Blood and Religion: The Conscience of Henri IV 9780773568846

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Blood and Religion

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Blood and Religion The Conscience of Henri IV 1553–1593 ro n al d s . l ov e

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston · London · Ithaca

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© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2001 isbn 0-7735-2124-0 Legal deposit second quarter 2001 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (bpidp) for its activities. It also acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for its publishing program. All illustrations are from the author’s private collection.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Love, Ronald S., 1955– Blood and religion : the conscience of Henri IV, 1553–1593 Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-7735-2124-0 1. Henri IV, King of France, 1553–1610—Religious life. 2. Religion and politics—France—History—16th century. I. Title. dc122.8.l69 2001

944’.031’092

c00-901077-7

Typeset in 10/12 Baskerville by True to Type

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To my loving father, William N. Love, from his admiring son

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Contents

Acknowledgments / ix Note to the Reader / xi Introduction: Interpreting Henri IV / 3 1 Mother and Son, December 1553 to August 1572 / 17 2 The Counterfeit Catholic, August 1572 to February 1576 / 51 3 Blood, Belief, Behaviour, and the Shaping of a King, February 1576 to June 1584 / 71 4 The Years of Uncertainty, June 1584 to August 1589 / 117 5 “The Years of Uneasy Balance, September 1589 to October 1591 / 175 6 The Years of Despair and Diminishing Choices, November 1591 to April 1593 / 219

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7 Conversion and the Conscience of the King, May to July 1593 / 269 Conclusion: Reinterpreting Henri IV / 305 Abbreviations / 311 Notes / 313 Bibliography / 415 Index / 451

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Acknowledgments

Writing, as I always tell my students, is lonely work, but not necessarily isolated work. It is lonely because the creative impulse comes solely from the individual. The conception of a project, the research, and the twin processes of reflection and composition can be done only by the author toiling alone. But that labour need not be isolated, for all of us rely upon those persons whose expertise, advice, common sense, and good judgment we trust when putting the final touches on a completed piece of work. It is with their aid and assistance that a manuscript proceeds by degrees from its genesis, through early drafts and development, to full maturity. A mere acknowledgment thus seems base coin with which to repay so great a debt to such people; yet it is the only currency we have. Many individuals lent their critical expertise in reviewing the manuscript in whole or in part, as separate chapters or preliminary articles published in professional journals. I am particularly indebted to Albert Hamscher, Linda and Marsha Frey, Merrill Distad, Michael Wolfe, Anne York, Brian Strayer, and Michael Hayden. Nor can I forget Joni Mazer, whose secretarial assistance at various points in the preparation of the early drafts was invaluable. In addition to these people are those friends and colleagues whose generous and much appreciated moral support gave me the fortitude to soldier on, despite the vicissitudes of a profession that, during these stressful times in academe, can be very cold toward those who have not yet gained entry into the charmed circle. Chief among these persons are Larry and Uta Stewart, Robert and Esther Grogin, the late Ivo and Jackie Lambi,

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Suzanne Johnson, Linda Distad, Donald Bailey, Glenn Ames, and Norman Ingram. In a more technical vein, I wish to thank the editors of the Canadian Journal of History, Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques, and the Selected Proceedings of the Western Society for French History for their permission to reprint portions of articles I published previously in these journals. I am also grateful for the constant support and assistance, both professional and moral, given by Philip J. Cercone and McGillQueen’s University Press throughout the long process of preparing the manuscript for print, from the initial stages of evaluation to the final stages of publication. That stands in sharp contrast to the obstacles thrown in the way by the Aid to Scholarly Publications Programme. Though this book has been published with the help of a grant through the aspp from the Humanities and Social Sciences Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the aspp’s byzantine procedures needlessly delayed the process by at least three years. So long as Canadian scholarship remains hostage to these government institutions, it never will flourish freely or reach its full potential. There are, finally, three men who merit special thanks and who rank together as my mentors. Lloyd Moote, Hubert Johnson, and the late George Rothrock not only read and reread the manuscript in its entirety, but also offered suggestions, recommendations, and advice that compelled me to refine interpretation and sharpen my arguments at every step. It is to the rigour of their high standards in scholarship, their guidance, and their professionalism that I owe the best parts of this book. The flaws, on the other hand, are mine alone. And each man, in his own way, taught me the valuable lessons of patience, perseverance and above all else that Au vaillant coeur, rien impossible!

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Note to the Reader

In the writing of any book of history or biography, certain decisions of form and usage must be made. Because English styles of naming nobility can sometimes differ from the French forms, titles of French figures are rendered as they were known and used in the sixteenth century – for example, the duc de Nevers, not the Duke of Nevers. For the sake of consistency, I applied the same rule of thumb even to those individuals whose names are well established in the English language. For example, instead of Francis I, I used François Ier. On the other hand, I followed accepted English forms for Spanish, Italian, and occasional German titles. Additionally, given the frequency with which titles changed in this period, in a few cases I retained the version best known in English, but in others surrendered to convention. Thus, François duc d’Alençon is used consistently, even though he officially became duc d’Anjou in 1576. By contrast, Henri IV’s ambitious first cousin, Charles de Bourbon, is identified successively as archbishop of Rouen, cardinal de Vendôme, and lastly cardinal de Bourbon, as he rose through the ecclesiastical ranks in France. Also, throughout the book I used the upper and lower case as required to distinguish between the institution and the physical object of the same name; hence, “Crown” vs “crown” and “Church” vs “church.” Regnal dates are provided for French monarchs and Roman pontiffs, while dates for other significant persons indicate birth and death. At the same time, as far as possible all dates from English sources after 1582 – when the Gregorian calendar replaced the Julian as the standard for Catholic Europe – are given in the so-called new

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style (i.e., ten days ahead of the dates still used by the English prior to the eighteenth century), except for the letters of Sir Henry Unton, Elizabeth I’s ambassador to France in 1590–91. He already had adopted the Gregorian calendar to the intense disapproval of Sir Robert Cecil, who scolded on 9 November 1591 (old style): “By the waie, Sir, you use the newe style, which is not to be donne by you that follow our reckoninge!” Finally, I endeavoured to avoid an error common to other historians of Reformation Europe, who refer both persistently and incorrectly to French Calvinists in this period as “Protestants.” Too many scholars use this label in its modern generic sense to identify any non-Catholic Christian, failing to remember that the term applied only to a specific faction of German reactionaries who renounced the decisions of the Diet of Augsburg in 1530. In short, the Huguenots were not Protestants, nor did they view themselves as Protestant – an important reminder for anyone working in the field. Consequently, on the rare occasions that the word appears in the present volume, it is used purposefully as a convenient expedient to indicate groups of nonCatholics without having to make repetitive distinctions among Calvinists, Lutherans, Anglicans, and others. For comparable reasons, the word “sect” is used deliberately with regard to both Catholic and Calvinist versions of the Christian faith. Though some readers may object, one must remember nevertheless that sixteenth-century people had a sectarian (i.e., exclusive), not denominational, view of religion. This accounts for the virility of the violence of the wars of religion throughout the early modern period, especially in France.

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Henri III, third son of Catherine de Medici and Henri II and the last Valois monarch of France.

Henri III de Lorraine, duc de Guise, leader of the ultra-Catholic Holy League in France.

The Ivry medal, minted in 1590, in commemoration of Henri IV’s great victory over the League at the battle of Ivry.

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ii Preface The obverse of the Ivry medal. Because of the importance of that battle, this was the first commemorative medallion minted by the new Bourbon monarch.

The formidable queen mother, Catherine de Medici, in widow’s weeds following the accidental death of her husband, Henri II, in 1559.

The medallion minted in 1572 to commemorate the marriage of Henri de Navarre and Marguerite de France.

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Preface Charles IX in 1572 at the time of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of the Huguenots in Paris.

The obverse side of the medallion minted by Charles IX in 1572 to commemorate the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. The king sits enthroned in majesty atop the dismembered corpses of the murdered Huguenots.

Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, Henri IV’s comrade-in-arms and most loyal Huguenot supporter, who eventually became his principal minister of state.

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iv Preface François, duc d’Anjou and d’Alençon, Henri de Navarre’s unreliable ally and Catherine de Medici’s least-liked fourth son.

Charles, cardinal de Bourbon and paternal uncle of Henri IV, represented as “Charles X” in 1590. This medallion commemorates his proclamation as king by the Catholic League.

Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, Henri’s charming but feckless father.

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Henri de Bourbon, prince de Navarre and de Béarn, in early childhood.

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Prince Henri de Navarre in 1570, at the time of the battle of Arnay-le-duc where, as a sixteen-year-old, he nominally commanded his first army.

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Gabrielle d’Estrées, Henri IV’s mistress and probably the only romantic partner he ever really loved.

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King Henri IV of France and Navarre as a mature man and monarch.

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Jeanne d’Albret, queen of Navarre, Henri’s strong-willed, able, and beloved mother. Note the physical similarity between her and her son.

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INTRO.QXD

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Blood and Religion

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2 Part Title “Those who unswervingly follow their conscience are of my religion, as I am of those who are brave and virtuous.” ( January 1576) “An empire over all the earth is not sufficient to make me change my religion, in which I was nourished and instructed with my mother’s milk, and which I hold to be true, and that it is only the word of God that I recognize as my guide.” (August 1589) “I am entering the house not to live in it, but to cleanse it.” ( July 1589)

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Introduction Interpreting Henri IV “Man ... is kind enough when he is not excited by religion.” – Mark Twain, 1906

One day, the story goes, Henri IV and a party of courtiers were walking in the Tuileries gardens when they happened upon a peasant grazing his cow. Separating himself from the main group, the king approached the astonished commoner to chat about the raising of cattle, their current market value, the best time to slaughter, and so on. At length the peasant confessed his surprise that the Bourbon monarch knew anything of cattle. “Know nothing of cattle!” exclaimed Henri in tart reply. With a sweeping gesture toward the herd of courtiers behind him, he added: “What do you think they are?” This is only one of many anecdotes recounted of the first Bourbon monarch of France in a little book published shortly after his assassination in 1610. Yet such tales are not found solely in the works of longdead authors; they are preserved in the popular French memory of Henri IV today. This fact was impressed powerfully upon me while, as a doctoral student, I completed my dissertation research in Paris over a succession of summers. In fact, whenever the topic of my thesis arose in casual conversation with individual French people, as it often did, I was treated to yet another anecdote about the king. Surprisingly, only once was a story repeated. Thus has Henri IV passed into the popular and political mythology of France, where he is remembered as a charismatic figure, the epitome of the hero-king with a common touch. But the same charisma that has helped to sustain that enduring folk-image of the Bourbon monarch long after his death also accounts, in part, for his success as a political leader in his own day. This success was due to

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more than his military skill and élan in war, or to his political pragmatism. Other contemporaries, such as the duc de Guise (head of the ultra-Catholic League) and Henri III (the last Valois monarch of France), possessed similar attributes without ever acquiring the same popularity or lasting reputation as Henri IV. Rather, the Bourbon king’s success, and especially his ability to inspire the loyalty of contemporaries, was due in large measure to his obvious and appealing human qualities, to the fact that he shared with his subjects many of their anxieties, and above all to his concern as a sixteenth-century man and monarch with matters of faith and personal salvation, a thread that runs continuously through his early career. What he actually believed, however, and whether his beliefs affected the broad scope of his leadership are questions that still perplex scholars who study the period. Particularly enigmatic is the whole question of Henri IV’s final conversion to Catholicism on 25 July 1593 at a critical moment in his early reign. Indeed, few events in the history of sixteenth-century France have fascinated historians to such a degree. As the major step toward a final resolution of the last of the bitter civil wars of religion that had disrupted the kingdom for more than thirty years, Henri’s abjuration was a momentous event, one that would have a profound influence on the subsequent shaping of royal power and society in France under later Bourbon monarchs. Yet in spite of all the attention it has received from generations of scholars, the royal conversion is still (to quote the editor of the short-lived Revue Henri IV from a somewhat different context) “plus célèbre que connue.”1 Fundamental questions about the motivations behind the king’s decision to abjure, especially relating to his timing, have not been answered by past interpretations, in part because of the historian’s usual concentration on the political circumstances immediately surrounding the royal act.

t h e enigma of th e r oya l c o n sc ie n c e The most recent published study of Henri’s abjuration is Michael Wolfe’s book The Conversion of Henri IV: Politics, Power, and Religious Belief in Early Modern France (1993). Wolfe examines the question of the importance of sincerity in the royal abjuration to Catholics on both sides of the conflict, and in particular how their common concern over this vital, if ultimately immeasurable, factor lay at the centre of their individual decisions to support or oppose Henri’s claims to rule. Wolfe thus focuses primarily upon the mentalité of the significant segments of Catholic opinion, rather than upon the monarch himself, to show how the royal conversion constituted

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“a crucial stage in the development of the French monarchy and early modern political culture.”2 Nevertheless, his allusions to Henri IV sketch out an important problem as yet unresolved by previous scholarship: what were Henri’s religious beliefs at the time of his conversion? Wolfe implies that there is significance to the movement of the king’s own mind in religious matters, though this idea is not fundamental to the development of his investigation. As he observes, “what sustained the conflict between the Leaguers and loyalist Catholics was ... the central question of Henri IV’s susceptibility to conversion.” But he also asserts that “what Henri IV actually thought when he made his `perilous leap’ at St.-Denis ... will never be satisfactorily answered by modern historians.”3 This question cannot be dismissed so easily, however; and it is possible that Wolfe’s assumption that it is unanswerable may derive from the fact that neither he nor other historians have grappled with it directly. Consequently, what Wolfe does write about the issue appears inconsistent and even contradictory. The reader is told first, for example, that the fact that Henri “waited over three months after his escape [from the Valois court in 1576] before officially recanting his conversion [of 1572] ... indicates just how incidental his confessional allegiances had become to him,”4 only to learn that his subsequent appeals after 1585 for a settlement of all confessional differences in France were “merely a smokescreen behind which to hide his indecision” about converting.5 But if Henri’s confessional allegiances were so “incidental,” then what could account for this sudden uncertainty, particularly when the reader is next informed of Henri’s “stubborn allegiance” to Calvinism?6 Political explanations alone are unsatisfactory. The portrait changes again when the reader is told that in spring 1593 the king had begun to attend disputations over points of doctrine.7 This implies movement in Henri’s own conscience about a conversion that went beyond simple political pragmatism. In short, though Wolfe’s purpose is not to probe the workings of the king’s mind, the motives he ascribes to Henri’s actions in developing his structural analysis of the royal conversion and its role in the foundation of Bourbon absolutism make the monarch appear to be anachronistic to the age of faith in which he lived. This is surprising given the author’s sensitive treatment of the religious views of contemporary French Catholics, the significance of their doctrinal debates, and the centrality of religion to the civil wars. Wolfe has undertaken an important study of Catholic opinion of Henri IV’s religious decisions at a critical juncture in the latter’s career. If, as he notes, the issue of the Bourbon monarch’s susceptibility to conversion kept alive the conflict between the rival Catholic

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groups and thereby prolonged France’s endemic civil-religious wars, then an examination of just how susceptible Henri actually was becomes essential to any understanding of his act. In this light, the question of the king’s faith, of the real nature of his religious convictions, cannot be ignored, especially in view of Wolfe’s conclusion that contemporary French Catholics eventually accepted his conversion as sincere. Moreover, as the final decision to abjure rested with Henri himself, it is crucial to investigate not only the character and depth of his faith, but its effect on his political choices as well. In a manner that seems rather two dimensional to the modern reader, previous historians have outlined four major sketches of Henri IV’s religious views before his conversion. The first portrays the monarch as a skeptic and opportunist who cynically bartered his nominal Calvinism for the Catholic crown free of any religious scruple.8 This contrasts sharply with the second interpretation of Henri as a proto-Catholic of genuine religious conviction, whose return to the traditional Church might have been sincere even if political considerations predominated in shaping his final decision.9 According to the third explanation, the Bourbon monarch was a political Huguenot of only lukewarm Calvinist faith, for whom religious loyalties were “a question of first claims and of honour rather than a matter of conscience” or “deep conviction.”10 Nevertheless, these authors argue, beyond his political goals he seems to have harboured some correct religious scruples about converting,11 ill-defined though those scruples might have been. The fourth view, finally, suggests that although the king was motivated consistently by pragmatic concerns,12 he was sincerely religious. His Christianity, however, was “uncomplicated by the subtleties of dogma” on the principle “that all that was necessary to salvation was a simple belief in Jesus Christ.”13 Henri thus appears as a kind of bland eighteenth-century deist,14 which is utterly inconsistent with his era. The essential problem with these four interpretations is that they lack the complexity necessary for understanding the multifaceted dimensions of human decision-making. Where one sees only the king’s political pragmatism at work, regardless of all other factors and variables, another reads back into his final conversion what might have been his mind by 1610, but which no evidence of seventeen years earlier supports. In still other instances, these interpretations reflect as much the bias individual scholars bring to their studies as they do the conclusions the historical evidence allows. Additionally, the majority of these views derive from an almost exclusive focus on the immediate political context of Henri’s abjuration in 1593. Rarely, if ever, do they consider a lengthier time-frame that not only embraces the long-term

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shaping of the king’s attitudes and religious beliefs from early childhood, but also considers his character, his leadership under trying conditions, and his own perception of his responsibilities as monarch – what his grandson Louis XIV later called the métier du roi – that go far deeper than simplistic assertions of political expediency or personal ambition. Admittedly, some works, such as three of the four most recent studies of Henri IV, are difficult to categorize.15 In the case of David Buisseret’s biography, this is due chiefly to the problem of omission. While recognizing that the Bourbon monarch was a personable man, a political man and “above all” a military man,16 Buisseret avoids any direct discussion of Henri as a religious man or of the formation of his conscience and its subsequent effect on his political choices up to 1593. Instead, he treats the individual aspects of Henri’s religious experience (e.g., his Catholic baptism, Calvinist upbringing, final abjuration, etc.) as mere background to his political career. Little regard is paid to their effect on the continuing development of his conscience or his decisions as Huguenot chef de parti and eventual king of France. To be sure, Buisseret acknowledges vaguely that Henri appears “to have had properly religious scruples” about his conversion,17 but their origin, depth, sincerity, and influence are not examined on the erroneous assumption that his religious choices adhered more to “a closely defined code of military law” than to any spiritual principle.18 On the other hand, Jean-Pierre Babelon’s and Janine GarrissonEstèbe’s biographies suffer from what might be described as academic forbearance. While both authors deal more directly with the issue of Henri IV’s faith than Buisseret, even conceding that he was a convinced Calvinist,19 they omit any real discussion of the formation of the Bourbon monarch’s conscience as a child and adolescent beyond the usual facts of his baptism, formal education, and early experiences. Nor does either author explore in a meaningful way how Henri’s Calvinist convictions affected his political choices in later life, apart from assessing briefly the interplay of faith and politics in his conversion of 1593. Babelon in particular evades the enigma of the king’s cynicism or sincerity on the claim that his decision was made solely by the force “of reality; he consulted neither conscience nor theologian.”20 But that claim disintegrates on careful examination of the evidence. There is still one other approach to the question of Henri IV’s religiosity that ought to be considered here, but whether this constitutes a distinct fifth category or variations of themes already defined is arguable. In any case, the historians who take this approach ignore the king’s religion altogether to concentrate wholly on the immediate political context of the conversion itself.21 Possibly this is because

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Henri had changed his creed under duress so often that these scholars have despaired of ever unravelling his motives for any of his religious-political policies. It is far more likely, however, that they do not regard the Bourbon monarch’s religious position as important enough to be considered primary in the movement of events before 1593 and, therefore, dismiss it as “irrelevant and insignificant” to the broader political picture.22 In fact, this last conclusion may be common to all of the authors cited in the several categories outlined above. Given the individual foci upon which they have constructed their various interpretations of the religious-civil conflicts in late sixteenth-century France and the subsequent development of absolute monarchy under the Bourbon kings, Henri’s conversion, his motives for converting, and the political ramifications of his conversion are the salient issues, not the depth of the king’s personal religious beliefs or their influence on his decision-making during his career both before and after the Religious Wars. But the question of whether Henri IV adhered to Calvinist or Catholic doctrines is both very relevant and very significant to the broader picture. This is not just because of the way in which his actions between 1589 and 1593, in particular, contradict the traditional interpretations of his religious position and final conversion. It is also because of what the key issue of Henri’s conscience reveals about the motivations and world views of sixteenth-century monarchs, for theirs was an age when religion, politics, and war were connected intimately and when their private desires so often conflicted with public duties and sacred responsibilities thrust upon them by their exalted royal rank and social role. Of crucial importance in both instances is the matter of the timing of the Bourbon king’s final conversion. Specifically, why did he put off abjuring for four years despite the many political advantages to be gained by renouncing his Calvinist creed in 1589, at his succession to the French throne? Not the least of these benefits might have been the general acceptance of his new royal authority by French Catholics and the probable conclusion of the civil war. Besides, Henri had promised in the Declaration of Saint Cloud (4 August), issued just two days after his accession, that he would receive Catholic instruction within six months. Yet instead of fulfilling his promise to the Catholic royalists, he temporized, thereby endangering his acceptability as French monarch among his own Catholic supporters and prolonging the bitter civil conflict against the League. Generally, historians have attributed Henri’s foot-dragging to political pragmatism and in particular to his fears of abjuring under con-

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straint and of alienating the Huguenots without gaining the Catholics.23 Hence, “the delay between his accession and his abjuration was essentially a tactical one, which allowed him to time an inevitable move so as to gain maximum benefit.”24 But this statement encompasses the very shaky assumption that Henri’s sole motivation for his abjuration was political. The evidence shows, however, that although political considerations certainly underlay much of his manoeuvring with the royalist Catholics in August 1589, they were not his exclusive concern.25 Even more importantly, the conventional argument fails utterly to explain the enigma of the king’s subsequent decision to besiege Paris in 1590, after his decisive victory over the League at Ivry. It would have been far more effective politically for him to profit from his newly won position of great strength by converting to Catholicism and thereby secure his crown once and for all. That he did not take advantage of his unassailable position in this fashion when even contemporaries expected him to do so, completely contradicts the usual portrait of the Bourbon monarch as a “supreme opportunist” whose primary motivations were political. It also undermines the naive, though persistent, assertion of “inevitability” as the determining factor in the royal abjuration. One thing a study of Henri’s early career amply demonstrates is that there were always choices, even if negative ones, and that nothing in his life was preordained.

b elief, unbelief , a n d r e l ig io u s

ME N TA LI T É

Behind the king’s constant resistance to conversion, therefore, must have lain something more important to him than mere considerations of political advantage, but to find it, one must recast the usual approach to understanding Henri’s attempt to balance his goals and desires by looking at his personal faith and his past behaviour in defending his religious independence. After all, if scholars have begun to study religion’s close relationship with, and deep influence upon, both the grassroots level of early modern society and its more élite groups, then surely the same measure must be applied to the monarchs themselves. This personalized approach is essential to appreciate their motivations more fully, as well as their perspectives on the intricate relationship between faith and politics as seen from their lofty position at the apex of the social structure. Ever since the publication of Lucien Febvre’s pioneering work Le Problème de l’incroyance au XVIe siècle: La religion de Rabelais (1947),26 the significance of religion in early modern European politics and culture has enjoyed a steady rehabilitation in historical research. Until then, the prevailing view, exemplified by such older works as Lucien

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Romier’s two-volume study Les origines politiques des guerres de religion (1913–14), held that political factors were primary in the development of religious controversy in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, following the initial Lutheran revolt. By consequence, fundamental issues of confessional difference, sectarian strife, and both popular and official manifestations of faith in daily life were relegated effectively to an incidental or even irrelevant place in the discussion. During the last five decades, however, and over the past twenty years in particular, a rich and varied historical literature has emerged to upset that traditional view. Indeed, this research not only reveals the intricate interconnection of religious life with social and political life as, perhaps, the essential defining force behind corporate or communal identities and confessional conflict, but also attempts to penetrate the thorny and often elusive issues of private versus public belief; the outward expression of these two facets of faith in material, cultural, symbolic, and ritual ways; and the rise of unbelief or irreligious ideas within the context of the Reformation, as well as the new perspectives which that movement stimulated with regard to religious commitment, to the great alarm of so many contemporaries. Scholars of French history have been especially active in exploring these themes. Starting specifically with the issue of belief versus atheism as reflected in the life and work of François Rabelais, Lucien Febvre was the first to identify the social or structural limitations – both material and linguistic – on the formation of perspectives as a component part of sixteenth-century culture. Early modern people, he concluded, possessed neither the intellectual tools essential for a concerted attack on the fundamental doctrines of Christianity (which everyone took for granted) nor the very assumptions and notions necessary to systematic unbelief. In other words, although the term “atheism” was used in sixteenth-century France, because of the depth of religious feeling and the pervasiveness of religious imagery at all levels of society, it was a theological chimera and not a real object.27 A twentieth-century definition of the word was thus inconceivable to early modern people, who understood the problem only in relation to the terms available to their culture. Febvre insisted, therefore, upon “the conservative characteristic of mentalité ” as one of gradual change,28 not only because ideas vary over time and space, but because the whole perceptual framework within which ideas are constituted varies, too. From that early root, subsequent research on religion’s cultural impact on the structures of early modern society has branched out in a variety of new directions, thus broadening the discussion. This has resulted in numerous studies devoted either in part or in whole to the

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religiosity of specific constituencies, social groups (as defined by status, gender, or some other factor), or political factions that adhered to a particular sectarian position. Some, for example, look at the interconnection of confessional, social, and political life among the nobility.29 Existing studies, however, tend to concentrate on issues of private conscience, sincerity, and the transmission of new religious ideas – especially Calvinism – among French aristocrats to the exclusion of old ties of kinship and loyalty that had bound together noble society and actually facilitated the infiltration of the new faith,30 or they simply subsume the aristocrats’ religious revolt into the larger political process of French state-building.31 The role of women in religious change during the early modern period has similarly become the object of systematic investigation. Initially, this consisted of biographical studies of the confessional experience of great noblewomen or prominent female literary figures at the forefront of the Reformation, many of whom were French.32 Increasingly, however, scholars have been scrutinizing those facets of religion that attracted women in the sixteenth century, as well as their state of life before converting to one sect or another and the consequences that the Reformation ultimately had for them.33 Of growing interest here is the issue of religious education of early modern women as both a moral and secular guide for an ethical life. This function was stressed by Catholic, Calvinist, and Lutheran theologians alike,34 as a means of combating heresy, providing a spiritual heritage for children, and restraining what was perceived by contemporaries to be the “uncontrollable force of feminine irrationality.”35 Still other scholars, meanwhile, have begun probing into the religious antecedents of the French civil wars, and especially into Catholic and Huguenot mentalité as expressed by their respective organizations and polemical works. For instance, where more traditional treatments of French Calvinism concentrated on the political aspects of the Huguenot struggle for legal recognition under the Valois and early Bourbon kings,36 newer studies explore the Calvinists’ religiosity and the outward expression of faith that bound together their community and strengthened their resolve in the face of deadly opposition from the Catholic majority.37 Fresh reassessments of the League (including its Parisian offshoot, the Seize) similarly have appeared. They portray it not as a rebellious political faction that threatened the social fabric, monarchical authority, and territorial integrity of France, but as a quasi-reform movement that “took root in the solidarity of a medieval, urban community, renewed by the civil wars,” according to which “religious, social and political unity constituted the practical postulates of daily life.”38 Thus, it is argued, the League arose primarily to safeguard

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the ancient constitution of the realm by opposing those factors that endangered it: the spread of heresy and the absolutist centralization of the French state.39 Even more recently, the nature of religious violence in late sixteenth-century France has become the object of intensive scrutiny. In the process, patterns of crowd behaviour have been identified in such events as the great Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of 1572 as being more evocative of limited, ritual violence than of random, unlimited killing. Thus, religiously motivated, urban bloodshed (it is maintained) was not rooted simply in a seething, mob-like irrationality, as portrayed by more conventional accounts. Rather, it was a “culturally coded” group disturbance that grew out of a collective consciousness. Whether that consciousness developed from a phenomenon of cultural anguish during a time of religious troubles,40 or from the frenzied, frustrated, and paranoic primitive mind of the French people that reached back to the dawn of time,41 or from a combination of social, religious, economic, and political tensions that together formed a mental framework that allowed such bloodshed,42 is a matter of debate. Whatever the case, all of these scholars agree that religious violence during the confessional conflicts in late sixteenth-century France assumed the character of a purification rite directed at specific targets. It constituted a “terrible act of faith on the part of an impassioned populace,” in which the punishments and forms of destruction inflicted by the crowd emulated those prescribed traditionally by the magistracy.43 The issue of belief versus unbelief raised initially by Lucien Febvre, however, still continues to attract the focus of much of the new scholarship outlined above. But where some historians, such as P.O. Kristeller,44 concur with Febvre’s conclusions about the absence of the intellectual or cognitive foundations for atheism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, other scholars argue that a systematic unbelief was more than feasible and was in fact evident in the work and attitudes of some individuals and social groups as a distinctive and identifiable element in the process of secularization since the Reformation.45 In fact, David Woottan concentrates explicitly on “the possibility of a society of atheists” in his study of Paolo Sarpi,46 whose History of the Council of Trent (he writes) “implies a totally secular and skeptical view of religion.”47 This line of enquiry has prompted, in turn, a search for the social and intellectual origins of atheism, either broadly conceived48 or having evolved within the changing religious attitudes – usually of common folk – in specific countries.49 Especially noteworthy, here, is the work of Carlo Ginzburg and David Sabean, who dissect oral culture as a means of entering into the cognitive

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worlds of Italian and German peasant communities,50 and of Christopher Hill, whose focus is the emergence of popular unbelief in seventeenth-century England.51 It is a peculiarity of all of this new research into religion’s profound role in defining sixteenth-century European culture, identities, and society that the one constituency consistently omitted from the investigation is that of the monarchs. Virtually without exception, the discussion of their religiosity is confined within the narrow limits of political or dynastic policy, as if their private conscience had no influence whatever on their decision-making, their perception of their relationship with their subjects, or their view of their reciprocal obligations to God and to society as divinely anointed sovereigns. A brief look at conventional treatments of the Tudors in England exemplifies this tendency.

a s y mbios is of r el ig io n a n d p o l it ic s In no case is this glaring oversight in recent scholarship more apparent than in that of Henri IV of France, who was moulded as profoundly as any of his contemporaries – noble or common, male or female, Catholic or Calvinist – by the age of faith in which he lived. To understand his religiosity and the hitherto unacknowledged, though nonetheless powerful, role played by his private conscience in determining his policy decisions, one must see his much-vaunted pragmatism in terms of a symbiosis of his political objectives and religious desires: the theme of this book. That he was pragmatic, even opportunistic at times (the usual assessment), is undeniable, but as with most sixteenth-century monarchs, his pragmatism is always assumed by historians to have been politically motivated. Why can it not be religiously motivated, too? After all, what one sees very clearly in Henri before 1593 is the pragmatist in him seeking to end the civil wars in a manner that would satisfy not just his twin political goals of securing the French crown that was rightfully his by birth and restoring peace to his war-torn kingdom, but also his equally strong religious goal of preserving his sincere profession of the Calvinist faith (imbibed, as he often said, “with his mother’s milk”) until finally forced to abjure. Certainly, it was pragmatic judgment that led Henri to insist, from 1576 onward, that the civil wars were politically, not religiously, based. He used this argument consistently to defend the independence of his own religious position. Subsequently, he was just as pragmatic in using military involvement to keep his restive Catholic supporters from pressing him too hard for his abjuration. This kind of pragmatism is also the only explanation for his actions immediately after the battle

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of Ivry. If his decision-making had been based upon political considerations alone, as most historians (but few contemporaries) assume, then doubtless he would have abjured quickly in the wake of his great victory to secure his throne. That he did not do so, thereby sacrificing his newly won political advantages in the event, strongly indicates that the king was as pragmatic in defending his private conscience as he was in pursuing his crown. Indeed, until 1593 these two goals were complementary in his thinking, not contradictory. Only when he became convinced in his own mind that they were no longer compatible, and that his emotional resistance to the conversion that was looming more and more pressingly upon him was no longer politically tenable, did Henri accept at last that he had to abjure. There was no other alternative. Because of his birthright and sacred obligations as legitimate French monarch, he understood that the sacrifice of his private conscience for the good of his people ultimately had to be made. That was his chief obligation received with his crown from God. As a sixteenth-century monarch, Henri IV took this responsibility very seriously. Thus, from this approach emerges a very different picture of the first Bourbon king of France. We see him not as a sceptic and opportunist, a political Huguenot, or an eighteenth-century-style deist where religion was concerned, but as a devoted Calvinist and a sincerely religious man in tune with his times: the thesis of this book. What was the spirit of those times? As Lucien Febvre observed: “Wanting to make the sixteenth century a sceptical century ... and glorify it as such is the worst of errors and delusions ... it was, quite to the contrary, an inspired century, one that sought in all things first of all a reflection of the divine.”52 Equally forceful is Geoffrey Parker’s more succinct comment that although he is personally indifferent to Catholicism and Protestantism today, “I always take the religion of sixteenth-century people seriously.”53 Together, these quotations from two distinguished modern historians, since echoed by others,54 expose the chief weakness of traditional assessments of Henri IV: they overlook the potency of personal religious motivation among monarchs during the age in which Henri lived, and thus remove the king from his historical context. How, then, might one reassess Henri within that context? To begin with, one must avoid fragmenting the subject. There has long been a tendency in early modern French history to compartmentalize in a modern bureaucratic manner the various aspects of royal government into distinct categories without examining sufficiently the personal relationships that complicate them and without evaluating their interrelationships comprehensively within the context of the assumptions of the age. Orest Ranum, in writing about Cardinal

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Richelieu and the counsellors of Louis XIII, criticizes this failing. He points out that while it is necessary to think, in part, in terms of bureaucratic divisions such as finance, justice, foreign affairs, war, and (one should add) religion, “the whole must be preserved at the same time by analyzing the functions of the major personalities which cut across those lines.”55 Paul Sonnino similarly alludes to the need for a human focus, defining his more recent work on Louis XIV and the Dutch War as a study “of moments, of personal interaction, and of options, where success depends on whether we can arrive at a more intimate level of contact with a selected cast of characters during the period immediately preceding” the outbreak of that seventeenthcentury conflict.56 At the same time, one must be equally careful to avoid the opposite extreme, which Joseph Bergin refers to as a sort of academic “tunnel vision” that results “from focusing sharply on an individual while leaving context, background and other connected aspects relatively underdeveloped.”57 Such myopia leads to the misrepresentation of the historical record, as major figures of the past are evaluated not according to the perceptions of their own age, but rather by the “contemporary preoccupations” of the individual scholar in search of “a usable past.”58 It is precisely this kind of distortion that A. Lloyd Moote warns against in his biography of Louis XIII. While major historical figures, he notes, brought to their particular circumstances intrinsic qualities of their own that profoundly influenced both their decisions and the direction of their public life, their perceptions and behaviour were conditioned in large part, too, by the society to which they belonged – what Moote calls “the broader formative setting” – and by contemporary mentalité. This “included ideals, values, beliefs and ideas” fundamental to their development.59 It is the unique interaction of these two factors, personal and societal, that allows “the great historical person” to leave his distinctive mark upon the society of his day. For this reason, an examination of the personal element is essential to political biography because it forces one to consider the intricate, ongoing exchange between the private person and the public persona as delineated by Moote, Ranum, Sonnino, and Bergin. Otherwise, the result may be a two-dimensional portrait of a high-profile career that has value for many readers who want only “the facts,” but a portrait that fails to grapple with the personality behind the career or to show its vital influence on the choices of the “great historical person” in combination with other, external factors. Nowhere are these postulates more applicable than in an exploration of Henri IV’s early career up to his final conversion to Catholicism on 25 July 1593. Thus, what is offered here is not just another

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political biography of the king or a narrow re-examination of his abjuration, though that signal event is the logical and necessary culmination of the present volume. Neither is this a new attempt to discover, by reference to his early career, the roots of Bourbon absolutism. Nor, by the same token, is this a further effort to reinterpret the structural transformation of early modern French monarchy as a result of the civil-religious wars, though the challenge Henri’s Calvinism offered to the catholicity of the Crown and to the traditional views of its ritual, symbolic role in early modern France forms a necessary element of the discussion. Rather what follows is a personalized, multidimensional exploration of the monarch as a whole man – not merely a political or military man, but a religious man, too – whose life was not full of inexplicable turns but was a composite made up of his actions and beliefs over the course of decades. This volume probes, in short, Henri IV’s mentality and motivations through successive chapters, placing specific focus on the development of his private conscience and the intimate interaction, even interdependence, of his commitments of faith and his political choices in his early career. Far from viewing himself as the helpless victim of fate, the Bourbon king always believed that he had some control over his destiny, and he sought to preserve that freedom in the face of circumstance.

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1 Mother and Son, December 1553 to August 1572 “[Henri de Navarre] is a great prince who has the air of an emperor, or one day will become one.” – The duke of Rio Secco, 1565

The sixteenth century was an intensely religious age, a time when doctrinal disputes and clashes over differing systems of belief too often were purged in blood. Aside from the traditional piety of contemporaries from all walks of life that had characterized medieval western Europeans, two very prominent issues – one external, the other internal – intensified religious awareness in the sixteenth century. First, among the more politically articulate and those who lived along the exposed southern and eastern fringes of the continent, there was the perceived notion that Christendom was seriously threatened in its fundamental existence by the onward march of Islam, with the formidable armies and navies of the Ottoman Empire, despite earlier successes in the west of the Spanish and Portuguese Reconquista. The second and perhaps more vital issue was the sectarian squabbling among Christians who were endeavouring to re-establish a purer, more primitive church, an undertaking labelled subsequently by historians as the Reformation. This friction produced not a reinvigoration of rich reform as had happened so often in the Middle Ages, but internecine quarrels and fragmentation. Already the Holy Roman Empire and England had divided over this issue, establishing a pattern that threatened the same result for much more of Europe. In France the focus of the reform movement that earlier had embroiled its neighbours was sharpened very considerably in midcentury. What had begun as a disorganized and muted, if not largely ignored, discussion among a handful of reform-minded French scholars and clerics intensified in the electrically charged atmosphere of

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political crisis and religious tension during the 1550s and 1560s. The escalation had begun slowly enough in the last years of the reign of François Ier (1515–47). He had become progressively less tolerant of religious dissent following the first publication of John Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion (1536) and the subsequent development of a sovereign and secure Calvinist centre at Geneva with close ties to France. But it soon picked up speed, coming rapidly to a head after 1559 when a swift succession of key political and religious events over a short period of time created the conditions for the eventual outbreak of civil and sectarian strife. That year witnessed the first synod of the dissident French Calvinist reformists; it also saw the unexpected death of Henri II (1547–59). The young and sickly heir, François II (1559–60), was dominated easily by his powerful in-laws of the House of Guise, the self-appointed protectors of French ultraCatholicism. Rapidly following came the disastrous Conspiracy of Amboise (1560), when some radical Calvinists attempted to kidnap the king; François’s own death from chronic ill-health hardly a year after his father’s untimely demise; and the Guise faction’s toppling from political power, effected by the astute queen mother, Catherine de Medici (1519–89). Her efforts to secure her own position and authority in the kingdom on the accession of her second son, Charles IX (1560–74), included an attempt to find middle ground in the increasingly bitter quarrels between French Catholics and Calvinists at the Colloquy of Poissy (1561), but this assembly served only to polarize and politicize still further the realm’s already deep religious divisions, exacerbated by factionalism at the Valois court. The final explosion came in 1562 with the massacre of some French Calvinists at Vassy by the duc de Guise, an event that sparked the outbreak of thirty-six years of religious-civil war. It was into this historical context of political and religious upheaval that the future Henri IV was born, on 13 December 1553. Alone, the influence of this turmoil on his development would have been enough to affect him in later life. Indeed, it truly would have been astonishing if in subsequent years, whether as Huguenot1 chef de parti or eventual king of France, his acts had not reflected the profound formative influence of that background. Yet as is common in developing youth, the most fundamental influence on the growing Henri was the relationship he shared with his pious, strong-willed, and able mother, Jeanne d’Albret, queen of Navarre (1528–72), who was herself a young woman moulded by the same circumstances. As one of those involved in the fervent search to revive a pristine Christianity, she reached an important religious decision around 1559 that caused her to reject the old Church in which she had been baptized for the new “reformed” religion of John

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Calvin. Thereafter, she became deeply involved at the forefront of the religious fervour of her day, because of her strong personal faith and her exalted royal birth. Like other contemporary Christians, Jeanne was sectarian, not denominational, in her beliefs. This was a period when decisive delineations among the various Christian sects according to a twentiethcentury perspective were meaningless. Certainly absent was any notion that everyone could find his or her own pathway to salvation, the fundamental principle upon which modern denominationalism is founded. To be sure, with the Peace of Augsburg (1555) in the Holy Roman Empire and the royal edicts of January (1562) and Nantes (1598) in France, and perhaps even with the Council of Trent, one sees the beginnings of a recognition and institutionalization of denominational lines beyond confessional definition, but it was not really until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that this began to take definitive form, when the Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist doctrines were recognized equally as distinctive varieties of Christianity. Until then, each group was reformist in spirit and inspiration; each also claimed to represent orthodoxy in its quest for the pristine faith of the primitive church. This duo-perspective can be demonstrated by reference even to Henri IV himself, who, on the eve of his final conversion to Catholicism in 1593, assured his distressed Huguenot followers that “I am entering the house not to live in it, but to cleanse it.”2 A very substantial part of Jeanne d’Albret’s influence on her son was, therefore, intensely religious. She consciously shaped him according to Christian truth as she knew it, to become a devout member of the “Reformed Religion” (or “so-called Reformed Religion,” as the Catholics dubbed it) and also its future protector. To that end, she imbued him with her own evangelical faith by careful instruction in his youth; she also imposed upon him a heavy commitment of honour and duty toward his creed, combined with a deep sense of guilt should he ever abandon it. But at the same time, Jeanne moulded her son for his eventual role as king of Navarre with all the responsibilities that monarchy entailed, including concerns of family, domain, and subject. So together with the obligation of the faith, Henri imbibed from his mother the obligation of the dynasty, or, as Jeanne very succinctly put it to her son and heir, duties “of blood and religion” that “are never separated.”3 These two features, blood and religion, were the key elements undergirding early modern kingship. They were also fundamental to Henri’s formation under his mother’s careful direction and became the principles by which he governed himself in later life. Moreover, precisely because of the position into which he was born at the apex of

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French society, among those on the highest level of political action and decision-making – the “makers of manners”4 who set the social pace and formed the standards of contemporary judgment – the same two elements rendered this future king of France a political-religious pawn in his salad days. His early experience deeply affected his mature appreciation of the role of a prince in the age in which he lived, as well as his view of the difference between private conscience and public profession of faith. He was, in short, the result and the focal point of religious fervour united to high-stakes politics. Consequently, if one does not first understand the formative influences and circumstances of Henri IV’s youth and upbringing, in combination with the mentalité of the age, including the principles, beliefs, and perspectives essential to the monarch’s personal development, then the chief events of Henri’s life from the 1570s to the 1590s are incomprehensible.

r eligion, politic s, a n d t h e p r in c e ly pawn, 1 5 5 3 – 1 5 6 7 Almost from the day of his birth, Henri de Navarre and his religion attracted the focused attention of contemporary religious and political leaders in France. Powerful men and women understood from at least 1560 onward that the practical advantages or disadvantages to their respective positions in the mounting religious and political tensions in the kingdom were affected significantly by whether the young Béarnais prince prayed in Latin or in French. As Henri grew older, their interest both in him and in his profession of creed intensified correspondingly from two related, if opposite, viewpoints. First, on a simple partisan-sectarian level was the central premise accepted by all contemporaries that one’s professed faith defined one’s political relationships. In fact, the connection between religion and politics in this age was regarded as so intimate (and religion generally was assumed to predominate) that it was inconceivable to anyone that a man’s political outlook could evolve independently from his creed. The higher one’s social rank, the more significant this relationship became as a guarantee of commitment to a cause that transcended shifts in self-interest. Although there are examples of individuals for whom shared religious convictions did not always ensure a consensus of political concerns, these exceptions to the general rule do not discount the fact that religious loyalty “undoubtedly supplemented other grounds of common interest in determining relationships ... and the resilience of those attachments.”5 According to the logic of the sixteenth-century mentalité, therefore, Henri’s profession of religion became a matter of immediate partisan attention

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among highly placed adult contemporaries during his childhood and adolescence. Because of the enormous advantages offered to the advancement of their particularist political goals by both his royal birth as a French prince of the blood through his father’s line and his future expectations as heir to his mother’s separate crown of Navarre, the question of his creed was vitally important. What these people understood was that by dominating him physically they could determine also the religion he professed in public. That in turn would assure his political utility to their party, which (they believed) they could make him accept as his own. Second, on a much broader national level was the attitude toward the young Navarre held by the state and those who governed it. According to Frenchmen of the day, all of whom shared François Ier’s view of “one king, one law, one faith” for the realm, religious unity played a fundamental role in maintaining the social and political order. Indeed, a common faith was perceived to be the principal element that bound together the social fabric, particularly at moments when that fabric appeared to be tearing. To most people of the time, including the Huguenots, “religious conformity was considered to be absolutely necessary for the unity of a nation, and anarchy would be the result if a government permitted the open exercise of two rival sects.”6 The “curse of new sects,” prophesied the Venetian ambassador to France on the eve of civil war in 1561, not only confused “totally the religion of the realm, which is the sole means of holding a people united and obedient to its prince,”7 but also menaced the peace and unity that guaranteed the laws and the exercise of virtue and justice: it destroyed “the control and order of the government”; it produced contempt “for the authority of magistrates and finally even for the prince”; and it caused “the division of the people, the seditions, and the civil wars which always spring from religious confusion.”8 In short, the consequences of religious diversity threatened (contemporaries believed) the very life of the state itself.9 Related closely to this view was the deeply engrained conviction that religious unity similarly confirmed the ancient links between French princes and their loyal subjects. Or as another contemporary writer put it: “[T]he first Bond ... which confirmeth, knotteth, and retaineth the obedience of Kings, is Religion.”10 Consequently, conformity to Catholic orthodoxy was regarded as an essential basis for royal political authority; at the same time, the Crown’s ancient relationship to the Church brought enormous prestige to French monarchs. After all, not only did they count a saint (Louis IX) among their lineage, they also gloried in their illustrious papal title as “les rois très-Chrestiens” – “their Most-Christian Majesties.” It even has been argued that the very

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essence of the French monarchy was embodied in that honorific, owing to the sovereign’s definitive identity as “Most-Christian.” He was “the first king of the world ... because he was the eldest son of the Church” and the head of the most ancient and noble house of Europe.11 The monarch was of necessity, therefore, chief of the Catholics, and in that capacity he also was God’s instrument in cleansing the realm of heresy and maintaining religious unity within his domains. Thus, to most sixteenth-century Frenchmen, their prince was analogous to the sun, “the Light of the multitude of men”; or as St Thomas Aquinas put it, “as the minister of God in governing the people,” the monarch “is to be in the kingdom what the soul is in the body, and what God is in the world.”12 Thus, as the living representative of God, he gave life to the kingdom just as the soul in man gives life to the body. Moreover, because the monarchy issues from God, it was considered a sacred institution of the divine will. All sovereignty lay, therefore, with the king, and this power extended even into the realm of the spiritual.13 For these reasons, many argued, the French people had always demanded that their monarchs swear publicly their loyalty to the Catholic faith before they were received as kings: “It was part of the mutual contract between the people and the king which was called the fundamental law of the realm.”14 That oath was given at the coronation, where the consecration at Rheims of every successive monarch with holy oil reaffirmed a double myth of “the providential sanction of Frankish kingship” and, by extension, “the chosen people.”15 A powerful symbol, the holy ampule conveyed “at one and the same time the king’s right to rule, the special favour God showed the French people, and their mission to preserve His holy religion.”16 The link thereby formed with God, the French sovereign, and the subject was seen as a living bond of inspiration and benediction.17 Accordingly, therefore, to many Frenchmen it was not the Catholic religion alone that assured the salvation of the kingdom and its integrity, but the monarchy in association with it, by guaranteeing the unity of the faith. Because the throne was tied so closely to the altar, which, more than ever in the mid-sixteenth century, had become the chief pillar of its temporal power, the monarchy was regarded as the “fédérateur” (i.e., confederator or amalgamator) of French unity.18 As part of that outlook, religious conformity under the Catholic faith was considered an essential condition for individual and collective salvation under the Crown, in a society that was perceived as an organic whole.19 Consequently, religious dissidence was greatly to be feared, especially when a prince of the blood such as Henri de Navarre was involved. In sixteenth-century French eyes, this kind of defection by a

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powerful and virtually untouchable royal scion so close to the throne was seen to threaten the traditional Catholicity of the Crown, monarchical authority, and the whole fabric of society. Inevitably, therefore, there was great tension between these two contrasting points of view, partisan-sectarian and statist, which in turn initiated a relentless competition between Calvinists and Catholics (led by the Crown) over who would dominate the young prince of Navarre, especially in the matter of his professed religion. This competition endured for almost forty years, until Henri’s final conversion to Catholicism in 1593, after he had become king of France. Thus, long before Henri was in any position to decide on religious matters for himself, a pattern of conversion, based chiefly on perceived political realities, had been firmly established. He did not invent it; he was, on the contrary, the victim of it to the point that before his nineteenth birthday he was forced to change his public profession of religion on four separate occasions by those who controlled him and his actions at the time. Although initially baptised a Catholic in March 1554 by the cardinal de Lorraine (one of the powerful Guise clan), assisted by the cardinal de Vendôme,20 Henri was confirmed in late December 1560 in the Calvinist faith by his mother, Jeanne d’Albret. She had just announced officially her own conversion to the Reformed Religion that Christmas. Thereafter, her residence in Paris became “a public school of the new doctrine; it was like a refuge for the new evangelists, who received a very benevolent and honourable welcome.”21 As for Henri’s often absentee father, Antoine de Bourbon (1518–1562), in matters of religion (wrote the Venetian resident in spring 1561) “he has shown himself neither firm nor wise.” Though “a gallant prince, generous and agreeable,” he lacked strong character, good judgment, and political talent. As a result, he moved “now in one direction, now in another, now following the Catholics in order to stand in well with the pope, now with the Huguenots to secure a following in the kingdom, now the Lutherans to keep the friendship of Germany.”22 Yet one thing was clear from his vacillations. However irresolute Antoine might have been, his inconsistency was “not without design,” especially as he became increasingly aware that his own interests lay with the majority Catholic party and, momentarily, the Valois Crown. Thus, from early 1561 onward there swiftly developed an ongoing and often bitter political rivalry over who would control the young Prince Henri and his creed. The boy was affected on the most personal level, as his parents, emerging at this time as leaders of opposing factions in France, quarrelled over the possession and religious upbringing of their son in the game of high-stakes politics.

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In all probability, Queen Jeanne’s decision to rear her son within the bosom of the Reformed Church was inspired by her sincere spiritual conviction and by what one anonymous contemporary called her “passion for the new faith.”23 Besides, in the reformist literature of the period, “virtuous women” like her were considered indispensable as both moral companions and teacher-mothers, and “spiritual richness” was regarded as the most important legacy these women passed on to their children.24 Fired by her own religious zeal and determined to see Henri brought up as a devout Calvinist carefully instructed in his new creed, Jeanne surrounded him from December 1560 onward with very capable Huguenot teachers. Chief among these men were his principal tutor François La Gaucherie (described as “a very learned man in Greek and zealous in the Reformed Religion”), Pontus de La Caze (a member of Jeanne’s conseil privé), and Pierre-Victor Palma Cayet (the future historian).25 She also entrusted Henri to the care and guidance of a reliable Calvinist gouverneur, Louis de Goulard, sieur de Beauvoir, who became a “real friend and counsellor” to the queen of Navarre in later years before he was killed in the slaughter of the Huguenots on Saint Bartholomew’s Day, 1572.26 Her confidence in these men was not misplaced. Indeed, though details are few, the early success of her son’s religious indoctrination under their tutelage was attested to by the Spanish ambassador to France, Perrenot de Chantonay. He noted significantly in May 1562 that the eight-year-old prince (whom he described as a “quick, intelligent and very handsome” boy) “shows himself to be firm in the [Calvinist] opinion of his mother.”27 Yet at the same time, religious inspiration was not Jeanne’s only motive for her keen interest in Henri’s Calvinist upbringing. She also had pragmatic concerns for the future political and spiritual welfare of her fellow Huguenots in the French kingdom. As the reigning Calvinist queen of Navarre, she was naturally concerned with the changing political climate of Catholic France and the mounting tensions in the realm, which, in the wake of Henri II’s accidental death in 1559, had begun more and more to threaten the outbreak of religious-civil war. Should this occur, Jeanne’s patrimonial domains to the south almost certainly would attract the focus of royal Catholic aggression because of the large concentration of Huguenots who lived under her protection and her own sectarian (and therefore political) affiliations in opposition to the Valois Crown. Until now, she wrote, “God ... has always granted me the grace to preserve this little corner of Béarn, where, little by little, good increases and evil diminishes.”28 But with the gathering of war clouds along the political horizon by 1562, the continued autonomy of the last vestige of

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her family’s ancient kingdom in the Pyrenees was cast into serious jeopardy. Her other concern, meanwhile, was the safeguarding of Huguenot interests, especially in Béarn, where she had begun issuing royal edicts that steadily restricted Catholic worship and promoted Calvinism instead. As heir to Jeanne’s crown, Henri was essential to the continuity of both policies. It was necessary, therefore, that he be prepared for his eventual role not only as king of Navarre but also as a Huguenot leader in France in the event of his mother’s death. So in a very real and purposeful way, Jeanne combined the twin principles of blood and religion in planning her son’s future. And she did not conceal this intent from her opponents, such as Catherine de Medici, to whom she wrote boldly: “I desire him to be such, Madame, that those to whom he has the honour to belong will recognize that in what I do for him I am rearing a faithful servant for them.”29 But Jeanne d’Albret’s early efforts to mould Henri into a committed Calvinist prince were disrupted at this time by her increasingly bitter clashes with Antoine de Bourbon, whose own developing political ambitions now allied him to the Valois Crown and the Catholic Church. Central to their quarrel was the need for the success of their respective political goals to dominate their son and his religious profession. As a result, Henri became an object of contention between his parents as they fought for control of him. Hitherto, the relations between husband and wife had been amicable and even affectionate since their marriage in 1547, despite Antoine’s frequent pecadilloes. Both before and after Henri’s birth, Jeanne had followed Antoine on his campaign in the ongoing war against the Spanish Habsburgs and also to the French royal court. Her infant son had been entrusted, meantime, to the care of his nurse, Jeanne Fourcade; his governess, Suzanne de Bourbon-Busset; and his maternal grandfather, Henri II d’Albret, king of Navarre, who oversaw the prince’s early upbringing à la Béarnaise.30 With her father’s death in May 1555, however, Jeanne returned to Navarre to assume at the same time her new crown and her son’s supervision. Antoine rejoined her there, though he left soon afterward for France’s northeastern frontier on the first of several prolonged absences. At his return in November 1556, he and his wife, together with Henri, proceeded northward for the little prince’s first introduction to the court of Henri II, where they arrived in February 1557.31 According to Palma Cayet, this visit was a great success. The Valois monarch was so impressed by his young namesake’s forthright answers to questions and his adult-like composure under circumstances that might have alarmed another three-year-old that he agreed with an

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eager Antoine to betroth Henri to his infant daughter, Marguerite, as soon as the two children came of age.32 Thus, the prince’s future had been mortgaged to royal interest and paternal ambition even before his parents’ approaching rupture, of which there was little indication at this time. During Henri’s second visit to the French court three years later, however, it became clear to everyone that the relationship between his mother and father had soured significantly. Yet the rift between Jeanne and Antoine involved more than private quarrels over religion or Antoine’s increasingly blatant infidelities. It was linked very closely to the turn of events at the French court following the death of François II on 5 December 1560, hardly a year after Henri II’s shocking demise. This brought in its wake the collapse of Guise domination and the Bourbon prince’s rise to political prominence as a result of the queen mother’s successful bid to become regent for the minor Charles IX. Until now, Antoine had been a weak and unthreatening opponent of the Guise brothers. Although he had been implicated in the Conspiracy of Amboise against them the previous March, along with his younger brother Louis de Condé (1530–1569), he had been spared the grizzly fate of the other conspirators because of his high birth. Instead, he had been forced to submit to a number of lesser humiliations at Guise hands.33 With the toppling of the latter’s position at court, however, Antoine’s political star began to rise, if only because to obtain the regency – and with it control over the direction of royal policy – Catherine de Medici needed his compliance. As first prince of the blood in France after the surviving Valois princes, all of whom were minors, Bourbon arguably was entitled to claim the post for himself in keeping with tradition. His consent was also essential to Catherine for quasi-constitutional reasons, because, as some contemporaries contended, the ancient statutes and laws of France prohibited women and foreigners from exercising the regent’s authority.34 With both factors weighing heavily against her, the Italian-born queen mother had to persuade Antoine (“without whose consent [she] could do nothing”)35 to relinquish his claims voluntarily before she could assume power. Then, to retain that power and associate the Bourbon prince so closely with the royal government that (Catherine hoped) he could neither oppose nor obstruct her rule, she conferred on him the rank of lieutenant-general of the kingdom in March 1561. This tied him for a time to her will. Now officially regent, Catherine pursued a policy of religious toleration in the kingdom during the next few months in order to preserve national peace. Her efforts led to the Colloquy of Poissy and its culmination, the Edict of Saint-Germain (issued on 17 January 1562 and therefore also called the “Edict of January”),

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which granted the French king’s Huguenot subjects limited freedom of conscience along with certain other liberties. What permitted the queen mother to manipulate Antoine so effectively, at least in the short term, was his weak and vacillating nature, coupled with what a second Venetian envoy denoted as his changeability, imprudence, and rather limited intellect, “even though he affects great intelligence in political affairs, which he does not much understand.”36 One highly placed French contemporary, the maréchal de Tavannes, described the Bourbon prince in similar terms as a man of “a natural fickleness, and very irresolute, going [first] in one direction and then suddenly in the other; thus fluctuating between the two, the opinion he had abandoned seemed the best to him, and [he] would adopt it again without any apparent logic.”37 Nor were these two men alone in their opinions of the prince.38 Because of this character flaw, made worse by his tendency in great matters to listen “to the advice of the many flatterers and worthless men who surround[ed] him,”39 Antoine lacked strong personal commitment to any cause, whether political or religious. Although prior to 1560 he had leaned heavily toward Calvinism,40 and more especially after the conversion of his wife when the Huguenots courted him as a potential protector of their party, he possessed neither the moral courage nor sufficient conviction to sever his ties completely with the traditional Church or to commit himself wholly to the new reform movement. Instead, he went no further in his sympathies than to waver indecisively between the two creeds. In fairness to Antoine, one should note that since, in mid-sixteenthcentury France, the doctrinal lines between the Catholic and Calvinist sects still were not drawn clearly, numerous other persons – not all of them commoners – remained as indecisive in matters of religion as he. His mother-in-law, Marguerite d’Angoulême, and his wife are just two examples. The particular problem with Antoine was that he vacillated in his political loyalties, so that through the skilful use of bribery, threats, and promises of future reward, the queen mother was able to seduce him rapidly and easily to her side and ultimately back to firm allegiance to the Roman Church. She appealed to the one thing that could motivate him decisively, self-interest. In short, Antoine de Bourbon could be bought. This certainly was the conclusion of the Venetian envoys to France, especially of Marc’ Antonio Barbaro, who wrote that Bourbon “was moved only by the hope of compensation,” that “he sees only his own interest,” and that “he uses religion as an instrument” to those ends.41 Even so, Antoine’s loyalty could not be assured should other opportunities for personal advantage present themselves to his view. Still, between 1560 and 1562 he became a

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willing royal ally and a professed Catholic in support of Catherine de Medici and her policy of religious toleration. But as usual with the restless Bourbon, his commitment was never absolute. Early in 1562 he began to split with the queen mother as he became identified increasingly with her nemesis, François duc de Guise (1519–63), and with Anne de Montmorency (1493–1567), the connétable de France, in the formation of a new ultra-Catholic “triumvirate” at court. This alliance, Jeanne d’Albret and her confidant the vicomte de Gourdon predicted ominously, would lead to religious-civil conflict in the realm because these men had many friends and followers and enjoyed the support of the ancient religion.42 Only the previous March, in 1561, had Antoine finally stopped dithering on the religious question and declared his devotion to the Catholic Church. Few contemporaries doubted that he had acted partly in gratitude for the lieutenant-generalship of the kingdom and partly in the hope of securing additional political and material reward. With his new alliance to Guise, however, he moved in a strongly sectarian direction, turning abruptly against the policy of religious toleration in France. He now condemned the queen mother’s recent Edict of January as vehemently as he had defended it hitherto. This act thoroughly alienated his oncehopeful Huguenot backers, who publicly denounced him in roundly sectarian terms of their own for joining “the enemies of God” against the Calvinist cause.43 It also completed his estrangement from Jeanne d’Albret. At this point Henri de Navarre became an innocent pawn in his parents’ bitter quarrel. Having at last taken sides in the mounting religious and political disputes at the Valois court, Antoine had decided by February 1562, or perhaps earlier, to restore his son to the Catholic Church. This was a gesture of good faith to his new associates, and particularly to Philip II of Spain, who was dangling the lure of an independent crown before Bourbon’s eyes.44 Refusing to allow this, however, Jeanne adamantly resisted her husband’s designs in a concerted effort to protect the integrity of Henri’s Calvinist religion and with it her plans for his future political commitment to the Huguenots. But her spirited opposition only further embittered her relations with Antoine. These reached their nadir on 4 March 1562, just three days after the Guise massacre of the Huguenot worshippers at Vassy, when it was reported that “the king of Navarre ... tormented his wife because she would not suffer the prince, her son, to go to Mass or to be present at the christening of the son of the Spanish ambassador.”45 This notable breach of sixteenth-century protocol, almost an insult to the king of Spain, illustrates just how inflexible Jeanne had become in her new religious commitments. The final break between

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Henri’s parents came shortly afterward when Antoine, keeping the boy with him at the French court, banished his estranged wife to her Béarnais domains, never to see her again. Before leaving, Queen Jeanne “addressed a long and severe remonstrance” to her son “to persuade him never to go to Mass, in any guise whatever, even going so far as to say that if he disobeyed her in this, she would disinherit him and not be known in future as his mother.”46 “Such an admonition,” comments a modern historian, “could hardly but have impressed (perhaps terrified) a young boy.”47 Obviously, Jeanne d’Albret was not above using heavy-handed threats to keep young Henri from converting to Catholicism against her wishes, or of employing guilt and filial obligation as means to influence his religious formation. Moreover, her methods seem to have been effective. With his Huguenot wife’s direct and powerful influence over their son now removed, though clearly not broken, Antoine was left alone with Henri. Until that time, he had been an absentee father whose involvement in the young prince’s life had been minimal at best, and their association over the next few months had little real or lasting impact on the development of the boy’s character, beyond certain inherited traits and – perhaps because of his experiences of paternal pressure – his adult aversion to the enforcement of religious conformity by coercion. The time they spent together was too brief, while Jeanne’s hold over Henri was too strong, even from a distance. Besides, Antoine’s sole interest in the young prince was concentrated on reintroducing him to the mass and to extirpating his son’s heresy for his own selfish ends. For that purpose he replaced all of the Calvinist retainers whom Jeanne had positioned so carefully around their son with Catholics. Only Beauvoir was retained in a lesser capacity as Henri’s master of the wardrobe, from which position he supplied the banished queen of Navarre with news of the boy.48 But despite his best efforts, Antoine’s goal proved far more difficult to attain than originally imagined, because the eight-year-old prince stubbornly resisted his plans. Even the Spanish ambassador, who had believed Bourbon’s assurances to Philip II three months before that Henri “would go to mass within a few days” of his separation from his mother,49 was forced to admit that this object was not to be obtained so easily.50 In fact, the boy remained so faithful to the promises he had made earlier to Jeanne (a steadfastness she later attributed neither to her threats nor to “his wisdom, strength or constancy,” but to the inspiration of God alone)51 that his father finally threatened to whip him if he continued to refuse to comply. So to his mother’s use of guilt and filial obligation, Antoine added fear of punishment to influence his son’s religion.

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Only in the face of such extreme pressure did Henri’s resistence gradually break down, though the process took almost four months. He finally submitted, however, and on 1 June at his investiture with the Catholic Ordre de Saint-Michel at the royal chapel of Vincennes, he swore publicly to protect the ancient Roman faith with his young life. Shortly thereafter, he was enrolled by his victorious father in the Collège de Navarre to be trained beside two other Henris – the younger Guise and the duc d’Anjou (later Henri III) – as a proper French Catholic prince of the blood.52 Inexplicably, Antoine did not force his son to receive confirmation at this time, whereby the believer avows his understanding of Catholic doctrine. Perhaps this was because the prince was considered to be still too young for such a mature expression of faith, or perhaps it was because he continued to resist his father’s authority. It is also possible that since Antoine himself was so inconsistent in his commitments, the thought of confirming his son in the ancient faith never crossed his mind. Yet Henri’s initial reunion with Catholicism was destined to be short-lived thanks to the death of his father a few months later from wounds received at the siege of Calvinist-held Rouen in the first major campaign of the religious-civil wars. Vacillating to the end, Antoine had Calvinist religious works read to him while languishing on his sickbed. He even swore almost with his last breath that, if he lived, he would embrace the confession of Augsburg and sponsor its spread,53 but to no avail. He died of fever on 17 November at the age of only forty-four. With his mother’s absence continuing, Henri now fell under the authority of Catherine de Medici, who held him at court for the next four years. During that time he was the object of an extended power struggle between Jeanne d’Albret, who sought repeatedly to secure his release and return to her side in the Huguenot south of France, and the wily queen mother, who used him to further royal Catholic interests. In fact, Catherine’s role in Henri’s early religious formation is fascinating, representing a third powerful influence on the boy in addition to the impulses of his parents, one shaped by expediency. Given her control over Henri, one might have expected the queen mother to continue his upbringing as a Catholic and possibly even to have him confirmed in the faith at the appropriate time. But she did not. Instead, she released Henri from regular attendance at mass and permitted him to hear Calvinist sermons privately in his chambers. Furthermore, she returned the general direction of his education to the prince’s exiled mother and reappointed his former Huguenot teachers and retainers to their original functions.54 In view of these changes, no one was surprised when the nine-year-old prince of Navarre soon

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reconciled with his mother’s faith, his third “conversion” to date. Finally, Catherine de Medici conferred on her young ward his late father’s numerous official titles of lieutenant-general of the kingdom, governor and admiral of Guyenne, and captain of a company of 100 lances.55 In late February or early March 1563, Jeanne d’Albret wrote to Catherine to thank her for this apparent good favour and “for the continual remembrance you are kind enough to have of me and mine ... and your desire to further my son’s welfare and my own.” “I have known you for so long a time, Madame,” added Jeanne with calculated humility, “that I never would doubt it.”56 Her obsequious tone notwithstanding, the queen of Navarre clearly understood that Catherine’s reversal of Antoine de Bourbon’s intentions regarding Henri’s religious profession was not motivated by any feelings of generosity or even toleration, but by political utility. Put simply, the queen mother intuited that at this point a Calvinist prince of Navarre was far more valuable to her as a counter than a Catholic one in her ongoing efforts to keep the Valois Crown’s political opponents divided and thus reduce them to inaction, if not impotence. For this reason, at the same time that Catherine permitted Henri to return to his former Calvinist affiliations, she had him sign a formal protest in January 1563 against the invasion of France by a Protestant German mercenary army under the command of Louis de Condé, Henri’s paternal uncle and the Huguenot protector. Although still very young, Navarre carried enormous prestige as the new first prince of the blood (a status inherited from his late father), the lieutenantgeneral of the kingdom, the royal governor of Guyenne, the senior member of the House of Bourbon, and, finally, the leading Huguenot after his mother and Condé. By manipulating Henri in this way, to take advantage of his high social rank and especially his Calvinist religious profession, the queen mother was able to throw the leadership of the Huguenot party off balance and thus prevent it from opposing the Crown effectively. Furthermore, with the conclusion of peace in March 1563 by the Edict of Amboise, which ended the first civil war, she possessed in Henri an ideal guarantee – at least in the short term – against the renewal of armed conflict with the militant French Calvinists. The young prince’s custody at court placed Jeanne d’Albret in a very difficult position. Already uncertain about the Huguenot army’s ability to protect her widespread patchwork of domains in the south of France, the Calvinist queen of Navarre also recognized that so long as her son remained a political pawn in the queen mother’s hands, she herself was vulnerable and therefore powerless to take a more active

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role in the civil-religious disputes. To be sure, she vigorously protested against Henri’s continuing detention and manipulation for Catholic ends,57 but beyond that Jeanne could do nothing. Besides, like any other great noble of the day, “she was concerned at all times to maintain a workable relationship with the Crown.”58 Her only real option was to maintain the careful “policy of disengagement” from all factions, a policy she had adopted after her banishment from the court the previous year. She thereby sustained reasonably amicable relations with the king and queen mother and avoided throwing herself openly behind Condé and the other militant French Calvinists. Above all else, Jeanne did not want to jeopardize her captive son’s position at court or expose his future inheritance of Béarn to royal Catholic attack and possible devastation. This might have been the result had she not remained officially “neutral.”59 But Catherine de Medici’s control over her youthful charge was broken in January 1567, when the prince of Navarre and his mother (who had rejoined him at court the previous year with royal permission) successfully escaped to Béarn. Up to that point, Henri’s contact with Jeanne had been intermittent, confined chiefly to an occasional exchange of letters, few of which have survived. Mother and son met face-to-face on two occasions, however, during Charles IX’s extended tour of France from March 1564 to May 1566. Catherine de Medici had orchestrated the tour to inspire popular loyalty to the Valois king and thereby promote peace and unity in the realm. Their first meeting occurred when the queen of Navarre, accompanied by eight Calvinist ministers and three hundred horsemen, joined a scandalized Catholic court at Mâcon in July 1564. This was a calculated act; a sectarian slap in the face that only deepened the antagonism between the two religious and political factions. Continuing with the royal cortège as far as Lyon and Crémieu, Jeanne – whose presence was a persistent source of embarrassment and religious friction – asked the queen mother for permission to return to Béarn with her son. Her request was denied categorically, though to soften the blow the Calvinist queen was awarded a “gratification” of 150,000 livres. Then she was ordered to withdraw from the court to her late husband’s seat at Vendôme, while Henri continued with the procession. The second encounter between the prince and his mother came a year later at Nérac, Jeanne’s favourite residence and the capital of her duchy of Albret. This meeting occurred shortly after the court had visited the Franco-Spanish frontier where the Princess Elizabeth was entrusted to the representatives of her future husband, Philip II. This time Catherine de Medici permitted Henri to remain with his mother for several months while the court continued northward to the Loire

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Valley. Jeanne used the opportunity not only to show her son their lands of La Flèche and Vendômois, but also to introduce the boy to the leaders of the Huguenot party at Cognac, including his uncle Louis de Condé. Only on 7 December 1565 did she and Henri finally rejoin the Valois king and the queen mother at Blois, returning with them to Paris on 1 May 1566. Once again there was friction between the Catholic court and the Calvinist queen of Navarre, but this time a more subdued Jeanne bore the pressures of her position in silence and assiduously avoided an open breach with her royal hosts that might have resulted in another banishment and renewed separation from her son. Meanwhile, she searched for an opportunity to escape with Henri from Paris to the comparative security of her domains across the Garonne River before a fresh outbreak of “troubles” might make their flight impossible. This scheme, according to Palma Cayet, “had been her principal objective in going to court” the previous year.60 Just such an opportunity came about as a result of the recent royal confirmation of Henri’s claims to his late father’s lands and titles. Thanks to her appearance of complacency, Jeanne successfully petitioned the Crown for permission to take her son on a tour of his estates in Picardy in autumn 1566. Moreover, because she and Henri returned faithfully from that first excursion after an absence lasting several weeks, Charles IX and Catherine de Medici permitted them to make a similar visit to the young prince’s domains of Vendôme, Beaumont, Saincte Suzanne, and La Flèche in the new year. Perhaps they were lulled into believing that Jeanne d’Albret’s submission to their authority was sincere. Certainly, they were distracted by the dangers implicit in the escalating violence in the Spanish Netherlands (where Philip II had just sent troops) and by recent papal criticism of royal French religious policy. Hence, neither the Valois king nor his usually acute mother became aware of Jeanne’s real designs until it was too late. This enabled the queen of Navarre and her son to leave Paris unopposed toward the end of January 1567, riding first to Poitou and thence farther south into Gascony. Their escape was followed immediately by the flight of the two other principal Huguenot leaders, Louis de Condé and Gaspard de Coligny (1519–72), the widely respected amiral de France, who had also joined the court the year before.

r eligion, politic s, a n d t h e p r in c e ly pupil, 1567–1572 Henri’s apprenticeship as the future Huguenot chef de parti now began in earnest under Jeanne’s careful direction. Although many

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moralists of the age “insisted on the essential role of the mother, who provided the initial moral nourishment” to her children, they also claimed that her influence had to be replaced by paternal authority after the age of seven.61 In Henri’s case, this was impossible. Antoine de Bourbon had not been a prominent figure in his son’s life, except during the few months they had spent together at the Valois court in 1562, and the prince’s death later that year had cut short even that brief association. As a result, now more than ever before, the full burden of Henri’s academic, political, and religious instruction – his “moral nourishment” – fell directly onto Jeanne’s shoulders. It was she alone, therefore, who forged her son’s early character, helping him to become a man who would know how, once maturity and means permitted, to place himself (she wrote) “at the service of God, of his King and of his blood.”62 Hitherto, the young prince’s formal education had followed the customary lines. At the Collège de Navarre, which he attended for about two years, he had been instructed in the belles lettres, including grammar, classical Latin, ancient history, and literature. The broad outlines of his schooling did not change significantly after c. 1564, when he was restored to the tutelage of La Gaucherie and Palma Cayet, but for a shift in emphasis; his instruction at this time expanded from the merely academic to moral and religious training as well, doubtless at his mother’s insistence. Dispensing with more conventional methods of instruction, La Gaucherie gave Henri selected Greek sentences to learn by rote “without either reading or writing.” Examples are “A sovereign who loves flattery and fears truth has only slaves around his throne” and “Happy are kings who have true friends; unfortunate are those who have only favourites.”63 The prince was required to repeat these phrases over and over again to Palma Cayet until he gradually understood their meaning, “just as we learn our mother tongue.”64 La Gaucherie’s objective here was clear: to prepare the young prince for his future royal role as king of Navarre by illustrating through these Greek passages the moral qualities of generosity, compassion, justice, and hatred of empty flattery that distinguished good monarchy from bad.65 Henri, however, seems to have preferred and remembered longest the more spirited, martial phrases he also had to memorize, such as “Victory or Death!” and “Sedition must be cast from the city!”66 These reflected his developing character as a man of action. At the same time, La Gaucherie saw to the boy’s initial military training, both theoretical and practical, which was an essential part of the education of any noble youth of his day. Henri read Vegetius and translated portions of Julius Caesar as schoolboy exercises, the written

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works of these two Roman authors still considered to form “the baggage of a military future” in sixteenth-century France.67 He also studied closely the Commentaries of his older contemporary Blaise de Montluc, which he later called “the Bible of warriors.” In addition to these more conventional works, the young prince read a number of romances in the tradition of the medieval chansons de geste, such as the fifteenth-century Amadis de Gaul (his favourite), which, though not strictly military in theme, were certainly complementary to his other studies. They reinforced the moral lessons of his Greek and Latin exercises with an enduring code of chivalry that still had significance for the age. How far this ancient martial ethic guided Henri’s later behaviour as an adult and as the eventual king of France is difficult to say. But that it contributed to the basic humanity, generosity, and sense of monarchical responsibility evident in so many of his subsequent actions, especially in war, is more than likely. Meanwhile, the practical aspects of his soldierly training were not forgotten. Henri learned to ride well, and he participated in various physical sports. He also excelled in the exercise of arms, for which he drilled with the pike, sword, and arquebus under the direction of M. de La Coste, a former lieutenant of the royal guards, into whose care he had been entrusted by his tutor. Perhaps the most fundamental part of the Bourbon prince’s early education, however, was the resumption of his religious instruction under La Gaucherie. Building upon foundations already well established by Jeanne d’Albret, the Huguenot tutor began inculcating into his royal pupil the principles essential to Calvinism. Though once again precise details are scant, the core of La Gaucherie’s lessons doubtless consisted of the sinfulness of man and his relationship with God, the meaning of the sacraments, the doctrines of predestination and justification by faith, the source of contrition, and so on. This education slowly transformed Henri’s hitherto early ingenuous adherence to the Reformed Religion into a strong personal conviction and firm belief in Calvinist religious tenets that reached beyond a faith inspired by mere filial devotion to Jeanne d’Albret or by feelings of obligation or guilt, or beyond simple ritual practice. In particular, La Gaucherie imbued the prince with a reverent respect for an omnipresent God in accordance with the doctrines of John Calvin. As one modern biographer observes, Henri was affected profoundly by this training, and throughout his life his correspondence revealed a providential view of the mysterious workings in the world of an everpresent divine will behind all of his exploits.68 It was also La Gaucherie who trained the boy to avoid using the Lord’s name in vain, as the Catholic royal princes frequently did, by substituting

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“Ventre-de-Saint-Gris” instead. This was a habit Henri never lost, and when combined with the depth and scope of his indoctrination, it indicates a religious determinism far more profound than the simple matter of not blaspheming. Thus, in 1566 when Jeanne d’Albret rejoined the court, she had every reason to be delighted with the progress made in the prince’s religious instruction. As she wrote at the time, “Miraculously, my son has been preserved in the purity of his religion amid so many assaults [on it].”69 She found that Henri (now thirteen years old) had been well versed in the essentials of his faith, and gave his tutor full credit for having planted in him “this root of piety ... for which I thank God.”70 This was powerful language, befitting her acknowledgment of the kind of rational, providential view of God and his servants that had been inculcated into her son. Yet despite four years of separation, it is also clear from existing evidence that the Bourbon prince’s training under La Gaucherie had been directed at long distance by the Calvinist queen of Navarre. Apparently, Henri’s tutor was given a free hand only in the boy’s academic training, the results of which Jeanne found generally disappointing. In fact, she disapproved strongly of La Gaucherie’s unorthodox teaching methods and complained in 1566 that in the seven years Henri spent under La Gaucherie’s tutelage, he had acquired hardly “a foundation in the rudiments.”71 Thus, when the old tutor died that year, she carefully replaced him with Jean-Baptiste Morely, a noted if highly controversial Huguenot thinker, who taught “my son so well and with such learning ... [that] he has acquired more in three or four months in Morely’s hands” than in all the time spent with the late La Gaucherie.72 As for the Bourbon prince’s moral and religious instruction, he had been taught in complete accordance with Jeanne’s wishes. She had even contributed directly, sending her son the works of classical Greek and Roman authors, such as Plutarch, to read for their moral lessons (“when,” Henri later recalled, “I was scarcely weaned”), and with good result. Many years after, he still referred to that ancient Greek writer as “my first teacher” and “a conscience to me ever since,” who “has whispered in my ear much good advice, both for myself and for the conduct of the government.”73 Jeanne periodically also sent the prince Calvinist religious works, as did other members of her entourage, which had a similar strong effect. In 1565, for example, he wrote to his mother asking her to thank madame de Tignonville (his sister Catherine’s governess) for the gift of just such a book. “[A]lthough I cannot use it now,” he added pointedly, “such artillery would frighten the Romans [i.e., Catholics] here.”74 So along with his Calvinist religious

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instruction, it is evident that Henri also was imbibing the increasingly sectarian language of Jeanne d’Albret and her fellow Huguenots. Following their flight from the court in 1567, the queen continued her personal direction of the prince’s formal education and once more surrounded him with staunchly Calvinist tutors. She also added a practical element to his training as the future king of Navarre and a Huguenot leader, imbuing him with a profound respect (in her own words) for “the service of God, the [Crown], and the goodwill of his own subjects and followers.”75 “She wished him to grow up, as she put it, `in the respect and loyalty he owed to the [Valois] king and his own position.’”76 Thus, in 1568 she dismissed Morely as Henri’s tutor, as his theological tracts had created too much controversy among mainstream Calvinist luminaries for even her to protect him any longer. In his place she appointed the equally talented but theologically conservative Florent Chrestien, whom Palma Cayet described as “an old servant of the House of Vendôme [i.e., Bourbon] ... well versed in all the belles lettres and poetry.”77 Jeanne also supervised carefully her son’s ongoing instruction in his Calvinist faith and was pleased with the results. “Since he has been at my side,” she wrote the vicomte de Gourdon on 1 September 1568, “[Henri] has been well instructed in the [Reformed] Religion and shows himself to be a champion of [religious] truth.”78 Nor was the queen alone in her appraisal. In his Relatzione of 1569, the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Carrero, described Henri in similar terms as “a young man full of wit, very carefully brought up in the new religion of his mother.” He then added significantly, perhaps looking forward to the prince’s future role in France as a key Huguenot leader, that “the general opinion [among French Catholics] is that he will become the scourge of our times unless God applies some remedy.”79 At the same time, however, Jeanne was careful not to restrict her son’s movements too closely as he entered puberty. On the contrary, she allowed Henri freedom enough “so that he could enjoy the pleasures natural to his age,” such as gambling, dancing, eating, and drinking – the usual pastimes of a young gallant – of which most Calvinist contemporaries disapproved. She might even have turned a blind eye to his first sexual experiences, for at age fourteen he was already showing those personal attributes that women later found so attractive in his adulthood. “Though his hair be a little red,” observed a contemporary in 1567, “the ladies do not think him the less agreeable for that. His face is finely shaped, his nose neither too long nor too small, his eyes full of sweetness, his skin brown but very clear and his whole mien animated with an uncommon vivacity so that if he is not well with the ladies he is very unfortunate.”80

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Although there is no clear evidence on this subject, in broad terms it appears that Jeanne also counselled Henri to regard women as pleasurable distractions without allowing them to influence policy decisions or to become so compelling as to draw him into the youthful profligacy that she felt was damaging the character of his first cousin, Henri de Condé (1552–88).81 After all, she was ever conscious of the fact that she was training a future king who had to learn how to bridle his passions to the sacred responsibilities of his position. Henri’s casual attitude toward women in his adult life might thus have reflected his mother’s tutelage. In any case, such counsel was all part of her care to ensure that these “budding passions of her son” did not become excessive or damaging to his developing character.82 In addition to the academic and religious aspects of his education after 1567, Jeanne d’Albret personally guided her son’s apprenticeship in the world of politics and war to prepare him for his eventual responsibilities as monarch and Huguenot leader. Not only did she take him on extensive travels throughout Béarn in 1567 and 1568, when the second civil war was being waged to the north in France, but she also assigned him some important independent tasks to perform as her representative. She sent him, for example, to pacify a small uprising in February 1568 in Basse-Navarre, where some of her Catholic subjects, against whom she was “using extreme rigour,”83 had rebelled against recent edicts that sharply limited their ancient form of worship. Then, two years later, in 1571, he quelled a Calvinist revolt in the same region that had erupted against the unequal application of the terms of the peace treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (signed on 8 August 1570), which had ended the third civil war begun in September 1568.84 The uprising had threatened to reignite the conflict in the south of France, which the queen of Navarre could ill afford. Both of these duties he carried out successfully. Furthermore, Jeanne carefully explained her policies to the prince. She told him that “he could learn from history how little respect was accorded to kings whose lack of learning and knowledge of their people kept them from being able to do their duty ... and she taught him to distinguish in every party and in both religions those who were really in earnest about the service of God and the [French] king.”85 The Calvinist queen also involved her son in all of her dealings with the Valois Crown after 1568. She similarly instructed her key advisers, such as the vicomte de Gourdon, to include Henri in their frequent councils “of doctrine and of war” so that he might be educated in these areas by men of experience.86 One historian has argued that the care Jeanne d’Albret took with the details of her son’s educational program, suggests that her rela-

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tionship with Henri was rather formal and lacked any genuine élan of affection, being cast in the mould of the eventual succession to the Crown of Navarre.87 While it is true that Jeanne never lost sight of the fact that she was training a future monarch and a leader for the Huguenot cause in France, and while it is equally true that “Henri was accustomed to obeying her,”88 much evidence exists to show that mother and son shared a warm personal relationship, too. There is, for example, a series of letters that reveals the genuine affection between them. Their contents range from Henri’s concerned enquiries for his mother’s safety and well-being on her journey south in 1562, following her banishment from the Valois court,89 to Jeanne’s expression of interest in the number and gender of the puppies born to Pistolle, her son’s pet dog,90 to her motherly admonitions about his love life,91 and to her instructions as to how he ought to wear his hair, dress, and carry himself on his arrival in Paris for his wedding in 1572.92 “I must confess,” wrote Jeanne sadly to the prince from Blois that January, while still negotiating the terms of the royal match, “that your absence robs me of half my joy.”93 In later years, Henri reminisced just as lovingly about “my good mother, to whom I owe everything, and who supervised my upbringing with such care and affection.” “[She] used to say,” he recalled playfully of his education, “that she did not want a son who was an illustrious ignoramus”94 – an unfavourable allusion, perhaps, to her late husband, Antoine. Indeed, it was as a tribute to Jeanne’s memory that Henri instructed the governess of his own son, the future Louis XIII, to take the same “spare the rod, spoil the child” approach to child-rearing, “for I know well, from my own experience, that there is nothing that can do him more good. When I was his age I was severely punished, by the command of the world’s best mother.”95 What these glimpses into their private family life reveal is a closeness between Jeanne and Henri in his formative years that generally is concealed by the frequently impenetrable formality of sixteenth-century French noble society. Furthermore, this affection between them helps to explain much about the way in which the young prince’s own personality developed. From this mélange of formal academic and religious training, maternal supervision, and perhaps even the long period of semi-independence at the Valois court during the four years of Jeanne’s exile in the south, there began to emerge a young man capable of seizing initiatives and of expressing his own views without prompting from his mother. Two of Henri’s modern biographers note that in subduing the insurrections in Basse-Navarre he already was developing the personal style that would later become famous – a style that combined charm, cajolery, appeals to personal fidelity, magna-

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nimity, and so on to tame the rebels.96 At the same time, he was developing a keen awareness of his place and political position in France, as a stunned royal envoy, Bertrand de La Mothe-Fénélon, discovered in September 1568, when he was berated vigorously by the adolescent prince in Jeanne’s presence before she herself spoke in reprimand of the royal agent. Up to that point, the Calvinist queen recalled later, “I believed that [the envoy] thought my son so young and ill informed that he was present without knowing why.”97 That Jeanne d’Albret was conscious of, and pleased with, the prince’s growing maturity is evident from her memoirs. In these she protested explicitly that when she and her son joined Louis de Condé at the outbreak of the third civil war earlier the same month, Henri “did not come to this cause as a child led by his mother; but that his own will and nature were joined to mine by the knowledge he had of its merits.”98 Thus, when the young prince marched with the Huguenot forces on his first campaign a few weeks later, there were no tears but “only smiles in [the] eyes” of mother and son at their parting, as Jeanne consecrated Henri to “such an excellent enterprise.”99 Clearly, then, there was sufficient maternal affection to allow the young Bourbon prince to develop the kind of confidence of ego necessary to start forming some tentative conclusions of his own and to seize on occasion initiatives of which his mother approved. What is more, that growing sense of self-confidence was noted by other contemporaries as well, such as a parlementaire of Bordeaux who wrote in 1567: We have here the prince of Béarn; it must be confessed that he is a charming youth. At thirteen years of age, he has all the more mature qualities of eighteen or nineteen; he is agreeable, polite, obliging and behaves toward everyone with an air so easy and engaging that wherever he is there is always a crowd. He mixes in conversation like a wise and prudent man, speaks always to the purpose, and when it turns out that the court is the subject of discourse it is easy to see that he is perfectly acquainted with it, and he never says more or less than he ought, in whatever place he is.100

As David Buisseret observes, “we can surely see here the man emerging from the child.”101 To her credit, then, Jeanne d’Albret was nurturing character traits in her son that were already showing signs of becoming self-sustaining. This again suggests a far stronger personal bond between them than a mere formal relationship. Subsequently, the course of events intruded upon this closeness between mother and son. With the outbreak of renewed civil war in early September 1568, they quit Béarn for the relative safety of

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Huguenot La Rochelle to avoid becoming politically isolated in the south of France. There, their position would have been endangered by lingering popular unrest over the queen’s recent prohibition of Catholic worship in Béarn, combined with impending French royal hostility and the menacing proximity of Spain. Jeanne also genuinely feared that if she and Henri remained either at Nérac or Pau, her capital of Navarre, the Catholic inhabitants “would assuredly make [the prince] change his religion, at least externally.” “For this reason in particular,” observed the Calvinist François de La Noue, “she had no difficulty abandoning her domains to the enemy.”102 Evidently, Queen Jeanne anticipated renewed attempts on the part of the Valois Crown to seize Henri and force him to abjure his faith. That would have harmed the Huguenot position by robbing the party at a single blow of the critical support both of the senior prince of the blood after the Valois brothers and of their future protector, for which role Henri was being prepared under his mother’s watchful eye. Hence, she did more than remove the young prince from harm’s way; she also identified him strongly with the Calvinist cause by publicly dedicating him “to defend the religion that she followed, and to avenge the honour of the princes of the blood among whom he held the first rank.”103 At the same time, Henri’s training as the future battlefield commander of the Huguenots began in earnest under the competent direction of his uncle, Louis de Condé, and Gaspard de Coligny, who shared the political and military leadership of the French Calvinist party. It was “under [their] guidance and in the school of [their] prudence and valor,” wrote Jeanne d’Albret expectantly, that “[the young prince] would learn the craft to which God had called him.”104 Henri’s early identification with the Calvinist cause as its prospective leader at this juncture was not merely advantageous, but crucial to Huguenot strength and survival on legal, military, and theological grounds. One Calvinist contemporary even referred to him at this early date as being “the principal support of those of the [Reformed] Religion.”105 Only when royal blood was associated with rebellion could political opposition to the Crown achieve a measure of legitimacy. Such legitimacy justified subjects of the Crown in taking up arms once civil war had begun and protected the rebels from the harsh rigours of royal justice once peace had been restored. This was because the sanctity of royal blood and the traditional political independence of noblemen could combine to place a prince, such as Henri de Navarre (or Louis de Condé, for that matter), beyond the clutches of royal law. But perhaps even more important than this to the Huguenots was that the young Bourbon prince’s nominal leadership, coupled with

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Condé’s, provided the principal moral justification for their armed resistance to what they perceived as unjust royal Catholic repression. According to John Calvin’s theology, if rebellion against the Crown were led by a prince of the blood or another of God’s designated magistrates, it became a legitimate corrective device against the excesses of a wilful monarch who ignored his own sacred obligations. This was a theological version of the prevailing secular view of the prince of the blood as “one of the guardians of the laws of France,” whose “natural duty” was “to defend [French] subjects when someone wants to oppress them with violence, to resist that person with the force of arms that God places in his hands for that purpose, and by this means to preserve the laws and edicts of the Kingdom.”106 The Calvinist party would be preserved, therefore, from both legal and spiritual censure. For these reasons, the Huguenots had earnestly sought the protection of a prince of the blood even before the outbreak of civil-religious war in 1562. Initially, they had approached Antoine de Bourbon, though these efforts soon had proved fruitless. Not only had Antoine’s private behaviour “scandalized the [Reformed] Church, but, what is more, [he had] declared himself the leader and protector of those whose hands are bloody with the blood of the children of God.”107 Consequently, they had turned to his younger brother, Louis de Condé, an openly confessed Calvinist and thus far more receptive to Huguenot appeals. Some contemporaries suspected, however, that Condé’s commitment to the Calvinist cause was due less to sincerity of belief than to rumours of a Huguenot promise “to give him 100,000 écus per year.”108 Whatever the case, perhaps as early as 1560, but certainly by 1562, he had become their “King David”109 – recognized as the protector of the Reformed Religion in France and as a vigorous enemy of the newly formed ultra-Catholic triumvirate of Guise, Montmorency, and Antoine.110 But the advantages Henri de Navarre could bring to the leadership of the Calvinist party were greater still than those afforded by Condé, even if his role were confined to that of figurehead. Henri possessed two fundamental qualities that his uncle lacked. First, his ability to protect the rebellious Huguenots from royal law was superior to Condé’s by the simple fact of his being heir to the crown of Navarre. Second, as first prince of the blood and head of the senior branch of the House of Bourbon, Henri automatically outranked his uncle in the line of succession to the French throne, affording him additional prestige in the hierarchically structured society of the age.111 Thus, even more effectively than Condé, the younger Bourbon prince could safeguard the Huguenot party’s continued unity and uniformity of

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command. He possessed to a greater degree than Condé those special qualities of royal birth and exalted social rank that alone could bridle the independence of high-spirited Calvinist nobles and guarantee obedience to commands issued in his name.112 These qualities also endowed him with the freedom to negotiate on his own authority with foreign princes for military aid, without reference to the French Crown. Although “he was very young,” his prestige “counted for very much.”113 It is not surprising, therefore, that when Henri and his mother joined the other Huguenot leaders at La Rochelle in September 1568 on the eve of the third civil war, many French Calvinists regarded the prince as their nominal commander-in-chief, above Condé, and as their “principal support,” even though he wielded no real authority. This was the conclusion of no less a personage than Théodore de Bèze, John Calvin’s successor at Geneva, who wrote of Henri de Navarre as “already head of our party.”114 Bèze believed, moreover, that on the basis of the boy’s lineage and titles alone, combined with the authority and expectations these advantages brought him, the greater part of “Aquitaine” undoubtedly would follow him.115 (Bèze meant by this the provinces in the southwest portion of France where the Huguenots were most numerous and the old Catholic nobility was still bound by ancient feudal ties to the Albrets.) Precisely because of these considerations, Louis de Condé agreed to share unofficially the leadership of the Huguenot party with his nephew at this early date,116 though Coligny remained his de facto cocommander. The Huguenot army was called thereafter the “Armée des Princes,” as Navarre and Condé “led” it together.117 In 1569, however, following the assassination of his uncle after the battle of Jarnac, Henri was officially proclaimed the Huguenot chef de parti. This declaration might have been premature, to be sure, considering the Bourbon prince’s youth and lack of experience, but it was necessary for the beleaguered Huguenots. Only by catapulting the now fifteenyear-old prince to the forefront of their party as its publicly acknowledged protector could they recover from the critical loss of Condé, an experienced prince of the blood who had led them for nine years, or restore morale to their defeated forces.118 Jeanne d’Albret was assuredly in no position to take the reins of authority into her own hands overtly. Although she was key in the religious and political decision-making of the party, warfare was ultimately the business of men. In fact, her gender was regarded by some contemporaries as a major handicap to her leadership during conditions of civil war, just as it was for Catherine de Medici, of whom, wrote the Venetian ambassador when listing the obstacles that had

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impeded her bid for the regency eight years before, “it is enough to say that she is a woman.”119 Jeanne had to be content, therefore, to guide her son from behind the scene during the present conflict. Her associate, Gaspard de Coligny, also was unqualified to assume overall command even though he had shared the military leadership of the cause equally with the murdered Condé. To be sure, the admiral was a conscientious leader, a talented and innovative soldier, and a widely respected man who enjoyed excellent family connections, related by blood to the powerful and numerous Montmorency clan. But he lacked the all-important royal blood, without which, noted Blaise de Montluc, he could not have lasted very long as Huguenot chef de parti. This left Henri as the only alternative, “though he was very young.”120 Striking swiftly, Queen Jeanne and Coligny immediately confirmed Henri’s supremacy in the party after its defeat at Jarnac. Gathering together the battered remnants of the Huguenot army, first at SaintJean-d’Angély and later at Cognac and La Rochelle, they presented the young prince to the troops as their new commander-in-chief “in the place and charge of the [dead] Prince de Condé, to the great contentment of the whole army.”121 After promising to defend the Reformed Religion with his life or until such time as Calvinist privileges were guaranteed in France (the first of many such public pledges), Henri received the troops’ oaths of loyalty and obedience as their new leader.122 Thereafter, he was present in Huguenot war councils and at the battles of Moncontour (October 1569) and Arnay-leduc (June 1570) as chef de parti. Obviously, Navarre was still too young to be anything but a figurehead at this time; nevertheless, his mother and the admiral, while exercising real control over Huguenot affairs, carefully maintained the appearance of Henri’s leadership. Acting ostensibly as regents, they issued orders, declarations, and so forth in his name, “by whose authority, as first prince of the blood, all things were governed and dispatched.”123 This pretense further allowed Jeanne d’Albret to continue guiding her son through the remainder of his political apprenticeship. It also permitted Coligny to buy valuable time during Huguenot negotiations with the court by alleging that he had to consult the prince of Navarre on every matter. Yet these advantages for the Calvinist party all hinged upon a single vital factor: the uninterrupted physical presence of Henri de Navarre among the Huguenots. Should he ever slip through their fingers into royal Catholic control, they would lose the many benefits that his active or even passive protection had to offer them. Hence, in 1569 the struggle to gain control over the young prince and his position on

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religion intensified anew. Jeanne d’Albret continued to identify her son with the Calvinist cause and to shape his political destiny as before, but now she imposed upon him an obligation of duty to the dead Condé. In other words, to maintain the twin principles of dynasty and faith that she had inculcated into Henri throughout his education, Jeanne now added the element of personal honour. That intangible, though nonetheless powerful, aspect of reputation in the warriornoble’s code of chivalry evoked the very highest moral values current in secular society and often tempered the harsh ethic of the age.124 To that end, she admonished her son in particular that “the late Monsieur your uncle has left you the memory of his Christian life [and] his honourable death in the service of his [divine] Protector, so that in emulating the zeal that he had for the glory of God, you will render yourself a worthy nephew of such an uncle.”125 Meanwhile, under Catherine de Medici’s careful guidance, the Valois Crown endeavoured to separate Henri from the Huguenots, as earlier it had to his father, Antoine de Bourbon. The goal was to capture and then convert him to Catholicism, or eliminate him altogether. Either way, the queen mother hoped to deal the Calvinist party a crushing blow that would divide its leadership, destroy its coveted theological-political legitimacy, and ruin both its internal unity and essential vitality. The political menace from the Calvinist quarter would thus be neutralized, while the spread of heresy in France might even be halted. In addition, a subsequent alliance between the Valois Crown and a solidly Catholic House of Bourbon would strengthen Catherine’s ebbing preponderance at court, where the Guise-led ultraCatholic faction was slowly regaining the upper hand in its bid to dominate royal policy. Consequently, during the next two years there were a number of royally directed, though unsuccessful, attempts to seize young Navarre from the Huguenots. These included at least one plot against his life in 1570. But with the repeated failure of the Crown’s efforts to capture or eliminate the Bourbon prince, Catherine de Medici fixed upon a plan to draw him to the court with an offer of marriage to her daughter, Marguerite. After the wedding he could be induced under force, if necessary, to abjure his Calvinist faith. According to well-placed contemporaries of both religions, and Catherine herself, it was with this objective in mind that Charles IX and the queen mother tendered a proposal to the Huguenot leaders at the first available opportunity, in February 1571.126 The timing seemed to favour Catherine’s purpose. Although such a marriage had been suggested as far back as 1556 by Henri II and Antoine de Bourbon, the queen mother renewed the offer the year

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after the treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye had been signed, on the pretext of cementing the recent peace.127 But the new proposal was received unenthusiastically by Jeanne d’Albret. She both suspected the real motives behind this sudden gesture of goodwill by an old enemy and feared its consequences for her son and for French Calvinism. Also, Coligny, his brother in England, the cardinal de Châtillon, and some other Huguenot leaders were trying at the time to arrange a match between Henri de Navarre and Elizabeth I, or at least with one of the English queen’s cousins. That, according to La Mothe-Fénélon, would make Navarre “the richest subject in Europe.”128 Jeanne’s initial response to Catherine’s proposal was therefore evasive. She claimed that she first had to consult with Calvinist theologians before a definitive answer could be given either way.129 With that inauspicious beginning, the negotiations for the royal match proceeded very slowly over the next thirteen months, until their conclusion in April 1572. The long duration was due to procrastination and obstruction by both parties involved because of their conflicting interests, especially with regard to Henri, who remained obediently in Béarn on his mother’s orders. The chief point of friction lay between the Catholic Crown’s need to obtain control over the Bourbon prince, and consequently over his religious stance, and the queen of Navarre’s determination to preserve her son’s Calvinism and close association with the Huguenots. Because she recognized that Catherine de Medici’s primary objective was to obtain power over Henri in order to separate him from the French Calvinists, and by this means force him back into the Catholic fold,130 Jeanne steadfastly resisted all royal pressure to summon him to court until a treaty of marriage favourable to his religion had been concluded. She also left her chief counsellors in Béarn so that, should anything happen to her, her son would be surrounded by experienced men who would advise and protect him while continuing her policies. Furthermore, because Jeanne regarded “this affair ... [as being] of such importance to worry me,”131 she initially stalled the talks, at first by refusing to negotiate with the Crown except through a third party and subsequently by contesting in detail every item that potentially threatened Henri’s religion or security. These tactics greatly annoyed the impatient queen mother, who had hoped to reach an agreement by early 1572.132 For good measure, Jeanne also managed to have withdrawn from the court the other major Calvinist Bourbon prince and possible target for Valois schemes, Henri de Condé (the eldest son and heir of the late Prince Louis), on the pretext that his cousin, Navarre, wanted “to take him on a tour of Béarn.”133

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Catherine was undaunted by her rival’s resistance, however, and continued to insist that Henri be brought to court “even before the termination [of the talks].” This, she told Jeanne repeatedly, depended on the prince’s presence and involvement “because he is so sensible.”134 “[But] I am not of that opinion [that he should be brought to court],” wrote a sceptical queen of Navarre, who confessed further that “the more things I see here, the more fear I have of his coming.”135 To overcome Jeanne’s stubborness and attain her ends, Catherine played a game of cat and mouse with the Calvinist queen. She isolated her from all contact with sympathetic persons during the negotiations; she mocked or scolded Jeanne by turns in allegedly private discussions that took place in very public settings or at inconvenient times; and she threw additional obstacles into the talks, such as changing the list of royal terms from one day to the next, to keep her Calvinist adversary off balance.136 Consequently, Jeanne had solid grounds to complain irritably to Henri in her turn that “nothing moves forward,” however much she protested that “I have all the patience in the world.”137 A second reason for the long delay in completing the negotiations was that Catherine had to contend with opposition to the proposed royal marriage among some of the most powerful members of the Valois court. They included Charles cardinal de Bourbon (1523–90), Henri de Navarre’s other paternal uncle and godfather, who had assisted at his baptism. To these people, any act should be resisted that confirmed in a constitutional or legal way the various concessions and privileges granted to the Huguenot minority by the Edict of January. Moreover, they were anxious about reports of Coligny’s plans to encourage the Valois Crown to lend active support to the Calvinist Dutch insurgents in their rebellion against Catholic Spain. To circumvent this resistance, both Catherine and Charles IX appealed directly to the religious authority of Pope Pius V (1565–72) to obtain dispensation for the match. His Holiness was fully aware that the French king’s and the queen mother’s ultimate goal in arranging the marriage was to return Navarre to the Roman religion.138 Yet he also recognized that the religious problems that might arise from a political union of the two faiths, problems they seemed to be ignoring, could not be shrugged aside. This point was argued vigorously by his nuncio in France, Salviatti.139 Hence, Pius saw the wedding, coupled with the Edict of January, as a blow to the final triumph of Catholic orthodoxy over the French reform movement. This was something he could not allow.140 Thus, without actually refusing to comply, the pontiff deliberately delayed his reply to Catherine’s and Charles’ request, though he personally believed that

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the proposed marriage “never will be consummated because it is contrary to the honour of God.”141 The queen mother, not to be put off, boldly threatened schism if Rome remained stubborn.142 Meanwhile, she split the opposition at the French court by persuading a reluctant cardinal de Bourbon with “prayers, cajolery, remonstrances and commands of his Majesty” to agree to perform the wedding ceremony in anticipation of a papal dispensation, which, she assured him, the pope “would not refuse.”143 Outmanoeuvred, Pius seemed to have no choice but to yield before the determined queen mother, but he died on 1 May 1572, before he could send the approval that she wanted. The cardinal de Lorraine was thus dispatched immediately to Rome to participate in the election of a new pontiff who might be more willing to endorse the wedding between Marguerite and the Huguenot Navarre. On 11 April, the treaty of marriage was finally concluded, though Jeanne d’Albret still had serious misgivings. Some members of both sects hoped, perhaps naively, that the royal wedding, together with the peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, would end the civil-religious disputes in France. But the Calvinist queen was under no such delusions. In fact, two months before the agreement was reached, she wrote almost prophetically of her incessant prayers that “this marriage does not occur from [God’s] anger in order to punish us, but from His mercy for His glory and our repose.”144 Moreover, because she recognized that, despite the new treaty, the Catholic Crown would try still to separate her from her son and convert him following his nuptials, Jeanne took some last precautions to forestall that from happening. Specifically, she had Henri reswear his commitment to his Calvinist faith, not only to focus his personal convictions in his own mind by means of giving a solemn promise to his mother, just as he had done previously in 1562, but also to undercut in advance any royal plans for Henri’s conversion by making it appear publicly that his Calvinism was too strong to be subverted. After all, she noted, “you will broadcast on your arrival [in Paris] the opinion that everyone will have of you thereafter.”145 For precisely that reason, Jeanne had told her son in February to “have care of our religion,” adding that his actions even then were being observed.146 She had written about the same time to the sieur de Beauvoir, Henri’s old gouverneur, to instruct him “above all else to see to it that [the young prince] persists in piety, because here [at the Valois court] they do not believe it, and say that he will go to Mass and not put up obstacles as I do.”147 This statement should not be misinterpreted to mean that Henri’s Calvinist convictions were weak, though undoubtedly some people believed that, in view of his youth,

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past experiences, and father’s example, he could be made to abjure without too much difficulty. Certainly, this was an argument used by Charles IX in his attempt to obtain Pius V’s dispensation for the match.148 Rather, Jeanne was drawing comparisons to the depth of her own commitment to the Reformed Religion, which even contemporaries regarded as extraordinary among the Huguenots. As for Henri’s loyalty to the faith, which she had done so much to nurture, she felt no misgivings. Notwithstanding, she admonished her son in January 1572, seven months before his marriage, “to apply yourself to your devotions more than to your pleasure and above all to be careful, both for your duty and your examples, to hear sermons often and to pray every day, and to obey and believe M. de Beauvoir as you have always obediently done, and not to fail to hear some lessons from M. de Francourt, as you have promised me.”149 In a second letter written three months later, in April, her warning to Henri to be on his guard once he had arrived at court was even more specific: “My son, ... choose for yourself among all the allurements that [the king, the queen mother, and the court] will offer you to corrupt you, whether in your personal life or in your religion, in order to erect against them all an invincible steadfastness; ... I know that they make no effort to conceal this.”150 Clearly, Jeanne still feared for the future of Henri’s personal and religious integrity after his marriage to Marguerite, in spite of her many precautions. But her untimely death on 9 June prevented her from further shielding her son. It also removed the single most influential person in his life. For his part, Henri was still nothing more than a political pawn. He was excluded from any real participation in formulating policy for the Huguenot party or in decision-making. Indeed, despite his pivotal role in the marriage affair, he had no more control over the wedding arrangements than he had in the choice of his religion. He was simply expected to obey the decisions made by his mother and Coligny. Nevertheless, Henri was fully aware of the religious and political circumstances that surrounded his impending marriage to Marguerite, and understood the Crown’s designs to use the union to separate him from his creed and the Huguenots. These points had been made abundantly clear to him by his mother on more than one occasion. Hence, in response to Jeanne d’Albret’s repeated warnings, he offered her a solemn promise: “I have understood clearly by your letter that they want nothing better than to make me go to court, thinking to separate me from the [Reformed] religion and from you; but I assure you that whatever ambush they may prepare against me to this end, they will not succeed, for there was never a

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more obedient son to his mother than I am to you, and I am very sensible of the debt I owe you, not only for bringing me into the world but for all the pains you have taken for my welfare and advancement.”151 Subsequently, the Calvinist prince tried to fulfil his promise to his mother to remain uncorrupted in his personal faith. But not even she had foreseen the bloody developments that soon made his oath untenable.

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2 The Counterfeit Catholic, August 1572 to February 1576 “The king of Navarre attended [his instruction] against his will; his mind was elsewhere.” – Father Maldonato, S.J., 1572

The next three and a half years of Henri de Navarre’s life, from July 1572 to February 1576, were crucial to his continuing religious and political formation. With the death of Jeanne d’Albret, followed three months later, on 24 August, by the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre, the brutal slaying of the first generation of Huguenot leaders, the young prince – now king of Navarre – was deprived abruptly of the strong direction that had been given to his development up to that time. He also was isolated physically from the protection of the Calvinist party following the massacre in Paris, where he was held as a closely supervised captive at court until his successful escape in 1576. Because of these sudden changes in his circumstances, Navarre became responsible for his own actions and decisions for the first time in his life, and at eighteen years of age increasingly began to show that independence of personality, so carefully nurtured by his late mother, that would serve him well in his subsequent career. Thus, when he finally emerged from captivity, he was no longer the passive political and religious pawn he had been hitherto. He was becoming instead an active and resourceful leader in Huguenot and French affairs. His personal commitment to the Calvinist faith was still firm, though tempered now by the experience of the horror that religious fanaticism could produce, and his conception of his future political goals and policy was slowly taking shape. For the moment, however, with both his mother and father now dead, the young monarch was wholly on his own and unable to

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foresee the violent tribulations that soon were to engulf him in late summer 1572, but as these challenges mounted around him, he was able to draw upon the highly varied legacies of those two very different persons. In what ways Henri had been moulded by his late father is difficult to say. One modern historian speculates (and it is only speculation) that as a very young boy, the prince was marked indelibly by the influence of Antoine de Bourbon, whose exciting reputation for “military exploits and perpetually athletic lifestyle had no common measure with the severe intellectual discipline imposed by [Jeanne d’Albret].” Consequently, the first few months the boy spent with Antoine at court in 1562 “must have marked profoundly the memory of Prince Henri, just as the death of his father on 17 November the same year certainly shocked him.”1 Though paternal influences probably played some role in Henri’s own athleticism and military prowess of later years, he never personally acknowledged any legacy from his feckless and usually absentee father. This presents a sharp contrast to the deep love and appreciation he expressed frequently for Jeanne, whom he still revered as “the world’s best mother” as late as 1601. From Antoine de Bourbon the young Huguenot monarch most likely inherited the buoyant parts of his character: his sense of humour, his ability to turn a phrase or bon mot, his considerable charm, and, most important, his elasticity of spirit, which allowed him to withstand adversity and adapt to the changing fortunes of his career. In short, “he had nothing of his Father, except that easiness of Temper, which in Antony was Uncertainty and Weakness, but proved in Henry Benevolence and Good-nature.”2 These were the qualities that made Navarre likeable as a man and flexible as a monarch. From Jeanne d’Albret, on the other hand, he received more austere attributes, “and he improved ‘em eminently afterwards.”3 Emotionally a Bourbon, he was physically an Albret, inheriting from his mother’s line his high forehead, hawkish nose, long, narrow face, and deep-set eyes. In fact, without his beard the mature Henri easily could have passed for Jeanne’s younger brother. He seems also to have depended more upon the Albrets than the Bourbons for his intellectual make-up: his pragmatism, political acumen, patience, commitment to principle, and keen intelligence. These were the qualities that made Henri effective as a leader of men and the eventual king of France. It was with the crisis and aftermath of the massacre on Saint Bartholomew’s Day, 1572, that these varied legacies slowly fused to produce an extraordinarily competent and multifaceted prince.

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saint barth olomew ’s a n d it s a ft e r mat h , 1572–1573 How deeply Henri was affected by Jeanne d’Albret’s death can be surmised from both the fluctuations of his own health in the spring and early summer of 1572 and his dutiful obedience to her final wishes. At the beginning of April the young prince had fallen very ill with fever, though by 20 May he was judged well enough to begin the long journey northward from Béarn to Paris for his impending marriage to Marguerite. His progress was halted abruptly at Verteuil-sur-Charante on 12 June, however, where he learned that his mother had died of “pleuresy” (doubtless tuberculosis) just two days before. There is probably some truth as well to the maréchal de Tavanne’s observation that the Calvinist queen had succumbed “to anger, heat and apprehension in her subtle spirit.”4 In any case, so afflicted was Henri by the tragic news that in his grief he suffered a relapse of his own recent illness and was forced to interrupt his journey at the town of Chaunay for several days. Before resuming his route to the French capital, the new king of Navarre undertook to honour his dead mother’s last wishes, especially with regard to religion. In her will, Jeanne d’Albret had bound Henri to several solemn obligations. Primary was her dying command to “Monseigneur le Prince, her son, to live out the course of his life according to the instruction that God had done him the grace to give him by His word, and conform his morals to it without ever abandoning this divine league by the apostacies of voluptuous living and the ordinary corruptions of this world ... [and] to live virtuously and to banish all corrupt persons from his household, and to surround himself with pious persons who may show him the right path and protect him against scandal.” In death, just as in life, the late queen of Navarre was determined that her son’s personal commitment to his Calvinist faith and the Huguenot cause in France remain secure and apparent. At the same time, she commanded him “carefully, inviolably and point by point to have observed in the sovereign lands of Navarre and Béarn, the ecclesiastical ordinances that she had published hitherto, as well as the universal exercise of the [Reformed] Religion that is practised there presently, assuring him that if he honours God, God will honour him.” Finally, Jeanne enjoined Henri to protect his sister, Catherine, and her religion; to strengthen his “friendship” both with his Calvinist Bourbon cousins and Gaspard de Coligny, “the better to serve the honour and glory of God”; and to retain the services of such faithful servitors as the sieurs de Beauvoir, de Francourt, and de Béthut.5

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Always a dutiful son to his beloved mother, Henri acted immediately upon her instructions. In fact, the day after he had learned of Jeanne’s death, Navarre wrote to Bernard d’Arros, the late queen’s lieutenantgeneral in Béarn, to confirm him in office and to order him also to ensure that all proclamations and edicts formerly issued by Jeanne were observed to the letter. D’Arros was commanded explicitly by Henri “to put your hand above all to the implementation of the ecclesiastical ordinances [issued between 1563 and 1567], because the said queen, my mother, especially entrusted me with this in her will.”6 Recovering from his illnesses by mid-June, Navarre resumed his progress to Paris and at last entered the French capital on 10 or 12 July at the head of a very long procession. Two Catholic royal emissaries, the maréchal de Tavannes and Armand de Gontaud-Biron (a Huguenot sympathizer and future maréchal de France, but at that time grand-maître de l’artillerie), had been sent by the Valois Crown to attend him. Henri was accompanied in addition by three of his Calvinist first cousins: Henri de Condé, François de Conti, and Charles de Soissons. Coligny, the comte de La Rochefoucauld, and “all the principal leaders of the [Reformed] religion” rode with him, as well.7 Behind them followed an impressive retinue of more than eight hundred Huguenot gentlemen clad in deep mourning for the late queen of Navarre. Just over a month later, on 18 August, these men put aside their somber dress for more festive garb, better suited to the royal wedding of their young chef de parti. But the extended celebrations that followed the marriage ceremony at the cathedral of Nôtre-Dame were disrupted on 22 August by the attempted murder of Coligny, probably perpetrated by the Guises or their adherents. This in turn triggered the terrible Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre only two days later. Although the precise origins of the bloodshed will probably never be known, recent scholarship has attempted notwithstanding to probe the phenomenon of religious violence as a characteristic of early modern society in troubled times. Turning away from older, more conventional interpretations that focus chiefly upon the immediate political tensions that contributed to the massacre in 1572 and similar acts of popular killing during the religious upheavals in France, some historians have begun to look for longer-term causes. Blazing this new trail is Natalie Z. Davis’s now-classic argument about the ritualization of violence as a collective rite of purification that was rooted in the popular mentality. Such grass-roots violence was an extension of official modes of punishment and was used when traditional authorities seemed incapable of fulfilling their duties. Others, such as Janine Estèbe-Garrisson, Denis Crouzet, and Barbara Diefendorf, search for the origins of religious violence in other soci-

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etal or even psychological antecedents. To Estèbe-Garrisson, such extreme examples of bloodshed were extraordinary events, the product of frenzy, frustration, and a primitive paranoia deeply embedded in the mind of the people. In particular, she argues, the “procedures used by the killers of Saint Bartholomew’s Day came back from the dawn of time; the collective unconscious had buried them within itself, [and] they sprang up again in the month of August, 1572.”8 Denis Crouzet instead points to a prevailing climate of anguished prophecies of God’s impending judgment among French Catholics by mid-century, a climate created by clerics and soothsayers, such as the famous Nostradamus. Coupled with what he perceives as the “desacrilization” of an embattled and enfeebled Valois monarchy, this prompted Catholics to exact divine vengeance directly on the Huguenots as both a sacred act of national salvation and a pious expression of their fidelity to God. Hence, for Crouzet, religious violence was the clear result of eschatological fervour set inextricably within a prophetic, biblical, and apocalyptic context. In contrast to the others, Barbara Diefendorf confines her analysis to a shorter time span in which Saint Bartholomew’s was a consequence of growing tensions in French society – not just religious, but political, economic, and social, too. This created a mental framework that permitted the slaughter as an impassioned act of faith by a populace that believed itself to be executing the will of God and the king.9 Clearly, the origins of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day massacre are very complex, and any detailed discussion of the subject’s many facets is beyond the scope of the present study. Suffice it to say, therefore, that whatever its long-range social or psychological causes, in the short term the massacre likely resulted from a panicked royal decision to assassinate the chief leaders of the Calvinist party before the Huguenots, angered by the failed first attempt on Coligny’s life, sought retribution against the Valois Crown.10 The presence in Paris of so many heavily armed, mistrustful Calvinists undoubtedly alarmed the court. There, fear of potential retaliation was felt keenly, especially since a number of high-ranking Huguenots – including Henri de Navarre and his cousin Condé – “mixed their complaints with threats.” This made it appear “as if they wanted revenge” for the attack on the admiral’s life.11 There lies the logic of a pre-emptive royal strike, planned hastily and in secret by an anxious king, queen mother and other powerful members of the court, against the leading Calvinists while they still were concentrated conveniently in Paris and before they could take matters into their own hands. The royal conspirators perhaps also anticipated that the direct action of eliminating the party chiefs at this moment might draw the teeth of future Calvinist opposi-

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tion forever: “The Head being off, the members cannot stand.”12 Probably for the same reason several important Catholic noblemen, such as François duc de Montmorency (eldest son of the late constable, Anne), the maréchal de Tavannes, and the grand-maître, Biron, were targeted for assassination, too. These men were key figures among the “Malcontents” (forerunners of the Catholic politiques) and sympathized politically with the Huguenots.13 Whatever the case, considering the haste with which the plot was organized and the bi-partisan character of its intended victims, the massacre cannot be construed as the grand anti-Calvinist conspiracy, calculated over months or perhaps even years, that contemporary Huguenot writers claimed it was.14 This is indicated futher by contradictions found in contemporary Catholic evidence.15 One thing is clear, however: what had begun as a focused assault on a very small group expanded rapidly into a riot-like, wholesale slaughter in Paris, which then spread quickly to the provinces in the form of similar fanatical purges.16 Henri de Navarre and his cousin Condé had a unique fate in this plot-turned-massacre. According to the maréchal de Tavannes, who claimed participation in the secret discussions despite being one of its possible targets, the conspirators had agreed to spare the two Bourbon princes not only because of their youth and royal blood, but also in the hope of converting them.17 Alive, they could be used as hostages to prevent Huguenot reprisals; dead, they simply would add to the martyrs’ roll and thus strengthen rather than weaken Calvinist resolve. Catherine de Medici certainly concurred with this line of reasoning. She recognized further that if the House of Bourbon were decapitated, the House of Guise would become far too powerful.18 The queen mother doubtless also feared that the death of Navarre and Condé would make formidable enemies of the surviving members of their family, Catholic or Calvinist, when the last thing the Valois needed at the moment was more enemies. Consequently, the morning after the massacre Charles IX summoned Navarre and Condé to offer them life in return for their immediate conversion to Catholicism, despite Jeanne d’Albret’s deathbed appeal that her son be permitted to exercise his religion “wherever [he] may be.”19 Up to this point, the Valois Crown had harboured no doubts about the sincerity and firmness of Henri de Navarre’s commitment to his late mother’s faith. This is clear from instructions Charles IX had issued earlier that summer to the sieurs de Ferrels and de Beauville, his ambassadors in Rome, who were to secure a papal dispensation for the marriage between Navarre and Princess Marguerite. Although it had been hoped at the French court that Pius V’s successor would be more

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amenable to the match than the former pope had been, the new pontiff, Gregory XIII (1572–85), opposed it still more stubbornly. In fact, before he would even consider granting the Church’s consent, the pope demanded the young king of Navarre’s complete submission to Rome and return to the Catholic faith. “[But] to this I must reply to His Holiness,” wrote Charles to Ferrels in late July, “that ... I find this response far removed from reality,” for although “I wish no less than His Holiness that the king of Navarre himself would accept the [pope’s] conditions ... [he] is a Prince who has already entered into the knowledge of things [i.e., he is old enough to understand his own mind and make decisions for himself], and who was nurtured in the contrary religion, [and] His Holiness ... knows well enough that according to the order and reputation that Princes and states keep in their affairs, it is completely impossible to prevail upon them so easily.”20 Recognizing, therefore, that the Calvinist Navarre would not convert voluntarily and that Gregory XIII would not relent without a conversion, Charles had “resolved ... to proceed with the marriage” for reasons of state in the hope that a dispensation would follow eventually.21 With the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre, however, the French Crown believed it had the necessary leverage to force Navarre immediately to abjure in return for his life. Not only would that accomplish what the royal marriage had been planned to achieve all along, but it also would satisfy the demands of the Holy See. Yet rather than submit to Charles’s peremptory order to convert on the morning of 24 August, Henri de Navarre answered evasively, “without conceding to the king’s proposition,” that he wished to be left alone in peace for his life and conscience. He then added enigmatically that he and his cousin were prepared to obey the king “in all things.”22 In sharp contrast, Henri de Condé flatly refused to convert and roundly denounced the highranking perpetrators of the violence. But this outburst only earned him the wrath of Charles, who called the defiant prince seditious, a rebel, and the son of a rebel. The king added in a rage that if Condé had not obeyed the command to convert within three days, he would be strangled!23 Eight days later, however, neither of the Bourbon princes had agreed as yet to abjure, which finally forced their exasperated royal captor to offer them one of three choices: “la messe, la mort, ou la Bastille.”24 Faced with such threats, they eventually surrendered, though not until they had undergone a pretense of instruction on 25 September, a full month later. Scholars past and present have been very critical of Henri de Navarre in their interpretations of his forced conversion of 1572. For the most part, they have accepted the statements of a handful of contemporary authors and ignored the strong religious nurturing the

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prince had received from his Calvinist mother. From this neglect has resulted the perpetuation of an unfavourable and inaccurate appraisal of the king of Navarre’s actions and motivations immediately following the massacre, one that sees him as opportunistic, devoid of sincere religious conviction, and self-serving. In fact, some scholars and popular writers go so far as to suggest that Henri was “invited” to convert and that he “consented” to do so25 without offering a word of resistance to his enemies. How justified are these critics? Navarre was intelligent and perceptive, and indeed he might have been thinking of his possible options days, weeks and perhaps months in advance. His eventual reversion to the Catholic faith, in spite of his sincere Calvinist convictions and the promises he had made to Jeanne d’Albret, certainly points in this direction, especially when it is considered together with that keen sense of pragmatism that was also part of his developing character. He was, however, still a largely inexperienced youth who probably was incapable of such a degree of long-range vision. During the three and a half years of his captivity at the court after Saint Bartholomew’s, Henri matured steadily. He developed his plans; he learned from Catherine de Medici how to dissemble and disguise his real designs; and when he finally fled from the court in 1576, he had a clearer vision of his goals and how to achieve them. But that he was this well prepared in 1572 is highly unlikely. It is more reasonable to argue instead that Navarre had relented in order to buy time to think or to escape, or that he had acted out of caution, recognizing the futility of heroic gestures. Still more plausibly, he simply reacted from the natural fear that any isolated eighteen-year-old would have felt given the same terrifying circumstances. After all, he had just witnessed the slaughter of many of those men whom he had known in his childhood and adolescence. Conjecture on this matter may be resolved by a careful look at the contemporary evidence. This reveals that Henri strongly resisted the royal command to convert, as exemplified by his evasive response to Charles. Significantly, Navarre had both the presence of mind and courage enough not to abjure his faith opportunistically in return for his life, even though he responded from a position of extreme weakness. He disobeyed calmly and with due respect for the king, just as his mother had taught him. There was no panicky display of surrender or desperate plea for mercy.26 This is especially revealing of his already emerging strength of character, even of principle, given the violent circumstances. Henri no doubt recognized the gravity of the situation and understood that his life was by no means sacrosanct. After all, the Saint Bartholomew’s conspirators had agreed only that his royal blood

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“ought to be respected.” Besides, that quality had not prevented the murder of his uncle, another royal prince, four years before at Jarnac. This was sufficient proof of the real insecurity of his position. Probably, therefore, Henri had no choice but to abjure, though whether, as first prince of the blood, he would have been executed for refusing to adopt Catholicism as Charles threatened is impossible to say. Yet for thirty-three days he resisted the enormous pressure placed upon him. Nor did he make any outward sign of surrender in this period, despite a contemporary claim or two that Navarre attended mass and other services perhaps as early as late August.27 This was denied categorically, however, by the Tuscan ambassador, who reported in two separate letters (dated 8 and 16 September respectively) that the king of Navarre had not yet been present at any Catholic ceremonies and was continuing to stress, moreover, that he “wishes to serve His Majesty, but to live in the religion in which [he] was nurtured.”28 Finally, “intimidated on the one side and encouraged on the other,”29 he at last agreed to convert, but relenting “more from fear than from [any religious] sentiment.”30 It is noteworthy that, for all of Condé’s vituperation and bold words on the morning of 24 August and his later reputation for inflexible Calvinism, the prince surrendered to Catholic pressure and began attending mass almost two weeks before his cousin.31 From these two pieces of evidence alone it is clear that Henri de Navarre was not moved by opportunism or lack of religious conviction to renounce his faith. On the contrary, he clung to his Calvinism as long as he could. This proved his mother right in her trust in his religious conviction and the Valois court wrong in its presumption that he would go to mass without opposition. The account of the Jesuit Father Maldonato further supports this view. Entrusted with instructing the two Bourbon princes in Catholic dogma, he detailed his vain efforts to inspire his unwilling pupils with any sympathy whatever for the ancient religion. The entire process of instruction occupied only a very brief five hours the day before Navarre and Condé were expected to undergo the official ceremony of abjuration at the Augustinian monastery in Paris. This amounted to little more than a debate between the Calvinist ministers, whom the princes had brought with them for support, and Maldonato, who was assisted by five Catholic theologians from the Sorbonne. The priest lamented that throughout the meeting, Henri de Navarre paid scant attention to the proceedings. Instead, he spent the time chatting with others in a corner and only occasionally listening. Condé was just as indifferent. Finally, their complete lack of interest forced the exasperated Jesuit to concede that the two young men were as obstinately

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attached to their faith as before, “as both were inflexible and would hear nothing about a change of religion.”32 All the same, on 26 September the two princes made their solemn abjuration in the presence of the papal nuncio and members of the court, though “their lips pronounced the words which were disavowed by their hearts.”33 To promote the opposite impression, Catherine de Medici declared publicly that Navarre had converted “in such a fashion and with such devotion that all good Christians could hope for.”34 Nevertheless, she, too, admitted privately that the abjuration had been forced,35 implying that Henri’s solemnity during the conversion ceremony had been just an act. Perhaps this explains why the queen mother laughed aloud as he made his “humble” obeisance before the altar at his subsequent reinvestiture in the Catholic Ordre de Saint-Michel on 29 September. She knew that Henri’s conversion was a hollow mockery, as did most everyone else.36 From such evidence as this, only one conclusion is possible: that despite Navarre’s outward change in religious profession, he had preserved his Calvinist conscience intact, even though he had lost his struggle to keep the promise he had made to his late mother never to be separated from his religion or the Huguenots. What Jeanne d’Albret had not envisaged for all of her perspicacity was the spilling of so much Calvinist blood or the grave dangers to her son’s life that rendered those promises untenable. Navarre’s conversion was but the necessary first step in fulfilling the political plans of the Valois Crown and Catherine de Medici, who had announced triumphantly (and prematurely) after Saint Bartholomew’s “that there was now only one religion in France.”37 With Henri firmly under control, the king, the queen mother, and their advisers initiated step two. This was the important work of publicly confirming his conversion and especially of discrediting him with the Huguenots, both personally and religiously, as Jeanne d’Albret had predicted they would attempt to do shortly before her death. The process began when Henri was forced on 3 and 5 October to appeal to Rome for papal acceptance of his abjuration and for the long-awaited dispensation for his marriage to Marguerite.38 To maintain the illusion of her son-in-law’s sincerity, Catherine de Medici also wrote to the pope on his behalf, alleging that Henri had “asked the cardinal de Bourbon, his uncle, and the king my son and his brother[-in-law] and me to write to Your Holiness to ask you ... to absolve and pardon him of all the heresy in which he was nourished and instructed.”39 These humiliating letters were followed on 16 October by an edict issued from the court in Henri’s name that commanded the full restoration of Catholic practice and ecclesiastical property in his personal domains, along with the prohibition of all Calvinist worship.40

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Had this decree been enforceable, it would have reversed all of the late queen of Navarre’s legislation against Catholicism, which her son had confirmed immediately upon his succession to her crown. To be sure, some Huguenots, such as those living in Bordeaux, felt betrayed by Henri’s conversion and renounced him as their protector, but many of his subjects were convinced that these anti-Calvinist orders had been forged secretly by others and that Henri would have repudiated the edict if he had been free to do so.41 Hence, they simply ignored it. They also defied the notoriously anti-Huguenot comte de Grammont, who had been appointed royal governor for Béarn in a fourth proclamation, dated 17 October.42 In fact, Bernard d’Arros used his authority as Henri’s lieutenant-general to imprison the count, which forced the captive monarch to command the latter’s release to appease his royal gaolers. The Huguenots of La Rochelle similarly ignored the order issued in the young king of Navarre’s name to submit to a royal Catholic governor. Finally, Charles IX insisted – probably at his mother’s prompting – that Henri write to Philip II to offer the restoration of any domains he held that allegedly belonged to Spain.43 The purpose of the offer, whether accepted or not by the Spanish monarch, was to maintain peaceful relations between the two kingdoms, especially in light of the late amiral de Coligny’s efforts in 1571–72 to encourage King Charles to invade the Spanish Netherlands in support of the beleaguered Dutch rebels. The harsh political and religious measures forced upon Henri undoubtedly were designed to increase the vacuum in the command structure of the Calvinist party that Saint Bartholomew’s had created so suddenly. Without his leadership, even as a simple figurehead around whom the party faithful could regroup, the Huguenots (it was believed) would be unable to reorganize, let alone rebel. They would lose the vital protection of a prince of the blood because a Catholic king of Navarre could hardly be acknowledged as the protector of the French Reformed Church, especially if he issued edicts that prohibited freedom of conscience in his own kingdom. This, in turn, would reduce dramatically the legitimacy of their rebellions, a legitimacy so important to the mentalité of the age. As for Henri personally, his connection with the Huguenots as their titular commander-in-chief would be cut, leaving him friendless and without support. The third step in royal planning was to force Navarre to adopt a stance of active opposition, whether genuine or not, to his former coreligionaires. This included not only his attendance at the gruesome execution of Calvinist prisoners, but also his participation in military operations against major Huguenot targets. Hence, with the start of the fourth civil war between the Crown and its Calvinist subjects late in

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1572, Henri de Navarre was sent under close guard with the royal army to besiege La Rochelle.44 What better way to publicize the young king’s recent conversion, or to ruin his reputation among his former associates, than to include him in a Catholic attack on the foremost Huguenot stronghold in France? Henri de Condé and François d’Alençon (1555–84), the fourth and least liked of Catherine de Medici’s sons, were also sent on this campaign. As Navarre’s former adjutant in the Calvinist party, Condé’s credibility with the Huguenots had to be ruined, too. As for the ever-troublesome Alençon, no doubt he was included to keep him under close surveillance and deprived of any opportunity to disrupt the Crown’s plans.45 Unfortunately for royal policy, this manoeuvre was a complete military and political failure. Already plagued with the usual problems of sixteenth-century armies, the royal forces were embarrassed still further by the presence of Navarre, Condé, and Alençon. In fact, the princely trio was widely suspected of uniting their efforts to cripple any successes scored against the Calvinist Rochelais. According to unconfirmed reports, the princes regularly passed intelligence on royalist plans to the Huguenot garrison; they also led disguised Calvinist troops into the Catholic camp at Neuil, frequently in broad daylight, to sabotage gun batteries, trenches, and mines. They allegedly even plotted a mutiny against the royal commander, the duc d’Anjou,46 though he wrote that Navarre, at least, had no such contact with his former coreligionnaires.47 Whether or not these reports were genuine, the fact is that the three princes formed a handy focal point for certain disaffected elements in the Catholic forces opposed to royalist plans. In view of the harmful effects such rumours produced, the maréchal de Tavannes afterwards complained that had Navarre and Alençon been left behind in Paris, better order could have been kept in the royal camp, La Rochelle would have fallen, and the Huguenot party might have been destroyed.48 The Catholic secretary of state, Pomponne de Bellièvre, seems to have shared this view. In a letter to Charles IX written after the conclusion of peace in June 1573, he praised those men who had helped the Crown restore order to the kingdom. But in listing their names he – or maybe Charles himself – crossed out “the king of Navarre” in heavy strokes of ink, perhaps after reflecting on Henri’s opposition to the royal efforts.49 As one modern historian points out, however, little concrete evidence has survived to substantiate the numerous rumours and allegations: “As a result, it is impossible to know exactly what Alençon and Navarre were planning.”50 These charges indicate, nevertheless, that the royal army was seriously divided and that the Malcontents turned to the princes for leadership.

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Whatever the case, after eight months of fruitless activity, great expense, considerable loss of life, and utter failure, the Crown reluctantly ended both the siege and war. Contributing to the royal decision was the recent arrival at court of the news that Henri d’Anjou had been elected to the Polish throne. Because the Valois prince was required to pledge to uphold religious toleration in Poland according to the Confederation of Warsaw, he could hardly be a party to razing the chief Calvinist fortress in France. In addition, Charles IX was perhaps jealous of his brother’s new royal dignity and so wanted him out of the kingdom as quickly as possible.51 For various reasons, then, the fourth civil war was halted, and a treaty favourable to the Huguenots was signed on 24 June 1573, renewing the articles of the defunct peace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. As a modern historian observes, the decision to end the war in this way “denied Saint Bartholomew’s even the dubious virtue of Realpolitik.”52 The failure of the royal assault on La Rochelle was also a humiliating defeat for the Catholic Crown, as was the foiling of its political goals vis-à-vis Henri de Navarre. If the many suspicions were correct, he had managed to renew some of his former links with the French Calvinists and to aid them in their defence, despite the Crown’s best efforts to snap those bonds entirely.

surv iving th e valo is c o u rt , 1 5 7 4 – 1 5 7 6 The royal authorities learned at least one important lesson from the utter fiasco of their failure at La Rochelle: Navarre’s separation from the Huguenots, so vital to the success of royal policy, had to be enforced much more strictly by keeping him securely at court. He could be cut off more effectively there from his former coreligionnaires and be more closely observed, all under the minute supervision of the king and the queen mother. Thus, Henri’s movements were monitored carefully thereafter by a watchful Catherine de Medici. To that end, she employed twenty-six spies to accompany him at all times in everything he did, and thereby prevent intrigue or, worse still, an escape. She also staffed his household with Catholic officers and gentlemen to maintain even closer scrutiny.53. Despite these precautions, Navarre’s absolute isolation proved impossible to secure. In fact, he appears to have carried on a regular correspondence with the vicomte de Turenne (who was still Catholic and at court at this time in the household of the duc d’Alençon), the seigneur de Thoré (a Montmorency brother), the sieurs de Guitry and de La Nocle, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, and Jean de la Haye. All of these men were either Calvinists or Catholic Malcontents who sought

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Henri’s freedom. Their communications with Navarre, complete with clandestine meetings in dark forest glades, led to no fewer than seven separate escape attempts: one in February 1574, another two months later in April, three more in July the same year, a sixth attempt in June 1575, and a final effort in February 1576, which succeeded.54 This evidence refutes a recent contention that “when it came time to restore princely leadership over the Huguenots,” Henri was passed over by the Malcontents in favour of Henri de Condé.55 Not surprisingly, in his years as a captive at court, Navarre’s freedom of movement was increased or decreased according “to reports of his correspondence with the Calvinists,”56 his various attempts at escape, or the changing political circumstances in France. For instance, in late May 1574, when King Charles finally succumbed to tuberculosis, Henri was kept in close confinement behind locked doors. With her position as regent more vulnerable than ever and her third son, Anjou, not yet returned from Poland to assume his brother’s crown, Queen Catherine could ill-afford to permit the freedom of anyone who might interfere with the smooth transfer of royal authority, especially during a period of intermittent civil war. For that reason, she placed Navarre, Alençon, and a number of other powerful men who potentially threatened her “so-called regency” and the accession of the new king, Henri III (1574–89), safely under lock and key until the crisis had passed.57 The two princes were confined in the royal château de Vincennes, where the windows of their chambers were grated like those in a prison cell, their rooms were searched on a daily basis, and everyone was prohibited from speaking to them for fear of conspiracies.58 “[Even] the ladies who go out at night to sleep are all compelled to take off their masks, there being some impression that the Duke and the king of Navarre will escape unawares in this fashion.”59 Nor were the queen mother’s precautions unjustified. The previous March, the two princes had been suspected of involvement in a clandestine “third party” at court. They had been implicated, furthermore, in the so-called Conspiracy of Saint-Germain-en-Laye to effect an escape “in order to have them undertake something prejudicial to [Charles IX’s] authority and the peace of the state.”60 Both Navarre and Alençon had denied any complicity in the plot to the dying king, of course,61 but few people at court believed in their innocence. Meanwhile, rumours of their impending arrest had moved the less closely watched prince de Condé to flee with Huguenot help from Amiens to the Holy Roman Empire, where he immediately renounced his forced Catholicism. Later in May, the English ambassador, Dr Valentine Dale, reported that the two princes had approached him secretly with a request for money to bribe their guards into letting them escape if Charles IX died.62 About

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the same time, Alençon began negotiating secretly with Louis of Nassau for a Dutch invasion of northern France, and also with the prince de Condé and the Calvinist duc de Bouillon for similar strong aid.63 All things considered, therefore, Catherine had good reason to fear for the security of her position at her son’s untimely death, though she hid her concerns behind a façade of tranquility. She did not place any faith in either Navarre’s or Alençon’s promises to respect their dying monarch’s last wish that they obey her commands. On the other hand, to keep Navarre permanently locked away would defeat the impression that the late Charles IX, Queen Catherine, and the new king, Henri III, absolutely needed to promote. Without the semblance of his freedom of movement, the royal campaign to discredit him with the Huguenots would fail. They had to make it appear as if Henri’s incarceration at court was voluntary, his support for the Valois Crown and its anti-Calvinist policies genuine, and, most importantly, his conversion to Catholicism – on which the whole scheme hinged – firm. For this reason, the queen mother always denied that Navarre was a prisoner, insisting instead that he enjoyed “all the liberty [he] wished” and that he was at the court of his own free will “to bear the King my son company.”64 To lend credibility to this fiction, whenever possible Navarre was “treated merrily” and with “great familiarity” by the Valois monarchs and their mother in public circles, “as if to show that he was free.”65 In reality, few people were duped by the royal façade. They knew that Henri was still held in suspicion and kept under close surveillance.66 Nevertheless, with every day that he remained in custody, the illusion of his personal liberty that the Crown was trying to create gradually seemed more real to the public eye, to the detriment of his reputation among the Huguenots. But not even controlled freedom of movement ensured the Crown’s power over Henri, who managed to form fresh alliances within the court itself. Henri III was especially troubled by the close relations between his younger brother Alençon and Navarre. To halt their collusion, the new king adopted a number of pre-emptive measures to divide them. He ordered his mignons to insult both men and to provoke their mutual jealousies over positions, titles, and women whenever possible – “means that seldom fail to succeed.”67 And when insult failed to work, outright bribery was used in its place. Both princes, for example, were promised privately the powerful rank of lieutenant-general of the kingdom.68 What is more, these tactics very nearly bore fruit. After Alençon’s successful flight from court in September 1575, Catherine managed to entice him back into the royal fold temporarily by granting him the lieutenant-generalship, along with his royal brother’s former appanage of Anjou and other privi-

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leges. Navarre similarly was tempted. In fact, two of his closest Huguenot supporters complained years later that the pretty face of his mistress, Charlotte de Sauves, “spoiled [his own] plans to escape,” while his lingering hope to regain the promised lieutenant-generalship (a title both he and his father had held formerly) also delayed his flight from the court.69 But what of Navarre’s religion following Saint Bartholomew’s? Despite his public abjuration a month after the “infamous” massacre in Paris, where violence (he later wrote) had “forced me to take ... a religion for which I had wished neither by desire nor in my heart,”70 he remained resolutely Calvinist in his convictions. He showed only “on the surface that he had returned to the Catholic Church rather than expose himself to the [further] anger of King Charles IX.”71 This was also the judgment of other well-placed contemporaries, such as the vicomte de Turenne, who had almost daily contact with Navarre at this time. He added, moreover, that Henri not only harboured a profound resentment for the religion that had been forced upon him, but also burned to avenge the recent slaughter of the Huguenots.72 In view of the pivotal role of his conversion in the Crown’s plans and the widely held belief that his change of religion had been forced and insincere, it is surprising that during the three and a half years of Navarre’s captivity at court, no positive effort was made by the Valois kings or the queen mother to strengthen their hold on their young hostage by trying to imbue him with Catholic convictions. Instead, in order to maintain a public façade of his conformity, they only applied superficial or coercive pressure in the matter of his religion. Navarre was required to go to mass and to be present at various religious processions. He was thrust forcibly into the company of noblemen whose Catholicism was above reproach, such as the duc de Guise and his brother Mayenne, whose hatred for the Huguenots was notorious and whose participation in the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre was well known.73 And he was forced to write periodically to the pope to renew his submission and obedience to the universal Church. Because interests of state and not religious idealism dominated Valois statecraft,74 the depth of Henri’s Catholicism after 1572 was never more than a secondary consideration in the Crown’s political plans, if considered at all. Besides, there was no immediate sense of urgency here; the succession to the throne still looked to be secure, with the result that the question of Navarre’s potential candidacy for the Catholic throne according to Salic Law was not yet an issue. What mattered at this time, therefore, was the outward appearance of his Catholic profession, not its depth or substance. In short, his conformity was deemed to be more important than his sincerity.

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In time, however, this strategy proved fatal and the undoing of royal policy. Although the tactics of coercion succeeded with Henri in the short term, so long as he was Catholic in name only, the Crown never could be certain of its political control over him or of his continuing submission. It thus was faced with an uncomfortable paradox. Navarre was needed by the Valois to strengthen their power in France against the Huguenots and the Guises; he was also necessary to ensure a Catholic succession, for which there already was a glimmer of concern.75 It cannot have been far from anyone’s thoughts that, as first prince of the blood after Alençon, Henri was only one remove from the French throne should Henri III die without legitimate male issue. This alone made his life precious. But because he was also an ally and co-conspirator of the current heir presumptive, a counterfeit Catholic and a focal point of numerous Calvinist and Malcontent plots against the government, the prince could not be trusted by the Crown. So it would get rid of him if it could. That Henri de Navarre understood the realities and dangers of his captivity and genuinely feared for his life is clear from the letter he wrote in January 1575 to his old friend the baron de Miossens: The court is the strangest place you have ever seen. We are nearly always ready to cut each other’s throat. We carry daggers and wear mail shirts, even breastplates, under our cloaks. Sévérac will tell you why. The king is in as much danger as I am; [but] he likes me more than ever. Monsieur de Guise and Monsieur de Mayenne never leave me ... You have no idea how well protected I am in this court of friends. Everyone is against me. The faction of which you know [i.e., Guise] wish me all possible evil, on account of Monsieur’s [Alençon’s] affection for me, and for the third time they have forbidden my mistress [Charlotte de Sauves] to speak to me, keeping so close to her that she dare not even look at me. I am only waiting for the moment when I shall have to fight a pitched battle as they all say they will kill me, and I would like to forestall them.76

Henri’s anxiety was not unjustified. Early in his captivity he had begun to suspect the Guises of plotting against his life. Perhaps he remembered that the sworn objectives of the Guise-led triumvirate in 1562 had included “not just the defeat but the elimination of the Bourbons, an intention confirmed in subsequent Guisard-Spanish communications.”77 This had also been the goal of a similar conspiracy in 1563, attributed to Duke François and his brother, the cardinal de Lorraine. Their alleged purpose was to remove any possibility of the young “heretical” prince’s succession to the Catholic French throne.78 And following Jeanne d’Albret’s death in June 1572, Henri suspected a

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“fraude italienne ou Guisarde” and halfway accused Catherine de Medici and the Guises of poisoning his mother.79 With Saint Bartholomew’s and his subsequent captivity, the Bourbon prince renewed these charges in a way that became still sharper and more personal. In April 1574, for example, he claimed to have been warned by the vicomte de Turenne of a new plot to execute him should his wife, Marguerite, give birth to a male child. Henri immediately voiced his outrage against the duc de Guise, whom he accused of having obtained a special written order for this purpose from the French king on the argument that with the Catholic succession secured (for the infant would be baptised in the Roman faith and reared at court), Navarre would become expendable. Then, to implicate the duke still further while adding to his own credibility, Henri claimed that at La Rochelle in 1573 Guise had plotted to kill him, Alençon, and also Charles IX, ostensibly to place the duc d’Anjou (now Henri III) on the throne as a puppet.80 Not long afterwards, Navarre went even so far as to charge Catherine de Medici with being Guise’s accomplice. He claimed not only that she wanted to make the duke connétable de France, but that she, too, wished the whole House of Bourbon exterminated.81 Faced with such threats to his life, whether real or imaginary, Henri argued that no one could blame him for trying repeatedly to escape from the court. His captivity continuing, however, the prince quickly learned from his gaolers how to protect himself by concealing his real feelings and designs behind false appearances. So skilful was he in presenting a façade that the English ambassador was moved to admire his “cunning dissimulations.” These were attributed by Dr Dale to Henri’s able adoption of Catherine de Medici’s own methods.82 At the same time, Navarre probably also drew upon memories of how his mother had disarmed a watchful court with her apparent complacency in 1566–67, just prior to their flight. In other words, Henri’s strategy for survival was to become deceptively cooperative. In addition to practising outwardly the religion he had been forced to profess, he publicly obeyed all royal commandments and maintained correct relations with the king and the queen mother. To both of them he protested his loyalty and obedience. He also feigned greater dislike for Alençon than he actually felt to create the impression that Henri III’s efforts to divide the two princes were successful. Meantime, he consorted openly with Catholic nobles, such as his enemy Guise, whose company had been thrust upon him.83 Finally, he participated in the many pleasures of the court as the Valois king had hoped he would do, for which his Huguenot supporters later criticized him. He gambled and hunted, the usual pastimes of any six-

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teenth-century aristocrat, and he surrendered to his attraction to women. Yet he strictly avoided what contemporaries called the “real vices” of the court (without defining them) and especially Henri III’s mignons.84 Only in one way did Navarre reveal his genuine loyalties, and that was by lending his protection to the Huguenots whenever he could. He even appealed to staunchly Catholic nobles to aid him in this task.85 Nevertheless, as a result of his masquerade the prince soon acquired his father’s reputation for fecklessness, which proved to be an effective disguise. He even fooled Henri III into believing that he was “a man who loves his pleasure too much”86 – a significant comment considering the source! The young king of Navarre also learned to turn the conditions of his incarceration to personal advantage. It was said, for example, that by means of his widely praised natural courtesy and agreeable conversation, he disarmed his gaolers and guards, whom he made the unconscious executors of his purpose. He also artfully used Queen Catherine’s own spies as double agents against her. Meanwhile, he managed to create his own following at court among sycophantic noblemen who hoped for his patronage in the form of honours and pensions should he become the lieutenant-general of the kingdom as he had been led privately to expect. Accomplishments such as these prompted Agrippa d’Aubigné to write later in admiration that throughout his captivity the young prince had concealed beneath a façade of political indolence other virtues that eventually made him the pride of all true Frenchmen and the scourge of his enemies.87 Because of their preoccupation with the general disorder in the kingdom and the ongoing power struggle at court with the Guise faction, the king and the queen mother gradually, if unintentionally, relaxed their watchfulness over Navarre. Perhaps the latter’s studied complacency had slowly misled them into believing that he might be trusted for the time being while they tended to more pressing matters of state. Henri’s veneer of cooperation certainly seems to have persuaded Henri III and Queen Catherine that he was becoming, or maybe already was, sincerely attached to them. At least this was how the French king perceived their relations, judging from his apparently genuine surprise and disappointment at his brother-in-law’s eventual escape and from his conviction that others had “pushed him to this result.”88 In any case, it appears that, carried away by wishful thinking, Navarre’s royal captors began to underestimate him and to delude themselves into believing that he was theirs to command. On 3 or 4 February 1576 Henri de Navarre at last escaped the court while pretending to hunt in the forêt de Halatte near Senlis. No one had expected such a ruse on his part because he had previously

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hunted for stretches of eight and nine days a number of times, well removed from the court and its close surveillance of his actions. On these occasions he had always returned, just as he and his late mother had done in 1567 from their various excursions before making a similar flight. His habitual reliability had only reinforced his carefully contrived masquerade as a Catholic and loyal ally of the Valois Crown. Hence, according to one contemporary observer, “At present [Henri] is free and goes everywhere on the assurances secretly given in his name by Monsieur de Guise, that he would never leave the court without the consent of the king.”89 To maintain this façade while awaiting an opportunity to escape and to disarm any lingering suspicions, Navarre had continued to play the companion of Guise up to the last moment, despite his past assertions of the duke’s alleged designs against his life.90 Finally, with the king of Navarre’s captors growing more lax in their surveillance of his actions, he used the hunt near Senlis as the means to regain his freedom.91 Slipping away quietly with only three or four companions, he rode southward to be joined by others along his route. Eventually, his party included a number of men who, sooner or later, became important to his cause. Among them were his Calvinist friends Agrippa d’Aubigné and the baron de Rosny (later the duc de Sully), the Huguenot-turned-Catholic comte de Lavardin, and a few devout Catholic noblemen, such as Nogaret de La Valette (soon to become Henri III’s favourite as the duc d’Épernon) and, curiously, the comte de Grammont. Crossing the Seine River at Poissy, the young king and his followers rode first to Châteauneuf-en-Thymeras and thence to the town of Alençon, which they reached by 6 February. From there they continued on to La Flêche and Saumur in Poitou. This put them within the protective perimeter of Henri’s territorial base south of the Loire. The scheme of the Valois to obtain control of Navarre through marriage and massacre, to convert him to ensure Huguenot disunity, and to tie him and the other Bourbon princes to the Crown both to strengthen its authority in France and to undercut the rival Guise faction, now lay in ruins. It had come to nothing because of two mistakes. The first was the king and queen mother’s failure to imbue their royal hostage with any genuine affection for Catholicism, the surest means of keeping him at court in political and religious submission. The second was their carelessness in not maintaining the tight level of security around him that they had instituted in 1573 but had allowed gradually to relax.

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3 Blood, Belief, Behaviour, and the Shaping of a King, February 1576 to June 1584 “[The king of Navarre] is a great prince, youthful, and giving promise of one day becoming a great leader[;] he will win easily the hearts of the nobility and the people, and instil fear in all others.” – Blaise de Montluc, 1576

A peculiarity of Valois policy toward the captive Henri de Navarre was that the Crown was so consumed by a desire to secure his external conformity to the Catholic faith, that it did not see that this was insufficient in itself to solidify his coerced conversion of 1572. By failing to recognize the necessity of winning the young prince in his conscience, the royal authorities were unable to gain any kind of long-term victory in their efforts to retain him in the traditional Church. In fact, this focus on outward practice and profession, regardless of conviction, pervaded all of Henri’s early experiences of the Valois court. This is certainly evident from the way in which he had been manipulated cynically by his own father in 1561–62, as well as from the circumstances of his captivity following the bloodshed of Saint Bartholomew’s ten years later. To be sure, Jeanne d’Albret too had recognized the need for her son to maintain a public persona, but while grooming him for her own political and sectarian ends, she also had taken great care to imbue him with a genuine Calvinist faith and a strong sense of his moral obligations, which elevated her efforts above mere expediency. By contrast, neither Henri’s father, Antoine de Bourbon, nor his royal captors after the massacre of 24 August 1572 made any attempt to indoctrinate him fully with Catholicism. His outward submission alone was deemed sufficient by the royal authorities, whose preoccupations were, for the moment, far more political than religious. Hence, recognizing what the Crown wanted, Henri soon learned to dissemble his real feelings and lull his Catholic gaolers by pretending to conform. As we have seen, that façade later facilitated his escape.

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Yet there was far more behind the issue of Navarre’s conversion than the degree of his conformity – outward or internal. Whatever the political motives of the two factions struggling over the control of the prince and his profession of faith, underlying their competition was the essential clash between two very different conceptualizations, the first, of religion, and the second, of community and monarchical responsibility. On the one hand, for Calvinists like Jeanne d’Albret, Louis de Condé, Gaspard de Coligny and even young Henri himself, the idea of religion was deeply rooted in the principle that the individual has a private relationship with God. What mattered most was sincerity of conviction, not works, because the doctrine of Justification by Faith – irrespective of personal merit or effort – formed the core of their belief.1 Indeed, according to Calvinist theology, works established only the righteousness of the individual, not of God, since “our boasting [i.e., pride] is not excluded by law [i.e., works righteousness] but by faith.” Moreover, “so long as any particle of works righteousness remains some occasion for boasting remains” too. Hence, man is not justified by works; rather, “righteousness according to grace is owed to faith.” “Farewell, then,” sneered John Calvin, “to the dreams of those who think up a righteousness flowing together out of faith and works.”2 In addition to this, because Calvinism was in its essentials a religion of the book, it automatically placed a heavy premium on private conscience and an introspective analysis of conscience through selfreflection, meditation of the life to come, and, above all, repentance. The latter required in particular “a transformation, not only in outward works, but in the soul itself.”3 Thus, “the first step toward obeying [God’s] law is to deny our own nature,” wrote Calvin, since it is not enough simply to discharge Christian duty “unless the mind itself and the heart first put on the inclination to righteousness, judgment and mercy.”4 In other words, “men must cleanse away the secret filth in order that an altar may be erected to God in the heart itself,” so as to awaken the conscience and sooth the afflicted mind, for “nothing is achieved unless we begin from the inner disposition of the heart.”5 If, therefore, one accepts the Calvinist system of belief, then the corporate rituals, hierarchical structures, and elaborate symbolism that permeated the Catholic conceptualization of religion and its formal practice were not simply inefficacious, and hence extraneous, but anathema as the products and external manifestations of “superstition” and “idolatry.”6 For that reason, the liturgy of the mass was the special object of opprobrium to John Calvin, who both condemned and scorned it as dangerous and “nothing but a kind of sorcery.”7

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Moreover, Calvinism was very much a group endeavour in which the faith and conduct of individual believers, whether peasants or kings, were carefully scrutinized by the community of believers. Hence, on doctrinal grounds, the followers of Calvin held that the monarch had to rule in accordance with their beliefs and would not be allowed any latitude. The Calvinist community, as a body of believers, acknowledged no temporal authority superior to themselves unless that authority ruled in accordance with “true religion and virtue.” Thus, if the prince espoused contrary doctrines after assuming the crown, he would no longer have their support. Moreover, Calvin wrote, the subjects of a king had the right, even the duty, to withdraw their obedience from him if he did not rule in accordance with approved religious practices.8 This certainly was the position adopted by Huguenot polemicists after the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre, as they began to assert theories of popular sovereignty and even tyrannicide, instead of the prevailing notions of divine right, in their search for alternative origins of monarchy. One also finds echoes of this view in Jeanne d’Albret’s admonitions to her son about the relationship between blood and religion, his conduct in Paris, and his duty to the Huguenot cause. In short, the subjects of an errant king could be released from their allegiance by the community of believers because his rule was based to a large degree upon the consent of the governed. This proposition has made some historians claim that modern ideas of representative or democratic government came partly from Calvinist teachings. From the Catholic perspective, on the other hand, faith alone did not bring salvation. According to the ancient teachings and doctrines of the Church, works were not the source of pride, as Calvin derided, but the very means of inculcating faith. Hence, works were emphasized as a principal route to salvation, since they (the sacraments in particular) could reinforce the gift of faith. Thus, for Catholics, participation in the rituals of the Church not only represented an outward expression of private belief but, in combination with other works, reinforced and even kindled belief in others. To that end, the ceremonial of the mass was pivotal. As Barbara Diefendorf observes, because the gathering of the faithful was believed to be pleasing in the sight of God, “it was the laity’s special role to demonstrate this common union by assembling for worship.”9 Other rituals, such as the distribution of holy bread, the display of saints’ relics, and the frequent organization of religious processions, were equally vital, both as public professions of belief according, in part, to the doctrine of good works and, together with the ceremonial of the mass and the sacraments, as “accessible symbols” of faith that delineated a

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distinctive community of Christian believers and reaffirmed religion in daily life. Catholic celebrations were not always strictly devotional in character. They were ordered on occasion by the civic authorities and the king to pray for success in war and other secular affairs. This corresponded, of course, to Thomist theology that informed much of the medieval theory of monarchy. As pater familias, or father of his family (in this case the feudal state composed of the three social orders), the prince was first and foremost a sacred figure and intermediary between God and man whose primary duty was to defend the faith in his realm. “Thus the king, taught the law of God,” wrote St Thomas Aquinas, “should have for his principal concern the means by which the multitude subject to him may live well.”10 Following from this, the prince was subject to the doctrine of the two swords, which effectively limited his power. The pope, through ecclesiastical hierarchy, held the sacred sword, which was superior to the secular sword held by the ruler. The Catholic concept of community envisaged the whole “state of Christ’s Church” (including angels, the deceased, and those presently living), with the pontiff, who possessed the Power of the Keys via the Petrine Succession, at the apex. “Consequently,” wrote Aquinas, “in the law of Christ, kings must be subject to priests,” and specifically to the Roman See, “which God had foreseen would be the principal seat of the Christian priesthood.”11 If, therefore, a prince failed in his duty to uphold that sacred law as interpreted by Catholic doctrine, or if he disobeyed the pope in his faith and conduct, then he was in danger of excommunication. Yet only the pontiff could release the subjects of an errant king from their allegiance, since the monarch ruled not by popular consent but by permission of the pope, who alone had the power to bind and to loose on earth. In Catholic mentality, therefore, the corporate rituals and symbolism of the ancient Church that so offended John Calvin, particularly those rites that affirmed the special relationship between Catholicism and the French Crown, reflected “a merging of worldly and religious aims.” Moreover, they “demonstrate well the way in which Catholic beliefs, monarchical policies and civic identity were mutually reinforcing elements.”12 The ancient coronation ceremony, or sacre, is a perfect example of this convergence, for it both empowered the new monarch with the blessings of the Roman Church through anointment with holy oil and laying on of hands and subordinated him to that institution, in keeping with the law of Christ and his own duties to the Christian community in his sacred role as secular intermediary with God.

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For the above reasons, a strong argument can be made that if the Valois Crown seemed to ignore the importance of Henri de Navarre’s conscience in 1572–76, or even later in 1584–89, it was not due necessarily to a single-minded preoccupation with affairs of state or crass cynicism, though not a few people on both sides of the religious quarrel were tainted with that mentality as well. It was because his private convictions simply did not matter. In view of the Catholic concept of religion, community, and royal duty to uphold the faith, Henri’s external conversion and subsequent participation in the ritual acts that surrounded the monarchy, whether as prince of the blood, heir presumptive to the throne, or king of France, had for French Catholics and the Crown a mystical power regardless of his private beliefs. This outlook, therefore, involved far more than the simple political strategy of separating Henri from the rebellious Huguenots so as to divide their leadership and present a united royal front against them. And what were Navarre’s private beliefs in February 1576? Still Calvinist in his heart, he was no less devoted to his late mother’s creed than before. That faith had become his by conviction; moreover, it grew stronger and even more personal with the passage of years. But it was tempered now by his vivid experiences of the horrors of religious fanaticism and the manner in which his conformity to creed had been exploited by those who had power over him. In effect, the death of Jeanne d’Albret marked a major turning point in the young king of Navarre’s political and religious development. Over the next few years his deepening maturity manifested itself in three significant ways. First, the slaughter of the Huguenots in 1572 tested his commitment to his faith and to his late mother’s legacy, a test he would pass in the long run, but in the meantime the bloodshed affected him deeply, prompting the moderate side of his nature to assert itself. The best evidence for this initial transformation is found in Navarre’s actions subsequent to his escape from the court. Hitherto, there had been a real danger that, along with the intense religious instruction he had received from Jeanne, he might also have absorbed her strong sectarianism, even bigotry. Indeed, every early indication pointed to this result. One needs only to recall, for example, his belligerent boyhood references to Calvinist religious works as “artillery” to “frighten the Romans.” As nominal Huguenot chef de parti after 1569, he had also signed numerous documents that decried “the rigours and cruelties that the Roman Anti-Christ has imposed to exterminate” the Calvinists, and that labelled Catholics as “the servants of idolatry.”13 His unqualified confirmation of Jeanne d’Albret’s harsh anti-Catholic legislation in Béarn immediately after her death similarly indicated his

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developing sectarian outlook, joined to filial obligation. Probably more than any other factor, therefore, the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre, which was the deadly fruit of fanaticism, paradoxically prevented Henri from continuing down this path to become a religious bigot like Henri de Guise or Henri de Condé. Moreover, it is likely that this event contributed to his promotion of religious toleration in France after 1576. From genuine personal feeling, religious tolerance became the cornerstone of his political platform, regardless of any lingering resentments he might have harboured against the Catholics for previous ill-treatment. Second, Henri’s captivity taught him to recognize the need for effective duplicity on some occasions; he also learned how to practise it convincingly. Prior to 1572, the prince had been constrained by both parents. To make him comply with their wishes or political interests, his mother had threatened him occasionally and his father had beaten him. Others, such as Catherine de Medici, had manipulated him, too. One might suspect that at the time Henri had learned to conceal his real feelings behind a façade of compliance, but two facts argue against this: he was very closely controlled and, because of his youth and inexperience, he lacked the necessary subtlety to practise duplicity convincingly. After 1572, however, with the dramatic change in his circumstances and the many challenges to his security at court, the prince learned to deceive his enemies effectively with an appearance of submission in order to protect himself and ultimately to escape. The third and most important change one sees in Navarre during the period from June 1572 to February 1576 is the growth in his political awareness. Despite his late mother’s powerful influence, religious nurturing, and emphasis on the unity of “blood and religion,” he came to understand that public profession and personal conscience were not necessarily the same thing. Not only could one make a distinction between them, one could also use them separately for separate purposes. This was especially important when dynasticism or political need imposed a requirement of outward religious profession that was not congruent with one’s inner faith. Perhaps the king of Navarre had come to this understanding from the way others had exploited him in his youth and from his experience of carnage and captivity. In any case, he had gradually become convinced that the civil wars were chiefly the result of political causes, backed by zealotry, for which religion was a flimsy pretext, concealing personal or political ambition behind a thin veneer of legitimacy and public appeal. His view was broadened still further by his high station in life and multiplicity of roles – as a great nobleman and leading Huguenot, a monarch in his

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own right, and a prince of the blood in the line of succession to the Catholic French crown. These roles were sometimes complementary and sometimes contradictory. But he had to come to terms with them after his escape from court because he had to sustain all of them at the same time. This alone required him to widen his perspective beyond the limited sectarian view of so many of his contemporaries. Consequently, when Henri launched his independent political career in 1576 by reclaiming his former role as Huguenot chef de parti, it is probable that his intellectual awareness of the possible separation of private belief and external conformity had already begun to permeate, and perhaps even dominate, his political decision-making. This must not be misconstrued as a surrender to simple pragmatism or opportunism. Nor does it indicate a weakening of Henri’s Calvinist convictions, though some may well ask how a believing Huguenot could accept such a division. After all, Calvin certainly insisted that behaviour must conform to belief and make it manifest. But Calvin was not a king, nor did he suffer the same vicissitudes or traumas in his life that Henri de Navarre had been forced to endure. As the founder and leader of his own reformed church, based in the relative security of Geneva, he could afford the luxury of both personal and public commitment. There was no Saint Bartholomew’s in his personal past. Henri, by contrast, was in no such position. Instead, his increasing awareness that private belief and external conformity could and sometimes should be separated was the product of his growing maturity. It signified, with the passage of time and distancing from his mother’s death and the amalgam of all those past influences and experiences that had moulded him, the capstone to the formation of the man and the future leader of men. This duality of perspective was a vital part of any early modern monarch acting en roi, but especially of Navarre, for whom it represented the conflict of obligations that he spent much of his adult life trying to reconcile. Precisely for these reasons, the political program he developed as Huguenot leader after 1576 concentrated on de-emphasizing the religious controversy that divided Frenchmen. Henri promoted, instead, a two-pronged policy of toleration for Calvinists and Catholics alike, and loyalty to the Crown. This allowed him to stress the political causes of the civil wars and to expose the “real” enemies of France who used religion, he argued, to cloak political ambition. To be sure, this was partly a return to the traditional justifications of rebellion used by the first generation of Huguenot leaders. They too had claimed above all else to be fighting in the name of the king for the good of his state. It was also partly a reflection of Jeanne d’Albret’s stern moral lesson to

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her son that he respect and obey the French Crown.14 “I will always abide by my first and last maxim,” she had written once to Charles IX, “which is never to spare my life or goods to show you how much I am your humble and obedient servant.”15 What was unique to Henri de Navarre’s approach was his sincere appeal for political duty to the Crown and French patriotism, side by side with religious toleration, in a way that was more evocative of principle than of princely rebellion. That allowed him to unite men of conflicting religious opinion behind him in a more universal party. It also preserved the integrity of his own faith, protecting him from further political manipulation and giving him an effective voice in French affairs.

a time of r ef lec t io n , fe b r ua ry to june 1576 Immediately following his escape from court in February 1576, Henri’s chief priority was “to re-establish his dignity [as Huguenot chef de parti] so long deprived.”16 But this time he wanted the authority as well as the title. To assert a political presence in the kingdom commensurate with his royal birth and high social rank, and to play thereafter an active and independent part in French affairs while avoiding political isolation, he needed a secure personal power base at the head of his former coreligionaires, many of whom had begun rallying around him already.17 Otherwise, backed by no one, Navarre would be powerless to act effectively and might perhaps fall subject once again to the control of others. That passive, impotent, even submissive role he refused any longer to assume. This aim corresponded to his own conscience and temperament, especially if one accepts that he had sustained strong Calvinist convictions in secret despite his forced conversion to Catholicism and his public display of conformity during his long captivity at the Valois court. But Henri’s goal of resuming the leadership of the Huguenots was not easy to attain. No sooner had he regained his personal freedom than he was confronted with the hard reality of having to separate his “blood and religion” and juggle the demands of both, according to the various political roles he now had to play and the different religious groups he had to court. On the one hand, this conflict stemmed from the two major obstacles he faced in his bid for the Calvinist command. First, there was the challenge of two strong rivals, Henri de Condé and François d’Alençon. Both men had escaped the court much earlier than Navarre and had subsequently established themselves as joint leaders of the Huguenot party. Second, there was the impediment of widespread Calvinist scepticism regarding Henri’s personal commit-

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ment to the Reformed Religion. This was a direct result of his forced conversion to Catholicism and appearance of conformity after August 1572. Added to that scepticism was the Huguenots’ profound mistrust of traditional princely authority after the Valois Crown’s “treacherous” slaughter of its Calvinist subjects on Saint Bartholomew’s Day. On the other hand, this conflict of demands on Navarre also issued from his reluctance, for very political reasons, to take any action that would irreparably alienate Henri III and Catherine de Medici, with whom he still needed to work. Similarly, he dared not estrange those moderate-Catholic nobles who had followed him out of captivity and whose continued support he required. Henri thus faced the dilemma of having to regain the confidence and leadership of the Huguenots without offending or repelling his moderate Catholic backers at the same time. It was a very complex and delicate process indeed to balance his private conscience and political needs in a way that was complementary, not contradictory, to his goals. Ultimately, Navarre’s success in resolving these contrasting demands depended less upon the religion he professed officially following his escape than upon the timing of that public profession of creed. After all, for the majority of contemporary Frenchmen in both sects, his return to Calvinism was a foregone conclusion. Of Henri’s rivals for command, Condé was the stronger. He had the advantage over Alençon of blood, religion, and precedence to support his claim: he was the son of the late Huguenot protector, Louis de Condé; he had been Navarre’s adjutant in the party after his father’s murder in 1569; and he enjoyed a reputation among French Calvinists, especially the zealots, for blind commitment to the Reformed Religion. To be sure, he too had been forced to abjure Calvinism in the aftermath of Saint Bartholomew’s. However, his spirited initial defiance in the face of royal threats and his immediate renunciation of Catholicism on his escape only seventeen months later had strengthened his credibility with the party. In addition, Condé had been regarded by many Huguenots as head of the House of Bourbon and first prince of the blood while his cousin’s captivity continued. Thus, for a variety of reasons the prince had been elected “governor and protector in the name and under the authority of the king [of France]” of the Calvinist party in June 1574.18 That dignity he now viewed as his own, and in 1576 he refused to relinquish it without a struggle. This point was made very clear to his cousin’s agent, François de Ségur, whose initial advances on Henri’s behalf were rebuffed by the prince with the sneer that “the king of Navarre should leave to the Huguenots the management of their own affairs. They have done well enough without him until now!”19

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Although not as secure with the Calvinists as Condé, the duc d’Alençon was also in an advantageous position to challenge Henri for the Huguenot leadership. This was thanks to his place at the apex of the party’s military command. When the Valois prince escaped the court in September 1575, his enraged royal brother, Henri III, initially ordered his recapture dead or alive because of the potential damage he could cause to the Crown’s interests. Only with difficulty was the king dissuaded from this drastic course of action by advisers who pointed out the serious implications of the execution by royal command of a prince of the blood and the heir presumptive to the throne.20 The queen mother was thus sent in pursuit of her fugitive fourth son, whom she finally encountered at Champigny. There, on 21 November, they signed a seven-month truce, in return for which Alençon was promised certain “rewards.”21 But true to his fickle nature, and perhaps fearing for his safety should he return to court without sufficient personal backing to protect his interests, the prince broke the truce in late December or early January 1576. He then offered his leadership to the Calvinists in the current fifth civil war against the Crown. The Huguenots knew full well that he was neither trustworthy as a man nor talented as a commander, irrespective of his Catholic faith – yet another stumbling block. But they had accepted his offer because of the prestige, legitimacy, and protection he could give them in view of his proximity to the French throne.22 Even his religion was politically useful, however, as a means to strengthen the party’s alliance of convenience with Henri duc de Montmorency-Damville (1534–1614) and the Malcontent faction (signed in 1574), and to attract additional Catholic support for the current campaign. For these reasons, when the duke joined Henri de Condé, his Calvinist German ally John Casimir of the Palatinate, and their combined army of 20,000 men in Burgundy, he was recognized as commander-in-chief, owing to his seniority.23 And like Condé, he was unlikely to relinquish his position to the newly escaped Navarre. But this twin challenge represented only one of the obstacles to Henri’s bid for the Calvinist leadership. He also faced the reluctance of many Huguenots to re-acknowledge him as chef de parti merely on the merits of his rank as first prince of the blood, his former dignity as their leader before August 1572, or what they regarded as his longoverdue escape three and a half years later. This was complicated further by the deep mistrust of traditional princely authority that had developed among them in the wake of the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre and the concurrent emergence – “as by a fatal necessity”24 – of a maturing spirit of republicanism. That shift in viewpoints had led

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French Calvinists to redefine the role of their high-born protector – even of someone as acceptable as Condé – along strictly sectarian lines, and to limit sharply his prerogatives by means of civilian control. The essential problem for Navarre was that his religious integrity had become an object of Huguenot suspicion and close scrutiny as a result of his behaviour during the several years of his confinement. The Calvinists knew, of course, that his conversion to Catholicism had been coerced. But his subsequent conformity to the traditional Church without apparent resistance; his participation in the royal siege of La Rochelle, though forced upon him; his apparent fraternization with the most intolerant Catholic nobles; and his reportedly scandalous lifestyle at court all had indicated to them a vacillating religious character that was ultimately untrustworthy. Because this was an age when religious profession usually defined political loyalties, the Huguenots’ misperception of Navarre’s shifting commitment to the Reformed Religion, heedless of the circumstances behind it, called into serious question his political reliability. It appeared by his actions as if their former chef de parti had betrayed the Calvinist cause exactly as his father, Antoine de Bourbon, had done in 1561–62. Even two of Henri’s staunchest supporters within the party, d’Aubigné and Sully, had misread the situation. They, too, were led to attribute his long delay in eluding the court not to the strict conditions of his confinement, but to his alleged reluctance to abandon either his mistress or his promised rewards, a view subsequently adopted by historians.25 To this extent the Valois Crown’s tactical efforts from 1572 to 1576 to separate Henri de Navarre from his Calvinist faith and then to discredit him with the Huguenots (and inadvertently with posterity) had succeeded. Another consideration for the party that might have obstructed Henri’s bid for the Calvinist command was his relative inexperience as a political and military leader. Though praised widely for his intelligence and precociousness as a youth, and though trained carefully by his mother for his future roles as a Huguenot leader and eventual king of Navarre, Henri had been allowed to exercise a semi-independent political authority on very few occasions. Similarly, though present at the battles of Jarnac and Moncontour in 1569 as joint leader with Louis de Condé, and even nominally in command of the Huguenot forces at Arnay-le-duc in 1570 (where, it was reported, he demonstrated considerable talent and courage for his age),26 in reality Navarre had been little more than a spectator at these engagements. Whether or not his inexperience as a leader was significant to Calvinist thinking in 1576 is hard to determine, as there are no indi-

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cations either way. Yet it is possible that this factor was raised as an additional argument against him by those Huguenots who already hesitated to accept his authority on the basis of his past behaviour in religion. Had he simply renounced his forced Catholicism and made immediate public profession of his return to the Reformed Religion after fleeing the Valois court (“without having said goodbye”), Henri might have been restored to his former dignity as Calvinist chef de parti without too much difficulty. After all, it was only in religion that Condé enjoyed an advantage over his first cousin in February 1576. Otherwise, he was inferior to Navarre both in social prestige and precedence of birth. Henri was head of the House of Bourbon, a monarch in his own right, and second in the line of succession to the French throne. By contrast, Condé was the eldest son of a cadet branch of the family and third in line for the crown. Thus, had Navarre returned officially to Calvinism after regaining his freedom, the prince would have been relegated automatically to second place behind his cousin, because of the essential hierarchical structure of sixteenth-century French society and the supreme importance of status in royal blood lines. Henri, moreover, was fully aware of the importance of these two qualities in rallying the Huguenots behind his leadership.27 By the same act of conversion, the duc d’Alençon also could have been displaced. As heir presumptive to Henri III’s crown, he stood a little before Navarre in order of precedence, to be sure. But his Catholicism, noted the latter, necessarily divided the duke from any meaningful commitment to the Calvinists, because he was “contrary in his heart to our religion.” Besides, it was clear that he had allied himself with the party for reasons solely of self-interest and would abandon it easily from the same motives if it served his purpose. Thus, had Henri declared his immediate return to the Reformed Religion at the time of his escape, Alençon would have become dispensable to the party. After all, Navarre’s prestige was as great as, if not superior to, the duke’s in view of his personal royal title, while his political allegiance to Huguenot interests would be more secure because of its grounding in religious profession. Finally, although Henri’s official return to Calvinism might not have restored his credibility among the many partisans who still doubted his religious integrity, it certainly would have satisfied those Huguenots who were motivated more by political than religious grievances (a distinction already made in the 1560s)28 and who recognized the advantages of his leadership for the very reasons he had noted. But Henri had to be mindful of one other strategic consideration before committing himself to making any new profession of religion.

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While for all practical purposes it was incumbent on him to return officially to Calvinism so as to regain the backing of his former Huguenot supporters and reclaim the leadership of their party, yet he could not afford to offend irreparably the Valois king, Henri III, or the queen mother, Catherine de Medici, to both of whom he still swore his loyalty as a French subject. Besides, as a French prince of the blood, he had a fixed place in the hierarchical structure of contemporary society. At its apex ruled Henri III, his lawful sovereign and the proper object of his obedience and respect because of feudal obligation and the dignity of the Crown, regardless of the merits of the man who wore it. This lesson had been impressed repeatedly upon Navarre by his mother’s teachings. Moreover, he recognized that good relations with the court were essential to bolster the legality of the Calvinist cause. For similar reasons, Navarre did not want to alienate, by making too swift a conversion, those malcontent Catholic nobles who had followed him out of captivity. Because his relations with the Calvinists since August 1572 had become so tenuous as a result of his behaviour in captivity, Navarre needed the support of his Catholic noble followers in February 1576 to form the nucleus of an alternative private power base. This had a special appeal for Henri, even as a professed Calvinist, inasmuch as these men generally were ready “[to serve] him disinterestedly and through pure attachment to his person.”29 For this reason alone, recalled the future duc de Sully in later years, Navarre always preferred their support over that of the Huguenots, who tended to view religion – not personal merit or even social prestige – as primary in determining their loyalties to their leaders. Finally, there was a personal element to Henri’s thinking. He had come to recognize that a hasty conversion might make him appear too casual in his religious commitments. He understood that his enemies, such as the Guises, would not fail to use this as a moral weapon against him. What Navarre was contemplating was his fifth conversion to date, and the stigma of insincerity in his religious choices at this moment would surely ruin his credibility with everyone, sympathetic Catholics and Calvinists alike. These various factors were interrelated and to a degree interdependent. Moreover, they constituted the matrix within which Henri’s political decision-making evolved after February 1576. But what they reflected most of all was his steady maturing into a stronger and more self-assured young man. He emerged from the profound formative experiences of his captivity with a sophisticated understanding of what was and was not possible in resolving the various problems he had to face and the conflicting demands of his new position. He was now very different from the intelligent but callow youth who had gone to Paris

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in 1572 to embark on his ill-starred marriage to Marguerite de Valois. Though hardly two months into his twenty-third year at the time of his escape, as events were to show he had begun to calculate the possibilities and potential consequences of his religious and political decisions with an astuteness and instinct usually associated with greater age and broader exposure. Even professional historians frequently forget just how young were early modern men and women of royal or high noble birth when they were expected to take the burden of great responsibility upon their shoulders. This feature is almost foreign to the modern age. Charles V, for example, was only nineteen when elected to the Holy Roman Imperial Crown, with authority over vast territories that eventually stretched from Europe to Asia. Yet already he had been king of Spain for two years. Similarly, in 1610 the nine-year-old Louis XIII succeeded to the French throne. Just seven years later he organized a palace coup that toppled his mother, Marie de Medici, and her faction from power in order to take royal authority into his own hands. Henri de Navarre was clearly no exception to this general pattern. Indeed, what one sees in him after 1576 is the prince developing into the king. Thus, guided by his sharpening instincts and awareness of the weaknesses of his situation, Henri refused to make any hasty religious or political commitments immediately following his escape from court, knowing that such actions might damage rather than strengthen his tenuous position, disaffect his few Catholic or Huguenot supporters, or alienate irrevocably the Valois Crown. Instead, he moved very cautiously. His only decisive act was to repudiate his coerced conversion to Catholicism in a “full declaration that he had been constrained by force on Saint Bartholomew’s [sic] to adopt this religion, in which he neither had been nourished nor had any prior disposition in his soul [to embrace].”30 This announcement surprised no one.31 Unexpected and inexplicable, however, was Henri’s omission of making a formal profession of Calvinism at the same time, especially in view of his strong personal convictions and obvious political need to re-establish himself with the Huguenots. The issue here was not whether Navarre would resume the profession of the Reformed Religion. That was a foregone conclusion. Indeed, one must weigh the significance of his comment during his flight from court that he left behind two things he did not regret, the foremost of which was the Catholic mass.32 This, together with his formal repudiation of that unwanted creed, suggests that religion was an integral part of his thinking, side by side with politics. The real issue was the problem of timing, and specifically Henri’s recognition at this juncture of a need for delay in making any new public profession of

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faith in order to leave open, temporarily, the question of his religious commitments. His reasoning here was twofold: devotional and strategic. Though deeply committed in his conscience to Calvinism, his forced conversion of 1572 nonetheless represented a public act of apostasy. John Calvin defined this “unpardonable sin” as “ignorance joined with unbelief” and a “rebellion by which the reprobate forsake salvation.”33 Apostasy was, in short, the ultimate breach of faith. At the same time, it was as a breach of Henri’s promise to his late mother never “to abandon this divine league [i.e., the Reformed Religion] by the apostasies of voluptuous living and the ordinary corruptions of this world.” How far this matter troubled Navarre in his conscience is difficult to determine, since existing evidence is circumstantial. Yet it is significant that even though Calvinist sermons were heard at the small court he established following his escape and, on at least one occasion, he attended a Huguenot baptismal service, at no time over the next five months did Navarre receive communion in conformity with the rites of the Reformed Church.34 According to St Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, this fundamental Christian sacrament demanded of its celebrants “an attitudinal change, not just a promise; reconciliation rather than mere external obedience.”35 The apostle warned in particular that: “[w]herefore whosoever shall eat this bread, and drink this cup of the Lord, unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord ... For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself, not discerning the Lord’s body. For this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep.”36 In other words, anyone who celebrated communion in bad faith or with an agitated heart was guilty of impiety or blasphemy, and thus subjected himself to divine judgment. As David Sabean observes in his study of peasant culture in late sixteenth-century Württemburg, the meaning of this scripture was taken literally by contemporary Protestants and Catholics alike.37 There is no reason to suspect that Henri de Navarre differed in his views or that the scriptural admonition quoted above did not affect him, too. After all, he was his mother’s son and had been instructed carefully in the tenets of his Calvinist creed. Moreover, he had just emerged from captivity at the Valois court, where he had been forced to profess a faith that he did not believe and to observe its sacraments for three and a half years. Certainly, his heart was agitated against his gaolers if his first statements on achieving his freedom are any indication. Hence, it is probable that Henri, like any other Christian of his day, needed a period of self-reflection, penitence or even contrition, according to the demands of scripture and Calvinist theology,38 before

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he received “worthily” the sacrament of communion within the Reformed Church. Otherwise, he risked his mortal soul. In Calvinist and Catholic doctrine alike, the Eucharist did not bring a peaceful heart; rather, a peaceful heart was a precondition for taking the Eucharist.39 Indeed, wrote John Calvin, “no one can embrace the grace of the gospel without betaking himself from the errors of his past life into the right way, and applying his whole effort to the practice of repentance.”40 Therein lay justification by faith. At the same time, however, Henri’s devotional concerns were balanced by an important strategic element in his thinking. Specifically, the act of receiving communion according to Calvinist rite would have been the definitive outward symbol that he professed the Reformed Religion. Yet it is clear from his subsequent actions that while he would take the time needed to atone for his apostasy and reconcile his conscience with his former creed, he would return officially to Calvinism only at the earliest practical moment. Under present circumstances, ambiguity was Navarre’s best political ally. So long as he remained publicly uncommitted to the reformed faith, he could attract support from Huguenot and moderate-Catholic groups alike, without alienating either. This would allow him to build the power base he needed from which to challenge Alençon and Condé for the Calvinist command, and to establish his political influence in both the party and the kingdom at large. Furthermore, confessional ambiguity allowed him to dissociate himself politically from the current Huguenot rebellion and its two princely leaders. For similar reasons, Henri also withdrew into self-imposed isolation, using the force of geography to emphasize still further his detachment from the current troubles and troublemakers in France. He set up a temporary headquarters at strategically situated Saumur on the Loire River, which added military neutrality to his posture of religious ambiguity. He then summoned various Huguenot nobles to join him with their troops, the latter to provide protection against possible enemy attack, and to help secure the districts surrounding his stronghold on the banks of the Loire.41 These summonses served an important additional function. They represented a clear announcement that Navarre had assumed the Calvinist command as if the continuity of his leadership had never been interrupted and he was still the de facto chef de parti. In effect, by appealing directly to individual Huguenot noblemen, from whose loyalty and support he planned to fashion a personal following within the party itself, and by refusing to join his two rivals’ rebellion (which helped meantime to reassure the Crown of his political intentions), he offered an oblique challenge to Alençon and Condé for the party

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command. That struck at the very core of the princes’ power and prestige, since it undermined their pre-eminence as well as the legitimacy of their claims to lead. And he accomplished this without weakening the combined rebel faction, which Henri judiciously called “the party of the common cause” at this time.42 A more explicit appeal surely would have split it into rival groups under separate commanders during the current crisis, with potentially severe consequences for the Huguenots. Meanwhile, the king of Navarre assiduously avoided making any outward sign of commitment to the Calvinist creed. Instead, complained Agrippa d’Aubigné, he lived at Saumur for the next five months, “without profession of religion.”43 Henri’s posture of military neutrality and religious ambiguity quickly produced results. One of these was the swift reaction of Henri III, who put aside his initial anger at his brother-in-law’s escape to try to tempt him back into the royal Catholic fold with gifts of money, horses, and other “rewards.”44 The Valois king feared that the fugitive Navarre would make common cause with Condé and Alençon, and he was desperate for peace at any price.45 Besides, he probably was encouraged along this route by the conciliatory letter Henri wrote to him immediately after his escape. This assured the worried French monarch that his cousin “knew in his conscience the amity and good will” that Henri III bore him and that he “would do nothing prejudicial to the Crown.”46 The outcome was that smoother relations gradually resumed between the two kings. This gave the Calvinist leader important advantages later on when he began formulating his broader political plans. A second result of Navarre’s posture of non-commitment was the effect it produced on one of his princely rivals for the Huguenot command. An anxious duc d’Alençon also contacted him at Saumur, similarly hoping to persuade him not to convert. To that end, the prince argued that by remaining Catholic, Henri would be in a good position to demand his former gouvernement of Guyenne as an appanage and to obtain the strongholds of Blaye, Château-Trompette (commanding Bordeaux), and Bayonne as security in any future agreement with the Crown. As well, if Henri were to make himself joint leader of the Catholic Malcontents with Alençon and Montmorency-Damville, who were already allied with Condé and the Huguenots, he could use his position to intimidate Henri III still further. Alençon’s motive for this “friendly” overture was, however, strictly self-interest, as he “feared being supplanted of all credit with the [Calvinist] party.”47 The prince recognized that once Navarre returned officially to the Reformed Religion, he himself would lose his joint leadership of the Huguenots and the political leverage that this

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gave him in France.48 So it was in Alençon’s best interests to convince Henri to remain a Catholic. But Navarre refused to be bribed or cajoled by either the French king or his younger brother into accepting the alternative they offered, despite its obvious and potential advantages. Instead, he continued to demure, refusing for the moment to give any concrete indication of renewing his formal commitment to the Reformed Religion. As a result, some Huguenot observers (and not a few historians) misread his temporizing as simple vacillation or perhaps even insincerity, because it appeared to them that Henri had not yet “resolved what he would do with regard to his religion.”49 Navarre was not insensitive to this criticism, or to the problem that the longer he delayed a formal announcement, the greater his risk of alienating the Huguenots. Yet he dared not act precipitately, whatever the reservations in his own conscience. So he waited patiently at Saumur until such time as the political conditions in France reached a point where his own position was more secure and a formal announcement could be made. That point finally arrived in early May with the ending of the fifth civil war. Only then did Henri write to the vicomte de Gourdon, Jeanne d’Albret’s trusted friend and confidant, instructing him to spread the word privately among the Huguenots that the king of Navarre’s conformity to Catholicism between 1572 and 1576 had been both counterfeit and coerced, which many knew already. Henri wrote that “finding myself ... free of my former apprehensions and past pains, I have declared expressly before everyone and in due form ... [that] I am returning my soul to the exercise of the Reformed Religion and profess to live and die in it, and to sustain and defend it at the cost of my blood.”50 Furthermore, Gourdon was to explain Navarre’s motives for his singular behaviour as a captive at court and his subsequent actions following his escape. Significantly, this letter was penned just four days before the conclusion of the Peace of Beaulieu. Signed on 6 and 7 May, the treaty put a temporary end to the hostilities between the Catholic Crown and its Huguenot and Malcontent subjects. Still more noteworthy, however, is that Henri did not declare his official return to Calvinism until 13 June at Niort,51 more than a month later. What this lengthy delay indicates, along with his other actions in the five months that followed his flight from court and the timing of his private letter to Gourdon, is that although Navarre knew where his heart lay in matters of faith, his political head was astute enough to recognize the importance of moving cautiously to avoid creating negative impressions. He did not want the Huguenots to perceive him to be vacillat-

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ing in his religious commitments, as his flat repudiation of Catholicism in February and his unofficial instructions to the vicomte de Gourdon in May certainly indicate. But neither could he afford to appear insincere in his religious choices; had he rushed too hastily to profess the Calvinist faith after either his escape or the conclusion of the Peace of Beaulieu, people might have attributed his action to crass political opportunism. Hence his need for restraint. There was also the devotional matter of whether, in good conscience, he could have made an immediate public profession in any case, as this depended upon his worthiness to receive the sacrament of communion according to scripture and Calvinist teaching. Before Navarre could reaffirm his profession of faith, that had to be sorted out, too, during a period of self-reflection. Above all else, however, this delay implies that Henri already had formed a determination in his own mind not to make religion, and specifically his religion, the focal point for rebellion or the current political chaos in France. As will become evident, this was perhaps the principal foundation of his developing political outlook and the constant theme of his career until at least 1593. The assertion, therefore, that Henri’s long delay in returning officially to the Calvinist profession of faith “indicates just how incidental his confessional allegiances had become to him,”52 not only dismisses the complexities of Navarre’s position, but also ignores important clues to his thinking that are found in the existing evidence and that refute such a view. At the same time, the king’s determination required him to walk a very narrow path in order to reconcile his personal convictions with his political needs and responsibilities as he struggled to preserve his integrity in the public eye. How narrow that path was is evident from the various reactions to Henri’s new declaration of religious profession and the fact that despite his best efforts he was unable to avoid criticism of his motives. As expected, he lost the support of a number of Catholics who had followed him out of captivity. One was Nogaret de La Valette, who had promised his father never to serve a heretic prince.53 There were others, too, such as the moderate Michel de Montaigne, who suspected that Henri’s profession of Calvinism was insincere and a mere pretext to avoid abandonment by the Huguenots.54 Many French Calvinists were similarly sceptical of Henri’s motives, as indicated by the very cool reception they gave him at La Rochelle on 28 June. Although he was received with the honour due to his royal rank and prestige as a prince of the blood, he was not acknowledged as the Huguenot chef de parti. That did not occur until a year later. Furthermore, the Rochelais conspicuously denied him certain marks of

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respect he had formerly enjoyed as party leader. They also required him to make a humiliating public penance for having been “reduced” into the “Roman Religion” by threats in 1572.55 In fact, everyone forced to convert in the wake of the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre had to undergo these rituals for both scriptural and practical reasons. From the Calvinist perspective, their apostasy had broken the bonds of church and community, and had also exposed “the failure of faith that afflicted a portion” of the Huguenot congregation when threatened by death.56 Knowing that their creed was doomed if its adherents cowered in the face of persecution, the ministers and elders responsible for church discipline insisted as strongly as Calvin ever had upon the need for total commitment on the part of their flock. Nor did their theological principles allow for anything less than complete dedication. Only this, together with the common bonds that united all French Calvinists, fortified the Reformed Religion against eradication in a hostile kingdom. Hence, Huguenot ministers refused to permit church members, however exalted in rank, “to go through the motions of Catholic practice, even when such subterfuges might guarantee their safety.”57 It is perhaps significant that no exception was made for the king of Navarre. Obviously, however much his new profession of the Reformed Religion helped in restoring his credit among the Calvinists, the memory of his past behaviour in captivity at court still lingered. And the length of time between his escape and his formal return to their faith had also left a negative impression. Additionally, the Huguenots had serious misgivings about the now officially Calvinist Navarre’s continued fraternization with the moderate Catholics still riding in his suite. Henri had tried to overcome their doubts by promising to send the Rochelais a list of the men who accompanied him so that anyone suspected of participation in the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre might be denied entry.58 But despite his offer, only Navarre and his Calvinist followers were permitted inside. For Henri, it must have seemed by late June 1576 that his situation was becoming more stable and that with the easing of some of the tensions he had faced the previous February, his place within French politics and the Huguenot party – though still unsettled – was becoming more sharply defined. Having survived the traumas of Saint Bartholomew’s and escaped the court, he had the time at Saumur to wrestle with the conflicts that arose between the drive of his conscience and the demands of the circumstances imposed upon him by his birth, training, and position. Clearly, during the first few months that followed his flight he was feeling his way. The confidence he would show in subsequent years had not yet blossomed fully. Navarre

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was still learning the difficult and complex role of a prince. In the process, he found that he was not only able, but was forced, to make his own religious and political decisions and to take responsibility for charting his own course.

t h e y ears of prepar at io n , ju n e 1 5 7 6 to june 1584 Once the Peace of Beaulieu had been signed and Henri had made official his profession of Calvinism, he was free to pursue more aggressively his political aspirations. France technically was at peace and the question of his own religious affiliation had been set aside. Still unresolved, however, was his need to regain his former position as Huguenot chef de parti. The Calvinists’ less-than-enthusiastic reception of him at La Rochelle had demonstrated that this would take time, as he had not yet won their full confidence or support. Even after the Huguenot assembly of Montauban finally restored him to the leadership in 1577, in order to preserve his freedom of action he had to struggle against the restrictions on his authority imposed by councils and clerics. Nevertheless, Navarre’s return to the Reformed Religion had brought him at least one important advantage: it had strengthened his hand against the prince de Condé and the duc d’Alençon,59 his two rivals for command. They now found that their prestige and authority in the party had been undercut significantly by their cousin’s “conversion,” just as he had anticipated.60 On a much broader level, meanwhile, was the king of Navarre’s growing concern that the civil struggles in France be confined to a political vein and that there be less emphasis on the fundamental religious quarrel that divided his countrymen, menaced the existence of the Reformed Church, and threatened his private conscience. Political ambitions, he now began to claim, were what actually motivated the powerful leaders of the various Catholic factions. This concern, evident in Henri’s strategic thinking as early as February 1576 and perhaps before, underpinned his tentative assertion from June onwards of a unique politique perspective on the wars, which he founded upon twin principles of religious toleration and loyalty to the Crown, even patriotism. Only that platform, with the explosive factor of religion disarmed, could achieve a larger consensus and subsume a number of differences in the ongoing political and sectarian quarrels. In this way, by cutting across religious lines to attract substantial backing both for himself and the Huguenots from moderate-Catholic sources, Henri prepared as far as possible for an uncertain political future. In the meantime, he accommodated his own political aspira-

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tions and personal religious convictions in a manner that was complementary, not contradictory, to his goals. Yet however broad his developing perspective, Henri’s immediate political future in France still depended upon the very partisan problem of securing the Huguenot leadership from his two rivals. Condé, obviously, was his chief opponent. The prince’s firmly entrenched position within the party as its elected protector since 1574 and his credit among Calvinist zealots gave him a personal basis of power. Navarre was thus unable to challenge his cousin by direct frontal assault. His methods had to be much more oblique and, consequently, less effective, if only to preserve Huguenot unity in the face of the continuing Catholic military threat. But at the same time, Henri was well aware that he enjoyed the powerful advantage of precedence over Condé in both blood and prestige of royal rank. These qualities, combined with his public profession of Calvinism, automatically reduced the prince to a subordinate position.61 Nevertheless, Condé stubbornly refused to relinquish his former authority to his cousin and even rejected the assembly of Montauban’s restoration of Navarre to the party leadership a year later. This resulted in a divided command that had serious consequences for Calvinist military operations during the sixth civil war that broke out in spring 1577. In what was dubbed subsequently as the “year of evil tidings” by the Huguenots because of their numerous reverses on the battlefield, they lost, in the unfavourable terms of the Peace of Bergerac (signed on 3 September), many of their gains from the previous treaty of Beaulieu. Directly responsible for much of their ill success was the continuing rivalry between the two Bourbon princes, which threatened to divide the party into factions.62 Fortunately for Navarre and his reputation, most of the blame for the deterioration of Huguenot fortunes fell upon Condé, as many Calvinists complained that “rather than the public good, the said prince had been motivated by his particular interest.”63 They also increasingly objected to his authoritarian manner and insolent behaviour toward Huguenot civilian leaders, an additional source of friction.64 For his part, Henri tried to preserve at lease a façade of unity. In 1579, for example, he excused Condé’s unauthorized seizure of Catholic La Fère in Picardy to an angry Valois Crown. That bellicose act openly violated the treaties of Beaulieu and Bergerac.65 But this façade was shattered during the so-called Lovers’ War of 1580 (the seventh of France’s civil-religious conflicts),66 when the prince refused all military cooperation with Navarre. Worse still, he seized a number of towns in Dauphiné and Languedoc that had pledged their allegiance to his royal cousin, the acknowledged chef de parti. He even

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dared to use two of these strongholds as collateral in hiring German mercenary troops from his former co-commander, John Casimir of the Palatinate. The subsequent clash between the two men finally bifurcated the Huguenot party into distinct factions, something Henri had wanted to avoid. Hence, Henri pressed forward his separate peace negotiations with the French Crown before its forces derived any advantage from the schism.67 Condé repudiated the terms of the treaty signed at Fleix on 26 November, and matters did not improve with the outbreak of the eighth and last of the civil wars in September 1585, when, as a result of his rash behaviour and impetuosity, the Huguenots suffered potentially serious reverses in the opening rounds of the new campaign at Brouage and Angers. Obstinacy, bad judgment, and a continuing refusal to coordinate his military efforts with those of Navarre characterized the prince’s record. Condé proved to be a stubborn opponent whose obstruction Henri never overcame completely. Moreover, his negative influence on the party lasted beyond his death in 1588. His former supporters, the most militant and fanatical Huguenots, grudgingly shifted their political obedience to his royal cousin, but they withheld their personal loyalty. Thus, it is hardly surprising that when Navarre, as the new king of France, was forced at last to convert to Catholicism in 1593, these men were the first to abandon him. By contrast, François d’Alençon was far more vulnerable. His leadership of the “party of the common cause” was already tenuous, even without the additional interference of the Valois Crown and Navarre. This was chiefly because the duke had never regarded his alliance with the Huguenots as anything more than a temporary political expedient that would last only so long as it served his interests. This much is clear from remarks made by contemporary observers, such as his brother-inlaw Henri, his sister Marguerite de Valois, and his former retainer the vicomte de Turenne.68 It is similarly obvious from the prince’s own efforts to impede Calvinist military operations between January and May 1576, the better to facilitate his private negotiations with the Catholic court.69 Furthermore, Alençon both disliked and distrusted his allies, about whom he once openly sneered: “One has only to know the Huguenots to hate them. I have never known any men of worth among them except François de La Noue.”70 Thus, if the duke was separated easily from the Calvinists by the concurrent efforts of the Valois Crown and the king of Navarre, it was largely because of the wide breach that already existed between himself and the party. To enlarge that breach, Catherine de Medici had been working steadily on the court’s behalf to lure the duke back into the royal

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camp with the usual promises of reward, just as she had succeeded temporarily in doing the previous fall at Champigny. But although Alençon was receptive to her offers, “saying that the court was much more pleasant ... than the war, and that he despised a party where his authority was not absolute,”71 he refused to drop the Calvinist alliance before a formal treaty was signed to end the conflict. He feared, in short, the loss of his advantages and political leverage. Once the fifth war was concluded, however, and his various emoluments were secure, he swiftly returned to court. The Peace of Beaulieu (also called the Peace of Monsieur because of Alençon’s backing for it) thus effectively divided him from the Huguenots. Thereafter, to prevent any further collusion with his former allies, the Crown saw to it that he was identified strictly with Catholic interests. For that reason, in mid-1576 he was compelled to join the newly formed Catholic League (along with Henri III’s mignons) after the king had assumed its leadership.72 Similarly, when civil war once more broke out the following March 1577, the prince was given command of a large army to lead against the Huguenot strongholds of La Charité and Issoire.73 This snapped whatever remaining ties he had retained with the party. But in two vital ways Henri de Navarre also contributed to his brother-in-law’s split with the Calvinists. First, by returning publicly to the profession of the Reformed Religion in June 1576, he immediately “won credit with the party, and diminished that of Alençon.”74 Second, by enforcing a policy of religious toleration in his restored gouvernement of Guyenne, which also accorded with the recent treaty of Beaulieu, Navarre was able to represent himself as the real “guarantor of the Peace of Monsieur.” That this prominent role was relinquished by the negligent Valois prince became especially clear after he forbade Calvinist worship in Provins and Tours, two towns awarded him as part of his new appanages. Thus, Henri helped to detach Alençon politically from the Huguenots, while strengthening substantially his own position as their chef de parti. Especially ironic, however, was that by insisting that Navarre participate in the treaty in the first place, Alençon naively diminished his own role and enhanced that of his rival in the councils of the Huguenots, even though Henri’s religious profession was still ambiguous at the time the peace was signed. Alençon probably hoped by this gesture to encourage his brother-in-law to remain Catholic, despite his repudiation of that creed in February. As well, by supporting Henri’s restoration to the governorship of Guyenne (which he had been granted first in 1562 on his father’s death), the Valois prince accelerated his rival’s political ascendancy within both the kingdom and the

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Calvinist party. Together with his patrimonial domains, this gouvernement gave Henri a large territorial power base in the southwest of France, over which he now exercised extensive legal, administrative, and military authority as a great officer of the Crown. The full extent and significance of that power was attested to by the Huguenot duc de La Force. He explained that in the absence of the French king, a governor or lieutenant-general of a province legally exercised the monarch’s civil and military powers as if the sovereign were physically present.75 In Henri’s case, all of these prerogatives were underpinned and reinforced by the religious, traditional, and even feudal family ties of the Albrets (his maternal line) to the large Huguenot community and the regional Catholic nobility.76 It was the fulfilment of what Théodore de Bèze had anticipated for the young prince ten years before. Thus, thanks in large measure to Alençon’s naivety, Henri de Navarre became henceforth a major player in French politics and religion who had to be taken seriously by the Valois Crown and the Calvinist party alike. But in spite of the displacement of his two princely rivals for command and his restoration as Huguenot chef de parti in 1577, Henri’s hold on the Calvinist leadership was still insecure because of the many limitations placed on his authority. This was due to the profound effect that Saint Bartholomew’s continued to exercise on Huguenot attitudes. The massacre had shattered old perceptions of the relationship between the Catholic French Crown and its Calvinist subjects. This had led in turn to the emergence of a new spirit of republicanism, even militancy, among Huguenot survivors of the carnage, best expressed after 1572 in the polemical writings of François Hotman, Théodore de Bèze, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, and others.77 It also had produced among French Calvinists a corresponding mistrust of unlimited authority vested in one man alone, whether or not he was a Huguenot prince of the blood. This was an obvious corollary to their rejection of John Calvin’s initial theological affirmation of dutiful obedience (or, if necessary, passive resistance) to legitimately consecrated, divinely ordained monarchy, no matter how oppressive it seemed to be. According to Calvin’s theology, only when a prince became a tyrant by making war on his subjects in violation of his royal covenant with God, affirmed by his coronation oaths, could the lesser magistrates defy the throne with overt force. Thus, in place of the obligation of obedience, as confirmed by the Huguenot “confession” of May 1559 that the king’s “laws and statutes must be obeyed, [and] we must ... bear the yoke of subjection with frank willingness, even though the ruler be unfaithful,”78 there emerged new ideas of popular sovereignty.

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Yet despite this dramatic change in attitudes the Huguenots could not escape the essential hierarchical structure of French society or the conservative mentalité of the age that still permeated their political relationships. They continued to recognize the need for the more centralized, traditional authority of a great nobleman or prince of the blood to preserve the unity of their party and its command. At the same time, such a leader would legitimize their armed resistance to the Valois Crown according to the customary legal and theological justifications.79 For these reasons, after 1572 the Calvinists anxiously sought a prince of the blood to lead them.80 But this time, they wanted one whose role and responsibilities were redefined narrowly according to the party’s religious interests and political needs. His jurisdiction over Huguenot affairs was to be limited sharply, therefore, as defined by the rudimentary constitution that had been sketched out for the organization of an autonomous Calvinist republic within France, the so-called United Provinces of the Midi.81 In effect, the Huguenots envisaged their new chef de parti as an elected officer whose primary duties were to execute the policies of Calvinist political assemblies, defend the interests of the party exclusively, and conduct military operations, all under the close scrutiny of civilian agencies. Precisely what practical shape these limitations on Henri de Navarre’s authority assumed in 1577 remains obscure because of the lack of detailed information. Existing evidence suggests, however, that these limitations were similar in character and extent to those imposed earlier on Henri de Condé, following his escape from court in March 1574 and subsequent election in June as Calvinist protector. At that time, before a group of distinguished witnesses and Huguenot representatives from the assembly of Milhau, Condé had had to swear an oath to live and die in the Reformed Religion, to promise his full support in Huguenot negotiations with the Crown, and to lay down his arms and make peace with the French king only with the consent of the party. Furthermore, the prince had been encumbered with a small council of clerics and civilian advisers to oversee his activities and to review both his military conduct and political decisions in their capacity as watchdogs for the Calvinist cause. Previously, in 1569, when Henri de Navarre had first been acknowledged as chef de parti, a similar council had been formed “to give him advice and to guide him.”82 But in reality this was political windowdressing to legitimize decisions made in his name by the real makers of Calvinist policy, since the prince was too young and inexperienced at the time to exercise authority on his own. In sharp contrast, the council that was attached to Condé in 1574 (and subsequently to Navarre in 1577) was created specifically to ensure that the prince did

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nothing detrimental to the party’s needs and would be unable to act on his own initiative through self-interest. One also suspects that because both princes had been compelled to convert to Catholicism after the massacre of 1572, these councils were created to ensure their religious conformity and personal commitment to the Reformed faith. No wonder Agrippa d’Aubigné later complained that under such circumstances “a prince of the Huguenots has as many controllers as servitors!”83 Perhaps the most significant change of all, however, was that Condé and Navarre, in turn, became chef de parti, in 1574 and 1577 respectively, by election. This was unprecedented. To be sure, in February 1574, just prior to Condé’s escape from court, the Calvinists of La Rochelle had elected François de La Noue as a desperately needed interim commander.84 But that was a logical means of selection given that the highly respected old soldier was not of royal blood and, therefore, lacked the essential qualification to assume the mantle of leadership on his own authority. The same impediment had faced Gaspard de Coligny in 1569. Otherwise, prior to 1572 the Huguenots either had offered the command to a French prince, as in 1560–61 when they solicited first Antoine de Bourbon and then Louis de Condé to lead them, or else they had accepted passively the acclamation of a new commander by the great nobles of the party, such as in 1569 when Henri de Navarre was proclaimed the Calvinist chief by Jeanne d’Albret and Coligny. Because of the young prince’s royal blood, prestige, and grooming for the role, he was seen as the natural successor to the murdered Louis de Condé. In practice, however, many of these narrow limitations on Henri’s authority quickly broke down. The conditions of repeated civil war made frequent communications virtually impossible, while the declining fortunes of Huguenot military operations between 1577 and 1584 placed a heavy premium on traditional hierarchical leadership. Still, some constraints – such as the small advisory council and the interference of republican-minded Calvinist political assemblies – remained to inhibit the youthful king’s freedom of action and decision, often at critical moments. Nor was their impact upon Henri the only adverse effect of these innovations in restricted leadership. Combined with the mentalité that lay behind them, they steadily undermined the Huguenots’ politicalmilitary alliance of 1574 with the Malcontent faction. This was due to Calvinist efforts to apply the same limitations to the moderate-Catholic leader, the duc de Montmorency-Damville, who had been named second-in-command to Henri de Condé by the assembly of Milhau. Because many sectarian-minded Huguenots mistrusted the duke’s

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Catholicism, they wanted to restrict his effective authority by creating another advisory council to oversee his activities.85 But this was unacceptable to the politique leader, who mistrusted in turn his allies’ growing republican sentiments. Indeed, observed the contemporary Calvinist historian La Popolinière, the esprit des marchands of the Huguenot political assemblies clashed with the esprit de corps of the old nobility. Meanwhile, the kind of powers demanded by men like Montmorency-Damville, Condé, and even Henri de Navarre “were not compatible with the equality of the Third Estate.”86 The result was that by 1577, just as Navarre was being restored as Huguenot chef de parti, the Catholic duke renounced his alliance with the Calvinists. He denigrated them as mere shopkeepers “inexperienced in affairs” and “enemies to all the nobility ... [as they] wanted popular and communal domination.”87 In effect, by redefining the role and restricting the authority of the party leadership along strict sectarian lines, the Huguenots were condemning themselves to political isolation and possibly, therefore, ultimate annihilation. Because they were an embattled minority, it was natural that their focus became increasingly partisan. But they also developed in the process an ever-deeper optimism that the “undeniable truth” of their religion would prevail in the end. The problem was, however, that this restricted perspective severely clouded their vision of the broader French political scene and its daily changes. It also cost them the support of moderate-Catholic allies whose political and military clout alone gave the Calvinist party the means of defending itself more effectively in the long run. Indeed, only the emptiness of the royal treasury and the factionalism at the Valois court, where the Guises and Henri III vied for domination, prevented the Catholic Crown from prosecuting the war against its rebellious Huguenot subjects in 1577 and 1580 with such force and concentration as to destroy them. Calvinist military operations were certainly lack-lustre during these two limited conflicts, indicating that the party was already finding it difficult to defend itself without moderate-Catholic aid even in the short term. The continuing rivalry between Navarre and Condé over the leadership, the Huguenots’ lack of resources, and their apparent inability (or perhaps simple refusal) to raise sufficient troops and funds for new campaigns also had a serious effect. In 1576 and certainly in 1577, these circumstances posed both problems and possibilities for the chef de parti, Henri de Navarre, whose background gave him necessarily different perspectives from those of Huguenot assemblies and councils. To be sure, their efforts to impose various restrictions on his leadership created difficulties. But

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he brought to his situation a maturing political outlook, conditioned by boyhood memories of being shuffled repeatedly between the Calvinist and Catholic creeds by his parents and other French leaders. This memory was sharpened, even focused, by his experience of the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre and subsequent years of captivity. That unique viewpoint helped him exploit prevailing circumstances to his own advantage. Already, the young king had demonstrated considerable subtlety of understanding in the way he had handled difficulties after his escape from court. He had been astute enough to recognize the political realities of his situation and the dangers of an immediate public profession of the Reformed Religion. How different was the approach of Henri de Guise and Henri de Condé, whose separate careers illustrate that religious zealotry could be just as constricting as iron shackles. Whatever the motives they might otherwise have had for their respective actions and decisions, their narrow sectarian outlook effectively tied their hands and prevented any kind of compromise with moderates on either side of the quarrel. So what was regarded as a source of strength in many contemporary eyes was in reality and historical hindsight a serious weakness. By contrast, Henri de Navarre consciously held himself aloof from the intense partisanship and religious extremism that characterized his ultra-Catholic enemy and zealous Calvinist cousin. Instead, he perceived, in a way no former Huguenot leader ever had, that if he were to lead with any kind of success, he could not allow his political decision-making to be shackled by religious partisanship or by the French Calvinists’ inflexible interpretation of his role as chef de parti. He had to be free to take full advantage of the shifting political alliances and circumstances of the civil upheavals to strengthen his leadership and position. Hitherto, only Gaspard de Coligny had developed some notion of the problems posed by this linkage of religious commitment to political factionalism. He also had perceived how the blending of these two factors made stereotypes of the contending parties, and thus of their leaders, from the outset of the conflicts. Addressing a Huguenot council of war in 1562, the late admiral had warned that the ultraCatholic Guises would enjoy widespread popular support as the “Party of Order” in the coming contest of arms, for they appeared to be defending the established order of society and government, which were hallowed by the traditional Church. By contrast, the Huguenots seemed to be menacing both foundations of the French state through their religious dissent.88 But the admiral never found a viable solution to this problem.

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What Henri de Navarre understood, as the Huguenot councils and clerics who tried to shackle him did not, was that so long as the explosive issue of religion dominated this essentially political quarrel, the Huguenots would continue to be seen as mere rebels and subversives. That in turn would prevent him from cutting across religious lines to secure the support of moderate Catholics, essential to their survival. The Calvinists lacked sufficient numbers and resources to convert France to the Reformed Religion or to defeat single-handedly their more numerous and better-supplied Catholic opponents. Furthermore, as Henri’s relationship with the Huguenots was still fragile (in spite of his recent “conversion” and subsequent restoration as their chef de parti), he had to extend his personal power base among sympathetic Catholic nobles whose loyalty and support would be based upon personal attachment rather than a common religious commitment. That was essential if he were to strengthen his hold over the party, undermine civilian control, and increase his effectiveness as a leader on the national stage. But to achieve this, he had to strike a larger consensus between the two groups, one that would emphasize their common political goals and minimize their religious differences. But perhaps the most important factor that shaped Henri’s perception of what he had to do (and the one usually forgotten by modern historians too quick to label his outlook either as religious scepticism or mere opportunism) was his royal blood. He was much more than a private Huguenot or a Calvinist chef de parti; he was also a monarch in his own right as king of Navarre and a French prince of the blood in the line of succession to the throne. Of these public roles he was acutely aware.89 Thus, he shared ambitions and responsibilities in common with great Catholic noblemen of his day, and these naturally placed him in the forefront of French affairs. This certainly was expected of him, given contemporary attitudes – Catholic or Calvinist, rebel or royalist – toward the corrective role of the prince of the blood in government, combined with the hierarchical structure of sixteenthcentury French society. Moreover, as an heir to the French Crown, however distant, Henri’s personal fortunes were tied automatically to the interests and general welfare of the kingdom he might one day inherit. Perhaps this, too, had been a consideration for Jeanne d’Albret, whose greatest ambition (her modern biographer claims) “was the strengthening of her son’s position as an heir to the throne of France.”90 Besides, there was also the politically significant fact that the French kingdom was not a collection of separate principalities in which the Huguenots could establish an independent enclave, such as the

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Lutherans had done in the Holy Roman Empire with the support of the territorial princes and the conclusion of the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. Although many French Calvinists were impressed by the German example (the conception of a “United Provinces of the Midi” was one attempt to copy it), conditions in France were not the same. Fundamentally, France was a unitary state, if only in the nascent sense, in this period; autonomous territorial princes did not exist within the realm to be won over as in the Empire. Henri alone came closest to this independent status because of his dignity as king of Navarre, but his own future was connected too closely to a united France for him ever to want to dismember it. For all of these reasons, the Huguenot monarch had to examine the French political and religious scene in its broadest possible context rather than concentrate on individual partisan or sectarian details. This was vital to the future success of his leadership. Only by approaching the civil upheavals from a wide perspective could Navarre hope realistically to protect the religious and constitutional interests of the Calvinist party, reconcile his private conscience with his own political aspirations, or bridge the chasm that had opened between the Huguenots and their former moderate-Catholic allies. Clearly, such aims, being almost contradictory, required tremendous leadership skills of young Henri. The groups he had to court were not only different but openly hostile to one another. This forced him to find a formula that would remove or reduce the points of contention between the rival factions and permit him to focus their attention on common political objectives above particularist religious concerns. At the same time, that formula had to allow him the means to maintain good, or at least correct, relations with the Catholic French Crown, even when leading rebellion against it. This was crucial to the preservation of both the Calvinist party’s political legitimacy and the extensive powers he wielded personally as Henri III’s governor of Guyenne. In short, Navarre dared not forfeit either of these advantages by carelessly throwing away royal confidence. It is not surprising, therefore, that he rejected the Calvinists’ myopic sectarian view of his role as their protector in favour of a far more flexible and even conciliatory function based upon religious toleration and loyalty to the Crown. He began by focusing French enmity on the ambitious duc de Guise, whom he now accused of using religion as a “cloak” and a “false cover” to conceal more sinister political designs as the real enemy of France.91 In doing so, Henri struck a responsive chord among many French Catholics who were already disposed to this way of thinking.92 In addition, he appealed to his countrymen’s common sense of patriotism and duty to the Crown

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“as Frenchmen and citizens of the same Fatherland,” while cultivating a personal reputation for unconditional loyalty and obedience to the king of France, even in times of civil war.93 Specifically, he announced his wish “that everyone should know the truth of my intentions, and the affection that I bear for the true service of the king, for the good repose and tranquility of this kingdom.”94 Finally, to tie everything together, Navarre deliberately enforced a policy of religious toleration throughout his gouvernement of Guyenne and his patrimonial domains of Béarn, beyond what was stipulated in the articles of the recent Peace of Beaulieu. He thereby guaranteed all of his subjects equal justice before the law and full freedom of conscience without distinction.95 In effect, what Henri did was to make himself the sole religious and political leader in the kingdom to advocate toleration.96 Only in this way could he attract the moderate-Catholic support that he and the party needed, or successfully shift popular attention from the religious quarrel to the essentially political disputes which, he claimed, lay at the root of the civil wars. That was fundamental if he were ever to displace the prevailing concentration on religious details that divided the French people with the interests of state that united them. In part, Navarre’s posture represented a return to the traditional justifications of rebellion that formerly had been used by Louis de Condé and Gaspard de Coligny. By claiming to defend the Valois monarchy from the over-mighty Guises, they, too, had invoked French patriotism and loyalty to the throne to legitimize Huguenot revolt. The Guises wished, it was alleged, “to overthrow [the state] for their own advantage” under the pretext of religion.97 And in part, Navarre’s stance also grew out of boyhood lessons learned from Jeanne d’Albret about his moral obligations to the French Crown and kingdom. Henri’s approach was unique, however, in that behind his policy of toleration and his appeals to French patriotism and political duty to the monarch lay an even more important message: France’s salvation from civil and religious strife depended ultimately upon the peaceful and equal coexistence of the two faiths. Perhaps this more than anything else allowed him to unite men of conflicting religious opinion in common cause under his leadership. By stressing the similarities between Huguenots and Catholics as Frenchmen all and fellow Christians, “believing in one God, confessing one Christ, [and] desiring one reform in this state,”98 he was able to make a broad appeal for toleration to safeguard France from further civil war and possible disintegration. Moreover, this appeal permitted him to take advantage of moderate sympathies that were growing gradually at all levels.

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Hitherto, any notion of toleration was rejected almost universally by both religious groups. To French Catholics, it was a term of derision. Even when they had practised a quasi-toleration at various times in the past, they had acted from ulterior motives for purely pragmatic ends, while never doubting “that at some point toleration would be rejected.” The Huguenot view of the concept as “a valuable weapon in their struggle for political survival” was no less cynical, since French Calvinists could hardly promote a genuine toleration while still trying to assert the validity of their own faith and doctrines.99 Hence, whenever they invoked the ideal, their real objective was to secure Calvinist advantage at Catholic expense. By 1576, however, the politique concept of religious toleration, advocated by men such as the former chancellor Michel de L’Hôpital and the essayist Michel de Montaigne, was gaining ground. Regarded as an expedient to peace in France, not as an ethical principle, it ultimately repudiated the notion of two religions in one state, but without the taint of hypocrisy. This version of toleration was seen as a potential via media to ending the civil conflict and restoring religious unity to the realm. The belief was that by “gentle persuasion” the Calvinists could be induced to return to the Roman Church in peaceful obedience to the throne.100 This certainly was the position now adopted by the Valois king, Henri III, who saw toleration (at least for the moment) as a practical means of averting civil war when the Crown was weak and the royal treasury empty.101 It also was the view of many great Catholic nobles, who similarly feared the dire political and social consequences to the realm of continued religious strife.102 Even numerous Huguenots had begun to look upon the renewal of civil war as a last resort in their quest for recognition. As a result, in a way that gave his own words and actions the strength of continuity, Henri’s frequent declarations (such as the “Remonstrance aulx Estates à Blois pour la Paix”, authorized in late 1576) defended religious toleration on precisely these pragmatic and patriotic grounds: “[For] if we do not permit both [faiths] to be free, we will be responsible for the renewal of war; if we renew it, [the state] will be dissipated; and in this dissipation we will lose all.”103 But Navarre did more than just plead an eloquent case for toleration in principle; he practised it, too, by instructing his subordinates in Guyenne to ensure fair legal treatment of and religious liberty to everyone living under his authority.104 Nor did he exempt his own patrimonial domains of Béarn from this policy. On the contrary, he repealed the most repressive of his late mother’s anti-Catholic edicts,105 even going so far as to restore to the Catholic clergy their former pensions and property. Despite Jeanne’s powerful influence on

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his spiritual formation, the adult Henri could contradict her on religious matters. He also added Catholics to his small council of Huguenot advisers and to his personal bodyguards, which served a double purpose: to illustrate that his promises of toleration and equal treatment were sincere and to weaken the Calvinists’ civilian control of his actions by diluting their influence. From the outset, Navarre’s implementation of toleration in his territories was so successful that by 1577 or 1578 the number of sympathetic Catholics who had joined his ranks almost reached parity with the Calvinists under his command.106 For that reason, whenever he referred thereafter to “our party,” he actually meant men of both religious groups working together under his leadership for the greater good of France.107 But they were still a minority. It was a measure, therefore, of Henri’s determination to deflect attention away from the religious question (which he needed to keep within the private sphere) and onto the political issues (which he stressed as the real causes of the civil wars) that when his appeals to common interest or patriotism failed to achieve desired results, he too used overt coercion to impose his will. Significantly, however, this took the form not of religious persecution, but of legal sanction. For instance, in 1577, when at the fresh outbreak of fighting he needed money for Huguenot defence, the Calvinist leader ordered the lieutenantgeneral of his hereditary duchy of Albret to seize Catholic ecclesiastical revenues only from those churches and monasteries that had declared openly against the Reformed Religion in disobedience to his edicts.108 His message was very clear: comply with his official policy and remain at peace with the opposite sect or be penalized for defying the law. Yet in spite of these efforts at persuasion, Navarre was unable to overcome all opposition to his program of toleration. Nor was it possible to resolve over night the differences between his religiously divided followers and subjects in Guyenne. On the contrary, many Catholics in his gouvernement remained actively hostile toward him because of his Calvinist profession. This is clear from the fact that in December 1576 he was refused entry into Bordeaux, the ancient seat of the governors of the province, and was almost killed in a skirmish at Eauze the following March 1577.109 This makes it all the more ironic that some short-sighted Calvinist nobles so resented the attention their chef de parti seemed to expend on winning moderate-Catholic support, as opposed to pursuing Calvinist interests exclusively as they believed he ought, that they transferred their loyalty to his old rival for command, the inflexible prince de Condé. A similar strong sectarianism also ensured that the city of Pau

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(the old capital of Béarn) remained “a little Geneva” after Navarre’s return there circa 1579. Despite the Bourbon monarch’s efforts to allow it, the celebration of the mass was prohibited, while the Catholics in his own suite were confined to the use of a tiny chapel in the château for their private devotions.110 At the same time, Henri had to contend with the efforts of some of his closest advisers to subvert his policy of moderation for purely sectarian ends. In 1580, for example, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay (called the “Huguenot pope” because of his prestige among French Calvinists) urged him to sponsor a provincial ecumenical council to discuss and perhaps even resolve the doctrinal differences dividing Catholics and Huguenots.111 But what appeared on the surface to be a thoughtful plan for religious reconciliation was, in fact, nothing more than a cynical propaganda ploy designed to strengthen the Reformed Religion in Guyenne and Béarn at Catholic expense. Hence, the Calvinist chef de parti rejected it as contrary to his policy and the public image he was trying to project. Even so, Henri was not above making a similar proposal three years later to the Lutheran princes of Germany, chiefly to obtain their military support. Navarre’s efforts, meanwhile, to impose toleration did not succeed in halting completely the open sectarian quarrelling among his Calvinist and moderate-Catholic followers. Because of the continuing discord, Catherine de Medici saw an opportunity to turn this strife to the Valois Crown’s advantage. She went to Guyenne in autumn 1578, ostensibly to settle various problems related to the recent Peace of Bergerac, but in reality to undercut her son-in-law’s growing preponderance in the southwest. Her mission failed, but by the time she returned northward in May 1579, the queen mother had at least been able to attract the most disgruntled Catholic nobles back to Paris and the royal camp by capitalizing on their ill-feeling.112 Given this erosion of support and its potential dangers for the Huguenots in France, it was essential that Henri repair the rupture that had occurred in 1577 between his coreligionnaires and the moderate-Catholic duc de Montmorency-Damville if he were to prevent the party’s total isolation. In fact, it was probably only the young king’s efforts over the next few years to establish a close working relationship with the duke on the basis of shared political goals and personal friendship that prevented the latter from joining the Valois Crown and the Guises against the Calvinists in civil war.113 Henri respected, perhaps even feared, Montmorency-Damville’s military skill and wide experience. He certainly recognized the strategic importance of the duke’s gouvernement of Languedoc as a link between the heavily Calvinist provinces of Guyenne and Dauphiné.

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Besides, Navarre still needed the moderate-Catholic leader’s support to strengthen his own power base. Hence the Huguenot monarch worked tirelessly to develop good relations with the powerful governor. He praised the duke’s ability, consulted him on all matters of mutual concern, and gave assurances that “I am the most true and steadfast friend you have in the world.”114 He was even careful to refer collectively to Montmorency-Damville and his followers by their chosen appellation of “United Catholics,” rather than by their former designation as “Malcontents” or by the newly acquired, but equally derogatory, label of “politiques,” both of which they despised.115 Moreover, because any new links between the Calvinists and the moderate Catholics could be forged most effectively by strengthening the friendship between the two leaders, Henri went so far as to try to compromise with the duke in their private dispute over the county of Foix. This Montmorency-Damville claimed as part of his gouvernement, even though it was rightfully a portion of Navarre’s patrimony.116 At the same time, the Huguenot chef de parti actively encouraged his politique counterpart to participate in the various Calvinist political assemblies, either personally or by proxy, as an equal member so that “the United Catholics could speak through the mouth of the said marshal, the king of Navarre and those of the [Reformed] religion desiring that [the two groups] speak with one voice.”117 As a final gesture, Henri ordered all Calvinists in Languedoc to obey the Catholic governor’s authority. Although these efforts did not produce an immediate political reconciliation between Montmorency-Damville, the United Catholics, and the Huguenot party at this juncture, at least they secured the duke’s neutrality in the military campaigns of 1577 and 1580. This was almost as valuable, for it protected the Calvinist rear from attack by removing a potentially dangerous Catholic threat. It also left open a door to a future rapprochement between the two factions. In the meantime, Henri’s tactfulness perhaps contributed to the Catholic governor’s own efforts to maintain peace in his gouvernement through some kind of religious accommodation. This is suggested by the duke’s designation of three more towns in Languedoc in 1581 as centres for newly formed chambres mi-partis to hear legal disputes between Catholics and Calvinists living under his authority.118 (The Peace of Beaulieu had required the establishment of only one, at Montpellier.) This further vindicated Navarre’s public promotion of toleration. Indeed, it says much for the growing acceptance of his platform that by May the same year he felt secure enough as Huguenot chef de parti to summon a general assembly of the French Calvinist churches at Montauban, where his policy was endorsed officially.119

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Two years later, in 1583, when the duke’s position was threatened directly by the actions of the Valois Crown and the interference of his Guise enemies, Henri’s patient diplomacy finally paid off. Montmorency-Damville formally renewed his alliance with the relieved Huguenot leader and the French Calvinists, as his interests now ran parallel to theirs. Navarre’s political motivations and pragmatic approach to toleration must never be confused with scepticism or a weakening of his Calvinist beliefs. On the contrary, because of the various and sometimes conflicting roles he had to play, he was expected by contemporaries in both churches to use religion as a political tool. Indeed, to many people of position and power, the king of Navarre’s personal beliefs and confessional sincerity were still secondary to political factors at this time.120 Moreover, the use of religious expedients for temporal goals was vindicated further in his case because of the way others had manipulated him as a pawn since his early childhood to obtain particular political objectives. Consequently, if Henri’s religious decisions after 1576 were shaped by pragmatism, it was because political necessity forced him to work within the parameters that practical politics allowed, despite the sincerity of his personal convictions. In the modern perspective, it is often contended that the young king’s delicate balancing of the two religious groups in his own party, combined with the political motives behind his advocacy of toleration, makes his personal religious convictions appear weak or inchoate. Usually it is claimed that if Henri was later able to bend religion to his political needs, it was either because he felt no pang of conscience, being a sceptic, or he was convinced in his own mind that dogma ultimately did not matter. In support of both arguments, Navarre’s early appeals for moderation – a solution already urged independently at the Estates General of 1576 by men whose religious convictions have never been questioned121 – are contrasted with the strong sectarian sentiments of many of his contemporaries. Allegedly, these people were more inclined to agree with the saintly Louis IX that “a layman, whenever he hears the Christian religion abused, should not attempt to defend its tenets, except with his sword, and that he should thrust into the scoundrel’s belly, and as far as it will enter!”122 How different was Henri’s perspective that “religion is placed in the hearts of men by the force of doctrine and persuasion, and is confirmed by examples in life and not by the sword.”123 In making this argument, he invoked, knowingly or not, Martin Luther’s principle of conscience, first articulated in the 1520s and repeated by most sixteenth-century reformers when they defined the limits of

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state power over religion. Faith was a concern of the individual heart, of private belief; and the official use of coercion for the sake of conformity was not just morally wrong, but counter-productive.124 Clearly, the depth of his own convictions aside, Navarre had been convinced by the vicissitudes of youthful experience that religion had become the plaything of politics and that there was no future in trying to enforce doctrinal truth through violence. The differences between the two hostile creeds could be resolved only, he believed, in a kingdom at peace. Yet this in no way challenges the traditional notion that Henri’s decisions after 1576 were moulded by his developing pragmatism. Rather, the point is, and it is an important one, that he fought pragmatically for his religious as well as his political goals. However lucid his appreciation of the necessities imposed upon him by his public roles and political posture in France, there also turned within him the great concern to defend the independence of his conscience. Thus, he became ever more convinced of the need to prevent religion, and especially his religion, from becoming the focus of the conflicts in the kingdom. His commitment to toleration was one means of averting this. Another was his repeated willingness from this time forward to receive instruction before a freely convoked national council or general assembly. This oblique invocation of Gallican sentiment underpinned his more direct appeals to French patriotism. By February 1577, Henri was already using this approach when he respectfully refused to submit to Henri III’s recent declaration at Blois that only Catholicism would be permitted in the kingdom. In his “Reponse ... aux deputez des Estats,”125 the Calvinist chef de parti warned the French king’s envoys sent to secure his obedience to the royal will and to convince him of the political necessity of his immediate return to the ancient faith,126 that national disunity, bloodshed, and bitter civil war would continue so long as the Crown allowed the practice of just one version of Christianity in France. Tactfully reminding them of the Valois monarch’s solemn oaths to protect Calvinism and religious toleration at his 1573 election to the Polish throne,127 Henri added that only by enforcing toleration throughout the realm in accordance with the provisions of the Crown’s own peace treaties, such as Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1570) and Beaulieu (1576), could further misery be avoided. As for royal speculation that his political return to Catholicism would expedite the restoration of French unity, Navarre pointed out that this was a false hope. Even if he “wanted to or could” abjure as Henri III now insisted, none of the Calvinists would follow his example or continue to obey his leadership, which depended upon his outward commitment to their faith. That would

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render him powerless to aid the Valois king in re-establishing peace in France. But in any case, the Huguenot chef de parti declined personal conversion, while confessing significantly that “I have been want to pray to God ... that if my religion is true, as I believe, may it please God to confirm me in it; if it is false, may God teach me the truth and illuminate my mind to follow it, to live and die in it, and after having expelled all errors from my mind, may God give me the means to expel them from the kingdom and from all the world.” For some contemporaries (and most modern historians), Navarre’s statement held interesting implications for the future. They took it to mean an awareness on his part that he might undertake a political reconciliation with Catholicism at some later date, however firm his refusal to do so now, simply by undergoing the formality of religious instruction before a general council convened for that purpose. Certainly, this was the Venetian ambassador’s interpretation of Henri’s response.128 It also was the view of Huguenot zealots such as Michel de La Huguerye, who already believed that Navarre’s Calvinist convictions were weak and his commitment uncertain, regardless of his formal profession the previous year.129 No doubt to dispel such notions from the outset, those Calvinist ministers attached to Henri’s small council of advisers had tried to censor the objectionable references to a general assembly from the first draft of Navarre’s statement, along with anything else that implied the possibility of a future abjuration. But he had reinserted the stricken passages, refusing to allow the ministers to politicize his religion by making it the explicit focus of Huguenot disobedience to royal authority or the cause of renewed civil war. That would have damaged the public image he was trying to project in that it would reinforce old, unfavourable stereotypes. It would also have confined his decisionmaking to a narrow sectarian path, as his religious profession would have once again become an object of political manipulation by others. In short, Navarre was attempting to balance a concern for the independence of his private conscience with the political realities of his position. Yet also present in his appeals for toleration in France and his professed resolve “never to change his religion unless [the Catholics] could show him that he erred in it, and only then by a general council or assembly,”130 were motives of the sincerest religious kind. Indeed, two fundamental aspects of Navarre’s character are revealed in his reply to Henri III’s deputies, and particularly in the passage quoted above. The first and most obvious is that he lacked completely the religious fanaticism exhibited by so many of his contemporaries. This in itself is surprising. Given the same multiple influences and youthful experiences, almost anyone else would have

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become warped, suspicious, devious, or indecisive; yet none of these traits marked Henri’s character. Instead, temperamentally ill-suited to be a bigot or a zealot in religion, the Bourbon monarch came to regard faith as an intensely personal choice and a private arrangement with God. “Those who unswervingly follow their conscience,” he wrote the Catholic sieur de Batz in January 1576, “are of my religion, as I am of all those who are brave and virtuous ... And I shall soon be able to see my true-hearted followers who wish to acquire honour with me, among whom I hope always to find you.”131 This extraordinary statement, written in his own hand to a friend and loyal follower, captures the essence of Henri’s state of mind more succinctly than any other. It also shows the subtlety with which he appealed for toleration and independence of conscience, using those enduring and still meaningful ideals of honour and chivalry that attracted the personal loyalty of moderate-Catholic noblemen – such as de Batz – who shared with him a common cultural heritage. It shows as well his respect for and defence of private religious conviction in the full confidence that (as Henry VIII of England once wrote) “the law of every man’s conscience be but a private court, yet it is the highest and supreme court for judgment or justice.”132 In drawing this conclusion, Navarre must have been responding to harsh experiences in his own life. Throughout his early youth, he had never really been free to exercise his own conscience. In religious as in political and military matters, others had always made decisions for him that he was expected or forced to obey. His personal experiences in the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre and its aftermath had also acquainted him with the abhorrent results of religious fanaticism taken to tragic extremes. Hence, when Henri refused to convert, as Henri III now demanded, instead defending his Calvinist beliefs on the basis of his private relationship with God and choosing a political platform based upon a policy of toleration, whatever its practical merits, he did so in large part because these things corresponded to his perception of faith, his early experiences, his moderate temperament, and his respect for life and conscience.133 In short, he considered religious intolerance as repugnant on the moral level as it was divisive and short-sighted on the practical level. The second aspect of Henri’s character revealed by his response to the Valois king’s new edict on religion is that he was tolerant only within the limits his era found tolerable! One must not overlook the ominous warning contained in his promise to defend what contemporaries called “right religion,” as revealed to him by God, to the exclusion of all other “errors.” These he swore to expel “from the kingdom and from all the world.” So despite his moderation, he was

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still a sixteenth-century man who relected the mentalité of the age, with its prejudices, shortcomings, and perhaps even some of its sectarian impulses. But a policy of religious toleration formed only the first half of Henri’s unfolding political platform. Alone, it was insufficient to remove the ongoing friction between his Calvinist and moderateCatholic followers, or to provide the kind of long-term party unity that he required. Hence, the second half of his policy was founded upon patriotic appeals to the duty that all loyal Frenchmen owed to their king and country regardless of creed: a rallying cry that was as potent as the cause of religion. Integral to Henri’s approach was his propaganda assault on Guise claims to represent the Party of Order. He accused the ultra-Catholic duke and his confederates of cynicism and hypocrisy for using the pretext of religion to mask a secret political agenda aimed at subverting the French kingdom and royal authority.134 Then, carefully linking his own interests directly with those of the Crown and country as a whole to further undermine the duc de Guise’s political posturing as protector of the established system, Navarre repeatedly professed a sincere “affection for the good, peace and tranquility of the kingdom,” as well as for “the grandeur of the French Crown.”135 He thereby drew an even sharper contrast between himself, an obedient subject struggling to preserve the integrity of France under its rightful Valois monarch, and the over-mighty Guises, who allegedly sought to overthrow both. Additionally, Henri’s approach re-emphasized the distinction that he continued to make between his broadly conceived brand of leadership and the intense sectarianism of both Guise and Condé. What he did, in effect, was to forge a powerful image of the Huguenot and moderate-Catholic alliance as an alternative Party of Order, united under his leadership in their common duty to France and the Crown. For this “patriotic” element of his policy to be effective, however, it was imperative that Navarre maintain correct relations with the Catholic court at all times. For that reason, he issued constant assurances of his loyalty to Henri III, whom he never failed to address with the proper respect or to treat with due deference. As well, at every opportunity he reiterated his sworn resolve to expend both his life and goods in the Valois king’s service.136 To this Henri added that as “Frenchmen and citizens of the same Fatherland” the primary duty of each Catholic and Calvinist subject was to “lay aside his wayward affections and devote himself to the service of the king and the safety of his country.”137 Likewise, in a shrewdly timed reference to the duc de Guise and the first ultra-Catholic Holy League (which had just been disbanded by order of Henri III), Navarre solemnly pledged to

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uphold the French king’s ban against all organizations that, “under new pretexts and covert designs in the name ... of religion or the reconciliation of the state,” threatened the peace and royal authority.138 He then repeated that, “after the person of the king my lord and Monsieur [d’Alençon] his brother, I have more interest in the conservation and restoration of this kingdom than any other person in the world.”139 At the same time, the Huguenot chef de parti very carefully avoided instigating any confrontations with the Crown, whether political or military, to the point even of permitting the royal Catholic forces to strike the first blow in the campaigns of 1577 and 1585. This ensured that neither he nor the Huguenots could be accused of fomenting rebellion or, worse still, promoting treason. Instead, he kept open negotiations, “as was his custom,”140 on the argument that even an unfavourable peace was preferable to the continuation of a war that hurt everyone.141 As for the independent and often embarrassing activities of some of his subordinates (especially Condé), whose actions often violated the various peace treaties and besmirched the personal political image that the Huguenot leader was trying to project, Navarre either justified their indiscretions as political or military necessities advantageous to the Crown or disavowed any responsibility for them. Either way, he kept the focus off religion. To be sure, there were occasions on which Henri himself defied the authority of the Catholic Crown with military force. But in each case he carefully justified his disobedience on legal or moral grounds, specifically by invoking the articles of the various treaties or other royal pronouncements. This allowed him to present himself and the Huguenots still as loyal subjects whose behaviour actually conformed to the Crown’s own directives. For example, in October 1578, when Navarre captured the town of Fleurance in a surprise attack, he excused his action as a legitimate exchange for the equally unlawful seizure by royal Catholic forces of La Réolle, a security town guaranteed to the Calvinists by the late treaty of Bergerac. Even Catherine de Medici, then at Nérac trying (unsuccessfully) to negotiate her son-inlaw’s return to Paris and the Catholic faith, had to admit that this was a fair trade.142 Comparably, in January 1580, when Henri disobeyed royal orders to relinquish the seven security towns that still remained in Calvinist possession, he respectfully reminded Henri III that the surrender of these places was “conditional upon Your Majesty’s promise to put your edict [of Bergerac] fully into execution.” As this had not yet been done, Navarre insisted that the Huguenots were within their legal rights to decline the royal command. Besides, he argued in righteous indigna-

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tion, as “very loyal and natural French subjects” the Calvinists did not merit the kind of treatment usually reserved for “Spaniards, Englishmen or other foreigners” who sought to harm the kingdom. This was a thinly veiled reference to the Guises and their alien antecedents.143 Later that year when Navarre himself fired the opening shots in the Lovers’ War, he similarly protested that the Huguenot party had the right to fight in legitimate self-defence against Catholic aggression because the royal promises of 1577 still had not been carried out. As always, however, he concluded his public declaration by reaffirming his personal loyalty to Henri III.144 It says much for Navarre’s determination to identify his interests with those of the French kingdom and the Crown, whether at war or peace, that he fell back on self-justifications to legitimize his actions. Technically, this was unnecessary because of his exalted royal rank. Nevertheless, to affirm his position he voluntarily subjected himself to much of Henri III’s will. At the same time, however, he did not hesitate to invoke his personal royal status whenever he could not justify his actions as an obedient French subject. On more than one occasion he found it useful to reiterate the important point that as an anointed king who occupied an autonomous throne, he had forfeited neither his sovereignty nor his independence to France. Navarre thus asserted his absolute freedom to make war and conclude peace, and to contract alliances and summon foreign military aid to his support, without the need for permission from the French Crown to do so.145 This was his right and prerogative as a reigning monarch. But perhaps the most important benefit Henri derived from the strongly patriotic component of his political policy was that he could thereby keep open his lines of communication with Henri III, who seems to have believed in his brother-in-law’s assurances of loyalty even in wartime.146 This brought significant advantages. In particular, the generally cordial relations he had fostered with the Valois monarch since 1576 gave Navarre the means to extend his control over Guyenne with royal support in his capacity as provincial gouverneur. In 1576, for example, he unabashedly invoked Henri III’s authority to gain entrance to Catholic Bordeaux, earlier denied him by the troublesome parlement because of his Calvinist faith.147 He then secured his advantage by inducing the French king “to instruct all towns, governors [of towns] and captains of his gouvernement, [to] render him obedience in the service of his Majesty.”148 Navarre similarly manipulated his relations with the Crown to remove any provincial lieutenantsgeneral, Catholics all, who attempted to check his rule. By this means, Henri secured the dismissal of the rigorous amiral de Villars in 1579. When his successor, the more moderate maréchal de Biron, proved to

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be just as obstructive, Navarre had him replaced with the still more flexible maréchal de Matignon in September 1580.149 Like Guise in Lorraine or Montmorency-Damville in Languedoc, the Calvinist monarch was determined to have full control over his territorial power base. To achieve that end, he used every legal means at his disposal, which included invoking the authority of Henri III. With the conclusion of peace at Fleix in November 1580, Henri de Navarre and the Huguenots enjoyed four consecutive years of relative tranquility. During this time the Calvinist king consolidated his position and prepared for an uncertain future. From his small court at Nérac, he continued to extend his control over the Huguenot party and his gouvernement, while building support for his cause in other quarters. On a partisan level, for example, he sponsored a number of Huguenot political assemblies at Montauban, St Foy, Saint-Jeand’Angely, and Vitré, where Calvinist delegates re-endorsed both his leadership and his policy of toleration.150 On the national level, meanwhile, Navarre continued to evade Henri III’s ongoing efforts to attract him back to the court and Catholicism. As well, he successfully parried the Valois king’s attempt in 1582 to purchase the governorship of Guyenne for his chief favourite, Nogaret de la Valette (now duc d’Épernon). In 1583 the Huguenot monarch finally succeeded in renewing the Huguenot alliance with the United Catholics and their leader, the new duc de Montmorency.151 The duke had been under increasing pressure to give up his gouvernement of Languedoc to Henri III’s other leading favourite, Anne duc de Joyeuse, whose own efforts to dislodge Montmorency had included trying to raise popular rebellion against him and, when that failed, to have him excommunicated by the pope. Joyeuse did all of this with the French king’s tacit approval. These clumsy attempts to break the powerful duke’s hold on strategic Languedoc backfired, however. They served only to precipitate Montmorency’s reconciliation with Henri de Navarre and the Huguenots for simple self-defence.152 On an international level, meantime, the Calvinist chef de parti promoted a project for an ecumenical council of Calvinist and Lutheran churches in western Europe.153 This plan was endorsed by the Huguenots, whose hopes for such a union were encouraged by the close relations that were developing steadily between the French and Dutch Reformed churches. The German Lutheran princes spurned Navarre’s overtures, however. Perhaps they sensed that he was more interested in securing their political, financial, and military support against a common Catholic enemy than in reaching a genuine doctrinal rapprochement between the major non-Catholic churches of the

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day. Possibly, the mutual animosity that prevailed between the followers of Martin Luther and John Calvin also coloured their response. Whatever the case, not until February 1589 did Navarre again propose a reconciliation between the two creeds. But all this was not the only diplomatic activity of 1583. Doubtless to Henri’s great surprise, he also received envoys from the very Catholic Philip II of Spain, who sent secret offers of a military alliance and large subsidies if Navarre and the Huguenots agreed to renew the civil war against Henri III. Philip even promised (though he cannot have been serious) to help the Calvinist chef de parti put the crown of France on his own head.154 It was the Spanish king’s obvious intention to preoccupy the French so completely with their own domestic squabbles that they could not intervene in the Netherlands on behalf of the Dutch rebels. In keeping with his self-made image as a faithful servant and champion of the Crown, however, Navarre informed Henri III fully of these proposals. He then loyally offered his services and those of the French Calvinists for a diversionary attack on northern Spain to support the duc d’Alençon’s projected campaign in the rebellious Low Countries.155 By the spring of 1584 it was becoming clear to contemporaries that this brief period of relative peace was drawing rapidly to a close. The duc d’Alençon, the last of the Valois brothers after the reigning king, was very ill with tuberculosis and expected to die soon. Since Henri III was as yet childless, the next in line to the Catholic crown was his Huguenot cousin, the king of Navarre. That situation was unacceptable, however, to the ultra-Catholics aligned with the Guises. But in spite of his awkward position as the Calvinist heir presumptive and leader of a minority party, Navarre was by that time far stronger politically than he ever had been. He commanded support from the duc de Montmorency, the United Catholics, and an extensive portion of southern France, as well as from several foreign princes with whom he had established diplomatic relations.156 His image as the possible successor to the Valois king was strong despite the stumbling block of his Calvinist religious profession. Indeed, the English ambassador observed at this time that “all good Frenchmen begin to cast their eyes upon him, and try more and more to gain his favour” in anticipation of his accession to the throne.157 By contrast, popular respect for Henri III was in rapid decline, as he was resented bitterly for excessive taxation, the misdeeds of marauding royal troops, and his and his court’s loose morality. Even the popularity of the Guises was on the wane thanks to their thinly concealed use of the civil conflict for what many observers viewed as private ambition, a perception the Huguenot leader had reinforced at every opportunity. Thus, by the

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time the duc d’Alençon died on 10 June 1584 and was “buried at St Denis with all the customary honours and solemnities required in France on such an occasion,”158 Henri de Navarre had already fallen heir to much goodwill. Many contemporaries were convinced that his popularity would increase still faster if he could be drawn nearer to Paris and the power centre of the kingdom.159

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4 The Years of Uncertainty, June 1584 to August 1589 “This prince was not born to give in to despair.” – Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to Michel de Montaigne, 1583

The death of the duc d’Alençon caused a sudden and dramatic shift in the political-religious balance in France, turning the militantly Catholic faction of the duc de Guise not only against the new Calvinist heir presumptive but potentially against the Crown itself. Almost immediately, fresh battle lines were drawn in preparation for the renewal of civil war, which almost everyone knew was coming. At the heart of this ferment was the irresolute policy of the French king. Initially, between May 1584 and June 1585, Henri III seemed strongly inclined to unite forces with Navarre against the ultra-Catholic Guises, but because of the Huguenot monarch’s persistent refusal to abjure his Calvinist faith or its outward profession, together with the steadily worsening conditions throughout France and his own weakening position, the French king “was forced into an uneasy alliance” with the newly reorganized Catholic League and its Guise leadership in July 1585.1 Moreover, during the next four years Henri III continued to vacillate between these two political poles. On the one hand, he waged a halfhearted war against his Huguenot subjects and their chef de parti in response to ultra-Catholic pressure and the need to fulfil his sacred duty as monarch to protect the kingdom from heresy. On the other hand, he tried repeatedly to persuade Navarre to convert and return to court, both to end the controversy surrounding the succession issue and to join forces with him against their common enemy, the League. Not until December 1588 did the Valois king finally make a decisive commitment to a single path. Desperate by that time to free himself from Guise dom-

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ination, he had both the duke and his younger brother, the cardinal de Lorraine, assassinated. Subsequently confronted with fierce ultraCatholic opposition and a kingdom in open revolt against him, he recognized that the only alternative to complete political isolation and perhaps even the loss of his crown was to sign a formal truce with the Calvinist Navarre in the spring of 1589. For a few short months the two royal Henris campaigned together against the badly shaken League, until the French king, the last of the Valois line, was himself murdered at the beginning of August. With his death, the Catholic crown of France passed to his Huguenot cousin in conformity with custom and traditional Salic Law, but against religious convention. This sparked a new and particularly bitter phase in the ongoing civil war. For Henri de Navarre, the years 1584 and 1589 represented major turning points in his career. On both dates the fundamental belief he had imbibed from his mother about the inseparability of “blood and religion” was put severely to the test. Prior to the death of Alençon, he had been able to strike a successful working balance between the two principles. He had developed a high degree of political astuteness since his capture in 1572, and well understood the merits of occasional duplicity, as well as the important reality that one’s private conscience and public profession of faith were not necessarily the same thing. These hard-learned lessons, coupled with his native intelligence, courage, determination in the face of such trying experiences as the Saint Bartholomew’s Massacre, and intimate knowledge of the court and royal affairs, had allowed him to emerge from captivity in 1576 with his Calvinist convictions unshaken and a keen sense of what was and was not possible to accomplish after reclaiming his former role as Huguenot chef de parti. Additionally, over the next eight years he had managed to maintain the balance between the twin underlying principles of his life and career. This he had accomplished by separating himself from the sectarian quarrels of his day and concentrating instead on the political causes that, he always insisted, lay at the root of the civil wars in France. As long as he lived, the duc d’Alençon, as Catholic heir presumptive to the French throne, had served the Calvinist king as a political shield. But his premature death heightened enormously the profile of the Guises, lending credence to their claims to be defending the realm from heresy, in that they now “possessed an unambiguous cause in [their] aim of excluding the Protestant [monarch] from succession to the throne.”2 This turn of vents threatened Henri de Navarre’s endeavours to maintain the complementary relationship between the two principles that formed the bedrock of his perceptions. He now confronted the unwelcome prospect of someday having to choose

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between his blood and religion to safeguard his claims to the crown. Is it any wonder that, on learning of the French king’s alliance with the Guise-led League in July 1585, Henri allegedly declared that half his moustache turned white with “the apprehension of the ills I felt for my country”?3 With the renewal of civil war and a new phase in the Huguenot struggle for recognition, he was affected not just on a political level, but on an intensely personal level, too. Between spring 1584 and spring 1589, therefore, Henri’s primary preoccupation was to strengthen his status as heir presumptive to the Catholic crown according to the venerable Salic Law. But to succeed, he needed the approval, if not the support, of the reigning Valois monarch, who still regarded him as a potential ally if he would only convert to the Catholic faith. Hence, in the ensuing conflict Navarre waged two concurrent, yet interdependent campaigns against the joint strength of the Valois Crown and the League. One campaign was military. Partly because he lacked the resources necessary for offensive action, the Calvinist leader waged a defensive war designed to frustrate the enemy attack, exhaust their means and buy valuable time until events allowed him to seize the military initiative. But his defensive posture was also compelled in part by his second, more vital campaign – this one political – to separate Henri III from his alliance with the over-mighty Guise faction and then to unite the Calvinists and the Crown against that common enemy. Accordingly, Navarre intensified his political policy of downplaying the role of religion in the civil wars while accentuating the interests of state. He concentrated in particular on drawing a still sharper distinction between his own loyalty to the king, on the one hand, and Guise sedition and ambition, on the other. His precise aim was to re-emphasize the political and dynastic issues as the root of the new civil conflict, but to mute as far as possible the religious issue. To that end, Navarre constantly reiterated his own willingness to receive instruction before a national assembly. This allowed him both to build up his moderate-Catholic support by invoking French Gallican sentiment and, without having to sacrifice his faith or principles, to meet halfway the Valois monarch’s condition that he abjure. So long as Henri III was alive, Navarre had room to manoeuvre. He was, after all, only the heir presumptive to the crown, not the heir apparent. The Valois monarch might yet perform his duty and sire a son to continue his line, whatever contemporary opinion held to the contrary. But Navarre lost his advantage when Henri III was assassinated in 1589. The parameters of his choices were narrowed substantially as he was elevated suddenly to the French throne and catapulted into a role of much more significance than he ever had been forced to

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accept before. This increased massively the stresses on his long-held belief in the inseparability of blood and religion. Consequently, he underwent a dramatic crisis of conscience in the first hours of his reign that caused him to waver uncertainly between attempting to secure moderate-Catholic support in order to assert his rightful claim to the throne (which, these men insisted, could be achieved only at the price of an immediate conversion) and persisting in his refusal to abjure for the sake of the crown. In the event, he was able to maintain the unity of his two principles of dynasty and religion by purchasing the support of the murdered king’s Catholic servitors at the cost of a solemn promise to receive instruction within six months of his accession. Although this was interpreted by many contemporaries as a pledge to convert, it was in reality a careful compromise that allowed Henri to win royalist-Catholic support, while protecting his private conscience and outward profession of faith. In addition, it bought him the time he needed to try to establish his position by force of arms.

for king and c ountry : a c o n t e st o f words, 9 june 1584 to 3 1 ju ly 1 5 8 5 As soon as it became evident that Alençon’s life was ebbing, Henri III openly acknowledged his Calvinist cousin’s rights to the succession as “my sole and only heir” in accordance with Salic Law, despite his religious profession.4 Clearly, to the Valois monarch there was no legal question “over who is to be my successor, as if it were a matter admitting of doubt or discussion.”5 Moreover, he was right. Whether a law of Catholicity was applicable to the French succession was still strictly a theoretical problem at this time, since no legal precedent existed “to assert or [to] deny that the king had to be Catholic except the long unquestioned tradition of fidelity to Rome dating back to Clovis.”6 By contrast, the legal basis of the Salic principle was regarded historically as both fundamental and irrefutable. But precisely because of the serious issues raised by Navarre’s religious profession and its implications for the monarchy, many powerful people at court wanted to supplant his rights to the French throne as heir presumptive, regardless of Henri III’s endorsement. They invoked for that purpose the final resolution of the late meeting of the Estates General at Blois. This had not simply reaffirmed the old connection between the throne and religion; it had recast that connection in constitutional form. Specifically, the Estates had declared in 1577 that Catholicism was both an ancient custom of the kingdom and “the fundamental and principal law of the realm through which the king received his greatest honour, the title Très-Chrestien.”7 Having thus

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imposed upon the Crown (at least in principle) a quasi-law of Catholicity through the consent of the nation, which by itself carried great mystique, the three estates had sworn further to prohibit all other religions in France. Heading this new opposition was Charles cardinal de Bourbon, Navarre’s aged uncle, who declared his nephew a bastard and a heretic, and claimed the succession for himself.8 Far more dangerous, however, was the strong support given to the cardinal’s claims by the duc de Guise and his brother Mayenne. They were suspected already by contemporaries of planning to foment trouble in the realm as soon as Alençon was dead.9 Moreover, Catherine de Medici herself seemed to have been part of this alleged conspiracy. She ridiculed Navarre’s rights to the succession because of the remoteness of his bloodlines, and perhaps even contemplated (rumour had it) an alliance with the Guises to force her royal son into revoking the peace treaty of 1577.10 To circumvent this growing opposition, Henri III sent his favourite, the duc d’Épernon, and Pomponne de Bellièvre, a secretary of state, to Guyenne in May 1584. They were to induce the king of Navarre to convert immediately to Catholicism and return to Paris so as to avert renewed civil war and further division in France.11 In return, he was to be assured of Henri III’s favour and readiness to join forces with Navarre against the ultra-Catholic, over-mighty Guise faction. The Huguenot leader declined both proposals and invoked, indirectly, the 1555 Augsburg principle of cuius regio, euius religio to defend his stand. The French king’s envoys were reminded sharply that, as Navarre was a monarch in his own right, his sovereignty was independent of France. Thus, he was free to exercise his personal conscience on the unassailable argument that it was “unreasonable that [he], who is a prince with a high opinion of himself and who believes he has great resources both within and without the realm, should give up his religion on the simple command of whoever it may be.”12 This firm response led many contemporaries to conclude that, at this point, the Calvinist monarch “is more Huguenot than ever.”13 But his position should not be interpreted to mean that Henri spurned the French king’s overtures out of hand. On the contrary, the Huguenot chef de parti and his court at Nérac were much divided over the issue of his conversion and whether he ought to return to the Valois court.14 Ultimately and with respect, he refused to abjure. But in doing so he solemnly reaffirmed his loyalty to the French Crown and offered his royal Catholic cousin all the aid at his disposal against the would-be disturbers of the public peace. He also carefully reiterated his previous offers “to be instructed in a free and properly estab-

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lished council, in which religious controversy may duly be debated and decided,” for it was “only through reason, and with the respect that was his due” that his abjuration could be achieved, if at all.15 Navarre himself certainly was under no illusions as to the insecurity of his position in 1584 and 1585. Nor did he fail to see that a conversion would cement his relationship with Henri III. It is even possible that he had alrleady begun to think that someday he might have to renounce his personal religious convictions for an overtly political end. There are indications that this idea, however ill-formed, had crossed his mind perhaps as early as 1577; in that year he had alluded to the possibility of a future change of religion in his reply to Henri III’s decree from the Estates at Blois, which forbade Calvinist worship in France. This suggests an early awareness on his part that at some future date he might have to abjure his faith for political reasons, and that he wished to keep a door open to that possibility. Henri’s subsequent declarations of his willingness to receive instruction might also have stemmed partly from this awareness. With the death of the duc d’Alençon in 1584, the question of a future conversion must have become more compelling for Navarre, if for no other reason than that the matter was constantly brought to his attention. Now that he was heir presumptive to the Catholic French throne should Henri III die without legitimate male issue, the Huguenot leader was pressed on all sides, more strongly than ever, to abjure his Calvinist creed as the surest means to strengthen his claims to the crown.16 In fact, some contemporaries believed that the allure of the succession was so strong that Henri would gladly convert, “as it is presumed he will do in time.”17 After all, the French Crown was well worth “a couple of psalms.”18 Yet Henri refused to sacrifice his private conscience or personal safety to political opportunism. Part of his thinking probably was strategic. Because Henri III was young and vigorous at age thirty-three and still might father a son to succeed him, Navarre’s accession to the throne was not guaranteed. So even had he been inclined to abjure at this time, it would have been a gamble to do so. As the perceptive Pomponne de Bellièvre warned, by converting on the eve of civil war “without first being convinced of his error [in religion], and solely out of fear of royal attack,” Henri would alienate the Huguenots when he most needed their support, but without really winning the Catholics or securing his political future.19 Hence, he wisely maintained his moderate stance. At the same time, he renewed his customary offers to receive instruction and swore his loyalty to the king of France. What the words quoted above also suggest, however, is that the sincerity of Navarre’s religious scruples was the most significant element

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in his decision not to convert in the summer of 1584. Indeed, his sentiments in this regard had been made abundantly clear to his younger cousin, the bishop of Rouen (later cardinal de Vendôme), in March 1583, when the latter had urged Henri to abjure his Calvinism for worldly advantage. The Huguenot leader’s dignified reproof of the bishop’s appeals casts light on the way in which the symbiosis of his personal religious outlook and political concerns had matured since 1576. “I have received your letter,” wrote the king of Navarre, and freely believe that the affection you bear me and the grandeur of our family made you speak out ... but on that which you add, that to win the favour of the [Catholic] nobility and the people it is necessary that I change my religion, representing to me the inconveniences [that would result] if I do not, I think, cousin, that the good men among the nobility and the people, before whom I desire to justify all my actions, would love me much better, professing one religion than none at all. And they would have occasion to believe that I had no faith, if without considerations other than worldly ones (since you use none other in your letters), they saw me passing from one [sect] to the other. Tell those who make such proposals, cousin, that religion, if they ever knew what it is, is not stripped off like a shirt; for it dwells in the heart and, thank God, is so deeply impressed on mine, that it is as little in my power to discard it, as it was at the beginning to enter upon it, this grace coming from God alone and from no other source ... Believe me, cousin, the course of your life will teach you that the only true plan is to commit yourself to God, who guides all things, and who never punishes anything more severely than he does the abuse of the name of religion.20

Such eloquent and forceful declarations of Henri’s strong religious commitment convinced many contemporaries in 1584 that his conversion was unlikely. These statements revealed Navarre to be a man of high principle who refused to betray his private conscience or the faith inculcated into him by his mother for mere political or dynastic advantage, as his clerical cousin urged him to do. At the same time, this response also reveals the key difference between Calvinist and Catholic conceptions of faith, sincerity, and conversion, a difference that would haunt Henri for the next nine years, especially after his accession to the throne in 1589. The problem for the Huguenot leader was not simply that he believed in a version of Christianity different from Catholicism; rather, the version he professed emphasized inward sincerity of individual conscience as the paramount measure of true faith and salvation. Or as William Shakespeare put it more poetically: “My words fly up, my thoughts remain below. / Words without thoughts never to heaven go.”21

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Because of their very different conceptualizations of the individual’s relationship with God, Catholics and Calvinists had differing ideas of what conversion meant and of the relative importance of faith versus works in that regard. Catholic culture judged piety by participation in ritual (i.e., works) and outward conformity. Given their emphasis on behaviour, as opposed to verbal expression of faith and the whole issue of intent that lay at the heart of Calvinist culture, many Catholics could call upon Henri to convert, at least outwardly. Like the Valois king and the bishop of Rouen, however political their other motives might have been, they sincerely believed that by his very participation in the rites of the Church and corresponding submission to the divine will, the king of Navarre could achieve through his own efforts and the grace of God an inward conversion according to the doctrine of works. Given their emphasis on justification by faith alone, the Huguenots naturally rejected such a notion, as Henri’s response illustrates. Hence, those Catholics who urged him to abandon his Calvinist religion even if he could not abjure his Calvinist beliefs were not necessarily behaving cynically, though doubtless many of them – but no more so than at least some of the Huguenots who at the end counselled Henri to do the same thing – had more cynical motives in mind, as well. Elsewhere in France, meanwhile, the political situation became increasingly tense in the spring and summer of 1584 as the Guise faction rallied its forces, consolidated its growing strength to the north and east of Paris, and initiated an extensive propaganda campaign against the Huguenots. Hoping to disperse the gathering storm, Henri III issued a declaration on 11 November “against all persons making leagues, associations, musters of troops, intrigues and practices against the peace of this realm.”22 The edict was ignored, however. Moreover, two months later, on 2 January 1585, the principal Guise leaders signed a secret treaty of “perpetual, offensive and defensive” alliance with an agent of Philip II at the château of Joinville. This pact stipulated that Catholicism was to be the sole religion in France, the cardinal de Bourbon was to be recognized as heir presumptive, the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) was to be ratified in full, and the decrees of the Council of Trent – so long resisted by the Gallican-minded Valois monarchy – were to be enacted throughout the realm. In addition, Philip II of Spain pledged to provide 50,000 écus each month to support a large army. In return, he was to receive Cambrai and French military aid against the Dutch rebels in the Spanish Netherlands. Finally, the French Crown was to renounce its old alliance with the Ottoman Turks, first concluded by François Ier. The Holy Catholic League, initially formed in 1576 but disbanded by royal command the following year, thus was reconstituted with Spanish subsidies.23

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Now organized, funded, and primed for action, the League leaders began to flaunt royal authority with near impugnity, “ignoring the fact of the king’s will.”24 This pushed the country ever closer to the brink of civil war. On 31 March 1585 they issued a manifesto from Péronne, in Picardy, by which they claimed that the League was taking up arms solely in defence of the Catholic faith.25 In reality, this declaration was a direct attack on the government of Henri III, who had just published (on 28 March) a second futile edict that forbade the formation of any armed unions in the kingdom.26 It especially targeted his two favourites, the ducs de Joyeuse and d’Épernon. Meanwhile, the League leaders levied still more troops in the German states and Switzerland to augment the French forces they already commanded. They also seized a number of strategic French towns (including Verdun, Toul, Dijon, Lyon, Orléans, Nantes, Bourges, and Angers) to consolidate their control over the provinces to the north and east of the Loire River, as well as the river itself. This effectively reduced the Crown’s control to Paris, parts of western France, and a few large cities in the south that still pledged allegiance. Thus, by spring 1585 it was becoming rapidly clear that a Guise offensive was imminent – one “led and directed,” Philippe Duplessis-Mornay charged, “by the spirit of Spain.”27 Lacking both money and military force, Henri III’s position became increasingly desperate as his political options narrowed. In early April he issued a third declaration against the newly reorganized League and its recent manifesto.28 He also instituted a personal bodyguard for his own protection at court, the infamous “Forty-Five,” which soon earned a popular reputation as a band of hired assassins. Furthermore, he raised fresh troops for the Crown to counterbalance Guise strength. But these levies were so “undisciplined, licentious, disaffected and, what is worse, badly paid” that the Tuscan ambassador later despaired that anything “can be hoped from such men.”29 Finally, the king sent his mother to negotiate with the duc de Guise in Champagne, which led many contemporaries to suspect that he was on the verge of surrendering to League demands to unite against Navarre and the Huguenots.30 But a capitulation was the last thing the Valois monarch had in mind. Nevertheless, a crisis was brewing, and as his position became weaker and the Guises grew stronger, some kind of compromise might soon be unavoidable. Thus, while Catherine de Medici played for time with the League leaders, Henri III dispatched two more agents southward in a last-ditch effort to persuade Navarre to convert and unite with the Crown against the ultra-Catholic faction in order “to prevent the evil designs of the duc de Guise.”31

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Clearly, the Valois monarch’s personal and political preferences drew him toward his Calvinist cousin. But the latter steadfastly refused to abjure his faith – though he were offered “all the monarchies of the world”32 – and in view of Henri III’s own devotion to the Roman faith as a devout Catholic and “eldest son of the Church,” the French king could not ally himself with an alleged “heretic” or party of heretics against fellow Catholics, no matter who or how menacing they were. Even so, it was not at all certain which side the Valois monarch ultimately would take in the approaching struggle. To avoid a dangerous rupture with Henri III, therefore, Navarre adhered closely to the political policy he had developed since 1576, by laying increased emphasis on Huguenot loyalty to the Crown. Hence, though warned that “the Guises were on the point of exploding and that [the Calvinists] could not look out for their own safety too soon,”33 he kept the party on a peaceful footing throughout 1584 and early 1585, apparently “letting passe all occasions to arm,”34 in dutiful obedience to the French king’s urgent appeals for patience. Navarre similarly saw to it that the Huguenots observed the terms of the previous peace treaties of Bergerac and Fleix in their dealings with the court, “on the assurance I have given them,” he wrote to Henri III, “that your Majesty will see to the repression of your enemies, and to [Calvinist] safety at the same time.”35 Meanwhile, Henri acceded to royal commands as far as possible, so long as these did not contradict his religion or responsibilities as Calvinist chef de parti, or endanger Huguenot security. He then drove home his points by identifying his own interests as heir presumptive still more intimately with those of the Valois Crown that he might one day inherit. In particular, he reminded Henri III’s agents that he “cannot be defended more faithfully than by a prince of his own blood, nor his state than by those who can be saved only by its salvation.”36 These measures were very astute. They not only undercut League propaganda that Huguenot behaviour was a justification for taking up arms in defence of the state or religion as a prelude to civil war; they also allowed Navarre to draw an even sharper contrast between Calvinist loyalty and obedience, on the one hand, and Guise disobedience and sedition, on the other, in order to win the confidence of Henri III. The Huguenots, asserted their chef de parti, “are ready, at the first word that Your Majesty sends to me, to do all that loyal subjects can do for your service,” while the rebellious League just “wanted to usurp the kingdom.”37 Only by re-emphasizing the political and dynastic issues at the root of the conflict could Navarre hope to overcome the religious obstacle that divided him from the French king and prevented a royal alliance.

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Moreover, the Calvinist leader’s strategy paid an important early dividend. This was Henri III’s consent, obtained after much lobbying in autumn 1584, to extend Huguenot tenure over eight security towns granted for their defence by the treaty of Bergerac, for an additional two years beyond the original expiration date of 1585.38 Navarre then used this as a vehicle to secure further royal permission to fortify other Calvinist-held towns in his gouvernement as protection against the growing League menace.39 Nor did his finesse at stretching a political inch into a country mile end here. The Huguenot leader next informed the Valois king that, in the absence of explicit instructions, he could only guess at Henri III’s wishes. Compelled, therefore, to act on his own authority as royal governor, Navarre undertook whatever he thought was expedient or necessary to preserve public order in Guyenne, “according to the natural loyalty he had for [the king’s] service.”40 In other words, by cleverly manipulating his status and extensive legal powers as a provincial governor in a way that did not directly contravene Henri III’s recent edicts against armed unions, the Huguenot chef de parti found the means – however dubious – to begin raising troops and organizing the Calvinists for war, all with the apparent knowledge and consent of the Crown. Clearly, noted the Leaguer Villegomblain with grudging admiration, Navarre “knew how to exploit his advantages whenever he had them.”41 During the summer of 1585, however, the Huguenots’ peaceful posture became increasingly untenable as political conditions in France steadily worsened. Despite Navarre’s efforts to prevent it, on 7 July Catherine de Medici signed the alliance of Nemours with the League on behalf of her beleaguered royal son.42 Henri III also seems to have lost patience with Navarre and was now inclined to war, perhaps believing that military force might accomplish what cajolery could not. Whatever the case, he apparently hoped by the new treaty to contain, or even siphon away, Guise power as he had done in 1576–77. In reality, however, the Crown “was absorbed by the League,”43 for that faction obtained everything it had demanded from the king. The limited religious toleration by previous royal edicts was rescinded; Calvinist worship was prohibited; and Guise control over northeastern France was confirmed with royal subsidies to defray the League’s expenses. In essence, the treaty of Nemours was a declaration of war against the Huguenots.44 This at last compelled Henri de Navarre and the Calvinist party to prepare openly for the military struggle that everyone knew was coming. Already, between 1583 and early 1585, the Huguenot leader had written to several Protestant princes in western Europe to solicit pledges of men, money, and matériel in the event of

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hostilities. At the same time, he had proposed the formation of a Protestant union composed of the rulers of England, Denmark, various German states, and the Huguenots as a common front against the Catholics’ counter-reformation. Now, however, Navarre’s requests for aid became far more urgent and precise. To his agent in the Germanies, for example, he wrote: Make the largest levy of Reiters that you can; also get as many Swiss as you can and a few lansquenets; as well, take on any volunteer princes ... [and] hire the best, most experienced officers ... Raise a second army at the same time with the help of the king of Denmark and those Christian princes interested in our preservation and the success of our struggle, which is so important ... See to it that Duke Casimir [of the Palatinate] takes charge and overall command of the foreign army ... [But] if he is unable to march in person, ... implore him in my name to use all his means, credit and authority to secure whatever we need in terms of officers, artillery and munitions, or cash for supplies, as well as the issuance of military instructions.45

Nor did Navarre’s requests go unheeded. Several German princes contributed sums ranging from 6,000 florins to as much as 100,000 florins, depending upon their wealth and ability to pay. By the end of July 1586, these contributions amounted to a combined total of 691,000 florins,46 most of which was earmarked for the large mercenary army that Henri’s agents now began to raise in the German territories. Even the usually parsimonious Elizabeth I of England pledged 100,000 crowns for the Huguenot cause on the compelling advice, important to her own realm’s security, that if “the king of Navarre and those of the Religion in France are well backed, the enterprises of her Majesty’s [Spanish] enemies will be broken, and the progression of the Prince of Parma [Philip II’s commander in the rebellious Dutch Netherlands] made vain.”47 In fact, the English queen’s support rapidly became a principal mainstay of Navarre’s war effort. He himself acknowledged, for example, that much of the financial burden of the proposed German army, which eventually marched to his relief in 1587, was met by Elizabeth.48 In the meantime, whenever the Calvinist leader required additional money or matériel with which to sustain his campaigns, he turned automatically to his English ally.49 So vital, indeed, was her generosity toward his cause that after Henri’s succession to the French throne in August 1589, the need to keep open his lifeline to England via La Rochelle and Dieppe heavily influenced his strategic thinking. As this initial Anglo-German aid would be slow to materialize, however, Navarre focused his immediate attention in autumn 1585 on

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consolidating Huguenot defences in the southwest of France and around the fortress-city of La Rochelle. In particular, he fortified his strongholds along the Dordogne River as his chief line of defence, repairing their walls, reinforcing their garrisons, and provisioning them with supplies and munitions.50 The provincial nobility under his command received similar orders “to see to their security without further delay, each in his own place, according to the means at hand,” after which they were to join their chef de parti in the field.51 These efforts were hampered, however, by the Huguenots’ hitherto close observation of the recent peace treaties by Navarre’s command. As both Mme de Mornay and the vicomte de Turenne noted, the various strongholds had “been so stripped of grain ... that before the fall harvest, they could starve without difficulty.” They were also desperately short of munitions and weapons with which to defend themselves.52 Partly for this reason, Navarre intensified his aggressive political campaign vis-à-vis the Crown by redoubling Calvinist pledges of loyalty and service to Henri III.53 He also wrote personally to the king on 10 July to point out the contradictory nature of his new alliance. After all, not only was the Valois monarch about to break his own edicts of pacification; worse still, he had just united himself with the same men he had denounced the previous spring as rebels guilty of lèse-majesté and as would-be perpetrators of civil war against his obedient Huguenot subjects. Meanwhile, continued Navarre, his own frequent offers of assistance to the Crown had been ignored. The Calvinist leader nevertheless renewed his oaths of loyalty to the French king and once more reaffirmed his willingness to receive Catholic instruction before a national assembly. At the same time, he issued a personal challenge to the duc de Guise, despite the difference in their rank, if that would preserve the public peace.54 Although this latter appeal to ancient chivalric tradition and divine judgment in trial by ordeal was more symbolic than practicable, it was not intended to detach Navarre from the image of a chef de parti, as Denis Crouzet contends;55 rather, it was meaningful only because it was made in that capacity. Besides, Crouzet overlooks the important fact that Henri offered to fight the duke individually or with a force equal to whatever Guise chose to bring to the engagement. Implicit, therefore, was the possibility of a major pitched battle between rival Catholic and Huguenot armies to decide once and for all the religious and political quarrels in France. Crouzet is on more secure ground, however, when he suggests that in offering his challenge, the Huguenot monarch abandoned all rank “to stand naked before God.” Yet it is highly doubtful that Henri was inspired here by any messianic (even blasphemous) vision of the duel as a “combat of redemption” by

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which French sins would be cleansed in blood.56 It is far more likely that, as a sincere Huguenot, he was appealing to the terrible majesty of a Calvinist God who aided the righteous – His special vessels – against their enemies by means of the ancient practice of trial by ordeal. At the same time, the importance of Navarre’s many concurrent offers to receive Catholic instruction cannot be underrated. While he refused to abjure his Calvinist creed if he were not first convinced of his error or if it meant the loss of personal honour or dignity on which his political image in France depended, he nevertheless attempted by these offers to meet the demands of Henri III halfway. As one modern historian points out, his aim always had been to oppose the Guises, never to alienate the French king.57 This explains the constant emphasis in his private letters and public pronouncements during this time on the bonds of blood that united the two monarchs in common cause for the welfare of the state that Henri III now ruled and that Navarre might one day inherit. That appeal was coupled with his continuing tactic of contrasting Guise self-interest and disloyalty to the French Crown with his own fidelity and moderation. It was essential for the preservation of his religious integrity, as well as for his political reputation in France, that he continue to separate himself from the religious quarrel and focus instead on the political issues that also lay behind the civil wars. Nor were his efforts ineffective in this regard. Contemporaries as partisan in outlook as the Calvinist Agrippa d’Aubigné remarked at this time that “[t]he king of Navarre played a brand new character, speaking only of the preservation of the state, and putting Huguenot passions behind him, as he believed he was indispensable to the king.”58 It was up to his Valois cousin, however, either to accept Navarre’s assurances of personal loyalty and support against the League – without the prerequisite of a conversion – or to reject them. In a second, longer letter to Henri III, dated 21 July, Navarre reiterated everything he had argued eleven days before.59 Because of the masterful way he exploited the inconsistencies in the French king’s decision in order to emphasize the personal and dynastic bonds that (Navarre urged) united the two monarchs in common interest, it too deserves examination at some length. Quoting “the words from your own letters,” the Huguenot leader once more recalled Henri III’s previous charges of lèse-majesté against the Guises and their confederates as “rebels and perturbers of the public peace.” He pointed out “that you knew at the time that, whatever pretext they cared to use, they were conspiring against your person and your crown, that they wanted to aggrandize themselves at your expense and to your damage, and

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[that they] aimed only at the total ruin and dissipation of your state.” By contrast, Navarre and the Huguenots had remained peaceful in strict obedience to the king’s commands, “the better to ... distinguish between and advertise to your subjects the different causes that motivated” the two parties. In particular, observed Navarre, “I have accommodated myself ... entirely to the commands of Your Majesty” even when legitimate opportunities had presented themselves to strike the League with armed force. Hence his great surprise at the Valois monarch’s union with that newly reconstituted faction, by which “the conspirators are now armed ... with your backing and authority against your most obedient and loyal subjects, and against myself, who has the honour to be of your blood.” “I leave it to Your Majesty,” continued Henri, “to consider the labyrinth in which I now find myself, and what hope remains to me but despair ... If it is a question of religion (though however [the Guises] use it to shield themselves, this point least touches their heart), I have agreed to a free council; if it is one of security, ... I have offered to quit my gouvernement and my strongholds on condition that they do the same in order not to obstruct peace in this state.” If, however, it was Navarre himself the League wanted, he was ready to oblige, since he already had challenged the duc de Guise to personal combat to avoid another civil war. But above all else, he warned Henri III, “in recognizing the conjunction of my fortune with that of Your Majesty, ... they will purchase my ruin with your own.” He then concluded by deploring “with all my heart the predicament of Your Majesty; seeing you forced (as you will not make use of my loyalty) into the total ruin of your realm.” A separate letter to Catherine de Medici enabled the Huguenot leader to be still more direct in his profession of personal duty. “I hold such rank in this kingdom,” he protested, “that I am obliged to oppose the ruin of the Crown and House of France with all my strength against those who want to usurp them both.”60 Navarre next took his case before the kingdom at large, publishing three pronouncements in rapid succession. In the first, the “Declaration ... against the calumnies published against him,” he repeated everything he had stressed privately to the Valois monarch, with a specific view to showing “all Europe his just cause and the wrongs committed against him.”61 This was followed in early August by a second protest “concerning the peace made with the House of Lorraine, the chief and principal instigators of the League, to the prejudice of the House of France,”62 issued jointly with the prince de Condé and the duc de Montmorency from the town of Saint Paul de Cade-jours. A forceful appeal to French patriotism and monarchical sentiment, this publication accused the League princes of seeking to usurp the Crown

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as enemies of the Valois king and his realm. The three confederates then pledged to “wage war with [the Guises] and exterminate them by every means in our power,” with the aid of all “true and good Frenchmen.” Shortly after, the Calvinist monarch issued a third pronouncement that similarly denounced the treaty of Nemours as “a peace made with foreigners at the expense of the princes of the blood; with the House of Lorraine at the expense of the House of France; with rebels at the expense of obedient subjects; with agitators at the expense of those who have brought peace by every means within their power.” “I intend to oppose it with all my heart,” proclaimed the Huguenot leader, “and to this end to rally around me ... all true Frenchmen regardless of religion, since at this time it is a question of the defence of the state against the usurpation of foreigners.”63 Then, to reinforce this perception, Navarre began using to good effect, the derogatory label “Spanish-Frenchmen” to contrast his Guise and League enemies with all “true and natural Frenchmen” whose first loyalty lay with the Valois Crown. This served not only to re-emphasize the foreign antecedents of that over-mighty family, but also to evoke among French subjects – especially those who lived along the northern frontiers – bitter memories of Spanish invasions before 1559, notorious for their brutality. To such people, the League’s alliance with Philip II of Spain would have seemed tantamount to forming a pact with the devil himself. Together, these three pronouncements in the late summer of 1585 represented a counter-declaration of war against the Guises and the League, but significantly not against the king, whom the Calvinists, their chef de parti, and the United Catholics claimed to defend as royal champions. This essential distinction, stressed continuously by Navarre, implied that in the coming struggle the Huguenots and their politique allies would differentiate between the opposing forces, because (declared the duc de Montmorency) “it is not a question of discerning religions, but of separating the Lorrainers from the French, the League conspirators from the good Catholics.”64 Moreover, this shrewd propaganda device brought immediate benefits. Although the Calvinists’ military position appeared to be weak, Navarre’s three pronouncements were surprisingly effective among moderate French Catholics, many of whom “flooded to his standard” until, by midSeptember, they greatly swelled his ranks.65 Such prominent and devout individuals as the duc de Montpensier (Navarre’s Catholic second cousin) and the duc de Nevers were moved similarly to reject the League and serve with the royal forces instead.66 Even the duc d’Épernon reportedly put aside his keen hostility toward the Calvinist religious minority to declare his willingness to stand as one of

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Navarre’s seconds in the duel he had proposed to Guise, if Henri “did him so much honour as to chose him.”67 Yet these successive declarations had only limited effect on Henri III, for by now the anxious French king had run out of options. He evidently believed that if he were to restore peace to his realm, dissipate League power, and recover his rapidly diminishing authority, he had to secure his Huguenot cousin’s conversion immediately. Only this could destroy the entire political edifice built by the Guises at a single blow by removing the sole pretext of religion upon which they claimed legitimacy. After all, wrote Filippo Cavriana, the Tuscan ambassador to France, “no one believes the war is due to religion, but to vendetta, ambition and avarice.”68 As for Navarre himself, it was assumed by many Catholics, including the Valois king, “that the French Crown is a good incentive” for his abjuration.69 But with the Huguenot leader’s continuing “obstinacy” on this issue, Henri III was forced by circumstances to adopt a course of action he would have preferred to avoid (i.e., civil war) “inasmuch as ... it threatens the ruin of my state and people.”70 One thing is clear, however: Navarre’s moderation, encouragement, and restraint kept his lines of communication with Henri III open. The latter remained ever hopeful, despite submitting to the Guise faction, that his Calvinist cousin might yet be brought around to a conversion, as his repeated protests of loyalty and offers to receive instruction seemed to imply. In fact, the Valois king reportedly declared in mid-July, just after joining forces with the League, that Navarre’s recent pronouncements were “so full of excellent reasoning and offers” that “the majority of the nobility could not take up arms justifiably against” him.71 For precisely that reason, Henri III briefly delayed the full execution of the treaty of Nemours, following its registration by the Paris parlement on 18 July, while he sent a third delegation southward (on 21 July) in a final bid to induce Navarre to abjure.72 But the royal envoys’ argument that “it is much better to be king of France eating fish on Friday, than the poor prince of Béarn with the freedom to eat meat at his pleasure,”73 failed to impress the Huguenot chef de parti. Disappointed but not disillusioned by this fresh setback, Henri III tried again to secure his Calvinist cousin’s abjuration, this time indirectly. On 27 July the French king wrote to the vicomte de Gourdon, whom he urged unsuccessfully to convert.74 Knowing that the viscount was one of the Huguenot leader’s oldest family friends and most trusted advisers, the Valois monarch gambled that if he persuaded Gourdon to abjure, Henri might follow his example. That would remove the single obstacle to an alliance between the two monarchs against the Guises.

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for king and c ountry : a c o n t e st o f a r ms , 1 august 1 5 8 5 to 2 au g u st 1 5 8 9 With the failure of these various efforts by both monarchs to restore order to the kingdom by means of peaceful negotiation, the exchange of words gave way to the contest of arms. The “War of the Three Henris” (named for Henri III, Henri de Navarre, and Henri de Guise) had begun.75 In autumn 1585 several royal forces were mobilized against the Huguenots. One, led by Guise’s younger brother the duc de Mayenne, was to invade Guyenne. There, he was to rendezvous with the troops of the maréchal de Matignon, a king’s man as well as lieutenant-general of the province, who incidentally also enjoyed an “excellent correspondence” with the Calvinist Navarre.76 Meanwhile, the recently promoted maréchal de Biron (who “is nothing Leagueish,” noted the English envoy)77 and the two royal favourites, Joyeuse and Épernon, were to have separate commands in Saintonge, Gascony, and Provence respectively. In this way, Henri III hoped to maintain some control over the combined military operations with the specific aim of blunting League power. For the same reason, in Champagne and the northern provinces where the Guise faction was strongest, the Valois monarch purposely restricted the number of troops at the duke’s disposal in the hope that the League leader would be defeated and perhaps even killed in action.78 So Henri III, too, knew the value of duplicity, the stock in trade of any early modern monarch acting en roi. No wonder the Huguenot Philippe Duplessis-Mornay predicted that although the Catholic forces would be large, their leadership would be divided, since the French king “will follow no other design than what he plans for his own good.”79 Villegomblain similarly noted in his memoirs that while the Valois monarch did not like the Calvinists, he hated and feared the Guises. This “saved the king of Navarre,” concluded the former Leaguer, for his party was so weak that had Henri III and his lieutenants not “traversed in every way possible the plans and enterprises” of the ultra-Catholic faction, the Calvinists might have been destroyed.80 Now faced with the reality – not just the spectre – of renewed civil war, Henri de Navarrre accelerated Huguenot military preparations, though his resources in terms of men, money, and matériel were far less plentiful than those of the enemy. Thus, after arranging for the defence of Calvinist-held territory as best he could with the limited means at his disposal, he prepared to wage a defensive war designed to blunt the enemy’s advance and harass his forces at every turn. But at this juncture the Calvinist cause received an unexpected boost from, ironically, a very Catholic quarter.

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On 9 September the newly elected pope, Sixtus V (1585–90), launched a Bull of Excommunication, the Brutum Fulmen, against Navarre and the prince de Condé. This declared them heretics incapable of succeeding to the French Crown; it deprived them of their titles and estates; and it absolved their vassals from all allegiance.81 In addition, Sixtus promised financial support for the war against the Huguenots and a plenary indulgence for any Catholic who joined the struggle on the side of religion. Contrary to Guise, Spanish, and papal expectations, however, the pontiff’s act was a grave miscalculation. Reaction to it in France was almost universally negative. The bull was condemned by moderate Catholics in particular as an unprecedented example of Roman interference in the traditional rights and privileges not just of the patrie, but of the Gallican Church especially, along with its ancient ties to the monarchy. In addition, Sixtus V was accused of being a creature of Philip II of Spain, hand-chosen to succeed the dead Gregory XIII the previous April, in order to further Spanish interests throughout Europe.82 As a result, the parlement of Paris refused to register the bull on the principle that no pontiff had jurisdiction in the temporal affairs of any state.83 The Valois king also prohibited the publication and sale of the objectionable document in France as an affront to his royal authority. He even imprisoned one printer in Paris who dared to defy his express command.84 Many French Catholic clergy similarly seem to have protested the bull. Offended Gallican sentiment was not, however, the only reason for this unexpectedly virulent reaction to the papal edict. Some of it was due to the existence of a long-standing bias against Rome, which the Venetian ambassador had identified as far back as 1561. “The political influence of the pope counts for nothing in France,” he had written at the time: “The power of the Holy See has been weakened by the new sects which ... do everything to diminish [the pontiff’s] authority. Added to this is that the pope was not born a prince, and that he does not exercise like other rulers, therefore, a natural authority.”85 Henri de Navarre did not fail to exploit this particular prejudice. Writing directly to Henri III, he asked if the Valois monarch could justify the intervention of a pope “in the government of this state” to the point of disposing of the succession and thus of the realm itself? Such arrogance, he noted, had been intolerable to the king’s predecessors. Besides, Navarre asked, if this bull were allowed to pass unchallenged, what was to prevent the pontiff from declaring Henri III himself ineligible to rule at some future date? After all, as well as being the father of all Christians, the pope was supposed to be a good shepherd who searched for lost lambs. Why, then, was he trying to subvert France?86

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But Navarre did not stop here. Sixtus’s precipitate action provided him with an ideal opportunity to defend himself and his religion before the two leading moral authorities of the realm, the faculty of theology of the Sorbonne and the parlement of Paris, in roundly Gallican terms. This enabled him, in turn, to reinforce both his image as the first servant of the Crown and his characterization of the Spanishbacked Guises as enemies of the state at a moment when his Catholic audience, made sensitive to assaults on the French Church and its ancient connection with the monarchy, would be most receptive to this argument. In his letter to the Sorbonne, dated 11 October, the Calvinist king insisted in his own defence that a heretic is one who persists obstinately in error through personal ambition. But as he “had been nourished in a religion that I hold to be holy and true” and had offered frequently to submit to the judgment of a general or national council, this charge could not be applied to him. Neither was he heretical by the strict definition of the Gallican Church, seeing that the decrees of the Council of Trent never had been approved by the French Crown, the clergy, or the parlements, because they were too ultramontane. Consequently, the Sorbonne was faced with a simple choice: to endorse either the pretensions of the League or the “just rights” of Henri de Navarre; “civil war or a [national] council; the extermination of one faction in this state by the other, or the reunion of both parties into one.”87 In his defence to the parlement, also dated 11 October, Henri invoked the fundamental laws of France that governed the succession (i.e., the Salic principle) in the full knowledge that it was the judges’ solemn duty to uphold them inviolate, irrespective of religion. According to these laws, the Calvinist chef de parti was the legitimate heir to Henri III, his profession of faith notwithstanding. This legal fact could not be changed. Hence, he argued, any attempt on the part of the League to abrogate the proper line of succession in favour of the aged cardinal de Bourbon was unlawful. In this way, Navarre again identified himself very closely with the state by representing the Guises and their Spanish allies as subverters of the French monarchy and constitution. “If my cause is just,” he appealed humbly to the judges in his closing remarks, “I desire you to approve it, if it is unjust, then do, messieurs, what you think is your duty to do for the good of the state ... I desire no other judges than you.”88 Finally, Henri took his public protest all the way to the Holy See itself by issuing jointly with his cousin, Condé, a forceful if impudent reply to “Monsieur Sixtus, self-styled pope.” In this response, the Calvinist king dismissed the recent bull of excommunication as

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“abusive” to France and then went on to accuse the pontiff himself of lying and heresy. Moreover, Navarre declared that he was ready to substantiate these charges before a free and lawfully convoked church council, to which Henri promised to denounce the pontiff as the antiChrist if he failed to attend. As a final gesture the Calvinist monarch’s agents publicly posted the placard in Rome to the grudging admiration of Sixtus himself, who had the temperament and strength of character to appreciate, even admire, that kind of audacity.89 In the meantime, the military side of the civil war gathered momentum in France, although from the fall of 1585 to the fall of 1587 there were no decisive engagements. This stage of the struggle amounted to little more than a war of position as both sides concentrated more on making small tactical gains through siege-craft than on undertaking broad strategic manoeuvres designed to force a major battle. Certainly, the Huguenots were in no condition to take the offensive at this time – or at least not until the great mercenary army then being raised in the Germanies was ready to march – even if Navarre had permitted it. That fact was made abundantly clear by the prince de Condé’s impetuosity at the start of hostilities. Suddenly abandoning the siege he had just begun in October of Brouage in Upper Saintonge, a vital target that commanded a strategic approach to La Rochelle, the prince made an ill-conceived dash with most of his forces, against overwhelming odds and contrary to the advice of cooler heads, to take Angers-sur-Loire. Its château, he had recently learned, had been seized by a small party of Huguenots, but he refused to coordinate his manoeuvres with his cousin Navarre, to the detriment of Huguenot planning. The result was almost disastrous. Two days before the prince reached the château, it was recaptured by royal forces under the duc de Joyeuse. Subsequently finding himself encircled by royal troops on the wrong side of the Loire River, Condé only narrowly prevented the loss of his entire force by dispersing it in small groups through gaps in the enemy lines. He then made his own way to Avranches and thence to England to avoid capture. As for the siege of Brouage, it had to be lifted. This left La Rochelle and its approaches dangerously exposed to Catholic attack at a critical moment, as the region had been stripped of Calvinist soldiers for the prince’s ill-fated foray. This reverse nearly crippled the Huguenots’ initial war effort; it also seriously undermined their morale. As Richard Wagmor, the English envoy, later noted: “The ill-succeeding voyage unto Angers hath so frostbitten the forwardness of the noblemen and gentlemen (as well of Poitou as other places), hitherto at the Prince’s devotion, that though

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professing to continue the same, most part keep their houses or lie at [La] Rochelle, to temporise and attend the descent of the reiters.”90 Far more successful, by contrast, were Henri de Navarre’s defensive manoeuvres of “cat and mouse” in Guyenne. There, his small forces effectively neutralized the two much larger armies of Mayenne and Matignon, blunting their progress and harassing them at every turn. To be sure, part of Navarre’s achievement here was due to conditions beyond his control, and specifically to the fact that the enemy campaign was “directed with a certain lack of enthusiasm.”91 Matignon, for example, did not take the field until late autumn 1585. Even then, he only half-heartedly confronted Navarre at Nérac in December and again at Castets the following February, when he fell back in order to join forces with Mayenne at the appointed rendezvous. Thereafter, the two Catholic commanders occupied themselves in the spring and summer of 1586 with capturing minor Huguenot strongholds, as opposed to more substantial targets. Their efforts were dulled further, meanwhile, by the logistical problems of maintaining large bodies of troops on campaign for extended periods of time, as well as by the refusal of both commanders to cooperate with each other or to coordinate their movements – just as Duplessis-Mornay had predicted – perhaps on the secret instructions of their respective leaders, the duc de Guise and Henri III. Nevertheless, the vigorous nature of Huguenot resistence under Navarre’s leadership also prevented the enemy’s success. Indeed, it was at this time that the Calvinist chef de parti began to earn his reputation as a skilled cavalry commander. Recognizing, unlike Condé, “that he had not strength enough to keep the field” against the enemy forces in Guyenne, Navarre rode with 2,000 arquebusiers à cheval (mounted infantry trained to fight on foot or horseback), 300 light cavalry, and 500 gens d’armes, “which yet were all veterans, well disciplined, ready upon every occasion, and not embarrassed with baggage or artillery.” With these troops, “he scoured the whole country, sometimes making sudden excursions into one part and sometimes into another, providing everything that was necessary, and never giving the enemy any opportunity of coming to an engagement with him.”92 These rapid cavalcades were far more, however, than simple cavalry raids in force. They were the manoeuvres of an “equestrian army” that could live off the land and strike swiftly wherever and whenever Navarre chose, or fight a conventional field battle when the need arose.93 Moreover, this guerilla style of combat was especially well suited to the Huguenots’ limited resources, and Henri excelled at it, once joking that “anyone who likes to relax inside his armour should not trouble to make war.”94

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In short, by employing a Fabian strategy,95 Navarre utterly frustrated his opponents in Guyenne and next in Poitou, whither he shifted his forces in June 1586 to block yet another royal army under the redoubtable maréchal de Biron. The marshal’s intention, after sweeping Calvinist garrisons from Saintonge and Poitou, was to besiege Marans in the marshes of Aunis, just north of La Rochelle, as the capstone to restoring royal control over the region. But long before he reached his objective, Biron already admitted to feeling vulnerable before the rapid movements of the Huguenot leader’s equestrian army, which, he wrote, “will be able to make an assault [upon the royal troops] ... without risk, as infantry cannot run after cavalry!”96 As well, given Navarre’s ability to appear and vanish “like lightening,”97 many other Catholics began to endorse Étienne Pasquier’s opinion that if “the war is conducted in this fashion, I cannot see that we will have so prompt an end to the Huguenots as the League promises.”98 Nor did subsequent events give them any reason to change their view. On the contrary, by the time Biron approached Marans on 10 July, the place had been fortified so skilfully by Navarre that it could be taken only by a protracted siege. Hence, after some light skirmishing between the opposing forces in which the marshal himself was wounded slightly, the royal troops withdrew without attempting a formal assault. This “single check ... seems to have broken the fighting spirit” of Biron’s army.99 Coincidentally, Mayenne’s desultory campaign in Guyenne against the Calvinist forces led by the vicomte de Turenne also ended at this time, having accomplished little or nothing100 – a point loudly trumpeted by Huguenot propagandists.101 Meanwhile, the duc de Joyeuse’s offensive in Gévaudan similarly ground to a halt. The Calvinists, in contrast, were by their own account “still fresh in spirit and courage, even stronger than before the war, and hold the field in all [their] provinces.”102 Given the enemy’s failure to achieve anything of significance against the Huguenots, Navarre was justifiably pleased with his generalship, boasting in mid-September that he had “resisted victoriously three fresh and well-paid armies.”103 But if the Huguenots’ defensive military posture during this first phase of the civil war, from fall 1585 to fall 1587, was compelled to a large degree by a lack of resources, it was dictated at least as much by Navarre’s policy, and specifically his continuing efforts to achieve a political rapprochement with the Valois king against the Guises and the League. This was, after all, the only aspect of the civil conflict in which the Calvinists could take the initiative with little risk to themselves and a reasonable chance of success. For that reason, Navarre had opened the campaign of 1586 by publishing (on 1 January) four new declarations, addressed this time to

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the citizens of Paris and the three orders of the kingdom.104 In each he repeated his two customary themes of Guise sedition and treachery against the Crown and, in contrast, his own religious moderation and Calvinist loyalty to Henri III. Moreover, the tone and content of each declaration were adapted to meet the specific character and attitude of its intended audience. To the clergy, he affirmed that he was neither heretical nor stubborn in his profession of faith, but open to “quiet” persuasion: “We believe in one God, we acknowledge one Jesus Christ, and we draw upon the same Gospel. If in the interpretation of the same passages we have differed, I believe that the means I have proposed might bring us to agreement.” Should they spurn his offers, he declared, “may the blood which will be spilled be upon your heads.” To the nobility, Navarre re-emphasized his distinction between all “true and natural Frenchmen” and the Guises, while adding his regret that “in the press of battle I cannot distinguish among those whom I know to have been deceived” by the League. “But God knows the secret of my heart,” he concluded, “[and] may their blood fall upon the authors of these miseries.” How far these public appeals enhanced the Calvinist monarch’s reputation in France is unclear, though in one crucial area they succeeded. They permitted Henri to maintain his communications with the French king, who was increasingly resentful of Guise arrogance and eager to escape it. This explains why, on three separate occasions over the next year and a half, Henri III, apparently seeing an opportunity, renewed his efforts to persuade Navarre to convert and return to the court as his heir and ally. He even authorized extended talks from December 1586 to March 1587 between Catherine de Medici and his Calvinist cousin on the neutral ground of the château of SaintBrice, near Cognac, under cover of a general truce. As usual, the queen mother’s task was to persuade her son-in-law to abjure his Calvinist faith as the single means of restoring peace to the troubled realm, in the belief that his conversion would encourage the majority of Huguenots to follow his example.105 Also as usual, her chief means to this end was bribery with promises of pensions and titles, including even the annulment of Henri’s disastrous marriage to Marguerite. From their first meeting, however, it was clear to the more astute members of Catherine’s suite that the Huguenot chef de parti “was not so ready to declare himself a Catholic as some wanted to make us believe, and that it will take a while yet to restore this rock to the Church.”106 Once again Navarre refused to abjure and instead announced “very clearly” that after defending the Reformed Religion through twenty-five years of civil wars “it would be unreasonable to abandon the exercise of it now.”107 Nevertheless, he reaffirmed his

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willingness to receive instruction. But, mused Pomponne de Bellièvre, instruction and conversion were not the same thing. Moreover, he concluded, given “the difference that exists between facts and wishes ... we will sooner come to the end of our money than the war!”108 So Catherine attempted to steal around the thorny obstacle of faith by appealing to her son-in-law’s professed loyalty to the Crown. Accused by her of disobedience, Navarre sharply retorted: “Madame, you can reproach me with no other fault but an excess of loyalty!”109 On that sour note, months of fruitless negotiation ended, the frustrated queen mother returned to Paris, and hostilities resumed in full vigour. Still hopeful, however, that he could bring his Huguenot cousin to reason and thereby throw off the Guise yoke, Henri III made a final appeal to Navarre in May 1587, despite having just renewed the treaty of Nemours (on 20 April) under League pressure.110 To that end, he dispatched the moderate-Catholic duc de Montpensier (who was also a Bourbon prince from a cadet branch of the family) to the Huguenot chef de parti in early May with fresh offers of peace.111 But as the success of these negotiations hinged, like those before them, upon Navarre’s immediate conversion to Catholicism, they too failed. Not until spring 1589, when he was isolated politically after murdering the Guise brothers at Blois, would the French king again approach his Calvinist cousin for support. The rest of 1587 was taken up with military activity. In the autumn of the previous year, Navarre had recognized that the Calvinists’ style of fighting to that date was “something that cannot endure” and that “it will be necessary, in the end, to take the offensive.”112 By that he meant two things. First, his tactical sense told him that a defensive war ultimately could not succeed. It was, at best, a temporary holding action designed to obstruct the enemy’s movements, exhaust their means, and sap their morale until improved conditions or greater resources allowed the Huguenots to seize the military, as well as the political, initiative. Second, Navarre’s strategic sense told him, perhaps as early as 1585, that in order to achieve Calvinist objectives, at some point he would have had to take the conflict across the Loire River into the heart of enemy territory, “as this is the only way,” he said, “to bring them to reason.”113 That moment arrived in autumn 1587, when the large army raised for the Huguenot cause by his agents in the Holy Roman Empire finally invaded northeastern France. This event required Navarre to move with great dexterity if he were to avoid alienating the Valois monarch and preserve the image he had built since 1584 of Huguenot loyalty to the Crown. Hitherto, his successful balancing of both political goals had depended in large measure on restricting the

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Calvinist war effort to one of self-defence. This new development in the military campaign was clearly offensive in nature, however, and threatened to bring the Huguenots into direct conflict with Henri III, with potentially disastrous results for their leader’s ongoing political campaign to win the king. No sooner, therefore, was Navarre informed that the German forces were almost ready to march than he issued, on 14 July, a “Protest concerning the entry of his army into France.”114 His goal, as usual, was to separate Henri III from the League – not just by fair words, this time, but by offering him the military means to do so. To that end, he began the declaration by reminding the Valois monarch that the Huguenots fought solely to protect him “and all bons François from the oppression of the sworn enemies of this Crown and State.” For precisely that reason, Navarre continued, “we have maintained a defensive war, ... hoping that our patience would calm the fury and rage of those of the House of Lorraine and, meantime, that his Majesty would recognize the truth of their pernicious designs to exterminate totally the House of France, and by that means usurp the kingdom.”115 He concluded by declaring his readiness, upon Henri III’s command, to place the German mercenary army at the king’s disposal, in order “to deliver him from the tyranny of the Lorrainers.” But instead of accepting this offer, the Valois monarch prepared to meet the coming invasion with three forces of his own. The first, led by the duc de Guise, was assigned to Champagne, through which the Germans were expected to march. A second army was dispatched under the duc de Joyeuse to Poitou, where Navarre had spent the late summer and early autumn sparring with the royal forces, seizing small towns, and generally enlarging Huguenot control of the region around La Rochelle. The third and largest royal army, finally, was commanded in person by Henri III. He took up a position along the Loire in order to prevent the joining of the Calvinist and mercenary forces. In making these dispositions, the king secretly gambled that Joyeuse would defeat the Huguenots and that the Germans would destroy the duc de Guise after suffering heavy losses of their own. According to Villegomblain, Henri III even secretly ordered the loyalist officers in the duke’s army to abandon him at the crucial moment, to leave him “naked, without force and powerless.”116 The Valois monarch could then emerge triumphant over both parties, with his authority intact and his dignity restored.117 But at this point events moved too rapidly for him to control. In September, news of the German army’s advance summoned Navarre eastward to meet it. Yet before he could do more than reassemble the troops he had scattered among the various strongholds along his

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defensive line in Poitou, Joyeuse marched directly toward him with the clear intention of forcing a battle. At the same time, the maréchal de Matignon advanced northward from Bordeaux to catch the Huguenot forces in a pincer movement. Leaving La Rochelle, Henri tried to avoid the enemy trap by slipping across Joyeuse’s front in a southerly direction toward Guyenne before Matignon could block his route. Evidently, it was the Calvinist leader’s plan to put his fortified line of the Dordogne between himself and the enemy, and then to circle northward to rendezvous with the advancing Germans along the Moselle River. From there, the united forces would march toward Paris.118 But before he could accomplish this manoeuvre he was overtaken by Joyeuse at Coutras and forced to fight a battle on 20 October. Despite the superior numbers and equipment of the royal army, Navarre won a resounding victory over the duke in little more than an hour, during which the royal favourite himself and 2,500 of his troops were slain. Huguenot losses amounted to only about 500 men. News of the debacle halted the advance of Matignon, who quickly placed all blame for it on Joyeuse. The dead man’s impetuosity and lust for reputation (the marshal accused) had inspired him to attack Navarre before the two royal armies could join forces. This unexpected triumph confronted the Huguenot leader, however, with a potentially ruinous paradox. Coutras was the first major engagement won by the Huguenots since the beginning of the civil wars in 1562, and from it Navarre earned high praise for his generalship. Even the Leaguer Villegomblain saw in his victory “the foundation of a great reputation ... This exploit placed him in the rank of the great captains of his time ... because he showed on this occasion much assurance, and excellent judgment.”119 But in defeating Joyeuse, Navarre had killed a king’s man – a royal favourite, no less – and destroyed a king’s army. This diametrically contradicted the stated goals of his political and military policies up to now, which were focused against the League. To limit the potential damage, therefore, Henri wrote to the Valois monarch immediately following the battle to justify the fighting on the basis of self-defence; to apologize for the slaughter; and to emphasize once more that Henri III’s real enemies “are those who, by the ruin of our blood and of the nobility, want what is yours ... your crown.”120 In conclusion, Navarre pleaded with the king to summon him and the Huguenots to the royal service against the Guise faction, and renewed his pledges of loyalty and obedience. Then, to demonstrate his sincerity with a gesture of good faith, Henri had the body of Joyeuse embalmed properly and interred respectfully according to Catholic ritual.121 He also treated his Catholic prisoners

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with elaborate courtesy. For they too were the king’s men, not members of the League,122 and the Huguenot leader’s purpose always was to draw a sharp distinction between the two parties. That point he stressed once more to the royalist maréchal de Matignon, to whom he expressed his regret that, on the day of Coutras, “I could not differentiate between the good and natural Frenchmen and the partisans of the League.”123 For the same reason, Navarre did not follow up the Huguenot victory by marching to rendezvous with the invading German army on the Moselle or upper Loire, as originally planned. This was due partly to logistics. Because the Calvinist forces were in no condition to continue the campaign following the battle, he was forced to disband his troups for several weeks to allow them the time to rest and re-outfit. His decision was certainly not motivated by an irresponsible desire to lay the captured enemy standards at the feet of his current mistress, Corisande d’Andoins, comtesse de Grammont, in Béarn or by a strategic miscalculation, as some contemporaries and most historians allege. Far more significant than logistics, however, was the important political consideration – especially in the wake of Coutras – that Henri dared undertake no project that would bring him into direct military conflict with the Valois king. Precisely because Henri III’s own army blocked his route across the Loire, Navarre did not march directly to meet the Germans. This in turn denied the cumbersome mercenary army effective leadership against the duc de Guise, who defeated it handily at Auneau on 24 November (to the Valois monarch’s chagrin), despite the smallness of his forces. Following their capitulation on 8 December, the beaten Germans were chased quickly from the kingdom in confusion and with considerable loss. From a strictly military perspective, therefore, Sully was correct in concluding years later that all the advantage of the Huguenot victory over Joyeuse “floated away like smoke on the wind.”124 But from Navarre’s much broader political perspective, restoring the long-term integrity of his campaign to win the Valois monarch was more important than securing his shortterm military gains. From this point forward, the focus of French attention shifted from the battlefield to the Valois court, where the royal situation deteriorated rapidly. Eager for the acclaim he had won at Auneau, an overconfident duc de Guise entered Paris in May 1588 against Henri III’s express command that he remain in Champagne. This action precipitated the Day of the Barricades on 12 May, when the agitated citizenry, fearing that the popular duke would be arrested, blockaded the city streets and threatened to massacre the royal troops whom the king

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had brought into the capital to maintain order. Only the duke’s personal intercession with the mob saved these soldiers from almost certain slaughter. Thus, deeply humiliated, Henri III fled Paris the next day with only a small guard, leaving his mother to negotiate with the Leaguers. Henri de Navarre immediately offered both his services and his army to the Valois king against the duc de Guise, whose behaviour, he declared, was concrete evidence of his greater interest in usurping the crown than in defending religion.125 But Henri III still insisted that any rapprochement be preceded by the Huguenot leader’s conversion to Catholicism. By midsummer, however, Henri III had lost all room to manoeuvre. Unable to attract support from other quarters, the French monarch was compelled to sign the Edict of Reunion with the League on 11 July. This was a complete royal surrender to Guise-backed demands that he eradicate the Calvinist heresy in France, publish the decrees of the Council of Trent, exclude Navarre from the succession in favour of the cardinal de Bourbon, appoint the duc de Guise lieutenant-general of the realm, and convoke the Estates General at Blois in October. In addition, the duc d’Épernon, the principal surviving royal favourite, was to be removed from court and stripped of his many offices, while four royal secretaries of state (namely, Brûlart de Sillery, Villeroy de Neufville, Hurault de Cheverny, and Pomponne de Bellièvre) similarly were to be dismissed from service. This time Guise had pushed too far. On 23 December, during the Estates at Blois, Henri III had him murdered in the royal apartments in a desperate bid to restore his authority. The next day the cardinal de Lorraine was also garroted by royal command, while other prominent Leaguers – including the old cardinal de Bourbon – were placed under close arrest. Only Mayenne and his half-brother, the duc de Nemours, escaped almost certain death or incarceration, as they were elsewhere in the kingdom and beyond the immediate reach of royal vengeance. Yet the Valois king’s action came too late. Moreover, it backfired. Confronted subsequently with fierce ultra-Catholic opposition and a kingdom, including Paris, in open revolt against him because of Guise’s murder, Henri III found himself isolated and in danger of losing his throne.126 As a result, concluded the Venetian ambassador, “there is no longer any reason to fear the Crown of France.”127 Navarre, taking a different view, was ecstatic at the new turn of events. “The King triumphs,” he wrote to the comtesse de Grammont, “he has strangled the cardinal de Lorraine, killed Guise, and rounded up the League leaders. He has sent an agent to Lyon to grab [the duc de] Mayenne, too.”128 He then added, somewhat maliciously, that his

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joy would be complete if he received word that his estranged wife Marguerite had also been strangled. That news, he cooed, combined with the death of her mother, “would make me really sing the song of Simeon.” Part of Navarre’s wish came true on 5 January 1589, when Catherine de Medici died at the age of seventy after a long illness. Suppressing his relief at the passing of an old opponent, whom he probably respected as much as he despised, the Huguenot leader commented only that “I will speak as a Christian; it was God’s will!”129 What most pleased him, however, was that the unexpected murder of the Guise brothers finally opened the way to a reconciliation with Henri III. Indeed, the assassination and then rebellion of much of Catholic France against the hapless Valois monarch effectively dissolved “the impediments and obstacles to reaching some good agreement for peace.”130 Even the king’s remaining servitors recognized that an alliance with the Huguenots and their chef de parti was now the only route to political salvation.131 The English ambassador, Sir Edward Stafford, concurred with this assessment, observing: “One thing I am sure of, that in all likelihood all yet turneth onelie to the King of Navarre’s good.”132 “The more things move forward,” Navarre assured the sieur Du Pin, a secretary of state, “the more it seems things take a turn for the better for us. All loyal servitors of the King know the need they have of my assistance.”133 Yet the Huguenot leader dared not act precipitously. Philippe Duplessis-Mornay advised him instead to use caution, sensing that the Valois monarch still hesitated to take the final step and perhaps even thought of continuing his campaign against the Calvinists because of the necessity at this time of showing that he was a good Catholic.134 Fully aware of Henri III’s desperate predicament and need for Huguenot support, because “otherwise, he is undone,”135 Navarre bowed to this sage advice. He thus moved very circumspectly over the next few weeks so as not to pressure the king or frighten him away. In particular, he withheld making any overt offers of assistance until it was politically propitious to renew them. Meanwhile, to smooth the way toward an alliance with the reluctant monarch, Navarre published an appeal for peace on 4 March. In it he vigorously reaffirmed his devotion to Henri III, re-emphasized the community of interests between the French Crown and its Huguenot subjects, pledged solemnly to uphold the principle of religious toleration in France as a pathway to lasting peace, and reiterated his own willingness to receive instruction. “We are in a house that is going to collapse,” he warned, “a boat which is going to be lost, and there is no remedy but peace.”136 Finally, a truce was concluded on 3 April between the two monarchs.137 Then, against the protests of his counsellors, who distrusted

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Henri III and feared a repetition of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, Navarre went personally to greet the king on 30 April at Plessis-les-Tours. He came “with such an open and honest face,” recalled an eyewitness to the event, “that there was not one among the onlookers of this interview, who did not carry away incredible joy in his spirit.”138 By this bold and perhaps even foolhardy act, given the circumstances around it, the Huguenot leader successfully “broke the ice, and not without numerous warnings that, if I went there, I would be a dead man.”139 He also earned the admiration and praise of his Huguenot advisers, especially Duplessis-Mornay, who admitted, “Sire, you have done what you ought, and what no one else could have advised you to do.”140 With the new treaty, the goals of Henri de Navarre’s political and military campaigns since 1584 were realized. Uniting their armies, the Catholic king and his Huguenot ally swept aside League resistance before marching in late July on rebellious Paris “to attack the enemy in their chiefest strength.”141 Originally, the Valois monarch had wanted to strike into Brittany, but the Calvinist leader had advised against this “shameful voyage, from which damage is certain, and from which profit is impossible.” Such a move would have made it seem as if Henri III were fleeing before Mayenne, and would so ruin the king’s reputation in France and with foreign princes that no one would want to serve him.142 Unable in any case to contain his satisfaction over the recent turn of events, Navarre wrote gleefully to his mistress on 18 May: “I am writing to you from Blois where five months ago I was condemned as a heretic and ineligible to succeed to the crown; and I am at this hour its principal support.”143 The League’s confederate, the duc de Lorraine, similarly acknowledged that “the largest and principal part of the forces of the king of France is composed of heretics, and even the king of Navarre ... is close to his person.”144 The allied monarchs opened their siege of the French capital with every promise of success, but once again unexpected violence completely changed the situation. On 1 August, Henri III was stabbed in the abdomen by Jacques Clément, a young monk from the city who was himself slaughtered immediately by the royal guards. At first, it was believed Henri would survive the blow, but toward evening his condition grew worse. By the early morning hours of 2 August his physicians had given up all hope of his recovery, so the Valois king summoned Navarre to his bedside in order to bless him and to recognize him as his lawful successor. He also insisted that everyone present do the same and, furthermore, that they leave their differences of religion to the decision of a convocation of the Estates General once peace had been restored.145 It is ironic that Henri III finally accepted his Calvinist

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cousin as his successor, his religion notwithstanding, on his deathbed, when it was too late to help either of them. Nevertheless, he urged Navarre to convert with this terse warning: “Brother, I assure you, you will never be King of France, if you turn not Catholick, and if you humble not your self unto the Church.”146 After receiving absolution and the last sacrament, the Valois king died in the presence of his Catholic servitors (Navarre having returned, meantime, to his camp at Meudon). Among them were Charles d’Orléans, Grand Prior of France, the duc d’Épernon, the maréchal de Biron, Roger de Bellegarde, Grand Equerry of France, and François d’O, the surintendant des finances. Now, “of the three Henrys, only Navarre remained, and the fate of the kingdom was in his hands.”147

for crown and c on sc ie n c e , au g u st 1 5 8 9 With the sudden extinction of the Valois line, the French Crown was Henri de Navarre’s by right of birth and succession, claims strengthened by the deathbed endorsement of the murdered king. Even so, the latter’s assassination threw the united royalist-Catholic and Huguenot party into turmoil. What had seemed only a remote possibility on the duc d’Alençon’s death five years before was now a sudden disturbing reality. The Calvinist chef de parti had become the presumptive French monarch according to the fundamental Salic Law that governed the succession. The essential issues behind the ongoing civil war had changed with the single thrust of a knife. No longer was it a struggle against the political ambitions of the Guises and their League partisans, or a battle between two hostile creeds. Nor was it simply “the success of a minor negotiation, the winning of a battle or a little kingdom such as Navarre that was at stake.”148 It was now a conflict to set a Calvinist king upon a traditionally Catholic throne “in the fairest monarchy of Europe.” Immediately following this dramatic shift in circumstances Henri de Navarre found himself “king [of France] sooner than he had expected or desired, half-seated on a shaky throne.”149 Particularly unnerving was the irresolute behaviour of many otherwise royalist-Catholic French nobles who agreed with his accession in principle but wavered considerably over whether to accept him as their new sovereign. Navarre had the best legal claim, to be sure; however, most of them also believed that a Calvinist succession violated French custom, the faith of the previous kings of France, and the ancient coronation oath. In other words, in a manner that was no longer simply hypothetical, the two chief ideals upon which the traditional conception of French monarchy was based were now pitted against each other. The first of

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these was the right of heredity by blood, enshrined in the constitution by venerable Salic Law. That was the primary foundation of Navarre’s claims to legitimacy and the crown after the murder of Henri III. The second ideal was the sacral role of the sovereign, a fundamental medieval concept deeply engrained in traditional notions of the French monarchy, being the monarchy’s basis of authority and its link to both the subject and the Church. In this latter view, the king was regarded first and foremost as a sacred figure, an intermediary between God and man whose importance was second only to the pope. Accordingly, the monarch’s solemn duty was to guide his subjects in holiness, as well as through the sacred rituals performed at his coronation, on holy days in the religious calendar and during commemorative events, such as victory celebrations, at which Te deums were sung. These ceremonies ensured that the realm remained true to the Church and thus in divine favour, serving as occasions of prayer for the intercession by the saints with God. Such rituals also had a clearly political purpose. They placed the king and his people under God’s protection and, by extension, identified royal acts and authority with His will.150 To most Catholic Frenchmen, therefore, the primary duty of their prince was to defend the faith – which they understood not as Christianity broadly defined, but as Catholicism – against all heresy in accordance with his coronation oaths. At the same time, these oaths were the strongest evidence that the sovereign himself had to be Catholic, since the whole function of society, at the apex of which the sovereign stood, was seen to depend upon his ability to guard the law of God, received with his crown, and to uphold it.151 Even the contemporary Huguenot polemicist, Petrus Ramus, argued that “if the King will be loved, and obey the commandments of God and retaine the obedience and love of his subjects, he must of necessitie establish Religion,” because that “is a most assured bonde of humane actions and of the true obedience of subjects towards their Kings.”152 It was partly upon this very concept of monarchy and its reciprocal obligations to God that the Leaguers had justified their revolt in July 1585153 and their subsequent rebellion against Henri III after December 1588. They had accused the Valois king of tyranny, among other charges, for failing in his duty to exterminate heresy.154 It was also this concept that now gave the Catholics in the royal camp so much cause for alarm in August 1589. Because the “natural imperative” of the Salic Law and the “religious imperative” of the sacre (or coronation ceremony) were now in clear conflict, “nation and religion became contradictory, which forced French Catholics to choose one or the other.”155

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No wonder, then, that the royalist-Catholic nobles vacillated as they tried to determine where their first loyalty lay. On the one hand was their commitment to uphold the constitutional and legal succession to the throne; on the other was their duty to safeguard the Catholicity of the French Crown in accordance with traditional views of its sacrality and their own sincere religious convictions. The mood of some of the late monarch’s chief servitors was threatening. According to one eyewitness, at Henri IV’s second encounter with these men near the stillwarm corpse of his murdered predecessor, he found them “shouting loudly, putting on their hats or throwing them to the ground, clenching their fists, whispering together, touching hands to confirm vows and promises, of which one could hear as conclusion: ‘Rather a thousand deaths!’”156 More alarming still was the marquis d’O’s blunt assertion that he “would surrender to the enemy rather than suffer under a Huguenot king ... [affirming] out loud what others were muttering between clenched teeth.”157 Henri was deeply disturbed by this open display of animosity from a group of Catholics whose loyalty to him was essential, but whose deep religious scruples and belief in the traditional Catholicity of the Crown were thrown into direct conflict with their respect for the fundamental Salic Law and the legal principle of succession through legitimacy of blood. Thus, badly shaken, he retreated into an antechamber with two trusted advisers, the duc de La Force and Agrippa d’Aubigné, to consider his options. The immediate problem for the Calvinist-leader-turned-king-ofFrance was that the Catholic nobles’ crisis of conscience over their divided loyalties seriously jeopardized his position as presumptive French monarch. He was presented with a grave political and emotional dilemma. On the one hand, he needed strong backing from the late king’s Catholic servitors to assert successfully his rights to the throne. The Huguenot minority, still his chief basis of support, was simply too weak to assure his just claims unaided. But on the other hand, Navarre did not want to compromise his Calvinist faith by converting on demand in return for obedience from the Catholic royalists. How, then, could he obtain their recognition without impairing his newly inherited royal authority or repudiating his religion? In almost every modern account of his succession to the French throne, Henri IV’s dilemma in August 1589 is treated by historians as a purely political problem. Only in three cases is there any suggestion that religious scruples influenced his conduct as he manoeuvred for royalist-Catholic support, though two of these authors later contradict themselves.158 For the majority of scholars and biographers, the real question in August 1589, therefore, was not whether Henri IV would abjure, but when. Timing, not intent, was at issue. This conclusion was

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based chiefly upon an assumption that foremost in the king’s mind was a cynical political calculation that a hasty conversion at this time would not guarantee the adhesion of the Catholic royalists to his party, especially if it appeared he had abjured from constraint or self-interest, while it certainly would alienate the Huguenots and his Protestant allies abroad. Such an outcome promised a loss of support he could ill afford. Otherwise, “his personal [religious] convictions were no obstacle to his conversion.”159 Thus blinkered by a narrow political focus, most scholars ignore, dismiss, or simply fail to see the full extent of Navarre’s stress at the moment he learned of his succession. Nor do they recognize the tremendous uncertainty that afflicted his own mind over how to proceed in the opening hours of his reign, an uncertainty for which there is considerable contemporary evidence. Instead, they present Henri as a cool-headed pragmatist, unfettered by doubt, emotional tension, or genuine religious scruple, whose principal aim was to secure his recognition as lawful French monarch before making a political abjuration. To that end, they claim, he compromised easily with the royalist Catholics over the question of his religious profession, pledging specifically to maintain Catholicism in France without innovation and to receive instruction before “a free and national council” within six months of his succession. In exchange for these concessions, he secured Catholic noble recognition of his sovereignty in accordance with fundamental law. The royal bargain was then sealed on 4 August by the twin Declarations of Saint Cloud. Much of the traditional interpretation of the king’s actions outlined above cannot be disputed. Henri was politically pragmatic; moreover, he was always just as concerned with maintaining his public image and reputation among the moderate Catholics as he was with preserving his Calvinist basis of support. This, too, was recognized by his enemies in August 1589.160 It is also possible that Henri was already mindful (though not yet convinced) that a future conversion to Catholicism might become unavoidable if he ever wanted to wear the French crown in peace. After all, the late king had warned him of this eventuality almost with his dying breath. Besides, Henri was himself far too intelligent not to have recognized on a purely rational level, the inherent contradiction that existed in his day of a Catholic country ruled by a Calvinist king whose religion was embraced only by a minority of his subjects. What can be disputed, however, is the assertion that his bargaining with the Catholic royalists was motivated exclusively by considerations of pragmatic politics. On the contrary, because Henri was a sincere Calvinist for whom matters of faith were just as important as considerations of political advantage, his compromise with the Catholic nobles

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at Saint Cloud two days after his succession was aimed not simply at consolidating his new position as French monarch by nailing down royalist-Catholic support, but also at providing him a practical means of avoiding a conversion he did not want to make. This element of the king’s private conscience and his efforts to protect it is key to comprehending his political decision-making in August 1589, for it reveals his continuing struggle in the face of growing difficulty to maintain the old balance between his blood and religion. Although Henri de Navarre’s sudden accession to the French throne was opposed by many royalist Catholics, their disapproval was by no means unexpected. Since the previous April, Navarre had witnessed numerous portents of their reluctance to acknowledge his authority should he some day become the king of France, one being that Catholics in the allied royal army had divided over the issue of his creed. Many royalist Catholics genuinely feared that a Calvinist succession posed as great a menace to the established religion of France as the League did to the country’s political integrity. In addition, there was a heated legalistic debate over Henri’s right to inherit a crown against which, it was alleged, he had been in open rebellion for many years.161 If nothing else, a large number of these nobles had serious personal misgivings about obeying the orders of a Huguenot prince who was still under the ban of the Church. For precisely these considerations, the formerly royalist Villeroy de Neufville had joined Mayenne and the ultra-Catholics, for whom, he always contended, religion was far more important than was acknowledged by the royal party.162 Hence, Navarre was acutely aware of the precariousness of his position as presumptive Calvinist heir to the Catholic crown long before Clément struck his fatal blows. Even so, when the shocking news of the regicide swept through the royal forces around Paris on 2 August, it struck Henri with near paralysing force. Shocked by the sheer unexpectedness of Henri III’s death, the Huguenot leader was quite unprepared to assume the French crown immediately. This is clear from a letter he wrote to the seigneur de Souvré on 1 August, in which he reported Clément’s attack on the Valois monarch and the doctors’ initial assurances “that his Majesty is out of danger.” But before he could send it, the king’s condition had deteriorated so dramatically that a very anxious Navarre added in a postscript: “If things take a turn for the worst (which God forbid!), I beg you, my friend, to wish me to prove myself the man I have always promised myself to be.”163 His state of mind, obviously, was anything but cool. Although long aware of the possibilities and potential repercussions of Catholic opposition to his religion should he actually succeed to the

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throne, the Huguenot leader had neither a feeling of immediacy nor time enough to prepare for the event. While Henri III had lived, the questions surrounding the succession issue had been largely moot, as the king’s health was good and he yet might have sired an heir. His death thus caught Navarre (and everyone else, for that matter) almost completely off-guard. But what made Henri’s situation worse was the fact that he could not be certain how the Catholics “would hold themselves toward him” now that he was their king.164 Would they keep their final promise to the dying Valois monarch and accept Navarre’s authority on the strength of French custom and fundamental Salic Law, regardless of his religious profession? Or would they reject him out of hand because of his Calvinist faith, as they had seemed likely to do at their first encounter over the bloody corpse of Henri III? In fact, so uncertain was Navarre about how the royalist Catholics would react that his immediate response to the news of his succession to the throne of France was uncharacteristically indecisive. He vacillated nervously between rushing to the royal headquarters at Saint Cloud “to present himself to the officers as their king, or retiring toward the Loire for his safety, to retain in his party the provinces on the opposite side of that river.”165 Given the many uncertainties that confronted him, it was clear to Henri’s Calvinist advisers that his first priority was to maintain the backing of the United Catholics who had fought by his side since at least 1585, and then to add to it that of the late monarch’s servitors. Recognizing that at this tense moment their shaken royal master needed “good counsel more than ... consolation,” both La Force and d’Aubigné urged him to “keep at your side those [nobles] who already are attached to you and ... at once sort out those Catholics less committed to the pope than to their king, for the rest will do you more harm close to you than if they are far away.”166 In short, if he failed to win the support of the moderate Catholics, the general acceptance of Henri’s authority as king of France, let alone the continuity of his military strength against the League, never would transpire.167 This would be no easy task. In view of the Catholic nobles’ conflicting concerns over their religious duty to uphold the Roman faith and their political duty to serve the French Crown, there was a very real danger that they might abandon Navarre to join the League for the sake of their religion.168 As it was, many royalist-Catholic nobles were unwilling to dismiss out of hand the rival claims to the throne put forward “with so little reason” by their League enemies in the name of Charles cardinal de Bourbon, Navarre’s aged uncle.169 Still others entertained vague notions either of returning to the ancient tradition of election, in which the surviving Guises figured prominently, or of

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backing Philip II’s pretensions to the throne through his daughter, the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia, who was a granddaughter of Henri II. Alternatively, the nobles might seek the direct protection of the Spanish monarch (as the League had done already) to ensure that the French Crown and Catholic Church never fell under the power of a Huguenot, though, even in the opinion of Villeroy de Neufville, submission to such “a covetous prince” would prove disastrous to France.170 In fact, it was precisely that fear that prompted a number of other Catholic nobles to argue that if they did not unanimously accept the Huguenot leader as their monarch according to France’s fundamental laws of succession, the united royalist-Catholic and Calvinist party would dissolve swiftly into a cluster of hostile factions that could be destroyed piecemeal. This would leave the kingdom easy prey to the League and its dangerous Spanish allies. As a result of these contradictory fears, Henri IV was presented with an opportunity at his accession to choose a course of action that would both strengthen his grip on the crown and enhance his position with Catholic Frenchmen. Of course, the most obvious solution to his predicament would have been for him to convert immediately to Catholicism, but this option was no less repugnant to him now than before. Indeed, it says much for Henri’s character at such a critical juncture that he rejected that option. This indicates that his personal religious convictions were a major obstacle to his conversion, however pragmatic or politically calculating his other considerations might have been. In the first hours of his reign, he must have discovered in a way he never had before just how deep-seated were the Calvinist principles instilled in him by Jeanne d’Albret and how much difficulty he would have making an abjuration, however great the political prize. How, then, could he overcome the royalist Catholics’ reluctance to accept his authority as the new Calvinist king of France without having to compromise his conscience? Henri’s answer was to present them and the rest of the nation with a political fait accompli. What he evidently recognized (probably at the urging of cooler heads who had snapped him out of his initial shock over the death of Henri III)171 was that he had to seize his crown at once and wield the authority associated with it. If he continued to hesitate or make it seem as if he awaited permission to ascend a throne that was incontestably his by right of birth and fundamental French law, the legitimacy of his succession might be cast into doubt because of the religion he professed. In that event, an abjuration would become his only possible means of keeping his crown – a political gamble and last resort that still brought no guarantee of success. On the other hand, by quickly assuming his new role

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as king of France both in title and authority as the natural result of French custom and tradition, without reference to the religion he professed, Henri could impose himself on the Catholics in the royal camp. In this way, he could cast them as loyal subjects who owed their obedience to the commands of their legitimate monarch, thus making them less likely to risk charges of lèse majesté by challenging the Calvinist king’s sovereignty solely on the basis of his profession of faith. Consequently, in mid-morning of 2 August a more resolute Navarre issued a series of commands that reaffirmed his legitimacy as French monarch and restored some order to the army, which had been thrown into a state of some confusion by Henri III’s assassination. He confirmed the late king’s servitors in their functions and dignities to ensure the continued operation of the royal government according to his will. He also dispatched officers throughout the royal forces to secure their obedience to his orders. He even courted popular loyalties by declaring his intention to restore unity to the realm in order to unburden his subjects of the civil war. This pronouncement doubtless served to remind the public of his former political image as a man of peace who had been forced in 1585 to take up arms in selfdefence. Then, to calm initial alarm over the accession of a Calvinist prince to the throne, Henri issued fresh assurances of protection for French Catholicism without change or innovation under his rule. At the same time, he called upon his people to render him obedience as their rightful sovereign. Finally, he attended to his duties as a former loyal subject and his needs as a monarch at war. He decried Henri III’s murder to the kingdom, adding his regret that “God has called him to rule at such an ill-season,” and he expressed his condolences in a personal letter to the newly widowed queen, Louise de Vaudémont. At the same time, he informed various foreign princes of the recent regicide in preface to his requests for their military and financial aid. He similarly took charge of the royal financial accounts and summoned the ban et arrière ban,172 both of which actions were special prerogatives of the lawful king of France. And he carefully donned purple-coloured clothing according to the ancient custom of French monarchs in mourning. The last was an unmistakable, outward symbol of his sovereignty and legitimacy as presumptive heir.173 In looking back on Navarre’s bold performance, the future duc de Sully recalled in his memoirs that the new king acted decisively, en roi, and never allowed himself to be dazzled by the mere trappings of the throne.174 Even the duc de Mayenne, the League leader, had to agree with this assessment, noting in August 1589 that “the prince de Béarn ... omits nothing in his behalf to seize [the crown] and render [himself] master.”175

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Judging from his actions, Henri had clearly recognized the rashness of his initial panicky impulse to make a hasty retreat across the Loire River to his territorial base in the south. Some of his advisers still urged him to withdraw to Tours at least, where the late king had established his provisional capital, the royal council, and those loyal parlementaires who had fled with him from rebellious Paris. But others thought this would be “shameful.” Not only would such a move forfeit the strategic control Henri III and Navarre had painstakingly regained over the Seine, Oise, and Marne rivers in the spring campaign against the League; it would also abandon “the most noble half of [the] kingdom” to the enemy.176 That would spell political disaster for Henri IV, whose withdrawal would be viewed as an admission of defeat.177 Because both monarch and monarchical power were associated traditionally with Paris and the northern half of the kingdom, where the Catholic League enjoyed its greatest strength, a southward retreat would destroy the Huguenot leader’s claims to sovereignty in France. As the royalist sieur de Guitry so succinctly warned, “Sire, who will believe you are king if your edicts are issued from Limoges?”178 Such reasoning was a powerful tonic for a monarch who, in the words of one modern historian, “wanted to be more than the duc d’Aquitaine.”179 At the same time, a sudden move toward the south would have identified Henri exclusively with Huguenot interests and thus alienated the royalist Catholics he was trying to attract. Ever since 1576 the Calvinist leader had fought relentlessly to avoid exactly this kind of sectarian stigmatization by promoting a policy of religious moderation in order to unite the two hostile creeds in obedience to the French Crown. Now that he was the Calvinist king of France, it was even more imperative that Henri maintain this non-sectarian image, despite a sudden emergence of Huguenot pressure to use his new authority to enhance French Calvinism at Catholic expense.180 It was crucial as well that he not allow the slightest suggestion that he had received the crown from Huguenot hands.181 The king knew that he was simply too dependent upon the royalist Catholics’ military and political recognition of his claims to jeopardize aid from that quarter. Certainly, the Calvinist party had insufficient strength by itself to seat him securely on the throne, however confidently some Huguenots boasted of their power. Besides, he was acutely aware that in peace or war his subjects would continue to be divided by faith, but politically they were Frenchmen all. That unity, he told Jacques-Auguste de Thou, was what he now needed to stress in order to tighten his hold on the crown.182 Ultimately, Henri’s various actions and declarations in the early hours of his new reign indicate that he had begun to define an alternative conception of kingship to that of Catholic Frenchmen. It was

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rooted still in medieval tradition, but it allowed for a Calvinist monarch in France by detaching the ritual, sacral functions of the Crown from its material roles. The policy of toleration Henri had implemented ever since 1576 as king of Navarre and Huguenot chef de parti was already a major step in this direction. Quite apart from the fact that the Calvinist emphasis on private conscience and the exclusivity of faith in obtaining salvation effectively rendered unimportant much of the religiously based ritual of kingship, Henri’s immediate reaffirmation of toleration upon his accession to the Valois throne laid the foundation for the more secular or politically based conception of the king of France as the sovereign authority and the living embodiment of the state. That, in turn, created the potential for an entirely non-sectarian, Christian, French monarchy, in which religion was relegated to a secondary role at best. This trend was reinforced strongly, meanwhile, by Henri’s determination to claim his new throne on the basis of an iron-clad hereditary right through blood and Salic Law, as opposed to religious orthodoxy or the sacral character of the king as fidei defensor. That latter concept had yet to be established as a fundamental legal or constitutional principle of French monarchy, whatever his opponents claimed to the contrary. Besides, in itself the invocation of heredity also suggested at least divine approval of his succession, if not divine right. In purely practical terms, a reconceptualization of kingship based upon blood and accepted fundamental law would permit Henri to minimalize the problem of his specific religious creed while maintaining his claim to the crown, for this ideal excluded conditions, especially religious ones, that might restrict the monarchy or monarchical authority. The Calvinist king understood that his sovereign power and prerogative would automatically be limited if, in return for accepting him as their legitimate prince, the royalist Catholics – let alone the League – successfully imposed terms on his rule that adhered to older, more nuanced and corporate concepts of the Crown. As will be seen, Henri spent the next four years trying to enforce his altered perception of kingship through battlefield victories. In the end, however, Henri failed to achieve that goal. The Catholics in both factions refused to allow the separation of the traditional medieval concept of the French monarchy, with its sacred responsibilities, symbolism, and ancient ties to the Roman Church, from its merely material functions. Despite all of Henri’s sworn promises following his accession to innovate nothing in the Catholic religion, this division was precisely the innovation that French Catholics feared the most, whether royalist or Leaguer. Forced finally to recognize this fact, the king at last surrendered and abjured (though not before he had

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extracted a number of important concessions as the price of his conversion to the ancient faith). By the conclusion of the civil wars, he even implied his acceptance of the inviolability of the intimate relationship that existed between the principle of Catholicism and the French Crown. “Nothing can be so contrary to the commandment and service of God,” he admitted belatedly in 1599, “than to seek to irritate and provoke the people against their magistrates and those to whom they ought to bare respect and obedience, as we have proved only too often, to our damage.”183 Nevertheless, Henri did manage to lay the foundation for a revised, Gallican conception of French monarchy that emphasized the notions of blood and gloire over the mystical, sacral aspects of medieval kingship. Consequently, perhaps those historians who seek the origins of subsequent Bourbon absolutism in Henri IV’s reign should look to the alternative view of monarchy that he developed from the outset of his accession to the throne. It follows, then, that Henri’s only realistic course of action on the morning of 2 August was to visit the Catholic nobles at the royal headquarters of Saint Cloud and present himself boldly as their rightful monarch.184 Whatever his misapprehensions over the precariousness of his political relationships, he was confident in his own mind that God had called him to the French throne as the legitimate successor to Henri III.185 Furthermore, a show of bravado was essential if he were to win the initial round in establishing his authority without abjuring his faith. Judging from the evidence, his aplomb met with considerable success. Indeed, the Catholic duc d’Angoulême recalled years later that Henri spent most of the day receiving those men who already had sworn their fidelity to him in the presence of the dying Valois monarch, and who now looked beyond their religious differences to declare “in the tempest of this horrible event [i.e., the regicide], that they wanted no other shelter than the justness of their [new] king and the glorious protection of his arms.”186 Part of the credit for Henri’s early success must go to the timely counsel of three trusted Calvinist advisers, who had suggested some additional measures to strengthen his hand without giving in to the Catholics on the question of religion. Philippe Duplessis-Mornay had recommended involving the nobility in “a kind of crusade ... [to avenge] the death of the late king while the wound is fresh.” This would be an ideal means, he reasoned, “of keeping these men united to [the Calvinist monarch’s] service, without pay.”187 Moreover, this excuse could be used to avoid making any concrete commitments with respect to religion to the Catholics on the argument that nothing else could be undertaken until the regicides had been caught and duly punished.188 Henri saw the wisdom of this advice and acted upon it immediately.189

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At the same time, Agrippa d’Aubigné had urged using individual noblemen to secure the loyalty of particular groups in the royal army. He reasoned, for example, that the royalist sieurs de Givry and d’Humières could easily win over the nobles from Picardy, Brie, and the Îlede-France, as the two men came from those regions. He also believed that by sending the influential (and potentially dangerous) maréchal de Biron to procure the loyalty of the Swiss mercenaries in the royal army, the king could obtain the services of a solid corps of professional soldiers who served for wages and not religion. At the same time, he would gain a “first proof” of the marshal’s own obedience to his commands.190 Accordingly, Henri dispatched Biron to the Swiss commanders to indicate their importance to his good fortune and the obligations they could expect from him in return. Not only did these men give their support in exchange, they also agreed to serve for the first two months of his reign without pay.191 That was a notable concession. Moreover, both the marshal’s acceptance of the task “with a Gascon gaiety” and his success “gave much confidence” to the Calvinist monarch.192 Finally, the comte de Châtillon had cautioned that any promises to the royalist Catholics would fail if Henri unwisely showed too much favour to the Huguenots,193 the ulterior aim of his Calvinist colleagues. It is significant that this eldest son of the martyred amiral de Coligny was able to see beyond partisanship and revenge to recognize as clearly as his royal master the importance of appealing to all Frenchmen without distinction of religion. Yet regardless of these first gains, Henri ultimately was unable to deflect the attention of the majority of royalist-Catholic nobles from his faith as he had hoped. Instead, he was forced to compromise still further with them on the question of his religious profession to obtain their recognition of his rule. Thus, in the late morning or early afternoon of 2 August, he publicly renewed his customary promises to receive instruction at some future, though still unspecified, date.194 Until now, he had tried to avoid such a declaration as king of France because of the way it could be used by the Catholics to constrict both his power and his policy as their new monarch. Some men were satisfied with the royal gesture and acknowledged Henri’s authority in return. “You are the king of the brave,” lauded the sieur de Givry effusively, “and only cowards will abandon you.”195 But most of the Catholic royalists, including the most prominent nobles in the army, refused to be appeased by this vague assurance. On the evening of 3 August these men retired to the privacy of the nearby château de Gondi to discuss whether they would recognize the Calvinist heir as their king and, if so, on what terms.

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The assembled nobles split swiftly into several groups. One of these wanted to reconvene the Estates General within six months to decide the future of the crown, as its members were not convinced that Henri de Navarre was close enough in blood to claim it. A second group, led by the marquis d’O, proposed demanding that the Calvinist leader convert immediately to Catholicism and, if he refused, that they join the League against him. This course of action was rejected, however, by a third group whose spokesman, the influential maréchal de Biron, recommended that Henri be recognized and obeyed provisionally – not as king but as captain general of the army. His object was to withhold the royal French title from Navarre until he received instruction in and converted to the Roman faith. The chief argument used by this faction for not totally excluding Henri from the throne, as the other two groups advocated, was that the integrity of the kingdom would be destroyed if all hope of a future reconciliation between the Calvinist leader and the Gallican Church were cut off too precipitately. At the same time, however, these nobles equivocated over giving their full support to the king. They feared that an eventual reunion with their League coreligionnaires would be prevented should they recognize Henri’s authority too quickly, before resolving the issue of his religious profession.196 In the end, a consensus was reached by which it was agreed that Navarre should be recognized as the legitimate monarch of France, on condition that he issued certain guarantees for the Catholic faith.197 On the surface, this result seems strange, as it went against the initial stand of all three factions at the meeting. What their solution indicates, however, is that although all of these men were committed to the tradition of a Catholic French Crown, their debates over the degree to which the new king’s conversion was to be made a condition of their recognition show that even they had not yet accepted Catholicism as a constitutional, and therefore legal, principle in the fundamental law of the succession. Certainly, the king’s own partisans in the assembly exploited this ambiguity to the full in support of his claims. Chief among them was Achille Harlay de Sancy, who argued vehemently that, as a monarchy, France could not exist without a king. For this reason the French sovereign never dies; as soon as one incumbent of the crown is dead, his successor is proclaimed immediately in his place. Sancy insisted, therefore, that Henri de Navarre was already king of France by virtue of his birth and fundamental law, so that it would be unconstitutional to deny what nature and custom had just given him. Moreover, as differences in religion had no bearing whatever on the obedience owed to the lawful monarch, he argued that any effort by the Catholics to

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exclude Navarre from the throne would be dishonourable and perhaps even sinful, because their faith demanded loyalty to the Crown. As for granting Henri the “ridiculous title” of captain general, this too was absurd. It would reduce him to equality with the duc de Mayenne, whom the League just recently had proclaimed lieutenantgeneral of the kingdom “in the absence of a monarch for France.” Sancy concluded by inviting those Catholics who would not accept Navarre as their rightful sovereign to retire in neutrality to their estates to wait upon events.198 Having at length been persuaded, the Catholic nobles agreed to commit themselves to Henri IV’s service, provided that he receive instruction (i.e, that he converted) within six months of his accession; that he exclude Calvinist worship from the realm (also for the next six months); that he grant no public office or appointment to a Huguenot; and that he permit his Catholic servitors to justify themselves in Rome for having joined an alleged “relapsed heretic” in a common national struggle.199 They then dispatched three delegates to the king with their demands, which were couched in the language of an ultimatum. So angry was the Huguenot Sully at this flagrant affront to Henri’s dignity that years later he still denounced these Catholics for their obstructionism. They were, he sneered, the king’s secret enemies, “because they carried everything there with a high hand and thought they had the right to give the laws to Henri.”200 No less offended, and maybe even alarmed, by these endeavours to force his abjuration through political pressure was the Huguenot monarch himself. Sternly reminding the three “envoys” of his legal entitlement to the crown and his predecessor’s dying wishes that the Catholic nobles recognize his succession, Henri rebuked them in terms that echoed those of Sancy and his own letter to the Paris parlement of October 1585. It “would be contrary to the intentions of allmighty God and your duty,” he scolded, “if anyone attempted to contravene [these rights]” simply because of his religion. Besides, he asked archly, did the nobles really believe he could be forced to abjure when the humblest French peasant was willing to die for his faith? Henri next made it absolutely clear that he refused to be coerced into abjuring his Calvinist conscience, whether or not he was in religious error. That could be determined only by a national council. But even if he did convert, he asked, how believable would that conversion be? Furthermore, would the Catholic nobles actually follow a perjurer and apostate into battle, because that was exactly what he would become if he changed his religion for political reasons as they now demanded? “Would you have a king,” he challenged, “who worshiped no God?” At this point, Henri re-emphasized the distinction he continually made

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between all “true Frenchmen” and “Spanish Frenchmen,” whom he now defined as those men who opposed him because of personal ambition or dedication to the service of the king of Spain. He then finished by declaring en roi that all disloyal Catholics were free “to find their pay under those insolent masters” (meaning the League and Philip II), adding that “I will have among the Catholics only those who love France and honour!”201 Clearly, the Bourbon king resented the impatience of those men who demanded that he “bend the bow of my affairs to the string of their passions.”202 Yet his indignation to the contrary, it was evident that Henri’s affairs had reached a crisis. At issue here was not so much his Calvinist profession as his capacity to control his Catholic subjects without undergoing an immediate conversion. Hitherto, as Huguenot chef de parti, he had managed to distance himself from the religious controversy by alleging his willingness to receive instruction. The problem was that the Catholics had interpreted this as a commitment to ultimate conversion. Such was never his intention. Worse still, they expected him to translate his past words into action now that he was king of France. This explains why they were attempting to extract from him a clear pledge to abjure his Calvinist faith as the price of their loyalty. Now, his credibility with these men was eroding, and it was clear that Henri could no longer placate them simply by repeating his former evasive statements about religion. It is an ironic twist that, in responding to royalist-Catholic demands that he convert, he himself raised the essential and ultimately immeasurable question of his sincerity should he abjure. That issue was to trouble French Catholics on both sides of the quarrel over the next few years. This question only heightened the personal crisis of conscience he had been undergoing ever since learning of his sudden accession to the throne, a crisis that seriously threatened the complementary relationship he had managed to sustain since 1576 between his principles of blood and religion. The French crown was his by right of inheritance, but was he willing to secure it at the cost of a conversion? A sincere Calvinist, the king refused to abjure his faith for mere political advantage, but as the first monarch of a new dynasty, he also knew that to proclaim an absolute intention of remaining Huguenot was to renounce the French throne.203 Realistically, Henri was in little position to bargain. All he could do for the moment was to try to accede to the Catholics’ conditions as far as possible, but in a way that would compromise neither his royal authority nor his private conscience. Thus, after insisting that a genuine instruction precede any potential change in his profession of religion, he consented to convoke a national council within six

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months “if possible,” adding that he would abide by its decisions. He also reaffirmed his pledge to protect Catholic worship in France without change or innovation, though he refused point-blank to prohibit the exercise of the Calvinist faith.204 This halfway submission on behalf of the king was a major concession to the Catholic royalists, most of whom wished to believe they had gained his clear commitment to conversion. Thus pacified and in agreement “that his courage was without parallel, his spirit full of vivacity and his speech of an eloquence more martial and natural than affected,”205 the nobles at last consented to recognize Navarre as their lawful monarch and swore to obey his commands. In the meantime, the Huguenot Sully and the royalistCatholic maréchal d’Aumont successfully procured the loyalty of the French guards and their officers, while Harlay de Sancy was dispatched to the Swiss and German mercenary troops with news of the accord.206 The following day, on 4 August, the royal pact was sealed; Henri published his promises to the Catholic nobles in the Declaration of Saint Cloud.207 In return, they formally recognized his rights to the French throne “according to the fundamental laws of this kingdom,” in a second declaration published at the same time.208 Henri IV was then acclaimed king of France before the royal army “after the ancient manner of the Emperours of the Romanes” (wrote a Huguenot chronicler), in place of the traditional ceremonies “with holy oyle, holy water, holy toyes and holy trashes.”209 News of the accord, along with multiple copies of both declarations, was dispatched promptly throughout the kingdom. At first glance, the declarations seemed both to commit Henri to an explicit agenda that scheduled when he was to receive instruction, and to imply what the outcome of that instruction would be. This was certainly the gist of one important royalist-Catholic’s warning that if the new monarch failed to be instructed (i.e., abjure) as he had promised, he would have more enemies than he knew what to do with!210 Hence, Henri’s declaration of 4 August is usually interpreted by historians from a Catholic perspective as his first official step toward conversion and “a personal commitment ... to maintain the Catholic character of the crown and country.”211 But the covenants of Saint Cloud in fact strengthened the king’s political position. One recent biographer even describes them as “a cunning compromise, which cost Henri the minimum possible loss.”212 They allowed him, in fact, to nail down his Catholic support without the prerequisite of a conversion, as the nobles originally had demanded. By yielding partially to the nobles’ conditions “in order to put the crown on his own head,”213 Henri obtained irrefutable proof

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in writing that the majority of French Catholic nobles accepted his claims and authority as their rightful monarch, according to the fundamental laws of the state “that prevail over unreasonable and particular interests and sentiments.”214 In short, whatever their reservations concerning his religion, the nobles had been manoeuvred into accepting the Calvinist king’s succession on the basis of his interpretation of his right to the crown. When the royalist-Catholic maréchal de Matignon subsequently scolded the restive parlementaires of Bordeaux, who balked at recognizing the Huguenot monarch because of his religious profession, he declared, “Kings enjoy their rank by right of succession and not election.” Thus, even if Henri IV were barred ultimately from heaven for his alleged heresy, on earth “his faith did not bar him from his rightful inheritance.”215 The general acceptance of his rule was, consequently, not conditional upon his immediate conversion to the Catholic religion. It merely was expected that Henri would conform to the faith of his predecessors as his promise was taken to indicate. In this, at least, Henri’s declaration had given the nobles hope that he would soon profess their faith, while in the meantime it eased their anxieties over serving a “heretical” monarch. The king scored a further point by granting permission to his Catholic servitors to justify their loyalty to him in Rome. He thereby ensured that political and not religious issues would receive the spotlight. For all practical purposes, in the eyes of Pope Sixtus V, an argument based upon preserving the interests of state against the enemies of France was the only defence that could excuse their obedience to a Huguenot king.216 The pope, too, was resisting the domination of Philip II of Spain and saw a powerful, reunited French kingdom as a necessary counterpoise to that monarch. By means of the Declarations of Saint Cloud, therefore, Henri IV managed both to preserve the integrity of his faith and to return the focus of attention to the political arena as before. More than this, he secured Catholic recognition of his succession, which confirmed the legitimacy of his claims. In short, he had found his means to reaffirm the old working balance between his principles of blood and religion, at least for the time being. Moreover, he made swift use of his political advantage by issuing a confident statement to his League enemies a few days later to the effect that, in view of his royalist-Catholic support, they were no longer strong enough to ruin him.217 In spite of these gains, Henri quickly learned that his promise to receive instruction was insufficient by itself to win some Catholic nobles to his side. With the religious compromise concluded and their scruples over a Calvinist succession assuaged, many of these aristocrats now used their leverage with the new king to obtain those material

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benefits that only he could bestow. But these went beyond the usual patronage payoffs that practically all prominent political figures need to make on their assumption of power, whether in the sixteenth century or in the twentieth. One contemporary loyalist even accused the Catholic royalists of “negotiat[ing] in the Swiss fashion” – a scornful reference to the famous European mercenaries in the royal army who served their employers faithfully so long as they were paid.218 Moreover, Catholic services were not offered at bargain prices, as many of the leading nobles in the king’s forces seized this opportunity to enrich themselves at royal expense. Furthermore, because these men carried so much weight with the other Catholics in the army, their “requests” could not be refused. One of the first to negotiate for private advantage in this fashion was the maréchal de Biron, “in whom ambition,” complained the king privately, “surpasses all belief!”219 In a confidential discussion with Harlay de Sancy on the evening of 3 August, Biron expressed doubts that Henri IV would have further use for his Catholic supporters once he sat securely on his throne. He declared cynically that royalist leaders should therefore look to their own interests, since never again would they have such an opportunity to increase their personal wealth or power. So despite the “first proof” of his loyalty in securing the Swiss to Henri’s service, the marshal still was considering his options. He hinted, however, that “if the king would like to give him the county of Périgord, he would not abandon [Henri to the League].”220 This “request” was granted readily with the result that the contented marshal quickly dropped his initial suggestion of withholding the crown from the Calvinist king to support the latter’s claims. His revised outlook was perhaps one of the principal reasons the other nobles subsequently agreed to recognize the Huguenot monarch’s authority.221 Others were equally self-serving. The covetous marquis d’O easily put aside his original opposition to Henri when he was reconfirmed as governor of both Paris and the Île-de-France, and as surintendant des finances et de bâtiments – all lucrative posts from which he already had grown very rich. The king was fully aware of d’O’s insatiable avarice and essential untrustworthiness, but he knew equally well that the marquis and former mignon was single-handedly capable of making the machinery of government, especially of taxation, run smoothly or of stopping it altogether. Also “rewarded” were the young duc d’Angoulême, who had asked bluntly for the post of colonel-général de la cavalerie legère from his royal guardian, and the maréchal d’Aumont, who had coveted the gouvernements of Champagne and Burgundy – the provinces respectively of the murdered Guise and his brother Mayenne.222 Similarly, Roger de Bellegard, already grand ecuyer du Roi,

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was gratified with the rank of colonel-général de l’infanterie française, along with its privileges and pension.223 Even the powerful duc de Montmorency, Henri’s old ally and comrade-in-arms, had to be promised the constable’s baton that his late father had held in return for his continued friendship, coupled with an auspicious marriage for his eldest daughter, Charlotte.224 The Calvinist king’s Catholic cousins engaged likewise in this frenzy of opportunism. Although they agreed with the cardinal de Vendôme (formerly the archbishop of Rouen, who stood third in line for the throne after Henri) that “the crown belongs legitimately to the Bourbons, as all Frenchmen know,”225 they were not certain it should go to the Calvinist Navarre. His religion, they felt, was a blot on their family honour.226 The princes’ misgivings were overcome, nevertheless, by the rewards and titles they too extorted from the king as the price of loyalty. Realistically, Henri could do little more than concede to their demands. Because his cousins stood directly behind him in the line of succession, they were potential foci of Catholic opposition within the royal party. They easily could frustrate his plans if he failed to gratify them equally with the other nobles.227 Yet however costly, the king reaped indisputable benefits from the brokerage, for the Catholic nobles needed Henri IV perhaps even more badly than he needed them. Largely for this reason, Harlay de Sancy referred to these men as “Realists” throughout his memoirs. In the social setting, the nobles required the confirmation of legitimate monarchical succession to justify their privileged place in the hierarchical structure of French society. At its apex stood the king, the source of all favours. In fact, Henri had argued precisely this point the previous April and March, when he declared, “Nobility, whose honour and degree is tied to that of our kings: Nobility which to be briefe can not hope to keepe that degree over the commons which God hath given it, when it shall see their sovereigne, him of whom it holdeth the sword cast headlong from his.”228 Hence, the royalist Catholics “cannot recognize any other except him who commands them absolutely,” since they did not want to be reduced in status to those who served either de par les peuples, or worse still, de par monsieur de Mayenne.229 Besides, it was only the lawful monarch who could grant them the gratifications they all coveted. As a result, many “officers of the old Court staid with the King more by reason of their interest than Inclination.”230 Nor was Henri slow to use this power over his Catholic supporters to retain their obedience. In December 1589 he required them all to apply for royal reconfirmation of their offices and corresponding privileges, which allowed him to maintain an important measure of control.231

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In the political setting, meanwhile, these nobles also knew that loyalty to the Calvinist king was their only real option. Their individual survival depended upon it. As former favourites and servitors of Henri III, they had bitterly opposed the Guises and their League partisans on personal or political grounds.232 Some had even participated in the assassination of the late duke just nine months before – hence a confident Agrippa d’Aubigné’s assurances to his shaken royal master in the early morning of 2 August that “[a]t the moment I am speaking to you the maréchal de Biron and with him the commanders of the best troops [in the royal army] have no thought of deserting you, for the crimes of Blois are on their head.”233 Consequently, many Catholic royalists dared not join the enemy faction for fear of their life, whatever their protests over Henri’s Calvinism. Contemporary historian Jean de Serres noted that these men recognized the Huguenot monarch’s authority “as the necessitie of the time and place did suffer.”234 Henri IV was not slow to play very skilfully on these anxieties. On the evening of 3 August, for example, he pointedly reminded the Catholics’ envoys that those “who have not spared the blood of your master [i.e., Henri III]” would hardly pardon the late king’s servitors. “Show your courage under my leadership, therefore, and apply it to the vigor of your arms.”235 In the legal setting, finally, the royalist Catholics were bound by custom and fundamental law to swear their fealty to the Calvinist monarch. Though almost everyone was certain that Navarre would never fully be sovereign until he had converted to Catholicism,236 all Frenchmen “were more obliged in conscience to recognize him as king than any other, because if this article of religion were removed, Henri IV still had the right and proximity” to the throne.237 The Huguenots knew this, the Catholic royalists knew this, and the king knew this.238 Even Villeroy de Neufville openly confessed that most League nobles also looked to Henri de Navarre as their rightful monarch, including Villeroy himself.239 Even so, a number of important Catholic nobles in the royal army withheld their signature from the accords of 4 August and abandoned the king, retreating into armed neutrality, because they would not serve a Huguenot. Yet neither did they join the League. Among these men were the pious duc de Nevers, the maréchal de Retz, Jehan sieur de Villiers (the governor of Poissy), François de Montholon (the garde des sceaux), and the sieur de Lavardin.240 But the greatest loss and the one most resented by the king was that of the duc d’Épernon, the former royal favourite. His loyalty was imperative given his governorship of four wealthy and strategic provinces in central and southern France, as well as his command of the single largest contingent of

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troops in the royal army. In fact, d’Aubigné had advised Henri two days earlier to secure the duke’s support especially, but to no avail. Refusing to acknowledge the Calvinist monarch’s authority so long as he persisted in his “heresy,” Épernon marched back to his gouvernement of Saintonge, “saying he would serve neither the League nor me.”241 The problem was that these noblemen simply did not trust Henri IV’s promise to receive instruction. Nor were they alone in withholding their support. “In the Provinces,” noted the Calvinist historian Élie Benoiste, “the Governors of Places who held for the [late] King, did in a manner the same thing. Some were bought [by Henri, but] others promising to obey, declared without ceremony, that they should do it with regret whilst the King continued an Heretick.”242 The Catholic parlementaires at Bordeaux flatly refused to acknowledge Navarre’s sovereignty and called for a meeting of the provincial estates: first, to assert the ancient religion as a fundamental law of the French succession; and second, to establish their own authority as an interim governing body in the province. In addition, they sent a councillor throughout Guyenne to incite the towns to join the League.243 It was only by quickly placing a garrison of loyal troops in the provincial capital, by reminding the upstart judges in person of the boundaries of their jurisdiction in relation to the king’s authority, and by imprisoning the major pro-League ringleaders of the opposition that the maréchal de Matignon narrowly averted the loss of the important port city to the ultra-Catholic party, and with it the entire province.244 As for the towns, they were advised, for the moment, “to reply [to the parlement’s agent] that they were Catholics obedient to the officers of the Crown of France ‘awaiting a [Catholic] king.’”245 Similar difficulties challenged the imposition of Henri’s authority at royalist Tours (where a Catholic attempt to foment mutiny among the garrison troops was blocked narrowly in October)246 and also in Brittany. There, the League was entrenched firmly under the former governor, the duc de Mercoeur, yet another Guise cousin whose wife was heiress to the ancient duchy. Although the late Henri III had made the Catholic prince de Dombes (a Bourbon prince of the blood) provincial governor after dismissing Mercoeur, the Breton nobility now defied his appointment. Instead, they acknowledged the prince only as “lieutenant-general” of the province until his kinsman, Henri IV, converted.247 They also refused to obey the Calvinist monarch’s convocation of the ban et arrière-ban until “it pleased God to give them a Catholic king who might be recognized and approved by all the estates of France, the fact of religion being the principal difference [between them].” This was a serious breach of the nobles’ ancient feudal obligations to the Crown, which required them as royal vassals to join the

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monarch for the purposes of war. They agreed, however, to adopt a posture of neutrality on their estates. Henri responded immediately to this Breton challenge to his sovereignty by dispatching two councillors from the royalist parlement of neighbouring Normandy. Their orders were to publish the declarations of 4 August, to declare Mercoeur guilty of lèse majesté, and “to inform the people of the will and intention of the king, so as to end the defiance that the rebels and enemies of His Majesty would have the people, under false impressions and pretexts [of religion], imbued and seduced.” Meanwhile, Henri also promised that only the Catholic faith would be exercised in Brittany, another notable royal concession on religion.248 Yet in spite of the difficulties, it seems that comparatively few men actually abandoned the Calvinist king to join the League.249 Bordeaux and Brittany were exceptional because of the strong ultra-Catholic presence in both places and perhaps also because of historical precedent. But most Catholic gentlemen (such as Nevers and Épernon) who refused to fall completely in line with Henri IV’s authority until he discarded his Calvinist faith were still unofficially his allies. They continued to make war on the League, which they too detested and regarded with bitter personal enmity. Furthermore, many nobles found a rationale for serving the Crown and suspending their judgment on its incumbent. Instead of fighting under the flag of the monarch now reigning, they fought in the name of the late Henri III, from whom they originally had received their offices and honours and to whom they had sworn their fidelity. This explains the apparent contradiction in the actions of the sieur de Tavannes, for example, and the royalist-Catholic nobility of Burgundy. They refused to recognize Henri IV as their king for the time being, but they united to avenge the death of the late Valois monarch in order to preserve “his state, our fatherland and ourselves.”250 It similarly explains why for several months a chastened but still defiant parlement of Bordeaux continued to use the old royal seal that bore the device of Henri III on legal documents, effectively disclaiming the Huguenot king’s authority by not exercising royal justice in his name.251 In short, these men were obedient to the Crown of France and all that it symbolized while “awaiting a [Catholic] king” to mount the “vacant” throne.252 Of course, there were also Catholic nobles and officiers who, for reasons of politics, religion, or especially family interest, deserted Henri and joined the League. Some did so immediately. Others, such as the barons de Lux and de Vitteaux, waited until weeks or even months had passed before abandoning Henri. In fact, de Lux lingered in the royal camp itself before quietly slipping away at the beginning

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of January 1590. This was because of his concern for the safety of his leaguer uncle, Pierre d’Épinac, archbishop of Lyon, who had been imprisoned at Blois immediately following the murder of the Guise brothers. Until the prelate’s release in the fall of 1589, de Lux feared doing anything that might jeopardize his kinsman’s life at the hands of the royalists.253 What the baron’s example demonstrates is that although the first wave of defections in August 1589 was certainly the largest, there continued over the next few months an intermittent trickle of desertions. This was stanched finally by the king’s victories on the battlefield and at the conference table. Henri attributed far less honourable motives than religious integrity or ties of kinship to those Catholic nobles who abandoned his cause. Suspecting that League infiltraters had entered the royal camp to encourage mass desertions and that some men withdrew merely “to wait to see which way this war would go,”254 the king accused those who left him of wishing to keep the oaths of loyalty they had sworn years before to the enemies of France. This allowed him to characterize the deserters as treacherous and base. He also charged them with having been bought by foreign gold – an unmistakable allusion to Philip II of Spain. “I am very sorry,” he declared of these men, “that they be no better Frenchmen only for their owne profit, and for no other cause.” More generally, he reproached such “Spanish-Frenchmen” for having no virtue, no consistency, no valour, and no honour, insinuating that by their unchivalrous behaviour they had made themselves unworthy of association with just men.255 After all, he wrote, it was not sufficient for a born gentleman to rest upon the virtue and merit of his ancestors as the foundation of his status, if he did not also sustain his title in loyal service to the Crown. For that reason, the king concluded, no one of honour or conscience could excuse himself legitimately from his duty, “seeing me armed and in the field in order to resist the pernicious designs of those who, by a detestable rebellion, have armed themselves against me.”256 Through such vivid accusations Henri both re-emphasized and expanded the contrast that he needed to draw between his new political image as the rightful French monarch and that of the League as a Spanish-backed faction in open rebellion against its lawful king, while continuing to avoid the religious pretext his Catholic opposition still used to claim legitimacy. At the moment, however, the immediate problem threatening the king concerned the erosion of his military strength, for as the various Catholic noblemen left the royal army that was besieging Paris, they took with them the troops under their command.257 Henri tried, on 8 August, to stanch the flow of desertions by explicitly addressing the religious issue behind their stubborn refusal to accept his authority. In

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a third declaration issued at Saint Cloud, he endeavoured to assure the retreating Catholic nobles that his word was good, that the promised national assembly would be convoked on schedule, and that he would abide faithfully by his other pledges of 4 August. As for those who already had joined the League against him, the king again stressed the obligation of loyalty all Frenchmen owed to the Crown over and above religion. But, he repeated, “[a]n empire over all the earth is not sufficient to make me change my religion, in which I was nourished and instructed with my mother’s milk, and which I hold to be true, and that it is only the word of God that I recognize as my guide.”258 It says much for the king’s religious integrity that despite the very real danger he faced of losing his Catholic support at this critical juncture, he nevertheless refused to dicker over the matter of his conscience or the Calvinist creed he professed. This declaration was followed four days later by yet another, which he aimed more generally at the provincial governors and lieutenants-general, the Catholic nobility, the clergy, and the common people.259 But Henri’s appeals were powerless to halt the fragmentation of the royal forces, which soon disrupted the siege of the League-held French capital. Indeed, “the fine Army, which would easily have brought Paris, and the League to reasonable terms, dispersed in a few days.”260 This left Henri with approximately 20,000 soldiers, half his original strength. “See how an army of more than 40,000 men,” reflected the duc d’Angoulême years later, “was reduced by the loss of one [i.e., Henri III].”261 Given this worsening predicament and the advance of a League relief army under Mayenne, the king’s only option was to raise the siege of Paris and conserve his remaining strength before it melted entirely away. Perhaps prompted by advice that Agrippa d’Aubigné had given him earlier about securing the loyalty of the nobles in northern France where the ultra-Catholic faction was dominant – advice subsequently reinforced by the opinion of his officers in a council of war – Henri divided his remaining forces into three portions. Two of these lesser royal armies he ordered into the provinces of Picardy, the Île-de-France, and Champagne to begin the slow work of reconquest. As for the third, the king planned to lead it personally into Normandy, with a view to strengthening his hold on that important province and protecting his vital lifeline to England via Dieppe.262 But before marching, Henri performed four significant acts. The first was to bury his predecessor’s last remains dutifully and with the proper respect. In view of the present conditions of war, however, and the fact that St Denis with its royal crypt was yet in enemy hands, he had to forgo the usual ritual associated with a state funeral. He never-

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theless made a swift detour to royalist Compiègne, where he saw to it that Henri III’s body was interred in the church of St Cornille in the presence of the late king’s former servitors.263 The Bourbon king’s rationale for attending carefully to this detail was simple. If he insisted on his own acceptance as the legitimate French monarch with all the respect and obedience that was his due, he had to abide by those customs that gave dignity and mystique to majesty. Though Henri the Calvinist might have rejected much of the religious symbolism that permeated Catholic representations of monarchy, Henri the king fully appreciated how it was that hallowed ritual and ceremonial embellished the throne and confirmed its secular authority. They formed that “proud dream ... laid in bed majestical” (wrote William Shakespeare) that gave “place, degree and form” to kingship, while “creating awe and fear in other men.”264 Hence, Henri also declared his ancient and exclusive prerogative as kingly fount of justice to punish his predecessor’s assassins. “As it has pleased God to call us to [Henri III’s] place ... [and] to the succession of this crown by the fundamental laws of this kingdom,” he wrote to the Roman Catholic clergy of Tours on 23 August, “and as Justice for so execrable a crime belongs to royal authority [alone], ... it has pleased God to give it to us, for the preservation of good, and the punishment of evil.”265 The king’s second act prior to opening the new military campaign was to grant permission to the duc de Luxembourg to leave for Rome to justify the Catholic nobles’ recognition of the Huguenot monarch before the Holy See. This partial fulfilment of his promises of 4 August could only improve his credibility among these men. In addition, Luxembourg was to deliver Henri’s letters to the Republic of Venice and the Catholic dukes of Ferrara, Mantua, and Tuscany to secure their good favour and political, if not military, support.266 Their help could pin down Spanish forces in Italy and thus prevent Philip II from backing the League with men and matériel. Henri’s third act, meanwhile, was to send the sieur de Lamarsolière to Mayenne as a gesture of peace to encourage the duke to recognize his authority. But as the League leader refused to receive the royal agent, Villeroy de Neufville spoke to him instead. The talks went nowhere. Although Villeroy noted the king’s misgivings about abjuring too precipitately without formal instruction, he rejected the idea of summoning a national council to instruct Henri that would have legitimacy neither in its function nor its form. The purpose of church councils was, he explained, to decide on matters of faith and not to instruct individuals in religion. Moreover, such bodies could be convoked only by papal fiat and not by royal command.

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As an alternative, Villeroy suggested that Henri notify the pope of his intention to receive instruction at once, and to explain why he had been prevented from abjuring until now. This would both satisfy the Catholic nobles that the royal submission constituted a genuine conversion, and make it appear as if it was not too hasty. Additionally, this course would allow the king more time to enlighten himself on Catholicism and to show that he had done nothing without just cause. If he refused, however, Villeroy warned that the League would proceed immediately to the election of the cardinal de Bourbon as the Catholic monarch for France, even though the aged prelate was a royal captive.267 Yet once again the value that Henri placed on religious sincerity had been underestimated. He rejected Villeroy’s proposal with a defiant statement couched in roundly Huguenot terms: “[M]y sword for reigning is worth more than all his rituals!”268 Evident in this single declaration was the persistence of the wide gulf between the Catholic and Calvinist conceptions of French monarchy. Nevertheless, it is possible that Villeroy’s threat, combined with Henri’s need to improve his credibility among his own Catholic servitors by appearing to translate his words into actions, prompted his fourth and most significant act before marching into Normandy. This was to issue royal letters patent on 27 August, by which he established 31 October – just two months away – as the date for his promised instruction before a national council to be held at Tours.269 Although the king’s announcement must have taken many royalist Catholics by surprise (probably they had not expected his instruction to come so soon), their relief at this welcome news was great. This may be judged from the bishop of Mende’s assurances to Henri: “There is nothing, Sire, which permits [our] kings to reign, or which most obliges their people to render them the very humble obedience which is their due, than to follow the example of our late good king and all of his predecessors and yours – it is this good and tidy resolution that I expect your Majesty has taken from the Inspiration of the Holy Spirit, to live and die in the same faith and very Christian, Catholic, apostolic and Roman religion.”270 Obviously, like other Catholic royalists the prelate expected the results of the king’s instruction to be a foregone conclusion. The royal announcement, however, was in reality a gilt-edged guarantee with a counterfeit ring. Contrary to Catholic expectations, Henri IV had no intention of converting either in October or in the near future. This was an act of pure duplicity, showing just how carefully he had learned his lessons in statecraft from Jeanne d’Albret and Catherine de Medici. In fact, the day after issuing his Declaration of Saint Cloud, he had confided to the vicomte de Gourdon (whom he had

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just elevated to a comté) that despite his solemn promise to the Catholic nobles to receive instruction, “I am slow-witted and dull at learning what the heart does not desire!”271 He had compromised with them only to the extent of giving paper pledges, to which he carefully had added the escape clause “if possible.” In other words, a conversion was still the farthest thing from his mind. Instead, he now turned his attention to defeating the League and defending his position by force of arms, an enormous task the difficulties of which he fully appreciated. “God have pity on me and show me mercy,” he wrote in a supplicating tone to the comtesse de Grammont, “[and] bless my labours, despite [the opposition] of so many men!”272

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5 The Years of Uneasy Balance, September 1589 to October 1591 “Those who seek in a prince what is termed policy, will find here sufficient cause to praise the prudence of a king who kept so many jarring interests united, and to admire his discernment in distinguishing those who acted with fidelity toward him.” – Maximilien de Bethune, duc de Sully, on Henri IV, 1591

When the duc d’Alençon died in June 1584, catapulting Henri de Navarre into position as heir presumptive to the French throne, religious and political factors combined to create a powerful constitutional crisis for France, one that raised the civil tensions in the kingdom to a new level of complexity. Far more was involved than a dynastic shift from Valois to Bourbon; also threatening was the prospect of a Calvinist inheriting the sceptre of St Louis. This had cast into immediate conflict the two principles governing succession: that of legitimate succession through the male line, enshrined in the venerable Salic Law, and that of the hitherto unchallenged Catholicity of the French Crown, solemnized by the ancient sacre or coronation ceremony. These principles stretched back in popular imagination to the early sixth century and Clovis. Never before had the monarchy faced this kind of conflict. To be sure, at least three times in France’s long history the crown had passed into different hands owing either to the decadence of the ruling family or to the extinction of its senior branch. While these occasions provided ample historical precedent for dynastic change, on none of them had religion been a factor. The new rulers had all professed Catholic Christianity. As a result, over the passage of time, the two principles underpinning the succession had become so tightly intertwined in contemporary thinking that the French king was assumed to be king because of his accession through fundamental law and his personal profession of the Roman faith. To the majority of Frenchmen, the Catholicity of the Crown was fundamental to the institution’s mystique, social significance,

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and political authority, especially as both law and religion were held to proceed from the monarch and divine ordination.1 In June 1584, however, these assumptions were shaken severely. For the first time in the kingdom’s history, the legitimate heir presumptive through the male line professed a version of Christianity different from, and condemned by, the traditional Church. Neither the Salic Law nor contemporary French mentality, popular or royal, had made allowance for this. Not even in 1573, when Charles IX had confirmed officially the line of succession through his brothers Henri d’Anjou and François d’Alençon (having sired only a daughter to this point),2 had any provision been made in the hypothetical event that all three princes died without producing a legal heir. Nobody had expected this to occur. Consequently, when Alençon died eleven years later, raising the spectre of Navarre acceding to the throne, conflict between the two fundamental facets of the French succession provoked strong sectarian opposition and debate. At the Valois court Henri III had to endure “the sound of death in his ears” from everyone around him, “everything in France coming down to this subject: ‘If your Majesty dies this could happen...’”3 And uncertainty over the future of the succession created conditions for the renewal of civil war in 1585. At the same time, this new crisis threatened to cast into conflict the Huguenot leader’s personal precepts of blood and religion, which made it more difficult for him to maintain a working balance between the two principles. Henri III tried, even after the civil war began, to convince the Calvinist chef de parti outwardly at least to abjure. His aim was to circumvent the looming succession problem by bringing the Salic Law and religion back into synchronization before the Guise faction built the developing controversy into a platform of opposition to the Valois Crown. In his own way Henri III, too, had imbibed the conviction that blood and religion “never can be separated,” which suggests that he was perhaps more astute in his judgment than is usually granted. But Navarre refused to abjure. To preserve both the integrity of his conscience and his eligibility for the French succession, he continuously invoked the themes of religious moderation, French patriotism, duty to the king, and political unity against the foreigner. This not only heightened his self-made image as royal champion and first servant of the Crown but also upheld the dignity of the throne he might one day inherit. Additionally, it sharpened his portrayal of the Guise faction as political radicals and the real disturbers of the public peace who sought to abrogate the fundamental laws of the kingdom and the constitution upon which it was founded.

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Ultimately, Navarre’s political perspective was vindicated when, in April 1589, he secured his long-hoped-for alliance with Henri III. But with the latter’s assassination the following August, the Calvinist leader lost much of his room to manoeuvre through the simple fact that he had inherited the French throne. He never doubted for a moment that the crown was incontestably his by inheritance and the will of God, regardless of religion.4 Hence, he always perceived himself to be protecting his throne and authority as rightful monarch of France against rebels and would-be usurpers of the state whose sole claim to legitimacy was the pretext of defending Catholicism against heresy. In his own mind, he was not fighting to win his crown “as if he had no predecessors,”5 which too many historians claim. But Henri’s refusal to convert meant having to convince the late king’s Catholic servitors of his legitimacy, because of their misgivings about his religion. The royal Declaration of Saint Cloud secured the support of the majority of the royalist Catholics, in accordance with the traditional definition of Salic Law, which did not allude to religion. In addition, by signing the covenant with their new Calvinist king, these nobles identified themselves definitively with the principles of hereditary monarchy that he espoused, as opposed to the innovations of the League.6 This was a major political victory for Henri. Nevertheless, he recognized that the only way to consolidate his authority on his terms after 4 August 1589, without the prerequisite of a conversion, was through decisive victory in the civil war. Indeed, his battlefield successes in the coming campaigns had to be significant and sustained. Inconclusive battles and minor skirmishes would be of little benefit to him, while deadlock or defeat would be disastrous. The spotlight would return immediately, in that event, to the issue of Henri’s conversion as the single means of defeating the League and restoring peace to France. Hence, from August 1589 to December 1592, the Calvinist king’s focus was distinctly military. Confident that the duc de Mayenne and his faction were sustained only by the “Roman consistories” and “Spanish phlegm,”7 Henri hoped to defeat them quickly in a contest of arms that would prove beyond doubt his legitimacy as French monarch. To preserve his Calvinist conscience, meanwhile, the king continuously diverted and misled, by one ruse or another and with at least a touch of cynicism, his mostly loyal but increasingly frustrated Catholic followers. If they never seemed to appreciate fully the importance of religious sincerity to the Calvinist monarch, he likewise either failed to take seriously enough, or turned a blind eye to, the importance of his conversion to even moderate French Catholics. They were motivated by what they genuinely judged, not without reason, to be in the best

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interests of the kingdom, if not of their sovereign. So in this regard, Henri was as guilty of misunderstanding, insensitivity, and duplicity as his Catholic servitors were of impatience, belligerence, and high-handedness. Everyone knew that the price of the royal conscience was high.

early ga ins a nd h ar d c h o ic e s: iv ry a nd th e s iege of par is Arguably, the year starting September 1589 and ending September 1590 was the most critical of Henri IV’s early reign. During this period he came closest to imposing his authority on France without a conversion. This was due chiefly to the stunning success of his intensive military campaign against the League, opened in mid-August 1589, by which he brought most of the realm under his control by mid-January. His efforts reached their zenith two months later, on 14 March 1590, when he annihilated his ultra-Catholic enemies’ independent power at the battle of Ivry, fought just forty miles west of Paris. What that decisive royal victory on the plaine de St André proved beyond all doubt was that the Huguenot king was worthy of his throne and that he had the power to keep it. Yet despite that devastating blow, the duc de Mayenne refused to submit, though it was all he could do following the debacle to scrape together what little remained of his forces to protect panic-stricken Paris, now vulnerable to imminent royal assault. Furthermore, because his irreparably crippled faction no longer had the resources or, for that matter, any real basis of military or even political power in the realm thanks to the disaster at Ivry, Mayenne appealed urgently to Spain for emergency aid. Without it, he knew that what remained of his party soon would collapse.8 From this date forward, therefore, the real driving force behind the ultra-Catholic cause in France became for all practical purposes the duke’s Spanish allies, as the League had been reduced to virtual impotence. But Henri did not exploit the political opportunity thus afforded by converting and crowning himself as contemporaries expected, though even this would give no guarantee of success because of the growing debate among Catholic Frenchmen over the issue of sincerity in a potential royal abjuration. He chose instead to invest Paris with his forces in early May, thereby sacrificing his advantage to protect his Calvinist conscience. The desultory royal siege that followed lasted four long months and ended finally in September, when the city was relieved by the dukes of Parma and Mayenne in command of a combined Spanish-League army. Forced to withdraw after the enemy had refused all of his offers of battle, the Calvinist king’s reputation and

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position in France suffered a serious setback. This consequence was made graver still by the untimely death of Pope Sixtus V, who had become so pro-royalist since 1585 that just before he died in August 1590, he seemed on the verge of throwing his full support officially behind Henri IV. Up to the battle of Ivry, the Huguenot monarch controlled the religious and political arena very well. Despite his letters patent of 27 August 1589, his subsequent actions clearly reveal that he had no intention of keeping his appointment at Tours to receive Catholic instruction. Obviously, Henri had to move with great caution here, as an overt omission to fulfil the promises he had made at Saint Cloud earlier that month almost certainly would have alienated the royalist Catholics. They had agreed, to be sure, that his claims as rightful heir to the French crown “cannot be contested.” Nevertheless, they continued to insist that a royal conversion was the king’s sole means of establishing his authority in the realm, restoring peace, and “bringing back all the hearts of his subjects to the loyal obedience due to his Majesty.”9 To escape Catholic pressure to abjure, therefore, Henri IV developed a military plan of action – beginning with his march into Normandy – to which he adhered closely over the next three and a half years. Because he recognized that his army was, for the moment, “the sole basis of my authority and the conservation of the state,”10 his aim was to apply relentless military pressure against the League so as to defeat it as quickly and as decisively as possible. Otherwise, he wrote, “[the ultra-Catholic enemy] will usurp all the rest of this state, or at least leave me with only a small part of it; but if I intensify the war, I can ruin and destroy them.”11 To that end, Henri repeatedly declared his determination to bring the duc de Mayenne to battle at every opportunity. Much more, however, lay behind his thinking than just his desire to vanquish the League. Equally important was his recognition that an intensive military focus would also permit him to avoid convoking the assembly promised in October for his instruction, without jeopardizing his royalist-Catholic support. In short, Henri saw the war effort as the ideal means of deflecting the attention of his Catholic servitors away from the issue of his creed, a point curiously missed by modern scholars but apparent to some contemporaries. His object was as simple as it was pragmatic: to preoccupy these nobles so thoroughly with the fighting that the majority might forget their concerns over his religious profession “and perhaps ... even be content to let him remain a Protestant [sic].”12 As for those Catholic royalists whose concentration was not so easily diverted, the conditions of war would allow him to claim, at the very least, that the royal campaign against the League

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demanded his undivided attention and prolonged absence in the field. This was a plausible justification that not only excused him for not returning to Tours in late October as expected, but also permitted him to delay his instruction almost indefinitely thereafter: “[For] the war continuing, and men’s minds being more influenced between both factions, the [royalist] Catholics would be still more confirmed to follow him, and that he might with promises gain time convenient to him to convert [i.e., delay his instruction].”13 Moreover, the king’s pretense was accepted by the royalist-Catholic nobles, and even resorted to by them. This is clear from the fact that several of them invoked it from time to time to excuse Henri’s foot-dragging to their more impatient coreligionnaires.14 Judging from the success of his Normandy campaign in the last quarter of 1589, Henri’s carefully conceived military program seemed destined to surpass his wildest expectations. “The King of Navarre is thought to do that he doth by sorcery,” wrote an English contemporary, “for all places do yield to him.”15 He won a spectacular (though by no means decisive) victory at Arques on 21 September against an ultra-Catholic army five times his strength: Mayenne (the king wrote) left the field “garnished with his dead and prisoners.”16 After that battle, Henri made a leisurely promenade up the Seine River toward Paris, where he launched a surprise dawn attack against the faubourgs of the French capital on 1 November. He thus showed the pro-League citizens that “they can no longer live in security.”17 These actions strengthened the king’s position in the realm enormously. They also firmly established both his credibility as monarch and his soldierly reputation at the expense of the duc de Mayenne, whose boast that he would halt his Calvinist opponent in the field was discredited thoroughly.18 At the same time, these achievements confirmed Henri’s control over the wealthy and strategic province of Normandy. He subsequently extended and consolidated that control through a string of almost bloodless conquests that rapidly brought many League-held towns under his power. These gains also protected his vital lifeline to England and his Anglican ally, Queen Elizabeth I, who supplied him at crucial moments with badly needed men, money, and matériel to prosecute the war. Consequently, by the end of December only Rouen, Le Havre, and a handful of isolated, relatively unimportant places in the province remained beyond his grasp.19 Of equal importance, meanwhile, was the effect produced by the king’s daring and totally unexpected attack on the French capital. So stunned were the League partisans living in the city that they seriously proposed negotiating a capitulation to the Calvinist monarch without

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delay.20 Even the ultra-Catholic duchesse de Guise put aside her hatred of Henri’s “heresy” to beg his protection for herself and her children.21 Doubtless, this sudden reversal of position, from offering implacable opposition to considering near-unconditional surrender, was due as much to the king’s astonishing demonstration of military prowess as it was to his careful protection both of Catholic Church property and religious processions in honour of All Saints’ Day, even during the fiercest part of the street fighting.22 At the same time, Henri’s benevolence toward the rebellious Parisians also must have impressed his own Catholic servitors. They probably viewed it as a reassurance of his promises made at Saint Cloud, something he needed at this juncture, since the assembly he had announced for his religious instruction should have opened on 31 October, the day before his surprise attack on Paris. That it was preempted by his assault on the French capital was, however, no coincidence. On the contrary, Henri had embarked upon a pattern of behaviour that he would adhere to until 1593. He managed to avoid each successive date set for his reintroduction to Catholicism by deliberately undertaking some new military action against the League. Moreover, as he selected his targets carefully to ensure that they were significant enough to warrant his failure to open the various assemblies as promised, his Catholic followers were unable to protest. Besides, the king had involved them so closely in these projects that they were too preoccupied to object in any case. Meanwhile, the fruits of his labours, which usually resulted in victory, seemed to vindicate his continuing procrastination. Nevertheless, for appearances’ sake Henri was always careful to interrupt his ongoing campaign, however briefly, to announce yet another date for the convocation of the promised assembly. This explains his quick detour to Tours in late November 1589. But his first act upon arrival was to obtain the unqualified recognition of his sovereignty from the loyalist judges of the parlement of Paris, who now resided at the provisional royal capital on the banks of the Loire.23 Added to this were fresh oaths of loyalty from the local Catholic clergy and the municipal council of Tours. Only then, on 28 November, did Henri issue new letters patent that reset the date of his instruction for 15 March 1590.24 Clearly, he had wanted his authority as lawful French sovereign reconfirmed by the kingdom’s chief judicial body, as well as by an important segment of the Gallican clergy, before issuing any fresh public statement on his religion. His purpose was clear: to remind everyone of his legitimacy as hereditary king of France, according to his view of the monarchy, irrespective of the faith he professed. Only in this way could he ensure that his Catholic servitors

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would submissively accept the postponement of the anticipated assembly well beyond the six-month deadline they had forced upon him at Saint Cloud, even if they did so “more out of necessity than of will.”25 After a week’s hiatus at Tours, Henri was ready to resume his military campaign, but before leaving, he performed two final tasks. The first was to offer the olive branch once again to Mayenne and the League, though this time he focused his attention on the party’s rank and file, to whom he promised generous terms if they submitted to his authority. This included a full royal pardon and the return of all confiscated property.26 The king’s offer was good for a period of six months only, however; at the end of that time, he warned, any rebel or “relapsed rebel” who fell into his hands would be punished to the full extent of the law. It is an interesting and perhaps significant twist that he now applied the same terms the League used to denigrate his alleged heresy in matters of religion to defame the political “heresy” of his ultra-Catholic enemies in the matter of their proper duty to the Crown.27 Henri’s other task was to begin proceedings against anyone suspected of complicity in the assassination of Henri III. This was a partial fulfilment of his oaths to the royalist Catholics of 2 August, and more recently to the widowed queen, Louise de Vaudémont, to punish the regicides. The first to fall victim to the new king’s justice was Father Bourgoin, a Jacobin prior captured in the recent assault on Paris. He was drawn and quartered for alleged involvement in the royal assassination. Jacques Clément also was tried and condemned posthumously for the murder of the late Valois king.28 Significantly, both hearings were carried out exactly as Henri had insisted the previous August at Saint Cloud, in strict accordance with his sovereign authority as French monarch and his exclusive prerogative as kingly fount of justice. This illustrated that, short of conversion, he omitted “no step by which he could establish his own power,”29 according to his conceptualization of the monarchy. Following Henri’s return to the field, the royal campaign against the League continued to prosper. In fact, by the close of 1589 the Huguenot monarch controlled not just Normandy, but most of the provinces of France, as well as two of the kingdom’s major river routes, the Seine and the Loire.30 As a direct result of his many victories, he was recognized as the legitimate monarch by a growing majority of French Catholic nobles, most of the highest-ranking Gallican clergy, and the royalist parlementaires scattered in various strongholds around the country.31 Even the Leaguer theologians of the Sorbonne in Paris had published a decree on 10 February that admitted that “Henry de Bourbon might, and ought to be honour’d with the Title of King: That

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in [good] conscience men might hold his Party and Pay him Taxes, and acknowledge him for King, on condition he turn’ed Catholick, etc.”32 As for the effect of Henri’s exploits on his own party, none of his Catholic servitors now dared to contest “his rank, his quality or his absolute power” on the grounds of his religion, or “thought of changing the form of government” by overturning the Salic Law to replace him as French monarch with a prince of their faith. Subdued, instead, by the king’s military achievements and the prospect of a decisive royal victory, they were all committed to destroying the League, which, by contrast, was showing signs of deep internal division.33 How different had been the Bourbon monarch’s position just six months before, when his grip on the crown had been shaky and his Catholic support uncertain. Outside the kingdom, Henri’s military successes had similarly stimulated a dramatic upsurge in international recognition of his legitimacy. This was demonstrated by the number of Catholic states that had opened official, or at least semi-official, relations with his court as early as November 1589, beginning with the Swiss cantons. Their example had been followed within a week by the Republic of Venice, a Catholic state famous for the political astuteness of its rulers and ambassadors. The Grand Duke of Tuscany had also endorsed the Huguenot king’s authority in France, albeit privately,34 while even the pro-League duke of Savoy had begun to acknowledge Henri’s just rights.35 Still more encouraging was the news from Rome. Over the bitter protests of Mayenne and the Spanish ambassador, Pope Sixtus V had received the unofficial embassy of the duc de Luxembourg in December, according him those honours usually reserved for accredited envoys.36 The royal victory at Arques had already inspired the pontiff to send a new legate northward in October “to negociate some good agreement between the [Lorraine] princes and the king of Navarre,”37 but now he approved the royalist Catholics’ recognition of their Calvinist king “for the good of France.” That endorsement virtually repudiated the feeble claims to the crown put forth in the name of “Charles X,” the aged cardinal de Bourbon. (The League had declared him French monarch only on 21 November, though he was still a prisoner in royal hands.) In fact, it might even be argued that the pope’s action was an oblique renunciation of the League itself. In any case, Henri IV’s heavy investment in the war effort against his ultra-Catholic enemies was earning him rich dividends. So it was with justifiable pride at the astonishing speed and extent of his progress, in conjunction with the confidence he now felt in the security of his position, that he exulted in early January 1590: “My achievements are miraculous ... I fear nothing from the League!”38

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Having gained so much, the king’s decisive victory over the enemy’s superior forces at Ivry two months later, on 14 March,39 might have been his ultimate accomplishment. He certainly equated the battle’s stunning outcome with “the peace of this kingdom and the ruin of the League,”40 a view shared by the majority of contemporaries. Royalists and ultra-Catholics alike saw the victory as both “the establishment of [Henri’s] reign” and a military and political defeat of vast proportions for the League, which was “vanquished and reduced to nothing.”41 “One can say,” the sieur de Villegomblain recalled some years later, “that on this day was built the tomb of the League; because since then it was impossible for it to rise up again; and it could do no more than to languish until its death.”42 Nor was he alone in his assessment. Villeroy de Neufville and President Pierre Jeannin, the duc de Mayenne’s principal civilian advisers, similarly believed that the ultra-Catholic organization was finished after Ivry. Indeed, had it not been for the element of Spain, Spanish arms, and Spanish gold, the rebel faction possibly might have collapsed at this time. For this reason, both men strongly advised the duke to make peace with the victorious Huguenot monarch as soon as possible, before he lost all of his political leverage in France or before the Spanish influence – already expanding in the party – became irresistible.43 Apparently, Mayenne followed this advice, but only as a delaying tactic,44 while he appealed urgently for fresh reinforcements from the Spanish Netherlands to keep alive the ultra-Catholic cause in France. But Philip II was in no position to respond quickly to Mayenne’s desperate pleas for assistance. Indeed, Spain’s policy had fallen into turmoil after the news of Ivry was finally released and unsuccessfully minimized at Madrid.45 Furthermore, the duke of Parma, Philip’s brilliant, yet cautious, governor of the Netherlands refused to march to the League’s rescue, despite explicit orders.46 Though appalled by the Catholic defeat in a battle he thought never should have been risked,47 Parma was more concerned for the safety of Spain’s tenuous position in the rebellious Low Countries, where at this moment the Dutch rebels and their English allies were fighting a vigorous campaign. Besides, he was suspicious of the ultra-Catholic faction and its leaders, sneering that, as Frenchmen, “the less they are trusted the better, where their own interests are concerned.”48 Not until late August, more than five months after the debacle, did the League leader finally receive the help from Spain he so desperately needed. In the meantime, Henri IV’s already strong reputation skyrocketed. Within France, Catholic support for his cause increased geometrically after Ivry, especially among those nobles who had withdrawn into political neutrality the previous August rather than serve a Huguenot

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king. Men such as the pious duc de Nevers, the former secretaries of state Pomponne de Bellièvre and Brûlart de Sillery, and the French chancellor Philippe Hurault de Cheverny now rushed to join Henri’s standard.49 To these prominent Catholics, the Calvinist monarch’s astonishing military triumph was a strong indication of God’s blessing for a just cause.50 This view was shared, it seems, by a dejected Mayenne, who attributed the League’s defeat to God’s punishment for its disobedience, wickedness, and pride.51 News of the king’s victory produced a comparable effect outside French borders. In particular, Henri’s prestige was boosted in Rome, where (according to one contemporary source) the duc de Luxembourg now “very boldly avouched unto the Popes face” that the royalist Catholics were more determined than ever to support their Huguenot monarch “with fire and sword. And hazarde their landes and livings in the maintenance of his right.”52 A deeply impressed and hopeful Sixtus V responded by acknowledging Henri IV’s claims to the French Crown. The pontiff added: “That were it not that the king is a Hugonite by profession: he worthely deserveth to beare thys title. viz. The Great Caesar of the World. With which glorious title he offered to grace and honour the king, so as he would change his religion.”53 But all of the military, political and diplomatic gains that Henri had won from his victory over the League were sacrificed soon afterward by his refusal to push home his advantage at the expense of his conscience. Immediately following Ivry, the Calvinist king had two clear options. One was to consolidate his indisputably predominant position in the realm by converting to Catholicism and crowning himself as a prelude to ending the civil war. The other was to continue his military program as before in the hope of establishing his authority conclusively by force of arms, without undergoing an abjuration in advance. Had he been an opportunist and religious sceptic, or even an undogmatic Christian, surely he would have selected the first option. That was the logical step, given the dramatic growth in his strength, the humiliation of the League, and the increased recognition of his sovereignty among many former Catholic opponents at home and abroad. Such men were beginning to agree with the king’s view that his triumph on the plaine de St André was a clear indication that divine providence confirmed his legitimacy as the rightful French monarch.54 Besides, the timing for a politically motivated conversion was ideal, as the alternative date announced the previous November for Henri’s instruction (i.e., 15 March) coincided nicely with his victory just the day before. By abjuring at this time, he could have fulfilled his promises of 4 August 1589. This in turn would have polished his tar-

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nished image as a man of his word, while preserving his dignity as French monarch. A conversion made from a position of great strength doubtless would have been interpreted as a gift to the nation rather than an act performed under duress. Additionally, it would have satisfied his impatient Catholic servitors, who recognized after the king’s great victory that they had lost much of their political leverage with him and could no longer insist that he abjure as a condition of their loyalty.55 At the same time, a conversion would have cleared the way for Henri’s sacre and coronation, that ancient ceremony of royal consecration whereby all French monarchs were invested with the priestly quality of sacerdos. This was the only element of sixteenth-century kingship that still eluded him in spring 1590.56 Fundamental to contemporary notions of monarchy, this single attribute was hallowed as “the true luster of the Royal dignity,” and the ritual that bestowed it was held in equal esteem as “the most beautiful blossom of the Royal dignity in this kingdom.”57 Based upon biblical example and discharged with solemn pageantry by the Gallican Church, the sacre carried deep religious significance. By swearing oaths to uphold “right religion” and by undergoing a ritual consecration with holy oil that, by tradition, had been used to anoint Clovis, the new king made a sacred covenant with God and a public expression of homage “for the crown that He has given to [him], to which we [i.e., the royal subjects] in turn join our thanks, our praise and our voice for [the monarch’s] prosperity.”58 To sixteenth-century French eyes, therefore, the coronation ceremony, with its medieval pomp and lofty symbolism, was essential to the confirmation both of royal power and of religious orthodoxy. But as Henri’s coronation generally was agreed to be contingent upon his return to the Roman faith,59 so long as he remained a Calvinist it was assumed that he never could participate in this very Catholic ritual. Had the king elected to convert and crown himself after Ivry as the League leaders and their Spanish allies fully expected him to do,60 he probably could have hastened the end of the civil war. A royal abjuration certainly would have destroyed the ultra-Catholic faction’s single claim to legitimacy. Meanwhile, Henri’s sacre would have lent an aura of sincerity to his conversion that it otherwise might have lacked. The ritual similarly would have enhanced his prestige throughout Catholic Europe as “His Most Christian Majesty” and first prince of the Church – honorifics of real importance to contemporary Frenchmen.61 To be sure, a royal abjuration at this time would not have brought an instant solution to all of Henri’s problems. At the heart of League opposition and polemic since 1589 was the crucial question of his sin-

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cerity, or rather of how it could be guaranteed should the Calvinist monarch actually convert. On the basis both of feelings of genuine religious concern and of the requirements of political propaganda, many Leaguers argued that Henri was ineligible for the French crown even if he returned to the traditional Church. (Popular support of the ultra-Catholic rebellion depended ultimately, after all, upon that faction’s ability to manipulate public opinion and justify its actions on legitimate principles of resistance.) They suspected the king’s offers to receive instruction was a ploy to divide the Catholics, and pointed to his past statements of religious commitment to his Swiss, English, and German allies as proof of his duplicity. Under such circumstances, they asked, could they accept a royal conversion as genuine? Still more fundamental was the ancient unity among the Gallican Church, French society, and the Crown. Only after the monarchy had been cleansed of vice and restored to religious virtue, argued League hard-liners, could it resume its sacred duty of promoting the faith. The first act toward that end was to overturn the hereditary claims of Henri de Bourbon and elect a more acceptable Catholic king.62 Still, a timely conversion could have accomplished much toward undermining League resistance. With the religious obstacle removed, the party’s legitimacy would perforce be destroyed along with its unity, since Leaguers of more moderate views could be expected to submit to the king. But in spite of the many conspicuous advantages a political conversion had to offer him in spring 1590, Henri refused to embrace Catholicism after Ivry.63 He chose instead to besiege the League-held French capital, and so postponed his instruction a second time, until 15 March 1591.64 This decision caused an immediate demoralization of the Catholics under the king’s command, some of whom even contemplated abandoning him in their despair over his apparent bad faith.65 It also very nearly cost him the growing favour of the pope, who at first was so disaffected with the news of Henri’s failure to proceed to his instruction that he briefly contemplated a military alliance with Spain.66 Finally, by refusing to abjure his Calvinist faith, the Bourbon monarch seemed to be depriving himself of his greatest opportunity to give the political coup de grâce to the League, allowing it time to recover some of its lost vitality with Spanish support. Nevertheless, Henri’s decision to besiege Paris was a reasonable one. Like other sixteenth-century Frenchmen, the Huguenot monarch had a Ptolemaic rather than Copernican view of Paris, seeing it as the centre of the French universe and the very heart of its government, law, learning, and even culture. He believed like everyone else that whoever controlled the capital also controlled the rest of France, since

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the whole organic life of the kingdom was oriented on that city. This perception was particularly meaningful during the last of the civilreligious wars when Paris was upheld as “the symbol of the maintenance of the Catholic League.”67 The king’s Catholic and Calvinist advisers were unanimous, therefore, in recommending the siege as a capstone to his recent victory at Ivry. But Henri had reached this decision already and had sent orders to various royalist commanders on the evening of 14 March to join him with their forces immediately for an assault on Paris.68 He knew that the capital’s submission was essential to his success, and noted further that should it fall in the wake of Ivry, “I could begin to feel fully the effects of the Crown.”69 This course of action was also consistent with Henri’s long-term military strategy. Paris had been his ultimate target in autumn 1587 and again in July 1589, when he had convinced his murdered predecessor to attack it.70 Subsequently, from late August 1589 until early March 1590, Henri had constructed a tight ring of strongholds around the city, having lacked the manpower to undertake a more direct attack. This concentric barrier included Pontoise, Étampes, Gisors, Clermont, and other previously League-held places that he had captured one by one in the Île-de-France. Hence, although the formal siege that the king now planned against the French capital in mid-March 1590 was largely an impromptu scheme conceived in the first flush of victory, so “that we may gather the fruits of the war, which God has given us,”71 it also was a reasonable next step in a much longer process. The problem was, however, that after Ivry Henri became the victim of circumstances he had created. Because of his definitive military victory over the League, the Catholic royalists entreated him increasingly, though respectfully, to keep his word and abjure “to install myself more easily in my kingdom.”72 Yet the thought of a conversion was now no less repugnant to the Calvinist king, on both religious and political grounds, than before; hence, like many other persons confronted with a disagreeable task, he procrastinated. But to postpone his instruction a second time without risking his royalist-Catholic support or restricting his political options, he needed to preoccupy his Catholic servitors with a military objective of such significance as to justify the delay. The French capital was the obvious choice. Consequently, when Pomponne de Bellièvre approached Henri immediately after Ivry with the specific aim of inducing him to receive instruction as he had pledged, the Catholic secretary of state found to his despair that the king “could think only of the siege of Paris; and all other things that one wanted to talk to him about were superceded by this thought.”73 Similarly, when the Leaguer marquis de Vitry later

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delivered to the royal camp outside Paris a message from Mayenne that only the obstacle of religion prevented the duke from recognizing Henri as his monarch, “[t]he King, saying nothing regarding religion, told Vitry that with the grace of God and the force of his arms he knew very well how to make himself recognized!”74 So to Henri IV, Paris was well worth avoiding a mass! One point that the king never seems to have pondered in formulating his plans, however, was the consequences for his political options should he actually succeed in capturing Paris. That a royal victory would establish his authority in France, he was aware; but that it would negate any further excuse for delaying his conversion and force him to accept the Catholic conceptualization of French kingship, he apparently did not consider. Henri was thus far from omniscient in deciding to besiege the French capital. There is, finally, one other indication of the way in which the king’s religion might have affected his political thinking at this juncture: his choice of an alternative date for his instruction. Each time he postponed the opening of the promised assembly, whether he made the announcement in autumn 1589, spring 1590, or eventually in summer 1591, he rescheduled it for the following 15 March. To be sure, because the Lenten season began during that month, it was a time of repentance fitting for a prospective convert, but Henri’s constant return to 15 March suggests that his selection was far more deliberate, that this date represented in his mind a bitter symbolism that had little to do with the religious calendar. As with other articulate men of his day, his early education had been rooted in the Latin classics. Among these were the works of Julius Caesar, with whose life and career the Huguenot monarch was very familiar. By repeatedly selecting the Ides of March as the date of his instruction, Henri – whose sense of humour was often piquant – was perhaps drawing a parallel between himself and that ancient Roman statesman. Where over-mighty Caesar had been assassinated by his former friends and colleagues for the sake of the Republic, thus paying the ultimate political price with his life, the embattled Calvinist king was expected by his Catholic subjects to renounce his faith for the good of France, perhaps at the ultimate Christian cost of his eternal salvation. In any case, the fact that Henri IV did not abjure immediately after Ivry shows that he had principles beyond political opportunism, and specifically that he wished to put off his instruction for as long as possible, despite his promises. Henri could have benefited politically from an attack on Paris only if he captured the city quickly, while it was still vulnerable and the citizenry in a state of panic after learning of Mayenne’s defeat at Ivry. In

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fact, the Parisians were so demoralized by the news of the king’s unexpected victory, and so angered by Mayenne’s defeat, that the papal legate and the Spanish ambassador both feared a popular uprising in favour of peace with the king.75 The exhausted royal army was unable, however, to take advantage of the situation. In addition, foodstuffs, money, and munitions were in very short supply, while heavy rains had made the local roads impassable to baggage wagons, guns, and even cavalry.76 Thus, like it or not, for fifteen precious days the king languished at Mantes, whence he had pursued the remnants of the shattered League army as it fled from the field of Ivry. Besides, his acute strategic sense probably warned him of the foolhardiness of marching suddenly into the heart of enemy territory, past numerous hostile garrisons that potentially barred his retreat, to besiege a city of 200,000 souls with only 15,000 men of his own. This would have been uncharacteristic of his generalship.77 Not until 7 May, after two full months of rigorous campaigning to plug the last holes in the royal blockade around Paris (still the only way to capture the city with such scanty resources),78 did Henri and his army finally appear before its walls. By that time, the city was far better prepared to resist him. Nonetheless, one event worked to his advantage. Two days later, on 9 May, the aged cardinal de Bourbon died at Fontenay-le-Comte, still a royal prisoner. Always a reluctant candidate for the throne, the cardinal – once described as “a pious man of very good intentions, but without spirit”79 – reportedly recognized his nephew as rightful king on his deathbed. He protested further that he had accepted his nomination by the League as monarch solely to preserve the rights of his family to the succession. So long as the ultraCatholic faction acknowledged his sovereignty, it also had to acknowledge the claims of the Bourbons. With “Charles X’s” last breath, therefore, the League lost more than an alternative to Henri IV. It also lost the traditional pretense used to justify its armed opposition to the Crown, that it was fighting in the name of a “reigning” monarch. At the same time, the semblance of legality that had sustained Mayenne’s own power up to now was eroded significantly, as his authority as lieutenant-general had been predicated, after all, on League backing for the dead cardinal’s candidacy for the throne.80 Without sufficient troops to reduce Paris through conventional methods of siegecraft, Henri divided his forces into large mobile detachments. These he positioned at strategic points around the city to enclose its fortified perimeter of thirty miles and sever its communications with the exterior. The king’s plan was simple: since he lacked the manpower to seize the rebellious capital by storm, he

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would starve it slowly into submission.81 But however confidently Henri predicted that the capital “must surrender within twelve days,”82 the League defenders refused to yield to his blockade, even though by late June the death toll from famine had reached 100 to 200 persons per day.83 The king was fully aware of the grim conditions in the beleaguered city, thanks to intercepted League dispatches, and he again wrote boldly on 15 July that the defenders had reached a state where “it is necessary [either] to fight or to send deputies.”84 To encourage negotiations, Henri regularly issued assurances to the Parisians “of his paternal concern for their well being.”85 In addition, he promised clemency, a full royal pardon to anyone who deserted the capital to join him, and protection for their Catholic faith.86 He even disobeyed his own strict orders by offering succour to those who managed to reach the safety of his lines after fleeing Paris.87 For taking the double approach of holding “the rod in one hand and the apple in the other,”88 Henri received much criticism from sixteenth-century observers and, subsequently, from modern scholars.89 From his perspective, however, the king had to make it appear that time was on his side and, further, that he possessed sufficient might to take the city whenever he wished. Only out of love for his subjects, he alleged, rather than by constraint from a lack of means, did he withhold his final assault. This enabled him to represent himself as the stern, though forgiving, father of his people who was distressed at seeing them reduced to such extremes because they had listened to the lies of “evil” men “who at the expense of your life and means dare to aspire to the usurpation” of the throne.90 To strengthen this image, he repeatedly reminded the starving Parisians that they held the remedy to their plight in their own hands and that if they submitted to his authority he would welcome them with open arms. As an additional inducement, he reaffirmed his solemn promises to protect their Catholic faith.91 But probably Henri would not have subjected the city to a concentrated attack in any case. He feared exposing it to pillage and to the risk of the widespread massacre of its inhabitants by Huguenot soldiers, who had an old score to settle for Saint Bartholomew’s Day, 1572. Nor did he have any desire to reduce “the principal ornament of France” to a smouldering ruin, from which he could have drawn little advantage.92 By the beginning of August the Calvinist king seemed to be on the verge of success. At that time, he met with the cardinal de Gondi and the archbishop of Lyons, who had been sent by the League governor of Paris, the duc de Nemours, to discuss the possibility of arranging a general peace for the kingdom. This was to include the surrender of

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the capital and special provisions for the Roman Church. The two envoys also asked for safe-conducts to seek out Mayenne in order to solicit his participation in the proposed talks. But Henri insisted that the city negotiate for itself, and rejected its submission as part of a general treaty with the League. He wanted the unconditional surrender of Paris and the rebellious Parisians, as “he willeth them to yield it up unto him as his right, and to stand to his mercie.”93 Thus, he threatened that his troops were poised to take Paris by assault “if [the citizens] do not soon arrange themselves with me by free will.”94 Nevertheless, he granted the two prelates passports to seek out “the fat duke” (as he now called Mayenne)95 and promised again to preserve Catholicism in France. He then pronounced with consummate royal dignity, and in accordance with his materialist notion of monarchy, that “it was not for vassals to give conditions to their king but rather for the king to pardon them.”96 The Huguenot monarch was running rapidly out of time, however. On 1 August the duc de Mayenne had finally begun marching to the relief of Paris. Three days later, on 24 August, the duke of Parma crossed the French frontier to join forces with the League leader at Meaux. In the meantime, the “fat duke’s” refusal to negotiate with a “heretic” brought the attempted negotiations of Gondi and Lyons to an abrupt halt. To meet the military threat now looming against him, Henri withdrew most of his troops to Chelles on 30 August, to a field of his choosing just nine miles from the capital. For the next eight days, he tried unsuccessfully to draw the allied commanders into battle, in the hope of winning another victory like Ivry that “would be the decision of the siege, and of all the troubles of the realm.”97 Parma refused, however, to risk his army needlessly in combat against such a skilful opponent, preferring to wait within his fortified encampment for an opportunity to crack the royal blockade of Paris. On 8 September that opportunity came. Under cover of thick mist, he swiftly captured Lagny on the Marne River and slaughtered its royalist garrison. Having thus opened a supply route to the famished capital (which was revictualled promptly), Parma left it in Mayenne’s possession along with Spanish reinforcements to bolster the depleted French garrison. He then seized a few more towns from the royalists, to ensure that the holes he had just punched through their lines would remain open, before starting to retrace his steps to Flanders in October. For Henri the relief of Paris was a near-disastrous reversal, as he saw the promising harvest of four months of hard effort suddenly spoiled. This loss was rendered particularly tragic, since, according to contemporary opinion, had the combined Catholic army been delayed just two or three days longer, the city would have had to have fallen.98

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Knowing that it was foolhardy to continue the siege in the presence of the enemy forces, the Calvinist king tried a last desperate attack on Paris (11 September) in the vain hope of capturing it by surprise. But this was repulsed and the royal army was forced to march away. To save face, Henri issued an official account of the siege in mid-September “so that each [subject] might know that there was nothing in [his retreat from the capital] that was not done through reason, and without constraint.”99 This lends credit to Sully’s later observation that it was the Bourbon monarch’s constant maxim that “a prince always should have the appearance of doing voluntarily even what he is constrained to do” for the sake of his political image.100 In spite of his failure to capture Paris, Henri still might have triumphed politically over the League in summer 1590 had Pope Sixtus V lived long enough to throw his considerable support behind the royalist cause, for the Roman pontiff had become so receptive to the conciliatory advances of the Huguenot monarch by this time, and so impressed with his military prowess, that he seemed on the verge of backing him openly against the ultra-Catholics and their Spanish allies. On more than one occasion, Henri had declared his desire “to be embraced as an obedient child” by Sixtus, so long as “any pledges which his Holiness might demand” did not violate his sovereignty or the traditional power he wielded as king of France over the Gallican Church. Furthermore, Henri had consented to receive the new papal legate, Cardinal Cajetan, on condition that the prelate presented his credentials directly to him and not to the League.101 Meanwhile, the duc de Luxembourg’s skilful diplomacy had given Sixtus such faith in the royal promises to receive instruction that he contemplated sending a hand-chosen theologian for that purpose and even added his personal assurances that a speedy absolution would follow the king’s conversion.102 As for the League, Sixtus increasingly resented its constant demands, under threat of impeachment and even bloodshed by Philip II, that he declare war on the “Béarnais” in alliance with Spain,103 dismiss the duc de Luxembourg at once, and excommunicate all Catholic Frenchmen who currently served the “relapsed heretic,” Henri de Bourbon.104 This simply added to Sixtus’s fear of growing Spanish hegemony in Italy which, he believed, could be checked only by a powerful, reunited France under its legitimate monarch. Equally offensive to the pontiff were League challenges to his spiritual jurisdiction and public criticism of his ecclesiastical authority, as revealed in letters Henri IV had captured at Ivry and then cunningly forwarded to Rome.105 The documents also exposed the rank insubordination of his new legate, Cajetan, who not only had corresponded privately with

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Spain, but had sided openly with the League.106 Hence the bitter complaints by Henri’s Catholic servitors that the cardinal-legate came only “to divide France, sell out the nobility ... and abolish the royal family.”107 Hence also Sixtus V’s own fury toward his disobedient envoy, who (he exclaimed) “does everything the Spanish ministers in Paris desire, and not what we have ordered!”108 Inspired by the news of Ivry, the pontiff took bold action against the Holy Catholic League and Spain, with which he virtually severed relations.109 Sixtus recognized the claims of the Huguenot monarch despite further Spanish efforts at intimidation,110 and repeated his warm assurances to the duc de Luxembourg that the French king would be welcomed warmly into the Church after his conversion. At the same time, he absolved the royalist Catholics who served the Huguenot monarch,111 disavowed the actions of the maverick Cajetan,112 and considered appointing a new legate in his place specifically “to discharge the king of the excommunication which was before pronounced against him, saying that he did it before by false information, and hopeth he will become a most Christian king, and that the Crowne of France doth of right appertaine unto him; and to that purpose the Pope hath written to the Cleargie, commanding them to obey and praie for the king upon paine of his excommunication.”113 Had the “politique pope” (as the ultra-Catholic faction called him)114 lived longer, he and Henri might have reached an accommodation that would have compensated the Calvinist king completely for his reverse at Paris and, ironically, brought him full recognition of his sovereignty as rightful French monarch by the spiritual head of the Roman Catholic Church. Who then would have dared to grumble about his delays in receiving instruction? But the pontiff’s untimely death on 27 August destroyed these prospects. In the wake of these two major setbacks – the royal defeat outside Paris and the death of Sixtus V – Henri’s political position in France was badly weakened. As a result, a large number of Catholic nobles, disillusioned with his persistent refusal to abjure his conscience on the private principle “that [even] to win a kingdom he would never abandon his religion,”115 threatened to quit the royal party until the Calvinist monarch “had made some progress in his promises.”116 Those oaths had been “the sole foundation of the duty and obedience they had rendered him up to this point.”117 All Henri could do in the face of this renewed pressure was to grant a congé to those who wanted it, preoccupy those who remained behind with military affairs as before, and begin repairing the damage to his reputation by opening a fresh campaign against the enemy.118 One has to sympathize with the king’s supplication that “God give me peace; so that I might enjoy several years of rest!”119

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The many disadvantages of Henri IV’s Parisian effort from May to September 1590 are obvious to modern-day historians, but he, of course, had no access to this kind of hindsight. Although he clearly understood the intrinsic difficulties in undertaking a project of this magnitude, yet he decided to risk the siege of Paris, rather than choose a more repugnant course: that of an insincere conversion followed by a coronation. This violated not only his sense of conscience, but also his sense of hereditary monarchy and royal authority unconstrained. However, the Calvinist king’s failure to seize the capital did more than “delay for several more years his complete victory;”120 it also created conditions for growing tension between him and his Catholic supporters, whom he found to be increasingly less easy to distract with military affairs. As a result, his momentum slowed steadily over the next two and a half years. This unfavourable situation had far-reaching consequences for him in the months after September 1590 and laid the initial groundwork for his conversion from a position of weakness in July 1593.

t h e c h a llenges grow, se p t e mb e r 1 5 9 0 to june 1591 Following his repulse outside Paris in September 1590, the king’s political and military recovery depended upon his performing some noteworthy feat of arms. His options, however, were limited. Without sufficient manpower to renew the siege of the League-held capital, he had no other choice but to disband portions of his exhausted army “by the design and counsel,” he alleged, “of the wisest captains of this age.”121 He also granted certain disaffected Catholic nobles his leave to return to their estates. Meantime, his field strength was depleted still further by the troops he had dispersed among various royalist garrisons to reinforce his broken ring of strongholds around the city, as well as by those he had dispatched into the northern provinces for the protection of the Crown’s interests. The repercussions of this were potentially dangerous. If it appeared that the royal forces were disintegrating and the League was growing stronger with Spanish support, those men who currently backed Henri IV might consider their affairs lost and, “thinking of their preservation, ... throw themselves into the arms of [the party] which seems most able to protect them.”122 The king’s only possible course of action at this time was to restore his broken blockade of Paris and then pursue the duke of Parma’s columns on their slow march back to the Spanish Netherlands through northern France. With small mobile forces that numbered no more than 2,500 or 3,000 cavalry and arquebusiers à cheval capable of

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living off the land, he planned to vex Parma’s march at every turn.123 Hitherto, declared a determined Henri, the enemy had “wanted to avoid battle en gros; but God willing, they [now] will have it en détail.”124 He pledged to follow the enemy relentlessly, therefore, “to conduct [him] out of my kingdom” and to attack “whenever the opportunity presents itself to achieve some good effect.”125 As an additional advantage, this plan allowed him to preoccupy his restive Catholic servitors with the patriotic task of expelling the hated foreigner from the realm directly under his command, and thereby to quiet their most recent grumbling over his religion.126 By the end of October and the beginning of November, Henri had made considerable progress toward his recovery. No sooner had the duke of Parma left the immediate vicinity of Paris than the king had retaken Lagny, Charenton, and St Maur from the League, restoring his complete control over the Marne River. To this was added the town of Corbeil on the upper Seine in late October, which had taken Parma a full five weeks to reduce, but which fell to the sieur de Givry (one of the king’s most active commanders) in a single night attack.127 Consequently, the League-held capital soon found itself encircled once again by royalist garrisons that effectively blocked its approaches from all directions. In mid-November, however, it seemed as if Henri was about to break his own blockade by agreeing to negotiations with the duc de Mayenne over the possibility of reopening commerce with the city. For that purpose Villeroy de Neufville met with the maréchal de Biron to discuss terms.128 Though this appears to be contradictory to the king’s Parisian strategy, it was a shrewd manoeuvre on his part, for if the two parties reached an agreement, he stood to profit handsomely from the heavy duties he planned to exact on all goods passing in and out of Paris. This would relieve some of the perplexing financial difficulties that often hindered his military projects and, at the same time, impoverish the League’s chief bastion of support. Nevertheless, the king insisted on significant restrictions that removed any doubt about his intentions to maintain the integrity of his blockade. For example, the grain trade was to be excluded entirely from any accord. Henri was as determined as ever to control the capital’s access to supplies and to bring it to its knees by steady privation. Nor would he permit commerce on the upper Seine or Loire rivers, both of which flowed near or through League-held territory. All trade was to be confined strictly to the lower Seine, over which he held control. In view of such conditions, the duc de Mayenne very quickly lost interest in continuing talks that he had initiated in order to preserve Paris from an unbearable burden.129

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Yet Henri unofficially permitted some commerce between the hungry Parisians and his surrounding garrisons, primarily because of his continuing need for money. Duties on goods were kept deliberately very high; indeed, nothing was permitted to pass into the city unless extortionate “tributes” were paid first to the royalist “brokers,” so as to drain the capital of its wealth.130 It is also possible that the king hoped that by making the Parisians completely dependent on him for their subsistence, he could more easily reduce them to obedience. This certainly seems to have been the thrust of the conditions he had earlier tried to impose upon Mayenne in their talks. As for the pursuit of Parma, Henri’s efforts surpassed what he already had achieved in restoring his lines around the French capital. From the middle of October until the beginning of December 1590, he hounded the duke’s march so mercilessly and inflicted so much damage that what had begun as a dignified withdrawal quickly assumed the appearance of a headlong retreat.131 The king himself acknowledged as much when he joked to the duc de Montmorency that “[o]ur Spaniards are much more honest people than you must deal with [in Languedoc]; for they are not willing to put their host to any further trouble than to talk of withdrawing. They have done so little harm that I regard it as my duty to do them the honour of escorting them home.”132 Admittedly, much of Parma’s haste on this occasion stemmed from his eagerness to return to the rebellious Netherlands. His army was much diminished, winter was fast approaching, and Prince Maurice of Nassau (leader of the Dutch revolt) was again active in Flanders, where the Spanish position was deteriorating rapidly. But much of his urgency was due also to the heavy damage his army was sustaining as a result of the skilful manoeuvres of the Calvinist king of France, who had promised his followers that the duke would “not leave this country with less shame or peril” than other invaders had before him.133 True to his word, Henri took full advantage of the speed and mobility of the substantial equestrian army under his command to harass the slower-moving enemy army at every step exactly as he had sworn to do.134 He cut it off from badly needed sources of supply and frustrated its efforts to seize others by swiftly reinforcing royalist garrisons that were threatened with attack. He further impeded the Spaniards’ line of retreat by strengthening royalist strongholds, such as ChâteauThierry, or capturing League-held towns, such as strategic Clermont, that stood in the way. He even blocked the enemy’s progress for days at a time by seizing the bridges and other crossings along the Aisne River. Thus, Parma – already slowed to a crawl by his ponderous baggage and artillery trains – was able to make only short defensive

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strides on the road to Spanish Flanders. Meanwhile, his forces were depleted daily by the ravages of disease, deprivation, and the royalist cavalry, which fell suddenly and remorselessly on any stragglers. A contemporary historian captured the rapid pace of Henri’s energetic pursuit in a brief, though lively, description: “The King followed, and marching speedily, was sometimes before [Parma], sometimes quartered beside him, [and] sometimes pressed him in the rear; and by giving frequent Alarms, and bold skirmishes, did both day and night molest and surround the [enemy] Army.”135 Moreover, so effective were Henri’s bold tactics against the Spaniards, and so impressive the display of military skill behind them, that a number of League-held towns in the province of Picardy (through which both forces marched) submitted to his authority rather than face him in bloody combat.136 The king was not unaware of how to exploit his success in the field in order to rebuild his shaken reputation in the rest of France. In what might be called an intensive public relations campaign, Henri regularly issued accounts of his efforts against the retreating Spaniards. This both enhanced his image among his religiously divided subjects and pushed far into the background lingering memories of his check by Parma the previous September.137 He also relied upon his provincial commanders to dispel false reports spread by the enemy to detract from his achievements.138 His essential purpose was to restore his military reputation to its former lustre at the expense of the man whose generalship had tarnished it. In this he succeeded brilliantly. With the departure of the Spanish forces from French soil on 5 or 6 December, Henri IV boasted in triumph: “I have chased the prince of Parma and his army out of my kingdom.”139 By contrast, the duke received harsh criticism, even in Spain, for having “returned to Flanders without really relieving the city of Paris, for which purpose he was sent ... into France.”140 Subsequently, the capture of the League-held French capital became once more the focus of Henri’s attention and the dominant theme of his strategic thinking. As he still lacked strength enough to take it by formal siege, he planned yet again to seize it by stealth. According to the new scheme, late at night on 20 January 1591, a party of royalist officers was to approach the porte St Honoré near the Tuileries palace as if they were bringing provisions into the city. Leading a small train of supply wagons, they were to dress as peasants to conceal their armour and identity. The royalists were well aware that for safety’s sake such convoys were usually admitted by the hungry Catholic garrison in the dead of night. So the king fully expected the gates to be opened to his men without difficulty. Once inside, the dis-

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guised royalist soldiers were to overpower the guards and seize the gates. These would be obstructed with the supply wagons to prevent them from being closed. Thereupon, the royal army, massed and waiting in the vicinity, was to attack in force.141 Unluckily for Henri, his preparations were discovered. As early as 18 December the duc de Mayenne had noted a suspicious increase in royalist military activity near St Denis. Here, the king, the sieur de Givry, the maréchaux de Biron and d’Aumont, and the ducs de Nevers and d’Épernon (who had just returned to the royal standard from selfimposed neutrality) were to rendezvous with their troops.142 Accordingly, Mayenne warned the comte de Belin, the duc de Nemours’ successor as governor of Paris, to guard against a surprise.143 Reacting quickly, the count blocked up the porte St Honoré, where the attack was expected, and doubled the guard. This measure forced all traffic coming from that direction to enter the city by means of the wellprotected river route or through some other entrance. Consequently, when the date set for Journée des Farines (the “Day of the Flour” as it was called afterwards)144 finally arrived, Henri’s plan already had miscarried. Seeing the extensive preparations around the gate he had selected for his attempt, he reluctantly called off the attack and signalled his army to withdraw. But in spite of the royal retreat, the capital was still very hard-pressed by severe food shortages, thanks to the king’s newly reconstructed blockade.145 In addition, a League counterattack against royalist St Denis (captured during the king’s previous siege of Paris) was repulsed successfully with great loss of life. Among the dead was the chevalier d’Aumale, a Guise cousin and one of the League’s most spirited commanders. Clearly, between September and December 1590 Henri IV had accomplished almost everything he had set out to do. His muchtarnished reputation as a soldier had been polished brightly by the campaign against Parma. His former political and territorial strength in the heartland of France similarly had been recovered by the restoration of the royal blockade around Paris, as well as by the capture of numerous League strongholds en route to Picardy. All of this had enhanced the king’s prestige, even if the French capital had escaped his grasp for a third time since the beginning of his reign. Henri’s new gains were offset, however, by the tension mounting steadily between himself and his Catholic servitors over the persistent issue of his creed. In fact, by the end of December cracks began to appear ominously in the unity of the royal party. To be sure, the Huguenot monarch still commanded the loyalty of all the Catholic princes of the blood, the highest-ranking nobles, the marshals of France (with the single exception of the Leaguer duc Ange de

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Joyeuse), and the majority of the lesser Catholic nobility.146 But how long this would last was uncertain, as Henri’s recent military successes had merely cooled their simmering dissatisfaction and not frozen it.147 The difficulty was that his old ploy of using the war to preoccupy his Catholic followers was losing its effectiveness. As a result, the tension that had been bubbling beneath the surface had almost reached a boiling point, and the king was confronted with a more potent outburst of resentment over his repeated delays in receiving instruction than he had encountered four months before. What provoked the agitation at this juncture was probably royalistCatholic apprehension over the terms of a new treaty that the Calvinist vicomte de Turenne was negotiating on Henri’s behalf with the Protestant German princes of Anhalt, Saxony, the Palatinate, and the king of Denmark. The Catholic nobles evidently feared that a contentious clause from the previous agreement of 1586 would be repeated in the new one: that the goal of the German relief army was to establish the Reformed Religion in France.148 But what disturbed them most was their concern that, with the foreign princes’ military aid, Henri might defeat the League and secure his throne without the need of a prior conversion. For this reason, noted the English ambassador, some nobles tried hard to scuttle the proposed treaty altogether “as men fearful of the Kinge’s over much greatness; hopinge to compell him by meere necessitie to become a Catholicke.”149 This fresh outbreak of royalist-Catholic anger over Henri’s procrastination took two forms, one conciliatory, the other threatening. On the one hand, the king “was called upon by the tacite consent of discreet persons, to observe his promises” by summoning a national council.150 As Parma had been ejected from France and the League was diminished in strength, it was no longer fair, they said, for him to keep his loyal subjects in suspense in regard to what all of them ardently desired. On the other hand, a minority of Henri’s more impatient servitors, who “had not so much respect [for his crown], or that were affectionate to [the Catholic] Religion, murmured publickly, and complained as if they were deluded and deceived.”151 Far more severe in their reproaches of the king’s past conduct and obvious duplicity, these Catholics rebuked him for having let seventeen months pass since his accession to the throne without making the least gesture toward undergoing his promised instruction. Deeply discouraged by what they viewed with good reason as his bad faith, they warned Henri darkly that either he abjure his Calvinist religion or they would abandon his cause. No longer were they willing to serve a Huguenot monarch.152 That this group of malcontents would have carried out their threat at this time is unlikely, for they lacked the kind of cohesion

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that only made them a political menace to Henri with the emergence of the Tiers parti over the next four months. What is important, however, is that the king – who professed to being “stung to the quick” by this quasi-ultimatum and its alarming prospect of an open breach with his Catholic followers153 – reacted quickly to the new danger. Repeating his customary litany of excuses, in which he blamed his successive delays in receiving instruction on the civil war, he acknowledged frankly that “among other points, ... the point upon which you [i.e., the Catholic maréchal de Matignon] and my other affectionate servants place the principal foundation of the establishment of my affairs is on the change of [my] religion.”154 He insisted, as well, that no one had considered more extensively the various ways and means of restoring peace to France than he, including by this obvious expedient. Nevertheless, he refused absolutely to be pressured into a political conversion that would dishonour him just to satisfy their demands or compel him to acknowledge the Catholic conception of the monarchy, which he was unwilling to accept. He had expressed both points indirectly to the duc de Nevers the previous November, when he wrote with regal dignity that “[k]ings are established in order to render justice, and not to enter unto the passions of individuals!”155 A large part of Henri’s response, however, also was shaped by the emotional factor of religion. At risk here was his private conscience and possibly his salvation, which no sixteenth-century person ever dismissed lightly – hence his crisp retort to royalist Catholic protests that it was unreasonable to expect him to give up the faith he so long had professed, or to jeopardize his eternal soul by deserting the religion he had imbibed with his mother’s milk, for simple political advantage. A sincere, practising Calvinist, Henri was committed to his creed, having reaffirmed his faith on more than one occasion since his accession to the French throne. Consequently, whenever he argued that he needed time to search his soul for guidance, as he did now – stressing as always that if he ever were to abjure, it would be as a result only of gentle persuasion and “the respect that was his due”156 – he was not repeating some meaningless formula. He was identifying what was to him and to his contemporaries alike a genuine concern for personal redemption, in the firm belief that there was “nothing more dear than my salvation.”157 What is more, given the intensely religious context of his age, Henri was accepted at his word.158 Even so, he was faced with the political necessity of having to make a more concrete gesture toward the religion of his Catholic servitors for fear of losing their critical support. Thus, after repeating his latest promise to convene the long-awaited national council at Tours on the

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following 15 March,159 he assured them that his chief interest in continuing his military offensive against the League was to guarantee safe passage for the representatives coming to the assembly. Then, to dissipate any lingering ill-feeling, the king judiciously distributed some new honours, titles, and cash rewards among those noblemen “who were [most] like to fall away because of the delay of his promises.”160 Yet Henri had no intention of convoking the national council, despite his announcement. Instead, he planned to launch a new campaign against the League by laying siege to the town of Chartres – partly to continue pressuring Paris and partly to deflect royalist-Catholic attention away from his religion – after which he thought to join the duc de Nevers in Champagne “without going to Tours.”161 Curiously, Henri IV’s military program from this point forward has been criticized by historians as “incoherent” and “capricious” because of an erroneous conviction that his efforts were motivated by purely personal considerations, and in particular by his new-found love for Gabrielle d’Estrées. Some scholars have even gone so far as to admonish the king for having undertaken projects, such as his assaults on Chartres and later Noyon, solely to please his pretty mistress and to gratify her rapacious relatives with lucrative appointments.162 This narrow focus on the Bourbon monarch’s passion for Gabrielle seriously misrepresents the royal position, as it ignores the fundamental strategic and tactical factors that determined the course of Henri’s military activities over the next nine months. In the interval between the duke of Parma’s harried departure from French soil in December 1590 and the formal opening of the royal siege of Rouen in November 1591, Henri’s strategic vision was dominated continuously by Paris. Originally, his advisers had urged him to march against Rouen, the League-held capital of Normandy. However, the king had overruled this proposal because, in his own strategic perception of the war, the fall of Rouen would give him Rouen, but the fall of Paris would give him France on his terms, without the prerequisite of a conversion. Consequently, the main thrust of his military efforts during most of 1591 was to tighten his blockade still more closely around the French capital – even to “storm the city if he cannot starve it into surrender.”163 By early January Henri had already taken some preliminary steps in this direction by capturing two or three minor châteaux that lay between the royalist strongholds of Clermont and Beauvais. This gave him control over the plains to the northwest of Pontoise, an area from which Paris had drawn some of its provisions.164 Then, following the ill-starred Journée des Farines, the king swept southward to open officially his new campaign by laying siege to Chartres on 9 February.

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Regarded as one of “the best places of the League,”165 this town was of immense strategic value to the French capital as its chief granary and principal gateway in the west.166 As a result, when Chartres fell to the royal forces on 19 April after more than two months of siege, the ultraCatholic faction was dealt a tremendous blow, which also justified Henri’s third failure to appear at Tours for his instruction. Nor did he ride to Champagne to join the duc de Nevers. Instead, he quickly followed up his success at Chartres by seizing the neighbouring towns of Auneau, Houdon, and Dourdon. These three prizes consolidated his control over the fertile pays Chartrain and closed his fortified ring around Paris still more securely, “depriving it completely of the commodities of Beauce, which furnished it with part of its food.”167 Not even in the summer months of 1591, when the politicalreligious crisis that had been brewing since the beginning of the year came to a head, did the king lose his focus on the French capital. On the contrary, royal military preparations continued regardless of the tension. This prompted the Venetian ambassador to report his conviction “that his Majesty intends to take some decisive step as regards Paris,” adding that the city’s “obstinate resistance is leading the king to think of acquiring it by means other than force.”168 Later in September, when 4,000 English soldiers arrived at Dieppe specifically to serve in the forthcoming siege of Rouen, Henri tried unsuccessfully to persuade Elizabeth I to let him use these troops in a new offensive against the League-held capital instead. “But on this point,” wrote the Venetian ambassador, “it is certain that the Queen will not gratify his Majesty completely: her Agent here points out that Rouen would be in every respect a more desirable undertaking than Paris.”169 The truth was that Elizabeth was far more concerned to prevent the Spaniards from obtaining Norman ports, from which they could stage an invasion of England, than she was about Henri’s reduction of his rebellious capital. She feared, in short, a second armada. The Bourbon monarch’s choice of military policy between February and November 1591 was also determined by his vital need for tactical flexibility so that he might overcome the worst effects of the stalemate that had developed since January. The most striking reason for this deadlock was that the duc de Mayenne and his lieutenants refused to engage in any more field combats with their more talented royal opponent. This fact was made clear by the League leader’s evasive manoeuvres during the royal sieges of Chartres and Noyon. Given the strategic importance of these two towns, Henri IV had felt confident that Mayenne would be forced into fighting to save them in a battle “as costly [to the League] as Ivry had been the year before.”170 But on

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neither occasion did the duke allow himself to be lured into combat. Instead, he tried to draw his royal adversary away from the embattled Catholic garrisons by laying counter-sieges of his own to vital royalist strongholds such as Château-Thierry and Vervins.171 These oblique efforts to divert the king’s focus failed completely, however, as he refused to take the bait. Moreover, Henri successfully completed both his sieges without further interference from Mayenne. He thus acquired two strategically vital towns, the second of which (Noyon) was a key stronghold along the traditional “boulevard of invasion” via Picardy from the Spanish Netherlands. By contrast, the duke’s utter failure to rescue either place “clearly has shown the weakness of the League and all its partisans.”172 Nevertheless, Mayenne’s military cautiousness served at least one important function: it repeatedly robbed the Calvinist monarch of the military initiative and thus of the opportunity to win a final, decisive victory over his ultra-Catholic enemies. What is more, Henri was fully aware of the new situation. He even complained to the duc de Montmorency on 12 April 1591, a week before Chartres surrendered, that “I do not ... put much faith in [Mayenne’s] promise [to come to the relief of this town] because I have seen him do the same thing frequently before, but then not keep his word.”173 The League leader had learned to avoid the kind of trap that had cost him so dearly at Ivry (when the Huguenot monarch had invested nearby Dreux, knowing that its importance to the League and Paris would compel the duke to enter combat), even if his own countermeasures proved ineffective. This defensive-mindedness also spread to Mayenne’s lieutenants, especially those in command of important League towns such as Meaux and Orléans. They feared that Henri would turn suddenly upon them “in the same way ... as a bird of prey swoops down upon its quarry.”174 So they, too, refused to fight him in the open field and instead withdrew behind the comparative safety of their walls. As a result, the rapid campaigning that had characterized the conflict in previous years gave way to a plodding war of position, in which both sides contested places of lesser importance (e.g., Vervins, which changed hands four times in 1591) and achieved only moderate tactical or territorial returns. In view of his dwindling opportunities to confront the ultra-Catholic enemy face to face in battle, Henri recognized that he dared not waste his efforts in sustained campaigns against secondary objectives that would cripple his independence of movement or, worse still, remove him from the sensitive centre of France and French affairs. It was there, and only there, that ultimate royal victory could be won. What he understood better than all of his advisers was that under the chang-

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ing circumstances of the conflict, his final success depended upon his freedom to seize any tactical advantage over Paris and the League that came his way, or face any military crisis that threatened his position. As he later wrote to the Catholic sieur de Beauvoir-La-Nocle: “The conditions of war as well as those that concern this kingdom, are subject to so many different accidents, that, according as they happen, it is necessary for me to alter my thinking and make new resolutions.”175 Henri would lose that crucial flexibility if he allowed himself to be distracted by subsidiary campaigns on the peripheries of the realm. A final factor in the king’s decision-making was his anticipation of another invasion from the Spanish Netherlands.176 This had important ramifications for his political and military policy as the year wore on. Parma had promised Mayenne in December 1590 that he would return to France the following spring.177 Although he did not march until very late in 1591, despite Madrid’s periodic assurances to the League leader that the duke soon would begin his advance, Henri grew increasingly certain that an attack was imminent.178 He had to be ready, therefore, to block his Spanish enemy’s invasion of Picardy and the Île-de-France, especially as he had pledged to fight the duke of Parma as soon as he set foot on French soil.179 That would be difficult for Henri to accomplish if he were already engaged in Normandy or Champagne. Consequently, what seems on the surface to have been an erratic military policy had a consistent internal logic. Unfortunately for Henri, with the exception of his continuing blockade of Paris, few of his manoeuvres during the period between the fall of Chartres in mid-April and the siege of Rouen in early November contributed anything toward the successful conclusion of the war. While his surprise attack on Louviers (6 June) gave him military control over lower Normandy and his capture of Noyon extended his foothold in Picardy,180 these victories, and others like them, did not fundamentally advance any political resolution of the conflict; instead, they served only to motivate Spain and eventually the papacy to increase their aid to the ailing League. Meanwhile, the king’s political base – even in his own party – was eroding. In the spring another outburst of deep royalist-Catholic resentment over his consistent delays in receiving instruction took a decidedly menacing form. This was due to the emergence of the so-called Tiers parti around two of his Catholic first cousins, which threatened not only the unity of the royal party but also Henri’s authority as the rightful monarch of France. This unhealthy situation was complicated still further by developments in Rome, where Pope Gregory XIV promulgated new monitory bulls of excommunication on 1 March against the Huguenot monarch and all Catholic Frenchmen who served him.

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t h e c h a llenges c on ta in e d , a p r il to october 1591 Although earlier origins can be traced, it was not until the spring of 1591 that the Tiers parti became a serious menace to Henri IV’s political position. Until then, it was hardly more than an amorphous association of Catholic servitors of his late Valois predecessor that eventually included (it was alleged) the ducs d’Épernon, de Nevers, de Longueville, and d’Angoulême, the comte de Lavardin, and the marquis d’O. These men were drawn loosely together by their common reluctance to serve a Calvinist prince and their desire to convert him.181 It was suspected widely, as well, that these new “malcontents” had “concealed personal interests behind religious conviction” in a selfish desire “to elevate themselves by means of the [current] troubles ... [and] the division in the royal family.”182 In any case, as early as February 1590 Henri had learned of the existence of an emerging tiers parti from reports of his advisers and intercepted correspondence of his enemies, but it seems that neither he nor his League opponents as yet saw this sub-faction as a serious challenge to his position or authority. On the contrary, the king used this faction to his own advantage at the beginning of February 1591, when he concealed his impending attack on Chartres by spreading the false report that he was going to Tours to deal with the dissension.183 The duc de Mayenne was equally sceptical. Approached secretly by this minority group of disaffected royalists to discuss a possible alliance, he had dismissed their overtures as just another ploy by Henri to split the League.184 The ultra-Catholic leader was in any case ill-disposed to entertain their offers seriously because he believed that a union with them would delay the military and financial aid he expected from Rome. It would also create further unnecessary divisions among French Catholics,185 a view apparently shared by the duke of Parma.186 Nevertheless, from its inception Henri was well aware that the Tiers parti could become a political danger to his position if unchecked, because it was led by two of his Catholic first cousins: Charles cardinal de Vendôme (1562–94), who now succeeded the late “Charles X,” his uncle, as cardinal de Bourbon; and his younger brother Charles comte de Soissons (1566–1612). Both men were younger sons of the murdered Louis de Condé and thus credible alternatives for the French crown.187 In fact, the cardinal made a point of arguing that his claims were stronger than those of his Calvinist cousin because of his Catholic religion, in addition to his Bourbon blood and personal ability. If the Salic Law were to be set aside, he felt certain that his qualifications

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made him the obvious candidate for election to the “vacant” throne.188 He was abetted in this thinking by Soissons, who was busy furthering his own ambitions by persistently trying to marry the king’s Huguenot sister, Catherine de Bourbon.189 Fortunately for Henri, he enjoyed two very strong advantages over his cousins. The first was that he already possessed the French crown by right of birth and succession, a fact long recognized and accepted by his Catholic followers. The second was that the new cardinal de Bourbon and the comte de Soissons were generally mistrusted by royalists and Leaguers alike, to such an extent that the duke of Parma had advised Philip II in August 1590 to renounce a then current proposal to offer the cardinal the crown.190 Even so, the Calvinist king was concerned enough with the potential for conspiracy that from March 1590 onward he had kept the two princes constantly under surveillance. “Since that time,” noted Jacques-Auguste de Thou, “nothing passed between them of which his Majesty was not immediately informed.”191 Nor was this precaution unwarranted, especially in spring 1591, when the danger of the Tiers parti became increasingly real. At that time, months of seething royalist-Catholic discontent with Henri’s continuing procrastination crystallized around his two cousins in more militant form. Even more significant, perhaps, was that this growing dissatisfaction was filtering down from the upper echelons of the royal party to the general public. There, popular indignation was voiced in spontaneous outbursts critical of the Henri: “[T]he king, who had led them to hope for his reconciliation with the Church, had forgotten all his promises since the battle of Ivry; that he no longer bothered to respond to the appeals of his subjects; that he based all his hopes on the force of his arms; that they nevertheless knew how uncertain this was; that the siege [of Chartres], which had preoccupied him for such a long time, was proof of this; [and] that if such a place could interrupt the pace of his victories, what would the larger towns in the kingdom do?”192 Consequently, many Catholic commoners who hitherto had supported Henri IV’s cause (having put their trust in his frequent promises to receive instruction in their religion) now bitterly complained “that they were foolish to count any more upon his good faith.”193 Since the beginning of 1591, the cardinal de Bourbon had worked actively to forge this mounting disillusionment – aristocratic as well as popular – into a more extensive power base for the Tiers parti and his personal bid for the crown.194 During the royal assault on Chartres, Henri had been warned of his ambitious cousin’s plans “to revive his claim to the throne should the siege ... go badly and the king persist as a Protestant [sic].”195 Already the prelate had used his position as

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president of the royal council at Tours to win other Catholic nobles to his side, despite his oath of loyalty to Henri IV.196 It also appears that he had endeavoured to provoke additional resentment among the citizenry against the king’s continuing religious obstinacy. At the same time, it was reported that Bourbon had been in secret contact with Rome to enlist papal backing in the event of a future election for the French crown.197 With his own credibility eroding badly, all Henri could do for the moment was to monitor his cousin’s activities still more closely than before. Perhaps he sensed that stronger action against the cardinal would serve only to galvanize royalist-Catholic opinion more firmly behind the Tiers parti. As it was, revelations of his “secret” dealings with the Holy See deeply embarrassed Bourbon and in turn prompted many nobles and prelates suspected of complicity in his conspiracy to reaffirm their loyalty to Henri IV.198 The king’s posture of “wait and see” served his interests in another capacity, too, by allowing him time to deal more effectively with a new challenge from Rome. Ever since the death of Sixtus V in August 1590, his relations with the Holy See had plummeted, changing abruptly from near entente with the late pontiff to overt opposition by his proLeague successors. Fortunately for Henri, Urban VII’s thirteen-day reign (14–27 September) was far too brief to threaten him significantly, beyond giving the duc de Mayenne and his faction hope of future aid from Rome.199 But with the election of Gregory XIV on 5 December, after an interval of three months, the situation intensified, as the French king was faced with an implacable opponent who offered immediate political, financial, and even military support to the League. Virtually hand-picked by Philip II for elevation to the papal tiara and “entirely devoted to the interests of Spain,”200 Gregory appointed the ultra-Catholic bishop of Plaisance as French legate and Marcello Landriano (a papal nephew) as nuncio. He also encouraged Paris to withstand the royal blockade, and promised a generous monthly subsidy of 15,000 écus for the city’s support. He further authorized an expeditionary force of 9,500 troops under the command of his nephew, Ercole Sfondrato, duke of Montemarciano, to reinforce the ultra-Catholic cause.201 But what was potentially most damaging to the Calvinist king was Gregory XIV’s promulgation of two monitory bulls on 1 March 1591.202 These reaffirmed Sixtus V’s original excommunication of Henri in 1585 as a relapsed heretic whose kingdoms, seigneuries, and other titles were forfeit. The danger here was that the timing of these monitories coincided almost exactly with the emergence of widespread Catholic discontent over the Huguenot monarch’s third failure to receive instruction as promised and the resulting growth of the

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Tiers parti. It is even possible that the cardinal de Bourbon’s secret correspondence with Rome in January and February had precipitated the pontiff’s decision to publish the monitories. In any case, Pope Gregory’s apparent object was to divide sincerely pious Frenchmen, such as the ducs de Nevers, de Luxembourg, and de Longueville, along with the majority of the royalist-Catholic nobility, from the royal party by compelling them to place their religious loyalty to the Roman Church above their political duty to the Calvinist king.203 The pontiff enjoined them, on pain of excommunication and the forfeiture of their goods and titles, to abandon their “heretic” monarch for the ultra-Catholic cause.204 Gregory’s effort was only partly effective. The two bulls, added to royalist-Catholic impatience over Henri’s procrastination, certainly provided a stimulus for the most disaffected elements in the royal party to join the cardinal de Bourbon and his sub-faction. One must never forget, after all, that most of these men were as committed to their religion as the king was to his, and accepted without question the older, more nuanced perception of medieval French monarchy, its sacrality, and its traditional ties to the ancient faith. They were thus genuinely uneasy at the prospect of personal excommunication for serving an alleged heretic, who seemed incapable of keeping his word to convert. In addition, news of the monitories probably prompted the leaders of the Tiers parti to issue in late April or early May the “Remonstrance d’Angers,” which boldly challenged Henri to abjure “sooner rather than later” in order to pacify his realm.205 Arguing that “it is ceremonial, not doctrine, that is chiefly in dispute,” the pamphlet asserted the powerful argument that an outward conversion to Catholicism according to the king’s repeated pledges was “holy, honourable, advantageous and necessary.” Though perhaps opportunistic in view of its timing, this was not a cynical appeal to political expedient, though Henri certainly condemned it as such. It was a direct allusion to contemporary Catholic thinking on religion, community, and royal duty to uphold the faith, whereby the monarch’s participation in the ritual acts that surrounded the throne had mystical powers irrespective of his private beliefs. Moreover, this view was shared by many of Henri’s Catholic advisers, who also pressed him to abjure on the claim that “to think of any other remedy was not only vain, but destructive” to royalist unity.206 Perhaps they were encouraged by the “Remonstrance” to speak out. Even the Calvinist François de La Noue added his voice to the general Catholic chorus, arguing “that if [Henri] did not turn Catholicke he should never be King of France.” Nevertheless, he urged the Huguenot monarch to stall for time by isolating his chief

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opponents in the belief that this would “mitigate and defer the disease.”207 The element of religious cynicism that the king always claimed underlay the motives of his League enemies was thus hardly a Catholic monopoly. At all events, with the promulgation of the papal bulls in March 1591, the cracks in royal unity that had first appeared the previous December now widened perceptively among some segments of Henri’s support, with potentially dangerous consequences. Recognizing the threat to his position, the king moved quickly to suppress the “Remonstrance” with the backing of the royalist parlement at Tours. The parlement prohibited further publication of the obnoxious pamphlet, ordered that all existing copies be destroyed, and authorized printed responses to discredit it.208 Then, acting upon the advice of La Noue, Henri physically isolated the leaders of the Tiers parti by summoning the cardinal de Bourbon and his chief followers – “whom the king knew to be the principal authors of this cabal” – to his headquarters at Mantes under the pretense of asking their advice on current matters. In reality, he aimed to keep them under close personal surveillance.209 He similarly removed the comte de Soissons from his gouvernements of Poitou and Touraine to prevent him from building a personal power base in those provinces.210 As for the royalist Catholics at large, Henri’s remedy was, as usual, to preoccupy them with military affairs “to let victorious enterprises put to silence and quiet those spirits which were yet kept hidden in the breasts of men.”211 In the meantime, the Huguenot monarch mollified royalist-Catholic unrest still further by continuing his moderate line with the Holy See in an effort to avoid causing an irrevocable breach with Rome. After all, he was hopeful that the new pontiff might be drawn into the royalist camp like Sixtus V before him, having noted the previous December that the acting legate in France “wants to treat for peace; he no longer speaks of excommunication.”212 Hence, Henri generously allowed that Gregory XIV had been “deceived” into backing his ultraCatholic enemies “by the persuasions of the Spaniards who are in complete possession of the court of Rome.”213 He also permitted his Catholic servitors to write letters to the pontiff,214 just as he had allowed at his accession to the throne. Ostensibly, the king wanted his followers to have an opportunity to justify their continued obedience to a Calvinist prince before the Holy See, but his real purpose was threefold: to maintain open communications with Rome in the hope of conciliating Gregory XIV; to give the new pope a more favourable Catholic impression of Henri IV “than the League desired”; and “to divert [Gregory] ... from furthering the evil designs” of the rebel faction and its Spanish allies.215 These letters had no influence,

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however; and on 12 May the pontiff promised further material and moral support to the League. He also dispatched copies of the recent bulls to France with his nuncio, Landriano, in the belief, no doubt, that direct papal pressure would separate the royalist Catholics from their Huguenot monarch once and for all.216 Despite initial responses to Gregory’s new monitories, their overwhelming effect was altogether different from what the pope had anticipated. Just as the late Sixtus V had discovered in fall 1585, such actions simply rallied the majority of the king’s Catholic supporters more firmly behind him in defence of the patrie. To be sure, these loyalists were no less troubled by the unsettled question of Henri’s faith than those who chose to join the Tiers parti. They were also no less resentful over his unfulfilled promises to receive instruction. What offended them far more deeply, however, was papal interference in France’s private affairs. This they viewed as an affront to both French sovereignty and the traditional liberties of the Gallican Church, a view cogently expressed by the maréchal de Matignon, who wrote: “God gave [the pope] the power to regulate our conscience and to absolve our sins, but not the right to dispose of our crown.”217 Ironically, this hostile reaction had been anticipated even by contemporaries in the League, where the duc de Mayenne and his advisers all opposed the publication of the monitories in France. They feared a powerful Gallican backlash similar to that of 1585, on the conviction that the royalist Catholics never would abandon the Calvinist king (nor their offices and rewards) simply to please Gregory XIV.218 Similarly, as early as November 1589, several prominent royalist Catholics (including the then cardinal de Vendôme and the duc de Luxembourg), as well as foreign observers (such as Giovanni Niccolini, the astute Tuscan ambassador to Rome), had urged the papacy to soften its policies toward Henri IV or risk forfeiting all of France to the reform movement exactly as England and much of Germany had been lost.219 Neither the pope nor his nuncio listened to this sage advice. As a result, in late April 1591 it seemed as if the religious schism between Rome and the French kingdom prophesied by the League leader was on the verge of erupting. The monitories provoked an immediate outpouring of indignant Gallican responses that openly denied Gregory’s spiritual and temporal superiority over French kings in general and Henri IV in particular.220 They similarly offended pious Catholic noblemen such as the ducs de Nevers and de Luxembourg. These men not only refused to answer the nuncio’s personal letters without first obtaining royal permission but came very close to denouncing the pope as politically partisan in his views and, therefore, “no longer their father.”221

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More significant still was the hostile reaction of the Gallican clergy. They publicly rejected Gregory XIV’s bulls in a stinging counterdeclaration of their own, in which they summoned all rebellious League nobles to obedience under their legitimate sovereign, Henri IV.222 Their pronouncement was reinforced by separate edicts of the royalist judges at Tours and Châlons, who declared the monitory bulls null and void, “as abusive, scandalous, seditious, full of imposture, and drawn up contrary to the holy decrees, canonic constitutions, approved councils, and the rights and liberties of the Gallican Church.” Furthermore, the offending documents were condemned to be burned publicly by the hangman of each town. This was at once an explicit repudiation of their legitimacy and a mark of intense disrespect for their pontifical author. The royal courts also ordered the arrest and trial of Landriano, “the so-called nuncio, who had entered the kingdom clandestinely without leave of the king.” They even posted a reward of 10,000 livres for his capture. As a final measure, the judges declared forfeit the goods, titles, and benefices of any clergyman who approved the bulls, and strictly prohibited the transfer of any church revenues to the Holy See.223 Thus, far from splintering the royal party as Gregory XIV had anticipated, “the excommunication fulminated by the pope [against Henri IV] produced no effect on opinions, detached no one from obedience to the king, and did not even prevent many of the rebels from returning to their proper duty!”224 Nevertheless, the nuncio’s ill-advised publication of the papal monitories in France raised the religious question to a different level of complexity. An essential dichotomy now existed between Henri’s crucial need, on the one hand, to protect his personal political position by responding en roi to the pope’s interference, and the potential danger, on the other hand, that such a response posed to the unity of a royal party already shaken by widespread Catholic disillusionment over the king’s resistence to conversion and the rising profile of the Tiers parti. To resolve this dilemma, Henri manoeuvred cautiously over the next few weeks to disarm the double challenge to his position. This culminated in his promulgation of the edicts of Mantes on 4 July. The fact of the matter was that so long as the papal bulls did not appear in official form north of the Alps, the Huguenot monarch was free to continue his conciliatory policy toward Rome. Hence, he reappointed the royalist-Catholic duc de Luxembourg to denounce the “evil designs” of the League and Spain to Gregory XIV and also to reaffirm the king’s promises to receive instruction.225 But as soon as the monitory bulls were published in France, followed on 4 June by yet a third papal declaration that required strict Catholic obedience to the

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documents,226 they became a direct challenge to his authority. That utterly spoiled Henri’s conciliatory policy. He was left with no alternative but to reaffirm his legitimacy as rightful French sovereign in forceful response. Had it not been for “these absurd so-called Bulls of excommunication,” suspected a foreign observer, Henri “would have faltered from the right way” and converted.227 The danger of such a strong rebuttal was that it, too, could bring into very sharp relief the royalist Catholics’ conflict of loyalties, between their Huguenot monarch and their Roman faith. Pope Gregory had tried to exploit exactly this dichotomy with his bulls. Although his effort was largely ineffective, it nevertheless increased existing tension among the royalists. It both strengthened the Tiers parti (despite some anticipation that this faction would crumble after the successful siege of Chartres)228 and created pressure in the royal council, where even some of Henri’s Calvinist advisers reconsidered the matter of his conversion. Consequently, in the face of this newest challenge from Rome, the king needed to make a more substantial gesture toward religion, one that would allay royalist-Catholic anxiety over the smouldering issue of his instruction and yet reassure the Huguenots of his continuing Calvinism. For that reason, the king interrupted his military campaign against the League on 29 June to return to his headquarters at Mantes, where he issued two edicts on 4 July. One re-established religious toleration of Calvinism in France, and the other reaffirmed his respect for and protection of the Catholic faith. These he followed up immediately with the promulgation of a third declaration that was aimed specifically against the recent papal bulls. In the first of these royal edicts (the one restoring full freedom of conscience to the Huguenots, though with only limited freedom of public worship), Henri officially revoked his late predecessor’s antiCalvinist proclamations of 1585 and 1588. In their place, he re-established the more generous terms of the peace treaties of 1577 and 1580.229 The king was motivated, in part, by his need finally to respond to demands that Huguenots had been making ever since his accession to the throne, that he push forward the interests of their religion even at Catholic expense. “Win over the Catholics,” Duplessis-Mornay had advised him at the time, “but do not lose your Huguenots.”230 Although sympathetic,231 Henri had persistently rejected the Calvinists’ petitions in the past. He always saw more clearly than they the serious political consequences of such a policy, not the least of which was the alienation of his Catholic support, but this had caused them to question “my perseverence in the Religion”; to complain that “in religion, in justice and in finance, their condition is worse than it ever was

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under the late king”; and even to consider electing a new protector of the Calvinist cause in France, perhaps the vicomte de Turenne. “If I have not spoken as often to or caressed those of the Religion as much as they wanted,” argued Henri in self-defence, “the gravity of so many affairs has prevented me from doing so.”232 Not until after the publication of Gregory XIV’s monitory bulls, which had offended Gallicanminded Catholics deeply, did he feel secure enough to promulgate a decree for the benefit of French Calvinism without fear of damaging royalist unity. There were, however, two other fundamental motives behind Henri’s decision to restore former Huguenot privileges in July 1591, motives inextricably linked to his sovereignty and to his now aggressive line toward the papacy in Rome. By revoking the earlier anti-Calvinist edicts that explicitly barred him from the French succession because of his alleged heresy, the Huguenot monarch removed the last legalistic obstacle to his rule that had carried over from the previous reign. Furthermore, by re-establishing the terms of the former edicts of Pacification, Henri unmistakably “emphasized his claim that the papacy had no authority in France to override monarchical jurisdiction,”233 even in matters of the French Church. Consequently, in the summer of 1591 he was able to garner considerable support for his pro-Calvinist decree from both religious groups: the Huguenots, because he guaranteed them freedom of conscience and a large measure of legal status in the realm; and the royalist Catholics, because he championed the interests of the Gallican Church against what they themselves viewed as the sinister expansion of Spanish-backed papal power. This does not mean, however, that this initial edict was unopposed. On the contrary, it was greeted with varying degrees of objection from royalist-Catholic sources, which is why Henri had been careful beforehand to explain his motives fully to the Catholics on the royal council.234 Although the majority of these nobles were persuaded by Henri’s reasons for issuing the new decree, the cardinal de Bourbon vehemently objected and asserted “with fire” that “the kingdom of France cannot subsist very long if they tolerated two different religions, and that the new doctrine would destroy [the country] very quickly.”235 The prelate then rose dramatically from his seat as if to leave the room, trusting that the rest of the Catholics would follow en masse, given his pre-eminence in the council and leadership of the Tiers parti. But by this time his credit was so depleted that none of them joined him. The prelate was then ordered peremptorily by his royal cousin to be seated and to be still. This completed his humiliation. Thus, wrote de Thou, “the cardinal’s demonstration was totally useless.”236

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As for the king’s second edict of Mantes (the one reasserting his respect for and protection of French Catholicism),237 he reaffirmed his oft-repeated promises to receive instruction in the Catholic faith before “a free council or notable assembly.” He then set yet a third date (15 March 1592) for this purpose. As a further gesture, he renewed his old appeal to the patriotism of his Huguenot and Catholic subjects alike to live in harmony as loyal Frenchmen until peace could be restored, while urging them also to disregard any propaganda the League might spread against him.238 Having thus mended most of the cracks that had threatened the unity of his party since December, and reassured the continuity of his Catholic and Huguenot support, Henri IV was prepared to respond en roi to the monitory bulls of Gregory XIV. But he still acted cautiously to avoid the least suspicion of sectarian prejudice in his repudiation of papal authority.239 Hence, he stressed in preface to powerful royalistCatholic noblemen such as the duc de Nevers that he was not acting independently in this matter, but was following the recommendations of those French cardinals loyal to his crown and of the royalist parlementaires at Châlons and Tours. Both groups had advised him, he said, to issue a separate royal decree to complement their own fulminations that condemned the papal bulls officially; promised severe punishment to any disloyal Frenchman who dared to observe them; and renewed the letters patent recently published by the royal courts against all legates and nuncios who came from Rome without first acknowledging the legitimacy of Henri IV.240 Thus invoking the sanction of Catholic religious and judicial authority, the French king promulgated his third declaration of 4 July, which he aimed directly at the papal monitories. While emphasizing that he would have preferred a peaceful reconciliation with Rome, he declared that he could not allow the pope’s current challenge to his sovereignty to pass by in silence. Indeed, because the monitory bulls had been so violent and unreasonable, he was left, he said, with no alternative but to denounce them publicly for the defence and protection of the authority of the French Crown and the traditional privileges of the Gallican Church. Furthermore, Henri protested, Gregory XIV’s charges that his real goal was to subvert Catholicism in France were totally unwarranted and in no way justified by his past actions. On the contrary, the Calvinist king had always fulfilled faithfully his pledges to protect the Catholic faith, and he had no intention of ever going back on his word.241 Henri then sent copies of his three new decrees to the royalist parlements of Tours, Châlons, and Caen in Normandy to have them registered, noting that “we are certain [the judges] will do [this] willingly and without difficulty.”242

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But the strongly Gallican judges took matters much further than the Calvinist monarch had intended. On their own authority, and using the argument that royal and judicial edicts carried equal force “following from the custom established by [previous French kings],”243 the royalist parlementaires at Tours and Châlons issued additional decrees. These roundly condemned the actions of the “self-styled” pontiff, Gregory XIV, who was denounced bitterly as an enemy of peace, of the unity of the Catholic Church, of the king, and of France; a puppet of Spain and the ultra-Catholic rebels; cruel, inhuman, and even guilty of complicity in the “parricide” of Henri III. Moreover, they reordered the public burning of the pope’s monitory bulls by the royal executioner in their respective towns, and published one or two subsidiary decrees that promised severe punishment on charges of lèse majesté for anyone who abandoned Henri IV.244 This extreme judicial reaction was not what the Huguenot monarch had in mind. Indeed, his own condemnation of the papal monitories at Mantes had nowhere included an overt personal attack on the pope, only on his policies. Still hoping to effect some kind of reconciliation with Rome, Henri had avoided such criticism. He had instead adopted a defensive tone, recognizing that a subjective assault on Gregory XIV was unlikely to achieve that goal. At the same time, the French king had very carefully issued his response to the papal bulls as a declaration only. This may be defined in sixteenth-century terms as an openended royal statement, easily revoked, that broadly interpreted the Crown’s stand on a particular issue. His pronouncement did not carry the same weight, therefore, as his other two decrees of Mantes, which were edicts solemnly enacted to resolve a specific situation or legal problem with the irresistible force of law. In short, the royalist parlementaires had overstepped their authority, though in truth Henri must shoulder some responsibility for their indiscretion. After all, he had ordered the courts to endorse his decrees though he knew their current mood. As well, he had impugned Pope Gregory’s integrity by implication in his second edict of Mantes, when he observed that the pontiff had not the character of the late Sixtus V. Gregory was blind, he had charged, to the evil designs and selfish goals of France’s enemies, having accepted uncritically the League’s false assertions that the Huguenot king hated the Catholic faith.245 A further complication arising from this situation, meanwhile, was that the French Church itself seemed dangerously poised for an absolute break with Rome, as the conflict between Gallican and Ultramontane principles – so closely linked to Henri’s cause – was reawakened violently. Nor did it help matters that the fifteen-day grace period

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originally provided for in the monitory bulls had passed, by which time all French Catholics were supposed to have abandoned Henri IV. Technically speaking, the royalists were now excommunicate! In view of these new circumstances, some Catholic prelates in the king’s party, such as the influential archbishop of Bourges, proposed a complete separation of the French Church from Rome by recognizing a patriarch of their own.246 In this they were supported by the parlement of Tours.247 But the Calvinist monarch refused to consider any action that violated his solemnly sworn promises to innovate nothing in the Catholic Church, or that provided his League and Spanish enemies with exactly the evidence they needed to prove that he was, after all, an enemy of their faith who had to be opposed. Consequently, Henri renewed his search for a middle road with the papacy, despite his recent condemnation of the bulls, to safeguard his reputation among the Catholics and his political fortunes against the League. To that end, the king undertook two initiatives. First, he reauthorized the duc de Luxembourg’s embassy to the Holy See, initially canceled because of the pope’s late actions.248 One of the duke’s primary tasks was to justify the edicts of Mantes to the pope as indispensable for the restoration of peace to France, in part by undermining Huguenot strength with a policy of gentleness (a process begun by Henri III) and in part by preventing schism with Rome. The latter argument was an unmistakable reference to the prevailing ill-humour of the Gallican-minded bishops. In addition, the respected royal envoy was to visit Venice, ostensibly to renew the Republic’s alliance with France, but more likely to ensure that the duke was positioned strategically so that he could travel quickly to Rome at the first sign of relaxation in papal policy. The Calvinist monarch’s second initiative was to summon the royalist-Catholic bishops to Mantes early in July to study the monitory bulls in detail, to examine the manner in which they had been published, and to reconsider the pontiff’s motives for having issued them in the first place.249 Probably, part of Henri’s intention was to moderate the more schismatic elements of the Gallican clergy by keeping the door open to an understanding with Rome. But his major goal was likely to secure full ecclesiastical sanction for his own recent edicts of Mantes, not only to complement the legal endorsement he already enjoyed from the royalist parlements, but to present a united front to both his ultra-Catholic enemies and the subversive Tiers parti. He hoped to deprive them of the least opportunity to accuse him of religious favouritism in his actions. Although on 21 September the assembled prelates declared the papal monitories null and void, contrary to Gallican privileges and the

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traditional autonomy of the French Church, they refused to ratify the edicts enacted against the bulls by the parlements of Tours and Châlons.250 This was doubtless due to their objections over the latters’ abusive recriminations against the person of Pope Gregory apart from his policies. What the bishops appealed for instead was royal permission to send a separate delegation of French clergy to Rome to negotiate a compromise solution to the civil wars.251 This indicated that the alarming trend they had been displaying toward a decisive break with the Holy See was starting to reverse. Yet Henri refused to consent to the delegation at this juncture. Nor would he agree to the council’s additional offer to mediate with Mayenne and the League for peace, “as if,” sneered the Huguenot Duplessis-Mornay, “the king were not striving for that very end, and had not declared that for every step taken by others toward him, he was prepared to take four steps toward them.”252 Henri would not consent to any proposal that impugned his legitimate authority.253 Fortunately for him, however, a potential clash with the bishops over this issue was averted by Gregory XIV’s sudden death on 15 October. It is remarkable that during the fourteen months between September 1590 and October 1591 Henri IV had managed not just to recover his formerly predominant position in France following his military setback at the siege of Paris, but also to maintain it at a high level. To be sure, his situation had been weakened to a certain degree. In view of the prevailing circumstances of military stalemate and internal division in the royal party, this was perhaps inevitable. In terms of his prestige as a soldier, however, there was no question of his ascendancy. Furthermore, he had managed to contain the opposition that was forming among his own Catholic followers and even to redirect it against his external enemies. This was perhaps the chief advantage he gained from the promulgation of his three decrees of Mantes, based as they were on the strong Gallican and patriotic sentiments of the royalist Catholics. Nevertheless, the Calvinist king’s advantage was only temporary, and it gradually deteriorated.

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6 The Years of Despair and Diminishing Choices, November 1591 to April 1593 “Following always from his first resolution, the king tried all routes to peace.” – Pierre-Victor Palma Cayet, 1592

In looking back on Henri IV’s political and military activities from September 1590 to October 1591, one thing becomes abundantly clear. The methods he had used since August 1589 to fight the League and at the same time to distract his Catholic servitors from the issue of his creed were losing their effectiveness. His position had weakened steadily as a result. To be sure, Henri had made a number of small tactical gains on the military scene, but with rare exceptions his achievements after Ivry had contributed little to the ultimate resolution of the civil war or the realization of his political goals. Consequently, in the absence of further strategic victories, conditions were created for the gradual coalescence of the attentions of royalist Catholics, frustrated over the king’s repeated failures to receive instruction, around his two ambitious cousins, the cardinal de Bourbon and the comte de Soissons, a situation that threatened royal unity. How different the situation might have been if, following his triumph on the plaine de St André, the Calvinist king had been willing to convert to Catholicism, as that probably would have consolidated his authority conclusively in France. But for a variety of reasons, chief among which was the sincerity of religious scruple, he had refused to abjure. He hoped instead to defeat the League decisively in battle on his terms and in accordance with his view of the monarchy, without the need of a conversion. For all intents and purposes, therefore, by mid1591 Henri IV had begun fighting on two fronts. The first was his continuing offensive against the League for political and military control of France. The second was his defensive manoeuvring with the royalist

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Catholics over the heated issue of his profession of faith and their mounting demands that he abjure or lose their support “if their Religion did not find an advantage in their Obedience.”1 Nor did his situation improve between July 1591 and April 1593, during which time two themes emerged most clearly. One was the king’s losing struggle to check the growth of ever-stronger royalistCatholic opposition to his Calvinist creed, despite admonishing them that the enemy’s advantage lay in their ruin.2 Contributing to this was his difficulty with Elizabeth I, who had backed the Huguenot monarch substantially with men and money in the past. She was now growing reluctant to assist him further until he committed definitively to an operation against Rouen, her principal interest. Hitherto, Henri had been able to fend off the mounting pressure from his Catholic servitors, partly by playing their opposition to his profession of faith against the English queen’s generous support. However, when faced with the prospect of forfeiting her help, and with it his major source of foreign assistance, the French king lost much of his room to manoeuvre with his Catholic servitors, and his political options narrowed significantly. The second theme was Henri’s intense preoccupation with the ongoing military campaign against the League. In particular, he attempted to draw the duke of Parma into battle during the latter’s renewed invasion of France in spring 1592 for the relief of Rouen. The king sensed that this was his last opportunity to achieve his political goals without an abjuration. Indeed, if he could win a decisive victory over Parma, he conceivably could end the civil war. A royal triumph certainly would break the stalemate with the League by removing with a single blow the only prop that sustained the residue of ultra-Catholic power in the realm. That in turn would deprive Paris of its last hope of assistance and finally compel it to surrender to Henri’s authority. In addition, the defeat of the Spanish army of Flanders could not help but undermine royalist-Catholic opposition to the king’s profession of faith, just as Ivry had done in spring 1590. It also would firmly establish his reputation in Europe as the foremost soldier of the day. Who then could oppose the definitive consolidation of his authority in France on his terms, without the prerequisite of conversion? With so many pressures upon him, with so many limitations on his choices, and with so many obvious secular advantages available to him as the initial strength of his position diminished, the king might have opted for the easy political solution to his many problems in mid-1591 or early 1592, that offered by abjuring his Calvinist faith. This was the price demanded by his Catholic supporters for their continued obedience. What could have restrained him, then, but the crisis of his con-

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science and his strong desire to maintain the old balance between his principles of blood and religion? Ultimately, it was the collapse of Henri’s hopes for a decisive military victory over Parma in late 1592 and, consequently, his inability to hold the royalist Catholics in check any longer, that made the old balance untenable. The opening of the League Estates General in January 1593 was another factor. Although the assembly itself posed no real threat to the Calvinist king, he dared not ignore it. There existed a very real danger that the frustrated royalist Catholics might unite with the more moderate Leaguers against him if he continued to temporize over the matter of his religion. On the other hand, subsequent negotiations between the two factions at Suresne revealed that most Leaguers were willing to accept the Huguenot monarch if he changed his profession of faith, and that they might never willingly accept him otherwise. Thus faced with the very hard choice between sacrificing his conscience to secure his crown or remaining true to his faith but risk losing his support and possibly also his throne, Henri was impelled toward making the decision he had resisted strenuously for four years: to convert.

c ath olic pr otests , pa r ma , a n d t h e r ouen c ampa ig n , n ov e mb e r 1 5 9 1 to may 1592 Between fall 1591 and fall 1592, there was a noteworthy shift in the focus of Henri IV’s military program. The capture of League-held Paris still formed the basis of the king’s strategic thinking, but as the year progressed and the threat of a second invasion from Flanders by the duke of Parma steadily unfolded, Henri recognized an urgent need to defeat the Spaniard on French soil. In fact, the Calvinist king’s preoccupation with bringing the duke of Parma to battle grew so rapidly in late summer and autumn of 1591, just prior to the royal siege of Rouen, that it came to dominate his attention almost exclusively. This fixation led the English earl of Essex to observe that “the expecting of ... Parma makes the King afraid to do anything [else].”3 Already the previous February and March, Henri had been warned of a second invasion from Spanish Flanders.4 He also knew of promises Parma had made in December 1590 to a desperate duc de Mayenne to return with troops the following spring, “to force our [common] enemy to a disadvantageous battle, or to [make him] re-cross the Loire River in shame, and ruin him, if it is possible, at the same time.”5 Consequently, no sooner had Henri concluded the siege of Chartres in

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mid-April than he had begun to prepare for the Spaniards’ threatened invasion. He had reinforced the royalist garrisons blockading the French capital and entrusted the maréchal de Biron with the bulk of the royal army to sweep the League’s forces from the Île-de-France. Next, with smaller mobile forces of his own, Henri had crisscrossed northern and central France with the double aim of severing all League communications with the rebel capital as usual, while preserving his tactical flexibility in the face of changing military conditions and the anticipated challenge from Flanders. The king’s obvious intention here was to strengthen his control over the strategic border region and the provinces of Picardy and the Île-de-France, the traditional “boulevard of invasion” from the Spanish Netherlands along which Parma was expected to march. It is clear that the duke had assumed considerable significance in Henri’s military thinking as early as April 1591, when he admitted frankly to Elizabeth I’s special envoy, Thomas Wilkes, that winning a decisive battle over the governor of the Spanish Netherlands was his chief aim.6 Nor did this shift in his military focus (i.e., from a concentration on Paris to what soon would become a near-obsession with Parma) pass unnoticed by his French followers. Many of them were well aware of Henri’s determination to prove by combat, observed Sully, “that there are as good generals in the world as [Parma] is.” Doubtless, some of the Huguenot monarch’s resolve here was stimulated by deep feelings of personal rancour for his arch-opponent, whose untimely intervention in September 1590 had caused such damage to his affairs, but some was certainly provoked by the strong “professional” rivalry that had developed between the two men since their first clash of arms. The quotation above is evidence of this rivalry, as are Parma’s earlier promises to Mayenne. But undoubtedly the most important consideration for Henri at this juncture was his deepening anxiety over the dramatic increase in royalist-Catholic opposition to his religion, together with his evident calculation that Parma’s defeat would have the decisive political effect not only of bringing that opposition to heel but also of finally consolidating his sovereignty in the realm. What made this current upsurge of royalist-Catholic antagonism so disturbing in contrast to what Henri had experienced in previous years was its assumption of a new and dangerous dimension. Disenchanted with the Huguenot monarch’s repeated failure to receive instruction according to his sworn pledges of August 1589, by autumn 1591 the royalist Catholics were becoming strident, if not openly threatening, in their demands for Henri’s abjuration. In fact, by mid-October the resentment among the Catholic loyalists was so pronounced that the

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English ambassador, Sir Henry Unton, noted with alarm that “the estate of the Kinge is moste miserable, and him selfe as it were forcible governed by the Catholickes; the people malitiously bente against him through out all France, ... [as he is] very much hated for his religion and threatened by the Catholiques to forsake him if he converte not.”7 Moreover, shuddered Unton, Henri’s situation was growing worse every day. Quite apart from the French king’s “great povertie” (which, “if I was not an eye witness hereof I could not believe it”) and inability to fund the war effort to the point that he “himself wanted bread to eat, his Catholickes are apte uppon the least occasion to rebell; and his townes, wherein he hath not verie stronge garrysons [to impose order], ready to revolt, unlesse he will change his religion, which they now urge verie greatly, requireing him accordinge to promise to be instructed in the Catholicke faith.”8 Particularly outspoken at this moment was the council of bishops Henri had convened at Chartres in September to examine the late monitory bulls of Gregory XIV. While declaring the pope’s excommunication of the Huguenot monarch null and void on Gallican principle, the assembled prelates urged Henri to abjure, pledging to advise and assist him until “he was led back to the Catholic Church.” They even sent a delegation of bishops to implore the king directly to receive instruction “as, from the time of his accession to the Crown, he had given reason to hope that he would do,” and then to make peace with the League.9 As usual, Henri sidestepped the issue by arguing “that this was a very unfitt [moment] to urge him therein, consideringe the greate [military] affaires nowe in hande.”10 But the prelates would not be put off. Instead, they sent a second delegation to the king with a quasi-ultimatum (dated 18 December) in which their former requests had transformed into three overt demands: that he convert immediately to Catholicism; that he authorize his loyal Catholic clergy to mediate a peace between the French Crown and the League; and that he permit the prelates to appeal directly to Rome to justify their continued support of a Huguenot prince.11 The royal response to these bold injunctions was a carefully worded “no.” Rather than explode at this blatant affront to his royal dignity, the king remained conciliatory. He had learned from personal experience and his mother’s teachings (as Voltaire later wrote of him) “that Power is often lessened by the full use of it, and extended by Moderation.”12 So without actually refusing to abjure his Calvinist faith, Henri argued evasively that he intended to receive instruction as promised. But the civil war had prevented him thus far from fulfilling that pledge. He reassured them, however, that he would discharge this obligation as soon as possible. As for negotiating with the League, the

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king insisted that although he, too, wanted peace, negotiation was strictly a royal prerogative. The same was true of his dealings with Rome because French relations with the Holy See were not just religious, they were political as well. Hence, the bishops were instructed by the Huguenot monarch to return to their dioceses to pray for his success, their proper function.13 Even more troubling, however, than the general upsurge of popular discontent over Henri’s Calvinist creed or the overt episcopal challenge to his authority was the sudden resurgence in September of the Tiers parti. With effective leadership this faction could both organize and focus Catholic opposition to the king’s profession of faith, especially since its head, the cardinal de Bourbon, was both president of the restive council of bishops at Chartres (and hence the leading ecclesiastic in the land) and a prince of the blood in his own right. That made him a viable Catholic alternative for the French throne should Henri remain obstinate on the issue of his creed. To be sure, the cardinal had suffered a political defeat at Mantes the previous July when he had tried to obstruct his royal cousin’s edicts of toleration, but by the following autumn it was clear that this had been only a temporary reverse for the chef du Tiers parti. The ambitious prelate had used his prominent position at Chartres to rebuild his strength and form alliances with other disaffected Catholic noblemen in the royal party, such as the duc d’Épernon and Henri’s own ward, the comte d’Auvergne (later the duc d’Angoulême), who also was suspected of seeking “to erect a Tierce Partie, as they term yt, and neither to avowe him selfe to bee a royalist or a Leaguer.”14 Indeed, the cardinal might even have been the moving force behind the bishops’ ultimatum of 18 December, seeing that he personally led the delegation that presented the offensive document to the king.15 Meantime, the duc de Mayenne had reopened contact with the prelate. He hoped to use a revived Tiers parti (which he now saw as something more than a royalist ploy) as a means of splitting the enemy party or at least of driving Henri to convert. This time, however, Bourbon – who smarted still from his rebuke earlier that summer – informed the king fully of the discussions.16 No doubt because he had anticipated future trouble with his cousin after their heated confrontation in July, Henri had increased his close surveillance of Bourbon’s activities. Royal agents intercepted the cardinal’s mail as before, while other suspected members of the faction were watched continuously, as well. It was partly because of this that the comte de Soissons eventually quit the royal army in December 1591; he simply refused to command a company of Huguenot cavalry which, he knew, “the Kinge doth pose to brydle him.”17 Besides, he was

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piqued over Henri’s refusal to grant him either greater authority in the forces then besieging Rouen or the gift of a nearby abby and its revenues, for which he had asked.18 The Huguenot monarch was thus well aware of the resurgence of the Tiers parti in September 1591 and of its potential threat to his position. As to be expected, the Catholic nobles associated with this subfaction were accused by their Huguenot comrades-in-arms of opposing the king purely for reasons of self-interest, rather than religious scruple. The duc de Sully, for one, always believed that the dissidents had just one goal in mind: “to make Henry purchase their personal services at a very high price.”19 In some cases, his charges appear to have been justified. Sully was not the first, for example, to accuse the marquis d’O and the maréchal de Biron – both of whom were extraordinarily acquisitive, even for that age – of withholding money and support from the king’s war effort to make him so dependent on their aid that they could extort from him rich rewards in return. Similar impulses were attributed to other powerful Catholics, such as the duc d’Épernon, who had the arrogance to threaten Henri in their subsequent quarrel over the duke’s claim to the gouvernement of Provence – “If he may not enjoy it with the Kinges favour, he saieth he will maintayne his right with his sword, and presumeth much of the peoples devotion to him in that country; he doth in a manner openly declare himselfe against the Kinge.”20 More blatant still were the private motives attributed to the ambitious cardinal de Bourbon and the comte de Soissons, both of whom (it was said) had their eyes fixed firmly on the French throne. In fact, Soissons was widely suspected of labouring even “to bee head [of the Tiers parti]” to realize his goal, “whereunto his ambition only reachede; [as] hee is poore and of noe credyte” with the other Catholics.21 He tried also to elope with Henri’s sister, Catherine de Bourbon, in March 1592,22 but his scheme was thwarted by the king, who threatened severe punishment for anyone who assisted the count in his endeavour. Finally, there were rumours that Soissons, like the over-mighty Épernon, was being courted secretly by Spain to detach him from the royal cause.23 “This dissention will greatly hynder the Kinges service in this time, but,” noted Sir Henry Unton, “many doe labore theyr reconciliation, and some hope ther is of good successe.”24 Yet the major stimulus for the ominous upsurge of royalist-Catholic opposition to the king’s Calvinism in autumn 1591 was not selfinterest. It was the significant and persistent problem of sectarian conflict within the royal party, a conflict that could not be resolved by the imposition of official toleration from above. Certainly, it was sectari-

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anism and not private ambition that moved the duc d’Épernon both to expel the Calvinists from Provence once he had reclaimed the gouvernement and to prohibit the publication of the edicts of Mantes in open defiance of royal authority.25 And this was not the first time that he had reacted from such an impulse. He had abandoned the king in 1576 and again in 1589 precisely because he would not serve a Huguenot. It was also sectarian prejudice (charged Sir Henry Unton) that caused the royalist Catholics to protest loudly whenever Henri awarded individual Calvinists “any manner of preferment, [being] verie jalous when they perceive him to confer with them; which dothe discontente them, and grieveth the Kinge not a littell, as himselfe hath pleased to confesse unto me.”26 The exclusion of all Huguenots from high office had been, after all, one of the initial demands the Catholics had made in August 1589 as a condition of their support for the new monarch. Particularly galling to these malcontents, therefore, was the marriage Henri arranged in October 1591 between his ward, Charlotte de La Marck, duchesse de Bouillon, and the Calvinist vicomte de Turenne. Having just been promoted to the rank of maréchal de France, partly in reward for past services and partly to make him more eligible for the match, the viscount “was the first of the so-called reformed Religion who was raised to the dignities and offices of the Crown.”27 The king’s reasons were straightforward. He needed to secure France’s northeastern frontiers by ensuring that strategic Bouillon, an autonomous principality, remained in friendly hands. He also was bound by the terms of the late duke’s will, which stipulated that Charlotte was to have a Protestant marriage. Besides, Henri felt a need at this time to reassure his Huguenot followers of his continued good faith and protection. This was especially vital in view of the increasingly Catholic character of the royal council, which had been reorganized by the comte de Cheverny after his appointment as Keeper of the Seals in September 1590;28 the higher profile at court of Catholic clergymen such as René de Beaune, archbishop of Bourges, Grand aumônier du roi; and the role of Catholic monarch that the king himself had begun to assume in official ceremonies, from participation in many of which the Huguenots were excluded.29 The royalist Catholics were unimpressed, however. Not long afterward, they were given further cause to grumble when the Calvinist sieur de Clermont was granted a gouvernement in Brittany, along with a promotion to the rank of maréchal de camp.30 These royal acts were condemned roundly by the Catholics, who accused the king of breaking his promise not to promote Huguenots to high office. (In fact, he had made no such pledge.) But the issue was moot in any case, as Henri refused to be

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thwarted from exercising his royal prerogative and “saieth [that] he will either be a whole Kinge or none at all!”31 The real danger here was, however, that in the absence of significant royal victories since the fall of Chartres the previous April, and with the military stalemate continuing, the Huguenot monarch was vulnerable. Far from retaining the initiative in the field after Ivry, Henri’s progress in the war was stalled effectively after spring 1591 by Mayenne’s persistent refusal to be again provoked into open combat. No matter how diligently the king sought him out to offer battle, the League leader refused to fight and withdrew instead. This halted Henri’s forward momentum, however many tactical gains he made in the meantime, and robbed him of opportunities to bring the League to decisive engagement and thus end the civil conflict on his terms. Under these circumstances, the spotlight returned automatically to the heated issue of the king’s conversion, which, the royalist Catholics now clamoured more loudly than before, was the only way to end the civil war. Their increasing frustration heightened their sectarian ire against any Huguenot, however exalted his rank, while creating conditions for the resurgence of the Tiers parti through which Catholic opposition could be channelled. How different was the situation prior to the fall of Chartres and Henri’s subsequent promulgation of the edicts of Mantes, when his internal opposition had been largely on the defensive and unable to confront him openly because of his military successes. By autumn 1591, that opposition – made conspicuous by the recovery of the cardinal de Bourbon’s sub-faction and its threat to “presently revolte if the Kinge not alter his religion” – had become so menacing to the Huguenot monarch’s position that the ever-watchful Sir Henry Unton begged Lord Burghley in England to conceal all knowledge of the “conspiracy,” as “it may otherwise be prejudicyall to the Kynge.”32 At stake here was the precarious unity of the royal party, which now teetered on the brink of collapse. In that event, the Calvinist king would have had to abjure. But even that drastic action probably would not have salvaged his position, since a conversion under duress would have been seen as an obvious political expedient devoid of any spiritual value. This in turn would have played into the hands of League polemic, in which the issue of the king’s sincerity was emerging as the chief justification on both religious and political grounds for continued resistance. It also would have ruined utterly the reputation of a monarch who had claimed always that, as he had been born “during the permission [i.e., toleration] of both religions” in France and instructed and bred up in one from which he could not “in conscience depart, without better instruction,” neither “hope nor despaire of a

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Crown can draw him to so violent and rash a change: he should thereby incurre the blame of inconstancie, infidelity and hypocrisie: ... [but since he is] alwaies ... ready to receive instruction from a free and lawfull Council, ... hee defends nothing obstinately, it is honour and zeale of his conscience that binds him.”33 To bolster royal unity, therefore, and at the same time divert Catholic energies to more productive ends, Henri attempted once more to preoccupy these nobles with pressing military affairs in what ultimately was his last desperate bid to conclude the civil war with a decisive royal victory. Indeed, the anxious king now pinned all of his hopes on defeating the duke of Parma in battle, writing in September 1591 that “if the said duke puts into effect his [plan] to enter into this kingdom so soon, I have decided to go straight to him, as the most important thing above all other undertakings.” “I am giving orders to make ready the greatest force that I can,” he concluded, “so as to join me at the first command.”34 Such was the essential background to the Rouen campaign of 1591– 92. Hitherto, this target had held little attraction for Henri, who already controlled most of Normandy as well as the Seine River that flowed through it. Hence, he had steadfastly opposed any plan to attack that city as an unnecessary expenditure of royal troops and energies on a secondary objective when these resources could be put to far better use against Paris. Only when Elizabeth I made the undertaking an absolute condition of her continued military and financial support did Henri reluctantly agree to invest Rouen in November 1591,35 but not before he had used her forces to besiege Noyon or had pleaded with her that the League-held French capital was a better strategic target. Elizabeth had ignored his appeals, however; she insisted upon Rouen, which left Henri with no other choice than to comply. “I am astonished that anyone who is so much beholden to us for aid in his need,” she had scolded, “should repay his most assured friend in such base coin.”36 Thus, observed the Venetian ambassador wryly, “his Majesty is moved more by the assistance of the Queen of England [in this affair] than by his own wishes.”37 A royal threat against Rouen was, however, of primary concern to the League. As the city was one of the few large centres of ultraCatholic resistance remaining in the north, its loss would bring all of Normandy under royal control. Not only would this jeopardize the security of League-held Paris even further, but it might induce other rebel strongholds to make their separate peace with the king.38 In short, the League simply could not afford to lose Rouen. In view of Mayenne’s critical military weakness after the debacle of Ivry, any attempt to relieve the city in the event of a royal siege would

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require substantial military reinforcement from Spain in the form of Parma. Thus, although Henri was reluctantly compelled by Elizabeth I to attack Rouen, the new campaign had at least this attraction: it provided him with exactly the means he needed to draw the formidable duke into a decisive battle, something he had “resolved to give” on ground of his own choosing.39 Consequently, however much Henri later expressed his hope that the ultra-Catholic stronghold would fall into his hands or however confidently he predicted a swift victory over the rebel garrison once the royal trenches were in place,40 “Parma, not Rouen, ... dominated Henri’s thinking and determined his tactics at the siege.”41 Just as the king had anticipated, his envelopment of the Norman capital, completed by 11 November, proved to be an effective lure. From captured Spanish correspondence he learned of Philip II’s determination to relieve Rouen at once and of Parma’s orders to march south immediately for that purpose. The Catholic monarch and his advisers were very conscious of what the loss of the Norman capital would mean to the League’s survival in France and in turn how damaging a royal victory would be to the foreign policy of Spain. As Don Diego de Ibarra warned his Catholic Majesty the subsequent January: “Woe to us if ever the prince of Béarn should triumph! Because Your Majesty would find in him a most redoutable adversary, both as an established heretic king of France [and a] valiant soldier, who is as politically skilled as he is able in war ... and around whom have gathered, without doubt, all those who are most envious of the grandeur of the king of Spain.”42 Apparently, Parma agreed with Ibarra’s appraisal. He added that should the war with the Huguenot monarch continue much longer, Philip’s military resources – already strained by his many commitments around the globe – would be stretched to the point that “Spaine should have more wood to heat her oven, than corne to send to the mill!”43 In the meantime, from other letters intercepted between Brussels and Madrid, Henri learned of Mayenne’s growing urgency to rescue the city even if it meant facing the Calvinist king on the battlefield.44 Finally, dispatches waylaid from Rouen itself revealed just how rapidly conditions had deteriorated in the city since November and how desperate was its need for relief.45 On the basis of such intelligence, the Bourbon monarch expected an invasion imminently from the Spanish Netherlands and prepared to meet it “the best that I can.”46 His first step was to undermine Rouennais morale by warning the defenders on 1 December to put no faith in receiving Spanish relief, because to reach the city Parma would have to confront the royal army blocking his path, and in a contest of arms, the duke’s victory was by no means assured. After all, the Calvin-

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ist monarch artfully pointed out, no one had forgotten the startling outcome of Ivry, fought just one year before under almost identical circumstances.47 This kind of propaganda was almost guaranteed to heighten anxiety among the Rouennais, who were expected to step up their appeals for help and to exaggerate the desperation of their situation. With the hook thus baited for Parma, Henri’s next step was to intensify his attacks on Fort Saint Catherine, the citadel guarding Rouen’s eastern approaches. This strategy reinforced his words with action and ensured that the duke would be compelled to march directly to the city’s relief without delay. Indeed, Henri reasoned, “seeing that those in the fort will be very strongly pressed, I believe this will force [Parma] to help them, and that cannot be done without fighting. It is this that leads me to believe that battle soon will be joined.”48 The one weakness in the royal plan, however, was that the king could not be certain when the duke would actually arrive or whether his own forces at Rouen would have sufficient time to prepare fully for combat with the Spaniards. That, he wrote, “will depend upon the route that the enemy will take.”49 So rather than wait passively for their forces to reach him, the Huguenot monarch resolved to seize the initiative and use his mounted troops offensively, in order to disrupt Parma’s progress through northern France just as he had done the year before. “The common opinion is,” reported the Venetian ambassador, “that the King, who will have a flying squadron of cavalry far superior to that of the enemy, will do all that in him lies to attack the duke of Parma should that commander threaten a move upon Rouen; or should the duke attempt to form a permanent camp and thus wear out the King, his Majesty will be able to break it up by cutting off the duke’s supplies and fodder.”50 In addition, the royal delaying action would allow Henri to blunt the Spanish army’s fighting effectiveness long before it reached Rouen by denying it rest and undercutting its morale through constant harassment. Meanwhile, his own forces would have more time to prepare before taking up their position on the battlefield the king had preselected near the Norman capital. It was even possible that if Parma’s advance were delayed long enough, the beleaguered rebel city might surrender before relief arrived,51 though this might also remove the lure Henri needed to draw the enemy into battle. In any case, he was sufficiently confident in his tactics and “the justice of [the royal] cause which God favours” to believe that he was “in a good position to receive [the Spaniards] warmly.”52 In mid-January 1592 Henri launched his cavalry offensive after receiving reports that the enemy had begun its invasion of France.

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Leaving the experienced maréchal de Biron to continue the siege of Rouen with the royal infantry and only 400 horse, Henri dashed off at the head another equestrian army of 7,000 gendarmes and arquebusiers à cheval (soon to be joined by a further 2,000 cavalry) to meet the Spanish invaders on the frontiers of Picardy. From there, the king slowly fell back before Parma. Keeping always in front or on the flanks of the enemy army and never farther away than four leagues (approximately twelve miles), Henri skirmished with the duke’s forces at every opportunity. He also controlled the latter’s line of march very effectively by sending small detachments to block any attempts by the enemy to advance along alternative routes that allowed for greater speed and ease of manoeuvre. In this way, the Spanish army was confined “step by step to difficult roads.” As a further measure, Henri reinforced all royalist garrisons that obstructed Parma’s path, not only to prevent their capture and thereby slow Spanish progress even more, but also to cut off the Spaniards’ lines of communication and retreat to Flanders.53 Finally, to deny his enemy all means of supply once it had exhausted its own limited provisions en route, Henri instructed his commanders “to have the [royal] army live off the land where the enemy must pass, in order to inconvenience them as much as possible,” specifically by “eating the foodstuffs in advance” of the Spanish forces.54 At first, the Huguenot monarch’s tactics were so successful that Parma was impressed by, and even fearful of, his royal adversary’s skill, judging from the tight defensive formation he had adopted for the march. His army moved in the form of a rectangle, the flanks of which were closed by a line of baggage wagons protected by two regiments of foot soldiers. Openings in front of this formation and at each angle permitted the main body of troops in the centre to issue out in case of battle. These openings were shielded in turn by squadrons of cavalry, while units of light horse and arquebusiers à cheval rode on the outer wings of the army to provide further protection.55 Clearly, Parma refused to “expose himself to the danger of being assaulted unawares by the King’s readiness and celerity, which by past experience was exceedingly well known to him.”56 As a result of his extreme prudence, even paranoia, however, his speed was reduced to a crawl and his royal adversary was given full command of the situation. This was noted by the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Mocenigo, who reported that the duke “never [covers] more than a league [i.e., three miles] a day, and never dismounts till he has set all his guards, so afraid is he lest he should be surprised ... It seems from his order of march that he intends to remain on the defensive and not to offer battle, unless the King attacks him in his entrenchments.”57

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By contrast, Henri and his equestrian army were able to ride as many as eighteen leagues a day, or roughly fifty-four miles. This was a prodigious distance, given the difficult roads of the period and the problems involved in moving large bodies of troops rapidly. In fact, Parma so admired the French king’s skill and speed of manoeuvre during this first stage of the campaign that he reputedly declared “that this Prince was an Eagle in war which soared into the cloudes when they thought to take him, and fell sodenly upon them which held him to be farther off.”58 But in spite of such promising beginnings, events soon turned against Henri. His first major skirmish with the combined SpanishLeague forces, on 5 February near Aumale, almost ended in disaster when the Huguenot monarch was wounded by a stray musket shot in the thigh and very nearly captured. This injury forced him to spend the next ten days recuperating at Dieppe until he was once again fit enough to sit a horse. In the meantime, Parma used the respite gained from his royal adversary’s absence from the field to seize strategic Neufchâtel with its stores of food and ammunition. The stronghold surrendered on 12 February after a siege lasting only four days.59 Then, to make matters worse, Henri received word from Rouen of a great sortie thrown against the royal lines by the League garrison on 25 February. This had taken the maréchal de Biron completely by surprise (in fact, he was wounded in the attack) and had inflicted heavy damage. Initially, the Calvinist king called the attack “a minor setback.”60 But in reality it was serious enough, when combined with the Spanish army’s relentless if ponderous advance, that he was forced briefly to lift the siege.61 The duke of Parma quickly seized the opportunity thus afforded to throw an advance guard of men with money and munitions into Rouen, before making a short detour with the major portion of his forces to besiege royalist Rue in Picardy, near the mouth of the Somme River. Despite these reverses, the French king still hoped to bring his enemies to battle. For that reason he eagerly awaited reinforcements from England and the Dutch Netherlands. These troops, he believed, finally would give him the numerical superiority he needed over his opponents to risk battle “if the opportunity presents itself.”62 He then vigorously renewed his attack on Rouen, which forced Parma to abandon his own siege of Rue in order to rescue the threatened Norman capital. This time, however, the Huguenot monarch badly miscalculated his enemy’s next move, though in fairness his tactical decisions at this point were based upon personal experience of Parma’s recent conduct. Given the plodding pace of the duke’s advance and his

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strictly defensive formation, Henri did not expect him to expose himself or his army to the danger of royal cavalry attack by breaking formation in a sudden dash for the Norman capital, sixty-five miles away. But the king was without the means to block the enemy’s advance in any case. Because of the volunteer nature of the royal forces and the fact that Henri could not afford to pay his nobles from the treasury, he was forced periodically to grant these men leave to rest and refurbish their equipment, supplied at private expense. He was consequently often left seriously short-handed at critical moments. That danger had been noted the previous November by Sir Henry Unton, who reported scornfully to Lord Burghley that the king “is followed of all the nobillitie all moste, but in what manner your Lordship best knoweth, which is to come and departe at their pleasures.”63 Such was Henri’s condition now. Because he had not expected any sudden moves by Parma, he had granted many of his nobles permission to return briefly to their estates in late March. It is also possible that he had wanted to avoid a new confrontation with his Catholic servitors over his third failure to appear at Tours, as scheduled, to be instructed in their faith. In any case, the French king’s only option was to lift the siege of Rouen on 20 April for the second time. And although he issued immediate orders recalling his scattered troops, they could not be reassembled rapidly enough to prevent Parma from reaching the city. Henri thus withdrew to Pont-de-l’Arch, where he positioned himself between the enemy army and Paris in order to monitor Spanish activities, check any thrust toward central France, and await the return of his own troops. Years later, Sully reflected upon how crippling this problem of volunteer personnel had been to royal fortunes throughout the civil wars, and speculate about “what this prince [Henri IV] would have done, if, instead of such troops, he had [like Parma] a considerable number of well-disciplined soldiers under his command, all united, obedient to his will, constantly attached to his person, and willing to sacrifice their lives for him; in a word, such troops as those conquerors had, whose actions have been so highly extolled by posterity?”64 The first stage of the Rouen campaign having thus concluded, the second stage began. At the duc de Mayenne’s insistence, Parma reluctantly attacked and captured the town of Caudebec, the purpose being to reopen the lower Seine River to the League and to reduce the threat of a future royal attempt on Rouen. But during the assault the Spanish commander was badly wounded in the arm. In addition, this ill-advised operation had drawn the Catholic army into a narrow triangle of land between the sea and the Seine, where it could be easily trapped, without access to supplies or any apparent means of escape. The Calvinist king (who, in the words of the ever-present Venetian

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ambassador, was “not a prince to lose his way in the conduct of war”)65 immediately detected this tactical error. He thus pushed forward his own plans to bring his Spanish adversary to battle – “for which his Majesty prepares himself on all points to be ready when his forces will have arrived, and will not be distracted with anything else.”66 In a rapid series of manoeuvres in late April and early May, Henri skilfully occupied the landward approaches to the enemy’s position, boxing the Spaniards in at Yvetot with their backs to the river. In the meantime, he harassed the Catholic forces at every opportunity, denying them provisions and closing his ring ever more tightly around their camp. The day before the Calvinist monarch was to launch his final assault, however, Parma – though feverish from his wound – managed to escape across the Seine by means of a bridge of boats secretly constructed for that purpose. Only the duke’s years of military experience in the Netherlands, a region crisscrossed by water courses where constructing pontoon bridges was a standard feature of warfare, saved him from decisive defeat and perhaps even total annihilation on this occasion. Certainly, Henri could not have predicted a manoeuvre that lay outside his military experience or the expertise of his various commanders. Having thus slipped through the Calvinist king’s fingers, the duke fled upriver by forced marches to Saint Cloud and thence back to Flanders. En route, he stopped at Paris only long enough to receive the praise of the duchesse de Montpensier for having saved Rouen and to leave 1,500 Walloon troops to reinforce the capital’s garrison. Disgusted with the Spanish commander’s “flight to the Somme,” the leaders of the few League forces still remaining at Yvetot asked Henri for safe conduct to return home, to which “the king graciously assented.”67 This was the last time Parma set foot in France. On 2 December he died at Arras, exhausted and ailing from the wound he had received at Caudebec, just as he was about to launch a third invasion on behalf of the Catholic League. These events effectively ended the long Rouen campaign. For Henri IV it represented an unmitigated defeat on both a military and a political level. Not only had he failed to take the Norman capital from its League defenders, but he had not brought the duke of Parma to battle as he had sworn publicly to do. Although in the second half of 1592 he prepared for the expected third invasion from Flanders, being desperate to win the kind of victory that would “teach [the Spaniards] the art of war” and restore his own faltering position in the royal party,68 by early September it had become apparent that the anticipated attack would never come. At that date Parma was languishing to the point that even the French king did not believe that his arch-rival would survive the year.69 This was the death-knell to Henri’s old ploy of preoccupying

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his Catholic servitors with military affairs. With his failure to win a significant victory over the Spanish invader, the assertions of the royalist Catholics that only Henri’s conversion could defeat the League and restore peace to France now became emphatic, their opposition to his Calvinist faith having gathered momentum steadily in the final stages of the Rouen campaign. And he could elude them no longer. Immediately following Parma’s daring escape over the Seine the Huguenot monarch still might have succeeded in his goals if, during his pursuit of the Spanish forces back to Flanders, he had been able to compel them to fight.70 But probably by that time it was too late. Henri’s own army was exhausted, his treasury was empty, and his Catholic servitors were suspected once more of obstructing his progress lest he triumphed over his enemies and consolidated his authority without first converting to their faith.71 As an additional blow, news arrived from Brittany of a major royalist defeat near Craon. This forced the king to send forces to buttress his flagging authority in that province. He also had to dispatch the duc d’Épernon with troops to Provence at this time (though their argument over that gouvernement was still unsettled), which further reduced his manpower.72 There is good reason to suspect, however, that more lay behind Henri’s decision than a simple need to reinforce the royalist position in southern France. Épernon always had been one of the most unequivocal opponents of the king’s Calvinist faith, and because of his great prestige among the other Catholic nobles in the royal army, it is entirely possible that Henri wanted to separate the duke from the other Catholics before they were incited to more militant action. In any case, the king’s forces were so depleted that he could only harass Parma’s retreat from France without risking a major confrontation. But even had these difficulties not emerged to frustrate Henri’s efforts, the Spanish commander never had intended to fight a real battle unless absolutely forced. For one thing, he saw no reason to risk Spain’s policy in France or, by extension, its position in the Netherlands on the single cast of a die. This certainly was the conclusion of the contemporary historian Enrico Davila, who wrote that Parma, “comming only to succour the [League] Confederates, would not hazard [in a battle] the hopes of France, and the possession of Flanders, without expectation of some fruit by his victory that might counterveil so great a loss; and therefore with art and prudence, as he had done at Paris [in 1590], he pretended not to conquer, but not to be conquered.”73 Besides, the duke had sensed during his previous invasion of France that a campaign of manoeuvre was the key to defeating Henri IV, whose ultimate success – short of a conversion – depended upon winning a quick decisive victory. As Parma told Mayenne:

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“Because ... the prince de Béarn uses his boots more often than his shoes, ... he can be ruined sooner with delays and temporizing than with force.”74 But there was another, more personal reason for Parma’s caution. According to royalist and rebel observers alike, Philip II’s great commander “was afraid of engaging with a general such as he knew Henry to be, and of exposing to the event of battle the reputation of the greatest warrior in Europe,”75 for he had never “found in all those wars so importunate nor so pressing an enemy as the king.”76 “[O]nly God can perform miracles,” the duke once wrote to Philip II. At the same time, he admitted his reluctance to challenge a “triumphant enemy” who might take from him the military reputation he had worked so hard to acquire,77 or to put that image “willingly into the arbitrament of Fortune, which he had already safe in his own hands.”78 Yet it was precisely that professional rivalry that explains the dying Parma’s uncharacteristic eagerness in autumn 1592 to lead a third invasion of France. The needs of Spanish foreign policy aside, he was as determined as Henri to prove once and for all who was the better general, if for no other reason than that some contemporaries openly declared “that the Spanish owe their reputation to the fact that they never [before] have been matched with anyone of consideration.”79 Unfortunately for the modern military historian, Parma died before that confrontation could take place, though the merits of both commanders make the unanswerable question “who might have won” an interesting topic for speculation. In any case, that the two elements of policy and personal pride were at work simultaneously in the duke’s thinking can be seen in a letter he wrote to his royal master in June 1590, in which he cautioned: “It is not necessary to fight if we are not certain of success; otherwise, it will be the ruin of our plans. It is this that I have stressed ... to your agents in France, insisting that this point is absolutely essential.”80 Like Henri IV, Parma never undertook a military project unless it promised victory, because, also like the French monarch, the duke’s continuing political success – whether as governor of the Spanish Netherlands or as an ally of the Catholic League – depended upon his personal reputation as a soldier in battle as much as it did upon any other factor.

under c at h olic sie g e , may to dec emb er 1 5 9 2 So long as Parma lived, Henri was able still to distract royalist-Catholic attention from the matter of his faith by manipulating the rumour of a third invasion. In the absence of an actual military threat, however,

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this ploy rapidly lost what little remained of its effectiveness. And with the duke’s death on 2 December 1592, its usefulness disappeared altogether. Thus, the Bourbon monarch lost his last hope of achieving his political goals through decisive victory over his ultra-Catholic enemies, since Parma’s demise postponed indefinitely the planned third invasion from Flanders. No longer could he elude the royalist Catholics persistent assertions “that it was necessary for the good of the state that he be instructed in the Catholic religion; on which they made infinite discourses of all kinds, all of which concluded with this necessity.”81 Even more significant, perhaps, was that some highly placed Calvinists also began to admit that the issue of the king’s religion “opens or closes the door to all other matters.”82 In fact, throughout the Rouen campaign royalist-Catholic anger at Henri’s repeated failures to receive instruction according to his threeyear-old promise had grown relentlessly. Their mood became explosive by the end of March when Parma made his dash to relieve the Norman capital. At that time, reported the Venetian ambassador, the people of royalist Tours and Châlons were “being incited to rebellion by the priests, and it is clear that if some lack judgement and others courage, no one lacks the will to do mischief.”83 This popular outburst was a powerful indictment of the Calvinist king’s evident bad faith for not having appeared at Tours on 15 March for his long-awaited instruction. Yet it is ironic that this time he was preoccupied with a genuine military crisis rather than one of his own manufacture. Moreover, that Catholic priests had provoked the ferment, combined with the fact that the cardinal de Bourbon chose this moment to reissue the “Remonstrance d’Angers” under a different title,84 in tandem with a new “Discours Urging his Majesty to Render Himself a Roman Catholic,”85 suggests that these demonstrations of public ire were coordinated by members of the Tiers parti, perhaps on the cardinal’s orders. Henri fully appreciated the danger that this continuing escalation of royalist-Catholic opposition posed to his position. In a letter to Sully he wrote: “I see that the greater part of the most zealous Catholics are tired of this war, and will not, in the end, scruple to desert me, and either form a party of themselves, or join the Leaguers, with whom they do not hesitate to say they would agree better than with the Huguenots; this will be the ruin of the State, and of the House of Bourbon, because, if I am once rejected, they will never choose another out of it, whatever my relatives may think.”86 Nevertheless, he refused to be coerced. Whether dealing with the papacy, negotiating with the League, or simply writing to his own Catholic servitors, the king always insisted that he would not change his religion under

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duress. He argued instead that “if peace be restored to the kingdom, there will be ample opportunity to propose to him the instruction to which he has shown a willingness to submit, not without hope of some good results. For he is not obstinate by nature.”87 Besides, as always, there was the question of his personal beliefs to consider. Henri IV was still a practising Calvinist at this time. As an English observer noted at the outset of the Rouen campaign, the French king and his Huguenot officers heard sermons in Henri’s private chambers, “for he hath noe publique place, but preacheth in his [own] house” so as not to offend the Catholics.88 Furthermore, he continued to reaffirm his profession of the Calvinist faith in official documents.89 This was especially significant given the current pressures on his position and the very delicate balance he had to maintain between “them of the religion, who are few in number and of small power,” and the royalist Catholics, who formed the majority of his support.90 “Not wanting [therefore] to declare himself on his conversion, nor to be constrained in his conscience, [and] even less to drive away the Catholics who were in his service,”91 the Calvinist monarch repeated his promises to receive instruction “in the hope of thus arriving at the Crown.”92 As well, he renewed his pledges to protect the Catholic faith in France and continued to satisfy royalist-Catholic desires wherever possible,93 though this annoyed the Huguenots with whom “he doth pollitickly temporize ... all which best shewes his discretion.”94 In short, the king was determined “that the exigency of [his current] Affairs would not give way to the counsel of preventing the future with a present ruin,” in the hope that time would help him find solutions to his problems.95 In the opinion of experienced contemporaries, Henri was sincere about his religious profession. It would be wrong, therefore, to misrepresent such public statements as those quoted above, or, for that matter, his assurances to his foreign allies, as mere cynical attempts to cater to the expectations of his various Catholic and Protestant supporters. While it is true that as his political position deteriorated after spring 1591, the king was confronted increasingly with the unwelcome prospect of having to convert to recover his advantage and consolidate his possession of the crown, this did not diminish the deep personal concern he also felt for preserving his private religious convictions. To be sure, he had to consider the political effect of his pronouncements, which he worded carefully for the benefit of his intended audiences. After all, it was essential to his success that he placate his Catholic followers, on the one hand, with constant pledges to be instructed in their faith as promised. Yet it was equally essential that he reassure his Huguenot supporters and various English, German, and Swiss allies,

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on the other hand, of his unending commitment to the Reformed Religion. But the sheer vagueness of his promises to receive instruction at some unspecified date, in combination with his firm oaths not to be separated from the faith he had imbibed with his mother’s milk, suggests deeper motives than mere political expediency. In any case, to attribute the statements Henri made to either his own servitors or foreign ambassadors – who were able to judge for themselves the precariousness of his situation and the sincerity behind his words – to mere political guile and a transparent effort to assuage his religiously divided supporters with what they wanted to hear, would be as naive as to see only the purest of religious sentiments behind the pronouncements of the League or the Huguenots. The fact is that both elements – of political expediency and sincere commitment to conscience – motivated the king’s official statements. But unfortunately for Henri, his reassurances in spring 1592 were not enough to buttress his deteriorating political position in the royal party. This prompted Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to complain bitterly in mid-April: “Our Catholics desire peace at all costs; they ... say that everything depends on the king, that for the sake of an opinion he is losing the state; and thereupon, one after another, they are entering into private truces which go so far that one of these days the king will be sustaining the war all alone.”96 To make matters worse, the core of Henri’s moderate military support – both Catholic and Huguenot – had begun to disappear, a casualty of the civil war. Already this group had been diminished significantly by a number of untimely deaths in 1591. On 4 August François de La Noue, the “Bras de Fer,” died of wounds he had received at the siege of Lamballe. He was followed to the grave in early October by the comte de Châtillon, Gaspard de Coligny’s eldest son, and in September by the sieur du Hallot, one of the Montmorency clan. In 1592 this group was reduced further still by the death in February of the Catholic duc de La Valette, Épernon’s respected brother, and in June of Henri’s trusted cousin, François de Bourbon, duc de Montpensier, who died of camp fever near Rouen. He was joined not long afterward by the sieur de Guitry, the most respected of the monarch’s Calvinist commanders after Turenne and the late La Noue, and before the year was out by Michel Du Fay, grandson of the former politique chancellor Michel de L’Hôpital. But undoubtedly the greatest loss to Henri at this time was the wily old maréchal de Biron, who was decapitated by a cannonball at the siege of Épernay in July. Whatever trouble he had caused in the past, the marshal was widely respected for his large experience, personal valour, and military skill. There also is no denying that his support at critical moments since August 1589 had tipped the political balance in

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favour of the Calvinist king. Hence, Biron’s death was a great blow to Henri, who called it “one of the worst afflictions which I could be visited by, having lost in him not only the oldest and most experienced captain in my kingdom, but one in whose fidelity and prudence I placed all my affairs, having, apart from the great knowledge he had in them, recognized in him a particular affection he felt for me, which augments my regret more than any other consideration.”97 As a singular honour and mark of royal respect, Biron’s remains were interred in the basilica of St Denis beside the relics of past kings of France.98 Not everyone shared the Huguenot monarch’s high esteem for the old soldier, of course. Both Davila and L’Estoile called him “a servant of the king for his own good” and accused him of deliberately seeking to prolong the civil war for personal profit, which “he always preferred over the public good and salvation of the people.”99 The Leaguers were equally glad to be delivered from such a redoubtable enemy, as were many royalist Catholics, “who respected his great merit, [but who nevertheless] assumed him to be the cause, by his advice, of the delay in the king’s conversion.”100 But whatever the personal shortcomings of such individuals, Henri IV’s appreciation of how damaging the deaths of his moderate supporters was, is clear from comments he made shortly after La Valette was killed: “I pray to God to preserve me the rest of my good servants, especially those who have acquired through experience the capacity for the greatest offices of this state, whose number is diminishing.”101 Each of these three threats currently facing the French king – the menacing resurgence of the Tiers parti, the escalation of royalist-Catholic discontent at all levels, and the irreplaceable loss of key moderateCatholic and Calvinist supporters – placed an even higher premium on Henri’s leadership in 1592 than had been demanded in previous years. To be sure, he had long recognized that to inspire loyalty and obedience among his religiously divided followers he had to command in battle by personal example. Perhaps this was one of the lessons he had learned during his military apprenticeship under Louis de Condé and Gaspard de Coligny prior to 1572. Certainly, the Huguenot monarch owed his bipartisan backing after the current war’s beginning in 1585 “less to his place in the succession than to his willingness to risk his life in the forefront of every skirmish ... more like a common cavalry captain than a prince.”102 But at no time was the element of personal example more necessary to Henri’s political and military leadership, let alone his survival, than during the first half of 1592. Even so, his audacity frequently earned him harsh criticism from his contemporaries. During the skirmish at Aumale, for example, the late duke of Parma was so surprised to find the French king fighting in the

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front ranks among the royal horsemen that he allegedly remarked, “I expected to see a general: this is only an officer of light cavalry!”103 Henri’s two Calvinist advisers, the future duc de Sully and Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, also scolded their royal master. They complained that he “was always too prodigal of his own blood, and too careful of that of his soldiers.”104 Even the English ambassador, Sir Henry Unton, noted that “wee all wishe [the king] were lesse valliant .... His to much forwardness doth discourage greately his servants.” For that reason, he urged Queen Elizabeth “to admonishe the Kinge of his to much indangeringe of himself.”105 Yet Henri had no choice in the matter. His chronic shortages in money and manpower forced him “to do the acts of light horse” and to risk his life in battle, as he had “no other hope, nor any other security but himself.”106 Otherwise, his Catholic followers would have hesitated to fight for the still-Huguenot monarch, who was forced “to venture his own person upon all occasions [and make] way with his danger for those that followed him.”107 The Venetian ambassador identified exactly this problem while visiting the royal lines at Rouen: “His Majesty ran some risk in his desire to set an example to the others [in the army], who are backward at attacking unless his Majesty exposes himself to danger.”108 Henri himself pointed out this truth to those who criticized his socalled recklessness in war. “I cannot do otherwise,” he once admitted to Sully, “for since it is for my gloire and my crown that I fight, my life and everything else ought to be of no consideration with me.”109 Besides, what better way to prove that God was on his side than by constantly distinguishing himself in battle, generally emerging unharmed and victorious? Such renown was priceless; in fact, on numerous occasions the king’s reputation sufficed by itself to check the enemy’s advance “in several places that they had met him,” while their fear of his skill “made them miss some very advantageous opportunities.”110 Yet however much they criticized Henri’s bravado, many contemporaries were deeply impressed by his conduct in war. They acknowledged further that “the dignity of Generall dispens’d him not from the dangers of the common soldier,” with whom “he suffered patiently, and under-went ... [equal] perils, inconveniences and labours.”111 No doubt this also was one of the greatest contributors to his glowing reputation among foreign observers like Sir Henry Unton, who described him as “a most noble, brave Kinge; of greate patience and magnanymitie; not ceremonious, affable, famillier and only followed for his trewe vallour.”112 Another Englishman, Robert Dallington, echoed these sentiments and added upon reflection that “[t]here is no man so great by birth, or Noble, whom it well becommeth not to be as valiant

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and forward as the best, even though hee were a King: and indeed the greater hee is, the more his honour is engaged to be valiant.”113 Even the usually cautious Philippe Duplessis-Mornay put aside his misgivings to acknowledge at one point “that your Majesty ... [must] confine yourself to the limits of a great captain, seeing that after playing the role of Alexander for thirty years, you must henceforth play the part of Caesar.”114 Henri summarized his position best. He knew more than anyone else that he had to “endure a thousand things which give me trouble, and I thus daily endanger my life to maintain my reputation, resigning myself and my affairs to God, since it is much better that I should die with arms in my hands, than to live to see my kingdom ruined, and myself forced to seek assistance [i.e., exile] in a foreign country.”115 After all, he lived in an age when the success of a monarch still depended upon his individual qualities of justice, faithfulness, and above all courage, as well as upon his ability to command the loyalty of his servitors – particularly in times of crisis – through those intensely personal bonds that united man and man. It was, in brief, an age when the ancient code of chivalry was still a vibrant force in society, war, and government, and everyone believed, as Henri did, that “nothing preserves the authority of Princes like reputation, especially in this Kingdom, composed as it is of a Nobility who make profession of honour and spill their blood in order to acquire it.”116 By the close of the Rouen campaign, however, it was evident that personal bravery and leadership by individual example were no longer sufficient to check the growth of royalist-Catholic discontent or inspire obedience. On the contrary, after Parma’s escape over the Seine the king’s Catholic servitors became still more aggressive in their demands that he abjure. But this time they threatened not simply to abandon the Huguenot monarch as before, but to elect as king a Catholic prince of the blood,117 the objective long espoused by the League. That Henri was deeply alarmed by this ominous new development within the ranks of his own party was attested to by Sir Henry Unton, to whom he spoke “at length with great passion and discontent, discoursing at large of his miserable estate, of the factions of his servants, and of their ill dispositions.”118 Henri’s confidences were not simply exaggerations designed to produce a desired reaction with the ambassador of his English ally, Elizabeth I. As an eyewitness, Unton saw firsthand the deteriorating conditions in the royal party and the Calvinist monarch’s increasingly precarious position. This he had detailed in previous dispatches. So there is no reason to doubt Henri’s words here or to subscribe to him ulterior motives. His situation was, indeed, very serious.

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Anxious to placate the royalist Catholics and divert their anger, the king consented to new negotiations proposed by the League in early March. Held secretly at Mayenne’s request “to hide them from the Spaniards,” the talks, Henri hoped, might provide an alternative route to peace that would keep open his narrowing political options.119 Besides, the negotiations presented an ideal opportunity to exploit the bitter enmity he knew to exist between the ultraCatholic French and their Spanish allies (or as Henri put it, “between the foreigners and the French enemies”)120 and thus contribute to the steady deterioration of the League. Its partisans, he knew, were tired of war, dissatisfied with Mayenne’s ineffectual leadership, and increasingly eager to make a favourable peace. As the Venetian ambassador noted, the king and his advisers “keep an eye on all such facts and do all they can to increase the discord.”121 And although “his Majesty wants to proceed with [the ultra-Catholics] as their king and master,” wrote the royalist cardinal d’Ossat, he hopes “to win them over by his clemency and bounty in such a way as they will render him obedience and fidelity.”122 But these talks foundered, as usual, on the persistent obstacle of Henri IV’s conversion, over which neither side would relent. In the opening negotiations, the duc de Mayenne refused to recognize the Huguenot monarch as king of France until he had converted to Catholicism. He also wanted guarantees of protection for the Roman Church, a full pardon for all Leaguers, and a royal promise to prohibit the spread of Calvinism in the realm. The proposed treaty, he explained, would be a “capitulation” (i.e., an enumeration of terms or a charter) by which the League leaders would consent “to acknowledge ... upon certain conditions to make one king who was not in possession of the kingdom.” All that these men asked in return was what “was fit for their own security,” because once the agreement had been signed, they automatically would become subject to royal law and thus to royal reprisal, too. For that reason, their demands should not be seen as extraordinary, especially since the king himself had stated frequently his willingness to offer Mayenne generous terms in return for peace.123 But Henri refused to abjure on demand. He insisted, as he always had, that “conscience is so precious a thing that it cannot be negotiated by treaty or capitulation; it can change only through divine inspiration and instruction to which he freely would submit.”124 That he declined to do, however, until the ultra-Catholic faction had acknowledged his sovereignty and peace had been restored to France. Nor would he agree to the League leaders’ other conditions, even though “for the good of the nation, he is ready to pardon and forgive

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much.”125 Certainly, he refused to endorse any accord that made it appear as if he received his crown from League hands. In short, wrote President Jeannin, the Calvinist king replied with his usual “jargon,” wanting to be recognized first before he agreed to receive religious tuition. That “response he always has given without variation.”126 According to Michael Wolfe, the primary reason for the failure of this initial round of discussions was Henri’s stipulation that the staunchly Calvinist Philippe Duplessis-Mornay participate in them as a principal negotiator. This allegedly indicated that the king “was not ready to have any compromises made for him by his Catholic supporters.” Furthermore, by demanding the League’s complete submission before any discussion of a royal conversion took place, DuplessisMornay so discouraged the League’s chief negotiator, Villeroy de Neufville, that he threatened to break off the talks, “which was, of course, precisely what Henri wanted.”127 Although it is true that the king was unwilling to allow his Catholic servitors a free hand in the current discussions for fear that they would commit him to unacceptable conditions, there is no evidence to support the allegation, even from a Catholic perspective, that he deliberately sabotaged the talks by appointing Duplessis-Mornay. On the contrary, all indications are that Henri genuinely sought an alternate route to peace at this juncture and was willing to make extraordinary concessions to secure a treaty with the League. With his military program stalemated, his political position faltering even within his own party, and his siege of Rouen continuing, he doubtless hoped to achieve through negotiation what he seemed unable to win on the battlefield. The problem was, however, that to consent to the duc de Mayenne’s initial demands would signify that he condoned what he had always claimed was the League’s use of a religious pretext to foment rebellion against his royal authority (this would acquit the rebels of all guilt for their past actions and undermine his own policy of toleration). More significantly, he would be admitting that heredity (i.e., legitimacy of blood as enshrined in fundamental Salic Law and ancient French custom) was of secondary importance to religious profession in determining the rightful succession to the throne. There was, after all, no precedent for this in French history, and the king was not about to set one. Not only would that compromise his conscience, but in his eyes it would reduce his faith to a simple political issue, an outcome he had resisted for sixteen years. His consent to Mayenne’s terms also would mean, in effect, the total repudiation of those principles upon which Henri IV had based his life and public image since 1584. It was not simple hyperbole, therefore, that led the royalist Fleury to refer to these negotiations as “a contest of honour” in which the king and his

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chief agent understood very clearly what was necessary “for the conservation of [his] grandeur and authority.”128 Despite this diplomatic impasse, both leaders endeavoured to keep the talks alive. To that end, the ultra-Catholic duke modified his demands slightly. He also indicated his willingness to accept a royal conversion provisionally, without initial dispensation from Rome. For his part, the king bowed briefly to royalist-Catholic pressure and recalled Duplessis-Mornay,129 whom he replaced with the newly royalist cardinal de Gondi in time for the second round of discussions scheduled for 2 April at Noisy. At that meeting the Catholic negotiators on both sides agreed upon three points: that Henri set a clear timetable for his instruction (i.e., abjuration) before substantial talks with the League began over its recognition of his authority; that the papacy be included in reaching any final agreement; and that once the first two items were in place, the ultra- and royalist Catholics would initiate steps toward arranging the League’s submission in accordance with the king’s dignity. Both sides then agreed to reconvene on 10 April. But these resolutions, too, were unacceptable to Henri IV, who once again authorized Duplessis-Mornay to meet confidentially with Villeroy de Neufville over the next two days (3–4 April).130 At this time Duplessis-Mornay presented the so-called “Expédient proposé” in the king’s name.131 In this new proposal, Henri’s still unfulfilled promise of August 1589 to receive instruction “within a prescribed period” was restated, but this time he alleged his “desire and intention of uniting himself to and joining the Catholic church.” Ostensibly for that reason, he promised to begin preparations at once for his instruction within six or seven months,132 – a gesture of good faith directed at least as much toward has own Catholic servitors (once they learned of these private talks, of course) as to the League. At the same time, Henri agreed to allow the Catholics of both parties to intercede with Rome on his behalf, to inform the pope of his resolution, and to secure “his counsel and authority to facilitate and achieve the aforesaid instruction.” It was the Venetian ambassador’s conviction that if Mayenne refused to accept these astonishing royal concessions, “everyone would be justified in saying that he was the cause of all these troubles.”133 Never before had the Calvinist king made such an explicit statement of his intent to convert, one that contrasted so sharply with his vague pronouncements of the past and his most recent assertion to Mayenne that conscience could not be made the plaything of political compromise. It is possible, of course, that Henri finally recognized that the two principles of blood and religion that had defined his actions and decisions since 1572 were no longer compatible, and that the moment had come to sacrifice his Calvinist profession to the needs of Realpoli-

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tik if he were to consolidate his authority in France before it was too late. As it was, his policy of toleration and public assurances of his willingness to receive instruction were so inconsistent with the sectarian spirit of his contemporaries that, “with regard to religion, he was taxed by all Europe with too great lightness.”134 Many people also believed that as “Patience was none of his Favourite Vertues, ... if he could shorten [the war] by changing his Religion, that would be no balk in his way.”135 The chief fault of these criticisms, however, lies in their confusion of Henri’s pragmatism with political opportunism. By contrast, other more perceptive contemporaries (such as the Englishman Robert Dallington) were able to look behind the king’s public conduct to admire his great strength of character and religious consistency in the face of political pressure. Wrote Dallington, “though by his Phisiognomy, his fashion & maner of behaviour, ye would judge [Henri IV] leger and inconstant, yet is no man more firmely constant than he.”136 That being the case, the Huguenot monarch was no less certain in April 1592 than he had been in April 1583 that “religion is not stripped off like a shirt,” and no less determined to maintain the integrity of, and the working relationship between, his conscience and political needs. The problem in spring 1592 was that Henri was under siege in his own party and running rapidly out of time. With the failure to defeat Parma in the recent Rouen campaign, the threat of an open revolt among the royalist Catholics, and the likelihood of a third invasion from Flanders (should it ever materialize) probably months away, the king sensed that his last hope of achieving ultimate victory on his terms might lie in pacifying the League by diplomacy before royal unity disintegrated altogether and he was forced to take the repugnant step of abjuring his Calvinist faith on demand, having no other option. In short, he was gambling that ultra-Catholic resistence would collapse if he now made a more enticing offer, especially in view of Mayenne’s earlier, if limited, compromise, that the League was willing to accept a royal abjuration without the prerequisite of papal absolution. Hence, it was no accident that in reissuing the terms of the Declaration of Saint Cloud in the new Expédient, Henri included an explicit reference to a future royal conversion. Obviously, he was trying to manipulate the League into recognizing his legitimacy as French monarch beforehand on the same terms that the royalist Catholics had agreed to in August 1589 – that is, in accordance with the traditional definition of the succession by Salic Law, irrespective of his religious profession. Yet he also recognized that a mere promise to receive instruction at some undefined date would not convince the Leaguers

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of his good intentions. After all, the king’s own Catholic servitors had grown tired of his repeated ruses, delays, and outright duplicity over three long years as they waited for him to fulfil his initial pledge. Consequently, he had to issue a more explicit declaration of his “desire and intention of uniting himself to and joining the Catholic church.” On the surface, this statement seemed to carry with it a commitment to abjure, but in reality it was still imprecise enough to allow Henri room to escape. Detecting the royal subterfuge, Villeroy de Neufville warned Mayenne that religious instruction did not lead necessarily to conversion.137 Consequently, the duke proposed a set of counterconditions that were so unacceptable to the Huguenot monarch that they finally doomed the negotiations to pointlessness.138 Although he believed Villeroy de Neufville to be personally sincere (indeed, there were many who felt that Mayenne’s chief adviser “was not a very good Leaguer” because of his genuine concern for the welfare of France),139 Duplessis-Mornay rejected the new proposals outright on Henri’s behalf. He declared that the crown belonged to the Huguenot monarch by right of birth and merit; that his royal master was not vindictive but generous in victory; that he was served already by the largest number of French Catholics; and that if he yielded to the League’s exorbitant demands, the rebel faction would control too much power, while leaving the king very little with which to reward his own followers. More importantly, however, was Henri’s insistence that his conscience could not be forced without sinning and that as “a prince who feared God and was jealous of his reputation” he never would consent to such dishonourable terms. He refused to convert until convinced that he erred in religion, because otherwise “he would seem more atheist than Catholic.” Neither would he “promise [to abjure] in advance, not knowing how instruction would alter his conscience.”140 This statement alone was enough to justify Villeroy de Neufville’s earlier warning to Mayenne about the efficacy of religious tuition. For his part, the League envoy sympathized with Henri’s difficult political position and acknowledged his need to assuage the royalist Catholics without alienating the Huguenots.141 But Villeroy de Neufville was also aware of the mounting disunity within his own party; many of his confrères were tired of war, resentful of Spanish interference, and eager to recognize “the king of Navarre” if only he agreed to abjure. He even suspected that if Mayenne were to recognize Henri’s authority while still a Huguenot, most of the duke’s followers would submit without further resistence.142 Consequently, if the ultraCatholic chef de parti failed to embrace this opportunity for peace, warned Villeroy de Neufville, “he will curse the hour!”143 To ease the

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way, the League envoy tried to disarm Duplessis-Mornay’s objections to the rebel terms. But his arguments fell on deaf ears. Duplessis-Mornay summarily rejected the League’s conditions as exorbitant, declaring that “ground so sterile cannot produce much fruit.”144 He also divulged publicly the entire proceedings of the negotiations in an attempt to split the ultraCatholic leadership and drive a wedge between it and its supporters. Perhaps he also wanted to expose the potential danger of the League’s terms to the integrity of France and royal authority, and to show that the duc de Mayenne had acted in bad faith, that his real intention was to use the current talks as a simple ploy to frighten Spain into lending more aid.145 But Duplessis-Mornay’s gamble backfired. The royalist Catholics were scandalized to learn that a Calvinist had been entrusted with such delicate negotiations behind their back, and they blamed him personally for the failure of the talks on the grounds that he had not tried hard enough to bargain for better terms. After all, though on opposite sides in the war, they and their League counterparts shared a comparable view of the French monarchy and of the need for the king’s conversion to preserve it and the Gallican Church. Doubtless they also resented the fact that Duplessis-Mornay’s separate interviews with Villeroy de Neufville effectively ruined any hope for success from their subsequent meeting with the League negotiator on 10 April. Villeroy de Neufville and the royalist-Catholic Pomponne de Bellièvre attempted to salvage the situation by calling for a limited truce. This proposal was renewed on 29 April by Villeroy de Neufville, independently of Mayenne, in response to admissions by some royalist Catholics that they would consider deserting the king should he continue to resist conversion and Mayenne accept the proferred ceasefire. Meanwhile, the fiasco had given new strength to the Tiers parti, which also threatened to abandon the Calvinist monarch if he did not abjure, and then to call for the election of a Catholic prince in his place.146 By this time Mayenne had lost interest in talks that were going nowhere. Henri, meanwhile, suspected that the last-minute proposal for a truce was merely another attempt to split the royal party. Fearing, however, the possible erosion of his Catholic support should he halt the negotiations altogether, the king permitted them to continue sporadically throughout the summer months, perhaps on DuplessisMornay’s advice to do so even if it meant setting a clear date for his instruction. But Henri was not defeated yet. Having authorized his Catholic servitors the previous spring to send yet a third delegation to Rome on

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his behalf, he dispatched the cardinal de Gondi and the marquis de Pisany in October to attempt a reconciliation with the new pope, Clement VIII (1592–1605).147 Both Gregory XIV and his immediate successor, Innocent IX (November–December 1591), had died the year before. It is a strong indication of the depths to which the Huguenot monarch’s credibility had plunged among his Catholic supporters since summer 1591 that the faithful duc de Luxembourg – whom he first approached with this mission – declined to go.148 Appointed in the duke’s stead, Pisany was instructed to argue that royalist-Catholic support of the Calvinist king was essential for the preservation of France and the French monarchy from foreign [i.e., Spanish] invasion under excuse of religion. He also was to repeat Henri’s recent promises to protect the Catholic faith and receive instruction.149 The cardinal de Gondi’s task was even more focused. He was to convince Clement VIII of the absurdity of the religious pretexts used by the League and Spain in justifying their war against Henri IV, and to remind the pontiff that those who currently accused the Huguenot monarch of heresy had made frequent advances in the past to gain his favour. The latter was a thinly veiled reference to Philip II’s efforts in 1583 to bribe the Calvinist Navarre into fomenting civil war against the Catholic Henri III. Additionally, Gondi was to warn that promoting Spanish interests inevitably would reduce the pope to the role of his Catholic Majesty’s private chaplain, while any further interference in French affairs might provoke a schism in France. After all, the Gallican clergy and royalist parlements at Tours and Châlons already had taken stern measures against ultramontane insolence.150 Clearly, it would not take much to push them further down this path. Meantime, to contain the damage caused by Duplessis-Mornay’s misstep the previous spring, the king disposed of several vacant benefices among his Catholic nobles as rewards for their services. He also prohibited French Church money from leaving the kingdom for Rome to prevent the Holy See from using it to support the League. This was no innovation, he argued, alluding to the terms of the Declaration of Saint Cloud. It was only a safeguard to maintain the rights and privileges of the Gallican Church.151 Henri next undertook two final precautions. One was to appeal to his Italian allies, the Republic of Venice and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to intercede with the Holy See on his behalf in aid of the efforts of Gondi and Pisany.152 The other was to write directly to Clement himself, to assure the pontiff of the sincerity of his intentions. If this letter were to have the desired effect, the king knew that he had to use the customary forms of address, which no contemporary Protes-

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tant could employ in good conscience, not recognizing the pope as spiritual head of the Christian Church. But as desperate times required desperate measures, Henri bowed to convention and indicated his resolve “to render during our lifetime, the obedience which we owe to your Holiness and to the Apostolic See.” He then expressed his desire “to resume and observe in all things the same means that have been held and employed by our predecessors, in the observance of the honour and respect due to the Holy Father and the Holy See; and this for the purpose of entertaining, together with the filial devotion and reverence that belong to it, the good and perfect intelligence which is requisite between the Holy See and the kings and kingdom of France, for the universal welfare of Christendom and the maintenance of the Holy Catholic Church and religion.”153 Altogether, these timely royal actions quieted for a time the grumbling among the royalist Catholics over Henri’s religious profession. They were heartened by his fresh overtures to Rome and eager for the results of the new royal embassy. The Calvinist king was also hopeful. He anticipated that the negotiations with Pope Clement VIII offered a better chance of success than had existed under the latter’s two predecessors, since this pontiff had been a partisan of the late Sixtus V and thus an enemy of Spain. First impressions were deceiving, however, for Clement had come to regard the ultra-Catholic faction in France as “a spur and necessary instrument of the King’s Conversion.”154 Hence, he continued the League’s regular monthly subsidy at his accession. He also retained as legate the cardinal de Plaisance, whom he gave fresh instructions to confirm the late bulls of excommunication against Henri IV and, more ominous still, to issue a declaration of papal consent for the election of a Catholic king for France by the Estates General.155 Hoping still to find a compromise with the Holy See, Henri prohibited his parlements from condemning the new papal decrees, though not before the judges at Châlons had issued such an edict.156 As a final indication of his position, the new pope refused to see the Huguenot monarch’s representatives or even permit them to set foot in Rome.157 Evidently, Clement was not convinced of the sincerity of Henri’s desire to reconcile with the Roman Catholic Church, given the latter’s past behaviour and many public professions of faith. As he later asked the Venetian ambassador, “How can we believe in Navarre? One of his own party caused us to be told that even if Saint Peter himself declared that the king would become a Catholic we had better not believe it, for he has reached an age when it is ridiculous to think that he could change his faith ... It is a tale to tell children to say that he has any genuine thought of becoming a Catholic.”158 Many of the French

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king’s Catholic supporters had given guarantees of the latter’s good faith, to be sure, but the pope challenged pointedly in response: “Who will bind the cities or answer for the marshals? Some say Navarre himself, but when he is king who will venture to disobey him?”159 On that bitter note of papal reproach, Henri’s negotiations with Rome came to a halt. By the beginning of December the Calvinist monarch’s position in France had become very serious. He was in real danger of losing his Catholic support, and, Sully noted further, most of the royal troops, “Protestants, Catholics, and foreigners [alike], served him without [genuine] affection and perhaps wished more than they feared that he might suffer some considerable loss.”160 That would force him finally to choose between his Calvinist profession and the crown. What is more, the royalist Catholics used the king’s distress to intensify their pressure on him to abjure. The Gallican clergy in particular demanded that Henri authorize a second meeting of French bishops at Chartres, presumably to insist upon the Huguenot monarch’s immediate conversion and to threaten him should he decline.161 Yet these men also tried to make Henri’s abjuration as palatable as possible by assuring him that he could be absolved without having to humiliate himself before the pope in Rome. This could be accomplished easily, they argued, by summoning either the Estates General, the sovereign French courts, “or those whom it pleases the king to convoke together after the manner of the councils of Constance and Basle.”162 Such bodies, they claimed, could lift a ban of excommunication levied by the pontiff on their own authority, though doubtless Clement VIII would have had much to say on that subject. This may explain in part why Henri’s relations with Rome underwent such undulations. His own constant appeals for a national assembly to instruct him were far too reminiscent of the conciliar movement that the papacy had barely managed to defeat in the previous century. Thus, even a pope as supportive of Henri IV as Sixtus V had become in his final years would never have countenanced a secular assembly convened to discuss matters of faith without the authority or participation of the spiritual head of the Catholic Church. A similar impasse confronted the king in both the military and political spheres. Following Parma’s retreat from France the previous spring, the stalemate had resumed in the civil war. As the months passed and the duke sickened, the likelihood of a third invasion from Flanders appeared more and more remote. Meanwhile, Henri’s negotiations with the League in April and May had accomplished nothing other than, perhaps, revealing an inclination toward peace within the ultra-Catholic faction and the extravagant conditions of “personal

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advantage” upon which the League leaders were willing to come to terms.163 Even so, noted a disappointed Villeroy de Neufville, “[i]t is very difficult to negotiate a peace embarrassed by the war as we are; I have often remonstrated this to the leaders of both parties but in vain, as each wants to keep his advantage, or that which he imagines he has, as if they feared giving each other too much leisure [to obtain more].”164 Villeroy’s only solution to the military and political deadlock was to urge the immediate conversion of Henri IV. “Behold the theatre of mans life,” mused the contemporary historian Jean de Serres. “Divers passions appeare in diverse acts, hatred, rebellion, infidelity, treason, and fury shall play a long and tragicke rowle in many scaenes.”165 Had the duke of Parma lived to carry out his third invasion of France as anticipated, the outcome of the civil war might have been decided on the battlefield in a single afternoon. But with the duke’s death on 2 December, the Calvinist king faced a grave political crisis. Victory could no longer be obtained on the battlefield, and the royalist Catholics demanded with growing insistency that Henri convert, clamouring that he could expect only the desolation and ultimate ruin of France from further delay,166 a delay they no longer would tolerate. In short, the Huguenot king had run out of options.

t h e lea gue es tates a n d t h e c o n fe r e n c e of s uresne, ja nua ry to a p r il 1 5 9 3 Henri IV was not alone in his adversity, however. The duc de Mayenne, too, confronted a personal political crisis, due partly to the deterioration of League unity since March 1590, partly to his fading credibility as ultra-Catholic leader, and partly to his worsening relations with Spain. Generally “held in derision” by the party rank and file, the duke’s apparent timidity and “nonchalance” in the conduct of the civil war were blamed for the League’s many defeats.167 Furthermore, his leadership, never very firm to begin with, was also under siege by the ducs d’Aumâle, d’Elboeuf, de Nemours and the young Charles de Guise – all of them relatives of Mayenne with their own aspirations to power.168 Equally alarming were recent developments in Paris, where the citizenry had divided “between Leaguers and latent royalists.”169 Protesting loudly against their embattled protector in late autumn 1592, the majority of Parisians had begun agitating for peace with Henri IV on the suspicion that Mayenne and the other Catholic commanders hoped that the civil conflict might continue so as “to conceal their damnable actions.”170 Meanwhile, the judges of the rump parlement and the Chambre des comtes, joined by lesser officials, held a confidential meeting of their

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own on 20 October. Those in attendance agreed to open talks independently with Henri, the central focus of which would be to proffer a formal request that he renounce his Calvinism and convert to the Roman faith. In return, they would pledge their recognition of his authority as king. Should he refuse, however, the judges agreed to use all means at their disposal to attract royalist Catholic participation in the anticipated meeting of the Estates General, to assist in electing a new Catholic monarch for France.171 Although these men were willing to acknowledge Henri’s exalted rank and royal dignity at this time, and even to declare themselves his subjects, they stressed nevertheless that their final submission to him depended upon his adopting the religion of the majority of his people. Ten days later, on 30 October, the judges presented their resolution to an assembly of the Paris quartiers, where it passed overwhelmingly.172 Then a messenger was dispatched to the Calvinist king, whose conversion was requested formally on the central premise that religion alone divided his subjects and compelled them to take up arms against him. According to Micheal Wolfe, this turn of events in Paris was important precisely because it failed. As neither Henri nor Mayenne would “risk their delicate coalitions on talks which would lead to their mutual downfall,” the ominous result was that moderate Catholics in both parties were encouraged to follow a course independently of their respective leaders. Hence, by January 1593, and the opening of the League Estates, the king (and one must include the duke as well) “had every reason to fear the emergence of a truly formidable Tiers Parti of Catholics committed to his immediate conversion or to his immediate ouster should he refuse to see the light.”173 In general outline, this appraisal of the political situation facing both men in late 1592 is accurate. The problem is that it also is onesided. While it acknowledges the importance of religious consideration in the actions of the Parisian judges and quartiers, it overlooks the potency of the same motivation in Henri IV and the duc de Mayenne, whose swift repudiations of the resolution are presented in only political terms. While the king’s objection to the Paris proposal on the grounds of conscience is acknowledged,174 the implication is that this was the result more of lip-service than of sincere reflection, and that his real opposition stemmed from his political view (doubtless also true) that the new offer was just another League ploy to divide the Catholics in his party. Although pragmatic considerations undoubtedly lay behind Henri’s response in part, the important element of religion in his reaction cannot be dismissed so lightly. When he declared his long held conviction that private conscience was “such a precious thing”

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that he never would compromise his own “by such despicable arrangements,” and added that whatever faith he followed did not change the fact that his subjects were duty-bound to acknowledge his authority as their rightful monarch,175 he was reaffirming in emphatic language the two principles of blood and religion that continued to define his actions. The same rule applies to Mayenne. He could not accept the judges’ resolution because of his fundamental belief that the king had to be Catholic before his sovereignty could be recognized. Only this could preserve the Catholicity of the monarchy and French society as the principal guarantee of the sacred links between them. Nor could Henri’s mere agreement to receive instruction justify the League’s submission prematurely, as the judges proposed, for instruction (Villeroy de Neufville and others warned repeatedly) did not always lead to conversion. Hence, the duke’s protest that any plan for reconciliation with the Huguenot king required consultation with the entire party, was not simply an expedient to evade what he undoubtedly also saw as a threat to his unsteady leadership and the crumbling unity of the League.176 It was a genuine concern. As it was, only his timely arrival in the French capital in early November, coupled with his firm promise to summon the Estates General within a month, quieted the mounting opposition. Otherwise, reported the relieved Spanish resident, Don Juan Bautista de Tassis, the citizens would have submitted to the Huguenot monarch; “and what Paris does, the rest of the great cities of France will do.”177 Mayenne’s pledge to summon the League Estates was a reluctant decision and a last resort that revealed the precariousness of his leadership and the impotence of his faction. Hitherto, he had used this promise as an evasive ploy to buy time both to protect his position as head of the ultra-Catholic cause in France and to secure a steady supply of aid from Spain, in exactly the same way that Henri IV used his repeated promises to receive instruction. Yet it was evident to everyone who had frequent contact with the duke, and especially to Parma, “that he has little eagerness to summon the assembly so soon” and perhaps wanted to avoid it altogether,178 for despite the potential advantages to be gained from a meeting of the Estates, there were genuine risks, as well. On the one hand, if the assembled delegates could be convinced to overturn the Salic Law and declare the throne vacant on the basis of League theories about the supremacy of religious qualifications for the crown, Henri IV could be discredited as rightful French monarch, a Catholic could be elected king in his place, and the League’s flickering power in France might rejuvenate around a course of action that could rally its members and the

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nation.179 In that event, Mayenne’s leadership would be vindicated and his prominence in French affairs would be assured thereafter. But on the other hand, the Estates could pose a fatal threat to the duke’s shaky position, because the meeting would give his rivals for command an ideal forum in which to criticize his actions and challenge his authority with appeals for popular support. What made Mayenne especially vulnerable at this point was the steady deterioration of his relations with his Spanish allies, with whom he had been “in perpetual piques and reproaches” since autumn 1590.180 This erosion was due chiefly to the League leader’s persistent resistance to strong pressure from Philip II to summon the Estates General for the election of his daughter, the Infanta Isabella, as queen of France. Appearing outwardly to comply, the duke had issued several declarations summoning the assembly, the first of which set the meeting for 3 February 1590 at Melun. But on each occasion he had revoked the decrees on the same excuse used by Henri IV whenever postponing his instruction: the conditions of war did not permit it.181 Parma believed that Mayenne’s foot-dragging stemmed from his determination to retain the chief authority in France come what may and to his distrust of Spanish motives.182 It is also likely that the League leader resented his utter dependence on Philip II’s military force and the control this gave the latter over the direction of ultraCatholic affairs, “for [the duke] knows quite well that without the support of that sovereign he could do nothing against the forces of the King of France.”183 After all, Spanish, not League, troops had relieved Paris in 1590 and Rouen in 1592, which contributed to the widely held belief that “this war is kept alive [solely] by the will of Spain.”184 His powerlessness must have grated on the League leader, who was acutely aware of it and embarrassed by the fact that his Spanish allies had come to “make little account” of him.185 Parma had even speculated in a letter to Philip II whether they would require Mayenne’s services much longer, given the duke’s lack of credit with his own party and the Spaniards’ growing suspicions of his political reliability.186 To preserve his grip on ultra-Catholic affairs, therefore, and maintain his autonomy from Spain without sacrificing Spanish support, Mayenne had temporized continually over the issue of the Estates General. As Parma had lamented, the League leader created “100,000 excuses each month” to put off convoking the promised assembly.187 Don Diego de Ibarra’s assessment was even more blunt. He accused Mayenne of deliberately putting obstacles in the way of the Estates to protect his leadership and extort more aid from Philip II on the threat of negotiating with the “Béarnais” unless that support was immediately forthcoming.188

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Although increasingly pessimistic that Mayenne ever would summon the Estates and aware of the duke’s secret negotiations with Henri IV in spring 1592, the prince of Parma had endorsed the League leader’s incessant demands for money and matériel because of the rebel faction’s importance to Spanish policy.189 He had even advised Philip II to be still more generous in gratifying Mayenne’s exorbitant requests for guarantees of lands, titles, and revenues should the Infanta be elected queen. (In fact, the Spanish monarch had already established a slush fund of 200,000 écus to “encourage” hesitant French nobles, no doubt on the advice of his agents that money was “the principal way to win them over.”)190 With Parma’s death in December, however, and the crisis this produced in Spain’s position in the Netherlands, the League leader suddenly lost his only reliable source of military aid, and with it much of his political leverage in both France and the rebel party. As a result, he was compelled to summon the long-awaited Estates General for January 1593 as the sole alternative to complete disaster. So just like Henri IV, with whom the parallels were very strong at this time, the duke found that, having run out of political options, his hands were tied and that he, too, was facing an unwanted decision he had struggled persistently to avoid. Three weeks prior to opening the Estates General on 27 January 1593, Mayenne published a declaration in which he cogently defended the League’s opposition to Henri’s claims to the crown along very conservative lines. He also urged the necessity of finding a solution to the succession problem, though without explicitly proposing the election of a Catholic monarch.191 Protesting his faction’s unbroken commitment to the fundamental laws of France and its sole desire to preserve the state, the duke argued that all loyal Frenchmen would have accepted “Navarre” as king in accordance with the Salic tradition had he been a Catholic, but because of his persistence in religious error and his excommunication by Rome, Henri was ineligible for the succession. Indeed, continued Mayenne, “the perpetual and inviolable observation of religion and piety in this kingdom since the days of Clovis, [which was] reaffirmed in the Estates General of 1576 and 1588,” made it impossible to acknowledge Navarre’s claims to the throne. “One may not justly blame Catholics” for rejecting him, therefore, because they “have followed the law of the Church, the example of their predecessors, and the fundamental law of the kingdom, which require of a prince who pretends to the crown of this monarchy that he be a true son of the Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church.” At the heart of the duke’s argument was a view rooted deeply in French mentalité about the antiquity of the interconnection between Catholicism and the succession to the crown: whenever religious qual-

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ification and the Salic Law conflicted, the former always took precedence over the latter. This was because the ancient promise sworn at the coronation to protect and defend the Catholic faith in France against all heresy “is the first oath of our kings” upon which was “founded the obedience and fidelity of their subjects.” Indeed, without that royal commitment to “right religion” as defined by the traditional Roman Church, Frenchmen would be released from their equally sacred obligation of loyalty and service to the Crown, and the fabric of society would tear. Yet religion must transcend mere politics in any case, Mayenne argued, on the persuasive assertion that “the Church does not exist within the state but the state within the faith.” What the duke’s declaration did was to bring into sharp relief the irreconcilable positions of the League and the Calvinist king with respect to the monarchy and monarchical succession, with two important effects. First, Mayenne’s declaration showed sufficient understanding of the extreme ultra-Catholic position to buttress his troubled leadership of the rebel party. It threatened that position, too, however, for as the Spanish resident observed, should the “Béarnais” convert or merely feign Catholicism, he would “dupe everyone” and succeed, as there would be no further justification for resistance.192 Second, the declaration sent a clear message to the royalist Catholics that they had been fooled into serving Henri de Navarre for four years by temporizing measures and pledges as yet unfulfilled, and that the time had come to decide between the Huguenot king, on the one hand, and the good of the state and the faith, on the other. Beset by rivalries for command from his own relatives and growing hostility from Spain, whose continued support was essential to the League’s survival, Mayenne recognized that he had to present himself at least as a low-key ultramontanist in early 1593 if his authority were to continue. This was also essential if he were to improve his credibility among Catholic extremists, especially after having crushed the efforts of the radical Seize in Paris to seize control of the city in November 1591, hanging some of the ringleaders, arresting others, and forcing the remainder underground193 – hence Mayenne’s urgent need to make a vigorous attack against heresy and even, implicitly, against Gallicanism, one of the mainstays of Henri IV’s appeal among moderate French Catholics. Only this could strengthen his weakened position within the party and secure his leadership. As well, by not committing himself definitively to the election of a Catholic monarch or the Spanish Infanta, he obtained fresh room to manoeuvre.194 At the same time, the duke’s declaration posed a serious threat to the public image of the Calvinist king, who long had contended that the throne was his by right of blood and that he would receive instruc-

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tion once the civil disturbances were resolved. It presented him with a direct challenge to fulfil his repeated pledges and convert. Only narrowly had Henri IV managed to persuade the royalist Catholics in August 1589 to accept his view of the pre-eminence of Salic Law, exclusive of religious qualification, on the promise of receiving instruction within six months. This guarantee, combined with a strong conviction that the Guises “were guilty of [Henri III’s] death, of which we never so much as thought,” had rallied royalist-Catholic nobles around the Huguenot monarch. But far from keeping his word, Mayenne charged, Henri had resisted instruction “so as not to be constrained by his subjects,” and preferred instead “to trust to the success of his arms” to obtain his goals. Further, he had refused League offers of peace on the single condition that he abjure because, alleged the rebel leader, his real aim was to subvert Catholicism and establish the Calvinist heresy in its place.195 Mayenne’s appeal to all Catholic Frenchmen to join with the princes, prelates, and deputies “of this party” to save their religion thus sharply contradicted Henri’s portrayal of the League as a faction of malcontents in the service of Spain whose leaders concealed political ambition behind the mask of religion. To this the duke objected (in the words of one modern historian) “that the religious condition [of French sovereignty] was not a simple question of wilfulness of subjects but a profound matter of conscience that could not be compromised.”196 As a result, any possibility of Henri’s building bridges to the more moderate Leaguers was destroyed effectively, while a door was opened to reconciliation between them and the disillusioned Catholics of the royal party, who were threatening even now to abandon the king. There was, of course, widespread speculation about the duc de Mayenne’s real motives for issuing the declaration and summoning the Estates. Some alleged that he entertained thoughts of his own election as king. Still others argued that his actual purpose was to prevent the candidacy of his relatives, the ducs de Guise and de Nemours. Both men sought the throne either by election or by marriage to the Spanish Infanta after she had been declared queen. But “not being able to claim sovereign power for himself,” since Mayenne was married already, while his past performance as League leader inspired little support for his election, “he refuses to be the vassal of his nephew, or of his younger brother, and he will not work under them.”197 Meanwhile, there were those who argued that the duke planned to use the assembly as a vehicle for the conquest of France by Spain in return for certain rewards. This claim was countered by that of others, however, who believed that Mayenne saw the Estates as a means not only of

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restoring peace to France, but, more personally, of reviving his diminished authority over the League and securing his political autonomy from Philip II.198 As the Venetian ambassador to Rome wrote in February 1592, “They say that the Duke of Mayenne is not at all anxious that the estates should meet for the election of a [Catholic] king as he desires to continue that authority he now enjoys as LieutenantGeneral of the Crown of France.”199 In all probability, Mayenne never envisaged himself as king; nor would he have consented to the election of a foreign princess or French nobleman, however exalted, to the throne. Either action would have been completely out of character. Conservative by nature, traditional in outlook, and sincere in his profession of faith, the duke believed firmly in the two principles of succession by Salic Law and the Catholicity of the French Crown. He also lacked the imagination and vaulting ambition of his murdered older brothers to conceive of himself as anything but the subject of a legitimate monarch. This explains why he had taken only the title Lieutenant-General of the Crown and Kingdom of France in 1589 (having reluctantly accepted the League leadership from a sense of duty to his family and commitment to his faith) and promoted the aged cardinal de Bourbon as rightful heir to the “vacant” throne following the assassination of Henri III. Moreover, his outlook was not unique. Almost certainly it was shared by Villeroy de Neufville, President Jeannin, and perhaps even a majority of others in the rebel party, who were sincere in their assertions that they would accept Henri IV as their rightful king if he would only convert to the faith of his predecessors. Some contemporaries criticized the League leader’s actions as tactical blunders that confirmed the legitimacy of a Bourbon succession to the French crown in accordance with Salic Law.200 What these observers failed to understand was that Mayenne (and many others like him) could not have acted other than he did because of his profoundly conservative nature and respect for the ancient traditions of France. Because of that commitment to hallowed French custom, which included his conviction that the state could not exist outside the faith, the duke had to oppose Henri IV, whose conversion to Catholicism was, he believed, the only solution to the civil wars. He was resolved, in short, that “no Foreigner should have [the crown], nor even any other but that only Person to whom it belong’d rightfully, Religion being first secur’d.”201 This was the nucleus of Mayenne; it was also the primary thrust of his declaration. For precisely these reasons, the League leader carefully manipulated the mechanics of the ultra-Catholic assembly even before it convened. According to the contemporary historian Enrico Davila, who

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alone seems to have grasped Mayenne’s real motives, the duke selected Paris as the meeting place for two primary reasons. Rejecting Soissons and Rheims as possible venues on the advice of Villeroy de Neufville and President Jeannin, Mayenne recognized that the assembly would be “more publicke and more famous” if held in the French capital, where an increasingly restive citizenry needed stroking, too. More importantly, however, the city was well populated, situated far from the frontier with the Spanish Netherlands and surrounded by royalist garrisons. Consequently, any attempt by Philip II’s agents to influence the Estates with the threat of Spanish arms could be neutralized,202 while the already pliant parlement could be manipulated with greater ease, as well. As for the composition of the assembly itself, Mayenne ensured that many delegates were personal dependents who opposed the election of a foreigner to the throne, rather than “hirelings” bribed by Madrid. As a final precaution, he confirmed that the Estates would vote by order instead of by head. It was Davila’s firm belief that the duke’s chief goal was to stall for time to frustrate Spanish ambitions, though without overthrowing them decisively, so as to maintain his leverage in the hope of provoking Henri IV finally to convert, for Mayenne refused absolutely to preside over the dismemberment of France or the election of a Spanish princess to the throne of St Louis.203 Clearly, then, the convocation of the League Estates General in January 1593 was not nearly the threat to the Calvinist king that historians allege it to be. Indeed, its importance has been over-exaggerated by modern scholars in their search for clear-cut first causes of the subsequent royal conversion in July. The fact of the matter is that by itself the assembly posed little real menace to Henri IV. Contemporaries knew that it was a rump attended by none of the princes of the blood, officers of the Crown, marshals of France, or presidents of the sovereign courts, or by many of the nobility.204 Moreover, because only forty-five or fifty delegates were present at the opening session, the gathering had to be adjourned until February, when the numbers rose to between 118 and 128, the majority coming from Paris and the Îlede-France.205 The assembly, of course, might have worked to the advantage of the League extremists, since the mystique of the “voice of the nation” – even in a rump Estates – could have made it appear as if there were widespread support to break the Salic Law, had the delegates adopted a fervently anti-Bourbon stance.206 But like Mayenne, the delegates opposed any departure from monarchical tradition or fundamental law. For that reason, they rejected an early motion put forward by the extremist cardinal de Pellevé to take an oath never to acknowledge the

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“relapsed heretic” Henri de Navarre as king. What the delegates swore instead was to preserve Catholicism in France and to recognize no heretic as their sovereign, which implied interesting possibilities for Henri should he convert.207 The delegates wre no more receptive of Spanish proposals to elect the Infanta Isabella, despite Philip II’s extravagant offers of aid and reward. (This motion, noted the Calvinist king, “dampened the spirits of many at the said assembly, who do not want to fall under the domination of the Spaniard.”)208 Even Mayenne was astonished at one point when his exorbitant counter-demands, made in the full expectation that they would be rejected by the Spanish monarch, were accepted without quibble.209 Is it any wonder, therefore, that contemporary Frenchmen and foreigners alike – including Pope Clement VIII – dismissed the League Estates “with disdain,” declaring that “it will bring forthe no great extraordinarrie matter?”210 Still, the meeting could not be ignored by Henri IV. Because of the deepening dissatisfaction among his own Catholic servitors, there was a real danger that if he continued to temporize over the matter of his religion, these men might carry out their recent threats to unite with the more moderate Leaguers against him. Mayenne certainly was aware of the dissension. He had noted as far back as January 1591 that the royalist-Catholic nobles would welcome a convocation of the Estates because they feared seeing a Calvinist established securely upon the throne of France, and disliked the Huguenots.211 No doubt for that reason Henri had consented initially to a proposed meeting of the assembly in summer 1592, just as Duplessis-Mornay’s negotiations with Villeroy de Neufville were collapsing. He needed to appease his Catholic supporters with a fresh gesture of good faith and a new promise to receive instruction, the conditions of war permitting.212 As it was, Mayenne’s lucid declaration of 1593 stirred up the Catholic royalists generally, and the Tiers parti specifically, with its implied invitation to join the League.213 The difficulty for Henri, however, was how to respond en roi to the convocation of the Estates without further harming his own position. His initial instinct, expressed privately, was to attack the assembly vigorously as a “rash and insolent enterprise” that, in attempting “to perform all acts of sovereignty,” would neither preserve the Catholic faith nor restore peace to France. These were Mayenne’s declared objectives. Instead, the Estates would “inflame the war and make it immortal.”214 Yet the danger was that if the king’s condemnation of the assembly were too vitriolic, he could risk “lending credence to its claims of legitimacy by the seriousness of his concern.”215 That would weaken his position.

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Weighing his actions carefully in consultation with his advisers, who offered a variety of proposals for an official response,216 Henri did nothing until two days after the opening session of the League Estates on 27 January. At that point, he issued a declaration that defended his rights to the throne, reaffirmed the danger of League subversion under the mask of religion, and called for the immediate submission of the ultra-Catholic faction to his authority without condition.217 At the same time, he had the royalist parlement at Tours publish an injunction “against the assembly to be held in Paris under the name of the duc de Mayenne,” which had been convoked illegally and, hence, was an act of lèse majesté.218 Meanwhile, Henri also granted the royalist Catholics permission to issue a separate declaration in the name of “the princes, prelates, officers of the Crown and principal Catholic lords” to propose a conference with the chief Leaguers “somewhere between Paris and St Denis.” The object of the meeting was to discuss ways of preserving Catholicism in France and restoring peace lest the kingdom fell completely “to the insolence of the Spaniards,” since an end to the conflict could come only through consultation and compromise.219 (Another goal was to pacify the restive royalist Catholics with a further gesture.) A herald was dispatched to Paris with the proposal, and he returned the next day to receive Mayenne’s reply at the city gates. Thus, largely by oblique methods, Henri IV managed not only to oppose the ultra-Catholic assembly with effect, but also to preserve his dignity and political image as rightful French monarch. In refusing to deal personally or directly with the League Estates General beyond issuing an official declaration, or to dignify the meeting with that title, he very neatly undermined its legitimacy in the eyes of contemporaries who were conditioned to such symbolism. This established a pattern he observed over the next few months.220 Meanwhile, the duc de Mayenne accepted royalist offers of a conference, under the urgings of Villeroy de Neufville, who was deeply mistrustful of Spanish aims and similarly “inclined to an Agreement with the King, than to any other resolution.”221 Because of bitter opposition from extremists such as the cardinal de Pellevé, however, it was not until 9 March that the body of the Estates gave its consent, too. But the League leader agreed to the talks on condition that they “be between Catholics alone”; at the same time, however, he expressed doubt that his royalist coreligionnaires would be truly free to exercise their conscience in any case, given their dependence on the king. Hence, he warned, he would repudiate the colloquy if it did not strive, first, to preserve Catholicism in France, and second, to restore peace to the realm. He thus avoided any allusion to the thorny problem of a

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royal conversion and League recognition of the king, which troubled Henri so much that he very nearly rejected the proposed meeting.222As it was, he had to be pressured by the cardinal de Bourbon, Cheverny, the duc de Montmorency, and other royalistCatholic advisers to put aside his resistance and allow Mayenne’s terms.223 Perhaps also problematic was the League leader’s summons to the Catholic royalists to abandon their “heretic” allies, probably as a demonstration of good faith. This had no effect, however. In an increasingly rare demonstration of royalist solidarity and toleration, the Catholics appointed to represent the Huguenot monarch later pledged (on 16 May) to respect the edicts of Mantes of 1591 and to do nothing prejudicial to the interests of their Calvinist comrades-inarms.224 Mayenne then concluded his reply by suggesting Montmartre, St Maur, or Catherine de Medici’s former house at Chaillot as possible venues, to which the royalists countered with Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Only after further discussion was Aubervilliers selected as the meeting place by common consent, though this was changed to Suresne near Saint Cloud for greater convenience. The conference opened three months later.225 During the interval, details were worked out with regard to the date and organization of the meeting, the number and quality of the representatives to be appointed by both parties, the nature of their powers, and so forth. As for the duc de Mayenne and Henri IV, they concentrated on making last-minute military gains to strengthen their respective hands. The former tried unsuccessfully to clear the Seine of royalist garrisons, while the latter tightened his stranglehold more closely around Paris with the old hope of bringing the enemy to battle. In the rump Estates, meantime, a significant pattern emerged in the opening debates. Like Mayenne, the assembly was at heart conservative, monarchical and nationalist in its sympathies. The deputies of the Third Estate and the nobility demonstrated, in particular, a genuine eagerness to reach an accord with the Calvinist king, despite strong opposition from the more radical pro-Spanish clergy – hence the importance of a proposal made by the Second Estate on 5 April concerning the form of signature to be used in the current negotiations with the royalists. It was moved that the title “Estates” be replaced by “assembly” lest the royalists – who refused to concede the legitimacy of the gathering – broke off the talks. Though received favourably by the commons, the clergy was more reluctant to endorse the motion. But they finally acquiesced, and it was adopted formally on 7 April.226 At the first two meetings of the delegates at Suresne, on 29 and 30 April, little more was accomplished than approving credentials and

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arranging safe-conducts. Representing the League were Pierre d’Épinac, archbishop of Lyons and chief negotiator; the marquis de Villars, governor of Rouen; the comte de Belin, governor of Paris; Villeroy de Neufville and President Jeannin, Mayenne’s chief advisers; Jean du Maistre and seven others who stood for the Church, the parlement, and the three provinces of Brittany, Burgundy, and Champagne.227 Acting for the royalists were men hand-picked by Henri IV: Renaud de Beaune, archbishop of Bourges and chief negotiator; Pomponne de Bellièvre; Nicolas d’Angennes, sieur de Rambouillet; Gaspard de Schomberg, sieur de Nanteuil; François Le Roy, comte de Chavigny; Geoffroy Camus, sieur de Pontcarré; Jacques-Auguste de Thou; and Louis Revol, the royal secretary.228 “To be chosen for this crucial assignment,” notes a modern historian, “they must have enjoyed the king’s special confidence,”229 especially as some (e.g., Bellièvre) were recent adherents of his party. Having thus confirmed the credentials of the various participants, a ten-day truce was negotiated at a third meeting on 3 May, whereby all acts of hostility were prohibited within four leagues of the French capital and Suresne.230 Significantly, the truce did not extend to the Spanish forces of Philip II. Not until the delegates had assembled a fourth time on 5 May were substantive matters finally addressed. Although both sides agreed that peace was essential to the exhausted and war-torn kingdom, they differed diametrically over how to achieve it. The essential focus of the debate was whether a king by Salic Law could be constrained by religious principle. Speaking for the royalists, the archbishop of Bourges insisted that Henri IV’s profession of faith did not exclude him from the succession. Though nourished from infancy in the Reformed Religion, the king had repeatedly expressed his willingness to receive instruction and had frequently demonstrated his readiness to do so. He had promised most recently, for example, to protect Catholicism in France and to seek papal consent for the Suresne conference.231 Thus, the Huguenot monarch was no heretic by definition of canon law, which struck only at the authors of heresy and against those who rejected the true faith after it had been demonstrated to them. Henri was, instead, a simple sectary living in religious error, who never had been instructed properly in Catholicism. But because the Calvinist king had received his sceptre directly from God, Bourges continued, these doctrines did not pertain to him in any case. His authority was not contingent upon human conditions, a point upheld by Catholic theology and ancient Church authority. Hence, as God had given men laws and instituted kingship – to both of which the scriptures commanded strict obedience – Henri’s sovereignty could not be challenged either by the Estates General (seeing

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that hereditary monarchy was fundamental and perpetual, having been established also by God) or by rebellion or revolt. For all of these reasons, declared the archbishop of Bourges, the basis of any accord between the warring factions had to be the unconditional obedience of all French subjects to Henri IV as their legitimate sovereign. When that recognition had been given, the prelate assured his listeners, the king undoubtedly would convert for the good of the realm. Speaking for the League, the archbishop of Lyons agreed that peace in France could be maintained only by obedience to the rightful monarch. But, he argued, achieving that peace would be impossible so long as there existed a diversity of religion between the Huguenot king and the majority of his subjects. Catholics in good conscience could not recognize a heretic as their sovereign. That was contrary to the doctrines of the Church and French custom, royalist interpretations notwithstanding. Indeed, without that common profession of religion between the prince and his subjects, pursued Lyons, the realm could not live in that “true fraternity” of the Christian community commanded by God. Nor could a heretical monarch be trusted. The example of England amply proved what could happen when a prince had too much power to harm the Church. As it was, French Catholics had no reason to believe Henri de Navarre’s frequent pledges to receive instruction. His past actions had led many to suspect, instead, that his oaths were merely a ruse to secure his throne and that his real goal was to supplant the ancient faith with the Calvinist heresy. Lyons then invoked unconsciously the same principle that Jeanne d’Albret had impressed so powerfully upon her son over twenty years before, when he insisted that blood and religion had to be united for a prince to succeed to the crown of France. The establishment of “the kingdom of God” and the security of Catholicism had to be the foundation of any treaty signed with the royal party, and not obedience to Navarre. To this the royalist comte de Chavigny retorted, echoing his royal master, that the current civil war was fought not for the sake of religion, but against those who used religion to usurp the state. As for the traditional Church, it was safeguarded well enough by the king’s Catholic servitors already. On that sour note, the discussion ended, and the meeting was adjourned until the next day. The delegates’ fifth session on 6 May ended just as inconclusively, except that it brought into even sharper relief the major contention between the two factions. The royalists still would not commit the king to conversion until the ultra-Catholics had recognized him as their lawful prince and rejected Spain, thereby “rendering unto Caesar what was Caesar’s.” Meanwhile, the Leaguers still would not accept Henri IV

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or renounce the Spanish alliance – their sole remaining weapon in the civil war – until the Huguenot monarch had abjured, thereby “rendering unto God what was God’s.” Otherwise, the debate followed the same general pattern as the day before. To the archbishop of Lyons’s solemn affirmation that French Catholics had been forbidden to recognize Henri de Navarre as king by a succession of popes “who are our prophets [and] angels of God, assisted by His spirit,” the archbishop of Bourges countered that these strictures were invalid, since they had been issued by pontiffs subservient to the will of Spain. “That was not the way,” admonished the royalist prelate, “to bring back princes who have strayed from the bosom of the Church.” Then, in response to Lyons’s argument that Navarre’s succession was unacceptable to Catholic France because he had failed to convert despite many opportunities to do so since 1584, Bourges repeated that it was the primary duty of all Christians to fear God and honour the king in strict accordance with the teachings of scripture and the express commands of Jesus Christ. After this point-for-point exchange, the session dissolved quickly into a heated dispute over the limits of obedience to the hereditary monarch, the authority of Rome, and the liberties of the Gallican Church. The debate culminated in one royalist delegate’s angry assertion that Henri IV lacked neither the courage nor the friends to defend what God and natural law had given him! So this meeting, too, ended in stalemate, having accomplished nothing. During these first five sessions of the Suresne conference, the Calvinist king had kept a very low profile. He had even removed himself to the vicinity of Senlis and Compiègne so as to be close enough to monitor the talks, but far enough away that his presence would not jeopardize them to his political disadvantage.232 A masterstroke of royalist diplomacy, the colloquy had already succeeded in shifting popular attention away from the concurrent meeting of the League Estates, which effectively destroyed that body’s authority and rendered its debates “of only secondary importance.”233 This much is clear from the fact that as the ultra-Catholic deputies left Paris to attend the initial meeting of 29 April, they were met at the city gates by a large crowd of citizens clamouring for peace.234 This explains Henri’s extreme caution to do nothing that might have tipped the political balance in the League’s favour and thereby shifted the focus of attention back to the Estates. Even though he was not involved directly in the discussions at Suresne, Henri exerted a powerful influence. It is obvious, for example, that the king had briefed the royalist delegates very carefully. The arguments they used at the fourth and fifth meetings were identical to those he had employed since before 1589 in defence of his reli-

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gious profession and his claims to the crown. Henri also corresponded regularly with his representatives once the talks had begun, receiving their reports and issuing new instructions. As well, he held personal interviews with Gaspard de Schomberg and Louis Revol to learn firsthand what progress was made and to relay his directions for the next round of negotiations.235 A the same time, he worked quietly behind the scenes to hamstring the League Estates, by attempting to divide key members from the ultra-Catholic faction with offers of rich reward and by pursuing separate peace talks with the pro-League duc Charles de Lorraine. (The latter discussions had begun earlier through the mediation of Henri’s old ally, the Grand Duke of Tuscany.)236 The king even made secret overtures to Mayenne himself, who, it appears, thought briefly at this time of arranging private terms with his royal adversary, “being otherwise thwarted by the princes of Italy, who employ themselves in the kinges assistance, to the embarrassment of the king of Spaines greatness.”237 But none of these efforts bore fruit, and the Suresne talks wore on inconclusively, all because of the persistent stumbling block of Henri’s religion. From the frustrated tone of his correspondence after the meeting of 6 May, the Calvinist king evidently was losing hope of achieving any success from the talks the longer the deadlock continued. As he wrote in exasperation to the duc de Nevers, the royalist delegates had promised much good from the conference, but all that they and their League counterparts had discussed so far, it seemed, were their powers and safety at Suresne.238 Moreover, he was very anxious about the ill effect the lack of demonstrable progress was having on the continued growth of dissension within the royal party. As it was, recalled d’Aubigné, the Calvinist king’s Catholic followers were close to mutiny over his failure to receive instruction under the present circumstances.239 The princes of the blood were particularly fearful that unless he converted immediately, the League Estates would elect a monarch for France who was not of their house. Others complained, meanwhile, that Henri’s obstinacy over religion exposed the kingdom to the danger of yet another Spanish invasion. After all, letters intercepted just recently from Madrid revealed that Philip II was sending a further 4,700 troops to reinforce the rebel faction.240 Furthermore, the king could not fall back upon his Huguenot support as a counterbalance at this time, seeing that the majority of these troops were scattered in garrisons too distant to provide him with immediate aid. Besides, they had not been paid (deliberately, it was suspected) by the Catholic surintendant des finances, the slippery marquis d’O.241 Finally, there was the ongoing menace of the Tiers parti to consider, along with the king’s two scheming cousins, the car-

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dinal de Bourbon and the comte de Soissons. The latter was even suspected of raising troops covertly for his own purposes.242 It is powerful testimony, indeed, of the dangers Henri faced within his own party at this time that he thought seriously of gathering “some paied troupes of strangers about him, with some French also” – à la Henri III – as a personal bodyguard.243 Fearing the precariousness of his position and the growing disunity of his party, the king wrote impatiently (c. 8 May) to the royalist delegates at Suresne at the conclusion of their fifth session. He ordered them to press forward with the negotiations as soon as the League deputies returned from Paris and their consultations with the ultra-Catholic leaders. In short, Henri was desperate to win some concrete result from the talks, or at least to find some opportunity that could be exploited to his advantage.244 He now faced the same problem on the political front that he had faced on the military front a year and a half before: his fortunes depended upon winning a swift strategic victory at the conference table, but because of the stalemate that had developed over the issue of his religion, that success was increasingly unlikely. The Huguenot monarch was slowly coming to the conclusion in his own mind that time was running out and he was going to have to break the deadlock by some drastic action.

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7 Conversion and the Conscience of the King, May to July 1593 “My friends, I fear for you. I am of the same religion as you are; I feel the same zeal of Moses and Saint Paul, and I have made myself anathema [to you] in order to save God’s church.” – Henri IV to the Calvinist ministers, July 1593

Between fall 1591 and spring 1593, Henri IV had suffered a series of critical defeats that had dangerously weakened his position and, consequently, had strained royalist unity almost to the point of breaking. By stripping the French king of his remaining military, political, and diplomatic options one by one, these reverses had heightened the issue of his conversion as the only viable solution to the civil war. That in turn had amplified existing sectarian tensions within the royal party, where Henri’s Catholic servitors had become so disaffected with his persistent delays in receiving instruction, so resentful of the concessions he had made to the Huguenots, and so anxious that he end the conflict before it ruined France, that they threatened openly to abandon him if he still refused to abjure. The problem was that although the Calvinist king was “a past master at knowing the moods and minds of those with whom he had business,”1 he had exhausted all of the methods by which he had distracted the royalist Catholics in the past from the sensitive issue of his creed. He thereby lost his control. With the failure of the Rouen campaign and the resumption of the deadlock that had thwarted his efforts the previous year, Henri no longer could preoccupy these nobles with military affairs as before. Even his diplomacy in 1592 had failed to divert their attention in view of exorbitant League demands that, if accepted (noted Sully), would have given the enemy “occasion to boast that his power was at their disposal.” This grim situation was made worse by the subsequent rejection of his overtures to Pope Clement VIII, who wanted the French king’s conversion more than he feared the domi-

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nation of Spain. As a result, Henri’s long-cherished hope of consolidating his authority in France on his terms without first having to abjure dimmed steadily. The royalist Catholics, who regarded his conversion as the only route to peace, the security of their religion, and the preservation of the French Crown, now found themselves in a position almost to dictate the conditions under which the Huguenot monarch might secure his throne. Consequently, the chief threat to Henri IV in January 1593 was not the opening of the League Estates General as historians customarily assume; rather, it was the deep-seated disaffection among his own Catholic servitors whose support was crucial to his success. The rebel assembly at Paris was merely the final challenge to the king, because it threatened to broaden and confirm the incipient Catholic revolt in the royal party against his religious profession and sovereign authority unless he abjured. The basic royalism of the deputies and conservatism of the duc de Mayenne had made it very clear that Henri could recover the political advantage, undermine the Estates, and ultimately defeat the League and its arrogant Spanish allies by the simple act of conversion. This was confirmed by the results of the subsequent discussions at Suresne that forced on him the religious solution in a way he could no longer avoid. Since January, Henri had managed to deflect immediate political disaster by denying the legality of the rebel assembly and repeating yet again his willingness “to receive all good instruction and to submit ourselves to what God shall counsel us as being for our welfare and salvation.”2 But he could not alter the fundamental fact of the threat now confronting him, which represented a greater personal challenge to his private conscience, his views of royal authority, and, by extension, his conceptualization of the monarchy than he ever had faced before. The real issue behind ultra-Catholic resistance at this juncture, made very clear by the talks at Suresne, had little to do with the chronology of events. It was not simply a matter of the League’s wanting the king’s conversion before it would accept his sovereignty, or of Henri’s persistent position that his opponents must recognize his authority before he would receive instruction or abjure. The essential question concerned the symbiotic relationship of blood and religion to the French Crown that had been enunciated both by Jeanne d’Albret as far back as 1572 and, more recently, by the Leaguer archbishop of Lyons. For Henri, the royalist Catholics, and the League the two principles were equally inseparable, but where the rebel faction insisted that the monarch had to be Catholic to succeed to the throne – a position shared partially by the royalists, who also viewed Catholicism as intrinsic to French sovereignty – Henri insisted instead upon the inviolabil-

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ity of the fundamental Salic Law and thus upon his rightful claims to the crown irrespective of the religion he professed. The difference was, therefore, one of emphasis: the League stressed religion over blood to ensure the Catholicity of the throne, and the king stressed blood over religion to preserve the integrity both of his royal authority and his private conscience without conditions. Faced with a political stalemate at the very heart of the conflict in spring 1593, the reluctant Huguenot monarch was forced inexorably to recognize that the political and religious goals he had pursued since 1576 were no longer compatible. Like it or not, his conversion was becoming the only way to break the current deadlock and save his crown.

a “nota b le mutat io n ,” may to ju ly 1 5 9 3 Every modern account of this critical moment in Henri IV’s affairs presents his predicament as a straightforward political problem that he resolved coolly and decisively by means of a calculated political solution.3 Threatened by the League Estates General in Paris, the king no sooner learned of the ultra-Catholic delegates’ declaration to his representatives at Suresne that their single objection to his sovereignty was his profession of religion, than he announced his readiness to receive instruction. His conversion to Catholicism followed just two months later, on 25 July, thereby ensuring the collapse of the League.4 Within very broad outlines, this truncated version of events is correct. The problem is, however, that it perpetuates a false image of Henri, his character, and his choices. This conventional approach fails to consider the successive stages by which he reached his decision to abjure and the length of time it took him to do so. Both of these are significant factors in understanding his situation as he saw it and the process of his thinking. Similarly ignored is the agony of conscience he clearly underwent in coming to terms with the reality that to succeed in his political goals and ultimately rule his kingdom in peace, he had to abjure his Calvinist creed. Instead, writes one recent historian, “the king watched the situation carefully; [then] recognizing his opportunity, he abjured the Protestant [sic] faith ... and cut the ground from under his enemies’ feet.”5 Is it any wonder, given such abbreviated accounts, that the myth of Henri IV’s opportunism and religious scepticism prevails? Precisely for this reason, the immediate background of the king’s decision to convert must be examined in detail, with particular attention paid to its timing. Ever since the January inauguration of the League Estates in Paris, the pressure on Henri to renounce his profession of faith had become acute. This was not due, however, to the perceived threat of

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that assembly. It was due to the deepening disaffection of the royalist Catholics, who were becoming more and more sceptical about supporting their Huguenot monarch. Individuals such as the marquis d’O criticized him roundly for what they regarded as his religious obstinacy, while other loyalists – no doubt stung by Mayenne’s frankness in his “Déclaration ... pour la Réünion de tous les Catholiques de ce Royaume” – believed themselves deceived by Henri’s unfulfilled pledges to abjure. So they steadily intensified their threats to abandon him for the enemy camp should he persist in putting off his instruction. Some even talked openly of backing the ambitious cardinal de Bourbon’s candidacy for the throne in the event of an election.6 Warned of this, Henri remarked sardonically to the sullen prelate: “My cousin, take courage. It is true that you are not yet king; but you possibly will be after me.”7 Yet there is no evidence to suggest that the king was ready to capitulate at this time.8 What he hoped was to snatch a political victory from the League at the conference table before he lost his room to manoeuvre and abjuration became his only option. This much is clear from a letter he wrote on 26 April to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, in which he promised “with the good faith and the solemn word of a king, to make a declaration and public profession of the Catholic religion, according to the constitutions of the Church ... two months after my cousin the duc de Lorraine has reached an agreement with me by means of a just and solid peace.”9 Although some historians regard this as proof that Henri had already decided to abjure,10 no such claim can be made. This pledge was simply the price he had to pay for the Grand Duke’s support in two important matters. The first was to separate the duc de Lorraine from the League in order to deny the rebel faction a crucial source of military aid and also to block the movement of Spanish reinforcements to the Netherlands along France’s vulnerable northeastern frontier. The second was to secure a loan of 200,000 écus from the king’s Italian allies for Swiss troops “[to] deliver me from the embarrassment and subjection in which some who call themselves my servants hold me, in order to postpone indefinitely the results of my intentions.”11 Significant here is that the Huguenot monarch not only made his promise contingent upon the conclusion of peace with Charles de Lorraine, but added a factor of delay, just as he had done at Saint Cloud in 1589. He did this to ensure his recognition (he alleged) “by those who otherwise would continue [the war] and remain obstinate in their rebellion” against him. That this was, in reality, a cynical ploy intended by Henri to stall further a full commitment to conversion is revealed by his explicit statement to the English ambassador at this time that “his

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faith is not vendible” and that he refused to give up his Calvinist profession “notwythstanding ye offers of divers Princes if he would fashion himself in ye Catholique Fayth.”12 There is no reason to doubt the king’s word here or to believe that he merely told Elizabeth I’s envoy what she wanted to hear to ensure her continued support. On the contrary, there is ample evidence of his deep personal attachment to Calvinism on religious grounds beyond a simple adherence based on loyalty to his long-dead mother or on political obligations to the Huguenot party and his various Protestant allies. This is revealed by the fact that he continued to practise his faith, despite Catholic opposition, until July 1593, two months after declaring his intention to convert. The sincerity of his faith is also apparent from the general tone of his correspondence since 1589. In letter after letter Henri expressed himself in distinctly Calvinist terms as a member of God’s elect and the agent of His will. To his former mistress, the comtesse de Grammont, for example, he wrote in November that “God will watch over all. By consequence my affairs will go well; because I have in Him all of my confidence.”13 The following January 1590, he used almost exactly the same language while reflecting on the success of his Normandy campaign against the League. “Indeed, I do well on the road and go as God leads me,” he confessed, “because I never know what I ought to do at the [journey’s] end; however, my achievements are miraculous; they are conducted also by the Great master.”14 Nowhere, however, was the king’s tone more explicitly Calvinist than in describing his two great victories at Arques (where, he asserted, “the arm of the Almighty sustained and aided me”)15 and Ivry, both of which he attributed to providence. “God has been pleased to make known that His protection is ever on the side of right,” he announced triumphantly on 14 March 1590, after crushing the League’s forces on the plaine de St André. “His alone is the glory.”16 Clearly, to this sixteenth-century Huguenot, the idea of divine approval in trial by combat had very real and very deep meaning. Contemporary Catholics adhered to this belief too, of course. Villeroy de Neufville attributed the defeat of Henri III’s army at Coutras in 1587 to God’s just punishment for Catholic sins; hence his concern “that all good men rally more than ever to the [Valois] king to serve him loyally.”17 The duc de Mayenne similarly saw the will of God behind his rout at Ivry. The difference is, however, that where Catholics viewed themselves in a passive light as the receivers of grace from an omniscient and omnipotent God ever-present in history – a God who occasionally altered the affairs of men by performing miracles or, in this case, by granting victory to one side or the other in war – the Calvinists saw themselves in an active light as the chosen instru-

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ments and special vessels of God, however unworthy they might be for that role, through whom He worked His will in the world. This latter perspective strongly pervades the letters and statements of Henri IV before July 1593. Addressing his troops just prior to the battle of Ivry, for example, he declared, “God knows the intention of my heart ... He is my judge and irreproachable witness ... I appeal to this great God – who alone knows the designs in the hearts of men – to perform His will through me as He deems necessary for the good of Christianity, and to preserve me inasmuch as He knows that I will be useful for the peaceful repose of this state.”18 Five months later, while preparing for battle against the forces of Parma and Mayenne near Paris, the king wrote in almost identical terms, confessing, “The issue is in the hands of God, who already has ordered what must come to pass, according as it is expedient for His glory and the salvation of my people.”19 In short, Henri’s modes of expression and choice of words right up to spring 1593 clearly reveal that he adhered to the evangelical rather than the Roman Catholic view of the way divine providence governed the affairs of men, a view he had imbibed in his youth and had professed unwaveringly ever since. At the same time, his many appeals to a wise and omnipotent Calvinist God who granted victory to kings in battle for a just cause, confirmed the traditional view of monarchy on which Henri had founded, in part, his rightful claim to the French throne by Salic Law since his accession in 1589. According to most sixteenth-century political thought, if God both creates and ordains the royal dignitas, it is by His grace alone that princes rule over their subjects. So to rebel against the legitimate king, as the League had revolted against Henri IV, was to rebel against the Lord. This was rooted deeply in scripture. “The powers that be are ordained of God,” wrote St Paul to the Romans. “Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.”20 Consequently, the act of rebellion (in the words of a contemporary royalist) meant entering into “a damnable labyrinth” from which it was possible to escape only by recognizing the divinely ordained legitimacy of the Bourbon monarch, regardless of his religion.21 With the Suresne discussions locked in stalemate, however, the king lost his room to manoeuvre, and his steadfast resistance to receiving instruction became untenable. It was now apparent to everyone that a royal conversion was the only way for him to move closer to his goals. This certainly was the thrust of Gaspard de Schomberg’s report to Henri after the fifth session of the conference on 6 May. After listing “all the artifices of the opposition,” Schomberg concluded with the significant detail that the ultra-Catholic deputies had “made desperate

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representation” to their royalist counterparts that their sole objection to the Huguenot monarch was his religion. Once he had satisfied them on this point, then they and the rest of the Catholic nobility of France would be disposed to recognize him as their king.22 Henri’s immediate response, conditioned by years of reflex, was to repeat “his accustomed assurance of his willingness to be instructed.” But he insisted as always that he would submit to this only on his terms. There was a slim chance, after all, that the League delegates might buckle if he displayed an equal degree of firmness in rejecting their proposal. At the very least, this would buy him some time to consider what options he still had, if any. Yet it was the English ambassador’s sober opinion – based upon “assured ground” (i.e., reliable sources) and his own reading of the situation – that the king soon “will be forced to make that metamorphosis [i.e., convert] ... His distress is such, joyned with the practises of the [royalist] Catholickes, as will suffer no other course.” “Howbeit,” he added, “there can be nothing as yet spoken of assurance thereof.”23 That Henri struggled fiercely with this difficult decision in his own conscience, “of which he alone could be the only true judge,”24 is clear from the anxious tone of his letters of c. 8 May, as well as from the visible changes in his mood. According to a contemporary biographer, Baptiste Legrain, the king became uncharacteristically reserved and meditative25 – with good reason: he was being forced to recognize after so many years of struggle that Jeanne d’Albret’s prescription of the unity of blood and religion was not inviolable and that the two principles on which he had based his actions and decisions since early youth were no longer complementary. To help resolve his dilemma, therefore, and perhaps also to gage the limits of his support, Henri solicited advice from various members of his party, Catholic and Calvinist alike. But if he had hoped for some kind of consensus, he did not find it. Instead, “he received a diversity of counsel from his most trusted advisers, some representing to him the honour of perseverance in his faith, others public utility.”26 As to be expected, Catholic nobles such as the ducs de Montpensier and de Nevers, the comte de Cheverny, Jacques-Auguste de Thou, Gaspard de Schomberg, Louis Revol, and François d’O, all urged him to proceed immediately to a conversion. They warned further that unless he went to mass at once he risked losing everything, since his affairs had reached a nadir.27 By contrast, the Huguenots were divided widely on the issue. Sully and the duc de Bouillon (formerly the vicomte de Turenne) both counselled an abjuration as the sole route remaining to his full possession of the throne. In that event, they told the king, the Calvinists assuredly would protest; however, they were too dependent on his

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good fortune ever to abandon him.28 In fact, Sully went so far as to claim credit for convincing the king to convert. In his account of their private meeting on the evening of 15 February in the royal bedchamber, written years later, the old Huguenot recalled weighing carefully the probable political consequences should Henri either not abjure or abjure under Catholic pressure. To ensure that the Calvinists did not abandon him, elect a new protector, and possibly even provoke an additional civil war against his royal master, Sully advised Henri to convert while he still had time to act independently and before the moderate Catholics in both camps united to force his hand. As for the royal conscience, Sully continued, moral integrity and simple adherence to those essential beliefs shared by both faiths were more important than any distinctions of doctrine or dogma. In any case, recognizing that the choice had to be the king’s alone, he warned, “Your Majesty must make a decisive decision without consulting anyone.”29 But Sully’s position was almost unique.30 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, Agrippa d’Aubigné, and many other Calvinist stalwarts exhorted Henri to stand fast on the principle of his faith, reflecting their own unshakable sectarian views. They maintained that the Tiers parti was no real threat; that the election of the Spanish Infanta, should it occur, would split the League to the benefit of the royalist cause; and that all else failing, it was better to rule over a small portion of France in the service of God than reign precariously in a realm dominated by a foreign pope and the insolence of his own subjects, who will have forced him to abjure.31 Yet even though the majority of Henri’s political counsellors held that he ought to convert, he still was not convinced. “I fully recognize what you advise me is true,” he confessed to Sully, “but I see so many spines on all sides I turn that it will be difficult to avoid one of them from pricking me deeply.”32 What this suggests is that the king’s private declaration to his trusted Huguenot adviser on 15 February, that he had decided upon “a course of action by which I easily will achieve all I have fought for, without upsetting anyone,” cannot be taken to mean that Henri at last had made up his mind to abjure. What these two statements really indicate is that he had begun wrestling in a very personal way with the possibility of a conversion, a conversion that was becoming increasingly likely, to be sure, but that he had not yet reached a firm resolution whether to go through with the act. It is significant that at this point Henri began to consult with Catholic churchmen, such as Claude d’Angennes, bishop of Le Mans, and Jacques Davy du Perron, bishop of Evreux; to attend public disputations between Catholic and Huguenot theologians over matters of

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faith; and in particular to seek out the advice of Calvinist religious authority, too. Much more was involved in making his decision than just the practical questions of securing his rule. As a sixteenth-century man of strong conviction, he was agonizing in his conscience over the salvation of his soul, and it is clear that he would not make a decision to convert until satisfied on this essential point. This explains his subdued reaction to a sermon he heard on Sunday, 9 May, by Gabriel Damours, the warrior-pastor who had led the Calvinist army in prayer before the battle of Coutras in 1587. Alarmed at spreading rumours that the king might change his religion, Damours preached “with great boldness and vehemence” about God’s wrathful judgment against him should he commit this apostasy. This message offended Catholics such as the cardinal de Bourbon and the marquis d’O, who wanted a royal conversion and urged that the pastor be punished for his impudence. But Henri lowered his head and answered their injunctions humbly: “What would you have me do? He told me the truth.”33 When precisely the king consulted the Calvinist ministers is difficult to say, though it must have occurred sometime between the fifth and sixth meetings at Suresne (on 6 and 10 May respectively), because the archbishop of Bourges also was present. In any case, as Henri wrote later to his old friend and confidant, the comte de Gourdon, two Huguenot pastors, Morlas and Rottam, “had several discussions before me with the archbishop of Bourges and du Perron,” which involved a close examination of the principal tenets of both faiths. As a result of this theological exchange, he noted, “the Ministers were convinced that one can achieve salvation in the Catholic religion.”34 They, not he, had come to this startlingly tolerant conclusion, and it was the last encouragement he needed to make up his mind. Now armed with the sanction of Calvinist religious and pastoral authority, and in view of his pressing political needs, Henri decided, “in brief, to go to mass.”35 Yet he still issued no public statement and confided in no one save one individual. This suggests a lingering uncertainty in his own mind about the wisdom of his choice and its possible consequences, personal and political. Instead, he sent Schomberg and Louis Revol back to Suresne on 10 May with instructions for the archbishop of Bourges to test the League deputies’ reaction should he proclaim his readiness to convert.36 Whether the king’s two agents were informed of his resolution at the same time is unknown, though it is unlikely in view of his discretion, his uncertainty over how his decision would be received, and perhaps even his refusal to reveal the workings of his mind and conscience in an undignified way to his subjects at large. In fact, from surviving evidence it appears that the only other person allowed to

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share the royal secret was the prince de Conti, Henri’s Catholic first cousin and de facto second-in-command, whose two younger brothers led the Tiers parti. Writing to the prince later the same day, the Huguenot monarch outlined his three primary reasons for conversion: to undercut the League Estates and divide the rebel faction from its Spanish allies; to halt ultra-Catholic efforts to destroy his popular image; and most importantly, to placate his own disillusioned Catholic servitors, who were on the verge of mutiny.37 Well aware of the mood prevailing in the League assembly at Paris, Henri observed that the deputies’ fear both of growing Spanish domination and of continuing civil war had engendered in them “a desire to accommodate with me, if I were of their religion.” He further noted that their leaders had made similar protestations, though rather to conceal “that their real cause is other than religion” than from more honest motives. Even so, some of them were trying to turn popular opinion against him by making his conversion appear hopeless. Unless he took steps to halt these efforts, French Catholics might throw themselves into the arms of Spain in the belief that this was the only way to defend themselves and their religion. The king could think “of no better remedy than to convoke a number of prelates around me to undertake my instruction,” though he predicted accurately that this would have little direct effect on his League enemies. By challenging his sincerity and appealing for guidance to a hesitant Rome, they could “render suspect and odious all negotiations on my side” and thus find the means to sustain their opposition.38 Nevertheless, Henri reasoned, a timely conversion would “serve to content the common wish of my Catholic subjects who recognize me already; in that, at least, I hope the convocation [proposed initially for 10 July at Mantes] will be worth it, even if it has no force with the other party.” At Suresne, meanwhile, the sixth meeting of the conference had begun sluggishly, as Schomberg and Revol arrived late, but once they had delivered the king’s message to the archbishop of Bourges, the latter interrupted a desultory discussion on the current condition of France to summon the League delegates “to open their hearts to reveal candidly what lay within.” The archbishop of Lyons responded, as usual, by restating the ultra-Catholic position at some length. No sooner had he finished, however, than Bourges raised the still hypothetical question of Henri IV’s conversion as instructed, asking if the ultra-Catholics would assist their royalist colleagues to achieve this end? Lyons replied that, indeed, they desired nothing more so that they could return in good conscience to their proper obedience under a Catholic monarch of France. This was provided, of course, that the

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pope gave his sanction, as they did not wish to violate their holy obligations to Rome.39 Sensing that they had reached an important breakthrough in the stalemated discussions, both sides agreed to adjourn the meeting until 17 May to allow consultations with their respective superiors. As a gesture of goodwill, they extended the term of the current truce (which had just expired) for ten more days.40 But in spite of these developments, Henri still did not disclose his intention to convert for another week. Rather, he kept silent on the issue while trying, it appears, to find some greater assurance from members of the League that they would respond positively to his abjuration, instead of continuing to hide behind the equivocation of the need for papal approval. Part of this effort involved another unsuccessful attempt to reach a private agreement with the duc de Mayenne, who seemed willing to negotiate, “albeit the king doe make himself a Catholicke” first.41 It is also likely (though there is no hard evidence to confirm this) that Henri was actively canvassing support from individuals and influential groups, and perhaps even making one last agonizing reappraisal of his own position before committing publicly, and thus irrevocably, to a conversion. Otherwise, he made no outward manifestation of his intention to abjure,42 though Sir Thomas Edmonde, who knew nothing yet of the king’s private resolution, believed that he would have to convert soon to stave off trouble within the royal party. As it was, “the Catholickes of his side” pressured Henri relentlessly to abjure as the best means to frustrate the League’s pretensions and divide it from the French people. With the religious obstacle thus removed, they argued, he would be free “to treate with the said Duke [de Mayenne] of a peace following, as a king with his subjects,” rather than as their equal. In return, the royalist Catholics promised not only to serve the Huguenot monarch loyally, but even “to make assertion of a Private religion in the realme [i.e., schism] ... if the Pope persist in his obstinacie.”43 They also swore to put aside their differences with the Calvinists, the better to ensure Henri’s success. Not until 16 May, however, did the Huguenot monarch at last announce his decision to abjure (having been “converted in his heart”) to an astonished royal council.44 As evidence, he wrote an open letter – coupled with more personal appeals – in which he asked the “most knowledgeable” bishops, prelates, and theologians of France (the majority of them royalists of long-standing) to gather at Mantes on 15 July for his formal instruction and public conversion.45 Ever conscious of his political image, Henri knew that he needed the participation of these priests as “unimpeachable witnesses” of his sincerity and faith in God if he were to counter the inevitable protests

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from the League.46 Not long afterward, the king authorized a similar letter that announced his intentions to the rebel Estates in Paris.47 This news took everyone in the royal camp by surprise, including Sir Thomas Edmondes. He had just reported in a half-finished dispatch to England that Henri was not yet ready to abjure. Indeed, that the evervigilant Edmondes was taken so completely unaware by the king’s decision, especially given his views that an imminent royal conversion was inevitable, further indicates just how carefully Henri had kept his own council until his announcement. But after a short audience, during which the dumbfounded ambassador tried to dissuade him from this course, Edmondes revised his suddenly outdated brief midway, writing that the king “has determyned to render himself a Catholicke, which he would have rather understoode, than published by himself, howebeitt that he would shortlie send a gentleman [to] her Majesty [to tell her] whatt was fitt for him to doe in a case of so great extremitie.”48 The French Calvinists were even more dismayed by Henri’s sudden resolution, which they viewed both as a severe blow to their party and as the ire of God turned against them for their sins.49 The king tried to justify his choice to them on the ground of pressing political necessity. He argued that to prevent the “pernicious designs” of “the new Spanish-Frenchmen” (i.e., the League leaders) to elect a monarch “contrary to the true fundamental laws of the state,” he had resolved to summon “a general assembly of princes, prelates, officiers of the Crown, lords and others of our subjects, from both religions, on 20 July next, at the town of Mantes, to assist us with their advice and counsel in the affairs to be proposed for the salvation of the state, the common weal and repose of our subjects.”50 It was Sir Thomas Edmondes’s opinion, however, that the proposed assembly would be a mere formality, since the king had already determined to become a Catholic.51 Even so, Henri appears to have had serious second thoughts. Though a relatively minor detail, it is perhaps significant that even after he had reached the decision in his own mind to abjure, he still tried to postpone the event. For that reason more than any other, he successively pushed back the dates chosen in July for the ceremony, from the 10th to the 15th to the 20th and, lastly, to the 25th. In the interim, the king hastened to reassure the Huguenots that although “it is necessary that I lose myself for your sake,” he would continue to protect them and to remain Calvinist in his conscience. “I will show everyone,” he swore, “that I have not been persuaded [to abjure] by any other theology than the necessity of state.”52 The Huguenots, however, were unsympathetic to the king’s appeals. Their immediate reaction was to call for an assembly of their own to

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demonstrate their commitment to defending their religion and warn that their ruin would prove very costly to the Catholics should the latter ever dare to attempt it. For the same reason, they proposed a gathering of “honourable delegates” from their various Protestant allies abroad to show “that the true religion [i.e., Calvinism] also is not without friends.”53 The king’s personal appeals to key individuals faired no better. The respected Philippe Duplessis-Mornay in particular was unmoved by Henri’s defence “that he found himself on the very brink of a precipice through the intrigues of some of his own followers ... and saw that his only chance of escape lay in his conversion.”54 He was unimpressed equally by the king’s attempt to shift some of the blame for his situation onto the Huguenots, who, Henri had claimed, “had not stood by him as they ought.” Instead, this staunch Calvinist reproached Henri for his decision, writing, “I am confident, sire, in spite of whatever may be said, that your Majesty cannot forget the favours God has showered upon you.” Always the loyal subject, however, he added his prayers that God “will not forget you ... and I very humbly entreat the Almighty ... that He may impart His spirit to you according to the measure of your temptations, and may make you victorious, to His own glory, to your salvation, and to the instruction of your people.”55 By contrast, the royalist Catholics were overjoyed with the Huguenot monarch’s long-awaited announcement “to embrace and follow the religion of the kings his predecessors.”56 They attributed Henri’s decision to a combination of political and divine inspiration. While clearly recognizing the pragmatic compulsion behind his choice,57 they also wanted to believe that “the Holy Spirit had started to operate in his expectations” and that his conscience had been changed by the grace of God, whom “it has pleased to touch the heart of his Majesty.”58 One ought never to forget that although these men served a Calvinist king, they were devout Catholics to whom sincerity mattered. In response to the royal announcement, they issued the “Déclaration de Mantes” the same day – fulfilling a promise made earlier to Henri – by which they pledged to work closely with the Huguenots, to observe the edicts of toleration of 1591, and to respect the Calvinist faith in France, pending the resolutions of the assembly proposed for July.59 The next step, of course, was to inform the League delegates at Suresne of the royal decision. The following day (17 May) the archbishop of Bourges made the announcement just as the seventh session of the conference began.60 In addition, he submitted a written declaration, intended for the Estates in Paris, that told not only of the king’s intention to convoke an assembly for his instruction, but also of his

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wish that the current negotiations at Suresne be transformed into formal peace talks. For that reason, Henri offered to extend the current truce an additional two or three months, “so that his instruction may not be interrupted by the occupations of war.”61 According to Davila, the ultra-Catholics were stunned at this unexpected news.62 Recovering swiftly from his initial surprise, however, the archbishop of Lyons declared (just as Henri had predicted) that although he rejoiced at the royal resolution, he doubted the king’s sincerity. Hence, the matter would have to be referred to Rome for papal absolution, given Lyons’s insistence that Henri’s conversion would not be valid until confirmed by the pope. This was unacceptable to the royalists, who claimed that Clement VIII was under Spanish influence and would never recognize the king’s abjuration. Their solution was for the French Catholic clergy to absolve him provisionally ad futuram cautelam (“at caution for the future”) until such time as the Holy See was more receptive. At that point, Lyons asked leave to consult with the ultraCatholic leaders in Paris, whereupon the meeting adjourned. Despite efforts to blunt its effects, word of Henri IV’s announcement ignited acrimonious debate in the rump Estates, where the two lower orders favoured accepting the royal offer of a prolonged truce. The clergy, however, vociferously opposed this proposal and threatened ecclesiastical penalties for anyone in direct contact with the “heretic.”63 At length, the assembly was persuaded to hold off any commitment to an armistice until the following July when the Calvinist king’s conversion would have occurred or not.64 Meanwhile, the Spaniards increased their pressure on the Estates to endorse the cause of the Infanta Isabella. No doubt hoping to restore some cohesion to the crumbling unity of the League and preserve Spain’s waning influence at the same time, Philip II’s special emissary, the duke of Feria, appeared before the delegates on 19 May. He gave oral promises of further aid in return for their support of the Infanta’s claims to the crown.65 When they objected vehemently, however, to the ascension of a woman to the French throne, Feria returned on 28 May with the blunt motion that the Estates should overturn the Salic Law and elect Isabella as queen of France.66 This, too, was rejected unequivocally. Thus began “a whole series of formal Spanish proposals and League counter-proposals and objections” that continued until mid-July with just one result: the conclusion that the majority of the delegates, “this rank and file of the League,” wanted no alternative to Henri IV.67 In fact, reported Pierre de L’Estoile, had it not been for the presence of Mayenne to preserve a degree of moderation and respect for Philip II, the latter’s envoys would have been hooted down by the hostile assembly.68 As it was, the deputies mocked every word the Spaniards spoke

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with signs and gestures. Nor did Feria meet with better treatment outside the council chamber, where a hostile crowd of citizens pelted him with rocks.69 Some delegates, of course, endorsed the Spanish terms. The extremist cardinal de Pellevé, for one, urged their acceptance on the spot – a view shared by only a few rebel leaders.70 But others, such as the archbishop of Lyons, rejected the proposals as ridiculous, while the outspoken bishop of Senlis openly denounced them as evidence of Spanish “ambition mixed with religion.” “The Politicks were in the right,” the old man declared, “who had ever said, that the interest of State was hid under the Cloak of Religion.”71 As for the ancient principle of succession, this had been observed in France for 1,200 years, he argued, and could not be set aside without overthrowing the laws of the kingdom or dissipating its territory.72 Besides, added others, if the Salic Law were to be broken, the crown should go properly to England where there was a much older claim.73 Even Mayenne – in whose power lay “the choice and election of a king”74 – was suspected of entertaining Spanish terms only as a lever to force Henri IV to abjure; in fact, it was alleged, he quietly urged the Estates to reject the proposals as both dishonourable and dangerous to France.75 Matters reached a climax on 28 June when the parlement of Paris issued its famous injunction upholding the Salic Law.76 For several days the judges had been conspicuously absent from the Estates as they deliberated over their response to the Spanish proposals.77 On the one hand, they acknowledged that Henri IV was “the first prince [of the realm], to whom the crown belongs by right of blood.” If, therefore, he were Catholic, as he now promised to become, no one could challenge his claims. They also feared Spanish designs against France. On the other hand, the judges were very concerned lest the Calvinist king’s recent decision to convert was merely a ruse to secure his throne, and that relapsing again into heresy he would destroy the traditional Catholicity of the Crown. Thus, they vacillated until reminded by Guillaum Du Vair that, as royal judges, their first obligation, come what may, was to safeguard the throne and the laws of France as Frenchmen and “principal officers of this kingdom, [being] guardians and custodians of the rights of the Crown.”78 On that basis, the parlementaires at last committed themselves to the hereditary principle of legitimacy through royal French blood and the Salic Law, in accordance with their “honour and duty, as men who preferred to lose their life, than to be lacking on this occasion, in preventing the reversal of the laws of the kingdom, of which they were the chief guardians by virtue of their institution, and ... their oaths of loyalty at their reception [into the courts].”79 Two days later, President

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du Maistre80 and a delegation of twenty counsellors went to the Hôtel de Nevers to announce formally to Mayenne that the parlement “has declared and declares null and void everything that has been done or may be done in the assembly of the Estates to the prejudice of the Salic Law and [other] fundamental laws of the kingdom.”81 “After adopting such a position,” notes one modern historian, “the parlement could, of course, accept no alternative to Henry IV, though the judges showed no indication of being willing to accept him before conversion.”82 Despite speculation that he secretly had planned the arrêt in collusion with du Maistre just days before it was issued,83 Mayenne expostulated publicly against the parlementaires for having acted without first consulting him. He then ordered the edict revoked under threat of force if they refused to obey.84 Procureur général Molé replied on behalf of his colleagues, however, that even though “his life and goods were at [the duke’s] disposal, as a true-born Frenchman who would live and die a Frenchman,” he would sacrifice everything before he would submit to a foreign monarch.85 Subsequent efforts to force the judges’ submission in early July also failed. For all intents and purposes, Henri IV’s long-awaited decision to convert, followed by the rebel parlement’s defence of the Salic Law that it had inspired, spelled the collapse of the League Estates and the end of Spanish hopes. In fact, when Feria reappeared before the assembly on 10 July to demand the immediate election of the Infanta as queen and the revocation of the parlement’s injunction, the delegates indignantly ended the discussion.86 Equally significant, the judges’ arrêt (which Villeroy de Neufville hailed as the salvation of France) accelerated the League’s crumbling unity by providing some rebel leaders with an excuse to begin private talks with Henri IV.87 Even Mayenne found himself compelled to sign a three-month truce with the royalists on 31 July (though he shortly took up arms again until late 1595) in view of the second and third estates’ renewal of their resolutions in favour of an armistice, coupled with his faction’s worsening military situation.88 By that time it was evident to everyone that the League was on the verge of ruin, being “full of confusion, without direction and without order.”89 From Henri IV’s perspective, the period from April to July 1593 was no less volatile. The political dividends of his decision to abjure were slow to appear, and he was unable to predict their potential impact with any confidence. In fact, at times it seemed as if his position became worse rather than better. He was well informed, to be sure, of the ferment his announcement had caused at Paris, where “the combustion is great among ... the people, and nobyllitie, demanding earnestlie the peace, and the heades [of the League], and clergie,

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opposing themselves thereunto.” He also had heard reports that 500 citizens had approached the comte de Belin (the rebel governor of Paris) to demand peace once the king had abjured.90 But almost immediately, these first hopeful signs were counterbalanced by news of the League leaders’ efforts to restore their authority over the restive capital by means of persuasion backed with force. Not only had they spread rumours that Henri’s resolution to abjure was a ruse designed to gain Paris and afterward to “cutt the throates of all the Catholickes,”91 but the papal legate had also gone from door to door to preach against the king’s conversion.92 Meanwhile, reports arrived that Mayenne had summoned the comte de St Pol from Champagne with troops “to render the Parisians more peaceable.”93 Far more dangerous to the anxious king, however, was the lengthy delay in the League’s response to his surprise announcement of 17 May. The archbishop of Lyons had kept his word and consulted (on 20 May) with the ultra-Catholic leaders over this unexpected turn of events, but not until 2 June did they publish their decision to refer the whole matter to Rome and, at the same time, to reject Henri’s offer of an extended truce.94 This position was confirmed two days later by Lyons at the eighth and final conference at Suresne, despite appeals from the archbishop of Bourges to reconsider.95 The problem was that having conceded finally – and with enormous reluctance in his private conscience – the political necessity of his conversion, Henri wanted recognition as monarch and an armistice with the ultra-Catholics first, before proceeding to his instruction. He still refused to acknowledge religion as a qualification upon his hereditary claims to the crown; to admit the opposite, noted L’Estoile, would be the act of a desperate man.96 But the longer the rebel leaders delayed their answer to his announcement, the more difficult it would be to defend his position. Although “it is very certain that if the king had not struck this blow, their party [i.e., the League] would not have disunited, while that of the king would have diminished,”97 it was also true that the royalist Catholics had lost all patience with Henri’s temporizing and duplicity over the issue of his conversion, and that they would renew their pressure on him to abjure immediately if the League continued to resist. Consequently, when the ultra-Catholic leaders at last disavowed his resolution to convert, the king had little recourse than to return to the methods he had used since 1589 to preoccupy the royalist Catholics and defeat the League. Thus, just two days after the last meeting at Suresne, Henri laid siege to Dreux. He hoped to draw Mayenne into battle and defeat him as decisively as he had done three years before at Ivry. This new campaign would also distract royalist-Catholic atten-

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tion. That attention was momentarily well disposed to a fresh military effort, if only to counter enemy charges that the royal conversion was the forced result of the ongoing stalemate in the war. Moreover, “should victory arrange itself on the side of reason,” the king mused hopefully, it would produce the outcome he needed “[more] promptly than any conference.”98 In the meantime, Henri did everything he could “to render himself master of Paris.”99 He stirred up the citizens against their leaders by making constant offers of peace; he wrote to various churchmen to invite their assistance at his forthcoming instruction; and he welcomed any Leaguer who submitted voluntarily now that he had satisfied the religious question. He even contemplated military action against the capital, perhaps by attacking the faubourg SaintGermain.100 Thus, although Henri’s authorization of grain shipments to Paris in late May or early June may be interpreted as a royal propaganda ploy “to identify [his] conversion with prosperity,”101 it was far more likely a reminder to the citizens and their leaders of the “apple and rod” policy he had used during the siege of 1590. This was a demonstration, in short, that he still controlled all the approaches to the French capital and the means, therefore, to cut off those supplies at will should the city remain stubborn in its resistance. Nor did the Calvinist king forget to involve his Catholic servitors directly in these efforts. He had them publish open letters to the League, which summoned all true Frenchmen (bons françois) to obedience under their rightful monarch for the defence of the patrie against the hated foreigner.102 These measures failed to produce the desired results. Though it was reported several times that the duc de Mayenne had taken the royal bait and was marching to relieve Dreux, he never appeared. The town surrendered on 5 July without further incident. The king also received mixed messages from Paris, where it seemed that the League Estates was on the verge of electing a Catholic monarch. Seeing that the conference at Suresne was “broken,” he wrote despairingly on 25 June, “the Spaniards have made offers so great that our enemies have lent an ear.”103 He had heard as well that Count Mansfield (Parma’s successor in the Netherlands) had invaded northern France with fresh forces for the League – hence Henri’s obvious glee when he learned afterward that “the court of Parlament of Paris, have made prohibition uppon paine of Deathe, that noe man doe speake in the abollition, of the lawe Sallique, and have also defended [i.e., prohibited], to speake of the ellection of a newe king.”104 This was the first good news he had received since announcing his decision to convert. He must have been especially delighted to also hear that the duke of Feria and the papal

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legate had been insulted publicly and no longer walked around the city without a bodyguard for their protection.105 But Henri’s euphoria swiftly disappeared when word arrived that the marquis de Pisany, whom he had ordered to inform the pope of his desire to reconcile with the Church, had been turned away without an audience.106 Still more distressing, the royalist Catholics, from long experience, had quickly seen through the king’s ploy to preoccupy them with the Dreux campaign and were once again threatening that unless he proceeded directly to mass he would lose their support.107 In view of the circumstances, the disheartened English resident had to confess that he saw very few advantages coming from the announcement of Henri’s decision to abjure.108 Henri must have been of the same opinion. The Calvinist king was now left with no alternative but to confirm the date of his instruction.109 However, he shifted the meeting place from Mantes to St Denis with a view, perhaps, of reinforcing his image as rightful French monarch. This identified him with France’s patron saint and with the abbey’s ancient symbolic importance as “above all the place for the spiritual transition for royal souls” since the first Merovingian kings had established their rule over old Roman Gaul.110 No doubt for similar reasons he began planning his coronation at Chartres in accordance with ancient rite, in the certain knowledge “that this ceremony, so revered by our Nation, would produce marvellous results in the minds of the most sensitive, and the most delicate persons in matters of religion.”111 The king’s abjuration, followed closely by the sacre, would restore the ancient traditions of the French monarchy, its sacral character and its interconnection with the Roman faith, which Catholics on both sides of the civil war were most eager to re-establish. Pressed on all sides to convert and without hope of achieving a military solution to the war, Henri had no choice but to submit to the mass before he could defeat the League or secure its unconditional recognition of his sovereignty. The papal legate in Paris responded immediately, of course, with an injunction against any French ecclesiastic who obeyed the king’s summons to assist him at St Denis.112 But this was ignored, with the parlement’s support, by churchmen such as René Benoist, curé of StEustache. He insisted that attendance was essential to protect Henri “from the work of Satan and the Calvinist ministers” (an interesting juxtaposition) and to ensure that his abjuration was sincere. That accomplished, Benoist asserted, the newly converted monarch would become a pillar of the traditional Church.113 Equally significant, meanwhile, was Henri’s deliberate exclusion of the Calvinist ministers from the impending conference because of the

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precariousness of his current position and his need for decisive action.114 Originally, he had planned to convoke an ecumenical council of Catholics and Huguenots alike, chiefly to buy more time as usual and, “by pretty promises, words or other such means, to draw out this affair as long as he could; welcoming [the Catholics] warmly or making them gifts, such that they will advance very little in their designs, and yet still placate the foreign princes [i.e., Henri’s Catholic allies], ecclesiastics and common people ... with the conception they have of reducing his Majesty [to Catholicism].”115 What Henri now recognized was that he dared not include the Calvinist ministers in the upcoming discussions. Their participation, he knew, would extend debate over his religion and thereby delay his conversion still further. That would be intolerable to the royalist Catholics.116 (Needing to conceal this motive from his English allies, however, he alleged that having been “forsaken” by the Calvinists, who were too “intent upon their own affairs,” he had no option but to consult with his Catholic servitors and follow their advice.)117 Of course, the Catholic prelates invited to instruct Henri would not have consented to Huguenot involvement, in any case.118 Also, deliberate or not, the timing of the king’s instruction preempted the convocation of a Calvinist political assembly he had authorized at Mantes near the end of July119 (perhaps another reason for choosing St Denis). “I approve of this [meeting],” wrote its Huguenot organizer, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, just three months before, “provided that it stirs up nothing which, frankly, would cure the arm but kill the body.”120 The problem with Henri’s chronology was that it effectively ruined “the opportunity that Duplessis may have been trying to open up, of a pliable Protestant [sic] body willing to accept what the king proposed for the future of the movement.”121 Yet Duplessis-Mornay urged the ministers to attend the synod in any case. He hoped that the meeting would stir Henri’s conscience enough that he would not allow his instruction to become “a mere formality to fortify a resolution already made.” Perhaps even the king would change his mind to the greater benefit of the Huguenot cause, and remain a Calvinist.122 According to Pierre de L’Estoile, who watched events from Paris with keen interest, Henri IV attended his last Calvinist sermon on Sunday, 18 July, exactly eight years to the day since Henri III had revoked the 1577 edicts of Pacification.123 Shortly afterward, on the morning of Thursday, 22 July, the Huguenot monarch arrived at the gates of St Denis. He was received by eighteen or twenty prelates, theologians, cathedral canons, and so on, who had gathered in the town since the 15th of the month. These clerics escorted the king through

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cheering crowds of onlookers to his temporary lodgings at the Hôtel de Ville, where, in keeping with the joyful occasion, he ordered an extension of the truce with the League and a cessation of all hostilities until the end of the month, though his own forces stayed quietly on the alert in case of sudden emergency.124 Early the next morning, Henri met for five hours with the archbishop of Bourges, assisted by the bishops of Nantes, Le Mans, and Evreux, for his formal instruction in the Catholic faith.125 These men had been chosen, no doubt, because of their long-term support of the king not only as churchmen but also as advisers on matters of state. Henri opened the meeting by declaring himself ready to be enlightened in his heart; but, he added earnestly, success depended upon one point: “Prove to me that your society is the true Catholic and Apostolic church; when I am convinced of this I will believe all the rest, because I am persuaded that I must submit my soul to the faith and believe all that the true church teaches.”126 Yet, while the king had just conceded by this statement that his conversion was inescapable, “either because he believed that nothing was so sacred as the peace and repose of his kingdom, or because he wished to embrace by custom rather than conviction the Catholic faith,”127 his Calvinist conscience asserted itself dogmatically. He defended his own creed so well on the doctrinal level – even “quoting passages from the Holy Scriptures” – that the four prelates entrusted with his instruction were astonished “and prevented from giving satisfactory answers to his questions.”128 In fact, one bishop reportedly remarked the next day “that he never had seen a heretic better instructed in his error, who could defend it better or give better reasons for it.”129 Although this version of the proceedings is found only in L’Estoile, Henri’s familiarity with doctrine and skill in theological debate should have surprised no one. From early childhood he had been embroiled in the bitter sectarian controversies of the day and forced to profess both faiths by turns, depending upon whoever controlled him physically at any given time. Throughout his adulthood he similarly had been the focus of continuous efforts by knowledgeable Calvinists and Catholics alike to secure his absolute commitment to one belief or the other. That focus had intensified significantly after 1584 when he became heir presumptive to the Valois throne, and again after 1589 when he inherited the throne itself. So although Henri was sincerely Calvinist in conscience, having imbibed that faith (as he always said) “with his mother’s milk” – a faith he had professed now for almost forty years – he was very familiar with the major tenets of Catholicism, too. There is no reason to doubt Louis Maimbourg’s later comment that the king also had instructed himself in “an artificial way,” by proposing “his

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own Doubts and scruples in matters of religion” to Huguenot ministers to explore the foundations on which their opinion was based. He conferred as well with those Catholic priests loyal to him, “maintaining against them with the strongest Reasons he cou’d urge, the Principles which had been infus’ed into him by his Ministers, on purpose to discover by their Answers, ... what was real and solid truth betwixt them. And he always continued in this manner of Instruction, clearing and fathoming the principal Points of the Controversie.”130 Consequently, it was very difficult, if not impossible, for the bishops instructing the king to overcome his Huguenot disbelief in many key tenets of the Roman Church, or to persuade him of the falsehood of certain Calvinist doctrines, such as predestination, which, they argued, removed all moral responsibility from one’s personal actions. Nor could they convince him more generally that the faith he professed threatened both Christian society as a whole and the individual believer, too, because of its alleged connections to atheism and moral licence; its supposed repudiation of spiritual authority and thereby promotion of public disorder; and its irreconcilability with monarchy.131 On the contrary, Henri showed himself to be a very good Calvinist, well versed in the principles of his faith. He specifically questioned such doctrines as the adoration of the Host (though he accepted transubstantiation),132 the invocation of the saints, and auricular confession.133 Other principles, such as the concept of purgatory, he flatly rejected as simple badineries (i.e., absurdities) that he doubted the majority of Catholics or the prelates themselves believed.134 By the same token he refused even to discuss the prayer for the dead (stating that he was neither dead nor had any wish to die), while he wanted clear assurance on the limits of papal authority to meddle in the temporal affairs of France. Evidently, Henri’s distaste for Catholicism had changed very little since his escape from Paris in 1576 or his more recent denigration of “the perfidies of the mass” in 1588.135 Despite his basic moderation in religious matters, even he could not entirely escape the sectarianism that so deeply tinged the outlook of his Catholic and Calvinist contemporaries. Moreover, when he consented finally to sign a short general confession of Catholic dogma the next day (having spurned a longer and more detailed first version),136 he accepted the objectionable principles not as articles of faith, but only “as a belief in the Church, whose son he [now] was.”137 Apparently, this was enough to satisfy the royalist-Catholic clergymen, who had debated among themselves over previous days just what terms to include and whether the king would be willing to accept them. Perhaps they had concluded that he probably would convert for political reasons in order to save his crown, but they were willing to

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accept this so long as he protected the Catholic faith, did not allow the Huguenots too much latitude, and did not meddle in religious affairs. As for Henri, he had achieved basically what he wanted without having to make a complete capitulation to Catholicism. It is significant, indeed, that the final version of the document that he recited from the basilica steps two days later was far less a confession of private faith than it was a promise of external conformity. In it, he swore “before God” to recognize the Roman Catholic Church to be “the true Church of God” and the repository “of all truth and without error.” He also promised “to observe and uphold all decrees” issued by its councils, as well as all of its canons, “following the advice given to me by prelates and doctors as contained in statements that I agreed to earlier, wherein I pledge to obey the ordinances and commands of the Church.” In addition, he disavowed “all opinions and errors contrary to the holy doctrines” of Roman Catholicism, and promised further to obey the Holy See and the pope, “as have all my predecessors.” Finally, he swore never again to renounce Catholicism, “but instead to persevere in professing it with God’s grace until I die.”138 Thus, although Henri IV had resigned himself to the political necessity of converting, whatever the results of his instruction, he still struggled against it. He had commitments of conscience which made that act unpalatable. Chief among these was his genuine fear for the salvation of his soul. This is what he meant when he wrote to his Catholic mistress, Gabriel d’Estrées, about making “the perilous leap” in two days’ time, on 25 July.139 The king was not alluding here to the political risks of conversion, the meaning always attributed to his words. Those risks he had calculated already. His letter to the prince de Conti of 10 May, his manoeuvres during the Suresne conferences, and his conversations with various members of his party140 are sufficient proof of this. Rather, “the perilous leap” referred to the spiritual risks involved, specifically the welfare of his soul. Although the Calvinist ministers had conceded the previous May that he could be saved even as a Catholic (which he had inferred to mean that he could abjure in good conscience), in his own mind he was haunted still by uncertainty. He was in danger, after all, of committing apostasy – a mortal sin especially when perpetrated for temporal reasons alone, however worthy the cause – just as he had done under duress in 1572. And although he convincingly defended himself against League charges that he was a “relapsed heretic,” it would be far more difficult to deflect accusations that he was a “relapsed apostate,” even in his own mind. He therefore needed to be able to accept Catholicism at least on general religious terms, because that allowed him to sign the articles of faith as required with a broadly Christian sense of moral right and to receive

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the sacrament of the Eucharist with a worthy heart. Otherwise, he explained to the bishops at his instruction, since his salvation was “more dear to him than anything else,” he refused to abjure on a political whim, “even to gain four kingdoms.”141 On Saturday evening, 24 July, Henri signed the amended text of his abjuration and confession of faith before the Catholic clergy assembled to witness his act. Afterward, he held a final, tearful interview with his old Calvinist ministers to ask for their prayers and to reassure them of his continuing protection.142 Hoping still to change the king’s mind even at this late hour, Antoine de La Faye begged that his royal master should “not suffer so great a scandal shou’d come to them,” while others implored him not “to precipitate himself into certain ruin in the expectation of uncertain good.”143 But Henri rejected these lastminute appeals, retorting sharply that if he were to follow the pastors’ advice and remain Huguenot, there would be “neither King nor kingdom left in France.”144 With nothing more to say, these men bid farewell to Henri and left town shortly after. Having thus “made up his mind to do what he had to do,” the Bourbon monarch was beginning already to assume the persona of a Catholic sovereign in keeping with his new profession of faith and the medieval traditions of the French Crown. When, for example, he had emerged from his instruction at one o’clock the previous afternoon, he had observed the Roman Church’s strict prohibition against eating meat on Friday for his midday meal and had given instructions that this rule be respected thereafter in the royal household. He then appears to have begun voluntarily a penitent’s regime, which included fasting for the remainder of the day, combined with private prayer and contemplation. The next evening before meeting with the Huguenot pastors, he heard a sermon delivered by the archbishop of Bourges and, together with the assembled clergy, celebrated a Te Deum at the abbey church – though not before declaring St Denis an open town and inviting the Parisians (by means of a herald dispatched to the city for that purpose) to witness his abjuration the next day.145 Even so, early on the morning of 25 July, the Bourbon monarch met privately in his bedchamber with Antoine de La Faye, who had not left St Denis the night before with the other Calvinist pastors.146 Although there is no clear evidence, it is highly improbable that the Huguenot minister would have remained behind, let alone had a private interview with Henri just scant hours before he was to undergo his official conversion, without an explicit request from the king. This meeting could have jeopardized the public impression of Henri’s act that his Catholic servitors were endeavouring to create, i.e., that it was voluntary and sincere. Worse still, it could make it appear to sceptics on

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both sides that he had not severed all of his ties with his former coreligionnaires, that his profession of the Roman faith was merely a feint to secure his crown, and that having “relapsed” once before, he would relapse yet again. Precisely for this reason the king’s interview with La Faye – when combined with his earlier letter to Gabriel d’Estrées – reveals better than any other evidence the turmoil in his own thoughts and his crisis of conscience at this critical moment in his career. It indicates very strongly that Henri was still attached emotionally and spiritually to his dead mother’s faith; that he was genuinely uneasy in his own mind about his abjuration, perhaps even his apostasy; and that his request of the ministers the previous evening to pray for his soul was in earnest. Indeed, it is entirely likely that La Faye’s own admonitions that Henri reconsider his decision had struck a chord in the uncertain monarch much more forcefully than his pointed response to such last-minute appeals had suggested. Whatever the case, the Calvinist minister pledged once again to serve his sovereign faithfully, and prayed that God would preserve Henri from future harm. The king thanked him in return and reiterated his promise that, as a Catholic monarch of France, he would permit “neither any wrongs to be committed against [the Calvinists], nor any violence against their religion.” The ceremony of Henri’s abjuration began at around nine o’clock on the morning of 25 July with an imposing parade of more than one hundred clergy dressed resplendently in their full regalia, from the abbot’s palace to the basilica.147 An hour later, Henri himself emerged from the same residence, clad predominantly in the modest white clothing of a humble penitent, without the usual emblems of French royalty. He proceeded along the same route, now strewn thickly with flowers by cheering spectators, just taken by the churchmen to the steps of the basilica of St Denis. Once there, he was to make his formal profession of the Roman faith “with all the Sollemnities and Magnificence that the Catholics can devise.”148 Henri was accompanied by an enormous procession of princes of the blood, royal officiers, large numbers of nobles, and the chief judges of the royalist parlements, not only to ensure that he had irreproachable witnesses to his sincerity (he wrote afterwards), but more importantly to impress upon everyone the great significance of his act.149 At the bottom steps of the basilica, the king removed his hat and sword and climbed alone to the top, where he was met by the archbishop of Bourges. That prelate was seated before the church doors on an improvised throne draped with white damask embellished with the arms of France and of Navarre. The symbolism of this arrangement was very clear: only after the penitent monarch had professed the

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Catholic faith and received the archbishop’s absolution would the throne be delivered to him. It was an unprecedented expression of the Church’s supremacy over the Crown,150 and it confirmed in a visual way the duc de Mayenne’s powerful contention that the Church does not exist within the state, but the state within the faith. Kneeling before the archbishop, Henri swore “to live and die in the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman religion, to protect and defend it against all comers at the risk of my life and blood, renouncing all heresies contrary to this ... Church.” The king then gave Bourges a signed copy of his profession, and after kissing the prelate’s ring and receiving absolution, he entered the church. Inside, he repeated his profession of faith, received communion, heard mass, and performed the traditional acts of piety. The service over, Henri re-emerged from the basilica to the enthusiastic shouts of “Vive le Roy!” from more than 6,000 of his subjects, who had come “to witness this miracle that God has performed in our time”151 and to whom he threw generous sums of money in return.152 Then, following him back to his lodgings, the crowd repeatedly “forced open the doors in order to enter the place ... to see him in such manner that His Majesty was constrained several times to go outside or to show himself at a window.”153 As one modern historian notes, “this must have been an extraordinarily moving occasion, and [the king] made the most of it.”154 Not every royalist was pleased with the conversion, however. When Henri bathed later that evening, the Huguenots were reported to have grumbled “that he was trying to cleanse himself of the sin he had committed” by abjuring his Calvinist faith.155

epilogue France now had a Catholic monarch, and although it was not until February 1594 that Henri IV actually was crowned at Chartres, or until the subsequent March that he finally entered Paris, the way was prepared for an end to the civil war. For all practical purposes, the royal conversion had broken League resistance (though this sputtered on for another two years), as rebel towns and noblemen rushed to recognize the king’s authority, many “without bothering to concern themselves about his sincerity.”156 After all, conceded Villeroy de Neufville, “after so many declarations and protestations that M. le duc de Mayenne and many other members of the party had written and published to recognize His Majesty after his conversion, nothing could excuse us any longer from not doing so, if we did not want to be held for evil men and enemies of our country and our religion.”157

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Officially, of course, Henri was not absolved of his former heresy until the pope accepted his abjuration. That was withheld until September 1595. This delay gave the extremist cardinal de Plaisance the opportunity to issue an injunction against the royal conversion that declared it null and void, denied the power of the Gallican clergy to absolve the “king of Navarre,” and called upon all Frenchmen to reject the latter’s profession of Catholicism as an act of hypocrisy.158 Drawing upon the Gospel that “wolves would come in lamb’s clothing,” other hard-line preachers in Paris branded Henri as “an old grey wolf, whom all the world should pursue to the death.” They similarly called his conversion “a stinking farce.”159 Nevertheless, observed one anonymous contemporary, the royal abjuration “produced a great effect in the hearts of all the people, and especially of the Parisians who testified openly that no longer having any reason to refuse their obedience to the king, it was time that the duc de Mayenne fulfilled the promises he had made so often to recognize the king if he became a Catholic.”160 Sir Thomas Edmondes confirmed this popular response in his report that the Parisians came to see Henri “dailie in great multitudes ... to the Duke of Mayennes great despising for the consequences thereof.”161 At the same time, French Catholics as different in their loyalties (though united in their patriotism and veneration for the Crown) as the Leaguer Villeroy de Neufville and the royalist comte de Cheverny hailed the king’s resolution as “the only remedy to our misfortunes that remained to us” and “the act of the salvation of this state.”162 Nor was Henri IV slow to spread the long-awaited news of his conversion in order to reap all possible benefits. Scores of letters and descriptions of the ceremony at St Denis were circulated both within France and abroad to inform the king’s Catholic subjects and foreign courts of his renunciation of heresy and return to the Roman faith.163 Public celebrations, religious processions, Te Deums, fireworks, and other festivities were ordered throughout the realm “to make the greatest possible demonstration of joy.”164 In response, numerous rebel towns such as Riom in Auvergne submitted eagerly to Henri’s authority, while praising him in fulsome terms as “the true son of justice, the life of the state, the principle of political wisdom, the eye of monarchical order, the real Apollo who, from diversity of opinions and discordant chords, creates harmonious music.”165 Henri took equal care to win over his former enemies with generous offers of reward in return for their submission, and to secure his absolution from Rome. There, it was reported, “the pope does not conceal his great contentment” at the French monarch’s resolution,166 though the pontiff refused for the moment to absolve him until convinced of

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his sincerity. Almost immediately, preparations were made to return the pious duc de Nevers to the Holy See to inform Clement VIII of the royal conversion and to obtain his blessing.167 As well, Henri wrote “a beautiful letter to the pope, full of all submissions” and observing “the forms of address and embellishments judged necessary by the [French] prelates,” to be hand-delivered by his emissary.168 He further arranged for prominent royalist Catholics such as the duc de Montmorency (who had just been rewarded with the rank of connétable de France for past loyalty) to contact Rome on his behalf, “to render all services possible to M. de Nevers in his negotiations ... before the pope and the cardinals, and to prevent the evil designs of the enemies of the state [i.e., Spain].”169 Clement was to be reminded in particular that if he bowed to pressure from Philip II and withheld his absolution, the long-threatened schism between Rome and Gallican-minded Frenchmen “would be complete in France.”170 Likewise, trusted royal agents were sent, under pretext of returning to their own estates, to negotiate privately with key League nobles. In this way, confidential talks were opened with the comte de La Châtre at Orléans, the marquis de Vitry at Meaux, Villeroy de Neufville, President Jeannin, and the sieur d’Assincourt at Pontoise, the young duc de Guise and the comte de Rosne. From these discussions much was expected, “and the more for that the king assenting in a manner to all that they demand, there will remain little matter of cavill.”171 Henri even sent agents to Paris “for the private handling” of negotiations with the duc de Mayenne.172 At first, these various royal efforts seemed to promise quick results. On 31 July the king and the League leader concluded a three-month truce that halted all military activity in France, permitted freedom of travel throughout the realm, reopened commerce, and allowed for an exchange of prisoners, among other items.173 This agreement was received enthusiastically at Paris, despite grumbling from extremists and the Spanish residents, who blamed Mayenne personally for the League’s ill-fortune. Indeed, the citizenry hoped it would become the basis of a durable treaty, “having fallen in love with this first taste of peace.”174 Henri, too, desired that the new truce would make it “easier for me to negotiate a permanent treaty.”175 According to the cardinal de Plaisance, however, the duc de Mayenne had agreed to the respite simply to gain time. He was resolved not to submit to Henri’s authority until either he had completely lost his Spanish backing or Clement VIII had “rehabilitated” the French monarch. On 8 August, therefore, the League leader, his Spanish allies, and other prominent ultra-Catholics swore an oath between the hands of the papal legate in the traditional act of fealty,

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to remain united for the conservation of their faith and to refuse all negotiations with the “king of Navarre” until he had been granted papal absolution.176 It was the sieur de Villegomblain’s opinion, however, that the real motive for this was more opportunistic than altruistic. The League leaders believed (he wrote) that they could extort more from Henri in return for their obedience if they bargained as a group rather than as individuals.177 This fresh act of defiance, however, failed to halt the steady disintegration of League support as more and more rebels submitted to the king.178 This process was facilitated as much by the willingness of ultraCatholic nobles and governors to peddle their allegiance for pensions, honours, or simple cash rewards as by the disgust they now felt for their leaders. In fact, the latters’ oath of 8 August effectively alienated a number of League partisans, including Villeroy de Neufville. He viewed it as “so utterly contrary to the words of the duc de Mayenne and to the assurances that he had given me of his intentions of peace” that the respected adviser not only refused to represent the rebel faction any longer in discussions with the royalists, but began to distance himself from the party.179 Nevertheless, enough League resistance remained that in October and December 1593, and again in April 1594, the king had to issue new declarations summoning all Frenchmen to submit to his authority.180 In the meantime, Henri boosted his own appeal by means of what the Venetian ambassador called his “indescribable clemency and extraordinary humanity” toward those who “have most deeply offended him.” Writing encouragingly to the sieur de Moussoulens, for example, the king observed that “although you have so far followed the party of my enemies, I nevertheless esteem the good qualities which I hear you have, and I am sorry to see them used other than in my service. That is why I wish to exhort you henceforward to return to your duty ... You have no further excuse for resistance, as the religious pretext ... is no longer relevant; do not think that your return to obedience will be less agreeable to me just because it has been delayed so long.”181 Such personal appeals, notes a modern historian, must have been difficult to resist.182 Consequently, though Mayenne remained in arms for two more years with Spanish support and surrendered only after Clement VIII had granted the now-Catholic Bourbon monarch absolution, League resistance steadily dissolved. In fact, by summer 1594 ultimate royal victory seemed assured. No wonder that some years later the Bourbon monarch punned that “the best cannon I ever used was the canon of the mass; it served to make me king.”183 For all of these reasons, Henri IV’s conversion on 25 July 1593 is viewed by historians as the source of his ultimate triumph over the

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League and its Spanish allies. This is only true within very narrow political limits. To be sure, his conversion destroyed the raison d’être of the rebel faction and turned opinion rapidly toward the royalist cause, which reduced the final pacification of France simply to a question of time, but in reality, the conversion had far broader implications that represented for Henri a serious personal and political defeat. His private conscience aside, since 1584 the king had maintained that neither the tradition of succession nor the authority of the French Crown could be compromised and that therefore the monarch could not be constrained by his subjects. But by converting in order to consolidate his grip on the throne, Henri had been forced to accept that there were restraints upon his authority after all, and to concede further that the fundamental Salic Law was contingent upon the principle of religion. To be sure, he managed to extract a number of conditions from the Catholics in return for his conversion, such as a coronation held before the pope recognized his change of faith. Nevertheless, Catholicism now became an essential constitutional factor in determining the succession to the French crown. Similarly, Henri’s generous treatment of his League enemies after 1593 is exaggerated rather too easily by historians as a new element in royal propaganda designed specifically to validate his sincerity and project the image of a devout and merciful king to further his program of pacification. One recent study alleges, for example, that hitherto Henri had usually sided with those who counselled a harsh peace, “though necessity had at times compelled him to allow talks with the League.” Following his conversion, however, the king moved slowly “toward a lenient accord ... [because] a conciliatory approach could help dispel the warnings of apocalyptic doom sounded by radical Leaguers by extending to all subjects the mercy God had shown the king during his conversion.” Besides, “it was highly impolitic to treat the League in ways which contradicted the very spirit of his reconciliation with the church.”184 While it is true that royalist writings and the king’s own pronouncements after July 1593 emphasized his clemency toward rebels who returned to obedience under him, and perhaps also that contemporaries were surprised that Henri did not use his authority to crush his former enemies, the interpretation outlined above overlooks two fundamental aspects of his conduct at this time. One is that his conciliatory approach constituted no departure from the “apple and rod” policy he had observed up to now. Indeed, it is clear from the evidence that, far from advocating a harsh peace with the ultra-Catholic faction, the king’s frequent overtures to the rebel party (not all of which had been compelled by political necessity), had demanded only that it rec-

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ognize him first as monarch of France according to the Salic Law, without conditions, before any other terms were negotiated. In short, he wanted full acknowledgment of his rightful claims to the throne and prerogatives as French sovereign, irrespective of religion. Those prerogatives included, of course, the power to punish rebellion against the Crown – the real source of anxious League predictions after 1593 of “apocalyptic doom.” By the same token, whenever Henri had rejected the enemy faction’s counter-offers in the past, it was because these were so exorbitant that they threatened to diminish not just his authority as monarch, but his royal dignity, too. As “a prince who feared God and was jealous of his reputation,” noted Villeroy de Neufville, he could not have consented to such dishonourable terms. Nevertheless, a close examination of the private offers Henri made between 1589 and 1593 to individual nobles, some League leaders, and numerous towns, including Paris – especially at those times when he clearly held the political and military advantage – reveals just how far he was willing to bend “to win them over by his clemency and bounty.”185 Consequently, if after his conversion he borrowed from the example of Louis XII, who had declared on succeeding to the throne in 1498 that “it was unseemly for the king of France to avenge the injuries made against the duc d’Orléans,”186 it was because (in the words of the Venetian resident) Henri always had been willing “for the good of the nation ... to pardon and forgive much.” But when clemency failed to produce the desired results, he did not hesitate to apply coercion, as in spring 1594 when he declared null and void all previous declarations of the League, revoked Mayenne’s title of Lieutenant-General of the Crown and Kingdom of France, and promised to restore all Leaguers still in arms to their goods, dignities, and other offices provided they submit. Otherwise, they would be declared guilty of lèse majesté.187 Nor was this an idle threat. Refusing to surrender, the obstinate duc d’Aumale fled France, whereupon he was declared guilty of treason by the king, who also confiscated his lands and titles and had him burned in effigy. Clearly, not all of Henri’s acts were benign. Also influencing Henri’s policy toward the League after 1593 was the significant fact that his abjuration legitimized the ultra-Catholics’ rebellion on religious principle and forced him to accept their conception of the monarchy in place of his own. As a result, when they finally submitted, Henri could not punish them for crimes against the state, let alone for the assassination of his late predecessor, even though he had sworn solemnly to do so four years before. In short, his hands were tied. Ever since he had become heir presumptive to the Valois throne in June 1584, these men had claimed to oppose his

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accession solely to preserve the Roman faith that he now professed. Hence, when they at last surrendered, Henri had no choice but to concede the protective religious clause that they insisted be included in their separate treaties with the Crown and that shielded them from royal justice and, therefore, punishment for crimes of lèse majesté.188 The defence of religion thus formed the basis of their subsequent selfjustifications and the principle upon which their sense of honour turned,189 regardless of the pensions, offices, titles, and other benefits they also extorted from Henri as “the fount of all reward.”190 This was not necessarily an extension of their code of honour, as one recent scholar asserts,191 but the price of their submission. The king was not in any position to refuse their demands, a point stressed by several contemporary observers,192 who perhaps recalled François Ier’s maxim that there was nothing more dangerous than a dissatisfied nobleman. But the significant limitations placed upon the Bourbon monarch’s position after 1593 are best illustrated by his treaty with the duc de Mayenne. In their preliminary talks, Henri had insisted upon three conditions: that the duke negotiate as an individual and not as leader of the League; that the principle of religion be omitted from the text of any final accord; and that Philip II of Spain be excluded from participation in the discussions and the final agreement. In return, the king promised to honour Mayenne, to receive him at court in all friendship (“which is the greatest security he can give”), and to permit him to sign the articles of surrender not only in his own name, but on behalf of other members of his house who were also prominent members of the rebel faction, and his adherents as well.193 Thus, Henri contradicted his own first condition beforehand by allowing the duke implicitly (or explicitly, depending upon the interpretation of the individual reader) to submit as leader of the League. But Mayenne rejected these terms. He insisted instead that religion be recognized formally as his primary motive for taking up arms and that Henri, therefore, explicitly approve all the League’s actions during the war. He also demanded extensive powers over his gouvernement of Burgundy, a number of security towns with garrisons financed by the Crown, the repayment of his debts and those of his followers by the royal treasury, considerable authority over nominations to military, judicial and church appointments in his province, a substantial yearly pension in addition to a marshal’s baton, and, lastly, the participation of Philip II and the duke of Savoy as signatories in the final draft of the treaty.194 Despite his objections to the majority of these terms, Henri was not in a strong position to bargain because of the fact of his conversion. Apart from the problem that many Catholic royalists still suspected

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“that we ... have only the body of the king; while the Huguenots have his mind and affections and, moreover, that he always takes their side”195 – a suspicion reinforced, no doubt, by Henri’s renewal of the edicts of toleration of 1577 in spring 1594 and again the next year – he was now officially at war with Spain. A formal declaration of hostilities had been issued by him on 17 January 1595.196 Consequently, noted a contemporary, he could not afford to alienate the duke who was technically still in rebellion. This explains the king’s subsequent generosity,197 though he refused to give Mayenne the nearly sovereign powers over Burgundy he had requested.198 In the secret articles of their treaty signed in January 1596, the duke was granted amnesty for himself and his adherents, in addition to three security towns for the term of six years, an award of 3,580,000 livres to repay his debts, and the gouvernement of the Île-deFrance in exchange for that of Burgundy.199 Above all, the king was compelled to concede the religious clause that Mayenne had insisted be included in his peace with the Crown, to absolve him like other League nobles from potential prosecution for lèse majesté.200 This agreement, and others like it, placed important constraints upon royal prerogative and law that became very clear when Henri personally had to force the registration of his treaty with Mayenne through a resistant parlement of Paris. That court wanted instead to prosecute the rebel leaders for treason.201 But having accepted the religious justification of the League, the king knew that his hands were tied. So were those of his judges, though it required two stern lettres de juisson in March and April 1596 before they at last complied with the king’s will.202 For precisely the same reason, the Bourbon monarch rebuffed the persistent appeals of the dowager queen Louise de Vaudémont to bring Henri III’s assassins to justice, even though this had been one of the principal promises he had made in August 1589 to secure Catholic support. In a word, Mayenne, his Guise cousins, and his colleagues in rebellion were untouchable. Consequently, the only punishment Henri IV was ever able to exact on his former enemy was to walk the overweight and puffing duke briskly around the garden of the royal residence at Monceaux!203 In a very real sense, therefore, though the king’s conversion had ruined the League, it had also justified and absolved the Leaguers at great expense to the Crown. Hence, his posture of clemency toward his former enemies might have been due, in part, to the requirements of royal propaganda and the image of the devout and merciful monarch that his advisers were endeavouring to create. But it was forced upon him at least as much, if not more, by the serious limitations now placed on his authority and the king’s own recognition that

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“a prince always should have the appearance of doing voluntarily even what he is constrained to do” to preserve his position. Equally damaging to the Bourbon monarch was that in the eyes of many contemporaries his abjuration made it appear as if he had chosen sides in the sectarian quarrels of his day, where previously he had held himself aloof by emphasizing the interests of state and religious toleration. In effect, his surrender to the force of circumstances, though unavoidable if he wanted to retain his throne, ruined the carefully crafted political image he had laboured so hard to sustain with both religious groups throughout the civil wars. To those Catholic Frenchmen already concerned about his sincerity, the conversion made Henri vulnerable to the assassin’s blade, for religious extremists would never see him as anything but a false convert and opportunist. At least as a “heretic,” one holding out the promise of a genuine abjuration, he had offered the kingdom the hope of peace under a Catholic monarch. That view had probably protected him from attempts on his life prior to his conversion.204 Hence one subject’s lament in late July 1593: “The king is now lost: from this moment he is killable, where before he was not.”205 This prophecy took on the force of reality just one month later, when Pierre Barrière was arrested for plotting to assassinate the king.206 What is more, Henri seems to have recognized the new threat himself, judging from the vigour of his response in early January 1595 to Mme de Balagny’s innocent question as to why he looked so glum. Snapped the usually buoyant monarch: “Ventre-Saint-Gris! How could I be happy? To see a people so lacking in gratitude toward their king ... as to make constant attempts against his life. Since I have been here I hardly hear anything else spoken of.”207 Nor was his bad mood unwarranted. Just six days before, he had survived an attempt by the would-be murderer Jean Châtel to cut his throat. On another occasion, the king confessed his anxiety to Sully, complaining, “I was told always that by embracing the Roman Catholic religion all these evil intentions would be destroyed, and that M. de Mayenne and his partisans would acknowledge me so soon as I had taken that step, but I am beginning to recognize that there is in the hearts [of men] more ambition and avarice than religion and justice.”208 This hope had not been realized, and the efforts to assassinate him continued. By all accounts, there were two attempts in 1593, three in 1594, four more between 1595 and 1596, and at least eight others in subsequent years before the fanatical Ravaillac struck his fatal blows in 1610. It was probably no coincidence, therefore, that royalist prelates, parlementaires, and pamphleteers began to stress after July 1593 the inviolability of the royal person as “a superior being established over us” by

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God to represent His “divine Majesty,” and whose commands “are a sacred and unbreakable seal” to be respected and obeyed. Consequently, they warned, the subject who wilfully “defies his king, also defies God, of Whom he is the living image on earth.” Indeed, no one had the right even to strike down the sovereign on religious grounds “though he were an idolater,” for as God’s anointed magistrate, the king’s edicts, ordinances, and commandments had to be observed without question. To do otherwise would contradict divine law “and turn justice on its head.” Hence, by expanding traditional medieval notions of divine-right monarchy to include the concept that the “person of the monarch is sacred” in his very nature and not just by his exalted royal office, and that obedience was therefore his due, “as commanded by Him who gives [the sovereign] to us, and by Whose puissant arm he is sustained,”209 Henri’s Catholic servitors were already using the powerful theoretical and theological defence against would-be assassins that would be developed by political thinkers more fully in the next century.210 At the same time, they were laying the foundations for the subsequent growth of Bourbon absolutism. To the Huguenots, on the other hand, Henri became a king for Catholic Frenchmen only. Feeling betrayed and no longer trusting him,211 they responded to what d’Aubigné now called the Bourbon monarch’s “notable mutation”212 with a barrage of grievances, a search for a new protector, and a general withdrawal of military support.213 Not only did they cease to pray for his welfare, but by 1597 hardly a Huguenot could be found in the royal army then besieging Amiens, with the exception of devoted loyalists such as Sully.214 It also appeared by that time that the Calvinist party was on the brink of fomenting a new civil war against its former leader, who had not responded to its appeals for more privileges as it had wished. This hastened the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes the following spring, which granted liberty of conscience and a limited freedom of worship to the king’s Calvinist subjects “in perpetuity.” To be sure, there were cooler heads among the Huguenots who accepted the necessity of Henri’s act. While angling quietly to secure the leadership of the party for himself, the duc de Bouillon argued that the royal abjuration was “a necessary ceremony that had changed [the king] only in appearance.” He urged the Calvinists to maintain a united front behind their monarch, therefore, “to show the Catholics that the conversion ... has not made them change their obedience.”215 Sully agreed, adding with a sneer toward his coreligionnaires that “even at the slightest reverses, [the Huguenots] were always magnifying the most trifling errors of the king.” He felt that nothing would come of their sectarian grumbling.216

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Most French Calvinists were not so understanding, though a few, such as Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, grieved at Henri’s change of profession, “having seen lost at the same instant the soul and the honour of this great prince.”217 But they still adhered to the belief that “differences in religion do not remove our obligation of loyalty to our kings,” and so returned gradually to court to serve him.218 The majority agreed, however, with their pastors that Henri was “an ingrate,” and they became permanently estranged from the Crown. Even the faithful Agrippa d’Aubigné was unable to forgive his royal master’s apostasy and believed thereafter that “the life of this poor prince was condemned by God.”219 In fact, when the king was assassinated in 1610, d’Aubigné was unable to conceal a degree of self-righteous exultation that his prediction at last had come true. Henri endeavoured, of course, to maintain his former relationship with the Huguenots by writing to various groups and individuals alike to explain the political causes of his conversion and to assure them of his continued goodwill.220 To Duplessis-Mornay alone he penned three letters that implored his old friend and trusted adviser to return to his service, which the latter eventually did.221 But given the belief of many Calvinists that no reason could justify the compromise of religious principles, combined with the king’s successive refusals to grant them additional favours such as special law courts and a protector who professed their faith,222 the Huguenots felt isolated and fearful of renewed oppression. Their anxiety was reinforced even further by increasing Catholic efforts to divide the Bourbon monarch from his former coreligionnaires.223 Hence, they began preparing for their own defence to Henri’s alarm and great annoyance.224 The stage was rapidly being set for the new phase in the French civil wars that would end with the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes in 1598.

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Conclusion Reinterpreting Henri IV “Do not be deceived. I hold my life, temporal and spiritual, in the hands of the Holy Father, the true vicar of God.” – Henri IV to Agrippa d’Aubigné, c. 1610

Given the combination of Catholic qualms over the sincerity of the king’s conversion and Huguenot insinuations that he had abandoned their faith for reasons of simple opportunism, generations of historians have asserted that Henri IV was motivated exclusively by political interests and that he was consequently capable of taking a cynical view of his religious position. This assertion is usually illustrated by specific reference to the much-quoted, though apocryphal, statement attributed to the Bourbon monarch in 1593, that “Paris is well worth a mass.” (In fact, the duc de Sully claims to have said this himself when advising his royal master to abjure, though it originated more likely with the king’s ultra-Catholic enemies.) But there are fundamental dimensions to Henri’s personality that have never been considered, dimensions that exercised a powerful influence on his actions, his leadership, and his motivations. Chief among these was his religious scruple. Contrary to the usual narrow political perspective taken of Henri IV’s decision-making at key points in his career, a broader perspective acknowledges that matters of conscience significantly shaped his choices. To be sure, from time to time his unique political situation had required him to make compromises, such as in February 1577 when he first hinted at the possibility of a future abjuration, and again in August 1589 when, to nail down his Catholic support, he pledged to receive instruction. But as a sincere Calvinist Henri had refused any absolute promise of conversion, and in the four years following his accession to the French throne, though he had offered sufficient hints

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to keep alive the hopes of his Catholic followers while focusing their attention on the campaigns of the civil war, he had continued to avoid any final assurance of an abjuration. Even when it became clear that there was no alternative to a change of religion if he were to consolidate his hold on the crown and assert his authority in France according to his conceptualization of French kingship, it is significant that despite twenty years of grappling with this challenge, of temporizing, and of saying that he would receive instruction only to postpone the event time and again, it still took him two weeks to decide finally to commit himself. In short, in 1593 Henri IV was still his mother’s son, with her piety deeply ingrained. For almost three decades he had been a practising Calvinist, with many of his closest and most trusted associates deeply involved in the promotion of the reform. And he knew both sides of the religious quarrels as well as anyone, having spent much of his youth as a pawn in the confessional controversies at the Valois court and his adulthood as the focus of efforts by the Huguenots and the Catholics alike to secure him absolutely to their respective creeds. The major difference between him and the overwhelming majority of his contemporaries was, however, that where Henri was fundamentally a religious man, he was not at the same time a sectarian man. A lifetime of experience had taught him the need for toleration if he were to wear his crown in peace and, moreover, that as a reigning monarch he had obligations to protect the welfare of all Frenchmen, not just Huguenot or Catholic Frenchmen. It was this same view that underlay his alternative conception of a non-sectarian Gallican monarchy in which the mystical, sacral aspects of medieval kingship were reduced to a secondary role. This is what Mme de Mornay meant when she observed astutely in her memoirs: “It was abundantly clear that [the king] was filled with a belief which made his conduct [i.e., his conversion] excusable; namely, that the differences between the two faiths were only important because of the bitterness of the preachers, and he believed that someday, by his own authority, he would settle the quarrel between them.”1 Her statement should not be misconstrued as alluding to a sort of eighteenth-century deism that some modern scholars have applied to Henri IV. Such a notion assumes the existence of clearly defined, legally recognized, and socially accepted denominations as distinct varieties of Christianity, all of which are founded upon the essential principle that every man may find salvation in his own way. Obviously, this is not a very meaningful context for the sixteenth century, when each group involved in the reform movement claimed a monopoly on religious orthodoxy in its search for the pristine faith

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of the primitive church, and when men and women were willing to die over the definition of a word. There is no evidence that Henri, any more than his contemporaries, was willing to accept the existence of two churches in France as a permanent solution to the religious crisis. Like many others, he still entertained the hope that a reformed Catholicism and a less dogmatic Calvinism could be reunited in a single French Church under a secular-based monarchy, and so “settle the quarrel between them.” Rather, what Mme de Mornay identified by her statement above was the source of Henri’s moderation – that is, his fundamental lack of a narrowly conceived dogmatism. “Those who unswervingly follow their conscience are of my religion,” he had written long before, in 1576, “as I am of all those who are brave and virtuous.” To be sure, as a committed Calvinist the king sometimes expressed his faith in dogmatic terms; he also understood the need to reform the ancient Church both to preserve Christian orthodoxy and to maintain the social fabric of France under the maxim of “one king, one law, one faith.” After all, he had told the Huguenot ministers just prior to his final conversion, “I am entering this house not to live in it, but to cleanse it.” Yet unlike so many of his contemporaries who also had been victims of persecution by one sect or the other, he had learned from bitter experience that genuine religious conformity could be achieved only through persuasion and example, and not by coercion at the point of a sword. At the same time, however, Henri IV was a pragmatist who had been conditioned from childhood to see himself within the framework of his political role in France and who recognized the necessity of making unpalatable decisions through the force of contemporary circumstances. What he had come to accept in particular was that, like it or not, the two principles by which he had lived and conducted his affairs up to 1593 were no longer compatible, and that if he were to secure his throne and restore peace to his war-torn kingdom, he had to compromise on his publicly professed religion for the sake of his blood (i.e., his crown, his dynasty, and ultimately his responsibility to his subjects). The Huguenot monarch had agonized for months, even years, over what he perceived as a growing necessity if he were to give his subjects peace. He also had vast experience of the importance of religious declaration and of the obligation that it laid upon a prince. Hence, despite the sincerity of his Calvinist beliefs, he found that he could accommodate the mentalité of the age, as he recognized he had to do to preserve his throne and restore order to his realm. By the same token, it is entirely possible that the belief of close counsellors such as the duc de Sully and Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, that the king had sacrificed an important part of his conscience to the good of his

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people according to those sacred obligations he had inherited with his crown from God and later confirmed at his sacre, is considerably less naive than historians have assumed. Yet Henri did not easily reach the conclusion that he must convert, and it is clear from available evidence that he continued to agonize over his decision in subsequent years. Falling gravely ill near La Fère in 1595, for example, he wondered anxiously if, by abjuring, he had invited God’s wrath. Significantly, he confided his fears to the Huguenot Agrippa d’Aubigné, who urged him to consult a Calvinist minister. For obvious political reasons Henri refused this advice, though he prayed with his former adviser eight times before their meeting ended.2 The king’s distress is likewise evident from the bitter tone of statements he made in the months following his conversion. Attending mass one day in February 1594, he encountered a gentlemen “who always had professed the [Reformed] religion.” When asked why he now was going to Catholic services, the nobleman replied, “Because you are, Sire.” “Oh,” responded Henri derisively, “now I understand; you have some crown you want to win!”3 The same harsh note of sarcasm, perhaps even cynicism, can be found in another remark he made about two years later. Standing on a balcony before a large crowd of onlookers, the king observed ruefully to his companion, the former Leaguer Ange de Joyeuse: “My cousin, these people seem to be glad to see together a renegade and an apostate!”4 Clearly, he still had misgivings in his soul about the righteousness of his act and his spiritual salvation. By the end of his life in 1610, however, all indications are that the Bourbon monarch had gradually become comfortable with his Catholic religion, even if he still had not accepted all of its tenets. The chief fault with most historical treatments of the early career, religious perceptions, and political behaviour of Henri IV from his birth in 1553 to his final conversion in 1593 is that they are anachronistic. Precisely because modern Western historians live in a world where freedom of conscience is considered a constitutional right and doctrinal differences a secondary or even tertiary concern, they tend to apply twentieth-century motives of pragmatic politics to that sixteenth-century monarch, for whom conditions were very different. At the very heart of this problem is the failure to consult carefully the full historical record, which includes more than just the official documentation, letters, and pronouncements of the king. It consists also of his private papers and conversations with those men and women who knew and worked with him and who left memoirs of their own, as well as the register of what Henri actually did and, perhaps more important, when he did it. Together, these sources provide much broader

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understanding than the standard documentation alone, which paints at best a two-dimensional portrait of the king. The key to avoiding this pitfall is to place Henri IV back within the context of the religious age in which he lived. That he subjected his religious convictions to his political needs is indisputable. But that he did so reluctantly and not until he had concluded in his own mind that there was no viable alternative to conversion if he were to retain his crown, is also clear. He was, after all, a man of strong Calvinist conscience who demonstrated on more than one occasion that he was willing to defend his beliefs almost to the brink of political disaster. At the same time, however, he was a king who was as concerned with dynastic issues and affairs of state as any other ruler of his day, one who felt keenly the heavy obligations of his royal role and who ultimately recognized, as a monarch, that his personal religious beliefs sometimes had to be put aside for the greater good of the dynasty and the realm. But this does not make Henri a sceptic or opportunist or “deist,” though his basic moderation, humanity, and possibly even his historical sense (he did not wish to be remembered as the monarch who presided over the dismemberment of France) led him to actions that could be construed – at least from a preconceived notion of his faith – as lacking in religious conviction. Rather, it makes him a pragmatist and even a man of principle. By converting in 1593 he obviously accepted, as we too must accept, that certain duties were expected of a prince in his place and time, duties he had received with his crown from God. That was an integral part of the monarchical world view shared by Elizabeth I, Philip II, and other contemporary sovereigns. Perhaps William Shakespeare captured this idea best when writing of another royal Henry: “What infinite heart’s ease / Must kings neglect that private men enjoy! ... [who] little wot / What watch the king keeps to maintain the peace / Whose hours the peasant best advantages.”5 That concept of noblesse oblige, of honour reinforced by sacred royal obligation, so difficult to communicate to a modern age of individualism, in Henri IV’s case cannot be exaggerated.

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Abbreviations

an. Archives Nationales Arch. cur. Cimber and J.L.F. Danjou, eds., Archives Curieuses de l’histoire de France depuis Louis XI jusqu’à Louis XVIII, 27 vols. (Paris: 1834–40) Bib. Ars. Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal Bib. Maz. Bibliothèque Mazarine bn. Clairambault Bibliothèque Nationale, Collection Clairambault bn. 500 Colbert Bibliothèque Nationale, Cinq Cents de Colbert bn. Dupuy Bibliothèque Nationale, Collection Dupuy bn. ff. Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds Français bn. ff. n.a. Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds Français, nouvelles acquisitions CSP Domestic Public Records Office, Great Britain, Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series of the reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, 12 vols. (London: 1856–72) CSPF 1572–74 Public Records Office, Great Britain, Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series of the Reign of Elizabeth: Preserved in the State Paper Department of Her Majesty’s Public Records Office, 23 vols. (London: 1863–1950) CSP France Public Records Office, Great Britain, Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives of France, (London: 1912)

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312 Abbreviations Public Records Office, Great Britain, Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives of Milan, (London: 1912) CSP Rome Public Records Office, Great Britain, Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives of Rome, (London: 1916) CSP Spain Public Records Office, Great Britain, Calendar of Letters and State Papers, relating to English affairs, Preserved in, or Originally belonging to, the Archives of Simancas: Spain, 4 vols. (London: 1899) CSP Venice Public Records Office, Great Britain, Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts relating to English affairs existing in the archives and collections of Venice and other libraries in Northern Italy, 1202–1672, 38 vols. (London: 1864–1939) Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Mémoires et Documents LM Bernard Xivry, ed., Recueil des lettres missives de Henri IV, 9 vols. (Paris: 1843–76) Méms. de Nevers Gomberville, ed., Les Mémoires de monsieur le duc de Nevers, prince de Mantouë, pair de France, gouverneur et lieutenant général pour les rois Charles IX, Henry III et Henry IV en diverses provinces de ce royaume, 2 vols. (Paris: 1665) Michaud and Poujoulat Joseph François Michaud and Jean-Joseph-François Poujoulat, eds., Nouvelle collection des mémoires relatifs à l’histoire de France, 34 vols. (Paris: 1854) n.d. no date n.p. no place Négs. Tosc. Giuseppe Canestrini and Abel Desjardins, eds., Négotiations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, 6 vols. (Paris: 1859–86) Sully [1819] Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, Memoirs of the Duke of Sully, Prime Minister of Henry the Great, 5 vols. (Edinburgh: 1819) Sully [B & B] Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, Les Oeconomies Royales de Sully, edited by David Buisseret and Bernard Barbiche, 2 vols. (Paris: 1970–88) UCSP Public Records Office, Great Britain, Uncalendared State Papers of the Reign of Elizabeth I, 1592–1603, 10 vols. (manuscript sources as yet uncalendared) CSP Milan

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Notes

in t r o d u c t io n 1 Revue Henri IV, I, 2. 2 Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 1. 3 Ibid., 4; Wolfe, “The Conversion ... and the Origins of Bourbon Absolutism,” 293. 4 Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 29. 5 Ibid., 31. 6 Ibid., 55. 7 Ibid., 124. 8 See, for example, Baird, The Huguenots and Henry of Navarre, II, 303, 319, 331, 343, 344; De Crue, Le Parti des Politiques, 86. The very partisan Baird even equates (p. 319) the royal abjuration with “the fearful decadence of [Henri’s] moral nature,” and asserts that the latter’s “flimsy” efforts to justify his decision with “a phrase or two of lofty sentiment ... constitute the most bitter censure of his unprincipled deed, and a prophecy of the harvest of hyprocrisy and scepticism shown by [his] act.” 9 See, for example, Vaissière, Henri IV, 329, 330, 422–3; Vergani, Discussion historique, passim; Seward, The First Bourbon, 45, 98. In fact, Yves La Brière argues this case explicitly in La conversion d’Henri IV (1905). See also Vaissière’s article “La conversion d’Henri IV,” 43–58. In his article “The Conversion of Henry IV,” Edmund H. Dickerman asserts mistakenly that Vaissière is among those historians who argue for Henri’s scepticism (p. 2). Although Vaissière writes that the king’s Calvinist convictions had been “for some time very shaky” and that he was ultimately convinced he

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could “find salvation in both professions,” the French historian also contends that “it would be false to make of Henri IV a sceptic, and to deny in him the existence of a sincere religious sentiment” (p. 329). See, for example, Dickerman, “The Conversion of Henry IV,” 2–3; LaCretelle, Guerres de Religion, III, 439; Martin, Histoire de France, IX, 347; Jackson, The First of the Bourbons, I, 265; Vienot, Histoire de la Réforme Française, 444; Green, Renaissance and Reformation, 276–7; Nauert, Renaissance and Reformation, 219–20; Guizot, History of France, III, 393; Buisseret, Henry IV, 17, 28; Poirson, Henri IV, I, 482; Smith, Reformation Europe, 178; von Ranke, Civil Wars and Monarchy in France, II, 257, 361. In his article “The Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” Adair G. Williams alleges still further that Henri IV’s final conversion “marked the triumph of politics over religion as a motive of national policy” (p. 144). See also Estailleur-Chanteraine, Henri IV, 222, 224; Lanux, Henri IV, 29. Jackson, The First of the Bourbons, I, 264; Smith, 178; Willert, Henry of Navarre, 260–1; Lanux, Henri IV, 119; von Ranke, Civil Wars in France, II, 257; Estailleur-Chanteraine, Henri IV, 222, 223. Only Auguste Poirson and Owen Chadwick imply, though vaguely, that Henri IV might have been genuinely Calvinist in his faith and perhaps even dogmatic. (See Poirson, Henri IV, I, 479, 481; Chadwick, The Reformation, 164.) As for the king’s scruples at his abjuration, both Dickerman (“The Conversion of Henry IV,” 4, 5) and Martin (Histoire de France, X, 310) attribute these to feelings of shame or dishonour for betraying old promises to the Huguenots, rather than to conscience. Indeed, the examination of “the complex psychic activities of rationalization, projection and compensation” that Henri allegedly underwent to justify himself and placate his sense of guilt for repudiating his Calvinist servitors, as opposed to his faith (p. 11), is the focus of Dickerman’s evocative but unconvincing study. See, for example, Hurst, Henry of Navarre, 111, 113, 114–15; Reinhard, Henri IV, 33; Babelon, Henri IV, 553, 554; Salmon, Society in Crisis, 258; Pearson, Henry of Navarre, 82, 84; Gaudet, Henri IV, 163, 166; Andrieux, Henri IV, I, 277–8. Salmon, Society in Crisis, 258; Pearson, Henry of Navarre, 84, 87; Gaudet, Henri IV, 161; Hurst, Henry of Navarre, 115; Reinhard, Henri IV, 117; Lévis-Mirepoix, Henri IV, 439. Perhaps Andrieux enunciated this view best when he wrote that “theological subtleties bored [Henri] and he was a man very far removed from dogmatic intransigences,” adding that the king had “a very wide concept of Christianity, and this is why his abjuration posted no grave problems of conscience for him.” (Henri IV, I, 285–6.) This portrayal is particularly strong in Babelon (Henri IV, 112, 554, 555), Pearson (Henry of Navarre, 84), and Hurst (Henry of Navarre, 117), the last of whom writes in the style of a latter-day Voltaire that Henri IV’s

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27 28 29

30

abjuration of 1593 meant ultimately the complete secularization of politics: “The ‘Age of Faith’ was over at last.” The fifth account is François Bayrou’s recent biography, Henri IV: Le Roi Libre (1994), a rather superficial book that combines lengthy quotations from primary printed sources with short connecting sections of descriptive narrative. Buisseret, Henri IV, xiii. Ibid., 17. Ibid., 10. Garrisson-Estèbe, Henri IV, 104–5; Babelon, Henri IV, 112, 553, 555. Babelon, Henri IV, 559–60. Garrisson-Estèbe, Henri IV, similarly sidesteps the issue of the king’s thinking at critical moments in his career, asserting inaccurately, for example, that “no text, no document permits one to look into the psychology of Henri in the month that followed his marriage and [the massacre of] Saint Bartholomew’s Day” (p. 62). See, for example, Batiffol, Century of the Renaissance, 301–2, 304; Mariéjol, La Réforme et la Ligue, 365–82; Nouaillac, “La fin de la Ligue,” 205–14; Elliott, Europe Divided, 342, 343–4, 355; Russell, Henry of Navarre, 42, 67, 87; Mahoney, Royal Cousin, 55, 62–3, 274; Rothrock, The Huguenots, 113–21; Greengrass, Age of Henri IV, 69, 73–4; Briggs, Communities of Belief, 181; Bayrou, 247–55. Pearson, Henry of Navarre, 84. See, for example, Nauert, Renaissance and Reformation, 219–20; GarrissonEstèbe, Henri IV, 164–5; Vaissière, Henri IV, 330; Buisseret, Henri IV, 17; Dickerman, “The Conversion of Henry IV,” 1; Green, Renaissance and Reformation, 276; Babelon, Henri IV, 556; Salmon, Society in Crisis, 258; Pearson, Henry of Navarre, 82; Rothrock, Huguenots, 118; Lévis-Mirepoix, Henri IV, 402; Russell, Henry of Navarre, 67. Briggs, Early Modern France, 181. See Love, “Winning the Catholics,” 361–79. See the excellent translation, The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais by Beatrice Gottlieb (1982). See also Febvre’s essay “Aux origines de l’esprit moderne,” in his subsequent book, Au coeur religieux du XVIe siècle (1957); and Woottan, “Lucien Febvre and Unbelief,” 695–730. Wootton, “New Histories of Atheism,” 23–4. Neuschel, Word of Honor, 20, 21. See, for example, Salmon, Society in Crisis, especially 127–31; Shimizu, Conflict of Loyalties; Constant, “La pénétration des idées de la Réforme protestante”; Neuschel, Word of Honour. One exception here is Kristen Neuschel’s book, Word of Honor. In contrast to earlier studies, she examines ties of kingship and clientage within the noble community, as well as their oral and literate means of commu-

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316 Notes to pages 11–12

31 32

33

34 35 36

37 38 39

40 41 42 43

44 45

46 47 48

nication, as modes of transmission, rather than concentrating on reaching an understanding of aristocratic religiosity per se. An example of this approach is Jouanna, Le devoir de revolte. To cite just a few: Bainton, Women of the Reformation; Febvre, Amour sacré; Heller, “Marguerite of Navarre and the Reformers of Meaux”; Delaborde, Louise de Coligny; Blaisdell, “Renée de France”; Roelker, Queen of Navarre; Delaborde, Eléonore de Roye; Mariéjol, Margeurite de Valois. See, for example, Roelker, “The Appeal of Calvinism to French Noblewomen” and “Noblewomen in the French Reformation”; Thomas, “Women and the Civil War Sects”; Collinson, “Women in the English Reformation”; Brémond, Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux; Davis, “City Women and Religious Change”; Taylor, From Proselytizing to Social Reform; Gout, La Miroir des dames chrétiennes. See, in particular, Berriot-Salvadore, Les Femmes; Hannay, “‘Unlocke my lipps’”; Bézard, L’homme et la femme dans la morale calviniste. Berriot-Salvadore, Les Femmes, 133. For examples, see, Sutherland, Huguenot Struggle for Recognition; Baird, Rise of the Huguenots; Salmon, Society in Crisis; Rothrock, Huguenots; Thompson, The Wars of Religion. Barbara B. Diefendorf has been particularly active here. See her article “The Huguenot Psalter” and also her monograph, Beneath the Cross. Barnavi and Descimon, La Sainte Ligue, 196. Barnavi and Descimon, La Sainte Ligue; Barnavi, Parti de Dieu; Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries; Stankiewicz, Politics of Religion; Salmon, French Wars of Religion; Descimon, Qui étaient les Seize?; Harding, “Revolution and Reform in the Holy League.” Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, I, 47–8. Garrisson-Estèbe, Tocsin pour un massacre, 175–8, 194, 197. Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, 177. Meanwhile, it is argued, the crowd’s religious commitment, its multifaceted composition (which often included civil and religious authorities), and contemporary sermons that sanctioned violence in defence of doctrine legitimized the bloodshed. See Davis, “Rites of Violence,” 154, 169–70; Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, I, 49, 50, 479, II, 123; Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, 177; Neuschel, Word of Honor, 31. Kristeller, “The Myth of Renaissance Atheism,” 233–43. See, for example, Davidson, “Unbelief and Atheism in Italy.” Davidson is quick to add, however, that neither he nor other authors who take this view want to suggest that atheism was common in this period (p. 85). Woottan, Paolo Sarpi, 3. Woottan, “New Histories of Atheism,” 37. See, for example, Allen, Doubt’s Boundless Sea; Buckley, Origins of Modern Atheism; Force, “Origins of Modern Atheism”; Bouwsma, “Secularization

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317 Notes to pages 12–19

49

50 51 52 53 54

55 56 57 58 59

of Society”; Popkin, History of Scepticism; Woottan, “Unbelief in Early Modern Europe.” For French examples, see Kors, Atheism in France and “Theology and Atheism in Early Modern France”; Berriot, Athéismes et athétistes; Delumeau et al., Croyantes et sceptiques. For English examples, see Sommerville, “The Destruction of Religious Culture,” 76–93; Aylmer, “Unbelief in Seventeenth-Century England.” For Spanish and Italian examples, see Edwards, “Religious Faith and Doubt in Medieval Spain”; Davidson, “Unbelief and Atheism in Italy.” Ginzburg, Cheese and the Worms; Sabean, Power in the Blood. Hill, “Plebeian irreligion” and Irreligion in the “Puritan” Revolution. Febvre, Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century, 462. Parker, The Dutch Revolt, 16–17. For observations similar to those of Febvre and Parker, see Neuschel, who notes that the adjective religious “appropriately describes the origins and significance of French conflicts ... The belief in the exclusive veracity of Catholic or Reformed doctrine and the fear of pollution or extermination by adherents of the other both spurred and legitimated violence by both sides. Religious life and the wider life of the community or social group were always, everywhere and in all circumstances, interconnected” (Word of Honor, 31). Diefendorf also criticizes conventional wisdom’s tendency “to empty these wars of much of their religious content, so that the clash of faiths takes second place to the personal rivalries and political factionalism that divided the noble leaders in the wars.” The “persistent emphasis on long-term political developments,” and in particular the prevailing emphasis on the larger process of French state-building and the foundations of Bourbon absolutism (she continues), “has tended to obscure the originality of the religious revolt, its particular character ... and even its ultimate effect on the political outcome of the wars.” (Beneath the Cross, 178.) Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII, 1. Sonnino, Origins of the Dutch War, 5. Bergin, Rise of Richelieu, 3. Ibid., 2. Moote, Louis XIII, the Just, 13. c ha p t e r o n e

1 Although there are several sixteenth-century theories as to the origin of the name “Huguenot,” it is a French word—first used in a derogatory sense—that carried with it not only the meaning but also the connotation of the religious label, “Covenanter.” (See Rothrock, Huguenots, viii, 64.) 2 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journeaux, VI, 20.

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318 Notes to pages 19–24 3 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 27 March 1569, Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 35. Emphasis mine. 4 Shakespeare, Henry V, 107. 5 Neuschel, Word of Honor, 32–3. 6 Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 16. 7 Michele Suriano, “Commentarii del regno di Francia, 1561,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, I, 517. 8 Ibid., 537–9. See also Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, II, 128. 9 Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, II, 128. 10 Ramus, Commentaries of the civill warres of Fraunce, Part I, 89. It may be significant that Ramus was a Huguenot. 11 Barnavi, Parti de Dieu, 168; Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 109. 12 Aquinas, On Kingship, 34, 41, 54. 13 See, for example, Albon, De la Majesté royalle, 6, 8, 97–102. See also St Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship, 10, 55; Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 79–80; Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, II, 546–7. 14 Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 180. 15 Giesy, “Models of Rulership,” 41–6, but especially p. 43. 16 Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, 45. 17 Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, II, 55. 18 Barnavi and Descimon, La Sainte Ligue, 33, 36–7. 19 Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, 38. 20 There is some discrepency in the sources not only over the precise date of Henri’s baptism (it was either 6 or 15 March), but also over who performed the ceremony. See Antoine de Bourbon to Jeanne d’Albret, 1554, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 89; “Journal des naissances et morts des princes de Béarn,” bn. Dupuy 88, fol. 18; Halphen, Enquête sur le baptême d’Henri IV (1599), passim. Charles cardinal de Vendôme (later Bourbon), Henri’s paternal uncle, was named as the infant Bourbon prince’s godfather, as were his maternal grandfather, Henri d’Albret, king of Navarre, and apparently also King Henri II of France. (bn. Dupuy 88, fol. 3vo.; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 162.) Pierre-Victor Palma Cayet states also that the infant prince was baptised by the cardinal d’Armagnac. 21 Marc’ Antonio Barbaro, “Relazione del regno di Francia, 1563,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, II, 69. 22 Michele Suriano, “Commentarii del regno di Francia, 1561,” in ibid., I, 553–5. 23 “Histoire de Henry le Grand, première année de son règne, 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fol. 568vo. 24 Berriot-Salvadore, Les femmes, 121. 25 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 165. See also Roelker, Queen of Navarre, 183, 202; Buisseret, Henri IV, 7.

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319 Notes to pages 24–7 26 27 28 29

30 31 32 33

34

35 36 37 38

Roelker, Queen of Navarre, 189. Perrenot de Chantonay to Philip II, 19 May 1562, an. 21 MI 100, n.p. Jeanne d’Albret to the duc de Nemours, 1565, bn. ff. 3259, fol. 6. Jeanne d’Albret to Catherine de Medici, c. February or March 1563, bn. nouvelles acquisitions françaises 21603, fols. 91–91vo. For an interesting discussion of Jeanne d’Albret’s education of Henri de Navarre as a means of self-justification and self-vindication, see Berriot-Salvadore, Les femmes, 407–10. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 162. Ibid.; Buisseret, Henri IV, 3. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 163. Vieilleville, Mémoires, in Michaud and Poujoulat, IX, 296–8. See also Castelnau, Mémoires, in Michaud and Poujoulat, IX, 418–19, 436–8; Mergey, Mémoires, in Michaud and Poujoulat, IX, 567; Condé, Mémoires, in Michaud and Poujoulat, VI, 566–7; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 164; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 52. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 165; Tavannes, Mémoires, in Michaud and Poujoulat, VIII, 246; Condé, Mémoires, 573, 579; Vieilleville, Mémoires, 298; Castelnau, Mémoires, 439, 444, 447, 451. Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 664–5, 666. Marc’ Antonio Barbaro, “Relazione del regno di Franci, 1563,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, II, 47. Tavannes, Mémoires, 237. The views of Michele Suriano have been discussed above. His coadjutor, Marc’ Antonio Barbaro, agreed with his superior, describing Bourbon as open and outgoing; spendthrift but generous; widely liked, though vain; imprudent and inconsistent in his aims and actions; and never seeing a project through. He added that Antoine lacked stability, considered only his private motives and used religion as a mere tool. (“Relazione del regno di Francia, 1563,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, II, 45–7.) Castelnau, one of the French royal ministers, recalled (Mémoires, 451) that Bourbon “was valliant and good natured, but too easily persuaded.” Chappuys supported this view (L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 665), adding that Antoine was “a prince without ambition and easy to content” – an observation echoed by an anonymous contemporary who concluded also that Bourbon was unaggressive and easily satisfied. (“Histoire de Henry le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fols. 566–vo.) Finally, François de La Noue commented (Mémoires, in Michaud and Poujoulat, IX, 590–1) that Bourbon “had let himself slide little by little into a carefree life, and [was] so well abused with vain and rich promises and empty honours from those who sneered at him, that he was come to the point of changing his party.”

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320 Notes to pages 27–32 39 Michele Suriano, “Commentarii del regno di Francia, 1561,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, I, 553. 40 Castelnau, Mémoires, 413, 435, 445; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 164, 165; Guise, Mémoires, in Michaud and Poujoulat, VI, 528; Marc’ Antonio Barbaro, “Relazione del regno di Francia, 1563,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, II, 81; Rothrock, Huguenots, 75; Roelker, Queen of Navarre, 24–34; Buisseret, Henri IV, 4. 41 “Relazione del regno di Francia, 1563,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, II, 91, 93, 95. 42 Jeanne d’Albret to the vicomte de Gourdon, 25 January 1562, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 448; the vicomte de Gourdon to Jeanne d’Albret, 9 February 1562, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 449. 43 Théodore de Bèze to Jeanne d’Albret, 13 May 1561, bn. Dupuy 333, fol. 6vo. See also Condé, Mémoires, 622; Castelnau, Mémoires, 145; Tavannes, Mémoires, 247; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 669, 670; Marc’ Antonio Barbaro, “Relazione del regno di Francia, 1563,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, II, 91–3. 44 Nicholas Throckmorton to William Cecil, 14 March 1562, CSP 1561–2, no. 934 (2). See also Throckmorton to Elizabeth I, 6 March 1562, ibid., no. 924 (8); Guise, Mémoires, 528. 45 Ibid. 46 Perrenot de Chantonay to Philip II, 23 February 1562, an. 21 MI 100, n.p. 47 Dickerman, “The Conversion of Henri IV,” 5. 48 Jeanne d’Albret, Mémoires, 22. 49 Perrenot de Chantonay to Philip II, 23 February 1562, an. 21 MI 100, n.p. 50 Perrenot de Chantonay to Philip II, 19 May 1562, ibid. 51 Jeanne d’Albret, Mémoires, 4. 52 Perrenot de Chantonay to Philip II, 23 February, 19 May, 3 June 1562, AN 21 MI 100, n.p. These letters, as well as that written by Chantonay to Philip on 8 February, are quoted by Jeanne d’Albret in her Mémoires, 4. 53 Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret, IV, 370–1. 54 Jeanne d’Albret to Catherine de Medici, c. February or March 1563, bn. nouvelles acquisitions françaises 21603, fols. 91–2; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 165; Babelon, Henri IV, 106; Roelker, Queen of Navarre, 202, 206; Buisseret, Henri IV, 7. 55 These dignities were confirmed by letters patent, dated 26 December 1562 and 1 January 1563. See Jeanne d’Albret to Catherine de Medici, c. February or March 1563, bn. n.a. 21603, fols. 95–6; Babelon, Henri IV, 106; Roelker, Queen of Navarre, 206. 56 bn. n.a. 21603, fol. 91. 57 See, for example, Jeanne d’Albret to the vicomte de Gourdon, 28 March 1563, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 451. 58 Neuschel, Word of Honor, 58.

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321 Notes to pages 32–9 59 For a detailed discussion of Jeanne’s policy at this time, see Roelker, Queen of Navarre, 187–98. 60 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 166. See also Jeanne d’Albret, Mémoires, 45–6. 61 Berriot-Salvadore, Les Femmes, 131. 62 Quoted in ibid., 408. 63 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 165; see also Babelon, Henri IV, 112. 64 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 165. 65 Babelon, Henri IV, 112. 66 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 165, 166. 67 Babelon, Henri IV, 114. 68 Ibid., 112. 69 Jeanne d’Albret, Mémoires, 4. 70 Jeanne d’Albret to Théodore de Bèze, 6 December 1566, quoted in Roelker, Queen of Navarre, 251. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Henri IV to Marie de Medici, 3 September 1601, in LM, V, 462–3. 74 Henri de Navarre to Jeanne d’Albret, 1565, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 26–7. 75 Jeanne d’Albret, Mémoires, 115. 76 Desormeaux, La Maison de Bourbon, IV, 367. See also Berriot-Salvadore, Les femmes, 407–8. 77 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 166. 78 bn. ff. 17044, fol. 454. 79 Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, II, 153–5. 80 Méms. de Nevers, II, 586. 81 For her disapproval of Condé’s behaviour, see Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 21 February 1572, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 341. 82 Desormeaux, La maison de Bourbon, IV, 368, 474. 83 Bertrand de La Mothe-Fénélon to Charles IX, 13 January 1571, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondance, III, 432. 84 Jeanne d’Albret to Catherine de Medici, 1570 or 1571, bn. ff. n.a. 21603, fol. 54. 85 Desormeaux, La maison de Bourbon, IV, 368. 86 Jeanne d’Albret to the vicomte de Gourdon, 1 September 1568, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 454. 87 Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 21. 88 Ibid. 89 Henri de Navarre to M. de Larchant, 26 September 1562, in ibid., 26. 90 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 21 January 1572, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 337.

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322 Notes to pages 39–42 91 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 21 February 1572, in ibid., 341. 92 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 25 April 1572, in ibid., 343. See also Erlanger, Plus belles lettres, 20. 93 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 21 January 1572, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 338. 94 Henri IV to Marie de Medici, 3 September 1601, LM, V, 462–3. Desormeaux slightly altered this statement, writing that Jeanne “said that [Henri] should not be a donkey with a crown on his head.” (La maison de Bourbon, IV, 368.) 95 Henri IV to Mme de Montglat, 14 November 1607, LM, V, 385. 96 Buisseret, Henri IV, 6; Mahoney, Royal Cousin, 26. See also Roelker, Queen of Navarre, 404, from which both biographers appear to have taken their remarks. For the best description of Henri’s methods in subduing the rebellion of some of his mother’s Calvinist subjects in February 1568, see Bordenave, Histoire de Béarn et Navarre, 146–9. 97 Jeanne d’Albret, Mémoires, 114–5. 98 Ibid., 119. 99 Ibid., 120. 100 Méms. de Nevers, II, 585. 101 Buisseret, Henri IV, 6. 102 La Noue, Mémoires, 623. See also La Mothe-Fénélon to _____, January 1569, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondance, I, 137; La Popolinière, La vraye et entière histoire, 127–8. 103 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 167. This dedication was made at Tonnay-Charante while Jeanne and Henri were en route to La Rochelle. 104 Jeanne d’Albret, Mémoires, 119. 105 Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 676. 106 Guise, Mémoires, 534, 536. 107 Jeanne d’Albret to Théodore de Bèze, 13 May 1561, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 236; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 668; “Histoire de Henry le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fols. 566–566vo. 108 Michele Suriano, “Commentarii del regno di Francia, 1561,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, I, 557. 109 Renée de France, duchess of Savoy, to John Calvin, 20 May 1564, bn. ff. 3951, fol. 63. 110 Jeanne d’Albret to the vicomte de Gourdon, 25 January 1562 and 13 May 1562, bn. ff. 17044, fols. 448vo. and 450; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 668; “Histoire de Henry le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fol. 566vo.; Marc’ Antonio Barbaro, “Relazione del regno di Francia, 1563,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, II, 57.

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323 Notes to pages 42–4

111 112 113 114 115 116

117 118 119 120 121

122

123

Condé was also connected by marriage to the Calvinist Châtillons, which strengthened both his leadership and his appeal among the Huguenots. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 167; La Popolinière, La vraye et entière histoire, 128. See Castelnau’s comments on precisely this need (Mémoires, 455). Ruble, Correspondence ... Montluc, III, 252. Théodore de Bèze to Haller, 6 November 1568, in Bèze, Correspondence, IX, 187. Théodore de Bèze to Thretius, 22 November 1568, in ibid., 193. Théodore de Bèze to Haller, 6 November 1568, in ibid., 187; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 167; La Popolinière, La vraye et entière histoire, 128. Ibid., 133. Ruble, Correspondence .. Montluc, III, 252. Michele Suriano, “Commentarii del regno di Francia, 1561,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, I, 549, 559. Ruble, Correspondence ... Montluc, III, 252. Sir John Norris to Elizabeth I, 18 April 1569, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondence, I, 362; Bib. Maz. 2590, fols. 155vo.–158vo.; La Popolinière, La vraye et entière histoire, 175. Envoys also were dispatched by Jeanne d’Albret to friendly monarchs, such as Elizabeth I, who was informed of Condé’s death, of Henri de Navarre’s official elevation to the Huguenot command, and of his assurances that Huguenot treaties signed by the late Condé with the English queen would be honoured. (See La MotheFénélon to Charles IX, 6 May 1569, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondence, I, 367.) At the same time, Henri de Condé, the eldest son of the murdered Prince Louis, was declared Henri de Navarre’s co-leader. “Protestation faicte par les Princes, seigneurs, gentilshommes, capitaines, et soldats de l’armée,” 1569, Bib. Maz. 2590, fols. 153–4, 154vo.–155; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 241, 242–3; see further Jeanne d’Albret to Théodore de Bèze, 1569, in Bèze, Correspondence, X, 72; Sir William Norris to Elizabeth I, 1569, and a dispatch to the baron de La Mothe-Fénélon, 6 May 1569, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondence, I, 362, 367; Discourse of the Civile Warres in Fraunce, 68; Sommaire Recueil des Héroiques, et Généreuses actions du Roy Henri IIII, 17; Castelnau, Mémoires, 539; Mergey, Mémoires, 572; La Noue, Mémoires, 632; Gaudet, Mémoires, 34; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, III, 58; La Popolinière, La vraye et entière histoire, 175. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 257. See also Petrucci to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 24 September 1571, Négs. Tosc., III, 709; Ruble, Correspondence ... Montluc, III, 252.

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324 Notes to pages 45–7 124 For an anthropological analysis of various meanings of honour – as part of the sixteenth-century social dynamic, as a claim to the privilege of legitimated violence, and as a ritual feature of noble expression – see Neuschel, Word of Honor, 65–8, 76–7, 204–8, especially. 125 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 27 March 1569, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 34. 126 Catherine de Medici to Pope Pius V, 4 October 1571, in Catherine de Medici, Lettres, IV, 134; “Histoire de Henry le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fols. 568vo.–569; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 685–6; Sir Henry Norris to William Cecil, 15 March 1569, and to Elizabeth I, 3 June 1569, CSPF 1569–71, 47, 83; Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 85; La Mothe-Fénélon to Charles IX, 21 September 1571, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondence, IV, 229. 127 “Instruction pour le sr. de Beauville allant vers sa Sainctété, du 24 Aoust 1572,” bn. ff. 3951, fol. 146; Charles IX to M. de Farrels, 19 January 1572, bn. ff. 3451, fols. 135–135vo.; D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, III, 274. See also Tavannes, Mémoires, 354; Bouillon, Mémoires, in Michaud and Poujoulat, XI, 7, 8; Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 85. 128 Betrand de La Mothe-Fénélon to Catherine de Medici, 9 November 1570, and to Charles IX, 7 September 1571 and 21 September 1571, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondence, III, 359, and IV, 255, 239–41; Charles IX to La Mothe-Fénélon, 25 August 1571 and 10 September 1571, in ibid., VII, 243, 249. 129 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, III, 280. 130 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 8 March 1572, LM, I, ff. 33–4. Incidentally, the queen of Navarre had similar ulterior plans for Marguerite, whom she hoped to take to Béarn after the wedding where the princess might be made a Calvinist! (Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 21 February 1572, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 340; and to Henri de Navarre, 8 March 1572, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 45.) 131 Jeanne d’Albret to M. de Caumont, 1571, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 355. 132 See Catherine de Medici to Charles IX, August 1571; to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 8 October 1571; and to the duchesse de Nemours, 28 December 1571, in Catherine de Medici, Lettres, IV, 59, 76, 86–7. 133 Jeanne d’Albret to the sieur de Beauvoir, 11 March 1572, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 347, 351–2; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 687. 134 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 21 February 1572, and to the sieur de Beauvoir, 11 March 1572, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 339, 350.

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325 Notes to pages 47–50 135 Jeanne d’Albret to the sieur de Beauvoir, 11 March 1572, in ibid., 347. 136 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 6 March 1572, bn. Dupuy 658, fols. 129–30; to Henri de Navarre, 8 March 1572, LM, I, ff. 32–3; to Henri de Navarre, 21 February 1572, and to the sieur de Beauvoir, 11 March 1572, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 340, 345, 347, 348. 137 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 6 March 1572, bn. Dupuy 658, fols. 129–30; to Henri de Navarre, 8 March 1572, LM, I, ff. 32–3; to Henri de Navarre, 21 February 1572, and to the sieur de Beauvoir, 11 March 1572, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 339–40, 346. 138 In a letter to Pope Pius, written on 4 October 1571, Catherine claimed that this was her only intention. (Catherine de Medici, Lettres, IV, 134.) Charles IX similarly told his ambassador to Rome, M. de Ferrals, that he was to stress this point to the pope. (Charles IX to M. de Ferrals, 19 January 1572, bn. ff. 3951, fol. 135.) See also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 316; Tavannes, Mémoires, 354; Bishop of Mâcon to Monseigneur Salviatti, 15 April 1572, Négs. Tosc., III, 765–6. 139 Sully, I, 31 [1819]; Alexandro Contarini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 5 October 1571, CSP Venice, VII, 477; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 688–9. 140 Hirschauer, “La politique de St. Pie V en France,” 13–43. 141 Journal of Jehan de La Fosse, in Barthélémy, Journal d’un curé liguer, 143. (Hereafter cited as La Fosse, Journal.) 142 The Tuscan ambassador commented on Catherine de Medici’s determination. See Négs. Tosc., III, 648. 143 “Instruction pour le sr. de Beauville allant vers sa Sainctété, du 24 Aoust 1572,” bn. ff. 3951, fol. 147vo. 144 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 21 February 1572, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 340. 145 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 25 April 1572, in Erlanger, Plus belles lettres, 20. 146 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 21 February 1572, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 341, 342. 147 Jeanne d’Albret to sieur de Beauvoir, 11 March 1572, bn. Dupuy 658, fols. 136vo.–138; see also bn. ff. 2748, fols. 122–3. 148 Charles IX to M. de Ferrals, 19 January 1572, bn. ff. 3951, fols. 135–135vo. 149 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 21 January 1572, bn. Dupuy 211, fol. 38. 150 Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 25 April 1572, in Erlanger, Plus belles lettres, 20. 151 Henri de Navarre to Jeanne d’Albret, 1 March 1572, in ibid., 19–20.

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326 Notes to pages 52–6 c h a p t e r t wo 1 2 3 4

5

6 7 8 9 10 11

12 13

14

Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 21. Voltaire, Civil Wars of France, 3. Ibid. Tavannes, Mémoires, 356. Rumours that Jeanne had been poisoned by the royal parfumeur, Master René, with a pair of scented gloves, were unfounded, though widely broadcast. (See Marlowe, The Massacre at Paris, Act I, scenes 2 and 3, in The Complete Plays.) The Calvinist queen was only forty-five years old when she died. “Coppie du Testament de défuncte Très-haute, vertueuse Dame & Princesse Ieanne, par la Grace de Dieu Royne de Navarre, Dame souvereigne de Béarn, Duchesse d’Albret, de Beaumont, & Duchesse douayrière de Vendômois,” 8 June 1572, bn. Dupuy 81, fols. 134–135vo., 138. Jeanne’s Catholic brother-in-law, the cardinal de Bourbon, and her Calvinist co-leader of the Huguenot party, amiral de Coligny, were named as executors of the will. Henri de Navarre to Bernard d’Arros, 13 June 1572, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 46–7. Bouillon, Mémoires, 8; see also commandeur Petrucci to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 15 July 1572, in Négs. Tosc., III, 799. Tocsin pour un massacre, 194, 197. Beneath the Cross, 177. Rothrock, Huguenots, 95. “Histoire de Henry le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fol. 569; Cheverny, Mémoires, 470–1. See also “Instruction pour le sr. de Beauville ... Aoust 1572,” bn. ff. 3951, fol. 68; “Discours particulier où est amplement descrit et blasmé la massacre de la St. Barthélemy,” bn. ff. 17529, fols. 114–114vo. Marlowe, Massacre at Paris, Act I, scene 5, 549. “Discours particulier ... de la St. Barthélemy,” bn. ff. 17529, fol. 142; Bouillon, Mémoires, 9; de Thou, Mémoires, 276; Tavannes, Mémoires, 388; “Massacre of St. Bartholomew,” September 1572, CSPF, 1572–74, 183–4. For Huguenot and some Catholic claims, see, for example, Bouillon, Mémoires, 9; Mergey, Mémoires, 574–5; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, III, 303; de Thou, Mémoires, 275; Sully, I, 32–5 [1819]; Sully, I, 15–6 [B.& B.]. See also the “Histoire du Massacre faict à Paris l’an Mil cinq cens septant deux le Dimanche vingt quatriesme Jour d’Aoust,” bn. ff. 13959, fols. 4–32. For contrasting accounts, see Tavannes, Mémoires, 387, 405; Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 88–9, 93; commandeur Petrucci to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 31 August 1572, Négs. Tosc., III, 829–30. For an excellent discussion of the sources for the massacre and their reliability, see Sutherland, Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 312–37.

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327 Notes to pages 56–7 15 See, for example, the shifts in Charles IX’s pronouncements following the massacre. Initially blaming the bloodshed on the private feud between the Guises and Coligny, the king next claimed responsibility for the massacre as a response to an alleged Huguenot plot to replace the monarchy with “a dangerous tyranny mixed with some form of Republicanism and popular dissolution.” Both versions were contradicted by the duc d’Anjou (later Henri III), who placed all blame on Catherine de Medici’s jealousy of Coligny’s growing influence over Charles, who in turn ordered the slaughter of “all the Huguenots in France, so that none of them would remain to reproach him afterward.” (Charles IX to M. de Ferrels, 24 August 1572, bn. ff. 3951, fols. 144–5; and to Bertrand de La Mothe-Fénélon, 24 August 1572, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondence, VII, 324–5; “Discours du Roi Henri III à un personnage d’honneur et de qualité, estant prés sa Maiesté au Royaume de Pologne, des causes et motifs de la iournée St. Barthélemi,” bn. Dupuy 500, fols. 79–84vo.) For other contemporary accounts, see “Déclaration du Roy de la cause et occasion de la mort de l’Amiral & autres ses adhérans et complices, dernièrement advenue en la Ville de Paris, le vingt quatriesme iour du présent mois d’aoust, l’An Mil cinq cent soixante & douze,” 28 August 1572, bn. ff. Dupuy 331, fols. 69–70; Charles IX to Bertrand de La Mothe-Fénélon, 25 and 26 August 1572, in La MotheFénélon, Correspondence, VII, 325–6, 328; Charles IX to the comte de Schomberg, 13 September 1572, bn. ff. 3951, fols. 151vo.–154; “Remonstrance faite par le sieur de Bellièvre Conseiller au conseil d’estat et privé du Roy, aux ambassadeurs de Messieurs les treize Cantons des anciennes Ligues des haultes Allemagnes en la journée assignée à Baden en Ergonne la VIIIe jour de Décembre 1572. où il est traitté des causes qui ont meu le Roi de faire procéder à la punition de l’Amiral de Chastillon et de ses complices,” bn. Dupuy 569, fols. 79–88vo.; La Fosse, Journal, 148–9. 16 “Histoire de Henry le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fol. 569vo.; Gamon, Mémoires, in Michaud and Poujoulat, VIII, 614. 17 Tavannes, Mémoires, 387. See also Voltaire, Civil Wars of France, 12; Sigismondo de Cavalli to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 19 April 1574, CSP Venice, VII, 508. According to Henri III’s account, the conspirators included himself, Catherine de Medici, the duc de Nevers, chancellor Birague, and the maréchaux de Tavannes and de Retz. (“Discours du Roi Henri III ... de la iournée St. Barthélemi,” bn. Dupuy 500, fol. 83.) 18 Cloulas, Catherine de Médicis, 290, 300. 19 “Coppie du Testament de ... Ieanne ... Royne de Navarre,” bn. Dupuy 81, fol. 138vo. 20 Charles IX to M. de Ferrels, July 1572, bn. ff. 3951, fols. 140–141vo. See also Charles IX to the cardinal de Lorraine, July 1572, ibid., fol. 143vo.

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328 Notes to pages 57–60 21 Charles IX to the cardinal de Lorraine, July 1572, and to M. de Ferrels, 24 August 1572, bn. ff. 3951, fols. 143vo, 144–5. See also “Instruction pour le sr. de Beauville allant vers sa Sainctété, du 24 Aoust 1572,” ibid., fols. 146–47. 22 bn. ff. 4897, fol. 68; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, III, 326; anonymous letter to Secretary Concini, 28 August 1572, Négs. Tosc., III, 824. 23 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, III, 326; anonymous letters to Secretary Concini, 27 and 28 August 1572, Négs. Tosc., III, 820, 824. 24 bn. ff. 4897, fol. 71; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, III, 357, 359. 25 See, for example, Sully, I, 41 [1819]; Sully, I, 20–1 [B.& B.]; Neale, Age of Catherine de Medici, 82; Reinhard, Henri IV, 33; Garrisson-Estèbe, Henri IV, 62; Batiffol, Century of the Renaissance, 237; Sedgwick, House of Guise, 226; Spitz, Renaissance and Reformation, II, 500; Rothrock, Huguenots, 95; Chamberlain, Marguerite of Navarre, 104; Sichel, Catherine de’ Medici, 185; Soman, Massacre of St. Bartholomew, 37; Erlanger, St. Bartholomew’s Night, 158. 26 Anonymous letter to Secretary Concini, 26 August 1572, Négs. Tosc., III, 824. 27 Juan d’Olacqui reported that Villeroy de Neufville had sent him a note saying that Navarre and Condé had gone to mass on 27 August, just three days after the massacre. (Coudy, The Huguenot Wars, 217.) The commandeur Petrucci also reported this to the Grand Duke of Tuscany (27 and 31 August 1572, Négs. Tosc., III, 811, 830). Less clear is Chancellor Cheverny, who recalled in his memoirs that when Navarre attended the christening of the chancellor’s new-born son on 24 September, this was “the first baptism the king of Navarre ever attended in a Catholic church, to which he had been returned since Saint Bartholomew’s” (Mémoires, 471) 28 Négs. Tosc., III, 837, 838. 29 “Discours particulier où est amplement descrit et blasmé la massacre de la St. Barthélemy,” bn. ff. 17529, fol. 141. 30 “Histoire de Henri le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fol. 570. See also Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 683. 31 Charles IX to the maréchal de Matignon, September 1572, bn. ff. 3256, fol. 58; “Occurances in France,” September 1572, CSP France, X, 174; Sir Francis Walsingham to Sir Thomas Smith, 16 September 1572, in Digges, The Complete Ambassadour, 245. 32 This account of the instruction is found in Coudy, The Huguenot Wars, 239–40. The instruction was supervised by Charles cardinal de Bourbon, the princes’ uncle. 33 Ibid., 40. The ceremony of abjuration was not nearly so private as Michael Wolfe alleges (Conversion of Henri IV, 27). It was performed on Michaelmass before significant elements of the court, and was then followed with official statements by the Crown. Though the procession to

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34

35 36 37 38

39

40

41

42

the chapel and the ritual itself might have been less ostentatious than usual, neither was performed in “calculated silence.” Certainly, the subsequent investiture ceremony for the Ordre de St Michel was very public. Wolfe is correct, however, in suggesting that the Crown’s reluctance to make a great display would have been construed as evidence of the princes’ coercion, though his reinterpretation of Henri’s religious position at this time is inaccurate. Catherine de Medici to Philip II, 2 October 1572, and Pope Gregory XIII, 4 October 1572, in Catherine de Medici, Lettres, IV, 134–5. These letters were Catherine’s “official” account of the double abjuration to the Spanish king and the pontiff. See Bertrand de La Mothe-Fénélon to Charles IX, 29 September 1572, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondence, V, 146. See, for example, Dr Valentine Dale to Lord Burghley, 1 April 1574, CSP France, X, 482; Montaigne, Autobiography, 77. Bertrand de La Mothe-Fénélon to Charles IX, 29 September 1572, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondence, V, 146. Henri de Navarre to Gregory XIII, 3 October 1572, bn. ff. 17309, fols. 69–69vo.; Henri de Navarre to Gregory XIII, 5 October 1572, Bib. Maz. 2590, fols. 398vo.–399vo.; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 694; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 317; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 89; “Advertisements from France,” 19 October 1572, CSPF, 1572–74, 193. Henri de Condé was forced to make a similar submission. Catherine de Medici, Lettres, IV, 134–5. See also Tomasso Sassotti, “Brieve raccontamento del gran macello fatto nella citta de Parigi il viggesime quarto Girono d’Agosto d’ordine di Carlo Nono re di Francia, & della crudel morte di Ghasparro Sciattiglione, signore di Coligni & Grande Ammiraglio de Francia, MDLXXII,” in Soman, Massacre of Saint Bartholomew, 145. “Interdiction en forme d’édict pour le Rétablissement de la Religion Catholique au Royaume de Navarre,” 16 October 1572, bn. ff. 3256, fols. 112–14; Bib. Maz. 2590, fols. 393–8; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, III, 357, 359, 360; Sully, I, 41 [1819]; Sully, I, 21 [B. & B.]; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 694. LM, I, ff. 50; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 694. Bernard d’Arros, Henri’s lieutenant-general in Béarn, argued that as he had received his authority from the king of Navarre, he would carry out his instructions as originally ordered. (Garrisson-Estèbe, Henri IV, 63.) bn. ff. 3256, fols. 114–15, 122vo.–124; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 694; Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 21 April 1573 and 3 September 1573, Négs. Tosc., III, 875, 888. Grammont’s nomination added insult to injury; according to the English ambassador, Jeanne d’Albret had remarked not long before her death “that Gram-

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330 Notes to pages 61–4

43 44

45 46

47 48 49 50 51 52 53

54

55 56

57

mont was born to be the ruin of her and her house.” (September 1572, CSP France, X, 185.) “Occurances in France,” September 1572, CSP France, X, 179. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 7; Tavannes, Mémoires, 419; Cheverny, Mémoires, 471; Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 14 January 1573, Négs. Tosc., III, 866; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 696; Sutherland, French Secretaries of State, 178. For the fullest discussion of Alençon’s participation, see Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 25–33. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 7, 166–74; Tavannes, Mémoires, 419; Cheverny, Mémoires, 471; Bouillon, Mémoires, 11, 12. See also Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 30–1. The duc d’Anjou to Charles IX, 9 May 1573, in Campion, Lettres missives de Henri III, I, 259–60. Tavannes, Mémoires, 420. Pomponne de Bellièvre to Charles IX, 1573, bn. ff. 15840, fol. 387. Holt, The Duke of Anjou, 31. Sully, I, 48 [1819]; Sully, I, 25–6 [B. & B.]. O’Connell, The Counter Reformation, 243. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 372; d’Aubigné, Mémoires, 28, 30. See also Mémoires de l’Estat de France, LM, I, ff. 50; Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 18 September 1574, Négs. Tosc., IV, 25; Sigismondo di Cavalli to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 10 March, 19 April and 15 July 1574, CSP Venice, VII, 501, 508, 516; Dr Valentine Dale to Lord Burghley, 12 April 1574, and to Sir Thomas Smith and Francis Walsingham, 29 September 1574, CSP France, X, 486, 559; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 693. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 216, 222, 223, 236, 234; Sully, I, 49, 50 [1819]; Sully, I, 28–30 [B. & B.]; Tavannes, Mémoires, 427; Dr Valentine Dale to Lord Burghley, 8 March 1574, CSP France, X, 475; Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 100, 101, 133; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 74, 75, 77, 80; Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 8 June 1574, Négs. Tosc., IV, 25; Sigismondo di Cavalli to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 15, 26, 31 July 1574, CSP Venice, VII, 516, 517, 517–18. Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 29. Sully, I, 53 [1819]; Sully, I, 32–3 [B. & B.]. See also Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 14 August 1574, Négs. Tosc., IV, 19; Sigismondo di Cavalli to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 28 August and 3 September 1574, CSP Venice, VII, 519, 519–20. La Huguerye, Mémoires, I, 260, 295–6; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 234; Sully, I, 50, 53 [1819]; Sully, I, 32 [B. & B.]; Cheverny, Mémoires, 474; Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 14 and 15 April, 1 May 1574, Négs. Tosc., IV, 914–16, 917, 924; La Fosse Journal, 168.

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331 Notes to pages 64–6 58 Dr Valentine Dale to Lord Burghley, 7 June 1574, CSP France, X, 509–10, 512; Sigismondo di Cavalli to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 16 June 1574, CSP Venice, VII, 514; Bertrand de La Mothe-Fénélon to Catherine de Medici, 18 June 1574, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondence, VI, 148. 59 Sigismondo di Cavalli to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 6 May 1574, CSP Venice, VII, 510. In fact, the two princes tried this, but the ruse was discovered. 60 Charles IX to Bertrand de La Mothe-Fénélon, 27 April 1574, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondence, VII, 458; Bertrand de La Mothe-Fénélon to Charles IX, 10 May 1574, in ibid., VI, 104–5. See also La Fosse, Journal, 166–7; La Huguerye, Mémoires, I, 184. 61 Declaration of Henri de Navarre, 24 March 1574, CSP France, X, 483; Henri de Navarre to Catherine de Medici, 13 April 1574, LM, I, 60–70; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 227; Mme. de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 77; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 697. See also Dr Valentine Dale to Lord Burghley, 1 April 1574, CSP France, X, 482. 62 Dr Valentine Dale to Lord Burghley, 22 May 1574, CSP France, X, 503; Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 2 July 1574, Négs. Tosc., IV, 14; Sigismondo di Cavalli to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 15 July 1574, CSP Venice, VII, 516–17. 63 Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 77; La Huguerye, Mémoires, I, 296; Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 31 January and 15 June 1574, Négs. Tosc., IV, 13. 64 Sigismondo di Cavalli to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 20 May 1574, CSP Venice, VII, 511. 65 Dr Valentine Dale to Lord Burghley, 8 March 1574; to Francis Walsingham, 15 March 1574, and to Thomas Smith and Francis Walsingham, 23 October 1574, CSP France, X, 474, 476, 567. See also Charles IX to Bertrand de La Mothe-Fénélon, 7 March 1574, in La Mothe-Fénélon, Correspondence, VII, 453; Bertrand de La Mothe-Fénélon to Catherine de Medici, 18 June 1574, in ibid., VI, 149. 66 Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 30 August 1574, Négs. Tosc., IV, 20–1. 67 Sully, I, 53–4 [1819]; Sully, I, 33 [B. & B.]; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 373; Dr. Valentine Dale to Francis Walsingham, 18 March 1575, CSP France, XI, 30; Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 104, 108. In the meantime, Marguerite de Valois worked at obstructing her mother’s and royal brother’s schemes. (Memoirs, 129.) 68 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 334. 69 Ibid., 373; Sully, I, 54 [1819]; Sully, I, 34 [B. & B.]. See also Cheverny, Mémoires, 477; Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 139. 70 Henri de Navarre to the vicomte de Gourdon, 2 May 1576, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 455.

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332 Notes to pages 66–9 71 bn. Clairambault 634, fol. 53. 72 Bouillon, Mémoires, 11, 14. See also Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 164. 73 Henri de Navarre to Jean d’Albret, baron de Miossens, January 1575, LM, I, 81–2; Dr Valentine Dale to Sir Thomas Smith and Francis Walsingham, 10 November 1575, CSP France, X, 179; d’Aubigné, Mémoires, 30–1. 74 Salmon, Society in Crisis, 190. 75 On 22 August 1573, an act regulating the order of succession in France was issued by Charles IX in the event of his death without a direct male heir. Henri de Navarre and the other Valois and Bourbon princes of the blood were made to endorse this document. (bn. Dupuy 500, fols. 85–86.) 76 Henri de Navarre to Jean d’Albret, baron de Miossens, January 1575, LM, I, 81–2. 77 Rothrock, Huguenots, 93. 78 bn. ff. 20611, fol. 145vo. Jeanne d’Albret had used a similar accusation to justify joining Condé in the third civil war of 1568. See “Lettres de Treshaute, tresvertueuse, & trescherestienne Princesse, Iane Royne de Navarre, au Roy, à la Royne Mère, à Monsieur frère du Roy, à Monsieur le Cardinal de Bourbon son beau frère, & à la Royne d’Angleterre” (n.p.: 1568). 79 Henri de Navarre to the vicomte de Gourdon, 2 May 1576, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 455. 80 Henri de Navarre to Catherine de Medici, 13 April 1574, LM, I, 65–8. See also, Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 131; La Fosse, Journal, 166. 81 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 232. Navarre was not alone in these suspicions. See Thomas Wilkes to Francis Walsingham, 16 April 1574, CSP France, X, 490. Catherine never would have given the connétablerie to Guise or to anyone else; following the death in battle of Anne de Montmorency in 1567, the queen mother suppressed the office for the remainder of her lifetime to prevent any powerful rival from contesting her authority. See Castelnau, Mémoires, 523. 82 Dr Valentine Dale to Francis Walsingham, 21 June 1574, CSP France, X, 519. Pierre de L’Estoile also admired Navarre’s skill in dissimulation (Mémoires-Journaux, I, 113). 83 Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, February or March 1575, Négs. Tosc., IV, 36, 38. 84 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, I, 59, 113; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 372; Dr Valentine Dale to Sir Thomas Smith and Francis Walsingham, 10 November 1575, CSP France, XI, 179. 85 See, for example, Henri de Navarre to the amiral de Villars, 3 October 1572, LM, I, 43–44. This is significant, for on the same date Henri wrote the first of his letters to Pope Gregory XIII to ask for absolution.

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333 Notes to pages 69–78 86 Quoted in Buisseret, Henri IV, 11. 87 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 2, 378. 88 Henri III to the comte de Lude, 5 February 1576; and to the sieur de Mauvissière, 12 February 1576, in Campion, Lettres missives de Henri III, II, 366–7, 376. See also L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, I, 113. 89 Quoted in Reinhard, Henri IV, 37. 90 See d’Aubigné, Mémoires, 192; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, I, 114–15. 91 One modern French historian argues, however, that Henri’s escape could not have occurred without the tacit consent and perhaps even the complicity of Catherine de Medici and Henri III. Moreover, rather than pursue the royal fugitive, they allowed the young nobles who were close to Henri to join him. (Ritter, “Le roi de Navarre et sa prétendue fuite de la cour en 1576,” 667–84.) This is highly unlikely, however, given the safeguards that had been placed around Henri throughout his captivity. Furthermore, if other nobles were permitted to follow him, it was probably to divide the leadership of the combined Huguenot-Malcontent faction currently at war with the Crown, and so derive some advantage from the escape. chapter three 1 For the Calvinist emphasis on this doctrine, see Calvin, Institutes, Bk III, chap III, 1: 593; chap. XI, 1:725–6, and passim. For a modern discussion, see Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, 113. See more generally ibid., 108–18. 2 Institutes, Bk. III, Chapt. XI, 13: 743–44; 18: 748. Nevertheless, Calvin also saw a place for works, not as a source of salvation but as a means of strengthening faith. (See ibid., Bk III, chap. XIV, 18:784–5.) 3 Ibid., Bk III, chap. III, 6:598. 4 Ibid., Bk III, chap. III, 8:600. 5 Ibid., Bk III, chap. III, 16:610. 6 Ibid., 112. 7 Quoted from Calvin’s “Petit traicté de la Saincte Cene,” in Theisen, Mass Liturgy, 17. 8 “On Civil Government,” in Calvin, On God and Political Duty, 79–82. 9 Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, 31. 10 Aquinas, On Kingship, 65. 11 Ibid., 63. 12 Ibid., 38. See more generally 28–48. 13 Henri de Navarre to Augustus “the Pious,” elector of Saxony, 31 January 1569, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 30–1. 14 See Jeanne d’Albret, Mémoires, 115; Jeanne d’Albret to Henri de Navarre, 27 January 1571, in Rochambeau, Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret, 314; Desormeaux, La maison de Bourbon, IV, 367.

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334 Notes to pages 78–85 15 Jeanne d’Albret to Charles IX, 22 February 1571, bn. ff. n.a. 21603, fol. 69. 16 Reinhard, Henri IV, 39. 17 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 168. 18 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 303; Sully, I, 50 [1819]; Sully, I, 30 [B. & B.]; Jean Philippi, Mémoires, in Michaud and Poujoulat, vol. VIII, 639. 19 Quoted in Reinhard, Henri IV, 41. 20 Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 132; see also Bouillon, Mémoires, 29. 21 According to the articles of this truce, Henri III would provide 50,000 écus to pay off Condé’s German troops before they entered France; the Malcontents and their Huguenot allies were to be granted Angoulême, Niort, Saumur, Bourges, La Charité, and Mezières as security towns; the war was to be ended in France; and Alençon was to have a large personal bodyguard paid for by the Crown. These articles later formed the nucleus of the so-called Peace of Monsieur (more formally, Peace of Beaulieu) signed in May 1576. (D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 376–7; Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 1 and 21 November 1575, Négs. Tosc., IV, 48–9, 53; Cloulas, Catherine de Médicis, 387.) 22 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 223; Bouillon, Mémoires, 10, 12; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, I, 97–9. 23 Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 24 March 1576, Négs. Tosc., IV, 59; Cloulas, Catherine de Médicis, 388; Garrisson-Estèbe, Henri IV, 72. See also Villeroy de Neufville to the sieur de Mauvissière, 7 February 1576, bn. 500 Colbert 472, fol. 47. 24 Baird, The Huguenots and Henry of Navarre, I, 47. 25 See, for example, Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 28. 26 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 167; Sully, I, 11 [B. & B.]. 27 See Henri de Navarre to the vicomte de Gourdon, 2 May 1576, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 455vo. 28 Rothrock, Huguenots, 77. 29 Sully, I, 59 [1819]; Sully, I, 43 [B. & B.]. 30 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 168. 31 For contemporary reactions to Henri’s announcement, see Bouillon, 33; Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 1 and 23 February, 24 March and 3 June 1576, Négs. Tosc., IV, 56, 57, 58, 70; Dr Valentine Dale to Thomas Smith and Sir Francis Walsingham, 23 February 1576, CSP France, XI, 242; Henri III to the sieur de Mauvissière, 12 February 1576, in Campion, Lettres missives de Henri III, II, 376; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 16; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, I, 66; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 168; Sully, I, 54–5 [1819]; Sully, I, 37–8 [B. & B.]. 32 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, I, 86. The second “thing” he had abandoned was his estranged wife, Marguerite de Valois. 33 Calvin, Institutes, Bk III, chap. III, 23:619.

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335 Notes to pages 85–9 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41

42 43 44

45

46

47 48 49 50 51 52

D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 190. Sabean, Power in the Blood, 44. I Corinthians 11:27–30. Sabean, Power in the Blood, 46. I Corinthians 11: 28: “But let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of the bread, and drink of that cup.” See also Calvin, Institutes, Bk III, chap. III, 25:621. Of contrition and its effect on the afflicted heart, Calvin wrote: “he who well considers how serious to have run counter to God’s justice cannot rest until, in his humility, he has given glory to God.” (Bk III, chap. III, 16:610.) Ibid. Calvin, Institutes, Bk III, chap. III, 1:593. See, for example, Henri de Navarre to M. d’Assy, 6 February 1576; to M. de Verac, 28 or 29 February 1576; and to M. de Gironde, 29 April 1576, LM, I, 83–4, 87–8, 91. Henri de Navarre to the vicomte de Gourdon, 2 May 1576, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 455vo. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 16, 87; d’Aubigné, Mémoires, 38. See also Bouillon, Mémoires, 33; Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 151. The king’s efforts included releasing Navarre’s household from Paris, including his furnishings, servants, and personal belongings; paying the balance of Henri’s pension from the previous year in addition to the first instalment for 1576; allowing Catherine de Bourbon to join her older brother at Saumur; and giving Navarre a gift of six horses from the royal stables and a further 12,000 livres in cash. See Henri de Navarre to Forget, 23 February 1576, LM, I, 85–6; Bouillon, Mémoires, 33; Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 3 June 1576, Négs. Tosc., IV, 70. Dr Dale to Thomas Smith and Francis Walsingham, 23 February 1576, CSP France, XI, 242; see also Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 24 March 1576, Négs. Tosc., IV, 58. Henri III to the sieur de Mauvissière, 12 February 1576, in Campion, Lettres missives de Henri III, II, 376; see also Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 1 February 1576, Négs. Tosc., IV, 56. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 16. See also La Huguerye, Mémoires, I, 387. See d’Aubigné, Mémoires, V, 16; La Huguerye, Mémoires, I, 387. La Huguerye, Mémoires, I, 388. Henri de Navarre to the vicomte de Gourdon, 2 May 1576, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 455. Ibid.; d’Aubigné, Mémoires, 38. See also Bouillon, Mémoires, 33; Sully, I, 37 [B. & B.]; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, I, 67. Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 29.

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336 Notes to pages 89–93 53 Dampierre, Le Duc d’Épernon, 8. 54 Montaigne, Autobiography, 77. 55 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 87; Sully, I, 56–7 [1819]; Sully, I, 38 [B. & B.]. See also Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 699. 56 Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, 143. 57 Ibid., 122, 136. 58 Henri de Navarre to the mayor and aldermen of La Rochelle, 26 June 1576, LM, I, 94–5. See also d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 86; Sully, I, 56–7 [1819]; Sully, I, 38 [B. & B.]. 59 Although with the Peace of Beaulieu and the new appanage it had conferred upon him, Alençon had become the new duc d’Anjou, for the sake of clarity and consistency I have continued to refer to him by his original title. 60 See Henri de Navarre to the vicomte de Gourdon, 2 May 1576, bn. ff. 17044, fols. 455–455vo. 61 Ibid. 62 See, for example, contemporary accounts of the loss of Calvinist Brouage to the royal Catholic forces, which was due specifically to the bickering between the two cousins. (Sully, I, 110–11, 114; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 279, 284, 285; Bouillon, Mémoires, 35.) The Tuscan ambassador also noted that the Huguenot party was divided internally because of this rivalry as early as April. (Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 2 and 18 April 1577, Négs. Tosc., IV, 118.) 63 Bouillon, Mémoires, 35. 64 Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 2 and 18 April 1577, Négs. Tosc., IV, 118. 65 See Henri de Navarre to Henri III, 24 January 1580, and to Catherine de Medici, 24 January 1580, LM, I, 158, 159. 66 The popular name la guerre des amoureux apparently originated with d’Aubigné, who claimed in the Histoire universelle that it resulted from the amorous intrigues of Henri, Marguerite de Valois, the vicomte de Turenne, and others. As Navarre noted, however, it was precipitated by Condé’s rash behaviour and the Huguenots’ refusal to surrender certain towns as had been agreed with Catherine de Medici at Nérac, where Henri and the queen mother had met in 1579 to resolve several difficulties with the peace. The war was brief and inconclusive. It ended six months later with the Treaty of Fleix, signed in November 1580. 67 Henri de Navarre to Théodore de Bèze, November 1580 and 1 February 1581, LM, I, 330–3, 351–4. 68 Henri de Navarre to the vicomte de Gourdon, 2 May 1576, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 455vo.; Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 145; Bouillon, Mémoires, 29. 69 See Bouillon, Mémoires, 29.

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337 Notes to pages 93–8 70 Quoted in d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 233. According to Sully, Henri de Navarre himself had heard Alençon say on more than one occasion that “in his heart he hated the Protestants as he hated the devil.” 71 Bouillon, Mémoires, 29. 72 Marguerite de Valois, Mémoires, 146–9. 73 Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 31 May 1577, Négs. Tosc., IV, 120; Bouillon, Mémoires, 34; Cheverny, Mémoires, 478; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 117. 74 Bouillon, Mémoires, 33. 75 La Force, Mémoires, I, 108–9. 76 Vincenzo Alamanni to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 15 April 1576, Négs. Tosc., IV, 60–2; Henri de Navarre to M. de Vivans, 25 May 1576, LM, I, 91–2; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 214; Cloulas, Catherine de Médicis, 392; Salmon, Society in Crisis, 198–9; Buisseret, Henri IV, 9. 77 For abridged English translations of these three authors, see Franklin, Consitutionalism and Resistance. For modern discussions of the change in Huguenot attitudes, see Allen, History of Political Thought, 307; Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 188–9; Greengrass, Age of Henri IV, 11–13; Stankiewicz, Politics of Religion, 33–7. 78 Quoted in Allen, History of Political Thought, 304. 79 In fact, the Huguenots had so mitigated their outrage in subsequent negotiations with the Crown, reassuming their old posture of respect and loyalty, that an astonished Pierre de L’Estoile remarked that this “seems prodigious and strange, seeing that the day and wound of Saint Bartholomew’s is still bloody and very fresh.” (L’Estoile, MémoiresJournaux, I, 57.) 80 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 216. In their desperation, the Huguenots even contemplated offering the protectorship to the Calvinist German prince of the Palatinate, John Casimir. 81 The constitutional framework for this early “state within a state” was shaped at the Huguenot political assemblies of Milhau and Nîmes between 1573 and 1575. See Anquez, Assemblés politiques, 17–21; Haag, La France protestante, X, 116–27; Devic and Vaissete, Histoire de Languedoc, XI, 570; Salmon, Society in Crisis, 191–3. 82 Jeanne d’Albret to Théodore de Bèze, 1569, Théodore de Bèze, Correspondance, X, 72. 83 D’Aubigné, Mémoires, 71. 84 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IV, 216, 222. 85 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, I, 38. 86 Quoted in Greengrass, The Age of Henry IV, 14. For other contemporary accounts, see Gaches, Mémoires, 258–9; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 195–6; Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 11 March 1577,

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338 Notes to pages 98–102

87 88 89 90 91 92 93

94 95

96

Négs. Tosc., V, 117. See also Palm, Politics and Religion, 107–8, 122–3, 134, 135. Montmorency’s as recorded by the Calvinist historian La Popolinière and quoted in Greengrass, The Age of Henry IV, 14. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 35. See Henri de Navarre to the vicomte de Gourdon, 2 May 1576, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 455vo. Roelker, Queen of Navarre, 154. See, for example, Henri de Navarre to the Nobility, Cities and Communities of Guyenne, 21 December 1576, LM, I, 116. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, I, 59; Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 5 November 1576, Négs. Tosc., IV, 85–6. See: Henri de Navarre to the Nobility, Cities and Communities of Guyenne, 21 December 1576; to the sieur de Verac, 24 February 1576; to “Messieurs the assembled gentlemen of the Estates of Blois,” February 1577; to the duc de Montpensier, 7 September 1577; to the duc de Montmorency-Damville, 8 and 22 September 1577; to Henri III, two letters dated July 1578; and to Catherine de Medici, 29 July 1579, LM, I, 87, 116, 131, 147, 150–3, 181–2, 188, 237; Henri de Navarre to the Three Estates of France, 4 March 1589, in Musset-Pathay, Henri IV, 105–9, 188; Henri de Navarre to Henri III, March 1585 and 10 July 1585, in Dussieux, Lettres intimes, 59, 66–7; “Remonstrance aulx Estats à Blois pour la Paix, sous la personne d’ung Catholique romain...,” in Mornay, Mémoires et Correspondance (herafter cited as Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires), II, 40–78; Stafford to Sir Francis Walsingham, 23 March 1585, CSP Foreign, XIX, 371; Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 13 February 1577, Négs. Tosc., IV, 109; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 438; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 176–1. Henri de Navarre to the sieur de Verac, 24 February 1576, LM, I, 87. Henri de Navarre to the duc de Montmorency-Damville, 15 August 1576; to the Nobility, Cities and Communities of Guyenne, 21 December 1576; to the sieur de Batz, January 1577; to the officers and consuls of Bergerac, 27 December 1577; to the sieur de Puységur, 7 May 1578; and to M. de Meslan, 25 November 1580, LM, I, 100, 116, 121–2, 157, 172, 329; “Remonstrance à la France sur la protestation des chefs de la Ligue, faicte l’an 1585,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 66–7; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 175. For other examples of Henri’s approach, see Henri’s instructions to Ségur, his envoy to the duc de Montmorency-Damville, dated 25 March 1577, Bib. Maz. 2592, n.p.; the “Response du roy de Navarre a l’instruction des deputez,” in Méms. de Nevers, I, 453–7; Cheverny, Mémoires, 478; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 175, 176–7; Henri de Navarre to “Messieurs the assembled Gentlemen of the Estates of Blois,” 1 February 1577, LM, I, 129–31.

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339 Notes to pages 102–4 97 See “Declaration ... pour monstrer les raisons qui l’ont constrinct d’entreprendre la defense de l’autorité du Roy,” March 1562; “Traicte d’association faicte par monseigneur le prince de Condé avec les princes, chevaliers, [etc.] ... pour maintenir l’honneur de Dieu, le repos de ce royaume, et l’estat et liberté du Roy, soubs le gouvernement de la Royne sa mère,” 11 April 1562; “Seconde déclaration de monsieur le prince de Condé, pour faire cognoistre les autheurs des troubles qui sont aujourd’huy en ce royaume, et le devoir en quoy il s’est mis et se met encourse à présent pour les pacifier,” 25 April 1562; and “Les moyens de pacifier le trouble qui est en ce royaume, envoyez à la Roine par monsieur le prince de Condé,” 2 May 1562, in Condé, Mémoires, 626, 629–35, 645–7, 655–61, 666–7. See also the “Déclaration et protestation de Monsieur le Prince de Condé des causes qui l’ont contraint de prendre les armes, 1568,” Bib. Maz. 2590, fols. 27–8; Guise, Mémoires, 534; Tavannes, Mémoires, 252; Castelnau, Mémoires, 456–8, 471, 521, 550; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 167. 98 “Remonstrance aulx estats à Blois pour la Paix, sous la personne d’ung Catholique romain,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, II, 77. 99 Stankiewicz, Politics of Religion, 1–2, 7; Baumgartner, Radical Revolutionaries, 16. 100 Stankiewicz, Politics of Religion, 24–5, 55. 101 See Henri III’s opening address to the Estates General of Blois, 1576, in Méms. de Nevers, II, 242–5; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 440–3; Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 28 December 1576, Négs. Tosc., IV, 96. 102 See the duc de Montpensier’s address to the noble deputies at the Estates General of Blois, February 1577, in Lalourcé and Duval, Estats Généraux, II, 210–13; the duc de Damville’s response to the royal deputies in February 1577, quoted in d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 177–8. 103 “Remonstrance aulx Estats à Blois,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, II, 77–8. 104 Henri de Navarre to the sieur de Puységur, 7 May 1578, ibid., 172. 105 “Remonstrance à la France sur la protection des chefs de la ligue, faicte l’an 1585,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 66–7; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 175. 106 Sully, I, 59 [1819]; Sully, I, 42–3 [B. & B.]. 107 Babelon, Henri IV, 221. 108 LM, I, 140. 109 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 190; Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 30 October 1576, Négs. Tosc., IV, 84; Henri de Navarre to M. de Verac, 6 October 1576; to the mayor and aldermen of Bordeaux, 31 October 1576; to Henri III, December 1576; and to M.

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340 Notes to pages 105–7

110 111

112 113

114 115

116 117

118 119

120

de Batz, December 1576, LM, I, 107, 110–11, 112, 118–20; Sully, I, 105–6; Buisseret, Henri IV, 11; Garrisson-Estèbe, Henri IV, 80. Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 237, 240. “Advis de M. Duplessis sur les moyens de contenter les catholiques romains demandans le restablissement de l’exercise de leur religion en Béarn, envoyé au roy de Navarre en l’an 1580,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mèmoires, II, 94–5. Sully, I, 75 [1819]; Sully, I, 64–5 [B. & B.]. See Henri de Navarre’s instructions to Ségur, his envoy to Montmorency-Damville, dated 25 March 1577, Bib. Maz. 2592, n.p. Ségur’s job was to restore peace between the Calvinists and the Catholic duke in Languedoc specifically on the twin bases of religious moderation and the shared interests of all Frenchmen. Henri de Navarre to the duc de Montmorency-Damville, 16 June 1576, LM, I, 92–3. See, for example, Henri de Navarre to amiral de Villars, 13 January 1577, and to the Council of Religion at Bergerac, April 1578, LM, I, 126, 171. The edict of Beaulieu (May 1576) also referred officially to this faction as “catholiques associés.” Bouillon, Mémoires, 33. Ibid.; see also Henri de Navarre to the duc de Montmorency-Damville, 13 January and 17 April 1577, LM, I, 124–6, 134–8. MontmorencyDamville initially declined the invitation. The three towns were Albi, Lavour, and Casteldun. See Pomponne de Bellièvre to Henri III, 2 April 1581, bn. ff. 15891, fol. 157. Buisseret, Henri IV, 12. His policy was again confirmed by the Calvinist deputies at the assembly of Saint-Jean-d’Angely the following year. (See Henri de Navarre to the duc de Lesdiguières, 1 July 1582; and to _________, 1 July 1582, LM, I, 462–3, 463–4.) For examples of the prevailing attitude, see “Reponse du Roy de Navarre aux deputez des Estats,” 1577, bn. Dupuy 500, fols. 124–125vo.; Bib. Maz. 2950, fols. 296–9; Pomponne de Bellièvre to Henri de Navarre, 1588, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs., France 294, fols. 4–7; Bellièvre to the duc de Nevers, 3 August 1586, bn. ff. 3372, fol. 176vo.; “Mémoire transcript sur un escript de la main de la Royne Mère,” c. 1586, Bib. Maz. 2619, fols. 181–3; Henri III to Catherine de Medici, 1587, Bib. Maz. 2619, fols. 195–292; “Supplication au Roy sur advis de se faire Catholique, 1591,” bn. Dupuy 317, fols. 152–5; Henri de Navarre to the three Estates of France, 4 March 1589, Musset-Pathay, Henri IV, 110–12; Henri IV to the archbishop of Rouen, 6 March 1583, LM, I, 502–3; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VII, 63–4; Giovanni Dolfini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 11 March 1588, CSP Venice, VIII, 343; “The Oration and declaration of the French King, Henrie the fourth of

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341 Notes to pages 107–9

121

122 123

124 125

126

127 128 129 130

that name, and by the grace of God King of Navarre ... to the lords and gentlemen of his armie, before the citie of Paris, the eight [sic] day of ... August 1590” (London: 1590); Brémond d’Ars, Conférences de Saint-Brice, 17–18; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 436–7. See, for example, Henri III’s opening address to the Estates General of Blois, 1576, in Méms. de Nevers, II, 242–5; the duc de Montpensier’s address to the noble delegates at the Estates General, February 1577, in Lalourcé and Duval, États Généraux, III, 18; the duc de MontmorencyDamville’s response to the royal deputies in February 1577, quoted in d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 177–8 (see also pp. 440–3); Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 28 December 1576, Négs. Tosc., IV, 96. Joinville, Life of Saint Louis, in Joinville and Villehardouin, Chronicles of the Crusades, 175. Henri de Navarre to the Nobility, Cities and Communities of Guyenne, 21 December 1576, LM, I, 116 (italics mine). Compare this with the statement made to the pope by St Bernard of Clairvaux in the twelfth century, following the massacre of heretics at Cologne: “The people of Cologne have exceeded all decent bounds. Though we may approve of their zeal we most emphatically do not approve of what that zeal has brought about; for faith is a work of persuasion, and cannot be imposed by force.” (Quoted in Oldenbourg, Massacre at Montségur, 84.) It appears that Henri IV was more fully committed to Catholic tradition, at least in this regard, than his enemies. Sabean, Power in the Blood, 42. “Response du Roy de Navarre aux deputez des Estats,” Bib. Maz. 2950, fols. 296–9; bn. Dupuy 500, fols. 124–125vo.; “Reponse du roy de Navarre à l’instruction des deputez,” in Méms. de Nevers., I, 453–7. See also Cheverny, Mémoires, 478; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 175, 176–7; Henri de Navarre to “Messieurs the assembled gentlemen of the Estates of Blois,” 1 February 1577, LM, I, 129–31; Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 13 and 24 February 1577, Négs. Tosc., IV, 109, 115. “Instruction donnée par le Roy à Monsieur le Duc de Montpensier. L’envoyant vers le Roy de Navarre pour le faict de l’Edict d’Union Générale et que doresnavant luy au que le seul exercise de la Religion catholique en ce Royaumme suivant ce qui a été arresté aux Estats Généraux,” 1577, bn. ff. 15534, fols. 302vo–311. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 175. Giovanni Moro to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 27 April 1584, CSP Venice, VIII, 92. La Huguerye, Mémoires, I, 450. See Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 169.

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342 Notes to pages 110–13 131 LM, I, 121–2. This appeal was especially apropos for de Batz, whom Henri thanked for protecting a group of helpless Calvinists under attack by the Catholic forces. A chief tenet of chivalry was that there was no honour in assaulting the weak and unarmed, who must be protected instead. 132 Quoted in Pollard, Henry VIII, 155. 133 Babelon, Henri IV, 220. 134 Henri de Navarre to the Nobility, Cities and Communities of Guyenne, 21 December 1576, LM, I, 116. 135 See, for example, d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 176–7; Henri de Navarre to “Messieurs the assembled gentlemen of the Estates of Blois,” 1 February 1577; to the duc de Montpensier, 17 September 1577; and to Henri III, two letters dated July 1578, LM, I, 131, 147, 181–2. 136 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 176–7; Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 13 February 1577, Négs. Tosc., IV, 109; Henri de Navarre to the duc de Montpensier, 17 September 1577; to Henri III, two letters dated July 1578; and to Catherine de Medici, 24 July 1579, LM, I, 147, 181–2, 188, 237. 137 Henri de Navarre to the Nobility, Cities and Communities of Guyenne, 21 December 1576, LM, I, 116. 138 Henri de Navarre to Catherine de Medici, 29 July 1579, ibid., 237. 139 Henri de Navarre to “Messieurs the assembled gentlemen of the Estates of Blois,” 1 February 1577, ibid., 131. 140 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 131; see also Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 31 May and 10 July 1577, Négs. Tosc., IV, 120, 121; Henri de Navarre to amiral de Villars, 13 January 1577; and to the duc de Montmorency-Damville, 17 April 1577, LM, I, 126, 134–8. 141 See, for example, Henri de Navarre to the officers and consuls of Bergerac, 27 December 1577, LM, I, 157; Bouillon, Mémoires, 37. 142 Sully, I, 73 [1819]; Sully, I, 63 [B. & B.]; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, V, 334, 335; see also, Henri de Navarre to the sieur de Batz, 28 October 1578, LM, I, 202. 143 Henri de Navarre to Henri III, 10 January 1580, LM, VIII, 153. 144 “Declaration et protestation du roy de Navarre, sur les justes occasions qui l’on meu de prendre les armes, pour la défense et tuition des Églises reformées de France. Imprimé nouvellement, 1580,” in Arch. cur., X, 1–52. 145 Henri de Navarre to Henri III, 8 February 1584, LM, I, 637; see also “Instruction de ce que le sieur de Chassincourt dira au roy sur le voyage du sieur de Ségur,” 25 December 1583, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, II, 398–401.

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343 Notes to pages 113–16 146 See Sinolfo Saracini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 22 June 1577, Négs. Tosc., IV, 120. 147 Henri de Navarre to Henri III, December 1576, LM, I, 112. See also Henri de Navarre to the mayor and aldermen of Bordeaux, the common people and inhabitants, 31 October 1576, and to the sieur de Verac, 6 October 1576, LM, I, 110–11, 107. 148 Quoted in Reinhard, Henri IV, 46. 149 See Henri de Navarre to Henri III, December 1576, ibid., 112; Marguerite de Valois, Memoirs, 236, 251; Reinhard, Henri IV, 46; Sutherland, Secretaries of State, 211, 216, 217. 150 Bouillon, Mémoires, 42; Enea Renieri and Guilio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 4 June 1582, Négs. Tosc., IV, 420; Henri de Navarre to the duc de Lesdiguières, July 1582; to [blank], 1 July 1582, LM, I, 462–3, 463–4; Mme. de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 151; Buisseret, Henri IV, 12; Baird, Huguenots and Henry of Navarre, I, 215–16; Anquez, Assemblées politiques, 30–3. 151 Henri de Montmorency-Damville had succeeded his late brother, François, as head of the family in 1579. Hereafter, I shall refer to the politique leader by his new title. 152 Sir Edward Stafford to Sir Francis Walsingham, 22 November 1584, CSPF, XIX, 164; Giovanni Moro to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 23 December 1583, CSP Venice, VIII, 77; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, I, 162–3; Greengrass, The Age of Henry IV, 22; Palm, Politics and Religion, 152–5. 153 This was to include Denmark, Hanover, Pomerania, Hesse, Saxony, the Palatinate, England, and France. See Henri de Navarre to John III Vasa, king of Sweden, 18 July 1583; to the comte de [blank], 18 July 1583; to Charles duke of Sodermanland, 25 July 1583; and to Frederick II, king of Denmark, 31 July 1583, LM, I, 530–1, 535–40, 540–3, 546–8, 557–62, 616–18; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 139. 154 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VI, 457; Sully, I, 105–6 [1819]; Sully, I, 117–18 [B. & B.]; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 141–2. 155 “Justification des actions du roy de Navarre [6 July 1583],” in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, II, 301. See also Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to Henri de Navarre, 20 February 1584, in ibid., 527. 156 CSPF. 1583, art. 734; “Estat du roy de Navarre et son parti en France,” in Duplessis-Mornay, II, 241–56; Buisseret, Henri IV, 14. 157 CSPF. 1583, art. 734. See also Giovanni Moro to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 27 April 1584, CSP Venice, VIII, 92. 158 Cheverny, Mémoires, 481. 159 “Discourse envoyé à M. de Valsingham, sécrétaire d’estat d’Angleterre, pour induire la royne Elizabeth à embrasser l’union du roy de Navarre et son parti en France,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, II, 235–41, 241–56; CSPF. 1583, art. 734.

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344 Notes to pages 117–22 chapter four 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10

11

12

13 14 15 16

Buisseret, Henri IV, 15. Salmon, Society in Crisis, 235. Quoted in Vaissière, Henri IV, 265. “My disposition always has been to love him,” continued Henri III, “and I know he loves me. He is a little sharp; but at base he is a good man. I am sure that my moods will please him, and that we shall get along together.” Quoted by Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, Clervant, and Chassincourt in their report to Henri de Navarre, 14 April 1585, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, II, 275–6. See also Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 14 May 1584, Négs. Tosc., IV, 506. Ibid. Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 58. Ibid., 58–9. Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 25 June 1584, Négs. Tosc., IV, 515–16; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 153. Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 29 May 1584, Négs. Tosc., IV, 508–9; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 482. Henri de Navarre to the Calvinist counsellors of the chambre de justice at L’Isle-en-Jourdan, 15 July 1584, LM, I, 674; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 154. Pomponne de Bellièvre to Catherine de Medici, 16 May 1585, bn. ff. 15891, fol. 406; Pomponne de Bellièvre to President Jeannin, 13 December 1592, bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 191; Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 14 and 29 May, 10 July 1584, Négs. Tosc., IV, 506, 508, 519; Bouillon, Mémoires, 49; d’Aubigné, Mémoires, 69; “Le procès verbal d’un nommé Nicolas Poulain Lieutenant de la prévosté de l’Isle de France fort remarquable & veu de peu de personnes, sorti du Cabinet du Roy, qui contient toute la quintessence de la Ligue depuis le 2 Janvier 1585 jusques au jour des Barricades escheues le xii May 1588,” bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 282. According to Poulain, the League believed Épernon took 200,000 écus to Navarre from Henri III to fight the Catholics. See Pomponne de Bellièvre to Catherine de Medici, 16 April 1585, bn. ff. 15891, fol. 406; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, II, 230–1, and the “Déclaration du Roy de Navarre contre les calomnies publiées contre lui,” Mémoires, III, 89–126. Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 10 July 1584, 16 October 1584, Négs. Tosc., IV, 518, 538. See d’Aubigné, Mémoires, 69–70. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 169; Vaissière, Henri IV, 262. See Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 14 and 29 May, 10 July 1584, 5 and 13 March 1585, and Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 9 and 17 Sep-

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345 Notes to pages 122–6

17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25

26 27 28 29

30 31

32 33 34

tember 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 506, 508, 519, 549, 572, 614, 625; Bouillon, Mémoires, 49; d’Aubigné, Mémoires, 69; “Le procès-verbal d’un nommé Nicolas Poulain Lieutenant de la prévosté de l’Isle de France fort remarquable & veu de peu de personnes, sorti du Cabinet du Roy, qui contient toute la quintessence de la Ligue depuis le 2 Janvier 1585 jusques au jour des Barricades escheues le xii May 1588,” bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 282. Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 9 July 1585, and Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 10 November 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 588, 629. Antoine de Roquelaure, quoted in Reinhard, Henri IV, 78. Pomponne de Bellièvre to Catherine de Medici, 16 May 1585, bn. ff. 15891, fol. 406. LM, I, 502–3; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, II, 230–1. Shakespeare, Hamlet, 82. Méms. de Nevers, I, 633–4. bn. ff. 18895, fols. 127–43; see also “Le procès verbal d’un nommé Nicolas Poulain,” bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 282; Rothrock, Huguenots, 106. That Henri de Navarre was fully aware of the Spanish–Guise treaty is clear from his letter to Elizabeth I, 5 April 1585, in Dussieux, Lettres intimes, 62–4. La Fosse, Journal, 198. “Déclaration des causes qui ont meu Monseigneur le Cardinal de Bourbon et les Princes, pairs, seigneurs, Villes et Communautéz Catholiques de ce Royaume de France de s’opposer à ceux qui par tous moiens s’esforcent de subvertir la Religion catholique et tout l’estat,” bn. Dupuy 500, fols. 145–149vo. Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, I, 70–1. Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to the comte de Cheverny, 29 and 30 March 1585, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 9, 10. “Déclaration de la volonté du roy sur les nouveaux troubles de ce royaume,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, I, 72–82. Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 27 May 1585, Négs. Tosc., 611; see also Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 5 January and 5 April 1585, ibid., 545, 555–8. Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 16 April 1585, ibid., 563; Cheverny, Mémoires, 483. Henri III to Henri de Navarre, 23 March 1585, LM, II, 38; Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 5 March, 13 May 1585, Négs. Tosc., 549, 572. The two agents were Nicolas Brûlart de Sillery and Bertrand de La MotheFénélon. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, I, 364–5. Mme. de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 219. Serres, Civil Warres of Fraunce, 831.

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346 Notes to pages 126–9 35 Henri de Navarre to Henri III, May 1585, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 21–2. 36 Henri de Navarre to M. de Chassincourt, 30 March 1585, in ibid., 15. 37 Henri de Navarre to Henri III, 13 April 1585, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 82; La Fosse, Journal, 198. 38 “Au Roy,” 7 September 1584, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, II, 664–6; “Instruction à M. le comte de Laval et à M. Duplessis, aulxquels aussi a esté adjoinct le sieur Constant, de ce qu’ils auront à dire et remonstrer à sa majesté de la part du roy de Navarre et de l’assemblée des Églizes, tenure à Montaubon par la permission de sa majesté; dressée par M. Duplessis,” 13 September 1584, in ibid., 667–79; Philippe DuplessisMornay to M. de Saincte-Aldegonde, 23 December 1584, in ibid., 690. 39 Henri de Navarre to Henri III, May 1585, ibid., 23–4. See also Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 220. 40 Henri de Navarre to Henri III, May 1585, and “instructions to MM. de Clervant and de Chassincourt,” 1585, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, 24, 82–6. 41 Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 200. 42 bn. ff. 18895, fols. 144–52; bn. Clairambault 357, fols. 91–5; Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, I, 184–7, 689–92; Méms. de Nevers, I, 681–3; Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 9 July 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 585–6; Cheverny, Mémoires, 483; Bouillon, Mémoires, 50, 51; La Fosse, Journal, 198. 43 Buisseret, Henri IV, 18. 44 Henri de Navarre to Ségur-Pardaillan, July 1585, LM, II, 20. 45 Henri de Navarre to François de Ségur, 19 August 1585, LM, II, 120. For other examples, see “Accord et capitulation faicte entre le roy de Navarre et le duc Cazimir, pour la levée de l’armée des Reytres venues en France en l’an 1587, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 57–81; “Mémoire au doctor Grune,” 1585, bn. 500 Colbert 402, fols. 70–1. 46 CSPF, XXI, 61–2. See also Anquez, Henri IV et Allemagne, 52–3. 47 W.H. to Elizabeth I, 20 December 1585, CSPF, XX, 229. Half of this enormous sum was to be paid directly from the English treasury, while the remaining half was to be collected in the form of “money, rings or credit.” (“Memorandum by the sieur de Guitry,” 30 December 1585, ibid., 253.) 48 LM, VIII, 304. 49 See, for example, the “shopping list” of arms and supplies that Henri sent to Lord Burghley on 15 January 1588, CSPF, II, 33. 50 Bouillon, Mémoires, 52; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 159; Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 26 September 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 593. 51 “Instructions au sieur Constant, allant de la part du roy de Navarre vers M. de Montmorency; dressée par M. Duplessis,” July 1585, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, III, 152, 155.

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347 Notes to pages 129–33 52 Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 156; Bouillon, Mémoires, 52. 53 Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 28 May 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 577; Henri de Navarre to maréchal de Matignon, April 1585; to Henri III, 3 April and 7 May 1585; and to Ségur-Pardaillan, July 1585, LM, II, 20, 26–7, 38–40, 63–5; Henri de Navarre to Villeroy de Neufville, 29 March 1585, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 8. 54 Henri de Navarre to Henri III, 10 July 1585, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, I, 192–5; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 141–5; Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 9 July 1585, and Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 9 July 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 586, 614–15. 55 Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, II, 541. 56 Ibid., 542–3. 57 Garrisson-Estèbe, Henri IV, 129. 58 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VI, 275–6. 59 This letter was written just three days after the treaty of Nemours between Henri III and the Guises was registered in the parlement of Paris. Henri de Navarre to Henri III, bn. Dupuy 333, fols. 103–104vo.; see also Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 23 July 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 591. 60 Henri de Navarre to Catherine de Medici, 21 July 1585, in Erlanger, Plus belles lettres, 22. 61 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 89–126; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 157; Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, I, 133–63. 62 The declaration was dated 10 August 1585. See Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, I, 201–19; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 159–82. See also Henri de Navarre to Ségur-Pardaillan, August 1585, LM, II, 20; Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 29 September 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 593; Cheverny, Mémoires, 483. Although the prince de Condé was not present at these conferences, the declaration was issued in his name as well. 63 LM, II, 129–30. 64 “Protestation de M. le duc de Montmorency,” 1585, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 193–4. 65 Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 4 August and 17 September 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 622, 624; “Le procès verbal d’un nommé Nicolas Poulain,” bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 282; CSP Foreign 1583, art. 734. 66 Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 9 July 1585, ibid., 614. See also Nevers’s correspondence with Pope Sixtus V in 1585 and 1586, in Méms. de Nevers, I, passim. 67 “Instruction au sieur Constant, allant de la part du roy de Navarre vers M. de Montmorency,” July 1585, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 153–4. 68 Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 9 July 1585, and Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 9 July and 4 August 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 588, 619, 623. 69 Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 10 November 1585, ibid., 629.

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348 Notes to pages 133–5 70 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, II, 202. Compare this with “Harangue du roy faicte à Messieurs de Paris, l’onziesme d’Aoust mil cinq cents quatre vingts cinq,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, I, 219–21. 71 “Instruction au sieur de Constant, allant de la part du roy de Navarre vers M. de Montmorency; dressée par M. Duplessis,” July 1585, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 151–2. 72 This delegation consisted of four churchmen and Brûlart de Sillery. Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 4 August 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 623. See also Villegomblain, Mémoires, I, 375. 73 Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 4 August 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 623. 74 Henri III to the vicomte de Gourdon, 27 July 1585, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 460 vo. 75 The “War of the Three Henris” is, in fact, a misnomer in that it fails to include others of the same Christian name who were principle actors in the struggle by reason of their prominence as factional leaders in their own right or as key individuals in the various parties. Chief among them were Henri prince de Condé, spokesman for the Huguenot zealots and Navarre’s co-commander; Henri duc de Montmorency, the recognized leader of the United Catholics; Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne, a prominent Calvinist who later became duc de Bouillon; and Henri d’Orléans, duc de Longueville, and Henri de Bourbon, prince de Dombes, both of whom were prominent royalist princes in the service of Henri III before 1589. One might even add to this list Navarre’s old friend and confidant Henri d’Albret, baron de Miossens, one-time chancellor of the kingdom of Navarre. Thus, the struggle that broke out in 1585 could be called with equal justice the “War of the Nine Henris”! 76 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to president Duranti, 31 June 1585, in Duplessis-Mornay Mémoires, III, 48. 77 Sir Thomas Stafford to Sir Francis Walsingham, 9 February 1586, CSPF, XX, 363. 78 For royal and League military preparations at this time, see Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 17 September 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV; Cheverny, Mémoires, 483; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 159; La Fosse, Journal, 199–200; Buisseret, Henri IV, 21. 79 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to the duc de Montmorency, 11 July 1585, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, II, 156–7. 80 Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 373–4. 81 “La déclaration de Nostre Sainct Père le Pape Sixtus cinquiesme, à l’encontre de Henry de Bourbon, soy disant Roy de Navarre, et Henry semblablement de Bourbon prétendu Prince de Condé, hérétiques, contre leurs posteritéz et successeurs: par laquelle tous leurs subjects sont déclaréz absous de tous serments qu’ils leur auroyent juré, faict ou promis,” Arch. Cur., XI, 47–55; Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, I, 236–42;

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349 Notes to pages 135–9

82

83

84 85 86 87 88 89

90

91 92 93 94 95

96 97 98 99 100

Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 30 September and 24 October 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 594. “Avis sur la bulle du Pape Sixt V touchant la fulmination du Roi de Navarre et du Prince de Condé,” 1585, bn. Dupuy 137, fol. 145. Sixtus V had been elected pontiff in April 1585. “Remonstrance au Roy par la Cour de Parlement,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, I, 244–50; Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 12 November 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 597. Giulio Busini to Belisario Vinta, 25 November 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 599–600. Michele Suriano, “Commentarii del regno di Francia, 1561,” in Tommaseo, Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, I, 563. Henri de Navarre to Henri III, December 1585, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 225–7. LM II, 138–42; Filippo Cavriana to Belisario Vinta, 10 November 1585, Négs. Tosc., IV, 629. LM, II, 136–8. “Coppie de l’Opposition faite par le Roy de Navarre et Monseigneur le Prince de Condé, contre l’Excommunication du Pape Sixte cinquiesme, à luy envoyée et affichée par les cantons de la ville de Rome,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, I, 268–9; Arch. Cur., XI, 59–61. Wagmor to Sir Francis Walsingham, 20 April 1586, CSP Foreign, XX, 537. The Reiters referred to here were German mercenaries whose services were being negotiated at this time by the Huguenot leaders. Buisseret, Henri IV, 21. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 498–9. Love, “‘All the King’s Horsemen,’” 524. Henri de Navarre to the sieur de Saint-Geniés, January 1580, LM, I, 265. Serres, Commentaries of the Civil Warres, III, 903; Colynet, True History of the Civil Warres of France, 451; Richard Wagmor to Sir Francis Walsingham, 20 April 1586, CSPF, XX, 535; Étienne Pasquier to M. de SaincteMarthe, 158, in Pasquier, Lettres historiques, 265–6. Maréchal de Biron to Henri III, 20 June 1586, in Biron, Lettres, II, 388. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 499. Étienne Pasquier to M. de Saincte-Marthe, 1586, in Pasquier, Lettres historiques, 266. Vaissière, Henri IV, 274. Henri de Navarre to François de Ségur, 1586, bn. 500 Colbert 402, fol. 33; “Mémoire des deportements de M. Duplessis à Montauban, l’an 1586,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 412–13; Sir Thomas Stafford to Sir Francis Walsingham, 9 February 1586, and Richard Wagmor to Sir Francis Walsingham, 20 April 1586, CSPF, XX, 363, 535–6; Colynet, True History of the Civil Warres of France, 111; Philippe Duplessis-Mornay

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350 Notes to pages 139–42

101

102 103 104 105 106

107 108 109 110

111 112

113 114

115 116 117

to Pomponne de Bellièvre, 26 September 1586, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 334. “Response à ung petit discours sur le voyage de M. de Mayenne en Guyenne,” 22 December 1586, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 386–407. Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to François de Ségur, 29 April 1587, in ibid., 499. Henri de Navarre to François de Ségur, 20 September 1586, LM, II, 239. All four letters are reprinted in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, I, 331–42; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 286–310; LM, II, 165–80. Pomponne de Bellièvre to the duc de Nevers, 3 August 1586, bn. ff. 3372, vol. 174vo. Ibid. By this statement, Bellièvre made a clever allusion to the Gospel of St Matthew 16:18, which cannot have been lost on the pious duc de Nevers. “Instruction donnée par le Roy de Navarre à messieurs de Monguion et de La Force,” Bib. Maz. 2619, fols. 168–9. Pomponne de Bellièvre to the duc de Nevers, 20 September 1586, bn. ff. 3372, fol. 215. “Lettre d’un gentilhomme françois,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, II, 90. Lamented one contemporary, Henri III now was reduced to such a condition “that, dare I say it? The king, commanded by the League, puts himself on the offensive and the king of Navarre on the defensive.” (Étienne Pasquier to M. de Saincte-Marthe, c. April 1587, in Pasquier, Lettres historiques, 263. See also “Déclaration du Roy pour l’éxécution de son édit du moys de juillet mil cinq cens quatre vingt cincq touchant la réunion de ses subjetz à l’églize Catholique, Apostolique et Romaine,” Bib. Maz. 2593, fols. 196–205.) bn. ff. 3406, fols. 15–16. Bib. Maz. 2593, fols. 196–205. This view was shared by the English ambassador, Sir Thomas Stafford. (See Stafford to Sir Francis Walsingham, 27 February 1586, CSPF, XX, 395.) Quoted in Sully, I, 129–30 [B. & B.]. LM, II, 294–7; Bib. Maz. 2593, fols. 216–19. A contemporary English translation was published under the title The King of Navarres Declaration at the Passage of the River of Loire for the Service of his Majestie, the 18. of Aprill. 1587 (London: 1589). LM, II, 294–5. Villegomblain, Mémoires, I, 417, 419. In fact, according to a “Lettre interceptée et déchiffrée, escrite à M. de Joyeuse” (dated 11 August 1587), Henri III and Catherine de Medici, hating the League, would turn against it if it were defeated by the invading Germans. (See Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, III, 513.)

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351 Notes to pages 143–6 118 At least this was the conclusion of Pomponne de Bellièvre, who watched the Germans’ progress closely. (bn. ff. 15892, fols. 114–15.) 119 Villegomblain, Mémoires, I, 414–15. 120 Henri de Navarre to Henri III, 21 October 1587, in Dussieux, Grands faits, 27–8; see also “News from Divers Parts,” 28 November 1587, CSPF, XXI, 417. 121 bn. Dupuy 324, fol. 197. See also Henri de Navarre to the maréchal de Matignon, 23 October 1589, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 102. 122 Villegomblain, Mémoires, I, 415. 123 Nouaillac, Henri IV raconté, 137. 124 Sully, I, 193 [B. & B.]. Villegomblain agreed (Mémoires, I, 425), adding that this result partially damaged Navarre’s reputation. 125 Henri de Navarre to Mme de Fontevrault, May 1588, in Nouaillac, Henri IV raconté, 151; see also Sir Thomas Stafford to Sir Francis Walsingham, 29 May 1588, CSPF, XXI, 630; Licques, Philippe de Mornay, 115. 126 See “La vie d’Henry 4,” Bib. Ars. 3423, fols. 97–8; Étienne Pasquier to the comte de Sanzay, April 1589, in Dussieux, Grands faits, 109–10; Étienne Pasquier to Harlay de Sancy, April 1589, in Pasquier, Lettres historiques, 423. 127 Hieronomo Lippomano to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 23 February 1589, CSP Venice, VIII, 429. 128 Henri de Navarre to the comtesse de Grammont, 1 January 1589, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 127. 129 Henri de Navarre to Ségur-Pardaillan, 25 December 1588, ibid., 125. 130 LM, II, 421. 131 See “Lettre de Monsieur de Bellièvre au Roy de Navarre après les Barricades en ladicte Année 1588,” Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. France 294, fols. 4–7; Villeroy de Neufville to Henri de Navarre, c. 12 May 1588, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 118–19; the sieur de Buzenval to Lord Burghley, 17 July 1588, CSPF, XXII, 53. By this time, Henri III’s followers had been reduced to a few favourites “who obeyed him from self-interest, and some good Frenchmen, whom duty still retained.” (See “La vie d’Henry 4,” Bib. Ars. 3432, fols. 97–8; Étienne Pasquier to the comte de Sanzay, April 1589, in Dussieux, Grands faits, 109–110; Étienne Pasquier to Harlay de Sancy, April 1589, in Pasquier, Letters historiques, 423.) 132 Sir Edward Stafford to Sir Francis Walsingham, 5 February 1589, CSPF, XXIII, 94. 133 Henri de Navarre to M. Du Pin, 12 April 1589, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 134. 134 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to Henri de Navarre, 27 December 1588, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 126.

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Page 352

352 Notes to pages 146–8 135 Henri de Navarre to the comtesse de Grammont, 8 March 1589, in Nouaillac, Henri IV raconté, 151–2; Étienne Pasquier to Harlay de Sancy, April 1589, in Pasquier, Lettres historiques, 423. 136 Henri de Navarre to the three Estates of the Kingdom, 4 March 1589, in Musset-Pathay, La vie militaire et privée, 109–21; see also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 389; “Lettre du Roi de Navarre à Messieurs d’Orléans, du vingt-deux Mai 1589, à Beaugency,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, III, 554–8; “The King of Navarres Declaration at the Passage of the River of Loire for the Service of his Majestie, the 18. of Aprill. 1589” (London: 1589). 137 “Articles sécretz accordéz entre le Roy et le Roy de Navarre au commencement de l’an 1589 [3 April],” Bib. Maz. 2593, fols. 237–9; “Declaration de la trève accordée par le roy au Roy de Navarre [26 April 1589],” Bib. Ars. 4239, fols. 170–2; “Édict de la trève entre le feu Roy Henry III et le Roy de Navarre, publiée au parlement séant à Tours, le 19 d’Avril 1589,” Bib. Maz. 2593, fols. 251–8; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 236; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 391. 138 Étienne Pasquier to the comte de Sanzay, April 1589, in Dussieux, Grands faits, 109–10. 139 Henri de Navarre to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 30 April 1589, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 137. 140 Quoted in Licques, Philippe de Mornay, 135. 141 Maimbourg, History of the League, 492, 500–1. 142 Henri de Navarre to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 24 March 1589, in Nouaillac, Henri IV raconté, 163–5. 143 Henri de Navarre to the comtesse de Grammont, 18 May 1589, in Valori, Journal militaire, 275; Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 137–8. 144 Charles duc de Lorraine to Baretty, 30 May 1589, in Lepage, Lettres et instructions de Charles III, 37. 145 “Attestation sur les dernières parolles et actions du Roy Henri IIIême,” bn. ff. 3275, fol. 64; “Histoire de Henri le Grand, 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fols. 570–5; Valori, Journal militaire, 123–4; Dampierre, Duc d’Épernon, 47–8; Chappuys, L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 740; Étienne Pasquier to the comte de Sanzay, August 1589, in Dussieux, Grands faits, 107; “The whole and true discourse of the enterprises and secret conspiracies that have been made against the person of Henry of Valois” (London: 1589); Angoulême, Mémoires, 66; Gaches, Mémoires, 393; Serres, Civil Warres of Fraunce, 880. 146 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 406; John Wells to Sir Francis Walsingham, 8 August 1589, CSPF., XXIII, 405; Dampierre, Duc d’Épernon, 48; Péréfixe, Henry the Great, 76–7. 147 Rothrock, Huguenots, 110. 148 Sully, I, 201 [1819].

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Page 353

353 Notes to pages 148–54 149 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 79. 150 Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross, 43. As Diefendorf notes, the weakening of the monarchy under the last Valois kings during the religious wars made the need for such ritual displays still greater (p. 44). 151 Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 70; Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, II, 51. 152 Ramus, Commentaries of the civill warres, Part I, 187. 153 Barnavi, Le parti de Dieu, 38–9, 148; Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 37, 56, 79–80. 154 Barnavi, Le parti de Dieu, 150; Crouzet, Les guerriers de Dieu, II, 467. 155 Barnavi, Le parti de Dieu, 165. See also Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 176. 156 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 80–1. 157 Ibid., 81. 158 Andrieux (Henri IV, I, 226) and Vaissière (Henri IV, 329) both award Henri credit for some religious scruple but then reverse themselves, returning to the argument of opportunism. For a more consistent account, see Love, “Winning the Catholics,” 361–79. 159 Andrieux, Henri IV, I, 226. 160 See Villeroy de Neufville to M. de Tost, August 1589, bn. Dupuy 569, fol. 98vo. 161 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 407. 162 Villeroy de Neufville to M. de Tost, August 1589, bn. Dupuy 569, fol. 101. 163 Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 143–4. 164 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 1. 165 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 183; Henri IV to Philippe DuplessisMornay, November 1589, in Dussieux, Lettres intimes, 132; Sully, I, 201–2 [1819]; Sully, I, 219–20 [B. & B.]. 166 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 81–2. 167 Villegomblain, Mémoires, I, 475. 168 De Callières, Matignon, 281. 169 See, for example, a letter to M. de La Vieuville, 13 August 1589, bn. ff. 3977, fol. 191; Mme. de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 282–3; cardinal de Vendôme to the duc de Nevers, 6 November 1589, bn. ff. 3332, fol. 62vo.; Pomponne de Bellièvre to President Jeannin, 13 December 1592, bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 191; Angoulême, Mémoires, 67. 170 Villeroy de Neufville to the maréchal de Matignon, 12 November 1589, Lettres de Villeroy, 227. 171 In fact, in a letter to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay of 7 November 1589, Henri noted specifically the help and advice he had received from the comte de Châtillon, François de La Noue, Beauvais-la-Nocle, Guitry, and several others. (Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 427.)

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354 Notes to pages 155–8 172 This holdover from medieval times was the gathering of all royal vassals from sixteen to sixty years of age and their retainers, on the summons of the monarch, their feudal overlord, for the purposes of war. 173 See the “Histoire de Henri le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fol. 588vo.–89; Henri IV to the citizens of Tours, 2 August 1589, bn. Clairambault 634, fol. 52; to the duc de Nevers, royal governor of Champagne and Brie, 2 August 1589, in Valori, Journal militaire, 31–3; to the sieur de Bournazel, royal sénéchal and governor of Rouerge, 2 August 1589, and to the sieur de Sillery, 23 March 1590, in Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 40, 59–60; to the sieur de Montholon, garde des sceaux, 2 August 1589, in Dussieux, Grands faits, IV, 146–47; to M. de La Vieuville, 13 August 1589, bn. ff. 3977, fol. 191; and to the principal towns of France, 2 August 1589, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 147–8; the duc de Mayenne to count Mansfield, 10 August 1589, and to Chastenay, 11 August 1589, in Mayenne, Correspondance, I, 154–5, 167; Canault, Ornano, 104; Henri IV to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, November 1589, in Dussieux, Lettres intimes, 130. For the importance of such symbolism in royal French funereal ritual, see Giesey, Cérémonial et puissance souveraine; Jackson, Vive le Roi!. 174 Sully, I, 203 [1819]. 175 The duc de Mayenne to Philip II, 21 August 1589, in Dussieux, Grands faits, 147. See also in Mayenne to the sieur de Chastenay, 10 August 1589, Mayenne, Correspondance, I, 167. 176 “Histoire de Henri le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fols. 188–188vo. See also Baird, Huguenots and Henry of Navarre, II, 169. 177 Angoulême, Mémoires, 71. 178 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 1; Poirson, Sancy’s Memoirs, 165. 179 Babelon, Henri IV, 454. 180 See, for example, the “Mémoire des affaires généraulx pour le service de sa majesté, tant dedans que dehors le royaume, qui lui fait envoyé par M. Duplessis après la mort du roy Henri III,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 393–8. 181 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 417; de Thou, Mémoires, 349. 182 De Thou, Mémoires, 349. 183 LM, V, 149–50. 184 In doing this, Henri followed the advice of three of his most trusted Calvinist advisers, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, Théodore Agrippa d’Aubigné, and the comte de Châtillon, who suggested ways to follow up his initial political advantage. See “Mémoire des affaires généraulx pour le service de sa majesté, tant dedans que dehors le royaume, qui lui fait envoyé par M. Duplessis après la mort du roy Henri III,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 393–8. See also Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 245; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 80–3; Marsollier, Turenne, 147; Sully, I, 202 [1819]; Sully, I, 219 [B. & B.].

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355 Notes to pages 158–62 185 See Henri IV to the citizens of Tours, 2 August 1589, bn. Clairambault 634, fol. 52. 186 Angoulême, Mémoires, 67. See also “Histoire de Henri le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fol. 586. 187 “Mémoire des affaires généraulx ... après la mort du roy Henri III,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 393–8. Sufficient financing was a perennial problem in the Huguenot party; hence Duplessis-Mornay’s comment about pay. 188 Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 245. 189 See, for example, Henri IV to the citizens of Tours, 2 August 1589, bn. Clairambault 634, fol. 52; to the duc de Nevers, 2 August 1589, in Erlanger, Plus belles lettres, 56; and to M. de Maisse, 18 August 1583, in Halphen, Harangues et lettres, 21–4. As Wolfe observes correctly from the Catholic perspective, this crusade became “one of the emotional touchstones of Henri IV’s relationship” with the royalist Catholics. (Conversion of Henri IV, 58.) 190 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 82–3. 191 See “Histoire de Henri le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fols. 580–1. Apparently, the dying Henri III also had advised his heir to see to this, so that despite “this inopportune change [of monarchs] they would not alter their devotion.” (Étienne Pasquier to the comte de Sanzy, August 1589, in Dussieux, Grands faits, 146–7.) 192 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 83. 193 Marsollier, Turenne, 147. 194 Henri IV to the Catholic nobles at Saint Cloud, 2 August 1589, Valori, Journal militaire, 26–7; Rothrock, Huguenots, 113–14. 195 Quoted in Babelon, Henri IV, 454. See also Serres, Civil Warres of Fraunce, 884, which recorded that “this declaration retained them that were least scrupulous [in religion] in their duties.” 196 See Bib. Ars., 3438, fol. 2; “Histoire de Henri le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fols. 583vo.–586; Poirson, Sancy’s Memoirs, 166; Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 110–11; Dampierre, Duc d’Épernon, 49–59. 197 “Histoire de Henri le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fols. 583vo.–586. 198 Bib. Ars. 438, fol. 2; Poirson, Sancy’s Memoirs, 166; Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 110–11, Dampierre, Duc d’Épernon, 49–59. 199 Poirson, Sancy’s Memoirs, 166; Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 2; Péréfixe, Henry the Great, 83–4; Angoulême, Mémoires, 67; La Cretelle, Histoire de France, III, 353; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 408–9; Henri IV to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, November 1589, in Dussieux, Lettres intimes, 130. 200 Sully, I, 248 [1819]; Sully, I, 258 [B. & B.]. 201 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 83–6; Angoulême, Mémoires, 69; Dampierre, Duc d’Épernon, 51.

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356 Notes to pages 162–4 202 LM, III, 70–3. See also Henri IV to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, November 1589, in Dussieux, Lettres intimes, 133; Angoulême, Mémoires, 67. 203 Vaissière, Henri IV, 330. 204 Dampierre, Duc d’Épernon, 50–1; Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 110–11. 205 Angoulême, Mémoires, 69. 206 Poirson, Sancy’s Memoirs, 165; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 411; Dampierre, Duc d’Épernon, 52; Méms. de Nevers, II, 590–4; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 83; Angoulême, Mémoires, 67; Sully, I, 203 [1819]; Sully, I, 220 [B. & B.]. 207 “Sermont du Roy Henry 4 à son avenement à la couronne, du troisième [sic] jour du mois d’Aoust 1589,” bn. ff. 2751, fol. 5; “Serment fait par le Roy Henri IIII à son advenement à la Couronne, 4 Aoust 1589,” bn. ff. 3137, fols. 107–9; Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 2; bn. Dupuy 88, fols. 5–6. A printed copy of this declaration is also available in the Lettres missives, III, 357–9. 208 See the “Acte de reconnaisance pour roy trés chrestien de France de la personne de Henry de Bourbon Roy de Navarre par les Princes du Sang, ducs, pairs, et officiers de la couronne aux conditions que dessus dictes,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 6–7; “Promesse des princes du sang, ducs, pairs et officiers de la couronne de recognoistre le Roy Henri IIII, 4 Aoust 1589,” bn. ff. 3137, fols. 109–11; bn. Dupuy 317, fols. 95vo.–96, and Dupuy 88, fols. 5vo.–6; Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 3. 209 Colynet, True History of the Civil Warres of France, 412. See also Henri IV to the comte de Gourdon, 4 August 1589, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 465. 210 See the maréchal de Matignon to Henri IV, August 1589, bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 36. 211 Poirson, Henri IV, II, 25; Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 57. 212 Buisseret, Henri IV, 28. 213 Pastoret, Des moyens, 36. 214 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 3; bn. ff. 3977, fol. 191; Bib. Ars. 3432, fol. 103. See also the duc de Montmorency to his subordinates, 19 August 1589, bn. Dupuy 317, fols. 164vo.–165. 215 Maréchal de Matignon to Henri IV, August 1589, bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 36; see also De Callières, Maréchal de Matignon, 285–7, 300. In this way, the marshal brought the parlementaires to obedience. 216 In fact, precisely this argument was used by the nobles’ envoy, the duc de Luxembourg, in his subsequent mission to Rome. See Davila, Civil Wars of France, 452; LM, III, 156–7; Williams, “Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” 154–7; the duc de Luxembourg to Henri IV, 12 June 1590, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs., Spain 326, fol. 147; “Lettres escritte par les Princes et Noblesse de France à monseigneur le card.[inal] de Mont’Alto, par le duc de Pinay dit de Luxembourg, envoyé par lesdits

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357 Notes to pages 164–7

217 218 219

220

221 222 223 224

225 226 227 228

229 230 231

232 233 234 235 236

Princes et Noblesse à N.[ôtre] S.[aint] Père le Pape, sur les affaires et occurrances de ce temps.” (Paris: 1590). Davila, Civil Wars of France, 413; Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 118, 120; Bouillé, Histoire des Guises, III, 405–6. bn. ff. 3977, fol. 191. See also Angoulême, Mémoires, 67; Péréfixe, Henry the Great, 81. Henri IV to the comte de Gourdon, 4 August 1589, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 465. See also D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 80, 87; Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 2. Poirson, Sancy’s Memoirs, 166; Péréfix, Henry the Great, 80–2. This was an interesting choice of territory, as the Périgord was crucial to Henri’s power base in the south. Beauvais-Nangis, Mémoires, 52; La Force, Mémoires, I, 63. Angoulême, Mémoires, 68–70. Poirson, Henri IV, I, 28. Gaches, Mémoires, 394; de Thou, Mémoires, 70, 71. Both pledges later were fulfilled. Charlotte married the duc d’Angoulême in 1591, and Montmorency was created connétable de France in 1594. Cardinal de Vendôme to the duc de Nevers, 6 November 1589, bn. ff. 3332, fol. 63. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 407. Angoulême, Mémoires, 69; Gaches, Mémoires, 394; Benoiste, Edict of Nantes, 55–6; Péréfix, Henry the Great, 82. “The King of Navarres Declaration at the Passage of the River of Loire for the service of his Majestie, the 18. of Aprill. 1589” (London: 1589), 21. See also Henri’s Declaration of 4 March, in Musset-Pathay, Vie militaire et privée, 116–18. Quatre excéllants discours, 147. Benoiste, Edict of Nantes, 56; D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 81. “Déclaration portant injonction à toutes les Officiers du Royaume de prendre de Lettres du Roy, pour estre confirméz dans leurs offices. Au camp d’Alençon le 27 Décembre 1589. Reg.[istré] au parl.[ement] le 15., et en la Ch.[ambre] des Comptes le dernier Janvier 1590,” in Blanchard, Compilation chronologique, 1222. See also the sieur de Frontenac to Henri IV, 3 January 1590, bn. Dupuy 61, fols. 83–4. Bouillon, Mémoires, 54; Angoulême, Mémoires, 69. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 82. Serres, Civil Warres of Fraunce, III, 884. Quoted in Angoulême, Mémoires, 69. See, for example, the Calvinist François de La Noue’s warning to Henri IV in Davila, Civil Wars of France, 410; cardinal de Vendôme to the duc de Nevers, 6 November 1589, bn. ff. 3332, fol. 62vo., and to the duchesse

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358 Notes to pages 167–9

237 238 239 240

241

242 243

244

245 246 247

248 249 250

de Nevers, 7 November 1589, bn. ff. 3336, fol. 130; the parlement of Bordeaux to Henri IV, 20 December 1589, bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 77. Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 4. See also Villeroy de Neufville, Mémoires, I, 130. See Henri IV to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, November 1589, in Dussieux, Lettres intimes, 130; Angoulême, Mémoires, 67. Villeroy de Neufville, Mémoires, I, 130; Villeroy de Neufville to the maréchal de Matignon, 12 November 1589, Lettres de Villeroy, 227. Benoiste, Edict of Nantes, 60; Bib. Ars. 3432, fol. 103; bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 62; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 407, 411; Dampierre, Duc d’Épernon, 83–6; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 170; Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 111–16; La Force, Mémoires, I, 63; Maimbourg, History of the League, 735; VolanRevel, Faites de Henri IV, 26–7; Hardy, Tactique Française, II, 711. See also a run of correspondence between Henri IV and various persons between 21 November 1589 and 25 January 1590, LM, III, 84, 85, 125, 126. Henri IV to the comte de Gourdon, 5 August 1589, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 466. See also Henri’s letter to Gourdon of 4 August, fol. 465; Péréfixe, Henry the Great, 82, 84–5. At the same time, a number of Calvinist nobles, such as the duc de La Trémouille, abandoned the royal army in protest over the concessions Henri had granted the Catholics in the Declaration of Saint Cloud at Huguenot expense. Benoiste, Edict of Nantes, 60 (emphasis his). Maréchal de Matignon to Henri IV, 5 August 1589 and again in August, bn. Dupuy 61, fols. 24, 36; M. Du Barannan to maréchal de Matignon, August 1589, bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 34. Maréchal de Matignon to Henri IV, 8 August 1589, ibid., fol. 26; and to Henri IV, August 1589, ibid., fol. 36; see also De Callières, Maréchal de Matignon, 285–7, 300. The baron de Salignac was not so fortunate at Bayonne, also in Guyenne; only by the use of force was he able to put down a popular insurrection which, he later told the king, was incited by religious tensions. (Salignac to Henri IV, August 1589, ibid., fol. 28.) M. Du Barannan to the maréchal de Matignon, August 1589, bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 34. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 173. “Relation de la mission de MM. de Kercabin et du Hallgoët, délégués par le Parlement de Bretaigne pour disposer les populations en faveur du roi de Navarre,” in Barthélémy, League in Brittany, 47–8. Curiously, the parlement of Rennes declared for Henri IV despite Mercoeur’s League connections and the provincial nobility’s reticence. (Babelon, Henri IV, 478.) Barthélémy, League in Brittany, 34–44. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 170. Guillaum de Saulx-Tavannes to the duc de Nevers, 23 August 1589, in Pingaud, Correspondance, 310.

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359 Notes to pages 169–71 251 Brantôme, Oeuvres, V, 161. Matignon soon forced the judges to accept and use the new seals issued by Henri IV. (See De Callières, Maréchal de Matignon, 302.) 252 M. Du Barannan to the maréchal de Matignon, August 1589, bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 34. 253 Breunot, Journal, I, 58–9, 59ff. 254 Henri IV to the comte de Schomberg and Harlay de Sancy, December 1589, in Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 48. 255 “Harangue et Déclaration faite par le Roy Henri Quatriesme de ce nom, par le grace de Dieu, Roy de France et de Navarre” (n.p.: 1589); “The oration and declaration of the French king, Henrie the fourth of that name, and by the grace of God King of Navarre ... to the lords and gentlemen of his armie, before the citie of Paris, the eight day of ... August 1590 [sic].” (London: 1590), 4–5. 256 bn. ff. 3172, fols. 136–7. 257 When the duc d’Épernon withdrew, he took with him the 6,000 foot and 1,200 horse that constituted his personal command. “But his example proved of considerable consequence, because the Lords and Captains retired likewise, and the Troops disbanded themselves, and the fine Army, which would easily have brought Paris, and the League to reasonable terms, dispersed in a few days.” (Davila, Civil Wars of France, 411; see also Bib. Ars. 3432, fol. 103; Maimbourg, History of the League, 735; Volan-Revel, Faites de Henri IV, 26–7; Poirson, Henri IV, 30.) The Catholic sieur de Villiers took 600 badly needed horse with him, and the Calvinist duc de La Trémouille, for personal and political reasons, led away the entire contingent from Poitou. He aspired to the Huguenot leadership and hoped to weaken Henri’s control over the party in this way. Consequently, the combined royal army of 40,000 men shrank very rapidly to approximately 20,000. 258 “Harangue et Déclaration ... [1589], in Valori, Journal militaire, 28–31; Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 34–7. This declaration, along with that of 4 August, was registered quickly by the royalist parlements in France, which then issued the two documents throughout their jurisdictions. See “Extraict des Régistres de la Court de Parlement,” in “Déclaration du Roy” (Caen: 1589). 259 “Instruction du Roy à messieurs les Gouverneurs et Lieutenants Généraulx des Provinces et pays de Sa Majesté, avec une autre lettre de Sa Majesté, addressante à Messieurs du Clergé de Tours [12 August 1589]” (Tours: 1589). 260 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 411 (emphasis his). 261 Angoulême, Mémoires, 70. As contemporaries and near-contemporaries noted, the remainder of the army continued to diminish as a result of desertions and disease. (See Davila, Civil Wars of France, 411; Maim-

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360 Notes to pages 171–6

262

263

264 265 266 267

268 269

270

271 272

bourg, History of the League, 735; Bib. Ars. 3432, fol. 103; Volan-Revel, Faites de Henri IV, 26–7; Dampierre, Duc d’Épernon, 54; Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 112, 114.) Henri IV to the comte de Gourdon, 5 August 1589, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 466. The other two forces were commanded by the duc de Longueville (with François de La Noue) and the maréchal d’Aumont. See also d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 153. In fact, Henri alotted only twenty-four hours to bury the late Valois monarch. Curiously, the royal corpse was not transferred to St Denis until 1610. (“Histoire de Henri le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, 586vo.; Angoulême, Mémoires, 70; see also Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 156; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 153.) Shakespeare, Henri V, 69–70. “Instruction du Roy ... 1589.” “Histoire de Henri le Grand ... 1589,” bn. ff. 15534, fol. 587vo. Villeroy de Neufville to M. de Tost, August 1589, bn. Dupuy 569, fols. 98vo.–100; Henri IV to the comte de Gourdon, 5 August 1589, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 466. Henri IV to the comte de Gourdon, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 466. Henri IV, “The Lettres Pattents of the Kings Declaration for the referring of the general assemblie of the Princes, Cardinals, Dukes and Peeres, as well Ecclesiasticall as Temporall, the officers of the Crowne, the Lords, Gentlemen, officers and others, unto the 15 day of March next comming (22 December 1589)” (London: 1589), 2; “Articles accordés, jurés et signés entre le roy de France et de Navarre et les prélates, etc.,” in L’Estoile, Les belles figures et drolleries de la Ligue, 152–7; Bishop of Mende to Henri IV, 19 September 1589, bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 51; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 170. Bishop of Mende to Henri IV, 19 September 1589, bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 51. See also the cardinal de Vendôme to the duc de Nevers, 6 November 1589, bn. ff. 3332, fol. 62vo. Henri IV to the comte de Gourdon, 5 August 1589, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 466. Henri IV to the comtesse de Grammont, 9 September 1589, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 148. c h a p t e r fiv e

1 For general discussions and observations on the constitutional crisis in France in 1584, see Salmon, Society in Crisis, 234–6; Vaissière, Henri IV 255–7; Reinhard, Henri IV, 75–6; Cazaux, Henri IV, 20–7; Greengrass, The Age of Henry IV, 27–9; Babelon, Henri IV, 319–22.

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361 Notes to pages 176–80 2 This was the princess Marie-Elisabeth de France. She was born in October 1572 and died a mere six years later. 3 René de Lucinge to the duke of Savoy, 1584, in Dufour, René de Lucinge, 171–3. 4 See, for example, Henri IV to the citizens of Tours, 2 August 1589, bn. Clairambault 634, fol. 52; and to the comte de Gourdon, 4 August 1589, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 465. 5 Hanotaux, Tableau de la France, 124. 6 Salmon, Society in Crisis, 235. 7 Henri IV to the comte de Gourdon, 5 August 1589, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 466. 8 The duc de Mayenne to the duc de Mercoeur, 16 March 1590, bn. ff. 3646, fol. 55; to Sixtus V, 25 March 1590, bn. Dupuy 317, fols. 214-15; to the duke of Parma, 25 March 1590, bn. 500 Colbert, fol. 82; and to Philip II, 25 March 1590, bn. Dupuy 317, fol. 210; Vaissière, Henri IV, 361; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 31 March 1590, in Négs. Tosc., V, 106; Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 163; “État de la Ville de Paris après la Déroute d’Yvri,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 260–1. Mayenne also went to Brussels in person to appeal to Parma for support. (“Récit de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée du roy, depuis son arrivée devant Paris jusqu’au 9 Juillet 1590,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 465; Henri IV to the comtesse de Grammont, in Valori, Journal militaire, 286; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 462; Pierre Corneio, “Bref Discours et véritable des choses plus notables arrivées au siège mémorable de la renommée ville de Paris, et défence d’icelle par Monseigneur le Duc de Nemours, contre le Roy de Navarre,” in Arch. cur., VIII, 237; Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 122.) 9 “Instructions sur ce qui doyt estre representé au Roy. De la part de ses principaulx et meilleurs serviteurs [January 1590],” bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 85. 10 Henri IV to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 24 August 1589, LM, III, 23. 11 Henri IV to the maréchal de Matignon, c. December 1590, ibid., 316. See also Henri IV to the baron de Flers, 16 October 1589, and to M. de Bournezal, 2 March 1590, ibid., 58, 107. 12 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 427. 13 Ibid., 427. See also De Callières, Maréchal de Matignon, 292–3. 14 See, for example, De Thou, Mémoires, 349; “Instructions sur ce qui doyt estre representé du Roy,” bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 85. 15 John Wells to Sir Francis Walsingham, 10 July 1589, CSP Foreign, XXIII, 351. 16 For Henri IV’s account of this battle, see his letter to the comte de Gourdon, 21 September 1589, bn. ff. 17044, fols. 467–467vo. See also bn. Dupuy 88, fols. 25–26vo.

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362 Notes to pages 180–2 17 “Discours au vrai de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée...,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 33. For contemporary accounts of the attack, see DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, IV, 30–3; the cardinal de Vendôme to the duc de Nevers, 6 November 1589, bn. ff. 3332, fol. 63; and to the duchesse de Nevers, 7 November 1589, bn. ff. 3336, fol. 130; Henri IV, “Letters patent ... 1589,” 3; Sully, I, 215–17 [1819]; Sully, I, 229–30 [B. & B.]; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 424–5; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 170–3; Angoulême, Mémoires, 88; de Thou, Mémoires, 347; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 179–80; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 9, 261; Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 22–3; “Vrai discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’Armée conduite par Sa Majesté trés Chrètienne, depuis son Avènement à la couronne jusqu’à la fin de l’an 1589,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 68–70 (see also pp. 76–7). 18 De Thou, Mémoires, 346; Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 14–15; Rothrock, “Constitutional Implications,” 35. 19 See Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 194–5, 205; Henri IV to the duchesse de Montmorency, 7 January 1590, in Dussieux, Lettres intimes, 138; to M. de Vivans, 16 December 1589, and to the comtesse de Grammont, 16 January 1590, LM, III, 105, 135; “Continuation de ce qui est advenu,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 85. Henri also had strengthened his hold on the provinces of Orléanais, Maine, Touraine, and Anjou, leaving Paris virtually surrounded and blockaded by royalist garrisons. (De Thou, Mémoires, 346; see also the duke of Parma to Philip II, 20 February 1590, in Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, IV, 62.) 20 Cardinal de Vendôme to the duc de Nevers, 6 November 1589, bn. ff. 3332, fol. 62.; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 436; L’Estoile, MémoiresJournaux, V, 12–13. Even Villeroy de Neufville was of this persuasion. 21 Cardinal de Vendôme to the duchesse de Nevers, 7 November 1589, bn. ff. 3336, fol. 130. Henri graciously assented to her pleas. 22 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 425; “Discours au vrai de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 33. 23 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 427; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 194; maréchal de Biron to M. de Buchon, 27 November 1589, in Biron, Correspondance inédite, II, 62; Barthélémy, Journal d’un curé liguer ... suivi du Journal du secrétaire de Philippe du Bec (cited hereafter as du Bec, Mémoires), 244. Henri appeared before the parlement on 21 November. 24 “The Letters Pattents of the Kings Declaration for the referring of the general assemblie of the Princes, Cardinals, Dukes and Peeres, as well Ecclesiasticall as Temporall, the officers of the Crowne, the Lords, Gentlemen, officers and others, unto the 15. day of March next comming [22 December 1589],” (London: 1589) 25 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 427.

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363 Notes to pages 182–3 26 “The Letters Pattents of the Kings Declaration ... [22 December 1589],” 7–10; War in the Languedoc, in Menard and Baschi, Pièces fugitives, II, 34. This edict was registered on 22 December in the royalist parlement of Normandy, currently residing at Caen. 27 These were not idle threats. Henri had already made examples of the former League governor of Vendôme, Jacques de Mailly-Benchard, and Father Robert Chessé, the local Cordelier abbot. Both men were executed summarily for the crime of lèse majesté at that town’s surrender on 19 November. As ultra-Catholic sympathizers, they had stirred up popular resistance to the royal forces and loudly rejected Henri’s authority. “Each had deserved his treatment,” Henri wrote subsequently. “It was a just punishment from God.” (See Henri IV to the duc d’Épernon, 21 November 1589, LM, III, 85. See also du Bec, Journal, 243.) 28 De Thou, Mémoires, 349; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 183; “Les Cruautez commises contre les Catholicques de la ville de Vendosme, par le Roy de Navarre” (Paris: 1589), 6, 9; Fayet, Journal, 78; Barthélémy, Journal d’un curé liguer, 226; du Bec, Journal, 243. 29 The sieur de Longlée, French ambassador to Spain, quoted in Tomaso Contarini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 28 January 1590, CSP Venice, VIII, 480–1. 30 Henri’s control extended over the southern, central, and northwestern provinces; he also had established a firm foothold in League-held Champagne, Burgundy, Brittany, and Picardy. Only in Lyonnais and Provence was the Calvinist king weak. See Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 197; Henri IV to M. de Vivans, 16 December 1589, and to the comtesse de Grammont, 29 January 1590, LM, III, 105, 135; Poirson, Henri IV, 50–1; Babelon, Henri IV, 478. 31 One pamphleteer noted toward the end of 1589 that out of 100 or 120 Catholic bishops and archbishops, only 10 continued to back the League. (“Response à un avis qui conseille aux François de se rendre sous la protection du roy d’Espaigne,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 199.) The Dialogue de Manant et du Maheustre, published a few years later, set the number of Henri’s ecclesiastical supporters at 11 archbishops and 89 bishops in 1590, with only 3 archbishops and 15 bishops remaining with the League. (II, 13.) See also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 453; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 197; “Discours au vrai de ce qui s’est passé an l’armée,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 30; Henri IV to the cardinal de Vendôme, 10 December 1589, LM, III, 100–1. 32 Maimbourg, History of the League, 766–7. 33 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 197. 34 Ibid., 194; de Thou, Mémoires, 342, 344, 348–9; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 427; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 18 and 30 September 1589, Negs. Tosc., V, 60, 65; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle,

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364 Notes to pages 183–4

35 36

37

38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46

VIII, 176; “Continuation de ce qui est advenu,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 81. See the Savoyard ambassador to the Duke of Savoy, 1590, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. France 762, fols. 26–8. The duc de Luxembourg to Sixtus V, 6 December 1589, in Caringi, “Sixte-Quint et la Ligue,” 69; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, January 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 72–5; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 186, 187; Henri IV to the duc de Luxembourg, 7 March 1590, LM, III, 156–7; Ranke, Civil Wars in France, II, 144; Williams, “Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” 154. Breunot, Journal, I, 56; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 187; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 25 and 30 September 1589, and “Mémoire addressé au Cardinal Cajetan,” 3 October 1589, Négs. Tosc., V, 63–4, 64–6, 649–54. Cajetan arrived in France late in November or early December 1589. See also the cardinal de Vendôme to the duc de Nevers, 6 November 1589, bn. ff. 3332, 62vo. Henri IV to the comtesse de Grammont, 8 January 1590, in Nouaillac, Henri IV raconté, 187–8; LM, III, 116. For a modern account of the campaign and battle of Ivry, see Love, “Henry IV and Ivry Revisited,” 65–7. Henri IV to the duc de Luxembourg, 14 March 1590, in Valori, Journal militaire, 116. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 156. Mémoires, II, 40; see also Lezeau, “Catholic religion,” Arch. cur., XIV, 61. Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 149–50. See also Villeroy de Neufville to Pomponne de Bellièvre, 26 December 1592, bn. ff. 2751, fol. 157. Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 163; “Discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’Armée du Roy, depuis la Bataille donnée près d’Evry, le quatorziesme de Mars, iusques au deuxiesme du mois de May, mil cinq cents nonante” (Tours: 1590), 10; “Le Vray discours de la victoire merveilleuse,” n.p.; Villeroy de Neufville, Mémoires, I, 152–5, 163–4, 171–2; “Sommaire discours de ce qui s’est passe en l’armée du Roy,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 342; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 451, 454–7; “Discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’Armée du Roy, depuis le treiziesme du mois d’Avril dernier, iusqu’au 2. du mois de May,” 11; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 25 May 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 127. Tomaso Contarini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 12 April 1590, CSP Venice, VIII, 485. Philip II to the duke of Parma, 24 June 1590, in Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, III, 504; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 25 May 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 128; Tomaso Contarini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 12 April 1590, CSP Venice, VIII, 485; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 468; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 239.

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365 Notes to pages 184–6 47 The duke of Parma to Philip II, 24 March 1590, in Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, III, 476; see also Corneio, “Bref discours,” 234; Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 175. 48 The duke of Parma to Philip II, 31 January 1588, CSP Spain, IV, 199. 49 See “Le vrai discours de la victoire merveilleuse obtenue par le Roy de France et de Navarre, Henry 4. en la battaile donnée contre les rebelles ligués prés le bourg d’Yvry en la plaine S. André, le 14 Mars l’an 1590” (London: 1590); Legrain, Décade contenant, 472–3; Méms. de Nevers, II, n.p.; Beauvais-Nangis, Mémoires, 51; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 219; Cheverny, Mémoires, 506; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 279; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 218. 50 One example will serve here of a story that spread about portents of Henri’s victory allegedly seen on the eve of battle: “Great and likely was the signe that God fought for this gracious king, when the night before the battaile hee shewed a miraculous token of victorie to the kings side, namely, by a pitched battaile seene in the skie, wherein sight of many thousand persons, the lesser number did overcome the greater as it fell out afterward by the Kings side.” (“Newes from Rome, Spaine, Palermo, Geneuae, and France,” n.p.) 51 The duc de Mayenne to Philip II, 25 March 1590, bn. Dupuy 317, fol. 210; to commander Moreo, 14 March 1590, quoted in Bouillé, Histoire des ducs de Guise, III, 451; “Extraict d’une lettre contenant tout ce qui c’est passé depuis le commencement de la Ligue jusques l’année 1591,” bn. ff. 2751, fol. 80. 52 “Newes from Rome, Spaine, Palermo, Geneuae, and France,” n.p. 53 Ibid. 54 See, for example, the “Mémoire de M. Duplessis, de ce que se passé, tant pour le général que pour son particulier, à la bataille d’Ivry,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 475; “Extraict d’une lettre contenant tout ce que c’est passé depuis le commencement de la Ligue jusques l’année 1591,” bn. Dupuy 317, fol. 210; the duc de Mayenne to commandeur Moreo, 14 March 1590, in Bouillé, Histoire des ducs de Guise, III, 451; Méms. de Nevers, II, n.p. 55 Their most recent effort to make this threat occurred in January 1590, in “Instructions sur ce qui doyt representé au Roy. De la part de ses principaulx & meilleurs serviteurs,” bn. ff. 3332, fol. 62vo. See also De Callières, Maréchal de Matignon, 292. 56 Henri IV was already rex by virtue of inheritance and dux by his demonstrated military skill. See Buisseret, Henri IV, 50. 57 Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 551–2; see also De Callières, Maréchal de Matignon, 330; Henri IV to the comte de Rambouillet, 16 July 1593, LM, III, 819. 58 Bury, La vie de Henri IV, I, 393.

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366 Notes to pages 186–8 59 See, for example, Villeroy de Neufville to Pomponne de Bellièvre, c. 1590, in Villeroy, Mémoires, II, 228, 229; Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. France 762, fols. 26–8; “Articles proposéz à la Noblesse du Pais d’Auvergne, par Monsieur le Comte de Randan” (Paris: 1590), 22; “Supplication au Roy sur advis de se faire Catholique [c. April 1591],” bn. Dupuy 317, fols. 152–3. 60 The duc de Mayenne to Sixtus V, 25 March 1590, bn. Dupuy 317, fols. 214, 215; to commander Moreo, 27 March 1590, bn. Dupuy 317, fol. 218; Philip II to Bernardino de Mendoza, c. March 1590, in Dussieux, Grands faits, 168; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 451, 468; “Lettre d’un Gentilhomme déclarant les Raisons pour lesquelles il s’est depuis le douziesme de May départy de l’armée du Navarrois” (Paris: 1590), 9–10; Vaissière, Henri IV, 361; “Coppie d’une lettre envoyée par Henry de Bourbon Roy de Navarre à sa bien-aimée & confédérée la Reyne d’Angleterre par un Gentilhomme nommé Rucqueville. Après la rencontre des deux armées près Yvry la chausée, le Mercredy xiii iour de Mars 1590. & à costé ladicte Lettre surprinse avec le Gentilhomme qui le portoit, par un Capitaine nommé la Vallage, sus le chemin de Dieppe à trois lieues près de Rouen, lequel en a fait pert à ses amis, dont la teneur ensuyt” (Rouen: 1590). The last citation is an excellent example of League propaganda. 61 Villeroy de Neufville to Pomponne de Bellièvre, 1590 or 1591, in Villeroy, Mémoires, II, 228; Bury, La vie de Henri IV, I, 393; De Callières, Maréchal de Matignon, 331. 62 For League perspectives on the question of Henri’s sincerity, see Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, passim. 63 Henri IV to Elizabeth I, 15 March 1590, bn. ff. 4016, fol. 11; bn. Dupuy 119, fols. 7–7vo. See also Breunot, Journal, I, 61; “Lettre d’un Gentilhomme déclarant les Raisons.”; Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 152–5; Corneio, “Bref discours,” 248. 64 De Callières, Maréchal de Matignon, 296–9; Henri IV to the maréchal de Matignon, LM, III, 317. 65 “Lettre d’un Gentilhomme déclarant les Raisons.” 66 This occurred in June. The pope also had second thoughts about recalling his pro-League legate, Cardinal Cajetan. See Caringi, “Sixte-Quint et la Ligue,” XX, 787–88; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 2 and 8 June, 6 July 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 129–31, 132, 140–1. 67 Philip II to the duke of Parma, 30 March 1591, in Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, IV, 568. 68 Henri IV to the duc de Longueville, 14 March 1590, in Valori, Journal militaire, 116–17; and to François de La Noue, 14 March 1590, LM, III, 171–2. 69 Wrote Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to the duc de La Trémouille in December 1589, “it is vital for us to have Paris.” (Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV,

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367 Notes to pages 188–91

70

71 72

73 74 75

76

77

78

79 80 81

443.) See also Henri IV to the comtesse de Grammont, 14 May 1590, LM, III, 194. Maimbourg, History of the League, 492, 500–1. See also Henri de Navarre to the comtesse de Grammont, 21 May 1589, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 139; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 71; “Discours au vrai de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée conduicte par sa majesté, depuis son avènement à la couronne jusqu’à la prise des faulxbourgs de Paris,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 3; “Vrai discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’Armée conduite par Sa Majesté trés chrètienne, depuis son Avènement à la couronne jusqu’à la fin de l’an 1589,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 49. Henri IV to François de La Noue, 14 March 1590, LM, III, 171–2. Henri IV to Elizabeth I, 15 March 1590, bn. ff. 4061, fol. 11; bn. Dupuy 119, fols. 7–7vo. See also Pomponne de Bellièvre to President Jeannin, 13 December 1593, bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 192. Pomponne de Bellièvre to President Jeannin, 13 December 1593, bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 192. Bib. Ars. 3438, fols. 5–6. “État de la ville de Paris après la Déroute d’Yvri,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 260–1; Cheverny, Mémoires, 499; Corneio, “Bref discours,” 234–5; Franklin, Siège de Paris, 132, 146; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 450; Benoiste, Edict of Nantes, 74; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 19. The Swiss mercenaries in particular refused to march until they had received their overdue pay in full. See “Discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’Armée ... mil cinq cens nonante,” 8; Cheverny, Mémoires, 499; Corneio, “Bref discours,” 235; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 451; Love, “Henry IV and Ivry Revisited,” 73–4. Indeed, contemporaries regularly praised Henri for never pursuing a military objective unless he was guranteed first of victory. This was not the case with Paris. See Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 53–4; Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 9 September 1590 and 14 March 1592, CSP Venice, VIII, 503, and IX, 18. Interestingly, in 1984 when the French truckers struck for better working conditions, they blockaded Paris using the same tactics Henri IV had employed 400 years before. They cut off the major arteries to the capital, announcing: “We’ll make them eat rats in Paris!” The blockade ended, however, when the strikers grew weary of the siege and government temporizing. (See Time Magazine, 5 March 1984, 35–6.) Michele Suriano, “Commentarii del regno di Francia, 1561,” in Tommaseo, Relation des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens, I, 557. Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 171. Henri IV to the Aldermen and People of St Quentin, 19 May 1590, LM, III, 199; Villeroy, Mémoires, II, 513; “Récit de ce qui s’est passé,” Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 462; Corneio, “Bref discours,” 244, 248;

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368 Notes to page 191

82 83

84 85 86

87

88 89

90

Franklin, Journal du siège, 150; “Autre Discours sur la siège de Paris,” in Arch. Cur., XIII, 287; Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 42; “Newes from Rome, Spaine, Palermo, Geneuae, and France,” n.p.; Henri IV to the citizens of Saint Quentin, 20 May 1590, Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 60. Henri IV to the comtesse de Grammont, 14 May 1590, LM, III, 194; see also d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 195. Corneio, “Bref discours,” 261; see also “Autre Discours sur la siège de Paris,” 288. Contemporaries estimated that during the course of the siege, 30,000 to as many as 100,000 people died in all, most from starvation. Henri IV to the comtesse de Grammont, 15 July 1590, Valori, Journal militaire, 286. Buisseret, Henri IV, 36. See Henri IV to the citizens of Paris, 16 July 1590, Valori, Journal militaire, 167–70; Corneio, “Bref discours,” 258; “Discours de ce qui s’est passé en la conférence des députéz de Paris, avec le Roy, en l’Abbaye S. Anthoine des Champs, le septiesme iour d’Aoust, mil cinq cens nonante” (Tours: 1590), 5, 7; “Déclaration du Roy Henri IV. de vouloir conserver la Religion Catholique, Apostolique et Romaine, sans y rien innover, ensemble les habitans de sa bonne ville de Paris [2 August 1590],” Méms. de Nevers., II, 605; “Acte de la Protestation du Roy Henri quatriesme pour la conservation de la Religion Catholique, apostolique et romaine, et protection de la ville de Paris en cas de soubmission de ces sujets en son obeissance, 11 Aoust 1590,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 42–3; “La Déclaration faite par le Roi de Navarre, le xi iour de Aoust, M.D.X.C.” (n.p.: 1590); Proclamation of Henri IV to his good city of Paris, 5 June 1590, in Dussieux, Grands faits, 205. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 201; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 50–1; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 241; de Thou, Mémoires, 351; Matthieu, Petit sommaire, 59. According to L’Estoile, Henri allowed 4,000 people to pass through his lines, where they were cared for by royal command. D’Aubigné, for example, was made responsible for the wellbeing of four women and eighteen children. “Discours au vrai ... faulxbourgs de Paris,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 34. See, for example, d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 201; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 50–1; LM, III, 285; Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 122; see also de Thou, Mémoires, 351; Matthieu, Petit sommaire, 24; “Autre Discours sur la siège de Paris,” 287; “Récit de ce qui s’est passé,” in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, IV, 462; Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 4; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 241. “Aux Prévost des Marchans, Eschevins, conseillers et habitans de nostre ville de Paris du seizième Juillet 1590. St. Denis,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 39–40.

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369 Notes to pages 191–3 91 See Henri’s declarations to the Parisians above, note 85. See also “Aux Prévost des Marchans, Eschevins, conseillers,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 39–40. 92 De Thou, Mémoires, 351; Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 41; “Sommaire discours de ce qui est advenu en l’Armée du Roi,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 325. 93 “Newes from Rome, Spaine, Palermo, Geneuae, and France,” n.p. 94 Henri IV to the sieur de Tavannes, 11 August 1590, LM, III, 238; to J. Roussat, 11 August 1590, Correspondance politique et militaire, 74. 95 This slight was not altogether undeserved. Pierre de L’Estoile tells the story that while riding one day in full armour, Mayenne accidentally fell off his horse and it took twelve of his retainers to lift him back into the saddle. (L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 205.) 96 For these discussions, see “Déclaration vers le Roy de Navarre pour remedier au misérable Estate du Royaume du 2 d’aoust 1590,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 40–1; “Discours de ce qui s’est passé en la conférence de députéz de Paris,” 4–12; “Discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée du Roy, depuis le vingt-troisiesm Iuillet, iusques au septiesme Aoust, mil cinq cens nonante” (Tours: 1590), 13–25; Corneio, “Bref discours,” 257–8; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 470; Franklin, Siège de Paris, 194–5, 200–1; “Recueil de ce qui s’est passé en la Conférence des sieurs Cardinal de Gondy et Archèvesque de Lyon avec le Roy” (n.p.: 1590); Henri IV to the sieur de Tavannes, 11 August 1590, LM, III, 238; to J. Roussat, 11 August 1590, Correspondance politique et militaire, 74; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 241–4; Cheverny, Mémoires, 506. 97 Villeroy, Mémoires, II, 514. 98 Corneio, “Bref discours,” 266; “Sommaire discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée du Roy,” Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 331. 99 “Sommaire discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée du Roy,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 333. See also Henri IV to the duc de Montpensier, 5 September 1590, and to the duc de Montmorency, 11 and 12 September 1590, LM, III, 247, 251, 256. 100 Sully, I, 302 [1819]. 101 “Déclaration sur l’avis que le Roy à eu qu’il venoit un Cardinal Légat a ladere de Notre Saint Père le Pape, dans le Royaume de France. Au camp devant Falaise le 5 Janvier 1590. Rég.[istré] le 16 du mesme mois,” in Blanchard, Compilation chronologique, 1222; circular letter by Henri IV, 5 January 1590, in Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 55–6; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 434; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 187. 102 Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, January 1560, 16 and 23 February, 2 March, 7 and 13 April 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 74, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 116, 117; Tomaso Contarini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 28 January 1590, CSP Venice, VIII, 480–1; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 452; LM, III, 156–7; the duc de Luxembourg to Henri IV, 12

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370 Notes to pages 193–4

103

104

105 106

107 108 109 110

111

June 1590, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. Spain 326, fol. 147; Ranke, History of the Popes, II, 145. Apparently, Sixtus had offered similar assurances as far back as August 1586, when it was noted that the pontiff would have no difficulty “pardoning something from which will come so great a good to the universal Church.” (Pomponne de Bellièvre to the duc de Nevers, 3 August and 20 September 1586, bn. ff. 3372, fols. 176vo., 214vo.) See Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 16 September 1589, 17 February 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 58–9, 77–8; the duchesse de Montpensier to Sixtus V, 15 April 1590, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. Spain 326, fol. 138; the sieur de Longlée to Henri IV, 3 March 1590, in Longlée-Renault, Dépêches diplomatiques, 390. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 235–6; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 2, 9 and 17 March 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 80–4, 87–8, 94–101; “Discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’Armée du Roy, depuis le treiziesme du mois d’Avril dernier jusqu’au 2. du mois de May” (Tours: 1590), 13–14. Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 3 and 25 May 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 123–4, 125–6. Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, January 1590, ibid., 72–5; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 248. Thereafter, Cajetan gave the ultra-Catholic faction all the financial and moral support at his disposal and forbade any correspondence whatever with the royalist Catholics or the king. (See Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 25 and 30 September, 6 October 1589, January 1590, 16 and 17 February, 7 April, 15 and 20 June, 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 63–4, 66–7, 72–5, 75–6, 77–8, 116, 138, 139; “Lettres de Monseigneur Caietan, Légat collatoral de nostre sainct Père le Pape, au Royaume de France [1 March 1590]” [Lyons: 1590]; Williams, “Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” 153.) Cardinal Cajetan was already heavily under Spanish influence, being both a relative of the duke of Parma and a former servitor of Philip II. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 248. Négs. Tosc., V, 85, 112–16; Williams, “Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” 153–4. Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 15 and 22 June, 7 July, 3 August 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 138–9, 145–6. Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 9, 17, 22, and 30 March 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 87–8, 94–101, 108–12, 112–16; Williams, “Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” 155. The duc de Luxembourg to Henri IV, 12 June 1590, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. Spain 326, fol. 147; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 15 June 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 138.

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371 Notes to pages 194–6 112 LM, III, 183–4; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 29 and 31 March, 7, 13 and 22 April, 3 and 25 May 1590, Négs. Tosc., V, 103–4, 106, 116, 117, 122–4, 124–8; see also Tomaso Contarini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 28 January 1590, CSP Venice, VIII, 481; “Le vray discours de la victoire merveilleuse,” n.p. 113 “Newes from Rome, Spaine, Palermo, Geneuae, and France,” n.p. 114 See bn. Dupuy 88, fol. 8. 115 See Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 29 June, 6 July, 17 and 22 August 1590, Négs. Tosc., 139, 141, 147–9; Philip II to Sixtus V, 12 June 1590, quoted in Williams, “Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” 156; Ranke, History of the Popes, II, 148; the duke of Sessa to Philip II, 19 July 1590, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. Spain 326, fols. 177–82; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 236. 116 Corneio, “Bref discours,” 248; see also Pomponne de Bellièvre to President Jeannin, 13 December 1593, bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 192. 117 Franklin, Siège de Paris, 284–6; see also Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 123; Henri IV to the maréchal de Matignon, c. December 1590, LM, III, 316; Villeroy, Mémoires, II, 466. 118 Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 123; Du Bec, Journal, 245. See, further, Henri IV to the maréchal de Matignon, c. December 1590, LM, III, 316–18. 119 Henri IV to the comtesse de Grammont, 14 May 1590, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 160. 120 Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 122. 121 Henri IV to the mayor and Justices of Bordeaux, 11 September 1590, LM, III, 252–3. 122 Henri IV to the comte de Schombert and Harlay de Sancy, December 1591, in Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 51. 123 See Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 11 and 22 September 1590; to the Mayor and Justices of Bordeaux, 11 September 1590; to the duc de Nevers, 9 November 1590, LM, III, 251, 252–3, 256–7, 295–6; Henri IV to the comte de Schomberg and Harlay de Sancy, December 1589, in Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 51; “Sommaire discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée du Roy,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 332; Villeroy, Mémoires, II, 516; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 292; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 218; Cheverny, Mémoires, 508; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 246–7, 250; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 476. 124 Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 22 September 1590, LM, III, 257. See also “Sommaire discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée du Roy,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 332. 125 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 9 November 1590, LM, III, 296. See also his comments to the duc de Montmorency, 22 September 1590, and to the duc de Nevers, 24 November 1590, LM, III, 257, 306. 126 Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 123.

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372 Notes to pages 196–9 127 Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 8 October 1590, and to the maréchal d’Aumont, 15 November 1590, LM, III, 266, 298; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 287, 290, 291; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 214, 215; Cheverny, Mémoires, 508; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 247, 250; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 478. 128 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 10 November 1590, LM, III, 297; the duc de Mayenne to the Prévôt des marchands of Paris, 20 November 1590, in Mayenne, Lettres, I, 49. 129 The duc de Mayenne to the Prévôt des marchands of Paris, 20 November, and to President Brisson, November 1590, Mayenne, Lettres, I, 49, 54. 130 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 309; see also d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 244; Sully, I, 254 [1819]. In fact, a septier of grain cost sixteen écus at this time. (Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 29 December 1590, LM, III, 309.) This was very expensive. 131 See d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 218; Henri IV to the comte de La Voulte, 9 December 1590, LM, III, 309; duc de Mayenne to commandeur Diou, 3 December 1590, Mayenne, Lettres, II, 76; Cheverny, Mémoires, 508. 132 4 November 1590, LM, III, 289–90. 133 Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 22 September 1590, LM, III, 257. Cheverny concurred with this. (Mémoires, p. 508.) 134 For a discussion of Henri IV as a cavalry commander and innovator, especially with regard to his manoeuvring with Parma and the duke’s fear of his skill, see: Love “‘All the King’s Horsemen,’” 345–53. 135 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 479. 136 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 218. See also the duc de Mayenne to commandeur Diou, 3 December 1590, in Mayenne, Lettres, II, 76. 137 The duc de Mayenne to commander Diou, 3 December 1590, in Mayenne, Lettres, II, 76. 138 See, for example, Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 11 September 1590, LM, III, 251. See also a run of correspondence between the king, the duc de Nevers, and maréchal de Biron from September to December 1590. 139 Henri IV to the comte de Voults, 9 December 1590, LM, III, 309. 140 Tomaso Contarini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 2 March 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 526. 141 “Lettre contenant le Discours de l’entreprise du Roi de Navarre sur la Ville de Paris, le vingtiesme jour de Janvier 1591; & d’autres choses advenus en même temps,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 340–4; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 294–5; the duc de Mayenne to the archbishop of Lyons, 28 January 1591, and to commandeur Diou, 28 January 1591, in Mayenne, Lettres, I, 307–8, 311–12; Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 28 November 1590, LM, III, 313; Cheverny, Mémoires, 509; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 263; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 490–2.

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373 Notes to pages 199–201 142 Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 8 October 1590, and to the duc de Nevers, 28 December 1590, LM, III, 264, 312–13; and to the duc de Nevers, 26 December 1590, Méms. de Nevers, II, 222; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 490. 143 The duc de Mayenne to the comte de Belin, 18 December 1590, and to President Jeannin, 28 December 1590, in Mayenne, Lettres, I, 178–9, 234; “Lettre contenant le Disours de l’entreprise,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 340–1; Cheverny, Mémoires, 509; L’Estoile, MémoiresJournaux, V, 294, 295. 144 The Journée des Farines was one of three or four events celebrated annually in Paris until the fall of the city in 1594. (L’Estoile, MémoiresJournaux, V, 319; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 263.) 145 The duc de Mayenne to the archbishop of Lyons and to President Jeannin, 23 January 1591, in Mayenne, Lettres, I, 299, 301; Cheverny, Mémoires, 509; Tomaso Contarini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 6 December 1590, CSP Venice, VIII, 510; Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, LM, III, 374; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 283. 146 Henri IV to the duke of Saxony, 3 October 1590, LM, III, 260; Villeroy, Mémoires, II, 516; Cheverny, Mémoires, 507. 147 The parlement of Bordeaux and the Catholic citizens of the dioceses of Montpellier and Uzès, for example, had petitioned the king persistently throughout the fall of 1590 to receive instruction. The royalist archbishop of Bourges had said masses daily for Henri’s conversion. (See Davila, Civil Wars of France, 485; Henri IV to the people of Montpellier and Uzès, 6 October 1590, LM, III, 262; Cheverny, Mémoires, 506; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 291.) 148 Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 3 December 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 180. 149 Ibid. 150 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 485; “Remonstrance et supplication faicte au Roy, pour la Religion Catholique, Apostolique, & Romane” (Bordeaux: 1591). 151 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 485. 152 See “Lettre contenant le Discours de l’entreprise...,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 340; “Lettre du Sieur de Lamet, Gouverneur de Coucy, Contenant son réunion au party Catholique, escrite à un Gentilhomme de la suite du Roy de Navarre” (Paris: 1591). 153 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 485. 154 Henri IV to the maréchal de Matignon, c. December 1590, LM, III, 316. 155 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 21 November 1590, ibid., 301. See also de Thou, Mémoires, 349; Colynet, True History of the Civil Warres of France, 475; Serres, Civil Warres of Fraunce, 900.

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374 Notes to pages 201–3 156 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 169. Henri repeated this almost word for word to Matignon, c. December 1590, LM, III, 316–18. 157 Quoted in Angoulême, Mémoires, 69. For other examples of Henri’s confessions of faith, see his letters to J. Roussat, 14 March 1590, Correspondance politique et militaire, 50–1; to the comtesse de Grammont, 9 September, 20 November 1589, 8, 16, and 29 January 1590; to the baron de Flers, 16 October 1589; to M. de Bournazel, 9 March 1590; and to Mme de La Roche-Guyon, 31 August 1590, LM, III, 44, 58, 82, 97, 116, 122, 135, 150–1, 244. 158 See “Abrègé fait au duc de Savoye,” in Villeroy, Mémoires, II, 462; Franklin, Siège de Paris, 217–18; “Lettre d’un Gentilhomme déclarant les Raisons,” 9–10; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 2 and 8 June 1590, Négs. Tosc., IV, 131, 132; Villeroy de Neufville to Pomponne de Bellièvre, 1590 or 1591, Villeroy, Mémoires, II, 229; the Catholic response to Henri’s declaration of intent included in “La Déclaration faite par le Roi de Navarre, le xi iour de Aoust, M.D.X.C.” (n.p.: 1590), 11–14. 159 Henri IV to the maréchal de Matignon, c. December 1590, LM, III, 317; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 485; Girard, Duc d’Espernon, 123. 160 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 486. 161 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 13 and 14 February 1591, LM, III, 341, 342; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 485–86. 162 For this interpretation, see Buisseret, Henri IV, 37–8; Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 508–9, 514–15; Garrisson-Estèbe, La Saint Barthélémy, 160; Reinhard, Henri IV, 114–15. 163 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 6 December 1590, CSP Venice, VIII, 512; Cheverny, Mémoires, 509. 164 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 24 December 1590, LM, III, 314; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 283; the duc de Mayenne to the comte de Belin, 7 December 1590, in Mayenne, Lettres, I, 117. 165 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Jouraux, V, 299. Henri also considered Chartres to be one of “the finest places of my kingdom.” (See Henri IV to the duke of Saxony, 11 June 1591, LM, III, 394.) 166 The duc de Mayenne to the Prévôt des marchands and Aldermen of Paris, 4 December 1590, and to the comte de Belin, 6 December 1590, in Mayenne, Lettres, I, 91, 106; and to the comte de St.-Pol, 28 April 1591, ibid., II, 179; Tomaso Contarini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 15 February 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 534; Cheverny, Mémoires, 511; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 268; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 494. 167 Henri IV to the duke of Saxony, 11 June 1591, LM, III, 394–5; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 269; du Bec, Journal, 247. According to Mayenne, Chartres, Dreux, and Dourdans were the principal supply centres for Paris. (Mayenne to the Prévôt des marchands and Aldermen

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375 Notes to pages 203–6

168 169 170

171

172

173 174 175 176

177

178

179 180

181

of Paris, 4 December 1591, and to the comte de Belin, 6 December 1590, in Mayenne, Lettres, I, 91, 106.) Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 13 July 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 549–50. Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 19 September 1591, ibid., 556. Henri IV to the sieur de Beauvoir-la-Nocle, 19 April 1591, LM, III, 380. See also Henri’s letters to the sieur de Granville, 15 February 1591 (p. 343), to the duc de Nevers, 24 March 1591 (p. 361), to the duc de Montmorency, 12 April 1591 (p. 374), and again to the duc de Nevers, 15 and 19 August 1591 (pp. 463–4, 465–6). The duc de Mayenne to M. de Balbani, 30 March 1591, in Mayenne, Lettres, II, 112–13; de Thou, Mémoires, 352; Cheverny, Mémoires, 511, 513; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 298, 303; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 222, 225; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 296–8, 309; Henri IV to Elizabeth I, 11 April 1591, to the duc de Montmorency, 12 April; and to the duc de Nevers, 19 August 1591, LM, III, 370, 374, 465–6; Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 28 August 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 553–4. Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 28 August 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 553–4; see also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 507; Lloyd, Rouen Campaign, 111. LM, III, 374. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 268. September 1592, LM, III, 831. Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 10 December 1590, LM, III, 311; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 286; Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 26 March 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 534. Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 10 December 1590, LM, III, 391; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 252; the duc de Mayenne to M. de Balbani, 30 March 1591, in Mayenne, Lettres, II, 113. See Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 11 July 1591, 14 September 1591, 21 November 1591; to M. de Vaudore, 1 December 1591; and to the duc de Montmorency, 14 December 1591, LM, III, 415, 484, 486, 507, 511–12, 522. Henri IV to M. de Vaudore, 1 December 1591, and to the duc de Montmorency, 14 December 1591, ibid., 511–12, 522. Henri IV to the duke of Saxony, 11 June 1591, LM, 396; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 299; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 289; Cheverny, Mémoires, 512. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 331–3; Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 284; de Thou, Mémoires, 352; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 498–9, 511; Anquetil, Histoire de France, 275; Poirson, Henri IV, 114–15.

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376 Notes to pages 206–8 182 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 333; de Thou, Mémoires, 352. See also Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 29 December 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 247; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 511. 183 Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 473. 184 The duc de Mayenne to the nobility of Auvergne, February 1591; to commandeur Diou and the archbishop of Lyons, 17 February 1591; to commander Diou, 16 April 1591; and to the archbishop of Lyons, 28 April 1591, in Mayenne, Lettres, II, 42, 65, 165–7, 183. See also Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 284; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 500. 185 The duc de Mayenne to commandeur Diou, 16 April 1591, in Mayenne, Lettres, II, 156–57. 186 The duke of Parma to Philip II, 16 April 1590, in Philip II, Correspondence, 519. 187 Canault, Maréchal d’Ornano, 104; de Thou, Mémoires, 351; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 498; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 296; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 333; the duc de Mayenne to commandeur Diou and the archbishop of Lyons, 17 February 1591; and to commandeur Diou, 16 April 1591, in Mayenne, Lettres, II, 65, 156; Anquetil, Histoire de France, 275; Williams, “Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” 164. 188 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 498–9; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 296–9. 189 Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 21 and 29 December 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 229, 247. See also Villeroy, Mémoires, II, 271. 190 The duke of Parma to Philip II, 16 August 1590, in Gachard, Correspondance de Philippe II, IV, 519. For royalist views of the two princes, see Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 21 and 29 December 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 229, 247. See also the Savoyard ambassador’s dispatch to the duke of Savoy, c. 1590 or 1591, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. France 762, fols. 26–8; Villeroy, Mémoires, II, 473–5. 191 De Thou, Mémoires, 353; see also the duc de Mayenne to commandeur Diou, 16 April 1591, in Mayenne, Lettres, II, 156–7. 192 De Thou, Mémoires, 352. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 8; see also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 499; de Thou, Mémoires, 352. 196 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 8; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 499; de Thou, Mémoires, 352; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 296; Poirson, Henri IV, 114–15; Anquetil, Histoire de France, 275; Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 29 December 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 247. 197 “Discorso intorno l’ambasciera mandata el Cardinal di Vendomo alla Sta. di No. Ste. Gregorio xiiii,” bn. Fonds Italien 851, fols. 1–12; Philippe Desportes to the duc de Mayenne, 5 April 1591, bn. 500 Colbert,173–74; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 20

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377 Notes to pages 208–10

198 199 200

201

202

203

204

205

206 207 208

and 25 February 1591, Négs. Tosc., V, 153–4, 155; L’Estoile, MémoiresJournaux, V, 266–7; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 499–500; Poirson, Henri IV, 114–15; Anquetil, Histoire de France, 275. See, for example, “Discours du duc de Nevers à Henri IV,” 12 June 1591, bn. ff. 3980, fols. 300–2. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 290. Williams, “Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” 157; Ranke, History of the Popes, II, 153; see also Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 255; Cheverny, Mémoires, 508; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 292. Henri IV to the duke of Saxony, 11 June 1591, LM, III, 395; Cheverny, Mémoires, 510; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 493; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 26 January 1591, and 8, 20, and 25 February 1591, Négs. Tosc., V, 151–2, 152–3, 153–4, 155; L’Estoile, MémoiresJournaux, V, 289, 292, 296, 297; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 271, 277–9; the duc de Luxembourg to Gregory XIV, 8 April 1591, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 349–53. Two bulls, one addressed to the royalist-Catholic clergy and one to the Catholic nobility, judges, and commons of France, 25 May 1591, bn. ff. 23299, fols. 24–38, 38–40; Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 10; L’Estoile, MémoiresJournaux, V, 297–8; Cheverny, Mémoires, 510; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 502; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 278–9; Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 371; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 20 and 25 February 1591, Négs. Tosc., V, 153–4, 155; Malingre, Registres du Parlement, 46–50. Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 9 February 1591, Négs. Tosc., V, 153; Henri IV to the duke of Saxony, 11 June 1591, LM, III, 395. Bulls addressed to the royalist-Catholic clergy and to the nobility, judges, and commons, 25 May 1591, bn. ff. 23299, fols. 24–38, 38–40; Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 10; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 297–8; Cheverny, Mémoires, 510; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 502; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 278–9; Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 371; Malingre, Registres du Parlement, 46–50; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 277, 278–9; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 31 March 1591, Négs. Tosc., V, 155–6. The “Remonstrance d’Angers” was also published under the title “Supplication au Roy sur advis de se faire Catholique,” bn. Dupuy 317, fols. 152–5. See also Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 295; Tilley, “Pamphlets of the French Wars of Religion,” 464. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 500. Ibid. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 295. For the king’s counterremonstrances, see André Mailart, “Le Francophile”; Michel Hurault,

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378 Notes to pages 210–11

209 210 211 212

213 214

215 216

217 218 219

220

“Discours”; and two anonymous publications, the “Response à l’instance et proposition que plusiers font, que pour avoir une pais général et bien establie en France, il faut que le Roy change la Religion et se renge à celle de l’Église Romaine,” and the “Advertissement aux serviteurs du Roy sure la supplication adressée à sa Majesté, pour se faire Catholicque,” in Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 295; Tilly, “Pamphlets of the French Wars of Religion,” 464–5. The “Advertissement” may also have appeared in English translation under the title “A Discourse upon a question of the estate at this time” (London: 1591), which also attracted those who insisted upon Henri IV’s abjuration. De Thou, Mémoires, 352–3; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 501. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 498–9, 501; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 152. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 511. Henri IV to the comtesse de Grammont, December 1590, LM, III, 320. See also the duc de Mayenne to President Jeannin, 28 March 1591, in Mayenne, Lettres, II, 189. Henri IV to the duke of Saxony, 11 June 1591, LM, III, 395. “Lettres des Princes, officiers de la couronne et autre Seigneurs Catholiques au Pape sur son advènement au Sainct Siège et pourtant obéissence [6 April 1591],” bn. 500 Colbert 19, fols. 109–11; bn. ff. 3417, fols. 94–103; bn. ff. 2751, fols. 94–6; Bib. Ars. 4239, fols. 111–12; the duc de Luxembourg to Gregory XIV, 8 April 1591, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 374–8; Méms. de Nevers, II, 529–32; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 269–71; Cheverny, Mémoires, 511; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 298. Cheverny, Mémoires, 511; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 298. Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 277, 278–9; Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 31 March 1591, Négs. Tosc., V, 155–6; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 297–8. The maréchal de Matignon to Henri IV, August 1589, bn. Dupuy 61, fol. 36. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 298; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 502. Giovanni Niccolini to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 31 March 1591, Négs. Tosc., V, 156; the cardinal de Vendôme to the duc de Nevers, 6 November 1589, bn. ff. 332, fol. 63; the duc de Luxembourg to Gregory XIV, 8 April 1591, Méms. de Nevers, II, 522. See also Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 78; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 271. See, for example, Claude Fauchet, “Response aux animonttoires et Excommunications de Grégoire XIV,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 387–616; the anonymous “De la vraye et légitime Constitution de l’Estat” (n.p.: 1591). See also Cheverny, Mémoires, 293.

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379 Notes to pages 211–13 221 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 14 June 1591, LM, III, 402; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 256. 222 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 298; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 286; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 504. 223 “Arrest de la Cour de Parlement séant à Chaalons sur certaines Libelles, Invectives et scandaleuses Infidèles Bulles monitorialles & impriméz à Rheims,” bn. Dupuy 88, fols. 82–3. For a printed copy, dated 10 June 1591, see Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 395–6. See also L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 300; Malingre, Registres du Parlement, 46–50; Sir Francis Walsingham to Elizabeth I, 15 June 1591, Fugger Newsletters, II, 223; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 243–9. The royalist parlementaires of Brittany followed the example of their colleagues at Tours and Châlons on 22 October, issuing a similar condemnation of the papal bulls and prohibiting all French subjects from appealing to Rome. (See du Bec, Journal, 251.) 224 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 10. See also Pomponne de Bellièvre to President Jeannin, 13 December 1593, ff. Dupuy 770, fol. 204; Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 77–8. 225 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 14 June 1591, and to the duc de Retz, 7 July 1591, LM, III, 402, 417. For Luxembourg’s instructions, see “Instruction à Monsieur le duc de Luxembourg allant à Rome à la part des Princes, Prélatz et Noblesse Catholique de France estant à la suytte du Roi en Julliet 1591,” bn. ff. 3417, fols. 104–222; “Instruction à Monsieur de Luxembourg allant à Rome, 1591,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 56–69; “Instruction à Mons. de Luxembourg allant à Rome [1591],” Bib. Ars. 4239, fols. 113–19; “Instruction à Monsieur de Luxembourg allant à Rome,” c. April 1591, bn. Dupuy 88, fols. 68–77vo.; “Instruction à Monseigneur de Luxembourg, allant à Rome,” Méms. de Nevers, II, 512–24. 226 See “Déclaration de N.[ôtre] S.[aint] Père le Pape Gregoire XIV. Sur les lettres qui luy on esté escrites par la Noblesse qui suit le Navarrois” (Paris: 1591). 227 Sir Francis Walsingham to Elizabeth I, 15 June 1591, Fugger Newsletters, II, 223. 228 De Thou, Mémoires, 352. 229 Henri IV to the people of Tours, 8 July 1591, in Luzarche, Lettres historiques de Tours, 149–53; Chappuys, Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 801–2; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 301; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 248; Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 71–2; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 498; Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 480–1; Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 8 July 1591, LM, III, 422; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 280–91; Cheverny, Mémoires, 512; de Thou, Mémoires, 353; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 200.

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380 Notes to pages 213–15 230 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to Henri IV, 1 September 1589, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 407. 231 For example, the previous November 1590 Henri had given his consent (subsequently withdrawn for political reasons) to Philippe DuplessisMornay to publish the “Formulaire de la déclaration pour la révocation de l’édit de juillet [1585].” This document served as the blueprint for Calvinist privileges restored in the first edict of Mantes. See DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, IV, 492–504; Henri IV to the Calvinist ministers of Languedoc, 4 November 1590, LM, III, 293; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 199–200. 232 Henri IV to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 426–30. See also Henri’s earlier letter to Duplessis-Mornay, November 1589, in Dussieux, Lettres intimes, 131–2. 233 Buisseret, Henri IV, 41. 234 See Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 8 July 1591, LM, III, 422; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 498. 235 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 301; see also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 501. 236 De Thou, Mémoires, 353. 237 Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. France 762, fols. 48–9; Henri IV to the people of Tours, 8 July 1591, Luzarche, Lettres historiques, 149–53; Chappuys, Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 801–2; L’Estoile, MémoiresJournaux, V, 301; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 498, 501; Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 480–81; Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 8 July 1591, LM, 423; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 288–91; Cheverny, Mémoires, 512; “Lettres Patentes du Roi, Contenant déclaration de l’intention qu’il a pour maintenir l’Église & Religion Catholique, Apostolique et Romaine en ce Royaume; ensemble les droits et anciennes libertés du l’Église Gallicane,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 361–7; de Thou, Mémoires, 353; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 248; Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 200; Babelon, Henri IV, 524; Lloyd, Siege of Rouen, 111. 238 Henri IV to the people of Tours, 8 July 1591, in Luzarche, Lettres historiques, 153. 239 For Henri’s concerns here, see his letter to the duc de Montmorency, 8 July 1591, LM, III, 422. See also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 498. 240 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 14 June 1591, LM, III, 402; see also de Thou, Mémoires, 353. 241 Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. France 762, fols. 48–9; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 502; Cheverny, Mémoires, 512; Henri IV to the parlement of Caen, 8 July 1591, and to the duc de Montmorency, 8 July 1591, LM, III, 418–19, 421–4; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 301.

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381 Notes to pages 215–18 242 Henri IV to the people of Tours, 8 July 1591, in Luzarche, Lettres historiques, 149–53; De Thou, Mémoires, 353; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 502; Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. France 762, fol. 49; Cheverny, Mémoires, 512; Henri IV to the parlement of Caen, 8 July 1591, LM, III, 418–19. The decrees were duly registered on 5 August. 243 De Thou, Mémoires, 355; see also “Despêche envoyée de Tours par M. Duplessis au roy,” 3 October 1591, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 89. 244 Decree of the parlement of Tours, 5 July 1591, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 367–9; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 502; Cheverny, Mémoires, 512; Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 479–80; Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. France 762, fols. 48–9; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 291–2; Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 10; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 301, 302; Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 8 July 1591, LM, III, 421–4. As to be expected, the League-controlled parlement of Paris issued a counterdecree a month or two later. 245 “Lettres Patentes du Roi,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, IV, 361–7. 246 Williams, “Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” 158; Baird, Huguenots and Henry of Navarre, II, 270–1. See also Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 388–91. 247 Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 388–91; Williams, “Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” 158. 248 “Instruction à Monsieur le duc de Luxembourg,” bn. ff. 3417, fols. 144–222; bn. ff. 2751, fols. 56–69; Bib. Ars. 4239, fols. 113–19; Méms. de Nevers, II, 512–24. The instructions end by acknowledging they had been drawn up in the royal council, “the king being present ... and by [his] authority.” 249 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 10; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 301; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 293; de Thou, Mémoires, 353, 355; Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 8 July 1591, LM, III, 421–4; du Bec, Journal, 250–1. Present were the cardinal de Bourbon, the archbishop of Bourges, the bishops of Nantes, Beauvais, du Mans, Chartres, and Angers, along with several abbots, priors, and theologians who had been sent as deputies from all provinces of France. Subsequently, the assembly was removed to Chartres. 250 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 10; de Thou, Mémoires, 355; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 293; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 301, 302; “Déclaration du clergé de France [21 September 1591],” DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 72–5; du Bec, Journal, 251; Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 14 September 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 556. 251 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 10; de Thou, Mémoires, 355; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 293; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 301, 302; “Déclaration

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382 Notes to pages 218–25 du clergé” and “Ce qui se passa en la poursuite du résultat de l’assemblée du clergé,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 72–5, 123–4. 252 “Despêche envoyée de Tours par M. Duplessis au Roy, le 3 Octobre 1591,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 85–94. 253 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 302; de Thou, Mémoires, 355. c h a p t e r s ix 1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Benoiste, Edict of Nantes, 57. Angoulême, Mémoires, 69. Quoted in Lloyd, Siege of Rouen, 166. See Tomaso Contarini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 15 February, 2 and 30 March 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 524, 526, 535. The duc de Mayenne to Cardinal Cajetan, 20 November 1590; to the comte de St-Pol, 28 April 1591; and to President Jeannin, 28 March 1591, in Mayenne, Lettres, I, 54, II, 180–8. See also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 478; Tomasso Contarini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 6 December 1590, CSP Venice, VIII, 510. Lloyd, Siege of Rouen, 166–7. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 28 October 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 116. Ibid. “Déclaration du clergé de France [21 September 1591],” in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 72–5. See also Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 293–4; Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 6 November 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 131; Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 524. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 6 November 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 131. “Ce qui se passa en la poursuite du résultat de l’assemblée du clergé [18 December 1591],” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 122. Voltaire, Civil Wars of France, 22. “Ce qui se passa en la poursuite,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 123–4. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 29 December 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 247. “Ce qui se pass en la poursuite,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 122. Pomponne de Bellièvre to Louis Revol, 14 January 1592, bn. ff. 15893, fol. 2. Sir Henry Unton to Elizabeth I, 20 December 1591, and to Lord Burghley, 20 December 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 220, 221. Ibid. Sully, I, 302 [1819]; Sully, I, 318 [B. & B.]. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 23 March 1592, in Unton, Correspondence, 403. The province had been granted to Épernon originally

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383 Notes to pages 225–8

21 22

23

24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32 33 34

by Henri III. But because he already administered three other provinces, the duke named his brother, the duc de La Valette, as his deputy. When La Valette died in 1592, Henri planned to name a new governor, but Épernon immediately claimed the title as belonging properly to him (having never relinquished it) and rode to occupy the province. From this point forward, relations deteriorated rapidly between the two men. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 20 and 29 December 1591, in ibid., 221–2, 247. For this affair, see Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 21 March, 12 April, and 5 and 11 May 1592, in ibid., 401, 415, 442, 453; Henri IV to M. de Maisse, 26 March 1592, and to the duc de Montmorency, 26 March 1592, LM, III, 590, 594; Sully, I, 290–1 [1819]. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 12 and 16 April 1592, in Unton, Correspondence, 415, 420; Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 25 May 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 35. For the reports of Épernon’s “intelligence” with Spain, see Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 8 February 1592, in Unton, Correspondence, 309. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 20 December 1592, in Unton, Correspondence, 222. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 28 October 1591, in ibid., 118. Ibid. “Histoire de Henri IV,” Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 11. See also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 511; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 346; Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 1 and 13 October 1591, 3 and 9 March 1592, in Unton, Correspondence, 101, 108, 362, 369; the duc de Bouillon to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 15 March 1592, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 266; “Lettres Patentes portant creation d’un office de Maréchal de France, en faveur d’Henri de La Tour Vicomte de Turenne, Duc de Bouillon, Prince de Sedan, Premier Gentilhomme de la Chambre du Roy. Au Camp de Blangy le 9 mars 1592,” in Blanchard, Compilation chronologique, 1233. Cheverny, Mémoires, 502–6; Cheverny to Pomponne de Bellièvre, 7 August 1590, bn. ff. 15909, fol. 309. For some of these changes, see Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 102–4. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 8 February 1592, in Unton, Correspondence, 310. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 9 March 1592, in ibid., 369. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 28 October 1591, in ibid., 118. See also Maimbourg, History of the League, 857. Henri IV to the sieur de Beauvoir-la-Nocle, 14 September 1591, LM, III, 831 (emphasis mine). Ibid. (emphasis mine).

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384 Notes to pages 228–31 35 For Elizabeth’s threats to withdraw her support if Henri refused to comply with her wishes, see her letter to Sir Thomas Leighton and Henry Killigrew, 2 September 1591, in Elizabeth I, Letters, 212–13. 36 Elizabeth I to Henri IV, 9 November 1591, in Elizabeth I, Letters, 218–19. 37 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 20 November 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 563. 38 “Brèf Discours des choses plus mémorables advenues en la ville de Rouen, durant le Siège mis devant icelle par Henry de Bourbon, prétendu Roy de Navarre: valeureusement soustenu l’espace de quatre mois par les habitants de la dicte ville, souz la conduite de Mon Seigneur Henry de Lorraine, des sieurs de Villars, de Gessans, & autres vaillants Capitaines: iusqu’au 20. de Février 1591. que l’armée Hérétique leva le Siège à l’arrivée de l’armée Catholique, conduicte par Messeigneurs les ducs de Parme, de Mayenne, Sfondrato, de Guyse & d’Aumâle” (Lyons: 1591), 12. 39 See Henri IV to the parlement at Tours, 8 January 1592, LM, III, 546–7. 40 See Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 14 December 1591 and 3 January 1592; and to the duc de Nevers, 1 January 1592, LM, III, 521, 538, 540. 41 Lloyd, Siege of Rouen, 168. 42 Don Diego de Ibarra to Philip II, 10 January 1592, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. Spain 327, fol. 59. 43 Matthieu, Henry the fourth, 31. 44 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 18 January 1592, LM, III, 549. 45 Sir Henri Unton to Lord Burghley, 25 December 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 234. In fact, in 1592 Henri employed two secretaries, Beringhen and Choirin, whose special function was, apparently, to decipher captured enemy documents. (Sully, I, 331 [1819]; Sully, I, 333 [B. & B.].) 46 Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 14 December 1591, LM, III, 522; see also Henri IV to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 3 and 6 January 1592, ibid., 542–3. 47 Henri IV to the Mayor, Aldermen and People of Rouen, 1 December 1591, ibid., 510–11. See also L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 315–16. 48 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 9 January 1592, LM, III, 548. 49 Ibid. 50 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 17 and 18 January 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 4. 51 Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 14 December 1591 and 3 January 1592, and to the duc de Nevers, 1 January 1592, LM, III, 521, 538, 540. 52 Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 3 January 1592, ibid., 540. 53 “Ce qui se passa à Bive [17 February 1592],” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 199; Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to the earl of Essex, 7 February 1592, in ibid., 196; “Discours faict au camp de Neuf châtel sur ce qui

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385 Notes to pages 231–6

54

55

56 57 58 59

60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68 69 70

71 72 73 74

s’est passé entre le Roy et le Duc de Parme, ensemble la coppie d’une lettre du Roy escripte à l’un de ses officiers estant à la Rochelle, contenant ce qui est depuis advenu en son armée”(Tours: 1592). Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 19 December 1591 and 1 January 1592, LM, III, 529, 537; Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to the earl of Essex, 7 February 1592, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 196. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 258–9; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 531; Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 500–1; Sully, I, 280 [1819]; Sully, I, 302 [B. & B.]. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 531. Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 12 February 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 10. Quoted in Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 500–1; Matthieu, Henry the fourth, 31–2. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 535; “Discours du rencontre suivy”; “Brèf discours des choses plus mémorables advenues en la ville de Rouen,” 29; Lloyd, Siege of Rouen, 179. Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 27 February 1592, LM, III, 574. “Brèf discours des choses plus mémorables advenues en la ville de Rouen,” 30; du Bec, Journal, 255; Lloyd, Siege of Rouen, 180–1. Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 27 February 1592, LM, III, 571–2. Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 6 November 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 117. Sully, I, 298–9 [1819]. Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 14 March 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 18. M. des Reaux to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 22 April 1592, quoted in Davila, Civil Wars of France, 316. See also Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 22 April 1592, LM, III, 617–18; Sully, I, 262 [B. & B.]. Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 14 March 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 17. Henri IV to M. de Brèves, 21 December 1592, LM, III, 710. See also the king’s letter to the duc de Nevers of 7 December 1592, ibid., 708. Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 9 September 1592, ibid., 667. Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 17 May 1592, and to the duc de Montmorency, 19 June 1592, ibid., 635, 638–39; Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 25 May 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 34–5. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 550–1; Sully, I, 300 [1819]; Sully, I, 320 [B. & B.]. Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 19 June 1592, LM, III, 638–41. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 534. Quoted in Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 252, and in L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, II, 81.

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Page 386

386 Notes to pages 236–8 75 Sully, I, 289 [1819]; Sully, I, 310 [B. & B.]; Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 7 and 14 March 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 16, 17. 76 Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 90–1. 77 The duke of Parma to Philip II, 21 July 1590, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs., Espagne 326, fols. 148–52. 78 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 472. 79 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 7 March 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 16. 80 The duke of Parma to Philip II, 3 June 1590, Van Der Essen, Parma, V, 284. 81 Cheverny, Mémoires, 513. 82 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to M. de Fleury, 16 March 1592, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 231. 83 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 14 March 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 18. 84 “Supplication et advis au Roy de se faire Catholique, 1592,” Bib. Ars. 3737, fols. 102–7. 85 “Discours tendant à ce que S.[a] M.[agesté] se fasse catholique Romaine,” bn. 500 Colbert 31, fols. 226–8. 86 Sully, I, 290 [1819]; Sully, I, 270 [B. & B.]. 87 “Instruction à Monsieur de Luxembourg,” Méms. de Nevers, II, 512–24. For Henri’s dealings with the papacy, see ibid.; for his negotiations with the League in December 1591, see L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 317–18; for his relations with his Catholic servitors, see, for example, Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 26 March 1592, LM, III, 594. 88 Coningsby, Journal, 17. 89 Henri IV to the Seigneurie de Berne, 1592, bn. Dupuy 119, fol. 6; “Lettres du Roy à messieurs de la seigneurie de Berne sur la déclaration qu’il fit à son advénément à la couronne de maintenir la Religion Romaine, 1592,” ibid., fols. 8–9vo.; “Reponse de la part du roy,” c. November 1592, bn. ff. 4505, fols. 207–10. The last document was sent in response to proposals made by the Catholic parlementaires and other officials in Paris to encourage Henri IV to convert, in return for which they offered to recognize him as king. See below. 90 Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 28 October 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 116. 91 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 317–18. 92 Giovanni Francesco Marchesini to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 16 May 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 33. 93 Henri IV to the Seigneurie de Berne, 1592, bn. Dupuy 119, fol. 6; “Lettres du Roy à messieurs de la seigneurie de Berne,” ibid., fols. 8–9vo. 94 Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 28 October 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 117.

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Page 387

387 Notes to pages 238–42 95 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 500–1. 96 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to M. de Buzenval, 18 April 1592, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 303. See also his letter to M. de La Fontaine, 16 April 1592, in ibid., 296. 97 Henri IV to M. de Beauvoir-la-Nocle, 10 July 1592, LM, III, 645–6. 98 Du Bec, Journal, 261. Biron’s body was interred at the basilica on 22 July 1593, three days before Henri’s final conversion to Catholicism. 99 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 560; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 176. In fact, L’Estoile believed Biron would have joined the League in 1589 had that faction had sufficient wealth to satisfy his greed. 100 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 331–2; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 560. 101 Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 26 March 1592, LM, III, 591. 102 Mattingly, The Armada, 76. 103 Although the only source for this remark is Henri IV’s seventeenthcentury biography by Bishop Péréfixe, later historians have repeated it without question, building a damaging case against the king’s skills as a general. 104 Sully, I, 270, 281–2 [1819]; Sully, I, 287–91 [B. & B.]. The late maréchal de Biron had also scolded the king from time to time for his bravado in battle, saying that if Henri were killed, it would be disastrous for the royal cause, while a great personal defeat “would diminish the reputation that he has acquired through long years with much pain and great risk.” (The maréchal de Biron to Pomponne de Bellièvre, 13 December 1590, in Biron, Letters, II, 477–8). 105 Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 1 February 1592, in Unton, Correspondence, 296–7. 106 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 534; Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to the earl of Essex, 7 February 1592, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 196–7. 107 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 534. 108 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 30 December 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 570. 109 Sully, I, 270 [1819]; Sully, I, 288 [B. & B.]. 110 Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 150–1. 111 Abridgement of the life of Henry the Great, 3; Skory, An extract, 3. For almost identical comments, see Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to the earl of Essex, 7 February 1592, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 191; “The Discoverer of France,” trans. Edward Aggas (London: 1590), 12; Angoulême, Mémoires, 76; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 534; Péréfixe, Henry the Great, 58; and Michel de Montaigne to Henri IV, 18 January 1590, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 154. 112 Sir Henry Unton to Lord Burghley, 6 November 1591, in Unton, Correspondence, 129. 113 Dallington, View of Fraunce, n.p.

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388 Notes to pages 242–5 114 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to Henri IV, 6 February 1591, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 191. 115 Sully, I, 290 [B. & B.]. Jean de Serres echoed these thoughts when he wrote: “[The king] chooseth rather to exeed the limits of valour, then to be noted of any cowardise.” (Commentaries of the Civil Warres, III, 931.) 116 Henri IV to cardinal d’Ossat, 7 March 1597, in Ossat, Lettres, 444. 117 Sully, I, 300 [1819]; Sully, I, 320 [B. & B.]. 118 Harrison, Elizabethan Journals, 136. 119 “Mémoire envoyé au roy par M. Duplessis,” 28 March 1592, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 269; Henri IV to Philippe DuplessisMornay, 18 March 1592, LM, III, 580. See also Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 10 March 1592 and 5 April 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 17, 22. 120 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 15 January 1592, ibid., 549; see also Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 14 December 1591 and 7 May 1592, ibid., 522, 632; Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 17 March 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 534; Harrison, Elizabethan Journal, 123–24; Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 296. 121 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 26 February 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 13. 122 M. d’Ossat to Villeroy de Neufville, 1592, in Ossat, Letters, 39. 123 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 553–4; “Mémoire envoyé au Roy,” 28 March 1592, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 246–71. 124 See the “Articles proposez au Roy de Navarre par ceux de la Ligue pour estre reconnue Roy de France avec les responses [du Roi], 1592,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 145–7. 125 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 5 April 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 22. 126 President Jeannin to Villeroy de Neufville, 2 March 1592, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 208. 127 Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 108–9. 128 M. de Fleury to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 21 April 1592, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 312. 129 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to the duc de Bouillon, 3 April 1592, in ibid., 267–8. 130 “Lettre et Mémoire de M. Duplessis au roy,” 4 April 1592, in ibid., 268–70. 131 “L’Expédient proposé,” in ibid., 270–1; see also Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 22 April 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 25. 132 “Mémoire envoyée à M. de La Fontaine,” 16 May 1592, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 334–5. 133 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 26 April 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 25.

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Page 389

389 Notes to pages 246–9 134 “Remarques sur le gouvernement du Royaume durant les trois règnes de Henry 4, surnommé Le Grand, Louis 13 surnommé Le Juste, et Louis 14, surnommé Dieudonné, Le Grand et l’invincible,” Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 76. 135 Benoiste, Edict of Nantes, 57. 136 Dallington, View of Fraunce, n.p. 137 Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 256. 138 Henri was required to convert within three months with or without instruction, to break his ties with the Huguenots and reduce them to their status of 1585, to restore Catholic worship everywhere in France, and to accept the League’s religious pretext for the war, while “forgiving” its acts after December 1588 to release its members of any blame for the assassination of Henri III. The principal League leaders were to retain the honours and dignities granted by Mayenne as LieutenantGeneral of the Crown and Kingdom of France; their provincial gouvernements were to be made hereditary appanages; and their debts were to be paid by the Crown. Finally, the Estates General was to be summoned every six years to review public affairs, the royal finances, and the country’s administration. The pope and other foreign princes – including Philip II of Spain, who was to be paid an indemnity by Henri for supporting the League – were to sign the agreement as well. (See Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to Henri IV, 4 April 1592, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 270–1; President Jeannin to Villeroy de Neufville, 2 March 1592, in ibid., 208–9; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 327–8; Sully, I, 322–4 [B. & B.]; the duke of Parma to Philip II, 22 March 1592, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. Spain 330, fol. 105.) 139 “Histoire de Henri IV,” Bib. Ars. 3438, fols. 11, 12. 140 Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 155–7; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 554. 141 See, for example, Villeroy de Neufville’s letter to M. de Fleury of 25 April 1592, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 321. 142 Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 250–1; President Jeannin to Villeroy de Neufville, 2 March 1592; “Mémoire envoyé au Roy,” 28 March 1592, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 209–10, 248. 143 Villeroy de Neufville to M. de Fleury, 25 April 1592, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 320. 144 Duplessis-Mornay to M. des Reaux, 23 April 1592; and to M. de La Varrère, 23 April 1592, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 318, 319. 145 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 554–5. 146 Ibid.; “Mémoire,” April 1592, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 326–8. 147 De Thou, Mémoires, 356; Cheverny, Mémoires, 518; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 562; Henri IV to Pope Clement VIII, 8 October 1592, LM, III, 674–7. 148 De Thou, Mémoires, 356.

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Page 390

390 Notes to pages 249–52 149 “Copie de l’instruction baillé à mons.[ieur] le Marquis de Pisany,” 2 October 1592, bn. ff. 3646, fol. 13. 150 Mme de Mornay, Mémoires, I, 225–8; Baird, Huguenots and Henry of Navarre, II, 309–10. 151 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 557–8. 152 De Thou, Mémoires, 356; Henri IV to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 8 October 1592, LM, III, 675–6; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 562. 153 Henri IV to Pope Clement VIII, 8 October 1592, LM, III, 674–5. 154 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 564. 155 bn. ff. 4019, fols. 192–96vo.; Cheverny, Mémoires, 518; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 564. 156 Henri IV to the parlement of Burgundy, 22 November 1592, in Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 85–6; Cheverny, Mémoires, 518. 157 Cheverny, Mémoires, 518; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 562–3; Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 183–5; Négs. Tosc., V, 157. 158 Polo Paruta to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 30 January 1593, CSP Venice, IX, 57–8. See also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 562. The pope’s misgivings at this time referred only to Henri’s overtures to Rome in late 1592. The king had not yet announced his clear intention to convert; that would occur in April. 159 Ibid., 58. 160 Sully, I, 299 [1819]; Sully, I, 318–21 [B. & B.]. 161 “Mémoire de M. DuPlessis au roy,” 20 December 1592, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 390; Licques, Philippe de Mornay, 190. 162 “Pour l’Absolution du Roy par monsieur [l’évêque] du Mans, 1592,” bn. ff. 4016, fols. 1–6; bn. Dupuy 119, fols. 2–2vo. 163 Baird, Huguenots and Henri of Navarre, II, 307–8. 164 Villeroy de Neufville to Pomponne de Bellièvre, 26 December 1592, bn. ff. 2751, fol. 159. 165 Serres, Commentaries of the Civil Warres, 882. 166 See Pomponne de Bellièvre to President Jeannin, 13 December 1592, bn. Dupuy 770, fols. 191–210. 167 bn. ff. 3983, fols. 140–4; bn. ff. 3646, fols. 133, 210vo. 168 See “Lettre de M. le Duc de Parme,” January 1592, bn. ff. n.a. 23361, fol. 387; another copy of this letter, dated 15 January 1592, can be found in bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 189. See also Don Diego de Ibarra to Philip II, 12 January 1592, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 54; Don Juan Bautista de Tassis to Philip II, 22 December 1592, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs., Spain 330, fols. 257–9; Davila, 577. 169 D’Aubigné, Histoire Universelle, VIII, 298. 170 “Copie des lettres touchant l’État des affaires de France,” 31 October 1592, Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 173–4; Lezeau, “Catholic religion,” Arch. cur., XIV, 62–3.

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391 Notes to pages 253–5 171 “Déliberation faicte aux cordeliers sur la requisition qui fut faicte au roy Henry IIII de se rendre catholique,” 20 October 1592, bn. ff. 3996, fols. 265–6; Lezeau, “Catholic Religion,” Arch. cur., XIV, 63; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 183. Wolfe refers to this as the “semonneux affair,” after the French verb de semondre, meaning to offer a formal request. (Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 112–13.) 172 “Procès-verbal de l’assemblée des bourgeois, manans et habitants de la ville de Paris,” 30 October 1592, bn. Dupuy 88, fol. 156; Lezeau, “Catholic religion,” Arch. cur., XIV, 62–3; Cheverny, Mémoires, 519; “Reponse faite par le Duc de Mayenne, en l’Assemblée générale tenue en la Maison de Ville de Paris, le jeudi 6 Novembre, sur la proposition de paix conclue en son absence, & depuis ce 26 Octobre,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 175. 173 Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 113–14. 174 Ibid., 113. 175 “Reponse de la part du Roy,” bn. ff. 4505, fols. 207–10. 176 “Reponse faite par le Duc de Mayenne, en l’Assemblée générale tenue en la Maison de la Ville de Paris,” 7 November 1592, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 175. 177 Don Juan Bautista de Tassis to Philip II, 18 December 1592, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. Spain 730, fol. 245. 178 The duke of Parma to Philip II, 15 January 1592, bn. Dupuy 770, fols. 181–3; see also Don Diego de Ibarra to Philip II, 12 January 1592, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 52. 179 Rothrock, Huguenots, 117; Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 178–9. 180 Henri IV to the duc de Montmorency, 7 May 1592, LM, III, 632. 181 See, for example, Davila, Civil Wars of France, 529. Mayenne had planned to convoke the Estates General at Orléans on 20 January 1591, but had to postpone this until May 1591, when the Estates were to meet at Rheims. But this assembly, too, had to be postponed until some time in spring 1592. Finally, the duke was compelled by popular unrest in Paris and his difficulties with Spain to summon the assembly for December 1592, though this was delayed until the subsequent January 1593. Like Henri IV’s excuses, the duke’s claims that the conditions of war were responsible for the delays – though exaggerated – were not entirely unfounded. (See the duc de Mayenne to the comte de Suze, 19 November 1590; to the commandeur de Dion, 23 January 1591; to President Jeanin, 23 January 1591; and to the parlement of Aix, 27 April 1597, in Mayenne, Lettres, I, 39, 295–7, 299, II, 167; cardinal d’Ossat to the dowager Queen Louise, 4 September 1591, in Ossat, Lettres, 66; Cheverny, Mémoires, 519.) 182 The duke of Parma to Philip II, 15 January 1592, bn. Dupuy 770, fols. 181–3.

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392 Notes to pages 255–8 183 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 21 April 1591, CSP Venice, VIII, 542. 184 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 30 January 1592, ibid., IX, 7. 185 Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 26 February 1592, ibid., IX, 13. 186 The duke of Parma to Philip II, 15 January 1592, bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 184. See also Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 16 February 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 11. According to the Venetian ambassador, “the Spanish are afraid of being abandoned by the duke of Mayenne in virtue of [an alleged] secret understanding with the King.” 187 The duke of Parma to Philip II, 15 January 1592, bn. Dupuy 770, fols. 181–3; see also Don Diego de Ibarra to Philip II, 12 January 1592, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 52. 188 Don Diego de Ibarra to Philip II, 12 January 1592, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 52–3. See also the duke of Parma to Philip II, 15 January 1592, bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 190. 189 The duke of Parma to Philip II, 12 March and 28 October 1592, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs., Spain 330, fols. 103–4, 163–6. 190 See Don Diego de Ibarra to Philip II, 12 January 1592, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 54. Parma had also noted the avariciousness of the League nobles, complaining that ultra-Catholic governors held their towns “more in the quality of proprietors than of governors.” (Parma to Philip II, 15 January 1592, bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 186.) 191 “Déclaration de M. le Duc de Mayenne,” bn. Dupuy 243, fol. 11; “Déclaration faicte par Monseigneur le Duc de Mayenne Lieutenant general de l’Estat et Couronne de France, pour la Reünion de tous les Catholiques de ce Royaume” (Paris: 1593); “Harangue de Monsieur du Maine,” bn. 500 Colbert 16, fol. 328; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 572–6; de Thou, Mémoires, 356. The declaration was issued on 5 January 1593 and registered by the League parlement of Paris the next day. 192 Don Juan Bautista de Tassis to Philip II, 22 December 1592, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs Spain 330, fol 259. 193 For a thorough modern study of this confrontation, see Bernavi, La Sainte Ligue. For good summaries, see Salmon, Society in Crisis, 265–6; Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 214–15, 222–3; Anquetil, L’Esprit de la Ligue, 199–206; Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 177–8; Barnavi and Descimon, Le parti de Dieu, 199–202. 194 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 577. 195 Ibid., 574. 196 Rothrock, Huguenots, 118.

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393 Notes to pages 258–61 197 Don Juan Bautista de Tassis to Philip II, 22 December 1592, Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. Spain 330, fols. 257–9. See also L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 37; Cheverny, Mémoires, 517. 198 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 553, 564, 577, 583; Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 509–10. Sir Thomas Edmondes reported that Mayenne also planned to have the Estates declare him regent during the inter regnum, thus increasing his power as lieutenant-general of France. (Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 19 January 1593, UCSP Foreign, 244, fol. 25.) 199 Giovanni Moro to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 22 February 1592, CSP Venice, IX, 12. For other indications of Mayenne’s thinking, see Du Vair, Actions et traictes oratoires, 117–18; Maimbourg, History of the League, 897. 200 Quatre Discours, 146–7; Camden, Annales rerum Anglicarum, 1627, 45. 201 Maimbourg, History of the League, 763. As early as 4 April 1592, the Venetian resident reported that Mayenne had expressed a wish that Henri IV would change his religion. See Giovanni Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, CSP Venice, IX, 21–8. 202 This was a genuine concern, especially for the royalists. According to Henri IV, the Estates – originally slated to open on 22 December – were to coincide with Parma’s long-expected third invasion of France. Henri believed that not only had Philip II encouraged the pope and leaders of the League to elect a Catholic monarch, but “thinking to trouble me further,” he had also ordered his governor of the Netherlands to march into the kingdom to apply added pressure on the delegates to comply with Spanish policy. With Parma’s death, these plans collapsed and the assembly was postponed until mid-January. (Henri IV to M. de Bieves, 21 December 1592, LM, III, 710.) 203 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 564–5, 577, 584. This also was the opinion of Louis Maimbourg, later historian of the League. (Maimbourg, History of the League, 875.) 204 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 299; Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 101–2. 205 There were no delegates from Languedoc at this first meeting, though a deputy from Toulouse arrived later. Paris and the Île-de-France sent twenty and sixteen delegates respectively. The only other areas well represented were the League-held provinces of Champagne and Burgundy. (Rothrock, Huguenots, 120; Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 187.) 206 Ibid., 118. 207 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 15. 208 Henri IV to the prince de Conti, 10 May 1593, LM, III, 769. In his article “The Constitutional Implications of the Bourbon Succession,” George A. Rothrock convincingly demonstrates that the Spaniards were

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394 Notes to pages 261–2

209 210

211 212 213 214 215 216

217 218

219

willing to give Mayenne and the League anything they asked for if they would agree to Spanish proposals. But the duke refused at every turn. Hence, it was League obstinacy, not Spanish, that emasculated the plans to elect either the Infanta or a Catholic nobleman as monarch of France. Bib. Ars. 3438, fols. 16–17. Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 19 January 1593, UCSP Foreign, 244, fol. 25. See also Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 101–2; D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 1; the cardinal Del Monte to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 12 March 1593, Négs. Tosc., V, 158. Seeing the League Estates in “total disorder and discord over the election of a king of France,” the pope rejected the Spanish version of French affairs and seemed disposed finally to receive the marquis de Pisany and the cardinal de Gondi, with their proposals on behalf of Henri de Navarre. The duc de Mayenne to commandeur de Diou, 23 January 1591, in Mayenne, Correspondance, I, 295. See the “Instruction à M. Meslier, faicte et baillée par M. Duplessis,” 1 August 1592, in Duplessis–Mornay, Mémoires, V, 357–61. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 584. Henri IV to M. de Maisse, 29 January 1593, LM, III, 720–1. Rothrock, Huguenots, 119. See, for example, “Escrit de M. de Bellièvre. Contre la convocation des prétendues estats de la Ligue et pour exciter ceulx de ce parti à se sousmettre au roy,” bn. ff. 15893, fols. 68–96; “Sur la nullité de la convocation et assemblée des prétendues estats généraux de France tenuz à Paris en l’an 1593, et des déliberations qui ont estés faictes,” bn. ff. 3988, fols. 176–7. Déclaration du roy contre les prétendus estats de la Ligue (Tours: 1593). “Déclaration contre Charles de Lorraine Duc de Mayenne, & les prétendus Estats tenus, où à tenir dans la Ville de Paris. A Chartres le 29 Janvier 1593. Reg.[istré] le 8 Février suivant,” in Blanchard, Compilation chronologique, 1239; Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 14; Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 278–87. “Propositions des princes, prélats, officiers de la Couronne, et principaulx seigneurs Catholiques, affin de prevenir un repos tant necessaire à ce Royaume pour la Conservation de la religion Catholique et de l’Estat, faicte à monsieur le duc de Mayenne et autres princes de sa maison, prélats, seigneurs & autres personnes ... se trouvans assemblés dans la ville de Paris,” bn. 500 Colbert 16, fols. 311–12; “Proposition des Princes, Prélats, Officiers de la Couronne, & principaux Seigneurs Catholiques, tant du Conseil du Roi qu’autres étant près Sa Majesté,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 288–91; “The Proposition of the Princes, Prelates, Officers of the Crown and Chief Catholicke Lords, as well

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395 Notes to pages 262–7

220 221 222 223

224

225

226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235

Counsellors of the King, as others, now present with his Majesty; tending to the end of obtaining Peace, so necessary to this Kingdom for the conservation of the Catholic Religion, and of the State: made to the Duke of Mayenne and the Princes of his Family, the Lords and other persons sent by some Cities and Corporations, at this present assembled in the city of Paris,” in Davila, Civil Wars of France, 585–6; de Thou, Mémoires, 356; Maimbourg, History of the League, 876. Rothrock, Huguenots, 119. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 587. See also Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 526; Maimbourg, Méms. de la Ligue, 878. Louis Revol to Pomponne de Bellièvre, 15 March 1593, bn. ff. 15910, fol. 19. Gaspard de Schomberg to the duc de Nevers, 3 April 1593, bn. ff. 4719, fol. 11; Claude d’Angennes to Pomponne de Bellièvre, 3 April 1593, bn. ff. 15910, fol. 27. “Déclaration des Princes et officers de la couronne ceux de la Religion Refformé qu’il ne se fera rien en la Conférence de Suresne qui soit à leur préjudice,” 16 May 1593, Bib. Maz. 2593, fols. 167–8; “Déclaration de Mantes,” 16 May 1589, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 416–17; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 252. The following discussion is taken primarily from a very full and surprisingly impartial contemporary account of the meetings at Suresne, published in Paris under the title Discourse et Rapport véritable, de la Conférence ... (1593) See also a run of correspondence and accounts in bn. 500 Colbert 31, fols. 357–90. Equally extensive is the account by Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 447–66, and Laurens, Discours et rapport véritable de la conférence de Suresnes (1593). See also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 601–3. For recent treatments different from the one presented here, see Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, 189–92; Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 125–31. Rothrock, “Constitutional Implications,” 45. “Députés de la Ligue pour la Conférence,” UCSP Foreign, 244, fol. 292. Henri IV to M. de Beauvoir, ambassador to England, 7 May 1593, UCSP Foreign, 245, fol. 27. Buisseret, Henri IV, 43. See Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 6 May 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 300. The marquis de Pisany had been dispatched earlier by the king in the name of the royalist Catholics to perform this task. Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 8 May 1593, LM, III, 767. Williams, “Abjuration of Henry of Navarre,” 166. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 239. Henri IV to the prince de Conti, 10 May 1593, LM, III, 769.

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Page 396

396 Notes to pages 267–72 236 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 6 May 1593, UCSP, Foreign, 245, fol. 302; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 600. 237 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 6 May 1593, UCSP, Foreign, 245, fol. 300; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 600. 238 Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 8 May 1593, LM, III, 767–68. 239 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 336. 240 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 604–6; Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 6 May 1593, UCSP, Foreign, 245, fol. 290; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 336–7. 241 D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 336. 242 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 6 May 1593, UCSP, Foreign, 245, fol 302. 243 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 26 March 1593, ibid., 244, fol. 155. 244 See Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 98–9. chapter seven 1 Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 110–11. 2 Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 295–304; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 425–9. 3 A possible exception here is the work of Michael Wolfe, who examines the religious aspects of the issue, in particular the matter of Henri’s sincerity at his conversion, which was debated by Catholics on both sides of the quarrel. Otherwise, Wolfe tends to attribute the king’s motives to politics, with little reference to his conscience. (See Conversion of Henri IV, 92.) 4 For examples of this interpretation, see: Anquetil, Histoire de France, 335; Greengrass, Age of Henry IV, 152–3; Salmon, Society in Crisis, 269–70; Buisseret, Henri IV, 43–4; Rothrock, Huguenots, 120; Briggs, Early Modern France, 31. 5 Briggs, Early Modern France, 31. 6 Lezeau, “Catholic religion,” Arch. cur., XIV, 65. See also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 611. 7 See L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 211. 8 On the contrary, it appears that Henri was attempting to convert other Catholics to the Reformed Religion. According to Sir Thomas Edmondes, the king was eager to marry his sister, Catherine, to their cousin, the duc de Montpensier, not only to prevent the comte de Soissons and even the Calvinist duc de la Trémouille from wedding her, but also to fulfil his “great hope, that he [i.e., Montpensier] will render himself of the Religion.” (Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 19 January 1593 and 3 March 1593, UCSP, 244, fols. 23, 161.

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Page 397

397 Notes to pages 272–5 9 Henri IV to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 26 April 1593, LM, III, 763. 10 See, for example, Gaudet, Henri IV, 163. 11 Henri IV to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 26 April 1593, LM, III, 764. See also Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 26 March 1593, UCSP, 244, fol. 203vo. 12 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 26 March 1593, UCSP, 244, fols. 155, 203vo. 13 Henri de Navarre to the comtesse de Grammont, 20 November 1589, in Nouaillac, Henri IV raconté, 186. This echoes previous letters Henri had written to the countess, declaring, “On Tuesday, we will undertake ... the great deed [the final attack on Beauvoir-sur-Mer]. The special grace of God, shall I say like David, which has given me victory over my enemies until now, will make this business easy for me. So be it by His grace” (21 October 1588, in Babelon, Lettres d’amour, 122); and, “Everything is in the hand of God, who always has blessed my labours” (22 December 1588, Nouaillac, Henri IV raconté, 156). 14 Ibid., 187–8; LM, III, 116. 15 Henri IV to the comte de Gourdon, 21 September 1589, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 467vo. 16 Correspondance politique and militaire, 50–1. See also Henri IV to the citizens of Caen, 20 March 1590, in Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 58. Compare this with the staunchly Calvinist Philippe Duplessis-Mornay’s comment after Ivry: “The enemy took flight, terrified rather by God than by men; for it was certain that one side was not less shaken [by the outcome] than the other.” (Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, IV, 475.) 17 Villeroy de Neufville to the maréchal de Matignon, 4 November 1587, in Lettres de ... Villeroy, 209. 18 Quoted in Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 213–14. 19 Henri IV to Mme de la Roche-Guyon, 31 August 1590, LM, III, 244 (emphasis mine). Denis Crouzet takes this a step further, claiming that after Arques in 1589 the image of Henri as king underwent an evolution. No longer was he just the living representation of God according to contemporary views of monarchy, but his very acts were of divine essence. It was God who fought in the carnal person of the monarch, while both he and his followers felt “the presence of the Lord in their heart.” Thus Providence was united to destiny. (Les guerriers de Dieu, II, 578.) 20 Romans 13: 1–2. 21 La Labyrinthe de la Ligue, 42, 136. 22 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 6 May 1593, UCSP, 244, fol. 300. This confirmed an earlier statement made by the ultra-Catholic governor of Paris, the comte de Belin, who expressed a similar view in late April. (See L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, V, 238.)

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Page 398

398 Notes to pages 275–6 23 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 6 May 1593, UCSP, 244, fols. 300–2. 24 Sully, I, 358–9 [B. & B.]. Sully wrote at length of the many concerns that were passing through Henri’s mind at this difficult time. 25 Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 524. 26 Grotius, Annales, 115. 27 Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 522; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 587, 611–12; Jacques-Auguste de Thou to the duc de Bouillon, 11 April 1593, bn. ff. 20154, fols. 879–80. Henri’s new mistress, Gabrielle d’Estrées, was also suspected of advising the king to abjure, allegedly because she wanted to become queen of France and felt certain that the pope would grant an annulment of her royal lover’s first marriage as a reward. (See d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 341.) How much influence she actually had on Henri’s decision is impossible to determine, however. 28 Sully, I, 338–43 [1819]; Sully, I, 336–8 [B. & B.]; Marsollier, Duc de Bouillon, 172. It appears, however, that Bouillon’s advice was not unmixed with personal motive and that “perchance for his own interest it displeasd him not that the king should turn Catholick, to the end the first place among the Hugonots might remain to him.” (See Davila, Civil Wars of France, 587.) 29 Sully, I, 336–8 [B. & B.]. Wolfe perhaps makes too much of Sully’s phrase “absolue résolution,” to claim that this “‘absolute resolution’ laid the foundations of later Bourbon absolutism.” Given the context, the phrase should simply be seen to mean making a “decisive” or “final” decision concerning the royal conversion; there is but slender evidence to suggest that the phrase contains broader implications for the future of Bourbon rule. 30 Before his death in 1591, François de La Noue had told the king that a conversion probably was inevitable, though he recognized – as Henri did – that only peace would give the Calvinist monarch the freedom he needed to concentrate on matters of religion. For La Noue, the whole question concerned the issue of conscience, not religious truth per se. He also hoped (as did the king and so many of his generation) that the two churches would one day reconcile their differences and reunite on the basis of their common beliefs. (See Hauser, “François de La Noue et la conversion du roi,” 313–23; Huseman, “François de La Noue au service du libéralisme,” 189–208.) 31 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 587; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 333–5; Crump, A Huguenot Family ... Memoirs of Philippe de Mornay ... Written by His Wife (cited hereafter as Mme de Mornay, Memoirs, trans.) 243, 247. It was argued also that as Henri was unlikely to beget heirs from his first wife, Marguerite, he could divorce her and then remarry more easily in the Calvinist than in the Catholic Church.

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Page 399

399 Notes to pages 276–9 32 Sully, I, 338 [B. & B.]. 33 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 6. 34 Doubtless, this was the same conference mentioned by Sully (I, 377 [1819]; I, 354 [B. & B.]) and later described by the Jesuit Louis Maimbourg. After the Huguenot ministers acknowledged that salvation might be had in the Church of Rome, Henri allegedly responded, “There is then no longer deliberation to be us’d: I must of necessity be a Catholique, and take the surest side, as every prudent man wou’d do in a business of so great importance as that of Salvation: Since, according to the joynt opinion of both Parties, I may be sav’d being a Catholique, and if I still continue a Huguenot, I shall be damn’d according to the opinion of the Catholiques.” (Maimbourg, History of the League, 921.) 35 Henri IV to the comte de Gourdon, 28 June 1593, bn. ff. 17044, fol. 471. 36 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 606. See also Discours et Rapport véritable, de la Conférence, passim.. 37 Henri IV to the prince de Conti, 10 May 1593, LM, III, 769–771. 38 See also Henri’s letters to the sieur d’Abain (4 June 1593) and the marquis de Pisany (9 June 1593) for comments, LM, III, 787, 788–90. 39 Sir Thomas Edmondes, the astute English ambassador, was even more direct in his reporting of the exchange. Upon learning that the king “maie render himself a Catholicke,” the League delegates asserted hastily “that notwithstanding, they cannot acknowledge him, until the pope doe revoke his censures against him.” (Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 10 May 1593, UCSP, fol. 332. 40 See Discours et Rapport véritable, de la Conférence, passim. 41 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 16 May 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 7. 42 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 16 May 1593, ibid., fol. 7. 43 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 10 and 16 May 1593, ibid., fols. 332–7. 44 bn. ff. 3646, vol. 92; the comte de Cheverny to M. de la Guesle, 18 May 1593, bn. 500 Colbert I, fol. 240. The evidence does not support Wolfe’s assertion that because Schomberg and Revol “were not overly surprised by the king’s decision,” he perhaps already had discussed his conversion with some of his Catholic advisers. (Conversion of Henri IV, 130.) 45 “Copie de la lettre du Roy aux Evesques, pour sa conversion ... 18 mai 1593,” bn. Dupuy 770, fols. 225–6; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 466–67; “Lettre du Roy à l’Evesque de Chartres pour se trouver à sa conversion,” 18 May 1593, bn. ff. 4016, fols. 6vo.–7vo., also published in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 360–1, in Dussieux, Grands faits, 232–3, and in LM, III, 771–2; the comte de Cheverny to M. le procureur général of the royalist parlement at Tours, 18 May 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 418; Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 515–16; Henri IV to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, 30 May 1593, LM, III, 782–83.

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400 Notes to pages 280–2 46 “Lettre du Roy à l’Evesque de Chartres,” 18 May 1593, bn. ff. 4016, fol. 7vo. 47 “Propositions des Catholiques royalistes, 11 Juin 1593,” bn. Dupuy 650, fol. 133. 48 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 16 May 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 8. 49 Phlippe Duplessis-Mornay to M. de la Fontaine, 16 May 1592. and to M. de Marmet, 25 May 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 334, 424. 50 Henri IV to the Reformed Churches of France, 25 May 1593, LM, III, 779–80; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 431; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 342. 51 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 19 May 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 8. 52 Quoted in d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 341–2. 53 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to the duc de Bouillon, 25 May 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 428. It was to solicit Bouillon’s aid in this matter that Duplessis-Mornay wrote to him. 54 Mme de Mornay, Memoirs, trans., 273–4. 55 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to Henri IV, 25 May 1593, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 426–7. 56 The comte de Cheverny to M. le procureur général, 18 May 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 418; and to M. de la Guesle, 18 May 1593, bn. 500 Colbert I, fol. 240. 57 See, for example, Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 103–4; Callières, Maréchal de Matignon, 304; Maimbourg, History of the League, 911–13; Lezeau, “Religion Catholique,” 65; Canault, Maréchal d’Ornano, 124. 58 The bishop of Chartres to the comte de Cheverny, 27 May 1593, bn. Dupuy 119, fol. 9; Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 522–3. See also Bury, La vie de Henri IV, I, 330; Du Peyrat, Discours sur la vie et mort de Henri le Grand, 59–60; Matthieu, Histoire des derniers troubles, n.p.; De Callières, Maréchal de Matignon, 326–7. Some Protestants, such as the duc de Sully and Sir Thomas Edmondes, also chose to see the hand of God behind Henri’s act. 59 “Declaration de Mantes,” 16 May 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 416–17; Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 99–100; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 467. 60 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 16 May 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 7vo.; Bury, La vie de Henri IV, I, 331–2; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 606. See also Discours et Rapport véritable, de la Conférence; Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 380; LM, III, 771; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 413–14. 61 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 26 May 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 16; “Articles Bailez par les depputez de la part des Princes Catholiques du party du Roy, pour la conferrence, aux depputez du party contraire,” 17 May 1593 (n.p.: 1593) See also Davila, Civil Wars of France, 606; Discours et Rapport véritable, de la Conférence.

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Page 401

401 Notes to pages 282–3 62 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 606. 63 Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 105–6. For the best modern discussion of the debates in the League Estates at this time, see Rothrock, “Constitutional Implications,” 46–9; and by the same author, Huguenots, 120–2. 64 For the Estates’ reply to the royalists, see “Responces des Deputez de la Ligue à ceux du Roy, aux propostiions par eux faites aux conférences,” in Villeroy, Mémoires, III, 53–9. See also Breunot, Journal, I, 317. As expected, the Leaguers doubted Henri’s sincerity and wanted proof of his commitment. Hence, they insisted that he remove the Calvinist ministers from his presence, address himself to the pope for absolution, and declare Catholicism as the only faith in France. Otherwise, the League would sign no treaty with the king. 65 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 602; Bib. Ars. 3438, fols. 15–16; Dussieux, Grands faits, 226–7; “Subject d’une lettre interceptée, que l’agent du duc de Mercoeur estoit près le duc de Mayenne, qui est ung docteur de théologie, evesque de _____, deschiffrée par M. Viette,” 18 May 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 413–14. These promises included 8,000–12,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry for the immediate protection of the Estates, with more reinforcements to follow: a monthly subsidy of 1,200,000 écus to support a separate League army of 10,000 foot and 4,000 horse; and generous pensions for the chief leaders of the party. 66 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 603; L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 15, 16. 67 Rothrock, Huguenots, 121–2; see also “Constitutional Implications,” 47, 48–9. 68 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 16. 69 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 35. 70 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 16; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 603–4. 71 At the meeting of 21 June, a chorus of deputies picked up the prelate’s refrain, saying loudly that Philip’s envoys “wanted to make a Spanish cap from the cloak of religion.” (See L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 35.) 72 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 602–3. 73 Ibid. 74 “Discours des affaires de France faict par Rosne à Bruxelles, le XXIIe Décembre 1592,” Étrangères, Méms. et Docs. Spain 330, fol. 252. 75 Davila, Civil Wars of France, 604. See also d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IX, 2. 76 “Arrest donné au Palais de Paris pour la loy Salique et le legitime heritier de la couronne. Contre les Espagnols leur Infante et partisans,” 1593, bn. Dupuy 770, fol. 361; “Arrest donné au Palaix de Paris pour le Loy Saliq à la legitime heritier de la Couronne Contre les Espagnolz leur Infante et partisans. On appelle cet Arrest l’Arrest du President le Maistre, 1593,” bn. ff. 2751, fol. 16; Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 17; “Mémoire adressé par M. le Gard des Sceaux à Marillac sur ce qui s’est passé durant

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Page 402

402 Notes to pages 283–4

77 78 79 80

81

82 83

84

85

86 87

la Ligue lors de l’arrest du Parlement pour la Loy Salique, 1593,” bn. 500 Colbert, fols. 220–33. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 16. “Exhortation à la paix,” in Du Vair, Actions et traictes oratoires, 73–144. See also L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 36. Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 341–2. The parlement’s edict was dubbed subsequently the “Arrêt du Président du Maistre” because of his support for it. (L’Estoile, Mémoires, VI, 41.) Ironically, du Maistre had been one of the judges chosen to head the courts in January 1589, when the royalists were purged from the parlement following the assassination of the Guise brothers by Henri III. Du Maistre also reminded Mayenne of his obligation to defend these laws “in his quality as Lieutenant General of the Kingdom and Crown of France,” and especially the Salic Law, which had been the most important ever since Clovis. See “Relation de se qui se passa durant la Ligue lors de l’Arrest pour la manutention de la Loy Salique,” bn. Dupuy 549, vol. 129vo.; “Extraict des Registres du Parlement du Mecredy trentiesme jour du Juin 1593,” bn. ff. 3646, fols. 64–71; “Mémoire adressé par M. le Gard des Sceaux à Marillac sur ce qui s’est passé durant la Ligue lors de l’arrest du Parlement pour la Loy Salique 1593,” bn. 500 Colbert 1, fols. 222–3; UCSP, fols. 150–4; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 611. Rothrock, Huguenots, 122. This was implied by L’Estoile, who reported that Mayenne appeared to be discontented with the edict (Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 43). Du Vair (Actions et traictes oratoires, 117–18), Legrain (Decade de Henry le Grand, 529–30), and Maimbourg (History of the League, 897) stated directly, on the other hand, that the duke was behind the court’s action, while Davila wrote that President Jeannin, the archbishop of Lyons, and Mme de Montpensier all had suggested that Mayenne use the parlement to obstruct Spanish aims (Civil Wars of France, 609–11). Even the Spaniards suspected the ultra-Catholic leader of inciting the parlementaires to uphold the Salic Law (Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 493), though Villeroy de Neufville asserted that the judges had acted independently (Mémoires, I, 341). Bib. Ars. 3438, fols. 17–17vo.; Lezeau, “Catholic Religion,” Arch. cur., XIV, 63–4; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 490–1; L’Estoile, MémoiresJournaux, VI, 43–4. “Mémoire adressé par M. le Gard des Sceaux à Marillac,” bn. 500 Colbert 1, fol. 225. Like du Maistre, Molé had also been one of the chief initiators of the parlement’s recent arrêt. (See L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 41.) See the reports in the “Extraict du procès-verbal ... du Thiers Estat,” bn. ff. 16265, fol. 105ff. bn. 500 Colbert 1, fol. 225; Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 105–6; Breunot, Journal, I, 329–30, 337.

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403 Notes to pages 284–6 88 Rothrock, “Constitutional Implications,” 49. See also the “Articles accordez pour la trève générale” (Paris: 1593). 89 bn. 500 Colbert 1, fol. 228. 90 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 28 May 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 60–60vo. 91 Ibid., fol. 60. 92 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 28 June 1593, ibid., fol. 140vo. 93 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 10 July 1593, ibid., fol. 203. 94 “Lettre des Députés de la Ligue aux Députés des Prélats & Seigneurs Partisans du Roi,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, fols. 362–5. See also Discours et Rapports véritable, de la Conférence, n.p.; Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 28 May 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 60; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 469. 95 Discours et Rapports véritable, de la Conférence, n,p.; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 472–8. According to Palma Cayet (pp. 478–80), the royalist and Leaguer deputies met once more, on 11 June, at La Villette, halfway between Paris and Saint-Denis. The ensuing discussion was simply a repeat of that on 5 June. 96 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 73–4. 97 Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 102–3. 98 Henri IV to the duc d’Épernon, 10 June 1593, LM, III, 802. See also Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 9 June 1593; to M. de Saint-Denis, 14 June 1593; and to the duc de Bouillon, 27 June 1593, LM, III, 794, 803, 812; Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 10 June 1593, UCSP, fol. 91; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 607–8; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 483–4. 99 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 10 June 1593, UCSP, fol. 91vo. 100 Ibid., fol. 91; “Lettre du Roi, escritte à Monsieur Benoist Curé de S. Eustache à Paris,” 9 June 1593 (n.p.: 1593); L’Estoile, MémoiresJournaux, VI, 25; Henri IV to the sieur de Beauvoir la Nocle, 2 July 1593, LM, III, 850; Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 9 July 1593, UCSP, fol. 213. 101 Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 137. 102 See, for example, the “Lettre Escrite par les deputez des Princes, Officiers de la Couronne, & autres Seigneurs Catholiques qui recognaissent le Roy, pour la Conférence faicte à Suresne, & autres lieux. Aux Deputez de l’Assemblée qui est à present à Paris, du xxiii. Iour de Iuin, 1593” (Lyons: 1594); “Lettre des Députés des Princes et Seigneurs, Etant près de la personne du Roi, aux Députés du Duc de Mayenne & l’Assemblée de Paris,” 23 June 1593, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 362–76. See also “Remonstrances, to the duke de Mayne: Lieutenant Generall of the Estate and Crowne of Fraunce. Wherein, by way of information, are discussed divers privaties, concerning the pro-

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103 104

105 106

107 108 109

110

111

112 113

114 115

116

ceedings and affayres of that Duke and his associates” (London: 1593). Henri IV to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 25 June 1593, in Nouaillac, Henri IV par lui-même, 225. Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 2 July 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 147. See also Henri IV to the sieur de Beauvais la Nocle, 2 July 1593, ibid., fol. 170vo.; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IX, 13. Henri IV to the sieur de Beauvoir la Nocle, 2 July 1593, LM, III, 849; Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 2 July 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 147. Henri IV to the sieur de Beauvoir la Nocle, 2 July 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 172vo.; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 612. For Henri’s instructions to Pisany, see his letter dated 9 June 1593, LM, III, 788–91. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 73–4. Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 10 July 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 91. Letters were sent out on 8 July 1593 to various Catholic churchmen for this purpose. See, for example, Henri IV to the archbishop of Bourges, 8 July 1593, bn. Dupuy 119, fol. 10. See also du Bec, Journal, 260; Licques, Decade de Henry le Grand, 195. Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 139. Another modern historian noted that this move was possibly also symbolic, emphasizing “that only Catholic kings ever truly ruled the country.” (Greengrass, Age of Henry IV, 73.) See also Du Peyrat, Henri le Grand, 62. De Callières, Matignon, 330–1; Henri IV to the sieur de Rambouillet, 16 July 1593, LM, III, 819. According to the bishop of Chartres, his cathedral was chosen for the king’s coronation not only because Rheims was still in the hands of the League, but more importantly because it was widely accepted that Clovis had been instructed by St Solime at Chartres before receiving baptism by St Remy at Rheims. This event was celebrated every 24 September, therefore, and was recited in the lessons at matins. (Bishop of Chartres to the comte de Cheverny, 27 May 1593, bn. Dupuy 119, fol. 9.) L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 61; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 613; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 495. Benoist, “Advertissement en forme d’épistre consolatoire et exhortatoire, envoyé à l’Église & parroisse insigne & sincerement Catholique de St-Eustache de Paris” (St Denis: 1593). See Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to M. de La Fontaine, 19 June 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 462. “Mémoire au sr. Du Maurier dépesché par le Roi vers la Reyne d’Angleterre et le sr. de Lomenye son Ambassadeur près d’elle,” May 1593, in Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 97. “Mémoire de M. Duplessis envoyé par M. de Vicose,” 9 June 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 451.

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405 Notes to pages 288–90 117 See Henri IV’s conversation with Sir Thomas Wilkes, 11 August 1593, quoted in Camden, Annales rerum Anglicarum, 1627, 474. 118 “Copie de certains mémoires dressées par ceulx de la religion réformée lors que le roy Henry le grand allant à la messe embrassa la religion papistique,” bn. Dupuy 753, fols. 240–8. 119 Ibid.; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, IX, 85. 120 Duplessis-Mornay to M. de La Fontaine, 20 April 1593, in DuplessisMornay, Mémoires, V, 400. 121 Greengrass, Age of Henry IV, 74. 122 Ibid., 451–2; Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to the Huguenot ministers, 9 June 1593; “Mémoire de M. Duplessis envoyé par M. de Vicose,” 9 June 1593; and to M. de La Fontaine, 19 June 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 449, 451–2, 462–3. See also his earlier letter to Henri IV of 25 May, in ibid., 426–7. 123 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 60. The Huguenot minister de La Faye officiated at this service, which took place at Mantes. On 22 July, Henri rode to St Denis for his instruction to begin the following day. 124 “Mémoires de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée du roy,” 8 June to 1 August 1593, bn. 500 Colbert 31, fols. 559–66. 125 It is an interesting coincidence that Henri’s “instruction” in September 1572 had also taken only five hours. 126 Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 17vo. 127 Grotius, Annales, 221. 128 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 62. 129 Ibid., 61–2. Duplessis-Mornay gave a different version. According to him, one of the bishops allegedly said that “there was no need to brush up on his theology; and the king himself, when the prelates came to instruct him, admitted that he was not in need of very much instruction, as he had made up his mind to do what he had to do.” 130 Maimbourg, History of the League, 309–10. 131 See “Les sept preuves et resmoignages rendus par ledict seigneur roy à la veue de tout le monde de la candeur et probité de sa foy et de sa conversion,” bn. ff. 3706, fols. 26–35; “Définition générale représentée à sa majesté de la purété et vérité de la doctrine de l’église catholique et de l’erreur de la prétendue réformation,” bn. ff. 3706, fols. 17–21; “Dernière preuve démonstrative de la faulsété de la prétendue réformation des calvinistes représentée à sa majesté dans laquelle se voyent de singulières remarques,” bn. ff. 3706, fols. 21–5; “Raisons et preuves démonstratives contre les calmonies et faulses impressions ... aux fins de rendre la conversion du roy Henri IV feinte,” bn. ff. 3706, fols. 1–17. 132 Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 446. According to Palma Cayet, as far back as 1584 Henri had come to accept that the Host was “the true

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135 136

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body of our Lord”; the Calvinist version was merely a ceremony, he said, and therefore unsatisfying to him. According to John Calvin, auricular confession was “a thing so pestilent and in so many ways harmful to the church! ... it is useless and fruitless, but has occasioned so many impieties, sacrileges and errors, who would not consider that it should be abolished forthwith?” (Institutes, Bk III, chap. IV, 18:643–5; 19:645–7.) L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 62–3; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 445, 495. For other sources of Henri’s instruction, see “Process verbal de ce qui s’est passé à S. Denys à l’instruction pour l’absolution du Roy Henry IIII. 1593 Juillier,” bn. Dupuy 119, fols. 916–921vo.; “Procès-verbal de la cérémonie de l’abjuration d’Henri IV,” Arch. cur., XIII, 343–51; “Discours des cérémonies observées à la conversion du trés-grand et trés-belliqueux Prince, Henri IV, Roy de France et de Navarre, à la religion Catholique, Apostolique et Romaine,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, V, 403. Again, Henri conformed to Calvin’s repudiation of the doctrine of purgatory as “constructed out of many blasphemies and ... daily propped up with new ones.” If the blood of Christ is, he wrote, “the sole satisfaction for the sins of believers, the sole expiation, the sole purgation, what remains but to say that purgatory is simply a dreadful blasphemy against Christ?” (Institutes, Bk III, chap. V, 6: 676.) See Henri de Navarre to the comtesse de Grammont, 10 March 1588, in Nouaillac, Henri IV par lui-même, 144. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 62–3; “Procès-verbal de la cérémonie de l’abjuration,” Arch. cur., XIII, 346; Sully, I, 365–6 [1819]; Sully, I, 386 [B. & B.]. For the document of confession signed by Henri, see: “Profession de foy sainte, et présentée par le Roy, lors son absolution,” 24 July 1593, Étrangère Mems. et Docs. France 242, fols. 74–8; “Promesse que le Roy donna par escrit signée de sa main et contresignée du sieur Ruzé son secretaire d’Estat aprés avoir faict l’abduration et reçue l’absolution ...,” 25 July 1593, bn. ff. 4016; “Confession de foy saincte et présentée par le Roy lors de son Absolution, 193,” bn. ff. 4016, fols. 15–18; “Acte de l’abiuration d’erreur et hérésies faicte par le Roy et présenté lors de sa conversion et absolution,” bn. Dupuy 119, fols. 13vo.–14. A printed version of Henri’s profession of faith can be found in Sully, I, 366–8 [B. & B.]. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 62–4; Sully, I, 386 [1819]; Sully, I, 365 [B. & B.]. For the text of Henri’s signed confession of Catholicism, see Sully, I, 366–8 [B. & B.]. For various versions of Henri’s statement, see bn. ff. 10198, fols. 91–2; bn. ff. 1728, fol. 176; bn. Dupuy 119, fols. 13vo.–16; Étrangère, Méms. et Docs. France 242, fols. 74–8; bn. ff. 4016, fols. 15–18. A printed version can be found in Sully, I, 366–8 [B. & B.].

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407 Notes to pages 291–4 139 See LM, III, 821. See also L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 63. 140 See, for example, his discussions with the marquis d’O in May 1593 (Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 445) and Sir Thomas Wilkes on 11 August 1593 (Camden, Annales rerum Anglicarum, 1627, 474–5). 141 “Procès-verbal de la cérémonie de l’abjuration d’Henry IV,” Arch. cur., XIII, 348. See also “Procès verbal de ce qui s’est passé à St. Denis à l’Instruction et absolution du Roy Henry IIIIe 1593, Juillet,” bn. ff. 4016, fols. 21vo.–22. 142 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 67; Maimbourg, History of the League, 915–16. 143 M. Rotan to Duplessis-Mornay, 24 July 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 496. 144 Maimbourg, History of the League, 915–16. 145 “Relation des cérémonies qui furent faicte à St. Denis à la conversion de Henry IV,” bn. ff. 7774, fols. 258–64; “Journal des événements qui on précédé et suivi la conversion du roy Henry IV,” 17 May to 6 November 1593, bn. ff. 3997, fols. 66–141. 146 For accounts of this interview, see L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 67–8; Maimbourg, History of the League, 915–16; Boucher, Sermons, 224. 147 As the details of the ceremony have been described at length by Wolfe (Conversion of Henri IV, 146–55), Buisseret (Henri IV, 50–4), Babelon (Henri IV, 563–6), and others, they need not be repeated in great detail here. 148 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 5 August 1593, UCSP, fol. 256. 149 Henri IV to the marquis de Pisany, 7 August 1593, in Dussieux, Lettres intimes, 243–5. 150 Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 150. 151 Du Bec, Journal, 263; Sully, I, 392–3 [1819]; Sully, I, 373–4 [B. & B.]. 152 For official accounts of the conversion ceremony of 25 July at St Denis, see “Process verbal de ce qui s’est passé à S. Denys à l’instruction pour l’absolution du Roy Henry IIII, 1593 Juillet,” bn. Dupuy 119, fols. 16–21vo.; “Acte de l’abjuration d’error et hérésies faicte par le Roy et présenté lors de sa conversion et absolution,” bn. ff. 4016, fols. 18–18vo.; “Coppie du procès verbal de la conversion du Roy Henry IIII faicte à St. Denis 1593,” bn. 500 Colbert 1, fols. 234–9; “Copie authentique des actes de la conversion de Henri IV,” Arch. cur., XIII, 343–53; “Discours des cérémonies observées à la conversion du très Grand et très belliqueux prince Henri IV, roy de France et de Navarre, à la religion Catholique, Apostolique et Romaine,” ibid., 353–7; Henri IV to the marquis de Pisany, 7 August 1593, in Dussieux, Lettres intimes, 243–5. For private accounts of the conversion, see Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 495–96; Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 342–3; Chappuys, Histoire du royaume de Navarre, 805–6; du Bec, Journal, 262.

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408 Notes to pages 294–5 153 154 155 156 157 158

159 160 161 162 163

Du Bec, Journal, 263–4; Sully, I, 393 [1819]; Sully, I, 373–4 [B. & B.]. Buisseret, Henri IV, 45. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 69. Lezeau, “Catholic religion,” Arch. cur., XIV, 66; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 613. Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 343. Cardinal de Plaisance to the Catholics of France, 23 July 1593, in Dussieux, Grands faits, 234–6; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 495; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 613. See also Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 101. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 70. Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 18. See also Breunot, Journal, I, 375. Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 21 August 1593, UCSP, fol. 295. Cheverny, Mémoires, 524. For Henri’s circular letter to France on his conversion, see “De par le Roy,” 25 July 1593, bn. Dupuy 119, fol. 23, a copy of which appears in LM, III, 822–3. See also the large collection, “Actes et mémoires de la conversion et absolution de Henri IIII, Roy de France et de Navarre,” bn. Dupuy 119, fols. 1–110. Other examples of the royal announcement include “Remonstrance aux François, sur la conversion de Henry de Bourbon, IIII de ce nom, trés-chrestien Roy de France & de Navarre” (Lyons: 1594); “Procès-verbal de se qui s’est passé à St. Denis à l’instruction et absolution du Roi Henri quatre. 1593 Juillet,” bn. ff. n.a. 23363, fols. 11–21 (and related pieces, ibid., fols. 22–253); “Déclaration du Roy Henri IIII après sa conversion, 26 décembre 1593,” bn. Dupuy 379, fols. 82–97; “Harrangue du Sr. de Morlas, ambassadeur du Roi, à Mess. des Estats de Hollande sur la conversion du roi, 26 aoust [sic.] 1593,” bn. Dupuy 526, fols. 127–47; Pomponne de Bellièvre, “Advis aux François sur la déclaration faicte par le Roy” (n.p.: 1593); “Proclamation of reconciliation with the church and letters to the governors,” 25 July 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 259. For individual letters issued by the king, see Henri IV to the city of La Rochelle and to various Huguenot nobles, 25 July 1593, bn. ff. 4016, fols. 12–13, 13–14 (copies of which are published in LM, III, 823–4, 825–6); “Lettre du Roy envoyée à la cour et aux villes catholiques le vingtcinquiesm Juillet sur sa conversion à l’Esglise Romaine 1593,” bn. ff. 4016, fols. 168–9 (copies of which are published in Dussieux, Lettres intimes , 191–2, and LM, III, 825–6); Henri IV to the parlement of Tours, 25 July 1593, in Malingre, Registres du Parlement, 103–5; Henri IV to the marquis de Pisany in Rome, 7 August 1593, in Barthélémy, Choix de documents, 243–5. Finally, see a series of letters to the princes of Germany in Rommel, Correspondance de Henri IV.

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409 Notes to pages 295–7 164 M. de Souvré, governor of Tourraine, to the city of Tours, 25 July 1593, in Luzarche, Lettres de Tours, 190–2. 165 “Declaration de la ville de Riom, chef du duché d’Auvergne, & des habitans d’icelle en l’obeissance du Roy” (Paris: 1594). 166 Letter to Belissario Vinta, 20 August 1593, Négs. Tosc., V, 160. Letters also had arrived from Madrid reporting that Philip II was furious with Henri’s conversion, which he gave no credence. 167 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 2 and 21 August 1593, UCSP, 245, fols. 278, 295; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 617; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 503. See also “Instruction baillée à Monsieur le duc de Nevers allant à Rome, 31 August 1593,” bn. ff. 3417, fols. 222–70. 168 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to M. de La Burthe, 29 July 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 501; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 503. 169 See the connétable de Montmorency to Clement VIII, 6 August 1593, bn. Dupuy 62, fol. 20; “Extraicts d’une instruction du Roi Henri IV au sieur de la Fin s’en allant en Languedoc vers le connétable de Montmorency,” 1593, in Devic and Vaisselle, Histoire de Languedoc, 1510. 170 Cardinal d’Ossat to Villeroy de Neufville, 1593, in Ossat, Lettres, 55. 171 Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 21 August 1593, UCSP, 245, fol. 295. 172 See Sir Thomas Edmondes to Lord Burghley, 5 and 21 August 1593, ibid., fols. 256, 295; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 616–17. 173 bn. 500 Colbert 16, fols. 314–22; “Articles accordez pour la tresve généralle, 22 [sic.] July 1593,” UCSP, 245, fols. 276–77vo.; “Articles pour la tresve générale,” in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 476–82; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 448–500; “Articles accordez par le Roy pour la Trève générale. Du dernier de Iuillet 1593,” in Malingre, Registres du Parlement, 253–66; d’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 344; Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 525; Henri IV to the duc de Nevers, 1 August 1593, LM, IV, 3; Breunot, Journal, I, 370. 174 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 77; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 616; Breunot, Journal, I, 375; Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 18. 175 Henri IV to the maréchal d’Aumont, 4 August 1593, LM, IV, 4. Consequently, in November this truce was extended by the king until the end of December. (See Henri IV to the duc d’Angoulême, 4 November 1593, LM, IV, 45; Breunot, Journal, I, pp. 387, 390.) 176 Maimbourg, History of the League, 892; Palma Cayet, Chronologie novenaire, 500–1; Bib. Ars. 3438, vol. 18; Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 356–9. 177 Villegomblain, Mémoires, II, 105–6. Lezeau refutes this, arguing that Mayenne at first proposed a general treaty, but that his subordinates disapproved on the basis that all the honour and profit of such an

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181 182 183 184 185 186

187

188

189

agreement would go wholly to the duke as their chief. “Make peace as you will,” they allegedly declared, “as for us, we want to make war!” (Lezeau, “Catholic religion,” Arch. cur. XIV, 66.) Bib. Ars. 3438, fol. 18. Villeroy, Mémoires, I, 377. See “Déclaration portant abolition & pardon à ceux qui se restireront, du party des Rebelles, dans un mois. A Mantes le 27 Octobre 1593. Rég.[istré] le 1 Février 1594,” in Blanchard, Compilation chronologique, 1245; “Déclaration du Roy, faite à Mantes le 27 Décembre 1593,” in Malingre, Registres du Parlement, 106–36; “Déclaration du Roy après sa conversion, 27 Décembre 1593,” bn. ff. 4016, fols. 170vo.–184; “Déclaration qui accorde un nouveau délay aux Rebelles, pour rentrer sous l’obeissance du Roy. A Paris le 4 Avril 1594. Rég.[istré] le 6 du mesme mois,” in Blanchard, Compilation chronologique, 1250. Henri IV to the sieur de Moussoulens, October 1594, LM, IV, 236–7. Buisseret, Henri IV, 49. Quoted in Volan-Revol, Faites de Henri IV, 281. Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 163–5. Cardinal d’Ossat to Villeroy de Neufville, 1592, in Ossat, Lettres, 39. Quoted in Love, “Contemporary Opinion of Louis XII,” 242. Before succeeding his cousin, Charles VIII, as king, Louis had been in rebellion against him and, once defeated, had lived at court as a virtual hostage. On coming to the throne, however, he reassured his former enemies – many of them great officers of the Crown – that he would exact no revenge for their past opposition. Because of this kind of clemency that marked his subsequent reign, Louis XII was held up as the best example of an ideal king – until he was replaced by the legacy of Henri IV. “Déclaration du Roy, sur autre precdente du vingt-septiesme jour de Décembre dernier passé, par rapeller tous ses sujets à sa grace & clémence, & à une générale réconciliation & vraye réünion sous l’obeissance de Sa Majesté. Du 4 Avril 1594,” in Malingre, Registres du Parlement, 216–23; Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 549, 577–8; Davila, Civil Wars of France, 645; Maimbourg, History of the League, 944–5. bn. ff. 2751, fols. 188–90, 191–5, 196–7, 286–8, 289; Henri IV to the sieur de Bassompierre and President Jeannin, July 1594, Galitzen, Lettres inédites, 134–8. See also Lezeau, “Catholic religion,” Arch. cur., XIV, 66. See, for example, “Déclaration de Monsieur le Marquis de Canillac, & de la ville de Riom chef du Duché d’Auvergne, & des habitants d’icelle, en l’obeissance du Roy” (n.p.: 1594); “Lettres interceptes envoyées par un Gentilhomme de Seignieur de Vitry, à des Portes, Sécretaire du Sieur de Mayenne” (n.p.: 1594); Pierre Matthieu, “Harangue aux

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195 196 197 198

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consuls et peuple de Lyon. Du devoir & obeissance des subjects envers le Roy et du soing perpetuel de la Providence de Dieu sur ceste Monarchie Française” (Lyons: 1594); Henri IV to M. de Brèves, 26 December 1593, LM, IV, 76. “Du Devoir de la Noblesses Françoise vers son Roy” (c. 1594) Wolfe, Conversion of Henri IV, 176. Davila, Civil Wars of France, 645; Breunot, Journal, II, 149; Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 645. “Mémoire baillé par le Roy Henry quatriem estant au Camp devant Laon aux sieurs de Bassompierre et Président Jeannin estans près de sa maiesté de la part du Duc de Maienne en Septembre 1594,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 188–90. “Articles proposés par Mons. le Duc de Maienne pour se remettre en l’obeissance du Roy baillez par le Président Jeannin en l’année 1594,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 191–5. Cardinal d’Ossat to Villeroy de Neufville, 18 December 1596, Ossat, Lettres, 364. “Déclaration de la volonté du Roy, sur l’ouverture de la guerre contre le Roy d’Espagne” (Paris: 1595) Legrain, Decade de Henry le Grand, 632. “Response faicte de la Part du Roy Henry quatriesme aux articles présentéz par le président Jeannin, député du duc de Maienne. Cette response ne fait point délivré,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 196–7. “Articles Secretz et particuliers accordés par le Roy et Monsieur le duc de Maienne pour la paix générale du Royaume. Le 24 Janvier 1596,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 280–6; “Edict portant reglement pour la réduction de Charles de Lorraine Duc de Mayenne pair de France, à l’obeissance du Roy. A Folembray au mois de Janvier 1596. Reg. au Parl. le 9 Avril, en la Ch. des Comptes le 7, & en la Cour des Aydes le 29 May de même année,” in Blanchard, Compilation chronologiques, 1288. “Édit portant règlement pour la réduction du duc de Mayenne,” January 1596, an., XIa 8642, fol. 181. “Articles accordez par le Roy, pour la Trève générale du Royaume. Du mois Ianvier 1596,” in Malingre, Registres du Parlement, 266–73. “Lettres de juisson au Parlement pour verifier l’Édit de paix faict par Le Roy ave Monsieur le duc,” 20 March 1596, bn. ff. 2751, fols. 266–88; the second letter was issued on 6 April 1596, bn. ff. 2751, fol. 289. Sully tells the story. “Tell me truly, cousin,” he asked Mayenne while trudging swiftly along, “do I not walk a little too fast for you?” The duke wheezed in reply that he was almost stifled, adding “that if his Majesty walked but a little while longer, he would kill him without designing it.” “Hold there, cousin,” responded Henri, stopping and tapping the former League leader lightheartedly on the shoulder, “for this is all the

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205 206

207 208 209

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vengeance you ever will have from me.” (II, 126–7 [1819]; II, 96–7 [B. & B.].) Indeed, with the exception of Catherine de Medici’s reported plot in 1570 and, possibly, the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, there appear to have been no other attempts on Henri’s life before 1593. Quoted in L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, IV, 74–5. See “Bref discours du procès criminel fait à Pierre Barrière, dit La Barre, natif d’Orléans, accusé de l’horrible et exécrable parricide et assassinat par luy entrepris et attenté contre la personne du Roy (août 1593),” Arch. cur., XIII, 359–70. L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VII, 1. Quoted in Sully, I, 398–9 [1819]; Sully, I, 375 [B. & B.]. Pierre Matthieu, “Harangue aux consuls et peuple de Lyon. Du devoir & obeissance des subjects envers le Roy & du soing perpetuel de la Providence de Dieu sur ceste Monarchie Françoise” (Lyons: 1594); “Remonstrance sur la réduction de la ville de Mascon à l’obeyssance du Roy” (Paris: 1594); “Discours sur le Dernier propos du Duc de Nemours, par lequel il advertit le Marquis de St. Sornin d’estre obeissant au Roy” (Paris: 1595); “Discours sur l’execution du Duc d’Aumale faicte le sixiesme iour de Iuillet, 1595. Par Arrest de la Cour de Parlement de Paris” (Lyons: 1595); “Extrait du Sermon de Messire Simon Vigor, Archevêque de Narbonne, qu’il a fait le quatorzième Dimanche après Trinité,” 1594, in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, VI, 43–4; “Messire Claude de Sainctes, Evêque d’Evreux, en son Livre intitulé, Confession de la Foi Catholique, addressée au Peuple François, en l’article 56,” in Goulart, Méms. de la Ligue, VI, 44–5. For an excellent discussion of this idea in general as it was expressed in the seventeenth century, see Moote, Seventeenth Century, 36–43. See L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 6; Maimbourg, History of the League, 915–16; Henri IV to M. de La Fontaine, 4 July 1596; to the duc de Montmorency, 16 February 1597; and to the duc de Luxembourg, 11 August 1598, LM, IV, 325–6, 616, 691; Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to M. de Mermet, 25 May 1593; and to M. de La Fontaine, 19 June 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 424, 463. D’Aubigné, Histoire universelle, VIII, 343. For Huguenot grievances, see a series of cahiers de doléances from the subsequent Huguenot political assemblies at Ste Foy, Saumur, and Loudon, preserved in the Bibliothèque Mazarine, fols. 2593 and 2594, passim. See also Goulart, Méms. de la League, IV, 428–86; Henri IV to the comte de Schomberg, 31 March 1597; and to the duc de Luxembourg, 25 April 1597, LM, IV, 726, 751–2; Henri IV to Philippe DuplessisMornay, 30 March 1594, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, VI, 41.

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413 Notes to pages 303–4 214 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to M. de Bonneval, 29 June 1594, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, VI, 73; Henri IV to the duc de Luxembourg, 11 August 1597, LM, IV, 326. 215 The duc de Bouillon to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 12 August 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 513–14. 216 Sully, I, 341–2, 346–7 [1819]. 217 M. Somranges to Phlippe Duplessis-Mornay, 11 August 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 511–12. 218 Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to the bishop of Nantes, 15 August 1593, in ibid., 519–20. See also his letter to M. de Loménie, 11 August 1593, in ibid., 54. 219 D’Aubigné, Mémoirs, 117. 220 See, for example, Henri IV to various Calvinist nobles, 25 July 1593, and to the city of La Rochelle, 25 July 1593, LM, III, 823–4, 824–5; and to the duc de La Trémouille, 25 July 1593, Chartier de Thouars, 119. 221 See Henri IV to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 5 and 7 August 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 505, 505–6; see also LM, IV, 5–6, 14–15, 29. 222 See, for example, “Harangue faitte au Roy par monsieur de Fedeau au nom des Eglises reformées de France, avec la réponse de Sa Majesté du 12. Decembre 1593” (n.p.: 1594); “Mémoires dressées par ceux de la Religion Reformée lorsque le Roy Henry le Grand allant à la Messe, Embrassa la Religion Catholique ce quy fut en l’an mil cinq cents quatre vingt treize,” Bib. Maz. 2593, fols. 271–81; “Parolles du Roy Henry IIII au depputez de la Religion Prétendue R.,” 12 December 1593, Bib. Maz. 2593, fols. 269–70; “Paroles du Roy Henry IIII aux députéz de la religion prétendue reformée sur la fin du mois de Novembre 1593 arriverent à Mantes. Les députéz des Eglises de ceux de la Religion avec cahiers qu’illz présenterent au Roy ausquels Sa Majesté qui les avait mandez tout les propos suivans en November 1593,” bn. ff. 2751, fols. 173–4. 223 For accounts of these attempts and Catholic impatience with Henri’s failure to break off all connection with the Calvinists, see Philippe Duplessis-Mornay to M. de La Burthe, 29 July 1593, and to the duc de Bouillon, August 1593, in Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, V, 500–1, 509; Benoiste, Edict of Nantes, 69–70. 224 See, for example, Henri’s harsh admonition to Philippe DuplessisMornay of March 1594 that he had found “the recent assembly at Fontenay very strange, because it did not concern itself solely with religion, but with several other matters against my service. You are well aware that I know the difference between a synod and an assembly. See that it does not happen again,” LM, IV, 129.

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414 Notes to pages 306–9 c o n c l u sio n 1 Mme de Mornay, Memoirs, trans., 274. See also Lezeau, “Catholic religion,” Arch. cur., XIV, 65–6. 2 D’Aubigné, Mémoires, 98–9. 3 L’Estoile, Mémoires-Journaux, VI, 155. 4 Quoted in Volan-Revel, Faites de Henri IV, 282. 5 Shakespeare, Henry V, 69–70.

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421 Bibliography McNeill, John T., ed. Calvin: On God and Political Duty. New York: 1956. Mémoires de Condé. 6 vols. Paris: 1743. Mémoires du maréchal de Bassompierre, contenant l’Histoire de sa vie. Vol. I. Cologne: 1661. Menard, Léon, and Ch. de Baschi, marquis d’Aubais, eds. Pièces fugitives pour servir à l’histoire de France. 3 vols. Paris: 1759. Mergey, Jean de. Mémoires. In Michaud and Poujoulat. Vol. IX. Paris: 1854. Michaud, Joseph François, and Jean-Joseph-François Poujoulat, eds. Nouvelle Collection des mémoires relatives à l’histoire de France. 34 vols. Paris: 1854. Miscellaneous State Papers from 1501 to 1726. 2 vols. London: 1778. Monin, Hippolyte, ed. État de Paris en 1789: Études et Documents sur l’Ancien Régime à Paris. Vol. 362. Paris: 1889. Montaigne, Michel de. The Autobiography. Edited by Mervin Lowenthal. New York: 1956. – Complete Works. Translated by Donald M. Frame. Stanford: 1957. Montrozat, René de Lucinge, seigneur des Alymes et de. Lettres sur les débuts de la Ligue (1585). Edited by Alain Dufour. Geneva: 1964. – Lettres sur la cour de Henri III en 1586. Edited by Alain Dufour. Geneva: 1866. Mornay, Charlotte d’Arbaleste, Mme de. Mémoires. Edited by Madame de Witte. 2 vols. Paris: 1868. Mornay, Philippe Duplessis-Marley, sieur de. Mémoires et Correspondance. 12 vols. Paris: 1824–25. Ossat, cardinal Armand d’. Lettres de l’illustrissme et reverendissime cardinal d’Ossat, évesque de Baieux, au roy Henri le Grand et à monsieur de Villeroy, depuis l’année M.D.XCIV iusques à l’année M.D.CIII. Paris: 1824. Palma Cayet, Pierre-Victor. Chronologie novenaire, contenant l’histoire de la guerre et les choses les plus mémorables advenues sous le règne de Henri IV, 1589–1598. In Michaud and Poujoulat. Vol. XII. Paris: 1854. Pasquier, Etienne. Écrits Politiques. Edited by D. Thickette. Geneva: 1966. – Lettres. 2 vols. Paris: 1619. – Lettres Familières. Edited by D. Thickette. Geneva: 1974. – Lettres Historiques pour les années 1556–1594. Edited by D. Thickette. Geneva: 1966. Pericaud, Antoine. Notes et Documents pour servir à l’histoire de Lyon pendant la Ligue 1589–1594. Lyons: 1844. Philippi, Jean. Mémoires. In Michaud and Poujoulat. Vol. VIII. Paris: 1854. Pingaud, Léonce, ed. Correspondance des Saulx-Tavannes. Paris: 1877. Poirson, A., ed. Mémoires de Villeroy et de Sancy, documents divers. Paris: 1868. Pont-Aimery, Alexandre de. Les Oeuvres. Paris: 1595. Public Records Office, Great Britain. Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, of the reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth. 12 vols. London: 1856–1872. – Calendar of State Papers, Foreign, of the Reign of Elizabeth I. 23 vols. London: 1890–1950.

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422 Bibliography – Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives of France. 3 vols. London: 1912 – Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives of Milan. vol. 1, 1385–1618. London: 1912. – Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives of Rome. London: 1916. – Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English affairs, existing in the archives of Venice. 38 vols. London: 1864–1947. – Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts relating to English affairs Preserved in, or Originally belonging to, the Archives of Simancas Spain. 4 vols. London: 1899. Quatres excéllents discours sur l’état présent de la France. N.p.: 1593. Rigal, J.-L., ed. Mémoire d’un Calviniste de Millau. Rodez: 1911. Ritter, Raymond, ed. Lettres du Cardinal de Florence sur Henri IV et sur la France (1596–1598). Paris: 1955. Rochambeau, marquis de, ed. Lettres d’Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d’Albret. Paris: 1877. Ruble, Baron Alphonse de, ed. Mémoires inédits de Michel de La Huguerye. 4 vols. Paris: 1878. – , ed. Commentaires et lettres de Blaise de Montluc, maréchal de France. 5 vols. Paris: 1882. – , ed. Mémoires et poësies de Jeanne d’Albret. Paris: 1893. Saint-Auban, Jacques Pape, seigneur de. Mémoires. In Michaud and Poujoulat. Vol. XI. Paris: 1854. Sainte-Aldegande, Philippe de Marnix, seigneur de. A pithie, and most earnest exhortation, concerning the estate of Christiandom, together with the meanes to preserve and defend the same ... by a Germaine gentleman. Antwerp: 1583. Saint-Marc, Antoine Du Puget, sieur de. Mémoires. In Michaud and Poujoulat. vol. XI. Paris: 1854. Saulnier, Eugene, ed. Journal de François, bourgeois de Paris, 23 décembre 1588–30 avril 1589. Paris: 1913. Soman, A., ed. The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew: reappraisals and documents. The Hague: 1974. Stegmann, André, ed. Édits des Guerres de Religion. Paris: 1979. Sully, Maximilien de Bethune, duc de. Memoirs of the Duke of Sully, Prime Minister of Henry the Great. 5 vols. Edinburgh: 1819. Taillandier, A.H., and Mommergue, eds. Mémoires de Nicolas de Brichanteau, marquis de Beauvais-Nangis et Journal de procès du marquis de La Boulaye. Paris: 1862. Tamizay de Larroque, Ph., ed. Documents inédites de Guillaume de Saluste seigneur Du Bartas. Agen: 1864. – , ed. Lettres inédites de Guillaume Du Vair. Paris: 1873. – , ed. Lettres françaises inédites de Joseph Scaliger. Agen-Paris: 1879.

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423 Bibliography Tavannes, Gaspard de Saulx, seigneur de. Mémoires. In Michaud and Poujoulat. Vol. VIII. Paris: 1854. Thompson, James W., and Sidney H. Erhamen, eds. Letters and documents of Armand de Gontaut de Biron. 2 vols. Berkeley: 1936. Thou, Jacques-Auguste de. Mémoires. In Michaud and Poujoulat. Vol. XI. Paris: 1854. Tilley, Arthur. “Some Pamphlets of the French Wars of Religion (1560–94).” English Historical Review. XIV (1899): 451–70. Tommaseo, H., ed. Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens sur les affaires de France au XVIe siècle. 2 vols. Paris: 1838. Unton, Sir Henry. Correspondence, 1591–92. Edited by J. Stevenson. London: 1847. Vallée, G., and Parfourn, P., eds. Mémoires de Charles Gouyon, baron de La Moussaye (1553–1587). Paris: 1901. Valois, Marguerite de. Les Mémoires de la Reine Marguerite. Edited by Charles Chappellain. Paris: 1628. – Memoirs. Translated by Violet Fane. London: 1892. Valois, Noël, ed. Inventaire des arrêts du conseil d’État, reigne de Henri IV. 2 vols. Paris: 1886. Vieilleville, François de Scépeaux, maréchal de. Mémoires. In Michaud and Poujoulat. Vol. IX. Paris: 1854. Villegomblain, Fr. Racine, seigneur de. Mémoires des troubles arrivés en France sous les règnes des rois Charles IX, Henri III et Henri IV. Edited by Rivaudas de Villegomblain. 2 vols. Paris: 1667–68. Villeroy, Nicolas de Neufville, seigneur de. Mémoires d’Estat. 4 vols. Paris: 1665. Volkaersbeke, Kervyn de, ed. Correspondance de François de La Noue, surnommé Bras de Fer, précédée de la vie de ce grand capitaine. Paris: 1854. Walsingham, Sir Francis. Journal from December 1570 to April 1583. London: 1870. Weiss, Charles, ed. Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle, d’apres les manuscrits de la bibliothèque de Bésançon. 9 vols. Paris: 1841–52. Winwood, Sir Ralph. Memorials of affairs of state in the reigns of queen Elizabeth and king James I. 3 vols. London: 1725.

Contemporary and Near-Contemporary Histories, Biographies, and Works on the Art of War A Comparison of the English and Spanish Nation: Composed by a French Gentleman against those of the League in Fraunce, which went about to perswade the king to breake his alliance with England, and to confirme it with Spaine”. Translated by Robert Ashley. London: 1589. A Discours of the Civile Warres and Late Troubles in Fraunce, 1580. Amsterdam: 1970.

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424 Bibliography Airault, Pierre. Déploration de la mort du Roy Henri III et du scandale qu’en à réçu l’Église. N.p.: 1589. Albon, Claude d’. De la Majesté royale, institution et préeminence, et des faveurs Divines particulières envers icelle. Lyon: 1575. Amiraut, Moyse. La vie de François seigneur de La Noue. Leiden: 1661. Anquetil, P. L’Esprit de la Ligue. Paris: 1771. Anquez, Léonce. Henri IV et l’Allemagne d’après les Mémoires et la Correspondance de Jacques Bongars. Paris: 1887. Aubigné, Théodore Agrippa d’. Histoire Universelle. Edited by baron Alphonse de Ruble. 10 vols. Paris: 1886–1909. Bayle, Pierre. Critique générale de l’histoire du Calvinisme par M. Maimbourg. Ville-Franche: 1682. Benoiste, Élie. The History of the Famous Edict of Nantes. London: 1694. Bernard, Auguste de, ed. Procès-Verbaux des États-Généraux de 1593. Paris: 1942. Bignon, Jerome. La grandeur de nos rois et leur souveraine puissance. Paris: 1615. Bordenave, Nicolas de. Histoire de Béarn et Navarre. Edited by P. Raymond. Paris: 1873. Canault, Jean. La vie d’Alphonse d’Ornano, maréchal de France. Aubenas: 1975. Castille, abbé de, ed. Négociations diplomatiques et politiques du Président Jeannin ambassadeur et ministre de François Ier, Henri IV, et Louis XIII. Paris: 1819. Chandon, Jean. Vie et testament. Épernay: 1857. Chappuys, Gabriel. L’Histoire du royaume de Navarre contenant de Roy en Roy tout ce que est advenue de rémarquable des son origine. Paris: 1596. Chavigny-Beaunois, Jean Aimes de, trans. La Première Face du Ianus François, contenant sommairement les Troubles, guerres civiles & autres choses mémorables advenues en la France & ailleurs dès l’an de salut M.D. XXXIIII. iusques à l’an M.D. LXXXIX. fin de la maison Valesienne. Lyons: 1594. Chevreul, Henri, ed. Discours de ce qui s’est passé en la Prise de la Ville de Marseille pour le service du Roy, par Monseigneur le Duc de Guyse, son Lieutenant Général en Provence, sur l’advis donné par un de la ville mesme. Du 18 Février 1596. Paris: 1884. Colynet, Antony. The True History of the Civil Warres of France, betweene the French King Henry the 4. and the Leaguers. Gathered from the yere of our Lord 1585. until the present October. 1591. London: 1591. Confession et recognoissance de Hugues Sureau, dict du Rosier, touchant sa cheute en la papauté, & les horribles scandales par luy commis. Servirent d’example à tout le monde de la fragilité & perversité de l’homme abandonné à soy, de l’infinie misericorde & ferme verité de Dieu envers ses eslens. Basel: 1574. Dallington, Robert. The view of Fraunce, 1604. Edited by W.P. Barrett. London: 1936. Davila, Henrico Caterino. The History of the Civil Wars of France. Translated by Ellis Farnesworth. London: 1763. De Callières. Histoire du maréchal de Matignon (1547–97). Paris: 1661.

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425 Bibliography Deimier, sieur. La Royale Liberté de Marseille. Paris: 1595. Desormeaux, J.R.L. Histoire de la Maison de Bourbon. 5 vols. Paris: 1772–88. De Vic, Dom C.L., and Dom J. Vaissette, eds. Histoire Générale de Languedoc. 25 vols. Toulouse: 1879–92. Digges, Sir Dudley, ed. The Compleat Ambassador: or two Treaties of the intended Marriage of Queen Elizabeth of Glorious Memory; Comprised in Letters of negotiation of Sir Francis Walsingham, her Resident in France. Together with the Answers of the Lord Burleigh, the Earl of Leicester, Sir Tho. Smith, and others. London: 1655. Du Bartas, G. de Saluste, seigneur. Cantique de la victoire obtenue par le roy le 14e de mars 1590 à Ivry. N.p.: 1590. Dutillet, Jean. Recueil des rois de France. 2 vols. Paris: 1618. Garrard, William. The Art of Warre. London: 1591. Girard, Guillaume. Histoire de la vie du duc d’Espernon, divisée en trois parties. Paris: 1655. Grotius, Hugo. Annales et Histoires de troubles du Pays-Bas. Amsterdam: 1642. Halphen, Eugène, ed. Discours de la Bataille de Garennes, en Mars 1590. Paris: 1875. Histoire abrégé des singaries de la Ligue, contenant les folles propositions et frivoles actions usitées en faveur de l’autorité d’icelle en la ville de Paris, depuis l’an 1590 jusques au 22 du mois de Mars 1594, jour de sa réduction à son roi légitime et natural, Henri IV du nom, roi de France et de Navarre, avec le portrait en tableau de la tenue des états au plus près de la vérité. N.p.: 1595. La Huguerye, Michel de. Ephémeride de l’espedition des Allemands en France (Aout–Decembre 1587). Paris: 1892. La Jaisse, P. Leman de. Carte générale de la monarchie française, contenant l’histoire militaire depuis Clovis, premier roi chrétien, jusqu’à la quinzieme année accomplie du rèign de Louis XV. Vol. I. Paris: 1733. – Abrégé de la carte générale du militaire de France, depuis l’établissement de la monarchie jusqu’au 20 fevrier 1734 ... compris le supplement aux mutations et augmentations des troupes. 7 vols. Paris: 1734. Lalanne, Ludovic. Oeuvres Complètes de Pierre de Bourdeille seigneur de Brantôme. 11 vols. Paris: 1869. La Noue, François de. The Politicke and Militarie Discourses of the Lord de La Noue. Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1587. – Discours Politiques et Militaires. Edited by F.E. Sutcliffe. Geneva: 1967. La Popolinière, Henri de. La vraye et entière histoire des troubles et choses mémorables, advenues tant en France qu’en Flandres, & pays circonvoisins, depuis l’an 1562. La Rochelle: 1573. La Trémouille, L.-C. duc de, ed. Chartier de Thouars. Paris: 1877. Le Labyrinthe de la Ligue et les moyens de s’en retirer par A.D.L.P.A.S.. N.p.: 1590. L’Espine, Jean de. Excellens discourse de J. de l’Espine, angevin, touchant le repos & contentement de l’esprit. Basel: 1587.

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426 Bibliography Licques, David de. Histoire de la vie de Messire Philippe de Mornay dédiée à son Altesse. Leyde: 1647. Maimbourg, Louis. The History of the League. Translated by John Dryden. London: 1684. Marsollier, Jacques. Histoire de Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, duc de Bouillon. Paris: 1719. Mathas, M.A. Recherche des Connestables, Mareschaux, et Admiraux de France. Paris: 1623. Matthieu, Pierre. Histoire des derniers troubles en France, sous les règnes des rois ... Henri III ... Henri IV ... divisée en plusiers livres. 2 vols. Lyons: 1594–95. – Histoire des derniers troubles en France. Paris: 1613. – Remarkable considerations upon the life of M. Villeroy. Translated by Sir T. Hawkins. London: 1637. Mendoza, Don Bernardino de. Theorique and Practise of Warre. Translated by Sir Edwarde Hoby. London: 1597. Montrosat, René de Lucinge, seigneur des Alymes et de. The beginning, continuance, and decay of estates: wherein are handled many notable questions concerning the establishment of empires and monarchies. Translated by I. Finett. London: 1606. – Dialogue du Français et du Savoysien (1593). Edited by Alain Dufour. Geneva-Paris: 1963. Pinard, M. Chronologie historique militaire contenant l’histoire de la création de toutes les personnes qui les ont possedes ... des troupes de la maison du roi et des officiers superieurs qui y ont servi. 8 vols. Paris: 1760–78. Poole, Mrs. Reginald, ed. “Journal of the Siege of Rouen.” English Historical Review. XVII (1902): 527–37. Ramus, Petrus. The Three Partes of Commentaries, containing the whole and perfect discourse of the civill warres of Fraunce. London: 1574–76. Recueil des choses mémorables. Dordrecht: 1598. Satyre Ménippée de la vertu du Catholican d’Espagne. Et de la tenue des Étatz de Paris. N.p.: 1593. Serres, Jean de. The Three Partes of Commentaries of the Civil Warres of Fraunce. Translated by Thomas Timme. 4 vols. London: 1574–76. – A General Inventory of the History of France. Translated by E. Grimeston. London: 1607. – Generall Historie of France to 1598. Translated by E. Grimeston. London: 1611. – Inventaire Générale de l’Histoire de France. Paris: 1643. Shakespeare, William. Hamlet. Cambridge: 1964. – Henry V. Edited by John Dover Wilson. Cambridge: 1968. Thou, Jacques-Auguste de. Histoire Universelle. 11 vols. The Hague: 1740. Valois, Charles, ed. Histoire de la Ligue. Vol. I. Paris: 1914. Voltaire. An Essay upon the Civil Wars of France. London: 1731. Williams, Sir Roger. A Briefe Discourse of Warre. London: 1590.

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Contemporary Newsletters and Declarations “A briefe discourse of the merveylous victory gotten by the King of Navarre, against those of the Holy League, on the twentieth of October 1587.” London: 1587. “A Declaration Exhibited to the French King by hys Court of Parlement concerning the holy League.” London: 1587. “A declaration of the causes that have moved the Cardinal of Bourbon to oppose those which seeke to subvert the Catholic religion and the State.” N.p.: 1585. “A Declaration of the French kings proclaiming open warre against the king of Spaine and his adherents, with the causes him moving thereto.” London: 1595. “A Declaration of the Kings pleasure, published after his departure from Paris, Importing the cause of his sudden going away.” London: 1588. “A declaration set forth by the Frenche kinge, showing his pleasure concerning the new troubles in his realme.” Translated by E.Aggas. London: 1585. “A Discourse and true recitall of everie particular of the victorie obtained by the French King, on Wednesday the fourth of March, being Ashwednesday.” London: 1590. “A Discourse of all such Fights, Skirmishes, Exploites, and other politike attempts which have happened in France since the arrivall of the Duke of Parma, and the joyning of his Forces with the Enemies.” London: 1590. “A discourse of that which is passed since the Kinges departure from Gouy, to pursue the Prince of Parma.” London: 1592. “A Discourse of the over throwe of the Duke of Savoyes Armie, defeated by the L.[ord] de Diguieres.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1591. “A discourse upon a question of the estate of this time.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1591. “A Discourse upon the present estate of France. Togither with a copie of the Kings letters patents, declaring his mind after his departure out of Paris.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1588. “Advertisement au Roy, où sont déduicts les raisons d’Estat, pour lesquelles il ne luy est pas bien séant de changer de Religion.” N.p.: 1589. “Advertisement aux serviteurs du Roy sur la supplication adressée à sa Majesté, pour se faire Catholique.” N.p.: 1591. “Advertisement Catholique, sur l’hérétique et traistre déclaration de Henri d’Albret, se disant Roy de France, et de Navarre.” Paris: 1589. “Advertisement des Catholiques de Béarn, aux Catholiques François, unis à la Saincte Union: Touchant la Déclaration; faicte au Pont Sainct Clou, par Henry deuxiesme Roy de Navarre, le quatriesme jour d’Aoust. 1589.” Paris: 1589. “Advertissement à la noblesse et villes de Bourgogne, tenans le party de la Sainte Union.” Lyons: 1586.

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428 Bibliography “Advis aux François sur la Déclaration faicte par le Roy, en l’Eglise S. Denys en France, le xxv. iour de Iuillet, 1593.” Lyons: 1594. “Advis de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée commandée par Monseigneur le Duc de Nevers en Picardie, & de l’entrée de Monsieur son fils en la ville de Cambray.” Lyons: 1595. “A Journal, or Briefe report of the late service in Britaigne, by the Prince de Dombes Generall of the French kings Army in those partes, assisted with her Majesties forces at this present there, under the conduct of Sir John Norreis: advertised by letters from the said Prince to the kings Ambassadour here resident with her Majesty, and confirmed by like advertisements from others, imployed in that service.” London: 1591. “A Letter written by the king of Navarre unto the French king concerning his innocencie, against the slaunders of his adversaries.” London: 1585. “A most excellent exploit performed by the duke of Lesdiguieres upon the Pope’s armie at St. Esprite on the plaine of Pont-charra.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1591. “An Abstract of the proceedings of the French King.” London: 1590. “An Admonition given by one of the Duke of Savoyes Councel to his Highness, Tending to disswade him from enterprising against France.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1589. “An advertisement to the king of Navarre, to unite him selfe with the king and the Catholique faithe. Being in truth a very slanderous, false and seditious libele, against the said king of Navarre and other Christian princes made as an answer to his book intitled, The declaration of the king of Navarre as touching the slanders published against him.” London: 1585. “An Advertisement to the three Estates of Fraunce, concerning the warre of the League.” London: 1587. “An answere to the last tempest and villanie of the League, upon the slaunders which were imprinted by the same, against the French king.” Translated by T.H. London: 1593. “An Excellent Ditty made upon the great victory, which the French king obtayned against the Duke de Maine, and the Romish Rebels in his Kingdome, upon Ashwednesday being the fourth day of March last past, 1590.” London: 1590. “A Politike Discourse most excellent for this time present: Composed by a French Gentleman, against those of the League, which went about to perswade the King to breake the Allyance with England, and to confirme it with Spaine.” London: 1589. Arnauld, Antoine, “Libre Discours sur la delivrance de la Brétagne.” N.p.: 1598. “Articles accorded for the truce generall in France.” London: 1593. “Articles accordez par le Roy au sieur Du Plessis de Come, sur la réunion des Villes, Chasteau & Baronnie de Craon & Mont-Ian au service de Sa Majeste.” Angers: 1598.

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429 Bibliography “Articles accordez par le Roy, pour la Tresve générale du Royaume.” Paris: 1595. “Articles accordez pour la trefve es provinces d’Anjou et le Maine.” Le Mans: 1596. “Articles accordez pour la Trève générale du pays & Duché de Brétagne, Anjou & Touraine.” Paris: 1597. “Articles accordez pour la trève générale, 31 juillet 1593.” Paris: 1593. “Articles Bailez par les dépputéz de la part des Princes Catholiques du party du Roy, pour la conférrence, aux dépputéz du party contraire.” 17 May 1593. N.p.: 1593. “Articles concerning the yeelding of the citie of Grenoble into the Kings obeadience, agreed upon betweene the Lord Desdiguiers, and the committies of the countrey. Togither with the besieging and yeelding up of Chartres.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1591. “Articles Particuliers extraictz des généraux que le Roy à accordez à ceux de la Religion prétendue reformée, lesquelz sa Majesté n’a voulu estre compris esdictz généraux ny en l’Édict qui à estre faict et dressé sur iceux, Donné à Nantes au mois de May dernier. Et néantmoins Accordé sadicte Maiesté qu’ils seront entiérement acompliz et observez, tout ainsi que le contenu audict Édict. Et à ces fins seront Régistrez en ses Courtz de parlement Et alieurs où besoing sera, Et toutes déclarations Et lettres nécessaires en seront expédiées.” N.p.: 1601. “Articles pour la suspension d’Armes, accordez par Messieurs les Députez du Roy, avec ceux de Duc de Mercoeur.” Paris: 1597. “Articles proposez à la Noblesse du Pais d’Auvergne, par Monsieur le Comte de Randan.” Paris: 1590. “A state discourse upon the late hurt of the French king.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1595. “A Treatise Paraenetical, that is to say: An Exhortation. Wherein is shewed by good and evident reasons, infallible arguments, most true and certaine histories, and notable examples; the right way and true meanes to resist the violence of the Castilian king: to breake the course of his desseignes: to beat downe his pride, and to ruinate his puissence.” London: 1598. “A True Declaration of the Honourable Victorie obtained by the French King in winning of Noyon, and overthrow of the Duke of Maine his Forces.” London: 1591. “A True discourse of an overthrow given to the armie of the Leaguers in Province: by Monsieurs d’Esdiguieres et Lavalette.” Translated by Iamet Mettayer. London: 1591. “A True Discourse of the most happy victories obtayned by the French King, against the Rebels and enemies of his Majesty.” Translated by T.D. London: 1598. “A True Relation of the Frenche Kinge his good success, in winning from the

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430 Bibliography Duke of Parma, his forts and trenches, and slaieing 500. of his men, and the great famine that is now in the sayd Dukes Camp.” London: 1592. Benoist, René, bishop of Troyes. “Advertissement en forme d’épistre consolatoire et exhortatoire, envoyé à l’Église & parroisse insigne & sincèrement Catholique de St.-Eustache de Paris.” Saint-Denis: 1593. – “Avertissement à tous François d’obéir et recognoistre pour leur roy très Chrètien Henry III à limitation de la Grande ville, & principalement de la Sorbone, & généralement de toute l’université de Paris.” Paris: 1594. – “Remonstrance et Exhortation au Roy Très Chrestien Henry quatriesme de faire Chrestiennement vertueusement & constamment la guerre aux hérétiques, & schismatiques, lesquels sont dangereusement divisez de l’Eglise Catholique, Apostolique, & Romaine, ou est enseigné un notable moyen necessaire pour destruire l’hérésie.” Rouen: 1596. – “Voeu et Exhortation touchant la nécessaire conservation de la personne du Roy Trés-Chrestien Henry quatriesme, à la généreuse & bélliquese Nobless Françoise estant à présent au siège de la Ville d’Amiens.” Paris: 1597. Bernard, Estienne. “Discours véritable de la réduction de la ville de Marseille en l’obeissance du roy, le 17 fév.[rier] 1596.” Lyons: 1596. Boucher, Jean. “Lettre Missive de l’Evesque du Mans. Avec la responce à icelle, faicte au mois de Septembre dernier passé, par un Docteur en Théologie de la faculté de Paris: en laquelle est respondu à ces deux doutes: à scavoir si on peut suivre en seureté de conscience le party du Roy de Navarre, & le recognoistre pour Roy. À scavoir si l’acte de Frère Iacques Clément Iacobus doit estre approuvé en consience, & s’il est louable, ou non.” Paris: 1589. – “Sermons de la simulée conversion, et nullité de prétendue absolution de Henry de Bourbon, Prince de Béarn, à S. Denys en France, le dimanche 25 juillet 1593.” Paris: 1594. Bourbon, Charles cardinal de. “A declaration of the causes that have moved the cardinal of Bourbon to oppose those which seeke to subvert the Catholic religion and the State.” London: 1585. “Brèf Discours des choses plus mémorables advenues en la ville de Rouen, durant le Siège mis devant icelle par Henry de Bourbon, prétendu Roy de Navarre: valeureusement soustenu l’espace de quatre mois par les habitants de ladicte ville, souz la conduite de Mon Seigneur Henry de Lorraine, des sieurs de Villars, de Gessans, & autres vaillants Capitaines: iusqu’au 20. de Febvrier 1592. que l’armée Héritique leva le Siège à l’arrivée de l’armée Catholique, conduicte par Messeigneurs les ducs de Parme, de Mayenne, Sfondrato, de Guyse & d’Aumale.” Lyons: 1592. “Brèf récit de la Réduction de la ville de Marseille en l’Obeyssance du Roy, le dixseptiesme Février, 1596.” Aix: 1596. Clary, François de. “Remonstrances faicte au Grand Conseil du Roy, sur le restablissement requis par les officiers qui ont suyvy la Ligue.” Lyons: 1590.

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431 Bibliography “Congratulation des Bourgeois de Verneuil, à Monsieur le Baron de Medavy, leur Gouverneur, sur la réduction de son Gouvernement à l’obeissance du Roy.” Paris: 1594. Constant, P. “La Cause des Guerres Civilles de la France.” Langres: 1595. “Continuation de la Trève accordée pour un moys.” Tours: 1593. “Continuation de la trève généralle, iusques au premier jour de Ianvier prochain.” Troyes: 1593. “Copie de certaines lettres escriptes par monseigneur le Duc de Nyvernois, Prince de Mantouë, Pair de France, Gouverneur pour le Roy es pays de Champaigne et Brie: Avec autres Lettres de Messieurs les Maire et Eschevins de la ville de Troyes.” N.p.: 1594. “Copie de la Lettre escritte par Monseigneur le Duc de Bouillon, à Monseigneur le Prince de Conty, contenant le discours au vray du combat fait devant la ville de Dourlans le 24. du mois de Iuillet dernier.” Lyons: 1595. “Copie des lettres escrites par le duc d’Épernon au Roy de Navarre ... envoyées par un bourgeois de Poictiers à un sien amy estant en ceste ville de Paris.” Lyons: 1588. “Coppie de la lettre du Roy, Envoyée à Messieurs les Consuls, Eschevins et habitans de la ville de Lyon.” Lyons: 1594. “Coppie des Lettres du Roy envoyées à Monseigneur de Lavardin Mareschal de France, Gouverneur & Lieutenant pour sa Majesté, en ce pais du Maine, touchant l’Absolution & bénédiction dont il a pleu à nostre Sainct Père le Pape honorer sadicte Majesté.” Le Mans: 1595. “Coppie des Lettres du Roy. Sur l’absolution donnée à sa Maiesté par nostre Sainct Père le Pape Clément VIII.” Lyons: 1595. “Coppie des Lettres du Roy, Touchant la réduction de la Ville d’Amiens en l’obeyssance de sa Majesté.” Lyons: 1597. “Coppie des lettres escriptes par Monseigneur le Duc de Montmorency, Pair et Conestable de France, donnant advis d’une deffaicte sur les Espagnols au pais d’Artois par Monsieur le Mareschal de Biron.” Lyons: 1596. “Coppie d’une lettre d’un gentilhomme de Champagne à un gentilhomme de Bourgogne qui concerne l’estat de l’armée du Roy de Navarre et celle des srs ducs de Mayenne et de Parma ... avec la trahison descouverte des Politiques de Troye en Champagne.” Lyons: 1590. “Coppie d’une lettre envoyée par Henry de Bourbon Roy de Navarre, à sa bien-aimee & confédérée, la Reyne d’Angleterre par un Gentilhomme nommé Rucqueville. Après la rencontre des deux armées près Yvry la chaussée, le Mercredy xiii iour de Mars 1590.” Rouen: 1590. “Credible Reports from France and Flanders. In the moneth of May, 1590.” London: 1590. “Déclaration de la ville de Riom, chef du duché d’Aubeargne, et des habitans d’icelle en l’obeissance du Roy.” Paris: 1594. “Déclaration de la volonté du Roy, avec la remonstrance à Sa Majesté, par les

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432 Bibliography Princes de son sang, Officiers de la Couronne, Seigneurs, Gentils-hommes, et autres subjects de la France.” Tours: 1589. “Déclaration de la volonté du Roy, sur l’ouverture de la guerre contre le Roy d’Espagne.” Paris: 1595. “Déclaration de M. de La Châtre, mareschal de France, faicte aux habitants d’Orléans en l’assemblée tenue en son logis, le 17 fevrier 1594, pour les induire à recognaistre le Roy, représentent par icelle les causes et raisons pour les y emouvoir.” Orléans: 1594. “Déclaration de Monsieur le Marquis de Canillac, & de la ville de Riom, chef du Duché d’Auvergne, & des habitants d’icelle, en l’obéissance du Roy.” N.p.: 1594. “Déclaration de N.[otre] S.[aint] Père le Pape Grégoire XIV. sur les lettres qui loy on este escrites par la Noblesse qui suit le Navarrois.” Paris: 1591. “Déclaration des très illustres princes les duc d’Alençon et roy de Navarre.” Paris: 1574. “Déclaration du roy contre les prétendus estats de la Ligue.” Tours: 1593. “Déclaration du Roy sur son Édict du mois de juillet dernier touchant la réunion de tous ses subjets à l’Église Catholique, apostollique et romaine. Lu et publié en la court de Parlement le sixième d’Octobre 1585.” Paris: 1585. “Déclaration faicte en l’assemblée tenue à Suresne le dixceptiesme iour de May.” Tours: 1593. “Déclaration faicte par Monseigneur le Duc de Mayenne Lieutenant Général de l’Estat et Couronne de France, pour la Reünion de tous les Catholiques de ce Royaume.” Paris: 1593. “Déclarations du Roy, et des Princes de son sang, et autres Ducs, Pairs, Seigneurs et Gentilshommes de son Royaume, pour l’observation et manutention de la Religion, et des personnes et biens Écclesiastiques.” Caen: 1589. De Comnène, maréchal-de-camp de La Châtre. “Véritable narration de ce qui s’est passé depuis la prise des faubourgs de Paris sur la fin d’octobre 1589 jusques au mois de juillet 1593, tant à la Ferté Bernard et armées commandées par le maréchal de La Châtre en Berry qu’en la ville d’Orléans.” Paris: [1593]. “Defaite des Huguenots Albigeois devant la ville de Lautrech, Par Monseigneur le Duc de Ioyeuse.” Paris: 1592. “De la Puissance des Roys, contre l’usurpation du Tiltre & Qualité de Roy de France, faicte par le Roy de Navarre: & de l’assurance que peuvent avoir en luy les Catholiques.” Paris: 1589. “De la vraye et légitime Constitution de l’Estate.” N.p.: 1591. “Directions from the King, to the governors of the Provinces, concerning the death of the Duke of Guise.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1589. “Discours après la Réduction d’Amiens de l’an 1597.” N.p.: 1597.

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433 Bibliography “Discours de ce qui s’est passé au pays de Brétaigne, le Maine et Anjou.” Paris: 1589. “Discours de ce qui s’est passé en la conférence des députez de Paris, avec le Roy, en l’Abbaye S. Anthoine des Champs, le septiesme iour d’Aoust, mil cinq cens nonante.” Tours: 1590. “Discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’Armée du Roy, depuis la Bataille donnée pres d’Evry, le quatorziesme de Mars, iusques au deuxiesme du mois de May, mil cinq cens nonante.” Tours: 1590. “Discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’Armée du Roy, depuis le treiziesme du mois d’Avril dernier jusqu’au 2. du mois de May.” Tours: 1590. “Discours de ce qui s’est passé en l’armée du Roy, depuis le vingt-troisiesm Iuillet, iusques au septiesme Aoust, mil cinq cens nonante.” Tours: 1590. “Discours de la deffaicte des garnisons Espagnoles du pays de Haynault, par Monsieur le Mareschal de Balagny.” Paris: 1596. “Discours de la Légation de Monsieur le Duc de Nevers. Envoyé par le Trés-Chrestien Roy de France et de Navarre, Henry IIII: vers le Pape Clement VIII.” Tours: 1592. “Discours de la Victoire que Monseigneur le Mareschal de Biron, assité de Messirs. les Ducs de Guise, et d’Elbeuf, et autres Seigneurs ont obtenue sur les Espagnoles, aupres d’Aspiemont en la Franchecomte.” Paris: 1595. “Discours des Cérémonies du Sacre et Couronnement de Henry quatriesme par la grace de Dieu Roy de France & de Navarre.” Angers: 1594. “Discours des occasions qui ont meu le Roy de s’acheminer aux Fauxbourgs de l’université de Paris, & de ce qui s’y est passé les premier et second iour du mois de Novembre, 1589.” Tours: 1589. “Discours d’Estat, où la necessité & les moyens de faire la Guerre en l’Espagne mesme, sont richement exposez.” Paris: 1595. “Discours du rencontre suivy entre l’armée des Princes Catholiques et celle du Bérnais: Avec la prise de Neuf-chastel.” Lyons: 1592. “Discours du siège et prise de la ville d’Espernay, et comme sa Majestée voulant investir la ville, taillé en pièces trois cens tant Wallons qu’Espagnols, qui veuloient se iettes dedans, Suivans les memoires que sa Majesté à envoyé à sa Cour de Parlement.” Tours: 1592. “Discours entre le Roy de Navarre, et Marmet son Ministre, sur l’instruction pour luy demandée en forme de Dialogue.” Paris: 1590. “Discours faict au camp de Neuf Chatel sur ce qui c’est passé entre le Roy et le Duc de Parme, ensemble la coppie d’une lettre du Roy escripte estant à la Rochelle, contenant ce qui est depuis advenu en son armée.” Tours: 1592. “Discours/Histoire ample et trés véritable contenant les plus mémorables faits advenuz en l’année 1587 tant en l’armée commandée by M. le duc de Guyse qu’en celle des Huguenots conduite par le duc de Bouillon, envoyé par un gentilhomme françois à la reyne d’Angleterre.” Paris: 1588. “Discours sur la déclaration de la Guerre contre l’Espagnol.” N.p.: 1595.

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434 Bibliography “Discours sur la réduction des villes de Dijon et Nuys ... avec la lettre de M. de Biron à Mgr. le duc de Montmorency.” Lyons: 1595. “Discours sur une question d’Estat de ce temps.” N.p.: 1590. “Discours véritable de la Defaicte de l’Armée des Princes de Conty, & de Dombes, le 23 May 1592. par Monseigneur le Duc de Mercoeur devant la ville de Craon, en Anjou.” Paris: 1592. “Discours véritable de la defaicte des Lorrans devant Beaumont, par M. le duc de Bouillon ... le mercredy 4e jour d’octobre 1592.” Châlons: 1592. “Discours véritable de la desfaicte des reistres protestans à Aulneau.” Paris: 1587. “Discours véritable de la mort du sieur de la Valette, tué au siège de Rocque-brunette en Provence, 1592.” Paris: 1592. “Discours véritable des cérémonies, feux de joye, solemnitez, et autres resiouissances publiques, faictes en la ville de Tolose, sur sa réduction à l’obeyssance du trés-Chrestien Henry quatriesme Roy de France & de Navarre.” Lyons: 1596. “Discours véritable des Particularitez qui se sont passées en la réduction de la ville de Marseille, en l’obeissance du Roy.” Avignon: 1596. “Discours véritables de la routte & desfaicte des Maréchaux de Camp de l’armée du cardinal d’Autriche, qui venoyent pour le secours d’Amiens, advenue le xxix. Aoust, M.D. XCVII.” N.p.: 1597. “Du Devoir de la Noblesse Françoise vers son Roy.” N.p.: c. 1594. “Édict et déclaration de Monseigneur le duc de Mayenne et le Conseil général de la Saincte Union pour reunir tous vrais chrestiens français à la défence et conservation de l’Église catholique, ap.[ostolique] et rom.[ane] et manutention de l’Estat royal.” Paris: 1589. “Estat et desnombrement des deux armées qui sont à présent en Lorrane. Avecq les noms des chiefz qui ont chargé esdictes armées tant de cavalerie que d’infanterie.” Lyons: 1591. “Estats des régimens des compagnies de gens de guerre à pied françoys que le roi à retenuz pour son service, et les lieux ou il leur à este ordonné de s’acheminer et servir.” Le Mans: 1588. “Extraict des mémoires de M. Pierre du Four l’Evesque, adressé à Messieures les convoquez & deputez par le Roy, pour le reiglement des principaux affairs de son Royaume.” Rouen: 1596. “Extraict des nouvelles envoyées de Meleun le xviii. de May, 1592. de ce qui s’est passé es armées de Normandie, depuis le x. dudit mois.” N.p.: 1592. “Extraict d’une lettre que Monsieur le Duc de Montmorency à escripte au Roy, contenant au vray la deffaicte du Duc de Joyeuse prés la ville de Villemur en Languedoc, le xxviii jour d’Octobre, mil cinq cens quatre vingts et douze.” Châlons: 1592. “Extraict du procès criminel faict à Pierre Barrière, dict La Barre ... accusé de l’horrible et exécrable paricide et assassint par luy entrepris et attente contre la personne du roy.” Melun: 1593.

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435 Bibliography “Harangue de messire Urbain de Saint Gelays, chevalier de l’Ordre de France, sieur de Boisdauphin, Gouverneur & Lieutenant général en Picardie, en l’absence de Monseigneur le Duc d’Aumâle.” Lyons: 1592. “Harangue et Déclaration faite par le Roy Henri Quatriesme de ce nom, par le grace de Dieu, Roy de France et de Navarre.” N.p.: 1589. “Harangue faitte au Roy par monsieur de Fedeau au nom des Églises reformées de France, avec la réponse de Sa Majesté du 12. Decembre 1593.” N.p.” 1594. Henri IV. “The Lettres Pattents of the Kings Declaration for the referring of the general assemblie of the Princes, Cardinals, Dukes and Peeres, as well Ecclesiasticall as Temporall, the officers of the Crowne, the Lords, Gentlemen, officers and others, unto the 15 day of March next comming (22 December 1589.” London: 1589. “Instruction du Roy à messieurs les Gouverneurs et Lieutenants Généraux des Provinces et pays de Sa Majesté, avec une autre lettre de Sa Majesté, adressante à Messieurs du Clergé de Tours.” Tours: 1589. “Intimidations faictes par le Duc de Sessio, Ambassadeur du Roy d’Espagne, pour détourner le Pape de la bonne volunté qu’il avoit de recevoir Henry IIII. de ce nom, Roy de France & de Navarre, au giron de l’Eglise.” Lyons: 1594. “La Cause du Roy de France contre les pernicieuses Maximes & Conclusions des Ligueurs Rebelles.” Tours: 1593. “La Contre-Barricade d’un bon François, vray Zelateur de la Religion & repos de sa partie, pour la déffence de l’Illustrissime Duc de Nemours, Pair de France, contre les calomnies de ses adversaires envoyée à la ville de Lyon.” N.p.: 1593. “La Déclaration faite par le Roi de Navarre, le xi iour de Aoust, M.D.X.C.” N.p.: 1590. “La Deffaite de l’armée espagnolle, par Monsieur de Bouillon, devant la Ferte sur Cher.” Paris: 1595. “La Harangue faicte par Monseigneur le Duc de Mayenne aux Capitaines et Soldats de son armée.” Paris: 1589. “L’Antiespagnol, et Exhortation de ceux de Paris, qui se veulent faire Espagnols: à tous les François de leur party, de se remettre en l’obeissance du Roy Henry 4. & se delivrer de la tyrannie de Castille.” N.p.: 1593. “La Prophetie merveilleuse, contenant au vray les choses plus mémorables qui sont à advenir, depuis ceste année Mil cinq cens quatre vingts-dix, iusques en l’année Mil cinq cens quatre vingts-dixhuict, lesquelles n’ont esté encor mis en lumière.” N.p.: 1598. “La Suspension d’armes accordée par tout le royaume, par M.M. les députez du roy, avec ceux du duc de Mercoeur.” Paris: 1597. “Le Fleau de Henry soy disant Roy de Navarre.” Paris: 1589. “Le Manifeste de Monsieur de Vitry, gouverneur de Meaux, à la Noblesse de France.” N.p.: 1594.

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436 Bibliography “L’entrée de trés-grand, trés-chrestien, trés-magnanime, et victorieux prince Henry IIII. Roy de France et de Navarre. en sa bonne ville de Lyon, Le IIII Septembre l’an M.D.XCV. de son règne le VII ... Contenant l’ordre et la description des magnificences dressées pour cette occasion Par l’ordonnance de Messieurs les Consuls et Eschevins de ladicte ville.” Lyons: 1595. “Le recueil des excellens et libres discours sur l’estat présent de la France.” N.p.: 1598. “Les Cruautez commises contre les Catholicques de la ville de Vendosme, par le Roy de Navarre.” Paris: 1589. “Lettre de Monsieur [Jean] Bodin.” Paris: 1590. “Lettre des Etats Généraux assembléz à Paris, aux Provences & villes Catholiques de ce Royaume.” Paris: 1594. “Lettre d’un écclésiastique à un sien Seigneur et amy, sur les difficultez que les Ecclésiastiques d’Angiers et autres Ligueurs font de prester serment de fidelité au Roy Henri IIII.” Tours: 1589. “Lettre d’un Fidèle François, escrite du camp d’Evry la Chaussée, du septiesme de Février dernier, à quelques siens amis à Tours.” Tours: 1590. “Lettre d’un Gentilhomme déclarant les Raisons pour lesquelles il s’est depuis le douziesme de May départy de l’armée de Navarrois.” Paris: 1590. “Lettre du roi à M. de Thomassin, commandant de la ville de Châlons, sur la réduction de Paris, datée du 22 Mars.” N.p.: 1594. “Lettre du Roy envoyée à Messieurs de la Cour de Parlement, sur la réduction de la ville de Lyon.” Tours: 1594. “Lettre du Sieur de Lamet, Gouverneur de Coucy, Contenant son réunion au party Catholique, escrite à un Gentilhomme de la suite du Roy de Navarre.” Paris: 1591. “Lettre envoyée par Messieurs de la ville de Rheims, à Nosseigneurs les députéz des Estats de France assembléz en la ville de Paris pour l’eslections d’un Roy Catholique.” 26 May 1593. Paris: 1593. “Lettre Escrite par les députéz des Princes, Officiers de la Couronne, & autres Seigneurs Catholiques qui recognaissent le Roy, pour la Conférence faict à Suresne, & autres lieux. Aux Députéz de l’Assemblée qui est à présent à Paris, du xxiii. Iour de Iuin, 1593.” Lyons: 1594. “Lettre escritte à Madame la Duchesse de Nevers, par un des domestiques de monseigneur son mary, contenant ce qui s’est passé en Champaigne, depuis le premier iusques au huictiesme Octobre 1591.” N.p.: 1591. “Lettres de Monseigneur Caietan, Legat collateral de nostre sainct Pere le Pape, au Royaume de France.” Lyons: 1590. “Lettres escrites à Nostre Sainct Père le Pape et Briefs de Sa Sainctété.” Lyons: 1590. “Lettres escritte par les Princes et Noblesse de France à monseigneur le card.[inal] de Mont’Alto, par le duc de Pinay dit de Luxembourg, envoye

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437 Bibliography par lesdits Princes & Nobless à N.[otre] S.[aint] Père le Pape, sur les affaires & occurances de ce temps.” Paris: 1590. “Lettres interceptes envoyées par un Gentilhomme de Seigneur de Vitry, à des Portes, Sécretaire du Sieur de Mayenne.” N.p.: 1594. “Le vray discours sur la route et admirable desconfiture des Reystres ... par la vertu et prouesse de Mgr. le duc de Guyse à Angerville, 27 nov.[embre].” Lyons: 1587. Matthieu, Pierre. “Harangue aux consuls et peuple de Lyon. Du devoir & obéissance des subjects envers le Roy et du soing perpetuel de la Providence de Dieu sur ceste Monarchie Française.” Lyons: 1594. Mornay, Philippe Duplessis-Marley, sieur de. “An advertisement from a French Gentleman, touching the intention and meaning which those of the house of Guise have in their late levying of forces and armes in the realme of France, written as an answere to a certaine Déclaration published in the name of the cardinal of Bourbon.” London: 1585. – “A déclaration exhibited to the French King by hys Court of Parlyment concerning the Holy League. Whereunto is adioyned: An advertisement to the three estates of Fraunce, comprehending a true report of such occurances as have passéd betweene the house of Guize, in favour of the Holy League; and the King of Navarre & his adherents for their necessarie defence.” London: 1587. – “A letter written by a French Catholike Gentleman, conteyning à briefe awnsere to the slaunders of a certaine pretended Englishman.” London: 1589. “Newes from France.” London: 1591. “Newes from Rome, Spaine, Palermo, Geneuae, and France.” London: 1590. “Newes latelie come on the last day of February 1591, from diverse parts of France, Savoy, and Tripoly in Soria. Truelie translated out of the French and Italian copies, as they were sent to right Honourable persons.” London: 1591. “Ordinances set foorth by the King, for the rule and governement of his Maiesties men of warre.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1591. “Ordonnance de Monsieur le comte de Brissac Mareschal de France et Gouverneur de la ville de Paris, Messieurs les Prévost des Marchands et Eschevins d’icelle.” Paris: 1594. Orléans, Louis d’. “Advertissement d’un Catholique anglois aux catholiques françois.” Paris: 1589. Pigenat, Fr. Jean. “L’Aveuglement et Grande inconsideration des Politiques, dites Maheutres, lesquels veulent introduire Henry de Bourbon, iadis Roy de Navarre, à la Couronne de France, à cause de sa prétendue succession.” Paris: 1592. “Présentation des Lettres de provision du Gouvernement de Guyenne, octroyé par le Roy à Monsieur le Prince.” Paris: 1597.

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438 Bibliography “Propos et Devis en forme de dialogue, tenuz entre le Sire Claude Bourgeois de Paris, & le Sieur D’O, servants d’instruction à ceux qui sortent de la ville de Paris, pour aller demeurer es villes de party contraire.” Paris: 1591. “Protestation et déclaration du roy de Navarre sur la venue de son armée en France.” n.p.: 1587. “Raisons des Politiques qui veullent faire Henry de Bourbon Roy de France, & celles des Catholiques, par lesquelles est prouvé qu’il ne le droit estre: Avec les reponses aux arguments et répliques des Biarnois.” Lyons: 1590. Raynssant, O. “Représentation de la Noblesse Hérétique sur le théatre de France.” Paris: 1591. “Recueil de ce qui s’est passé en la Conférence des sieurs Cardinal de Gondy et Archévesque de Lyon avec le Roy.” N.p.: 1590. “Réddition de la ville d’Amiens à l’obeissance du Roy, le 25. Septembre, 1597. Avec un discours sur les utilités, biens, & commodités qui en reviennent à la France.” N.p.: 1597. “Réddition de la ville d’Amiens à sa Majeste le 25. September 1597. Ensemble un Discours sur les utilitéz, biens & commoditez qui en reviennant à la France.” Lyon: 1597. “Remonstrance à Messieurs de l’Assemblée tenue à Rouen, par le commandment du Roy au mois de Novembre 1596. par M. René Benoist Conseiller Confesseur du Roy, & nomme par Sa Majesté à l’Evesche de Troyes.” Rouen: 1596. “Remonstrance aux François, sur la conversion de Henry de Bourbon, IIII de ce nom, trés-chrestien Roy de France & de Navarre.” Lyons: 1594. “Remonstrance aux Gentils-Hommes Casaniers. Pour les induire de se rendre à l’armes au service du Roy.” Paris: 1597. “Remonstrance et suplication faicte au Roy, pour la Religion Catholique, Apostolique, & Romane.” Bordeaux: 1591. “Remonstrances à la supplication faicte au Roy de se faire Catholique.” N.p.: 1591. “Remonstrances à Monseigneur le Duc de Mayenne, Lieutenant général de l’Estat, & Couronne de France.” n.p.: 1593. “Remonstrances to the Duke de Mayne.” London: 1593. “Remonstrances, to the duke de Mayne: Lieutenant Generall of the Estate and Crowne of Fraunce. Wherein, by way of information, are discussed divers privaties, concerning the proceedings and affayres of that Duke and his associates.” London: 1593. “Resolution de Messieurs de la Faculté de Théologie de Paris.” Paris: 1590. “Response à la lettre, contenant le Discours véritable sur la prinse des armes et changements advenus en la ville de Lyon, le xviii. de Septembre M.D.XCIII. servant d’advertissement.” N.p.: 1593. “Response à une lettre envoyée à Paris après la prise des armes par Monsieur du Bouchaige.” Paris: 1592.

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439 Bibliography “Response aux lettres envoyées par le Duc de Lorraine, tant aux habitants de la Ville de Langres, qu’à quelques Gentilshommes par la France, pour les solliciter à se rebeller contre leur Roy.” N.p.: 1589. Ribbier, M. “Sur l’Edict du mois d’Avril 1598. publié le XXV. Février 1599.” N.p.: 1599. “Second Remonstrance à la Noblesse Catholique qui tient le party du Roy de Navarre.” Lyons: 1590. “Sommaire discours au vray de ce qui est advenu en l’armée du roy trés chrestien depuis que le duc de Parme s’est ioint à celle des énnémis, jusques au 15. de Sept.[embre]. Envoyé par Sa Majesté à Mons. de Beauvoir ... à Londres.” London: 1590. “The besieging and yeelding up of Chartres on the 19. day of April 1591.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1591. “The continuall following of the French king upon the Duke of Parma, the Duke of Guise, the Duke of Maine, and their Armies.” Translated by E. White. London: 1592. “The Contre-Guise.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1589. “The Contre-League.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1589. “The Copie of a Letter sent by the French King to the people of Artoys and Henault, requesting them to remoove the forces gathered by the king of Spaine, from the Borders of France, otherwise denouncing open warre.” London: 1595. “The Coppie of the Anti-Spaniard, made at Paris by a Frenchman, a Catholique.” London: 1590. “The Déclaration of the King of Navarre, touching the slaunders published against him in the protestations of those of the League that are rysen up in armes in the realme of Fraunce.” London: 1585. “The déclarations as well of the French King, as of the King of Navarre. Concerning the truce agreed upon betweene their Maiesties: and touching the passage of the river Loire.” London: 1589. “The Discoverer of France.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1590. “The King of Navarres Déclaration at the Passage of the River of Loire for the service of his Majestie. The 18. of Aprill. 1589.” London: 1589. “The Kings Déclaration, Importing a Revocation of all such Letters for Ennoblishment, as have not been verified in the Chamber of accounts of Normandy.” London: 1591. “The Letters Pattents of the Kings Declaration for the referring of the general assemblie of the Princes, Cardinals, Dukes and Peeres, as well Ecclesiasticall as Temporall, the officers of the Crowne, the Lords, Gentlemen, oficers and others, unto the 15. day of March next comming.” 22 December 1589. London: 1589. “The oration and declaration of the French King, Henrie the fourth of that name, and by the grace of God King of Navarre ... to the lords and gentle-

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440 Bibliography men of his armie, before the citie of Paris, the eight day of ... August 1590 [sic].” London: 1590. “The order of ceremonies observed in the annointing and coronation of the most Christian King of France & Navarre Henry the IIII. of that name, celebrated in Our Lady Church, in the Cittie of Chartres upon Sonday the 27. of February 1595.” Translated by Edward Aggas. London: 1594. “The whole and true discourse of the enterprises and secret conspiracies that have been made against the person of Henry of Valois ... king of France and Poland. whereupon followed his death.” London: 1589. “Three Letters written by the King of Navarre, first Prince of the bloud and Chiefe Peere of France to the States of the Cleargie, Nobilitie and third estate of France.” London: 1586. “Traicté de la iuste et canonique Absolution de Henry IIII. Très-Chrestien Roy de France & de Navarre.” Paris: 1595. “True newes, concerning the winning of the town of Corbeyll by the French King from the Prince of Parma, which was doone on S. Martins even at night last past 1590.” London: 1590. Vauprivas du Verdier, Antoine de. “Discours sur la réduction de la ville de Lyon à l’obéissance du Roy.” Lyons: 1594. “Vértible Narration de ce qui s’est passé depuis la prise des fauxbourgs de Paris sur la fin d’Octobre 1589. iusques au mois de Iuillet 1593.” Paris: 1593. “Vray Discours, de la Réduction de la ville de Marseilles, en l’obeissance du Roy, le Samedy 17 Fevrier, 1596.” Marseilles: 1596.

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441 Bibliography Cuignet, Jean-Claude. L’Itinéraire d’Henri IV. Paris: 1997. Delteil, Joseph. Le Vert-Galant. Paris: n.d. Duhoureau, François. Henri IV. Liberateur et restaurateur de la France. Paris: 1941. Elbée, Jean d’. Le Miracle d’Henri IV. Lyons: 1942. Estailleur-Chanteraine, Philippe d’. Henri IV Roi de France et de Navarre. Paris: 1954. Feret, abbé P. Henri IV et l’Église catholique. Paris: 1875. Garrisson-Estèbe, Janine. Henri IV. Paris: 1984. Gaudet, Joseph. Henri IV, sa vie, son oeuvre, ses écrits. Paris: 1879. Halphen, Eugène. Enquête sur le baptême d’Henri IV (1599). Paris. 1878. Henri de Navarre et le royaume de France, 1572–1598. Pau: 1984. Hurst, Quentin. Henry of Navarre. London: 1937. Jackson, Lady. The First of the Bourbons. 2 vols. London: 1840. James, G.P.R. The Life of Henry the Fourth, King of France and Navarre. 2 vols. New York: 1847. Jousset, abbé Pierre-Joseph. Henri IV et son temps. Tours: 1893. Lacombe, Charles Mercier de. Henri IV et sa politique. Paris: 1860. Lanux, Pierre de. La Vie d’Henri IV. Paris: 1927. Leathes, Sir Stanley. “Henry IV of France.” The Cambridge Modern History. Edited by Sir A.W. Ward et al. Vol. III. Cambridge: 1934. Lévis-Mirepois, duc de. Henri IV roi de France et de Navarre. Paris: 1971. Mahoney, Irene. Royal Cousin: The Life of Henri IV of France. New York: 1970. Musset-Pathay, V.-D. Vie militaire et privée de Henri IV ... d’après ses lettres inédites ... précédée d’une notice sur Corisandre, et d’un précis des amours de Henri IV; avec des notes historiques. Paris: 1803. Panegyrique de Henri le Grand, ou Éloge Historique de Henri IV, Roi de France et de Navarre. London: 1769. Pastoret, M. de. Des moyens mis en usage par Henri IV, pour s’assurer la couronne, et pacifier la France au sortir des troubles civils. Paris: 1815. Pearson, Hasketh. Henry of Navarre. London: 1963. Poirson, Auguste. Histoire du règne de Henri IV. 4 vols. Paris: 1865. Reinhard, Marcel. Henri IV ou la France Sauvée. Paris: 1943. Roy, J.-J.-E. Histoire de Henri IV. Tours: 1859. Russell, Edward F.L. Henry of Navarre; Henry IV of France. New York: 1970. Sedgwick, Henry Dwight. Henry of Navarre. Indianapolis: 1930. Seward, Desmond. The First Bourbon. London: 1971. Slocombe, Georges. Henri IV, 1553–1610. Paris: 1933. Taillandier, A.H. Henri IV avant la messe. L’École d’un roi. Paris: 1934. Vaissière, Pierre de. Henri IV. Paris: 1925. Villette, marquis de. Éloge Historique de Henri IV, Roi de France. Amsterdam: 1770. Vioux, Marcelle. Henry of Navarre. Translated by J. Lewis May. New York: 1937. Volan-Revel, V.-Adolphe. Faites de Henri IV, surnommé le Grand, contenant l’histoire de la vie de ce prince, ses bons mots, saillies, et reparties heureuses, ses correspondances

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442 Bibliography tant avec ses maitresse qu’avec ses amis, et les vies de d’Aubigné, Lesdiquières, Mornay, Bassompierre et Crillon. Paris: 1815. Willert, Paul F. Henry of Navarre and the Huguenots in France. New York: 1893.

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443 Bibliography – “Une source sur la Saint-Barthélémy: L’Histoire de Monsieur de Thou,’ relue et décryptée.” Bulletin de la société de l’histoire du protestantism français, CXXXIV (1988): 499–537. – “Pour une histoire, enfin, de la Saint-Barthélémy.” Revue historique, CCLXXXXII (1989): 83–142. Boutaric, Edgard. Institutions Militaires de la France. Paris: 1863. Bouwsma, William J. “The Secularization of Society in the Seventeenth Century.” In Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Congress of Historical Sciences. Moscow: 1970. Brémond d’Ars, G. de. Les Conférences de Saint-Brice entre Henri de Navarre et Catherine de Médicis, 1586–7. Paris: 1854. Briggs, Robin. Early Modern France, 1560–1715. Oxford: 1977. – Communities of Belief. Oxford: 1989. Buckley, M.J. At the Origins of Modern Atheism. New Haven, Conn.: 1987. Buisseret, David. Sully and the Growth of Centralized Government in France, 1598–1610. London: 1968. Burke, Peter. The Historical Anthropology of Early Modern Italy: Essays on Perception and Communication. New York: 1987. Butler, A.J. “The Wars of Religion in France.” The Cambridge Modern History. Edited by Sir A.W. Ward et al. Vol. III. Cambridge: 1934. Carrias, Eugène. La Pensée Militaire Française. Paris: 1848. Carrion-Nisas, marquis de. Essai sur l’Histoire Générale de l’Art Militaire. Paris: 1824. Chadwick, Owen. The Reformation. Harmondsworth: 1972. Chamberlain, E.R. Marguerite of Navarre. New York: 1974. Chassignet, L.-M.-M. Institutions Militaires. Paris: 1869. Cloulas, Ivan. Catherine de Médicis. Paris: 1979. Constant, Jean-Marie. “La Pénétration des idées de la Réforme protestante dans la noblesse provinciale français à travers quelques examples.” In Les Réformes: Enracinement socio-culturel. XXVe colloque international d’études humanistes. Tours. Paris: 1985. Cornette, Joël. Historie de la France: l’affirmation de l’État absolu, 1515–1562. Paris: 1994. Crouzet, Denis. Les Guerriers de Dieu: La Violence au temps des troubles de religion, vers 1525–vers 1610. 2 vols. Paris: 1990. Dampierre, marquis E. de. Le Duc d’Épernon, 1554–1642. Paris: 1888. Daux, C. “L’abjuration d’Henri IV.” Revue des Questions historiques. LXVIII (1900): 217–31. Davidson, Nicholas. “Unbelief and Atheism in Italy, 1500–1700.” In Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment. Edited by Michael Hunter and David Wootton. Oxford: 1992: 55–86. Davis, Natalie Zemon. “The Rites of Violence.” In Society and Culture in Early Modern France. Stanford: 1965: 152–87.

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448 Bibliography Pascal, Adrien. Histoire de l’Armée. 3 vols. Paris: 1847. Patry, Raoul. Philippe du Plessis-Mornay, un huguenot homme d’État (1549–1623). Paris: 1933. Pennington, Donald, and Keith Thomas, eds. Puritans and Revolutionaries. Oxford: 1978. Perre, Jean. La Guerre et ses mutations des origines à 1792. Paris: 1961. Popkin, R.H. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. Berkeley: 1979. Potter, John Milton. “The Development and Significance of the Salic Law of the French.” English Historical Review, LII (1937): 235–53. Ranke, Leopold von. Civil Wars and Monarchy in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. 2 vols. New York: 1859. – History of the Popes. Translated by E. Fowler. 3 vols. New York: 1901. Ranum, Orest. Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII. Oxford: 1963. Revue Henri IV. 4 vols. Paris: 1912. Ritter, Raymond. “Le roi de Navarre et sa prétendue fuite de la cour en 1576.” Bulletin philologique et historique du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques, II (1969): 667–84. Rocquin, F. La France et Rome pendant les guerres de religion. Paris: 1924. Roelker, Nancy Lyman. Queen of Navarre – Jeanne d’Albret, 1528–1572. Cambridge, Mass.: 1968. – “The Appeal of Calvinism to French Noblewomen in the Sixteenth Century.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, II (1972): 391–419. Rose, Paul Lawrence. “Bodin and the Bourbon Succession to the French Throne, 1583–1594.” Sixteenth Century Journal, IX (1978): 75–98. Rothrock, George A. “The Constitutional Implications of the Bourbon Succession.” Canadian Journal of History, III (1968): 34–51. – The Huguenots: A Biography of a Minority. Chicago: 1979. Ruble, Baron Alphonse de. Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d’Albret. 4 vols. Paris: 1881–86. Sabean, David W. Power in the Blood: Popular Culture and Village Discourse in Early Modern Germany. Cambridge: 1984. Salmon, J.H.M. “Catherine dei Medici and the French Wars of Religion.” History Today, VI (1956): 297–306. – “Henri of Navarre.” History Today, VI (1956): 387–94. – The French Wars of Religion: How Important Were Religious Factors? Boston: 1967. – Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century. London: 1975. Saulnier, Eugène. Le rôle politique du cardinal de Bourbon, 1523–1590. Paris: 1912. Sedgwick, Henry Dwight. The House of Guise. New York: 1938. Shennan, J.H. The Parlement of Paris. Ithaca, N.Y.: 1968. Shimizu, June. Conflict of Loyalties: Politics and Religion in the Career of Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France, 1519–1572. Geneva: 1970. Sicard. Histoire des institutions militaires de la France. 4 vols. Paris: 1834.

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449 Bibliography Sichel, Edith. The Later Years of Catherine de’ Medici. London: 1969. Smith, Preserved. Reformation Europe. New York: 1962. Sommerville, C.J. “The Destruction of Religious Culture in Pre-Industrial England.” Journal of Religious History, XV (1988): 76–93. Sonnino, Paul. Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War. Cambridge: 1988. Spitz, Lewis W. The Renaissance and Reformation Movements. 2 vols. Chicago: 1971. Stankiewicz, W.J. Politics of Religion in Seventeenth-Century France. Toronto: 1960. Supple, J.J. “The Role of François de La Noue in the Siege of La Rochelle and the Protestant Alliance with the mécontents.” Bibliothèque d’humanisme et Renaissance, XLII (1981): 107–22. Susane, L.A.V.V. Histoire de l’ancienne infanterie française. 8 vols. Paris: 1849–56. Sutherland, Nicola M. The French Secretaries of State in the Age of Catherine de Medici. London: 1962. – The Massacre of St. Bartholomew and the European Conflict (1559–72). New York: 1973. – The Huguenot Struggle for Recognition. New Haven, Conn.: 1980 Thompson, James W. The Wars of Religion in France, 1559–1576. New York: 1957. Vaissière, Pierre de. “La conversion d’Henri IV.” Revue Historique de l’Église de France, XIV (1928): 43–68. Van Der Essen, Léon. Alexandre Farnese, Prince de Parme, Gouveneur Général des Pays-Bas (1545–1592). 5 vols. Brussels: 1937. Vienot, John. Histoire de la Réforme Française des origines à l’Édit de Nantes. Paris: 1926. Wilentz, Sean, ed. Rites of Power. Philadelphia: 1985. Williams, Adair G. “The Abjuration of Henry of Navarre.” Journal of Modern History. V (1933): 143–71. Wolfe, Martin. The Fiscal System of Renaissance France. New Haven, CT.: 1972. Wolfe, Michael. “The Conversion of Henri IV and the Origins of Bourbon Absolutism.” Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques, IV (1987): 287–309. – The Conversion of Henri IV: Politics, Power, and Religious Belief in Early Modern France. Cambridge, Mass.: 1993. Wootton, David. Paolo Sarpi: Between Renaissance and Enlightenment. Cambridge: 1983. – “Unbelief in Early Modern Europe.” History Workshop Journal, XX (1985): 82–100. – “Lucien Febvre and the Problem of Early Modern Unbelief.” Journal of Modern History, LXX (1988): 695–730. – “New Histories of Atheism.” In Atheism from the Reformation to the Enlightenment. Edited by Michael Hunter and David Wootton. Oxford: 1992: 13–54. Zeller, Gaston. “Gouverneurs de provinces au XVIe siècle.” Revue Historique, CLXXXV (1939): 225–56.

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Agrippa d’Aubigné, Théodore, 69, 70, 87, 97, 130, 150, 153, 159, 167, 168, 171, 267; and abjuration of Henri IV (1593), 276, 303, 304, 308 Albret, Jeanne d’, queen of Navarre, 28, 35, 36, 46, 58, 60; character, 52; religious profession, 18–19, 23, 24, 27; and sectarianism, 19; and blood and religion, 19, 25, 73, 265, 270, 275; and Antoine de Bourbon, 25, 26, 28–9; and religious policy in Béarn, 24–5, 53; and Huguenot leadership, 43–4, 97; and Catherine de Medici, 25, 46–7; and Henri de Navarre, 24, 29, 38–40, 45, 48–50, 71, 77–8, 83, 85, 103–4, 173; death of, 49, 51, 53, 54, 67, 75 Alençon, François de Valois, duc d’Anjou et d’, 62, 63, 65, 67, 91, 115, 118, 176; and Huguenot leadership, 78, 80, 82, 86–7, 93, 94; death of, 115, 116, 117, 121, 122, 148, 175 Amboise, Conspiracy of, 18, 26 Amboise, Edict of, 31 Angoulême, Charles de Valois, duc d’, 158, 165, 206, 224 Anjou, Henri de Valois, duc d’. See Henri III Arnay-le-duc, battle of, 44, 81 arquebusiers à cheval, 138, 195, 231

Arques, battle of, 180, 183, 273 Arros, Bernard d’, 54, 61 Augsburg, Peace of, 19, 101, 121 Aumâle, Charles de Lorraine, duc d’, 252, 299 Aumont, Jean maréchal d’, 163, 165, 199 Auneau, battle of, 144 Beaulieu, Treaty of, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 102, 108 Beauvoir, Louis de Goulard, sieur de, 24, 29, 48, 49, 53 Belin, comte de, 199, 264, 285 Bellegarde, Roger de, 148, 165 Bellièvre, Pomponne de, 62, 121, 122, 141, 145, 185, 188, 248, 264 Benoiste, Élie, 168 Bergerac, Treaty of, 92, 105, 112, 121, 126, 127, 213, 288, 301 Bèze, Théodore, 43, 95 Biron, Armand de Gontaud, maréchal de, 54, 113, 148; and Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 56; and military operations, 134, 139, 199, 222, 231, 232; and accession of Henri IV (1593), 159, 160, 165, 167; character, 165, 225, 239–40; death of, 239 Bordeaux, 61, 87, 104, 113, 143, 169 Bouillon, Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne,

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452 Index duc de, 63, 68, 93, 129, 139, 200, 214, 226, 239, 275; and abjuration of Henri IV (1593), 303 Bourbon, Antoine de, king of Navarre, 23, 25, 26, 34, 42, 52, 69, 71, 81; character, 27; religious profession, 27, 28; death of, 30; and Huguenot leadership, 97 Bourbon, Charles cardinal de, 23, 47, 60; and succession, 121, 124, 145, 153; death of, 190. See also “Charles X” Bourbon, Charles cardinal de Vendôme-, 123, 166, 211, 214, 225, 263, 268, 272, 277; and Tiers parti, 206–7, 207–8, 210, 224, 227 Bourges, René (or Renault) de Beaune, archbishop of, 226, 277, 292; and Gallicanism, 217; and Conference of Suresne, 264, 265, 266, 278, 281, 285; and instruction of Henri IV (1593), 289; and abjuration of Henri IV (1593), 293–4 Brûlart de Sillery. See Sillery Burghley, Sir Robert Cecil, Lord, 233 Cajetan, cardinal, papal legate, 193, 194 Calvin, John, 18–19, 35, 42, 43, 72, 74, 77, 85, 86, 90, 95, 115 Calvinism, 11, 19, 35, 124. See also Huguenots; religious culture Casimir, John, Count Palatine, 80, 93 Catherine de Bourbon, 36, 53, 207, 225 Catherine de Medici, 18, 25, 26, 43, 45, 60, 62, 63, 65, 68, 69, 76, 79, 80, 83, 105, 112, 125, 127, 173, 263; as regent, 26–8, 64; and François d’Alençon, 93–4; and Henri de Navarre, 30–1, 121, 140–1, 146; and Jeanne d’Albret, 30–2, 46–7; death of, 146 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, 84 Charles IX, 18, 32, 33, 61, 62, 63, 65, 68, 78; and marriage of Henri de Navarre (1572), 45, 47, 49, 57; and conversion of Henri de Navarre (1572), 56, 57; and succession issue, 176; death of, 64 “Charles X,” 153, 183, 206. See also Charles cardinal de Bourbon Chartres, 294; siege of, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 213, 221–2, 227; and council of bishops, 224, 251 Châtel, Jean, 302

Châtillon, François de Coligny, comte de, 159, 239 Cheverny, Philippe Hurault, comte de, 145, 185, 226, 263, 275, 295 Chrestien, Florent, 37 Clément, Jacques, 147, 152, 182 Clement VIII, pope, 251, 282, 297; and Henri IV, 249, 250, 269, 295, 296; and League Estates General (1593), 261 Clovis, king of the Franks, 175, 186, 256 Coligny, Gaspard de, amiral de France, 33, 46, 47, 53, 61, 99, 159, 239, 240; and Huguenot leadership, 41, 44, 97, 102; assassination of, 54, 55 Condé, Henri de Bourbon, prince de, 38, 46, 54, 56, 57, 59, 62, 64, 65, 91, 112, 131, 135, 135; and Huguenot leadership, 78, 79, 81, 86–7, 92, 93, 96–7, 98, 137–8; and sectarianism, 76, 99, 104 Condé, Louis de Bourbon, prince de, 26, 31, 32, 33, 40, 41, 42, 44, 46, 59, 79, 81, 206, 240; assassination of, 43; and Huguenot leadership, 97, 102 Conti, François de Bourbon, prince de, 54, 278 Coutras, battle of, 143, 144, 273 cuius regio, euius religio, 121 Dallington, Robert, 241, 246 Damours, Gabriel, 277 Davila, Enrico, 240, 259, 260, 282 Day of the Barricades, 144–5 Declarations of Saint Cloud, 8, 151, 163–4, 173, 177, 181, 185, 246, 249 Dombes, prince de, 168 Du Maistre, Jean, 264, 284 Duplessis-Mornay, Philippe, 63, 95, 125, 134, 138, 146, 218, 288; and sectarianism, 105; and accession of Henri IV, 158, 213; and royalist Catholics, 239, 245, 248; on Henri IV’s military leadership, 241, 242; and negotiations with the League, 244, 247, 248, 261; and abjuration of Henri IV (1593), 276, 304, 307 Elizabeth I, queen of England, 46, 128, 180, 203, 220, 228, 241, 242, 273, 309 English ambassadors: Dr Valentine Dale, 64, 68; Sir Thomas Edmondes, 273,

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453 Index 275, 279, 280, 287, 295; Sir Thomas Stafford, 134, 146; Sir Henry Unton, 200, 223, 225, 226, 227, 233, 241, 242; Richard Wagmor, 137; John Wells, 180; Thomas Wilkes, 222 Épernon, Jean-Louis Nogaret de La Valette, duc d’, 70, 114, 134, 148, 199, 225, 239; and Henri de Navarre, 121, 132–3; and sectarianism, 89, 226, 235; and Holy Catholic League, 125, 145, 169; and accession of Henri IV, 167–8; and Tiers parti, 206, 224 Estates General: Blois (1576–77), 108, 120, 122, 256; Blois (1588), 145, 256; Paris (1593), 221, 250, 251, 253, 254, 263, 264, 266, 267, 270, 286; delegates to, 260, 263, 278; and Salic Law, 260; and abjuration of Henri IV (1593), 282 Estrées, Gabrielle d’, 202, 291, 293 Evreux, Jacques Davy du Perron, bishop of, 276, 277, 289 Faith and Works, doctrine of, 72, 73–4, 75. See also religious culture Fleix, Treaty of, 93, 114, 213 François Ier, 18, 21, 124, 300 François II, 18, 26 Gallican Church and Gallicanism, 135, 136, 158, 160, 186, 187, 193, 211, 212, 216, 217, 218, 223, 248, 266 gens d’armes, 138, 231 Givry, sieur de, 159, 196, 199 Gondi, Albert cardinal de, 191, 192, 245, 249 Gourdon, vicomte (later comte) de, 28, 37, 38, 88, 89, 133, 173, 277 Grammont, Corisande d’Andoins, comtesse de, 144, 145, 174, 273 Gregory XIII, pope, 57, 50, 135 Gregory XIV, pope, 214, 217; and excommunication of Henri IV, 205, 208, 209, 214; and Gallican reaction, 212, 223; and reaction of royalist parlements, 216; and Holy Catholic League, 208; and relations with Henri IV, 210–11, 212–13, 216; death of, 218, 249 Guise, Charles de Lorraine, duc de, 252, 258, 296

Guise, François de Lorraine, duc de, 28, 67 Guise, Henri de Lorraine, duc de, 4, 114, 117, 124, 134, 138, 165; and sectarianism, 76, 99, 111; and Henri de Navarre, 66, 67, 68, 70, 101; and Henri III, 125, 142; and battle of Auneau, 144; assassination of, 118, 145 Guise, House of, 18, 26, 45, 56, 67, 83, 98, 99, 102, 111, 115, 124, 132, 140, 167 Guitry, sieur de, 63, 156, 239 Harlay de Sancy, Achille, 160–1, 163, 165, 166 Henri II, 18, 26, 45, 154 Henri III, 4, 79, 112, 113, 115, 134, 138, 158, 167, 168, 169, 216, 249, 268, 288; as duc d’Anjou, 30, 62; and election to Polish Crown, 63; and French accession, 64; and blood and religion, 176; on religious conformity, 108; and succession issue, 122, 153, 176; and the Guises, 98, 142; and Holy Catholic League, 94, 117, 119, 124, 125, 127, 134, 140, 142, 144–5; and toleration, 103; and François d’Alençon, 80, 94; and Henri de Navarre, 65, 68, 69, 122, 176; assassination of, 118, 147–8, 149, 154, 155, 171, 177, 182, 258, 259, 301; burial of, 171–2 Henri IV, 3–4; accession (1589), 118, 119–20, 147–8, 150–6, 164, 177, 258; views of French monarchy, 77, 113, 121, 156–8, 172, 181, 201, 247, 270–1, 274, 285, 298, 299, 306, 307, 309; religious profession, 5–9, 13–14, 16, 120, 151, 154, 161, 162, 171, 177, 185, 201, 213, 219, 220–1, 238–9, 243–4, 253–4, 264, 268, 273–4, 289–93, 305–7, 308, 309; and toleration, 157, 246, 306, 307; and blood and religion, 162, 164, 221, 245–6, 254, 275, 307, 309; and Huguenot leadership, 162, 213–14, 226, 237, 287, 292, 294, 303; and military leadership, 177, 178, 179, 182, 183, 184, 188, 189–90, 190–3, 195–6, 197–8, 202, 203–5, 219, 220, 221–2, 229–33, 239, 240–2; and Paris, 196–7, 198,

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454 Index 202–3, 220, 221, 228, 286; and royalist Catholics, 148, 150, 152, 153, 159–62, 163–4, 164–7, 172, 177–8, 179–80, 183, 187, 194, 195, 199–201, 207, 210, 212, 218, 219–20, 222–4, 225–6, 228, 234–5, 236–8, 242, 246–7, 251, 261, 268, 269–70, 271–2, 278, 281, 285, 287; and Tiers parti, 206–7, 208, 210, 225; and Holy Catholic League, 126, 170, 182, 200, 219, 220, 223–4, 243–4, 245, 251–2, 285, 297, 298–300; and duc de Mayenne, 172, 196, 204, 227, 243, 244–5, 245, 257–8, 267, 279, 296, 300–1; and duke of Parma, 192, 195–6, 197, 199, 220, 221, 222, 228, 229, 230–3; and conversion controversy, 4, 5, 8, 15, 23, 157–8, 163, 173–4, 177, 178, 181, 182, 185–6, 186–7, 188–9, 194, 201, 202, 209–10, 215, 220, 221, 223, 227–8, 237–8, 252, 261; and League Estates General (1593), 260, 261–2, 278; and conference of Suresne, 266–7; and “perilous leap,” 291–2; abjuration (1593), 271, 272–3, 275–8, 279–81, 287, 288–9, 293–4, 295, 297, 302, 305, 307–8; and Catholic reactions, 4–5, 281, 282; assassination of, 302, 304. See also Henri de Navarre Henry VIII, king of England, 110 Holy Catholic League, 4, 11, 111, 130–2, 167, 177, 178, 182, 183, 190, 204; formation (1576), 94; formation (1585), 124; and Henri III, 117, 125; and conversion issue, 186–7; and blood and religion, 271; view of French monarchy, 270; and papacy, 194, 205; and Rouen, 228; and abjuration of Henri IV (1593), 285 Holy Roman Empire, 19, 64, 101, 125, 128, 141 Huguenots, 11, 18, 49, 60, 67, 68; and Antoine de Bourbon, 27, 42; and Louis de Condé, 42; and François d’Alençon, 80; and Henri de Navarre, 89, 90, 91; and princely leadership, 41, 61, 96–7; and Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 55, 56; and republicanism, 73, 80–1, 95, 98; and religious conformity, 21; and sectarianism, 98, 101, 104–5, 109, 303; and abjuration of Henri IV (1593), 292, 294, 303, 304

Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia of Spain, 154, 255, 257, 258, 261, 276, 282, 284 Innocent IX, pope, 249 Ivry, battle of, 9, 14, 178, 179, 190, 193, 194, 204, 219, 220, 227, 230, 274; and Henri IV’s views of, 184, 273; and Holy Catholic League, 184, 185, 203, 228, 285; and Paris, 187, 188, 189; and Sixtus V, 185, 189 January, Edict of, 19, 26–7, 28, 47 Jarnac, battle of, 43, 44, 59, 81 Jeannin, President Pierre, 184, 244, 259, 260, 264, 296 Joinville, Treaty of, 124 Journée des Farines, 198–9, 202 Joyeuse, Ange maréchal de, 199–200, 308 Joyeuse, Anne duc de, 114, 125, 134, 139, 142, 143, 144 Justification by Faith, doctrine of, 72–3, 86. See also John Calvin; religious culture La Châtre, Claude comte de, 296 La Faye, Antoine de, 292, 293 La Force, Jacques Nompar de Caumont, duc de, 95, 150, 153 La Gaucherie, François, 24, 34, 35, 36 La Huguerye, Michel de, 109 La Mothe-Fénélon, Bertrand de, 40, 46 Landriano, Marcello, papal nuncio, 208, 211, 212 La Noue, François de, 41, 93, 97, 209, 210, 239 La Rochelle, 41, 44, 61, 63, 68, 89–90, 97, 129, 138, 139, 142, 143 Lavardin, Jean de Beaumanoir, comte de, 70, 167, 206 Le Mans, Claude d’Angennes, bishop of, 276, 289 L’Estoile, Pierre de, 240, 282, 285, 288, 289 L’Hôpital, Michel de, 103, 239 Lorraine, Charles de Guise, cardinal de, 23, 48, 67 Lorraine, Charles duc de, 267, 272 Louis IX, king of France, 21, 175, 260 Louis XII, king of France, 299 Louis XIII, king of France, 15, 39, 84 Louis XIV, king of France, 7, 15

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455 Index Louise de Vaudémont, dowager queen of France, 155, 182, 301 “Lovers’ War,” 92, 113 Luther, Martin, 107, 115 Luxembourg, François de Piney, duc de, 172, 183, 185, 193, 194, 209, 211, 212, 217, 249 Lyons, Pierre d’Épinac, archbishop of, 170, 191, 192, 264, 266, 285; and blood and religion, 265, 278, 282 Malcontents, 56, 62, 63, 64, 67, 80, 87, 88, 97, 106. See also politiques Mantes, Edicts of, 213–15, 217, 218, 226, 227, 263 Marguerite de Valois, 26, 49, 53, 56, 60, 68, 84, 93, 146 Marie de Medici, 84 Matignon, Jacques de Torigny, maréchal de, 114, 134, 138, 143, 144, 164, 168, 201, 211 Mayenne, Charles de Lorraine, duc de, 145, 147, 165, 172, 183, 199, 211, 218, 247, 248, 282, 284, 295; character, 270; and Henri de Navarre, 66, 67, 155, 189, 192; and League leadership, 161, 178, 252, 253, 254, 257; and military leadership, 134, 138, 180, 190, 203, 227, 228, 233, 235, 286; and Tiers parti, 206, 224; and Spain, 177, 259, 261; and Henri IV, 179, 182, 254, 257–8, 272, 296, 300–1; and the duke of Parma, 205, 221, 222; and the battle of Ivry, 184, 273; and League Estates General (1593), 254–6, 258–9, 259–60, 270; views of French monarchy, 256–7, 259, 294; and abjuration of Henri IV (1593), 283, 294 Mercoeur, Philippe-Emanuel de Lorraine, duc de, 168, 169 Miossens, Henri d’Albret, baron de, 67 monarchy of France, 5, 16, 77, 148–9, 264–5; absolutism, 158, 302–3; and blood and religion, 19; and Calvinism, 73, 95–6; and Catholicism, 74, 75, 120, 149–50, 160, 175–6, 186, 209, 254–5, 256–7, 270, 301–2; religious aspects, 13, 21–3, 164, 173 Moncontour, battle of, 44, 81 Monsieur, Peace of. See Treaty of Beaulieu Montaigne, Michel de, 89, 103

Montluc, Blaise de, 35, 44 Montmorency, Anne connétable de, 28 Montmorency, François duc de, 56 Montmorency, Henri duc et connétable de, 80, 87, 114, 131, 132, 166, 197, 204, 263, 296; and Huguenots, 97–8; and toleration, 106; and Henri de Navarre, 105–6, 107, 115 Montmorency-Damville, duc de. See Henri duc et connétable de Montmorency Montpensier, François de Bourbon, duc de, 132, 141, 239, 279 Morely, Jean-Baptiste, 36, 37 Mornay, Charlotte d’Arbaleste, Mme de, 129, 306, 307 Nantes, Edict of, 19, 303, 304 Nassau, Louis of, 65 Nassau, Maurice of, 197 Navarre, Henri de, king of Navarre; birth of, 18; baptism of, 23; and blood and religion, 19, 25, 76, 118, 120, 176; character, 39, 40, 52, 83–4, 90–1; contemporary descriptions, 37, 40, 52; childhood, 25–6; religious profession, 19–20, 29–31, 37, 48–50, 51, 56, 57, 58–60, 66, 70, 71, 75, 76–7, 81, 84–6, 88, 89, 91, 103–4, 107–8, 109, 110–11, 117, 122–3, 126, 130, 136; and toleration, 76, 77, 78, 91–2, 99–102, 103–4, 105, 107–9, 109–10, 110–11; and sectarianism, 37, 54, 61, 71, 75–6, 99; education/instruction (religious, academic, political and moral), 24, 33, 34, 36–7, 38, 41, 45, 71, 76, 77–8, 83, 85, 102, 118; and Antoine de Bourbon, 28–9, 29–30, 31; and Catherine de Medici, 30–1, 69; marriage, 26, 45, 46–8, 49, 53, 84; and Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 55, 56, 57–9, 75, 76, 99, 110, 118; conversion (1560), 19, 23; conversion (1562), 30; conversion (1563), 31; conversion (1572), 45, 48, 57, 58–60, 71; conversion (1576), 82, 84, 88–9, 91, 94; and rivalry with François d’Alençon, 65, 68, 82, 87–8, 91, 94–5; and rivalry with Henri de Condé, 82, 91, 92–3, 98, 137; and Henri III, 87, 109, 111–12, 113, 114, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125–6,

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456 Index 127, 129, 130–1, 132, 133, 135, 139–40, 141, 142, 143–4, 144, 145, 146–7, 177; and moderate Catholics, 83, 100, 104, 105–6; and the Valois Court/Crown, 25–6, 30–3, 63–70, 71, 75, 76, 79, 83, 91–2, 102, 111–13; and Holy Catholic League, 126, 130–2; and military apprenticeship/leadership, 34–5, 41, 81, 128, 134, 138–9, 141–2, 142–3; and Huguenot leadership, 25, 33, 38, 41–4, 51, 60–2, 63, 64, 75, 77–9, 80–4, 86–7, 89–90, 91, 92, 95, 96–7, 98–9, 100, 106, 114, 118, 126, 129–30, 134; and French royal succession, 100, 115, 116, 117, 119, 122, 126, 136, 175, 176; and conversion issue, 93, 121–2, 133, 140. See also Henri IV Nemours, Charles-Emanuel de Savoie, duc de, 145, 191, 199, 252, 258 Nemours, Treaty of, 127, 132, 133, 141, 213 Nevers, Ludovico de Gonzagua, duc de, 132, 185, 199, 201, 202, 203, 209, 211, 267, 296; and Holy Catholic League, 167, 169; and Tiers parti, 206; and conversion issue, 275 O, François marquis d’, 148, 267, 272; and accession of Henri IV, 150, 160; character, 165, 225; and Tiers parti, 206; and conversion issue, 275, 277 Ordre de Saint-Michel, 30, 60 Palma Cayet, Pierre-Victor, 24, 25, 33, 34, 37 Paris, 9, 33, 53, 55, 105, 112, 116, 125, 145, 147, 152, 180, 181, 187–8, 196–7, 198–9, 220, 252, 253, 260, 262, 266, 268, 288; and the Seize, 11; siege of (1589), 147, 170, 171; siege of (1590), 178, 187, 188, 189–90, 190–3, 195, 255; and abjuration of Henri IV (1593), 284, 295 parlements: Bordeaux, 113, 164, 168, 169; Châlons, 215, 216, 218, 249, 250; Normandy, 169; Paris, 133, 135, 136, 156, 161, 181, 252, 260, 287, 301, and Salic Law (1593), 283–4, 286; Tours, 210, 215, 216, 217, 218, 249, 261 Parma, Alexander Farnese, duke of, 178, 184, 192, 196, 202, 205, 206, 207,

222, 229–34, 235–6, 242, 251, 252, 255, 286; on Henri IV’s military skill, 231, 232, 235–6, 240–1; death of, 234, 237 Pasquier, Étienne, 139 Pellevé, cardinal de, 260, 262, 283 Péronne, Manifesto of, 125 Philip II, king of Spain, 29, 32, 170, 207, 229, 236, 260, 264, 282, 300, 309; and Antoine de Bourbon, 28; and Valois Crown, 33; and Henri de Navarre, 61, 115, 249; and Holy Catholic League, 124, 132, 172, 267; and papacy, 135, 164, 193, 208, 296; and French succession, 154; and duc de Mayenne, 184, 255 Pisany, marquis de, 249, 287 Pius V, pope, 47, 48, 49, 56 Plaisance, bishop of, papal nuncio, 208, 250, 295, 296 Poissy, Colloquy of, 18 politiques, 56, 106, 283; and toleration, 103. See also Malcontents Ravaillac, Jacques, 302 Reformation, the, 10, 17; and France, 17–18 Reformed Religion. See Calvinism religious culture and sixteenth-century political structure, 20–1; and religious violence, 12, 54–5; and sectarianism, 19; and toleration, 103; and unbelief, 9–10, 12–13, 14; and views of conversion, 124; and women, 11, 24 Remonstrance d’Angers, 209 Reunion, Edict of, 145 Revol, Louis, 264, 267, 275, 277, 278 Rouen, 180, 202, 220; and siege (1562), 30; and siege (1591–92), 205, 221, 228–9, 237, 242, 244, 255, 269 sacre, French coronation oath and ceremony, 74, 149, 175, 186, 287, 308 Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, 12, 51, 58, 60, 61, 66, 71, 73, 75, 77, 80, 90, 95, 147, 191; origins, 54–6 Saint-Brice, conference of, 140–1 St Denis, 262, 287, 288, 292, 293, 295 Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Treaty of, 46, 48, 63, 108 St Louis. See Louis IX

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457 Index St Thomas Aquinas: and religious foundation of monarchy, 22 Salic Law, 66, 118, 119, 149, 176, 206, 271; and Conference of Suresne, 264; as constitutional principle of French succession, 120, 136, 148, 150, 175, 244; and duc de Mayenne, 256–7, 259; and Henri IV, 154, 157, 160, 177, 183, 246, 254, 258, 274, 299; and League Estates General (1593), 260, 382; and parlement of Paris, 283 Savoy, duke of, 183, 300 Schomberg, Gaspard de, sieur de Nanteuil, 264, 267, 274, 275, 277, 278 Serres, Jean de, 167, 252 Shakespeare, William, 123, 172, 309 Sillery, Nicolas Brûlart, marquis de, 145, 185 Sixtus V, pope, 164, 179, 185, 210, 216, 250, 251; and Henri de Navarre, 135, 136–7, 208, 211; and duc de Luxembourg, 183, 193, 194; and Spain, 194; and accession of Henri IV, 185, 193, 194 Soissons, Charles de Bourbon, comte de, 54, 224–5, 268; and Tiers parti, 206–7, 210 Spanish ambassadors: Perrenot de Chantonay, 24, 28, 29; duke of Feria, 282, 283, 286; Don Diego de Ibarra, 229, 255; Don Juan Bautista de Tassis, 254 Sully, Maximilien de Béthune, baron de Rosny, duc de, 70, 163, 193, 222, 237, 303; on royalist Catholics, 83, 161, 225, 251, 269; on the battle of Ivry, 144; on Henri IV as military leader, 233, 241; on conversion issue, 275, 276; and abjuration of Henri IV (1593), 276, 305, 307 Suresne, conference of, 221, 262, 263–6, 270, 274, 277, 278–9, 281–2, 285, 286 Tavannes, Gaspard de Saulx, sieur de, 169 Tavannes, Gaspard maréchal de Saulx-, 27, 53, 54, 56, 62

Thou, Jacques-Auguste de, 156, 207, 214, 264, 275 Tiers parti, 201, 205, 206, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 217, 224, 227, 240, 248, 253, 261, 267, 276, 278; origins, 206–7 Trent, Council of, 19, 136, 145 triumvirate, 28, 42, 67 Turenne. See Bouillon Tuscany, Grand Duke of, 183, 249, 267, 272 Ultramontanism, 216 United Catholics, 106, 114, 115, 132. See also Malcontents; politiques United Provinces of the Midi, 96, 101 Urban VII, pope, 208 Vassy, massacre of, 18, 28 Venetian ambassadors: Marc’ Antonio Barbaro, 27; Giovanni Carrero, 37; Hieronomo Lippomano, 145; Giovanni Mocenigo, 203, 228, 230, 231, 233–4, 237, 241, 243, 245; Giovanni Moro, 109; Michele Suriano, 21, 43, 135 Villars, André-Baptiste de Brancas, amiral de, 113, 264 Villegomblain, Fra. Racine, seigneur de, 127, 134, 142, 143, 184, 297 Villeroy, Nicolas de Neufville, seigneur de, 145, 152, 260, 262, 264, 284, 297, 299; on Spain, 154; on the succession issue, 167, 172–3; on the battle of Coutras, 273; on the battle of Ivry, 184; as League negotiator, 244, 245, 247, 248, 252, 261, 296; on conversion issue, 247, 254, 259; and abjuration of Henri IV (1593), 294, 295 Vitry, Michel de L’Hôpital, marquis de, 188–9, 296 Voltaire, 223 Westphalia, Peace of, 19.

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458 Index