Biological and toxin weapons : research, development, and use from the Middle Ages to 1945 9780198295792, 0198295790

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SWRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies

.... ,,.., 00 447.8

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Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Devewpment and Use from the Midale Ages to 1945 Edited by Erhard Geissler and j ohn Ellis van Courtland Moon

Stockho lm lntemational Peace

Research Institute

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Nolrobl Pari> S4 P""lo SU.,opo.-. Ta/p. RiprodQ.no t !'flbbllca10 dalla Regla ACQiCkmla tki Uncti s.otto gli ouspici e eol SMJ.Sido Ml b t Go-Hmo {Leonardo da Vinci's Atlantic Code in the Ambrosian Library, Milan, reproduced and pu.l>lishod by the Royal Academy of Liocei, under the 8U.$piCU and with the suppoR of the king and the lQV· munenl) (University or Hoepli: Milan. 1894-1904). The woodblock rc-produoed by Payne.CaJJwey is cluwy. and h is nawcd by several lCChnieaJ errors in picturing I.he machine and its load. It probably is German. from the period ISi~. Professor Jeffrey R-..da, Privue commurueation with the ll.llhor, Oct.

1995.

16 Most siege mach.iQ¢$ of the time were probably capable or h.a.ndlin& toads or l«s than 100 kg. To hwt 100 k& over 300 m (a di.stance neoeuary lO tocp the be$.ieging forces out of archery ranee) ~uircd a counterweicht·driven uc:buchet with an arm of about IS m and a coun•crwcight or 8000 k&· Dupuy. T. N., Tise £W1l11.tion. of Wtoporu aNl War/art (Bobbs-Merrill: Indianapolis , Ind.• 1980). p. 67; and Payne· G&llwey (note 14). Even the more generous calcullll:ions by Hill suggest that such a machine would be limited to hurling about 200 kg. Hill, 0 . R.• 1'rebuchcts' , Viazor, vol. 4 (1973), pp. 99-116. 11 Cited in Payne-Oallwey (noc.e 14). p. 29. 1• Chtveddcn et al. claim (wilhoul citing their sources) that lhc largest trebu On 12 June, for the first time, a shell filled with 500 grams of an emulsion of mouse paratyphoid bacillus was tested >9 Thus in 192S u.periments were canicd out chat had been largely val:ldaled 2 years earlier. CEB. &ptricnccs sur la contamination des sooris par le panuyph.ique, Le Souchet. 26 nove:mbre l 92S [Experi· menis on lhe c:oniamin11ion of mice by paratyphoid, Le Boochec. 26 Nov. 192SJ. .c> These trials took place on 23 a11d 27 Feb. 1923 (CEB, Artillcric nava.lc. Laboratoire des poudrcs. Compte rendu.. Resultats des cssais de pulvtriwion de liquidc produits par cJtplos.ion de bombc-.s ct d'obus du 27 (tvrier 192.3, i.ngtnicur Loiseau (Naval ArtiUcry. Explosives Laboratory, Report, Results or trials of liquid at0mi~on pcoduced by lhe cxp4osion or bombs and shells on 27 f.cb.• Engineer Loise-au)); 6 Mar. (CEB. ArtlJJcric oavaJe. Labotatoitc des poudtcs de Scvran, Prods·vcrbal des e-.ptrienccs de pul>drisa· tKln d'cmuls.lon min>lation. 61 CEB (66). p. 2 author-. ttanslation.

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BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

Research into protection against biological weapons was essentially dedicated to a study of ' sterilization procedures for microbial clouds'." Two distinct approaches were explored: antiseptic clouds and vaccinating clouds. The first technique enabled the instantaneous destruction of the virulence of a microbial cloud using clouds containing gaseous antiseptics (sulphuric or chloric acid). while the second was more difficult. While it had been shown that mice and poultry could be vaccinated against cholera by immersing them for several minutes in a vaccine cloud (Staub preparation), ' a practical application intended to immunize against the action of microbial clouds is still a long way away. A lot of research remains to be done'.'" These were the only French activities related to biological warfare before 1934. This research was characterized by individual dedication ; there was no industrial programme backed by firm political will. Despite the limited facilities available to them, Trillat and his team achieved significant results. There is still no real explanation as to why 10 years elapsed between the first and second meetings of the Bacteriological Commission. It is curious that the commission responsible for the initiation and coordination of military biologi· cal research met only once while relatively major research programmes were under way. Probably the disarmament initiatives in 1924-32 (especially the entry into force of the Geneva Protocol), the questionable advantage of bacteriological weapons and the easing of Franco-German relations led the French Government to exercise a high degree of discretion on the subject of biological warfare studies. The Bacteriological Commission was thus suspended and the Director of the CEEC became, de facto, the true coordinator of French military research related to biological warfare."

IV. A resurgence in the biological warfare research programme, 1935-40 The end of 1933 was marked by an increase of tension in Europe. On 14 October Germany left the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and seven days later it withdrew from the League of Nations. On 17 April 1934, in an unequivocal note, France firmly refused to support German rearmament and stated that henceforth it would ensure its own security. Less than three months after this statement, a ministerial decision was taken to reconstitute the Bacteriological Commission. On 6 July 1934 a preparatory meeting was held at the War Ministry to define the ground rules,n and the second meeting of the Bacteriological Commission was held 16 months later, on S December 1935. Gt!ntral Fontanez, who chaired the meeting, decided that the first priority was to discuss the significance of intelligence emerging from Germany.', He described allegations in the foreign press concerning trials carried out since 1932 by the German armed services to study conditions for the infection of 69 CEB (note 66), p. 3 authOCs rranslation. 10 CEB (note 66), p. 4 author's bUSlatioo. 11 This hypothesis would seem co be supponed by the fac1 lhM quarterly and annual reports from the Trillat Laboraiory were •ubmi1tcd be'~ evolulion. 1

See nocc 108.

This presenuaion by Vclu was unfortunate-ly de$troyed in JW\e 1940 so it is noc possible to give details of the conclusions ~suiting from these trial.s. i:z. CEB. Commission de: prophylaxie v~ltrinaire conttt la perre modeme. proob·vetbal no J, ~union du 10 (cvricr 1949 l l'ttat-major de la D!(cnsc nationaJc [CommiWon for veterinary prophyla.x.i.s apiftJl modem warfare, Report no 3. Mcetlng on 10 Feb. 19-49 at the Nalional Defence headquarters), p. .f. t is

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6. Biological warfare activities in Germany, 1923-45 ERH A RD GEISSLER

I. Introduction During the inter-war period (1919-39) and World War II foreign powers generally assumed that Gcnnany was pursuing an active biological warfare programme. one that had started earlier than the British or US programmes and that was well developed by the outbreak of World War II. An evaluation of Gennan documents demonstrates, however, that this assumption was wrong. Gennan biological warfare activities were sporadic, incomplete and largely unsupponed by the leadership. Many of the effons were non-events or nonstaners. At the end of World War II, Gcnnany was totally unprepared to wage biological warfare and was only poorly prepared to defend against it. 1 The perception of Gennan activities by other powers is compared here with the reality of what is shown by Gcnnan documents.' Section lI presentS an overview of German biological warfare research in 1923- 39. Intelligence, policy and organiz.ation of the biological warfare activities up to the end of World War II are examined in sections m-V, and the absence of cooperation with other Axis powers is discussed in secrion VI. Sections VII and vm describe the facilities and agentS involved, and section IX covers research and development (R&D). The conclusions of the chapter are presented in section X. Any study of the history of biological and toxin warfare activities is compli· cated by the dual threat presented by the agents concerned. They pose a natural hazard as well as a potential military threat; work on disease agents is normally carried out for public health reasons rather than for hostile purposes.' Moreover, military biological and toxin warfare research on the pathogenicity of agents and their infection routes is necessary for purely defensive purposes, making it impossible to distinguish between defensive and offensive research. The nature of the work provides no clue to the underlying motives.

or German biologtca.I and 1ox.in warfare history 191 S""4S is given 1.n Geissler. E.. BWlogisclst Wafftn-ftidts in llitltrs Ar1tnalt11.. BWlogischt wtd ToAin·Kampftnintl in /X1111cltlan4 19/S blJ 1945 (Btolog.icaf weapons: noc in Hi1ler's arsen.aJs: biological and toxin wea;pons in Germany from 1915 ID 1945). 2nd edn (LIT·Verl"ll: MUn.s«:r, 1999). 2 Numerous German memoranda. orders and lellers on biolo&ical and toxin warfare activities in 191S-4S survived ln Ccnnan archives. Thr Alsos Mission, a scientifK" intelligence mission which llC'Com· panied the advancing Allied fOrccs to determine the state or the alleged German atomic l'ission project and ocher armament activilie$, was especially successful in securing relevant documenlS. It conducted nu.mer· oos in1errogaiions of German officials. lbe au1hor tw translated pu.s.ages from German into EngJi$h. giv· in& the orig.lnal German 1ide in the accompanying fOOlnote. Some orthographic or typog.nphic tl"r0t'$ have been corrected. An auempt has been made to standardize spelling of names and des.i~ionJ. Except in ori&inaJ quotations. the current names for agents are used.. FcN" acronyms used in these roocnotes, soc 'Acronynu. abbrcviati00$ and code names' in this. volume. l Geissler, E. and Woodall, J. P. (eds), CQttlrol o/D~al-T1tuat Agtnts: TM Vaccints/or Ptact Programmt, SIPRI Chemical&. Biological Wufarc Studies. no. IS (Oxford Univmhy Prtss: OxJOfd, 1994). 1 A dee.ailed account

"'°"

• This rescareh was made possible by a generous grant from the Volkswagen Foundation.

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II. German biological warfare research, 1923-39: an overview The Gennan approach to chemical and biological warfare in 1923- 33 was dualtrack, developments occurring side-by-side with support for international disannament. In 1929 Gennany unconditionally ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,• to which it adhered throughout the inter-war period and during World War II. There was no specific biological and toxin warfare organiz.ation in Gennany before 1941. Until then, anny departments in charge of chemic-al warfare matters were also made responsible for biological and toxin warfare issues. In 1924 chemical and biological warfare issues were handled by a group within the Inspectorate of the Artillery (lnspektion der Artillerie, In 4) of the Anned Forces Ordnance Office (Wehramt, WA).' The Chemical Warfare Defence Section (Gasschutzabteilung, Wa Prllf 9) and the Inspectorate of Smoke Screen Forces and Gas Defence (lnspektion der Nebeltruppen und fUr Oasabwehr, In 9) were established in 1935-36 and took over chemical and biological warfare responsibilities.• Other groups involved in biological and toxin warfare were the Surgeon General's Office of the Anny Medical Inspectorate (HeeresSanitlltsinspektion, S In) and Veterinary Inspectorate (Heeres-Veteriniirinspektion, V In) and the Scientific Department of the Anny Ordnance Office (Abtei lung Wissenschaft, W/Wiss). Prior to its ratification of the Geneva Protocol, Oennany's interest in biological weapons (BW) in the 1920s was largely aroused by French and Russian articles suggesting that the two nations were considering using BW in a future war. On 9 November I923, a conference was held with the Chief of the High Command (Heeresleitung, HL) in which the 'main problems of gas warfare' were discussed by representatives of several departments of the War Ministry (Reichswehnninisterium). The conference concluded that defensive and offensive chemical weapon (CW) preparedness should be the responsibility of the In 4 group,' and that the HL should consider plans for the 'contamination of enemy hinterland by dropping of bacteria' from aircraft.• Some weeks later, an article citing charges voiced in the French Senate regarding Gennan chemical and biological warfare activity cautioned that biological sabotage could play a role in future conflicts and that the question of its feasibility should be examined.• As a result. the In 4 group pressed for defensive and offensive prepared· 4

ihe text of the pro1ocol is reprod11ced on chc SIPRI lnttmct web site at URL . s von Haack (F.), an TA, Tl , T2. T4,ctc., 'Bc:tr.: Gaskamp(, Vonrag bcim Chcf der H.L. am 20.11.23' cas warfare: rcpon to Cbief. High Command, 20 Nov. J923J. Bundesarliliv MilitJtarchiv (BA.MA). RHl2·21'99, 27 Nov. 1923; and lAuer). an den Abteilungsleiter TJ Hertt1 Obetsdeutnant Joachim von Sttllpnagel. "Betr.: Bc.k!lmpfung von Swche,n' {rt' combiting epidemics), secret. SAMA. RH 12·9/v.27. 19 Mar. 1924. [r~

6 Fromm (F.. Chief. HL]. Miueitung Beer.: lnspektion der Nebeluuppen und (Ur Gasabwehr (Commun· iC'alion, rt' inspectorate of smoke•SCfetn forcts and gas defence), SAMA. RW S/v.J4S, 17 Mar. 1936. 1 von Haack (F. ). Bctprechung bei HCC:te$lei1ung Stab am 9.1 1.23. Ceheim. Beu.: Ga.skampf {Notcs on a conference ac HL on 9 Nov. 1923, secret, ,,. gas wvfarcJ, BAMA, RH 12-2199. • von Haack (F.J. an lrupcktion rur Warren und Gcrll.l (lwg), Wa A. TA, Tl. Tl. T4, ln l. In S. Beu.: Cillltampf(ff gas warfare), BAMA. RH12-2199. Oct. t923. 9 Glatzel. L. (Rear Admiral). 'Der Bazillenktieg' (B~eriological warfare). Ot'u11ch,. Wt'hr d,. r

IH111scMn Z,,;1,.n1 . Militl1ische Wochenbeila:ge. no. 40 (22 Dec. 1923).

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93

ness. •• Alllliety was further heightened by a 1925 article claiming that the Soviet Union had developed a bacierial bomb. 11 These signals led 10 a conference attended by representatives of lhe In 4 group and the Scientific Senate of the Military Medical Service on 19 February 1925. 11 Professor Richard Ono of the Robert Koch Institute in Berlin and Professor Max Riemer reviewed the polential biological warfare agents. Otto emphasized that the bacierial epidemic disease agents were the most promising: 'typhoid, paratyphoid fever, dysentery, cholera, and plague . .. glanders, anthrax and agents causing wound infections' . Riemer was sceptical about 1he value of anthrax and glanders. Neither scientist considered lox.ins to be suitable weapons of war. As dissemination methods, they recommended the operation of aerosol generators from aircraft and the infection of drinking water. Dissemination experiments carried out later were perfonned as part of CW, ratherthan BW, iesting. While there was a limited degree of military cooperation between Gennany and the USSR in the testing of CW," there is no evidence that comparable tests were carried out with BW. Ocnnany was playing an increasing role in the Geneva disarmament conferences held under the auspices of the League of Nations. Besides unconditionally ratifying the 1925 Geneva Protocol , in the Preparatory Commission for the Conference on Disarmament (CD) Gennany advocaled a 101al ban on chemical and biological warfare preparedness,•• a provision incorporated in the MacDonald Plan accepted on 8 June 1933, al the subsequent CD." Unfortunalely, lhis conference collapsed when Oennany, by then under the rule of Adolf Hiller, announced in 1933 that ii was leaving lhe League of Nations. Although Oennan military scientific experts had discussed lhe feasibility of biological warfare in the 1920s, in the 1930s the focus was on chemical rather than biological warfare. Oennan experts were sceptical about lhe calls for biological warfare preparedness. When the newly fonned In 9 group questioned the S In about such preparedness,•• it replied that 'methods of bacteriological warfare should not be used' since they were nol a practical means of warfare: there was considerable danger that the use of biological agents could backfire

IO Auer, an den Cbc( des Stabes m.W.b, dtr S In Hcrm Ceocrilobcrst Prof. Or Napp {entrusted with the care of'Otief orSta.ff', S Cn). 'Beu.: Beklmpfung von Seuchen. Geheim' (rt> combating epidemics. secret). BAMA. RH 12· 9/v.27, 24 Jan. 1924. 11 Abw I. an In 4. Ausi ug aus Pres.semcldung (Al.46). Russland (EAuact from press report (Al.46}, Ruuia). BAMA. RH 12·Wv.27. 22 Jan. 1925. 12 Oenbctuift dC1 Heef'Cs·Saniw.s-tnspektion de$ Reichswehnninisteriums Ubet die Verwendung von Krankheitskeimcn im Kriege, Cichcime Kommando.sache-[Memorandum of the Medical lnSpoc10l'lle o( lhc: War Minjstry on the use of pathogens in war, top $«'rel), BAMA, RHl2-9/v.27, 3 1 Jan. 192$, pp. 16-17; Otto, R., 'Ole Verwc-ndung von Krankhcits.kcimen als Kampfmillel im Kriege', Oehe.ime

Komn:wlosache (The use of pathogens as we.apons in war), top secret, DAMA, RH ll-9/v.27. 1925. pp. 17- 22: and Riemer. 'Die Verwendun_g von Ktantheitskeimen aJs Kamp(miuel im Kriege', Gche-imc: Kommadosachc [The use or pathogens as weapons in war). top seertt, BAMA. RH12-9/v,27, 1925, pp. 22- 32. IJ See-chapter 8 in this volume. 1' '(Johann Heinrich] Graf {van) Bemstorl'f wm Ve.root des cht-mischen und bUterio1ogischen Kricgcs' IClr>J' Bcmstodf on the prohibition of CW and BWJ. wre (Wolfs Telc3raphcn Buro). no. 785, Auswlrtiges Amt. Politlsches An:hiv (PAAA), R94498, 23 Apr. 1929. IS Abrtlstungs-Konventions·Entwur1' (The British disannamc:nt dnft convention]. V61ktrbvnd. Dit Abri4lungskmiftrttklt. vol. t (1984). pp. IJ0..33. Ir.IN. by Lu Chn of these records. Hanis (note I), pp. 136-37. 21 Dona. Z. Y.. 'Kwanwns Army Number 731', Hi.11orical Mattrial on Jilin HUrory. ed. by Jilin Branch of the Committee on Culture and History (Changchun, 1987), pp. 44-77, trans. by Wang Qing

u .

~Doc. 93-06, Typescript copy, 'Staltmcnt or Major Karasawa Tomio', p. 10. NAS Record Group 331.

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to kill the subject'. Finally, a test group was given 4500 volts or electricily, but 'several jolts [were) nol enough; after several minutes of continuous currents [the victim) was burned to death'."' Ishii and his team conducted gruesome experiments in Beiyinhe on helpless prisoners for at least two years. Sometime in 1934 or 1935 a prison rebellion led to the escape of a number of men. Some were recaptured, but a few made it to a communist guerrilla camp. The Zhong Ma Prison Camp's activities were no longer secret. Little more than a year after the rebellion, a massive explosion rocked the camp. Ishii concluded that it was time to move on. He convinced his superiors that he had made great progress at Beiyinhe and needed an even larger facility to expand and develop effective biological weapons for future combat use. His superiors agreed with this assessment.

IV. Later biological warfare developments For the site of his largest death camp Ishii chose a cluster of 10 villages located approximately 24 km south of Harbin." Collectively, these villages were known as Ping Fan. The residents were forced to move on shon notice. Their land and houses were bought by the Japanese at a fraction of their wonh, and the military moved in shonly after lhe villagers were ordered to leave." Approximately 6 square kilometres (km') were confiscated. Y' In the autumn of 1936, Ishii supervised the construction of the largest known ' biological warfare facility. Millions of yen were poured into its construction; many millions more were spent on equipment. Although Japan was depressionridden in 1936, Ishii received 3 million yen 'for personnel, two hundred thousand to three hundred thousand yen per autonomous unit and six million yen for experimentation and research'." (In 1936, the military budget was 1105 million yen; total military expenditures, however, reached 2282 million yen.) lshii's annual operating budget for many years was 10 million yen or more. (In 1940 the mililary budget soared to 7266 million yen; expenditures rose to 11 033 million yen.") These sums of money were astonishing for an experimental military programme during the mid-1930s and World War a, a period in which budgetary emphasis was placed on military operations. Moreover, when he began to receive these huge sums of money, Ishii was only a lieutenant colonel in the Medical Corps. The explanation is twofold. By 1936 Japanese society was militarized and the government was incapable of opposing the will of the army. Second, the Kwantung Army commanders in Manchukuo and their superiors in the Tokyo High Command were aware of and supponive of Ishii's plans and willing to let him pursue his experiments to the fullest extent possible. How far they believed his claims cannot be determined. In his post-war

30 Segment

36. in 'The night of the shock: the las1 will and 1cS4ament of a general: the diary or Genenil

&do Saburo', Main.ichi Sltimbun (Tokyo), 21 Ott. 1982. tran$. by Reicko Rose. l 11bcse villages. now known as the Ping Fan Di$trict. were annexed to the city after the war. Ping Fan ls cwrtntly the southernmost district or Hubin. a city that today flu a population of more than 4 million. ll Han, X. and Zix>u, 0 ., 'Record or actual events o( the: bacterial faclOf}' in Ping Fan'. People'.s China, •Ol. 3 (1971), "B

lO

3: 3:

-......

t

0

.g: ::t

Date

N

~

-':

Jilin p,ovince. Manchukuo'

CJ

1940-41

0

~

('\)

Type or activity

Agents used

Units involved

Evaluation

r-

BW sabotage poisoning of wells:

Plague, cholera,

poisoning of crops through herbic·idcs

typhoid fever, anthra~.

Unil 100

Extremely effective in causing casualties

>

> z

0 -I 0

Cht'Jngteh Ciry, Hunan Province

(commW1ication cenlre n~r W e Tung Ting)/

Plague agent

plague-infected fleas discharged by aerial spraying; spraying of wheat and millel

Unit 731,

Overall: estimated 400-500 deaths;•

2nd division.

4 Nov. 1941 attack: minorepidemk: with 24 fatalities; first BW attack

commanded by Ota Kiy0 ""0z

"'

CheJ:.iang Campaign: cities of YUshan,

c

-

r-

herbicides

BW military opera tion;

0 0

( ")

glanders

agents, etc.;

1941, spring and summer. 4 Nov.

"'0-

Anlhrax,

para1yphoid, cholera,

dySC'1tery, typhoid, pl1guc

agents

Uni1 731

Japanese tactical advance~ questions remain as to degree to which BW were used~ Chinese casuaJties evaJuated

as hi,gh but attack boomeranged, causing numerous Japanese casualties (estimated as high as JO 000): one estimate claims 1700 Japanese fatalities but notes lhat estimate is probably to0 low

0

.g:

Daie

::t

Type of acrivity

Agents used

Units involved

Evalua(ion

N

~

Soviet-Manchurian border: Derbul River,

-':

Troklirechye area ofNonh Kltinga.n

CJ 0

~

('\)

c

z < m

:x> Vlo -I

1

-< 19.

"

o~

..,, =r :;:: 0

_3

n

:!

~ z

Province-' Summer 1942

.... x 8W$4bolage;

Glanders,

c:ontamination of water and ground

anthrax agents

Unit 100

Not available

•The uses of biological warfare listed in this table are only the best·known and most extensive incidents. Ac:cording to Harris. S. H.. Factories of Death: Jap

( ")

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:E

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146

BIOLOOICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

One sabotage technique was later summarized by a Fon Detrick official: In 1he field trials wilh B. W. lhe usual iactic was 10 direc1 ooc or more banal ions agains1

lhe Chinese at two points aboul a mile apart on a railroad. When the Chinese were driven back the Japs would then 1ear up lhe-mile of inck, and spray or spread in some olher manner lhc desired B.W. agent. and lhcn slllge a 'strategic retreat'. The Chinese would come rushing back into lhe area within 48 hours and then wilhin a few days plague or cholera would develop among lhc Chinese uoops. In all those cases, the Japanese tried lo leave spies behind in lhc con1J1mina1ed area 10 report on the resulls, bul Ibey admiued lhal this frequently was not successful and resulls were not clear." There were fewer field IeslS after August 1942. There were some desultory altacks in different regions of China during the three remaining years of fighting in East Asia, but the tests were infrequent and half-hearted. There is no obvious reason for the cessation of intensive field tests; perhaps they became 100 costly for the Japanese as the war turned against them. In addition, several of the tests backfired on the Japanese, causing heavy casualties among their own troops. Ishii was transferred from Unit 731 on I August 1942, and his successor as Acting Commander of Unit 731 , Kitano Masaji, frowned on field • lesls. He preferred lo work on human subjects in his laboratory, thereby hoping 10 perfect biological warfare as a practical means of warfare. Table 7.5 sum[ marizes the major instances of BW usc by Japan in its field operations. The effectiveness of Japan's usc of biological warfare in sabotage and military operations can be questioned. h clearly caused serious casualties in China, bul its effect in operations on the Sovie.I border is less cenain, and the Japanese campaign failed completely. h is doubtful whether BW gave Japan any real advantage against China. Although BW may have facilitated a temporary Japanese advance (e.g .. in the Chekiang Campaign of 1942) territorial gains were never permanent. China was so vast and its population so great that il ( could absorb such altacks. It must be strcssed, however, that Japan never suc\ ceedcd in devising a completely balanced offensive and defensive BW system. They never succeeded in creating an effective delivery system, especially against a specific target. The casualty rates from the Japanese biological warfare effon provide a warning regarding the dangers of a full-scale, welldeveloped biological warfare capability. Japanese biological warfare in China also highlights the major inhibitory factor to the use of BW: the boomerang effect on any nation which chooses such a weapon.

I

V. Other biological warfare units and activities Shiro Ishii was the motivating force and key figure of Japan's BW programme, but he did nol act or operate alone. He was not a rogue or renegade officer engaging in unauthorized activities-his work was pan of a larger effort by the military leaders in Tokyo and the Kwanlung Army High Command for the development of viable biological and chemical weapons.'° Ishii's annual ,. Fell Memorandum (note 48). 60 lt is diffte\lh to d1e specific military leaden who supported BW research.. In lhe immediate posc·war J>¢riod. high·ranking Japanese officers denied to their US i.ntcrrogaiors that Japan had any biological warfare programme. If they conceded lhe face. they argued that lhey wcrt unfamiliar with the project. All LabcJJcd Ishii a rogue officer who bott sole b1ame for biological warfare studies. He was a convtnat

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expenditures, averaging 10 million yen or more, were high. Other biological warfare experts received equally generous funds from the army budget. Obviously, massive and widespread biological R&D was a major objective of the militarists in Tokyo and in the Kwantung Army during the height of their domination of the Japanese Government. In order to achieve their goals, they were willing to devote whatever resources were necessary and to ignore the moral issues inherent in experiments on humans. Lieutenant General Kltano Masaji, a contemporary of Ishii, was his bitter rival and second in command of the BW programme. Their careers were astonishingly parallel: Kitano received his medical doctorate from Tokyo Imperial University in 1922 and, like Ishii, entered the army shortly after receiving his degree. He, too, rose rapidly in the Army Medical Corps, advancing one rank every three or four years. He lacked Ishii's namboyance but most of his contemporaries deemed him to be by far the better scholar. Before, during and after World War II, Kitano published several hundred scientific papers. Many of the data used in his papers were gained from experiments on humans. Although Kitano never admitted to working on humans, every microbiologist who read his publications knew that his references to ' monkeys' actually meant humans. The military sent Kitano to Manchukuo in 1932, shortly after its conquest of the province. He started work at the Army Medical College in Mukden (Shenyang). where he enjoyed a unique position for the next JO years. He rose to the military rank of lieutenant general at the same time as he held the civilian position of 'professor'. This honour was the result of a special imperial decree that permitted him to do so. Kitano was so important and powerful in Mukden that many of his colleagues dubbed him 'the Emperor' .•1 Kitano was as zealous as Ishii in his desire to experiment on humans. For 10 years in Mukden (1932-42), and later as the Acting Commander at Ping Fan (1942-45). he personally killed or supervised the killing by other scientists of hundreds, possibly as many as several thousand, Chinese, Koreans, and Westerners in biological warfare experiments. In the post-war period, after he was granted immunity from prosecution by the United States, Kitano outlined his research techniques to US scientists. His description of his research with a colleague on songo fever is illustrative of his approach.62 Although his notes were allegedly destroyed in the chaos that followed Japan's capitulation, Kitano recalled largely from memory and a few surviving notes that in working with songo fever: 'Subsequent cases were produced either by blood or blood from extracts of liver, spleen or kidney derived from individuals sacrificed at various times during the course of the disease. Morphine was employed for this purpose'." He also, reported: ' Blood from febrile man was injected . .. into horses. After incubation period . . . fever appeared to last 5 to 1 days in 6 of 15 experiments. Blood of febrile horses was injected into other horses with sctpc"goat. ll is still impossible to lisl all lho~ who took pan in biologieal watfatc acd'f'ilic•. or who endorsed mwivc allocalions for equipment and lhe ocher supplies required to maintain the nutne"rous dea&h camps in mainland China. The miliwy archives in Japan remain do$ed. ' Documents: aerm warf1TC

used in World Wat II in Ch.ina'. T(Jkyt> N~ws, 14 Aug. 1993 (in English). 6 1 Harris (note I), pp. 63, 80-81.

62 Songo wiu lhc Japanese name ror a Manchurian city near the Soviet border which is now called Sunwu or Sa.ngou by lhc Chinese. The Songo '*e.nt seems to be identical to che Hantaan viM (Kei-i$hi TsuneUhi). Geiss.ler, £., Private communication wilh the author. 1986. 6l 'Sacrifictd' was, ot course, lhc euphemism for 'killed'.

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positive results in one or two cases. Conversely, blood of febrile horses injected into man was positive in 2 of 8 experiments'. Kitano concluded his repon by commenting that 'Monali!y of the natural disease in Japanese soldiers was 30 percent when the disease was first discovered. . .. However, mortality in experimental cases was 100 percent due 10 the procedure of sacrificing experimental subjects' ... Wakamatsu Yujiro, a relatively obscure veterinarian, was the third most imponant figure in Japan's biological warfare programme. In 1936, by Imperial authorization, the Kwantung Army established a new research unit in Mokotan, a suburb of Changchun. The new unit was officially named the Kwantung Army Anti-Epizootic Protection of Horses Unit. Wakamatsu was appointed to head it. and it became commonly known as the Wakamatsu Unit. Later, ii was designated as Unit 100 by the Kwantung Army High Command. Wakamatsu, like his colleague Ishii in Harbin/Ping Fan, was given a vast fiefdom 10 command. Money and resources were never a problem, and during the operational life of Unit 100 Wakamatsu commanded an annual budget of 2- 3 million yen . As one officer observed 'if necessity demanded, all the money requested would have been granted' ." Unit 100 operated within a campsite of 20 km'. The land was confiscated from its Chinese owners who received only a nominal sum for their former possessions. In a frenzied building campaign, employing mainly drafted Chinese labourers, dozens of buildings were quickly constructed. The large building, characteristic of all death factories, stood near the entrance 10 the facility. It was used as the administrative or operational headquaners but also housed laboratories and holding cells for prisoners undergoing experiments. The camp contained several farms. One was used to grow food for all those stationed there: servicemen, veterinarians, scientists, technicians and prisoners. Other farms were used to grow exotic plants that were thought 10 be poisonous to humans, animals or both. Numerous laboratories were built. Some were used as venues for human testing and others for research on herbicides to kill crops and poison food. Dozens of stables were scattered throughout the camp to house small and large test animals. There were also power plants, autopsy and dissecting rooms, and crematoria for the disposal of human bodies and animal carcasses. The major responsibility of Unit 100 was plant and animal research for biological warfare. However, Wakamatsu and his associates did not hesitate to conduct human experiments. They may not have sacrificed as many people as Ishii and Kitano, but they cenainly contributed to the cause of human extermination. A laboratory assistant, Hataki Akira, recalled that the unit 'investigated the action of bacteria by means of experiments on domestic animals and human beings. for which purpose the detachment had horses, cows and other animals, and also kept human beings in isolation cells, which I know from what I saw myself. A veterinarian c-o nfessed that he and fellow scientists 'carried on research . . . in methods of employing bacteria and virulent poisons on a large scale for the mass extermination of animals and human beings ... In order to

6' 'Songo epidemic hemorrhagic rcvcr'. 13 Nov. 1947, Doc. 017, Dugway Pro\•ing Ground Library.

63 Khabarovsk Trial (note 2). pp. 52-53.

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ascenain the effectiveness of these poisons, experiments were performed on animals and living people' ." Under Wakamatsu's direction, the unit laboratories produced huge numbers of pathogens each year. The lechnicians concentrated their efforts on the manufacture of the agents for anthrax, glanders, plague and nose ulcer. In 1941 and 1942 the unit annually produced 1000 kg of anthrax bacteria, 500 kg of nose ulcer bacteria, and probably over 100 kg of glanders bacteria. In addition , Unit 100 created large quantities of herbicides and pesticides." Eventually, Wakarnatsu established 10 subunits, analogous to Unit 731 's subunits, throughout Manchukuo. They also produced large quantities of pathogens. Thousands of Chinese and other nationals were killed when these germs were unleashed in the field tests conducted principally by Unit 100, but periodically also in cooperation with Unit 731." The majority of the Changchuan Unit's field tests were carried out in 194041. The unit's saboteurs poisoned wells throughout Jilin Province. The unit's doctors injected unsuspecting patients with many different pathogens, causing widespread outbreaks of cholera, plague, typhoid fever and other illnesses. Plants and animal and human life were seriously affected by the spread of anthrax and glanders pathogens and by the herbicides used to infect the crops on which the local peasants depended for a living. Unit JOO caused death and destruction wherever it struck, and Wakarnatsu proved a worthy colleague to Ishii and Kitano... Masuda Tomosada was also notable in Japan 's BW programme. Born in 1901, Masuda was an exccp1ionally intelligent and ambitious person and graduated from the Kyoto Imperial University Medical School in the mid-J 920s. A fervent although impoverished nationalist, Masuda joined the Army Medical Corps to provide a living for his family. The army recognized his abilities and, like Ishii, he was sent back to Kyoto Imperial University where he was awarded a Ph.D. in microbiology in 1931. Sometime in the 1920s, Ishii and Masuda became close friends. Although Masuda received an appointment to the Army Medical College in Tokyo in 1931, he maintained his contact and friendship with Ishii, travelling with Ishii on an inspection tour of Manchukuo in 1932, shortly before Ishii took up his post in Harbin. Masuda believed in biological warfare and engaged in surreptitious research in Tokyo in the 1930s. He also commuted between Tokyo and Ping Fan, assisting Ishii in several operations. On I September 1937, Ishii appointed Masuda Acting Director of the Darien Anti-Epidemic Centre, a BW subunit of Unit 731. Two years later, at Ishii 's direction, Masuda was appointed head of a new biological warfare unit in Nanking, Unit Ei 1644.'° 66 Dong. Z. Y..

'Kwatuung Anny Number 100', llistorical Mattrial on Jitilt History (People's Press:

Chaniort on the clcc1ioa of the Russian commiucc of the lntcm.alionat Microbiological Society), 13 Jan. 1928, Bundes· lld11v Koblenz (BAK) R 73/llS. 14

15 [Russian 197~1986).

big medical encyclopaedia) (Publishing House of lhe Soviet E.ncyclopaedia: Moscow. vol. 16 M ( 1982). pp. 22~30 (in Russian).

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In 1926 Fishman had activated BW research in a small Moscow laboratory controlled by the MCA and supervised by Ginsburg. a microbiologist. As Fishman reponed in the first part of his 1928 repon, the laboratory concentrated on carrying out tests with Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum" and also performed research on disinfection and immunity. Although adequate for laboratory tests, this facility did not have detonation chambers. Fishman had to secure outdoor testing grounds for that purpose (see section IX). For security reasons, research was widely dispersed among medical and university laboratories. I n addition to these facilities, there were a number of special laboratories run by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD), which conducted BW research. They were euphemistically referred to as 'special construction or technical bureaus' but popularly dubbed 'sharaskhi' (privileged dcpanmentS of a prison or concentration camp)." FacUities In the Leningrad area The Zlatogrov-Maslokovich Laboratory, a department of the Leningrad Veterinary and ZOOiogical Technical Institute, was named in part after the eminent professor of bacteriology and infectious disease, Semen I. Zlatogorov. German BW expen Heinrich Kliewe identified the facility in 1943 as one of the three major centres of biological warfare preparations. It was engaged in work on disease agents and weapons." According to Kliewe, work was conducted on Yersinia pestis, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, Bacillus anthracis and other agents. Reputedly, it also worked on the development of techniques for the filling of artillery projectiles and bombs. Three other facilities in the Leningrad area were alleged to be engaged in biological warfare work: the Bacteriological Institute Leningrad, where work on plague was performed by Dr Prokovskaya; a facility in the naval base at Kronstadt; and a research station in the vicinity of Schlusserburg (SchlUsselburg) on the banks of Lake Lagoda. The first institute was allegedly involved in preparations for the diagnosis of infectious diseases, the second in plague research and the third in biological warfare experiments on cattle." Facllltles In the Moscow regjon Founded in 1933 as a facility responsible for the protection of military personnel from natural outbreaks of infectious diseases and from biological warfare, the Scientific Research Institute of the Red Army, directed by Ivan M. Velikanov, was located at Perkhushkovo (Vlasiha) near Moscow. 20 It was relocated to Vyatka (now Kirov) in 1942.

"Fishmao.(note 13).

11

Fishman (note 13). II KUcwc (note I); Chier o( Naval lntclJigcnce, NaWJI AsJNct.s ofBiolo&;oo/ Warjar~ (Otficc of Naval lnteWgenoe-. Technical lnteUigenoe Center. 1941). p. 47; and Alsos MiS$iOn. A-B-C·H-H/149, Report on

lhe lnienogaiion of l'lofe..or H. Kllewe. 7- 11 May t94S, NAW, RG319, p. !. 19 Alsos Mission A·B·C·H-H/149 (note 18), pp. I, 6. '°Chief or Naval lntelligenee (nole 18), p. SS: Hirsch (ooie I), p. 102: and Anonymous (The seacu or military biologisu). KraJnOjo Svtukl (Roter Stem, Journal of the Russian Ministry fOI Defense), 19 Dec. 1992 (i n Ruuian).

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The Scientific Research Institute of Health in Moscow, whose laboratories were under the direction of Ginsburg. worked on BW for the Soviet Army." According 10 Kliewe, it experimented with the agents of anthrax. cholera and plague.22 Other Moscow institutes which performed military BW research were the Moscow Chemical- Pharmaceutical Institute and the Saratov Institute for Microbiology and Epidemiology, often referred 10 as 'Microb'."

VIII. Agents The MCA decided to prioritize research into the agents of: anthrax, brucellosis, encephalitis, glanders, plague, tuberculosis and tularaemia. Agents studied in the MCA laboratories and subsequently tested in field tests were Bacillus anthracis, Clostridium borulinum, Yersinia pesris, Vibrio comma asiaricae, Mycobacterlum ruberculosis and the agents of cholera, glanders, tetanus, tularaemia and typhoid fever." According to Fishman's progress report, the MCA bacteriological laboratory, under Ginsburg, studied techniques to increase the virulence and stability of Bacillus anthracis." Rabbits, cats, goats and horses were used as test subjects, and the germs were placed on their skins or dispersed in the air throughout an enclosed chamber. In almost all cases, the animals died within two to three days of the conclusion of the tests. Dispersion tests were also carried out by blowing up capsules filled with explosives, which created a mist of anthrax agents killing the subject animals within two days. Regarding these tests Fishman noted: 'As to anthrax, it has a lot of chances to be used in war because its spores arc very viable and the disease usually results in a lethal outcome' . He concluded that botulinum toxin was suitable 'for sabotage purposes'.

IX. Testing grounds In his 1928 memorandum Fishman had recommended that field tests be carried out 10 determine the viability of anthrax weapons and 10 study means of strengthening defensive biological warfare equipment. The USSR had several major BW testing grounds. Tomka near Shikhany had been the site of the cooperative German-Soviet tests ended by Hitler in 1933. Its facilities and most of its equipment were transferred to the MCA. Here the Red Army established the central military chemical test field with a range of 400 square kilometres. In 1935 tests were conducted there to develop reliable methods for the use of the foot-and-mouth disease virus in combat operations."' In accordance with Fishman's recommendations, two islands were selected as testing grounds in the Soviet Union: Gorodomlia in Lalcc Seliger north of Moscow and Vozrozhdeniya in the Aral Sea. Gorodomlia, managed for the RKKA [Red Army) Biochemical Institute under the direction of I. M. Velikanov, was the site for experiments designed to evaluate whether BW 21 Chier of Naval lntelligmce (note 18). p. 47. 22 KUcwe (note I). 23 SMAR. Fonds 339'7. Opis I . Delo 6S7. p. 144.

"Klnch (ooce I). p. ICM "Fisllman (-13). "Chief or Naval lntc1llgtt.amc a major ~ral and died in 1962 at the age of 7S. Babicvsky. K., Private communication with E.mard Geissler, 1997, l9 SMAR, fnds 31. Opis 7, Delo 79. p. 239. '°Hi11 In 1943 there were specific charges detailing Russian guerrilla activities: the spreading of a typhus epidemic in the Karachevo region, south-cast of Bryansk, where 2808 persons were infected." At the same time, a lyphoid epidemic broke out in the German military garrison in occupied Kiev. Sent 10 investigate, Kliewe concluded that lhc epidemic was an act of sabotage carried out by a Czech who had contaminated the coffee of casinos and canteens with typhoid bacteria. In his investigation, Kliewe identified 60 cases of contaminated coffee." This report and other reported BW sabotage incidents led to the development of u.rgent protective measures by the German Security Service and military-medical inspection teams ... The German Army intelligence source was convinced that the Red Army was well prepared to wage extensive CBW operations on the Eastern front. In 1942 these convictions were strengthened by a deserter, von Apen, who provided detailed information on the Soviet offensive capability." He told German authorities that Stalin had initiated biological warfare activities in the Chikalov Biological Institute in Orenburg and that subsequent field trials with anthrax, plague and other diseases had been performed on the borderland between Mongolia and the USSR. Von Apen further described purported Soviet dis•1 Alws Mi.ssKin A·B·C·H·H/149 (note 18). p. I: Mili1ary Intelligence Division (noc.e 27); and Chief of Naval lnklligcnce (note 18). pp. 7, 49. q lrving. 0 .. Hitl~r ·s War (Hodder and Stoughton: London. 19TI). p. 463. "'Alsos Mission, B.C· •l·Hl30S. A Review of German Acti vities i n the field of Biological WaJfarc (MIS. War Ocpanme..: Was~ington. DC. 12 Slt ~f •M MRC (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1989).

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Professor William Whiteman Carlton Topley, Professor of Bacteriology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine {later a member of the MRC), and Captain Stewart Ranken Douglas, Deputy Director of the MRC's National Institute for Medical Research. These individuals represented a breadth of experience and expertise. As Secretary of the MRC in 193~9. Mellanby had been instrumental in biological warfare matters from the earliest concerns in the late 1930s, the setting up of BW defence contingencies, and the eventual appearance of Sir Paul Gordon Flldes' group at Porton, near Salisbury in Wiltshire. Mellanby persuaded Fildcs and most of his unit to engage in war work at Porton and arranged for his accommodation there. He was a member of the pre-war Bacteriological Warfare Subcommittee and the War Cabinet Biological Warfare Committee, and agreed to the setting up of a solely defence-oriented MRC Biological Warfare Defence Committee. This committee existed in 1951~3 but did not meet after 1960. Mellanby was essentially a pharmacologist and, like the MRC itself, was not much connected with biological warfare matters after the end of World Warn. As a senior medical figure Ledingham was instrumental in putting Dr David Willis Wilson Henderson in touch with Porton. In the early 1930s, as a member of the MRC, Ledingham" was one of the eminent bacteriologists approached by Hankey to comment on the likely military utility of BW. While Topley was a member of the MRC from 1938, and later of the War Cabinet Scientific Advisory Committee and several other official bodies, he was never further associated with biological warfare. Douglas was drawn into early discussions because of his immense practical experience of infectious diseases in World War I and senior role in the MRC's Department of Microbiology and Experimental Pathology. All these eminent bacteriologists had considerable experience of infectious disease in the context of its national emergence during wars." Subsequently, they produced three memoranda for Hankey. One, dated 13 April 1934, considered the Wickham Steed revelations; their opinion was faintly suspicious and understandably cautious. They observed that the harmless bacteria referred to in Steed's documents could have been intended to simulate chemical rather than biological warfare agents. This would only have been a realistic simulation for aerosolized particulate chemical warfare agents and not for chemical warfare gases. Also, no simulation of agent per se may have been intended: the bacteria being used merely as useful tools in determining air movements in the context of the vulnerability of the underground railway system to both biological and chemical warfare agents. The experts pointed out the vulnerability of the system to such attacks and that 'unforeseen ingenuity in aggressors must be watched and anticipated'." In their other memoranda, the authors suggested that the biological warfare 'issue was uncertain owing to the multiplicity of factors conIJ Quite fortuitou.sly hj$son. the late Profeuor J.M. Ledingham. wa.s, as a Royal Anny Medical Corps (RAMC) officer, a mrmbcr of Fddes' wartime team at Ponon. 14 Ltdingham wu one of the UK's leading bacteriologists with much experience of infectious dis.ems under conditions of war in Mesopotamia during RAMC scrvia in World Was I. Topley gained his first insight into epidemics when pos1ed to Serbia in 191 S to assisl in typhus control. He was the driving force behind the inception of the Emergency Public Health Servite bui Is perhaps best known to microbiologists for his wort (co-authored with G. S. Wilson) Principl~s of Bo.cttriolo11 and lmmlin.ity (Edward Arnold Publishers. Ltd: London, 1929). OouaJa.$ had earlier served with lhe Plague Commission in India and ln Otioa during the Boxer rising. "Enclosw. Ill to CBW2. 4 Nov. 1936 (PRO: CAB 161167).

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cemed' and that while biological warfare might never have the decisiveness of chemical warfare, advances must be anticipated and that the psychological effecls of threatened or actual BW attack would be considerable." In November 1936 the Bacteriological Warfare Subcommittee was set up by the Minister for the Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas lnskipp." to 'repon on the practicability of the introduction of bacteriological warfare and to make recommendations as to the countermeasures which should be taken to deal with such an eventuality' . 1• In the succeeding months, the subcommittee considered many notes prepared by its members at the chairman's direction. It is interesting to read in a memorandum by Ledingham and Topley that the ethical status of biological warfare was considered to be 'no lower or higher than that of the bayonet, shell or chemical arm'. The subcommittee also received assessments of the status of BW interests in Germany; these gave inrer alia glimpses of German perceptions of Soviet biological warfare activity. Indeed, German activity was said to be 'undenaken from a defensive aspect and is due solely to the fact that Germany possesses authoritative information that preparations for bacteriological warfare are being made in Russia'.•• The Soviet press levelled exactly similar accusations against Germany."' By February 1937 the subcommittee had prepared a broad-based repon on the practicability of biological warfare as seen from a purely theoretical basis and on the measures which might be necessary in defence. The repon was understandably diffuse and reflected the uncertainties surrounding both feasibility and actual threat. It stated that there was 'evidence that foreign countries are studying the question of BW but there is [s ic) insufficient data to enable an opinion to be formed as to whether there is an intent to use this weapon offensively or as to whether the technical difficulties in introducing bacteria on a sufficiently large scale have been overcome'." The subcommittee's first repon went on to recommend that 'a close watch should be kept on the activities of foreign countries for any indication of developments' . The report was subsequently approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence on 23 March 1937, although it did not accept the recommendation for a public statement on biological warfare. The committee also decided that the question of a need for a capability to retaliate in kind to a BW attack would not be considered at present."

16 Enclos.urc 111 to CBW2 (note IS). 17 l.alcr Viscounl Caldccotc and Lord Chancclk>c. 1• Tht subcommiltce (PRO: WOJ88/6SO) originally comprised: Col. Sir Mairicc Hankey. Chairman; Surg. Rear Admiral S. f . Dudley, Deputy Medical Director General of the Navy; Ll Gen. Sir J, A. Hanigan, Dl.reaor Gcnetal or Anny Medical Services; Alr Vice Marshal A. W. Iredell. Oircct0r RAF

Medical Servic.es; Maj. Stuart Blac-Jcmore. Medical Adviser Air Raid Precautions OepattmenL Home Office: N. K. Johnson, O\ief Superintendent Chemical Defence Reself(h Department: Dr E. Mellanby, Secretary, Medical Re~arch Council: Prof. J. C. G. Ledingham, Medical Researeh Council: Dr 8 . A. Keen. Rolhamstead £ll.pcrimental Station; Prof. W. W. C. Top1cy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; and Wg Cdr P. Warburton. Commiuee of Imperial Dcfeoct. and Francis Hemming, Economic Advisory Committee. Joinc Socrewics. 19 The War Office. 1937 (no4 The contemporary nominal rolls for the Biology Ocputmcnt. Porton have disappeattd. but from a varlc1y of SOUTCes it bas been possible to identify most of the mtdicaJ, scientific and tecbnical staffs of FiJdcs' unit US Servicemen were usually pn:sen1 in twos or t.httcs.

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BOP were designed for microbiological research using pathogens. The laboratories were primitive and like other microbiological laboratories of the time, had no containment facilities. As did other microbiologists at the time, Fildes' team relied on careful laboratory technique to reduce the possibility of accidental dissemination and human infection or (for toxins) poisoning. Most work during the war was with Bacillus anrhracis which was by then well known and undcrslood. For purposes of security, Bacillus anthracis was known as ' N'. As far as is known, only one case of anthrax occurred in the Fildes team when a typical cutaneous lesion arose on a worker's neck. The lesion resolved after treatment with penicillin and no systemic infection occurred." Fildes consulted with Porton staff on the means whereby chemical warfare agents could be disseminated from weapons and then considered how such means could be applied to BW. Obviously, the respiratory tract was the best portal for the entry of micro-organisms into the body in the BW context. While the gastrointestinal tract was eminently susceptible to infection by a considerable number of pathogens, the military use of food and water contamination in biological warfare was considered to be logistically complex, somewhat unpredictable and more appropriate for sabotage-like activities than tactical or strategic use by the armed forces. The eyes and skin were not particularly vulnerable, unlike the situation in chemical warfare. Clearly, the possibility that a biological warfare agent could be aerosolized from a munition or spray, and be shown to initiate an infection through the respiratory tract, was the best basis for assessing the reality of biological warfare. If this could be demonstrated, and if such agents could be readily produced on a large scale, then biological warfare was likely to constitute a potentially important and novel method of war. In the view of the War Cabinet, if feasibility were established, Fildes must define how to achieve the means of equipping the UK with a retaliatory biological warfare capability and addressing the problems of defence which would arise if biological weapons were used against the UK or its forces. After much consideration, Fildes decided to concentrate work on two putative agents, the spores of Bacillus anthracis and to a much lesser degree, botulinum toxin. Anthrax spores were likely to be more resistant to the physical effects of aerosolization from a bursting munition, the prospect of large-scale production of spores was attainable, the susceptibility of man and animals was known and, further, the bacterium and the disease were much studied and wellcharacterizcd" Botulinum toxin and botulism had also been well studied by 1940 and the toxin, probably the most toxic substance known at that time, clearly demanded some attention. 19 Henderson of the Lister Institute had shown l 7 Norris, K. P., ·A noce on F. C. Belton', Private communication with Gradon B. Caner, 9 Dec. 1993. l8 ln I~ Bacilliu Dlllhracir was a very well studied and dwacteriud bacterium. u was anthrax in all its major widesprt.ad, naturally occurring fonns (i.e., cutaneous, intestinal and rcspiraiory). lhe disease had hem known from antiquity and hs causative baclerium wu uneyed in food preparation (e.g.. by adequate cooking) can. when eaten, gi\-e rise 10 the Jeth.al poisoning known as botulism. Botulism has been sciendJically studied since 1896. lmmuniz.atMln of man or at1imall by the injection of toxoid had been dcmonsuatcd as rea!iblc ln the t-arly ytan or the 2Clh cen-

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that mice could be killed by the inhalalion of this toxin and had been dispatched to the Physiological Section at Ponon to explore the significance with chemical warfare expens: he was soon to join Fildes' group."' Before Fi Ides defined the anthrax programme, some limited preliminary work was done on flies and insect vectors of disease and on the contamination of foodstuffs, notably bread. This work was quickly abandoned when by Apri I 1942 Henderson and Professor Donald Deveraux Woods" devised an apparatus for selling up bacterial clouds in the laboratory. Experiments with anthrax spores showed that experimental animals could readily be infected by such clouds and that the LD,. (lethal dose where 50 per cent of the infected population dies) for guinea pigs was about !OS spores. It was then necessary to consider the military implications. Woods had joined Fi Ides' MRC Unit for Bacterial Chemistry at the Bland-Sutton Institute within the Middlesex Hospital in London in 1939. Woods' work had a profound effect on Fildes' unit, and he was able to publish the essentials of his pioneering work on the mechanism of the action of sulphonamides before volunteering to accompany Fildes during his wanime activity at Ponon. Both he and Fildes were subsequently to find that their pre-war work was capitalized on by others and that, to a degree, the world had passed them by. At Ponon, Woods devoted most of his time to field trials. Collaborating with Henderson on experimental inhalation infectivity work in the laboratory and in the field in the trials on Gruinard Island (discussed below) was in marked contrast to his earlier research and teaching. Fildes had considered using aircraft sprays to deliver aerosols of biological agents to targets but the only weapon systems available were devices such as the Smoke Cunain Installation (SCI), which produced a coarse spray with drop diameters of 0.5-4 mm, and thus unlikely to be in the respirable range." It was lury. but si nce bo1ulism was rare and sporadic there wu no grca1 use of prophylactic immuniu1ion. Highly purit1ed toxoids became widely available in dcvc,lopcd nations in the late 1940$, a 1equcl to war-

time wort: on biological waifare dcfenoe by Canad.a. the UK and the USA. .o Henderson tapidly became fiJcks• depuly and in 1946 succeeded him to become Chief Superintendent of the Microbiological Research Oepanmcnt (MRO) and Director of the later Microbiolog_icaJ Research &tabli.$h.ment (MRE) it Porton. Henderson spent ITIOSI of his pre· war yt.an at the U~er Institute: o( Preventative Medicine, "'Orking on lopingill viNs and the ClosuKlia, Al the outbreak or World War II he was seconded for war work lo lhe ChemicaJ Defence ExpcrimentaJ Station at Ponon but wu soon pers· uaded to join Fildes' group. E.ssentially, He.nderson masterminded much ofdlc work of the group, notably lhe trials on Gr'U.inaJCS Island and the dC\'elopment of methods for lhe laboratory study of infective aerosols. He was a major force in developing collaboration btc"'·ecn lhc UK. the USA and Canada. Perhaps his most outstanding aceompli:Shmtnt was to persuade the government the austerity-ridden post-war years to devote money and materials in shon supply to building the modem tsllblishment al Porton (now the Centre for Applitd Microbiology and Research) . When the MiniWy of Supply was abolished in J9S9, Henderson and the Biological Re$Can:h AdviiQry Board fought in vain 10 bring lhe establishment under civil tontrOI as a sort of National Institute for Microbiology to embrace both civil and defence topics. See DNctt, H. A.. •David Willis Wilson Henderson ( 190l-1968)', in Dictionary of Na1lonal Biograpliy

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(Oxfonl Univeni1y Prtu: Oxford, 196t-1970). pp. 504-506. ''·Donald Oevcraux Woods 1912- 1964'. in Gale. E. and Fildes. P.. Biographical Memoin of Fellows of IM Royal Socie1y , vol. 11 (1965). pp. 203-19. This obiluary ha.s baiely 2 sentences on Woods' ·war wor1t'. In 1946 Woods became Reader in Microbiology in the Department of 8 i()(htmistJy at Oxford, becoming lveagh ProfcsSOf of Chemical Microbiology in 1955. He remained connected with Porton for

some )'Cart through his independent membership or !he Biological Resc:arch Advisory Board from 1948 until rus dealh. For some years he had also bttn a me:mbcr oflhc: Chemical Defence Advi$0ry Board. ' 2 The Smoke Cunain lnMaJlation w~ a largely dual·role weapoa capable of being charged with a chemical warfare agent or a smoke fonnulruion. Several lypes were avajfablc: during World War II. Those for chemical warfare were generally charged wilh thickened mU!lard gas and were installed beneath air· craft. One type, the 400·1b (c. 180 k&) SCI differed in thai it was released from lhe aircraft to deliver a fallin& 'rod' of liquid agent droplets in the shape of its trajectOf')'. to fall onto the target. About 28 000 of lht.sc· devices. known as the Flying Cow, existed by 194'.

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also thought then that if lung-retention size panicles were disseminated from aircraft, the aerosol would be diluted and dispersed to such an extent that the proponion reaching ground level would be ineffective. An alternative method of aerosolization using a pyrotechnic formulation, such as was used for many arsenical (particulate) chemical warfare agents, was unlikely to be effective because of the perceived need for the formulation to be dry, the bactericidal effects of other components in the formulation and the heat of combustion. Field trials at Ponon with spores of Bacillus subtilis as a simulant for anthrax spores in bombs of several sizes showed that efficient dissemination could be achieved from bursting munitions and that acceptable concentrations of viable spores were produced. BOP had by now established the inhalation LD,0 of anthrax spores for several animal species. Field trials with the simulant suggested that lethal concentrations of anthrax spores could be achieved under realistic conditions. For reasons of safety, field trials with anthrax spores on the ranges at Ponon could not be carried out; however, it was necessary to test this concept. The Gruinard Island and Penclawdd Trials, 1942-43 It was for this reason that in the summer of 1942 a team of Ponon staff, not only from BOP but also from the Chemical Defence Experimental Station, together with servicemen from the Royal Engineers, the Royal Anillery, the Royal Army Medical Corps, the Royal Army Veterinary Cotps and the Pioneer CotpS moved to Gruinard Island in Gruinard Bay on the Ross-shire coast in nonh-west Scotland." A huned camp for the accommodation of 50 men, stores, a laboratory and enclosures for sheep were built on the mainland at Mungasdale. About 155 sheep were brought from local crofters. On the island itself only a Nissen hut and a sheep corral were built: all laboratory work was done in the laboratory hut in the mainland camp. The team was led by Sir Oliver Graham Sutton," then Head of the Planning and Reponing Section at the Chemical Defence Experimental Station at Ponon, who had considerable experience in conducting field trials, although the essentially bacteriological aspects were controlled by Henderson and Woods. Although Fildes was present for most of the 1942 trials, as he was again in 1943, the work was directed by Henderson and Woods. The aim of the 1942 trials was to 'ascenain the feasibility of producing lethal effects by the explo'' Gruirwd it an old Norse word meaning shallow fjotd. The .S22·acrt (c. 210 hectates) island was declared a prohibited area and for security reasons was referred to u 'X·Base'. It wu about 2 tm Ions and I km ICl"O$$ al the widest point. The is.land rose to 106 m at the highest point and was lugcly CO\'Cm:i with grass. heather and bracken. A shingle spit extended over I.he south-cast corner or the island to provide a convenient landing point from the mainland c. 0.15 mile (c. 1.2 km} away. Jn 1881 there wen:: 6 i~ itanu and some crofts (small rented cottages with a few adjacent fields} on lhc: island. In the immediate years berorc World Wu- IJ the island had been uninhibited. lbt. crofts we~ ruined and the-island was ooly used ror summer sheep grazing and local picnics. The island was noc used ror trials af\tr Aug. 1943. "" 'Otivcr Gnllham Sutton (1903-1977)', in Pasquill. F.. et al.• 8iograpltical Memoirs of Fellows of tlrl Royal Soc~ty. vol. 24 (1978). pp. S29-46. Sutton was a distinguished applied mathematician and ldmiJlis.. trator who had earlier headed the Me1eorological Section at Ponon and who was Superintendent of Re$CltCb at Ponon throughout most or World w~ ti. After the was he became. successively Chier Super· inkndent of the Radar Research and Development Establi$hment at Malvem, Profc»0r of Mathemalical Physics at the Royal Militaty College of Science. Director and later Dircctor.OCncral oflhc Metcrological OffKC and Cb.Urman of the National E.nvironmcnlll Research Council.

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sion of a modified 30 lb [c. 13.6 kg) Chemical/HE [high explosive] bomb charged with a suspension of anlhrax spores'. The thin-walled metal bomb contained 3 litres of a suspension of anthrax spores surrounding a central bursting charge. Because of the likely error in hilling a small trials layout from an aircraft flying at operational heights, the bomb was suspended from a gallows four feet (c. 1.2 metres) above the ground and electrically detonated. The first trial was carried out on 15 July 1942." Sheep and air-sampling devices were arrayed on an arc at 90 yards and some JOO yards (c. 80 and 90 metres) downwind of lhe bombs. After the detonation of the bomb a visible cloud was seen to have passed over a substantial part of the area. By seven days after exposure 10 the anthrax spores all but two of the sheep in that pan of the area were dead The trials were repeated in July and September, using arcs at 100 and 250 yards (c. 230 metres) and endorsed the conclusion that effective numbers of spores could be reliably disseminated in a viable and virulent condition and that a lethal effect extended at least 250 yards downwind. It was estimated from aerosol concentration data that deaths were li kely up to 400 yards (c. 365 metres) and possible at greater distances. The weapon appeared to be more potent than any chemical weapon of similar size. Further trials were done in September 1942 to estimate !he minimum lethal dose, and it was decided to mount a final trial when the 30-lb bomb would be dropped from an aircraft flying at an operational height to confirm the effectiveness of the bomb under realistic conditions. However, even at this stage it was recognized that small bombs released from a cluster to provide multiple point-sources of aerosol over a large impact area would provide a better weapon. The bomb was dropped from a Wellington bomber flying at 7000 feel (c. 2130 metres) on 26 September 1942. Unfortunately the bomb struck a peat bog and most of the charging was buried in the peat: none of the sheep deployed in the downwind arcs died. Because of !his unsatisfactory outcome a trial was arranged at Penclawdd on the Gower coast of Wales on 28 October 1942. This isolated and safe site was a firm, sandy seashore swept by the sea at high tide and used by the Chemical Defence Experimental Station and other Ministry of Supply establishments for proving trials.46 Dropped by a Blenheim bomber flying at 4950 feet (c. 1500 metres), the single bomb fell 20 yards (c. 18 metres) upwind of the aiming mark. Sheep placed at the 120 and 320 yard (c. 110 and 295 metres) arcs died subsequently of anthrax. The 1942 Gruinard and Penclawdd trials showed unequivocally that biological warfare was feasible, defined the minimum lethal dose at the ID,. for sheep, demonstrated that a serious risk of death extended to 500 yards (c. 460 metres) from the bomb and showed that, on a weight-for-weight basis, anthrax spores

"The chronology of che Gruinard Island 1rials is as follows: in 1942: IS and l4 July. 8. 11. 13. 17. 20. 22 and 26 Sep; an spores/litre of air through canisters for 14-15 minutes at 32 litres/minute. The British, Gennan and US service conialncrs gave high levels of protection but 1hc Bri1ish General Civilian Respirator was dangerously vulnerable. However, the 'Contex' add-on canister, which had been issued to counter the hazard of arsenical chemical warfare agenls, provided a much improved level of protection. Leakages in10 the respirator face piece through outlet valves and face-seals were also found. The dangers could be reduced to acceptable levels by the use of fabric shields for the valves and fabric hoods to remedy the face-seal problem. Much of this work was done in close collaboration with the Defensive. Munitions Section of the Chemical Defence Experimental Station at Porton. In the context of the safety and conduct of the 1943 Gruinard Island trials, the British Anny's Portable Field Disinfector Model No. 2 was tested successfully as a means of decontaminating the clothing, rubber boots, leather boots, respirators and rubber gloves used in the Gruinard trials. In the 1942 trials on Gruinard Island and at Penclawdd acid bleach tanks had been used for such purposes. While bacterial production skills at BOP were equally relevant to vaccine or toxoid preparation, BOP was never required to produce vaccines for biological warfare defence. Since 1936 the problems of vaccine availability had been the subject of much planning in the civilian sector and for lhe anned services. However, all concern in the 1930s and in the early part of the war was, until direct knowledge of the feasibility and hazard of biological warfare had emerged, based on largely theoretical, albeit sensible, extrapolations from naturally occurring disease. Even later, concern centred around anthrax and botulinum poisoning. While contingent preparations were made, no specific immunization regimes were introduced for the civilian population or the anned forces, other than those which were usual in the course of ordinary military health and hygiene. In civil defence (originally from the 1930s known as air raid precautions) there was virtually no mention of biological warfare, unlike chemical warfare, defence against which featured prominently in official literature. Contingency preparations for BW defence in the event of BW attacks on the UK centred around the Emergency Public Health Laboratory Service which had been set up in May 1938 by the Bacteriological Warfare Subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Its laboratories fonned a network throughout England and Wales under the Department of Health, on whose behalf it was then managed by the MRC. As stated above, these laboratories were never called upon to enact their BW defence role. No work was done on the rapid detection of a BW attack or rapid identification methods. The need for off-target advance warning of the approach of biological warfare agent aerosols was not to arise until later years. During World War II, when on-target delivery of biological warfare agents from bursting munitions or bombs was envisaged, it was considered that such attacks could be identified by the absence of HE effects and the absence of known chemical agents. Thus, if low-order explosive munitions were landing on a target, they

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could contain chemical or biological warfare agents. If the tests for known chemical agents were negative, a BW attack might be strongly suspected; respirators should continue to be worn and an attempt made to identify the nature of any residue in the munitions. Defensively oriented work at BDP was given a lesser priority than that conspicuously relevant to offence. This related not only to the initial quest to establish the reality of a completely unknown (to the UK) method of war, but to the political urge for possession of the means to retaliate in kind. In addition, biological warfare defence contingencies had been drawn up by the Committee of Imperi al Defence in the years before the war and the UK was well equipped. by the standards of the era, to respond effectively.

IV. The post-war perception World War II ended before the Allied N-bomb project had reached any son of operational capability. The only capability among the Allies was the UK's antilivestock cattle-cake stockpile, which was destroyed soon after the end of the war. The UK thereafter never possessed a biological warfare capability in the form of a pathogen production plant or a stockpile of biological warfare agents and weapons. Notwithstanding this, the UK continued work to acquire such a capability until the late 1950s when such a policy was discarded. The late 1950s also saw the abandonment of the UK's plans to acquire a modernized chemical warfare capability based on nerve agents. In 1945 Fildes and many of the staff of the BDP returned to their peacetime roles. Henderson and a few others stayed at Ponon while awaiting news of the future. Despite earlier fears, neither biological nor chemical warfare had been used during the war although Japan used chemical weapons against China in the early 1940s.•• The emergence of the nerve agents from occupied Germany was a considerable shock to the Allies." Such agents provided chemical warfare with a considerable tactical advantage that biological warfare was never likely to attain. Whatever strategic advantages might have been seen in the massive use of cluster bombs charged with biological warfare agents, these appeared to have been supplanted by the development of the atomic bomb. However, the concept of retaliation-in-kind was still an imponant element in military thinking and the prospect of potentially hostile nations acquiring BW capabilities required the need to possess both a retaliatory capability, to continue to assess putative agents and dissemination means, and to identify defence needs. Funher, for the proper conduct of the biological warfare programme, it was no longer acceptable to Henderson to continue with the ad hoc approach of wartime research ... Fundamental microbiological topics had to be studied with proper staff, resources and without the urgency of wartime needs. The key to success in the programme was a systematic evaluation of the basic biological, biochemical and physical factors which underlay biological warfare and bio-

62 Harris (note S). pp. n - 73. Sec also chapter 7 in this volume. 6J MUilet, R.-D.. ' World power staws throuch 1he use of poison ias? Germ.an prtparation1 for chemical warfare, 19 19-1945', ed. W. Deist. T1tt Gtrma.ri Mili1ary in 1M Att of Total War (Bcri: Leamington Spa. UK, 1985) pp. 171- 209. 6' 'Or D. W. W. Henderson' (obituary), Naturt, vol 220, no. 5 162 (5 Oct. 1968). pp. 101- 102.

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logical warfare defence by mul1i-disciplinary groups housed in the best laboratories attainable. All these things came to be ..,

V. Conclusions Driven by the threat of biological warfare and the need to acquire a capability to retaliate in kind if biological warfare could be demonstrated as feasible, the UK first established that feasibility and then developed a capability for anti· livestock BW retaliatory attack. That capability was destroyed afier World War II. Wartime plans for the joint British, Canadian and US anti-personnel BW cluster bombs never proceeded to the production stage. Although the UK continued a measure of offensively related research until the late 1950s, no biological warfare capability ever existed beyond the anti-livestock cattle-cake retaliatory weapons stockpiled between 1943 and 1945. The UK made no use of BW during World War II; the modest and almost token anti-livestock BW capability was strictly to provide Britain with the means of retaliation-in-kind. 66 The obligations entered into by the UK in ratifying the 1925 Geneva Protocol were scrupulously observed throughout the years when the UK sought and acquired a capability. Indeed, this binding condition was later, in the 1950s, to be used in argument for discarding offensively oriented activity in Britain. When the significance of atomic weapons became fully appreciated, the first use of such weapons was unconstrained by international agreement, and little point was seen in a continued interest in developing biological warfare (and chemical warfare) capabilities where first use was not an option.

65

An account of the history or biological warfare research 2t Ponon appears in C.aner. Q, B.. 'Bio· log)ca) warlare and biologic-al defence in the United Kingdom 19~1979 ' , RUSI Journal (Dec. J992). pp. 67-74. British attitudes and p01icy in lhc early 1990s arc staled in Pean.on. G. S.. 'Biological weapons: the: British view'. ed. 8 . Roberts. Biolo1ical Weoporu . Significant l»ues Series XV, no. I (Center for Strategic and Internacional Scudies: Washing1on. DC, 1993). 66 Lewis (note SI).

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10. Canadian biological and toxin warfare research, development and planning, 192545 DONALD AVERY

I. Introduction On 24 March 1970 the Canadian delegate to the United Nation's Conference of the Committee on Disarmament declared that 'Canada has never had, and does not possess biological weapons (or toxins) and has no intention to develop, acquire or stockpile such weapons in future'.• While this was a noble thought, it was incorrect. During World War JI Canada and its scientists played an important role in various British- US projects which sought to develop new biological warfare munitions and delivery systems, ostensibly for defensive and retaliatory purposes. Between 1939 and 1945 Canada and its allies believed that chemical and biologicaVtoxin weapons (CBW) would be used by their enemies. Indeed, during the early stages of the war leading Canadian defence scientists such as Sir Frederick Banting and Professor Otto Maass took the lead in trying to convince first British and then US authorities to adopt defensive measures against a biological and toxin weapon (BTW) attack, as well as developing a retaliatory capability. Until 1942 most of the emphasis was on assisting the UK, and meeting the German chemical weapon (CW) and BTW threat. This included offering the services of Canadian scientists, providing industrial resources and establishing the CBW testing stations at Suffield, Albena, and Grosse Isle, Quebec. Banting and Maass also played an imponant role in coordinating AngloAmerican CW and BTW cooperation, both before and after the Tizard Mission of September 1940. Named after its senior member Sir Henry Tizard, it was a top-secret British mission which exchanged highly sensitive scientific information. With Japan's entry into the war, Canadian scientists became even more concerned about the possibility of biological/toxin warfare, a threat which appeared panicularly imminent in November 1944 when Japanese bomb balloons began to appear over British Columbia. There was a direct relationship between Canada's chemical and biological warfare activities between 1938 and 1945. Both weapon systems were guided by the National Research Council (NRC) and the Army's Directorate of Chemical Warfare and Smoke (DCW), or more specifically by Banting and Maass. The vast facilities at Suffield were used to test both chemical and biological weapons. Both projects involved Canadian scientists with potentially deadly non-conventional weapons. Yet despite the similarities of the two weapon systems, there were also significant differences. Unlike most CW undenakings, biological warfare research was secret and hidden, its practitioners shadowy and self-conscious. Most were medical researchers, not chemists, committed 1 Cited

in l.t'gault. A.. 'Some aspecu of Canadian diplomacy in the area of disarmament and attn! con. trol, 1945-88', eds. J. English and N. Hillmer, Makin8 a Differtnce.' Conada'1 Fortlgn Policy in a Changing World Ordtr (lt$ter PUblishin,: Toronto. 1992). p. 174.

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professionally to saving, not taking, lives. Nevenheless their weapons included some of the world's most terrifying diseases- anthrax, brucellosis, bubonic plague, dysentery, tularacmJa, typhoid, typhus and yellow fever, as well as the deadly botulinus toxin. Unlike chemical weapons, these were primarily living pathogens whose banlefield use raised many alarming questions. Could they be controlled? Would both sides be crippled in a biological warfare exchange? Canada's involvement in biological warfare research, development and planning in 1939 was related to four major factors. The first was its involvement with the British military establishment through the Committee of Imperial Defence and, scientifically, through the British Medical Research Council. The second factor was the presence in Canada of a number of talented medical sci· enlists, most notably Banting and J. G. Craigie of the University of Toronto, E. D. G. Murray and J.P. Collip of McGill University, Guilford Reed at Queen's University and Charles Macklin at the University of Western Ontario. A third factor was the institutional links which were established between the various university research centres, and the two essential government agencies-the NRC and the Depanment of National Defence (ONO). It was also fonunate that General Andrew McNaughton, former Chief of the Canadian General Staff, was president of the NRC between 1935 and 1939 and that his hand-picked successor, Dean C. J. Mackenzie, was highly regarded by both the military hierarchy and the scientific mandarins. Equally imponant was the appointment of Banting as chairman of the NRC Associate Committee on Medical Research, which was established in the spring of 1938. Banting had both prestige and connections. He had been awarded the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine as a co-discoverer of insulin in 1923 and maintained one of the country's most successful medical research laboratories at the University of Toronto. Banting was the primary catalyst for mobilizing the rcsoun:es of the NRC and ONO between 1937 and his death in February 1941. His responsibilities were then assumed by Murray who presided over the organizing of Canadian biological warfare scientists into the secret M-1000 CommJuee, the creation of the War Diseases Research Station at Grosse Isle, the testing of biological warfare munitions at the Suffield Experimental Station, and coordinated the vital liaison with simllar facilities at Porton in the UK and Camp Detrick in the USA. Although final authority for Canada's biological and toxin programme remained with the Canadian War Committee, Murray and his boss, Dr Otto Maass, were given great latitude in making arrangements with British and US scientists for developing and testing various BW agents and munitions. Their position was enhanced by the fact that Canada was a junior panner in the British-US biological warfare alliance, and had neither the capability nor the responsibility of deploying these weapons in a retaliatory attack. This heavy burden rested with Canada's allies- the governments of the UK and the USA.1

John Bryden's recent study, ~adly Al/its: Canada's Stern War, 1917-1947 (McCkJland &. Stewan: Toronto, 19&9) provides a popular aocoun1 or Canada's involvement in biological warfare during World 1

War ti.

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II. The Geneva Protocol Canada's attitude towards international attempts at disarmament and arms control during the 1920s was innuenced by both domestic and Commonwealth considerations. World War I had deeply divided Canadian society, especially the I 917 conscription crisis which had polarized English· and French-speaking Canadians into two political solitudes. The war had also disrupted the federal Liberal Pany and created immense problems for its new leader William Lyon Mackenzie King. After assuming office in 1921, Prime Minister King was determined not to arouse suspicions in Quebec that Canada was being manipulated by British military authorities or that the country would be forced lo carry out collective security commitments 10 the League of Nations. The fact that the United States did not join the League also had an enormous impact on Canada's foreign policy since it provided additional reasons to adopt a quasi-isolationist position. This trend was evident in 1925 when Senator Raoul Dandurand, Canada's delegate to the Fifth Assembly, explained why his country was opposed lo the League's collective security protocol: 'in this mutual insurance against fire the risks assumed by the different states are not equal. We live in a fire-proof house, far from innammatory materials. A vast ocean separates us from Europe'.' On the other hand, Canada was prepared to support the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, which emerged from the League of Nations International Disarmament Conference of May-June 1925.' In part, this was because of the country's distaste for chemical weapons, especially since Canadian troops at Ypres had been among the first wanime victims of CW. The vagueness of the protocol was also attractive, and the King Government appreciated moral strictures without military commitments. Nor was there any objection from the Canadian Armed Forces whose interest in either chemical or biological warfare was virtually nil.' Finally, the requirement that each national government must independently ratify the protocol appealed to King since it allowed him ample time to sample Canadian public opinion before submitting the matter to Parliament. As a result, on 17 June 1925, Canada signed the Geneva Protocol, along with 37 other countries.• Canadian ratification would, however, take another five years. The explanation for the delay is quite simple. It was not until 1930 that the UK ratified the protocol, and since both Canadian foreign policy and defence priorities were strongly innuenced by Westminster, it made sense for the King Government to bide its time. Moreover, there was no Canadian peace/disarmament lobby pushing for ratification of the protocol, or advocating support for the League. J Stacey, C.

P., Canada and th' Agt> of Conflict, Vol. 2: 1921-1948 (University of Toron10 Preu:

Toronto. 198 1). 4 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in Wu of Asphy"'iating, Poisonous or Other Gases. and of 8.actcriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva. 17 June 1925: entered into force 8 Feb. 1928. Tbc tcJ.t of the Geneva Protocol is rcproduc-ed on the SIPRI Internee web site at URL . ' Harris, R. and Pa.Aman, J•• A lliglter Fo"'" of Killing: Tlie Sec~t SJ.ory of Gas and Germ Warfare {Chatto &. Windus: London. 1982), pp. 44-47; and Brophy, L.. e1 al.. The Chemical Warfare Service: Fr()m l.aboro1ory 10 Field {Offte:t: of the Chief of Military HiMory: Washington, OC, 1959). 6 SiaC(ial CoN.uh· anpe11). Box 187. E. B. Fred File, Fred to Geapen (n.,. 42). vol. 29. Murny 10 Fi.cl 26 Jan. 1942.

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order to expedite negotiations, Murray suggested that the WBC send representatives to the fonhcoming meeting of the M-1000 Committee in Ottawa." The 28 January mee1ing of British, Canadian and US scientists in Ottawa had an imposing agenda. At this stage, the threat evaluation by the assembled scientists and their subsequent research priorities were primarily based on scientific criteria of toxicity and ease of production, although there had been periodic repons that Japan had used 'germ' warfare in China. Of primary importance was the discussion of which pathogenic or toxin agents Germany and Japan might deploy." Botulinus toxin was Guilford Reed's choice, both because of its extreme toxicity, and because large-scale production was 'very easy' . There were, however, other candidates such as the viral diseases yellow fever and Rift Valley fever. The latter was deemed particularly dangerous since the virus was 'hardy and the disease difficult to diagnose'. Reed also described some of his own experiments with botulinus toxin with special reference to the persistence of its toxicity in natural waters and ' that chlorination does not appear to destroy the toxin'. Another proposal came from Or R. Sherman of the WBC, who predicted that different herbicides could be developed for 'the destruction of the rice crop which would cripple the Japanese just as destruction of the potato crop would the Germans'... How best to organize BW research was another subject of debate. As chairman of M-1000, Murray took the lead in describing his intention of establishing long-term contractual arrangements with both Canadian universities and private companies. He cautioned that this depended on whether the committee received funding from the ONO. Sir Henry Dale, visiting Ottawa on behalf of the British Medical Research Council (MRC), urged Murray to construet his operation on the British model which, he claimed, combined 'the decentralization of laboratories' with an effective 'register of pathologists, bacteriologists, building and equipment'. Dale also recommended that arrangements be made for the efficient transmission of BW documents 'from the English Committee to this and the American WBC' ." The most contentious issue was Murray's proposal for a joint Canadian-US rinderpest research station at Grosse Isle." For Murray, the advantages of the site were obvious and compelling. The island was isolated, yet only 35 miles (c. 56 km) from Quebec City. It was uninhabited, but had a physical infrastructure from its days as an immigrant quarantine station. Above all, it was available and could be immediately brought under ONO control. Murray's arguments produced different reactions from the British and US representatives. The WBC scientists were enthusiastic about his proposal and not panicularly concerned about the safety factors. According to Captain C. S. Stephenson the yellow fever virus 'was produced in the middle of New York City'; and he wondered 'if the virus of rindcrpest was really any more difficult to handle that of yellow fever' .w In contras!, Dale showed little interest in the Grosse Isle pro-

64 Murray Papen (ncKe 42), vol. 29. MuJTa)' 10 Fred 24 Jan. 1942; a.Dd Fred 10 Murray 27 65 NRC. vol. 69. Minutes of the Meetinc on Project M-1000. 28 Jan. 1942.

Jan. 1942.

66 NRC(notc65). 67 NRC. vol. 69. Enclo$Cd in letter H. C. Bault to Maclcmzit. 4 Feb. 1942. "NRC(oo> Major Cencral Myron C. Cramer. I.ht Judge Advocate General, ASF, to the Secrewy or Wu. Subject: ~ruction or crops by chemicals, 5 Mar. 1945 au.ached as, Reference I to ln1erim Repcwt no. 210 the USBWC, enclosed u.ncler oover letter: George W. Merck to USBWC, 17 Mar. 19-45. RC 160. For a simil• &cgal opinion, sec W.H. co Mr Merck, Subject Crop ~truction, 20 Dec. 1944, RC ltiO. lA Jud&c Advoca1t General co the Secretary of War, RG 160 (noce 33). The earlier lepl opinion cited in ooce 33 also cauboned: 'plausible lcgaUstic and other arguments to the contrary could readily be made by the enemy to serve his owo propaganda and political purposes'. W. H. to Mr Merck, 20 Dec. 1944, RG 160.

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Reinforced by lhe opinion of its scientific advisers, who also judged lhe agent harmless to man, the CWS pushed forward the LN project." By the close of March 1945, Major General William N. Porter had raised 1hc objective: now the Japanese homeland, as well as lhe gardens of isolated Japanese garrisons would be targeted. He aimed for the destruction of 30 per cent of the rice crop by 1946." The Chief of the Army Service Forces, General Brehon Somervell, however, spotted the political dimensions of this newly expanded project. He immediately forwarded lhe proposal to lhe War Department General Staff, ask· ing for a clarification of policy." The issue was subsequently placed before the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Following the recommendations of their planners, the use ofLN-8 against the Japanese rice crop was shelved until January 1946." The end of 1hc war short-circuited further discussion. Accepting a limited definition of chemical and biological warfare, US biological warfare officials had built up their justification case for the use of plant· inhibiting agents against the Japanese homeland and the gardens of the Japanese garrisons. John P. Marquand, the novelist who served as a biological warfare intelligence adviser throughout the war, related this justification to classical principles of war: What is actually pro~ is a type of blockade and harassing warfare as old as war itself. The denial of food 10 the enemy, either by the des1tuction of his own food supply or of crops in territory about to be occupied by him, is universally accepted military strategy, even though 1he weight of lhis deprivation falls on civilian and military personnel alike .... The use of a non-poisonous chemical on growing crops is simply a further projection of the accepted military plan of limiling the enemy's food supply and lhus shoncning the war.'• The original motivation of the US BW programme was for possible retali· atory use; by the end of the war, at least one of its potential options was for offensive use.

Ill. Intelligence The spur for the US biological warfare programme was the fear of Axis intentions and capabilities, a fear reinforced by a number of alarming intelligence reports, often magnified by rumour. An intelligence digest, dated 8 January 1943, summarized the reliable and less reliable reports of German and Japanese biological warfare activity. Beginning with the allegations that German saboteurs had infected French, Romanian and US horses with glanders in World Warr and that German agents had 'deliberately spread' the Spanish innuenza of 1918, the digest cited the attempts by Japan to purchase a yellow fever virus from the Rockefeller Institute, the attachment of Japanese bacteriological 15 The scientific advisers

lO lhe Special Projects Division of the CWS were the members of the DEF Committee whose investiga1ive panels reponod to the Prcsidenc of the National Academy or Sciences. For lhcir investigations of the effecu of LN. set Or O. H. Pcl'T)' Pepper to Dr Frank 8. Jcwen. lS Jan. 19, S. RC 160; and Dr 0 . H. Peny Pepper 10 Dr Frank B. leweu. 16 Apr. 1945. RC 16.S. 36 Major General WiJJiam N. Porter to Commanding Gcnitral, ASF. Subject: Milit&I)' requirements for

""'f,7deoltllC use of BW in China is found in PREM 3/6S; WO 1881680: the Chanteh lncklent. For the German use of BW in World

War I, see ch.apc.cr 3 in this volume. ' 1 Sec chapter 6 in lhis volume. •2 Hisrorlcot RtPon (note I), I, p.12. ''George W. Merck to Mr Bundy. 30 Dec. 1942, RG 165. "George W. Merck to Mr Harvey Bundy, 2J Mar. 1943. RG 16S. ''Colonel R. C. Jacobs to Mr George Merck, Subject Requests for information on b.w.. 23 Mar. 1943, RO 165. "'Cochranc-(nou I ), p. 130; and Historicol R'PQ" (note I ). pp. I, 14. II, 61 , Ill, 1'8. Cochrane (note I), p.130; Historical R'pon (note I), I, p. 12, IL. pp. 61~3. RG 165: and John P. MuquandlO Harvey Bundy, 31 Aug. 1943. 4 Quoted ln Historical /t,po,, (note I), II. pp. 62~3. '1

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lhe year 1943 intelligence repo11s regarding enemy activities in biological warfare have been almost non-existent and those which have reached War Research Service have been of rumor nature which are almost valueless'."' Not surprisingly, the lack of verifiable intelligence increased rathe r than diminished anxieties in official circles. During the course of the war two alens, bolh dubious, heightened concern. The first ale11 was sparked by lhe vulnerability of lhe Hawaiian Islands to BW sabotage, the second by repo11s that Gennany was charging its ' secret weapons' with a biological warfare agent. On 12 June 1942, a Honolulu doctor wrote an alarming lener to lhe Secretary of War in which he reponcd lhat lhe Hawaiian Islands were panicularly vulnerable to biological warfare sabotage, citing anthrax, bubonic plague, cholera, dengue, dysentery, foot-and-moulh disease. glanders, paralyphoid. typhoid and yellow fever as potential BW. After painting a graphic picture of lhe horrors of such an attack. he suggested a series of countermeasures: registration of bacteriolog.ists and other appropriate specialists . registration of laboratories, internment of suspected Axis agents, an eradication campaign directed against rats and Aedes Egypti mosquitoes, the securing of loyal civilian and military observers, and a massive immunization programme.'° Despite the almost frenzied tone of this letter, it was taken seriously at lhe War Depanment and subsequent precautionary measures were taken : vaccination of all military personnel against yellow fever; guarding of the food, milk and water supplies of the islands; stocking of reserve vaccine for the c ivilian population; and rat and mosquito control programmes." The second ale11 was especially troubling since it occurred six months before D-Day. the Allied invasion of Europe. On 17 December 1943, the Acting Director of the OSS, G. Edward Buxton. repo11ing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cited a repo11 from Swi12erland which warned that Germany was prepared to use aircraft and rockets charged with ' their secret weapon the toxin of bacillus botulinus'." In January 1944. the Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment established the Barcelona Sub-Committee to evaluate the rocket threat and to recommend defensive and offensive countenneasures." Warnings also came from G-2. which concluded that Germany could use this new tactic to ab-011 the Allied invasion of the continent, counter the Allied air raids against Gennan cities and damage British war industry." The Barcelona Subcommittee deemed the threat credible, although the intelligence was questionable. The problem was that the payload of the discovered rockets remained unce11ain: 'Not known whether these new weapons will carry gas, high explosive or biological agents. Must assume that all three may be employed' ." Ironically, the credibility of the German BW threat was strengthened by the biological 4'

Resume or lntclligcn« on BW for 1943. January I, 1944, reproduced in HlJtoricol Repon (note I) .

m;gi;: 154-58.

Or W. 8. Herter to the Stcrctuy of Wu, Subject: The next attack upon Oahu4ullcts-or bacteria.. 12 Junr 1942, reproduced in HiJ.ton·ca1 R~pon (note I ), Ill, pp. 97- 100, RO 165. 1 ' For coverage o( lhc BW Mili·sabot• measures taken in tht Hawaiian islands.. sec Historical R~pon (llOI< I). II. pp. 51>-55. ' 1 JCS 62S: Implications

or Recent Intelligence Regarding Alleged Germ.an Secret Weapon, 20 Dec. 1943, CCS 38S.2 ( I Z..17·43), section I, RG 218. Sec aJso Historical keport (note I ), IU. p, 16S; and cval·

uarions in British doeumcnlS: WO 1881681. ' 1 JNW I Il l: lmplica1ions of Recent Intelligence Regarding Alleged German Stcret Weapon, 11 Jan. 1944, RG 165.

"'JIS 21 : lntcJligencc: Regarding: Biologic.al Warfare, 29 J&A. 1944. CCS 38S.2 (12· 17-43). section I. » Minutes of lhe 2nd Mcning: of lhc Barcelona Subcommin«. ''Jan. 1944. RG 16S.

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warfare experiments carried out in Allied countries. As the Barcelona SubCommittee noted in its 26 January 1944 report: Experiments ... in England, Canada and the United States have shown that both 'N' (anthrax spores) and 'X' (botulinus toxin) can be produced in large quantities and that these have highly lethal qualities, although many of the field experiments are still in a preliminary stage. This combined with other information tends to show that the Germans may have also developed means for disseminating these agents by aerial bombs and by some forms of shell. Also the possibility should not be dismissed that they have perfected methods for disseminating the more perishable pathogenic agents such as those which cause plague and typhus." This tentative conclusion was reinforced by the underlying assumption that Germany had an early lead in the development of biological weapons. Although US biological warfare policy called for retaliation in kind, the Allies were prepared only to retaliate with gas against enemy personnel. The British supply of anthrax cakes, of course, could have been used against enemy cattle. In the six months before D-Day there was a continuing rash of alerts purporting to the BW threat. The reports regarding the delivery of biological agents by V-weapons were accompanied by others that cited different means of dissemination: drops from aircraft, smuggling from the sea, and the like. Other diseases and agents were often cited: psittacosis, rabies, tetanus and tularaemia. Some of the most intriguing reports dealt with the breeding of rats by Gennan scientists at Kastrup Airport near Copenhagen, Denmark. The rats were seen as potential carriers of foot-and-mouth disease rather than plague. The leading speculation was that they would descend over England in parachuted cages." Later assessments calmed fears. Despite further alarming reports, the Joint Committee on New Weapons and &juipment and the European Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, doubted the reliability of the reports and the reality of the threat." With the successful invasion of Europe and the liberation of France, intelligence officers became more sanguine regarding the dangers of biological warfare. However, they still hedged their estimates with a warning premised on the preparedness and ruthlessness of their foe: 'The chance of Gennany starting BW decreases as the Allies proceed further into Gennany. It must not be forgotten, however, that the Nazis have threatened to pull down civiliz.ation with them if they fall'.,. Throughout the war there were parallel fears regarding Japanese intentions, especially in respect of biological warfare sabotage. Fears were based largely on the ruthlessness of the Japanese Anny and the desperation of a nation facing inevitable defeat in the pending invasion of the Japanese home islands ~

" t...nm Repon of Battelona Sub-O>mminee, 26 lan. IjecU Division reports in WO 1881681; and WO 188/684, Public Record Office. JI JCS 62S/3: lmplications o( Recent lntc-lligenoc Reswdine Alleged German Scc~t Weapon., S Feb. 1944, CCS 385.2 (12·17-43), section 2, RO 218; and JCS 625/S: Implication$ of Recent lntclliaencc Reganliog Alleged German Sccret Weapon. 16 Feb. 1944, CCS.l&S.2 (12-17-43). section 2, RO 2t8. See also PREMJJ6S. Fi1de$ wu llso sceptical. See Paul FiJdcs Memorandum, X and Dr Helmuth Simoru. 23 May 1944. WO 1881686, Curiously, Eisenhower. who recommended I.he use or gas in rrtaliation for Getman uu of BW. did not mention the use of the anthru cattle cakes. "Special Projcc11 Periodic Intelligence Repon no. 7 (nogel and Rowan appoinlmenu. see 8 .W. (44) 11. 16Aug. 1944; 8 .W. (44) 12. 22 Aug. 1944; 8 .W. (44) Is< Mee1ing, M Aug. 1944; and 8 .W. (44) 2nd Meeting. 30 Aug. 1944 91 llistorical Rrport (note 99 Jlistorical R~port (DO(e

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was no Dominion representation on the ISSCBW . Ultimately, the USBWC decided to invite Dr Otto Maass, the Director of the Canadian Department of Chemical Warfare and Smoke, to attend their meetings."" Some of the differences between the British and the US programmes were the inevitable result of differe.n t priorities and past developments. The UK had a head start with anthr8Jl and botulinus toxin. Since the UK was more vulnerable than the USA to BW attack, the British programme was driven by a greater sense of urgency than the US programme. The objective was to secure a retaliatory weapon as rapidly as possible. Anthr8Jl was first selected, but its disadvantages led to an interest in brucellosis although no work was done on it in the UK during World War U. British investigations of botulinus toxin were unsatisfac,. tory and led to its downgrading as an offensive agent. The UK was convinced that it could not be effectively disseminated by aerial means. It is not surprising that the British researchers were somewhat miffed when their US counterpans insisted on duplicating the British work on anthraJ< and botulinus toxin. The US programme could also be far more eclectic than the British one: the USA sought to investigate all promising agents rather than concentrating on a few .1oi Despite these differences, collaboration was fruitful. The British researchers contributed their experience and at the beginning determined US offensive priorities in favour of anthrax and botulinus toxin; they provided the USA with its first promising munition, the 4-lb (c. 1.8 kg) HE/Chemical Type-F bomb and possibly the prototype or idea for the cloud chamber later developed at Fon Detrick. Although the official US historian, Rexmond Cochrane, states that Detrick adopted the cloud chamber from a model in use at Ponon, Dr Graham Pearson.• former Director-General Chemical & Biological Defence Establishment (CBDE), Ponon Down, described the Ponon prototype as follows: 'the apparatus developed at Ponon by D. W. W. Henderson and D. W. Woods was essentially a dynamic flow tube into which the noses/snouts of animals were inserted through ports. The apparatus was later described in D. W.W. Henderson's"An apparatus for the study of airborne infection"'.'°' However, only the United States could contribute the facilities that the UK needed to follow through on its earlier accomplishments. 10' If a viable retaliatory agent were to be mass produced, the necessary plants would have to be built in the USA.'"' The UK had scored a success in the production of anthrax cakes which could be used to infect the cattle population of Germany; five million were stored in Porton and, as of September 1944, had apparently mainsurrunariitd in Excerpt$ from British ISSCBW Documents Rt:garding Liaison with the United StateJ and

C...ada.R0160. IOl Meeting with General Bruns.kill, 28 Dec. 1944, RG 160. Merck, Generals Porter and Styer were stronflY in favour of Canadian participation in the USCBW. The UK continued lO demwc. JO Cochrane (note I ), pp. 480-81. The differcoces bc:tw«n lhc British and US biological wufare

organiiation.al suuetu.rcs are dtscribtd in Lt Cmdr Sarles to Mr 0COfge ~terc.k . 20 Apr. 1944. reproduced in Historical R'pon (nou: I ), 111. pp. 179-81 . Oavidson·Pralt, Ministry or Supply, de.scribes the British organization in Lt Commander William B. Sules; Conference on Biological Warfare, 10 Feb. 1944, RO 16S. The $t:l'U(;tt.1rt was modified in the tummer of 1944 when bioJogfcal warfare was plated under the ooauol of lhe British Q\iefs of Staff. 104 Cochrane (note t). pp. 437-38. '60-61. '8o-.81: and Pearson. G. S.. Privau communica1K>n with the aulhor, IS Aug. 199S. 1 Cochrane (nole I), p. 482. 106 The difficulties of building a comparable plant in lhc UK we~ detailed in a minute by Emt$l Brown. ChancellOJ of the Duchy of ~er, to Winston Churchill on 9 May 1944. See CAB (Cabinet) 1»'782. F0< ne (nole I), pp. 53-59. IJJ Cochr>ne (nole I). pp. 480-lll . '" Cochr>ne (nol< I), pp. 216-17. l!S Cochr>ne (nole I), pp. 209-53. llo6 Information provided by Donald Avery. u1 Cochr>ne ("°" I), pp. 254-75.

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Brucellosis and glanders, anti-personnel and anti-animal diseases, were promising. The agent Bruce/la suis (coded US) was nighly infeclious, easily culti vated and was evaluated as capable of mass production once safety problems regarding ils handling were solved. II underwent successful laboratory and pilot plant production. It was never mass produced until after World War II. '" Glanders, allegedly used as a sabotage agent in World War I, was easily cultivated, stable and difficult to detect or diagnose. Its cultivation did not go beyond the laboratory stage.'" There were six additional anti-personnel diseases studied in the BW programme. Only one, psittacosis, whose agent could cause severe illness, went beyond the laboratory stage during the war. It was tested at Detrick on an experimental basis. Although no agent material was produced, the results indicated that the pathogens could be produced once safety problems were solved."" Melioidosis was a terrifyingly effective disease for poisoning a water supply system. The emphasis of the research, however, fell on studying the survival of the organism. There was no investigation of methods of mass production or field dispersion."' The third disease, tularaemia, was successfully investigated by the WRS. Camp Detrick experiments were therefore limited to the improvement of production procedures. Although the studies indicated that large-scale production would be easy, the problem of storage was unsolved. There was no pilot plant production.'., The fourth disease, coccidiomycosis (coccidioidal granuloma), spread by a fungus, held promise largely as an incapacitating agent. Transferred from the laboratories of Stanford University to Detrick, its agent was judged as easily produced in the form of spores which, however, had to be handled carefully because of their highly infectious nature."' Investigations of neurotropic encephalitides remained preliminary, being carried out from June to September 1945.1.. Shellfish (mussel) poisoning studies were transferred from university and foundation laboratories long after the end of the war (December 1946)."' Plague was investigated by the US Navy Medical Research Unit at Berkeley, California. Laboratory testing was completed and small-scale pilot plant production was envisioned for Vigo. However, it never took place during the war. 1. . Four anti-animal diseases, including anthrax, were investigated. Although the offensive possibilities of rinderpcst were considered at Grosse Isle, the programme was largely centred on the production of a vaccine, successfully accomplished by the end of the war.'" The projects dealing with Newcastle disease and fowl plague, virus diseases, were also administered by tile Joint US-Canadian Commission although research was carried out at the Huntington Laboratory at Harvard University. Neither project reached the pilot plant

138 Cochrane (noce I), pp. 276-'17.

"' Cochrane (noce I). pp. 29&-J IJ. llogicaJ warfare', AIJOS Mis.5ion Repon no. B.C· H· H/lOS (MIS (US Military lnielligence Service). War Deportment: Wuhinglon. DC. 12 Sep. 194S). p. 2.

"Reponoflhe WBC [Wu Bu,... of ConsulWIU) Commiuee. 19 Feb. 19'12. ~in lhe Unplbli$hed m&nUM:ripc T1tt llistoricol Rep0rt cf tM Wor Rtuorch Office, No~mlxr 1944 Final.

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totalitarian enemy, led by either a dictator or a military clique, as more likely to be well prepared for biological warfare and as more likely to use it under certain circumstances. The record, however, reveals that although the AngloAmerican democracies came late into the biological warfare field, they developed the most promising and extensive programmes. {The question of Soviet BTW preparedness remains unresolved.) Although the Western Allies stuck to a policy of retaliation, their policy of strict security, coupled with the silence of the USA in regard to the Geneva Protocol, meant that Gennany and Japan could not assume that their enemies would not use BTW against them.

Organization There was no biological and toxin warfare organization before 1914. The use of BW in earlier times was at the whim of individual commanders. It was not part of any state office or bureau. Therefore, the use of biological weapons or agents was dictated by immediate circumstance, not by long-range planning. World War I brought a change. Most if not all biological warfare sabotage operations against animals were directed by one bureau of the Gennan General Staff." It is currently not clear what bureau managed the alleged French sabotage operations. During the inter-war period control of biological and toxin R&D in France remained under the Ministry of War although liaison and cooperation was carried out with various other bureaus and institutions. By the 1940 armistice, however, a degree of coordination was achieved between ministries of the French Government. A measure of centralization was also achieved. Presumably, a decision to use BW would have been taken by the prime minister in consultation with his cabinet." In Gennany in the inter-war period various military departments occasionally considered biological warfare matters without taking any implementing decisions. In September 1941 chemical and biological warfare responsibilities were dispersed among various departments of the Anny Ordnance Office and other bureaus. From 1943 to 1945 biological and toxin warfare. work was carried out in duplicative and uncoordinated manner by the Blitzableiter Committee and the ' Blome network'. Because of Hitler's prohibition , biological and toxin warfare activity was fragmented and scattered. No finn central control was ever established ... In Japan the work was compartmentalized, and no adequate coordination between the army and navy was achieved. The system, which operated at a low command level, was more pennissive than directed." In the USSR control was centralized. Several ministries were involved, especially the Military Chemical Agency. the People's Ministries of Health Care and Education, and the Institute of Chemical Defence. However, the ultimate control rested firmly in the hands of the communist politburo which functioned under the direction of Stalin." In the UK the Committee of Imperial Defence established a Biological Warfare Sub-Committee during the late 1930s. Once war broke out the War Cabinet formed a Committee on Biological Warfare, and l8 Soc chapccr 3 in I.his volume. )9 Soc chapter S in this volume. 40 Set chapcer 6 in this volume. ' 1 See chapcer 7 in this volume.

•2 See chapter 8 in this volume.

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the Ministry of Supply established the Biology Departmenl at Porton. In 1944, however, responsibility for the direc1ion of biological and toxin warfare activities was transferred to the Chiefs of Staff who established the InterServices Su~ommittee on Biological Warfare. Since the Chiefs of Staff functioned directly under the Prime Minister's War Cabinet, authority was clearly centralized." In Canada, ultimate responsibility for CBW rested in the hands of the Department of National Defence." In the USA final authority was held by the president, but direction and control were in the hands of the War Department. Although the War Research Service played an important role until 1944, it was essentially a coordinating and research organization which funnelled promising programmes for development to the Chemical Warfare Service, a branch of the Army Service Forces. In the final year of the war all biological and toxin warfare operations were transferred 10 the CWS." The most efficient biological and toxin warfare programmes in World War II were the result of centralized direction where the lines of responsibility were clearly understood and where various organizations worked in a coordinated fashion with one another (e.g., in Canada, the UK and the USA, and probably in France). The USSR had a large organization that was potentially capable of a major biological and toxin warfare effort. Not surprisingly, the vast Soviet programme was strictly controlled throughout most of the 1920s and 1930s by the military and ultimately the Communist Party leadership. The Great Terror, however, must have devastated Soviet biological and toxin warfare capabilities organizationally since it eliminated so many microbiologists and decimated the leadership of the Soviet Army. The USSR may have been less well prepared scientifically and militarily in 1941 than it was in 1935." Japan had a major programme which did not function under lines of clear-cut authority." Despite the claims of totalitarian and authoritarian nations, the democracies organized more effectively for biological and toxin warfare than their opponents. Reseatth and development Biological and toxin warfare R&D did not play any major role in warfare planning before the 20th century. It is significant that the customary prohibitions and established taboos of the laws of war were developed before World War I. The use of biological and toxin warfare was primitive and largely static. A beginning is discernible in World War I as evidenced by the German sabotage operations." However, its achievements seem rather negligible. Biological and toxin warfare R&D continued during the inter-war period into methods of delivery, including aerosol dispersion; use of vectors; contamination of water supplies; and improvement of physical and medical defences. Labora· tory and occasional field tests were conducted by France. Germany (largely centred on the dissemination of chemical agents), Japan and the USSR ... '3 See chapter 9 in this volume.

"'Stt ch.apter 10 ln lhis volume. '' Sec ch.apter 11 i.n I.bis volume. .W. See chapter 8 in this \'Olwnc. '' See c;Mpter 7 in this volume. 41 Sec chapet 3 ln this volume. 49 See chl()lcrS S, 6. 1and8 i n this volume.

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All countries considering biological and toxin warfan: during the in1er-war period understood 1ha1 offensive and defensive R&O were closely linked. In World War Il !he scientists of !he Axis and Allied powers were fully cognizant !hat a defensive biological programme required an understanding and an assessment of !he feasibility of biological and toxin warfare agents and weapons, methods of dissemination and combat utility. Except for Germany. bound by Hitler's prohibition, the major belligerents carried out extensive defensive and offensive R&O throughout the war. Certain conclusions were reached lhrough R&O during !he inter-war period and World War II. Firs!, airborne delivery and aerosol dispersal were more effective melhods of dissemination than vectors. Second, large water reservoirs were difficult lo contaminate especially in countries prolec!Cd by high hygienic standards. Third, although defensive measures (vaccination, masks, decontamination procedures, impregnates, protective cloihing and lherapeutic measures) were useful in reducing casualties from a BTW auack, perfect defence was impossible, especially for the civilian population. In World War II the Axis and Allied military coalitions studied, with somewhat different priorities, many of !he same agents: the anti-personnel agents of anthrax, botulinum toxin, brucellosis, cholera, glanders, malaria, plague, typhoid, typhus and yellow fever. They also studied anti-plant and anti-animal diseases: particular effort was expended by the USA on the former; Germany paid special aueniion 10 FMO and po1a10 beetles; and the UK developed and stockpiled anthrax caule cakes.'° France's programme did not develop far enough for the establishment of clear priorities in agent choice." Although the USA pursued a variety of anti-personnel agents, the emphasis of the US pre> gramme was on anthrax, botulinum toxin and brucellosis, the first two inherited from the British programme." Germany's production of biological and toxin warfare agents was negligible; Japan's production, carried out in its Manchurian factories. considerable." Linle is currently known regarding the extent of Soviet production of these agents. Even the Hirsch report docs not provide any quantitative information." On the Allied side, the UK produced 5 000 000 anthrax cattle cakes at Porton Down; Canada produced 500 liires of anthrax. The USA had the largest production capability, built a number of pilot plants at Camp Detrick and developed a mass production plant at Vigo. However, by the end of the war, the anthrax bomb project had not yet swung into action; and !he Vigo Ordnance Plan! had not produced any weaponized anti-personnel weapons."

Cooperation and coordination within alliances International cooperation in the field of biological and toxin warfan: was almost non-existent on the Axis side. Limited Anglc>French cooperation took place in early 1940, but it remained superficial, centring on defensive measures and the !IO Sec chapters 6, 9 and 11 in this volume.

SI See d'iapcc:r Sin this volume. 51 Set chapcers 9 and 11 in this volumr. 53 Set chapcers 6 and 7 in th.is volume. 54 Hi1$Ch, W. , &vin CMmical Warfarr and 8iolo1ica/ Warfar~ PnparaJitN11 tVld Capabilitirs (US Anny ChemiStock, Gcissitt and Trevan (note 72), p. 747.

7 1'

Unjttd Nations, Ad Hoc Oroup of thr States Parties to the Convention on lhc Prohibition of the Development. Production and SlOCkpiUng of Bacteriological (Bioloa:ical) and Toxin Weapons and on their Dcsuuclion. Proceckual Rep0rt. Ad Hoc Oroop docume,. BWCJAD HOC OROUP/44, 29 Jan. 1999. For up-to-dace information on the Ad Hoc Group see. Joina Bradford-SlPRI Chemical and Bk>logical Wllfatt Project. URL imon The O.to•i~catKin •nd N.iural ~>n: Procttding>of•Sll'Rtll'ugwiohConf