Between Reason and Faith: Anti-Rationalism in Italian Jewish Thought 1250–1650 [Reprint 2020 ed.] 9783112318195, 9783112307007

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PUBLICATIONS IN NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST STUDIES COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Editorial Board Chairman TIBOR H A L A S I - K U N

Members JOHN S . BADEAU

CHARLES P . ISSAWI

DOUGLAS M . D U N L O P

JOSEPH SCHACHT

JACOB C . HUREWITZ

EHSAN YAR-SHATER

Series A X

I his series, published under the auspices of the Department of Near and Middle East Languages and of the Near and Middle East Institute of Columbia University, consists of monographs, readers and other studies designed to promote systematic research on the Near and Middle East and to further pub .ic understanding of the problems of the area. The opinions expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department or the Institute.

BETWEEN REASON AND

FAITH Anti-Rationalism

in Italian Jewish Thought 1250-1650 by

I S A A C E. B A R Z I L A Y

1967

MOUTON THE H A G U E • PARIS

© 1967 by the Trustees o f Columbia University in the City of New York. No part o f this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the Publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER : 6 7 - 2 4 3 7 6

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS BY MOUTON & CO., PRINTERS, THE HAGUE

PREFACE

Some years ago while studying the Berlin Haskalah, it became clear to me that certain aspects of that movement were actually not as new as generally believed, and that these aspects must have had antecedents in an earlier age. Since the Jewish community of Italy was the only one in world Jewry, after the expulsion from Spain in 1492, which was exposed to a high degree to the impact of the secular culture of the environment, it was only natural to turn to that Jewry in search of these antecedents. The present study discusses the opposition to rationalism which arose among Italian Jews in the late medieval and Renaissance periods. Whereas this opposition reflects to a great extent the anti-rationalist trends that were spreading in Italy and other European countries as a reaction to medieval scholasticism, the emphasis of this study is on the unique Jewish aspect. It attempts to summarize the thought of Jewish intellectuals in Italy on the problem of Judaism in a milieu of growing involvement in the general culture. Viewed from this vantage point, this book is a continuation of my earlier studies of the Haskalah, though in a reverse direction. The anti-rationalist viewpoint is presented here as a continuous structured trend through a series of monographs on its major spokesmen throughout the ages. Owing to the marked difference in intellectual greatness and originality of the persons presented, the monographs are not of equal strength and quality. Regarding transliteration, I have attempted to be consistent, allowing however for a few exceptions. Thus the weak beth is transliterated throughout as V ; the 'b' is left, however, in Aboth. The koph is transliterated as 'q'; the koph of Cabbalah, however, as 'c'. The weak kaph is transliterated as 'kh', the guttural heth as 'h'; the tav is rendered by 'th' only at the end of a word; by a ' t ' at the beginning and in the middle. Finally the tsadi is transliterated a s ' s ' . Titles transliterated by others are left unchanged. Of diacritical marks only the half-circle sign de-

6

PREFACE

noting the guttural layin is used; it is nevertheless left out in Ibn Ezra. Perplexing to some readers of the notes may be my use, in a few instances, of two editions of one source. Unfortunately this was unavoidable. A certain edition used at one time was unavailable on other occasions. Thus, two different editions were consulted of Abravanel's Nahalath Aboth, of de Rossi's Me'or 'Einayim, and of Ya'aves' Or ha-Hayyim. Extended references to edition and page numbers should, however, remove any difficulties in identifying the source. In the attached glossary of Hebrew terms, words which appear in standard dictionaries have been excluded. The bibliography, though not exhaustive, includes most of the titles referred to in the text. Left out are the sources used for the "conclusion". While the weaknesses of this work with regard to both content and form are entirely my own, the credit for some of its assets I must share with others. I am indebted to my teacher and colleague, Professor S. W. Baron, for reading parts of the manuscript and making valuable suggestions; to my sister, Dr. Miriam Eisenstein, for innumerable stylistic improvements; to my wife, Hayyah (Helly), nee Frost, for the many hours she spent in typing and retyping the manuscript and for her advice regarding the form of notes and bibliography; and last but not least, to my children, Joshua and Sharona, whose demand on my attention made me aware of the preciousness of time, indirectly expediting the completion of the work. For most of the books used in this work 1 was dependent on the cooperation of the New York libraries. My thanks go to the library of Columbia University, Hebrew Union College, the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, the New York Public Library, and the library of the Union Theological Seminary. Their staffs have been at all times most courteous and helpful. For the publication of this book in the series of "Publications in Near and Middle East Studies, Columbia University", I am grateful to Professor T. Halasi-Kun, chairman of the Department of Near and Middle East Languages and Cultures and chairman of the editorial board, as well as to the other members of the board. Professor Halasi-Kun not only offered me the department's publication facilities, but also read the manuscript and made suggestions to improve its form. For a scrupulous reading and expert editing of the text my thanks are 'due to Mrs. Fanny Davis. A grant from the Council for Research in the Humanities, Columbia University, afforded me part of the leisure required for writing this book. New York, N.Y., September, 1965

Columbia University

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

5

Abbreviations

9

Introduction

11 PART O N E

RATIONALIST A N D ANTI-RATIONALIST T R E N D S A M O N G ITALIAN JEWS I N T H E T H I R T E E N T H C E N T U R Y

I.

T H E SPREAD OF SECULAR STUDIES AND RATIONALISM

.

.

19

JACOB BEN ABBA M A R I BEN R ' SHIM'ON ANATOLI

.

.

28

III.

ZERAHYAH BEN YISHAQ BEN SHALTIEL H E N OF BARCELONA

33

IV.

HILLEL BEN SHMUEL BEN EL'AZAR OF VERONA

42

II.

.

.

.

PART T W O I N T H E S H A D O W O F THE EXILE F R O M SPAIN

V. VI.

T H E SIXTEENTH CENTURY

61

ISAAC ABRAVANEL ( 1 4 3 7 - 1 5 0 8 )

72

1. Introduction 2. Metaphysical Speculations a. Creation Versus Eternity b. Man and the Universe 3. The Immortality of the Soul and Resurrection 4. Miracles

72 79 79 84 90 94

.

8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

5. 6. 7. 8. VII. VIII.

Prophecy Biblical Allegorizations National Thought The Ethical Problem

100 109 118 126

JOSEPH YA'AVES ( 1 4 3 8 - 1 5 0 7 )

133

JOSEPH IBN YAHYA ( 1 4 9 6 - 1 5 3 9 )

150

PART THREE ITALIAN ANTI-RATIONALISTS O F T H E RENAISSANCE A N D POST-RENAISSANCE PERIODS

IX. X. XI. XII.

JUDAH MOSCATO ( 1 5 3 2 - 1 5 9 0 )

167

'AZARIAH FIGO ( 1 5 7 9 - 1 6 4 7 )

192

JUDAH D E L BENE

210

F O L L O W - U P AND CONCLUSION

218

Glossary of Hebrew Terms

223

Bibliography

225

Index

233

ABBREVIATIONS

BT EJ HUCA JE JQR MGWJ REJ UJE

Babylonian Talmud Encyclopaedia Judaica Hebrew Union College Annual Jewish Encyclopedia Jewish Quarterly Review Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums Revue des Etudes Juives Universal Jewish Encyclopedia

INTRODUCTION

During the five centuries which separate Sa'adyah Gaon (d. 942) from Joseph Albo (d. 1444) a supreme effort was made by Jewish intellectuals to reinterpret Judaism in the light of Greco-Islamic philosophy and science which, from about the tenth century on, began to penetrate the Jewish world, exerting a marked influence on it. A tenacious loyalty to an ancient law and culture, on the one hand, and a growing awareness of the intellectual and scientific trends in the milieu, on the other hand, prompted such an interpretation and made it imperative. The creative minority within Jewry, it seems, could not respond to the challenge of the philosophical and scientific awakening in both the Islamic and, at a later period, the Christian world in any way other than by absorbing the new ideas and attempting to reconcile them with Judaism. The product of this effort was, indeed, a new synthesis necessitated by the historical reality. This synthesis had twofold implications. On the one hand, the interaction with the wider intellectual currents of the time caused Judaism to emerge from its insularity, enriched it, and demonstrated its vitality and adaptability. On the other hand, this process was wrought with grave dangers as far as the spiritual survival of the Jewish people was concerned. Since Jewry was deprived of the natural prerequisites for a normal national existence, its preservation in the Diaspora depended primarily on the integrity of its religious beliefs and practices, as well as on the preservation of its national hopes and aspirations. These foundations rationalism, by its very nature, tended to weaken and undermine. Although the spread of rational speculation and knowledge generally constitutes a positive force in the life of normal societies, enriching their ethos and elevating them to higher cultural levels, it has proven throughout exilic Jewish history to have had a rather adverse effect on the national Jewish ethos, evoking in the people centrifugal tendencies of social dissolution and religious decline.

12

INTRODUCTION

Being both individualistic and universal, enlightened and skeptical, rationalism is bound to have an adverse effect on Judaism, an essentially national religion centered on the community rather than the individual, and based on practices rather than abstract creeds. Notwithstanding the fact that medieval Jewish rationalism evolved its concepts and attitudes within the framework o f traditional Judaism, its character was essentially individualistic. A n offspring o f an intellectual perplexity which engulfed the creative minority o f the people in consequence o f their encounter with GrecoIslamic culture, rationalism directed itself exclusively to that minority. Whatever " h i g h e r " meanings it discovered in Judaism, they were not intended f o r popular dissemination, but rather treasured as the privileged possession o f an intellectual élite, fostering the illusion that by contemplating these concepts this élite would preserve its self-assumed aristocratic status not only in this world but in the hereafter as well. Although Talmudic Judaism is also deeply class conscious, doing its utmost to glorify the high position o f its legalistic creative minority both on earth and in heaven, nevertheless this minority is not conceived o f as exclusive in character.

O n the contrary, it is its explicit aim to attract

ever larger segments o f the people, so as to raise them to its level o f scholarship

and

behavior.

Moreover,

rationalist

though

Talmudic

Judaism is, and no less appreciative than the philosophers o f human reasoning as the highest quality in man, it considers this reasoning o f a thoroughly functional nature and completely subservient to the national ideal o f building, through legal regulation, a cohesive society, united in thought and attitudes, and sharing a common way o f life. In contradistinction, philosophical reasoning, aiming rather at individual selffulfillment, and spinning as it does its web in the isolation o f the mind, advances a point o f view which is essentially anti-communal, and which, when driven to its logical conclusions, may even become a socially disruptive force. W i t h rationalism, it may thus be concluded, individualism made its entry into Judaism, and though claiming a place f o r itself within the framework o f the national culture, it could not but weaken that culture by introducing a point o f view which was extraneous to it. However, the main danger o f rationalism to the religious and national integrity o f Judaism lay in its very essence, in its insistence on a greatly expanded concept o f Judaism by virtue o f which the contemplation o f man and the universe came to be thought o f as constituting an integral part o f Jewish culture, indeed its highest expression and goal.

Although

such a conception, with its implied positive attitude toward the pursuit

INTRODUCTION

13

of science and metaphysics, could justly be defended on grounds of adding new dimensions of meaning to Judaism, widening its scope and enhancing its intellectual significance, it could not be expected to remain unchallenged by the communally oriented leaders. They feared — and rightly so — that the spread of such a conception would adversely affect "functional" Judaism, relegating it to a secondary position and ultimately undermining many of the popular beliefs and practices which had become an integral part of its historical texture. It is above all the prevalence of this point of view, the concern for the continued existence of the nation and for the preservation of its culture, which is characteristic of the arguments of the anti-rationalists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, whose views constitute the bulk of this work. Though an immanent criticism of rationalism, in terms of its objective shortcomings as a Welt and Lebensanschauung, is also to be found in their writings, such criticism is of secondary importance; the major stress remains on the incompatibility of rationalism with the national ideal. Hence it is to history, rather than to an analysis of rationalism itself, and notably to the history of Iberian Jewry of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries — with the mass flight from Judaism as its outstanding characteristic — to which the anti-rationalists turn for evidence of the undermining effect of rational speculation. Judged from this point of view, their anti-rationalist stand represents a reassertion of the national-communal point of view, demanding that it be the only yardstick for the evaluation of the desirability of an interaction between Judaism and general culture. Rationalism, they accordingly assert, must be rejected as aristocratic in nature, serving the intellectual needs of only a small minority, and contradictory to the democratic and popular character of Judaism. They emphasize still more the ideological chasm between rationalism and Judaism. Rationalism, they point out, centers on the external universe, on the acquisition of knowledge of the physical environment; Judaism on the fate of the human soul, on man's spiritual welfare. With human destiny conceived by them in terms of drawing closer to God by restoring the soul to its Divine source, the antirationalists point to the lack of any correlation between the attainment of this goal and the rationalist ideal of intellectual perfection. Though not entirely unappreciative of rational learning and its achievements, they feel that the higher spiritual goals of humanity can hardly be attained by it. Regarding the intrinsic criticisms of rationalism, the anti-rationalists reiterate repeatedly the inadequacy of the deductive method, whose process they describe as slow, laborious, and rarely leading to a knowledge

14

INTRODUCTION

of causes. Especially "confused" and uncertain is metaphysical knowledge; nor has there been, according to them, any substantial advancement in the knowledge of the physical world. Common to almost all of them is the criticism of the rationalist conception of the soul as a "capacity" which attains substantiality through an intellectual and contemplative endeavor. This they reject in favor of the Platonic view of the soul as a separate Divine substance with an existence which precedes that of its earthly sojourn in the body and which continues after its separation from it. From the nine men discussed in this work only seven may properly be called anti-rationalists; the other two, Jacob Anatoli and Zerahyah Hen, represent rather the opposite point of view. I have nevertheless deemed it proper to include them — Anatoli as a representative of the early kind of rationalist allegory which penetrated Biblical exegesis in the wake of Maimonides' influence, and Zerahyah for the sake of a fuller understanding of the views of R' Hillel, the first anti-rationalist of Italian Jewry. Chronologically these men may be divided into three groups: The earliest, dating to the thirteenth century, includes Jacob Anatoli, Zerahyah Hen and Hillel ben Shmuel of Verona; the middle one, of the end of the fifteenth and the first half of the sixteenth centuries, includes Isaac Abravanel, Joseph Ya'aves, and Joseph Ibn Yahya; and finally the third one, of the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries, includes Judah Moscato, 'Azariah Figo, and Judah del Bene. Left out of the present discussion are the views of the mystic and scientist, Joseph Shlomo Delmedigo, with which I hope to deal in a separate study. Though all of these men, with the exception of Anatoli and Zerahyah, share the common characteristic of a critical attitude toward rationalism, their views do display a great divergence in terms of sources, emphases, and degrees of extremity of position, since they were widely apart chronologically, and each of them subject to different historical and cultural influences. Thus, whereas it is the impact of Aristotelianism, Maimonides, and scholasticism which is felt in the writings of R' Hillel of the thirteenth century, it is that of Platonism, the Cabbalah, and Renaissance humanism which strongly permeates the views of Moscato of the sixteenth century. Again, it is the rise of science which is adumbrated in the sermons of R' Figo of the seventeenth century. Even more decisively are the views of each affected by the historical situation of Jewry at his particular time. The relatively tranquil atmosphere of thirteenth-century Italy, with its amicable relations between

INTRODUCTION

15

Christian and Jewish scholars, is reflected not only in the rather liberal views on Christians held by the Jewish scholars of the time, but in the very nature of their thought. Even the anti-rationalist Hillel is a humanitarian, and his criticism focuses primarily on the Aristotelian concept of the soul, with the national elements pushed almost to the background. The reverse, however, is true of the Spanish group of anti-rationalists. With the exile from Spain only a recent event, experienced as a personal tragedy by all of them, their anti-rationalism is actually an expression of their frustration and embitterment at the Christian world. What wonder then that it is extreme and uncompromising, often condemning all forms of secular learning, on the one hand, and extolling the uniqueness of Israel and its culture, on the other hand. Similarly, Moscato's relatively mild censure of rationalism and his rather positive attitude toward secular learning might be understood in terms of the lingering benevolent atmosphere of Renaissance days, whereas the uncompromising and negative attitudes of Figo and del Bene could be seen against the growing éloignement between Christians and Jews, and the increasing hopelessness and despair among Italian Jews which had set in since the days of the Counter-Reformation. Finally, the description of the men discussed in this work as "Italians" must be somewhat qualified. Such an appellation is correct for all of them only from a purely territorial point of view, since they all lived and wrote their works in Italy. It would be wrong, however, to go much beyond that and consider them, or at least most of them, as Italians in any other sense, and to attempt to draw from this fact general conclusions with regard to the character of Italian Jewry and its culture. Of the nine men discussed in this work, Anatoli was of Provençal origin ; Zerahyah, Abravanel, and Ya'aves were Spanish and spent most of their lives in Spain. Spanish also, though a native of Italy, was Ibn Yahya. He was born in the year of his family's flight from Portugal (1496), an event that was, no doubt, imprinted on him by family tradition from the early years of his life, and the impact of which may well explain the extremity of his views. Direct Spanish influences also molded the views of the native Italian, R' Hillel, who, in his youth, spent some years at Barcelona studying both Jewish and secular subjects. Nor can the impact of such influences be ignored in the cases of Moscato and Figo. Though Moscato is perhaps the most typically Italian of all the scholars discussed here, he displays the deep influence of Halevi's Kuzari, and many of Figo's views are to be explained as a direct reaction to the critical rationalist attitudes which prevailed particularly among segments of

16

INTRODUCTION

Venetian Spanish Jews, whose spiritual leader he was for may years. It thus becomes obvious that the anti-rationalist trends described in this book transcend the geographical boundaries of Italy and constitute an expression of a larger segment of Jewry. It is with this qualification in mind that the title of our work may be found to be accurate. In conclusion, a final remark may be in place regarding the inevitable recurrence of similar subject matter in the exposition of the philosophies of the later anti-rationalists. The reader is likely to become aware of it in the sections devoted to Ya'aves, Ibn Yahya, and Figo, since each of these men draws, to a smaller or larger extent, from the thinking preceding him. Thus Ya'aves is greatly influenced not only by Halevi, but also by Abravanel and Eliyahu Delmedigo, and Ibn Yahya is under the same influence as well as under that of Ya'aves. Figo, again, though indebted to all of these men, is most greatly and directly influenced by his immediate predecessor, Moscato. Since this study is focused on antirationalism, and attempts to describe fully the views and attitudes of its major spokesmen, a certain degree of repetitiousness becomes unavoidable. However, this very repetitiousness constitutes in essence a basic trait of Jewish thought of the medieval period. Notwithstanding the constantly changing historical conditions of Jewry and its milieus, the crux of the problem under discussion, namely the relationship between reason and faith, or, more precisely, between Judaism and worldly culture, remained essentially unchanged, as did also — until the rise of science — the basic attitudes prevailing among the rationalists as well as among the anti-rationalists. Analogous to the former who, in the course of centuries, added but little original or new to the basic formulation of rationalism by Maimonides, the latter also continued for centuries merely to repeat and elaborate upon the basic concepts of anti-rationalism as expressed by Halevi. Thus, in the final analysis, there is indeed but little original and innovating intellectual creativity in medieval Judaism after Halevi and Maimonides.

PART ONE RATIONALIST AND ANTI-RATIONALIST TRENDS AMONG ITALIAN JEWS IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

I THE SPREAD OF SECULAR STUDIES AND RATIONALISM

The period from about the second quarter of the thirteenth century till around the middle of the following century constitutes a remarkable phase in the intellectual history of Italian Jewry. From Salerno and Naples in the south, through Rome and Perugia in the center, to Bologna and Ferrara in the north, a Jewry, awakened to the intellectual trends of the time, emerges, and, full of strength and enterprise, undertakes to expand its own horizons, contributing at the same time in no small measure to the enrichment of the general culture. Spanish Jewry was already entering the age of epigonism, in the wake of a great creative and scholarly development over a period of almost three hundred years, and an antirationalist and and-secular campaign was under way in the communities of Provence, when an exuberant youthful creativeness and a passion for the new learning of the time seemed to have gripped sizable sections of Italian, notably Roman, Jewry. Perhaps even more than in the Golden Age of Spain of the eleventh and twelfth centuries were the new tendencies distinguished by their encyclopedic and synthetic proclivities. The desire for a broader Jewish knowledge, that would encompass not only the Talmud but the Bible and the Hebrew language as well, went hand in hand with the longing to embrace the whole scope of secular learning of the time. Thus 'Immanuel of Rome, the most eminent Jewish poet of the age (1270-1330), boasts not only of his accomplishments in Hebrew grammar, Biblical exegesis, poetry, and mystical Jewish literature, but also of his "expertness" in mathematics, astronomy, and philosophy.1 It is above all the wide scope of learning, embracing mathematical, natural, and "Divine" knowledge, which he extols in his gifted cousin, Judah Romano, 2 1 Mahbaroth 'Immanuel ha-Romi in 2 volumes, ed. and introduced by Dov Yarden (Jerusalem, 1957); Mahbereth, 1,11. 317-368; VII, 11. 355-362 (hereafter cited as Mahbaroth). 2 Ibid., XII, 11. 158-166, 233-236; M. Steinschneider, Giuda Romano (Estratto dal giornale romano, II Buonarroti, quaderno I, gennaio, Roma, 1870); idem, Letteratura

20

THE SPREAD OF SECULAR STUDIES AND RATIONALISM

as well as in his older contemporary, Benjamin Bozecco. 3 The time abounded in Talmudic scholars and Biblical commentators, poets and philosophers, mathematicians and physicians, copyists and grammarians. 4 Instances of the pursuit of secular learning were common among Italian Jews even in earlier centuries. The Ahima'as Scroll, discovered by A. Neubauer almost a century ago, 8 points not only to a poetical tradition of almost two hundred years, from the ninth to the eleventh century, among the Jews of Southern Italy, but also to a preoccupation with medicine and astronomy. These proclivities, as well as an interest in historical and linguistic studies, are indicated also by Shabbetai Donolo's Sefer Hakmoni of the tenth century, R' Nathan ben Yehiel's lArukh of the end of the eleventh century, and possibly also the Yosiphon of the same period. 6 Although typical of the scholarly leanings of Italian Jewry, which were to persist in future generations, these are nevertheless only isolated instances to which it is hardly justifiable to attach social significance. It is, however, this social aspect which singles out the new development of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Though this activity is, as always, the work of individuals, these individuals preach their views and ideas in public, gather students around them, and through the students attempt to diffuse these ideas among wider circles. A sizable group of men arises in the Jewish communities of the time, and, fired by the spirit of the new learning, preaches new cultural values and attitudes. The study of the Talmud continues, of course, to occupy a central position; enthusiasm and zeal, however, seem directed toward the new vistas of secular learning, both Jewish and general. There appears even a criticism of the preItaliana dei Giudei (Roma, 1864), p. 36 (hereafter cited as Letteratura); A. Berliner, Persönliche Beziehungen zwischen Christen und Juden im Mittelalter (Halberstadt, 1881), p. 14 (hereafter cited as Persönliche Beziehungen). 3 Mahbaroth, XII, 11. 270ff. 4 M. Güdemann, Geschichte des Erziehungswesens und der Cultur {sie!] der Juden in Italien (Wien, 1884), chaps. III, IV, V (hereafter cited as Geschichte)-, A. Berliner, Geschichte der Juden in Rom, II (Frankfurt am Main, 1893), chaps. IV-V (hereafter cited as Geschichte)', H. Vogelstein and P. Rieger, Geschichte der Juden in Rom, 1 (Berlin, 1896), pp. 350-455 (hereafter cited as Geschichte)-, I. Zinberg, Toledoth Sifruth Yisrael, vol. I (Tel Aviv, 1955), bk. Ill (hereafter cited as Toledoth). Essential as primary sources for that period are the Mafibaroth of 'Immanuel, Kalonymos ben Kalonymos, Even Bohan, ed. A. M. Haberman (Jerusalem, 1956), see mainly pp. 44ff.; H. Schirmann, Mivftar ha-Shirah ha-'Ivrith b'ltalia (Berlin, 1934), passim. 6 Megillath Aftima'as, ed. Benjamin Klar (Jerusalem, 1944). ' Shmuel David Luzzatto, II Giudaismo Illustrato, I (Padova, 1848), pp. 34-42; Steinschneider, Letteratura, pp. 19, 20, 21, 32; Yishaq Baer, "Sefer Yosiphon ha-'Ivri", Sefer Dinaburg (Jerusalem, 1948-1949), pp. 178-205; Zinberg, Toledoth, vol. I, bk. III; Güdemann, Geschichte, chaps. I, II.

THE SPREAD OF SECULAR STUDIES AND RATIONALISM

21

eminence of the study of the Talmud per seP Most of the praises 'Immanuel showers upon the distinguished contemporaries of his day, are for their achievements in secular learning rather than in the Halakhah, whereas his own claim to paradise he justifies solely on the basis of his contributions to Biblical exegesis.8 Again, it is not for the sake of studying the Talmud that Yehiel ben Yoab, a disciple of Shabbetai ben Shlomo of the second half of the thirteenth century, keeps his night vigils, but rather to study philosophy, notably Maimonides' Guide.9 Nor, may it finally be mentioned, did 'Immanuel and his friends break open R' Aharon's box of manuscripts, which he had brought from Spain, in search of halakhic works, but rather in the hope of finding the works of Aristotle and his commentators—an act that was in violation of its owner's wish and their solemnly made promise. 10 That these trends seem to have gained widely in scope during the thirteenth century, giving rise to an intelligentsia, is indicated not only by 'Immanuel, whose poetical extravagances have almost as a rule a social setting, but even more so by the scholarly activities of Jacob Anatoli of the first half of the thirteenth century, and of R' Zerahyah Hen and R ' Hillel ben Shmuel of Verona of the second half of that century. All these men, the first two of whom hailed from Provence and Catalonia, respectively, gathered disciples around them in whom they tried to inculcate their new ideas. The last two, as we shall see, became involved in the early nineties of the thirteenth century in a lively polemic concerning miracles in the Bible and Maimonides' interpretation of them, a polemic that seems to have attracted rather wide public attention. The fact that Anatoli's attempts to teach his philosophical interpretations of the Bible in public ended in failure, 11 whereas those of the more extreme Zerahyah seem to have been crowned with success, gaining him many disciples and friends, 12 clearly indicates the change in attitude which had taken place in 7 Jacob ben Abba Mari ben R' Shim'on Anatoli, "Haqdamath ha-Mehabber" in Malmad ha-Talmidim, ed. S. Z. H. Halberstam (Lyck, 1866) (hereafter cited as Malmad). 8 Mabbaroth, XXVIII, 11. 627-631. 9 Cf., "Ha-Ketav ha-Zeh Shalahti Ani Yehiel ben R' Jacob... l'ha-Rav Shabbetai ben R' Shlomoh", Ozar Tob, hebräische Beilage, Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums, herausgegeben von Dr. A. Berliner und Dr. D. Hoffmann, XVII (Berlin, 1890), pp. 37-40. 10 Mabbaroth, VIII, 11. 490 ff. 11 "Haqdamah", Malmad. 12 C f , his Imrei Da'ath (commentary on Proverbs), ed. Dr. Israel Schwarz in P. Smolensky's Ha-Shabar II (Wien, 1871), conclusion at end of chap. XXXI; Tiqvath Enosh (commentary on Job), ed. Dr. Israel Schwarz (Berlin, 1868), pp. 167-293, see conclusion, p. 293.

22

THE SPREAD OF SECULAR STUDIES AND RATIONALISM

Italian Jewry with reference to the pursuit of philosophy and secular learning during the more than half a century that separates these scholars. What was the essence of the new learning, and what were the causes of its penetration and diffusion among the Jews? "Italian Jewry", Shmuel David Luzzatto observed, "has always been orthodox and at the same time more or less enlightened".13 At almost no time in its long history, not even during the Counter-Reformation with its enforced physical seclusion of the Jews behind the ghetto walls, had Italian Jewry ever withdrawn from cultural contacts with the general environment. Indeed, in no other land of the Jewish dispersion were relations between Jews and the majority population as consistently close as here.14 With the Jews constituting at almost all times an integral part of society, it is primarily to the general developments within that society that the new scholarly trends among them must be attributed. It was during the thirteenth century that scholasticism reached its peak, that many universities were established and developed, and that a great many of the works in Arabic on the philosophy, science, and medicine of the Ancients were translated into Latin, thus making available to the Christian world the intellectual heritage of both Greeks and Arabs.15 As far as the Jews were concerned, there were, however, additional factors which may have been conducive to the spread of the new learning among them to a greater extent and at an earlier date than among the non-Jews. Southern Italy and Spain, the fountainheads of the new learning whence it flowed to the North, had at the time large Jewish communities. Contacts between the Jewish communities of the North and the South of Italy were already common in the twelfth century and must have increased in the thirteenth.16 Even more important were the intensified ties which developed with the communities of Provence and Spain. While the influence of the Franco-German center continued in the area of the Halakhah, 17 in other areas Italian Jewry came more and more under the influence of the Spanish-Provencal center. The discernible beginning of these ties may be traced to the middle of 13

S. D. Luzzatto, Il Giudaismo Illustrato, I, p. 29. Giidemann, Geschichte, chaps. III, IV, V, VIII; Berliner, Persönliche Beziehungen ; see also I. Barzilay, "The Enlightenment and the Jews" (on microfilm, unpublished doctoral dissertation) (Columbia University, 1955), pp. 18ff. 15 Maurice de Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy (New York, 1909), pp. 240ff.; Ettore Coppi, Le Universita Italiane nel Medico Evo (terza edizione, Firenze, 1886); Antonio Favaro, L'Università di Padova (Venezia, 1922), pp. 5ff.; Steinschneider, Letteratura, passim. 16 Vogelstein and Rieger, Geschichte, I, pp. 397-398. 17 Ibid., pp. 374-387. 14

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23

the twelfth century, when the eminent scholar, Abraham Ibn Ezra, spent some years in the communities of Rome, Mantua, Lucca, and others, giving instruction in Hebrew grammar and Biblical exegesis, and composing some of his own works.18 Another scholar from Spain, a contemporary of Judah Halevi and Abraham Ibn Ezra, was Shlomo Parhon of Aragon, who also disseminated the knowledge of his countrymen in Hebrew grammar and Biblical exegesis among the Jews of Southern Italy. In 1161 he composed at Salerno his Comm. I Kings 3:12, p. 470, col. 1.

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to solve the problem of the motions of the heavenly bodies. This area of being is, however, so little known and abounds in so many false assumptions, that one ought rather to abstain from speculating on it. Neither is the number of the intelligences, nor their essence or effect known. 7 1 The second realm of being, which is lower in position in the universal hierarchy, is that of the rotating spheres with their stars. The hierarchical principle prevails here also, by virtue of which at least one of the spheres, the eighth or ninth, is superior to all the rest and directly moved by God. 7 2 Though more accessible to sensual human perception, this realm of being still yields little definitive and indisputable knowledge. A variety of opinions prevails with regard to the number of the spheres, their composition and motions. Plato considers them composed of the same substance as the sublunar objects, and like them subject to generation and decay; Aristotle attributes to them a different, ethereal substance, and considers them eternal. Nor is there agreement among scholars as to the question of the relationship between the spheres and the intelligences, whether the latter conduct them as a pilot does his ship, or in response to a desire which their images evoke in them. 7 3 He doubts the validity of Maimonides' view that they are alive and possessed of a soul, 74 and leans rather to a more natural explanation of their motions as prompted by a desire to return to their proper "abode", a desire which is also the cause of motion in the sublunar world. 75 If in the terms of the macrocosmosmicrocosmos parallelism, the intelligences take on the likeness of the head or the mind, the eternally rotating spheres are like the constantly moving heart. Doubtful as astronomical knowledge appears to him, of the truth of at least one aspect of it, namely judicial astronomy, he is fully convinced. Like most Jewish and non-Jewish scholars of medieval and Renaissance times, he believes that all motion in the sublunar realm, which is the cause of the multiplicity of natural beings, is ultimately the result of the motions of celestial bodies. It is the positions of the stars, especially the planets, in relation to each other and in relation to the various constellations of the Zodiac, which decide the fates of nations and individuals, countries and cities. Their positions affect and control not only the physical composition and fate of the individual, but also a great deal of his mental proclivities. Each nation, country, or city has its heavenly 71 72 73 74 76

Comm., I Kings 3:12, p. 475a, col. 1. For references see, supra, n. 69. See Comm. Exod. 25:10; I Kings 3:12; Mif'aloth, III, chap. 3. Guide, II, 4. Mif'aloth, III, chap. 3, p. 21.

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star, from which all its good and evil emanate, and it is to that notion that both Daniel and Zechariah alluded. These views, as we shall see, are of great importance in his conception of the uniqueness of Israel, and they will be dealt with later. At the moment, it is worthwhile to take note of two seemingly contradictory sets of assumptions which he makes with regard to the heavenly influence. It is, first, both collective and individual, affecting the group and the individual; secondly, it is both initial and permanent, implanting first the "tendency" and then acting upon it to bring about its realization. With the aid of these assumptions, Abravanel, as we shall see later, attempts to reconcile natural determinism and Divine Providence. 76 The third realm of being is the sublunar, more narrowly defined as our own world. It is the lowest of the three and the most material, hence the most subject to decay and destruction. As mentioned, its life span will not extend beyond the sixth millennium, whereupon it will come to an end, to be replaced, after some time, by a new world. Like the other two realms of being, it too is hierarchical. Indeed, it is from its hierarchy, sensually perceived, that the hierarchical nature of the other two domains is inferred. It consists of four stages: the material-inanimate, the vegetative, the sensual, and the intellectual, each successive stage being a higher form of the hierarchy and constituting the matter of the succeeding stage. Thus, what is form in a previous stage becomes matter in the succeeding one. In the spirit of rising neo-Platonism, as represented by the works of Marsiglio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, and Leone Ebreo, Abravanel conceives of man as the peak of creation and its goal. Man is not only the most elevated among the creatures of the sublunar world, but he is also superior to the rotating spheres. The arguments of Maimonides in behalf of the alleged "reasonableness" of the heavenly hosts, which refute the homocentric concept of the universe, are to him weak and unconvincing. Indeed, from the uniformity of the motions of the spheres an opposite view of them may be inferred, namely that they are neither alive, nor possessed of a soul. Hence "the smallest insect, by virtue of being alive, is more important than all the lofty cedars of L e b a n o n " . " They (the spheres) are perishable, whereas man's soul, created together with the 76

C/., mainly 'Atereth Zeqenim, chap. XI; Comm. Deut. 4:15ff., pp. 9-11; "Zevah Pesah ha-Shalem" in Haggadah Shel Pesah (Lodz, 1928), pp. 101-103, commentary on nrn n W a a n s a p - i m ' m a s i ; Nahalath Aboth, 3:18, p. 87b, commentary on DipaV D^a IXIplff Virrar •pa-on; ibid., 3:19, p. 97a, commentary on ^SS 75H WITO n i r a i ; "Ha-sha'ar ha-sheni", Ma'ynei ha-Yeshifah, XII, pp. 406ff. " Comm. Gen. 1:16, p. 12b.

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abstract intelligences and like them hewn from beneath the Throne of the Almighty, is eternal. 78 The fact that man, according to the Bible, appears last in the order of creation implies that he constitutes its highest form. This is not, however, as Maimonides thought, due to the potentiality inherent in man to transform himself into an actual intelligence. The reasons are much deeper and of greater significance in the universal order. Rather than being indicative of his intellectual capacity, the Biblical adage of man as having been created in the image of God points, in Abravanel's view, to his microcosmic nature. He is like God in the sense that he contains and unites in himself all the stages of being. God, he explains — again using the terms of the neo-Platonists — is not only the effective and final cause of the universe, but its formal cause as well. Since all existence originates in Him, it follows also that the order and laws 79 which govern that existence must be in Him. In Him are united the four forms, or principles, of being: substance, growth, sense, and reason, which appear in nature as either completely separate or hierarchically presupposing each other. Man is the only creature who, like God — though in a material manner, of course — contains and reflects the totality of reality. 80 He is a microcosm not only in relation to the sublunar world, but, as mentioned, also in relation to the universe as a whole. His mind is analogous to the abstract intelligences, his heart to the rotating spheres, and his body as a whole to the lower world. 8 1 Abravanel's concept of man and his position in the universe is perhaps illustrated best by the circle simile which recurs several times in his writings. 82 This simile is also used by Yohanan Alemano in his Shalar ha-Hesheq, in which it is referred to as originating with Ptolemy. 8 3 It is elaborated and stressed even more in the Dialoghi of Leone. 8 4 Though Abravanel introduces it as "a saying" (or parable) of the Ancients, 85 in view of the close spiritual relationship between him and Leone, it should rather be attributed to the latter's influence on him. The fact that it appears in the Mif'aloth and the Commentary on Genesis, both relatively '8 '»

Mif'aloth, VIII, chap. 6, p. 59a. D'Dlttl 80 Comm. Gen. 1:26, p. 14b; Nafialath Aboth, 3:18, commentary on D*?S3 DIN a - a n , p. 86b. 81 Ibid. 82 Comm. Gen. 1:26, p. 14a; Mif'aloth, VII, chap. 4, pp. 51-52. 83 Sefer Sha'ar ha-Hesheq ... m'eth ha-Rav ha-Shalem, ha-Philosoph ... Yohanan Alemano (Livorno, 1790), pp. 38-39b. 84 See Yehudah ben Yishaq Abravanel, Vikkuah 'al ha-Ahavah (Lyck, 1871), pp. 92b-93a. 86

n m a i p n l a s a , Comm. Gen. 1:26, p. 14a.

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late works and of the Italian period, when the younger Abravanel came thoroughly under the influence of neo-Platonism, may give additional support to this assumption. Like a circle, Abravanel explains, the universe constitutes a closed whole, all of whose parts are permeated with a Divine emanation, which is not only the source ol their existence, but of their destiny as well. It forms a circle of two halves, one containing the descending, and the other the ascending, returning emanation. Closest to God and directly emanated are the detached intelligences, followed, in the order of their receiving the Divine abundance, by the heavenly bodies and the two higher elements of fire and air. The lowest point in the first semi-circle is constituted by the two heavier elements, water and earth which, because of their heaviness and materiality, are farthest removed from God. With the formation of minerals, the lowest embodiment of the elements, the return flow of the heavenly emanation sets in. This stage is followed by the higher forms it assumes in plants and animals, and these by its highest expression in man. Man is thus closest to God, and his position in the ascending semicircle is similar to that of the abstract intelligences in the descending one. 86 Maimonides also asserts his belief in the organic nature ol the universe. His conception, however, is more restricted and static. Like man, the universe is organic, in his view, primarily on account of the Divine wisdom which permeates and rules it. It is also organic because of its hierarchical structure, by virtue of which some parts are dominant and others subservient. However, the basic characteristic of organic life, the mutuality in relationships among its components, he excludes from the organism of the universe. Although a heavenly abundance pervades and maintains the universe, its flow is in one direction only, namely from higher to lower beings. 87 On the other hand, by assuming a return of the Divine emanation, Abravanel embraces a more mystical and animistic conception. His universe, like that of his son Leone, thus assumes greater vitality and dynamism. It pulsates with life and a purposeful striving which, though unconscious in the lower forms, becomes conscious in the higher ones. In line with such a concept, Abravanel ventures to formulate his view on the goal of creation. The fact that Maimonides denied the ability of man to fathom that goal, 88 he explains, must not discourage us, since it does not represent his full thought on the matter. By it he merely wanted "

87 88

Comm. Gen. 1:26, p. 142a; Mif'aloth, VII, chap. 4, pp. 51-52. Guide, I, 72. Ibid., Ill, 13.

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to emphasize man's inability to penetrate that goal from the point of view of God the Creator. However, the fact that Maimonides himself asserts that nothing in nature is in vain and that all actions of God are wise and purposeful, 8 9 clearly points to a different opinion, namely that this goal is discernible, at least from the point of view of man. This goal can be discerned in the hierarchic order of the universe, in which a longing for ever higher forms of being manifests itself, a longing which reaches its culmination in man. There is no particle of matter in the universe, he writes, which is not infused with a spark ot spirituality to make it alive and fill it with a striving to become united with the Divine. The whole universe is thus imbued with God's spirit, and it is the growing consciousness of this fact which constitutes the goal of all creation. This goal, however, is attainable only in man or, more precisely, in the most perfect of the human species. Through contemplation and a moral life, select individuals draw closer to God, and by communicating their attained perfection to their fellowman, they realize His will and purpose. Thus the whole universe is directed toward the supreme goal of bringing forth these perfect individuals, and through them restoring the Divine emanation to its original source — God. 9 0 In conclusion it may be noted that it is for this very purpose of permeating the whole universe with a consciousness of the Divine origin, nature, and destiny that the universe was created and designed to be temporary. 9 1

3. THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL A N D RESURRECTION

If Abravanel's view of the eminent position of man in the universe reflects the neo-Platonist currents of the time, 92 his preoccupation with the problem of the soul and its immortality is to be attributed to an even more widespread interest in that problem during that period. From the second half of the fifteenth and throughout the sixteenth century, coinciding with the revival of Platonism on the one hand, and the re-emergence of the school of the Alexandrist interpreters of Aristotle on the other hand, this 88

Guide, III, 25. Mif'aloth, VII, chap. 4, pp. 51-52; VII, chap. 6, p. 59. " Ibid., VII, chap. 8; VIII. 92 C/., Cassirer, Kristeller, Randall (eds.), The Renaissance Philosophy of Man {see mainly Francesco Petrarca, "The Ascent of Mount Ventoux", pp. 44, 45; Marsiglio Ficino, "Five Questions Concerning the Mind", pp. 202, 204; Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, "Oration on the Dignity of Man", pp. 223 if.). 90

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problem became a central issue on which the adherents of the various philosophical traditions were heatedly divided. 93 None of Abravanel's writings on the subject are either systematic or original. They are of interest none the less, not only on account of the strong elements of Platonism which permeate them, but also — and foremost — because of their sharp criticism of the rational doctrine of the soul. As mentioned, the human soul, according to Abravanel, is only one aspect of the spirituality that pervades the whole universe and by virtue of which all matter is elevated and sanctified. Within that realm, however, its position is unique. Whereas the spirits of animals and plants, and the essences of the inanimate objects are the handiwork of the "universal soul", the human soul, along with the detached intelligences, has its origin in God. From this assumption he draws the conclusion that although the existence of all other spirits is transitory, that of the soul is eternal. 94 Above all Abravanel rejects the view of Maimonides that the soul constitutes a mere potentiality in man, surviving only to the extent that, through a life of study and contemplation, it is transformed into an acquired mind and is "actualized". This view, he believes, Maimonides borrowed from Alexander, the interpreter of Aristotle. 95 In contradiction to it, he asserts that "the souls are not created at the time the bodies are formed; nor d o their acquired concepts constitute their immortal part ... as Maimonides philosophized. Indeed, such a view is nothing other than a nonsensical falsehood and a repugnant opinion ... 9 6 The true view of the Torah is that all souls came into being bef ore the formation of bodies, indeed at the beginning of creation". 9 7 They are heavenly entities with an existence which precedes their attachment to the body and one that will continue after this attachment has been dissolved. 98 In consonance with the belief that the spiritual in the universe attaches itself as a rule to some form of matter, he expresses the view that "upon their creation, the souls were attached to thin spiritual substances of a 93 Renan, Averroes et I'Averroisme, pp. 349ff.; Randall, "Introduction to Pietro Pomponazzi" in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, pp. 257-279; Kristeller, Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, especially pp. 261-278, 279-286. 94 Mif'aloth, VIII, chap. 6, pp. 59b-60a. 95 Abravanel, Perush Abravanel 'a! Sefer Moreh Nevukhim I'Rabbenu Moshe ben Maimon, pt. I, chap. 1, commentary on "HST 0® D i m OWN", p. 2a; chap. XLI, p. 65b (hereafter cited as Comm. Guide). •• m u n n s n i Vua nptp 97 Mif'aloth, VII, chap. 6, p. 59a. 98 Ibid.: see also Comm. Jer. 1:4, p. 305, col. 1.

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heavenly nature, imperceptible to the sense of vision. To these substances they remain attached forever, before joining the body, while in it, and after separation from it". Accordingly, the human body is the temporary abode of three kinds of the spiritual: the soul p r o p e r , " the "heavenly spirit", and the "vital spirit". 100 Since the last originates in the semen, its existence ceases with the death of the body; the "heavenly spirit", however, being the carrier and "chariot" of the soul, departs with it from the body, to return to its heavenly abode. While joined to the flesh, this spirit is in constant motion and, similar to the sun and heavenly hosts in the world at large, it is the source of all the heat in the body. The existence of the soul in conjunction with its spirit, though eternal in human terms, is actually not so in universal terms, its duration being limited to the temporal existence of this universe. Like the detached intelligences with their heavenly spheres, the souls with their spirit-chariots will continue their combined existence long after the end of the sixth millennium, the year of the shmitah, when the sublunar world, having completed its cycle, will come to an end. They will then ascend to a higher stage of contemplation and closeness to God. However, in the year of the Jubilee, even this highest and purest of composites will be dissolved. Both the intelligences and the souls will then free themselves from their connections with the spheres and the spirits, and in their pristine purity re-merge with G o d . With the full retreat of the spiritual from the universe, preceded by a cessation of all material existence, the universe will come to an end. Only G o d will remain, and as He did before Creation, He will set the stage for a new creation, ushering in a new cycle of existence. 101 In less mystical terms, Abravanel summarizes his views on the soul and immortality as based on the following principles: a) Of all "parts" of the soul, the rational alone is eternal, as "there is no reason for its decay". b) This eternity is not of a collective nature, as some of the rationalists, i.e., the Averroists, assume, but rather individual. Though he is aware of the logical difficulties inherent in the assumption ol individualization for spiritual entities detached from matter, he nevertheless asserts his belief in the continued separate existence of each soul "according to its merits and knowledge". c) Immortality is not related to rational concepts and speculative •» natwn nrnnrmn

100

101 Mif'aloth, VIII, chap. 6, pp. 60-61; cf., J. S. Delmedigo, Masref la-ffokhmah ed., Odessa, 1865), pp. 89 ff.

(2nd

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knowledge, "as many of the philosophers of our people" claim, but is the result of a holy life in accordance with the word of God. d) Immortality is to be interpreted not in terms of "merging with the active intelligence" — "as many of the philosophers of our people", following the assumption of Arab scholars, interpret it — but in terms of merging with God. e) Nor is immortality confined to the souls of the perfect in consequence of their higher concepts and meritorious deeds. The souls of the wicked also survive, to undergo punishment, a belief which, in his view, indicates that the rational soul is not only a potentiality or aptitude — an opinion held by Alexander of Aphrodisias and shared by Maimonides — but a "separate entity". f) The meaning of the heavenly reward for the soul is of a purely spiritual nature. It concerns the bliss derived from the contemplation of God and His conception, which, because of the materiality of the body, is unattainable in this life.102 The rejection of any relationship between intellectual perfection and immortality is also the subject of some of Abravanel's Biblical allegories. Thus, the rising smoke of the incense burned on the altar of incense is meant to allude to the soul of the pious ascending to heaven. The fact, moreover, that this altar was not attached either to the Table or the Candelabra, but was facing the Holy of Holies, is meant to convey the idea that immortality is attainable neither by riches, symbolized by the Table, nor by speculative wisdom, symbolized by the Menorah, but only through the Torah. Again, the fact that the gold of this altar, standing for the most precious and everlasting possessions, was on top of a wooden frame, a rather modest and perishable substance, further teaches that it is not rational knowledge, but "plain deeds"103 which lead man to life eternal.104 Abravanel believes also in transmigration of souls, a belief which he interprets as an indication of God's benevolence to man. By assuming new bodily forms, the soul is given the opportunity to accomplish one of the following: either to attain some perfection that was denied to it in its earlier existence; to enhance the perfection it has already attained; or to atone for its sins, in order to lessen the punishment in store for it in the "world of souls". In support of this belief he mentions the Cabbalists, Plato, Pythagoras, "and the other ancients". On the other hand, he adduces the reasons of Aristotle and his commentators for opposing it, 102

Comm. I Sam. 25:29, pp. 284-287.

"a Q-ngspi D M 101

Comm. Exod., chap. 25, section preceding comm. on sentence 10, p. 50b.

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concluding, however, with the assertion that "this is a possible belief and in accordance with our tradition as transmitted by the prophets and forefathers". 105 To the anti-rationalist elements of Abravanel's thought belongs also his frequently asserted belief in resurrection. Though this is a belief of long standing in Judaism, Abravanel's conception of it, as well as the reasons he adduces in its support, are of a national rather than a religiousmetaphysical nature, and are undoubtedly connected with the historical reality of Jewry in the post-exilic period. As such, it belongs to his national thought and will be discussed in that context. It is mentioned here because of its mythological elements and because it is an integral part of his antirationalist Weltanschauung. He conceives of resurrection in terms of a reunification of body and soul that is to be brought about by a restoration of the body to its full former identity, both with regard to the quantitative relastionships among its components and to its qualitative properties. This, he asserts, will not be effected by any heavenly constellation, as is the belief of some astrologers, but by a direct, miraculous act of God. Indeed, it will be in the manner of a re-enactment of the primeval drama of creation, with the "heavenly dew" (Isa. 26:19) in the role of the formative, masculine element acting upon the dust of the earth which, by God's will, will become imbued with a receptive feminine potentiality.106

4. MIRACLES

Conceived of as a temporary suspension of natural law and a manifestation of God's direct intervention, miracles, in Abravanel's view, offer the strongest testimony of God's omnipotence and His supreme rule of the universe. Every miracle constitutes in a way a new creation, giving evidence for the belief in the Divine conduct of the universe, and refuting the determinist view. The affirmation of miracles implies therefore a belief in creation; their negation, the acceptance of the opposite view of eternity.107 To stress the paramount importance of creation, the Torah, he points out, 106

Comm. Deut. 25:5, p. 49. Main sources: Nahalath Aboth, chap. IV, pp. 139b-149b; Ma'yneiha-Yeshu'ah, XI, tamar9, pp. 397-398; "Introduction", Comm. Isa., pp. 9-12; ibid., commentary on chaps. 18,24,25,26. See also Rosh Amanah, chap. 15; Comm. Ezek., chap. 37; She'eioth Shaul, p. 8b. Dew and rain as the "semen of the heavenly hosts" are also mentioned in Yehudah Abravanel, Vikkuah 'al ha-Ahavah, p. 17b. 107 Mif'aloth, X, chaps. 1, 2, 10. 106

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begins with creation, the greatest of all miracles, a belief in which implies an ipso facto acknowledgement of all the rest in the Torah. 108 This being the case, Abravanel argues, why — it may be asked — did not Maimonides include this belief among his Articles of Faith? To this he replies that it actually is contained in the eighth article, which asserts the belief in the heavenly origin of the Torah. 109 Following his procedure in the discussion of most other problems, he formulates his own views on miracles after first refuting those held by the rationalists. He singles out for criticism Maimonides' and Gersonides' interpretation of miracles, which actually abolishes their supernatural character by conceiving of them as an integral part of a predetermined natural order. This view Maimonides expressed in his interpretation of the midrashic controversy between R' Yohanan and R' Jeremiah ben El'azar: Said R ' Y o h a n a n : " G o d m a d e an agreement with the sea to split before the Israelites ...". Said R ' Jeremiah ben E l ' a z a r : " H e m a d e such a n agreement not only with the sea, but with all creation which H e brought into being in the first six days ... H e commanded the sea to split before Israel ... the sun a n d m o o n to stop for Joshua ... the ravens to feed Elijah ... the fire not to consume H a n a n y a h , Mishael, a n d 'Azariah ... and the fish to spit out J o n a h ,..". 1 1 0

Commenting on this passage, Maimonides writes: When G o d brought this world with its essences into existence, H e made it a n integral part of those essences that the miracles which are to take place in them should occur at their proper time .... T h u s H e m a d e the nature of water to be always cohesive a n d in a downward flow; however, H e also m a d e it split for the passage of the Israelites a n d the drowning of the Egyptians. 1 1 1

He states this view even more clearly in his commentary on Aboth. Commenting on "Ten things were created on the eve of the Sabbath" {Aboth, V, 8), he writes: O u r sages embraced the view that only those ten things were m a d e then; however, at the time of their creation all other wonders a n d miracles were m a d e a n integral part of those things in which they were to occur. T h u s o n the second day of creation, when the waters were separated, it was m a d e a n integral p a r t of their destiny that the Red Sea should split before Moses, the J o r d a n before Joshua, a n d that all the miracles to be performed by Elijah a n d Elisha' should actually take place. The same is true with regard to the sun. When it was 108

10» 110

111

Mif'aloth, I, chap. 4. e r a © » m i n , 'tenth doubt', Rosh Amanah, chap. 1 6 , p. 20b. Bereshith Rabbah, ed. M. A. Mirkin, I (Israel, 1956), parshah V, 3, 4. Guide, II, 29.

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created on the fourth day, it was made a part of its destiny to stop at the command of Joshua. And so it is with all other miracles.112 Abravanel believes that Gersonides was also leaning toward this view, in support of which he quotes Gersonides' words: Miracles are subject to a certain lawfulness and order, since God, at the time of creation, bestowed upon everything its own essence which is the best and most suitable for it, and the most deserving of continuation and perpetuation.113 The implication of both interpretations is clear: The miraculous is part and parcel of the predestined order of things, and is therefore natural. 114 Abravanel raises many questions about such an interpretation of the Midrash. Foremost, that by it the essential nature of the miracle, always described as dependent on certain circumstances and meant as a countermeasure to them, would be abolished. Thus the Biblical explanation of the flood as caused by the sins of man; the affliction of Pharaoh as a punishment for his "taking of Sarah"; the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah in consequence of the wickedness of their inhabitants; or the miracles performed by Moses for the sake of convincing the Israelites of the truth of his mission — these as well as many others would become meaningless if conceived of as predetermined. Besides, the idea of an alleged "agreement" between God and natural things 115 is illogical. When a miracle occurs, it is only a small part of the element involved which is affected, whereas in all other behavior the element continues its normal functioning. Thus, although the fire ceased burning in the case of Abraham and Daniel, it continued acting naturally in all other circumstances. Similarly, while the water acted miraculously at the Red Sea, it maintained its natural qualities elsewhere. Had an "agreement" been made, it could have been one with the element only in a particular context whose very existence was not a reality at the time of creation. Nor can this difficulty be solved by suggesting that the "agreement" was made with the "universal", since, according to Aristotle, universals have no existence outside the mind, and in reality there is nothing other than particulars. 112

Moses ben Maimon, Pirqei Aboth 'im Perush ... Rabbenu Moshe ben Maimon ... v"im Perush ... Don Yishaq Abravanel... (Venezia, 1545), 5:8; Mif'aloth, X, chap. 3, pp. 79b-80a. 113 Mif'aloth, X, chap. 3, p. 80a; cf., Levi ben Gershon, Milhamothha-Shem (Leipzig, 1866), mcCamar VI, pt. II, chap. 10, pp. 450, 452 (hereafter cited as Milhamoth). 114 Surprising, however, is the fact that he does not mention at all Gersonides' diametrically opposite view on ,miracles, in the latter's Comm. I Kings, end of chap. XXII.

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The mere idea of an agreement between God and His creations, especially the inanimate objects, is objectionable. What the Midrash intends to teach, in Abravanel's view, is not that miracles were made an integral part of nature at creation, but rather that they are preconceived and predetermined in the Divine mind, so that they may occur as the need for them arises, without necessitating any change in God's will or knowledge, and without having to attribute to Him any "regret" 116 for what "He has done". Maimonides' or Gersonides' interpretation of miracles, he concludes, must be rejected, since it undermines "the foundations of the Torah", and is actually based on the determinism of the Greeks. 117 He is equally critical of another aspect of the rationalist concept of miracles, namely the view that they originate in the active intelligence. This view was embraced and elaborated mainly by Gersonides, who attributed prophecy to the same source. 118 One by one, Abravanel refutes his arguments in behalf of this doctrine, asserting instead that miracles originate directly from God. 119 Abravanel's popular approach to miracles as a manifestation of God's supreme mastery of nature is illustrated abundantly in his Biblical commentaries. He accepts all Biblical miracles at their face value, relegating their ultimate explanation to the supreme will and omnipotence of God. Thus, notwithstanding all the arguments of Gersonides to the contrary, 120 he insists that the miracle with the sun and moon at Gibe'on and Ayalon was not a mere slowing down of their motion for the sake of accelerating victory, but a heavenly event which actually brought the movement of these two celestial bodies to a standstill. 121 Gersonides' contention that such an interpretation is unacceptable in view of the fact that it would place Joshua in a higher position than Moses in terms of miracles,122 he rejects, declaring that the greatness of a prophet is not to be measured by the greatness of the miracle which he performs. He says: Miracles performed by the prophets during their lifetime are in accordance with the need of the hour. There may sometimes be a prophet of great excellence and yet he has never performed any miracles, as the need for them did not arise. On the other hand, there may be a prophet of much lesser stature, and yet he 118 11

'

niDinnn

Nabalath Aboth, 5:8; Mif'aloth, X, chaps. 3-5. 118 Milfiamoth, ma'amar VJ, pt. II, chap. 10. 119 Mifaloth, X, chaps. 8-10; see also Comm. Josh. 10:12, pp. 53-56. 120 Levi ben Gershon, Comm. Josh. 10:12; idem, Milhamoth, ma'amar Vi, pt. II, chap. 12, pp. 456 ff. 121 Abravanel, Comm. Josh. 10:12, pp. 53-56; Mifaloth, X, chap. 9. 122 This difficulty is also alluded to by Maimonides, Guide, II, 35.

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has performed many miracles, as there was a need for them in his day. 1 2 3 Besides, the sages have already indicated that the plague of darkness in Egypt was an event as miraculous as the stopping of the sun by Joshua; furthermore, wasn't the plague of the first-born a resurrection of the dead? 124

His rejection of the rationalist approach in favor of the popular one is illustrated most strongly in his commentary on the story of the womandiviner of 'En Dor. This story had already puzzled some of the geonim, notably R' Shmuel ben Hofni, who asserted that, notwithstanding the belief of the sages of the Talmud in the literal meaning of the text bearing on Samuel's resurrection, "their words are unacceptable when contradicted by reason". 125 Maimonides and Gersonides also showed a skeptical attitude toward the literal rendering of this text, suggesting that the events of this story are fictitious and the result of Saul's overstimulated or deluded imagination, caused either by his depression and anxiety or by the magical practices of the woman-diviner. 126 Abravanel expresses great displeasure with these rationalist interpretations. In his view, they not only contradict the Scriptures and the Talmud, but they also deny the direct testimony of the senses. "How", he asks, "can we deny the authenticity of this event? Even now, many famous and wise men have testified to the fact that they have seen how people who were slain by the sword were resurrected and made to watch the grazing cattle at night. And while these resurrected make their rounds, no wolf or any other animal would even dare to touch the cattle". To explain the 'En Dor story, he suggests that three assumptions be agreed upon: first, that following death dust returns to dust, and the spirit to God; second, that demons really exist and are somehow endowed with a knowledge of the future; and third, that they are possessed of an attraction and a lust for human bodies, and sometimes attach themselves to them. 127 This tendency to accept the miraculous stories of the Bible at their face value persists in almost all his commentaries. It was not, he argues, a prophet who appeared to Gideon, as Gersonides suggested, 128 but "a detached intelligence in the form of fire". He is fully aware that "as beings detached from matter, angels cannot be perceived by the senses; however, 123

Mif'aloth, X, chap. 9, p. 90b; see also Comm. Guide, II, 35, p. 31b. Mif'aloth, X, chap. 9, p. 91a; see also Comm. I Kings, 19:19, pp. 589-590. 126 David Qimhi, Comm. I Sam. 28:25, Miqra'oth Gedoloth, Neviim Rishonim (New York, 1951). 126 Abravanel, Comm. I Sam. 28:8, p. 296. 127 Ibid., p. 297. For a more skeptical attitude regarding the existence of demons, see, Zevah Pesah, commentary on "ha lahma 'anya" (Lodz ed., 1928), p. 26. 128 Levi ben Gershon, Comm. Judg. 6:11, Miqraoth Gedoloth, Neviim Rishonim. 124

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God willing ... they may miraculously be seen ... in human form". 129 It was also a heavenly being, rather than a prophet, who appeared to Manoah and his wife. Gersonides' interpretation of the angel's prohibiting strong drink to the woman as preventive of Samson's being attracted to women, and his merely physiological explanation of the connection between Samson's strength and his hairiness, he rejects as "sheer trickery". 130 He insists instead that the story be explained in terms of a miraculous act of Divine Providence. 131 Elijah, he also believes, was actually "taken alive" and transferred body and soul to "paradise on earth". 132 He admits, of course, that no human being could survive for even an hour in the belly of a fish, let alone for three days and three nights; this, however, should be no reason for rejecting the authenticity of the Jonah story, since "Divine might surpasses the natural". 133 Nor, may it finally be added, does he show any appreciation for Gersonides' rational explanation of Elisha"s re-floating of the ax-head by having the stick enter the hole in the head and thus bring the ax up to the surface. 134 The essence of all things being the handiwork of God who can change them at will, such explanations, he declares, must be rejected, so that the miraculous nature of the event may be fully preserved. 135 Only regarding the "miracle" with Ahaz' sun dial is his attitude more flexible, and here he actually fully accepts Gersonides' interpretation. 136 Neither Abravanel's speculations on the nature of the miraculous, nor his interpretations of the Biblical passages bearing on the problem are of value. He has contributed neither to the elucidation of the problem philosophically, nor to a more rational understanding of the Biblical texts. It is doubtful, however, whether it is from this point of view that this aspect of his writings ought to be judged. In the final analysis, his view that the miraculous in the Bible must be accepted at face value, as acts of God, can be seen as an expression of his firm stand against the rationalists and their shallow half-truths, in which he saw a great danger to the integrity of the faith.

129

Abravanel, Comm. Judg. 6:11, pp. 113-114; see also idem, Comm. Gen. 18:2, p. 45

wo a'-sjinsn rwva 131 132 133 134 135 136

Comm. Judg. 13:12, pp. 132-133. II Kings 2, p. 608, col. 2. Comm. Jonah 2:1. Levi ben Gershon, Comm. II Kings 6:6. Abravanel, Comm. II Kings 6:6, p. 622, col. 1. Ibid., 20:9, pp. 662-664; Isa. 38:8, pp. 182-183; Levi ben Gershon, Comm. II Kings

20:10.

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5. PROPHECY

To the category of the miraculous belongs also, in Abravanel's view, prophecy — one of the most discussed topics in his writings. His views on it seem to have crystallized early and were given their first expression in the 'Atereth Zeqenim, the earliest of his works. 137 To the Portuguese period also belongs, in all likelihood, the more thorough study of the subject in the Mahazeh Shaddai,138 which was unfortunately lost during the expulsion from Spain. The subject of prophecy continued to hold his interest during the last years of his life, when he was preoccupied with the writing of Lahaqath Neviim, which was to replace the lost volume. 139 Furthermore, the major part of his extant commentary on the second part of the Guide deals primarily with the sections on prophecy. Perhaps in no other subject of inquiry is Abravanel's indebtedness to Maimonides as great and yet the divergence from his rationalist conception so thorough. He expresses none of his own views before citing those of the master. Even when he asserts his anti-rationalist conception, it is always within the frame of Maimonides' thought and terminology. Above all he insists on the miraculous nature of prophecy, placing it in the category of the supranatural, for which no rational explanation is adequate or possible. Conceived of in terms of an encounter between the Divine and the human mind, which surely have no common basis for any relationship or comparison, prophecy, he believes, can be explained only as an act of G o d ' s grace and benevolence toward man. To rationalize it, as Maimonides does, amounts to degrading it to the level of a natural phenomenon, thus ignoring its unique Divine character. The fact that it was confined to Israel alone, and at certain times only, when the nation was situated in its own land and "close to God", plus the sense of awe and fear with which the prophets seem to have been overcome on the occasions of their prophetic seizures — all this points to the miraculous nature of the phenomenon. 1 4 0 Maimonides' natural approach to prophecy comes first to the fore in his views on the prerequisites of the prophet, with which he opens his discussion of the subject. " N o fool", he writes, "can become a prophet. 1,7

'Atereth Zeqenim, chaps. XII, XX. Comm. Josh. 10:12, p. 54b, col. 1; Comm. I Sam., 3:4, p. 184, col. 2. In Ma'ynei ha-Yeshu'ah, ma'ayan III, tamar 3, p. 294, col. 1, he refers to this work as "an enterprise of ocean-wide dimensions" 'M m m i 7131 rDNVn NTJl). 1,9 She'eloth Shaul, p. 8b. 140 Comm. Guide, II, 32 (Landau ed.), p. 22b. 138

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Nor is it possible for one to go to bed a non-prophet and arise in the morning a prophet". 1 4 1 As the culmination of one's spiritual development, prophecy constitutes rather the final stage of a long process of arduous preparation through which one's potentialities are realized and one's faculties elevated to their highest possible degree. Though prophecy is in the final analysis an act of God's will, its bestowal must be preceded by the fulfillment of three prerequisites, i.e., intellectualism, creativity, and ethical excellence. With the exception of Moses, who is in a class by himself, Maimonides emphasizes above all the perfection of the "imaginative capacity" 142 as the most essential prerequisite for the prophet. However, this quality being of an essentially physical nature — the result of the wholesomeness of the brain, the "purity of the moistures", and the balanced temperament — it can hardly be acquired, nor can it be significantly improved when defective. Indeed, it is a quality with which one is either innately endowed or not. This emphasis on the imaginative as the sine qua non of the prophetic make-up is directly connected with Maimonides' concept of prophecy as essentially a state of supernatural vision or dream, when the usual function of the senses ceases and the power of the imagination is fully activated. Indeed, he goes much further in asserting that both prophecy and dreams not only share a common origin in the imagination, but are actually spun from essentially the same substance, namely the data perceived by the senses in their wakeful activity. Only in two respects do prophecies differ from dreams. Whereas dreams are the product of the imagination only, prophecies result from an interaction between the rational mind and the imagination. Secondly, unlike dreams, which are incomplete and can be likened to fruits which have fallen from the tree prematurely, prophecies are mature and complete creations. These, however, are not fundamental differences in kind, for in the final analysis both dreams and prophecies are "more or less" of the same essence. It is this close association between prophecy and the imagination which explains, in Maimonides' view, the frequent decline of the prophetic power in many a prophet. As an essentially physical quality, imagination is easily affected by external and material vicissitudes. It weakens with age and declines under suffering and grief. This, he believes, is in all likelihood the reason for the disappearance of prophecy in the Diaspora. 1 4 3 141

142 143

Guide, II, 32.

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Guide, II, end of chap. 36.

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It is above all this natural approach of Maimonides, the treatment of prophecy as a phenomenon largely dependent on objective conditions and prerequisites, which Abravanel finds objectionable. Two of Maimonides' prerequisites, a fully developed intellect, perfected through thought and knowledge, and a creative, faultless imagination, he rejects outright. He admits that the acquisition of wisdom is no doubt a great merit on the part of the prophet, which may also facilitate the accomplishment of his mission; "with prophecy as such, however, it has nothing in common". 144 The fact that the spirit of God descended upon plain people like Gideon and 'Amos, who were taken from behind the flock and threshing floor to become messengers of God, clearly serves to deny that wisdom is a requisite for prophecy.145 In further support of this contention, he cites the consecration unto prophecy of Samuel and Jeremiah while still boys, at a stage when they could not as yet have acquired much wisdom.146 The strongest proof, however, he draws from the Revelation at Sinai. Maimonides, true to his view of intellectual perfection as a prerequisite of prophecy, a prerequisite that could not possibly be met by an entire people, whittles down the prophetic nature of the public revelation at Sinai. According to him, on that occasion the people heard only a mighty, inarticulate voice; Moses, however, heard the actual words and communicated them to the people. This, he explains, is the reason for the use of the singular rather than the plural in the account of the Ten Commandments. 147 Such a concept of the gratest event in Jewish history Abravanel rejects. Had the public reve lation consisted merely of hearing an in articulate, mighty voice, why the great importance attached to it, and why the insistence of prophets and sages on its supernatural uniqueness?148 The true interpretation, however, is contrary to that of Maimonides, who made a deliberate effort to interpret it so as to suit his own conception of prophecy. Indeed, it is this great event which proves the opposite of Maimonides' contention, for it shows that no preparation of any sort is required from the recipient of God's benevolence, and that "prophecy is acquired neither by rational studies, nor by speculation, but only by the grace of God ... through faith and good works ... Hence one finds in the 114

Comm. I Kings 3:12, p. 479a, col. 2. Nahalath Aboth, III, comm. on m a n DH1? ]D1B Vm»"" pTan, p. 89a; Comm. Amos 1:1, pp. 79-80; Comm. Guide, II, 32. 146 Comm. Jer. 1:4, p. 305, col. 2: Comm. Guide, II, 32. 146

147 148

Guide, II, 33. Comm. Guide, II, 33, p. 27.

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Torah neither philosophical investigations nor logical inferences nor demonstrations of the higher truths". 149 Abravanel is also critical of Maimonides for his insistence on a faultless creative imagination as the sine qua non for prophecy. He argues that since the "forms" that flow to the imagination during the prophetic trance are not of its choice or making, but a heavenly emanation, it is not essential for the imaginative power to be perfect. Like a mirror which reflects the objects even when dim and not polished, the imagination receives the heavenly flow even when in an imperfect state. Moreover, dependent as the prophetic vision is on its heavenly source rather than on the physical state of the prophet's faculties, "God would see to it" that these faculties functioned properly to receive His word. 150 In short: Great as is the distance between heaven and earth, so also is the distance between the master's and our ways, between his thoughts and our thoughts with regard to prophecy. We do not believe that it is natural, but consider it rather a miraculous phenomenon; not the work of the imagination or the intellect, but of God, who is the source of every word or form which the prophet receives. Accordingly, the prophet need be neither wise in sciences nor perfect in philosophical inquiries.151 Of Maimonides' three prerequisites he accepts only one, that of moral excellence, which in his view must be supplemented by the quality of courage, in order "to rebuke the people and hallow the name of God". 152 What is the essence of prophecy? According to Maimonides it is "a Divine abundance which flows via the active intellect, first unto the prophet's mind and then unto his imagination". 153 Moses was the only one whose prophecy was without any admixture of the imaginative; 164 in the case of the others, however, all their dreams and visions resulted from a synthesis of the two. Though accepting this view of prophecy as a product of the intellectual and the imaginative faculties, Abravanel suggests a new classification, which aims to expand the scope of "intellectual" prophecy on the one hand, and what he terms "sensual" 155 prophecy on the other hand. Antirationalist though he allegedly is, he is none the less a true son of a long tradition of rational speculations among Spanish Jewry, and above all a 149 'Atereth Zeqenim, chap. XII, shoresh 3 and 5, pp. 16b, 17a. 160 "Haqdamah" 2 and 5, Comm. Guide, II, chap. 36. 151 "Haqdamah" 5, ibid., p. 38a. 152 Comm. Amos 1:1, p. 79, col. 2. 163 Guide, II, beginning of chap. 36. 154 Beginning of chap. 35, end of chap. 36, end of chap. 45, ibid. 165

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man of the world, with a high regard for the rational and real. He regrets above all the close association which Maimonides established between the highly regarded prophecy and the little-esteemed imagination. Thus all his efforts seem directed toward loosening this association and enhancing the authenticity and stature of prophecy by reducing the fictitious element in it. He divides prophecy into three types. In the first the heavenly emanation is directed only to the mind; in the second to the imagination and the mind; in the third to the nefesh, the imagination and the mind. The assumption of the first as a class in itself is an attempt to widen the scope of the highest form of prophecy, which, according to Maimonides, was limited to Moses. On its behalf Abravanel argues that the imaginative is not an integral part of all prophecies. Were this so, there should be none without similes, symbols, or parables, in many of them, however, these elements are missing, thus indicating that these prophecies are of a purely rational character. Of such a nature, he asserts, are not only the prophecies of Moses, but also some attributed to the Patriarchs, and to Isaiah as well as to others. 156 If one assumes then that prophecy constitutes, in its highest form at least, a purely intellectual phenomenon free from any admixture of the imaginative, the q uestion arises as to the difference, if any, between it and rational truth. It is in answer to this question that Abravanel formulates his view on the nature of these two kinds of knowledge, the rational and the prophetic, a formulation that had a great impact upon Jewish scholars of the sixteenth century. The rational and the prophetic differ first, he asserts, with regard to their origin, rational truth being an emanation of the active intelligence, prophecy, of God. 1 5 7 Consequently, they also differ quantitatively, the "abundance" bestowed on the wise "being limited and of only short duration" as compared with the "unlimited abundance" granted to the prophet. 1 5 8 He goes on to analyze at length the other differences between them regarding method, scope, and quality of knowledge. The starting point of rational inquiry being the data of the senses or the effects of things, from which it regresses to an analysis of their causes, the very foundation upon which such inquiry rests is weak and uncertain. 156

Comm. Guide, II, 36, p. 35a; Comm. Gen. 18:12, p. Ma'ynei ha- Yeshu'ah, III, tamar 3, pp. 293-296. 15 ' Mif'aloth, X, chap. 8, p. 87b; Josh. 10:11; see also Levi ma'amar VI, pt. 11, chap. 10. 168 Comm. Guide, II, 36, p. 35b.

45; I Sam. 3:4-9, p. 184; ben Gershon,

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For the highest abstractions of the human mind to have their origin in the sensual and the imaginative, and for the reasoning faculty to be so closely associated with the "weak body" is to render both the process and the results of learning subject to constant error and faults. In addition, this method of attaining truth is long and tedious, its scope limited, and its results unrewarding. Even in the "lower world" the essences of things escape us. Knowledge is even scantier and less certain with regard to the realm of the rotating spheres; and as far as the abstract intelligences are concerned, they are a mere assumption regarding which one is in total ignorance. Entirely different are the method, scope, and quality of prophetic knowledge. Derived as this knowledge is from a Divine emanation, it starts with a perception of causes, from which the mind proceeds, in the order of nature, to their effects. Free from the necessity of relying on the data of the senses, of abstracting them and inferring from them, the prophet is spared the tediousness, slowness, and limitation of deductive reasoning. Instead, his knowledge is both instantaneous and synoptic, and as a result it is more valid and of higher quality than the knowledge attained by the rational process. 159 Worth noting in this criticism is the fact that it is not the rationalist ideal itself which Abravanel repudiates, but rather the rational method. The metaphysician and the scientist having failed in their endeavor, he entrusts their ideal to the prophet. Prophecy thus becomes identical with philosophy, if not in method, at least in goal. The treatment of prophecy as knowledge, indeed as the highest form of it, sharing with rational learning an identical ideal of truth, may appear strange to the modern reader, brought up in the tradition of a separation between natural and revealed truth. Such a separation, however, was not part and parcel of Abravanel's thought nor of the thought of his generation, nurtured as they both were in the belief in the encompassing and eternal truth of the Bible. Though from the beginning of the seventeenth century, with the rise of the scientific method, this concept of Biblical truth was to be subjected to a growing criticism, 160 such criticism was not entirely lacking during the age of Abravanel or even earlier. Indeed, 158

I Kings 3:12, pp. 469-471; Ma'ynei ha-Yeshu'ah, III, tamar 3, p. 294. C f , Galileo's letter to Costelli of December 1613, in J. J. Fahie, Galileo, his Life and Work (New York, 1908), p. 151; J. S. Delmedigo, Masref la-Hokhmah (2nd ed., Odessa, 1864), pp. 55, 85; Benedict Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, translated from the Latin by R. H. M. Elwes, I (London, 1905), chap. XIII. 1,0

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he himself points out that some scholars, among whom he names Gersonides, are of the opinion that the thoughts of the prophets were mainly of a political and moral rather than of a philosophical nature, 161 a view shared by Abravanel's contemporary, the Aristotelian Eliyahu Delmedigo. 162 Like Maimonides, however, Abravanel espouses the opposite view, namely "that the true prophets attain higher conceptions 163 which are unattainable by reason alone". 164 To these higher conceptions belongs, for instance, the doctrine of creation, communicated to Moses and the other prophets by revelation. In line with such a view he describes the excellences of Moses and King Solomon primarily in terms of the philosophical and scientific ideal of knowledge which prevailed in the schools. Moses, as a result of his prolonged stay on Mount Sinai, and Solomon, as a result of his inspired dreams and visions, came into possession of the widest range and highest degree of human knowledge. 165 Parallel to Abravanel's endeavor to widen the scope of "rational" prophecy is his effort to reduce the fictitious and imaginative elements in the more common type of prophecy. He agrees with Maimonides that because of "the depth of the matter" and the lack of preparedness on the part of the recipient, most prophetic revelations must first be directed to the imagination and only then to the mind. He rejects, however, Maimonides' view according to which the imagination is identical in both prophecy and dreams. He is even more critical of Maimonides' contention that prophecy, like dreams, is spun from the data of human experience with which the senses are preoccupied in their wakeful functioning, a view from which it may be inferred that Maimonides actually doubted the prognostic capacity of the prophet. Although it is true, Abravanel argues, that dreams are the product of the imagination, which weaves them from the data of the senses, the prophetic dream constitutes a Divine revelation and is independent of any external source. "The books of the prophets are full of forecasts in regard to things of which the prophets had no idea and with which they could have had no previous acquaintance". 166 In addition to the above two types of prophecy, Abravanel, as mentioned, suggests a third type, the "sensual". 167 Whereas the heavenly 181 162

Mif'aloth, I, chap. 2, p. 4b. Behinath ha-Dath, pp. 18-19, 21, and passim.

163 nrirs? nuron 184

165

us

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Guide, II, 38.' 'Atereth Zeqenim, chaps. XX, XXI; I Kings 3:12, pp. 472-477. "Haqdamah" 3 and 4, Comm. Guide, II, 36, p. 37.

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emanation "flows" to reason alone in rational prophecy, with neither the senses nor the imagination participating, and whereas this emanation is directed to both the imagination and reason in the "imaginative" prophecy, with the senses ceasing to function altogether, in "sensual" prophecy it is directed to the nefesh first and then to the imagination and reason, with the senses continuing to function normally. In this last group he classifies most visions which were beheld by their recipients while in a state of wakefulness. Though unreal in objective terms, since they are not subject to verification by outside testimony, these visions nevertheless constitute a reality to their beholders and are subjectively true. To this category belong Abraham's and Lot's visions of the angels, Jacob's struggle with the messenger of God, the Revelation at Sinai, the "voice" heard by Samuel, the fiery chariots seen by Elisha', and many others. 168 Whether this view is valid or invalid within the Maimonidean frame of reference, Abravanel's intention of singling out these visions as a group in itself is obvious. By it he aimed to wrest another section of the prophetic from the realm of the merely fictitious and imaginative and restore it to reality, though to only a subjective reality. This motivation prevails also in his treatment of another aspect of prophecy, namely the symbolic acts of the prophets, so profusely scattered throughout the Bible. True to his general view of prophecy, Maimonides relegated all those acts, described as either seen or actually performed by the prophets, to the realm of dreams and visions, devoid of objective reality. Their fictitious nature, Maimonides points out, is in most cases clearly stated in the texts themselves; however, even when this is not the case, it must always be so interpreted. 169 Abravanel rejects such a sweeping generalization as undermining the authenticity of many Biblical events and exposing the factual content of the Bible in general to grave doubts. Instead, he suggests a more discriminatory approach. He agrees that all actions in the context of a vision or a dream must be considered part of that dream or vision. Likewise, when the prophet himself relates what he did, saw, or heard, the view of Maimonides that it is all a dream must prevail, though this may not be explicitly stated. However, when the actions ot the prophet are preceded or accompanied by an objective statement to the effect that they actually took place or were carried out by him, they must be accepted as such, without attempt to explain them metaphorically. 170 188 170

Gen. 18:2, p. 45; I Sam., chap. 3, p. 184; Ma'yneiha-Yeshu'ah, III, tamar 3, p. 295. Guide, II, 46. Comm. Isa. 20, p. 121.

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Aided by such a yardstick, he argues against Maimonides in behalf of the reality of the "signs" of Gideon, 1 7 1 the "voice" of Samuel, 172 Hosea's conjugal difficulties, 173 Isaiah's walking "naked and barefoot", 1 7 4 Jeremiah's "going down" to the potter's house, 175 the Hananyah ben 'Azur story, 176 and others. The prophets, he points out, were in the habit of performing various acts so that "the people might see and, being impressed, change their ways". To relegate all such acts to the category of the fictitious is to render meaningless an important characteristic of prophetic behavior. Abravanel is also critical of another aspect of Maimonides' conception of prophecy, namely its differentiation from inspiration. 177 Maimonides does believe that heroic acts like those of the Judges or of Kings Saul and David, or creative works like Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, Daniel, Job, indeed all the Hagiographa, are inspired; they are not, however, prophetic. They are the result of the "spirit of holiness" which descended upon these heroes or creators while fully awake and in command of their senses. Moreover, even when this inspiration assumes the form of visions and dreams, these are not the same as those of the prophets. Thus Solomon's dreams at Gibe'on, or Daniel's dreams "are not true prophecies, to be placed in a category with Abraham's or Jacob's visions", but rather belong on a lower level. Indeed, the fact that they are "merely inspired" is indicated by the Biblical texts themselves. 178 Though such a view enhances the stature of prophecy, Abravanel objects to it, since it greatly reduces the scope of prophecy, excluding from its domain a sizable part of the hallowed Jewish lore. Should such a view be accepted, many of the great and hallowed heroes of the Jewish past, he fears, would be reduced to the level of secular heroes, and holy literary monuments, such as the Psalms and the Song of Songs, would be considered poetic creations not much different from those of Gabirol, Halevi, or the Ibn Ezras. If inspiration is rigidly separated from prophecy, the difference between a Solomon and an Aristotle, for example, would be

1.1 1.2 173

171 175

V6

1,77 178

Comm. Judg. 6:36-40. Comm. I Sam. 3. Comm. Hos. I, p. 20. Isa. 20. Jer. 18. Ibid., 28.

snpnnn

Guide, II, 45.

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179

reduced to one of degree and nothing else. In opposition to Maimonides' view, he believes that the difference between prophecy and inspiration, rather than fundamental, is actually one of scope and degree, inspiration denoting the whole range of phenomena which results from an encounter between the Divine and the human spirit, prophecy, on the other hand, the highest, most intense and abundant form of it. However, even the "inspirational" results of this encounter, expressed in ethical, intellectual, or creative excellence, surpass by far anything man is capable of attaining by mere natural means. 180 Abravanel's concept of prophecy, it may be concluded, is dominated by his anti-rationalist attitude in no less a degree than his concept of the soul, miracles, etc. Its rationalization by Maimonides, he feels, who conceives of it as dependent on rational accomplishments and natural conditions, on the one hand, and who overemphasizes the role of the imaginative in both its genesis and essence, on the other hand, has greatly reduced its stature, both in terms of its reality and in terms of its supranatural character. It is as a conscious effort to counteract the undermining effects of these views and restore to prophecy its uniquely miraculous character that his own formulation must be seen.

6. BIBLICAL ALLEGORIZATIONS

The spread of the Aristotelian philosophy among the Jews of Islamic Spain from the twelfth century on became one of the strongest stimuli in the intellectual history of Jewry for a period of almost four centuries. It gave rise to an unparalleled effort to interpret the Bible in the light of that philosophy and thus absorb current speculative notions as an integral part of Judaism. The philosophical Midrash that resulted from this prolonged effort proved almost as cumbersome and oppressive to the Biblical text as the earlier legalistic and legendary Midrash. In opposition to the latter, however, whose constructive national role is beyond doubt, the role and value of the former still remain questionable. Rather than the response to a challenge of national dimensions, it appears in retrospect to have arisen as a response to the needs of only a small enlightened minority. By the time of Abravanel, the second half of the fifteenth century, the 178 Ma'ynei ha-Yeshu'ah, III, tamar 3, p. 294; I Kings 3:5, pp. 461 ff.; Exod. 15:1, p. 25b. 180 Ibid., pp. 295-296; I Kings 3:5, pp. 462-463.

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inner strength and originality of that trend, which had yielded such works as the Guide, Gersonides' Wars, and Crescas' Light of the Lord, to name only the most important, were almost spent. Aristotelianism began showing signs of decline, a decline which, as far as the Jews were concerned, was precipitated, as mentioned earlier, by the events of the last century in the life of Spanish Jewry. It is in the light of this development that Abravanel's exegetical work, especially his attitude toward the allegorical method of the rationalists, must be considered. Viewed in its totality, it constitutes a concentrated effort on his part to bring an end to the domination of the rationalist point of view in the interpretation of the Bible. Such a sweeping generalization may of course be challenged by pointing to the numerous rationalist allegorizations he himself so frequently makes use of. It is true none the less. Rather than an essential characteristic of his commentary, these allegories are actually only incidental, and attributable both to the strong influence of Maimonides on him, and to a desire to counteract the radical use of this method by the rationalists. With both rationalists and mystics Abravanel shares the view that the literal rendering of the Bible does not of itself anywhere nearly exhaust its full meaning, and that certain parts of it, indeed, do not altogether yield themselves to such a rendering. Thus, although such accounts as the flood and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah must be accepted as authentic and interpreted at their face value, Jacob's dream and some of the visions of Ezekiel cannot be explained in any way other than the allegorical. Again, though a narrative like that of Isaac's wells ought to be accepted literally, it also yields itself to metaphorical interpretation. Indeed, the fact that the Bible yields itself to so many interpretations indicates, in his view, its unique character. In contradistinction to the secular works of the nations, in which only one meaning prevails in the text to the exclusion of all others, the literal meaning being at best trivial in an allegorical work and vice versa, the contrary is true of the Bible. Although the literal meaning of the text must be regarded as authentic, allusions to higher meanings must also be sought. What are these higher meanings? Are they to be identified with those of the mystics? References to the Zohar and the teachings of the Cabbalists, though not plentiful, are not infrequent in his works. The theory of the ten spheres and the relationship between them and the Deity are referred to already in the early 1 Atereth Zeqenim,181 and recur in his later works.182 181 182

'Atereth Zeqenim, chap. XXI. Deut. 4:15, p. 10a, col. 2; Nahalath Aboth, 5:1, p. 151a.

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He also alludes to the teachings of the Cabbalists regarding the resurrection of the dead, 183 the belief in the temporary existence of this world, 184 and, in connection with this, to their speculations on the soul 185 and its transmigration. 186 He further cites their interesting though very bizarre interpretation of Genesis 1:1,187 their reason for the prohibition of blood and fat, 188 and for God, rather than an angel, having "passed over" in Egypt, 189 etc. He quotes at length from the Zohar regarding the higher meanings inherent in each word and letter of the Torah, warning against a disrespectful attitude toward the secret lore. 190 Notwithstanding this, he generally steers clear of the Cabbalah and, with the exception of brief references, never gives it much attention. Even when referring to it, he is rather apologetic, and usually concludes either by stating his ignorance of the subject, or by rejecting its mystical assertions as logically unacceptable. 191 In his apotheosis of both Moses 192 and Solomon, 193 in which he showers upon them the highest praises, attributing to them the most embracing and deepest knowledge ever attained, the higher esoteric wisdom of the mystics is bypassed and ignored. Vociferous and outspoken an anti-rationalist though he is, by his education and activities, temperament and learning, he is still much closer to the rationalists than to the mystics, an attitude which is sustained in his Biblical commentaries. It is thus obvious that the "higher meanings" of the Bible, to which Abravanel is referring, are not to be identified with the Midrash of the mystics. Nor should they, on the other hand, be identified with the teachings of the rationalists, for which he seems to harbor nothing but contempt. While praising the "truth of all things, above and below", which Moses attained during the first ten days of his stay on Mount Sinai, he states clearly that this truth must not be identified with "the kind of empty and useless knowledge of the philosopher, who does not even compre183

Nahalath Aboth, IV, p. 140a. Mif'aloth, VII, chap. 3, p. 51a; VIII, chap. 5, p. 58b. Ibid., VIII, chap. 6, p. 61a. 186 Deut. 25:5, p. 49a. 18 ' Mif'aloth, III, chap. 4, p. 22a, 22b. 188 Lev. 3:1, p. 6a. 188 Zevah Pesah, commentary on DnSD V n n S I , p. 101. 190 Gen. 2, passage preceding commentary on f ' l N m D,»5>n n n V l D flVx, p. 16b, col. 2. 191 Deut. 4:15, p. 10a; Ezek., "ha-derekh ha-rishon", pp. 434-435; Mif'aloth, III, chap. 4, p. 22b; Zevah Pesafi, commentary on D n S » f " I S 3 THS»"!, p. 101; Nahalath Aboth, 5:1, commentary on oVlSin NH33 n r ) » N » .TTOJ73, p. 151a. 192 Exod. 19:11, p. 32b; 24:1, pp. 45b-47a; 'Atereth Zeqenim, XX. XXI; Rosh Amanah, 1; Mif'aloth, X, chap. 13. 193 I Kings 3:12. 184 186

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hend the essence of a fly, nor the smallest of natural things". 194 The same view he expresses in connection with his description of Solomon's wisdom, as a part of which he includes the "mysteries and secrets of the Torah". These, he points out, however, must not be understood in terms of the fictitious reasons suggested by Maimonides, which are mere guesses drawn from the books of ancient agnostics and without any foundation. 195 Nevertheless, as far as the rationalists are concerned, his attitude is not as explicit as might be inferred from the above. A line must be drawn between his attitude toward Maimonides and his attitude toward Maimonides' extreme interpreters as well as toward other rationalists, notably Ibn Ezra and Gersonides. Although he is very critical of the latter, he displays a warm understanding and consideration for the viewpoint of Maimonides, and constantly endeavors to exonerate him of the radical views that were attributed to him, and to prove his religious integrity. 196 Thus he justifies Maimonides' allegorical interpretation of the second chapter of Genesis 197 on the ground that, being a reiteration of the story of creation, this chapter does not yield itself to any other rendering. Besides, Maimonides, he feels, uses his allegory with restraint, not applying it, for example, to the entire first chapter. 198 Nor does he seem disturbed by Maimonides' symbolic interpretation of Adam's three sons, Cain, Abel and Seth. On the contrary, he himself offers "five arguments" in its support, asserting though that Maimonides must also have been fully convinced of their historicity. 199 Even Maimonides' rather unorthodox view of sacrifices 200 does not seem utterly unacceptable to him. Indeed, he labels his writing on the subject "holy rather than trivial words", 201 and expresses the opinion that support for Maimonides' view can be marshalled from the Scriptures. However, as has been seen and as will be shown, he is more frequently in disagreement with Maimonides, subjecting his views to sharp criticism. This dichotomic attitude persists throughout his writings, not excluding even the latest. In his letter of 1506 to Shaul, he expresses his regret for 1,4

*Atereth Zeqenim (Warsaw, 1894), chap. XXI, p. 84. I Kings 3:12, p. 477a, col. 2. 1,6 See mainly end of "Petihah", Comm. Guide, p. 6b; pt. I, chaps. VII, p. 18; VIII, pp. 20b-21a; X, p. 25; XI, p. 27a; XIV, p. 30; pt. II, chap. LIV, p. 10b. 197 Cf., Guide, II, 29, 30. 198 Gen. 2:4, section following the 42 "questions", beginning with: nttHDiTO "IB1X1 m m , p. 16. Gen. 4:11, pp. 23b-24a. !0 ° Guide, III, 32. 201 rmmp nVx , i a n n m n u a r m , "Haqdamah", Comm. Lev., passage beginning with m m p n ffVjW "Til p~ISH, p. 2b, col 2. 195

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the effort and energy he spent in his earlier days in the study of metaphysics and natural philosophy. However, even now, at the time of writing, when he seemingly made the decision to abstain from these studies and confine himself to Judaism alone, it is still the Guide which he lists second only to the Bible as the major text of his interest. Worth quoting are his own words which summarize this attitude: "I do not believe in everything Maimonides has written. The good we shall take, while the bad we shall reject. His words do possess, however, the quality of stimulating one to seek the good and upright". 202 With the darshanim of all times and ages, Abravanel shares the tendency of "squeezing" the Biblical text so that it may yield its inner treasures. That in the interpretation of the essence of these treasures he cannot free himself entirely from the rationalist Midrash, notably that of Maimonides, is obvious to any reader of his commentary. However, far more dominant a characteristic of his commentaries is the strong antirationalism which permeates them and which is indicative of his desire to free the Bible from the close association with the Aristotelian speculation of the Jewish rationalists. Though accepting in principle the midrashic method and assimilating to a great extent the view and terms of the rationalists, he struggles for an independent course of his own that will, if not eliminate the rationalist allegory altogether, at least modify its content somewhat, reduce its scope, and lessen its danger to the integrity of the popular faith and the authenticity of the Bible. Thus he does not reject the allegorical approach, but declares that its application must first of all be secondary to the literal rendering of the text and not supersede it in any way. Second, it must be confined to only certain sections of the text, and not extended either to the law or to those parts from which basic creeds are inferred. Thirdly, the allegory must least of all be drawn from the area of metaphysics and astronomy, but be rather of a social, national, or ethical nature. It is with the fate of man and his soul, the history of Israel and its destiny that the Biblical text ought to be brought into association, rather than with natural philosophy and the ever-changing speculations of metaphysicians and divines. These tendencies and views prevail in varying degrees in most of his allegories. Consequently, although he accepts almost fully Maimonides' interpretation of the Eden story, he infuses it with social and human motivations. All of it he believes to be an allusion to the nature of man. Eden symbolizes the universe as a whole; the garden this world; the tree 808

She'eloth Shaul, p. 7b.

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of life rational and Divine truth; and the tree of knowledge conventional truth. "It is not good for man to be alone" alludes to "man's need of society"; the "deep sleep" to the periods of childhood and youth, when the mind and its potentialities are still in a dormant state; and the "taking of the rib" to the "ejaculation of the semen" in the act of reproduction. 803 The relationship among Adam, Noah, and Abraham, who constitute the "three beginnings" of the Jewish people, he describes in terms of the relationship among the three forms of life on earth, the vegetative, the sensual, and the human. 204 Predominant in the allegorical rendering of the Patriarchs is the concept of the mind in its three stages, from the potential through the acquired to the prophetic, whereas the relationship between Isaac and Yishma'el, and between Jacob and Esau he interprets as symbolic of the relation between the speculative and the practical mind. 208 As mentioned, he objects most strenuously to the introduction into the Bible of metaphysical and astronomical concepts. Of Maimonides' interpretation of Jacob's dream as alluding to the organic unity of the universe, the abstract intelligences, the four elements, etc., he observes that it is hard to accept such an interpretation both within the context of the Biblical narrative and from the point of view of the essence of the prophetic vision. It seems utterly unreasonable, he argues, to ascribe to a man in flight for his life and in horror of his pursuing enemy revelations of such a nature. Moreover, why is such a mystical revelation necessary if the philosophers can attain by speculation the knowledge it supposedly imparts? Why, he further asks, was only Jacob of all the fathers singled out for such revelations, and why at such an inappropriate time and place, rather than at home, in his father's house, or in the beth midrash of Shem?206 Nor does he show a greater appreciation of the rationalizations regarding the Tabernacle and its vessels, though he admits that "it undoubtedly stands to reason to assume that they were also meant as allusions to other things besides their actual use". Of Maimonides' interpretation of the Cherubs as symbolic of the abstract intelligences; of the Candelabra as purporting to enhance the magnificence and glory of the house; of the incense as meant to dispel the bad odor of the slaughtered animals; and of the sacrificial cult in general as a concession to the times, since "this was 203 204

Comm. Gen. 2, p. 23a. "Introduction", Gen. 12:1, p. 35b.

•« ^ram 108

•wsn Vatpn, ibid.

Gen. 28:12, p. 5b (new pagination starts with

Toledoth).

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a custom of ancient idol-worshipers" — of all these and other interpretations he writes: "You see how weak his words are and how far from convincing." He is even more critical of Gersonides' allegories with their emphasis on metaphysical and astronomical concepts. "Nonsensical", he labels them, "misleading ... and never intended by the Torah". God, he argues, did not command the building of the Holy of Holies, the heikhal, and all the vessels as symbols of the various sciences which people attain by their reason and which are subject to so many errors and fallacies. 207 Rather than accommodate science and philosophy within the Biblical frame, Abravanel uses allegory for the opposite goal, namely to combat philosophy and secular learning. From the binding of Isaac, he sermonizes, one must learn to "bind" one's own mind on the altar of the Lord and subjugate it to the Torah and faith whenever, under the influence of speculations, it tends to stray away. Similarly, he interprets Abraham's request to Eli'ezer to find a wife for his son Isaac not from the "daughters of Canaan" but rather from his own family, as an instruction to the speculative mind to devote itself not to secular learning — which, like the daughters of Canaan, brings grief to the mind — but only to the Divine Torah, which alone God has designated as a means of the attainment of perfection. 208 In opposition to the Midrash of the rationalists, he offers his own Midrash, which is socially colored, deeply pious, and national. Thus he interprets the boards and the three covers of the Tabernacle as symbolic of the four classes of society, ranging from the ivory-tower scholars through the merchants and workers to the rich rulers and leaders. Abravanel contends, however, that the fact that the Tablets of the Law, the most precious possession, were deposited in the Holy of Holies, which was completely secluded, served to indicate that human perfection is not considered attainable by any of these classes, but only by those who study the Divine Law and its commandments. This idea is symbolized, he contends, by other parts of the Tabernacle also. The golden wreath around the cover of the Ark is to show that the "Torah alone is the true crown and garland"; the upward direction of the wings of the Cherubs indicates the heavenly source of all abundance; and the turning of all the candles toward the middle branch of the Candelabra is a sign that true wisdom must be in full harmony with the fundamentals of the Torah. 2 0 9 207

Exod. 25:10, pp. 48b-49a. ">' "Introduction", Gen. 12:1, p. 35b. ,0 » Exod. 25:10, p. 50.

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He reiterates most of these allegories, stressing the human aspect and introducing new elements of a historical and educational nature, in his interpretation of the Temple of Solomon and its vessels. He warns against subjecting them to the metaphysical and astronomical notions of Maimonides and particularly of Gersonides, asserting instead that the meanings attached to them must rather be in the spirit of the commandments of the Torah, in order that they may be used as directives and stimuli for proper actions. In short, he believes the allegory ought to be educational rather than informative, practical rather than speculative. Thus he interprets the three materials from which the walls of the Temple were made — stone, timber, and gold, one placed on top of the other — as signifying the growth of the monarchy in Israel from Saul to Solomon, both materially and spiritually. He suggests an alternate explanation of these materials as alluding to the three worlds; the stones symbolizing the sublunar, the timber the rotating spheres, and the gold the highest of them all, the realm of the detached intelligences. The childlike appearance of the Cherubs, of opposite genders, he interprets as an admonition "to every man and woman in Israel to dedicate himself persistently, from childhood, to the study of the Law and its practices". Pointing to the temporal existence of man is the altar of sacrifice, and its hollowness an allusion to the vanity of all worldly affairs. Symbolic of life, which is like a"raging sea", is the "Sea", and its receiving of the water from the outside an allusion to the heavenly abundance that sustains this world. 210 In a similar vein, both pious and traditional, is his allegory of the throne of Solomon. Its round top, symbolic of the heavens, indicates that it was by the wish of the heavens that Solomon was destined to reign; its two stays 211 allude to the two Torahs, the Written and the Oral, as the basis for the administration of justice; the lions to the strength of the prophets and sages, the interpreters of the law; and the twelve steps to the twelve tribes of Israel. 212 In conclusion, Abravanel's interpretation of Ezekiel's visions of the Chariots must be considered, if only on account of his constant reference to it and the anti-rationalism with which it is permeated. He dealt with the subject for the first time in the 'Atereth Zeqenim,213 and continued to deal with it in the Mdynei ha-Yeshu'ah,214 in the commentary on the 210 211

212 213 211

I Kings, 8 (Teshuvath ha-she'elah ha-shishith), pp. 518ff. xyit

I Kings 10:20, p. 542, col. 2; p. 543, col. 1. Chap. XXIV. Malayan II, tamar 2, pp. 285-286.

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Guide,215 and above all in the introduction to his commentary on Ezekiel.218 These visions were the subject of rather extensive comments by Maimonides, 217 and it is mainly against them that Abravanel directs his polemic. He sets forth seven arguments against them in the 'Atereth, nine in the introduction to Ezekiel, and twenty-six in the commentary on the Guide. There is no need to enumerate them all, but only the basic ones which recur in all of the texts. The general meaning of these visions, according to Maimonides and his interpreters, bears upon the cosmic order, with the first, or the "one", of the Chariot's "wheels" 218 signifying prime matter and the four elements; the "living creatures" 219 symbolize the heavenly bodies, and the hashmal the detached intelligences. This rendering Abravanel rejects as an "utter falsehood" which can by no stretch of the imagination be drawn from the prophet's visions. Were their meaning astronomic or metaphysical, he argues, why the great secrecy in which our sages enshrouded the study of ma'asei merkavah, since such studies are the subject of public instruction and exposition in all houses of higher learning? 220 The "living creatures" being four, he further argues, how can they be identified with the spheres, whose number is far greater according to Maimonides himself? Nor does the order in which they appear in the Biblical text support such a rendering. Were the wheels to signify the four elements, the hayyoth the spheres, and the hashmal the intelligences, they should have been listed either in this or in the reverse order. The Ezekiel text, however, according to this interpretation, would seem confused and devoid of any order. He is still more critical of another aspect, namely the lack of any obvious connection between such an interpretation and the general content of Ezekiel's prophecies. After all, he argues: Ezekiel prophesied at the time of the destruction of the Temple, and his prophecies are concerned with the sins of Israel, the destruction of Jerusalem, or the exile of the people and their future restoration. What possible interest could Ezekiel have had in spheres, elements, and intelligences, to place them at the beginning of his prophecies? And what bearing do they have altogether on the problem of the destruction and the exile?221 216 216 217

218 219 220 221

Comm. Guide, Pt. II, pp. 48-53. Comm. Ezek., p. 434ff. Guide, III, 1-7.

CTJDIN nvnn

Cf., Crescas, Or Adonai, ma'amar IV, drush 10, p. 90. "Introduction", Comm. Ezek., p. 435.

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He advances many more arguments and concludes with labeling all the interpretations of Maimonides "nonsensical and misleading".222 In contradistinction to such allegories, which ignore completely the national and historical setting, Abravanel suggests his own allegory which, though taking into consideration the symbolic meaning of these visions, interprets them as related to God's conduct of the universe on the one hand, and the imminent tragic fate of the nation on the other hand. The wheels, the living creatures, and the hashmal he believes symbolize the spheres, the intelligences, and God, and the visions in toto God's will that moves the universe through His spiritual beings. The heavenly Chariot, seen in motion by Ezekiel, may have only one significance, namely the departure of God's Providence from Israel, about to come as a result of its sins.223 Such symbolic meanings, forecasting both good and evil, he deduces also from the "whirlwind", the "cloud", the "flaming fire", and the "brightness",224 interpreting them all as bearing on the historical fate of the people, and thus offering an explanation for their appearance at the beginning of the Book of Ezekiel. Many more allegories could be mentioned; those cited, however, seem sufficient to illustrate his method and his unique position between the traditional and rationalist expositors of the Bible.

7. NATIONAL THOUGHT

If the influence of Maimonides is prevalent in Abravanel's metaphysical and Judaic speculations, it is that of Halevi, author of the anti-rationalist Kuzari, which is felt in the more limited area of his national thought. To it may be traced his concept of the uniqueness of Israel, the role of Eres Yisrael, the relationship between the Torah and philosophy, and many of the similes and metaphors he frequently uses, though not always acknowledging their source. This influence is overshadowed, however, by the direct impact of Jewry's tragic historical reality of the time. Few among his contemporaries show a greater awareness than he of the full range of current events, or a closer acquaintance with their effect on Jewry. It has been especially for the last thirty-two years, he writes in the middle of the nineties, that 222 m m

"Introduction", Comm. Ezek., p. 437, col. 1. Ibid., pp. 439-440. Ibid., p. 446.

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the Jews have become increasingly exposed to unprecedented suffering such as neither they nor any other people on earth have ever experienced before. The scope and intensity of the evils that befall everyone bearing the name "Jew" are beyond anything the human imagination can envision. They are harassed all over Europe and expelled from most Christian countries in both East and West, "beginning with Russia and Germany and ending with the territories of Italy and all the kingdoms of Spain". Crushed and decimated is the proud, prosperous, enlightened, and numerous Spanish Jewry, with only remnants surviving as scattered and uprooted refugees. Even more tragic is the fate of the Marranos, who are being indiscriminately led to their death. 225 Commenting on the phrase, "in every generation one ought to regard oneself as though one had come out of Egypt", of the Passover Haggadah, he observes that this phrase describes indeed the situation of present-day Jews, when every individual Jew experiences personally what the people en masse experienced in Egyptian bondage. "Though some Jews may evoke compassion from their captors and may be spared greater sufferings, their position remains nevertheless submissive and servile as compared with that of the ruling people." Far worse, however, is the lot of many others, who are put by their enemies to hard labor, or subjected to great hardships and sufferings. Some are even chained and exposed to grave dangers, and others forbidden by their oppressors to keep the Sabbath and holidays. 226 Abravanel was also fully aware of the spiritual havoc the expulsion had wrought among the exiles. Even those who chose suffering to conversion soon became the victims of apathy and despair. "They say", he writes of them, "that God has forsaken the sons of Jacob forever, and that He will not cease punishing them". In addition, he regrets the growing indifference to learning and scholarly pursuits that is spreading among them. 227 It is this background one must keep in mind in order to understand Abravanel's intense literary activity in the post-exilic period, an activity which is permeated with a deep awareness of the tragedy that befell the people and a concern for Jewish survival. This literary activity, rather than constituting a goal per se, is motivated by national considerations. To strengthen the people in this tragic hour by reviving in them a sense of national pride and a faith in their imminent redemption seems to have become the prime task he set for himself in the remaining years of his life. With that aim in mind he wrote not only his Messianic trilogy, but 225 228 227

"Introduction", Ma'ynei ha-Yeshu'ah, pp. 271-275; XII, tamar 6, p. 413, col. 1. Zemh Pesati, p. 142. "Haqdamah", Ma'ynei ha- Yeshu'ah; "Haqdamah", Nafialath Aboth.

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also the Sedeq'Olamim and Zevah Pesah, as well as many of his commentaries. Even his struggle against rationalism must be directly attributed to this motivation. Indeed, in 1506, when Shaul of Crete addressed himself to him with his philosophical questions, and in the best tradition of the time showered upon him his highest praises, it was the national aspect of his activity which, next to his scholarly work, Shaul lauded most. "Wonderful counselor", he calls him, whose advice "revived the hearts of the depressed and the spirit of the lowly ... You were to them", he continues in the language of the prophet, "an iron pillar and a fortress, a source of strength to the weak who, under the increased pressures of the sudden and bitter fate of Galuth, despaired of the hope of redemption". 228 The national thought of Abravanel finds its deepest expression in his views on the essence and uniqueness of the Jewish people and the Messianic ideal. Like Halevi long before him, he conceives of the Jews as a separate species of the human race, indeed, a "higher" form of it. 229 Whereas it is the "natural" which constitutes the essence and destiny of the other nations, it is the spiritual and the Divine to which the Jews are committed. They became imbued with this ideal from almost pre-historic times, a fact symbolically expressed by the'aqedah of Isaac. The meaning of this extraordinary event at the dawn of Jewish history, he explains, must not be interpreted in terms of a personal experience peculiar to Abraham, denoting his total surrender to the will of God, but rather as a supreme act through which the nation-to-come was transformed from its very inception into a "holy seed". Since all future generations were potentially contained in Isaac, by his binding and suffering the future people were symbolically purged of evil inclinations. The c aqedah thus marks the detachment of the Jewish people from the rule of lowly matter, and their consecration to the holy and spiritual. 230 This uniqueness he expresses also in the astrological terms of the time. Whereas all other nations have their origin in the heavenly hosts and depend upon them for their bodily and spiritual sustenance, Israel has its origin in God and depends directly upon Him. As has been seen, Abravanel, like most of his contemporaries and predecessors, is an ardent believer in astrology and its doctrine of a direct relationship between the higher and the lower worlds. 231 However, he believes that this doctrine does not pertain to Israel either in part or in toto. Although as individ228 229 230 231

She'eloth Shaul, p. 2a. Cf., Kuzari, I, pars. 95, 103; II, par. 44; IV, par. 3, and passim. Gen. 22:1, pp. 51-52. See, supra, pp. 86-87.

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uals, the Jews, like other individuals, are subject to the rule of the stars, as a people under the direct guidance of God they are not affected by them. Moreover, it is only with regard to the "inclination and tendency", implanted by the stars in the individual at his birth, that the Jews, like all the rest of humanity, are subject to their rule. The Jews differ from all others, however, as far as the actual realization of this initial "inclination" is concerned. Although it remains predetermined and subject to no change in the case of the other nations, in the case of Israel it can either be changed or be completely abolished through the direct intervention of God. 232 The unique position of Israel among the nations Abravanel describes in the cosmic terms of his time. He likens it to the position of the prime intelligence among the intelligences, and to that of the highest and largest sphere among the rotating heavenly spheres. Like them in the "upper worlds", Israel on earth, by being the most perfect, is closest to God and directly guided by Him, without any intermediaries. 233 He discovers another parallelism between the heavenly hosts and Israel: Like the sphere, which though material nevertheless merges with the detached intelligence and, stimulated by its image, is in perpetual motion in order to attain the highest degree of perfection, so Israel clings spiritually unto God, and, stimulated by His image and the desire to worship Him, is moved to deeds of justice and to a life of holiness in accordance with the precepts of the Torah.

This parallelism goes even further, attaching cosmic significance to another basic element in Abravanel's national thought — Eres Yisrael. Similar to the relationship between the sphere and the abstract intelligence which is at its closest "in the center of the circumference, at a point equally distant from the two poles", the relationship between Israel and God reaches its greatest intensity and intimacy in the Chosen Land. 234 It is only there that God's Providence is direct and most abundant, since of all the lands it is uniquely endowed "to absorb the Divine spark". 235 Reiterating the simile of Halevi, he asserts that, like certain plants or fruits which develop best in a given soil and in consequence of a particular mode of tendance, so Israel can attain its full spiritual growth only in 232

Deut. 4:15ff., p. 9b, col. 1; pp. 10-11; Ma'ynei ha- Yeshu'ah, XII, tamar 8, p. 415, col. 2; 'Atereth Zeqenim, chaps. XI, XII; Nahalath Aboth, 3:19, p. 97; Zevah Pesah, pp. 123, 134-135. 233 Exod. 24:1, p. 46a, col. 2; 46b, col. 1; *Atereth Zeqenim, chap. XII; Nahalath Aboth, 3:18, commentary on •Dip»1? o r o lK*lj?2P VintZP f l ^ H . 234 'Atereth Zeqenim, chap. XXV 236 "»nVxn f v r i n yiapV

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Eres Yisrael and through a life of holiness. 236 Since Eres Yisrael alone is the land of prophecy, it is the eloignement from it, rather than the sadness of life in exile — as Maimonides thought — which explains the decline and disappearance of this heavenly abundance among the Jewish people. 237 Central in Abravanel's national thought is the Messianic hope, a subject to which he devoted three volumes. Consistent with his systematic and thorough approach, he leaves out no section of Jewish literature, Biblical or post-Biblical, in his search for evidence that may have a bearing on this hope. Thus he discovers in Daniel seventy prophecies of redemption, sixty of which have already been realized; ten, however, still await fulfillment. 238 In his Mashmi'a Yeshifah he extends the area of his search to include the whole Bible. Here he names seventeen "announcers" of redemption, beginning with Bala'am and ending with Daniel, and ascribes to them — Daniel excluded — more than sixty prophecies on the subject. 239 He further extends his investigation to the midrashic literature in his Yeshifoth Meshiho, in which he collects an array of later sources dealing with this subject. Among the reasons for the superiority of Isaiah to all the other prophets, he lists primarily the greater number of "prophecies of consolation" in his book as compared with any other book of the Bible. 240 Second to Isaiah, in this respect, is the Book of Psalms, followed by the Books of Ezekiel and Jeremiah. By this vast array of sources Abravanel aims to put this belief in the Messianic hope on a solid foundation, and dispel any doubts raised against it. Such doubts came from several sources. There were those who, while sharing this belief, nevertheless objected to its elevation to the rank of a cardinal tenet and to its inclusion by Maimonides among the major Articles of Faith. 241 Others doubted its future validity, believing as they did that the Messianic prophecies contained in the Bible may have already been fulfilled during the period of the Second Commonwealth. It is against such doubts, to which must also be added the spiritual interpretation of Messianism by Christians, that Abravanel directs his arguments. The major source for his concept of Messianism is the Book of Isaiah, from which he gleans fourteen principles of that faith, none of which, 2,6 'Atereth Zeqenim, chaps. XIII, XXV; Nahalath Aboth, 3:18, p. 88a; c f , Kuzari, II, pars. 10-12. 837 Comm. Amos 1:1, p. 79; Guide, II, 36; Kuzari, II, pars. 13-14. 238 Ma'ynei ha-Yeshu'ah, XII, tamar 8, p. 421. "8 Sefer Mashmi'a Yeshu'ah in Perush 'al Neviim u-Ketuvim, pp. 425-608, passim. Introduction, "Ha-behinah ha-Revi*ith", Comm. Isa., pp. 6-7. 141 C f , Joseph Albo, Sefer ha-'Iqqarim (Tel Aviv, 1951), ma'amar rishon, chap. 1.

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he points out, has yet been realized. Reflecting no doubt the historical reality of the period of the exile from Spain, with its increased tensions between Christians and Jews, is the fact that at the head of this list of principles he puts "the vengeance that God will wreak upon the nations at that time", and the statement that "the vengeance upon Edom and Basra will be by far greater than that which He will inflict upon the other nations". Among the other fundamentals of this creed, he lists the ingathering of the exiles, among whom he also includes the lost ten tribes, thus bringing an end to Galuth altogether; the restoration of the monarchy of the House of David; the conversion to Judaism of the rest of humanity; and the prevalence of peace. Worth mentioning in this connection is Abravanel's rather favorable disposition toward the Marranos. Among "the redeemed" he includes the renegades to the faith who, as a result of coercion or persuasion, deserted the fold and assimilated into the nations. "They will repent and return fullheartedly unto God". 2 4 2 Not only does Abravanel devote a great part of his literary activity to proving the validity of the Messianic hope as a major article of faith in Judaism, but, with perhaps even more immediate effect on his contemporaries and on Jewry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, he puts forth his deep conviction of the imminent realization of that hope. Redemption, he feels, is at hand; indeed, it has already begun, and Galuth is drawing to a close. This conviction he bases on the contemplation of the historical reality of the time as well as on observation of the constellations of the stars. Events on earth in both the Christian and the Jewish worlds are much too great and unique to be disregarded. The Church is showing increasing signs of inner corruption and decay, 243 whereas the spectacular and steady advance of the Ottoman Turks is continuing unabated — events whose possible implications are not lost on Abravanel. 244 Developments of no lesser importance, from a Jewish point of view, are taking place in the Jewish world. Spanish Jewry, the richest, largest, and possibly the oldest of the European Jewish communities, has been completely uprooted and destroyed, and expulsions of Jews from other parts of Christian Europe are becoming commonplace. The fate of Jewry, it seems to Abravanel, has reached its lowest possible point, beyond which only a turn for the better can take place. Like the grain of Mashmi'a Yeshu'ah ("ha-mevasser ha-shelishi", in summary, following the redemption prophecies of Isaiah), pp. 491-496. 243 Yeshu'oth Meshiho, pt. II, chap. 5, p. 34a. "4 Ibid., p. 35a.

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wheat which disintegrates and rots away completely before flourishing forth in a new "stalk with seven ears", so the Jewish people, having reached such a low state, are bound to enter upon a period of revival and salvation. Significant also, he believes, are the "territorial" changes Jewry has been undergoing over the last two centuries, changes which greatly affect its geographic distribution. Beginning with the expulsion from England at the end of the thirteenth century, and followed by the expulsions from France at the beginning and end of the fourteenth century, through the more limited though more frequent expulsions from Germany and other parts of Europe in the course of the fifteenth century, and concluding with the great expulsion from Spain in 1492, the area of Jewish habitation has become increasingly restricted. Moreover, these changes have seemed to follow a clear pattern. Gradually the Jews are leaving Western and Central Europe, and in their eastward movement are drawing ever closer to their ancient homeland. This remarkable phenomenon has become especially noticeable recently, when "not only Jews, but Marranos as well, who had already deserted the fold, began leaving the lands of the West... and assembling in increasing numbers in the Holy Land". 245 The unique nature of the times is also indicated by heavenly signs. Since the year 1464 a heavenly formation of unprecedented significance has become noticeable, indicating that great things are about to happen on earth. Jupiter and Saturn, the most important of the planets astrologically, have come into conjunction. Moreover, since that date, this conjunction has remained in the Zodiacal sign of Pisces, a most auspicious sign and of unique significance for Jews. It was at the end of the period of such a conjunction in the same Zodiacal sign that the redemption from Egypt took place some three thousand and three hundred years ago; and it is now that such a constellation appears for the second time. Since according to his calculations this constellation is to last about eightythree years, thirty-two of which have already elapsed, there remain more than fifty years during which redemption is bound to take place. Although the exact date of this great event remains unknown, he speculates: "If it should be at the end of two small conjunctions, each lasting twenty years less fifty days, the time of redemption might be in the year five thousand two hundred and sixty-three" (1503). Two other possibilities are the years 1505 or 1534. However, be the year of the anticipated event whatever it may, of one thing he is convinced, namely that "the time of the 246

Comm. Isa. 43:6, pp. 206-207.

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birth of the Divine Messiah, who will be superior to Abraham and more elevated than Moses, has undoubtedly arrived", and that the Messianic age has already been ushered in.246 Closely connected with the Messianic belief and, like it, formulated in national rather than universal terms is Abravanel's concept of the resurrection of the dead, a miraculous event to follow the advent of the Messiah. "What is the purpose of this revival"? he asks. "Why should the soul, after having rejoined the spirits, return again to the body?" Maimonides, in his Epistle, Abravanel points out, could find no answer to this question. Nor does the answer of Sa'adyah, Nahmanides, Crescas, and others who declare its purpose to be "that the full human personality, composed of both body and soul, be either rewarded or punished", seem acceptable to him. Instead, he believes that three purposes are meant to be served by resurrection. It is meant first of all as a reward and compensation to the Jews who suffered Galuth, secondly as a punishment of "our enemies", and thirdly as a victory for Judaism in the world. Since resurrection, he explains, will immediately follow the advent of the Messiah, "when God will redeem His people by restoring them to their homeland, and punish their enemies", it would seem strange, indeed, for only a relatively few to be privileged to see this great event, while the rest of the nation, who died in Galuth and suffered martyrdom for the sanctification of His name, were excluded from partaking in resurrection or witnessing God's salvation. Nor would it seem just, on the other hand, for God's vengeance to be wreaked on only the nations living at that time, leaving unpunished all those enemies "who have consumed and crushed us, and yet passed away with honors ...". This, indeed, would amount to a rewarding of sinners. Resurrection is, moreover, to serve a still loftier and more spiritual purpose. With many of the deceased coming back to the realm of the living and sharing with them their experiences of heavenly reward and punishment, there will come an end to all untrue faiths, and the nations of the world will acknowledge God alone and the true faith, Judaism. It is for this triple purpose that not only the Jewish deceased, but some non-Jewish as well will be resurrected, the former to be compensated for their prolonged sufferings and the latter to be punished for having caused it and for having "shed their (the Jews') blood like water". Since, as far as the nations are concerned, the purpose of their resurrection 246

Mctynei ha-Yeshu'ah, XII ("ha-sha*ar ha-sheni ... sha'ar ha-Shamayim"), pp. 406-418, especially tamar 6 and 7, pp. 412-414; also Comm. Ezek. 20:36, pp. 520-521.

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is the punishment of the wicked among them and the universal diffusion of the true faith, it follows that not all will arise, but "only some ... a few in each district, city or state", in sufficient numbers to carry out this task. 247 8. THE ETHICAL PROBLEM

A final expression of Abravanel's anti-rationalism is to be found in his views on ethics. Human reason having proven a failure in both physics and metaphysics, he argues against the rationalists, it ought not to be appealed to as the final arbiter of moral values, nor should its pursuit of speculative truth be considered the highest destiny of man. Parallel to his rejection of the attempts at a synthesis of Judaism and rationalism in the field of metaphysics is his refutation of such attempts in the ethical sphere. The endeavor of Jewish rationalists to prove the conformity of Jewish moral teachings to either Platonic or Aristotelian ethics is, in his view, a vain enterprise, based on a misconception. Judaic and Greek ethical systems are completely different, and ought not to be related to one another. It is therefore wrong to explain the "teachings of the Fathers" in terms of a rational ethical system evolved by speculation and human reason. They must rather be considered as a body of maxims inferred by the sages of the Oral Tradition from the Scriptures, in recognition of which achievement these teachings are attributed to them; their origin, however, does not lie with the sages, but is Divine. 248 The two systems differ first of all in regard to their respective views on the origin of the ethical, and, as a result, on its essence and justification. According to Judaism, the source of the ethical, like that of religion, is the will of G o d ; according to the rationalists, however, it is human reason. Consequently, the ethical does not constitute to the Jew an autonomous domain where his actions carry their own justification. It is such a domain, however, to the rationalists. Commenting on the saying of Antigonos of Socho: "Be not like the servants who minister to their master for the sake of receiving a reward, but be like servants who minister to their master not for the sake of a reward", 2 4 9 Abravanel expresses his disapproval of the interpretation of The Messianic hope is also strongly displayed in Zevah Pesah, see esp. commentaries on: "shfokh hamatkha", "lo lanu", "ahavti ki yishma"', etc. 2 " Main sources: "Introduction" to Comm. Isa. (beginning with "ha-shoresh harishon"), pp. 9-14; Nahalath Aboth, IV, pp. 139-149; Ma'ynei ha-Yeshu'ah, XI, tamar 9, pp. 397- 398; see also Isa. 18, p. 113 , col. 1; 24:16, p. 137; 25, 26, pp. 142-143; Ezek. 37:1, p. 574. 248 Nahalath Aboth (second introduction). "» Aboth, 1:3.

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Maimonides who understood it to mean that "one should not perform the commandments for any ulterior motive, but for their own sake ... since one should love truth for the sake of truth". This kind of interpretation, he feels, is too philosophical, introducing the mode of thought of the moral philosophers. What is morally right or wrong from a rationalist point of view, however, is not necessarily so from a Jewish point of view. Since the philosophers reject belief in Divine Providence as well as in reward and punishment, the only remaining sanction of the moral act, in their thinking, is inherent in its intrinsic value. N o t so, however, in Judaism, where the ethical and religious are inseparable, and both the expression of God's will. Only as a Divine ethical expression does an act assume moral standing; not, however, on account of its inner reasonableness. Indeed, in themselves some of the commandments or prohibitions are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. Nor is there actually any correlation between their observance or violation, on the one hand, and the promised reward or threatened punishment, on the other hand. In short, the only yardstick by which actions are to be measured is their compliance with or rejection of the will of God. 2 5 0 By similar reasoning, he rejects another principle of Maimonides' ethics, namely the principle of the golden mean, which Maimonides borrowed from the Nicomachean ethics. Though praiseworthy from the point of view of man in general, this principle is of little use to the Jew. The measuring and weighing it suggests as a yardstick for moral actions is, in the final analysis, an appeal to reason. The possession of the Torah, however, makes resorting to such calculations superfluous. "The path of the Torah which God has set for His people is the only right one ... requiring nothing else". 251 He suggests another reason for discouraging the rationalist approach in ethics, namely the undermining effect it is liable to have on collective morality. It is in this sense that he interprets Hillel's warning: "Separate not thyself from the congregation, trust not in thyself until the day of thy death". The reliance of the individual on his own reason, he points out, usually leads him away from conventional morality by encouraging the assertion of individualistic standards and judgments. 252 It finally follows f r o m the above that in the ancient controversy regarding the ethical ideal, whether it should be sought in knowledge or in deeds, in speculation or in faith, Abravanel unhesitatingly aligns himself with the s

"

Aboth, p. 27b. Ibid., 2:1, p. 46, commentary on DTNn V? TO""® • • • "J"n NTt IPX . Ibid., 2:5, p. 63b.

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popular view, which considers an adherence to Jewish practices and creeds, as evolved by tradition, to be far more essential in Judaism than reflection on their meaning and contemplation of the great issues of metaphysics and natural philosophy. Commenting on the words of R' El'azar ben 'Azariah, that "a man whose wisdom exceeds his deeds" is like "a tree whose branches are many, but whose roots are few, and the wind comes and uproots it and overturns it", 253 he observes that by "wisdom" are implied the speculations of the rationalists, and by"deeds" the practice of the commandments. Since (Abravanel says) this man has exchanged the essential for the trivial, i.e., for the results of his own speculations, a "wind" from another man will come along, refute his opinions, uproot, and overturn them. Thus his wisdom will not endure.

This, he remarks, is indeed what has been happening all along with the rationalist speculations. The teachings of the Ancients have been refuted by Plato, and those of Plato by Aristotle. Ibn Roschd rejected the views of Abu Nasser and Themistius, and the same will, most probably, happen to Ibn Roschd's views.254 Philosophic speculations, in the final analysis, leave one rootless, constantly drifting; deeds, on the other hand, anchor the individual in a specific way of life. The conclusion to be drawn thus becomes obvious: When faced with the alternative of a life devoted to either speculation or the Torah, the decision must be in favor of the latter. "The day is short and the work plentiful", leaving one no other choice. 255 Those who chose the opposite, even the greatest among them, came to regret it. Thus: It is told of Aristotle ... that after he had met Simeon the Pious and listened to his words on Divine matters, he retracted his own views.

In that context Abravanel tells of a similar development about which he "heard" regarding the "great Rabbi Maimonides" who supposedly had written in an epistle: At the end of my days there came to me a man who told me sensible things. And if it had not been for the fact that I was too old, and my works diffused throughout the world, I would have retracted many of the views which I have expressed in them.

On this Abravanel comments: "Undoubtedly it is the Cabbalah to which he is referring". 256 253 254 265 256

Aboth, 3:22. Ibid., pp. 105-106. Ibid., 2:20, p. 63b. Ibid., 3:22, p. 106b.

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An additional example of his anti-rationalist stand is his attitude toward the problem of the Articles of Faith, a problem closely related to the ethical issue. These articles, which were first formulated by Maimonides and, following his lead, by Crescas and Albo, are, in Abravanel's view, alien to Judaism and actually the result of foreign influences. Following the method of mathematics and other deductive fields of knowledge — where certain axiomatic assumptions are made which, though being themselves outside the area of demonstrative truth, nevertheless constitute the foundation upon which the deductive structure is built — the above scholars undertook to infer the teachings of Judaism demonstratively, from a few so-called "higher principles". This approach, he asserts, is foreign to the Jewish tradition, which recognizes no difference between "essentials" and "incidentals". Everything in that tradition, to the minutest detail, is of equal importance, and casting a doubt on even the most trivial point is as grave an offense as denying a major tenet or the transgression of a basic commandment. Were these "higher principles" of real importance, he argues, they would have been mentioned by the sages of the Oral Tradition. The fact that they were authored by Maimonides must not in itself be considered very significant. Far from intending to express through them all aspects of Judaism, he considered them merely a bare minimum to serve as a guide for the simple and ignorant. As a matter of fact, they appear only in his commentary on the Mishnah, which he composed in his youth; they are left out of the Guide altogether.257 In conclusion, Abravanel's comment on Maimonides' qualification of the term "faith" may be cited as a final illustration of his objection to the encroachment of reason upon the area of belief and of his desire to restore to religion the status of an autonomous Divine entity which is in no need of rational endorsment. By faith (Maimonides writes) we do not understand merely that which is uttered with the lips, but also that which is apprehended by the soul, the conviction that the object (of belief) is exactly as it is apprehended .... For belief is possible only after the apprehension of a thing.258 This qualification, Abravanel comments, is not clear to him at all, since, according to it, faith would depend upon conception and rational knowledge; nowhere in the Bible has he ever found the use of "faith" for things apprehended by thought and speculation, or as a synonym for knowledge. In opposition to this he suggests that what is meant by "faith" is first of 157 168

Rosh Amanah, chaps. XXIII, XXIV. Guide, I, 50.

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all something received by tradition rather than attained by investigation and speculation, and secondly, something which has its origin either in prophecy or in miracles rather than in rational demonstration. 259 The anti-rationalist viewpoint of Abravanel, having been presented in its various aspects, needs no further elaboration. It may not be out of place, however, to conclude with an observation on Abravanel himself. Though he is seemingly consistent throughout and congruous in his views and attitudes, the genuineness of his views may be open to some doubt. His "system" seems too complacent and too little beset by doubts or questions to be convincing. His claim — so repetitious and vociferous — to be in the possession of all the answers is more irritating than impressive. Neither is his strongly asserted "nationalism", nor his no less emphatically expressed anti-rationalism actually as deep as one might be inclined to believe on the basis of his voluminous writings. True, he was a man of great literary talents; however, it was only through them and not by any actual deeds that he gave expression to his convictions. Whether these convictions were really deep and sincere may still be questioned. Were he really so serious in his Messianic hopes and speculations, why, one is tempted to ask, didn't he show the slightest sign of personal involvement? Why, while in Corfu — in the mid-nineties, after the fall of Naples to the French — not so far from Eres Yisrael, the alleged land of his hopes and dreams, didn't he even "go up" for a pilgrimage, to imbue himself with that "holy spark" of whose diffusion in the Holy Land he so often wrote? Indeed, some ten years later, when he was approaching the seventieth year of his life, such an idea was suggested to him by Shaul of Crete. "Who knows", Shaul wrote to him, 260 "whether this is not the right time in the eyes of the Lord to put in your heart the good counsel that may lead you to the desired land"? Shaul even pressed his point a little further and persistently inquired: Let me know your ways ... whether you are still desirous of the worldly goods and the temporal honors of being in the councils of the nobles and the mighty ... or perhaps, since you have grown old and grey, you may have decided to withdraw from the practical affairs of the world, and ... go up to the "dwellings of the shepherds" ... to grace its dust, and dedicate yourself to the service of the soul.261

269

Comm. Guide, pt. II, p. 3. Most probably in the year 1506. The heh of "n"~llO 111®", the date given for that letter, must be assumed to stand for the year 5,000 (1240). 261 V r r r o s ? , She'eloth Shaul, p. 4a. 260

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There is no reason to assume, however, that Abravanel ever entertained such an idea. He seems, perhaps unconsciously, too deeply rooted in the Christian environment and culture, and too intent on the temporal goods of wealth, honor, and power, to give them up for a mere vague spiritual dream. One must not forget the basic fact of his life, that most of it was spent in the service of the Christian states and their rulers. He had reached the height of his career under the "most Christian" rulers, Isabella and Ferdinand, in the shadow of the Inquisition and the unfolding of an unmistakable policy of ever greater and harsher measures against the Jews. Even the exile does not seem to have had a very deep personal effect on him or to have caused him in any decisive way to re-evaluate his life and pursuits. After only a short interruption, he resumed his career of serving the Christian state, though under a new master, and as late as the last years of his life he was engaged in mediation efforts between Venice and Portugal, next to Spain the greatest persecutor and tormentor of Jews of the time. 262 Nor does his vast scholarly work bear convincing evidence of any deep and far-reaching effect the Iberian Jewish tragedy may have had on him. He gives vent to his bitterness against the Christian world by limiting resurrection to only small numbers of Christians, and by claiming greater glories for the Jews than for Christians in the Messianic age. Beyond this, however, he does not go. On the contrary, he quotes Christian scholars and savants with great frequency and respect, often preferring their views to those of Jews. In view of the tragic lot of Jewry in Christian Europe at the time, such a practice points to a certain detachment from the historical reality, and to an attitude which exceeds anything that may be explained in terms of scholarly objectivity and liberalism. Moreover, his anti-rationalism seems to have been of a mere literary nature, and must least of all be identified with a negative attitude toward secular learning. Indications of a rather positive stand toward that learning are perhaps as profuse in his writings as those to the contrary. Notwithstanding the many criticisms of Maimonides, his admiration for him never diminished, nor did he, to the last days of his life, cease to study his Guide. Nor should the fact be ignored that it is his son Leone who presents perhaps the most extreme case of Jewish assimilation to the Renaissance proclivities of a revived Platonism with its strong penchant for the pagan motifs of love and beauty. Without implying any responsibility 262

Netanyahu, Abravanel, pp. 82-85.

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on the part of Abravanel for this unique spiritual development of his eminent son, one cannot overlook the fact that it is this great absorption of the son with the pagan culture of the Ancients that constitutes perhaps the strongest contradiction to the views embraced and preached with such zeal by the father.

VII JOSEPH YA'AVES (1438-1507)1

The inclusion of R' Joseph Ya'aves among the Italian anti-rationalists may, of course, be contested on several grounds. Not only is he a native of Spain where he spent most of his life, but almost all of his works, whether composed there or in Italy, are both spiritually and historically connected with the Spanish milieu, especially the tragic period of the expulsion. Spanish no doubt are the roots of his Cabbalistic proclivities as well as of his inveterate anti-rationalism. Though mystical tendencies were on the ascendant in Italy also at the time, as indicated especially by the literary works of Yohanan Alemano and the criticism of the Cabbalah by Eliyahu Delmedigo, they were strongly impregnated with the revived neo-Platonism. Ya'aves' Cabbalism, however, seems free of such admixtures. Even less Italian is his resistance to secular learning and his strong anti-rationalism. Such resistance was to develop in Italy at a somewhat later time, as a result of the worsening political and economic situation of the Jews during the Counter-Reformation and in the wake of the rise of the Cabbalah. However, even then it was not to assume such intense and uncompromising a character. That the Italian Jewish milieu in the last decade of the fifteenth and early part of the sixteenth centuries, the time of Ya'aves' anti-rationalist campaign, displayed tendencies of a rather opposite character, may best be indicated by Rabbi Yehudah ben Yehiel's (better known as Judah Messer Leon) study of rhetoric,2 the preoccupation of his son, R' David Messer Leon, with secular studies,3 1 See on him J. Rubinstein, "Hayyei ha-Mehabber, Ar$o, Moladto, Ofyo v'Ishyuto" in Joseph Ya'aves, Sefer Hasdei ha-Shem (New York, 1934), pp. 9-16; M. S. Ghirondi, H. Neppi, Toledoth Gedolei Yisrael u-Geonei Italia (Trieste, 1853), letter yod, nos. 26, 52, pp. 145, 158; D. Conforte, Qore ha-Doroth (Cassel ed., Berlin, 1846), p. 30a. 2 Nofeth Sufim. 3 Neubauer, "David Messer Leon", Israelitische Letterbode, von M. Roest (Amsterdam, 1884-85), pp. 106-111.

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the philosophical works of Eliyahu Delmedigo, 4 and the neo-Platonist writings of Alemano and Leone Ebreo. This notwithstanding, it must not be forgotten that most of Ya'aves' works, or perhaps all of them, were actually composed in Italy,8 and that it was there that he spent the last * See on him Joseph Shlomo Delmedigo, Elim (2nd ed., Odessa, 1864), pp. 44, 58; idem, Masref la-Hokhmah, pp. 10-11, 84; Reggio, " H a q d a m a t h ha-Mefaresh" in his edition of E. Delmedigo's Behinath ha-Dath; E. Renan, Averroes et V Averroisme, p. 382; Ghirondi-Neppi, Toledoth Gedolei ..., pp. 14-16. 6 To these belong Sefer Or ha-Ifayyim of Ferrara, 1554, and Sefer Hasdei ha-Shem of Constantinople, 1533 (ed. J. Rubinstein, New York, 1934). The first Ya'aves composed soon after his arrival in Italy in 1492 (see "Petihah"); the second "in the second year since the exile from Spain" (see beginning of "Introduction" by his son Isaac). Preceding them was the Sefer ha-Derashoth, which is mentioned several times in the Or ha-Hayyim (see in Przemysl ed., 1873, chap. 5, p. 32a, chap. 12, p. 69a). In view of Ya'aves' statement that it was only after his and his family's safe arrival in Italy that it "occurred" to him to become a peregrinating preacher, "to wander f r o m town to town and tell of G o d ' s justice and His righteous ways" (end of "Petihah", Or ha-Hayyim), it may be assumed that the Derashoth (sermons) were also composed in Italy. Indeed, this seems to have been the first work he wrote immediately after his arrival. To the same period, i.e., his first or second year in Italy, belongs the pamphlet, Ma'amar ha-Ahduth (Lublin, 1596), which is referred to in the Hasdei ha-Shem (see New York ed., 1934, chap. 5, p. 24). A few years later, or, more precisely, not earlier than the late nineties, he composed his commentary on Aboth, (published for the first time at Adrianople in 1550 by his two grandsons, the sons of this son Isaac). This may be inferred from the references the work contains to Abravanel's Nahalath Aboth (commentary on Aboth) and possibly also to Abravanel's Rosh Amanah. The former Abravanel completed in the summer of 1496 (see end of work), and the latter somewhat earlier (c/., Netanyahu, Abravanel, p. 284, n. 42). C f , the commentaries of Abravanel and Ya'aves on Aboth, 2:1, 2:2, 2:7, 4:4, and esp. 3:1. F o r Abravanel, see, Nahalath Aboth (New York ed., 1953), pp. 89-90, 91, 92, 97, 98, 106, 132; for Ya'aves, see Warsaw edition of 1910 of Massekheth Aboth 'im Perush ha-Rav he-Hasid R' Yoseph Ya'ave? (hereafter cited as Commentary Aboth), pp. 23, 24, 28, 35, 47, and 91. C f , also Ya'aves Aboth, p. 24, with Rosh Amanah, chap. 23. Though a printed edition of Abravanel's Nahalath Aboth appeared only in 1505 (Constantinople), Ya'aves may have been acquainted with the contents of the commentary either through the possession of a manuscript or, more likely, through written contacts with Abravanel. Indeed, in his commentary on 4:2 (p. 90), Ya'aves implies such a contact. Should this assumption be rejected, the composition of Ya'aves' commentary on Aboth, as well as his subsequent works, would have to be delayed till after 1505, the year of the appearance of the first edition of Abravanel's Nafialath Aboth. The last of Ya'aves' works is the commentary on Psalms, published at Salonika in 1571 by his great grandson, Isaac. A new edition was published recently by Rabbi Shmuel Halpern (Tehillim 'im Perush iha'.Rav heHasid ... Yoseph Ya'aves (London, 1952) (hereafter cited as Commentary Psalms or Ps.). Jn this commentary Ya'aves makes frequent allusions to his Sermons and to his commentary on Aboth (Halpern ed., 2:1, p. 7; 8:2, p. 31; 8:6, p. 36; 24:4, p. 131, and passim). H e also mentions in it his pamphlet, Sefer Yesod ha-Emunah (Piotrkow, 1911), 36:11, p. 217. In addition, Ya'aves may have written a commentary o n the Torah. Though he alludes rather frequently to it (Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 5, p. 33b; Hasdei ha-Shem, chap. 8, p. 49; Comm. Ps. 15:2, p. 69; 23:6, p. 126; 29:1, pp. 163, 164), it is not clear whether this work was identical with the Sermons or was a separate work. We are rather inclined to the first view. It may thus be suggested that Ya'aves' works

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fifteen or sixteen years of his life, years filled with literary and public activity. Though it may be assumed that most of his activity, in both writing and preaching, was undertaken for the sake of his compatriots, the newly arrived emigres from the Iberian Peninsula, he may have considered it beneficial for the native Jews also, some of whom, as we have seen, had come under the influence of Renaissance tendencies. Be the historical background of Ya'aves' works whatever it may, as far as their influence is concerned, they constitute part and parcel of Italian Jewish literature of the sixteenth century. Whereas his commentaries on Aboth, the Psalms, and the IJasdei ha-Shem were published by his descendants at Adrianople and Salonika respectively, his other writings were published at Ferrara in 1554. Their influence seems to have been felt especially among Cabbalists and anti-secularists. Frequent references to them appear in Ibn Vidas' Reshith Hokhmah, first published in Venice in 1579,6 as well as in Judah Del Bene's Sefer Kisoth VBeth David.1 Rarely was the impact of the historical reality upon a person's views felt more strongly than in the case of R' Joseph Ya'aves. In all his works, whether of a speculative or religious nature, whether concerned with the essence and destiny of Judaism or with those of the other nations and with their culture, one feels the full weight of the tragic fate that descended upon the Jewish community of Spain in the closing decades of the fifteenth century. Though he himself indicates that his anti-rationalism is no innovation of his, and that he is indebted for it to such earlier Spanish masters as Judah Halevi, Jonah Gerondi, Nahmanides, and Crescas, as well as to his own contemporaries, notably R' Joseph Hiyyun and Isaac Abravanel, 8 because of its intensity and extremism, its source must, no doubt, be sought in the tragedy of the exile. Although his inimical attitude were composed in the following chronological order: 1) Sefer ha-Derashoth, 2) Or ha-Hayyim, 3) Mdamar ha-Ahduth, 4) Hasdei ha-Shem, 5) Commentary on Aboth, 6) Yesod ha-Emunah, and 7) Commentary on Psalms. That the commentary on Psalms was, in all likelihood, his last work is indicated not only by the fact that it contains allusions to his earlier writings, but also by its structure. It is complete only to the end of chapter 73. Chapters 74-82 are missing altogether, and the commentary ends abruptly with chapter 112. Although his great-grandson, R' Isaac, who published the text, explains the missing chapters as the result of theft (see the end of commentary on chap. 73, p. 376), he offers no explanation for the lack of a commentary on chapters 113-150. It is possible that death interrupted the work before it was completed. 6 Eliyahu ben R' Moshe Vidas, Reshith Hokhmah (Livorno, 1856), p. 6b; sha'ar ha-yirah, chap. 15, p. 48a; sha'ar ha-ahavah, chap. 2, p. 59; sha'ar ha-teshuvah, chap. 6, p. 126b; sha'ar ha-qedushah, chap. 13, p. 52a; sha'ar ha-'anavah, chap. 3, p. 98b. 7 (Verona, 1646); see, sha'ar revi'i. 8 Or ha-Hayyim, (Lemberg, 1874), chap. 12, p. 23.

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toward secular learning and his advice to recoil from it altogether seem typical of the trends that spread among certain circles of Spanish Jewry of the fifteenth century, it was, however, only as a result of the expulsion, with its accompanying tragic aftermath, that these earlier tendencies crystallized and matured into a full-fledged system of thought which, though perhaps narrow-minded and fanatic, is consistent and of great inner strength and conviction. Following the lead of Judah Halevi and even using some of his similes, Ya'aves stresses above all his belief in the uniqueness of Israel within the human race. From the dicta of the Midrash and the Aggadah he infers this uniqueness to be a principle governing not only history, but all life. The selection of Israel preceded even creation; 9 indeed, it was for its sake that the universe was brought into existence.10 Whereas only one stage separates man from the animals, the Jew is removed from them by two stages. He shares with the rest of humanity the "image of G o d " ; by the possession of the Torah, however, he alone is privileged to attain a higher state of being. 11 The article of faith considered by Ya'aves as the most important foundation of Judaism is Divine Providence. Though he stresses its universal nature, he interprets it primarily in nationalist terms. Of four kinds of Providence, he asserts three to be concerned with Jews alone. The first, of "a general" nature, deals with the Jewish people as a whole, "to separate them from other nations"; the second guards over the fate of every individual Jew; and the third, of "a special kind", is reserved only for the pious, "to save them from the evils brought upon them by the iniquities of their fellowmen". 12 Ya'aves realizes, of course, that "the nations of today are not like those of the past"; that the differences in religious and moral creeds between them and the Jews have been greatly reduced. Whereas in the distant past, he says: ...we were completely at variance with them, we and they at two opposite poles ... the nations of today acknowledge God, believe in creation, Providence, reward and punishment, and resurrection, and are free of idolatry.13 This notwithstanding, and even contradicting himself to some extent, he points out in another context that since they, i.e., the nations, reject other • Commentary Psalms 2:1, p. 7. Or ha-Hayyim, p. 26. 11 Commentary Aboth (Warsaw, 1910), 3:18, pp. 67-68. 12 Comm. Ps. 33:13-14, p. 193. " Hasdei ha-Shem, chap. 9, p. 56; Ma'amar ha-Ahduth, chap. 3, p. 9. 10

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principles of Judaism, such as "the prophecy of Moses, the divinity of the Torah and the resurrection of the dead ... which are all derivatives of the great principle of creation ... even their belief in this principle, i.e., creation, becomes meaningless". 14 Furthermore, rejecting as they do "the commandments of the Sabbath, the holidays, the tefillin, and others ... which all imply that principle, they actually deny it". 16 The fact that Christianity adopts some of the creeds of Judaism, while rejecting others, Ya'aves finds very puzzling indeed, and actually pointing to an inner inconsistency in Christianity. 16 The expulsion from Spain, with its accompanying sufferings and hardships, gave rise to a mood of resignation and skepticism among the exiles. "Experience had already taught us", he writes, "that exile and tribulations, rather than bringing us closer to the faith, actually increase heresy and fallacious views". 17 It was for the sake of combating them and in order to restore the shattered hope that he felt called upon to formulate his views on Galuth and Ge'ulah (exile and redemption). However, if the present-day reader anticipates some new and perhaps modern point of view in his analysis of the problem and its solution, he will be disappointed. Both are conceived of entirely in the spiritual terms of the popular faith, which was becoming impregnated more and more with elements of the Cabbalistic myth. Within this frame, however, his views are not completely lacking in originality. In reflecting on the long historical road of suffering Israel, Ya'aves reaches the conclusion that the fate of the nation is by no means accidental and arbitrary, but part of a Divine scheme by which God tests His believers, in order to separate the true from the false. It is obvious to any true believer in the Divine origin and conduct of the universe, he asserts, that this world is somewhat "out of gear", proceeding contrariwise to its predestined course. The tragic fate of God's people seems in contradiction to the natural order of things, and cannot be understood except in terms of a test to which God subjects both the nations and Israel, in order to punish and reward them accordingly in "the end of days". 18 He expresses the same idea in somewhat different terms when he states that at present it is "God's messengers" who rule the world, and hence comes all the suffering. In the future, however, when God's direct rule 14 16

"

17 18

aVian © n n a nrp-n i s s a n , Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 5, p. 16a. Comm. Ps. 113:4, p. 449. Ma'amar ha-Ahduth, p. 10. Hasdei ha-Shem, p. 49. Ibid., chap. 8, p. 43if.; Ma'amar ha-Ahduth, chap. 3, pp. 11-12; chap. 10, p. 29.

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will be restored, an end will come to suffering and the Jewish people will be many times rewarded. 19 Ya'aves offers another, conventional explanation of the tragedy of Galuth. It is precisely because of God's love for Israel that he punishes them in this life, so that, purged of their sins, they may be ready for their full reward in the future. He acts contrariwise with the other nations, repaying them immediately, but leaving nothing in store for them in the future except their due punishment. 20 Along with his spiritual views and his interpretation of redemption in terms of a final victory for pure monotheism, Ya'aves entertains a vision of the future which is permeated with a deep longing for a changed earthly Jewish reality. "Commensurate with the sorrow and degradation", he writes, "will be the joy and elevation ... The shame suffered will be transformed into honor", 21 and the whole people will become a nation of priests, "consecrated unto the worship of the Lord". 22 As the Jews served the nations in the past, the nations in turn will serve them in the future. 23 This, he observes, is fully justified. Though it is true that some Muslims are under the rule of Christians, and some Christians under the rule of Muslims, thus also suffering Galuth, their fate is hardly comparable with that of Israel. "Only Israel is deprived of any rule, having neither king, prince, nor judge; the nations, however, have their kings, who sooner or later intercede on their behalf". Moreover, none of these "exiled" minorities are ever exposed to forced conversion and threatened with all kinds of suffering, as the Jews are.24 Of greater prominence in Ya'aves' writings is another element of his thought, namely his sharp criticism of rationalism and his relentless struggle against it. This finds its first expression in his view on the Articles of Faith. Following the established tradition since Maimonides of interpreting Judaism in terms of such articles, he undertakes his own formulation, which differs, however, in many respects from that of the rationalists. He conceives of Judaism as based on three major tenets: creation, Providence, and reward and punishment in "the end of days" — three which, in his view, are actually one and implied in the concept of God as hayah, hoveh, veyiyeh (He was, He is, and He will be). The hayah (He was) signifies His absolute singleness, the belief that there was nothing besides Him at the time of creation. The hoveh (He is) points to 19 20 21 22 28 24

Ma1 amar ha-Afrduth, chap. 7, p. 21. Hasdei ha-Shem, chap. 3, pp. 18, 20. Comm. Ps. 42:6, p. 250. Ma'amar ha-Afiduth, chap. 9, p. 24. Comm. Ps. 45:10, pp. 263-264. Hasdei ha-Shem, chap. 7, p. 34.

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the all-embracing and permanent nature of Divine Providence, and the veyiyeh (He will be) to the ideal of the future, when God will be recognized by all the universe, and the Utopian age, conceived of in both transcendental and historical terms, will be ushered in. 25 The other principles, God's existence and incorporality, though "two precious stones" and basic creeds in Judaism, do not belong to its unique essence, "since we share the belief in them with the philosophers, the sages of other nations", and the followers of the other monotheistic faiths. 26 Moreover, though he admits the importance of a pure, spiritual conception of the Deity, free of any corporality, Ya'aves is unwilling to put much emphasis on it. Indeed, no great intellectual effort is needed to prove it. "From our flesh we see God". If the soul which leads the body is spirit, how much more so God, who leads the universe!27 Furthermore, in view of his attaching greater importance to the practices of religion than to the speculations regarding its underlying ideas, the anthropomorphic conception of the Deity appears to him much less an evil than the contemptuous attitude toward religious practices of the "philosophizers", with their allegedly pure and lofty concepts. Referring no doubt to actual experiences of the period of the exile from Spain, he writes: If there be by chance, God forbid, some ignorant woman who, barren of wisdom and understanding, is unable to conceive of God but in material terms, but on the other hand scrupulously keeps all the commandments and, never transgressing, longs in her heart for her Creator, being ready to sacrifice her very life for God's Law — and indeed, she did suffer greatly on its account — such a woman is kept in much higher regard by the Lord than all those selfstyled, wise intellectuals.28 As mentioned, Ya'aves stresses above all the importance of the belief in Divine Providence. He conceives of it as universal, and is critical of the philosophers for qualifying it as either limited to the heavenly abode or to man and the species in the sublunar world. It is indeed, he argues against the rationalists, just because of God's loftiness, on the one hand, and the "lowness" of all creation, on the other, that the universal nature of Providence must be upheld. 29 Such a conception is, in his view, implied 25 Sefer Yesod ha-Emunah, pp. 3-5; McCamar ha-Ahduth, pp. 5-7; Comm. Ps. 36:11, pp. 216-217. 26 Sefer Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 5, p. 15b. 27 Ibid., p. 16. 28 Ibid., p. 16b. 29 McCamar ha-Ahduth, pp. 7-8; Comm. Aboth, 1:17, pp. 20-21; Comm. Ps. 8:6, p. 37; 19:2-3, pp. 100-101; 33:13-14, p. 193; 36:11, pp. 216-217, and passim-, Cf., also Abravanel, Zevah Pesafi, commentary on "hamashpili lir'oth ba-shamayim u-ba-are?", and passim.

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in the story of Jacob's ladder, which he interprets as indicative of the "unity of the upper and lower worlds". The folim ve-yordim (they go up and down) points to the "prevalence of Providence, and to the fact that it is actually the lower world, i.e., the earth, which is the permanent abode of the messengers of Providence". Meaningful also is "God standing above it", indicating the miraculous and direct nature of Providence. Though He sends forth His messengers, their role is only that of "the axe in the hand of him that heweth therewith", whereas He himself actually leads and provides.30 This idea he further upholds by numerous other quotations from the Bible.31 It is these tenets, rather than those of the philosophers, which he believes implied in "I am the Lord ... thou shalt have no other gods" (Ex. 20:2-3), and in "Hear, O Israel" (Deut. 6:4). The Anokhi (I) intends to communicate the belief: ... that the same God who gave us the Torah at Sinai is our God who delivered us from Egypt, and that it is this deliverance, accompanied as it was by so many miracles, which was meant to prove the principle of creation, since it cannot be proven in any other way.32 Similarly, "Hear, O Israel" must not be interpreted, as the philosophers do, in terms of an appeal to the people to delve into the higher speculations of mcfasei bereshith and malasei merkavah (creation and the essence

of God), but as an attempt to diffuse the belief in God's unity in the universe. Communicated as these commandments were to the people en masse, men, women and children, how is it possible, he asks, that a whole nation should have been commanded to speculate about those truths, for which "not even one in a thousand" possesses the capacity? Furthermore, were speculation implied in this commandment, it should have been phrased "See, O Israel", since it is the sense of vision which is the vehicle of rational truth, and the sense of hearing rather the instrument of tradition. 33 The comprehension of these "Divine things" being beyond human reason, it is only through miracles, inspiration, or prophecy that they are attainable. 34 While thus admitting the existence in Judaism of articles of faith, he stresses above all the tenet of creation, which is rationally less acceptable, and the universality of Divine Providence, which is subjected by the rationalists to many qualifications. Moreover, he conceives of these as 30 31 32 33 34

Ma'amar ha-Afiduth, chap. 7, p. 21. Ibid., p. 9. Cf., Abravanel, Rosh Amanah, chap. 7. Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 5, p. 16a. Ma'amar ha-Ahduth, chap. 6, p. 18.

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Divine revelations of whose truth the people were made aware miraculously, through the events of their early history, 35 rather than as commandments to the rational mind to speculate on these matters. Ya'aves differs from the rationalists not only in his view of the nature of the basic tenets of Judaism and the method of their communication, but also with regard to their relative importance as compared with "practical" Judaism, and how best to have them infused into the people's minds. Characteristic of Judaism, he believes, is the view which does not draw a demarcation line between belief and practice. Important as these articles are, a mere belief in them is not enough. As creatures of flesh and blood, he says: We have been warned that it is not sufficient to have these tenets conceived of rationally; they must also be implemented in certain practices which would testify to their truth.36 Of such a nature, in his view, are the Sabbath prayers,37 some of the Ten Commandments, yea, even the three Sabbath meals, etc.38 It follows from the above that in the centuries-old controversy regarding the question of what should constitute the ideal of the Jew — contemplation and knowledge, or devotion and a scrupulous observance of the Law —Ya'aves aligns himself with the anti-rationalists and reiterates most emphatically that it is indeed deeds and practices, rather than speculation, which Judaism considers most important and essential. Though thought and contemplation may appear more estimable to the human mind, it is actions and deeds which are held to be of far greater importance by the Divine mind. With matter rather than form constituting the major component of man, his perfection is attainable only through deeds. Through them alone does faith become firmly established.39 Although "faith is the cause of actions, it is by actions that faith is upheld". 40 Therefore, rather than rely on the limited power of reason, it is our duty to submit wholeheartedly to the will of God, as expressed in the Torah, and to do things from pure love, even that which seems contrary to reason and nature. 41 The philosophers, he observes, may be people of high moral standards and lofty intellectual ideals; however, they may not be counted among ®6 Yesod ha-Emunah, pp. 7-22. Ibid., p. 21. " Ibid., p. 16. 38 Ibid., ip. 22. " Comm. Aboth, 1:17, p. 20. 40 Ibid., 3:23, pp. 78-80. 41 Comm. Ps. 8:2, p. 32; 15:2, pp. 69-70. 36

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the "doers of good", since the principles by which their actions are guided are of human and not Divine origin. 42 Ya'aves also offers some "proofs" of his views. Were the rational comprehension of things our desired goal, he argues: Why did not (our past sages) compose for us a short work to instruct us in the true laws of the Torah on which there is general agreement among them ...? We would then study the Torah with ease and (use the gained leisure to) train ourselves and our children in logic and mathematics ... so as to know the existence of God demonstratively. This, however, we were not permitted to do. We were deliberately commanded to study the Torah orally and not to write it down, since by submitting it to writing we would have neglected it. 43 The fact that Adam was expelled from Eden, he further argues, and Moses was not admitted to the Promised Land because of an insignificant transgression, clearly shows that it is deeds rather than thoughts which are decisive,44 and that a commandment which may appear to us most trivial is actually of greater importance than "all the wisdoms put together". 45 Indeed, it was Adam's preoccupation with metaphysical inquiries, he explains, that made him oblivious of God's commandment, thus causing fatal results to the whole human race. Like Aristotle of a much later day, Adam believed that intellectual contemplation constituted man's highest destiny, and instead of keeping God's commandment, and through it clinging unto Him, he delved into speculation and neglected the observance of the commandment. 46 It was in order to rectify this perverted view that the children of Israel declared at the stand at Sinai their readiness "to do and hear", 47 thus indicating the primacy of practice over speculation. 48 The neglect of religious practices is what he emphasizes primarily in his criticism of pre-exilic Spanish Jewry. He levels his sharpest words against the "philosophizers"; nor does he spare the Talmudists and Cabbalists. Though he considers "the knowledge of the Talmud and its study" 49 major goals for a Jew, he is resentful of the hair-splitting pilpul which became prevalent among Spanish Talmudists, to the detriment of the study of the practical law and piety. Their display of intellectual 42 43 44 46 46

47 48 49

Comm. Ps. 14:14, p. 65. Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 9, p. 21b. Comm." Ps. 8:12, p. 32; 25:12, p. 145. Ibid. 29:1, p. 162 (last two lines of page). Cf., this view with Abravanel's Comm. Guide, I, chap. 2.

s»®n ntwn

Comm. Ps. 29:1, pp. 162-163. "13 VfflVsm n a V r i n USTT", Sefer Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 3, p. l i b .

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acumen, he points out, was not always motivated by religious or moral considerations, but rather by pride and haughtiness. 50 Ya'aves' works exhibit amply the great attraction he felt for the Cabbalah. In almost all of them he quotes the Zohar, and alludes frequently to the writings of R' Jonah Gerondi, 51 Nahmanides, and above all to the many midrashim. With the Cabbalists, he believes in the higher mystical meanings of the Torah: that it constitutes the soul of the world,52 the names of God ;53 and that the three components of the law, the "statutes", the "commandments", and the "judgments" — which parallel the three parts of the universe (that of the angels, the spheres, and the sublunar world)— are meant for the perfection of the three human souls, the neshamah, the ruah, and the nefesh.5i This notwithstanding, he also levels his criticism against the Cabbalists for some of their attitudes and practices in which he sees a danger to normative Judaism. Admirer of the Cabbalah though he is, he remains staunchly loyal to halakhic Judaism, which holds the knowledge of the Law and its scrupulous observance, according to its "revealed" interpretation, to be most essential. Such knowledge and practice, he points out most emphatically, must precede any pursuit of esoterics, and anyone acting contrariwise is guilty of a grave transgression. 55 He writes with bitterness of the "little foxes ... the sinful people" who, in their ignorance and conceit, delve into the study of mysticism before having mastered the basic texts of the Bible, the Mishnah, and the Talmud. Of them he says: Smitten with the blindness of their pride, and barren of any knowledge or piety, these ignoramuses, who are so numerous, pride themselves in their attainment of the secrets of the Torah and its mysteries.66 It is in opposition to all these groups of philosophers, Talmudic dialecticians, and false claimants of mysticism, that he appeals for a return to popular Judaism based on an unwavering allegiance to the tenets of faith and its religious practices. His sharpest and most extensive criticism, however, he reserves for the rationalizers and the pursuers of secular studies. This criticism is the major theme of his Or ha-Hayyim, though it is profusely scattered in his 50 61 62 63 54 55 66

Or ha-Hayyim, "Introduction". Notably in his commentaries on Psalms and on Aboth. Comm. Ps. 19:1, p. 97. Comm. Aboth, 4:2, p. 89. D-'tJB&m m i s a ^ p i n , Comm. Ps. 15:2, pp. 69-70. Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 1, p. 3b. Ibid., p". 4a.

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other writings also. To the extent one can judge on the basis of these utterances, his acquaintance with the sciences and philosophy was not an intimate one. Rather than attempt an analysis of them in order to point out their intrinsic shortcomings, as other anti-rationalists did, he rests his case against them with the mere assertion that, in view of the great variety of views and opinions prevailing among the scholars, their truth is invalid.57 With the exception of Aristotle, no philosopher or secular scholar is ever mentioned in his writings. Whatever philosophical views are referred to in them are drawn exclusively from Jewish sources, and their rejection is usually arbitrary, justified solely by the general reason of their being in contradiction to the fundamentals of the faith. He rejects first of all the contention of the rationalists that it is the attainment of rational truth which constitutes man's destiny, and that it is through speculation that one may arrive at a comprehension of the essentials of the faith. Even if this were true in relation to the doctrine of God's existence and His incorporality, the gain of this approach, he argues, would be far outweighed by the loss it would cause. After all, important as these two principles are, the Jews share the belief in them with the rest of humanity; the uniqueness of Judaism, however, is based on many other principles, which cannot be proven rationally. The rationalist approach, however, once adopted, becomes to its adherents the sole criterion of validity, thus weakening the belief in those Articles of Faith which do not yield themselves to rational proof. 58 57

"What one asserts, another refutes, and there is no end to speculation", Yesod ha-Emunah, p. 4; see also Comm. Ps. 19:8, pp. 103-104. 88 In view of the striking similarity between the views of Ya'aves and Eliyahu Delmedigo regarding 1) the rational approach to Judaism, 2) anthropomorphism, and 3) the evaluation of Maimonides' work [with reference to 1), cf. Ya'aves, Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 5, with E. Delmedigo's Behinath ha-Dath, pp. 11-12; with reference to 2), cf.. Or ha-Hayyim, p. 16b, as quoted supra, p. 139 with Behinath ha-Dath, p. 15, where Eliyahu states that anthropomorphic notions have no negative effect on the belief in God as a substance: "VXH n i » X » r i l » K 3 p T K ^ n » l W n r r ; with regard to 3), cf., Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 9, p. 21, and this chapter below, pp. 147-148, with Behinath ha-Dath, p. 21], it may be assumed that Ya'aves was acquainted with the views of Delmedigo, as expressed in his concise Befiinath ha-Dath. (See also supra, The Sixteenth Century, pp. 69-71). It may further be assumed, as pointed out earlier, that 'Azariah de Rossi was also familiar with Eliyahu's view regarding the relationship between rational knowledge and faith {see, supra, The Sixteenth Century, p. 71.) An investigation of Hebrew letters in Italy during the sixteenth century would, in all likelihood, produce further evidence of the diffusion of Eliyahu's views. Thus Joseph Shlomo Delmedigo may actually not have exaggerated at all when he stated that it was as a result of the diffusion of Eliyahu's views, notably his anti-Cabbalistic stand, that he felt compelled to write his Masref la-tjokhmah, in order to refute them (see pp. 9-11). Without taking a stand in this work regarding Geiger's view of the camouflaged nature of Yashar's

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The detrimental consequences of rationalism are twofold, undermining the integrity of faith on the one hand, and weakening the hold of religious practices, on the other hand. Though the rationalists assert their belief in God as "the First Cause", they equally insist on the determinist, unchangeable nature of the universe, thus refuting Divine Providence.59 Furthermore, by transcendentalizing the Deity they reject the belief that it is possible for a human, "the offspring of a female ... to gain the privilege of clinging unto the Creator of the universe".60 Instead, they advance the view of the so-called "active intelligence, a fictitious invention of the Ishmaelite sages", and assert that to the extent that one actualizes his potential mind, one may be privileged to unite with the active intelligence. Such a view, however, refutes some of the basic creeds of Judaism, 61 Rationalism also adversely affects the religious practices of its followers. As a result of their belief in reason as the essence of man, and in speculation as the sole road leading to God, they acquire a disdainful attitude toward the practices of Judaism, entertaining the view that these practices are meant primarily for the plain and ignorant who, destitute of speculative capacities, must cling to practices as their only means of worshiping God. 62 He sums up the other negative results of rationalism as a contemptuous attitude on the part of its followers toward the study of the Talmud; the subjection of the Bible to an extreme allegorization which voids it altogether of its historical significance; and a growing skepticism in relation to miracles, not excluding even the Revelation at Sinai.63 He is no less vehement in his criticism of the pursuit of natural sciences. The claim of its students that it was knowledge of nature that Moses was seeking when he pleaded with God, saying: "Let me know Thy way" (Ex. 33:13), he rejects as a misinterpretation, deploring also their view that it is through such studies that one actually gains a closer knowledge of God. Were this so, he argues, one would have to admit that the investigations of Aristotle are of greater benefit than the Torah of Moses. Also the preoccupation of the sages of the Mishnah and the Talmud with "the basic commandments and their particulars", 64 to the total exclusion Masref (A. Geiger, Melo Hofnayim (Berlin, 1840), German sect., "Einleitung", pp. 51-52), it may nevertheless be pointed out that, in as much as Geiger bases his argument on the assumption that Eliyahu's views were almost completely unknown until Yashar diffused them through his Masref, the validity of this argument is doubtful, indeed. 68 Comm. Ps. 14:1, p. 64. 60 "Vd.t p a i n n V n o r • • • rrox r i V r 1 , ibid. i 5 : i , p. 67. 61 Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 15, p. 16a. 62 Ibid., chap. 5, pp. 14-15. 63 Ibid., chap. 15, p. 26b. 64

Drrpnpn nns»n rrra?

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of everything else, would be inexplicable. And finally, what would be the meaning of the Psalmist's: "He declareth His word unto Jacob, His statutes and judgments unto Israel. He has not dealt so with any other nation" (Ps. 147:19-20)? In refutation of this view he asserts that "the way of the Holy Torah", far from being in accordance with nature, is actually in opposition to it. Indeed, it hardly follows from the point of view of natural law that an infringement of the prohibition of leavened bread on Passover, for instance, or the eating of fat or the drinking of blood should be punishable by kareth (death by Heaven). Nor does it seem "natural", on the other hand, that the keeping of a commandment like tejillin should be rewarded with longevity. Judaism and nature are two separate realms, which have hardly anything in common. 65 Any attempt at reconciliation between the two is therefore unwarranted. As it is a distortion of the Torah to attempt to discover Aristotelian notions in it, it is equally wrong to look to the Talmud for support for the pursuit of natural sciences. The fact that some references to mathematics, astronomy, or medicine may be found in the Talmud must by no means be used as a justification and encouragement of their pursuit. It is true, of course, that the sages of the Talmud were experts in all the wisdoms, and knew all the languages and even the art of magic. This knowledge, however, they obtained orally, by tradition, without devoting much attention to it.66 Essentially all these studies are the domain of the Gentiles, who cling unto the acts of God, while it is God Himself who is the "portion" of Israel. 67 Ya'aves' conclusion is therefore a radical one. He advises his coreligionists to break completely with secular learning, and to rededicate themselves to the sole ideal of studying the Torah. Commenting on Ben Bag Bag's saying: "Turn it (the Torah) and turn it again, for everything is in it" (Aboth 5:26), he writes: After one has finished the course of studies prescribed earlier,68 he must repeat it again and again all his days ... since it contains everything .... And though it may occur to you to use some of the secular studies as handmaids and servants of the Torah, even this should not be done .... You must be attracted neither to logic nor to medicine, philosophy, or astronomy, as none of them equals the Torah in perfection .... A new insight into the Torah, which you may gain by studying it anew, is of greater value than all the wisdoms put together.6' 65

Or ha-IJayyim, chap. 3. For this division between the "natural" and the "Divine", cf. Abravanel, Mif'aloth, ma'amar I, chap. 3, p. 6a, col. 1. 66 Or ha-Iiayyim, chap. 3, p. 11. «' Ibid., chap. 6, p. 16b. "8 Aboth, 5:25. " Ibid., pp. 133-134.

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This onslaught on rationalism and secularism, Ya'aves must have realized, had but little chance of success as long as the rationalists could claim Maimonides as their pioneer and greatest champion. It is with an eye on this problem, and in order to show the difference between Maimonides and later rationalists, and possibly also to forestall too sharp a reaction to his criticisms of rationalism from its admirers, that Ya'aves devotes a sizable part of his anti-rationalist Or ha-FIayyim to a discussion of Maimonides. In opposition to the Cabbalists of an earlier as well as of a later day, who attempted to belittle Maimonides' rationalism by spreading the rumor of his alleged withdrawal from philosophical pursuits in the last days of his life and of his having embraced the Cabbalah, 70 Ya'aves does not deny nor minimize Maimonides' rationalism. In refutation of it, however, he declares that Maimonides' concept of human perfection as dependent on intellectual attainments is opposed both by the Bible and by the Talmud. 71 Such, he observes, was also the opinion of Isaac Abravanel, upon whose commentary of the Guide he showers the highest praises. In this connection he also cites with delight a play on words by Abravanel who, following the exposition of the views of Maimonides, added: "This is the opinion of Rabbenu Moshe, but not Moshe Rabbenu", which is to say that great as Maimonides was, his view is refuted by the Torah. 72 With this mild censure, Ya'aves seems to rest his case against Maimonides, though emphasizing that Maimonides must not be taken as an example for emulation. He was unique in his erudition and piety, and what happened to him was indeed a miracle which did not recur. Though he plunged into the depths of philosophy and natural science, prerequisites for the study of medicine, he emerged wholesome and unscathed in faith. 73 Moreover, he actually pursued those studies not for their own sake, but in order to defend the integrity of the faith. "He girded himselt with a sword like an Ishmaelite, delved into their books ... diligently studying their methods of investigation ... only to refute them". Fortified by his own belief in the Jewish tradition, he demonstrated the invalidity of Aristotle's proofs of eternity. Great, however, as his achievement was, it proved in the course of time to be a liability rather than an asset. As long as he was alive, his own example served as a safeguard against the distortion of his views; with his death, however, as "his words were being transmitted from vessel to vessel, their original flavor evap,0 71

"

Cf., supra, p. 128, and below p. 180, and n. 105. Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 9, p. 21b. Ibid., chap. 12, p. 23b. Ibid., chap. 10, p. 22a.

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orated, and great was the damage caused by them". 74 Whereas Maimonides and his descendants staunchly preserved their religious integrity, his disciples did not. Some of them inferred from his works the denial of creation, the assumption of prime matter, or even more extreme views. The very light which had illuminated his mind with a philosophical knowledge of the existence of God became a source of darkness to his followers, deterring them from the right path. 75 In conclusion, it must be pointed out that his strongest arguments against rationalism and secular learning Ya'aves drew not from intrinsic critical analysis, but rather from the contemplation of the historical reality of Spanish Jewry of the last period of its existence. It was as a result of it that he reached the conclusion that, in the final analysis, there ought to be only one yardstick by which the pursuit of secular learning and rationalism must be evaluated. Neither the objective truth attained by them, nor the sense of satisfaction one may derive from them is to be considered decisive, but rather the influence they exert on the religious and national integrity of the people. He finds that the tragic experiences of Spanish Jewry, judged from this point of view, have proven beyond doubt that the effect of secular learning and rationalism was absolutely negative. The pursuit of secular learning and the prevalence of a rationalist attitude among the upper crust of the Jewish community of Spain, he feels, dried up the roots of their religious integrity, sowing the seeds of skepticism and apathy among them. They were like a tree whose foliage and branchery were rich but had only thin roots to support them, a tree which thus, when exposed to the whirling storm of the exile, could not muster sufficient strength to withstand it and was uprooted. On the other hand, the ignorant and the simple, both men and women, though like a tree of few leaves and branches but with roots deep and strong, preserved their religious integrity notwithstanding all the hardships of the time. "Most of those who boasted of their wisdom", he declares, "had converted on the day of trial ... while the ignorant sacrificed their wealth and life for the sanctification of their Creator". 76 It is most unlikely that the anti-rationalist campaign of Ya'aves had any noticeable effect on his contemporaries or the subsequent generations of Italian Jewry. At no time, not even during the second half of the six74 75

76

Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 9, p. 21b. Ibid., chap. 10, p. 22a; chap. 15.

"»si [o-wim] ,i)3 n r a DTOD m i-ran nbis • • • rrrasro n^Nsnan a m

ONTO r u m p b y Dll»»! DSU n o » f nun, Or ha-Hayyim, chap. 2, p. 7; chap. 5, p. 16b; Hasdei ha-Shem, chap. 9, pp. 58-59; Comm. Aboth, 3:23, p. 78.

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teenth century or in the seventeenth century, when the general situation of the Jews in the country had deteriorated markedly, did they withdraw from the general culture. On the contrary, the number of Jews attending the medical school of Padua, for instance, increased during those centuries. 77 Nor did they remain unaffected by the artistic trends of the time, notably music, the dance, and the theater. 78 Moreover, the rise of scholars like 'Azariah de Rossi, Judah Moscato, Aryeh Modena, Simone Luzzatto, and Joseph Shlomo Delmedigo — to name only the most prominent — during the very time when the new mysticism, emanating from Safed, was gaining strength, clearly shows that the pursuit of secular studies remained an outstanding feature of Jewish life in Italy even long after the heyday of the Renaissance was over.

" See Antonio Ciscato, Gli Ebrei in Padova (1300-1800) (Padova, 1901), chap. Vili, p. 218. 78 See above, pp. 68-69 and n. 39.

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The impact of the tragedy of the exile from the Iberian Peninsula is also felt strongly, though indirectly, in the writings of Joseph Ibn Yahya. He displays a deep resentment and bitterness against the Christian world on the one hand, and reasserts his faith in Jewish uniqueness on the other hand. Since he is a native of Italy and exposed as he must have been to the environment and the secular trends of the time, these emotions never lead him to a repudiation of secular learning altogether, as was the case with Ya'aves. The pursuit of such learning was a long established tradition in his family, which not even an event like the exile could weaken. His father David pursued both "Torah and philosophy, grammar and poetry", in which subjects he wrote works that were still in the hands of his grandson, Gedaliah Ibn Yahya. 1 R' Joseph's two sons, the above mentioned Gedaliah and the younger Judah, followed a similar course. Full of superstitions and inaccuracies as the Shalsheleth ha-Cabbalah is, it nevertheless bears witness to its author's acquaintance with the philosophical, astronomical, and medical learning of this time.2 Gedaliah's brother Judah studied at the Studio of Padova and in 1557 received the degree of doctor, on which occasion such great honors were bestowed on him as had never been given to any other Jew before him.3 Joseph, it seems, bore the name of his grandfather who, in 1496, at the age of seventy, when threatened by Don Juan of Portugal with the alternative of death or conversion, fled from Lisbon with his three sons, David, Meir, and Shlomo, and after many hardships and tribulations arrived in Italy. The old man died in Ferrara, and shortly thereafter Joseph was born in Florence.4 According to R' Gedaliah Ibn Yahya, in his middle 1

Gedaliah Ibn Yahya, Sefer Shalsheleth ha-Cabbalah (Amsterdam, 1697), p. 52b. Ibid., pt. II, pp. 56ff. 3 Ibid., p. 53a. 4 "Haqdamah", Sefer Torah Or Vhe-Hakham ... Don Yoseph ben ... ha-Dayyan Don David Ibn Yaftya ha-Sefaradi ... (Bologna, 1538) (hereafter cited as Torah Or). 2

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age R' David was appointed by the communities of the Kingdom of Naples the head of a yeshivah, rabbi, and judge.5 He remained in this post for twenty-two years, "until the Jews were exiled from those territories, after which he returned, in 1540, to his home at Imola", where he died in 1543.« Most of Joseph's life was spent at Imola in Romagna, near Bologna, which at the time belonged to the Papal States. According to his son Gedaliah, he seems to have served there in the capacity of rabbi all his life.7 He himself, however, speaks rather of the great wealth he accumulated there, and the business activities which brought him "to the courts of kings and rulers". 8 Yet it appears that it was his brother Judah who for some time was mainly responsible for the conduct of these businesses, while Joseph himself was left to the pursuit of his studies. The early death of Judah, who was the older of the two, forced him out of his leisurely seclusion and plunged him into new experiences. Reluctant and unwilling as he was at first, he soon became very much absorbed in his new enterprises, to the detriment of his scholarly work.9 Joseph was thirty years old when, reawakened by an inner drive and the promptings of his uncle and father-in-law, also named Gedaliah Ibn Yahya, he resumed his scholarly activity, and in the course of several years wrote his commentaries on the Ketuvim. With the exception of Ezra-Nehemiah and the Chronicles, a commentary on which he completed in 1538,10 all the other commentaries were carried out in a relatively short time, in the years 1525/26-1528.11 In the last years of his life he composed three other books, Torah Or, Derekh Hayyim, and Ner Misvah. In the first he discusses "ultimate bliss";12 in the second the ethical principles one should follow for its attainment; and in the third "the commandments, by which that happiness 6 6

nrrbs? p i osntn

Shalsheleth ha-Cabbalah, p. 52b; Cf., U Cassuto, Gli Ebrei a Firenze (Firenze, 1918), p. 258, n. 3. 7 r-n "TT VD dp p"pb m m ^ a i n 8 Joseph Ibn Yahya, "Introduction", Perush Hamesh Megilloth, Tehillim, Mishlei, Eyob, Ezra, Divrei ha- Yamim, ffibbro he-ffakham ... Don Yoseph ... ben Don David Ibn Yahya ha-Sefaradi (Bologna, 1538). All references to the Books of the Bible in this chapter, whether preceded by the word "comm." or not, are to this commentary. • Ibid., commentary on Shir ha-Shirim, p. 1; Shalsheleth ha-Cabbalah, p. 52b. 10 Commentary, end of Chronicles, p. 121a. 11 He began to write the commentary on Shir ha-Shirim at the age of thirty, i.e., in 1525-26. By 1527 ('""ITS MP), he had completed the commentary on all the Scrolls (see end of comm. on Esther) and on the Psalms (ibid., p. 65b). The year after, 1528, he completed the commentaries on Proverbs and Daniel, the latter in the house of his uncle and father-in-law at Massa in Tuscany (see end of Comm. Dan., p. 113a). 12

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is also attainable". 13 Only the first was published, and the other two were "accidentaly" (sic) consumed by fire at the time the Talmud was ordered burned at Padova in 1554. According to his son R' Gedaliah, the Derekh Hayyim was a commentary on many of the midrashim of the Talmud, and the Ner Misvah explained the "reasons for the commandments". 1 4 R ' Joseph's main contribution to Hebrew letters of the sixteenth century was in the field of Biblical exegesis. As an exegete, he shows a preference for the plain and "revealed" meanings of the text. With the exception of the Song of Songs which, following a long established tradition, he interprets allegorically, most of his other commentaries are on the whole free of this tendency, which has been prevalent for centuries among both rationalists and mystics. He does emphasize that the Biblical text has a hidden meaning in addition to the revealed one, 15 and though he conceives of the former mainly in terms of school metaphysics, the use he makes of it is rather moderate. 16 On the other hand, he steers clear of the Cabbalistic Midrash. In all his writings he refers only twice to Cabbalistic explanations, and from one reference, at least, his negative attitude to them may be inferred. He offers a rather reasonable explanation of the levirate institution in Judaism; dismisses, however, the speculations of the mystics connecting it with the transmigration of souls as "contradictory to nature ... and rather strange in our eyes". 17 His commentary even displays signs of a critical approach. The Book of Ruth, he points out, was written after David became king and it became evident that a new dynasty would emerge from him. 1 8 Though he believes that it was King David who wrote down all the Psalms, this, he thinks, does not imply that David actually composed them. 1 9 Yahya attempts to explain the Psalter as following a chronological order, but ultimately gives up this attempt with the observation that this is impossible to maintain: As we do not know the connection between the Five Books of Moses and the sequence of their chapters, we are equally ignorant with reference to the possible connection between the five books of the Psalter and the order of their respective Psalms. 13 14 15 18 17 18 18

End of "Haqdamah", Torah Or. Shalsheleth ha-Cabbalah, p. 52b. Comm. Song of Songs 1:9; Prov., "Haqdamah", p. 66b and chap. 1, pp. 66b-67a. Prov. 25:11, p. 83b. Ruth, p. 17a; see also Torah Or, chap. 42. "Haqdamah", Ruth. Comm. Ps. 42, p. 26b.

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It is possible, he suggests, that this was the reason which prompted Maimonides to confuse the order in his Guide.20 The Book of Proverbs, he further observes, was actually concluded with the last verse of chapter twenty-four after which, however, new proverbs were discovered and added.21 Interesting in themselves as all these observations may be, they seem of little direct relevance to our main theme, except possibly to indicate the generally rational approach prevalent in his writings. This, however, may be inferred more directly and more convincingly from his attitude toward secular learning. To what extent Ibn Yahya was acquainted with or even mastered such learning, is not easy to ascertain. His son Gedaliah calls him a uomo universale,22 and he himself promises in the introduction to his three books on the "Torah and its mysteries" to deal with mdaseh bereshith and mcfaseh merkavah.23 On the basis of the extant Torah Or and his commentaries, however, there is little reason to assume a very intimate acquaintance on his part with either medieval philosophy or science. Most of the references to them are of a general nature and, rather than displaying any originality, are usually restatements of earlier formulations. Nevertheless, a penchant for philosophy and an admiration for secular learning can hardly be denied to him. He entertains especially a high regard for metaphysics. The "and (in the) congregation" of "I will praise the Lord with my whole heart in the assembly of the upright and (in the) congregation"24 he interprets as "alluding to the sages of the nations, who are proficient in ma'aseh bereshith and ma^aseh merkavah, to the extent that these things are rationally conceivable". More ingeniously, he interprets the sentence that follows25 as meaning: "Great though the acts of God are in the Divine realm,26 and beyond human conception, they are sought and inquired into by all the sages". Though the wise realize that they will never attain a knowledge of God, 27 they endeavor nevertheless to comprehend as much of it as lies in their capacity.28 Also "Let them not depart from Thine eyes"29 he interprets as alluding to "the mysteries of creation", 20 21 22 23

24 25 2

Comm. Ps., 101, p. 47a. Prov. 25:1, p. 83a. masnn W i s DDn, Shalsheleth ha-Cabbalah, p. 52b. "Haqdamah", Torah Or, p. 4a.

mVI D,-)tP 1103 mV *733 71 HTIX, Ps. 111:1. n.TXDil bo1? O W l l 71 WVti D'Vni, Ps. 111:2. « TiVxn oViva " inpnvT

28 Ps. 111:2, p. 51b. 2« *]">rS7» liV" VX, Prov. 3:21.

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which one must always keep in mind, since through their study man may attain "great perfection".30 Of course, when faced with the dilemma of choosing between the "father's instruction",31 symbolic of reason, and the "mother's law",32 standing for "the true tradition of the community of Israel", one must give preference to the latter; this, however, is not a happy solution, and a more desirable one would be to combine the two.33 Such a synthesis he also recommends in his interpretation of Psalm 1. Among the joys implied by the ashrei, he names "the bliss of the intellectual soul on reaching the heights of Aristotle and his master Plato", which he places one stage below the highest form of bliss, the prophetic.34 The "fruit" in the tree simile of that Psalm stands, of course, for the Torah, and the "leaf" for secular wisdom; however, the promise that "its leaf shall not wither" he interprets to the effect that "the students will find shelter in the shadow of these wisdoms, and profit from them in the understanding of the Torah". 35 Besides metaphysics, R' Joseph entertains a high regard for astronomy, mathematics, and the natural sciences, notably optics, one of the most pursued branches of "natural philosophy" in the Middle Ages.36 His concept of the universe — to the extent that it appears in his works — is in harmony with the notions of it which prevailed throughout the ages till the times of Giordano Bruno and Galileo. He conceives of the earth as "half water and half land", forming the center of the concentric spheres and surrounded by the spheres of air and fire, respectively. The four elements, "from which all the objects of the sublunar world are composed", are the offsprings of "one father and mother, the material form and primeval matter". As for the heavens, he conceives of them in terms of the hierarchy of the seven planets, from the moon to Saturn, encompassed by the eighth or ninth sphere, the largest of them all, because of whose size and strength they are all moved "once a day from East to West". In line with prevalent notions is also his belief in astrology. Mercury37 causes "contentions and quarrels" on earth; 38 Venus,39 how30

31 32 33

Comm. Prov., ad. loc., p. 69a.

-101» - p x rmn

Comm. Prov., 1:19, p. 67a. Ps. ad. loc., p. 7a. Ibid., p. 7b. 36 Cf., George Sarton, Six Wings, Men of Science in the Renaissance (Bloomington, Indiana, 1957), pp. 83ff. 34 35

37

38

3313 m u m

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ever, brings joy and happiness. Whereas the sun brings "salvation and glory to the rulers of the earth", Mars 40 causes "plagues, wars, and hunger". Jupiter 41 is "a star of love and benevolence";42 Saturn, however, causes "famine, captivity, and desolation". 43 Ibn Yahya's general acquaintance with secular learning and his admiration for it is perhaps best illustrated by his commentary on Proverbs 8 and 9. In accordance with current notions, he divides the "realm of wisdom" into three kinds: 1) "Divine wisdom", whose subject is the purely spiritual: God, the angels, the mind, and the soul; 2) "natural wisdom", which deals with the material, such as "the substance oi the heavens and their hosts, the four elements and the composites thereof"; and 3) the "wisdom of mathematics",44 the position of which is intermediate between the above two, containing ingredients of both the "Divine" and the "natural". He further subdivides the "wisdom of mathematics" into the following: 1) arithmetic,45 2) geometry,46 3) music, 4) weights, 5) measurements, 6) optics, and 7) astronomy. He defines the first as "the knowledge of things which have no existence in matter ... and (are) not to be perceived in it, constituting, however, accidentals of it". Owing to its abstract nature, it comes closest to the Divine wisdom. Geometry he defines as "the knowledge of things which, though imaginable as detached from matter, are conceived of by the mind as inherent only in matter". In opposition to these two, the following four — music, weights, measurements, and optics — he defines as dealing with various aspects of material things, and the seventh, astronomy, as possessing elements of both natural and mathematical wisdom. Though astronomy is not as pure as mathematics, its subject being the heavens, it is the most sublime among the sciences. As for logic and medicine, they are to be considered as arts rather than "wisdoms".47 It is in terms of allusions to all these sciences that he interprets the various phrases of chapter eight. The "excellent things" 48 allude to the "high quality" of the Torah; by the "right things"49 arithmetic is meant, which is subject to no error; the "truth" 50 refers 40 41 42 43

44 45 46 47

DHNO pis px-nnanx aaia

"Haqdamah", Comm. Ps., p. 2a.

DmaVn nnnn iDonn naan mia&nn naan Prov. 8, p. 72a.

48 Q'TU 49 nnera 50 nax

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to geometry, which is also free of error; "they are all plain to him that understandeth" 51 pertains to optics, and the "right to them that find knowledge" 52 to astronomy. 53 Interpretations and allegorizations of such a nature, bearing on philosophy and the sciences, notably astronomy, and usually extolling them, are to be found in other passages of his works also. 54 All this notwithstanding, Ibn Yahya must be considered an antirationalist, since the mythological and pietist elements in his conceptions far outweigh and overshadow the rationalist. It is not the weakness of reason as such in unraveling the secrets of the universe, nor its frequently false use, nor the primacy of practice to thought in Judaism upon which he puts his major stress. Although these and other arguments are to be found in his writings, 55 they are never elaborated, nor are they very prominently displayed. His anti-rationalism, like that of Ya'aves, draws primarily from his deep faith in the uniqueness of Israel among the nations, a faith which seems to have gained in strength and intensity as a result of the tragic historical reality of Jewry of the time. It is this uniqueness, carried to its most extreme conclusions, which constitutes the cornerstone upon which he erects his anti-rationalist edifice. To understand this, the tragic fate of the Jewish people in the early decades of the sixteenth century, the period immediately following the exile from the Iberian Peninsula, must be realized, since it is, no doubt, his reflections on this fate that led Ibn Yahya to his views. To judge solely from his writings, the state of Jewry in Christian Europe at the time must have reached a most tragic climax, and the tension between the Jews and the dominant majority must have become virtually insufferable. Indeed, rarely has the awareness of Galuth been expressed at greater length and in more moving terms than by Ibn Yahya. Spiritual and pietist that he is, his eyes are wide open to the more tangible — economic, social, and cultural — realities of Jewish existence in Christian Europe. Galuth to him means the constant exposure of Jewry to economic insecurity and financial ruin. 56 Whatever a Jew possesses, he observes, does not actually belong to him. 57 Hence the 61 sa 53

pyob d t i m DVD run n-1^®1

Prov., p. 72b. Song of Songs 1:7, p. 8a; 5:14, p. lib; 6:1, p. 12a; Ps. chap. 8, p. 11a; 19:2-3, p. 16a; Prov. 9:2, p. 73b; Job 28:1-2, p. 99a. 56 Prov. 5:3, p. 70a; 30:1-4, p. 87a; Song of Songs 6:11, p. 12a. 56 Song of Songs 5:7, p. 11a. 6 ' Ps. 77, p. 35b. 54

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(1496-1539)

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sense of security the rich Jews seem to entertain appears to him a mere delusion. "They do not know, nor do they see ... that their wealth is without foundation, and like chaff is likely to disappear". 58 Were they to realize it, as well as their altogether shameful existence, and face the fact that in the foreign milieu they can never lead a full Jewish life, they would most probably show a greater eagerness to return home to their native land. Oblivious, however, as they are to the lessons of history, and deluding themselves with false hopes, they neither deny the Messianic hope nor crave for its fulfillment.59 Galuth means cultural deprivation also. Preoccupied as they are with eking out their miserable livelihood, and embittered by their tragic lot, the Jews have neither the leisure nor the psychological conditions conducive to the pursuance of scholarly work. "My intellectual soul", he comments on Psalm 77:3, "craves for secular learning;60 the hardships of Galuth, however, keep it away from pursuit of it". 61 Worst, however, are the physical and mental sufferings of the Jews at the hands of the Christians. The mere name "Jew" has become an abhorrence to Christians, and they flee from him as from something abominable.62 Contempt and hate for the Jew are being implanted in the young from their birth, with the consequence that even the smallest, poorest, and most miserable urchin dares to chase, stone, curse, and spit in the face of even the great in Israel.63 Indeed, to do evil unto a Jew has become a kind of "natural religion" with some Christians,64 and shedding his blood is not even considered a sin.65 What wonder then that, driven as he incessantly is from place to place, abused and persecuted, the Jew has become impoverished, weak, and cowardly to such an extent that he is fearful "even of rustling leaves".66 It is this tragic situation, accompanied as it was by intensified efforts on

58

60 81

Ps. 5:3, p. 10b. Ibid.

mttsnn •nan1?

Comm. Ps. p. 36b; similar observations on this aspect of Galuth are also to be found a century later in Simone Luzzatto's Discorso circa il stato degli Ebrei nell inclita citta di Venezia (Venezia, 1638); see Hebrew ed., Ma'amer *al Yehudei Venezia (Jerusalem, 1951), chap. 16, as well as in Judah del Bene's Sefer Kis'oth I'Beth David (Verona, 1646), bayith shvi'i, sha'ar 42. 62 Comm. Ps. 88, p. 43a. ,3 Ibid. 109:16, p. 51a. " Ibid. 83, p. 41b. " Ibid. 94, p. 45b. " Ibid. 109, p. 51b.

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the part of Christians to convert the Jews,67 which must be borne in mind in order to understand what may appear to us as Ibn Yahya's "excessive" nationalism which, as mentioned, is also the foundation of his antirationalism. This is not to say that these views are completely the result of a transient historical reality and lacking any basis in Jewish lore of earlier times. Their extreme form, however, can, no doubt, be explained as a reaction to that reality. Though Ibn Yahya's views on the uniqueness of the Jewish people and their culture are scattered throughout all his writings, they constitute the major topic of his Torah Or which, as mentioned, he wrote not long before his untimely death at the age of forty-four. The central theme of the seventy-eight short chapters of the book is the human soul and its destiny, a topic that was central to the general philosophical speculations of the age.68 The discussion is kept on a rational level only in the first twenty chapters, following which it degenerates into midrashic expositions, and the intellectual standard declines. The work opens with the question regarding the essence of human happiness and the means for its attainment. One after another Ibn Yahya advances various conceptions of this ideal, rejecting each as inadequate, for one reason or another. Were human happiness the pleasure derived from food or drink, he argues, pigs would be the most successful. Again, were it the result of either riches or honor, human destiny would be dependent upon the incidental and transient. 69 He also rejects the Roman conception of this ideal as identical with power and rule, and that of the Greeks, who sought it in philosophy. Praiseworthy as the concept of the Greeks may be, "they were led by their speculations to the assumption of the eternity of the world and determinism, because they were without a tradition and Torah". 70 Ibn Yahya therefore concludes that the ideal of human happiness must, in the final analysis, concern itself primarily with the human soul, to whose analysis he now turns. First mentioned is the view which denies any existence for the soul after the death of the body, a view which he ascribes to Abu Nasser and which, according to R' Joseph ben Shemtov, was also held by Aristotle. Though Aristotle declared intellectual knowledge to be the highest ideal of man, he did not mention, ben Shemtov points out, that such knowledge " Comm. Ps., p. 57a; Song of Songs 5:7-9, pp. 7a, 8b; 8:6, p. 13b; see also general introduction to that commentary. ,8 Cf., Renan, Averroes et I'Averroisme, chap. 3, pp. 355ff. •• Torah Or, chaps. 1-3. 70 Ibid., chap. 5; cf., Kuzari, I, pars. 63, 65, 67, and passim.

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warrants immortality. This view Ibn Yahya rejects, of course, outright. 71 The second view is attributed to Themistius and Abu Hammad, who took a more moderate position with regard to the master's view, and interpreted human happiness to mean that through study and contemplation the "primeval mind" 72 is transformed into an "acquired mind" 73 which, after the death of the body, joins the active intellect, with which it is actually identical. Though the followers of this opinion, Ibn Yahya explains, also stress the importance of moral excellence for the attainment of this ideal, they treat it merely as a prerequisite, rather than as a direct cause, immortality being considered by them as primarily the result of the vita contemplativa. This view, he argues, that the mind "gains substantiality through its own concepts",74 contradicts truth, and has already been rejected by Judah Halevi in his Kuzari and by Hasdai Crescas in his Or Adonai. Moreover, it actually refutes the basic tenet of the Torah, according to which happiness is a direct result of the keeping of the commandments.75 Nor does he show a greater enthusiasm for the third view, that of Maimonides. He entertains, of course, the highest regard for him, calling him "the mighty lion"; 76 he rejects, however, his rationalist view of human destiny. Maimonides, he explains, is essentially in agreement with the above interpreters of Aristotle, and, like them, considers immortality dependent on intellectual attainment. The mi?voth, accordingly, are a mere preliminary77 to the higher speculative concepts. Since they were proclaimed to a multitude, the concepts underlying them could only be alluded to in the Torah; they are nevertheless implied, and it is the duty of the enlightened to discover and prove them rationally. Thus it is above all the contemplation of God, His knowledge and Providence, which constitutes, according to Maimonides, the ideal of an enlightened Judaism. This view, Ibn Yahya comments, though not entirely wrong, must be rejected for two reasons. First, because it is the result of the "vain speculations of the philosophers by which Maimonides was enticed",78 and secondly, because of the exclusive nature of its concept of immortality, as a result of which this state is believed attainable only by a select few, "

72

Torah Or, chap. 6.

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" "

77 79

Torah Or, chap. 7. "VVTM "HKfl", Introduction to Song of Songs, p. 3b; Introduction to Ps., p. 2b.

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JOSEPH IBN YAHYA (1496-1539)

rather than by the masses. Though the latter may keep all the commandments, they can never hope to partake of the heavenly bliss because of their incapacity to perceive the underlying meanings and aims. In opposition to this view, he asserts that the mere keeping of the misvoth renders one perfect, assuring to all Israel a share in the world to come.79 As a fourth view, he advances the teaching of Crescas, according to whom the soul, as the conceptualizing substance in man, is imperishable, and the goal of the commandments is to permeate man with the love of God. 80 A fifth view is cited in the name of Efodi, who asserts that the mi?voth, like a magnet, possess a mysterious quality, and by keeping them one gains immortality and true happiness.81 Though showing a preference for the latter two views over that of Maimonides, he rejects them all in favor of the sixth and final view, that of Judah Halevi, who defines Israel as a separate species in the human race, unique in body and soul.82 In line with the centuries-old theory of the parallelism between the microcosmos and the macrocosmos, Ibn Yahya asserts that parallel to the three realms of being in the universe — the sublunar, that of the rotating spheres, and the angelic83 — are the three souls: the vegetative,84 with its seat in the liver; the sensual,85 in the heart; and the intellectual,86 in the brain. However, to lend a cosmic basis to his notion of the uniqueness of Israel, he expands both parts of the parallelism, adding to the universal order, on the one hand, a fourth realm of being, the Divine, and, on the other hand, an "extra soul" 87 to parallel it or be its microcosmic image. It is this "extra soul", he asserts, which is in the sole possession of the "seed of Israel", the Chosen People. A t first, he explains, all humanity shared in the possession of the four capabilities. Since the "generation of dispersion", however, God removed His Divine image from the other nations, and, leaving them only in the possession of the "angelic" soul, made the seed of Abraham the sole possessors of the "extra soul". The phenomenon of prophecy, he argues in the spirit of Halevi, and the miraculous events recorded only in Israel, clearly point to a unique aptitude of the Jewish people for things Divine, which must be 79 80 81 82

83 84 85 88 87

Torah Or, chap. 8. Ibid., chap. 9. Ibid., chap. 10. Ibid., chap. 11.

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explained as the result of "another kind of soul". 88 Being hewn out of the realm of the Divine, this soul is perfect and everlasting. As such, it can actually gain nothing from keeping the commandments. However, since this soul is attached in this life to "dark and filthy" matter, the purpose of the commandments is to purify that matter somewhat, in order to make it possible for the soul to dwell temporarily in it. 88 The difference between Israel and the nations thus has its origin in almost prehistoric times, and goes beyond anything which may be explained as the result of the possession of the Torah. A bodily dimension is added to the spiritual, to make this uniqueness even more pronounced. Subject as the Jews are to the laws of conjugal purity, circumcision, and diet, their corporal substance attains greater purity, thus becoming a more appropriate abode for the higher form of their soul. 90 Israel thus marks a higher and more Divine state of being. As the intellectual soul separates man from the animal, so the Divine soul sets Israel apart from the rest of humanity. 91 Emanated as it is from the "Divine realm", this soul is eternal. On the other hand, the soul of the other nations, originating from the active intelligence, is perishable. 92 Different also is the nature of Providence in relation to both. Whereas it is direct and Divine in the case of Israel, it is indirect and communicated via their heavenly princes in the case of the other nations. 98 That such deep and essential differences, originating almost in the cosmic order of things, must also result in a difference in goals and destinies between Israel and the other nations, is obvious to Ibn Yahya. Endowed only with an intellectual soul, the human race can and ought to strive to elevate itself only one stage, reaching out for the angelic domain. Endowed, however, with a Divine soul, and thus apt for greater perfection, Israel can and ought to strive to elevate itself higher, reaching out for the realm of the Divine. 94 In short, it is the unity with God 95 which he declares to be the sole destiny of Israel, 96 making all other ideals the inheritance of the other nations. "In all truth", he writes, "material pleasure, riches, honor, and the clinging unto the active intelligence are all goals of the 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

85 96

Torah Or, chaps. 12, 13, 15. Ibid., chap. 17. Ibid., chap. 16. Ibid., chap. 18; Prov. 9, p. 73b. Torah Or, chaps. 11, 42. Ibid., chap. 14; Comm. Dan. 10:13. Torah Or, chap. 70.

TiVxn p i a n n

Torah Or, chaps. 20, 23.

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other nations, but not of Israel... Whereas intellectual wisdom is the form of the human race, it is the Torah which is the form of the species of Israel". 97 It is not so much the repudiation of rationalism and secular learning as such that ought to be inferred from the above, but rather their downgrading in the scale of human values. Though they are valid and valuable per se, theirs is not the highest value. Hence they must not be considered, at least from a Jewish point of view, as the highest ideal of man. Beyond the realm of the natural, encompassing both the sublunar world and that of the rotating spheres, and constituting the subject of rational thought, there looms the more sublime realm of the Divine which, barred as it is to human reason, is nevertheless accessible to the unique extra soul of Israel. Ibn Yahya thus seems to be repeating the views of his predecessor, Ya'aves, who saw the universe divided between the realm of nature and the realm of the Divine, with the first considered the domain of other nations, and the second the domain of Israel. In contradistinction to Ya'aves, however, who preached a total recoil from the pursuit ol secular learning, Ibn Yahya takes a more moderate stand. True, the uniqueness of Israel, he is convinced, lies in its commitment to the spiritual and the Divine; there is no inconsistency, however, between this and the pursuit of secular learning. Thus, while declaring secular learning to be the proper domain of non-Jews, he nevertheless deplores the fact that as a result of the conditions of Galuth, the Jews are unable to pursue that learning.98 He also takes a more optimistic view than most other anti-rationalists with regard to the prospects of rational knowledge in general. Though he emphasizes the inability of human reason alone, unaided either by prophecy or inspiration, to penetrate the secrets of the Divine realm,99 he displays a belief in the cumulative nature of knowledge in physics and astronomy. 100 This somewhat dichotomic attitude is also felt in his view of the relationship between theory and practice in Judaism, a problem which is central in the writings of most anti-rationalists. Thus, in his commentary on the Song of Songs, 6:11, he allegorizes the "flourishing vine"101 as alluding to the studies of metaphysics, and the "budding pomegranates" 102 " " "

100

101 102

Torah Or, chaps. 18, 20, 22. Comm. Ps. 77. Comm. Prov. 30:1-4. Comm. Ps., p. 17a.

jBinnmon owimsin

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to "the rest of the Torah". The fact, he points out, that the "fruits of the valley", 103 symbolic of "the good deeds", 104 precede both the vine and the pomegranate, is intended to show the validity of the old adage that wisdom endures only when preceded by the "fear of sin". 105 This view, however, is somewhat compromised by his interpretation of the Shemcf, in the first two sections of which he finds implied two approaches with regard to the "love of God": the contemplative and the practical. Those whose love of God is solely the result of the practice of the mi$voth he likens to one who has become a physician through the mere practice of medicine, never having studied it theoretically. On the other hand, those whose love of God is the result of contemplation he likens to one whose study of medicine preceded his practice. There can be little doubt that the author's sympathy lies with the "contemplative" lovers, who, "being in a state of permanent love, need no practice at all". 106 Worth recalling in this context is Ibn Yahya's view of the misvoth as actually unessential for immortality as such, but serving rather as a means to counteract the base proclivities of matter. 107 Ibn Yahya's anti-rationalism, it may be concluded, is thus of a qualified nature. Notwithstanding some references to the contrary, his attitude toward the pursuit of science and philosophy remains positive throughout most of his writings. He rejects, however, the contention of the rationalists that it is rational truth which constitutes the destiny of man and the road leading to immortality. In short, though admitting the immanent value of intellectualism, he rejects its transcendental claims, asserting that these constitute the essence and aim of Judaism.

103 105 1M 107

VrnrpaK a^aiDn m m s n Comm. Song of Songs, p. 12a. Comm. Ps. 73, pp. 33b-34a. Cf., supra, p. 161.

PART THREE ITALIAN ANTI-RATIONALISTS OF THE RENAISSANCE AND POST-RENAISSANCE PERIODS

IX JUDAH MOSCATO (1532-1590)1

The unique character anti-rationalism assumed in Italy is perhaps best illustrated by the works of R' Judah Moscato, an outstanding rabbi and preacher at Mantua in the second half of the sixteenth century. He is completely a product of the Italian milieu, and hence more typical of that Jewry and its culture than any of the men considered heretofore. Leone Ebreo displays, no doubt, a much deeper involvement in the culture of the Renaissance than he; Leone's Judaic background and scope appear meager, however, when compared with those of Moscato. Perhaps closest to him, in regard to scope of knowledge and the tendency to bring Judaism into contact with the cultural tradition of classical antiquity, is 'Azariah de Rossi. De Rossi falls far short of Moscato, however, in his linguistic and esthetic accomplishments. In the Mantua circle of enlightened rabbis, scholars, and artists of the second half of the sixteenth century,2 there were no doubt many who came under the influence of the great awakening in the arts, philosophy, literature, and the sciences; few, however, equalled Moscato in breadth of knowledge and the synthesis into which he succeeded in fusing its various components. Indeed, he comes closer than any other Jewish scholar of the period to the ideal of the uomo universale of Renaissance days. "He was one of the greatest musicologists of our time", R' Menahem Hacohen Porto, a contemporary ot Moscato, wrote of him.3 If Leone 1

For the date of his birth, cf., Abe Apfelbaum, Sefer Toledoth ha-Gaon R' Yehudah Moscato (Drohobycz, 1900), pp. 7-8 (hereafter cited as Toledoth Moscato). 2 Prominent among them were the Provençale brothers, Moshe and David, the latter's son Abraham, Abraham Portaleone, author of Sefer Shiltei ha-Gibborim, R' Shmuel Casis, R' Shmuel Romili (see Moscato, Nefusoth Yehudah, sermons 33, 34), Isaac Fuah (ibid., serm. 35), the dramatist Leone Sommi, and many others (see mainly Schipper, Geschichte fun Yiddischer Teater-Kunst un Drame, I, chap. 3). 3 Cf., Apfelbaum, Toledoth Moscato, p. 9. Unfortunately, the Minhah Belulah, p. 180, which Apfelbaum refers to as the source for this statement, does not contain it. Since

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JUDAH MOSCATO (1532-1590)

Ebreo and Yohanan Alemano, the two Jewish neo-Platonists of the second half of the fifteenth and the early part of the sixteenth century, interpret the universe in terms of love and beauty, 4 Moscato sees all creation as based on musical relationships "without which the world would not exist even for one moment". Subject to such relationships are not only the four elements, the heavenly hosts, the seasons of the year, etc., but also the composite of body and soul, the realm of the angels, yea, the name of God. The yod stands for the octave, the heh for the fifth, the vav for the sixth, and the second heh for the fourth. 5 In such terms he speaks also of some of the heroes of the nation's past. A man of great harmony was King David; it was, however, only in Moses that the harmonious relationship found its fullest expression. Even his name, identified with "Musa", points to it. 6 This theme Moscato upholds by a great array of quotations not only from Plato, Galen, and al-Farabi, but also from the Bible, the Kuzari, and the Zohar. Moscato was also a great rhetorician and very familiar with classical literature on the subject. His penchant for the harmonious, orderly, and beautiful reveals itself in this area also. True, he was not the first to introduce this subject into Hebrew letters. Almost a century earlier another Mantuan rabbi, Judah Messer Leon, had composed his Nofeth Sufim, an analysis of the Bible in the light of classical esthetics; 7 however, it was in the sermons of Moscato that some of the ideas of his precursor were not only further stressed and developed, 8 but actually realized in the structure and form of the sermon, thus elevating it to a work of artistic skill and excellence.9 In addition to a sermon on music, Moscato devotes another long sermon to the subject of "order", in which he extols it as the guiding principle in one's thoughts, speech, and actions. In this he describes the three methods of learning as defined by Galen: the "resolutive" (from cause to effect), the "compositive" (from effect to cause), and the "definitive". 10 there is only one edition of this work (Verona, 1594), it must be assumed that the number of the page has been listed incorrectly. 4 C f , Don Yehudah ben Yishaq Abravanel, Vikkuah'al ha-Ahavah, pp. 13ff., 52ff., 59ff., 75ff., and passim, and Yohanan Alemano's Sefer Sha'ar ha-Hesheq (Livorno, 1790), pp. 33, 34, 38-39, and passim. 6 Nefufoth Yehudah (Warsaw, 1871), serm. 1, p. 2a (hereafter cited as Nefusoth). * Ibid., p. 3. ' Ed. A. Jellinek (Wien, 1863). 8 C f , Nefusoth, serms. 5, p. 18a; 17, p. 45a; 23, p. 58b. • C f , Israel Bettan, "The Sermons of Judah Moscato", HUCA, VI (Cincinnati 1929), pp. 297-236; idem, Studies in Jewish Preaching, pp. 192-226. 10 Nefusoth, serm. 5 (megillath sedarim) pp. 16-17.

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Along with classical and later sources, such as Aristotle, Quintilian, Cicero, Galen, and Rudolph Agricola, which he cites in support of his theme, he quotes at even greater length from the Bible, the Talmud, the Midrash, Ibn Ezra, Maimonides, and many others, to show that these ideas, far from being alien to the Jews, are actually part and parcel of their cultural heritage. Thus he divides the concept of order into three kinds: "natural, arbitrary, and artifiical",11 pointing out that an acquaintance with all of them is displayed by the sages of the Gemara in their analysis of the first Mishnah of Berakhoth.12 Many of the questions posed by the sages of the Oral Tradition on the sequence in the Bible, he further observes, also exhibit an awareness of the various kinds of order.13 Moreover, swayed by his tendency to allegorize, he finds even Galen's three methods of learning alluded to in the Bible. Thus he interprets the "from thee" of Deuteronomy 30:1114 as referring to the "compositive" method, which begins "from below", i.e., present data, and proceeds to the "higher" causes; and the "far off" as referring to the "resolutive" method, whose order is reversed, i.e., from the causes to their effects.15 The extent to which Moscato sometimes goes in his harmonizing tendencies may perhaps be illustrated by the allegory which he attaches to the ethrog and lulav ceremonies. Among their many symbolisms, he discovers also, strange as it may sound, those of the art of rhetoric. The ethrog he likens to the heart — it has a wonderful inner organization and indicates the inventiveness of the rhetorician, the orderly arrangement of his words and thoughts, and their memorization. The lulav is like the body, and the hadas like the eye, the former symbolizing the posture oi the body and its gesticulations, the latter the expression of the eyes and face in the art of oratory. Finally, the 1aravoth symbolize linguistically the sweetness and flow of speech.16 Though the text bearing on the qualities of the rhetorician is, quite naturally, drawn from Quintilian and Cicero, passages from Isaiah,17 Ezekiel,18 and the Midrash 19 are also cited and are interpreted in such a way as to bear witness to the presence of these ideas in Jewish sources.20 u 12

WON1?»! ,'"Tm ,"S73t5

Nefusoth, serm. 5, p. 15b. 13 Ibid., p. 16a. 11 "For this commandment... is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off". 15 Nefusoth, serm. 5, p. 17. 16 Ibid., serm. 17, p. 45a. " Isa. 54:1. 18 Ezek. 47:12. 1» . . . n D n n V m b s n •'KB -.p^n pID, BT, Sanhedrin, p. 100a and parallels. 20 See also serm. 23, p. 58b.

170

JUDAH MOSCATO (1532-1590)

To the humanist tradition of the Renaissance must also be ascribed Moscato's linguistic excellence. Besides Hebrew, Aramaic, and Italian, he also mastered Greek and Latin. 21 Whereas the knowledge of Latin was quite common among Jewish scholars throughout the medieval period, 22 this was not the case with Greek. In this respect, Moscato can be classed with a more select group of Jewish savants, the best known among whom were R' David Provençale, author of Dor Haflagah,23 Abraham Portaleone, author of Shiltei ha-Gibborim,2i and the much younger Yashar of Candia. 25 Though he was an accomplished linguist, Moscato's views and observations in this area show little of a critical approach. Probably under the influence of the Kuzari,26 or perhaps more directly as a result of the views which prevailed in his immediate environment, he believes Hebrew to be the first language of the human race, and many of its roots to persist in numerous Greek and Latin derivations. 27 It is, in his view, the only "natural" and Divine language, in contradistinction to all other languages, which are conventionally formed. These views, it may be noted, were shared by R' David Provençale and 'Azariah de Rossi. 28 Indeed, 'Azariah admits that it was from Moscato that he learned an additional "proof" for the primacy of Hebrew among languages, namely that it was only proper for "the perfect God to have bestowed the perfect language upon the most perfect man, Adam". 29 Moscato, it may be mentioned in this connection, frequently resorts to the rule of the interchange of letters belonging to the same euphonic group, in order to solve some textual difficulties. For this purpose he makes frequent comparisons between Hebrew and Aramaic. 30 Perhaps more impressive than his humanist accomplishments in music, rhetoric, and languages is Moscato's vast knowledge of Judaica, and what may be regarded as the more substantial subjects of secular learning, 21

In serm. 14, p. 40a, he states: "I am versed in Greek and Latin "HS03 Tfirai) (TO1?! p"1 p®1? ""Via; see also Apfelbaum, Toledoth Moscato, p. 11. 22 M. Steinscheider, "Die italienische Literatur der Juden", MGWJ, XLII (Berlin, 1898), pp. 261-265. 23 Cf., 'Azariah de Rossi, Sefer Me'or 'Einayim (Warsaw, 1899), chap. 57, p. 400. 21 Sefer Shiltei ha-Gibborim (Mantua, 1612), p. 9. 25 Geiger, Melo Hofnayim, Hebrew section, p. 24. 28 Sefer ha-Kuzari (Zhitomir ed., 1866), II, pars. 67, 68 ff.; IV, par. 25, p. 436ff. 27 Nefusoth, serms, 1; 3, p. 9b; 5, p. 15a; 14, p. 40a; 31, pp. 76b, 79a; 41, p. 112a-b, and passim. 28 Me'or 'Einayim, chap. 57. 2 " Ibid., (ed., Cassel, Warsaw, 1899), p. 398; (ed., Ben Ya'acov, Wilno, 1865), p. 183. 30 Nefusoth, serms. 14, pp. 39b-40a; 30, p. 75a; 31, p. 77a.

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notably philosophy. The Biblical, Talmudic, and midrashic literature is at his fingertips, and amply used both in his sermons and in his expansive commentary on the Kuzari. Though essentially an anti-rationalist, he shows the greatest admiration for Maimonides, references to whom are most frequent in his writings. He calls him "a mountain of myrrh ... a bed of spices",31 praising his moderate views on prophecy, Providence, the active intellect, etc., as compared to the rather extreme views of Gersonides.32 Almost as frequently mentioned are the Kuzari and the works of Abraham Ibn Ezra, Nahmanides, Arama's (Aqedah, Gersonides, Abravanel, Albo, and many others. With lesser frequency he refers to Messer Leon's Nofeth Sufim, Shemtov's Sefer ha-Emmunoth,33 Bibago's Derekh Emunah,3i R' Joseph ben Shemtov's Kevod Elohim,35 Abraham Shalom's Nveh Shalom,36 as well as others. Often quoted are Cabbalistic works. Besides the Zohar and the Tiqqunim, references are common to ben Gabbai's 1 Avodath ha-Qodesh,37 Recanati's commentary,38 Gikatilia's Sha'arei Orah,39 the Ma'arekheth ha-Elahuth,M the Pardes,*1 etc. From non-Jewish sources, most frequently mentioned are the works of Plato and Aristotle. Appearing less often are the names of Heraclitus, Ptolemy, Eusebius, Pirminius, Avicenna, Ibn Roschd, al-Farabi, Pico, and Moletius. A wide acquaintance with philosophy and medieval science is displayed in the Qol Yehudah,42 and, to some extent, also in the sermons. Though a Renaissance man in so many respects, not excluding this strong eclectic tendency, Moscato is oriented, like most scholars of his age, to the essentially medieval. Almost two generations after Copernicus' De Revolutionibus Orbium Celestium (1543), Moscato does not show the slightest awareness of the new orientation, and continues to speak of the earth as the center of the universe, with the sun moving around it in a perfect circle, from which he infers "that the distance between the point of 31

Moscato, Qol Yehudah, commentary on the Kuzari in the Zhitomir ed. of the Kuzari (Zhitomir, 1866), I, 1, p. 13. All page references in this chapter are to this edition of the Qol Yehudah. 32 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 33 Nefufoth, serm. 5, p. 18a. 34 Ibid., pp. 24b, 34b, 39a. 35 Ibid., p. 39a. 36 Ibid., p. 34b. 37 Ibid., pp. 2a, 5a. 38 Ibid., p. 81b. 39 Ibid., p. 7b. 40 Qol Yehudah, V, par. 20, p. 545, col. 1. 41 Nefufoth, p. 116a. 42 Qol Yehudah, I, par. 1; II, par. 20; IV, par. 3; V, pars. 2, 12, 21, and passim.

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sunrise in the east and that of sunset in the west is double the distance between heaven and earth". 43 With most scholars of the age, both Christians and Jews, he shares a belief in astrology. "To everything there is a season" of Ecclesiastes 3:1, he interprets as pointing to the universal domination of the heavenly hosts over nature, man included.44 In the same spirit he interprets Ecclesiastes 5:7 as pointing to the seven planets and the stars of the eighth sphere, "whose changing constellations" cause all the changes in the "lower world".45 Similarly, he does not show the slightest awareness of the great advances made during the sixteenth century in anatomy and physiology.46 He continues to believe in the "spirits" of the blood as "the dwelling place and carriers" of the forces which nature put in charge of the body. 47 He attaches prognostic significance to dreams,48 and is convinced of the mystical power inherent in the combinations of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet.49 From the middle of the fifteenth century, when Florence under the Medicis became a center of Platonic studies, a revival of Platonism became an outstanding feature of the Renaissance both in Italy and abroad. 50 The two Jewish exponents of this spiritual tendency were Leone Ebreo and Yohanan Alemano; their works, however, had but little influence on Jewish thought of the sixteenth and later centuries. The Dialoghi del Amore of Leone, either written in Spanish or Italian, Latin or Hebrew, both colored by a sensual estheticism and rich in mythological similes of pagan literature, had on the whole no effect, even though they were praised by a number of Jewish scholars.51 Nor did the works of Alemano exert a major influence. Most of them, with the exception of Sefer Sha'ar 43

Nefufoth, serm. 39, p. 107a. Ibid., serm. 33, p. 86b. 45 Ibid., serm. 41, p. 112b. 4 " C f , Arturo Castiglioni, "The Renaissance" in A History of Medicine (2nd ed., New York, 1947), chap. XVI; Sarton, "Fifth Wing: Anatomy and Medicine", III, in Six Wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance, pp. 174 if. 47 Nefufoth, serm. 9, p. 24b. 48 Ibid., serm. 33, p. 89b. 49 Qol Yehudah, IV, par. 25, pp. 440, 442. 50 C f , Überweg, "Die Philosophie der Neuzeit", Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, III, par. 5; Cassirer, Kristeller, Randall, The Renaissance Philosophy of Man -, Kristeller, Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, pp. 17-31, 261-278, 279-286, 287-336; E. Cassirer, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (Darmstadt, 1963). " Pflaum, Die Idee der Liebe, Leone Ebreo; Carl Gebhardt, "Einleitung" in Leone Hebraeus, Dialoghi d'Amore (Heidelberg, 1929); Isaiah Sonne, "Li-She'elath ha-Lashon ha-Meqorith shel Vikkuhei ha-Ahavah Ii-Yehudah Abravanel" in S'yyunim, in memory

44

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ha-Hesheq (Livorno, 1790), a part of a larger work, still remain in manuscript. 52 It was in the second half of the sixteenth century that Platonism gained in Moscato a new adherent and a popular exponent of its views among Italian Jews. Plato's works, notably the Timaeus, and his ideas are among the most frequently referred to in Moscato's Qol Yehudah and the Nefusoth Yehudah. Moreover, the preoccupation of the sermons with God, the essence of man and his soul, and their unique conceptions clearly point to the strong influences of Platonism. Moscato devotes a whole sermon to the exposition of the neo-Platonic theory of emanation in order to explain the mystical midrash of Psalms 104 regarding the creation of light, a midrash which had previously puzzled Maimonides. 53 Most interesting is his observation that the "son" mentioned in Proverbs 30:4 ("Who has established all the ends of the earth? What is his name, and what is his son's name, if thou canst tell?") may possibly allude to the first emanation of the Deity, the universal mind, which, "according to the testimony of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, in a small work which he composed on heavenly and Divine love ... the Platonists and some of the ancient sages call the son of God". 54 In the spirit of the neo-Platonic speculations of the Renaissance is Moscato's concept of man as a microcosmos, a topic to which he devotes one of the longest sermons in the collection.55 Parallel to God, whose plural name, Elohim, he interprets as denoting His identity with the wholeness of existence, man is also called "whole" (kol), to indicate that just as his body is parallel in structure to that of the universe, so is his mind, by encompassing actively or potentially all the images of creation, a reflection of the totality of being. It is man, Moscato observes most ingeniously, who is meant by the word kol (all) in the concluding sentence of the first chapter of Genesis, "... since it is in him that all the acts of creation are reflected and engraved". 56 Like Abravanel, he believes this idea to of Simhoni (Berlin, 1929), pp. 142-148; idem, '"Iqvoth ha-Vikkuhim 'al ha-Ahavah ba-Sifruth ha-'Ivrith", Tarbiz, III (Jerusalem, 1931-1932), pp. 287-313 ; Joseph Klausner, "Don Yehudah Abravanel u-Philosophiath ha-Ahavah shelo", ibid., pp. 67-98. •* Cf., Pflaum, op. cit., "Die jüdische Bildungswelt", par. 3, pp. 67-70; Umberto Cassuto, "Aleman Jochanan ben Isak", EJ, II (Berlin, 1928), pp. 176-179; idem, Gli Ebrei a Firenze, pp. 304-305; G. Scholem, "Hibbur Bilti Nöda" m'Reb Yohanan Alemano", Kiryath Sefer, V (Jerusalem, 1928-1929), pp. 273-276. 53 Guide, II, 26. 54 Nefu$oth, serm. 8, p. 21b. 55 Ibid., serm. 9, pp. 22-27. " Ibid., p. 23.

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be implied in the "in our image" of Genesis 1:26. The fact that man is described as consummating creation signifies that in him are embodied all the preceding stages, and that, like God, he contains, in a way, the totality of existence.57 This idea, he points out, is also indicated in the view ascribed by the Midrash to R' Joshua bar Nehemiah who, in the name of R' El'azar, voiced the opinion that, upon creation, man "filled" the whole universe from east to west, north to south 58 — a view which he explains as alluding to Plato's concept of the soul as endowed, in its pre-natal state, with universal knowledge.59 Man, however, is not only mind. No less significant is the material element in him, as a result of which he is constantly in conflict with himself, but if victorious may attain greater heights of perfection than even the angels who, as pure spirits, are free of the snares and temptations of the senses.60 It is this "strange composition" of man, "a shining Divine spark" in dark matter, which Moscato believes alluded to in the Biblical: "I form the light, and create darkness, I make peace ... and ... do all" (Isaiah, 45:7), the "light" of which he interprets as pointing to the "illuminating intellectual part", the "darkness" to matter, the "peacemaking" to their "mixture and harmony" in one subject, and "all" as alluding to man as a microcosmos.61 These ideas about the uniqueness of man, resulting from his intellectual powers and Divine soul, on the one hand, and his intermediate position between heaven and earth, on the other hand — ideas so central to the sermons62 — were a rather common topic in the humanist literature of the Renaissance. However, in his sermons Moscato stresses another aspect of man, which, though less commonly encountered in the general writings of the time, may be specifically traced to the works of the Platonist Pico, with which he seems to have been acquainted. We refer to the idea of man's freedom of choice. Man, he points out, is the only creature whose perfectibility is entrusted not to nature but to himself; and since free actions are far superior to constrained, natural ones, man is the only being who, by virtue of his freedom, is capable of happiness.63 However, 67

Nefufoth, serms. 35, p. 94b; 33, p. 86a; c f , Abravanel, Comm. Gen. 1:26. Bereshith Rabbah (Mirkin ed.), 8:1, p. 50. 59 Nefufoth, serm. 9, pp. 23b-24a. 60 Ibid., serm. 34, p. 91b. 61 Ibid., p. 92. 92 C f , ibid., serms. 10, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, and passim. ,a Ibid., serm. 31, p. 77a; c f , Pico's "Oration on the Dignity of Man", Renaissance Philosophy of Man, pp. 225 ff.; see also Alemano, Sefer Sha'ar ha-Hesheq, p. 42a. 58

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because man is free, his actions are unpredictable. Just as he can soar high, so he can also "sink very low, and be worse than any creature". This, he explains very perceptively, is the reason why only in the creation of man is the phrase omitted "and God saw that it was good", a phrase which is repeated with every other stage of creation. And it is this omission which he finds alluded to in the Psalmist's: "How great is Thy goodness that Thou hast hidden for them that fear Thee" (Ps. 31:20), which he interprets: "How great is the good which Thou hast hidden and covered with the mantle of silence, by omitting to mention 'and it was good' in the creation of man, as Thou hast done with the other creatures".64 In the spirit of neo-Platonism is also Moscato's concept of human happiness as the fulfillment of man's longing for God, his restoration unto Him, the source of all being. Like Isaac Abravanel, his son Leone, and Alemano, Moscato conceives of happiness as "nothing other than the return to the Divine origin" of things.86 This he finds implied in the relationship between the Hebrew osher (happiness), and shur (to look, to gaze), a relationship which points to the identity of happiness with the contemplation of God. It is also indicated, he suggests, in the relation between the Hebrew teshifah (salvation) and vayyisha1 (He turned to) of Genesis 4:4, even though the two may be from different roots.66 Most frequently referred to in this connection is the simile of God as a "point" and the universe as a circle around it: We have compared God to the indivisible point, since the line, area, and body are all formed from it .... There is no place free of the point, which is thus potentially contained " in all geometrical forms.68 To continue with this simile, he compares the angels with the line, "on account of their thinness and simplicity ... As the line differs from the point only by the dimension of length ... so the angels also are only one stage removed from God". He proceeds to compare the heavenly spheres with the two-dimensional area, because of their "being two stages removed from God". Though they also possess body, because of "its great purity and transparency" it is actually irrelevant. Only the bodies of the lower world, which are three stages from God, and whose substance is "thick and rough", are three-dimensional. Hence, he interestingly observes, the M

«

M

67

•8

Nefufoth, serm. 31, p. 77b. Ibid., p. 81a. Ibid., p. 77a.

n m nti -nm

Nefusoth, serm. 17, p. 45a.

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earth is called Arac in Aramaic, to denote length, width, and depth. 69 This simile, Moscato points out, is common in the writings of the Ancients, notably the Platonists. 70 It is also found in the Zohar and the works of Abraham Ibn Ezra. 71 If the concept of God as the all-pervasive points seems to yield itself to a pantheistic interpretation of the Deity, the concept of the universe as a circle, sending out its radii toward a never attainable center, and thus expressive of the longing that permeates all creation to reunite with its original source, restores the transcendental relationship between God and creation, though it conceives of this relationship in dynamic terms. As stated previously, these views are central to Leone's Dialoghi12 and Alemano's Sha'ar ha-Hesheq (in which they are attributed to Ptolemy), 73 and are also alluded to in the commentary of Isaac Abravanel. 74 In this connection it may be worthwhile to present some of Moscato's exegetical suggestions as illustrations of the impact of these ideas. Superfluous to add that they are forced and farfetched; they are interesting none the less as examples of the kind of exegesis that arose in consequence of the penetration by both Platonism and the Cabbalah, with their mysticism of numbers and letters, and the unique techniques of the Gematria and the Notariqon. Thus Moscato explains the tavi (my tav) of Job 31:35 75 as symbolic of God, who is denoted by the last letter of the alphabet, signifying that "He is the final goal of all things, longed for by everyone". 76 Similarly, he explains the qaveh (hope) of Psalms 27:1477 as derived from qav (a line), "which is to say that the line-rays of your contemplating mind 78 must always be directed toward God's countenance, anticipating salvation only from Him". 79 He suggests that the circle and point simile are alluded to in the four-letter name of God, as well as in the first section of Shemac. By its form, the yod symbolizes the point, whereas the heh and the vav, f i x p a i s ' a r m " p u t , Nefufoth, serai. 17, p. 45b; see also Qol Yehudah, IV, chap. 25, p. 450. 70 Nefufoth, serm. 31, p. 77a. 71 Ibid., p. 78a. 72 See mainly concluding sections of Yehudah ben Yishaq Abravanel, Vikkuah 'al ha-Ahavah, pp. 91-93. 73 Sefer Sha'ar ha-Hesheq ... m'eth ... Yoftanan Alemano ..., pp. 38-39. 74 Comm. Gen. 1:26. ,UJ?, p 75 76

77 78 7

Nefufoth, serm. 31, p. 77b.

7

n mp i b s v n t n n , s i s , i -np

" Nefufoth, serm. 36, p. 99a.

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"being circular numbers", are symbolic of the circle. As for the Shema the number of words in its first sentence is six, "a circular number"; the number of letters in it being twenty-five, it is the square of the "circular five", and the number of sentences in the whole section is "the circular" six. Finally, the total of the squares of the four letters of the name of God is 186, which is also the total of the numerical values of the letters in the Hebrew word Maqom, denoting God. 80 The number of such contorted, though amusing exegetical sophistries is so vast in his writings that one wonders how a man of his learning and knowledge could have regarded them seriously. Perhaps he used them merely for homiletic purposes, without attaching particular significance to them. Next to Platonism, Moscato's writings display most strongly the influence of the Cabbalah. To some extent at least this may be attributed to the general spirit of the age, which witnessed the spread of mysticism among both Christians and Jews. 81 Far more potent a factor, however, was the more direct influence of the Mantua milieu. By the time Moscato had settled there — most likely around the middle of the sixteenth century 82 — Mantua was becoming the center of Cabbalistic pursuits in Italy. The early phase of this development may, most probably, be traced to the end of the fifteenth century when, following the exile from Spain, some Spanish Cabbalists made this town their new home. Prominent among them was the anti-rationalist Joseph Ya'aves who, together with other "wise and respectable" members ot the community, was instrumental in persuading the newly arrived Cabbalist, R' Judah Hayyat, to write his commentary Minhath Yehudah on the Mcfarekheth ha-Elahuth of R' Peres. 83 For some time there also lived here, though somewhat earlier, the Cabbalist and Platonist, Yohanan Alemano. 84 However, Mantua emerged as a great center of mysticism, possibly the greatest in Italy, only in the early years of the second half of the sixteenth century. It was here that Meir ben Gabbai's c Avodat ha-Qodesh was published in 1545, the Tiqqunim in 1558, the Mcfarekheth ha-Elahuth in 1558 and the Zohar itself in the years 1558-1560. Next to Safed, the local Jewish community could boast of possibly the largest number of Cabbalists of any 80

mpn, Nefu$oth, serm. 31, p. 79a. Joseph Leon Blau, The Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the Renaissance (New York, 1944); Sarton, Six Wings ..., pp. 74-76. 82 Cf., Dedication of Nefusoth; Apfelbaum, Toledoth Moscato, chap. 2. 83 Cf., "Haqdamah", Sefer Ma'arekheth ha-Elahuth. 84 Cassuto, "Aleman Jochanan ben Isak", EJ, II (1928), pp. 176-179; G. Scholem, "Hibbur Bilti Noda< m'Reb Yohanan Alemano", Kiryath Sefer, V (1928-1929), p. 274. 81

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Jewish community.86 The Mantuan Rabbi Moshe Provençale, one of the eminent scholars of his day,86 was among those who endorsed the printing of the Zohar,87 His brother R' David composed a commentary on the Torah, lIr David, in which elaborate expression was given to the mystical point of view.88 His son Abraham wrote an introduction to the 1593 Venetian edition of R' Vidas' Reshith Ijfokhmah. Here also lived for many years the greatest Italian Cabbalist of the time, Menahem 'Azariah of Fano, 89 as well as his teacher, R' Ezra, who introduced him to mystical lore.90 Though Moscato never became as ardent a devotee of the Cabbalah as many of its more famous adepts in Italy, such as Menahem 'Azariah of Fano, or Israel Srug, to name only the best known among them, its impact on him was no doubt greater than on most rabbis of his time. He believed in the antiquity of the Zohar, and from it argued for the antiquity of the vowels, against the contrary view of Eliyahu Bahur.91 From it, interestingly enough, he also inferred the antiquity of the pursuit of secular learning and music in Israel.92 He devotes one of the most extensive sections ol the Qol Yehudah to an explanation of the chapters in the Kuzari which deal with the Sefer Yefirah,93 at the outset of which he criticizes the haver for treating this book as though it belonged to the "natural sciences" rather than to the "much superior" esoteric wisdom of the Cabbalists. As commentator, he promises to remain faithful to the haver's exposition of the ancient text and not to give to Halevi's words meanings which he did not intend; he nevertheless goes on to fill his commentary with numerous Cabbalistic quotations and speculations. Aware of this inconsistency, he concludes this section with the following apologetic note : 85

See Apfelbaum, Toledoth Moscato, p. 24. Cf., Nefufoth, serm. 33 ; L. Zunz, "Toledoth R' 'Azariah min ha-Adumim" in Me'or 'Einayim (Warsaw ed., 1899); see also "Hassagah" and "Teshuvah l'Hassagah", ibid., pp. 426-441. 87 See Moshe Provençale, "Psaq ... R' Moshe Provençale" in Tiqqunei ha-Zohar (Mantua, 1558). 88 A. Posner, "R' David ben Abraham Provençale" in M. Margalioth ed., Encyclopedia I'Toledoth Gedolei Yisrael, II (Tel Aviv, 1955), pp. 414-415; Ghirondi-Neppi, Toledoth Gedolei Yisrael u-Geonei Italia, pp. 81, 83. 89 Yehudah Aryeh Modena, Hayyei Yehudah, ed. Abraham Kahana (Kiev, 1911), p. 15. 90 See Menahem 'Azariah de Fano, "Haqdamath ha-Mehabber — Petihah", Sefer Pa'amon ve-Rimmon ... 91 Qol Yehudah, III, chap. 31, p. 310. On Eliyahu Bahur, see B. Suler, "Levita, Elia, Germanus", EJ, X (Berlin, 1934), pp. 888-893. 92 Nefu$oth, serm. 1, passim, serm. 5, p. 18a. 93 Qol Yehudah, IV, chap. 25. 86

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Though I have promised not to exercise myself in things too great and wonderful for me, especially with regard to the words of the fiaver, who does not delve in the depth of that wisdom ... I did not, however, avoid mentioning them, for their knowledge is of great benefit.94 A large part of this section deals with the mystery of the alphabet and its application in charms and amulets. He quotes Maimonides' rejection of these superstitious practices; 95 however, his opinion is drowned in an array of quotations in their support. 96 Although the views ol the haver on these matters seem rather critical and almost identical with those expressed somewhat later in the Guide,91 Moscato endeavors to interpret them as being actually "contrary to the opinion of the Guide", and "coming rather close to a belief in their truth". 9 8 "All these", he concludes, referring to a most bizarre array of passages from various commentaries on the Sefer Yesirah, "convinces us that the (mystery) of the letters ... is not something fictitious, but has a real foundation". 9 9 Like many of the Cabbalists, Moscato was disturbed by Maimonides' rationalism and outright criticism of the practices of the mystics. 100 He admired Maimonides too much to ignore his opinion and so attempted to prove, by means of letters allegedly written by him, that Maimonides was not actually anti-mystic. He was especially disturbed by the "degrading" reasons set forth by Maimonides for the sacrifices and the vessels of the Temple. 101 Yet an explanation for this, he suggests, may be found by comparing his view of the Tabernacle and its vessels with his view of the lex talionis.102 As in the latter case, he argues, Maimonides, though well aware of the interpretation of that law by the sages of the Oral Tradition, 103 intentionally overlooked that tradition, since, in the context of the Guide, he desired merely to interpret the Bible according to its own terms, similarly, in the case of the vessels of the Temple, his rational reasons were meant only for the "obstinate skeptics". They do not preclude, however, Maimonides' own belief in the higher significance of the Temple and its 91

Qol Yehudah, p. 463; see also pp. 432-433. Guide, I, 61, 62. 86 Qol Yehudah, IV, chap. 25, p. 439. 97 Cf„ Kuzari, III, par. 53, p. 351; IV, par. 23, p. 430. 98 Qol Yehudah, III, chap. 53, p. 351; IV, chap. 25, pp. 439, 440. 99 m i s N I N F -IDO» n a n n - D W n v n w n p ® PX •o u a V a aar-V n a n n"?X VDI nr® ñ a s » • p o n ' ? n a V» iV v V a s ,Tnxa, ibid., p. 442. 100 Guide, I, 61, 62. 101 Ibid., Ill, 45. 102 Ibid., Ill, 41; see Shemtov's commentary, ad loc. 103 Moses ben Maimón, "Hilkhoth Hovel u-Mazziq", Neziqirt in Mishneh Torah (Wilno, 1900), bk. 11, chap. 1. 9S

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ceremonial cult, though it may be known only to a select few. 104 Moreover, Moscato also accepts at its face value the allegation that Maimonides in later life actually embraced mysticism and repudiated rationalism. In its support, he quotes two letters which Maimonides allegedly wrote, one to his son Abraham with regard to the mystical significance of the Tabernacle and its vessels, and the other to the Jewish communities of Egypt and Yemen, telling them of an old man he had met in the Holy Land who "illuminated his eyes" in the paths of the Cabbalah, and asserting that had he (Maimonides) known before what he knows now, he would not have written much of what he did write. 105 Moscato's Cabbalistic proclivities are also strongly exhibited in his conception of the Torah. Following the view of the Zohar, Nahmanides, Recanati, and most later Cabbalists, he asserts: Everything is contained in our perfect Torah, either explicitly or by the way of implication, through its words, the Gematria or the mere form of the letters.104 Though it is the "revealed" exposition which must be considered fundamental, it is the mystical which is the higher and the more gratifying. He deplores the decline of esoteric wisdom among the Jews, especially in the present, when "the eyes of men are blind to its secrets"; he hopes, however, that a day will come when "the river of wisdom will overflow on both banks, bringing forth the choicest of fruits, sweet unto the spirit and a comfort to the higher soul". 107 It is to the influence of the Cabbalah that the frequent use of the Gematria, the Notariqon, and other exegetic techniques, appearing mainly in his sermons, must be attributed. The letter lamed, he points out, is the only one in the alphabet which is taller than all the other letters, to indicate "the elevated position one may attain through study". 108 He uses the various numerical letter techniques in the interpretation of some 104

Qol Yehudah, III, chap. 47, pp. 337-338; cf., Abravanel's Comm. Exod. 25:10. Qol Yehudah, III, chap. 47, p. 438. Although Apfelbaum (Toledoth Moscato, pp. 16-17) may be right in assuming that Moscato drew his information regarding Maimonides' alleged retreat from rationalism from the just published Shalsheleth ha-Cabbalah of Gedaliah Ibn Yahya, published in Venice in 1587 (see, ibid., Amsterdam ed., 1697, p. 33b), this is not necessarily so, since the "evidence" bearing on it was adduced earlier, though in slightly different form, in Abravanel's commentary on Aboth 3:21-22, p. 106b (Venezia, 1545). By the time Moscato wrote his Qol Yehudah, there were available three editions of the Nafialath Aboth: the first, of Constantinople, 1504/05; the second, of Venice, 1545; and the third, of Venice, 1565/66. Cf. B. Friedberg, "Nahalath Aboth", Bet *Eked Sepharim (Antwerpen, 1928-31). C f , supra, p. 128. 109 Nefu$oth, serm. 14, p. 41a. 107 Ibid., serm. 7, p. 21a. 108 Ibid., serm. 25, p. 63a. 105

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phrases from the Song of Songs, to make them bear on the awesome and mystical nature of the month of Elul and the High Holidays.109 Most of them, however, are well known and need not be repeated here. Less popular are some of these combinations bearing on the Hanukah holiday. Why, he asks, has this holiday been designated to last eight days? He finds the answer in the assonance of shemen (oil), shmoneh (eight), and ¡fashmonai (Hasmoneans) — all of which contain the Hebrew letters shin, mem, nun. He furthermore points out that both shemem and shmoneh are symbolic of the Torah. Like oil, the Torah "fattens our portion and provides us with healthy nourishment and light"; again, like the number eight which is the first cubic number among the numbers, thus designating a three-dimensional volume, the Torah possesses length, width, and depth, "theory and practice, the revealed and the hidden". And finally, "It is only proper for the Torah to be the eighth of the seven wisdoms, to show that it is superior to all of them". 110 He also uses the mystical significance of numbers in the interpretation of the commandment of Sisith (fringes). The eight fringes required on each side allude to the Torah; the four sides to which they are attached allude to the four elements which compose the body, and the five "knots" to the obligation of every individual Jew to subject himself to the Torah as contained in the Five Books of Moses.111 In conclusion, a more elaborate instance of this technique may be cited from sermon 43, which actually introduces the listeners or readers to some of the Cabbalistic notions. He explains the ketem (gold) of Lamentations 4:1112 as alluding to the three crowns lost by Israel as a result of the destruction of the Temple: the crown of priesthood (kehunah), indicated by the kaph; of Torah, indicated by the tav; and of royalty (malkhuth), indicated by the mem — a loss that will be amply compensated for during the future redemption. He finds ample Scriptural support for this consolation, notably in the "royal" Psalm 45. The "Upon thy right hand did stand the queen in gold Ophir" 113 indicates the future restoration of Israel unto God, and the lost crowns are alluded to by the ketem. The manifold reward, however, is alluded to by the shegel (queen). The appearance of this particular word in the text, he observes, is not accidental, but intentional, "as each of its letters actually points to triple 106 110 111 112

Nefufoth, serm. 28, pp. 70b-71b. Ibid., serm. 37, p. 100b. Ibid., p. 101a. aion n m n XW anr 05?r ro^x, 'How is the gold become dim! How is the most fine gold changed'. us -psiN nroa -|ra ,l 7 bw nasi, Ps. 45 :io.

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numbers ot singles, tens, and hundreds alluding to the triple crowns in store for the people upon their future restoration unto their Supreme King". Furthermore this he infers even from the form of the letters, each of which consists of three lines: Though the lower line of the gimel is short, it alludes to the crown of malkhuth, which is inferior to the other crowns. However, the words "upon thy right hand did stand the queen" indicate that the sphere of malkhuth will in the future shift to the right instead of being in its present position on the left as a result of Adam's sin.114 With the last part of the above quotation, Moscato, as mentioned, went beyond the mere use of the external techniques of the Cabbalah, and actually introduced his listeners or readers to some of its concepts and images. Indeed, the whole lengthy sermon from which the above is drawn may be taken as a typical example of the penetration of the Cabbalistic myth into the popular homily. It constitutes a bird's-eye view of the spiritual history of the people in terms of a conjugal relationship between God and Israel, colored rather strongly by sexual allusions. Thus, Abraham constitutes "the beginning of the courtship" ;115 it is, however, only in the vision of Jacob that the promise of its fulfillment is given. The promise that the land "whereon he was lying" will be his and his seed's is like a ketubah (marriage contract) given to him by God. Again, the assurance that his seed will be like "the dust of the earth" implies the promise that the marriage will be consummated. The stand at Sinai symbolizes the actual marriage, and the descent of the cloud upon the Tent of Meeting the beginning of its consummation. Although the most auspicious moments in the history of that relationship have been reached in the erection of the two Temples, its full and everlasting consummation is reserved for the future. The main text upon which Moscato bases this interpretation is, of course, the Song of Songs, the ups and downs of whose love story between the shepherd and his Shulamith he allegorizes beautifully to bear on the fluctuations in the spiritual relationship between God and Israel.116 On another occasion Moscato introduces his listeners to some of the cosmic notions of the Cabbalah bearing on the four worlds, the spheres, and the heavenly hosts.117 Like the rationalists of an earlier day, Moscato is an avid allegorizer, always on the lookout for new meanings and inferences that can be drawn 114

115 116 117

Nefusoth, serm. 43, p. 117.

trDiTwn Vrnnn n m a x d s

Nefusoth, serm. 43, pp. 115a-116a. Ibid., serm. 51, p. 132.

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from the "mysterious and sealed words" of the Bible.118 Very frequently he even attaches a number of allegorical interpretations to the very same text, 119 as he is of the opinion that "every correct meaning" may be drawn from it, provided it is done with "wisdom, understanding, and knowledge". 120 Superfluous to add, however, that there is a marked difference between his allegories and those common in rationalist works. To the extent that he sometimes has recourse to philosophy in his allegories, it is to Platonism rather than to Aristotelianism. The latter, though frequently referred to and commented upon in the Qol Yehudah, is left out almost completely in the more original Nefu$oth Yehudah. The same is true with regard to the natural sciences. Rarely are they the subject of his allegories, as is so common in rationalist writings. He reflects the humanist tendencies of the Renaissance, and it is therefore man rather than the universe — man's spiritual and moral perfection for the sake of his restoration unto God, rather than his intellectual development — which is in the center of his allegory. Hence his constant preoccupation with the problem of the soul and its immortality, and the numerous allegories he discovers in the Bible and the Midrash allegedly bearing on it.121 Undoubtedly the central topic of the sermons is the essence of Judaism and the relationship between it and secular learning. The utterances of Moscato on various aspects of this problem are so numerous that, when taken in toto, they may yield one of the strongest and fullest expressions of the anti-rationalist point of view. He examines the whole realm of secular knowledge and, comparing it with Judaism, comes to the conclusion that it is the latter which is by far superior in all respects, and hence is to be preferred both intellectually and as a way of life. That such a comparison still seems meaningful to him is indicative of the essentially still medieval nature of his thought and attitude. As he thinks of secular learning in terms of the past, he also conceives of Judaism in terms of an all-embracing, autarchic cultural entity. Though writing in the last decades of the sixteenth century, he — as mentioned earlier — displays no awareness of the many gains made during that century in technology, medicine, mathematics, astronomy, and other areas of knowledge. Nor does he show any acquaintance with the constantly expanding geographic horizon — an acquaintance which might have altered his conception of the physical world. In this respect he not only lags behind the scientifically minded 118

120 121

Neftisoth, serm. 37, p. 100b. See, for instance, serms. 10, 17. Nefufoth, serm. 10, p. 30b. See mainly serms. 10, pp. 28-31; 29, p. 72a; 36, pp. 97-98, and passim.

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Yashar of Candia — a fact which is easily understandable in view of the relatively great difference in age between them (Yashar was born in 1591; Moscato died in 1590) — but is also much behind the older 'Azariah de Rossi. The pursuit of truth per se — an ideal so prominent in the Meor 1 Einayim, and adumbrating a characteristic that was to become strong in modern mentality — is entirely alien to Moscato. Only in humanist terms was Moscato, no doubt, on the level of the knowledge of his day. Although humanism may have constituted the mainstream of sixteenth-century culture, there also became noticeable, as the century progressed, another current which, though of lesser strength and with a smaller following at the time, and leaning as yet to a great extent on the shoulders of the Ancients, was soon to free itself from that tutelage, to become a mainstream in the culture of the seventeenth century, and to revolutionize human thought and life. We refer, of course, to the rise of science and its new methods.122 The fact that Moscato shows no awareness of these developments, and that his intellectual horizon, though strongly permeated with the new humanist notions, is still essentially medieval with regard to the more exact areas of knowledge, may explain the ease and simplicity with which he allegedly solves the problem of reason versus faith, or secular knowledge versus Judaism. The "reason" he deals with is still medieval and pre-scientific. Deeply engrossed by secular learning as he was, making frequent allusions to it even on the most solemn occasions,123 Moscato could not, and indeed did not, object to its pursuit. He even treated benevolently the preoccupation with philosophy. Though Ecclesiastes, he points out, warns that our "words be few", since "God is in heaven" and man "on earth" (Eccl. 5:11), nevertheless "the door to the realm of speculation must not be closed. On the contrary, it is incumbent upon every maskil to examine (things rationally) as far as it is in his capacity".124 The two ways of truth — reason and faith — are both valid and therefore cannot be in contradiction to one another. They are "two lights" and must be equally cherished.125 He expresses this view at greater length in his allegorization of the story of the covenant Abraham made with Abimelekh and the "chief captain of his hosts, Phikhol" (Gen. 21:22-34). Abimelekh, he 122

John Herman Randall, "The Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua", Journal of the History of Ideas, I (Lancaster, Pa. and New York, 1940), pp. 177-206. 123 Cf., his eulogies on some of the leaders of the Mantua community, in serms. 32,33, 34, 35. 124 Nefufoth, serm. 4, p. 12a. 125 Ibid., p. 14b.

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interprets, is symbolic of prime philosophy; Phikhol, as his name indicates, of logic, whose strength lies "in the mouth", and whose rules regulate all thought processes. Abraham "is the head of the Divine faith", and the covenant as a whole signifies the harmony achieved between reason and faith, by the subjugation of the former to the latter.128 Similarly he allegorizes Isaiah's simile of the seven kinds of trees, which, he envisions, will spring forth in the desert at the time of the ingathering of the exiles. They allude, in his view, to the "seven wisdoms of the quadrivium and the trivium", the need for which, as "a ladder of knowledge", is indicated by the words: "... that they may see and know, and consider and understand" (Isa. 41:19-20). This alleged harmony between revealed and rational truth notwithstanding, Moscato feels obliged to justify his frequent recourse to secular learning; and it is this justification which indicates his deep commitment to that learning, on the one hand, and the medieval nature of his concept of Judaism, on the other hand. The reason he adduces, though interesting, is far from original, as he himself admits. "Be not amazed", he assuages the more conservative listener or reader, "at my frequent drawing of water from foreign wells, as, in my view, this water actually springs from our own well".127 In support of this contention, he quotes from the Kuzari,12a the Guide,129 Shemtov's Sefer ha-Emunoth,130

Bibago's Derekh

Emunah,

and the Zohar, all of which share the view that all wisdom had its origin in ancient Israel, whence it was first transmitted to the Chaldeans, then to the Persians and the Medes, and finally to the Greeks and the Romans.131 It is only as a result of this long chain of transmission, he asserts, in the course of which this wisdom has fallen into the hands of dishonest "philosophizers" who have falsified and distorted it, that it may sometimes appear to be in contradiction to the Torah. In its original essence, however, and when it is pursued with a pure heart and soul, there can be no contradiction between it and the Torah. On the contrary, secular wisdom may rather be of assistance and benefit to it.132 Such a justification, it may be noted, is also found in Messer Leon's esthetic analysis of the Bible, the Nofeth Sufim, of almost a century earlier,133 as 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133

Nefyfoth, serm. 14, p. 39b. Ibid., serm. 5, p. 18a. Kuzari, I, par. 63; II, par. 66. Guide, II, 11. Sha'ar III, chap. 4. Nefusoth, serm. 5, p. 18a. Ibid., serm. 14, p. 39a, and passim. Cf., "Introduction" and Sha'ar I, chap. 13 in Nofeth $ufim.

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well as in the writings of Yashar of Candia of the first half of the seventeenth century. 134 This valiant defense of secular learning represents only one aspect of Moscato's thought on the subject. It is counterbalanced and perhaps even contradicted to some extent by an opposite stand he takes with regard to that learning from a national, ethical, and epistemological point of view. He seems to draw a demarcation line between his attitude toward the humanities, on the one hand, and toward the sciences and philosophy, on the other. As a true son of the Renaissance, endowed with a deep sense of the orderly and the beautiful, he fully embraces humanist ideals, without perceiving in their pursuit any danger to the integrity of the Jewish faith and way of life; he is critical, however, of the older traditions of medieval learning as centered in mathematics, natural sciences, and metaphysics. The reason for such a dichotomy in attitudes is obvious. Preoccupied as the humanities were with man rather than the world, and with literary rather than philosophical problems, they laid no claim to ultimate truth, nor did they attach transcendental importance to their pursuits. Hence, they obviously contained no direct challenge or danger to faith. Contrary was the case with science and philosophy, which since ancient times had been associated with all "heretical" trends. Their followers not only claimed to be in the possession of "higher truths" which differed from those offered by the popular faith, but also asserted that their intellectual pursuits constituted the highest ideal of man, assuring one the immortality of his soul. It is against these claims that Moscato levels his criticism, questioning the validity of rational knowledge and its alleged transcendental significance. It is for the sake ol disproving these contentions that he undertakes his analysis of that knowledge. Noteworthy, first of all, is his low opinion of mathematics. Though aware of its instrumentality in astronomy and music, he considers its main role to be preparatory, i.e., as a mere instrument by the aid of which man's capacities for higher knowledge in ethics and natural science are developed.135 Though demonstrable, mathematical concepts are purely fictitious and without relevance to real objects. Hence mathematics can hardly be considered "a proper nourishment for the soul and its survival".136 Such a view of mathematics need not amaze us, for such 1;u

Joseph Shlomo Delmedigo, "Haqdamah", Malayan Gannim, in Elim (Odessa, 1865), pp. 129-130. 135 Nefufoth, serm. 14, p. 39a. 138 Ibid., serm. 13, p. 36b.

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was the consensus of the time. 137 Even two generations later this view was still shared by a mathematician of the stature of Joseph Shlomo Delmedigo, who asserted that mathematics, being purely formalistic and without any interest in "causes", was unphilosophical. 138 Nor does Moscato display a high regard for so-called "natural philosophy". With vestiges of the deprecatory medieval attitude toward the "low world of the sublunar region" still deeply imbedded in him, he cannot be very appreciative of a field of study whose major interest is in objects "coming under the rule of generation and decay" 139 and subject to constant change. 140 He argues that since natural philosophy is based on sensual perception, and inasmuch as the laws of nature remain constant and each generation inherits the knowledge of those which preceded it, one would justly expect natural philosophy to be cumulative; yet there is no marked progress in this field. "What was shall be, and what was done shall be done, and there is nothing new under the sun". Should perhaps some scholar, boastful of his findings, claim an innovation, "he is uttering falsehood", for "it has been already of old time which was before us". The fact that nothing of that past knowledge has ever been preserved, must not, he points out, mislead us. Ancient scholars no doubt recorded their wisdom for posterity, or transmitted it orally to their descendants and disciples. However, as a result of natural cataclysms, which destroyed even cities and states, none of it has remained. 141 Least certain and valuable is, in Moscato's view, the "Divine wisdom" of metaphysics. All its speculations are "remote assumptions" whose validity is very doubtful. 142 It offers a mere "semblance of thought and guesswork", 143 and, more than any other area of knowledge, is subject to error. Its views of the heavens can hardly be proven, nor is its goal of knowledge, defined as "a clinging unto the active intelligence", ever attainable, even according to the views of its own followers. 144 137 As late as the end of the sixteenth century the academic status of mathematics remained low as compared with that of medicine, jurisprudence, and philosophy; c/., Fahie, Galileo, his Life and Work, p. 13, n. 2; p. 34. las Joseph Shlomo Delmedigo, "Ma'ayan Hatum", Elim (Odessa, 1867), p. 427. 109 Nefufoth, serm. 14, p. 40b. 110 Ibid., serm. 13, p. 36b. 141 Ibid., serm. 14, p. 40b. An opposite view of this problem was held some centuries earlier by Gersonides who, from the relative novelty of knowledge in the history of man, notably in medicine and astronomy, concluded that both man and the world were a creation in time. See Levi ben Gershon, Milfiamoth ha-Shem, ma'ainar 6, pt. I, chap. 15; see also J. S. Delmedigo, Elim (Odessa, 1864-1867), pp. 86, 302, 390. 142 Nefusoth, serm. 13, p. 36b. ,JS Ibid., serm. 14, p. 39a. 1,4 Ibid., p. 38a; Qol Yehudah, pp. 63, 563.

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Moscato advances further reasons for the rejection of the pursuit of science and philosophy. Not only is their knowledge invalid, but the acquisition of it is difficult and time-consuming. Being interrelated, the sciences, he argues, are complicated, and the mastery of one is unattainable without a previous study of many prerequisites. Such an interdependence is characteristic not only of the various branches of mathematics, but of the other areas of rational knowledge as well, which makes a full mastery of them a most protracted and wearisome undertaking.145 More serious, however, is another basic deficiency which he believes characteristic of rational knowledge, namely its being completely devoid of any of the spiritual values so essential to man's transcendental hopes. False above all is the belief that it is rational knowledge which constitutes the highest ideal of man, and that through it alone he may gain temporal as well as eternal happiness. Were this so, he argues, the attainment of this ideal would be limited to only a very few, perhaps "one in a thousand".146 In opposition to this rather one-sided concept of human essence and destiny, Moscato advances the more democratic view which he believes embedded in the Jewish tradition, the view that recognizes man's deeds to be of equal and perhaps of greater importance that his intellectual achievements as a means of attaining spiritual perfection and immortality.147 Like the Kuzari so many centuries earlier, he is convinced that there must be "certain practices and ways of life which are more pleasing to God than others". However, it is the failure of the rationalists clearly to define such practices which particularly reveals the futility of their speculations.148 Rational knowledge thus fails both theoretically and practically. It can offer neither truth nor moral guidance. Though there is demonstrable truth in mathematics, there are no such proofs in ethics. The higher the speculations of man, the less the evidence for their validity. Nor is there any ground for hope that the future may yield more positive results. The human mind is incapable of attaining truth even in the sublunar realm, and all the more so in the "heavenly abode". To summarize, "There is neither wisdom in man's speculations, nor understanding in his actions, so long as he is relying on his own capacities".149 Moscato declares that Judaism is free of the shortcomings and inadequacies of rational knowledge. In contradiction to the difficulty and 145 Nefusoth, serms, 10, p. 28a; 12, p. 35b; 13, pp. 36-37; 14, p. 39a, and passim. 148

147 148 118

Ibid., serm. 18, p. 47a. Cf., also supra, p. 140.

Nefusoth, serm. 18, pp. Ibid., serms, 13, pp. 36,

Ibid., serm. 14, p. 39a.

47-48. 37a; 14, pp. 39a, 40b, 42b.

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uncertainty of the sciences and philosophy, the Torah is both easy to understand and truthful. Indeed, it is the facility with which it can be comprehended that is alluded to in: "Moses commanded us a law, an inheritance of the congregation of Jacob" (Deut. 33:4). The Torah is like an inheritance one receives without working for it. 150 Based as it is on a public revelation, communicated through the senses of vision and hearing, it has a certainty as great as if proven by rational demonstration. 151 Its excellence, however, lies in its teachings and commandments, which contain both speculative and ethical truths designed to assure man's temporal as well as eternal happiness. 152 As a Cabbalist or, more precisely, as one favorably disposed toward the Cabbalah, Moscato believes in the "higher" meanings of the Bible, in addition to its revealed meaning. With the exception, however, of relatively short allusions to its doctrines and the use of its midrashic techniques, he never undertakes, either in his sermons or in his commentary, a more elaborate exposition of the Cabbalah. On the other hand, he repeatedly stresses the rational wisdom of the basic beliefs of the Torah, such as creation, creatio ex nihilo, God's miracles, and Providence, which, together with its ethical teachings and Divine practices, constitute a solid foundation for the attainment of happiness in this world as well as in the hereafter. Left to his own capacities and deprived of Revelation, man, he feels, would never be able to attain his perfection and happiness. 153 Indeed, it might have been the weakness of the human mind, its inability to comprehend the secrets of the universe or to establish by its own resources a proper system of ethical practices, which made the Revelation of the Torah necessary in the first place. Should one, he writes, impressed as he may be with the philosopher's concept of human perfection as dependent on actual knowledge of the totality of being, 154 fall into despair because of his inability to attain that perfection, he ought to be told the following: God appeared from the Holy Mount to bestow upon us a Torah of truth, which aimed to substitute for the deficiency of this universal knowledge .... Perceiving the difficulty of attaining wisdom, He gave to Israel a Torah instead, so that by its aid they may find patterns of life.166 150 Nefusoth, serm. 12, p. 35b. Ibid., serm. 14, p. 38b. 152 Ibid., serm. 18, p. 48a, and passim in serms. 12, 13, 14. 133 Ibid., serms. 10, 13, 14, 18, 33, 34, and passim.

151

151

b a s a mbatnnn bb-o irvrm

« D v, n m m x m y W l V ' , Nefusoth, serm. 9, p. 23. Cf., Sa'adyah Ga'on, "Haqdamath ha-Mehabber", Sefer ha-Emunoth ve-ha-De'oth (Tel Aviv, 1959), pp. 27-28. 155

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The same, he thinks, is implied in the passage on wisdom in the Book of Job (28:12-28). Moscato's anti-rationalism, it may be concluded, though seemingly extreme, is actually of a rather moderate character. Strongly convinced as he is of the truth of Judaism and wholeheartedly devoted to its way of life, he never advocates an alienation from foreign culture and the milieu. Indeed, his view that culture has its origin with the Jewish people and hence is an integral part of the Jewish heritage is the strongest evidence of the high regard in which he held it. Significant also is the fact, which has been pointed out earlier, that he never includes the humanities in his criticism of secular learning. On the contrary, as seen, he devotes whole sermons to music, rhetoric, and Platonism, and quotes abundantly from a wide range of classical and later literature. Admirer of Halevi that he is, he by no means shares Halevi's view of the polarity between Judaism and Hellenism, with the domain of the beautiful and the truthful as the exclusive possession of the latter. Nor, as seen, is he inimical to philosophy and the sciences. His view may perhaps be best understood by comparing it with that of 'Azariah de Rossi. Whereas to de Rossi Judaism is identical solely with the Law, in the view of Moscato it constitutes an entire culture. The difference is significant and far-reaching in its implications. Conceived of as a Divine Law alone, the essence of Judaism is reduced in scope, and its claim on Divine authoritative truth is confined to the religious-ethical realm. Thus, although 'Azariah insists on an uncompromised allegiance to the full scope of the Jewish law, he is equally insistent on full freedom of investigation in those areas of knowledge which are extraneous to it. As the revealed word of God must prevail in the realm of religious and ethical practice, so the standard of truth must reign supreme in secular learning. The latter is progressively cumulative, and the attainments of one generation are constantly superseded by those following it. Any attempt to reconcile contemporary secular knowledge with the earlier concepts of the Midrash and the Aggadah is unwarranted and actually constitutes a confusion of two unrelated areas. Although it is obvious that the acceptance of such a view would result in full freedom for the Jew to pursue the culture of the foreign milieu, it is equally obvious that it would also undermine the concept of Judaism as an autarchic cultural entity, reducing it both in essence and in scope. In opposition to this rather sober and limited conception of de Rossi, Moscato advances a more embracing though less critical view. Judaism to him is not only a Divine Law, but a whole inclusive cultural entity, with

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ethical, philosophical, natural, and transcendental truths. Even the newly re-emphasized arts of rhetoric, esthetics, and Platonism — indeed, everything beautiful and truthful the human mind ever discovered or will discover — are all implied in it or can somehow be inferred from it. Although both de Rossi and Moscato thus share a positive attitude toward secular learning, they differ in its evaluation and in the relationship which they seek to establish between it and Judaism. To de Rossi secular learning is an area extraneous to Judaism proper, with standards of truth of its own, which need not be reconciled with Judaism. Hence it can and ought to be followed independently. To the extent that a Jew desires to be on the cultural level of his time, he must partake of both cultures and treat them as separate and unrelated. To Moscato, on the other hand, secular learning is not extraneous to Judaism, but part and parcel of it. Its acquisition does not mean a trespassing on foreign territory, but actually a regaining of old boundaries. Hence secular learning and Judaism are not to be approached separately, but rather by way of a synthesis — a synthesis based, however, on one standard of truth, namely that of Judaism. Whatever is in conformity with it ought to be accepted as true, whatever contradicts it rejected as untrue. The fact that the critical view of de Rossi was to gain ever growing recognition in later centuries of scientific growth, whereas the type of views Moscato held was to lose ground and come under ever sharper criticism as both perverting Judaism and shackling the advance of free human thought, goes only to show that as far as Moscato is concerned, he was a true son of his time and generation; he did not, however, rise above and beyond them. Less than a generation separates him from Galileo, and yet how deeply medieval still is his concept of knowledge and how hopeless his prognosis of it. Indeed, it is above all as a unique instance of the humanist kind of syncretism that evolved among the Jewish intelligentsia in Italy during the days of the Renaissance that his work may still hold our interest and attention.

X 'AZARIAH FIGO (1579-1647)

Among the outstanding Jewish anti-rationalists in Italy was R' 'Azariah Figo1 (1579-1647).2 A native of Venice, he received a well-rounded education, which included both Jewish and secular studies.3 For some years, it seems, he was greatly attracted by the latter, which consumed much of his time and energies, to the neglect and detriment of his Judaic studies. In later life, when he reflected on this youthful period, it appeared to him that it was an act of God's grace which "had opened his eyes" to the realization of the dangerous path he was following of "placing the accidental above the essential". Even after he had made the decision to reapply himself fully to the traditional studies, he was not yet sure whether he would be able to abide by it, and whether in the future he would not again be overcome by a passion for "the foreign enchantress" and once more be distracted from his chosen path. 4 This, however, does not seem to have been the case. His major work, the Giddulei Terumah, modestly called "A commentary on Rabbi Shmuel ben Yishaq ha-Sardi's Sefer Terumoth", is of a purely halakhic nature, betraying none of the 1

His name is spelled in various ways. Thus, according to M. Mortara (Mazkereth Hakhmei Italia (Padova, 1886)), it is "Pigo"; whereas according to A. Apfelbaum (Rabbi *Azariah Ficcio (Fichio), p. 8, n. 3), it is "Ficcio (Fichio)". The JE (V, p. 383) follows Mortara in spelling it as "Figo (Pigo)", and the EJ (VI, p. 969) accepts a somewhat modified version of Apfelbaum, spelling it "Picho (Piccio)". Again, Roth (The Jews in the Renaissance, p. 35, n. 5, and p. 270) spells his name "Picho". In view of such uncertainty, the old, though most likely faulty spelling, "Figo", will be preserved in this text. 2 For the dates of his birth and death, as well as other biographical data, cf., R' Moshe Zacuth's "Haqdamah" to the first edition of Figo's sermons, Binah V'lttim (Venezia, 1648), reprinted in Apfelbaum, Rabbi 'Azariah Ficcio {Fichio), pp. 64-69, (hereafter cited as Ficcio). 3 'Azariah Figo, "Haqdamah", Sefer Giddulei Terumah (Venezia, 1643); Apfelbaum, op. cit., p. 9. 4 Figo, "Haqdamah", Giddulei Terumah.

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earlier tendencies. 5 Those tendencies, however, were not completely forgotten. Indeed, they persist rather strongly in the Binah l'(Ittim, his collected sermons, which appeared in print a year after his death. 6 Not only do these contain frequent allusions to the sciences, philosophy, and especially medicine, but they also display a constant preoccupation with the problem of the method and essence of science and philosophy, and the difference between them and Judaism. True, these secular digressions are not of such an extent and character as to warrant the inference of an intimate acquaintance on his part with science and philosophy. On the other hand, it would seem unwise to attribute them to the mere lingering memory of his earlier "youthful extravagances". They seem rather to reflect the impact on him of the spirit of the time and the Venetian milieu. The generation of Figo was unique in the intellectual history of the modern world. It marked the end of the humanist Renaissance and the beginning of the age of science, with its new method of inquiry. It was the generation of Ticho Brahe, Galileo, Kepler, Gilbert, and others, to name but a few of the eminent scholars of the time. Among its outstanding Jewish representatives were such illuminati as Modena, Simone Luzzatto, and Yashar of Candia, the first two of whom served with Figo in the Rabbinate of Venice. Although there is no reason to assume that Figo actually followed or comprehended the great current discoveries and developments in mathematics, astronomy, and medicine, 7 his youthful training and the spiritual climate of Venice, where most of his life was spent, made him no doubt aware of them. Indeed, it is this awareness, rather than any specific knowledge, which is strongly displayed in many of his sermons. Above all, he likes to turn to medicine for some of his comparisons and similes. The consciousness of sin he compares to a patient's awareness of his sickness, which is the first step to recovery, and inversely, the refusal to admit sin to the lack of a physical reaction on the part of the diseased limb, which is a sign of grave danger. 8 Voluntary penitence, he explains, like a 6

Apfelbaum, Ficcio, chap. 6. Figo also wrote a book of Responsa and a work on the Methods of the Talmud (Shitoth ha-Shas), which were not printed, however; Apfelbaum, op. cit., pp. 65, 68, 75; see also H. J. D. Azulai, "Ma'arekheth Gedolim" in Sefer Shem ha-Gedolim (Tel Aviv, 1960), letter 'ayin, no. 16. • Venice, 1648; c f , Apfelbaum, op. cit., p. 57. 7 C f , Charles Singer, A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900 (Oxford, 1959), chap. VII; Sarton, Six Wings, Men of Science in the Renaissance, passim. 8 Binah V'lttim (Venezia, 1648; Lemberg, 1797), serm. 9, 2nd sermon for Shabbath Teshuvah, pp. 25b-26a. Throughout the present work, the Lemberg edition of 1797 has been used. Since the numbering of the sermons is faulty, the references given here are extensive, indicating, in most cases, the occasion on which the sermon was delivered. (Henceforth the Binah V'lttim will be cited as Binah).

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natural cure, is lasting and without ill after-effects; contrariwise, forced or "calculated" penitence is like an artificial cure, which may prove to be short-lived and of adverse effect on other parts of the body.9 Again, like food and drink which sustain the "natural heat" and the "basic moisture", thus keeping the body in a healthy balance, teshuvah exerts a similar effect on the spiritual balance.10 His secular horizon, however, is much wider. He also speaks of the meaning ol definition,11 the scientific method,12 the difference between scientific and judicial astronomy,13 the rotating spheres,14 and the "parts" of the soul.15 Indicative of the spirit of the time is the fact that he devoted a part of his inaugural sermon at the Sephardic congregation Talmud Torah in Venice to a rather scientific explanation of thunder and lightning.16 The rise of science, though reflected in some of the allusions and references of the sermons, is only one element in their cultural background. Perhaps more important for a fuller understanding of that background are some other developments of the time which affected more strongly and directly the Jewish community and which are even more amply displayed in these sermons. Though from the point of view of the general culture this was the first generation of a new Europe starting out on the spectacular road of intellectual self-emancipation, from a Jewish point of view, things were much less auspicious. On the contrary, it was the beginning of a social, political, economic, and cultural decline which had set in in the life of Italian Jewry and which was to last as long as the "old regime". The conditions of Jewish life in Italy, precipitated by the Counter-Reformation of the middle of the sixteenth century, were worsening continuously. By the early decades of the seventeenth century, the ghetto system had become a physical reality throughout the peninsula. In consequence of expulsions and a rapidly declining economy, the area of Jewish habitation and the extent of Jewish economic pursuits were becoming more limited. As a result, the social friction within the Jewish communities increased, as did also the tension between Jews and Christians.17 9

Binah, serm. 8, 1st sermon for Shabbath Teshuvah, pp. 23-24. Ibid., serm. 5, 3rd sermon for the second day of Rosh ha-Shanah, pp. 18-19; see also serm. 10, 3rd sermon for Shabbath Teshuvah, pp. 29b, 32-33. 11 Ibid., serm. 11, 4th sermon for Shabbath Teshuvah, p. 34b. 12 Ibid., serm. 16, 2nd sermon for the second day of Succoth, p. 49a. 13 Ibid., pp. 48a-49b. 11 Ibid., serm. 30, for Shabbath and Hoi ha-Mo'ed Pesah, p. 71a. 15 Ibid., serm. 39, 4th sermon on Peraqim, Pt. II, p. 10b. 16 Ibid., pt. II, serm. 34, p. la; see also Apfelbaum, Ficcio, p. 65. 17 Roth, The History of the Jews of Italy, chaps. VII, VIII; Simhah Luzzatto, Ma'amar 10

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Directly connected with these changes and aided by them was the wide diffusion of the Cabbalah. No sooner was the Talmud burned 18 and prohibited than the printing houses of Venice, Mantua, Ferrara, Cremona, and elsewhere began to fill the void with the basic texts of Jewish mysticism: Shemtov's Sefer ha-Emunoth (Ferrara, 1556), R' Peres' Ma'arekheth ha-Elahuth (Ferrara, 1558), the Tiqqunei ha-Zohar, (Mantua, 1558), the Zohar (Mantua, 1558-1560), and, somewhat later, the works of Cordovero and R' 'Azariah of Fano. For the first time in a history of about three hundred years, the Cabbalah, which up to then had been an exclusive esoteric doctrine, emerged into the open, soliciting the attention and support of wider circles.19 It was also during that same period that an opposite trend of rationalist skepticism was rising among some segments of the Jewish community, notably in Venice. The fact that similar trends were spreading at that time in Hamburg and Amsterdam also, communities with a strong element of ex-Marranos, points no doubt to their Spanish origin and to their possible connection with both medieval rationalism and the critical tendencies of the Renaissance.20 It is these elements of a general and Jewish nature which must be kept in mind in order to understand fully the views of Figo, as reflected in his masterful Binah V'lttim. They may best be described as strongly nationalist on the one hand and anti-rationalist on the other, two characteristics which are integrally connected and mutually dependent. Though, as we shall see, he subjects rationalism to an "inner" criticism, his main opposition to it is on national grounds, as he sees in it a danger to Jewish uniqueness. This uniqueness signifies to him first of all, to use a modern term, nationhood, distinguished not only by the consciousness of a common historical past and present, but also by the common hope of national restoration. 'al Yehudei Venezia, chaps. Ill, p. 87; VII, p. 96; V i l i ; Modena, Hayyei Yehudah, pp. 49-50; Binali, serms. 10, 48, and passim; Carmi, "Haqdamah", Sefer Kenaf Renanim, p. 8. 18 C f , Graetz-Rabinowitz, Divrei, VII (1908), p. 262, n. 1. 19 Asaf, "L'Pulmos 'al Hadpasath Sifrei ha-Cabbalah", Sinai, V (1939), pp. 360-368. 20 See bibliographies in Carl Gebhardt, "Regesten" and "Anmerkungen", Die Schriften des Uriel Accosta (Amsterdam, 1922); Benjamin Klar, "Sha'agath Aryeh 'al Qol Sakhal", Tarbiz, XIII (Jerusalem, 1942), pp. 135-149; Ellis Rivkin, Leon da Modena and the Kol Sakhal (Cincinnati, 1952). Of other sources, see mainly Ludwig Blau, "Einleitung", Leo Modem's Briefe und Schriftstücke (Budapest, 1905),pars. 156, p. 146; 183, p. 171; Yehudah Aryeh Modena, Ziqnei Yehudah, ed. S. Simonson (Jerusalem, 1956), pars. 16, pp. 30-31 ; 33, pp. 48-49; 35, pp. 50-52; 77, p. 99; Shmuel ben Abraham Abohab, Devar Shmuel (Venezia, 1702), par. 152.

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To the extent that this consciousness sustained itself throughout the ages by a sense of "strangeness" among the nations and the longing for a full Jewish life, these two elements are strongly displayed in his writings. Few men have given such deep and ample expression to the consciousness of exile and the longing for redemption. Though seemingly accepting the traditional justification of exile as caused by "our sins", he nevertheless dares voice strong objection to this harsh punishment: We can hardly restrain ourselves (he writes) from expressing our deep sorrow at this punishment, to have us tossed around in this bitter Galuth, expelled from our holy and beloved land, and scattered among many peoples in the four corners of the earth ... God, blessed be He, could have left us in our land, to punish us there with the harshest of punishments ... but not to exile and enslave us ... Why did He desire that the nations become our masters and rejoice at our degradation, while we look in grief at their well-being?21

Exile, in the view of R' Figo, constitutes a fourfold tragedy for the Jewish people. It exposes them, first of all, to continuous economic ruin. In consequence of heavy taxation or outright robbery, they are left almost "hungry, naked, and destitute". Secondly, it exposes them to violence, "to physical torture and bloodshed". Thirdly, it degrades them socially to the lowest degree, "excluding them almost altogether from the family of man"; and fourthly, it deprives them of the opportunity of living a full Jewish life, "in accordance with God's laws and commandments". 22 At the root of these evils there is, in his view, one major cause, namely the religious difference between the Jews and the peoples among whom they live. Though other nations have also been exiled from their lands, their lot has not been as tragic as that of the Jews. "Since they eat their bread, drink their wine ... and dress like them ... their exile is no exile". The Jews, however, being forbidden to conform, are totally isolated among the nations, and, "deprived of rest and peace", suffer the worst and most bitter lot in the world. 23 Figo also advances the other traditional explanations of Galuth — i.e., the holiness of the land which could not bear the sinful people in its midst, and the need for the diffusion of the faith. 24 He prefers, however, the view which draws an analogy between the lot of Israel among the nations and that of the soul in the body. Parallel to the soul, sent down "into this dangerous world" to enhance its perfection and, by conquering "

n

"

»

Binah, serm. 54, pt. II, p. 39. Ibid., serm. 28, pt. I, p. 67. Ibid., serm. 53, pt. II, p. 38a. Dm numV

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all temptations, to increase greatly its reward, Israel too was exiled so that it might purge itself of all sins and be ultimately rewarded. By exposing themselves to a constant struggle for each of their beliefs and practices, by rejecting the temptation to save themselves from all hardships through embracing the faith of their enemies, and even by suffering martyrdom "for the sanctification of His name", the Jews attain the highest degree oiteshuvah and thus make themselves worthy of the highest reward. 25 Parallel to his preoccupation with the problem of exile is his attention to the problem of redemption. Like Abravanel long before him, he argues vehemently against the scoffers and skeptics who either interpret the belief in redemption metaphorically, as implying a spiritual rather than an earthly promise, or assert that it has already been realized during the Second Commonwealth. 26 True, he does stress mainly the spiritual aspect of redemption, 27 declaring its realization to depend only on a Divine miraculous intercession; 28 he rejects, however, no less emphatically, the denial of its earthly aspects. Such a denial, he declares, is inconsistent with prophecy. Isaiah's words, "If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land", do not allude to a spiritual promise but to material good, implying well-being in this world. 29 It may be interesting to note that, again like Abravanel, he lists among the benefits of redemption the sense of satisfaction the people would derive from the sight of God's vengeance upon their enemies.30 Though fully aware of the warning of the Torah against the harboring of such emotions, he interprets the warning as applying to relations among Israelites only, remarking in this context that the gratification of these emotions is very satisfying to most people. 31 This rather realistic interpretation of Jewish nationalism, though typical of a slowly rising new Jewish mentality, constitutes only one aspect, and not by far the most outstanding one, of his broader concept of Israel, a concept dominated largely by spiritual and mystical elements. What singles out Israel among the nations is, in his view, the unique and close relationship between it and God. Israel is the only bearer in the world of a pure spiritual conception of the Deity: 26 28 27 28

" ,0

31

Binah, serm. 54, pt. II, p. 40a; cf., Kuzari, I, par. 115; II, par. 44. Binah, serm. 53, pt. II, p. 38; serm. 54, pt. II, p. 40. Ibid., serm. 19, pt. I, p. 55a. Ibid., serm. 25, 2nd sermon for Shabbath ha-Gadol, pt. I, pp. 63b-64a. Ibid., serm. 53, pt. II, p. 38b. C f , supra, p. 123. Binah, serm. 19, pt. I, p. 54b.

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The Ishmaelites do adhere to a strict monotheism free of all vestiges of corporality; they add folly to nonsense, however, by a belief in their false prohet.. ,32 As for the Christians (Arameans), their very concept of the Deity is impure ... 33 Echoing the Christian-Jewish polemic of his own and earlier days, 34 Figo emphasizes again and again that this relationship pertains not only to the past, but is equally applicable to the present, as it will be to all eternity: In spite of all hardships and tribulations, we are still called by His name, and no other nation can deprive us of it, a fact that gives us the greatest satisfaction.36 Perhaps more typical of Figo's national thought are its transcendental elements, which lend to the concept of Jewish uniqueness greater depth and "higher" dimensions. In these, however, he displays little originality, and merely elaborates upon the earlier views of Halevi, Abravanel, Ya'aves, and Joseph Ibn Yahya. Very much like Abravanel, he argues against the rationalists' rejection of the homocentric view, declaring instead that man is the goal of creation by virtue of his intellect and moral capacities. 36 Again, like him and other anti-rationalists, he asserts that this goal attained its destiny and fullest expression in Israel, a people distinguished as a "heavenly species" on earth and in the possession of the highest qualities of the heavenly bodies. Through the inheritance of the land of Israel, he argues, they — like the heavenly hosts above — are placed in the "highest position" on earth. Through the Torah, both their substance and form are purified and spiritualized to such a degree as to approximate the heavenly essences. Moreover, they are also analogous to the heavenly bodies with regard to motion, as the constant preoccupation with the Torah keeps them in perpetual activity and mobility. 37 To the same source, notably Abravanel, must be ascribed Figos' astrological beliefs, frequently adduced in support of his views on the unique position of Israel in the universe. 38 Like most Jewish savants of earlier as well as his own times, he asserts that the determinant power of 32 33

"aron naraj n a n n a " .

Binah, serm. 26, p. 67b; serm. 53, pt. II, p. 38a. C f , Apfelbaum, Ficcio, p. 72; Blau, Leo Modem's Briefe und Schriftstücke, Hebrew section, par. 47, p. 48 and n. 3. 36 Binah, serm. 55, 4th sermon for Shabbath Nahamu, pt. II, p. 43b; serm. 42,1st serm. for Shavu'oth, ibid., p. 12b. 3(1 Ibid., serm. 32, pt. I, pp. 75-76; c f , supra, pp. 87-88. 3 ' Binah, serm. 54,3rd sermon for Shabbath Nahamu, pt. II, p. 41b; c f , supra, pp. 122 and 161 ff. 38 Binah, serm. 3,3rd sermon for the first day of Rosh ha-Shanah, pt. I,pp. 8b-9a; serm. 4,2nd sermon for the second day of Rosh ha-Shanah, pt. I, p. 16a; serm. 11, 4th sermon for Shabbath Shuvah, pt, I, p. 35a, and passim. 34

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the stars affects all nations but Israel. He is, however, more original, displaying his homiletic acumen, on the one hand, and conceivably also the impact of the Cabbalah, on the other hand, in stressing the decisive role of Israel in the dramatic struggle between the natural and providential orders. It is Israel, he declares, which is both the cause of the conflict between these two orders and the main factor in overcoming that conflict. In this spirit he interprets most ingeniously Psalm 68:34-35 as denoting God's struggle against the motions of the heavenly bodies, a struggle in which He calls upon the people of Israel ("Ascribe ye strength unto God") "to lend strength to Him ... so that by the help of (their) deeds, He may overpower nature". 39 Thus it is interesting to observe that the notion of a people privileged in the universal order leads to the notion of a God struggling against His own laws — a struggle that can be won, however, only with the help of the privileged people themselves. The great power Israel wields in the universe Figo finds also expressed in the symbolism of the lulav and the ethrog:

The roundness of the ethrog is symbolic of the roundess of the heavenly spheres, and the juice that can be squeezed out of it of the abundance of the heavenly hosts by which they maintain the lower world ... The holding of the ethrog in our hand indicates that all the heavens ... even the abstract intelligences which move them ... are in our hand.40 What is the source of this power? The answer is simple: the Torah. Its concept, however, is far from simple, pointing again, most likely, to the influence of the Cabbalah and other sources. Embracing the ancient view of the parallelism between the macrocosm and the microcosm so frequently encountered in medieval and earlier literature, Figo displays the direct influence of Ya'aves when he expands that parallelism to include the Torah. He interprets its three sections, "the laws, commandments, and ordinances",41 as meant for the perfecting of the three souls, which are parallel to the three worlds.42 Thus, he concludes, it may not be farfetched to assume that by the observance of all the parts of the Torah, with the corresponding three stages of the soul, the worlds are merged together, "with the upper ones descending, and the lower ones ascending ... as if they were all one". 43 If Figo's national thought displays primarily his indebtedness to Abra3

" Binah, serm. 3, pt. I, pp. 8-9. Ibid., serm. 15, p. 47b.

40

41 42 43

trtjuwam rvnxan ^ p i n n

Cf., supra, p. 143. Binah, serm. 39, 4th sermon on Peraqim, pt. II, pp. lOb-lla.

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vanel and Ya'aves, his criticism of secular learning and rationalism exhibits, even more strongly and directly, the influence of Moscato's Nefusoth Yehudah. Like Moscato and most other anti-rationalists, Figo is critical above all of the view that it is through reason and contemplation that one gains happiness and perfection. This view he rejects outright as inconsistent with the nature of man and the "Divine purpose". "Were this so", he argues, "the human race would be most despicable, utterly lacking in perfection, and farther removed from its goal than the lowest creatures". Whereas all creatures, having been equally endowed by the Creator, attain the perfectibility natural to them, only a select few of the human race would, owing to circumstances or the incidental excellence of their minds, attain their goal; the bulk of humanity, however, would fall short of it. In contradiction to this, he believes that human happiness and destiny must be of such a nature as to be compatible with the capabilities of man and within the reach of every individual, "big or small, wise or ignorant". 44 Like Moscato, he stresses the inner weaknesses of rational truth: the uncertainty of its conclusions, the frequency of error and fallacy in its speculations, and the limited area for which it can claim full validity.45 However, rather than these aspects, it is its social shortcomings which he particularly dwells upon. Being naturally difficult and intricate, philosophy or the sciences may at best be pursued by only a select few of the "refined minds and pure intellects".46 The inaccessibility of these studies is further enhanced by their interdependence, because of which a full mastery of one cannot be achieved without first acquiring some prerequisites — a task which entails long, laborious preparation. The mastery of astronomy, for instance, presupposes the study of mathematics; of medicine, natural philosophy; and of metaphysics, a knowledge of the rules of logical inference. 47 Ethically and spiritually motivated is another criticism which he levels against the pursuit of philosophy and the sciences. They are, he observes most poignantly, purely the result of natural human inquisitiveness, altogether devoid of moral or spiritual motivation. 48 Thus the astronomer, who studies the heavens, has only one purpose in mind: 44

Binah, serm. 36, pt. II, pp. 5-6; c f , supra, pp. 140, 188-189. Binah, serm. 16, pt. I, p. 49a; serm. 20, pt. I, p. 56b; sermon 43, 2nd serm. for Shavu'oth, pt. II, p. 13b. 46

48 4

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,

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Binah, serm. 43, pt. II, p. 13a; c f , also Moscato, Nefusoth, serm. 14. Cf., supra, p. 188.

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... to know everything pertaining to them, the qualities of the heavenly bodies, their number, motions, and indications. With this satisfied, his goal has been attained, and beyond it he does not proceed. Since the astronomer is either lacking in the belief in the immortality of the soul, or indifferent to it, his investigations result in no actions or practices that may have a bearing on his spiritual perfection.49 It is all these shortcomings and inadequacies of rational truth, Figo asserts, that are overcome in Judaism. The fact that Judaism was communicated to the senses and not to reason is in accordance with the Divine foresight which intended to establish it on sound and strong foundations that would never totter or fall. Human reason (he says), weak and inadequate as it is, is bound to falter, err, and not attain real truth. Contrariwise, the truth attained by the senses and experience is subject to no doubt or error.60 In opposition to the difficulties and intricacies of philosophy and the sciences, Judaism is plain and easy. And finally, contrary to rational learning, whose goal is single and attained only at the end of protracted and laborious studies, Judaism's goals are many and are attained in the very process of studying and practicing it. 51 Above all it is the "democratic" character of Judaism, its dedication to the common good rather than to the good of the select few, which Figo stresses as its outstanding trait. Because of this it puts the main emphasis on practice rather than speculation, in the belief that only in this way can every individual be made a partner in collective wisdom. With wisdom thus conceived in terms of man's spiritual rather than intellectual needs, the ideal of truth per se must remain alien to Judaism. Though intrinsically meritorious, it is valuable from a Jewish point of view only to the extent that it enhances the worship of God through the observance of His commandments. Thus, when the sages of Israel study the heavens, for instance, it is not for scientific purposes but rather to gain a better understanding of the practices which the people were commanded to keep on earth. For this purpose, however, they need not study the geometry of Euclid or the Almagest of Ptolemy, since the necessary knowledge is obtained by way of a tradition that may be traced to Moses. 62 Through the observance of the holidays at their prescribed times, the whole community shares in the results of this wisdom, and it is "

t0

41 62

Binah, serm. 46, pt. II, p. 19b; cf., Kuzari, I, par. 1; IV, pars. 13, 19. Binah, serm. 43, pt. II, p. 12b; c f , supra, p. 188. Binah, serm. 35, pt. II, p. 4a; serm. 43, pt. II, p. 13. C f , supra, p. 146.

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in this universal application that the importance of that wisdom lies.53 The ideal of truth per se, which had captivated the heart of 'Azariah de Rossi to the extent of minimizing the significance of those parts of the Jewish tradition which seem inconsistent with it, thus suffers a serious setback in Figo. This notwithstanding, it would nevertheless be wrong to overemphasize this aspect of his thought and interpret it in terms of a negative attitude toward secular learning in general. On the contrary, numerous passages can be gleaned from his sermons indicating a diametrically opposite attitude. Not only does he, as mentioned earlier, allude to the sciences and philosophy, but he actually displays a deep appreciation of them, especially with regard to their impressive gains during his own generation. As a consequence of the invention of spectacles, the telescope, and other precision instruments, he points out, experimentation has improved greatly and advances have been made in various fields, notably astronomy.54 The knowledge obtained through the scientific method, which proceeds from effect to cause, he further observes, is "strong and valid".55 Not only can he find nothing prohibitive in the pursuit of science, but, on the contrary, he considers the study of astronomy, for instance, a misvah in the eyes of the Lord. 56 Moreover, notwithstanding his own criticism of rationalism, he is in favor of metaphysical speculations, since through them faith is put on a stronger foundation. 57 In rationalist terms, it may finally be added, he describes the qualities of the future Messiah and the bliss of the hereafter. 58 This dichotomic attitude toward science and philosophy — regarding them, on the one hand, as deserving pursuit by the "refined minds and pure intellects", rejecting them, on the other hand, as an inadequate ideal from the point of view of the transcendental-spiritual needs of humanity at large — finds other expression in his sermons. Two ways, he explains, lead man to a belief in the existence of God: the contemplation of the "wonderful lawfulness" of the universe as a whole, and the observation of the miraculous organic structure of all creatures with their processes of generation and decay.59 Both ways, however, requiring reasoning and contemplation, can necessarily be followed only by a very few. More effective as a means of nurturing a belief in God in 63 64

66

" "

"

Binah,

serm. 45, pt. II, pp. 19-20. Ibid., serm. 7, pt. I, p. 21; serm. 42, pt. II, p. 12b.

Ibid., serm. 16, pt. I, p. 49a. Ibid., serm. 46, pt. II, p. 19. Ibid., serm. 45, pt. II, p. 17a.

Ibid., serm. 13, pt. I, p. 42b; serm. 45, pt. II, p. 17a. Ibid., serm. 30, sermon for Shabbath v'Hol ha-Mo'ed Pesah, pt. I, p. 71a.

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larger multitudes are miracles. By appealing to the senses rather than reason and by their extraordinary nature, they amaze and awe people, and impress upon them God's existence and Providence. 60 Reiterating the view of 'Azariah de Rossi, 61 Figo observes that although the orderliness of nature is actually the strongest evidence of its Divine origin and conduct, because of its "constancy and permanence" people are hardly aware of it. Only a miracle renews in them the sense of wonder and the realization of Divine Providence. 62 He expresses the same idea and dichotomic attitude in his allegorization of the search of the enamored shepherdess for her lover in the Song of Songs (3:1-4), which he interprets as symbolic of the search of Israel for God. Explaining "in the nights" as signifying the sublunar world, the "streets" and the "broad ways" the realm of the rotating spheres, and the "watchmen" the detached intelligences, he describes this search as passing through three stages, beginning with our world, proceeding through the heavenly bodies, and ending with the intelligences. The use of the active "I sought him" 63 in the first two stages, but of the reversed "they found me" 64 in the third, he allegorizes as indicative of the fact that, although it is within the power of man to comprehend the sublunar world and that of the heavenly hosts, the conception of the third world, that of the intelligences, is beyond his grasp. The search for God, which remains fruitless throughout the three realms of being, is crowned with success only after ascending beyond the realm of the watchmen-intelligences. Thus, he explains, only after "much toil and investigation, and the use of decisive demonstrative arguments" does the search yield its rewarding results, a sound belief one can lean upon. Indeed, this is indicated in the words of the shepherdess: "I held him and would not let him go". However, Figo concludes, rewarding as this intellectual-contemplative process may be, its usefulness to the multitude is very doubtful indeed. Who, with the exception of a select few, "can ascend to the heights of such a lofty conception"? Only through miracles, as recorded in the Bible, "which require neither investigation nor rational exertion", does the multitude become aware of the Divine origin and conduct of the universe. 65 It thus becomes clear that Figo's resistance to rationalism and secular •» Binah, pp. 71b, 72a. Beginning of "Qol Elohim" in Me'or *Einayim. 82 Binah, serm. 30, p. 72a; serm. 31, sermon for the 7th day of Pesah, p. 73a; see also serm. 13, pt. I, p. 41b. 81

69 84 85

vrnppn

TINS» Binah, serm. 30, pt. I, pp. 71-72; serm. 16, pt. I, p. 49a; cf., supra, p. 140.

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learning, far from being absolute, is actually of a very qualified nature and motivated by national and social considerations extraneous to philosophy and science as such, rather than by their inner shortcomings and inadequacies. Though, as pointed out earlier, an analysis of the inner weaknesses of rationalism and secular learning is found in his writings, it must not be treated very seriously, as in it he merely reiterates the criticisms of his great predecessor, Judah Moscato. In the final analysis, the prime motivation for Figo's resistance to secular learning and rationalism stems from his deep concern for the Jewish community and its spiritual survival in the face of grave external and internal dangers. With the welfare of the people foremost in his mind, he feels called upon to re-emphasize another concept, which is basic in the thinking of all anti-rationalists, namely the primacy of deeds and actions in Judaism over speculation and thought. As has been seen, he does not consider speculation prohibited. On the contrary, it is even meritorious with regard not only to the principles of the faith, but also to the reasons for the commandments, provided, however, that the belief in these principles and the keeping of the commandments are not made dependent on the results of such speculation. Commenting on Deuteronomy 29:28, he points out: Regardless of whether the reasons for the commandments are hidden from us and known only to God, or ... known to us and our children, we shall keep them for the sole reason that we were commanded to do so. The utter subjection of our will to God's will must be our only guide and motivation in the observance of the Law, rather than any rationalization of one sort or another. 68 Though there is nothing in the Torah to contradict reason: "There are many things in it which cannot be deduced or comprehended rationally." 67 A rationalist approach would therefore be inadequate and accomplish little. With this view as his frame of reference, he explains, very ingeniously indeed, the tension between Saul and David. Commenting on I Samuel 18:14-15,68 he writes: Although David was a man of reason and discretion, and could well rely on his own judgement, he did not act accordingly, but always desired that the Lord cling unto him and be with him, and that whatever he did be in full agreement with His will. Saul, on the other hand, though the elect of God and perfect, relied more 66 67

68

Binah, serm. 39, pt. II, p. 10b. Ibid., serm. 45, pt. II, p. 18a.

t j b » i n i s » Vo®» sin

bin® KTI ,ias? 'm bwn

r a n bob i n VPI

'AZARIAH FIGO (1579-1647)

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on his own reason and judgement, thus committing many mistakes. 89 He interprets in the same spirit Psalm 53:370 as follows: God looked down from heaven on earth to see whether there was someone among men who, though a maskil, nevertheless sought God, i.e., desired to act in no other way than according to His teachings.71 This emphasis on the functional rather than the intellectual and contemplative as the essential in Judaism, though of long standing in Jewish lore, seems, in the case of Figo at least, attributable to the historical reality of his own environment, rather than to earlier literary sources. The recurrence of this theme in his sermons and the seriousness with which it is treated are essentially his reaction to both rationalism and mysticism, which were gaining in strength and scope during his lifetime. It is primarily with his eye on the mystics, whose zeal for the "higher" meanings of Judaism makes them often forgetful of its more simple, revealed meanings and inclines them to introduce innovations in custom and law, that he declares deeds to be superior not only to the "common kind of speculations", 72 but also to the "knowledge of the deeper secrets". In this spirit he interprets Psalm l l l : l - 2 7 3 as follows: Though I am wholeheartedly grateful to Him, blessed be He, for the deep secrets of the righteous, into which only they and the holy congregation have been initiated — this being a most wonderful and excellent thing — however, the importance of the Divine practices74 to which we adhere on His command is far greater than the attainment of these secrets ... Whereas these mysteries are neither essential nor accessible to all, the Divine practices are necessary, easy, and within the reach of all who seek them ... They are accessible to all the people and denied to none.76 Figo is thus critical of the Cabbalah for essentially the same reason that he is critical of philosophy and science, namely on account of its esoteric and unpopular character. 76 However, his main arguments in the defense of Jewish practices were no doubt directed against the rationalist anti-tradition trends which, interestingly enough, made a vigorous appearance in the Italian Jewish com69

70 71

72 73 71 76

Binah, serm. 12, pt. I, p. 41a.

D,n1?N nx a m t d p » t r n mm 1 ? m s na

^ptpn ornvm crnVx

Binah, serm. 12, pt. I, p. 41a.

ona-in fry n r r s s n ho1? t r n n t j rrwa D ^ n i -msn a m p moa aa1? Vaa 'n m i x '.TTt»»

Binah, serm. 36, 1st sermon on Pirqei Aboth, pt. II, p. 6a. ™ For Figo's belief in transmigration of souls, see, Binah, serm. 52, pt. II, p. 35a; see also Israel Bettan, "The Sermons of 'Azariah Figo", HUCA, VII (Cincinnati, 1930), p. 468.

206

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(1579-1647)

munities, notably Venice, at the same time mysticism was increasing its sway. Although a certain negligence of Jewish practices had been typical of Italian Jewry even in earlier centuries," the situation became aggravated as a result of the secular trends of the Renaissance and the influx of sizable numbers of ex-Marranos into the communities. By the end of the sixteenth and the early part of the seventeenth centuries, the indigenous slackness in relation to religious observance, combined with the freethinking tendencies of Spanish émigrés, produced a fermentation which threatened the religious integrity of the Jewish community. 78 It is this situation which is strongly reflected in the sermons of Figo. According to them, two major criticisms were being leveled against normative Judaism, and both seem to have originated among the newer Spanish element with its marked segment of ex-Marranos, who had been for some time out of contact with a living Jewish reality. Whereas some among them were altogether critical of the practices of Judaism, asserting philosophically that devotion and contemplation, a "pure heart" and moral living, were far more significant than adherence to any ritual and practice, 79 the criticism of others was more "Karaitic" in nature, as these were skeptical mainly with regard to the validity of the Oral Tradition. In reply to the criticisms of the former, Figo marshals numerous Biblical and midrashic sources and, giving them a most ingenious interpretation, stresses repeatedly that it is solely by adherence to the practices of Judaism that one identifies oneself with it, rather than by mere thoughts, good intentions, and even moral living. Thus he explains that the difference in opinion between R' 'Aqiba and R' Tarfon as to what should be considered more important, study or deeds, 80 is actually a difference in definition but not in views. 'Aqiba thinks in terms of cause and effect, whereas Tarfon thinks in terms of goal and means. As the cause of deeds, study is superior in the eyes of 'Aqiba; as a means, it is inferior in the eyes of Tarfon. Essentially, however, they both agree that it is, indeed, deeds which are the more important. 81 7

7

Cf., Güdemann, Geschichte des Erziehungswesens..., II, pp. 208ÎÏ. and n. XIII, 329ff.; M. A. Schulvass, "Hayyei ha-Dath shel Yehudei Italia bi-Tequfath ha-Renaissance" in Hayyei ha-Yehudim b'Italia bi-Tequfath ha-Renaissance, pp. 175ff.; E. Delmedigo, Sefer Behinath ha-dath, pp. 72, 73; Blau, Leo Modends Briefe und Schriftstücke, Hebrew section, par. 19. 78 See this writer's "The European Enlightenment and the Jews", pp. 76ff. 79 Binah, serm. 4, 2nd sermon for the second day of Rosh ha-Shanah, pp. 16b-17a; serm. 41, 7th sermon on Peraqim, pt. II, p. 15b. 80 BT, Qiddushin, p. 40b. 81 Binah, serm. 4, pt. I, pp. 16-17a; sermon 55,4thserm. forShabbathNahamu, pt. II, p. 54a.

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Most of his attention, however, Figo devotes to the critics of the Oral Tradition. To judge from his rather frequent allusions to them, their number must have been sizable and their impact strongly felt.82 Against them he argues that "It is the Oral Tradition, received by Moses from God, which explains the written Torah; without it we would be deprived of the knowledge of the particulars of the Law". Commandments such as the ethrog, phylacteries, fringes, the holiday of Shavifoth, necessitate this tradition, without which they could not be observed. Moses transferred this tradition to Joshua, and he in turn passed it on to subsequent generations. When God said to Joshua: "Be thou strong and very courageous, that thou mayest observe to do according to all the law which Moses my servant commanded thee" (Joshua 1:6), it was the Oral Law and the injunction to keep it —just as one keeps the Written Law — that was implied in the "according to all". 83 The equal importance of both traditions, he further observes, is indicated also by the character of the Revelation at Sinai. As this revelation was transmitted via the senses of vision and hearing, so must these two senses continue to serve as the intruments for its future preservation. Referring, no doubt, to the individualist tendencies of the d'Accosta type, which found some adherents in Venice,84 he warns: You must not think that the essential is only what your eye perceives in the Written Torah, believing as you certainly do in its Divine origin, whereas the Oral Tradition, transmitted by the way of the ear, may appear doubtful to you, perhaps the invention of the sages, and not the word of God ... Beware of such thoughts ... they are false. Both traditions are the word of the living God. Whatever your ear receives from your masters and your eye perceives in the Written Torah has its origin in one and the same Divine source ... However, should there still be some who, disregarding this warning, may continue to persist in their refusal to acknowledge the authoritative tradition, believing that they are able by their own capacity to delve into the meaning of the Written Torah — such people are completely lost and hopeless ... 86

The close interdependence between these two traditions Figo finds symbolized also by the two Cherubs which were above the Ark of Testimony. They were male and female, one giving, the other receiving, which is, indeed, illustrative of the nature of the Oral Tradition. Their outstretched wings, pointing to a flight into distance, indicated that "For many days to 82 83

84 85

Cf., Shmuel Abohab, "Haqdamah" and par. 192 in Devar Smhuel. Binah, serm. 36, 1st sermon on Pirqei Aboth, pt. II, pp. 5-6.

Klar, "Sha'agath Aryeh 'al Qol Shakhal", Tarbiz, XIII (1942), pp. 135-149. Binah, serm. 38, 3rd sermon on Peraqim, pt. II, p. 9b.

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come, indeed, till the end of days, will the Oral Tradition last, protecting and sheltering at the same time the Written Law that was deposited in the Ark". 8 6 Whether these sermons of R' Figo had any effect in curbing the heretical trends among his contemporary coreligionists is of course very doubtful. Indeed, pointing to the contrary is the fact that almost half a century later, R' Abraham Hayyim Viterbo of Venice felt compelled once again to undertake a defense of the Oral Tradition against those who were trying "to destroy it utterly ... by proving that there was no relationship whatsoever between the Oral and the Written Traditions, contending that the former was a mere invention of the rabbis". 87 However, whether effective or not, these sermons clearly testify to the emergence of an opposition to historical Judaism among certain circles of Italian Jewry in the first half of the seventeenth century, a fact which is amply borne out by other sources of the time. If it be added that along with these skeptical trends, other forces of moral decline and social dissolution were gaining greatly in the life of the Jewish community of the time, 88 one can surely gain further insight into the background of R' Figo's anti-secular and antirationalist stand. A positive attitude toward philosophy and science in such a situation, he must have felt, could serve only to encourage and intensify the centrifugal forces of dissolution and thus jeopardize all the more the spiritual integrity of the community. What wonder then that the stand he took in relation to their pursuit was negative and in opposition not only to that of liberals like Modena and Simone Luzzatto but even to his own beliefs and convictions of an earlier period. Negating his own formerly displayed admiration for rational truth, he declares: Our Torah has no need for any external wisdom ... as all wisdom is contained therein ... Indeed, it was given to Israel so that Israel should not have to mingle with the nations of the world and learn their wisdom.89 Whatever their genesis, the views of Figo thus constitute a full, conscious retreat from the cultural patterns embraced by Italian Jewry throughout the ages. Though strongly influenced by Judah Moscato, he continues none of Moscato's humanist pursuits. With the exception of the structure 86

Binah, serm. 43, 2nd sermon for Shavu'oth, pt. II, pp. 13b-14a. ' Abraham Hayyim Viterbo, "Sefer Emunath Hakhamim", Ta'am Zeqenim, ed. E. Ashkenazi (Frankfurt am Main, 1854), pp. 19ff. 88 Binah, serms. 10, pt. I, pp. 31-32; 14, pt. I, p. 43b; 47, pt. II, p. 23b; 48, pt. II, pp. 25-26, and passim-, see also Cecil Roth, "The Memoirs of a Siennese Jew (16251633)", HUCA, V (Cincinnati, 1928), pp. 353-402. " Binah, serm. 43, pt. II, p. 13. 6

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90

of the homily, which exhibits classical patterns, the humanist tradition, with its penchant for esthetics and rhetoric, music, neo-Platonism, and classical culture in general suffers a total eclipse in him. None of these subjects or any one of the sages of the nations, frequently referred to in the works of many Jewish scholars of the Renaissance period, is even as much as mentioned by him. True, he shows a greater awareness and appreciation of the rising sciences; he resists them, however, most vehemently, calling for a withdrawal from them into the inner shell of exclusive Jewish studies and practices. Although he shared — theoretically at least — the liberal attitude to the new learning displayed by men like Modena, Luzzatto, and Yashar of Candia, who regarded it as the most noble pursuit of man and the best means to safeguard a Jew's standing and honor in the foreign milieu, 91 he nevertheless was more seriously concerned than they with the people's spiritual welfare and survival, and consequently took an opposite stand. That it was Figo's thinking rather than theirs which was, no doubt, more typically representative of the Jewish mentality of the time is best illustrated by the life and works of Joseph Shlomo Delmedigo, by far the greatest scientist and mathematician among the Jews of the first half of the seventeenth century, who wasted his brilliant mind and energies in constant wanderings and in recourse to ever new stratagems and camouflage behind which he felt compelled to hide his real radical views.

"

Bettan, Studies in Jewish Preaching, (1939), pp. 227-272. See this writer's "The European Enlightenment and the Jews", chap. V, pp. 43 ff.

XI JUDAH DEL BENE

A younger contemporary of Figo, who shared some of his views, was Judah del Bene1 whose Kisoth VBeth David (Verona, 1646) is an important source for the study of the spiritual milieu of Italian Jewry during the first half of the seventeenth century. The earlier influences of Renaissance humanism, which had deeply affected his father, David del Bene, in the closing years of the sixteenth century, 2 receded and disappeared almost entirely from the spiritual horizon of the son. With the exception of some derogatory remarks regarding philosophy and secular learning, no other reference to them or to any secular scholar ever appears in his work. Nor are there to be found in it any traces of the esthetic accomplishments of an earlier day. Though he sought to prove the riches and beauty of the Hebrew language, his style remained awkward, his composition confused, and the work in general a clear indication of the cultural decline which set in among Italian Jewry in the post-Renaissance era. Del Bene and his father, R' David, for many years served as rabbis among the Jews of Ferrara, where mystic trends prevailed. Moreover, his father was a disciple of the famous Cabbalist, Menahem 'Azariah of Fano. 3 Perhaps as a result of these influences, and like most of his contemporaries, del Bene was an admirer of the Cabbalah. However, with the exception of the assertion that the Torah constitutes the names of God and the advice to study the Zohar,4 he gives no further attention to it. A more important and a recurrent theme in his work is the struggle 1

Ghirondi-Neppi, Toledoth Gedolei Yisrael u-Geonei Italia, letter yod; Umberto Cassuto, "Del Bene (Hebrew 21t3D!3) Jehuda Assael ben David Eliezer", EJ, X (Berlin, 1930), p. 908. a Kaufmann, "The Dispute about the Sermons of David del Bene of Mantua", JQR, VIII (1896), pp. 513-524. 3 Ibid.; see also "Introduction" to Kis'oth VBeth David, and Bernstein, Mavo, I and II, "Piyyutei Ferrara" in Mi-Shirei Yisrael b'Italia. 4 Kisoth VBeth David, chap. Ill, p. 10b (hereafter cited as Kisoth).

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against rationalism and secular studies. His thoughts on this subject, however, possess neither depth nor originality and are a mere reiteration of earlier statements. He opposes both philosophy and the sciences on account of the danger inherent in them to the integrity of the faith. They undermine not only the belief in miracles, creation, and the revival of the dead, but also spread skepticism with regard to belief in revelation and the immortality of the soul. 5 Moreover, they are neither truthful nor beneficial in themselves.6 False and pernicious to faith is, above all, metaphysics. 7 The rationalist ideal of wisdom as a prerequisite to immortality, and the conception of the latter in terms of the soul's uniting with the active intelligence, he considers a degradation of the ideal of the Torah, according to which human perfection depends on morality and good works rather than on speculation and intellectual excellence.8 He therefore advises his readers to divert themselves from"speculative, natural, mathematical, or Divine studies" and dedicate themselves only to the Torah. He says: Study only the Torah and dispense with the multitude of Arabic, Chaldean, or Greek books which are full of assumptions, premises, and syllogisms — the invention of their authors' sophistries.9 This notwithstanding, del Bene's negative attitude toward secular learning must not be overstressed, as he himself qualifies it either directly or by implication. Indeed, in one of the most interesting chapters of his work he expresses actual envy of Christian scholars and their impressive achievements. How much more fortunate are they than the Jewish scholars! By joining the Church hierarchy or a monastic order, they gain complete economic independence and are free to dedicate themselves to their scholarly pursuits. In the long run they also gain power, wealth, and prestige. Jewish savants, on the other hand, lacking institutional backing and harassed by economic hardships and financial worries, have neither the leisure for scholarly pursuits nor expectation of attaining worldly compensation. "Being so poor and degraded, how can we", he asks, "ascend the ladder of rational knowledge?" 10 Nevertheless he seems rather apologetic for the failure of his coreligionists to contribute to the advancement of secular learning. 5

'

7 8 9 10

Kisoth, chaps. 3, 4, 6, 8, 46, and passim. Ibid., chap. 4. Ibid., chap. 18, pp. 41b-42a. Ibid., chap. 4, pp. 12-13a; chap. 8, p. 17a. Ibid., chap. 3, p. 10b. n v T o t w n i b a n a rnbvV ^du h d d ^ k , ibid., chap. 42, p. 7Sb.

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Another important topic of the Kisoth VBeth David is the Hebrew language, whose praises fill many of its passages. Though most of his views on this subject are a reiteration of earlier statements, scattered throughout the Jewish literature of the Renaissance or earlier periods, he introduces some new ideas which are usually attributed to the maskilim of a later day. Like Judah Halevi, Hillel ben Shmuel of Verona, David Provencale, 'Azariah de Rossi, Judah Moscato, and many others, he asserts his belief in the Divine origin of Hebrew in contradistinction to the conventional genesis of other languages.11 He is unique, moreover, in his insistence on the need not only of preserving the language, but also of diffusing and transforming it into a major vehicle, if not of oral, at least of literary communication. He admits, of course, that in their dispersion the Jews must acquire the language of the land in which they live; as "guests" they should communicate in the language of their host-country. They must not, however, become oblivious of the fact that it is Hebrew which is their native tongue, and the language of the country only a foreign acquisition. Though a necessity for economic purposes and commercial dealings, the host language ought not to be allowed to encroach upon other areas.12 Like Naphtali Wessely at the end of the eighteenth century, who, in the wake of the Toleranz-Patent of Joseph the Second (1781), was to urge German Jewry to embrace a dual language policy and study both Hebrew and German, 13 del Bene, preceding him by almost one hundred and fifty years, gives similar advice to the Italian Jews of his day. There is, however, a marked difference in emphasis between the two. Whereas Wessely stresses the overall importance of German, limiting Hebrew to only religious-moral matters, the opposite is true of del Bene, who advocates that Hebrew become prevalent in all areas of Jewish life with the exception of the economic domain. Furthermore, he urges that Hebrew be used even in commercial matters, in bookkeeping and correspondence among Jews.14 Superfluous to add that these urgings, rather than indicative of a new upsurge of the ancient tongue, are actually a clear sign of its rapidly declining role in the life of Italian Jewry and of the ever-growing diffusion of Italian among them, a fact which he himself regretfully points out. It seems rather strange that during the age of the ghetto, with its physical seclusion of the Jews and the greatly reduced interaction between them 11

"

13

"

Kisoth, chap. 9, pp. 24b-25a. Ibid., p. 26 and chap. 46. Hartwig Naphtali Wessely, Divrei Shalom ve-Emeth (Berlin, 1781-1784). Kisoth, p. 26b.

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and the Christians, 15 the centuries-old balance between Hebrew and Italian1® was upset and the knowledge of Hebrew declined and became limited to small circles.17 Anticipatory of the arguments of the Hebraists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries against their linguistically assimilated coreligionists is del Bene's defense of Hebrew as an efficient and adequate vehicle of literary expression. In response to his own contemporaries, who show a preference for the Italian language on account of its "riches and sweetness", he emphasizes the intrinsic riches of Hebrew, its abundance of nouns and verbs, and its stylistic flexibility, which all render it most appropriate for human communication. 18 Indeed, he points out that his purpose in writing this very book is to prove this contention. In it he deliberately discusses the various subjects under consideration in a variety of ways, "just to show the riches and greatness of our language". 19 He finds expecially regrettable the spread of the Italian language among Jewish women. Whereas its acquisition by men may be justified on economic grounds, no such justification can be made with regard to its acquisition by women. It should be sufficient for them, he feels, to learn to read the prayer book and to acquire the rudiments of writing which are necessary for the handling of household affairs. To teach them the foreign language is dangerous, inasmuch as the foreign literature, with its unbridled display of lust and passion, then becomes accessible to them, jeopardizing their moral purity and integrity. To allow this is "bringing fire near tow". 20 The need and opportunity to foster the study of the Hebrew language and the Bible, he finally observes, are especially great now, in view of the fact that the possession of the Talmud is still forbidden. 21 Interesting also, though only indirectly related to the main theme of this study, are the political views of del Bene, which reflect both the influence of 'Azariah de Rossi and Simone Luzzatto, on the one hand, and the general historical reality of the time with an intensified Messianic anticipation among Jews, on the other hand. Like these two eminent 16

C f , Simone Luzzatto,'lyyun XII, in Ma'amar 'al Yehudei Venezia, p. 108. C f , Modena, The History of the Rites, Customs and Manner of Life of the Present Jews Throughout the World, Written in Italian by Leon Modena, a Rabbi of Venice, pt. II, chap. 1, pp. 57-60. " Kisoth, chap. 12, pp. 32b, 34a. 18 Ibid., chap. 9, pp. 24b-25a; chap. 46. 18 Ibid., p. 86a. "> Ibid., p. 26b. !1 Ibid., chap. 50, p. 94b. 16

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scholars, and similarly motivated by a deteriorating economic situation, a rising religious fanaticism, and a declining benevolence toward the Jew in general, he emphasizes the duty of the Jews in Christian Europe, especially in Italy, to be loyal to the country of their domicile, to pray for the welfare of their respective states and their rulers, and to honor and love these rulers and the people among whom they live.22 Though it is obvious from the Kisoth VBeth David that its author was well aware of the deteriorating situation of the Jews, both politically and economically23 — a fact borne out by other sources of the time24 — he, like Simone Luzzatto in his apologetic Discorso, never utters a word of criticism directed against the Christian rulers. On the contrary, he praises them and expresses gratitude to them for the peace and security the Jews enjoy under their dominion. Theirs, he points out, is a rule of law and order rather than violence. Besides, they alone carry the military burden of defending the country against its enemies, leaving the Jews behind "to tarry with the baggage". In short, the Christian Italians are "a people of kindness and truth, and there is no other nation equal to them either intellectually or morally".25 As for the Christians in general, he advances two additional reasons for praising them. Owing to a great extent to the esteem and honor in which the Christians have held the Bible, this Book has been preserved throughout the many centuries of Jewish dispersion. Even more interesting, because perhaps indicative of another source of the Messianic frenzy of the Shabbetai Zvi era, are his praises of the Christian conquests in the New World and their conversion of the native population. Strange as it may appear, he sees in these the hand of Divine Providence, which has destined the Christian nations to bring the word of God to the remotest islands and peoples. He is fully aware, of course, that according to Christian thinking the Old Testament was only a "temporary" dispensation; he is pleased, nevertheless, with the new multitudes who have joined 22

Kisoth, chap. 45, pp. 84b, 85a, 89a; cf., "Azariah de Rossi, Me'or 'Einayim, chap. 55; Simone Luzzatto, Ma'amar ..., chaps. 6, p. 93; 8, p. 100; 13, pp. 113, 114, 117. !> Kisoth, chap. 30, pp. 62b-63a; chap. 42, p. 79b. 21 In his Ma'amar ..., Luzzatto writes: "The Jew is preoccupied with one m a j o r worry, i.e., how to overcome his want and poverty", pp. 108-109. H e further observes: "It almost never happens that Jewish wealth — if it be substantial to some extent — remains in the possession of one family for more than one generation", ibid., p. 96. In the " H a q d a m a h " to his Kenaf Renanim, Joseph Carmi writes: "As a result of our sins and the sins of our forefathers, we are beset with ever greater troubles. The hardships of exile are increasing and so is our poverty. (Worst of all), there is nobody to intercede on our behalf". 26 Kisoth, chap. 45, p. 85a.

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the ranks of those "who acknowledge our God". Moreover, as a result of the work of Christian missionaries, the new peoples, he states hopefully, will also learn about the "Torah, prophets, and other writings", and thus be prepared "for the anticipated day". 26 Worth noting in the above passage is the awareness of this pious rabbi of the basic affinity between Judaism and Christianity, on the one hand, and his Messianic fervor, on the other. It may also be surmised that it was not only the spread of Christianity in the New World which awakened del Bene's Messianic anticipations, but possibly also — as in the case of his contemporary of the North, Menasseh ben Israel — rumors regarding the existence of certain tribes in the New World allegedly adhering to Jewish laws and customs. 27 To the same background of a heightened Messianic fervor, but related perhaps more directly to the opening of the protracted War of Candia (1645-1669), belongs another aspect of del Bene's political thought, namely his sharp criticism of the Muslims and Islam. He minces no words in pointing out the lawlessness, corruption, and violence which prevail in the domains of the Ottoman Empire. Cunning, deceit, and an unabashed perversion of justice reign supreme in a rule of terror and oppression, lacking in elementary civility and humaneness. Especially dangerous are the Janissaries, "an encounter with whom is like one with wild beasts, yea, with Satan himself". 28 Though he qualifies his criticism as not leveled at the ruling house of the Ottomans, he observes, nevertheless, that at least as far as their treatment of the Jews is concerned, they can hardly be compared to Christian rulers. 29 It has become almost a commonplace in many a Jewish community of the East, even in the largest of them, to be attacked in the middle of the night by thieves and robbers who put hundreds of Jewish houses to the torch and plunder their inhabitants. Such cruelties, however, do not happen in Christian countries, nor is there anything of this sort heard of "in these lands". 30 He is no less critical of Islam. Besides its adherents' repetitiously declared belief in God's unity, he sees nothing of value in it. True, the Muslims do observe certain religious practices, such as circumcision, the ritual slaughtering of animals, dietary laws, and prayers, but he does not attach much importance to that observance. On the contrary, their laws 26 27 28 29 80

Kisoth, chap. 44, pp. 83-84a. C f , Cecil Roth, A Life of Menasseh ben Israel (Philadelphia, 1945), chap. IX. Bayith shemini, Kisoth, pp. 87-89. Ibid., p. 89a. Ibid., chap. 49, p. 91b.

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of immersion and cleanliness, he believes, are actually conducive to a heightening of bodily lusts and passions. Of a sensuous nature also is their concept of heavenly bliss. Especially reprehensible he finds the martial spirit which permeates that religion, and to which he attributes the prohibition against drinking wine and the "commandment" to sleep on the ground. It is seemingly the Italian in del Bene who reacts strongly to the substitution for wine of water, "an element very harmful indeed, and of most adverse effects on both body and soul". 31 This being the case, del Bene asks, how is it to be explained that the rule of the Holy Land has been entrusted to Muslims? In reply he suggests two reasons. Contradicting to some extent his earlier, rather deprecatory attitude toward Islamic practices, he points out that the Muslims have been given the dominion over the Holy Land as a reward for their "keeping in some fashion some of the Divine commandments of the Torah", imperfect though their conception of them may be. 32 More important, however, since it is grounded in realistic and political motivations, is his second reason, which sees their rule as the lesser of two evils. Had the Christians become its rulers, he argues, they, as the heirs to Rome, could, on the basis of the law of conquest, claim it as their permanent possession. The Muslims, however, having had nothing to do with its conquest from the Jews and with the expulsion of the Jews from it, can make no such claim. Hence their holding of the land is only transitory; they serve in the capacity of its temporary trustees. 33 Though it is to be doubted whether these chapters in the book, with their exaggerated praise for Christians on the one hand, and their equally exaggerated criticism of Muslims on the other, were written with an eye to the Christian reader, their apologetic character seems well in line with a similar attitude taken by his predecessor, 'Azariah de Rossi, 34 and by his contemporaries, Simone Luzzatto 35 and Leon Modena. 36 Even his condemnation of Muslims and Islam may possibly have been motivated by apologetics which aimed to disprove the frequent accusation against the Jews of siding with the Turks in their wars against Christian countries. 37 31

Kisoth, chap. 49, pp. 90-91. Ibid., pp. 89b, 90a-b. 33 Ibid., p. 91b. 94 Me'or 'Einayim, chap. 55. 85 Ma'amar ..., chaps. 3, p. 87: 6, p. 93; 8, p. 100, and passim. 38 History of the Rites ..., pt. II, chap. 5, pp. 74-76. 37 In 1538, during the war between Turkey and Venice, the Jews of Candia were accused of harboring spies among them, and, as a result, were in grave danger (see Abraham Danon, "Quelques Purim Locaux", RE J, LIX (Paris, 1907), pp. 115-118, 125-133). For almost two years Venetian Jewry was under the threat of expulsion as a 32

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217

A n o t h e r r e a s o n f o r his anti-Islamic stand m a y h a v e been the rapidly w o r s e n i n g situation o f the J e w s in the O t t o m a n Empire, especially in Palestine. W i t h the d e a t h o f Selim 11 in the early seventies o f the sixteenth century, the g o l d e n era in the history o f Turkish Jewry w a s d r a w i n g t o a n end. A s a result o f a g r o w i n g decentralization, the dispersed J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s were b e c o m i n g m o r e and m o r e e x p o s e d to the w h i m s , greed, a n d a m b i t i o n s o f local potentates.

Particularly d e p l o r a b l e b e c a m e the

situation o f the Jewish c o m m u n i t y in Palestine, w h i c h only a s h o r t t i m e earlier had displayed such strong signs o f e c o n o m i c prosperity a n d spiritual creativeness.

Financial harassment a n d persecution b r o u g h t it t o

the brink o f e c o n o m i c ruin. 3 8 O w i n g t o the close ties b e t w e e n Italian a n d Palestinian Jewries, this situation w a s well k n o w n t o Italian J e w s w h o spared n o effort t o alleviate t h e suffering o f their coreligionists in the H o l y L a n d . 3 9 D e l Bene's bitter d e n u n c i a t i o n m a y t h u s be a direct react i o n t o this situation, t h o u g h , as m e n t i o n e d earlier, there m a y a l s o have been other, m o r e direct causes, n o t a b l y the W a r o f Candia, p r o m p t i n g it.

result of the war of Cyprus. ( C / , Cecil Roth, History of the Jews in Venice (Philadelphia, 1930), pp. 87-92). Giacomo Foscarini who, after the fall of Cyprus to the Turks, became the Provenitore Generale of Crete and undertook to strengthen the defenses of the island, displayed great strictness in relation to the Jews, notably foreign Jews, whom he considered actual or potential spies (Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa (Gotha, 1856), pp. 707-708). The accusation leveled against the Jews of spying on behalf of the Turks, and of committing acts of cruelty against Christian warriors were even more common in the seventeenth century. In consequence of such rumors, Paduan Jewry was exposed to grave danger in 1684. (See Antonio Ciscato, Gli Ebrei in Padova, (1300-1800), (Padova, 1901), pp. 201-203; Graetz-Rabinowitz, Divrei, VIII, pp. 302-303; S. Dubnow, Divrei Ymei Am Olam, VII (Tel Aviv, 1948), p. 158.) Indicative, in all likelihood, of the suspicion in which the Jews were held was the fact that in 1645, after the fall of Canea to the Turks, when the Venetian Senate, in dire need of funds for the conduct of the war of Candia, opened the ranks of Venetian nobility to a slight extent to the rich, both native and foreign, it expressly stated that "the Jews, the Turks, and the Saracens" are to be excluded from the exercise of this privilege, and "whoever proposes candidates from these three classes will be punished by perpetual banishment and the confiscation of his possessions" (P. Daru, Histoire de la Republique de Venise, IV (Paris, 1819), bk. XXXIII, p. 536). 38 S. A. Rosanes, Qoroth ha-Yehudim b'Turqiyah ve-Arsoth ha-Qedem, III (Sofia, 1938), pp. 1, 16, 66, 97, and 241 ff.; Yishaq ben Zvi, Eres Yisrael ve-Yishuvah bi-mei ha-Shilton ha-Ottomani (Jerusalem, 1955), chaps. VII, X, see mainly pp. 220ff.; Horvoth Yerushalayim (Venezia, 1627), 2nd ed. by Eli'ezev Rivlin (Jerusalem, 1928); J. Kna'ani, "Ha-Hayyim ha-Kalkaliyim bi-$efath ba-Me'ah ha-16", Zion (Me'assef), VI (Jerusalem, 1934), pp. 172-217; Shmuel Avisur, "Sefath Merkaz l'Ta'asiyyath Arigei §emer ba-Me'ah ha-16", Sefer $efath, I, Yishaq ben Zvi and M. Benayahu (eds.) (Jerusalem, 1962), pp. 43-69. 38 Blau, Leo Modena's Briefe und Schriftenstiicke, Hebrew section, par. 151, pp. 140-141; Moscato, Nefufoth, serm. 22; Schulvass, Roma vi-Yerushalayim, chaps. X, XI.

XII

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Moscato and Figo were the last eminent scholars of Italian Jewry who gave a rationalist expression to the anti-rationalist point of view within the framework of medieval Jewish thought. In the atmosphere of seventeenth-century Jewry, which was becoming increasingly permeated with mystical reveries and Messianic expectations, little room was left for a rational discussion of any of the speculative issues of the past. There was, however, an additional reason for the disappearance of the anti-rationalist point of view from Italian Jewish literature, namely the rise of science, which deprived the anti-rationalists of some of their strongest arguments, notably the futility of human reason as attested by the alleged lack of progress in the physical sciences. At the very time Figo was articulating his vigorous opposition to rationalism and secular learning, a growing awareness of the new rational knowledge, based on the observation of facts and a quantitative approach, was spreading. Indicative of this new tendency were not only the mathematical and astronomical works of Joseph Shlomo Delmedigo, but also the preoccupation of Simone Luzzatto with mathematics, the admiration for the new type of knowledge displayed by Leon Modena, and its adumbration by Figo himself. By the early decades of the eighteenth century the pursuit of science and mathematics must have spread to relatively wider circles of Italian Jewry, to judge from the rather elaborate and enthusiastic expression given to it in the dramas, sonnets, and shorter tractates of the mystic Moshe Hayyim Luzzatto, as well as in other literary works, notably the poetry of eighteenth-century Italian-Jewish literature. As the sciences progressed, it was becoming perfectly clear that if the anti-rationalist position was to continue to be defended, this defense would no longer be able to draw on the arguments regarding the inadequacy of human reason in the natural sciences, but would rather have to be based

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exclusively on an emphasis of the unique spiritual and ethical values of Judaism. Indeed, such a development actually took place in the early stages of the Haskalah. When the early maskilim of the pre-Mendelssohnian period made their appearance in both the Germanies and Eastern Europe, they displayed, on the one hand, a great admiration for the sciences and mathematics, and on the other hand they defended the totality of Judaism, emphasizing its spiritual and ethical uniqueness. These developments unfolded, however, outside of Italy and are therefore beyond the scope of this study. As far as Italian Jewry is concerned, its role and position within the larger Jewish community declined from about the middle of the seventeenth century on. New forces were coming to the fore in both the general and the Jewish environments, with the center of Jewish culture and leadership shifting to Central and East European Jewry. Only once more, during the nineteenth century, was the voice of anti-rationalism raised again by an Italian Jew, S. D. Luzzatto. Two centuries after Figo he took up the cudgels in defense of the spiritual and ethical values of Judaism against the increasingly encroaching tendencies of scientific determinism and materialism. Having been a critical scholar himself, he did not direct his criticism against rational knowledge as such, but rather against its shallow half-truths in metaphysics and ethics. In the nineteenth-century atmosphere of a growing cosmopolitanism, utilitarianism and historical relativism which were being diffused among ever wider circles of Western and Central-European Jewries, Luzzatto was the only scholar of renown who remained loyal to the anti-rationalist orientation—an almost permanent feature of Italian Jewish culture throughout the ages — and valiantly defended the religious and ethical uniqueness of Judaism. More than three centuries separate us from the last formulations of the anti-rationalist point of view. These centuries witnessed an ever greater preoccupation of humanity with the study of the physical universe through the adoption of the scientific method of observation, experimentation, and quantitative expression. In addition, the last century and a half have witnessed the emergence and growing acceptance of the principle of evolution and historical relativism as an explanation not only of the phenomena of nature, but of human culture in its broadest aspects as well. While the advance of science revolutionized the very conditions of human existence, the combined effect of the scientific method and the principle of evolution revolutionized man's conceptions of both the universe and the growth of human culture and institutions. A mechanically functioning

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universe, explained in terms of forces and counter-forces, and mathematically expressed, superseded the medieval concept of the universe conceived of in terms of teleological causes, essences, and spirits, and qualitatively expressed. Similarly, in the realm of man, a historical determinism, grounded in the concept of evolution and regarding human culture and institutions as natural products of the physical and spiritual environments, came to supersede metaphysical and transcendental assumptions and explanations. The shaking effect on religion of these developments is well known, and there is no need to enlarge on it. In their intoxication with the victories of reason, the "enlightened" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries undertook to eliminate religion altogether, viewing it as fictitious and as an unreasonable and harmful phenomenon in the history of man. In the Western civilization of our day a new modus vivendi has been arrived at between science and religion — a modus vivendi which came in the wake of a growing awareness of the limitations of science on the one hand, and of the renunciation of religion's claim to intellectual knowledge on the other hand. The complete separation which has set in between the intellectual and spiritual realms, spelling an autonomous existence and independent development for both, may actually be interpreted as a revival of the "double-truth" approach of the Averroists. Such an outcome appears to have been precipitated by the development of science itself. Notwithstanding its spectacular advances over the last three centuries, the realization of its actual confinement to a limited section of universal matter and its commitment to a purely mechanical interpretation of it, rescinding any claim to teleological or transcendental explanations, is dawning with ever greater conviction upon a growing number of men. On the other hand, long ago, indeed since the overthrow of medieval rationalism, it has become equally obvious to even the staunchest defenders of the "higher" and supposedly all-inclusive Biblical truth, that no new attempt at a reconciliation between reason and faith is likely to be meaningful or possible. In the light of modern developments, the utterly fictitious and arbitrary nature of the medieval philosophical Midrash which was read into the Bible as almost the highest word of Divine truth stares mockingly in our face as a warning against any renewed attempts in that direction. Moreover, the knowledge accumulated over the last few centuries is too new, even to the believers in the Biblical adage that "there is nothing new under the sun", to allow any attempt even by the most ingenious mind to accommodate it within the Biblical framework. Thus, although modern culture, no doubt, constitutes an unparalleled

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victory of human reason and a testimony to the greatness of man's rational capabilities, its development, far from eliminating the anti-rationalist viewpoint, actually tends to uphold it, though in a clearly demarcated domain. Indeed, it is only in the contemporary world, hundreds of years since the formulation of the seemingly rather naive conceptions of the anti-rationalists, and in the wake of a long scientific development which appeared utterly to refute them, that we are becoming aware, more than ever before, of the validity of some of the basic anti-rationalist views and attitudes. In an age of ever deeper probing into the subconscious recesses of the human psyche, and of horrible displays of the intensity of human passions, the anti-rationalist conception of man in terms of a composite of various, often contradictory faculties, forces, and inclinations, rather than a predominantly rational being, is becoming almost commonplace. Modern developments have also vindicated another contention of the anti-rationalists, namely the obvious lack of any correlation between the intellectual achievements of man and his spiritual welfare and aspirations. Nor has the anti-rationalist conception of Judaism as spiritual and functional rather than intellectual lost its validity. True, large sections of the Jewish people have abandoned the practices of Judaism. Meaningless also to the modern Jew is the anti-rationalist concept of human culture as divided between the realm of the natural and the spiritual, with the former conceived of as the proper domain of non-Jews and the latter of Jews alone. Indeed, the whole course of modern Jewish history may be interpreted in terms of a conscious effort on the part of the Jewish people to overcome this dualism and be restored unto the rest of "natural" humanity. All this notwithstanding, the essential truth of the antirationalist conception remains unshaken. As frequently indicated in this text, the insistence of the extreme anti-rationalists on a strict separation between the two realms, to the extent of demanding a total withdrawal from the pursuit of rational knowledge, reflects only a response to a historical situation and must not be construed as their stand in absolute terms. Most of them actually admired secular learning. Hence it is not in the resistance to rational truth as such that the crux of their ideology lies, but rather in the limited significance they attributed to that knowledge as a means for the realization of man's longing for self-fulfillment. Rational truth alone, they justly felt, would not solve man's problems, nor bring him peace of mind. Not by a knowledge of matter would his eternal quest for meaning be served, but only by a spiritual and transcendental approach. It is in this sense that the views of the anti-rationalists remain still meaningful.

222

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Rationalism in terms of a search for truth through a direct confrontation with reality needs no defenders nowadays, not even among Jews. Indeed, it is owing to its adoption that modern Jewry has finally been restored to a natural existence both culturally and politically. However, with this fateful revolution a fait accompli, with the Jewish people completely assimilated to a universally prevalent naturalism, the time appears ripe for Jewry to reflect on the historical path it has followed over the last centuries; to search its soul and ponder on its essence and destiny. Though the wheel of history cannot be turned back and Judaism must remain committed to a full partnership with humanity at large in the search for truth and social justice, it must equally search for ways and means to absorb this worldly culture in its own way and impregnate those goals with its own spirit. It must counteract its newly acquired commitment to naturalism by a reassertion of its historical commitment to the spiritual and transcendental. As, in the days of old, Judaism championed the principles of the spiritual and ethical in a civilization predominated by a sensual and morally corrupt paganism, it is called upon to assume the very same role in contemporary civilization: to embrace the cause of man rather than that of the universe, the spiritual rather than the material, the transcendental rather than the immanent. By doing so it will counter the growing prevalence of modern paganism — the adulation of materialist science — and act in the spirit of its national ethos as it has revealed itself in its long history.

GLOSSARY OF HEBREW TERMS

aggadah Legend, fiction, non-legalistic part of the Talmud. Anokhi "1", first word in the Ten Commandments, referring to God. 'aqedah Binding, refers to the binding of Isaac (Gen. 22). 'aravoth (pi. of'aravah) Willows, used with the palm branch in ceremonies during the holiday of Succoth (Tabernacles). ashrei Blessed, happy; the first word of the Book of Psalms. ba'alei shemoth Miracle workers who perform by the aid of an alleged knowledge of God's names. Berakhoth Blessings, first tractate of the "order" Zera'im of the Mishnah, and first tractate of the Talmud, dealing primarily with prayers. beth midrash House of study, synagogue. darshanim Preachers, homilists. Elohim One of the names of God in the Bible. Elul Twelfth month in the Jewish calendar, corresponding to August-September. Ere? Yisrael The land of Israel. ethrog Citron, used with the palm branch in ceremonies during the holiday of Succoth (Tabernacles). galuth Exile, dispersion. gaon, geonim Originally a title bestowed upon the heads of the Talmudic academies of Sura and Pumpedita in Babylonia; in later times an appellation of the highest honor among rabbis, usually used with regard to eminent scholars of Jewish law. gemara Study, particularly the Aramaic part of the Talmud which expounds the Mishnah. gematria A technique, common among homilists and mystics, which interprets a word according to the numerical value of its letters. geulah Lit. redemption; Utopian forecasts and speculations; the restoration of the Jews to their ancestral homeland. gimel Third letter of the Hebrew alphabet. hadas Myrtle, used with the palm branch and ethrog in ceremonies during the holiday of Succoth (Tabernacles). halakhah Traditional law, legalistic part of the Talmud. halakhic Legalistic, pertaining to the Halakhah. hashmal In modern usage, electricity; in Ezek. 1, uncertain, amber, glitter, etc. bayyoth Living creatures which uphold the Chariot (Ezek. 1). haver Colleague; in post-Biblical usage a title honoris causa given to scholars and sages who did not have the official title of "rabbi"; the exponent of Judaism in Halevi's Kuzari. heikhal Temple, middle part of the Temple.

224

GLOSSARY OF HEBREW TERMS

kaph Eleventh letter of the Hebrew alphabet. kareth Lit. cut, cut off; a word which appears frequently in the legal sections of the Pentateuch as part of the phrase, "He shall be cut off from his people", and understood by the rabbis to mean punishment by the heavens for offenses deserving the death penalty, which are, however, outside the jurisdiction of any h u m a n court. Ketuvim Lit. writings; Hagiographa, third section of Biblical writings in addition to the Pentateuch and Prophets. kol All, whole. lamed Twelfth letter of the Hebrew alphabet. lulav Palm branch, used in ceremonies during the holiday of Succoth (.Tabernacles). ma'asei bereshith Esoteric speculations regarding the creation of the world. ma'asei merkavah A term derived from Ezekiel's visions of the merkavah (Chariot), denoting esoteric speculations regarding God, His throne, and the angels. Maqom Lit. place; fig. one of the names of God signifiying His omnipresence. maskil (pi. maskilim) Enlightened, rationalist. mem Thirteenth letter of the Hebrew alphabet. menorah Candelabra, one of the ceremonial vessels of the Tabernacle and the Temple. Midrash Study, interpretation, exposition of Scriptures in order to derive laws allegedly implied in the text (Midrash halakhah), or moral teachings (Midrash aggadah). midrashic Fictional, homiletic, pertaining to Midrash. mifvoth (pi. of misvah) commandments of the Torah, meritorious deeds. notariqon A technique, common among homilists and mystics, which takes each letter of a word as the initial letter of some other word. osher Happiness. pilpul Talmudic argumentation of a legalistic character; derogatorily, casuistic subtlety. Shavu'oth Feast of Weeks; Pentecost. shema' Lit. " H e a r " : First word of the passage in Deut. 6:4, recited in prayers twice daily, which enjoins upon Israel the belief in G o d ' s unity, the love of G o d , and the keeping of His commandments. firuf One of the techniques employed by mystics and Messianic speculators: the interpretation of a word by transposing its letters. tav Mark, sign, twenty-second letter of the Hebrew alphabet. tefillin Phylacteries. teshuvah Repentance. yeshivah A n academy in which the Talmud is the major subject of study. (Sefer ha)-Zohar Book of Splendor, major text of Jewish mysticism.

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INDEX

Abeth (Abravanel), 74; Ya'aves, commentary on, 134n Abraham, 39, 107, 114-115, 120, 182 Abravanel, Isaac: 72-132; abstract intelligences, 85-86, 105; anti-rationalism of, 74-75, 78-79, 126ff.; astrology, belief in, 86-87, 120, 124; Biblical allegories, 93ff., 110, 113; bibliography (recent) on, 72 n; cabbalah, 75, 110-111; concept of creation, 80fF., 83-84; criticism of rationalists' approach to miracles, 96-98; demons, belief in, 98; Eden story, 113-114; 'En Dor miracle, explained by, 98; ethical problem, 126-132; ethical systems of Greeks and Jews, 127-128; Ezekiel's vision, 118; Figo and, 197-198; Gersonides' view of miracles, criticism of, 96-97, 112; Gibe'on and Ayalon miracle explained by, 98; immortality, 92-93; life of, 72-73, 75, 77-78, 130-131; literary activity in post-exilic period, 119-120; on Maimonides and cabbalah, 128; Maimonides, criticism of views on: acts of prophets, 107-108, creation, 80-81, 83, ethics, 126-127, Ezekiel's visions, 116-118, "faith", 129, Jacob's dream, 114, miracles, 95-96, prophecy, 100-103, prophecy and inspiration, 108-109, soul, 91, spheres 86, symbolism of temple, cult and vessels, 114-115; Maimonides, dichotomic attitudeof Abravanel to, 112-113; Maimonides'impact on, 79, 110; metaphysical speculations, 79-90; on Moses, 111; national motivation of writings during post-exilic period, 119; national thought, 118-126; Nissim's and Crescas' view on creation, criticism of, 82-83; Noah, allegorical meaning of, 114; Platonic view of creation, rejected by, 80-81; prohecy, cause of decline, 122; prophecy in writings of, 100; prophecy, types of, 104-106; prophetic and rational truth, 104-105; redemption, signs of imminent arrival, 123-124; relationship between views and person of, 130fF.; resurrection of the dead, 94, 125; sensual prophecy, 106-107; Solomon, 111-112; Solomon's throne, symbolism of, 116; spheres (rotating), 86, 105; transmigration of souls, belief in, 93; works of Italian period, 73-74 nn 3-7; works of Iberian period, 72-73, n 2; Ya'aves on, 147 Abravanel, Yehudah ben Yishaq, see Ebreo, Leone abstract intelligences, 85-86, 105 Abu Hammad, 83, 159 Abulafia, Abraham, 44, 62 accident, Aristotle's definition of, 50 Adam, 115, 142, 170 Aggadah: Anatoli on, 31, 'Azariah de Rossi's rejection of, 68; Hillel's attitude toward, 56 Ahaz' sun dial, Abravanel's interpretation of miracle of, 99 Ahima'as Scroll, 20 Al'ami, Shlomo, 76 Alemano, Yohanan, 64, 88, 172-173 allegorical interpretation of the Bible, 27; Abravanel and, 93, 109-118; Anatoli and, 28-31; Figo, on Song of Songs, 203; Hillel's approach to, 47-48; Moscatoand 169, 176-177, 180-185; Yahya on Song of Songs, 162-163, see also 153-154; Zerahyah and, 34-38, 47-48

234

INDEX

alphabet, 179-180 America, del Bene on Christian conquest of New World, 214 Amos, 102 Anatoli, Jacob, 28-32; allegorical interpretation of Bible, 29-30; Maimonides' influence on, 28 ff.; negative attitude to mysticism, 31 translations by, 24 Anaxagoras, 80, 81 ancients, rise of science and, 182; transmigration of souls and, 93 anti-rationalism: Abravanel's approach to, 74-75, 78-79, 94, 109, 116-118, 127-130; as one aspect of Italian Jewish culture during Renaissance, 70; cabbalists as champions of, 67; Figo's views on, 200, 208-209; gaining strength of, 62-63; Hillel as exponent of, 42, 54-56; S. D. Luzzatto's position on, 219; modern culture and, 221; Moscato's view of, 167,190,199; science and, 218-219; struggle between rationalists and anti-rationalists in Spain, 75-76; Ya'aves and, 133, 138-140, 143-145, 148; Yahya's qualified anti-rationalism, 156, 158, 163 *aqedah, 39-40, 48-49, 120 *Aqedath Yishaq ('Arama), 78 •Aqiba, 206 Arabic language, Zerahyah on Hebrew derivations from Arabic, 34 n Arabic literature, translation into Latin and Hebrew of, 22-24 •Arama, Yishaq, 78 'aravoth, symbolism of, 169 Aristotle: anti-Aristotelian trends during Renaissance, 62-63; decline of Aristotelianism, 110; diffusion in Italy of writings of, 23-24; eternity and creation in, 80-81, 83; Hillel's Tagmulei ha-Nefesh and, 50, 52-53; immortality and, 158-159; influence on Spanish Jews, 109-110; rotating spheres, conception of, 86; transmigration of souls, opposition to idea of, 94; Zerahyah and, 37 ark of testimony, symbolism of, in Figo, 207-208 articles of faith: Abravanel's view of, 129; Ya'aves' view of, 138f., 143-144 arts, Jewish participation in, 69 'Arukh (Parhon), 23 Asaf, S., 64 asceticism, 65-66 Ashkenazi Jews, 35 astrology: Abravavel on, 86-87, 120-121; Abravanel on heavenly signs of imminent redemption, 124-125; Figo's belief in, 198-199; Moscato's belief in, 171; Yahya's belief in 154-155; Zerahyah's rejection of, 38 astronomy: Abravanel and, 86-87; Figo's view of purpose of, 200-201; Yahya's interest in, 154-156 Averroism, 40-41, 52-53, 62, 78, 92, 220 Avicenna, 37-38 Behinath ha-Dath (Delmedigo), 63-64 Bene, David del, 67, 210 Bene, Judah del: 210-217; admirer of cabbalah, 210; education of Jewish women, 213; Hebrew and Italian, 212-213; Luzzatto Simone and, 214; Muslims and Islam, criticism of, 215-216; political views of Rossi, Luzzatto, Modena and, 216; political views of, 213-214,216-217; praise of Christians, 214-215; secular learning, attitude to, 211; war of Candia and, 216, 217 n 37 Benjamin of Tudela, 61 Berekhyah, Aharon, of Modena, 66 Bible: Abravanel's commentary on, 73; Abravanel on miracles in, 96-99; "higher meaning" of, 111-112, 189; Hillel on essence of soul in, 52; literal interpretation of, 49, 110; modern developments and, 219; "secret" and "revealed" meanings

INDEX

235

of, 29, 34, 40; Zerahya's exegesis and views of, 33-34, 47; see also allegorical interpretations of the Bible Biblical exegesis: Anatoli, 28-31; Moscato's suggestions, 176-177; Yahya's contribution to, 152; Zeraliyah on, 34-38 Binah V'lttim (Figo), 191 body, as abode of three kinds of the spiritual, in Abravanel, 92 body and soul, in Hillel's Tagmulei ha-Nefesh, 51-52 Book of Proverbs, 30-31, 35-36 Book of Yesirah, 40 Cabbalah in Italy: 63-68; Abravanel's attitude toward, 75, 110-111; Cordoveran and Lurianic formulations, 65, 69; Delmedigo's criticism of, 63-64; del Bene's admiration for, 210; diffusion of, 195; Figo and, 199, 205; Maimonides and, 179-180; Mantua as center of cabbalists, 177-178; Moscato and, 177-182; rationalism and anti-rationalism and, 67-68, 76; rise of, 63-65; teachings of, 111; Yahya Joseph and, 152; Ya'aves and, 133, 143 cabbalists, criticism by Ya'aves, 142-143 Candelabra, symbolism of, 114-115 Candia, Jews of, accusations against, 216 n Canon (Avicenna), 37-38 Capsali, Eliyahu, 64 cherubs, symbolism of, 114-116 Christian-Turkish wars and the Jews, 216, 216-217 n Christianity: Abravanel's relationship with Christian world, 131; Counter-Reformation, effects of, 64,192-193; del Bene's views on, 214-215; position of Christian scholars, 211; position of Jews in 15th and 16th-century Europe and, 156-158; Ya'aves' view on inconsistency of, 136-137; see also Judeo-Christian relations Christians: Anatoli's liberal attitude toward, 31; Figo on conception of deity of, 198 circle and point simile: Abravanel's concept of, 88-89; Moscato on, 175-176 contemplation, views on, 77, 202-203 Cordoveran interpretation of the Cabbalah, 65-69 conversion, Christian efforts at converting Jews, 157-158 Counter-Reformation, 64, 194-195 creatio ex nihilo, 80, 83, 189 creation: Abravanel's concept of, 79-84; articles of faith and, 82-83; Figo's view of man and, 198; miracles and, 94-95; Moscato's view of, 168, 174; in the Torah, 94-95; view of transcendental relationship between God and, 176; Ya'aves' views of, 140-141 Crescas, Hasdai, 76, 82, 160 Crown (Abravanel), 74-75 David ben Yehudah Messer Leon, 68 David, 152, 204-205 deeds: deeds versus study, Abravanel's emphasis on, 127-128; Figo's view of primacy of, 204-206; Moscato's view of importance of, 188; Ya'aves' concept of importance of, 141-143 Delmedigo, Eliyahu: criticism of Cabbalah, 63-64; criticism of rationalism, 69-71; nature of prophecy, 106; similarity between Ya'aves' views and, 144-145 n Delmedigo, Joseph Shlomo, 69; on mathematics, 187; rational knowledge and, 218; see, Yashar of Candia demons, Abravanel's belief in existence of, 98; Anatoli's rejection of belief in, 31 Derekh Hayyim (Yahya), 151-152 de Rossi, 'Azariah, see Rossi, 'Azariah de

236

INDEX

determinism, Abravanel's refutation of deterministic view of miracles, 94-95 Dialoghi del Amore (Leone), 88, 172 Discorso (Luzzatto), 214 Divine Law, essence of Judaism and, 190 Divine Providence, "Divine purpose": Figo's view of, 200, 203; nature of, according to Yahya, 161; Ya'aves' stress on importance of, 136, 139-141; Zerahyah's view of, 38 "Divine Wisdom", 26; Moscato's view of, 187; Yahya's concept of, 155; see also metaphysics Dorvan (Hillel), 45 dreams, prophecy and, 101, 106 earth, Yahya's concept of, 154 Ebreo, Leone, 87, 131-132, 172; circle simile and, 88; Moscato and, 167 Eden story, Abravanel's interpretation of, 113-114 "Efodi", Yahya on, 160 El'azar ben 'Azariah, Abravanel on words of, 128 Elijah, 99 Elisha', 99, 107 Elohim, Moscato's interpretation of, 173 emanation: Abravanel on, 89, 104; concept of, in relation to soul, in Hillel, 53; neoPlatonic theory of, 171 Empedocles, 80-81 'En Dor story, 98 Ere? Yisrael, Abravanel's view of, 121-122 Esau, 114 eternity, Abravanel on, 79-84, 92 ethics: Abravanel on ethical problems, 126-132; morality in rational ideology of 13th century, 26; writings on during 16th-17th centuries, 65-66; see also deeds ethrog, Figo's view of symbolism of, 199; Moscato's view of symbolism of, 169 Europe, Jewry in Christian Europe, 156-158, 214 exchange of letters between Hillel and Zerahyah, 38, 43, 47-49 exile and redemption: Abravanel's conception of, 123-125; Figo on, 195-196; Ya'aves on, 138-139; see also Galuth Ezekiel, allegorical interpretation of visions of, 116, 118 faith: Abravanel's criticism of Maimonides' concept of, 129-130; del Bene on, 211; Hillel's position in struggle between reason and, 49-56; Maimonides and, 129-130, 147-148; Ya'aves' view of rationalism and, 145 Fano, Menahem 'Azariah de, 66, 178 Faradsch ben Salem, 24 Ficino, Marsiglio, 63, 87 Figo, 'Azariah, 192-209; Abravanel and, 197-200; allegorization of Bible, 203; antisecular and anti-rational stand of, 200, 208-209; astrological beliefs of, 198-199; background of views of, 195; deeds versus speculation and, 204, 206; educational background of, 192-193; ethrog and lulav, symbolism, 199; exile and redemption, 196-197; Halevi's influence on, 198; Judaism and rational learning, 201; man as goal of creation, 198; medicine in similes of, 193-194; on miracles, 203; Moscato's influence on, 200, 204, 208; mysticism, criticism of, 205; rise of science and, 193, 194; Rossi's ('Azariah) influence on, 203; science and philosophy, attitude to, 202, 204; uniqueness of Israel, 197-199; Ya'aves' influence on, 198-200; Yahya's influence on, 198 First Prophets, Abravanel's commentaries on, 74

INDEX Forms of the Elements,

237

The (Abravanel), 84

Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, literary activities at court of, 24-25, 28 Galen, 168-169 Galuth and ge'ulah, Ya'aves' views on, 137-138; Yahya's awareness of, 156-157, 162; see also exile and redemption Gemotria, 40, 180 Genesis: Abravanel's commentary on, 88-89; Zerahyah's view of, 36 geometry, Yahya on, 155-156 Gersonides: Abravanel's criticism of allegories of, 115-116; concept of creation of, 81; interpretation of miracles by, 95-97, 99; nature of prophecy, 106 ghetto system, in Italy, 64, 194 Gibe'on and Ayalon miracle, 97 Giddulei Terumah (Figo), 192-193 Gideon, 98-99, 102, 108 G o d : Abravanel's conception of, 81, 83-84, 88-91, 94, 97, 121; circle simile and, 89, 175-176; Figo's conception of, 197-198, 202-203; Moscato's concept of, 168, 175f., 182; relationship between creation and, 96-97, 176; relationship between Israel and, 121, 182, 197-198; Ya'aves' view of existence of, 138-140, 144; Yahya on approaches to love of God, 163 Greek philosophy: comparison between Judaic and Greek ethics, 126f; spread of Greek rationalism among Spanish Jews, 75-76 Guide (Maimonides), 23; Abravanel's commentaries on, 74; Anatoli, influenced by, 28 f.; Hillel's commentary on, 44-46; Hillel's questions to Zerahyah regarding, 38; influence exerted in Italy through translations of, 25; Moscato's view of, 179; view on historicity of Biblical narrative in, 40; Zerahyah, influence of Guide on, 33-34 hadas, symbolism of, 169 Haggadah, Abravanel's commentary on, 73 halakhic Judaism, Ya'aves' loyalty to, 143 Halevi, Eli'ezer, 64 Halevi, J u d a h : 75, 80; on creation, 82-83; influence on Abravanel, 118, 120-121; influence on Figo, 198; uniqueness of Israel, 160; view of Judaism, 190 happiness: Moscato's concept of, 175, 187; Yahya's concept of, 158f. haskalah, 219 Hayyat, Yehudah, 63, 66 "Hear, O Israel", Ya'aves' interpretation of, 140 "heavenly spirit", Abravanel's conception of, 92 heavens, Abravanel on, 86-87 Hebrew language: del Bene's views on, 212-213; glossary of terms, 223-224; Hillel's views on, 40, 57; Moscato's view on, 170-171; Rossi, 'Azariah de, on, 170; study of, 23; Zerahyah's explanation by comparison with Arabic, 34 n; Zerahyah's view on, 40 heikhal, Abravanel's view on, 115 heroes (Biblical), Abravanel's view of, 110 hierarchical principle, in Abravanel's concept of the universe, 85-87, 90 Hillel ben Shmuel ben El'azar of Verona: 42-57; allegorization of Bible, 47-49; analysis of Judaism, 55-57; attitude to Aggadah and Halakha, 55-56; exchange of letters between Zerahyah and, 38, 43, 47-49; ideology of rationalism of, 25-27; life of, 42-44; Maimonides' influence on, 44-46; scholarly activities of, 21; as translator, 44; works of, 44-45; see also Hebrew Hiyyun, Joseph, 77

238

INDEX

holy of holies, Abravanel's view of, 115 IJoni ha-Me*agel, 56 humanism, Figo's retreat from, 208-209; Moscato and, 183 Ibn Ezra, Abraham, 23, 81, 176 Ibn Gabirol, Shlomo, 75 Ibn Roschd, 53, 128 Ibn Yahya, see Yahya, Joseph Ibn imagination, role of, in prophecy, 101, 103, 106 'Immanuel da Benevento, 65 'Immanuel of Rome, 19-21, 61 immortality: Abravanel's views on, 90-94; Hillel's concept of, 55; Maimonides' concept of, 159 inspiration, prophecy versus, 108-109 intellect: Abravanel's view of relationship between immortality and intellectual perfection, 93; phases of, in Hillel's Tagmulei ha-Nefesh, 52; role of, in Abravanel's view of prophecy, 104; role of, in Maimonides' approach to prophecy, 102, 103 intellectualism, Yahya's views of, 163 intelligences: abstract intelligences, 85-86; Figo's interpretation of Song of Songs and, 203; task of, in Hillel, 53 Isaac, Abravanel's symbolic interpretation of, 114-115; see also 'aqedah Isaiah, 108, 122, 197 Islam, del Bene's attitude toward, 215-217 Ishmaelites, 70, 198 Israel: Abravanel on origin of, 120; Figo on lot of, 196-197; Yahya on destiny of, 161-162; impact of fate and sufferings of, on Ya'aves, 135, 137-138; relationship between God and, 121, 187, 197-198; see also Judaism, uniqueness of Israel Italian Jewry: characterization by Luzzatto, 22,42; contacts with country's population, 22; cultural decline in 14th and first half of 15th century, 61; del Bene's Kisoth VBeth David, a source of study of, 210; diffusion of Italian language among, 212-213; effect of Ya'aves' anti-rationalism on, 148-149; geographic, economic and political readjustments, 61; help extended to Jews of Palestine by, 217; immigration and influence of Spanish Jews on, 62, 64, 206; impact of Renaissance on, 69; laxity in observance of Jewish religious practices by, 206; receptivity to mystical trends, 64, 65, 206; relations between communities of North and South Italy, 22; spread of Cabbalah among, 64, 69; treatment of Jews by Venice, 216-217 n; trends in 17th-century communites, 208, 218-219; worsening situation in consequence of Counter-Reformation and economic decline of, 194; Zerahyah's impact upon intellectual life of, 33 Italian language: del Bene's view on, 212-213; Hillel's use of, 50 n Italy: del Bene's praise of Christian Italians, 214; expulsion of Jews from Spanishdominated southern Italy, 62 Jacob, Abravanel's symbolic interpretation of, 114 Jacob's dream; 107; Abravanel on Maimonides' interpretation of, 114; allegorical interpretation of, 110; Hillel's interpretation of, 48; Moscato's interpretation of, 182; Zerahyah's interpretation of, 41 Janissaries, del Bene's views of, 215 Jewish Aristotelians, Abravanel's cirticism of, 81-82 Jewish historiography (Rossi, 'Azariah de), 68-69, 71 Jewish scholarship, 69, 211 Jewish university, plans to establish, 69 "Jewish wisdom", Meir ben Gabbai's definition of, 67 Jewry: Abravanel's view of state of, 118-119, 123-124; accusations against, 216-217 n ;

INDEX

239

Christian efforts to convert Jews, 158; deterioration of situation of, in 16th century, 62, 64-65; expulsion from Iberian Peninsula, 62; geographic distribution of Jews, 124; in Ottoman Empire, 217; persecutions, 118-119; physical and mental sufferings of, 157; position of, in 16th-century Christian Europe and impact on Yahya, 156-158; see also Judaism Job, Book of, 36 Jonah story, 39, 99 Joseph ben Shemtov, 77 Joseph ben Shraga, 64 Joshua, 207 Judaism: consequences of exile, 196-197; del Bene's awareness of basic affinity between Christianity and, 215; de Rossi's view of, 71, 190; emphasis on unique spiritual and ethical values of, 218-219; Figo's view of nature of, 201, 205; Hillel's analysis of, 55-57; ideal of the Jew, 141-143; influence of modern culture on, 221; Moscato's concept of, 183, 185, 190-191; nature and, 146, 199; natural science and, 145-146; opposition among Italian Jewry to traditional Judaism, 208; philosophy and science, versus, 201; rational knowledge and, 201; resurrection and, 94, 125; Ya'aves' view of major tenets of, 138-141; Yahya's concept of, 162-163; see also uniqueness of Israel Judeo-Christian relations: deterioration of, in 15th and 16th centuries, 62; effects of, on Abravanel's writings, 123; language and, 212-213; tensions in, 194; Yahya and, 156-158 Kalonymos ben Kalonymos, translations by, 24 Ketuvim, Yahya's commentary on, 151 Kisoth VBeth David (del Bene), 210, 212, 214 knowledge: Abravanel's concept of rational and prophetic, 104-106; Anatoli on, 30; ethical ideal and, 127-128; growing awareness of rational knowledge, 218; Moscato on, 187-188; in rationalist ideology of 13th century, 26; Yahya's view of rational knowledge, 162 Kuzari (Halevi), 82-83, 170, 188 language: Hebrew as first language of man, 40, 168; among Jews in Italy, 212-213 Latin, translations from Arabic into, 22-24 learning: Galen's three methods of defining, 168-169; see also secular learning legalistic Judaism: Hillel's view on, 55-56; Rossi's ("Azariah de), view on law as essence of Judaism, 71; Ya'aves' view on importance of revealed law, 143 Leone Ebreo, see Ebreo Leone logic, Zerahyah on, 35 Lonzano, Menahem, 66 Lot, visions and, 39, 107 lulav, allegory and symbolism of, 169, 199 Lurianic interpretation of the Cabbalah, 65, 69 Luzzatto, Moshe Hayyim, 218 Luzzatto, Shmuel David: characterization of Italian Jewry, 22, 42; anti-rationalism of, 219 Luzzatto, Simone, 213-214, 218 Ma'amar ha-Dorvan (Hillel), 45 Ma'avar Yabboq (Aharon Berekhyah), 66 Maestro Gaio, 43-44; Hillel's letter to, 46 Maimonides: Abravanel on: allegorical interpretations of, 112-113; articles of faith of, 129; criticism of interpretation of Ezekiel's visions by, 117; criticism of views

240

INDEX

on prophecy of, 107-108; ethical principles of, 127; rejection of view on soul of, 91; on writings and beliefs of, 79f., 91, 107-108, 112-113, 117, 127, 129; Anatoli under influence of, 28f.; Cabbalah and, 177-178; Delmedigo on, 70; purpose of creation according to, 90; Hillel on views of, 44-47, 54; immortality, concept of, 159; influence of Guide, 23, 25; interpretation of miracles by, 95-96; Moscato on, 169, 179-180; nature of universe, 89; polemic on, 25; prophecy according to, 100-103; rationalism of, 38-40; Shemtov ben Shemtov's criticism of, 77; thirteen articles, 82-83; view on rotating spheres, 86; Ya'aves and, 147-148; Yahya's attitude toward, 159; Zerahyah and, 35-36, 38-40, 47 man: Abravanel's concept of, 79, 84-90; Anatoli's interpretation of Book of Proverbs, 30; concept of, in 13th-century rationalist ideology, 27; Figo's view of nature of, 198, 200; Moscato's concept of, 173-175; Zerahyah's concept of, 36 Mantua: as center of Cabbalah, 177; as Jewish cultural center, 69, 167; Moscato in, 177-178 Marranos: Abravanel's favorable disposition toward, 123; Abravanel on tragic fate of, 119; influx in Italy of, 206 mathematics: 26; Joseph Shlomo Delmedigo's opinion of, 187; Moscato's opinion of, 186-188; Yahyaon, 154-155 medicine, Figo's use of similes from area of, 193-194 Meir ben Gabbai, 66-67, 78 Menahem of Recanati, 63 Menorah, as symbol of speculative wisdom, 93 Messer Leon, Judah, 168; see Yehudah ben Yehiel Messiah: del Bene's anticipation of, 213-215; Figo's description of, 202; Hillel's views on, 57 messianic hope: Abravanel's view of, 122-125; doubts raised against, 122-123; intensification of, in 16th century, 65; Yahya and, 157 messianic trilogy (Abravanel), 73, 119, 122 metaphysics: Abravanel's speculations, 79-90; del Bene's concept of faith and, 211; Luzzatto's position on, 219; Moscato's view of, 186; in rational ideology of 13th century, 26; Yahya's high regard for, 153-154; see also "divine wisdom" midrash: Abravanel and, 95-97, 113, 115-116; arbitrary nature of, 220; in Hillel's view of Judaism, 55-56; Moscato's use of technique of, 189 Mif'aloth Elohim (Works of God), Abravanel, 76, 80, 88-89 miracles: Abravanel's acceptance of. 82, 94-99; Delmedigo's views on, 70; Figo on, 203; miraculous nature of prophecy, in Abravanel, 100; Rossi, 'Azariah de, on, 203 miraculous (the) in the Bible: Hillel's views on, 48; Maimonides' views on, 38-39 misvoth, 159-160, 63 Modena, Judah (Leon), 69, 218 Moral Epistle (lggereth Musar) ('Alami), 76 morality, see ethics Moscato, Judah: 167-191; anti-rationalism of, 190; attitude to natural philosophy, 187; attitude to secular learning, 184, 185-186, 188, 190-191; belief in antiquity of Zohar and vowels, 178; belief in astrology, dreams and mystical power of Hebrew alphabet, 171; Cabbalah and, 177, 181-182; concept of man, 173; concept of the Torah, 180; erudition of, 171; exegetical suggestions of, 176-177; failure of rational knowledge, 188; Gematria and Notariqon and, 180; linguistic excellence of, 170; Platonism and, 173; prevalence of musical relationships, 168; scientific knowledge and, 183-184; use of allegory by, 169, 182-185; view of metaphysics, 187; on reason and faith, 184 Moses: miracles of, 96; Moscato's view of, 168; oral tradition and, 207; Ya'ave? on, 142 Mostin, criticism of cabbalists, 60

INDEX

241

"mother's law", symbolic meaning of, 154 music, Moscato's musical interpretations, 168 Muslims, del Bene's criticism of, 215-217 mysticism: Anatoli's negative attitude to, 31; diffusion of basic texts of, 195; Figo's attitude toward, 206; Mantua as a center of, 177-178; Moscato and, 178, 180-182; in Rieti's Small Temple, 61 ; receptivity of Italian Jewry to mystical trends, 64, 65, 206 Nahmanides, 34-35, 46 Nahum Ish Gamzu, 56 Naples, literary activities at Frederick II's court, 24-25, 28 Nathan ha-Me'athi, translations of, 24 national thought: Abravanel on, 118-126; Anatoli's concept of equality of nations, 32; Figo on, 195f., 198; Ya'aves on, 136f.; Yahya's nationalism, 158, 160-162 "natural philosophy", Moscato's low regard for, 187-188 natural science: Judaism and, 222; Ya'aves' criticism of, 145-146; Yahya's interest in, 154-155 nefesh, in Abravanel's conception of prophecy, 104 Nefusoth Yehudah (Moscato), influence on Figo of, 200 neo-Platonism : Abravanel and, 87-88; immortality of the soul and, 90-91; Jewish exponents of, 172-173; Moscato as adherent of, 173 Ner Mifvah (Yahya), 151-152 Nissim, concept of creation and eternity of, 82 Noah's Ark, Anatoli's allegorical interpretation of, 29-30 Nofeth $ufim (Messer Leon), 168 Or Adonai (Crescas), 76 Or ha-Hayyim (Ya'aves), 147 Old Testament, Christian view of, 214; see also Bible oral tradition: Figo's defense of, 206-208; "higher principles" and, 129; Hillel's view of importance of, 56; lex talionis as interpreted by sages of, 179; sages of, 169; Viterbo and, 208 "order", Moscato's concept of, 168-169 Ottoman Empire, 215, 217 Padova, university of, 150 Palestine, situation of Jewish community in, 217 Parhon, Shlomo, 23 Passover Haggadah, Abravanel's commentary on, 73 Patriarchs, Abravanel's views on, 114 penitence, Figo on, 193-194 personality, Hillel's conception of, 55 Petit, Shlomo, 25, 46-47 Petrarch, 41, 62 philosophy: Abravanel on philosophical speculation, 115, 128; del Bene's attitude toward, 211; Delmedigo's (Eliyahu) approach to, 70-71; demand for separation between religion and, 71 ; Figo's attitude toward, 200-201, 208; Hillel's Tagmulei ha-Nefesh, 49-56; Moscato and, 184fF.; Ya'aves' views of, 141-143; Zerahyah on relationship between religion and, 41 physics, 26 Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni, 62, 87, 174 pietism, in Rieti's Small Temple, 60 planets, Abravanel on, 86 Plato and Platonism; circle simile and, 176; eternity, concept of, 80-81; influence on

242

INDEX

Abravanel's views on immortality of soul, 91; revival of study of, 62, 171-172; rotating spheres, conception of, 86; soul, concept of, 174; transmigration of souls and, 93 Platonic Academy, 62 poetry: 'Immanuel of Rome, 19, 21; religious poetry of 16th and 17th centuries, 65 political views: of del Bene, Luzzatto, Modena and Rossi, 216 Pomponazzi, Pietro, 62 Portaleone, Abraham, 68 prophecy: in Abravanels writings, 100-109; Delmedigo's (Eliyahu) views on, 70; dreams and, 101 ; inspiration versus, 108-109; Maimonides' approach to, 100-103; miraculous nature of, in Abravanel, 100; sensual prophecy (Abravanel), 106-107; Yahya's concept of, 160-161 prophetic knowledge and method, Abravanel on, 105-106 prophetic revelation, Hillel on nature of, 48 prophetic vision, Zerahyah's view on, 37-39 prophets: Abravanel's views of miracles performed by, 97-98; symbolic acts of, 107-108 Provence, ties between Italian Jewish communities and, 22 Provençale, Abraham, 178 Provençale, David, 178 Provençale, Moshe, 178 Proverbs, Book of, 30, 34-35, 153 Providence, see Divine Providence Psalms, prophecy versus inspiration and, 108 Psalter, Yahya's view of, 152-153 punishment, see reward and punishment Pythagoras, 93 rationalism: Abravanel's opposition to, 79, 95-97, 105, 127-129; Anatoli and, 28-31; in Biblical interpretation, 110; Cabbalah's attitude toward, 67-68; causes of polemic against, in Italy, 62; del Bene's struggle against, 211; Delmedigo's criticism of, 69-71 ; Figo's opposition to, 195, 200, 204; Hillel's position versus, 42, 48, 54, 57; modern culture and, 221-222; spread in Jewish communities of, 25-27; struggle between rationalists and anti-rationalists in Spain, 75-76; Ya'aves' opposition to, 141, 145; Yahya's approach toward, 153, 162; in Zerahyah's thought, 34-41 rational truth: Figo on, 200-201; Moscato on, 186-188; Ya'aves' rejection of role of, 144; see also knowledge, rationalism rationalist skepticism, with regard to religion, 195, 206-208 reality, man as a reflection of, 88 reason and faith: Hillel's position on, 49f.; Moscato's view of, 184-186; Renaissance influence on relationship between, 69 Recanati, Menahem, 61-63 religion: Averroist attitude toward, 41; Delmedigo's (Eliyahu) approach to, 70-71; separation between philosophy and, 71 ; Zerahyah on relationship between philosophy and, 40-41 ; see also Christianity, Judaism religious poetry, 65 religious practices: Figo's view on importance of, 205-206; Ya'aves on effects of rationalism on, 145; see also deeds Renaissance: anti-Aristotelian trends during, 62-63; impact on Jewish scholarship, 69; influence on Moscato, 167, 183, 186 Reshith Hokhmah (Vidas), 65-66 resurrection, Abravanel's concept of, 94, 98, 125 revealed Judaism: Abravanel on, 80; Rossi on, 71

INDEX

243

revelation at Sinai, 102, 107; Moscato on purpose of, 189 reward and punishment: Abravanel on meaning of heavenly reward, 93; Delmedigo's views on, 70; nature of, in Hillel's Tagmulei ha-Nefesh 54-56; Ya'aves' view of, 138 Rieti, Moshe, 60 Romano, Judah, 19, 24 Rossi, 'Azariah de: attitude to Cabbalah, 68; demand for separation between Judaism and secular learning, 71; on Hebrew language, 170; ideal of truth per se, 202; influence on del Bene's political views by, 213; Judaism, view of, 190-191; Moscato and, 167 rotating spheres, Abravanel's conception of, 86-88 Ruth, Book of, Yahya on, 152 Sabbath: belief in creation and, 82; Ya'aves on nature of prayers of, 141 sacrificial cult, 29, 112, 114 Samson, 99 Samuel, 107, 108 Saul, 204-205 science: anti-rationalism and, 218-219; del Bene's attitude toward, 211; development and limits of, 220; diffusion among Italian Jews of, 22; Figo's attitude toward, 200-202, 208-209; Judaism and natural science (Ya'aves), 145-146, 222; Moscato's views of, 186-188 scientific method and knowledge: evolution and, 219-220; Figo on, 202; prophetic and 105-106; rise of, in 16th century, 184 scholasticism, 22 Scotus, Michael, 31 Scriptures, see Bible Second Commonwealth, redemption and, 197 secular learning: Abravanel's use of allegory to combat, 115; Cabbalah and, 67-68; del Bene's qualified negative attitude toward, 211; Figo's attitude toward, 200, 202, 204, 209; Moscato on, 183f., 191; Rossi on, 190-191; Rossi's demand for a separation between Judaism and, 71; spread of, 19-27; Ya'aves' attitude toward, 133, 135-136, 143, 146, 148; Yahya's position on, 150, 153, 155^ 162 secularism, relationship between Judaism and, during Renaissance, 68-69 Sedeq cOlamim (Abravanel), 120-121 Sefer ha-Emunoth (Shemtov), 76-77 Sha'ar ha-Hesheq (Alemano), 88 Shalsheleth ha-Cabbalah (Gedaliah Ibn Yahya), 150 Shamayim Hadashim (New Heavens) (Abravanel), 80 Sha'ul of Crete, Abravanel and, 120, 130 shema': Moscato's interpretation of, 176-177; Yahya's interpretation of, 163 Shemtov ben Shemtov, 76-77 Shiltei ha-Gibborim (Portaleone), 68 Shi'ur Qomah, 40 shmitah, 82, 85, 92 Shmuel ben Hofni, 98 Sinai, revelation at, 102, 107, 205 ?iruf, 40 Small Temple (Rieti), 61-62 Sodom and Gomorrah, 96, 110 Solomon, 35, 106, 111, 116 Solomon's throne, Abravanel's symbolic interpretation of, 116 Sommi, Leone, 69 Song of Songs: Figo's allegorization of, 203; Hillel's commentary on, 45,47; Moscato's

244

INDEX

interpretation of, 181-182; prophecy versus inspiration and, 108; Yahya's commentary on, 152, 162-163 soul: Abravanel's views on origin, essence and immortality of, 90-94; Averroist concept of, 52-53; controversies between Maimunists and their opponents on subject of, 45; del Bene on, 211; essence of, in Hillel's Tagmulei ha-Nefesh, 50-54; existence of "spirit" and, 92; Moscato's preoccupation with, 183; Yahya's concept of, 158f. Spanish Jewry: Abravanel on tragedy of, 119, 131; Aristotelianism and, 109-110; flourish and decline of, 76; impact of fate of, on Ya'aves, 135-137, 148; influence of, on Italian communities, 23-24, 62, 64, 206; persecution, expulsion and exile of, 62,119,123, 150,156; struggle between rationalists and anti-rationalists in, 75-76; ties between Italian Jewish communities and, 22-23; Ya'aves on causes of spiritual decay of, 148 spheres, rotating, Abravanel's conception of, 86-88 spirit, existence of soul and, 92 spirituality, Abravanel on, 91 Srug, Israel, 178 sublunar realm, Abravanel's conception of, 86, 87 stars, Abravanel on, 86 Students' Goad (Anatoli), 28 symbolism, see allegorical interpretations of the Bible Tabernacle, Abravanel's symbolic interpretation of, 114-115 Tagmulei ha-Nefesh (Hillel), 44, 45, 47, 49-56 Talmud: burning of, 64, 66, 195; importance of study of, in 13th-century Italy, 20-21 Talmudists, Ya'aves' criticism of, 142-143 Tarfon, view on study and deeds, 206 tefillin, 82, 146 Temple of Solomon: Abravanel's interpretation of symbolism of, 116; Maimonides on vessels of, 179-180; Moscato's interpretation of, 181-182 Ten Commandments: prophecy and, 102; Ya'aves' view of nature of, 141 Themistius, 159 Toleranz-Patent (Joseph II), 212 Torah: concept of creation in, 91-92, 94-95; del Bene's view of rationalism and, 211; Delmedigo on philosophy and, 70; Figo on Israel and, 199, 207-208; Moscato's conception of, 180-181, 189; soul's origin according to, 91; view of happiness in, 159; Ya'aves' view of, 146 Torah Or (Yahya), 151, 153-158 tradition, see oral tradition translations: of Arabic works into Latin and Hebrew, 22-24, 33; Hillel's work in the field of, 44-45; Zerahyah's translations into Hebrew, 33 transmigration of soul, Abravanel's belief in, 93-94 truth: Figo on rational truth, 200-201; prophecy and, 105; Rossi on, 71; in secular learning, 190; Ya'aves' rejection of rational truth as destiny of man, 144 uniqueness of Israel: Abravanel's concept of, 87, 120-121; Figo's views on, 195f., 197-198; Ya'aves' concept of, 136; Yahya's concept of, 156, 158, 160-162 universe: Abravanel's view of hierarchical order of, 85-87, 90; Figo's view of unique position of Israel in, 198-199; Maimonides' belief in organic nature of, 89; Moscato's concept of, 171-172, 175-176; Yahya's concept of, 154-155, 160-161 Valla, Lorenzo, 62 Venice: spiritual climate of, 193, 195, 206; treatment of Jews after fall of Candia, 216-217 n Vidas, Eliyahu, 65, 66

INDEX

245

vita contemplativa, 159 "vital spirit", Abravanel's concept of, 92 Viterbo, Abraham Hayyim, 208 Wessely, Naphtali, 212 wisdom: Anatoli on three areas of, 30; del Bene on, 211; Figo's concept of, 201-202; Hillel on, 55; Meir ben Gabbai on, 66-67; Moscato's concept of, 185 f.; origin in ancient Israel of, 27, 185; in rationalist ideology 26; Yahya's classification of, 155 women (Jewish): del Bene's opposition to study of Italian language by, 213; symbolic meaning attached to, in Anatoli's interpretation of Book of Proverbs, 30; Zerahyah's allegorical interpretation of, 35-36 written law, Figo on oral and, 206 Ya'aves, Joseph: 133-149; anti-rationalism of, 77-78, 133, 140, 142, 144, 145, 148; articles of faith, 138, 144; criticism of Talmudists and cabbalists, 142-143; divine providence, 136, 139-140; as exponent of mysticism, 64, 133; Galuth and Ge'ulah, 137-138; influence on Figo of, 199-200; Judaism and nature, 146; Maimonides and, 147-148; rationalism cause of spiritual decay of Spanish Jewry, 148; on secular learning, 62,133,135-136,143,146,148; similarity between views of Delmedigo and views of, 144-145 n; Spanish influence on, 133, 135-136; uniqueness of Israel, 136, 144; works written in Italy, 134 n Yahya, David Ibn, 150-151 Yahya, Gedaliah Ibn, 150-151 Yahya, Joseph Ibn, 150-163; allegorical interpretations of Bible, 153-156; anti-rationalism of, 156, 158, 162-163; astrology, 154; Biblical exegesis of, 152, 162-163; Cabbalah, 152; earth and heavens, 154; Galuth, 156-157; happiness, 158-159; life of, 150-151; mathematics and astronomy, 155; metaphysics, 153-154; nationalism of, 158,160-162; secular learning, 153; uniqueness of Israel, 156,158,160-162; views on soul and their rejection by, 158-160; writings of, 151-152; Ya'aves and, 156 Yahya, Judah Ibn, 150, 151 Yashar of Candia 209; see Delmedigo, Joseph Shlomo Yehiel ben Yoab, 21 Yehudah ben Yehiel, 133; see Messer Leon, Judah Yishma'el, Abravanel's symbolic interpretation of, 114 Zerahyah ben Yishaq ben Shaltiel Hen of Barcelona, 33-41; allegorical interpretation of the Bible, 34-39; Ashkenazi Jews, 35; concept of divine providence, 38; concept of prophetic vision, 37; exchange of letters between Hillel and, 38, 43, 47-49; Guide's influence on, 33; Hillel's attitude toward allegorisms of, 47-48; life and work of, 33; on logic, 35; Maimonides' influence on, 36, 38-40; on Nahmanides, 34-35; on Proverbs, Book of, 35; rationalism of, 25-27,40; rejection of belief in astrology, 38; on religion, 40-41 Zevah Pesah (Abravanel), 119-120 zodiacal signs: Abravanel on, 86; redemption and, 124-125 Zohar: Abravanel's references to, 110-111; circle simile and, 176; connection between burning of Talmud and diffusion of, 64; printing of, 66, 178