Border Games: The Politics of Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide [third edition] 9781501765803

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BORDER GAMES

BORDER GAMES The Politics of Policing the U.S.-­Mexico Divide Third edition Peter Andreas

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ​ ​I THACA AND LONDON

Copyright © 2022 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress​.­cornell​.­edu. First edition published as Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide, Cornell University Press, 2000; second edition 2009. Third edition 2022 by Cornell University Press Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: Andreas, Peter, 1965– author. Title: Border games : the politics of policing the U.S.-Mexico divide / Peter Andreas. Description: 3rd edition. | Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2022. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2022006039 (print) | LCCN 2022006040 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501765773 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781501765780 (paperback) | ISBN 9781501765797 (epub) | ISBN 9781501765803 (pdf) Subjects: LCSH: Border patrols—Mexican-American Border Region. | ­Boundaries. | Drug control—United States. | Noncitizens—Government policy—United States. | Smuggling—Mexican-American Border Region. | Illegal immigration—Government policy—United States. | MexicanAmerican Border Region—Economic conditions. | Mexico—Boundaries— United States. | United States—Boundaries—Mexico. Classification: LCC HJ6690 .A7 2022 (print) | LCC HJ6690 (ebook) | DDC 363.28/50972/1—dc23/eng/20220401 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022006039 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022006040

Contents

Preface to the Third Edition

vii

1.

The Escalation of Border Policing

2.

Creating the Clandestine Side of the Border Economy

12

3.

The Escalation of Drug Control

35

4.

The Escalation of Immigration Control

63

5.

Escalation in a New Security Landscape

85

6.

Escalation in a New Po­liti­cal Landscape

110

7.

Endless Escalation? Border Policing Trajectories

138

Notes Index

1

157 185

Preface to the Third Edition

I had long been drawn to the border, crossing into Mexico from Texas, Arizona, and California at vari­ous times in my youth during the 1970s and 1980s. As a ten-­year-­old boy I even smuggled large wads of cash hidden on my body as my ­mother and I fled south across the border.1 Latin Amer­i­ca and the United States are where I spent my childhood years, and the border was where the two came together in dramatic fashion, blending and clashing at the same time. When I arrived at the border south of San Diego in the mid-1990s to do research for my doctoral dissertation, it was clear that the United States and Mexico had become even more intertwined, yet also more distant. For all the fash­ion­able business school talk in ­t hose days about the border-­blurring effects of globalization and economic integration, what most struck me about this par­tic­u­lar border was the rush ­under way to prop it up and demarcate it more than ever before. This real­ity was immediately evident while I was standing inside the entrance of the public affairs office at the U.S. Border Patrol’s sector headquarters south of San Diego in the summer of 1996. I could not help but notice two large photo­ graphs prominently displayed on the wall. They showed the same stretch of the California-­Mexico border, historically the single most popu­lar crossing point for unauthorized mi­g rants heading north. The first photo­g raph, taken in 1991, showed a mangled chain-­link fence and crowds of ­people milling about, seemingly unaware that the border even existed. For them, it seemed as if this truly was a borderless world. The Border Patrol was nowhere in sight. The image was of a chaotic, defied, defeated, and undefended border. The second photo­graph, taken just a few years ­later, showed a sturdy ten-­foot-­high metal barrier backed up by light posts and Border Patrol all-­terrain vehicles monitoring the line. No ­people gathered on ­either side. The image was of a quiet and orderly border that deters and defends against illegal crossings. The new barrier was built by Army reservists out of 180,000 metal sheets originally made for temporary landing fields during military operations. Mexicans dubbed it the “Iron Curtain.” ­These sharply contrasting pictures w ­ ere part of a larger transformation u ­ nder way in policing the nearly two thousand miles of boundary. In just a few years, policing the border had under­gone a metamorphosis, from a low-­intensity, ­low-­maintenance, and po­liti­cally marginal activity to a high-­intensity, high-­ maintenance campaign commanding enormous po­liti­cal attention. Reflecting the new enthusiasm for border policing, the size of the Border Patrol more than vii

viii

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doubled in the 1990s. An advertising agency even coined a catchy slogan to woo thousands of new recruits: “A c­ areer with borders but no bound­aries.” The border enforcement role of many other federal agencies also expanded at a dizzying pace. The buildup, moreover, was not restricted to the U.S. side of the line: the Mexican military was placed in charge of the antidrug campaign in many of Mexico’s northern states. And this was just the beginning of a ratcheting up of border enforcement that would continue for de­cades. What was driving this rapid escalation of border policing? That was the under­ lying question that motivated my border research and led to the first edition of this book in 2000. It was a particularly intriguing question b ­ ecause the tightening of border controls was happening at a time and place other­w ise defined by the dramatic relaxation of state controls and the economic opening of the border—­most notably through the North American F ­ ree Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Noticeably left out of NAFTA ­were two of Mexico’s leading exports: psychoactive drugs and mi­grant ­labor. Instead, higher tariffs on t­ hese smuggled “goods”—or “bads,” depending on one’s perspective—­had been imposed in the form of more intensive policing. The result was the seemingly paradoxical ­construction of both a borderless economy and a barricaded border. My research led me to conclude that the escalation of border policing was ultimately less about deterring the flow of drugs and mi­grants than about recrafting the image of the border and symbolically reaffirming the state’s territorial authority. ­Those who viewed border enforcement as ­either puny and in­effec­tive or draconian and inhumane too often failed to appreciate its perceptual and symbolic dimensions. Indeed, it struck me that border policing had some of the features of a ritualized spectator sport, which could e­ ither tame or inflame the passions of the spectators. In calling it a “game”—­t hus the title of this book—­I did not mean to belittle or trivialize border policing and its deadly serious ­impact. Instead, I meant to capture its performative and audience-­directed nature. The game meta­phor also drew attention to the strategic interaction between border law enforcers and evaders. It provided a healthy antidote to the all-­ too-­common meta­phors of war and natu­ral disaster—­such as “invasion” and “flood”—­used to characterize the clandestine movement of drugs and mi­grants across the border. The dynamics of the border game, I argued, provided a power­ful po­liti­cal and bureaucratic impetus for continued escalation—­escalation that had in some ways become self-­perpetuating. Still, while my argument predicted more escalation, I did not quite anticipate the astonishing border-­policing boom that was still to come in the early years of the twenty-­first c­ entury. The book quickly became both out of date and more relevant than ever—­hence the impetus for a second edition in 2009, and now another revised version more than a de­cade l­ ater.



Preface to the Third Edition

ix

As it turns out, the border buildup I had documented ­earlier was merely a warm-up to a far more high-­profile and high-­drama activity escalating at a rec­ ord pace, with a U.S. president even entering office promising to build a massive border wall. Rather than interpret ­t hese more recent border crackdowns and barrier-­building initiatives as something entirely new and unpre­ce­dented, in this new edition of Border Games I instead view them as the logical outcome of an escalatory dynamic that began much ­earlier but was playing out on a far bigger stage in a transformed security and po­liti­cal context. The border game has ­continued, but with new rules, new players, higher stakes, more po­liti­cal contestation, and far more lethal consequences. In writing a book about policing borders, I have had to cross disciplinary borders well beyond my home field of po­liti­cal science. In this book I borrow from and speak to a much more diverse audience, including criminologists, sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, historians, and specialists in public policy and area studies. That audience extends outside of the academic world to the policy world and broader public sphere. Having lived in both worlds, I continue to try to bridge the borders that divide them. A few words of caution are called for regarding research in this par­t ic­u ­lar area. First, much of policing is by nature secretive, and the official documents produced for public consumption can conceal as much as they reveal. They are nevertheless enormously useful for my purposes, b ­ ecause an essential part of the story is showing how the policing face of the state pre­sents itself in public. Second, it is obviously impossible to calculate with any precision the size and scope of clandestine cross-­border flows; the published government statistics on drug trafficking and unauthorized migration necessarily are rough estimates. Readers are advised to keep ­t hese built-in limitations in mind. Indeed, the packaging of official data is very much part of the po­liti­cal pro­cess of image-­crafting to cultivate support for more policing. In carry­ing out my research, I relied on a wide assortment of primary and secondary source materials, including hundreds of government documents, reports, and media accounts. I also conducted dozens of interviews with government officials, journalists, policy analysts, and representatives of nongovernmental organ­izations on both sides of the border, at both the local and national level. I am deeply indebted to ­t hose who took time from their busy schedules to meet with me. A year at the Brookings Institution proved ideal for conducting research and opening doors in Washington. As a base for two years of research and writing near the border, I could not have asked for a better place than the Center for U.S.-­Mexican Studies of the University of California at San Diego. The first edition of the book was completed during a fellowship at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. Generous research funding came

x

Preface to the Third Edition

from grants by the SSRC-­MacArthur Foundation Program on International Peace and Security, the Mellon Foundation, the Institute for the Study of World Politics, and the Harvard Acad­emy for International and Area Studies. The initial travel funding was provided by Cornell University’s Einaudi Center for International Studies and the Department of Government, where this book began as my doctoral dissertation. The research for the ­later editions was funded by Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs and the Department of Po­liti­cal Science. This latest edition was greatly enabled by the research assistance of Gabriel Merkel, Nell Salzman, and especially Isabella Bellezza-­Smull. Fi­nally, I wish to express a special thanks to my longtime editor at Cornell University Press, Roger Haydon, with whom I had the ­great fortune to work on a number of books over the years and who encouraged me to do another update of this one; and to Mahinder Kingra, who expertly guided the manuscript over the finish line ­after Roger retired.

The U.S.-­Mexico border

1 THE ESCALATION OF BORDER POLICING

A fundamental paradox of our times has been the simultaneous softening of borders through globalization and hardening of borders through intensified policing. Leading the list of policing targets have been clandestine cross-­border flows of mi­grants and drugs. Indeed, the tightening of controls over t­ hese border flows has been the most notable exception to the opening of borders through the liberalization of the world economy. ­Here the advice of other­w ise influential free-­ market proponents has fallen on deaf ears.1 States have treated ­these cross-­border flows as threatening to the autonomy, social cohesion, and sometimes even the identity of national po­liti­cal communities. And the policing apparatus of the state has increasingly been expected and empowered to maintain the bound­aries between insiders and outsiders and to proj­ect at least the appearance of securing national borders. Clandestine cross-­border activities such as unauthorized migration and drug trafficking are not new, of course. ­After all, border law evasion is as old as border law enforcement. What is new is that the policing of ­t hese border crossings has been elevated from the status of “low politics” to “high politics,” involving a shift in the definition of security threats and in the practice of security policy. Crime fighting, not war fighting, has increasingly defined the border security priorities of many states since the end of the Cold War, blurring the distinction between soldiering and policing. This transformation has been most pronounced along the geographic fault lines that divide the developed and less developed countries of the world. The longest such fault line is the land border between the United States and Mexico. 1

2 CHAPTER 1

In this book I trace the intensifying practice and politics of policing the flow of drugs and mi­grants across the U.S.-­Mexico divide. I explain why such policing has sharply escalated during the past three de­cades, stressing the importance of the perverse and often unintended feedback effects of past policy choices, the po­liti­cal and bureaucratic incentives and rewards for entrepreneurial state actors, and the symbolic and perceptual appeal of escalation regardless of its a­ ctual deterrent effect. Escalation has taken very dif­fer­ent forms in the cases of immigration and drug control, which differ in their playing fields and their rules of the game. In the case of unauthorized migration, the United States and Mexico have, not surprisingly, defined it in fundamentally dif­fer­ent ways: on the U.S. side it has been primarily treated as a law enforcement and security ­matter; on the Mexican side, as a social and economic m ­ atter.2 Consequently, most of the escalation of immigration control has taken place on the U.S. side of the line—­though, with much prodding from Washington, Mexico has increasingly cracked down on the northward movement of Central Americans and other non-­Mexican nationals through Mexican territory (which the Mexican government, in turn, has tried to rhetorically depict as a humanitarian campaign to save mi­grants from smugglers, traffickers, gangs, and other predators). On the other hand, drugs such as cocaine and heroin are criminalized by both countries, and therefore control efforts have often been officially promoted as collaborative even though ­t here has been much tension and fin­ger pointing in both directions. Despite the differences between immigration and drug control, t­ here are some core similarities as well as a growing convergence in the two increasingly militarized policing missions.3 In both cases the primary target has been the supply (drugs, mi­grants, and ­t hose who smuggle them) and only secondarily the demand (consumers of drugs and employers of mi­grant l­ abor). Foreign supply has been defined as the main source of the prob­lem, and suppressing it through more intensive policing has been promoted as the solution. The two are officially distinct policing missions, but in practice they increasingly rely on the same strategies, hardware, technologies, and personnel, and they are merged in official discourse about “border threats,” “border security,” and “cross-­border crime.” Cross-­border law enforcement and security cooperation—­including the provision of U.S. training, intelligence, and equipment—­has traditionally been dominated by drug control concerns but has increasingly involved migration ­matters. On both sides of the U.S.-­Mexico line, escalation has translated into tougher laws, rising bud­gets and rapid agency growth, the deployment of ever more sophisticated equipment and surveillance technologies, and a growing fusion between law enforcement and national security institutions and missions. Of course, the most vis­i­ble—­and certainly the most symbolic—­sign of escalation

The Escalation of Border Policing

3

has been the construction of more and bigger physical barriers, including the partial building of a border wall. The border-­policing offensive has been reflected in high-­profile U.S. enforcement initiatives since the early 1990s, starting with Operation Gatekeeper and Operation Hold-­t he-­Line. As their names suggest, t­ hese policing efforts are a sharp contrast to the celebratory, feel-­good discourse of North American economic integration. Even as economic trends have pushed to remake the border into a bridge facilitating rising l­egal flows, policing trends have reinforced the border as a barrier against illegal flows. Consequently, the busiest border in the world has also become one of the most heavi­ly fortified, advantaging and enriching some while endangering and even killing o ­ thers. ­These border developments, which began in earnest some three de­cades ago, defied the upbeat proclamations a­ fter the Cold War that borders w ­ ere becoming increasingly irrelevant in the so-­called age of globalization. Territorial ­controls w ­ ere often impatiently dismissed as relics of the past. Capturing the prevalent mood at the time, the international relations scholar Richard Rosecrance proclaimed that “territory is passé,” and the business management guru Kenichi Ohmae even boldly declared the emergence of a “borderless world.”4 Echoing a common view, the geographer Lawrence Herzog argued that the internationalization of the world economy “has led to an inevitable reshaping of boundary functions. The most obvious change has been the shift from bound­ aries that are heavi­ly protected and militarized to t­ hose that are more porous, permitting cross-­border social and economic interaction.”5 ­Others claimed that globalization was about “unbundling” territorial sovereignty and “de-­bordering” the state.6 Even in the realm of immigration, we w ­ ere told, t­ here was a progressive “desacralization of territory” g­ oing on, whereby states would “become inclusive rather than exclusive or enclosed.”7 A particularly fash­ion­able view was that greater economic interdependence was generating more harmonious cross-­ border relations and less state intervention. Glossed over in ­t hose rosy projections was the fact that the clandestine side of cross-­border economic exchange was being turned into a source of rising anxiety, often leading to heightened tensions and more state intervention in the form of policing. Thus, far from being dismantled and retired, the border regulatory apparatus of the state was being retooled and redeployed.8 Rather than borders being transcended, states ­were doubling down on bordering.9 As scholars and pundits wrote much about the retreat of the state and the opening of borders, they ­were initially slow to recognize the reassertion of state policing and the tightening of border controls. Especially in the field of international relations, the policing side of state border practices and the clandestine side of cross-­border economic activity had long been marginalized subjects. The

4 CHAPTER 1

relative neglect of policing was puzzling, given that the lawmaking and law-­ enforcing authority of the state was the “bedrock of sovereignty.”10 As a core component of the state’s mono­poly over the legitimate means of coercion, police practices epitomized sovereignty in action. Nonetheless, the study of policing remained primarily the domain of the specialized fields of criminology and criminal justice studies, which traditionally focused almost exclusively on domestic issues such as local crime control.11 Only in more recent years has t­ here been a surge of scholarly interest across disciplines in the dynamics of border policing.12

Escalation as a Response to Loss of State Control? Per­sis­tent and widespread unauthorized border crossings are widely viewed as extreme examples of a loss of state control over national borders. Indeed, for many scholars, pundits, and policy prac­ti­tion­ers, “loss of control” is the dominant narrative.13 The basic story line is that border defenses are ­under siege or entirely bypassed by clandestine transnational actors.14 Although the focus is on the lack of state control rather than the increase in control efforts, embedded in the story is an implicit explanation for the escalation of force: increased policing can simply be understood as a natu­ral policy response to an increase in illegal cross-­border flows and a corresponding increase in public pressure on the state to secure its borders. In other words, the state is viewed as simply reactive, responding to a growing clandestine transnational challenge and to rising domestic pressure to meet the challenge. The loss-­of-­control theme provides a power­f ul narrative. For advocates of tougher enforcement, its seductively s­ imple justification for escalation can be used to provoke alarm and to mobilize support for further escalation. Alternatively, for critics of increased border enforcement it can be used to demonstrate the severe limits and even futility of such escalation.15 For both, however, it can lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of border policing and clandestine border crossings. The stress on loss of control understates the degree to which the state has actually structured, conditioned, and even enabled (often unintentionally) clandestine cross-­border flows, and overstates the degree to which the state has been able to control its borders in the past. By characterizing state policing as largely reactive, it obscures the ways in which the state itself has helped to create the very conditions that generate calls for more policing. Most importantly, to evaluate policing practices narrowly, in terms of ­whether they attain control, is to fail to capture their larger po­liti­cal and sym-

The Escalation of Border Policing

5

bolic function. Border policing is not simply a policy instrument for deterring unauthorized crossings but a symbolic repre­sen­ta­tion of state authority; it communicates the state’s commitment to marking and maintaining the borderline. The U.S.-­Mexico border would seem to be the quin­tes­sen­tial case of policing escalation as a response to loss of state control. ­After all, that border—­t he gateway to the world’s largest destination country for both illicit drugs and un­ authorized mi­g rants—is notoriously porous. It might therefore seem entirely predictable that the state would devote more attention and resources to policing it. This conventional explanation, however, obscures more than it reveals. The popu­lar po­liti­cal call to “regain control” masks the fact that t­ here actually never was a time when the border was effectively “­under control.” In one form or another, unauthorized crossings have been a defining feature of the border ever since it was established.16 Yet with rare exceptions, such crossings commanded ­limited national po­liti­cal attention and remained minimally policed ­until recent de­cades. What has propelled the sharp escalation of border policing? The loss-­of-­ control narrative focuses attention on shifts in smuggling patterns, especially the growing power and wealth of Mexican drug-­trafficking groups and the development of more daring and better-­organized migrant-­smuggling efforts. Yet law enforcement has not merely responded to ­these shifts but helped induce them. Characterizing the state as simply reacting to a growing border prob­lem fails to capture this dynamic. Even while failing to control clandestine border crossings, law enforcement efforts have ­shaped their location, routes, methods, and organ­ ization. This has had enormous consequences in terms of the incentives and rewards for key actors—­lawmakers, law enforcers, and law evaders—as well as for public and media perception. The focus on loss of control also directs attention to domestic public pressure on the state to secure the border more forcefully. Lawmakers and law enforcers are certainly sensitive to public opinion. Indeed, many of their actions are geared ­toward making a favorable public impression. Yet rather than simply being held captive by public opinion, entrepreneurial po­liti­cal actors also compete and collaborate in crafting it. Po­liti­cal actors do not merely respond to public pressure to “do something” about the border. Instead, they skillfully use images, symbols, and language to communicate their interpretation of what the prob­lem is, where the prob­lem comes from, and what the state is or should be ­doing about it. For example, the overwhelming po­liti­cal focus on curbing the influx of drugs and mi­grants at the border has drawn attention away from the more complex and po­liti­cally divisive challenge of dealing with the enormous domestic demand for both psychoactive substances and cheap foreign ­labor. And the narrow fixation on the border has also con­ve­niently overlooked

6 CHAPTER 1

the fact that more unauthorized mi­g rants have overstayed their visas than have illegally crossed the border.17 Public perception is powerfully s­ haped by the images of the border that politicians, law enforcement agencies, and the media proj­ect. Alarming images of a border out of control can fuel public anxiety, whereas reassuring images of a border ­under control can reduce such anxiety. Depending on where along the border one chooses to look, both images are readily available. Thus, one can argue, as I do in this book, that “successful” border management depends on successful image management, and that this does not necessarily correspond with levels of a­ ctual deterrence. From this perspective, the escalation of border policing has been less about deterring than about image crafting.

The Logic of Escalation Viewing the escalation of border policing as simply a response to loss of control neglects its deeper po­liti­cal roots and symbolic functions. Border enforcement has never been a particularly effective or efficient deterrent against ­either illicit drugs or unauthorized migration. Yet policing methods that are suboptimal from the perspective of a means–­ends calculus of deterrence can be optimal from the po­liti­cal perspective of constructing an image of state authority and communicating moral resolve. In the case of the U.S.-­Mexico border, signaling a commitment to the idea of deterrence and projecting an image of pro­gress ­toward that goal has been more po­liti­cally consequential for politicians and bureaucrats than actually achieving deterrence. My account of the escalation of border policing places the state front and center.18 As highlighted in the chapters that follow, escalation has been propelled by perverse and often unintended policy feedback effects and by the primacy of images and symbols for state actors engaged in border management.19 Unraveling the logic of escalation requires taking into account how state practices shape and interact with unauthorized border crossings and, at the same time, proj­ect images and messages to vari­ous audiences concerned about such crossings. ­These images and messages are part of a public per­for­mance for which the border functions as a kind of po­liti­cal stage. For t­ hose state actors charged with the task of managing the border, the way their frontstage actions shape the perceptions of the audience—­ Congress, the media, foreign observers, the broader public—­ultimately ­matters more than ­whether or not the unauthorized border crossers are actually deterred. In fact, the feedback effects from some of the most popu­lar parts of the policing per­for­mance can actually create a more formidable border control prob­lem.

The Escalation of Border Policing

7

My emphasis on the theatrical, audience-­directed nature of border enforcement draws from so­cio­log­i­cal insights about the role of images and symbols in public interaction. In the social drama depicted by Erving Goffman, actors are constantly preoccupied with “engineering a convincing impression” that moral and other standards are being realized. Although the actors occupy social roles to which normative expectations are attached, they can be creative and entrepreneurial occupiers of ­those roles: they can comply with but also manipulate their normative environment. Similarly, in my account of the border as a po­liti­cal stage, state actors continuously engage in “face work” and the “art of impression management.”20 What makes the border a particularly challenging stage is that the actors are involved in a double per­for­mance, having to assure some of the audience that they are facilitating l­egal flows across the border while reassuring ­others in the audience that they are committed to securing the border against illegal flows. The composition of the audience varies in the cases of drug and immigration control, and also shifts over time. For Mexico’s antidrug campaign, the foreign audience—­Washington, especially congressional critics—­has long been crucial, but the domestic audience has also become increasingly impor­tant as drug vio­ lence has skyrocketed and the antidrug campaign has become much more costly and militarized. The U.S. drug control per­for­mance has attempted primarily to impress a domestic audience, including many of the same congressional voices that have traditionally scrutinized Mexico’s per­for­mance. Leaders in both countries have often gone to g­ reat lengths to proj­ect an image of collaboration and cooperation in fighting drugs—an image that has been difficult to maintain in the face of public embarrassments and high-­level corruption scandals, some of which have deeply shaken the relationship. Despite ­these strains, however, the United States and Mexico are on the same stage in that they share the goal of convincing their audiences that they are committed to curbing drug trafficking across their shared border. It has become an increasingly awkward per­for­mance to pull off. Not wanting to ruin the show, U.S. and Mexican officials have often promised to play even harder. A cohesive image of policing teamwork across the border is less evident in the case of immigration control, however. The Mexican government sends strong messages to assure its own domestic audience that it opposes the buildup of U.S. border controls and that it advocates for the rights of mi­grants. But backstage, ­under growing pressure from Washington, Mexico has greatly intensified its efforts to deter, detain, and deport U.S.-­bound non-­Mexican mi­grants. Indeed, much of the dirty work of U.S. immigration control in recent years, mostly ­targeting Central American asylum-­seekers fleeing vio­lence and poverty, has

8 CHAPTER 1

i­ ncreasingly been outsourced to Mexico, away from the glare of the U.S. media spotlight. The popularity of the border as a po­liti­cal stage is based as much on the expressive role of policing (reaffirming claims of territorial authority) as it is on the instrumental goal of policing (effective territorial control). High-­profile border enforcement campaigns that fail in their instrumental purpose can nevertheless be highly successful in their expressive function. Even as the enforcement per­for­ mance may fail to significantly deter unlawful border crossings, it can nevertheless succeed in reaffirming the importance of the border and state authority. Therefore, border control efforts are not only actions (a means to a stated instrumental end) but also gestures that communicate meaning.21 Failing enforcement agencies have expanded and grown so much partly ­because of the symbolic power they derive from their position as border maintainers.22 The seizure of drugs and arrest of smugglers, for instance, take the form of a ritualistic per­for­ mance, with the responsible officials keenly aware of the wider audience. Even though the drugs confiscated constitute only a fraction of the overall quantity crossing the border, and the smugglers arrested are easily replaced, ­these policing practices are po­liti­cally popu­lar expressions of the state’s moral resolve.23 From this perspective, border policing is not only the coercive hand of the state but a ceremonial practice, not only a means to an end but an end in itself. ­Those who question the value of the policing effort on instrumental grounds risk being labeled defeatists whose loyalty is questionable. Fearful of the reputational costs of appearing lax on border security, many po­liti­cal actors commit to an escalating symbolic per­for­mance. And once invested in the per­for­mance, they find it difficult to change course b ­ ecause of the po­liti­cal embarrassment of seeming to backtrack on previous commitments.24 The border has taken center stage only in the last few de­cades, however. Border law enforcement and border law evasion had long been largely outside the national po­liti­cal spotlight; the audience has historically been small and had minimal expectations of an impressive enforcement per­for­mance. How and why did this change? In the pages that follow, I argue that the feedback effects of state practices on both sides of the U.S.-­Mexico border helped to create the very problems for which increased policing has been promoted as the solution. The powerful image effect and symbolic appeal of enhanced policing has brought with it substantial bureaucratic and po­liti­cal rewards while generating perverse and often unintended consequences that fuel calls for even more policing.

In the next chapter I turn to tracing the historical dynamics of law enforcement and law evasion across the U.S.-­Mexico border. The border has always been

The Escalation of Border Policing

9

marked by per­sis­tent, widespread, and diverse unauthorized flows in both northward and southward directions. Largely b ­ ecause of the feedback effects of state policies on both sides of the border, however, the northbound flows of drugs and mi­grants eventually became the most prominent and controversial components of the clandestine side of the U.S.-­Mexico economic relationship. In other words, state practices, rather than simply abstract “market forces,” have been crucial in creating Mexico’s competitive advantage as a major exporter of both psychoactive drugs and mi­grant ­labor and in setting up the po­liti­cal conditions for the sharp escalation of border control efforts. In chapter 3 I trace the expansion of U.S. and Mexican campaigns to police the flow of drugs across the border from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. As an unintended consequence of U.S. efforts to interdict the trafficking of Colombian cocaine through the Ca­rib­bean, the cocaine flow was pushed to the U.S.-­Mexico border at the same time as the United States and Mexico ­were forging a new and more intimate economic partnership. To help secure the smooth passage of the North American ­Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S. and Mexican leaders orchestrated a law enforcement buildup on both sides of the border that signaled a joint commitment to drug control. Highly vis­i­ble but misleading indicators of state resolve—­increased arrests, drug seizures, bilateral initiatives—­helped sustain an image of cooperation and pro­gress and obscured the failings, flaws, and negative side effects of the enforcement effort. This positive image was sustained long enough for the ­free trade accord to pass, but the unintended feedback effects of both enhanced law enforcement and NAFTA itself generated new prob­lems that threatened to undermine bilateral relations. First, increased Mexican law enforcement perversely created greater opportunities for officials to collect bribes and payoffs, which in turn attracted more intensive U.S. media and congressional scrutiny. Second, the post-­NAFTA boom in commercial flows si­mul­ta­neously drew more po­liti­cal attention to the border and made the task of weeding out the drug flow increasingly difficult. ­These po­liti­cally embarrassing situations created an opening for opportunistic lawmakers and law enforcers to simplistically blame the f­ree trade accord for the failures of drug control and to push for even more drug interdiction resources. Scrambling to manage ­t hese policy feedback effects, U.S. and Mexican officials turned to more high-­tech and militarized forms of drug enforcement. Chapter 4 mirrors chapter 3 but focuses on intensified U.S. efforts to police the cross-­border flow of unauthorized Mexican mi­grants in the 1990s. Past state practices helped create the conditions for a domestic anti-­immigrant backlash in the early 1990s, especially in the border state of California, which was being hit hard by an economic recession and bud­get crisis. Skillfully exploiting dramatic images of unauthorized immigrants rushing across the border, po­liti­cal

10 CHAPTER 1

entrepreneurs defined and targeted the border as both the source of the prob­ lem and the most appropriate site of the policing solution (rather than, for example, the workplace). Once the border became the primary stage on which the government’s moral resolve to combat clandestine migration would be tested, politicians from across the po­liti­cal spectrum scrambled to outdo one another in proposing tougher mea­sures to secure the border. In this heated po­liti­cal climate, the federal government launched a high-­profile border control campaign that focused on fortifying the most vis­i­ble and popu­lar urban entry points for unauthorized mi­g rants, pushing them to attempt the clandestine crossing in more remote and treacherous areas farther from public and media attention. An enabling po­liti­cal climate and bureaucratic entrepreneurialism w ­ ere essential in sparking this border offensive, but the enforcement campaign subsequently took on a life of its own. By prompting shifts in the methods and location of clandestine border crossings, law enforcement created more (and more challenging) work for itself. As mi­grants ­were forced to rely more on the ser­v ices of professional smugglers, border enforcers responded with tougher and more expansive antismuggling initiatives. Similarly, as mi­grants w ­ ere pushed to attempt the border crossing along more remote and difficult terrain—­w ith hundreds ­dying e­ very year in the process—­t he reach of border enforcers geo­graph­i­cally expanded. Even though the enforcement effort failed to substantially reduce the flow of mi­grants and had the side effect of making or­ga­nized mi­grant smuggling a more profitable business, it succeeded in making unauthorized border crossings more dispersed and less vis­i­ble—­and thus in projecting an image of a more secure and orderly border. Chapter 5 documents the transformed border security environment in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Much of the post-­September 11 escalation of border policing, I emphasize, involved repackaging pre-­September 11 border control ideas and instruments as “new” antiterrorism programs and initiatives. This included more physical barriers, increasing the use of new surveillance and information technologies to construct “virtual borders,” and “thickening” borders by extending border controls outward. Yet even as border enforcement agents in this new security context w ­ ere now careful to publicly declare terrorism to be public e­ nemy No. 1, in their day-­ to-­day on-­t he-­ground activities they continued to be largely preoccupied with policing unauthorized cross-­border flows of mi­grants and drugs. However, adding counterterrorism to an already ambitious and overextended border control agenda—­now integrated u ­ nder the broad new label “homeland security”—­upped the ante, creating a fresh source of border anxiety and further hardening the policy discourse about borders and border policing.

The Escalation of Border Policing

11

South of the border, meanwhile, the greatest security threat facing Mexico was a far more militarized drug war that increasingly resembled a real war, with the government’s military-­led crackdown only adding fuel to the surge of vio­lence it was supposed to quell. Moreover, even as Mexican migration slowed considerably in the aftermath of the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, Mexico became increasingly dangerous terrain for northbound Central Americans fleeing extreme vio­lence and deprivation in their home countries, so much so that getting to the U.S.-­Mexico border came to be even riskier and more perilous than crossing it. Chapter 6 extends the story into the transformed po­liti­cal landscape of the Donald Trump presidential campaign and presidency, which placed the border and border policing in a far more intensive and sustained national po­liti­cal spotlight. Indeed, candidate and then president Trump made the border and his vows to build a “big beautiful wall” his defining issue. The border took po­liti­cal center stage like never before. The Trump administration’s border crackdown, focused overwhelmingly on migration, ended up dividing a po­liti­cally polarized nation even more than it divided the United States and Mexico. The escalation of border policing therefore continued but also became far more po­liti­cally contentious. At the same time, the Trump administration aggressively pushed to extend immigration controls beyond the borderline, more off-­stage and out of sight, using diplomatic arm-­twisting to compel Mexico and Central American governments to deter and detain mi­grants bound for the United States before they even reached the border. Some of ­t hese moves in the border game would outlive the Trump years, as would the hyperpoliticization of the border. Playing the border game continued to be po­liti­cally rewarding for some, but also became much more of a po­liti­cal minefield for ­others. In chapter 7, I conclude by revisiting the central claims of this book, pointing to some lessons that the escalation of policing may have for managing the border and border crossings, and making some brief speculations about f­ uture border enforcement trajectories.

2 CREATING THE CLANDESTINE SIDE OF THE BORDER ECONOMY

The popu­lar notion that the U.S.-­Mexico border is out of control falsely assumes that ­t here was once a time when it was truly u ­ nder control. Even though the smuggling of drugs and mi­grants has received the most media and policy attention in recent years, the real­ity is that t­ hese clandestine activities are part of an old and diverse border smuggling economy that thrived long before drugs and mi­grants became the pillars of cross-­border smuggling. As Peter Reuter and ­David Ronfeldt have rightly pointed out, “Mexicans have always been available to supply what­ever Americans want but cannot obtain legally in their own country—­just as Americans have always been ready to provide what­ever Mexicans want and cannot acquire readily in Mexico.”1 Paralleling the historical pro­ cess of formal economic integration between the United States and Mexico has been an informal, and certainly less celebrated, pro­cess of clandestine economic integration.

An Economic Relationship Founded on Smuggling Smuggling—­simply defined as clandestine economic activities that involve bringing in or taking out without authorization—­has been an integral dimension of U.S.-­Mexico cross-­border economic exchange since the nineteenth ­century.2 What has changed over time are the par­tic­u ­lar smuggling activities

12

Creating the Clandestine Side of the Border Economy

13

and their organ­ization and direction, the methods and speed of transport, state laws and the intensity of their enforcement, the degree of societal anxiety and po­l iti­c al and media attention, and the level and nature of consumer demand. The U.S.-­Mexico economic relationship was founded on smuggling, and unlike the situation t­oday, much of what was smuggled flowed from north to south. High tariffs and minimal enforcement capacity meant that ­after in­de­ pen­dence in 1821, a majority of Mexico’s trade was contraband. In the 1820s an estimated two-­t hirds of the foreign goods entering the country had evaded customs duties.3 Smuggling into Mexico from the United States reached extreme levels in the following de­cades. With the end of the Mexican-­American War in 1848, trade with Texas ­rose sharply—­much of it in the form of smuggling. The United States also became a major clandestine exporter of arms to Mexico. Mexican authorities bitterly complained about the American “traders of blood” who profited from supplying plains Indians engaged in cross-­border raiding and plundering.4 ­Until the end of the U.S. Civil War, thousands of fugitive slaves smuggled themselves across the border, leading to many incursions into Mexican territory by U.S. law enforcement.5 The fugitive slave issue remained a g­ reat source of tension in U.S.-­Mexico relations all the way up to the Civil War, with Mexico per­sis­tently refusing to sign on to a U.S. extradition treaty that included rendition of escaped slaves. During the Civil War, Mexico became a back door through which Confederate forces, seeking to get around the Union blockade, could smuggle cotton to Eu­rope and bring in war supplies. As the only neutral country sharing a land border with Confederate territory, Mexico enjoyed a special niche in war­time trading. The Mexican border town of Matamoros became a smuggling depot, where war supplies could be ferried across the Rio Grande to Brownsville, Texas, and exchanged for Southern cotton. A Union general lamented that “Matamoros is to the rebellion west of the Mississippi what the port of New York is to the United States. It is a ­great commercial center, feeding and clothing the rebellion, arming and equipping, furnishing the materials of war.” 6 One historian described the spike in economic activity in the area as resembling the California gold rush of 1849, with the area drawing entrepreneurs, speculators, agents, and brokers to it like a magnet.7 According to one estimate, more than twenty thousand speculators from the Union, the Confederacy, ­England, France, and Germany arrived over a four-­year period.8 The tiny Mexican coastal hamlet of Bagdad, at the mouth of the Rio Grande some thirty miles from Matamoros, experienced an equally dramatic growth spurt,

14 CHAPTER 2

mushrooming virtually overnight from a handful of huts to a town of some fifteen thousand residents. This blockade-­evading supply line was crucial to sustaining the Confederate war effort west of the Mississippi, and ­there was ­little the Union naval authorities could do about it. As stipulated in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Rio Grande was neutral and therefore could not be blocked by ­Mexico or the United States within a mile north or south of its entrance. Seeking to impose order on all cross-­border trade and travel, government authorities began to set up official ports of entry along the border and deploy customs agents to run them. All crossings in the areas between the ports of entry ­were by definition classified as illegal. But along the vast and sparsely populated borderline, the locations of the handful of officially sanctioned crossing points—­ sometimes with hundreds of miles between them—­were often incon­ve­nient for larger numbers of border residents, many of whom simply continued to go about their daily border business as before, though this was now treated as unlawful. At the same time, the arrival of the railroad in the late nineteenth ­century connected border towns to national markets and greatly facilitated and accelerated the cross-­border movement of goods and p ­ eople—­legally and illegally. The tremendous challenge of imposing controls on border crossings extended to livestock—­especially unauthorized c­ attle crossings. As ranching spread along the border, c­ attle rustling (stealing and smuggling ­cattle) became a huge law enforcement headache on both sides of the border. Also troublesome ­were stray ­cattle wandering across the line, with retrieval often complicated by inflexible customs agents treating the “self-­smuggled” animals as contraband ­cattle for which duty payment was owed.9 The first government-­erected border fence, along the Baja-­California border in 1909, was designed to inhibit the movement of diseased c­ attle rather than p ­ eople and goods—­t hough the latter would become the focus of the urban fencing proj­ects that sprang up during the 1910–20 Mexican Revolution and then remained afterward.10 Of greatest concern during the Revolution was the smuggling of arms and ammunition into Mexico, continuing an old pattern of the United States serving as the favored weapons supplier during periods of social and po­liti­cal ­unrest south of the border. In South Texas, customs collector Robert Dow complained that merchants along the border supplied “all comers with arms and cartridges even when aware they ­were used for revolutionary purposes.” In one smuggling scheme, the rebel leader Pancho Villa bartered confiscated c­ attle for U.S. weapons. One particularly creative gunrunner, Victor Ochoa, used rubber bladders to float large quantities of ammunition across the Rio Grande at night from El Paso to Juárez.11 Washington deployed tens of thousands of troops to the border in an effort to stem the flow of arms, impose order, and enforce neutrality laws.

Creating the Clandestine Side of the Border Economy

15

Even as the demand for smuggled arms dried up with the ending of the Mexican Revolution, the demand for smuggled alcohol shot up with the introduction of Prohibition in the United States in 1920. Smugglers adapted to the new market environment and simply switched from one commodity to another. Vari­ ous types of booze—­tequila, mescal, rum—­had long been smuggled into the United States from Mexico, but to evade taxes rather than prohibitions. Prohibition turned alcohol smuggling into a much bigger, more profitable, and more violent border business. And as smuggling boomed, so too did the policing of smuggling: the size of the U.S. Customs force was small ­until the Prohibition era, when the number of inspectors along the border ­rose from 111 in 1925 to 723 in 1930.12 More intensive enforcement of Prohibition transformed the illicit trade in alcohol across the border. In South Texas, for example, the trade was initially dominated by Mexican tequileros, smugglers on ­horse­back who used mules and donkeys to carry their alcohol supplies across the line in remote areas. But as border authorities ­were increasingly effective in their operations against the tequileros, by the late 1920s tequileros had been replaced by more sophisticated and violent bootleggers transporting larger volumes of alcohol by car and truck along road networks. Effective enforcement against the tequileros, in other words, unintentionally helped pave the way for the rise of a new and more dangerous breed of smuggler.13 Many Mexican border towns, such as Tijuana and Juárez, became busy vice districts—­offering booze, brothels, and gambling to swarms of U.S. tourists—­ and also illicit liquor trade centers, helping to build up the border smuggling infrastructure.14 ­A fter Prohibition was repealed, this infrastructure simply adapted to other smuggling opportunities. At the same time, Prohibition helped to establish a much greater, even if still ­limited, federal policing presence along the border. Meanwhile, the large-­scale smuggling of ­legal goods into Mexico, which had been the backbone of smuggling in the nineteenth ­century, continued to grow in the twentieth. In the 1920s Mexican officials even contemplated building fences around some border towns to keep out goods smuggled from the United States. The governor of Baja, however, protested that this would give the residents of ­t hese towns “the appearance of herded ­cattle” and rejected the idea.15 The building of fences to control illegal cross-­border flows would ­later become a popu­lar strategy on the U.S. side of the border. Although U.S. border states historically enjoyed a significant comparative advantage in the contraband trade, the flow was not entirely one-­way. For example, the smuggling of candelilla, a strong natu­ral wax from native shrubs, had become a thriving export business in some northern Mexican states by the 1950s

16 CHAPTER 2

thanks to the strict controls on price and production imposed by the central government. Also, the illegal trade in animals from Mexico—­especially the smuggling of parrots, often intoxicated with tequila to keep them quiet—­became such a profitable business that feuds between rival smugglers could result in their hijacking one another’s parrot shipments.16 Even the illegal importation of insects from Mexico—­f ueled by the demands of insect collectors in the United States and elsewhere—­would ­later evolve into a sizable business.17 De­cades of protectionist Mexican economic policies designed to insulate the country’s industries and generate revenue for the government meant that U.S. ­border towns functioned as unofficial shopping centers for merchandise, ranging from ­house­hold appliances to automobiles, waiting to be smuggled into Mexico. In the late 1970s, Mexicans purchased so much in Laredo, Texas, that Laredo was ranked among the highest U.S. cities in retail sales per capita, despite the fact that its local residents earned some of the lowest wages in the country. Of the $4 ­million worth of tele­vi­sion sets exported from Laredo to Mexico in 1978, an estimated $2.8 million worth w ­ ere smuggled. The Laredo airport became a major hub for small planes loaded with smuggled U.S. goods bound for Mexico. Flying was not only faster but cheaper: g­ oing by land required passing through more Mexican customs checkpoints, and therefore spending more on payoffs.18 The situation got so out of hand that in February 1979 the López Portillo administration appealed to the Car­ter administration for assistance in stemming the contraband trade in luxury items, electronics and other appliances, powdered milk, and more, which was estimated to have cost Mexican business $1 billion in losses.19 In 1977 Mexican dairy farmers blamed a loss of over $400,000 per day on smuggled U.S. milk.20 Only membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and the subsequent liberalization of trade (formalized by NAFTA in 1994) enabled Mexico to substantially undermine this kind of smuggling. But just as smugglers who made their living from contraband saw their business shrink ­because of the state’s market liberalization policies, the lack of liberalization in other key sectors of the clandestine economic relationship—­most notably drugs and mi­grant ­labor—­ensured not only the per­ sis­tence but the expansion of the smuggling networks that had been built up over a long history of protectionist economic policies.

Origins of the Mexican Migration Connection Almost two centuries ago, Mexico tried unsuccessfully to curb unauthorized U.S. immigration into its northern regions. The so-­called Mexican Decree of

Creating the Clandestine Side of the Border Economy

17

April 1830 had prohibited further immigration from the United States into Texas, and Mexico deployed garrisons to try to enforce the law. Yet the influx of Americans continued mostly unabated, and by 1836 they greatly outnumbered native Tejanos. Many of the settlers also illicitly brought slaves with them in violation of both Mexican and U.S. laws—­Mexico had banned the slave trade in 1824 and outlawed slavery in 1829, and the United States prohibited its citizens from trafficking slaves into foreign lands. A variety of exemptions and creative settler schemes to import and hold slaves, including the ­legal fiction that slaves ­were long-­term contract laborers, allowed settlers to circumvent t­ hese laws. And local Mexican officials showed ­little enthusiasm for enforcing rules handed down by a distant central government in disarray. Slavery and the slave trade became growing irritants in settler relations with the increasingly antislavery Mexican government and played no small part in calls for revolution in 1835 and the war of in­de­pen­dence in 1836.21 In defiance of the Mexican authorities, maritime slave smuggling into Texas grew in the years leading up to the Texas Revolution. Slave smugglers helped to supply and finance the Texas Revolution, and some, such as James Bowie, directly participated in fighting Mexican general Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna’s forces. In a sense, the Alamo was a bloody attempt to control unauthorized U.S. immigration. Mexico won that ­battle but lost the war. ­After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase of 1853, the regions in question became part of the sovereign territory of the United States, and white settlers—­many of them Eu­ro­pean immigrants—­moved west to occupy the newly acquired lands. T ­ oday the migration movement has been reversed, with vast numbers of Mexicans populating t­ hese regions. The first U.S. attempt to control migration across the southwest border was directed not at Mexicans but at Chinese laborers. Efforts to prohibit Chinese immigration in the late nineteenth c­ entury mark the beginning of the federal government’s long and tumultuous history of trying to keep out “undesirables.” The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 barred the entry of Chinese laborers, who u ­ ntil then w ­ ere coming in mostly by steamship to San Francisco. But while this front door entry was closing, back doors ­were opening, especially via the U.S.-­Canada border and the U.S.-­Mexico border. The federal government had no stand-­a lone immigration control apparatus when the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed, but enforcement of the law would stimulate the creation of entirely new federal administrative capacities. The U.S.-­Mexico border, long a gateway for smuggled goods, was now also becoming an increasingly impor­tant gateway for smuggled ­people. In 1900 ­there ­were just a few thousand Chinese in Mexico, but less than a de­cade l­ater nearly sixty thousand Chinese mi­grants had departed to Mexico. Some stayed, but the

18 CHAPTER 2

United States was a far more attractive destination.22 In his investigations, U.S. immigration inspector Marcus Braun witnessed Chinese arriving in Mexico and reported, “On their arrival in Mexico, I found them to be provided with United States money, not Mexican coins; they had in their possession Chinese-­English dictionaries; I found them in possession of Chinese-­American newspapers and of American railroad maps.”23 In 1907 a U.S. government investigator observed that twenty to fifty Chinese arrived daily by train in the Mexican border town of Juárez, but that the Chinese community in the town never grew. As he put it, “Chinamen coming to Ciudad Juarez e­ ither vanish into thin air or cross the border line.”24 Foreshadowing f­ uture developments, a January 1904 editorial in the El Paso Herald-­Post warned, “If this Chinese immigration to Mexico continues it w ­ ill be necessary to run a barb wire fence along our side of the Rio Grande.” The El Paso immigration inspector stated in his 1905 annual report that mi­grant smuggling is the sole business of “perhaps one-­t hird of the Chinese population of El Paso.”25 As U.S. authorities tightened enforcement at urban entry points along the California-­Mexico border, smugglers shifted to more remote parts of the border farther east in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. This shift provided the rationale for the federal government to deploy more agents to t­hese border areas—­a dynamic that would repeat itself again at the end of the ­century. More port inspectors ­were hired, and a force of mounted inspectors was set up to patrol the borderline by ­horse­back. As smugglers in ­later years turned to new technologies such as automobiles, officials also pushed for the use of the same technologies for border control.26 Chinese mi­grants w ­ ere not the only ones coming through the back door; they ­were simply at the top of a growing list of “undesirables” that included paupers, criminals, prostitutes, “lunatics,” “­idiots,” polygamists, anarchists, “imbeciles,” and contract workers in general. Japa­nese laborers w ­ ere banned in 1907. Illiterates ­were banned from entry in 1917. As seaports became more tightly regulated and policed, immigrants who feared being placed in one of t­ hese excludable categories increasingly turned to the back door. Th ­ ose groups that w ­ ere disproportionately being turned away at the front door ports of entry—­a mong them Lebanese, Greeks, Italians, Slavs from the Balkans, and Jews—­a lso found Mexico to be a con­ve­nient back door alternative.27 The popularity of the Mexican back door received a major boost from new U.S. restrictions on Eu­ro­pean immigration through the national origins quotas in 1921 and 1924. Passport rules left over from World War I and formalized in the Passport Act of 1918 also now required immigrants to secure visas at U.S. consulates abroad. The Mexico smuggling route offered a way for Eu­ro­pe­ans seeking to migrate to the United States to sidestep ­these new numerical restrictions and

Creating the Clandestine Side of the Border Economy

19

documentation requirements. This sparked alarm in Washington and provided po­liti­cal ammunition for calls for more border enforcement. The commissioner-­ general of immigration reported in 1923 that each new entry restriction “promoted the alien smuggling industry and furnished new and multiplied incentives to illegal entry.”28 The commissioner’s report the following year predicted that the Immigration Law of 1924 “­will result in a further influx of undesirable Eu­ro­pean aliens to Mexico with the sole object in view of affecting illegal entry into the United States over the Rio Grande.”29 Local media reports reinforced ­these concerns. An article in El Paso’s Spanish-­ language newspaper La Patria on 22 December 1924 pointed to the booming cross-­border business for “contrabandistas de carne humana” (smugglers of ­human meat) in the wake of the new U.S. immigration restrictions.30 The article (with the headline “Foreigners Who Want to Cross Over to the United States Have Invaded the City of Juarez”) described Juárez as a depot for foreigners waiting to enter the United States.31 To address the concern over mi­grant smuggling, Congress greatly expanded the Immigration Bureau’s personnel powers to search and arrest along and near the borderline. In a country other­w ise wary of increasing the power and reach of government, border control was clearly one realm where politicians pushed to bolster federal authority. ­After several years of growing po­liti­cal pressure to create a uniformed border patrol force, Congress passed legislation establishing the U.S. Border Patrol in 1924 with a $1 million bud­get and a total force of some 450 officers. The Border Patrol’s primary mission was to keep out unauthorized immigrants, especially the smuggling of Eu­ro­pe­ans. Wesley Stile, one of the first Border Patrol agents hired in the summer of 1924, l­ater recalled, “The t­ hing that established the Border Patrol was the influx of Eu­ro­pean aliens.” Border patrolmen “­didn’t pay much attention to the Mexicans” b ­ ecause they ­were considered merely cheap seasonal farm laborers who returned to Mexico when no longer needed.32 This meant that the growing influx of unauthorized Mexican workers was largely ­tolerated and overlooked—at least for the time being. Despite an 1885 law restricting the importation of contract workers, throughout the early twentieth c­ entury large numbers of Mexicans w ­ ere informally recruited by U.S. employers to work in southwestern agriculture. Whereas formal, ­legal entry was a complicated pro­cess, crossing the border illegally was relatively ­simple and largely overlooked. Up to half a million Mexicans may have come to the United States in the first de­cade of the c­ entury. The Mexican Revolution, U.S. ­labor shortages during World War I, and the continued expansion of agriculture in the Southwest fueled a further influx. ­There was a growing disconnect between the formal entry rules handed down from a distant capital and the realities, needs, and practices along the border. Strict controls against Mexicans

20 CHAPTER 2

crossing the border ­were widely perceived as neither ­viable nor desirable. As one observer put it, “from a practical administrative standpoint a quota system would be impossible to enforce” ­because the long border with Mexico “could not be adequately policed. The pressure to bring Mexicans across the border would be so ­great and smuggling them would become so profitable that a quota law for Mexicans would become a joke.”33 Mexicans ­were viewed by employers and policymakers alike as an ideal ­labor force: flexible, compliant, and temporary—or so it seemed at the time. Millions of unauthorized Mexican mi­grants would eventually s­ ettle in the United States, becoming a vital source of ­labor for agriculture and other sectors of the economy but also becoming the main rationale for more intensive border enforcement. It was not u ­ ntil 1929 that U.S. border inspectors even made any real effort to regulate the entry of Mexican nationals, sending hundreds of thousands of laborers back to Mexico during the G ­ reat Depression when they ­were no longer needed. When the United States’ thirst for cheap l­ abor was renewed in the 1940s as a result of l­ abor shortages created by World War II, Mexican workers w ­ ere encouraged to return in large numbers. This time, however, the federal government played a formal, active role in regulating the pro­cess. The Bracero Program, a guest-­worker scheme in place between 1942 and 1964, was created both to ensure a cheap source of ­labor for southwestern agribusiness interests and to inhibit unauthorized migration. While it was in effect, the program provided for more than 4.5 million individual contracts for temporary employment. The legacy of the Bracero Program was the institutionalization of large-­scale ­labor migration from Mexico to the United States. During the de­cades in which the program existed, an interdependent relationship between employers and mi­ grants became firmly established.34 Moreover, many “temporary” workers ended up settling in the United States, helping to create the permanent migratory networks that provide a bridge and a base for new arrivals. An immediate consequence of the Bracero Program was that the promise of guaranteed employment unintentionally encouraged unauthorized border crossings. In the years following the program’s creation, large numbers of workers made their way across without ­going through the formal channels of the recruitment pro­cess. As mi­grants streamed north, apprehensions by the Border Patrol jumped from 182,000 in 1947 to more than 850,000 by the end of 1953. In a dramatic effort to impose control, in June  1954 the Eisenhower administration launched Operation Wetback, which resulted in the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans. ­Under the command of retired general Joseph Swing, the operation revitalized the Border Patrol and enhanced the sense of order along the boundary.35

Creating the Clandestine Side of the Border Economy

21

Yet even as the Border Patrol was engaged in highly publicized mass roundups of unauthorized mi­grants, the government was making it easier to import Mexican laborers legally through the Bracero program. While apprehensions of unauthorized border crossers dropped sharply in 1955–56, the number of imported Bracero workers r­ ose. To enhance the appearance of control while also ensuring an adequate supply of l­abor, the Border Patrol often played both enforcer and facilitator. Immigration scholar Kitty Calavita notes, “Illegal immigrants, or ‘wetbacks,’ ­were often ‘dried out’ by the INS Border Patrol, who escorted them to the Mexican border, had them step to the Mexican side, and brought them back as ­legal braceros.” In some cases, she points out, “the Border Patrol ‘paroled’ illegal immigrants directly to employers.”36 But even though the Bracero program helped create the appearance of a more orderly, regulated, and temporary ­labor flow, it also created an increasingly awkward image prob­lem for the federal government. In 1960 the Eisenhower administration was deeply embarrassed by the CBS documentary Harvest of Shame, which drew public attention to the deplorable working conditions of Bracero ­laborers.37 It also added legitimacy to l­abor u ­ nion pressures to end the guest-­ worker program. By formally ending the program a few years ­later, the administration ­distanced itself from the appearance of officially sanctioning poor working conditions. The only t­ hing that changed, however, was the l­egal status of the Mexican workers. They continued to be welcomed by employers who had come to rely on this cheap and flexible l­abor supply and who had l­ittle to fear from the law, since the hiring of unauthorized mi­grants was not a felony.38 By exempting employers from any responsibility, the complicity of the state in facilitating the importation of Mexican workers continued as before, albeit in a much less public form. Illegal entry r­ ose sharply in the following de­cades, the formal Bracero system having simply been replaced by an informal one.39 The incentives for clandestine entry ­were further reinforced by the 1965 Immigration Act, which for the first time imposed a limit of 120,000 immigrant visas annually for immigrants from countries in the Western Hemi­sphere. Moreover, the 1976 decision to limit visas to 20,000 per year per individual country in the Western Hemi­sphere created an enormous backlog of applicants from Mexico, making backdoor illegal entry even more attractive.40 The clandestine nature of the l­abor flow benefited both employers and the state. For employers, the unauthorized status of the l­abor force ensured compliance and low wages: lacking public support and state protection, unauthorized immigrants w ­ ere less likely to or­ga­nize or complain about working conditions. For U.S. officials, the very fact that the workers w ­ ere in the country without a formal invitation helped reduce the appearance of direct government complicity.

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As long as unauthorized immigration remained outside the media spotlight, the evasion of U.S. border controls by unauthorized entrants would not become a po­liti­cal embarrassment. For the time being, at least, the clandestine cross-­ border l­ abor flow was largely off the po­liti­cal map. As a result, its rapid increase in the 1960s and 1970s was not matched by a similar increase in INS enforcement capacity. Interior enforcement was almost non­ex­is­tent, and border controls remained at token levels. Even as the number of border apprehensions increased from approximately seventy-­one thousand in 1960 to more than a million in 1978, the bud­get of the Border Patrol remained less than the bud­gets of many city police departments.41 Minimal po­liti­cal support in Washington meant that the Border Patrol would remain a relatively small force. The l­imited effectiveness of enforcement meant that illegal entry remained relatively ­simple and inexpensive: mi­grants ­either smuggled themselves across the border or hired a local professional, called a coyote, to guide them. The sheer magnitude of the clandestine ­labor flow, however, stimulated more entrants into the mi­grant smuggling business, and with the dispersion of the flow from agricultural to urban areas, smuggling gradually became better or­ga­nized. Government reports suggest that smuggling organ­izations had grown in size and complexity by the mid-1970s. Still, the use of a professional smuggler remained more a con­ve­nience than a necessity. In fiscal year (FY) 1970 only 8.4 ­percent of the unauthorized mi­grants caught by the Border Patrol in the southwestern region had attempted entry with a smuggler. This figure ­rose to 13.5 ­percent in FY1975. Apprehension statistics, of course, prob­ably understate the amount of smuggling g­ oing on, given that mi­grants who pay a coyote are less likely to be apprehended than t­hose who do not. Penalties remained low: fewer than 50 ­percent of the smugglers caught between 1973 and 1975 ­were prosecuted, most on a misdemeanor charge.42 The ser­v ices of a smuggler generally meant a faster and safer trip across the border and could even include door-­to-­door ser­vice from the point of departure in the sending community to the point of destination in places such as Los Angeles. This was particularly useful to first-­time border crossers who w ­ ere unfamiliar with the terrain and the enforcement-­evasion game. Hiring a smuggler did involve personal risks (­t here was potential for theft and physical abuse), but attempting the clandestine border crossing without such help increased the likelihood of assault by border thieves and abuse by the authorities. Border enforcement, failing to significantly deter illegal crossings, was largely a ritualized per­for­mance. The Border Patrol could cover only about 10 ­percent of the nearly two-­t housand-­mile border, and the arrests it did make ­were more apparent than real.43 Even though the INS insisted that “prompt apprehension

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and return to country of origin is a positive deterrent to illegal reentry and related violations,” the evidence suggests that mi­grants simply kept trying to cross ­until they eventually succeeded.44 Arrest statistics had l­ittle to do with a­ ctual deterrence and every­t hing to do with bureaucratic incentives. If l­ ittle e­ lse, high apprehension numbers provided po­liti­cal ammunition in annual bud­get requests. The Border Patrol could boast that it made more arrests than any other law enforcement agency, which at least showed that it was keeping busy. The failure to provide a reasonable mea­sure of effectiveness was even given a positive spin: a 1973 INS publication put it, “The Border Patrol’s contribution to our country’s security and welfare is so far reaching that it cannot be mea­sured”; the patrol “has maintained a reputation for getting the job done.”45 Both the Border Patrol and the unauthorized border crossers benefited from an arrest system based on “prompt apprehension and return to country of origin.” For the Border Patrol, lack of detention space for a high volume of crossers necessitated a speedy removal pro­cess based on “voluntary departure.” And for the mi­grants, a quick return to the Mexican side was welcomed b ­ ecause it short46 ened the delay before another attempt at crossing. Repeated arrests merely postponed entry for mi­grants, but they helped Border Patrol agents inflate arrest statistics and improve their internal per­for­mance evaluations. External reviewers, however, ­were less impressed. One government study bluntly concluded: “Presently the border is a revolving door. . . . ​We repatriate undocumented workers on a massive scale. . . . ​The illegals cooperate by agreeing to voluntary departure and significant numbers promptly re-­enter. It is not unusual for an illegal to undergo multiple apprehensions and re-­entries for t­here are no serious deterrents.” 47 A clandestine form of cross-­border interdependence gradually developed as a result of de­cades of large-­scale Mexican migration. On the U.S. side, employers (especially in agriculture but increasingly in other sectors of the economy as well) became accustomed to a cheap, reliable, and disposable l­ abor force. At the same time, Mexico became increasingly reliant on exporting its l­abor surplus. Remittances from mi­g rant workers provided much-­needed foreign exchange (amounting to several billion dollars annually) which was especially impor­tant ­because it went directly to lower-­income h ­ ouse­holds. Entire communities became eco­nom­ically dependent on such remittances; many of them became l­ ittle more than “nurseries and nursing homes” for the c­ hildren, parents, and grandparents of immigrants employed in the United States. The remittances also helped to fund the northward trip of other community members.48 The Mexican state itself came to rely on the United States as a safety valve for the nation’s unemployment prob­lem. Though not officially promoting unauthorized

24 CHAPTER 2

migration, government officials took no steps to curb it, and in some re­spects Mexican policies actually encouraged such migration. The state-­promoted development model generated economic growth—­but without significant gains in employment. Economic policies that created what Philip Martin calls “growth without jobs” indirectly encouraged workers to turn to the under­ground exit option of migrating to the United States.49 In rural communities, that option was reinforced by the strong urban bias of Mexican economic and social policies.50 Increasingly, the exit option included work not only in U.S. agriculture (traditionally the backbone of unauthorized employment) but also in urban-­based sectors of the economy such as ser­v ices and construction. Not surprisingly, as employment opportunities expanded spatially and occupationally, migration became more permanent, less seasonal, and more city-­focused—­and thus increasingly vis­i­ble to the general public. The prob­lem, of course, was that although their illegal status was part of what made Mexican workers attractive to employers, this status reinforced public hostility. And as their numbers grew ­after the ending of the Bracero Program, expanding beyond the traditional confines of rural agricultural regions in the West, public tolerance gradually deteriorated. ­These changes further politicized the issue of unauthorized immigration in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Years of U.S. congressional debate over how to respond to unauthorized immigration culminated in 1986 with the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). IRCA introduced employer sanctions for the first time, authorized an expansion of the Border Patrol, and offered a general legalization program (as well as a special legalization program for agricultural workers). Some two million Mexicans—­far more than initially projected—­were eventually given ­legal status u ­ nder provisions created by IRCA. The proponents of IRCA argued that this supply of newly legalized workers would meet the domestic demand for immigrant ­labor, while sanctions against employers would deter the hiring of unauthorized workers. This combination, it was hoped, would inhibit ­f uture unauthorized migration. In practice, however, IRCA generated perverse and unintended (though not unpredictable) consequences that contributed to the very prob­lem for which the law was sold as a solution. For example, many onetime immigrants who had gone back to Mexico returned to claim legalization papers. And ­t hose who ­were legalized ­u nder IRCA helped facilitate the arrival of new unauthorized immigrants. Meanwhile, the employer sanctions proved to be largely symbolic; their immediate impact was to spark an enormous under­ground business in fraudulent documents. B ­ ecause the new law did not require them to verify the authenticity of the documents, employers still risked l­ittle by hiring unauthorized workers. And fraudulent papers, now a necessity for mi­grants, ­were relatively

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25

inexpensive and easy to obtain. Any of some twenty-­nine dif­fer­ent documents could be used to satisfy the document-­check requirement. As a result, unauthorized workers and their employers had ­little trou­ble adapting to the new rules of the immigration enforcement game. The only real change was that employers had to at least maintain the appearance of hiring ­legal ­labor. INS inspectors w ­ ere satisfied as long as employers made sure to go through the ritual of asking for documents and filling out the proper paperwork; employers could be prosecuted only if it could be proved that they “knowingly” hired unauthorized workers. The perceived increase in employer “compliance,” in turn, helped the INS improve its own enforcement image. Another key image effect of IRCA was the appearance of a more controlled border—at least in the short term. Border apprehensions from FY1986 to 1989 dropped by nearly half, from more than 1.6 million to fewer than 855,000. The eventual legalization of some 2 million Mexicans in the United States—­many of whom had previously been ­going back and forth across the border without authorization—­contributed to this image of enhanced control. But starting in 1989, apprehensions again began to rise sharply, and by the early 1990s they had returned to their pre-­IRCA levels. Not only did the employer sanctions have l­ ittle deterrent effect, but the millions of mi­grants legalized u ­ nder IRCA w ­ ere able to provide a stronger and more stable base for unauthorized arrivals. One U.S. government commission even concluded that the legalization programs for agricultural workers had unintentionally promoted more immigration by sending the message that being illegally employed in farmwork in the United States would help immigrants become l­egal residents.51 Thus, in the end, IRCA became part of the prob­lem rather than the solution. The immediate po­liti­cal benefit of the law for its proponents was to defuse domestic pressure by fi­nally “­doing something” about unauthorized immigration. Yet it also helped set the stage for the intense anti-­immigrant backlash in the early 1990s—­w ith the southwestern border becoming a focal point of media scrutiny, po­liti­cal debate, and public outrage.

Origins of the Mexican Drug Connection The entry of drugs into the mix of smuggled goods in the first de­cades of the twentieth ­century profoundly transformed the dynamics of law enforcement and law evasion across the U.S.-­Mexico border. U.S. prohibition laws, beginning with the 1909 Opium Exclusion Act and the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Law, provided a major boost for Mexico’s nascent drug export sector.52 Marijuana had been

26 CHAPTER 2

grown in Mexico since the nineteenth c­ entury, and in the first de­cades of the twentieth ­century Chinese immigrants brought opium growing to the states of Sinaloa and Sonora. The new U.S. prohibitions and the subsequent rise in drug smuggling created po­liti­cal prob­lems for the central government in Mexico, which exercised only minimal control over its northern border states. Not only did the prohibitions generate concerns about incursions into Mexican territory by U.S. law enforcers and drug smugglers, but the emerging Mexican drug trade was located in border states that w ­ ere areas of antigovernment opposition. The clandestine border economy (of which drugs had now become a part) provided a financial base for strongmen such as Estéban Cantú, who ruled Baja California as his own private fiefdom from 1914 to 1920.53 U.S. antidrug laws ­were matched by similar laws on the Mexican side of the border. In 1916 Mexico prohibited opium imports; in 1923 it banned the importation of all narcotics. Mexico outlawed the export of heroin and marijuana in 1927 partly to pacify the United States and conform to an emerging international drug prohibition regime. But the criminalization of drugs in Mexico also reflected state efforts to gain greater control over the border and to limit further U.S. territorial incursions.54 In practice, however, enforcement of drug laws was minimal. In the 1950s and 1960s Mexico supplied about 75 ­percent of the U.S. marijuana market and 10–15 ­percent of the heroin market. In the early 1970s, Mexico’s share of the U.S. heroin market ­rose sharply, not simply as a result of high U.S. consumer demand but ­because of law enforcement initiatives on the other side of the globe. Turkey had been the primary supplier to the booming U.S. heroin market in the 1960s, but when the Turkish government (­under intense U.S. pressure) prohibited opium production and implemented a strict control program in 1972, production naturally shifted to a logical and much closer alternative: Mexico. Thus, the unintentional feedback effect of targeting Turkey and severing its “French Connection” with Marseilles was to transplant the heroin supply prob­lem to Mexico. Targeting Mexico as a growing drug source country, the Nixon administration launched Operation Intercept in September 1969. Through intensive scrutiny of vehicles crossing the border, the highly publicized operation predictably created enormous traffic jams and jolted the local economies of border cities. The Mexican tourist and fresh produce industries ­were especially hurt. Minimal amounts of drugs ­were seized in “the nation’s largest peacetime search and seizure operation by civil authorities.”55 Yet the primary purpose of the operation was not to interdict and deter drugs at the border but to signal Richard Nixon’s dis­plea­sure with Mexico’s lax drug eradication effort.56 Loud protests by the Mexican government and the economic stress on border cities soon led U.S.

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officials to relax their pressure on the ports of entry—­but not ­until Mexico had promised a more aggressive antidrug program. Operation Intercept significantly elevated the drug issue on the U.S.-­Mexico policy agenda and ushered in a new era in cross-­border drug control initiatives. The centerpiece was Mexico’s launching of Operation Condor in 1975, the most ambitious eradication effort ever undertaken by any country. The northern states of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua ­were especially targeted. The results ­were dramatic: Mexico’s share of the U.S. marijuana market fell from over 75 ­percent in 1976 to as low as 4 ­percent in 1981, and its share of the U.S. heroin market plummeted from 67 ­percent in 1976 to 25 ­percent in 1980. ­These reductions ­were primarily accomplished through the use of herbicides in aerial eradication, as well as the deployment of military troops for manual eradication. Cross-­border law enforcement collaboration between the United States and Mexico, including intelligence sharing, surveillance, and training, also contributed to the campaign’s impressive outcome.57 The operation generated significant rewards for officials on both sides of the border. For Washington, it demonstrated the viability of a supply-­reduction strategy based on bilateral cooperation, intensified law enforcement at the source of production, and promoted greater use of technology in drug enforcement. Indeed, Operation Condor was considered a model program for all drug source countries. The operation also provided much greater U.S. law enforcement access to Mexican territory and police forces. Richard Craig notes that the Mexican Attorney General’s Office had obtained from the United States an air wing that was bigger and better than most air forces in Latin Amer­i­ca. For the Mexican military the operation provided a means to gain training that con­ve­niently resembled counterinsurgency tactics, and government authority was reimposed in many rural areas. Meanwhile, Mexican leaders ­were pleased that their operation projected a positive international image.58 It was less noticed, however, that the very success of the eradication effort led to a restructuring, rather than a permanent reduction, of Mexico’s role in the drug trade. Thanks to the antidrug offensive, the least efficient and least competitive smuggling groups ­were weeded out (jailed or forced out of business), leaving the market open for more sophisticated organ­izations that relied more heavi­ly on vio­ lence, corruption, and intimidation. Some of Mexico’s leading smuggling organ­ izations (not only for drugs but for other commodities as well) emerged during the height of the government’s antidrug offensive.59 One Mexican analyst argued that “the impact of the U.S.-­inspired eradication program on the market place has been . . . ​to give comparative advantage to large scale criminal organ­izations.” 60 Meanwhile, part of the collateral damage of the antidrug offensive was more extensive corruption within Mexican law enforcement. Increased drug control

28 CHAPTER 2

brought with it increased proximity of the police to drug trafficking—­and an increased opportunity and incentive for traffickers to bribe them. This relationship, in turn, retarded the much-­needed professionalization of the federal police forces.61 The spread of corruption also made it increasingly difficult to sustain the  success of the drug control campaign. And unfortunately for the Mexican government, the campaign’s impressive early accomplishments had created an inflated U.S. expectation of success. Within a few years the Mexican drug trade had adjusted to the new enforcement environment. Not only did production of marijuana and opium poppy again rapidly expand (this time in more dispersed and less vis­i­ble plots), but by the mid-1980s Mexico was becoming an increasingly impor­tant transshipment point for South American cocaine bound for the U.S. market. The full significance of this change and its impact on the southwestern border region would not be recognized u ­ ntil years ­later. Drug trafficking and drug enforcement grew together in the 1980s. Beginning with the Reagan administration’s launching of a new “war on drugs,” the U.S. campaign for control escalated at home and abroad. Bud­gets grew, agency missions expanded, tougher laws w ­ ere introduced, and the overall importance of the issue on the policy agenda was significantly elevated. At the time, however, the focus was not on the U.S.-­Mexico border but on the influx of Colombian cocaine and marijuana through south Florida. The South Florida Task Force, ­under the direction of Vice President George Bush, was launched in January 1982 to target air and sea smuggling routes in the Southeast (it would l­ ater serve as a model for antidrug efforts in the Southwest). For the first time in the history of U.S. drug enforcement, the U.S. military stepped in to play a support role for the Coast Guard and the Customs Ser­v ice. Turning to the military for assistance required loosening the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act (prohibiting military involvement in domestic law enforcement), which in turn would open the door for an enhanced military role on the southwestern border in ­later years. Funding for the Defense Department’s interdiction campaign increased from $4.9 million in FY1982 to an estimated $387 million in FY1987.62 Contributing to the growing fusion between military and law enforcement missions was President Ronald Reagan’s 1986 security directive that for the first time officially classified drugs as a national security threat. Funding for interdiction doubled between 1982 and 1987 and continued to focus most intensively on the Southeast. Federal cocaine seizures ­rose sharply as well, from two tons in 1981 to twenty-­seven tons in 1986 to one hundred tons in 1989.63 But ­t hese seizures, though statistically impressive, did ­little to reduce the drug flow; in fact, cocaine imports more than doubled between 1984 and

Creating the Clandestine Side of the Border Economy

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1986.64 U.S. officials pointed to the rec­ord amounts of drugs they w ­ ere seizing as an indicator of policy pro­gress, but part of the reason they w ­ ere seizing more was that more drugs w ­ ere flowing across the border.65 Even though pouring more resources into an increasingly militarized interdiction campaign made l­ ittle sense from the standpoint of a cost–­benefit calculus of deterrence, it made a g­ reat deal of sense in a po­liti­cal calculus of image projection. With Demo­crats and Republicans out-­toughing each other over the drug issue, pushing for a bigger and better border interdiction effort became a favorite means of displaying po­liti­cal resolve. In fact, in 1988 the House of Representatives voted 385 to 23 to amend the defense bill by ordering the deployment of the U.S. military within forty-­five days of enactment to “substantially halt the unlawful penetration of U.S. borders by aircraft and vessels carry­i ng narcotics”—­even though the Pentagon made it clear that such a demand was unrealistic.66 Commenting on the Senate’s effort to increase the interdiction role of the military in 1988, Senator John McCain (R-­Ariz.) spoke for many in Congress: “This is such an emotional issue—­I mean, w ­ e’re at war h ­ ere—­t hat voting no would be too difficult to explain.” Voting against it, he said, would be “voting against the war on drugs. Nobody wants to do that.”67 Reflecting on the debate over a 1988 drug bill, Representative Charles Schumer (D-­N.Y.) said, “It’s quick-­hit, image over substance, and nobody cares if it’s g­ oing to work.”68 Out-­toughing on the drug issue occurred on the campaign trail as well. The 1986 race between Florida’s Republican senator Paula Hawkins and Demo­cratic governor Bob Graham was one example. When Senator Hawkins described herself as “the general in the Senate’s war on drugs,” the governor countered with a tele­v i­sion advertisement showing him first in a police he­li­cop­ter, advocating a tough line on drug control, and then next to a captured smugglers’ airplane, calling for more military involvement in the drug war and attacking Hawkins for voting against increased funding for the Coast Guard’s drug war effort. The Congressional Quarterly described the election-­driven escalation: “In the closing weeks of the Congressional election season, taking the pledge becomes a familiar feature of campaign life. Thirty years ago, candidates pledged to ­battle domestic communism. . . . ​In 1986, the pledge issue is drugs.”69 The Maginot Line–­style strategy in south Florida did not significantly deter drug importations, but it did powerfully influence the location, methods, and organ­ization of drug smuggling. As some in the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) recognized, its most impor­tant impact was to push much of the traffic to the Southwest, making Colombian traffickers increasingly reliant on Mexican smuggling networks. Testifying at a Foreign Affairs Committee task force hearing on 7 October 1987, assistant DEA administrator David Westrate

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noted that the enforcement crackdown in the Southeast had redirected more cocaine shipments through Mexico: Now that’s got a serious downside, other than it opens a second major theater for us to address, which is the southwest border. . . . ​It also has produced a strong linkage between the Colombian major drug organ­ izations and Mexican drug organ­izations—­a connection we did not have before. And I think that clearly is something that’s ­going to cause us fits in the next ­couple of years.70 In other words, the main impact of the U.S. interdiction strategy was to create more business for Mexican smuggling organ­izations and more work for law enforcement. Reflecting the growing law enforcement focus on the Southwest, Operation Alliance was launched in June 1986 to coordinate all interdiction efforts along the U.S.-­Mexico border (including coordination between the military and civilian agencies).71 Through Operation Alliance, the increased attention on the Southwest helped fuel the growth of such agencies as the Customs Ser­vice.72 Apparently, the main lesson learned from the experience in the Southeast was that the strategy needed to be replicated in the Southwest. Coast Guard admiral Paul Yost testified: “The more money that you spend on it, the more success you are ­going to have in the interdiction area. . . . ​We did that in the Ca­rib­bean for the last two years, and I’m sure that what w ­ e’re about to do on the southwest border ­w ill also be extremely successful. It is also g­ oing to be extremely expensive, and the success expense ratio is ­going to be a very direct one.”73 Mea­sur­ing such success, however, was po­liti­cally tricky. At a 1987 Senate hearing held in Nogales, Arizona, Senator Pete Domenici (R-­N.Mex.) summarized the situation: Now, I understand that ­we’re shooting at floating targets. I mean, you do well in the Southeast and they [the traffickers] move to the Southwest. ­We’ll load up the Southwest and what happens next? Nonetheless, we have to continue the war on drugs. And for us to sustain the resources, you have to have a few field victories of significant size that are mea­sur­ able. We have to take that to the floor and to the committee and tell them we put a billion seven more and it’s ­doing something. And it ­can’t only be mea­sured by manpower, it has to be mea­sured in results.74 The reply by Customs Commissioner William Von Raab was predictable: “­We’re just about 1 year into Operation Alliance. The seizures, which are your typical mea­sure of success, are impressive. Operation Alliance totals 250,000 pounds of marijuana and about 16,000 pounds of cocaine; that’s very good.” The com-

Creating the Clandestine Side of the Border Economy

31

missioner further asserted that, based on seizure levels, interdiction had improved ten times in the previous five years. He also noted that air interdiction in the Southwest was being enhanced through the use of airborne warning and control system (AWACS) planes and the deployment of new aerostat radar balloons.75 Pleased to hear that some pro­gress was being made in controlling the border, none of the committee members questioned what ­these mea­sures of success actually mea­sured. At the same hearing, Von Raab acknowledged that “­there is good news and bad news” in increased drug seizures: “The good news is that we are catching more drugs b ­ ecause we are getting better at d ­ oing our jobs. We have more resources. The bad news is that we are catching more b ­ ecause more is coming across.” He concluded, “We are winning the ­battles, but I am not sure we are winning the war. . . . ​However, I am extremely comfortable with our per­for­mance.”76 Meanwhile, the business community along the southwestern border was becoming increasingly concerned that intensified drug checks at the official ports of entry, which caused border congestion and traffic jams, ­were slowing the rise in l­egal commerce. Thus, not only law enforcement advocates but also the private sector pushed for more federal funding to upgrade the ports of entry. As the president of one U.S. brokerage firm told a congressional committee, “The significant increases in commercial and civilian traffic coupled with the need to address the drug prob­lem are creating a disastrous situation for manufacturers, importers, and border city retailers.” He warned: “If U.S. Customs is g­ oing to ser­v ice the needs of the commercial sector and civilian sectors and at the same time increase their surveillance and interdiction program for drugs, international trade and relations are ­going to suffer irreparable harm ­unless the appropriations for improved facilities and manpower are provided.”77 Such concerns reflected the dilemma that U.S. officials had partly created for themselves: they had transplanted much of the cocaine trafficking from south Florida to the U.S.-­Mexican border, but efforts to harden the border against the illegal trade came into direct conflict with the policy goal of facilitating the expansion of ­legal trade. In an effort to reconcile t­ hese goals, in February 1987 the Customs Ser­v ice initiated the Southwest Border Strategy, “a seven point action plan designed to improve our ability to facilitate cargo at the border while at the same time increasing our ability to prohibit . . . ​commercial cargo, trucks and rail cars from being used to conceal narcotics.” The most impor­tant part of the plan was the implementation of a system called Line Release, which allowed the preapproval of some trucks and the pro­cessing of “routine, repetitive shipments in a minute or two.”78 Although it generated ­little po­liti­cal attention and concern at the time, in l­ater years this system would invite sharp po­liti­cal allegations that drug control was being sacrificed to ­free trade. Rather than helping to

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resolve the tension between enforcement and facilitation, Line Release pro­cessing would draw attention to it. The 1985 murder of DEA agent Kiki Camarena in Guadalajara was a dramatic sign that the Mexican drug trade not only had recovered from the crackdown of the 1970s but had been transformed into a more violent and corrupting enterprise. The murder also demonstrated that the increased capacity of the DEA to pressure Mexican traffickers directly within Mexico (a result of the collaborative enforcement efforts in the 1970s) had brought with it significant new risks. The Camarena affair sent U.S.-­Mexican relations into a tailspin, reversing the climate of antidrug cooperation that had been cultivated during the previous de­cade. The most vis­i­ble and immediate U.S. response to Camarena’s disappearance was the launch of Operation Intercept II in February 1985, involving intensive checks on traffic entering from Mexico and even a partial closing of the border. Similar to its pre­de­ces­sor, Operation Intercept in 1969, the 1985 version had l­ ittle impact on drug flows but created enormous traffic delays along the border. Its primary purpose, however, was not interdiction but communication: it was intended to display U.S. anger and frustration and to send a strong message to Mexico City. In 1985, as in 1969, the United States strategically used the border as a high-­profile stage from which to signal disapproval of Mexico’s antidrug per­for­mance. The diplomatic crisis worsened in 1986. In January, Mexicans ­were shocked by the DEA-­orchestrated kidnapping of René Verdugo Urquídez to the United States to stand trial for his alleged role in Camarena’s murder. And on 8 March most of the U.S. customs h ­ ouses on the border w ­ ere temporarily shut down (the official reason given was the need to search for weapons and drugs being smuggled into the United States by Libyan terrorists). The out­spoken Von Raab even publicly accused the governor of Sonora of cultivating opium and marijuana on his own farms and having the farms guarded by the Mexican military.79 Heated congressional hearings on the Camarena affair became a public platform for a much broader interrogation of official corruption in Mexico. Regardless of w ­ hether the corruption accusations w ­ ere valid or not, what most offended the Mexicans was the public nature of the Mexico-­bashing by U.S. politicians and law enforcement officials. For the first time, the U.S.-­Mexico war on drugs also became a full-­blown cross-­border war of words. Although the entrenchment of drug-­related corruption in Mexico had long been well known, it was not ­until Camarena was murdered that U.S. officials publicly pointed fin­gers at specific individuals within the Mexican po­liti­cal system and security apparatus. Growing alarm over drug-­related corruption in Mexico fueled more general anxiety over the security of the border. The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse

Creating the Clandestine Side of the Border Economy

33

and Control sponsored a series of hearings in the Southwest and concluded in its final report that the border was “totally out of control and threatening, not only to the region itself, but to the entire country.”80 The Camarena affair helped spark policy initiatives on both sides of the border that would have long-­lasting consequences. In Washington, Camarena’s murder provided an impor­tant impetus for the U.S. Congress to mandate, as part of the sweeping Anti-­Drug Abuse Act of 1986, that the United States make foreign economic and military assistance, votes in multilateral lending institutions, and support for cross-­border trade contingent on “full cooperation” with U.S. antidrug objectives. The law created a certification pro­cess that required the State Department to publish an annual report on the drug control efforts of source countries; ­t hose countries viewed as insufficiently cooperative could be “decertified,” triggering a range of sanctions such as halting foreign assistance and voting against loans to the country from multilateral financial institutions. Such an evaluation mechanism would reshape the politics of drug control: the annual review pro­cess ensured that the antidrug per­for­mance of source countries such as Mexico would remain elevated on the U.S. policy agenda and receive substantial media attention. Moreover, once established, this oversight pro­cess would be extraordinarily difficult to reverse or modify. Despite widespread criticism of the certification law, policymakers shied away from changing it for fear of appearing “soft on drugs.” In Mexico, meanwhile, investigations into Camarena’s death embarrassed the government by exposing close links between traffickers and the security apparatus. Largely ­because of pressure from Washington, the notoriously corrupt Federal Security Directorate (which had long enjoyed close ties to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) was quickly disbanded. Also, Rafaél Caro Quintéro, the trafficker accused of orchestrating Camarena’s murder, was arrested in April 1985. It is “a sad irony,” noted a 1986 U.S. congressional report, that Camarena’s murder “has ultimately benefited U.S. drug control efforts in Mexico. The American outrage over this incident has brought Mexican cooperation in many levels of narcotics control, as well as some dismissals of corrupt individuals.”81 Partly to signal its renewed commitment to fighting drugs, the Mexican government continued to devote more resources to enforcement. For example, the percentage of the attorney general’s bud­get devoted to drug control r­ose from 32.5 ­percent in 1985 to more than 60 ­percent in 1988. At the same time, the government continued to expand the role of the military in drug crop eradication. In 1987 this activity involved some twenty-­five thousand soldiers—up from only five thousand in the late 1970s.82 The increased militarization of the antidrug effort was legitimated by the declaration by President Miguél De La Madrid Hurtado that drug trafficking was a national security threat (paralleling a similar

34 CHAPTER 2

declaration by his U.S. counterpart). Given that the language of national security had been rare in Mexican po­liti­cal discourse, his statement was a major departure from the past. ­These changes, however, ­were merely a prelude to the sweeping antidrug initiatives by the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The challenge facing the new Mexican president was to overcome the poisonous fallout from the ­Camarena affair in order to nurture a closer economic relationship with the United States. Success in ­doing so depended at least partly on projecting a new image of Mexico’s drug control effort and taming U.S. anxiety over the flow of drugs across the border. Fortunately for Salinas, he had key allies on the U.S. side, reflected in the celebratory mood that emerged from the November 1988 meeting between the recently elected Presidents George H. W. Bush and Salinas. But at the same time as Salinas and Bush began to orchestrate a metamorphosis of the U.S.-­Mexico economic relationship, its clandestine underside was rapidly changing as well. Official estimates suggest that Mexican marijuana and heroin exports alone w ­ ere already generating an estimated $2.2 to $6.8 billion annually by the late 1980s, making drugs a sizable export industry.83 And the heightened role of cocaine in Mexican drug smuggling was dramatically elevating the financial stakes of the trade.

As the clandestine side of the U.S.-­Mexico economic relationship evolved and developed over time, the flow of drugs and mi­grant ­labor became its most prominent and controversial components. State practices on both sides of the border played an essential, even if often unintended, role in creating and transforming this under­ground cross-­border economy, helping to set the stage for a rapid expansion of immigration and drug controls. Clandestine economic flows w ­ ere a constant in the history of the U.S.-­Mexico border, yet for the most part commanded only sporadic policy attention. Most of the time, border policing remained a peripheral and low-­profile activity, and smuggling rarely attracted the national po­liti­cal spotlight. This situation began to change significantly in the 1970s and 1980s—­but even the policy initiatives of t­ hose de­cades w ­ ere entirely overshadowed by the rapid escalation of policing in the 1990s.

3 THE ESCALATION OF DRUG CONTROL

The 1990s saw a rapid escalation of U.S. and Mexican efforts to curb the smuggling of drugs across their shared border.1 Despite failing to deter the drug flow, enforcement initiatives generated highly vis­i­ble and symbolically appealing operational results that projected an image of a shared cross-­border commitment to drug control. Such image projection was an essential po­liti­cal ingredient for creating and sustaining a new and much closer cross-­border economic relationship. In other words, the building of more police barriers was intimately connected to the dismantling of economic barriers between the two countries. But even as the United States and Mexico worked to build a close trading relationship, the per­sis­tent failings and unintended consequences of the antidrug campaign made managing the border and bilateral relations over the drug issue increasingly awkward and difficult in the post-­NAFTA era. And t­ hese prob­lems, in turn, reinforced the pressures to escalate drug enforcement.

Pushing Cocaine Smuggling to the U.S.-­M exico Border As long as the heroin and marijuana that traditionally dominated the business of drug smuggling across the southwestern border ­were produced within Mexico, Mexican drug smuggling remained primarily a local and regionally based activity. In the mid-1980s, however, a strategic alliance began to emerge between Colombian cocaine exporters and Mexico’s smuggling organ­izations. Intensified U.S. 35

36 CHAPTER 3

pressure on trafficking routes through the Ca­rib­bean and south Florida, beginning in the early 1980s, created incentives for Colombian traffickers to turn to their Mexican counter­parts. The percentage of cocaine entering the United States through Mexico had been negligible in the early 1980s. But according to State Department estimates, by 1989 nearly a third of cocaine exports ­were routed through Mexican territory; by 1992, more than half; l­ater in the 1990s, as much as 75–80 ­percent.2 Although the antidrug campaign in the Southeast had helped U.S. lawmakers and law enforcers show immediate and vis­i­ble interdiction results during a period of rising domestic anxiety about drugs, its impact on smuggling patterns was to relocate the prob­lem to the southwestern border and fuel a booming business for Mexican smugglers. Focused narrowly on their assigned task of deterring drugs in the Southeast, U.S. antidrug strategists apparently paid ­little attention to what the repercussions would be for Mexico, the border region, and U.S.-­Mexican relations.3 The U.S. interdiction crackdown in the 1980s not only disrupted the traditional routes for cocaine smuggling, through the Ca­rib­bean and south Florida, but also the favored method of such smuggling: light aircraft. Extending the U.S. radar net from the Southeast to the Southwest forced much of the trade out of the air. The United States had constructed what one se­nior customs official described as a “Maginot line of radar” across the border that reduced air smuggling by an estimated 75 ­percent from 1982 levels.4 In the pro­cess, the Customs Ser­v ice built up an air interdiction infrastructure. Between 1986 and 1992 it tripled the size of its air fleet and increased its air program personnel sixfold. A majority of Department of Defense (DOD) interdiction resources also targeted air smuggling.5 As one observer put it, “Unused DOD resources looking for a mission have married the ambition of the Customs Ser­vice to have its own air forces.”6 In 1990 some 40 ­percent of AWACS (airborne warning and control system) planes’ airtime was devoted to drug surveillance.7 And even the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), which once had been focused on detecting Soviet missiles, redirected some of its energies t­ oward detecting drug-­smuggling aircraft. U.S. officials boasted that the sharp drop in air smuggling displayed the effectiveness of interdiction.8 But the a­ ctual effect was to redirect rather than reduce the drug flow.9 With much of the traffic pushed out of the air, road transportation networks through Mexico to the U.S. market became an integral component of the cocaine trade. The Mexican organ­izations that controlled smuggling along t­ hese routes w ­ ere more than willing to sell their services—­ offloading, storing, and smuggling—to Colombia’s cocaine exporters.

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37

Escalation during the Salinas Years When Carlos Salinas assumed the Mexican presidency in December 1988, he faced the daunting twin tasks of coping with a more power­f ul, internationally connected Mexican drug-­smuggling business (largely thanks to the “success” of U.S. law enforcement in the Ca­rib­bean and south Florida) and with rising U.S. po­liti­cal expectations that Mexico demonstrate much greater commitment to ­doing something about it. Thus, it was critical to his broader agenda—­sweeping market reforms at home and deeper economic integration with the United States—­that the drug issue be effectively managed. His counter­parts in the Bush administration and ­later the Clinton administration shared this objective. While pushing Mexico to adopt an aggressive antidrug campaign, they also collaborated with Mexico in selling the campaign’s results to the U.S. Congress and the media. Salinas did launch an aggressive campaign to revitalize the Mexican antidrug program, declaring that drug trafficking was the number one security threat facing the nation. Eleven days a­ fter taking office, Salinas assured a visiting U.S. congressional del­e­ga­tion that he would “make life miserable for drug traffickers.” Representative Charles Rangel (D-­N.Y.), who was part of the del­e­ga­tion and who had previously been critical of Mexican antidrug efforts, noted, “We w ­ ere not so arrogant as to ask for specifics, but we w ­ ere indeed overwhelmed by the specifics that ­were given to us, and more importantly by the depth of that commitment.”10 Signaling a new willingness to work with the United States, in 1989 the Salinas government signed a comprehensive agreement on bilateral cooperation and in 1991 endorsed the Treaty on Cooperation for Mutual ­Legal Assistance. ­These accords created vari­ous bilateral interagency groups for coordinating the antidrug effort. Reflecting the heightened importance of the drug issue on the bilateral agenda, a new section within the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established to h ­ andle m ­ atters related to drug and arms trafficking, and drug policy specialists ­were added to the Mexican embassy and consulates in the United States.11 Meanwhile, to bolster Mexico’s international image, in 1990 the Mexican government became party to the 1988 United Nations Convention against Trafficking in Illicit Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Among his efforts to build a more formidable drug control apparatus, Salinas created a national security council, developed a new intelligence agency, set up a unit within the Attorney General’s Office for drug enforcement, and or­ga­ nized new antidrug units of the federal judicial police for rapid interdiction.12 In 1992 the Planning Center for Drug Control (CENDRO) was established to improve interagency coordination and intelligence gathering. And in 1993 the

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National Institute to Combat Drugs (modeled a­ fter the DEA) became the lead agency for antidrug planning and supervision. The buildup of Mexico’s antidrug program was particularly impressive, given that it occurred during a time of deep cuts in overall government spending. In an era defined by massive deregulation and privatization, drug control stood out as one of the few areas where state intervention in the economy was increasing. The resources devoted to drug control by the Mexican Attorney General’s Office tripled from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. Drug control came to dominate the Mexican criminal justice system: the majority of the federal bud­get for the administration of justice was being applied to the effort by the end of the 1980s. The “Mexican attorney general’s office,” one Mexican scholar has observed, “has basically become an antidrug law enforcement agency.”13 To give the criminal justice system more teeth, the Criminal Code was reformed, toughening the penalties for drug smuggling and related corruption. The Attorney General’s Office also positioned rapid-­response interdiction strike forces at new bases of operation throughout Mexico. Most prominent was the establishment in 1990 of the Northern Border Response Force to target cocaine air shipments from Colombia. The U.S. State Department, the Pentagon, and the DEA assisted ­t hese efforts by providing training, equipment, and intelligence. Salinas also extended the antidrug role of the military. By the end of the 1980s a new army staff section was focused on drug control, and about one-­t hird of the military’s bud­get was devoted to the drug control effort. As a result of its growing antidrug mission, the military became the “supreme authority, or in some cases the only authority,” in parts of some states, among them Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Jalisco, and Guerrero.14 Militarization reflected the new emphasis on defining drugs as a national security threat. As the Salinas government beefed up efforts on the Mexican side of the border, U.S. drug control strategists built up interdiction efforts on their side. The shift in drug smuggling from the Southeast to the Southwest provided the main rationale for escalation. The Bush administration reported in 1991, “The successes of interdiction forces in the southeastern United States and the Ca­rib­bean islands and Sea has caused drug smugglers to shift their focus ­toward Mexico as a primary transit point into the United States”; therefore, “resources have been enhanced along the Southwest border.” Concretely, that meant 175 new Customs Ser­vice inspectors, 200 more Border Patrol agents, 23 more canine drug-­detection teams, and increased funds for “capital assets such as fencing, ground sensors, traffic checkpoints, aerostats, and other equipment to detect smugglers.”15 The formal designation of the region as a “High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area” in 1990 reinforced attention on the Southwest border, including additional federal antidrug assistance and enforcement initiatives. Between 1988 and 1993

The Escalation of Drug Control

39

the Customs Ser­v ice increased the number of southwestern border inspectors by 41 ­percent and investigators by 21 ­percent. While Customs focused on the ports of entry, in 1992 the Border Patrol was designated the lead law enforcement agency for drug interdiction between the ports of entry. New fencing proj­ ects ­were initiated to deter drug-­laden vehicles from entering the United States at unauthorized crossing points. An impor­tant institutional development was the establishment of the Southwest Border Initiative in October 1994. Its purpose was to “develop a regional strategy to investigate, prosecute and dismantle the most significant narcotics traffickers operating from Mexico.”16 The Southwest Border Council, created to oversee the program’s implementation, was composed of the U.S. attorneys covering the border area and representatives from the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, DEA, FBI, the Customs Ser­v ice, and the Border Patrol. The U.S. side of the border also became more militarized. In November 1989, as part of the Pentagon’s expanded interdiction role, Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) was established, based at Fort Bliss, Texas. JTF-6 involved units of some seventy infantrymen armed with M-16 ­rifles; they w ­ ere divided into camouflaged four-­ man teams to cover designated thirty-­mile segments of the border. In FY1990, JTF-6 conducted twenty operations in support of border drug enforcement. By FY1992 the number of missions had increased to 408.17 Teams of National Guardsmen ­were also drafted into antidrug work in the late 1980s, deployed to remote border posts to monitor smuggling in rural areas and to ports of entry for cargo inspection. What began as a test program became a permanent presence. With the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1990 and 1991, Congress authorized funding for National Guard interdiction activities.18

Appearances and Realities: The Po­l iti­c al Success of a Failing Policy The impressive quantitative results of the drug enforcement offensive—­more arrests and seizures—­were officially promoted as evidence of unpre­ce­dented U.S. and Mexican resolve and cooperation in fighting drugs.19 During Salinas’s six-­ year term in office, arrests nearly doubled, prominent traffickers (most notably Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo) ­were jailed, and principal figures in the Camarena case ­were convicted. Seizure levels ­rose sharply, prompting Mexican officials to boast that they w ­ ere confiscating more drugs than any other country in the region. Indeed, in Salinas’s first year in office the government seized more drugs than in the previous six years combined.20

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Year ­after year the State Department’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report offered glowing reviews of Mexico’s antidrug rec­ord, emphasizing the unpre­ce­dented bilateral cooperation and the results that had been achieved. Assessing the Salinas rec­ord, Robert Gelbard, the State Department’s top drug control official, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “Mexico’s anti-­drug effort has been among the most dynamic and comprehensive in the hemi­sphere.” U ­ nder Salinas, “Mexican authorities seized over 247 metric tons of cocaine, made over 100,000 drug-­related arrests, and eradicated 147,000 hectares of opium poppy and marijuana crops. . . . ​President Salinas also established the National Counternarcotics Institute (INCD) to improve inter-­agency anti-­drug coordination, overcome bureaucratic obstacles and address corruption.” Gelbard concluded that “­these successes represent a substantial level of ­effort and a credible demonstration of po­liti­cal w ­ ill.”21 As intended, Mexico’s strong antidrug per­for­mance helped preserve the upbeat mood in U.S.-­Mexican relations on the eve of the NAFTA vote. Salinas was apparently well aware that a positive antidrug image was a prerequisite for passage of the agreement. An internal 1992 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency memorandum observed that “perhaps the most impor­tant of all of Salinas’ motivations is his perception that a better image of Mexico w ­ ill figure prominently and favorably in the outcome of ongoing f­ ree trade negotiations.”22 U.S. officials w ­ ere not passive bystanders but active collaborators in the effort to recraft Mexico’s drug control image. Salinas and his U.S. counter­parts ­were, in a sense, on the same po­liti­cal stage, carry­i ng out a carefully choreographed per­for­mance designed to proj­ect the right messages and images to an anxious domestic U.S. audience. Law enforcement agents who worked in Mexico during the Salinas years ­were reportedly warned by their superiors not to let the drug issue undermine pro­gress t­ oward a new economic relationship.23 A former drug policy official in the Bush administration acknowledged, “­People desperately wanted drugs not to become a complicating f­ actor for NAFTA,” and another official noted that “once Bush and Salinas de­cided to go with NAFTA as the No. 1 goal, then every­t hing e­ lse had to be made manageable.”24 One State Department official even conceded that his job was to make the Mexican government look good so that the members of the U.S. Congress would be more willing to sign the trade pact.25 Pushing NAFTA through Congress also required deflecting concerns that opening the border to ­legal trade might unintentionally open it to illegal drugs. In May 1993 two members of Congress, Representatives Helen Bentley (R-­Md.) and Marcy Kaptur (D-­Ohio), wrote a bipartisan “Dear Colleague” letter insisting that “Congress should not approve the NAFTA deal ­unless it and our borders are locked tight from drug runners.”26 Their concern had been sparked by

The Escalation of Drug Control

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a front-­page New York Times report that Mexican traffickers w ­ ere preparing to exploit the f­ ree trade agreement as a cover for drug smuggling.27 At least for a time, the administration was able to push aside such worries by pointing to the apparent pro­gress made by the joint U.S. and Mexican interdiction efforts and promising that NAFTA would further energize such efforts ­because it would lead to greater U.S.-­Mexican antidrug cooperation. Moreover, the administration stressed that even though the border was being made more business-­friendly, it was also being made more secure.28 A $357 million upgrade of inspection stations along the border would increase the number of truck inspection docks from 130 to 902. Other initiatives involved enhanced use of detection technologies such as X-­ray equipment and mobile scanners.29 U.S. agencies ­were given instructions on how to ­handle any worries and perceptions that NAFTA might make the border more permeable to the flow of drugs.30 Law enforcement officials who thought NAFTA was bad for drug control ­were reportedly silenced.31 During the campaign to pass the ­free trade agreement, however, drug smuggling across the border not only survived but thrived, creating a far more formidable law enforcement prob­lem in the post-­NAFTA era. As the Economist observed: During Mr.  Salinas’s tenure, drug bosses consolidated their fiefs. . . . ​ American anti-­drug agents knew of the spreading rot, often refusing to work with counter­parts they knew to be crooked. But other American officials, keen to cement Mr. Salinas’s economic reforms with the North American F ­ ree Trade Agreement, turned a blind eye, often issuing statements praising his anti-­drug efforts, despite evidence to the contrary.32 According to one se­nior State Department official, U.S. Embassy staff reports from Mexico City deliberately glossed over prob­lems of drug-­related corruption in the effort to push NAFTA forward.33 As the Salinas government was renegotiating its economic partnership with Washington, Mexican smugglers w ­ ere renegotiating the terms of their partnership with Colombia’s cocaine exporters. In the beginning of that business alliance, the Mexicans had simply been paid in cash for moving Colombian cocaine across the southwestern border, $1,000 to $2,000 for e­ very kilogram. But as the relationship matured and the Colombians faced intensified law enforcement pressure at home and abroad, the leverage of the Mexican smugglers grew. As a  result, they increasingly demanded payment in the form of product: 40– 50 ­percent of each cocaine shipment, which in turn expanded their own distribution networks, especially in the western parts of the United States. Thus, they increased the Mexican share of cocaine profits by five to ten times, dramatically

42 CHAPTER 3

changing the financial stakes of smuggling across the southwestern border.34 At the same time, Mexican smugglers ­were rapidly taking over the booming U.S. market for methamphetamines—­t hanks in part to successful U.S. law enforcement crackdowns on domestic producers. Mexico’s growing stake in the cocaine trade produced more sophisticated and or­ga­nized smuggling organ­izations along the border’s transportation hubs, the most prominent of which ­were the so-­called Gulf, Tijuana, and Juárez cartels. Their meteoric rise would l­ater lead the head of the DEA to describe them as “the premier law enforcement threat facing the United States.”35 According to Eduardo Valle, who resigned in protest as personal adviser to the Mexican attorney general in May 1994, Mexico’s leading drug traffickers had become “driving forces, pillars even, of our economic growth.”36 The Mexican government calculated that the gross revenues of Mexican drug-­smuggling organ­izations reached $30 billion in 1994.37 U.S. officials estimated the profits at $10 billion.38 (For comparison, Mexico’s most impor­tant ­legal export, oil, generated $7.4 billion in 1993.)39 Such drug revenue figures necessarily are “guesstimates,” but even the most conservative numbers indicate that the drug trade had become a major economic force in Mexico. Ironically, the operational achievements of the U.S. and Mexican antidrug campaigns during the Salinas years, cheered by both countries, ­were actually aided by an expanding drug trade. Well-­publicized increases in seizures and arrests on both sides of the border w ­ ere partly made pos­si­ble by the fact that t­ here ­were more drugs to seize and smugglers to arrest. Similarly, rec­ord eradication levels ­were facilitated by bumper crops of marijuana and opium poppy. In other words, the boom in the drug trade also meant a boom for law enforcement. Barry McCaffrey, the White House drug policy director, told a congressional committee in 1996, “The positive news is that our agents and inspectors are seizing huge amounts of drugs. . . . ​Seizures on the southwest border climbed dramatically from 1991 to 1995.” The increases ­were by 50 ­percent for cocaine, 100 ­percent for heroin, and 150 ­percent for marijuana.40 He emphasized that drug seizures by the Mexican government ­were up as well. Left con­ve­niently unmentioned was ­whether t­ hese results ­were having any real deterrent effect on smuggling across the border or any impact on the price and availability of drugs on U.S. streets. Impressive drug enforcement statistics masked the fact that the Mexican crackdown was selective: old guard smugglers w ­ ere targeted (especially t­ hose connected to Colombia’s Medellín cartel), while the business of other smugglers (especially t­ hose connected to Colombia’s rising Cali cartel) expanded. Thus, rec­ ord arrest and seizure statistics during the Salinas years did not lead to less smuggling but simply created openings for more aggressive smugglers who w ­ ere on the rise. For example, the Arellano Félix b ­ rothers, leaders of the Tijuana car-

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tel, moved up as the government jailed traffickers such as Rafaél Caro Quintero, Félix Gallardo, and Chapo Guzmán.41 Nevertheless, what mattered po­liti­cally was that Mexico and the United States formally embraced the same policy goals: market liberalization along with a renewed and expanded commitment to enforcing drug criminalization. Salinas, a Harvard-­educated technocrat, was viewed in the United States as an ideal partner in pushing ­t hese goals forward and forging a new bilateral relationship. As one official in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City put it, “We liked Salinas ­because he w ­ asn’t anti-­American.” He was “someone we could work with.” 42 But even as U.S. and Mexican officials boasted about pro­gress in curtailing drug trafficking, the feedback effects of the policy initiatives during the Salinas years made managing the drug trade and bilateral relations over the drug issue increasingly difficult in the post-­NAFTA era—­provoking further calls for enforcement escalation.

From Increased Law Enforcement to Increased Corruption Although the Salinas antidrug offensive helped pacify U.S. critics and paved the way for the passage of NAFTA, it had the particularly perverse result of encouraging more drug-­related corruption. As more government resources ­were devoted to drug control, smugglers responded by devoting more resources to paying off ­those ­doing the controlling. Thus, drug-­related corruption reflected not only the weakness of the Mexican state but also its power: law enforcement had to be bribed ­because it could not be entirely bypassed or bullied. In order to stay in business, drug smugglers had to pay a higher price for an essential state ser­v ice: the nonenforcement of the law. The corruption prob­lem in Mexico was exacerbated by the fact that when Salinas took office, he did not reform the Mexican criminal justice system but simply expanded the size and power of an already corruption-­plagued policing apparatus. His top appointments, according to Peter Lupsha, produced a “law enforcement power bloc with deep connections to prior corrupt administrations, agencies and organ­izations.”43 This corruption went all the way up: Salinas appointed Enrique Alvarez del Castillo, the former governor of Jalisco, as his attorney general. ­Under Alvarez del Castillo’s governorship, the drug trade in Jalisco had thrived and traffickers operated with ­little to fear from authorities.44 The extent of drug-­related corruption was revealed by the series of high-­profile murders and scandals (including the arrest of Raúl Salinas, the president’s ­brother) that left the Mexican po­liti­cal system deeply shaken. Although mystery,

44 CHAPTER 3

intrigue, and speculation necessarily surrounded t­ hese controversial events, it is impor­tant to understand how they helped propel an increasingly militarized escalation of drug control. For drug traffickers, paying off corrupt government officials was simply a necessary cost of ­doing business, and the cocaine boom ensured they had plenty of money to cover the cost. In the case of Mexico, a study by the Autonomous National University in Mexico City calculated that cocaine traffickers spent as much as $460 million on bribery in 1993—­far more than the annual bud­get of the Mexican Attorney General’s Office—­whereas in 1983 they had spent between $1.5 and $3.2 million on bribery. (­These calculations ­were derived from a widely used model that assumes a certain degree of corruption in trafficking nations: $1,000 in payoffs for each kilogram of cocaine.)45 Bribes and payoffs functioned as the equivalent of paying a tax. The level of corruption needed to ensure protection—­t he tax rate—­depended on the intensity of the drug enforcement effort. As enforcement increased, so did the smuggler’s need to corrupt ­those ­doing the enforcing (the tax collectors). Thus, increased drug enforcement capacity, while failing to deter the drug trade significantly, successfully increased the capacity to tax the trade in the form of corruption. Smugglers who paid the tax ­were less pressured by the tax collectors than t­ hose who did not. One se­nior Mexican official during the Salinas administration explained that drug enforcement agents “receive money from one group of traffickers and they cannot act against ­people from that group. But they have their hands f­ ree to arrest ­people from other groups.”46 This selective enforcement was pragmatic: officials could perform their job—­ seizing drugs and arresting smugglers—­while also collecting taxes from the drug trade. ­Those smugglers with the most resources and connections ­were the ones most able to afford the corruption tax, whereas the smaller smuggling entrepreneurs who w ­ ere less able to afford it w ­ ere treated as tax evaders. Not surprisingly, then, it is the small-­time smugglers that w ­ ere most often “audited” and penalized. Thus, enforcement had l­ittle impact on the overall drug flow but helped to weed out amateur smugglers and inflate arrest statistics. The financial rewards of drug enforcement (or rather, nonenforcement) created enormous competition within law enforcement agencies for assignment to key posts along the smuggling corridors. Eduardo Valle, who left the Attorney General’s Office t­ oward the end of the Salinas administration, claimed that while he was in office the top Mexican drug enforcement posts ­were auctioned off to the highest bidder. The price of a par­tic­u­lar law enforcement position, he said, depended on changes in drug-­smuggling routes along the border: “In Coahuila, for example, ­there are four or five entrances into the United States. If one crossing point is closed, the price of the federal police chief ’s position in that area goes

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down ­because the post is irrelevant, but the price of the police chief positions in other places goes up. This is openly discussed inside the federal police.”47 The case of Mario Ruiz Massieu, Salinas’s top antidrug prosecutor between March and November 1994, provides a glimpse into how the system of drug corruption was or­ga­nized. Federal prosecutors and police commanders allegedly paid Ruiz Massieu as much as $1 million to be assigned to profitable posts along the border and in other major drug areas. Officials brought him suitcases containing up to $150,000 in regular kickbacks. One official familiar with Ruiz Massieu’s operation described it as a “franchising system.”48 Apparently the selling of posts did not cease a­ fter his departure. In 1995 it was reported in the Mexican press that border area posts ­were being sold for up to $500,000.49 The higher the law enforcement position, the higher the payoff. A notebook recovered from the smuggling organ­ization run by Juan García Abrego of the Gulf cartel revealed the tiered structure of payoffs: $1 million to the national commander of Mexico’s Federal Judicial Police; $500,000 to the force’s operations chief; $100,000 to the federal police commander in the city of Matamoros. García Abrego’s cousin Francisco Pérez testified in a 1994 federal trial in Texas that between 1988 and 1991 he had delivered $500,000 to Javier Coello Trejo, Mexico’s deputy attorney general. Coello was eventually dismissed but never charged.50 Beyond providing corrupt state officials with a share of the profits, as Peter Lupsha explains, the trafficker was expected to assist the police and the po­liti­cal system by providing grist for the judicial mill, as well as public relations materials to give U.S. drug enforcers. Thus, while the trafficker could gain protection and warning information, the police could gain credit, praise, and promotions; the po­liti­cal system gained campaign monies and control; and the U.S., statistics, to justify a job well done.51 This symbiotic relationship between traffickers and the authorities could be volatile, given changes in government leadership, the transfer or promotion of key officials, and intense competition between smuggling organ­izations over transportation routes.52 This volatility was evident, for example, in the rise and demise of one of Mexico’s leading traffickers, García Abrego, who was a major beneficiary of the arrest of Angel Félix Gallardo early in the Salinas administration. García Abrego’s trafficking operation, which flourished during the Salinas era, lost high-­level protection ­after President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León entered office in late 1994 and soon lost market share to its Tijuana and Juárez competitors. Having fallen out of ­favor, he became a hunted fugitive. By the time he was arrested in early 1996 and extradited to the United States, his business

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was already in shambles.53 His capture was nevertheless applauded by the United States and Mexico as a sign of official resolve in the antidrug campaign. This high-­profile arrest, meanwhile, created new opportunities for other smuggling organ­izations, especially the Juárez cartel, headed by Amado Carrillo Fuentes. Corruption scandals resulted in the firing or transferring of individual officers and, at times, the disbanding of entire agencies and the creation of new ones. A report from the Mexican Attorney General’s Office indicated that some 400 agents of the Federal Judicial Police (over 10 ­percent of total personnel) ­were fired or suspended on drug-­related charges between mid-1992 and mid-1995.54 On 14 August 1996, 737 federal law enforcement officers ­were dismissed (including Horacio Brunt, the celebrated police commander who had captured the head of the Gulf cartel), and an additional 270 employees of the Attorney General’s Office ­were fired between December 1996 and August 1997.55 Such mass firings, however, w ­ ere overshadowed by the magnitude of the prob­lem: the Mexican attorney general estimated in 1996 that “70 to 80 ­percent” of the judicial police force was corrupt.56 Moreover, many fired police officers ­were rehired in other regions of the country.57 ­Others simply joined the criminal underworld full-­time. The Mexican Ministry of the Interior estimated in an internal report that by 1995 ­t here w ­ ere about nine hundred armed criminal bands, more than half of whose members w ­ ere current or former law enforcement agents.58

From Increased Corruption to Militarized Escalation The response of the Zedillo government to the growing corruption prob­lem was to turn to the military.59 Its antidrug role, though enhanced during the Salinas years, expanded much further u ­ nder Zedillo. “In the past, t­ here was always a reluctance to allow the military to play a stronger role,” noted one U.S. official in 1995. “But with the Zedillo administration, that mindset has dissolved.”60 This new reliance on the military reaffirmed the Mexican government’s definition of drug trafficking as “the most serious danger to national security.”61 This further militarization of Mexico’s antidrug campaign was greeted with enthusiasm by U.S. officials in Washington and at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City.62 In order to give the military new law enforcement powers, Zedillo modified the constitution and criminal codes. Generals ­were put in charge of the Federal Judicial Police, the National Institute to Combat Drugs, and the Center for the Planning of Drug Control. An active-­duty officer also headed the uniformed branch of the Mexican federal Customs Ser­v ice. The military also increasingly

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ran the Center for National Security and Investigation (the federal intelligence agency). By early 1998 military personnel occupied top law enforcement posts in two-­ thirds of Mexico’s states.63 More than one hundred military personnel ­were brought into the federal Attorney General’s Office in the northern state of Chihuahua and o ­ thers w ­ ere engaged for similar functions in the border state of Tamaulipas. In some states, such as Nuevo Leon, the Federal Judicial Police forces ­were entirely replaced by soldiers.64 Overall, by 1998 some 40 ­percent of the 180,000-­member army was reportedly focused on drug control.65 The Mexican secretaries of defense and navy acknowledged that drug control had become the primary mission of their ser­v ices.66 The militarization of drug control in Mexico also meant a greater militarization of U.S.-­Mexico relations and new cross-­border military ties. Interaction ­between the U.S. and Mexican armed forces, extremely l­imited in the past, ­became more intimate through military assistance and training for antidrug programs.67 A bilateral working group for military issues, created following the visit of Secretary of Defense William Perry in October 1995 (the first trip to Mexico by a U.S. secretary of defense), included among its functions cooperation on drug issues. And the following April his Mexican counterpart, General Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, visited the United States. In FY1997 more than fifteen hundred Mexican military personnel ­were scheduled for training in an expanded Department of Defense counternarcotics program. In addition, the CIA provided instruction, resources, and operational support for a Mexican army intelligence unit: the Center for Anti-­Narcotics Investigations—­CIAN.68 ­These developments w ­ ere particularly remarkable, given that ­until the 1980s Mexican military manuals depicted the United States as Mexico’s e­ nemy.69 But even as militarization signaled Mexico’s heightened commitment to drug deterrence, the expanded military role in drug control also increased the proximity of the military to drug smugglers, raising the risk of corruption. In one of the most notorious cases of military corruption, when ten agents from Mexico’s Federal Judicial Police attempted to apprehend smugglers delivering eight hundred pounds of cocaine from a small airplane on a remote airstrip in the state of Veracruz in late 1991, members of the Mexican army opened fire on the agents, killing seven of them. The traffickers escaped. Though the U.S. ambassador to Mexico described the incident as “a regrettable accident,”70 video footage captured by a U.S. Customs surveillance flight overhead indicated that the Mexican soldiers ­were protecting the traffickers.71 A series of drug-­related scandals further exposed the growing corruption prob­lem within the military. In February 1997 the head of the federal antidrug

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agency, General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, was arrested on charges of working for the Juárez cartel. The federal antidrug agency, which had been patterned a­ fter the DEA and garnered much U.S. praise when it opened in 1993, was quickly dismantled. It was subsequently rebuilt as the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes against Health (FEADS). Just a few weeks before the scandal, the White House drug policy director, Barry McCaffrey, had described the general as “an honest man who is a no-­nonsense field commander of the Mexican army who’s now been sent to bring to the police force the same kind of aggressiveness and reputation he had in uniform.”72 Indeed, no other army commander had displayed more antidrug initiative. The prob­lem was his selective focus, largely leaving the Juárez cartel untouched while targeting other trafficking groups. “He was showing results,” one U.S. official had noted.73 Apparently, t­ hese results inhibited further scrutiny at the time. The news of the general’s arrest caught U.S. officials off guard. According to one U.S. Embassy official in Mexico City, concerns over military corruption had rarely been mentioned in staff meetings prior to the affair.74 Following the arrest, officials in Mexico City and Washington rushed into damage-­control mode. Mexican attorney general Jorge Madrazo Cuellar promised a massive overhaul of the criminal justice system to fight drug trafficking and or­ga­nized crime. President Zedillo said that the corruption case revealed the seriousness of narcotics crime and that the government would “have to take mea­sures never seen before in our country to stop it.”75 Meanwhile, President Bill Clinton tried to give the general’s arrest the most positive spin pos­si­ble: “­They’re obviously saying to the world and the ­people of Mexico, we ­w ill not tolerate the corruption . . . ​even if it’s at the highest level.”76 Robert Gelbard, the State Department’s top antidrug official, offered a similar interpretation: “If the Gutiérrez Rebollo arrest revealed just how deeply rooted corruption is in Mexican counter-­drug institutions, it also showed unpre­ce­dented po­liti­cal courage by President Zedillo. . . . ​This is precisely the kind of pro­gress we are trying to encourage.”77 Yet this scandal, even though unusually high-­profile, proved not to be an isolated incident. The next month General Alfredo Navarro Lara was arrested for offering $1 million a month to the top federal justice official in Baja California on behalf of the Tijuana drug cartel.78 And a 1997 White House report indicated that thirty-­four se­nior Mexican military officers had been targeted for disciplinary action as a result of drug related corruption.79 The Mexican government’s response to such corruption, however, was to further reinforce the militarization trend. As the head of the or­ga­nized crime unit within the Mexican Attorney General’s Office explained it, putting the military on the front lines of drug control was a big risk, but ­t here was no alternative, given the deepening corruption within the police forces.80 Other officials ac-

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knowledged that t­ here w ­ ere h ­ uman rights risks involved in militarizing drug enforcement but argued that the military could not be worse than the police ­a lready ­were.81 Their views echoed a common perception in Mexico that the military was a lesser evil than the police. The militarization of Mexican drug control was also oriented ­toward impressing an external audience.82 It sold well in Washington ­because it sent a strong signal that the Mexican government considered drug trafficking a serious national security threat. Such signaling often came at po­liti­cally opportune moments. For example, early in the morning of 1 March 1996—­t he day of the deadline for the Clinton administration’s decision on ­whether or not to certify Mexico as fully complying with U.S. drug control objectives—­Mexican troops ­were deployed in a highly vis­i­ble sweep of Tijuana neighborhoods in search of the Arellano Félix ­brothers, leaders of the Tijuana drug cartel. By the end of the day, Mexico had received the certification blessing from Washington, and the troops returned to barracks. The next year the ante was upped: one week before the U.S. certification deadline, Mexico replaced the entire federal police force in the border state of Baja with military personnel. “Obviously, the Mexican government wants to satisfy parts of the U.S. government by d ­ oing something spectacular before the certification,” observed Victor Clark Alfaro, a prominent h ­ uman rights leader in Tijuana.83

From Drug Certification Rituals to Further Escalation In 1986 the U.S. Congress pushed through a law requiring that the State Department provide an annual report card for drug-­producing and -­exporting countries, indicating the extent of their cooperation with U.S. antidrug objectives. Countries labeled as noncooperative would be “decertified,” resulting in material and nonmaterial penalties: aid cutoffs, votes against loans from multilateral lending agencies, loss of trade preferences, and the stigma of being branded a “narco-­state.” Alternatively, the president could decertify a country but opt for a national-­interest waiver—­meaning that the material penalties would not be imposed, though the stigma of the decertification label would remain. In real­ity, only a few countries ­were ever fully decertified, and ­t hese tended to be countries Washington had few ties to, such as Iran and Syria. Nevertheless, the certification pro­cess powerfully conditioned the practice and politics of drug control. Even if rarely fully enforced, the law framed the drug debate and kept the issue on the policy agenda. By establishing an annual review pro­ cess that commanded significant po­liti­cal attention and media coverage, the law

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guaranteed that the antidrug per­for­mance of countries such as Mexico would be on Washington’s radar screen. The certification pro­cess also shifted attention away from the domestic demand for drugs and ­toward the foreign supply. Further, the focus on supply reduction reinforced po­liti­cal and bureaucratic incentives to rely on misleading mea­sures of cooperation. As one U.S. antidrug official put it, beefing up the tools of the supply-­reduction effort—as in Mexico’s ac­cep­tance of more he­li­cop­ters from the United States—­was an “end goal,” regardless of what was actually accomplished.84 ­Because the certification pro­cess rewarded the most immediate and vis­i­ble operational “successes”—­arrests and seizures—­drug-­exporting countries tended to prioritize the law enforcement efforts that generated t­ hese results. Policy initiatives that had longer-­term but less vis­i­ble effects, such as judicial reform, ­were neglected. Regardless of what the drug war statistics actually indicated, a positive image of effort is what received a passing grade in the certification game. One U.S. official candidly remarked, “If I ­were a Mexican official, I would do the same t­ hing: give the Americans the statistics that ­w ill make them happy.”85 The certification pro­cess produced heated criticism, not only from foreign governments (who considered it patronizing and hypocritical) but also at home. Calling the certification pro­cess a charade, Senator Christopher Dodd (D-­Conn.) pointed out that “if we w ­ ere to subject our own nation to this very test we apply to other countries, we ­wouldn’t pass it.” The certification pro­cess, he said, “places us in a very silly situation year in and year out where we pick winners and losers where no one is a winner.” ­Because no country is actually “fully cooperating” with the United States, the certification law “creates the kind of sham situations we find ourselves in.” The senator urged a reconsideration of the law: “It’s g­ reat for press releases, it’s g­ reat for speeches and so forth, but I d ­ on’t think it’s helping us substantially in advancing the common international efforts that have to be waged if w ­ e’re g­ oing to be successful in our war against the proliferation of narcotics.”86 Nevertheless, policymakers ­were reluctant to change the law for fear of the reputational costs. Representative Lee Hamilton (D-­Ind.) put it, “We cannot be seen as politicians who are weak on drugs.”87 Thus, certification had a lock-in effect: once established, it was extraordinarily difficult to discard or even modify. During the Salinas era, Mexico successfully jumped through the certification hoops with l­ ittle serious po­liti­cal opposition. Quantifiable increases in drugs seized, crops eradicated, and smugglers arrested proved sufficient to keep congressional critics in Washington at bay. Other Latin American countries, such as Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, received noticeably more scrutiny. In the post-­ Salinas era, however, revelations of deepening corruption and the expanding

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power of Mexico’s drug-­smuggling organ­izations pushed Mexico to center stage in the Washington certification debate. This put the administration in an increasingly uncomfortable position: to decertify Mexico would contradict the entire thrust of Clinton’s Mexico policy and deeply strain cross-­border relations; to do nothing could invite congressional allegations that the president was not taking the drug prob­lem seriously. As a way out of this straitjacket, in 1996 the administration opted to display its antidrug resolve and distract attention from Mexico by decertifying a more distant country that it could more easily afford to alienate: Colombia. Although the press and critics viewed this move as hypocritical and cynical, within the White House it was considered a po­liti­cal success; Clinton, it seemed, had dodged a bullet.88 Though the decision to praise Mexico and punish Colombia may have worked po­liti­cally, it further eroded the credibility of the administration’s drug per­for­ mance reviews. At a heated congressional hearing over the decision to certify Mexico that year, Senator Carol Moseley-­Braun (D-­Ill.) commented that the certification pro­cess “has nothing, zippo, to do with the truth with regard to narcotics enforcement. To suggest that it does is why you have ­these Senators bouncing off the walls h ­ ere.” Senator Robert Bennett (R-­Utah) explained the issues with the certification pro­cess in broader but equally blunt po­liti­cal terms: The certification is clearly a joke, if the purpose is to determine what is ­going on in Mexico. At the same time, I understand why it was done. It was done ­because the President felt that we could not undercut President Zedillo to the point where the prob­lem would get worse, so we lied. . . . ​We ­can’t de-­certify Mexico. We have to lie about what is g­ oing on ­because our relationship with Mexico is so impor­tant that we ­can’t let it go down the tubes. Other senators, however, less concerned about preserving the overall bilateral relationship, continued to protest the administration’s certification decision. Pete Domenici (R-­N.Mex.) exclaimed, “We ­can’t continue to let our borders be invaded the way they are.”89 In an effort to contain and respond to the po­liti­cal fallout from the 1996 certification debate, in March the Clinton and Zedillo administrations created the High-­Level Contact Group against Drugs, composed of a team of se­nior U.S. and Mexican officials. Its main objectives included designing a bilateral cooperative antidrug strategy to improve cross-­border institutional coordination and assessing joint initiatives and their results.90 In other words, as an increasingly restless U.S. Congress demanded more results, Clinton and Zedillo officials mobilized to collaborate in delivering a more persuasive per­for­mance. To call

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the per­for­mance collaborative, however, is not to suggest that it was not coercive: pressure from Congress gave the administration leverage to insist on law enforcement concessions from Mexico. One Mexican official described it as a “good cop, bad cop” routine: Congress played bad cop, blasting Mexico on its antidrug rec­ord, and then Clinton officials played good cop, negotiating with Mexico to show pro­gress on the antidrug front to pacify Congress.91 Mexico’s antidrug per­for­mance, which included the implementation of new and expanded anti-­organized-­crime legislation, received a positive grade in the administration’s March 1997 certification review.92 But the ensuing congressional reaction was even more hostile than that of the previous year—­partly ­because the certification decision came on the heels of the news that Mexico’s top antidrug official, General Gutiérrez Rebollo, was on the payroll of the very smugglers he was in charge of fighting. The embarrassing corruption scandal, which could not have come at a worse time for Mexico, provided impor­tant po­ liti­cal ammunition for an emerging bipartisan co­a li­t ion of Mexico critics on Capitol Hill. To appease Congress and avoid a deeper diplomatic rift with Mexico, se­nior administration officials negotiated with Senate leaders on a resolution that required the White House to issue a pro­gress report by the following September outlining new U.S.-­Mexico achievements on the antidrug front. This resolution included demands that pro­gress be made in dismantling drug-­smuggling organ­ izations, strengthening ties between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies, increasing joint patrols on the border, and tackling corruption.93 In short, the price paid to get Mexico through the certification hoops was to promise a bigger and better antidrug per­for­mance. Thus, the dynamics of the certification pro­cess pushed for further escalation. Even if the quantitative results—­arrests and seizures made, crops eradicated, new laws passed, and bilateral agreements signed—­had ­little impact in significantly reducing smuggling, they ­were po­liti­cally sold as expressions of antidrug resolve. “This is not about what Mexico has done,” one administration official candidly noted. “This is about convincing the Hill that what­ever Mexico has done is enough.”94 Escalation, in other words, had less to do with ­actual deterrence than with generating the kind of statistical indicators necessary to make it through the annual certification ritual. Armed with impressive statistics, the administration reported to Congress in September 1997 that eradication and seizures, “while not absolute mea­sures of po­liti­cal w ­ ill or operational effectiveness, are nonetheless valid indicators of a government’s commitment to fighting drugs. In each year since 1994, Mexico has increased the quantity of illegal drugs seized and led the world in destruction of illegal drug crops.”95 And testifying before a Senate committee

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that fall, Barry McCaffrey reviewed a long list of accomplishments resulting from ­increased U.S.-­Mexico cooperation and concluded: In the last two years, the level of cooperation on drugs has been phenomenal to the point that it would clearly . . . ​rank as one of the most dramatic transformations I’ve seen in the region in the last 30 years. . . . ​We started with almost no contact, military-­to-­military, police-­to-­police, no extradition, no money-­laundering agreements, no legislation in Mexico that could deal with the prob­lem. Now t­ here’s considerable.96 When statistics failed to adequately impress, administration officials pointed to “cooperation” itself as the most impor­tant accomplishment. As the State Department’s James P. Rubin explained in evaluating Mexico’s antidrug per­for­ mance in February  1999, it is a country’s cooperation in the drug war that counted, and “­t here’s a difference between cooperation and success.”97 Regardless of the low results, he said, Mexican officials are “cooperating more closely with the United States at virtually e­ very level than ever before.”98 The Mexican government subsequently became more assertive in displaying its antidrug resolve prior to the certification decision, even spending $100,000 a month to hire three major Washington lobbying firms.99 In February 1999, Zedillo dispatched his interior minister to Washington to highlight a new $550 million high-­ tech initiative to secure the country’s borders against drug smuggling.100 Much of that spending, he announced, would go t­ oward purchasing infrared cameras, special X-­ray machines, and satellite communications gear, as well as more he­li­cop­ters and planes for the country’s antidrug air fleet.101 At a congressional hearing following the decision to certify Mexico, a se­nior State Department official pointed out that t­ hese antidrug expenditures w ­ ere especially impressive b ­ ecause they came at a time when Mexico’s federal bud­get was the most austere in de­cades.102

Hardening the Border in the Age of ­F ree Trade Although NAFTA helped turn the border into a bigger bridge for ­legal trade, some of its feedback effects helped reinforce po­liti­cal calls to barricade the border against the illegal drug trade. The predicament facing U.S. law enforcement strategists was that NAFTA had made the task of border interdiction more difficult and at the same time had drawn heightened po­liti­cal and media attention to the deficiencies of the interdiction effort. Ironically, the prob­lem had been partly self-­created. Past law enforcement initiatives not only pushed cocaine smuggling from the Southeast to the Southwest

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but also pushed it from the air to the ground. Smugglers adapted by increasingly hiding their drug shipments within the rising volume of commercial trucks, railcars, and passenger vehicles crossing the border. Hence, the NAFTA-­encouraged boom in cross-­border traffic had the side effect of creating a much more challenging job for ­those border officials who w ­ ere expected to weed out the illegitimate flows from the legitimate ones—­a challenge that had in turn provided the rationale for a further infusion of law enforcement resources at the ports of entry. As the 1999 National Drug Control Strategy Report explained, “Rapidly growing commerce between the United States and Mexico w ­ ill complicate our efforts to keep drugs out of cross-­border traffic. Since the southwest border is presently the most porous of the nation’s borders, it is t­ here that we must mount a determined coordinated effort to stop the flow of drugs.”103 Concern that smugglers might benefit from NAFTA was deliberately not discussed during the negotiations over the ­free trade accord in the early 1990s. “This was in the ‘too hot to ­handle’ category,” noted Gary Huffbauer of the Institute for International Economics, but “it’s a painfully obvious prob­lem.”104 An internal report written by an intelligence officer at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City claimed that cocaine traffickers ­were establishing factories, ware­houses, and trucking companies as fronts in anticipation of the expected boom in cross-­ border commerce ­after NAFTA’s passage: they “intend to maximize their legitimate business enterprises within the auspices of the new U.S.-­Mexico ­free trade agreement.”105 Some traffickers reportedly even hired trade con­sul­tants to determine what products move most swiftly through border inspection ­u nder NAFTA guidelines. “They have very specific issues,” noted Craig Chretien when he was the special agent in charge of the DEA’s San Diego office. “Does a perishable get through quicker than a load of steel? What kind of cargoes get through faster than o ­ thers?”106 Mexico’s deregulation of its trucking industry, which allowed licensed trucks to travel anywhere within the country without inspections, created ideal conditions for smugglers. On the U.S. side of the border the road network in the Southwest was being improved to h ­ andle more than a doubling of traffic levels. Yet as early as October 1992 an internal DEA report predicted that the lifting of trucking restrictions would “prove to be a definite boon to both the legitimate food industry, and to drug smugglers who conceal their illegal shipments in trucks transporting fruits and vegetables from Mexico to U.S. markets” and that “the projected overhaul of the Mexican road system [would] expedite the exportation of both legitimate and illegitimate crops.”107 In addition, the sheer volume of border crossings provided an ideal environment for drug smuggling. In 1995 the DEA estimated that most cocaine traveled through regular ports of entry in commercial trucks

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and passenger vehicles.108 One truck pulled over near San Diego, for example, was smuggling eight tons of cocaine stuffed into cans of jalapeño peppers.109 On any given day in 1997, 220,000 vehicles flowed across the border into the United States from Mexico. Only nine large tractor-­trailers loaded with cocaine would satisfy the nation’s drug demand for one year.110 U.S. border officials searched more than a million commercial trucks and railway cars crossing from Mexico in 1997 and found cocaine in only six.111 Clearly, the enforcement challenge was the equivalent of finding a needle in a haystack—­a haystack that kept getting bigger and a needle that kept getting better at hiding. U.S. imports from Mexico skyrocketed in the 1990s, and most of this trade arrived via commercial cargo conveyances across the southwestern border. Commercial traffic from Mexico increased from 1.9 million arrivals in 1991 to more than 3.5 million in 1996. In Laredo, Texas, the busiest truck crossing point on the border, nearly one million trucks entered in 1997—up from 185,000 a de­ cade ­earlier112—­and the number was expected to double by 2010. To avoid long delays, customs agents could not realistically inspect most of the vehicles entering from Mexico.113 The more intensive and intrusive the inspection pro­cess, the longer the wait at the border. The Customs Ser­vice, of course, had to claim that “narcotics enforcement . . . ​comes first, even if trade facilitation suffers when counternarcotics operations slow the flow of commerce.”114 But although the domestic po­liti­cal context prompted officials to declare their primary allegiance to border control, economic realities dictated that the border remain highly porous. Hence, prioritizing enforcement over facilitation was much easier said than done. One se­nior customs official explained, “If we examined ­every truck for narcotics arriving into the United States along the Southwest border. . . . ​ Customs would back up the truck traffic bumper-­to-­bumper into Mexico City in just two weeks—15.8 days. In 15.8 days, ­there would be 95,608 trucks backed up into Mexico. That’s 1,177 miles of trucks, end to end.”115 Heightened po­liti­cal concern that ­free trade was inadvertently aiding drug smuggling made border officials increasingly wary of projecting the impression that they ­were facilitating trade at the expense of enforcement. Indeed, some officials erased the word “facilitation” from their vocabulary, opting instead to talk in terms of “traffic management.” One se­nior customs official noted that facilitation had become the “F word,” sending the “wrong message” to Congress, the public, and the trade community.116 Similarly, any new evidence that the border had become easier to cross legally was handled with reassurances that the border was also being made more difficult to cross illegally. For example, the release of a study showing that traffic was moving more quickly through the San Ysidro port of entry south of San Diego (the busiest border crossing in the world)

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was purposely delayed u ­ ntil it could be shown that enforcement had also been beefed up.117 Yet despite ­t hese careful efforts to construct an image of heightened border security, the rising flow of commerce across the border provided an irresistible opportunity for po­liti­cal entrepreneurs to attack the administration as being “soft” on border control, and for bureaucratic entrepreneurs to deflect blame for policy failure and push for more enforcement resources.118 Leading the po­liti­cal charge was Senator Diane Feinstein (D-­Calif.), who raised the border interdiction issue in the mid-1990s a­ fter press reports that the Customs Ser­vice was being lax on truck inspections in order to promote trade. In a 5 February 1996 letter to President Clinton, Feinstein blamed “customer-­friendly” policies on the border for the influx of cocaine and even asked the president to replace George Weise, the commissioner of the Customs Ser­v ice.119 What had drawn Feinstein’s attention was the Line Release program, which allowed customs agents to wave preapproved trucks through a port of entry without inspection. Feinstein called it “a superhighway for smugglers,” criticizing the program for failing to run background checks on trucking companies and ­drivers.120 Although Line Release began in 1987, it did not attract much media and po­liti­cal attention ­until a­ fter the passage of NAFTA. In 1994, NAFTA’s first year, 2.7 million Line Release vehicles crossed the border—­a 44 ­percent increase over 1993.121 ­Free trade opponents from both ends of the po­liti­cal spectrum also opportunistically used the drug issue to bolster their positions. Patrick Buchanan, for example, attacked both Republicans and Demo­crats for supporting NAFTA, which he said has made the border “wide open” to drug trafficking.122 Three days before the congressional vote on ­whether to grant President Clinton fast-­track authority to negotiate trade agreements, Representative Maxine ­Waters (D-­Calif.) held a press conference to release a report titled Drug Trafficking on the Fast Track. The report urged that the Customs Ser­vice should be required to inspect 75 ­percent of all trucks and commercial maritime vessels at points of entry into the United States.123 Such a sharp increase in the level of inspection was technically pos­si­ble but realistically unthinkable; in practice, it would virtually shut down the border. The Nixon administration, it should be remembered, tried such intensive inspections for a few weeks during Operation Intercept in 1969. In 1999, as one customs official noted, it ­couldn’t be done for even a few days without d ­ oing severe damage to trade.124 Business leaders along the border w ­ ere already complaining about the traffic jams and long delays, which they blamed on stepped-up drug inspections.125 But even as increased cross-­border economic integration placed practical limitations on border controls, domestic po­liti­cal imperatives required the admin-

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istration to devote ever more resources to the enhancement of such controls. The administration attempted to ­counter po­liti­cal charges that it was facilitating too much, and enforcing too ­little, by increasing cargo inspections at the ports of entry. Thus, in February 1995 the Customs Ser­v ice announced Operation Hard Line, an intensified effort to target drug smuggling in commercial cargo. Customs received 657 new positions through Hard Line in FY1997—­roughly a 25 ­percent increase in personnel on the border.126 Operation Hard Line provided a major boost to enforcement efforts in the San Diego sector in par­tic­u­lar, which had been the focus of Senator Feinstein’s attacks. Staffing for the San Diego office of Customs Investigations, for example, almost doubled between 1994 and 1996, including personnel moved to the San Diego ­sector from the interior.127 A year ­after Operation Hard Line was initiated, the ­Customs Ser­vice issued a press release praising the program’s “record-­breaking success”: 24 ­percent more seizures of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana than in the previous year. Another press release a few days l­ater boasted that the number of drug seizures along the California-­Mexico border had increased by 76  ­percent over the same period the year before. The fine print, however, revealed that although the overall number of drug seizures was up, the a­ ctual amount seized had fallen—­suggesting that smugglers had adapted to the increased enforcement by breaking their loads into smaller packages to reduce their risks.128 The trend had in fact been t­oward more but smaller drug shipments—­creating more and harder work for customs. Inspectors spent most of their time overwhelmed with small-­ scale marijuana busts. Indeed, some officials believed smugglers ­were using small marijuana shipments as a decoy to distract inspectors while they moved larger and better hidden shipments through the ports of entry. The Customs Ser­vice also attributed a dramatic increase in arrests at the ports of entry to its efforts to harden the border. The number of drug-­related border arrests in southern California produced by customs investigations, for example, jumped from about 400 in 1992 to about 3,500 in 1996.129 Such arrests served the impor­tant po­liti­cal purpose of showing increased activity, even if not necessarily increased effectiveness. ­Those arrested tended to be the most expendable and easily replaceable foot soldiers in the drug trade.130 And the smugglers eliminated by increased arrests w ­ ere some of the least skilled and least sophisticated, many specializing in marijuana (a bulkier product than cocaine and more easily detected by drug-­sniffing dogs). U.S. officials had long acknowledged that seizures at the border ports of entry represented only a small percentage of the cross-­border flow of drugs. Moreover, as the head of the U.S. Customs Ser­v ice in San Diego noted, traffickers assumed that a certain percentage of their product w ­ ill be seized and calculate this into their profit projections.131 Nevertheless, seizure statistics w ­ ere the leading

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instrument used by the Customs Ser­vice to justify its mission, fend off po­liti­cal attacks, and ensure continued funding. In other words, t­ here was a bureaucratic imperative to generate seizures in order to proj­ect a positive impression of enforcement effort—­regardless of what t­ hese seizures actually meant. When George Weise, customs commissioner, appeared on Nightline in May 1997 to defend his agency against charges of lax border inspections, he pointed to the substantial increase in drugs that had been seized in commercial cargo since Operation Hard Line was initiated—­even though such an increase could simply indicate that concealment in commercial cargo was becoming an increasingly popu­lar smuggling method.132 When cocaine seizure levels declined in 1997, customs officials predictably reacted with alarm. A 28 November 1997 National Trea­sury Employees Union memo noted that Congress had provided millions in new funding for enforcement positions for Operation Hard Line and warned that “no doubt Congress ­w ill be highly upset with t­ hese 1997 [seizure] figures . . . ​[­because] border drug interdiction is becoming a major po­liti­cal issue in Washington.” A similar memo on 22 December declared that new enforcement efforts ­were necessary, “the objective being to increase our seizures so customs and the ­union ­don’t get their heads handed to them by the politicians in Washington when the bud­get meetings start in March.”133 The low seizure levels did indeed provoke po­liti­cal grumbling. “Congress has directed almost e­ very pos­si­ble resource t­ oward drug interdiction efforts, including more agents, better technology and several hundred million dollars in additional funding,” said Representative Ron Packard (R-­Calif.). “­These are not the results we expected. If interdiction is down, the American ­people deserve some answers.” In response to such concerns, the Customs Ser­v ice launched Operation Brass Ring in early 1998, which the commissioner promised would “dramatically increase drug seizures.”134 To keep generating drug seizures without stopping the rising flow of commercial traffic, border control strategists turned to state-­of-­the-­art technologies. Alan Bersin, the attorney general’s designated “border czar” u ­ ntil mid-1998, explained the dilemma and its solution: Our border is intended to accomplish twin purposes; on the one hand, it is intended to facilitate trade in order to bring our nation the significant benefits of international commerce and industry. At the same time, it is geared to constrain and regulate the ­free movement of p ­ eople and goods in order to block the entry of illegal mi­grants and unlawful merchandise. The key to resolving ­these apparently contradictory pur-

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poses lies in the strategic application of modern technology. We can and must have a border that is both secure and business-­friendly.135 To help filter out illegal from l­egal flows, g­ iant X-­ray machines, costing $35 million each and large enough to drive a truck through, w ­ ere being in136 stalled along the border. Equipment previously restricted to military use during the Cold War was also being adapted for use in border law enforcement. In March 1995 a Border Research Technology Center was opened in San Diego for this purpose.137 Experimental devices tested included an electronic current capable of disabling a fleeing car and an ion scanner designed to detect drugs hidden in vehicles.138 The intense po­liti­cal fire directed at border inspectors for not ­doing more to reduce the flow of drugs had translated into increased po­liti­cal support for more resources to harden the ports of entry. “Our borders are being overrun by drug dealers,” Senator Phil Gramm (R-­Tex.) warned.139 His proposed solution: hire a thousand new Customs Ser­vice inspectors and devote $56 million to technological improvements, including surveillance cameras, mobile and stationary X-­ray machines to inspect trucks, and ultrasonic machines to scan containers. A spokesperson for Senator Gramm justified ­these requests by stating, “We need to do what’s necessary to increase the ­legal trade and shut off the flow of illegal drugs.” Making that happen, he said, w ­ ill “take a g­ reat deal more equipment and p ­ eople.”140 The White House became an especially enthusiastic advocate of a high-­tech solution to the dilemmas of drug interdiction in the age of NAFTA.141 As the drug policy director Barry McCaffrey put it, “Technology can help us stop drugs while facilitating l­ egal commerce.”142 In September 1998 he told a congressional committee that “[we cannot deter drugs] ­unless we give the Customs Ser­vice and the Border Patrol the tools they need to do their job. That’s where we need congressional focus and resources.” We can “fix” the border, he asserted: “It is achievable. We can use high-­technology, non-­intrusive inspection systems, linked intelligence, change manpower and doctrine to protect the American p ­ eople along the Southwest border.”143 And so the buildup of border drug enforcement continued, but in an increasingly high-­tech fashion.

The Politics of Mea­s ur­i ng Policy Effectiveness However forcefully government officials promoted a bigger and better border ­interdiction campaign, the built-in limits of such a deterrence effort had long

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been known. In 1993 the Government Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, reported that “interdiction has not had—­and is unlikely to have—­a significant impact on the national goal of reducing drug supplies to the United States. The enormous profits in cocaine make interdiction losses relatively inconsequential.”144 Even unimaginable interdiction successes would not significantly affect drug prices on the street ­because most of the value added (roughly 90 ­percent of the street price in the case of cocaine) came a­ fter the product crossed the border (reflecting the risks and costs imposed by domestic law enforcement). ­Because the cost of the drug before it entered the country was only a small percentage of the retail price, smugglers could easily replace lost loads.145 Even as the instrumental value of the interdiction campaign was challenged by evidence that it was an inherently inefficient enforcement tool, officials took refuge in its symbolic value—­and dismissed anyone who disregarded it. In response to “­t hose who argue that interdiction is a hopeless endeavor,” the Bush White House insisted that “a civilized society does not leave its border totally open to t­ hose who would harm its citizens. Interdiction has both symbolic and real value. It demonstrates our national ­w ill to oppose drug traffickers on ­every available front.”146 Thus, largely on the basis of its symbolic merits, border interdiction had become not simply a means to an end (reducing the drug supply) but an end in itself. Part of the po­liti­cal and bureaucratic allure of interdiction was that it generated indicators of government resolve that ­were perceptually appealing even if highly misleading. Senator John McCain explained it in blunt terms: It is easy to talk of a war on drugs, involve our military in an antidrug program, pour billions into the effort, and then disguise a lack of success with reassuring rhe­toric. . . . ​The mea­sures of success that are being made public have virtually no practical meaning. For example, efforts to assist seizures are mea­sured in terms of the amount of drugs seized, with no effort to relate such data to the percentage of total drugs that get through, or to ­whether seizures have any meaningful impact on the main smuggling networks. . . . ​A nother equally meaningless mea­sure of capability is to report the number of detections, arrests, or intercepts, with no attempt to relate this to the number of successful crossings or a­ ctual convictions, or w ­ hether such actions have any real 147 effect on the flow of drugs. Distorted evaluations and the use of partial indicators of effectiveness ­were certainly not new. In 1973 the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse pointed out that the drug control

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funding mechanism is so structured that it responds only when “bodies” can be produced or counted. Such a structure penalizes a reduction in the body count, while it rewards any increase in incidence figures and arrest statistics with more money. ­Those receiving funds have a vested interest in increasing or maintaining t­ hose figures. The statistics, in turn, fuel public and bureaucratic concerns, and assure that the prob­lem continues to be defined incorrectly. ­These kinds of figures, concluded the commission, “are dramatic, but do not r­ eally tell what is happening.” Increased numbers of arrests, for instance, “may simply mean more violators, rather than more effective enforcement.” Similarly, “the quantities of drugs seized may reflect only the size of the illegal market.”148 Many years ­later, the reliance on misleading mea­sures of effectiveness persisted, but the po­liti­cal stage on which they ­were displayed had significantly expanded. In 1972 only two Senate committees and one House committee held hearings on proposed drug legislation; by the mid-1980s, drug policy cut across the jurisdiction of some seventy-­four congressional committees and subcommittees. Consequently, congressional hearings had become an increasingly impor­tant forum for evaluating and promoting the federal antidrug effort. Each hearing followed the same basic routine: the chair would deliver an opening statement about the scourge of drugs, insisting that we must do more to stop drugs from crossing the nation’s borders. Other committee members would then offer their own variations on the same theme. Th ­ ese would be followed by testimonies from drug enforcement officials, highlighting what their agencies ­were accomplishing and what they hoped to accomplish if more resources w ­ ere forthcoming from Congress. Each agency was concerned only about showing the success of its discrete mission, rather than with the viability of the policy as a ­whole. Each had its own way of mea­sur­ing and justifying its per­for­mance. For example, the Customs Ser­vice highlighted seizures and arrests at the border ports of entry; the DEA prioritized the capture of major traffickers; the State Department stressed the level of cooperation with Mexico. Poor results tended to be blamed on mismanagement and insufficient resources. Improved results ­were assumed to come from more and better law enforcement and cross-­border cooperation. The question-­and-­answer period that would follow the prepared official testimonies could often get heated, but given the po­liti­cal and bureaucratic interests involved, t­here was rarely any challenge to the basic under­lying supply-­side logic of the drug control strategy.

Projecting an impression of cross-­border commitment and pro­gress in the antidrug campaign had ultimately proved to be more po­liti­cally consequential for

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U.S. and Mexican leaders than ­whether or not the drug supply had actually been reduced. Regardless of its deterrent effect, the escalation of enforcement efforts had helped to fend off po­liti­cal attacks and kept the drug issue from derailing the broader pro­cess of economic integration. In other words, a policy that had largely failed in its stated goal had nevertheless helped to realize other key po­ liti­cal objectives—­most notably the creation and maintenance of NAFTA. The intensified antidrug campaign, however, brought with it significant collateral damage: more corruption, more militarized law enforcement, more linkages between the drug trade and legitimate cross-­border trade, and a generally more “narcoticized” U.S.-­Mexico relationship.

4 THE ESCALATION OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL

Efforts to police the flow of unauthorized immigrants across the U.S.-­Mexico border underwent a metamorphosis in the 1990s: in the span of a few years, immigration control along the border was elevated from one of the most neglected areas of federal law enforcement to one of the most po­liti­cally popu­lar.1 Although the escalation of policing largely failed as a deterrent and generated perverse and counterproductive consequences that reinforced calls for further escalation, it was strikingly successful in projecting the appearance of a more secure and orderly border. The unpre­ce­dented expansion of border policing was ultimately less about achieving the stated instrumental goal of deterring unauthorized border crossers and more about po­liti­cally recrafting the image of the border and symbolically reaffirming the state’s territorial authority. The escalation of border enforcement influenced where, how, and how often unauthorized immigrants crossed the border. This generated enormous rewards for lawmakers, law enforcers, and law-­evading mi­grant smugglers and powerfully ­shaped public and media perception. At the same time, the narrow and symbolically appealing focus on the borderline itself as both the source of the prob­lem and the site of the policing solution drew attention away from the more po­liti­cally awkward and divisive task of formally recognizing and regulating a well-­entrenched informal cross-­border l­ abor market.

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Creating and Channeling the Backlash During much of the twentieth ­century, the United States and Mexico not only quietly tolerated but actively facilitated and encouraged the influx of cheap ­labor across the border; ­until recent de­cades the rising level of unauthorized immigration commanded l­ ittle national po­liti­cal attention. For example, the platform of the Republican Party did not even mention immigration control u ­ ntil 1980 and did not affirm the country’s right to control its borders or express concern about unauthorized immigration ­until 1984.2 Congressional debate over how to deal with unauthorized immigration culminated in the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, which introduced employer sanctions for the first time, as well as a l­ imited legalization program. But instead of discouraging unauthorized immigration, the main impact of legalization u ­ nder IRCA was to reinforce and expand already well-­established cross-­border migration networks. Many onetime immigrants who had gone back to Mexico returned to claim legalization papers. And ­t hose who ­were legalized ­under the program provided a more secure base for the arrival of new immigrants. Meanwhile, the primary impact of the poorly designed and minimally enforced employer sanctions was to create a booming business in fraudulent documents. IRCA’s perverse consequences helped set the stage for a power­f ul backlash against unauthorized immigration in the 1990s, most acutely in California, which was home to nearly half of the unauthorized immigrants estimated to be in the country. The state was hit hard early in the de­cade by a bud­get crisis and an economic downturn. Economic insecurity and a rapidly changing demographic profile combined to nurture rising nativist fears among California’s disproportionately white, middle-­class electorate. The new restrictionist mood in the state was reflected in the passage of Proposition 187 by California voters in 1994, which sought to bar unauthorized immigrants from receiving social ser­ vices. Proposition 187 was intentionally designed and promoted as a symbolic gesture to express frustration and “send a message” to the federal government.3 Even though it was subsequently declared unconstitutional (as its proponents expected), its passage by a three-­to-­two margin sent shock waves across the country and through the halls of Congress. The backlash against unauthorized immigration was partly created and then opportunistically channeled by po­liti­cal and bureaucratic entrepreneurs. They sought to direct attention to the border as both the source of the prob­lem and the most appropriate site of the policy solution. Beginning with Patrick Buchanan, politicians used the border as a po­liti­cal prop in voicing their opposition to unauthorized immigration. During the 1992 presidential campaign

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Buchanan held a press conference above Smugglers Canyon (a well-­k nown point of illegal entry along the border south of San Diego) to denounce what he called the federal government’s failure to deter an “illegal invasion.” In the following years more mainstream politicians embraced many of Buchanan’s ideas and similarly a­ dopted the border as a po­liti­cal stage.4 Governor Pete Wilson of California revived his floundering 1994 electoral campaign by blaming the state’s woes on the federal government’s failure to control the border. His most effective tool for communicating this message was a tele­v i­sion advertisement based on video footage of unauthorized immigrants dashing across the border from Mexico into the southbound traffic at the San Ysidro port of entry. Against the background of this chaotic scene the narrator’s voice said: “They keep coming. Two million illegal immigrants in California. The federal government w ­ on’t stop them at the border, yet requires us to pay billions to take care of them. Governor Wilson sent the National Guard to help the Border Patrol. But that’s not all.” Governor Wilson then appeared, pledging to do more: “For Californians who work hard, pay taxes and obey the laws, I am suing to force the federal government to control the border and I’m working to deny state ser­vices to illegal immigrants. Enough is enough.”5 Only a few years ­earlier, Wilson had asked for a relaxation of federal immigration controls so that Mexican workers could cross the border to apply for special agricultural workers’ visas. Far from being passive bystanders, border officials helped construct this image of the border ­under siege. The Border Patrol produced the original video footage used in the Wilson campaign.6 It also helped to create the spectacle of an overrun port of entry in the first place. While the Wilson ad conveyed the impression that this disorderly scene was an everyday occurrence, it had in fact been sparked in 1992 by intensified Border Patrol pressure on unauthorized crossers to the west of the port of entry.7 Squeezed by the deployment of more agents and a new fence along the westernmost five-­mile stretch of the border (traditionally the single most heavi­ly used point for unauthorized entry), smugglers responded by orchestrating charges of fifty mi­grants at a time—­called “Banzai runs” by border officials—­t hrough the southbound lanes of the San Ysidro port of entry.8 The dramatic footage of men, ­women, and ­children dashing across the border and weaving through the busy traffic was broadcast across the nation, providing a power­ful focusing event that galvanized public attention. Critics accused the Border Patrol of deliberately provoking the charges and playing up the images to secure more funding.9 The scenes of the Banzai runs not only ­were effectively exploited for po­liti­cal gain by Governor Wilson but projected the message that lax border controls w ­ ere the root of the unauthorized immigration prob­lem.10 Left out of this message was the anemic condition of workplace

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controls, the economic reliance of key sectors of the California economy (particularly agriculture) on unauthorized foreign workers, and the fact that as much as half of the unauthorized immigrants in the country had not entered illegally but simply overstayed their visas. Instead of challenging this border-­focused message, both Republicans and Demo­crats embraced it. Targeting the border (rather than, say, domestic employer demand for inexpensive ­labor) not only had an irresistible symbolic appeal but helped define the nature of the prob­lem and ­limited the range of acceptable policy solutions. To a remarkable extent, then, official policy debate over unauthorized immigration was quickly reduced to a narrow debate over controlling the border. Politicians across the po­liti­cal spectrum sounded increasingly alike in pledging their commitment to border control. For example, echoing popu­lar po­liti­cal sentiment, Representative Brian Bilbray (R-­Calif.) exclaimed, “We have traveled all over the world as a nation since 1914, securing the frontiers of other nations, but the greatest power in the world has not chosen to secure its own national territory.”11 President Clinton put it, “We c­ an’t afford to lose control of our own borders at a time when we are not adequately providing for the jobs, health care, and the education of our own ­people.”12 Having identified the border as the po­liti­cal battleground on which the government’s resolve to fight unauthorized immigration would be tested, politicians rushed to outdo one another in proposing tough new mea­sures.

The U.S. Border Control Offensive Although border control was a low priority for President Clinton when he first took office, he soon became an enthusiastic proponent of tighter controls in order keep up with Republican initiatives in Congress. In late July 1993 he held a news conference to announce aggressive new mea­sures against unauthorized immigration: “­Today we send a strong and clear message. We ­w ill make it tougher for illegal aliens to get into our country.” ­These mea­sures included hiring six hundred more Border Patrol agents—an idea Clinton a­ dopted as his own, though the proposal actually came from an amendment proposed ­earlier in the month by Representative Duncan Hunter (R-­Calif.). In announcing the increase in Border Patrol personnel, the president said, “It’s certainly plain to anybody with eyes to see that the Border Patrol is drastically understaffed, breathtakingly understaffed.” Just a few months e­ arlier he had actually recommended trimming its size as a cost-­saving mea­sure.13 Signaling the administration’s new commitment, the attorney general and the INS commissioner became frequent visitors to the border.14 The attorney general even appointed a Special Representative to

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the Southwest Border, who was immediately dubbed the “border czar” by the press. Officials of the Border Patrol (the uniformed enforcement wing of the INS), long accustomed to being outside the po­liti­cal spotlight and marginalized within the criminal justice system, w ­ ere suddenly brought center stage—­and indeed ­were even invited to the White House for press announcements with the president.15 The heightened status of immigration control was reflected in the unpre­ce­ dented expansion of the INS. Long viewed as the neglected stepchild of the Department of Justice, it now became one of the fastest growing federal agencies. The agency’s bud­get nearly tripled between FY1993 and 1999, from $1.5 billion to $4.2 billion, and the single most impor­tant growth area was border enforcement. Between 1994 and 1998 more than $3.3 billion was spent on the Border Patrol, whose own annual bud­get jumped from $354 million in 1993 to $877 ­million in 1998—­a 148 ­percent increase. With much of the spending g­ oing t­oward hiring new agents, the INS soon had more officers authorized to carry a gun and make arrests than any other federal agency. From 1993 to October 1999 the number of Border Patrol agents in the Southwest more than doubled, from 3,389 to about 8,200. In the San Diego sector alone the number r­ ose from 998 in October 1994 to 2,264 by June 1998, and ­there ­were as many agents in this sector as ­there ­were along the entire southwestern border in the 1970s.16 The infusion of personnel was matched by new fencing, equipment, and surveillance devices: infrared night-­vision scopes, low-­ light TV cameras, ground sensors, he­li­cop­ters, and all-­terrain vehicles.17 To “thicken” the border, the Border Patrol also expanded its checkpoints on the roads leading north. The rapid growth of the INS was particularly impressive ­because it took place in an era other­w ise characterized by government downsizing. While most federal agencies w ­ ere struggling in the face of bud­get cuts, the INS was struggling to manage its fast-­paced expansion. The INS established an around-­the-­clock hotline for prospective applicants, hired an advertising agency, expanded its recruitment at colleges, military bases, and job fairs, and began promoting its ­careers on the Internet.18 The positions of “Border Patrol Agent” and “Immigration Inspector” ­were listed as two of the top ten areas of job growth in the federal government.19 Thus, although “devolution”—­less federal spending and more responsibility transferred to state governments—­had become a popu­lar po­liti­ cal theme, trends in immigration control pushed in the opposite direction. The border buildup was scheduled to continue at a fast pace. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 called for hiring a thousand new Border Patrol agents per year and a total force of ten thousand by the year 2001. All new recruits w ­ ere sent to the southwestern border, where over

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90 ­percent of the Border Patrol was deployed.20 Among other mea­sures, the act promoted tougher sentencing guidelines: mandatory minimum sentencing for ­those convicted of smuggling aliens for commercial gain, and in some cases a doubling of penalties. The 1996 law also authorized the construction of new physical barriers, most notably a multilayered fence to reinforce the fourteen miles of fencing already in place south of San Diego. The extra fencing was first recommended by a study prepared by Sandia Laboratories, a national weapons lab. Arguing that “the illegal aliens have shown that they w ­ ill destroy or bypass any single mea­sure placed in their path,” the Sandia study concluded that “a three-­ fence barrier system with vehicle patrol roads between the fences and lights w ­ ill 21 provide the necessary discouragement.” The biggest advocate of the new fencing, Representative Duncan Hunter (R-­Calif.), proposed building a similar barrier ­system at each of the major urban corridors along the southwestern border. The military also came to play an impor­tant support role on the border. Praising the growing cooperation and coordination between law enforcement and the military, INS commissioner Doris Meissner said, “Think of this as one team, dif­fer­ent roles, dif­fer­ent uniforms, but with the same game plan—­and that is to restore the rule of law to the border.”22 Military personnel w ­ ere prohibited from making arrests, but they assisted the INS by operating night scopes, motion sensors, and communications equipment and by building and maintaining roads and fences. South of San Diego, army reservists constructed a ten-­foot-­high steel fence. In Nogales, Arizona, army engineers installed a fifteen-­foot-­high fence nearly five miles long, extending from one end of town to the other. Technologies and equipment originally developed for military use ­were increasingly adapted for border enforcement purposes. Magnetic footfall detectors and infrared body sensors, many of which ­were first used in Vietnam, w ­ ere deployed along the border. An electronic fingerprinting system (called IDENT), adapted from the Navy’s Deployable Mass Population Identification and Tracking System, was used by the Border Patrol to keep rec­ords on apprehended border crossers. The Border Research and Technology Center established in San Diego continued to facilitate the conversion of defense technologies. Experimental devices tested included a camera that could see into vehicles to find hidden passengers, and a computer to check commuters by voiceprint.23 The administration’s border control offensive was based on a strategy developed by the INS in 1993–94 called “prevention through deterrence.”24 The objective of the increases in fencing, surveillance equipment, penalties, and law enforcement personnel was to inhibit illegal entry and thus reduce the need to apprehend entrants ­after ­t hey’ve crossed the border. Massive injections of law enforcement resources at the most popu­lar points of unauthorized entry w ­ ere designed to disrupt the ­human traffic, forcing mi­grants to attempt the crossing

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in more difficult, remote areas or at official ports of entry (which, the INS said, ­were easier to control). The result, U.S. border control strategists argued, was that many would-be border crossers ­were discouraged from trying, and ­t hose who did try failed repeatedly and eventually gave up ­because of frustration and depleted resources. The prevention-­through-­deterrence strategy was first tested with the launching of Operation Blockade (­later given the more diplomatic name of Hold-­t he-­ Line) in El Paso in September 1993.25 Silvestre Reyes, the El Paso Border Patrol chief who was the architect of the plan, faced initial re­sis­tance from his superiors at INS headquarters. ­There was concern that such a concentrated deployment of force would lead to violent confrontations and strain U.S. relations with Mexico on the eve of NAFTA. Moreover, the emphasis on deterring entry rather than apprehending mi­grants as they crossed contradicted the Border Patrol’s traditional reliance on high apprehension numbers to justify bud­get requests.26 Nevertheless, an enabling po­liti­cal climate and his own bureaucratic entrepreneurialism made it pos­si­ble for Reyes to secure the overtime pay he needed to deploy 450 agents for intensive coverage of a twenty-­mile stretch of the border. As hoped, the operation led to a sharp drop in attempted entries in the El Paso sector. Previously ­t here had been up to ten thousand unauthorized border crossers per day, and only one of eight had been apprehended.27 The high-­profile show of force quickly reduced this flow to a trickle, drawing the immediate attention of Washington and the media, as well as California politicians ­eager to replicate the El Paso experience.28 Bureaucratic re­sis­tance within the INS soon withered away as the operation was widely praised.29 Chief Reyes became an overnight hero and would ­later even be elected to Congress. The power­f ul appeal of Operation Hold-­t he-­Line was that the results ­were both immediate and highly vis­i­ble. Once the strategy had achieved national attention, the INS had ­little choice but to promote it and take credit for its success.30 One consequence was that the rewards system within the Border Patrol was suddenly turned upside down, prevention rather than number of apprehensions becoming the new enforcement goal. In consultation with the Defense Department’s Center for Low Intensity Conflict, in 1994 the INS developed a comprehensive plan to apply “prevention through deterrence” across the rest of the border. The strategy would first focus on the busiest points of illegal entry: the El Paso and San Diego sectors, which in FY1993 had accounted for 68 ­percent of all apprehensions. Thus, in October  1994 El Paso’s Operation Hold-­the-­Line was joined by Operation Gatekeeper south of San Diego, which targeted the fourteen westernmost miles of the border. Together, t­ hese two operations covered the border areas that had traditionally accounted for two-­t hirds or more of all illegal entries. The plan was

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then to extend the strategy to the Tucson sector and south Texas—to which mi­ grants ­were expected to turn ­after the El Paso and San Diego sectors ­were secured—­and ultimately to the entire boundary. The vision was the restoration of the country’s “confidence in the integrity of the border.”31

Self-­Perpetuating Escalation An enabling po­liti­cal climate and bureaucratic entrepreneurialism helped launch the new border control offensive; but once initiated, it became self-­reinforcing. The tightening of controls in El Paso and San Diego predictably pushed mi­grants to attempt entry elsewhere; consequently, apprehensions remained far below previous levels in the El Paso sector but jumped in New Mexico and Arizona. Similarly, apprehensions in the Imperial Beach sector south of San Diego declined sharply ­after Gatekeeper began, but arrests skyrocketed in the remote parts of eastern San Diego County. ­These enforcement-­induced shifts in the ­human traffic, dispersing the unauthorized migration flow from the traditional urban entry points, created a border version of NIMBY (“not in my back yard”). As crackdowns in one area pushed mi­grants to neighboring areas, officials and residents in ­t hose areas predictably lobbied for more Border Patrol agents and resources. Thus, Operation Safeguard was launched in Nogales, Arizona, in 1995 (and expanded to Douglas and Naco, Arizona, in 1999); Operation Gatekeeper was extended in October 1996 to cover sixty-­six miles; and in January 1997 Operation Hold-­t he-­Line was extended ten miles west into New Mexico. In late August 1997 the INS announced Operation Río Grande in southeast Texas, where it set up floodlights, twenty-­foot-­high watchtowers, video cameras, and high-­powered infrared vision scopes for thirty-­ one miles along the river. As small border towns suddenly became major corridors of illegal crossings, new agents poured in and new fencing proj­ects began. For example, in Douglas, Arizona, a new five-­mile steel fence was built—­backed by a trench originally dug to deter Pancho Villa’s army from crossing into the town during the Mexican Revolution—­and the number of Border Patrol agents increased fivefold between 1994 and 1998.32 Apprehensions in this town of 15,000 residents dramatically increased from 3,000 a month in 1995 to 27,000 in March 1999 alone.33 The mayor of Douglas complained that the stepped-up enforcement was “making our town a militarized zone.”34 Similarly, in the Arizona town of Naco (population 7,000) the Border Patrol detained sixteen hundred unauthorized entrants in 1989. In 1999, apprehensions passed this number by a thousand—in just the first twelve days of February.35

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Mexican towns across the Arizona border boomed as a result of the influx of ­people heading north. The town of Agua Prieta, for example, had six small ­hotels and 60,000 residents in the mid-1990s. By mid-1999 it was reported to have a population of 120,000, sixteen ­hotels, and numerous safe ­houses from which a hundred smugglers operated. Its central plaza had become a waiting place for some three thousand p ­ eople planning to cross the border, and the Border Patrol was returning an average of twenty thousand apprehended Mexicans a month to the city.36 “This people-­smuggling business has surpassed narco-­trafficking ­here,” noted Agua Prieta’s mayor. “And the Border Patrol strategy is the reason.”37 The expanding Border Patrol presence in areas between the ports of entry, meanwhile, sparked a surge in attempted illegal entries through the ports of entry themselves, and the INS responded with an infusion of new port inspectors. Their number r­ ose from 1,117 to 1,865 between FY1994 and 1997, representing a 67 ­percent increase. At some crossing points, such as Calexico and San Ysidro in California, the number of inspectors more than doubled. The vast majority of INS port-­of-­entry inspectors for the entire country w ­ ere now assigned to the southwestern border. The increase in staffing was matched by stiffer penalties: ­t hose who attempted entry using fraudulent documents ­were being prosecuted for repeat violations, and vehicles could also be confiscated. In addition, to inhibit the use of forged documents, officials ­were moving to replace the old border-­ crossing cards with high-­tech visas containing a digital fingerprint. By disrupting the traditional routes and methods of clandestine entry, the ­intensified border control campaign transformed the once relatively s­ imple illegal act of crossing the border into a more complex system of illegal practices. Past forms of unauthorized entry primarily involved e­ ither self-­smuggling or ­limited use of a local “coyote.” With the escalation of border policing, however, the use of a professional smuggler became standard practice. Indeed, as the Border Patrol chief of the San Diego Sector put it, the w ­ hole border-­crossing experience had been transformed into a smuggling game.38 The increased use of smugglers, a 1997 report of the Binational Study on Migration concluded, “helps to explain why most mi­grants attempting unauthorized entry succeed despite significantly more U.S. Border Patrol agents and technology on the border.”39 The study’s surveys found that nearly 75 ­percent of all unauthorized Mexican border crossers w ­ ere now using the ser­v ices of a smuggler. As the demand for smuggling ser­v ices and the risks of crossing the border went up, so did the price of being smuggled. Fees jumped in some places from $250 per person to as much as $1,500.40 Border control officials viewed the increases as a key sign that the deterrence strategy was working. Yet higher prices ­were not necessarily a significant deterrent, given that much or all of the smuggling fee was often covered by relatives and friends already in the United States

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rather than by the immigrants themselves. The main impact of higher fees, it seems, was to enrich increasingly sophisticated and well-­organized binational smuggling groups. Miguel Vallina, the assistant Border Patrol chief in San Diego, pointed out, “The more difficult the crossing, the better the business for the smugglers.”41 INS commissioner Doris Meissner explained in January 1996, “As we improve our enforcement, we increase the smuggling of aliens that occurs, ­because it is harder to cross and so therefore ­people turn more and more to smugglers.”42 But even though Meissner recognized that the Border Patrol had created business for smugglers, she also said that “[we are] moving as aggressively as we can . . . ​so that we can put them [the smugglers] out of business.”43 ­There was a recognition that more enforcement fueled more smuggling but also an assurance that more enforcement would somehow end smuggling. In practice, more enforcement certainly put some smugglers out of business, but this simply created business for their competitors: one smuggler’s loss was another’s gain. Smugglers w ­ ere, at core, travel ser­v ice specialists, even if some ­were abusive. As long as ­t here was a strong demand for smugglers’ services—­ which the tightening of border controls guaranteed—­smuggling would likely persist. The high profits of the business, which had sharply increased since the border crackdown, ensured that t­ here would be smugglers willing to accept the increased occupational risks. Said one smuggler working the border, “Figure it this way. If I work in a factory five days, I make $125 a week. If I take one person across the border, I get $300.”44 A good guide could reportedly make $60,000 per year on the border.45 As border controls improved, so did the skill of smugglers in circumventing them. A se­nior INS official acknowledged, “Alien smugglers have developed a sophisticated infrastructure to successfully counteract U.S. Border Patrol operations.”46 A federal prosecutor agreed that the skill and sophistication of the smugglers had “improved dramatically.”47 The operations that had the greatest transportation and communication capabilities ­were ­those most capable of evading law enforcement’s tightening net. Some smugglers literally went under­ ground, tunneling ­under the border defenses.48 ­Others turned to transporting mi­grants in eighteen-­wheelers that blended in with the boom in cross-­border trucking brought on by the liberalization of trade. Although the Border Patrol interpreted the use of this smuggling method as a sign that law enforcement pressure had forced smugglers to take “desperate mea­sures,” the ability to move one hundred or more mi­g rants across the border in a single truckload reflected a more developed transportation system than in the past. “You c­ an’t search e­ very semi,” one border agent pointed out. “You’d back up the ­whole border, and they [the smugglers] know that.”49 The higher stakes of the migrant-­smuggling game also sparked a technological race. Peter Skerry and Stephen Rockwell noted that

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“as the Border Patrol pours more resources into night-­vision scopes, weight sensors and g­ iant X-­ray machines for seeing into trucks, smuggling rings c­ ounter with their own state-­of-­t he-­a rt equipment paid for by increased [smuggling] fees.”50 Thus, even as the small-­time, freelance entrepreneurs who once dominated the smuggling business along the border ­were being weeded out by intensified enforcement, they ­were being replaced by better or­ga­nized and more skilled groups. One INS intelligence report suggested that many smuggling operations once based in the United States had relocated to the Mexican side of the border to help insulate principal leaders from prosecution.51 A multi-­agency federal task force estimated that ten to twelve family-­based organ­izations dominated the trafficking of mi­grants across the U.S.-­Mexico border.52 An unintended side effect of U.S. efforts to deter the maritime smuggling of Asian mi­grants added to the challenge of dealing with or­ga­nized mi­grant smuggling. The highly vis­i­ble arrival of Chinese smuggling boats such as the Golden Venture in 1993 drew enormous media attention, helping to create an image that the United States was ­under siege and prompting a swift law enforcement crackdown. Smugglers responded by diverting much of the Asian mi­grant traffic to ­alternative routes, one of which was through Mexico.53 Meissner noted, “We’ve ­stopped that illegal boat traffic, but ­there are still a lot of ­people coming from Asia, mainly through Central Amer­i­ca and Mexico.”54 Indeed, a December 1995 federal study estimated that a hundred thousand unauthorized south Asian and Chinese immigrants traveled through Central Amer­i­ca and Mexico annually en route to the United States.55 Such long-­distance smuggling of non-­Mexicans represented only a small percentage of unauthorized migration across the southwestern border, but it was certainly the most lucrative component of the business. In response to tighter controls, the smuggling of mi­grants across the U.S.-­ Mexico border became a more or­ga­nized business, which served to justify still tougher laws and tougher enforcement. The INS had had an antismuggling program since 1978, but smugglers ­were not aggressively targeted along the border ­until the mid-1990s.56 For example, Operation Disruption, launched in May 1995 to detect “drop ­houses” in the San Diego area, produced the arrest of 120 smugglers and the uncovering of 117 drop ­houses.57 The crackdown displaced much of the mi­grant smuggling eastward to the more rural Imperial Valley. The Border Patrol, in turn, responded with a nearly tenfold increase in the number of agents assigned to combat smuggling rings in that area.58 Other federal agencies, such as the FBI, also deployed new agents to the border to combat the increasingly or­ga­nized traffic.59 The number of prosecuted alien-­smuggling cases skyrocketed. In San Diego, the busiest federal court in the country for migrant-­smuggling cases, prosecutions

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r­ose from 33  in 1993 to 233  in 1996.60 Smugglers ­were now being sentenced to years rather than months in prison. Although the sharp growth in the number of arrests and in the severity of penalties failed to curb smuggling, one federal prosecutor explained that the tougher policy was justified b ­ ecause it “sends a serious message” to smugglers and improves officer morale.61 Still, t­ here appeared to be no shortage of smugglers. One official from the Border Patrol’s antismuggling unit noted, they “just get paid more for taking more risks.”62 Consequently, even though arresting more smugglers provided an indicator for officials needing to show pro­gress in controlling the border, it had not necessarily curbed smuggling. As one federal prosecutor explained it, t­ here is a “Vietnam approach” in which pro­gress against smugglers is mea­sured by “body counts.” To justify bud­gets, the “statistics monster must be fed.”63 At the same time, as the risks and penalties increased, so did the smuggler’s willingness to take more extreme mea­sures to evade law enforcement. This partly explained the increase in the number of high-­speed chases and accidents that occurred when smugglers tried to evade highway checkpoints near the border. The heightened stakes also exacerbated the corruption prob­lem within the INS. In 1994 the Dallas Morning News reported that “no agency of the government is more vulnerable to corruption than the INS, where front-­line workers, paid ­little more than the minimum wage, give out green cards and other coveted documents that are worth thousands on the black market.”64 Michael Bromwich, the inspector general of the Department of Justice, noting the doubling of INS personnel along parts of the border since 1993, warned, “Experience in other contexts indicates that massive law enforcement hirings may be accompanied by increased police corruption ­because of the greater susceptibility of new recruits to temptation or b ­ ecause corners may be cut in screening and training the new hires.” Fraud and corruption allegations involving INS employees w ­ ere the single largest component of the caseload of the Office of Inspector General.65 INS port inspectors w ­ ere particularly vulnerable to corruption. They w ­ ere in charge of the thinnest line of the deterrence effort, ­were hired locally (not routinely rotated to other posts along the border), w ­ ere poorly paid, and had l­ittle supervision.66 Moreover, as border controls increased, the incentive also increased for smugglers to offer bribes or buy entry documents from ­t hose d ­ oing the controlling. And as smuggling groups became more sophisticated, or­ga­nized, and profitable—­ given the higher demand and cost for their ser­v ices and the heightened risks involved—­the capacity and means to corrupt also grew. Bribing corrupt officials was like paying an entry fee—­and the incentives both to pay and to collect the fee increased as traditional methods of entry became more difficult and risky.

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The Nonescalation of Workplace Enforcement The escalation of U.S. immigration control was highly selective. Noticeably downplayed in the rush to secure the border was the fact that some 40–50 ­percent of all unauthorized immigrants in the United States entered the country legally (perhaps as tourists or students) and then simply overstayed their visas. Each year roughly 150,000 of the p ­ eople who had entered the United States that year stayed on to live illegally in the country. The neglect of visa overstays was itself a revealing indicator of how the symbolic importance of border enforcement had overshadowed the stated policy goal of reducing the size of the unauthorized immigrant population. At the same time as Congress had pushed for an unpre­ce­ dented increase in the size of the Border Patrol, l­ ittle had been done to track down the holders of expired visas. Similarly, while border enforcement had escalated, ­t here had been a noticeable nonescalation in the enforcement of employer sanctions and workplace standards to deter the hiring of unauthorized immigrant ­labor. The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform noted in a staff report that, “By one mea­sure, Operation Gatekeeper appears to have had l­ittle effect—­t he availability of workers in industries that are dependent on illegal alien ­labor.”67 In some industries, in fact, that reliance actually increased as border controls tightened. For example, the percentage of unauthorized workers in California’s agricultural industry ­rose from less than 10 ­percent in 1990 to as high as 40 ­percent in 1997. At the same time, the Border Patrol was turning its attention away from California’s agricultural fields and ­toward the border: while more than two thousand agents covered the San Diego sector of the border, the number of agents north of Los Angeles had fallen from 65 to 22 in just a few years.68 The president’s 1994 report on immigration stated, “Every­one agrees that the primary incentive for illegal immigration is employment. Workplace enforcement of ­labor standards and employer sanctions are the instruments for reducing that incentive.”69 Yet only about 2 ­percent of the INS bud­get was devoted to enforcing employer sanctions. When asked at a news conference why the lion’s share of spending went to border enforcement rather than focusing on the job magnet, Commissioner Meissner simply responded, “We have always argued that the centerpiece of effective enforcement must be the border, and that it must be backed up with employer enforcement.”70 In 1998, INS workplace investigations targeted perhaps 3  ­percent of the nation’s employers of unauthorized ­foreign workers, and most of ­t hose investigations did not result in penalties. Tellingly, the INS did not request more inspectors to enforce employer sanctions

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in its FY1999 bud­get, and the 130 inspectors it had requested in the FY1998 bud­ get proposal ­were not funded by Congress.71 ­There ­were only about seventeen hundred INS investigators assigned to cover the interior of the country in 1997, and less than a fifth of their time was devoted to worksite enforcement.72 Thus, what John Shaw, the assistant INS commissioner for investigations, observed in 1993 was even more true by the end of the de­cade: “­There are 7.2 million employers out t­ here. In their lifetime, t­ hey’re never g­ oing to see an immigration officer u ­ nless they stand up and scream that 73 ­t hey’ve got a factory full of illegal aliens.” For example, t­ here w ­ ere only about six thousand INS investigations of employers for immigration violations in FY1995, a drop from almost fifteen thousand in FY1989. The number of fines against employers for hiring unauthorized immigrants fell from two thousand in FY1992 to 888 in FY1997, and the total amount of the fines dropped from $17 million to $8 million.74 Moreover, the INS generally settled cases for less than half the amount of the original fine. In short, the employer sanctions established by IRCA in 1986 ­were notoriously weak and minimally enforced. B ­ ecause employers w ­ ere not required to verify the authenticity of documents, they risked ­little by hiring unauthorized immigrants—so long as they could pre­sent some form of documentation; the consequence was an expansive business in phony documents. According to Richard Rogers, head of the INS in Los Angeles, “You can buy a packet with a Social Security card and [green card] right now on the street for about $50 or $75, one sufficient for an employer to use as verification.”75 The lack of attention to the workplace was a striking example of the enormous gap between expert opinion and policy practice. For example, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform concluded in a September 1994 report that “reducing the employment magnet is the linchpin of a comprehensive strategy to reduce illegal immigration.”76 The commission proposed a national computer registry of the names and social security numbers of ­people authorized to work in the country, and pi­lot proj­ects to use the registry in select states. Employers would be required to call a central number to check that the social security numbers of their workers w ­ ere valid and issued to individuals authorized to work. Nevertheless, the sweeping immigration law passed by Congress in 1996 reaffirmed the policy focus on the border. The final legislation gutted the proposal for a mandatory verification system, opting instead for a l­imited “voluntary” pi­ lot proj­ect, and rejected requirements for tamperproof birth certificates and driver’s licenses.77 Moreover, although an e­ arlier version of the proposed legislation called for an increase in the number of L ­ abor Department inspectors to enforce wage-­and-­hour laws and an increase in the penalties for employers who

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repeatedly hire unauthorized immigrant workers, ­these provisions ­were deleted in the final bill.78 Thus, Congress, the most enthusiastic proponent of tough border controls, at the same time blocked efforts to enhance worksite enforcement. The INS commissioner commented, “Being effective means making it hard for an illegal immigrant to get employment. Yet with this Congress, it’s been an uphill b ­ attle to get resources for employer enforcement.”79 The lack of meaningful workplace controls helped to fuel more border controls. Inhibited from seriously targeting the workplace, politicians had to rely on touting their support for border control to demonstrate their resolve in fighting unauthorized immigration. Moreover, lax workplace controls ensured that high levels of unauthorized immigration would persist, creating more work for the Border Patrol. And this, in turn, provided a rationale for more agents and resources. The INS remained ­under an intense congressional spotlight—­not b ­ ecause of its beefed-up border controls or its neglect of workplace controls but instead ­because it was not d ­ oing even more to police the border. Evaluations in congressional hearings tended to be narrowly focused on operational concerns—­ equipment and technology needs, agency coordination, hiring levels, and strategy implementation. The unquestioned assumption seemed to be that the obstacle to effective deterrence was technical rather than any fundamental flaw in the control strategy itself. Being pushed hard by Congress, however, is what had made the INS grow so impressively. The INS’s adversarial relationship with Congress, in other words, was also symbiotic: the INS had been an easy target for politicians, but po­liti­cal attention had brought with it an unpre­ce­dented increase in enforcement resources.80 Even as INS officials admitted that the border-­ focused control strategy could have only a ­limited deterrent effect as long as workplace enforcement remained anemic—­and complained about the reluctance of Congress to strengthen it—­they nevertheless welcomed the new po­liti­cal commitment to beefing up border controls.81

The Contradictions of Economic Integration It became an increasingly awkward prob­lem for U.S. officials that even with the strong domestic po­liti­cal imperative to control the border more effectively, enforcement had become more difficult in the broader context of economic integration and market reform—­which, in turn, further reinforced the push to improve border controls. According to the INS, “The Administration’s goal is

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unambiguous: a border that deters illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling and facilitates l­ egal immigration and commerce.”82 But this was much easier said than done. The president’s 1994 report on immigration frankly acknowledged that “efforts to facilitate travel across the U.S.-­Mexico border as part of the North American F ­ ree Trade Agreement may conflict with the need to establish closer controls on cross-­border traffic to enforce immigration laws.”83 The tension between facilitation and enforcement played out on a daily basis at border ports of entry. At San Ysidro, the busiest land-­border crossing point in the world, “inspectors are frustrated that they must often choose between a thorough inspection which slows traffic or an expedited one that keeps traffic moving,” according to the U.S. Commission for Immigration Reform.84 Operation Gatekeeper only added to the frustration, sparking a 40 ­percent rise in the use of fraudulent documents. The policy response was a mixture of tougher penalties, a sharp increase in the number of port inspectors, and the testing of more technologically sophisticated traffic management procedures such as automated vehicle license-­plate readers and a system that used palm prints and fingerprints to verify the identity of individuals and reduce pro­cessing time. Innovations in traffic management, however, did ­little to tame the economic forces that helped to maintain high levels of unauthorized immigration. Market integration and Mexico’s own internal economic reforms, at least in the short and medium terms, added to the incentives for Mexican workers to seek employment in the United States. Robert Bach explained, before he became a se­ nior INS official (and a key proponent of border enforcement), “Increased market integration means the sending country’s loss of control over its own ­labor supply. Although po­liti­cal tensions may increase . . . ​the demand for l­ abor inside the United States w ­ ill continue to dominate attempts to regulate the flow of immigrant workers.”85 In addition, the Mexican government’s strategy to restructure Mexico’s economy was a labor-­shedding pro­cess. Wayne Cornelius pointed out that “even with a booming export sector,” Mexico’s neoliberal economic development model “has much less capacity to create employment than the old import-­substituting industrialization model that it replaced. Indeed, the new model’s goals of efficiency and global competitiveness are inversely related to job creation.”86 On the eve of the NAFTA vote, Attorney General Janet Reno argued that the passage of the trade accord would “help me protect our borders.”87 She even warned that if NAFTA failed, “effective immigration control [would] become impossible.”88 Without NAFTA, she said, unauthorized immigration was “only ­going to get worse. I ­don’t have the numbers, but ­every bit of logic . . . ​would confirm it.”89 On the Mexican side, President Carlos Salinas promised that the passage of NAFTA would help Mexico export tomatoes rather than tomato pickers.

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The aggressive po­liti­cal campaign to sell NAFTA, however, con­ve­niently glossed over what Douglas Massey and Kristin Espinosa found obvious: The provisions of NAFTA . . . ​[­w ill] help to bring about the social and economic transformations that generate mi­grants. The integration of the North American market w ­ ill also create new links of transportation, telecommunication, and interpersonal acquaintance, connections that are necessary for the efficient movement of goods, information, and capital, but which also encourage and promote the movement of ­people—­students, business executives, tourists, and, ultimately, undocumented workers.90 Although many immigration specialists predicted that NAFTA (along with slowing birthrates in Mexico) would in the long term help to reduce cross-­border ­labor flows, in the short and medium terms the liberalization of trade actually helped to promote them.91 NAFTA, it should be emphasized, was only one component of a much broader pro­cess of economic restructuring in Mexico that helped stimulate unauthorized immigration.92 Particularly impor­tant was the liberalization of agriculture. Luis Téllez, the former undersecretary for planning in Mexico’s Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources, estimated that as many as fifteen million peasants would be leaving agriculture in the next de­cade or two.93 Crossing the border in search of other work would no doubt be the most logical option for some. In Mexico, massive reductions in state assistance in rural areas was creating incentives to migrate.94 Since the late 1980s the Mexican government had been cutting back subsidies to peasant farmers for electricity, fertilizer, w ­ ater, and credit; slashing price supports for many crops; and eliminating prohibitions on the sale of communal farm lands (about 70 ­percent of Mexico’s cropland and half of its irrigated land). The government’s income subsidy program, initiated in late 1993 for producers of corn and other basic crops, was a poor substitute for the kind of public investment—­affordable credit, crop insurance, infrastructural improvements such as irrigation and drainage—­needed to modernize Mexican agriculture and make small-­scale farming truly v­ iable.95 Adding to the exit incentive was the collapse of the peso in December 1994, which plunged Mexico into the most severe recession in over half a c­ entury. The devaluation of the peso further widened the U.S.-­Mexico wage gap, increasing the incentive to earn dollar wages in the United States. In 1995 about 10 ­percent of jobs in Mexico’s formal sector ­were lost. The private sector responded to the crisis by cutting jobs and lowering wages, and the subsequent economic recovery was not followed by substantial gains in wages or employment. Meanwhile,

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a healthy U.S. economy remained a power­f ul magnet for low-­skilled mi­g rant ­labor. Thus, even if left politely unmentioned in the official policy debate, unauthorized immigration had become an integral dimension of U.S.-­Mexican economic interdependence. Mexico had become dependent on exporting part of its unemployment prob­lem (which in turn generated an estimated $6 billion in annual remittances from Mexican mi­grants), and many U.S. employers had become dependent on the cheap l­abor provided by Mexican workers.96 And this mutual dependence, far from being reversed, had only been reinforced by the state-­ promoted pro­cess of economic restructuring and market liberalization. This was the less celebrated, clandestine side of U.S.-­Mexico economic integration.

The New Image of Order on the Border Even in the face of t­ hese economic realities, U.S. officials repeatedly praised the results of their border campaign to deter unauthorized immigration. In January 1996, in his State of the Union address, President Clinton highlighted his border enforcement rec­ord: “­After years and years of neglect, this administration has taken on a strong stand to stiffen protection on our borders.” ­Later that year the INS claimed that “the border is harder to cross now than at any time in history.”97 Doris Meissner boasted that the border strategy was “showing dramatic success.”98 Gus de la Viña, the chief of the Border Patrol, told a Senate committee in April 1999, “We have achieved more in the past five years than had been accomplished in de­cades.”99 Evaluations on the ground ­were equally celebratory. Commenting on the results of Operation Gatekeeper, Johnny Williams, chief for the San Diego sector, boasted that it was “prob­ably the single largest accomplishment in the Border Patrol’s history.”100 Alan Bersin, who u ­ ntil mid-1998 was the attorney general’s point person on the southwestern border, asserted that “for the first time in our history, we are moving decisively ­toward a border that functions effectively; one that is a lawful and orderly gateway; one that manages significantly better the prob­lems of illegal immigration and smuggling; and one that promises and routinely delivers handsome dividends from an investment in regional integration.”101 Most revealing about official statements, pro­gress reports, and press releases from this time is what was not said: no claim was made, no evidence was presented, that overall levels of unauthorized immigration had actually declined as a result of tighter border controls. Indeed, the INS did l­ ittle to formally evaluate the effectiveness of border deterrence. The GAO, in its 1997 assessment of the U.S. border control strategy, concluded that the INS lacked a formal pro­cess

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to systematically and comprehensively determine the strategy’s effectiveness. Although the INS stated that “the overarching goal of the strategy is to make it so difficult and so costly to enter this country illegally that fewer individuals even try,” the GAO found that the INS and Justice Department had “no plans” for direct examination of the deterrent effect.102 ­There was no indication that large numbers of would-be border crossers ­were giving up in the face of tighter controls—­and ­t here was ­little reason to believe they would do so anytime soon.103 Although “­there is evidence the flows are shifting,” one GAO official explained, “what we are not seeing is ­people being discouraged from even trying.”104 Most mi­g rants simply kept trying (sometimes being apprehended more than once in the same day) ­until they eventually made it across the line. Despite official threats of criminal prosecution for repeat crossings, l­imited detention space meant that relatively few repeat offenders ­were ever prosecuted. As the Border Patrol’s San Diego chief candidly acknowledged, “When they run, we grab as many as we can. We take them back to the border and they try again. Eventually, most of them get through.”105 Even in the face of the massive border buildup, the number of unauthorized immigrants in the country was growing by an estimated 275,000 per year. By 1999 approximately six million unauthorized immigrants ­were living in the United States.106 Judged purely on its instrumental deterrent effect, then, the border control strategy’s po­liti­cal popularity was puzzling. But a failing policy could still succeed po­liti­cally. In this case, the border appeared more orderly ­because much greater control had in fact been imposed at the urban crossing points most vis­i­ble to the media and the public. As the Border Patrol put it, “The daily chaos which reigned along the San Diego border has, at long last, been replaced by scenes of control and order.”107 Gone ­were the images of the “Banzai runs” that helped reelect Pete Wilson and fanned the flames of the anti-­immigrant backlash in California. In just a few years, a power­ful image of control had been successfully projected through a high-­profile deployment of enforcement resources and personnel along what ­were once highly contested sections of the border. In truth, however, unauthorized crossings ­were much less vis­i­ble ­because they ­were more dispersed, more remote, and more hidden. “Sealing the border is an impossible mission,” one researcher from the University of Texas at El Paso noted. “Chief Reyes [the El Paso sector Border Patrol chief who launched Operation Hold-­the-­ Line] has compromised by making the prob­lem invisible. In that sense, he’s been successful.”108 The new image of order was powerfully captured by two of the Border Patrol’s public relations videos. The first, titled Border ­under Siege, was made in 1992. The narrator describes the border as “less a boundary than a backdoor.” The second video, less dramatically titled Challenge on the Border, was produced

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in 1996 and proj­ects an entirely dif­fer­ent message. The first video depicts the border as being overwhelmed by clandestine crossers; the second video is largely self-­congratulatory, applauding the Border Patrol for fi­nally securing the border so that it “is no longer an open backdoor.” But, the border had many back doors. Closing some of them had moved, not removed, the clandestine population flow. In the case of Operation Gatekeeper, “the game is to try and focus as much attention as pos­si­ble on one small piece of real estate,” explained T. J. Bonner, the president of the National Border Patrol Council. “You then hope every­one ignores the fact that ­we’re being totally overrun in the rest of the sector.” The truth, Bonner said, was that “it’s bursting out all over—­Arizona, New Mexico, parts of Texas. I ­don’t see how that translates into success.”109 From the po­liti­cal perspective of t­ hose charged with the task of border management, however, the way the media and the public see the border was more impor­tant than ­actual deterrence. Pushing much of the migration flow out of sight also helped push it out of the public’s mind, and media coverage reinforced the new look of order. “Canyons once crowded with illegal crossers,” glowed the Los Angeles Times in 1998, “are empty of all but sturdy new fences and the ­border agents who have poured into the region by the hundreds. Mi­grants no longer sprint en masse through the San Ysidro port of entry onto freeways.”110 Ironically, some of the most perverse and counterproductive effects of the border deterrence effort actually contributed to making the border appear more orderly and secure. For example, the tightening of controls encouraged unauthorized mi­grants to cross the border fewer times but, once across, to stay longer in the United States. The traditional pattern was that most Mexicans who entered illegally did not stay but went back and forth in what amounted to cross-­ border commuting. The increased risk and cost of crossing the border, however, also increased the incentive for many unauthorized immigrants to extend their stay or perhaps even to s­ ettle down permanently. In short, the more difficult and costly the commute, the greater the incentive to relocate closer to the workplace—­a trend confirmed in a number of empirical studies.111 If the goal of deterrence was to reduce the size of the unauthorized immigrant population in the United States, this outcome was an indicator of not only a failed but a counterproductive policy.112 Yet by contributing to the policy goal of reducing the number of illegal border crossings, it enhanced the appearance of order. When a 1997 Urban Institute study found that unauthorized immigrants in California ­were remaining in the state for longer periods of time due to tighter border controls, the INS responded, “This is another sign that our efforts to control the border are working.”113

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The power­ful image effect and symbolic appeal of enhanced border policing had not only overshadowed its failings and flaws but made it rewarding for its architects. For the INS, the border campaign brought with it unpre­ce­dented orga­nizational growth and po­liti­cal commitment to a long-­neglected and much-­ maligned agency. For elected leaders, it won votes, provided a po­liti­cally costless method of signaling that they ­were “tough” on unauthorized immigration, and helped inoculate Demo­crats against Republican attacks that they ­were “soft on illegals.” As stated in the 1996 Demo­cratic Party platform: “For years before Bill Clinton became President, Washington talked tough but failed to act. In 1992, our borders might as well not have existed. The border was under-­patrolled, and what patrols ­there w ­ ere, w ­ ere under-­equipped.” The platform credited Clinton for reversing this history of neglect: “President Clinton is making our border a place where the law is respected and drugs and illegal immigrants are turned away.”114 In the 1996 presidential race, beefed-up border controls provided Clinton with a power­ful po­liti­cal shield against Republican attack, especially in the po­liti­cally vital state of California. In June a Republican National Committee tele­v i­sion ad highlighted a border entry point marked “Mexico” and then showed what ­were presumably unauthorized immigrants r­ unning across the line in the glare of spotlights. “­Under President Clinton,” it declared, “spending on illegals has gone up, while wages for the typical worker have gone down.” The Demo­cratic National Committee quickly counterattacked with an ad showing what ­were presumably unauthorized immigrants being handcuffed. The ad emphasized that Clinton had massively beefed up the size of the Border Patrol and displayed scenes from the Republican ad with the word WRONG stamped in red letters.115 Both of ­t hese tele­v i­sion campaign advertisements ­were run most often in California, where anxiety over unauthorized immigration had been highest. Clinton handily won the war of images: in the November election he not only took California as a w ­ hole but prevailed even in the conservative stronghold of Orange County—­t he birthplace of Proposition 187. In other words, the images of a chaotic border that w ­ ere so masterfully exploited by Governor Wilson in 1994 ­were unavailable for Bob Dole in 1996. The administration’s border control offensive had successfully erased them. In his autobiographical account of his experience as l­abor secretary during the first Clinton administration, Robert Reich recalled that one week before the November 1996 elections, Mark Penn, a chief pollster for the campaign, gave a pre­sen­ta­tion at the White House in which he explained how Clinton had gone from trailing the Republican candidate by ten points to leading by twenty points: he did so “by coopting the Republicans on all their issues—­getting tough on welfare, tough on crime, balancing the bud­get, and cracking down on illegal

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immigration.”116 Penn then showed videotapes of campaign advertisements that emphasized ­t hese themes. Given this account, it should not be surprising that Clinton was accused of taking credit for Republican initiatives. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-­Calif.) complained, “I build fences and put Border Patrol in the bud­get and they [Clinton officials] do all the press conferences.”117

High-­profile immigration control initiatives such as Operations Hold-­the-­ Line and Gatekeeper transformed the landscape of the southwestern border. This meant not necessarily a reduction in unauthorized immigration but rather a reinvention of the image of the border. The border control offensive was not only the latest move in an endless game of cat and mouse; it reflected a fundamental change in the rules of the game itself. The most vis­i­ble form of clandestine entry—­groups of unauthorized mi­grants openly crossing the border near urban areas—­was no longer po­liti­cally tolerable. Thus, for the border crossers, evading apprehension had become a longer and more complex game requiring greater risk, patience, and stealth. With per­sis­tence, mi­grants would eventually make it across the line, but in a less vis­i­ble—­a nd thus less po­liti­ cally embarrassing—­manner than before. In other words, the old game between border enforcers and clandestine border crossers persisted, but the game strategy of the enforcers had changed to maximize the appearance of control. For border enforcers, projecting a “winning image” seemed to provide a po­liti­cally v­ iable alternative to actually winning the game. That image came at an enormous cost: more intensive border policing brought with it more (and more or­ga­nized) professional smuggling, greater corruption, and many more border deaths.118 But at least for the time being, ­t hese negative consequences ­were obscured by the power­f ul po­liti­cal and symbolic appeal of a border that appeared more orderly and secure. At the same time, however, it should be emphasized that the deterrence effort created the conditions for its own expansion, since the shifts in the methods and location of illegal border crossings placed new demands on the law enforcement system to adjust and keep up. Indeed, as envisioned by the Border Patrol, this was just the beginning of a long-­ term buildup.119 Operation Gatekeeper, the San Diego sector chief explained, was a “demonstration proj­ect.” The assumption was that once it was shown that the most contested piece of the border could be significantly controlled with an infusion of resources, a similar show of force would work elsewhere. One agent put it, “We are taking back the border, piece by piece.”120

5 ESCALATION IN A NEW SECURITY LANDSCAPE

It has become a cliché that every­t hing changed ­after September 11. Much did indeed change, but in the realm of border enforcement, much of what at first glance appeared to be new was actually an acceleration and extension of prior initiatives. This included a continued overwhelming focus of resources on the U.S.-­Mexico borderline and a relabeling of old ideas and plans as new counterterrorism tools. The issues of migration and terrorism became linked more than ever, further securitizing both the debate over migration and the practice of managing migration. It was still the same old border game—­but it was now more difficult to manage, with more players, played out on a bigger stage, and with higher stakes.1 And the game would also become even more dangerous and militarized, especially on the Mexican side of the line. U.S. border agents continued to spend most of their time on the ground policing the clandestine cross-­border flow of drugs and mi­grants at the southern border, even as the new security environment required new attention to the northern border and public pronouncements that fighting terrorism was now the number-­one priority. In this regard, rather than prompting a radical departure from the past, the September 11 attacks provided a po­liti­cal and bureaucratic win­dow of opportunity to sustain, deepen, and geo­g raph­i­cally expand prior border-­policing initiatives. This involved both a traditional hardening of border controls by building more physical barriers and hiring new border agents, and a “thickening” of controls by projecting more policing and surveillance activities beyond borderlines.2

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The Border Aftershocks of September 11 The most impor­tant “border control” failures in the case of the September 11 terrorist attacks w ­ ere actually the visas issued to the hijackers by the consulate offices overseas and the poorly secured doors between the passenger cabin and the cockpit in each of the hijacked planes. Nevertheless, the immediate U.S. response included a dramatic crackdown on border ports of entry and a toughening of the policy discourse about border security. U.S. border inspectors ­were put on a level-­one alert, defined as a “sustained, intensive, antiterrorism operation.” Border ports of entry w ­ ere immediately plagued by massive traffic jams and long delays; cross-­border traffic slowed to a trickle. In the days a­ fter the terrorist attacks, politicians from across the po­liti­cal spectrum rushed to pledge their commitment to strengthen border security. Agencies tasked with the job of border control declared that counterterrorism was now their priority mission. For U.S. border enforcers, however, the expectation of success in the suddenly prioritized counterterrorism campaign was much higher than in the cases of drug and immigration control—­indeed, the border deterrence level was expected to be 100 ­percent. The task was also more difficult: if the existing border enforcement apparatus had proved unable to stop multi-­ton shipments of drugs and hundreds of thousands of crossings by unauthorized mi­grants each year, the chances of deterring a few bombs or a handful of terrorists seemed even more remote. Moreover, the handy vis­i­ble indicators of pro­gress traditionally used for border enforcement work—­large numbers of apprehensions, arrests, confiscations, seizures, and so on—­were not applicable. Counterterrorism “successes” w ­ ere by their nature less frequent, less vis­i­ble, and more secretive. With the elevated focus on counterterrorism, border enforcers ­were given a harder job, faced higher expectations of success, and could not rely on the same old con­ve­nient mea­sures of effectiveness. ­Under extreme po­liti­cal scrutiny and public pressure, U.S. border strategists scrambled to adapt the old drug and immigration control infrastructure to the new counterterrorism effort. It was an awkward fit, and the retooling pro­cess was cumbersome. The INS enforcement apparatus, for instance, was built to h ­ andle millions of mi­grant workers entering the country in search of employment rather than to detect and deter a few determined individuals arriving to commit terrorist acts. Similarly, the U.S. Customs Ser­vice border enforcement operations had ­until September 2001 been focused on drug control. Th ­ ese already overstretched agencies ­were now expected to reinvent themselves to play a frontline role against terrorism. The new security worry was that the same groups, methods, and routes long used to smuggle mi­grants and drugs into the country would now be used to smuggle in terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. But while t­ hese agencies

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faced greater po­liti­cal pressure and higher public expectations for success, they ­were at the same time showered with new resources—­the fiscal year 2003 bud­get provided an increase of more than $2  billion for border security, including a 29 ­percent increase in the bud­get of the INS and a 36 ­percent increase in the inspections bud­get of the Customs Ser­vice. A more profound change was the consolidation of vari­ous agencies u ­ nder a new cabinet-­level Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—­the largest reor­ga­ ni­za­tion of the federal government in half a c­entury. The once obscure term “homeland security” became part of the everyday security discourse. The new department was created to bring together parts of many existing agencies and departments, including the Coast Guard, Customs Ser­vice, and INS. A core objective of the consolidation effort was to provide “one face at the border,” replacing the previously more fragmented profile. This reor­ga­ni­za­tion reflected the growing prominence of law enforcement and border controls in national security. DHS began operating in 2003 with a bud­get of $37 billion and more than 170,000 employees. Although the terrorist bombings on September 11 took place thousands of miles away, the shockwaves ­were immediately felt along the U.S.-­Mexico line. Ports of entry ­were virtually shut down, squeezing the arteries that provided the lifeblood to the border economies and the larger U.S.-­Mexico economic integration pro­cess. In Laredo, Texas, for instance, during peak crossing times before the attacks, it took a pedestrian about five minutes to cross a bridge checkpoint and a motorist half an hour. Immediately ­after the attacks, the wait increased up to five hours. Retail sales in U.S. border cities plummeted as Mexican shoppers stayed south of the border. Mexican border towns w ­ ere similarly shaken by the decline in U.S. visitors. This was not the first time the United States had put a sudden squeeze on the border ports of entry. More than three de­cades e­ arlier, Operation Intercept had virtually closed the border to pressure Mexico to do more against drug trafficking. This time, however, the crackdown took place in the context of much greater economic interdependence and integration. Even though the intensity of the border enforcement squeeze was temporary, the new security context introduced added anx­i­eties whose chilling effect on the border was longer-­lasting. The virtual closing of the border signaled that security could trump trade. Before September 11, it was the reverse: despite more intensive and more high-­profile border control campaigns in the de­cade before the attacks, trade still trumped security. The U.S. border-­control crackdown on September 11 starkly illustrated the high price of asymmetric interdependence for Mexico. During the previous de­cade, Mexico had become far more dependent than the United States on an open economic border and therefore far more vulnerable to security-­related border

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closings. Reflecting this real­ity, almost 90 ­percent of Mexican trade went to the United States, but only 15 ­percent of U.S. trade went to Mexico. Partly to ensure that the border with the United States would remain open ­after September 11, the Mexican government moved to signal that it was taking counterterrorism more seriously. Mexican officials detained hundreds of p ­ eople of M ­ iddle Eastern origin, restricted the entry of citizens from a number of Central Asian and M ­ iddle Eastern countries, provided U.S. authorities with intelligence information on pos­si­ble suspects based in Mexico, and targeted bank accounts of suspected terrorists. The Mexican government also announced the creation of a national immigration database and installed false-­document detectors at southern border checkpoints. In early 2002 it announced plans to deploy X-­ray machines at southern and northern border crossings. Th ­ ese security mea­sures helped thicken U.S. border controls, with Mexico turning into a buffer zone. For Mexico, the new politics of counterterrorism cooperation had in some re­spects come to resemble the older and more familiar politics of counternarcotics cooperation. As had long been the case in the “war on drugs,” Mexico would now also be expected to demonstrate its resolve and cooperation in meeting U.S. “war on terror” objectives. Although not uncontroversial in Mexican domestic politics, the new antiterrorism mission provided a less diplomatically sensitive impetus for cross-­border security cooperation than had been the case with drug control. It also provided a more po­liti­cally palatable rationale for Mexico to cooperate on immigration control—as long as the targets ­were non-­ Mexican nationals. Mexican officials ­were careful to characterize terrorism as a mutual security concern and, in a sharp departure from past official rhe­toric, even talked about security as an “interdependent ­matter.” In the post–­September 11 era, the border policy agenda became even more driven by U.S. worries and anx­i­eties, irrespective of Mexican priorities and concerns. This had troubling implications for Mexico, most notably a hardening of the U.S. immigration policy debate as immigration ­matters came to be viewed through the prism of national security. In the months before the terrorist attacks, Mexico had high hopes of reaching a migration deal with the United States, but such hopes w ­ ere dashed on September 11 as Washington’s attention suddenly shifted. Not only had immigration policy reform stalled and been placed on the back burner, but the prior escalation of U.S. immigration control efforts along the border intensified. This escalation included a continuation of the Border Patrol hiring boom that started in the 1990s. The force had already doubled in size in the 1990s, but then doubled again by 2010—­totaling nearly twenty thousand

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agents and making it the fastest-­growing federal job.3 At the same time, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), tasked with enforcing federal border control, customs, trade, and immigration laws, similarly grew to a force of some twenty thousand employees worldwide, many of them concentrated at or near the border. The ongoing border-­policing buildup targeting unauthorized migration also included building hundreds of miles of new border fencing, some of it double fencing, mandated by the 2006 Secure Fence Act—­a dramatic expansion of the new fencing proj­ects started in the early 1990s.4 Although Congress was unable to achieve consensus when it came to immigration reform legislation, the one ­t hing it was in agreement about was the need for more border fencing. President George W. Bush signed the bill, which enjoyed overwhelming bipartisan support, right before the November 2006 midterm elections. “Unfortunately, the United States has not been in complete control of its border for de­cades and, therefore, illegal immigration has been on the rise,” he stated. “We have a responsibility to enforce our laws. We have a responsibility to secure our borders. We take this responsibility seriously.”5 Left unstated, of course, was that the country had never actually had complete control of its borders, and it likely never would. Over six hundred miles of new fencing was completed by the end of the de­ cade. Much of the fencing was backed up by new stadium lighting, surveillance cameras, and sensors. The most imposing and formidable-­looking new fencing was mostly erected in highly vis­i­ble urban areas; ­t here was minimal or no fencing along vast stretches of much less vis­i­ble parts of the border. As was true of the e­ arlier fencing proj­ects in the 1990s, the main effect of the newly built barriers was to channel mi­grants into more remote and dangerous terrain away from the public eye, with lethal consequences for many crossers.6 And, as in the past, this channeling would make mi­grants even more reliant on smugglers to guide them across the border. The narrow focus on the borderline as the source of (and solution to) unauthorized immigration was exemplified by the highly controversial Minuteman Proj­ect, a militia-­style border-­monitoring effort launched in early 2005 that involved armed civilians taking up patrol positions along the Arizona-­Mexico border. This initiative—­essentially a border publicity stunt designed to embarrass the federal government into stepping up enforcement—­was actually a variation of an old strategy. Recall the “light up the border” campaign of the early 1990s, when local anti-­immigration activists drove south of San Diego and shined their headlights on the borderline to draw attention to illegal crossings and provoke a reaction from the federal government. The infusion of border-­control resources in the

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years a­ fter “light up the border” forced mi­grants and smugglers to shift their entry efforts eastward to the Arizona-­Mexico border, which would become the focus of the Minuteman Proj­ect. This time, the initiative would draw recruits from across the country, aided by the use of the Internet and national media coverage. The post–­September 11 security climate also enabled a militarization of immigration control along the border via the larger mission and mandate of “homeland security.” In the past, military units operating on the border ­were formally ­limited to assisting antidrug work: “It had to have a counterdrug nexus,” noted a spokesperson for Joint Task Force North (which replaced Joint Task Force Six in September 2004). “Now our mission is a major supporter of homeland security.” The new expanded mission was to support federal law enforcement agencies in the “interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to the United States,” which could include targeting unauthorized immigration.7 Although a further militarization of border control was partly inhibited by the large-­scale deployment of military forces to Iraq and elsewhere, some aspects of border policing provided training in desert warfare. For example, in early 2005 an Alaska-­based Stryker unit (designed to roll out quickly on eight-­wheeled armored vehicles using surveillance and reconnaissance to generate information) on its way to Iraq spent sixty days in the New Mexico desert working with the Border Patrol and was reportedly responsible for the Border Patrol’s apprehension of twenty-­five hundred unauthorized immigrants.8 The following year the Bush administration announced the deployment of six thousand National Guard troops to the border to assist the Border Patrol with immigration enforcement-­related tasks for a two-­year period as part of Operation Bootstrap (with the number of troops scaled back to three thousand for the second year). Though not allowed to make arrests—­the troops provided support activities such as intelligence gathering and training—in sheer size the force was the largest military deployment to the border since the Mexican Revolution. Major military contractors, such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumman, w ­ ere also recruited to play a larger role in border control—­using, as one press report put it, “some of the same high-­priced, high-­tech tools t­ hese companies have already put to work in Iraq and Af­ghan­i­stan.”9 U.S. border officials turned to military contractors not only for their latest high-­tech gadgets but also for help devising new strategies that connect physical barriers, technology, and manpower. “This is an unusual invitation,” the deputy secretary of homeland security, Michael Jackson, told military contractors at a 2006 industry event before the contract bidding pro­cess. “­We’re asking you to come back and tell us how to do our business.”10 Reflecting the growing faith in high-­tech solutions, in 2004 the Border Patrol began to use unmanned aerial vehicles, the first civilian law enforcement

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agency in the world to do so. In September 2005 border officials in Arizona unveiled a new unmanned aerial surveillance system based on the satellite-­controlled Predator-­B spy drone used for military operations in the ­Middle East and elsewhere.11 By the end of the de­cade the Department of Homeland Security, which already operated hundreds of manned aircraft—­the largest nonmilitary air force in the world—­a lso had along the border a small fleet of Predator drones, at a cost of approximately $12,255 per flight hour. President Obama, who largely continued the Bush administration’s post–­ September 11 enforcement policies, boasted about the border buildup at a 2010 press conference: “We have more of every­thing: ICE, Border Patrol, surveillance, you name it. So we take border security seriously.”12 But it was still not serious enough for Obama’s critics. “You know, they said we needed to t­ riple the Border Patrol. Or now t­ hey’re ­going to say we need to qua­dru­ple the Border Patrol,” the president said in 2011 of t­ hose who criticized him for not being even tougher on border security. “Or t­ hey’ll want a higher fence. Maybe t­ hey’ll need a moat. Maybe they want alligators in the moat. Th ­ ey’ll never be satisfied. And I under13 stand that. That’s politics.” But beyond the po­liti­cal theater that Obama was keenly aware of, it was not at all clear what the a­ ctual deterrent effect of all this border enforcement activity was. Many determined mi­grants and their smuggler guides continued to be redirected rather than deterred by the new border barriers.14 This included more “express ser­vice” of mi­grants through ports of entry (hidden in vehicles or through fraudulent use of documents, or simply paying compromised inspectors to look the other way) rather than braving the harsh desert and mountain terrain. ­There was also a surge in the landing of mi­grants on California beaches by speedboat and other low-­profile, radar-­evading marine craft. Smugglers charged a premium for t­ hese faster and more con­ve­nient modes of clandestine entry.15 The continued escalation of enforcement certainly made the border more challenging and dangerous to cross, with hundreds of mi­grants ­dying each year in remote and hostile terrain. Indeed, the border was harder to cross than ever before in the nation’s history. Immigration laws ­were toughened and more stringently enforced than at any other time. Reflecting the securitization of immigration control a­ fter September 11, federal prosecutions for immigration law violations more than doubled from 2001 to 2005, replacing drug law violations as the most frequently enforced federal crime.16 By the end of the de­cade, more than half of all federal prosecutions ­were for violations of immigration law, and in the Southwest region it was more than 80 ­percent.17 Illegal entry and re-­entry subsequently became the most prosecuted federal crimes. Much of the spike was due to Operation Streamline, which began along a ­limited stretch of the border in 2005 but was l­ater extended border-­w ide. By

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criminally prosecuting illegal entry rather than relying on voluntary return, the aim was to replace the long-­standing practice of “catch and release” with a “zero tolerance” approach. First offenses w ­ ere misdemeanors, but second offenses w ­ ere felonies that could involve substantial jail time. One predictable consequence of this punitive change in the rules of the border game was to overwhelm the courts and fuel a booming business in federally funded detention centers for nonviolent immigrant offenders in the Southwest and elsewhere.18 In 2008 some 442,000 detainees ­were pro­cessed through ICE’s 32,000 detention beds (costing $2.4 billion per year), more than twice the number five years ­earlier.19 Deportations also spiked: between 2009 and 2014, a rec­ord two million p ­ eople ­were deported from the country, with two-­thirds from the border region.20 Critics labeled Obama the “deporter-­in-­chief” for deporting more ­people than any other president. The hardening of the border and toughening of immigration enforcement was no doubt having a deterrent effect on some would-be unauthorized border crossers, given that the crossing was made much more difficult and the odds of being detained and deported had increased. Still, surveys of mi­grants indicated that almost all the Mexicans who attempted illegal entry eventually made it to the United States—­t hanks largely to hiring the ser­v ices of professional smugglers.21 Ultimately, the biggest inhibitors to unauthorized migration w ­ ere not just tougher border enforcement but broader push-­and-­pull f­actors. Demographic and economic shifts within Mexico began to reduce the push to migrate, while at the same time the sharp contraction of the U.S. economy starting in 2007 greatly reduced the pull of employer demand. Just as the economic boom of the 1990s had fueled an enormous influx of unauthorized workers despite intensified policing efforts to keep them out, the G ­ reat Recession of 2008 discouraged many new mi­g rants from leaving home and even encouraged some to return home. Low-­wage immigrants ­were hit particularly hard by the economic downturn, especially in the construction sector.22 Following a long-­established historical pattern, as the jobs began to dry up so did the unauthorized migration flow. ­There ­were an estimated 11.2 million unauthorized mi­grants in the country in 2010—­more than half of them Mexican—­down from a high of 12 million in 2007 but still higher than the 8.4 million in 2000, and t­ riple the 1990 level of 3.5 million.23 At the same time, some of the continued U.S. l­ abor market demand for Mexican mi­grant ­labor was quietly being met by a sharp increase in the number of l­egal temporary workers let in from Mexico from 27,000  in 1995 to 361,000 in 2008.24 This allowed a growing number of Mexican mi­grants and their U.S. employers to entirely bypass the border enforcement and evasion game.

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The Mexicanization of the U.S.- ­C anada Border ­ fter the bombings on September 11, the po­liti­cal heat from Washington not only A turned to a dif­fer­ent worry (terrorism) but also extended to a dif­fer­ent border that had long been con­ve­niently kept out of the po­liti­cal spotlight: the U.S.-­Canada border. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, Canada began to experience the kind of U.S. po­liti­cal scrutiny and alarmed media attention that had long been familiar to Mexico. The politicization of the border unsettled the historically special U.S.-­Canada relationship and brought to an end what had been a mutually con­ve­nient low-­maintenance approach to border control. U.S.-­Canada border enforcement during most of the twentieth c­ entury could be characterized as low intensity, low profile, and low priority (the Prohibition era being the most prominent exception). Border control issues rarely took center stage in bilateral relations. This low-­visibility approach to border policing was mutually con­ve­nient and tolerated, and persisted into the 1990s. As described by the assistant chief of the Border Patrol in the Spokane sector in Washington, “In the past the [northern] border w ­ asn’t an issue,” the border was “more of an afterthought.”25 Thus, while tensions and conflicts over border control issues had long been defining features of U.S.-­Mexico relations, such conflicts w ­ ere only now arising for U.S.-­Canada relations in the aftermath of September 11. The result was a partial “Mexicanization” of the U.S.-­Canada border and cross-­border relations.26 Although Canadians had long complained of being taken for granted by the United States—­treated as if the border did not exist and Canada was the fifty-­ first state—in the wake of the September 11 bombings they discovered that the only ­t hing worse than no attention was negative attention. Securing the border had long been such a low priority that it had famously been dubbed “the longest undefended border in the world.” This openness was suddenly a source of high anxiety. Canada found itself in the uncomfortable and unfamiliar position of being viewed as a security prob­lem. The porosity of the border would now become highly politicized and intensely scrutinized. The new U.S. border worry was that the expansive commercial cross-­border networks and routes could be conduits for terrorists. The relabeling of the U.S.-­ Canada border as a security vulnerability involved heightened U.S. po­liti­cal attention and media coverage, as well as the deployment of more border enforcement and surveillance resources. The Mexicanization pro­cess was also evident in greater U.S. expectations that Canada help achieve U.S. border control goals, and in new Canadian policy mea­sures meant to both pacify Washington and signal maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and policy autonomy.

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Before September 11 the boom in l­egal commercial flows across the border had overshadowed illegal flows, including smuggling of drugs, cigarettes, and mi­grants. The clandestine side of the expanding U.S.-­Canada trading relationship was largely kept out of the national po­liti­cal spotlight and never turned into a major source of cross-­border tension. Both countries exercised restraint to avoid politicizing illegal border crossings while at the same time expanding cross-­border policing cooperation. Thus, even as Washington frequently chastised Mexico for being the primary transshipment point for cocaine entering the United States, Ottawa quietly accepted the fact that the United States was the primary transshipment point for cocaine entering Canada (loud complaints would prob­ably have done ­little good anyway). Moreover, the United States was the main source of unregistered arms in Canada, which many Canadians considered a security threat but grudgingly accepted as the price of living next to a country glutted with arms and with loose gun control laws.27 At the same time, Canada, especially British Columbia, became a major exporter of high-­potency marijuana to its southern neighbor.28 A relatively small but growing number of mi­grants w ­ ere also smuggled into the United States via Canada. Con­ve­niently for Canada and the bilateral relationship, U.S. border concerns remained fixated on Mexico. The contrast to the lack of concern over controls at the northern border was striking. As Stephen Flynn noted, “Before Sept. 11, half of the northern border’s 126 official ports of entry ­were left unguarded at night. Typically, orange cones w ­ ere simply put up in the center of the roadway to signal the border crossing was closed.”29 Tellingly, by the end of the 1990s ­there w ­ ere more U.S. Border Patrol agents in Brownsville, Texas, than along the entire U.S.-­ Canada border. And indeed, in the rush to deploy more agents to the U.S.-­ Mexico border, U.S. agents w ­ ere often transferred south from their northern border posts. By 2001 only 334 U.S. agents policed the four-­t housand-­mile-­long northern border compared to nine thousand agents on the two-­t housand-­mile-­ long U.S.-­Mexico border. Canada made ­great efforts to remain outside the orbit of U.S. border anx­i­eties. Writing shortly before the terrorist attack on September 11, Demetrios Papademetriou and Deborah Waller Meyers noted that “Canada has been largely insulated from Amer­i­ca’s often wild and unpredictable tilting at the windmills of illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and more recently, foreign terrorism—­a lthough not without a ­great deal of effort and skilled diplomacy.”30 The event that most threatened to destabilize this mutually con­ve­nient minimalist approach to border policing was the Ahmed Ressam affair in December 1999. Ressam, an Algerian national who had been living in Canada for five years, was arrested ­after attempting to enter the state of Washington on a ferry from Victoria, British Columbia, with the trunk of his car full of explosives—­

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apparently part of a terrorist bombing plot. His capture was “the border-­control equivalent of winning the lottery.”31 The po­liti­cal ­ripple effects from the Ressam affair marked the beginning of the new politicization of border control issues in the bilateral relationship. The episode sparked hearings in the U.S. Congress on northern border security and unleashed the first barrage of attacks in the U.S. media accusing Canada of being soft on terrorism. Such po­liti­cally charged fin­ ger pointing would become more common ­after September 11. Canadians breathed a collective sigh of relief when it turned out (contrary to some initial media reports) that none of the nineteen September 11 hijackers had entered the United States from their country—­a point that Canadian officials made sure to repeatedly emphasize. Nevertheless, the U.S.-­Canada border was a ready-­made po­liti­cal target for t­ hose who blamed lax border controls for the United States’ vulnerability to terrorism. The openness of the U.S.-­Canada border became a po­liti­cal prop. In late 2001, Senator Byron Dorgan (D-­ND) held up a rubber traffic cone at a congressional hearing on northern border security to show what meets t­ hose who arrive at some checkpoints a­ fter 10 p.m.: “This is Amer­i­ca’s security at our border crossings. Amer­i­ca c­ an’t effectively combat terrorism if it d ­ oesn’t control its borders.”32 Although the focus was the U.S.-­ Canada border and the issue was terrorism, the new border security discourse echoed the older and more familiar drug and immigration control discourse that has characterized U.S. border relations with Mexico. The relabeling of Canada and the border as a security threat even entered the realm of Hollywood entertainment. A special post–­September 11 episode of the popu­lar tele­v i­sion series The West Wing focused on terrorists who had sneaked into the United States across the “Vermont-­Ontario” border. Apparently nobody told the scriptwriters that ­there is no such border, since Vermont actually shares a border with Quebec. (This mix-up, while prob­ably not even noticed by most viewers, became a source of many jokes in Canada about how geo­graph­i­cally challenged their southern neighbors ­were.) In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Congress pushed to ­triple the number of border agents deployed to the northern border, and National Guard troops w ­ ere also sent to help with patrols and inspections at ports of entry. The Coast Guard was instructed to escort gas and oil tankers crossing the ­Great Lakes. New surveillance equipment arrived along with new enforcement personnel. Cameras with night-­v ision lenses w ­ ere installed along some portions of the border, and a satellite tracking system was introduced to detect unauthorized entries. The deterrent effect of t­ hese new U.S. border security initiatives was questionable. Given that a much larger border enforcement presence along the U.S.-­ Mexico border had failed to keep out hundreds of thousands of illegal entries

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e­ very year, it was unclear how a much smaller force along the longer U.S.-­Canada border would keep out a few determined terrorists. But just as the border enforcement buildup along the U.S.-­Mexico border had a po­liti­cally useful symbolic effect in the 1990s, the same was perhaps now true of the new buildup along the U.S.-­Canada border. Additional security mea­sures ­were also implemented on the Canadian side of the line. Right ­after the terrorist attacks, Ottawa ordered a high state of alert at border crossings. Since then, it has beefed up security at airports, added more funding for detection technologies and personnel, and introduced legislation to combat the financing of terrorism. Two thousand officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police w ­ ere also deployed to border patrol and counterterrorism duties. Tougher immigration control mea­sures included the introduction of a fraud-­resistant resident card for new immigrants, greater detention capacity and deportation activity, more security screening for refugee claimants, and a tightening of the visa regime—­including a requirement that Saudi and Malaysian visitors obtain visas. The most impor­tant changes in Canadian law w ­ ere the 2001 Anti-­Terrorism Act and the 2002 Public Safety Act, which gave new surveillance and enforcement powers to security agencies. Similar to their Mexican counter­parts, Canadian officials tried to appease Washington with new security initiatives—­some more useful symbolically than instrumentally—­while trying to avoid the impression that their policy shifts reflected U.S. pressures. Nevertheless, the incentives ­under conditions of asymmetrical interdependence w ­ ere clear: e­ ither take stronger mea­sures on border security or risk a unilateral U.S. hardening of the border, with potentially devastating economic consequences. Canadians interpreted a post–­September 11 warning by Secretary of State Colin Powell as a thinly veiled threat: “Some nations need to be more vigilant against terrorism at their borders if they want their relationship with the U.S. to remain the same.”33 The economic costs from any security-­related disruptions in border flows became immediately evident in the wake of the September 11 bombings. The virtual shutting down of the border ports of entry created havoc at the border, given that Canada and the United States w ­ ere conducting $1.3 billion in trade per day, most of it shipped by truck across the border. Some forty thousand commercial shipments and three hundred thousand ­people w ­ ere crossing the four-­thousand-­ mile-­long U.S.-­Canada border daily. In the days following the terrorist attacks, delays for trucks hauling cargo across the border increased from 1–2 minutes to 10–15 hours, stranding parts, shipments, and perishable goods. Trucks ­were backed up for thirty-­six kilo­meters at the Ambassador Bridge connecting Windsor, Ontario, and Detroit (the site of 27 ­percent of U.S.-­Canada trade crossings).

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Such border disruptions ­were much more costly for Canada than for the United States. Although about 25 ­percent of U.S. trade went to Canada, 87 ­percent of Canada’s trade was U.S.-­bound. Even more impor­tant, foreign trade constituted a far greater percentage of the Canadian economy than it did of the U.S. economy. Forty p ­ ercent of Canada’s GDP was tied to exports to the United States, whereas only 2.5 ­percent of U.S. GDP was tied to exports to Canada. In this regard, Canada was similar to Mexico in the extremely asymmetric nature of its interdependence with the United States. The two countries ­were very dif­fer­ent in most re­spects, but they had something inescapably impor­tant in common: both had a long and porous border that was viewed as a security concern by the United States, and both ­were eco­nom­ically dependent on keeping their border open. A ­ fter the U.S. border security crackdowns following the September 11 attacks, both Canada and Mexico became much more aware of the risks and vulnerabilities that came with asymmetric interdependence. Canada had in the past masterfully negotiated asymmetric interdependence in a manner that produced favorable outcomes, but navigating the less stable post–­September 11 politics of insecurity, fear, and blame was more challenging.34 Thus, the old Mexican lament, “poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States,” increasingly resonated in Canada as well.35 Some degree of Mexicanization was even evident in the heightened politicization of the drug issue in the U.S.-­Canada relationship. Claiming that the United States was facing a “flood of illicit substances” across the northern border, David Murray, special assistant to President Bush’s drug policy director, warned that if Canada loosened its marijuana laws, Washington would potentially retaliate with tougher border inspections.36 In December 2002 U.S. antidrug czar John Walters similarly warned that the adoption of more liberal marijuana laws in Canada would make it “probable we w ­ ill have to do more restrictive t­ hings at the border.”37 Even if such menacing language was mostly bluffing, it very much echoed past U.S. efforts to use the threat of tougher border inspections to pressure Mexico to crack down on illegal drugs. The pro­cess of Mexicanization in U.S.-­Canada border relations was still at an early stage in the immediate years a­ fter September 11. And many f­ actors inhibited further Mexicanization, including a long history of close law enforcement cooperation, similar levels of economic development, and a (mostly) shared language and culture. Thus, the U.S.-­Canada border control relationship remained qualitatively dif­fer­ent from that of the U.S.-­Mexico border. This was most evident, Papademetriou and Meyers noted, in the areas of “intelligence cooperation, similar enforcement priorities, ability to deliver on commitments, similar levels of technological capability, [and] a habit of working together on

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­ atters large and small.”38 The enduring differences in the profiles of Canada m and Mexico remained more impor­tant than the growing similarities in their relations with the United States. Even as the U.S.-­Canada border had become partly Mexicanized, Mexico was pushing to Canadianize and de-­Mexicanize its border relations with the United States, strategically using the NAFTA partnership as a rhetorical device to make the case for equal treatment on border ­matters. The Mexican government even boldly pushed for a trilateral embrace of multilateral security mechanisms and the creation of a continental security community. In this case, it seemed, Mexico had supplanted Canada as the most enthusiastic promoter of multilateralism.39

“Smart Borders” Balancing the twin policy objectives of facilitating the increase in ­legal border crossings and enforcing laws against unauthorized crossings had always been a cumbersome and challenging task. But with the terrorism threat added to an already overextended U.S. border control agenda, the balancing act became even harder. For instance, in 2004 more than 427 million travelers, the majority of them noncitizens, w ­ ere inspected at U.S. ports of entry. Most of ­these travelers arrived via the nation’s land borders with Canada and Mexico. Since September 11, border inspectors w ­ ere told to prioritize security, even while the sheer magnitude of border crossings ­limited how much the borders could be effectively secured. A favorite coping mechanism was to emphasize new cargo-­tracking systems, inspection technologies, and traffic management strategies to ease border congestion and extend inspections outward beyond ports of entry. Such a strategy necessitated greater private-­sector collaboration in policing and more expansive cross-­border surveillance and policing coordination. This was articulated in the thirty-­point “smart border” declaration signed between Canada and the United States in December 2001, and partially extended to Mexico the following spring. Meeting with Canadian prime minister Jean Chrétien at the Detroit-­Windsor border crossing, President George W. Bush declared, “This ­great and peaceful border must be open to business, must be open to p ­ eople—­a nd it’s got to be closed to terrorists and criminals.”40 ­These “smart border” agreements called for a layered approach to monitoring cargo and travelers that by its very nature required greater cross-­border cooperation. In the case of travel, for instance, the agreements called for consultation on visa policies and greater screening of third-­country nationals, the development of preclearance procedures and provision of advanced passenger information, and the creation of compatible databases to foster cross-­border information sharing.

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U.S. officials w ­ ere applying this more high-­tech and more internationalized form of border control not only regionally but also globally. As summarized by the White House in January 2002: The border of the ­future must integrate actions abroad to screen goods and ­people prior to their arrival in sovereign U.S. territory. . . . ​Agreements with our neighbors, major trading partners, and private industry ­will allow extensive pre-­screening of low-­risk traffic, thereby allowing ­limited assets to focus attention on high-­risk traffic. The use of advanced technology to track the movement of cargo and the entry and exit of individuals is essential to the task of managing the movement of hundreds of millions of individuals, conveyances, and vehicles.41 The 9-11 Commission added an influential voice to the growing chorus calling for the internationalization of border controls, noting that “the further away from our borders that screening [of travelers] occurs, the more security benefits we gain.”42 The Commission argued that “the U.S. government cannot meet its own obligations to the American ­people to prevent the entry of terrorists without a major effort to collaborate with other governments. We should do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies, and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel and border crossing over the medium and long term through extensive international cooperation.”43 Pointing to the ability of terrorists to plot against American territory and interests from afar, the Commission provocatively concluded that “the American homeland is the planet.”44 To track international travel, the United States called for more tamper-­proof travel documents, greater sharing of passenger data, and more extensive pre-­ inspection of passengers. As a condition for access to U.S. territory, airlines ­were now required to electronically submit passenger manifests in advance. The passage of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act in May 2002 mandated that foreign nationals’ documents include machine-­readable biometric data (such as digital fingerprints) to identify visitors.45 In March 2004 the United States announced plans to send customs inspectors to foreign airports. Fifteen foreign airports w ­ ere participating in pre-­inspection as of spring 2005, and Congress mandated that this be expanded to at least twenty-­five foreign airports.46 Pre-­inspection actually dated back to the 1990s, when it began to be used on a l­ imited basis by the INS as an immigration control tool, but it was ­reinvented and greatly expanded a­ fter September 11 as a counterterrorism tool. Many of the technological innovations in surveillance and tracking of cross-­ border travelers, including the use of biometrics,47 actually predated September 11, but they w ­ ere given much greater funding, legitimacy, and po­liti­cal support as a result of the new prominence of homeland security concerns. David Lyon

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pointed out that “despite the media hype, responses to the attacks do not amount to an entirely new surveillance landscape. Rather, already existing surveillance systems are being reinforced and intensified.”48 The turn to a greater reliance on surveillance technologies, such as the introduction of automated facial recognition systems at a growing number of airports, provoked rising concerns about invasions of privacy and an emerging “homeland security industrial complex.”49 It also prompted charges that the po­liti­cal pressure to find quick technological fixes that minimize border disruptions led to an embrace of many wasteful and inefficient devices. “­After 9/11, we had to show how committed we ­were to spending hugely greater amounts of money than ever before, as rapidly as pos­si­ble,” said Representative Christopher Cox (R-­CA), then-­chairman of the Homeland Security Committee. “That brought us what we might expect, which is some expensive m ­ istakes. This has been the difficult learning curve of the new discipline known as homeland security.” According to Randall J. Larsen, a retired Air Force col­o­nel and former government adviser on scientific issues, “Every­one was standing in line with their silver bullets to make us more secure ­after S­ eptember 11. . . . ​ We bought a lot of stuff off the shelf that ­wasn’t effective.”50 The centerpiece of the high-­tech U.S. approach to tracking cross-­border travel was US-­VISIT—­the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology system—an ambitious new entry–­exit screening system that combined integrated databases and biometrics.51 Launched in 2004, the new system required foreigners arriving in the United States with visas to have their documents scanned and their fingerprints and photo­g raphs taken. US-­V ISIT was extended to include the collection of biometric data from visitors arriving from visa-­waiver countries. As described by Accenture, the firm awarded the $10 billion contract to set up US-­VISIT,52 “the end vision for the US-­VISIT solution is built around the concept of a virtual border. The virtual border is designed to operate far beyond US bound­aries to help DHS assess the security risks of all US-­bound travelers and prevent potential threats from reaching US borders.”53 ­Those applying for visas abroad could have digital fingerprints and photo­graphs taken at U.S. embassies and consulate offices, making it pos­si­ble to compare this biometric information with the biometrics collected through US-­VISIT upon arrival at U.S. ports of entry.54 US-­VISIT was a striking illustration of a pre–­September 11 idea l­ater touted as a “new” antiterrorism initiative. In 1996, Congress had mandated an entry–­ exit system as an immigration control tool to crack down on foreign visitors overstaying their visas, but its implementation was repeatedly put off in the face of or­ga­nized opposition concerned about potential travel delays. The initiative was revived and repackaged in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks as a counterterrorism tool. US-­VISIT was a more high-­tech and ambitious version of the

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e­ arlier stalled effort, reflecting the heightened U.S. emphasis on technological solutions. US-­VISIT remained a work in pro­gress. For instance, in early 2005 the Department of Homeland Security began to test the use of encrypted tags to track the entry and exit of border crossers as part of US-­VISIT. ­These electronic tags, called RFIDs (radio frequency identification), used tiny inexpensive microchips half the size of a grain of sand that transmit radio signals prompted by a signal from a specialized reader. U.S. border control officials expressed high hopes for such devices. Asa Hutchinson, the undersecretary for border and transportation security, explained in early 2005, “Through the use of radio frequency technology, we see the potential to not only improve the security of our country, but also to make the most impor­tant infrastructure enhancements to the US land borders in more than 50 years.”55 While new surveillance technologies w ­ ere being developed to screen out undesirable border crossers, creating “smart borders” also involved identifying and facilitating “low-­risk” frequent travelers. At some U.S. border crossings, additional special lanes ­were opened for business commuters who ­were willing to undergo a security background check and pay a special border-­crossing fee. Thousands of frequent travelers enrolled in the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection system, which guaranteed a wait time of no more than fifteen minutes to enter the United States south of San Diego. Similarly, the Nexus program along the U.S.-­Canada border allowed low-­risk frequent travelers who underwent background checks to quickly cross through designated ports of entry. ­Those enrolled in the Nexus program received a computerized photo identification card that could be electronically scanned at border crossings in dedicated lanes. A similar program, the F ­ ree and Secure Trade program, was put in place to ease truck congestion at border ports of entry. Canada and the United States also launched a joint Nexus program for air travelers that included an evaluation of iris recognition biometric technology at the Ottawa and Montreal international airports. Another innovative air travel system available at some airports, the Passenger Accelerated Ser­v ice, allowed frequent travelers to insert an identity card and their hand into a scanning machine (using a hand geometry recognition system) to avoid long lines. The Patriot Act authorized setting up a computer database of “trusted travelers” allowed to use electronic identification cards to bypass regular security lines at airports. All t­ hese innovations ­were designed to do one ­t hing: make borders more secure while making sure they also remained open to legitimate trade and travel. The extension of border controls beyond borders also included developing a layered approach to cargo inspections at land, sea, and air ports of entry.56 Not since the height of sea piracy in ­earlier centuries had ­t here been such concern

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about the threat posed to cargo security by nonstate actors. Robert Bonner, the commissioner of customs and border protection, called ship containers “the potential Trojan h ­ orse of the twenty-­first c­ entury” and exclaimed that the sum of all fears is the possibility of a “nuke-­in-­a-­box.”57 But unlike ­earlier campaigns against sea piracy, the new policing strategy placed greater weight on preventive mea­sures.58 This was illustrated by the Container Security Initiative, launched in 2002 by the U.S. Customs Ser­vice, which created a preclearance system to facilitate the movement of cargo containers with documents submitted electronically twenty-­four hours before arrival.59 The initiative also deployed U.S. Customs agents to work with local customs officials at foreign ports to identify and inspect high-­risk cargo bound for the United States. The first phase of the initiative targeted twenty large ports in Eu­rope and Asia. By mid-2005, thirty-­ seven of the world’s biggest seaports had signed on to the Container Security Initiative, representing most of the cargo shipped to the United States. Ports enrolled in the program ­were required to set up scanning equipment to inspect the contents of cargo deemed “high risk.” Foreign governments had strong incentives to cooperate with the inspections ­because it meant that goods shipped from their ports did not face extra delays upon arrival at U.S. ports.60 Some of the costs of this screening and preclearance system w ­ ere shifted to the private sector, as airlines, shipping companies, and travel agencies w ­ ere essentially deputized to do more self-­policing and electronically submit passenger and cargo manifests in advance. Carrier sanctions and denial of (or delayed) territorial access provided the stick while preferential and speedier access provided the carrot to ensure greater private sector cooperation and compliance. For instance, U.S. companies enrolled in the Customs-­Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (which required a background check and submission of a security profile outlining the vari­ous security mea­sures the com­pany is taking) could move through the “fast lane.” Truck ­drivers for companies certified by the program received a border-­crossing card for expedited entry and a transponder61 was placed in their truck to transmit the manifest to customs agents prior to their arrival at the port of entry.62

Escalating Drug Vio­l ence Meanwhile, the most serious security concern on the Mexican side of the border was not transnational terrorists but skyrocketing drug vio­lence, which itself was an unintended byproduct of the government’s militarized drug enforcement crackdown. When he took office in December 2000, President Vicente Fox had initially resisted the temptation to further militarize the drug war.

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He proposed sending the army back to the barracks, but changed his mind in the face of pressure from Washington, particularly U.S. drug tsar Barry McCaffrey.63 In the fall of 2004, clashes between traffickers for control of the border city of Nuevo Laredo became particularly violent, made pos­si­ble by a buildup of firepower since the 1990s. In response, Fox launched Operation Mexico Seguro in June 2005, deploying some seven hundred soldiers and police to Nuevo Laredo, and the operation was then extended elsewhere.64 This provided a hint of what was to come. With much fanfare, Mexico’s next president, Felipe Calderón declared an all-­ out war on the country’s leading drug traffickers when he took office in December 2006. “We ­w ill give no truce or quarter to the enemies of Mexico,” Calderón instructed the troops at a military base in early 2007.65 Some of the initial military successes ­were impressive, including the largest cocaine bust the world had ever seen—­more than 23.5 metric tons seized by the marines searching a container boat traveling from Colombia. But while Calderón’s military-­led antidrug offensive weakened the Tijuana, Juárez, and Gulf trafficking organ­izations—­ which since the 1990s had become much more power­ful thanks to their expanded role in shipping and distributing cocaine across the border—­these “successes” created an opportunity for rival traffickers. The ensuing disor­ga­ni­ za­tion, disruption, and competitive scramble to control turf, routes, and market share fueled an unpre­ce­dented wave of drug vio­lence in Mexico.66 Applauding Calderón’s drug war offensive, Washington pledged $400 million in antidrug military and police assistance for Mexico in 2008 as part of the Merida Initiative—­the newly signed U.S.-­Mexico security cooperation agreement—­ and took on an increasingly active role ­behind the scenes in Mexico. This included setting up a “fusion intelligence center” at a northern Mexican military base modeled on similar counterinsurgency centers in Iraq and Af­ghan­i­stan, providing military and police training for thousands of Mexican agents, and deploying CIA operatives and military contractors to Mexico to gather intelligence, assist in wiretaps and interrogations, and help plan raids and other operations. The use of private U.S. military contractors made it pos­si­ble to get around Mexican laws prohibiting foreign military personnel from carry­ing out operations on Mexican territory. In early 2011 the Pentagon also began to deploy high-­altitude Global Hawk drones deep into Mexican territory on drug surveillance missions.67 More than ever before, U.S. officials viewed the situation in Mexico as a security threat, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton even ­going so far as to describe it as an insurgency. Yet much to Mexico’s frustration, Washington made only token efforts to curb the clandestine export of U.S. firearms that was arming Mexican drug gangs.68 Despite Mexico’s protests, t­ here was l­ ittle domestic po­liti­cal pressure within the

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United States—­and plenty of po­liti­cal obstacles—to more intensively police and restrict bulk weapons sales, ranging from handguns to AK-47s, by thousands of loosely regulated gun dealers in Texas and elsewhere near the border.69 In late 2011, J. Dewey Webb, the special agent responsible for curbing gun smuggling in Texas for the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, noted, “The United States is the easiest and cheapest place for drug traffickers to get their firearms.”70 Despite the proximity of the drug vio­lence in Mexico and public anxiety about spillover, stopping the southbound flow of arms generated far less attention and concern than the northbound flow of drugs.71 Government efforts to block the flow w ­ ere met by ­legal challenges from the National ­R ifle Association.72 Washington provided sophisticated surveillance technology and expertise to help Calderón target and remove a growing number of high-­profile traffickers. But as had been the case in the elimination of high-­level Colombian traffickers in the 1990s, this decapitation strategy did not translate into a reduction of drug trafficking. Rather than reducing the drug flow, the crackdown was d ­ oing more to intensify brutal competition within and between a growing number of rival smuggling organ­izations, and this created a much more fluid and volatile—­and therefore much more violent—­criminal market environment. In 2007 t­ here w ­ ere five Mexican criminal organ­izations dominating the trafficking of drugs into the United States; in 2012 ­t here w ­ ere nine, mostly spinoffs and remnants of the old organ­izations. And ­t hese new organ­izations ­were even more willing and able to use vio­lence to protect and promote their business. The most trigger-­happy of the new groups, Los Zetas, was founded by former members of an elite U.S.-­trained antidrug Mexican military unit.73 They started out as enforcers for the Gulf trafficking organ­ization, but then broke away to form their own organ­ization. Their emergence was a turning point in the Mexican drug wars, in terms of not only military discipline, sophistication, and capacity, but also willingness to routinely use extreme brutality. In Darwinian style, other trafficking organ­izations adapted and ­adopted similar methods or risked elimination.74 Many of the new recruits ­were from the military. Los Zetas brazenly hung banners on bridges urging t­hose with military backgrounds to join their organ­ization. “The Zetas operations group wants you, soldiers and ex-­soldiers,” read one such banner. “We offer you a good salary, food, and attention for your f­ amily. D ­ on’t suffer hunger and abuse anymore.”75 Recruitment efforts extended into Guatemala to former members of the Kaibil counterinsurgency commandos, who had been responsible for some of the bloodiest government massacres during the country’s brutal civil war. By 2010 Los Zetas had a fighting force of more than ten thousand soldiers.76 Each year the drug killings in Mexico continued to mount. By 2012, drug-­ related deaths had reached nearly fifty thousand since Calderón launched his

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drug war offensive at the end of 2006.77 Brushing aside critics and insisting the vio­lence was a sign of pro­gress in the drug war, Calderón kept sending in more troops, at one point deploying as many as ninety-­six thousand army soldiers and sixteen thousand marines across a dozen states.78 This only fueled the flames: death rates ­were significantly higher in states targeted by military campaigns than in nontargeted states.79 ­Human rights abuses by the military also skyrocketed, provoking a growing public outcry. And the crackdown did not necessarily mean less corruption. In 2012, half a dozen se­nior military officers, including two generals, w ­ ere charged with aiding drug trafficking.80 Rising fear of “spillover” vio­lence from Mexico generated calls to further ­militarize the U.S. side of the line. Alarm about spillover, noted security analyst Adam Isacson, “has crept into official rhe­toric, especially at the state and opposition-­politics level, as a chief argument for further increasing US investment in border security, including greater use of military capabilities at the border.”81 A September 2011 Texas Department of Agriculture report, authored by two retired generals, declared, “Conditions within ­t hese border communities along both sides of the Texas-­Mexico border are tantamount to living in a war zone in which civil authorities, law enforcement agencies as well as citizens are ­under attack around the clock.”82 What was most remarkable, however, was how ­little spillover ­there actually was. Indeed, urban areas on the U.S. side of the border had some of the lowest crime rates in the country. In 2010, Juárez was one of the most violent cities in the world, whereas its twin city just across the border, El Paso, was one of the safest in the United States. When Enrique Peña Nieto assumed the Mexican presidency in 2012, ­t here was widespread speculation that he might end or at least de-­escalate his pre­de­ ces­sor’s all-­out drug war and turn his attention to other priorities. Indeed, one trafficking group, the Knights Templar, welcomed the new president with narcomantas (narco-­banners) that read: “If you honor your promise [to alter the course of the drug war], we ­w ill lay down our arms . . . ​other­w ise we ­w ill continue to defend our territory.”83 But instead of retreating, Peña Nieto doubled down, deploying soldiers to even more states than his pre­de­ces­sor, eventually patrolling the streets in a majority of Mexican states. Within a few years drug vio­lence had again spiked, matching the peak levels of vio­lence from 2010 to 2012. To make m ­ atters worse, as security analyst Vanda Felbab-­Brown noted, the brutality not only continued to rage on in hotspots such as Guerrero, Michoacan, and Tamaulipas, but returned to places such as Tijuana and Juárez where the vio­lence had momentarily declined, and even extended into areas previously untouched by drug vio­lence. She suggests that part of the new surge of vio­lence was due to the infighting within the Sinaloa drug trafficking organ­ization ­a fter the 2016 recapture of its leader,

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Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, as well as clashes with other trafficking organ­ izations encroaching on Sinaloa territory along the northern border.84 Thus, while the arrest of El Chapo and his extradition to the United States was certainly good public relations for the Mexican government and was cheered on by Washington, it unleashed yet more bloody ­battles over turf and leadership. This was entirely predictable. ­After all, El Chapo himself had successfully risen to the top partly by ruthlessly taking advantage of the market opportunities created when his Colombian and Mexican business rivals w ­ ere weakened or taken out by government crackdowns. The war on drugs helped give rise to El Chapo, and the war on drugs took him down when he became too much of an embarrassment.85 In the wake of his downfall, even more brutal and skilled criminal entrepreneurs, both within and outside of El Chapo’s Sinaloa organ­ ization, ­were now muscling their way in to fill the power vacuum. The drug trade consequently became even more chaotic, fragmented, and difficult to contain. With the mounting death toll and militarization of their society, more and more Mexicans suffered from drug war fatigue. Yet ­t here was no end in sight. ­After years of making war on drugs, making peace seemed as distant as ever.

­R unning the Gauntlet The surge in drug vio­lence in Mexico was also making it increasingly difficult for the tens of thousands of U.S.-­bound Central Americans to clandestinely travel through the country safely. Even as Mexican migration to the United States was sharply declining, migration from Central Amer­i­ca’s violence-­plagued “Northern Triangle” (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) was sharply rising, with the Border Patrol apprehending more Central Americans than Mexicans by 2014. And unlike the typical Mexican mi­grant, many of them w ­ ere asylum-­seeking families and unaccompanied ­children, which the U.S. border enforcement apparatus was ill-­equipped to deal with. Mi­grants on their northward journey faced a gauntlet of extortionist criminals, bandits, and corrupt cops.86 This increasingly predatory environment, it should be pointed out, ultimately contributed to the U.S. policy goal of making the border harder for mi­grants to overcome. Indeed, for many it had actually become more dangerous and difficult to reach the border than to cross it. B ­ ecause most of the effort by mi­grants to reach the United States was taking place backstage, away from the borderline itself, the ­hazards of the trip provoked only modest and sporadic U.S. media attention and public concern. Navigating the dangerous journey through Mexico—­some twelve hundred miles from the border with Guatemala to Texas—­had never been easy, but be-

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came far more complicated and perilous as the drug war sharply escalated a­ fter 2006 and the country’s criminal landscape was thrown into disarray. As competing crime groups fragmented and diversified, some turned to the kidnapping of mi­grants for ransom (paid for by mi­grants’ U.S.-­based relatives) and collecting fees for safe passage through their territory. Kidnapping mi­grants became a big business, with Mexico’s national ­human rights ombudsmen estimating that some twenty thousand mi­grants w ­ ere held hostage for ransom ­every year. Most feared was the Zetas drug-­trafficking organ­ization, which had developed a notorious reputation not only for brutalizing abducted mi­grants but also for mass killings and disappearances. In the summer of 2010 the Zetas allegedly murdered seventy-­ two mi­grants in the border state of Tamaulipas. By 2012 the Zetas controlled much of the criminal turf on the Mexican border with Texas, forcing mi­grant smugglers to pay a passage fee to cross into the United States.87 This high-­risk environment, in turn, made mi­grants even more reliant on smugglers not only to evade or buy off law enforcement but to bribe criminals. As one mi­grant put it, “A good coyote [smuggler] is well connected; he knows who and how to bribe.”88 The clandestine passage from Central Amer­i­ca to the U.S. border had also become much riskier due to closer U.S.-­Mexican law enforcement cooperation ­after September 11. Mexico’s “Plan Sur,” first initiated between 2001 and 2003, included deploying hundreds of new border agents and military personnel to highway checkpoints designed to intercept northbound Central Americans. The United States provided Mexico with inflatable Zodiac boats to patrol the rivers in the southern border area. U.S. officials increasingly came to view Mexican migration control efforts through the prism of counterterrorism. A 2004 State ­Department report on terrorism, for example, applauded Mexico’s increased willingness to stem the flow of mi­grants entering the country.89 Washington beefed up support for ­these efforts through the 2008 Merida Initiative, which included installing scanning and other detection equipment at Mexico’s southern border crossings and providing at least $90 million in assistance to the National Migration Institute, the Mexican government agency responsible for detaining and deporting unauthorized mi­g rants.90 Creating a “twenty-­first c­ entury border” to deter U.S.-­bound unauthorized flows of p ­ eople and goods was a centerpiece of the Merida Initiative. Between 2010 and 2015 the U.S. State Department provided $130 million for Mexican border security, with about half targeting Mexico’s southern border. Alan Bersin, assistant secretary for policy in the Department of Homeland Security (who had previously been the Clinton administration’s “border tsar” in the 1990s), candidly commented in 2012, “The Guatemalan border with Chiapas is now our southern border.”91 In the wake of a sudden surge of Central American families and unaccompanied ­children attempting to cross the border into the Rio Grande Valley of

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South Texas in 2014—­many of them brought to the border by smugglers with instructions to turn themselves in to U.S. agents and request asylum92—­pressure from Washington induced Mexico to launch a renewed and expanded “Plan Sur,” with hundreds of additional agents deployed to cast an enforcement net within 160 kilo­meters of the border. The U.S. provided funds for more training, scanning equipment, mobile migration-­control kiosks, and canine patrols. The Mexican crackdown included targeting the freight trains that had become the favored form of transport for northbound mi­grants. At the urging of Washington, freight train operators increased the speed of the trains, and this predictably made it more dangerous (and sometimes lethal) for mi­grants to jump on. Intensified policing of the traditional train route, including hiring of private guards by the train companies and erecting concrete walls and posts near the tracks to keep mi­grants from boarding, pushed mi­grants to more difficult and dangerous rural routes and transportation methods. It also pushed them away from the network of shelters providing humanitarian assistance along the train routes. And it made them even more vulnerable and dependent on their smugglers, who jacked up their fees to compensate for a longer and more complex ­clandestine journey.93 Mexican authorities publicly portrayed the new policing campaign as “protecting” and “rescuing” mi­grants from the clutches of criminal organ­izations. What this often meant, however, was rounding them up and deporting them. Reflecting the new real­ity, more Central Americans ­were now being deported from Mexico than from the United States. When it came to interdicting Central American mi­grants, it was increasingly clear that Mexico had become a de facto buffer zone and an extension of U.S. border controls, keeping mi­g rants from even reaching U.S. soil where they could access the asylum claim pro­cess. The emergence of this “vertical frontier,” as sociologist David Fitzgerald has described it, stretched the entirety of Mexico from south to north, with the Mexican constitution greatly empowering the authorities to expel undesirable entrants without judicial hearings.94 Mexico, which had for years publicly chastised the U.S. for mistreating Mexican mi­grants and had at least rhetorically urged greater re­spect for the h ­ uman rights of mi­grants, was at the same time more than willing to quietly do Washington’s dirty work backstage when it came to deterring, detaining, and deporting Central Americans. When fewer of them reached U.S. territory, fewer could claim asylum. Much of the prodding and inducements from Washington took place in private, ­behind closed doors, but recognition of the results was increasingly public. In 2015 President Obama praised Mexico for reducing Central American transit migration: “In part b ­ ecause of strong efforts by Mexico, including at its southern border, w ­ e’ve seen ­t hose numbers reduced back to much more man-

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ageable levels.” In 2016 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Juan Gonzalez similarly applauded Mexico for its U.S.-­f unded policing campaigns, “in par­tic­u ­lar at its southern border and along common routes t­ oward the United States.”95 The combined impact of an escalating drug war and intensified migration policing had sharply increased the risks, uncertainty, and dependence on professional smugglers for Central Americans and other third-­country nationals transiting through Mexico to the United States. The result was a mounting humanitarian crisis for mi­grants that was about to get much worse.

6 ESCALATION IN A NEW PO­L ITI­CAL LANDSCAPE

As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump boldly promised not only to play the border game better and harder than any of his pre­de­ces­sors, but to actually change the rules and win the game. His signature campaign pledge to build a “big, beautiful wall” was part of his nostalgic message to “make Amer­i­ca ­great again.” It did not quite work out that way. The wall pledge was wildly popu­lar on the campaign trail, but once President Trump took office it became so po­liti­cally divisive that it ended up walling him in. His po­liti­cal opponents in Washington denounced the wall as immoral and inhumane while con­ve­niently glossing over the fact that they had spent de­cades supporting efforts to build up border barriers. The old bipartisan consensus on the importance of border security that had kept the border game ­going for so many years was now broken and would be difficult to restore. So while the escalation of border enforcement would go on to reach new heights u ­ nder the Trump administration, it would also be far more po­liti­cally contentious than in the past. With a president calling mi­grants criminal invaders and declaring a national emergency to divert military funds for his wall, the border took po­liti­cal center stage like never before, with enormous ­ripple effects on both sides of the line that would endure well beyond the Trump era.

“Build That Wall!” Donald Trump launched his presidential bid by disparaging Mexican immigrants: “­They’re bringing drugs. Th ­ ey’re bringing crime. Th ­ ey’re rapists. And 110

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some, I assume, are good p ­ eople.”1 ­Those words starkly differentiated Trump from his opponents, setting the tone for an electoral campaign that routinely targeted Mexico and Mexicans. And his favored solution was to simply wall them off. “The border is wide open for cartels and terrorists,” he tweeted in 2015. “Secure our border now. Build a massive wall & deduct the costs from Mexican foreign aid!”2 Trump’s handlers came up with the wall idea as an easy and ­simple way to keep their candidate focused on the anti-­immigration theme of the campaign. It was the perfect sound bite and pitch for a real estate developer who took pride in building t­ hings and loved boasting about it. This would be his biggest construction job: “I would build a g­ reat wall, and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me, and I build them very inexpensively.”3 It also gave Trump supporters something concrete and vis­i­ble to latch on to: the promise to build a border wall was the biggest applause line at Trump campaign rallies. “Build that wall! Build that wall!” became the favorite rally chant.4 A sense of loss of control was fueling right-­w ing pop­u­lism, and Trump masterfully tapped into this sentiment by vowing to construct a wall as a quick-­fi x solution to reassert control. Critics w ­ ere as dismissive of Trump’s wall as they ­were of Trump as a presidential candidate. The wall, they said, was nothing more than a po­liti­cal fantasy. But words mattered. It should be remembered that Trump’s pre­de­ces­sors had carefully avoided calling any new border barriers a “wall.” In the pre-­Trump era the term was po­liti­cally taboo, viewed as sending the wrong message to Mexico and to the world. Recall that when the conservative Pat Buchanan ran for president in 1996, he proposed building a “sea wall” to stop the “tidal wave” of illegal immigration across the border—­and was dismissed as an extremist by the Republican Party.5 At that time, memories of the Berlin Wall and all that it represented ­were still too fresh. The upbeat mood of the time was about breaking down walls, not building them up. But by the time Trump ran for president, the world had changed. Trump broke the wall taboo, and his fans loved him for it. Calling for a border wall made a statement, and it sounded bigger and bolder than anything done before. The real­ity was that any new wall would build on the sprawling border enforcement infrastructure already in place. As we saw in ­earlier chapters, since the 1990s politicians of all stripes had scrambled to show their commitment to border security. During that time, annual federal funding for border and immigration control mushroomed from $1.5 billion to $19.5 billion. According to one estimate, even before Trump took office and began to push for his border wall, Washington was already spending some $5 billion more on border and immigration control than for all other federal law enforcement combined.6 Enforcement mea­sures included erecting hundreds of miles of metal barriers,

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adapting technology initially developed for the military for border enforcement, and deploying a fleet of manned and unmanned aircraft to monitor from the air. Thousands of under­ground sensors and hundreds of infrared radar and video surveillance systems covered the border. The size of the Border Patrol had more than quintupled since the early 1990s, from some four thousand to over twenty-­ one thousand.7 The border enforcement buildup had made the crossing far more perilous for mi­grants, while enriching the smugglers they relied on. Trump was taking border enforcement to the next level, and in ­doing so he took full owner­ship of an issue that had previously been marked by a bipartisan consensus. His wall would be the latest addition to the border barrier-­building frenzy first launched by President Clinton, greatly expanded by Bush, and continued by Obama. But Trump was the only president willing to actually call it a wall. As he put it in January 2017, “It’s not a fence. It’s a wall.”8 He quickly dismissed opponents as “open borders Demo­crats” despite the fact that it was a Demo­cratic president who initiated the border buildup that began in the 1990s. By the start of Trump’s administration the border had already become one of the most heavi­ly policed in the world, yet Trump portrayed it as wide open, and proclaimed that he was the first president to take border security seriously. The president’s proposal called for a wall to cover one thousand miles of the nearly two-­t housand-­mile-­long border, with natu­ral obstacles covering the remainder.9 Before Trump took office, t­ here w ­ ere already over 650 miles of vari­ ous types of border fencing already in place, and portions of it very much looked like a formidable metal wall. Trump’s plan certainly did not call for tearing all that fencing down and starting from scratch. Instead, the plan would simply add more miles of fencing and reinforce existing fencing in key vis­i­ble places. Cost estimates varied widely, with the president claiming $10–­$12 billion, but other estimates reaching as high as $40 billion. Trump insisted it d ­ idn’t ­matter, b ­ ecause he would get Mexico to pay for it. Skeptics pointed out that a wall would have dubious effectiveness, would prompt countermoves such as more tunnels and ladders, and would be irrelevant to stopping drugs since the DEA estimated that most drugs ­were smuggled in through official border ports of entry in passenger vehicles and commercial cargo conveyances. The wall was also irrelevant for addressing visa overstayers (who ­were a majority of the unauthorized mi­grants in the country) or for managing asylum seekers (most of whom ­were trying to find rather than evade border agents). But none of that mattered for Trump when it came to border politics—­a ll that mattered was the potent symbolism and imagery of the wall. Pressure on Trump to deliver on his wall promise began as soon as he took office. The day ­after the election the conservative pundit Ann Coulter proposed a “detailed schedule” for the new president’s first hundred days in office: “Day 1:

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start building the wall.” Then “Day 2: continue building the wall.” This was repeated ­until: “Day 100: report to American p ­ eople about pro­gress of wall. Keep 10 building the wall.” For influential voices such as Coulter, the success or failure of the Trump presidency was g­ oing to be judged first and foremost on getting that wall built, and ­doing so as fast as pos­si­ble. Moving ahead on the border wall, however, faced immediate obstacles, starting with Trump’s promise that Mexico would foot the bill. In his first phone call with his Mexican counterpart, Enrique Peña Nieto, Trump pushed hard. “If you are g­ oing to say that Mexico is not g­ oing to pay for the wall, then I do not want to meet with you guys anymore, b ­ ecause I cannot live with that,” he said. “My position has been and ­will continue to be very firm saying that Mexico cannot pay for that wall,” countered Peña Nieto. A frustrated Trump implored him to not say such ­t hings in public: “But you cannot say that to the press,” Trump replied. “The press is g­ oing to go with that, and I cannot live with that.”11 Without resolving how the wall would actually get funded, the Trump administration quickly moved ahead with soliciting contractor proposals. The guidelines included stipulations that the wall must be strong enough to sustain blows for up to four hours from “sledgehammers, car jacks, pickaxes . . . ​propane or butane or other similar hand-­held tools.” Other instructions ­were that it had to be “physically imposing in height” and “impossible to climb.”12 The announcement generated some two hundred submissions, and several prototypes ­were constructed along the border south of San Diego in early 2018, which the president enjoyed posing in front of. Trump became obsessed with e­ very wall detail, right down to the color of the paint. The president initially insisted that the wall be solid concrete to look more formidable, but agents on the ground emphasized the operational need for a material that would allow them to see what was happening on the other side. He was eventually persuaded by the argument that concrete would be structurally unsound, but remained worried that the steel-­bollard alternative would not deter determined climbers. And, he emphasized, the wall “needs to be beautiful.”13 Long ­after the design had been finalized, Trump insisted that he wanted to incorporate sharp spikes and black paint on the bollards. At one point he apparently even fantasized about digging a border trench and electrifying the wall, and indicated that he hoped climbers would be injured.14 But beyond the obsessive planning, Congress still had not allocated any funding for the proj­ect, and Mexico was still insisting it would not pay for it. Trump remained undeterred. He told the National R ­ ifle Association, “­We’ll build the wall. D ­ on’t even think about it, that’s an easy one,” and promised his base, “If we have to close down our government, ­we’re building that wall.”15 In December 2018 Trump invited the media to cover a meeting with Senator Chuck Schumer, in

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which he took full responsibility for a government shutdown if that was what it would take to get his wall: “And I’ll tell you what, I am proud to shut down the government for border security, Chuck, b ­ ecause the p ­ eople of this country d ­ on’t want criminals and p ­ eople that have lots of prob­lems and drugs pouring into this country. So I ­will take the mantle. I ­will be the one to shut it down.”16 Schumer ­later described the meeting as Trump throwing a “temper tantrum” about the wall, while Trump boasted that he was pleased it got such high tele­vi­sion ratings.17 Trump would not budge on his wall pledge, telling Schumer, “The wall was why I was elected.”18 Up against the wall, Trump embraced the wall even more. And so rather than backing down, the president shut down the government for five weeks—­the longest government shutdown in the nation’s history. In a video sent to millions of his supporters, Trump affirmed his wall pledge with background images of mi­grants besieging the border: “It’s very dangerous out ­there. Drugs are pouring in, ­human trafficking, so many dif­fer­ent prob­lems, including gangs like MS-13.” He continued: “We d ­ on’t want ’em in the United States. We d ­ on’t want ’em in our country.”19 Trump also used his first nationally televised address to make his border wall pitch: “My fellow Americans,” he said on the eve­ning of 8 January 2019, “to­night I’m speaking to you b ­ ecause t­ here is a growing humanitarian and security crisis at our southern border.”20 But when Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer met with Trump the next day, they still refused to budge. The president abruptly ended the meeting with them ­after they told him the wall was not something they w ­ ere willing to discuss. “­We’re g­ oing to confront the national security crisis on our southern border, and ­we’re ­going to do it one way or the other,” Trump announced a­ fter the failed meeting. “It’s an invasion.”21 The Demo­cratic leadership kept saying they w ­ ere for “border security,” but for Trump that had to mean a wall: “Drones and all of the rest are wonderful and lots of fun, but it is only a good old-­fashioned wall that works!” Trump tweeted.22 ­After his nationally televised address, the president traveled to the border to campaign for his wall. In a photo op in McCallen, Texas, Trump surrounded himself with border agents and drugs, arms, and money that had been seized. “That says it all,” Trump said of the displayed seizures. But what he ­didn’t say was that most of it had come from law enforcement busts on international bridges and at official ports of entry, where a wall would be irrelevant. He also did not mention that the crime rate in McCallen was at an almost thirty-­year low, but instead warned, “You’ll have crime in Iowa, you’ll have crime in New Hampshire, you’ll have crime in New York without a wall.”23 The president spoke near an immigrant detention center, but did not go inside. When the government shutdown fi­nally came to an end without resolving the wall issue, the president’s next move was to declare a national emergency to

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justify diverting military funds to pay for his wall. By ­going all in on the border wall, Trump had disrupted the decades-­old Washington consensus on border security, which had deployed thousands of new agents, built hundreds of miles of new fencing, and spent billions on new surveillance gear. For Demo­crats and Republicans alike, promoting border security had been easy money po­liti­cally since the 1990s. Where ­t hings had always gotten contentious was about the interior, ­whether it was targeting employers or offering a path to citizenship for unauthorized mi­grants already in the country. Demo­crats had been more than willing to devote more resources to border security if Republicans would soften their stance on a path to citizenship. Indeed, part of the Demo­cratic calculus for supporting more border enforcement—at one point during the Obama years even offering to double the size of the Border Patrol to forty thousand agents—­ was that it would bring more Republicans on board for immigration reform legislation, which never happened.24 Demo­crats had been instrumental in the passage of the 2006 Secure Fence Act during the Bush administration, which called for some seven hundred miles of fencing along the U.S.-­Mexico border. But when the wall became the concrete manifestation President Trump’s anti-­ immigration message, it would prove impossible to get Demo­cratic buy-in. As the controversial centerpiece of Trump’s presidential campaign, the wall idea had become so po­liti­cally polarizing that to be pro-­wall was to be pro-­Trump. “A wall is an immorality—­it’s not who we are as a nation,” said House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, even as she pledged to support more funding for border security.25 Pelosi was still willing to play the old border game, devoting ever more resources to securing the southwest border, but not if Trump was ­going to now change the rules by insisting on his po­liti­cally charged wall.

Crackdown and Backlash Amid all the frontstage po­liti­cal ­battles over building the border wall, the Trump administration was busily trying to make life as miserable as pos­si­ble for mi­ grants crossing the border. Most of them ­were asylum-­seeking Central Americans, and rather than increase the government’s capacity to pro­cess their cases in a fair, timely, and humane manner (including providing more shelters, judges, and social ser­v ices), the administration’s approach was to do every­t hing pos­si­ ble to deter them from coming. Trump was preoccupied from the very start with the number of border apprehensions, boasting that the numbers ­were way down during his first months in office. He claimed at a rally in Kentucky, “Since the day of my election, w ­ e’ve already cut illegal immigration at the southern border by 61 ­percent—­think of that, 61 ­percent!—­and we ­haven’t started.”26 In July 2017

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Trump boasted, “You know, the border is down 78 ­percent.” He added, “­Under past administrations, the border d ­ idn’t go down—it went up.”27 But pointing to apprehension numbers as the indicator of his administration’s success put the president in an awkward bind when the numbers crept up that summer. And as the numbers ­rose, so did the temper of an embarrassed president who had made controlling the border his signature issue. Trump lashed out at his advisors, pushing them to come up with tougher mea­sures to get the numbers down. And so playing the border game u ­ nder Trump became increasingly punitive. In April 2018 Attorney General Jeff Sessions declared that the Department of Justice would impose a “zero tolerance” policy ­toward unauthorized border crossers. Rather than being something entirely new, this approach primarily involved fully enforcing preexisting federal legislation that criminalized unauthorized border crossings. The standard practice ­until that point was for first-­time offenders to be charged with a misdemeanor and then quickly released. But now they would be “met with the full prosecutorial power of the Department of Justice,” explained Sessions.28 This would include families, which in practice meant separating ­children from their jailed parents and reclassifying them as unaccompanied minors. “­Today we are h ­ ere to send a message to the world: we are not ­going to let this country be overwhelmed,” Sessions announced on 7  May in Border Field State Park south of San Diego. “If you are smuggling a child, then we ­will prosecute you, and that child ­will be separated from you as required by law.”29 The administration was utterly unprepared to deal with the chaotic consequences of its new policy.30 Six weeks ­after the ­family separation policy went into effect, more than two thousand ­children w ­ ere being held alone in mass detention centers while their parents awaited prosecution, and the government had no system in place to re­unite them. Hundreds of parents w ­ ere deported without their c­ hildren, and a number of c­ hildren died while in custody. The mounting ­human rights catastrophe turned into a self-­created public relations disaster for the Trump administration. The public outcry included former first lady Laura Bush condemning the zero-­tolerance policy as “cruel” and “immoral,” and the UN High Commissioner for ­Human Rights declaring that the Trump administration had committed “a serious violation of the rights of the child.”31 The barrage of media reports featured images of ­children in cages and an audio clip posted online of ­children crying out for their parents. The eight-­minute recording, taped by a staff person inside a detention center, appeared on ­every major media website that same day, and was played on the floor of the h ­ ouse by California Demo­crat Ted Lieu in front of the cameras. Reporters pushed the secretary of homeland security, Kirstjen Nielsen, for a response: “Have you seen the photos of ­children in cages?” “How is this not child abuse”?32 The miserable de-

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tention conditions that the administration had hoped would remain backstage, away from the public eye, ­were now frontstage and in the glare of the media spotlight. Within days President Trump issued an executive order ending the separation of immigrant ­children from their parents, but reaffirmed the administration’s commitment to zero tolerance. The night before the reversal, Trump commented to fellow Republicans that his d ­ aughter Ivanka had told him that the optics w ­ ere bad. “The crying babies,” he said, “­doesn’t look good po­liti­cally.”33 But even as Trump continued to crack down on mi­grants crossing the border, he was easing up on t­ hose who smuggled them. Unlike his pre­de­ces­sors, Trump redirected enforcement resources away from ­going ­a fter smuggling organ­izations and t­oward arresting, detaining, and deporting the mi­g rants themselves. During the first year of the Trump administration, the number of new mi­grant smuggling cases opened by the investigative arm of ICE plummeted by nearly 60 ­percent, from 3,920 to 1,671. By 2019, staffing at the ­Human Smuggling Cell, the specialized intelligence unit within ICE, had shrunk by more than half since 2016. Detentions and deportations ­were the clear priority.34 Meanwhile, business was booming for smugglers, with mi­grants paying as much as $7,000 per person for the clandestine crossing from the state of Tamaulipas to the Texas side of the river.35 According to one estimate, premium all-­inclusive smuggling packages—­involving direct bus ser­v ice from locations across Central Amer­i­ca to the U.S.-­Mexico border and paying off gangs and cops along the way—­could cost $10,000 or more, leaving mi­grants with enormous debts to pay off.36 ­These sorts of fees, in turn, predictably ensured new entrants to the h ­ uman smuggling business. Trump showed even less enthusiasm for targeting employers who hired unauthorized mi­grants. For instance, between March 2018 and March 2019, the Trump administration prosecuted more than 112,000 ­people for illegal entry or re-­entry, but prosecuted only 11 employers for hiring unauthorized workers.37 This was perhaps not surprising, given Trump’s own history of such unauthorized hiring at his resorts, golf clubs, and own residences—as maintenance workers, groundskeepers, and h ­ ouse­keepers.38 To the extent that the workplace was targeted, the focus was mostly on g­ oing ­after employees in high-­profile raids rather than the employers themselves. As a presidential candidate, Trump had advocated for the nationwide adoption of E-­Verify—­a government online system for verifying worker eligibility—­but he put it on the back burner during his presidency. ­There was not a lot of po­liti­cal pressure from his base to do other­w ise: as conservative pundit Ann Coulter put it, “We want that stuff too—­ but we also want a wall. . . . ​The chant at ­every campaign rally ­wasn’t, ‘Enforce E-­Verify!’  ”39

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Caravans and Soldiers to the Border As the long and arduous clandestine journey through Mexico to the U.S. border became increasingly risky and costly for Central American mi­grants fleeing criminal vio­lence and poverty (made worse by devastating hurricanes, drought, and crop failures), a growing number of them turned to an innovative mode of travel: ­human caravans, which provided both safety in numbers and avoided dependence on costly smugglers. The caravans could also be viewed as a strategic response to intensified government enforcement efforts to curb the transit of U.S.-­bound mi­g rants through Mexican territory.40 But what made practical sense for individual survival in a grueling journey was also po­liti­cally explosive—­and exploitable. By making largely invisible, offstage be­hav­ior hypervisible and onstage, right in the glare of the media spotlight, mi­grants ­were disrupting the rules of the game. The old rules involved quietly and covertly evading or paying off authorities along the way, not defiantly walking straight past them in large numbers in the m ­ iddle of the day with the cameras rolling. And while immigrant rights organ­izations and other sympathetic viewers cheered the mi­grant caravans on, o ­ thers jeered, and still o ­ thers panicked and sounded the alarm bells. Even if numerically ­these ­people w ­ ere a relatively small percentage of the mi­grants heading north, it was the hypervisibility of the caravans that mattered most. One supportive writer who joined up with a caravan described the experience as an exhilarating “form of civil disobedience against a global order.”41 But what for some was a narrative of empowerment and heroism, for ­others was a narrative of brazen and dangerous lawlessness. It was not entirely clear ­whether the caravans ­were prompting more ­people to pick up and move or simply provided a new mechanism to make an already planned trip. Regardless, what mattered po­liti­cally was that a northward trek that had been mostly out of sight was now intensely vis­i­ble and in the media eye—­and the biggest caravan of all was making international news headlines and headed for the U.S. border right before the November 2018 midterm elections. When a caravan of seven thousand mi­grants arrived at the Guatemala-­Mexico border in October 2018, the Mexican government deployed some five hundred federal anti-­riot police to block their entry. ­After a few days of an uneasy standoff, with immigrant rights advocates and journalists documenting e­ very move, the police eased up and let many through. Thousands of ­others simply circumvented the police and crossed into Mexico illegally, including forming a h ­ uman chain and wading across the river separating the two countries.42 Although this was not the first caravan or­ga­nized as a protective mea­sure against abusive cops and gangs, it was exceptionally large and continued to attract more media attention as it moved north.

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With Fox News daily reports playing up images of the caravan as it inched its way up ­toward the border, Trump jumped to attention. He claimed, without providing any evidence, that “criminals and unknown ­Middle Easterners” ­were part of the caravan headed to the border.43 He warned of a coming invasion: “I must in the strongest of terms, ask Mexico to stop this onslaught,” he tweeted on 18 October 2018. “And if unable to do so, I ­will call up the U.S. military and CLOSE OUR SOUTHERN BORDER!” Using catastrophic rhe­toric, the president announced that he was deploying thousands of active-­duty troops to the border to meet the threat. “This is an invasion of our country and our military is waiting for you!” Trump declared in late October. Secretary of Defense James Mattis opposed the move, but the president persisted, and fifty-­two hundred active-­duty troops ended up being sent to the border as part of Operation Faithful Patriot.44 At one point Trump publicly suggested that soldiers might shoot mi­grants if they threw rocks, but he was informed that d ­ oing so would be illegal. Undeterred, he reportedly l­ater suggested that soldiers should shoot mi­grants in the leg to slow them down. Trump’s aides repeatedly tried to explain to the president that the law prohibited the military from taking direct action—­they could build fences, set up tents and barbed wire, but not detain or arrest mi­grants.45 Trump used the caravan to help make the midterm elections about his favorite issue: the border and stopping mi­grants from crossing it. “A blue wave in November means open borders, which means massive crime; a red wave means safety and strength—­t hat’s what it is,” he proclaimed to his supporters at a rally in Charleston West ­Virginia. “A vote for any Demo­crat in November is a vote to eliminate immigration enforcement, throw open our borders, and set loose vicious predators and violent criminals. ­They’ll be all over our communities. They ­w ill be preying on our communities.”46 The message played to his wall-­obsessed base. According to Demo­cratic pollster Stanley Greenberg, Republicans who voted in the 2018 midterms cited “open borders” as their most impor­tant reason. Nevertheless, the message did not resonate with many voters outside of Trump’s base, and a majority ended up voting Demo­cratic.47 Still, Trump’s base was more energized than ever, and the dramatic scenes of caravan members arriving in Tijuana and being met with force and tear gas by U.S. authorities as they attempted to cross into the United States provided yet another way for Trump to justify his wall and rationalize deploying soldiers to the border. In his 2019 State of the Union speech, Trump highlighted that he had sent an additional thirty-­seven hundred troops to the border to c­ ounter the mi­grant caravans. He tweeted on 31 January 2019: “More troops being sent to the Southern Border to stop the attempted Invasion of Illegals, through large Caravans, into our country. We have s­topped the previous Caravans, and we w ­ ill stop t­hese also. With a wall it would be sooo much easier and less expensive. Being built!”48

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Meanwhile, conservative media commentators kept pushing the Trump administration to do more, sometimes sidestepping criticizing the president directly by instead blaming the bureaucracy. On 27 March 2019, Lou Dobbs told his viewers: “What has happened to our Department of Homeland Security, the department that slow-­walks the president’s demands to secure our southern border, while si­mul­ta­neously releasing tens of thousands of illegal immigrants into the United States?” Dobbs continued: “President Trump has declared a national emergency, sent the military to the border, yet DHS is para­lyzed. The world’s only superpower now appears suddenly defenseless and on its knees before Central American and Mexican illegal immigrants. Has the Department of Homeland Security SOLD OUT AMER­I­CA?” Dobbs told his audience that the top story that eve­ning was “The Department of Homeland Security surrendering our border.”49 Trump, a devoted watcher of Fox News, was hypersensitive to any negative coverage. He told the head of Homeland Security, Kirstjen Nielsen, “Lou Dobbs hates you. Ann Coulter hates you. Y ­ ou’re making me look bad.”50

Pushing Out the Border: Constructing the Mexico Wall As president Trump became increasingly frustrated and embarrassed about his inability to seal the border, he pointed an accusatory fin­ger at Mexico: “Mexico, whose laws on immigration are very tough, must stop ­people from ­going through Mexico and into the U.S.,” he tweeted. “We may make this a condition of the new NAFTA agreement. Our country cannot accept what is happening!”51 The president threatened to shut down the border u ­ nless he got the results he wanted. In late March 2019 he went so far as to announce, “If Mexico d ­ oesn’t immediately stop ALL illegal immigration coming into the United States through our southern border, I w ­ ill be CLOSING the border, or large sections of the border, 52 next week.” Even before Trump took office, he had a rocky relationship with Mexican leaders. Mexican President Peña Nieto was initially an out­spoken critic of candidate Trump, even comparing Trump’s tone to that of Mussolini and Hitler.53 For Peña Nieto, Trump’s anti-­Mexican rhe­toric was a con­ve­nient way to unite Mexicans around anything other than opposition to his presidency. His approval ratings ­were plummeting. He got into a twitter tit-­for-­tat with Trump about paying for the border wall, insisting that “Mexico ­w ill never pay for a wall.” But as Trump began to look like a pos­si­ble winner, Peña Nieto changed his tone and repeatedly expressed his willingness to work with whoever was elected. Candidate Trump spoke publicly of his wall plans while standing next to a ­silent Peña

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Nieto.54 Peña Nieto was heavi­ly criticized at home for appearing subservient to Trump, and left office as one the most unpop­u ­lar Mexican presidents in recent history. Succeeding Peña Nieto, Mexican president Andrés Manuel Lopéz Obrador entered office in December 2018 having vowed on the campaign trail that he would not do Washington’s “dirty work” when it came to ­handling Central American migration. He began his presidency by giving thousands of United States–­bound Central American mi­grants humanitarian visas allowing them to transit through Mexico. Lopéz Obrador promised a paradigm shift in migration policy, claiming a shift in focus from militarization to development. At first it was unclear if Lopéz Obrador’s rhetorical support for a dif­fer­ent approach to migration—­one that respected h ­ uman rights and addressed root ­causes—­would be reflected in his ­actual policies. Mexico was in the midst of delicate negotiations for a revised NAFTA, and it remained to be seen if Lopéz Obrador would be willing to risk the all-­important trade relationship. Nearly 80 ­percent of Mexico’s exports w ­ ere northbound, making the country acutely vulnerable to U.S. threats of border closures or a slowdown in cross-­border trade. It did not take long for Lopéz Obrador to fold u ­ nder U.S. pressure, and his administration soon began to do precisely the dirty work he had promised to avoid. On 30 May 2019, President Trump threatened to impose a 5 ­percent tariff on all Mexican exports entering the United States. The tariff would become effective on 10 June ­under the “International Emergency Economic Powers Act.” It would increase by 5 ­percent e­ very month to 25 ­percent—­and stay ­t here—if Mexico failed the task of ­running interference against mi­grants bound for the United States. Trump proclaimed, “Mexico cannot allow hundreds of thousands of p ­ eople to pour over its land and into our country—­violating the sovereign territory of the United States. If Mexico does not take decisive mea­sures, it ­w ill come at a significant price.”55 By 7 June 2019 an agreement with the Trump administration was reached giving Lopéz Obrador forty-­five days to prove Mexico could reduce the number of mi­grants crossing into the United States. The deal included Mexico’s promise to send as many as six thousand National Guard personnel to the border with Guatemala and another provision to expand the Migration Protection Protocol—­a controversial Trump program, other­wise known as the “Remain in Mexico” policy, that made asylum seekers in­def­initely wait in makeshift camps in Mexican border cities while their cases w ­ ere being pro­cessed in the United States. As a consequence, more than seventy thousand mi­grants became stranded on the Mexican side of the border, most of them living in extremely precarious conditions and targets for extortion, theft, and kidnapping. Tired and fearful of the long wait, some turned to smugglers to try get them across the border. Alternatively, Mexico

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offered asylum seekers one-­way bus tickets back to the southern border where they could self-­deport. As Mexico began its migration crackdown, reformist migration expert Tonatiuh Guillén López—­whom Lopéz Obrador had named to head Mexico’s Migration Institute—­submitted his resignation. Mexico’s prison director, Francisco Garduño Yáñez, was tapped to replace him. Paralleling the troop deployment on Mexico’s southern border, nearly fifteen thousand troops ­were reportedly also dispatched to the country’s northern border to block the movement of mi­grants into the United States.56 Lopéz Obrador presented the June 2019 deal to the Mexican public as a crisis averted with the United States and insisted that Mexico would continue to defend both its sovereignty and the rights of mi­grants. But more than ever, the pro-­ migrant rhe­toric rang hollow. The Mexican public was also becoming less sympathetic to Central American migration, with public opinion polls suggesting broad support for the government’s crackdown and rising xenophobic attitudes ­toward mi­grants.57 The results of the crackdown ­were immediate. Deployed troops of the newly formed Mexican National Guard, originally created to confront the country’s drug-­trafficking organ­izations, set up immigration checkpoints along a ­limited number of highways heading north from the border with Guatemala to apprehend, detain, and deport mi­g rants. They also reportedly raided ­hotels in the southern Mexican border states of Chiapas and Quintana Roo.58 Mexican ­authorities apprehended 132  ­percent more mi­g rants in Chiapas state and 190 ­percent more in Tabasco in the period a­ fter Trump’s tariff threat (June and July), compared to the same time in 2018. Deportations to Guatemala surged by 70 ­percent in the June–­July 2019 period, compared to the previous year. The majority of Mexico’s twenty-­nine detention centers quickly became overcrowded—­ some of them w ­ ere at 300 ­percent over capacity, according to the country’s National ­Human Rights Commission.59 The once highly vis­i­ble mi­grant caravans that so enraged Trump w ­ ere now broken up and dispersed, and the proliferation of more government checkpoints along traditional northbound transportation routes forced mi­grants to instead attempt the clandestine journey through more difficult and remote terrain (where they would be even more reliant on smugglers for safe passage). Mexico had clearly prioritized the trade relationship with the United States over the welfare of mi­grants. It had averted economic fallout with Washington in exchange for becoming Trump’s enforcer of U.S. immigration policy in the region. Lopéz Obrador named General Vicente Antonio Hernández Sánchez, the commander of the Tapachula military zone, to lead the force’s southern border efforts, indicating a greater militarization of Mexican immigration enforce-

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ment.60 And the militarization extended well beyond the southern border: former military officials w ­ ere now in charge of federal migration offices in a majority 61 of Mexican states. This po­liti­cal context infused López Obrador’s decision to travel to Washington in July 2020 (his first foreign trip as President of Mexico) with controversy. The official purpose of the visit was to celebrate the implementation of the United States-­Mexico-­Canada Agreement (USMCA). But the Mexican president stressed that the visit was more than about trade. In his eyes, it would bolster relations between Mexico and the United States, which in his estimation had greatly improved during his presidency: “My critics, our adversaries, ask how can I go [to the United States] if he [Trump] has offended Mexicans? I want to say to the ­people of my country that in the time ­we’ve been in government, ­t here has been a relationship of re­spect, not just ­toward the government but especially ­toward the p ­ eople of Mexico.”62 Trump had indeed been more respectful rhetorically, in sharp contrast to his 2016 campaign rhe­toric when he infamously labeled Mexican mi­grants as criminals, drug dealers, and rapists. But critics argued that Trump’s rhe­toric had softened b ­ ecause the Mexican president had accommodated Trump with a litany of concessions on migration and border enforcement. Indeed, some argued that Mexico not only ended up paying for a wall but actually built it—­t he country itself had become a de facto wall when it came to blocking U.S.-­bound Central American mi­grants.63 Meanwhile, U.S. diplomatic arm-­twisting extended beyond Mexico to the Northern Triangle. In 2018 the Trump administration began to push for “Safe Third Party Agreements”—­agreements stipulating that, if a mi­grant passes through a designated safe country on their way to the United States, they must claim asylum in that country and may be legally turned away by U.S. border officials. Safe third-­country designations are typically based on the assessment that the country in question has an asylum system functioning according to international standards and w ­ ill not put mi­grants seeking asylum at risk. On July 23 the administration threatened Guatemala with tariffs ­unless it agreed to a deal. Three days ­later, the two countries signed an “Asylum Cooperative Agreement” allowing the transfer of non-­Guatemalan asylum seekers from the United States to Guatemala.64 By late 2019 the administration had entered into similar agreements with Honduras and El Salvador. ­After having slashed $370 million in aid to the three countries as punishment over migration in June 2019, in the fall the administration announced that “targeted assistance” would resume ­after reaching the migration agreements.65 In his 2020 State of the Union address, President Trump highlighted t­hese agreements as part of his accomplishments: “Very importantly, we entered into

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historic cooperation agreements with the governments of Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. As a result of our unpre­ce­dented efforts, illegal crossings are down 75 ­percent since May, dropping eight straight months in a row.” Trump had reason to be especially pleased with Mexico: Just a few days e­ arlier, with riot gear and pepper spray, national guard troops had broken up a caravan of some four thousand mi­grants attempting to cross into Mexico on their way to the U.S. border.66 Thus, while many of Trump’s ambitions along the U.S.-­Mexico border w ­ ere never fully realized, he very much succeeded in outsourcing much the unsavory tasks of deterring, detaining, and deporting asylum-­seekers, moving it more offstage and out of sight. As long as this enforcement crackdown took place outside of U.S. territory, Trump could si­mul­ta­neously avoid a national outcry and claim some success.

Narco-­Terrorists and Corrupt Generals Part of President Trump’s rationale for a “big, beautiful wall” along the border was that it would help stop terrorists. Without providing any evidence, he boldly proclaimed at a Rose Garden news conference in early January 2019, “We have terrorists coming through the southern border ­because they find that’s prob­ably the easiest place to come through. They drive right in and make a left.”67 His press secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, was more than willing to invent scary statistics to back up Trump’s wild claims: “We know that roughly, nearly 4,000 known or suspected terrorists come into our country illegally, and we know that our most vulnerable point of entry is at our southern border.”68 ­These type of frightening, over-­t he-­top assertions received l­ ittle play beyond Fox News. But then President Trump found a way to make the terrorist threat south of the border suddenly real: redefine Mexican drug traffickers as terrorists. Presto, at the stroke of a pen, Mexico would instantly rise to the top of the list of terrorist threats facing the nation. Mexican traffickers would join a list of “foreign terrorist organ­izations” that included the Islamic State and al-­Qaeda. And the threat was not in faraway lands such as Af­g han­i­stan and Syria but right next door, in the nation’s own backyard. In an interview with former Fox News host Bill O’Reilly on 26 November 2019, Trump stated that Mexican trafficking groups “­w ill be designated” as terror groups b ­ ecause “we are losing 100,000 p ­ eople a year to what is happening and what is coming through Mexico.”69 Trump noted that his administration had been in the pro­cess of formalizing the terrorist designation for the previous ninety days. Such a designation was a serious ­matter: among other t­ hings, designating a foreign organ­ization as a terrorist group made

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it the target of special sanctions, including freezing assets, and made it illegal to knowingly offer support to the group. Mexican officials predictably reacted with alarm to the possibility that their country would soon have a dramatically elevated security threat status, and the government warned that any violations of its national sovereignty would not be acceptable. ­These worries ­were not unfounded, not only ­because of Mexico’s deep historical sensitivities and grievances—­losing more than a third of its territory in the Mexican-­American War—­but also ­because countries designated as a serious terrorist concern in the post–­September 11 era had invariably been the targets of major U.S. overt and covert interventions, including outright invasion and occupation. Trump had made it clear that he thought U.S. troops ­were needed in Mexico. ­A fter Mexican drug traffickers ambushed and massacred nine members of a Mormon ­family—­a ll dual U.S.-­Mexican citizens—in Sonora, Mexico, in early November 2019, Trump turned to Twitter to offer U.S. boots on the ground. “The cartels have become so large and power­f ul that you sometimes need an army to defeat an army!” he wrote to his Mexican counterpart, President Lopéz Obrador.70 The Mexican government’s response was to say no thanks. But it was not hard to imagine why Mexico might fear that the United States might not always ask for permission if traffickers w ­ ere now designated as terrorists. Entrenched drug corruption, which had long plagued Mexican institutions, could plausibly even be recast by Washington as a form of “harboring terrorists.” The terrorist label had always been malleable, fuzzy, and politicized—so much so that the United Nations could not agree on a formal definition—­but Trump’s move to designate traffickers as terrorists involved a new level of imaginativeness. Mexico, of course, could quickly c­ ounter with its own label-­stretching moves: ­after all, b ­ ecause most of the firearms seized from Mexico’s “terrorist-­ traffickers” originated in the United States, Mexico could plausibly define U.S. gun manufacturers and the hundreds of U.S. gun shops near the border as aiders of terrorism. Notoriously loose U.S. gun laws, and a lack of po­liti­cal w ­ ill and capacity to stem the flood of smuggled guns south, was clearly a top external security threat for Mexico. Mexico could go even further and designate the United States as the leading funder of terrorism, given that U.S. drug consumption was what was enriching the trafficker-­terrorists. Trump was deafeningly ­silent about ­t hese forms of U.S. complicity in the escalating drug vio­lence in Mexico. In 2018 t­ here w ­ ere more than thirty-­t hree thousand drug-­related hom­ i­cides in Mexico—­a 15 ­percent increase from the year before and a rec­ord high. ­After hurried meetings between U.S. and Mexican officials in Mexico City in early December 2019, the Mexican government was relieved when Trump agreed

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to shelve his plan to designate traffickers as terrorists, averting another diplomatic crisis. “Even the threat of designation was useful leverage in terms of ­obtaining further cooperation” from Mexico, explained one se­nior Trump administration official, noting that reviving the plan continued to be “a live possibility,” depending on how much Mexico cooperated on issues such as stopping mi­g rants and drugs from crossing the border. Mexican foreign minister Marcelo Ebrard expressed his gratitude to the United States for delaying the plan, promising that “­there w ­ ill be good results.”71 Notably, Mexico intensified its targeting of high-­level traffickers, a “kingpin” strategy long favored by Washington as a metric of drug war pro­g ress despite the strategy’s l­imited success in stemming drugs and growing evidence that it actually fueled more drug vio­lence. The “good results” that most concerned President Trump, however, had much more to do with curbing migration than drug trafficking and related vio­lence. Indeed, Mexico’s newly created National Guard, which was supposed to take on precisely the drug-­trafficking organ­izations that Trump threatened to label as terrorists, was now diverted to immigration control duties to impress and appease Washington. Meanwhile, the drug war in Mexico raged on, with Lopéz Obrador sending mixed messages about Mexico’s commitment to fighting it. While on the campaign trail, he had boldly declared that he would de-­escalate the drug war and send soldiers back to the barracks. One of his campaign slogans was “abrazos, no balazos”—­hugs, not gunfire. But once he was in office, it was clear that t­ here would still be plenty of balazos. His biggest move was to announce the creation of the National Guard—to grow to 150,000 strong over three years—­composed of members of the military and police u ­ nder a single command. With the commanders and training coming from the military, and more than two-­t hirds of the force coming from military police transferred from the army and navy, this move seemed to be a continuation of the militarized approach of his immediate pre­de­ces­sors. As one Mexican security analyst put it, “­Really the national guard is the military, disguised as nonmilitary.”72 ­There ­wasn’t even much of a disguise: Lopéz Obrador would ­later announce plans to make the National Guard a branch of the army.73 Mexico’s military bud­gets continued to grow through the antidrug offensive, despite per­sis­tent accusations of widespread h ­ uman rights violations and lack of oversight and accountability. As plans to create the National Guard moved forward in early 2019, the army claimed that its latest buildup of military equipment was necessary to support the new force. Even as the bud­gets of other government agencies shrank during Lopéz Obrador’s first two years in office, defense spending shot up by almost 40 ­percent.74 Ever-­greater reliance on the military to perform law enforcement tasks reflected the country’s chronic failure to build an

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effective professional police force. Mexico’s dramatic escalation of the military’s drug war role in late 2006 was pitched as a stopgap move ­until more professional and less corrupt civilian forces could be developed, but the counterproductive result was to instead inhibit and substitute for such development. The military bud­get had doubled since 2006, to approximately $5.6 billion in 2020.75 And as the role of the military grew, so did its po­liti­cal influence. This real­ity became starkly evident during a crisis in U.S.-­Mexico drug diplomacy sparked in October 2020 when U.S. authorities arrested former Mexican defense minister General Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda on drug-­trafficking charges while he was at the Los Angeles airport. During his time as defense minister, the general had been the point person for the military’s frontline role in the drug war, and he spearheaded the passage of a 2017 security law that cemented the military’s role in fighting drugs and or­ga­nized crime—­a law that had been roundly criticized by the United Nations and h ­ uman rights organ­izations. Never before had such a high-­level Mexican military official been charged for colluding with traffickers, prompting outrage within the Mexican government and within the military leadership in par­tic­u­lar. Most upset ­were Cienfuegos’s military colleagues who ­were still in top-­level positions, and speculative media reports on who might be implicated next added fuel to the fire. U.S. officials claimed they had a long trail of evidence that the general, whom they said was known as “El Padrino” (the godfather), had colluded with the H-2 drug cartel (an off-­shoot of the Beltran-­ Leyva drug-­trafficking organ­ization), between late 2015 and mid-2017, taking bribes both to look the other way and to target the organ­ization’s rivals. A furious Mexican government insisted the United States return the general to Mexican soil, where he was subsequently exonerated without a trial. His arrest in the United States, and then the Mexican government’s unwillingness to even investigate the charges upon his return, sent shock waves through Mexico and had a deeply chilling effect on U.S.-­Mexico antidrug cooperation. Lopéz Obrador, who had made fighting corruption a centerpiece of his administration, even accused U.S. prosecutors of having “fabricated” the allegations against the general. The president’s critics, in turn, charged that he had capitulated to the military, a close po­liti­cal ally that he had become deeply dependent on and could not afford to alienate.76 ­There was no real civilian oversight of the military beyond the president himself. Fortunately for Lopéz Obrador, growing U.S. reliance on Mexico to carry out its immigration control agenda made it harder for Washington to pressure Mexico on the drug war front. Curbing migration was the clear U.S. priority, reducing U.S. leverage when it came to drug enforcement. And Lopéz Obrador was far more willing to go a­ fter Central American mi­grants than one of his own top generals. So, while Mexico quickly caved to U.S. pressure on migration, quite

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the opposite was the case when it came to drug trafficking. In what appeared to be at least in part retaliation for the general’s arrest, in December 2020 Mexico ­adopted a new law restricting cooperation with U.S. drug enforcement agents operating in the country. The new law stripped agents of their diplomatic immunity and required them to share all information with Mexican authorities.77 The Mexican government even ­stopped approving visas for DEA agents stationed in Mexico. The public response from Washington, caught up in the tense aftermath of a disputed presidential election, was strikingly muted. ­Behind the scenes, however, the cooperative drug war relationship with Mexico that had been carefully cultivated for de­cades was now in disarray. Mexico’s support for the Merida Initiative—­t he $3 billion U.S. aid program that had been the cornerstone of cross-­border security cooperation since 2008—­had already declined considerably ­under Lopéz Obrador, but would be officially declared dead by Mexican authorities in the coming months. U.S.-­Mexico drug war politics devolved to the finger-­pointing and distrust of the late 1980s—­except the Mexican military was now in charge of the antidrug campaign with l­ ittle accountability or oversight, the trafficking organ­izations ­were now more numerous and better armed, and the country was plagued by rec­ord levels of drug vio­lence. Moreover, traffickers’ repertoire of psychoactive exports had diversified to include more synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamines and fentanyl (up to fifty times more potent than heroin), which ­were even harder to suppress.

Pandemic Border Politics In late February 2020, as the United States recorded its first coronavirus death, President Trump declared, “Border security is also health security.” The “diseased mi­grant” who threatens U.S. public health was added to the litany of narratives deployed to justify mi­grant exclusion. Using disease as a pretext to exclude “undesirables” through border controls was a centuries-­old playbook with a long history in the United States and elsewhere.78 The U.S. Immigration Act of 1891 had prohibited the entry of criminals, polygamists, prostitutes, contract laborers, and ­those with a “loathsome or contagious disease,” and from 1898 to 1915 the proportion of immigrants denied entry to the United States on medical grounds jumped from 2 ­percent to more than 30 ­percent.79 In the 1900s the Irish w ­ ere accused of bringing in cholera and the Italians for spreading polio. Fast-­forwarding to more recent years, President Trump’s chief adviser on immigration, Stephen Miller, had a pre-­Covid track rec­ord of proposing that public health powers be invoked to tighten U.S. border controls.80

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­After declaring a national emergency in March 2020, the Trump administration restricted all nonessential travel across the country’s borders. U ­ nder the so-­called border ban, mi­grants, including asylum seekers and unaccompanied ­children, w ­ ere e­ ither immediately turned away at border crossings or detained and quickly expelled to Mexico in an average of ninety-­six minutes. Starting in March, almost all border enforcement encounters w ­ ere pro­cessed ­under a new category—­ “expulsions,” or Title 42 cases, referring to individuals who may be “expelled to the country of last transit or home country in the interest of public health.” Critics denounced the move as a cynical ploy. Charanya Krishnaswami, an advocacy director for Amnesty International, commented: “This ban was never about the pandemic, and it was never about public health . . . ​t he Trump administration is weaponizing Covid-19 to achieve the policy objective its sought from Day 1: shutting the border to p ­ eople seeking safety.”81 Trump also used the pandemic to bolster his case for a border wall, despite the fact that top public health officials stated that ­t here was no evidence that physical barriers would prevent the spread of the virus.82 In late May, Trump commented, “Mexico is having a very, very hard time, as you know, with ­COVID, especially along the border . . . ​w ith Tijuana and vari­ous places along the border. And fortunately, we have a brand-­new wall along t­ here, and the wall is saving us.”83 A week ­later, in early June, Trump described Tijuana as “the most heavi­ly infected place anywhere in the world, as far as the plague is concerned.”84 The real­ity was that many U.S. cities, including San Diego just across the border, had higher virus mortality rates than Tijuana. Late that same month the president traveled to the border at Yuma, Arizona, commemorating the completion of two hundred miles of “power­f ul border wall . . . ​t he most power­f ul comprehensive border wall structure anywhere in the world” that has “­stopped covid.”85 The wall was credited for saving countless lives by stopping drugs, criminals, and now too, infectious disease. The March 2020 pandemic border closure mea­sure known as Title 42 effectively suspended U.S. asylum laws in the name of public health, enabling border officials to expel mi­g rants without pro­cessing their claims. The United States was not alone in taking advantage of the pandemic crisis to keep out mi­g rants. During the pandemic, Mexico deported most of its detained mi­ grant population, citing concern about COVID-19 spreading in detention facilities. In March  2020, Mexico’s National Institute of Migration had 3,579 foreign nationals h ­ oused throughout its sixty-­five detention facilities and shelters. By the end of April the number had dropped to 106 mi­g rants.86 Mexican officials reportedly bused mi­g rants to the southern border with Guatemala, where many ­were left to self-­deport themselves back to their home countries.87

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The Wall a ­ fter the Wall Donald Trump’s loss to Joe Biden in the 2020 presidential race prompted immediate speculation about the fate of Trump’s border wall and his restrictive immigration policies more generally. Trump officials, meanwhile, scrambled to speed up wall construction along the border—­much of it in areas where crossings w ­ ere relatively uncommon—­before Biden took office. The wall would remain far from complete, but Trump was determined to get as much of it built as pos­si­ble by the end of his term. Perhaps predictably, one of Trump’s last acts before leaving office was to proudly tour a section of the border wall that he had promised his base, which he used as a con­ve­nient backdrop for boasting about his successes and railing against his opponents. The partially built wall would be the most vis­i­ble, concrete legacy of his presidency. On the day that he was sworn in, President Biden declared that “building a massive wall that spans the entire southern border is not a serious policy solution. . . . ​It ­shall be the policy of my Administration that no more U.S. taxpayer dollars be diverted to construct a border wall.”88 But while the new administration quickly put a stop to new wall construction, with some newly erected quarter-­mile fragments of the wall connected to nothing at all, ­there was no commitment to tear down any of what had already been built. That would be an extraordinarily expensive de­mo­li­tion job, and would provide a ready-­made prop for po­liti­cal opponents looking for a highly vis­i­ble symbol of the new administration’s lack of commitment to border security. Indeed, some po­liti­cal opponents ­were quick to use half-­completed wall segments along the border as a photo op to call on Biden to finish the job—­other­w ise, the imagery suggested, Biden was leaving the border wide open. Republican senator Lindsay Graham, for example, pointed to a gap in the wall along the Arizona border as an invitation to unauthorized migration: “Nothing around h ­ ere makes sense u ­ nless you plug this hole,” he said.89 The real­ity was that most of what had been erected by that point had simply replaced or reinforced fencing that had already been ­t here before. In that sense, the wall proj­ect was more about reinforcing existing barriers than about building something entirely new. The Trump administration had devoted $16.45 billion to fund 794 miles of border wall between fiscal years 2017 and 2021, with most of it diverted from the Defense bud­get. Of the 455 miles of wall that w ­ ere actually built during the Trump years—­mostly in Arizona and New Mexico, at a cost of over $20.7 million per mile—­only 49 miles ­were built in places where no previous barrier existed: 158 miles replaced shorter pedestrian fencing, 193 miles replaced existing vehicle barriers, and 55 miles ­were new or replacement secondary fencing. All in all, 703 miles of the 1,970-­mile-­long border ­were now

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fenced off. In places where upgrades ­were made to existing fencing, border officials installed plaques giving Trump credit for fencing that had actually been built by his pre­de­ces­sors.90 Moreover, even as the Biden administration halted construction on Trump’s border wall, it was as enthusiastic as any previous administration about building a high-­tech “smart” wall that would be more po­liti­cally palatable and less visibly controversial than a physical wall. This included deploying more motion sensors, infrared cameras, aerial drones, lights, and other devices to detect unauthorized border crossings.91 Biden’s proposed immigration bill prioritized “smart border controls,” including $1.2 billion in screening technology and infrastructure such as radars, surveillance towers, and biometric facial recognition data-­processing capacity. Lobbying from the border security industry remained as intense as ever, and indeed thirteen leading border security executives and top employees actually contributed three times more to Biden than to Trump in the 2020 presidential election (with the exception of companies providing private detention ser­v ices, which continued to f­ avor Republicans).92 While Biden quickly moved to repeal some of Trump’s most extreme immigration restrictions and toned down the shrill border rhe­toric, the vast border enforcement machinery built up over de­cades continued to grind on. While Biden pushed to end Trump’s controversial “Remain in Mexico” policy for asylum seekers (which was ­later reinstated through a lower-­court ruling that the Supreme Court refused to block), he continued Title 42 expulsions that had been justified by the Trump administration as part of the public health response to the global pandemic. While he ended Trump’s construction of a hard border wall, he earmarked funds for a “smart” wall. He also kept in place many of the troops Trump had dispatched to the border, and the Pentagon announced the deployment would be extended at least ­until September 2022.93 And while Biden was not overtly coercing Mexico into acting as a buffer country through tariff threats, he was luring Mexico into the same function through benefits like vaccines. In March 2021, Mexico declared its southern border closed to nonessential travel and deployed more security personnel to its border with Guatemala.94 Mexico’s renewed crackdown occurred in the context of si­mul­ta­neously occurring talks with Washington on vaccines and immigration, prompting speculation that millions of doses of surplus AstraZeneca vaccines ­were being sent to Mexico in return for help stemming Central American migration.95 Biden continued his pre­de­ces­sor’s practice of encouraging southern neighbors to use military force to block mi­grants, but added a humanitarian rationale: “We’ve secured agreements for them to put more troops on their own border. Mexico, Honduras, and Guatemala have all agreed to do this,” announced Tyler Moran, special assistant to the president for immigration for the Domestic Policy

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Council. “That not only is g­ oing to prevent the traffickers, and the smugglers, and cartels that take advantage of the kids on their way ­here, but also to protect ­those ­children.”96 As of June  2021, Mexico had sent 6,244 troops and 1,449 national guardsmen to its southern border states to bolster immigration control. In late August, Mexico’s defense secretary, General Luis Cresencio Sandoval, told journalists that “detaining all migration” was now the top mission of the military in the country’s border zones.97 Mexico’s military crackdown at its southern border generated chaos and fear among mi­grants and prompted them to “seek more dangerous routes to avoid detection and deportation,” noted Mexican immigration expert Eunice Rendon.98 Another away-­from-­the-­border move by the Biden administration was to increase foreign aid to Central Amer­i­ca, pitched as promoting development to give would-be mi­grants reasons to stay home. The administration announced $310 million in emergency aid to Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala in April 2021 for humanitarian relief, with $104 million earmarked for asylum seekers, internally displaced p ­ eople, and refugees. The call to “stem the flow” by addressing “root c­ auses” stood in stark contrast to Trump’s law-­and-­order approach and built on Obama’s “Alliance for Prosperity” program, which in 2014 allocated $1.6 billion in aid to the Northern Triangle ­after the wave of unaccompanied minors arrived at the U.S.-­Mexico border. Biden’s new twist was to condition f­ uture aid on good governance and anticorruption measures—an approach that would be immediately tested, given that the president of Honduras was u ­ nder investigation in U.S. federal court for cocaine trafficking (his ­brother had already been convicted as a co-­conspirator). Critics argued that prior aid to the region had empowered corrupt regimes, and that the spillover effects of the U.S.-­promoted drug war in the region contributed to the vio­lence driving so many to flee north. Even as a long-­term strategy, it was not at all clear that development assistance would significantly stem migration, given that the poorest municipalities in countries such as Honduras w ­ ere not the highest senders of mi­grants. Economic despair certainly mattered, but research findings pointed to the importance of access to smuggling networks, ­family ties in the United States, and capacity to pay for the trip as key determinants in the decision to migrate.99 Meanwhile, changing the toxic orga­nizational culture of the U.S. border enforcement agencies that had become hyper-­politicized u ­ nder Trump would be an especially daunting task. A long-­entrenched culture that not only tolerated but rewarded and protected abuse and resisted oversight and accountability had only gotten worse during the Trump years.100 Within the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Patrol—­w ith over sixty thousand employees (of which some twenty thousand w ­ ere Border Patrol agents)—­had grown to

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be not only the largest federal law enforcement force but also the most abusive.101 It was also easily the most corrupt—­mostly involving bribe-­taking to facilitate drug trafficking and mi­grant smuggling—­which was a chronic prob­lem that long predated the Trump administration.102 It did not help ­matters that the Border Patrol had experienced such a dizzying pace of growth since the 1990s that “No trainee left b ­ ehind” was a favorite joke at the Acad­emy.103 Indeed, the difficulty of attracting and retaining personnel had been a major impediment to the Trump administration’s plans to hire an additional five thousand agents. Entrance standards, screening, and training had all suffered, while overseeing a massive border enforcement apparatus became ever more unwieldy and vulnerable to corruption. Years of anxiety about an out-­of-­control border, it seems, had produced an out-­of-­control Border Patrol.104 “Border Patrol brings to the position a strong paramilitary self-­identity, believing they are not restrained by the same constitutional restraints placed upon all of law enforcement,” noted a former head of internal affairs for U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It was perhaps no surprise, therefore, that Border Patrol agents w ­ ere arrested at approximately five times the rate of any other U.S. law enforcement force, with the figure in 2019 reaching a five-­year high of 286 officials.105

The Politics of the Post-­T rump Border Game By the time Joe Biden took office, the politics of the border game had clearly changed. From the Clinton era through the Bush and Obama years, ­t here had been bipartisan consensus on the need for more border security. But Trump had made the border such a polarizing, defining issue of his presidency that border security had become a po­liti­cal minefield. Playing the border game, especially in regards to the treatment of mi­grants, was now much harder for Demo­crats: If they ­were seen as too tough, they ­were vulnerable to attacks from the left that they ­were immoral and behaving like Trump, but if they ­were seen as too soft, they w ­ ere vulnerable to attacks from the right that they w ­ ere for “open borders.” In other words, if not played just right, the border game could be a border trap. Many Demo­crats, including President Biden, no doubt wished to simply change the subject and turn attention away from the border. Republicans w ­ ere not about to let that happen, and w ­ ere quick to pounce on any perceived Biden border liability. Biden’s first months in office included a sharp rise in the number of apprehensions along the southern border. April 2021 was the Border Patrol’s busiest month in more than two de­cades, though still

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lower than the highest points in the 1990s. And the numbers remained high in the months that followed, defying the traditional pattern of reduced crossing attempts during the summer heat. Apprehensions in July ­were the highest level since 2000, averaging more than sixty-­seven hundred arrests per day. ­These numbers ­were certainly high, but also highly misleading due to double-­counting. A much larger proportion than usual w ­ ere repeat crossers: as a result of the Covid-19 restrictions that began u ­ nder Trump and w ­ ere extended u ­ nder Biden, most apprehended mi­grants at the border w ­ ere being immediately sent back, giving them the opportunity to quickly try again, sometimes multiple times on the same day. That meant that the number of encounters reported ­were much higher than the ­actual number of ­people trying to cross the border for the first time. During the first nine months of FY2021, fewer p ­ eople attempted to make the border crossing for the first time than during the first nine months of FY2019.106 Nevertheless, conservative critics immediately attributed the high apprehension numbers to the Biden administration’s more “welcoming” stance t­oward mi­grants, calling it “disorder at the border by executive order.”107 One Republican congressman and member of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border Security put it: “Biden’s executive action to stop wall system construction, his reversal of deterrent-­focused Trump policies, and his endless public statements in 2020 about open borders and easy illegal entry and transforming Amer­ i­ca into a sanctuary nation are directly responsible for the border crisis, which has indeed become a serious threat to our republic.”108 Con­ve­niently not mentioned was the fact that the world was in the midst of a global pandemic, with far-­reaching economic consequences disproportionately affecting job security in developing countries—­the same countries mi­grants w ­ ere leaving. The New York Times reported in May 2021, “At the U.S.-­Mexico border in recent months, agents have ­stopped ­people from more than 160 countries, and the geography coincides with the path of the virus’s worst devastation.”109 In April almost a third of all families apprehended along the border ­were not from Mexico or Central Amer­i­ca. This unpre­ce­dented spike in the number of mi­grants from nontraditional sending countries included thousands of Brazilians, Ec­ua­ dor­ians, and Venezuelans. According to the Economic Commission on Latin Amer­i­ca and the Ca­rib­bean, the pandemic had produced the “worst social, economic and productive crisis” in 120 years.110 Further magnifying the migration pressures, Honduras and Guatemala ­were still reeling from a pair of devastating hurricanes in late 2020. Adding to the border challenge, a growing number of expelled mi­grants w ­ ere sending their ­children to attempt the crossing into the United States alone, well aware of a November 2020 federal court ruling barring the expulsion of unaccompanied ­children. March 2021 saw a rec­ord number of unaccompanied child

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arrivals at the border. Biden’s conservative opponents w ­ ere now the ones using images of detained c­ hildren to attack the administration: “The Biden administration’s reckless open-­border policies have created a humanitarian crisis for ­unaccompanied minors coming across the border,” declared Governor Greg Abbott of Texas. “With no plan in place, the administration has created heartbreaking and inhumane conditions for c­ hildren who are being held in Texas.”111 Abbott neglected to mention, of course, that if Biden had truly been pursuing an “open-­border” policy, no ­children at all would be detained. Regardless of the reason, nature, and magnitude of the migration flow, managing the border had become an immediate po­liti­cal liability for post-­Trump Demo­crats. Using the border as a po­liti­cal prop to showcase resolve against amorphous threats in symbolic assertions of territorial sovereignty had for more than two de­cades before the rise of Trump been a staple of border politics across the aisle. Trump changed the game by “owning” border security, centering it in his harsh anti-­immigrant rhe­toric and pursuing it with punitive crackdowns and unpre­ce­dented theatrics. The domestic po­liti­cal backlash portrayed Trump-­style border security as morally repugnant and inhumane, making it exceedingly difficult for Demo­crats to now take back the issue of border security and play the same old border game. Trump “owned” border security in that he had taken the po­liti­cal game of “who can be tougher” to its most extreme conclusion. It was an act that was now impossible for Demo­crats to follow. Unable to compete on the “out-­toughing” front, they therefore attempted to recast their border moves as being “smarter”—­hence the renewed enthusiasm for “smart walls” based on the latest surveillance and detection technologies. Biden’s poll numbers suggested that he faced strong disapproval when it came to his ­handling of immigration ­matters. In a July ABC/Ipsos poll, only slightly more than a third of respondents approved of the way the administration was ­handling “immigration and the situation at the U.S.-­Mexico border.” And in August only 25 ­percent of respondents in a Suffolk University/USA ­TODAY poll approved of Biden’s ­handling of immigration. Slowing migration—­and pushing it more offstage, and out of sight and out of mind for U.S. publics—­was a clear priority and perhaps unpre­ce­dented in its po­liti­cal urgency for a Demo­cratic president. The border predicament for the Biden administration played out during Vice President Kamala Harris’s visit to Guatemala and Mexico (her first international trip) in early June, with curbing migration at the top of the agenda. She was attacked from the left for telling Guatemalans, “do not come” to the border, and attacked from the right for not including a visit to the border in her travel itinerary. One media commentator put it, “It is a bad week when you have equally outraged both Alexandria Ocasio-­Cortez and Fox News.”112 Ted Cruz placed any

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failures at the border on Harris’s shoulders by labeling her the “border tsar,” a title she never wanted, and blasted the vice president for not ­going to the border. One group of Republicans displayed a milk carton with a picture of the vice president with the headline “MISSING AT THE BORDER.”113 Harris could not have been pleased that her first job assignment was to be the administration’s point person on managing migration, which the media immediately portrayed as being in charge of the “border crisis.” Her handlers tried, to no avail, to clarify that she was not focused on the border but rather on addressing the “root c­ auses” of Central American migration. The vice president did not help ­matters when she bungled questions about why she had not been to the border. In an interview with NBC’s Lester Holt, Harris got defensive when pressed about ­going to the border: “We’ve been to the border. So this ­whole t­ hing about the border—­we’ve been to the border.” Holt then pointed out that she, in fact, h ­ adn’t been to the border, to which she replied: “And I ­haven’t been to Eu­ rope. And I mean, I ­don’t understand the point that ­you’re making.” White House officials ­were reportedly “perplexed” by Harris’s “ill-­prepared answers.”114 The next day Harris’s office announced that the vice president would in fact be visiting the border. So as much as Harris tried to resist the border game, in the end she was forced to play along, even if she was not particularly skilled at it. Questioning the game or opting not to play was not po­liti­cally acceptable. Meanwhile, state-­level Republicans did every­thing they could to keep the ­border in the headlines and depict the Biden administration as soft on border security. In an unpre­ce­dented move, the Republican governors of Arizona and Texas asked their republican counter­parts in other states—­including Ohio, South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Arkansas, and Florida—to send to the border armed personnel, ranging from National Guard troops to Highway Patrol troopers. The collective show of force on the Arizona and Texas borders conveyed the message that ­there was a growing border crisis that the federal government was refusing to address. As explained by Florida governor Ron DeSantis, “Where the federal government has failed, the states are stepping up into ­doing our best to fill the void.”115 Some governors ­were even turning to private donors to help cover the cost.116 Texas governor Greg Abbott declared a state of disaster at the end of May 2021, asking state law enforcement “to prevent the criminal activity along the border, including criminal trespassing, smuggling, and ­human trafficking, and to assist Texas counties in their efforts to address ­those criminal activities.”117 In his disaster declaration, the governor said that “President Biden’s open-­border policies have paved the way for dangerous gangs and cartels, h ­ uman traffickers, and deadly drugs like fentanyl to pour into our communities.”118 The Texas governor even pledged to restart construction on Trump’s wall, paid for in part through a crowdfunding campaign to raise money from private

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donors. Signaling his continued loyalty to the former president, the governor invited Trump to tour the border with him on 30 June  2021. In accepting the ­invitation, Trump said in a statement, “The Biden administration inherited from me the strongest, safest, and most secure border in U.S. history and in mere weeks they turned it into the single worst border crisis in U.S. history. It’s an unmitigated disaster zone.”119 During the border tour, the former president falsely claimed that his wall had been nearly completed when Biden took office. “Within a few months you would have had the wall totally complete and they ­were ­going to paint it,” Trump said. “They w ­ ere supposed to paint the wall. They ­aren’t even ­doing that. They got to get a coat of paint on the wall. Believe it or not, it does rust. Maybe that’s what they like—­let it rust, let it rot.”120

7 ENDLESS ESCALATION? BORDER POLICING TRAJECTORIES

Borders are “back with a vengeance.”1 The business of bordering is booming, most visibly evident in a surge in border barrier construction.2 Unlike centuries past, the main perceived border security threats are not military invaders but transnational law evaders, with the smuggling of mi­grants and drugs topping the list of concerns. This border dynamic has been most strikingly evident along the territorial divides between lands of wealth and lands of poverty, nowhere more dramatically so than the U.S.-­Mexico border and the external borders of the Eu­ro­pean Union. What historian Timothy Snyder and I described as “the Wall around the West” more than two de­cades ago has been built up into a far more expansive and militarized border enforcement apparatus.3 Focusing on the dynamics of policing on and across the U.S.-­Mexico border, my purpose in this book has been to explain the sharp escalation of enforcement and its distinct trajectories across time and policing missions. Since the early 1990s, policing the flow of mi­grants and drugs through this border has gone from being a low-­priority and low-­profile activity to a highly vis­i­ble campaign attracting intense po­liti­cal attention. My explanation for this escalation has highlighted the role of policy feedback effects and the primacy of image management and symbolic politics. Escalation has provided a po­liti­cal mechanism for coping with the perverse and often unintended consequences of past policy choices and has generated considerable rewards for lawmakers and law enforcers by signaling a commitment to territorial integrity and projecting an image of territorial authority. At the same time, the per­sis­tent failures and negative side effects of escalation ­either have been glossed over or have fueled calls for further escalation. 138

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The rush to fortify the boundary between the United States and Mexico is particularly striking ­because it has come at a time when the two countries have enthusiastically constructed a border-­free North American economic space. The retreat of the state in the name of market liberalization has been matched by the reassertion of state policing in the name of market criminalization. The simultaneous creation of a borderless economy and a barricaded border may seem paradoxical and has certainly created some awkward policy tensions and dilemmas. Yet as I have stressed, part of the po­liti­cal proj­ect of turning the border into a more expansive economic bridge has also involved making it a more formidable barrier. For t­ hose state actors who have helped orchestrate the rolling back of the state to promote the economic opening of borders, ­t here is nothing contradictory about also rolling forward the policing apparatus of the state to patrol borders more intensively. On both sides of the U.S.-­Mexico divide, a liberalizing state is not necessarily a less interventionist state. Thus, for example, when President Clinton declared the “end of the era of big government” in his 1996 State of the Union address, he also announced the appointment of a military general to lead a reinvigorated antidrug campaign and stressed that his administration was the first to get serious about securing the nation’s borders against unauthorized immigration. Two de­cades l­ ater President Trump was gutting government regulations while deploying troops to the border and building a wall. Rolling back the state, it seems, has been less about dismantling the regulatory state than about retooling and redeploying it. The same can be said of Mexico, which has under­ gone sweeping market reforms and privatization while si­mul­ta­neously turning its military into a frontline drug and immigration control force. The U.S.-­Mexico border is in many ways distinctive: it is the most heavi­ly traveled land crossing in the world and also one of the most heavi­ly fortified. Nowhere e­ lse has the state so aggressively loosened and tightened its territorial grip at the same time. Nowhere e­ lse have the contrasting state practices of market liberalization and criminalization more visibly overlapped. Yet in some re­spects ­t hese border dynamics epitomize the changing relationship between rich and poor countries generally. Back in the 1970s, third-­world re­sis­tance to the first world’s promotion of economic liberalism was a major source of international friction.4 Following the debt crisis of the 1980s, however, most developing countries a­ dopted the tenets of economic liberalism through sweeping market reforms, IMF-­style structural adjustment programs, and greater integration with the global economy. Perhaps ironically, it is now the advanced industrialized states that are most resistant to economic liberalism, building up their protective walls against two of the developing world’s leading exports: drugs and mi­ grants. Many developing countries have in essence taken literally the advice of

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Western free-­market proponents by engaging in t­ hose activities that provide them with a comparative advantage and market niche. In many cases t­ hese under­ground economy exit options are crucial sources of employment and revenue, helping to cushion the painful shocks of the market-­based economic restructuring pro­cess. Imposing higher tariffs in the form of more intensive policing has helped to deny but not defy this sobering real­ity. The degree of tension and conflict between the developing countries of the Global South and the advanced industrialized countries of the Global North ­w ill no doubt continue to depend significantly on how they manage and cope with this less celebrated, clandestine side of their economic relationship.

Border Narratives The story line of border policing can take vari­ous forms, directing attention to some facts and not to o ­ thers and offering an interpretation of ­those facts. The narrative that has dominated much of the official policy debate in Washington, for example, characterizes borders as being ­under siege by clandestine transnational actors, with the smuggling of drugs and mi­grants drawing most of the attention. It is a nostalgic narrative that assumes that borders w ­ ere once much more effective barriers. For ­those who consider borders “out of control,” the narrative has provided a rallying cry to “regain control.” Support for this viewpoint has not been ­limited to conservative voices calling for a border wall. ­After the Cold War, then-­ senator John Kerry (D-­MA) even drew an analogy between old and new border threats: “Historically, many wars began with border incidents, one country probing the protective membrane of another. In the war with the transnational criminal organ­izations, our borders are flouted regularly, w ­ hether by smugglers carry­ing narcotics or trading in the most precious and pathetic commodity of all—­human beings.”5 Although this sort of comparison between military threats and transnational crime threats does more to inflame passions than enlighten minds, it very much reflects the sense of urgency that has come to grip policy circles. This popu­lar border narrative contains impor­tant truths. Border laws are constantly ­v iolated, sometimes violently, in ways that mock the territorial credibility of the state. The narrative ultimately conceals more than it reveals, however. For one t­ hing, it is misleading. Characterizing policing efforts as simply a defensive response to the clandestine cross-­border flow of drugs and mi­g rants glosses over the ways in which state practices have powerfully conditioned and even encouraged such flows (often unintentionally) and con­ve­niently draws attention away from the enormous domestic demand for mi­grant ­labor and psychoactive substances.

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The dominant border narrative is also incomplete. It suffers from historical amnesia. Urgent appeals to “restore borders” forget the fact that, with rare exceptions, the deterrent effect of borders has long been more imaginary than real.6 From a broader historical perspective, the development of comprehensive border controls is relatively recent. And it is the very existence and enforcement of such controls, a­ fter all, that has made it necessary for many border crossers to try to circumvent them. In other words, rather than simply reflecting the impotence of the state, clandestine cross-­border flows also reflect the power of the state to determine who and what have authorized territorial access. The border narrative I offer in this book suggests that the escalation of policing has been less about deterring than about image crafting. Judging border controls primarily in terms of their technical success or failure to meet the stated instrumental goal of deterrence misses much of what ­t hese territorial practices are all about. Border enforcement is certainly about deterrence, but it is also about propping up state claims to territorial authority and symbolically reaffirming the traditional po­liti­cal bound­aries of an “­imagined community.” As Timothy Mitchell reminds us, “Setting up and policing a frontier involves a variety of fairly modern social practices—­continuous barbed-­w ire fencing, passports, immigration laws, inspectors, currency controls, and so on. Th ­ ese mundane arrangements . . . ​help manufacture an almost transcendental entity, the nation state.”7 From this perspective, statecraft is not just about power politics and deploying material resources; it is also about image politics and deploying symbolic resources. State power is based on physical capabilities and coercion, but it is also fundamentally based on legitimacy and its symbolic repre­sen­ta­tion.8 This conception of statecraft, rooted in a so­cio­log­i­cal understanding of laws and their enforcement, has informed much of my narrative of border policing. Laws are not only forms of direct social control but also carriers of meanings: “The police,” noted the late sociologist Joseph Gusfield, “represent the vis­i­ble presence of t­ hose meanings, meanings that are always somewhat fictive and problematic, but which are nevertheless maintained.” Laws establish and maintain moral bound­aries: “The public drama of law provides the expectations and perceptions of what is normal and acclaimed and what is deviant and condemned. It tells us what is publicly admissible.”9 The symbolic function of law is nowhere more apparent than in the criminal justice system. Prohibiting and punishing are “signifying practices” that communicate where authority is located, how order and community are to be maintained, and where to expect threats.10 From this view, border policing should be seen not simply as a strategy of deterrence but also as a ritualistic per­for­mance.11 When the failures of the deterrence effort lead to a per­for­mance crisis, the performers save face by promising

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a bigger and better show. The audiences may cheer or jeer, but the need for the per­for­mance is rarely seriously questioned. An effective per­for­mance, however, requires much more than tough talk and promises. As the U.S.-­Mexico border experience illustrates, the po­liti­cal and bureaucratic allure of enhanced enforcement is that it has delivered perceptually and symbolically useful indicators of state activity: smugglers arrested, drugs seized, mi­grants deported, and so on. ­These vis­i­ble signs of state resolve, however, have created the conditions for further escalation: smugglers who respond with more sophisticated border-­crossing methods provide a rationale for even more intensive and extensive policing. ­Those officials charged with the task of securing the border can thus si­mul­ta­ neously praise their enforcement pro­gress and point to the emergence of a more formidable enforcement prob­lem—­which in turn justifies more funding. Escalation, in other words, feeds on itself. And so the border game of law enforcement and law evasion continues on. The official indicators used to evaluate the game are ambiguous and therefore easy to manipulate. Almost any outcome (for example, e­ ither a decrease or an increase in drug arrests and seizures) can be po­liti­cally interpreted both as a sign of law enforcement pro­gress and as a sign that much more enforcement is needed. Many official objectives—­such as increasing “interagency coordination,” improving “bilateral cooperation,” and “disrupting” smuggling patterns—­are so vaguely defined that they defy precise mea­sure­ment. The game score is often recorded in the form of “body counts”—­smugglers busted, drugs interdicted, mi­grants expelled, and so on. Many of the indicators used as evidence of law enforcement success (such as the higher fees smugglers charge mi­grants) also benefit smugglers. And many of the mea­sures emphasized by the law enforcers to show they have been playing hard (more drugs interdicted, more smugglers caught) may actually indicate more smuggling. Some of the most popu­lar “metrics” used to evaluate the enforcement performance—­miles of fencing built, number of motion detectors installed, new agents deployed, and so on—do more to signal activity than to mea­sure effectiveness. Yet rather than challenging the indicators used to assess the game, most policymakers have simply pushed for playing harder. Their public statements have had more to do with reaffirming a moral commitment to staying in the game than with any fundamental appraisal of the logic of the game itself. This does not mean that the border game has not changed over time. As ­we’ve seen, the playing greatly intensified in the 1990s, became more securitized and militarized in the aftermath of September 11, and then became hyper-­politicized during the Trump era. With more players, an expanded playing field, and bigger and more demanding audiences, the game has gotten harder and harder to play. The stakes have grown, the casualties have mounted, and the costs have mushroomed.

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Border Lessons Border narratives have prescriptive implications. Lessons drawn from the narrative determine which policy options are considered legitimate and which ones are dismissed or ignored. The border narrative that informs much of the Washington policy debate, for instance, defines the prob­lems of drugs and unauthorized immigration primarily as the combination of externally driven threats and inadequate defenses to repel them. As then-­representative John L. Mica (R-­FL) once put it in the case of drug trafficking: “The correlation between a loose border and ­human misery in this country is obvious.”12 The policy solution thus seemed equally obvious: tighten border controls. And when d ­ oing so fails to achieve adequate deterrence, then tighten some more. For de­cades now, politicians from across the po­liti­cal spectrum have pushed for more border agents, more and better inspection and surveillance technologies, more enforcement collaboration with Mexico, and so on. In short, rather than questioning w ­ hether or not to escalate, the policy debate has largely revolved around how and how much to escalate. But continued escalation of border enforcement, although it has been po­liti­ cally and bureaucratically rewarding, has too often merely chased the symptoms of deeper prob­lems not located along the border itself. Take, for instance, the enormous domestic demand for mind-­a ltering substances and cheap mi­grant ­labor. The continued unwillingness of the United States to fully recognize and confront the demand side means that the flow of drugs and mi­grants has kept ­going around, under­neath, or through the border defenses—­ensuring a thriving business for both law enforcers and law-­evading smugglers. For de­cades, ­domestic mea­sures to curb the demand for drugs (treatment, education, and prevention) have long taken a distant back seat to supply-­focused law enforcement. Of the billions of dollars the federal government has annually spent to combat drugs, about two-­t hirds has typically focused on supply reduction and only one-­t hird on demand. It has long been recognized that this has not been based on cost-­effectiveness. A RAND study from more than two de­cades ago found that $34 million invested in treatment reduced cocaine use as much as $366 million invested in border interdiction or $783 million invested in source-­ country programs.13 Efforts to interdict the supply have never had much impact on the domestic price and availability of drugs, and even dramatic improvements in interdiction are unlikely to change this fact.14 An abundant supply and the high profits of the illicit trade make drug seizures a relatively small cost of d ­ oing business for smugglers. To make ­matters worse, the growing popularity of hyper-­ concentrated and compact synthetic drugs such as fentanyl has made border interdiction an even more in­effec­tive enforcement tool.

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The heart of the nation’s drug prob­lem is chronic drug use, most alarmingly reflected in an opioid epidemic with skyrocketing overdose deaths. It is therefore first and foremost a public health prob­lem rather than a law enforcement and security prob­lem.15 The surgeon general rather than the attorney general or a military general should arguably be leading the antidrug campaign. Hard-­core drug users in the United States, though they are a relatively small percentage of the total drug-­using population, consume the bulk of the imported drug supply. Washington’s approach to reducing demand has long been driven primarily by a combination of neglect and punitive mea­sures: access to treatment has been woefully inadequate, and many drug users have been locked up for non-­ violent drug offenses, only to find drugs easily available in the nation’s vast prison system. The United States has by far the highest incarceration rate of advanced industrialized countries—­w ith extreme racial disparities in sentencing—­partly thanks to harsh mandatory minimum sentencing for drug law violators.16 The scant attention paid to the demand side is equally evident in the case of immigration control. Of all advanced industrialized nations, the United States imposes some of the toughest penalties on the smuggling of mi­grants and related activities yet is one of the most lenient with ­those who employ them. While the policy debate is dominated by the discourse of “stopping the flood of immigrants” and “controlling the border,” only a negligible portion of the immigration control bud­get has been devoted to enforcing the country’s anemic employer sanctions laws. Equally impor­tant, existing workplace rules—­minimum wages; overtime pay; environmental, health, and safety regulations—­have long been only loosely enforced. Comprehensive enforcement of ­these rules would make it more difficult for employers to engage in the extreme exploitation of workers (both immigrant and nonimmigrant) and would thus undermine employers’ most impor­tant incentive to hire unauthorized l­abor. However modest the impact might be, an emphasis on regulating the workplace and raising ­labor standards would bolster worker rights and go much further ­toward addressing the root of the prob­lem than would tougher border enforcement. A policy shift away from the border and t­oward the workplace, however, is po­liti­cally difficult, ­because it would no doubt cause an allergic reaction among employers who have long been accustomed to minimal state intervention. Some readers might draw a cynical, Machiavellian lesson from this book: that the escalation of border enforcement may be a march of folly, but it nevertheless remains a smart policy path precisely ­because it offers a perceptually appealing po­liti­cal salve for an extraordinarily difficult set of prob­lems that have no easy short-­term solutions. Machiavelli himself might as well have had the border in mind when he stated that “men in general make judgements more by appearances than by real­ity, for sight alone belongs to every­one, but understanding to few,” and

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advised rulers to “keep the p ­ eople preoccupied with festivals and shows.”17 The economist Jagdish Bhagwati has articulated this view with candid clarity. Long before such initiatives as Operations Gatekeeper and Hold-­the-­Line ­were conceived or Trump’s border wall was promised, he pointed to India’s experience to illustrate the po­liti­cal benefits of a symbolic show of U.S. force on the border: Border enforcement would be sufficiently vis­i­ble to satisfy ­t hose who feel that we should be “­doing more” to regain control of our border. In public policy, the advantage of such vis­i­ble, symbolic action is much too understated. Where a prob­lem is not capable of total solution, such action acquires ­great importance. Thus, while I believe that the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s decision to construct a fence along the enormous India-­Bangladesh border in the State of Assam was an in­effec­ tive policy . . . ​I believe that it was nevertheless a splendid policy. For, to be seen to be ­doing nothing at all, even though one could not ­really close the border, would have been po­liti­cally explosive since it would have been read as indifference or indecisiveness. And building the fence was the least disruptive way of d ­ oing nothing while appearing to be 18 ­doing something! From this perspective, stupid policies can be smart politics. My narrative of policing the U.S.-­Mexico border is to a significant extent a story about the po­ liti­cal success of flawed and failing policies. Donald Trump even succeeded in winning the presidency by pledging to build an expansive border wall. Yet as I have also stressed, the enforcement buildup has done far more than simply proj­ ect an appearance of “­doing something,” for the collateral damage has been enormous and continues to grow. In the case of U.S. immigration control, thousands of mi­grants have died (mostly from exposure or dehydration) as they have been pushed to attempt entry in more hazardous terrain away from urban areas.19 Harsher penalties have meant that t­ hose who are caught may languish in overcrowded private detention centers. In some border areas where inland checkpoints have proliferated, the enforcement crackdown has generated growing complaints from local residents that their communities have come to feel like occupied territories, with racial profiling standard practice. Enforcement pressure has also made mi­grants much more reliant upon the clandestine underworld of or­ga­nized smuggling. Far from seriously deterring unauthorized immigration, then, the border enforcement offensive has instead turned mi­g rant smuggling into a more expansive, corrupting, and profitable business. And this, predictably, has provided a policy justification for increasingly treating unauthorized entries as an or­ga­nized crime prob­lem. Or­ga­nized crime, in turn, has been officially defined as a national security threat.

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Despite the billions of dollars invested, the sprawling border enforcement apparatus built up over the years to ­handle the mass migration of Mexicans looking for work has proven grossly inadequate and a mismatch when it comes to managing the growing number of Central American asylum-­seekers (many of them families or unaccompanied c­ hildren). Pushing Mexico to crack down on ­t hese desperate mi­grants on their way to the border has made them even more vulnerable to extortion, kidnapping, rape, and other forms of extreme vio­lence and abuse by criminals and corrupt authorities. This perilous situation predated the Trump administration but was made far worse by a po­liti­cal leadership overtly hostile ­toward immigrants and determined to cut off access to the asylum pro­cess in the name of border security. Rather than retooling and re­orienting the vast border enforcement apparatus to more effectively pro­cess asylum claims in a humane manner, the Trump administration treated asylum-­seekers as a criminal and security threat. Escalation has not only stretched and distorted the criminal justice systems on both sides of the border but has also propelled a militarization of the border that now extends throughout Mexico, targeting both drugs and mi­grants, with deeply troubling implications for h ­ uman rights and civil–­military relations. And it should not be forgotten that an e­ arlier phase of drug enforcement escalation is what created such a sizable border drug-­smuggling business in the first place: squeezing the Colombian cocaine pipeline in the Southeast rerouted it to the Southwest, dramatically elevating Mexico’s role in the illicit trade. The crackdown on Colombia’s traffickers failed to reduce the drug supply but succeeded in massively expanding the power and wealth of Mexico’s traffickers. It thus fueled greater border corruption on both sides of the line, deepened the integration between ­legal and illegal cross-­border commerce, and made the drug prob­lem an even more challenging issue in bilateral relations. And the Mexican government only added fuel to the fire, sparking skyrocketing vio­lence as it carried out an ever-­more militarized campaign against trafficking organ­izations.

More Militarization? It might be tempting to conclude that the escalatory dynamics along and across the U.S.-­Mexico border must inevitably lead to increasingly more militarized forms of enforcement. As w ­ e’ve seen, antidrug operations on the Mexican side of the borderline are already largely in the hands of the military, and Mexico’s newly created National Guard (substantially composed of military personnel) has been turned into a de facto immigration control force. ­These developments, in turn, may provide further po­liti­cal ammuni-

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tion and legitimacy for t­ hose who advocate a greater military role on the U.S. side of the line. Starting in the 1990s, proposals to send in the troops have proven especially popu­lar during the U.S. election season, when the border has often served as a con­ve­nient po­liti­cal stage. Republican presidential candidate Lamar Alexander once even proposed creating a fifth branch of the armed forces that would focus on border control tasks. More recently, weeks before the November 2018 ­midterm elections President Trump declared that he was sending thousands of active-­duty soldiers to confront mi­grant caravans at the border. And in revving up his own re-­election campaign, in late spring 2021 the governor of Texas not only dispatched National Guard forces to the border but asked Republican governors across the country to send reinforcements. Some voices within the U.S. military have also long advocated expanded border enforcement duties for the troops. As the Cold War came to an end, one former army officer suggested that with the military looking for new work, an “easily accomplished mission for existing forces would be patrolling the borders. It is, of course, absurd that the most power­ful nation on earth cannot prevent a swarming land invasion by unarmed Mexican peasants. The U.S. Army is entirely capable of plugging the holes permanently, and border duty would be excellent military training.”20 Writing in the military journal Par­ameters at a time when the border enforcement boom was just getting ­going, Major Ralph Peters argued that the “domestic employment of the military appears an inevitable part of our own ­future, at least on our borders and in some urban environments. . . . ​[We are living in a] terribly changed and rapidly changing world” where, he noted, illegal immigrants, terrorists, drug lords, and or­ga­nized crime are among the most serious threats. “The U.S. armed forces,” he urged, “must change with that world, and must change in ways that are fundamental.” He concluded: “It is painful to write this. . . . ​Selfishly, I do not want my Army to change, and my secret fantasies run more to Sherman at Shiloh than to tracking desperate, malnourished economic refugees. . . . ​It is a miserable prospect to be an officer faced with the need to argue in f­avor of filthy missions that w ­ ill never entirely succeed and which w ­ ill lend endless ammunition to ­those who loathe the institution that has given worth to my life. I wish it could be other­wise.”21 Some prominent security analysts have even advised that the United States should prepare for full-­scale military action not only along but across the ­border. In The Next War, published more than two de­cades ago, former secretary of ­defense Caspar Weinberger described key potential ­future conflicts that U.S. ­national security strategists should be ready for. In the war scenario closest to home, sixty thousand U.S. troops are deployed to the southwestern border ­after a  radical nationalist leader takes power in Mexico with the help of p ­ owerful

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­ rug-­trafficking interests, and the resulting chaotic situation has turned the northd ward flow of p ­ eople and drugs into a flood. Unable to plug the border holes, Washington launches a full-­scale military invasion. Some six months ­later, law and order have been restored south of the border. The State Department’s postwar strategic assessment of the conflict criticizes the failure of U.S. intelligence to foresee the crisis but praises the military’s readiness to intervene.22 Fortunately, this scenario has so far remained in the realm of fiction. But President Trump at various times certainly seemed to flirt with this option, w ­ hether in response to drug violence or mi­grant caravans, if for no other reason than to add pressure on Mexico to further militarize enforcement on its side of the border. In the spring of 2020, the president reportedly favored launching U.S. military commando raids against drug traffickers in Mexico but was talked out of it by his aides; and that same spring, Stephen Miller, Trump’s top advisor on immigration ­matters, even proposed sending 250,000 U.S. troops—­one sixth of the armed forces—to seal the border (the idea was quashed by defense secretary Mark Esper).23 Such an extreme level of border militarization is inhibited by official opinion in several quarters. Importantly, a much more expansive U.S. military role has long been opposed by the law enforcement community. While welcoming vari­ ous forms of military assistance in a support role, enforcement bureaucracies such as the Border Patrol jealously guard their turf. In 2018, the head of the national ­Border Patrol ­union even described the mission of National Guard troops on the border at that time as a “colossal waste of resources.”24 A significantly greater ­border role for the military is also widely opposed by mainstream po­ litical elites and by much of the military establishment itself, which considers the border a distraction. It should be remembered that when President Trump deployed more troops to the border in late 2018, some of the loudest grumbling came from within the military. Rep. Ruben Gallego (D-­Ariz), a former marine and member of the House Armed Ser­vices Committee, told Army Times, “It feels warm and fuzzy to say that we have guys with camouflage down on the border, but it’s just politicians playing with ­people’s emotions. [The troops] ­don’t actually end up being effective, and ­you’re eroding our military capability for real threats.”25 At the diplomatic level, a far more expansive and vis­i­ble U.S. military presence on the border would have poisonous consequences for cross-­border ties—­ both in relations between Washington and Mexico City and in relations be­tween  local communities along the border. Full-­scale militarization would have a disastrous impact on h ­ uman rights and could significantly impede the cross-­border commerce—­more than tripling since the mid-1990s—­that both countries have enthusiastically promoted. Sealing the border by military means may be technically feasible (remember the Iron Curtain) but is incompatible with maintaining an open demo­cratic society and sustaining one of the ­nation’s

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most impor­tant trading relationships. It would ultimately also be counterproductive by destabilizing Mexico, helping to create the very crisis situations and mass refugee flows that U.S. national security planners wish to avoid.

De- ­e scalation? So if full-­blown border militarization has its limits, what are the prospects for de-­escalation and demilitarization? In recent years a growing number of scholars, journalists, and mi­grant rights advocates have even pushed for “open borders” as a way to roll back immigration controls.26 Border barriers that impede the f­ ree movement of p ­ eople are denounced as inhumane and immoral for sustaining extreme levels of racial and economic in­equality, with some provocatively labeling the enforcement of borders a form of “global apartheid.”27 Open borders for Central American mi­grants, one historian suggests, would help make up for a long, notorious history of U.S. military meddling, coup plotting, economic exploitation, and support for deeply corrupt and repressive regimes in the region.28 And as global warming most negatively impacts the poorest regions of the world, including Central Amer­i­ca, the United States and other rich countries most responsible for causing such devastating climate change should at least be expected to open their borders to the growing exodus of “climate refugees.”29 Other open-­borders advocates have stressed that t­here is a self-­interest a­ ngle ­here as well: the United States, like most nations in the advanced industrialized north, is an aging country with stagnant population growth (the growth rate during the past de­cade has been the slowest since the 1930s); and they note how much the country benefited eco­nom­ically from having more open borders for migration for much of its early history.30 But not all agree on what the economic impact would be from open borders in the ­future. Some radical scholars believe it would fundamentally subvert capitalism by geo­graph­i­cally unshackling the workers of the world, whereas some liberal economists, f­ ree market advocates, and libertarians argue that such openness is precisely what capitalism most urgently needs.31 Regardless, such sweeping appeals to open borders have so far mostly fallen on deaf ears in official policy circles. Perhaps the geographer ­Reese Jones is right that someday we may view border barriers to the ­free movement of ­people as being just as antiquated and unjust as slavery and colonialism, which at one point ­were also taken for granted and assumed to be unchangeable.32 But that day seems a long way off. And in the meantime, the “open borders debate” in intellectual circles is a nondebate inside the beltway: ­t here are certainly no congressional hearings weighing the costs and benefits of open borders. As a po­liti­cal slogan, “open borders” has had even less traction in mainstream public discourse

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than has “defund the police.” Both slogans are a response to legitimate, long-­ standing grievances regarding the inhumane and often racist treatment of vulnerable groups and individuals, ­whether on the border or on city streets. But as policy prescriptions they have not only lacked sufficiently broad public appeal but have been weaponized by opponents. As we have seen, conservative politicians and media commentators have even turned “open borders” into a favorite dismissive slur against their po­liti­cal adversaries, and Demo­crats are wary of being smeared by the label. Some progressive po­liti­cal strategists who other­w ise ­favor open borders have therefore cautioned that explic­itly taking this stance is a po­liti­cal trap to be avoided.33 ­Whether one likes it or not, much of day-­to-­day politics is about the art of the pos­si­ble, a game of compromise that can be dismayingly far from what may be most desirable. The chronic po­liti­cal miscalculation of so many Demo­crats, ­however, has been to naively bet that their pragmatic support for ever more border security can somehow woo enough conservatives to back a fundamental overhaul of the nation’s dysfunctional immigration system. This has yet to happen and shows ­little prospect of happening anytime soon. Congressional efforts to pass comprehensive immigration reform bills have stalled again and again since 2006. A far cry from open borders, part of such an overhaul would be a modest move ­toward more open borders—­including providing a path to citizenship for the country’s unauthorized immigrant population living in the shadows, and substantially raising the ceiling on the number of visas given out each year. Yet even this more l­ imited reform agenda has so far proven po­liti­cally illusory. In the meantime, displays of territorial authority performed at the border are likely to remain po­liti­cally appealing even if also po­liti­cally contentious. Following de­cades of hyper-­globalization freeing up cross-­border trade and financial flows, politicians have stubbornly clung to the notion that they can at least continue to make a good showing of controlling the cross-­border movement of ­people—­except that of globe-­trotting elites and passport holders from wealthy countries, of course, who have long enjoyed the privileges of open borders. Thus, while we may not see the completion of a border wall spanning the entirety of the U.S.-­Mexico border anytime soon, its symbolic appeal as a sovereignty prop is likely to keep wall-­talk on the agenda. Indeed, one can expect that “finish the wall!” ­will be a popu­lar rally chant and po­liti­cal slogan in f­ uture Republican electoral campaigns. But the “walls” that are likely to m ­ atter most in the f­ uture are t­ hose that cast an increasingly long shadow beyond the physical borderline itself, not only regionally but globally.34 This continues the trend ­toward more policing and surveillance activities beyond borders, and, most recently, outright outsourcing of the dirty work of detention, deterrence, and removal to Mexico and Central

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American countries through restrictive migration deals akin to t­ hose signed by Eu­ro­pean Union members with Turkey, Libya, and other countries.35 Making migration management and asylum pro­cessing “someone ­else’s prob­lem” ­bottles up mi­grants in buffer countries, keeping them more out of sight and out of mind of both h ­ uman rights and national-­security-­sensitive domestic publics. Pushing a regional humanitarian crisis outside the orbit of U.S. media coverage diffuses ­national outrage, which has been a key mobilizing tool for migrant-­rights organ­ izations. With migratory flows diverted through proxy borders that only sporadically make front-­page headlines, the U.S.-­Mexico border can be portrayed as more “­under control” and an enduring symbol of state authority and territorial integrity. This scenario further “thickens” U.S. borders in that it continues to push the external perimeter outward, into and beyond Mexico. It remains to be seen, however, w ­ hether the ultimate reward for Mexico’s agreeing to be even more of a buffer state ­w ill be to ease restrictions on the entry of Mexican mi­grants into the United States. If the composition of unauthorized migratory flows at some point shifts again and returns to being predominantly Mexican (and ­t here has already been an uptick in the number of Mexicans apprehended at the border), the Mexican government w ­ ill certainly not cooperate the way it has been in stemming the flow of Central Americans and other third-­country nationals. The United States may then grudgingly opt to give preferential treatment to Mexicans, including through the issuance of more work visas, in exchange for Mexico’s continuing to harden its southern border. This selective border-­opening scenario is clearly not what open-­borders advocates have in mind, but it would surely be welcomed by Mexico. It is in the realm of drugs, notably marijuana, where a selective de-­escalation of enforcement may soon be on the horizon. Interdicting marijuana has traditionally taken up much of the time of U.S. border inspectors and their drug-­ sniffing dogs, so much so that one trick used by traffickers has been to deliberately send an easily detectable low-­value load of marijuana through the port of entry to distract agents while sneaking in higher-­value loads of more potent drugs. Marijuana seizures—­historically the most common type of drug bust along the border—­have ironically served as a de facto form of pot protectionism, with domestic marijuana producers the biggest unintended beneficiaries. And legalization of the crop in states such as California, Washington, and Colorado has given them an even greater competitive edge over their Mexican counter­parts— so much so that smuggled California marijuana exports now dominate a booming boutique consumer market in Mexico.36 The jobs of U.S. border inspectors would certainly be easier if they did not have to spend so much of their time and energy weeding out weed.

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With more and more U.S. states legalizing marijuana for recreational use (the f­ uture l­ egal status of the drug at the federal level remains highly uncertain), and Mexico now following in Canada’s footsteps by moving ­toward legalizing the plant as well, the day in which Mexico lobbies to make marijuana part of the official North American trade relationship may not be too far off. And projecting even further ahead, it is not at all clear how competitive Mexican marijuana producers would ultimately be in this new ­legal market environment. Just as ­free trade decimated Mexico’s domestic corn producers, who faced tough competition from U.S. agribusiness a­ fter NAFTA, U.S. and Canadian growers may in the end have the upper hand in a l­egal North American marijuana trade (especially if much of the manual l­ abor is done by cheap mi­grant workers). But while marijuana may in the not-­too-­distant ­f uture be removed from the border game, t­ here is no sign that the rest of the game-­playing between drug law enforcers and evaders w ­ ill ease up any time soon, especially given its maddeningly self-­perpetuating logic: cracking down on routes, methods, and traffickers simply leads to harder to police routes and methods and the rise of more evasive and brutal traffickers. One trafficking organ­ization’s loss is another’s gain. Even as Mexico has proven highly capable of eliminating individual traffickers—­most of the targeted “kingpins” from the 1990s and 2000s have been killed or captured—­this has not reduced trafficking.37 Moreover, the ensuing new turf ­battles for control of trafficking routes and border hubs further fuel the vio­ lence that militarized government crackdowns w ­ ere supposed to quell. We’ve seen this vicious dynamic again and again. And if the past is any guide to the ­f uture, we can expect it to continue. By some estimates, t­ here have been more than 200,000 drug-­related killings in Mexico since 2007, with the death toll continuing to mount at a rapid rate. One pos­si­ble development that would bring some relief to Mexico and the border is a greater geographic dispersion of the drug trade, such as a partial move back to the Ca­rib­bean trafficking routes that w ­ ere once the main gateway for Colombian cocaine bound for the United States. ­There are already some signs of such a shift, including via the use of GPS-­guided submersible and semisubmersible vessels. This is an alarming trend from a U.S. national security perspective, ­because the delivery mechanism can transport more than drugs, but it is actually a positive development from the perspective of reducing drug vio­lence and other collateral damage along trafficking routes. A ­ fter all, the more removed the illegal drug trade is from ­legal commerce, population centers, and regular transportation channels, the better. It would be a positive change if the trade ­were pushed more out to sea and even u ­ nder the sea. Of course, if the use of submersibles and semisubmersibles ­were to ­really take off, it would provide a rationale for the government to adapt and deploy the U.S. Navy’s latest submarine de-

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tection technologies for counterdrug purposes. To date, t­hese submersibles typically require a small crew, but one can easily imagine the development of unmanned remotely controlled vehicles. This remote-­control scenario applies not only to sea transport but also to air transport. The proliferation of aerial drones ­w ill certainly continue in the coming years, and drones have the potential not only to provide surveillance and targeted strikes but also to carry illicit cargoes such as drugs (especially low weight, highly compact, and ultra-­potent synthetic opioids). ­There have already been scattered reports of small, inexpensive “narco-­drones” flying across the border.38 As drones become capable of hauling bigger loads, this smuggling method may become more popu­lar—­which would predictably prompt the development of new anti-­drone policies, strategies, and technologies. At the same time, governments can be expected to incorporate more and more drones into their antidrug arsenals. As ­we’ve seen, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security already operates a small fleet of satellite-­controlled Predator-­B drones along the border that w ­ ere originally used for military operations in the M ­ iddle East and elsewhere. The U.S. Coast Guard has similarly begun to use ScanEagle—­a ten-­ foot-­long drone similar to one first used by the U.S. military in Iraq—to detect drug-­smuggling craft on the high seas. Meanwhile, the spread of new synthetics, someday potentially including synthetic cocaine, promises to further undermine the traditional dominance of drugs derived from plants, with far-­reaching repercussions for the cross-­border drug trade and government suppression efforts. The advantages of synthetics, which are often manufactured in mobile clandestine laboratories, include their compactness and the minimal l­ abor and territory required for their production. While losing market share as a result of U.S. marijuana legalization initiatives, Mexican traffickers have made up for it by expanding into the fentanyl trade. Fentanyl, often mixed with heroin or used in counterfeit prescription pills, is a hyper-­concentrated and dangerous drug that has been a leading contributor to a rec­ord number of U.S. overdose deaths in recent years. Many U.S. users w ­ ere exposed to the drug only a­ fter first becoming hooked on opioid prescription painkillers. The war on drugs, however, is highly selective, mostly avoiding any serious targeting of the U.S. phar­ma­ceu­ti­cal companies that have so aggressively pushed their addictive products. Of course, the biggest game-­changer of all would be to change the ­legal status of not only marijuana but also harder drugs such as cocaine and heroin. Some see legalization as a sort of magic bullet, at the stroke of a pen stripping the illegal drug trade of its prohibition-­inflated profits that have provided the financial incentive for such violent competition between traffickers on the Mexican side of the border. Traffickers would likely diversify and turn to other illicit businesses—as mobsters

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did in the United States ­after the prohibition of alcohol was lifted—­but their core revenue stream would dry up. At the moment, however, the legalization option remains a po­liti­cal nonstarter beyond marijuana. Given this po­liti­c al real­ity, the main immediate challenge for Mexico—­ geographically cursed by sharing a lengthy border with the world’s largest consumer of illicit drugs—is figuring out how to reduce the extraordinarily high levels of drug vio­lence in northern border states and along trafficking corridors even if unable to substantially suppress the drug supply. One option would be to simply ­favor ­those traffickers most willing to avoid bloodshed while more narrowly and aggressively targeting t­hose traffickers who continue to use extreme vio­lence to ­settle their business disputes.39 Such accommodation need not simply mean corruption, as has been the case in Mexico in the past.40 Nevertheless, it would inevitably invite domestic and international accusations of corruption and complicity if the government ­were perceived as favoring one trafficking group over another and giving out f­ ree passes to the border for good be­hav­ior. Publicly making peace with criminal organ­izations that feed the enormous appetite for illicit drugs in the United States is po­liti­cally taboo and would prompt even more intense Mexico bashing north of the border, inviting even more calls to fortify it. Unfortunately, ­these are the sort of po­liti­cal conundrums that tend to lead to policy per­sis­tence and escalation rather than a fundamental change in course. The morally charged politics of the drug war all too often crowds out more pragmatic approaches.41 Moreover, the Mexican military itself may be one of the biggest obstacles to changing course and returning to the barracks, as its po­liti­cal influence and bud­ get have swelled thanks to the military-­led antidrug campaign and the hyperviolence it has unleashed. Even though president Lopéz Obrador’s commitment to confronting drug trafficking organ­izations has been questionable and relations with the U.S. on the drug war front have been severely strained, his commitment to (and reliance on) the military has only grown. The Mexican military’s expanding responsibilities in recent years have gone well beyond the anti-­drug campaign to include such duties as the management of ports and a greater role in customs control. So where does all this leave the f­ uture of the border game? At least in the near and medium terms, the most likely scenario is neither all-­out militarization of immigration and drug controls nor a full de-­escalation and opening of the border. Rather, we are more likely to see a continued muddling through in the muddled ­middle, both dismaying immigration and drug policy reform advocates and infuriating “finish the wall” enthusiasts. Despite the Fortress Amer­i­ca dreams of some conservative isolationists, the enormous investment that the United States and Mexico have made in the economic integration pro­cess is likely to keep the border highly porous—­even while heavi­ly fortified. Similarly, despite

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the border-­free dreams of some liberal internationalists that the deepening linkages between the U.S. and Mexico are leading to a “vanis­hing frontier,” 42 the territorial divide between the two countries w ­ ill most likely continue to be intensively policed regardless of its effectiveness and heavy h ­ uman toll. Although much is uncertain, it is safe to predict that continuing to harden the border against the unauthorized cross-­border flow of mi­grants and drugs, while keeping the border open to the flow of virtually every­t hing ­else, ­w ill remain a formula for policy frustration. How this frustration is po­liti­cally managed, including the ever-­present temptation for opportunistic politicians and bureaucrats to exploit it and for entrepreneurial security contractors and smugglers to profit from it, w ­ ill profoundly shape the f­uture of the border and the bilateral relationship. The interdependent businesses of border law enforcement and border law evasion, it seems, have a bright ­f uture.

Notes

PREFACE

1. Peter Andreas, Rebel ­Mother: My Childhood Chasing the Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017), 183–84. 1. THE ESCALATION OF BORDER POLICING

1. For instance, the late Milton Friedman and the Economist have advocated drug legalization, and the Wall Street Journal for many years ran a Fourth of July editorial calling for a constitutional amendment—­“­There s­ hall be open borders”—­establishing ­free migration into the United States from Mexico and Canada. 2. Obviously, Mexican migration to the United States becomes unauthorized only once the border has been crossed without formal permission. However, in recent years a growing percentage of border crossers have been non-­Mexican nationals (mostly Central Americans) using Mexico as a transit point. 3. Timothy J. Dunn usefully defines militarization as “police acting like the military and the military acting like police as well as their mutual collaboration and integration, particularly military involvement in domestic law enforcement and security ­matters.” Dunn, “The Militarization of the U.S.-­Mexico Border in the Twenty-­First ­Century and Implications for ­Human Rights,” in Handbook on ­Human Security, Borders, and Migration, ed. Natalia Ribas-­Mateos and Timothy J. Dunn (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2021), 35. 4. Richard Rosecrance, “The Rise of the Virtual State,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (1996): 45–62; Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in an Interlinked Economy (New York: Harper Business, 1990). 5. Lawrence A. Herzog, “Changing Bound­aries in the Amer­i­cas: An Overview,” in Changing Bound­aries in the Amer­i­cas, ed. Lawrence A. Herzog (La Jolla: Center for U.S.-­ Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 1992), 5–6. 6. John Gerard Ruggie, “Territory and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International Organ­ization 47, no. 1 (1993): 139–74; Lothar Brock and Mathias Albert, “De-­bordering the State: New Spaces in International Relations” (paper prepared for annual meeting of the American Po­liti­cal Science Association, Chicago, 31 August–3 September 1995); Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 29. 7. David Jacobson, Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 41. 8. Peter Andreas, “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-­First ­Century,” International Security 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 78–111. 9. Beth A. Simmons and Hein E. Goemans, “Built on Borders: Tensions with the Institution Liberalism (Thought It) Left B ­ ehind,” in “Challenges to the Liberal International Order: International Organ­ization at 75,” special issue 2, International Organ­ization 75 (Spring 2021): 398. 10. Janice Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1995): 213. 11. For an early plea to change this, see William F. McDonald, “The Globalization of Criminology: The Next Frontier Is the Frontier,” Transnational Or­ga­nized Crime 1, no. 1 157

158 NOTES TO PAGES 4–6

(1995): 1–22. Some notable early works on cross-­border policing include Ethan E. Nadelmann, Cops across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993); and Malcolm Anderson et al., Policing the Eu­ro­pean Union: Theory, Law, and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). For a rare early study of the escalation of U.S.-­Mexico border enforcement, see Timothy Dunn, The Militarization of the U.S.-­Mexico Border, 1978–1992: Low-­Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home (Austin: Center for Mexican-­American Studies, University of Texas, 1996). 12. This is reflected, for instance, in the recent proliferation of border policing–­related books in a wide range of disciplines, including history, sociology, geography, po­liti­cal science, and anthropology. See, for example, Holly M. Karbo and George T. Diaz, eds., Border Policing: A History of Enforcement and Evasion in North Amer­i­ca (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2020); S. Deborah Kang, The INS on the Line: Making Immigration Law on the U.S.-­Mexico Border, 1917–1954 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019); Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Migra! A History of the U.S. Border Patrol (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-­Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security, 2nd  ed. (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2016); ­Reece Jones, Border Walls: Security and the War on Terror in the United States, India, and Israel (London: Zed, 2012); Joseph Nevins, Operation Gatekeeper and Beyond: The War on “Illegals” and the Remaking of the U.S.-­Mexico Boundary, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010); Martin Schain, The Border: Policy and Politics in Eu­rope and the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019); Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, 2nd ed. (New York: Zone Books, 2017); Elisabeth Vallet, ed., Borders, Fences and Walls: State of Insecurity? (New York: Routledge, 2014); Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, Frontiers of Fear: Immigration and Security in the United States and Eu­rope (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012); Jeremy Slack, Deported to Death: How Drug Vio­lence Is Changing Migration on the U.S.-­ Mexico Border (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019); Jeremy Slack, Daniel E. Martinez, and Scott Whiteford, eds., The Shadow of the Wall: Vio­lence and Migration on the U.S.-­Mexico Border (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2018); Michael Dear, Why Walls ­Won’t Work: Repairing the U.S.-­Mexico Divide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Ruben Zaiotti, Cultures of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of Eu­ro­pean Frontiers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 13. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chap. 8; Claire Sterling, Crime without Frontiers: The Worldwide Expansion of Or­ga­nized Crime and the Pax Mafiosa (London: Warner, 1995); John Kerry, The New War: The Web of Crime That Threatens American Security (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997); Moises Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy (New York: Anchor Books, 2006); Louise Shelley, Dark Commerce: How a New Illicit Economy Is Threatening Our ­Future (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2018). 14. In the case of migration, Myron Weiner’s The Global Migration Crisis: Challenges to States and to H ­ uman Rights (New York: HarperCollins, 1995) echoed the anxiety-­ provoking popu­lar perception that “advanced industrial countries can protect their borders from invading armies but not from hordes of individuals who slip into harbors, crawl u ­ nder barbed-­w ire fences, and wade across rivers” (9). 15. This is captured in the title of Wendy Brown’s book, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty. 16. Peter Andreas, Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made Amer­i­ca (New York: Oxford University Press), chap. 15. 17. Krishnadev Calamur, “The Real Illegal Immigration Crisis ­Isn’t on the Southern Border,” Atlantic, April 19, 2019.

NOTES TO PAGES 6–14

159

18. This does not mean conceptualizing the state as a unitary rational actor pursuing the “national interest.” Rather, multiple contradictions and interests within the state apparatus reflect dif­fer­ent sets of relationships inside the state, between the state and society, and between the state and the international environment. 19. Paul Pierson, “When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Po­liti­cal Change,” World Politics 45 (July 1993): 595–628. 20. On the dramaturgical perspective in so­cio­log­i­cal theory, much of it inspired by the writings of Erving Goffman, see Dennis Brissett and Charles Edgley, eds., Life as Theater: A Dramaturgical Sourcebook, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2017). Goffman’s best-­known work is The Pre­sen­ta­tion of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor, 1959), quotations from 251. 21. On the symbolic role of laws and their enforcement, see David Garland, “Punishment and Culture: The Symbolic Dimension of Criminal Justice,” Studies in Law, Politics, and Society 11 (1991): 191–222; and Joseph Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement, 2nd ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986). 22. Law enforcement agencies are in many ways examples of the organ­izations referred to in the title of Marshall W. Meyer and Lynne G. Zucker’s Permanently Failing Organ­izations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989): organ­izations that persist, and may even expand, despite low results. 23. As one criminologist suggests, “Drug police, like priests, are more impor­tant for what they symbolize and stand for than for what they do.” Peter K. Manning, The Narc’s Game: Orga­nizational and Informational Limits on Drug Law Enforcement (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980), 253. 24. Joel Brockner and Jeffrey Rubin, Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts: A Social Psychological Analy­sis (New York: Springer, 1985). 2. CREATING THE CLANDESTINE SIDE OF THE BORDER ECONOMY

1. Peter Reuter and David Ronfeldt, Quest for Integrity: The Mexican-­U.S. Drug Issue in the 1980s (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1991), 10. 2. For a more detailed account, see George T. Diaz, Border Contraband: A History of Smuggling across the Rio Grande (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015). 3. Jorge A. Hernández, “Trading across the Border: National Customs Guards in Nuevo Leon,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 100, no. 4 (1997): 433–51. 4. Brian Delay, “19th ­Century Lessons for ­Today’s Drug-­War Policies,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 27 July 2009. 5. Ethan E. Nadelmann, Cops across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993). 6. Quoted in Rodman L. Underwood, ­Waters of Discord: The Union Blockade of Texas during the Civil War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2008), 72. 7. Fredericka Meiners, “The Texas Border Cotton Trade, 1862–1863,” Civil War History 13, no. 9 (December 1977): 293–94. 8. Robert W. Delaney, “Matamoros, Port of Texas during the Civil War,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 58, no. 4 (April 1955): 473–74. 9. Rachel St.  John, Line in the Sand: A History of the Western  U.S.-­Mexico Border (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2011), 99–100. 10. St. John, Line in the Sand, chap. 5. 11. Louis R. Sadler, “The Historical Dynamics of Smuggling in the U.S.-­Mexican Border Region, 1550–1998,” in Or­ga­nized Crime and Demo­cratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-­ Mexican Borderlands, ed. John Bailey and Roy Godson (Pittsburgh: ­University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 164.

160 NOTES TO PAGES 15–20

12. Nadelmann, Cops across Borders, 30. 13. See especially George T. Diaz, “Twilight of the Tequileros: Prohibition Era Smuggling in the South Texas Borderlands, 1919–1933,” in Smugglers, Brothels, and Twine: Historical Perspectives on Contraband and Vice in North Amer­i­ca’s Borderlands, ed. Elaine Carey and Andrae M. Marak (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2011). 14. See St. John, Line in the Sand, chap. 6. On Tijuana’s development as the premier vice district, see especially Paul  J. Vanderwood, Satan’s Playground: Mobsters and Movie Stars at Amer­i­ca’s Greatest Gaming Resort (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010). 15. Marshall Car­ter, “The Po­liti­c al Economy of Crime in the U.S.-­Mexican Borderlands” (revision of a paper prepared for the North American Economic Studies Association, Southern Economics Association Meeting, Washington, DC, November 1978), 6. 16. See Timothy Green, The Smugglers: An Investigation into the World of the Con­ temporary Smuggler (New York: Walker, 1969), 292. 17. One smuggler arrested in 1995, for example, had been bringing tens of thousands of Mexican beetles, moths, and butterflies into the United States for over a de­cade and selling them for as much as $1,000 apiece. Houston Chronicle, 20 July 1995. 18. Tom Miller, On the Border: Portraits of Amer­i­ca’s Southwestern Frontier (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), 52. 19. Marshall Car­ter, “Law, Order, and the Border: El Paso Del Norte” (revision of a paper prepared for the annual meeting of the National Council on Geographic Education, Mexico City, November 1979), 6. 20. Car­ter, “Po­liti­cal Economy of Crime,” 17. 21. For a more detailed account, see especially Paul D. Lack, “Slavery and the Texas Revolution,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 89, no. 2 (October 1985): 181–202. 22. Patrick Ettinger, Imaginary Lines: Border Enforcement and the Origins of Undocumented Immigration, 1882–1930 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 99. 23. Quoted in Ettinger, Imaginary Lines, 100. 24. Quoted in Erika Lee, At Amer­i­ca’s Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882–1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 159. 25. Quoted in James Branson Reynolds, “Enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Law,” Annals of the American Acad­emy of Po­liti­cal Science 34, no. 2 (1909): 368. 26. Lee, At Amer­i­ca’s Gates, 57–58. 27. Ettinger, Imaginary Lines, 105. 28. Quoted in William H. Siener, “Through the Back Door: Evading the Chinese Exclusion Act along the Niagara Frontier, 1900–1924,” Journal of American Ethnic History 27, no. 4 (2008): 60. 29. Quoted in K. B. McCullough, Amer­i­ca’s Back Door: Indirect International Immigration via Mexico to the United States from 1875 to 1940 (PhD diss., Texas A&M University, College Station, 1992), 51–52. 30. Quoted in McCullough, Amer­i­ca’s Back Door, 6. 31. McCullough, Amer­i­ca’s Back Door, 230–31. 32. Quoted in Ettinger, Imaginary Lines, 162. 33. Quoted in Aristide Zolberg and Robert Smith, Migration Systems in Comparative Perspective: An Analy­sis of the Inter-­American Migration System with Comparative Reference to the Mediterranean-­European System (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, 1996), 9. 34. Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration and the INS (New York: Routledge, 1992).

NOTES TO PAGES 20–25

161

35. The massive sweeps of Operation Wetback would be illegal t­ oday, given court decisions that have enhanced the rights of immigrants. It should also be noted that the operation sparked a new form of illegal entry—by means of fraudulent documents such as tourist cards and birth certificates. 36. Kitty Calavita, “U.S. Immigration and Policy Responses: The Limits of Legislation,” in Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James Hollifield (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 59. 37. Zolberg and Smith, Migration Systems, 14. 38. In 1952 Congress passed an act that made it illegal to “harbor, transport, or conceal illegal entrants.” Employment, however, was excluded from the category of “harboring,” thanks to an amendment (called the Texas proviso) that was a concession to agribusiness interests. See Calavita, “U.S. Immigration,” 60. 39. Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren, “Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Policy: Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin Amer­i­ca,” Population and Development Review 38, 1 (2012): 1–29. 40. Christian Joppke, “Why Liberal States Accept Unwanted Immigration,” World Politics 50, no. 2 (1998): 272. 41. The Border Patrol’s 1980 bud­get was less than the bud­get of the Baltimore police department and less than half that of the Philadelphia police force. Michael Teitelbaum, “Right versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy—­t he United States,” Foreign Affairs 59, no. 1 (1980): 55. 42. See Comptroller General of the United States, Smugglers, Illicit Documents, and Schemes Are Undermining U.S. Controls over Immigration: Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States (Washington, DC, 30 August 1976), 5–6, 18. 43. Comptroller General of the United States, Illegal Entry at United States–­Mexico Border: Multiagency Enforcement Efforts Have Not Been Effective in Stemming the Flow of Drugs and ­People; Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States (Washington, DC, 2 December 1977), 7. 44. INS annual report, 1978, cited in Sherrie A. Kossoudji, “Playing Cat and Mouse at the U.S.-­Mexican Border,” Demography 29, no. 2 (1992): 161. 45. Immigration and Naturalization Ser­v ice, The Border Patrol: Its Origins and Its Work (Washington, DC: Immigration and Naturalization Ser­v ice, 1973). 46. Josiah M. Heyman calls this dynamic the “voluntary departure complex”; see Heyman, “Putting Power into the Anthropology of Bureaucracy: The Immigration and Naturalization Ser­vice at the Mexico–­United States Border,” Current Anthropology 36, no.  2 (1995): 261–87. 47. Domestic Council’s Committee on Illegal Aliens, Preliminary Report, December 1976, quoted in Comptroller General of the United States, Illegal Entry at United States–­Mexico Border, 17. 48. Wayne Cornelius, quoted in Zolberg and Smith, Migration Systems, 34. 49. Philip Martin, cited Zolberg and Smith, Migration Systems, 21. 50. See Bryan Roberts and Agustin Escobar Latapi, “Mexican Social and Economic Policy and Emigration,” in At the Crossroads: Mexican Migration and U.S. Policy, ed. Frank D. Bean, Rodolfo O. De la Garza, Bryan Roberts, and Sidney Weintraub (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). 51. Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural Workers (Washington, DC, 1993). 52. Drug prohibition became institutionalized at the international level with the 1909 Shanghai Convention and the Hague Opium Convention of 1911–12. A drug prohibition regime was expanded through the United Nations in the post–­World War II period.

162 NOTES TO PAGES 26–31

53. See María Celia Toro, Mexico’s “War” on Drugs: C ­ auses and Consequences (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). 54. Toro, Mexico’s “War” on Drugs, 67. 55. Quoted in Richard Craig, “U.S. Narcotics Policy t­ oward Mexico: Consequences for the Bilateral Relationship,” in The Drug Connection in U.S.-­Mexican Relations, ed. Guadalupe Gonzalez and Marta Tienda (La Jolla, CA: Center for U.S.-­Mexican Studies, 1989), 73. 56. Richard B. Craig, “Operation Intercept: The International Politics of Pressure,” Review of Politics 42, no. 4 (1980): 564. 57. Toro, Mexico’s “War” on Drugs, 27. 58. See Craig, “U.S. Narcotics Policy,” 75. 59. Miguél Ruiz-­Cabañas, cited in Reuter and Ronfeldt, Quest for Integrity, 16. 60. Samuel Del Villar, “The Illicit U.S.-­Mexico Drug Market: Failure of Policy and an Alternative,” in Mexico and the United States: Managing the Relationship, ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 22. 61. Miguél Ruiz-­Cabañas, cited in Reuter and Ronfeldt, Quest for Integrity, 16. 62. John Moore, “No Quick Fix,” National Journal, 21 November 1987, 2955. 63. Toro, Mexico’s “War” on Drugs, 31. 64. Moore, “No Quick Fix,” 2956. 65. “The l­ imited seizure and trafficking data available indicate seizures increasing as smuggling increases.” Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Border War on Drugs (Washington, DC, March 1987), 51. 66. Congressional Quarterly Almanac 44 (1989): 85–111. 67. Quoted in Washington Post, 15 June 1988. 68. Quoted in Washington Post, 19 September 1988. 69. See “Four Key Issues Playing Role in Congressional Contests,” Congressional Quarterly, 18 October 1986, 2599. 70. Quoted in Moore, “No Quick Fix,” 2957. 71. According to Alan Eliason, se­nior tactical coordinator, Operation Alliance was “designed to be a permanent hardening of the nation’s drug enforcement posture all along our southwest border.” Senate Subcommittee on Trea­sury, Postal Ser­v ice, and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, Southwest Border Law Enforcement and Trade: Hearings, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 19 August 1987, 260–61. 72. Customs Commissioner William Von Raab testified (ibid., 24), “The Congress has been very generous and we have responded accordingly. The Customs Ser­v ice has gone up from 12,000 to 16,000 men and ­women over the past four years or so. That’s quite a strain on an organ­ization. We are g­ oing to deploy 250 million dollars’ worth of assets across the Southwest border; that’s a tough job. ­We’re working closely with the Defense Department in d ­ oing that.” 73. Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost, U.S. Coast Guard, before the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, U.S. Narcotics Control Efforts in Mexico and on the Southwest Border, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 22 July 1986, 34. 74. See Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Southwest Border Law Enforcement and Trade, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 19 August 1987, 25. 75. Senate Subcommittee, Southwest Border Law Enforcement and Trade, 25, 191, 200. 76. Senate Subcommittee, Southwest Border Law Enforcement and Trade, 191, 202. 77. Statement of Russell L. Jones, president of Richard L. Jones Custom­house Brokers, before Senate Subcommittees, Southwest Border Law Enforcement and Trade, 143–44. 78. Testimony of James C. Piatt, U.S. Customs Ser­v ice, Senate Subcommittee, Southwest Border Law Enforcement and Trade, 306–8.

NOTES TO PAGES 32–38

163

79. Jorge Chabat, “Drug Trafficking in U.S.-­Mexican Relations: What You See Is What You Get,” in Drug Trafficking in the Amer­i­cas, ed. Bruce M. Bagley and William O. Walker III (Coral Gables: North South Center, University of Miami, 1994), 378. 80. House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Southwest Border Hearings (El Paso, Texas, Tucson, Arizona, San Diego, California) and Mexico Trip Report (Nogales, Mexico City, Culiacan), 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 12–19 January 1986, 3. 81. House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, Southwest Border Hearings, 17. 82. María Celia Toro, “Drug Trafficking from a National Security Perspective,” in Mexico: In Search of Security, ed. Bruce M. Bagley and Sergio Aguayo Quezada (Coral Gables: North South Center, University of Miami, 1993), 326. 83. Cited in Reuter and Ronfeldt, Quest for Integrity, 7. 3. THE ESCALATION OF DRUG CONTROL

1. On the U.S. side, federal antidrug funding for the southwestern border reached about $1.7 billion in FY1997 (supporting more than 7,700 agents and inspectors): from FY1993 to 1997, Customs Ser­vice funding for the southwestern border grew 72 ­percent; from FY1990 through 1997, DEA funding for the southwest border area ­rose 55 ­percent (and a further 24 ­percent in FY1998), and the INS antidrug bud­get ­rose 164 ­percent; and from FY1991 to 1997, the Defense Department’s counternarcotics support increased 53 ­percent. See Office of National Drug Control Policy, Briefing Book: An Overview of Federal Drug Control Programs on the Southwest Border (Washington, DC, August 1997). 2. State Department estimates cited in Peter H. Smith, “Semior­ga­nized International Crime: Drug Trafficking in Mexico,” in Transnational Crime in the Amer­i­cas, ed. Tom Farer (New York: Routledge, 1999), 195. 3. Author interview with former Joint Task Force Six official, San Diego, 21 February 1997. 4. Congressional Research Ser­v ice, Drug Interdiction: U.S. Programs, Policy, and Options for Congress, report prepared by the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, September  1996, proceedings of a seminar held by the Congressional Research Ser­v ice, 12 December 1995, 19–20. 5. Houston Chronicle, 16 August 1992. 6. Testimony of Jack Blum, former Senate investigator, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Border Drug Interdiction, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 24 February 1993, 85. 7. Los Angeles Times, 9 April 1990. 8. Testimony of Michael Lane, acting customs commissioner, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Border Drug Interdiction, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 24 February 1993, 5. “Interdiction is a successful and proven concept,” he said, pointing to a three-­quarters drop in air smuggling. 9. According to the General Accounting Office, “interdiction has not made a difference in terms of the hard goals of deterring smugglers and reducing the flow of cocaine.” Testimony of Louis J. Rodrigues, Senate Subcommittee on Trea­sury, Postal Ser­v ice, and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, Border Drug Interdiction, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 25 February 1993, 147. 10. Quoted in New York Times, 12 December 1988. 11. Peter Reuter and David Ronfeldt, Quest for Integrity: The Mexican-­U.S. Drug Issue in the 1980s (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1991). 12. Reuter and David Ronfeldt, Quest for Integrity. 13. María Celia Toro, Mexico’s “War” on Drugs: C ­ auses and Consequences (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 58.

164 NOTES TO PAGES 38–41

14. Roderic Ai Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 92. 15. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, DC, 1991), 102–3. 16. Testimony of Mary Lee Warren, deputy assistant attorney general, Criminal Division, the House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico and along the Southwest Border, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 25 February 1997, 72. 17. Oversight Hearing on Border Drug Interdiction, Senate Subcommittee on Trea­ sury, Postal Ser­v ice, and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, Border Drug Interdiction, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 25 February 1993, 133. 18. In the words of one guardsman engaged in border surveillance in southern California, “It’s hot, it’s miserable, it sucks, but this is how we make our grant money.” Quoted in San Diego Union-­Tribune, 20 October 1996. 19. Procuraduria General de la Republica, Programa Nacional 1989–1994: Evaluacion y Seguimiento (Mexico City, February 1993); Procuraduria General de la Republica, Instituto Nacional para el Combate a las Drogas, Programa Nacional para el Control de Drogas, 1989–1994: Avances y Resultados (Mexico City, September 1994). 20. U.S. Department of State, Department of State Dispatch, 26 November 1990, 294. 21. Testimony of Robert Gelbard, assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement m ­ atters, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Drug Trade in Mexico and Its Implications for U.S.-­Mexican Relations, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 8 August 1995, 67. 22. Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Assessment: Mexican Counterdrug Security Forces: Prob­lems and Prospects (Washington, DC, June 1992), iv (obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive). 23. New York Times, 11 July 1997. 24. Quoted in New York Times, 31 July 1995. 25. National Public Radio, Morning Edition, 23 May 1995. 26. Christian Science Monitor, 4 June 1993. 27. Congressional Rec­ord, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 25 May 1993, H2776. 28. “While the increase in legitimate trade across the U.S. /Mexican border could ­offer . . . ​opportunities for increased drug smuggling, the U.S. is increasing the number of U.S. Customs inspectors on the border, enhancing inspection technology, increasing coordination with other U.S. law enforcement agencies, as well as developing cooperative relationships with Mexican law enforcement agencies and with legitimate Mexican exporters.” Department of State, Administration Position Paper: NAFTA and the War on Drugs (Washington, DC, October 1993). 29. Department of State, Administration Position Paper: NAFTA and the War on Drugs. 30. For example, a 17 August 1993 Customs Ser­v ice memorandum from the deputy commissioner to the commissioner (Washington, DC, 17 August 1993) listed a number of talking points that could be used in h ­ andling public inquiries, such as highlighting that “Customs staffing was increased by 300 inspector positions in FY92” for the southwest border, thus adding to “a gradual build-up of Customs inspectors and agent personnel since 1987.” 31. Former DEA official Phil Jordan, interviewed on ABC News Nightline, 6 May 1997, claimed that DEA agents ­were ordered to keep quiet about NAFTA’s potential negative consequences. 32. Economist, 16 December 1995, 38–39. 33. Author interview with State Department official, Washington, DC, 2 August 1996.

NOTES TO PAGES 42–47

165

34. New York Times, 11 July 1997. 35. Quoted in Washington Post, 30 March 1997. 36. Quoted in Mexican Insights (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin Amer­ i­ca, July 1995), 45. 37. Excelsior (Mexico City), 26 August 1995. 38. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico (Appendix  II: Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration) (Washington, DC, June 1996), 26. 39. La Jornada (Mexico City), 16 May 1994. 40. Testimony of Barry R. McCaffrey, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Senate Judiciary Committee, Drug Interdiction on the U.S.-­Mexico Border, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 31 July 1996. 41. Sebastian Rotella, Twilight on the Line: Underworlds and Politics at the U.S.-­Mexico Border (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 136. 42. Author interview, Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, 16 July 1997. 43. Peter Lupsha, “Drug Lords and Narco-­Corruption: The Players Change but the Game Continues,” in War on Drugs: Studies in the Failure of U.S. Narcotics Policy, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Alan A. Block (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 191. 44. Los Angeles Times, 7 January 1989. 45. Samuel González Ruiz, Ernesto Lopez Portillo, and José Arturo Yanez, Seguridad Publica en Mexico: Problemas, Perspectivas, y Propuestas (Mexico City: UNAM, 1994), 73. 46. Quoted in New York Times, 20 June 1993. 47. National Public Radio, Morning Edition, 23 May 1995. 48. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 16 June 1995. 49. Excelsior (Mexico City), 7 September 1995. 50. New York Times, 21 May 1996. 51. Lupsha, “Drug Lords,” 182. 52. Lupsha, “Drug Lords,” 182. 53. New York Times, 12 May 1996. 54. Cited in Andres Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos: Guerillas, Stockbrokers, Politicians, and Mexico’s Road to Prosperity (Boston: ­Little, Brown, 1996), 302. 55. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Report to Congress, vol. 1, United States and Mexico Counterdrug Cooperation (Washington, DC, September 1997), 35. 56. Quoted in Boston Globe, 1 September 1996. 57. Associated Press, 29 September 1996. 58. Cited in Oppenheimer, Bordering on Chaos, 301. 59. On the Mexican military in the 1990s, see Raul Benitez Manaut, “Mexico: La Nueva Dimension de las Fuerzas Armadas en los Años Noventa,” Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 11, no. 3 (1996): 8–17. 60. Quoted in International Herald Tribune, 25 May 1995. 61. Mexican Government, National Drug Control Program: 1995–2000 (Mexico City, October 1995), 6. 62. Author interview, Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, 16 July 1997. 63. Economist, 8 March 1998, 44–46. 64. Donald E. Schulz, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The United States, Mexico, and the Agony of National Security, Strategic Studies Institute Special Report (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 24 June 1997), 4. 65. See George W. Grayson, “Civilians Order Army Out of the Barracks,” Hemisfile 9, no. 3 (1998): 8.

166 NOTES TO PAGES 47–52

66. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington DC, March 1999). 67. Author interview, Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, 16 July 1997. 68. Grayson, “Civilians Order Army Out,” 8. 69. Schulz, Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 17. 70. New York Times, 11 July 1997. 71. Kevin Jack Riley, Snow Job? The War against International Cocaine Trafficking (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1996), 231. 72. Press conference with Barry McCaffrey, director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, and Jorge Madrazo, Mexican attorney general, Washington, DC, 29 January 1997. 73. Quoted in New York Times, 11 July 1997. 74. Author interview, Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, 16 July 1997. 75. New York Times, 25 February 1997. 76. Quoted in San Diego Union-­Tribune, 21 February 1997. 77. Testimony of Robert Gelbard, assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement ­matters, Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemi­sphere and Peace Corps Affairs, Foreign Relations Committee, Mexican and American Responses to the International Narcotics Threat, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 12 March 1997. 78. Andrew Reding, “Facing Po­liti­cal Real­ity in Mexico,” Washington Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1997): 103–17. 79. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Report to Congress, 1:35. 80. Author interview with Samuel González Ruiz, director, Or­ga­nized Crime Unit of the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, Mexico City, 16 July 1997. 81. Author interview with Miguél Ruiz-­Cabañas, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City, 18 July 1997. 82. According to one Mexican official, militarization was primarily driven by the need to appease the United States. Author interview with Mexican Embassy official, Washington, DC, 3 June 1997. 83. Quoted in Associated Press, 21 February 1997. 84. Author interview, Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, 17 July 1997. 85. Author interview, Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy, Mexico City, 17 July 1997. 86. Statements of Christopher Dodd, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, The Narcotics Threat to the United States through Mexico, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 28 March 1996. 87. Comments of Lee Hamilton, press conference on the certification pro­cess, National Press Club, Washington, DC, 6 February 1998. 88. Author interview with former Clinton foreign policy adviser, 13 December 1996. 89. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, The Narcotics Threat to the United States through Mexico: Hearing, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 28 March 1996. 90. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the President, U.S./ Mexico Bi-­National Drug Threat Assessment (Washington, DC, and Mexico City, May 1997). 91. Author interview with Mexican Embassy official, Washington, DC, 3 June 1997. 92. “Ley Federal Contra la Delincuencia Organizada,” Diario Oficial, 7 November 1996. 93. Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1997.

NOTES TO PAGES 52–56

167

94. Quoted in New York Times, 14 February 1999. 95. Office of National Drug Control Policy, Report to Congress, 1:3. 96. Testimony of Barry R. McCaffrey, director of the Office on National Drug Control Policy, joint hearing of Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, U.S. and Mexican Counterdrug Efforts since Certification, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 29 October 1997. 97. Quoted in Economist, 20 February 1999. 98. Quoted in New York Times, 14 February 1999. 99. New York Times, 2 February 1999. 100. Financial Times, 15 February 1999. 101. Washington Post, 5 February 1999. 102. Testimony of Rand Beers, assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs, House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and ­Human Resources, Government Reform Committee, Oversight of U.S.-­Mexico Counternarcotics Efforts, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 4 March 1999. 103. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy Report (Washington, DC, 1999), 69–70. 104. Quoted in New York Times, 24 May 1993. 105. Quoted in New York Times, 24 May 1993. 106. Quoted in New York Times, 30 July 1995. 107. Drug Enforcement Administration, The New Agricultural Reform Program and Illicit Cultivations in Mexico (Washington, DC, 14 October 1992) (obtained from the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act). 108. Los Angeles Times, 12 February 1995. 109. New York Times, 24 May 1993. 110. Testimony of Alan D. Bersin, U.S. attorney for the Southern District of California, House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, Border Security and Deterring Illegal Entry into the United States, 105th  Cong., 1st  sess., 23 April 1997, 17. 111. New York Times, 20 September 1998. 112. New York Times, 20 March 1998. 113. U.S. Customs Commissioner Samuel Banks claimed, regarding trucks crossing the border, that “over the last four years, w ­ e’ve gone from inspecting 5 ­percent of the trucks to 25 ­percent of the trucks.” Quoted in Journal of Commerce, 16 March 1998. 114. U.S. Customs Ser­v ice, Enhanced Truck Inspection: Report to Congress (Washington, DC, September 1997), 5. 115. Remarks of Harvey G. Pothier, deputy assistant commissioner, Office of Air Interdiction, U.S. Customs Ser­vice, in Congressional Research Ser­vice, Drug Interdiction, 22. 116. Author interview, U.S. Customs Ser­v ice, San Diego, 4 April 1997. 117. Author interview, San Diego Dialogue, La Jolla, Calif., 12 May 1997. The San Diego Dialogue is a public policy center at the University of California at San Diego that publishes the “Border Wait Time Reports.” 118. For example, Operation Alliance, which helped to coordinate federal law enforcement efforts on the southwestern border, produced a May 1997 report on the negative consequences of NAFTA for drug control. The report was subsequently leaked to the press, generating prominent media coverage, which in turn provided ammunition for key voices in Congress to push for beefed-up border controls. 119. Washington Post, 20 February 1996. 120. Quoted in Mike Allen, “Importers’ Ire Up over Border Inspection Rise,” San Diego Business Journal, 31 July 1995, 1, 17. 121. Narcotics Enforcement and Prevention Digest 1, no. 10 (1995): 1.

168 NOTES TO PAGES 56–61

122. R ­ euters, 22 June 1999. 123. Office of Representative Maxine W ­ aters, Drug Trafficking on the Fast Track: Executive Summary (Washington, DC, 4 November 1997). 124. Author interview, U.S. Customs Ser­v ice, San Diego, 21 March 1997. 125. San Antonio Express News, 24 March 1999. 126. Author interview, U.S. Customs Ser­v ice, Washington, DC, 4 June 1997. 127. Author interview, U.S. Customs Ser­v ice, San Diego, 21 March 1997. 128. Customs Ser­v ice press releases, 26 and 28 February 1996. 129. Author interview, U.S. Customs Ser­v ice, San Diego, 21 February 1997. 130. Author interview, U.S. Customs Ser­v ice, San Diego, 7 April 1997. 131. Author interview, U.S. Customs Ser­v ice, San Diego, 7 April 1997. 132. ABC News, Nightline, 6 May 1997. 133. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 4 February 1998. 134. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 4 February 1998. 135. Testimony of Alan D. Bersin, U.S. attorney for the Southern District of California, House Appropriations Subcommittee of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1996, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 29 March 1995. 136. San Francisco Examiner, 31 August 1998. 137. The technology center received its funding from the National Institute of Justice. The Office of National Drug Control Policy also had a counterdrug technology assessment center. The Customs Ser­v ice, however, remained the primary developer of technology for the detection of contraband. Author interview with Chris Aldridge, Border Research and Technology Center, San Diego, 7 March 1997. 138. San Diego Union-­Tribune, 18 March 1995. 139. Quoted in Arizona Daily Star, 4 June 1999. 140. Quoted in Houston Chronicle, 4 January 1998. 141. See Office of National Drug Control Policy, Ten Year Counterdrug Technology Plan and Development Roadmap (Washington, DC, February 1999). 142. Testimony of Barry R. McCaffrey, House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and ­Human Resources, Government Reform and Oversight Committee, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 25 February 1999. 143. Testimony of Barry R. McCaffrey before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, The Western Hemi­sphere Drug Elimination Act, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 16 September 1998. 144. Testimony of Louis J. Rodrigues, director, Systems Development and Production Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Senate Subcommittee on Trea­sury, Postal Ser­v ice, and General Government, Committee on Appropriations, Border Drug Interdiction, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 25 February 1993, 148. 145. See Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave, Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1988). Also see Peter Reuter, “Quantity Illusions and Paradoxes of Drug Interdiction: Federal Investigation into Vice Policy,” Law and Con­temporary Prob­lems 51, no. 1 (1988): 232–52. 146. Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, DC, 1991), 94. 147. Quoted in J. F. Holden-­R hodes, Sharing the Secrets: Open Source Intelligence and the War on Drugs (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 190. 148. National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, Drug Use in Amer­i­ca: Prob­lem in Perspective, Second Report (Washington, DC, 1973), 282, 227.

NOTES TO PAGES 63–68

169

4. THE ESCALATION OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL

1. Part of this chapter draws on Peter Andreas, “The U.S. Immigration Control Offensive: Constructing an Image of Order on the Southwest Border,” in Crossings: Mexican Immigration in Interdisciplinary Perspective, ed. Marcelo M. Suárez-­Orozco (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); and Andreas, “The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-­NAFTA Era,” Po­liti­cal Science Quarterly 113, no. 4 (1998–99): 591–615. 2. Joseph Nevins, “ ‘Illegal Aliens’ and the Po­liti­cal Geography of Criminalized ­Immigrants” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of American ­Geographers, Boston, 28 March 1998). 3. Kitty Calavita, “The New Politics of Immigration: ‘Balanced-­Budget Conservatism’ and the Symbolism of Proposition 187,” Social Prob­lems 43, no. 3 (1996): 284–305. 4. Sebastian Rotella, Twilight on the Line: Underworlds and Politics at the U.S.-­Mexico Border (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), 30. 5. Quoted in Katrina Burgess and Carlos González Gutierrez, “Reluctant Partner: California in U.S.-­Mexico Relations” (unpublished manuscript, n.d.), 29–30. 6. Author interview, Border Patrol Western Regional Headquarters, Laguna Niguel, CA, 27 March 1997. 7. Author interview with Douglas Kruhm, former assistant commissioner of the Border Patrol, Washington, DC, 6 February 1998. 8. The fence was built by the military, and was funded and justified as a deterrent against drug smugglers driving loads across the border. Although in practice it served immigration control purposes as well, it had to be built as a drug-­control fence in order to secure military assistance and minimize po­liti­cal opposition to the idea. Author interview with Douglas Kruhm. 9. Rotella, Twilight on the Line, 55. 10. As Alan D. Bersin, the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of California (appointed by Janet Reno as the administration’s point person on border issues), put it, “The Banzai runners re-­elected Pete Wilson.” Speech at the Institute of the Amer­i­cas, University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, CA, 11 July 1997. 11. House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, Border Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 10 March 1995, 6. 12. ABC News, This Week with David Brinkley, 20 June 1993. 13. Quoted in Fred Barnes, “No Entry: The Republicans’ Immigration War,” New Republic, 8 November 1993, 10–13. 14. Attorney General Janet Reno made fourteen trips to San Diego alone between 1994 and 1998. Los Angeles Times, 28 June 1998. 15. Author interview with Douglas Kruhm. 16. Author interview, U.S. Border Patrol, San Diego Sector Headquarters, San Diego, 4 March 1997. 17. In the San Diego sector between October 1994 and June 1998, infrared scopes increased in number from 12 to 599; under­ground sensors from 448 to 1,214; computers from 100 to more than 1,350; and vehicles from 700 to more than 1,765. INS Fact Sheet, 14 July 1998. 18. Washington Post, 13 May 1999. The Border Patrol also used mass e-­mails within the Justice Department to recruit new applicants. A sample that was diverted my way targeted federal employees living in cold climates with the allure of a posting along the sunny and warm southern border. 19. Leigh Rivenbark, “Help Wanted,” Federal Times, 28 July 1997, 1, 14. 20. Associated Press, 4 January 2000.

170 NOTES TO PAGES 68–72

21. Sandia National Laboratories, Systematic Analy­sis of the Southwest Border (report prepared for the INS, Washington, DC, January 1993), ES-5. 22. Doris Meissner and Janet Reno news conference, 12 January 1996. 23. San Diego Union-­Tribune, 18 March 1995. 24. Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond: National Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Border Patrol, July 1994). 25. For the most detailed account, see Timothy J. Dunn, Blockading the Border and ­Human Rights: The El Paso Operation That Remade Immigration Enforcement (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009). 26. Author interview with Representative Silvestre Reyes (D-­Tex.), former El Paso Border Patrol chief, Washington, DC, 4 February 1998. 27. Testimony of Laurie E. Ekstrand, U.S. General Accounting Office, House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, Border Security, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 10 March 1995, 105–10. 28. Apprehensions in the El Paso sector dropped 72 ­percent from FY1993 to 1994. Testimony of Laurie E. Ekstrand. 29. According to an El Paso poll of February 1994, 84 ­percent favored the new Border Patrol strategy. Testimony of Laurie E. Ekstrand. 30. Author interview with Silvestre Reyes. 31. Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond, 2. 32. Boston Globe, 14 May 1998. 33. Dallas Morning News, 13 June 1999. 34. Quoted in Arizona Republic, 8 October 1999. 35. Arizona Daily Star, 14 February 1999. 36. Migration News, June 1999. 37. Quoted in Arizona Daily Star, 11 July  1999. The enforcement buildup along the Arizona-­Mexico border in 1994–99 included an increase in Border Patrol agents from 287 to 1,285, a more than a doubling of under­ground sensors, a tripling of vehicles, and a quadrupling of the number of low-­light TV cameras and night scopes. INS Fact Sheet, 8 October 1999. 38. Author interview, San Diego Border Patrol sector, San Diego, 4 March 1997. 39. See Binational Study on Migration, Binational Study: Migration between Mexico and the United States (Mexico City and Washington, DC: Mexican Foreign Ministry and U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 1997), 28. The study was a lengthy research proj­ect commissioned jointly by the U.S. and Mexican governments. 40. INS Fact Sheet, INS’ Southwest Border Strategy, 1 May 1999. 41. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 5 February 1995. 42. Janet Reno and Doris Meissner news conference. 43. Testimony of Doris Meissner, House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary, Appropriations Committee, FY97 Justice Appropriations, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 8 May 1996. 44. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 2 May 1992. 45. San Diego Union-­Tribune, 28 April 1996. 46. Testimony of George Regan, INS acting associate commissioner of enforcement, House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, Combatting Illegal Immigration: A Pro­gress Report, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 23 April 1997. 47. Author interview, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California, San Diego, 1 April 1997. 48. Smugglers reportedly created a network of fifty to sixty tunnels u ­ nder the border city of El Paso; one exited next to City Hall and another ­under the Fort Bliss army base. ­Reuters, 21 October 1999.

NOTES TO PAGES 72–77

171

49. Quoted in New York Times, 18 June 1999. 50. Peter Skerry and Stephen Rockwell, “The Cost of a Tighter Border: People-­ Smuggling Networks,” Los Angeles Times, 3 May 1998. 51. U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed (Washington, DC, December 1997), 42. 52. Migration News, June 1998. 53. Author interview, National Security Council, Washington, DC, 2 June 1997. 54. Quoted in New York Times, 30 May 1996. 55. Quoted in New York Times, 30 May 1996. 56. Author interview with se­nior official in the Border Patrol’s antismuggling unit, San Diego, 28 April 1997. 57. Migration News, 2 February 1996. 58. Los Angeles Times, 10 May 1998. 59. Los Angeles Times, 29 May 1996. 60. Department of Justice, Annual Report of the Office of the United States Attorney, Southern District of California (Washington, DC, 1996). 61. Author interview, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California, San Diego, 28 April 1997. 62. Author interview, U.S. Border Patrol, San Diego sector headquarters, San Diego, 8 April 1997. 63. Author interview, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California, San Diego, 1 April 1997. 64. Dallas Morning News, 11 September 1994. 65. Inspector General Bromwich, Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Threat and Effects of Corruption to U.S. Law Enforcement along the Mexican Broder, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 14 May 1997, 5–6. 66. Author interview, Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California, San Diego, 4 April 1997. 67. U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Staff Report on Border Law Enforcement and Removal Initiatives in San Diego, California (Washington, DC, November 1995), 7. 68. St. Louis Post-­Dispatch, 14 March 1999. 69. Accepting the Immigration Challenge: The President’s Report on Immigration (Washington, DC, 1994), 42. 70. Doris Meissner press conference, 8 February 1996. 71. General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist (Washington, DC, April 1999), 3; Migration News, January 1999. 72. Washington Post, 16 February 1997. 73. Quoted in Dick Kirschten, “Tempest-­Tossed Task,” Government Executive, October 1993. 74. Migration News, April 1996; Migration News, November 1998. 75. San Diego Union-­Tribune, 2 November 1997. 76. San Diego Union-­Tribune, 3 November 1997. 77. San Diego Union-­Tribune, 3 November 1997. 78. Associated Press, 25 September 1996. 79. Quoted in New York Times Magazine, 27 October 1996, 52. 80. Mark Reed, the INS district director in San Diego, explained that although the pressure and criticism from Congress may often have been unfair and misplaced, in the end it helped his agency grow; it would have been far worse if the INS had simply been ignored. Author interview, San Diego, 1 May 1997.

172 NOTES TO PAGES 77–81

81. Author interviews with INS officials in Washington, DC, and San Diego, March and June 1997. 82. Immigration and Naturalization Ser­v ice, Building a Comprehensive Southwest Border Enforcement Strategy (Washington, DC, April 1996). 83. Accepting the Immigration Challenge, 42. 84. U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Staff Report on Border Law Enforcement, 14. 85. Robert L. Bach, “Hemispheric Migration in the 1990s,” in The United States and Latin Amer­i­ca in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War, ed. Jonathan Hartlyn et al. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 274. 86. Wayne A. Cornelius, “The Immigration Issue in U.S.-­Mexican Relations: A Structurally Determined Irritant” (paper prepared for Conference on Mexico and the United States in the Next De­cade, Pacific Council on International Policy and Center for U.S.-­ Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, 11 May 1998), 15. 87. Janet Reno, “Consider NAFTA a Border Control Tool,” Los Angeles Times, 22 October 1993. 88. Quoted in Wayne Cornelius and Philip Martin, “Perspective on NAFTA: Take the Long View of Immigration,” Los Angeles Times, 2 November 1993. 89. R ­ euters Business Report, 1 November 1993. 90. Douglas S. Massey and Kristin E. Espinosa, “What’s Driving Mexico-­U.S. Migration? A Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analy­sis,” American Journal of Sociology 102, no. 4 (1997): 991–92. 91. See Philip L. Martin, Trade and Migration: NAFTA and Agriculture (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1993). 92. See Monica L. Heppel and Luis R. Torres, Migration in the Post-­NAFTA Era: Policy Issues for the United States and Mexico (Washington, DC: Center for Inter-­Cultural Education and Development, Georgetown University, September 1995). 93. Cited in Philip L. Martin, “Mexican-­U.S. Migration: Policies and Economic Impacts,” Challenge (March 1995): 56–63. 94. See Santiago Levy and Sweder van Wijnbergen, Transition Prob­lems in Economic Reform: Agriculture in the Mexico-­U.S. ­Free Trade Agreement, Policy Research Working Papers (Washington, DC: World Bank, August 1992). 95. See Manuel Pastor Jr. and Carol Wise, “State Policy, Distribution, and Neoliberal Reform in Mexico,” Journal of Latin American Studies 29, no. 2 (1997): 419–56. 96. A 1995 Mexican government survey found that some six hundred thousand Mexican h ­ ouse­holds w ­ ere receiving money from relatives in the United States: San Diego Union-­Tribune, 31 October 1999. 97. Immigration and Naturalization Ser­v ice, Operation Gatekeeper: Two Years of ­Pro­gress (Washington, DC, October 1996). 98. Testimony of INS Commissioner Doris Meissner, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, Judiciary Committee, Oversight of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser­ vice, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., 2 October 1996. 99. Testimony of Gus de la Viña, chief of U.S. Border Patrol, Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, Judiciary Committee, Border Patrol Operations and Staffing, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 27 April 1999. 100. Quoted in New York Times, 28 August 1996. 101. Alan D. Bersin, “Reinventing the U.S.-­Mexico Border,” San Diego Union-­Tribune, 25 August 1996. 102. General Accounting Office, Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive (Washington, DC, December 1997).

NOTES TO PAGES 81–89

173

103. See David Spener, “The Logic and Contradictions of Intensified Border Control in Texas,” in The Wall around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North Amer­i­ca and Eu­rope, ed. Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder (Lantham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 104. Quoted in San Antonio Express News, 20 May 1999. 105. Quoted in San Diego Union-­Tribune, 14 January 1996. 106. Washington Post, 15 March 1999 and 17 February 2000. 107. Quoted in Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 1999. 108. Quoted in Dallas Morning News, 22 October 1995. 109. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 6 July 1996. 110. Los Angeles Times, 28 June 1998. 111. See, for example, Frank Bean et al., Illegal Mexican Migration and the United States–­Mexican Border: The Effects of Operation “Hold the Line” on El Paso/Juarez (Austin: Population Research Center, University of Texas, and U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 1994). 112. This is most forcefully argued in Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Karen A. Pren, “Why Border Enforcement Backfired,” American Journal of Sociology 121, no. 5 (March 2016): 1557–600. 113. New York Times, 12 October 1997. 114. The Demo­cratic Party’s 1996 National Platform, quoted in Nevins, “ ‘Illegal Aliens,’ ” 4–5. 115. Dick Kirschten, “Crossing the Line,” National Journal 3 (August 1996): 1422–27. 116. Robert B. Reich, Locked in the Cabinet (New York: Knopf, 1997), 329. 117. Quoted in Los Angeles Times, 28 June 1998. 118. A 1997 report by researchers at the University of Houston found that over the previous four years, 1,185 p ­ eople had drowned, died of exposure or dehydration, or been hit by automobiles while trying to cross the border between official ports of entry. New York Times, 24 August 1997. And the deaths would continue to grow. See Wayne A. Cornelius, “Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Control Policy,” Population and Development Review 27, no. 4 (December 2001): 661–85. 119. Border Patrol Strategic Plan 1994 and Beyond, 12. 120. Author interview, U.S. Border Patrol San Diego sector headquarters, San Diego, 4 March 1997. 5. ESCALATION IN A NEW SECURITY LANDSCAPE

1. Part of this chapter draws on Peter Andreas, “A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-­Canada and U.S.-­Mexico Lines ­after 9–11,” in The Rebordering of North Amer­i­ca: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context, ed. Peter Andreas and Thomas Biersteker (New York: Routledge, 2003), and Peter Andreas, “The Mexicanization of the U.S.-­Canada ­Border: Asymmetric Interdependence in a Changing Security Context,” International Journal 60, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 449–62. 2. For a more detailed analy­sis of the internationalization of policing ­a fter September 11, see Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), chap. 5. 3. Michael Dear, Why Walls ­Won’t Work: Repairing the U.S.-­Mexico Divide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 108. 4. See Blas Nuñez-­Neto and Yule Kim, Border Security: Barriers along the U.S. International Border (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Ser­v ice, updated May 13, 2008).

174 NOTES TO PAGES 89–95

5. Quoted in Edward Alden, The Closing of the American Border: Terrorism, Immigration, and Security since 9/11 (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 274–75. 6. See especially Jason de Leon, The Land of Open Graves: Living and ­Dying on the Mi­grant Trail (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 157. 7. Quoted in Sierra Vista Herald, 21 April 2005. 8. Sierra Vista Herald, 21 April 2005. 9. Quoted in New York Times, 18 May 2006. 10. Quoted in New York Times, 18 May 2006. 11. Arizona Daily Star, 30 September 2005. 12. Quoted in Edward Alden and Bryan Roberts, “Are U.S. Borders Secure?,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 4 (July/August 2011): 20. 13. Quoted in Adam Isacson and Maureen Meyer, Beyond the Border Buildup: Security and Mi­grants along the U.S.-­Mexico Border (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin Amer­i­ca, April 2012), 6. 14. This has been well documented in a number of ethnographic studies. See especially Gabriella Sanchez, ­Human Smuggling and Border Crossings (New York: Routledge, 2014); and David Spener, Clandestine Crossings: Mi­g rants and Coyotes on the Texas-­ Mexico Border (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). 15. Los Angeles Times, 24 March 2011. 16. New York Times, 29 September 2005. 17. Tom Barry, Border Wars (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 104. 18. New York Times, 28 September 2011. 19. Dear, Why Walls ­Won’t Work, 112. 20. Dear, Why Walls ­Won’t Work, 181. 21. Alden and Roberts, “Are U.S. Borders Secure?,” 24. 22. Douglas S. Massey, “Isolated, Vulnerable, and Broke,” New York Times, 4 August 2011. 23. For ­t hese and other estimates, including data sources and methodology used, see Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant Population: National and State Trends 2010 (Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 1 February 2011). 24. Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Karen Pren, “Why Border Enforcement Backfired,” American Journal of Sociology 21, no. 5 (March 2016): 1595. 25. Quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, 22 September 2002. 26. This section partly draws from Peter Andreas, “The Mexicanization of the U.S.-­ Canada Border: Asymmetric Interdependence in a Changing Security Context,” International Journal 60, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 449–62. 27. One undercover Canadian investigation in 1994 found that most of the guns ­purchased on the black market w ­ ere smuggled into Canada from the United States. Christian Science Monitor, 14 March 1995. 28. A cover story in Forbes called marijuana “Canada’s most valuable agricultural product—­bigger than wheat, ­cattle, or timber.” Forbes, 10 November 2003. Canadian officials calculated that $4 to $7 billion worth of Canadian marijuana was sold in the United States annually. Washington Post, 28 May 2003. 29. Stephen Flynn, Amer­i­ca the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 187. 30. Demetrios Papademetriou and Deborah Waller Meyers, “Introduction: Overview, Context, and a Vision for the ­Future,” in Caught in the M ­ iddle: Border Communities in an Era of Globalization, ed. Papademetriou and Meyers (Washington, DC: Car­ne­gie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 36. 31. Flynn, Amer­i­ca the Vulnerable, 137. 32. Quoted in Portland Press Herald, 4 October 2001.

NOTES TO PAGES 96–101

175

33. Quoted in Toronto Sun, 20 September 2001. 34. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye point out that Canada has historically done better in negotiations with the United States than one might expect. See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Scott, Foresman, 1989). 35. Thomas J. Biersteker, “The Rebordering of North Amer­i­ca? The Implications for Reconceptualizing Borders a­ fter September 11,” in Andreas and Biersteker, Rebordering of North Amer­i­ca, 154. 36. Christian Science Monitor, 10 May 2003. 37. USA ­Today, 8 May 2003. 38. Papademetriou and Meyers, “Introduction,” 82. 39. Athanasios Hristoulas, “Trading Places: Canada, Mexico, and North American Security,” in Andreas and Biersteker, Rebordering of North Amer­i­ca. 40. Quoted in Kathleen Millar, “FAST Pro­cessing at the Border,” U.S. Customs ­Today, October 2002. 41. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Border Security—­Smart Borders for the 21st ­Century,” 25 January 2002. 42. The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 389. 43. The 9-11 Commission Report, 390. 44. The 9-11 Commission Report, 362. 45. The International Civil Aviation Organ­ization established standards for biometric identifiers in May 2003, determining that facial recognition is the most universal interoperable biometric for machine-­readable documents. 46. Lisa M. Seghetti et al., Border and Transportation Security: Selected Programs and Policies (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Ser­v ice, 29 March 2005), 7. 47. In 2000 MIT’s Technology Review called biometrics one of the “top ten emerging technologies that w ­ ill change the world.” Quoted in Jonathan P. Aus, “Supranational Governance in an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’: Eurodac and the Politics of Biometric Control” (University of Sussex, Sussex, UK: Sussex Eu­ro­pean Institute Working Paper, December 2003), 18. 48. David Lyon, Surveillance a­ fter September 11 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 15. 49. Citing market researchers at Homeland Security Corp., Business Week reported in 2004 that “the homeland defense industry, a $4 billion market in 2000, is expected to balloon to more than $170 billion in 2006.” Eric Wahlgren, “Terror May Be Your Portfolio’s Security,” Business Week Online, 16 August 2004. 50. Quoted in New York Times, 8 May 2005. 51. For a detailed evaluation, see Rey Koslowski, Real Challenges for Virtual Borders: The Implementation of US-­V ISIT (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, June 2005). 52. According to one business press report, “Accenture wowed government officials with a demo that included biometric devices that scanned fingerprints and wireless tags that tracked immigrants’ whereabouts.” “Accenture Hits the Daily Double,” Business Week Online, 12 July 2004. 53. Accenture digital forum, “US DHS Awards Accenture-­Led Smart Border Alliance the Contract to Develop and Implement US-­VISIT Program at Air, Land, and Sea Ports of Entry,” 1 June 2004. 54. Rey Koslowski, “Intersections of Information Technology and H ­ uman Mobility: Globalization vs. Homeland Security” (position paper prepared for the ESRC/SSRC colloquium “Money and Migration ­a fter Globalization,” St. Hughes College, University of Oxford, 25–28 March 2004), 19. 55. Quoted in Jo Best, “US to Slap Tourists with RFID,” Silicon​.­com, 26 January 2005.

176 NOTES TO PAGES 101–105

56. See Stephen E. Flynn, “The False Conundrum: Continental Integration versus Homeland Security,” in Andreas and Biersteker, Rebordering of North Amer­i­ca, 110–27; and U.S. Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner, “Pushing Borders Outwards: Rethinking Customs Enforcement” (speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 17 January 2002). 57. Quoted in New York Times, 25 May 2005. 58. See Jessica Romero, “Prevention of Maritime Terrorism: The Container Security Initiative,” Chicago Journal of International Law 4, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 597–606. 59. The initiative was an outgrowth of U.S.-­Canadian efforts to more carefully screen maritime cargo arriving in Canada and transshipped to the United States (as well as cargo arriving in the United States and transshipped to Canada). See Romero, “Prevention of Maritime Terrorism.” 60. New York Times, 12 June 2003. 61. Such transponders utilized Global Positioning Satellite technology. GPS technology could be used to track not only trucks but also cargo containers, passenger vehicles, cell phones, ­humans, and even pets embedded with personal microchips. 62. Nicholas Stein, “Amer­i­c a’s 21st ­C entury Borders,” Fortune, 6 September 2004, 114–20. 63. Benjamin Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars: Crackdowns and Cartels in Latin Amer­i­ca (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 219; Ioan Grillo, El Narco: Inside Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011), 92. 64. Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars, 220. 65. Quoted in Grillo, El Narco, 113. 66. For detailed and nuanced accounts, see Guillermo Trejo and Sandra Ley, “Why Did Drug Cartels Go to War in Mexico? Subnational Party Alternation, the Breakdown of Criminal Protection, and the Onset of Large-­Scale Vio­lence,” Comparative Po­liti­cal Studies 51, no. 7 (June 2018): 900–937; and Angélica Durán-­Martínez, The Politics of Drug Vio­lence: Criminals, Cops and Politicians in Colombia and Mexico (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 67. New York Times, 6 August 2011. 68. New York Times, 16 August 2008. 69. For a detailed account, see especially Ioan Grillo, Blood Gun Money: How Amer­ i­ca Arms Gangs and Cartels (New York: Bloomsbury, 2021). 70. Quoted in The Guardian, 8 December 2011. 71. On the domestic obstacles to curbing gunrunning to Mexico, see especially James Verini, “Mexican Roulette,” Foreign Policy, 30 August 2011. 72. Dear, Why Walls ­Won’t Work, 134. 73. For an overview, see June S. Beittel, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organ­izations: Source and Scope of the Rising Vio­lence (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Ser­ vice, 7 January 2011). 74. Jeremy McDermott, “Militarisation of the Drug War in Latin Amer­i­ca: A Policy Cycle Set to Continue?,” in Militarised Responses to Transnational Organised Crime: The War on Crime, ed. Tuesday Reitano, Lucia Bird Ruiz-­Benitez de Lugo, and Sasha Jepperson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 265. Also see George Grayson, “Los Zetas: The Ruthless Army Spawned by a Mexican Drug Cartel,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 2008. 75. Quoted in Grillo, El Narco, 104–5. 76. Grillo, El Narco, 105, 128. 77. The Justice in Mexico Proj­ect at the Trans-­Border Institute (University of San Diego) has carried out the most careful and detailed tracking of Mexican drug vio­lence. 78. Ioan Grillo, Gangster Warlords: Drug Dollars, Killing Fields, and the New Politics of Latin Amer­i­ca (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 269.

NOTES TO PAGES 105–113

177

79. David Shirk and Joel Wallman, “Understanding Mexico’s Drug Vio­lence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 8 (2015): 1363. 80. Lessing, Making Peace in Drug Wars, 237. 81. Adam Isaac­son, “Northbound ‘Threats’ at the United States–­Mexico Border: What Is Crossing T ­ oday, and Why?,” in American Crossings: Border Politics in the Western Hemi­sphere, ed. Maiah Jaskoski, Arturo C. Sotomayor, and Harold A. Trinkunas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 139. 82. Quoted in Isaac­son, “Northbound ‘Threats,’ ” 139. 83. Quoted in Banjamin Lessing, “Logics of Vio­lence in Criminal War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 8 (2015): 1492. 84. Vanda Felbab-­Brown, “Hooked: Mexico’s Vio­lence and U.S. Demand for Drugs,” Brookings Blog, 30 May 2017. 85. Peter Andreas, “We W ­ ill Miss El Chapo: He Was Easy to Blame for Our Drug War Failures,” The Guardian, 12 January 2016. 86. For a detailed account, see Noelle Kateri Brigden, The Mi­grant Passage: Clandestine Journeys from Central Amer­i­ca (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018). 87. Brigden, Mi­grant Passage, 81. 88. Quoted in Noelle Brigden and Peter Andreas, “Border Collision: Power Dynamics of Enforcement and Evasion across the U.S.-­Mexico Line,” in Protean Power: Exploring the Uncertain and Unexpected in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 114. 89. David Fitzgerald, Refuge beyond Reach: How Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 139. 90. Isaac­son, “Northbound ‘Threats,’ ” 137. 91. Quoted in Fitzgerald, Refuge beyond Reach, 140. 92. Adam Isacson and Maureen Meyer, On the Front Lines: Border Security, Migration, and Humanitarian Concerns in South Texas (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin Amer­i­ca, February 2015), 12. 93. Adam Isacson, Maureen Meyer, and Hannah Smith, Increased Enforcement at Mexico’s Southern Border: An Update on Security, Migration, and U.S. Assistance (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin Amer­i­ca, November 2015). 94. Fitzgerald, Refuge beyond Reach, 131. 95. Quoted in Fitzgerald, Refuge beyond Reach, 141. 6. ESCALATION IN A NEW PO­L ITI­C AL LANDSCAPE

1. Quoted in Katie Reilly, “­Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico,” Time, 31 August 2016. 2. Quoted in Daniel Fappiano, “The Wall ­Isn’t ­Really About the ‘Wall,’ ” The Recorder, 31 January 2019. 3. Quotation from BBC News, 6 February 2017. 4. Washington Post, 12 February 2016. 5. Pat Buchanan for President 1996 campaign brochure, “Reclaiming the American Dream.” 6. Todd Miller, “Basically Trump’s Border Wall Already Exists,” ­Mother Jones, 27 August 2016. 7. Doris Meissner et al., Immigration Enforcement in the United States: The Rise of a Formidable Machinery (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, January 2013). 8. Quoted in CNN, 11 January 2017. 9. BBC News, 6 February 2017. 10. Quoted in Tim Marshall, Divided: Why ­We’re Living in an Age of Walls (London: Elliott and Thompson, 2018), 39.

178 NOTES TO PAGES 113–120

11. Quoted in Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Michael  D. Shear, Border Wars: Inside Trump’s Assault on Immigration (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2019), 63. 12. Marshall, Divided, 40. 13. Quoted in Jason Zengerle, “How Amer­i­ca Got to ‘Zero Tolerance’ on Immigration: The Inside Story,” New York Times Magazine, 16 July 2019. 14. Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 4. 15. Quoted in Marshall, Divided, 53. 16. Quoted in “Trump’s Catastrophic Meeting with Chuck and Nancy,” Washington Monthly, 11 December 2019. 17. Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 357. 18. Quoted in Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 369. 19. Quoted in Mary Papenfuss, “Trump Issues Dark Warning about Immigrants in New Plea for Wall Funding,” Huffington Post, 21 December 2018. 20. Quoted in New York Times, 8 January 2019. 21. Quoted in Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 375. 22. Quoted in New York Times, 12 January 2019. 23. Quoted in New York Times, 10 January 2019. 24. New York Times, 12 January 2019. 25. Quoted in New York Times, 5 January 2019. 26. Quoted in Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 100. 27. Quoted in Daniel Denvir, All-­American Nativism: How the Bipartisan War on Immigrants Explains Politics as We Know It (London: Verso, 2020), 249. 28. Quoted in Zengerle, “How Amer­i­ca Got to ‘Zero Tolerance.’ ” 29. Quoted in Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 264. 30. For a more detailed account, see Adam Isacson, Maureen Meyer, and Adeline Hite, A National Shame: The Trump Administration’s Separation and Detention of Mi­g rant Families (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin Amer­i­ca, August 2018). 31. Quoted in Zengerle, “How Amer­i­ca Got to ‘Zero Tolerance.’ ” 32. Quoted in Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 276. 33. Quoted in Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 277. 34. Sebastian Rotella and Tim Golden, “How Smugglers Are Thriving ­under Trump,” Atlantic, 21 February 2019. 35. New York Times, 6 January 2019. 36. Jasper Gilardi, “Ally or Exploiter? The Smuggler-­Migrant Relationship Is a Complex One,” Migration Policy Institute, 5 February 2020. 37. New York Times, 31 May 2019. 38. Washington Post, 4 December 2019. 39. Quoted in Denvir, All-­American Nativism, 253. 40. See especially Abigail Thornton, “The History of Caravans as a Strategic Response,” in The Mi­grant Caravan: From Honduras to Tijuana (San Diego: Center for U.S.-­Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 2018–2019). 41. Amelia Frank-­Vitale, “From Caravan to Exodus, from Migration to Movement,” NACLA Report on the Amer­i­cas, 20 November 2018. 42. New York Times, 31 October 2018. 43. Quoted in San Diego Union-­Tribune, 22 October 2018. 44. Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 335. 45. Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 336–37. 46. Quoted in Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 326. 47. Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 341. 48. Quoted in El Paso Times, 11 February 2019. 49. Quoted in Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 379.

NOTES TO PAGES 120–130

179

50. Quoted in Davis and Shear, Border Wars, 380. 51. Quoted in David Scott Fitzgerald, Refuge beyond Reach: How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 142. 52. Quoted in El Paso Times, 29 March 2019. 53. The Guardian, 7 March 2016. 54. The Guardian, 7 July 2017. 55. Donald J. Trump, “Statement on Emergency Mea­sures to Address Illegal Immigration at the Mexico-­United States Border,” 31 May 2019. 56. ­Reuters, 24 June 2019. 57. Washington Post, 17 July 2019. 58. Milenio, 7 February 2019. 59. El Heraldo de Mexico, 28 June 2019. 60. Milenio, 6 November 2019. 61. Washington Post, 17 December 2020. 62. Mexico News Daily, 6 July 2020. 63. Jorge Ramos, “Trump Got His Wish: Mexico Is Now the Wall,” New York Times, 7 February 2020. 64. Washington Post, 23 July 2019. 65. R ­ euters, 16 October 2019. 66. Los Angeles Times, 24 January 2020. 67. Quoted in Associated Press, 8 January 2019. 68. Quoted in Associated Press, 8 January 2019. 69. Quoted in United Press International, 7 December 2019. 70. Quoted in Associated Press, 5 November 2019. 71. Quote from ­Reuters, 26 December 2019. 72. Quoted in Washington Post, 17 December 2020. 73. El Universal, 16 June 2021. 74. New York Times, 15 January 2021. 75. Washington Post, 17 December 2020. 76. New York Times, 15 January 2021. 77. New York Times, 15 December 2020. 78. For a broader discussion of pandemics and border politics, see Michael R. Kenwick and Beth  A. Simmons, “Pandemic Response as Border Politics,” International Organ­ization 74, supp. iss. E.1 (2020): 20–31. 79. Politico, 25 March 2020. 80. New York Times, 3 May 2020. 81. New York Times, 13 May 2020. 82. Politico, 10 March 2020. 83. Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump and Vice President Pence during Briefing on the 2020 Hurricane Season.” The White House, 28 May 2020. 84. Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump in a Roundtable on Supporting Amer­i­ca’s Commercial Fishermen,” The White House, 5 June 2020. 85. Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump in Roundtable on Border Security—­ Yuma, AZ,” The White House, 23 June 2020. 86. Mexico’s National Institute of Migration, “Actúa INM con responsabilidad ante la contingencia por COVID-19,” 26 April 2020; Telemundo, 27 April 2020. 87. Proceso, 8 April 2020. 88. Quoted in Adam Isaac­son, “From ‘Pause’ to ‘Reverse’: What Lies Ahead for Stopping Trump’s Border Wall and Fixing the Damage,” WOLA commentary, 11 February 2021. 89. Quoted in New York Times, 16 March 2021.

180 NOTES TO PAGES 131–136

90. Greg Grandin, “The Militarization of the Southern Border Is a Longstanding American Tradition,” NACLA Report on the Amer­i­cas, 17 January 2019. 91. Isaac­son, “From ‘Pause’ to ‘Reverse.’ ” 92. Todd Miller, “Biden’s Border: The Industry, the Demo­crats and the 2020 Elections,” Transnational Institute (Amsterdam), 2020, 16. 93. Rose L. Thayer, “Deployment of US Troops along U.S.-­Mexico Border ­Will Stretch into a Fourth Year, Pentagon Announces,” Stars and Stripes, 6 July 2021. 94. Proceso, 19 March 2021. 95. New York Times, 18 March 2021. 96. CNN, 12 April 2021. 97. Washington Office on Latin Amer­i­c a, Weekly U.S.-­Mexico Border Update, 3 September 2021. 98. Quoted in Leon Krauze, “­There’s a Crisis of Vio­lence and Racism in Southern Mexico, It Needs Urgent Attention,” Washington Post, 31 August 2021. 99. Michael A. Clemens, “Vio­lence, Development, and Migration Waves: Evidence from Central American Child Mi­grant Apprehensions,” working paper, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC,2017. 100. A. C. Thompson, “Years Ago, the Border Patrol’s Discipline Prob­lem Was Denounced as ‘Broken’: It’s Still Not Fixed,” ProPublica, 20 June 2019. 101. ­These abuses and the lack of accountability are well documented by ­human rights organ­izations. See, for example, Adam Isaac­son, “Fixing a Culture That Protects and Rewards Abuse at U.S. Border Agencies,” WOLA Commentary, 14 October 2020. 102. David Jancsics, “Law Enforcement Corruption along the U.S. Borders,” Security Journal (October 2019). For a particularly vivid description of the seriousness of the border corruption prob­lem, see Tim Gaynor, Midnight on the Line: The Secret Life of the U.S.-­Mexico Border (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2009). 103. Garett M. Graff, “The Border Patrol Hits a Breaking Point,” Politico, 15 July 2019. 104. This predated the Trump administration. In 2014 Politico described the Border Patrol as the country’s most out-­of-­control law enforcement agency. See Garrett M. Graff, “The Green Monster,” Politico, November/December 2014. 105. Max Radwin, “Trump Leaves Biden Corruption Prob­lem at Mexico Border Wall,” Insight Crime, 21 January 2021. 106. “Rising Border Encounters in 2021: An Overview and Analy­sis,” American Immigration Council, Washington, DC, 2 August 2021. 107. Fox News, 27 April 2021. 108. Press Release, “Higgins Introduces Finish the Wall Act,” 22 April 2021. 109. New York Times, 16 May 2021. 110. Quoted in Jorge Ramos, “The Perpetual Crisis at the Border—­and What We Can Do about It,” New York Times, 2 April 2021. 111. Quoted in New York Times, 15 March 2021. 112. Ed Luce, “Kamala Harris’s Troubled Vice-­ Presidency,” Financial Times, 11 June 2021. 113. New York Times, 6 June 2021. 114. Quoted in Luce, “Kamala Harris’s Troubled Vice-­Presidency.” 115. Quotation from CNN, 30 June 2021. 116. Jack Herrera, “Why Are Republican Governors Sending National Guard to the Border?,” Politico, 10 July 2021. 117. Muzaffar Chishti and Jessica Bolter, “Texas Once Again Tests the Bound­aries of State Authority in Immigration Enforcement,” Policy Beat (Migration Policy Institute), 29 June 2021. 118. Texas Tribune, 2 July 2021.

NOTES TO PAGES 137–144

181

119. Quoted in Texas Tribune, 15 June 2021. 120. Quoted in New York Times, 30 June 2021. 7. ENDLESS ESCALATION? BORDER POLICING TRAJECTORIES

1. Martin Schain, The Border: Policy and Politics in Eu­rope and the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 208. 2. Ron Hassner and Jason Wittenberg, “Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Bound­aries and Why?,” International Security 40, no. 1 (2015): 157–90. 3. Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder, eds., The Wall around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North Amer­i­ca and Eu­rope (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000). 4. Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 5. John Kerry, The New War: The Web of Crime That Threatens Amer­i­ca’s Security (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 149. 6. See Janice Thomson and Stephen Krasner, “Global Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty,” in Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, ed. Ernst-­Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 198, which rightly points out that t­ here never has been a “golden age” of state control. 7. Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American Po­liti­cal Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 91. On the construction of national identities, see Benedict Anderson, ­Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991). 8. Roger Friedland and Robert A. Alford, “Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradictions,” in The New Institutionalism in Orga­nizational Analy­sis, ed. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 238. 9. Joseph Gusfield, The Culture of Public Prob­lems: Drinking-­Driving and the Symbolic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 159, 181. 10. David Garland, Punishment in Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 11. This view reinforces the conclusion of James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Orga­nizational Basis of Politics (New York: F ­ ree Press, 1984), 735, that analy­sis of the state should more fully incorporate a recognition of “the ways in which po­liti­cal life is or­ga­nized around the development of meaning through symbols, rituals and ceremonies.” 12. Statement of Representative John L. Mica, House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and H ­ uman Resources, Committee on Government Reform, Examining the Drug Threat along the Southwest Border, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 24 September 1999. 13. Cited in Council on Foreign Relations, Task Force Report: Rethinking International Drug Control (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations Press,1997), 55. 14. Peter Reuter, “Quantity Illusions and Paradoxes of Drug Interdiction: Federal Investigation into Vice Policy,” Law and Con­temporary Prob­lems 51, no. 1 (1988): 233–52. 15. On a public health approach to drugs, see Eva Bertram, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas, Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial (Berkeley: ­University of California Press, 1996), chap. 10. 16. On the racial dimension of mass incarceration, see especially Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: New Press, 2010).

182 NOTES TO PAGES 145–149

17. Quoted in David Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 181. 18. Quoted in Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “U.S. Immigration Policy: What Next?,” in Essays on ­Legal and Illegal Immigration, ed. Susan Pozo (Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1986), 124. 19. See especially Jason De Leon, The Land of Open Graves: Living and D ­ ying on the Mi­grant Trail (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015). 20. Christopher Bassford, “What Role for the Military Now?,” Newsday, 17 September 1991. 21. Ralph Peters, “­A fter the Revolution,” Par­ameters 25 (Summer 1995): 11–14. 22. Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer, The Next War (Washington, DC: ­Regnery, 1996). 23. New York Times, 19 October 2021. 24. Quoted in Davis Winkie, “Death, Drugs, and a Disbanded Unit: How the Guard’s Mexico Border Mission Fell Apart,” Army Times, December 8, 2021. 25. Quoted in Winkie, “Death, Drugs, and a Disbanded Unit,” Army Times, December 8, 2021. 26. The books published just in the last few years alone include Javier Hidalgo, Unjust Borders: Individuals and the Ethics of Immigration (New York: Routledge, 2021); Peter Laufer, Up Against the Wall: The Case for Opening the Mexican-­American Border (London: Anthem, 2020); Justin Akers Chacon, The Border Crossed Us: The Case for Opening the U.S.-­Mexico Border (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2021); R ­ eece Jones, ed., Open Borders: In Defense of F ­ ree Movement (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2019); Todd Miller, Build Bridges, Not Walls: A Journey to a World without Borders (San Francisco: Open Media/City Lights, 2021); Alex Sager, Against Borders: Why the World Needs ­Free Movement of P ­ eople (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2020). Calls for open borders are growing, but are certainly not new. See especially Joseph Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (1987): 251–73. 27. Catherine Besteman, Militarized Global Apartheid (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2020); Joseph Nevins, ­Dying to Live: The Story of U.S. Immigration in an Age of Global Apartheid (San Francisco: Open Media/City Lights, 2008). On borders as reinforcers of racial inequalities, see especially R ­ eece Jones, White Borders: The History of Race and Immigration in the United States from Chinese Exclusion to the Border Wall (Boston: Beacon Press, 2021). 28. Aviva Chomsky, Central Amer­i­ca’s Forgotten History: Revolution, Vio­lence, and the Roots of Migration (Boston: Beacon Press, 2021). 29. Todd Miller, Storming the Wall: Climate Change, Migration, and Homeland Security (San Francisco: City Lights, 2017). 30. Farhad Manjoo, “­There’s Nothing Wrong with Open Borders,” New York Times, 16 January 2019. On how restrictive immigration policies are contributing to a demographic crisis, see Charles Kenny, “The Real Immigration Crisis: The Prob­lem Is Not Too Many, but Too Few,” Foreign Affairs November 11, 2019. 31. Contrast, Besteman, Militarized Global Apartheid, with Kimberly Clausing, Open: The Progressive Case for ­Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020); Jason L. Riley, Let Them In: The Case for Open Borders (New York: Avery, 2008); and Bas van der Vossen and Jason Brennan, In Defense of Openness: Why Global Freedom Is the Humane Solution to Global Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 32. ­Reese Jones, Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move (London: Verso, 2016), 163.

NOTES TO PAGES 150–155

183

33. Daniel Denvir, “How Bernie Sanders Should Talk about Borders,” Jacobin Magazine, April 16, 2019. 34. In the case of immigration control, see Todd Miller, Empire of Borders: The Expansion of the U.S. Border around the World (San Francisco: City Lights, 2019). In the case of policing more generally, see Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 35. In this regard it should be acknowledged that the United States has simply taken a page from the Eu­ro­pean playbook. The model of outsourcing the management of migratory flows and borders has been carried out by the Eu­ro­pean Union since the 1990s and substantially reinforced in subsequent de­cades, targeting dozens of countries for border externalization mea­sures. 36. Washington Post, 8 August 2021. Th ­ ere are virtually no controls on southbound traffic through the ports of entry, making smuggling into Mexico exceptionally easy. 37. Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-­Mexico Border Wars, 2nd ed.(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2017), 36. 38. Tim Wright, “How Many Drones Are Smuggling Drugs across the U.S. Southern Border?,” Air & Space Magazine, June 2020. 39. Something along t­ hese lines is suggested by Mark Kleiman, “Surgical Strikes in the Drug Wars,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011. To some extent, the Mexican government already followed this selective targeting strategy by prioritizing tracking down and largely dismantling Los Zetas, the country’s most violence-­prone trafficking organ­ization. 40. Peter Andreas, “The Po­liti­cal Economy of Narco-­Corruption in Mexico,” Current History 97 (1998): 160–65. 41. This has unfortunately been true for de­c ades. See Bertram et  al., Drug War Politics. 42. Andrew Selee, Vanis­hing Frontier: The Forces Driving Mexico and the United States Together (New York: Public Affairs, 2018).

Index

Abbott, Greg, 135, 136–37, 147 Af­g han­i­stan war, 90, 103 Agua Prieta, Mexico, 71 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), 31, 36 airports, 9, 96, 99–100, 101–2, 127, 153 air smuggling interdiction, 28, 29, 36, 47, 53, 54, 90–91, 99, 101, 112, 153, 163n8. See also Northern Border Response Force (Mexico) Alamo, ­battle of, 17 alcohol smuggling, 15, 154 Alexander, Lamar, 147 Alfaro, Victor Clark, 49 “Alliance for Prosperity” program, 132 Alvarez del Castillo, Enrique, 43 Amnesty International, 129 animal smuggling, 16 Anti-­Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 33 Anti-­Terrorism Act (2001) (Canada), 96 Arellano Félix ­brothers, 42–43, 49 Arizona, 18, 68, 70, 82, 89, 91, 136, 170n37 Arkansas, 136 arms trafficking, 14–15, 37, 103–4 Asian immigrants. See Chinese immigrants and smugglers Asian ports, 102 “Asylum Cooperative Agreements,” 123–24 asylum-­seekers: Biden and, 132; corruption and, 146; funding and, 112, 115, 132, 148; imaging and, 124; Mexican immigrants compared, 108, 146; Mexico and, 7–8; militarization and, 149; Obama and, 108; outsourcing and, 151; pandemic and, 129; Trump and, 112, 115–16, 121–22, 123, 124, 129, 146, 148; U.S. and, 106, 107–8; walls and, 112. See also c­ hildren, unaccompanied automobiles, 18. See also traffic management AWACS (airborne warning and control system), 31, 36 Bach, Robert, 78 Baja California, 14, 15, 26, 48, 49 Banks, Samuel, 167n113 “Banzai runs,” 65, 81, 169n10

Beltran-­Leyva drug-­t rafficking organ­ization, 127 Bennett, Robert (R-­Utah), 51 Bentley, Helen (R-­Md.), 40–41 Bersin, Alan, 107, 169n10 Bhagwati, Jagdish, 145 Biden, Joe and his administration, 130–37. See also Harris, Kamala Bilbray, Brian (R-­Calif.), 66 Binational Study on Migration (1997), 71, 170n39 biometrics, 99, 100, 101, 131, 175nn45, 47, 52 Bolivia, 50 Bonner, Robert, 102 Bonner, T. J., 82 “border czar” (Special Representative to the Southwest Border), 66–67 Border Field State Park announcement, 116 border games. See cross-­border cooperation (bilateralism) border narrative. See imaging and media border narrative; statistics and data (mea­sur­ing policy effectiveness) Border Research and Technology Center, 68 Border ­under Siege (video), 81 Bowie, James, 17 Bracero Program, 20, 21, 24 Braun, Marcus, 18 Bromwich, Michael, 74 Brownsville, Texas, 94 Buchanan, Patrick, 56, 64–65, 111 Bush, George H. W. and his administration, 28, 34, 37, 38–39, 40, 60, 133 Bush, George W. and his administration, 89, 90, 97, 98–99, 112, 115 Bush, Laura, 116 Calavita, Kitty, 21 Calderón, Felipe, 103, 104–5 Calexico, California, 71 Cali cartel (Colombia), 42 California: Border Patrol and, 71; drug smuggling and, 57; historical perspectives and, 14, 18; illegal (unauthorized) immigration, 18, 69, 71, 91, 169n10; immigration

185

186 INDEX

California (continued) backlash and, 9, 64; immigration imaging and, vii, 9–10, 65–66, 81, 82, 83, 116; marijuana and, 151; mi­grant workers and, 65–66, 75; militarization and, 48; nativism and, 64; politics and, 65, 69, 83, 91, 116; walls and fences and, 14. See also San Diego, California and other cities Camarena, Kiki (murdered DEA agent), 32–33, 34, 39 Canada and the northern border: Chinese laborers, 17; cross-­border cooperation and, 94, 97–99, 175n34, 176n59; cross-­border economy and, 93–94, 96–97, 99; gun-­ smuggling and, 174n27; marijuana and, 152; 9/11 and, 85–87, 93–98; open borders and, 157n1; statistics, 96–97; technological escalation and, 98, 101 candelillla smuggling, 15–16 Cantú, Estéban, 26 capitalism, 149 caravans, 118–20 Ca­rib­bean islands and Sea, 38, 152 Caro Quintéro, Rafaél, 33, 43 Carrillo Fuentes, Amado, 45 Car­ter, Jimmy and his administration, 16 catch and release, 92 CENDRO (Mexico Center for the Planning of Drug Control), 37, 46 Center for Anti-­Narcotics Investigations (CIAN), 47 Center for Low Intensity Conflict, 69 Central American mi­g rants: Biden and, 132; caravans and, 118–20; cross-­border cooperation and, 108–9, 131–32, 151; Harris and, 135–36; imaging and, 106; Mexican mi­g rants compared, 157n2; Mexico and, 2, 7–8, 121, 122, 123, 127–28; Obama and, 132; open borders and, 149; as “someone ­else’s prob­lem,” 150–51; statistics, 122, 132; technology and, 107; Trump and, 123; vio­lence and, 11, 106–7, 146. See also asylum-­seekers; Guatemala certification by U.S., 33, 49–53 Cervantes Aguire, Enrique, 47 Challenge on the Border (video), 81–82 Chiapas, Mexico, 107, 122 Chihuahua, Mexico, 27, 47 ­children, 23, 66 ­children, unaccompanied, 106, 107–8, 116–17, 129, 132, 134–35, 146 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (U.S.), 17

Chinese immigrants and smugglers, 17–18, 26, 73 Chrétian, Jean, 98 Chretien, C., 54 CIA, 103 CIAN (Center for Anti-­Narcotics Investigations), 47 Cienfuegos Zepeda, Salvador (“El Padrino”), 127 citizenship, path to, 115, 150 climate refugees, 149 Clinton, Bill and his administration: barriers and, 112; bipartisan consensus and, 133; certification rituals and, 51–53; drug traffickers and, 37; ­f ree trade and, 56–57; immigration and, 66, 70–74, 80–84; immigration imaging and, 84; mi­g rant workers and, 66–70; militarization and, 139. See also NAFTA (North American ­Free Trade Agreement) Clinton, Hillary, 103 Coahuila (Mexico), 44–45 cocaine smuggling: Biden and, 132; Colombia’s exporters and, 35–36, 41–42; consumer demand and, 55; cross-­border economy and, 31–32; ­f uture possibilities and, 152–53; historical perspectives, 28–29; legalization and, 153–54; mea­sur­ing effectiveness and, 61; militarization and, 29–30, 103, 146; NAFTA and, 53–59; Salinas years and, 37–50; statistics, 28–29, 40, 42–43, 47, 58, 103, 163n9; synthetics and, 153. See also Guzmán, Joaquín (“El Chapo”); 1990s drug smuggling; Southeast border strategy Coello Trejo, Javier, 45 Colombia, 50, 51. See also cocaine smuggling Colorado, 151 Container Security Initiative (2002), 102 Cornelius, Wayne, 78 corruption, bribes and payoffs: asylum-­seekers and, 146; Biden and, 132; Camarena’s murder and, 32, 33; certification rituals and, 51; immigrant smuggling and, 74, 107; immigration imaging and, 84; militarization and, 43–49, 105, 127–28, 149; NAFTA and, 9; narco-­terrorists and, 124–28; Operation Condor and, 27–28; Salinas years and, 40, 43–49, 50; Southeast border strategy and, 146; statistics (1993), 44; as tax, 44; Trump administration and, 117, 133. See also Cienfuegos Zepeda, Salvador (“El Padrino”) and other corrupt officials Coulter, Ann, 112–13, 117

INDEX 187

Covid-19, 128–29 Cox, Christopher (R-­CA), 100 “coyotes,” 22, 71, 107. See also immigrants and immigrant smuggling Craig, Richard, 27 Cresencio Sandoval, Luis, 132 criminalization: Abbott and, 136; asylum-­ seekers and, 139; G. W. Bush and, 98; cross-­border cooperation and, 2, 43; detention and, 81; of drug users, 144; historical perspectives, 18, 128; imaging and, 114, 141; Mexican and U.S. compared, 157n3; Mexico and, 38, 48; militarization and, 140, 146; scholarly interest and, 4; territorial control and, 26; Trump and, 116, 119, 123, 146. See also “voluntary departure” cross-­border cooperation (bilateralism): border narratives and, 143; Camarena murder and, 32; Canada and, 94, 97–99, 175n34, 176n59; Central American mi­grants and, 108–9, 131–32, 151; certification ritual and, 50–52; Cienfuegos’s arrest and, 127, 128; drug smuggling and, 26–27, 35, 103–4, 164n28; drug supply reduction and, 50; ­f uture of, 155; Gortari and, 34; historical perspectives, 23–24; ­human rights and, 7; imaging and, 61–62; immigration and, 108; immigration and drug smuggling compared, 127–28; law enforcement and, 107; mea­sur­i ng policy effectiveness and, 142; militarization and, 2, 47, 102–9, 131–32, 148–49, 157n11; NAFTA and, 43; 9/11 and, 88, 107; overview, 34; pandemic and, 119; politics and, 39–40; statistics, 39–40; success versus, 53; U.S. Congress and, 23; vio­lence and, 146. See also Canada and the northern border; cross-­border economy; ­f ree trade (market liberalization); slavers (­owners and traders), U.S.; smuggling; Treaty on Cooperation for Mutual L ­ egal Assistance (1991) cross-­border economy: Anti-­Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and, 33; barriers versus economic integration and, 3; criminalization and, 139; drug smuggling and, 35, 139–40; historical perspective, 139–40; marijuana and, 151–52; Mexican drug cartels and, 42; mi­g rant workers and, 5–6, 9, 16, 24, 66, 71–72, 77–80, 92, 140, 172n96; militarization and, 121–22, 148–49; 9/11 and, 87–88; Operation Intercept (1969) and, 26–27; Operation Río Grande and, 71; policing and, viii; Salinas and, 37, 38; smuggling

and, 12–16; state policy versus, 8–9; U.S. Customs and, 31–32. See also Canada and the northern border; corruption, bribes and payoffs; ­f ree trade (market liberalization); globalization; mi­g rant workers; NAFTA (North American ­Free Trade Agreement); peso collapse (1994); ports of entry; smuggling; tariffs; U.S. financial crisis (2008) Cruz, Ted, 135–36 Cuellar, Jorge Madrazo, 48 Customs-­Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, 102 data. See statistics and data (mea­sur­ing policy effectiveness) de-­escalation, 149–55 demand and markets. See drug smuggling; mi­g rant workers democracy, 148–49 Demo­crats: Biden and, 133, 135–36; open borders and, 150; Trump and, 112, 114–16, 119. See also politics; Schumer, Charles (D-­N.Y.) and other Demo­crats deportations: Covid-19 and, 129; imaging and, 142; Mexico and, 7, 107, 108, 122, 129, 132; 9/11 and, 96; pandemic and, 129; statistics, 20, 92, 122; Trump and, 116, 117, 124. See also detention and detention centers; Operation Wetback (1954) DeSantis, Ron, 136 detention and detention centers: Canadian border and, 96; ­children and, 116–17, 129, 135; Covid-19 and, 129; criminalization and, 81; cross-­border economy and, 122; escalation and, 92; funding, 97; ­f uture possibilities and, 150–51; Mexico and, 7–8, 11, 88, 108, 122, 124; 9/11 and, 88; politics and, 131, 145; statistics, 70, 92; Trump and, 114, 117, 119, 122, 124; “voluntary departure” versus, 23. See also deportations deterrence, 2, 68–70, 141. See also walls, fences and other barriers Detroit, 96–97 Dobbs, Lou, 120 documents, immigration: employer sanctions and, 64, 76–77; mi­g rant rights and, 161n35; nation states and, 141; 9/11 and, 88, 100; Obama administration and, 91; Operation Gatekeeper and, 78; technological escalation and, 71, 102 Dodd, Christopher (D-­Conn.), 50 Dole, Bob, 83

188 INDEX

Domenici, Pete (R-­N. Mex.), 30, 51 Dorgan, Byron, 95 Douglas, Arizona, 70 Dow, Robert, 14 drug smuggling: border narratives and, 140, 143; Canadian border and, 97; Central American immigration and, 109; consumer demand and, 5–6, 13, 26, 50, 140, 143–44, 154; cross-­border cooperation and, 127–28; cross-­border economy and, 35, 139–40; escalation and, 146, 152, 164n28; ­f uture possibilities and, 147–48, 154, 183n39; ground traffic and, 54; gun smuggling and, 125; health versus enforcement and, 144; historical perspectives, viii, 25–34, 161n52; imaging and, 7, 8, 159nn22, 23; immigration contrasted, 2–3, 127–28; legalization and, 157n1; mi­g rant smuggling and, 91; NAFTA and, vii, viii, 9, 35, 53–59, 167n118; 9/11 and, 86; politics and, 9, 97; statistics, 5, 9, 42–43, 50, 55, 57–58, 60, 104–5, 125, 162n65, 163n1; technology and, 27, 103, 168n137; territorial authority and, 26, 28, 38, 103; terrorism and, 124–28; Trump’s terrorism policies and, 124–28; U.S.-­Mexico cooperation and, 26; vio­lence and, 102–9, 125, 152, 154, 176n77; walls and fences and, 112, 169n8. See also air smuggling interdiction; cocaine smuggling; corruption, bribes and payoffs; cross-­border cooperation; Juárez drug cartel and other cartels; militarization; 1990s drug smuggling; smuggling; truck trafficking; walls, fences and other barriers drug-­smuggling organ­izations: Colombian cocaine and, 36; cross-­border cooperation and, 104; Mexican economy and, 42; Mexican National Guard and, 122; Operation Condor and, 27; territorial authority and, 5; U.S. arms and, 103–4; U.S. Mexico politics and, 128; U.S. militarization and, 29–30. See also cocaine smuggling and Colombian traffickers; Juárez cartel and other cartels; 1990s drug smuggling Drug Trafficking on the Fast Track (U.S. congressional report), 56 Dunn, Timothy J., 157n3 Durango, Mexico, 27 Ebrard, Marcelo, 125 economy. See cross-­border economy Eisenhower, Dwight D. and his administration, 20, 21

“El Chapo” (Guzmán), 43, 106 Eliason, Alan, 162n71 “El Padrino” (Cienfuegos Zepeda), 127 El Paso, Texas, 14, 18, 19, 69–70, 81, 105, 170nn28, 29, 48 El Salvador, 106, 123, 132 employer sanctions and workplace solutions: border enforcement versus, 2, 144; Bracero program and, 21, 24; Clinton administration and, 75–77; funding and, 144; historical perspectives, 19, 20, 39; imaging and, 9–10; INS and, 25, 75–76; IRCA and, 24–25, 64, 76; politics and, 9, 64–66, 115; statistics, 75–76; Trump and, 117. See also mi­g rant workers Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (2002), 99 escalation: overviews, 1–11, 138–42, 158n14, 159nn22, 24; ­f uture possibilities, 11, 143–55; game meta­phor and, viii–­i x; research on, 158n12. See also cross-­border cooperation (bilateralism); de-­escalation; historical perspectives; imaging and media; militarization; politics; smuggling; technological escalations; territorial authority, U.S. (nation-­state) (homeland security) Esper, Mark, 148 Eu­ro­pean outsourcing, 151, 183n35 Eu­ro­pean ports, 102 E-­Verify, 117 facial recognition. See biometrics ­family separation policy (2018), 116–17. See also ­children, unaccompanied FBI, 39, 73 Feinstein, Diane (D-­Calif.), 56, 57 Felbab-­Brown, Vanda, 105–6 Félix Gallardo, Angel, 39, 43, 45–46 fentanyl, 128, 143, 153 Fitzgerald, David, 108 Florida, 29–30, 136. See also Southeast border strategy Flynn, Stephen, 94 Fort Bliss army base, 170n48 Fox, Vicente, 102–3 Fox News, 120 ­f ree trade (market liberalization): Central American mi­g rants and, 149; criminalization and, 139; drug criminalization and, 43; immigrant smuggling and, 72; immigration and, 80; smuggling, historical and, 16. See also cross-­b order economy; globalization; NAFTA; open borders

INDEX 189

“French Connection,” 26 Friedman, Milton, 157n1 funding and costs: apprehension versus deterrence and, 69; asylum-­seekers and, 112, 115, 132, 148; crowdfunding, 136–37; Demo­crats and, 115; employer sanctions and, 75–76, 144; escalation and, 142; INS and, 67, 75–76, 87; mea­sure­ments of effectiveness and, 61, 142; Mexican drug enforcement and, 33; Mexican militarization and, 126–27; Mexican tech and, 53; NAFTA feedback and, 41; 9/11 and repercussions and, 92; Operation Hard Line and, 61; statistics, 23, 69, 107, 143; supply reduction versus demand reduction and, 143; ­a fter 2000, 107; U.S. Border Patrol and, 38, 69; U.S. militarization and, 28–29; U.S. National Guard and, 39; walls and, 112, 113, 114–15 Gadsden Purchase of 1853, 17 Gallego, Ruben (D-­Ariz), 148 game meta­phor, viii–ix García Abrego, Juan, 45–46 Garduño Yáñez, Francisco, 122 Gelbard, Robert, 40 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1986), 16 globalization, vii, 1, 3–4, 99, 118, 149. See also capitalism; climate refugees; Covid-19; cross-­border economy; ­f ree trade (market liberalization); NAFTA (North American ­Free Trade Agreement) Goffman, Erving, 7, 159n20 Golden Venture (Chinese boat), 73 Gonzalez, Juan, 109 Gortari, Carlos Salinas de, 34 Government Accounting Office (GAO), 60 GPS (Global Positioning Satellite technology), 176n61 Graham, Bob (Florida governor), 29 Graham Lindsay (R-­S. Carolina), 130 Gram, Phil (R-­Tex.), 59 ­Great Depression, 20 ­Great Recession of 2008, 92 Greenberg, Stanley, 119 ground traffic, 54. See also automobiles; truck trafficking Guatemala, 104, 107, 124, 129, 132, 134. See also Central American mi­grants Guerrero (Mexico), 38, 105 guest workers, 20, 21, 24 Guillén López, Tonatiuh, 122 Gulf drug cartel, 42, 103, 104

gun smuggling, 103–4, 125, 174n27 Gusfield, Joseph, 141 Gutiérrez Rebollo, Jesús, 48 Guzmán, Joaquín (“El Chapo”), 43, 106 H-2 drug cartel, 127 Hamilton, Lee (D-­Ind.), 50 Harris, Kamala, 135–36 Harrison Narcotics Law (1914), 25 Harvest of Shame (CBS documentary), 21 Hawkins, Paula (R-­Florida), 29 Hernández Sánchez, Vicente Antonio, 122–23 heroin, 2, 26, 27, 34, 35, 42, 57, 128, 152, 153–54 Herzog, Lawrence, 3 Heyman, Josiah M., 161n46 “High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area,” 38 High-­Level Contact Group against Drugs (bilateral), 51–52 historical perspectives, viii–ix, 2–3, 8–9, 138, 141, 142. See also ­under immigrants and immigrant smuggling and other specific topics Holt, Lester, 136 Homeland Security Committee of U.S. Congress, 100 homeland security industrial complex, 100 Honduras, 106, 123, 131, 132 Huffbauer, Gary, 54 humanitarian aid, 132 humanitarian crises, 109, 131–32, 151. See also mi­g rant rights and ­human rights ­Human Smuggling Cell of ICE, 117 Hunter, Duncan (R-­Calif.), 66, 68, 84 Hurtado, Miguél De La Madrid, 33–34 Hutchinson, Asa, 101 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, 67–68 imaging and media (border narrative): Anti-­Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and, 33; asylum-­seekers and, 124; Bracero laborers and, 21; bribes and, 9; Canadian border and, 93–94, 95, 96; Central American mi­g rants and, 106; certification rituals and, 49–50; Clinton and, 37; deterrence versus, 69, 141; drug smuggling versus immigration and, 2; escalation and, 8, 140–41, 143, 159nn22, 23; ­family separation policy and, 116–17; Harris and, 136; historical perspectives, vii–­v iii, 22, 34; immigration and, 7–8, 9–10, 21, 23, 25, 63, 64–70, 74, 77,

190 INDEX

imaging and media (border narrative) (continued) 80–84, 135; immigration, Trump’s policy and, 116–17, 118, 119, 120, 123–24; INS and, 25, 77, 80–83; mea­sur­ing effectiveness and, 60–61; mi­g rant rights and, 151; mi­g rant workers and, 75; NAFTA and, 9, 41, 54, 56, 164n31; 9/11 repercussions and, 89–90, 94–95; Operation Condor and, 27, 28; pandemic politics and, 134; Proposition 187 and, 64; public opinion and, 6–8; Salinas and, 37–40; smuggling and, 142; so­cio­log­i­ cal theory and, 159n20; State authority and, 5–6; statistics, 5, 8, 39–40, 50–51, 60–61; territorial authority and, viii, 181n11; urban-­based ­labor demand and, 24; U.S. Border Patrol and, 65; U.S. Customs and, 164n30; workplace controls and, 77. See also politics; public opinion, U.S.; statistics and data (mea­sur­ing policy effectiveness); walls, fences and other barriers immigrants and immigrant smuggling: overview, 9–10; Asian, 73; border narratives and, 140; from Canada, 94; China and, 73; Chinese, 17–18, 26, 73; Clinton administration and, 63, 68–71; cross-­border cooperation and, 7–8, 108; cross-­border economy and, 77–80; deaths, 173n118; drug smuggling contrasted, 2–3, 127–28; escalation and, 70–74, 145–46; Eu­ro­pean outsourcing and, 151, 183n35; Eu­ro­pe­a ns to U.S., 18–19; funding, 108, 109; historical perspectives, 16–25, 63, 147; imaging and, 7–8, 9–10, 21, 23, 25, 63, 64–70, 74, 77, 80–84, 135; imaging, Trump’s policy and, 116–17, 118, 119, 120, 123–24; kidnapping and, 107; militarization and, 2, 149, 157n3; 9/11 and, 89, 92; 1990s and, 63; North to South, 17–18; Obama administration and, 91; or­ga­n ized smuggling groups and, 145–46; outsourcing and, 183n35; po­liti­cal backlash and, 64–66; politics and, 9–10, 64, 81, 83–84, 119, 127–28; professional smugglers and, 10; statistics, 22–23, 71–72, 73–74, 81, 82, 98, 106, 115–17, 119, 122, 132–34, 135, 170n28, 173n118; territorial authority and, 3, 143; Trump and, 110–11, 115–28; U.S. and Mexican governments contrasted, 2. See also asylum-­seekers; “Banzai runs”; Central American mi­grants; ­children, unaccompanied; citizenship, path to; criminalization; documents, immigration; mi­grant rights and h ­ uman rights;

militarization; 9/11; open borders; smuggling; truck trafficking; U.S. INS (Immigration and Naturalization Ser­vice) and other agencies; walls, fences and other barriers Immigration Act (1965), 21 Immigration Law of 1924, 18 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) (1986), 24–25, 64 Imperial Beach sector, 70 Imperial Valley, California, 73 INCD (National Counternarcotics Institute) (Mexico), 40 India-­Bangladesh border, 145 Indians, plains, 13 INS. See U.S. INS (Immigration and Naturalization Ser­vice) insect-­smuggling, 16, 160n17 “International Emergency Economic Powers Act” (Trump), 121 Iowa, 136 Iran, 49 Iraq war, 90, 103 IRCA (Immigration Reform and Control Act) (1986), 24–25, 64 Iron Curtain, 148 Isacson, Adam, 105 Jackson, Michael, 90 Jalisco (Mexico), 38, 43 Japa­nese mi­g rant workers, 18 Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6), 39, 90 Joint Task Force North (2006), 90 Jones, ­Reese, 149 Jordan, Phil, 164n31 JTF-6 (Joint Task Force 6), 39, 90 Juárez (Mexico), 14, 15, 18, 19, 103, 105 Juárez drug cartel, 42, 45, 48, 103 judicial reform, 50 Justice in Mexico Proj­ect, 176n77 Kaibil counterinsurgency commandos (Guatemala), 104 Katur, Marcy (D-­Ohio), 40–41 Keohane, Robert, 175n34 Kerry, John (D-­M A), 140 kidnapping of mi­g rants, 107 “kingpin” strategy, 125 Knights Templar trafficking group, 105 Krishnaswami, Charanya, 129 ­labor. See mi­g rant workers ­labor u ­ nions, 21 Larsen Randall J., 100

INDEX 191

law enforcement: overview, 8–9; border narratives and, 141; Mexico and, 38, 107; militarization versus, 1, 28, 148. See also criminalization; territorial authority (nation-­state) (homeland security); U.S. Border Patrol Libya, 151 Lieu, Ted (D-­Calif.), 116 light up the border campaign (1990s), 89–90 Line Release program, 31–32, 56 livestock smuggling, 14 lobbyists, 53, 131 Lockheed Martin, 90 Lopéz Obrador, Manuel, 121, 122–23, 125, 127–28, 154 Loredo, Texas, 16, 55, 87 Los Angeles, California, 76–77. See also Orange County, California Los Angeles Times, 82 Los Zetas, 104, 183n39 Lupsha, Peter, 43, 45 Lyon, David, 99–100 Machiavelli, 144–45 Malaysians, 96 March, Jaes G., 181n11 marijuana: Camarena affair and, 32; Canadian border and, 94, 97; Colombian traffickers and, 35; consumer demand for, 26; ­cross-­border cooperation and, 27; ­f uture possibilities and, 151–52, 154; historical perspectives, 25–28, 35; legalization of, 151–52, 153; politics and, 154; Salinas and, 40; statistics, 27, 30–31, 34, 40, 42, 57, 60–61, 174n28 market liberalization. See f­ ree trade Massieu, Mario Ruiz, 45 Matamoros (Mexico), 45 Mattis, James, 119 McCaffrey, Barry, 42, 48, 53, 59, 103 McCain, John (R-­A riz.), 29, 60 McCallen, Texas, 114 mea­sur­ing policy effectiveness. See imaging and media (border narrative); statistics and data Medellín cartel (Colombia), 42 media. See imaging and media (border narrative) Meissner, Doris, 68, 73, 75, 80 Merida Initiative (2008), 107, 128 methamphetamines, 42, 128 Mexican American War, 125 Mexican Attorney General’s Office, 47, 48

Mexican border agents, 107 Mexican Center for National Security and Investigation, 47 Mexican criminal justice system, 48 Mexican Decree of 1830, 16–17 Mexican federal antidrug agency, 47 Mexican Federal Judicial Police, 47 Mexican Federal Security Directorate, 33 Mexican government, 2. See also cross-­border cooperation; cross-­b order economy; deportations; detention and detention centers; militarization, Mexican; Salinas, Raúl and his administration and other administrations; territorial authority, Mexican; Trump, D. J. and his administration Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 37 Mexican National Guard, 121, 122, 124, 126, 132, 146–47 Mexican National H ­ uman Rights Commission, 122 Mexican police force, 127 Mexican Revolution, 19 Mexican secretaries of defense and navy, 47 Mexican war of in­de­pen­dence (1836), 17 Mexico Center for National Security and Investigation, 45 Mexico Center for the Planning of Drug Control (CENDRO), 37, 46 Mexico Criminal Code, 38 Mexico federal Customs Ser­v ice, 46 Mexico Federal Judicial Police, 45 Mexico Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources, 79 Mexico National Institute to Combat Drugs, 45 Mexico’s National Institute of Migration, 129 Meyer, Marshall W., 159n22 Meyers, Deborah Waller, 94, 97–98 Mica, John L. (R-­FL), 143 mi­g rant rights and ­human rights: caravans and, 118; Central American mi­g rants and, 108; cross-­b order cooperation and, 7; fraudulent documents and, 161n35; imaging and, 151; Lopéz Obrador and, 121; Mexican militarization and, 105; Mexico and, 122; militarization and, 49, 146; open borders and, 149; outsourcing and, 151; statistics, 107; U.S. and, 116. See also Amnesty International; asylum-­seekers; humanitarian crises; moral standards mi­g rants. See immigrants and immigrant smuggling

192 INDEX

mi­g rant workers: agricultural, 19–20, 23, 65–66, 75, 79; asylum-­seekers contrasted, 146; capitalism and, 149; Chinese, 17–18; consumer demand for, 19–20, 66, 71, 72, 74, 78, 92, 143, 144; cross-­border economy and, 5–6, 9, 16, 24, 66, 71–72, 77–80, 92, 140, 172n96; escalation and, 140, 145–46; historical perspectives, 19–22, 23–24, 161n38; imaging and, 9–10, 25; INS and, 21, 25; Japa­nese, 18; Mexican government and, 23–24; NAFTA and, viii; 9/11 and, 86; 1990s overview, 63; po­liti­cal backlash and, 64–66; statistics, 20, 22, 75, 79, 92, 172n96; urban-­based, 24; workplace enforcement and, 75–77. See also employer sanctions and workplace solutions; guest workers; immigrants and immigrant smuggling Migration Institute (Mexico), 122 militarization: cross-­border cooperation and, 2, 47, 102–9, 131–32, 148–49, 157n11; cross-­border economy and, 121–22, 148–49; defined, 157n3; ­f uture possibilities and, 146–50; law enforcement versus, 1, 28, 148. See also criminalization; ports of entry militarization, Mexican: Biden’s policies and, 132; certification and, 33; corruption and, 43–49, 105, 127; criminalization and, 146; drug smuggling and, 11, 27–28, 102–9, 154; drug smuggling groups and, 105–6, 146; funding and, 38, 126–27; ­f uture possibilities and, 154; historical perspectives, viii, 17; ­human rights abuses and, 105; h ­ uman rights and, 49; 9/11 and, 85, 142; police versus, 49; politics and, 154; Trump’s policies and, 113, 122–23, 148; ­a fter 2000, 102–3; U.S. demands and, 166n82; U.S. politics and, 49; vio­lence and, 11, 102–9, 146. See also Mexican National Guard; militarization militarization, U.S: Biden and, 131–32; Clinton and, 139; corruption and, 149; crime rates and, 105; criminalization and, 140; Florida and, 29–30; funding, 28; historical perspectives, 28–31, 39, 147, 149; INS and, 68; 9/11 and, 85–95; 1989, 39; Operation Río Grande and, 70; politics and, 29, 147, 148–49; statistics, 90; technology and, 68; Trump and, 112, 115, 119, 131, 139, 147, 148. See also airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and other military technology; militarization; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and other agencies

Miller, Stephen, 148 Minuteman Proj­ect, 89 Mitchell, Timothy, 141 Montreal International Airport, 101 moral standards, 7, 10, 141, 154, 183n41. See also mi­grant rights and ­human rights Moran, Tyler, 131–32 Moseley-­Braun, Carol (D-­Ill.), 51 mounted policing, 18 Murray, David, 97 Naco, Arizona, 70–71 NAFTA (North American ­Free Trade Agreement): overview, viii; Canadian border and, 98; corruption and, 43–46; drug smuggling and, vii, viii, 9, 35, 53–59, 167n118; feedback effects, 53–59, 62; imaging and, 9, 41, 54, 56, 164n31; immigration and, viii, 78–79; Lopéz Obrador and, 121; marijuana and, 152; mi­grant workers and, viii, 54; 9/11 and, 96; Salinas years and, 40–41, 43–46; smuggling and, 16; Trump’s immigration policy and, 120; U.S. DEA and, 164n31 narco-­terrorists, 124–28 National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, 60–61 National Counternarcotics Institute (INCD) (Mexico), 40 National Defense Authorization Act for FY1990 and 1991, 39 National Drug Control Strategy Report, 54 National Guard, 65 National Institute of Justice, 168n137 National Institute to Combat Drugs, 38 National Migration Institute (Mexico), 107 National R ­ ifle Association, 104 national security. See territorial authority (nation-­state) (homeland security) National Trea­sury Employees Union, 58, 61 nation-­state. See territorial authority (nation-­ state) (homeland security) Navarro Lara, Alfredo, 48 Nebraska, 136 New Mexico, 18, 70, 82, 90 The Next War (Weinberger), 147–48 Nielsen, Kirstjen, 116, 120 Nieto, Peña, 120–21 9/11: Canadian border and, 93–98; cross-­ border cooperation and, 107; Mexico and, 87; militarization and, 85–95, 142; politics and, 89, 96–97; ports of entry and, 87; statistics, 86, 89, 91, 92, 98; technology and, 10, 88, 89, 90, 98–102

INDEX 193

9/11 Commission, 99 1990s drug smuggling: certification rituals and, 49–53; cocaine smuggling and, 35–36; corruption and militarization and, 43–49; escalation and, viii; mea­sur­ing policy effectiveness, 59–62; NAFTA and, 53–59; politics versus failing policy, 39–43; Salinas years, 37, 39–46; statistics, 36, 55, 57; U.S. policy and, 38–39 Nixon, Richard, and his administration, 26–27, 56 Nogales, Arizona, 68, 70 NORAD (North American Air Defense Command), 36 North American ­Free Trade Agreement. See NAFTA Northern Border Response Force (Mexico), 38 Northern Triangle, 123 Northrup Grumman, 90 Nuevo Leon (Mexico), 47 Nuevo Loredo (Mexico), 103 Oaxaca (Mexico), 38 Obama, Barrack, and his administration, 91–92, 108–9, 112, 115, 132, 133 Ocasio-­Cortez, Alexandria, 135–36 Ochoa, Victor, 14 Office of National Drug Control Policy, 168n137 Ohio, 136 Olsen, Johan P., 181n11 open borders, 149–50, 157n1, 182n26. See also ­f ree trade (market liberalization) Operation Alliance, 30–31, 162n71, 167n118 Operation Blockade, 69 Operation Bootstrap, 90 Operation Brass Ring (1998), 58 Operation Condor (1975), 27–28 Operation Disruption (1995), 73 Operation Faithful Patriot, 119 Operation Gatekeeper, 3, 69–70, 75, 78, 80, 82, 84 Operation Hard Line (1995), 57, 58 Operation Hold-­t he-­Line, 3, 81, 84 Operation Intercept (1969), 26–27, 56, 87 Operation Intercept II (1985), 32 Operation Río Grande, 70 Operation Safeguard, 70 Operation Streamline (2005), 91–92 Operation Wetback (1954), 20 opioid epidemic, 144, 153 opium, 25–26, 28, 32, 40, 42, 161n52 Opium Convention of 1911–12, 161n52

Opium Exclusion Act (1909), 25 Orange County, California, 83. See also Los Angeles, California O’Reilly, Bill, 124 Ottawa International Airport, 101 Packard, Ron (R-­Calif.), 58 pandemic politics, 119, 128–29, 131, 134 Papademetriou, Demetrios, 94, 97–98 parrots, 16 Passport Act of 1918, 18–19 Patriot Act, 101 Pelosi, Nancy (D-­Calif.), 114, 115 Peña Nieto, Enrique, 105–6, 113 Penn, Mark, 83–84 Permanently Failing Organ­izations, 159n22 Perry, William, 47 Peru, 50 peso collapse (1994), 79–80 Peters, Ralph, 147 phar­ma­ceu­t i­cal companies, 153 “Plan Sur,” 108 policing. See escalation; law enforcement; militarization politics: border games meta­phor and, viii–­i x; Canadian border and, 93, 95–96, 97; cross-­border cooperation and, 61–62, 127–28; drug smuggling and, 9, 97, 127–28; employer sanctions and, 64–66, 144; escalation and, 6–11, 91, 143, 144–45; failing policy versus (1990s), 39–43, 53–59; federal authority and, 19; gun smuggling and, 104; Guzman arrest and, 106; historical perspectives, vii–­v iii, 1, 24, 138, 147; immigrants and, 9–10, 64, 81, 83–84, 119, 127–28; legalization of drugs and, 154; mea­sur­ing effectiveness and, 58–62, 69; mi­g rant workers and, 66; militarization and, 29, 49, 102–9, 147, 148–49, 169n8; NAFTA feedback and, 56–57, 79; 9/11 repercussions an, 89, 96–97; 1990s and, 147; open borders and, 149–50; Operation Alliance and, 30–31; outsourcing and, 150–51; polarization and, 133–34; statistics, 23, 52–53, 58, 59–62; Trump’s border enforcement and, 131, 132; U.S. Border Patrol and, 67; U.S.-­Mexico drug war and, 127–28; vio­lence and, 154. See also Demo­ crats; ­f ree trade (market liberalization); imaging and media; 9/11; public opinion, U.S.; Republican Party; individual politicians (U.S. and Mexican) Portillo, López administration, 16

194 INDEX

ports of entry, 14, 39, 54, 87, 98, 154, 183n36. See also airports; Canada and the northern border; documents; seaports; truck trafficking; U.S. Customs Ser­v ice Posse Comitatus Act (1878), 28 “prevention through deterrence” strategy (1993–94), 68–70 privacy, invasion of, 100 private sector self-­policing, 102, 103 Prohibition, 15 Proposition 187 (California), 64 public health versus enforcement, 144 public opinion, Mexican, 122 public opinion, U.S.: “Banzai runs” and, 65–66; Biden and, 135; imaging and, 6–8; mi­g rant workers and, 24; open borders and, 150; territorial authority and, 4, 5–6. See also imaging and media (border narrative); politics Public Safety Act (2002) (Canada), 96 Quintana Roo, Mexico, 122 racial disparities, 144, 145 railroads, 14, 54, 108 RAND study, 143 Rangel, Charles (D-­N.Y.), 37 Raytheon, 90 Reagan, Ronald, and his administration, 28 Rebollo, Gutiérrez, 52 Reed, Mark, 171n80 Reich, Robert, 83–84 “Remain in Mexico” policy, 121–22, 131 Rendon, Eunice, 132 Reno, Janet, 169n10 Republican Party: historical perspectives, 64. See also Buchanan, Patrick and other Republicans; McCain, John (R-­A riz.) and other Republicans; politics Ressam, Ahmed, affair (1999), 94–95 Reyes, Silvestre, 69, 81 Rio G ­ rand Valley, Texas, 107–8 roads, 36, 54 Rockwell, Stephen, 72–73 Rogers, Richard, 76–77 Rosecrance, Richard, 3 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 96 Rubin, James P., 53 Salinas, Carlos and his administration, 37, 39–49, 50 Sanders, Sarah Huckabee, 124 Sandia Laboratories, 68

San Diego, California: Bersin, Alan, 80; immigrant smuggling and, 72, 73–74; immigration escalation and, 71, 81; long-­term escalation and, 84; Operation Hard Line and, 57; prevention through deterrence and, 69–70; technology data, 169n10. See also light up the border campaign (1990s); Smugglers Canyon; U.S. Border Research Technology Center Santa Anna, Antonio Lopez de, 17 San Ysidro, California, 55–56, 65, 71, 78, 82 Saudis, 96 Schumer, Charles (D-­N.Y.), 29, 113–14 seaports, 18, 56, 101–2, 176nn59, 61 Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection system, 101 Secure Fence Act (2006), 89, 115 Sessions, Jeff, 116 Shanghai Convention, 161n52 Shaw, John, 76 Sinaloa (Mexico), 26, 27, 38, 105–6 Sinaloa drug trafficking organ­i zation, 105–6 Skerry, Peter, 72–73 slavers (­owners and traders), U.S., 17 Smugglers Canyon, 65 smuggling: consumer demand and, 13, 16; defined, 12; escalation and, 112, 142; globalization and, 1; historical perspectives, 1, 12–16, 138; North to South, 17–18, 183n36. See also Canada and the northern border; drug smuggling; immigrants and immigrant smuggling Snyder, Timothy, 138 Sonora, 26, 32, 125 South Dakota, 136 Southeast border strategy, 9, 28, 30, 31, 36, 37, 38, 53–54, 146. See also Florida South Florida Task Force, 28 Southwest Border Council, 39 Southwest Border Initiative, 39 Southwest Border Strategy, 31 Special Representative to the Southwest Border (“border czar”), 66–67 statistics and data (mea­sur­ing policy effectiveness): “Asylum Cooperative Agreements” and, 124; certification rituals and, 52–53; deterrence versus, 69; drug certification versus, 50; drug vio­lence and, 125; escalation and, 142; inaccuracy of, ix; “kingpin” strategy and, 125; Mexican border agents and, 107; Operation Gatekeeper and, 70; Operation Hard Line and, 57;

INDEX 195

Operation Río Grande and, 70–71; pandemic deportations, 129; U.S. Defense Department, 36; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 132–33. See also drug smuggling; funding and costs; imaging and media (border narrative); immigrants and immigrant smuggling; militarization; politics Stile, Wesley, 19 Stryker unit (Alaska), 90 Swing, Joseph, 20 Syria, 49 Tabasco, Mexico, 122 Tamaulipas (Mexico), 47, 105, 107 tariffs, viii, 13, 16, 121, 122, 123, 131, 140 technological escalations: air, sea, and land ports of entry and, 101–2; Biden and, 131; border narratives and, 143; Canadian Border and, 95–96, 101–2; cargo ships and, 176nn59, 61; Central American mi­g rants and, 107; Clinton administration and, 59, 67, 68, 71; drug smuggling and, 27, 103, 168n137; funding and, 168n137; historical perspectives, 18; immigrant smuggling and, 72–73; Mexico and, 53; military and, 91; NAFTA feedback and, 41, 59; 9/11 and, 10, 88, 89, 90, 98–102; Operation Gatekeeper and, 78; sea and air transport and, 153; statistics, 169n10, 175nn45, 47; U.S. Border Patrol and, 67, 73, 95–96; U.S. Customs and, 164n28; U.S. militarization and, 68; U.S. Navy and, 152–53; US-­V ISIT and, 101; workplace controls and, 77; Zedillo and, 53. See also biometrics Téllez, Luis, 79 tequileros, 15 territorial authority, Mexican, 33–34, 125 territorial authority, U.S. (nation-­state) (homeland security): Colombian cocaine and, 152–53; drug smuggling and, 26, 28, 38, 103; economic statistics, 175n49; escalation and, 4–6, 159n18; globalization and, 3–4; historical perspectives, 138–40; imaging and, viii, 181n11; immigration and, 3, 143; North-­South immigration and, 17; politics and, 150; Reagan and, 28. See also cross-­border economy; Jackson, Michael; militarization; 9/11; Ressam, Ahmed, affair (1999); U.S. Department of Homeland Security terrorism, 124–28. See also 9/11; Ressam, Ahmed, affair (1999)

Texas, 13–18, 70, 82, 94, 104, 105, 108. See also Abbott, Greg; Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6); Loredo, Texas and other towns Texas Department of Agriculture, 105 Texas Revolution, 17 Tijuana, Mexico, 105, 129 Tijuana drug cartel, 15, 42–43, 48, 49, 103 Title 42 cases, 129, 131 tourists, 15 traffic management, 78, 176n61. See also automobiles; truck trafficking trains, 14, 54, 108 Trans-­Border Institute (University of San Diego), 176n77 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), 14, 17 Treaty on Cooperation for Mutual L ­ egal Assistance (1991), 37 truck trafficking: Canadian border and, 101; cocaine smuggling and, 31; historical perspectives, 15; immigrant smuggling and, 72–73; NAFTA and, 41, 54–55; 9/11 and, 96; politics and, 56, 59; statistics, 96, 167n113, 176n61; technology and, 73, 101, 102, 176n61; walls and, 112, 114. See also traffic management Trump, D. J. and his administration: asylum-­seekers and, 112, 115–16, 121–22, 123, 124, 129, 146, 148; escalation and, 142; imaging and, 116–17, 118, 119, 120, 123–24; immigrant c­ hildren and, 116; immigration and, 110–11, 115–28; Mexican government and, 113, 120–23, 124–25; militarization and, 112, 118–20, 131, 139, 147, 148; pandemic politics and, 128–29, 134; polarization and, 133; politics and, 11, 110–11, 112–15, 119, 132, 135–36, 137, 147; statistics and imaging and, 115–17, 119, 132–33; terrorists and corruption and, 112, 124–28; U.S. Border Patrol and, 133; wall of, 11, 111, 112–15, 119, 120–24, 129, 130–31, 136, 137, 139, 145, 169n8. See also imaging and media (border narrative) tunnels, 72, 170n48 Turkey, 26, 151 “undesirables,” 18–19 UN High Commissioner for H ­ uman Rights, 116 United Nations Convention against Trafficking in Illicit Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 37 United States. See also California and other states; economy, cross-­border; entries beginning “U.S.”

196 INDEX

United States-­Mexico-­Canada agreement (USMCA), 123 University of Texas at El Paso, 81 U.S. Border Patrol: air interdiction and, 90–91; “Banzai runs” and, 65, 81; Bracero Program and, 21; Canadian border and, 93, 95–96; Central American mi­g rants and, 106; Clinton administration and, 66–69, 169n18; escalation and, 84; establishment of, 19; funding, 22; historical perspectives, vii–­v iii, 20, 22–23, 180n104; immigration imaging and, 21, 65–70, 74, 81–82, 83, 169n18, 170n29; Iraq war and, 90; law enforcement versus, 39; mi­g rant workers escalation and, 24; 9/11 and, 88–89; Obama and, 91; statistics, 38, 39, 68, 69, 70, 71, 78, 88–89, 90, 94, 95, 112, 115, 132–34, 170nn29, 37; technology and, 67, 73. See also U.S. INS (Immigration and Naturalization Ser­v ice) U.S. Border Research Technology Center, 58 U.S. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, 104 U.S. CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 33, 103 U.S. Civil War, 13–14 U.S. Coast Guard, 28, 29, 30, 87, 95, 153 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 75, 76, 78 U.S. Congress: certification rituals and, 49–50, 51–52, 53; cocaine smuggling and, 58; cross-­border cooperation and, 23, 51–52; employer sanctions and, 77; ­f ree trade and, 55–56; imaging and, 6–7, 29, 37; Mexican corruption and, 9, 32; mi­g rant smuggling and, 19; mi­g rant workers and, 161n38; militarization and, 39; NAFTA and, 40–41, 56; technological escalation and, 100–101. See also Demo­crats; IRCA (Immigration Reform and Control Act) (1986) and other acts; politics; Republican Party; U.S. GAO (General Accounting Office); individual members of Congress U.S. Customs Ser­v ice: cross-­border economy and, 31–32, 55; escalation and, 30; foreign airports and, 99; historical perspective, 15; mea­sure­ment of effectiveness and, 61; NAFTA feedback and, 56; 9/11 and, 86–87; statistics, 15, 36, 38–39, 56, 57, 59, 132–33, 162n72, 163n1, 164nn28, 30; technological escalation and, 102; truck trafficking statistics, 167n113; U.S. Border Patrol versus, 39. See also ports of entry; Southwest Border Strategy; U.S. ICE ( Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

U.S. DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration), 29–30, 39, 42, 48, 54, 112, 163n1. See also Camarena, Kiki U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, 40 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 87, 91, 101, 107, 116, 120, 132–33, 153 U.S. Department of Justice, 67, 74, 116. See also INS U.S. DOD (Department of Defense), 36, 69, 132–33, 162n72, 163n1 U.S. Embassy (Mexico), 41, 43, 45, 48, 54 U.S. FEADS (Special Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes against Health), 48 U.S. financial crisis (2008), 11 U.S. GAO (Government Accountability Office) (General Accounting Office), 60, 80–81, 163n9 U.S. government. See cross-­border cooperation (bilateralism); imaging and media (border narrative); militarization, U.S.; politics; territorial authority (nation-­state) (homeland security); U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser­vice (INS) and other agencies U.S. ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), 89, 91, 92 U.S. INS (Immigration and Naturalization Ser­v ice): Clinton administration and, 66–67, 68–69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75–76, 77; Congress versus, 77; cross-­border economy and, 78; employer sanctions and, 25, 75–76; expansion of, 67–69; fraud and corruption and, 74; funding and costs, 67, 75–76, 87; historical perspectives, 22–23, 25; imaging and, 25, 77, 80–83; immigrant smuggling and, 72, 73–74; mi­g rant workers and, 21, 25; 9/11 and, 86–87, 99; politics and, 77, 171n80; statistics, 23, 67, 80–81, 87, 163n1, 164n28. See also Southwest Border Council; U.S. Border Patrol U.S. Justice Department, 39 U.S. L ­ abor Department inspectors, 76–77 USMCA (United States-­Mexico-­Canada agreement), 123 U.S.-­Mexico border: author’s experience and, vii; Canadian border compared, 94, 97–98; Eu­ro­pean Union border compared, 138; map, xi; research and, ix–­x. See also escalation; Juárez and other border towns U.S. National Guard, 39, 147 U.S. Navy, 152–53 U.S. Pentagon, 39, 103 U.S. Special Prosecutor’s Office for Crimes against Health (FEADS), 48

INDEX 197

U.S. State Department, 39, 53, 61, 107 U.S. Supreme Court, 131 US-­V ISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology System), 100–101 Valle, Eduardo, 42, 44 Vallina, Miguel, 72 Veracruz (Mexico), 47 “Vietnam approach,” 74 Villa, Pancho, 14 Viña, Gus de la, 80 vio­lence: Central American mi­g rants and, 11, 106–7, 146; drug smuggling and, 102–9, 125, 152, 154, 176n77. See also Camarena, Kiki; corruption, bribes and payoffs; militarization; narco-­terrorists virtual boders, 100 visas: bilateral cooperation and, 128; Canada and, 98–99; historical perspectives, 21; mi­g rant workers and, 66, 75; 9/11 and, 86, 96, 100–101; technological escalation and, 71, 98–99, 100–101; walls and, 112 “voluntary departure,” 23, 76, 92, 161n46 Von Raab, William, 30–31, 162n75 walls, fences and other barriers: Arizona and, 70; Biden and, 130–33; Clinton administration and, 67, 68; funding and, 112–13, 114–15, 130, 169n8; historical perspectives,

vii, 2–3, 14, 15, 18, 111–12, 139; imaging and, 2–3, 65, 112, 117, 130, 150; imaging, Trump’s and, 113–14, 130; immigration politics and, 84, 145; militarization and, 90; 9/11 and, 10, 85, 88, 89; 1990’s and, 39, 111–12; pandemic and, 128–29; politics and, 169n8; statistics, 124, 130–31; trains and, 108; 2016 and ­a fter, 11, 111, 112–15. See also Trump, D. J. and his administration Walters, John, 97–98 ­Waters, Maxine (D-­Calif.), 56 Webb, Dewey, 104 Weinberger, Caspar, 147–48 Weiner, Myron, 158n14 Weise, David, 56 Weise, George, 58, 61 Westrate, David, 29–30 The West Wing (TV show), 95 Williams, Johnny, 80 Wilson, Pete, 65, 81, 83, 169n10 worker rights, 144 workers. See mi­g rant workers World Wars I&II ­labor shortages, 19–20 Yost, Paul, 30 Yuma, Arizona, 129 Zedillo Ponce de León, Ernesto and his administration, 45, 51, 53 Zetas drug-­t rafficking organ­ization, 107 Zucker, Lynne G., 159n22