarity’, which would work as a powerful deterrent for migrants intending to cross the border from Turkey (Kingsley, 2017). In September 2017, UNHCR issued a press briefing calling for urgent action to ‘ease conditions on Greek islands’, which achieved very little. A few weeks later, the coordinator for the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, Maarten Verwey, visited Kara Tepe and demanded that 300 people be transferred from Moria, which was then hosting twice the number of migrants it could accommodate. According to Fotini Rantsiou (2017, p. 1), Verwey suggested that ‘they be housed in empty containers in a new extension lying empty and without any

100 Elisa Pascucci et al. electricity in Kara Tepe’. The transfer would thus further integrate the municipality’s camp into the most securitized section of the hotspot. In early 2018, Greek NGO workers and public officers in Lesvos expressed their fear that the final transformation of Kara Tepe into ‘a detention facility, like Moria’ in the context of the proposed expansion of the hotspot, might be imminent. Meanwhile, reports by international NGOs were continuing to document the deterioration of security and infrastructural conditions in the island’s camps, and the dramatic rise in mental health problems among migrants, including post-traumatic stress disorder, selfharm, and suicide, among migrants (MSF, 2017). For Pallister-Wilkins (2018), the Greek system of containment through camps entrenched by the EU-Turkey Statement rationalizes and regulates the compassion animating the wide range of humanitarian actors – both professional and volunteer – who have been active in Greece in 2015–2016. It thus works on two levels. On the one hand, it limits and controls the circulation of migrant bodies that are to be included into the European political and social space highly selectively, and always only partially and temporarily. On the other hand, it acts on European society by ‘taming’ acts of aid and emerging solidarities, making them governable and even allies to government. While these observations are important, it is also essential to highlight how, on the Greek humanitarian border, ‘control’ does not equate coherence and efficacy, but repeated failures – in knowing, acting in a timely manner, and coordinating. The conditions in Kara Tepe, outlined above, demonstrate how the agentic capacities at work in this system include centralized initiatives to govern migration by national and supra-national bodies, but also less coherent efforts to manage the humanitarian crisis by local authorities and international non-governmental actors, all the way down to actions by volunteers providing care to the migrants struggling to survive in conditions of political uncertainty and material precarity. While the system admittedly is flexible in the face of constantly changing situations, for migrants it constitutes a highly uneven and unpredictable landscape of ‘neglectful care’ that no one takes responsibility for. It is these unstable negotiations across a range of actors and agentic capacities, including migrants who counter the reduction to embodied abjection by clinging on daily activities that are formally forbidden within camp spaces, which we wish to foreground as a dynamism constitutive of the humanitarian border. In many instances, these agencies appear to repeatedly fail to act, or progressively withdraw. The gaps in infrastructural provision that they engender, such as lack of electricity and water in camps, produce geopolitical effects that unfold in the everyday, while having resonances on a wider scale. Through the inefficacy of humanitarian care that characterizes places like Moria and Kara Tepe, even the movement of people across borders is effectively slowed down, and even deterred.

Lebanon According to the UNHCR (2017a), between April 2011 and December 2017 altogether 1,015,500 Syrians sought asylum in Europe. At the end of 2017,

‘Delay and neglect’ 101 approximately the same number of Syrian refugees were hosted by one single country in the Middle East: Lebanon. While figures have dropped slightly since the introduction of restrictive border policies and the stop to official registration procedures in 2015, Lebanon remains the country with the highest number of refugees per capita in the world (Boustani et al., 2016; UNHCR, 2017b). A state in which violent conflict3 ‘is embedded in national boundaries, social and economic organization and political administration’, Lebanon has suffered serious financial losses as a result of the Syrian crisis (Boustani et al., 2016, p. 9). The condition of refugees in the country reflects this historically entrenched precarity. According to a survey published by the UNHCR (2017b, p. 8), in 2017 over half of Syrian families had no members with legal residency, ‘87% of refugees report(ed) having borrowed money’, and ‘77% of Syrian refugee households reported having experienced a lack of food or lack of money to buy food during the 30 days prior to the survey’. The inadequacies of humanitarian delivery have been blamed on the lack of coordination between governmental, international and, non-governmental actors. The Lebanese government has tried to harmonize existing responses by establishing ministerial coordination offices, with limited results (Boustani et al., 2016). The informal, seemingly inefficient nature of the response is particularly evident in the question of refugee shelter. Discussions on the topic started immediately after the beginning of the crisis. They were marked by a sharp conflict between the government (backed by public opinion), categorically opposing the creation of ‘Syrian camps’, mostly on security grounds, and the UNHCR and NGO partners, for whom these kinds of ‘managed’ refugee settlements were the only viable solution (Boustani et al., 2016). Such security narratives, however, hid a far more complex reality. In 2016, UN officers in Beirut described their work in facilitating refugees’ access to the local rental market as ‘adaptation’ to a system of governance historically based on a loosely regulated market economy, as well as on networks of patronage that closely bind the state and private capital. Their actions in this field were classified under the agenda of ‘humanitarian innovation’. However, the narratives of UN officers in Lebanon stressed the role of localized dynamics and historical continuities in limiting the agency of aid organizations to the mediation between landlords and tenants, and the promotion of private sector involvement in refugee housing provision – from local letting agencies to international ‘sharing-economy’ actors like Airbnb. Despite the border and visa restrictions introduced in 2015, and although EU member states’ cooperation does influence humanitarian responses within the country, the Lebanese ‘governance-scape’ is not marked by externally regulated border enforcement facilities and practices (as in Greece). Lack of coordination, informality, and market laissez-faire attitudes are rather the product of a system that has worked through decentralized governance at least since the late Ottoman period. Municipalities have a prominent administrative role, so-called networks of clientelism and patronage shape policy practices, and sectarian and religious groups are fully institutionalized (Hamieh and Mac Ginty, 2010).

102 Elisa Pascucci et al. Even in such a decentralized socio-political system, however, the incorporation of Syrian households in local market circuits did not loosen the barriers between refugees and local societal and political institutions. Rather, it contributed to the constitution of a temporally protracted humanitarian border that worked through informality, infrastructural precariousness, and the creation of informal encampments – despite the policies aimed at avoiding formal refugee camps. According to UN Habitat and UNHCR (2014), in 2014 82% of Syrians in Lebanon were settled in private apartments and ‘substandard shelters’ including ‘garages, worksites and unfinished buildings’, while the remaining 18% were living in informal tented settlements, mostly in peri-urban settings (see Boustani et al., 2016, p. 21). During winter months, conditions were particularly critical, also in the capital Beirut (UNCHR, 2018). Some of the Syrians families settled near Jarahieh, Bekaa, in 2016, used recycled UNHCR cloths and advertising billboards to cover and repair their provisional shelters. In the surroundings of temporary school buildings, clinics, and NGO offices, small stacks were sprawling where street vendors, some of whom underage, were selling clothes, telephone covers, and snacks. Humanitarian agencies had no other choice but to invest resources for infrastructural improvement in schools and playgrounds projects, since local authorities did not allow substantial interventions on the infrastructure of existing refugee shelters that would risk making them ‘permanent’. As one of the interviewed aid workers observed, even the approved projects were made difficult by the lengthy, complex negotiations with local municipalities, whose administrators and politicians expected the resources spent on refugee settlements to be spread among local communities that, in some cases, shared similarly precarious livelihoods. Small contractors in the construction sector who lost a bid to bigger companies based in the capital, a relatively common occurrence, could seek protection from local notables, and attempt to disrupt projects in order to benefit from the need for further works. This negative and decentred governance, which functioned by withdrawing action and dispersing responsibility, produced a ‘neglectful humanitarian landscape’ where bordering practices worked by compounding the condition of refugeeness through social provisionality and infrastructural precarity, entrenching immobility. At the same time, refugees and migrants played an increasingly active role in this diverse landscape of humanitarian bordering. At the end of 2016, NGOs founded and led by Lebanese professionals and volunteers, but also by young Syrian expatriates, were increasingly prominent in the Lebanese refugee aid milieu. One of them, Basmeh & Zeitooneh, had started operating also in Turkey, and had just received a pro-bono management consultancy from the leading US-based multinational AT Kearney,4 aimed at diversifying and expanding their international operations and relations with donors. Soon after its foundation, in 2012–2013, Basmeh & Zeitooneh had opened a community centre in one of the historical refugee camps of Beirut, Chatila, where longterm Palestinian residents had years of experience in welcoming new displaced people: first poor Lebanese displaced by political violence and the Beirut housing market, then Palestinians in search of a new refuge after the violent destruction

‘Delay and neglect’ 103 of the Nahr el Bared camp, and finally Syrian refugees (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016). ‘For refugees from Syria,’ Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2016, p .2) writes, ‘arriving in the camp . . . and sharing its increasingly cramped space and limited resources’ has meant experiencing ‘a space of solidarity’. However, just as for Nancy ‘togetherness and being together are not equivalent’ (Nancy, 2000, p. 60 quoted in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016, p. 2), solidarity here does not mean absence of hierarchies and divisions. Spaces of ‘refugee-to-refugee hosting’ and community-based humanitarianism are not exempt from the reproduction of everyday borders (Pascucci, 2017). On the contrary, the precarious coexistence of shared or antagonistic histories of violence and exile can work to perpetuate exclusionary boundaries of political belonging. Through them, the everyday geopolitics of humanitarianism and borders contribute to the reproduction of the nation-state.

Conclusions Examining the politics of refuge and bordering in Greece and Lebanon in the months following the application of the EU-Turkey Statement on refugees, this chapter has shed light on the ‘materials that connect and conjoin geopolitics and everyday life’ within and through humanitarian borders (Pain and Smith, 2008, p. 2). The ‘hotspot machine’ at work in Aegean Greece, we have shown, is one of the most poignant examples of contemporary humanitarian bordering, operating as a negative system of governance and diluted responsibility (Rose, 2014). While the migration regime behind these unsafe and agonizing conditions is less coherent than it appears, any acts of resistance contesting it have only succeeded in disturbing but not changing the precarious situation for the thousands of refugees still trapped in the camps. Shadowed by meagre possibilities for resettlement in the EU, the affective landscapes of the hotspot appear despondent from the everyday geopolitical perspective. To further discuss how Syrian refugees shape and are shaped by the humanitarian border, we have described a number of localized responses to the prolonged refugee crisis in Lebanon. In this context, the aim of the refugee aid regime to govern the situation by means of formal camps has not succeeded as the national and local governments, as well as some sectors of the Lebanese society, are not supportive of them. This contradiction has, perhaps paradoxically, led to the creation of informal encampments, compounding informality and infrastructural precariousness. The local and transnational grassroots organizations working with and for migrants have gained only limited success in improving their housing situation, largely in fear that this would serve to establish their presence in the society. Also, divisions between different migrant groups pose obstacles to creating mutually supportive networks and infrastructures. Hence, the solidarities at play in Lebanon have not succeeded in building a ‘safe zone’ to the humanitarian border, even with more leeway for migrant agentic capacities than in the Greek context. The mundane geopolitical struggles carried out by individual and collective actors in Lebanon – be they asylum seekers, local

104 Elisa Pascucci et al. people, refugees from previous generations, or transnational aid workers – are not meaningless or triumphant, but produce subtle shifts in the constitution of the always contextual and fluctuating humanitarian border. We hope to have shown that the notion of the humanitarian border can be diversified and deepened by looking into how the regime and its counter forces enact it in different geographical contexts. A parallel comparison between the Greek and Lebanese situations brings to the fore the spatial and temporal variabilities of the border, as well as the numerous agentic capacities embedded in it. Our discussion also shows how the improvised and provisional system of crisis governance effectively obscures the question of responsibility in how the situation is managed in different locations and socio-cultural settings. Our account of the humanitarian border thus aligns itself with calls for a theorization and practice of international ethics that, while acknowledging the enduring relevance of the national, goes beyond ‘statist imaginaries’ (Bulley, 2017 quoted in Paasi et al., 2019). Such ethics, we believe, can only counter the blurred accountabilities produced by these modalities of border governance (Schindel, 2019) if founded on an understanding of political agency that is localized, contextualized, and pluralistic. By grasping the multifaceted spatialized agencies at play in the merging of humanitarianism and borders, well beyond territorial border-crossing environments and governmental apparatuses, it is also possible to impact on the precarities and inequalities produced by global borders.

Notes 1 Available at: https://peoplesassemblylesvos.wordpress.com/ [Accessed 06.02.2018]. 2 Fieldwork for this paper has been carried out by Elisa Pascucci between October 2016 and February 2018, in the context of a broader project on humanitarian economies in responses to the Syrian refugee crisis (Academy of Finland SA 295297). 3 Including the 34-day long war with Israel of 2006, which caused over 1,000 Lebanese deaths. 4 www.middle-east.atkearney.com/news-media/news-releases/news-release/-/asset_publ isher/00OIL7Jc67KL/content/a-t-kearney-conducts-pro-bono-project-to-support-syrianrefugees?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=http://www.middle-east.atkearney.com/newsmedia/news-releases/news-release%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_00OIL7Jc67KL% 26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview% 26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-2%26p_p_col_count%3D1 [Accessed 22.02.2018].

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8

Asylum reception and the politicization of national identity in Finland A gender perspective Eeva-Kaisa Prokkola

Introduction In autumn 2015, hundreds of asylum seekers from Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria started to arrive daily at the border town of Tornio, having travelled to this northern Finnish–Swedish border point all the way through Europe and Sweden. The situation was considered highly exceptional in Finland, especially because the country is not considered an attractive destination for immigrants compared to Sweden. Arguments about different kinds of threats and dangers immediately started to dominate the public debate in Finland and, within a few weeks, hundreds of policemen, border guards, security authorities, and servicemen were relocated to Tornio to monitor border crossing and asylum reception. The border-related questions and migrant border crossings were approached institutionally from the perspective of security (cf. Tesfahuney, 1998; Huysmans, 2000; Ackleson, 2005; see Bauder, 2019). The process of asylum reception in Finland was not merely a state initiative, however, as local parishes and nongovernmental organizations, the Finnish Red Cross in particular, played an important role. The reception and related activities were also characterized by a strong gendered division of labour; while security authorities and servicemen were usually men, the majority of the civic organization workers and volunteers were women. Finland, a Nordic welfare state and net emigration country until the late 20th century, provides an interesting case from the perspective of border securitization because of its pervasive national-identity building project (Paasi, 1996) and its gendered dimension (Prokkola and Ridanpää, 2017). The gendered roles of citizen participation are enforced by the Finnish military service, which is obligatory for male citizens and voluntary for females. Although scholars have long challenged the understanding of the nation as an unified community where people (not knowing each other personally) identify themselves as part of a wider national community (Anderson, 1983), the notions of the particularity of the nation and of national destiny still bear strongly in the minds of people and are often used to justify exclusive border and migration policies. The history of nationalism became visible in Tornio, which became a site for heated discussions

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and street protests for and against open borders. The increasing number of asylum seekers was loudly opposed by anti-immigrant groups, creating societal conflicts and a specific yet inharmonic atmosphere of nationalism. Emotionally loaded criticism was not only targeted at the asylum seekers, but also at state authorities and workers from non-governmental organizations, especially females. The discursive framings of asylum reception in Finland in many ways reproduced the moral dimension of national gender roles that have formed over the country’s history. This chapter aims to widen our understanding of the relationship between nationalism and gender by scrutinizing the gendered imaginations and rationalities of border crossing and asylum reception in Finland. The examination focuses on the Tornio border crossing point and on how societal gender relations and politics of the body were performed, reproduced, reimposed, and challenged in the context of the 2015–2016 asylum-seeker reception. The point of departure for the analysis is an understanding that borders are an important part of national identity narratives and performances, and that the imaginations of national borders and their protection are not gender-neutral (Mostov, 1995; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler, 2002; Prokkola and Ridanpää, 2017).

Borders, national identity, and gender in Finland Regardless of its seemingly technocratic nature, border securitization is entangled with the long-standing geopolitical and cultural imaginations of otherness (van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007) as well as with the (re)production of gender roles. Many studies now underline that the question of border security no longer refers to military defence of the state in its traditional meaning but also to social and economic security (Bigo, 2001) and identity securitization, related to a fear of losing national identity and culture. What is often problematic in the studies of state–migrant relationships, however, is an unproblematic view of the state as ‘a territorial trap’ (Agnew, 1994) that contains and maintains a single, coherent identity. The state certainly holds power over migrant destinations, yet the state is not a singular entity with one harmonious identity but encompasses social, economic, and gender divisions that are often enormous. When viewed from this perspective, border and migration securitization is a complex and multifocal process where societal order and prevailing gender relations can become challenged in ways that create social vulnerability and polarization. In Finland, like in many European countries, border and migration securitization has become an integral part of national identity formation and of the making of political divisions between ‘friends’ and the ‘enemy’ (cf. Campbell, 1992; Bialasiewicz et al., 2007). Huysmans (2000, p. 752) argues that the multiple challenges that the Western European welfare states now face, including economic globalization, increasing poverty and inequality, the revival of racist movements, and challenges to the democratic order itself, provide grounds for migration securitization, that is, migration is presented as a threat to public order, cultural identity, and labour market stability. Accordingly, it has been argued that

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the migration ‘crisis’ in Finland, like in many other parts of Europe, highlights more the question of societal polarization and the incapability of EU member states to agree about the reception of asylum seekers than what is termed ‘leaking borders’ (Brown, 2017). Since images of threat and danger are integral to the production of the political and cultural identity of the state (Megoran, 2005), the discourses of state borders and their protection need to be interpreted against the geopolitical background and the history of the state in question. Nationalism and the imaginations of the borders of Finland provide a good example here. Finland is an interesting case from the perspective of nationalism because of its geopolitical position between Sweden and Russia; for example, during the Cold War, Finland was seen to be located between the West and the Eastern bloc. It has been argued that defending the state’s borders has been a crucial element of the construction of national identity narratives in Finland because of the country’s historical background. After the Treaty of Hamina, 1809, by which Sweden ceded Finland, its eastern territory, to Russia, Finland constituted an autonomous territory in Russia (Paasi, 1996). Moreover, because of the Winter War with the Soviet Union (1939–40) and the continuously experienced threat of the Soviet Union/Russia, the protection of the symbolic and physical borders of the state territory and national identity building via education and media have been of great interest in Finland (Paasi, 1996). Paasi (2016, p. 6) points out that ‘Finland’s borders were labelled as “sacred” in many textbooks, referring to the home, religion and the fatherland axis and implying that Finland was a “chosen” nation in the religious sense’. The shared conception of national identity as something based on the cultural and racial homogeneity of the population became rather exclusive, and has been constructed through the discourses of difference and otherness (Häkli, 2005, p.13). The debate about closing the border in Finland in 2015 can be interpreted against the prevailing national imaginaries in which protecting the border is depicted as the duty of men while women’s bodies become symbols of national honor and purity (see Mostov, 1995). Younger women, in particular, often become symbols of the honor of the collectivity; however, they usually retain an object position in these imaginations and are excluded from the active ‘collective “we” of the body politic’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 47). One persuasive strategy to increase the willingness of (male) citizens to protect the border has been to create and communicate emotionally laden images of the national territory as a female body that should be protected. Here, the imaginations of the borders of Finland provide a good example. The portrait of the Finnish territory as Suomi-neito (the Finnish Maiden), a light haired and young female wearing the traditional national costume, is argued to symbolize the need to protect the sovereign nation and its territorial borders (Gordon, 2002). As a way of securitizing the 2015 asylum reception, Finnish nationalist groups deployed similar kinds of emotionally loaded imageries highlighting the vulnerability of women and girls and the need to protect them from male strangers. National imaginations of the vulnerability of women/borders have played a crucial part in justifying the securitization of migration in Finland. The leading

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roles and participation of women in the 2015 asylum reception process problematizes the masculine nationalistic idea of female citizens as vulnerable and in need of protection, like the Finnish Maiden. This chapter takes up the so far neglected question of the gendered nature of border and migration securitization as an analytical starting point and follows the idea that gender is not ahistorical or apolitical but constructed in individual and institutional relations (Connell, 1995); it is in and through these relations that the societal distinctions and relations between men and women become established, maintained, and disrupted. The chapter discusses how women’s active participation in the asylum reception was represented as a threat by the extreme-nationalist masculinist groups; how the polarization of national identity comes out in the categorization of different groups; and what kinds of moral conceptions of women were reproduced.

Mapping the local and national discourses of bordering This study analyses different sets of material through which it is possible to gain understanding of the gendered nature of border and migration securitization in Finland. Rather than the traditional critical geopolitics approach which emphasizes the discursive production of threat and danger by state elites (Coleman, 2009), the study will examine the contextual, local, and mundane interpretations of border and migration securitization in the context of the reception of asylum seekers in Finland in 2015. In the analysis, particular attention is given to the politicization of national identity, that is, how different people (or usernames in social media) utilize national identity narratives and group categorization as well as how they position themselves in relation to these narratives. It is understood that nationalism operates contextually (cf. Paasi, 2016) and can be mobilized both emotionally and discursively by different interest groups. By following this kind of relational understanding of national identity, the focus in this chapter is not on the particularity of national identity but on how people connect themselves to particular identity narratives, and in what ways they articulate and categorize identities. Additionally, the experiences of the securitization and politicization of national identity are discussed in the context of the asylum reception in Tornio. The materials on which the study is based consist of 19 open-ended interviews that were conducted among local authorities and nonstate actors that participated in asylum reception, and of 401 survey responses from Tornio inhabitants (a random sample). The materials provide insights into gendered versions of border securitization and its moral legitimizing. Moreover, a systematic analysis of migration- and border-related discussions was conducted in an open social media discussion forum (Suomi24 TornioHaparanda, July–December, 2015). The collection of different sets of material provides different perspectives on border and migration securitization, and on related gendered discourses. The anonymous survey and the social media discussions illustrate different kinds of attitudes towards the border and the asylum reception than do the face-to-face interviews with people who participated in border surveillance and asylum reception on the ground.

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The analysis of the research material pays attention to the discursive production of gender and nationalism in the local narratives on borders and migration that were articulated and circulated both in physical and virtual spheres of communication. Gender-related questions were not directly posed to the informants; however, they were autonomously taken up by many of the interviewed people and in the open questions part. The gender dimension is also embedded in the language and categorizations of the materials, for example kukkahattutäti (‘a naïve moralizer’; literally, ‘a lady with a flower hat’) in itself refers to a somewhat older female person. The comparison of different sets of materials reveals also some contextual differences. Compared with the qualitative interview material that was collected in Tornio, it is unlikely that all of the people who wrote in the TornioHaaparanta social media forums had personal experiences of asylum reception and maintenance. In some cases, the lack of knowledge and personal experience may provoke different kinds of imaginaries that, when repeated in social media, are considered (emotional) truths. Moreover, even though the focus in this paper is on the Tornio border crossing point and the town of Tornio through which most of the asylum seekers arrived, the discussion is illustrative of the particular atmosphere of nationalism (Stephens, 2016) through which the circulation of the gender-specific meanings of asylum reception in Finland can be interpreted.

An imagined nation divided: coddling nannies, multiculturalists, patriots, and racists The situation at the Tornio border crossing point was constantly reported on in national broadcasts and the state intervention at the border gained international visibility. The media discussion forums played a significant role in circulating the images of threat and mobilization of nationalistic ‘close the border’ demonstrations in Tornio. The forums were utilized to organize demonstrations in which hundreds of people from across Finland participated. The political meaning making in social media became a highly ambivalent, contested, and emotionally laden process where the circulation of gendered images and feelings of danger were embellished with narratives about historical geopolitical relations and of national and cultural othering. In this section, the gendered construction of national identity and belonging is discussed in terms of the morally toned categorizations that were repeated in the TornioHaparanda social media discussion forum and elsewhere in Finland: coddling nanny, flower hat lady, multiculturalist, patriot, and racist (hyysäri, kukkahattutäti, suvakki, isänmaallinen, rasisti). It is argued that these categorizations, when put into work in public debates, create and strengthen distinctions and differentiation within the members of an imagined nation, and aim at legitimizing a specific definition of good citizenship and national identity (cf. Prokkola and Ridanpää, 2017). The analysis of the social media discussion points out how the distinction between inside/outside is produced through the circulation of emotions (cf. Ahmed, 2004; Stephens, 2016; p. 184) and how the border is not only drawn between nations, citizens, and strangers but extended to the whole of society in rather gender-specific ways.

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Because of the country’s long history of ethno-cultural nation building, migrants in Finland face more racism than in many other European countries. Although different forms of racism are a widely accepted problem in Finland (Puuronen, 2011), using the term ‘racist’ to describe individual people and their opinions is considered stigmatizing and problematic, thus the use of the term has become a contested issue. In the social media debate it was often argued that the term is reflexively used rather unfairly against all those Finnish people who espouse a critical attitude towards migration. In this same context, the meaning of patriotism is often taken up to justify one’s argument and as identity positioning. Even though many reject the notion of nationalistic patriotism, in the dominant narrative of Finnishness patriotism is often referred to as something that characterizes good citizenship (Prokkola and Ridanpää, 2017). In the social media debate, the usernames who make anti-immigrant arguments often justify their views in the name of patriotism, seemingly out of the fear that other participants of the discussion consider them as racist, and thus as some kind of loser: Patriotic action I respect your demonstration very much. It is great to see that some people have the courage to take action. Surely you are supported by 90% of Finns (this still silent part of the people). Thank you. And for the critics: I’m not a racist but a realist who has a family and worked all my life. I have never walked through the doors of the social welfare office. And never fussed around with booze (maybe 10 years ago). (TornioHaaparanta September 19, 2015) The stereotypical characterization of the Finns as uncivilized and racist people thus becomes an issue itself and many participants in the discussion aimed to make a distinction between their own identity and racism. The argument over asylum reception became a struggle over what constituted proper civic behaviour and what kind of people the Finns are. The everyday geopolitics of national identity, and national otherness, was present in many ways. For some, the threatening other was the male asylum seeker, and for others the objects of fear were the right wing nationalist movements, the mobilization of Soldiers of Odin, for example. In the TornioHaparanda Suomi24 social media forum the discussion became heated and arguments for and against migration, vigilante street patrols, and demonstrations were put forward: Welcome to Tornio refugees just like everywhere It sounds like a normal Finnish attitude, don’t you think: ‘we are not racist, just patriotic’ yet we are categorizing people according to the colour of their skin and, based on that, we are sorting their characters and behaviour. (TornioHaaparanta, September 19 2015)

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Asylum seekers, non-governmental organizations, and women workers were presented as a threat to a particular national consciousness. In the imaginaries mobilized by some extreme-nationalist groups, asylum reception become associated with coddling and possible intimate relationships between the male asylum seekers and female caregivers. The people participating in asylum reception were called kukkahattutädit (a lady with a flower hat or a wide-eyed moralizer), suvakit (multiculturalist) and hyysärit (coddling nanny). Kukkahattutäti is used to refer to someone who is very naïve and believes only good of people. Hyysäri refers to a person who makes a fuss about everything and has a negative connotation; it produces particular groups of citizens as the other. Hyysäri is simultaneously one of us and differentiated and stigmatized for her/his actions, in this case, helping the asylum seekers. These terms were used in a rather negative manner that well exemplified the polarization of society. The term suvakki in itself has an ethical dimension, in referring to those who are excessively tolerant and whose worldview is different from ‘ours’. It can be argued that these categorizations also produce a particular moral order, making a distinction between decent, national-minded citizens, and traitors to the imagined desired community. In many debates, the interests of the citizens and state officials were also seen as contradictory: Ridiculous piffle about racism When one reads these writings, it can be noticed that many ‘suvakit’ do not realize what racism actually means. All criticism of immigration is racist in their opinion, for example, if somebody says that the borders should be closed, it is racism for them. So foolish are many ‘suvakit’. (TornioHaaparanta 30 September 2015) To ‘suvakeille’ again These new economic migrants (‘gate-crashers’) will be very expensive to Finland. Apologies, for speaking the truth and saying something negative about immigration, so then I’m a racist. But the country is worried about this issue. (TornioHaparanda 11 November 2015) Such anti-immigration discussions and biased gender relations did not appear out of thin air, however. Instead, the opposition to the asylum seekers needs to be interpreted against the long history of nationalism in Finland and the wider political turbulence of the 2015 election, which resulted in a new government that included the nationalistic True Finns Party alongside the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party. The government started its work in difficult economic circumstances, adapting to austerity policies and increasing unemployment, which together created inconsistency in the governmental debates and increased societal polarization. Equality and gender relations were notably absent from the agenda of the new government and hard economic values dominated the public discussion.

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Asylum reception and the everyday experiences of politicized national identity Much hostility in the social media debates and even physical attacks were directed towards the reception centers, leading politicians, and non-governmental actors, and the workers and volunteers from the Finnish Red Cross and the Lutheran Church. What has largely been ignored in the discussion and analysis of the asylum reception from the perspective of societal polarization in Finland (Puustinen et al., 2017) is the significance of the gendered division of labour in the reception effort. A majority of the border security authorities from the police and the Finnish Border Guard were male officers, while the grassroots maintenance work and care was coordinated by organizations such as the Finnish Red Cross where women are active participants. In some discussions, the asylum reception was linked to the question of sexuality; helping male asylum seekers was equated to sexual and intimate interest towards them. The relationships between Finnish women and male asylum seekers became a question of the morality of the nation, and the role of women as moral sustainers of the nation. In comparison to male asylum seekers, female asylum seekers were almost invisible in the public discourse and did not exist in the threat imaginaries and accounts of nationalist groups. In the interviews and in the social media debates, border protection and the masculine national order (Prokkola and Ridanpää, 2015) became visible in ways in which especially young girls were presented to be naïve and thus in danger: C11: These young girls are so naïve. They are just joyous when these (asylum seekers) come, giving hugs and taking pictures. Near the reception centers, and in other places and in Haparanda, I know that the girls are strictly watched over by the parents. The parents of teenagers are very careful, about where the girls go and when. (A city representative) The threats to Finnish culture and young women were actively taken up by the nationalist groups. The extreme nationalist group called Soldiers of Odin started autonomous street patrols in the Kemi-Tornio area and in some other Finnish towns in the name of citizen safety, by this means contesting state authority in border securitization from below (cf. Doty, 2007). Moreover, the establishment of new asylum reception infrastructures spurred opposition and even violent acts towards the reception centers, but also towards immigration officials, servants, and volunteers. Threatening situations and friction were reported by several female workers who participated in the open-ended interviews in Tornio, pointing out how the border securitization and politicization of national identity was lived out as an everyday experience: C5:

Hmm, well there are always . . . these . . . the only threat that come to us in the Red Cross, it was a phone call that came to the unit’s mobile phone . . . ‘you are nannying those [the asylum-seekers] and our pensioners are left without

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any help’. And there was one text message, ‘yes, we know you and your house will burn’. C6: Oh, you has this kind of. Yes. I had one acquaintance . . . quite a smart person said ‘well, you are nannying those, too’ (Female informants, NGOs; ellipses in original) Although in the interviews only women respondents reported friction, the general oppressive national atmosphere and the mobilization of extreme groups were considered problematic by most people in Tornio. According to a postal questionnaire that was conducted in Tornio in 2016 (all together 401 respondents; 46.9% male and 52.9% female), the ‘close the borders’ provocations and the heightened atmosphere of nationalism was considered awkward and some respondents even described the demonstrations as a national shame. The survey points out that in Tornio, both male and female respondents considered the mobilization of right wing groups and vigilante securitization from below as a threat from the perspective of their everyday security (Figure 8.1). This suggests that the politicization of national identity and belonging, manifest especially in the social media debate, may vary depending on the circumstances of the issue. The majority of people shared a concern over extremism and societal polarization.

Discussion This chapter has discussed particular gendered imaginations of national protection and identity that can be seen as driving forces behind the border and migration securitization. The chapter has focused on how these were manifested in Tornio, a small border

Experienced threat from extremist groups 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

1

2 Male

3

4

Female

Figure 8.1 A survey conducted in Tornio shows that most people consider the activities of extremist groups threatening, yet male respondents were more likely to disagree with the statement ‘I consider the activities of extremist groups as a threat’ (1=agree; 2=neither agree nor disagree; 3=disagree; 4=don’t know)

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town in northern Finland that formed a specific site of state intervention and nationalistic mobilization. It is argued that this particular moment and the public debate in 2015 are well illustrative of what Stephens (2016) terms an affective atmosphere of nationalism. Stigmatizing stories and categorization pertaining to asylum seekers, Finnish authorities, and non-governmental organizations involved in the reception were circulated in the media, picturing the asylum seekers and their reception as a threat to an imagined Finnish nation, as well as to the economic and cultural resilience of the state and its Western values. In national discourses, Finnish females are often presented as strong and independent Nordic women. Recent literature on Finnish war history recognizes women as important actors and in stories about World War II Finnish women are portrayed as the home front and as the moral sustainers of the nation (Prokkola and Ridanpää, 2017). The 2015 asylum reception, however, disclosed that this kind of image of women as taking care of people in war only persists when the objects of care are the fellow citizens, the members of the nation. In the imaginaries and discussions of the extreme nationalists, helping the asylum seekers, the ‘strangers’, was turned into something that stigmatized women and made them look like morally indecent citizens. The analysis of the asylum reception in Finland shows that national cultures, norms, and narratives of belonging continue to be of great importance for people’s identity positioning in multiple ways (see also Skey, 2010). However, national identity and culture should not be presented as a source of ontological security, but identity positioning of individuals and groups are better viewed as attempts to achieve security (Browning and Joenniemi, 2017, p. 32). Earlier research has shown that in Finland, border and migration securitization produced a negative impact on society as a whole; many people were afraid to speak openly about their attitudes towards migration (Puustinen et al., 2017). The relational understanding of identity as a positioning rather than eternal fixed feature is important because it enables us to avoid stigmatization and categorization of people. The relational conception of national identity also underlines the importance of recognizing the violent history and present of border drawing (Massey, 2005), and thus is about making an ethical claim. The media discussion studied in this chapter well illustrates that nations are not single entities, and that the sense of belonging within a group(s) and the emotional landscape of an individual have an impact on one’s perception of the world. Therefore, even if we can speak of specific affective national atmospheres, we should be careful not to reproduce the image of homogenous peoples. The categorization of people in the context of the 2015 asylum reception politicized the question of national identity and provoked contradictory normative conceptions of the Finnish people as members of an imagined nation.

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Ahmed, S. (2004). Collective feelings: or, the impressions left by others. Theory, Culture and Society. Volume 21(2), 25–42. Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Spread and Origin of the Nationalism. New York and London: Verso. Bauder, H. (2019). Imagining a borderless world. In: A. Paasi, E.-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities and Mobilities. London: Routledge, 37–48. Bialasiewicz, L., Campbell, D., Elden, S., Graham, S., Jeffrey, A., and Williams, A. (2007). Performing security: the imaginative geographies of current US strategy. Political Geography. Volume 26(4), 405–422. Bigo, D. (2001). The Möbius ribbon of internal and external security(ies). In: M. Albert, D. Jacobson and Y. Lapid eds., Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 91–117. Brown, W. (2017). Border barriers as sovereign swords: rethinking Walled States in light of the EU migrant and fiscal crises. Political Geography. Volume 59, 2–4. Browning, C. and Joenniemi, P. (2017). Ontological security, self-articulation and the securitization of identity. Cooperation and Conflict, Volume 52(1), 31–47. Campbell, D. (1992). Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Coleman, M. (2009). What counts as the politics and practice of security, and where? Devolution and immigrant insecurity after 9/11. Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Volume 99(5), 904–913. Connell, R. W. (1995). Masculinities. Cambridge: Polity Press. Doty, R. (2007). States of exception on the Mexico–U.S. Border: security, ‘decisions,’ and civilian border patrols. International Political Sociology, Volume 1(2), 113–137. Gordon, T. (2002). Kansallisuuden sukupuolittuneet tilat (gendered spaces of nationhood). In: T. Gordon, K. Komulainen and K. Lempiäinen eds., Suomineitonen Hei! Kansallisuuden Sukupuoli. Tampere: Vastapaino, 37–55. Häkli, J. (2005). Who is the Finn? Globalization and identity in Finland. Journal of Finnish Studies. Volume 9(2), 12–26. Huysmans, J. (2000). The European union and the securitization of migration. Journal of Common Market Studies. Volume 38(5), 751–777. Massey, D. (2005). For Space. London: Sage. Megoran, N. (2005). The critical geopolitics of danger in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. Volume 23(4), 555–580. Mostov, J. (1995). ‘OUR WOMENS’/‘THEIR WOMENS’ symbolic boundaries, territorial markers, and violence in the balkans. Peace and Change. Volume 20(4), 515–529. Paasi, A. (1996). Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Boundary. London: Wiley. Paasi, A. (2016). Dancing on the graves: independence, hot/banal nationalism and the mobilization of memory. Political Geography. Volume 54, 21–31. Prokkola, E.-K and Ridanpää, J. (2015). Border guarding and the politics of the body: an examination of the Finnish Border Guard service. Gender, Place and Culture, Volume 22 (10), 1374–1390. Prokkola, E.-K. and Ridanpää, J. (2017). Youth organizations, citizenship, and guidelines for tourism in the wake of mass tourism in Finland. Citizenship Studies. Volume 21(3), 359–377. Puuronen, V. (2011). Rasistinen Suomi (Racist Finland). Helsinki: Gaudeamus.

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Part III

Contested mobilities and encounters

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9

Tourism, border politics, and the fault lines of mobility Raoul V. Bianchi and Marcus L. Stephenson

Introduction International tourism has increasingly come to be regarded as a predominantly positive social and economic force that few states attempt to restrict and many have sought to embrace. Meanwhile, the right to travel within and across international borders, which constitutes the prerequisite for enjoying the pleasures of being a tourist, has increasingly become the focus of academic debate (Breakey and Breakey, 2013; Higgins-Desbiolles, 2007). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and centralized state-planned economies throughout Eastern Europe in conjunction with market reforms in China, the embrace of liberal capitalism and democracy was supposed to herald the dissolution of national borders as markets became increasingly integrated and citizens (re)claimed their right to the freedom of movement (see Fukuyama, 1989; Ohmae, 1990). However, recent events associated with the upsurge of global migration and the securitization of borders (see Jones, 2016), bear witness to the profound asymmetries that mark the mobility rights and empowerments of tourists, and those deemed to lack the ‘right credentials for travel’ (Kaur and Hutnyk, 1999, p. 3). As unprecedented numbers of people seek to move across borders, forced to travel because of political persecution and conflict, environmental breakdown, and/or economic collapse, many states together with a multitude of interlocking governing agencies have increasingly sought to (re)assert control over their borders. The objective is to police, filter, and restrict those mobilities conceived to be ‘illegitimate’ or problematic while ensuring that hindrances to the crossborder mobility of capital, goods, services, and ‘legitimate’ travellers (in other words, tourists) remain minimal. During the 19th century an estimated 50 million Europeans, displaced by the rise of industrial capitalism and disruption of traditional agrarian economies, sought new lives and the possibility of a better livelihood in the newly colonized territories in the Americas, Australia, and New Zealand, something that few migrants could contemplate today (Wolf, 1982, pp. 363–364). Despite the widespread human suffering precipitated by a combination of conflict, poverty, and environmental degradation throughout the global south, migration and crossborder movement has been increasingly stifled and in some cases criminalized.

124 Raoul V. Bianchi and Marcus L. Stephenson Rich nations have sought to toughen their border management regimes via the application of sophisticated technologies of surveillance to track and police the movements of those deemed to lack the ‘legitimate’ credentials to travel, as well as to outsource the containment of migration to third states and off-shore detention centres (Davidson, 2016; Delle Femmine, 2017). Meanwhile, tourism continues to be avidly promoted as one of the world’s most dynamic industries capable of stimulating inclusive and sustainable growth, also fostering socioeconomic development (UNWTO, 2017a). This chapter develops ideas previously published in works by Bianchi and Stephenson (2013, 2014) to focus on the contradictions that mark the intersections between the right to the freedom of movement and travel, and the right to tourism. These rights are examined through the prism of bordering practices and discourses through which different modalities of travel are represented, valued and policed, and the unequal geographies of movement are made tangible. In doing so, the chapter points to a central paradox of international tourism. While tourism is celebrated as an instrument of economic development, peace, and a marker of global citizenship, securitized border management regimes have accentuated disparities between those deemed to be lacking the ‘appropriate’ credentials for travel and those whose mobility is defined as ‘legitimate’. The argument presented in this chapter repudiates the normative view of tourism as an apolitical phenomenon, abstracted from the broader realm of mobility politics and structural determinants of immobility.

Citizenship, the state and the right to travel The establishment of rights to the freedom of movement, travel, and holidaymaking is rooted in the development of industrial capitalism and shift to mass societies in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Marshall, 1992). By the 1930s the right to a break from the ardours of labour and to participate in leisure activities was established through legislation enacted in a number of industrialized states in response to the collective bargaining efforts of sections of the labour force (Barton, 2005). However, it was not until the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (Article 24) that the right to paid holidays, as a corollary of the right to leisure, was established as a universal human right. These rights were reinforced in a series of international labour conventions promulgated by the International Labour Organisation in Geneva in 1936 and 1970, while the inauguration of the International Bureau of Social Tourism in 1963 signalled growing support for extending the right to participate in leisure and holidaymaking to disadvantaged social groups and not just to remunerated members of the workforce (see McCabe, Minnaert, and Diekmann, 2011). In Great Britain, a major turning point in the rights to leisure and the freedom to roam came about as a result of the 1932 mass trespass of Kinder Scout organized by members of the British Workers Sports Federation. This campaign concerned the rights of ordinary working-class citizens to access the wild uplands of the Peak District that had been illegally enclosed by the landowner,

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and was a vital step towards the right to roam and to the later establishment of National Parks in Britain (Solnit, 2002, pp. 165–166). Although the advancement and protection of such rights can also be seen against the backdrop of attempts by the state and industrialists to morally regulate working leisure time and facilitate the social reproduction of labour (Clark and Critcher, 1985, pp. 60–62), such struggles provided a counterpoint to the exploitative effects of industrial capitalism by granting workers periodic rest from their labours, as well as to the advancement of associated civil and political citizenship rights. The colonial era marked the birth of travel as an engine of social, economic, and cultural change, as newly colonized territories became progressively integrated into an expanding global economy and the emergence of a commercial travel industry began to eclipse an earlier era of elite travel undertaken by members of the European aristocracy and emergent bourgeoisie. During this period travel was framed by imperialism and patriarchal values (see Enloe, 2000, pp. 21–25). It was also deeply imbued with racialized tropes and marked by discriminatory practices in which colonized peoples were viewed through an Orientalist prism and mobility was restricted to an elite minority or discouraged and suppressed altogether (Selwyn, 2017). While the inhabitants of Britain’s overseas colonial dominions and territories were initially granted the right to enter Britain ‘freely and without controls’ (Hayter, 2004), travel for pleasure remained a privilege for the ‘European traveller of respectable appearance’ (Lloyd, 2003, p. 116). Notwithstanding variations in the scope and complexity of bureaucratic restrictions on travel across Europe, the right to leave and enter states remained relatively unhindered until the outbreak of World War I. States then began to consolidate their monopoly over the ‘legitimate means of movement’ through control over territorial borders and the issuance of passports (Torpey, 2000, p. 7). However, during the early 19th century, passports were often issued to nationals of one state by the authorities of another (Lloyd, 2003, p. 10). It was not until the issuance of passports had come firmly under the control of states that travel documents became associated with the political rights of national citizenship. The outbreak of hostilities in 1914 saw the pre-war era of the relative ease of travel come to an end, especially as governments across Europe and in the United States tightened restrictions on cross-border travel. Subsequently, laws were established requiring both foreigners and nationals to be in possession of a passport (and increasingly, visas) to enter and/or leave sovereign territory (Torpey, 2000, p. 111). Upon their introduction during the early 20th century, passports were initially seen to dehumanize the carrier. Today, they increasingly signify ‘a distinctly 21st-century identity crisis, becoming a highly sought after commodity, like real estate and fine art . . . Depending on our country of origin, a passport may grant us extreme privilege or extreme distress’ (Pines, 2017). Although the function and scope of passport controls has changed considerably over the past century, the passport remains a necessary but by no means sufficient ‘instrument of individual international mobility’ and a principal means by which ‘mobile

126 Raoul V. Bianchi and Marcus L. Stephenson individuals are identified, tracked, and regulated’ (Salter, 2004, p. 72). Despite examples of post-national passports (such as the Nansen Passport for stateless refugees 1922–1938), attempts to introduce a world passport by peace campaigner Garry Davis (1961), and the emergence of multilateral frameworks governing cross-border travel and passport-free travel areas (such as the Schengen area), sovereign-territorial states continue to retain the ultimate authority when it comes to governing cross-border travel (see Hall, 2008). This was recently brought starkly into focus when Bulgaria (an EU but non-Schengen state) and Hungary (an EU and Schengen member) resorted to building walls and fences and in some cases deploying armoured vehicles to deter the entrance of migrants and refugees (Statewatch Observatory, 2015). The aftermath of World War II witnessed coordinated efforts by governments to liberalize international travel regulations through the consideration of international standards for passport and visa regimes, a move rejected by the Russians under Stalin (Gorsuch, 2013, p. 12). The post-war boom in mass tourism, precipitated by rising disposable incomes in Western liberal democracies and the falling costs of travel, meant that the regulation of international travel quickly shifted from being primarily concerned with customs formalities and cross-border traffic to one more closely related with economic growth and development. In addition to harnessing tourism to post-war modernization discourses and projects, the ideological power of tourism was soon to be invoked by international agencies (for example the United Nations World Tourism Organisation and the International Institute for Peace through Tourism) in the service of peace and international understanding amongst nations.

Tourism as a universal solvent of borders Since the emergence of the nation-state and the consolidation of their sovereign authority over borders and international mobility in the early 20th century, states have consistently struggled to reconcile support for the freedom of movement and control over their borders. Indeed, despite provisions in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) the right to the untrammeled freedom of movement has thus far failed ‘to achieve the status of a universally-recognized human right’ (Adler, 1985, p. 337). In recent years this tension has been aggravated by a number of factors, not least the heightened risk from global terrorism and resurgent nationalisms. And yet, despite the explicit targeting of tourism by terrorist groups, the idea that tourism comprises an intrinsic force for peace (D’Amore, 1988), means that it has often been regarded as a potential means of easing diplomatic tensions and a potential solvent of borders (see Kim and Prideaux, 2003). The promotion of travel as an instrument of diplomacy and peaceful coexistence between states began to take shape in the mid-19th century. Such ideals found expression in the philanthropic foundations of Thomas Cook’s enterprise and were later reiterated in John Mason Cook’s proclamation that ‘Ours is a “business of peace” and “pleasure”’ (Brendon, 1991, p. 189). Notwithstanding

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the inherent contradiction of associating tourism with peace whilst colonial territories were being subjugated and plundered for their resources and labour, this view reflects the cosmopolitan liberalism of 19th century British radical liberals and free traders who envisaged a world bound together through the ‘peaceful rivalry of trade’ (Lowes Dickinson, cited in Brennan, 2001, p. 79). The idea of tourism as a benevolent force gathered momentum in tandem with attempts by the League of Nations to construct a peaceful international order and the expansion of commercial travel during the interwar years. Meanwhile, in the United States, government and corporate support for international tourism became associated with high-minded ideals of world citizenship and peace at precisely the time when the US became deeply involved in post-war European recovery under the auspices of the Marshall Plan (1948–1952) (Endy, 2004). In the Soviet Union, although tourism had been heavily restricted under Stalin, Krushchev (1953–1964) later set about promoting tourism as an instrument of mutual solidarity amongst communist nations and peaceful coexistence with the West (Gorsuch, 2013, p. 13). Following the expansion of mass travel in the post-war period, the United Nations declared 1967 to be the International Year of Tourism whose motto was ‘Tourism: Passport to Peace’. Shortly after that on 27 September 1970, a special general assembly of the International Union of Official Travel Organisations (IUOTO) (founded in The Hague in 1947) adopted the statutes of what was to become the World Tourism Organization (WTO), based in Madrid since 1975 and incorporated into the United Nations as a specialized agency in 2003. The discourse of ‘tourism as peace’ has since become established in the diplomatic lexicon of policy-makers and tourism organizations worldwide. That is not to diminish the genuine efforts by governments, civil society, and commercial operators to harness the potential of tourism to promote cultural dialogue, reconciliation, and social justice (see Blanchard and Higgin-Desbiolles, 2013). Equally, however, such examples are often challenged by the intersection of tourism with the logics of militarism, war, and territorial conquest (see Lisle, 2016), as well the tendency for authoritarian governments to seek legitimacy and foreign exchange through tourism development (see Pack, 2006; Richter, 2000). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, long-standing plans by the European Community (soon to be European Union) to create a panEuropean space of borderless travel were cemented in the mobility rights contained in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty and the Schengen common travel area which came into effect in 1995. Moreover, tourism was celebrated as one of the principal means through which Europeans could experience the benefits of EU citizenship. Nonetheless, the survival of the freedom of movement within the EU and the right of non-EU citizens to enter and travel throughout the common travel area have been threatened by the rise of populist nationalist parties. The growing hostility towards refugees and migrants from outside the EU, and indeed towards minorities within, has also exacerbated the situation.

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The pursuit of tourism: from a privilege to a (human) right The association between tourism, peace, and the democratization of mass societies was consolidated within the politico-legal foundations of the post- World War II order. Henceforth, tourism was to become not merely a major force of mass consumption in Western industrial democracies, it was soon to be seen as akin to a human right. The universal right to tourism is a corollary of the rights to participate in leisure, holidays, and the freedom of movement. This was set out in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as both the 1966 International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (Breakey and Breakey, 2013). Although the ethical and legal foundations governing the right to tourism as opposed to the right to the freedom of movement remains ambiguous and contested, there is a broad consensus regarding the position that ‘tourists must be allowed freedom of movement in the destination countries’ (Nkyi and Hashimoto, 2015, p. 397). The idea that international tourism represents a largely benign form of crossborder movement, premised upon consensual trade ties between states, continues to exert a powerful influence on government thinking worldwide. The United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) has consistently sought to strengthen support for the right to tourism as set out in the UNWTO’s (1999) Global Code of Ethics for Tourism (recently incorporated into a draft convention in 2017) while the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) endeavours to limit attempts by governments to regulate or tax tourism activities. However, to privilege the right to tourism in the absence of the universal right to development blurs if not effaces altogether an important politico-legal and ethical distinction between the freedom of movement and right to travel on the one hand, and the right to tourism on the other. The development of tourism often implies a claim on the territories and resources of destination communities as for example evinced by the eviction of coastal communities to make way for large-scale resort developments in Sihanoukville in Cambodia (Becker, 2016, pp. 104–105). Furthermore, this may deny these communities many of the rights enshrined in the UNDHR, including the rights to shelter and work and the rights to development itself. Tourism is alone amongst industries in proclaiming its elevation to a human right. It is also the only ‘industry’ warranting its own specialist UN agency, bestowing upon it a political status over and above other forms of human mobility and commerce (Ferguson, 2007). Tourism is supported by a global authority dedicated to its continuous growth and expansion, while other seemingly less desirable forms of mobility are increasingly regulated, controlled, and restricted. As if to underline its inconsistent approach to human rights, in the lead up to the 2013 UNWTO General Assembly, which was co-hosted by Zimbabwe and Zambia, the organization nominated Zimbabwean premier Robert Mugabe as an unofficial ‘leader for tourism’. This was despite Mugabe’s problematic human rights record and the collapse of the country’s tourism industry for which he was significantly responsible, while Mugabe himself was subject to an international travel ban (Smith, 2012)!

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The tensions between development rights and the right to tourism were starkly revealed during the two-decade long campaign against travel to Burma (renamed ‘Myanmar’ by the military dictatorship in 1996), from the early 1990s until the release from house arrest of democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi in 2010 (see Bianchi and Stephenson, 2014, pp. 201–205). While campaigners argued that the severity of human rights abuses directly associated with the construction of hotels and tourism infrastructure, and the benefits accruing to the military as result, warranted a boycott of organized tourism (Keefe and Wheat, 1998), travel to Burma was defended by an assortment of journalists, travel writers, and commercial operators on the grounds of tourists’ right to pleasure as well as for more collectively spirited ideals including its alleged contribution to economic development and democratization (see Bianchi and Stephenson, 2014, pp. 201– 205). Following the release of Suu Kyi (who had supported the previous boycott) in 2010, visitor arrivals steadily increased despite mounting international concern over the human rights atrocities committed by Myanmar’s security forces against the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State (see Long, 2017).1 Despite numerous challenges including political violence and instability in major destinations, stagnant real wages, and increased income inequalities in many advanced economies, demand for tourism continues apace with growth in international arrivals of 3.9 per cent between 2016 and 2017 (UNWTO, 2017b). This growth is further bolstered by the precipitous rise in the demand for travel from China as well as a robust belief in not only the right to travel, but the right to tourism itself in many Western societies. However, the unquestioned right to pursue tourism remains controversial, given that political support, along with moves to provide a more robust legal framework for tourism as a human right, has emerged at a time when the right to the freedom of movement for non-tourist mobilities has increasingly come under attack.

The securitization of travel and the attack on free movement The collapse of the Soviet Union was hailed by conservative commentators as proof of the worldwide embrace of free markets and liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1989). Equally, freedom of movement and the right to travel became lodestars of democracy and symbols of citizens’ free will, as described here by journalist Dan Burstein commenting upon the aftermath of events in Berlin in 1989: A central demand of East Germany’s peaceful revolution was freedom of travel, symbolically epitomized by the right to walk freely across the city of Berlin. (cited in Goldstone, 2001, p. 80) In the modern era, democratic and despotic states alike have resorted to restrictions on the rights of departure and entry of certain citizens and non-citizens, for both ideological and practical reasons. Although they were hated symbols of Tsarist class oppression, shortly after the installation of the new Bolshevik

130 Raoul V. Bianchi and Marcus L. Stephenson regime in 1917 travel restrictions were promptly restored (Dowty, 1987, p. 69). Between 1947 and 1953, the Soviet Union imposed draconian restrictions on outbound travel and its citizens were advised to avoid ‘dangerous “border zones”’ (Gorsuch, 2013, p. 26). Meanwhile, in a move contested by representatives of the travel industry, during the 1950s the United States government abrogated the travel rights of US Communist Party members, including the confiscation of their passports in contravention of the US Constitution’s provisions on freedom of assembly and speech (Torpey, 2000, p. 171). Modern states have always sought to impose their authority at the frontier. However, a central paradox of modern travel concerns the simultaneous desire of the citizens of wealthy states to travel freely with a minimum of hindrance while extending their support for borders at home to be strongly enforced. The increased geo-strategic significance of borders and political concerns over the governance of mobility reflect seismic changes in the global political economy and geopolitics that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. While the period 1989–2001 was marked by the opening of borders and the increasing ease of cross-border travel, between 2001 and 2012 some 30 barriers have been added to the 13 that had survived the Cold War, compared to the 19 that were built between 1945 and 1991 (Vallet and David, 2012, p. 113). In contrast to the previous epoch of state-managed capitalism and international trade, globalization and the rise of a multipolar geopolitical order has been accompanied by new modes of neoliberal border governance whose principal concern is to align the imperatives of border security with minimal disruption to the conditions necessary for the continued accumulation of capital and the movement of tourists (Prokkola, 2012). Considering that international tourism generates US$1.5 trillion in global export earnings (UNWTO, 2017b), and that the openness of international borders is crucial for its continued growth and expansion (see WEF, 2017, p. 4), tourism is uniquely positioned within and shaped by the tensions that may exist between the forces of free trade on the one hand and tighter border security on the other. Nearly 30 years since the removal of one of the most symbolic of barriers to the freedom of movement, the Berlin Wall, a combination of factors have conspired to reinforce the expansion of borders and proliferation of restrictive bordering practices, accentuating the divergent experiences and rights of international mobility. Although tourism had been subject to the threat of international air piracy since the early 1970s, by the 1980s and into the 1990s tourists became ‘legitimate’ targets of various paramilitary-terrorist organizations. Frequent attacks against tourists in North Africa, East Africa, the Middle East, and South-East Asia began to present a significant challenge to policies devoted to open borders and free movement that are, in principle, the pillars of liberal free market democracies and a prerequisite for international tourism to continue to expand and grow. Although by no means the sole cause, the terror attacks on US territory of 11 September 2001 provided a powerful impetus for the strengthening of border security apparatuses and forensic policing of crossborder flows.

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The heightened threat to travellers and tourists from various localized and global terrorist groups provided the pretext for drafting draconian anti-terror legislation and accelerated provisions for restrictions on travel and the securitization of key tourism installations. While the segregation of tourism enclaves from impoverished local communities has long been a feature of international mass tourism, increasingly international tourism intersects with a complex and variable matrix of securitization and border governance strategies (Lyon, 2003; Salter, 2004). Moreover, these border governance strategies have been projected beyond the frontiers of states through a combination of the rescaling of state authority, outsourcing of border controls, and the use of pre-emptive bordering practices. These measures have been further enhanced through the use of new digital surveillance technologies and biometrics to track, identify, and sort mobilities along a spectrum of risk and desirability (Vaughn-Williams, 2009, pp. 14–24). The opaque ties between different branches of the state and a range of private security agencies, militias, and ordinary citizens have also multiplied (Robin, 2017), with the resulting escalation in the disciplining of ‘illegal’ border crossings and policing of borders. The barriers to international cross-border travel are neither simply financial nor are they strictly formal-legal constraints derived from the rights of citizenship. While the country of origin and political citizenship rights of travellers exert a major influence on the individual’s right to travel, as evidenced by the highly unequal country rankings in the annual Henley and Partners (2018) Passport Index, a new era of uncertainty marked by a resurgent populist nationalism and geopolitical realignments has nevertheless further accentuated the pervasiveness and severity of (re)bordering practices in which differential mobility rights are becoming more marked and borders are becoming less porous. Although there has been a steady relaxation in restrictive passport and visa regimes – the percentage of the world’s population needing a visa prior to travel fell from 77 to 58 per cent between 2008 and 2016 (WEF, 2017, p. 4) – advanced economies and in particular European destinations, continue to be some of the most restrictive as compared to emerging economies (UNWTO, 2016, pp. 12–13). From the use of racialized passenger profiling to compile ‘no fly’ lists (Klein, 2007, p. 304; Souid, 2010), together with the consistent and arbitrary denial of travel rights for travellers of predominantly Arab/Muslim origin (Ansari, 2016; Stephenson and Ali, 2010), there is mounting evidence of selective travel restrictions and discriminatory profiling imposed on the mobility of non-white and other minority citizens. For example, although the Canadian state has consistently prided itself on its multicultural approach to domestic and immigration policies, since 9/ 11 it has to some extent mirrored US policy, intensifying the securitization and surveillance of its borders, based ‘on assumptions about race and risk’ (Torabian and Mair, 2017, p. 29). These authors observe that ‘smart’ travel programmes, such as NEXUS, Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection, and Free and Secure Trade, work towards securitizing, constricting and regulating mobility. They further suggest that individuals who do not have ‘mobility capital’ (Torabian and Mair, 2017, p. 28) to access technologies to facilitate travel can potentially have their level of access to Canada restricted.

132 Raoul V. Bianchi and Marcus L. Stephenson More recently, discrimination has become increasingly overt. This is exemplified by the recent executive orders enacted by US President Trump in January 2017, which suspended travel to the US by citizens from seven (later six – Iraq was removed from the executive order issued in March 2017) Arab/Muslim states. Despite numerous judicial challenges, including the argument of the significant economic contribution of tourists from Muslim countries to the US economy (estimated to be US$18.4 billion in 2014) (Hyde, 2016), together with warnings from leading tourism executives regarding the threat of a ‘lost decade of travel’ (Ting, 2017), the ban remains in place and was reinforced by a Supreme Court ruling (McCarthy and Laughland, 2017). Following the ban, there have also been reports of the removal of Arab/Muslim travellers from frequent flyer and trusted traveller loyalty schemes (such as Global Entry) in the United States (Sheivachman, 2017). While such moves do not amount to an abrogation of the legal right to travel, they are discriminatory and indicate that access to such symbolically important schemes are potentially restricted to only those deemed to conform to state-sponsored narratives of legitimacy. Moreover, despite the US government’s increased fear concerning the travel and tourism mobilities of suspected terrorists, it is ironic that travel advisories in a number of countries, including Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and Ireland, have started to warn citizens intending to visit or who are visiting the US to be aware of crime associated with the possession of firearms (Vora, 2017). Politically motivated interventions compromising and restricting the mobility of those deemed lacking the necessary credentials for ‘legitimate’ travel are not limited to the United States, nor indeed to Western capitalist democracies. Such interventions nevertheless continue to be framed by the climate of perpetual insecurity and dehumanizing discourses that are particularly marked in the world’s wealthiest and powerful states preoccupied with the threat of global terrorism and the ‘migration crisis’ (Jones, 2016). However, other factors continue to play a role, including the desire to enforce secure and controlled leisure environments for tourists, illustrated by the proliferation of fortified resort complexes and islands (see Hodgetts, 2017). That is not to say that real threats and security concerns do not exist. However, while tolerance of pervasive dataveillance technologies has increased because of the heightened fear of terrorism, there is a danger that discriminatory racialized biases are embedded within the technologies and practices of border governance and securitized travel. One such innovation involves the use of facial recognition software. This technology has the potential to fully displace the use of the passport and manual processing so that travelling through borders can be seen as being seamless, less invasive, and swift (Hunt, 2017). Despite the perceived merits of the operational functionality of facial recognition, there have been concerns that algorithms produced by predominantly white software engineers discriminates against people of colour (Breland, 2017). Legitimate travel by minority ethnic and religious communities can thus be hindered by such prejudices and further amplified by the deployment of seemingly neutral technological bordering procedures. Seen in the current context of growing prejudice against the mobility of refugees and ‘illegal’ immigrants and the

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rise of Islamophobia, the prospects for a democratic politics of mobility in which all forms of mobility are anchored within a robust framework of rights appear to be fading.

Conclusion: tourism, bordering, and the democratic politics of mobility The post-Cold War era, marked by economic globalization and accelerated technological innovation gave rise to an upsurge in cross-border trade and deepening market integration not witnessed since the early 20th century. The integration of the global economy and strengthening of global inter-governmental cooperation throughout the 1990s and early 2000s also led to some loosening of the restrictions on the freedom of movement and ease of cross-border travel. However, despite visa liberalization in many countries (the impetus for which is overwhelmingly commercial), the creation of common travel areas (such as Schengen) and the growth of multilateral visa regimes, mobility rights, and patterns of cross-border movement are becoming increasingly restrictive, differentiated, and unequal. Moreover, while international tourism continues to grow apace, fuelled by the middle classes of emergent economies and increasing efforts by the institutions of tourism governance to institutionalize the right to tourism, the mobility of the millions of impoverished peoples seeking to improve their life chances through emigration, or refugees fleeing conflict, is increasingly policed, restricted, and criminalized altogether. This chapter has argued that the right to tourism (in contrast to the right to the freedom of movement) cannot justly be advanced in a world in which the universal right to development is far from being realized and the mobility of millions of citizens is deemed problematic or ‘illegitimate’. The most rational and logical way to improve one’s life chances in a global context marked by rising inequalities and differential life chances premised on geography is to move from poor countries in the global south towards the more prosperous regions located overwhelmingly in the northern hemisphere (Therborn, 2017, p. 76). However, such possibilities are increasingly beyond the scope of most of the inhabitants of the global south. Even then the unhindered passage by non-white minority ethnic and religious travellers in possession of the requisite travel documentation is by no means guaranteed. Meanwhile the proliferation of borders together with the widespread and pervasive use and deployment of data-veillance technologies continues unabated in the name of ‘security’. This serves to reinforce a climate of perpetual danger and erode trust between strangers and to fuel anxieties directed at the mobility of those seen to be dangerous and risky ‘others’. This has the paradoxical effect of accentuating anxieties amongst those travelers who are often the target of such fears (Ali, 2017). Notwithstanding the existence of complex and nuanced intersections between tourist, migrant and refugee mobilities (see Lenz, 2007; McVeigh, 2015), dominant political and media discourse continues to systematically differentiate between the ‘rightful’ business of holidaymaking undertaken by tourists and the less desirable movements of others deemed risky and/or undesirable.

134 Raoul V. Bianchi and Marcus L. Stephenson It is paradoxical that in a world of increased digital connectivity and hyper-mobility the material pathways of travel and cross-border mobility have become increasingly regulated, managed and often restricted altogether for those without the credentials for ‘legitimate’ travel. Citizens and tourists themselves are moreover unwittingly implicated in largely invisible practices of surveillance and data-mining through the geo-locational tracking and ubiquitous connectivity of mobile smart technologies, which are used for everything from booking holidays to taking photographs and continuous online social interaction. The intersection of such technologies and security has taken a step further with the recent announcement by the US government that the social media accounts of all prospective visa applicants will potentially be vetted (Reuters, 2018). This has significant implications for the right to travel for not just ‘high risk’ travelers but to anyone whose views might fall foul of government policy. The increased adoption of digitally enabled security devices, whereby one’s eligibility to travel is based on pre-clearance of the individual rather than the political status of one’s country of origin, have been hailed by some as a sign of moves towards a new era of frictionless travel (WEF, 2017, p. 5). Such technoutopian strategies carry with them the potential for discriminatory bias and lack of transparency given the corporate concentration of power in the digital technology sector and commercial value of personal data, with the risk of further reinforcing a world of differential and unequal mobility rights. The failure to consider tourism as a political phenomenon that is deeply implicated in the various rights-based struggles over the freedom of movement will only serve to further differentiate the citizenship status of tourists from those whose mobility credentials carry less currency. This will potentially exacerbate the contemporary assault on the democratic and universal right to the freedom of movement and travel, ultimately undermining the rights to development for all.

Acknowledgements An earlier version of this chapter was presented as a keynote lecture by the first author at the conference: Borderless Worlds – For Whom? Ethics, moralities, and (in)justices in mobilities (University of Oulu, Finland, 7–8 September 2016).

Note 1 The Rohingya Muslims are officially classified as ‘illegal immigrants’ in Myanmar and are denied basic citizenship rights. Classed as foreigners within Myanmar they require a special permit from the authorities in order to travel both within the country or abroad (Jones, 2016, p. 63).

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10 Commodification of contested borderscapes for tourism development Viability, community representation, and equity of relic Iron Curtain and Sudetenland heritage tourism landscapes Arie Stoffelen and Dominique Vanneste

Introduction For several decades, borders and borderland settings have been interpreted not just as territorially dividing elements but also as social constructs that mediate and even facilitate exchange between neighbouring communities. The border studies literature has come to stress the complex and multifaceted role of borders in globalizing societies, highlighting the cross-border cooperation challenges and opportunities as well as the role of borders in social consciousness and identity processes (van Houtum, 2000). From a concrete policy perspective, this changing view on territorial borders reflects the European Union (EU) regional policy, which has focused on cross-border cooperation in the framework of a ‘Europe of the regions’ with increased intensity since the 1980s (Johnson, 2009; Jakola, 2016). Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, which symbolically marked the end of ‘border as barrier’ thinking, possibilities to establish systematic cross-border contact and work towards integrated cross-border regions have further increased (Gelbman and Timothy, 2010). The changing perspectives on the functioning of territorial borderlands have also had a pronounced impact on tourism studies. One significant evolution is the interpretation of borderlands as potential tourism attractions, even in cases of current or previous hostile boundary situations. In their most basic form, borderlines can become direct objects of tourist attention, for example, through the excitement of crossing borders and reflecting on borders as heritage locations (Timothy, 1995, 2001). This is also applicable to relic borders that do not function as territorial delineations anymore but that are still ‘characterised by a natural landscape that serves as a background for the cultural/political landscape and built environment’ (Gelbman and Timothy, 2010, p. 250). Commodification of these relic borderlands into tourism landscapes may spatially demarcate and

140 Arie Stoffelen and Dominique Vanneste symbolically construct a feeling of commemoration and represent renewed interest in cross-border cooperation (Gelbman and Timothy, 2010). Additionally, shopping, gambling, and vice are regularly prominent in international borderlands due to contrasting national legislatures on these issues. Also attractive natural landscapes are often located in proximity to international borders as a consequence of large distances to politico-economic cores of society and the (previous) separating and marginalising effect of the border (Timothy, 1995, 2001; Ioannides et al., 2006). Because of the potential of many borderlands to attract tourists, tourism is frequently seen as a pathway to regional development in these often socioeconomically underdeveloped regions (Timothy, 2001; Prokkola, 2010). However, borderlands have traditionally been defined mostly in terms of territorial delineation and separation, and regularly coincided with contestation. Even the most collaborative or integrated borderlands (Martínez, 1994; Timothy, 2001) have primarily functioned as territorial barriers and political frontiers, and have only recently made the change to also cover (in)direct tourism functions and commodified tourism narratives. Transitions from hostile border zones to objects of tourism attention may not be smooth, particularly for local communities who have incorporated the borderlands in their day-to-day creation of meaning and sense of place (Prokkola, 2007). This chapter analyses the viability, community representation and ethical components of borderland tourism projects that function as part of broader European cross-border integration plans. Since an important ‘way to view memory politics is through both the officially produced images of memory and the way the public responds to these products’ (Tomczuk, 2016, p. 109), this chapter focuses on the creation of tourism narratives and the socio-spatial conflicts resulting from this commodification process. We use the case study of the relic Iron Curtain and Sudetenland landscapes between Germany and the Czech Republic, departing from 35 semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted in 2013 and 2014 as part of a larger project on tourism governance and regional development complexities in the German–Czech borderlands, to show how cross-border tourism projects can result in contestations and societal agitation (see Stoffelen, 2018 for a detailed methodology). The selected tourism projects result in challenging encounters between commodified Iron Curtain histories, which have a symbolic function in EU-inspired cross-border regionalization discourses, and locals with their memories.

Memory contestations in cross-border tourism development Many commentators have discussed the multifaceted role of tourism in regionbuilding processes in rural contexts. In general, this literature stresses the intricate balance between, on the one hand, safeguarding the sector’s stakeholder empowerment and regional regeneration capacity, and, on the other hand, industry-oriented growth perspectives. Tourism is interpreted as a precursory sector to reach region-building aims but also one that is not automatically synchronized

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with larger regional processes due to the complexity of reaching the above described balance (Kauppila et al., 2009; Stoffelen and Vanneste, 2016). From this observation follows that the role of tourism in cross-border connectivity processes is more diverse than only creating border-related tourist attractions. To conceptually frame the interaction between borderland contexts and tourism development, Timothy (2001) distinguishes between three types of interrelations. He describes borders as (i) tourist attractions and destinations; (ii) real and perceived barriers for development and cooperation; and (iii) modifiers of the tourism landscape. The relationships between these different borders–tourism intersections are dynamic ‘and the current global economic and political climate has a major role to play in this fluidity’ (Timothy, 2001, p. 172). This fluidity in the interrelations between tourism and borderland settings can also be conceptualized through the constitutive role of tourism in ‘borderscapes’. This concept describes the multi-sited, relational, and socio-spatial configuration of borderlands resulting in and given form by discourses, locational practices, and material outputs (Dell’Agnese and Amilhat Szary, 2015; Brambilla, 2015). From this view, borders are not just obstacles for transboundary exchange but also socially constructed institutions and power-laden political-discursive processes that are at least partly shaped by tourism development practices (Paasi, 1998; Laine, 2016). This conceptual connection between border landscapes and tourism development can be translated into several policy observations in European borderlands. While the continuous barrier effect of transnational borders is undoubted, also for tourism development, many regional policies pursue cross-border regionalization plans with tourism projects (Scott, 2013). Tourism can be a means for regional pride, support rural infrastructure upkeep, and provide an economic impetus to the borderlands on local and regional scales (Stoffelen and Vanneste, 2017). Tourism development can also be a medium to outline political border discourses and symbolically reflect EU-inspired policy perspectives towards potential crossborder integration (Zhurzhenko, 2011; Scott, 2013). As such, the commodification of borderlands for tourism can be strategic and the created (cross-)border narratives can have important symbolic roles to shape border discourses and gain support for general cross-border policies (Scott, 2013). The promotion of tourism can, therefore, function as a conduit for politics of memory in borderlands. Politics of memory are the discursive and material reevaluation and reframing of history and borderland dynamics for strategic (political) purposes (Zhurzhenko, 2011; Tomczuk, 2016). For example, Gelbman and Timothy (2010) describe how acting upon collective and individual memory provides an intermediary step to turn (hostile) border landscapes into landscapes of tourist attraction. Through selective reflections on these memorial landscapes, specific histories and socio-spatial memories can be employed with political objectives in mind, for instance regarding regional or national identity (Stoffelen and Vanneste, 2018). The politicized nature of tourism development in (cross-)border contexts follows from the discussion above (Prokkola and Lois, 2016). Power relations in tourism commodification and in the creation of borderland narratives make

142 Arie Stoffelen and Dominique Vanneste bordering processes through tourism development selective (Scott, 2013). Moreover, stakeholders operating on different levels seek different goals with borderland tourism projects (Stoffelen et al., 2017). This way, transnational tourism projects may result in attracting visitors to the commodified borderscape and may provide economic, political, and symbolic support for the larger discourse of cross-border relations. Such projects may simultaneously alienate others, mostly local communities, who may feel that their place-based meanings are not or are under-represented in the commodified borderscape. Since ‘tourism is an agent in the creation of both spatial and mental layers of the landscape that may clash with already present layers of others’ (Stoffelen and Vanneste, 2015, p. 549), borderland tourism commodification processes may lead to discomfort, disconnection, and potential contestation among stakeholders (Cantrill and Senecah, 2001). Such situations can undermine local support and the long-term viability of borderland tourism projects. These insights also indicate that reaching crossborder region-building and the socio-spatial dispersal of tourism-related impacts throughout the borderlands is complex. Relic border landscape tourism projects, such as regarding the Iron Curtain and Sudetenland in the German–Czech borderlands, may be sensitive for contestation and stakeholder alienation because of the projects’ political role in EU regionalization processes.

Iron Curtain and Sudetenland tourism projects Setting the scene: general evolution of cross-border discourses The cross-border contact between north-eastern Bavaria, southern Saxony and Thuringia (Germany) and the Karlovy Vary region (Karlovarsky kraj) in the west of the Czech Republic has changed drastically during the 20th century (Figure 10.1). Prior to World War II, ethnic Germans constituted most of the population in the current Czech borderlands. Their presence dates back to the expansion of the Holy Roman Empire in the Middle Ages. This area with predominantly German speakers was later dubbed ‘Sudetenland’. The German– Czech socio-cultural connections remained close until the annexation of Sudetenland by Nazi Germany in 1938. After World War II, the ethnic Germans were forcibly expelled from the Czech borderlands as a retribution for the war. They were replaced by people from Central and Eastern Europe. The subsequent erection of the Iron Curtain further reduced the social, economic, and political connectivity between the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), and Czechoslovakia until 1989. The rhetoric on cross-border relations in the German–Czech borderlands has shifted rapidly since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Currently, policy documents stress the importance of cross-border cooperation for future regional development. Symbolic for this shift was the establishment of Euregio Egrensis, a cross-border organization that formalized cooperation in the German–Czech borderlands, as early as 1993. The Czech accession to the EU in 2004 gave a further boost to crossborder policies. Most regional plans nowadays stress the advantages of the area’s

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Figure 10.1 The administrative delineation of German–Czech borderlands for the period 1950–1990 with indication of the former Sudetenland. This area disappeared after World War II. Its borders are mapped following Braun and Kvasnicka (2014, p. 256)

borderland location and use variants of the slogan ‘Located in the heart of Europe’ to highlight this. The following remark from a German district officer during an interview is illustrative of this perceived value of cross-border cooperation: The border situation was for a long time a disadvantage because of the Iron Curtain. [It was] kind of the end of the world. And it [requires] a lot of time to make this thinking disappear. It’s not the end of the world, but the entrance to another world in a way . . . More and more it’s becoming an advantage in terms of being central. (German regional district officer) Practically all interviewees mentioned that intensifying cross-border cooperation would still be beneficial. They mostly referred to the establishment of economic networks but the interviewees also actively discussed the intensification of crossborder social ties and the breakdown of the mental border that had grown between the 1940s and the 1980s. Border landscape commodification for tourism Tourism functions as a prolific sector in this system of increased attention to crossborder cooperation in the German–Czech borderlands. On both sides of the border

144 Arie Stoffelen and Dominique Vanneste but particularly in the Czech Republic, regional plans include the tourism sector to deal with the area’s weak socio-economic structure. Many INTERREG cofunded tourism projects have been initiated on local scales in the last decades. Because of the geographically peripheral location, the area is characterized by relatively low population densities in the middle mountain landscape, making the German–Czech borderlands a well-resourced nature-based destination. Spa tourism, especially in the Czech Republic, and cultural offerings in regional towns complement the nature-based tourism supply. More direct border-related tourism products are also present but are politically selective in their commodification. Below, we will discuss this selectivity with a focus on two relic landscape reflections in the commodified borderscape: the Sudetenland and the Iron Curtain histories.

Sudetenland reflections The Sudetenland history, with particular reference to the forced removal of ethnic Germans from the Czech borderlands after World War II, proved to be a socially sensitive topic that currently still influences the region (see also Svašek, 2002). In the interviews, the impact of this history was mostly discussed in relation to the Czech area. The Karlovy Vary region was described as an area with a difficult mentality, resulting from the massive inflow of people from Central and Eastern Europe without local roots and traditions after World War II. Social relations and community groups were noted as relatively weak and as developing rapidly only since the last decade. Regarding Germany, interviewees noted the continuing sentimental value of the discussion, especially among the elderly: There are certainly still sentimental issues in [the Sudetenland discussion], but in a non-hostile way. [For example,] it would hurt me when I’d go there and see that my parental home has been demolished because a border was built here. (Local German community organization representative) Consequently, this topic was not discussed in a context of tourism apart from some remarks on the tourist flows directly after the fall of the Iron Curtain by former Sudeten Germans with romanticized images of their homeland. When contemplating the societal sensitivity versus the potential gains, the Sudetenland history is deemed by the interviewees not worth the effort to develop on a large scale for tourism. Only on a local scale, a network of village museums exists in Bavaria with nostalgic reflections on the village life in the 19th century. Additionally, most urban attractions in Karlovarsky kraj still position themselves in the German market with their previous German names (for example Karlsbad for Karlovy Vary, Frankenbad for Františkovy Lázně, Marienbad for Mariánské Lázně, Eger for Cheb). Yet altogether, there is a tendency to only give a little attention to the Sudetenland history in the commodified borderscape.

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Iron Curtain reflections The commodification of relic Iron Curtain landscapes can also be considered potentially contested considering the politically and socially disruptive situation that lasted for several decades (Tomczuk, 2016). Yet, the commodified German– Czech borderscape does include Iron Curtain tourism products and narratives. Most high-profile is the town of Mödlareuth between the German states of Bavaria and Thuringia, located in proximity to the Czech border (Figure 10.1). This small village is nicknamed ‘Little Berlin’ because of the erection of a wall in the 1960s that separated the western from the eastern part. Currently, the village hosts the ‘German-German museum’ and functions as one of the most symbolic places for the divided Germany during the Cold War. The museum includes a fenced area where the previously restricted zone is recreated with watch towers, dog cages, bunkers, and barbed wire fences, of which some are original and others are reconstructed (Figure 10.2). Apart from Mödlareuth, the Iron Curtain history is commodified in the German–Czech borderlands in two projects with European-level recognition. The first is the ‘European Green Belt’ (EGB). This project, which runs along the whole previous Iron Curtain, builds on the within-Germany ‘Grünes Band’ (GB) that developed directly after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. The EGB centres on nature conservation, environmental awareness, and education in the previously restricted border zone, which due to low levels of human impact for several decades constitutes an area of high natural value. The aim of the project is to create awareness about the memorial landscape with its natural heritage that resulted from the socio-political situation during the Cold War. This awareness should allow the improvement of ecological networks and sustainable development of the borderlands. Low-impact tourism and ‘soft’ recreation (for example through hiking and cycling paths, guided excursions, information panels) are important tools to deliver this message: It was one of the first aims to protect and develop the Green Belt as a memorial area . . . And to gather all the information, also from contemporary witnesses, and to give it to the younger generation. Because in Germany we now have a generation which has no idea what the former border looked like or how it was to live in the GDR or at the border. (German nature conservation NGO project manager) The narrative of the EGB project reflects the trend to stress the dilution of the border in the area. (E)GB slogans include ‘Borders separate. Nature unites!’ (Frobel et al., 2011), ‘From deathzone to lifeline’ (European Green Belt, 2016), and ‘A living monument to European history’ (Grünes Band Deutschland, 2009). Reflecting the larger message that the project is future-oriented, the EGB website emphasizes that the project fits within policy frameworks of cross-border cooperation: ‘The Green Belt is an initiative that is tailored to fit the current political situation and current developments’ (European Green Belt, 2016).

Figure 10.2 Top: Impression of the German-German museum in Mödlareuth. Bottom: Information panel in Mödlareuth on the previous border wall, stating: ‘You are standing here in the divided village of Mödlareuth directly at the border to the GDR in front of the approximately 700-meter-long concrete barrier wall. Mödlareuth, originally one village and sheltered in the Tannbach area, is today an example of the division of Germany. But this border is not a border! We are here in the middle of Germany’ Source: Photos taken by A. Stoffelen in 2014.

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The second project in which the relic Iron Curtain landscape is commodified for tourism is the ‘Iron Curtain Trail’ (ICT). The trail constitutes a long-distance cycling route, often along previous border patrol roads, along and across the previous Iron Curtain from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. The idea was coined by Michael Cramer, a German member of the European Parliament, following his Berlin Wall Trail concept (Cramer, 2012; Havlick, 2014). Promoted by the European Commission, the ICT was institutionalized in 2011 as route 13 of the EuroVelo Network (European Parliament, 2013). The ICT has a thematic overlap with the EGB. It also focuses on awareness creation about the memorial landscape of the Iron Curtain and tourism is interpreted as an agent in doing so. A memorandum of understanding was signed between both project managements in 2014 to exchange information and to cooperate on the development of sustainable tourism along the relic Iron Curtain (European Green Belt & European Cyclists Federation, 2014). However, the ICT is more tourism-focused than the EGB, and it is not the natural landscape that is the object of the project actions but the cultural landscape at the intersection of border-related tourist attractions, political-historical perspectives, and natural values: The Iron Curtain Trail cannot only be about infrastructure. It has to be mostly about this living history. . . . I think for Europe it’s important to understand the historical context and, you know, the conflicts that are happening even now. (Czech NGO coordinator) The trail has simultaneous aims of providing an interesting tourism product, which creates awareness about the past, and establishing a forum for local stakeholders on both sides of the border to get to know each other and work towards a shared future. The trail infrastructure should serve not only tourists but also locals, thereby improving cross-border mobilities and, by extension, exchange on local levels (European Parliament, 2013). Hence, both the European Green Belt and Iron Curtain Trail are strongly guided by and illustrative of political strategies that stress the value of crossborder integration. They present the border as a connecting element rather than as a separation between Germany and the Czech Republic. Creating awareness of the relic Iron Curtain landscape is a way to portray a desired future by learning lessons from the past. In this sense, the commodified memoryscape functions as part of the multi-layered cultural cross-border landscape of the German–Czech borderlands and is anything but devoid of political values (Stoffelen and Vanneste, 2015). Commodified borderland contestations The identified absence of large-scale Sudetenland expressions and the presence of Iron Curtain reflections are indications of the selectivity of the tourism commodification of the relic German–Czech borderscape. Despite their

148 Arie Stoffelen and Dominique Vanneste relatively high profile, the Iron Curtain tourism projects are not univocally supported by all stakeholders as they encounter two types of contestations: the projects’ application and management and the borderland narratives of these projects. Application and management Interviewees highlighted several aspects that impede the development and management of the borderland tourism projects. First, some interviewees doubted whether the projects provide tourism products that are strong enough to become long-term tourist attractions. The value of the ICT and EGB in, for example, 2014 (25 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain) was stated without doubt, but not for the subsequent years. Moreover, the lack of supportive infrastructure and tourism amenities as well as the low accessibility of the area because of its geographical peripherality may undermine the strength of the ICT and EGB (European Parliament, 2013). Additionally, not many barbed-wire fences and watchtowers remain apart from the earlier described German-German museum in Mödlareuth. The creation of awareness about the Iron Curtain landscape is, therefore, a difficult process that depends on intangibles and storytelling to deliver the message to tourists. A German destination management organization (DMO) manager noticed: The problem is that you can’t see much. . . . There are some places where you can see the border. The rest is green. And [when] you can’t recognize the border, it’s difficult to communicate . . . to the tourists . . . how it was 25 years ago. (German DMO manager) Second, because both projects are European-level in size and organization, the centres of decision-making are located far away from the actual borderlands. Additionally, the creation first of political support, then of an overarching legal entity, and finally the local implementation in a variety of institutional settings has proven to be arduous. Consequently, local interviewees often perceived the implementation of the ICT and the EGB as slow. Some noted that they had heard about the projects but were unaware of their status even though both projects had moved beyond the initial planning phase at the time of the interviews: I cannot recognize real activities. What’s the aim, how can we manage it? Who works really on this thing? . . . Somehow this message that there is an activity [isn’t] really [present] here. (German nature park director) Third, question marks were placed around the responsibility and dependency on other stakeholders. Especially the maintenance and promotion once the EGB and

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ICT have been established was deemed a topic that should have been discussed before the projects’ initiation. Regional managers felt that they needed to invest many resources, while tourists will only spend a maximum of two nights in the destination before moving on. They also pointed to their dependency on other destinations further along the route to invest in the trail. Proactively engaging in the projects was perceived as a high-risk affair: [I]t’s hard to promote a trail this long. Who is responsible for it? . . . For whom gives it a return on investment? . . . And what will we do when the next destination says, ‘I’m not interested in it’? (German DMO manager)

Encounters with sensitive histories The second identified type of contestation regards the commodified narrative of the projects. These projects present a relatively homogeneous image of the Iron Curtain history, which should foster support for larger cross-border integration ambitions. Closely resembling the findings from Tomczuk (2016), who argues that the communist political memory in the Czech Republic is still contested, we found that the narrative of the Iron Curtain borderland projects is a topic of socio-spatial identity debates. There was widespread support among interviewees in Germany and the Czech Republic that people should be informed about the negative aspects of the past. Interviewees mentioned the low historical awareness of younger generations. They also recognized the opportunity provided by memorials such as the ICT, EGB and remaining border remnants for education, even though these represent a symbolic landscape layer which they preferably would not have had at all. For example, an interviewee discussed the Schneeberg mountain in Bavaria, which was closed for the public during the Cold War because of the now unused telecommunications tower on the summit: [The tower] is in the middle of a nature protection area. So we try to find a way to use it. There are people who say, ‘just smash it down’, but that’s not possible because it’s a monument. I think it’s not nice, this tower, but it’s an important monument to explain to young people how the situation was. It gives small hints how 25 years ago this border was [opened] and how severe the situation was [before]. (German nature park director) While most interviewees agreed on the awareness-creating potential of the relic border landscape, others had doubts about using this heritage for tourism promotion. An intricate balance exists between the unchallenged educational value and sometimes individual senses of place that are negatively fuelled by the memorial landscape and its commodification. Some stakeholders noted that projects like the ICT and EGB focus too much on the past and risk adding to

150 Arie Stoffelen and Dominique Vanneste cross-cultural misunderstandings and prejudices. Some even symbolically referred to the possibility that a ‘Green Iron Curtain’ would be erected, not one with barbed wire but one in which the environmental legacy of the Iron Curtain symbolically cements mental barriers. The borderland tourism projects, thus, lead to challenging encounters between local memories and commodified histories: It’s the question if it’s to our advantage. . . . Maybe it’s because of our negative experiences. When we hear ‘Iron Curtain’ it’s not positive for us. (Czech interviewee) It’s just a personal feeling but . . . the name ‘Iron Curtain’ is not really positive. Especially the people in [the former] East Germany are still happy there is no Iron Curtain anymore . . . Maybe projects like the Iron Curtain Trail will support the thinking about [the former] East Germany in a negative way. (German interviewee) While departing from an ethical perspective that highlights an inclusive, equitable and peaceful future for Europe, the rationale behind the ICT and EGB establishes an implicitly political normative morality regarding the remembrance of this past that does not automatically reflect local place meanings. This situation is not aided by complexities of the multi-level tourism governance situation in the German–Czech borderlands (Stoffelen et al., 2017). While the Bavarian tourism destination management system is characterized by intensive multi-scalar information exchange between local public and private sector stakeholders and regional destination agencies, the system in the Czech Republic is not conducive for bottom-up participative management. Regional tourism governance in Karlovarsky kraj is characterized by high competition and lacking internal and public-private information exchange. There is also a distinct absence of cross-border networking organizations that aim to align the German and Czech tourism governance systems. No broad-based forum has been established in which the encounters between educational values and local memories regarding the Iron Curtain can be discussed apart from some outreach during the project development. The project implementation, therefore, remains dependent on the proactive stance of individual stakeholders in key positions, providing a vulnerable system to guarantee participative conflict mediation in the long run.

Discussion and conclusion Our chapter analyses the viability, community representation, and ethical aspects of borderland tourism projects that commodify potentially conflictive border landscapes as part of EU policies on internal cross-border regionalization. The presented study of relic Iron Curtain and Sudetenland landscapes between Germany and the Czech Republic shows that memory politics in European borderlands are contested processes. In the German–Czech borderlands, projects like the Iron Curtain Trail and the European Green Belt simultaneously build on and actively modify the border

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landscape through addition of a commodified memoryscape layer (Timothy, 2001; Gelbman and Timothy, 2010). The results from the case study on these projects, however, confirm that ‘the organizational capacity and power relations between stakeholders, influencing the way territorial resources are configured for tourism purposes, importantly determine the outcome of such situations and the mental landscape layers that come to dominate’ (Stoffelen and Vanneste, 2015, pp. 553–554), particularly in borderland contexts. Iron Curtain tourism in Germany and the Czech Republic provides an active but selective agent in memory politics to symbolically illustrate and give form to EU-inspired plans for promoting cross-border cooperation (Zhurzhenko, 2011; Scott, 2013). Regarding the ICT and EGB, the encountered contestations result from the selectivity of these memory politics and a missing participative governance system across the border. This combination undermines the capacity to deal with (i) contested encounters between local memories and the created borderland tourism narratives; and (ii) development and promotion challenges of the tourism projects. As such, the long-term viability of and local support for projects like the ICT and EGB is all but guaranteed. These insights show that the commodification of relic border landscapes for tourism is embedded in a multi-scalar field of politics and power relations. As such, the results confirm the view from Prokkola and Lois (2016), who emphasize the political nature of heritage-based tourism development in transboundary regions. In European borderlands, tourism projects involve intricate relations and sometimes incompatible goals between stakeholders from EU-level policy to local project implementation, and may disconnect from local socio-spatial experiences and memories (Johnson, 2009; Laine, 2016). These encounters between European cross-border policy and local memories are further put under tension by the recent national-institutional tendency to increasingly close internal European borders in the wake of the 2015 migration wave, thereby challenging both the European cross-border discourse and local (cross-)border life. This discussion raises questions about when borderland tourism projects such as the Iron Curtain Trail can be deemed successful. Are they successful when they succeed in attracting tourists and allow them to create meaningful experiences, in other words, when the project provides a successful tourism product? Is it when the project succeeds in its underlying goal to provide symbolic, political, and economic support for larger EU discourses on (cross-border) regionalization? Or is it when a socio-spatially equitable participation and representation of stakeholders’ place-based meanings and memories is achieved, with everyone being able to discuss their visions in the project development and management? This ambiguity opens a discussion on the role of locals and their memories to reach larger regionalization goals. Currently, EU projects such as the ICT establish a normative morality regarding the representation of the past, stressing European unification from the top down by using local histories but without incorporating how these have fuelled local place identities. Defining when symbolic borderland tourism projects are successful is, consequently, inherently political and ethically ambiguous. Equity aspects in terms of whose memory is commodified and institutionalized, and for which purpose, are highly challenging in such projects.

152 Arie Stoffelen and Dominique Vanneste In this sense, uncertainties remain about the functioning of symbolic borderland tourism projects as mediums for cross-border region-building processes embedded in larger EU regional policies. As it stands, the case of commodification of Sudetenland and Iron Curtain heritage in the German–Czech borderlands shows that cross-border tourism development seems to coincide with some form of selective opening and closing of the border. This selective opening and closing can apply to policymakers, community members, tourists, or a combination of these stakeholders that are (dis)empowered to symbolically give form to the border and/or physically cross it. Relic border landscape commodification for tourism purposes as part of memory politics results in projects that are created by some and for some, but not by all and for all. This selectivity results in a field of tension between stakeholder visions regarding the borderland settings that may not be easy to manage for the benefit of all.

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Kauppila, P., Saarinen, J., and Leinonen, R. (2009). Sustainable tourism planning and regional development in peripheries: a Nordic view. Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism. Volume 9(4), 424–435. Laine, J. P. (2016). The multiscalar production of borders. Geopolitics. Volume 21(3), 465–482. Martínez, O. J. (1994). Border people: Life and Society in the U.S. - Mexico Borderlands. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Paasi, A. (1998). Boundaries as social processes: territoriality in the world of flows. Geopolitics. Volume 3(1), 69–88. Prokkola, E-K. (2007). Cross-border regionalization and tourism development at the Swedish-Finnish border: ‘Destination Arctic Circle’. Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism. Volume 7(2), 120–138. Prokkola, E-K. (2010). Borders in tourism: the transformation of the Swedish–Finnish border landscape. Current Issues in Tourism. Volume 13(3), 223–238. Prokkola, E-K. and Lois, M. (2016). Scalar politics of border heritage: an examination of the EU’s northern and southern border areas. Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism. Volume 16(S1), 14–35. Scott, J. W. (2013). Constructing familiarity in Finnish–Russian Karelia: shifting uses of history and the re-interpretation of regions. European Planning Studies. Volume 21(1), 75–92. Stoffelen, A. (2018). Disentangling the tourism sector’s fragmentation: a hands-on coding/ post-coding guide for interview and policy document analysis in tourism. Current Issues in Tourism, (online first), 1–14. Stoffelen, A., Ioannides, D., and Vanneste, D. (2017). Obstacles to achieving cross-border tourism governance: a multi-scalar approach focusing on the German-Czech borderlands. Annals of Tourism Research. Volume 64, 126–138. Stoffelen, A. and Vanneste, D. (2015). An integrative geotourism approach: bridging conflicts in tourism landscape research. Tourism Geographies. Volume 17(4), 544–560. Stoffelen, A. and Vanneste, D. (2016). Institutional (dis)integration and regional development implications of whisky tourism in Speyside, Scotland. Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism. Volume 16(1), 42–60. Stoffelen, A. and Vanneste, D. (2017). Tourism and cross-border regional development: Insights in European contexts. European Planning Studies. Volume 25(6), 1013–1033. Stoffelen, A. and Vanneste, D. (2018). The role of history and identity discourses in crossborder tourism destination development: a Vogtland case study. Journal of Destination Marketing & Management. Volume 8, 204–213. Svašek, M. (2002). Narratives of ‘Home’ and ‘Homeland’: the symbolic construction and appropriation of the Sudeten German Heimat. Identities. Volume 9(4), 495–518. Timothy, D. J. (1995). Political boundaries and tourism: borders as tourist attractions. Tourism Management. Volume 16(7), 525–532. Timothy, D. J. (2001). Tourism and Political Boundaries. London: Routledge. Tomczuk, S. J. (2016). Contention, consensus, and memories of communism: comparing Czech and Slovak memory politics in public spaces, 1993–2012. International Journal of Comparative Sociology. Volume 57(3), 105–126. van Houtum, H. (2000). An overview of European geographical research on borders and border regions. Journal of Borderlands Studies. Volume 15(1), 57–83. Zhurzhenko, T. (2011). Borders and memory. In: D. Wastl-Walter ed., The Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies. Farnham: Ashgate, 63–84.

11 Contested mobilities across the Hong Kong-Shenzhen border The case of Sheung Shui J.J. Zhang

Introduction: borders on the move It is fair to say that the ‘borderless world’ discourse (Ohmae, 1990) that has gained much popularity at the end of the 20th century is increasingly becoming obsolete. Empirical evidence from all corners of the world proving the contrary remind us of discriminatory practices of mobility regimes that still render many people immobile in a supposedly interconnected ‘global village’. For example, research on passport hierarchies (see Wang, 2004; Jansen, 2009; Zhang, 2013) shows that far from seamless travels as promised by technological advancements and the formation of regional political blocs, people’s imagined mobility more often than not falls short of what is happening on the ground. Furthermore, the commitment of the Trump administration in enacting a physical wall between the United States and Mexico in the name of national security casts an even stronger doubt over the ‘borderless world’ thesis. Indeed, borders, both metaphoric and physical, are everywhere. The aim here is not to provide a literature review on works on borders, as Paasi (2005) and Bauder (2011), for example, have provided insightful analyses of the changing landscape of border studies. Instead, the claim to be made in this exploratory chapter is that existing literature on borders is highly focused on migrants (people tout court) and the sovereign act; everyday border-crossings and things crossing borders do not get sufficient interest in academia. But if one looks at the suitcase traders between Turkey and Russia (Eder et al., 2003; Aydin et al., 2016), and the parallel traders between Hong Kong and mainland China (Zhang and Kwong, 2017), it becomes apparent that the literature on borders is missing the arbitrage (moral and financial) and materiality dimensions. Therefore, it is argued that forays into engagements with the politics of mobility, morality, and materiality, what I call the 3 ‘M’s of cross-border scholarship, could maintain and enhance the relevance of border studies in the decades to come. The utility and potentiality of the 3 ‘M’s in cross-border scholarship will be discussed in the context of contested mobilities in a South China border town. More specifically, and focusing on the Hong Kong–Shenzhen border, this chapter examines the cultural politics of cross-border consumption through shopping activities in the border town of Sheung Shui, Hong Kong. There has been a

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proliferation of interest in mainland Chinese day-tripping in Hong Kong’s border towns of late. Protests by the locals in Hong Kong against Chinese shoppers in general and parallel traders (those who bulk-buy products in Hong Kong to sell to wholesalers in the mainland at a profit) in particular, and counter-protest activities have been drawing media attention. Yet, there is a dearth of academic inquiries into these contested mobilities and encounters between people and goods. Moreover, these Chinese ‘non-tourists’ cannot be subsumed under the conventional tourism framework. Neither can existing epistemologies of border studies explain the political in cross-border materiality or the material in crossborder politics. These frontier issues are as much to do with the material culture of cross-border shopping as they are about debates relating to sovereignty, economic integration, and social exclusion. By interrogating episodes of contested mobilities in Sheung Shui, this chapter shows how the cultural politics of day-tripping and human interactions permeates into the everyday, and weaves into the fabric of contemporary socio-political life at the border.

The 3 ‘M’s of cross-border scholarship How do we go beyond the current people-centric and state-centric narratives in border studies? Developing a curiosity about the things that flows in and through borders and a keener sense of how they interact with people, or how they become points of engagement between people could provide some clues. The concepts of mobility, morality, and materiality could help us in this endeavour. Contemporary studies on mobility have presented a slew of useful vocabularies for a more nuanced understanding of people and things in motion. For example, by engaging with the notion of a ‘new mobilities paradigm’ (Sheller and Urry, 2006) and ideas associated with it, Tim Cresswell (2010, p. 17) advocates making the study of mobility ‘powerfully political’. In his narration of what he calls ‘the politics of mobility’, which engages with the conceptual tenets of movement, representation, and practice, mobility is broken down into six constituent parts, namely motive force, velocity, rhythm, route, experience, and friction. These ‘facets of mobility’ serve to ‘differentiate people and things into hierarchies of mobility’ (Cresswell, 2010, p. 26). Furthermore, in his book, Staging Mobilities, Ole B. Jensen (2014) utilises lexicons such as ‘mobile with’, ‘temporary congregation’, and ‘negotiation in motion’ to urge its readers to recognize mobility as concerned with how the movement of people and things affects our understanding of self and other in the built environment. He sees ‘the contemporary city as an assemblage of circulating people, goods, information and signs in relation networks creating the meaning of movement’ (Jensen, 2013). Conversely, David Bissell (2014) delves into the question of how everyday commuting is changing who we are. In his depiction of commuting experiences in the over-crowded Sydney, he explores concepts like ‘painful commuting’, ‘changing body tolerances’, ‘changing relations’, and ‘changing comprehension of others’. These lexicons are extremely applicable in understanding local people’s sentiments towards the impact of cross-border shopping

156 J.J. Zhang activities in general and their encounters with the mainland Chinese visitors in particular. Antagonism against the mainland Chinese day-trippers is often built on moral grounds. Complaints by locals in the border town evolve around the visitors’ excessive consumption pattern, and alleged immoral behaviour ranging from blocking passage ways, to littering, spitting, and defecating in public. The ethics of consumption points to challenging questions relating to locals’ perceived rights to the goods, their judgment on how much is excessive, and what are considered selfish consumption habits. Indeed, as Pellandini-Simányi (2014, p. 1) asks in her book, Consumption Norms and Everyday Ethics, ‘What is the acceptable amount to consume?’ These are all difficult to answer under Hong Kong’s market economy. Lee and Smith’s (2004) Geographies and Moralities might also shed some light on the moral geographies of contested mobilities in Sheung Shui. According to them, ‘ethics is understood as a moral theory and morality as practical action’ (cited in Paasi, 2019, pp. 21–36). Therefore, it would be essential to look at how locals deal with such issues of morality in their everyday encounters with mainland Chinese visitors. Things associated with cross-border day-tripping is another dimension worth pursuing in the endeavour to rethink border studies. There needs to be an awareness that cross-border activities at Sheung Shui are a part of material culture and material culture involves not just people, but things as well. Therefore, there is a need to interrogate the role things/purchases play in the processes of encounter and interaction in cross-border mobilities. I am interested in things that are part and parcel of cross-border day-tripping and the different ways in which their materialities participate in moments of contested mobilities. At the border town of Sheung Shui, things ranging from goods/purchases to suitcases and human bodies are seen as sites of bordering. As such, instead of state-led ‘border practices’, bordering is seen as a social practice performed by ordinary citizens (Zhang, 2013). So, rather than seeing cross-border exchanges as political rhetoric of promoting economic and social integration, I see them as being experienced by ordinary people. In the midst of the wide-spread anti-Chinese sentiments and hostility towards mainland Chinese tourists in Hong Kong, due attention to moments of contested mobilities may play a humble but critical role in informing policy makers about the lived experiences of local Hong Kongers residing in border towns. The rest of the chapter is divided into three sections. The next section provides a contextual background to mainland Chinese day-tripping in Sheung Shui. This is followed by an exploratory reading of the moments of contested mobilities in relation to the aforementioned 3 ‘M’s of cross-border scholarship based on interviewees with locals in Sheung Shui. The conclusion offers a reflection on the implications of this study to the reconceptualization of border studies and suggests areas for further research.

Sheung Shui: shopping haven at the edge In today’s China, thanks to the growing modernization and consumer economy, travel restrictions for ordinary people have been increasingly loosened up.

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Drifting away from the era of isolationism, the state has been actively using ‘travel’ to ‘imagineer’ the modern Chinese subject (Nyíri, 2010). Despite that, with the household registration system still tying people to their birthplace, people in modern China are at once restricted and relaxed in their mobility. Today, around 200 million Chinese people are internal migrants, and some 4.4 billion domestic tourist visits were made in 2016, increasing by 10% from 2015. Outbound tourism numbers amount to 122 million. Of all mainland Chinese arrivals in Hong Kong, same-day visits take up 59%, or 25.4 million out of 42.8 million in total. In terms of transport infrastructure and networks, the state is constructing high-speed railroads that connects Beijing to politically remote parts of Greater China, like Tibet, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. Obviously, the modern Chinese subject enjoys increasing mobility within and beyond mainland China. However, Chinese people travel across borders for various reasons beyond touristic activities. A series of other activities besides travelling for work or pleasure also help bind ‘Greater China’ together. The most significant internal border crossings involve the territory of Hong Kong and include: mainland students commuting daily to schools in Hong Kong, those who travel to visit relatives, ‘mainland mothers’ who cross over to Hong Kong on tourist visas to deliver their babies, and parallel traders who smuggle goods like mobile phones and infant milk powder to sell in the mainland. How do we make sense of these Chinese mobile subjects’ identity as ‘modern Chinese citizens’ and the stark realities of how Hong Kongers perceive them? This chapter is concerned with one particular type of cross-border activity – mainland Chinese day-tripping in Hong Kong border towns. More specifically, the chapter explores the contested mobilities in the border town of Sheung Shui, which is conveniently connected to the mainland via public transport and is a shopping haven for day-trippers from the neighbouring city of Shenzhen. This is further fuelled by the Individual Visit Scheme, which allows mainlanders to visit Hong Kong as individual travellers (not in tour groups). It was first introduced in four Guangdong cities in 2003 in the hope of boosting the economy after the SARS outbreak, and later expanded to 49 cities across the mainland in 2007 (Tourism Commission, 2017). Permanent residents of Shenzhen enjoyed the ‘multiple-entry permit’ until April 2015, which promoted even greater crossborder mobility (South China Morning Post, 11 April 2015). In addition, the lower tariffs in Hong Kong, the stronger Chinese Yuan, and concerns over product safety in China all make purchasing in Hong Kong especially appealing, thereby attracting hordes of Chinese visitors on a daily basis. However, these day-trippers have been blamed for overcrowding, shortage of goods, and rent hikes in these border towns. Smaller businesses that better cater to locals’ needs were forced to close due to rent increases. Specifically, among these day-trippers is a considerable group of ‘parallel traders’ who cross the border to bulkpurchase Hong Kong products and sell to mainland wholesalers for a profit. Traded goods range from infant milk powder and diapers, to cosmetics and iPhones, to name a few. The consistently great number of mainland Chinese visitors often exceeds the carrying capacity of border towns. Moreover, shoppers

158 J.J. Zhang often open their suitcases right in front of shops to re-pack their purchases, which annoys business owners. The general atmosphere of discontent has led to several protests that were anti-mainland Chinese in general and anti-parallel traders in particular. These protests usually started out peacefully, but sometimes evolved into fierce clashes between the anti-mainland Chinese and pro-establishment camps. Some even became abusive incidents where protesters ended up in scuffles with the police or kicked and shouted at the mainland day-trippers (South China Morning Post, 9 March 2015). It is claimed that such clashes show ‘rising cultural tensions with China’ (International Business Times, 8 April 2015). Despite the ‘one trip per week’ restriction imposed on Shenzhen permanent residents in April 2015 largely in order to alleviate parallel trading, locals complain that parallel traders are still everywhere (South China Morning Post, 17 April 2016). The mainland China–Hong Kong cross-border day-tripping issue is both cultural and political, and recent episodes have seen a city divided over conflicting views on the consequences of increasing social and economic integration with the mainland. The next section provides a glimpse of the cultural politics of hosts’ encounters with the mainland Chinese visitors.

Moments of contested mobilities In this section, I shall draw upon data collected from a pilot fieldwork in Shueng Shui, during which a total of ten semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with residents. Potential interviewees were identified by snowballing personal contacts and approached based on purposive sampling. Respondents were asked about their perception of mainland Chinese day-trippers and to share episodes of encounters with them. Mobility One of the most prominent themes that emerged from the interviews was that of everyday mobility in the border town. People lamented about their speed of movement as they traversed through the market place. A middle-age female interviewee who has lived in Shueng Shui for more than 25 years complained, ‘When they carry their suitcases . . . very crowded . . . full of people . . . you simply cannot walk as fast as you want.’ However, another resident in her thirties pointed to the opposite, ‘I have to be alert when walking in Sheung Shui. Seems I am not allowed to walk slowly.’ One might be confused at the first instance when presented with two completely different sentiments. Were they upset because they could not walk quickly or because they could not stroll slowly through the town? I posit that it is less about the speed of movement but more due to the residents’ perceived loss of control over the speed in which they chose to walk that is of concern. In explicating the politics of ‘velocity’ in his six ‘facets of mobility’, Cresswell (2010) alludes to the idea of ‘hierarchies of mobility’. In other words, those who are economically powerful can afford to travel faster than those who are not. However, in the case of Sheung Shui, the

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politics of velocity played out not so much along lines of economic hierarchy, but along those of everyday rhythms of movement, be it fast or slow, which residents were accustomed to before the influx of day-trippers from the mainland. The bodily encounters among the locals, visitors, and their suitcases are also noteworthy. Most of the respondents animatedly relate instances when their feet were ‘rolled over by suitcase wheels’ as day-trippers whizzed through the market place. This brings to mind Jensen’s (2014) ideas of ‘mobile with’ and ‘temporary congregation’, and Bissell’s (2014) concern with ‘painful commuting’. Activities associated with cross-border day-tripping have inevitably brought about a temporary congregation of visitors, shop owners, local commuters, and the like. Their mobility patterns become more complex as locals now need to negotiate new algorithms of movement introduced by the day-trippers. Indeed, some may experience ‘painful commuting’, both physical and psychological, while participating in moments of mobility with one another. These frictions (Cresswell, 2010) and unpleasant experiences in motion constitute moments of contested mobilities. The mobility patterns, rhythm, and tempo of the mainland Chinese parallel traders were also scrutinised by locals in Sheung Shui. One housewife in her forties shared her surveillance of the parallel traders’ movement with their goods through the town: Actually the goods are ready in the pharmacies, seems like they have communicated before, they know at what time of the day and who will be coming with their strollers to move them away box after box. Also . . . at about 6-7.30pm, you could see groups of parallel traders packing their goods and lining up . . . what were they waiting for? Changing of shifts at the customs. Then they cross the border without any obstructions. I guess bribery is involved. Personal interview This observant interviewee speaks of the alleged well-planned and highly synchronised movement between goods, parallel traders, and their local counterparts from their time in Sheung Shui through to the checkpoint at the Hong Kong–Shenzhen border. As Jensen (2013, p. 4) reminds us, ‘Mobilities do not “just happen” or simply “take place”. Mobilities are carefully and meticulously designed, planned and “staged” (from above). However, they are equally importantly acted out, performed and lived as people are “staging themselves” (from below).’ Although this form of ‘staging’ does not originate from the state, participants do find their movements being dictated by a certain timetable and this contributes to the disruption of the rhythm and tempo of daily commuting by the locals. It is also apparent that such organized disruption or new patterns of movement have become part and parcel of the lived environment in Sheung Shui. Locals cope by alluding to the illegality of the suspiciously organized mobility of people and things, and the incapability of the allegedly corrupted Chinese customs officers in managing the porous border.

160 J.J. Zhang Morality Another theme being featured repeatedly in the interviews is that of morality associated with consumption culture brought about by cross-border day-tripping. According to Pellandini-Simányi (2014, p. 1), while moral issues of consumption have been analysed through both historical research and citizenship studies, those related to everyday life ‘lack systematic analysis.’ Moreover, ‘not all consumption norms are codified in religious taboos and secular laws’ (ibid, p. 3); judgment on everyday consumption practices based on normative grounds can also be passed by ordinary people. This is especially crucial in our analysis of contested mobilities in Sheung Shui as we are not only concerned with the movement/crowdedness brought about by the influx of day-trippers, but also the associated consumption behaviour and its implications on everyday life at the border town. A shop owner in his 50s showed concern over the increasingly homogenised retail landscape in the border town at the expense of locals’ needs: There are so many pharmacies . . . there used to be stationery shops and restaurants, now there are six to seven pharmacies. Shop owner Cross-border shopping and parallel trading activities were often blamed for the excess in shops catering to mainland Chinese visitors. The ubiquitous pharmacies have come to dominate the retail landscape at border towns. They are in fact more like convenience stores that sell a wide variety of products popular amongst crossborder shoppers, ranging from the latest Korean cosmetics to infant milk powder and diapers. Mainlanders were often derogatively referred to as ‘locusts’ in Hong Kong locals’ lexicon to represent their sheer number and alleged overzealous consumption habits. Jason Ng, a prolific local blogger and author, puts it most succinctly: Wherever the swarm settles, from busy shopping areas to border towns in the New Territories, the locusts pillage the area’s luxury goods and everyday supplies. They empty shelves and bid up prices for local residents. Entire neighborhoods are being transformed to meet their insatiable appetite for gold watches and skincare products. Near the Lo Wu border control, corner stores and noodle houses have been evicted to make way for pharmacies that sell baby formula to day trippers from nearby Shenzhen. (Jason Ng, 2014, pp. 228–229) Moral dimensions of consumption surface when referring to the snapping up of everyday supplies at border towns by day-trippers and their indulgence in luxury goods. Indeed, ‘consumption norms mediate ideals of justice; that is, principles involving questions of entitlement and the distribution of valued goods’ (Pellandini-Simányi, 2014, p. 6). The sense of injustice was also apparent in another longtime resident’s lamentation about how the layout of a neighbourhood shopping centre has been redesigned to cater to the flow of mainland Chinese day-trippers:

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It has changed a lot when compared to several years ago. You know Landmark North has been built for quite a number of years . . . Two years ago, the layout of the mall has changed. For example, on the floor connecting to the train station, there used to be an A1 bakery, some cosmetics shops, jewellery shops, an ice cream shop . . . There wasn’t a clear layout. But now, that floor only sells luxury watches, jewellery and cosmetics. Such that the mainland visitors can get the high-end goods easily once they get out from the train station. Sheung Shui resident It is clear that the interviewee felt a sense of injustice towards the layout of an otherwise community shopping centre, which was alleged to be catering specifically to the needs of cross-border day-trippers. Such easy and convenient access to luxurious goods at the expense of ordinary consumers is also a topic of interest to Tim Richardson and Ole Jensen when they analyse the route and stations of Bangkok’s BTS, an urban mass rapid train service. They observe that stations are often strategically built next to or connected conveniently with shopping centers and argue that such increased connectivity linking ‘powershoppers’ and ‘mobile elites’ to branded goods is in fact producing social inequalities in mobility terms (Richardson and Jensen, 2008). In the case of Sheung Shui, locals’ sentiments lie between a sense of inequality as shopping centres are perceived to be prioritizing mainland Chinese consumers, and that associated with the supposed immorality of one’s indulgence with luxurious items. These sentiments might seem mediocre and mundane, but as PellandiniSimányi (2014, p. 4) points out, everyday consumption norms ‘guide practices through an unreflected sense of what is normal, decent or appropriate to do.’ Other than feelings of injustice, consumption norms also mediate ideals of a ‘good life’. Interviewees often reminisced about the ‘good old days’ in the border town they grew up in to contrast with the often cut-throat environment in today’s Sheung Shui. A university student in his 20s and who grew up in Sheung Shui recalled: Before the influx of parallel traders, many old shops were mainly serving locals . . . You could feel the human warmth, the social bonding. They would not think about maximizing their profits. There used to be a Thai restaurant where the Thais would gather. It’s like a bar. It’s more than a store. They had a few tables for people to sit and drink beer and eat. If you were good friends with them, they would cook a few dishes for you. Sadly, it was not sustainable due to the increased rental . . . Now the mainlanders rent the shop no matter how much it is . . . People say some mainlanders come to do money laundering. It doesn’t matter how expensive the rent is, and they know it [parallel trading] is a very good profit-making business. They can keep their capital mobile and make them ‘clean.’ University student, Sheung Shui Such memories speak of how locals think about business ethics and what they judge as the ‘right’ or ‘appropriate’ way of doing business. The ‘human warmth’

162 J.J. Zhang and non-profit seeking virtues of past businesses were used to contrast with the alleged unethical, immoral, and even illegal business practices. A similar romanticization of the ‘good old days’ can also be deciphered from the following interview quote from a third generation female resident: I have been in Sheung Shui since I was born, my parents seldom leave Sheung Shui. They went to school and work in Sheung Shui. They have succeeded my grandparents’ business. Their friends are in Sheung Shui too. When I was small, I went to their homes to barbeque and they played mahjong. When I see them on the streets, we just stop our bikes and say hi, chat for a while. When I go downstairs to buy something, the auntie will send regards to my mother and grandma, as she has been there since I was small and I mostly buy things from her shop. My grandma used to buy but now it’s my turn because she can’t walk. So the auntie asked about my grandma when she doesn’t see her. It’s like this in this community. My whole family buy things from the same shops since the past. So I am highly attached to or connected with this community. But it’s different now . . . shops below my home are mainly for parallel trading business. The biggest change is the community’s socio-cultural life. People used to have a chat when they see each other. But now you can only see chain stores, they are not for local people. Sheung Shui resident It is clear that contested mobilities brought about by cross-border day-tripping do have far-reaching consequences. Other than the hitherto discussed disruptions to the rhythm of everyday life, unpleasant encounters, and the like, we are now talking about a border town community’s sense of belonging, the kind of lifestyle that residents can only reminisce about, and the dissipating social relationships that spanned generations. However, issues of morality do not stop at the level of complaints and lamentation. As Lee and Smith (2004) remind us, morality can be seen as practical action. Indeed, the third generation resident shared proudly about their endeavour to snub chain stores that were deemed to be catering to mainland Chinese day-trippers and support local stores instead: These few years I won’t go to [supermarkets like] Wellcome or Parknshop but mainly small [local] shops. When my parents suggest going to restaurants in a shopping mall, I usually refuse to and suggest going to a small business. If we want to preserve those cultures, we have to walk the talk. So it’s good that some young people have campaigns to support local shops. Sheung Shui resident This example shows how locals react to the sense of injustice through their everyday consumption practices. As such, consumption norms do not merely mediate ideals of justice and a ‘good life’, they also translate into practical actions as well. Admittedly, more needs to be done to unravel these actions and

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their effectiveness in relaying the voices of the residents concerned. We shall now turn to the third and final ‘M’, that of ‘materiality’. Materiality Moments of contested mobilities arise in Sheung Shui through the materiality of things associated with cross-border day-tripping. Things like discarded cardboard boxes, over-sized suitcases, and even mainland Chinese bodies are sites of bordering practices. For example, it is not uncommon to see cardboard boxes littering pedestrian walkways in Sheung Shui, prompting residents to frown upon such behaviour. One of them complained: They always repack the goods along the walkways. Actually I don’t mind them involving in parallel trading, what I am concerned about is that they make the streets very dirty. Cardboard boxes are messily discarded on the walkways and streets, blocking the passages and we really can’t pass through. Sheung Shui resident Cross-border day-trippers, including parallel traders, usually bulk-purchase goods for the best price. However, in order to save space, they often remove the cardboard boxes and repack their purchases into suitcases. The problem is, most of them perform such unpacking and repacking along walkways and streets, thus leading to congestion. Residents often shared their experience of ‘wading through’ ‘swarms’ of suitcases, bodies, and cardboard boxes just to get to the other side of a walkway. Restaurant owners were equally annoyed as they complained that their businesses were affected due to the blocked passages. A female resident in her 20s even devised her own method to ‘deal with’ the alleged misbehaving crowd by barging her way through walkways. When I come back from work, I carry a lot of things in a big bag so that I could use it to barge through. Because they have a lot of stuff with them. They underestimate their body size; they don’t realise that they are carrying bags on both shoulders plus a suitcase. When you say ‘excuse me’, some will move aside slightly if you are lucky, but others don’t move at all. Since we can’t communicate, I simply barge through and hit them with my bag. Sheung Shui resident The angry encounters with and irate brushing of bags and bodies can perhaps be added to David Bissell’s notion of ‘painful commuting’. Moreover, the energy, emotions, and senses that are being captured in such moments of contested mobilities could bring a new dimension to works on sensuous materialism (Zhang and Crang, 2016) that seeks to go beyond visual-centric analyses in order to ‘gain a more nuanced understanding of the complex interactions between objects and people’ (p. 434).

164 J.J. Zhang Apart from non-moving things, bodies on the move is of particular concern amongst interviewees too. One local commuter shared: I travel to work at around 6.45am-7am. There may be one or two seats in the first two train coaches, but after 7am, there won’t be any seats left. It’s not necessarily crowded with people, but each of them [day-trippers] carries one or two suitcases such that they occupy the space of three or four people. Then the train becomes very crowded, but there may not be many people. Sometimes, when I take the minibus, it is full of 24-inch or 29-inch suitcases. I can barely pass through the aisle to get a seat. I have to stride across the suitcases in order to reach my seat. Sheung Shui resident It is clear that contested cross-border mobilities are not confined to the border town, but extend beyond it as day-trippers often make use of the efficient public transport system to reach other commercial centres in the city. Local commuters often find themselves in conflict with suitcases that spread across the seats and floor of train carriages, depriving them of space and comfort. Yet, such materialities of discomfort and inconvenience might still be bearable compared to the witnessing of bodily excretions by another commuter: I once encountered a mainland Chinese family on the train. The son was in a stroller. When the train reached Tai Po Market, the son said he needed to pee badly. Then the mother started to grumble, ‘you are really annoying, I asked you to go to the toilet but you didn’t.’ Four stops later, the father suggested getting off to the toilet, but the mother was still grumbling. Finally, they used a plastic bag for their son to pee in, but the bag burst and the urine spilt over. And you know how they blow their nose? They blow the nose and the snot goes straight onto the floor of the carriage . . . it’s too hard to forget those scenes. Sheung Shui resident Indeed, such transgressions of moral and cultural norms depicted by young children urinating or defecating, and adults spitting in public have often been captured by locals on their mobile phones and posted online in an attempt to shame the ‘misbehaving visitors’. Although such visual evidence is common on social media like YouTube (Ng, 2014), it is the sensuous materialism (for example the sound of phlegm clearing; the smell of urine; the sight of one spitting in public) embedded in such cross-border mobilities and encounters that requires further academic inquiries.

Conclusion I argued at the outset that the ‘borderless world’ discourse is becoming obsolete and that empirical evidence from many corners of the world clearly indicates that

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borders have not evaporated. However, should we be satisfied with border studies that are primarily state- and human-centric? How do we sustain the relevance of border studies in a rapidly changing world? In this exploratory chapter, I threw caution to the wind by paying attention to everyday border crossings, the things flowing in and through border towns, and how they create new spaces of encounters and also conflicts, demonstrating the need for ethical and moral considerations in border and mobility studies. Using a collection of contested mobility moments shared by local residents in Shueng Shui, discussions covered themes of mobility, morality and materiality, what I call the 3 ‘M’s of crossborder scholarship. Since this was an exploratory research, analyses are preliminary, and the moments of contested mobilities discussed are not meant to be exhaustive. Instead, my aim here was to provide some possibilities for border studies to move beyond delving solely into migrants and the sovereign act; everyday moralities, meanings of movements, and mundane things often weave together and breathe new life into our understanding of social life at the border town and beyond. Future research on borders and mobilities should continue to explore themes associated with the tempo and temporality of border town life, moral dimensions of consumption, and sensuous materialism of host–guest relations. These themes not only provide opportunities to go beyond traditional visual-centric analyses, but also create platforms to engage with the nuances of cross-border mobilities, which could contribute to the continued relevance of cross-border scholarship in decades to come.

References Another day of clashes in Hong Kong at parallel trader protests (2015). South China Morning Post. 9 March. Aydin, K., Oztig, L. I. and Bulut, E. (2016). The economic impact of the suitcase trade on foreign trade: a regional analysis of the Laleli Market. International Business Research. Volume 9(3), 14–24. Bauder, H. (2011). Toward a critical geography of the border: toward the dialectic of practice and meaning. Annals of the Association of American Geographers. Volume 101(5), 1126–1139. Bissell, D. (2014). How commuting is changing who we are. 12 May. Mobile Lives Forum. [online] Available at: http://en.forumviesmobiles.org/video/2014/05/12/how-commutingchanging-who-we-are-2339. Cresswell, T. (2010). Towards a politics of mobility. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. Volume 28(1), 17–31. Eder, M., Yakovlev, A. and Çarkoglu, A. (2003). Suitcase Trade between Turkey and Russia: Microeconomics and Institutional Structure. Working paper WP4/2003/07. Moscow: State University, Higher School of Economics. International Business Times. 8 April 2015. Hong Kong’s clashes over mainland shoppers show rising cultural tensions with China (2015). Jansen, S. (2009). After the red passport: towards an anthropology of the everyday geopolitics of entrapment in the EU’s ‘immediate outside’. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. Volume 15, 815–832.

166 J.J. Zhang Jensen, O. B. (2013). Staging Mobilities. New York, London: Routledge. Jensen, O. B. (2014). Staging mobilities. 4 March. Mobile Lives Forum. [online] Available at: http://en.forumviesmobiles.org/video/2014/03/04/staging-mobilities-2213. Lee, R. and Smith, D. M. (2004). Geographies and Moralities: International Perspectives on Development, Justice and Place. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons. Ng, J. Y. (2014). No City for Slow Men: Hong Kong’s Quirks and Quandaries Laid Bare. Hong Kong: Blacksmith Books. Nyíri, P. (2010). Mobility and Cultural Authority in Contemporary China. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Ohmae, K. (1990). The Borderless World. London: Harper Collins. Paasi, A. (2005). The changing discourses on political boundaries: mapping the backgrounds, contents and contexts. In: H. van Houtum, O. Kramsch and W. Zierhoffer eds., Bordering Space. Aldershot: Ashgate, 17–32. Paasi, A. (2019). Borderless worlds and beyond: challenging the state-centric cartographies. In: A. Paasi, E.-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities, Mobilities. London: Routledge, 21–36. Pellandini-Simányi, L. (2014). Consumption Norms and Everyday Ethics. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Richardson, T. and Jensen, O. B. (2008). How mobility systems produce inequality: making mobile subject types on the Bangkok Sky Train. Built Environment. Volume 34(2), 218–231. Sheller, M. and Urry, J. (2006). The new mobilities paradigm. Environment and Planning A. Volume 38(2), 207–226. Shenzhen imposes once-a-week limit on cross-border visits to Hong Kong by permanent residents (2015). South China Morning Post. (11 April). Slump in Shenzhen visitors to Hong Kong but parallel traders are still everywhere, locals complain (2015). South China Morning Post. (17 April 2016). Tourism Commission (2017). Individual visit scheme. HKSAR. [online] Available at: www. tourism.gov.hk/english/visitors/visitors_ind.html. Wang, H. (2004). Regulating transnational flows of people: an institutional analysis of passports and visas as a regime of mobility. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power. Volume 11(3), 351–376. Zhang, J. J. (2013). Borders on the move: cross-strait tourists’ material moments on ‘the other side’ in the midst of rapprochement between China and Taiwan. Geoforum. Volume 48, 94–101. Zhang, J. J. and Crang, M. (2016). Making material memories: Kinmen’s bridging objects and fractured places between China and Taiwan. Cultural Geographies. Volume 23(3), 421–439. Zhang, J. J. and Kwong, Y. M. (2017). Reconceptualising host-guest relations at border towns. Annals of Tourism Research. Volume 66, 196–199.

Part IV

Borders, security, politics

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12 Trade, Trump, security, and ethics The Canada–US border in continental perspective Heather N. Nicol and Karen G. Everett

Introduction Nice guy, good-looking guy, comes in [and says] – ‘Donald we have no trade deficit’ . . . I said, ‘Wrong Justin, you do’, I didn’t even know . . . I had no idea. I just said, ‘You’re wrong’ . . . He said, ‘Nope we have no trade deficit.’ (Nielsen, 2018)

In this Tweet, US President Donald Trump recounted an exchange with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in March 2018. Contradicting pronouncements by President Trump, Prime Minister Trudeau was adamant that the US had no trade deficit with Canada. In the week that followed statistics were published proving Trudeau correct and Trump, both factually and ethically, on the wrong track. This was not just a harmless deception on Trump’s part, however. It was also a strategy of intimidation, constructed in relation to his North American neighbours – intending the victimisation of the less powerful. While the entire incident reflected a rather obvious subterfuge on the part of the president, it also raised the question of why the state of trade matters to Canada– US relations, and correspondingly to the Canada–US border? What does this tell us about the moral and ethical management priorities of North American borders? This chapter tackles these questions through exploration of the political and socially constructed assemblages of thought and practice, perception, and imagination that govern continental border management in North America. These, in turn, also reflect and produce relations of power that influence not just the Canada–US, but also the US–Mexican border (Ackleson, 2011, 2009; Nicol, 2015; Villegas, 2013). We explore the Mexican border narrative, and then contextualize it within the structure of existing, yet geographically ‘differentiated’ continental border management policies and programmes (Ackleson, 2011; Andreas, 2005; Heyman, 2012). Finally, we suggest that the inequitable and morally dubious outcomes that result are constructed by and reinforced through Canada’s responses to US economic and security hegemony, as well as by US policies and practices. Indeed, although there is a common belief that today’s international borders are deterritorialized, global, and seamless, this is not the case in North America. Despite many new agreements and technologies, rather than thinning as a result of ‘increased cooperation, better management, and freer flows of goods and people’ borders are

170 Heather N. Nicol and Karen G. Everett ‘thickening, growing ever more difficult to traverse, both legally and illegally’ (Ackleson, 2009, p. 336). Moreover, not all borders are equal. It is easier for Canadians to navigate North American borders than for Mexicans: a discursive and regulatory environment treats the northern and southern borders of the US differently. But Canadians also participate in creating these differentiated border management regimes – improving their own trade and mobility be it at the expense of Mexicans’ when necessary: flows of goods and people across the Canada–US border has often been at the expense of those who cross the US southern border. While the rationale is generally an economic one, the cascading moral and ethical implications of this convenient bilateralism are profound. This is because borders are about power and social control: borders become locations where those who have it exert power. In the context of North America, because Canada must respond to the US, it can exert its ‘power’ via ‘the imposition of systems of control over spaces and groups which are subservient to their political or economic power’ (Newman, 2011, p. 35). In other words, Canada does to Mexico what it does not want done to itself. To this end, the political processes involved in Canadian and American border management also raise important questions about the ethical outcomes of these decisions. Immigrants (in this case, those from Mexico) are positioned as ‘others’ and thus security threats – for reasons that go beyond the physical security of the state (Bigo, 2002; Newman, 2011). The result is a North American border regime where discursive assessments of ‘danger’ and ‘criminality’ regularly find their way into matters of mobility, migration, and economic policy. Contrary to the essentialist assumption that ‘northern’ and ‘southern’ borders of the US are separate cases, however, or that they can be clearly devided into developed and developing, law abiding and criminal, orderly and chaotic worlds, this chapter suggests that the Canada–US border and its border management policies are not separate but co-constituted with US border discourse and management of the US–Mexican border (Ackleson, 2011; Pavlakovich-Kochi, 2011). Indeed, the security ‘asymmetry’ that characterizes the US treatment of the Canada–US and the US–Mexican border (and the structural implications of those policies upon border relations) comes at the expense of Mexico. While recent events documenting Canada’s discomfiture at being exluded from US-Mexican NAFTA talks might suggest otherwise, historically this situation has been maintained by both Canadian and American policy makers. Rather than positioning Canada along with Mexico as victimized by US political and economic hegemony, as recent media coverage might suggest, this chapter suggests that the political leadership within Canada – those who were contemporaneously negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as Trump tweeted – have in the past willingly participated in the marginalisation of the US–Mexican border to maintain a greater degree of bilateralism and to tip the scales of border policy differentiation in their own favour.

Maintaining the good neighbour narrative Trudeau’s response to Trump’s trade deficit claim was not accompanied by questioning as to the apparent need for deficits to work in favour of the US,

Trade, Trump, security, and ethics 171 although it raised an ethical dilemma for Canadians, who find themselves democratically unrepresented within the landscape of US hegemony politics. Instead, he validated the geopolitical assessment the deficit argument entailed, knowing full well how the Trump administration instrumentalizes the concept of deficit in cross-border trade to challenge global trade patterns that do not support US economic hegemony, and seeks to reorganize the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or do away with it altogether. He did not challenge the need for US tariffs on other country’s goods entering the country to ensure that foreign competition is discouraged: Mexico and Canada have been exempted from this penalty until such time as a new NAFTA Agreement can be reached. Instead Trudeau played into the new and politically expedient, albeit highly contentious paradigm shaped by Trump and his political base, debating deficit size rather than principles. While the belief that the US is a victim of continental and international powers stemming from the NAFTA is not new (see Nicol, 2015), the way in which Trump’s ‘America First’ narrative has represented the US within the existing circuitry of both global and continental trade relationships is; particularly in his targeting of Canada–US trade relationship. It fits uncomfortably within the current structural organization of bilateral Canada–US security practices that are organized through neoliberal border management technologies (Côté-Boucher, 2010; Gilbert, 2007; Sparke, 2004, 2005). In responding to Trump’s assertion, Prime Minister Trudeau was therefore sensitive to the need for maintaining the carefully cultivated pro forma narrative about partnership and trust between Canada and the US (Konrad and Nicol, 2008). Misrepresentations about the trade relationship, even if transparently false, could challenge the stability of the existing assemblage of security discourses and practices in support of cooperative border management. Indeed, Canada – both the Canadian public and its policy makers – have learned through the Mexican experience. Most Canadians follow popular media accounts that describe US attitudes towards Mexico (both under the Trump administration and the previous Obama and Bush administrations), and are acutely aware that Mexico’s experience with the US security institutions has not been facilitative. Most are familiar with US interventions ranging from the implementation of new forms of surveillance; increasing risk assessments and penalties applied to undocumented immigrants, including detentions; to the concomitant inland expansion of border management and the construction of more, and higher, border walls (Andreas, 2003, 2011; Coleman, 2009, 2007; Ek and Fergusson, 2010). Trump’s ‘wall’ is as familiar to a Canadian audience as it is to Americans. Canada has not yet seen the same degree of overt securitisation as Mexico, but fears that it might. Rather than question American policy, government policy has been to assure the US that it is not Mexico (Andreas, 2005; Andreas and Biersteker, 2003), that it does not present a challenge to US security in the same way as Mexico, and that it closely shares US economic and political values. This encapsulates Canada’s motivation for consistently accommodating security cooperation. It has resulted in a disproportionately less disruptive border when measured against the Mexican experience (Ek and Fergusson, 2010;

172 Heather N. Nicol and Karen G. Everett Heyman, 2012; Payan, 2006; Villegas, 2013), but also little concern about its inherent injustice.

Making the difference While the US Department of Homeland Security insists that the US has one border, a common set of national policies and practices that exert an equal ‘tour de force’ throughout the continent, this belies the way in which border narratives and practices have been strongly differentiated. US borders with Canada and Mexico actually present two decidedly different cases and reflect two different management priorities (Hristoulas, 2013). They also reflect two very different, discursively constructed, threat assessments (Andreas and Biersteker, 2003). There are popular accounts that sustain these differences and reflect evolving perceptions about danger and lawlessness. These, in turn, authorize increasingly aggressive and militarized means of border control. One of the most enduring has been the creation of southern border imaginaries, which play to the trope of a dangerous and open border. Here illegal migrants and putative ‘bad hombres’ stream north from Mexico. Moreover, the decision to use the term ‘hombre’ by president Trump, much like the use of the term ‘illegal’ immigrant reflects a deliberately unethical decision that serves to villainize and criminalize those who irregularly cross borders for a multitude of reasons. For Bauder (2013), the term illegal immigrant . . . implies that an immigrant has committed a crime, that she does not belong, and that someone else (often the speaker) has been wronged. These implied meanings and the emotional responses they elicit have real consequences, affecting the judgment and behavior of decision makers and voters, which can in turn inform policies and legislation. (Bauder, 2013, p. 2) Moreover, Trump has now tenuously linked security along the Mexican border and the perceived threat of illegal migrants with the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programme, the majority of whom come from Mexico (Lopez and Krogstad, 2017). The decision to link children who were brought to the US by their parents with larger issues of criminality and security in immigration is questionable. Moreover, most DACA participants are engaged in behaviours associated with good citizenship (for example, going to school, finding employment, paying taxes, donating organs) even though they are not citizens nor will receive citizenship from participation in this programme (see: Glum, 2017; Shoichet, Cullinane and Kopan, 2017). To impose unfair outcomes on children of immigrants, in order to achieve partisan goals (particularly as a result of ill-conceived policy) remains unethical and morally questionable. The convenient imaginary of unbearable pressure along the southern border is also a product of deliberate political manipulation. Here the notion of ‘illegal’

Trade, Trump, security, and ethics 173 immigration is augmented by the notion that there are ‘illicit’ flows of products and goods ‘flooding’ American markets and threatening American lives at ports of entry. Yet Heyman (2012) contends that infrastructure and technology deficits at ports of entry, as well as purposeful popular narratives, are coconstituted by US underinvestment in ports of entry with Mexico. While ‘flooding’ of portals to the southern US might be an apt imagery, it is the result of a deliberate geography of securitisation and a policy of underinvestment. The result is ‘[v]ast lines of overheating cars and sweltering pedestrians, shopping bags in hand’ that characterise the ports of entry while outside the ports, we find border patrol SUVs crisscrossing the desert just inside the border wall, sensors below and drones overhead . . . signaling a public discursive focus on Mexican “illegality”, despite the immense volumes of mobile goods and people surging through legitimate ports. (Heyman, 2012, p. 267) Contrast this image with the relatively unmanned border line with Canada where, despite Trump’s pre-electoral threats to build a wall, the militarized scenes of the southern border are absent. Instead, the ports of entry that punctuate the border line see seamless flows of orderly truck traffic, a product of high degrees of deliberate and continuing bilateral investment in transportation security infrastructures between Canada and the US over the past two decades (Konrad and Nicol, 2008). The moral implications of these differentiated border landscapes is striking. While most Canadians and Americans pass easily across the Canada–US border, along the US–Mexico border there is a ‘terrain of terrible risks facing such people – death by heat and dehydration in the Arizona desert – [which] marks them as specifically “disprivileged” actors within North American capitalism’ (Heyman, 2012, p. 265). Indeed, if we map the regional relationships involved – both in terms of the significance of cross-border trade and the kind of cross-border cooperation that closer economic ties has supported – it is clear that, post 9/11, there has been significant policy regime differentiation between, within, and among nationstates with regard to state border management and securitization. The landscape of cross-border trade suggests that rather than integrating the North American political landscape, the result has been three economies linked in a series of inequitable iterative stages in which the US is mediary. If the NAFTA was intended to usher in a continental economy in North America, instead its impact has been to regionalize trade effects and corridors in distinctive clusters (Ackleson, 2011; Pavlakovich-Kochi, 2011). There is no single border, or common ground on practices to manage labour and immigration, negotiated. Moreover, it is unlikely that one will develop (Hristoulas, 2013; Moens, 2011). NAFTA may be a ‘globalization type’ agreement negotiated among North American nations, but it has nonetheless reinforced highly regionalized patterns of continental trade. Canada–US trade (imports and exports) connects much of the continental US to its northern

174 Heather N. Nicol and Karen G. Everett neighbour, throughout the central, eastern, and northern US. Mexican trade (imports and exports) are concentrated in southern states. Indeed, as Pavlakovich-Kochi (2011) suggests, the platform for cross-border cooperation has generally been between southern US and Mexican states, while regional cooperation between Canada and the US has involved northern states and provinces. On the immigration side, similar patterns exist. Rates of immigrant and refugee detention are inequitably concentrated along the southern border, where levels of cross-border migrants remain the highest, reinforcing the notion that both north and south border play different roles in the immigration narrative of the US. It is also clear that if the NAFTA and its emphasis on an integrated continental economy had been the leading geopolitical rationale for differentiated border management practices prior to Trump’s election (Sparke, 2004, 2005), by the end of the second decade of the 21st century new and important popular geopolitical and geo-economic assessments are at play. Much like the notion that the US has a trade deficit with Canada, these assessments may be more fanciful than factual, but they nonetheless galvanize public and political support in new ways – reinforcing dubious moral and ethical outcomes. Originally, for example, the ‘southern border’ of the US with Mexico was even more open for cross border migration than the north (Payan, 2006). Disenchantment towards Mexican immigration became apparent in the last quarter of the 20th century, and it has escalated since then (Andreas, 2003). Rather than deal more effectively with the management of migratory labour, by the late 1900s American authorities turned instead towards ‘law and order’ solutions (Andreas, 2011; Payan, 2006). A large expansion of the Immigration and Naturalization Services Agency (INS) and the arming of border guards met the flow of labour. It was during this time that the narrative of the unruly border, the criminal border, and the dangerous border was constructed through the discursive and material technologies that met the expansion of immigration. According to Payan (2006), it was not long before this narrative, focused as it was on unauthorized immigration, became part of a more generalized war on the Mexican border, which conflated immigration with terrorism and the war on drugs. Regardless as to the general orderly nature of Mexican cross-border immigration, and the culpability of US economic demands and border management practices in encouraging undocumented migrant labour, what emerged was a generalized rhetoric that painted this border as out of control and dangerous: as a threat to ‘America’. Such threats required securitization. Responses to undocumented immigration created a ‘general justification’ to expand border policing along the southern border, supported by a political and media dialogue describing a border out of control. This discourse focuses upon murdered women, drug cartels, and other forms of violence. It is a narrative that reduces Mexicans to criminals and ‘illegals’ who ‘infect’ the US society and economy. It feeds nicely into another narrative – a security one in support of a militarized southern border, the latter a place where a ‘web of illegality’ has resulted from the misrepresentation and

Trade, Trump, security, and ethics 175 mishandling of border management policies from the 1990s forward (Andreas, 2003, 2011). Indeed, as Heyman (2012, p. 268) notes, along this southern border there was ‘unequal investment in between-port enforcement over port operations’. Rather, between-port enforcement responded to anti-immigrant narratives, these prioritized, to serve both anti-Mexican politics and more conservative political elements in the US. In making these observations, Heyman reminds us that border management is driven by assemblages of policy and practice that may be contradictory, and that serve more than one purpose. While economic policy may be the rationale for action, there are many root causes of differentiated border policy within North America, including investment, anti-immigration narratives, racism, and securitization responding to larger fears of terrorism. A case in point is a recent article published in The Washington Post, entitled ‘Foreign suppliers are flooding the U.S. aluminum market with aluminum’. It reports Trump’s comments that: ‘You see what’s happened with our steel and aluminum industries. They’re being decimated by dumping from many countries . . . They’re dumping and destroying our industry and destroying the families of workers. And we can’t let that happen’ (Long, 2018). The concept of ‘flooding’ and dumping evoked here echoes the familiar images of an unruly human flow of undocumented workers heading north across the Rio Grande, taking jobs from real Americans legitimately employed in the US economy. In this way, ‘illegal’ immigration is augmented by the notion that there are ‘illicit’ flows of product and goods ‘flooding’ American markets and threatening American lives at ports of entry. It reflects a discursive technique which seeks to problematize continental neoliberal market forces within a politically expedient discourse – suggesting it to reflect the dangerous relationship between ‘illegal’ Mexican migration and US labour markets (Heyman, 2012; Sparke, 2004, 2005). In this way, Trump’s threats find new ways to revitalize and politicize nativist sentiment, implying that the threat is now to a way of life and livelihood – it is indeed civilizational.

‘Mexicanizing’ Canada It is in this context that trade deficits – or the perception of deficits referred to in the beginning of this chapter – matter. In 2018, Canada has found itself, like Mexico, the target of US ire, subjected to the imposition of a similar type of ‘unruly border’ trope as Mexico, but in the context of trade. This is not the first time American policy makers have expressed alarm about their northern neighbours, however. Shortly after 9/11 American security experts began to apply the same negative discursive lens to the Canada–US border as they had to Mexico. Ethical or not, the goal was to ‘Mexicanize’ Canada through claims about open borders and the threat of crime and terrorism (Andreas, 2003, 2011). In doing so, the US undertook a reassessment of border practices with Canada. Canadian policy makers and academics coined the term ‘Mexicanization’ to describe the process (Granatstein, 2010).

176 Heather N. Nicol and Karen G. Everett As we have already noted, the popular term used to describe the purposeful and unequal treatment of the US–Mexican border is ‘Mexicanization’ (Andreas, 2003, 2005; Granatstein, 2010; Nicol, 2015). As this term is both racialized and pejorative, when used with political intent (Andreas, 2005), the purpose of using it here is not to reify racism, but to identify underlying popular geopolitical and geo-economic assessments deliberately purported by US policy makers to prioritize certain types of threats while marginalizing Mexicans more generally (Heyman, 2012) and transferring this strategic discourse to describe the Canada–US border. The fear was not unfounded. Even after the dust had settled from 9/11, American security experts during the early 2000s began to apply the same pejorative, discursive, elements that characterize US political perceptions of the Mexican border to ‘reimagine’ the Canadian situation and to ‘Mexicanize’ it through discursive claims about crime and terrorism (Andreas, 2003, 2011; Andreas and Biersteker, 2003; Nicol, 2015). In the years after 9/11 this border narrative found broader application: ‘Since 9–11, Canada has been receiving a heavy dose of the harsh scrutiny the U.S. usually reserves for Mexico on borderrelated law enforcement issues’ (Andreas, 2003, p. 6). The dangerous Canada discourse has been carefully cultivated during the post 9/11 era initially as an explanation for the 9/11 security breach, and then as a reprimand to Canada’s refusal to join the ‘War on Terror’ and the invasion of Iraq (Nicol, 2015). There were those among American policy makers who then sought to portray the Canadian border as an open door to the movement of terrorists aided and abetted by a lax immigration programme embedded in a highly multicultural Canadian society (Papademetriou and Collett, 2011). As late as 2009, for example, American politicians were still (wrongly) suggesting that some of the 9/11 attackers entered the United States through Canada (CBC News, 2009, para. 1), while in 2010, the US Government Accountability Office (GOA) asserted that the border with Canada was a place of significant threat and that a border wall might be necessary there as well as with Mexico. Trump’s election campaign, and post-election rhetoric among American policy makers has continued to fuel these contentious assumptions. Even more recently, there has been an attempt to present the Canadian border as ‘more dangerous’ than the US–Mexican one. Indeed, experts have been marshalled to suggest that ‘[i]f Homeland Security is really concerned with security, and the biggest security threat is terrorism, we should be more worried about the Canadian border than the Mexican border’ (Matalon, 2015). Ironically, however, by participating in, legitimizing, and contributing to the dangerous Mexican border narrative, Canada has contributed to its own ‘Mexicanization’. Indeed, the Canadian government has more or less adopted more a ‘Mexicanized’ southern border trope. Even as recently as March 2018, anyone who visited the relevant Canadian government website could find a warning to ‘Avoid non-essential travel’ to both the northern and western states because of ‘high levels of violence and organised crime’ (Government of Canada, March 19 2018). It has used such border imagery uncritically, to justify distancing itself from the Mexican border situation through arrangements with the US – such as

Trade, Trump, security, and ethics 177 the Smart Border or the Beyond the Border Agreement (Gilbert, 2007, 2013). These are both bilateral border security agreement negotiated by Canada and the US after 9/11. After the failure of trilateral security negotiations among Canada, Mexico, and the US, in 2009 (The Security and Prosperity Partnership – SPP), Canada moved to exclude Mexican interests through a broader focus on bilateral border arrangements with the US. The SPP was the first and only attempt to create a trilateral border agreement in North America. It sought to manage economic, and other low risk, border flows (Gilbert, 2007) but failed to gain required support. Indeed, the Canadian government – and specifically the Conservative government prior to 2015 – followed the advice of senior strategists and scholars of Canadian–American relations. In the wake of the implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative of 2007, and following the collapse of the SPP (Granatstein, 2010,), it moved to participate in the negotiation of a bilateral, Beyond the Border Agreement with the US. Moreover, after the SPP collapsed, the Canadian government imposed a visa requirement for Mexican travellers. Perhaps because this SPP fiasco suggested the imperiled future of trilateralism in North American security arrangements, or because it felt itself under scrutiny of American law makers, the Canadian government claimed that it was being overwhelmed by what it termed as ‘bogus’ refugee claims from Mexican citizens seeking refuge in Canada. The visa requirement achieved the government’s primary objective of dramatically reducing refugee claims from Mexican citizens in Canada. It criminalized refugee claimants (on an individual and collective/national basis) and eroded human rights in refugee politics ‘by denying the human rights crisis created by narco-violence and corruption in Mexico’ (Gilbert, 2013, p.141). Villegas (2013, pp. 2207–2208) argues that in doing so, new assemblages of illegality infused immigration discourses in Canada. He cites the Toronto Star statements that point ‘to the ways in which “experts” in the immigration industry, including social and settlement workers, are used to inform the public and substantiate claims’. For Villegas, such language sets the tone ‘for how to imagine Mexican refugee claimants . . . the choice of words (“swarmed”) draws on the considerable number of metaphors used to refer to migrants as dangerous, which include images of floods, waves, tides, infection and animalization’. The image of ‘a ‘swarm’ of ‘dehumanized Mexican claimants [is] part of the racialized project to depict them as irresponsible and a threat to Canadians and the Canadian nation state’ (ibid). The Mexican visa requirement also played into another major concession to US security initiatives – which continues to have repercussions. This was the adoption at about the same time, of US changes to the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States. Long a sore point and implemented through the US–Canada Smart Border Action Plan, under the agreement, refugee claimants must request refugee protection in the first safe country they arrive in, unless they qualify for an exception to the agreement. Since 15 February 2013, Mexico has been on Canada’s list of designated countries of origin, that is countries that respect human rights, offer state

178 Heather N. Nicol and Karen G. Everett protection, and do not normally produce refugees (Government of Canada, April 3, 2017) – although refugee claims will be heard in some cases. But evidence shows there are challenges – for example for LGBT Mexicans making refugee claims in Canada despite the ‘high risk of persecution, violence, and even death within Mexico’ (Eagle Canada, n.d., p. 6). This contradiction between Canada’s designated list and the treatment of LGBT people in Mexico creates a moral and ethical border management problem for Canada if ethics are to reflect the untoward treatment people receive because of a certain policy or security decision (Newman, 2011). This is a significant point for both Canada’s treatment of those who pass through its borders, and the policies it supports in the US. Overall, despite Mexico’s status as a designated country, Canada has consistently encouraged and even supported the ‘Mexicanization’ of the US southern border by encouraging the metaphor of a dangerous border, by distancing itself from Mexico, and by seeking to entrench bilateralism rather than trilateralism as the context for North American border management. Simply put, the Canadian economy relies upon trade with the US, and seeks to avoid seeing a thicker border emerge in light of changing economic or security imperatives (Hristoulas, 2013; Sokolsky and Lagasse, 2006). Despite the more far-reaching trade effects of the Canadian border, the larger volume of crossings on the southern border has preoccupied US border personnel, consumed the lion’s share of US border budget funds, and dominated media coverage. The northern border has generally been an afterthought for US security experts, and most Canadians would like to keep it that way.

Conclusions The recent dialogue about deficits between President Donald Trump and Canadian Prime Minster Justin Trudeau, like many of Trump’s interventions, sought to disrupt. Trump’s aim as interlocutor was to create a discursive shift, and to turn the carefully crafted and polished rhetoric about Canada–US partnership and cooperation on its head (Konrad and Nicol, 2008; Nicol, 2015). It suggests that the US has been victimized and politically manipulated by its smaller and less populous North American neighbors, sweeping aside the more normative assertion that the hegemonic power of the US has consistently dictated the conditions for management of trade and immigration. In doing so, it also ignores the fact that the US has largely created these scenarios through its domestic mandates and reinforcement of inequitable management policies (Heyman, 2012). The result has been a landscape of differentiated border management regime within North America, this itself as a result of the way in which the US ‘manages’ each neighbour differently (Ackleson, 2011; Pavlakovich-Kochi, 2011). Yet if the Mexican border is ‘dangerous’, it is a situation largely constructed by US attitudes and interests (Heyman, 2012; Payan, 2006), and the discourse of which can end up being replicated by other countries. Conversely, if the Canadian border is not dangerous, it is understood by Canadian decision makers that this assessment is unstable. Indeed, in the news

Trade, Trump, security, and ethics 179 as this essay was being written, President Trump threatened to pull out of the NAFTA if Mexico does not step up border security, then demanded that the treaty negotiations be speedily concluded. Perhaps this is its intention. Ackleson (2011) suggests that North American border dynamics reflect the contradictory impulses of regulation and openness, ‘leading to an evolving but uneven and tenuous border and mobility management regime that increasingly favours certain economic classes and trade interests but marginalizes exceptions’ (pp. 248–249). Historically, the US has ‘exceptionalized’ its southern border, while expediting cross-border flows across its northern one. In doing so, it has negotiated a deeply integrated security agreement with Canada, while increasingly viewing and treating its southern border as a security problem. But more than this, it has also repeatedly failed to invest along its southern border in ways that expedite the flow of people and goods through ports of entry (Ackleson, 2011; Andreas, 2005; Villegas, 2013). President Trump’s nuclear deterrents, or its planned new wall with Mexico, if realized, will only continue this process of disinvestment where investment it is needed most. On the other hand, since 9/11, if not before, the Canadian response to US policy shifts has almost always been one of negotiating special arrangements or bilateralism to position the Canadian state in a better economic situation. There has been a near exclusive focus on bilateral security arrangements with Canada in the aftermath of 9/11: ‘acknowledging not only the deep economic, social, and cultural ties, but also the new reality that the United States cannot attain the additional security it desires through unilateral actions alone’ (Meyers, 2003, p. 5). Canadian policy makers work to ensure that bilateral security management trumps trilateralism in North America. Canadian politicians and their public have unhesitatingly excluded Mexico in continental arrangements wherever possible (Cameron and Tomlin, 2002). Indeed, most Canadian policy makers have been consistent in their approach that Mexico is either an afterthought in most negotiations on North American security, or a poker chip to use in bettering relations with the US. It is only since threats of tariff walls and the abrogation of the NAFTA that reinvigoration for consultation with Mexico has occurred, but this will likely be short lived. Canadian authorities have attempted to collaborate with Mexico in order to resist the seemingly unfair US terms, but at the same time they lobby American decision makers in Washington for concessions more suitable to bilateral concerns. The result has been considerable political indifference to inequitable and unjust border management in North America. The vulnerability of Canada–US border to US disapproval has made Canadians sensitive to the political undercurrents which have increasingly problematized the US–Mexican relationship (Ackleson, 2009, 2011; Andreas, 2005, 2006; Moens, 2011; Walker, 2017). This, in turn, incentivizes the Canadian government to keep its distance through discursive and policy frameworks, which, in the end, also contribute to the inequalities of the US–Mexican border. As such, the Canadian government not only makes ethical decisions about who does and does not belong in Canada

180 Heather N. Nicol and Karen G. Everett through its own border and immigration policies, it contributes, even if secondarily, to the same decisions being made in the US. Finally, there is also a larger political and structural significance to these developments. Scholars have long argued that because of a significant deficit of trilateralism in the North American security relationship, EU type border arrangements will be difficult to achieve (Popescu, 2011). Our analysis of the current Canada–US border relationships underscores this. While the NAFTA agreement already contributes to border regime differentiation in North America, should the NAFTA fail, it will only increase. Indeed, the integrated border security cooperation developed by Canada and the US to facilitate the flow of NAFTA goods is unlikely to undergo significant change in orientation in either case, if only because these borders have been explicitly designed to monitor the flow of goods – something sorely needed if trade protectionism develops in North America. In other words, NAFTA borders, for better or worse, have become the standard for the structure of Canada–US border practice. The US as economic hegemon dominates the relationship, and in doing so, leaves little room for either improvement or more equitable application of border management processes. Still, Canada relies on these inequities to better facilitate a more suitable form of bilateral border security. Rather than question the fact of ‘Mexicanization’, Canadians and their representative simply seek to avoid this fate themselves. The moral and ethical qualities of this strategy are little discussed in Canada. Instead, through popular belief that multiculturalism is a Canadian ‘value’, most Canadian believe, because of the assurances of social and news media, that they are extremely tolerant – a beacon for the vulnerable and the refugees of the contemporary world. It is one of the inexplicable feats of the Canada–US discourse that despite the thickening of the North American borders, the trope of borderless world dominates North American border relations. Were this true, there would be no need for a greater degree of management at the Canada–US border, nor would the Canadian experience be connected to that of the US–Mexican border. Indeed, it is perhaps an ironic twist that the illusion of a borderless world creates the justification for the thickening of border control.

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Trade, Trump, security, and ethics 183 Sparke, M. (2005). In the Space of Theory: Postfoundational Geographies of the Nation-State. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Villegas, P. (2013). Assembling a visa requirement against the Mexican ‘wave’: migrant illegalization, policy and affective ‘crises’ in Canada. Ethnic and Racial Studies. Volume 36(12), 2200–2219. Walker, M. (2017). Borders as systems of continuity and discontinuity in the age of Trump. Journal of Latin American Geography. Volume 16(2), 173–176.

13 Ontological (in)security The EU’s bordering dilemma and neighbourhood Jussi P. Laine and James W. Scott

Introduction – European Neighbourhood as a dialogical space The concept of ‘Neighbourhood’ as something geopolitical has been popularized by the European Union (EU) and its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Since 2004, the ENP has aimed at creating multi-layered partnerships with states as varied as Georgia, Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia, and Ukraine. The aim is not simply economic cooperation and free trade, but also involves an ambitious project of systematically creating closer and more effective political relationships. ENP is thus also associated with the emergence of the EU as a political actor on the world scene. There is no question that the EU’s immediate regional vicinity is a space where the policy impacts of the EU are most strongly felt and where the influence of the EU and of its member-states is most direct. As a result, it is also a space where the geopolitical identity of the EU is being produced through interaction and communication with neighbouring states. And yet, as a highly contested project, the geopolitical significance of Neighbourhood is by no means clear. EU internal crises, exacerbated by the June 2016 Brexit referendum, and conflict situations in Mediterranean and Eastern Europe contexts would appear to challenge the EU’s ability to sustain major regional cooperation initiatives. Furthermore, the Neighbourhood agenda risks being increasingly defined by humanitarian crises, debates on immigration tinged with xenophobia, and a conflation of migration with security threats. Despite this pessimistic backdrop, a reassessment of Neighbourhood, both as concept as well as a geopolitical project, is a necessary step in developing more productive and mutually beneficial forms of regional cooperation. This is no easy task as there is no inevitability to Neighbourhood as an alternative geopolitical space, and the track record of ENP since its inception has been mixed at best. One major difference between Neighbourhood as originally defined by the EU and more traditional geopolitical ‘spheres of influence’ is that of possibility. Spheres of influence are unambiguously linked to state interests and projections of power that entail some form of territorial control and domination. Neighbourhood could, on the other hand, potentially signify new spaces for political interaction and socio-cultural dialogue along New Regionalist lines, especially

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if these facilitate cooperation that is jointly negotiated around common concerns (see Telò, 2015; Söderbaum, 2016). A central weakness of Neighbourhood policy is a Eurocentric bias that permeates both normative and critical debate and that obscures the fact that the EU itself is being shaped by its neighbours (Browning and Christou, 2010; Morozov and Rumelili, 2012). One aspect of the Eurocentric view is the reduction of Neighbourhood to a specific policy and normative criteria of policy evaluation or ‘objectively’ existing international relations (Börzel and van Hüllen, 2014). However, critical analyses of the evolving ENP have also involved a certain degree of Eurocentrism by primarily focusing on EU-European bordering and othering practices, and thus framing non-EU ‘others’ as border victims while rarely contemplating their perceptions and agency (Brambilla, 2015). Instead of employing a priori constructed criteria that explain what Neighbourhood is and what it is not, greater conceptual openness could help capture the complexity of regional relations between the EU and the other neighbours. Casas-Cortes et al. (2016) have, for example, characterized geographies of migration across the EU’s external borders in terms of a ‘non-accession integration’ that thwarts neat territorial distinctions between EU and non-EU neighbours. Similarly, rather than something territorial, Neighbourhood can be conceptualized as a context of interaction that is politically framed in very general terms but that in detail is composed of many different interaction spaces that are interlinked in complex ways (see for example Laine, 2017). While Neighbourhood exists as a normative cooperation idea, as a policy, it also clearly entails questions of socio-cultural encounter and thus confrontation and contestation. This is vividly exemplified by the EU’s engagement with civil society actors, as will be discussed in greater detail below. But cross-border cultural and social relations between communities also contribute to the constitution of Neighbourhood. As such, Neighbourhood can be productively understood as a context within which relational networks and concrete spaces of interaction link together societies within the EU and in neighbouring states (Celata and Coletti, 2017). In the last decade or so the geopolitical salience of social and spatial imaginaries has been increasingly emphasized by numerous observers of Europe, bridging diverse philosophical, socio-cultural, and empirical perspectives. For example, the Mediterranean border spectacle, as documented by de Genova (2013), and the migration limboscapes of Ceuta (Ferrer-Gallardo and Albet-Mas, 2016) very much resonate with Agamben’s (1998) ideas of ‘bare life’ and the ‘camp’ as a space of exception. In two exemplary interventions on Europe’s (geo)political imaginations, moreover, Bialasiewicz et al. (2013) and Moisio et al. (2013) draw attention to different imaginaries underlying the EU’s visions of regional cooperation as well as more control-oriented agendas of securitization and border control. Following Brambilla (2015), the concept of imaginary can be expanded to encompass ‘borderscapes’ – social/political panoramas that emerge around border contexts and that connect the realm of

186 Jussi P. Laine and James W. Scott high politics with communities and individuals who are affected by and negotiate the EU’s borders. This perspective transcends the panoptic gaze implicit in ‘border spectacles’ as it follows the discursive and performative construction of migration, refugee crises, and their consequences in a wider socio-spatial context (ibid).

Selective visibility Implicit within the concept of imaginary is the relatively underdeveloped issue of selective visibility and/or invisibility. The relative in/visibility of specific groups and their conditions has clear political consequences in terms of public recognition and access to political and social resources. Selective in/visibility has come to constitute a key element in the overall political and media framing of the Neighbourhood, whereby Eurocentrism continues to be mainstreamed into the EU’s Neighbourhood-related discourse. Specific arguments and social imaginaries are mobilized in order to legitimize the EU’s role as promoter, not only of regional cooperation, but of social transformation. At the same time, the EU’s selective framing of events occurring on its eastern and southern neighbourhood, such as the Arab Spring or the so-called refugee crisis, and local civil societies is in fact counterproductive, resulting in the EU’s failure to effectively connect with local societies, and eliciting in turn resistance from civil society actors. In the following, we interrogate the means through which different imaginaries of Neighbourhood context are being constructed and communicated between the EU and its neighbours. We argue that the EU’s attempts to maintain a sense of purpose and geopolitical orientation has been achieved through a simplification of complex social realities in the Neighbourhood. The EU seeks to confirm its positive role and the basic relevance of existing Neighbourhood policies, and this feeds in to imaginaries that serve the ontological security and geopolitical identity of the EU (see Natorski, 2015). This reduction of complexity, however, clashes with the desire of local civil society actors to have greater voice and presence in public debate in the sense of an Arendtian politics of recognition (see below). A conceptualization of the wider European Neighbourhood in terms of socio-political interaction and interdependencies includes arriving at understandings of ‘Neighbourhood’ as a set of ideas and imaginaries that reflect not only political visions but also everyday cultural images and social representations. Beyond the migrant and refugee narrative, which is becoming hegemonic in terms of securitized visions of Neighbourhood, there is a need to understand local societies in the European Neighbourhood. Civil society offers a vital ‘boundary object (see Häkli, 2012) by projecting imaginaries of Neighbourhood as contact point and a point of contestation (see Dines, Montagna and Ruggiero, 2014; Laine, 2017) rather than a mere territory whose incorporation to the spatial and political orders depends solely on its exclusion from the EU imaginary.

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Neighbourhood as a social imaginary Over the past 15 years, ‘The Neighbourhood’ has become a matter of increasing relevance for EU politicians and institutional bodies. Various rounds of EU enlargement altered the geopolitical context of the EU – from the relatively harmless integration of Central European ex-socialist countries to more difficult situations represented by post-Yugoslav regions. The EU’s external border has constantly been pushed towards the east, converting formerly detached regions into adjacent regions which had to be handled by EU security and migration policies in particular ways. New member states and the regions acquiring the ‘neighbour’ status, through inclusion in various EU programmes were urged to conform to altered schemes of geopolitical interest and the necessities of the EU border regime. Border regulations introduced by the Schengen treaty stepwise were superimposed on EU members and outsiders alike, often producing political irritation and a sense of becoming subdued to the exclusionary impact of a tight external border. From its very beginning on, the ENP has had a double orientation towards developing a specific rationale targeting geostrategic and ideational targets alike. In order to be meaningful, ambitious political projects such the EU’s promotion of Neighbourhood, must build on social imaginaries that orient action, reduce complexity, and provide actors a ‘focus selectively on some aspects of the world as the basis for becoming active participants therein and/or for describing and interpreting it as disinterested observers’ (Jessop, 2014, p. 209). By the same token, social imaginaries provide practical clues to the everyday and how it is socially interpreted; they tell us what would be an obvious solution to a problem – according to a guiding principle or rationale which is immediately intelligible or acceptable. Social imaginaries, for example of modernizing South Mediterranean societies, influence perceptions of the neighbourhood and are reflected in the EU’s framing of its role of political and social actor as a force for positive change and development. These ideas are central to the construction of a coherent narrative of positive – many would say paternalistic – actorness that is at once bound up in the ontological security (identity) of the EU which is deeply influenced by the socio-cultural background of ‘Europeanness’. However, in order to achieve and sustain the image of a positive transformational EU role, some aspects of social reality are marginalized through simplifications of political relationships (Jessop, 2014). ‘In/visibility’ reminds us that power relationships play an important role in framing and selective and truncated views of EU-Neighbourhood relations; we find filtered political and social representations of this relationship that form the basis of actual engagement. The Neighbourhood includes both the EU and the partners – it is not about an external or extra-territorial borderland but rather a contact zone (Delanty, 2011). Thus, the issue of extra-territorial bordering needs to be rethought (Casas-Cortes et al., 2016). In this sense an imaginary can be understood as being part of a bordering exercise that continually produces selective and shifting narratives of

188 Jussi P. Laine and James W. Scott Neighbourhood. These narratives are not necessarily hegemonic. As de Genova (2013) demonstrates, the mediated and excessive visibility of migrants as illegals and thus as outsiders, living without status and real rights in society, and being suspected of threatening ‘normal society’, tends to detach the Neighbourhood from its territorial connotations. The border spectacle of migration may depict the borders of the EU as existing in a territorially external space. At the same time this spectacle also allows for these borders to move inwards, attaching themselves to a certain figure of migrant ‘illegality.’ Different imaginaries described in the literature as relevant for local and national discourses about European Neighbourhood address the question of similarities and differences in the political and social construction of the Neighbourhood. From the comparison of dominant and marginalized imaginaries transported in each discourse, a common rationale of ‘neighbourification’ can be derived, which is immanent to the political staging of the European Union as a contested and controversial project. For example, as an example of a ‘Eurocentric universality’ the need for assisting civil society organizations (CSOs) in the Neighbourhood expressed by EU officials might be accompanied by references to the idea that there is a natural, fundamental link between European and non-European populations which exists at a basic everyday level. Neighbourhood can thus be conceptualized as a context of interaction that is politically framed in very general terms but that in detail is composed of many different interaction spaces that are interlinked in complex ways. The European Neighbourhood emerges as a patchwork of relations rather than merely as a cooperation policy or border regime. Neighbourhood as promulgated in the case of the EU’s project of regional cooperation is itself an example of a spatial imaginary: that of a band of regions where the EU exerts transformative power as a ‘force for good in the world’. Such imaginaries reflect various neighbourhood spaces that are mutually created; they reflect power and social asymmetries (and historical memories), but also processes of potential transformation. Neighbourhood spaces are all those spaces where interrelationships between the EU and regional partners are articulated. Above and beyond concrete EU policies these can include broader forms of societal interaction reflected in diasporas, high-level political elite circles, Russian-speaking communities in the Baltic States, migrant communities, policy communities, popular cultures and lifestyle spaces, and so on. In this way, Neighbourhood resembles a mosaic of partial connections and broad disconnections/cautious encounters that reflect identity and power politics – neighbourhood is a multiplicity of interconnections operating at different levels. Like the border regime, which confers status as it securitizes EU external relations, Neighbourhood is a socio-political and cultural complex that defines the mutual positions of the neighbours – and this includes the EU; the EU is also a Neighbour. On the other hand, the ENP has been loaded with idealistic notions of neighbourly relationships and their embeddings in terms of political philosophy. Two aspects of ideation have been relevant: a relational and an ideologicalspiritual one. The relational aspect refers to the ideal of communication at eye

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level, which – in spite of factual imbalance and asymmetry – was supposed to be affected by political negotiation, partial concession of facilitated economic exchange, and promotion of everyday cross-border interaction of the population. In particular, bringing the neighbours closer to the EU should be promoted by regional development assistance along the EU external border and support for an independent civil society. The ideological aspect is based on claims for the superiority of ‘European’ norms, values, ways of life, and attitudes. The implementation of democracy, human rights, individual freedom, wealth, independence, and other high moral values was not only identified as a desirable aim for the development of the Neighbourhood. Adherence to such values was also declared a precondition for achieving compatibility with the EU and thus the prospect of future EU accession. This hegemonic attitude towards the Neighbourhood was structured by the principle of ‘conditionality’; in that, once neighbouring countries were funded or engaged in formal cooperation, they or the actors involved had to prove that they conformed to EU norms or acted according to EU values. Hence corruption, high levels of criminality, everyday negligence of the state, civil distrust, and so on were earmarked as undesired or incompatible features which had to be overcome by the ‘candidates’ through intensified endeavours to comply. With the implementation of ENP, the relational and ideological aspects of this ideational notion of Neighbourhood have appeared compatible with territorial aspects, at least as long as the underlying hegemonic construct has not been challenged. Nevertheless, these two notions do not really harmonise; they are engaged in an ambiguous and controversial relationship that raises a number of ethical questions as well. The one-sided attitude of bringing the blessings of value-imbued action and good governance to the rest of the world is often perceived from the non-EU vantage point as patronizing, hypocritical and unethical. Political tensions between the EU and the Neighbourhood, periodically arising along with major conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, or recently between the EU and Russia during the Ukraine conflict, often force adjacent countries into the role of backers of political interests which originally had not been theirs. Finally, the contradiction between the claim for ultimate moral values and relatively poor practices of political cooperation, deterrence of migrants and asylum seekers, or of economic destabilization in the name of neoliberal modernization, has rendered the ENP a contested concept – in discourses both within and outside the EU. The double nature of in/visibility: a political tool and an element of the human condition Imaginaries and in/visibility can be conceptualized as having a dialectical relationship in which: I. The imaginary serves as a frame and supporter of in/visibility; for example imaginaries of the Neighbourhood as peaceful complements to the EU require

190 Jussi P. Laine and James W. Scott and reinforce a bias pro compliant, and a bias contra non-compliant, structures, people, ideas, and so on; II. In/visibility serves as a tool of the creation and implementation of imaginaries; it includes everyday definitions of people living ‘outside’ as being noncivilized, deviant, and so on; this might also imply articulations of the agency of the ‘non-EU’ (see Mälksoo, 2009); both might inform the creation of imaginaries that require a peaceful, consolidated, interactive Neighbourhood. This dialectic does not emerge by chance. It is indebted to the dual nature of in/ visibility itself. On the one hand it is an element of the human condition, as reflected by everyday practices. At a very basic level social identity, building, and the drawing of social boundaries rely on interactive and discursive techniques of producing difference, bias, and (political) relevance. On the other hand, in/visibility is an element of policy making and the political instrumentalizing of social difference. The human condition of appearing and placing oneself in a complex world has been addressed by Hannah Arendt (1998 [1958]). Whether one chooses, depending on the circumstances, to be politically or socially visible, can of course be an individual matter, but the imposition of invisibility can be considered a denial of basic rights to an active political and social life. Hence social research indebted to Arendtian ideas stresses the significance of visibility as a means and an expression of social acceptance and integration (Lollar, 2015). Borren (2008) has suggested that Arendt’s political philosophy can be adapted to criticize European ‘politics of in/visibility’ that disenfranchizes non-citizens through exposing them (as threats) and/or obscuring their claims, problems and, motivations. Moreover, Brighenti (2007) has argued that the relation of social agents to political institutions and power is characterized by mutual attempts at making persons, ideas, and objects selectively invisible or visible so as to achieve strategic or tactical objectives. We assume that by doing so these actors adhere to particular imaginaries which suggest or enforce the implementation of situated in/visibility. In/visibility is thus political in the broadest sense of the word. Framing practices used by the media have strong similarities to more formal policy-making as they both deliberately produce either salience or neglect of events, persons, groups, and issues addressed in public discourse. Privileged subjects and objects of political interest are made visible in ways that best serve particular interests. Powerless subjects and groups tend to be hidden from the public eye and/or their significance be downplayed, so as to prevent them from verbalizing their own interest or stir up debates about social injustice. Related to the European Neighbourhood, such biased framing has a tacit colonial and postcolonial connotation. There is a clear parallel between everyday markers of otherness and the ascription of fundamental non-compatibility to migrants and ‘non-European’ civil society on the one hand, and on the other top-down gazes on non-compliant states and their structural deficiencies that seem to reflect the insinuation of social inferiority communicated by everyday notions of Neighbourhood.

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Neighbourhood and the ‘selective visibilities’ EU geopolitics can be critically assessed by relating the persistent ambiguity between ideational and territorial imaginations to asymmetric interactions between different narratives of Neighbourhood. While the individual discourses aim at the same problem – the regulation of closedness and openness of the external border – they have remained discursively and symbolically separated from one another. The unfolding of ENP and ENPI measures fell into a period characterized by the global financial crisis, the EU’s internal economic crisis, rising north-south development disparities, and civil unrest in the southern Neighbourhood. The 2010–11 outburst of civil resistance and the call for political change in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region precipitated the EU into a political dilemma. This dilemma exemplifies the tension between the territorial and ideational notions of Neighbourhood which had already governed the ENP. A significant part of the dilemma is the contradiction between European and domestic understandings of the role of civil society and the significance of civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for upheaval and protest against totalitarian regimes. The overthrow of dictatorships or corrupt governments in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, and Egypt inspired most political commentators inside the EU, as well as scholars working close to EU institutions, to give euphoric appraisals. There was ample belief in the selfhealing capacities of civil society, much of which allegedly had been inspired by the EU message of preserving human rights and establishing democracy. The civil movement in these countries was considered to be an outcome of a rising collective orientation towards universal values such as democracy, freedom, respect of human rights, the rule of law, and so on – values which were claimed as specifically European and transatlantic. In the debate that followed, both the territorial and idealistic notions of the Neighbourhood became intertwined, the idealistic notion serving as an ideological backlog of the territorial notion which was strengthened by its extension to US strategies in the Middle East. Within this context civil society emerged as a measurable element of local readiness for good relations with the EU, while at the same time the project of building up civil society according to European values was declared a primary target for ENP and combined EU/US geostrategy – a logic that seemed to confuse means and ends. This mingling of cause and effect was a direct outcome of the mixing of territorial and idealistic notions of Neighbourhood; it both served ideological and strategic purposes while playing down the necessity to properly analyse political interests and claims for autonomy uttered by local agents. Many reports and analyses of the role of CSOs in Arab Spring protests were uncritical about possible ideational incompatibilities between the EU’s understanding of civil society and the ambitions developed by local civil agents (see for example Echagüe et al., 2011; van Hüllen, 2012; Dandashly, 2014), although it has repeatedly been noted that EU assistance often resulted in inconsistent

192 Jussi P. Laine and James W. Scott bureaucratic support of uncontroversial rights (Bicchi and Voltolini, 2013; Börzel, Risse and Dandashly, 2014). The alternative interpretations of the role of civil society in the outbreak of the Arabellions were marginalized, such as the argument that they had been a direct reaction of the population to mass impoverization following politically dictated neoliberal reforms in MENA countries (Bergh, 2012, p. 305; Dalmasso, 2014), rather than a struggle for more democratization. Most spectators followed the political presets formulated by the EU. In its institutionalized support of democracy, for example through the European Initiative Democracy and Human Rights, the geostrategic component was temporarily subordinated to the idealistic aim of supporting civil society and creating favourable conditions for the implementation of universal values and good governance (Tömmel, 2013). Intrinsically every claim that was made for human rights and democracy conveyed the hidden agenda of binding civil agents and their countries closer to the EU. The conceptual logic of such a political project has been elaborated only by a small number of critical analyses. Based on her study in Morocco, Dimitrovova (2010, p. 524) describes the nature of civil society as contradictory and changing, ‘which is at times supportive of, at other times hostile or indifferent to, the EU’s democratic and often neo-liberal inspired agenda’. The deep divides between urban and civil society organizations that are close to government elites, and thus have access to ENP, and those CSOs which spontaneously emerge in rural areas seem obvious. Many urban CSOs were established by a middle-class intellectual elite, often involved in the ‘political and administrative machinery of the government,’ some were even founded by political leaders to better popularize their agendas and improve their techniques of political manipulation (ibid, p. 530). In contrast, rural CSOs tend to follow more communitarian approaches, establishing grassroots networks to meet the challenge of poverty and service provision as felt by local communities (Härdig, 2014). When civil societies and their transboundary relations are addressed by the EU or NGOs, this divide is seldom regarded. Europeanized notions of civil society are mostly geared towards the communitarian variant reflecting idealistic notions of grassroots autonomy, self-empowerment, and natural rights as a natural basis of communication and support. However, they often fail to identify such spontaneous CSOs because these hardly have a voice in the domestic political arena. It is the larger national and international NGOs and their proliferation which tend to be recognized as representatives of grassroots movements and a ‘vibrant civil society’ (Jad, 2011, p. 90; Silva, 2013). Hence, it is not surprising that the EU is oriented towards well-established urban CSOs, mistaking their aims and agendas as a representation of grassroots agency. Accordingly, much EU support, especially EU funding, is often channelled through government bodies and thus ends up in pro-government elite circles of the civil society – which finally strengthens the state’s ‘strategies of control and containment of civil society discourses’ (Dimitrovova, 2010, p. 529). EU financial and moral support of local CSOs often puts pressure on them to professionalize and bureaucratize, to the effect that their autonomy from both internal and

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international powers has been reduced (Daniele, 2014, p. 28). European understandings of civil society thus tend to result in a consolidation of the domestic regime which continues to counteract European values, while the very promoters of autonomy, political independence, and self-empowerment are excluded. This neglect of civil society as it operates and is understood locally damages the EU’s claim for liberating the neighbourhood. However, this did not come about by coincidence: Since the ‘quest for freedom’ performed by the civil society is contained in the geostrategic notion of Neighbourhood, it does not make any difference if the outcome of moral-based endeavours really conform to the promises which have been made on the basis of idealistic notions of Neighbourhood. To EU officials it might already suffice to claim that they established good relations and support of ‘the’ civil society of a neighbouring country – and to EU-based CSOs it is often satisfying enough to establish good relationships with CSO elites in the countries involved: Their westernized concepts and ways of communicating are often more formalized and, hence, better compatible with European understandings of international relationships than the mentalities found in grassroots initiatives operating on the basis of a particularized logic of serving local needs. In sum, civil society in the Neighbourhood has been in increasing danger of co-opted within the EU’s geostrategic purposes. Contrary to the EU aspirations, civil society in the neighbourhood countries has been kept at a distance. The geostrategic target of drawing the Neighbourhood closer to the EU has been partially leveraged, which in turn has reduced the broadcasting of idealistic notions of neighbourhood and cooperation particularly with the southern Neighbourhood. The Ukraine conflict then served as a new focus of geostrategic and ideational interest to the EU, which distracted public awareness, and political impulse, from the conflict-laden and unsatisfying situation in the MENA region. The evolution of the hegemonic political logic of creating a territorial belt of ‘compliant civil societies’ has been enabled by the practice of blinding out and making invisible local stakeholders’ situational attempt at political self-reflection and autonomous liberation.

Conclusions The EU has imagined its Neighbourhood in ways that that provide both reactive and accommodating positions for the populations and governments involved. Policy instruments such as the ENP have first set the stage and then have been followed by informal practices seeking to address civil society actors in crisisridden or destabilized countries. In order to establish ‘favourable’ conditions throughout the Neighbourhood, domestic CSOs have been addressed as potential collaborators that might have a positive effect on the rapprochement of ‘their’ regions to the EU. Usually this task of creating the ‘3 Cs’ (compliance, compatibility, and commitment) in the Neighbourhood is performed by social and spatial imaginaries that suggest a natural belonging or focused contribution of local groups to

194 Jussi P. Laine and James W. Scott the European project. The nature of this project, and the objectives that are supposed to be pursued, are politically addressed by references to high moral values that the EU promises to represent. Social imaginaries of frictionless adaptability of European norms and values by agents out of the Neighbourhood serve the purpose of recruiting natural allies. This is a genuinely geopolitical strategy which is by no means new. Only the particular political context requires some modification. It is exactly for such modifications of older geostrategic patterns that politics of in/visibility come in. They serve to establish biased political accounts of the willingness or potential resistance toward the project of creating a peaceful, norm-compatible and cooperative belt of neighbours. Making internationally visible metropolitan CSOs that talk ‘our’ language while obscuring the agency of CSOs and groupings that have different social goals is one way that the EU has attempted to shape neighbouring environments. Imaginaries that imply the question of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ partners contribute much to this end. But also without performing obvious steps of moral polarizing guided by normative EU philosophies, the dividing line made up by targeted in/visibility has an effect that should not be underestimated. It tacitly assumes that there is an element of latent everyday subversion of the Neighbourhood that requires proactive selection. Again, this is the ethically controversial logic of hegemony and power politics, rather than open cultural exchange and mutual respect. One possible means for avoiding neo-colonial reductionism in conceptualizing Neighbourhood relations can be derived from Ellison’s (2003) recipe to regain relational complexity and conceptual openness by making visible the invisibility of others, and one’s own invisibility. This would require a radical deconstruction of political and academic concepts by ‘a ceaseless questioning of those formulas’ through which historians, politicians, sociologists, and minority leaders had described the identity and the relation of minorities to a larger society and culture (ibid, p. 57). To detect invisibilities and question their representation in academic concepts of neighbourhood might be a task of similar importance.

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14 An ethical code for cross-border governance What does the European Union say on the ethics of cross-border cooperation? Elisabetta Nadalutti

Introduction Why is it important to single out a cross-border governance (CBG) ethical code of values in dealing with cross-border cooperation (CBC) issues? This is the main question I will address in this chapter by focusing on CBC in Europe. Blatter (2000) and Scott (2015) have already shown how important values, symbols, ideologies, and belief systems are in shaping and building crossborder networks. However, they do not systematically analyze and define what these values mean and are. Hence, my aim here is to clarify what integration, connectivity, equality in opportunities, trust, and responsibility towards the border people and their common space mean in relation to European crossborder cooperation (COM, 2017a). This chapter outlines an approach for an integrated analysis of economic, social, political, and ethical activities that occur at the border. I will conceptualize cross-border governance ethics as instrumental ethical values for developing authentically human/social relationships of solidarity, trust, responsibility, and reciprocity in harmony with the lived space. By providing a common language of CBC values I try to respond to the call of Directorate General (DG) for Regional and Urban Policy, according to which we should shift from a prevalent economic approach to CBC since ‘ongoing difficulties cannot be addressed through financing and investments alone’ (COM, 2017b, p. 4; Interreg-Interact, 2017). Two main issues contribute presently to the underestimation of a CBC ethical dimension. First, there does not exist any formalized EU cross-border governance ethical code. Surely, the European Commission informally deals with a number of values, such as freedom (freedom to move from one country to another with the opportunity to access health services, harmonized social security systems, or taxation systems), welfare (the border conceived as a ‘common good space’ through sharing services, joint facilities etc.), border citizens as persons with needs (sick people in need of specific treatments), solidarity based on cooperation, joint collaborative activities and participation (through the mobilization of public-private operators at the local/regional level) (COM, 2017a; Committee of

198 Elisabetta Nadalutti the Regions, 2017; Interreg-Interact, 2017). However, COM does not properly spell them out as CBC ethical values within the frame of a CBG-ethical code. Second, CBC is still coordinated by ‘elites’ at the European, national, regional institutional level. Therefore, we witness a ‘top-down’ kind of management of CBC activities rather than a real bottom-up response to them through civil society participation. There is a great concern and focus on improving good governance through institution building capacity, but citizens’ involvement is still neglected (COM, 2018). Stakeholders at the local level and civil society are mainly engaged in the submission of projects, which need to respond to (but not to challenge) the Commission’s financial and bureaucratic expectations. Within this framework, border people are simply at the bottom of CBC activities. They ‘live’ and experience CBC as passive consumers of CBC outcomes and are often unaware that the changes in their cross-border zones typically occur thanks to CBC. The analysis will proceed as follows. I will begin by reviewing European Union’s official documents on cross-border cooperation in order to clarify what values the European level institutions aim to promote and spread through such cooperation. Then I will focus on an ethical approach and will shape a theoretical framework against which the practical CBC activities on the Italy–Slovenia border will be analyzed within the wider framework of Interreg. I have selected this specific case study for historical and geographical reasons, as will be explicated through the analysis. The chapter draws on several research materials and methods. First, I have carried out an extensive document analysis and, second, held 21 qualitative interviews with European Commissioners of the Directorate General (DG) that focus on cooperation. I also interviewed the representatives of the Committee of the Regions (CoR), and the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), as well as national and local/municipal stakeholders and civil society representatives. Interviews were carried out between February 2013 and May 2018 in Italy, Slovenia, Belgium, and Germany.

What is the ethical dimension of CBC according to the European Union? Cross-border regions (CBRs) cross international borders and can typically be considered as the most peripheral areas of two or more neighbouring sovereign states that are separated by a fixed jurisdictional line (De Sousa, 2013, pp. 670–671). De Sousa suggests that they are ‘special areas of fluxes and exchanges of a social, cultural, economic and political nature, a space where the development of multiple activities takes place and where the type and intensity of transactions have evolved in time’ (2013, p. 671). I suggest that CBRs are also ethical places where the subjects of CBC activities should be people who share common problems, interests, and needs. As such, people with their values, norms, and beliefs shape their border space through interaction. According to our analysis, their ‘needs’ have an ethical dimension, since without accomplishing them people are afflicted. And affliction

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negatively influences not only the scale of pleasures, but also it corrodes people’s ‘soul’. As the COM (2017a) points out, integration is the process that helps internal border regions to transform from mainly peripheral areas into areas of growth and opportunities, where joint services and activities develop locally. This process should involve people, their needs, expectations, identities, diversities, and values (Inforegio, 2008) and calls for their active participation in order to manage the shared space of the border. The Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion (COM, 2008) and Regulation (2013) shows that the European Commission has the following aims for cross-border cooperation: to provide a more integrated and inclusive approach to tackling local problems (art. 22), to help regions lagging behind (art. 2) through participation in cooperation programmes (art. 20), and to address common challenges identified jointly in border regions (art. 5). All of this should occur within a social system able to guarantee and promote sustainable and good quality employment and social inclusion, and that is able to fight poverty and any forms of discrimination (Chapter 2, art. 7). It is surprising that although there is a constant ‘informal’ reference to the ethical dimension of cross-border cooperation, the values that underpin CBC are never explicitly mentioned. Moreover, official documents generally denote ‘people’ as ‘human capital’ in a way that, instead of focusing on a ‘person’ with his/her specific needs, refers more to the capacity of people to produce economic value. It is thus obvious that the European Commission has privileged a market-based approach to cross-border cooperation. People are seen to have agency in an economic sense and mainly as consumers of CBC. However, although a DG Commissioner confirmed to me during the interview that ‘the European Union does not have a narrative that addresses the CBC ethical dimension’, it is unanimously recognized that CBC values are important (interview with a CoR member of the President Cabinet, May 2018). Indeed, the ethical value of trust is the layer from where we start from with CBC . . . but we [European Commission] have not defined it yet. Nevertheless, I can say that we have illustrated trust with a number of projects. Projects that were trying to heal the scars of the past. (Interview with a DG Commissioner, May, 2018) In sum, the EU approach to CBC seems to me a paradox. On the one hand, the representatives of the European Commission and other bodies like the Committee of the Regions and Association of European Border Regions, point to the ethical importance of cooperation. This is needed to boost a peaceful way to live together at border areas, and to perceive borders as meeting points where ‘goods’ are common rather than separated and encapsulated within nation-state borders. On the other hand, the EU’s emphasis and action concerns more the economic outcomes of CBC. It seems to me that there are, so far, no European studies that explicitly focus on codifying CBC values and their contributions to the socio-cultural wellbeing

200 Elisabetta Nadalutti of cross-border citizens considered as ‘persons’ who are regarded as ends, rather than means, of CBC. Therefore, the next section will scrutinize CBC actions by enriching the present discourses with a discussion on ethical values that emerge from the philosophical thinking of three authors: Simone Weil, Edith Stein, and Amartya Sen. They all accentuate the importance of joining economic, political and social action with ethics.

An ethical-normative theoretical approach to CBC First, it is important to clarify here the selection of these political philosophers and their particular relevance for CBC. Weil is relevant for her approach, theorization, and understanding of rootedness, especially as elaborated in her work ‘The need for roots’ (1952). I argue that we cannot really grasp the meaning of borders for people without focusing on the way border people are rooted in these specific contexts. Stein’s (1989) ‘On the problem of empathy’ focused on the significance of ‘empathy’, a value that is also necessary in order to develop, promote, and strengthen cooperation. I also contend that Sen’s ‘Development as freedom’ can help us to better understand the meaning of ‘development’, which is one of the goals pursued through cross-border cooperation. In Sen’s conceptualization, development is not narrowed to economic growth only, but refers to citizens’ access to opportunities, values, and norms. A simultaneous reading of Sen’s (1999), Weil’s (1952), and Stein’s (1989) works suggests that the economic systems should be based on an ethic that is people centred and centred on people rooted into society in order to function correctly. By tradition, borders have been perceived and portrayed as either obstacles or opportunities. It is obvious that historical, cultural, and institutional barriers make it difficult to see the border as a common good. However, my argument is that if an empathetic dimension is built in to cross-border cooperation, this will help to develop the awareness of the border also as a common good. Thus the border would not just be a possession of the ‘I’ and ‘you’ in isolation, which corresponds with a typical realistic approach to CBC. The empathic feeling is in line with the conceptualization of rootedness as explained by Weil. First it is recognized that individual agency (‘I’ and ‘you’) is deeply complementary to social arrangements and vice-versa (‘we’). Second, there is the need to ‘have roots by virtue of human beings’ real, active and natural participation in the life of a community which preserves in living shape certain particular treasures of the past and certain particular expectations for the future’ (Weil, 1952, p. 6). Put in another way, the principles of rootedness and empathy could clarify the EU’s motto ‘unity in diversity’. Because we are aware of our identity, culture, and social life, we thus could acquire new values through empathy. When we empathically run into ranges of value closed to us, we become conscious of our own deficiency or disvalue. Every comprehension of

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different persons can become the basis of an understanding of value . . . we learn to see that we experience ourselves as having more or less value in comparison with others. (Stein, 1989, p. 116) Additionally, this reading of CBC leads us to reconsider the importance of national borders as the operationalization of the principle of ‘diversity’. Accordingly, borders bring with them different identities, memories, values, and languages, which are an enrichment to society. Weil also focuses on and explains why and how the values of ‘consent’, ‘love’, and ‘justice’ are linked to the ethical value of ‘freedom to choose and act’. ‘Consent’ presupposes a life that contains motives for consenting, and choosing. ‘Consenting’ links to the principle of ‘obedience’ since there are two main categories of ‘obedience’: one that is consented to and thus presupposes freedom, and the other, which is not based on consent (Weil, 1987, p. 6). In the next section I will provide a summarized view of my conceptualization of the cross-border governance ethical code, which will then be operationalized ‘on the ground’ through the analysis of the case study.

An ethical code for cross-border governance This section aims to explain why CBG-ethical values are necessary for the fulfillment of the aims of cross-border cooperation (Table 14.1). These ethical values summarized in the table are interlinked and support one another. As pointed out by one of the interviewees: . . . cooperation is good because we can highlight what joins, links together several borders rather than those things that divide us. This is achieved through dialogue and by speaking to each other. And this, I think, is the main goal of cooperation. (Interview with an officer in the Joint Technical Secretariat in Trieste, January 2017) This quotation illuminates that people should be the very agents of CBC. Ideally, CBC calls for bottom-up participation that translates into bottom-up action (in other words, to join and find common solution to common problems). Surely, the fact that people join together in communal CBC activities, is owing initially to motivation linked to achieving COM funding through Interreg. Since ‘. . . still today there is no trust in cooperating with people who are just at two kilometers away from your own border. You do not think about cooperation because you had centuries of wars’ (interview with a civil servant in the CoR, May 2018). The European Commission (as well as other European bodies like the Committee of the Regions) is aware of these obstacles to cooperation. Hence its commitment to finance CBC activities. However, there is also the understanding that CBC does not just refer to administrative and legal institutions, but is linked

Table 14.1 Cross-border governance ethical code Ethical Values

Definitions that draw upon the political philosophers analyzed

Human agency/ Participation

‘People have to be seen as being actively involved – given the opportunity in shaping their own destiny’ (Sen, 1999, p. 53). Hence, participation refers to the capability to show and express what we value. As Stein explains, by focusing on people as ‘human agents’ we arrive to form a community that occurs when a ‘subject accepts the other as a subject and does not confront him but rather lives with him and is determined by the stirring of his life’ (2000, p. 130).

Common Good

Corresponds to ‘public good’ that is not ‘nonmarketable’ but has significant influence on our welfare. Moreover, people consume it ‘together’ rather than separately (Sen, 1999). According to Stein, common good develops when I enter in an empathic dialogue with the ‘other’.

Subsidiarity

This is the ethical value not to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can do.

Responsibility

Weil suggests that this is the value of being useful and even indispensable within the social context. Individuals are responsible for ‘social matters’ that are distinct from their personal ones and feel a personal concern for the ‘common good’. Sen and Stein argue that responsibility is to take interest in the life of each other, to be accountable.

Rights/ Obligations

Sharing of reciprocal duties/recognition of specific rights.

Gratuitousness

Based on the logic of gift, it is an expression of social cohesion and solidarity. Weil suggests that gratuitousness fosters and disseminates solidarity and responsibility for justice and the common good among different economic players.

Order

According to Sen order consists in the extensive interconnections between human wellbeing and the fulfillment of economic, social, political needs and freedoms. Weil further clarifies that order is a texture of social relationships such that no one is compelled to violate imperative obligations in order to carry out other ones.

Freedom

According to Sen, freedom refers to development since it removes person’s deprivation. Weil talks about freedom as the ‘need for liberty’ and the ‘power’ to choose in a society where rules (which limit the possibility of choice) are imposed for the common interest.

Consensus/ Obedience

Sen suggests that political freedom is the freedom that people have to choose who should govern and on what principles. Weil clarifies that ‘Consented obedience is what one concedes to an authority because one judges it to be legitimate’ (1952, p. 2).

Trust

According to Sen, trust is at the basis of social interaction and it is the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity. Weil clarifies that trust reinforces and supplements empathy (Stein), and it is backed up by truth. (Continued )

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Table 14.1 (Cont.) Ethical Values

Definitions that draw upon the political philosophers analyzed

Empathy

Stein defines empathy as an irreducible intentional state in which both other persons and the mental states of other persons are given to us. In an empathetic experience, we are presented with not mere bodies in motion, but rather with persons (1989). Empathy is closely linked to rootedness, since ‘reciprocal exchanges by which different cultural environments exert influence on one another are no less vital than the fact to be naturally rooted in one. But a given environment should not receive an outside influence as something additional to itself, but as a stimulant making its own life more intense’ (Weil, 1952, p. 40).

to people who, as agents, shape border spaces through (or without) interaction. During the interviews, I was repeatedly reminded that ‘. . . research led by the COM shows that main obstacles to cooperation are linked to language and cultural obstacles. Without mentioning the lack of trust among border people who are not comfortable to work together’ (interview with a civil servant at the CoR, Brussels, May 2018). It is evident that the European Commission has a normative commitment since it explicitly says that the ‘added value’ of CBC is (among many) to facilitate the sharing of ideas and assets, and to encourage strategic work towards common goals (COM, 2017c; European Regional Development Fund, 2007–2013). Thus people as ‘human agents’ start collaborating in CBC projects. By doing that they build relations based on trust that should develop through shared knowledge. This collaboration would ideally generate a feeling of responsibility towards joint efforts to succeed in achieving project goals. Finally, the ethical outcome is to benefit all. Nevertheless, while the COM is clear about the way the Interreg budget (which amounts to EUR 10.1 billion for the programme 2014–2020) should be invested between regions and territorial, social, and economic partners, it seems to be more nebulous about the ways to achieve ‘ethical’ goals (COM, 2017c). Many interviewed local actors pointed out that the ‘EU directives are so abstract and general that we, civil society, need to interpret them. We need to find a harmonization between EU expectations and border people’s values and needs’ (interview with a Project Lead Partner, April 2018). EU’s civil servants as well as stakeholders repeatedly pointed out that ‘Programme 2014–2020 has a huge focus on economy. The approach is on the return of the investment’ (DG Commissioner, May 2018). Surely, this focus does not help to promote social participation that is effective and dynamic, where individuals come out of their personal interests, become active agents, and feel responsible for the common good. The ethical principle of ‘responsibility’ clearly refers to a ‘true bottom up approach’ to border issues since it implies a face-to-face relationship that can be discovered only after the fact of the encounter (Stein, 2000). Moreover, responsibility towards CBC activities claims for an awareness that includes ‘rights’ linked to ‘obligations’

204 Elisabetta Nadalutti and which respond to specific ‘needs’ rooted in cross-border spaces. This is said on the grounds that rights acquire legitimacy only if related to obligations, since rights are the results of correlated duties (Weil, 1952; Sen, 1999). A dynamic circular relation links obligations to rights. It is through this relationship that ‘responsibility’ can fully develop (Sen, 1999). Operationalized on the ground, the right to be informed about CBC outcomes implies the obligation to search and become aware of these outcomes. Additionally, communication is not a one-way practice but involves active participation and shared knowledge and information among several actors engaged in CBC, who belong to different governmental levels. In other words, there should be a top-down/bottom-up flow of information that is based on the ethical value of responsibility to inform and to develop knowledge. Stakeholders and civil servants repeatedly highlighted this, since ‘. . . you do not communicate from Brussels to the local level. Communication must be managed together and there is shared responsibility in communicating outcomes and best/worst practice. It takes two to tango’ (interview with a DG Commissioner, Brussels, May 2018). This shows that ethical values as subsidiarity, responsibility, and obligation are going hand-in-hand with the multi-level governance (MLG) approach adopted by the COM in relation to the EU Cohesion Policy. Indeed, CBC does not refer only to cooperation practices among actors who belong to different governmental levels, but also to a specific way of living the border. Another important ethical value is gratuitousness, understood here as social solidarity of the third sector. In line with the EU directives on CBC, any economic transaction is not purely monetary but is an opportunity for human interaction; for each party to go beyond what is contractually required so as to create mutual assistance, human development, and goodwill. Thus, although money surely can trigger cooperation (DG Commissioner, Brussels, May 2018; civil servant interviewed for this research), there is also ‘. . . the need of the need to cooperate. Hence, it is essential that local people, municipalities see the advantage to be together. CBC works only if you have a truly win–win formula’ (DG Commissioner, January, 2017). Following Weil’s approach, I suggest that perceiving and living the border as a ‘common good’ is the very operationalization of a ‘win–win’ formula. Indeed, by linking rootedness to the common good, we could feel the territory as a personal interest that we ‘ideally own’. This approach to the border would re-conceptualize CBC joint activities, whose operationalization is presently very problematic. Additionally, ethical values like ‘consent’ that is based on consultation to common activities, ‘justice’ for a good management of the resources, and ‘love’ for the common space would be very important, as will be shown in the analysis of the case study region. We cannot conclude this section before elaborating more on the ‘relationship’ ‘obedience-consensus’ that should be linked to ‘trust’ and ‘loyalty’. If these values are not integrated in CBC and there is a disagreement, for instance on managing resources, finding an agreement on projects to be

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funded because of the rise of local and private interests, then cooperation can not only be negatively influenced in its outcomes, but also be deprived from its original meaning.

A normative-ethical analysis of cross-border cooperation in the Upper Adriatic Region A brief historical overview of the research area The following empirical analysis focuses on the border area located between the Italian region Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (FVG) and the state of Slovenia in the Upper Adriatic area of Europe. This specific border zone is by no means homogeneous in terms of population, geography, and economic capacity. Nowadays, the inhabitants of this area include Slovenophone residents in the Friuli-VeneziaGiulia region, an Italophone minority in Slovenia, and a number of ‘new’ ‘ethnic groups’ that have recently emerged as minorities, such as the Friulan people. These groups play an important role in shaping cross-border governance and in influencing socio-economic integration (Nadalutti, 2015). Moreover, FVG and Slovenia share a very closed and interlinked history that still influences cooperation in the present day. As remarked by one interviewee: ‘History is still very alive here. And the emotional side of the border has surely its weight in cross-border cooperation’ (interview in Italy with a project lead partner, April 2018). Indeed, during World War II the border between Italy and Slovenia was torn apart. The end of the war left deep scars related to how the territory was divided. Hatred between the two countries arose due to diasporas and ethnic issues1 that are still not fully solved.2 Since 1989 the European Commission has launched three Interreg Community Initiatives (1989–1993; 1994–1999; 2000–2006) to promote CBC, as well as to construct and shape a different political-economic-institutional-social dimension in Europe by acting directly at the level of sub-state actors (Perkmann, 2003). The then European Community (EC) aimed to tackle the structural development difficulties of border areas, which were defined primarily in economic and environmental terms. For the period 2007–2013, Interreg become an objective of ‘European territorial cooperation’ and it was informally known as Interreg IV. We have now entered the new phase of Interreg V with the 2014–2020 programme, which aims at achieving the strategic goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (Inforegio, 2008). Growth here refers to targeting and fighting poverty and social exclusion, to promoting development and education, and to boosting employment. Although at the time of writing we are in the year 2018, the Programme 2014–2020 has started only now due to several bureaucratic and management delays. Therefore, the next section will focus both on the concluded 2007–2013 programme, and partly on the new Programme 2014–2020.

206 Elisabetta Nadalutti Human agency, participation, common good and subsidiarity Generally, Objective 2007–2013 ended by highlighting the importance of working more concretely in order to build a border community that ‘shares values, understands each other language, and where people trust each other’ (interview with a DG Commissioner, January 2017). It is obvious that the European Commission aims at creating a ‘cross-border community’ through promoting cross-border cooperation. As Stein argues, people as ‘human agents’ can form a community that is an organic union of individuals. In this kind of community, where empathy is important on the grounds that the individuals need to accept one another, solidarity may prevail. In order to build a cross-border community that draws on ethical values such as participation, agency, empathy, and solidarity, there is the need to strengthen, promote, and invest in people-to-people projects. Such small-scale projects have been recognized as successful instruments for sustainable regional development of cross-border areas, instruments that create added value (interviews; Committee of the Regions, 2017; AEBR, 2016). However, as one local stakeholder pointed out: It is true that people-to-people projects are very important, but they take too much time from the managing authority, the secretariat, the monitoring committee. Thus there is no space for these projects. This is due to the fact that the Commission has not foreseen them in the operational programme as projects “per se”, even in the new Programme 2014–2020. There is a contradiction in Brussels, because on the one hand the Commission supports these projects and thus their added value; but on the other, it agrees that people-to-people projects are not included in the operational programmes. (Interview with a Slovenian stakeholder, January 2017, Slovenia) This interview representatively voices the local malaise linked to the fact that the European Commission does not make any distinction between people-to-people (P2P) projects (in other words, small projects) and strategic projects (macroprojects), which are different in size, budget, duration and content (Committee of the Regions, 2017). As pointed out by the representative of the CoR, P2P projects are not anchored in the Commission’s regulations. Following Sen’s theorization (1999), we could suggest here that participants in CBC projects as well as in the administrative level are ‘deprived’ of the ‘freedom’ to apply these smaller projects that could potentially lead to best qualitative results in CBC. Conversely, the main concern is about the financial management of the projects. This case study shows that a kind of intergovernmental, rather than cross-border, logic emerges from the regional and local level. As pointed out by the Management Authority (MA) in Trieste, ‘the way of thinking [of] the programme is still national’ (interview with a MA stakeholder, May 2017, Italy). For instance, a Slovenian officer from the Republic of Slovenia clearly stated that relations with the MA in Trieste are nowadays ‘not very good’ and

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that Slovenia was suggested to become MA for the 2014–2020 Programme. It was put forward ‘that it would have been better to have the headquarters of the MA in Ljubljana, not in Stanjel’3 (interview in Slovenia, February 2017). We are aware that actors who belong to different governmental levels, who can be private or public, respond and probably perceive CBC differently. However, what concerns us here is the fact that CBC values seem to be lost because of administrative hindrances, rivalries, competition, and nationalistic attitudes to CBC. This quotation, for instance, shows on the one hand how (personal) relations between Slovenian and Italian officials who manage the programme at the administrative level are not presently optimal. On the other hand, the Republic of Slovenia clearly seems to have a national approach to CBC, by wanting to transfer the MA headquarters to the capital of the state. It was not a surprise to me that this kind of solution was suggested, since the State of Slovenia disagreed with the way the MA managed Italy-Slovenia 2007–2013. Presently, the European Commission has reconfirmed Trieste as MA for Interreg 2014–2020. This decision was certainly not based on consensus among Italian and Slovenian actors, but rather on the COM pressure to accept its final decision. In order to overcome this lack of empathy among Italian–Slovenian actors and to re-build dialogue, actors at the administrative level are ‘organizing several joint meetings. Hence, we (Slovenians and Italians) may find an agreement during these meetings. However, it often happens that what we consented to in an informal meeting is then not agreed in the plenary session’ (interview with a Slovenian stakeholder, February 2017, Slovenia). This excerpt shows at first that ‘consensus’ is difficult to achieve and second, that responsibility towards the programme is weak. It became clear to me that the lack of an agreement during these meetings created delays for the whole programme. Accordingly, these delays negatively influenced the activities of the actors who were working on projects, and created a domino effect. I will focus on this effect in the next section. Order, consensus/obedience, empathy It is thus obvious that consensus among actors who manage CBC in the Italy– Slovenia area is weak at the administrative level. Border activities are not felt yet as ‘common’ activities. An interviewee stated that though CBC has developed stronger linkages and relations across the border, this ‘does not mean to join together in order to face a common cross-border challenge’ (interview with an Italian local civil servant, February 2017) through a common agreed strategy. By referring to the management of the funds, a Slovenian civil officer explained: The MA in Trieste looked at the ways to use all the money, and reallocate the money also when the project was concluded. The Slovenian state instead pushed in order to conclude the Programme 2007–2013 as soon as possible. (Interview in Slovenia, February, 2017)

208 Elisabetta Nadalutti As Table 14.1. displays, two important ethical values that should back up crossborder cooperation are ‘consensus’ and ‘obedience to rules’, especially in CBC activities that should be ‘joint activities’ that should provide an overall order. It is not surprising, then, that the lack of these values undermine other values like trust, responsibility, freedom and empathy. Weil (1952) warns that human beings who do not fully accomplish obligations contribute to creating imperfections in the social order. The quotation above refers to the MA activities to escape the risk of the EU rule of decommitment. This refers to the principle according to which the ‘. . . Commission shall automatically decommit any part of a commitment which has not been settled by the payment on account or for which it has not received an acceptable payment application’ (COM Regulation No. 188/2013). Nevertheless, the decommitment rule hit the Italy–Slovenia area during the Programme 2007–2013 and generated a feeling of panic and alarm between beneficiaries as well as a general lack of trust and confidence towards those institutions that dealt with the programme. Concisely, the Friuli-Venezia-Giulia region had a budget of EUR 303 million allocated by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF) within Programme 2007–2013. However, the whole budged has been reduced to EUR 233 million according to the regional resolution no. 2442/2013 (Repubblica Italiana, 2016), which explains how several activities have been cancelled due to ‘procedural and operational problems’ (ibid. p. 48). By doing this, the FVG region and thus the MA were able to declare that finally 90% of the resources provided by the Programme 2007–2013 were spent, rather than only 60% of it. The diffused feeling of uncertainty, lack of trust, and fear caused by this action had repercussions on the way actors perceive CBC. If we analyse the above ‘decommitment’ action in the light of the CBG-ethical code, we can say that the actors engaged in cross-border cooperation activities were not able to internalize the ethical value of subsidiarity, since decisions have been made by elites only. Border citizens received only partial information on the state of the art regarding the management of the funds. Because of this, the value of freedom was at stake. Local actors did not have the freedom to choose to actively engage and participate in CBC projects in order to avoid the decommitment rule and to spend the money of the programme. Instead of working jointly, each actor seemed to be autonomous from the other. Finally, by undervaluing the processes of mutual knowledge that could be boosted through P2P projects, the implementation of Art. 19 of Regulation 1080/ 2006, which addresses beneficiaries that belong to at least two countries and who should promote cooperation based on joint development, joint implementation, joint staffing, and joint financing, is extremely difficult. A local civil servant clearly pointed to this as follows: There was this agency on the Italian part which was leading the Italian part of the project. We [Slovenians] were leading ours. Each of us managed its own bit. We initially wanted to integrate these two parts. Nevertheless, it was impossible (Interview with a civil servant, November 2017, Slovenia)

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Conclusion I started my analysis by asking whether cross-border cooperation is underpinned by a cross-border governance ethical code. I argued that because CBC governance is linked to people-to-people relations, and to how people’s life could be improved thanks to, because of, and through CBC, an ethic of CBC in border zones should be better spelled out, formalized, and operationalized both in official documentation and on the ground. We have seen that while economic and bureaucratic aspects of cross-border cooperation are highly formalized, the ethical dimension of CBC is not. Its ‘human’ dimension is lost in bureaucracy and money management. This approach to CBC leads to the distortion of the true meaning of cooperation, causing it to be mainly ‘consumeristic’ from people’s side. Respectively, people are detached from CBC activities, and there is a general lack of information, both top-down and bottom-up. The reinforcement of a CBG-ethical code to CBC would clarify the ethical problems of CBC and the need to develop an empathic relationship between the people of the border, administrative and managerial bodies, and the different governmental levels that are actively engaged in CBC. This is vital for developing joint projects that can be successfully reinforced on the ground, so that the people belonging to one state experience CBC problems and difficulties mutually with their neighbours. In other words, there is an acute need to feel like members of a cross-border community. Unfortunately, cross-border zones are still perceived as state-bound, rather than as a ‘common good’ that crosses the border. Hence, I have two recommendations that are linked with two requirements at the border. First, there is a need to become conscious of what CBC implies from an ethical perspective. Second, there is a need to focus on knowing well each other’s ‘national-rooted’ communities in order to move to a ‘cross-border-rooted’ community that would implement both cross-border beliefs and cross-border interests.

Interviews Civil Servant, Committee of the Regions (December 2018). Brussels. Belgium. Civil Servant, Republic of Slovenia, Government Office for Development and European Cohesion Policy (February 2017). Stanjel. Slovenia. Civil Servant, EGTC-GO (February 2017). Gorizia. Italy. Civil Servant, Municipality of Gorizia (February 2017). Italy. Civil Servant, Member of the MA (May 2017). Trieste. Italy. Civil Servant, Joint Technical Secretariat (January 2017). Trieste. Italy. Civil Servant, Municipality of Nova-Gorica (November 2017). Slovenia. Civil Servant, Regional Development Strategy of Northern Primorska Nova Gorica (November 2017). Slovenia. Civil Servant, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri Dipartimento per le Politiche di Coesione (February 2018). Rome. Italy.

210 Elisabetta Nadalutti Civil Servant, Comitato delle Regioni (Assmbly of Regions) (February 2018). Rome. Italy. Civil Servant, Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale (February 2018). Rome. Italy. Civil Servant, CoR, EGTC (May 2018). Brussels. Belgium. CoR Member of the President Cabinet (May 2018). Brussels, Belgium. DG Commissioner, EC Unit of Cross-Border Cooperation, DG Regio (January 2017). Brussels. Belgium. DG Commissioner, Communication Unit, DG Regio (May 2018). Brussels. Belgium. DG Commissioner, member of the Unit ‘European Cross-Border Cooperation’, DG Regio (January 2018). Brussels. Belgium. DG Commissioner, DG Region and urban Policy (January 2017). Brussels. Belgium. Member of Staff, Association of European Border Regions (April 2016/December 2017). Berlin. Germany. Project Lead Partner (April 2018). Trieste. Italy. Stakeholder, EUroservis (December 2016). Trieste. Italy. Stakeholder, Ex-member of the Joint Technical Secretariat in Trieste (January 2017). Slovenia.

Notes 1 Trieste was occupied for 42 days by Slovenians troops. During that period Tito’s troops killed an unknown number of Italians in the Karst foibe. A number estimated at between 200,000 and 300,000 Italians left the Slovene Littoral and Istria during and after the war in order to escape Tito’s communist regime. On the other hand, during fascism, Slovenes were not allowed to speak their language. In 1975 the Treaty of Osimo presupposed extensive cross-border economic and cultural cooperation of Italian and Slovenian minorities with their national societies. 2 2001, Italy adopted Law 38 which recognized 32 Slovenophone communities in FriuliVenezia-Giulia. 3 Stanjel is the village where the Slovene Infopoint is located. It is the Republic of Slovenia Government Office for Development and European Cohesion Policy.

References AEBR. (2016). People-to-People Projects. Gronau, Germany. [pdf] Available at: www.aebr. eu/files/publications/130416_Argumente_Kleinprojekte_EN.pdf. Blatter, J. (2000). Emerging trans-border regions as a step towards sustainable development. International Journal of Economic Development. Volume 2(3), 402–439. COM. (2008). Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion. Brussels. [pdf] Available at: http://ec. europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/consultation/terco/paper_terco_en.pdf. COM. (2017a). 534 final. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Boosting growth and cohesion in EU border region. 307 final. [online] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX% 3A52017DC0534.

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15 The role of ‘nature’ at the EU maritime borders Agency, ethics, and accountability1 Estela Schindel

Introduction: deterrence and exposure It has been observed worldwide that dissuasive measures, no matter how harsh, do not deter potential immigrants from trying to cross borders. Deterrence is not only ineffective, but also fatal since most migrants or refugees are not dissuaded but instead risk the travel in more precarious conditions and through longer and more dangerous routes (Mountz, 2013; Nevins, 2002). This became clear in the wake of ‘Operation Gatekeeper’ implemented at the Mexican–US border in the 1990s, which included the erection of a wall, among other securitization measures. This forced migrants to take alternative routes through the desert, where they were exposed to the elements, such as extreme heat or cold, dangerous rivers, attacks by wild animals, or physical collapse caused by hunger, thirst, or exhaustion. In Europe, most border-related deaths are similarly due to increased exposure to environmental conditions like extreme temperatures or dangerous seas, to bodily exhaustion, or to a combination of the two, like drowning, dehydration, asphyxia, or hypothermia.2 The lack of reliable information and of standardized criteria and definitions for what counts as a borderrelated death is a big problem for the question of accountability. But beyond the quantitative assessment of the deaths at the border, there is a qualitative element that needs to be addressed: how can accountability be tracked in complex border contexts? When border areas are the object of more intensified surveillance, migrants – and their facilitators’ networks – look for alternative routes, which are usually more deadly, since they imply an increased exposure to environmental risks. This chapter engages with the role of such environmental factors in clandestine border crossing, and addresses the question of how the realm constructed as ‘nature’ can be included in reflections on the ethics and mobilities. A closer analysis of what we consider ‘nature’, therefore, is key to understanding the problem of responsibility and accountability for the deaths at the EU borders: who is to account for lives lost due to intensive exposure to the elements, and how? What role do environmental factors play in those deaths and how can this be analytically grasped? To what extent are geographical, topographical, oceanographic, meteorological, and physiological features part of the calculations and strategies of

‘Nature’ at the EU maritime borders 213 border surveillance and control (border struggles)? What migrant subjectivities and ethical considerations are at stake? My claim is that a framing of ‘nature’ that places those factors as external to history, politics, and society, plays a decisive role in blurring accountability for the deaths at Europe’s sea borders. What in Western eyes may seem like open, ‘borderless’ spaces, like deserts, mountains, or seas, become active agents in the practices of border enforcement and border crossing. The ways in which allegedly ‘natural’ factors are imbricated in the long chains of causes that lead to border-related deaths need therefore to be disentangled and exposed. This chapter is based empirically on material collected during fieldwork at the Greek–Turkish maritime border zone between 2013 and 2016. Micro-sociological observations, semi-structured interviews, and conversations were conducted on the Greek islands Lesvos (years 2013, 2014); Chios and Samos (2015); and Kos and Leros (2016), as well as on the Turkish coast around Ayvalik (2014) and Bodrum (2016). Altogether I spoke with more than seventy people, including members of Frontex, the Hellenic Coast Guard, international organizations, and NGOs active in the field, as well as with activists, politicians, journalists, members of the local population, and persons in transit. The observations included visits to ships, ports, local government sites, registration centers for persons in transit, activists, and NGO offices, and the coastal areas affected by the illegalized crossings. The designation ‘persons in transit and seeking for international protection’ is, in my view, the most appropriate to define the situation of the people I interviewed during their journey to continental Europe, and whose border crossings I aim to scrutinize. While many of them may apply for asylum, it is unclear yet whether they are to be regarded as ‘migrants’ or ‘refugees’ – a distinction that in the current situation needs to be regarded critically (see Schindel, 2017). Even though they designate different situations, for style reasons all through this chapter they are indistinctly referred to as ‘illegalized’ or ‘unwanted’ ‘travellers’, ‘refugees’, ‘migrants’, or ‘border crossers.’ The use of the term ‘illegalized’ instead of ‘illegal’ aims at making explicit the societal phenomenon that renders certain border crossers as ‘illegal’: The term stresses that their condition of ‘illegality’ is not inherent but produced by certain visa and border regimes, which close up all legal channels for applying for asylum or migration. Border crossers are therefore being labelled as ‘illegal’ before they have the chance to legally claim their status as refugees (Bauder, 2013; Weber and Pickering, 2011).

Practices of border crossing: deserts, islands, seas In the context of a volume aimed at discussing mobilities in migration and tourism, it is particularly relevant to point out the extent to which traffickers, or facilitators, organize their businesses and sell their services in ways that resemble travel agencies. The terms facilitators, smugglers, or traffickers, referring to the persons providing clandestine transport services to Europe, are not equivalent and imply different interpretations of their task. In their narratives of the border crossing from the Turkish coast to the Greek islands, migrants and refugees

214 Estela Schindel usually referred to them as ‘agents’. At least until the establishment of the EU– Turkey agreement in 2016 (which allows for deporting migrants back to Turkey and partially curbed the number of crossings), illegalized border crossers spoke of traffickers and their commissioners openly offering catalogues with pictures of the available vessels and their prices around certain streets in Izmir and Istanbul. As with the tourist industry, there were offers tailored for all budgets. Only in this market, risk, duration, and physical difficulty of the crossing are the main variables that compose the price, together with the condition of the boat. The cost is determined in great part by the geographical distance between the Turkish coast and the island of choice, the strength of the current, and the roughness of the sea in that precise part of the Aegean, the seasonal weather and the intensity of the wind, as well as the various topographical conditions both for departure and arrival. Other factors influencing the market price are the conditions on the islands that await the travellers, and the distance that the newly arrived will need to walk, exhausted and wet, to the next police station in order to receive documentation allowing them to register and, hopefully, continue the journey. Samos, for instance, is the closest of all the Greek islands to Turkey. Nowhere is insular Europe closer to the Asian continent than here: only two kilometers separate it from the Turkish coast at its easternmost tip. However, according to the divers and emergency teams that rescue migrants lost at sea, here it is not the sea itself but the shoreline that is more dangerous. The crossing to Samos is riskier because of the coast’s rocky profile, where travellers often get trapped, or get lost on the island before finding a road leading to an inhabited area. For these reasons Samos is ‘sold’ as a cheaper destination by the facilitating networks, for instance, in comparison to the journey from Cesme to the soft beaches of the island of Chios, where none of my interviewees in 2015 had seen or heard of a fatal crossing. At the same time, though, the open sea between Chios and Turkey is rougher and potentially more dangerous than the more protected strait waters which, further north, separate the Turkish continent from the island of Lesvos, making the ride again more potentially dangerous. Compensating for the riskier sea crossing in terms of maritime conditions, in Chios the arrival is relatively smooth and the main road is close, so that the city is more easily reached. Lesvos, on the other hand, is not only close but also has favourable winds from the north. It is also a much bigger island and for those arriving by boat the walk to the capital Mytilini can be sixty kilometers long. Migrants and those who facilitate their journeys must consider oceanographic, geographical, topographical, and meteorological factors, together with the technical aspects of the shape and structure of the boats, into their calculations and strategies. Thus, facilitators charge according to the strain, duration, and risk of the route, which in turn also shapes the patterns of the Hellenic Coast Guard’s surveillance of the border area. However, this does not mean that those factors are neutral, passive, or objective conditions. Indeed, this is a politically crafted assemblage of deterrence and augmenting of environmental risks, which tends to be obscured by its displacement into a zone allegedly external to society.

‘Nature’ at the EU maritime borders 215 Environmental factors play a decisive role in the logistics and practice of clandestine border crossings. The very fact that people on the move need to resort to clandestine routes should not be naturalized, but rather placed in relation to the larger regulatory framework that often does not leave them any other alternative. In the North Aegean area, trips between the Turkish and the Greek coasts may take about an hour and a half by ferry, an hour by catamaran, and even less with a speedboat. Migrants need much longer, sometimes twice as long, to reach the coast, and may spend up to twelve hours on the water trying to reach the European shore – either because they take less patrolled coasts, try to elude successive Greek and Turkish border ships that push them back, or because they get lost at sea after having paid a much higher price than the regular commercial ticket for a ferry crossing, or even a flight. In my fieldwork, fishers and migrants referred to cases where groups looking to cross over to Greece ended up abandoned on some deserted beach on the Turkish coast instead of being taken to an island, or they were left unbeknownst to them on an inhabited island. Boats that were pushed back to Turkey would be left stranded at some wild area of the coast with little possibility of reaching a town or even a street. In all these instances, stories of survival out in the open and in extreme conditions were relayed. There were stories about lighting fires in order to call attention, about getting sick from eating wild fruits or drinking human fluids, about lying completely soaked on a wet ground, extreme situations of hunger, thirst, and cold. Such situations evoke archaic images of what the West ascribes to pre-technological, or pre-civilized conditions. Yet these circumstances are all but ‘natural’ in the sense of extra-societal; they are the product of a politically crafted assemblage of the convergence of technologies, policies, and the environment in creating the conditions for clandestine border crossing, pushing the unwanted travellers to such unprotected realms. In addition, the ‘push back’ manoeuvers of the coast guard ships create or extend the risks of their journey. Since the travellers are determined not to go back to Turkey, they stay longer out on the water, looking for more convoluted routes to avoid the patrols and thus increasing their exposure to the elements. These practices suggest that border enforcement is tending towards a displacement of agency into what could at first sight be called, generally, the realm of ‘nature.’ This encompasses the environmental factors that increasingly shape and condition the logistics of illegalized border crossing. A deeply rooted view in Western cultures and sciences assumes that such factors are a sort of given, and conceives of nature as the opposite to culture and civilization. The stark distinction between ‘nature’ as ‘nonhuman’ and ‘human’ has been asserted since the Renaissance, when humans radically distanced themselves from nature, and created a system explicitly devoid of human participation and restricted from accessing the realm of history (Evernden, 1992; Ferkiss, 1993; Jonas, 1982). This separation assumed a strict exemption, excluding characteristics of humans from the domain of nature: ‘a world devoid of the properties we associate with humans – in short, devoid of subjectivity’ (Evernden, 1992, p. b50). The epistemic separation between biological and social realms, however, has been the object of much scholarly refutation. Writing from quite different perspectives,

216 Estela Schindel authors as diverse as Karl Marx and Martin Heidegger questioned the notion of nature as something ‘just lying there’ and purported that nature did not exist as such until humans worked on it, not simply subduing nature through technology, but creating nature as such in the first place (Marx as referred to by Ferkiss, 1993, p. 100; Heidegger, 1990 [1953]). The very concept of the human, for Agamben (2004), is the product of an ‘anthropological machine’ that relentlessly drives us apart, in our capacity for self-knowledge, from the continuum of organic life. In words of Bruno Latour, there is no universal, unique, transhistorical definition of what is ‘nature’ but ‘natures-cultures’ altogether (Latour, 1993, p. 105). ‘Nature’ is not a given, pre-existent realm that precedes or is external to culture and society, but a socially and culturally constructed notion that has evolved throughout history and is subjected to social and political constrains. In their apparent neutrality, however, environmental factors play a role in border-related deaths through diversified forms of displaced, mediated, indirect, or nonhuman agency. Geographical scholarship has emphasized the need to pay attention to the role of the biological, environmental, and material in the context of a ‘post-human geopolitics’ (Dittmer, 2013). State borders, circulation, and mobility are being increasingly conceived of as complex assemblages that are composed of more than just the material, but also of interrelations of physical systems and human politics (Dittmer, 2013; Salter, 2013; Walters, 2011). The role of nonhuman actors in geopolitical processes and, specifically, in the context of border enforcement, has been put forward in the case of deserts, rivers, and animals at the US–Mexican border by several authors (for example, Doty, 2011; Squire, 2014; Sundberg, 2011). Juanita Sundberg cites abundant evidence of ‘the deterrence function ascribed to nature’ by scholars and shows how US border enforcement has admittedly relied on ‘geography itself’ as a deterrent, treating ‘rivers, mountains, and deserts as objects of geopolitical calculation and instruments of enforcement.’ (Sundberg, 2011, p. 323) For this author, environmental features cannot thus ‘be backdrops to (geo) political affairs but are integral to and constitutive of them’ (Sundberg, 2011, p. 332). Writing about the US–Mexican border, Roxanne Lynn Doty has claimed that the ‘raw physicality’ of environments like the desert is mobilized by social and political powers in forms that occlude their workings, thus presenting border-related deaths as due to ‘natural causes’ (Doty, 2011, p. 607). Just like the maritime and insular condition in the Aegean sea border, the physical forces of the desert are used as a ‘moral alibi’ that allow border enforcement authorities to displace responsibility for such deaths. What does this mean in terms of ethics and accountability? How to grasp conceptually the role that ‘natural’ factors increasingly play at the illegalized border crossings?

Pushed back to ‘nature’: geographies of non-accountability and neo-refoulement The ‘push back’ operations consists of manoeuvers where migrants’ boats are forced back, either to their port of origin, to another destination outside the EU, or to remote areas of the sea. These actions have been criticized for

‘Nature’ at the EU maritime borders 217 blocking asylum-seekers from claiming protection, thus violating international and European asylum law, such as the prohibition of refoulement.3 The principle of non-refoulement is meant to protect the right of persons seeking asylum against being ‘rejected, returned, or expelled’ in ways that would compel them to remain in or to return to a territory where they may face a threat of persecution to life, physical integrity, or liberty (Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 2003, p. 150). The terms of the threat against which the international treatises protect are described as if proceeding exclusively from either a state or a de-facto political force. Therefore, they protect from persecution from a concrete agent. However, the convention for the protection of refugees does not address the eventuality that travellers are just abandoned to their fate out in the open, where they are forced to survive in conditions that the West equates to a ‘pre-civilized’ state. There is no specification about the action of expelling refugees into zones of exposure to environmental dangers or to the point of physical collapse. There seems to be neither an adequate legal nor theoretical framework for the action of being pushed back ‘into the elements.’ And this is what has been happening consistently in the North Aegean, according to my interviews, between 2013 and early summer 2015. Push back manoeuvers force travellers to keep navigating without being able to reach the coast. In words of a local politician, Turkish and Greek patrol coast ships would ‘play ping pong’ with the dinghy boats, either pushing them away from their territorial waters or just leaving them to their fate in unseaworthy boats. A high official of the Greek Coast Guard referred with pride, in 2013, to how now there were migrants’ boats that would sail from Turkey directly to Italy, in order to ‘bypass’ the control of their patrolling ships; in other words, making the maritime routes longer, more convoluted, and therefore much riskier. Weber and Pickering (2011) frame this as ‘strategies of non-arrival’ and stress that they play a role in exposing unwanted travellers to a higher risk of death. For these authors, the explanation for these deaths is linked to complex chains of responsibility and accountability, but the state is the primary actor involved. Whether an unwanted outcome or the product of a rather systematic procedure, they argue, death by environmental factors should be traced back to political decisions, for they are not only foreseeable but also a consequence of border protection policies. How can political responsibility, accountability, and ethics, be brought into this picture? To what extent is the non-refoulement legislation actually up-to-date in contemporary border control configurations, where abandonment to such zones of exposure and active practices of rejection may coexist and entangle with each other? Alison Mountz (2011, 2013) has shown the way in which geography is used to inhibit and undermine the spaces of asylum on islands, and is included in deterrence politics as a form of ‘neo-refoulement’. In this way ‘states use geography to subvert international refugee law’ through the ‘many ways in which distance mediates claimants’ access’ particularly in islands (Mountz, 2011, pp. 120–121). In another work, Hyndman and Mountz (2008) characterize

218 Estela Schindel strategies employed by the Australian government and the EU based on ‘legal and extra-legal geographies of exclusion’ as ‘neo-refoulement’: a set of geographical projects that make access to asylum impossible. By this term the authors mean the return of asylum seekers and other migrants to transit countries or regions of origin before they even reach the sovereign territory in which they could make a claim. While externalization practices are not particularly new, they argue, this deliberate re-spatialization of asylum deserves more attention, given its increasingly commonplace use. Thus the question here is whether and how the notion of neo-refoulement as conceived by Alison Mountz can be expanded in order to include processes like the ones described here. The use of the environmental forces in deterrence practices and, indirectly, as a killing device, constitutes in my view another form of infringing the right to reach a territory of asylum. A refoulement where unwanted travellers are being pushed back not to a third country, but to zones of abandonment to the elements that, far from being ‘natural’, are politically crafted. The case of the so called ‘left-to-die-boat’, when 63 people died of hunger and thirst in an area of the Mediterranean that was heavily monitored by military and commercial ships can be seen as a precedent of a pattern that can be found elsewhere: the apparent lack of agency for deaths that were caused by ‘abandonment’ to the elements and being left to their own fate (Heller et al., 2014). Although there was no active ‘push back’ operation, the principle of denying rescue and letting unwanted migrants die relies on a similar displacement of agency towards apparently ahistorical and apolitical forces. Based on the ancient Greek terms for ‘life,’ Giorgio Agamben (1998) distinguishes between the qualified life of a citizen with rights (bios) and mere biological existence (zoe). According to Agamben, modern (bio)politics produces ‘bare life’: a zone of indistinction between zoe and bios. Under this condition, zoe can be politically produced at any time: forms of life where biological survival can be politically crafted. This liminal condition is located between the citizenship of rights and the individual who lacks civil guarantees. Following these concepts, those illegalized migrants who are pushed to take longer routes and spend long periods of time in the open, whether on land or sea, are being displaced into such a zone of mere biological subsistence and deprived of the rights of qualified citizenship. They are abandoned to the zone of indistinction between zoe (biological existence) and bios (a politically qualified life) that Agamben calls ‘bare life’ where the existence is reduced to biological survival. A person who has fallen into this zone has no civil value; it is an existence exposed to death without cultural, legal, or religious inscription. For Agamben, the condition of bare life implies an abandonment to the sovereign power. In this case, however, the abandonment and exposure are extended to the force of the elements, in direct contact with environmental or physiological processes. While for Agamben the juridical political structure where the biopolitical relationship between sovereign and bare life takes place is the concentration camp, diverse studies have shown how this structure can and should be considered also in relation to borders and mobility (Salter, 2008; Vaughan-Williams, 2009, 2012).

‘Nature’ at the EU maritime borders 219 Furthermore, the particularity of the insular condition reproduces and geographically broadens the precariousness and isolation of persons seeking international protection, moving the processing of the application to the very margins of the sovereign territory (Mountz, 2011, pp. 120–121). By being pushed into a realm of mere survival, the life of irregular border crossers is taken beyond the threshold of animalization (Agamben, 1998), to a zone of mere biological existence that has been politically produced. Push back operations that force unwanted migrants to navigate adrift, therefore increasing their exposure to environmental risks, also mask shipwrecks and deaths at sea as events deprived of agency, thus obscuring political accountability by underlining the supposed neutrality of environmental factors. It is not as citizens of rights, but by their biological existence that migrants become the object of humanitarian protection when rescued or assisted. Once again, they are assimilated to a condition that drives them closer to ‘nature’, to the realm of the biological, and further away from the world of guarantees and rights. But how are the entanglements of ‘culture’ and ‘nature’ that emerge through such practices to be conceptually grasped? How do they relate to problems of ethics, accountability, and injustice at the border of the EU?4

Conclusions: accountability, ethics, and re-politicization of ‘nature’ Environmental factors like geomorphology, topography, and weather are part of the border assemblages and imbricated in the complex chains of responsibility and accountability for migrants’ deaths (Weber and Pickering, 2011), as well as new configurations of what Hyndman and Mountz (2008) have termed neorefoulement. However, a widespread de-historicized and de-politicized construction of ‘nature’ conceals the moral responsibility behind the lethal condition of the borders by displacing agency towards these supposed neutral forces. Accountability and ethics are notions that are still strongly linked to human subjectivity, intention, and consciousness. In this view, they cannot thus be ascribed to the environmental forces usually associated to ‘nature’. While the Western tradition of sharply dividing ‘nature’ from society and culture has been deconstructed scholarly, as I exposed above, I sustain that the consequences of this construction of ‘nature’ as external to society and ‘neutral’ is still productive, both materially and symbolically, in the workings of EU border enforcement that pushes illegalized migrants to increased environmental and physiological risks. The displacement of crossing routes into realms constructed as those of ‘nature’ allows for the displacement and blurring of the accountability for border-related deaths. This has not only concrete material and practical consequences for illegalized travellers, but also symbolic and cultural implications. The creation of zones of biopolitical exposure, or the mobilization of environmental forces for practices of deterrence and neo-refoulement, is consistent with other operations through which unwanted border crossings are being symbolically produced in continuity or contiguity to ‘nature’ through the border regime (Schindel, 2016). The

220 Estela Schindel material displacement of migrants to a zone of exposure to the elements, or bare life, is complemented and informed by discourses that construct migration as close to and in a continuum with the realm of nature, in opposition and separation to Europe as a highly technologized world. Bruno Latour (1993) has called this operation ‘purification’. The Eurocentric assumptions underlying such a dualism may be theoretically overcome, but still inform the logics underlying practices and discourses of border surveillance and control. These material and symbolic operations are not localized exclusively on the geographic periphery of Europe. They may also occur in refugee camps and internment centers ‘inside’ continental Europe, as the pictures of the mud in Igumenitsa or Calais remind us (places that incidentally are referred to by migrants as the ‘jungle’ or ‘mountain’). These symbolic operations are present also in the narratives and vocabularies used to characterize migration, such as the references to organic or geological processes of ‘flows’, ‘tides’, or ‘seasonal tendencies’ (Schindel, 2016). Along the same lines, these discourses emphasize potential sanitary risks in relation to transit migrants, even when the medical condition of the recently arrived, according to most sources, is no different from the average population, excluding, of course, conditions that are due to the very circumstances of clandestine travel (like insolation, dehydration, flus, or scabies due to the overcrowded means of transport or habitation while on route), and are thus politically induced by the border, visa, and asylum regimes. The Aegean geography, topography, and environment should be taken into account as agents through which biopolitical exposure is enhanced and the EU border regime’s lethal condition becomes de-historicized and de-politicized. What is understood as ‘nature’, on the contrary, is historically and socially co-constituted and, far from being transparent or neutral, implies a series of political and moral assumptions. Furthermore, this construction conceals the agency and responsibility behind the borders’ lethality by displacing agency towards allegedly neutral forces. In this context, the question of how to re-politicize spaces of humanitarian emergency due to apparent ‘natural’ risks, reframing them as part of a certain border regime, becomes crucial. Writing about the European Central Mediterranean borders, Paolo Cuttitta (2017) has shown how this area, too, far from being a naturalized, neutral space, becomes a field for agency and activism where not only lives are rescued, but also where the supposed extra-political realm of the sea becomes re-politicized. What seemed to be external to society and politics, like the contingencies of navigation on high seas, turns out to be a highly political and contested space. If the production of zones of mere biological survival implies turning the illegalized border crossers into examples of bare life, a degraded form of existence, re-politicizing the seas means also restoring the rights and guarantees that all human lives deserve. The production of ‘bare life’ zones at high seas, however, should not be understood here as a unilateral operation exercised by the powerful, but as the stake of an ongoing battle along the border zones. Bare life does not need to be considered as a zone where agency is not possible, but as a condition where subjectivity and resistance are possible. The possibility of agency thus should be reassessed on both ends of the complex border assemblage at the Aegean in order to account for both

‘Nature’ at the EU maritime borders 221 the persons on the move and those nonhuman elements that conceal the chain of political responsibilities for injustices taking place. The ways in which the winds, the sea streams, the weather, and the rocks that face illegalized travellers on their way to Europe are being politically constructed needs to be understood as one of a number of spaces where ‘border struggles’ (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013) are taking place. The geography and the environment of the Aegean are being politically crafted and disputed, and become thus another terrain where the right to mobility is currently being contested. In this context, the agency of border enforcement is displaced to the allegedly neutral realm constituted by the sea currents, the winds, the woods, or the weather to which illegalized migrants become increasingly exposed. What is understood as ‘nature’, therefore, needs to be unpacked and re-conceptualized: it needs to be opened up and scrutinized in order to make sense of the extent to which border geographies are being politically mobilized, and in order to trace back accountability and ethical responsibility for exposing migrants to increasingly lethal risks.

Notes 1 The research leading to this article was supported by the Center of Excellence ‘Cultural Foundations of Social Integration’ at the University of Konstanz, funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) in the framework of the excellence initiative of the federal German government. 2 For an account of border-related deaths and their causes see the map produced by migreurop at: www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/map_36.1_des_morts_par_milliers_aux_ frontieres.pdf. For a critical overview of the diverse approaches to statistics of borderrelated deaths see Heller and Pécoud (2018). 3 The European Court of Human Rights ruled against this practice in the case Hirsi et al. v. Italy, having found that the passengers of a boat diverted by the Italian coast guard back to Libya in 2009 were exposed to the risk of ill-treatment there. The applicants in Hirsi were eleven Somali nationals and thirteen Eritrean nationals who had been part of a group of about two hundred individuals trying to reach Italy aboard three vessels crossing the Mediterranean from Libya. On 6 May 2009, as they were within the Maltese Search and Rescue region of responsibility, they were intercepted by the Italian police and coastguard, transferred onto Italian military ships and, ten hours later, handed over to the Libyan authorities in the Port of Tripoli (see Moreno-Lax, 2012). 4 This condition has undergone further reconfiguration since the introduction of the ‘hotspot approach’ and the agreement between the European Union and Turkey for the devolution of asylum seekers in 2016. Together with the so called ‘geographical restriction’ which excludes certain Greek and Italian islands from the regular asylum regulation, the ‘insularization’ of migratory control reached a new dimension. This seems now to be aimed at replicating the ‘excision’ policy, one which Australia has applied to part of its insular territory (Mountz, 2011) in order to deny access to the continent to asylum seekers. These developments do not contradict but rather complement the interpretation of the border assemblages depicted here.

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16 Afterword Borders are there to be crossed (but not by everybody) Noel B. Salazar

The ethnographic docufiction Jaguar (1967), by French anthropologist Jean Rouch, contains a famous border scene that serves as a humorous illustration for many of the points this book is trying to make (see Introduction). Three young Songhay men from Niger journey to search for their fortune on the Gold Coast (modern-day Ghana). One third into the story, the three Sahelian migrants arrive at the border between Niger and the Gold Coast. One of them goes to inquire with the police to find out how they can get to the other side (because they do not have any legal papers). The trick to present themselves as ‘tourists’ fails. They receive no permission to cross. In the voiceover comment, one of the friends says the customs officers are fools, while we see the trio bypassing the police station, strolling to the Gold Coast along the beach (just behind the border control post). Jaguar was shot in 1954, at the end of the colonial era in West Africa. The streetwise ‘jaguars’ depicted are the historical precursors to the current-day West African ‘adventurers’ embarking on the perilous overland journey towards Europe (Bredeloup, 2013). The story illustrates that borders are as much physical as they are imagined, and that it takes human creativity to deal with the border regimes imposed upon each of us (Salazar and Glick Schiller, 2014). Geopolitical developments such as the end of the colonial era have obvious consequences for physical borders (territorial lines demarcated in space) and symbolical boundaries (socio-spatially constructed differences between cultures or other categories of ‘belonging’). The end of the Cold War marked another such moment, going together with a glorification of globalization and a generalized optimism related to the utopian idea of a borderless world (Abram et al., 2017; Paasi, 2019). Notwithstanding the many efforts by free trade proponents and open or no border activists alike, striving for a world with penetrable or no borders as the ideal state of human affairs, the political significance of borders has not been reduced (Bauder, 2019). Complete borderlessness is ‘a hoped-for universalization of liberalism, but it is also, and perhaps more importantly, an upgrading and rethinking of the site of political imagination from the national to the global’ (Couton and López, 2009, p. 107). Arguments in favour of free movement across borders pertain mostly to economic (or political) efficiency and to ethical considerations (Pécoud, 2013).

Afterword 225 One of the merits of this volume is that it positions the debate on the ethical issues in border research centrally, thereby nicely complementing similar work in the field of mobility studies (Bergmann and Sager, 2008). The moral discomfort with borders arises from their role ‘as limits, barriers, instruments of control set up to dominate, exclude and exploit’ (O’Dowd, 2010, p. 1039). The longstanding ethical argument against borders is often traced back to Immanuel Kant’s essay ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’ (1795), where he argued that states needed to submit themselves to cosmopolitan laws, embracing all the peoples of the earth. This was based on the premise that the peoples of the earth (not rulers or states) own the earth and therefore must be free to travel anywhere on its surface. We have come to imagine that movement, certainly of the long-distance kind, is border crossing, as though borders came first, and movement, second. The truth is more the other way around. No matter which scale we are talking about, borders have always existed in human history in some form or the other (Buchanan and Moore, 2003) and they are here to stay. The 20th century even saw an increase of mobility control, both along international and internal borders. Barriers to border-crossing movements typically increase after big ‘crises’ (think of 9/11 in the US or the recent refugee influx in the EU), accompanied by discourses of securitization. Borders and mobilities are thus not antithetical. Furthermore, borders attract new mobilities (Stoffelen and Vanneste, 2019). As the first section of this book confirms, to theorize mobilities and translocal networks and connections is at the same time to theorize borders (cf. Salazar and Jayaram, 2016). Borders have thus also become an indispensable conceptual category. From the standpoint of ethics, it is important to analyse the many different aspects and layers of borders. While the reasons and motivations to cross borders are usually multiple, they are linked to the ability of those traveling (and their social networks) to imagine the ‘elsewhere’ (and its ‘others’) on the other side of the border. Bordering practices (re)produce socially shared meanings of (im) mobility (Andersson, 2014). In the Middle Ages, pilgrimage (peregrinatio) referred to a self-imposed exile and wandering for the love of God. This type of ‘true’ travel (peregrinari) was contrasted with aimless and useless rambling or purposeless vagrancy (vagary), thereby revealing a deeply embedded concern over the morality of voyaging (Stagl, 1995). Today, similar processes are at work through which group distinctions are made, feeding back into the production of the social through culturally inflected notions of ‘border crossers’ (for example, the categories ‘migrant’ versus ‘tourist’) (Salazar and Coates, 2017). However, even behind the idealized image of global elites hide other socially differentiated realities than that of an assumed borderless world. Borders are key elements in processes of exclusion and states have a monopoly to control mobilities across them and to define the accepted ethical norms and forms of hospitality towards border crossers. While there is much controversy about the building of a wall along the entire border between the US and Mexico, I vividly remember my visit to that area in the 1990s. While driving on

226 Noel B. Salazar the highway between San Diego and the border crossing at Tijuana, an unconventional traffic sign caught my attention. It depicts a family on the run and, in large capital letters, the word ‘caution’. In other words, the ‘danger’ of people trying to enter the United States illegally along the US–Mexican border had been normalized in a traffic sign (on the Canada–US border, see Nicol and Everett, 2019). In the EU context, EU institutions discursively frame the cross-border movements of EU citizens as ‘mobility’, while ‘migration’ refers to the (not so wanted) movements of incoming ‘outsiders’ (Salazar, 2018). While EU policies have led to cross-border collaborations (Nadalutti, 2019), they have also created tensions in the relations with the EU’s ‘neighbours’ (Laine and Scott, 2019). In my own ethnographic fieldwork, too, I have been confronted with various types of borders and border practices. The first example shows that preferential treatment at borders is not always reserved for the elites. Before the 2014 East African Community Agreement, a passport was needed to cross the border between Tanzania and Kenya. In the past, however, many Maasai and their cattle regularly crossed the border without the required documents. The fact that border patrol officers ignored this ‘illegal’ practice reinforced the imaginary of freedom that is often linked to (semi)nomadic people such as the Maasai. The latter points also to the importance of border crossing imaginaries and the way these circulate and are reinforced via (social) media channels (see also Lulle, 2019). In addition, the herds and goods that Maasai move across the border remind us to pay attention to the ethical aspects of ‘cross-border materiality or the material in cross-border politics’ (Zhang, 2019). The reason why they cross borders, namely to find fresh grazing grounds for their cattle, makes us aware of the role of ‘nature’ (Schindel, 2019). The second example illustrates the potential disconnect between border regimes and their outcomes. From 1999 until 2012, all returning overseas Indonesian labour migrants had to use the special Selapajang Terminal at Soekarno-Hatta International Airport in Jakarta. This was a separate building located some distance from the ‘regular’ airport terminals where all other people enter or leave the country. The infamous airport terminal was originally intended to protect Indonesian migrant workers from predatory transport operators or money changers offering unfair rates. However, confining their arrivals to a designated terminal only made them more susceptible to such brokers. Mobility or border brokers are actually a useful starting point for investigating contemporary regimes of translocal human movement (Biao and Lindquist, 2014). One could add here the people involved in ‘borderwork’ (Cassidy, 2019, including volunteers and activists (Pascucci et al., 2019). The key motivation for producing this edited volume stems from observing that present-day borders can be simultaneously open and closed, have multiple functions and even locations (Novak, 2019), as territories are not merely bounded territorial units but simultaneously also relationally constituted. Especially the latter is a very important point to make. Moreover, it is good to openly acknowledge the ambiguous character of borders. Borders function to allow passage as much as they do to deny it; they work to increase or decelerate the speed of

Afterword 227 movement as much as they do to prevent or reverse it (Casas-Cortes et al., 2015). A processual view of borders sees them not as that which is either fixed or as such must be overcome, but as ‘an evolving construction that has both practical merits and demerits that must be constantly reweighed’ (Agnew, 2008, p. 175). Border crossings – be they physical or virtual – can be thought of as an entanglement of movement, meaning, and practice, involving a complex politics of hierarchy, of inclusion and exclusion (Elliot et al., 2017). New boundaries are constructed even as borders are crossed (Prokkola, 2019), and such boundaries are multiple and multifaceted. Therefore, it is necessary to question mobility ideologies that associate certain forms of border crossings (or the lack thereof) with specific meanings and causalities. Almost half a century ago, Roger Nett (1971) wrote that the right of free movement of people on the face of the earth was the civil right we are not ready for. This still seems to be the case today, even in the realm of tourism (Bianchi and Stephenson, 2019). Although most of the world’s population stays put, there is a fear that as more people will have the ability to cross borders they will automatically do so. This rests on a failure to distinguish between mobility and motility – the ability to move. There is no global uniform trend towards more mobility, anywhere, anytime. Moreover, as Rogers Brubaker (2010, p. 70) argues, ‘The politics of belonging are generated not by the movement of people across borders, or by the movement of borders across people, but by the absence of movement or mobility – in social space, not geographical space’. As suggested in the title of this Afterword, borders are here to stay, as will the human urge to cross them (if needed). In addition to external borders (and the violence and sufferings they may impose on people), we must also examine the ‘internal boundaries’ pervading everyday life, to comprehend why and how certain borders are not straightforwardly crossed. At the same time, we must shift the ethical burden of human mobility from border crossers to institutions controlling (and preventing) those movements (Sager, 2018). If anything, the various contributions to this collection remind us all that ‘the answer to what borders do should always be related to the overriding ethical concern that they serve and not undermine human dignity’ (Agnew, 2008, p. 329).

References Abram, S., Feldman Bianco, B., Khosravi, S., Salazar, N. B., and De Genova, N. (2017). The free movement of people around the world would be Utopian. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power. Volume 24(2), 123–155. Agnew, J. (2008). Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking. Ethics and Global Politics. Volume 1(4), 175–191. Andersson, R. (2014). Illegality, inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe. Oakland: University of California Press. Bauder, H. (2019). Imagining a borderless world. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities, Mobilities. London: Routledge, 37–48.

228 Noel B. Salazar Bergmann, S. and Sager, T. eds. (2008). The Ethics of Mobilities: Rethinking Place, Exclusion, Freedom and Environment. Aldershot: Ashgate. Bianchi, R. V. and Stephenson, M. L. (2019). Tourism, border politics and the fault lines of mobility. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities, Mobilities. London: Routledge, 123–138. Biao, X., and Lindquist, J. (2014). Migration infrastructure. International Migration Review. Volume 48(S1), 122–148. Bredeloup, S. (2013). The figure of the adventurer as an African migrant. Journal of African Cultural Studies. Volume 25(2), 170–182. Brubaker, R. (2010). Migration, membership, and the modern nation-state: internal and external dimensions of the politics of belonging. Journal of Interdisciplinary History. Volume 41(1), 61–78. Buchanan, A. E., and Moore, M. eds. (2003). States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Casas-Cortes, M., Cobarrubias, S., De Genova, N., Garelli, G., Grappi, G., Heller, C., et al. (2015). New keywords: migration and borders. Cultural Studies. Volume 29(1), 55–87. Cassidy, K. (2019). Everyday bordering, healthcare and the politics of belonging in contemporary Britain. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities, Mobilities. London: Routledge, 78–92. Couton, P. and López, J. J. (2009). Movement as Utopia. History of the Human Sciences. Volume 22(4), 93–121. Elliot, A., Norum, R., and Salazar, N. B. eds. (2017). Methodologies of Mobility: Ethnography and Experiment. Oxford: Berghahn. Laine, J. P. and Scott, J. W. (2019). Ontological (in)security: the EU’s bordering dilemma and neighbourhood. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities, Mobilities. London: Routledge, 184–196. Lulle, A. (2019). ‘Borderless’ Europe and Brexit: Young European migrant accounts on media uses and moralities. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities, Mobilities. London: Routledge, 65–77. Nadalutti, E. (2019). An ethical code for cross-border governance: what does the European Union say on the ethics of cross-border cooperation? In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities, Mobilities. London: Routledge, 197–211. Nett, R. (1971). The civil right we are not ready for: the right of free movement of people on the face of the earth. Ethics. Volume 81(3), 212–227. Nicol, H. N. and Everett, K. G. (2019). Trade, Trump, security and ethics: the CanadaUS border in continental perspective. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities, Mobilities. London: Routledge, 169–183. Novak, P. (2019). Borders, distance, politics. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities, Mobilities. London: Routledge, 49–62. O’Dowd, L. (2010). From a ‘borderless world’ to a ‘world of borders’: ‘bringing history back in’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. Volume 28(6), 1031–1050. Paasi, A. (2019). Borderless worlds and beyond: challenging the state-centric cartographies. In: A. Paasi, E-K. Prokkola, J. Saarinen and K. Zimmerbauer eds., Borderless Worlds for Whom? Ethics, Moralities, Mobilities. London: Routledge, 21–36.

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Index

accountability 212, 219–21 activism 30–2 affective landscapes 96 Agamben, Giorgio 218 agency 212 agentic capacities 94, 97 Anderson, Bridget 45 anti-nationalism 32 anti-racist positions 42 Arendt, Hannah 40, 190 Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) 198 asylum reception: gender-specific meanings 112; national identity politicization, relationship 108; politicized national identity 115–16 Balibar, Etienne 37–9, 50, 56–7, 59, 79 bare life zones, production 220–1 Barents cooperation 4 Bauder, Harald 11, 37 belonging, open borders 43–5 Berlin Conference 41 Berlin Wall 130 Better Shelter-IKEA Foundation 99 Beyond the Border Agreement 177 Bianchi, Raoul V. 12, 123 biometric borders 51 Bissell, David 155, 159, 163 border controls: oppressiveness 29–30; spatially mobile/territorialized forms 55–9 border crossing 224, 227; globalization, relationship 23–4; practices 213–6 border functions 39–40; contextual manifestation 60 bordering: de-professionalization 78; impact 78, 85–9; local/national discourses, mapping 111–12; mobility,

democratic politics 133–4; perception 156; practices 28; tactics 98 borderlands: commodification 139–40; commodified borderland contestations 147–50; tourism projects, ethical components 140 borderless Europe, Brexit 65; context 67–8; methodology 66–7 border-less friendships, Brexit (impact) 72 borderlessness, tracing 69 borderless worlds 21; discourse 23–6, 30–2; ethics, crafting 23–6; imagining 37–8; literature 28; narrative 49; perspectives 31t; term, popularization 24; thesis 5, 26–30, 154 border manifestation: capture 57; complexity/fluidity 52 borders 1; absence 5; battlefield, imagining 41; border-related terms, contestation 21–2; common activities 207; concept, polysemy 41–2; contextual/geohistorical features 5; distance/politics, relationship 49; enforcement 215; enforcement, temporality 95–6; essence, discovery 56–7; everywhere-ness 57; freedom, relationship 40–1; function 226–7; inequality 13–14; landscape commodification 143–7; lines/functions, distinction 58; location 50–3; management techniques/technologies 52; movement 154–5; multiplication 23–6; national identity/gender, relationship 109–11; overdetermination 57; perseverance 3–5; policing 131; politics, tourism 123; porosity 32; practices 28, 156; regime 39; security, transnational discourse 30; social differences 52; spectacles 186; state-centric reading 55; top-down conceptualizations 95; tourism,

Index universal solvent 126–7; transformations, spatialities 55–9; ubiquity, polysemic nature 59; understandings, existence 54–5; vulnerability, national imaginations 110–11 borderscapes 141 borderwork: clinical decision-making 85–7; global expansion 95 boundary-drawing 65–6 Brexit: borderless Europe, relationship 65; leave vote 70, 72; vote 66, 69–72 Britain: belonging, politics 78–80; geoeconomics 78; Immigration Act (1971) 79; Immigration Act (2014) 85; leave vote 70 Brubaker, Rogers 227 business economy 25 Cameron, David 68 camp arrangements 93–4 camp form: multiplication 102; recasting 96 camp geographies 96–7 Canada: border, threat 176; good neighbour narrative, maintenance 170–2; Mexicanizing 175–8; US border, continental perspective 169 Carens, Joseph 42 care provisions, mechanisms 97 cartographic illusion 25 cartographic imagination, elements 23 Cassidy, Kathryn 11–12, 78 CBC. see cross-border cooperation Centre Party 114 Ceuta, migration limboscapes 185 China, cultural tensions 158 Chinese non-tourists, subsuming 155 citizenship: domicile principle 44; duties 79; granting 43–4; travel right, relationship 124–6 civil societies 192; neglect 193 civil society organizations (CSOs) 191; role, reports/analyses 191–2 clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) 80, 84 Cold War: back-projection 67–8; collapse 24; Finland, location 110; optimism 22 collectivity (collectivities) 80 Committee of the Regions (CoR) 198, 201, 206 commodified borderland contestations 147–50; application/management 148–9 common good 206–7; space 197 common language 14

231

conditionality, principle 189 consensus/obedience 207–8 contested borders (Hong Kong-Shenzhen border) 154 contested borderscapes, commodification 139 contested mobilities: impact 162; moments 158–64 continuous uncertainty, media uses 72–4 control, technical landscapes 29 Cook, John Mason 126 Cook, Thomas 126 counter-mapping exercises 51–2 counter-meanings 24 Cramer, Michael 147 Cresswell, Tim 155, 158 criminality, assessments 170 crisis, migrants 68 cross-border community, creation 206 cross-border cooperation (CBC): common language 14; coordination, elites 198; ethical dimension, EU perception 198–200; ethical-normative theoretical approach 200–1; ethics, EU perception 197; focus 139; interest, renewal 140; normative-ethical analysis 205–8; political philosophers, relevance 200; top-down management 198; values, common language 197 cross-border day-trippers 163 cross-border discourses, general evolution 142–3 cross-border governance, ethical code 14, 197, 201–5 cross-border migrants, exploitation 43 cross-border regionalization 151 cross-border regions (CBRs) 198–9; establishment 9 cross-border relations, rhetoric 142 cross-border scholarship, 3 ‘M’s 155–6 cross-border spaces, needs 204 cross-border tourism development, memory contestations 140–2 danger, assessments 170 day-trippers: cross-border day-trippers 163; influx 159–60 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program 172 de Genova, Nicholas 38, 40, 94, 97 delay 93 democracy: implementation 189; institutionalized support 192 deserts, border crossing practices 213–16

232 Index detention facilities, offshore relocation 51 deterrence 212–13; function 216; practices 219–20 development rights, tourism rights (tension) 129 dialogical space 184–6 differentiated continental border management policies/programmes 169 discomfort, materialities 164 disconnection 73 discrimination 29–30 distance: notion 60; politics, relationship 49, 59–60 domicile principle 44 Doty, Roxanne Lynn 216 dumping, concept 175 East African Community Agreement 226 Eastern Europe: migrants 67; orientalisation 67–8 economic activity, real flows 25–6 economic globalization 109–10 economic nationalism 24–5 economic power 170 embodied distance 50 empathy 207–8 environmental forces, mobilization 219–20 environments, raw physicality 216 ethical basis 74 ethical dilemmas, multiplicity 6–8 ethical dimension, EU perception 198–200 ethical codes 58, 197, 202–3 ethical values 200 ethics 1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 21, 30–2, 33, 128, 150, 156, 161, 169, 189, 194, 212, 217, 219–21, 225, 226, 227; achievement 74; borderless world 23; borders 8, 39, 79, 140, 165; consumption 161; cross-border 197–211, 226; definition 10; everyday 74; free movement 224; mobility 30, 224; nature 212, 216, 219; EU perception 197; international 21, 33, 104; trade/Trump/ security, relationship 169 ethno-cultural nation-building 113 Eurocentric bias 185 European border struggles, dislocation 97–8 European Commission: cross-border community creation 206; normative commitment 203 European Community 127 European Economic Area (EEA), surcharge 81

European Green Belt (EGB) 145; establishment 148–9; narrative 145; rationale 150 European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) scheme 83 European Neighbourhood, conceptualization 186; dialogical space 184–6 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 184, 188–9; unfolding 191 Europeanness, socio-cultural background 187 European refugee crisis 98 European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 208 European Social Fund (ESF) 208 European traveler, privilege 125 European Union (EU) 127; bordering dilemma/neighbourhood 184; citizenry, border-less communality 67–8; Cohesion Policy 204; externalization/virtualization process 56; perception 197; policy impacts 184; regional policy 139; selective visibility 186–90; treaty 65; Turkey Statement 100 European Union (EU) borders: enforcement 219; location 58; prominence 53–5; spatial manifestation 55; transformations 54 European Union (EU), maritime borders: deterrence/exposure 212–13; nature, role 212 Europe, re-bordering 67 EUROSUR 53 Everett, Karen G. 13–14, 169 everyday bordering 78; usage 80–2 everywhere border, top-down conceptualizations 95 exclusion, politics 10 exposure 212–13 facial recognition, operational functionality 132–3 faith-based positions 42 Feldman-Bianco, Bela 41 female genital mutilation (FGM), victims 88 finance, flows 27 Finland: anti-immigrant groups, impact 109; bordering, local/national discourses 111–12; borders 109–11; borders, closing 116; Cold War location 110; imagined nation, division 112–14; migration crisis 110; national-identity building project

Index 108; national protection/identity, gendered imaginations 116–17; patriotic action 113 Finland, asylum reception 108; analysis 117; gender-specific meanings 112 Finland, national identity: borders/ gender, relationship 109–11; geopolitics 113; politicization, asylum reception 108 Finnish Red Cross, volunteers 115 flooding, concept 175 flows, control 30 fluid fields 54 Free and Secure Trade 131 freedom: borders, relationship 40–1; concept, importance 40; quest 193 free mobility 68–9; denial 43–4 free movement, attack 129–33 Friuli-Venezia-Giulia (FVG) 205 FRONTEX (Frontex) 53, 97, 213 gender: borders/national identity 109–11; oppression, border mechanism 42 geoeconomics 78 geographical scale, impact 44 geographical scholarship 216 geographical unevenness 27 geography, moral judgment basis/moral concerns 22–3 geopolitical developments 224 Gerada, Clare 85 German-Czech borderlands: administrative delineation 143f; cross-border cooperation 143–4; cross-border relations, rhetoric 142 German-German museum (Mödlareuth) 145, 146f Global Code of Ethics for Tourism 6–7 globalization: spatialities 49; tendencies 26–7 global migration, upsurge 123 good neighbour narrative, maintenance 170–2 goods, flows 27 gratuitousness, ethical value 204 Greater China, binding 157 Greece: Greek-Turkish maritime border zone, fieldwork 213; humanitarian borders 97–100; mobilization 93 Green Iron Curtain, possibility 150 Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion 199 Grünes Band (GB) 145

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Häkli, Jouni 12, 93 healthcare: bordering, impact 85–9; charging, (geo)political economy 82–9 healthcare access 86–7; national security 86–7 Heidegger, Martin 216 Hellenic Coast Guard 214 here/there dichotomies 49 heritage tourism landscapes, viability/ community representation/equity 139 Hiebert, Daniel 43 Hong Kong-Shenzhen border: checkpoint 159; contested mobilities 154 Horizon 2020 research project 66 hospitality 6–8 human agency 206–7 human agents, collaboration 203 human capital 199 human condition, element 189–90 humanitarian borders 4, 29; everyday geopolitics 93–7; geopolitics 94 humanitarian delivery, inadequacies 101 humanitarian disasters, IOM figures 39–40 humanitarian inclusion 94 humanitarian innovation 101 human mobility, scale 6 human rights 128–9; attention 32; implementation 189 illegal border crossings, disciplining 131 illegal immigrants: environment, problems 78; mobility, prejudice 132–3 illegal immigration: augmentation 175; notion 172–3 illegalized migrants, domicile right to citizenship assertion 44 imaginaries, creation/implementation 190 imagined nation, division 112–14 imagineering 157 Immigration Act (1971) 79 Immigration Act (2014) 85 Immigration and Naturalization Services Agency (INS), expansion 174 inclusion, politics 10 inconvenience, materialities 164 independence, implementation 189 individual freedom 189 Individual Visit Scheme 157 indulgence, immorality 161 industry-oriented growth, perspectives 140–1 inequality, increase 109–10 informants, gender-related questions 112

234 Index information and communication technology (ICT): implementation 148–9; rationale 150; strength, undermining 148; surcharge 83 information technology 26 injustice 160–1 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 128 International Labour Organisation, labour conventions 124 international politics, spheres of interest thinking 3–4 international production networks 8 international tourism 124 international trade 130 International Union of Official Travel Organizations (IUOTO), founding 127 INTERREG 144 Interreg Community Initiatives 205 intolerance 29–30 invasive tourists, political protests 7 in/visibility: double nature 189–90; politics, criticism 190 Iron Curtain: landscapes, commodification 145; reflections 145–7; relic Iron Curtain heritage tourism landscapes, viability/ community representation/equity 139; sensitive histories, encounters 149–50; tourism projects 142–50 Iron Curtain Trail (ICT) 147; success 151 irregular border crossers 219 islands, border crossing practices 213–6 Jaguar (docufiction) 224 Jensen, Ole B. 155, 159, 161 joint collaborative activities/ participation 197 jus domicilii (law of residence) 44 Kallio, Kirsi Pauliina 12, 93 Kant, Immanuel 225 Kara Tepe 99–100 Kemi-Tornio area, street patrols 115 Khalili, Laleh 95 Khosravi, Shahram 39, 45 Kinder Scout, mass trespass (1932) 124–5 King, Martin Luther 79 Kyi, Suu 129 Laine, Jussi P. 12–13, 184 Latour, Bruno 220 law of residence 44

League of Nations, international order 127 leave vote 70, 72 Lebanon, humanitarian borders 100–3 liquid migration 68–9 local discourses, mapping 111–12 local inhabitants, nation-state distinction 45 Lulle, Aija 11, 65 macro-economic aspects, attention 32 Management Authority (MA) 206–7 maritime borders, nature 212 Marshall Plan 127 Marx, Karl 216 mass tourism, post-war boom 126 materiality 163–4 May Day rally, no-border world 45 media: self-restricting practices 65–6; spaces, power asymmetries 70–1 media uses 72–4; free mobility/moralities 68–9; young European migrant accounts 65 memory contestations 140–2 memoryscape layer, commodification 151 Mexicanization 175–6, 178 Mexicanizing 175–8 Mexican-US border, closure 40 Middle East and North African (MENA) region 191 migrants: autonomies, refugee autonomies 98; bordering practices, horizontal encounters 50; cultural capital, degradation 41; status, uncertainty 72 migration: border spectacle 188; challenges 23; freedom, possession 38; liquid migration 68–9; spatialities 54–5 migration control 39; extra-territorial projection 51 Migration Observatory, briefing (2014) 81–2 Migration Studies, renaissance 51 mobile populations, differential significance 56–9 mobility (mobilities) 1, 30–2; absence 227; contested mobilities, moments 158–64; control 39; democratic politics 133–4; facets 158–9; fault lines 123; free mobility 68–9; multiplicities 6–8; policing 94; regimes, discriminatory practices 154; right 7; visiting friends and relatives (VFR) stimulation, migration (impact) 7

Index mobility, morality, materiality (3 ‘M’s) 154, 158–64 Mödlareuth (German-German museum) 145, 146f moral, definition 10 moral action, fostering 69 moral economy, appeal 82, 87 moral flaws 42 moralities 78, 115, 160–3; and geography 4, 8, 22–3, 65, 69, 74, 156; borders, border crossing 3, 30, 34, 97, 173, 178, 225; media use 65, 67–8; young European migrant accounts 56 morality, borders 74; consumption 160, 165; materiality 154, 163–4; normative 150 moral, alibi 216; order 114; impact 23; symbolization 22–3 moral panic 11, 65–6, 74, 75 moral values 189, 194 Mountz, Alison 217–18 movement freedom, barriers symbol 130 Mugabe, Robert 128 multiculturalists, coddling 112–14 Nadalutti, Elisabetta 14, 197 Nahr el Bared camp, destruction 102–3 nannies, coddling 112–14 Nansen Passport 126 national body 23 national borders, disappearance 25 National Coalition Party 114 national discourses, mapping 111–12 National Health Service (NHS): Amendment Act (1949) 81; belonging, UK political project 87–9; bordering 87; borderwork 85, 87–8; burden 73; everyday bordering 80–2; immigration checks 78–9; memorandum of understanding (MoU) 86; overseas visitors cost 83 National Health Service (NHS) Act (2006) 81 national identity: borders/gender, relationship 109–11; importance 29; politicization 111 national identity: politicization, asylum reception 108 nationalism: animation 28; importance 29 nationalistic patriotism, rejection 113 National Parks, establishment 125 national protection/identity, gendered imaginations 116–17 national security, healthcare access 86–7

235

national socialization 28 national states: problems 5; self-evidence 6 nations, imagined nation division 112–14 nature: de-historicized/de-politicized construction 219; non-accountability/ neo-refoulement, geographies 216–19; re-politicization 219–21; role 212 neighbourhood: conceptualization 188; EU bordering dilemma 184; European neighbourhood, dialogical space 184–6; selective visibilities, relationship 191–3; social imaginary 187–9; spaces 188 Neighbourhood: political/media framing 186; reassessment 184–5; reduction 185; relevance, increase 187 neo-refoulement, geographies 216–19 Nett, Roger 227 NEXUS 131 Ng, Jason 160 Nicol, Heather N. 13–14, 169 no-border idea 45–6 no borders movement 32 no-border world 45 no fly lists, compilation 131 non-accountability, geographies 216–19 non-arrival, strategies 217 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 191; impact 93, 97; involvement 99; prominence 102 non-mobile populations, differential significance 56–9 normativity 74 North American capitalism, disprivileged actors 173 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): geopolitical rationale 174; globalization type 173–4; intention 173; reorganization 171; talks 170 Novak, Paolo 11, 49 objective policy 13 Objective structured clinical examination (OSCE), upfront costs 84 Ohmae, Kenichi 22, 49; borderless world 24; neoliberal economic ideas 10–11; Ohmae’s thesis 30 ontological (in)security 184 open borders 41–3; belonging, relationship 43–5; claims 22 order 207–8 Overseas Visitors Office 83 overtourism 6

236 Index Paasi, Anssi 1, 11, 21, 57, 154 painful commuting (Bissell) 163 parallel traders 157–8 participation 206–7 Pascucci, Elisa 12, 93 patriotic action 113 patriots, coddling 112–14 penumbral borders 8–10 people: communication/mobility 9; free migration, border restriction 42 people-to-people (P2P) projects 206 peregrinari (true travel) 225 peregrinatio (pilgrimage) 225 peri-urban settings 102 place-specific distance 50 political agency 97 (geo)political economy, impact 82–9 political geography, study 94 political power 170 political projects 80; conceptual logic 192 politicized national identity, experiences 115–16 politics: borders, relationship 49; distance, relationship 49, 59–60; impact 78 polymedia 69 polymorphic humanitarian borders 94 polysemy 41–2; reverberations 57–8 post-human geopolitics 216 post-national passports 126 poverty, increase 109–10 power: asymmetries 70–1; landscapes, border line expression 59–60 processual turn 51 Prokkola, Eeva-Kaisa 1, 12, 108 public border-drawing practices 67 purification 220 racism 29–30, 114 racists, coddling 112–14 racist, term (usage) 113 Rantsiou, Fotini 99–100 refugee camp form, centrality 93 refugees: autonomies, migrant autonomies 98; crises 12, 96–7; protection, convention 217 relic Iron Curtain: heritage tourism landscapes, viability/community representation/equity 139; landscapes, awareness 147; landscapes, commodification 145 religious positions 42 remapping migration 51

Richardson, Tim 161 rights, denial 41 Rohingya Muslims, human rights atrocities 129 Rouch, Jean 224 rules, obedience 208 Saarinen, Jarkko 1 safe space 79 Salazar, Noel B. 14, 224 Samos, insularity 214 sanctuary city movement 44 Sassen, Saskia 25, 27, 28 Schengen treaty 187 Schindel, Estela 14, 212 Scott, James W. 12–13, 184 seas, border crossing practices 213–16 Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection 131 security: missions 28; threats, transformation/rescaling 29; trade/ Trump/ethics, relationship 169 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) 176 sedentary cartographies 51 seeing, penumbral borders 8–10 selective visibility 186–90; neighbourhood, relationship 191–3 self-governed restriction 71 self-problematization 26 services, flows 27 Shenzhen residents, multiple-entry permit 157 Sheung Shui: contested mobilities 155, 160; pedestrian walkways 163; shopping haven 156–8 slavery, victims 88 Smart Border 177 Smith, David 69 social care, provision 80 social imaginary 187–9 social-justice views 40 social life, multiplicity/hybridity 27 social motion, form 51 social power, discursive landscape 29 social-to-spatial analytical trajectory 55 society, ideas 45 socio-spatial inequality/violence, social movement resistance 22 Soldiers of Odin 113, 115 solidarity 197 southern border imaginaries 172–5 sovereign-territorial states, authority 126

Index Soviet Union, collapse 129–30 space of places 23–4 spatial production, process 54 spheres of interest thinking, strengthening 3–4 Staging Mobilities (Jensen) 155 state-centred geography 56 state-centred institutions, everyday life 57 state-centred spatialities 54 state-centred territoriality, expression 52–3 state-centric cartographies 21 state-driven control functions, impact 23 state institutions 8 state-migrant relationships 109 state-oriented map 8–9 Stephenson, Marcus L. 12, 123 Stoffelen, Arie 12–3, 139 sub-national administrative units, functions (transformation/ reconfiguration) 53–4 subsidiarity 204, 206–7 substandard shelters, usage 102 Sudetenland: annexation 142; GermanCzech borderlands, administrative delineation 143f; heritage tourism landscapes, viability/community representation/equity 139; reflections 144; sensitive histories, encounters 149–50; tourism projects 142–50 Suomi-neito 110 surveillance 212; technologies, application 124 Syrian camps, creation 101 technologization 29 territorial differences 27 territorially-defined national states, problems 5 territorial trap 8, 21, 51 third-country nationals 8 Tornio, extremist group activities 116f TornioHaparanda Suomi24 social media forum 113 tourism: border landscape commodification 143–7; border politics, relationship 123; crisis 6; cross-border tourism development, memory contestations 140–2; landscapes, viability/community representation/equity 139; mobility, democratic politics 133–4; projects 142–50; promotion 141; pursuit 128–9; tourism-related impacts, socio-spatial

237

dispersal 142; universal border solvent 126–7 tourism, development 141; contested borderscapes, commodification 139; politicized nature 141–2 tourism, rights 7; development rights, tension 129; institutionalization 133 tourist movements, liberty 7 “Toward Perpetual Peace” (Kant) 225 trade: peaceful rivalry 127; Trump/security/ ethics, relationship 169 transboundary relations 192 transnational discourse 30 transversally bordered spaces (Sassen) 29 travel: right, citizenship/state relationship 124–6; securitization 129–33 traveler anxiety, accentuation 133 Treaty of the European Union 65 Trudeau, Justin 169 True Finns Party 114 Trump, Donald: America First narrative 171; executive orders, negative impact 132; trade deficit claim, Trudeau response 170–1; trade/security/ethics, relationship 169; Trudeau exchange 169 uncertainty 208 uncontrolled immigration 69 United Kingdom (UK): border(ing) regime 84–5; economy, value 84; political project, administration 87 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), refugee count 96–7 United Nations Refugee Convention, usage 7 United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), tourism support 128 United States: border, DHS recognition 172; border, pressure 172–3; Canada border, continental perspective 169; good neighbour narrative, maintenance 170–2; southern border, cross border migration openness 174; southern border imaginaries 172–5 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) (1948) 124, 126, 128 Upper Adriatic Region, CBC normativeethical analysis 14, 205–8; common good 206–7; consensus/obedience 207–8; empathy 207–8; human agency 206–7;

238 Index order 207–8; participation/subsidiarity 206–7; research area, historical overview 205 urgent care necessity, NHS bordering, impact 87 US-Canada Smart Border Action Plan 177–8 us/them dichotomies 49 utopian thinking 45 Vanneste, Dominique 12–13, 139 velocity, politics 158–9 Verwey, Maarten 99–100 visa requirements 177 visiting friends and relatives (VFR) stimulation, migration 7 Walzer, Michael 43 wealth, implementation 189 Western Africa, EU border externalisation 60

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (2007) 177 win–win formula, operationalization 204 women, vulnerability 110–11 world spaces, state-centred cartography 53 World Tourism Organization (WTO) 127; Global Code of Ethics for Tourism, creation 6–7 World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) 128 xenophobia 29–30 YMOBILITY research project 66 young European migrant accounts 65 Zhang, J.J. 12–13, 154 Zimmerbauer, Kaj 1 zone of indistinction 218