Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism: Society, Relationship, and Responsibility 9781648021282, 9781648021299, 9781648021305

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Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism

A volume in History and Society: Integrating Social, Political, and Economic Sciences Jaan Valsiner, Søren Dosenrode, and Mario Carretero, Series Editors

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Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism Society, Relationship, and Responsibility

Emiliana Mangone University of Salerno

INFORMATION AGE PUBLISHING, INC. Charlotte, NC • www.infoagepub.com

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data   A CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress   http://www.loc.gov ISBN: 978-1-64802-128-2 (Paperback) 978-1-64802-129-9 (Hardcover) 978-1-64802-130-5 (E-Book)

Copyright © 2020 Information Age Publishing Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the publisher. Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Series Editors’ Preface—Altruism as a Political Act: Transcending the Individual......................................................... vii Introduction: Altruism and the Social Sciences............................. xi 1 Modernity and Altruism to Be Rediscovered.................................. 1 Abstract............................................................................................... 1 The Enlightenment and the Concept of Man................................. 1 The Systems of Ideas of the 19th Century....................................... 9 The Ego/Alter Relationship: Altruism to Be Rediscovered............ 13 Notes................................................................................................. 18 References........................................................................................ 18 2 The Social Sciences Discover Altruism..........................................21 Abstract............................................................................................. 21 From Ancient Philosophy to Modernity......................................... 22 Sociology and Its Dimensions of Analysis...................................... 32 Evolutionism and Sociobiology....................................................... 51 Psychology Between Evolution and Social Representations......... 56 Economics Between Rational Choice and Cooperation............... 64 Notes................................................................................................. 72 References........................................................................................ 73



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3 Intellectual Heritage......................................................................81 Abstract............................................................................................. 81 Auguste Comte and the Birth of the Term “Altruism”................. 81 The Sociological Dichotomies of Émile Durkheim and Social Solidarity................................................................. 87 Marcell Mauss and the Gift: From Secondary Sociality to Primary Sociality............................................................... 104 Pitirim A. Sorokin’s Altruistic Creative Love: Genesis and Aims.................................................................... 109 Serge Moscovici and the Elementary Forms of Altruism........... 126 Notes............................................................................................... 138 References...................................................................................... 141 4 Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism................147 Abstract........................................................................................... 147 The Construction of the Cultural Objects: Altruism/Egoism...... 148 Altruism and Egoism as Symbolic-Cultural Realties................... 153 From the Dichotomy Altruism/Egoism to the Altruistic and Egoistic Relationships..................................................... 159 A Model Based on Altruistic and Egoistic Relationships............ 165 Note................................................................................................ 171 References...................................................................................... 171 5 Society, Relationship, and Responsibility.................................... 175 Abstract........................................................................................... 175 Time in Everyday Life and Altruistic Relationships.....................176 Values, Ethic of Responsibility and Altruistic Relationships...... 181 The Role of the Social Sciences in the Construction of the Ethics of Responsibility................................................ 186 References...................................................................................... 189 Conclusions: Future Research Prospects.....................................193 About the Author..........................................................................199

Series Editors’ Preface Altruism as a Political Act: Transcending the Individual

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miliana Mangone in this book Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism—takes the psychological notion of altruism to the level of society and its political organization. This is a very fitting start for our new book series which is meant to include monographs and volumes to build integrated new knowledge through connections between history and its neighboring social sciences.

Human relations are hard to understand in simple terms, as these involve mutually linked between three levels of organization. Historical events are created by persons (psychological—micro level) in the societal contexts (sociological—mezzo level) within the economic and political frame (macro-level). History as a discipline needs unity of different sciences. If one wants to understand and explain a phenomenon or an event, two, three, or more approaches or disciplines, are necessary. Undoubtedly, a monodisciplinary approach makes good sense in some cases, but not in all. An example could be an analysis of the impact of World War I. Trying to get a comprehensive understanding of its consequences would include a psychological dimension (e.g., What happens to a society when a generation of young men and women get traumatized?), some sociological and political considerations (Which impact did the war leave on trust in societal institutions? Which political and governmental processes and institutions?), an Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism, pages vii–ix Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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economic twist (What happened to the economy, nationally and globally?), and the consequences to science and technology, to culture, and so on. The value of interdisciplinary synthesis should be obvious. As a matter of fact, this synthesis sometimes comes from an implicit dialogue among diverse disciplines. We mean the cases where different disciplines are using very close notions but with different names. For example, historiography has developed the idea of myths of origin to explain the process of nations building. This is to say invented narratives which play the role of the starting points of specific nation. On their part other social sciences have formulated the notion of national master narrative to explain how these invented events are interiorized by citizens a posteriori. This coincidence of very similar notions should be much more developed and no doubt it could produce useful benefits to explain how the micro, mezzo and macro levels interact to produce the final result of both nationalism and patriotism. But it is also true that very often academics prefer to ignore such implicit dialogues. Yet it is not always so. Although most, if not all academics, would agree in the virtues of a multi- or interdisciplinary approach, we also recognize that it is no easy approach, neither in carrying it out nor in publishing the result. Concerning the latter, the majority of academic institutions still prefer very traditional, mono-disciplinary structures, making it hard to publish high level, interdisciplinary research. With this series, History and Society, Information Age Publishers is here taking a concrete step to overcome this deficit and to facilitate the publication of interdisciplinary research on the highest level. Our series editors’ prefaces will be included in each book in our series to help the readers see the primary contributions of each book, as well as to point to connections with the others. We are off to a very good start with this first exposition in our series. What does Mangone accomplish in this book? In her own words, she looks at altruistic relationships which are based on an ethic of responsibility, characterize a free, harmonious, humanistic, and creative society. We are not facing a “new humanism,” but a committed humanism. For the social sciences, this means that we are not faced with a “humanism of the social sciences,” but with committed social sciences. (p. 189)

What precise forms can such committed humanistic social sciences take? This question remains beyond the scope of this book, but will undoubtedly be discussed in other forthcoming books in our series. We observe in our contemporary world very interesting sociopolitical changes where wars become limited to pointed rocket attacks (or threats of these) on objects that would horrify the comfortable television audience if they encounter

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glimpses of devastation in between the never-ending flow of consumer advertising. Then one encounters rare but dramatic shooting episodes in public places that leave everybody emotionally numb. At the same time, long-term wars are fought out in the secrecy of trade tariffs talks with occasional splashes in the mass media. The sociopolitical world in the 21st century is very different from its 20th century counterpart by the virtuality of wars—and of peace. The difference seems to disappear—we seem constantly fighting some war in our minds while horrors at times happen elsewhere. To whom would the new social sciences be committed under these circumstances? To whom and for what would the social sciences be ethically responsible? To the political systems that distrust them and step-by-step gets rid of the long cultivated expertise under the neoliberal argument that the specific areas of humanities have no future job prospects? These are burning questions in all of our societies—which need answers. We hope that Mangone’s elaboration of the theme of altruism would lead the readers to try to answer these questions. Jaan Valsiner Aalborg-Vienna Søren Dosenrode Aalborg Mario Carretero Madrid-Buenos Aires

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Introduction Altruism and the Social Sciences

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he social sciences did not discover altruism when Comte (1851– 1854/1875–1877) coined this term, which started to be widely used when his works were translated into English in 1852 (Dixon, 2012). On the contrary, since ancient times scholars, starting with philosophers, have tried to explain—using the cause-effect terminology—and understand the signifier and signified (de Saussure, 1916/1971). The reasons why in certain situations some people behave positively towards others (altruistic behavior) and why in similar situations the same people behave differently remained an enigma. Obviously, not all disciplines have actually used the term altruism, but this does not mean that human and social sciences have not addressed human conduct that can directly or indirectly be traced back to it. As the social sciences developed and became an autonomous set of knowledge, more and more categories of phenomena were “removed” from philosophical speculation, and from moral or political discourse to form the core of the new disciplines. Demography, statistics, economics, and sociology were a way of collecting data and observing the new and complex society emerging from the great transformations that had affected Western societies since the 18th century. In other words, there is a tendency to break with tradition, Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism, pages xi–xx Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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and the analysis of phenomena is brought back to experience. Man begins to be studied as homo sociologicus. The reflections proposed here, being the author is a sociologist, will inevitably be affected by the epistemological influence of this discipline, also through a review of its development, but with disciplinary “encroachments” that will allow for as broad and organic as possible a vision of the object of study of this work. It is widely held that sociology is a science developed at the end of the 19th century with the aim of studying the changes that occurred in that period in the forms of association of both individuals and institutions—those same changes that will then characterize the so-called “modern states.” But if we really want to explain sociology, and above all its object of study, we need to look more closely at its origins. It is customary to date the birth of sociology when Comte, with his Cours de philosophie positive (1830–1842), attributes the term sociology to those studies previously called social physics. The new term is a neologism combining two words: the first of Latin origin (socius, societas), the second of Greek origin (logos)—the two words, merged together, meant (and still mean) the study of society. However, this discipline, although not yet in possession of its own epistemological structure, had already existed, at least in essence, for many centuries. This is especially true if one considers the innumerable philosophical studies that addressed, through the centuries, social transformations and the relationships between social structures and individuals. At the end of the 19th century, two major changes occurred. On the one hand, the religious aura that accompanied the reading of the transformations of primitive societies is lost, and, on the other hand, new research methods are adopted, developed mainly for the natural sciences, by scholars who were preparing to analyze the social transformations that characterized that historical period. The birth of sociology, therefore, brings with it some open questions, including the debate on altruism or, in other terms, on moral solidarity or social solidarity. The term altruism, coined by Auguste Comte (1851–1854/1875–1877), is one of the few terms born in the scientific field that will then enter the common language keeping the same meaning it originally held: the opposite of egoism (selfishness). The centrality of altruism in the social sciences can be observed in many classics (Bykov, 2017; Wuthnow, 1993). Durkheim, for example, explains the basis of social solidarity in modern society precisely through the contrast between egoism and altruism (Durkheim, 1893/1960). In his well-known work Suicide (Durkheim, 1897/2005), he defines its implications by counterposing altruistic and egoistic suicide, identifying what will

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later become the most famous type of suicide. Later, functionalism (Parsons and Merton) will renew the subordination of individual action to society in a functionally positive way and, therefore, with a marked orientation towards the collective. Similarly, both Weber and Marx, while not using the term altruism as such, refer to it indirectly—the first, when describing the ethics of love of charismatic authority as opposed to legal and rational authority; the second, when raging against Christian charity. This interest in altruism as an object of study in the social sciences, however, gradually decreased—especially in Europe. Since the 1950s, theoretical and empirical studies clearly show the disinterest of social scientists in this object, except for Pitirim Sorokin (1950a, 1950b, 1954a, 1954b). The Russian-American sociologist established in 1949—with funding from Mr. Eli Lilly and the Lilly Endowment—the Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism. In recent years, however, the study of altruism seems to take on new vigor, especially in the United States: In 2012 the section “Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity” was included among the branches of the American Sociological Association (Nichols, 2012). The shift was started by Vincent Jeffrey who, together with other colleagues, in the article “Altruism and Social Solidarity: Envisioning a Field of Specialization” (Jeffries et al., 2006) outlined the reasons for the need for this field of study. Subsequently, as early as 2009, a newsletter of the nascent section of “Altruism and Social Solidarity” was created, which then took its final name when “Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity” was established in 2012. The promoters of this section have considered these three aspects a single field of specialization, as they are significantly interdependent in the sociocultural reality (Jeffries, 2014). If this is what happened in the United States, Europe also experienced a renewed interest in studies on altruism, particularly by French sociology, starting from the numerous retakes on Marcel Mauss’ (1923–1924/2002) work on the gift and following the anti-utilitarian movement (Caillé, 1988). Last, in chronological order, are Steiner’s works (2016), who outlines a history of altruism starting from a critical theory of economics, and Moscovici’s social psychology (2000), that lead to the definition of the elementary forms of altruism. Despite this renewed vitality of the studies on altruism, especially in European literature (see above), we notice that Pitirim Sorokin is not numbered among the classics that made a significant contribution to the development of these studies. In the United States, his intellectual heritage has been collected by various scholars (Jeffries, 2002; Johnston, 2001; Krotov, 2012, 2014; Nichols, 2009; Weinstein, 2000).

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The aim of the present work is to outline, in broad terms and based on Collins’ three dimensions of analysis (1988),1 how with some objects of study of sociology (social order, integration, social action, interaction, etc.) it can derive references to altruism or to other actions for which it have been used the terms solidarism and social solidarity—see for example Durkheim (1893/1960) and his differentiation between organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity. We will resort to deduction because the term altruism, or rather the concept of altruism, even after Comte, has never attained great relevance in sociological studies. In light of the above, we will propose an analysis of altruism developed along the diachronic dimension, considering the reference approaches and authors in an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary way (Piaget, 1972). Our ultimate objective is to highlight how much it is necessary, for the social sciences, to return to studying positive actions and sociocultural dynamics, rather than only negative ones, in order to promote them for the well-being of the whole society of reference. Starting from the assumption that the social sciences and the humanities (especially sociology) have adopted a “negativistic” approach since their inception, (i.e., a modus operandi) that tends to bring out only negative or pathological phenomena without ever highlighting positive and healthy ones (Sorokin, 1966). The present work is based on the hypothesis that there is no egoism or altruism understood in a behavioral sense, as argued by sociobiologists or behaviorists, but altruistic relationships and egoistic relationships. We will, therefore, focus our attention on the relationship and particularly to the “rela(c)tion,” that is, to a relational process that is interaction between individuals—individuals placed in a sociocultural context that only partially influences these processes, which, however, in turn, influence the context. This hypothesis will be upheld (a) by the literature review of those scholars (Comte, Durkheim, Sorokin, Moscovici, Mauss) who have analyzed positive phenomena, contributing to their knowledge (directly using the term altruism or with other social constructs), and whose thought is to be considered an intellectual heritage; and (b) by the analyses of the determining elements of positive and negative actions, and their relationships with all the elements that constitute and give rise to sociocultural phenomena (personality, society, culture). This way privileges the spaces of the Ego/ Alter relations within the processes developing in society, since all social phenomena and attitudes, as well as actions, are built in an environment that has its own places, times, and symbols, paramount for the cognitive processes of self-signification activated by individuals for the construction of social realities in their daily relational experience.

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But our ultimate goal is to try and overcome the dichotomy of altruism/egoism starting from a procedural and methodological order pertaining to the very object of study. What should be analyzed, therefore, is neither altruism nor egoism (static terms), since they are replaced by processes. The relationship, therefore, is the process that should be analyzed and, more specifically, the altruistic relationships, for society (pro-social or hetero-directed) and the egoistic relationships, for oneself (anti-social or self-directed). We will address two orders of questions: 1. identification of the elements determining and influencing the promotion of meaningful relationships, in order to identify possible elements that could promote such actions; and 2. the need for positive relationships (gratitude, altruism, solidarity, cooperation, etc.) to return to being an object of study of the social sciences, specifying both the role of positive actions and that of the social sciences for the development of humanity. This work is a theoretical analysis in which the factors involved are multiple (first of all, the multidisciplinary interest in the object of study) and linked to different dimensions (individual, cultural, and social). For this reason, it was necessary to integrate several levels, which develop over the five chapters of the book, coherently converging on the objective defined above. The term altruism was first used by Comte, a watershed in which the attention of scholars is focused on man and his life in the associated form. The concept of man, also in relation to nature, shifts its attention definitively from religion to politics. For this reason, we will present (Chapter 1) a brief overview of the various concepts of man though making it clear that we raise no claim to temporal or theoretical exhaustiveness. Using some schools of thought and systems of ideas developed from the Enlightenment, we will try to highlight the most compelling evolutionary stages of this concept, which will then form the basis of studies on altruism. We will finally affirm the need for a rediscovery of this concept through the Ego/ Alter relationship. Modernity, by shifting its attention to a man-centred concept of human beings, moves ever further away from religious aspects. The focus is once again on man, but also on his life in the associated form and, therefore, on politics. Hence, the need to understand how the various sciences have come to this concept and, above all, how these disciplines attempted to explain (cause–effect) and understand (sense and meaning) the reasons why in certain situations some people behave positively towards others

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(altruistic behavior) while in similar situations the same people behave differently. Obviously, not all disciplines have actually used the term altruism, but this does not mean that philosophy, sociology, biology, psychology, and economics have not dealt with behaviors that can directly or indirectly be traced back to it (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 contains the in-depth analysis—in chronological order—of those authors (Comte, Durkheim, Sorokin, Mauss, Moscovici) who best represented and contributed to the advancement of knowledge on the phenomenon of altruism. In this chapter, we tried to outline the history of this objects of study, with its ups and downs, since the birth of sociology. We will describe the ideas and constructs of the above-mentioned authors without any speculation, to offer as much of a “neutral” reading of them as possible. This theoretical study is also necessary in order to broaden our knowledge of some of the principles that form the basis of the proposed hypothesis, at least in terms of (a) the ways in which each subject constructs his or her own Self and identity in relation to sociocultural dynamics; and (b) analyses carried out in different disciplinary fields having altruism or similar concepts as their object of study. Chapter 4 leads the reader to discover that the representations of altruism and egoism in contemporary society are constantly changing, following the transformations of society itself. Having abandoned the idea that the factors causing altruism or egoism lie in mere human nature, they are ascribed to people’s conduct, their freedom, their relationships, their associative forms, and in society. The attention is now focused on two elements of the daily life of individuals: culture and social relations. We will try, therefore, through the meso-theories developed in recent decades, which study the relationships between lifeworld and social system, to describe the links between altruism, egoism, culture, and social relations. We will pay particular attention to the relationality of individuals, in an attempt to overcome the dichotomy of altruism/egoism by addressing aspects that, in previous studies, have been little, indirectly or marginally considered. The last chapter (Chapter 5) will try to wrap up the previous reflection, looking towards the future. With the application of the bounded rationality model, the individual does not project himself into time indefinitely (the future time horizon may longer or shorter). In order to promote change and hoping that in future altruistic relationships will cover most of the forms of relation/interaction between human beings, we should focus our attention not on behaviours but on the reasons and the objectives of individuals and the values underlying them. Time and space are constitutive elements for the processes of social interaction and also two basic categories of and for the social sciences. The everyday experiences of individuals can in fact

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be perceived—and therefore studied—in their continuous development, in their flow within the unity of the single experience and the situation, or they can be reflected upon after they have been experienced (Schütz, 1967). In the first case, they coincide with experience—and this applies also to the researcher—and cannot be separated from it; in the second case, by reflecting on past action, it is perceived as something separated from experience. In this way, time is no longer uniform and becoming aware of this means that individuals are oriented in their actions/interactions by the temporal and spatial dimension (social and historical context). This allows us to define the overall picture of the phenomenon in such a way as to be able to place and interpret it in the environment, from which it also emerges in its spatial-temporal dimension. This configures the construction of a new humanity that negotiates between individual liberties and responsible liberties and in which the drive to self-realization cannot be conceived without the commitment to the other and the community in the broad sense, thus recognizing the concept of common good. In the attempt to escape from a sensate culture by affirming the “ethics of responsibility,” the role of the social sciences is to analyze the sociocultural phenomena, not to explain them, but to be able to understand and accompany their transformation in favor of a solidaristic development of humanity. Finally, the “Conclusions” will propose no real conclusive reflections, as the debate on this subject is still open. Rather, they set out general guidelines for future research prospects. The study of the sociocultural phenomenon of altruism (or of altruistic relationships) must be framed in a logic in which research is the tool to broaden the capacity to describe the phenomenon, through the increase of knowledge that leads to its explanation and understanding, and then to its prediction. These levels are neither sequential nor separate (Homans, 1967), but a single whole that translates into methodological integration between the disciplinary areas of social sciences (theoretical, empirical, operational). Keeping the three levels of analysis together (macro, meso and micro) implies an intellectual action that goes beyond the disciplinary methodologies and points of view. The study of sociocultural phenomena and the relative methodologies adopted must be oriented towards the integration of the subjective and objective dimension. The element that holds everything together is the interpretation and construction of reality through the relationships between individuals, and between individuals, society and culture. Since individuals are agents of interaction (in their daily life and in institutions), all these aspects should be seen as a correlation of interpretations and not only as the response to a triggering cause. For the study

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of sociocultural phenomena (including altruism and egoism) it is therefore necessary to consider an integrated interweaving of factors, disciplines and methodologies. Sociological knowledge, and that of the other social sciences, must flow into a single integrated system of knowledge (integral social sciences) that must place its main attention on all aspects of the transformation of society (in a holistic sense: aspects of personality, society, and culture) without neglecting reflectivity. This marks the passage from the order of explaining (erklären) to the order of understanding (verstehen): the search for the reason of phenomena must no longer refer to a cause, but to a meaning that can represent the key to interpreting the dynamics of the interaction between individual and society and, above all, to improve the conditions of this relationship.

A Note on Personal Pronouns Not to show any preference, and for ease of reading, we chose to use both his and her throughout the book when referring to subjects or individuals.

Note 1. The macro dimension, concerning social systems and their forms of organization; the micro dimension, which deals with the relationship between individual and society and with social actions; and the meso dimension, which, in an effort to integrate the two previous ones, addresses the relations between social system and lifeworld (totality of meanings and representations of culture).

References Bykov, A. (2017). Altruism: New perspectives of research on a classical theme in sociology of morality. Current Sociology Review, 65(6), 797–813. Caillé, A. (1988). Critique de la raison utilitaire: Manifeste du MAUSS [Critique of utilitarian reason: Manifest of the MAUSS]. Paris, France: Éditions la Découverte. Comte, A. (1830–1842). Cours de philosophie positive [The positive philosophy] (Vol. 6). Paris, France: Bachelier. Comte, A. (1875–1877). System of positive policy (Vol. 4). London, England: Longmans, Green, & Co. (Original work published 1851–1854) Collins, R. (1988). Theoretical sociology. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Javanovich. de Saussure, F. (1971). Cours de linguistique générale [Course in general linguistics]. Paris, France: Payot. (Original work published 1916) Dixon T. (2012). La science du cerveau et la religion de l’humanité: Auguste comte et l’altruisme dans l’Angleterre Victorienne [The science of the

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brain and the religion of humanity: Auguste Comte and altruism in Victorian Britain]. Revue d’histoire des sciences, 2(65), 287–316. Durkheim, É. (1960). The division of labor in society (G. Simpson, Trans.). Glencoe, IL: The Free Press of Glencoe. (Original work published 1893) Durkheim, É. (2005). Suicide: A study in sociology. (J. A. Spaulding & G. Simpson, Trans.). London, England: Routledge. (Original work published 1897) Homans, G. C. (1967). The nature of social science. New York, NY: Hartcourt. Jeffries, V. (Ed.). (2014). The Palgrave handbook of altruism, morality, and social solidarity: Formulating a field of study. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Jeffries, V. (2002). Integralism: The promising legacy of Pitirim A. Sorokin. In M. A. Robinson (Ed.), Lost sociologists rediscovered (pp. 99–135). New York, NY: Mellon Press. Jeffries, V., Johnston, B. V., Nichols, L. T., Oliner, S. P., Tiryakian, E., & Weinstein, J. (2006). Altruism and social solidarity: Envisioning a field of specialization. The American Sociologist, 37(3), 67–83. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s12108-006-1023-7 Johnston, B. V. (2001). Integralism, altruism, and social emancipation: A Sorokinian model of prosocial behavior and social organization. Catholic Social Science Review, 6, 41–55. Krotov, P. (2012). Pitirim Sorokin studies in Russia in the context of the new section on altruism, morality, and social solidarity in the American Sociological Association. The American Sociologist, 43(4), 366–373. https://doi .org/10.1007/s12108-012-9166-1 Krotov, P. (2014). Pitirim Sorokin’s heritage: From core ideas to syntheses of theory and of practice. In V. Jeffrey (Ed.), The Palgrave handbook of altruism, morality, and social solidarity: Formulating a field of study (pp. 123–147). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Mauss, M. (2002). The gift: The form and reason for exchange in archaic societies. London, England: Routledge. (Original work published 1923–1924) Moscovici, S. (2000). Les formes élémentaires de l’altruisme [The elementary forms of altruism]. In S. Moscovici (Ed.), Psychologie sociale des relations à autrui [Social psychology of relationships with others] (pp. 71–86). Paris, France: Nathan. Nichols, L. T. (2009). The Russian roots of Pitirim A. Sorokin’s sociological work in the United States. In A. F. Smetanin, E. N. Rozhkin, U.P . Shabaev, V. E. Sharapov, I. L. Zherebtsov, P. P. Krotov, I. A. Goncharov, & N. F. Zyuzev (Eds.), Pitirim Sorokin in the history, science and culture of the 20th Century, materials of the International Conference Celebrating the 120th birthday of P. A. Sorokin (pp. 149–160). Syktyvkar, Russian Federation: Institute of Language, Literature and History-Komi Scientific Center. Nichols, L. T. (2012). North Central Sociological Association presidential address: Renewing sociology: Integral science, solidarity, and loving kindness. Sociological Focus, 45(4), 261–273. Piaget, J. (1972). L’épistémologie des relations interdisciplinaires [The epistemology of interdisciplinary relationships]. In OCDE (Ed.),

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L’interdisciplinarité: Problèmes d’enseignement et de recherche dans les universités [Interdisciplinarity: Teaching and research problems in universities]. Paris: OCDE. Retrieved from http://www.fondationjeanpiaget .ch/fjp/site/textes/VE/jp72_epist_relat_interdis.pdf Schütz, A. (1967). The phenomenology of the social world. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Steiner, P. (2016). Donner . . . Une histoire de l’altruisme [Giving . . . A history of altruism]. Paris, France: PUF. Sorokin, P. A. (1950a). Altruistic love: A study of American good neighbors and Christian saints. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (Ed.). (1950b). Exploration in altruistic love and behavior. A symposium. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (Ed.). (1954a). Forms and techniques of altruistic spiritual growth: A symposium. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (1954b). The ways and power of love: Types, factors and techniques of moral transformation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (1966). Sociological theories of today. New York, NY: Harper & Row. Weinstein, J. (2000). Creative altruism: Restoring Sorokin’s applied sociology. Journal of Applied Sociology, 17(1), 86–117. Wuthnow, R. (1993). Altruism and sociological theory. Social Service Review, 67(3), 344–357.

1 Modernity and Altruism to Be Rediscovered

Abstract As specialists in the field well know, the term altruism was first used by Comte, a watershed in which the attention of scholars is focused on man and his life in the associated form. The concept of man, also in relation to nature, shifts its attention from religion to politics. For this reason, we will present a brief overview of the various concepts of man—though making it clear that we raise no claim to temporal or theoretical exhaustiveness. Using some schools of thought and systems of ideas developed from the Enlightenment, we will try to highlight the most compelling evolutionary stages of this concept, which will then form the basis of studies on altruism. We will finally affirm the need for a rediscovery of this concept through the ego/alter relationship.

The Enlightenment and the Concept of Man The concept of man, and man in relation to nature, shifts its attention definitively from religion to politics: The focus is now on men and their life in

Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism, pages 1–20 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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the associated form. Machiavelli’s The Prince (1532/2011), in a way, ferries human history towards modernity and the concept of humanity that will characterize the following system of ideas. In ancient philosophy, the cognitive process is not independent of individuals, and experience or research are two ways of interpreting reality. Both, in their own way, aim at the wellbeing of the individual together with others in society. Modernity, instead, characteristically highlights the problem of the correspondence between human representations and external reality. This defines the problem common to both ancient and precritical modern philosophy: the gnoseological problem, that is, the problem of the value of knowledge (gnòsis), of the indubitability of human representations, and of the existence of an external reality that prompts men to act. Common to both modern and ancient philosophy is also the principle of receptivity, or passivity of individuals to external reality: Reality is external, but it acts on the perceptive-sensory apparatus of man. In this perspective, man’s “perceiving” is passive (one is not free not to hear a signal, such as a sound, or to hear it differently), while the “thinking” is active (one is free not to think or to think differently). Hence, the fact that the perceivable content imposes upon man as an effect of external reality on the organs of sense. This perceiving is twofold, at the same time revealing and occulting external reality. On the one hand, the sensation generated by an external cause reveals reality as such; on the other hand, the effect is not the cause, but, being a consequence of external reality, it hides the actual structure of the source. These mechanisms orient people’s behavior towards themselves and others. Before Kant, the Enlightenment philosophy tried to solve this problem in two ways: empiricism and rationalism. The former highlights the revealing character of human perception, while the latter, starting with Descartes, emphasizes its occulting character. In the ancient philosophical systems, knowledge is the result of the observation of nature suitably elaborated; it is the product of observations from which general principles are drawn (inductive method, Socrates). Conversely, in modernity, knowledge entails formulating, with due gradualness, intermediate principles that contemplate all nature-related aspects (practicaloperational method). In other words, the senses are taken into account, but moving towards the experientia litterata, that is to say, the systematic experience carried out methodically and without any form of social conditioning. This, in short, is the foundation of the empiricism initiated by Francis Bacon: Sensations are the only element that relates man to reality, and it is by questioning them that we can know something about external reality.

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This emerging new science has attributes such as to shed new light on the real course of nature in order to achieve greater practical success (technique). What must be developed is the philosophical knowledge1 based on the rational elaboration of data, which will peak in the philosophia activa, that is, in the study aimed at the construction of useful tools for mankind. The establishment of this science requires eliminating all social conditioning on the mind: The union of mind and nature can be achieved only if errors and prejudices are removed. Any form of social conditioning could prevent an objective interpretation of nature. Indeed, Bacon distinguishes the interpretation of nature, which is obtained through the scientific method, from the anticipation of nature (idòla),2 which prescinds from experiments and instead progresses directly from partial elements to general axioms. In the societas, both research and applied experiments must coexist (mind/hand conjugation), leading to the liberation and empowerment of humanity. If Bacon emphasizes the need for observation in order to understand nature, Galilei does not stop at what appears but tries to understand the true architecture of the universe by studying its language (i.e., mathematics) on the grounds that the works of nature cannot be weighed against a purely human meter, by basing the explanations on what men can understand or what is useful to them. The main consequence of this assumption is that one cannot investigate why nature operates in a certain way (final cause), but only how it works (efficient cause). Galilei fully realizes the liberation of knowledge that Bacon wished for: The social knowledge (common sense) of the idòla is completely alienated from the new science that reduces nature to measurable objectivity. Following the scientific revolution and the diffusion of the experimental method, the philosophical current of empiricism, which finds its highest expression in England (Locke and Hume in particular), becomes more and more established. The objectification of nature limits the human ability to know. Indeed, empiricism is characterized by a theory of reason as a set of powers limited by experience (there are no innate ideas), understood as the source of the cognitive process and a tool through which to validate intellectualistic thought only if it can be verified and measured. According to Locke, the human mind is born empty, devoid of any knowledge: It fills up with notions through the learnings occurring in the course of everyday life. All learning results from experience and there is nothing, among universally accepted knowledge, that cannot be questioned. Science is but a contrast between different theses; the same empirical experience shows that nothing we know is known a priori but everything must be acquired; epistemic certainty must arise from the observation of real phenomena. Locke, therefore, argues that all mental products are elaborations

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of external perceptions that are part of the experience (empirical facts). While some of the ideas reworked by perceptual experience are assigned a hierarchical degree,3 these are never ideas directly produced by the mind. The cognitive process, for Locke, is the perception of an agreement or disagreement between some ideas of men. If this process does not take place, there is no knowledge. The perception of agreement or disagreement can be direct (intuition) or indirect (demonstration) by using other ideas (as for mathematics). In the eyes of subsequent scholars, he appears as an anti-innatist firmly anchored to experience, so much so that in the Enlightenment he became Descartes’ opposer par excellance and the continuer of the English scientific and experimental tradition that would then influence the thought of the following centuries. The offspring of this philosophy is Hume, who takes to the extreme the empirical principle that all knowledge comes from the senses. When Hume’s empiricism denies reason, it does not refuse human awareness, but rather the idea that one can rely on innate knowledge (not pertaining to experience) to reveal the reality of things, beyond perceptions. These take two forms, based on their greater or lesser force on men: impressions, which are the strongest perceptual facts, and ideas, which are the weakest perceptual facts and are built as copies of impressions. The most substantial result of Hume’s reflections is his criticism of the principle of causality: For the English scholar, the causal law is not a real objective law, it is rather a mental habit, a consequence of habit. However, neither logic nor experience can guarantee that something will happen: If a law has constantly occurred over time, it is not certain that it will do so in the future. It follows that the only truly certain knowledge is that of the mathematical sciences, since these are mental operations that take place with the help of conventional signs (mathematical symbols). This, however, does not lead to the conclusion that everything is uncertain, but suggests to men to be more cautious in their acceptance. This radical scepticism is attenuated by the feeling of “belief” that unites all men: It is the feeling that springs from direct and immediate impressions, rather than from ideas. It can be said, therefore, that although external reality cannot be justified, man’s instinct to believe cannot be eliminated. While empiricism highlights the revealing character of sensation, rationalism, starting with Descartes, emphasizes its occulting aspect. Similarly, while rationalism bases its knowledge on reason, empiricism bases it on experience. In other words, for rationalists, the construction of “knowledge” is based on principles disconnected from experience (a priori or innate). This does not detract from reality, quite the contrary: Knowledge, going beyond experience, creates a sort of bridge with reality, going beyond the

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occulting character of perceptible representations. It is not a question of going from an ever-developing reality to an immutable one, but rather of building a passage from human representations to the external reality. Rationalism, of which Descartes is one of the greatest exponents, opens the way to man’s dualism (being and reason) that will then characterize the whole of modernity. According to Descartes, rational thought conflicts with traditional knowledge and reaches its maximum naturalness in an inner reality free from all conditioning (ego): Only in this case, can we speak of a knowledge that is clear in all its aspects and comprehensible to the human mind without the intervention of others (personal instrument of each and every man). To find a foundation for the method, it is necessary to criticize existing knowledge (methodical doubt). No form of knowledge escapes doubt, because the senses can deceive, and this must lead men to seek the evidence of things, for it is precisely in doubt and research that the true essence of being is revealed: Because doubt means thinking and thinking means being (Cogito, ergo sum). The dualism emerges precisely from Descartes’ cogito. Truths are split in two: On the one hand, there is the conscious and free-thinking substance (res cogitans—soul), that is, the self, and on the other hand, the spatial and unconscious body substance (res extensa—body), that is, divisible into parts. With the cogito and the affirmation of dualism, man has definitively abandoned nature’s conditionings and dominates it by deciphering its characters. In light of the above, we can affirm that Descartes marks the birth of modern individualism and the definitive contrast between individualistic (individual—I) and organicist theories (society—us) that will then influence modern thought. Empiricism and Rationalism evolved between the 17th and the 18th century, but during the Enlightenment the development and progress of human reason was particularly affirmed, both in cultural and civil aspects, and Kant’s critical philosophy seemed to find the right solution to the quarrel between the two main philosophical currents (which, however, were not always in opposition). Before delving deeper into the basic elements of Kant’s philosophy, we should explain how the “critique” became the fundamental tool of his thought. To criticize means to wonder about the foundations of human experiences (foundation), defining: (a) the conditions that allow their realization (possibility), (b) the titles of their legitimacy or illegitimacy (validity), and, finally, (c) the boundaries of these (limits). At the basis of Kant’s critical philosophy lies, thus the limit of the human capacity to know (hermeneutics of finitude). It is not scepticism; rather, it is in the recognition of the

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limit of experience that its validity is acknowledged. The recognition of the limit becomes the norm that attributes legitimacy and ground to the various human faculties. Recognizing the limits of human activity in every field does not detract from the value of this activity, but rather is the only possible guarantee of its validity. In other words, a “science of the limits of human reason” is not only the ascertainment of such limits, but also, and above all, the justification, precisely by virtue of them and on their basis, of the powers of reason. It is in this reason that the limits of human reason are determined, since the latter cannot be imposed from outside, being autonomous and self-directing. The limits of human reason coincide with those of man, thus wanting to overcome them with something greater than reason means entering the world of dreams. With his critique, Kant answers the search for the foundation of scientific knowledge (Copernican revolution): He argues that the activity of knowledge is not based on mere acquisition of data, but is a process of elaboration and order according to a priori forms, typical of every thinking individual; therefore, the justification must be sought within the same cognitive process. Individual experience originates from the transcendental process (constitution of each element within the experience) and therefore the basis of universal judgments (a priori) does not lie in the experience itself but in individuals. According to Kant, knowledge is distinguishable in three main faculties: sensibility, which is proper to the senses and delivers data as they are perceived through the a priori forms of time and space; understanding, which allows to categorize a priori forms; and reason, which, going beyond experience, tries to explain the reality of things through the three ideas of soul, world, and God. Kant’s critical philosophy contains most of the elements that still underpin today the understanding and interpretation of social transformations (e.g., the concepts of time and space) and on the relationship between man and society. A phenomenon is not a real event per se, but only when it interacts with the knowing subject (i.e., man).

The European Enlightenment: Economics, Moral Philosophy, Law The Enlightenment influenced ideas in many sectors of human life and took on different characteristics depending on the geographical area in which it was spreading. For example, England is characterized by the school of political economy, which numbers Adam Smith among its major exponents. Considered the forerunner of political economy and particularly of

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macroeconomics, in his work, An Inquiry Into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776/1904), Smith states that the origin of civilization is due to a primordial division of labor in the various trades. His example of the pin factory is emblematic: To illustrate his theory, Smith fictionally fragments the manufacture of a pin into all its phases. One worker pierces the metal, another straightens the wire, another cuts it, another makes the tip, a fifth crushes it at the end and then inserts the head—which three more, in the meantime, are busy making—others insert it into the pins. Once the manufacturing work is finished, new workers polish the pins and wrap them in paper, ready to be sold. The production of a pin is thus divided into about eighteen operations. In short, given such a division of labor to produce a pin, with phases divided between several workers, the total production will be much higher than that of a single worker engaged in all phases, not only because of the time saved in transitioning from one manufacture phase to another, but also due to a greater specialization in each phase, which also leads to the construction of machines to rationalize the various moments of production. Another of Smith’s works, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1767), is even more important to our ends. In it, the author bases the moral life of man on the pursuit, over time, of the greatest happiness. And, according to Smith, the guide to happiness is sympathy, in its etymological sense of similar feeling, for through sympathy men can approve or disapprove of their own conduct depending on whether others sympathize with them or not. Men must be like spectators of their actions and agree with all other spectators. In judging their behavior, men resort to a sort of translation: To better analyze it, they split up, creating an imaginary “impartial spectator,” detached precisely because he is not directly involved. This spectator allows men to mediate between the impulses aimed exclusively at satisfying their needs and the desire to be accepted by the community, renouncing selfish actions, and instead promoting those useful to the whole community. The guiding criterion of sympathy is the manifestation of an order, or harmony, prepared for mankind by God. In other words, men approve of behaviors that reflect what they would adopt and oppose those following different wills and instincts from their own. If the Enlightenment brings man back to reason, Rousseau wants to bring reason to nature. The result is still the same, because in both cases what is questioned is the relationship between natural and artificial man— where the latter results from social constraints, as Rousseau explains in Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of Inequality Among Men (1782/2014). Unlike Hobbes’ state of nature (Homo homini lupus), Rousseau’s is based on harmony between man and nature: When man satisfies his primary needs,

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he develops a feeling of compassion towards his fellow men. In the state of nature, there is no property or oppression. Only as more and more structured forms of social organizations develop (especially because of the appearance of ownership) does civil society gradually emerge, based on the distinction between “mine” and “yours” (codification of inequalities). In this way, humanity leaves its original natural conditions and structures itself into a coercive organization, based on the distinction between rich and poor, masters and slaves. What Rousseau advocates is a new form of society, certainly not to bring humanity back to the forests or caves, but to restore “in law the natural equality between men.” The incipit of The Social Contract reads: Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Here’s one who thinks he is the master of others, yet he is more enslaved than they are. How did this change come about? I don’t know. What can make it legitimate? That’s a question that I think I can answer. If I took into account nothing but force and what can be done by force, I would say: “As long as a people is constrained to obey, it does well to obey; as soon as it can shake off the yoke, it does even better to shake it off. If its right to do so is challenged, it can answer that: it gets its liberty back by the same ‘right’—namely, force—that took it away in the first place. Any justification for taking it away equally justifies taking it back; and if there was no justification for its being taken away no justification for taking it back is called for.” But the social order isn’t to be understood in terms of force; it is a sacred right on which all other rights are based. But it doesn’t come from nature, so it must be based on agreements. (Rousseau, 1762/2017, p. 1)

The question raised in this book is finding a form of association in which everyone remains free and master of himself. The aim of this social pact is therefore, above all, to guarantee the freedom of each individual. It will no longer be the natural freedom of the state of nature, but the freedom arising from the contract based on the will of the contracting parties, who decide to submit to a general will. Individual relations are replaced by those of the citizens with the law, an expression of the general will, to which all submit. The “political body” is born, in which men (citizens) are integral parts of the whole and everyone has sovereignty. The state is, therefore, a moral person, a collective body that is not identified with a person or the arithmetical sum of the individual wills, but with the general will that “re-establishes in law the natural equality between men” and guarantees everyone’s freedom, a freedom linked to reason and laws. Rousseau also translated this problem as an individual educational problem in Émile (1762/1889), understood as the formation of the new man. A prerequisite for education must be the idea that nature is good

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and therefore its harmony and development in the child should not be disturbed. The education of the child (Émile) should be essentially negative, it should never intervene in the natural process of maturation of his faculties, nor should it pretend to “see the man in the child.” Children must find for themselves the first rudiments of science thanks to a contact with nature unmediated by books and uninfluenced by society—indeed, they should be kept away from the latter until they have attained, with reason, full freedom. The culmination of education is precisely the achievement of reason, or full capacity for judgment, with the affirmation of a moral conscience that reduces inequalities. Meanwhile, in France as in the rest of Europe, following the profound cultural, social, and economic changes, arose the need for a new legal-normative structure of the public law to adapt it to the ever-changing social reality. One of the main popularizers of this orientation was the Italian Cesare Beccaria, who, with his work An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (1769), first published in 1764, summarizes the liberal conception of criminal law, marking the beginning of what can be considered a new approach to the question of punishment. Starting with Montesquieu’s works (1721/1973), who criticized the legislation of his time as extremely damaging to individual dignity and the effective practice of free will, and with Rousseau’s (1782/2014), who referred to the right of nature, Beccaria promotes the idea that crime must be considered for itself, according to a strict pay code, in which no personal considerations are allowed regarding the offender: The judge must apply the law without ever evaluating the causes of the crime. These principles will then be structured in the 19th century with the Classical School of Criminal Law, which contributed to the affirmation of the so-called “tariff system,” that is, the proportion of the penalty to the severity of the crime. This idea determined a strongly dogmatic abstraction: Crime was to be considered as an “entity of law and not of fact.”

The Systems of Ideas of the 19th Century The centrality acquired by reason with the Enlightenment gains a new guise with romanticism. By reason, we mean that “infinite” force that dominates and inhabits the world and that is understood as consciousness, freedom, and ability to create. In its implementation, it has acquired two interpretations: as feeling and as absolute reason. The former is understood as an activity free from any determination and manifested precisely in those enterprises more closely connected to feeling, such as religion and art; the latter moves from one determination to another. The second interpretation was carried on by philosophers such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel—considered, the

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latter, the father of idealism. To Hegel, in particular, is generally ascribed the culmination of this interpretation. According to Hegel, true knowledge is that which opens up to reason (the part connects to the whole and the finite to infinity), applying the principles of distinction and unity, and converging in the theory of dialectics, that is, in the construction of a new logic based on the principle of dialectical contradiction. This is possible because reason overcomes the partiality of the intellect: On the one hand, understanding that the part has no meaning except in the whole that contains it; on the other hand, considering that the whole has no meaning or value if there is no distinction within it. Only rational knowledge makes it possible to find the link between these two halves, and this is dialectical knowledge that keeps the two opposites together. This dialectical process develops in three phases through the natural and historical world: the thesis, or the moment of immediacy (being); the antithesis, or the moment of alienation (not being); and the synthesis, or the moment of mediation (becoming). The protagonist of this dialectical process is the idea, or the spirit. In the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline (Hegel, 1830), the entire process is divided into three structures of thought: the logic, which is the science of the idea in itself and for itself; the philosophy of nature, which is the science of the idea transformed into a “world” and, therefore, alienated from itself; the philosophy of the spirit, which is the science of the idea in its return to itself from alienation. The spirit is first subjective or individual (finite or limited), then it becomes objective (outside of itself), and finally absolute (in itself, for itself, and with itself). It is precisely in this last moment that the history of the idea (reason) crosses with that of humanity, but only to use it as a tool: Reason is achieved only by forging human action for its own ends, hence, the Hegelian concept of The Cunning of Reason. According to this concept, individuals (and even populations) delude themselves that they operate only to pursue their particular interests, while they actually implement the much higher ends of the spirit. Not man, but the idea, is the subject of history, and as long as the will of individuals coincides with the ends of reason, there is no disjuncture between the universality of the latter and the particularity of the former. Reality is, therefore, an immanent process that takes place dialectically. In other words, reality can be understood by reason because it is rational in its manifestations in the world: This (revolutionary) assumption is expressed by the principle “that which is rational is real and that which is real is rational.” In this way, Hegel resolves the contradictions of previous philosophies. If reality is a manifestation of reason, it can be understood using the concepts elaborated by reason.

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If these are the assumptions and basic concepts that influenced the thought of the 18th and the first half of the 19th century, the second half of the century saw the first signs of further revision. Positivism transposed in science the romantic tendency to identify finite and infinite, and to consider the former as the progressive realization of the latter. In this period, science is extolled as the only legitimate manifestation of the infinite, charging it with a religious meaning, as if to become a new religious faith to replace the traditional ones. One of the main characteristics of this new way of thinking about the world and the actions of men is to distinguish scientific knowledge from both vulgar and philosophical knowledge. The features of scientific knowledge are objectivity, that is, full independence from personal tendencies, and positivity, that is, absolute adherence to facts and submission to the control of experience. There are two forms of positivism: evolutionary positivism (Spencer), which justifies the religious value of science through a mysterious underlying, infinite reality, and social positivism (Saint-Simon, Comte, and Stuart Mill), which places science as a prerequisite for a new social and religious order. Evolutionary positivism, in turn, can be distinguished into Darwinian evolutionism and social evolutionism, and the assumptions of both have characterized English positivism. Darwin’s (1859) theory of evolution states that all animal species result from an evolution differentiation within common strains after a process of natural selection, in which only those species able to gradually adapt to environmental changes survive. The controversy raised by Darwin’s book quickly became one of the first wide-ranging scientific debates: Some accepted the idea of an evolutionary change but rejected the mechanism of natural selection, while others, while admitting natural selection, wanted to preserve the notion of progress towards perfection or of an external force capable of governing the evolutionary process (God). Similarly, Spencer’s (1876/1898) theory of social evolution maintains that, since society is a superorganic reality, it goes through various stages of development, the succession of which is determined not only by the progress of knowledge, but also by the affirmation of an evolutionary type of selection. Spencer tries to elaborate an evolutionist theory that can be valid both for the natural world (inorganic evolution) and for the social world (superorganic evolution), and, in perfect coherence with positivism, he finds analogies between the individual organism and the social organism. Both grow with the passing of time and change their structure, becoming more complex; moreover, their interdependence is strengthened to the point of surviving the death of their individual components. This social evolution, however, must also be supported by principles deriving from law, politics

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(understood as an instrument to fulfil the will of the citizens and protect their individuality), and the economy, with liberalism. All these elements, for Spencer, existed in the English society of his time, in which his thought was developing from the union between Darwinian evolutionism and Comte’s vision of organicist sociology. Comte’s social positivism is certainly of greater importance for our reflections. He stands out, by both personal intention and his contemporaries’ perception, as a prophet of a new religion stemming from philosophy, and is so convinced of it that he even writes The Catechism of Positive Religion (Comte, 1852/1858). The French scholar indicated with the term altruism, the willingness to take an interest in others and their well-being— term deriving from the Italian altrui (another person). In other words, for Comte, “Live for Others, is the simplest summary of the whole moral code of Positivism” (Comte, 1851–1854/1875–1877, I, p. 566); the altruist is he who selflessly places the good of others as the aim of his actions. Of particular importance is Comte’s doctrine of science, since natural science has shown that only by knowing its laws is it possible to govern nature for the social development of humanity. On this basis, Comte claims the need for a science of society—here coining another term, sociology, which he will deem the science of society—that increases our knowledge of the laws of human conduct, in order to found a true social engineering aimed at the “religion of humanity” (Comte, 1830–1842). Science is—or should be—positive knowledge, that is, knowledge which renounces the knowledge of causes, restricting itself to the verification of phenomena and their relations, and thus constructing general laws to make science pragmatic for social ends. Positive knowledge is therefore the perfect form of knowledge and is the third of the stages (positive stages) identified by Comte. There are two other previous stages: the first one, the theological stage, is that of knowledge addressed to the intimate nature of beings, so that phenomena are thought to be caused by supernatural agents; the second stage (metaphysical) is characterized by the replacement of those supernatural agents with abstract forces, real entities inherent in the phenomena. The succession of these mental stages (law of the three stages) is considered by Comte a fundamental discovery and is applicable to all manifestations of the evolution of human beings and to the historical course of events. Obviously, not all sciences reach the third stage, and society, in order to achieve it, must become organic and hierarchical, placing positivist philosophers at the top. They, in turn, must assume functions of arbitration and control, while preserving all other social structures (property, state, family, etc.). The specific features of this new society are its orientation and regulation towards the common

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good, with a great associative spirit and altruistic feeling, which also becomes a religious feeling, having Humanity as its new god.

The Ego/Alter Relationship: Altruism to Be Rediscovered Studies on altruism must, therefore, combine objective aspects (the system) with subjective aspects (individuals), taking into account all the dimensions, levels, and factors involved in the expression of altruism. This suggests that the analysis must consider the multidimensionality and multifactoriality that characterize altruism, as it derives from human relations. In his essay “Les formes élémentaires de l’altruisme” (2000), Moscovici poses two fundamental assumptions for studying altruism. First, that both altruism and egoism can be problematic behaviors depending on their interpretation, which in turn is based on the social and cultural expectations of the reference society. Second, that altruism is linked to the relationship between individuals (intensity and duration) and to the situation they experience. This suggests that the renewed interest of the social sciences in altruism can be considered as an attempt to reconfigure the ego/alter relationship starting from the transformations of society and the “doings and beings” of human beings. Over the last two centuries, societies have become increasingly complex in both relationships and processes, whose gradual unfolding changed according to the different geographical areas and, above all, to the sociocultural contexts that are considered as a reference for the analysis. Processes such as secularization (loss of relevance of religion in social life), rationalization (predominance of purposive rationality) and, finally, individualization (Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft with the replacement of Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity with organic solidarity) have caused transformations in both the social representations and the beliefs through which individuals interpret the surrounding society, as well as the values by which they orientate themselves within it, and on which they base their relations. All these processes led to redefining the relationship between individuals and their social environment, producing a sort of “break” (transformation)4 in rhythms and lifestyles, and affecting, in general, people’s representation of their life and world, as well as their actions towards others. These changes in rhythms and lifestyles lead to a sort of “decline in daily life,” meaning a measure of human well-being that goes beyond economic parameters and includes aspects related to the ability of individuals to perform an activity— the capability approach (Nussbaum & Sen, 2004)—their cultural identity and sociality, up to aspects related to their living environment.

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Of course, “living” has an intrinsic multifactorial and multi-conceptual dimension, and so does the capability approach. The latter should be considered beyond the resources and satisfactions of individuals falling within the framework of control of their freedom of acting and being. The capabilities approach “sees human life as a set of ‘doings and beings’—we may call them ‘functionings’—and it relates the evaluation of the quality of life to the assessment of the capability to function” (Sen, 2003, p. 4). The fundamental concepts are, therefore, the functionings and capabilities (Sen, 1982; 1987), a sort of measure of the freedom of individuals to be able to choose between several life chances. Functionings are “states of being and of doing” that allow the achievement of well-being, while capabilities allow for the acquisition of “valuable functionings,” which in turn expand what individuals can manage. This approach was defined by Sen himself (1987) as a development approach based on individuals because development is the result of the aims, objectives, and interactions that individuals experience among themselves and with institutions. In this context, individual well-being is paramount. At the risk of oversimplification it can be said that the well-being aspect of a person is important in assessing a person’s advantage, whereas the agency aspect is important in assessing what a person can do in line with his or her conception of the good. The ability to do more good need not be to the person’s advantage. (Sen, 1985, p. 206)

Sen’s reasoning is based on the principle of equality, that is, not “everything for everyone,” but “what is necessary so that everyone can have equal opportunities to choose their own life project.” Now, taking up Dahrendorf’s arguments (1988), it can be affirmed that life chances, understood as the possibility of choosing between alternatives, are never distributed equally: There are no societies in which all men have the same entitlements (access to and legitimate control over things) and enjoy the same provisions (a set of material and immaterial choices). If the possibility of choosing between alternatives is itself seen as an important element in a dignified existence, the set of capabilities plays a further role. This means considering two more elements: efficiency and freedom. “If one person could have achieved all the relevant functioning vectors that the other could then in some important sense the first person had at least as much freedom to live well” (Sen, 1985, p. 201). A further version of the capability approach can be ascribed to Martha Nussbaum who, having worked with Sen since 1986 at the World Institute for Development Economics Research, tries to fill the gaps existing in the first version of this approach. Nussbaum redefines capabilities as a political

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and moral space within which individuals and governments can act, focusing on political principles that guarantee a minimum of social justice (Nussbaum, 2003). The essential foundation for this is the dignity of the human being, a notion linked to different concepts (respect, self-realization, autonomy, etc.). According to Nussbaum, The Capabilities Approach is not a theory of what human nature is, and it does not read norms off from innate human nature. Instead, it is evaluative and ethical from the start: it asks, among the many things that human beings might develop the capacity to do, which ones are the really valuable ones, which are the ones that a minimally just society will endeavor to nurture and support? An account of human nature tells us what resources and possibilities we have and what our difficulties may be. It does not tell us what to value. (Nussbaum, 2011, p. 28)

Three are the capabilities identified by Nussbaum: basic capabilities, which are the innate abilities and natural inclinations that allow the development of advanced abilities (i.e., language); internal capabilities (i.e., personality traits, emotional and intellectual abilities, etc.); and combined capabilities, that give the individual the freedom to exercise the chosen functions adapted to external conditions (social, political and economic environment). Sen’s and Nussbaum’s conclusions on the capabilities approach tend to keep individuals together with their living environments; however, they do not see this relationship as a “crisis of the human species” but rather a crisis concerning a number of elements and factors including “living together” in solidarity and social justice (Naussbaum & Sen, 2004). In light of the statement above, the starting hypothesis to overcome the dichotomy egoism/altruism is that there is no such thing as altruism or egoism understood in a behavioral sense, as claimed by sociobiologists or behaviorists, but there are altruistic relationships and egoistic relationships. It follows that our focus will be on “rela(c)tion,” that is, on a relational process that is action and at the same time interaction between individuals who are placed in a sociocultural context. The latter partly influences these processes that, in turn, influence the context. Research focuses once again on the individual, an individual who is capable of significant interactions that fit into a cultural context. These relationships are influenced, on the one hand, by culture, and, on the other, by the indissoluble link with everyday life and context. Consequently, it is possible to transition from an approach to the study of social phenomena aimed at searching for a cause (causality) to one focusing on the overall significant interactions between what Sorokin (1948) defined as “indivisible sociocultural trinity” (society, culture, and personality). This transition outlines the

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reciprocal relationship between life-world and social system and represents the pivotal moment in which attention is paid not only to the individual as the recipient of decisions but to the individual as a “subject” and active part in relational processes (Donati & Archer, 2015; Mangone, 2019). These aspects were examined by both Mauss (1923–1924/2002) and Moscovici (2000): The former referred to the need to close the give/receive/ reciprocate cycle of the gift, while the latter discussed the elementary forms of altruism. Both emphasize how these actions are based on individuals’ relationality. Sorokin, moreover, in his last researches (fully devoted to the activities of The Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism), focuses his attention on the transformation of human solidarity that would be replaced by the love relationship, that iceberg-looking feeling—“Love is like an iceberg: only a small part of it is visible, and even this visible part is little known” (Sorokin, 1954, p. 3)—that the Russian-American sociologist considered as “the supreme and vital form of human relationship.” This way privileges the spaces of the ego/alter relationships within societal processes, since all social phenomena, attitudes, and actions are built in an environment that has its places, times, and symbols, which are fundamental in the cognitive processes of self-signification activated by individuals for the construction of social realities in their daily relational experience. What should be analyzed, therefore, is neither altruism or egoism, but the relationship. This procedural and methodological order overcomes by itself the altruism/egoism dichotomy, since these two static terms are replaced by processes: the altruistic relationships, for society (pro-social or hetero-directed) and the egoistic relationships, for oneself (antisocial or self-directed). Showing some ambiguity, any form of relationship fluctuates between the exchange of information and the symbolic action on the other: Implemented and experienced relations are, therefore, problematic actions that most often do not allow reciprocity between the subjects, which is paramount for altruistic relationships. If social relationships connect ego and alter, it is precisely through them that one discovers the other and the actions towards them. The idea of otherness, which usually leads to the concept of unfamiliar or foreign, depends on the recognition or not of the other within the cognitive order preestablished by the society or reference groups (Gutmann, 1992). As Simão stated in describing the importance of human relations, The process to which the notion of otherness concerns a complex and even paradoxical recognition of similarities and differences among an I and his or her Others, with which the I could share or not his or her experiences,

Modernity and Altruism to Be Rediscovered     17 expectances, hopes, and fears, in affairs related to work, educational, leisure, familiar, private, and public situations. (2012, p. 1281)

And it is precisely recognition that can push the relationship in an altruistic or selfish direction. Indeed, the lower the anonymity of the individual with whom one relates, the more the individual is oriented towards an altruistic relationship. In this way, the ego/alter relationship is no longer based on inequality (in what) but differentiation (for whom). The focus should be on ego’s attitudes, as she perceives herself as similar to/different from alter in a given symbolic sphere, as well as on alter’s responses within a relational framework built on expectations that may influence the determination of closeness/distance and openness/closure. Actions towards others depend on the idea that individuals construct of them, the interpretations of their past and present actions, and the predictions of what they will do in the future (Berger & Luckmann, 1969). One of altruism’s premises is a hypothetical (not guaranteed) restitution of the good or service granted to the other. It can be argued, therefore, that attitudes (positive or negative) towards others are oriented by one’s perception of them. Individuals construct their action schemes based on the meanings they attribute to their everyday existence. These social representations (Farr & Moscovici, 1984), understood as systems of interpretation of the social environment that constitutes reality (the idea of the world, Weltanschauung), determine the meaning and significance of actions and events. Furthermore, they define the experience of reality by identifying limits, meanings, and types of interactions by reducing the information ambiguity and making the meanings of actions unequivocal (turning the unfamiliar into familiar). If we try to further analyze this process through representations, as a cognitive-descriptive process, we find that the recognition of otherness refers to a wider and more complex categorization process. This, in turn, leads to the visibility of the ego/alter nexus (the basis of social identification) and at the same time makes the near/far dimension apparent and visible. Ego strengthens and unfolds positively, thus negatively defining alter. This process is particularly significant when the individual is already aimed at “defending her own world.” The opposite happens instead in an altruistic relationship and particularly with what Moscovici (2000) defined as “participatory altruism.” This form of altruism gives rise to an “us” that connects and binds together the members of the group, community, or society, and it is for this “us” that individuals are ready to sacrifice themselves. Individuals still defend “their own world” but this world is no longer individualized but referred to the collective as humanity. In this case, the altruistic

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relationship is directed towards supporting that bond that must hold for the survival of the group of which one is part (humanity), regardless of its form. In a certain way, ego connects with alter in the “us,” becoming almost interchangeable—so much so that it is no longer possible to distinguish when something is being done for the other or our good. It is, therefore, necessary to activate transformation processes of the perceptive and cognitive system of individuals so that their experience unfolds as a synthetic re-interpretative experience of the ego/alter relationships. A widespread idea in contemporary society is that globalization hindered the humanitarian ethos aimed at that communicative interaction for the “understanding” between two subjects in action who refer to each other and act taking into account their mutual intentions, motivations and expectations. And yet, this ethos should be considered a valuable opportunity for individual growth in the perspective of changing everything that hampers the construction of a new civil and solidaristic coexistence.

Notes 1. Bacon distinguishes knowledge into three degrees: (a) historical knowledge based on the memory of observations; (b) poetic knowledge based on fantasy, without any relation to data; and finally, (c) philosophical knowledge. 2. Bacon distinguishes four types of idòla. The first two are the idòla tribus and the idòla specus, typical of men; the first refers to prejudices common to human groups (tribes), while the second refers to the deformations produced by the individual as a result of his education and training. The other two are the idòla fori and the idòla theatri, external to men; the first refers to the distorted use of language and the second to past doctrines or erroneous demonstrations. 3. Locke proposes a scheme of ideas: the simple ideas that are provided to man by experience; the complex ideas that are based on the simple ones, but that are the result of accumulation. Similarly, there are qualities of these ideas: the primary qualities that are the objective perceptions; the secondary qualities that are the subjective impressions that we receive. 4. Here the term break is to be understood as synonymous with the Greek krisis, which etymologically means divide or separate. It is the moment that separates a way of being or a series of phenomena from other different ones.

References Beccaria, C. (1769). An essay on crimes and punishments. London, England: F. Newbery. (Original work published 1764) Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. New York, NY: Doubleday & Co.

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Comte, A. (1830–1842). Cours de philosophie positive [The positive philosophy] (Vol. 6). Paris, France: Bachelier. Comte, A. (1858). The catechism of positive religion (R. Congreve, Trans.). London, England: J. Chapman. (Original work published 1852) Comte, A. (1875–1877). System of positive policy (Vol. 4). London, England: Longmans, Green, and Co. (Original work published 1851–1854). Dahrendorf, R. (1988). The modern social conflict: An essay on the politics of liberty. New York, NY: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Darwin, Ch. R. (1859). On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. London, England: John Murray. Donati, P., & Archer, M.S. (2015). The relational subject. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Farr, R. M., & Moscovici, S. (Eds.). (1984). Social representations. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Gutmann, A. (1992). Introduction. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism and “the politics of recognition” (pp. 3–24). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hegel, G. W. F. (1830). Encyklopädie der philophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse [Encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences in basic outline]. Heidelberg, Germany: Oßwald. Machiavelli, N. (2011). The prince. London, England: Penguin. (Original work published 1532) Mangone, E. (2019). Gratitude and the relational theory of society. Human Arenas: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Psychology, Culture, and Meaning, 2(1), 34–44. Mauss, M. (2002). The gift: The form and reason for exchange in archaic societies. London, England: Routledge. (Original work published 1923–1924) Montesquieu (de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de), Ch.-L. (1973). Persian letters. London, England: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1721) Moscovici, S. (2000). Les formes élémentaires de l’altruisme [The elementary forms of altruism]. In S. Moscovici (Ed.), Psychologie sociale des relations à autrui [Social psychology of relationships with others] (pp. 71–86). Paris, France: Nathan. Nussbaum, M. C. (2003). Capabilities as a fundamental entitlements: Sen and social justice. Feminist Economics, 9(2/3), 33–59. Nussbaum, M. C. (2011). Creating capabilities: The human development approach. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Nussbaum, M. C., & Sen, A. (Eds.). (2004). Quality of life. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Rousseau, J.-J. (1889). Émile or, concerning education (E. Worthington, Trans.). Boston, MA: D. C. Heath & Company. (Original work published 1762)

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Rousseau, J.-J. (2014). Discourse on the origin and the foundations of inequality among men. Adelaide, Australia: The University of Adelaide Library. (Original work published 1782) Rousseau, J.-J. (2017). The social contract. Bowen Island, British Columbia: Jonathan Bennett. Retrieved from http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/ pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf (Original work published 1762) Sen, A. (1982). Choice, welfare and measurement. Oxford, England: Blackwell. Sen, A. (1985). Well-being, agency, and freedom: The Dewey lectures 1984. The Journal of Philosophy, 82(4), 169–221. Sen, A. (1987). Commodities and capabilities. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Sen, A. (2003). Development as capability expansion. In S. Fukuda-Parr & A. K. Shiva Kumar (Eds.), Readings in human development: Concepts, measures, and policies for a development approach (pp. 3–16). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Simão, L. M. (2012). Otherness. In H. K. Anheier, M. Juergensmeyer, & V. Faessel (Eds), Encyclopedia of global studies (pp. 1280–1282). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Smith, A. (1767). The theory of moral sentiments. London, England: A. Millar, A. Kincaid, and J. Bell. Smith, A. (1904). An inquiry into the nature and the causes of the wealth of nations. London, England: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1776) Sorokin, P. A. (1948). The reconstruction of humanity. Boston, MA: The Bacon. Sorokin, P. A. (1954). The ways and power of love: Types, factors and techniques of moral transformation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Spencer, H. (1898). The principles of sociology (Vol. 3). New York, NY: D. Appleton and Company. (Original work published 1876)

2 The Social Sciences Discover Altruism

Abstract Modernity shifts the attention to a man-centered concept of human beings, thus moving ever further away from religious aspects. The focus is once again on man, but also on his life in the associated form and, therefore, on politics. Hence, the need to understand how the various sciences have come to this concept and, above all, how these disciplines attempted to explain (cause–effect) and understand (sense and meaning) the reasons why in certain situations some people behave positively towards others (altruistic behavior) while in similar situations the same people behave differently. Obviously, not all disciplines have actually used the term altruism, but this does not mean that philosophy, sociology, biology, psychology, and economics have not dealt with behaviors that can directly or indirectly be traced back to it.

T

he social sciences did not discover altruism when Comte (1851–1854/ 1875–1877) coined this term—which started to be widely used when his works were translated into English in 1852 (Dixon, 2012). On the contrary, since ancient times scholars, starting with philosophers, have tried to explain (cause–effect) and understand (meaning and sense) the reasons Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism, pages 21–79 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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why in certain situations some people behave positively towards others (altruistic behavior) and why in similar situations the same people behave differently. Obviously, not all disciplines have actually used the term altruism, but this does not mean that human and social sciences have not studied behaviors that can directly or indirectly be traced back to it. A phenomenology akin to altruistic behavior has always existed in human history. For this reason, we will review how this phenomenology of human action has been addressed by some disciplines (philosophy, sociology, biology, psychology, and economics), while emphasizing that we raise no claim to either temporal or theoretical completeness.

From Ancient Philosophy to Modernity Regarding antiquity, we cannot help turning our gaze to classical Greek philosophy, a difficult branch of knowledge to structure in a time frame. However, considering the organization of research in schools and the relationships between the different schools of thought, we can identify five periods: cosmological, anthropological, ontological, ethical, and religious. For our purposes, the anthropological, ontological, and ethical periods are of greatest interest, being characterized by the search for the unity of man in himself and with others, a condition considered as the foundation of a harmonious, associated life. Starting the reflection on antiquity necessarily involves referring to their idea of man and how it was related to social organizations. This inevitably invokes sophistics, particularly Protagora and Gorgia, and Socrates and the Socratic schools. Although both focus on man, they oppose each other, the first being based on individualism and the second on universalism. The sophists focus on man not as part of nature, but as the bearer of specific characters. Its exponents were the first to stress the educational and formative value of knowledge towards a paideia aimed at the global development of man as a member of a social world. The fundamental teaching of sophistics is synthesized by Protagoras, who states, “Of all things the measure is man, of the things that are, that [or how] they are, and of things that are not, that [or how] they are not” (Diels & Kranz, 1952, 80B1). This statement is doubly interesting. First, as asserting the acceptance of things as they present themselves to individual men (hence, the definition of individualism): Things are true as they appear and as they are perceived through the senses; second, as acknowledging different values between different human civilizations. We can further describe the first aspect by specifying that the relationship between nature and man is accomplished

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through sensitive action: What is perceived by the senses is true because it exists, what is not perceived is not true and does not exist. The second feature, instead, can be seen as the first expression/manifestation of the socioanthropological concept of cultural relativism.1 For both, there is no need to carry out further research to validate things, because they are considered true. This means that even if opinions (ideas about things) are contradictory, they are at the same time equivalent (all true). This, however, does not prevent their modification, which cannot obviously be aimed at truth, since all the opinions are equally true, but must go towards private or public utility. The sophist’s task (who was remunerated for this) was precisely to make people understand the usefulness of things, and the arts through which this could be achieved (change of opinions, persuasion) were rhetoric and oratory, typical of oral cultures. If for Protagoras all things are true (in a relativistic form), for Gorgia, all things are false. Being the advocate of rhetoric and oratory, he attributes to these practices the power of persuasion and not that of producing truth. He claims that nothing exists, and that even if something exists it cannot be known; moreover, even if it is known it cannot be communicated to others. Gorgia’s contrast with Protagora is only apparent, since both converge on denying the objectivity of individual thought. Socrates overcomes the typical Sophistic attitude of relativistic individualism. While admitting subjectivism and trust in human capacities, he claims the need for a critical examination of reasonings to ascertain the best among them. In other words, the founding idea of Socratic philosophy is that no one can assume their truth as absolute or better until it has been compared with other truths. Hence, men’s dutiful search for understanding others’ points of view through confrontation, dialogue and continuous discussion. Not only this process of research, which takes its cue from “knowing that one does not know,” is a duty, but it becomes the greatest good to be imparted to the younger generations. It is only from the discussion for the common search for truth that shared values and truths emerge (hence, the name of universalism). On the basis of Socratic doctrine, each individual acts according to her convictions by doing what she considers good for herself, hence, the idea that “no one does evil voluntarily” for the pleasure of doing so: If she knew that her actions are not good for her, she would not act so. In other words, if individuals could always recognize what is positive for themselves, they would always act in the direction of good, because good is preferable to evil, and will and desire would both tend towards it. These aspects of the Socratic doctrine were also taken up by Hannah Arendt (2006) in her analysis of Adolf Eichmann’s trial as a New Yorker correspondent from Jerusalem. As

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she attended the trial in the courtroom, Arendt developed the idea that the evil perpetrated by Eichmann—and by the Germans co-responsible for the Shoah—was due not to the malignant nature of their soul, but to a complete unawareness and inability to understand the meaning of their actions. Tending towards community does not mean denying the value of individuals; on the contrary, it means building bonds of solidarity and justice between them. Starting from the knowledge of himself, man must tend towards the knowledge of actions (what he must do) and essence (what he must be); this is the signature virtue of men. Human knowledge is not merely linked to reason or intellectual activity but derives from the continuous search for a conjugation between being and doing. The problem of universalism is, therefore, a problem of choices, which can be made freely only if opportunities are equally distributed—based on individual need rather than stemming from social privilege. Hence, the Aristotelian concepts—see The Nichomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 2009)—of vertical equity, for which different subjects must be treated differently, and horizontal equity, according to which equal subjects must be treated equally. In other words, equity must correspond to social justice (equality of rights and recognition of different needs). According to Aristotle, every action, and therefore every choice, is made in view of an end that appears “good and desirable.” However, there is an end that can be considered supreme—the highest good—on which all depend, namely happiness, which is the primary and fundamental object of political science. But what is happiness for men and what does it consist of? According to Aristotle, this question can be answered only if we determine what man’s task is, that is, to do his work well and this, in turn, means living according to reason (virtue). These virtues are divided into intellectual or rational (dianoetic), based on the exercise of reason, and moral (ethical), which consists in the control of impulses by reason. The latter aims to determine the right medium (mesòtes, mediocritas), that is, the adequate medium for attaining good according to reason—and, therefore, according to the wise man. Obviously, this implies avoiding extremes (excess and defect) and knowing how to combine the two virtues. The main ethical virtue is justice, to which Aristotle dedicates an entire book of The Nichomachean Ethics. It is not only a particular, whole, and perfect virtue, but also has a specific meaning: It is distributive or commutative. This brings us to the question of distributive justice, and, specifically, to reconsider the close link between bioethics and biojurisprudence in the allocation of resources at both the macro and micro levels. The relationship between rights and duties translates into an interindividual relationship of commutative justice, as well as into a social relationship of distributive justice of resources and goods. By commutative justice,

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in its meaning linked to individualistic liberalism, we mean a justice that controls the execution of exchanges, transactions, and contracts between free individuals minimizing the intervention of society and/or the state. If justice is the fundamental virtue, men cannot live without another quality: friendship. The latter, when based not on usefulness and pleasure but on what is good, is lasting and stable over time; otherwise, it is accidental and temporary. For Aristotle, “The virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also (for his friend is another self )—if all this be true, as his own being is desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is that of his friend” (Aristotle, 2009, ix, 9, 1170b, 5, p. 178). Summarizing, as argued by Niall and Seglow, Aristotle draws a distinction between self-love that is virtuous and self-love that is contrary to virtue, such as pure self-gratification. The pursuit of virtue involves developing oneself as a virtuous person: in acting (as we would term it) altruistically so as to benefit one’s friends, a person promotes virtue in themselves and so becomes a better person. (2007, p. 5)

And since the virtue sought by men is happiness, the highest form of happiness will consist in the highest virtue of life, that is, the theoretical virtue culminating in wisdom. After Aristotle, Greek philosophy addressed the moral question. The main task thus became the search for a moral orientation, that takes precedence over the theoretical one. In other words, thought must serve life and not vice versa. Philosophy remains a quest, but life conduct no longer has its center and unity in science. Instead, science is subordinate to life as means to an end. For the Stoics, for example, ethics is the practical use of reason. Reason is the instrument through which men reach an agreement between themselves and nature. In this case, action is seen as a duty (kathêkon) and therefore stoic ethics is the ethics of duty, in which human action represents conformity to the rational order. This perspective leads to one of the typical doctrines of the stoic epic: the justifiability of suicide. When conditions oppose the fulfillment of duty, the wise man must choose death even if he is at the height of his happiness—as many of the masters of Stoa, such as Seneca, did. Duty, however, does not coincide with good. The latter begins only when the action suggested by duty is repeated and consolidated until it becomes a uniform and constant disposition, that is, virtue understood as the only true good. This is true because virtue is the means by which the rational order of the world that directs the life of every man (and the life of the human community) is constituted. It follows that if the law governing

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humanity is one, then so is the human community; the man who conforms to the law is a citizen of the world (cosmopolitan), and his actions follow the will of nature that governs the whole world. Cosmopolitanism, in this sense, is the doctrine that denies all territorial and political divisions by affirming the right of man, and particularly of the wise man, to define himself as a citizen of the world. The wise man, therefore, does not belong to this or that nation, but to the universal city in which all men are free, fellow citizens. There are no slaves, because slavery imposed by man-on-man, according to the Stoics, is evil. The rejection of the polis and the affirmation of universal power became more evident when the Stoics saw in Alexander the Great the sovereign who embodied their political ideals. The crisis of Greek society, and the transition to Hellenistic civilization, promoted the diffusion of cosmopolitan ideals and made Greek no longer a national language but the coiné, a universal means of communication. The primacy of the moral problem is affirmed not only on theoretical questions but also on daily employments and, therefore, on politics. Stoic cosmopolitanism is characterized by two fundamental elements: the concept of a universal reason that rules things according to a necessary order; and the awareness that reason provides men with infallible rules of action that constitute natural law. An important cosmopolitan school was Epicureanism that welcomed women and based its precepts on solidarity and friendship among its members. For this school, too, philosophy becomes the means to an end by freeing man from harassing passions—and man’s ultimate goal is happiness. According to Epicurus, philosophy must subordinate its speculative character to a practical end and Epicureanism provides four precepts that can “guide” to happiness: (a) freeing men from the fear of the gods, (b) freeing men from the fear of death, (c) demonstrating the accessibility of pleasure, and (d) demonstrating the brevity and temporariness of evil. For the Epicurean ethic, happiness consists in pleasure: All choices aim to escape pain and through them we evaluate good, every good. Pleasure is divided into two kinds: static pleasure and pleasure in motion. The first consists in the absence of pain and the second in joy and cheerfulness. Happiness rests in the first of these pleasures: the absence of disturbance or inner turmoil (ataraxy) and the absence of pain (aponia). This negative character of pleasure imposes a selection among needs, distinguishing them between natural and useless—although even among the former there are those that are necessary and those that are not. Natural and necessary needs must be satisfied, while the others must be abandoned and dismissed. In other words, Epicureanism does not advocate giving in to pleasure, but the calculation and moderation of pleasures:

The Social Sciences Discover Altruism    27 When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure, we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual lust, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is wisdom. Therefore wisdom is a more precious thing even than philosophy; from it spring all the other virtues, for it teaches that we cannot live pleasantly without living wisely, honourably, and justly; nor live wisely, honourably, and justly without living pleasantly. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them. (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, 132)

But all this does not translate into pure hedonism, because this would contradict the cult of friendship that is considered a good in itself. Their attitude towards men is summarized in the maxim, “Is not only nobler, but also pleasanter, to confer than to receive benefits” (Attalus, Fragments, 544), a principle forming the foundation and justification of solidarity among all men. The transition from individualism to universalism, which characterized the crisis of Greek cities, can be evinced also in the art forms of the time, especially the tragedies. Among the foremost authors, we can remember Menander, who is considered the most famous playwright of the “new comedy” (νέα κωμωδία), characterized by the centrality of man (humanitas). Menander recalls both humanism and realism, because of their anthropocentric vision of man. What matters is the individual, seen in the everyday and private dimension, as well as his character. Men are depicted as “citizens of the world,” with the aim of transmitting the values of philanthropy, solidarity, friendship, respect, humility, and recognition of human limitations, all linked to a private sphere (individual and domestic). The pedagogical function of his works is well-known: What triumphs, in the end, is always common sense, the wise man, because through suffering man can learn and can redeem himself. An example is the Heautontimorùmenos (“The Punisher of Himself”), which will be taken up by Terence in 163 B.C., and which reveals the whole intergenerational struggle representing the crisis of a social organization that had become more conservative regarding social differences. The plot of the comedy is clear in its ultimate purpose: The old Menedèmo was undoubtedly wrong, selfish, and petty in preventing his son Clinia to marry his beloved Antìfila, as poor and without dowry. Clinia, not being able to accept principles in which he does not believe and not wanting to openly rebel against his father, left home and

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enlisted as a mercenary, and Menedèmo ends up voluntarily living a life of renunciation, imposing a voluntary expiation (hence the title) that shows better than words could do how the silent educational (punitive) action of his son worked. It is the full affirmation of the cosmopolitanism praised by the Stoics, but also by the Epicureans themselves: the denial of the differences between social layers, man as a citizen of the world, without distinctions based on social rank. Among the post-Aristotelian schools, in addition to stoicism and Epicureanism, we find eclecticism, which bases all its precepts on the idea that the aim of man is happiness and that happiness is the absence of tumults and the elimination of passions. The diffusion of eclecticism is mainly due to the conquest of Macedonia by the Romans, which made Greece a province of the Roman Empire. Rome, for its part, began to welcome and disseminate Greek philosophy, which became part of Roman culture, while Greek philosophy was gradually adapting to the Roman mentality. Such a conjugation was achieved by applying the principle of consensus gentium (common agreement) on some fundamental truths considered to exist in men, before any research, and independent from them. Roman eclecticism, however, will differ from its Greek version, while remaining substantially based on the same precepts. Philosophical research is completely subordinated to practical purposes, but it is characterized by that speculation that tends towards religious interests. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, for example, insists on the practical character of philosophy: “Philosophy teaches us to act, not to speak” (Seneca, Letters from a Stoic, 20, 2). To this is added the theme of spiritual interiority, a step towards the recognition of what will then be called introspection or conscience. Seneca vigorously affirms that God lies inside of man, an original feature of his doctrine that will then characterize following theories. If in Greece philosophy was essential for rational investigation, Christianity determined a new direction for Western thought. What one believes in is no longer the result of research, but the acceptance of revelations. Religion excludes the principle of research, because truths are given from above; man accepts and adheres to a truth because it comes from a higher entity. Research, however, does not disappear altogether, because its need reappears when people wonder about the meaning of these truths. Hence, the birth of Christian philosophy, which aims to guide men in understanding the truths revealed by Christ for a community founded on love. Emblematic in this sense is the parable of the good Samaritan from the Gospel of Luke: On one occasion an expert in the law stood up to test Jesus. “Teacher,” he asked, “what must I do to inherit eternal life?”

25

The Social Sciences Discover Altruism    29 “What is written in the Law?” he replied. “How do you read it?”

26

He answered, “‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength and with all your mind’; and, ‘Love your neighbour as yourself.’”

27

You have answered correctly,” Jesus replied. “Do this and you will live.”

28

But he wanted to justify himself, so he asked Jesus, “And who is my neighbour?” 29

In reply Jesus said: “A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, when he was attacked by robbers. They stripped him of his clothes, beat him and went away, leaving him half dead. 31A priest happened to be going down the same road, and when he saw the man, he passed by on the other side. 32 So too, a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. 33But a Samaritan, as he travelled, came where the man was; and when he saw him, he took pity on him. 34He went to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine. Then he put the man on his own donkey, brought him to an inn and took care of him. 35The next day he took out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper. ‘Look after him,’ he said, ‘and when I return, I will reimburse you for any extra expense you may have.’ 30

“Which of these three do you think was a neighbour to the man who fell into the hands of robbers?”

36

The expert in the law replied, “The one who had mercy on him.” Jesus told him, “Go and do likewise.” (Luke 10:25–37, NIV)

37

The kingdom of God requires abandoning excesses and individual interests, while “love thy neighbor” becomes the first and fundamental duty. Therefore, love (agápe = charitas) guarantees harmony among all the members of the community, as it emerges from the letters of St. Paul. In particular, in the letter to the Philippians, St. Paul exalts altruism: “3Let nothing be done through strife or vainglory, but in lowliness of mind let each esteem the other better than himself. 4Look not every man to his own things, but every man also to the things of others” (Philippians 2:3–4, KJ21). There is no doubt that the limits of human research are already inherent in Christian philosophy; the terms and the meaning of the problem are already given, there is no tendency to clarify a truth that is already known, but the collective responsibility precisely in relation to the truth, which is at the same time limit and guide. In a later, more mature phase of Christian philosophy, this collective responsibility, for St. Augustine, manifests itself through the search for clarity with oneself and “to be what one must be”: Men must recognize themselves in their spiritual nature (confession). The search for the divine is inherent in man, who was created in the image and likeness of God in His triple nature (eternity, truth, and love):

30    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism To Be, to Know, and to Will. For I Am, and Know, and Will: I Am Knowing and Willing: and I Know myself to Be, and to Will: and I Will to Be, and to Know. In these three then, let him discern that can, how inseparable a life there is, yea one life, mind, and one essence, yea lastly how inseparable a distinction there is, and yet a distinction. (St. Augustine, The Confessions, xiii, 11)

In summary, if man is made in the image and likeness of God, it means that not only must he seek God, but he must also love Him and connect to Him by imitating Him. For St. Augustine, free will equals the search for good (evil is sin). This actually excludes the possibility of free will, which, however, will be considered in scholastic philosophy, particularly by Giovanni Scoto Eriugena, who states that free will is free will, that enables man to decide both for good and for evil. Human freedom, therefore, is the prospective possibility, or the potentiality, of sinning or not sinning, because only this situation allows him to be rewarded or punished. St. Thomas Aquinas, in his The Summa Theologica maintains that human will is a free will not diminished by the finalistic search for God: Now God moves everything in its own manner, just as we see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is light are moved differently, on account of their diverse natures. Hence He moves man to justice according to the condition of his human nature. But it is man’s proper nature to have free-will. Hence in him who has the use of reason, God’s motion to justice does not take place without a movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free-will to accept the gift of grace, in such as are capable of being moved thus. (St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, I, 2, q. 113, a. 3)

In other words, it is the very order of the world that requires evil, distinct in pain (deficiency of a form, of integrity) and guilt (deficiency of an unfulfilled or unfinished action). The latter is the form in which man deliberately chooses evil by performing an action that deviates from the precepts of reason and divine law. For St. Thomas, men have predispositions (habitus) that allow them to grasp the practical principles on which all good actions depend. In this way, virtues are habitus, that is, practical dispositions that allow us to live righteously and flee evil. St. Thomas was the last great theologian of the Middle Ages, before the historical period that will lead humanity towards modernity, through Humanism and the Renaissance. The date often considered the watershed between the Middle Ages and the modern era is either 1453 (fall of Constantinople in the hands of the Turks), or 1492 (discovery of America).

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In either case, the middle of the 14th century marked a radical change in men’s attitude towards the ideas of the ​​ world and life. This was the era of the “rebirth” of the human spirit, already existing in the classical age and based on freedom, the autonomy of rational beings, and the relationship with nature. Humanism (humanitas), which literally derives from humanae litterae or studia humanitas, in clear contrast with the divine litterae of the Middle Ages, marks the return and the affirmation of man as the central and unique object of philosophical knowledge. We thus have (a) the recognition of the historical dimension of events and the evolution of humanity; (b) the recognition of the centrality of man as a worldly being capable of determining his own destiny; and (c) the recognition of the civil task of religion (indeed, for humanists the identity between philosophy and religion is essential, as well as the unity of all religions with respect for different cults). This will lead, during the Renaissance, to the affirmation of man and his “human” prerogatives—a man interacting not only with God, but with other men, nature, and God. This renewal—based on the awareness of man’s relationship with the world—cannot be understood without considering two basic aspects. Firstly, the new idea of science, based on observation and experimentation (Copernicus and Galilei), according to which the human knowledge of the world is neither fixed nor based on a closed system, but is fallible and correctable. Secondly, the new relationship with politics and the dynamics of living in a community. Machiavelli’s thought (1532/2011) refers precisely to the latter aspect, with a pessimistic view attributing man to a nature that can be summed up in the homo homini lupus later adopted by Hobbes in The Leviathan (1651). In this logic, men in their natural state are fundamentally selfish and actions are determined based on the instincts of survival and oppression. In the state of nature, all men are driven by instinct and try to eliminate whatever (or whomever) hampers the satisfaction of their desires. This viewpoint can be simplified by stating that individuals consider their neighbors as enemies (bellum omnium contra omnes), denying the possibility of approaching their fellow man under natural love. It follows that the state of man is a perpetual conflict abounding in evil and malicious acts. The concept of man, also in relation to nature, shifts its attention definitively from religion to politics. The focus is not only on individuals but also on their life in the associated form. Machiavelli, in a way, ferries human history towards modernity and lays the foundations of a concept that will deeply affect the Western system of thought.

32    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism

Sociology and Its Dimensions of Analysis As the social sciences developed and became an autonomous set of knowledge, more and more categories of phenomena were “removed” from philosophical speculation and moral or political “discourse” to form the core of the new disciplines. Demography, statistics, economics, and sociology were a way of collecting data and observing the new and complex society emerging from the great transformations that had affected Western societies since the 18th century. In other words, there is a tendency to break with tradition, and the analysis of phenomena is brought back to experience. Man begins to be studied as homo sociologicus, that is, as an acting subject at the center of a dense network of social relationships. It is widely held that sociology is a science developed at the end of the 19th century with the aim of studying the changes that occurred in that period in the forms of association of both individuals and institutions—those same changes that will then characterize the so-called “modern states.” But if we really want to explain sociology and, above all, its object of study, we need to look more closely at its origins. It is customary to date the birth of sociology when Comte, with his Cours de philosophie positive (1830–1842), attributes the term sociology2 to those studies previously called social physics. This discipline—although not structured as a “science”—however, already existed many centuries earlier than commonly believed.3 This is especially true if one considers the innumerable philosophical studies containing the first “sociological thought” that, since classical times, have addressed social transformations and the relationships between social structures and individuals (among many, we can mention Aristotle’s study on the birth of Greek cities). The question we must ask ourselves, then, is: which changes occurred at the end of the 19th century in the studies on social transformations? On the one hand, the religious aura that accompanied the reading of the transformations of primitive societies is lost, and, on the other hand, new research methods are adopted, developed mainly for the natural sciences, by scholars who were preparing to analyze the social transformations that characterized that historical period. These are the reasons why we will reflect on the objects of study of sociology that can be traced back to altruism, or at least to positive actions, by covering the evolution of this thought. Nisbet (1977) designed two ways to present the history of sociological thought: The first, and more classic, is based on thinkers whose works are the content of the discipline itself; the second, less usual, but not less used, is based on schools. In the present

The Social Sciences Discover Altruism    33

contribution, we will try to integrate both ways, since it is important to refer not only to the so-called “masters,” but also to the orientations or traditions that have spread and have contributed to the affirmation and the autonomy of sociology as a science, as well as to the critical reflection on it. What characterized the evolution of sociology was not so much the object of study, which starting from Comte was clear to all those who wanted to undertake sociological studies, but the need to make it independent from other sciences, particularly from natural science. In a highly complex scenario like the social one, with the paramount role of relationships at various levels, it is necessary to distinguish the various dimensions of analysis (Collins, 1988): the macro, concerning social systems and their forms of organization; the micro, which deals with the relationship between individual and society and with social actions; and the meso,4 which, in an effort to integrate the two previous dimensions, addresses the relations between social system and lifeworld (totality of meanings and representations of culture). Concerning the origin of the discipline, if we owe the birth of the term sociology (as well as altruism) to Comte,5 its dissemination is due to the transformation of the traditional forms of social life triggered, on the one hand, by the French Revolution and, on the other, by the Industrial Revolution that was spreading throughout Europe from the mid-19th century. The reason for this last statement is very simple: We resort to the new science (and no longer to religion!) to explain the transformations—or destruction—of traditional forms of life, trying to predict possible future scenarios. The birth of sociology, therefore, brings with it some open questions, including the debate on altruism or, in other terms, on moral solidarity or social solidarity. The term altruism, coined by Auguste Comte (1851– 1854/1875–1877), is one of the few terms born in the scientific field that will then enter the common language maintaining its original meaning: the opposite of egoism (selfishness). The centrality of altruism in the social sciences can be observed in many classics (Bykov, 2017; Wuthnow, 1993). Durkheim, for example, explains the basis of social solidarity in modern society precisely through the contrast between egoism and altruism (Durkheim, 1893/1960). In his well-known work Suicide (Durkheim, 1897/2005), he defines its implications by counterposing altruistic and egoistic suicide, identifying what will later become the most famous type of suicide. Later, functionalism (Parsons and Merton) will renew the subordination of individual action to society in a functionally positive way and, therefore, with a marked orientation towards the collective. Similarly, both Weber and Marx, while not using the term altruism as such, refer to it indirectly. The first, when

34    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism

describing the ethics of love of charismatic authority as opposed to legal and rational authority; the second, when raging against Christian charity. This interest in altruism as an object of study in the social sciences, however, gradually decreased—especially in Europe. Since the 1950s, theoretical and empirical studies clearly show the disinterest of social scientists in this object, except for Sorokin (1950a, 1950b, 1954a, 1954b). The RussianAmerican sociologist in 1949, with a funding from Mr. Eli Lilly and the Lilly Endowment, established the Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism. In recent years, however, the study of altruism seems to have taken on new vigor, especially in the United States; in 2012, the American Association of Sociology started including in its ranks the section “Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity”6 (Nichols, 2012). The promoters of this section have considered these three aspects a single field of specialization, as they are significantly interdependent in the sociocultural reality (Jeffries, 2014). Europe also experienced a renewed interest in studies on altruism, particularly by French sociology, stemming from the numerous retakes on Marcel Mauss’ work on the gift (1923–1924/2002) and following the antiutilitarian movement (Caillé, 1988). Last, in chronological order, are Steiner’s works (2016), who outlines a history of altruism starting from a critical theory of economics, and Moscovici’s social psychology (2000). Despite this renewed vitality of the studies on altruism, especially in European literature (see above), we notice that Pitrim Sorokin is not numbered among the classics that made a significant contribution to the development of these studies. In the United States, his intellectual heritage has been collected by various scholars (Jeffries, 2002; Johnston, 2001; Krotov, 2012, 2014; Nichols, 2009; Weinstein, 2000)—but we will address it in other chapters. In this chapter, we will try to outline, in broad terms and based on Collins’ three dimensions of analysis (1988), how, by some of sociology’s objects of study (social order, integration, social action, interaction, etc.), we can derive references to altruism or those actions that benefit others than the actor and for which have been used the terms solidarism and social solidarity—see for example Durkheim (1893/1960) and his differentiation between organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity. We will resort to deduction because the term altruism or, rather, the concept of altruism, even after Comte, has never attained great relevance in sociological studies. The approaches to the study of sociocultural phenomena have inevitably followed the development of sociology and its affirmation as an autonomous discipline and, therefore, have been characterized together with the definition of social sciences, based on the reference paradigm.

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The Macro Dimension of Analysis At its origin, sociology placed the social order (structure or system) as an essential prerequisite for individual and collective action (macro dimension) and this element has been the key to understanding the sociocultural phenomena of both Durkheim’s positivism and Parsons’ pure functionalism (1949), as well as Merton’s structural-functionalism (1949). In summary, in this approach the whole explains the parts. Parsons, for example, dedicated all his studies to the development of a model of analysis suitable for all types of communities, claiming that individual actions are based on requests from society (the social system determines both individual and collective actions). Individuals would therefore act—in a positive or negative direction—based on rules learned and internalized through primary and secondary socialization. The higher the degree of integration of the individual in the social system, the more he contributes to its conservation. In this sense, the action of the individual is functionally positive, otherwise the action will be dysfunctional (harmful). Hence, the supremacy of the system over the individual, whose action is subordinated to the necessity of survival of the system itself. The American sociologist solves the classical problem of order through a scheme valid for every social system: The role played by the individual mediates between the structure of the personality and the institutional structure. The social structure can be said to be constituted by normative cultural models, internalized by the individual through socialization (primary and secondary), and institutionalized by the social system. The primary object of the analysis must, therefore, be the set of mechanisms that allow for the integration of the individual into the social system, and at the same time between societal subsystems. These actions, which can be called interdependent actions, are identified in role behaviors: Individuals act based on their roles defined by institutionalized expectations. Individual action is oriented towards a given situation, built by a set of physical, social, and cultural objects that motivate the subject. The whole process of interdependence is aimed at the basic motivation for human action: obtaining gratifications and avoiding sanctions. The problem of order is solved through the interpenetration of the systems (Figure 2.1). Although Parsons criticized Sorokin (who had been his professor at Harvard), this concept clearly derives from the latter’s idea of the indivisible sociocultural trinity (Sorokin, 1948)—personality, society, and culture. But what does Parsons claim through his idea of system ​​

36    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism Social System Compliance With Role Expectations

Institutionalization

Cultural System

Personality System

Interiorization

Figure 2.1  The interpenetration of the systems.

interpenetration? He argues, as did Sorokin, that to study social phenomena one cannot consider only the social system (society) but must also study that of the personality of individuals and the cultural system. And it is precisely in the interpenetration between these three systems that interconnection, integration, and mediation between the individual/individualistic aspect of the action and the holistic pole of the structure develop. The constitutive element of this process are the values that ​​ represent the criteria for defining the role and that, at the same time, form the basis of the motivational structure of the personality. To clarify this, it is essential to examine the assumptions of the theory of social action—understood as structural action—within a more general framework which can reconcile actions such as altruism and solidarity. Parsons’ theory of action requires the following elements: (a) the actor (the subject); (b) the purpose of the action, that is, the future situation towards which the process is oriented; (c) the situation in which the action begins, whose potential development differs from the situation to which the action is directed. This situation can be analyzed on the basis of two elements: (i) what the actor cannot control (conditions of the action), and (ii) what he can control (means of action); and (d) the implicit relationship between conditions and means (choice of alternative means for a given end). It is in this choice that the normative element arises; Parsons resolves every motivation and behavior of the individual within the normative definition. And it is within this normative definition that we find positive actions (functional to society) and negative actions (dysfunctional to society). It follows that a positive action (gratitude, altruism, solidarity, cooperation, etc.) is not aimed at other people’s good, but at preserving the social order.

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There is, therefore, a fracture between individual and society: On the one hand, human action aimed at achieving a goal; on the other, the world itself—apparently meaningless—in which action is developed through the means-ends scheme. Thus sketched, the theory of action poses action and the role as a voluntary overcoming of the rift between social and individual, without allowing, however, to fully grasp the real dynamic processes of the former. Consequently, deviance (negative action) is for Parsons the main origin of the mechanisms of change in society. In Parsons’ social system, based on shared normative expectations, deviant actions originate from and consist in a disturbance of the communication between ego and alter, more specifically, a deficiency of alter in favor of ego. Such a deficiency is structured in the personality of an individual through a system of needsdispositions based on a distorted orientation towards shared expectations (egoistic orientation). The structure of needs-dispositions of the personality in relation to the system of the social roles can either conform to it or refuse (oppose) it. Therefore, the personality is explained in terms of the system of roles, and the system of roles in terms of individual personalities. However, this generates a vicious circle with an inevitably random exit. This process can only be analyzed in terms of a series of psychological mechanisms, based on which the negative action is outlined as an individual orientation towards the normative system, and is seen as an adaptation to an experienced individual tension. Like Parsons, but obviously with different nuances, Merton (1949) bases his functional analysis (he does not speak of functionalism) on the relationship between means and ends, namely between cultural goals and legitimate means.7 To better understand the balancing processes between cultural goals and legitimate means, we will invoke Merton’s theory of deviance (middle-range theory).8 On the base of this theory the choices—and the consequent actions (positive or negative)—are not due to biological or instinctual impulses badly repressed by social control, but are a “normal” response to the social pressures experienced by individuals. Contemporary societies are characterized by the growing importance attached to cultural goals and the simultaneous lessening of that attached to the “means,” thus dissociating final values and ​​ instrumental values, particularly when the importance of strictly legitimate means is lessened in favor of any effective means for achieving the cultural purpose. When the legitimate practices for reaching a strongly supported cultural goal are overshadowed, we witness a form of anomie (absence of rules). Possible solutions are schemes of actions (adaptation) that vary according to the individual’s position in the social organization (the social status and its related sources of knowledge are the elements determining the opportunities to reach a given goal through

38    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism

legitimate means). Within this context, uncertainties are emphasized for two reasons: On the one hand, there is an almost complete lack of rules on the legitimate procedures for achieving the “goals,” and, on the other, these very cultural goals are urged for everyone, without real openings in the institutionalized ways to reach them (e.g., the American dream of a selfmade man). Negatively oriented attitudes are, therefore, helped by these anomic conditions, and take different forms depending on how individuals resolve the antinomy between the “goals” set by culture and the “means” used to achieve them (adaptation). Every society sets limits, through juridical or cultural norms, to the satisfaction of individual aspirations, also determining the legitimate means to be employed. In a stably structured society, these limits are perceived as necessary and fair. However, when these normative values change, ​​ there is less respect for them, and consequently, a greater number of individuals will perform negative actions (deviance). If the norms lose credibility, more individuals are not willing to respect them; the state of anomie frames a situation of loss of credibility of the rules. In this condition, individuals are particularly uncomfortable because, given that normative values are no longer working, they lose their points of reference—both if the norms are no longer effective, and if formally present but without any meaning. Merton’s first objective, with regard to the theory of deviant behavior (and therefore to negative actions), is to find out how some structures exert a well-defined pressure on some individuals so as to make them behave outside the norm. Societies always try to maintain a balance between institutionalized goals and means. A real integration between the two values—at the base of the stability of the social system—occurs only when gratifications are obtained not only in achieving the goals but also in using certain means over others. It can be argued that, as contemporary society is a system based on competition, it is integrated if the emphasis is placed not only on the object of the competition (i.e., the goal) but also on the means by which it is achieved. Obviously, some individuals, for various reasons, start at a disadvantage for important goals, and it is therefore necessary to provide for the possibility of a more accessible alternative destination. If this were not the case, we would have what Merton calls aberrant behavior: “That aberrant behavior may be regarded sociologically as a symptom of disassociation between culturally prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing these aspirations” (Merton, 1949, p. 67). According to Merton, modern societies seem to be characterized by the great importance attributed to cultural goals and to the parallel attenuation of the importance of means. This causes anomie, a condition for which the American sociologist proposes an individual adaptation scheme (not personality types) that vary

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according to the position of the individual in the social structure. Merton’s model of the social system is anomic in two senses (as told above) and the adaptive behaviors are therefore favored by these anomic conditions, and take different forms (conformity, innovation, ritualism, renunciation, rebellion) depending on how individuals resolve the antinomy between the goals set by the culture and the means employed to achieve them. Merton’s model is a tool for the interpretation, above all, of negative (deviant) actions in modern society, where cultural dissociation is structurally linked to class division. Anomie is the form of a contradiction typical of this social system that cannot be solved in terms of the existing situation. Adaptations to the state of anomie, which in Merton’s scheme are considered as responses subjectively and individually processed to deal with psychological distress (subjective anomie), must be considered as responses elaborated collectively and consciously based on real social contradictions. Functionalism was widely criticized for its systematic and generalizing claims (particularly Parsons’ works). The first criticism was to have considered exclusively or, at least, predominantly the phenomena of integration and social order without taking into account the problems of change and conflict. The attention paid to culture and the importance attributed to the process of internalizing values have ​​ caused functionalists to lose sight of the fact that culture can also be a “constraint,” thus leading to social interests aimed at change. The conflictual perspective follows this idea: For its scholars, it is conflict, rather than regulatory integration, that performs the primary functions of preserving the system and promoting changes. The deviation from the norm is considered paramount for the interpretation of functional consequences. This implies a different evaluation of individual action, to be traced back to a specific definition of conflict: According to the major exponents of the conflictual current, particularly Coser (1962), deviations from the norm are not always dysfunctional to the group because greater moral cohesion can be built around the violated norm and its redefinition. If for structural-functionalists (Durkheim, Parsons, Merton), society is based on its order and, therefore, every single action must be functional to society, in Weber’s theory, and even more in Marx’s critical theory (1932), society is based on an unstable equilibrium of opposing forces that generate social change. If functionalists assert that the structure prevails over the individual, Max Weber considers sociology as the comprehensive science of social action. Weber’s (1978) “Sociology of Meaningful Understanding” (Verstehen) qualifies human action as a social action only when it is “meaningful.”

40    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism

Actions are social when individuals take into account those of others, which are driven by individual motivation. Therefore, actions are social as they always refer to the behavior of others, which in turn influences them in their evolution. In other words, social actions must be defined in terms of objective meanings of the activity of the individual. And, in this perspective, sociology “is a science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a casual explanation of its course and effects. In ‘action’ is included all human behaviour when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning” (Weber, 1947, p. 88). For Weber, actions become the key for the interpretation of Western modern society, which is increasingly dominated by instrumental rationality. Weber defines a type of social action (goal-instrumental and value-rational actions, affective action, and traditional action) through the conceptual tool of the ideal type.9 Weber’s development of the ideal type begins with the criticism of the use of collectivist concepts. In fact, he thinks that sociology should proceed from the actions of the individual, few or many separate individuals, and the concept of the ideal type is nothing more than a tool that allows one to measure reality. It is not an accurate copy of reality; it is only a means that emphasizes the connections that the scholar considers relevant. Through the ideal type of a phenomenon, the researcher will then focus on those connections that have meaning for her in the causal web that determines the phenomenon itself. When Weber refers to individual motivations, the reference to values is ​​ implicit. He interprets the plurality of values by ​​ overcoming the contrast between Kant’s principle of “never using others only as means but always also as ends” and utilitarianism that claims to always choose “actions that maximize people’s utility and happiness.” The contrast is overcome through the dualism between the ethics of principles, Gesinnungsethik, also called intentions or beliefs, and the ethics of responsibility, Verantwortungsethik (Lassman & Speirs, 1994; Lassman, Velody, & Martins, 1989). The first refers to absolute principles, which are assumed regardless of their consequences (e.g., religious ethics), the second to all those cases in which particular attention is paid to the relationship between means and ends and to the consequences of action. The ethics of responsibility restores to each individual the burden of the consequences of his actions towards herself and towards others (both for good and for evil), even beyond temporal and spatial proximity. In light of the above, ascribing the conduct of human beings to a single general principle is a flawed approach. In modern society, the idea of ​​responsibility for choices has often been delegated to law, in the form not of ethics of responsibility, but of ethics reduced to a simple procedure.

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In discussing the link between material interests (economy) and ideal interests and beliefs (religion), Weber refers to the Protestant Reformation by developing the idea of Beruf (Weber, 1904–1905), a term introduced in Luther’s German translation of the Bible. The idea of Beruf—which in German means both vocation and work—expresses that central dogma of all Protestant churches that consider daily work, that is, carefully fulfilling the duties of one’s profession/vocation as the only way to be acceptable to God, since the division of labor has forced every individual to work for others. Luther himself will take charge of the evil of society, because this is inherent in his mission of help (profession) which he carries within himself. Concerning professions, Weber has also been interested in the distribution of power between the various positions occupied by individuals within the different forms of social organization (in particular in the bureaucratic structure), as well as in its legitimation, thus opening a new window in the study of the satisfaction that comes from the participation of individuals in the various social organizations. In his studies, Weber wonders how to control the members of a social organization so as to maximize efficiency and effectiveness, minimizing the unhappiness that comes from the very use of control. According to Weber, all forms of social organization, particularly the bureaucratic one, set certain norms that must be observed to guarantee their own functioning. The exercise of this power, however, can produce a state of alienation in those who obey and do not consider it legitimate. Indeed, Weber uses the term power for the ability to induce others to obey, legitimacy for the acceptance of the exercise of power, and authority for the combination of these two (legitimate power). On this last element, the German sociologist provides a typology of the authorities, which differ in their origins and legitimation rather than in the type of power exercised: ◾◾ Traditional authority, based on the belief in the sacredness of traditions (“we have always done so”) and on the legitimations of those who hold authority based on these traditions. This type of legitimation, in the modern world, has weathered down, being a power that derives directly from God (an exception is the authority of the Pope). ◾◾ Charismatic authority, when individuals accept the order of their superior due to his personality, and because they identify themselves with him. Charismatic authority springs from a relationship of devotion or even love between the leader (leader) and his disciples (followers). The validity of the charism is based on the “recognition” by the followers and the legitimacy is based on having been chosen (e.g., Jesus). According to Weber, however,

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the charismatic leader does not have to be a positive force (see, for example, Mussolini and Hitler). Sociology considers all types of charismatic domination like the charisma of heroes, prophets, saviors, and so on. ◾◾ Legal-rational or bureaucratic authority, based on normative rules and on the right of those who have been given authority by such rules. This type of power legitimacy comes directly from the legal systems and is granted by law. It is the power of modern “democracies,” in which the people freely elect their rulers. If traditional authority does not exist in modern societies, since the “sacred” is no longer considered an explanation of the earthly things of men, charismatic authority is opposed to legal-rational authority because the latter evolves into what Weber defined as a “steel cage” and only a charismatic authority with innovative actions can counter this situation. In Weber’s theory, but even more so in Marx’s critical theory (1932), society is based on an unstable equilibrium of opposing forces. Marx’s entire work is imbued with moral values centered on human dignity, achieved by satisfying two primary needs of man: sociality and individual freedom. However, in the philosophical tradition, these two needs are considered as opposed to each other, hence, the need for an ethic that guarantees the development and realization of individuals in terms advantageous for both themselves and others. The rejection of the hedonistic morality (promoted by the bourgeois class), as well as of the renunciation-oriented Christian one, projects individuals towards a simple, austere, and, at the same time, satisfying and happy lifestyle. Marx openly opposes Christian charity solidarity, because they guarantee the dignity of human beings by making them all equal. As such, Christian charity should be considered as a way for covering social conflicts, that is, a sort of alibi behind which to hide to avoid facing the structural knots of existing injustices. In other words, the development of modern society, according to Marx, is based on actions of social conflict aimed at satisfying primary and secondary needs (Maslow, 1954): In this way, the motivation for an action arises from the universal tendency to satisfy certain orders of needs, which are different by nature and complexity, in ways other than according to a logic of purpose-oriented rationality. In this way, actions cannot be enveloped in an ideal model, as they escape all rational logics. (Mangone, 2018, p. 70)

The actions implemented to satisfy needs are the first ones, but since men tend to modify their needs, these, like thought systems, are transitory and

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are rooted in different historical periods. It follows that the evolution of human beings depends on their material condition and on the different forms by which they associate to satisfy their needs. Conflict is not a structural property of human societies but is to be found primarily in the individual and is, at the same time, outside and within social norms, in the tension between the needs that can be satisfied within a social form and those that cannot be institutionalized. Social change, therefore, cannot be ascribed to extra-social elements (climate or geography), as it was for moral statisticians, nor to the system of ideas, since they are not the driving forces of society, but the reflection of material interests that drive men to action and to relate to others. In such a society, production systems become independent from all other systems, and it is on these relationships that the entire cultural superstructure of society and the division into social classes is formed. Marx, however, does not reify either the society or the class, indeed, he maintains that the social entity par excellence is the individual, even if only within the society in which he builds relationships which condition his actions. In general, the Marxist approach posits that the system of thought reflects the political and economic interests of small groups of individuals, particularly those who own the means of production. The system of thought becomes the mere instrument of reproduction of social inequalities and injustices; this approach, therefore, is obviously an interpretative reading of reality that starts from very specific instances, although with some peculiar aspects. The system of representations (system of ideas), which is the result of social practices, can increase or decrease the transparency of a society. In other words, social reality, human beings, and human groups in their interactions, produce “images” that at a given historical moment become a mode of consciousness. The things that are evident in society are, in fact, explained by not-so-evident relations of production. This establishes a dialectical and reciprocal relationship by which we can understand the true nature of things, in which the social relations are ordered by the means of production underlying them. Accepting this Marxist perspective increases our disposition to solve the problems of the poor through a political liberation.

The Micro Dimension of Analysis The evolution of sociology has been characterized by two querelles: quantitative/qualitative and macro/micro. Neither dimension has clearcut boundaries; it is necessary to give due consideration to the micro and macro aspects of human action, reiterating how the individual is that component of society from which attention cannot be diverted. Microsociology

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deals with small segments of time and space (human action rather than social change) and a limited number of individuals: actions and individuals, behavior and responsibilities. This approach generally highlights meaningful action in the sphere of everyday life; the starting point is no longer society, but individuals or, better, their interactions. The scholars who apply this paradigm (interactionism) base their researches precisely on the study of the interactions between individuals. The innovative idea of​​ this approach is the emphasis placed on the interpretation that individuals give of their “life situation.” The key factor is not only the structuring of roles within society but also the culture within which interactions develop. Subjective factors, even more than objective ones, allow for interpretation: The symbolic relationship of the individual with her body, with others, and with the context of reference, is fundamental for the process of interpretation and signification. Thus configured, the phenomenological approach no longer focuses on how integration happens, but on how this is considered a fact of everyday life, allowing interpretation and the consequent choice of decisions and actions (be they positive or negative). This approach studies the everyday by paying attention to the obvious actions of everyday life, which then become the object of further study to demonstrate that the forms of everyday life play an important role in maintaining the social order. Schütz (1967; 1970–1971), for example, claims the importance of what “appears obvious” in everyday life, since it is precisely in it that social phenomena are represented. Everyday life, which he more specifically calls “the world of everyday life,” has an intersubjective character. Each interpretation of this world is based on a set of “available knowledge” that acts as a framework of reference, which in turn allows individuals to understand and control everyday experience, based on meaningful actions expressed in interactions. Starting from Weber’s concept of meaningful action, Schütz makes a further effort to clarify its underlying connections. In consideration of the criticism posed to Weber, according to which he conceives meaningful action mainly in relation to his model of purposeoriented rational action, for Schütz, actions can have both a meaning and a representation before they are actually carried out, that is, when they are a project for the future (sense of production); while they are carried out, that is, when they are experienced in the present (sense of produced); and, finally, after they have been accomplished, in other words, when they are a memory—past—for the person who carried them out (self-understanding) and for the recipient or spectator (hetero-understanding). In simpler terms and following Schütz’s theory, we can state that the attribution of meaning to an action is arbitrary as it is connected with an individual project and

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thus susceptible to modifications. Indeed, the action planned and the one taken often do not coincide, entailing the necessary distinction between aims (action planned) and cause (action taken). Therefore, actions can be understood only if we can understand their ultimate purpose and the timespan they refer to. Thus, outlined the connection between action and meaning, it follows that the authentically subjective sense of action remains almost completely inaccessible to the understanding of the other, while, on a social level, the meaning of an action is generically interpreted with the objective sense that is actualized in typifications. With Schütz’s theory, the object of study of sociology becomes the meaningful action that takes place in the “world of everyday life,” thus laying the foundations for a future understanding of the processes at the origin of culture, objectified and generalized, through the social communication of meanings. The latter is born in the intentionality of consciousness and, once shared and internalized, influences consciousness itself, in addition to action and intersubjective relationships. These, in turn, are the object of study of phenomenology, of which Goffman is the most prominent scholar. Starting from the assumption that society is nothing more than a scenic representation, Goffman denies any dialectic between inside and outside: The subject is considered as a pure mask in a social staging, whose rules and structural characteristics determine the various roles acted by the subject himself. Goffman addresses the concept of integration of individuals within social organizations in two of his main works: Stigma (1968) and Asylums (1971). These two works have a “political” character: The first describes and analyzes the practices of social inferiorization of people different from us through stigma and, therefore, through the attribution of moral judgments that allow labeling someone as belonging to a lesser category; the second analyzes the dynamics within total institutions, particularly psychiatric ones. Interaction, identity, and the self are the fundamental elements characterizing Goffman’s work. Concerning the self, he distinguishes in it two characters: the actor, the free and independent component of the subject, and the character, the set of characters needed by men every time they interact with others in their lifeworld. The self is the result of a situation (frame) that occurs and is experienced. It originates from the meaning attributed to the situation around which the relationship is organized based on a sort of negotiation. In fact, individuals adapt to situations, try to adapt these to their own needs, and build their own behavior based on the role expectations of the external world and, in this way, try to control and guide their action based on the idea that others have of them. These are the dynamics normally occurring in the construction and strengthening of identity and the self.

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Each individual, in his everyday life, experiences a reality rich in direct or mediated social encounters. In these contacts with others, there is a tendency to assume a certain line, that is to say, a model of verbal and nonverbal acts with which one expresses his opinion on the situation and his evaluation of its participants, particularly ourselves (Goffman, 1967). Goffman (1959) appropriately illustrates this mode of interaction: He states that individuals take and interpret different identity expressions according to the contexts and social situations in which they find themselves (dramaturgical approach). The American scholar claims that every man needs a kit for his identity, thanks to which he is able to manipulate his own image, and rely, in the external world, on objects that give him a feeling of himself—his body, his immediate actions, his thoughts, his possessions—free from any contact with foreign and contaminating elements. For Goffman, identity must be distinguished in personal identity and social identity. The latter, in turn, must be distinguished in virtual—attributed to the individual based on his appearance, that is, what others imagine and through which our categorization is only approximate—and actual, that is real, since it allows to attribute, with certainty, to which category that individual belongs. The constant oscillation of social identity between virtual and actual, due to the continuous changes of situations, forces the subject to redefine her social identity when she suffers stigmatization. Stigma is a personal attribute (physical or cultural), such as mental illness, homosexuality, skin color, handicap, or religion, whose examination arouses in the other individuals a strong doubt about the social identity of the subject, determining the predominance of the virtual component over the actual one. For his part, the stigmatized individual always tries to control the difference between the two components of his identity, or to hide the elements that could cause the stigma, forestalling any action that could be frowned upon and hinder integration. The identity of a subject is redefined, therefore, through the systems and interaction techniques implemented in a situational manner. It follows, according to Goffman (1959), that the roles played and interpreted by each subject in the various social contexts and situations are nothing more than a dramatic effect emerging from a scene. As a scholar of interactions, Goffman defined the scripts as recurring “sketches” of interaction that generically define the essentiality of the actors’ role. In other words, this notion refers to a structure suitable to describe an appropriate sequence of actions in a given context. The scripts are therefore complex structures of knowledge on an ordered succession of actions and define situations that have become known by experience. The use of this form of knowledge does not require specifications, nor explanations about what is done. In everyday

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life, the most effective method that individuals implement to better manage situations is environmental interpretation. This happens through recurring schemes (conceptual representations of single objects) and scripts (conceptual representations of events and social relations) that generically define the essentiality of the role of the actors in a relationship. Goffman, often considered Mead’s successor, has mainly addressed micro-processes of interaction between the I (self) and the Other, focusing particularly on face-to-face ones.10 Assuming that these interactions have motivations intrinsic to some preconditions of social life,11 it is not the aspect or the set of forms through which they are made explicit that provides indications on the status of the individual or on the character of social relations, but information and the factors independent from what individuals actually are. Thus, in all social relations, the social position of the individual depends on the participatory structure, which can change depending on the context, as the latter influences the subjective attitude of each participant in the interaction. This gives rise to various kinds of social relations: formal or informal, spontaneous or planned, symmetrical or asymmetric, altruistic or egoistic, etc.

The Meso Dimension of Analysis The classical sociological approaches have allowed us to highlight the central problem of the processes of integration and social order, especially regarding how the external (objective) reality is transformed into an internal (subjective) reality. If for functionalism and conflictualism this reality is given—therefore, imposed—for interactionism, it is placed in a communicative and intersubjective perspective. Emphasizing intersubjectivity and communication means recognizing the individual’s capacity not only to share, but also to re-elaborate and transform reality and, therefore, to construct new meanings to be shared. Objective reality seeps through the individual, who initially perceives it as unique, but at the same time develops that reflective capacity (May & Perry, 2017) which allows her to consider external reality as relativized and, therefore, no longer as the only one possible worldview. It is, therefore, necessary to try and redefine the paradigms: the micro- and macro-dimensions of a social action must receive the same attention. A sociology that does not integrate actor and contexts—within which the actions take place—is not conceivable. It is essential to switch from the order of explaining (erklären) to that of understanding (verstehen), and the search for the reason for the manifestation of socio-cultural phenomena should no longer refer to a cause, but to a meaning.

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In such a complex scenario as modern society, in which relations (at different levels) are paramount for sociocultural phenomena—and, therefore, also for decision-making and action processes—the meso dimension of analysis, addressing the relations between social system and lifeworld, allows to overcome the macro (structure) and micro (social action) opposition. Due to its relevance for the present work, we will examine Archer’s morphogenetic theory (1995, 2003; Donati & Archer, 2015) that claims the simultaneous presence of multiple factors and levels in the process of defining the goals and characteristics of the social systems that implement them. Indeed, she argues that The crucial linkage to make and to maintain is not between the “micro” and the “macro,” conceived of as the small and impersonal in contrast to the large and impersonal, but rather between the “social” and the “systemic.” In other words, systemic proprieties are always the (“micro”) context confronted by (“macro”) social interaction, whilst social activities between people (“micro”) represent the environment in which the (“macro”) features of systems are either reproduced or transformed. . . . Two implications follows from this. Firstly, that the central theoretical task is one of linking two qualitatively different aspects of society (the “social” and the “systemic,” or if preferred “action” and its “environment”) rather than two quantitatively different features, the big and the small or macro and micro. . . . The second implication is that if the misleading preoccupation with size is abandoned, then the linkages which need forging to account for the vexatious fact of society are those between the “people” and the “parts” of social reality. (Archer, 1995, pp. 11–12)

In this way, the relationship between individual and society assumes a multidimensional connotation, falling within the morphogenetic theory in which the macro emerges from the micro, and conditions it by retroacting on it (cycle). The two elements cannot be studied separately, or made to prevail one over the other, since structure and action constitute different levels of stratified social reality, each with specific and non-reducible characteristics. For this reason, the crucial linkage to make and to maintain is not between the “micro” and the “macro,” conceived of as the small and impersonal in contrast to the large and impersonal, but rather between the “social” and the “systemic.” In other words, systemic proprieties are always the (“micro”) context confronted by (“macro”) social interaction, whilst social activities between people (“micro”) represent the environment in which the (“macro”) features of systems are either reproduced or transformed. (Archer, 1995, p. 11)

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In the morphogenetic approach, processes depend on the interaction with the real world; therefore, the systems must be studied for their actual shape (morphogenetic cycle12) rather than for how we would like them to be. In the present work, we will apply the morphogenetic cycle, which in its general form is characterized by structural conditioning, sociocultural interaction, and structural elaboration, to altruism. To give a graphical representation (see Figure 2.2), we can set as the starting point the subject (X) that acts positively towards the subject (P) through a material or nonmaterial aid (O); this causes a structural conditioning and represents the first moment (T1). The object (O) is the second moment of the cycle (T2) which is intended for the subject (P)—third moment of the cycle (T3). It is in this passage from T2 to T3 that the sociocultural interaction is revealed. All the interacting elements reach time T4, the moment in which the three elements structurally elaborate and reproduce the meaningful interactions of a condition that leads to (or at least can lead to) altruism. Starting from the assumption that the cultural system is the fruit of human action, and that once it reaches its autonomy it influences future generations, we want to emphasize the importance of the interactions between the subjects (within the morphogenetic cycle), connected with both cultural conditioning (structural arrangement of the cultural system), and the resulting processing towards its confirmation (reproduction) or change (innovation). This shows that processes can deliver expected or unexpected results, and those of the processes of interaction have several directions. When analyzing

P ( T3 )

X ( T1) Structural Conditioning

Socio-Cultural Interaction

O ( T2 ) T4

Structural Elaboration

Figure 2.2  The morphogenetic cycle.

Structural Reproduction

T4

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positive actions, we should therefore understand “where they come from” and “how they work,” linking—through the meso analysis—their becoming a system (macro analysis) with interactions (micro analysis). This multidimensional vision allows us to observe the elements of a sociocultural process, but, above all, the relationships formed between them, overcoming the traditional visions that kept these levels separate. It is necessary to combine the system (objective dimension) with individuals (subjective dimension), that is to say, the objective aspects must be combined with the subjective ones, taking into account all the dimensions, levels, and factors involved in the sociocultural process considered. This process leads to the constitution of the social subject, since it implies exchange between individuals by activating communication processes, rather than by closing oneself towards the other. It is not born to satisfy private or corporate needs but is connected to sociality and citizenship. These definitions of sociocultural processes entail that their analysis must consider their characterizing multidimensionality and multifactoriality. Each process, regardless of its context, presupposes the knowledge for the construction of reality, and this is even more necessary in an ever-more complex scenario where actions are less and less precise due to continuous changes. In other words, the socialization process is paramount, because it influences the relationship between individuals and between individuals and society in an attempt to construct an identity that is as social as possible while taking into account the role played by individuals. Thus, the spaces of the relationships within the sociocultural processes are privileged, which become an important factor for the recognition of identity through and within the relational investments of each individual. Identities are built in an environment with its own places, times, and symbols, which are paramount for the cognitive processes of self-signification activated and implemented by each individual activates with respect to his experience of daily life starting from primary socialization. Identities are ever-moving realities, with structuring and destructuring dynamics, the result of a continuous process of socialization that allows for the construction of individuality, but also of an individual inclined towards the community (social subject). Considering the above, the study of altruism or, in general, of positive actions, cannot entail mere simplistic analyses within the sociological field. Individual activities appear only with the expression of a need to be satisfied and in relation with others: The multidimensionality and multi-contextuality of everyday life impose an interdisciplinary analysis. The reality experienced by every individual is built daily through a process of socialization, which is learning and internalization but also externalization and objectification (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). These phases sketch the basic process of

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self-structuring, which represents the link between society and the individual. This process must ensure, on the one hand, the integration and adaptation of individuals, and on the other, the maintenance, development, and updating of knowledge that allows civil coexistence, social inclusion, and the right degree of competitiveness in the economic and work world.

Evolutionism and Sociobiology Evolutionism developed within positivism and is divided into social evolutionism (Spencer, 1876/1898) and Darwinian evolutionism (Darwin, 1859). The former’s basis was the idea of ​​development through various stages, the succession of which is determined not only by progress of knowledge, but also by the affirmation of an evolutionist selection. According to the former, instead, all living species (including men) are the result of an evolution-differentiation within common strains that have undergone a process of natural selection, in which only those species that can gradually adapt to environmental changes survive. Individuals have always established a multivaried relationship with their physical and social environment: they are part of the environment but are strongly affected by it in their interactions; they change it but endure its constraints. All of this brings about to continuous modifications and adaptations. For evolutionary biology—based on Darwin’s concepts of individual selection and survival of the fittest—altruism is a theoretical challenge, because when an organism acts to promote the survival of another organism, rather than its own, it violates the principle of individual selection. This leads to the assertion that altruism is an “aberrant” behavior for evolutionary biology (Monroe, 1996), although its constant presence in human history makes such an explanation difficult to uphold. A discipline that tried to resolve these knots is sociobiology. Its birth is attributed to Wilson (1975), who, in the book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis uses the term in a new sense, since it originally referred only to societies of insects—and indeed, Wilson is an entomologist. In its new meaning, the term indicates: “The systematic study of the biological basis of all forms of social behaviour, including sexual and parental behaviour; in all kinds of organisms including man” (Wilson, 1975, p. 10). Sociobiology studies almost only animal or human collectives, since it is among these that similar processes and behaviors can be observed (a similarity that must obviously be taken with caution). These, in turn, explain phenomena based on common biological traits. Sociobiology is, therefore, the study of reciprocal interactions between social and biological processes. This peculiarity leads

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to studies of the reciprocal relationships between processes of social and cultural evolution, as well as of human evolution in general. Ultimately, sociobiology argues that the sociocultural phenomena of the everyday life of individuals can be explained by resorting not only to cultural processes, but to a conjugation of these and natural evolution processes (Dobzhansky, 1962). Sociobiologists are particularly interested in individual altruistic and egoistic behaviors. Scholars of this discipline define individuals as altruists if they, in their decision-making processes (Piliavin & Charng, 1990), give more importance to others or, better said, to the effects of their actions on them—if they are positive for others rather than for themselves. We should, however, point out that sociobiologists address the study of altruism or egoism only from the point of view of survival and/or genetic result, without considering questions of a moral nature (Sigmund & Hauert, 2002), since their conclusions would be simplistic if they referred only and exclusively to genetic adaptations. In this regard, Ruse (1991) argues that altruism is a collective illusion “fobbed off on us by our genes to get us to cooperate” (p. 506). Altruism is usually explained through two key hypotheses, both based on the evolutionary idea of individual ​​ selection: kin selection and group selection. The first hypothesis (kin selection) explains altruism by claiming that the process of natural selection works through the genes rather than through the group or the individual organism. In other words, altruistic behavior works for a group of individuals sharing the same genes to ensure their survival—i.e., parents who lose their lives to save those of their children (Haski-Leventhal, 2009). If scholars dealing with altruism wonder whether this type of behavior is possible for everyone—and for evolutionists, it is the selfish behavior for survival, rather than altruism that prevails in society—for sociobiologists the problem is to look at altruism through genes and to guarantee their survival for future generations. Starting from the idea that all living beings are programmed by their genes to maximize the result of survival and reproduction of the species, and assuming that altruistic behavior entailed a sacrificial attitude, this means that altruists, in the medium or long term, are destined for extinction. However highly we value selfless acts, in humans at least, the evolutionary perspective seems to suggest that those kinds of behaviours would be selected against in the long run, and hence altruism as a trait would not survive. Altruism would simply not be an evolutionarily stable behavioural strategy. On the evolutionary paradigm, altruistic individuals could only flourish if they enjoyed some adaptive benefit as a result of their altruism. Obviously, if altruism is strictly defined as non-beneficial self-sacrifice, then this is impossible. However it is defined, evolutionary theory faces the problem of explaining how

The Social Sciences Discover Altruism    53 the phenomenon of altruism—which is present in insect behaviour through to human behaviour—plainly can persist and yet is incompatible with the general theory of natural selection. (Scott & Seglow, 2007, p. 45)

Consequently, the origins of altruistic and moral behavior can only be explained by developing cooperation strategies. In particular, in the kin selection hypothesis, cooperation is realized between relatives, since the sacrifice of one can allow the reproduction of genes through the surviving relative. The kin selection theory has fitted the sociobiologists’ agenda based on Darwin’s ideas on altruism developed for insects: It is evident that with mankind the instinctive impulses have different degrees of strength; a savage will risk his own life to save that of a member of the same community, but will be wholly indifferent about a stranger: a young and timid mother urged by the maternal instinct will, without a moment’s hesitation, run the greatest danger for her own infant, but not for a mere fellow-creature. (Darwin, 1871, p. 87)

Selection, therefore, does not work on individuals, nor on individual genes, but on kinship ties, both direct and collateral. This evolution-based selection has led to the affirmation of altruistic behavioral patterns in the animal world (worker bees that die to defend the queen bee and, therefore, the possibility of reproduction for the swarm) and in humans, for which an individual gives up part of his resources or take certain risks to benefit to another individual with whom she shares a close family bond (child or other blood relative), to preserve the preferential transmission of her genetic line. According to Monroe (1996), however, the kin selection hypothesis cannot be applied only to individuals who share a consanguineous bond: Rescuers offer the most dramatic refutation of the kin selection hypothesis. Every single rescuer knew they were endangering their family members through their attempts to help Jews. Under the Nazi policy of kith and kin, the rescuers’ relatives, including even their youngest children, could be killed because of their actions. This meant that children far too young to be directly involved in helping their parents would be punished for the parents’ deeds. In biological terms, the effects of this policy were clear: those who shared the rescuer’s genes could be killed because of the rescuer’s actions. (Monroe, 1996, p. 165)

Rescuers, or those defined as heroes, belie this hypothesis, since they do not distinguish between relatives and strangers (e.g., firemen jumping into the fire to save lives).

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The second hypothesis (group selection) keeps faith with Darwin’s principle of natural selection, maintaining however that the evolutionary process does not work directly on individuals or through parental bonds, but through groups. To explain altruistic behavior, which is alien to normal, selfishness-based Darwinian logics, this hypothesis points to the competitive advantage that groups derive from the presence of altruistic individuals. Groups develop a protection mechanism towards their altruist members, so that the group can compete more effectively and efficiently in the biological process of natural selection. Within a group, personal interest may be favored, but, between groups, the interest of the group is oriented towards a more successful strategy. Thus, groups that want to gain a competitive advantage from the presence of altruistic members will protect and encourage them. There are no moral considerations, not even in the group selection hypothesis; altruism is simply considered a tool (like many others) to allow the group to compete more effectively in the natural selection process. Following this logic, sociobiologists suggest that, among the various group selection functions, are the sanctions for those who do not protect altruists, and, conversely, incentives to increase altruistic attitudes. Both hypotheses, in their application to human beings, are close to the utilitarian economic and rational choice approaches. On this basis, some authors (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2004; Sigmund & Hauert, 2002) reinforce the hypothesis of reciprocal selection (Trivers, 1971), called social exchange in the sociological field (Blau 1964; Homans, 1961). According to this hypothesis, individuals choose to help those who, in the future, could help them or their relatives, in a condition of reciprocity. We should point out, however, that this is an uncertain investment, since the individuals can never know for sure if their helpee will really reciprocate in the future. It is the exchange of mutually beneficial acts between different individuals, whether they are consanguineous or not; not the exchange of a material good, since the good is represented by the survival of a person (or her relatives). This is precisely one of the aspects preventing evolutionary biology from fully explaining altruism; individuals often help others who are not their relatives or members of their group, but complete strangers, so there is no certainty of a future reciprocity. It is within this perspective that the model of mutual altruism must be considered. It presupposes that each ego, in order to maximize their advantage, can choose in their relationship with alter between two types of action: cooperation and defection. The theoretical coordinates of reciprocal altruism can be traced back to game theory (first and foremost the prisoner’s dilemma), on which we will expound in another part of the present work. Therefore, this approach is independent, virtually or in fact, from

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sociobiologists’ “genetic” assumptions. What is specific to sociobiology is the intent to explain the genesis and stabilization of reciprocal behaviors as an extension of a more restricted “genetic” altruism. In other words, it is assumed that cooperation began between blood relatives and was then extended to non-blood relations (Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1995), while “genetic” altruism still acts as motivational anchoring for the “non-genetic” forms of altruism. Sociobiology, which attempts to implement what has been called the uncertain alliance between the social sciences and the natural sciences, has been harshly criticized, charged with being an undisciplined collection of biology—or social sciences-related theses and models (sociology and economics in the first place) rather than a “real” discipline. Thompson (1982), for example, argues that when she receives criticism from biologists, she opposes them with sociology, and vice versa when she receives criticism from sociology, she defends herself with biology. For evolutionists and sociobiologists, who base their discipline on Darwin’s notions of individual selection and survival of the fittest, altruism presents a major theoretical problem. For these scholars, altruism is achieved through either kin or group selection, with the necessary exceptions, such as those identified by Monroe (1994, 1996), of individuals who sacrifice themselves for relatives. It follows that evolutionists and sociobiologists, when they claim to study altruism, refer to statistical trends, in the long-range genetic selection of behaviors, which can fit the common idea of ​​altruism. The sociobiological hypothesis, by extending Darwin’s model (Darwin, 1871, 1872), claims that the maximization of their overall identity is the main reason for action for human beings. If this hypothesis holds, it is because natural selection has led to the multiplication of “behavior-specific” or “cultural-generic” genes that govern human social behavior. As Durham, an anthropologist, states: Where the natural selection theories of sociobiology have been right in their prediction or explanation of human behaviour, it has often been for the wrong reasons. The apparent consistency between biological theory and human behavior suggests not that there is necessarily an underlying biological basis that guides, steers, controls, programs, predisposes, or inclines every human activity, but rather that the traditions and customs produced by cultural processes are often adaptive in the “biological sense.” I believe that these coherences can best be explained by the joint evolution of biology and human culture. (Durham, 1979, p. 41, emphasis in original)

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Some models of the world within the conceptual domain of social sciences, such as altruism, can resemble those of the natural sciences; therefore, the models of the world constructed by any observer can be borrowed from natural sciences, such as biology, or otherwise formed following their models. But those who actually want to study altruism will detach themselves from the scientific discourse close to the natural sciences because they will have to reflect on the inter- or trans-individual specificity of the object context of the social sciences. The hypothesis that most forms of social behavior in humans have an adaptive biological character, expressing trends that stabilized in the course of evolution as a result of past adaptive functions (Irons, 1979), is not enough to apply the sociobiological models for studying sociocultural phenomena. The clear separation between social and natural sciences must be interpreted as a formally established division between explanation and understanding: Explanation, and only explanation, refers to natural phenomena and the same goes for understanding and action, culture and human society. If we develop the argument of intentionality, we see that the variety of meanings attributed by the individual to natural or social situations is logically unpredictable; this unpredictability accounts for the complete incompatibility between the study of sociocultural phenomena and the evolutionary or sociobiological approach.

Psychology Between Evolution and Social Representations Psychology, perhaps even more than other disciplines, has studied altruistic behaviors. The word altruism—introduced by Comte (1875–1877)—is taken up by Spencer in The Principles of Psychology (1855) and thus spread in the Anglo-Saxon world in clear opposition to the concept of egoism. A few years later, Spencer himself (1879) dedicated three chapters of his book The Data of Ethics to praise altruism as a private motivation for action. As summarized by Budd, for Spencer altruism is to be considered “as an evolving private motive that would weigh heavily in the eventual equilibrium between self and society” (1956, p. 41). And motivational aspects are what underpins the studies on altruism, at least until the development of social psychology, that gave us, thanks to Moscovici (2000), one of the most recent typologies of altruistic behavior. Before sketching the essential elements of the motivational theory, however, we should look at the first psychology, which was obviously keen to deal with positive behaviors. For Freud (1920), father of psychoanalysis, altruism means actions aimed at the well-being of those who perform them. If one can speak of

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altruistic motivation, this happens only as a strategic function of a purely selfish behavior (Batson, 1991). Freud explained that children learn to love others only through socialization; they love their parents for selfish reasons: Quite simply, they need them. Only later, by developing their personality, do individuals demarcate love and selfishness. According to Freud, life is a continuous struggle between the creative force of love (eros) and the destructive force of death (thanatos), balanced in the moral power of the superego. On the one hand, there is the natural search for pleasure, held back by the surrounding social reality, that generates displeasure—a fertile ground for the fear of death—on the other hand, the automatic instinctual repetition of lived experiences. In describing the importance of aggressiveness for human behavior, Freud bases his theory on the three regulating principles of nirvana (death), pleasure (libido), and reality (external world). According to the dynamics of libido, destructive impulses manifest themselves in two directions: towards others (aggression, murder) and towards oneself (suicide). As for altruism, Freud explained in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) that individual development is a product of the interaction between the struggle for happiness (egoism) and the drive for cohesion with the other members of the community (altruism). For psychoanalysis, the concept of instinct—of impulse to act in a given manner towards a purpose not deliberately chosen—is clearly important in explaining human behavior. This concept applies well to complex organisms, its psychological value is real and allows us to see the behavioral impulses that will develop and typify depending on the social environment to which man must react. In this sense, the struggle for life seems to be more and more rooted and vigorous—Bergson (2013) spoke of a vital impulse. Every moment man experiences his needs to improve his bodily and social existence. Given that individual behavior is learned also in relation to the reference environment, developmental psychology has dealt with the notion of egoism and altruism as products of the socialization process in the evolutionary phase of the individual. This focuses on how altruism is learnt and developed, and on how to reduce the egocentric impulse as one grows. Hoffman (1978), for example, argued that under certain conditions human beings are “programmed” to help others, even against their own interests. His theory on the development of altruistic motivations (Hoffman, 1975) suggests that these develop in children through different stages: from empathic anxiety (emotional distress due to the involuntary experience of the suffering of another individual) to sympathetic discomfort. The latter is divided into three levels: On the first level, the child knows that others are separate physical entities but does not realize that they have thoughts and feelings different from his own; therefore, he tries to console them in

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the same way he expects them to console him. At the second level, the child becomes aware that others are sources of thoughts and feelings different from her own and tries to comfort them on the basis of these. The final level occurs when the child can show solidarity with the general situation in the lives of others. It follows that the ability to help others increases over time, in developing empathy13 and social responsibility. Piliavin (2001), based on the social learning theory (Bandura, 1977; Bandura & Walters, 1963), argues that altruism develops through learning and conformation to parenting models. In other words, if children grow up in environments where altruistic actions are promoted and implemented, they will also adopt these behaviors by developing an altruistic self. This line of studies includes Krebs’ seven-stage model (1982), also called the seven levels of altruism. He places altruism along a continuum going from the most selfish to the altruistic behaviors. Along this continuum, we find stages that range from “egocentric accommodation” (mainly to relieve distress and fulfill safety needs) and “instrumental cooperation,” to “mutual altruism” (sensitivity to others in general, fulfilling role obligations) and “conscientious altruism” (prosocial behavior guided by an internal sense of social responsibility); until one reaches “autonomous altruism” (based on internal high values) and “integrated altruism” (full identification with humanity). Very few reach the last stage: “universal self-sacrificial love.” (Haski-Leventhal, 2009, p. 276)

Based on the social learning theory, altruism is considered a learned behavior, linked to the development of individuals. This theory, however, does not give due consideration to the motivations that push an individual to assume or not assume altruistic behavior, nor to the type of altruistic behavior to aspire to. An attempt at an alternative explanation to these problems—as mentioned above—was proposed first by the theory of motivations and then by social psychology. Human motivation includes a vast repertoire of impulses: From those of a physiological nature to the social ones acquired from culture (e.g., success), from impulses pushing man to know his environment to those tending to help others. When talking about motivation, we generally distinguish between primary and secondary motivation. Primary motivation equals physiological needs; humans need food and water to survive and, if this need is not sufficiently met, they set in motion mechanisms of action so as to remedy their situation. At first glance, everyday individual activities seem to have little to do with physiological needs; however, many daily or routine activities can be traced back to these needs through complex learning and

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conditioning processes. Secondary motivation results from those complex processes of learning and conditioning. Money is a very common secondary motivation, it has the same function as the lever for the mouse in Skinner’s experiment (1953): It provides us with food, clothing, and the shelter we all need. Motivational theory places human needs first, but this does not mean that social objectives should be neglected; rather, their achievement is all the more facilitated the more individual needs are satisfied. This approach, widely applied in the psychology of organizations (Schein, 1980), has given rise to different perceptions of human nature: First is (a) economic-rational, which takes the economic incentive as the main motivation for individuals. If individuals are driven by the satisfaction of primary needs, it is relatively easy to control their actions (and therefore their productivity), from both a qualitative and quantitative point of view, by appropriate rewards. This brings us to the concept of homo oeconomicus, that is to say, the man immune to any emotion and interested only in economic gain. It is obviously an oversimplification, incompatible with the characteristics of the personality, but the function of money as a primary incentive carried out by cannot be denied. The second perception of human nature is (b) social, which, while not denying any importance to economic incentives, focuses on the social needs to be met: individuals feel the need to group. This tendency has led some psychologists to speak of “herd instinct” (gregarious), although it seems more appropriate to talk about the need for affiliation as an evolution of the relationship of dependence between children and their parents. To satisfy this need, individuals must be able to form social groups and interact socially, so that the motivation for positive action can be promoted in an environment that encourages the formation of groups able to satisfy this need. Then follows (c) self-realization, which refers to the satisfaction of the needs of curiosity, competence, and motivation to succeed; curiosity pushes man to search or manipulate many aspects of his environment, thus stimulating him to be more effective. Man is all the more effective the more he is competent, and the more effective he is, the more he is competent in interacting with the environment. This last aspect leads to the last form of perception, (d) complex, which refers to the elements that must be considered simultaneously; individuals are carriers of emotions and reasons, even irrational ones, and their behavior is the essential substance of everyday life. All human needs are important. But it is necessary to understand why, in certain conditions, some needs become more important than others. An answer to this question was provided by Maslow’s model of the hierarchy of needs (1954). He starts from the assumption that the reason for any behavior arises from the universal tendency to satisfy certain orders of needs,

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different in nature and complexity. Maslow proposes a hierarchical scale that goes from the lowest or simplest level to the highest or most complex level. Every man, from birth to death, performs a continuous process of satisfaction of needs: Once one is satisfied, another emerges. At the lowest level we find the physiological needs, which are paramount when not met: Higher-level needs (i.e., self-realization, need of love) are unlikely to arise on an empty stomach. Only when a need is met does it cease to be a motivating factor for behavior. Human behavior begins to be motivated by the next level of needs when physiological needs are fully met. Among these, safety needs are often mistakenly understood only as the need to feel safe against the outside world. Unless the subject is in a real situation of extreme dependence that generates deprivation, this need is seen above all as a need to have “fair opportunities”: Man is more willing to take risks when he trusts in the opportunities at his disposal. Social needs include the need for affiliation and belonging, the need to be accepted by one’s peers and other similar ones. Above these are the esteem needs that are of considerable importance to the individual. They fall into two categories: (a) needs connected to the self-evaluation of the individual, and (b) needs related to the reputation enjoyed by the individual outside (e.g., recognition of his own merits, social position). At the top of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs are the self-realization needs, that is, the need to realize one’s potential. Obviously, they often remain below the conscious threshold, since most of the resources of individuals are employed to satisfy lower-level needs. Maslow’s model is certainly attractive to interpret motivational and vindictive dynamics: The hierarchical order of needs also establishes the order of priority in satisfaction. However, there are two problems in Maslow’s theory’s basic assumptions: (a) the needs of individuals do not always follow the hierarchical order, and (b) different needs emerge over time. Although some of this theory’s aspects required changes, determining which were the most important needs by distinguishing them in categories proved to be very useful for strategies aimed at increasing motivation towards positive actions. Individuals join groups or organizations with needs that contrast those of the formally established structures. One of the major scholars to highlight this contrast is Chris Argyris (1957). With his theory of psychological growth,14 he argues that organizations where individuals cooperate to achieve common goals are structured in such a way as to promote the development of personality growth. According to Argyris, modern social structures, due to their rationality, prevent the development of individual personality: The contrast between

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the functional logic of organizations and the needs of human growth can cause frustration and disappointment that can lead to situations of conflict. The way out proposed by Argyris consists in the development of a new culture, attentive to human needs, and starting from the assumption that the more these needs are met, the more the level of human performance increases, producing immediate and positive effects also on the efficiency and effectiveness of organizations. At first glance, the motivational theory may seem to be man’s revenge on social systems. The underlying discourse, however, is different: She highlighted the personal growth needs of each individual. When we talk about individuals, we talk about a microcosm in the macrocosm, with needs and requests that, to be satisfied or listened to, need to be framed in a broader vision: individuals, before being members of a social system, are members of a group, and we should study them as such. Individual behavior is expressed more completely and complexly within group dynamics. But the group, like many other objects of study in the human and social sciences, requires a definition. Identifying a definition of group that satisfies all research needs is not simple; different points of view have followed each other over the years. A quick look at the three major points of view will allow us to grasp the complementarity existing between the sociological approach and the psychological approach. The first point of view regards the definitions centered on the individual: They highlight the individual needs that lead to the formation of groups (wishes or interests of the individual or possibility of receiving goods from the group). According to these definitions, the group is formed when individuals, in satisfying their needs, identify common objects of satisfaction, goals that can be more easily achieved through cooperation. The group is considered an aggregate rather than a whole, and the satisfaction of individual needs is the essential element for its existence. The group is identified with an aggregate of individuals who establish relationships based on desires, goals, or needs of which each of them is a carrier. The second point of view concerns the definitions centered on the collective: They put in the foreground the sociological aspects of structure and process, which concern the group’s system of rules and norms. The characterization of the group is determined by the overall relationships. The key word of these definitions seems to be the awareness of having something in common, a collective-oriented perspective of the group, formed by a plurality of individuals with a common purpose and a more or less shared system of rules, with specific and interacting roles.

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The last point of view seeks an integration between individual and social. The integration between the needs and expectations of individuals and the tasks and regulatory aspects of the groups leads us in a psychosocial direction on which Kurt Lewin had interesting ideas (1939). He elaborates the “field theory” by applying to groups the principles of the Gestalt school: the group must be observed as totality and identified as an organized social subject capable of expressing behaviors and cultures different from those of the individuals who are part of it. The group is something more, or, better said, something different from the sum of its members; it has its own structure, peculiar ends, and particular relationships with other groups. The essence of a group is not the similarity or difference between its members, but their dynamic interdependence. This means that a change, of any part or any fraction, affects the status of all the others. The individual’s representation of the group is modified: it progresses from a “me and the others” without differentiation to a “system of positions” in which each occupies a specific space; the group cannot be reduced to sociological or psychological data. In order to study it, it needs its own interpretative categories that cannot be defined based on the individuals who compose it or the effects it produces. When we talk about the group we talk about a “one in many” and “many in one”; we find a psychological problematic and an overall problematic. These axioms are inherent in the explanation of altruism given by social psychology as a behavior resulting from the interaction between individual and environment (Bierhoff & Rohmann, 2004), and between two or more individuals. This approach recognizes the importance of the situational conditions giving rise to altruistic actions (Monroe, 1996), considered the result of an interactive decision-making process in which the characteristics of the actors (helper/helpee) connect with the physical and social environment and influence each other. Indeed, symbolic interaction has often been used to explain altruistic behavior: Individuals attribute symbolic meaning to objects and conducts, to themselves and to others, and simultaneously develop and transmit these meanings through interaction and communication. Furthermore, individuals construct their own self (Mead, 1934) also through the knowledge of the others and the interpretation of their behavior. According to Mead, the construction of the Self or, better, one’s life project with respect to the surrounding world, is determined by the conjugation of the self- (I) and the hetero-referentiality (Me), and is the product of a social process of self-interaction, in which the actors signal to themselves the dynamics existing in the situations in which they act, while the resulting action is linked to the interpretation of those very dynamics (Mead, 1934, 1970). This process is substantial when it allows the individual, in relation to others, to shape the idea of reality ​​ so as to also

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guide her conduct, aiming her action at a change not only in the behavioral structure, but also in the social one. Mead explained that moral behavior is the result of individuals’ ability to see themselves from the point of view of others, and of their desire for reassurance. However, this explanation seems reductive and raises some questions: Why do individuals react differently to the same situation? Why do some of them not meet social expectations? And why only some individuals behave altruistically? An attempt at combining the many factors involved (personality, motivations, situations, etc.) has been advanced by the theory of social representations, which in Europe had its fulcrum in the school headed by Serge Moscovici (1984). According to the theory of social representations, these do not arise from individuals taken singularly in isolation but are formed, consolidated, and disseminated in social life. They are socially generated, refer to objects or social phenomena and are shared by all members of a group. As the extensive literature has shown (Duveen & Lloyd, 2005; Jodelet, 1984; Moscovici, 1984), in the study of social representations, it is necessary to analyze the relationship between the complex cognitive systems present in each individual and the systems of symbolic relationships existing between social actors (individuals and groups). Representations are cognitive elaborations of reality that guide individual sense-making processes; although they are not produced by the individual actor, they are continually rethought, requoted, represented at a microgenetic level. The systems of representations existing in a given culture are transmitted and are the product of an entire sequence of elaborations and changes that occurred over time (Laszlo, 1997). From a “structural” point of view, social representations are composed of two interdependent dimensions (Abric, 2001; Guimelli, 1994): the iconic (image) and the symbolic (meaning). The representation of an event, a phenomenon or an object matches an image to an idea and an idea to an image. At the base of this process there is the need to reconstruct the “common sense” or the form of understanding of social events that creates the substratum of images and meanings without which no collectivity could operate. In fact, the community could not function without those social representations—based on a variously structured set of theories, ideologies, and “visions of the world”—underpinning the symbolic and cultural terrain that makes interaction between individuals possible (Moliner, 1996). One of the prerogatives of social representations is that they allow for the transformation of ideas into collective experiences and interactions into behaviors. Unlike sciences, that are the tools through which to understand the “reified” universe, they deal with the “consensual” universe and restore collective awareness by giving it form; they explain objects and events in

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such a way as to make them accessible to all, making them coincide with the immediate interests of individuals. It is evident, then, that the purpose of all representations is to turn the unusual, or even the unknown, into something familiar (Moscovici, 1984). The unfamiliar attracts and intrigues the community, alerts individuals, forces them to make explicit the implicit assumptions underlying the consensus. These theoretical premises allow us to delineate some functions performed by social representations (Purkhardt, 1993): (a) They build and shape social reality, (b) allow communication and social interaction, (c) demarcate and consolidate groups, (d) direct socialization, and (e) make the unfamiliar familiar. On these general principles, Moscovici (2000) argues that altruism and egoism can both be problematic behaviors depending on their interpretation, which is based on the social and cultural expectations of the reference society. He distinguishes three elementary forms of altruism (participative altruism, fiduciary altruism, and normative altruism)—the details of which will be presented in the following pages—on the basis of two orders of principles: (a) All definitions converge on the fact that altruistic behavior presupposes a non-self-centered position (self-sacrifice); and (b) there is no altruistic personality, since individuals behave differently along the temporal dimension even in the presence of the same situation. Moscovici, however, did not try to explain altruism, but rather to highlight the lack of interest towards this sociocultural phenomenon, above all from European scholars. His attempt is based on social representations that give shape to many of the social explanations expressed by individuals to justify their own and others’ actions. Consequently, individuals try to know what is real before asking why something happens the way it actually happens. This process also makes the individual-society dynamic more understandable: Each individual lives within one or more social structures and knows what they are, but if she must provide explanations about them or about the activity of the structures in which she acts, she will surely refer to her social, mental, and cultural representations, which are an expression of reality.

Economics Between Rational Choice and Cooperation If sociology and psychology consider the principle of “self-interest” to be a lesser incentive for altruism, for economics it becomes the pivotal motivation in the decision-making processes of human beings. This assumption peaks in the theory of rational choice (Abell, 1991; Allingham, 2006; Coleman & Fararo, 1992) originally based on two elements: rationality, according

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to which humans in decision-making processes are oriented towards the action most likely to make them achieve their goals and value (Batson & Ahmad, 2009), according to which humans tend to maximize personal interest. Mancur Olson (1971), an economist, stated that “rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest” (p. 2) nor will they act to obtain the interest of another individual. In other words, for individuals, the rational choice consists in maximizing their benefits (Schmidtz, 1995) by satisfying the hierarchy of preferences. Even if this means, in some circumstances, worrying about others, rationality remains oriented to personal benefit. It follows that the altruistic motivations of some individuals are based on a rational choice, meaning the potential benefits they could gain in the future; therefore, their primary objective is not altruism, but a possible future benefit. Economists—starting with Adam Smith (1767)—reflect on actions or, better said, on sociocultural phenomena akin to altruism. In general, early 19th century political economists found it difficult to understand how a phenomenon like altruism could exist in an efficient world (Monroe, 1994). The first political economists based their theories on the idea that human beings had a dual nature: one selfish and interested only in personal wellbeing and the other, public, capable of putting the well-being of others on an equal footing with their own. This last aspect, however, faded away as the discipline developed, until only the utilitarian function remained. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1767), Smith attempts to explain man’s moral life with the aim of maintaining the greatest amount of happiness over time. According to Smith, the guide to wellbeing and happiness is “sympathy” (common feeling), for it is through it that men can approve or disapprove of their own conduct. In judging their own behaviour, men resort to a kind of translation. They stand as spectators of their actions and must agree with all other spectators. This “sympathy,” which psychologists call empathy, allows human beings to mediate between the impulses aimed exclusively at satisfying their needs and the desire to be accepted by their community by promoting and strengthening actions useful to it. Subsequently, Smith’s intellectual heirs of the 20th century approached the dynamics of altruism in two ways: (a) as interdependent utility functions, or (b) as double services, originating from a dual nature of man (selfish-private and altruistic-public). The first way does not raise the question of why the happiness of others brings pleasure to those who act altruistically, while the second way simply assumes the vision of the double nature of man (egoistic/altruistic). Here too, as in other disciplines—such as sociobiology or psychology—some questions remain unanswered: Why do individuals

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show different tendencies towards altruism? And why, sometimes, does the same individual behave more altruistically than others? Contemporary economists, in the wake of their predecessors, when dealing with altruism treat it as a phenomenon that deviates from the general line of personal interest. Their explanations often refer to the importance of psychic gratification, in which the altruist helps another mainly because he feels good about himself (Becker, 1976) or because he expects something back in the form of gratitude for his good deeds (Mangone, 2019), be it material goods or benevolent behavior or cooperation (Axelrod, 1984). Thus, altruism is a mechanism for obtaining a personal interest, even if deferred, such as a psychic good or a future investment (do ut des). Economists have rarely wondered whether altruism influences the market system or what role it might play in the current economic system, much less have they suggested that it might question the theory of rational choice. One author who highlighted the limits of rationality models related to the actions of human beings was Herbert A. Simon (1983), who with the book Reason in Human Affairs traced a valid analysis of the problem of reason, describing the various formal conceptions of rationality. Since his origins, man has tried to improve his living environment and to do this he had to take a controlling position by facing the problems as they arose without weighing them adequately. To these ever-new problems, man applied solutions that had already been successful for similar, even if not identical, ones, excluding a priori the very possibility of alternatives. Simon’s work aims to underline the limits of these models of rationality. He bases his theories on the assumption that, without knowing the limits, it is not possible to develop procedures aimed at eliminating them and fully employing the rational potential of men in the execution of their actions. The pivotal point of his reasoning is all in the self-evident concept: “No conclusion without assumptions.” The rational process consists of two phases: symbolic inputs and symbolic outputs. Both phases are derived and mediated by social representations and the rational process only operates when the human mind has received an adequate number of inputs. It is defined as instrumental because it can show how to reach a given end but not the end itself, that can tend towards the preservation of the subject (positive ends) or her destruction (negative ends). This highlights the complications in using our reason, mainly due to the interrelationships of values. Simon, therefore, felt the need to formulate a theory aimed not at creating a new logic, but at helping the individual who is struggling with a choice.

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The first of these theories, called the theory of the expected subjective utility or Olympic model, is based on forcing all values into a single function. It represents a complex mechanism of application of reason to the problems of choice. This theory can be explained by four points, each of which is a fundamental component: (a) the function of utility, that is, the ability that each decision-maker has to indicate with a cardinal number his liking of future events; (b) the presence of a group of alternatives among which to make the choice; these alternatives do not necessarily have to be mono-temporal, they can also concern a series of choices that can be made over a period of time; (c) the possibility for the decision-maker to fix a joint probability distribution for all future events; and (d) the choice of an alternative that maximizes the expected outcome. In these terms, the theory does not seem applicable to human beings, but at most to omniscient divinities who see not only the present, but also and above all the future. No human being, even assisted by the most powerful computers, can plan with certainty on events that have yet to happen. In the real world, the application of the theory of the subjective expected utility is not conceivable. It can be used, with considerable reduction and approximation, for problems of choice in restricted fields, such as those of a single company, but certainly not for the complex world of the social actor. As an alternative to the previously analyzed theory, which is inapplicable for the real world, there is a behavioral model or of bounded rationality. Following this model, the choice have the following general scheme of execution: (a) the decisions taken by the individual do not concern the whole of human life, but consider only restricted areas of it; (b) when the individual makes a choice, which is very important to him, he certainly does not consider future scenarios but refers to the present and at most to possible perspectives; (c) the very fact that the subject is looking for a solution to a problem of choice, makes his attention turn to certain aspects of his life and not to others; and (d) a considerable part of the efforts of the individual decision-maker is absorbed by the frantic collection of information and facts relating to the decision on the matter. Once these operations have been carried out, the choice will be quick. With this model of rationality, the individual is not projected on an infinite or indeterminate temporal scale. In real life, the environment in which human beings live can be divided into separate and distinct problems: “Sometimes you’re hungry, sometimes you’re sleepy, sometimes you’re cold. Fortunately, you’re not often all three at the same time” (Simon, 1983, p. 19). If this division into many factors does not provide an exhaustive description of the current world, it has done so in the past, and it has represented the evolution of human rationality. To apply the bounded rationality model, however, we need an organism

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able to focus its attention on the factors that deserve time after time. For neuropsychologists, the physiological processes that we call emotions are of great importance, because they consider focusing one’s attention one of their main functions; emotions distract us from the thoughts in our mind to draw our attention to other factors that require it. Today, there is no need to be in search of food, but that does not mean that human beings are not reminded of the need to eat. This, like other needs necessary for the survival of the subject (e.g., breathing), are automatically managed by human physiology without the need to call attention on them. The survival of the individual, therefore, is guaranteed by emotional mechanisms capable of ensuring that urgent problems are given priority over the planning of actions. Moreover, individuals need a mechanism capable of constructing alternatives; all the responses given by the subject are, almost always, improvements or re-elaborations of already available alternatives. The ability to acquire data on the problem of choice and on the environment in which individuals live is necessary both to facilitate the creation of alternatives and to estimate the possible consequences, thus allowing the subject to preserve the image of that part of the world involved in his decisions and to set his rationality on the basis of that image. According to Simon, this behavioral model maintains that human reason is very limited and very conditioned by the social context and by the evaluative capacities of man. According to this theory, living beings, including man, make choices of adaptation and survive in a world where problems can be fractioned and where not everything is connected to everything else. It does not allow us to obtain the optimum in Pareto’s sense (Pareto, 1896), but it does provide an approach to rationality that explains how men can succeed in a world that is far too complicated and complex to understand. Social scientists instead give very little consideration to the intuitive model, which is however very present in the popular imagination. According to this model, a large part of human thought, and, therefore, the success achieved by man in making valid and convenient decisions, is possible because of his capacity for intuition and judgment. The concepts of intuition and judgement are also at the centre of the controversy on the specialization of the functions of the two cerebral hemispheres, which, however, is not of interest to us here. Instead, it is of fundamental importance to understand whether there are actually two distinct forms of thought—analytics and intuition. Intuition is usually used to refer to the sudden attainment of a solution to a problem. Each individual, in his microcosm, has the mastery of distinctive abilities that allow him to recognize one of the thousands of situations

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present in latency in memory; this ability is the greatest source of intuition in a subject. Without the recognition of situations, based on past experiences, the search for solutions would proceed very slowly in complex spaces. Intuition develops the knowledge we have gained from past experiences; the intuitive model recognizes the influence of emotions on human thought and their role in allowing the concentration on specific problems at given times. The last model that Simon associates with the theory of rationality is the evolutionary one, according to which only organisms that behave as if they were rational, that is, those that adapt, will survive. The evolutionary point of view leads to the acceptance of evolution and, therefore, of rational schemes, but it does not allow us to adopt a perspective of optimization of the ends. Not everything that evolves and develops necessarily reaches a final state of adaptation and continuous movement towards the objectives, even when these are ever-changing. This model does not explain the mechanism of the rational process but suggests the directions in which to move. Moreover, Darwin’s version of the model, based on variation and selection, requires a series of feed-back “inputs” that contribute to the growth of adaptive capacity. This type of model has very rigid limits because it does not allow for the existence of those worlds in which weak creatures live; the latter will disappear with the process of competition. The evolutionary theory predicts the disappearance, in the short term, of some worlds, for which human beings can or must make plans, although it does not bind them to a consequent maximization of the purpose. From Simon’s theories, we can deduce some significant aspects of what the economists call “rational choice” processes. For Simon, when dealing with the decision-making process, we must consider two models of man: the economic man, motivated by self-interest and informed about the alternatives available, and the administrative man, who tries to satisfy his needs and follow his interests, even if he often does not know what they really are. The latter model of man tries to satisfy his needs and interests, but he is aware that only some of the alternatives are possible and is willing to be satisfied with an adequate solution without going in search of the optimal one. Man appears to be a “deliberately rational being,” but, given his limited capacities, he can do nothing that is truly rational. For this reason, his decisions are influenced by the organized group to which he belongs. According to Simon’s theories, the formalization of the social structure should facilitate rational decision-making processes by distributing the responsibilities among the members and providing them with the resources, tools, and information necessary to fulfill them. At the basis of bounded rationality is the idea of limited cognitive abilities on the part of individual decision-makers:

70    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism It is impossible for the behaviour of a single, isolated individual to reach any high degree of rationality. The number of alternatives he must explore is so great, the information he would need to evaluate them so vast that even an approximation to objective rationality is hard to conceive. Individual choice takes place in an environment of “givens”—premises that are accepted by the subject as bases for his choice, and behaviour is adaptive only within the limits set by these “givens.” (Simon, 1947, p. 92)

This is a good synthesis of the concept of bounded rationality. If Simon draws the limits of rationality models, Monroe (1994, 1996) opposes the mechanisms of rational choice by contrasting the constructs of rational choice with the dynamics of identity defined by collaborative connections. Since rational choice theory is considered both a normative and a positive political theory, it seems particularly appropriate to compare it with an alternative theory focusing on acts that occur at the intersection of ethics and politics. In doing so, I am not arguing that rational choice theory is wrong, merely that it has limited application and that analysts must apply it only when relevant. . . . Some acts emanate from a kind of rational choice calculus but that others require a different theory. As a general rule, acts that emanate from core values will be better explained through a cognitive theory emphasizing identity. . . . But acts that do not tap into our basic sense of self may be explained quite satisfactorily through rational choice theory. (Monroe, 1996, pp. 220–221)

In The Heart of Altruism (1996), she studied the experiences, reflections, and motivations of individuals who under the Nazi had risked their lives and those of their families and friends to save strangers in danger. She discovered that identity processes are crucial in positioning individuals along a continuum that goes from selfishness to altruism. The positioning of an individual is therefore based on self-perception and the formation of identity: The more he perceives and recognizes himself in individualistic terms, as an atom or member of a group considered superior, the more his ethical elements are reduced. This leads us to emphasize the importance of the contexts and systems of ideas within which individuals act and to highlight how much they influence this same action (theory of perspective). Monroe’s theory of perspective is easily verified in the context of cooperation. An emblematic example is the prisoner’s dilemma (Rapoport & Chammah, 1970), which in one of its simplest forms refers to the quandary experienced by two prisoners (A and B) being questioned by police about a crime jointly committed (Figure 2.3).

The Social Sciences Discover Altruism    71 Prisoner A: Do Not Confess

Prisoner B: Confess

Prisoner A: Do Not Confess

5 years for both prisoners

0 years for prisoner B 15 years for prisoner A

Prisoner B: Confess

0 years for prisoner A 15 years for prisoner B

10 years for both prisoners

Figure 2.3  Prisoner dilemma matrix.

Police officers isolate the prisoners and tell each that if he cooperates with authorities (confess) his sentence will be reduced. The suspects understand that since the evidence is skimpy, if neither prisoner confesses both will receive 5 years in jail. But they also know that if one prisoner confesses and the other does not, the one who confesses will receive no jail time, while his accomplice will receive a heavy sentence (15 years in jail). If both prisoners confess, both go to jail for an intermediate time period (10 years in jail). What does the prisoner do? The prisoners, not knowing if the other will cooperate or not, will both decide to cooperate by taking a decision that does not really maximize the interests, but places them in an intermediate position (A and B will be sentenced to 10 years in prison). This raises a very specific question: Why do the two prisoners behave so? To answer, we will refer to Axelrod’s work (1984), because it clearly demonstrates the value of combining a rational choice approach with a theory that focuses on the self in relation to others. All the results of Axelrod’s studies based on the repeated application of the prisoner dilemma game are summarized in the opening lines of the first chapter (The Problem of Cooperation) of his book The Evolution of Cooperation: Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? This question has intrigued people for a long time. And for good reason. We all know that people are not angels, and that they tend to look after themselves and their own first. Yet we also know that cooperation does occur and that our civilization is based upon it. But, in situations where each individual has an incentive to be selfish, how can cooperation ever develop? The answer each of us gives to this question has a fundamental effect on how we think and act in our social, political, and economic relations with others. And the answers that others give have a great effect on how ready they will be to cooperate with us. (Axelrod, 1984, p. 3)

Individuals do not project themselves into time indefinitely (the future time horizon may be longer or shorter) and therefore a change of scenery

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leads to change the world view and especially the perspectives that depend on changes in external conditions. These are the factors that can influence in a positive sense (altruism and cooperation) and in a negative sense (egoism and self-interest) the actions of human beings.

Notes 1. Cultural relativism, besides being a concept of the anthropological and sociological sciences, is, in its application, a methodological principle according to which, in order to escape ethnocentrism, the study of a given culture must be faced without preconceptions and without comparing it with other cultures. This is because a cultural element, such as a custom, can only be explained in relation to its cultural environment. 2. The new term is the result of a neologism that combines two words: the first of Latin origin (socius, societas), the second of Greek origin (logos). These two words merged together mean precisely the study of society. 3. It cannot be said that there is a univocal periodisation in the history of sociology, since this is usually linked to the training of the scholar who tries to explain it (for this reason, we refer to the many textbooks addressing the history of sociological thought). 4. For further details on meso-analysis, see Collins (1988), while for their concrete application see Archer’s (2003) theory of agency. 5. The French scholar based all his studies on the belief that this new disciplinary field could produce knowledge about social phenomena (through scientific evidence) and at the same time well-being for the whole of humanity by using science to predict and thus control human behavior. 6. The promoter of the initiative is Vincent Jeffries who, together with other colleagues, in the article “Altruism and Social Solidarity: Envisioning a Field of Specialization” (Jeffries et al., 2006) outlines the reasons for the need for this field of study. Subsequently, as early as 2009, a Newsletter of the nascent section of “Altruism & Social Solidarity” was created, which will then take its final name when “Altruism, Morality, & Social Solidarity” was established in 2012. 7. Goals and means are two types of institutionalized values within the social or cultural structure. The goals are the aims, aspirations, legitimate interests of the members of society ordered according to a hierarchical model of priority that characterizes the society of reference; and the means, or norms, set the ways of achieving the goals. There is not always the same emphasis between cultural goals and norms, nor is there a constant relationship. 8. In sociology, medium-range theories occupy an intermediate position between the general theories of social systems—too far from particular categories of behaviour, organization and social change to provide an explanation for what is observed—and those detailed descriptions that are all but generalized. Merton then tries to find a middle ground, which he defines in this way: The “middle-range theory is principally used in sociology to guide empirical inquiry. It is intermediate to general theories of social systems which are too remote from particular classes of social behavior, organization, and change to

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9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

account for what is observed and to those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that are not generalized at all. Middle-range theory involves abstractions, of course, but they are close enough to observed data to be incorporated in propositions that permit empirical testing. Middle-range theories deal with delimited aspects of social phenomena, as is indicated by their labels” (Merton, 1949, pp. 39–40). In constructing the ideal type, it is necessary to isolate from the complexity of the phenomenon those elements that uniform in their repetition. These uniform elements will be the basis for the construction of a model that will not be the real measure of the phenomenon, but only an instrument for measuring reality. The ideal type is the right mediation between historical experience and the search for synthesis of knowledge. This type of interaction can be defined in the strict sense as what transpires only in social situations, that is, in areas in which two or more individuals are physically in the presence of each other’s response (Goffman, 1967). There are many reasons why individuals establish social interactions, in the presence of each other, inevitably giving importance to public visibility. The cycle represents a temporal sequence because the structure always precedes the action and its outcomes in the form of reproduction or innovation. Empathy is a relatively new word, it has its origin in the artistic field in Titchener’(1909) work to translate the German word Einfuhlung, which indicated the process of guessing how to observe an object or an event to see it from within. It was adopted by clinical psychology since the 1950s to refer to the understanding of the other’s point of view, becoming synonymous with taking a position or perspective (Batson & Shaw, 1991). The theory of psychological growth consists in the passage from the state of childhood to that of maturity, with which the individual acquires not only a series of positive abilities for himself (ability to research and adapt, independence, etc.), but also the ability not to inhibit the growth of other individuals towards their personal maturity.

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Nichols, L. T. (2009). The Russian roots of Pitirim A. Sorokin’s sociological work in the United States. In A. F. Smetanin, E. N. Rozhkin, U. P. Shabaev, V. E. Sharapov, I. L. Zherebtsov, P. P. Krotov, I. A. Goncharov, & N. F. Zyuzev (Eds.), Pitirim Sorokin in the history, science and culture of the 20th Century, Materials of the International Conference Celebrating the 120th Birthday of P. A. Sorokin, Syktyvkar (pp. 149–160). Syktyvkar, Russian Federation: Institute of Language, Literature and History-Komi Scientific Center. Nichols, L. T. (2012). North Central Sociological Association presidential address: Renewing sociology: Integral science, solidarity, and loving kindness. Sociological Focus, 45(4), 261–273. Nisbet, R. A. (1977). The sociological tradition. New York, NY: Basic Book. Olson, M., Jr. (1971). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pareto, V. (1896). Cours d’économie politique [Manual of political economy]. Lausanne, Switzerland: F. Rouge Éditeur. Parsons, T. (1949). The structure of social action. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Piliavin, J. A. (2001). Sociology of altruism and pro-social behavior. In N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), International encyclopedia of the social and behavioral sciences (pp. 411–415). Oxford, England: Elsevier. Piliavin, J. A., & Charng, H. W. (1990). Altruism: A review of recent theory and research. Annual Review of Sociology, 16(1), 27–65. Purkhardt, S. C. (1993). Transforming social representations: A social psychology of common sense and science. London, England: Routledge. Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1970). Prisoner’s dilemma: A study in conflicts and cooperation. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. Ruse, M. (1991). The significance of evolution. In P. Singer (Ed.), A companion to ethics (pp. 500–510). Oxford, England: Blackwell. Scott, N., & Seglow, J. (2007). Altruism. New York, NY : Open University Press. Schein, E. H. (1980). Organizational Psychology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Schmidtz, D. (1995). Rational choice and moral agency. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schütz, A. (1967). The phenomenology of the social world (G. Walsh & F. Lehnert, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Schütz, A. (1970–1971). Collected papers, Volumes I–III (I. The Problem of Social Reality; II. Studies in Social Theory; III. Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy). The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Seneca, L. A. (n.d.). Seneca letters from a stoic. Retrieved from https://www.lettersfromastoic.net/letter-20-on-practicing-what-you-preach/ Sigmund, K., & Hauert, C. (2002). Altruism. Current Biology, 12(8), R270–R272. Simon, H. A. (1947). Administrative behavior. New York, NY: Macmillan. Simon, H. A. (1983). Reason in human affairs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York, NY: McMillan.

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Smith, A. (1767). The theory of moral sentiments. London, England: A. Millar, A. Kincaid, and J. Bell. Sorokin, P. A. (1948). The reconstruction of humanity. Boston, MA: The Bacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (1950a). Altruistic love: A study of American good neighbors and Christian saints. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (Ed.). (1950b). Exploration in altruistic love and behavior: A symposium. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (Ed.). (1954a). Forms and techniques of altruistic spiritual growth: A symposium. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (1954b). The ways and power of love: Types, factors and techniques of moral transformation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Spencer, H. (1855). The principles of psychology. London, England: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans. Spencer, H. (1879). The data of ethics. London, England: Williams and Norgate. Spencer, H. (1898). The principles of sociology (Vol. 3). New York, NY: D. Appleton and Company. (Originally published in 1876) St. Augustine. (n.d.). The confessions. Retrieved from https://www.gutenberg .org/files/3296/3296-h/3296-h.htm#link2H_4_0013 St. Paul. (n.d.). Letter to Philippians. Retrivied from https://www.biblegateway .com/passage/?search=Philippians+2&version=KJ21 St. Thomas Aquinas. (n.d.). The summa theologica. Retrivied from https://www .newadvent.org/summa/2113.htm Steiner, P. (2016). Donner . . . Une histoire de l’altruisme [Giving . . . A history of altruism]. Paris, France: PUF. Thompson, J. L. (1982). Human nature and social explanation. In S. Rose (Ed.), Against biological determinism (pp. 30–49). New York, NY: Alison and Busby. Titchener, E. B. (1909). A text-book of psychology. New York, NY: MacMillan. Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35–57. Weber, M. (1904–1905). Die protestantische Ethik und der “Geist” des Kapitalismus [The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism]. Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, XX, 1–54 and XXI, 1–110. Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization. London, England: Collier-Macmillan. Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. Berkeley: University of California Press. Weinstein, J. (2000). Creative altruism: Restoring Sorokin’s applied sociology. Journal of Applied Sociology, 17(1), 86–117. Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wuthnow, R. (1993). Altruism and sociological theory. Social Service Review, 67(3), 344–357.

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3 Intellectual Heritage

Abstract The concept of altruism is not new to the social sciences; many scholars, using this term on its own or together with other constructs, have contributed to advancing the knowledge on this phenomenon. In this chapter, we will try to sketch the history of this theme since the birth of sociology, with its ups and downs. We will describe the ideas and constructs of the following authors: Comte, who indeed coined the term altruism, and Durkheim, Mauss, Sorokin, and Moscovici, who in the panorama of the social sciences are the scholars who have contributed most to bring attention to this object of study. We opted for describing rather than speculating on these ideas and constructs, to offer a “neutral” reading of them.

Auguste Comte and the Birth of the Term “Altruism” Starting from the 18th century, a new and complex reality emerged because of the great transformations that were taking place in Western society. Consequently, a vast repertoire of behavior, previously falling under the domain of a moral authority (clergy or army) or attributed to individuals, took on Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism, pages 81–146 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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forms of autonomy detached from the previous subordination, albeit as yet not with full awareness. Society, and particularly individual behavior, broke the bonds of tradition, and the analysis and study of social phenomena was brought back to the experience of the individual within a dense network of relationships: the homo sociologicus was born. In light of these transformations that were affecting the whole of society, we decided to begin our reflection on the altruism universe and the intellectual heritage that we received, by examining Auguste Comte’s work, in which we can find one of the first attempts to formulate generalizing laws for the development of society. These laws are the expression of an immanent order of the phenomenal reality of society in transformation. As the readers should by now have clear, the word altruism is one of the two terms coined by Comte that in later times have become paramount for the development of social sciences—the other word being, obviously, sociology. Comte had also coined other terms such as sociocracy and biocracy, but these have not found proselytes or become widespread like the other two. As Habito and Inaba (2006) pointed out, The original French term “altruisme” was suggested by the French legal phrase “le bien d’autrui” (the good of others), and was formed from the Italian equivalent, “altrui,” itself a derivative of the Latin “alter” or “other.” Altruism is precisely “other-ism”: the effort or actual ability to act in the interest of others. (p. 1)

From its birth, although with ups and downs, the term altruism has become an analytical construct for the social sciences. In order to understand why Comte considered altruism superior to egoism, it is necessary to outline the theoretical and social context (Coser, 1977; Pickering, 2009) framing this thought. The latter then became the core idea in Comte’s project of a “Religion of Humanity” (Comte, 1852/1858) that was to direct and accompany the improvement of modern society, no longer under the influence of religion or the army. The humanity of which Comte speaks includes many individuals of all generations, but it does not contain all of them: It excludes those defined as “parasites” and “criminals” because they have not passed on to the next generations what was transmitted to them. Therefore, only those men who have cooperated and worked for human endeavour, and to whom we are in debt, are part of it. As Colin (2003) said, The notion is generally traced to the widely acknowledged founder of sociology, Auguste Comte, who is credited with coining the term for his depic-

Intellectual Heritage    83 tion of the cohesion of humanity that he expected to emerge in the positive era, now that the distractions and defections of theology and militarism were left behind. (p. 54)

The concept of altruism appears on the scene of the transition to modernity because of the need for a new moral guide for the budding society. Comte leaves open the question of when and to whom to be altruistic but makes it clear that individuals can be altruistic or pursue their self-interest. In this way Comte allowed for pro-social behaviors linked to altruism to be motivated by selfish interests. Comte’s main objective was to create a new science—the science of society, first social physics and then sociology (the new positive science)— that, along the lines of the natural sciences, could explain the previous development of society and predict its future. This new science was considered the most complex and dependent on the evolution of the other ones, which is why Comte places it at the highest level of the hierarchical scale of sciences. It also employs all the tools used by the sciences that precede it in the hierarchical scale, while also paying attention to the historical method. The studies of the new positive science are based on the social order and on the elements that determine the stability within this system; therefore, the cornerstones of this new system are the social statics and the social dynamics, that is, the study of all the elements that produce stability or change for society. Statics and dynamics come together in a single direction of analysis focused on the mutual relations between the elements within a social whole that must be balanced. When this does not happen, according to Comte, we are faced with a pathological condition (crisis). The elementary unit of this social group is not the individual but the family, since it forms tribes, communities, and nations. And it is within the family that, according to Comte, the natural egoistic tendencies of human beings are mitigated and oriented towards social purposes rather than mere individual self-interest. Together, the families constitute the society that is bonded not by physical ties, as in nature, but by spiritual ties in which language and religion are two essential elements for cohesion (solidarity and consensus). Comte adds the division of labor to these two constructs, considering it a further instrument to strengthen human solidarity as it makes individuals aware of their dependence on others—although some aspects of the division of labor in industrial society were considered unfavorably. The new science, therefore, laid its foundations on reasoning and observation as the only legitimate means of acquiring knowledge. The latter, in turn, had to translate into social utility for the improvement of human condition. As Comte said, “The fundamental problem of human nature,

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[is] the subordination of Egoism to Altruism.” (Comte, 1851–1854/1875– 1877, I, p. 592) and an important role in this subordination is played by the social sciences, or rather by sociology, whose task is to identify the laws that govern society, as the natural sciences do for nature. According to the French scholar, social actions are neither arbitrary nor fortuitous: individuals obviously tend to pursue their own interests in a society founded mainly on the Hobbesian principle Homo homini lupus, and laws help individuals set limits to their own actions. At the same time, individuals understand that they can modify the course of social laws for the pursuit of their own interests. The new positive science that used observation, experimentation, and comparison as tools to explain the laws and perturbations of society had, therefore, the task of teaching men to look at things not in an absolute way but in relative terms. Relativity rejects all-encompassing social solutions (considered to be applicable to all societies, regardless of their characteristics) and is based on the conviction that every solution must be adapted to the concrete state of the society to which it refers. In particular, comparisons in the sociological field become quite important because they allow one to examine and juxtapose the state of society in different parts of the world. This is necessary because even though humanity has essentially planned its own development in, overall, the same way, this has been achieved unevenly throughout the world. Not all societies have reached the same states, and above all, they have not reached them at the same time; therefore, we also need a historical outlook on this evolution. And it is precisely on this evolution that Comte conceived its Law of Human Progress or Law of the Three Stages according to which humanity has evolved through three main consecutive stages, in which the next stage is reached only by the destruction of the previous one. The same process affects also the organizational system of society, as well as the system of ideas, alternating “organic” periods (balance) and “critical” periods (imbalance). The three stages are divided into: theological stage, dominated by priests and the military (antiquity); metaphysical stage, dominated by clergymen and jurists (Middle Ages and Renaissance); and, finally, the positive stage, governed by industrialists and moral and scientific guides (modernity). The predominant factor in this development is undoubtedly what Comte defined as intellectual evolution, although we should not forget the influence of many other factors in the evolution of humanity. Comte’s reflections must be included in what he himself defines the normative theory, which is also the most interesting for the present considerations. In his idea of development of a positive society, guiding this process falls on the industrialists and sociologists, because, possessing superior knowledge, they act as guides for the rest of humanity—as did the priests

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and the military in the past. Science is—or should be—positive knowledge, that is, knowledge that forswears the study of causes, focusing instead only on the verification of phenomena and their relations, building general laws to make science pragmatic for social objectives. Positive knowledge is therefore the perfect form of knowledge and that is why it is placed in the third stage (positive stage) identified by Comte. In the eyes of his contemporaries, Comte appears—willingly—as the prophet of a new religion, transforming philosophy (the new positive science represented by sociology) into religion, and is so convinced of it that he writes The Catechism of Positive Religion (Comte, 1852/1858). This new society is characterized by its orientation and regulation in view of the common good, with great associative spirit and altruistic feeling; the latter also becomes a religious feeling, having humanity as its new god. In other words, for Comte, The individual must subordinate himself to an Existence outside itself in order to find in it the source of his own stability. And this condition cannot be effectually realised except under the impulse of propensities prompting him to live for others. The being, whether man or animal, who loves nothing outside himself, and really lives for himself alone, is by that very fact condemned to pass his life in a miserable alternation of ignoble torpor and uncontrolled excitement. Evidently the principal feature of Progress in all living things is that the general consensus which we have seen to be the essential attribute of vitality should become more perfect. It follows that happiness and worth, as well in individuals as in societies, depend on adequate ascendancy of the sympathetic instincts. Thus the expression, Live for Others, is the simplest summary of the whole moral code of Positivism. (Comte, 1851–1854/1875–1877, I, pp. 565–566, emphasis in original)

Altruist is who selflessly aims his actions at other people’s good. The new positive order, in Comte’s own words, will have “love as a principle,” “order as a base,” and “progress as an objective.” In this way, individuals will be full of love for their fellow human beings. The evolution of altruism entails the subordination of self-love to the love for others and the satisfaction of their needs, as a source of well-being for the individual and for society. Altruism can overcome selfish instincts (Comte believed that some inclinations of human beings—including egoism and altruism—came from specific areas of the brain) only if it is paralleled by the rational capacity of human beings to negotiate within the system of needs by mediating between individual needs and social needs. In this logic, intellect and rationality function best at the service of human needs when they do so through the practice of altruism. Altruism,

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therefore, combined with rationality and intellect, pays attention to the freedom of others to compete for their own existence and individual realization. Inasmuch as each individual is limited by other people’s freedom— since the freedom of each individual is built not at the expense of others but on their freedom—it is imperative to complete each individual freedom by devoting oneself to the others. The individual is pure abstraction if he is not conceived in these terms in the social system. One way to achieve salvation is to act according to the spirit of brotherhood and a feeling of duty. And it is precisely on this moralistic vision of altruism, which Comte would like to become universal for humanity, that the French scholar dwells in his last works. His main assumption went against the idea of egoism and altruism held by the Catholic Church. The latter, predominant until then, posed human nature as selfish and stated that positive actions toward others existed only as gifts from the divine grace, whereas modern biology was demonstrating that altruistic inclinations were innate in the human species. On these biological foundations, Comte bases his idea of the social system, even considering it one of the two most important discoveries of modernity, together with Nicolò Copernico’s heliocentrism (Dixon, 2012) to the point of stating that positivism alone finally establishes a correspondence between theory and practice, relying mainly on the discoveries of modern science on the natural existence of altruistic instincts. The “Religion of Humanity” is not pure worship but aims at organizing social life. Thus Comte, in his last works, returns to the germinal problem, political in its nature: finding a solution for a state of crisis by trying to identify the laws that govern change and development in society. Once these laws are identified, it is possible to intervene, modifying the very structure of society. From these motivations began the birth of the new positive (sociological) science which, not by chance, Comte placed at the top of the hierarchy of sciences, not only for historical reasons (it was the last one to be born), but because this science had as its object of study the most complex one, society. This aspect of Comte’s religiosity was not given much weight, being considered a minor part of his vast theoretical system. And it is true that the French scholar faced plenty of criticism, particularly from Spencer who refused the assumptions on which he had founded all his theory aimed at establishing a “Religion of Humanity.” Actually, Comte’s “Religion of Humanity” had no other purpose than to make the social sphere sacred, because he was convinced that only the social man (homo sociologicus) could exist. Obviously, due to the very nature of this work, we will not join this debate because our purpose is purely to highlight the greatest contributions to the development of altruism as an analytical concept for the social sciences. Synthesizing

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greatly, it can be said that Comte—whose thinking has affected much of the development of systems of ideas from the Enlightenment onwards in the Western world, regardless of their sharing—theorized that human altruism is a natural instinct similar to egoism. They differ particularly for one aspect, the latter tending to the conservation of the individual, while altruism is oriented to the conservation of the species sometimes playing a major role in the maintenance and social development of mankind.

The Sociological Dichotomies of Émile Durkheim and Social Solidarity With Émile Durkheim’s work, the history of sociology reached a fundamental stage: His intention was to build a social science that could act as solid foundation for public action, while being aware that sociological research had not made such progress as to allow this new discipline to be the basis of new policies. The approach of this French scholar—the natural father of sociology—presents a strong element of innovation compared to moral statistics,1 which in that historical period represented the positivistic mainstream. According to Durkheim’s approach, the social order (structure or system) is the essential prerequisite for individual and collective action: The whole explains the parts. Human beings, only if and to the extent that they are inserted (integrated) into a system or belong to a structure, become social beings (social actors). Individuals regulate their behavior in groups and in society according to a complex system of norms that are consciously or unconsciously internalized, that is, they become an integral part of each individual. Given the theory in these terms, the functions of reproduction and persistence are highlighted. These functions are carried out by inculturation, education, conformity to norms, the combination of expectations of role, in a society in which the constitutive element is supposed to be the consensus around values. This difference between individual and social is outlined in dualistic contrasts: organic solidarity vs. mechanical solidarity, altruism vs. egoism, social fact vs. psychic fact, collective representation vs. individual representation, sacred vs. profane, social order vs. anomie. These contrasts are paramount in the explanations of many sociocultural phenomena and of society in general. For example, Durkheim, through the opposition between altruism and egoism, explains the foundations of social solidarity in modern society and defines its implications in the book Suicide (Durkheim, 1897/2005), identifying what will later become the main typology

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of suicide by contrasting altruistic suicide with egoistic suicide. And it is precisely the theme of social solidarity that permeates Durkheim’s entire work, as he considers it to be the element that binds and integrates individuals to and into society. Indeed, its absence determines what Durkheim will call social pathologies, such as suicide.

Altruistic Suicide Versus Anomic Suicide At the heart of the Durkheim’s studies, as mentioned above, lies the difference between individual and social. This dualism is outlined through contrast throughout the whole of the French sociologist’s work (organic solidarity vs. mechanical solidarity, social fact vs. psychic fact, etc.). Among these is the contrast between altruism and egoism, expressed in the juxtaposition between altruistic suicide vs. egoistic suicide. Since the beginning of the last century, Durkheim’s book (1897/2005), Suicide, lies at the basis of all studies dealing with suicide. It is considered the “classic” text for an empirical approach to the study of this phenomenon since its first publication in 1879. According to Durkheim, suicide must be considered a social phenomenon and not an individual one. This is the work in which Durkheim proves more strongly that the new budding sociological science could study such a specific and individual problem as suicide, and to provide, after careful analysis of the data, conclusions that can contribute to the explanation of this complex phenomenon. In this study, Durkheim does not consider suicide as a mere individual act. On the contrary, following the line laid down in his other works, he wants to highlight, with empirical data, the predominance of social actions over individual ones. At the center of his treatise, therefore, is not the act of suicide or the individuals who perform it but the social conditions that determine it. In Durkheim’s theory, sociology must identify and eliminate the potential divisions within society before they create discomfort among its component. Furthermore, it must guide the subjects, leading them to plan their behavior in a society that is increasingly functionally differentiated. To avoid confusion of thought and ideas deriving from the superficial use of the term suicide in the popular sense, Durkheim (1897/2005) prefers to provide—in the introduction to his work—the explanatory definition of what he intends to study through comparable facts: The term suicide is applied to all cases of death resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he knows will produce this result. An attempt is an act thus defined but falling short of actual death. (p. xii)

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The French sociologist is therefore not interested in the way in which an individual decides “in full awareness” to end her life. An individual can decide to end her existence in a nonviolent way (for example, by refusing food), but, according to Durkheim’s theory, this behavior still falls under the category of suicide. All the acts that can be traced back to similar factors, well defined and tending towards the same end, constitute the elements of the same category—in this case, that of suicide. Durkheim argues with the moral statisticians who preceded him in these studies, considering implicit the idea that the causality factor is exclusively social and not extra-social as they claimed. In the first part of his work, he goes so far as to refute the statements of these scholars in relation to the reasons determining (or not) suicide. He does not explain the high suicide rates through natural phenomena (natural-telluric, climatic-seasonal, etc.), nor does he consider them a consequence of a mental pathology. If the tendency to suicide, by its very nature special and defined, were a variety of madness, it would be partial madness and limited to a single act. If, therefore, a suicide madness existed, it would be a “monomania”—and, indeed, that is how it has often been qualified. It follows that the action of an individual is influenced by her environment, and this is true also for gestures as dramatic as suicide. Taking this position to the limit, Durkheim goes so far as to argue that the causes of suicide are to be found in the balance of two pairs of opposing moral forces (egoism-altruism and anomie-fatalism) resulting from the combination of two variables: intégration (integration) and réglementation (regulation). He opposes any form of individualism through the concept of social order2 understood as the moral balance of society resulting from the combination of these last two variables. Durkheimian sociology, therefore, states the primacy of the social over the individual. By stating that society has a higher value than the individual, Durkheim wants to make it understood that society can only be explained through social facts,3 and it is by observing the characteristics that these social facts assume in society that he gives shape to his typology of suicide, based on the different degree of dependence of the individual on society (egoistic, altruistic, anomic, to which he adds a fourth type, fatalistic). The four types of suicide trace this act back to the individual’s bond with society, which is the common substratum, even if these types are different from each other. Egoistic suicide results from a poor integration of the individual into the social groups to which he belongs. This is the case when the individuality of the subject prevails over the community. Durkheim highlights these characteristics by analyzing suicide rates in relation to three social groups (religious, family, political) which he considers paramount for the moral

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and social order of society. These are the groups with which the individual interacts almost daily and throughout his life. Morselli (1879), in his study of moral statistics had already differentiated suicide rates within religious communities, highlighting a clear difference between Protestant and Catholic countries. Durkheim further deepened this analysis by expanding the number of religious faiths examined: The comparison is no longer restricted to Catholics and Protestants but also includes Jews. With the weakening of traditional beliefs and the transformation of social solidarity, no longer mechanical but organic (the characteristics of which will be analyzed later), men desire more and more to be able to act and think freely about religion, a behavior highlighted by a higher instability of religious systems, that leaves believers without a strong spiritual guidance. Both Catholicism and Protestantism forbid suicide by divine law. The basic difference that makes suicide rates higher in Orthodox and Protestant countries (e.g., Russia, Saxony, and Denmark) is the less hierarchical structure of the clergy. This leads to a greater intensity of free examination and free will, whereby each individual becomes the author of his own faith and of his acts towards himself and others. Conversely, in Catholic countries (such as Spain, Italy, Portugal), there is a strong cult of tradition, considered inviolable, that generates cohesion (collective consciousness). This situation does not create the conditions for suicide. The low suicide rate of the Jewish population can be explained in a similar way, since they have always been subject to hostility, which has led to the consolidation of a team spirit, thus, creating a strong internal unity able to oppose external attacks. Suicide, therefore, is inversely proportional to the integration of the individual into the religious group to which he belongs. The inverse proportionality of suicide rates with the degree of integration/cohesion of the individual in a given group will be the constant of egoistic suicide. Another social group examined by Durkheim is the family defined as domestic society. From the data relating to individuals belonging to a family group, the French scholar elaborates some considerations. The first one is that a peculiarity of the domestic society is the higher number of unmarried people who commit suicide compared to married people. Durkheim proposes two possible causal explanations for this: the first is the influence of the domestic and family environment (this is considered more credible as a possible cause); the second is the “marriage selection”: marriage requires some physical, moral, and economic prerequisites. However, the latter explanation is rejected by Durkheim because, otherwise, the category of single people would contain the dispossessed of the entire society and therefore the suicide rates above average that are found in it would be attributable

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to this type of inferiority. In his study, Durkheim analyzes in detail all the possible forms of family group and, as in the previous case, he draws conclusions on the basis of some regularities. Couples without children commit suicide more than those with offspring; widowers without children more than those with children; men more than women. The latter aspect can be probably ascribed to a stronger emotional involvement with the primary groups. The author concludes his treatise on domestic society by stating that “just as the family is a powerful safeguard against suicide, so the more strongly it is constituted the greater its protection” (Durkheim, 1897/2005, p. 160). The family is the first form of society with which individuals come into contact and from which they learn moral elements: “Morality begins with people’s first encounters with social life it is the family that not only provides children with its first contact with society but also with the morality of that society” (Prus, 2011, p. 76). With the last of the three societies examined, that is, the political one, Durkheim considers the political-social organization as being capable of influencing suicide rates in a positive or negative way. Major social upheavals, civil wars, and revolutions can enliven collective feelings (Sorokin, 1942/2010) by directing the energies of individuals towards a single purpose and increasing the degree of social cohesion for a certain period of time. Therefore, they reduce the number of voluntary deaths. The above illustrates how different social groups have a regulatory influence on suicide. This is due not to special characteristics of each but to a characteristic common to all. Religion does not owe its efficacy to the special nature of religious sentiments, since domestic and political societies both produce the same effects when strongly integrated. This, moreover, we have already proved when studying directly the manner of action of different religions upon suicide. Inversely, it is not the specific nature of the domestic or political tie which can explain the immunity they confer, since religious society has the same advantage. The cause can only be found in a single quality possessed by all these social groups, though perhaps to varying degrees. The only quality satisfying this condition is that they are all strongly integrated social groups. So we reach the general conclusion: suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups of which the individual forms a part. (Durkheim, 1897/2005, p. 167)

Integration protects the individual from suicidal behavior, making her responsible for herself and for others; the support of the cohesive community prevents self-destructive dynamics. However, this is true only to a certain extent, beyond which integration acts in the opposite direction.

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What characterizes altruistic suicide, unlike egoistic suicide, is the excessive integration within the social group, with the total cancellation of the individuality of the subject, who is completely absorbed by the duties imposed on him by collective life. This type of suicide can be found, in various forms, even in ancient populations, such as the suicide of individuals at the threshold of old age. The Visigoths, for example, had institutionalized this practice: On their borders rose a cliff from whence the elderly who were tired of living threw themselves down. A similar case was the voluntary death of servants and slaves following that of their masters, or the suicides of women following the loss of their husbands. These particular forms of suicide fulfill a duty towards society, hence, why Durkheim (1897/2005) defines them as obligatory altruistic suicide: Now, when a person kills himself, in all these cases, it is not because he assumes the right to do so but, on the contrary, because it is his duty. If he fails in this obligation, he is dishonored and also punished, usually, by religious sanctions. Of course, when we hear of aged men killing themselves we are tempted at first to believe that the cause is weariness or the sufferings common to age. But if these suicides really had no other source, if the individual made away with himself merely to be rid of an unendurable existence, he would not be required to do so; one is never obliged to take advantage of a privilege. Now, we have seen that if such a person insists on living he loses public respect; in one case the usual funeral honors are denied, in another a life of horror is supposed to await him beyond the grave. The weight of society is thus brought to bear on him to lead him to destroy himself. To be sure, society intervenes in egoistic suicide, as well; but its intervention differs in the two cases. In one case, it speaks the sentence of death; in the other it forbids the choice of death. In the case of egoistic suicide it suggests or counsels at most; in the other case it compels and is the author of conditions and circumstances making this obligation coercive. (pp. 177–178)

Finding common elements in these two types of suicide (egoistic and altruistic) can be done only in terms of a flattened vision of life: For suicidal individuals of the first type, there is no world outside themselves; for those of the second, there is strong deprivation of an individual reality. This is even truer if we consider the synthesis proposed by Durkheim (1897/2005) on egoism and altruism: Having given the name of egoism to the state of the Ego living its own life and obeying itself alone, that of altruism adequately expresses the opposite state, where the Ego is not its own property, where it is blended with something not itself, where the goal of conduct is exterior to itself, that is, in one of the groups in which it participates. (p. 179)

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This definition not only highlights Durkheim’s juxtaposition of two forms of individual conduct, but also the distinction between individual and society. Indeed, the dichotomy altruism/egoism shows Durkheim’s main ontological idea of society: its primacy over the individual. According to Durkheim, altruism and social solidarity are in fact indistinguishable. As Bykov stated, “The idea of altruism in his [Durkheim’s idea] conception is almost indistinguishable from the idea of social solidarity as he emphasizes the formula ‘Everywhere that societies exist there is altruism, because there is solidarity’” (Bykov, 2017, p. 800). Durkheim’s hope, which also translates into his moral idea of society, is that in modern society—in which the individual and collective dimensions coexist—these types of suicide (altruistic and egoistic) will no longer occur. Nevertheless, he examines a particular group about altruistic suicide: the army. In this group altruistic suicide is considered to be endemic; in fact, suicide rates of members of the army, for almost all European countries, were higher than those of the civilian population of the same age. The French scholar, thus, wonders what causes this high suicide rate among the army ranks, because it is a social group whose members are highly integrated. As a possible answer, he considers the following to be a determining factor: The coefficient of aggravation special to this profession is then caused not by the repugnance it inspires, but, on the contrary, by the sum total of states, acquired habits or natural dispositions making up the military spirit. Now, the first quality of a soldier is a sort of impersonality not to be found anywhere in civilian life to the same degree. He must be trained to set little value upon himself, since he must be prepared to sacrifice himself upon being ordered to do so. Even aside from such exceptional circumstances, in peace time and in the regular exercise of his profession, discipline requires him to obey without question and sometimes even without understanding. For this an intellectual abnegation hardly consistent with individualism is required. He must have but a weak tie binding him to his individuality, to obey external impulsion so docilely. (Durkheim, 1897/2005, pp. 191–192)

The individual who finds himself in difficulty, outside the military institution, is unable to manage himself and adapt without suffering the strong impact of a failure to resolve personal problems. In the last part of his writings on altruistic suicide, Durkheim reiterates the need to precisely and objectively define the object of study of suicide, due to the risk of assuming ambiguous positions. He clarifies that altruistic suicide, though showing the familiar suicidal traits, resembles especially in its most vivid manifestations some categories of action which we

94    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism are used to honoring with our respect and even admiration, people have often refused to consider it as self-destruction . . . if suicides with the spirit of renunciation and abnegation as their immediate and visible cause do not deserve the name, it can be no more appropriate for those springing from the same moral disposition, though less apparently; for the second differ by only a few shades from the first. (Durkheim, 1897/2005, p. 199)

Anomic suicide is the type of suicide Durkheim dwells on the most, because he considers it the most characteristic of the contemporary world. The basic difference between this type and the two previous ones is that, while their basic aspect is the quantum of the individuals’ bond to society, that is, the degree of integration to the society to which they belong, anomic suicide is linked to the lack of strong social rules—hence the term anomie.4 The term anomie can be considered as that condition in which forms of regulation of the relations between the organs (individuals) of a society (organism) are missing or lacking. This type of suicide is found to a greater extent in periods of economic disruption that mimic the state of society and of the individual himself, who is no longer able to discern what is possible from what is not. Times of crisis (both in their positive and negative outcomes) lead to an increase in suicide rates. This statistical variation is justified by the change in social living conditions, which change the scale of social values that govern individual needs. This creates an imbalance between what is possible and what is not possible. Materialism leads the individual to think that there are no insurmountable limits to his desires. These are thus unlimited so far as they depend on the individual alone. Irrespective of any external regulatory force, our capacity for feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless abyss. . . . It has been claimed, indeed, that human activity naturally aspires beyond assignable limits and sets itself unattainable goals. (Durkheim, 1897/2005, p. 208)

In order to reduce this phenomenon and/or the effects of crises, Durkheim does not believe in the repression of the individual desires, nor in coercive actions, but rather points to the necessity to rethink the forms of organization of social groups and especially the professional group (as this type of suicide is linked to economic crises). Anomie in the economic sector, however, is not the only determinant of this type of suicide. Durkheim also refers to other forms of anomie that can influence suicide rates; for example, he considers the number of suicides related to divorce and separation, whereby marriage assumes the function of regulating human passions. The dissolution of the marriage bond creates a moral weakening that can lead to an increase in the probability of suicide for both men and women. In other words, for anomic suicide, the individual situations (economic

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crisis, divorce, or other) represent only the opportunity. The real cause of anomic suicide is the partial or total lack of regulation within social groups, which creates disorientation in individuals. In summary, it can be said that Durkheim’s theory of suicide is all based on a balance of two pairs of opposing social moral forces: egoism-altruism and anomie-fatalism.5 In turn, these find their explanation on two other variables: integration and regulation, respectively—the main pillars of the central theme of Durkheim’s sociology. The latter’s aim is to reach the social order that is subordinate to integration, which is, in turn, based on sharing and consensus around factors (beliefs, rules, values, etc.) that are, for this purpose, consolidated and transmitted to become common (collective consciousness). This allows Durkheim to oppose all forms of individualism in favor of a social solidarity that sees transformed from mechanical solidarity of communities to organic solidarity of modern society.

Organic Solidarity Versus Mechanical Solidarity Durkheim’s methodological innovation is therefore substantial: He clearly separates individual from social. This approach will then become the paradigm of reference of sociology with Parson’s functionalism (Parsons, 1949). The social takes precedence over the individual, the organic solidarity over the mechanical one, the collective representations over the individual ones, acquiring meaning through the institutions that represent the constant with respect to the variability of the weight of individuals. Society cannot be explained through individual actions and motivations, but through external and constricting social facts that creep into individual consciousness (substratum of individual representation) constituting collective consciousness (substratum of collective representations). For Durkheim—as mentioned above—even phenomena typically considered individual, such as suicide, have a social determinant. Among the many commentators on Durkheim’s work on suicide, Talcott Parsons (1949) tries to reconstruct Durkheim’s typology in relation to another of his works: The Division of Labor in Society (Durkheim, 1893/1960). Parsons starts addressing Durkheim’s typology by considering altruistic suicide as a direct consequence of a mechanical solidarity due not to the similarity between individuals but to their subordination to the group: “Altruistic suicide is a manifestation of a conscience collective which is strong in the sense of subordinating individual to group interests, and which has the particular content of a low valuation of individual life relative to group values” (Parsons, 1949, p. 330). Egoistic suicide, on the other hand, is characterised by organic solidarity, which tends to enhance the value of individual

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personalities. For Parsons, egoism is the reflected representation of the cult of the individual, rather than stemming from collective or common conscience defined as “the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its own life” (Durkheim, 1893/1960, p. 79). From this simple definition it can be deduced that collective consciousness, as well as representation, are independent from the rest of social life, yet are constituted and reproduced in it. Not believing that egoism can stem from the transformation of collective consciousness, Parson disagrees with Durkheim and criticizes his position. He claims, instead, that egoism results from the reflection of the consciousness of individuals that almost contrasts with the collective one. The American scholar emphasizes the fact that the various types of suicide were not born simultaneously. More specifically, he believes that the concept of anomy, which has evolved during the development of Durkheim’s other works, was developed after those of egoism and altruism. In summary, the principle of Durkhem’s theory of suicide, as reconstructed by Parsons, separates anomic suicide from the other two types: the former is characterized by the absence of rules, while the others see the preeminence of the group over the individual and differ from each other in the content of the rules. The emphasis is therefore on the origin of the regulatory power. In the context of altruistic and egoistic suicide, this is internal to the individual, originating from the process of socialization and mainly in the phase of the internalization of the rules. It then splits: collective content (collective consciousness) in the first case (altruistic suicide) and individual content (individual consciousness) in the second case (egoistic suicide), while for fatalistic suicide this regulatory power is to be considered external to the individual. Anomic suicide, on the other hand, is characterized by the total absence of rules and, therefore, of regulatory power. But how to define this regulatory power, which can be identified in the consciousness? According to Durkheim (1893/1960) the collective consciousness, No doubt, it has not a specific organ as a substratum; it is, by definition, diffuse in every reach of society. Nevertheless, it has specific characteristics which make it a distinct reality. It is, in effect, independent of the particular conditions in which individuals are placed; they pass on and it remains. . . . it does not change with each generation, but, on the contrary, it connects successive generations with one another. It is, thus, an entirely different thing from particular consciences, although it can be realized only through them. It is the psychical type of society, a type which has its properties, its conditions of existence, its mode of development, just as individual types, although in a different way. (pp. 79–80)

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It follows that the collective consciousness has a life completely independent from the individuals, it is almost an external coercion for the subjects, to the point of attributing negative definition to the action contrasting with the integrity of the consciousness of a given collectivity. And yet collective consciousness cannot be confused with social consciousness: As the, terms, collective and social, are often considered synonymous, one is inclined to belief that the collective conscience is the total social conscience, that is, extend it to include more than the psychic life of society, although, particularly in advanced societies, it is only a very restricted part. (Durkheim, 1893/1960, p. 80)

The collective consciousness represents the vital force of a community, therefore everything that tends to weaken or diminish this factor disturbs the individuals. In The Division of Labor in Society (Durkheim, 1893/1960), the French sociologist uses the term representation. While its definition is similar to that of collective consciousness, it will not replace this idea. The former, as a phenomenon, affects the consciousness: a representation is not simply a mere image of reality, an inert shadow projected by things upon us, but it is a force which raises around itself a turbulence of organic and psychical phenomena. . . . Thus, the representation of a sentiment contrary to ours acts in us in the same sense and in the same manner as the sentiment for which it is a substitute. It is as if it had itself become part of our conscience. (Durkheim, 1893/1960, p. 97)

This strong analogy, however, is not particularly emphasized by Durkheim. On the one hand, he continues to consider collective consciousness as the main form of bonding of individuals within society, as well as the primary explaining element of social cohesion (the element that produces integration). So much so as to characterize the mechanical solidarity typical of traditional societies, in which individuals are similar to each other and share common rules and values. On the other hand, and at least in this work, representations are considered as a negative element because they often contrast with the conscience, or they are underestimated with respect to the problem of meaning in social life. Mechanical solidarity can be strong only if the ideas and tendencies common to all the members of the society are greater in number and intensity than those which pertain personally to each member. It is as much stronger as the excess is more considerable. . . . Solidarity which comes from likenesses is at its maximum

98    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism when the collective conscience completely envelops our whole conscience and coincides in all points with it. But, at that moment, our individuality is nil. (Durkheim, 1893/1960, pp. 129–130)

Together with the principle of division of labor, instead, we see the development of a new type of solidarity (organic solidarity), based on the recognition of differences and less focused on norms and values. The collective conscience leaves open a part of the individual conscience in order that special functions may be established there, functions which it cannot regulate. The more this region is extended, the stronger is the cohesion which results from this solidarity. . . . the individuality of all grows at the same time as that of its parts. Society becomes more capable of collective movement, at the same time that each of its elements has more freedom of movement. (Durkheim, 1893/1960, p. 131)

As the division of labor progresses, the collective consciousness becomes weaker and, because of this progress, the division of labor becomes the source of solidarity. Although we should consider this as Durkheim’s juvenile position, in The Division of Labor in Society (Durkheim, 1893/1960), he already raises the question that the division of labor may not even be a normal social phenomenon when the relations between organs are not regulated because they are in a state of anomie. After all, the historical period in which Durkheim elaborated his theories was rich in social changes. The fall of the Ancien Régime and the consequent loss of traditional institutions had brought collective life to two extremes: On the one hand, the individual with his needs that, if not satisfied, cause suffering; on the other hand, a centralized state unable to stop the selfish impulses of individual citizens. Individuals do not inherently possess a sense of the limit which, therefore, must be put in place by an external force. The latter can be only society, whose moral power is such to be respected by individuals. These are the reasons why he later changed his position and pointed out that even those systems that had developed a high degree of organic solidarity, nevertheless needed a common faith, a collective consciousness, if they wanted to avoid their disintegration into a cluster of mutually antagonistic individuals, aimed only at self-assertion (Coser, 1977). Durkheim’s sociology, therefore, envisages the primacy of society over the individual. The scholar opposes any form of individualism through the concept of the social order understood as the moral balance of society resulting from the combination of two variables: integration and regulation. By stating that society has a higher value than the individual, Durkheim wants to make it understood that society can only be explained through social facts and that

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man becomes an integral part of the social—the organ of an organism— only after overcoming his egocentric nature. The collective consciousness as it is conceived by Durkheim transcends social divisions to form the main bond of the community and ensure its continuity over time. Although it is of a spiritual nature, it imposes modes of thought and action on individuals, and it is actualized in institutions through social, moral, juridical or political rules, as well as in religious visions, through collective beliefs or rituals. The collective conscience arouses representations, again collective, which constitute the basis of all human judgments underpinning individual actions. And it is through the latter—the collective representations—that the primacy of the social over the individual is affirmed once again.

Collective Representations Versus Individual Representations Durkheim’s first true conceptualization of collective representations can be found in the appendix to The Rules of Sociological Method (Durkheim, 1895/1982). However, it is possible to date, with a wide margin of certainty, the birth of collective representations as a tool for explaining social phenomena, especially those of cohesion and integration, with the publication of the essay “Individual and Collective Representations”6 (Durkheim, 1895/1953), which wants to be a comparative study through the process of analogy between the laws of sociology and psychology. In his opening pages, Durkheim states that collective life—like the mental life of the individual—is made up of representations. We can therefore presume that individual and social representations are somehow comparable, as they are both in the same relationship with their respective substrates. In this way, the representations are seen as phenomena. And as such, the scholar cannot pretend that they do not exist, since the observation reveals the existence of an order of phenomena called representations that are distinguished by specific characteristics from other phenomena of nature. It is contrary to any method to consider them as if they did not exist. In this essay, neglected by most, Durkheim not only highlights the autonomy of sociology from psychology as a discipline, but shows how representations are a new object of study completely original also in view of the historical period. If, on the one hand, individual representations are considered a psychic phenomenon based on memory and the reenactment of memories (where the latter shares with the former only the physiological state), on the other hand, the collective representations are independent from organic connections. They are psychic facts with their own persistent reality, and as representations, they have the capacity to act on each other. Individual and collective representations do not lack similarities, if only

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for the simple fact that both are representations. And for the same reason, some laws may be common to both systems, even if of a different nature. Just as the substratum of individual representations is the consciousness of each individual, so that of collective representations is the whole of society; the former originates from the latter, that is not the common denominator of individual representations. In the same way as collective consciousness, therefore, collective representations (made explicit as the constitutive dimension of social life) are stable elaborations that repeat themselves over time, are internalized by individuals, but exist independently of them. These representations are to be understood as “collective” in the sense that they are shared by all the members of a social group and are coercively handed down from generation to generation. In other words, the existence of collective representations is deduced from the reality of individual representations to which the social fact is added. To attempt a summary of Durkheim’s conceptualizations, we could say that to explain collective representations one must refer to the properties of the whole. The whole, however, is formed only by the grouping of the parts, which happens over long time spans. Indeed, between the pure state of isolation of an individual and the state characterized as an association (integration) are interposed innumerable “intermediaries.” The arising phenomena, therefore, do not derive directly from the nature of the associates and their independence differs according to the number and entity of the force with which the single elements are synthesized. The raw material of each social consciousness is closely related to the number of social elements, to the way in which they are grouped and distributed, that is, to the nature of the substratum. But from the moment of creation of a first substratum of representations, they become partially autonomous realities that exist by their own life. They have the power to attract, to reject, to form between them syntheses of every species, determined by their natural affinities and not by the state of the environment in which they evolve. Therefore, the new representations, which are the product of these syntheses, have the same nature. Their near causes are other collective representations, not this or that character of the social structure. The most significant examples of this phenomenon are to be found in the evolution of religions, and it is not by chance that Durkheim (1912/1995), in one of his best-known texts, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, starting with an examination of the totemic system of the Australian Warramunga tribe, outlines an accurate analysis together with a look at the possible paths for the social sciences and the possible future of modern Western societies. In the path proposed by Durkheim in this text we find all the concepts of his theory, as well as references to collective representations. Indeed, from the introductory pages, in

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which he describes the object of his study and his theory of knowledge, he states that the basis of all systems of beliefs and all cults must necessarily be a number of fundamental representations and ritual attitudes that, despite their different forms, have the same objective meaning and perform the same functions everywhere. This stems from the fact that the first systems of representations that man has made of the world and himself are religious. Religious representations are collective representations that express collective realities. Rituals are ways of acting that arise in groups and are intended to arouse, maintain, or reproduce certain mental states of these groups. In this work he reaffirms, with examples from spirituality and religious life, the characteristics of collective representations. The way in which individual and collective representations are formed helps to highlight their differences: The former are the result of the experience of the individual acquired directly by the spirit through action and as such linked to empirical knowledge of, the latter are the product of cooperation that extends over space and time (i.e., many individuals have mixed and combined their ideas and their feelings, as well as accumulated knowledge and experience from generation to generation). The representations are the expression of the duplicity of man. The individual ranges between two modes of behavior (homo duplex): on the one hand, the individuality of each subject, on the other hand, everything in the human being expresses other than himself. These two types of states of consciousness are not only different in their origin and their properties; there is real antagonism between them, they contradict and deny each other. Men cannot devote themselves to moral ends without depending on themselves, without crushing the instincts and propensities most deeply rooted in their bodies. The first is the “profane” nature of the individual: Everything that depends on the body in mental life (sensations and appetites) is to be considered profane and inferior forms of human activity because they favor particular ends. The second is his social or “sacred” nature, through which man expresses reason and carries out the moral activities privileging collective ends—thus, considered at the top of the hierarchical scale of activities. According to Durkheim, human duality is only one form of the division between sacred and profane that is found at the base of all religions and also characterizes the distinction between individual and collective representations. The collective representations, therefore, are forces capable of attributing to the things to which they refer to characters that do not exist in any other form. Marginal objects or individuals can be given great power and a sacred value. This power, although ideal, acts as real and consequently influences individual conduct. Collective representations, unlike individual representations—which, while causing physical repercussions on the

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organism, are not made up of these—presuppose that consciences act and react to one another. They result from these actions and reactions, which are only possible by virtue of material intermediaries. Therefore, the latter not only reveal the mental state to which they are associated, but contribute to constitute it (Durkheim, 1912/1995). Both individual and collective representations depend on their substratum, but for the latter to be constituted we need a sui generis system of individual consciences, with the effect of developing a world of feelings, ideas, and images which, once born, obey its own laws. They are recalled, rejected, merged, divided, and multiplied without these combinations being directly commanded and determined by the situation of the underlying reality. For Durkheim, collective representations are an explanatory tool that does not require further decomposition or study. Although he emphasizes their existence as a phenomenon, he does not follow on explaining their dynamics, nor does he delve into the aspects related to the representations as forces capable of attributing a positive or negative value to a certain object or individual. After all, a collective representation, simply because it is collective, ensures objectivity, because its persistence, generalization, and preservation are not without reason. If it disagreed with the nature of things, it would not have been able of an extended and prolonged dominion over spirits; a collective representation is necessarily subject to an indefinitely repeated control. The men, who adhere to it, verify it by their own personal experience, so it cannot be completely inadequate for its object. In the field of study of social representations, Durkheim deserves the great merit of having conceptualized them, defining them as forces (and at the same time as phenomena) that can prompt us to act, although he does not care about the dynamics connected to them except as regards the spiritual life, since he considers them natural phenomena. A criticism to the French scholar (first of all by individualists) is that, having long underestimated the concept of representation, but, above all, not having taken due account of the phenomenon of collective representations, he has ignored the problem of the meaning that individuals give to their lives. And, consequently, he did not give due importance to the role that collective representations—as expressions of social reality—play within a community and its cohesion and integration. This has led to Durkheim being given the label of determinist, perhaps rather approximately, since in his analyses, he has completely excluded the influence that individuals can exert on each other and, taken together, on society. In Durkheim’s sociology, representations (even though they present themselves as novelties) are not a specific object of study; rather, they represent a tool through which to explain society. The French scholar was not sufficiently farsighted in understanding

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the importance that collective representations, as he had originally conceptualized them, once they had lost their static nature, would later assume: a paramount role in the processes of construction of social reality and consequently on the integration of individuals within society. In conclusion, if in the 19th century the prevailing approach to the study of society was the hard positivism of moral statistics, with Durkheim, considered one of the founding fathers of sociology, there is a renewal on the assumption that the individual is subordinate to society as the latter is a superior organism. As summarized by Prus (2011), according to the eminent French scholar it can be considered that there is nothing in people’s biological nature that automatically leads them to attend to religion, morality, honor, or any other feature of group life. Envisioning the newborn human as an asocial creature, Durkheim says that it is the task of the community to transform this newcomer from a tabula rasa into someone capable of assuming a social, moral life within the community. (p. 67)

Only if they are integrated into a system or belong to a structure, and depending on their degree of integration, do human beings also become social beings (social actors). Consequently, the structure (or system) always comes before the individuals, inasmuch as it precedes and can explain them. This idea will then become dominant in the United States with Parsons’ and Merton’s structural-functionalism, which will influence all Western sociological thought for the explanations of sociocultural phenomena and the dynamics of change in society, including those related to its integration and cohesion. The social order is the essential prerequisite for individual and collective action. To underline this difference between individual and social, Durkheim in all his works thinks through opposing dichotomies (organic solidarity vs. mechanical solidarity, altruism vs. egoism, social fact vs. psychic fact, collective representation vs. individual representation, sacred vs. profane, social order vs. anomie), each of which aims to assume a fundamental importance in the explanations of many sociocultural phenomena and society in general but also, and above all, to bring out the clear distinction between individual and social. Durkheim’s very theory of suicide, as mentioned above, is based on a balance between the two variables of integration and regulation, which is then expressed in the two pairs of opposing social moral forces: egoism-altruism and anomie-fatalism. Men regulate their behavior in groups and in society according to a complex system of norms and rules that are consolidated and transmitted to become a common heritage (collective consciousness). This allows Durkheim to oppose all forms

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of individualism in a society where the constituent element is supposed to be the consensus around values to move towards social solidarity.

Marcell Mauss and the Gift: From Secondary Sociality to Primary Sociality Studies on altruism must combine the system with individuals. They must be able to combine objective and subjective aspects, taking into account all the dimensions, levels, and factors involved in the expression of altruism. This suggests that its analysis must consider the multidimensionality and multifactoriality that characterizes it. This way privileges the spaces of social relations within social processes, including those relating to altruism, since all social phenomena, attitudes, and actions are built in an environment that has its own places, times, and symbols, which are fundamental in the cognitive processes of self-signification activated by individuals for the construction of social realities in their everyday experience. In this perspective, we propose a reflection on a specific aspect of society, and especially of the relationships between individuals that, while recalling altruism, enjoys its own definition: the gift. We will refer to Marcel Mauss’ (1923–1924/2002) classic work The Gift. In this work, Mauss, citing Boas’ (1897) studies on the potlatch7 ritual and Malinowski’s (1922) on the kula8 ritual, describes the sociality of gift in archaic societies. The reader may be wondering why, in addressing altruism, we are talking about the gift. We will clarify this in the following pages, but some concerns should be appeased forthwith by Caillé’s (1998) definitions of gift (one sociological and one more general): Any supply of goods or services made without any guarantee of return, with a view to creating, maintaining or regenerating the social bond. In the gift relationship, the link is more important than the property. 2°) general definition: any action or service carried out without expectation, guarantee or certainty of return, and thus including only a dimension of “gratuity.” (p. 75)

Moreover, as Steiner (2016) pointed out, Mauss’s contribution extends Durkheim’s thought while promoting the passage from the stark altruismegoism opposition to that of gifts and counter-gifts. Gifting is no longer just for archaic society: It happens also in modern society with forms and ways usually linked to organizations, which makes these exchanges more complex and not too far from those taking place in the market. The gift produces exchanges that are not governed by a contract and thus it not only

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allows greater initiative by encouraging creativity, but it also strengthens social ties. There are at least three differences between a gift and a contract: 1. The gift is free; it is done by choice. There is no constraint for individuals to donate or to reciprocate (the non-obligation to reciprocate does not envisages sanctions, it is only of a moral nature). 2. There is no guarantee of restitution and therefore the exchange is based on trust and on the evaluation of the receiver of the gift: The key point is that “giver” and “receiver” are in a very complex relationship, which is located in a relational network characterized by increasing changes in all its elements; moreover, it is too often believed that any asymmetry in this type of relationship is due to the communicative behaviour of the “giver,” who highlights his dominance. Actually, the differences are more due to cultural factors and identity construction than to factors intrinsic to the relationship: the distance between “giver” and “receiver” forms a model of rational organization, which codifies and finalizes the relationship and that could be defined as Taylorist-utilitarian.” (Mangone, 2019, p. 37)

But if in general terms trust and mistrust can be considered an expectation of experiences by the individual (with positive and negative value, respectively), the former entails a cognitive and/ or emotional burden such as to allow to overcome the threshold of mere hope (Mutti, 2007) and consider a relationship positively. 3. The gift requires reciprocity; there is no abolition of debt (as in contracts of purchase/sale). It is exactly the opposite, the gift induces indebtedness towards the other, and the longer the period of repayment, the more active the link between the two parties is. In this way, there is a shift from an approach reducing individual action to mere exchange (do ut des) to an approach focused on the overall interactions between the aspects of exchange and all other relevant social and cultural variables. Mauss summarizes these aspects as follows: “The gift is therefore at one and the same time what should be done, what should be received, and yet what is dangerous to take. This is because the thing that is given itself forges a bilateral, irrevocable bond” (Mauss, 1923–1924/2002, p. 76). The paradigm of gift, therefore, underlines the importance, positive and normative, sociological, economic, ethical, political and philosophical, of this type of action. Speaking of a gift in modern society seems like an oxymoron, given the clash between the idea of a sympathetic and supportive society (solidarity) and that of a society in which everyone pursues only their self-interest. This binary idea of society determined also a sort of geographical bipartition: the utilitarian and rational western society that shuns the use of gifts as a

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way of building social cohesion or ties, unlike the other so-called “exotic” societies that are still based on this type of action. This has prevented scholars from recontextualizing the phenomenology of the gift and updating it to modern society (Caillé, 1988). But what were Mauss’s considerations? His essay exposes some fundamental aspects of the nature of the gift that can also be generally transposed to Western societies. The first of these aspects is the “obligatory sociality” of the gift, represented by the cycle give/receive/reciprocate, strongly present in the primitive societies studied: One must give to show one’s own power and wealth. The obligation to give is induced by community and honor bonds: Those who cannot find and own objects to introduce into this circle are excluded from the community. Furthermore, one must receive to guarantee a peaceful relationship (refusing the gift is an offence to the giver); and, finally, one must reciprocate by reciprocating the gift with an equivalent or better one, or else one will offend the giver. But what determines the last form of obligation (reciprocation)? According to Mauss, the objects donated and received have symbolic, mythical, and religious characteristics that bind and influence the individual who gives or receives them. In particular, he referred to the Maoris’s hau that designates, as does the Latin spiritus, both the wind and the soul—more precisely, at least in certain cases, the soul and the power in inanimate and vegetal things, the word mana being reserved for men and spirits. When the received object has a soul and incorporates the hau, this tends to return to its place of origin; therefore, the receiver must get rid of it, reciprocating the gift. If this does not happen, the spirit contained in the object becomes evil. Mauss also stresses how in primitive and ancient communities the “thing” (res) had a higher value than in modern society. To clarify this, he cites the Roman society: “Things are not the inert objects that the law of Justinian and our own legal systems conceive them to be. First, they form part of the family: the Roman familia includes the res, and not only people” (Mauss, 1923–1924/2002, p. 63). This example makes us reflect on modern society because, while attributing great importance to things, at the expense of people, the gift rarely happens, except when motivated by a special date. The difference with the past is that for primitive societies the give/receive/ reciprocate cycle was useful, not in the utilitarian economic sense, but in the sense that giving and receiving was in the interest of both giver and receiver. The individual who shuns the gift is marginalized from society, just like the receiver who does not accept, or who does not correspond,

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offends and undermines the ties with the community of the giver. The gift described by Mauss in primitive societies is therefore not gratuitous and disinterested: It establishes a cycle of goods so that everyone has an interest in engaging in its closure. Not only does the gift determine a form of “credit,” an expectation of replacement of the gift, but it also determines the “power” of the giver towards the receiver. A further aspect is that the gift strengthens and preserves social and community bonds between individuals, between individuals and the community, and between communities. The obligation to close the give/receive/reciprocate cycle promotes and strengthens a dense network of social and community relations within primitive tribes. Mauss (1923–1924/2002) states that this symbol of social life—the permanence of influence over the things: exchanged—serves merely to reflect somewhat directly the manner in which the subgroups in these segmented societies, archaic in type and constantly enmeshed with one another, feel that they are everything to one another. (p. 42)

Gift is a social ritual that strengthens cohesion as it reinforces the relationships of all parts of society. Finally, Mauss (1923–1924/2002) defines the gift as a total social fact: That is to say, in certain cases they involve the totality of society and its institutions (potlatch, clans confronting one another, tribes visiting one another, etc.), and in other cases only a very large number of institutions, particularly when these exchanges and contracts rather concern the individual. All these phenomena are at the same time juridical, economic, religious, and even aesthetic and morphological, etc. (pp. 100–101).

The total social fact is the theoretical object defined by Marcel Mauss that most influenced the anthropology of the last century. For Mauss, the total social fact was a powerful tool for the scholar: a basic structure through which it was possible to settle and interpret apparently distant dynamics of a different and complex nature, such as that of the gift. The gift is therefore part of what Mauss (1923–1924/2002) calls the system of total services that, involving all social classes and all forms of community life, is both a social and an economic system. This shows that in archaic societies, unlike modern ones, there is no separation between the economic and the social-emotional sphere. Mauss, in line with his demonstration that all sociality based on gift has as its foundation the search for interest and profit, concludes his essay with an interesting interpretation of homo oeconomicus. According to Mauss, the distinctive character of modern

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homo oeconomicus, compared to those of the archaic man is to be found not in the search for profit and interest (already existing in primitive societies), but in the rationalization and technicalization of this research. In Mauss’s work, we can see an attempt to overcome two widespread paradigms of the social sciences: utilitarianism (methodological individualism) with homo oeconomicus and holism with Durkheimian collectivism. This attempt will then be taken up again by updating Mauss’s work through a modern interpretation of his study by the scholars who founded the MAUSS9 (Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste dans les Sciences Sociales). The acronym is obviously not accidental; these scholars wanted to highlight their esteem of the French scholar (and the strong ideal link with his thought). The third paradigm is proposed by Alain Caillé (2007) who asks the following question: What if the gift was the instrument with which men create society? The gift becomes a promoter of relationships and social bonds because man is not content to just live in society and reproduce it, but he must actively produce society in order to live. Thus, we make a great leap forward in reading the “value” of goods and services: no longer only use value and exchange value, but also bond value because the bond becomes more important than the good itself: “Any provision of goods or services, without any guarantee of return, with a view to creating, nurturing or recreating the social bond between persons” (Godbout & Caillé, 1992, p. 32). This also defines the difference between primary and secondary sociality (Caillé, 1995) in which the former refers to personalized relationships built over time, while the latter refers to the relationships developed between functions and not between individuals. Obviously, it is easy to find and understand the gift in a primary sociality. In a secondary one, instead, it becomes more difficult, unless we define the three dimensions of analysis of sociology: the micro (of the alliance between individuals), the meso (of the alliance of individuals with groups and groups between them), and, finally, the macro (of the relationship of individuals and groups, and groups of groups, with the symbolic totality that they form). The first level is the gift, with its faceto-face relationship, the second we can ascribe to associations, and the third level is that of politics. In modern society, only a few realities come close to those described by Mauss, and they are based on local exchanges that give life to an “us”— which will be taken up by Moscovici (2000a) in the description of the elementary forms of altruism—in which individuals are no longer strangers to each other. In these realities, the economy creeps back into society by replacing the contract with the gift, since human beings are essentially relational beings.

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Pitirim A. Sorokin’s Altruistic Creative Love: Genesis and Aims The social sciences and the humanities—especially sociology and psychology—have adopted a “negativistic” approach since their inception, that is, a modus operandi that tends to bring out only negative or pathological phenomena without ever highlighting positive and healthy ones (Sorokin, 1966). Moreover, they were characteristically oriented towards societal contrasts—normal/pathological, north/south, friend/enemy, center/periphery, rich/poor, egoism/altruism, as we saw for Durkheim and his sociological dichotomies—often ignoring the meaningful interactions between all the elements that constitute and give life to sociocultural phenomena (personality, society, and culture). Very often the studies concerning some positive aspects of everyday life—such as altruism, solidarity, etc.—have been neglected, since these are not considered a problematic (negative) aspect of society but rather a regular aspect of human and social events. Considering this, we intend to present Sorokin’s theories on altruism by examining their source ideas, the characteristics, dimensions and aims of altruism, and the controversies that followed the publication of the works in which these reflections were presented (Mangone & Dolgov, 2019). Our intention is to underline how Pitirim A. Sorokin’s forgotten theories—especially those on positive actions, such as altruism—can still find their space (Mangone, 2018) because they are rooted in a continuous search for an integration of the points of view and methodologies of the human and social sciences. These roots must be revitalized by the social scientists, whose disciplines (e.g., sociology)were originally placed at the service of humanity to promote its development, integration, and cooperation. The RussianAmerican sociologist Sorokin had an “intuition” synthesizable in the idea that humanity itself must act for its own salvation.

A “Prophet” Sociologist: Pitirim A. Sorokin Whomever reads Sorokin today must place his thinking within the historical reality that the scholar lived in Russia and the United States of America. He narrates it himself in his autobiography, A Long Journey: The Autobiography of Pitirim A. Sorokin (Sorokin, 1963). The evolution of his thinking saw several phases corresponding to his personal and family events; in a letter to Whit Burnett he says, “Eventfulness has possibly been the most significant feature of my li-adventure. In sixty-eight years I have passed through several cultural atmospheres” (Sorokin, 1958a, p. 178). I will divide the evolution of his thought into two major moments: the Russian experiences,

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that marked him dramatically, and the American ones, that first made him a renowned sociologist and then sentenced him to oblivion. He was born January 21, 1889, and lived up to the age of 11 among the Komi people, one of the Ugro-Finnish ethnic groups, in the North of Russia. He spent his childhood following his itinerant craftsman father and received his early education, along with a group of other boys, from a peasant teaching people to read and write. When both his father and mother died—he became “independent” but penniless—he began attending an Orthodox college for the preparation of teachers, and ultimately, the Petersburg university in a time of great splendor for Russian culture. During this period, he studied law, history, psychology, and sociology, which will become his main discipline. In Russia, he found among his teachers Pavlov, Kovalevsky, Petrajitsky, De Roberty, Bechtereff, and this results in two currents of reference for Sorokin: populist idealism, and positivist and determinist behaviorism. Among these masters, those who definitely had greater influence on his thoughts are: Kovalevsky, who in the interpretation of the historical and social phenomena focuses on their multidimensionality, and De Roberty, whom Sorokin includes into the sociologistic school, because in his sociological and philosophical theories, he specifies that the world consists of three major energies: the inorganic one (physiochemical), the organic one, and the social one (superorganic). A subdivision that Sorokin will resume in his study on social and cultural dynamics. During his stay in Russia he was imprisoned six times for his political commitment (three times under the Tsarist regime and three times under the Communist regime) and even sentenced to death in 1918. The sentence was not executed due to Lenin’s personal intervention. Sorokin, resumed academic activity since the foundation of the faculty of sociology at the University of Petersburg, becoming also its first professor and dean. However, in 1922 he was arrested again for his political activity and exiled by the Soviet government. When, in 1923, Sorokin abandoned Russia and crossed the Atlantic to reach the United States, he was still young, but he had already climbed the social ladder despite many problematic and contrasting experiences (particularly domestic and political ones). The Russian period was when Sorokin’s thought basis was constructed, as it can be seen in his early works in the Russian language as well as in his major works. Due to his wandering life, he learned the basics of reading, writing, and arithmetic without regularly attending school, and with a thirst for knowledge that resulted in reading countless books from classical Russian literature. But the development of his thought can be attributed also to his conversations with what could be considered the intellighenzia, particularly priests, deacons, and other famous members of the Orthodox church.

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Such teachings led Sorokin to be against both a Philistine condition and a superficial representation of life reduced to mere materiality and sensory perception. To this, however, I must add that Orthodox Christianity also influenced his theoretical approach. In particular, the unitary conception of faith and reason (typical of Russian Christianity) will be found in Sorokin’s theory of integralism: the integration of the systems of truth (meaning, faith, and reason) are the royal road to the knowledge of the entire social reality. Sorokin himself said that these experiences had been a greater teaching than all the books and conferences. They were attached to a composite existential basis: Living on the border between Europe and Asia meant getting acquainted with both social and cultural realities, while for what concerns his personality, the familialism he suffered in his early adolescence clashed and intertwined with his youth experiences of urbanism, social struggle, positivist scientism, and mystical knowledge. Despite the complexity of these experiences, when he reached America, as an exile, Sorokin’s thought had not yet reached its full maturity. The American academic circles welcomed him enthusiastically, at least in the early years, so much so that they offered him a chair in Minnesota in 1924 and—after the publication of Social Mobility (1927) that made him known to the academic audience—the privilege to found and then direct the sociology department at Harvard in 1930. However, the biggest problem faced by Sorokin just after his arrival in the United States was the approach of American social sciences. In fact, beyond a broad anthropological-cultural horizon and sweeping views of social psychology, the scope of sociology is greatly reduced. It merely performs analysis and research on particular aspects of that society, without worrying about a deeper and more open view on the interpretation of that very social reality through which providing guidance, value, and meaning to the research itself. In other words, the sociology and social sciences that Sorokin met in the United States were characterized by a theoretical poverty that did not correspond to his total conception of man and society. His outlook, sweeping the entirety of humanity and its history, brings him closer to Europeans than to Americans, bringing to fruition his sociological orientations, as well as the psychological, historical, and philosophical ones. He renews both methods and contents through a systematic interpretation of social reality, its structures, and its dynamics (Sorokin, 1937a, 1937b, 1937c, 1941a, 1962, 1964). In particular, the four volumes of Social & Cultural Dynamics10 systematically expose Sorokin’s conception of society and its social and cultural dynamics. Given the length of the historical period examined and the amount of documentation employed, this study remains unique in the history of sociology. These three works—Social & Cultural Dynamics; Society, Culture,

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and Personality; and Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time—mark Sorokin’s isolation in the American academic world. His criticism of the methods and theories of sociology is nothing more than a critical analysis of the fashion and illusions of American society. With these works, it shifted from the initial enthusiasm following Sorokin’s arrival in America, to the annoyance of the power circles of American culture. This gap widened even more when, in his last 20 years, teaching, and research activities, Sorokin focused fully on implementing a committed sociology. This seemed to be a sort of final stage in his life’s long pilgrimage and in his intellectual journey: the quest for vital energy that helps humanity overcome its deadly crisis. This energy is found in the power of creative altruistic love. On this theme, Sorokin, in 1949, thanks to funding from Mr. Eli Lilly and the Lilly Endowment can establish The Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism. This center had the objective to study—in an interdisciplinary way, through the promotion of research and symposia—the theme of altruism, analysing its various types, aspects, and dimensions, as well as the effects on the individual, social, and biological life. This is the moment in history when Sorokin, from being considered a great scholar on his arrival in America, became, in the eyes of the American culture and academic circles, a prophet, a preacher. At this point, the gap between Sorokin and the American culture will never be filled. Here begins the rejection phase: He is ignored by the sociological literature controlled by some groups, his works on structural sociology remain at the foundation of the discipline but are no longer cited. Controversy followed controversy until shortly before his death in February 1968. These polemic debates were not only due to his marginalization by the academic world, but also probably because, between him and the American environment, there never was a true and proper “fusion.” Sorokin always maintained himself on a theoretical plane, disdaining the study of some aspects of American society, which he also heavily criticized in his last works. And America never forgave him.

The Altruistic Creative Love “At the present juncture of human history, a notable increase of an unselfish, creative love (goodness) in the superorganic world is the paramount need of humanity” (Sorokin, 1958b, p. 184). This is the end point of Sorokin’s strenuous work. In fact, beyond any form of “prophetic vision” and all the controversies that followed the above statement, the RussianAmerican sociologist had an “intuition” synthesizable in the idea that humanity itself must act for its own salvation. Hyper-individualism has led to

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conflicts between individuals and groups, whose negative effects reverberate on these same individuals and groups: In the twentieth century interhuman strife assumed the catastrophic proportions of two world wars and many other wars, of endless bloody revolutions and revolts, not to mention crimes and milder forms of the “struggle for existence.” At present, due to the discovery of the intra-atomic secrets and to the invention of Apocalyptic means of destruction, this moral anarchy begins to threaten the survival of mankind and especially the continuation of its creative mission. The situation explains why a notable increase of unselfish, creative love in the total human universe is the paramount present need of humanity. (Sorokin, 1958b, p. 185)

The American academic world’s criticism of Sorokin’s ideas was probably caused by an incomplete or superficial knowledge of both his previous works and those in which the author condenses the discussion of creative altruistic love (Sorokin, 1948, 1950a, 1950b, 1954a, 1954b). And, most likely, his activities at The Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism (Sorokin, 1955, 1963, Chapter 15, 1995) were also little known. Therefore, in order to avoid the same problem, here one chooses to clarify some of the aspects of the work carried out by The Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism in the years when it was financed to carry out the research. The Activities of the Center The Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism aimed to study—in an interdisciplinary way, through the promotion of research and symposia— the theme of altruism by analyzing its various types, aspects, and dimensions, as well as the effects on individual, social, and biological life. The center was officially founded in February 1949 with a funding of $120,000—of which $20,000 had already been donated in the winter of 1946—donated to Harvard University by Eli Lilly and the Lilly Endowment to allow Sorokin to adequately continue his research on these issues. About 10 years later, a further funding of $25,000 allowed for the prolongation of some studies and the publication of some volumes. There were two assumptions underpinning the work of the center: (a) no intervention, including international ones (e.g., the United Nations), had succeeded in eliminating or reducing conflicts or bloody struggles between peoples; (b) creative love, of which little is still known, is virtually a power—the mysterium tremendum et fascinosum—if we know how to produce, accumulate, and use it. In the activities of the center, we can distinguish two phases. The first one aimed mainly at delineating and formulating an operational definition of creative love and verifying the state or level of study

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of this topic in the contemporary sciences. In this phase, the publication of the volumes Altruistic Love (Sorokin, 1950a) and Explorations in Altruistic Love and Behavior (Sorokin, 1950b) are emblematic. The first was published at the start of the activities of the Harvard Center. In it, Sorokin applies his ability as a social analyst to a study of the characteristic traits of individuals who are sensitive to the needs of others and who respond freely with kind help: the American “good neighbors” and the “Christian-Catholic saints” (500 and 4,600 cases, respectively). In this phase, the center also carried out several studies on the power of love, consisting in the collection of stories involving this power through a semi-experimental or experimental method applied to students of Harvard University, Radcliffe College, and Boston Hospital Psychopathic, as well as on different conflicted individuals. These studies—published in The Ways and Power of Love (Sorokin, 1954a)—yielded a series of facts and proofs that show the power of love and that Sorokin summarized in 13 points (see Sorokin, 1995, p. 283). This validated the assumptions underpinning the birth of the center, leading to the second phase of its activities, focused on investigating the procedures and factors of formation and transformation of altruism (Sorokin, 1954b), and in particular to test (where possible) the effectiveness of the approaches of altruistic education starting from ancient yoga techniques. The above-mentioned researches substantially yielded four lines of result: The first states that there seem to be three types of altruists (the early-fortunate, the late-matured or the late-catastrophic, and finally, the intermediary)—the second confirms the law of polarization previously formulated in Man and Society in Calamity (Sorokin, 1942/2010), according to which many individuals in a community hit by a catastrophe transform their behavior egoistically (carpe diem) or, conversely, altruistically; the third leads to the revision of the prevailing theory of the structure and integration of the personality (Sorokin, 1947/1962); and, finally, the fourth brought out, through the detailed study of the ways of achieving altruistic transformation in group affiliations, as well as of the values and actions of the individual, the strategies to achieve this task. Obviously, these studies could only start from a deep knowledge of the society, culture, and value system in which individuals live and act, and this explains why, in order to investigate the basic problems of altruism, it is necessary to study structures and sociocultural dynamics, as well as the value system. These aspects are further explored in other studies that, directly or indirectly, were part of the activities of the center—Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis (Sorokin, 1950c), S.O.S. The Meaning of Our Crisis (Sorokin, 1951a), The American Sex Revolution (Sorokin, 1957b), Power and Morality: Who Shall Guard the Guardians (Sorokin & Lunden, 1959), and

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New Knowledge in Human Values (Maslow, 1959)—and by the Research Society in Creative Altruism (a different institution from the center), established in the winter of 1955 and that ceased its activities after a few years due to lack of funds. With Sorokin’s retirement as professor emeritus at the end of 1959, the activities of the center, without funds besides, were officially terminated. It was affiliated to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences11 to carry out ordinary administration activities but no longer research activities. According to Sorokin, change must start from the rediscovery of man’s positive values, and science arises as a guide also by overcoming strictly sensate knowledge models. The Genesis of the Concept For Sorokin (1948) the key aspects of what appears to be the only means of saving humanity are the following: A peaceful, harmonious, and creative society can exist only when its members possess at least a minimum of love, sympathy, and compassion ensuring mutual aid, co-operation, and fair treatment. Under these conditions its members are united in one collective “we” in which the joys and sorrows of one member are shared by others. In such a group a member is not an isolated “atom,” but a vital part of a creative community. . . . Exercise your legal right and perform your legal duties when they do not harm anyone else and when they do not violate the rights and duties of others—such is the essence of marginal altruism, slightly above the purely legal conduct prescribed. (pp. 57–58).

Sorokin never departs from his idea of sociology as a science engaged in the study of meaningful interactions between all the elements of superorganic phenomena. A discipline able to show the way for improving the living conditions of individuals. And here are the origins of another of Sorokin’s criticisms towards the modus operandi of some social sciences (particularly sociology and psychology), that is, being “negativistic.” These disciplines are able to reveal only negative or pathological phenomena, without ever pointing to positive and healthy ones. According to Sorokin, altruistic love is not just a feeling, but a positively vital force that can push phenomena towards the highest levels of solidarity (social interaction). In light of this, the terms used by Sorokin since the book Contemporary Sociological Theories (1928) to qualify the conduct of human beings are not conflicting and cooperative; with a telling choice, he adopts the terms antagonistic (or compulsory) and solidaristic. The latter term is not by chance: It is precisely the social responsibility of solidarity that is

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entrusted with guaranteeing the safeguard of social vulnerabilities, thus, presupposing reciprocity. The main problem of a constantly changing society is the lack of mechanical solidarity ties—as per Durkheim. The person’s action emerges as a causal dependence between her physical involvement and the pressure exerted on her by the environment. The term solidarity therefore presupposes a greater involvement of all the interacting parties in the social system. In this way, not only do we avoid neglecting social protections for the more vulnerable people, but we also stimulate individual energies and autonomous initiatives to strengthen the protection and safeguard for all people. Applying a solidarity model therefore leads to two important transformations: On the one hand, institutions must assume a control function by guaranteeing individual freedoms and offering a minimum universalistic protection; on the other hand, there is the multiplication and differentiation of the individuals involved in the decision-making processes related to collective well-being goals. The solidaristic form of human conduct will be then replaced by the love relationship, that love considered by Sorokin as “the supreme and vital form of human relations.” This concept, before reaching its maturity with the works produced during the activity of the Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism, had already appeared in previous writings through which we can outline its very genesis. Before focusing on altruistic creative love and before outlining its genesis, we must emphasize that Sorokin’s theories never abandoned the idea that individual development is closely related to the sociocultural organizations of society. His research does “not leave doubt as to the correlation of growth, variation, and decline of social structures and cultural systems on the one hand, and the development and changes of the human personality, on the other hand” (Sorokin, 1947/1962, p. 345). The personality is not merely the result of the conflict between conscious and unconscious (as in Freud’s theory), but instead the result of a more complex negotiation between several aspects. In this regard, Sorokin describes, in general terms, four levels whose combination leads to the development of the acting personality: (a) the biological unconscious, which is the lowest level and represents instincts; (b) the biological conscious or the bioconscious, the level in which the energy of the person’s body becomes conscious and is able to control instincts; (c) the sociocultural conscious or socioconscious, which is formed by the ways of interacting with others, by the personal experiences that are realized together with others through collective life and that are transmitted from individual to individual, from group to group, and from generation to generation; and (d) “The supraconscious level represents the fourth and highest level of psychic activities, mental energies,

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and personality. It is the level of inspiration for spontaneity, originality, and creativity of genius. In the writings of all civilizations it is designated by numerous expressions, such as ‘the divine element in man,’ ‘the manifestation of divinity,’ ‘the sublime energy of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness,’ ‘creative genius.’” (Vexliard, 1963, p. 167) This premise, we will now try to outline the genesis of the concept of altruistic creative love through three of Sorokin’s writings that precede the start of the activities of the Harvard Center: The Crisis of Our Age (1941b), Man and Society in Calamity (1942/2010), and The Reconstruction of Humanity (1948). Needless to say, in none of these books will we find the concept as it will be outlined in The Ways and Power of Love (Sorokin, 1954b), but there are many references to altruism and the means and ways through which to transform the personality of individuals to rebuild a humanity in crisis. Sorokin (1941b) thus wrote, during World War II, in The Crisis of Our Age: The present crisis is not ordinary. It is not merely an economic or political maladjustment, but involves simultaneously almost the whole of western culture and society, in all their main sectors. It is a crisis in their art and science, philosophy and religion, law and morals, manners and mores; in the form of social, political, and economic organization, including the nature of the family and marriage—in brief, it is a crisis involving almost the whole way of life, thought, and conduct of Western society. (pp. 16–17)

In the last chapter of this book, identifying the way out of the crisis with the change in cultural mentality,12 he refers for the first time to the Sermon of the Mountain, which will be recalled several times in subsequent works: There must be a change of the whole mentality and attitudes in the direction of the norms prescribed in the Sermon of Mount. When such a change occurs, to a notable degree the technical ways of remodelling the economic and political structures in this direction became easy. Without this change, no mechanical, politico-economic reconstruction can give the desired results. . . . A transformation of the forms of social relationship, by replacing the present compulsory and contractual relationships with purer and more godly familistic relationships, is the order of day . . . Our remedy demands a complete change of the contemporary mentality, a fundamental transformation of our system of values, and the profoundest modification of our conduct toward other men, cultural values, and the world at large.” (Sorokin, 1941b, p. 319, emphasis in original)

Sorokin can be seen as a foreshadower of the overcoming of modern (sensate) culture towards a transformation of relations between individuals, and between individuals and institutions, through the rediscovery of the positive values of man.

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Sorokin’s analysis on sociocultural changes as consequences of disasters (war and revolution, famines and plagues) is inserted in this theoretical framework. The most interesting aspect for the present contribution, which therefore requires our attention, is the general principle that he identifies. Starting from the idea that people live in a time in which calamities are recursive, these have a great influence on many aspects of everyday life: from the forms of thought to behavior and from social life to cultural processes of society. Sorokin defines these as typical effects that are repeated every time disasters of the same type strike. Sorokin (2010) affirms: The life of any society is an incessant fluctuation between periods of comparative well-being and those of calamity. . . . Sooner or later this phase is succeeded by a new stretch of well-being, which is replaced, in turn, by a further period of calamity. And so this alternation goes on, throughout the entire duration of society in question. (p. 13)

Beyond this first consideration, the Russian-American sociologist, clarifies a general principle (law of diversification and polarization of the effects of calamity): I would stress the general principle of the diversification and polarization of these effects in different parts of the population. By this principle is meant that the effects of a given calamity are not identical—indeed, often are opposite—for different individuals and groups of the society concerned, since individuals and groups differ from one another biologically and psychosocially. (Sorokin, 1942/2010, p. 14, emphasis in original)

This depends, of course, on the degree of exposure to the disaster and the effects are not only on the emotional aspects such as fear, but also on the cognitive processes of representation, memory, imagination, and structuring of thought. These are factors that determine major changes, both on an individual level as well as in the social structure, which nevertheless necessarily require overcoming a crisis situation and the search for a new balance. What was stated by Sorokin in the middle of the last century is still valid today in describing the dynamics that occur in societies subjected to calamities. In fact, the crisis caused by calamity is not to be considered sui generis, but it represents a normal moment of the flow of life that allows the recognition of the characteristics of social systems that might not otherwise be recognized since the calamity generates consequences on the vital level, on the socio-psychological regulatory mechanisms, as well as on social change. In this sense calamities one of the potent and radical agents of sociocultural change. Although when the emergency is over, many a society rapidly recovers (reestablishing its equilibrium, its unity, its institutions, its system of

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In this book as well, the final chapter is dedicated to the future (A Glance into the Future) and to the possible means by which to escape from disasterbrought crisis (wars and revolutions, famines and plagues), but also to an anarchy of values that can be overcome only with their greater integration and embeddedness: Since the trends are already in operation they cannot be prevented or averted. They can be shortened and alleviated, however, by the individual as well as by societies. The best way for an individual to meet them is by integrating his values and rooting them—not so much in the values of the sensory world—but rather in the moral duty and transcendental values of the kingdom of God. . . . For societies, the shortest, the most efficient, and the only practical way of really alleviating and shortening the crisis is by reintegrating its religious, moral, scientific, philosophical and other values. This integration must be effected in such a way that new system of values is rooted not only in the noblest values of this sensory world, but primarily in the values of moral duty and the Kingdom of God. (Sorokin, 1942/2010, p. 318)

In the light of this statement, we can deduce that thinking about the future during or after a disaster cannot ignore the existence of a community, or of a group of individuals that is configured as such, since it is from the relationships that are established and can be considered positive in themselves that the design and reconstruction of identity features and new system of goods and values should start from. Sorokin attributed the disintegration of solidarity links in favour of an exasperated individualism—present in the sensate cultural mentality—that would lead to the destruction of humanity and not to its possible escape from the crisis, as he suggested in The Reconstruction of Humanity (Sorokin, 1948). In this book, Sorokin tries precisely to sketch how humanity can emerge from the highly uncertain situation following World War II, which has in fact led to a catastrophic crisis. According to the author, the only possible way out from this crisis is altruism, that becomes the only tool for peace and survival. Towards the end of the book, Sorokin (1948), in summarizing the solutions for the calamities (crises) of sensate society, states: Since, besides the complexity of mental phenomena, the main reasons for our helplessness in rendering man creatively altruistic are the neglect of these phenomena by science during the past four centuries, the wrong conception of man and the sociocultural universe entertained by this science, and the disregard of the existing body of Oriental and Occidental experience in the field of the superconscious, the first remedial steps evidently

120    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism consist in the correction of these defects. . . . An incomparably greater proportion of scientific research and cognitive effort must be devoted from now on to the study of superorganic “energies of man.” . . . If during the next fifty years no important discovery should be made in the field of natural science, this would not seriously matter. But if our knowledge and control of man’s highest energies are not markedly expanded, this will mean a real catastrophe. For the sake of man’s very survival, the governments, foundations, universities, private endowers of research funds, and science itself must shift the bulk of their resources and activities to this field. A series of research institutions should be established. The most productive minds should be dedicated to this purpose. (p. 196)

Individual conduct is not always positively oriented towards the other, but such conduct can be transformed by a revolution of minds and hearts, obviously a revolution without violence: “The whole transformation of culture and institutions, of human conduct and social relationships, can be accomplished in orderly and peaceful fashion through the willing and concerted action of individuals and groups, guided by their consciousness, conscience, and superconsciousness” (Sorokin, 1948, p. 231). The reference to the levels of personality—particularly the superconscious—is always present, also in implicit form, as when he recalled the general principle previously defined in Man and Society (Sorokin, 1942/2010): “Positive polarization,” crises and calamities call forth also a “negative polarization,” a portion of the population being freed from the control exercised by the conscious and superconsciuos forces and falling victim to the chaotic unconscious, biological impulses. Such persons became “worse than the beasts,” in the words of Aristotle and Plato. (Sorokin, 1948, p. 196)

The book ends with a recommendation for the future to ensure the rebirth and transformation of humanity towards a happy and creative order: Since the existing sensate order is moribund, we have no choice, unless we are resigned to the extinction of our civilization, but to follow the road to renaissance and transfiguration. Assisted by the forces of the historical process and especially by the liberated energies of the superconscious, humanity may travel this road until it reaches the haven of the new order of creative peace and happiness. All that is necessary is the supreme mobilization of our available mental and moral forces, control of subconscious drives by the conscious and superconscious factors, and unflinching determination to meet courageously all the difficulties of the pilgrimage. It is for humanity itself to decide its destiny! (Sorokin, 1948, p. 241)

What Sorokin (1948), certainly non-exhaustively, presented in The Reconstruction of Humanity (definition, forms, grades of altruism, and methods

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and techniques for the transformation of minds and hearts) will find its peak maturity, supported by many examples, in the over five hundred pages of The Ways and Power of Love (Sorokin, 1954b).

Altruistic Creative Love: Aspects, Dimensions, Production, Transformation, and Power The idea of love fits into this theoretical framework as “the supreme and vital form of human relationship” (love relationship) and as such the ways, forms, and power of this energy (love energy) are to be studied. This force is likened, for their similarities, to an iceberg: Love is like an iceberg: only a small part of it is visible, and even this visible part is little known. Still less known is love’s transempirical part, its religious and ontological forms. For the reasons subsequently given, love appears to be a universe inexhaustible qualitatively and quantitatively. Of its many forms of being the following can be differentiated: religious, ethical, ontological, physical, biological, psychological, and social. (Sorokin, 1954b, p. 3)

These forms actually refer to the very aspects of love: (a) religious love, refers to the experience of love for God or the Absolute; (b) ethical love “is identified with goodness itself. Love is viewed as the essence of goodness inseparable from truth and beauty” (Sorokin, 1954b, p. 6, emphasis in original); (c) ontological love, is considered the highest form of unifying, integrating, and harmonizing creative power or energy. This is the “core” of love, because it makes the world go round, and without it, we would witness the collapse of the physical, biological, and social world (D’Ambrosio, Faul, & Research Fellow, 2014); (d) physical love, refers to love expressed through the unifying, integrative, and ordinating energies of the universe; (e) “The biological counterpart of love energy manifests itself in the very nature and basic processes of life. This energy, still little known, and often called the ‘vital energy’ that mysteriously unites various inorganic energies into a startling unity of a living—unicellular or multicellular—organism [. . .] without the operation of a biological counterpart of love energy, life itself is not possible, nor its continuity, nor the preservation and survival of species, nor life evolution, nor life evolution, nor the emergence and evolution of Homo sapiens” (Sorokin, 1954b, p. 9); (f) psychological love includes all the intellectual aspects of emotional, affective, and desire experiences. For its very nature, psychological love is an altruistic experience; and (g) social love is the last of the forms identified by Sorokin: “On the social plane love is meaningful interaction—or relationship—between two or more persons where the aspirations and aims of one person are shared and helped in their realization by other

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persons” (Sorokin, 1954b, p. 13). The highest form of social love identified by Sorokin shines through in the Sermon on the Mount because in it the social relationship of love is expressed at the highest level. It follows that love has not only multiple aspects and forms, but also different dimensions. Sorokin identifies five of them, for which he avoids any psychometric analysis,13 given that they have both scalar and non-scalar characteristics. However, he believes that it is empirically possible to find evidence or proofs: Sorokin acknowledged that because of the indistinct nature of love the dimensions had both scalar and non-scalar characteristics. It is difficult to know the range of how many times greater one act of love is from another or whether it is lower, higher or equal to another act. Although, it is possible to empirically witness acts of love and know that one act is greater than another. (D’Ambrosio et al., 2014, p. 40)

We will now describe the five dimensions through Sorokin’s own words: 1. The Intensity of Love: “In the intensity love ranges between zero and the highest possible point, arbitrarily denoted as infinity. The zero point is neither love nor hate” (Sorokin, 1954b, p. 15). 2. The Extensity of Love: “The extensity of love ranges from the zero point of love of oneself only, up to the love of all mankind, all living creatures, and the whole universe. Between these minimal and maximal degrees lies a vast scale of extensities” (Sorokin, 1954b, p. 16). 3. The Duration of Love: “May range from the shortest possible moment to years or throughout the whole life of an individual or of a group” (Sorokin, 1954b, p. 16). 4. The Purity of Love: “Ranges from the love motivated by love alone— without the taint of a ‘soiling motive’ of utility, pleasure, advantage, or profit, down to the ‘soiled love’ where love is but a means to a utilitarian or hedonistic or other end, where love is only the tinniest trickle in a muddy current of selfish aspirations and purposes” (Sorokin, 1954b, p. 17). 5. The Adequacy of Love: “The adequacy of the subjective goal of love to its objective manifestation ranges from a complete discrepancy between the subjective goal of love actions and its objective consequences, up to their identity. Inadequacy may have two different forms: (a) love experience may be subjectively genuine in the loving person, but the objective consequences of his love actions may be very different from, even opposite to, the love goal; and (b) a person may have no love experience or intentions subjectively, yet the objective consequences of his actions, though motivated by something else than love, may be most beneficial for others, similar

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to the effects of genuine love. The first sort of love experience and activity is altruistic subjectively but not objectively. The second sort of experience and action is not altruistic subjectively but is altruistic objectively (Sorokin, 1954b, p. 17). It should now be noted that, although Sorokin referred to the ways and power of love, the words “love” and “altruism” had been interchangeable during all the activities of the Harvard Center, as well as in the book The Reconstruction of Humanity (Sorokin, 1948), in which he also accurately describes the different types of altruism. Sorokin does not just describe aspects and dimensions of altruistic creative love, but considers it an energy that can be produced, accumulated, and distributed by individuals and institutions: “If love can be viewed as one of the highest energies known, then theoretically, at least, we can talk about the production or generation, the accumulation (or loss), the channeling, transmission, and distribution of this particular energy” (Sorokin 1954b, p. 36). The Russian-American sociologist identified five steps through which to produce and improve love energy: 1. The increase of creative heroes of love, meaning the great creators and thinkers (e.g., Plato, Dante, Shakespeare, Mozart, etc.) and the heroes or apostles of love (e.g., Buddha, Christ, Francis of Assisi, Gandhi, etc.). It should be noted that in his book Altruistic Love (1950a), which is the first work published since the Harvard Center began its activities, Sorokin applies his ability as a social analyst to a study of the characteristic traits of people who are sensitive to the needs of others and who respond freely with gentle help: the American “good neighbors” and the Christian-Catholic saints. 2. The increase of creative heroes of truth and beauty, thinkers and creators in different fields of science and the arts are great forges for some of the components (truth and beauty) of the highest value (love energy). According to Sorokin (1958b), Among all the meaningful values of the superorganic world there is the supreme interal value—the veritable summum bonum. It is the indivisible unity of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. Though each member of this supreme Trinity has distinct individually, all three are inseparable from one another [. . .]. These greatest values are not only inseparable from one another, but they are transformable into one another. (p. 180)

What is needed is a growth in the love of parts of society: 3. the increase of love by the rank and file,

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4. an increase in the production of love by groups and institutions, and finally, 5. the increase love-production by culture and the total culture. If this is how love energy can be generated or increased, it is no utopia to think that it can also be accumulated and distributed (King, 2004): Like other forms of energy, love energy can also be accumulated or stored (a) in individuals, (b) in social institutions, and (c) culture . . . , accumulated love can also be distributed according to the particular needs of various persons and groups. (Sorokin 1954b, p. 45)

Chapter IV in The Ways and Power of Love (Sorokin, 1954b) describes the benefits of the power of creative love in the social life and activities of human beings through numerous findings. This chapter concludes the description of the aspects, dimensions, production, and management of love, as well as its power, to leave room in the rest of the book (the remaining two thirds) for a detailed description of the types of altruism, the growth of altruism and the means to transform individuals and groups into altruists. The over 500 pages end with the chapter “From Tribal Egoism to Universal Altruism” in which, using a medical metaphor, Sorokin states that sick humanity can find a cure in the affirmation of universal altruism. Love acted as an antidote. Its force created little islands of health amid great sickness. It is this that gives me hope for today. . . . Some day—perhaps soon—mankind will learn what individuals have always known: that love is the only truly creative force in the world. (Sorokin, 1958c, p. 17)

In The Mysterious Energy of Love (Sorokin, 1959)—the year in which the Harvard Center closed its doors—Sorokin argues that, although little is known of this energy and of how it is produced and used, it is enough to justify the hypothesis that the “grace of love” is one of the three highest energies known to man (along with truth and beauty). These are the peculiarities that make creative altruistic love a powerful tool for the reconstruction of humanity, which was falling into a marked sensism due to the transformations of its cultural mentality.

Amitology as an Applied Science of Altruistic Creative Love The activities of the Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism allowed Sorokin to call the attention of researchers—albeit with few followers—on themes such as love and altruism, previously snubbed by the social sciences,

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too keen to seek negative values instead of positive ones. According to Sorokin, the change must start from the rediscovery of the positive values of man and science is a guide for it, also by overcoming strictly sensate models of knowledge. Three reports on the center’s activities were published (in English and French), all signed by Sorokin (1955, 1963, Chapter 15, 1995), but each of them has a different ending—yet they can all be traced back to Sorokin’s basic idea that social scientists must assume a leading role in the social transformations necessary to “rebuild humanity.” The report published in the French magazine Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie ends with the following statement: “Humanity is dying from a lack of love. The vast fields of the human universe require gardeners of this wonderful flower. Vivos voco!” (Sorokin, 1955, p. 103). Needless to say, the social scientists did not answer the call. Interestingly, this “call” was not spelled in the same terms in the two English versions. In the version published after Sorokin’s death, thanks to his son Sergei (Sorokin, 1995) and derived from private documents, there is no “call”; however, there is one—in less categorical, but equally clear terms and always in Latin—in the report included in his autobiography: I have devoted some ten years of my life to the study of the “mysterious energy of love.” This study has seemingly added something to the extant knowledge of this energy. If the results are more modest than I might have wished, my excuse can be expressed by an old adage Feci quod potui faciant meliora potentes. (Sorokin, 1963, p. 292)

These different endings, however, only confirm Sorokin’s firm belief in the potential of the social sciences as a guide for humanity, to the point of hypothesizing the birth of a new applied science to promote friendship, unconditional love, and mutual aid: The historical moment has struck for building a new applied science or a new art of amitology—the science and art cultivation of amity, unselfish love, and mutual help in interindividual and integroup relationships. A mature amitology is now the paramount need of humanity. Its development tangibly determines the creative future of homo sapiens. (Sorokin, 1951b, p. 277)

The first task of this new discipline is an accurate analysis of the main aspects, properties and basic forms of altruistic relations and love energy, which means that amitology actually starts from the study of social relations and interactions. Applying these assumptions implies understanding the mechanisms by which human beings make their decisions based on their degree of knowledge about a given situation. I am back to the problem that

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Sorokin (1958b) raised in the Integralism Is My Philosophy on the construction of an integrated system of knowledge that may hold together the three forms: empirical-sensory, reason, and intuition. A knowledge system able to provide as many elements as possible to understand superorganic phenomena, so as to have the opportunity, whenever possible, to foresee their transformation. According to Sorokin, transformations must begin with a rediscovery of the positive values of man, and science acts as a guide also by overcoming strictly sensate models of knowledge. In the case of sociology, it is not only a sociology of the crisis, but a “critical sociology” that does not stop at analyzing the degenerative processes of society but searches for its deep roots, denouncing the negative factors that cause them. At the time when Sorokin expressed his “foolish” ideas—as they were then defined by some of his colleagues (Sorokin, 1955)—and still today while this work is coming into being, no solution has yet been found for the devastations and wars. This is because individuals tried to act from the outside, thinking of changing political and economic institutions without intervening on individuals. These attempts are destined to fail because, to change institutions and the economic system, it is necessary to change the individuals acting in these very institutions and systems. Or, rather, it is necessary to transform people’s way of interacting by orienting them towards the love relationship that characterizes a free, harmonious, humanistic, and creative society. Sorokin’s cannot, however, be termed sociological humanism; instead, we could speak of a committed humanistic sociology. A sociology that does not analyze and study only social phenomena, but a science that, with its peculiarities, contributes to the analysis and study of the most human part of individuals and society (living man). The purpose is to contribute to the discovery of human beings as creative and responsible social actors.

Serge Moscovici and the Elementary Forms of Altruism The path we have taken to highlight how the concept of altruism, or similar concepts, have been addressed by social scientists began with the precursor of this discipline: Auguste Comte, who coined the term. It is fit that it should end with another scholar of the European school, precisely the French school: Serge Moscovici. In his essay Les formes élémentaires de l’altruisme (Moscovici, 2000a), he argues that both altruism and egoism can be considered problematic behaviors depending on their interpretation which, in turn, is based on the social and cultural expectations of the

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society of reference. Moscovici did not try to explain altruism, but rather to highlight the lack of interest, especially among European scholars, for this sociocultural phenomenon. His attempt is based on the social representations14 that shape many of the social explanations used by individuals to justify their (and others’) actions. Before delving into the description of the three forms of altruism (participatory, fiduciary, and normative) proposed by Moscovici, it is important to understand the theoretical framework in which they are to be inserted. Therefore, we will sketch out the essential elements characterizing the social representations that underpin individual behavior. Among the disciplines of social sciences, social psychology has long shown that the individual is constantly immersed within a system of relationships that contributes strongly in defining his actions and characteristics. Everyday life sees the formation, consolidation, and circulation of social representations, understood as common sense theories that take shape in everyday interactions and refer to social objects or phenomena. Social representations do not come from single, isolated individuals: They are created socially and shared by all members of a group. As shown by the extensive literature (Duveen & Lloyd, 2005; Jodelet, 1984; Moscovici, 1984), in order to study social representations, it is necessary to analyze the relationship between the systems of symbolic relationships held by social actors (individuals and groups) and the complex cognitive systems of each individual. In the flow of daily experience, social actors try to articulate the dialogue between the individual and society in the concrete context of the existing symbolic relationships between subjects, groups, and institutions. The process is influenced by stereotypes, prejudices, and, more generally, beliefs (Moscovici & Markova, 2006). The common feature of all these psychosocial phenomena is that they express a social representation that individuals and groups build in order to act and communicate. Representations, as symbolic constructions influenced by the social position of the individuals who produce them (Jodelet, 1984), perform the fundamental function of “conventionalizing” objects, individuals, events, giving them a precise form, assigning them to a given category, and defining them in a model, distinct and shared by a group of individuals. Furthermore, they are prescriptive, that is, they impose themselves on us. Representations are widely shared cognitive elaborations of reality that guide the individual processes of sense making. The systems of representations existing in a given culture are transmitted to us and are the product of a long sequence of elaborations and changes occurring over time (Laszlo, 1997). The structure of social representations is composed of an iconic dimension (image) and a symbolic one (meaning). The two are interdependent

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(Abric, 2001; Guimelli, 1994): in a social representation the image corresponds to an idea and vice versa. Representations enable individuals to share an implicit set of images and ideas, which are assumed as given (Moliner, 1996). At the basis of this process, there is the need to rebuild the “common sense” or the form of understanding of social events that creates the substratum of images and meanings without which no collectivity could operate. One of the prerogatives of social representations is that they allow ideas to be transformed into collective experiences and interactions into behaviors. They correspond to the “consensual” universe and reestablish collective awareness by giving it form, explaining objects and events in such a way as to make them accessible to all and to make them coincide with the interests of individuals. Clearly, then, “The purpose of all representations is to make something unfamiliar, or unfamiliarity itself, familiar” (Moscovici, 1984, p. 37). The unfamiliar attracts and intrigues the community, alerts individuals, forces them to make explicit the implicit assumptions that are the basis of consensus. The fear of losing the usual points of reference, of losing contact with what provides a sense of continuity, of mutual understanding, is unbearable. When diversity imposes itself in the form of something that is not “enough” as it should be, individuals instinctively reject it because it threatens the given order. The act of representing (representation) is a means of transferring what disturbs us, what threatens the universe of individuals, from the outside to the inside, from a distant place to a near space. The transfer is made by separating concepts and perceptions normally connected and placing them in a context where the unusual becomes usual, where the unknown can be included in a recognized category. When theories, information, and events multiply, they must be reproduced at a closer and more accessible level, transferred to the consensual universe, defined and represented. To give something a familiar aspect, it is necessary to activate two mechanisms of thought. The first mechanism (anchoring) strives to anchor unusual ideas, to reduce them to ordinary categories and images, to place them in a familiar context. Anchoring, therefore, is a process that brings something foreign and disturbing that concerns us into our system of categories and compares it with the model of a category that we consider suitable. Anchoring means classifying and naming something; it is the rooting of representation in society. This mechanism performs three functions: (a) cognitive function of integration of novelties; (b) interpretation of novelties; and (c) orientation of conduct and social relations. This process, by making the unknown familiar, reduces fear and anxiety about what cannot be explained. Familiarity, after all, is an intrinsic necessity of daily life. Giving a name to someone or something has three consequences (Haas, 2006): (a) once a

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name has been given, the person or the thing can be described and acquire certain characteristics and tendencies; (b) the person or the thing differs from other people or from other things by virtue of these characteristics and tendencies; and (c) the person or the thing becomes the object of a convention between those who adopt and share it. The aim of the second mechanism (objectification) is, instead, to objectify these ideas, that is, to transform something abstract into something almost concrete. This mechanism turns the unusual into usual so that it becomes manifest, accessible, concrete, and, consequently, more controllable. In this way, we shift from the abstraction of the idea to the concreteness of the image. When an idea enters everyday knowledge, it is materialized. For example, in every process of dissemination of scientific theories such a transformation from abstract to concrete takes place through a figurative nucleus. When a theory enters the common sense, there is a selective retention of some ideas that, decontextualized from the original theoretical field, are reworked and reorganized on the basis of familiar knowledge. Objectifying “in images” is a strategy justified by the need to simplify the overload of notions to which we are daily exposed. This process involves three steps: (a) selection and decontextualization, (b) construction of a figurative nucleus, and (c) naturalization. Objectification permeates the idea of unfamiliarity with reality, transforming it into the very essence of reality (Farr & Moscovici, 1984). The materialization of an abstraction is one of the most mysterious characteristics of thought and language. In short, objectifying means reproducing a concept in an image. Once society has achieved such a process, it finds it easier to talk about whatever the paradigm implies. Then formulas and clichés emerge, synthesizing and binding together images that were previously separate. As Moscovici (1961, 2000b) has shown, the image of the concept ceases to be an indication and becomes a replica of reality. Then the notion or entity from which it is derived loses its immaterial character and acquires an almost physical, independent existence. What is perceived takes the place of what is thought, and images become real factors, rather than factors of thought. Thus, the distance between the representation and what is represented is compensated. It is ontologically and epistemologically correct to argue, then, that social representations shape many social explanations, which is why individuals try to know what is real before wondering why something happens in the way it happens; they must reduce ambiguity and make the information unequivocal. As is well known, behavior towards other individuals depends to a great extent on the idea that is built of them, on the interpretations of their past and present actions, and on the predictions of what they

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will do in the future (Berger & Luckmann, 1969). Since social actions are closely interconnected with the processes of social perception, it is easy to understand why scholars are so interested in the reciprocal judgement of individuals. When individuals judge (Heider, 1958; Hewstone, 1983), they try to explain or interpret the behavior of the judged subject, making the social context of reference more predictable and comprehensible. In other words, social representations can be considered a set of cognitive matrices with the task of coordinating words, ideas, images, and perceptions that are interconnected and shared by a wide category of people who identify with each other (Jodelet, 1984; Moscovici, 1984). We can now argue that attitudes (positive or negative orientation) towards something or someone are guided by our perception of them: Social reality arises not only from social meaning, but also from the products of the subjective world of individuals. The theory of social representations is based on the problem of knowledge. Indeed, knowledge is one of the main forms through which individuals build reality and activate processes of meaning in their daily lives. Social representations are the symbolic mediation between the intimate aspects of private life and aspects of public life. Considering the above, we find to be more appropriate the definition of social representations as systems of interpretation that support the relationships of individuals with the world and with others, as well as guiding and organizing behaviors and social communications (Jodelet, 1984). Furthermore, they intervene in various processes, such as the diffusion and assimilation of knowledge, individual and collective development, the definition of personal and group identities, and the expression of groups and social transformations. As cognitive phenomena, they bind the social belonging of individuals to the affective and normative implications, to the internalization of experiences, practices, models of conduct, and thought socially inculcated or transmitted through social communication (to which they are linked). However, this definition must not be confused with that of common sense, even if the representations, being a form of knowledge, contribute to the transformation of the reality of common sense and allow the constitution of that “shared knowledge” (constitutive of common sense) and its reproduction. If this is the definition today considered most appropriate, we cannot leave out Durkheim’s theory—forerunner of the studies on representations—with the concepts of collective consciousness (Durkheim, 1893/1960) and collective representation (Durkheim, 1895/1953). The current concept of social representation derives, therefore, from that “determined system” consisting of the set of beliefs and feelings shared by the average members of a society (collective consciousness). The concept of representation was

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born in the sociological field, even if it finds its theoretical application in social psychology (Abric, 2001; Farr & Moscovici, 1984; Guimelli, 1994). Both disciplines agree on a specific aspect: Socially shared representations, which allow for the construction of the idea of world and reality, are different from all other forms of mental and cultural representations. Apart from this aspect, the two disciplines hold substantially different positions. For example, in Durkheim’s sociology, collective representations are conceived as units that cannot be broken down and whose function is simply explanatory; moreover, they are considered autonomous from individuals and substantially stable over time. Conversely, Moscovici (1961), the main exponent of the theory of representations for social psychology, maintains exactly the opposite and to emphasize this distinction, he uses the term social instead of collective; if collective representations are an explanatory term (in the classical sense) and refer to a general class of ideas and beliefs (science, myth, religion, etc.), they are phenomena that need to be described and explained as specific to the way of understanding and communicating—a way that creates both reality and common sense. Social representations allow the transformation of something unknown or little known into something “familiar,” shifting from the reified universe (characterized by scientific causality) to the consensual universe (characterized by social causality).15 These dynamics of handing down of knowledge and, therefore, of signification processes, are generally realized through the selection and integration of three elements: (a) information, that is, the quality and quantity of elements relative to an object perceived as different (general information on phenomena and situations); (b) the field of representation, that is, the context within which the contents of the information are organized (the social and cultural context within which the information is acquired); and (c) the attitude, or the positive or negative orientation towards the object of representation, existing even with just a few perceived differences (information) or a scarce information organization. Social representations, therefore, have a specific content and meaning that differs from one sphere to another (public and private), from one society to another (different cultures), and within the same society because of the variety of experiences and biographies among the members of the community (Hannerz, 1996), and as such they are paramount for the creation and transformation of content. The processes that generate the representations are processes of construction of reality, understood as that process that allows individuals to continuously create, through their actions and interactions, a common reality experienced as objectively factual and subjectively significant. Everyday reality is a socially constructed system to which people accord a certain order and sequence in phenomena, that is, a reality that

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contains both subjective and objective elements, where the former bear witness to the significant reality of individuals and the latter refer to the social order or the institutional world as a human product (Wallace & Wolf, 1980). From Durkheim’s idea of collective representations as determined and independent from individuals, we conceive social representations as historical phenomena constituted and reproduced by individuals who interact and who continuously build and reconstruct daily social reality through processes of signification. These theoretical premises allow us to outline some of the functions16 performed by social representations: 1. They build and shape social reality, because they constitute the meaning and sense of actions and events, as well as defining the experience of reality by identifying the limits, meanings, and types of interactions. They reduce ambiguity by turning the unfamiliar and the differences of everyday life into familiar, making the meanings of actions unequivocal. In other words, they make clear what must be explained and the explanation itself (effects and causes) through an established order within which people can interpret and understand their own material and social world, becoming active actors in social life. 2. They promote communication between individuals and groups, since both communicate through shared representations, which determine a two-way influence: on the one hand, the structure and content of the representations influence the actions, on the other hand, communication and interaction (actions) influence the social representations. It is precisely through the communication flow (institutional, interindividual or media) about socially relevant events, objects or situations that social representations emerge, are built, evolve, and even are deconstructed. It is in this sense that representations are generally understood as products of human action and communication. 3. They promote intra- and inter-group communication, since they are based on images, ideas, and symbols that are exchanged between the members of the group. This form of knowledge acquires a common meaning (or meanings) allowing for a consensus on the definition of a “real image of the world” that will then be shared. This process allows to preserve and consolidate a group identity, thus, social representations regulate and justify the relationships established between individuals and between groups. 4. They guide the social action because individuals, when they share a representation, interpret their own and others’ attitude on the

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basis of this, and acting guided by this knowledge means that the action takes on the same meaning for both actor and spectator. Social representations guide the actions of individuals and groups in such a way as to make them understandable in a unique and unitary way to all. Whenever representations are not shared (e.g., groups of different cultures) there is often a misinterpretation that gives rise to misunderstandings that in turn can, in extreme cases, generate conflict. 5. They socialize the subject. To better understand this function, we will mention the socialization of the child (primary socialization): The child interacts with her parents who are imbued with the social representations deriving from their experience as adults, and it is precisely from these representations that the parents make explicit the symbolic meanings of the child’s behavior. Social representations, before being internalized and becoming intrapersonal, are interpersonal. The representations shared by a group (in the case of primary socialization, the family) impose themselves on individuals (children) until they penetrate deep into their personality and become part of it, giving rise to “the world”—not “a world,” unlike what happens in secondary socialization, with a weaker internalization and based on the division of labor and, therefore, of roles (see Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This leads us to argue that attitudes (understood as positive or negative orientation) of individuals are directed by the perception that individuals have of the action and other social actors: social reality springs from the processes of social significance, but also from the products of the subjective world of individuals, also full of sense and meaning. Each individual builds his own scheme of action on the basis of the meaning he attributes to his daily existence. He finds a world of meanings and events that become real only because he is “a perceptive and conscious social being” in dialectical relationship with society—historically determined, since it changes over time and over the course of one’s life. This process also makes the individual-society dynamic understandable: Each individual lives within one or more social structures and knows what they are, but if they have to provide explanations about them or about the activity of the structures within which they act, they will certainly refer to their social, mental, and cultural representations, since they are an expression of reality. It is the idea that the individual has built himself of society and that persists in time by reproducing itself. In other words, it is a privileged knowledge that the individual, as part of society, has managed to acquire through experiences and analyses of his own and others’ behavior

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and attitudes. The world that surrounds human beings in their daily experience originates essentially from two sources of information: on the one hand, sensory information and, on the other hand, social information. We should remember, however, the cyclical movements of systems (ideational, idealistic, and sensate) identified by Sorokin (1957), produced by the transformations of the mental bases of the individuals and characterized by specific values and forms of knowledge. Social information can be traced back to Sorokin’s cultural mentality, because it concerns the experience linked to individual thought and to the processes of symbolic mediation, allowing for the attribution of meaning. Beyond this reference to Sorokin for a broader theoretical perspective framework, we should point out that both types (sensory and social) are necessary for systematizing knowledge on an object or subject, and they experience continuous changes and transformations. Therefore, all cognitive activities that allow the construction of conceptual and representative maps can be considered as a balance between the process of assimilation that ensures continuity in time (understood as Chrónos—past, present, and future) and the process of accommodation,17 understood as the ability to deal in the present with future changes and uncertainties. The theories presented allow us to include Moscovici’s reflections on altruism in the appropriate reference framework. In his essay Les formes élémentaires de l’altruisme (Moscovici, 2000a), not by chance published in a book titled Psychologie Sociale des Relations à Autrui, edited by Moscovici himself, he considers altruism not in its biological or moral aspects—as many authors had previously done, especially in sociobiology—but as a relationship of individuals and, above all, as a relationship between individuals and society. And it is precisely on the relationship between the individual and society that he claims that both altruism and egoism can be considered as problematic behaviors, depending on their interpretation, which in turn is based on the social and cultural expectations of the society of reference. The scholar presents himself as a cultural relativist, not in its negative meaning, which refers to ethnocentrism, but in its application as a methodological principle according to which, in order to escape ethnocentrism, a culture must be studied without preconceptions and without comparing it with other cultures. This is because a cultural element, such as a custom, can only be explained in relation to its own cultural environment, just as altruism and egoism can only be studied in the cultures and societies where they actually occur. In a society where altruistic behaviors prevail, those departing from this “normality” are deviant (egoistic behavior), while the opposite happens in a society where egoistic behavior prevails (altruistic behavior will be considered deviant). And it is precisely on this principle that

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Moscovici affirms that altruism can be considered neither a characteristic of human nature nor an instinct. He distinguishes the three elementary forms of altruism (participatory altruism, fiduciary altruism, and normative altruism) on the basis of two orders of principles: 1. All definitions converge on the fact that altruistic behavior presupposes a non-egocentric position (self-sacrifice). The problem of finding a definition is typical of the concept of altruism; Moscovici does not propose his version but refers to Macaulay and Berkowitz’s (1970) as very close to his own: “As behavior carried out to benefit another without anticipation of rewards from external sources.” (Macaulay & Berkowitz, 1970, p. 3). This definition implies that behaviors of this type are universally present and that they are all independent from external sources, and that those who decide to act altruistically do so voluntarily. Therefore, there is agreement on the fact that those who perform altruistic actions do so through a sacrifice of themselves and because their interests are directed towards others. 2. There is no altruistic personality because individuals behave differently along the temporal dimension even in the presence of the same situation. Moscovici comes to this conclusion when he wonders whether there are “true altruists” or rather whether there is an altruistic personality, such as the introverted or authoritarian personality. There is no scientific evidence to sustain the existence of an altruistic personality, but only similar conditions that unite individuals, as highlighted by Rusthon (1980), and Futz and Cialdini (1990), that can be summarized as follows: (a) individuals help others only in certain situations; (b) individuals are not always in a position to help others; and (c) the same individuals who in certain circumstances give help may not do so in other circumstances. In light of the above, someone cannot be defined as altruistic compared to someone else, nor can it be said that if an individual has behaved altruistically in a given situation he will always do so or he will do so in other situations. It depends on the context; therefore, there are no constants in altruistic behavior. What is constant, instead, is the fact that altruistic and pro-social behavior take place within a relationship. Hence, the three forms of altruism proposed by Moscovici, which we will try to describe with the help of examples. The first form is the participatory altruism (altruisme participatif), characterized by a strong integration of the members of society and a high degree

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of division of labor. The example we will use to better describe this form, however, comes from the animal world and is that of ants and bees. This is because no community like that of an anthill or a beehive can best describe the idea of participation in the community by implementing cohesion and stability. Transposing this image to the human world, the strong participation in common life remains what causes individuals (individual or collectives) to sacrifice all their time and energy, and more rarely their lives for all those involved. For example, altruism towards family members, the religious community, one’s country, or unknown comrades or individuals (much more rarely) who find themselves in a difficult situation. Although Moscovici affirms that there is no “free altruism,” in the case of participatory altruism, he states that it is an altruism without the others (altruisme sans autrui) because it is not addressed to a precise identified subject but to the whole community. In participatory altruism, what emerges is the “us” that binds together the members of the group, the community, or society, and it is for this “us” that individuals are ready to sacrifice themselves. In this case, altruism is directed at supporting that particular bond that cannot be broken for the survival of the group of which one is part, regardless of the form that the latter may take. In a way, the Self is joined with the Other in the Us; they become almost interchangeable, so much so that we can no longer distinguish when we are doing something for the Other or for the good of the Us. The second form is “fiduciary altruism” (altruisme fiduciaire). Starting from the idea that some animal species also help beings of other species, Moscovici wonders what human beings seek in a relation of help between them. The answer is sufficiently obvious: They seek trust—but as Schütz (1967) stated, the answers to everyday phenomena must be sought in what “seems obvious.” This degree of trust must be all the higher when the subjects are strangers to each other, and in fact, if we look at the definition of trust as the actor’s expectation of a positive experience (Mutti, 2007), the parties (both) necessarily expect to live a positive experience. This raises the problem of building networks for the implementation of social capital based on relationships of trust aimed at fostering the ability to recognize each other, to exchange information, to help each other and to cooperate for common purposes. But if, in general terms, trust can be considered as a positive expectation of experiences by the individual, in detail the relationship of trust is closely linked to their experiences, positive or negative (aspects related to value), cognitive and/or emotional load, and conditions of uncertainty. Concerning this last aspect, the way to reduce uncertainty seems almost paradoxical, because it presupposes the existence of relationships of trust, which, in turn, bring with them the obligation to take a risk: the encounter with the Other is, above all, to bet on his positive action in

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order to be able to trust him. Hence, why we speak of fiduciary altruism (or altruism of trust). We thus shift from an approach that tends to reduce the actions of individuals only to mere exchange (do ut des) to an approach that pays attention to the overall interactions between the exchange and all other relevant social and cultural variables. (Mangone, 2019, p. 35)

And since the relationship of trust is based on the relationship in which each party acts in full independence from the other, they could also be disappointed for lack of gratification. Here is involved another factor: empathy. The more empathic one is with the suffering and misery of others and the more fiduciary altruism seems to increase, since the sense of responsibility and guilt often increases positive actions towards others. The fiduciary relationship (relationship of trust) reduces the distance between Ego and Alter, and through empathy, it smooths out the harshness of one’s interests and the feelings that separate the individual from the social environment of which he is part. In other words, fiduciary altruism makes it possible to create an intersubjective world and promotes intersubjectivity. The last form identified by Moscovici is normative altruism (altruisme normatif) which, if it cannot be understood as altruism in the subjective sense, is certainly altruistic in the objective sense of action. Moscovici claims this because he wonders whether it is possible to consider an act of pure altruism one in which a third factor, that is, a norm, intervenes. As he then explains, every society and culture have their own system of classification of altruism and egoism, together with a repertoire of who should or should not be helped in certain circumstances. And this brings the reflection back to the theory of social representations. Based on the latter, Moscovici distinguishes two macro representations of altruism: one that considers altruism from the point of view of the relationship between individuals (responsibility) and the second that considers it in relation to the collectivity in an impersonal way (solidarity). Although he is aware that this may not be the correct way to study altruism, Moscovici believes that this is a logically inevitable approach in social psychology. Moreover, one of the advantages of this approach is to acknowledge that many of our institutions—social security, insurance, pension funds, mutual societies, etc.—are institutions of normative altruism. Both are therefore representations centered on responsibility or solidarity that must be balanced so that the institutions can function satisfactorily for the social system as a whole. The normative prescription (social or cultural) to provide help and assistance to those in need is obviously linked to the sense of responsibility but also to the fact that those who are suffering are not responsible for their condition and do not take advantage

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of the circumstance. In other words, the saying, “God helps those who help themselves” turns into, “Others will have to help those who help themselves,” and this is seen as an obligation. These processes offer an idea of this form of altruism that religious beliefs or education have instilled as a “duty” in the conduct towards others: helping one’s neighbor or defending someone who is in danger. One is faced with expectations that prescribe altruistic behaviors and distinguish it from those that disobey the rules. After his description of the forms of altruism, Moscovici tries to draw general conclusions. Firstly, he believes that forms of pure altruism (an attitude or behavior caused only by the motivations of those who act in a totally disinterested manner) are unlikely to exist. This is because, according to Moscovici, the economic principle according to which “we have nothing for nothing” is forgotten in the analyses, thus, believing that we can receive without giving because there is an obligation of altruism: an individual must do his duty through the sacrifice of his own time and energy in the name of moral rules and social imperatives. Given this, Moscovici maintains that society holds mixed forms of altruism that can be further divided into two types: egoistic altruism and altruistic egoism. The former concerns those who use their sacrifices and generosity towards others for their own benefit (receiving gratitude or other material/immaterial goods); it cannot be considered pure altruism because it is based on a selfish principle (that of receiving something in return and making others feel obliged to repay). The latter is practiced by those who give themselves to others to satisfy their own feelings of guilt or responsibility (e.g., that of a parent who does not spend for himself but spends for his own child). Secondly, and stemming from the idea that altruism is linked to the relationship between individuals but in particular to the relationship between individuals and society, Moscovici claims that in society there are mostly mixed forms of altruism and this depends substantially on the intensity and duration of the relationship and the situation. However, Moscovici did not try to explain altruism for two basic reasons: first, because he did not believe that there was an explanation both coherent and based on observations and, second, because the existing explanations, particularly those by sociobiology or psychoanalysis, cannot be used without strongly criticising their assumptions. Rather, he wanted to unearth the disinterest of scholars of social sciences, particularly French ones, in this sociocultural phenomenon.

Notes 1. Moral statistics arose when the need to know social phenomena and their deepest reasons was risen also by the governments of the nascent nation-states. The

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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

first statistical studies for the analysis of social events were aimed at explaining the deepest reasons for these phenomena, and for the first time they called into question the social environment in which the individual acts. Such a cultural revolution was long opposed, but in the end the concept expressed for the first time by Quetelet (1869) in Belgium and Guerry (1864) in France managed to find a precise place in the scientific and cultural environment of the time. Scholars who first used statistical and demographic data to explain social phenomena, including those related to suicide, were called moral statisticians. The social order is in fact subordinate to integration; a concept very dear to Durkheim. This integration is based on sharing and consensus around factors (beliefs, rules, values, etc.) that are, thus, consolidated and transmitted in order to become common. Let us remember that Durkheim, in referring to social facts, indicates them as sui generis realities and defines them as “ways of acting, thinking and feeling which possess the remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual. Not only are these types of behaviour and thinking, external to the individual, but they are endued with a compelling and coercive power by virtue of which, whether he wishes it or not, they impose themselves upon him. . . . They consist of manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him. Consequently, since they consist of representations and actions, they cannot be confused with organic phenomena, nor with psychical phenomena, which have no existence save in and through the individual consciousness. Thus they constitute a new species and to them must be exclusively assigned the term social” (Durkheim, 1895/1982, pp. 51–52). The concept of anomie has been analyzed, in addition to Durkheim, by other scholars. In particular, this concept was redefined in the last century by Merton (1949), one of the leading exponents of structural-functionalism. The American sociologist states that the state of anomie indicates a situation in which there is a loss of credibility of the norms rather than their total absence. In this state, the social actors find themselves in a condition of particular discomfort because, since the normative values are no longer effective, they lose their references. Therefore, suffering is generated both in the event that the norms are no longer effective and in the event that they are formally present but meaningless. Fatalistic suicide is considered of second order: Its analysis is relegated to a note at the end of the chapter on anomic suicide. The little relevance that the French scholar places on this type of suicide is most likely due to the similarity of theoretical concepts between altruistic and fatalistic suicide. The essay we will refer to was published in the journal Revue de Métaphysique in 1898 and was taken from the appendix (in its original version) that the author had written for The Rules of Sociological Method (Durkheim, 1895/1982) published a few years earlier. For a correct reading, however, we specify that, in this work, we will refer to the English translation in Sociology and Philosophy (Durkheim, 1895/1953). The Potlatch is a ceremony that takes place between Native American tribes on the Pacific Northwest Coast of the United States and Canada. It is a ritual

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8.

9. 10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

ceremony, which traditionally includes a seal or salmon banquet, where the hosts show their wealth and importance through the distribution of their possessions, thus prompting the participants to reciprocate when they hold their own potlatch. The kula is a symbolic exchange of gifts between the people of the Trobriand islands in Papua Nuova Guinea. Its participants underwent trips of hundreds of miles by canoe to exchange gifts consisting of red shells necklaces (soulava), exchanged in a northerly direction (the trip is in a clockwise circle), and white shell bracelets (mwali), exchanged instead in a southerly direction. The exchange takes place between different objects: necklaces for bracelets and vice versa. Its characteristic was that the objects had to change hands continuously and the exchange was accompanied by a rigid ritualization. Among the main promoters of the MAUSS are Gérard Berthoud, Alin Caillé, Jaques T. Godbout, Jean-Louis Laville, Serge Latouche and Guy Nicholas. We wish to point out that these volumes have been revised and published in a one only volume by the author with the title Social & Cultural Dynamics. A Study of Change in Major Systems of Art, Truth, Ethics, Law and Social Relationships (Sorokin, 1957). From available archives (Sorokin Foundation in the United States and P. A. Sorokin fonds of the University of Saskatchewan in Canada) it was not possible to trace documents indicating when the center ceased to be part of the academy. In fact, the website shows no trace of the center, yet Sorokin is named as a deceased member. By cultural mentality Sorokin (1957a) meant the internal aspects of a cultural system that concerned the experience linked to people’s thoughts and the processes of symbolic mediation that allows the attribution of meaning. Hence, the development of the theory of cyclical movements of the systems that he had identified (ideational, idealistic and sensate) and that are produced by the transformations of the mental bases of men and groups. On these five dimensions some scholars (Levin & Kaplan, 2010) have developed and validated a measure of love, the Sorokin Multidimensional Inventory of Love Experience (SMILE). In view of Sorokin’s opposition to quantophreny and testing, which diminish social reality, we doubt he would have been particularly enthusiastic about this application of his theoretical framework on love. In this work, we will refer exclusively to “social representations” as forms of elaborated and interpreted knowledge. However, it should be made clear that there are other strands of study related to representations: that of cultural representations (Levy-Bruhl, 1970), based on what is defined as the law of participation that involves a constant mystical participation with the world by individuals, and that of mental representations (Kozulin, 2015; Vygotsky, 1978) that are tools created by cultures that guide and transform the cognitive work of individuals. It is necessary to clarify these two concepts. For “scientific causality” the effect is explained a posteriori, attributing the cause on the basis of theories or explanatory models legitimate and shared by the scientific community, while for “social causality” both the effects and the causes are directly related to our

Intellectual Heritage    141 social representations that allow to identify and recognize the specific context and the reality of the situation. 16. These indicated are an adaptation of those identified by Purkhardt (1993): (a) social representations construct and shape social reality, (b) social representations allow communication and social interaction, (c) social representations mark and consolidate groups; (d) social representations direct socialization, and (e) social representations make the unfamiliar familiar. 17. The term accommodation refers to the transformations that past experiences undergo when an individual receives new information, while the term assimilation indicates the degree to which any information received from the environment can be adapted to the background of experiences already possessed by the individual.

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4 Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism

Abstract The representations of altruism and egoism in contemporary society are constantly changing, following the transformations of society itself. Having abandoned the idea that the factors causing altruism or egoism lie in mere human nature, they are ascribed to people’s conduct, their freedom, their relationships, their associative forms, and in society. The attention is now focused on two elements of the daily life of individuals: culture and social relations. We will try, therefore, through the meso-theories developed in recent decades, which study the relationships between lifeworld and social system, to describe the links between altruism, egoism, culture, and social relations. We will pay particular attention to the relationality of individuals, in an attempt to overcome the dichotomy altruism/egoism by addressing aspects that, in previous studies, have been little, indirectly or marginally considered.

Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism, pages 147–173 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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The Construction of the Cultural Objects: Altruism/Egoism When talking about altruism, we usually refer to conditions that concern the individual. However, a more in-depth analysis shows that it is closely linked to both culture and society and therefore to interactions and meaningful relationships. It is well known that there is no univocal definition of altruism or a single approach to its analysis, as shown by the fact that throughout history various disciplines have proposed their own key to its explanation and interpretation on the basis of their specific characteristics. The various definitions produced over the decades have not fully explained the concept, which remains strongly ambiguous. Admittedly, it is a highly relative concept, particularly for certain aspects. Among these, on the one hand, the processes and common forms of human sociability, and, on the other, their constant and repeated functional correlations in social space-time. This outlines the reciprocity between the lifeworld and the social system, and represents the central moment in which attention is paid not only to the individual as the recipient of the decisions, but to the individual as a “subject” and active part in the decision-making processes. In this way, there is a shift from an approach that tends to reduce altruism to economic aspects only and, in particular, to rational choice (Abell, 1991; Allingham, 2006), to an approach that focuses on the overall interactions between all the other important social and cultural variables. In this perspective, the concept of common sense (Holthoon & Olson, 1987) is paramount in the construction of social reality: When individuals experience situations that involve them, they mobilize the “embedded knowledge” typical of common sense, understood as a cultural system. It is a set of frameworks of thought, representations, and perceptual patterns with both cognitive and symbolic aspects, used by subjects at an implicit level. This means hypothesizing a knowledge “incorporated” in social practices and rules, a knowledge present in the mind in its latent state, which can then be mobilized without realizing it. This process also applies to situations connected with altruism: The idea of altruism is neither stable nor common to all societies. Individuals represent their actions in different ways, and at different levels consider them acceptable on the basis of their everyday experience. Changes in attitudes towards other individuals are thus the result of the combination of the psychic component and the broader understanding of the context in which the subject acts. This understanding stems from the constraints and conditioning posed by the context, and from man’s actions on it—understood as history, relationships, and collective transformations. It is clear that each individual elaborates an idea and

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a representation of what “altruism” and “egoism” mean for herself: if, on the one hand, altruism appears as an objective fact, on the other hand it shows a high degree of relativity, due to the fact that deriving from the fact that it is closely linked to the social space-time dimension, culture, and the relationality and sociality of individuals. In other words, the relationship between the way individuals think about altruism and egoism and the way they perceive them is part of the cognitive activity of categorizing, which allows the organization of information from both outside and inside (body signals). Attitudes towards others, therefore, are oriented by the perception of altruism and egoism: social reality springs from the social meaning attributed to certain situations, but also from the meanings produced by the subjective world. The reality that individuals construct through daily activities by way of the socialization process (Dubar, 2003) is characterized not only by learning and internalization, but also by exteriorization and objectification (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). In the case of altruism, the exteriorization phase, consisting of two determined and successive time frames, corresponds to the moment when individuals first form their basic knowledge and define expectations in relation to their idea of altruism or egoism (first time frame), then recreate attitudes and lifestyles by virtue of their knowledge (second time frame). In the objectification phase, individuals perceive, instead, the consequences of their actions, thus, realizing the conjugation between action and culture, habitus (Bourdieu, 1979), that is, a lifestyle so that attitudes and choices are manifestly unified in different environments. Altruism and egoism are a reality that surrounds individuals starting from the very relationships that they establish with others and that emerge through everyday roles. In general, altruism and egoism can be considered cultural objects, as Griswold (1994) puts it. In defining a cultural object, she states that it may be defined as shared significance embodied in form. In other words, it is a socially meaningful expression that is audible, visible, or tangible or that can be articulated. . . . Notice that the status of the cultural object results from an analytic decision that we make as observers; it is not built into the object itself. (Griswold, 1994, p. 11)

It should be noted that this definition, although clear on the modalities and creators of cultural objects, does not clarify that the “products” differ according to the source of production. Altruism and egoism are considered cultural objects because of their relationship between fact and structure. They are, in fact, the result of

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interpretation and therefore—as interpreted cultural objects—see the increase or decrease of forms of shared representation over time. In such a scenario, the representations of altruism and egoism express both the subjective sense attributed to this category and the cultural and social reference framework available in a given time and space (Schütz, 1932); the construction and representations of altruism and egoism are present both in the micro-everyday scene and in the macro-institutional scene. In a previous work and with reference to sociocultural processes—superorganic phenomena (Mangone, 2018, p. 60)—we tried to apply and adapt Griswold’s “cultural diamond” (1994, p. 15). More specifically, we tried to explain the connections and relationships that are established between the elements involved in the construction/production of a sociocultural process as a social problem. Similarly, we now want to try to describe the connections and relationships that are triggered in the construction of altruism as a cultural object (see Figure 4.1). Two aspects differentiate our model from Griswold’s: the attribution of a “sense” of the connections (meant as directionality) and the reference to the lifeworld (Lebenswelt) that Husserl (1970) had defined as the “kingdom of original evidence.” In our case, therefore, it differs from that particular context in which the individuals are anchored and that we can call “the social world, by which we mean the economic, political, social, and cultural patterns and exigencies that occur at any particular point in time. Cultural sociology centers, first and foremost, on the relationship between cultural objects and the social world.” (Griswold, 1994, p. 15). The starting point, therefore, is that incorporeal knowledge (common sense) and those Lebenswelt

Subject (Creator)

Subject (Receiver)

Altruism/Egoism (Cultural Objects)

Figure 4.1  Elements, connections, and relationships involved in the construction of altruism/egoism as a cultural object.

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primary relationships (Cooley, 1962) that precede all cognitive insights and reflections in everyday life. Through primary relationships, the individual recognizes herself, but also—and above all—she is open to the knowledge of the other: The individual recognizes the other and recognizes herself in the other (Mead, 1934), so the Self is determined by combining self- (I) and hetero-referentiality (Me). The Self results from the social process of self-interaction, in which individuals signal to themselves the dynamics implemented in the situations they experience, while the resulting action is linked to the interpretation of these dynamics. And, since altruism is part of the process of self-interaction, the Self allows the individual, in relation to others, to give shape to the ideas of altruism and egoism so that they can direct her conduct, orienting her actions not only towards a change in attitudes, but also towards the change of the social structure. The Lebenswelt is, therefore, the element from which meanings and representations spring, and from which all other connections start. Proceeding counterclockwise in the proposed model, we see that the first connection is with the subjects who create meaning through a symbolic mediation that allows for the interpretation and construction of reality. Here, the subject must be considered in Touraine’s (1995) form: That Subject is freedom, and the criterion of the good is the individual’s ability to control his or her actions and situation, to see and experience modes of behaviour as components in a personal life history, to see himself or herself as an actor. The Subject is an individual’s will to act and to be recognised as an actor. (p. 207)

Between lifeworld and subjects, understood as creators, there is a reciprocal connection that allows for the other to be recognized. This reciprocity becomes paramount for everything related to altruism and egoism, since the idea of otherness usually brings us to the concept of unfamiliar (Moscovici, 1984), a condition that entails mistrust and uncertainty. Anything that is not recognized in the preestablished cognitive order of society can be considered a problem or a deviation. Indeed, Moscovici (2000), in describing the elementary forms of altruism and referring to the relativity of this concept, argues that it can be a deviant behavior in some societies (in Durkheim’s sense), because it departs from the average behavior. Hence, the need for a mutual connection between subjects and lifeworld, in order to reduce the conditions of uncertainty. Since subjects are constantly searching for a balance between their psychic and social components, they are obliged, in a way, to relate with the world around them, and consequently with others. The “creators” of altruism and egoism can be both individual and collective subjects.1 We disagree with Durkheim’s idea (Durkheim, 1912/1995)

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that culture, and therefore cultural objects, are a product only and exclusively of the collective; individuals, as part of it, are continuously involved in socialization and integration processes, both of which are related to the construction of meaning. The creators are in mutual connection with the receivers, as we will discuss shortly. It cannot be otherwise, because each subject, regardless of their role in the process of cultural production (creator or receiver) or number (single or collective), is in relation to others, as parts of the same system, who have recognized themselves as similar and at the same time different from each other. We, thus, come to the third element of the diamond, that is, altruism and egoism as cultural objects. The cultural object may be defined as shared significance embodied in form. In other words, it is a socially meaningful expression that is audible, visible, or tangible or that can be articulated. . . . Notice that the status of the cultural object results from an analytic decision that we make as observers; it is not built into the object itself. (Griswold, 1995, p. 11)

This definition clearly describes the modalities and producers of cultural objects. However, from what we said above, it is clear that altruism and egoism, as “products,” differ according to the source of production: Cultural systems generally transform events and objects into cultural objects, giving them a specific meaning that differs according to the reference culture. The last reciprocal connection in the model is between cultural object and lifeworld. This reciprocity is obviously justified by the fact that the lifeworld contains all cultural objects and that their production is influenced by it, which in turn is related to the subjects. This brings us to the fourth and last element of our diamond, that is, the receiver. Like all cultural products, altruism and egoism also have their own recipients: The latter (individual and/or collective) may or may not coincide with the producers, but they should certainly not be considered a “passive public,” since they are, like the “creative” subjects, producers of meanings that refer to lifeworlds. The return to the lifeworld concludes the process of construction/ production of altruism and egoism as cultural objects. The model served as an illustrative support: This elaboration was useful to highlight the relevance of the cultural aspects and social relations that individuals experience in “building” and “producing” the concepts of altruism and egoism in their everyday lives, but more than anything else we wanted to highlight the link that exists between knowledge, representations, and the sense of an action.

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Altruism and Egoism as Symbolic-Cultural Realties In a scenario as complex as contemporary society, in which relationships (at different levels) are paramount for social phenomena and therefore also in the processes of social construal, that is, in the socio-psychological processes by which individuals perceive, understand, and interpret the world around them in order to give it meaning and determine their actions and judgments. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the different dimensions of analysis, particularly for sociology (Collins, 1988). Briefly, they are the macro dimension, pertaining to social systems and their organization forms (in this case, the object of study are the structure and its systems); the micro dimension, that deals with the relationship between individual and society and with social actions (here, the object of study are the individuals and their actions); and the meso dimension, that focuses on the relations between social system and lifeworld, where the latter is understood as the set of meanings and representations of culture. It is this dimension that will characterize our path from this point on. The representations of altruism and egoism in contemporary society are constantly changing, in parallel with the transformations of society itself. Having abandoned the idea that the factors causing altruism or egoism lie in mere human nature, they are ascribed to people’s conduct, their freedom, their relationships, their associative forms and in society. The attention is now focused on two elements of the daily life of individuals: culture and social relations. We will try, therefore, with the support of recently developed meso-range theories, which study the relationships between social system and lifeworld, to describe the links between altruism, egoism, culture, and social relations. The culture should be understood as the expression of the totality of man’s social life. It is characterized by its collective dimension. In the end, culture is acquired and therefore does not depend on biological heredity. However, although culture is acquired, its origin and its characteristics are predominantly unconscious. (Cuche, 1996, p. 16)

In other words, culture is constituted both by objective elements (tools, capabilities, etc.) and subjective ones (beliefs, roles, values, etc.) and represents one of the principal factors when evaluating the individuals’ sense of belonging to a society. All the activities and the institutions are “cultural” from the moment when a meaning is required in order to operate. This does not endorse the view that social life is connected to a cultural determinism, but rather we support the position that culture is the key component

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for the way a person acts: “every social practice depends on and relates to meaning; consequently, that culture is one of the constitutive conditions of existence of that practice, that every social practice has a cultural dimension” (Hall, 1997, pp. 225–226). Cultural objects hold significance among the people who live within a social world and the latter, in turn, has meaning only through the culture (Griswold, 1994) with which it is observed. Culture, therefore, is a fundamental dimension of everyday life and as such it is necessary to understand it in relation to the various situations of the social world. Through this study, we can hypothesize paths to improve the relationships and forms in which the interactions between individuals, and between these and other elements of the system, are expressed. Culture is not a static element, on the contrary, it is built and reconstructed based on a continuous process of definition that allows for the identification of shared values and attitudes that support both structure and actions. And yet, we cannot forget that the ways in which human action manifests itself are culturally determined and filtered through the approval of the group to which one belongs. Culture contains within itself the tools (language, symbols, signs, etc.) that give it meaning, because they are shared within a context that must then validate the action, including those in situations considered altruistic or egoistic. Culture is confirmed as a determinant for the action of individuals: It contains both the rules that govern the group and the characteristics that distinguish it. Culture, on the one hand, allows legitimacy and, on the other hand, presents an intrinsic value that does not depend on whether it is usable or not. These peculiarities characterize the functions of the cultural system, allowing individuals to “survive” the external environment, promoting integration within the community of belonging, and reducing the anxiety that can arise in individuals for unforeseen situations or changes. The symbolic systems used by individuals to exchange meanings and knowledge are, in fact, a constitutive element of the social context of reference because they are rooted within the culture and the specific linguistic codes. The development of further knowledge can only stem from a system of symbols and meanings shared by a culturally determined community, which, inevitably, thinks about itself and the surrounding world through such symbols and meanings. Symbolic-cultural systems are therefore an inexhaustible source of wealth for acquiring and building the knowledge that allows us to form an interpretative space for the meanings of the reality that we experience with others. There are no meanings beyond or outside those that can be traced back to the knowledge shared and consolidated in a specific social group and, obviously, outside those found in the text or words used by those who communicate within it. This first reading of the

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relationship between altruism/egoism and culture draws a complex scenario, in which the world and the individuals who are part of it are configured as an endless network of relationships based on events that intersect, overlap, are mutually determined, and can also often be contrasting. The chain of events that follow each other day after day allow, through their definition and processing, to reproduce meaning through symbolic mediation, which allows not only the interpretation, but also the construction of reality. The dynamics connected to communicative processes are particularly relevant, since it is through them that knowledge is transformed into models of reality, that is, into symbolic mediation between the intimate aspects of private life and the aspects of the public life of human beings in their everyday lives. Social reality, including, therefore, the construction and identification of what is altruistic or egoistic, arises not only from the social meanings attributed to a certain phenomenon (cultural object) but also from the products of the subjective world of individuals. Patterns of action and human relationships are built according to the meaning attributed to daily existence; individuals find a world of meanings and events that become real for them because they are “social beings.” On these premises, Mary Douglas (1985) states that culture is a “mnemonic system” that helps individuals calculate the risks and consequences of their actions, thus shifting the barycenter from the individual to the collective idea. A community uses its common experience, accumulated over time, to determine which losses are likely to be most harmful, and which damage can be avoided by establishing the model of the world of actors, as well as the scale of values by which the various consequences are judged (serious or trivial). Obviously, Douglas’ general cultural theory should be seen in the broader context of her studies on primitive thought and taboos (Douglas, 1966), which are related to the behavior of modern man in situations of risk and danger. At the basis of her interpretation is the principle that: “In all places at all times the universe is moralized and politicized” (Douglas, 1992, p. 4) and the concepts of altruism and egoism become key terms to this end. In modern societies, however, altruism and egoism do not perform the same function as in pre-modern ones: The replacement of altruism with egoism is typical of contemporary society, since the globalization process has established cultural systems capable of integrating ever larger communities, within which individuality and attention to oneself have increased precisely because of (and in reaction to) the advent of the world system (Wallerstein, 1976). In their daily actions, individuals obviously try to avoid harmful events; to do so, they do not base their reasoning on precise economic or probabilistic calculations, but rather on conditions that allow them to overcome the crisis situation by identifying objectives at the same time tangible and

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flexible, often delegating this function to social organizations, including the institutions. On the basis of these considerations, we apply on two dimensions (precisely grid and group) the grid-group model (Douglas, 1970) which, although it was created to order and organize the various logics adopted by social groups and organizations with regard to risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990), has potential also for the dichotomy altruism/egoism. In general, this model hypothesizes that all societies can be compared by evaluating the degree of separation between the members of society and the outsiders and considering to the border that each individual erects between herself and the rest of the world. The group can therefore have a strong sense of belonging, and thus of cohesion or, vice versa, a low sense of belonging and a consequent low degree of cohesion (the extremes are marked by group and individual, respectively). If we consider instead the system of rules that connects each individual to the others (grid), this refers to all the other social distinctions and delegations of authority that individuals resort to in an attempt to limit the interference of others (at the extremes there are autonomy and subordination). Groups are distinguished between those with a strong adherence to the rules, with heavy cultural constraints, and those with a low degree of adherence to the rules and therefore a high level of cultural autonomy. By crossing group and grid, we obtain four forms of social and cultural organization, which can be matched by different individual attitudes (Figure 4.2). GRID ( + ) (Subordination) Isolated individuals who have no traits to participate in groups GROUP ( – ) (Individual)

Fatalism

Hierarchical structures and role differentiation Hierarchism

Individualism Egalitarianism

Each individual is for themselves and competition.

( + ) GROUP (Community)

All are considered equal. There are no different rules or values for individuals.

(Autonomy) GRID ( – )

Figure 4.2  Adaptation of the grid-group model.

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A high (+) position on both dimensions (strong sense of belonging and adherence to the rules) gives rise to a “hierarchical” organization form in which the members share, in principle, the provisions that the group produces by placing trust in the institutions charged with control. A high position on the sense of belonging and low on the adherence to the rules determines “egalitarian” forms of organization: The members of the group are advocates of an approach that starts from (and with) the sharing of responsibilities, since all individuals are considered equal. A low position (–) on both dimensions (poor sense of belonging and nonadherence to the rules) produces “individualist” forms of organization, that appreciates the autonomous capacities of the members who, based on their own criteria, act taking responsibility for the positive or negative consequences of their actions. The last position (poor sense of belonging and adherence to the rules) gives rise to forms of organization considered fatalist that, being influenced by factors external to the group (with which they have no links) rely on fate, not considering any kind of control feasible. The model (see Figure 4.3) produces along the grid axis—autonomy (–)/subordination (+)—a continuum of positive actions (altruistic, +/–), ranging from a maximum to a minimum value. In the social organizations characterized by egalitarianism, what prevails is the concept of Us— the same “Us” identified by Moscovici (2000) in the form of participatory ( – ) EGOISM ( + )

GROUP ( – ) (Individual)

Ego

Ego/Them

Fatalism

Hierarchism

Individualism

Egalitarianism

Super-Ego

Us

( + ) GROUP (Community)

(Autonomy) GRID ( – ) ( – ) ALTRUISM ( + )

Figure 4.3  Application of the grid-group model to altruism/egoism.

( + ) ALTRUISM ( – )

( + ) EGOISM ( – )

GRID ( + ) (Subordination)

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altruism—which allows to recognize Alter based on similarity between individuals. Conversely, in the hierarchical ones there is a dichotomy Ego/ Them in which the Ego is sufficiently integrated to produce positive actions, but in a limited form, since individuality is privileged and there is a strong distinction of roles. On the opposite front, in individualist organizations, the Super-Ego prevails, projecting all actions onto itself. Therefore, there are no positive actions towards others, but only actions that produce beneficial effects on oneself. The entity of these self-oriented actions is gradually reduced in the case of fatalist organizations, because the Ego prevails and there is a sort of reliance on “luck” or “fate.” A further analysis also reveals a reading along the group axis—individual (–)/community (+)—in which the transition from Ego to Ego/Them and from Super-Ego to Us tends to produce an increase in positive actions because the individuals tend towards the community. This being but a model, we will obviously not find such distinct situations in real life. Nevertheless, it contributes to the understanding of the complex process of representation of altruism and egoism—which so far continue to be considered within a dichotomy. Different social organizations produce different ideas of the world and, therefore, different cultural systems of reference, which become the frames within which to interpret attitudes towards the other. Although static, the symbolic-cultural approach allows us to define, through the general cultural theory, the conceptual boundaries within which we can then review and redefine the processes of social construal in order to add more tiles in the composed mosaic of description and interpretation of the reality of social dynamics related to altruism and egoism. However, there still are some paramount issues that must be taken into account: (a) the influence of actions on the objectives of the individual; (b) the community of reference as an integral part (or not) of the objectives of the individual; (c) the influence on the individual or collective good depending on the type of community; and finally, (d) the type of community on the basis of support, commitment, organization and boundaries defined by its members. In summary, it can be said that the cultural approach can help to understand the way in which actions are perceived, offering a systematic view of the very wide range of objectives that individuals seek to achieve. In other words, altruism and egoism cannot be considered a problem linked to the nature of human beings, but rather a problem of everyday life, for which we should consider the political implications and positions of individuals with respect to individual and collective objectives.

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From the Dichotomy Altruism/Egoism to the Altruistic and Egoistic Relationships The attitudes and actions of individuals towards each other are therefore influenced on the one hand, by culture, and on the other, by the indissoluble link with context and everyday life. Thus, we move away from the search for the cause of a phenomenon (principle of causality) to focus instead on those overall interactions (relationality) that Sorokin (1948) had defined as indivisible sociocultural trinity (society, culture, and personality). Having identified the elements constituting the everyday life of individuals, that is, culture and social relations, we will now turn our attention to the latter. We will pay attention to the relationality of individuals, in an attempt to overcome the dichotomy altruism/egoism by addressing aspects that, in previous studies, have been little, indirectly or marginally considered. Our starting hypothesis is the idea that there are no altruism or egoism understood in a behavioral sense, as argued by sociobiologists or behaviorists, but that there are altruistic relationships and egoistic relationships. We will, therefore, turn to the relationship and particularly to the relationship in action, that is, to a relational process that is interaction between individuals—individuals placed in a sociocultural context that only partially influences these processes, which, however, in turn, influence the context. The focus is once again on the individual, an individual who is capable of significant interactions that fit into a cultural context: The cultural aspect of meaningful interaction consists of (1) the totality of meanings, values, and norms possessed by the interacting individual and groups, making up their “ideological” culture; (2) the totality of their meaningful actions–reactions through which the pure meanings, norms, and values are objectified, conveyed, and socialized, making up their behavioural culture; (3) the totality of all the other vehicles, the material, biophysical things and energies through which their ideological culture is manifested, externalized, socialized, and solidified, making up their “material” culture. (Sorokin, 1962, p. 313)

And these meaningful relationships are precisely what push individuals in one direction rather than another. The passage from the principle of causality to relationality outlines the reciprocal relationship between lifeworld and social system and represents the pivotal moment in which attention is paid not only to the individual as

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the recipient of decisions but to the individual as a “subject” and active part in relational processes (Donati & Archer, 2015). We thus shift from an approach that tends to reduce the actions of individuals only to mere exchange (do ut des) to an approach that pays attention to the overall interactions between the exchange and all other relevant social and cultural variables. (Mangone, 2019, p. 35)

Undoubtedly, relationships are influenced, on the one hand, by the cultural system, and, on the other, by the everyday life and biography of the individual. These aspects were examined by both Mauss (1923–1924/2002) and Moscovici (2000): the former referred to the need to close (exit) the give/ receive/reciprocate cycle of the gift, while the latter discussed the elementary forms of altruism. Both point out that these actions are based on the relationality of individuals. Sorokin, moreover, in his last researches fully devoted to the activities of The Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism, focuses his attention on the transformation of human solidarity that would be replaced by the “love relationship,” that iceberg-looking feeling (“Love is like an iceberg: only a small part of it is visible, and even this visible part is little known”; Sorokin, 1954, p. 3) that the Russian-American sociologist considered as “the supreme and vital form of human relationship.” This way privileges the spaces of the Ego/Alter relationships within societal processes, since all social phenomena, attitudes, and actions are built in an environment that has its places, times, and symbols, which are fundamental in the cognitive processes of self-signification activated by individuals for the construction of social realities in their daily relational experience. In his essay Les formes élémentaires de l’altruisme (2000), Moscovici argues that the study of altruism is linked to the relationship between individuals (intensity and duration), as well as to the situation that they experience. This suggests that the renewed interest of the social sciences in altruism—or similar forms of relationships—can be read as an attempt to reconfigure the Ego/Alter relationship starting from the transformations of society and the “doings and beings” of human beings. The relationship is therefore the process here analyzed. It is this method that overcomes the altruism/egoism dichotomy, since static forms and terms are replaced by processes: altruistic relations, such as relations in favor of society (pro-social or hetero-directed), and egoistic relations, such as relations in favor of oneself (anti-social or self-directed). For this procedural and methodological order, we chose not to address the problem of defining the concept of altruism, taking for granted that, although differentiated, all its definitions agree on some aspects, synthesized

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by Simmons (1991) as follows: “(1) seeks to increase another’s welfare, not one’s own; (2) is voluntary; (3) is intentional, meant to help someone else; and (4) expects no external reward” (p. 3), and previously inherent in Macaulay and Berkowitz’s (1970) definition according to which altruism was to be considered, “as behavior carried out to benefit another without anticipation of rewards from external sources” (p. 3). Once again, we see here an implicit reference to the relationships between individuals. Simmons’ items are no less than the basic elements of human relationality: (a) the presence of another, more or less generalized; (b) the will to interact and enter into a relationship; (c) a precise sense and meaning, and finally (d) the absence of expectations on the other. In this direction, we will start our reflection from Archer’s morphogenetic theory (1995). The scholar first gave concrete impulse—despite vast criticism—to overcome some key dichotomies in the history of sociology (individualism/holism, structure/agency, micro/macro). Archer claimed the simultaneous presence of several factors and levels in the process defining the aims and characteristics of the social systems that implement them. In this way, the relationship between individual and society is multidimensional and must be read from the point of view of the morphogenetic theory: macro stems from micro and conditions it by retro-acting on it (cycle) through certain processes (social or structural conditioning, sociocultural interaction and structural elaboration and reproduction). Micro and macro cannot be studied separately, nor one can be given precedence over the other, since structure and action are different levels of a stratified social reality, each with specific and non-reducible characteristics. In morphogenetic theory, processes are dependent on interaction with the real world, so society must be studied for how it actually is (the morphogenetic cycle represents a time sequence, because the structure always precedes action and its outcomes in the form of reproduction or innovation) and not for how we wish it to be. Starting from the assumption that cultural systems result from human action and that, once they reach their autonomy, they influence future generations, the importance of interactions between subjects within the morphogenetic cycle is clear. These are interconnected with both the cultural conditioning (structure of the cultural system), and with the resulting processing aimed at either confirming or changing it (reproduction and innovation, respectively). This shows that the outcomes of a process, in the case of relationships, can lead to pro-social or antisocial outcomes, and the processes of interaction—not going in one direction only—produce emerging effects in several directions. Applying this multidimensional vision to altruism and egoism means observing cultural and social systems, individuals, but above all the relationships that are formed

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between them, overcoming the traditional visions that kept these levels and the various elements involved in the social construal processes separate. If we try to draw (see Figure 4.4) the relationship referring to the morphogenetic cycle, we can hypothesize that the starting point is the subject (X) who acts towards the subject (Y) through relational modalities (Z); this characterizes what is defined as structural conditioning and represents the first moment (T1). The altruistic or egoistic relationship (Z) is the second moment of the cycle (T2), aimed at the subject (Y)—the third moment of the cycle (T3)—and it is in this passage, from T2 to T3, that sociocultural interaction is disclosed. All the interacting elements reach T4, which represents the moment in which the three elements structurally elaborate and reproduce the significant interactions linked to a condition that produces or can produce altruistic relationships or egoistic relationships. In reality, therefore, studies on altruism must combine the system (objective dimension) with the individuals (subjective dimension), that is, they must be able to combine objective and subjective aspects, taking into account all the dimensions, levels, and factors involved in the social relation. The relationship with reality is never given and at every subsequent moment (T1–Tn) there are possibilities that beg to be explored. This way privileges the spaces of social relations within the processes developing in society: All social phenomena and attitudes and actions towards others are built in an environment that has its own places, times, and symbols, which are fundamental in the cognitive processes of self-signification Y (T3)

X (T1) Structural Conditioning

Socio-Cultural Interaction Z (T2)

T4

Structural Elaboration Structural Reproduction

Altruistic Relationship Egoistic Relationship

Figure 4.4  Application of the morphogenetic cycle.

T4

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activated by individuals for the construction of social realities in their daily life experience. After all, the ground on which an individual concretely manifests who he is and who the others are is the relationship with the others. On this issue, Dubar (2003) distinguishes between a biographical identity process (identity for oneself, who the individual would like to be—belonging) and a relational one (identity for others, who the individual is for others—attribution). This dualism must flow into an identity negotiation (complex communicative process) between who asks for identity and who offers it. It can be said, therefore, that the dynamics, in the relationship between those who express pro-sociality and those who receive the effects of this expression, produces benefits to both parties involved in the relationship. This, however, requires individuals to recompose their identity in a context that has its own places, times, and symbols (social relation), which are fundamental in the processes of self-recognition and hetero-recognition. This way privileges the spaces of relationships, which become paramount for the recognition of identity through and within the relational investments of each individual. This process implies an “objective transaction” between attributed and assumed identities, which can lead to a conflict between the stakeholders and the social organizations offering status, roles, categories, and other forms of recognition. The “objective transaction” involves main identification spaces—places where the “main status,” in Goffman’s sense (1981), is recognized—within which individuals consider themselves sufficiently recognized and valued. Being able to “play” with different spaces and to “negotiate” one’s investments and “manage” one’s belongings is a basic element of the objective transition. Compared to Mauss’s give/receive/reciprocate relationship (2002) for the gift, which would hypothetically imply an obligation to reciprocate, we can argue that the exercise of negotiation eliminates the supremacy (power relations between the giver and the receiver) arising within the relationship. Negotiation is seen, therefore, as a form of regulation of the social relation and ensures that the aim to be achieved is not prearranged, but is built during the process and, even where it is fixed, is never definitive, but subject to further modification and discussion. The key point is that “giver” and “receiver” are in a very complex relationship, which is located in a relational network characterized by increasing changes in all its elements; moreover, it is too often believed that any asymmetry in this type of relationship is due to the communicative behavior of the “giver,” who highlights his dominance. Actually, the differences are more due to cultural factors and identity construction than to factors intrinsic to the relationship: the distance between “giver” and “receiver” forms a

164    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism model of rational organization, which codifies and finalizes the relationship and that could be defined as Taylorist-utilitarian. (Mangone, 2019, p. 37)

For this reason, we propose to overcome the altruism/egoism dichotomy in a relational key: the altruistic relation as pro-social or hetero-direct relations, and the egoistic relations as antisocial or self-directed relations. The social relation is not a constraint for the individual, rather, it is what promotes the self-determination of the subject based on reflexivity (May & Perry, 2017). If these are the general elements of social relations, the altruistic relationships and the egoistic relationships present some peculiarities: in everyday life, they are not “neutral categories” and their results will depend on the type of balance established between goals and means. To clarify, we will transpose for the altruistic and egoistic relationships what Merton (1968) said about anomie : The altruistic relationships and the egoistic relationships are a “normal” fact, a consequence of the pressures of the social structure on its members. Each society sets limits, through legal and/or cultural norms, to the satisfaction of individual and collective aspirations, also establishing the legitimate means that can be used to satisfy them. These limits are perceived as necessary in a stably structured society, but in a society in continuous evolution there are oscillations of the limits that create dissonance (Festinger, 1962), a condition that often determines attitudes, the outcomes of which are neither always predictable nor always positive for all parties involved. If we recall the two elements that, according to Merton’s theory, constitute the social system, we can better understand the origin and the directions of these pressures: the first is the structure, in this case represented by the cultural system, the second is the social structure formed by the statuses and the related role functions. For both these structures there are institutionalized values: the goals, aspirations, and interests of the members of society, prioritized according to the social system of reference; and the means or norms that establish how to achieve the goals. There is not always the same emphasis between goals and norms, let alone a constant relationship, despite the efforts of social institutions to maintain a balance between these two institutionalized values. Obviously, people assume individual adaptation patterns (Merton himself proposes a typology) that vary according to their position in the social structure, since social status is what set the opportunities to reach a goal through legitimate means. It follows that the possibility of an altruistic relationship is greater where there are greater legitimate opportunities to reach the proposed goal. The adaptations used take different forms according to how the antinomy between the goals set by culture and the means

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used to achieve them is resolved, or, taking up again the elements of the symbolic-cultural theory, between the poles of the grid-group model (autonomy/subordination, and individual/community). In other words, interacting individuals often find it difficult to grasp the meaning of what happens or is about to happen and this goes together with the feeling that the attitude to be taken is hazy or unclear, because it is impossible to explain the whole interweaving of the social relation. To simplify the understanding of what was said so far, we can divide the altruistic relationship and the egoistic relationships into macro-areas. The first is the area of needs, in which these correspond to the goals, while all that concerns their satisfaction is linked to the means. Obviously, for this area, we must distinguish the goals of a material and primary nature—Maslow’s scale of needs (1954)—from the secondary and relational ones: For the former, the resources or means are well defined, while for the latter the combinations can be multiple given the numerous elements involved. The second is the area of the transaction, characterized by a situation of exchange between individuals through the relationship and the mutual expectations of demand and capability to respond. Finally, there is the area of the transition, which includes all those situations particularly significant for the life cycle of individuals, where each transition is a goal to be achieved by using means of the primary network of relationships to find a new balance.

A Model Based on Altruistic and Egoistic Relationships To reach a first synthesis, we can say that altruism, in contemporary society, detached from the elements that linked it only or almost exclusively to human nature or to purely economic aspects, plays a role in the daily life of individuals and their subjectivity that needs further investigation in order to better explain and understand both its dynamics and its results. Nevertheless, neither individual nor communities always activate the ability to respond to (reflect on) situations that require altruistic relationships. If the term activation indicates a series of processes that emphasize the active role of the subject in determining the causes or premises of events and effects affecting his behavior, talking of pro-action means recognizing that even the possibilities of action offered by the social context fall under individual responsibility. Individuals, therefore, seldom adopt a proactive position, preferring a reactive one, which is typical of a situation with little or no social relations from which descend the processes of reflexivity that allow for a conscious and responsible decision-making.

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To clarify once again, however, that, we do not believe we should talk of altruism or egoism, but rather of egoistic or altruistic relationships; we will try to build a model on the basis of the elements already mentioned and which characterize both the symbolic-cultural approach and the morphogenetic cycle. This attempt to deconstruct or, rather, to break down the relationship is fundamental because it is impossible to study altruism based only on aspects related to the personality of the individual. Together with personality, we must consider also the social and cultural aspects because every form of action that has positive effects, not only on those who act but also on those who receive it, is nothing more than a form of interaction and, therefore, of social relations between two or more parties. We propose a graphic representation of this model (see Figure 4.5) articulating the existing connections between the different and multiple conceptual categories that allow the construction of altruistic or egoistic relations that allow individuals to improve their own and others’ well-being, or only their own condition. The reference to the symbolic-cultural approach is mainly due to the connection between lifeworld and social system—as seen when considering altruism as a cultural product—favoring the interaction between communities and individuals starting from relationality. The social relation produces added value as a reciprocal action of subjects (individual or collective), from which the order of reality develops (shared social space). The latter requires an activity of mediation between human subjectivity and social systems or, better said, between the different means that the social organization provides for the achievement of the cultural system’s goals. Related to the order of reality of the social relationship, there is the reflexivity, placed as a guide (May & Perry, 2017), to close then the morphogenetic cycle with processing and structural reproduction. Here the term reflexivity will be used without distinguishing it into social and relational (Donati, 2011), but keeping the two terms together. This is because we believe that social reflection is neither subjective nor structural. Moreover, it is not sufficient to produce that knowledge related to what we do, think and experience in a relational context—an emerging effect of the interaction between specific forms of doing and being of individuals—and that allow the consolidation of trust to achieve the construction of a relationship between individuals in a perspective of hetero-directionality. This form of reflexivity also needs to be articulated in relational reflexivity, which allows individuals to orient themselves, with regard to the reality emerging from their interactions, as something able to reflect on themselves since it goes beyond the powers of individuals or the collectivity. Hence, the use of the concept of socio-relational reflexivity that keeps together the two aspects of reflexivity necessary for structural and symbolic

Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism     167 Individual Subjects

Collective Subjects

Shared Social Space Social Organization

Cultural System

Means

Goals SOCIAL RELATIONS Communities Individuals PERCEPTION (Self/Hetero)

DOING

Super-Ego Ego

BEING Them Us

SOCIO-RELATIONAL REFLEXIVITY

Structural Elaboration and Reproduction TRUST

Self-Directionality

Hetero-Directionality

Egoism, Utility, Competition, Ingratitude, etc.

Altruism, Solidarity, Cooperation, Gratitude, Ghift, etc.

ALTRUISTIC RELATIONSHIP

EGOISTIC RELATIONSHIP

DISTRUST

Social Capital

Figure 4.5  Model based on the altruistic and egoistic relationships.

mediation between means and goals, and between the beings and doings of individuals by combining self- and hetero-perception. This also considers that in the process of social relations it is necessary to remember the grid-group model’s elements of autonomy/subordination and individual/ collective, that determine different forms of social organization, with corresponding different forms of recognition (see Figure 4.3). Socio-relational reflexivity constitutes the T4 time of the morphogenetic cycle, in which all the interacting elements elaborate and structurally

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reproduce the significant interactions linked to a condition that produces or can produce altruistic relationships or egoistic relationships on the basis of the production of conditions of trust (Fukuyama 1996; Gambetta, 1988) or distrust (Mutti, 2007). But if in general terms trust and mistrust can be considered an expectation of experiences of the individual (with positive and negative value, respectively), for the first one we are in the presence of a cognitive and/or emotional load that allows us to overcome the threshold of mere hope. Specifically, the relationship of trust is closely linked to the experiences, positive or negative (aspects related to the value), the conditions of uncertainty, and the cognitive and/or emotional load of individuals. For the process of building conditions of trust, the relevant aspects mainly involve the social and individual dimensions. On the one hand, we must highlight the cultural and ethical changes that increasingly alienate individuals from common and shared goals and objectives, generated by individualistic and markedly competitive approaches. On the other hand, individuals experience continuous changes of which they often bear the consequence without being their main architects—see Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1994) when he underlines the aspects characterizing the individualisation of human life. Moreover, individuals tend—for their own preservation and reproduction—to look for ways to reduce uncertainty. And yet it seems almost paradoxical how uncertainty is reduced, since it presupposes the existence of trusting relationships, which, in turn, carry with them the obligation to run a risk: The confrontation with the others is, above all, a bet on their positive action in order to be able to trust—or mistrust—them. From the first outcome, the altruistic relationship will then take shape (altruism, solidarity, cooperation, gratitude, gift, etc.), from the second, the egoistic relationships (egoism, utility, competition, ingratitude, etc.). But is it possible to have conditions that favor trust and, therefore altruistic relationships? These conditions can be guaranteed only through the mobilization of resources, relations, and opportunities that the social player can express; in other words, it can only be achieved through social capital in relation to the social context. The term social capital was introduced by Loury (1977, 1987), who understood it as the set of resources that are found within family relationships and in the social organization of the community and that are useful for the development of individuals. Bourdieu (1979) considered it under the same perspective. Nevertheless, we must point out that the most influential contribution to the definition of the concept of social capital is Coleman’s (1990), who argues that it is created when the relationships between individuals change in order to facilitate action. Obviously, it is not tangible, since it is inherent in relations between individuals. These

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relationships can be considered as forms of capital because, like other capitals, they produce material and symbolic value. The value of social capital, in fact, is inherent in the fact that it identifies certain value aspects of the social structure that can be considered useful resources for individuals in realizing their own interests. The concept of social capital has no set boundaries: It consists of relationships of trust (strong and weak, variously extended and interconnected) that promote the ability to recognize and understand each other, to exchange information, to help each other and to cooperate for common purposes. We are talking of formal and informal reciprocal processes, regulated by rules that define, in a varyingly flexible way, the form, content, and boundaries of exchanges. These relationships are the product, intentional or unintentional, of social investment strategies aimed at the establishment and reproduction of lasting and usable social relations that can provide material and symbolic profits. What happens with these processes? It happens that the idea that it is the market that creates stable relationships within a community is dropped. Social capital implies an idea of holistic development that does not stop at economic aspects, but is linked to the degree of civicness (Putnam, 1992) and freedom of the community and, above all, to the adoption of correct behavior based on trust, elements that lead back to belonging and reciprocity. Social capital, since it directly involves individuals, stimulates protagonism through actions that lead to sharing a path aimed at achieving a common goal. This leads us to conclude that altruistic relationships have value only when they are oriented towards a path aimed at the continuous search for well-being in a situation of conscience and responsibility. In everyday reality, the social, value, cultural, relational component can represent the multiplier of well-being, without which any work, good, structure, or service can be sterile or perceived as unimportant. In this way, altruistic relationships are no longer an abstract conceptualization, but become the “social place” within which a reciprocity between individuals is regenerated. Social relations, in their daily development, contain both relations with the other and relations with social organizations, and as we said individuals are conditioned by self- and hetero-directed perception. The attitudes of individuals, however, are not always positively oriented towards each other—because difference is not considered as a resource, but rather as a constraint to everyday life and a threat to the future—a condition that reinforces the degree of distrust and influences the attitudes and actions to be taken. These conditions of mistrust, affecting not only situations characterized by a lack of information, but also those

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with a surplus of it that makes it difficult to reduce complexity, are paramount in the process of building social representations of trust or mistrust and, therefore, of the future life plan of individuals. If expectations of trust do not replace the lack or excess of information (reduction of mistrust), there is no positive reassurance about their idea of a future dimension of their lives in reciprocity with others. If we try to combine the above reflections and the individuals’ idea of the future, with their actions aimed at finding a balance between goals and means, two orders of questions emerge: 1. In contemporary society, the proliferation of images and information leads us to think that to avoid the effect of saturation described by Maffesoli (1988) we need to create an ethics of image and information that not only promotes individual critical choice, but does not limit creativity, which has a significant part in the choices to determine the balance between goals and means. Contemporary culture, based on immanence and aesthetics, combined with the speed with which images and information are replaced, does not allow individuals to create their own symbology to elaborate and build those symbolic mediations necessary to deal with everyday events in reciprocity and prefer altruistic relationships over the egoistic ones. 2. If perceptions are the direct product of the interactions between the individual and his environment (physical, mental, and social), then this product is also the reality translated into its representation, a story that has developed and continues to act in individuals beyond any form of conditioning. In conclusion, it should be remembered that the proposed model, through which we tried to interpret the dynamics of social construal or collective construct of altruism and egoism—with the final aim of leaving this dichotomy behind—overcomes the economic and naturalistic logics that have always characterized the study of these phenomena. Such a model, however, can only be applied if we believe that the intervention of individuals can be incisive (doing something!) and responsible (choice and attribution of guilt). In other words, in order not to have too rigid of an interpretative model, there must be a structure that guarantees responsibility, evidence-based practice, and long-term action that ensures the balance between goals and means. These are fundamental aspects, since the altruistic relationships of individuals are based fundamentally on the trust and consensus that the community, often in opposition to the political system, can still claim to have within society itself.

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Note 1. In the social reality, the social actors are not only individuals, but also other social units (family, groups, classes, movements, etc.). What is important, from the sociological point of view, is to clarify the meaning attributed to the concept of collective action. We can consider collective actions only those actions carried out by a certain number of individuals who agree among themselves in developing common strategies.

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Mauss, M. (2002). The gift: The form and reason for exchange in archaic societies. London, England: Routledge. (Original work published 1923–1924) May, T., & Perry, B. (2017). Reflexivity: The essential guide. London, England: SAGE. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self & society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Merton, R. K. (1968). Social theory and social structure. New York, NY: The Free Press. Moscovici, S. (1984). The phenomenon of social representations. In R. M. Farr & S. Moscovici (Eds.), Social representations (pp. 3–69). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Moscovici, S. (2000). Les formes élémentaires de l’altruisme [The elementary forms of altruism]. In S. Moscovici (Ed.), Psychologie sociale des relations à autrui [Social psychology of relationships with others] (pp. 71–86). Paris, France: Nathan. Mutti, A. (2007). Distrust. In Italian Sociological Association (Ed.), Annual review of Italian sociology 2007 (pp. 47–63). Naples, Italy: Srciptaweb.it. Putnam, R. (1992). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Schütz, A. (1932). Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt [The meaningful structure of the social world]. Vienna, Austria: Springer. Schwarz, M., & Thompson, M. (1990). Divided we stand: Redefining politics, technology and social choice. Hemel Hempstead, England: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Simmons, R. G. (1991). Presidential address on altruism and sociology. The Sociological Quarterly, 32(1), 1–22 Sorokin, P. A. (1948). The reconstruction of humanity. Boston, MA: The Bacon. Sorokin, P. A. (1954). The ways and power of love: Types, factors and techniques of moral transformation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (1962). Society, culture, and personality: Their structure and dynamics: A system of general sociology. New York, NY: Cooper Square. Thompson, M., Ellis, R., & Wildavsky, A. (1990). Cultural theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Touraine, A. (1995). Critique of modernity. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. Wallerstein, I. (1976). A world-system perspective on the social science. The British Journal of Sociology, 27(3), 343–352.

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5 Society, Relationship, and Responsibility

Abstract With the application of the bounded rationality model, the individual does not project himself into time indefinitely (the future time horizon may be longer or shorter). In order to promote change and hoping that in future altruistic relationships will cover most of the forms of relation/interaction between human beings, we should focus our attention not on behaviors but on the reasons and the objectives of individuals and the values underlying them. This configures the construction of a new humanity that negotiates between individual liberties and responsible liberties and in which the drive to selfrealization cannot be conceived without the commitment to the other and the community in the broad sense (ethics of responsibility), thus recognizing the concept of “common good.” In the attempt to escape from a sensate culture by affirming the ethics of responsibility, the role of the social sciences is to analyze the sociocultural phenomena, not to explain them, but to be able to understand and accompany their transformation in favor of a solidaristic development of humanity.

Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism, pages 175–191 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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Time in Everyday Life and Altruistic Relationships In the middle of the last century—right after the end of World War II—Sorokin (1948) wrote: A peaceful, harmonious, and creative society can exist only when its members possess at least a minimum of love, sympathy, and compassion ensuring mutual aid, co-operation, and fair treatment. Under these conditions its members are united in one collective “we” in which the joys and sorrows of one member are shared by others. In such a group a member is not an isolated “atom,” but a vital part of a creative community. . . . Exercise your legal right and perform your legal duties when they do not harm anyone else and when they do not violate the rights and duties of others—such is the essence of marginal altruism, slightly above the purely legal conduct prescribed. (pp. 57–58)

In light of the continuous transformations of contemporary society, which increasingly sees solidarity wearing away in favor of intense individualism, is it still possible to think of the future of humanity as a group founding its existence on what Sorokin defined as marginal altruism? To try and answer this question, we will refer to some basic concepts in the human and social sciences. The reflections presented so far, which find their epistemological roots in sociology, have highlighted that we must consider the integrated study of the three elements that define sociocultural phenomena (society, culture, and personality) along a space-time dimension. We wanted to overcome the egoism/altruism dichotomy by highlighting how these should be considered processes, rather than mere facts sui generis. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the altruistic relationships and the egoistic relationships, which also produces a direct experience of individuals with their current social context, or umwelt (Schütz, 1932), in their everyday activities. The meaning attributed to these relations varies together with the umwelt. If this dynamic is applied to the individual in a relationship, we can see that it assumes different meanings depending on the time frame in which it is placed (temporal perspective). Time and space are constitutive elements for the processes of social interaction and, therefore, characterize the relationality of individuals. The everyday experiences of individuals can in fact be perceived—and therefore studied—in their continuous development, in their flow within the unity of the single experience and the situation. Quoting again Schütz, and transposing to the relation— understood as relation in action—what he said for actions, we can affirm that this has a meaning and a representation before it actually takes place (sense of production), while it takes place (sense of produced), and finally after it has taken place (self-understanding and hetero-understanding). In simpler

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terms and following Schütz’s theory, we can state that the attribution of meaning to a relationship is arbitrary as it is linked to a project constructed by the actor and as such susceptible to modification. Indeed, the relationship planned and the one actually implemented often do not coincide, and therefore we must distinguish between final and causal reasons, or, better, between sense as an end (project) and sense as a cause (implementation). In the case of altruistic relationships, this implies that they can be understood in their entirety and in their sense only if we can understand the purpose that was placed in them and the time frame to which they refer. In this way, time is no longer uniform and becoming aware of this means that individuals are oriented in their actions/interactions by the temporal and spatial dimension (social and historical context). In the case of altruistic relationships, the temporal dimension, and in particular the idea of the future, is particularly important, since these are based on the expectations that arise between the parties involved and that therefore concern the future perspective. A few years ago, anthropologist Marc Augé (2008) published a pamphlet entitled Où est passé l’avenir? in which he wondered what happened to the future, highlighting the main paradoxes of the issue. The question posed by the French scholar had no reference to altruistic relationships, trying instead to find an answer to the prevailing idea of contemporary society living on immanence. The purpose of this chapter is to start from the paradox that every individual exists in a time following his birth and preceding his death (finite and infinite) to culminate in the idea that, despite their finitude, individuals can still imagine a future dimension of time and consequently act—or not act—consequently. Time is a polysemic concept and is inseparable from individual actions. And yet, for many years it has been considered an unproblematic aspect of everyday life (Adam, 1995, 2004). The scientific traditions that addressed time are, on the one hand, philosophy, with the idea of the linear or circular time (individual times), and, on the other hand, the physical and natural sciences, up to Einstein’s relativity and quantum physics (natural times). Between these two lies the sociological research, that tried to mediate between the minuteness of the first and the magnitude of the second (Ricoeur, 1991) by focusing the attention on social or collective time, which is linked to all aspects of everyday life (psychological, social, and cultural ones). However, a social reading of time in the global society requires the analysis of temporal cultures. According to philosophical tradition, there is a chronological time (Chrónos), consisting of a measurable triad that represents its quantitative aspect: past (yesterday), present (today) and future (tomorrow); and a time of action (Kairós) consisting instead in the opportunity that can happen at any given time, the so-called “right time, opportune

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time, time for.” If Chrónos therefore represents the “time of truth” and the quantitative dimension (measurability and duration), Kairós represents the qualitative dimension of time, related to the search for meaning in human action (time of action). Kairós allows us to state that, both in individual and collective experience, time is not uniform; it does not have the same value at different moments and junctures, nor over the same day. This impacts on everyday activities and on the forms that individuals adopt to communicate. If we can imagine a future dimension of altruistic relationships, these two perspectives and temporal cultures (Chrónos and Kairós) merge. This because Chrónos refers to the present, to a “forced culture of immanence,” which brings individuals back to the ancient idea of Kairós that bound them to fate. While it is true that individuals act with respect to the future based on instrumental rationality, they very often give in to fatalism. In other words, the experiences of time (temporal cultures) in everyday life—beyond common aspects such as its measurement—affect individuals differently because they are a symbolic mediation between society and individual subjectivity, outlining, time after time, new time horizons on which to base the decisions for future projects. Attitudes towards the future, therefore, do not appear dominated by purpose-oriented rationality (action based on the rational evaluation of purposes, means, and consequences). Rather, they seem ruled by the search for balance between goals and means, starting with the very selection of the goals on a hierarchical scale akin to Maslow’s (1954), which motivates actions with the universal tendency to satisfy certain orders of needs, differing in nature and complexity. Individuals base their decisions on temporal cultures and the degree of knowledge they have about a given situation, but how they decide is not yet clear. Their choices entail two paradoxes. The first is that—being forced to choose—they are bound to a responsibility proportionate to their abilities and rights (or to those that they believe they have), as well as to their degrees of freedom. The second is that the individual is obliged to select in that specific time (since in the future they could change) the range of possible alternatives to which she will devote her energies to achieve her goal. In light of these two paradoxes, it emerges that individuals decide whether to relate to the other, and how, by constructing a scale of importance (priority) based on their knowledge of the situations. The conjugation of the specific interest of the individual with her wishes and desires passes through a series of elements that promote both the change and the conservation of these conditions. In other words, we are faced with that inevitable human condition that is uncertainty. In the analysis of the relationship between individuals and future, this makes it necessary to understand

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the mechanisms that prompt individuals to choose change, rather than stability—and vice versa. Following this logic, we could claim that the individual faces a sort of “uncertainty about values,” because in everyday life choice happens in a condition of uncertainty and it concerns the way in which the future self of the individual will evaluate a situation happening as a consequence of the choice made today. In other words, uncertainty does not concern the future conditions of the world per se, but the future conditions of the individuals who make the choice and who must imagine their future and possible conditions to direct themselves in a condition in which the emotional, psychological, and social involvement is all but residual. Individuals now live in complex societies characterized by delicate adjustments and multiple interdependencies. The propensity to reflexivity prompts individuals to weigh the imponderable: They strive to consider even the lowest probabilities and are concerned about the long-term consequences of ongoing processes, even those in which they are not directly involved. Individuals process and interpret information to build their idea of a world on which to base their daily positioning towards themselves and others. But what prompts human beings towards marginal altruism—as Sorokin called it—or altruistic relationships (pro-social relationships)—as we call them—thinking of their future self that is not the same as that of today? The necessary condition is undoubtedly a situation in which the interactions between individuals are based on trust and from which emerges a hetero-directionality of the attitudes of human beings, supported by the conservation and promotion of social capital as a “common good” for the welfare of the whole community. This implies rethinking the position that each individual has within society with respect to others and, in particular, to reconsider goals and means in a direction in which the Super-Ego and the Ego are transformed into Us or Them, and then to trigger forms of change that partially abandon the individualism typical of contemporary society to achieve recognition of the other as an integral part of our lives and the great community that is humanity. However, change has always sparked fear in individuals, because it closely links cultural change with their changing attitudes and perceptions. In support, we propose Kurt Lewin’s unfreezing-refreezing model (1951, 1952), originally conceived for organizational change, here re-elaborated and applied to relational change. The re-elaboration of this model (see Figure 5.1) was possible because, unlike other models on organizational change, it is based on aspects related to culture and interaction between individuals. Its three characterizing phases are divided into (a) unfreezing, when the balance between goals and means is disrupted. This process generates forces favoring change, or overcoming the opposition to change that exists within the individual (who discovers

180    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism REFREEZING Incorporation of change and maintenance of the new relational order

ALTRUISTIC RELATIONSHIP

CHANGING Attempt to improve one’s condition in relation to others and vice versa UNFREEZING Breakdown between “goals” and “means,” and recognition of needs and change EGOISTIC RELATIONSHIP

Figure 5.1  Adaptation of the unfreezing–refreezing model.

that she must change); (b) changing, a phase in which the individual tries to find a balance between conservative forces (stability and balance) and innovative forces (change)—need to redefine her goals; and finally, (c) refreezing, that is, the phase in which she institutionalizes or achieves stability after change by reestablishing goals. Comparing the individual to an ice cube that melts whenever it is placed near a heat source may seem excessively simplifying and reductive, and yet this is precisely what happens in everyday life: Individuals experience discomfort every time they are faced with a choice (unfreezing), resulting in a breakdown of the internal balances, which leads to a redefinition of the cultural goals (changing) and then to a new equilibrium (refreezing). This cycle is obviously dependent on its context, since individuals are proactive rather than reactive towards their environment—both social and natural. Individuals always try to maintain identity based on assumptions and values, and to do this, they usually implement strategies that are both instrumental and expressive. The difference is that the former (instrumental) allows one to manage problems of context adaptation and internal integration. These strategies are mainly operational in nature, that is, they are aimed at pursuing specific and measurable objectives. The second strategies (expressive), instead, operate in the symbolic field and aim at protecting the stability and coherence of shared meanings. In addition, they allow individuals to keep alive the awareness of their individual and collective identity.

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If such is the situation of the individual who tries to modify his own way of relating to others, then the theory of rational choice is not applicable to the dynamics of altruistic relationships. Rather, they could embrace a model of choice closer to that of bounded rationality (Simon, 1983). The bounded rationality model holds the following aspects as its general scheme of execution: (a) individual decisions do not concern the whole of human life, but consider only limited areas of it; (b) when individuals make a choice, even a very important one, they do not consider future scenarios but look at the present and at most to possible perspectives; (c) the very fact that the individual is seeking the solution to a problem, causes her to focus on certain aspects of his life rather than others; and (d) a major part of the individual’s efforts in a choice is absorbed by frantically collecting information and facts about the decision in question (problem of knowledge). In the bounded rationality model, individuals do not project themselves in time indefinitely (the future time horizon may be longer or shorter). In everyday reality, the environment in which individuals live is divided into separate and distinct problems, and attention is paid to the factors that deserve it from time to time. The ability to acquire knowledge of the situations and environment in which individuals live is necessary both to facilitate the creation of alternatives and to estimate the possible consequences, allowing the individual to preserve the image of that part of the world involved in his decisions and to set her decision (relationship in action) on the basis of that image.

Values, Ethic of Responsibility and Altruistic Relationships To promote change and hope that in the future pro-social actions—in their various altruistic manifestations—will become the majority of forms of relationship/interaction between human beings, we should focus not on behaviors, but on the motives and objectives of individuals (Batson, 2011) and on their underlying values. Focusing on values, however, puts the researcher in a complex position, as the analysis is made more difficult by the fact that, although values are sufficiently explicit, they present aspects of latency that are often difficult to identify. These aspects of latency refer to Parsons (1951) who attributed the function of latency to culture, since it provides individuals with the motivation to act through the values and norms internalized during the socialization process. In other words, values guide from the outside the relation in action of individuals, since culture “does not act,” it exists but is not “active,” and its operation is not evident in social interaction. In a lexical sense, and

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according to conventional wisdom, the term “value” holds two meanings. The first refers to anything (material or not) that is considered important and coveted if not possessed, or, conversely, if it is possessed, whose loss is feared. The second, almost always declined in the plural, refers to the ideals to which human beings aspire and to which they refer when they have to make judgments or choices. In line with the present work, we can consider Kluckhohn’s (1951) definition, for whom value is “a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action” (p. 395). Values outline social principles, the objectives to which a culture attributes an intrinsic value; they define what is relevant to the members of a social organization and form the basis of judgments about what is right or wrong (they are often in fact defined as moral or ethical codes). These defining aspects allow us to pinpoint three fundamental dimensions of values (without prejudice to the normative dimension for which values indicate “what individuals should want,” the desirable): 1. The emotional dimension, representing what one wants and what individuals are most attached to. In this case, conforming to the values is an indication of “good behavior” regardless of the advantage that the individual may gain from it. If we consider values in this dimension, they allow the development of feelings of shame and/or guilt that lead to avoid any punishment linked to “bad behavior.” On this basis, all individuals should be led to develop altruistic relationships and not egoistic relationships. 2. The cognitive dimension, which allows the social actor to be aware of her action, which presupposes an inherent capacity for reflection on the part of individuals. 3. The selective dimension, which refers to the ability of values to direct social action and motivate individuals. We should, therefore, consider values as all those cultural components accepted and shared by everyone who participates in the social organization. Their function is paramount, indeed, they are often circulated by political institutions in order to strengthen the sense of belonging, since consensus is also a dimension of solidarity within groups. If at the origin of the species the influence of the environment prevailed over that of men, today we are faced with the opposite situation: It is man who prevails over the environment and strongly modifies its conditions through techniques and technologies that may impact negatively on it. The principle of responsibility (Jonas, 1984) wants to be the ethical foundation

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of actions aimed at preserving both man (in the physical, social, and psychological sense) and the integrity of his world for future generations. Ethics, meaning those objective and rational foundations that allow to distinguish human behavior in good, just or morally lawful, versus bad or morally inappropriate, has since ancient times characterized the lives of human beings. Ethical principles, or the search for them, usually distinguished between secular and religious dimensions, allow individuals to manage their freedom, especially in relation to its limits, the delineation and application of which preserve the right to exist of other human beings. Today, when we talk about ethics, we risk repeating what has already been said. However, we cannot avoid this danger in addressing the problems highlighted so far and which are all related to relationships. There is usually a contrast between the two classic dimensions of ethics (secular and religious), but perhaps we should also talk about a further dimension, which is the public dimension or that of responsibility. It would be superficial to contrast secular and religious ethics with regard to the issues connected with altruistic relationships. We will thus avoid any speculation and conjecture based on the opposition between these two dimensions of ethics, which result in a vague and valueless framework; hence, the need for a public ethic and, specifically, for an ethic of responsibility, based on neither individual morality nor collective ethics (secular or religious), but representing the vision of the world that is changing (e.g., the use of technology to enslave nature, which has made the latter particularly vulnerable to irreparable damage, with negative influences on the future well-being of individuals) and, hence, the persistent validity of the ancient rules of the ethics of fellow man (righteousness, mercy, honesty, solidarity, etc.). However, they must be reconsidered and rethought, given the development of the sphere of collective action in which the actor, the action, and the effects are no longer the same. The strength of this collective action imposes on ethics a new dimension of responsibility never imagined before. In the age of technology, man (Gehlen, 1980) has changed the meanings of actions and of the objects on which these are reflected, with all the consequences that this entails. Past ethics had to consider neither the global condition of human life nor the distant future—indeed the survival—of the species. Precisely for this reason, a new conception of rights and duties is necessary, for which neither ethics nor traditional metaphysics offer principles and/ or a completed doctrine (Jonas, 1984). The ethics of responsibility is far removed from both hyper-subjectivism and objectivism. It seeks intersubjective and intercultural values that help the dialogue between the different positions aimed at the collective good:

184    Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism An imperative responding to the new type of human action and addressed to the new type of agency that operates it might run thus “Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life”; or expressed negatively: “Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life”; or simply: “Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth”; or, again turned positive: “In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will.” (Jonas, 1984, p. 11)

In light of this imperative, individuals—beyond their religious faith and/or political affiliation—can move towards an ethic of responsibility. The latter would guarantee the collective good, since the real problem lies in the fact that any moral rule has exceptions, so there is a need to identify among the conflicting rules which is the main one. New contrast would thus emerge between the Kantian principle of “never to use other people merely as means to an end, but always also as ends,” and the utilitarian idea spurring people to always choose “actions that maximize their utility and happiness.” (Mangone, 2018, p. 78)

Therefore, to ascribe the conduct of human beings to a single general principle is a flawed approach; there are many cases and situations (individual and collective) that must be faced with arguments that take into account the circumstances in which they occur. In modern society, the idea of the responsibility for choices has been delegated to law, in the form not of ethics of responsibility—where there are no religious or nonreligious people, believers or nonbelievers, but just citizens—but rather of a public ethics reduced to a simple procedure. Leaving aside the ethical and jurisprudential aspects, the question of altruistic relationships could be posed in terms of a conflict between individual freedoms and social responsibilities, but the debates about this conflict are obviously affected by both the disciplines addressing it and the cultural context of reference. Weber well interpreted this aspect in two of his numerous writings—Political writings (Lassman & Speirs, 1994) and Science as a Vocation (Lassman, Velody, & Martins, 1989)—in which he clarifies that the plurality of values takes the form of dualism between the ethics of principles (Gesinnungsethik—also called of intentions or convictions) and the ethics of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik). The first refers to absolute principles, assumed regardless of their consequences (e.g., religious ethics), the second concerns instead all those cases in which particular attention is paid both to the relationship between goals and means, and to the consequences of action.

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In short, following the ethics of responsibility means that each individual must bear the consequences of his actions towards himself and others, even beyond temporal and spatial proximity. Man is aware of the fact that his life has a longer or shorter “expiration date,” but the boundary between life and death is no longer clearly defined as in ancient times, and not because death has taken over life, but rather because both have lost their positive meaning as values. Indeed, contemporary society witnesses an ever-increasing contradiction: On the one hand, there are investments in human and financial resources to improve the material conditions of existence, while, on the other hand, there are difficulties in making sense of the very lives of individuals. And the altruistic relationships are clearly relevant precisely in the search for the meaning to existence, in the reappropriation of one’s subjectivity, and in the construction of identities. Human action, in its broadest sense, must be understood as the most appropriate way of acting towards oneself and others in the various different situations one experiences, and it mirrors the relevant aspects found within the social context to which the situations refer. In reality, the vision or imagination of the future, together with the conception of the present, is linked to the adaptation of the conception of self, which consists in the resolution of the dualism between doing and being and, therefore, of the discordances often resulting from social relations. The clear contrast between doing and being necessarily determines dissonant aspects (Festinger, 1962) that generate pressure and conflict in individuals. If this tension is not rightly canalized, if it is not aimed towards the search for new elements of positivity within the complex network of relationships that the individual experiences in their everyday activities, then it can become a determining factor for choosing egoistic relationships rather than altruistic ones. Egoistic relationships, therefore, must be considered as an action that fits into a specific social context, in which many factors influence the “construction” and “formation” of the self of individuals and the construction of their “defences” against dissonant situations. Relationality, and in particular a relationship of trust, expressed in the role-playing between the individual and the social organization, is fundamental for action deemed necessary, at certain times and contexts, to address a condition experienced as a problematic situation. Social relations, triggering symbolic mediation (reflexivity) between human subjectivity and social systems, determine the definition and promotion of needs, rights, and duties in a logic founded on the ethics of responsibility and able to trigger positive changes in individual attitudes, reducing or eliminating discordances in the social relationship, thus, directing them towards altruistic relationships.

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This configures the construction of a new humanity, or the reconstruction of the existing one, in terms of a negotiation between individual liberties and responsible liberties, in which the drives for self-realization cannot be conceived without the commitment to the other and the community in the broadest sense. Considering the individual as a social animal, as a subject that produces meaningful interactions and that is linked to his fellow human beings in a context of norms, values, and meanings, it can be said that the ethics of responsibility allow the individual to recognize himself in the concept of common good: a good that individuals experience as members of a community and that they can only pursue from a solidarity that can give meaning to human action and its development. Sorokin (1954) closes his The Ways and Power of Love with the dilemma that humanity must face for its future survival and development. Humanity can continue to act according to predatory logics based on selfishness (individual and collective) and leading to extinction or it can embrace logics of universal solidarity that lead to salvation and earthly happiness. Each individual has the choice to follow one of the two paths.

The Role of the Social Sciences in the Construction of the Ethics of Responsibility Change must begin with the rediscovery of the positive values of man, and science is also seen as a guide through the overcoming of strictly sensate (sensory) models of knowledge. The social sciences are not merely the “sciences of the crisis”: they are critical sciences, not limited to the analysis of the degenerative processes of society but that seek their deep roots by denouncing the negative factors causing them. Applying these principles implies understanding the mechanisms through which human beings take their decisions. These dynamics highlight the issue of the choice. The latter, in turn, must be specified according to the temporal dimension and degree of knowledge of situations, as well as to who makes decisions and how. Those who decide (individuals or politicians) base their decisions on cultural mentalities and their degree of knowledge of a given situation, but the way in which they decide is not yet clear. We return once again to the problem that Sorokin (1958) raised with regard to the construction of an integrated system of knowledge that holds together the three forms of knowledge: empirical-sensory, reason, and intuition; a system of knowledge that can provide as many elements as possible for the understanding of superorganic phenomena, and then, where possible, also predict their transformations. The dynamics described so far prompt us to state the desirability of the reconstruction of “humanity.” A new humanity that can no

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longer be intended only as a right, but also as a duty to act based on the ethics of responsibility. In abandoning a sensory culture through the affirmation of the ethics of responsibility (or, as Sorokin had foreshadowed, through creative altruism love or love relationship), the role of the researcher, and therefore of the sociologist or psychologist, as well as of the anthropologist or of the other scholars of social sciences, is to analyze the sociocultural phenomena in order to understand them and accompany their transformation towards a solidaristic development of humanity. Sociology—our reference discipline—and social sciences are therefore an instrument for knowing the interconnections of society, because they are not limited to specific aspects of society as such, but analyze the interactions, links, and mutual conditioning. According to Berger and Luckmann, the central question of sociological theory can be formulated as follows: How is it possible that subjective meanings become objective facticities? Or, in terms appropriate to the aforementioned theoretical positions: How is it possible that human activity (Handeln) should produce a world of things (choses)? In other words, an adequate understanding of the “reality sui generis” of society requires an inquiry into the manner in which this reality is constructed. (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 30)

Sorokin himself—who was one of the last scholars to devote part of his research to the analysis of positive aspects of society such as love—clearly highlighted these characteristics. For the Russian-American sociologist, “Sociology describes only the most common generic forms and stages of development, without, however, pretending to formulate ‘laws of development’ and ‘historical tendencies’” (Sorokin, n.d., chap. I, pp. 4–5). The problem of these sciences, however, is that since their origin they have assumed a “negativistic” modus operandi, tending to highlight only negative or pathological phenomena without ever highlighting positive and healthy ones (Sorokin, 1966). Moreover, they have tended towards the contrasts presented by individual societies (e.g., the dichotomy egoism/altruism) often leaving out the meaningful interactions between the elements that constitute and enliven the sociocultural phenomena (personality, society, and culture). Usually researchers look to conditions that concern the individual, but a more in-depth analysis shows that, in everyday reality, these conditions are closely related to society and culture. The latter has been vastly neglected in studies concerning positive aspects of everyday life such as gratitude, altruism, solidarity, cooperation, and so on, and this is justified

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by the fact that these are not considered as problematic (negative) aspects of society, but as regular aspects of human and social events. Our idea, instead, is that globalization processes have hindered the humanitarian ethos aimed at communicative interaction and “understanding” between two subjects in action (relationship), who act taking into account their mutual intentions, motivations, and expectations. Therefore, there has been no passage from an approach that reduces the actions of individuals to the mere aspects of exchange (do ut des) to an approach that focuses on the overall interactions between the elements that characterize the exchange and all other social and cultural variables. The work of social researchers and the consequent knowledge they produce are configured in two ways. On the one hand, they formulate scientific responses to real problems not by providing the solution, but by proposing possible paths to be taken for the improvement of the need in question. On the other hand, they allow the development of a “critical and active citizen” very close to Schütz’s (1946) ideal type of the “well-informed citizen.” The latter, revisited according to the current society, seems to hope for a modern citizenship no longer configured only as a right, but also as a duty, and aiming for the constitution of a socially approved and shared knowledge, based on the ethics of responsibility, to be developed through a reflection that is neither subjective nor structural, but related to the order of reality of the social relationship, and that is an essential guide (May & Perry, 2017) for social cohesion and solidarity. We find here the idea of an integrated system of knowledge able to project the activity of the sociologist and other social science researchers in a direction of positive social change. We find also the idea of a sociology, and other social sciences, in a leading role towards these positive changes: the researchers “are ordinary human beings who have dedicated their lives to create knowledge” (Valsiner, 2017, p. 23) and are themselves part of the sociocultural phenomena they study. A distinguished scholar like Sorokin was so convinced of this that he believed in the potential of the social sciences as a guide for humanity, so much so that he even hypothesized the birth of a new applied science that would deal with the promotion of friendship, unconditional love, and mutual aid: The historical moment has struck for building a new applied science or a new art of amitology—the science and art cultivation of amity, unselfish love, and mutual help in interindividual and integroup relationships. A mature amitology is now the paramount need of humanity. Its development tangibly determines the creative future of homo sapiens. (Sorokin, 1951, p. 277)

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The first task of this new discipline would be a careful analysis of the main aspects, properties, and basic forms of altruistic relationship and love energy, which means that amitology actually starts from the study of social relations and interactions. As Rusu (2018) notes, At the core of amitology lie two complementary high ideals: an anthropological end, aiming to discover the most efficient techniques for the altruistic transformation of human personality, and a societal ideal, aiming to reconstruct humanity as a universal community of altruistic love. At a microlevel, Sorokin strove for amitology to lead to the “creative altruisation” of persons and groups, that is, to people’s characterial transfiguration through the power of love. On the macro-level of redeeming society of its evils and hate, conflict and war, violence and inequality, Sorokin imagined a political economy of love based on “finding and inventing the most efficient ways of production, accumulation, and circulation of love energy in the human universe.” (p. 11)

However, applying these ideals implies understanding the mechanisms through which human beings make their decisions on the basis of their degree of knowledge on a given situation, since all exogenous attempts to change individual behaviour are unsuccessful—that is, when one tries to change the political and economic institutions without changing the individuals acting in these systems or, better said, without transforming the way human beings interact, orienting it towards those altruistic relationships which, based on an ethic of responsibility, characterize a free, harmonious, humanistic, and creative society. We are not facing a “new humanism,” but a committed humanism. For the social sciences, this means that we are not faced with a “humanism of the social sciences,” but with committed social sciences. The social sciences not only analyze and study social phenomena, but, with their specificity, contribute to the analysis and study of the more human part of the individual and of the social (living man).

References Adam, B. (1995). Timewatch: The social analysis of time. Cambridge, England: Polity. Adam, B. (2004). Time. Cambridge, England: Polity. Augé, M. (2008). Où est passé l’avenir? [The future]. Paris, France: Éditions du Panama. Batson, Ch.D. (2011). Altruism in humans. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. New York, NY: Doubleday.

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Festinger, L. (1962). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Gehlen, A. (1980). Man in the age of technology. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Jonas, H. (1984). The imperative of responsibility: In search of an ethics for the technological age. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. Kluckhohn, C. (1951). Values and value-orientations in the theory of action: An exploration in definition and classification. In T. Parsons & E. Shils (Eds.), Toward a general theory of action (pp. 388–433). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lassman, P., & Speirs, R. (1994). Weber: Political writings. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Lassman, P., Velody, I., & Martins, H. (1989). Max Weber science as a vocation. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman. Lewin, K. (1951). Field theory in social science. New York, NY: Harper & Row. Lewin, K. (1952). Group decision and social change. In G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, & E. L. Hartley (Eds), Readings in social psychology (pp. 197– 211). New York, NY: Holt. Mangone, E. (2018). Social and cultural dynamics: Revisiting the work of Pitirim A. Sorokin. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Maslow, A. H. (1954). Motivation and personality. New York, NY: Harper & Row. May, T., & Perry, B. (2017). Reflexivity: The essential guide. London, England: SAGE. Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. New York, NY: Glencoe. Ricoeur, P. (1991). Le temps raconté [Time narrated]. Le Courier de l’Unesco, 44(4), 11–15. Rusu, M. S. (2018). Theorizing love in sociological thought: Classical contributions to a sociology of love. Journal of Classical Sociology, 20(1), 3–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/1468795X17700645 Schütz, A. (1932). Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt [The meaningful structure of the social world]. Vienna, Austria: Springer. Schütz, A. (1946). The well-informed citizen. an essay on the social distribution of knowledge. Social Research, 14(4), 463–478. Simon, H. A. (1983). Reason in human affairs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Sorokin, P. A. (n.d.). The nature of sociology and its relation to other sciences. Saskatoon, Canada: University of Saskatchewan, University Archives & Special Collections, P. A. Sorokin fonds, MG449, I, A, 3. Sorokin, P. A. (1948). The reconstruction of humanity. Boston, MA: The Bacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (1951). Amitology as an applied science of amity and unselfish love. In K. G. Specht (Ed.), Soziologische forschung in unserer zeit [Sociological research in our time] (pp. 277–279). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

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Sorokin, P. A. (1954). The ways and power of love: Types, factors and techniques of moral transformation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (1958). Integralism is my philosophy. In W. Burnett (Ed.), This is my philosophy: Twenty of the world’s outstanding thinkers reveal the deepest meaning they have found in life (pp. 180–189). London, England: George Allen & Unwin. Sorokin, P. A. (1966). Sociological theories of today. New York, NY: Harper & Row. Valsiner, J. (2017). From methodology to methods in human psychology. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

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Conclusions Future Research Prospects

U

sing a medical metaphor, Sorokin affirms that sick humanity can find an effective cure in the affirmation of universal altruism, which is seen as an “antidote” (Sorokin, 1958a). In The Mysterious Energy of Love (1959), Sorokin argues that, although little is known of this energy and its mode of production and use, it is sufficient to justify the hypothesis that the “grace of love” is one of the three highest energies known by man (along with truth and beauty). These are the peculiarities that make altruism, or the altruistic relationship, a powerful tool for the reconstruction of humanity, which was falling into a marked sensism due to the transformations of its cultural mentality. In light of this, it is necessary to revitalize research on the various forms of altruistic relationships (gratitude, altruism, solidarity, cooperation, etc.); this new orientation cannot remain enclosed within the limits of humanism, but must aim to establish a new way of doing research, capable of privileging the positive aspects. This tendency had reinforced Sorokin’s (1951) belief that the social sciences were a guide for mankind, to the point of hypothesizing the birth of a new applied science to promote friendship, unconditional love, and mutual aid. It is therefore necessary to carry out studies that not only analyze social phenomena in their negative effects or

Beyond the Dichotomy Between Altruism and Egoism, pages 193–198 Copyright © 2020 by Information Age Publishing All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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conditioning, but also contribute to a science—positive sociology or positive psychology (Mangone & Dolgov, 2019; Nichols, 2012; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000)—that, with its specific characteristics, can contribute to the analysis and study of the more human part of the individual and society (positive or pro-social actions). For researchers, it is no longer enough to possess only that mental quality—sociological imagination (Wright Mills, 1959)—that helps them use information to reach a clear synthesis of what happens or may happen to the individual and the world. The challenge posed by the continuous changes in society, increasingly moving towards globalization, pushes towards a “reinvention”—in particular of sociology—in the form of a new sociological imagination (Fuller, 2006; Solis-Gadea, 2005) in order to contribute to the discovery of human beings as interacting beings. This new perspective requires a knowledge-acquiring process that makes it possible for individuals and their social organizations to identify and mediate their personal interests, combining goals and means. Relationships trigger symbolic mediation (reflexivity) between human subjectivity and social systems and determine the development of that knowledge that leads to the definition and promotion of needs, rights, and duties within a social relationship. This happens particularly through three factors: (a) the involvement of individuals in the surrounding environment; (b) the orientation towards their own interests and those of others; and finally, (c) the possibility of creating relationships for a strong and lasting future collaboration—factors that we find, substantially, in Mauss’s (1923–1924/2002) circularity of the gift: give–receive–reciprocate. It can be said, therefore, that in order to study the altruistic relationship, and their effects, two premises are necessary: 1. Time and space (social environment), since they are two central categories for social analysis, as well as distinctive and constitutive elements of the phenomenologies related to the relationships and everyday experiences of individuals. The latter can be perceived— and therefore studied—in their continuous development, in their flow within the unity of the single experience and the situation; or they can be reflected upon after they have been experienced (Schütz, 1967). In the first case, they coincide with experience— and this applies also to the researcher—and cannot be separated from it; in the second case, by reflecting on past action, it is perceived as something separated from experience. In this way, time is no longer uniform, and becoming aware of this means that indi-

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viduals are oriented in their actions/interactions by the temporal and spatial dimension (social and historical context). 2. The study of altruistic relationships must consider all three levels of analysis of the social sciences, but particularly the meso level: (a) the macro-social level (relative to social systems and their forms of organization); (b) the micro-social level (relative to the individual and his social actions); (c) the meso-social level (relative to the interactions between social system and lifeworld, understood as the set of meanings and representations of culture). Keeping together the three levels of analysis described above implies an intellectual action that goes beyond the “disciplinary” points of view and methods of investigation (qualitative and quantitative). The study of the different forms of altruistic relationships (altruism, solidarity, cooperation, gratitude, etc.) and the relative methodologies adopted must be oriented towards the integration of the subjective and objective dimension. The element that holds everything together is the interpretation and construction of reality through the relationships between individuals, and between individuals, society, and culture. Since individuals are agents of interaction (in their daily life and in institutions), all these aspects should be seen as a correlation of interpretations and not only as the response to a triggering cause. In the 21st century, social relations have taken on a much more complex form than in the previous century, and this leads to conclusive reflections: 1. The study of altruism cannot be enclosed within the boundaries of individual disciplines (sociology, psychology, economics, etc.). 2. The category altruism must be considered virtual and replaced by the category altruistic relationship, which contains all those forms of expression of the relationship that are configured as heterodirected (pro-social). Human action, as a whole, must be understood as the most appropriate way to behave in different situations, and it mirrors the relevant aspects found within the context in which situations occur, thus resolving the dualism between doing and being and the disharmonies and discordances often resulting from social relations. The relationality expressed in the role-playing between the individual and the system is a fundamental defense against negative actions. And in a similar context, the social sciences assume a leading role in redefining not only the paradigms of study, with which they connect the lifeworld (subjectivity and intersubjectivity) and the social system (organizational and subjective structure) but also in fostering the

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relationship between the individual and the social system by orienting the definition of needs, rights, and duties towards an ethics of responsibility. The new research projects on altruistic relationships are a laboratory of methodological experimentation. The analysis must not be limited to scientific research on the issues in question, but also facilitate and accompany the processes of social change. Social science methods do not simply reproduce the phenomena they study, but contribute, to a greater or lesser extent, to their construction. In this logic, research activities, due to the nature of the object of study (the relationship cannot be reduced to numbers or tests), must be able to identify the altruistic relationship in terms of behaviors, lifestyles, and cultural models. One cannot, therefore, understand the life of individuals without understanding society (and vice versa). It is not possible to imagine a world without egoistic relationships, but it is possible to imagine a world in which the negative consequences of these relationships are reduced to a minimum. After all, Sorokin (1958b) maintained that the future of humanity, and its development, is in the hands of humanity itself: Neither law nor education, nor religion or the economy, or science—even though the latter has a specific role in accompanying the processes of improving the lives of individuals and communities—can be enough for this task. This task is assigned to the whole of mankind, and therefore to its communities that can exist only if they have certain characteristics: A peaceful, harmonious, and creative society can exist only when its members possess at least a minimum of love, sympathy, and compassion ensuring mutual aid, co-operation, and fair treatment. Under these conditions its members are united in one collective “we” in which the joys and sorrows of one member are shared by others. (Sorokin, 1948, p. 57)

It is precisely from this brilliant intuition that social scientists need to apply an integrated and integral approach of study and analysis, starting from the assumption that collective strategies are required to promote positive collective effects. Acting on the community means acting on several levels (individual, domestic, institutional, and social), and it is the community as a whole that is the object of the interventions, since it is necessary to normalize the altruistic relationships of the entire community, strengthening the existing networks and structures and creating new ones. It is through methodologically founded observation that we can lay the foundations to build an integrated system of knowledge deriving from an integral social science: “Redefine the paradigms of sociology and other

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social sciences in a direction that keeps together the different dimensions (macro, meso, and micro)” (Mangone, 2018, p. 86). On these last aspects, it is necessary to uphold free and autonomous scientific reflection. Sociological knowledge, and that of the other social sciences, must, however, necessarily merge into a single integrated system of knowledge (integral social sciences), paying attention to all aspects of the transformation of society (in the holistic sense, aspects of personality, society, and culture). This marks the passage from the order of explaining (erklären) to the order of understanding (verstehen): The search for the reason of phenomena must no longer refer to a cause, but to a meaning, which can represent the most effective key for analyzing and developing the interaction between individuals.

References Fuller, S. (2006). The new sociological imagination. London, England: SAGE. Mangone, E. (2018). Social and cultural dynamics: Revisiting the work of Pitirim A. Sorokin. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Mangone, E., & Dolgov, A. (2019). Sorokin’s “altruistic creative love”: Genesis, methodological issues, and applied aspects. Human Arenas, 3, 6–22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42087-019-00058-w Mauss, M. (2002). The gift: The form and reason for exchange in archaic societies. London, England: Routledge. (Original work published 1923–1924) Nichols, L. T. (2012). North Central Sociological Association presidential address: Renewing sociology: Integral science, solidarity, and loving kindness. Sociological Focus, 45(4), 261–273. Schütz, A. (1967). The phenomenology of the social world. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. American Psychologist, 55(1), 5–14. https://doi.org/10.1037/ 0003-066x.55.1.5 Solis-Gadea, H. R. (2005). The new sociological imagination: Facing the challenges of a new millennium. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 18(3/4), 13–122. Sorokin, P. A. (1948). The reconstruction of humanity. Boston, MA: The Bacon Press. Sorokin, P. A. (1951). Amitology as an applied science of amity and unselfish love. In K.G. Specht (Ed.), Soziologische forschung in unserer zeit [Sociological research in our time] (pp. 277–279). Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. Sorokin, P. A. (1958a). Love: The most effective force in the world. Guideposts, 13(2), 16–17. Sorokin, P. A. (1958b). Integralism is my philosophy. In W. Burnett (Ed.), This is my philosophy: Twenty of the world’s outstanding thinkers reveal the deepest

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About the Author

E

miliana Mangone is an associate professor of sociology of culture and communication at University of Salerno (Italy), Department of Political and Communication Sciences. She is a director of the International Centre for Studies and Research “Mediterranean Knowledge” (2015– 2021). Her main investigative interests are in the field of cultural and institutional systems, with particular attention to the social representations, relational processes, and knowledge as key elements to the human act, and in migration studies. She recently published “Gratitude and the Relational Theory of Society,” Human Arenas, 2(1), 34–44 (2019); Social and Cultural Dynamics. Revisiting the Work of Pitirim A. Sorokin (Springer, 2018); (with G. Masullo & M. Gallego, eds.), Gender and Sexuality in the Migration Trajectories. Studies between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean Shores (Information Age, 2018).

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