Between East and West: The Formation of the Moscow State 9781644697146

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BETWEEN EAST AND WEST The Formation of the Moscow State

BETWEEN EAST AND WEST The Formation of the Moscow State

M A R AT S H A I K H U T D I N O V

BOSTON 2021

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Shaĭkhutdinov, M. E. (Marat Ersainovich), author. Title: Between East and West: the formation of the Moscow state / Marat Shaikhutdinov. Description: Updated American edition. | Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2021. | This updated American edition is dedicated to the influence of the East and the West on the rise of the Moscow principality and its gradual transformation into a centralized Moscow state from the twelfth to the early sixteenth. | Includes bibliographical references. Identifiers: LCCN 2021035430 (print) | LCCN 2021035431 (ebook) | ISBN 9781644697139 (hardback) | ISBN 9781644697146 (adobe pdf) | ISBN 9781644697153 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Russia--History--Period of Consolidation, 1462–1605. | Despotism--Russia--History | Moscow (Russia)--History. | Moscow (Russia)--Politics and government. | Moscow (Russia)--Foreign relations. Classification: LCC DK100 .S427 2021 (print) | LCC DK100 (ebook) | DDC 947/.041--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021035430 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021035431 Copyright © Academic Studies Press, 2021 ISBN 9781644697139 (hardback) ISBN 9781644697146 (adobe pdf) ISBN 9781644697153 (epub) Book design by PHi Business Solitions Cover design by Ivan Grave Published by Academic Studies Press 1577 Beacon Street Brookline, MA 02446, USA [email protected] www.academicstudiespress.com  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contents List of Figures List of Ancient Geographical Maps of Moscovia, Europe, and Asia Author’s Preface to the American Edition Introduction 

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1. Historiography of the Formation of Moscow  2. Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player 3. Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi 4. Rus between the Horde and Lithuania  5. The Course towards the Creation of the Centralized State  6. The Origin of the Russian Autocracy  7. The Last Gatherer of the Russian Land 

1 23 74 98 121 145 180

Conclusion207 Index235

List of Figures Chapter I Figure 1. Apollinary Mikhailovich Vasnetsov. “Founding of Moscow” (1917).

22

Chapter II Figure 2. Sergey Vasilievich Ivanov. “Baskaki” (1909).

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Chapter III Figure 3. Russian cities are sending soldiers to Moscow. Detail of the composition on the theme “The Legend of the Mamay Massacre.” Fragment of the icon “Sergius of Radonezh with a Hagiography”, mid-seventeenth century, Yaroslavl.

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Chapter IV Figure 4. Apollinary Mikhailovich Vasnetsov. “Defense of Moscow against the Invasion of Khan Tokhtamysh” (1918).

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4.3. Russian-Lithuanian relations Figure 5. Jan Matejko. “The Battle of Grunwald” (with Ulrich von Jungingen and Vytautas at center) (1878). 120

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Chapter V Figure 6. Pavel Petrovich Chistyakov. “The Grand Duchess Sofya, Daughter of Vytautas, Tears off the Belt from Prince Vasily Kosoy at the Wedding of the Grand Duke Vasily the Dark in 1433” (1861). 144

Chapter VI Figure 7. Nikolay Semenovich Shustov. “Ivan III Overthrows the Tatar Yoke, Tears Apart the Image of the Khan, and Orders to Kill the Ambassadors” (1862). 179

Chapter VII Figure 8. Adolph Iosifovich Charlemagne. “Meeting of the Grand Duke Vasily III Ioannovich with the Ambassadors of Emperor Charles V near Mozhaysk” (1887).

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List of Ancient Geographical Maps of Moscovia, Europe, and Asia Map 1. Johann Gottfried Philipp Abelin and Lukas Kilian. “A plan of Moscow,” also known as “Sigizmund’s Plan,” dedicated to Sigismund II, King of Poland and Sweden (1610). Map 2.  Gerard Mercator and Henricus Hondius. “Tartaria” (1606). Map 3.  Gerard Mercator and Henricus Hondius. “Nova Europae Descriptio” (1606). Map 4.  Abraham Ortelius. “Asiae Nova Descriptio” (1574) from Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Spectacle of the Globe of the Earth)—the world’s first geographical atlas, consisting of fifty-three large-format maps with detailed explanatory geographic texts, which was printed in Antwerp on May 20, 1570 and reflected the state of geographical knowledge at that time. Map 5.  John Speed. “A Newe Mape of Tartary” (1626). Map 6.  Anthony Jenkinson and Frans Hogenberg. “Russiae, Moscoviae et Tartariae Descriptio” (1562). This map was compiled by the English merchant, diplomat, and traveler A. Jenkinson (1529–1610), who was the ambassador to Russia under Ivan the Terrible; from 1557 to 1571 he repeatedly visited Russia as a representative of the Moscow trading company. The result of these travels was not only official reports, but also the most detailed map of Russia at that time. 

223 224 225

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Map 7.  Richard Blome and Thomas Burnford. “A Generall Mapp of the Kingdoms of Tartaria” (1682). Blome first began engraving maps for his Geographical Description of the Four Parts of the World in 1667. The completed volume was in small folio, and contained twenty-four maps. Blome’s principal handicap in the production of the atlas was the lack of a mapmaking production in England comparable with that in Europe. Also, to finance his work, he promised his sponsors to add their coats of arms to certain maps. 229 Map 8.  Semen Ulyanovich Remezov. “Ethnographic Map of Siberia” (seventeenth century). Remezov was a Russian historian, architect and geographer. He compiled three collections of maps, charts and drawings of Siberia. Leo Bagrow, a Russian historian of maps, notes that Remezov’s works show some idiosyncratic details in line with Muscovite cartographic tradition. 230 Map 9.  Jan Willemsz Blaeu and Hessel Geritsz. “Map of Russia” (1614). The top left corner has an inset plan of Moscow with a seventeen-point key. On the right is a prospect of Archangel, Russia’s only northern port until the founding of St. Petersburg in 1700. Three figures in Russian dress stand above. The map was compiled from manuscript maps and works by Isaac Massa. The inset plan of Moscow has been attributed to the Crown Prince Fyodor Godunov. 231 Map 10.  Jan Willemsz Blaeu and Hessel Geritsz. Fragment of “Map of Russia” (1614). 232 Map 11.  Fra Mauro’s map (1460). The main difference of this map from previous medieval European maps is the display of paved roads that connect the regions and cities of Russia. Probably, the merchants who traded at the Italian ports of the Northern Black Sea region helped in the creation of this map. In the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries they travelled between Surozh (Sugdeya), Tana, and Moscow, and reached Pechora in search of birds of prey, highly valued in the West and East. This map shows trade routes along the Don and the rivers of the Moscow region, as well as a complex network of northern rivers. 233

Author’s Preface to the American Edition

A

s I present the monograph Between East and West: The Formation of the  Moscow State to American readers, I would like to draw attention to several fundamentally important points. First of all, it should be noted that this work is one among the few academic studies on the early period of Russian statehood produced by contemporary scholars on the post-Soviet space. Of course, in the old days (and perhaps over the past thirty years), the publication of such a monograph was impossible, not the least because of the ideological dogmas and stereotypes—the legacy of the Soviet era. Since then, the situation has changed dramatically. The process of rethinking the historical past has begun in the newly independent states on the EuroAsian continent. In search of their cultural, civilizational, and geopolitical identity, the young states turned to their historical roots. In this sense, Kazakhstan, with its statehood being closely related to the history of Ulus Jochi (Golden Horde), is no exception. Over the years of independence, new historical sources have become available to Kazakhstani scholars, as well as foreign research on the history of the Moscow state, Ulus Jochi, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The absence of censorship by the state authorities allows Kazakhstani historians to think broadly and freely. The book offered to American readers is not just the result of many years of research; it is an attempt to present an objective, unbiased, and independent Kazakh view of history. In part, this shows the uniqueness and academic novelty of this monograph. In this work, I tried to find an answer to the big question: how did the small principality of Moscow manage to rise and then transform into a powerful centralized state? What internal and external factors influenced this process? As a result of this study, I came to the following conclusions. In my opinion, the rise of the Moscow principality and its transformation into a Moscow

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centralized state was not historically inevitable. The Tver principality, Veliky Novgorod or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, given a favorable situation, could have assumed the role of the unifier of all Russian lands, but various factors prevented them from gaining the upper hand over the Moscow principality and taking the leading role in creating a unified Russian state. I understand the desire of many generations of Russian historians and politicians to prove that the Moscow centralized state emerged as a result of internal factors, including the convenient geographical location of Moscow at the intersection of trade routes, the secure position of the Moscow principality, the transfer of the metropolitan see to Moscow, the desire of the Russian principalities to strengthen economic ties, and others. Without rejecting these and other reasons, I nevertheless believe that external factors played an important, if not decisive, role in the formation and further development of the Moscow centralized state. Being incorporated into the Ulus Jochi (Golden Horde), Moscow derived a number of benefits from its vassal position, borrowing from the Horde the idea of a strong central power, as well as many political, legal, and administrative institutions. The need to pay tribute on time forced Moscow to establish tax, customs, and postal services. In the same period, a population census was carried out for the first time in Russia. Note also that Ulus Jochi exempted the Russian Orthodox Church from taxes. By the irony of history, it was the Russian Orthodox Church that led the struggle of Russia against the Horde khans, who made a significant contribution to the rise and strengthening of the Moscow principality. Given these important circumstances, the concept of the so-called “Mongol-Tatar yoke” can be regarded as outdated and untenable. This concept makes it impossible to identify and adequately describe the influence of the Golden Horde on politics, law, economy, and culture of the Moscow state. It is also necessary to take into account the influence of the Byzantine Empire. It was Constantinople that appointed most of the Russian metropolitans, provided Moscow with highly qualified priests and the necessary church literature. Even after the fall of Constantinople, the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church on Russia did not stop; it even intensified. Finally, the emergence of the well-known theory “Moscow—Third Rome,” which had a significant impact on the formation of Russian foreign policy doctrine, would have been impossible without Byzantine influence. An important role in the formation of the Moscow centralized state was played by the states of Western Europe, including the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, the Roman Curia, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, and others. Of

Author’s Preface to the American Edition

course, historians remember the long struggle of Russia and the northern crusaders for influence on Novgorod and Pskov, as well as for the spheres of influence in the Eastern Baltic region, but history also knows that for many years the Moscow state effectively engaged in political, trade-economic, military-technical, and cultural interactions with the states of Western Europe. It is also important to take into account the influence of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, ninety percent of the population of which were Orthodox Russian people. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania became a powerful rival of the Moscow principality, claiming control of the entire territory of Russia. In turn, the grand dukes of Moscow claimed the “historical lands” of Russia that were part of Lithuania, considering them their “patrimony.” History does not permit the subjunctive mood, but one can assume that if the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in alliance with Poland and Tver, would had gained a victory over the Moscow principality, the history of Russia, Europe, and the whole world could have developed in a completely different way. In sum, the Moscow centralized state was formed and developed under the significant influence and pressure of both the East and the West. Russia chose a strategic alliance with the Golden Horde, but did not stop various interactions with the Byzantine Empire and Western Europe. At the same time, the Moscow state absorbed all the most valuable and pragmatic, from the point of view of its rulers, elements of Eastern and Western statehood and political thought. I am therefore convinced that without the influence of the above-described external factors, the Moscow centralized state, as we know it, might not have appeared on the political map of the world. Moreover, I assume that a single Russian state could have formed on the basis of another principality (for instance, Tver or Veliky Novgorod) or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, as well as on the basis of completely different political values, without excessive centralization and unification, without autocracy, authoritarianism, and outright tyranny. These are the main theses of this study. I sincerely hope that it will arouse the interest of both the scientific community and the general public. I am also aware that in many respects this monograph is controversial and polemical in nature. Therefore, I regard it as an invitation to a broad scientific discussion. Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan March 10, 2021

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F

or several decades I have been studying the history of a number of European and Asian states. My published monographs include Geopolitics of the West,1 Geopolitics of the East,2 as well as a separate work entitled Germany.3 A number of my books are dedicated to Russian geopolitics, among them Contemporary Russian Geopolitical Thought: State and Prospects4 and Kazakhstan and Russia in New Geopolitical Coordinates.5 I recently published a two-volume work Russia in World History,6 dedicated to the genesis of Russian people and the development of Russian statehood. This updated American edition is dedicated to the influence of the East and the West on the rise of the Moscow principality and its gradual transformation into a centralized Moscow state from the twelfth to the early sixteenth century. Moscow’s emergence and the formation of Moscow’s centralized state was the result of complex economic, social, and political processes in the territory of Northeastern Rus. However, the political, economic, and cultural appearance of the Moscow centralized state was formed with the active direct participation and powerful influence of the East (Golden Horde) and the West represented by the Byzantine Empire, the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, the Roman Curia, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, as well as the members of the Hanseatic League. At the same time, the Moscow state is not just a link between different

1 Marat Shaikhutdinov, Geopolitics: History, Theory, Practice [Russian], vol. 1, Geopolitics of the West (Pavlodar: LLP NPF “EKO,” 2005). 2 Ibid., vol. 2, Geopolitics of the East [Russian] (Karaganda: KRU, 2006). 3 Marat Shaikhutdinov, Great Powers: History, Theory, Practice. Germany [Russian] (Nur-Sultan: Astana International University, 2019). 4 Idem, Contemporary Russian Geopolitical Thought: State and Prospects [Russian] (Karaganda: RK SGU, 2001). 5 Idem, Kazakhstan and Russia in New Geopolitical Coordinates [Russian] (Karaganda: KRU, 2002). 6 Idem, Great Powers: History, Theory, Practice. Russia in World History [Russian], vol. 1, Kievan Rus (Nur-Sultan: Astana International University, 2019); ibid., vol. 2, Moscow State [Russian] (Nur-Sultan: Astana International University, 2019).

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historical epochs: it has its own appearance and its own value as a self-sufficient civilization, continuously projecting its geopolitical influence onto adjacent spaces. Still, for the West, the Moscow state has traditionally been, for the most part, the East, and for the countries of the East—part of the West. The Moscow state has occupied a prominent place in Russian and world history not because it was predetermined by the entire previous course of history (such an approach would have regarded historical fatalism), but because the Moscow princes were initially aimed at large-scale goals. From generation to generation, the Moscow rulers subjugated more and more territories, but at the same time they worked closely with Ulus Jochi (Golden Horde), seeking for themselves the grand ducal throne of Vladimir. Gradually, Russian-Horde relations began to acquire a more equal and sometimes even partner-like character. The trips of the Russian princes to Sarai and the coordination of various issues with the khans ceased to be something extraordinary and turned into a diplomatic routine. The logical conclusion of this long and complex historical process was the emergence of a single Russian state, as well as its gradual exit from the rule of the Golden Horde. Feeling the weakening of the Horde, Moscow at first stopped paying tribute (“exit”) to the khans, then declared the khans’ illegitimacy, and ultimately began to simply ignore them. Moreover, after the collapse of the Golden Horde, Moscow began to openly claim the role of its legal successor. In sum, the appearance of Moscow state was a response to the challenges of the era of the Mongol conquests. On the other hand, it also created the preconditions for the emergence of the Russian Empire. Following the development of the Moscow state, this book has several tasks: first, to indicate the main stages of the formation of the Moscow principa­ lity and its gradual transformation into the Moscow centralized state; second, to identify the most important political, economic, social, geographical, religious reasons for the rise of Moscow, as well as to analyze the approaches of various Russian historians to the content and hierarchy of these internal factors; third, to reveal the influence of Ulus Jochi, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Byzantine Empire, and Western European countries such as the Holy Roman Empire on the formation of the centralized Moscow state; fourth, to determine the characteristic features of Moscow’s foreign policy, by emphasizing that already in the process of the formation of the Moscow state, the growing geopolitical ambitions of the Moscow princes

Introduction

and their desire for territorial expansion were evident, which resulted in the absorption of neighboring Russian principalities, as well as other lands of Kievan Rus, and also the creation of territorial spheres of influence along the entire perimeter of their borders; fifth, to analyze alternative scenarios for the formation of a unified Russian state led by Tver, Novgorod, or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For this monograph, a wide range of historical sources was used, among which the Russian chronicles occupy an extremely important place. This type of sources includes the Second Novgorod Chronicle, the Fourth Novgorod Chronicle, the First Sofia Chronicle, the Second Sofia Chronicle, the Resurrection Chronicle, the Patriarchal or Nikon Chronicle, the Rogozhsky Chronicle, The Chronicle of Abraham, the Simeon Chronicle, the Yermolin Chronicle, the Moscow Chronicle of the late fifteenth century, and others. The Russian chronicles not only provide historical facts, but also reveal the political sympathies and antipathies of the chroniclers. Of particular interest are the discrepancies between the Moscow and regional annals in the interpretation of certain historical events. Another type of sources are the spiritual letters of Ivan Kalita, Ivan II the Red, Dmitry Donskoy, Vasily I, Vasily II, Ivan III, and Vasily III. They make it possible to trace the territorial growth of the Moscow principality and the grand dukes’ domain, as well as the gradual weakening of the dependence of the Moscow princes on the Golden Horde in matters of succession to the throne. Valuable historical sources are the biographies of Moscow princes, including Praise to Ivan Kalita, A Word about the Life and the Repose of the Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich, Tsar of Russia, and others. However, the canons of the hagiographic genre forced their authors to focus on the positive, keeping silent about the mistakes of Russian princes. Of great importance for the researchers are works telling about the struggle against the Golden Horde, including The Tale of Shevkal, Zadonshchina, The Legend of the Mamai Massacre, The Tale of the Invasion of Tokhtamysh, Message to the Ugra, and others. These literary works contain a lot of valuable information, but it is important to take into account the tendentiousness of Russian authors, as well as their habit of translating political issues into the religious field. In the course of working on the monograph, I extensively used various historical stories, legends, and historiosophical works. These sources include The Tale of the Princes of Vladimir, Tale on the Taking of Tsargrad, Message about Unfavorable Days and Hours, and other works, which influenced the formation

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of the views of the Russian elite up until now. In these works one can find the origins of genealogical myths that made it possible to substantiate the kinship of the Moscow princes with the Roman and Byzantine emperors, and which gave Moscow the opportunity to claim territories that once belonged to the Russian princes of the Kiev era. Secondly, these stories set forth the postulates of the official Moscow historiography, which substantiated the place of Russia in the global historical process, as well as its long-term role on the global stage. Third, it is important to take into account that the historical stories show an arrogant attitude towards the peoples of the Great Steppe and the Ottoman Empire, anti-Islamic attacks, as well as a rather biased attitude towards Western peoples such as Germans, Poles, and Swedes. Of great importance for this study are European sources, in particular the works of Plano Carpini (History of the Mongols), Francesco da Collo (Report on Muscovy), Marco Polo (On the Diversity of the World), William of Rubruck (The Journey of William of Rubruck to the Eastern Parts of the World) and others. Also valuable and useful are Polish sources, such as the chronicles of Jan Dlugosz, Maciej Stryjkowski, Maciej Miechowita, Iodocus Ludovic Decius, Marcin Kromer, Marcin Bielski and others. According to R. A. Nalivaiko, the work of Jan Dlugosz contains more than 600 pieces of evidence about the history of Kievan Rus, the Southern Russian principalities of the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.7 Jan Dlugosz considered Poland as the center of the Slavic world, but he was quite loyal to the Moscow state and its struggle against the Golden Horde. It is worth noting that modern Russian historians admit that Jan Dlugosz was the first to use the term “yoke” to denote Moscow’s dependence on the Golden Horde.8 Of particular interest for the historian are the German sources, among which are notes of Western diplomats and travelers, for instance Notes on Muscovite Affairs by Sigismund von Herberstein. It would be naive to seek in these works an apology for the great Moscow princes and their deeds. The Europeans, some of whom were in the Moscow service, sometimes covered the events of Russian history they observed with bias, but nevertheless, they largely fill in the gaps in the traditional Russian chronicles and the official Moscow 7 R. A. Nalivaiko, “Russian-Horde Relations of the Thirteenth–Fifteenth Centuries in the Annals of Poland by Jan Dlugosz” [Russian], Ancient Rus: In Time, in Individuals, in Ideas 2 (2014): 46. 8 Yu. V. Seleznyov, “The Origin of the Concept of ‘Mongol-Tatar Yoke’ (Termino-logical Note),” [Russian] Russian History 4 (2012): 107.

Introduction

historiography. The Western works contain many valuable facts and unique opinions about the political system, economy, and military forces of the growing Moscow state. One should not underestimate the Oriental sources, which are of great importance for my work, in particular, the Mongolian The Secret History of the Mongols and the Chinese chronicle Yuan Shi (The Official History of the Yuan Dynasty). An important role is played by Arab and Persian sources, including the works of Ali ibn al-Athir (The Complete History), Minhaj al-Siraj Juzjani (Tabaqat-i Nasiri: A General History of the Muhammadan Dynasties of Asia, including Hindustan; from A.H. 194 (810 A.D.) to A.H. 658 (1260 A.D.) and the Irruption of the Infidel Mughals into Islam), Ata-Malik Juvayni (History of the World Conqueror), Rashid al-Din Hamadani (Compendium of Chronicles). Without these sources, it is difficult to understand the specifics of Mongolian statehood and the policy of Ulus Jochi in relation to the territories it conquered. I am also much indebted to the classic works of the most prominent Russian historians from the eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries, including N. M. Karamzin, N. A. Polevoy, N. I. Kostomarov, S. M. Solovyov, V. O. Klyuchevsky, M. K. Lyubavsky, D. I. Ilovaysky, S. F. Platonov, A. E. Presnyakov, P. N. Milyukov, and many others. Of course, each of these historians defended his own approach to Russian history and interpreted historical sources in specific ways. Nevertheless, the hypotheses, concepts, and theoretical and methodological approaches of the classics of Russian historiography still retain their scholarly significance today. There is a large amount of scholarly literature on each aspect of the formation of the Moscow state. Unfortunately, the format of this publication does not allow to mention all the historians whose works helped me to form my own vision of Russian history. Conceptually, the works of such Russian historians as Yu. G. Alekseyev, N. S. Borisov, A. A. Gorsky, A. Yu. Dvornichenko, A. A. Zimin, V. A. Kuchkin, Ya. S. Lurie, I. B. Mikhailova, A. I. Pliguzov, R. Y. ­Pochekaev, Yu. V. Seleznyov, L. V. Cherepnin, N. V. Shtykov, and others have been of much use in my research. It is also important to note the original historical works of such Western scholars as Richard Pipes, Charles Halperin, John Fennell, Michael Khodarkovsky, Bertold Spuler, and others. In particular, considerable attention is paid to discussions of the Mongolian influence on the development of the Moscow state. The Mongol influence on Russia was first described by the historians who called themselves Eurasianists. So, N. S. Trubetskoy writes that Russia “was drawn into the general

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financial system of the Mongolian state”9 and that “the Tatars introduced Russia into the nationwide Mongolian network of postal routes.”10 In his opinion, the Mongols could also influence Moscow’s administrative apparatus and military affairs.11 In 1931, V. A. Ryazanovsky criticized Eurasianism. According to him, there was no systematic control of Russia by the Tatars, they did not establish their own dynasty there and did not have a permanent governor or governors, the baskaks were appointed sporadically, the government was in the hands of Russian princes, and relations with the Horde were mainly in the hands of the grand duke.12 The same processes were unfolding in Russia as in Europe: … in the states of continental Europe, the period of feudalism, under the influence of certain social reasons, was replaced by an absolute monarchy. Likewise, under the influence of internal processes (geographical, economic, political), the Moscow principality grew stronger and the monarchy of the Moscow princes developed, which was replaced with time by an absolute monarchy. Along with these internal factors, there were additional external factors that contributed to the main process, perhaps accelerating it: pressure from the Swedes and Livonian Brothers of the Sword in the northwest, from Lithuania in the west and from the Tatars in the south.13

Ryazanovsky’s arguments were analyzed by G. V. Vernadsky, who considered the problem of Mongolian influence on Russia to be complex. As he wrote, “First of all, we must consider the direct effect of the Mongol invasion—the real destruction of cities and population; then the consequences of the conscious policy of the Mongol rulers for various aspects of Russian life.”14 In his opinion, “the influence of the Mongolian model on Moscow gave its full effect only after the latter was liberated from the Mongols. This can be called a delayed action effect. Moreover, in some respects the direct Tatar influence on Russian

  9 N. S. Trubetskoy, Genghis Khan’s Legacy [Russian] (Moscow: Agraf, 2000), 240. 10 Ibid., 241. 11 Ibid. 12 V. A. Ryazanovsky, “On the Question of the Influence of Mongolian Culture and Mongolian Law on Russian Culture and Law” [Russian], Questions of History 7 (1993): 159. 13 Ibid., 161. 14 G. V. Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia [Russian] (Moscow: Lomonosov, 2011), 357–358.

Introduction

life increased rather than diminished after the liberation of Rus.”15 For instance, Vernadsky compared the state of Rus in the Kievan period and under the Mongols, including the sphere of state power (the ratio of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements), social relations (freedom or lack of freedom of social groups), economy (growth of boyar land tenure), politics (deformation of political life under the Mongols), and the legal sphere (adoption of some models of Mongolian law-making). At the turn of the twenty-first century, a discussion broke out between American historians Donald Ostrovsky16 and Charles Halperin.17 Both historians recognize the significant influence of the Golden Horde on the development of Russia and agree that Russians borrowed military orders, diplomatic procedures, and some administrative and financial institutions from the Mongols. However, Halperin denies Ostrovsky’s conclusion about the key role of the Mongols in the formation of the autocratic model of state administration in Russia. The arguments of both researchers were analyzed by D. M. Goldfrank, who largely supports Ostrovsky’s view regarding the influence of the Horde on the historical development of the Muscovite state, but at the same time partially agrees with of Halperin’s assessment.18 Of considerable interest in the context of discussions about the Mongolian influence on the Moscow state are the works of American and British researchers of the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries such as Mikhail Chernyavsky,19 David Christian,20 Horace Dewey,21 Henry L. Eaton,22 Robert Craig Howes,23 15 Ibid., 358. 16 D. G. Ostrowski, “Muscovite Adaptation of Steppe Political Institutions: A Reply to Halperin’s Objections,” Kritika: Explorations in Russians and Eurasian History 1, no. 2 (2000): 267–304. 17 Ch. J. Halperin, “Muscovite Political Institutions in the 14th Century,” Kritika: Explorations in Russians and Eurasian History 1, no. 2 (2000): 237–257. 18 D. M. Goldfrank, “Muscovy and the Mongols: What’s What and What’s Maybe,” Kritika: Explorations in Russians and Eurasian History 1, no. 2 (2000): 259–266. 19 M. Chernyavsky, “Khan ili Vasilevs: aspect russkoi srednevekovoi politicheskoi zhizni,” Zhurnal istorii idei 20, no. 4 (October–December 1959): 459–479. 20 D. Christian, “History of Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia,” in his Inner Eurasia from Prehistoric Times to the Mongol Empire, vol. 1 (London and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998). 21 H. W. Dewey, “Russia’s Debt to the Mongols in Suretyship and Collective Responsibility,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 30, no. 2 (April 1988): 249–270. 22 H. L. Eaton, “Cadasters and Censuses of Muscovy,” Slavic Review 26, no. 1 (March 1967): 54–69. 23 R. C. Howes, The Testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967).

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Edward Keenan,24 Robert Mitchell,25 David Morgan,26 Dineley J. Prince,27 Valentine Tschebotarioff Bill,28 Simon Franklin and Johnatan Shepard,29 Robert O. Crummey,30 Janet Martin,31 Simon Franklin,32 and many others. M. Chernyavsky considers the Mongol invasion as an interruption of Russian history, which led to mass cruelties: Ivan IV, in his opinion, ‘killed every day because of the khan’. However, the Byzantine Empire also influenced Moscow: ‘because of the Byzantines, Ivan IV prayed every night’. E. Keenan admits that the people of Kievan Rus and Moscow borrowed certain institutions from the Mongols, but does not consider these borrowings positive. At the same time, he emphasizes that Moscow had an opportunity to grow and to gain control over other principalities, because it did not throw a challenge to the Mongol states. In his opinion, Moscow had no reason to challenge the Mongols, since its goals were opposite to those of the Mongols.33 Robert Craig Howes analyzed the wills of Ivan Kalita, Ivan III, and Ivan IV the Terrible. In his opinion, the will of Kalita reflects the traditional understanding of power: Kalita divides his possessions equally between his sons. The will of Ivan III illustrates a significant change in the perception of the power of grand duke, as he establishes a hierarchy of power and commands his younger sons to obey their elder brother Vasily. Finally, the will of Ivan IV is the culmination of the transformation from grand duke to autocratic tsar: Ivan IV bequeaths to his son the entire Moscow state. These changes also show that gradually the power of the Mongols weakened, and the Moscow rulers acted with increased independence.34

24 E. Keenan, “Muscovy and the Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe Diplomacy,” Slavic Review 26, no. 4 (December 1967): 548–558. 25 R. Mitchell, The Chronicle of Novgorod (New York: AMS Press, 1970). 26 D. Morgan, The Mongols (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 27 D. J. Prince, “Mongol Material in Old Russia,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 58, no. 1 (1919): 74–88. 28 V. Tschebotarioff Bill, “The Circular Frontier of Muscovy,” Russian Review 9, no. 1 ( January 1950): 45–52. 29 S. Franklin and J. Shepard, The Emergence of Rus, 750–1200 (London and New York: Longman, 1996). 30 R. O. Crummey, The Formation of Muscovy 1300–1613 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1987). 31 J. Martin, Medieval Russia 980–1584, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 32 S. Franklin, Writing, Society and Culture in Early Rus c. 950–1300, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 33 Keenan, “Muscovy and the Kazan,” 557. 34 Howes, The Testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow, 314.

Introduction

Jeffrey L. Neal notes that many historians have commented on how the Moscow princes created a centralized state, but few mention why it was necessary. In his opinion, the Moscow princes developed their desire for power because they saw the absolute power of the Khan.35 The abovementioned researcher notes that there are three interpretations of the Mongol influence on the rise of Moscow: complete denial of this influence; recognition of Mongolian influence as a setback to Moscow; and explanation of the rise of Moscow exclusively by Mongolian influence.36 For my part, I offer the following interpretation: the Mongolian influence was strong enough, and it had both negative and positive consequences for Russia. The Byzantine Empire, the states of Western Europe and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania also had a certain influence. But this was not all: a special role was played by internal factors within the Moscow state. The French historian Pierre Gonneau and the Russian historian Alexander Lavrov in their joint work From Rus to Russia dedicated the chapter “Northeastern Rus: The Beginning of Muscovy. Between Mongol Domination and Lithuanian Expansion” to this problem.37 They claim that a Russian-Tatar symbiosis developed in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries.38 At the same time, they believe that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Galicia-Volhyn principality were also the heirs of Kievan Russia.39 French researchers Elisabeth Carpentier and Jean-Pierre Arrignon note that “the Mongol yoke was expressed not so much in destruction as in the creation of a new political and economic order, which intensified the schism of the Christian world.”40 According to them, “the Russian principalities became part of the political space, the heart of which was in the center of Asia. On the contrary, the Christian West strengthened and contributed to the creation of the Russian-Lithuanian state, to which Poland joined in 1386.”41 “Thus,” write the historians, “the main consequence of the Mongol invasion was the emergence

35 J. L. Neal, The Rise of Muscovy, no. 156 of Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History), Western Oregon University, 2006, https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his/156, 17. 36 Ibid, 3. 37 P. Gonneau and A. Lavrov, Des Rhôs à la Russie: Histoire de l’Europe orientale, v. 730–1689 (Paris: PUF Nouvelle Clio, 2012), 221–263. 38 Ibid., 246–254. 39 Ibid., 255–263. 40 J. Carpentier and F. Lebrun in collaboration with J.-P. Arrignon et al. (eds.), History of Europe [Russian], trans. M. Yu. Nekrasov, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Evraziya, 2017), 189. 41 Ibid., 189.

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of two political formations that opposed each other along the entire line from Pskov to the Sea of Azov through Smolensk.”42 In sum, “the main result of the expansion of the West and the establishment of the “Mongolian world” during the thirteenth century was the split of Europe into two politically, economically, and culturally hostile spaces, which were also divided in religious terms: the West, a zone of Catholic Roman influence, and the East, a zone of Orthodox influence.43 At the same time, the Moscow state of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries became the heir to Byzantium: “the clergy of the Russian Church prompted the grand dukes of Moscow to both assert their Roman dynastic legitimacy, declaring the origin of the Rurik dynasty from Augustus, and to express their adherence to the Byzantine imperial ideal by putting forward the slogan ‘Moscow is the Third Rome.’”44 In my opinion, every historian has a grain of truth. I accept that the Mongol influence on Russia was significant, and it penetrated into the economy, politics, and culture of the Moscow state. Nevertheless, it is necessary to take into account the influence of other external powers such as Byzantium, Sweden, the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Scandinavian states, and others. The European influence on culture, law, and political institutions of the Moscow state was not so obvious, but it would be wrong to deny it. In addition, I believe that external influence on the process of state building in the Moscow state is not limited to imposing, copying, or borrowing certain political, administrative, and financial institutions. Put simply, the presence of external threats from both the East and the West, without any penetrating contacts, could already contribute to the gradual formation of a centralized Russian state and the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies that took place in Russia even before the Mongols—suffice it to mention the activities of Andrei Bogolyubsky. While working on the book, I also took into account the works of German historians, including K. Wittfogel’s volume Russia and the East, in which he claims that Moscow autocratic state was based on the Asian model,

42 Ibid., 189. 43 Ibid., 190. 44 Ibid., 221.

Introduction

borrowed from the Mongols. Wittfogel uses the approach pioneered by Karl Marx, who explains how the creation of massive constructions such as dams, levees, and marinas propelled the development of centralized power in Asian societies.45 It is also necessary to mention the work of Eva-Maria Stolberg, “Review of the Death of Mongols in Asia and Europe,”46 Bertold Spuler’s Die Goldene Horde. Die Mongolen in Rußland 1223–150247 and Die Mongolenzeit,48 Ekkehard Klug’s Das Fürstentum Tver (1247–1485),49 as well as Frithjof Benjamin Schenk’s Aleksandr Nevskij. Heiliger—Fürst—Nationalheld. Eine Erinnerungsfigur im russischen kulturellen Gedächtnis (1263–2000)50 and others. It is also important to note the fundamental works of contemporary Lithuanian historians, including the History of Lithuania51 written by Alfonsas Eidintas et al. as well as History of Lithuania: From ancient times to the year 156952 by Edvardas Gudavičius. These works are distinguished by objectivity and impartiality, that are especially valuable when it comes to highlighting the sensitive issues of Russian-Lithuanian and Russian-Polish relations. In the postSoviet period, the interest of Polish, Lithuanian, and Belarusian researchers in the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania increased, as evidenced by

45 K. A. Wittfogel, “Russia and the East: Comparison and Contrast” [Russian], Slavic Review 22, no. 4 (December 1963): 627–643. 46 E.-M. Stolberg, “Review of the Death of Mongols in Asia and Europe” [Russian], Journal of Asian Studies 57, no. 2 (May 1998): 517–519. 47 B. Spuler, Golden Horde. Mongols in Russia. 1223–1502 [Russian], trans. S. Yu. Chuprova (Moscow: ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2019). 48 Idem, History of the Muslim World: The Age of the Caliphs. Mongolian Period [Russian], trans. L. A. Igorevsky (Moscow: ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2020). 49 E. Klug, “Principality of Tver (1247–1485),” in Society [Russian], ed. P. D. Malygin and P. G. Gaidukov (Tver: RIF [Redaktsionno-izdatel′skaya firma], 1994). 50 F. B. Schenk, Alexander Nevsky in Russian Cultural Memory: Saint, Ruler, National Hero (1263–2000) [Russian], trans. Elena Zemskova and Maya Lavrinovich (Moscow: NLO, 2007). 51 A. Eidintas, A. Bumblauskas, A. Kulakauskas, M. Tamoshaitis, History of Lithuania [Russian] (Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2013). 52 E. Gudavicius, History of Lithuania, vol. 1, From Ancient Times to 1569 [Russian], ed. E. L. Nazarov, trans. G. I. Efremova (Moscow: Fond I. D. Sytina “Baltrus,” 2005).

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the works of A. B. Zakzhevsky,53 A. Lyuby,54 O. I. Dzyarnovich,55 D. Vilimas,56 R. Čepaitienė,57 and other researchers. A significant contribution to the historical study of the Moscow State and Ulus Jochi was made by such modern Kazakhstani historians as K. Z. Uskenbay, A. I. Kushkumbaev, A. K. Muminov, Zh. M. Sabitov, M. T. Laumulin, S. M. Akimbekov, and others. The interest of Kazakh historians in this topic is quite understandable: at present, independent Kazakhstan positions itself as one of the heirs of Ulus Jochi. I deliberately provided all chapters, paragraphs, plots and historical episodes with numerous references and citations in order to ensure the objectivity and balance of my conclusions and assessments using the sources and scholarly literature of different eras. My goal and objectives could be realized only on the basis of the classical approach, based on historical theory, methodology, and source study, on the basis of scholarly principles proven by life—the principles of historicism, objectivity, and comprehensiveness. Alongside with classical research methods, I also used interdisciplinary approaches. I adhere to a chronological approach, which involves the study and presentation of history by periods, and within them by topics (directions, trends, factors, personalities). Special attention is paid to the more influential Russian princes in order to show the role of specific individuals in the history of the Moscow state. I tried to cover the history of the Moscow state as objectively as possible. This was not an easy task: being at the junction of East and West, the Moscow state was influenced by various geopolitical powers, but at the same time it was itself projecting its growing power onto neighboring countries.

53 A. B. Zakzhevsky, “The State and Prospects of Modern Polish Studies on the History of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania,” [Russian] St. Petersburg Slavic and Balkan Studies 1, no. 3 (2008): 101–114. 54 A. Lyuby, “Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Belarusian Historiography of Twentieth Century” [Russian], Acta Historica Neosoliensia 1 (2020): 164–178. 55 O. I. Dzyarnovich, “‘Lithuania’ and ‘Rus’ from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century as Concepts of Belarusian Historiography” [Russian], St. Petersburg Slavic and Balkan Studies 1, no. 3 (2008): 234–249. 56 D. Vilimas, “The Grand Duchy of Lithuania: Stereotypes of Historical Memory in Lithuania” [Russian], Ab Imperio 4 (2004): 507–522. 57 R. Cepaitienė, “Memories of Greatness: The Image of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Historical Memory of Modern Lithuania” [Russian], Ukrainian Historical Book 16 (2013): 366–392.

Introduction

It is important to emphasize that without knowledge of the history of the Moscow state, it is impossible to understand the origins of behavior of modern Russia. Many of today’s problems, especially Russia’s relations with the West, the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Belarus, and the Central Asian states, are rooted in the Moscow era. For example, how can one understand the current struggle around Ukraine and Belarus, as well as Russia’s ineradicable desire to designate its “spheres of influence” in the post-Soviet space while not knowing the history of Moscow’s relations with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland? How, not knowing the history of Moscow’s centuries-old relations with Ulus Jochi (Golden Horde) and the post-Horde khanates, can one understand the Kremlin’s policy towards Tatarstan and the Turkic states of Central Asia? The list of such questions can be almost endless. The importance of knowing Russian history in his own time was well understood by the American diplomat George Frost Kennan, who tried to clarify the origins of Soviet behavior in his “Long Telegram.” Almost needless to remind readers that in order to understand Moscow’s behavior such political scientists as Richard Pipes, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Henry Kissinger have carefully studied Russian and Soviet history. In my opinion, every modern politician should carefully study Russian history, starting with Kievan Rus and Muscovy. To understand is not to agree, approve, forgive, or forget. To understand is to learn and predict Russia’s behavior in order to develop the most reasonable and effective strategy for one’s state in relation to Russia. Of course, in the book presented to the American readers, I in no way suggesting to offer a final solution to the question I posed, since in Russia and abroad the interpretation of the key problems of the history of Moscow state will continue to spark heated debates. So again, I view my work as an invitation to a broad scholarly discussion.

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CHAPTER 1

Historiography of the Formation of Moscow 1.1.  RUSSIAN HISTORIANS OF THE NINETEENTH AND THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES ON THE REASONS FOR THE RISE OF MOSCOW Every historian once in while is tempted to consider this or that event as inevitable. However, such an approach throws us into the arms of historical fatalism. This also applies to the problem of the rise of Moscow. In my opinion, it is important not only to find out the reasons for the rise of Moscow and its transformation into the core of a single Russian state, but also to understand why other centers of power, such as Tver, Novgorod, or even Grand Duchy Lithuania, failed to do so. It is important to understand whether the unification of the Russian lands was inevitable precisely in the form of a centralized state, instead of a freer state based on other principles. Let us begin our consideration of these and other issues with the historiography of the topic.

N. M. Karamzin’s Concept One of the first historians to ponder the reasons for the rise of Moscow was Nikolai Mikhailovich Karamzin (1781–1826), who considered this issue in the context of his ideas about the inevitability and usefulness of the Russian autocracy. In his fundamental work, History of the Russian State, Karamzin notes that the rise of Moscow would have been impossible without the “quiet” that was established in Russia under the Moscow prince Ivan Kalita: “Our Fatherland lamented in humiliation; the heads of the princes were still falling in the Horde at the behest of the khans, but the farmers could work in the fields, merchants

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could travel from town to town with goods, the boyars enjoyed the abundance.”1 It was this important change that “marked the rise of Moscow, which since the time of the Ivan has become the true head of Russia.”2 In his famous note “On Ancient and Modern Russia” Karamzin draws attention to another factor in the rise of Moscow, namely, Ivan Kalita’s annexation of “private estates to the grand duchy.”3 According to the historian, the Moscow princes did not confine themselves to “assembling the parts into a whole: they still had to bind them firmly, and strengthen monarchy by autocracy.”4 Karamzin believed that the Horde khans themselves contributed to the strengthening of Moscow: “Lulled by the caresses of the rulers of Moscow, with childish naivete the khans gave them entire regions and subordinated other princes of Russia, until the very time when the force, brought up by cunning, completed the work of our liberation with the sword.”5 “The princes grovelled in the Horde,” continues Karamzin, “but, returning from there with a jarlig from the merciful khan, they commanded more boldly than in the days of our independence.”6 As a result of his reasoning, Karamzin deduces the popular formula: “Novgorod is famous for its former cradle of the monarchy, Kiev for its baptismal font of Christianity for Russians; but in Moscow the fatherland and faith were saved.”7

S. M. Solovyov’s Concepts In History of Russia from the Earliest Times, Sergei Mikhailovich Solovyov (1820–1879) identified a number of reasons for the rise of Moscow. First of all, he noted the important role of the Moscow principality as “the middle, borderline place between the old South, and the new Northern Russia.”8 According to Solovyov, Moscow attracted people: “When Southern Russia lost its significance, the principalities were exhausted from strife, the crushing of volosts, and especially from the Tatar pogrom, after which there was no more security here, then it was necessary to increase the resettlement of people from south to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

N. M. Karamzin, History of the Russian State [Russian] (Moscow: Eksmo, 2015), 329. Ibid., 329. Ibid., 992. Ibid., 992. Ibid., 992. Ibid., 993. Ibid., 329. S. M. Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times [Russian], vol. 2, books 3–4 (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo sotsial′no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1960), 453.

Historiography of the Formation of Moscow

north, in the places which are safer, and the first frontier principality was Moscow.”9 “Moreover,” the historian continues, “apart from Southern Russia, the population of the Moscow principality should have also flown from the nearest regions—Ryazan, Tver, Rostov, which are constantly less safe than the Moscow region.”10 According to Solovyov, it was the influx of population that became one of the most important reasons for the subsequent enrichment of Moscow: “The increase in population in the principality, together with its long-term security, increased the income of the princes, and this explains why Kalita was already so rich that he could buy whole principalities like Belozersk, Uglich, and Galich.”11 As Solovyov concludes, The abundance of money not only allowed the Moscow princes to increase their possessions inside and retain their grand ducal dignity, begging the khan and his nobles; it gave them new means to increase the population of their volosts, buying up prisoners in the Horde and settling them in their own country; this is how a special class of population took place—the Horde, which is often mentioned in the wills and treaties of the prince; let alone the fact that the abundance of money allowed the Moscow princes to give the settlers more benefits than they could get in other regions, from other, less wealthy princes.12

According to Solovyov, the position of Moscow between the Northern and the Southern Russia was of great importance in ecclesiastical terms: “AllRussian metropolitans who stayed in the South, in Kiev, after the city lost its significance, moved to the north, and after the Tatar pogrom, had to pay special attention to Northeastern Russia, to where, apparently, the main scene of the Russian Orthodox world was transferred.”13 As modern Russian historians note, “the problem of the formation of the Moscow state turns with Solovyov into the problem of the emergence of statehood in Russia in general. The center of the historical life of the Russian people

  9 10 11 12 13

Ibid., 453–454. Ibid., 454. Ibid., 454. Ibid., 454. Ibid., 455.

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moved from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries to Northeastern Russia, where a single Russian state began to form around Moscow.”14

V. O. Klyuchevsky’s Concepts Among the followers and students of Solovyov, Vasily Osipovich Klyuchevsky (1841–1911) occupies a special place. For him, the history of Russia was primarily the history of colonization, the political consequence of which was the appanage order developed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In A Course in Russian History Klyuchevsky identifies five main reasons for the rise of Moscow. He puts the geographical factor in the first place: … the position of the city of Moscow was especially advantageous. With its upper tributary Istra, the River Moscow comes close to the Lama, a tributary of the Shoshi, which flows into the Volga. Thus, the River Moscow connected the Upper Volga with the middle Oka by the Lama portage. On the other hand, the city of Moscow arose at the very bend of the river, at its turn to the southeast, where it, by its tributary Yauza, comes almost right up to the Klyazma, along which a transverse route went through Moscow from west to east. Finally, from the third side through Moscow, a road ran from Lopasnya from the Kiev and Chernigov south to Pereyaslavl and Rostov.15

An equally important role in the process of Moscow’s rise was played by the security factor associated with its location: “the central position of Moscow protected it from all sides from external enemies; external blows fell on the neighboring principalities—Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Smolensk—and very rarely reached Moscow. Thanks to this cover, the Moscow region became a refuge for the outlying Russian population, who everywhere suffered from external attacks.”16 According to Klyuchevsky, the rulers of Moscow acted energetically and thought outside the box: “Moscow princes develop specific policy in advance, 14 M. Yu. Lachaeva (ed.), Historiography of the History of Russia before 1917: Textbook for Institutions of Higher Study [Russian] (Moscow: Vlados, 2003), vol. 1, 336. 15 V. O. Klyuchevsky, Works [Russian], vol. 2, A Course in Russian History, part 2, afterword and comments V. A. Aleksandrov and V. G. Zimina (Moscow: Mysl′, 1987), 8–9. 16 Ibid., 11.

Historiography of the Formation of Moscow

with the first steps they begin to act outside of custom, earlier and more decisively than others they leave the usual rut of princely relations, looking for new ways, without thinking about old accounts, about political customs and decorum.”17 Thus, Moscow acted more pragmatically than Tver and aimed at fighting the Golden Horde, rather than cooperating with it: The Moscow princes saw the state of affairs differently. They have not yet thought about fighting the Tatars at all; seeing that it is much more advantageous to act on the Horde with “humble wisdom,” that is, servility and money, rather than weapons, they zealously courted the khans and made them the instrument of their designs. None of the princes more often than Kalita went to bow to the khan, and there he was always a welcome guest, because he did not come there empty-handed. … Thanks to this, the Moscow prince, by genealogy the youngest among his brethren, achieved the senior grand ducal throne.18

From Klyuchevsky’s words, one can draw a rather controversial conclusion that the Moscow princes simply manipulated the Golden Horde khans. According to Klyuchevsky, the acquisition of the grand ducal throne by the Moscow prince had two consequences for Russia: “The moral consisted in the fact that the Moscow appanage owner, having become the grand duke, was the first to lead the Russian population out of that despondency and torpor into which external misfortunes plunged him.”19 According to the historian, Northern Russia began to take a break from the Tatar pogroms: “In these calm years, two whole generations managed to be born and grow up, to whose nerves the impressions of childhood did not instill the unaccountable horror of their fathers and grandfathers before the Tatar: it was they who went to the Kulikovo field.”20 The political consequence was that the Moscow prince “was the first to begin to lead Northern Russia out of the state of political fragmentation, into which it was brought by the apogee order.”21 So, since the time of Ivan Kalita, a “princely union” has been formed around Moscow, which at first was “financial and bonded,” since Ivan Kalita 17 18 19 20 21

Ibid., 13. Ibid., 19–20. Ibid., 20. Ibid., 20. Ibid., 21.

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won the right to collect the Horde tribute and deliver it to Sarai. But then this union also received political significance.22 Finally, thanks to the transfer of the metropolitan see from Vladimir to Moscow, the latter became the ecclesiastical capital of Northeastern Russia long before it became a political capital.23 As a result, “the rich material resources at the disposal of the Russian Church began to flock to Moscow, helping to enrich it.”24 Klyuchevsky notes the threefold attitude of the population towards the Moscow principality and its prince: 1) They are accustomed to look at the elder, the grand duke of Moscow as an exemplary ruler-master, the installer of land peace and civil order, and at the Moscow principality as the starting point of the new system of land relations, the first fruit of which was the establishment of greater internal peace and external security. 2) They are accustomed to looking at the senior Moscow prince as the people’s chieftan of Russia in the struggle against external enemies, and at Moscow as the culprit of the first popular successes over the unfaithful Lithuania and the nasty “raw-food” Hagarians. 3) Finally, in the Moscow prince, Northern Russia is accustomed to seeing the eldest son of the Russian Church, the closest friend and collaborator of the main Russian hierarch, to consider Moscow a city on which the special blessing of the greatest saint of the Russian land rests and with which the religious and moral interests of the entire Orthodox Russian people are connected.25 This meaning was acquired by the middle of the fifteenth century by the appanage Muscovite prince, who for one and a half hundred years acted as a small predator, lying around the corner in wait for his neighbors.26

M. K. Lyubavsky’s Concepts Similar to Klyuchevsky, Matvey Kuzmich Lyubavsky (1860–1936) identifies several main reasons for the rise of Moscow. In particular, he draws attention 22 23 24 25 26

Ibid., 21. Ibid., 23. Ibid., 23. Ibid., 26. Ibid., 26.

Historiography of the Formation of Moscow

to the geographical position of Moscow: “In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, all the principalities around Moscow were ruined and devastated by the Tatars, and only the Moscow region remained untouched. Naturally, as a result, Moscow became stronger and richer than other principalities and was able to make annexation by force and money at their expense.”27 Lyubavsky comes to the conclusion that since the Moscow prince “could guarantee the population more security from the violence of the Tatars and other enemies,”28 Moscow began to attract “neighboring smaller bodies of a homogeneous national consistency.”29 Moscow’s success was also facilitated by “the friendly work of the Moscow boyars. The Moscow policy of gathering did not stop and did not weaken even in those moments when there were young princes or princes who did not distinguish themselves with special abilities.”30 “Obviously,” states the historian, “the boyars and servants lived better in the Moscow principality than in other principalities.”31 According to Lyubavsky, the rise of Moscow was largely due to the weakening of the appanage princes of Northeastern Russia: “Separately, the princes of Tver, and the Nizhny Novgorod-Suzdal, and Ryazan princes opposed Moscow. … Under such circumstances, Moscow could easily seize one principality after another, without arousing amicable opposition. … As a result of the multiplication of some branches of the princely family, individual lands fell apart into many appanages. All these small principalities could not withstand the seizures from Moscow.”32 Finally, M. K. Lyubavsky concludes, “the centralization of Northeastern Russia in the hands of Moscow was greatly helped by the khans of the Golden Horde. We saw that the khans gave entire principalities to the Moscow princes, whose rulers were not able to pay tribute regularly to the Horde.”33

S. F. Platonov’s Concepts The approach of Sergei Fedorovich Platonov (1860–1933) to the problem of the rise of Moscow similar to Klyuchevsky’s views. In Platonov’s opinion, it is important to enumerate the conditions thanks to which the initially weak 27 M. K. Lyubavsky, Russian History from Scythia to Muscovy [Russian] (Moscow: EKSMO Algoritm, 2012), 265–266. 28 Ibid., 266. 29 Ibid., 267. 30 Ibid., 267. 31 Ibid., 267. 32 Ibid., 268. 33 Ibid., 266.

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Moscow principality could fight against the stronger Tver principality and to distinguish them from other conditions that supported the Moscow principality and helped to strengthen it.34 Platonov sees the main reason for the rise of Moscow in its geographical position: Moscow was located at the junction of roads leading from southern Russia to northern Russia and from the Novgorod land to the Ryazan land. Immigrants from the southern regions, going north, could not pass the Moscow rivers and settled in large numbers around the city of Moscow earlier than moving further north. That is why the Moscow principality was quickly and densely populated, and this gave the Moscow princes large funds, since the denser the population of the appanage was, the more the appanage prince received.35 … The Moscow River, on the other hand, was such a waterway that connected the upper Volga with the middle course of the Oka. The Novgorodians used this route, importing bread, wax and honey from the richest places in the Ryazan land. Owning such a trade road, the Moscow princes derived their income from the trade movement in the form of taxes from merchants, etc. Thus, the geographically central position of Moscow contributed to the rapid settlement of the Moscow principality and the enrichment of the Moscow princes.36

A certain role was also played by “the talents and dexterity of the first Moscow princes, who knew how to use the benefits of their position.”37 The strengthening of the Moscow principality Platonov attributes to: 1) the sympathy of the clergy, expressed by the change in the residence of the metropolis; 2) the political shortsightedness of the Tatars, who could not timely notice the strengthening of the principality that was dangerous for them; 3) the absence of strong enemies, since Novgorod was not strong, and in Tver there were constant feuds among the princes; 4) sympathy of the boyars and sympathy of the population.38 34 S. F. Platonov, Full Course of Lectures on Russian History [Russian] (Moscow: AST, 2017), 143. 35 Idem, Textbook of Russian History for Secondary School: Systematic Course [Russian], commentaries N. P. Sokolov (Moscow: Zveno, 1994), 99. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Platonov, Full Course of Lectures, 143.

Historiography of the Formation of Moscow

As Platonov notes: “Relying on their strength and wealth, with the support of the horde, the Moscow princes were the real power, capable of maintaining order and silence not only in their appanage, but throughout the Vladimir-Suzdal region.”39 In addition, the Moscow principality “was screened out from border attacks by the outlying principalities (Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Smolensk, and so forth); it was in friendship with the Horde. This was enough to inspire a desire to settle closer to Moscow, under its protection. The people went to the Moscow lands, and the Moscow princes built cities, settlements, villages for them.”40 Moscow princes “bought for themselves entire estates (Yaroslavl, Belozersk, Rostov) from impoverished princes and simple villages from small owners. They ransomed the Russian ‘captives’ from the Horde, took them out to their lands and populated entire settlements with these prisoners, ‘Horde men.’ Thus, the population in the Moscow volosts multiplied, and at the same time the forces and means of the Moscow princes grew.”41 Overall, the different concepts of the rise of Moscow put forward by Russian historians of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries do not so much contradict as complement each other. They present practically the same factors of the rise of the Moscow principality from different angles: geographical location, security factor, activity of Moscow princes, support of the boyars and the population, influx of population from other lands, transfer of the metropolitan see to Moscow, assistance to the Moscow princes from the Horde khans, and so forth. Nevertheless, each researcher constructs the sequence and hierarchy of reasons for and stages of the rise of the Moscow principality in a different way.

1.2.  SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE RISE OF MOSCOW At first, Soviet Marxist historians largely followed Klyuchevsky’s view, but at the same time they tried to combine his approach with the class doctrine, propagated by Marxism, in order to avoid unnecessary accusations from the party organs and their own colleagues. I will focus only on the most significant works and concepts of the Soviet era that concern the reasons for the rise of the Moscow principality.

39 Platonov, Textbook of Russian History, 101. 40 Ibid., 101. 41 Ibid., 102.

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The author of the first Soviet textbook on the history of Russia, M. N. Pokrovsky, considers the rise of Moscow in the framework of the so-called the theory of “commercial capital.” Pokrovsky notes that the Moscow prince “was one of the smallest and most insignificant, but he sat extremely comfortably,”42 since it was through Moscow that “commodity movement” went, that is, “the Moscow prince could collect taxes from merchants more than anyone else. At the same time, and partly for the same reason, any other natural tribute and rent from the peasants were higher with him, because the peasant population near Moscow was denser than in other places.”43 In addition, the Moscow principality “represented greater security for the population than the outlying lands. In addition, the Moscow prince, receiving good incomes due to the profitability of his position, was less pugnacious than others, and therefore they more willingly settled on his land, since there were fewer dangers related to war.”44 According to Pokrovsky, “being the richest,” the Moscow prince “was not yet the most powerful prince. Much stronger than him at that time were the princes of Ryazan or Nizhny Novgorod, and especially those of Tver. But we must not forget that all these princes, together with the Moscow princes, were then vassals, henchmen of the Tatar khan.”45 From Pokrovsky’s point of view, “the unification of Russia near Moscow was largely performed by the Tatars.”46 “The khan,” the historian develops his thought, “was very suspicious of the Russian princes and was not at all inclined to help those of them who were stronger, for a strong prince could come up with the idea of disobeying the Tatars, and raising an uprising against them. … Thence there is patronage that the khan gave to the Moscow prince, the weakest and in the eyes of the khan the most harmless.”47 The ecclesiastical factor also played an important role: “an alliance arose between the Orthodox Church and the infidel khans, which for the Orthodox Church turned out to be much more beneficial than for the Tatars.”48 Thus, the Moscow prince “relied, on the one hand, on his wealth, on the other, on the 42 M. N. Pokrovsky, Russian History in the Most Concise Outline [Russian], 4th ed. (Moscow: Partiinoe izdatel′stvo, 1933), 30. 43 Ibid., 31. 44 Ibid., 31. 45 Ibid., 31. 46 Ibid., 26. 47 Ibid., 31. 48 Ibid., 32.

Historiography of the Formation of Moscow

Tatars, and on the third, on the support of the church, and gradually became the head of all Russian princes.”49 Pokrovsky believes that the unification of Rus around Moscow should have an economic reason, since the densely populated city “could exist only thanks to the trade of bread and other raw materials. If such raw materials were not brought up, the population of the city would die of hunger or would have to scatter.”50 This means that “in Moscow, next to the feudal population, a young urban, in the Western expression, bourgeois population was formed, consisting of artisans and merchants.”51 Pokrovsky’s ideas were rejected by P. P. Smirnov in 1946: M. N. Pokrovsky does not explain how exactly bread was received to supply the population of Moscow. But his statement that it was bread “from the surrounding lands” testifies that he assigned the main role in this process not to the organization of patrimonial production and supply in the order of feudal duties, but to trade, to commercial capital. Only in 1931 M. N. Pokrovsky rejected this erroneous attitude and even called his theory of “commercial capital” “illiterate.”52

P. P. Smirnov mercilessly criticized the concepts of M. N. Pokrovsky, V. V. Mavrodin, K. V. Bazilevich, S. V. Bakhrushin, and other historians, and put forward the theory of an “agrarian coup” allegedly committed by the Moscow princes in order to collect the money for the Golden Horde. The historian doubts that the Moscow princes could pay tribute by mining silver or collecting customs duties. He also rejects the “naive” idea that Ivan Kalita could use the remnants of the “exits” (that is, tribute) to enrich the Moscow principality. According to Smirnov, the main source of income for the Moscow princes “could only be the peasant economy and the grain it produced. Tatars too considered peasants to be the main source for covering the tribute.”53

49 50 51 52

Ibid., 32. Ibid., 33. Ibid., 34. P. Smirnov, “Formation of the Russian Centralized State in the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Centuries” [Russian], Questions of History 2–3 (1946): 62. 53 Ibid., 73.

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K. V. Bazilevich, V. V. Mavrodin, I. I. Smirnov, S. V. Yushkov, and other historians rejected the concept of “agrarian coup” as untenable.54 Ya. S. Lurie55 and V. V. Mavrodin56 noted that the initial period of the unification process is associated not with Moscow, but with Tver. Although Mavrodin emphasizes that the Moscow principality was one of the most populated: “The rapid growth rate of the urban and rural population and the development of lands that were once covered with forests and inaccessible for agriculture, turned the Moscow region into a rich and populous reign.”57 The second factor in the rise of Moscow is, for Mavrodin, its security: “while Moscow was weak, while it was still a tiny principality where Daniel Alexandrovich was sitting, it was guarded from Lithuanians, Swedes, Germans and Tatars by Smolensk, Tver, Novgorod, Pskov, Ryazan; when Moscow accumulated strength, it itself became the defender of Russia from the ‘enemies.’”58 Moscow “was the geographical center of the Great Russian people, and this latter began to form around Moscow as an ethnic center.”59 The third factor Mavrodin notes is “the growth and expansion of Moscow trade, an increase in its share in all Russian trade in general, an increase in the number of townspeople—merchants and artisans who enriched the prince’s treasury, striving to strengthen the power of the prince, who collected and united the Russian lands.”60 The fourth factor is “the very fact that the metropolitan of ‘All Russia’ was in Moscow, and consequently, the transformation of Moscow into the church center of Russia.”61 Finally, the fifth factor is the policy of the Moscow princes towards the Horde.62 “These prerequisites,” Mavrodin summarizes, “caused the transformation of Moscow into the “capital city of all Russia,” and only if they are taken together. The factors that contributed to the rise of Moscow did not 54 A. M. Sakharov, “The Problem of the Formation of the Russian Centralized State in Soviet Historiography” [Russian], Questions of History 9 (1961): 78. 55 Y. S. Lurie, “The Role of Tver in the Formation of the Russian National State” [Russian], Scientific Notes of the Leningrad State University, series “History” 36, no. 3 (1939). 56 V. V. Mavrodin, “A Few Comments on the Article by P. P. Smirnov, ‘Formation of the Russian Centralized State in the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Centuries” [Russian], Questions of History 1 (1950): 83. 57 Idem, “Formation of a Unified Russian State,” in his Ancient and Medieval Russia [Russian] (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2009), 519. 58 Ibid., 520. 59 Ibid., 521. 60 Ibid., 523. 61 Ibid., 524. 62 Ibid., 524.

Historiography of the Formation of Moscow

come into effect as one specific historical development. They developed gradually, and their cumulative effect intensified, as one factor appeared, and another lost the role that it had previously played. Moscow became the center of the emerging Russian state only when the whole set of prerequisites that made Moscow the “capital city of all Russia” became real and effective.63 Another source worth to note is L. V. Cherepnin’s work, Formation of the Russian Centralized State in the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Centuries (1960). Cherepnin believes that “Moscow was not only a political center, but also the center of the territory where the Great Russian nationality was formed. And even more: the very fact that Moscow was the focus of the emerging and developing Great Russian nationality became an essential prerequisite for its transformation into the basis of the country’s political unification.”64 However, nationality is “not only an ethnic phenomenon, but also a historical one, which requires certain conditions for its development, contributing to the development of the territory by the people, the growth of the economy, the country’s culture, and the people’s struggle for national independence.”65 The Moscow land had such conditions, as it was an area that was “developed by that time agriculture and crafts,” as well as “the focus of fine arts.”66 Moscow, located at the intersection of trade routes, “was one of the largest centers of economic ties beginning to take shape between various Russian lands.”67 Security, for Cherepnin, is another important reason for the rise of Moscow: “The geographical position of Moscow in the central region, relatively remote from the arena of the most frequent attacks of the Tatar-Mongol and other foreign hordes on Russia, guaranteed this city and its region a certain security, contributed to the influx of residents here, and to population density, and hence the rise of the economy and culture.”68 “Thus,” notes Cherepnin, “material prerequisites were also created, manpower was accumulated for the organized struggle of the Russian people against the Tatar-Mongol domination, the aggression of the Lithuanian feudal lords, and so forth. … The city was not only a focal point of trade relations, but

63 Ibid., 524. 64 L. V. Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State in the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Centuries [Russian] (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo sotsial′no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1960), 455. 65 Ibid., 456. 66 Ibid., 456. 67 Ibid., 456. 68 Ibid., 456–457.

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also the focus of the routes along which the military forces moved from here.”69 Therefore, in Moscow, there quickly emerged and strengthened those social forces on which the grand ducal power relied in its policy of unification: the boyars who served the state, the lower classes of grand duke’s officials—noblemen and the so-called boyar children—and the trade and artisan population of the cities (especially its top tier). In Moscow land, earlier than on the outskirts of Russia, a strong knot of feudal relations was tied.70

Cherepnin claims that the economic upsurge of Moscow “favorably affected the position of the local princes.”71 At the same time, “one cannot but consider the nature of the policy of the Moscow princes. Historical literature sometimes allowed its complete depersonalization.”72 As Cherepnin summarizes: The preconditions for Moscow’s role as the center of the Russian state were not realized immediately, but in the course of a long and stubborn struggle of the Moscow principality with other feudal centers of Northeastern Russia—a struggle that affected all classes and social groups of various Russian lands. In the course of this struggle, historical conditions sometimes developed in such a way that it seemed that not Moscow, but another political center would lead the unification of Russia. The leading role of Moscow as the center of the political unification of the Russian lands was not immediately strengthened.73

Many traditional approaches to the problem of the rise of the Moscow principality were criticized in A. A. Zimin’s monograph A Knight at the Crossroads. Zimin rejects the role of geography in the rise of Moscow: “There were no ‘comfortable routes’ in the Moscow region. The little river Moscow was just the Cinderella granddaughter to the powerful Volga. Therefore, the cities along the Volga (Galich, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Nizhny) had a much more convenient

69 70 71 72 73

Ibid., 457. Ibid., 458. Ibid., 458. Ibid., 458. Ibid., 458–459.

Historiography of the Formation of Moscow

geographical (and commercial) position.”74 As for the transit trade, it “could hardly capture the broad masses of the local population, especially since the beginnings and ends of the routes along which it was conducted were not in the hands of the Moscow princes.”75 Moreover, Moscow was not a particularly important industrial center: “The most important centers of the salt industry were Sol Galichskaya, Vologda, Nerekhta; less so Pereyaslavl, Rostov, Northern Dvina, and Rusa. … But what about Moscow? In the areas immediately adjacent to it, there was no wealth of any kind—no fossils, no salt wells, no dense forests.”76 Zimin also notes that weapons were needed to wage war (sword, chain mail, shield, shell, spear, saber), but there was no iron ore in the Moscow principality.77 According to Zimin, it is difficult to assert that Moscow was the ethnographic center of Russia, since the ethnogenetic process cannot be localized in one district only: “It took place throughout the territory of Northeastern Russia, and the role in this process, say, Tver, Galich, and Novgorod was equally significant.”78 The historian believes that the Moscow principality was not the only paradise for those who would like to hide from the Horde raids: “The place was unsafe: more than once the Tatars approached Moscow, Vladimir, Kolomna and simply ‘climbed’ over the Oka. The inhabitants of more western (Tver) or northern (Novgorod) lands felt much safer.”79 According to Zimin, in the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries Moscow was not the center of national resistance to the Golden Horde: I. D. Veselovsky, begging in the Horde for a jarlig that would grant the grand ducal throne to Vasily II, whom he was going to make his son-inlaw, argued that his ward owed his power only to the will of the Horde king and the order of his father. Prince Yury was also looking for the throne of ‘his spiritual father.’ This father was Dmitry Donskoy, whose name was associated with the victory over the Tatar.80 74 A. A. Zimin, A Knight at the Crossroads: Feudal War in Fifteenth-Century Russia [Russian] (Moscow: Mysl′, 1991), 191–192. 75 Ibid., 192. 76 Ibid., 192–193. 77 Ibid., 193–194. 78 Ibid., 195. 79 Ibid., 195. 80 Ibid., 195.

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What was the reason for Moscow’s victory in the struggle for the unity of Russia? According to Zimin, the key to understanding this “lies in the peculiarities of the colonization process and in the creation of a military-service army (of the Court).”81 He notes that “the main territories of the Moscow principality (within Moscow, Kolomna, Dmitrov and Mozhaysk), as far as the then level of agricultural technology allowed, were developed. The lands of the Moscow region were snapped up by Kalita’s associates, including immigrants from other lands who fled under his patronage.”82 As a result, the colonization of new areas began, which was carried out through the construction of monasteries and their branches, and by military force. According to Zimin, the basis of “the military might of Moscow was the Tsar’s court with its three components: the grand ducal officials, the boyars and the boyar children.”83 According to Zimin, “the Moscow princes strove to act not alone, but in collaboration with their close and distant relatives. They all came from ‘Kalita’s nest.’”84 At the same time, in the Kalita clan, “all were ‘brothers,’ but brother to brother brings strife. The head of the clan, the grand duke, was considered the ‘oldest brother,’ the rest—‘the younger ones.’ ‘Younger brothers’ were more like vassals than relatives.”85 “Later, it turned out,” the historian clarifies, “that the ‘younger ones’ were destroyed when the need for them disappeared. Their place was taken by new children and grandchildren of the Moscow sovereigns.”86 In sum, Soviet historiography contributed to solving the problem of the rise of Moscow. Not all Soviet historians strictly adhered to Marxist dogmas. Even under the circumstances of ideological dictate they attempted to find new methodological approaches in studying the rise of Moscow (see, in particular, the works of L. V. Cherepnin, A. A. Zimin, and others).

1.3.  POST-SOVIET HISTORIOGRAPHY: NEW APPROACHES The collapse of the USSR and the liquidation of the ideological monopoly of the Communist Party led to a methodological crisis in historical science. The departure from Marxism had the characteristics of a catastrophe. The historians 81 82 83 84 85 86

Ibid., 203. Ibid., 203. Ibid., 203. Ibid., 206. Ibid., 206. Ibid., 207.

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began a rarely successful search for new approaches to the problems of Russian history, including the rise of Moscow. Thus, in the work From Rus to Russia the famous neo-Eurasian scholar L. N. Gumilyov notes: “Many saw the reason in the geographical position of Moscow: it was, they say, in the center of the Russian land, at the crossroads. But after all, Tver was also in the ‘center,’ and Uglich or Kostroma were in a much more advantageous position in relation to trade routes, but these cities did not become the capitals of the new Rus—Russia.”87 From the point of view of the passionarity theory of ethnogenesis, the reason for the rise of Moscow is that it was the Moscow principality that attracted many passionaries: Tatars, Lithuanians, Russians, Polovtsians— everyone who wanted to have confidence in the future, and public position commensurate with merit. Moscow was able to use all these newcomers, applying to their inclinations, and unite in a single Orthodox faith. At the same time, energetic and principled people went to Moscow for the most part. Thus, the Golden Horde Tatars, who fled after the coup of Uzbek to Moscow, formed the backbone of the Russian cavalry army, which subsequently ensured the victory on the Kulikovo field.88

“The passionarity potential of Moscow,” sums up Gumilyov, “‘prevailed’ over the wealth of Novgorod, the prowess of Tver, and the dynastic claims of Suzdal.”89 The historian emphasizes: “The fall of passionarity in the ancient Russian centers was a striking contrast to its growth in Moscow. The same Novgorodians who, back in the twelve and the thirteenth centuries were considered such a violent people that the princes refused to go to them, because they could not be controlled, by the fourteenth century turned into quiet inhabitants of a calm ‘bourgeois’ city.”90 In my opinion, L. N. Gumilyov’s concept is interesting and original, but he is not able to convincingly provide neither the reasons for the creation of the Russian centralized state, nor the reasons for the rise of Moscow itself. N. S. Borisov, the author of a number of historical works admits that “the harmony and logical perfection of Klyuchevsky’s scheme gave it amazing 87 88 89 90

L. N. Gumilyov, From Rus to Russia [Russian] (Moscow: AST, 2002), 190. Ibid., 191. Ibid., 191. Ibid., 191.

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longevity,”91 but notes that this model is “of speculative character”: “Indeed, there is no reason to doubt the enormous significance of the ‘geographical factor’ in explaining Moscow’s successes. But this factor cannot explain Moscow’s success over Tver, whose location was no less—if not more!—advantageous.”92 According to Borisov, the “geographical factor” and the two reasons derived from it for Moscow’s victory over Tver “should be taken out of the equation.”93 Only the third and fourth reasons remain: the “alliance with the church” and the “flexible policy” of the Moscow princes.94 In addition, Borisov claims that “for the first half of the fourteenth century, the ‘alliance’ of the Moscow princes with the metropolitan see is nothing more than a historiographic myth,” that is, the role of the metropolitans in the victory of Moscow “was much more modest than it is commonly thought.”95 There remains only the fourth position of the Klyuchevsky scheme—the “flexible policy” of the Moscow princes. According to Borisov, it is important to find out “how original this policy was, how great its impact on the attitude of the rulers of the Horde to Moscow and Tver, and, finally, whether this policy was something exceptional for its time in moral terms.”96 “The last statement,” notes Borisov, “is quite often uttered by writers, publicists and even historians, inclined to categorical and paradoxical judgments. The desire to present the victory of Moscow in its struggle against other feudal centers as a victory of dark beginnings over light, despotism over freedom, selfishness over self-sacrifice, meanness over nobility is rooted deep in history.”97 Traditional approaches to the problem of the rise of Moscow is opposed by A. A. Gorsky: In scholarly literature, when considering the problem of the formation of the Moscow state, there are two theses: 1) Moscow rose thanks to the support of the Moscow princes by the Horde; 2) The Moscow state took shape in a stubborn and ever-growing struggle against the Horde yoke.

91 N. S. Borisov, The Policy of the Moscow Princes (Late Thirteenth–First Half of the Fourteenth Centuries) [Russian] (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1999), 11. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid., 11–12.

Historiography of the Formation of Moscow Both judgments, seemingly contradictory in principle, can even coexist under the cover of the same books: before Dmitry Donskoy, there was “support,” and other princes (of Tver) fought with the yoke, and with Dmitry Donskoy Moscow was already leading the struggle for liberation. Historical reality was very far from such scheme.98

Considering the expansion of the Moscow and its interaction with the Lithuanian principalities, Gorsky distinguishes three approaches in scholarly literature: 1. Moscow princes unite Russia, opposing the Horde “yoke”; Lithuania, taking advantage of the weakening of Russian lands as a result of the Mongol invasion and the Horde “yoke,” expands on their territories, and seizes those lands that were weakened. 2. Despotic Moscow, relying on the Horde, is expanding into the Russian lands; some of them, striving to free themselves from the Horde “yoke,” pass under the rule of the Lithuanian princes, incommensurably softer than the Moscow one. 3. A kind of compromise approach: in Eastern Europe there were two centers for the unification of Russian lands—Moscow and Vilnius.99 … The supporters of all three approaches proceeded from the fact that in the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries processes of unification were naturally taking place on the East European plain. Nobody even asked the question: why was it necessary to form large states at all?100

Gorsky notes that during the time of the Horde a “grandiose territorial redistribution” took place, during which the two largest great principalities arose: Moscow and Lithuania. “Why,” asks the historian, “did the researchers not ask themselves about the reasons for this redistribution?”101 First, because in the Soviet era “the superiority of large states over small ones was recognized a priori.”102 Secondly, “also important was the conviction that the unification processes began even before Batu’s invasion, in Northeastern Russia (or, alternatively, in Northeastern

  98   99 100 101 102

A. A. Gorsky, Russian Middle Ages [Russian] (Moscow: Astrel′, Olimpus, 2010), 191. Ibid., 196–197. Ibid., 197. Ibid., 198. Ibid., 198.

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Russia and in Southwestern Russia, in Galicia-Volhyn), and then [after the invasion] it was only necessary to “resume” these processes.”103 With this approach, the “unification processes” looked like something permanent: it turned out that as soon as Russia disintegrated by the twelfth century, the reverse process began right there (approximately with Andrei Bogolyubsky, that is, in the same century). Unification! Indeed, it turned out that “fragmentation” is some kind of historical “perversion,” which people immediately strove to eliminate, and the system of independent lands is something unstable.104

Gorsky focuses on the theory that the stronger princes annexed the other principalities: “Traditionally, it is believed that the Moscow and Lithuanian principalities were expanding their territory, and the rest of the political formations were victims of their expansion (no matter how one treats these expansions). However, in fact, many other princes also expanded their territory by annexing lands.”105 “Among the Russian princes,” clarifies Gorsky, “the practice of annexations was not started by the ones from Moscow.”106 S. M. Munchaev and V. M. Ustinov write about the objective and subjective factors of the rise of Moscow. The subjective factor was the “active policy of the Moscow princes.”107 Among the objective factors, first of all, it should be noted that the Moscow land was the territory where the formation of the Great Russian nationality began. The geographical position of Moscow guaranteed it a certain degree of security: from the northwest, where Lithuania threatened, it was covered by the Tver principality; from the east and southeast, where the Golden Horde could attack—by other Russian lands. This contributed to the influx of residents and a constant increase in population density. The intersection of trade routes contributed to the transformation of Moscow into a major hub of economic ties between the Russian lands.108 103 104 105 106 107

Ibid., 198. Ibid., 198–199. Ibid., 200. Ibid., 202. Sh. M. Munchaev and V. M. Ustinov, Russian History. Textbook for Universities [Russian], 2nd rev. ed. (Moscow: Norma-Infra, 2000), 58. 108 Ibid., 57–58.

Historiography of the Formation of Moscow

Dvornichenko believes that the problem of “the reasons for the rise of Moscow” is far-fetched and uninteresting for social history: “The question is much more interesting, not ‘why,’ but ‘how’ did the rise of Moscow happen. In the end, if not to fall into mysticism, both Tver and Nizhny Novgorod could have been in the place of Moscow. And that would change little in our history.”109 *** This short historiographic sketch does not reflect the entire variety of scholarly literature concerning the reasons for the rise of Moscow, but it allows to draw a number of conclusions. As one could see, the question of the reasons for the rise of Moscow has for centuries remained the subject of fierce discussions, which often acquire political and ideological connotations. For many years Russian (and even Soviet) historiography was dominated by the model proposed by Klyuchevsky, around which the conflicts unfolded. The list of reasons for the rise of Moscow remained approximately the same (geographical factor, security, population influx, policy of princes, policy of Horde khans, religious factor, and so forth), but this list was configured in various ways, based on each historian’s own ideas about the priority of these or other reasons. In the course of numerous discussions, Soviet historians sometimes criticized Klyuchevsky’s scheme, or tried to adapt it to new realities. Pokrovsky tried to consider the reasons for the rise of Moscow within the framework of the theory of “commercial capital,” which he created. Smirnov proposed the theory of an “agrarian coup.” Cherepnin noted the role of Moscow in the development of economic ties between various Russian lands. Zimin argued that the key to understanding the reasons for the rise of Moscow lies in the specifics of the colonization process and in the creation of a military service army, among other factors. Other historians tried to find new approaches to the question of the rise of Moscow. In particular, Gumilyov considers this problem within the framework of his theory of passionarity and ethnogenesis, Borisov focuses on the policy of the Moscow princes, Gorsky analyzes in detail the relations of the Moscow principality with the Ulus Jochi and criticizes some historiographic cliches. Unfortunately, the criticism of pre-revolutionary and Soviet concepts 109 A. Y. Dvornichenko, Russian History from Ancient Times to the Fall of Autocracy. Textbook [Russian] (Moscow: Ves′ mir, 2010), 274.

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of the rise of Moscow does not always lead to the emergence of new convincing theories. Therefore, I believe that it is too early to conclude the discussion about the reasons for the rise of Moscow. It is necessary to continue research on this interesting topic. An important way of development would be the intensification of research dialogue between historians of Russia, the West, and the East.

Figure 1.  Apollinary Mikhailovich Vasnetsov. “Founding of Moscow” (1917).

CHAPTER 2

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player 2.1.  THE ORIGIN OF MOSCOW APPANAGE PRINCIPALITY Before starting a conversation about the emergence of Moscow, it is necessary to give American readers at least a brief overview of the previous events in Russian history. By the middle of the ninth century, the Eastern Slavs had two main state centers, Kiev and Novgorod. In 862, the Novgorodians called for the Varangian Rurik (r. 862–879) to reign. In 882, his son Oleg (r. 879–912) captured Kiev.1 This is how the Old Russian state arose, which grew in the struggle against the Byzantine Empire and the peoples of the Great Steppe, including the Pechenegs and Cumans. Oleg signed the first treaties with Byzantium (907 and 911). His son Igor (r. 912–945) was not so successful in signing a treaty with the Greeks2 less favorable for Russia in 944, and then was killed by the Drevlians for his insistence on collecting tribute a second time in a row.3 His wife, Princess Olga (r. 945–962), punished the Drevlians, and again ordered the collection of tribute from the lands under her control. The son of Olga and Igor, Svyatoslav (r. 964–972) dealt a crushing blow to the Khazar Kaganate, but was defeated in the war with Byzantium and was killed by the Pechenegs. After bloody feuds between the heirs of Svyatoslav, his youngest son Vladimir (r. 980–1015)

1 2 3

Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles [Russian], vol. 1, Laurentian Chronicle, issue 1, The Tale of Bygone Years, 2nd ed. (Leningrad: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1926). Ibid., 43–53. Ibid., 54–55.

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became the prince of Kiev. He introduced Christianity to Russia, which henceforth became an ally of the Byzantine Empire. In a new battle for power, the fourth son of Vladimir, Yaroslav the Wise (1019–1054), became the prince of Kiev. During his reign, Russia inflicted a number of defeats on the Pechenegs, entered into a new treaty with the Byzantine Empire, and reached the peak of its geopolitical power. Yaroslav the Wise bequeathed the Kiev throne to his eldest son Izyaslav. The rest of the lands were distributed as follows: Chernigov went to Svyatoslav, Pereyaslavl to Vsevolod, and Smolensk to Vyacheslav. However, in fact, Izyaslav ruled Russia not alone, but in a kind of triumvirate together with Svyatoslav and Vsevolod. A destabilizing factor was the rogue princes (Vseslav, prince of Polotsk, and Rostislav, the grandson of Yaroslav the Wise), who had no share in the management of Russia. Rostislav was soon poisoned by the Greeks in Tmutarakan. In 1067 Izyaslav, Svyatoslav, and Vsevolod treacherously arrested Vseslav of Polotsk. A year later, the Cuman (Polovets) nomads came to Rus and defeated the triumvirate on the Alta River. The inhabitants of Kiev demanded that Izyaslav give them weapons to protect them from the Cumans, but they were refused. Angered by this, the population of Kiev turned away from Izyaslav and declared Vseslav their prince. However, the Polish king Boleslav II came to the aid of Izyaslav. Izyaslav regained the Kiev throne, and Vseslav fled back to Polotsk. The triumvirate was restored, but in 1073 Svyatoslav and Vsevolod opposed Izyaslav and he fled to Europe. Svyatoslav entered Kiev. In 1076, Svyatoslav died, and Izyaslav returned to Kiev. Now Izyaslav and Vsevolod, as well as the heir of Izyaslav, Svyatopolk, and the heir of Vsevolod, Vladimir Monomakh, moved to the first place in Kievan Rus. The eldest son of Svyatoslav, Oleg, was left out of business, since power was transferred in a rota from brother to the next elder brother, and not from father to son.4 In 1078, Izyaslav and Vsevolod defeated Oleg in the Nezhatina field, but Izyaslav died in battle. Vsevolod became the prince of Kiev. After his death in 1093, “any of the grandsons of Yaroslav the Wise could take the Kiev throne: the eldest son of Vsevolod, Vladimir Monomakh, the eldest son of Svyatoslav, Oleg, or, finally, Svyatopolk, the eldest son of Izyaslav, who died in the Nezhatina field.”5 As a result, three warring groups arose: 4 5

A. N. Bokhanov, L. E. Morozova, M. A. Rakhmatullin, A. N. Sakharov, V. A. Shestakov (eds.), History of Russia from Ancient Times to the Present Day [Russian] (Moscow: AST, 2016), 139. Ibid., 143.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player one led by Svyatopolk in Kiev, another led by Vladimir Monomakh in Chernigov, and the third led by Oleg in Tmutarakan. Oleg was descended from the middle son of Yaroslav, and Vladimir was the son of the youngest brother. Therefore, Oleg now quite reasonably claimed the seniority of the Chernigov principality and all the lands that were under the rule of Chernigov—Smolensk, the Rostov-Suzdal land, Beloozero, and others. But in order to prove his right to Chernigov, he had to compete with the mighty Vladimir Monomakh.6

A new princely strife began. At the same time, the Cuman tribes came to Russia, demanding to confirm the peace treaty signed by Prince Vsevolod. However, Svyatopolk threw the ambassadors into prison. War broke out. In 1094, Oleg brought the Polovets armies to Russia and laid siege to Chernigov. Vladimir Monomakh left the city. He was accompanied by his wife (the English princess Gytha), as well as his sons, Izyaslav, Yaropolk, Vyacheslav, and Yury (the future founder of Moscow). Monomakh led the struggle of Russia against the Polovets armies, although he himself provoked a new round of this conflict, as he allowed the assassination of the Polovets ambassadors in 1095. In 1097 the first congress of Russian princes was held in Lubech. The princes agreed that each of them should retain the lands of their fathers—the children of Yaroslav the Wise. In 1113, the Kiev prince Svyatopolk died. The townspeople begged the sixty-year-old Vladimir Monomakh to take the grand ducal throne. With his mighty hand, Monomakh temporarily halted the incipient disintegration of Kievan Rus. After the death of Monomakh, contrary to the rota system, his eldest son Mstislav (1125–1132) became the prince of Kiev, although his uncles and cousins, who were older than him, were still alive. This laid the foundations for future conflicts. After the death of Mstislav, Russia entered a period of political fragmentation. Kiev passed from hand to hand. The Rostov-Suzdal prince Yury Dolgoruky, the youngest son of Vladimir Monomakh, reigned twice in Kiev. He went down in history not only as an ambitious politician but also as a creator of new population centers. Under Yury new waves of population came into the Rostov-Suzdal region from the Kiev, Chernigov, and Pereyaslavl lands, which suffered from civil strife and Polovets invasions. M. K. Lyubavsky lists the cities 6

Ibid., 143.

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built by Yury and his sons: “Pereyaslavl on Lake Kleshchina, Uglich field on the Volga, Ksnyatin at the confluence of the Nerl and the Volga, Yuryev-Polsky, Dmitrov on the river Yakhroma, Moscow, and so forth. The cities built after Yury include Rzhev, Zubtsov, Tver, Kostroma, Unzha, Gorodets, Nizhny on the Volga; and north of the Volga, Sheshnya, Dubnya, Klin on the river Sestra, Zvenigorod, Gorokhovets, Yaropolk, and Starodub on the Klyazma, as well as others.”7 The first mention of Moscow, located between the Suzdal and Chernigov-Seversky regions, refers to April 4, 1147, when, according to V. N. Tatishchev, Yury Dolgoruky received Svyatoslav Olgovich of Chernigov there. Not all historians recognize this date.8 Yury Dolgoruky did not found Moscow from scratch. According to the legend, “there were beautiful, good villages along the Moscow River at this place,”9 which belonged to the Suzdal boyar Stepan Ivanovich Kuchka. Kuchka did not accept Yury’s dominion, for which he was executed. In 1156, Yury laid the foundations of the “city of Moscow” below the mouth of the river N ­ eglinnaya and above the river Yauza, a little distance from where he received Svyatoslav. According to V. A. Kuchkin, Yury Dolgoruky “surrounded his M ­ oskvoretsky 10 courtyard with wooden walls and turned it into a city.” According to V. O. ­Klyuchevsky, the small “village” Moscow “was then a rural princely estate or, more precisely, a station yard, where the Suzdal prince stayed on his trips to the Kiev south and back.”11 At the same time, the historian notes, this courtyard “should have had significant household facilities.”12 In the pre-Mongol era, Moscow did not play a significant role in the life of Northeastern Russia. As Klyuchevsky asserts: As a new town, far from Rostov and Vladimir, the centers of the Suzdal region, Moscow later than other Suzdal cities had the opportunity to become the capital of its own principality. Moreover, this new principality

  7 Lyubavsky, Russian History from Scythia to Muscovy, 135.   8 V. A. Kuchkin, “The Foundation of Moscow as Covered by the ‘History of Russia’ of V. N. Tatishchev” [Russian], Ancient Russia. Questions of Medieval Studies 4 (2009): 24–32.   9 “The Tale of the Beginning of the Reigning City of Moscow,” in Izbornik: Tales of Ancient Russia [Russian], comp. and notes L. Dmitrieva and N. Ponyrko, ed. D. Likhachev (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1986), 295. 10 Ibid., 6. 11 Klyuchevsky, Works, vol. 2, part 2, 5. 12 Ibid., 5.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player should have become the domionion of the youngest prince. Indeed for the most of the thirteenth century a constant reign is not observed in Moscow: princes appeared in Moscow only for a short time, and they all were the youngest sons of their fathers.13

In 1236, the grand duke of Vladimir, Yury Vsevolodovich (grandson of Yury Dolgoruky), allocated the Moscow principality to his son Vladimir. In the long term, this event could have played an important role in the rise of the Moscow principality, but at that moment Russia turned out to be the object of aspirations of a powerful new power—the Mongol Empire. The Moscow principality, like many other Russian regions, fully experienced the power of the Mongol army, which will be discussed in more detail below.

2.2.  RUS IN THE ORBIT OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE In 1206, on the banks of the Onon River, Genghis Khan was proclaimed the Great Khan, King of Kings and Sovereign of Sovereigns, the ruler of all Mongols. This is how the Mongol Empire appeared. Its first blows were aimed at the Tangut state of Xi Xia and the Jin Empire. In the fall of 1207, Genghis Khan began a war with Xi Xia, and sent his eldest son Jochi to conquer the neighboring forest peoples of the vast Sayano-Altai region (Southern Siberia). The campaign was successful, the Mongolian soldiers returned with virtually no losses. According to the Secret Legend, pleased with this result, Genghis Khan handed over the tribes and peoples of Southern Siberia under the control of Jochi.14 The Chinese dynastic chronicle Yuan shi confirms that Jochi “at the beginning of the founding of the state, as a qin wang (‘prince of blood’), was allocated to the northwest.”15 Thus, the Ulus Jochi gradually began to form. Only direct offspring of Jochi could rule there.16

13 Ibid., 6–7. 14 S. A. Kozin, Secret Legend. Mongolian Chronicle 1240 [Monγol-un niruča tobčiyan / Yuan chao bi shi], vol. 1, Introduction to the Study of the Source. Translation, Texts, Glossaries [Russian] (Moscow: Izdatel′sky dom Akademii nauk SSSR, 1941), 174–175. 15 R. P. Khrapachevsky (ed. and trans.), The Golden Horde in Historical Sources. Chinese and Mongolian Sources [Russian], vol. 3 (Moscow: Nauka, 2009), 221. 16 A. K. Kushkumbaev, “Ulus Jochi (Golden Horde) in the Imperial Dimension” [Russian], Medieval History of Central Eurasia 3, no. 1 (2020): 40.

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Conquest of China In 1209, Genghis Khan again laid siege to Zhongxing, the capital of Xi Xia. The Tangut sovereign recognized the sovereignty of Genghis Khan. The Uighurs and the Karluk Turks who lived along the Ili and Chu rivers also surrendered to the Mongols. The Mongols then entered into an alliance with the Southern Song Chinese and completed the encirclement of Jin. In February and March 1211, the Mongols infiltrated deep into the Jin. At the Yehulin ridge, the Jin army was defeated, and in the fall the Mongols laid siege to Beijing. In the spring of 1212, Genghis Khan again invaded Jin. First fell the Western capital of Jin (Datong city), then the Eastern capital (Liaoning city). In 1213, Emperor Wei Wang Yun Ji was assassinated. He was replaced by the former ruler of the Western capital, Hulahu, who signed a truce with the Mongols and paid them a large ransom. Then Hulahu moved his residence from Beijing to the southern capital (Kaifeng). At this point, part of the Jin army, mainly composed of members of the nomadic tribe Khitan, came into contact with the Mongols and proclaimed their desire to cooperate. The Mongols came to the aid of the Khitan and in 1215 Beijing was taken. In 1216, Genghis Khan returned to Mongolia, leaving in China Mukhali, his comrade-in-arms from the Jalair tribe. Mukhali was given the title of guo wang (“prince of the state”).17

War with Western Liao and Khwarazm At that time, there were two large states on the western borders of Mongolia— the Qara Khitai Khanate (the Chinese called it Western Liao) and the Khwarezmid Empire. The Khwarezmid ruler Shah al-Dīn Muhammad II fought with the Qara Khitai Khanate and the rulers of Central Asia. In 1207 he took Bukhara, and in 1208 he conquered Khwarazm and Herat. In 1209 he defeated the Qara Khitais in the Ilamysh steppe, and in 1212 he took Samarkand. In 1211, Prince Kuchlug, leader of the nomadic tribe of Naimans, who had fled to Western Liao, overthrew the Qara Khitai ruler and struck the rear of the Mongols.18 He changed his religion from Christianity to Buddhism and began to persecute Muslims. In 1218, the Mongol corps under the command of Jebe came up against him. Jebe declared that “each person should adhere to his faith and keep the path of his ancestors in religion.” Kuchlug fled to Badakhshan, but 17 History of the East, vol. 2, East in the Middle Ages [Russian] (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo “Vostochnaia literatura” Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, 1999), 378. 18 L. N. Gumilyov, Ancient Russia and the Great Steppe [Russian] (Moscow: AST, 2002), 485.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

was captured and surrendered to the Mongols, who subjugated the entire basin of the river Tarim and Zhetysu region up to river Talas. Khwarazmian Shah, Mohammed II, learnt about the capture of Beijing and sent an ambassador to Genghis Khan. The khan commanded the ambassador: “Tell the Khwarazmian Shah: I am the ruler of the East, and you are the ruler of the West! Let there be a firm agreement between us on peace and friendship, and let the merchants of both sides go and return, and let the expensive products and ordinary goods that are in my land be transported by them to you, and yours to me.”19 Then Mongolian ambassadors went to Bukhara, where they announced that Genghis Khan was ready to recognize the shah “on a par with the dearest of his sons,” but the shah did not want to agree to the role of the “younger” ruler. Soon a Mongolian mission and a merchant caravan arrived in Otrar. The shah ordered to kill the Mongolian ambassador, cut off the beards of his companions, and sent them with a message to Genghis Khan: “I am coming at you, even if you were at the end of the world, to take revenge.”20 In the fall of 1219, the Mongols invaded the dominions of Muhammad II. In February–April 1220 Otrar, Bukhara, Samarkand, Sighanaq, Jend, and Benaket fell. The Arab chronicler Ibn al-Athir reports that Genghis Khan gave an assignment to a twenty-thousand Mongolian detachment: “Find the Khwarazmian shah, wherever he is—even if he clung to the sky—and overtake and grab him.”21 Mohammad II fled to Khorasan and then to the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. He took refuge on the island of Ashuradeh, where he died at the end of 1220.

The First Clash of the Mongols with Russia In 1221–1222 the corps of Jebe and Subetai passed through Azerbaijan and Georgia and went to the foothills of the North Caucasus, where they defeated the Cumans and the Ossetians. The Cumans asked for help from the Russian princes. Three great Russian princes—Mstislav Romanovich (Kiev), Mstislav Mstislavich Udaly (“the Brave,” Galich), and Mstislav Svyatoslavich (Chernigov)—decided to help the Cumans. On May 31, 1223, a decisive battle 19 Z. M. Buniyatov, State of the Khorezmshah-Anushteginids [Russian] (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), 132. 20 History of the East, vol. 2, 379–380. 21 B. E. Kumekova and A. K. Muminov (eds.), Collection of Materials Related to the History of the Golden Horde, vol. 1, Extracts from Arabic Works Collected by V. G. Tiesenhausen [Russian] (Almaty: Daik-Press, 2005), 34.

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took place on the Kalka River, in which the Russian-Cuman army suffered a crushing defeat. Rashid al-Din describes this event in the following way: Then they [the Mongols] moved to the country of Russians and to the Kipchaks who had gone there. … They fought for a whole week, and finally the Kipchaks and the Russians fled. The Mongols followed on their heels and destroyed their cities to the point that they depopulated most of their lands. From there they went back and joined Genghis Khan on the way when he was returning from the country of Tajiks.22

Historical Background Jochi died in February 1227. There are several versions of his death. Rashid al-Din reports that there was a conflict between Jochi and his father: allegedly, Jochi avoided participating in the next military campaign, after which the angry father declared: “He will see no mercy, I will put him to death.”23 Minhaj al-Siraj Juzjani claims that Jochi decided to rebel against his father, telling his entourage: “Genghis Khan has gone mad that he is destroying so many people and destroying so many kingdoms. It seems to me the most expedient to kill my father while hunting, to get close with Sultan Muhammad, to bring this state to a flourishing shape and to help the Muslims.”24 His brother Chagatai learned about this plan and informed his father about it, who sent his people to kill Jochi. The third version, which has come down to us in the steppe legends, speaks of the death of Jochi from the hooves of a lame kulan.25 Kazakhstani historian K. Z. Uskenbay suggests that researchers should “abandon the conjectures of Juzjani and assume that the firstborn of Genghis Khan died a natural death. His middle age and constant complaints of illness only confirm this assumption.”26 At the time of Jochi’s death his son, Batu, was eighteen years of age. 22 M. Kh. Abuseitova and Zh. M. Tulibaeva (eds.), History of Kazakhstan in Persian Sources [Russian], vol. 4, Collection of Materials Related to the History of the Golden Horde. Extracts from Persian Works Collected by V. G. Tiesenhausen and Processed by A. A. Romaskevich and S. L. Volin (Almaty: Daik-Press, 2006), 80. 23 Ibid., 115. 24 Ibid., 40. 25 R. Yu. Pochekaev, Golden Horde. History in an Imperial Context [Russian] (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2017), 11. 26 K. Z. Uskenbai, Eastern Dasht-i Kypchak in the Thirteenth and the Early Fifteenth Centuries. Problems of the Ethnopolitical History of Ulus Jochi, ed. T. Mirgaleev [Russian] (Kazan: FAN AN RT, 2013), 68.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

In August of the same year, 1227, Genghis Khan died. His son Ogedei ascended the throne, and together with his brother Chagatai he revised the boundaries of the Ulus Jochi. A number of Central Asian possessions, which had previously belonged to Jochi, fell under the rule of Chagatai, and the Siberian possessions of the Jochids came under the control of Ogedei and his offspring. After the kurultai of 1229, at which Ogedei was elected khan, Batu did not return to his ulus, but remained with his uncle. Perhaps the sons of Genghis Khan did not trust Batu and wanted to keep him close. R. Yu. Pochekaev notes that in 1230–1234 Batu participated in the war against Jin, even though his direct duty was to further the Mongol cause in the territories of his own ulus, where the Mongols were at war in the Volga and Ural regions. Perhaps this convinced Ogedei of Batu’s loyalty. For participation in the war against Jin, the Jochids received at the kurultai of 1235 the Pingyangfu district in Shanxi province, the proceeds from which were to go to their treasury. At the same time, it was decided to make a big march to the West, “to the last sea.” Part of the new land was to go to Batu as compensation for the areas taken from him by Chagatai and Ogedei.27 Further expansion of the empire became a family affair of all descendants of Genghis Khan. Batu and his brothers (Orda, Shiban, Tangad, and Berke) took part in the campaign along with Guyuk and Koden, the sons of Ogedei, Chagatai’s son Baidar and his grandson Buri, Mongke and Bochok, the sons of Tolui, the fourth son of Genghiz Khan and his senior wife Borte, as well as Kulkan, the youngest son of Genghis Khan.28 M. T. Laumulin comments that the army that marched West could include up to 150 thousand soldiers: “There were fifteen princes of blood in Batu’s army, and each of them could command no less than a tumen, that is, he headed ten thousand soldiers. But even if only thirty thousand took part in the raid, this would still be more than the scattered feudal lords in Europe could muster to oppose the newcomers, even if they managed to unite. To this, it is necessary to add the Mongols’ brilliant tactics of combat operations and the fact that they had the best reconnaissance at that time.”29

27 Pochekaev, Golden Horde, 13. 28 Kushkumbaev, “Ulus Jochi,” 41. 29 M. T. Laumulin, “The History of the Golden Horde in Orientalism: a Brief Outline” [Russian], Medieval History of Central Eurasia 1 (2020): 51.

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The Campaign against Rus and the Growth of the Ulus Jochi In the winter of 1236–1237 the Mongols conquered the Volga Bulgaria. Ata-Malik Juvayni writes in the History of the Conqueror of the World: Within the borders of the Bulgar, the princes came together; the earth groaned and buzzed from the multitude of troops, and the wild beasts and predatory animals were stunned by the noise of the vast hordes. First, they [the princes] took the Bulgar city, which was known in the world for the inaccessibility of the area and its large population, by force and by storm. Its inhabitants were [partly] killed and [partly] captured; they were made an example to all people like them. From there they [the princes] went to the lands of Rus.30

The first stage of the invasion began in the fall of 1237, when Batu came to the Ryazan principality, and Subedei and Burundai approached Russia from Volga. Batu did not want to fight with Ryazan, since its prince did not participate in the battle of Kalka, but the Mongols needed food and a change of horses in order to move forward. The Mongols demanded that the residents of Ryazan pay tithes to the khan, but they replied: “When none of us survives, then you will take everything.” On December 21, the city fell. Prince Yury Ingvarevich was killed. After the occupation of Kolomna, Moscow fell on January 20, 1238. It was defended by Vladimir, the youngest son of Yury Vsevolodovich and the governor Filip Nyanka with a small army. Vladimir was captured or killed, but the Mongols were temporarily detained. Nevertheless, all the main cities of the Vladimir-Suzdal land were conquered soon. On February 7, 1238, Batu took the city of Vladimir. Then the Mongols captured Suzdal, Bogolyubov, Kideksha, Rostov the Great, Tver, Kostroma, and Yaroslavl. On March 4, 1238, the troops of Yury Vsevolodovich were slaughtered on the Sit River by Burundai’s regiment. Yury Vsevolodovich himself was killed in that battle (his head was cut off) and was later buried in the Assumption Cathedral in Rostov. His nephew, Vasilko Konstantinovich, was also captured as a prisoner and then executed. Meanwhile, another Mongol army besieged Torzhok, which held out longer than Ryazan and Vladimir. On March 5, Torzhok was taken. There were about 280 versts (300 kilometers) to Novgorod, which the army could cross in 30 Abuseitova and Tulibaeva, History of Kazakhstan, 58.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

fifteen or twenty days. But the Mongols did not go all the way: when only 100 versts (106.68 kilometers) were left till Novgorod, they turned south. Notably, the Novgorodians did not help either Yury Vsevolodovich on Sit River or the residents of Torzhok.31 Some modern Russian historians suggest that the Mongols did not intend to go to Novgorod, knowing that the Novgorod prince Yaroslav Vsevolodovich and his son Alexander were absent on the Sit River. As a result, the principality of Novgorod, including Pskov, the principality of Polotsk, and part of the principality of Smolensk were not affected by the invasion. This played an important role in the development of the Russian lands.32 On their way back to their native steppes, the Mongols besieged Kozelsk in the northern part of the Chernigov principality for forty-nine days. The city was taken only after the death of all its defenders. Fifteen-year-old Prince Vasily was killed or missing. Rashid al-Din Hamadani notes: “During this campaign, Batu came to the city of Kozelsk and, besieging it for two months, could not take it. Then Kadan and Buri arrived and took it in three days. Then they settled in the houses and rested.”33 By the summer of 1238, the Mongols had left the Russian lands. They needed time to regroup their forces. In addition, a threat to them came from the eastern and southern borders of Russia. The Mongols fought with the Circassians and the Ossetians, attacked the Crimea, and fought with the Cumans. Russian chronicles mention the campaigns of the Mongols against the Mordovians and the city of Murom. In the spring of 1239, the second stage of the invasion of Russia began. On March 3, the Mongols attacked the most southeastern region of Kievan Rus— South Pereyaslavl. The city was taken, and its inhabitants were killed. In the summer or early autumn, the Tatar troops took Glukhov, Sosnitsa, Kursk, and other cities. On October 18, 1239, Chernigov fell. Soon the Mongols were at the walls of Kiev. The Kiev prince Daniel Romanovich of Galich sent his tysyatsky (captain) to Kiev, and fled to Poland himself. Kiev fell on December 6, 1240. Daniel Romanovich tried to create an anti-Mongol coalition with Poland and Hungary. As Yu. R. Miroshnichenko 31 V. A. Kuchkin “Alexander Nevsky—Statesman and Commander of Medieval Russia” [Russian], Notes of the Fatherland 5 (1996): 23. 32 History of Russian Foreign Policy from Late Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Century (from the Overthrow of the Horde Yoke to the Northern War) [Russian] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1999), 77. 33 Abuseitova and Tulibaeva, History of Kazakhstan, 85–86.

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and S. L. Udovik write: “Poland and Hungary hoped that the Horde and Daniel of Galich would weaken each other, after which they would be able to divide the principality.”34 In spring of 1241, Batu ravaged Galicia-Volhyn Rus, but it quickly revived, since Daniel Romanovich began to build cities, fortresses, and castles, which alerted the Jochids.35 In 1241–1242 Mongolian troops fought through southern Poland, Bohemia, Hungary and Wallachia. In April 1241, the Mongols utterly defeated the Polish-German army of Prince Henry II the Pious in the battle of Legnitsa, and later in the same month, in the battle on the Shayo River, Batu and Subedei destroyed the main forces of the Hungarian king Bela IV. In the spring of 1242, the Mongolian units reached the Adriatic Sea, but, having received news of the death of Ogedei, Batu returned to Dasht-i Kypchak.

Economic and Political Consequences of the Mongol Invasion Russian émigré historian E. F. Shmurlo writes: “The invasion of Batu materially depopulated the Russian land. In particular, the cities received a hard blow: lots of them were destroyed; only in February 1238, the Mongols took fourteen cities, not counting settlements and graveyards. The population fled to the forests; the country has become impoverished and desolate.”36 Dvornichenko notes that forty-nine of seventy-four Russian cities were destroyed, life did not resume in fourteen cities, and fifteen cities became villages.37 According to Yu. V. Seleznyov, Northeastern Russia became a source of money and human resources for the Horde’s military expeditions and the construction of cities on the Lower Volga.38 Lyubavsky wrote that it was no coincidence that the Russian tribute to the Horde was called “exit”: the money left the country. As a result, silver ceased to play the role in internal exchange in Russia, and its economy began to devolve from monetary to natural exchange.39 34 Yu. R. Miroshnichenko and S. L. Udovik, Rus-Ukraine: The Formation of Statehood, vol. 1, Rus-Ukraine: From Ancient Times to the Creation of an Empire [Russian] (Kiev: Vakler, 2011), 202. 35 N. F. Kotlyar, “Courtyard of the Galician Romanovichs (Thirteenth Century)” [Russian], Ancient Russia. Questions of Medieval Studies 1 (2008): 69. 36 E. F. Shmurlo, History of Russia (Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries) [Russian] (Moscow: Veche, 2005), 78–79. 37 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 185. 38 Yu. V. Seleznyov, Russian-Horde Military Conflicts of the Thirteenth and the Fifteenth Centuries. Directory [Russian] (Moscow: Kvadriga, 2010), 8. 39 Lyubavsky, Russian History from Scythia to Muscovy, 191.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

B. Yu. Kagarlitsky states that the devastation of Kiev and other cities was monstrous, and almost all cities suffered silmutaneously, except for Novgorod and Pskov, which the Mongols did not reach. By this, the outcome of the Mongol invasion was qualitatively different from the effects of the regular conflicts between the Russian princes.40 In addition, B. Yu. Kagarlitsky draws attention to the contradictions in historical sources. For example, Giovanni da Pian del Carpini writes that in Kiev there were hardly two hundred houses left,41 while noting that he saw rich merchants from Genoa, Venice, Pisa, and Acre there.42 It is not clear what the rich merchants did in ruined Kiev. According to D. G. Khrustalyov, the formation of the Golden Horde led to the rupture of the historical evolution of Northeastern Russia. Northeastern Russia became the “Russian ulus” of the Horde. This meant political dependence, tributary relations, and military obligations in relation to the Horde.43 Rus lost its possessions at the conjunction of Oka and Volga, the Middle and Lower Volga regions, in the North Caucasus. This led to the revitalization of Hungary, Poland, the Teutonic Order, Sweden, Denmark, and Lithuania. Against this background, the fragmentation of the Russian lands continued.44 Many historians have repeatedly noted that it was from the Mongols that Moscow adopted the idea of a strong state. Already in the nineteenth century, Karamzin, the official Russian historiographer, argued that Moscow “owes its greatness to the khans.”45 As noted in the introduction, the first Eurasians also recognized the strong Mongol influence on Russia. Thus, N. S. Trubetskoy asserted that the Moscow state arose thanks to the Tatar yoke, and Moscow became a powerful state only after the conquest of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia. The Russian tsar was the heir to the Mongol khan. As a matter of fact, “the overthrow of the Tatar yoke boiled down to the transfer of the khan’s headquarters to Moscow.”46

40 B. Yu. Kagarlitskiy, Peripheral Empire: Cycles of Russian History [Russian] (Moscow: Eksmo Algoritm, 2009), 86–87. 41 J. Carpini and G. Plano, Travels to the Golden Horde [Russian] (Moscow: Eksmo, 2021), 106. 42 Ibid., 136. 43 D. G. Khrustalyov, Russia and the Mongol Invasion (1220s–1250s) [Russian] (St. Petersburg: Evraziya, 2013), 78. 44 Ibid., 300. 45 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 447. 46 Trubetskoy, Genghis Khan’s Legacy, 157–158.

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V. A. Ryazanovsky criticized Eurasianism. According to him, the MongolTatar influence on Russian culture did not play a unique or a particularly important role.47 In the same way, there was no direct influence of the Mongolian law on the Russian legal system, neither through the application of the Mongolian code, nor through the creation of a special system of laws.48 Ryazanovsky points out that the Mongols did not create their own dynasty in Russia and did not appoint regular governors—baskaks were appointed sporadically. Government in Russia was still in the hands of Russian princes, and the relations with the Horde were in the hands of the grand duke.49 That is, there were no special conductors of Mongolian influence.50 Ryazanovsky also notes that the Mongols overlooked the strengthening of the great Moscow principality, since they were only interested in the material issues—squeezing out more and more funds from the princes and the population. That is why “the grand duke’s throne was the subject of bargaining and rebidding.”51 Ryazanovsky’s arguments were questioned by Vernadsky in his Mongols and Russia (1953), which was already mentioned in the introduction. Vernadsky compared the Russian state and society in the Kiev period and in the post-Mongol era. He noted that in the Russian state of the Kiev period, the monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements of power “balanced each other, and the people had a voice in government throughout the country.”52 After the Mongols, the situation changed: there was a sharp division between Eastern Russia (Muscovy) and Western Russia (included in the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth). In Western Russia, the aristocratic element became stronger, and in Eastern Russia, the monarchical element developed.53 At the same time, the power of the Moscow tsar “was immeasurably greater than the power of his Suzdal predecessors.”54 Vernadsky also notes the contrast between the pre- and post-Mongolian periods in the sphere of social relations. He claims that the society of Kievan Rus can be called a free society,55 while in the Muscovite state all classes of the nation were assigned to public service.56 47 V Ryazanovsky, “On the Question of the Influence,” 152–163. 48 Ibid., 158. 49 Ibid., 159. 50 Ibid., 159. 51 Ibid., 160. 52 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, 358. 53 Ibid., 359. 54 Ibid., 359. 55 Ibid., 359–360. 56 Ibid., 360.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

Vernadsky acknowledges the influence of the Mongols on the administration: the khan of the Golden Horde was the supreme ruler of Russia—its king. “Not a single Russian prince had the right to govern his land without the necessary jarlig from the khan.”57 He believes that the recognition of the rights of the Rurik dynasty by the Mongols made it easier for the Russians to accept Mongol suzerainty.58 At the same time, “the internal political life of Russia never stopped, rather, it was limited and deformed by Mongol rule.”59 According to Vernadsky, before the Mongols, Russian princes were more interested in politics rather than in economy. Under the Mongols, the situation changed: the princes were limited in political rights, so began to pay more attention to their dominions.60 Vernadsky also compares the judiciary system before and under the Mongols. Under the Mongols, the khan took over the top management of all administrative functions, so the power of the Russian princes was sharply reduced.61 However, judicial practice was the least affected by Mongol rule,62 even though the Russians adopted some models of Mongolian jurisprudence63 such as death penalty, corporal punishment, and torture. Vernadsky notes that the boyars of Eastern Russia supported Moscow, contributing to the unification of Russia.64 At the same time, as the Horde weakened, the grand duke of Moscow felt confident enough to bequeath to his sons different shares of his possessions and to appoint his own successor.65 Richard Pipes examines the influence of the Mongols on Russia and the Moscow state within the framework of the theory of the patrimonial state. In his opinion, Russia, unlike Europe, did not know vassalage and conditional land tenure. The Russian prince “was the only owner of his own estate. It was only natural, then, that the accumulation of land became his obsession. He bought land, exchanged it, took it as a dowry and seized it by force.”66 As a result, the princes turned into “ordinary businessmen.”67 According to Pipes, early Russian 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

Ibid., 368. Ibid., 377. Ibid., 368. Ibid., 370. Ibid., 379–380. Ibid., 380. Ibid., 380–381. Ibid., 370. Ibid., 379. R. Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime [Russian] (Moscow: Zakharov, 2012), 79. Ibid., 79.

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statehood was distinguished by “an unusually deep abyss between the holders of political power and society, and a personal, patrimonial manner of exercising sovereign power.”68 These properties of Russian power “were aggravated by a devastating external event—the Mongol conquest of 1237–1241.”69 Pipes argues that the Mongols needed money and recruits, so they did not occupy Russia, but instead imposed tribute on it, conducting the first census of the country’s population.70 As he stresses, not a single Russian prince could come into power without receiving the khan’s jarlig.71 The jarlig went to the one “who promised the most money and people and guaranteed better than others that he would be able to control the restless population.”72 Pipes emphasizes that the Russian princes had to squeeze and squeeze out tribute and recruits from the population, since in case of arrears they could be summoned to Sarai where the jarlig would be transferred to a more obsequious rival.73 Under such conditions, the most unprincipled and ruthless survived, while others went to the bottom. As Pipes ironically notes, “Collaboration became the pinnacle of political virtue for Russians.”74 He then argues that the Mongol dominance had aggravated the isolation of the princes from the population and prevented them from realizing their political responsibility. It also taught them to think that power is inherently lawless.75 As mentioned in the introduction, at the turn of the twenty-first century, a discussion arose between Donald Ostrovsky and Charles Halperin. Both historians recognized the significant influence of the Golden Horde on the development of Russia and noted Moscow’s borrowing of Mongolian military, administrative, and financial institutions. However, Halperin denied Ostrovsky’s conclusion about the key role of the Mongols in the formation of an autocratic model of state administration in Russia. Halperin believed that the Moscow autocracy was neither an imitation nor a response to the Mongols’ governance:

68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75

Ibid., 80. Ibid., 80. Ibid., 81. Ibid., 81. Ibid., 82. Ibid., 82. Ibid., 81. Ibid., 81–82.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player The Mongols are being accused of being the cause of the established regime in Russia. According to him, the ideology and forms of the Moscow autocracy were largely Byzantine, not Tatar origin. Autocracy was the norm in the early stages of European development from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, and Muscovy did not need a Mongolian model to join this widespread phenomenon.76

In 2016, Halperin returned to the issue of Mongol influence. He noted that the Tatar influence on Russia varied chronologically, geographically and socially, but “the interactions between Russia and the Tatars have never been secondary or insignificant.”77 Halperin emphasized: “The fact that the Russians borrowed some of the Tatar institutions did not mean that they borrowed all the Tatar institutions.”78 In his opinion, the Moscow princes lacked either the ability or the desire to copy all Tatar institutions. For example, the Muscovites did not borrow the imperial system or the conditional land tenure from the Mongols. Likewise, the zemsky sobor was not a copy of the kurultai.79 Halperin also notes that even after the conquest of Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberia, “Muscovy did not become and did not feel like a successor state to the Juchid ulus.”80 As he states, an acception of this connection required “more than some kind of territorial succession, the involvement of Mongolian servicemen or the borrowing of Mongolian institutions; it required entailing the assimilation of political and cultural identity. Muscovy did not have this very identity.”81

2.3.  NOVGOROD LAND: GEOPOLITICAL ALLIANCE WITH THE HORDE AGAINST THE WEST After the death of the grand duke of Vladimir, Yury Vsevolodovich, on the river Sit, the eldest of his living brothers Yaroslav took the throne. As Fennel writes, he “was the most experienced in politics and the most steadfast of all

76 Halperin, “Muscovite Political Institutions in the 14th Century,” 237–257. 77 Idem, “The Relationship between Russia and the Djuchid Ulus,” in Golden Horde in World History. Collective Monograph [Russian] (Kazan: Institut istorii im. Sh. Mardzhani Akademii nauk Respubliki Tatarstan, 2016), 196. 78 Ibid., 202. 79 Ibid., 203. 80 Ibid., 204. 81 Ibid., 205.

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the Vsevolodovichs.”82 The son of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, Alexander, reigned in Novgorod from 1236. The other sons of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich—Andrei, Konstantin, Yaroslav, Daniel, and Mikhail—were first mentioned in Russian chronicles only in 1239.

Battle of the Neva In 1240 the Swedish fleet invaded the Russian lands. Alexander Yaroslavich with his retinue set out to Ladoga, and the Swedes, under the command of the royal son-in-law Birger Magnusson stopped at the mouth of the Izhora, where they wanted to build a fortress. If it had actually been built, the Novgorod land and Northeastern Russia would have lost access to the Baltic, and all Russian trade would have been under Swedish control.83 According to the Sofia First Chronicle, the Swedish ambassadors declared to Alexander on behalf of Birger: “Fight with me if you dare; I am already here and will take your land captive.” Alexander, as if in response to Birger, declared to his friend: “God is not in power, but in truth.”84 On July 15, 1240, Alexander dealt a powerful blow to the Swedes. He even laid a seal on the face of the Swedish “king himself ” with his sword.85 This is the official Russian version of the Battle of the Neva. At the same time, some Russian historians, for example, I. P. Shaskolsky, note that the Swedish chronicles are silent about the Battle of the Neva and doubt that it was Birger who led the Swedish army, since he became jarl only in 1248.86 The post of jarl in 1240 was occupied by Ulf Fasi, so it is possible that it was Fasi who led the Swedish army to seize Russia’s most important outlet to the Baltic Sea.87 At the same time, the Russian historian D. G. Khrustalyov supports the version of the Danish researcher J. H. Lind, who asserts that the campaign to the Neva could have been led by Birger Magnusson. Around 1237, Birger married Ingeborg, the daughter of the Swedish king Eric X Knutsson (1208–1216),

82 J. Fennell, The Crisis of Medieval Russia. 1200–1304, ed. and introduction A. L. Khoroshkevich and A. I. Pliguzov [Russian] (Moscow: Progress, 1989), 137. 83 V. T. Pashuto, Foreign Policy of Ancient Russia [Russian] (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), 292. 84 PSRL, vol. 5, 177. 85 Ibid., 178. 86 I. P. Shaskolsky, Russia and the Crusaders. The Struggle for the Baltic in the Twelfth and the Thirteenth Centuries, [Russian] (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2016), 158. 87 Ibid., 159.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

and was one of the most influential people in the kingdom.88 Lind believes that the Neva campaign was not started by the Swedish king, but began with an independent attack by a small detachment.89 Nevertheless, Russian historians do not deny that the Battle of the Neva ended in victory. As Karamzin noted: “The damage from our side was barely noticeable, and this is a memorable battle, delighting all our sorrowful Fatherland.”90 This victory was also mentioned by Solovyov, who noted that the Battle of the Neva had an extremely important religious significance for Novgorod and the rest of Russia. It symbolized the victory of Orthodoxy over Catholicism, since in the legends about the exploits of Alexander Nevsky, the Swedes are called nothing else but “the Romans.”91 Alexander’s victory did not allow the Swedes to gain a foothold on the banks of the Neva and close the free access to the sea to other Russian lands. Novgorod could continue trading with European countries. However, Alexander Yaroslavich did not prevent the Teutons and the Danes from taking Pskov, which angered the Novgorodians. Alexander with his family went to his father in Pereyaslavl.92 Taking advantage of the situation, the Germans built a fortress in Koporye.93 Karamzin reports that the Lithuanians, Germans, and Chud (an Ugro-Finnish tribe) devastated the banks of the Luga and took away cattle and horses, so that the farmers could not cultivate the fields. Therefore, the archbishop with the boyars went to Alexander for help.94 In March 1241, Alexander Nevsky razed the fortress in Koporye to the ground.95 The supporters of the crusaders were hanged; only a few were pardoned.

88 D. G. Khrustalyov, Northern Crusaders. Russia in the Struggle for Spheres of Influence in the Eastern Baltic from the Eleventh to the Thirteenth Centuries [Russian], 2nd rev. ed. (St. Petersburg: Evraziya, 2012), 241–242. 89 J. H. Lind, “Some Thoughts on the Battle of Neva and Its Role” [Russian], in Yu. K. Begunov and A. N. Kirpichnikov, Alexander Nevsky and His Epoch. Research and Materials (St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 1995), 48. 90 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 275. 91 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 153. 92 PSRL, vol. 5, 177. 93 Ibid., 178. 94 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 276. 95 PSRL, vol 5, 179.

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Battle on the Ice In 1242, Alexander Yaroslavich and his brother Andrei Yaroslavich invaded the land of the Peipsi (Chud), who were allied with the Germans. Cutting the paths connecting Pskov with the Teutonic Order and the German bishoprics in the Baltic, Alexander liberated Pskov and expelled the German garrison,96 which was there in accordance with the treaty between the city and the Order. Seventy German knights and many common warriors were killed. Six knights were tortured. Then the Novgorod-Suzdal army invaded the lands of the Order, where the Estonians lived, and devastated them.97 On April 5, 1242, the famous Battle on the Ice took place on Lake Peipsi. According to the chronicler, the German troops were lined up in a “pig” or a wedge formation,98 which was designed for a powerful frontal strike. However, during the first strike the best fighters were located in the vanguard and out of action, while the soldiers marching in the column did not participate in the battle for a long time, keeping their positions.99 According to Khrustalyov, the formation of the Russian troops was traditional: they had three regiments in front and archers in the back, but Alexander concentrated his own troops on the flanks, and in the center he placed the Suzdal men, who were the most combat-ready. Alexander imposed his course of the battle on the enemy and achieved complete victory.100 Khrustalyov emphasizes that the Battle on the Ice ended an important stage in the struggle for the Baltic states. In 1241, the historical maximum of the spread of German colonization to the East was reached. In 1242, Alexander Nevsky returned the borders to the position of 1224 and consolidated the peace for more than a decade.101 According to Shaskolsky, the offensive of the crusaders in 1240–1242 was the largest in the entire period of fragmentation in Russia. The massive size of the enemy armies made the victories of Alexander Nevsky over the Northern European chivalry all the more important.102 At the same time, Fennell doubts that Alexander Nevsky’s victory in the Battle on the Ice was a turning point in Russian history. He notes that the most   96 Ibid., 180   97 I. Danilevsky, “Alexander Nevsky and the Teutonic Order” [Russian], Baltic Accent 3–4 (2011): 108–109.   98 PSRL, vol 5, 180.   99 Khrustalyov, Northern Crusaders, 325. 100 Ibid., 332. 101 Ibid., 339–340. 102 Shaskolsky, Russia and the Crusaders, 173–174.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

complete description of the battle is contained in the Novgorod First Chronicle, while the chronicle of the Suzdal land downplays the significance of the entire event, so much so that the hero there is not Alexander, but his brother Andrei.103

The Eastern Context In 1246, at the all-Mongolian kurultai, Guyuk, the eldest son of Ogedei, was elected as a new khan. Batu, who during the western campaign was in conflict with Guyuk, ordered his brothers sent to the kurultai to support Guyuk’s candidacy.104 I. M. Mirgaleyev believes that Batu formed government bodies that did not depend on the all-Mongolian khan and did not recognize Guyuk.105 Pochekaev disagrees with this approach, and claims that there is no reason to regard Batu as a separatist striving for the independence of his ulus; also he never had a khan title, i.e. was not an independent sovereign. On the contrary, throughout his reign, he closely linked his future with the Mongol Empire and very actively participated in the political events that took place in it in the middle of the 13th century. And his vast possessions and numerous troops were a resource that allowed him to gain influence in imperial affairs and eventually become perhaps the most powerful man in the Mongol Empire.106

The Choice between the Horde and the West In the years 1242–1246 the Mongol Empire was ruled by Turakina, the widow of Ogedei, who did not interfere in the Batu’s affairs.107 In 1242, the grand duke of Vladimir, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, was summoned to the capital of the Empire, Karakorum.108 He sent his son Konstantine there, and himself went to Sarai, the capital of Ulus Jochi. Batu said to Yaroslav: 103 Fennell, The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 145. 104 Pochekaev, Golden Horde, 18–19. 105 I. M. Mirgaleev, “The Golden Horde State in the System of International Relations” [Russian], Bulletin of the Chelyabinsk State University, series “History” 12 (2009): 95. 106 Pochekaev, Golden Horde, 18. 107 Ibid. 108 PSRL, vol 5, 181.

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“Be you the eldest among all the princes among the Russian people.” According to Khrustalyov, in alliance with Batu, Yaroslav became not only the most authoritative figure in Rus, but also a noticeable participant in Mongolian political life.109 In 1244, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich sent the Rostov’s princes—Vladimir Konstantinovich, Boris Vasilkovich, and Vasily Vsevolodovich to Batu. The khan “honored” them by giving them the Rostov land as a fiefdom and released everyone to their homeland. However, it seems that the Rostov princes should not have interacted directly with Batu, as they were subordinate to the eldest prince, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich. That is, having received their fiefdoms from the hands of the Mongol khan, the Rostov princes changed their allegiance. They violated the hierarchy of the Russian princes and turned into the khan’s sluzhebniki (service people). In 1245, Yaroslav Vsevolodovich again went to Batu, together with the princes of Northeastern Russia, including Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich, Ivan Vsevolodovich, Vladimir Konstantinovich, Boris Vasilkovich, and Vasily Vsevolodovich. Batu gave Kiev to Yaroslav Vsevolodovich. In this regard, Karamzin writes: “So our sovereigns solemnly renounced the rights of an independent people and bowed their necks under the yoke of barbarians.”110 A year later, Yaroslav was summoned to Karakorum. After one of the lunches hosted by Turakina, he fell ill and died on September 30, 1246.111 The question about Yaroslav Vsevolodovich’s successor was resolved at the congress of Russian princes in Vladimir in 1247. Yaroslav’s brother Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich became the grand duke of Vladimir, and Alexander Nevsky received the Tver principality, while remaining the prince of Novgorod. Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich did not go to the Horde for a jarlig, which was taken as advantage by his brother Mikhail Khorobrit of Moscow, who expelled Svyatoslav from the Vladimir throne. Solovyov claims there was no legitimate explanation of Mikhail’s actions: he was not even the eldest son of the eldest brother.112 In the winter of 1248, Mikhail Khorobrit died in a battle with the Lithuanians on the river Protva. As a result, Moscow was once again left without its own prince.

109 Khrustalyov, Russia and the Mongol Invasion, 285. 110 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 277. 111 Carpini, Plano Travels to the Golden Horde, 133. 112 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 155.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

Andrei Yaroslavich was dissatisfied with the decision of the congress of princes, and in 1247 he went to Batu. Alexander Yaroslavich did the same. Batu sent them to Karakorum, where in 1248 Alexander received Novgorod, Kiev, Chernigov, and “the entire Russian land,” while Andrei was appointed to reign in the Grand Duchy of Vladimir. Solovyov notes that Alexander, as the older brother, could not be satisfied with such a decision. Kiev was not a good lot: by that time Southern Russia was devastated, and Kiev was nothing but ruins. Therefore, Alexander could consider himself entitled to be angry with his younger brother.113 Having received his jarlig, Andrei Yaroslavich expelled his uncle Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich from Vladimir and began to behave independently in relation to the Tatars.114 In 1250, he created an anti-Mongol coalition with his brother Yaroslav Yaroslavich Tverskoy and Daniel Romanovich of Galich. As part of this strategy, in the same year, Andrei married the daughter of Daniel of Galich, Anastasia. However, the circumstances were against Andrei Yaroslavich and Daniel Romanovich. In 1251, Batu seated his protege Munke (Men-gu) on the throne in Karakorum and decided to transfer the great principality of Vladimir to Alexander Yaroslavich,115 who came to Karakorum and received confirmation of his jarlig. Andrei refused to acknowledge this. Batu sent his beklyarbek (high-ranking official) Kuremsa against Daniel Romanovich of Galich, and Nevryuy’s army went to Vladimir to punish Andrei and Yaroslav Yaroslavich of Tver.116 Daniel Romanovich fought off the Tatars, but Andrei and Yaroslav in May or July 1252 were defeated at Northern Pereyaslavl. Andrei Yaroslavich fled to Novgorod, but he was not accepted there.117 Fennel notes that a punitive detachment against Andrei’s father-in-law, Daniel, was sent simultaneously with the campaign led by Nevryuy. Thus, the resistance to the Golden Horde came from at least two of the oldest princes of the Suzdal land with the support of the rulers of the Volhyn and Galician lands.118 As Fennel states, it was from this moment that the real dependence of Russia on the Golden Horde began: “the Tatar yoke began not so much during the 113 Ibid., 156. 114 V. V. Kargalov, Foreign Policy Factors in the Development of Feudal Russia. Feudal Russia and the Nomads [Russian] (Moscow: Vysshaya shkola, 1967), 140. 115 Gorsky, Russian Middle Ages, 139. 116 PSRL, vol 5, 186. 117 Ibid., 186. 118 Fennell, The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 148.

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invasion of Batu into Russia, but from the moment Alexander Nevsky betrayed his brothers.”119 R. D. Temirgaliev states that the practice of seeking help from the Horde during internal squabbles became widespread, and the arrival of various “armies” in Russia had grave consequences for the local population. If Nevryuy defeated only the centers of revolts in Pereyaslavl and Suzdal, then his followers were more ruthless and punished both the right and the guilty.120 Not finding refuge in Novgorod, Andrei Yaroslavich fled to Sweden, and Alexander Yaroslavich combined the all-Russian Kiev throne with the Vladimir one. Novgorod remained a separate principality, where Alexander appointed his son Vasily to reign. As a result, Alexander obtained from Novgorod the recognition of the supremacy of the Vladimir prince. From now on, the one who sat on the Vladimir throne became the de facto sovereign of Novgorod. According to N. M. Pronina, this was a step towards consolidating the power of the Vladimir-Suzdal princes in all of Northeastern Russia, and, therefore, towards the revival of Russian autocracy.121 Perhaps the events of 1255 forced Alexander Yaroslavich Nevsky to show mercy to his fugitive brother Andrei.122 In 1256, he summoned Andrei Yaroslavich from Sweden and gave him the Suzdal principality. In 1257, Andrei and Alexander even went to the Golden Horde together to honor Khan Ulaghchi, who replaced Batu in 1256. In 1257, Ulaghchi died and Berke, the third son of Batu, ascended the throne. According to the Kazakh historian Zh. M. Sabitov, during Berke’s reign Ulus Jochi actually gained independence from the Mongol Empire, which paved the way for the formal collapse of the Mongol Empire in 1269 at the Talas kurultai.123 Berke was the first of the Horde khans to convert to Islam. Juzjani (also called Minhaj-i-Siraj, a thirteenth-century Persian historian) writes about Berke in his chronicle Tabaqat-i Nasiri:

119 Ibid. 120 R. D. Temirgaliev, Ak-Orda. History of the Kazakh Khanate [Russian] (Almaty: Aspandau, 2019), 80–81. 121 N. M. Pronina, Great Alexander Nevsky. “The Russian Land will stand!” [Russian] (Moscow: Eksmo Yauza, 2014), 225. 122 Fennell, The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 157. 123 Zh. M. Sabitov, “Political History of Ulus Jochi in 1256–1263” [Russian], Golden Horde Review 2 (2015): 59.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player No one drinks wine in his entire army, and with him [Berke] there are always great scholars from [among] the interpreters [of the Koran], exponents of hadiths, lawyers, and dogmatists. He has many theological books, and most of his meetings and interviews take place with scientists. In his palace, disputes are constantly taking place regarding the science of Sharia. In the affairs of Islam, he is extremely firm and diligent.124

In 1257, the Golden Horde introduced a new tribute collection system in Russia. Mongols were dissatisfied with the principle of courtyard taxation of tribute, according to which an artisan had to pay as much as a boyar. But the Novgorodians did not allow them to impose the tirbute on their city and opposed the population census that the Tatars organized to facilitate tribute collection. In 1258, Alexander Yaroslavich was summoned to Sarai, where he was asked about the failure of the population census. In 1259, Alexander and his brothers Andrei of Suzdal and Boris of Rostov, together with the Tatars, again entered Novgorod. When the chislenniki (“counters”) began the census, a revolt arose. The Tatars demanded to ensure their safety and threatened with possible punitive measures.125 As a result, the Novgorodians agreed to pay silver to the Horde. Then Alexander entrusted Novgorod to his son Dmitry126 and returned to Vladimir. Charles Halperin argues that the 1259 revolt in Novgorod was not motivated by a desire for national independence. In his opinion, it is a harbinger of the subordination of the Novgorod government to the Mongol authorities on contractual terms.127 Undoubtedly, Alexander Yaroslavich Nevsky was also under pressure from the West. The Swedish-German attack on Northern Russia was accompanied by Catholic expansion. In particular, Pope Innocent IV wrote two letters (dated January 23 and September 15, 1248) to Alexander.128 In the first letter, the Pope called on the Russians to coordinate their actions with the Teutons in the event of an attack by the Tatars on Russia. In the second letter, the Pope mentioned 124 Kumekova and Muminov, Collection of Materials Related to the History of the Golden Horde [Russian], vol. 1, Extracts from Arabic Works Collected by V. G. Tiesenhausen, 44. 125 Ibid., 189. 126 Ibid., 190. 127 Ibid., 85. 128 A. G. Lapshin, Vatican Policy in Russia in the Thirteenth Century. Alexander Nevsky and the Theocratic Aspirations of Innovent IV” [Russian], Bulletin of the Vladimir Institute of Law 3 (2011): 182.

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Alexander’s consent to convert to Catholicism. In M. B. Sverdlov’s opinion, Alexander understood that Innocent IV was planning to plant his own power in Russia, but “did not transfer these negative feelings to relations with Western countries.”129 The chronicles report that Alexander refused to accept the Catholic faith.130 Alexander Nevsky paid special attention to the Swedes, who practically conquered Finland at that time. In 1256, he destroyed the strongholds of the Swedes. Sweden abandoned plans to conquer Karelia. From that moment on, Swedish attacks on the Russian borders ceased for more than a quarter of a century. In the spring of 1262, Alexander Nevsky entered into an agreement with Mindaugas, the grand duke of Lithuania, against the Livonian Order. In summer, Mindaugas laid siege to Wenden, the main fortress of the Order. Alexander sent his younger brother Yaroslav and his son Dmitry to help Mindaugas. In the fall of 1262, Russian troops took Dorpat (renamed Yuryev), but did not go deep into Livonia, since Mindaugas retreated from Wenden.131 Dmitry returned to Novgorod. Thus, the union of Russia and Lithuania did not take place.

Historical Background: Lithuania By the middle of the thirteenth century, Lithuania became one of the strongest Eastern European states. In 1248, Mindaugas (r. 1248–1263) became the grand duke of Lithuania. He is known in Russian sources as Mindovg. He managed to unite the scattered Lithuanian tribal unions (Samogitians, Aukšaits, Yatvingians, Kurshees, and others). Under him, the rapid growth of Lithuania began at the expense of the Russian lands.132 S. F. Platonov notes that Mindovg “was the first of the Lithuanian princes to try to bring together the previously hostile Russian and Lithuanian tribes and build his own state on their union. This state was still very fragile and weak; but it gave Lithuania protection from the Germans, and the Russians—a refuge from the Tatars, and therefore it held on.”133

129 M. B. Sverdlov, “Alexander Nevsky: A Genius of Strategy and Tactics” [Russian], Petersburg Historical Journal: Research on Russian and World History 3 (2017): 16. 130 PSRL, vol 5, 187. 131 Pronina, Great Alexander Nevsky, 245–246. 132 P. P. Tolochko, A. A. Oleinikov, et al. (eds.), History of Ukraine. From the Sixth to the Twenty-First Century [Russian] (Kiev: Kievskaya Rus′, and Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2018), 118. 133 Ibid., 90.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

In 1251 Mindovg adopted the Catholic religion at the suggestion of the Livonian Order. In the same year, Prince Tovtivil of Polotsk, his nephew Vikint (a Samogitian prince), and Daniel Romanovich of Galich went on a campaign to Lithuania, but Mindovg withstood them and struck a blow at Samogitia. Gradually, he extended his power to the Russian region of Vitebsk and part of the Smolensk region.134 From the middle of the thirteenth century, the Lithuanian dynasty was established in Polotsk, but the Polotsk land retained its autonomy. Platonov notes the pragmatism of Mindovg: “Mindovg fought all his life with the Germans, sometimes yielding to them, then again rising to them. When it was beneficial for him, he agreed to be baptized by the Germans and for this he received a royal crown from the pope.”135 Indeed, Mindovg became king of Lithuania in 1253, and in return gave the Livonian Order a part of the Samogitian and Yatvingian lands. But already in 1254, Lithuania made peace with the Galicia-Volhyn principality, since its security was threatened not only by German crusaders, but also by Hungary and Poland. In 1258–1259 this alliance collapsed, as beklyarbek Burundai forced Daniel and Vasilko Romanovich to participate in the campaign against Lithuania. In this campaign, Roman, son of Daniel, was killed by Voishelk, the eldest son of Mindovg. In 1260 the Samogitians, with the support of Mindovg’s nephew Treniota (Troniata), defeated the Livonian and Teutonic Orders, and Treniota became the leader of Samogitia. In 1261, Mindovg renounced Catholicism and entered into an alliance with Novgorod, where Prince Dmitry (son of Alexander Nevsky) ruled, but this union did not last long. According to Shmurlo, Mindovg was a skillful strategist, but he was born too early for the idea of a united Lithuania to triumph: “The time of Gediminas and Olgerd has not come yet. Mindaugas died at the hands of his loved ones; however, the seed he sowed did not rot.”136

Last Years of Alexander’s Reign The end of the reign of Alexander Nevsky was darkened by the growth of foreign policy tensions. In 1262, a threat arose to the dominions of Alexander Nevsky from Khan Berke, who demanded that Russian troops took part in his campaigns. Alexander Yaroslavich personally went to the Horde to soften Berke’s demands. The khan agreed not to require Russian troops to participate in the 134 Ibid., 90. 135 Ibid., 90. 136 Shmurlo, History of Russia, 69.

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Mongol expeditions, but did not release Alexander Yaroslavich137 and kept him in Sarai all winter and summer. There, Alexander Yaroslavich fell ill, and left for Rus. On November 14, 1263, Alexander Nevsky took monastic vows and died in the evening of the same day. He was buried in front of a huge crowd of people in the monastery of the Nativity of the Mother of God in Vladimir. Next year saw the death of another controversial politician, Daniel Romanovich of Galich, who made peace with all his relatives before his death.

Alexander Nevsky in Historical Research In historiography, there is no uniform assessment of Alexander Nevsky. His personality and actions are much extolled by the politically conservative historians. Thus, Karamzin commented that Alexander’s reign helped stabilize the Russian principalities: The name of the Saint, given to him, is much more expressive than the Great: since the Great are usually called the happy; Alexander, however, could only alleviate the cruel fate of Russia with his virtues, and the subjects, zealously glorifying his memory, proved that the people sometimes justly appreciate the dignity of sovereigns and do not always consider them in the outward splendor of the state. The most frivolous Novgorodians, reluctantly yielding to Alexander some rights and liberties, unanimously prayed to God for the deceased prince, saying that “he worked a lot for Novgorod and for the whole Russian land.”138

Shmurlo commends the efforts of Alexander Nevsky. He writes: “Alexander is a type of a northern prince: practical mind, prudence, iron will, perseverance and patience; there is no place for hobbies; only the real good is valued.”139 A. P. Bogdanov compares Alexander Nevsky with Alexander the Great and notes the superiority of the Russian prince: “Alexander Nevsky, unlike Alexander the Great, did not conquer nor destroy anything—he saved and preserved Rus, the Orthodox faith, and the Russian civilization itself, thanks to which [the Russian] world still stands.”140 137 PSRL, vol 5, 191. 138 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 293. 139 Shmurlo, History of Russia, 67. 140 A. P. Bogdanov, Alexander Nevsky. Friend of the Horde and Enemy of the West [Russian] (Moscow: Veche, 2017), 3.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

In contrast, the liberal historian Yu. N. Afanasyev believes that Alexander Nevsky was the first of the Russian grand dukes who, instead of resisting the Tatars, turned to direct cooperation with them. He began to act in alliance with the Tatars against other princes: he punished the Russians, including Novgorodians, for disobeying the conquerors, in a way that the Mongols never dreamed of (he cut off noses, ears, and heads, and put one man on a stake). … But today’s mythological consciousness will perceive the news that the prince was actually the “first collaborator” quite unequivocally— as an anti-patriotic slander.141

I. N. Danilevsky offers a more weighed opinion: Alexander Nevsky is not a villain or a hero. He is the son of his difficult time, which was not at all guided by the “universal values” of the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries. He did not make any fateful choice—he was chosen by the Horde khans, and he only fulfilled their will and used their strength to solve his momentary problems. Alexander did not fight the aggression of the crusaders; rather, he fought with the Dorpat Bishop for spheres of influence in the Eastern Baltic and negotiated with the Pope [allowing, judging by the available sources, after the Battle on the Ice, the construction of a Catholic cathedral church in Pskov]. And the battles he won were not at all “the biggest battles of the early Middle Ages.” Alexander Yaroslavich was not a traitor to national interests if only because these very interests, like the nation, had not yet existed and could not exist. Collaboration is a concept that did not exist in the thirteenth century.142

Fennell believes that Alexander did nothing to support “the spirit of resistance to the Golden Horde. It takes an endless generosity of heart to call his policy selfless.”143 Charles Halperin compares Alexander Nevsky with Daniel Galitskiy and comes to the following conclusion: 141 Yu. N. Afanasyev, “The time of Unbearable Overpolitization is Coming to an End— Conversation Led by E. Kashtanova” [Russian], Motherland 4 (1991): 8–10. 142 I. N. Danilevsky, “Contemporary Russian Discussions about Prince Alexander Nevsky” [Russian], Proceedings of Russian Studies 2 (2010): 234–235. 143 Fennell, The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 163.

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Between East and West Alexander, of course, was something more than just an unprincipled and insignificant adventurer. His military and political talents saved Novgorod and Pskov from hostile Catholic neighbors, and he appears to be a good prince, quite capable of exercising his power when necessary. He also understood that he would either have to die a martyr’s death and doom his country and people to ruin, or cooperate with the Tatars, and chose the latter. Not having such an advantage of Daniel as being far from the Horde, Nevsky simply had no other option.144

Schenk examined the evolution of the image of Alexander Nevsky in chronicles, ideology, propaganda works, and historical research. In his opinion, the changes in the image of Alexander Nevsky can be interpreted as “an expression of changes in the concepts of collective identity in Russian history.”145 The historian states: In post-Soviet Russia three discourses of memory about Alexander Nevsky, created under the influence of the Orthodox Church, regional authorities (Novgorod, Pskov, and St. Petersburg), and the federal government portrayed him as a saint and heavenly patron, a regional ruler and a patriotic commander. These images correlate with various concepts of collective identity: church-sacred, regional, and state-national. The three concepts, however, are not in a competitive relationship, but rather complement each other. If at the end of the long nineteenth century three ideal types of the image of Alexander Nevsky—monk, prince, and warrior—represented only conditionally compatible concepts of collective identity—sacred society, empire, and nation—today Alexander Nevsky has become the embodiment of various community projects that can be merged into a single concept of a latent anti-Western “patriotic consensus.”146

144 Ch. Halperin, Tatar Yoke: The Image of the Mongols in Medieval Russia [Russian], trans. M. E. Kopylova, ed. Yu. V. Seleznyov (Voronezh: Voronezhsky gosudarstvenny universitet, 2012), 71. 145 Schenk, Alexander Nevsky in Russian Cultural Memory, 500. 146 Ibid., 508–509.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

2.4.  ULUS JOCHI AND COMPETITION BETWEEN MOSCOW AND TVER IN NORTHEASTERN RUSSIA After the death of Alexander Nevsky, his brother, the prince of Tver Yaroslav Yaroslavich (r. 1264–1272), became the grand duke of Vladimir. However, he rarely visited Vladimir, as he preferred Tver,147 which then experienced an economic, political, spiritual, and cultural upsurge. As noted by Ya. A. Perekhov, the powerful rise of the Tver principality was primarily associated with the active settlement of the region by numerous refugees from Ryazan, Vladimir, Murom, and other principalities, most often exposed to the raids of the Tatars.148 At the same time, trade and military benefits played a great part in the development of the region: “it was through Tver that the trade route ran through, by which Novgorod supplied grain. Thus, the one who controlled Tver could easily force Novgorod into submission, blocking its food supply.”149 At the same time, the cultural significance of Tver increased. The Transfiguration Cathedral, built in Tver in 1285–1290, became the first stone church in the Northeast of Russia erected after the invasion of Batu. The beginning of chronicle writing in Tver dates back to the same time. These events increased the political prestige of the Tver princes.150 Some historians admit that Tver could also have become the nucleus of a unified Russian state. Under Tver, it could have formed with different principles and values: not as a result of a rigid centralization, but first as a free federation of principalities as the first stage and then as a single state with significant regional autonomy.151 However, Tver was overshadowed by Moscow. In 1263, Alexander Nevsky appointed his two-year-old son Daniel (1263–1303) the ruler of Moscow. “From that time,” writes Klyuchevsky, 147 In order not to violate the internal logic of our story, we note that after the death of Yaroslav Yaroslavich, his brother Vasily (1272–1276), prince of Kostroma, became the grand duke of Vladimir. He was replaced by the eldest son of Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Alexandrovich of Pereyaslav (1276–1281). 148 Ya. A. Perekhov (ed.), History of Russia (from the Ninth to the Twentieth Century): Textbook [Russian] (Moscow: Gardariki, 2002), 61. 149 Ibid. 150 N. V. Shtykov, “Centers of Russian Statehood of the Thirteenth-Fifteenth Centuries in Modern Russian Historiography” [Russian], Proceedings of the History Faculty of St. Petersburg University 15 (2013): 209. 151 L. I. Semennikova, Russia in the World Community of Civilizations [Russian] (Bryansk: Kursiv, 1999), 76.

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“Moscow becomes the capital city of a special principality with a permanent prince: Daniel became the founder of the Moscow princely house.”152 According to historians, while Daniel was small, his lands were ruled by Yaroslav Yaroslavich through his service people, and the final separation of the Moscow principality from Vladimir occurred only after the death of Yaroslav Yaroslavich in 1271.153 Of course, at the time Moscow was not considered to become the center of the political unification of the Russian lands. It was still too weak to claim any important geopolitical role in Russia. In 1281, civil strife began between the sons of Alexander Nevsky—Andrei, who reigned over Gorodets and Kostroma, and his elder brother, Dmitry of Novgorod.154 Andrei went to the Horde, where he slandered his brother in front of the Khan Tode Mongke, received a jarlig for the grand ducal throne and, with the help of the Tatars, ruined Murom, Pereyaslavl, Vladimir, Yuryev-Polsky, and Suzdal.155 In 1282, at the invitation of the Novgorodians, Andrey arrived in Novgorod and ascended the throne.156 Fearing that Dmitry would try to return to Novgorod, Andrey went to Sarai, where he stated that Dmitry did not want to pay tribute, and received another army from Tode Mongke. The Novgorod, Tver, and Moscow armies jointly opposed Dmitry and gathered to storm Pereyaslavl, but after negotiations they refused to storm. Dmitry went to Nogai Khan and returned with the Tatar army. As Fennel writes: “Brother went against brother, both with the support of rival Tatar detachments. The ensuing chaos only clearly demonstrated the inability of both brothers to do anything more than call for help from outside forces, Swedes or Tatars, in the incessant struggle for power.”157 In this situation, Andrey and the Novgorod mayor Semyon Mikhailovich signed an agreement, according to which Andrey was not supposed to retreat from Novgorod, and Novgorod was not to seek another prince except Andrey. However, Dmitry, with the help of the Tatars, Swedes, and some principalities of the Suzdal land, forced Andrey to step down from the thrones of Novgorod 152 Klyuchevsky, Works, vol. 2, part 2, 7. 153 G. V. Talina, “Muscovite Russia from an Appanage Principality to a Kingdom: The Evolution of Statehood through the Prism of the Contemporaries’ Ideas” [Russian], Knowledge. Understanding. Skill 2 (2015): 143. 154 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 34. 155 PSRL, vol. 18, 78. 156 Ibid., 78. 157 Fennel, The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 192.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

and Vladimir. True to its agreement, Novgorod rejected Dmitry, for which it paid the price. As Fennel writes, In the winter of 1283/84 all the princes, under the command of Dmitry and Andrey, together with the Tatar army, invaded the Novgorod land. This was one of those rare cases in the second half of the XIII century, when “all the land of Suzdal” united against Novgorod, and this only time it was done with the support of the Tatars. … Dmitry again became not only the grand duke, but also the ruler of Novgorod.158

In 1285 Andrei returned from the Horde with a third Tatar army, but Dmitry prevailed and captured several of Andrey’s boyars. For several years, there were no further conflicts between the brothers, as Dmitry continued his rise to power. In 1286 Dmitry’s son Ivan married the daughter of Dmitry Borisovich of Rostov.159 Next year Dmitry attacked Tver, together with Andrey, Daniel of Moscow, Dmitry Borisovich, and the Novgorodians. The city of Kashin was besieged and Ksnyatin was burned.160 Now, Dmitry Alexandrovich claimed power over the entire Northeastern Russia. In 1291, the beklyarbek Nogai helped Khan Toqta ascend the Horde throne and strengthened his own position. In 1292, Andrey again slandered Dmitry, this time before Nogai. In 1293, the army of Dyuden, brother of Toqta, moved to Russia and “there was much evil.”161 Dyuden’s army attacked precisely those city centers whose princes supported Dmitry.162 The city of Vladimir was ruined, as well as fourteen other cities and regions.163 Dmitry fled to Pskov, and Andrei captured the grand ducal throne and again declared himself the prince of Novgorod. With the mediation of Mikhail Yaroslavich of Tver (Dmitry’s cousin), Dmitry agreed that Andrei would hold the grand ducal throne, but kept Pereyaslavl for himself. In 1294 Dmitry died. Pereyaslavl passed to his son Ivan, who had previously been imprisoned while reigning in Kostroma.

158 159 160 161 162

Ibid., 193. PSRL, vol. 18, 81. PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 34. PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 35. N. V. Shtykov, “Dudeney’s Army and Political Development of the Tver Land” [Russian], News of the Penza State Pedagogical University named after V. G. Belinsky 27 (2012): 1132. 163 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 190.

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Andrei Alexandrovich was now the grand duke of Vladimir. According to Fennel, he did not have a powerful center that would become the basis and a reliable backbone for his activities. His patrimony Gorodets was too remote and, obviously, still suffered from a lack of population. … In the capital city of Vladimir and in Novgorod, he spent more time than on the eastern outskirts of the Suzdal land. … [His rivals] spared no effort to strengthen their possessions and, having no business in Novgorod or Vladimir, could focus on developing local resources. … Tver and Moscow began to advance to the role of the true centers of power and influence in Northeastern Russia.164

Borisov also believes that from now on, Daniel became the second person in the political hierarchy of Northeastern Russia. This position, supported by Moscow’s significant economic and military potential, turned out to be very advantageous. He was free from the various expenses associated with political primacy. All those dissatisfied with the Grand Duke Andrei Alexandrovich were drawn to him— from Ivan of Pereyaslavl to the Novgorod boyars. Daniel skillfully used these sentiments to strengthen Moscow and expand his possessions.165

Daniel Alexandrovich, Mikhail Yaroslavich of Tver, and Ivan Dmitrievich of Pereyaslavl opposed the grand duke of Vladimir, Andrei Alexandrovich,166 but things settled down without much bloodshed. Andrei Alexandrovich was especially worried about Pereyaslavl, where reigned Ivan, the son of Dmitry ­Alexandrovich. In 1295 Andrei went to the Horde, but could not convince Sarai to help him with an army. The congress of princes in Vladimir decided that Pereyaslavl will remain the fiefdom of Ivan Dmitrievich.167 Andrey attacked Pereyaslavl, Moscow, and Tver, but Daniel Alexandrovich and Mikhail Yaroslavich stopped him at Yuryev-Polsky, where the parties made peace and confirmed the decisions of the Vladimir congress.168 164 Fennel, The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 196. 165 Borisov, The Policy of the Moscow Princes, 372. 166 PSRL, vol. 18, 83. 167 Fennel, The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 197. 168 PSRL, vol. 18, 83–84.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

In 1296, the Novgorodians expelled Andrey Alexandrovich and invited Daniel Alexandrovich to their city. Daniel gave Novgorod to the thirteen-yearold Ivan (instead of the eldest son Yury) and made an alliance with Mikhail Yaroslavich against Andrei. Andrei came from the Volga Horde together with the Tatar commander Nevryuy and headed to Pereyaslavl. In 1298, the allies defended Pereyaslavl, but Daniel Alexandrovich ceded the Novgorod reign to Andrei Alexandrovich. Meanwhile, in 1299, Khan Toqta defeated Nogai on the Bug River, and then confirmed Andrei’s jarlig for the drand ducal reign. In 1300 Mikhail Yaroslavich left Daniel’s coalition. According to the Simeon Chronicle, Daniel went to a city in Ryazan principality, also called Pereyaslavl, where he “beat many boyars,” and “by some trick” took Konstantin Romanovich of Ryazan as prisoner.169 Kolomna and some other Ryazan lands were annexed to Moscow. In this way, the territorial expansion of the Moscow principality began. In 1302, the childless Ivan Dmitrievich of Pereyaslavl died. Andrei Alexandrovich sent his boyars to Pereyaslavl, but Daniel Alexandrovich had already put his governors there.170 Thus, according to Gorsky, Daniel violated the rights of Andrei, to whom these principalities were supposed to go.171 Daniel died on the night of March 4/5, 1303,172 leaving five sons—Yury, Alexander, Boris, Athanasius, and Ivan. According to N. I. Kostomarov, Daniel “was the first prince who raised the importance of this city [Moscow], which was previously an insignificant suburb of Vladimir.”173 As noted by Borisov, Yury Danilovich (r. 1303–1325), retained his father’s priorities in the field of politics. He did not show any particular desire to get the grand ducal throne of Vladimir and successfully used the advantages that the role of “second person” gave. Yury resolutely and skillfully suppressed attempts to weaken Moscow through internal strife or incursion of the Horde’s wrath.174

169 Ibid., 85. 170 Ibid. 171 A. Gorsky, Moscow and the Horde (Moscow: Lomonosov, 2016), 27. 172 PSRL, vol. 18, 85. 173 N. I. Kostomarov, Russian History in the Biographies of Its Main Figures [Russian] (Moscow: Eksmo, 2004), 90. 174 Borisov, The Policy of the Moscow Princes, 373.

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Under Yury, Moscow’s expansion intensified. Thus, in 1304, the people of Pereyaslavl recognized Yury Danilovich as their prince.175 The princely congress also decided to transfer the power over Pereyaslavl to Yury, thanks to which, according to L. V. Cherepnin, “Moscow possessions began to directly border on the territory of the Grand Duchy of Vladimir.”176 In 1304, Yury Danilovich took Mozhaysk, which “became the most important stronghold on Moscow’s western border. Possessing Mozhaysk and Kolomna, the Moscow government got the opportunity to use Moscow’s advantageous position as a junction of the most important roads.”177 Yury also ordered to kill the blinded Konstantin Romanovich of Ryazan,178 but the sons of Konstantin Romanovich retained the Ryazan throne. Andrei Alexandrovich died on July 27, 1304.179 As Fennell notes: It was the end of an era of chaos of disunity, fragmentation, weak aspirations, military unpreparedness and helplessness. … By 1304, the grand duke in Russia had less authority and less real power in matters of national importance than ever before. The former Kiev empire lay in ruins. … The Southwestern Russia was absolutely oriented towards Eastern Europe and by the end of the century had almost no connections with the Suzdal land. There was nowhere to be found a hint of a thriving economy. The only exception was Novgorod.180

Now, after the death of Andrei Alexandrovich, Mikhail Yaroslavich of Tver was the eldest in the family of Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, and the Vladimir boyars asked him to take the throne. The Novgorodians also recognized Mikhail Yaroslavich, hoping that he would receive the status of grand duke. As for Yury Danilovich, according to Gorsky, he could not lay claim to the Vladimir throne, since he was not only younger than Mikhail of Tver, but also younger than the son of Andrei Alexandrovich, who was also called Mikhail. In addition, his father Daniel did not own the grand ducal reign.181

175 PSRL, vol. 18, 86. 176 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 460. 177 Ibid., 460. 178 PSRL, 86–87. 179 Ibid., 86. 180 Fennel, The Crisis of Medieval Russia, 208. 181 Gorsky, Moscow and the Horde, 39.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

Mikhail Yaroslavich went to Khan Toqta for a jarlig. Yury Danilovich followed suit. The Metropolitan Maxim, who in 1299 transferred his see from Kiev to Vladimir-on-Klyazma, urged Yury not to go to the Horde, but Yury insisted. In 1305, Mikhail Yaroslavich received a jarlig for the grand ducal throne and went against Yury Danilovich, but it did not come to war. In 1308, Mikhail again attacked Moscow, but failed. In 1311, his son Dmitry also wanted to go against Yury, but the Metropolitan Peter did not bless him.182 In 1312, the patron of Mikhail of Tver, Khan Toqta, died and power in the Horde passed to Khan Uzbeg183 (r. 1312–1341). Mikhail Yaroslavich stayed with the Horde, and Yury Danilovich resumed the fight for Novgorod. In 1314, Yury sent Prince Fyodor of Rzhev to Novgorod. The governors of Mikhail Yaroslavich were captured. Fyodor signed an agreement with the son of Mikhail— Dmitry the Fearsome Eyes. Novgorod now belonged to Yury Danilovich, who went to Novgorod with his brother Athanasius.184 Soon, Yury Danilovich was summoned to the Horde, where he had to bargain for the grand ducal jarlig, which Mikhail Yaroslavich of Tver also claimed. The Horde promised the jarlig to the highest bidder. Mikhail named such a high price that Yury told him: “Father and brother, you offer more: I concede, because I do not want to plunder the Russian Land.” In the fall of 1315, Mikhail Yaroslavich returned to Russia with a Tatar detachment. On February 10, 1316, the army of Athanasius was defeated near Torzhok.185 The Novgorodians refused to extradite Athanasius, but freed Fyodor of Rzhev. Peace was concluded, but Mikhail Yaroslavich seized Athanasius and sent him hostage to Tver. Eventually, the Novgorodians were forced to accept Mikhail Yaroslavich. In 1317, Yury Danilovich married Konchaka (renamed Agafya), the sister of Khan Uzbeg, received the jarlig for the grand ducal reign of Vladimir, and went to Tver with a Tatar detachment led by Kavgady.186 Mikhail Yaroslavich met Yury and Kavgady at Kostroma, where he recognized the transition of the grand ducal reign to Yury, but Yury and Kavgady began to ravage the Tver principality. On December 22, Mikhail Yaroslavich defeated Yury Danilovich’s

182 183 184 185 186

PSRL, vol. 18, 87. Ibid., 87–88. Ibid., 88. Ibid., 88. Ibid., 88.

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army and took his wife Konchaka and brother Boris prisoners.187 Yury fled to Novgorod. The victory of Mikhail Yaroslavich testified to the increased potential of Tver. In addition, Khan Uzbeg was worried about the too close contacts of Tver with Lithuania, as evidenced by the marriage of Dmitry the Fearsome Eyes and Maria, the daughter of the Lithuanian Prince Gediminas (r. 1316–1341). Lithuania’s new heyday was associated with Gediminas, during whose rule Lithuania annexed Polotsk (1307), Berestye (1315), Vitebsk (1320), Minsk (1326), Turov and Pinsk (1336), and other cities. Gediminas is also considered the founder of Vilnius (1323). In 1318, Yury Danilovich and Mikhail Yaroslavich went to the Horde again. Meanwhile, Konchaka died in Tver, and rumors about her poisoning were spreading.188 The allies of Yury Danilovich accused Mikhail of tribute arrears, claimed that he resisted the khan’s ambassador and ordered the death of Konchaka. On November 22 Mikhail Yaroslavich was killed in the Horde.189 Yury Danilovich returned home with the grand ducal jarlig, bringing with him Konstantin (the son of Mikhail Tverskoy) and the Tver boyars. Yury signed a peace agreement with the brothers of Konstantin Dmitry, Alexander and Vasily, under conditions that were very attractive to him. After that, Yury released his captives for a large ransom, and only then he handed over the body of Mikhail Yaroslavich to his widow. In 1321, the sons of Mikhail of Tver revolted. In response, Yury attacked Tver. Dmitry Mikhailovich of Tver, son of Mikhail, paid 2000 rubles of tribute to Yury and pledged not to try to take the grand ducal throne away from him. In March 1322, Dmitry told Khan Uzbeg that Yury Danilovich had concealed part of the tribute. In the fall of the same year, Dmitry received the jarlig for the grand ducal reign.190 As Klug notes: “Dmitry became the grand duke when Yury of Moscow engaged in actual or alleged fraud in the payment of tribute, withholding part of it. It can clearly be seen here how much impact the payment of tribute had on Tatar policy.”191 According to Solovyov, Yury Danilovich intended to go to the Horde, but on the river Urdoma he was captured by Dmitry’s brother Alexander. Later Yury Danilovich fled to Pskov, and then to Novgorod. 187 188 189 190 191

Ibid., 88. Ibid., 88. Ibid., 89. Ibid., 89. Klug, “Principality of Tver,” 378.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

In 1324, Yury went to the Horde. Dmitry the Fearsome Eyes also went there. On November 21, 1325 Dmitry killed Yury.192 On September 15, 1326, Uzbeg ordered the execution of Dmitry,193 and the jarlig for the grand ducal reign went to Dmitry’s brother Alexander Mikhailovich of Tver. Solovyov comes to a well-grounded conclusion: “Tver did not lose anything either from the death of Mikhail or from the death of Dmitry; for the third time precedence and power went to a Tver prince.”194

2.5.  THE FAMILY OF IVAN KALITA AND THE DOMINANCE OF MOSCOW Yury left no sons, so the Moscow throne went to his younger brother—Ivan Danilovich Kalita (r. 1325–1340). “Of the five Danilovich brothers, only he survived,” notes Dvornichenko, “and the rest died childless.”195 This historical accident “led to important consequences. The Moscow ‘fatherland’ was not divided, not split between the heirs. It fell entirely into the hands of Ivan Danilovich. And these hands were reliable.”196 The possessions that Ivan Kalita received were not large. There were five or seven cities, which dominated over fifty-one rural parishes. In addition, there were up to forty villages that belonged directly to the prince. However, through threats, violence, marriage alliances and the purchase of land from other princes, Kalita increased his possessions. In particular, he annexed the principalities of Rostov, Galich, Belozersk, and Uglich. As a result, the Moscow principality became the largest and strongest among the Russian principalities, although the lands bought by Kalita lay in strips as they stretched in a thin chain to the North, to the Northern Dvina region.197 Where did Kalita get the money for his purchases? As Borisov notes: Some believe that he concealed part of the Horde tribute, others believe that he sharply increased the grain trade, others point to the development of the regions of the Russian North, rich in furs. But all this is nothing more than guesswork. Note that researchers somehow eluded the simplest and, 192 PSRL, vol. 18, 89. 193 Ibid., 90. 194 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 225. 195 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 275. 196 Ibid., 275. 197 Ibid., 276.

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Between East and West as it seems to us, natural explanation. With a firm hand, the Moscow prince brought about relative order in the lawlessness of anarchy, theft, and local tyranny that reigned in Russia. Large amount of funds (including those that were supposed to go to the Horde as tribute) were simply plundered by all kinds of “strong people.” This orgy of robbery was complemented by banditry on the roads, which greatly impeded trade between cities.198

To fight against “thieves and outlaws,” Kalita made changes to the legal norms. As Borisov explains, According to the ancient tradition, large landowners (boyars, monasteries, episcopal sees) had the right to judge all criminal cases without exception within their estates. However, by no means all landowners could wage a successful fight against robber bands. In addition, even after catching the villains, local judges often released them for a bribe. Only the strong hand of the central government could properly arrange this complex matter.199

Kalita withdrew the most serious criminal cases from the jurisdiction of the landowners and transferred them to his administration. The prince entrusted the investigation and punishment of these crimes to his governors.200 Undoubtedly, Ivan Kalita was an energetic and ambitious politician who knew how to form and implement long-term plans in the conditions of Northeastern Russia with its dependence on the Ulus Jochi. At that time, the grand ducal reign of Vladimir belonged to Alexander Mikhailovich Tverskoy. Although, soon the positions of Alexander Mikhailovich were seriously undermined due to a fatal incident in Tver. The Rogozhsky chronicler reports that the Horde baskak Shevkal (Chol-Khan) began to oppress the Tver people. The townspeople asked Alexander Mikhailovich for protection, but he urged them to endure. However, the Tver people did not want to wait and looked for a convenient time to take revenge on Shevkal. An opportunity presented itself on August 15, 1327. The Tatars tried to take a mare from a deacon, nicknamed Dudko, and he called the Tver people for help. The people attacked the Tatars, and Shevkal himself was killed.201 198 Borisov, The Policy of the Moscow Princes, 237. 199 Ibid., 237. 200 Ibid., 238. 201 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 43.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

Kalita took advantage of this situation. He went to the Horde and returned in the winter of 1327/1328 with the army led by Fedorchuk. Kalita and the Tatars brutally suppressed the Tver uprising. Tver was burned, the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich fled to Pskov, but Moscow and the entire fatherland of Ivan Kalita were saved from the “rotten Tatars.”202 The French historian Rene Grousset states: “It was as the executors of the khan’s will that the Moscow princes began their journey to power and greatness.”203 The Western researchers consider the uprising of 1327 a milestone event for the Moscow principality and for Tver. Helene Carrer d’Ancausse, while writing about the suppression of the uprising in Tver, also notes: The reward for assisting this punitive operation was generous: thanks to the Mongols, Ivan Kalita received a label for the grand ducal reign, and with it the right to collect tribute from the Russian principalities and administer judgment among the princes. The dream of the founder of Moscow was becoming a reality: his principality was turning into the political center of the country, moreover, the center of gravity of the conquered Russian lands.204

Klug also asserts: “a retrospective view makes it possible to speak about the strengthening of Moscow’s domination over Russia starting from that time. In the subsequent years, the Vladimir throne remains with the Moscow rulers, except for the short-term attempts to press out their Moscow opponents undertaken by the princes of Nizhny Novgorod and Tver [once again] in the second half of the fourteenth century.”205 Borisov believes that the anti-Horde uprising of 1327 cancelled the political prospects of Tver for a long time, if not forever.206 He considers Kalita’s participation in the campaign against Tver as a “forced action”: “You cannot see here any particular baseness of the Moscow prince. Almost all the princes of that era went with the Tatars. If he had not supported the army of Fedorchuk,

202 Ibid., 43–44. 203 R. Grusset, Steppe Nomads who Conquered the World. Under the Rule of Attila, Genghis Khan, Tamerlan [Russian], transl. V. E. Klimanov (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2020), 396. 204 H. Carrer d’Ancausse, Eurasian Empire: History of the Russian Empire from 1552 to the Present Day [Russian], transl. A. A. Peshkov, 2nd ed. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010), 15. 205 Klug, “Principality of Tver,” 378. 206 Borisov, The Policy of the Moscow Princes, 374.

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Kalita would not have saved Tver from the pogrom, but would have put his own principality at risk.”207 In 1328, Kalita and Alexander Mikhailovich’s brother Konstantin arrived to Khan Uzbeg, but the khan ordered Alexander Mikhailovich himself to be delivered to the Horde. The khan also gave Kalita the grand ducal jarlig, placing him on the throne of “All Russia.” According to the Rogozhsky chronicler, “from now on there was a great silence for 40 years and the Russian land ceased to fight.”208 In March 1329 Kalita attacked Pskov, where Alexander Mikhailovich was situated.209 Alexander Mikhailovich fled to Lithuania, while Kalita and Pskov made peace. Soon, Uzbeg divided the Tver principality between Ivan Kalita and Alexander Vasilyevich of Suzdal. Kalita received Novgorod and Kostroma, and to Alexander went Vladimir and the Volga region. Borisov asserts: It was not the khan, but Ivan Kalita who proposed to divide the grand ducal power, citing difficulties in collecting tribute and the inability for one person to care for such a vast territory. … He took the most profitable territories for himself: Novgorod and Kostroma, fed by the Volga trade. Ivan Danilovich gave his “colleague” Alexander Suzdalsky the prestigious but feeble Vladimir with the surrounding district. The narrow-minded and ambitious Suzdal prince took the bait. As a result, Kalita received several more years of rest.210

After the death of Alexander of Suzdal, Ivan Kalita again went to the Horde, where he received all the grand ducal reign and, in addition, half of Rostov. However, by doing so, he also took upon himself “the entire oppression of the Horde tax.”211 Having exhausted his treasury, Kalita demanded that Novgorod return the Zakamsk (Trans-Ural) silver. The Novgorodians delayed, and Kalita took Torzhok and Bezhetsk away from them, and in 1333 recalled the governors from Novgorod and began to ravage its lands. In February of 1335 Kalita reconciled with the Novgorodians. The Moscow-Novgorod union was consolidated as a result of a visit to Moscow undertaken by the entire Novgorod elite.212 207 Ibid., 374. 208 PSRL, vol. 15, part. 1, 44. 209 Ibid., 45. 210 Borisov, The Policy of the Moscow Princes, 374–375. 211 Ibid., 375. 212 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 504.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

In 1336, Khan Uzbeg forgave Alexander Mikhailovich of Tver.213 Perhaps the khan made this decision because Kalita could not fulfill all the requests of the Horde.214 As a consequence, in 1338 Alexander Mikhailovich went to the Horde and returned from there with the title of grand duke, accompanied by the Tatar ambassadors Kindyak and Abdul.215 In 1339, Kalita sent his youngest son Andrei to Novgorod. Kalita himself with his other sons, Simeon the Proud and Ivan the Fair, went to the Horde,216 where he made sure that all tribute from the Russian lands headed towards Moscow, and he would personally take it to Sarai. This decision of the Horde had long-term consequences not only for the Moscow principality, but also for the whole of Northeastern Russia. In the fall of 1339, Ivan Kalita sent Simeon the Proud, Ivan the Fair, and Andrei to Sarai, and already in October Prince Alexander Mikhailovich of Tver and his son Fyodor were executed,217 accused of having ties with Lithuania. Now the grand ducal reign of Vladimir fully belonged to Ivan Kalita, and the obedient and loyal brothers of the late Alexander Mikhailovich, Konstantin and Vasily, remained in Tver. As Borisov writes: “The death of Alexander of Tver and his son left a dark shadow over the historical reputation of the Moscow princes. … However, the modern system of moral assessments should not be mechanically transferred to the past. The execution of the princes of Tver was perceived by the people of that era primarily as God’s judgment.”218 In 1340, Khan Uzbeg demanded that the North Russian princes set out on a campaign against Prince Ivan Alexandrovich of Smolensk, who could not pay the tribute. It is possible that Kalita avoided participating in this campaign.219 On March 31, 1341 Ivan Danilovich Kalita died.220

Ivan Kalita in Historical Research Karamzin notes: “Despite Ivan’s deceit calculated to cause the death of a dangerous rival, the Muscovites praised his goodness, and while saying goodbye to 213 PSRL, vol. 18, 92. 214 Borisov, The Policy of the Moscow Princes, 375. 215 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 418. 216 PSRL, vol. 18, 92. 217 Ibid. 218 Borisov, The Policy of the Moscow Princes, 316. 219 Idem, “Smolensk Campaign of 1340” [Russian], Rus, Russia. Middle Ages and Modern Times 2 (2011): 29. 220 PSRL, vol. 18, 93.

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him in a coffin, they filled it with their tears, and they unanimously named him the Gatherer of the Russian land and the sovereign father.”221 Solovyov states: “Our ancestors imagined Kalita as the propagator of peace, security, and internal order.”222 Kalita got “to taste the benefits of autocracy, and therefore was known to the posterity by the name of the first gatherer of the Russian land.”223 S. M. Munchaev emphasizes: “Ivan Kalita played a positive role in the unification of Northeastern Russia around Moscow as the main territorial core of the future Russian centralized state.”224 Gorsky speaks more harshly about Kalita: to believe that it was during his reign that the main foundation of the future power of Moscow was laid (and this is how it is traditionally regarded in historiography, including the works where Kalita’s Horde policy is assessed negatively), is to fall into exaggeration. Ivan Danilovich became the first Moscow prince who retained the grand ducal reign of Vladimir until the end of his days. But this does not mean that the Vladimir throne had already become associated with the Moscow princes.225

The sixteenth-century Polish historian Martini Cromeri in his work On the Origin and Deeds of Poles (De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum) calls Ivan Kalita the first prince of the Moscow land and emphasizes that Kalita’s descendants “conquered their closest relatives, princes of the same people and language, and significantly expanded their principality.”226 Cromeri explains the successful expansion of the Moscow princes by the weakness of the Russian principalities who suffered from internal strife and Cuman and Tatar attacks.

Simeon the Proud Kalita’s activities were continued by his eldest son Simeon the Proud (r. 1340– 1353), who called the Russian princes to unity in the face of the Golden Horde. As Solovyov writes,

221 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 336. 222 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 242. 223 Ibid. 224 Sh. M. Munchaev and V. M. Ustinov, Russian History. Textbook for Universities [Russian], 2nd rev. ed. (Moscow: Norma-Infra, 2000), 62. 225 Gorsky, Moscow and the Horde, 61. 226 M. Cromeri, De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum (Basle, 1555), 15

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player It is said that Simeon, calling the princes to his well-known goals, reminded them that Russia was only then strong and glorious when the princes unquestioningly obeyed the elder, and that now only by the same unquestioning obedience to him, Simeon, they can free themselves from the Tatar yoke; but the princes knew the difference between the former and the present relationship, they knew what such obedience would lead to.227

On May 2, 1340, Simeon the Proud went to the Horde, where Konstantin Mikhailovich of Tver, Konstantin Vasilyevich of Suzdal, Vasily Davydovich of Yaroslavl, and others also gathered. But the jarlig for the grand ducal reign of Vladimir was received by Simeon the Proud, who took the throne on October 1, 1341.228 The strengthening of Moscow alarmed Khan Uzbeg, who in 1341 separated the Nizhny Novgorod principality from the Grand Duchy of Vladimir and handed it over to Konstantin Vasilyevich of Suzdal. And yet, Simeon continued his expansion as he bought a number of villages in the Vladimir region—in the districts of Pereyaslavl, Yuryev, and Kostroma—as well as in the Galich principality. In 1341 Uzbeg died and his son Jani Beg (r. 1342–1357) became the khan. In May 1342 Simeon the Proud again went to the Horde, where his rivals also arrived, but Jani Beg retained the status quo. In 1343 Simeon tried to return the Nizhny Novgorod principality, but failed. Relations between Moscow and Novgorod were difficult. After the death of Ivan Kalita, the Novgorodians took the Belozersk region from the Moscow principality. Simeon reminded the Novgorodians of their guilt before his father and sent his people to Torzhok for tribute, but the Novgorodians reminded him that he was only the sovereign of Moscow so far, and Novgorod elected its own princes and did not tolerate violence.229 In the winter of 1341/1342 Simeon the Proud went to war with Novgorod, but ended up making peace. In 1348 he again visited Novgorod, which was at that time at war with Magnus IV of Sweden230 and left his brother Ivan the Fair there. The gradual rapprochement

227 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, 248. 228 PSRL, vol. 18, 93. 229 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 340. 230 PSRL, vol. 18, 96.

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between Moscow and Novgorod was caused by the need to repel the Lithuanian threat. Relations with Tver also improved. In 1347, Simeon the Proud married the daughter of Alexander Mikhailovich, Maria, and in 1349, his own daughter, Vasilisa, was married to an appanage prince out of Kashin, Mikhail Vasilyevich. In the winter of 1349/1350 Moscow was on the brink of war with the Lithuanian prince Algirdas (Olgerd, r. 1345–1377), but Khan Jani Beg took Simeon’s side.231 Peace with Lithuania was sealed by marriages: Algirdas married Ulyana, the daughter of Alexander Mikhailovich of Tver, and Algirdas’s brother, the Volhyn prince Liubartas married a relative of the Rostov prince Konstantin Vasilyevich, Agafya.232 However, as Cherepnin notes, “Algirdas did not stop actions aimed at seizing the Smolensk lands.”233 In 1352, Simeon the Proud and his brothers went to war with Smolensk. On Protva they were met by ambassadors from Algirdas.234 As a result, peace was concluded. On April 27, 1353, Simeon the Proud died of plague, which at that time covered all of Europe. Soon after his death, in 1356, the Lithuanians attacked Bryansk and Smolensk again.

Historical Background: Lithuania Modern Lithuanian historians note that under Algirdas Lithuania became a great power and expanded its borders from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This expansion led to the heterogeneity of the Lithuanian state: it now included lands with a pagan Baltic population and much larger territories densely populated by Orthodox Rusyns. Under Lithuanian control, these areas were isolated from other Slavic territories, and a specific Slavic-Rusyn nationality of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania gradually began. From these territories, the modern Belarusian and Ukrainian nations subsequently emerged. On these lands, the Lithuanians found what they did not have: the church system and writing. Both of these circumstances determined the important role of the Orthodox culture in early Lithuanian history: the Lithuanian princes were fascinated by Orthodox culture, and those who became governors in the Slavic lands often adopted Orthodoxy. The Ruthenian script became the official language of documents of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. “This is somewhat reminiscent of the situation 231 Ibid., 96. 232 Ibid., 96–97. 233 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 541. 234 PSRL, vol. 18, 97.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

with the Franks in Gaul, when the Germanic tribes of the Franks, having created their own state and power structures on the lands of Gaul, adopted the language and culture of the local population.”235

Unity in the Religious Sphere Simeon paid special attention to the Russian Orthodox Church. In particular, he was worried by the fact that a special metropolitanate arose in Volhyn, to which all the dioceses of Southwestern Russia were subordinate. This threatened the unity of the Russian Church. In 1347, at the request of Simeon and Metropolitan Theognostus of Kiev, the Byzantine emperor abolished the new metropolitanate. In 1352, Simeon and Theognostus asked Constantinople to appoint Bishop Alexius of Vladimir to the Moscow See in the event of the death of Theognostus, which happened in 1354. Alexius headed the Moscow see until 1378.236

The Politics of Simeon the Proud in Historical Research Simeon’s work was highly appreciated by historians. As Karamzin notes, “This sovereign, cunning, prudent, went to the Horde five times to maintain peace in the state; taking advantage of the excellent favor of the khan, he sought freedom for the ruined Tver principality not to pay tribute to the Mughals, and the first, it seems, called himself the grand duke of All Russia.”237 Platonov names Simeon the successor of Kalita’s work: To his son Simeon, according to the chronicler, “all the Russian princes were given assistants.” His very nickname “the Proud” shows how he behaved towards those assistants. Relying on their strength and wealth, with support in the Horde, the Moscow princes were the real power, capable of maintaining order and silence not only in their lot, but throughout the Vladimir-Suzdal region.238

Gorsky points to the territorial appetites of Simeon the Proud:

235 Eidintas, Bumblauskas, Kulakauskas, and Tamoshaitis, History of Lithuania, 39. 236 PSRL, vol. 3, 86. 237 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 347. 238 Platonov, Full Course of Lectures, 145–146.

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Between East and West Ryazan possessions on the left bank of the Oka were annexed to the Moscow principality, the Yuryev principality became part of the Grand Duchy of Vladimir, the Smolensk principality (together with Bryansk) passed under the suzerainty of the Grand Duchy of Vladimir, and finally, Lithuania was neutralized. Simeon failed only when he tried to return Nizhny Novgorod [under Moscow’s control].239

After the death of Simeon the Proud, his brother Ivan Ivanovich the Fair (r. 1353–1359) took the grand ducal throne with the consent of the Horde, although Konstantin Vasilyevich of Suzdal also claimed the grand ducal throne of Vladimir.240 Ivan the Fair received the jarlig from the khan and judicial power over the princes of Northern Russia. This immediately provoked opposition: while Ivan was in the Horde, Oleg of Ryazan captured Lopasnya, which belonged to Ivan the Fair’s nephew, Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov, and held the Moscow governor Mikhail Alexandrovich captive until he received a ransom.241 In the chronicles, Ivan the Fair is called “meek, quiet and merciful.” Dvornichenko notes: Apparently, his firmness of character could not compare with that of his father and brother. Nevertheless, he managed to defend everything that his predecessors achieved. Moreover, the strengthening of the princely power is evident during his reign. This is confirmed by the well-known conflict with the tysyatsky. … During the reign of Simeon the Proud, the Moscow tysyatsky boyar Alexei Petrovich Khvost was expelled and deprived of his possessions. Under Ivan, he returned, but in February 1357, during Matins, his cold corpse was found on the square with signs of a violent death. The criminal plot that excited the Muscovites meant the growth of monarchist tendencies at the expense of communal traditions and was clearly promoted according to the prince’s own idea.242

Like his predecessors, Ivan the Fair concealed part of the tribute from the Horde, which he used to buy land from less wealthy Russian appanage princes. 239 Gorsky, Moscow and the Horde, 71. 240 PSRL, vol. 3, 86. 241 PSRL, vol. 18, 98–99. 242 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 277.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

Sometimes land changed owners through barter. For example, Ivan acquired Luzha, Vereya, Borovsk, and other places on the left bank of the Oka from the Ryazan princes in exchange to Novy Gorodok at the mouth of Protva river.243 Ivan the Fair died on November 13, 1359,244 leaving behind his daughter Anna and his sons, Dmitry and Ivan. According to historians, Ivan the Fair did nothing outstanding, but was known as a wise mediator in princely disputes. However, this is not so little for the cruel era in which Ivan the Fair had to live. *** Originally, the Moscow principality was one of the many appanage principalities, and not the most powerful. For a long time, it remained on the sidelines of the political process in the Slavic lands. This quiet was beneficial for Moscow and allowed it to accumulate strength and subsequently make a decisive leap forward. Daniel Alexandrovich, Yury Danilovich, Ivan Kalita, Simeon the Proud, and Ivan the Fair expanded and strengthened their principality, using force and threats, purchasing lands from appanage princes, imposing their governors, and so forth. According to Klyuchevsky, the Moscow princes were “brave predators: they are keen observers of what is happening around them, carefully looking out for what is not firm, and take it into their hands.”245 As Presnyakov notes, “The Moscow princes collected not the land, but the power; they did not expand the territory of their Moscow patrimony, but built a great reign, gradually and persistently turning it into their ‘state.’”246 Still, this does not change the essence: a powerful state was unthinkable without territorial growth. Continuously expanding their possessions, the family of Ivan Kalita acted in a rather uniform manner. Does this mean that all Kalita’s heirs were less able and innovative than he was? Each of the Moscow princes was an individual, with their own advantages and disadvantages. However, they were united by a long-term common goal, which they had been implementing over the years: the gradual gathering of Russian principalities under the aegis of Moscow. From 1304, Moscow competed with Tver, whose princes also claimed power over Northeastern Russia. Having approximately equal positions with 243 Lyubavsky, Russian History from Scythia to Muscovy, 258–259. 244 PSRL, vol. 18, 100. 245 Klyuchevsky, Works, vol. 2, part 2, 13. 246 A. E. Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State [Russian] (Moscow: Bogorodsky pechatnik, 1997), 112.

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Tver, Moscow acted more pragmatically and rationally, without spending its financial and economic resources on resistance to the Golden Horde, which from 1237–1238 controlled the space of the former Kievan Rus. Ivan Kalita and his successors perceived the Horde khans as legitimate kings, acted as obedient vassals in relation to the Horde, and, if necessary, used military force against those who raised anti-Horde uprisings. Still, it would be wrong to perceive the Tver princes as “patriots of the Russian land,” and the Moscow princes as “traitors.” Thanks to his pragmatic policy, Ivan Kalita achieved Moscow’s monopoly right to collect tribute for the Golden Horde. Not all the tribute collected by Moscow reached the Horde, which allowed the Moscow princes to accumulate economic strength and eventually turn Moscow into the center of Northeastern Russia. To replenish its treasury, Moscow more than once resorted to forceful pressure on other Russian principalities. Being the descendants of Alexander Nevsky, the Moscow princes tried to keep proud Novgorod under their control. Novgorod had its own geopolitical interests and did not want to act in the wake of Moscow. At the same time, the Moscow princes competed with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which absorbed a significant part of the lands of the former Kievan Rus and could also claim the role of the unifier of the Russian lands. And yet, despite numerous obstacles and external threats, Moscow has become a promising geopolitical player, a political, economic and religious center of Northeastern Russia. With some reservations, the geographical position of Moscow at the intersection of trade routes, the security factor, a powerful influx of population and service people into the Moscow land, and Moscow’s fairly competent policy towards Ulus Jochi all played a role. It should also be recognized that, regardless of the subjective intentions of the Horde khans, to a certain extent, they also contributed to the gradual rise of the initially small and inconspicuous Moscow principality. Of course, the transfer of the metropolitan see from Vladimir-on-Klyazma to Moscow, as well as the skillful diplomacy of the highest church hierarchs, who were able to establish constructive relations with the Horde and even receive certain economic privileges and security guarantees from it, also had a significant effect. What is especially important, during the reign of all the heirs of Ivan Kalita, there was an increase in the grand ducal power. This trend continued in subsequent centuries. By the middle of the fourteenth century, the strong Moscow principality exerted considerable influence on Northeastern Russia, but was still dependent on the Ulus Jochi. Moscow was burdened by this dependence and was waiting to demonstrate its increased power to the weakening Horde. This historic mission befell to Prince Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy.

Moscow as a New Geopolitical Player

Figure 2.  Sergey Vasilievich Ivanov. “Baskaki” (1909).

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CHAPTER 3

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi 3.1.  “GREAT ZAMYATNYA” AND ITS CONSEQUENCES Moscow’s relations with the khans largely depended on the domestic situation in the Ulus Jochi, which entered a period of internal political instability. According to the Kazakh historian S. M. Akimbekov, the main object of claims in the political struggle in Ulus Jochi was precisely the central government. The sacredness of state power was lost in the ulus, and a severe organizational crisis struck it. However, significant sources of income remained at the disposal of the state and its central administrative apparatus. In particular, there were regular receipts from the territory of dependent Russian principalities, as well as the income from control over trade routes.1

Khan Jani Bek died in 1357. It was rumored that he was killed by his eldest son Berdibek and warlord Toglubai. Berdibek (r. 1357–1359), the last legitimate khan from the clan of Batu, murdered all his brothers to secure his power. In 1359, he gave the post of beklyarbek to his son-in-law, Mamai. After Berdibek’s

1 S. M. Akimbekov, History of the Steppes: The Phenomenon of the State of Genghis Khan in the History of Eurasia [Russian], 2nd rev. ed (Almaty: Institute of Asian Studies, 2016), 595.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi

death, Mamai lost all posts,2 but managed to survive under a number of shortlived khans. This is how the Mongol state entered the “Great Zamyatnya,” a dynastic crisis with rapid succession of khans. According to R. Bechtold, it “became part of the catastrophe of the Mongol state, which covered the lands they had conquered in the previous century: China, Persia, Central Asia, as well as Southern Russia.”3 After Berdibek’s death, Khulna Khan (r. 1359–1360) ruled for only five months and was killed by Naurus,4 the protégé of Taidula, the wife of Uzbeg and mother of Jani Beg. Naurus did not belong to the most influential branch of the Jochids, and the Horde nobility was unhappy with the strengthening of Taidula. This was used by Mahmud Khizir (1360–1361), the former bridegroom of Taidula. He became khan, and Naurus and Taidula were killed. Thus, the power in the Horde was seized by a khan who had nothing to do with the house of Batu, except for distant kinship along the line of Jochi.5 Other descendants of Jochi also got involved in the struggle for power. In 1361, Khizir was killed by Ordu-Malik, but the latter was opposed by TimurKhoja, the son of Khizir, who fought for power with his uncle Murid, also known as Amurat and Murid. Timur-Khoja won, but Murid proclaimed himself khan in Ukek and Gulistan. Outraged by the weakness of Timur-Khoja, the Sarai emirs led by Yaglybai began to migrate to the Crimea, plotting to transfer the throne to the descendant of Batu from the Uzbeg branch. Kildibeg of the house of Uzbeg became khan in 1361 and banished Ordu-Malik from Sarai, while Timur-Khoja and Murid fought among themselves. Timur-Khodja was killed by Mamai, but Murid overthrew Kildibeg. The new khan was Abdullah from the house of Batu, which marked the end of the first stage of the “Great Zamyatnya.”6 His supporter Mamai brought

2 R. Yu. Pochekaev, Tsars of the Horde. Biographies of the Khans and Rulers of the Golden Horde [Russian], 2nd rev. ed. (St. Petersburg: Evraziya, 2012), 156–157. 3 Quoted from: M. S. Gatin, “The Relationship between Russia and the Golden Horde in the Second Half of the Fourteenth Century in the Interpretations of German Historians” [Russian], Scholarly Proceedings of the Kazan State University, series “Humanities” 151, nos. 1–2 (2009): 91. 4 PSRL, vol. 18, 100. 5 Pochekaev, Tsars of the Horde, 148. 6 Ibid., 153.

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the Crimea, the Northern Black Sea region, and the Volga region under the control of the Uzbeg clan.7 The “Great Zamyatnya” significantly changed the nature of Russian-Horde relations. The rival groups in Sarai were giving conflicting orders. Russian princes still went to the Horde for jarligs, but now they not always obeyed the Tatar orders, and sometimes even openly ignored them. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania also took advantage of the weakening of the Golden Horde. Prince Algirdas launched a powerful offensive against the western possessions of the Horde. At the same time, Lithuania was in alliance with Tver, and they both had influence on Moscow.

The Reign of Dmitry Konstantinovich Having briefly outlined the general situation in Ulus Jochi, I would like return to the events of 1359. At that time, Metropolitan Alexius headed the Moscow government and took care of the sons of Ivan the Fair: nine-year-old Dmitry and the baby Ivan, as well as Vladimir, the five-year-old nephew of the prince.8 The grand ducal throne of Vladimir went to Dmitry Konstantinovich of Suzdal. Solovyov notes that Dmitry received the throne not from his father, and not from his grandfather, that is, “without any right.”9 It is even more remarkable … that it was not the eldest of the Suzdal princes, Andrei Konstantinovich, who got the jarlig from the khan, but the youngest, Dimitry. Andrei, according to the chronicler, did not want to take the jarlig; a story tells that he said: “To seek a jarlig is only to spend money, and then, when the legal heir of Moscow, Dimitri, grows up, then I must go to war with him, moreover, I would have to break the oath given to his father.”10

According to Gorsky, the territory of the Grand Duchy of Vladimir with the cities of Vladimir, Pereyaslavl, Kostroma, Yuryev-Polsky, Dmitrov, and Yaropolch

  7 Ibid., 154.   8 A. I. Pliguzov, Living Water of Nepryadva: Battle on the Kulikovo Field in the Testimonies of the Contemporaries and in the Memory of the Descendants [Russian] (Moscow: Kvadriga, 2017), 15.   9 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 264. 10 Ibid., 264.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi

all left from under the power of Moscow.11 The Galich principality went to the son of the last Dmitrov prince, Dmitry Borisovich, and the Sretensk half of Rostov, which Kalita took possession of, returned to the Rostov princes. “In fact,” the historian believes, “the territory controlled by the princes of the Moscow House returned almost to the 1237 borders—the time before Ivan Kalita received the jarlig for the grand ducal throne of Vladimir. Moreover, Moscow even lost the so-called ‘Ryazan places’ in the southwest that were originally part of the Moscow principality, and not of the grand duchy of Vladimir.”12 By 1362, Khan Murid and Khan Abdullah, supported by Mamai fought for the power in the Horde. Dmitry Ivanovich bought a jarlig for the Grand Duchy of Vladimir from Murid.13 As Russian chronicles note, Dmitry had the right to the Grand Duchy, as his father and his grandfather had both reigned there.14 At the same time, the Lithuanian prince Algirdas defeated the Tatars at the Blue Waters. Paradoxically, he became the banner of the anti-Horde struggle and all-Russian unity. According to Perekhov, “Moscow’s traditional loyalty to the Horde allowed Algirdas to tie both these ideas into one knot, presenting his anti-Moscow policy as a fight against the Tatar satellite.”15 In 1363 Dmitry Ivanovich also accepted the jarlig from Khan Abdullah.16 Khan Murid saw this as rebellion and issued a jarlig for the the Grand Duchy of Vladimir to Dmitry Konstantinovich of Suzdal, but Murid was killed and Dmitry Ivanovich drove Dmitry Konstantinovich out of Vladimir. The chronicles see this as the restoration of an age-old consensus: Dmitry Ivanovich was now in the city where his father reigned, and Dmitry Konstantinovich returned to his own city, Suzdal.17 With Dmitry Ivanovich, it becomes clear that the grand ducal title and the city of Vladimir constitute a patrimony, that is, the hereditary property of the Moscow princes, and cannot belong to anyone else.18 As Cherepnin states: “The policy that the Moscow princes pursued towards the Horde, starting with Ivan Kalita, began to crack. Under these new conditions the Moscow boyars began to act more independently of the Horde.”19

11 Gorsky, Moscow and the Horde, 75–76. 12 Ibid., 76. 13 Pliguzov, Living Water of Nepryadva, 21. 14 PSRL, vol. 18, 101. 15 Perekhov, History of Russia, 69. 16 PSRL, vol. 18, 102. 17 Ibid. 18 Platonov, Textbook of Russian History, 103. 19 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 554.

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In this new political climate, Dmitry Ivanovich acted decisively: he “pacified” Konstantin Vasilyevich of Rostov and expelled Ivan Fedorovich of Starodub and Dmitry Ivanovich of Galich out of their possessions. The exiles hoped for the help of Dmitry Konstantinovich, who received a jarlig for the Vladimir reign,20 but he refused the jarlig in exchange for Dmitry Ivanovich’s help against his younger brother, Boris Konstantinovich of Suzdal. Dmitry Konstantinovich even got his daughter Eudoxia married to Dmitry Ivanovich in marriage, and then he took Nizhny Novgorod and forced Boris to go to Gorodets.21

Historical Reference In 1364, Dmitry Ivanovich and his ten-year-old cousin Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov made an agreement that read: … I, Prince Vladimir, will respect you, the grand duke, as a father, and obey your supreme power; and I, Demetrius, will not offend you and will love you like a younger brother. Let each of us rule over his own fatherland without any doubts. I, Demetrius, will take what belonged to my parent and Simeon; and you take your father’s lot. Friends and enemies, we may have in common. … Our boyars can move freely, mine to you, yours to me, returning the salary given to them. … But I, Vladimir, am obliged to deliver to you, the grand duke, from my inheritance, the well-known tribute for the khan. … The atives of the Horde are to send their service, as in the old days [the Russian princes allowed Tatar soldiers to settle in Russian cities]. … You, younger brother, will take part in my military campaigns, and muster all your boyars and your servants under the princely banners; for which you will receive a salary from me during your service.22

3.2.  NEW ROUND OF MOSCOW-TVER RIVALRY In 1365, the Zvenigorod prince Ivan Ivanovich the Younger died,23 and his lands passed to his elder brother, Dmitry Ivanovich of Moscow. In this way, Dmitry began to acquire small pieces of Northeastern Russia. In 1367, the Moscow

20 PSRL, vol. 18, 103. 21 Ibid. 22 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 358. 23 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 76.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi

Kremlin was rebuilt in stone. The chronicles link this fact to Moscow’s offensive campaigns against other Russian princes.24 The fiercest opposition was between Dmitry Ivanovich and Mikhail Alexandrovich of Tver, the son of Alexander Mikhailovich who was killed by the Horde. They also argued over the legacy of the deceased Simeon Konstantinovich of Dorogobuzh. Simeon refused to leave his lands to his cousin Mikhail of Tver, and instead bequeathed them to his uncle Vasily and brother Eremey Konstantinovich,25 and Dmitry Ivanovich supported the opponents of Mikhail. In 1368, Mikhail arrived in Moscow for a trial over a lawsuit with Eremey Konstantinovich, but was thrown into prison. Part of Simeon Konstantinovich’s lands, and Gorodok, which belonged to Mikhail, went to Moscow.26 At this time, the Horde ambassadors arrived in Moscow and Dmitry released Mikhail, but in the same year he went to war against Tver.27 Mikhail reported this to his son-in-law, the Lithuanian prince Algirdas. As a result, the anti-Moscow union of Lithuania and Tver was formed.28 Algirdas went to war against Moscow with his brother Kęstutis and his nephew Vytautas.29 The Lithuanians stood near Moscow for three days and left without taking the city, but caused considerable damage to the Moscow lands. The chroniclers believed that Russia has never seen such great evil from Lithuania before.30 While Algirdas was fighting the Livonian Order, Dmitry Ivanovich attacked Tver. Then Algirdas laid siege to Moscow,31 but when Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov, Vladimir Dmitrievich of Pronsk, and Oleg Ivanovich of Ryazan came out against him, Algirdas asked for peace.32 As the Russian historians note: “This was a critical moment in the relations between Vilnius and Moscow. Lithuania was forced to yield to the new rising Russian power.”33 Then Mikhail of Tver went to the Horde again. In 1370, Mamai, on behalf of Khan Muhammad, handed Mikhail the jarlig for the reign of Tver, as well as the jarlig for the Grand Duchy of Vladimir. According to Pliguzov, Mikhail’s 24 Ibid., 84. 25 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 269. 26 PSRL, vol. 15, no. 1, 87. 27 Ibid., 88. 28 Pliguzov, Living Water of Nepryadva, 21. 29 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 88. 30 Ibid., 90. 31 Ibid., 94. 32 Ibid., 94. 33 Bokhanov, Morozova, Rakhmatullin, Sakharov, and Shestakov, History of Russia from Ancient Times to the Present Day, 263.

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actions meant “the recognition of the previous vassal obligations of Russia in relation to the Horde that existed before ‘Zamyatnya’ in 1361.”34 Mikhail returned home together with the Tatar ambassador Sarykhozha, who ordered Dmitry Ivanovich to come to Vladimir and pledge his loyalty to Mikhail. But Dmitry replied: “I am not going … I will not let Mikhail be crowned as the ruler of Grand Duchy of Vladimir, and the path for you, the ambassador, is clear.”35 Sarykhozha gave the jarlig to Mikhail and went to Moscow, where he received rich gifts, for which he praised the Moscow prince in the Horde.36 Mikhail of Tver sent his son Ivan to the Horde.37 Dmitry Ivanovich also went there, and he received a jarlig for the Grand Duchy of Vladimir.38 Then Dmitry Ivanovich sent an army to the Bezhetsk swamps and killed the Tver governor.39 The complete ruin of Tver was prevented by Oleg Ivanovich of Ryazan.40 Dmitry Ivanovich’s ally, Vladimir Dmitrievich of Pronsk, occupied Ryazan and declared himself a prince.41 Later Oleg Ivanovich returned and took Vladimir Dmitrievich hostage.42 In 1372, Mikhail of Tver took Kistma and Dmitrov, and Kęstutis and Andrey Polotsky burned Pereyaslavl and Kashin,43 as well as Torzhok. The Novgorodians wanted to recapture Torzhok, but they were defeated.44 Mikhail went to join Algirdas at Lyubutsk,45 but Dmitry Ivanovich defeated the Lithuanian patrol regiment and Algirdas agreed to peace. Algirdas promised that Mikhail would return everything he had taken in the Moscow region and recall his governors. If Mikhail would begin to plunder the Moscow principality once again, Dmitry would be free to deal with him. However, Dmitry reserved the right to complain about Mikhail to the Horde.46

34 Pliguzov, Living Water of Nepryadva, 21. 35 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 95. 36 Ibid., 96. 37 Ibid., 96. 38 Ibid., 96. 39 Ibid., 98. 40 Ibid., 98. 41 Ibid., 99. 42 Ibid., 100. 43 Ibid., 99–100. 44 Ibid., 102. 45 Ibid., 103. 46 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, bools 3–4, 274–275.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi

Historical Background: Lithuania Taking the side of Tver in its attempts to win back the lost primacy from Moscow, the Lithuanian prince Algirdas mounted three campains against Moscow, in 1368, 1370, and 1372. Each time, he failed to occupy the Kremlin. Thus, the goals declared by Olgerd (“all Russia should belong to the Lithuanians”) were not achieved, while Vilnius did not become “the second Kiev.”47 At the same time, Lithuanian historians admit that the Russian lands were in no hurry to join the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of their own free will or because of their fear of Moscow. The Lithuanians used military force as well as indirect influence to further their conquests. Byzantine sources confirm that the Lithuanians were “a brave and warlike people.” Even dynastic marriages at that time were concluded by open military pressure. The Lithuanians, most likely, were imperialists same as everyone else, the only difference was that after the seizure of a foreign land they were in no hurry with oppression. At first, they did not change the established order. Most accurately, this tactic is characterized by the favorite expression of the Lithuanian princes: “We are not destroying the old days, and we are not introducing novelty.” They kept the old structures of the principalities, which would later turn into appanages with their own privileges, or into autonomous regions, in today’s language.48

Fragile Peace with Tver Soon, Prince Mikhail Vasilyevich of Kashin rebelled against to Mikhail of Tver and went for protection to Moscow, and from there to the Horde, but returned with nothing.49 After his death, his son Vasily surrendered to the will of Mikhail of Tver. After that, Dmitry Ivanovich released Ivan, the son of Mikhail of Tver, ransomed by him from the Horde, and Mikhail brought his governors out of the Moscow region.50 At this time, the vassals of Mamai first invaded Northeastern Russia, devastating the Ryazan principality. In 1373 they wanted to plunder the Moscow region as well, but Dmitry Ivanovich did not let them go beyond the Oka river. A new state in the Volga region, the Blue Horde, grew stronger under Urus

47 48 49 50

Eidintas, Bumblauskas, Kulakauskas, and Tamoshaitis, History of Lithuania, 39. Ibid., 41. PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 104. Ibid., 105.

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Khan, and in 1373–1374 Urus knocked Muhammad Khan out of Sarai. These changes contributed to the weakening of the relations between Mamai and Moscow. As Pliguzov notes, “Apparently, by 1375 the Russian princes recognized the possibility of not paying the tribute to the Horde, but the decision not to collect the money was not made.”51 In 1375, the Horde ambassador Nekomat brought the jarlig for the Grand Duchy to Tver.52 In response, Dmitry Ivanovich and his allies from among the princes of Northeastern Russia took Mikulin, Zubtsov, Belgorod, and Gorodok, and then besieged Tver.53 Eventually, Dmitry Ivanovich of Moscow and Mikhail Alexandrovich of Tver made peace.54 As noted by Solovyov, Mikhail retained the title of grand duke, but agreed to consider himself Dmitry’s younger brother. Mikhail pledged not to attempt to conquer Moscow or Novgorod, and he also imposed this promise on his children and nephews. In addition, Mikhail pledged not to seek the Grand Duchy of Vladimir and not to accept it from the Tatars. Dmitry promised not to accept Tver from the Tatars, but he ensured that the Kashin principality did not depend on Tver. Mikhail pledged to support Dmitry in case of an attack by the Tatars, and in the event of a war against the Tatars. Mikhail refused the alliance with Algirdas, and promised to fight the Lithuanians if they attacked Moscow or Smolensk. Mikhail also pledged to live in peace with Novgorod and Torzhok. All disputes between Moscow and Tver were given to local courts, and some particularly difficult disputes were resolved by Oleg Ivanovich of Ryazan.55 However, the 1375 peace between Dmitry Ivanovich and Mikhail Alexandrovich did not put an end to the long dispute between Moscow and Tver. In a few years, this agreement of 1375 would be broken.

3.3.  BATTLE OF KULIKOVO: VICTORY OVER MAMAI OR OVER THE GOLDEN HORDE? Mamai’s attempt to regain control over Russia by issuing a grand ducal jarlig to a more loyal prince failed.56 His other failure was the loss of the Volga possessions. Refusal from attempts to subjugate Sarai had grave consequences for Mamai. 51 Pliguzov, Living Water of Nepryadva, 22. 52 Ibid., 22. 53 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 111. 54 Ibid., 112. 55 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 276–277. 56 Pochekaev, Tsars of the Horde, 167.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi

Although Urus Khan returned to the Blue Horde in 1375, Sarai remained in the hands of rulers hostile to Mamai and Muhammad Khan. A wedge was driven between Mamai and his emirs in the Middle Volga region, of which Moscow took advantage. The Rogozhsky chronicler reports that in 1376 Moscow troops moved to Kazan, which paid 5,000 rubles to the Russian princes and soldiers, and the Russians left their tax collector and customs officers there.57 In this regard, Akimbekov notes: “One can clearly see the desire of the Russian princes to copy the system of management of the dependent territories used Ulus Jochi. The Moscow principality already, and very effectively, imitated the organization of the Jochid state. It sought to behave in the Russian lands and adjacent territories according to its new status.”58 However, new troubles awaited Russia. In 1377, the Tatar prince Arapsha (Arab-Shah) came to Russia. The Russian troops moved to counter him, but they lost their vigilance and indulged in drunkenness.59 On August 2, 1377, Arapsha defeated the Russian troops and, together with the Mordovian princes, ravaged Nizhny Novgorod and Ryazan. In response, Boris Konstantinovich of Gorodets devastated the Mordovian lands.60 Mamai, who controlled the Mordovian lands, could not leave this event without consequences and sent his experienced commander, Mirza Begich to Russia. However, Begich was defeated by Moscow troops on the Vozha River (a tributary of the Oka) on August 11, 1378.61 As Spuler notes, “Dmitry achieved great success, since he managed to prove that the power of the Tatars over Russia, which they had enslaved, was no longer insurmountable. Since this victory was won on the defensive, the grand duke now considered it appropriate to go on the offensive himself.”62 In the spring of 1379, Khan Tokhtamysh took the throne in Ulus Jochi use. According to many historians, Mamai recognized his power; but soon a conflict broke out between them. “The war was inevitable,” writes Pliguzov, “but Mamai was clearly not ready for it and could not leave the rebellious Russia in his rear.”63 Trying to restore his former authority and in need of financial resources, Mamai demanded that the Moscow prince Dmitry Ivanovich continue paying 57 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 116–117. 58 Akimbekov, History of the Steppes, 616. 59 Ibid., 118. 60 Ibid., 119–120. 61 Ibid., 134. 62 Spuler, Golden Horde, 116. 63 Pliguzov, Living Water of Nepryadva, 23.

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tribute in the same amount as it was under Khan Jani Beg. Having received no answer, Mamai began to prepare a campaign against Russia and for this purpose made an alliance with the Lithuanian prince Jogaila.64 Their troops were to come together on September 1, 1380. Dmitry Ivanovich learnt of this in August and gathered his army immediately. He received help from Novgorod and Pskov, as well as the princes of Rostov, Yaroslavl, and Belozersk. On August 15, the Russian regiments gathered in Kolomna. Dmitry Ivanovich was blessed by the Bishop Gerasim of Kolomna and, possibly, Sergius of Radonezh, the abbot of the Moscow Holy Trinity Monastery.65 Then, the army of Dmitry Ivanovich crossed the Oka, and on September 6–7, the Don. The battle took place on September 8 on the Kulikovo field near the confluence of the Nepryadva River and the Don. The Russian army numbered up to sixty thousand people, and the army of Mamai included fifty or sixty thousand people. Due to the numerical superiority of the Mongolian cavalry, the Russians could not use detour maneuvers, but Dmitry Ivanovich placed a strong ambush regiment in the nearby forest near the Don under the command of his cousin Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov with Prince Dmitry Bobrok as his advisor.66 Boyar Mikhail Brenok, dressed in princely armor, was appointed the main commander of the main forces, and Dmitry Ivanovich himself went into battle as an ordinary soldier. After about four hours of the battle, it became clear that the advantage was on Mamai’s side. The Russian infantry was split, and the cavalry also experienced difficulties. When it seemed that the Tatars were already close to victory, the Russian ambush regiment entered the battle. Mamai was the first to retreat, and his entire army ran after him.67 Only darkness saved the Tatars from complete destruction. Jogaila, upon learning of this, thought only of flight. Maciej Stryjkovsky, a sixteenth-century Polish historian, in his Chronicle of Poland, Lithuania, Zhmud, and All Russia notes that Dmitry “began to emerge from the oppression and obedience of the Trans-Volga and Crimean Tatars.”68 64 R. Y. Pochekaev, Mamai. The Story of the “Antihero” in History [Russian] (St. Petersburg: Evraziya, 2010), 89. 65 Pliguzov, Living Water of Nepryadva, 15. 66 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, 280. 67 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 140. 68 M. Stryjkowski, Ktora przedtym nigdy šwiatła nie widziała Kronika Polska, Litewska, Zmodska i wszystkiey Rusi (Królewiec, 1582), 91.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi

Stryjkovsky mentions that after Dmitry’s victory “more than thirteen miles of the fields were full of Tatar corpses,” but he immediately reports on Dmitry’s unsuccessful war with the Lithuanian prince Olgerd after the battle with Mamai. According to D. V. Karnaukhov, the claims of the Polish historian do not find confirmation in the sources of that time: “Apparently, they were intended to emphasize the merits of the Lithuanian monarch, post factum including in his track record a successful war against Dmitry, famous for his victory over the Tatars.”69 Dmitry Ivanovich, nicknamed Donskoy, returned to Moscow in triumph.70 However, the triumph had a strong shade of bitterness, since prominent Russian princes, including Mikhail Brenok, Fedor Romanovich of Belozersk, his son Ivan Fedorovich, Andrey Serkizov, Simeon Melik, and others died in the Battle of Kulikovo field.71 The Battle of Kulikovo field is assessed differently by historians of different eras. According to Karamzin, this battle “has not yet stopped Russia’s calamities, but it proved the revival of its forces.”72 N. V. Savelyev-Rostislavich believed that the victory over Mamai was the victory of the “whole people.”73 Solovyov called the Battle of Kulikovo field “a sign of the triumph of Europe over Asia,”74 but at the same time admitted that “the Kulikovo victory was one of those victories that border on defeat.”75 Klyuchevsky writes: “… almost all of Northern Russia, under the leadership of Moscow, opposed the Horde on the Kulikovo field and, under the Moscow banners, won the first popular victory over Hagarians. This demonstrated to the Moscow prince how important was the role of the national leader.”76 According to Platonov, the Battle of Kulikovo field “gave impetus to a decisive unification of the people under the rule of one sovereign, the Moscow prince.”77 Shmurlo is more skeptical:

69 D. V. Karnaukhov, “Historical Image of Muscovy in the Polish Chronography of the Renaissance” [Russian], Bulletin of the Russian State University for the Humanities, series “History. Philology. Culturology. Oriental Studies” 10 (2008): 110. 70 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 140. 71 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 140. 72 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 373. 73 N. V. Savelyev-Rostislavich, Dmitry Ioannovich Donskoy, the Originator of Russian Glory [Russian] (Moscow, 1837), 31. 74 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 287. 75 Ibid., 288. 76 Klyuchevsky, Works, vol. 2, part 2, 22. 77 Platonov, Full Course of Lectures, 151.

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Between East and West The real results of the Kulikovo battle are negligible. Its significance is only moral, ideological: it pointed to the possibility of defeating the Tatars, undermined the former beliefs in their invincibility down to the root, gave birth to bright hopes, strengthened faith in the future, justified the collective policy of the Moscow princes, but did not yet give triumph over Asia.78

Vernadsky believes that in the Battle of Kulikovo field “Eastern Russia did the maximum that it was capable of at that time. If the strife in the Golden Horde continued, then this battle would ensure immediate independence for Russia. In reality, however, unity and strong power in the Horde were restored soon after the defeat of Mamai.”79 In general, the defeat of Mamai “was a heavy blow for the Mongol authorities, but not fatal.”80 Within the framework of the theory of ethnogenesis and passionarity, Gumilyov asserts that the Battle of Kulikovo field played a decisive role in the formation of a single Russian ethnos: “Armies of Muscovites, Vladimir, Suzdal, and other principalities went to Kulikovo field, and from the battle there returned a host of Russians who went to live in Moscow, Vladimir, Suzdal, and other cities. This was the beginning of their awareness of themselves as a single entity—Russia.”81 Pliguzov suggests placing the Battle of Kulikovo in a broader historical context: The battle on the banks of the Nepryadva is one of the episodes in the policy of the Moscow prince, and the situation in 1380 is similar to the situations in 1370 and 1375. Dmitry Moskovsky, in the struggle for the growth of his “fatherland,” seeks to break the hostile alliance of Tver, Lithuania, and the Horde, who attracted the princes of Northeastern Russia to their side. To do this, he uses all the means available to him: from a reconciliation with Mamai (1371) and the intra-Russian campaign against Tver (1375) to the “evil battle” with the Tatars (1380).82

Dvornichenko believes that the significance of the Battle of Kulikovo field “can neither be overestimated nor underestimated: 78 Shmurlo, History of Russia, 79. 79 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, 281. 80 Ibid., 281. 81 L. N. Gumilyov, “Echo of the Battle of Kulikovo” [Russian], Ogonyok 36 (1980): 17. 82 Pliguzov, Living Water of Nepryadva, 24.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi Its meaning is not even the defeat of the Mongols, because 1380 was followed by 1382 when Khan Tokhtamysh took Moscow and again imposed an “inevitable” tribute, and the yoke lasted another century. But the victory on the Kulikovo field had an enormous political and socio-psychological impact on the entire subsequent history of Russia, because the myth of the invincibility of the Mongols was destroyed, the emerging Great Russian nationality acquired clearer guidelines and perked up.83

Gorsky considers it necessary to pay attention to the geopolitical consequences of Dmitry Donskoy’s victory over Mamai’s troops: The implicit result of the Kulikovo victory was the violation of the unstable equilibrium that had existed for almost twenty years between the two parts of the horde: the defeat of Mamai contributed to their unification under the rule of the legitimate khan. Objectively, Tokhtamysh received the most concrete political benefit from Mamai’s defeat on the Kulikovo field.84

Bertold Spuler also admits that the defeat of Mamai did not lead to a fundamental weakening of the power of the Golden Horde, since it allowed Toktamysh, the contender for the throne, who was then favored by the ruler of Central Asia, Timur, to ultimately win over his rivals and restore a stable government in the Tatar state. In 1382 he led a campaign against Moscow and, having laid siege to the city, forced the Russians to resume paying tribute.85

According to Akimbekov, the main result of the Kulikovo battle for Dmitry Donskoy was that he managed to partially neutralize his competitors inside the Russian lands. By agreeing to an alliance with Mamai, they have discredited themselves in the eyes of Tokhtamysh. It took them time to start a new

83 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 279. 84 Gorsky, Moscow and the Horde, 94–95. 85 B. Spuler, History of the Muslim World: The Age of the Caliphs. Mongolian Period [Russian], transl. L. A. Igorevsky (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2020), 218.

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Between East and West anti-Moscow political game with his help. Dmitry secured the status of the most powerful prince in the Russian lands and thereby increased the chances of the inevitably forthcoming negotiations with the new authorities of the Juchid state.86

At the same time, Akimbekov admits that the victory of Dmitry Donskoy over Mamai “made it easier for Tokhtamysh to unite the Ulus of Jochi.”87

3.4.  INVASION OF TOKHTAMYSH The defeat of Mamai in the Battle of Kulikovo field seriously changed the political situation in the Golden Horde. The Chingizid Khan Tokhtamysh profited from Mamai’s weakened position as he defeated Arapsha, captured Sarai, and began to threaten Mamai. In the fall of 1380, the troops of Mamai and Tokhtamysh came face to face on the banks of the Kalka River. But as soon as the first attack began, Mamai’s warriors dismounted and swore allegiance to Tokhtamysh.88 Mamai fled, but at the turn of 1380 and 1381 he was killed near the city of Solkhat.89 Tokhtamysh buried Mamai with all the honors, accepted Mamai’s son Manzur into his service and married Tulun Beg Khanum, the daughter of Berdi Beg and the widow of Mamai.90 Thus ended the “Great Zamyatnya.” Ulus Jochi was once again united under the rule of a single khan. “With the victory over Mamai,” asserts Vernadsky, “Tokhtamysh became the ruler of both the eastern and western parts of the Ulus Jochi. In fact, he was now one of the most powerful rulers of that time. Naturally, he considered it his duty to restore the control of the Golden Horde over Russia.”91 As Grusset writes about Tokhtamysh: The unification of the Golden Horde and the White Horde, the defeat of the Moscow principality made him a new Batu and a new Berke. This revival had the greater echo because by this time the Chingizids had been 86 Akimbekov, History of the Steppes, 626. 87 Ibid. 88 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 141. 89 Pochekaev, Mamai, 96. 90 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 141. 91 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, 282.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi expelled from China, eliminated in Persia, and fell into decay in Turkestan. Tokhtamysh was the only one of this brilliant family who remained on horseback. Restorer of Mongolian greatness, he, quite naturally, considered himself called to continue the work of his great ancestor Genghis Khan, and, obviously, it was this thought that pushed him to attempt to conquer Transaxonia and Persia.92

However, before that, it was important to form stable relations with Rus and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. First of all, Tokhtamysh decided to obtain confirmation of the alliance concluded by Mamai with Lithuania. To this end, in 1381, he sent an embassy to Lithuania and declared his suzerainty over the grand duke of Lithuania.93 Then Tokhtamysh informed Dmitry Donskoy and other Russian princes of his victory over their common enemy Mamai.94 Thus, he reminded Moscow of the need to pledge allegiance to him. As Spuler states, “No one, not even the Prince of Moscow, dared to evade this.”95 In turn, Vernadsky points out that neither Dmitry Donskoy, nor other Russian princes “considered it necessary to pay a personal visit to Tokhtamysh; however, they all sent a kilij to the new khan with congratulations and numerous gifts.”96 Vernadsky’s account is in good agreement with the data of the Rogozhsky chronicler.97 The chronicle also reports that in the same year Tokhtamysh again sent his ambassador to Russia with a squad of 700 soldiers. The Mongols reached Nizhny Novgorod, but did not dare to go to Moscow.98 In the fall of 1382, Tokhtamysh himself went to Russia. According to the Rogozhsky chronicler, Oleg Ivanovich of Ryazan pointed out all the fords on the Oka to the khan, and Dmitry Konstantinovich, the prince of Nizhny Novgorod sent his sons Vasily and Simeon to Tokhtamysh.99 Dmitry Donskoy “did not raise his hand against the tsar” and retreated to Kostroma.100 The Tale of the Invasion of Tokhtamysh reports that among the Russian princes there was

  92 Grusset, Steppe Nomads, 399.   93 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, 282.   94 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 141.   95 Spuler, Golden Horde, 117.   96 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, 282.   97 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 141.   98 Ibid., 142.   99 Ibid., 143. 100 Ibid., 143–144.

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Between East and West not unity, but distrust. And then, the pious prince came to an understanding and enlightenment, and after consideration, became perplexed and lost in thought, thereafter he became afraid to take a stand against the tsar himself. And he did not go to battle against him, and did not raise his hands against the tsar, but went to his city Pereyaslavl, and from there— past Rostov, and then, I will say, hastily to Kostroma.101 … The townspeople were agitated and raged like drunkards. Some wanted to stay, shutting themselves up in the city, while others thought to flee. And a great strife broke out between those and others: some with belongings rushed to the city, while others fled from the city, robbed.102

The situation was saved by Ostej, the grandson of Algirdas, who organized the defense of Moscow. Vasily and Simeon Konstantinovich, who arrived with the Mongols, promised the Muscovites that the khan would not ruin the city, but only take “honors and gifts.”103 However, when the Muscovites opened the gates to the Mongols on August 26, a terrible bloody pogrom began.104 Soon after, Tokhtamysh took Serpukhov, Pereyaslavl, and Kolomna, and then sent his ambassadors to Moscow with proposals for peace.105 As a result, Dmitry Donskoy recognized his allegiance to the Horde and paid the tribute. Tokhtamysh did not deprive Dmitry of the grand ducal title, although this is precisely what Mikhail Alexandrovich of Tver was stubbornly seeking. Halperin writes about Tokhtamysh’s campaign: This blow to Moscow’s prestige, not to mention its economy, was enormous and, of course, caused significant damage to its political ambitions.106 … Despite the scale of this disaster, Moscow remained too strong for Tokhtamysh to withdraw the jarlig for the Vladimir throne. The payment of the tribute, no doubt, resumed (probably even in larger quantities than before), and the direct heir of Dmitry Donskoy—his son Vasily 101 The Story of the Invasion of Tokhtamysh, ed. and commentaries M. A. Salmina, http://lib. pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=4983. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Halperin, Tatar Yoke, 143.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi Dmitrievich—remained a hostage in the Horde for several more years. Tokhtamysh succeeded in restoring a position favorable to Tatars.107 … At the same time, Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy recognized Tokhtamysh as the legitimate khan.108

Pliguzov believes that despite the consequences of the invasion of Tokhtamysh, the relations between Rus and Horde stabilized after the Battle of Kulikovo. For example, the amount of tribute for the Horde was now fixed.109 I tend to support A. N. Kirpichnikov’s view: There is no dispute that Tokhtamysh’s invasion of Moscow slowed down the unification of the country and revived the separatism of some local rulers who rival the grand duke. However, even after the revenge campaign of 1382, the Horde itself began to treat Moscow more carefully and prudently. Dmitry Ivanovich’s legitimate rights to the grand ducal throne were recognized as incontestable. Not the applicants from Tver or Nizhny Novgorod, but the winner over Mamai got the jarlig for the Grand Duchy of Vladimir at the end of 1382.110

After the invasion of Tokhtamysh, the dispute between Moscow and Tver was also resolved. Having devastated Moscow, Tokhtamysh was going to march on Tver. To avoid the invasion, Mikhail of Tver sent his ambassador Gurlen to the khan, but he was intercepted by the Tatars and brought before the Tokhtamysh. Tokhtamysh spared Gurlen, returned his confiscated belongings to him, and sent him to Tver with the jarlig. When the khan returned to the Horde, Mikhail went there with his son Alexander, but Dmitry Donskoy got the jarlig for the Grand Duchy of Vladimir. Mikhail Tverskoy returned to Tver, and his son Alexander remained a hostage in the Horde111 and returned home only in 1386. According to Cherepnin, in this way Mikhail practically cancelled his agreement with the grand duke of Moscow (1375), according to which the political independence of the Tver principality was significantly undermined. Now Michael owned the grand ducal throne of Tver as granted by the khan.112 Thus, 107 Ibid., 144. 108 Ibid., 144. 109 Pliguzov, Living Water of Nepryadva, 25. 110 A. N. Kirpichnikov, Battle of Kulikovo [Russian] (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1980), 113. 111 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 149. 112 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 649.

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as Klug notes, “the coexistence of the Moscow and Tver states has become a fact.”113 The issue with the Ryazan principality was resolved differently. After the invasion of Tokhtamysh, the Ryazan land was devastated by Moscow as a revenge for the help provided by Oleg Ivanovich to Tokhtamysh. Oleg fled to Lithuania, and upon returning to Russia, signed a treaty with Dmitry Donskoy. Oleg Ivanovich returned some territories to Moscow, called himself the younger brother of Dmitry Donskoy, broke with Lithuania, and pledged to act with Moscow as one. However, already in 1385, in violation of the contract, Oleg took Kolomna114 but was beaten. In the same year, Moscow and Ryazan made an “eternal peace,” which was sealed by the marriage of Oleg’s son Fyodor and Dmitry Ivanovich’s daughter Sofia.115 Relations between Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod also improved. In 1383, after the death of Dmitry Konstantinovich, Nizhny Novgorod was occupied by his brother Boris. Dmitry’s sons Vasily Kirdyapa and Simeon, with the help of Moscow, expelled Boris Konstantinovich from Nizhny Novgorod.116 Much more difficult was the situation with Novgorod, which traditionally did not want to obey Moscow, but even more so to pay Tokhtamysh tribute (the so called ‘chernyi bor’). In order to collect it and bring to justice the Novgorod Ushkuyniks (warriors), who attacked Nizhny Novgorod and Kostroma, Dmitry Donskoy and his cousin Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov undertook a punitive campaign against Novgorod in 1386. As a result, the Novgorodians paid Moscow a fine of eight thousand rubles for the damage caused by the ushkuyniks.117 In this way Moscow restored its treasury, which had been depleted by Tokhtamysh.118 Cherepnin notes that by the mid-1380s, there was a possibility of an alliance between the Moscow grand duke and the grand duke of Lithuania, Jogaila, son of Algirdas. Moreover, Jogaila’s marriage to the daughter of Dmitry Ivanovich was considered. There was an agreement about this union between Dmitry Donskoy and Jogaila’s mother, Algirdas’s widow, Uliana Alexandrovna (daughter of Alexander Mikhailovich of Tver), but these plans were not implemented in practice. The Polish influence at Jogaila’s court overpowered Russian 113 Klug, “Principality of Tver,” 380. 114 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 150. 115 Ibid., 152. 116 Ibid., 154. 117 PSRL, vol. 3, 93–94. 118 Kostomarov, Russian History in the Biographies, 133.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi

influence and in 1386 Lithuania and Poland were united following Jogaila’s marriage to the Polish queen Jadwiga. Catholicism was introduced in Lithuania.119 As a result, the Lithuanian offensives against the Russian principalities intensified. Relations between Dmitry Ivanovich and the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church were not easy. On December 2, 1375, Cyprian became the metropolitan of Kiev and Lithuania. According to the decision of the Byzantine Council, he was to head the entire Russian Church after the death of Metropolitan Alexius. Alexius did not recognize the decision of the Patriarchate. Dmitry Ivanovich also greeted Cyprian unfriendly, so Cyprian left to Kiev. Alexius offered Sergius of Radonezh to become his successor, but Sergius refused. Then Dmitry Ivanovich supported the candidacy of Mityai, his confessor and custodian of the state seal, who was unpopular among the capital’s clergy. Dmitry Ivanovich sent Mityai to Constantinople to be installed, but he unexpectedly died.120 Constantinople appointed Pimen as metropolitan. Dmitry Ivanovich did not accept him, and Cyprian was again summoned to Moscow,121 but during the raid of Tokhtamysh he fled to Tver. Dmitry Donskoy summoned Pimen back from exile, but Pimen fled to Byzantium. In contrast to his military victories, the glorious Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy suffered complete defeat in this conflict with the highest Orthodox hierarchs. Some modern Russian historians believe that by his impulsive and ill-considered actions, the grand duke only exacerbated the turmoils existing within the Orthodox church.122 Dmitry Donskoy died on May 19, 1389 at the age of thirty-nine. Before his death, he drew up a spiritual letter in which he blessed his eldest son, Prince Vasily, and gave him “my fatherland, the grand duchy.”123 “In other words,” explains Dvornichenko, “he finally merged the concepts of Moscow and the 119 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 651. 120 N. S. Borisov, “From the History of the Ecclesiastical Political Struggle in the Era of the Kulikovo Battle. ‘Mityai’s Case’” [Russian], Rus, Russia. Middle Ages and Modern Times 3 (2013): 73. 121 N. E. Vedeneeva, “The Political Situation in Russia in the Last Quarter of the Fourteenth Century” [Russian], Bulletin of the Astrakhan State Technical University 5 (2006): 48. 122 I. B. Mikhailina and M. V. Efimova, “Moscow and Constantinople in the Reign of Dmitry Donskoy: A New Tsargrad” [Russian], Bulletin of St. Petersburg University, series 2 “History” 4 (2010): 6. 123 Spiritual and Contractual Letters of the Great and Appanage Princes of the FourteenthSixteenth Centuries [Russian], ed. L. V. Cherepnin and S. V. Bakhrushina (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1950), 34.

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grand ducal reign of Vladimir. In this merge, Moscow was obviously privileged. It became the main city of Russia, the capital of the Great Russian state.”124 Dmitry Donskoy also expressed his belief that Russia can free itself from the yoke and the obligation to pay tribute: “But if God changes the Horde, my children will not pay a tribute the Horde, and the son who collects tribute from his paytrimony will keep it to himself.”125 It is important to note that Dmitry’s lands were distributed unequally among his sons: Vasily’s possessions were larger than all other lots combined, which gave him some advantages. Dmitry Donskoy’s will also indicated that in the event of the death of his eldest son Vasily, his lands and possessions should be transferred to the eldest of the surviving brothers (it was Yury Dmitrievich). Note that at the time of drawing up the will, Vasily had no children. These important legal subtleties were one of the reasons for the war of 1425–1453. *** The activities of Dmitry Donskoy are assessed by Russian historians ambiguously. For example, Karamzin notes: none of the descendants of Yaroslav the Great, except for Monomakh and Alexander Nevsky, was so loved by the people and boyars as Dimitri, for his generosity, love for the glory of the fatherland, justice, and kindness. Brought up amid the dangers and noise of the military, he did not have the knowledge gleaned in books, but knew Russia and the science of government.126

Solovyov agrees with Karamzin: “Dmitry’s grandfather, uncle, and father, in silence, prepared rich means for an open, decisive struggle. The merit of Dmitry was that he knew how to use these means, knew how to deploy the prepared forces and use them timely.”127 In contrast, Kostomarov sees only negative moments in Dmitry Ivanovich’s activities:

124 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 280–281. 125 Ibid., 36. 126 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 381. 127 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 306.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi The reign of Dimitri Donskoy belongs to the most unfortunate and sad ages of the long-suffering Russian people. … Apart from minor struggles, the Moscow land was twice devastated by the Lithuanians, and then suffered the invasion of Tokhtamysh’s Horde. Ryazan suffered twice from the Tatars, twice from the Muscovites, and was brought to utter ruin; the Tver land was ravaged by the Muscovites several times; Smolensk suffered from both Muscovites and Lithuanians; Novgorod suffered ruin from Tver and the Muscovites.128

Obviously, it would be wrong to paint the personality, life, and work of Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy in black and white. A considered and balanced view is needed, taking into account both the grand duke’s successes and his inevitable mistakes and failures. Of course, Dmitry Donskoy has played an extremely important role in Russian history. The beginning of his reign fell in the period of the “Great Zamyatnya” in the Ulus Jochi. In this situation, the young prince, with the help of Metropolitan Alexius, found the right approach and began a long diplomatic game with the Horde rulers. Soon he was able to act more independently from the Horde, and began politic games within the Northeastern Russia, as seen from his rather tough steps towards some Russian appanage princes. When necessary, Dmitry Ivanovich created various coalitions. The territory of Moscow was expanding, the princely power also increased, and, according to Dvornichenko, this could only happen at the expense of democratic institutions in Moscow and in neighboring lands: “But in neighboring lands it turned out better than at home, because the Moscow prince had to rely on the support of the community as well.”129 In the new geopolitical conditions, the growing Moscow principality was also opposed by the alliance of Mikhail Alexandrovich of Tver and his son-inlaw Algirdas. More than once, this alliance inflicted painful blows and crushed the ambitions of Dmitry Ivanovich, but the latter outplayed them in the Horde, turning the Horde officials into his allies. It might have seemed to many Russian people that the agreement signed in 1375 between Dmitry Ivanovich and Mikhail of Tver terminated the long dispute between Moscow and Tver, but this was not entirely true. The main achievement of Dmitry Donskoy was his victory on the Kulikovo field, where almost all the princes of Northeastern Russia gathered under 128 Kostomarov, Russian History in the Biographies, 135. 129 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 278.

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his banners. Not even the invasion of Tokhtamysh, nor the plundering of Moscow could completely neutralize the growing might of the Russian state. During this period, the prerequisites for the leadership of Moscow as the nucleus of the future united state continued to ripen. This was reflected in the literature of that era (see A Word about the Life and the Repose of the Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich, Tsar of Russia, Zadonshchina, The Legend of the Mamai Massacre, and other texts). These works were written soon after the events they describe, as a kind of medieval journalism. They all emphasized the sovereign status of the Moscow princes, using the titles “tsar” and/or “autocrat,” and presented Moscow as the dynastic and political heir of Kiev and Vladimir-Suzdal in Russian history. The Moscow princes were described as the rulers of “all Russia,” the military commanders of the united Russian troops, defenders of Orthodoxy, and liberators of Russian society from the Horde yoke. They embodied the force uniting the Russian lands and branches of the Rurikid dynasty.130 At the same time, Halperin notes: The texts of the Kulikovo cycle differ greatly in their approaches to the events surrounding the first and most famous victory of Russia over the Tatars. The epic poem Zadonshchina shows Tatar warriors as noble knights, revealing a mutual understanding that binds the military elite of warring nations, the Chronicle Tale of 1380 emphasizes the illegitimacy of Mamai from the point of view of the Chingisids, and the Legend presents all events within the framework of the religious struggle. Nevertheless, despite the variety of works, they all adhere to the conceptual framework of Russian-Tatar relations, and none of them suggests that when Dmitry Donskoy defeated Mamai, Russia threw off the Tatar yoke.131

Nevertheless, it can be argued that during the reign of Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy, the Golden Horde began to gradually lose its levers of political and financial control over Russia. The hour of the final liberation of the Russian lands was still far away, but Russia had a cautious hope.

130 M. N. Shevchenko, “Formation of the Ideological Foundations of the Power of the Moscow Princes (late Fourteenth–Early Fifteenth Century)” [Russian], Bulletin of the Tyumen State University. Research in the Humanities. Humanitates 4 (2018): 192. 131 Halperin, Tatar Yoke, 141–142.

Change in the Balance of Power between Rus and the Ulus Juchi

Figure 3.  Russian cities are sending soldiers to Moscow. Detail of the composition on the theme “The Legend of the Mamay Massacre.” Fragment of the icon “Sergius of Radonezh with a Hagiography”, mid-seventeenth century, Yaroslavl.

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CHAPTER 4

Rus between the Horde and Lithuania

F

rom 1383, Vasily, the eldest son and heir of Dmitry Donskoy, was a hostage of Khan Tokhtamysh.1 In 1384 he fled from the Horde to Podolia, and then to Wallachia and Lithuania. In 1386, Vasily negotiated with Prince Vytautas of Lithuania (son of Prince Kęstutis and nephew of Prince Algirdas), who then fought with his cousin Jogaila. At the same time, the sixteen-year-old Vasily became engaged to Vytautas’s daughter Sophia, and in 1387 he returned to Moscow together with the Lithuanian and Polish princes.2 According to Vernadsky, at about the same time, “three important Mongolian officials appeared in Moscow, expressing a desire to accept Christianity and serve the new grand duke. They may have been old friends of Vasily who helped him escape from the Horde.”3 In 1389 Vasily received the jarlig for the Grand Duchy of Vladimir4 from the Horde ambassador Shikhmat, and he reigned there from 1389 to 1425. According to the Rogozhsky chronicler, Grand Duke Vasily I sat at “the throne of his father, and grandfather and great-grandfather.”5 This new formula was intended to confirm Vasily’s natural right to the throne (before that, only the father and the grandfather were mentioned). In 1390, Vasily I married Sophia, the daughter of Vytautas.6 The wedding was officiated by Metropolitan Cyprian.

1 PSRL, vol. 23, 130. 2 Ibid., 131. 3 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, 290–291. 4 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 157; PSRL, vol. 18, 139. 5 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 157; PSRL, vol. 18, 139. 6 PSRL vol. 15, part 1, 132; PSRL, vol. 18, 140.

Rus between the Horde and Lithuania

4.1.  DUAL STRATEGY OF THE MOSCOW PRINCIPALITY IN RELATION TO THE GOLDEN HORDE By his caution, Vasily I resembled his great-grandfather Ivan Kalita. While forming his foreign policy strategy, the prince relied on two groups of boyars. At first, the council dominated by the “elders” (Feodor Koshka, Danila Biakont, Sergius of Radonezh), who advised to pay the tribute to the Horde, while keeping the Tatars out of the Moscow lands. By the beginning of the fifteenth century, “young” boyars began to dominate (Ivan Koshkin, Ivan Vsevolozhsky, Mikhail Andreevich Chelyadnya and others).7 They were were against the payment of tribute, but advocated joint actions with the Horde against Lithuania.8 Gorsky describes the strategy of Vasily I in relation to the Ulus Jochi as following: In relation to the Horde, Vasily Dmitrievich continued his father’s policy, although he preferred more cautious tactics (perhaps under the influence of his adolescent impressions of the ruin of Moscow by Tokhtamysh and being held hostage at the khan’s court). He recognized a vassal position in relation to the legitimate khans. When temporary usurpers reigned in the Horde, the grand duke, not seeking to aggravate the situation (and even trying to use the Horde military aid in his own interests), actually behaved like an independent ruler.9

In 1391, enmity broke out between Tokhtamysh and his suzerain Timur (Tamerlane). Timur gathered an army of 200,000 and went to Upper Tobol, where part of Tokhtamysh’s army was located, but he found that Tokhtamysh had already gone to Yaik. Timur overtook Tokhtamysh on the Middle Volga. On June 18, Tokhtamysh was defeated on the banks of the Kondurcha River. Timur did not pursue the enemy, but allowed two influential leaders from Ulus Jochi, who had joined him against Tokhtamysh—Prince Temur Qutlugh (son of Timur-Malik, the khan of the Blue Horde, and grandson of Urus-khan) and Emir Edigu—to go to Kipchak and guard against Tokhtamysh’s return.10 Vernadsky believes that Timur underestimated Tokhtamysh, who lost the entire

  7 N. E. Vedeneeva, Vasily Dmitrievich—Grand Duke of Moscow (1389–1425) [Russian] (Astrakhan: Izdatel′stvo ASTU, 2007), 118.   8 Gorsky, Moscow and the Horde, 128–129.   9 Ibid., 136. 10 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, 292–293.

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eastern part of Ulus Jochi, but actually controlled the Golden Horde, and Temur Qutlugh and Edigu did not dare to oppose him.11 To strengthen his position in the Horde, Tokhtamysh tried to improve relations with Moscow. According to the Rogozhsky chronicler, in 1392 Vasily I went to the Horde to “Tsar Tokhtamysh” to ask for support in dealing with Nizhny Novgorod. The chronicler directly says that Vasily took Nizhny Novgorod “with gold and silver, but not with truth.”12 (I will return to this plot in Section 4.2.) In 1393 Tokhtamysh restored relations with the prince of Lithuania Vytautas, whose cousin Jogaila in 1386 became king of Poland under the name of Władysław II. The main goal of the Horde-Lithuanian negotiations was to conclude an alliance against Timur.13 On May 20, 1393, Tokhtamysh gave Jogaila the jarlig to rule over the regions that belonged partially to Lithuania and Rus, but formally remained under the rule of the Horde. “Thus,” says Spuler, “Tokhtamysh wanted to support the expansion of Lithuanian lands at the expense of the lands of Rus as a reward for the alliance against Tamerlane. At the same time, he demanded payment of tribute for these areas, which would be a confirmation of his supremacy.”14 As a result, Jogaila abandoned his plan to fight the Tatars, although as early as 1388 this plan was supported by Pope Urban VI.15 In 1395, the threat of Timur’s attacks loomed again over Northeastern Russia. In April, on the Terek River, Tokhtamysh suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Timur and fled to the Volga, and Vasily Dmitrievich took his sons in. Timur proclaimed Koirijak the khan of the Golden Horde, but Temur Qutlugh soon ousted him. The actual ruler of the Horde was Emir Edigu, who changed the khans at his discretion. While Russian troops on the orders of Vasily I occupied the banks of the Oka, Timur’s troops burned Yelets.16 The Yelets prince was captured, and the inhabitants of the city were killed or taken into slavery. As Karamzin writes: The news of the invasion of this new Batu horrified all of Russia. They expected the same general destruction, which was the fate of our state 11 Ibid., 293. 12 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 162. 13 Spuler, Golden Horde, 120. 14 Ibid., 120. 15 Ibid., 120–121. 16 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 165; PSRL, vol. 23, 134.

Rus between the Horde and Lithuania for 160 years. They told each other about miraculous conquests, about the ferocity and the countless regiments of Tamerlane; they prayed in churches and prepared for a Christian death, without the hope of meeting strength with force.17

In such a dangerous situation, Vasily Dmitrievich instructed Vladimir Andreevich (the Brave) of Serpukhov to defend Moscow, as he went to Kolomna. However, on August 26, 1395, Tamerlane left the borders of Russia, surprising the Moscow elite. As the chronicler wrote, there was “great joy in the city of Moscow.”18 The Muscovites were sure that they were protected by the icon of the Virgin of Vladimir, which was delivered to Moscow on the day of Timur’s departure from Russia.19 On the way home, Timur plundered the city of Azak (Azov) at the mouth of the Don, then turned to the Lower Volga region and burned two important centers of the Golden Horde, Astrakhan and New Sarai (Sarai-Berke). After that, he left Kipchak and returned to Samarkand.20 According to Spuler, Timur’s behavior in this campaign “clearly shows that he, as a conqueror, did not strive to extend his dominance to Southeastern Russia for a long time. It is quite obvious that his task was only to destroy the basis of the power of his opponent and former protégé.”21 Possibly, Timur’s councillors suggested to him that it was better not to ruin Russia, but to make it a counterweight to Lithuania. However, Vasily I managed to avoid a military conflict with Lithuania. In 1396, Moscow and Lithuania even agreed to coordinate their foreign policy, especially since at that moment the Lithuanian prince Vytautas was not only Vasily I’s father-in-law, but also a supporter of a return to Algirdas’s “all-Russian” program (I will return to this in section 4.3). After his defeat by Timur, Khan Tokhtamysh ceded the throne to Temur Qutlugh22 (however, as Spuler notes, the policy of the Golden Horde was at that time still determined not so much by the rapidly changing khans as by the Emir Edigu).23 Meanwhile, Tokhtamysh went to Kiev to ask for help from the 17 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 392. 18 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 165. 19 PSRL, vol. 23, 134. 20 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, 297. 21 Spuler, Golden Horde, 123. 22 Ibid., 123. 23 Ibid., 124.

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Lithuanian prince Vytautas. Temur Qutlugh demanded that Vytautas hand over Tokhtamysh. The war became inevitable. In August 1398, on the banks of the River Vorskla, Temur Qutlugh and Edigu defeated Tokhtamysh and Vytautas.24 In 1405 Tokhtamysh offered Timur an alliance against Edigu, but both of them died in the same year. Edigu knew that Vasily I, like his predecessors, did not share income with the Golden Horde. “Apparently,” writes Platonov, “the sudden retreat of the terrible Tatar conqueror was interpreted by Russia as a sign of Tatar weakness.”25 The khan’s ambassadors appeared in Moscow more than once, however, according to Karamzin, “instead of tribute, they received only unimportant gifts and returned with the answer that the grand duke of Moscow had become impoverished and unable to pay silver to the khans.”26 In 1408, Khan Bulat Timer sent Emir Edigu to Russia. The emir informed Vasily Dmitrievich that the khan was going to Lithuania, while he was sent to Moscow. Edigu’s troops burned Nizhny Novgorod, Rostov, Dmitrov, and Serpukhov.27 Then the Horde troops besieged Moscow. Vasily Dmitrievich fled to Kostroma, and again left Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov to defend Moscow. Edigu took compensation of 3000 rubles28 and left on December 21, burning Ryazan on his way back. The amount he received was more than two times less than the annual tribute requested from the grand duchy, as it was established after the annexation of Nizhny Novgorod, Murom, and Tarusa (7000 rubles). By that time, Vasily I owed 91,000 rubles, which he had been supposed to pay over the period of thirteen years.29 Presnyakov assesses the position of the Moscow principality after the Edigu raid: This raid clearly revealed the difficult situation of the Great Russian Grand Duchy, powerless to unite all the military means of Great Russia for defense against the Tatars, weakened by unrest and bound by internal strife of the Golden Horde. It is true that Edigu could not derive any lasting results from his success, except for plundered spoils.30 24 Vernadsky, Mongols and Russia, 302. 25 Platonov, Full Course of Lectures, 153. 26 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 403. 27 PSRL, vol. 23, 142. 28 Ibid., 143. 29 Gorsky, Moscow and the Horde, 130. 30 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 238.

Rus between the Horde and Lithuania

On his return to the Horde, Edigu sent a letter to Vasily I,31 in which he advised him to make peace: The great khan sent me to you with an army, having learned that Tokhtamysh’s children had found refuge in your land. We also know what is happening in the regions of the Moscow reign: you not only swear at our merchants and hinder them in every possible way, but also ridicule the khan’s ambassadors. Was it like this before? Ask the elders: the Russian land was our faithful ulus; it kept fear, paid tribute, honored the ambassadors and the merchants of the Horde. You don’t want to remember that— and what are you doing? When Timur took over the kingdom, you did not come to see him with your own eyes, did not send either a prince or a boyar to him. The reign of Timur had passed; Shadi Beg ruled for eight years: you did not visit to him! Bulat is reigning for the third year already: you, the oldest prince in the Russian ulus, have not appeared in the Horde! All your deeds are not good. You had good manners and performed good deeds when the boyar Feodor Koshka lived and reminded you of the khan’s benevolence. Now, his unworthy son, Ivan, your treasurer and friend: what he says, you believe, but you don’t listen to the thoughts of the community elders. What happened? The ruin to your Ulus. Do you want to reign peacefully? Summon the eldest boyars to the council: Ilya Ioannovich, Peter Konstantinovich, Ioann Nikitich, and others who agree with them in good thoughts; send one of them to us with the ancient tribute, the same that you paid to Tsar Jani Beg, so that and your kingdom does not perish completely. Everything you wrote to the khans about the poverty of the Russian people is a lie: now we ourselves have seen your ulus and have learned that you collect a ruble from two plows in it: where does the silver go? The Christian land would have remained safe and sound if you had regularly paid the khan’s tribute; but now you run like a slave! Think and learn!32

Commenting on this letter, Halperin notes: The main thrust of the message is this: when the Russians behaved like members of the ulus, Russia was protected from trouble. When Vasily I 31 PSRL, vol. 23, 143. 32 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 405.

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Between East and West began to ignore this tradition, he endangered the safety and security of his region. The Moscow people who commissioned this text wanted Vasily to submit to Edigu. But then the question arises, what group of people could declare their desire for reconciliation with the hated Tatars so publicly. Another mystery is the allusion at the cooperation of Feodor Koshka with the enemies. The letter sympathizes with him, but jeopardizes his reputation.33

Edigu’s letter had no consequences for Moscow. Only in 1412 did Vasily I go to Khan Jalal ad-Din34 (son of Tokhtamysh). According to Karamzin, Vasily I “… again pledged to pay tribute to the Mughals: he paid it, it seems, until the very end of his life, despite internal unrest, and the frequent changes in the Horde.”35 Thus, the policy of Vasily I regarding the Golden Horde was not always successful. In the end, he had to resume paying tribute to the khans. But Vasily I also derived benefits from his relations with the Horde: more than once he used the military and political support of the Horde to establish control over Northeastern Russia and oppose the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

4.2.  TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF MOSCOW IN RELATION TO SPECIFIC RUSSIAN PRINCIPALITIES Vasily I continued the course of his predecessors aimed at uniting the Russian lands and protecting the borders of the Moscow principality from the Horde as well as from Lithuania. At the very beginning of the reign, Vasily I quarreled with his uncle Vladimir Andreevich (the Brave), the hero of the Battle of Kulikovo, who left for his patrimony, the city of Serpukhov, and then went to Torzhok.36 Later, a new agreement was signed, according to which Vladimir Andreevich ceded Volok and Rzhev to Vasily I37 in exchange for Gorodets, Uglich, and Kozelsk. Vasily I successfully bargained for the right to send his uncle on campaigns: “If I sit under siege in the city [Moscow] myself, and I send you out of the city, then you must leave with me your princess, your children and your boyars; if I leave

33 Halperin, Tatar Yoke, 166. 34 PSRL, vol. 23, 144. 35 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 407. 36 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 157. 37 Ibid., 157.

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you in the city and go away myself, then I will leave with you my mother, my younger brothers, and boyars.”38

Historical Reference Vladimir Andreevich died in 1410. According to Solovyov, In his will he divided his region into five parts according to the number of his sons. He asked Grand Duke Vasily to take care of his sons, as well as his wife and the boyars, and to mourn him. Disputes between his sons were to be decided by the princess, their mother, and the grand duke was to carry out her sentence. And the testator adds: “Their fatherland and inheritance shall be without loss.” In the event of the death of one of the sons, the testator ordered this: “If he does not have a son and a daughter remains, then any of my brother’s children can marry this daughter, and their lands will be shared equally.” … We have the letters of agreement between Vasily Dmitrievich and his brothers. In them there are no contradictions against the previous letters of the same kind. To explain the subsequent events, it should be noted that Princes Andrey and Peter Dimitrievich were obliged, in the event of the death of Vasily, to keep the grand duchy for his son, while this condition is not found in the letter of Yury [one of the sons of Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy]. Like Yury, the youngest son of the grand duke, Konstantin, did not want to give up his rights in favor of his nephew. We saw that Konstantin was born shortly before the death of his father, so that no inheritance was assigned to him in the testament of Dimitri Donskoy. But in his first will, after providing for his own son, Vasily Dimitrievich says: “And I bless my brother and son, Prince Konstantin. As his inheritance I give him Toshnya and Ustyuzhna, according to the spiritual letter of our father, the grand duke.” But when in 1419 Vasily demanded that his brothers renounce their rights to seniority in favor of his nephew, Konstantin showed obvious resistance: “This was never supposed to happen,” said the young prince. Vasily got angry, and repealed his offer of inheritance. Konstantin went to Novgorod, the refuge of all disgruntled princes; however, he soon obeyed the demands of his older brother and returned to Moscow.39

38 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 356. 39 Ibid., 357.

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Relations with Nizhny Novgorod Prince Dmitry Konstantinovich of Suzdal and Nizhny Novgorod died in 1383.40 Then his brother Boris Konstantinovich begged for Nizhny Novgorod from Tokhtamysh,41 and received the jarlig for this throne. The sons of Dmitry Konstantinovich, Vasily Kirdyapa and Simeon, got Suzdal.42 After returning from the Horde, Vasily and Simeon expelled their uncle from Nizhny Novgorod,43 leaving Gorodets to him. In 1392, Boris Konstantinovich bought Nizhny Novgorod from Tokhtamysh once again. On July 16 of the same year, Vasily I renounced his oath of friendship to Boris Konstantinovich and went to the Horde, where “with gold and silver, but not with truth”44 he received from Tokhtamysh the jarlig for Nizhny Novgorod, as well as the rights to Murom, Meschera, and Tarusa.45 On October 25, 1392, Vasily I returned to Moscow, and on November 6 he went to Nizhny Novgorod. Boris Konstantinovich was arrested. Vasily I left his governors in Nizhny Novgorod, and ordered Boris Konstantinovich with his wife and children to be kept in chains in different cities under strong guard.46 In 1394 Boris Konstantinovich died,47 however, Boris’s nephews, Vasily Kirdyapa and Simeon Dmitrievich, who were maternal uncles to the grand duke of Moscow, were still alive in Suzdal. Because of the oppression of Vasily I, they fled to Tokhtamysh. According to the Yermolin Chronicle, a chase was sent after them, but they were not overtaken.48 In 1401, the people of Vasily I found Simeon’s wife Alexandra in Mordovia.49 In 1402, Simeon submitted to the will of Vasily I and, together with his family, went to Vyatka, where he died five months later.50 In 1403, Vasily Kirdyapa also died, so the question of the Nizhny Novgorod principality was closed. Cherepnin notes two points:

40 PSRL, vol. 23, 130. 41 Ibid. 42 Vasily Kirdyapa and Simeon opened the gates of Moscow to the army of Khan Tokhtamysh in 1382. 43 PSRL, vol. 18, 137. 44 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 162. 45 PSRL, vol. 18, 142; PSLR, vol. 23, 132–133. 46 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 163. 47 Ibid., 164. 48 PSRL, vol. 23, 133. 49 Ibid., 138. 50 Ibid., 138.

Rus between the Horde and Lithuania First, the annexation of Nizhny Novgorod and the other Russian cities mentioned above to the Moscow principality was prepared diplomatically (during the visit to the Horde made by Vasily I in the second half of 1392) and secured by military means (as a result of the Moscow campaign led by the grand duke and the “oldest boyars” at the end of 1392). Second, the Moscow government was not keen to call attention to the fact that the princes of Suzdal and Nizhny Novgorod were forced into submission by force.51

Commenting on the words of the chronicler who stated that Vasily I took Nizhny Novgorod “with gold and silver, but not with truth,”52 Cherepnin emphasizes: “it is absolutely certain that it was not only about the money, but about the growing power of the Moscow Principality, which the Horde could not ignore.”53 Sometimes, chroniclers as well as later historians overshadow the fact that Vasily I had some legal grounds to claim Nizhny Novgorod for himself, since he was the grandson of Prince Dmitry Konstantinovich by his mother Eudoxia.

Relations between Moscow and Tver Soon after the 1382 invasion of Tokhtamysh Tver became practically independent from Moscow. In 1399, Moscow and Tver signed an agreement, which, according to E. L. Konyavskaya, consolidated mutually beneficial cooperation between the two principalities,54 which was highly praised by the chroniclers.55 However, in the same year, Mikhail Alexandrovich Tverskoy died. Tver was now headed by his ambitious son Ivan Mikhailovich. As Presnyakov states: In the first quarter of the fifteenth century Tver overcame the last appanage strife, supported by the grand duke of All Russia. Its new-found internal integrity made Tver more independent in relation to Moscow and the Grand Duchy of All Russia. Under the Grand Duke Ivan Mikhailovich, 51 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 664. 52 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 162. 53 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 667. 54 E. L. Konyavskaya, “Moscow and Tver: From the End of the Thirteenth up to the Fifteenth Centuries” [Russian], Ancient Russia. Questions of Medieval Studies 1 (2019): 45. 55 PSRL, vol. 15, part 1, 165.

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Between East and West Tver stands as an independent political unit between Moscow, the Tatars, and Lithuania. At the time of his father’s death, two weeks after the victory of the Tatars on the banks of the Vorskla, Ivan found himself face to face with the strengthened force of the Horde.56

However, in practice, Moscow did not want to recognize Tver as an equal, which prevented the joint actions of both principalities against Lithuania. As noted by Presnyakov, the Tver army participated in the first attack against Vytautas in 1406, but Vasily I concluded an armistice with Vytautas without consulting Ivan Mikhailovich, and wrote Ivan Mikhailovich’s name below the names of Vasily’s brothers in the contractual charter. Therefore, Ivan Mikhailovich did not participate in Vasily I’s campaigns at Vyazma and Ugra,57 and in 1412 an alliance was concluded between the grand dukes of Lithuania and Tver, that “they should be everywhere together.”58

Relations with Ryazan The relationship between Moscow and Ryazan was determined by a contractual charter drawn up by Vasily I and the Ryazan prince Fyodor Olegovich in 1402. Fyodor promised to honor Vasily I as an older brother and lost the right to independently regulate his relations with the rulers of Lithuania, the Horde, the neighboring Russian principalities, and estates of the Ryazan land. The dependence of Ryazan on Moscow became so great that a clause was required regarding the non-interference of Vasily I in the internal affairs of the Ryazan principality and the inviolability of the Ryazan borders.59

Relations with Novgorod Under Vasily I, relations between Moscow and Novgorod deteriorated, since Novgorod did not want to obey Metropolitan Cyprian, who demanded to liquidate the independent court of the Novgorod archbishop and restore the metropolitan see in Novgorod. Solovyov indicates that this issue arose back in the time of Dmitry Donskoy: “

56 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 239. 57 Ibid., 239–240. 58 Ibid., 240. 59 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 708.

Rus between the Horde and Lithuania For a long time, one of their main conditions that the Novgorodians posed to their grand dukes was not to call them to court in the Lower Towns [settlements between Oka and Volga]; in 1385 they decided to acquire the same right in relation to the church court. The city mayor and the tysyatsky captain called a veche, where everyone vowed by kissing the cross not to go to Moscow for the metropolitan’s trials, but to keep court according to the Greek law; they wrote about this in an offical letter.

According to the The Chronicle of Novgorod, in 1391, Metropolitan Cyprian came to Novgorod and asked the Novgorodians to tear this letter apart, but they answered: “We kissed the cross at the same time, we wrote and sealed this letter and sealed our souls.” Cyprian told them: “I remove the kiss of the cross from you, I will break the seals of the letters, and I bless and forgive you—only give me the right of trial, as it was under the former metropolitans.”60 The Novgorodians did not obey, and Cyprian left infuriated. In 1393 Vasily I demanded that the Novgorodians vow him allegiance and sent his brother Yury and uncle Vladimir Andreevich with an army to Torzhok.61 Soon the Moscow boyar Maxim was killed in Torzhok, after which Vasily I executed the murderers “with various torments.”62 Meanwhile, the Novgorodians, with the princes Roman of Lithuania and Konstantine of Belozersk, attacked the territories of Vasily I.63 In the same year, the Novgorod ambassadors agreed with Cyprian’s demands regarding the metropolitan’s court. Vasily I sent his ambassadors to Novgorod, after which the Novgorodians paid tribute to Moscow, and also gave 400 rubles to the ambassador of Cyprian.64 Cherepnin believes that the war of 1393 was “a prelude to the decisive offensive of the Moscow grand ducal power against Novgorod with the aim of annexing the Dvina land.”65 In 1395, history repeated itself. Cyprian came to Novgorod and requested the right of trial, but the Novgorodians did not grant his request.66 Two years later, Vasily I and the Lithuanian prince Vytautas demanded that Novgorod broke its agreement with the Livonians, but the Novgorodians declared: 60 PSRL, vol. 3, 96. 61 PSRL, vol. 1, 142. 62 PSRL, vol. 23, 133. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 696. 66 PSRL, vol. 3, 97.

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“Prince Vasily! With you we have our own peace, with the Germans another, and with Vytautas a third!”67 In response to this impudent statement, Vasily I announced to the entire Dvina land, “Will you ally yourself with the grand duke, and get away from Novgorod?”68 The grand duke’s troops took the Dvina land, Volokolamsk, Torzhok, Bezhetsky Verkh, and Vologda. Vasily I formally freed these territories from their allegiance to Novgorod and threw out the letters confiming it.69 In 1397, the Dvina land has officially joined to Moscow through the Dvina charter. In 1398, the Novgorodians drove the Moscow garrisons out of the Dvina land, executed the traitors, and imposed a fine on the Moscow merchants.70 Thus, the Dvina land again became dependent on Novgorod. In the same year, Novgorod ambassadors arrived in Moscow with petitions and great gifts. Vasily Dmitrievich signed peace with the ambassadors on “ancient conditions”71 and appointed his younger brother Andrey as governor in Novgorod, and Ivan Vsevolodich Kholmsky in Pskov.72 In 1401, Moscow tried to seize the Dvina land once again,73 but was defeated without receiving support from the local population, who were angered by the violence of the Moscow troops. Vasily I hastened to make peace, possibly because he was afraid of the rumors about Vytautas’s plans for Novgorod.74 Thus, the plans of Vasily I and Metropolitan Cyprian to establish political and ecclesiastical control over Novgorod were not fully realized. However, Moscow was now more active in the confrontation with Novgorod, which either defended itself or organized counter-attacks on Moscow’s possessions. Ultimately, Novgorod and Moscow realized that they needed joint action to counter Lithuania, which developed a close alliance with the Teutonic Order.

67 PSLR, vol. 18, 135–136. 68 PSRL, vol. 3, 98. 69 Ibid., 98. 70 PSRL, vol. 3, 98–99; PSRL, vol. 23, 136. 71 PSRL, vol. 3, 100. 72 PSRL, vol. 23, 136. 73 PSRL, vol. 3, 101–102. 74 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 235.

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Figure 4.  Apollinary Mikhailovich Vasnetsov. “Defense of Moscow against the Invasion of Khan Tokhtamysh” (1918).

4.3.  RUSSIAN-LITHUANIAN RELATIONS Relations between Moscow and Lithuania developed in a contradictory way, due to the family ties between Vasily I and Vytautas. In 1392 Vytautas concluded the Ostrov agreement with Jogaila, the ruler of Poland, and became the grand duke of Lithuania, Russia, and Samogitia, but recognized himself as a vassal of Jogaila. According to G. Levitsky, the alliance with Poland untied Vytautas’s hands, leaving him free to conduct an active campaign in the East. His Eastern policy can be seen as another attempt to unite all Russian lands under the rule of Lithuania. The Moscow prince took a strange position during this offensive. Not only did he not resist Vytautas and did not help the distressed Rurikids who were close to him by blood, but, on the contrary, he favored the aggressive father-in-law.75

75 G. Levitsky, Grand Duchy of Lithuania (Moscow: Lomonosov, 2014), 74.

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At first, Vasily I too often followed Vytautas’s lead and did not hinder his expansion in relation to the Russian lands. In 1394 Vytautas conquered the Kiev principality, and in 1395 he appointed a governor in Podolia.76 In 1395, Vytautas entered the Smolensk lands,77 where the Prince Yury Svyatoslavich and his brothers fought for their inheritance. When Yury went to Oleg Ivanovich of Ryazan, Vytautas was near Smolensk. According to the Yermolin Chronicle, Prince Gleb Svyatoslavich met with Vytautas, who offered himself to the brothers Svyatoslavichs as an arbitrator. The Svyatoslavichs came to Vytautas, but were captured.78 Then Vytautas put his governors in Smolensk. In response, Oleg of Ryazan attacked Lithuania, but when he went home, Vytautas plundered his land.79 Oleg unexpectedly turned, attacked the Lithuanian army, and defeated it. According to Solovyov, during all these events Vasily I “clearly took the side of his father-in-law. In 1396 he went to visit him in Smolensk and celebrated Easter here.”80 In the same year, Oleg of Ryazan again went against Vytautas and laid siege to the city of Lyubutsk, but Vasily sent an ambassador to him and led him away from the city.81 Before the year’s end, Vytautas went to war against Ryazan again.82 Oleg fled, and Vytautas plundered the city. Vasily I met with Vytautas in Kolomna and did him “much honor.”83 As noted in the previous section, in 1397 Vasily I and Vytautas together demanded that the Novgorodians broke their peace agreement with the Germans, but received a rebuff.84 Perhaps, Vasily I did not realize, or did not want to realize, what plans Prince Vytautas had for Novgorod. In 1398, Lithuania and the Teutonic Order signed the Treaty of Salynas, according to which Vytautas promised the Teutons to help them take Pskov, and the Teutons offered to help Vytautas take Novgorod. The Treaty of Salynas was signed at the cost of serious concessions from Vytautas: he pledged to help establish the Order’s authority over Samogitia (also known as Zhmud).85 76 Eidintas, Bumblauskas, Kulakauskas, and Tamoshaitis, History of Lithuania, 48. 77 PSRL, vol. 3, 97. 78 PSRL, vol. 23, 134–135. 79 Ibid., 135. 80 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 372. 81 PSRL, vol. 23, 135. 82 PSRL, vol. 3, 97. 83 Ibid., vol. 23, 135. 84 Ibid., 135–136. 85 B. N. Florea, “The Road to Grunwald: The International Life of Eastern Europe in the Fourteenth and Early Fifteenth Centuries,” Problems of National Strategy 2 (2010): 159.

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Novgorod was saved from Vytautas only thanks to the fact that Vytautas entered into the war with Temur Qutlugh and lost. In 1398 Vytautas had sheltered Tokhtamysh, who was then at war with Temur Qutlugh.86 Vytautas and Tokhtamysh had entered into a strategic alliance: in exchange for Lithuanian military assistance, Tokhtamysh promised to help Vytautas capture Moscow, as well as give him the jarlig to the lands of Southwestern Russia. In this regard, Solovyov notes: “It is impossible to assert that the triumph of Vytautas and Tokhtamysh over Temur Qutlugh would have the necessary consequence of subordinating Moscow and other reigns of Eastern Russia to Vytautas; but it is also impossible not to recognize that Moscow was in great danger from this celebration.”87 The Ukrainian historians believe that in the event of a victory over Temur Qutlugh, Vytautas would have become “the undisputed leader on the territory of Rus and could unite it under his rule. Sharing victory with Moscow was not part of his plans, on the contrary, he desired to control this city.”88 On August 12, 1399, the issue was resolved: Vytautas, as well as his Russian, Polish and German allies, were defeated by Temur Qutlugh on the Vorskla River.89 Twenty princes died, including the heroes of the Battle of Kulikovo, Andrei and Dmitry, sons of Algirdas, as well as Dmitry Bobrok. As Gudavičius states: It is not only Vytautas’s hopes for triumph at the expense of the Russians and Tatars that collapsed. The peace with the Teutonic Order, for which the Samogitians had paid, was supposed to free Lithuania of the hegemony and suzerainty of Poland. Now, it was all in vain. Having successfully begun to strengthen the statehood and international position of Lithuania, Vytautas did not foresee all the dangers, lost his sense of reality, and, having taken an unjustified risk, lost terribly. His radical political course had to be changed, and other ways had to be found to achieve his goals.90

Presnyakov believes that Vytautas’s defeat undermined the plans of a major offensive on the Tatar world, and on the other hand, it was a sobering blow to the dreams of the Salynas Congress [where the peace with the Teutonic Order was signed]. In 86 PSRL, vol. 23, 136. 87 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 374. 88 Miroshnichenko and Udovik, Rus-Ukraine, 220. 89 PSRL, vol. 23, 137. 90 Gudavicius, History of Lithuania, vol. 1, 206.

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Between East and West Polish-Lithuanian relations, Vytautas’s policy returned, to a large extent, to the former paths of solidarity with Jogaila; however, Vytautas was now recognized as a life-long grand duke.91 … It was not the military failure of 1399 that destroyed Vytautas’s plans for the Northern Russia, but the temporary unification of the Great Russian forces against him. In the coming years Novgorod, and then Pskov, made “eternal peace” with the grand duchy of Vytautas. But this reconciliation did not restore Vytautas’s strength over the Northern free cities.92

Indeed, after the defeat on the Vorskla, Vytautas calmed down and in 1400 made peace with Novgorod “as in the old times.” However, in 1401 the Smolensk issue aggravated. Yury Svyatoslavich, with the help of Oleg of Ryazan, regained Smolensk, which had been captured by Vytautas in 1395, killed the governor Roman Mikhailovich of Bryansk, but released his wife. In the fall of 1401, Vytautas unsuccessfully tried to take revenge and agreed to a truce.93 After the death of Oleg of Ryazan in 1402, Yury Svyatoslavich hoped for the help of Vasily I, but the latter decided not to spoil his relations with Vytautas. In 1404 Vytautas again laid siege to Smolensk,94 and Yury Svyatoslavich again turned to Vasily I for help. When Vasily hesitated, Vytautas took Smolensk, killed Yury’s boyars and put his own governors in Smolensk.95 Vasily I blamed Yury for what had happened, declaring to him: “You came here with deception, ordering the Smolensk people to surrender to Vytautas.” Yury Svyatoslavich and his son Fedor left for Novgorod96 where he was given thirteen suburbs to rule over.97 In May 1404, peace was signed between Lithuania and the Teutonic Order in Raciaz. Vytautas confirmed the terms of the 1398 agreement, which meant the return of the Order and Lithuania to the plans of a joint offensive against Russia. In February 1406, Vytautas again attacked Novgorod and Pskov, but they turned to Moscow for help.98 This time Vasily I broke the alliance with Vytautas and joined with Tver and the Horde to resist him. The armies clashed on the 91 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 235. 92 Ibid., 235. 93 PSLR, vol. 23, 138. 94 Ibid., 139. 95 Ibid., 139. 96 Ibid., 139. 97 PSRLvol. 4, 144–145. 98 PSRL, vol. 23, 140.

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Plava River, but ended up calling for a truce.99 In 1407, the opponents met at Vyazma and again made peace.100 Later, in 1408, the Russian and the Lithuanian armies came against each other on the Ugra River, but Vasily I and Vytautas signed an “eternal peace.”101 In 1409 Lithuania also signed a peace treaty with Pskov, which had concluded a peace agreement with the Teutonic Order.102 As Solovyov writes: “after the peace on the Ugra, during the rest of Vasily I’s reign, he did not discover any more enemy plans either against Moscow or against Novgorod and Pskov.”103 Looking ahead, it is worth noting that in 1414 the Novgorod ambassadors visited Lithuania and signed a peace agreement “as of old” with Vytautas.104 In his History of Poland, Jan Dlugosz criticizes Moscow’s army, which allowed Vytautas’s army to lead several campaigns “in the Moscow lands, and their prince” (in terras Mosquitarum et eorum ducem), gave the Lithuanians “impunity to ravage their land,” and avoided a complete disaster only due to strife among the conquerors.105 Having reconciled with Moscow, Vytautas began to prepare for a decisive blow against the Teutonic Order. In May 1409, Rumbold, one of Vytautas’s close associates, led an uprising in Samogitia against the Teutonic Order. The crusaders were expelled, but Vytautas denied his involvement in the anti-Teutonic rebellion in every possible way. The decisive battle between the 30,000-strong crusader army led by Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen and the 30,000-strong Polish-Lithuanian-Russian coalition led by Vytautas and Jogaila took place on July 15, 1410, near the village of Grunwald. This largescale event was recorded by Russian chroniclers.106 The Battle of Grunwald ended with Vytautas’s victory. The Grand Master of the Teutonic Order and many dignitaries perished. The winners captured the enemy camp with all their property. The losses amounted to at least 8,000 people on each side.107 According to the Belarusian historians A. Shilyaev and Y. Kotlyarov, the Torun Peace Treaty of 1411 was quite sparing for the Teutonic Order. It “did   99 Ibid., 140. 100 Ibid., 141. 101 Ibid., 142. 102 Ibid., 143. 103 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 2, books 3–4, 378. 104 PSRL, vol. 23, 144. 105 Joannes Dlugossius, Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae [Polish], vol. 10, 1405–1410 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1997), 14, 20. 106 PSRL, vol. 23, 143. 107 V. Urban, Teutonic Order, transl. P. Rumyantsev (Moscow: AST, Astrel′, 2010), 316–317.

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not suit either the Grand Duchy of Lithuania or, moreover, the Kingdom of Poland.”108 The Polish king Jogaila was all the more alarmed, as in the new geopolitical situation, Vytautas could again claim the role of an all-Russian leader. To consolidate the union of Poland and Lithuania, Jogaila achieved in 1413 the signing of the fundamentally significant Union of Horodlo.109 As Platonov writes, Under the terms of the union, which were determined by the PolishLithuanian congress in 1413 in the town of Horodlo (on the Western Bug), the subjects of the grand duke of Lithuania, accepting Catholicism, received the rights and privileges that the persons of the corresponding class had in Poland: Lithuanian princes and boyars received the rights of the nobility, ordinary warriors—servants of princes—became the same as Polish gentry nobility; the court and administration in Lithuania were modeled after the Polish royal court, and new positions were given only to Catholics. Those people who saw profit and honor in the new order, were full of fear, or were attracted to Poland and Catholicism, supported the union, accepted the Polish faith and carried the Polish influence into their Lithuanian-Russian environment. Thus, among Vytautas’s own subjects, there were no longer two, but three orientations: Orthodox-Russian, Old Lithuanian, and a new one, Catholic-Polish. Everyone pinned their hopes on the prince, who was popular and treated everyone with equal attention. Everyone considered him a part of their group, but he did not take anyone’s side directly. Holding on to the necessary alliance with Poland, he was closest to those in Lithuania who wanted the union with Poland. But he understood that such supporters of Poland were still weak and very few in number. Therefore, Vytautas himself was not inclined to join Jogaila expicitly and decisively.110

108 A. Shilyaev and Yu. Kotlyarov, “Political Relations and Military Conflicts of 1411–1435 between the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Teutonic Order,” in States of Central and Eastern Europe in a Historical Perspective: Collection of Scholarly Articles Based on the Materials of the Second International Scientific Conference “Social, Political, and Cultural Processes on the Territory of Central and Eastern Europe in a Historical Perspective,” Pinsk, November 24–25, 2017 (Pinsk: PolesGU, 2017), vol. 1, 183. 109 Vl. Grabensky, History of the Polish People (Minsk: MFTsP, 2006), 126. 110 Platonov, Textbook of Russian History, 96.

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Perekhov believes that the Union of Horodlo created conditions for the absorption of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Russia by the Polish Kingdom: In fact, the Russian princes and boyars were forced to convert to Catholicism, which in the long term led to their complete Polonization. The Russian Orthodox population of the principality of Lithuania was reduced to the position of second-class subjects, which almost automatically deprived Vytautas of the moral right to be the spokesman for the idea of all-Russian unity.111

Nevertheless, it should be recognized that the last years of the reign of Vasily I were marked by a gradual rapprochement between Moscow and Lithuania. In the winter of 1420, intensive relations between Vasily I and Vytautas resumed, and from the summer of 1420 Metropolitan Photius took an active part in their interaction. In the first half of 1421, Vytautas and Vasily I signed an agreement in which the former was called “lord and father.” Vasily I, as a junior ally, was obliged to send troops to help Vytautas. Already in 1422, Moscow regiments took part in the siege of the Teutonic Golub Castle, initiated by Vytautas. In the same years, Vytautas’s suzereinty strengthened over principalities in the upper reaches of the Oka River, a territory that has long been a subject of debate between Lithuania and Moscow (Lithuania officially accepted Moscow’s control over these lands in 1494). The rapprochement with Vytautas was largely due to Vasily I’s fears regarding the fate of Moscow after his death. Presnyakov explains that in the event of the death of Vasily I, the younger prince remained the heir, since the elder son of Vasily I, Ivan died in 1417. Soon after this loss, a spiritual letter was drawn up, in which the son Vasily, born in 1415, was entrusted to his mother, Sophia, daughter of Vytautas: she would replace his father as a natural guardian to her son and a ruling widow-princess. Vasily saw in Vytautas his father-in-law. In 1423, another testament was compiled. Vasily gave the same order regarding Sophia and her son. In the same year Sophia, daughter of Vytautas, went to her father, she was followed by Metropolitan Photius. This trip made political sense. Metropolitan Photius brought to Vytautas the

111 Perekhov, History of Russia, 77–78.

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Between East and West spiritual letter of Vasily: it was presented to the grand duke of Lithuania in the original.112

*** Vasily I Dmitrievich died on the night of February 27, 1425. As was already mentioned there were problems of succession to the throne and about the dangers that could lie in wait for the successor of Vasily I, his young son Vasily. Let me now dwell briefly on the results of the reign of Vasily I. Vasily Dmitrievich made a lot of efforts to preserve the legacy of Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy, although he did not have many of the outstanding qualities of his illustrious father. Nevertheless, his pragmatism, caution, and discretion should be noted. Thanks to these qualities that the Moscow principality not just survived in a hostile environment, but also significantly expanded its limits at the expense of Nizhny Novgorod, Suzdal, Murom, Tarusa, Bezhetsky Verkh, Vologda, and Perm. Under Vasily I, the process of internal colonization, as Klyuchevsky remarks, went uninterrupted. Not only new lands were annexed to Moscow, but also Vasily sought to strengthen the ties between the Russian lands and to consolidate the monarchical, autocratic principles of the increasing grand ducal power. He preferred working by peaceful means, but when necessary, he used violence, arrests, and executions without hesitation. Of course, these methods are far from Christian ideals, but they fit into the customs of the Kalita dynasty. Nevertheless, Vasily I and Metropolitan Cyprian failed to subjugate Novgorod to Moscow completely, in the political as well as in the ecclesiastical sphere. Vasily’s attempts to annex the Dvina land to Moscow also failed, since the local population could not come to terms with Moscow’s tyranny. The growing Tver did not want to go under Moscow’s control, since Moscow was not ready for an equal alliance. As a result, the Tver principality began to draw closer to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Despite the lingering fear of the Horde, Vasily Dmitrievich sought consent from the khans for certain territorial acquisitions and relied on the military force of the Horde to solve internal Russian problems. He evaded paying tribute for a long time, and only in 1412 he bowed his head to the new Horde khan. Moscow’s relations with Lithuania were ambivalent, which was largely due to the relationship between Vasily I and Vytautas. At first, Vasily Dmitrievich 112 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 241.

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followed the lead of his father-in-law and actually supported his encroachments on Russian lands, including Smolensk and Ryazan. Then Vasily I broke off the alliance with Lithuania and began to oppose Vytautas’s plans and designs in relation to the Russian lands. Vytautas’s victory in the Battle of Grunwald contributed to the growth of his authority in Lithuania as well as in the Northeastern and the Northwestern Russia. This led to new Lithuanian attacks on Novgorod and Pskov in 1412–1413. The reign of Vasily I ended with a new rapprochement with Vytautas, which was due to the concerns of the grand duke of Moscow regarding the fate of his family after his death. The wise and experienced Vytautas tried to squeeze the maximum benefit for Lithuania from the fact of being appointed Vasily I’s heir and the guardian of the young Vasily and Princess Sophia. His position was threatened by another claimant to the Moscow throne, the Prince of Galich, Yury Dmitrievich of Zvenigorod. This dramatic and even tragic plot will be discussed in the next chapter. In conclusion, a few more words about Vasily I’s policy towards the Russian Orthodox Church are needed. After the death of Metropolitan Cyprian in 1409, the Russian Orthodox Church was headed by Metropolitan Photius, who came from Greece.113 Traditionally, the metropolitan controlled all the dioceses both in the Moscow state and in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Soon, Vytautas accused Photius of neglect of the Lithuanian flock, and in 1415 the bishops appointed Gregory Tsamblak as the Kiev metropolitan. In 1419 Tsamblak died and Vytautas made peace with Photius, however, an extremely dangerous precedent for the division of the Russian Orthodox Church was created.114 Vasily I was the son of his time, with his own merits and disadvantages. He did a lot to preserve and strengthen the Moscow principality, but made many mistakes of strategic nature, including in the field of foreign policy. He turned family and dynastic ties into a yoke around the neck of his own state. It is no coincidence that at the end of his reign, Moscow had to follow the Lithuanian foreign policy, and not vice versa.

113 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 412. 114 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 281.

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Figure 5.  Jan Matejko. “The Battle of Grunwald” (with Ulrich von Jungingen and Vytautas at center) (1878).

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CHAPTER 5

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V

asily I bequeathed his son “Prince Vasily, and his princess, and his children to his brother and father-in-law, the Grand Duke Vytautas.” With this, the ten-year-old Vasily II (r. 1425–1462) was completely dependent on Vytautas, on his mother Sophia, daughter of Vytautas, and the Metropolitan Photius, as well as on the boyars, among whom Yuri Patrikeyevitch, Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozhsky, Ivan Fyodorovich Koshkin, Fedor Ivanovich Sabur, and Alexander Vladimirovich Lykov stood out.1 The independent reign of Vasily II Vasilyevich began only on October 5, 1432, when the envoy of the Horde khan, Mansur Ulan, conducted the ceremony of placing him on the throne.2

5.1.  FEUDAL WAR OF 1425–1453: RUSSIAN WARS OF THE ROSES? As soon as Vasily II ascended the throne, his younger brother, Yury Dmitrievich, Prince of Zvenigorod and Galich, immediately presented his rights to the Moscow principality.3 In this confrontation, Yury relied on the Galich princi1 I. G. Ponomareva, “Boyar Entourage of the Moscow Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich in 1425–1432” [Russian], Russian History 1 (2011): 96. 2 Ibid., 96. 3 S. L. Kinev, “Principles of Inheritance of Power in Russia from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Century as Reflected in Russian historiography” [Russian], Bulletin of the Tomsk State University 353 (2011): 88.

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pality, and Vasily II was supported by the Moscow population, the clergy, and the boyars.4 In his will Dmitry Donskoy indicated that if Vasily did not have an heir, the throne after him was to pass to his younger brother, Yury Dmitrievich. When Vasily I had a son, Vasily, a dispute about dynastic succession arose between the direct and the indirect heirs. The rivalry between the young direct descendant and his elder uncle was inevitable.5 However, the final testament of Prince Vasily Dmitrievich was also important. V. A. Kuchkin notes that Vytautas is sealed this … will with his seal and became the main guarantor of this will. After the death of Vasily I, this circumstance did not allow the opponents of the new grand duke, Vasily II, to begin a large-scale struggle with him for the grand ducal throne. This throne de facto remained in his hands. But by no means de jure. The internal opposition concluded that the father of Vasily II, the Grand Duke Vasily Dmitrievich, was forced in this last will to express the desire for his son’s possession of the grand ducal reign.6

The Grand Duchess Sophia and Metropolitan Photius demanded that Yury Dmitrievich came to Moscow and swore allegiance to Vasily II. However, Yury went to Galich-Mersky instead.7 He was clearly aware that an invitation to the Kremlin could be an “invitation to the next world.”8 Thus, war broke out between the two branches of the offspring of Dmitry Donskoy. It was resembled of the war of the Scarlet and White roses in England. The beginning of this bloody war coincided with terrible epidemics that broke out in a number of Russian lands.9

What Was the War of 1425–1453? The historians of the nineteenth century interpreted the events of 1425–1453 as a struggle between the two concepts: the decentralized appanage system and 4 Platonov, Full Course of Lectures, 154. 5 Halperin, Tatar Yoke, 169. 6 A. A. Kuchkin, “Three Wills of Vasily I” [Russian], Ancient Rus. Questions of Medieval Studies 2 (2016): 53. 7 PSRL, vol. 8, 168. 8 N. S. Borisov, Ivan III. Father of the Russian Autocracy [Russian] (Moscow: Akademichesky Proekt, 2016), 19. 9 PSRL, vol. 5, 263; PSRL, vol. 18, 168; and others.

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the monarchical state.10 Presnyakov believed that the struggle between Yury Dmitrievich Zvenigorodsky and Vasily II was “a struggle for Moscow. The grand duchy throne was transferred from Vladimir to Moscow. This was a struggle for the leadership in the family of the Moscow princes, from which the grand ducal power was now inseparable.”11 The Soviet historians considered the events of 1425–1453 against the background of Marxist ideology, and called this conflict a “feudal turmoil” or “feudal war.” For example, Grekov and Bakhrushin noted: “This feudal turmoil, which covered the territory of the main Russian lands, was a clash of two systems: the old, obsolete order of feudal fragmentation, and the new order, which included the strengthening of the grand ducal power.”12 V. V. Mavrodin’s “Formation of a Unified Russian state” includes a section on the “Feudal War,” which says: The Moscow principality became the arena of strife that lasted from 1425 to 1453. The old, moribund appanage-patrimonial system, the system of feudal fragmentation, headed by appanage princes, gave the last battle to a new political beginning—an emerging centralized state with a strong power that first belonged to the grand duke and later to the tsar.13

In his turn, Cherepnin writes: A strong centralized power was ideal for the ruling class of feudal lords. It gave them the opportunity to exploit the working people and provided them with protection from external enemies. But at the same time, the strengthening of the central power meant that the feudal lords had to sacrifice in its favor a part of their material wealth and political privileges that the possession of land and dependent peasantry gave them. At a certain stage in the evolution of a feudal society, this contradiction in the relations between individual or groups of feudal lords and the central state power, 10 I. B. Mikhailova, “Moscow or the Patrimony of Kalita’s Family? The Struggle for the ‘Oldest’ Grand Ducal Throne in Northeastern Russia in the Second Half of the Fifteenth Century” [Russian], Proceedings of the Faculty of History of St. Petersburg University 1 (2010): 81. 11 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 264. 12 B. D. Grekov and S. V. Bakhrushin, History of the USSR [Russian] (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1939), 243. 13 V. V. Mavrodin, “Formation of a Unified Russian State,” in his Ancient and Medieval Rus [Russian] (St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2009), 574.

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In his doctoral dissertation, V. N. Bochkaryov proposed the idea that the events of 1425–1453 were a major “feudal war,” “a struggle of the new progressive principles against the old separatist ones.”15 At the end of the Soviet era, the events of 1425–1453 were also considered from other perspectives. For example, N. E. Nosov put forward the idea of the opposition of two tendencies in the development of land ownership: the “capitalist” North with strong peasant population, and the Center, where the elite relied on serfs.16 Zimin argued in a similar fashion: The question was, what path Russia would take: the pre-bourgeois path, which developed in the North with its salt-extracting industry, or the serf path. … Moscow, dominated by serfs and monks, was opposed by the Northern free cities with a large popilation of industrial workers (salt-makers, hunters, fishermen) and free peasants.17

The modern Russian historian Dvornichenko criticizes Zimin: Ostensibly, Vasily II was supported by the residents of the Center. However, the real picture was much more complicated. As in Kievan Rus, in the fifteenth century there was a struggle between various regions and within urban communities. The Moscow prince was supported not only by individual cities, primarily in the Center, but also by certain groups in those communities that generally supported the opponents of the grand duke. The princely “courts”—powerful corporations of grand duke’s officials— also played an important role in this struggle. Thus, during the turmoil of the first quarter of the fifteenth century, the old and the new collided. But the new element here was not the Northern system, as A. A. Zimin believed. On the contrary, it was the Moscow system, which carried the

14 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 743. 15 V. N. Bochkaryov, Feudal War in Appanage-Princely Russia of the Fifteenth Century. Struggle for the Creation of the Russian National State [Russian] (Doctoral diss., MGU, 1944), vol. 1, 1. 16 N. E. Nosov, About Two Tendencies of Feudal Land Tenure in Northeastern Russia in the Fifteenth and the Sixteenth Centuries [Russian] (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), 12. 17 Zimin, A Knight at the Crossroads, 209.

The Course towards the Creation of the Centralized State beginnings of autocracy.18 … The “troubles” of the second quarter of the fifteenth century were a stage in the formation of statehood in Eastern Europe, which intertwined ancient traditions with innovations. The name of “feudal war,” which is common in our historiography, only obscures the nature of these events.19

Mikhailova believes that the events of 1425–1453 developed on two intersecting planes: On the one hand, there was a process of stratification of urban communities located on compact lands. From the socially homogeneous population, such strata of elite landowners as boyars, boyar children, nobles, and clerks stood out. Gradually, there also developed specific groups of people who could be taxed, namely, the peasantry and residents of urban settlements. These new categories were characterized by instability, had internal contradictions due to property differentiation and the presence or absence of judicial and tax benefits. … On the other hand, there was the plane of inter-princely and inter-city relations in the second quarter of the fifteenth century. There, two irreconcilable groups met in their struggle for the Moscow throne: the future-oriented reformers, builders of new state relations (Vasily II, his advisors and associates), and conservatives attached to ancient traditions, common to all Rurikids (Yury Dmitrievich of Zvenigorod, his sons Vasily Kosoy and Dmitry Shemyaka, and their associates). Representatives of both groups alternately occupied the grand ducal throne, where they had the opportunity to implement their political plans and put into practice the model of social structure that seemed most timely and most promising to them.20

Now let’s return to the events of the spring and summer of 1425. As it is known, Yury Dmitrievich and Vasily II agreed on an armistice until June 29. According to the chronicler, Yury Dmitrievich used the truce to mobilize and train his troops “from all his cities.” As follows from the chronicle, he received massive support.21 18 A. Yu. Dvornichenko, Russian History from the Ancient Times until the Fall of Monarchy. Textbook. [Russian] (Moscow: Ves′ mir, 2010), 286–287. 19 Ibid., 287. 20 Mikhailova, “Moscow or the Patrimony of Kalita’s Family?,” 81. 21 PSRL, vol. 18, 167.

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When the Moscow regiments advanced to Kostroma in the spring of the same year, Yury went to Nizhny Novgorod. An unsuccessful pursuit was sent after him, after which the Muscovites under the command of the appanage prince Konstantin Dmitrievich22 (according to other sources, Andrey Dmitrievich)23 returned to Moscow, and Yury returned to Galich. Metropolitan Photius visited Yury Dmitrievich twice with his admonitions.24 Yury promised the metropolitan to send ambassadors to Moscow for peace talks,25 however, he retained the right to appeal to the Horde khan, who was still the highest legal authority for the Russian princes.26 On February 23, 1428, the forty-two-year-old childless prince Pyotr Dmitrievich of Dmitrov died.27 Yury of Zvenigorod hoped to get a part of his younger brother’s inheritance, but Vasily II annexed his lands. A new conflict broke out. On March 11 of the same year, Vasily II and Yury Dmitrievich concluded an agreement, according to which Yury recognized himself as the younger brother of Vasily II, but confirmed his right to appeal to the Horde khan.28 The issue of the Dmitrov lands was not resolved. Prince Vytautas took advantage of the difficult situation. He ordered Vasily II not to help Novgorod and Pskov,29 while he attacked Pskov in 1426, and Novgorod in 1428.30 In 1427 Vytautas signed an agreement with Boris Alexandrovich of Tver, obliging him to second all Lithuania’s decisions in the sphere of foreign policy. In 1430 Ivan Fyodorovich of Ryazan joined Vytautas,31 and about the same time Ivan Vladimirovich of Pronsk also went to him.32 Soon the situation changed dramatically: Vytautas died in October 1430.33 His death led to huge geopolitical shifts: Vytautas’s successor, Svidrigiello, broke the union with Poland and returned to Algirdas’s “all-Russian” program. At the same time, Svidrigiello relied primarily on those Russian lands that managed

22 PSRL, vol. 8, 92. 23 PSRL, vol. 5, 263. 24 Ibid.; PSRL, vol. 8, 93. 25 PSRL, vol. 8, 93. 26 Borisov, Ivan III, 21. 27 PSRL, vol. 8, 94. 28 Spiritual and Contractual Letters, 63–67. 29 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 416. 30 PSRL, vol. 5, 263; PSRL, vol. 8, 94. 31 Spiritual and Contractual Letters, 67–68. 32 Ibid., 68–69. 33 PSRL, vol. 8, 95.

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to preserve the traditions of the ancient Russian city-states: Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk, and Kiev.34 In January 1431 Svidrigiello made peace with Novgorod, and in July with Pskov. He made a special stake on the Tver principality, since his mother was the Tver princess Ulyana Alexandrovna, and his wife Anna was the daughter of the Tver prince Ivan Ivanovich. According to Perekhov, at that moment conditions arose for the creation of the Vilnius-Tver-Novgorod axis, which could become a counterweight to Poland and prevent it from absorbing Western Russia.35 However, on December 9, 1432, Vytautas’s brother Sigismund defeated Svidrigiello and renewed the union of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with the Polish crown. In 1440 Sigismund was killed by conspirators and the thirteen-year-old Casimir Jagiellon ascended the throne in Vilnius. In 1444, the Polish King Wladislaw died in a battle with the Turks, and in 1447 Casimir became the king of Poland under the name of Casimir IV. In 1431, Yury Dmitrievich persuaded Vasily II to go to the Horde to resolve the dispute about the grand ducal reign.36 Yury had an intercessor in the Horde, Mirza Teginya37 (Tyginya) from the Shirinsky clan, but the boyar Ivan Dmitrievich Vsevolozhsky convinced khan Ulugh-Muhammad that if the khan granted the throne to Yury, then Moscow would enter into a dangerous friendship with Lithuania, since Prince Svidrigiello was a friend of Yury.38 Vsevolozhsky told the khan: Yury is looking to get the grand ducal reign according to ancient Russian rights, but our sovereignty is by your grace, knowing that it is your ulus: you can give it to whoever you want. One demands, the other prays. What do chronicles and dead letters mean, where everything depends on the will of the tsar? Isn’t that what she who approved the will of Vasily Dmitrievich, who handed over the Moscow reign to his son? Vasily Vasilyevich has been on the throne for six years: you did not overthrow him, therefore, you yourself recognized that sovereign as legitimate.39

34 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 239. 35 Perekhov, History of Russia, 80. 36 PSRL, vol. 8, 95. 37 PSRL, vol. 18, 171. 38 PSRL, vol. 8, 171; PSPL, vol. 18, 171. 39 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 418.

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According to Halperin, the main message of these words was the recognition of the fact that Russia was still a Tatar ulus, and that the spiritual letter of Dmitry Donskoy could not prevent the khan from making his own choice.40 In 1432, Ulugh-Muhammad gave the grand ducal reign to Vasily II, and ordered Yury Dmitrievich to hold by the bridle the horse on which his nephew was sitting. However, Vasily II begged the khan to cancel this humiliating procedure and save Yury from dishonor.41 On October 5, the khan’s ambassador Mansur-Ulan officially put Vasily II on the grand ducal throne in Vladimir, and Yury received Dmitrov, the former patrimony of his brother Peter, who died in 1428.42 Soon there was a new reason for the renewal of the conflict between Vasily II and Yury: on February 8, 1433, at the wedding of Vasily II, his mother Sophia tore off the golden belt from Yury Dmitrievich’s son, Vasily Kosoy. This belt was intended for Dmitry Donskoy during his marriage to Eudoxia Dmitrievna, but was replaced.43 Enraged, Vasily Kosoy and Dmitry Shemyaka went to their father in Galich. On their way they robbed Yaroslavl, the patrimony of Vasily II. At this time, boyar Vsevolozhsky,44 who recently successfully defended the rights of Vasily II in the Golden Horde, also joined Yury Dmitrievich. Yury Dmitrievich defeated Vasily II on the banks of the Klyazma, assigned the rule over Kolomna to him, and took Moscow for himself.45 However, it was soon discovered that Moscow’s boyars and military elite began to defect to Kolomna.46 Even the sons of Yury Dmitrievich went to Vasily II.47 As a result, Yury Dmitrievich made peace with Vasily II, but then started a new mutiny. In March 1434, the troops of Vasily II were defeated near Rostov, and once again Yury Dmitrievich occupied Moscow.48 On June 6, 1434 Yury Dmitrievich suddenly died.49 Vasily Kosoy declared himself the grand duke, and his younger brothers made peace with Vasily II. Dmitry Shemyaka and Ivan Krasny recognized Vasily II as their “elder brother,” 40 Halperin, Tatar Yoke, 171. 41 PSRL, vol. 8, 96. 42 PSRL, vol. 5, 264; PSRL, vol. 18, 172. 43 PSRL, vol. 8, 264–265; PSRL, vol. 18, 172–173. 44 PSRL, vol. 7, 265; PSRL, vol. 18, 172. 45 PSRL, vol. 5, 265. 46 PSRL, vol. 18, 173. 47 Ibid., 173–174. 48 Ibid., 174. 49 Ibid., 175.

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pledged to serve him during war and pay part of the khan’s tribute, on the condition that the grand duke alone communicated with the Golden Horde, and did not allow the appanage princes to come “to any trouble.” Vasily II granted Uglich and Rzhev to Shemyaka, and to Dmitry Krasny was given Bezhetsky Verkh.50 But the peace between Vasily II and the sons of Yury did not last long, as their interests were too different. Once again, they came to war. Soon Vasily Kosoy fled to Novgorod; on January 6, 1435 he was defeated on the Kotorosl River and fled to Vologda, and then to Rostov. On May 14, 1436 he was captured and blinded51 by order of Vasily II (after that, abandoned by everyone, he lived twelve years until his death). At the same time, Vasily II freed Dmitry Shemyaka, returned him his freedom, and gave Kolomna to him.52 In 1437 Khan Ulugh-Muhammad, expelled from the Golden Horde, came to Russia53 and took over the city of Belev, which Vasily II had promised to hand over to him. Vasily II gathered a 40,000-strong army against Ulugh-Muhammad, led by Dmitry Shemyaka and Dmitry Krasny, but the modern Russian historians doubt the reliability of these figures.54 On December 5, the Russian army was defeated. Ulugh-Muhammad left Russia and founded the Khanate of Kazan. On July 3, 1439, Khan Ulugh-Muhammad reappeared under the walls of Moscow. Vasily II did not have time to gather an army and went to the Volga. Ulugh-Muhammad, stood under Moscow’s walls for ten days. Then he left, but on the way back he caused considerable damage, burning Kolomna and capturing many Russian people.55 Dmitry Krasny died a year later,56 and Galich and Bezhetsk passed to Dmitry Shemyaka. At the turn of 1440–1441, Vasily II took the Novgorod suburb of Demon.57 The Novgorod embassy offered Vasily III a ransom of eight thousand rubles. The people of Pskov took advantage of this situation and ravaged several Novgorod villages.

Spiritual and Contractual Letters, 87–89. PSRL, vol. 18, 176. Ibid., 176. Ibid., 188. D. A Seliverstov, “Belevskaya Battle of 1437 (1)” [Russian], Golden Horde Civilization 5 (2012): 314. 55 PSRL, vol. 18, 190. 56 Ibid. 57 PSRL, vol. 5, 267. 50 51 52 53 54

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In the winter of 1444–1445 Vasily II sent his army to Ryazan against the Horde prince Mustafa. Mustafa was defeated,58 and Vasily II expelled Ulugh-Muhammad from Nizhny Novgorod. In revenge, Ulugh-Muhammad attacked Vasily II near Suzdal in 1445. According to the Simeon Chronicle, Dmitry Shemyaka “did not come, and neither did he send his regiments.” Fighting alone, thus Vasily II was taken prisoner by the Tatars, together with his cousin Mikhail Andreevich of Vereya.59 As a ransom, Vasily II agreed to give the Tatars 200 thousand rubles. Soon, Tatar mirzas came to Moscow to collect this money. Their delegation included Seyit Asan, Utesh, Quraish, Dylkhoz, and Aidar.60 The reaction to their coming should be interpreted against the mass transfer of the Tatars to the Moscow service that was happening at that time. As Vernadsky writes, The Tatars used to come to Russia as agents of an alien and distant Tatar power; now the Tatars poured into Russia as permanent servicemen of their Russian grand ducal power. The satisfaction of the Tatar princes with Russian cities and volosts was the main obligation of the Grand Duke Vasily, which he was entangled with after leaving the Tatar captivity. In return, Vasily received a new contingent of service people. Only the more far-sighted of the Moscow statesmen understood that such a massive admission of Tatars to the Moscow service meant, in essence, the end of the Horde. For the majority of Muscovites, on the contrary, such an unexpected legal conquest of the Moscow Grand Duchy by the Tatars seemed an unheard-of disaster and a violation of the rights and advantages of the indigenous Russian people.61

The Moscow people were also outraged by the need to pay a huge ransom. This feeling was used by Dmitry Shemyaka, who said that, through the fault of Vasily II, the Tatars would rule in Russian cities directly.62 As Borisov writes: “Many people thought the idea advocated by Dmitry Shemyaka was very attractive: by overthrowing Vasily II, you can free yourself from the need to pay the whole 58 Ibid. 59 PSRL, vol. 18, 194. 60 PSRL, vol. 18, 195. 61 G. V. Vernadsky, Outline of Russian History [Russian], ed. S. B. Lavrov and A. S. Lavrov (Moscow: Airis-press, 2002), 150. 62 PSRL, vol. 18, 196.

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world a huge ransom that he promised the khan for his release from ­captivity.”63 Dmitry Shemyaka organized a conspiracy against Vasily II and involved Boris Alexandrovich of Tver in this conspiracy.64 When Vasily II went to the The Holy Trinity Lavra, the conspirators took Moscow, plundered the treasury,65 and then captured Vasily II. Dmitry Shemyaka and Ivan of Mozhaysk asked Vasily II: “Why do you love Tatars and give them Russian cities to feed? Why do you shower the infidels with Christian silver and gold? Why do you exhaust the people with taxes? Why have you blinded our brother, Vasily Kosoy?”66 Shemyaka demanded from Vasily II the original of the secret agreement with the Tatars, which could become the main point of accusation against Vasily II for treason. When ­Shemyaka arranged a search, the letter was found. Its content enraged the ruling elite.67 On the night of February 16–17, 1446, Vasily II was blinded. Borisov writes about the influence of this fateful event on Vasily II: A tragic experience exalts a person in an amazing way. Ivan the Great’s father came out of the bloody font not the miserable loser he had been before. His face, disfigured by the servant’s knife, reflected the mysterious glory of the ancient passion-bearers Boris and Gleb. In his tragic blindness, with a dark bandage that forever hid the upper part of his face, the contemporaries saw something prophetic. A unique, and in his own way, majestic character appeared on the stage of Russian history—Vasily the Blind.68

Dmitry Shemyaka exiled Vasily II to Uglich and sat in his place, but the people turned away from him in horror because of the atrocity he had committed. Now on the side of Vasily II there were not only the Orthodox clergy and boyars, but also a large part of the population. Even Boris Aleksandrovich of Tver supported him, since Dmitry Shemyaka posed a much greater danger to Tver. In this regard, Klug notes:

63 Borisov, Ivan III, 81. 64 PSRL, vol. 18, 196. 65 Ibid., 197. 66 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 433. 67 Borisov, Ivan III, 85. 68 Ibid., 89.

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In September 1446, Dmitry Shemyaka realized that many people had turned away from him and began to consult with his boyars whether Vasily II should be released.70 Soon Dmitry Shemyaka went to Uglich and solemnly reconciled with Vasily II, who in turn repented of his “iniquities” and thanked Shemyaka for his “kindness.”71 Vasily II received freedom, and Vologda was given to him to rule.72 The Moscow nobility, who had recently scolded Vasily II, now sided with him again. At the same time, the mother of Vasily II, Sophia, instructed him to continue the struggle. On February 17, 1447 Vasily II returned to Moscow,73 and Dmitry Shemyaka and Ivan of Mozhaysk fled across the Volga. The second stage of the war was marked by the struggle for the Trans-Volga regions and the fall of the cities that supported Shemyaka. At the beginning of 1447 Uglich fell. In 1450, Vasily II took Galich, Shemyaka’s ancestral city, and in 1451 he took Ustyug. The sons of the Horde’s Khan Ulugh-Muhammad, Yakub and Qasim, who were loyal to the Moscow prince, took part in the campaigns against Dmitry Shemyaka, for which in 1452 Vasily II granted Qasim a lifetime possession of a city on the Oka in the Meshchera region, which received the name Kasimov. Qasim attracted large masses of pro-Moscow refugees from Kazan, where Qasim’s brother Mäxmüd ruled. Their enmity was fierce: Mäxmüd had killed their father, and Qasim eventually took revenge on him in 1456. Defeated in the Ustyug land, Dmitry Shemyaka fled to Novgorod, where he was poisoned and died on July 17, 1453.74 By order of Vasily III, the

69 70 71 72 73 74

Klug, “Principality of Tver,” 380. PSRL, vol. 18, 200. Ibid., 201. PSRL, vol. 5, 269. Ibid., 269. PSRL, vol. 5, 271; PSRL, vol. 18, 208.

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Metropolitan Jonah forbade the commemoration of Dmitry Shemyaka along with other deceased members of the Moscow princely house. Thus, the feudal war of 1425–1453 ended with the victory of the supporters of the centralized Russian state. As Platonov notes: In the struggle of the Galich princes with the grand duke, the old principle of clan inheritance and seniority of uncles over nephews appears for the last time in Northern Russia. The Moscow custom of patrimonial inheritance from father to son has triumphed over the old order here decisively and irrevocably thanks to general sympathy: the people have already appreciated the advantages of family inheritance, leading to the establishment of autocracy desired by the country.75

Zimin states: Thus the blind, unwise ruler took back his throne. His opponents were cast to the ground. The unity of the lands around Moscow was restored. But at what cost? “Kalita’s nest” was eliminated. Only Mikhail Andreevich, the brother-in-law of the grand duke, retained his patrimony at Beloozero. The rest either died (Prince Yury Dmitrievich and Vasily Kosoy), or perished (Dmitry Shemyaka), or were imprisoned (Vasily Yaroslavich), or ended up abroad (Ivan Andreevich, Ivan Dmitrievich, son of Shemyaka, and Vasily Yaroslavich’s son Ivan). “Kalita’s nest” was replaced by the family of the grand duke, and there remained only a step to complete the transition to one autocrat like Ivan IV Vasilyevich.76

A natural question arises: why did Russia prefer the unifying strategy of Vasily II? What were the strategic mistakes of Prince Yury of Zvenigorod, Dmitry Shemyaka, Vasily Kosoy, and Dmitry Krasny? First, these princes thought in categories of small appanage territories, while Vasily II thought in the categories of the general state. Second, even the Northern cities supported Vasily II, which neutralizes Zimin’s thesis about the struggle between “feudal Moscow” and “free” cities. Third, the appanage princes of the “Kalita’s nest” did not have a clear program of state building. It is unclear what the Russian state would have been like if they had won. In this context Dvornichenko recalls Zimin’s 75 Platonov, Full Course of Lectures, 154–155. 76 Zimin, A Knight at the Crossroads, 210.

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thesis: while the predecessors of Dmitry Shemyaka strove to establish themselves in Moscow, Shemyaka “proceeded to create an independent state in the North, which included Ustyug, Galich, and Vyatka. Perhaps Shemyaka’s plans also included a connection with Veliky Novgorod, and a stronger one than the Novgorodians would like.”77 “It is hard to say,” writes Dvornichenko, “what this statehood would be like, but it is clear that the communal order would be weaker there.”78 Borisov further notes: The sources do not allow us to judge how the worldview of the northerners differed from the worldview of the inhabitants of the Oka-Volga interfluve. One can also argue about what social views Dmitry Shemyaka had. However, another thing is obvious: the North, due to its natural conditions and low population density, was inaccessible to the control for the Moscow administration. The strong influence of Novgorod has long been felt here, there were various forms of joint Moscow-Novgorod government, intertwined with the prerogatives of local appanage princes from Rostov and Yaroslavl houses.79

Fourth, contemporaries noted that the princes could not adequately equip their army. Even Metropolitan Photius, seeing Yury’s army, mockingly said: “I have never seen so many people in sheep wool.”80 Fifth, in the course of the feudal war, the appanage Kalitichis showed excessive cruelty, more even than the supporters of Vasily II, who were also not distinguished by their gentleness and mercy. Nevertheless, it is too early to constitute that the scholarly problems associated with the events of 1425–1453 are explained in every detail. In my opinion, discussions and research on this topic should continue. At the same time, it is important to move away from attempts to find simple and unambiguous answers to complex questions of Russian medieval history.

77 Ibid., 202. 78 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 287. 79 Borisov, Ivan III, 118. 80 PSRL, vol. 23, 168.

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5.2.  VASILY THE BLIND’S ATTACK ON APPANAGE The war of 1425–1453 did not stop the uncompromising struggle of Vasily the Blind for the subordination of the last relatively independent appanage territories to Moscow. I. B. Mikhailova notes that Vasily II and his associates, following the ideas of Ivan Kalita and Dmitry Donskoy, continued the building of a single Russian state.81 Indeed, soon after the war ended and treaties with Tver and Lithuania were signed, Vasily II went to punish Ivan Andreevich, the prince of Mozhaysk, “for his failure to correct wrongs.”82 Ivan betrayed Vasily in 1446 and sided with Dmitry Shemyaka. According to the Simeon Chronicle, Ivan then fled to Lithuania. Vasily II captured Mozhaysk and installed his governors.83 The Mozhaysk principality was liquidated. In 1456, Prince Ivan Fyodorovich of Ryazan died as a monk,84 having given his eight-year-old son Vasily and daughter Feodosia to the care of Vasily II. The grand duke took Ivan’s children to Moscow and sent his governors to Ryazan.85 After seven years, the young Vasily got back his estate, but it no longer had an independent role. Thus, only two princes in the Moscow dynasty now owned their lands as independent rulers: Vasily II’s cousin Mikhail Andreevich owned Vereya and Beloozero, and Vasily Yaroslavich owned Serpukhov. According to Borisov, the matter was complicated by the fact that Vasily II was married to the sister of Vasily of Serpukhov. Vasily Yaroslavich’s other sister was married to Mikhail Andreevich. In addition, when Vasily II languished in prison in Uglich, Vasily Yaroslavich was preparing a raid on the city for its release. In 1452 Vasily Yaroslavich went to Ustyug as part of the army of Vasily II. And yet in 1456 Vasily II imprisoned Vasily Yaroslavich in Uglich, accusing him of insulting the new Trinity abbot, Vassian. The son of Vasily II, Ivan, dared to sympathize unjustly punished Vasily Yaroslavich, by that losing Pereyaslav, which he received in 1454.86

81 I. B. Mikhailova, “Troubles in Russia in the Second Quarter of the Fifteenth Century” [Russian], Bulletin of St. Petersburg University, series 2 “History” 1–2 (2004): 11. 82 PSRL, vol. 18, 208. 83 Ibid., 209–210. 84 Ibid., 212. 85 Ibid., 212. 86 Borisov, Ivan III, 141.

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According to the Simeon Chronicle, in 1456 Vasily II punished Novgorod for “the failure to correct the Novgorodians.”87 The Novgorodians gathered a large army and approached Russa, where the prince of the grand ducal lineage, Ivan Vasilyevich Obolensky Striga, stayed then with his brothers and the daring voivode Fyodor Vasilyevich Basenok. The Novgorodian rebels were defeated, some were seized and brought to the grand duke, including their mayor Mikhail Tucha.88 Between February 20 and 25, 1456, the Yazhelbitsy peace treaty was signed, according to which Novgorod agreed to pay 10,000 rubles to Moscow.89 Novgorod recognized the transfer of part of its possessions to the Moscow principality and renounced an independent foreign policy. Novgorod agreed to annually send the tribute to the Golden Horde, not to host the enemies of Vasily II and to return all the lands purchased by the city. In 1460 Novgorod again became close to Lithuania. To prevent a union between them, Vasily II went to Novgorod, along with his sons Yury and Andrey. The official purpose of the visit was pilgrimage to the Novgorod shrines in the St. Sophia Cathedral.90 The Chronicle of Abraham speaks of the “honor” shown to Vasily II by Novgorodians.91 In fact, Vasily II found himself in a dangerous situation. There were attempts to kill Fyodor Basenok, who fought with the Novgorodians near Rusa in 1456.92 Then Archbishop Jonah threatened that in the event of the murder of Vasily II, his son Ivan would come to Novgorod.93 The threat worked, especially since not all Novgorodians wanted a break with Moscow.94 In 1462, the ambassadors of the grand duke visited Novgorod. Some Novgorodians again expressed dissatisfaction with the Yazhelbitsy peace treaty and the collection of tribute in 1461. Archbishop Jonah was to go to Moscow to calm Vasily II,95 however, this trip took place only at the end of 1462. Soon Pskov, which fought with the Livonians, also recognized its dependence on Moscow. The people of Pskov asked Vasily II to appoint

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

PSRL, vol. 18, 210. PSRL, vol. 23, 155. PSRL, vol. 18, 211. PSRL, vol. 16, 200. Ibid., 201. PSRL, vol. 5, 272; PSRL, vol. 23, 156. PSRL, vol. 20, 264. Y. G. Alekseyev, Sovereign of All Russia [Russian] (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1991), 53–54. PSRL, vol. 16, 206–207, 211, 218–219.

The Course towards the Creation of the Centralized State

A. V. Czartoryski as governor in Pskov, whom they chose as prince in 1456. Moscow gave the go-ahead, but Czartoryski refused to take the oath to Vasily II and left for Lithuania with his children. Upon learning that Pskov was left without a prince, Vasily II immediately sent his son Yury there. Pskov put Yury “on the throne of his father, Grand Duke Vasily Vasilyevich.” Vasily II was recognized as the supreme head of the Pskov state. Then the Pskov authorities agreed with Yury about the approval of  I. V. Striga-Obolensky as their governor (on behalf of Vasily II). Thus, according to Cherepnin, a political system acceptable for Moscow and Pskov was found: “The grand duke of Moscow was the supreme head of the Pskov land. His representative in Pskov was the governor, who was nominated by the Pskov authorities and concluded a contract with them on the observance of laws and traditions.”96 Learning about the changes in Pskov, the Livonians hastened to make peace with Pskov “by the full will of Pskov.”97 Striga-Obolensky did not reign for long and left for Moscow in 1461. Pskov asked Vasily II to give them another prince. Soon Prince Vladimir Andreevich arrived in Pskov, but he ruled “not according to the Pskov request, nor according to the old ways.” In the fall of 1462, the veche court sentenced Vladimir Andreevich to dismissal, as a sign of which he was pushed off the veche platform and expelled from the city. After that, the Novgorod mayor went to Moscow to settle the problem with the governor, but by that time the grand duke had died. Another acquisition of Vasily II was Vyatka. In 1458, Vasily II sent an army to Vyatka, but the campaign was unsuccessful. “They neither reached Vyatka, nor took it. … And thanks God they at least preserved their health.”98 The governor Gregory Mikhailovich Perfushkov was blamed for the failure of the campaign. By order of Vasily II he was chained in iron and exiled to Murom.99 In 1459 the second campaign took place. Vyatka was taken, together with Orlov and Kotelnich. As a result, the residents of Vyatka “gave their lowered foreheads” to the grand duke “to do as he will.”100 Thus, the territorial expansion of Moscow under Vasily the Blind was quite successful. At the same time, Vasily II did not consider the past merits of individual princes and used the facts of “treason” of the princes during the war of 1425–1453 as an excuse for “tightening the screws.” On the whole, by the end   96 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 836–837.   97 PSRL, vol. 12, 113.   98 PSRL, vol. 23, 156.   99 Ibid. 100 Ibid.

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of the reign of Vasily II, the possessions of the Moscow principality increased thirty times compared with the beginning of the fourteenth century. According to Borisov, while cleaning up the estates of the appanage princes of the Moscow house, Vasily II cleared the way to unlimited power for his son and heir Ivan. Despite being sixteen years old, Ivan was already quite an adult, a family man. Back in 1454, his father gave him his own patrimony, Pereslavl-Zalessky [former Pereyaslavl] with the surrounding district. Here, under the watchful eye of his father’s confidants, Ivan mastered the difficult art of managing people.101

On February 15, 1458, the son Ivan (called the Young) was born to the prince Ivan.

5.3.  MOSCOW’S REACTION TO THE COUNCIL OF FLORENCE AND THE FALL OF BYZANTIUM The formation of the Russian centralized state was actively promoted by the Russian Orthodox Church,102 although its relationship with Vasily II was not easy. In 1437, Vasily II decided to appoint Ryazan bishop Jonah to the metropolitan see, but Constantinople wanted to appoint its own man as the metropolitan. As a result, the Greek Isidore, who was known as a supporter of the Orthodox-Catholic union, became the metropolitan. At first, Vasily II met Isidore quite cordially, but soon learned that he was going to go to Italy to participate in the Florentine Council of Christian Churches (1438–1445), at which the Orthodox Church intended to recognize the supremacy of the Pope. In this regard, Vasily II directly told Isidore: “Our fathers and grandfathers did not want to hear about the unification of the Greek and Roman Laws; I myself do not wish this. But if you think differently, then go, I do not forbid you. Remember only the purity of our faith and bring it with you.”103 Isidore vowed not to betray Orthodoxy, and then went to the Council.

101 Borisov, Ivan III, 141. 102 Vernadsky, Outline of Russian History, 152. 103 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 423.

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On July 6, 1439, a union between Orthodox and Catholics was signed at the Florence Cathedral. The Metropolitan Isidore received the title of the Papal legate in Lithuania, Livonia, Russia, and all the regions of Poland under the jurisdiction of his metropolitanate. Then Metropolitan Isidore returned to Kiev, where he was greeted as the single metropolitan of all Russian dioceses, and in the spring of 1440, he came to Vasily II with a letter from the Pope. In Moscow, Isidore began to serve the liturgy according to the new model, which included mentoning the name of the Pope before the name of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople. The enraged Vasily II did not accept the blessing from Isidor, declared him a “Latin charmer and a heretic,” and then ordered him to be dethroned and imprisoned in the Chudov Monastery until the trial.104 The Russian bishops considered the Florentine definition and recognized it as contrary to sacred rules and tradition, they urged Isidore to repent and return to the fold of Orthodoxy105 but he disagreed. On March 2, 1440, Isidore was arrested, but he managed to escape from Moscow to Tver. Borisov admits that this escape was set up by the Moscow authorities, who feared accusations of persecution of the legally elected church hierarch. However, the Tver prince Boris Alexandrovich did not know about Vasily II’s plan, and ordered to arrest Isidor. Six months later, Isidore fled to Rome, where he died in 1463.106 Church historian I. K. Smolich states: The mistrust of the Greeks that already existed in Moscow intensified after the Council of Florence, and the firmness shown by the grand duke in defending the Orthodox doctrine was not only recognized and approved by church circles, but also showed them that the state power wants and can serve Christian goals. This event was an extremely important manifestation of Russian religious consciousness, which subsequent generations were able to appreciate.107

104 Macarius (Bulgakov), metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna, History of the Russian Church, vol. 3, History of the Russian Church during the Period of Its Gradual Transition to Independence (1240–1589), section 1, The State of the Russian Church from Metropolitan Kirill to Metropolitan Saint Jonah, or during the Mongol Period [Russian] (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Spaso-Preobrazhenskogo Valaamskogo monastyria, 1995), 359. 105 Ibid. 106 PSRL, vol. 18, 190. 107 I. K. Smolich, Russian Monasticism. 988–1917. Life and Teachings of the Elders. Appendix to the History of the Russian Church [Russian] (Moscow: Pravoslavnaya entsiklopediya, 1997), 77.

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In 1441, the Ryazan bishop Jonah was elected the new metropolitan,108 and in 1448 the autocephaly of the Russian Orthodox Church was established, which was further strengthened after the fall of Constantinople on May 29, 1453 and the tragic death of Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos. As a result of the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, the most important trade routes from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, which connected Europe with the Near and Middle East, fell under the control of the Ottoman Empire. This dealt a severe blow to the trade of Genoa, Venice, the countries of Eastern Europe, and the Moscow state.109 Russian people were shocked by the fall of the Byzantine Empire.110 They regarded this catastrophe as God’s punishment for fact that the Greeks accepted the decisions of the Council of Florence. The collapse of Constantinople was reflected in Russian chronicles and historical stories. Thus, the Simeon Chronicle reports: “In the same year, May 29, Constantinople was taken by the godless Turks, by Mustafa Muratovic.”111 There is also a cycle of historical stories related to the fall of Constantinople, including Tale on the Taking of Tsargrad, the author of which describes the dramatic events of 1453 from an Orthodox point of view. He is rather biased in his depiction of the behavior of the Turkish Sultan and Turkish soldiers, and also expresses the hope that after a certain time Constantinople will be liberated by the Russian people. According to Shmurlo, after the fall of Constantinople, Moscow turned “into the keeper of Orthodoxy and became the banner under which all Orthodox people could trustingly gather, not only Russia.”112 However, in 1461 Moscow was seized with confusion: the Metropolitan Jonah, the last metropolitan of Kiev and All Russia, died.113 The new Metropolitan was the Rostov Archbishop Theodosius. The Western Russian hierarchs received their Metropolitan Gennady from Constantinople, and Jonah’s successors could no longer speak on behalf of all of Russia.

108 Platonov, Textbook of Russian History, 109. 109 Z. V. Udaltsova, “Responses to the Conquest of Constantinople by the Turks in the Russian State” [Russian], Byzantine Times 38 (1977): 19–20. 110 A. Zadokhin, “The Image of Constantinople in Russian National Consciousness and Foreign Policy” [Russian], Observer 12 (2008): 121. 111 PSRL, vol. 18, 208. 112 Shmurlo, History of Russia, 89. 113 PSRL, vol. 18, 214.

The Course towards the Creation of the Centralized State

5.4.  GROWING POLITICAL INSTABILITY Boris Alexandrovich of Tver, a cautious and far-sighted politician, who was called the “autocratic sovereign” by the courtiers, died on April 18, 1461.114 The prince was known for his tough and ruthless disposition. Back in 1426, he threw his great-uncle Vasily Mikhailovich, the last independent ruler of the Kashin domain, into prison. With his death, according to Borisov, the autonomy of Tver, which had been the largest principality, was liquidated.115 After the death of Boris Alexandrovich, his four-year-old son Mikhail ascended the throne,116 but the real power was in the hands of the prince’s widow Anastasia and Father Moses, who was elevated to the see in 1458 by Metropolitan Jonah himself. Jonah had feared that otherwise Moses might turn to the Western Russian Metropolitan Gregory for assignment. In the spring of 1462, a boyar conspiracy was uncovered to free Prince Vasily Yaroslavich of Serpukhov from prison in Uglich. The chronicler notes: and the grand duke ordered to seize them—Volodka Davydov, Parfyon Brein, Luka Posiviev and many others—to execute, flog, and torture, and drag by horses around the city and across all squares, and eventually to behead them. But many people who saw all this, including boyars, and rich merchants, and the priests, and the common people, all were in great horror and amazement, and it is pitiful to see how the eyes of all were filled with tears, because they had never heard of such a thing before, not that they had seen it happen to Russian princes; besides, it is unworthy of an Orthodox great sovereign, the only one in the whole universe, to execute such executions and shed blood during the holy Lent.117

According to Borisov, the Moscow executions of February 1462 were a demonstration of the grand duke’s power. Vasily the Blind wanted such measures to intimidate his potential opponents—the supporters of the appanage princes. The specter of a new appanage rebellion was more terrible for Moscow than all the Tatar raids and natural disasters combined. It is easy to imagine the development of 114 Borisov, Ivan III, 152. 115 Ibid. 116 PSRL, vol. 18, 214. 117 PSRL, vol. 23, 157.

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On March 27, 1462, forty-seven-year-old Vasily the Blind died.119 According to Borisov, he did not receive a decent obituary in the annals: “Only a description of his funeral has survived, in which the sparks of a vivid feeling are deeply hidden under the cold ashes of ritual grief.”120 In the spiritual letter of Vasily II it was written: “And I bless my oldest son, Ivan, with my fatherland, the grand duchy.”121 Yet not a word is said about the khan, which testified to the weakening of the Russian dependence on the Golden Horde. Ivan, the new grand duke, received “a third of Moscow” and twelve cities, including Kolomna, Vladimir, Pereslavl-Zalessky, Kostroma, Galich, Ustyug, Suzdal, Nizhny Novgorod, Borovsk, Kaluga, Aleksin, as well as Vyatka land, that is, more land than any of his predecessors.122 Yury received Dmitrov, Mozhaysk, Serpukhov, Khotun, and twenty-seven villages.123 Andrey the Elder received Uglich, Bezhetsky Verkh, and Zvenigorod.124 Boris received Rzhev, Volokolamsk, Ruza, and twenty villages. Andrey the Younger got Vologda with Zaozerye,125 and Vasily’s widow received half of Rostov for life,126 while the other half remained with the local princes. As Alekseyev states, with this new division of Moscow lands the Moscow system was reborn “from the ashes of the feudal war,”127 but at the same time it was partially counterbalanced by the increased power of the grand duke. *** 118 Borisov, Ivan III, 158. 119 PSRL, vol. 5, 273. 120 Borisov, Ivan III, 162. 121 Spiritual and Contractual Letters, 194. 122 Ibid., 194. 123 Ibid., 194–195. 124 Ibid., 195. 125 Ibid., 195. 126 Ibid., 195. 127 Alekseyev, Sovereign of All Russia, 61.

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Summarizing the approaches and views of various historians, one can draw a number of important conclusions. Vasily II showed himself to be a talented politician and diplomat who knew how to turn any setbacks in his favor. Blinded, he acquired real perspicacity and special political intuition. He knew how to attract attention to himself, he knew how to be arrogant and cruel, then miserable and unhappy, so that he began to arouse pity on the part of his enemies and political opponents, both inside and outside his state. Borisov notes that Vasily II was the only military leader in Russian history who did not lose a single battle. The gifted and loyal people with whom he surrounded his throne were hardly so immoral as to serve an obvious scoundrel or a nonentity. But, knowing about the cruelty of some of the massacres perpetrated by Vasily II, we do not know anything about their reasons.128

One can agree with Presnyakov, who asserts that Vasily the Blind prepared the successes of his son Ivan III in the field of state building: “Ivan III Vasilyevich is recognized as the true organizer of the Great Russian state. But he was building his big political edifice on a solid foundation.”129 Presnyakov emphasizes that it was under Vasily the Blind that the Moscow patrimony finally merged with the territory of the grand ducal reign.130 Indeed, as modern Russian historians note, the successor of Vasily the Blind could only “annex the finally weakened Tver, the semi-dependent Ryazan, Rostov and Yaroslavl, crush the freedom-loving Novgorod and Pskov and begin to win back their fatherland (Smolensk and the Seversky land) from Lithuania.”131 The main event that determined the reign of Vasily the Blind was the feudal war of 1425–1462, in which the supporters of the centralized Russian state gained the upper hand over the appanage descendants of Ivan Kalita. Undoubtedly, Yury Dmitrievich and his sons—Dmitry Shemyaka, Vasily Kosoy, and Dmitry Krasny—were brave and courageous politicians who were not afraid to challenge Vasily II, even though he was supported by the political and church elite. However, neither the outstanding personal qualities, nor the support of the “pre-bourgeois” cities helped the appanage princes to win. Cherepnin also 128 Borisov, Ivan III, 8. 129 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 278. 130 Ibid., 282. 131 Bokhanov, Morozova, Rakhmatullin, Sakharov, and Shestakov, History of Russia from Ancient Times to the Present Day, 285.

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draws attention to the words of the chroniclers, who noted that the Moscow boyars, nobles, and boyar children “did not have to serve the appanage princes.”132 Interestingly, during the war of 1425–1453 stable coalitions were not always observed. For example, the children of Yury Dmitrievich first sided with their father, then went over to the side of Vasily the Blind, and then found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades, when Vasily Kosoy fought against Dmitry Shemyaka and Dmitry Krasny. It should be remembered that the feudal war of 1425–1453 happened against the background of numerous Tatar raids and the ongoing expansion of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which sought to place Novgorod, Pskov and the Smolensk lands under Vytautas’s control. One can, of course, assume that if Vytautas had lived a little longer, Moscow could have faced new powerful challenges. Similarly, Moscow could have faced big problems if Svidrigiello had stayed in power and started implementing Algirdas’s “all-Russian program.”

Figure 6.  Pavel Petrovich Chistyakov. “The Grand Duchess Sofya, Daughter of Vytautas, Tears off the Belt from Prince Vasily Kosoy at the Wedding of the Grand Duke Vasily the Dark in 1433” (1861).

132 PSRL, vol. 12, 18; PSRL, vol. 23, 147.

CHAPTER 6

The Origin of the Russian Autocracy

T

he twenty-two-year-old Ivan III Vasilyevich (1462–1505), who ascended the throne after the death of Vasily II, was, of course, an extraordinary personality. By that time, he had accumulated serious political and managerial experience as a co-ruler with his father. Like Vasily the Blind, Ivan III strove to establish a centralized state power that would not depend on the appanage princes or the Golden Horde. According to the Yermolin Chronicle, Ivan III “sat at his father’s throne in the grand duchy in Vladimir and the grand duchy in Novgorod the Great and Nizhny, and in all the Russian land.”1 Undoubtedly, such title testified to the long-term plans of Ivan III. Especially surprising is that Ivan III was able to put almost all of his plans into practice.

6.1.  NEW PARADIGM OF GRAND DUCAL POWER Ivan III was the first Russian autocrat who synthesized the experience of Byzantium and the Golden Horde. Moreover, according to Borisov, Ivan III took from them not an idea, as the Eurasians thought, but above all the technology of absolute power. He adapted this technology to a completely different society. Here, in Russia, only a strong central government could solve two main tasks: ensuring independence and redistributing the meager surplus product in the interests of the state.2 1 PSRL, vol. 23, 157. 2 Borisov, Ivan III, 11.

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The growth of Ivan III’s prestige was cemented by his marriage with Sophia Palaiologos, the niece of the Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI (the first wife of Ivan III, Maria, died on April 23, 1467). Sophia’s guardian was Pope Sixtus IV. It is possible that Ivan III agreed to the advancement of the Greek-Catholic union to the East and even to Moscow’s participation in the war with the Turks. Sixtus IV agreed to the marriage, which was solemnized on November 12, 1472, but after that Ivan III immediately rejected the postulates of the Council of Florence. Shmurlo notes that Sophia “brought with her to Moscow the sovereign rights to the Byzantine throne, and Ivan, becoming her husband, transferred these rights to himself. … And having become the heir to the Byzantine emperors, the Moscow prince thereby acquired the character of a sovereign and ceased to be an appanage prince.”3 Under Ivan III, the double-headed eagle, the emblem of the Byzantine emperors, became the state emblem of Russia for the first time. Thus, the historical, civilizational and cultural continuity between Moscow, the Western Roman Empire, and Byzantium was recorded. From now on, V. Mikushevich notes, the grand dukes of Moscow “begin to feel like emperors, although they do not dare to utter this word openly.”4 Russian historians emphasize that it was Ivan III, and not Ivan IV, who was the first among Russian rulers to receive the name “Terrible,” the one who said: “To whom I want, to that I will give the principality.”5 This, according to V. V. Ilyin and A. S. Akhiezer, meant that under Ivan III the power of the Moscow sovereign became unlimited: “an autocracy not constrained by any laws.”6 With Ivan III’s reign “the lack of order, the illegality of power as a certain paradigm, a civilizational foundation, a mindset, a mechanism of action” become the central characteristics of Russian autocracy.7 Solovyov draws attention to the change in Ivan III’s title: In the letter of Ivan Kalita as far as we know, is for the first time we come across the title of the grand duke of All Russia. But this title was not used in relations with the Lithuanian court up to the time of Ivan III. After the 3 Shmurlo, History of Russia, 90. 4 V. Mikushevich, “Around the Third Rome” [Russian], Novaya yunost′ 4 (1998), http://magazines.russ.ru/nov_yun/1998/4/mikush.html. 5 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 145. 6 V. V. Ilyin and A. S. Akhiezer, Russian Statehood: Origins, Traditions, Prospects [Russian] (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1997), 152. 7 Ibid., 152

The Origin of the Russian Autocracy death of Casimir he first used in interactions with the Lithuanian prince Alexander the expression “Ioann (instead of Ivan), by God’s grace the sovereign of all Rus and grand duke of Vladimir and Moscow and Novgorod and Pskov and Tver and Ugra and Perm and Bulgaria and others.” To the title of his father, Ioann added the title of the grand duke of Vladimir, Pskov, Tver, Vyatka and Bulgaria, getting rid of the name of Rostov.8

At the same time, the title of the grand duke sounded differently depending on which of the foreign sovereigns Ivan III was dealing with In relations with Livonia and small German possessions, Ivan takes the name of the “Tsar of All Russia.” In the signature of the letter of Archduke Philip, son of [the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire] Maximilian, Ivan and his son Vasily are called the tsars of Vladimir, Moscow, etc. We see the same title in the list of speeches of [Maximilian’s] Ambassador Hartinger. In the charter of the Danish king, Ivan is named emperor. …9 A seal has survived from 1497 with the following title: “Ivan, by God’s grace the sovereign of all Russia and the grand duke of Vladimir, and Moscow, and Novgorod, and Pskov, and Tver, and Ugra, and Vyatka, and Perm, and Bulgarian.”10

Other attributes of grand ducal power were also of great symbolic significance. For example, the first coronation happened on February 4, 1498. Dmitry, the eldest grandson of Ivan III and the son of Prince Ivan Ivanovich the Young, was first crowned king. In this regard A. M. Bokhanov notes: The ceremony took place in the Dormition Cathedral in the presence of the grand ducal family and Orthodox hierarchs. After the prayer service and the speech of the grand duke, Ivan III put the royal regalia on the shoulders of his grandson: the hat of Monomakh and the neckpiece.11 The coronation of Dmitry, who became co-ruler of Ivan III, not only revived the old custom, it marked the beginning of the formation of the sacred ritual of initiation into the supreme power.12   8 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 145.   9 Ibid., 145. 10 Ibid., 146. 11 A. N. Bokhanov, Autocracy. The Idea of Royal Power [Russian] (Moscow: Russkoe slovo, 2002), 181. 12 Ibid., 183.

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Uspensky believes that the Monomakh’s hat initially symbolized the orientation of the Moscow prince towards the Horde, and later, the orientation towards Byzantium.13 On the other hand, the “Chalice of Augustus of Rome” presented to Dmitry connected the Russian sovereigns with the Roman and Byzantine traditions and was associated with the claims of the Russian rulers in connection with Augustus, which implied a connection between Moscow and Rome.14 To substantiate the claims to a connection between Moscow and Rome, the Legend of the Grand Dukes of Vladimir was created, according to which Emperor Augustus sent his relative Prus to the banks of the Vistula River, and since then this place has been called “the Prussian Land.”15 Many centuries later, the Novgorod prince Gostomysl, before his death, advised the city nobility to invite a prince from the Prussian land to reign: “They went to the Prussian land and found there a certain prince named Rurik, who was from the Roman family of Augustus the king.”16 Rurik laid the foundation for a new dynasty: “And the fourth generation from the Grand Duke Rurik is the Grand Duke Vladimir, who enlightened the Russian land with holy baptism in the year 6496 (988). And from the Grand Duke Vladimir the fourth generation is his great-grandson Vladimir Vsevolodovich Monomakh.”17 According to the authors of the Legend, the Byzantine emperor Constantine Monomakh sent an embassy with gifts to Vladimir Monomakh: From his neck he took off the life-giving cross, made of the life-giving tree, on which Lord Christ himself was crucified. From his head he took off the royal crown and put it on a golden dish. He ordered to bring a carnelian cup, from which Augustus, the king of Rome, drank wine, and a necklace that he wore on his shoulders, and a chain, forged from Arabian gold, and many other royal gifts.18

The genealogical myth contained in the Legend strengthened the legitimacy of the Rurikids and affirmed the idea of monarchical power. The Legend hinted at the special role of the Rurikids in protecting the entire Orthodox world. In this 13 B. A. Uspensky, Sketches on Russian History [Russian] (St. Petersburg: Azbuka, 2002), 97. 14 Ibid., 98. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

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case, the so-called transfer of “royal gifts” also symbolized the transfer of sovereign ambitions from Byzantium to Moscow.19 In an effort to strengthen his autocratic power, Ivan III relied on the Orthodox Church. When Ivan III began to be called tsar, the Metropolitan Simon acquired the title of patriarch. However, the relationship between Ivan III and the Church was not easy because of the struggle between two directions in the Russian Church: “money-grubbers” and “non-possessors.” The leader of the money-grubbers ( Josephites) was the abbot of the Volokolamsk monastery, Joseph Volotsky. For Joseph, the bishops were the servants of both the Church and the state, and any monastery is a joint church-state institution. Hence, he supported the claims of monasteries to land holdings inhabited by peasants.20 The leader of the “non-possessors” was Nilus of Sora, who said that monks should live by the labor of their hands.21 He was succeeded by Vassian Patrikeyev. Ivan III hesitated between both church currents, but the non-possessors were closer to him in spirit, since he was always short of money. The Muscovite state needed a powerful army, and there was little arable land to give out to servicemen, because much of it was in the possession of churches and monasteries. Trying to seize at least part of this land, Ivan III began to rely on nonpossessors, but the church council of 1503 rejected the arguments of Nilus of Sora and the lands remained with the monasteries. Nevertheless, one can agree with Smolich, who argued that thanks to the non-possessors, the problem of monastic possessions moved from the sphere of church life to the sphere of state and economic interests.22 On the whole, the process of the formation of the Russian autocracy was inextricably linked with changes in the sphere of land relations. Its other contexts were the elimination of the independence of the appanage principalities, and the territorial expansion of Moscow in its mission to join together all Russian lands.

19 The Tale of the Princes of Vladimir [Russian], ed. and comments R. P. Dmitrieva, trans. L. A. Dmitriev, http://lib.pushkinskijdom.ru/Default.aspx?tabid=5103. 20 Smolich, Russian Monasticism, 64. 21 Ibid., 68–69. 22 Ibid., 90.

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6.2.  RUSSIAN LEVIATHAN: ABSORPTION OF ESTATES BY THE STATE As most historians admit, Ivan III was the first to accept the title “Sovereign of All Russia,” but this title did not yet correspond to the Russian realities. The Pskov and Ryazan principalities remained independent, and the Southwestern Russian lands were part of Lithuania. According to G. Levitsky, the title of Ivan III at that time was a kind of political program of the Rurikids.23 It is important to note that the policy of Ivan III in relation to patrimonies was significantly different from the policy of his father Vasily the Blind. Now the specific principalities not only changed their overlords, but were liquidated and merged into the Moscow state.24 “A truly formidable power,” states A. E. Presnyakov, “was about to strike the local patrimonial principalities. In the sixties, this power clearly affected the liquidation of the patrimonial possessions of the Yaroslavl princes.”25 In 1463 the Yaroslavl prince Alexander Fedorovich Bryukhaty sold the rights to his principality to Ivan III, but formally remained the prince of Yaroslavl until his death in 1471. Then the Yaroslavl principality lost its independence. In fact, the princes of Yaroslavl went over to the service of the Moscow sovereign. Ivan III gave his new vassals their own ancestral estates as awards under the condition of service.26 Then came the turn of the Rostov princes, who, like the princes of Yaroslavl, switched to the position of service princes, but still reigned in their patrimonial “half of Rostov.” In 1474, they sold this half of Rostov to Ivan III, and he sold it to his mother, the Grand Duchess Maria, who owned the other half of Rostov. As Presnyakov states: “The patrimony of the grand duke is growing, absorbing the small estates of the appanage princes. Its direct power over the territory and population of the Moscow-Vladimir Grand Duchy is growing stronger and generalized; the Moscow state is under construction. But in the grand ducal family itself, the patrimonial views and attitudes are still alive.”27 This became especially clear when the brother of Ivan III, Yury Vasilyevich of Dmitrov, died 23 Levitsky, Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 87. 24 Alekseyev, Sovereign of All Russia, 65. 25 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 288. 26 V. D. Nazarov, “On the Inclusion of the Yaroslavl Reign in the Russian State” [Russian], Rus, Russia. Middle Ages and Modern Times 4 (2015): 68. 27 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 288.

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in 1473. Yury’s lands should have been divided among all the brothers, but Ivan III took them for himself, which made the brothers of the grand duke unhappy. Boris and Andrey the Elder were forced to sign agreements, according to which Yury’s lands remained in the sole possession of Ivan III. At the same time, Ivan III granted Vyshgorod to Boris, and the mother of Ivan III, the Grand Duchess Maria, gave Andrei the Elder the town of Romanov on the Volga. However, the brothers remained dissatisfied with the agreements, and the echoes of this intra-family conflict were felt for many years, especially at critical moments for Ivan III. Nevertheless the right of the grand duke to escheat patrimonies was now introduced into the general rule of Moscow law.28 Ivan III continued the course of Vasily II in relation to Pskov, which Moscow needed as an ally against Novgorod. As it was noted in the previous chapter, in the fall of 1462, the Moscow governor Vladimir Andreevich was expelled from Pskov. A mayor went to Moscow to settle the problem, but by that time Vasily II had died. To show his displeasure, Ivan III refused to accept the Pskov embassy, but then ordered Pskov to figure out for themselves which prince they needed as governor. Pskov decided to ask the prince of Zvenigorod. In Pskov, he was given “the entire prince’s duty,” and he took an oath “according to the Pskov duty and at its people’s will.” As Cherepnin notes, “Pskov’s relationship with the Moscow government was still based on its recognition of the supreme power of the grand duke. The Moscow government, for its part, provided military assistance to Pskov and controlled the foreign policy of the Pskov Republic.”29 Thus, in 1463 the Moscow general F. Yu. Shuisky sent an army to Pskov to organize a rebuff to the Livonians. After a series of hostilities between Pskov and the Livonian Order, peace was concluded for nine years.30 Soon relations between Pskov and Novgorod worsened, since the Novgorodians did not help Pskov during its war with the Livonian Order, explaining that the Novgorod government cared “that the blood of the peasants not be shed.”31 In 1464 or 1465 the Pskovites seized the lands of the Novgorod Cathedral of St. Sophia as a revenge for the refusal of the Novgorodians to help Pskov in the fight against the Livonians. Pskov also wanted to achieve ecclesiastical 28 Ibid., 292. 29 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 842. 30 Ibid., 842. 31 PSRL, vol. 16, 213.

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independence from Novgorod and asked Ivan III to order the metropolitan to send a Pskovite bishop to Pskov.32 Pskov hoped for Moscow’s support in the conflict with Novgorod, but Ivan III was careful. Of course, he would like to take advantage of this conflict, but at the same time, he strove to remain neutral. Novgorod also asked Moscow for military assistance against Pskov, but Ivan III did not want to question the security of the northwestern borders of Russia and refused the Novgorodians.33 In this situation, Novgorod began negotiations with the Livonian Order on joint actions against Pskov. This forced Pskov to negotiate with Novgorod. In 1466 the Novgorod ambassadors arrived in Pskov and in their presence at the city council the peaceful resolution of the Novgorod-Pskov conflict was confirmed.34 In the same year the prince of Zvenigorod left Pskov and Shuisky became the new governor. With whose participation the territory of the city was reorganized in 1468, and a church reform was carried out. The veche approved the corresponding charter, and two church administrators were elected from among the clergy. However, the Novgorod archbishop Jonah did not recognize the charter approved at the veche and demanded the abolition of the reform.35 In October 1469, ambassadors from Ivan III and Metropolitan Philip arrived in Pskov. The metropolitan charter indicated that the authority of the Novgorod bishop over the Pskov church should be restored. At the Pskov veche, the 1648 charter on church reform was publicly burned. Archbishop Jonah took advantage of his new power and indulged in lawlessness in the field of church government. Opposition to the Novgorod boyar government began to grow in Pskov.36 In the meantime, Ivan III focused on Novgorod, where Marfa, the widow of the mayor Isaac Andreevich Boretsky, was in charge of affairs. According to A. L. Yanov, without annexing Novgorod, the newborn Russian state had practically no chance of becoming an organic part of Europe. Simply because the Novgorod empire controlled the entire North of the country (the most

32 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 843. 33 Ibid., 844. 34 Ibid., 845. 35 Ibid., 848. 36 Ibid., 849.

The Origin of the Russian Autocracy developed and prosperous part of at that time), thereby cutting off Russia’s ability to communicate with the West directly.37

Archbishop Jonah died in November 147038 and was replaced by Archbishop Theophilus. Ivan III ordered Theophilus to appear in Moscow for the appointment without any delay, but according to the old customs, as was the case with my father, Grand Duke Vasily, and with my grandfather, and with my great-grandfather, and with all the former grand dukes, from whose family I am, of Vladimir, of Novgorod, and of all Russia.39

Thus, in his address to the Novgorodian metropolitan, Ivan III emphasized the all-Russian significance of his autocratic power, which follows from the very fact of his origin. Outraged by his words, the Novgorod boyars and Marfa Boretskaya signed an agreement with Casimir IV, according to which the Novgorodians recognized Casimir IV as their prince, and he promised to protect them from Moscow, to preserve the veche order, the Orthodoxy, and the privileges of the boyars. Ivan III sent ambassadors to Novgorod with the words: This is my patrimony, people of Novgorod, from the beginning: from our grandfathers, from our great-grandfathers, from Grand Duke Vladimir, who baptized the Russian land, from the great-grandson of Rurik, the first grand duke in your land. And from that Rurik to this day you knew the only family of those grand duke, first of Kiev, and then of Vladimir, up to the very Grand Duke Dmitry-Vsevolod Yuryevich, and then of Moscow, from that grand duke to me. We own you, and we favor you, and we protect you everywhere, and are free to execute you, if you do not start looking at us in the old way. And you have not been with any king or the grand duke of Lithuania since the time the land became yours, but now you are turning away from Christianity to Catholicism, breaking your vows. I, the grand duke, do not inflict any violence on you, nor do I impose any burdens

37 A. L. Yanov, Russia and Europe. 1462–1921 [Russian], vol. 1, European Centenary of Russia. 1480–1560 (Moscow: Novy khronograf, 2008), 124. 38 PSRL, vol. 25, 284. 39 Ibid., 284.

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Then, in March 1471, Metropolitan Philip turned to the Novgorodians: “Do not deviate from the Holy, great antiquity and do not forget the words of the Apostle: fear God, but honor the prince.” However, the Novgorodians did not listen to Metropolitan Philip. The conflict became inevitable. On May 23, 1471, Moscow went to war against Novgorod. The Moscow chronicle collection of the fifteenth century says that Ivan III went against Novgorodians “not as Christians, but as foreign pagans and apostates from Orthodoxy,”41 as “his great-grandfather, his faithful Dmitry Ivanovich, [went] against the godless Mamai and his godless Tatar army.”42 Carrer d’Ancausse notes that the pretext for the war was the accusation brought against the Novgorod authorities that they were being supported by the Pope and Lithuania. But since 1453, with the fall of Byzantium and the unsuccessful attempt of the Florentine Cathedral to reconcile the Western and Eastern churches, the Moscow metropolitan see considered itself the center of Orthodoxy and Eastern Christianity. Thus, the conquest of Novgorod, as well as the conquest of Ryazan, had features of a crusade, which explains its ruthlessness.43

The Novgorod Fourth Chronicle reports: In the year 6979 (1471), the Grand Duke Ivan Vasilyevich fell into anger at Veliky Novgorod, began to gather his army and to send it to the Novgorod lands. At first they took Staraya Russa and burned the holy churches, and burned all of Staraya Russa, and went to Shelon, fighting; the Pskovites helped the prince and inflicted a lot of harm on the Novgorod lands.44

On July 14, 1471, the troops of Ivan III won the battle on the Shelon River. The Muscovites pursued the Novgorodians, they stabbed and flogged them, and the 40 41 42 43 44

Ibid., 285. Ibid., 287. Ibid., 287. Carrer d’Ancausse, Eurasian Empire, 17–18. PSRL, vol. 4, 127.

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fleeing soldiers trampled each other.45 Twelve thousand Novgorodians were killed, and more than two thousand Novgorodians were captured. For the first time, the captured Novgorod boyars were treated not as honorary prisoners, but as traitors.46 On August 11, the Korostyn peace treaty was concluded. On the same day, the Novgorodians were defeated on the Dvina River, where all the suburbs of Novgorod took part in battle. The Novgorod elite begged Ivan III to show mercy, after which he ordered to stop burning and capturing, and to release the prisoners. Novgorodians pledged to pay 16,000 silver rubles.47 In November 1475, Ivan III again arrived in Novgorod and began to judge the local boyars following the complaints of the population. This was an autocratic innovation: in the old days only the Novgorod city veche and the council of masters could judge officials. In 1477, two officials from Novgorod arrived in Moscow. They called Ivan III “the sovereign,” although earlier the Novgorodians called the Moscow prince “lord.”48 This new title meant that the Novgorodians acknowledged their vassal relations to Moscow. Taking advantage of this, Ivan III sent his ambassadors to Novgorod and instructed them to find out what kind of state the Novgorodians wanted.49 The veche speakers proudly answered to Ivan: We bow to you, our lord, the grand duke; but we do not call you the sovereign. Your governors will be judged by the ancient settlement; but we will not have your judgment, nor your officials. We do not give the courtyard of Yaroslavl. We want to live according to the agreement that we concluded with you in Korostyn [in 1471]. Whoever offered you to be the sovereign of Novgorod, you know yourself, so execute them for their deception; here we will also execute these lying traitors. And you, sir, we beat on your forehead, so that you keep us as in the old days, with only the vow of alliance.50

Outraged by this impudent response and the “incorrigibility” of the Novgorodians, Ivan sent on September 30, 1477 a “folded letter” to Novgorod, in which

45 PSRL, vol. 25, 289. 46 Alekseyev, Sovereign of All Russia, 79. 47 PSRL, vol. 25, 291. 48 PSRL, vol. 8, 183. 49 PSRL, vol. 25, 309. 50 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 481.

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he wrote about the beginning of the war.51 On October 9, the combined army of Moscow, Tver, and Pskov went to Novgorod. On December 7, the Novgorod ambassadors arrived. They told the prince: “The veche bell in our fatherland in Novgorod may be destroyed, the mayor may perish, but we will keep our state.”52 On January 15, 1478, Novgorod surrendered; the veche was disbanded. On January 20, satisfied with the outcome of his campaign, Ivan III informed his mother, Grand Duchess Maria Yaroslavna, that he had brought Novgorod “completely to his will.”53 On January 22, 1478, Moscow governors, Ivan Obolensky-Striga and his brother Yaroslav, were sent to Novgorod.54 On February 2, Marfa Boretskaya was arrested. Estates of prominent Novgorodians were confiscated. The Novgorod veche bell was installed in Moscow to ring there along with the other bells.55 On December 2, 1479, Ivan III arrived in Novgorod. Arrests of “the main seditioners” began in the city. According to Borisov, the Novgorod campaign of 1479–1480 “strongly resembled a punitive expedition.”56 New repressions fell on Novgorod in 1481–1482, in the winter of 1483–1484, in the winter of 1487–1488, and in the winter of 1489–1490. In 1489, 7,000 landowners were withdrawn from Novgorod, which, according to modern Russian historians, “seriously weakened appanage separatism.”57 The land fund of Novgorod was used to create a local system. As noted by Dvornichenko, the gross inventory of Novgorod lands, which began by order of Ivan III in 1495, played a significant role in the development of the norms of local law. The census continued after the transfer of Novgorod to prince Vasily (future Vasily III) and ended in 1505.58 Undoubtedly, the subordination of Novgorod to Moscow was not profitable for Poland, which had its own interests in Novgorod. Polish chronicler Jan Dlugosz recalls that earlier the Novgorod land was in vassal dependence on the Polish king and paid an annual tax to his treasury in the amount of 100,000 rubles (annis singulis centum millia ciclorum).59 In his opinion, Ivan III “was 51 PSRL, vol. 6, 207; PSRL, vol. 18, 255. 52 PSRL, vol. 6, 215. 53 PSRL, vol. 18, 265. 54 PSRL, vol. 6, 220. 55 Ibid., 221. 56 Borisov, Ivan III, 275. 57 Ilyin and Akhiezer, Russian Statehood, 384. 58 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 290. 59 Joannes Dlugossius, Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, vol. 12, 1462–1480 (Cracow: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2005), 443.

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vexed by the fact that Novgorod, the most extensive and richest of the lands of Russia … rejected his power and, at its will, … chose and removed its princes and rulers.”60 Dlugosz explained the capture of Novgorod both by the passivity of the Polish king and by the fears of Ivan III that the excessive wealth of Novgorod could in the future push its inhabitants to revolt (divitiis per multas aetates aucta, aliquando in rebellionem verteretur). According to the chronicler, the annexation of Novgorod contributed to the growth of Ivan III’s power, which made him “dangerous to the neighboring peoples” (singulis gentibus per circuitum erat terribilis). Dlugosz concluded that Lithuania was the first to suffer from Moscow’s policy, as it lost part of its territory. The Moscow state was described by him as the main adversary of Lithuania and Poland in the struggle for the lands of Rus.61 Another Polish chronicler, Matthias Mechovius, notes “[Ivan] appropriated Novgorod, the greatest and richest state, for himself, snatched it from the hands of the king of Poland, Casimir III, who left it unattended.”62 According to Karnaukhov, Mechovius does not discuss the reasons for actions of Ivan III and does not give his own assessments. However, his information about Moscow played an important role, since his books circulated throughout Europe and were repeatedly reprinted.63 Ryazan, where Prince Vasily Ivanovich, married to Ivan III’s sister Anne, ruled, did not go unnoticed by Ivan III. In 1483, Vasily Ivanovich died, his possessions were divided between his sons. Ivan received the title of grand duke and two thirds of the principality, and Fyodor received Perevitsk and Staraya Ryazan. Ivan made an agreement with Ivan III and called himself “younger brother.” After the death of Ivan Vasilyevich in 1500, his son Ivan became even more dependent on Moscow. Relations between Moscow and Tver, which was surrounded from all sides by Moscow possessions, were not easy. Upon his ascent the throne, Ivan III signed an official agreement to regulate the relations with his brother-in-law, Mikhail Borisovich of Tver, who turned nine in 1462. Of course, from this treaty, Duke Ivan III received much more than Mikhail.64 While the first wife of Ivan III, Maria (sister of Mikhail Borisovich of Tver), was still alive, the ties between the two principalities were not bad. But 60 Ibid., 443. 61 Ibid., 443–444. 62 M. Mechovius, Chronica Polonorum (Cracow, 1521), 343. 63 Karnaukhov, “Historical Image of Muscovy,” 103. 64 Borisov, Ivan III, 171–172.

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on April 23, 1467, Maria died. Now, nothing could prevent the tightening of Ivan III’s policy in relation to Tver. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that in 1484 Mikhail Borisovich Tverskoy began negotiations with Casimir IV about the possibility of marrying his granddaughter. Dissatisfied with the betrayal of Mikhail Borisovich, in the winter of 1484– 1485 Ivan III organized a campaign on Tver.65 Mikhail Borisovich was forced to enter into negotiations with the grand duke of Moscow. At the end of 1484 or at the beginning of 1485, Ivan III and Mikhail Borisovich signed a final agreement, according to which the prince of Tver passed to a subordinate position in relation to the prince of Moscow and recognized the right of the grand duke of Moscow to those borderlands between the Moscow and Tver principalities, which the latter declared his possessions. In addition, the Tver prince now had, at the request of the grand duke of Moscow, to send his troops together with the Moscow troops against the grand duke’s enemies.66 Immediately after the agreement was signed, princes Andrey of Mikulino and Osip of Dorogobuzh came from Tver to serve the Moscow prince. Ivan III gave Dimitrov to the first of them, and Yaroslavl to the second.67 Chronicles report that representatives of the Tver boyars began to move into the ranks of the Moscow service boyars.68 Cherepnin, not without reason, believes that, “accepting the Tver princes and boyars to his service, despite the situation in the end of 1484 and 1485, the Moscow grand duke prepared a decisive attack on the Tver principality in order to eliminate its independence.”69 The reason for the second campaign of Ivan III’s troops to Tver was the fact that a messenger sent by Mikhail Borisovich with letters to Lithuania for Casimir IV was intercepted.70 The war became inevitable. Ivan III considered the renewal of Mikhail’s negotiations with Casimir a betrayal and on September 8, 1485 he surrounded Tver with large forces. On September 10, parts of the city were set on fire. Tver princes and boyars began to defect to the grand duke of Moscow.71 “Recognizing his own exhaustion,”

65 PSRL, vol. 6, 236. 66 Ibid., 236. 67 Ibid., 237. 68 Ibid., 237. 69 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 893. 70 PSRL, vol. 6, 237. 71 PSRL, vol. 8, 216.

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Mikhail Borisovich Tverskoy fled to Lithuania on the night of September 12, taking his treasury with him.72 On September 12, the Tver boyars and common people opened the city gates to the Moscow army.73 On September 15, Ivan III with his son Ivan Ivanovich the Young entered Tver, where he announced that he would grant this principality to his son Ivan.74 At the same time, a Moscow governor, Vasily Fedorovich Obrazets Dobrynsky, was appointed to Tver. Ivan III brought many Tver princes and boyars to Moscow. With him “This decision,” states Cherepnin, “had the goal of preventing a rebellion of local feudal lords, which could arise in the Tver land with the goal of restoring its political independence.”75 Then Ivan III sent the boyars to Tver, to Staritsa, Zubtsov, Opoki, Klin, Kholm, and Novogorodok to describe the local lands and divide them into taxable portions.76 Karamzin exclaims bitterly: So easily disappeared the existence of the famous Tver state, which since the time of St. Mikhail Yaroslavich was called the grand duchy, and for a long time argued with Moscow about primacy. Its people, yielding to other Russians in industry, were famous for their courage and loyalty to the sovereigns. The princes of Tver had up to 40,000 cavalry troops; but, being enemies of the Muscovites, they did not want to participate in the great feat of our liberation and thus they lost the right for general regret in their misfortune. Mikhail Borisovich ended his days as an exile in Lithuania, leaving no sons.77

As Presnyakov comments, “In the last years of Ivan III there were no appanage or estates on the territory of the Moscow-Vladimir Grand Duchy. It was soldered into a single patrimony of the sovereign grand duke.”78 Thus, the “gathering” of Russian lands within the centralized Muscovite state was basically completed. Formally, Ryazan and Pskov retained independence, but in fact they were completely dependent on Moscow. In order to strengthen the centralized 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Cherepnin, Formation of the Russian Centralized State, 894. 76 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 499. 77 Ibid., 499. 78 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 292.

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state, in 1497 a nationwide Code of Law was approved, which included sixtyeight articles.79 Ivan III is considered to be the “gatherer of the Russian land.” Nevertheless, it is necessary to remember how this gathering was carried out. Ivan III used a wide range of the following methods, from peaceful admonitions and lengthy negotiations to direct military violence and terror. Once this task was completed, the grand duke turned to those ancient Russian lands that at that time belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

6.3.  THE RUSSIAN-LITHUANIAN RIVALRY One of the foreign policy priorities of Ivan III was the struggle with Lithuania, which eastern lands belonged to the Russian princes. Ivan III lured these princes into his service in every possible way, although he himself was against the transfer of his boyars to Lithuania. Pipes notes in this regard: As the territory of Moscow grew, it became possible to escape from the Duke’s long arms only in Lithuania. However, after 1386, any defector there automatically became an apostate, since that year Lithuania converted to Catholicism; this meant that the tsar considered himself to have the right to confiscate the property not only of the fugitive himself, but also of his family and his clan.80

Shmurlo poses another problem: With his title of the “Sovereign of All Russia,” and his energetic defense of Orthodoxy in foreign Lithuania, Ivan III posed a new question: who should be at the head of the united Russian nation, Lithuania or Moscow? For three centuries this question will remain as one of the most inflammatory and urgent. Many years will pass until Russian life will be able to give a satisfactory answer to it.81

79 “Code of Law of 1497,” in Russian Legislation from the Tenth to the Twentieth Centuries [Russian], vol. 2, Legislation of the Period of Formation and Strengthening of the Russian Centralized State (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1985), 54–97. 80 R. Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (Moscow: Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1993), 120. 81 Shmurlo, History of Russia, 98.

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As the Lithuanian princes lost interest in Algirdas’s “all-Russian” program, Ivan III tried to justify his claims to the Russian lands of the Lithuanian principality. In some cases, he conjured statements about the belonging of various Russian-speaking regions to the cities on the Moscow side, in other cases he appealed to historical precedents, in yet other cases he explained the belonging of Russian lands to Lithuania by the “hardships” of the state under the former Moscow princes.82 In 1478, Ivan III announced the “return” of the old Russian lands: Polotsk, Vitebsk, and Smolensk. He also took advantage of the fact that in 1481 Casimir IV forbade the followers of Orthodoxy to build new churches and restore old ones, after which the Orthodox princes began to move to the side of Moscow.83 Ivan III drew the Crimea into the fight against Lithuania, and already in September 1482 Kiev was on fire. Instead of lashing out against Novgorod and Pskov, Casimir IV made peace with Moscow for ten years. In 1492 Casimir IV died. His son John Albert now headed Poland, and his other son Alexander ruled in Lithuania. Hoping for Alexander’s inexperience, Ivan III attacked Lithuania. Alexander thought to solve the problem by marrying Ivan III’s daughter Helena, but the latter declared that “everything he [Ivan] owns is his property,” including the territories taken from Lithuania. On February 7, 1494, Ivan III and Alexander signed an agreement, the main points of which could be summarized as follows. 1) Both sovereigns and their children should live in eternal love and help each other in any case. 2) Everyone owns their lands along the ancient borders. 3) Alexander will not accept the princes of Vyazma, Novosil, Odoev, Vorotynsk, Permyshl, Belevsk, Meshchera, Govdyrev, or the grand dukes of Ryazan who remain on the side of the Moscow sovereign. Ivan will preside over their disputes with Lithuania. 4) Ivan shall release the two princes of Mezets, exiled to Yaroslavl. 5) In case of insults, general judges shall be sent to the border.

82 V. N. Temushev, “Information about the Moscow-Lithuanian Borderlands in the Ambassadorial Books of the Time of Ivan III” [Russian], in Proceedings of the Department of Russian History from Ancient Times to the Twentieth Century, ed. A. Dvornichenko (St. Petersburg: SPU, 2006), 304–305. 83 I. Karatsuba, Choosing Your Own History. Crossroads on the Path of Russia: From Rurik to Oligarchs (Moscow: AST, Korpus, 2015), 68.

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6) The Russian traitors—Mikhail of Tver, the sons of the prince of Mozhaysk, sons of Shemyaka, princes of Borovsk and Vereya—shall not be released from Lithuania, and if they leave, they will not be accepted again. 7) Ambassadors and merchants will travel freely between two states.84 According to Gudavičius, The war of 1492–1494 did not become large-scale, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania lost few lands. However, its moral consequences were much sadder. The Lithuanian state apparently lost, its monarch was humiliated and intimidated. The concluded peace treaty did not provide any guarantees; rather, it made the Russian invasion official. Ivan III showed himself as a strong ruler, and Alexander as the weak one. Their states, one strong and one weak, had to live side by side. Russia openly put forward a longterm political program declaring that part of the Lithuanian state had been illegally annexed, and any peace agreements were a temporary concession, given by the grand duke of Moscow out of kindness. The concept of illegal annexion was determined by the historical past of Russia and the beliefs prevalent in the disputed lands.85

In 1495, the daughter of Ivan III, Helena, married Alexander. The Lithuanians hoped that this marriage would strengthen the peace between the two states, and Ivan III hoped to strengthen the position of Orthodoxy in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. However, Alexander soon detained and accused the Turkish ambassador, who was heading for Moscow, of espionage. In turn, Ivan III wrote to his daughter that his son-in-law was setting the Horde against Moscow and the Crimea. Ivan III was especially outraged by the fact that Alexander called him in diplomatic correspondence only “the grand duke” and not “the Sovereign of All Russia.” Meanwhile, Prince Simeon Ivanovich Belsky fled to Moscow and informed Ivan III that his daughter Helena was being forced to convert to Catholicism. The enraged Ivan III wrote to Alexander: “although the peace treaty says that princes with estates should not be accepted, but since there was no such oppression of faith from you before, and your ancestors never

84 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 515. 85 Gudavicius, History of Lithuania, vol. 1, 494.

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had such a need, we have now accepted Prince Simeon into our service with his fatherland.”86 As a result, a new war broke out with Lithuania (1500–1503), with the Livonian Order on the side of Alexander, and the Crimea and the Khanate of Kazan on the side of Ivan III. In the midst of the war with Moscow, Alexander was elected king of Poland and signed an agreement on the merger of Poland and Lithuania into a single state, which gave rise to high expectations among some of his subjects. Nevertheless, on July 14, 1500, in the battle of Dorogobuzh, the Lithuanians were defeated, and a prominent military leader, Hetman Konstanty of Ostrog, was captured in Russia. He went into Russian service, but then fled home.87 In 1503, Alexander let the grand duke of Moscow know that he would agree to peace with Moscow if he received his “fatherland” back, to which Ivan III replied: “Your royal fatherland is the land of Poland and Lithuania, and Russian land is ours. What we took from you with God’s help, we will not give up. Also Kiev, Smolensk, and many other cities belong to Russia: we intend to obtain those too.”88 Klyuchevsky remarks in this regard: “The idea of the state unity of the Russian land was now turning from a historical memory into a political claim, which Moscow hastened to declare in all directions and present as its inalienable right.”89 On March 25, 1503, the parties signed a six-year truce. Lithuania pledged not to touch the lands of Moscow, Novgorod, Pskov, Ryazan and Pronsk, as well as to cede to Moscow the lands of Prince Semyon of Starodub, Vasily son of Shemyaka, Prince Simeon Belsky, Princes Trubetskoy and Mosalsky, as well as the cities of Chernigov, Starodub, Putivl, Rylsk, Novgorod, Gomel, Lyubech, Pochep, Trubchevsk, Radogoshch, Bryansk, Mtsensk, Lyubutsk, Serpeysk, Mosalsk, Dorogobuzh, Belaya, Toropets, Ostrey—in total, nineteen cities, seventy districts, twenty-two settlements, and thirteen villages.90 Gudavičius notes that as a result of the war of 1501–1503, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania

86 Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (2012), 113. 87 Levitsky, Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 88. 88 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 531. 89 Klyuchevsky, Works, vol. 2, part 2, 111. 90 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 291.

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Between East and West lost a quarter of its territory. The war of 1492–1494 was a kind of a reconnaissance mission conducted by the united Russia. [The terms of] the ceasefire of 1503 showed the planned political aggression of Russia, its undoubted military superiority. The concept of the sovereign of all Russia, put forward by Ivan III, did not leave room for the existence of the Lithuanian state. The pamphlet narratives that appeared in Russian written sources of the fifteenth century, claiming that Gediminas came from the appanage lines of the Polotsk or the Smolensk princes, were now expanded and became the basis for “historical”-political doctrines. They supplemented the opportunistic Tale of the Princes of Vladimir (which existed already in 1523, and must have appeared most likely at the turn of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries), which showed the origin of the Moscow Rurikovichs from the Roman emperor Augustus.91

According to Ilyin and Akhiezer, Ivan III’s policy towards Lithuania and the wars he initiated in 1487–1494 and 1500–1503 contributed to the liberation of the Belarusian and Ukrainian lands from the control of Lithuania and Poland, and the transfer of these lands to the Moscow state.92 Thus, the idea of uniting all Russian lands into a single state continued to live, but the initiative passed from Lithuania to Moscow.93 Why did this become possible? Solovyov names two main factors. First, there was a fundamental difference between the territorial acquisitions of Moscow and Lithuania: Ivan acquired Novgorod, Tver, Vyatka, Perm, a part of Ryazan, and subjugated Kazan; Casimir also acquired lands for Poland and entire kingdoms such as Bohemia and Hungary for his sons. However, Ivan gave all his acquisitions to one son, who through this received the means for new acquisitions, while the occupation of the thrones of Poland, Lithuania, Bohemia and Hungary by Jogaila’s grandchildren testified only to the instant greatness of the dynasty of Lithuanian princes. It did not bring any benefit to their native country, the historical development of which ceased after its merger with Poland.94

91 Gudavicius, History of Lithuania, vol. 1, 508. 92 Ilyin and Akhiezer, Russian Statehood, 150. 93 Levitsky, Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 89. 94 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 153.

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The second factor were the differences in the political structure of the Moscow state and Lithuania: The grand duke of Moscow, became the sole ruler of a vast country and an autocrat. However, the power of the grand duke of Lithuania and the king of Poland lessened. While the Moscow sovereign arbitrarily disposed of the funds of his country, his rival, in fulfilling his intentions, needed the help and consent of the Sejm, from which he had to buy this aid.95

Thus, Ivan III achieved significant success in the fight against the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for the return of the “primordial” Russian lands. However, Smolensk was still inaccessible to Moscow.

6.4.  MOSCOW’S EXIT FROM THE SHADOW OF THE GOLDEN HORDE The main task of the entire life of Ivan III was the exit of the emerging ­Moscow state from the rule of the Golden Horde (Ulus Jochi). The Golden Horde already found it hard to control its territories. Under Tokhtamysh, it remained a single state, but after the defeat from Timur, the process of disintegration began. In the early 1420s the Khanate of Sibir arose, the Uzbek Khanate was formed in 1428, the Khanate of Kazan in 1438, the Crimean Khanate in 1441, the Nogai Horde in the 1440s, and the Kazakh Khanate in 1465. After the death of Küchük Muhammad Khan in 1459, the Golden Horde ceased to exist as a single state. The Great Horde was still formally considered the main among the Jochi states, and it considered itself entitled to continue to control the Russian lands. The grand dukes of Moscow also traditionally perceived the Tatar khans as their overlords.96 However, according to Spuler, Ivan III opened a new active period in Moscow foreign policy. Immediately after ascending to the throne, he teamed up with the grand duke of Tver, Mikhail Borisovich, for a joint struggle against the Tatars. It was Ivan III who was honored to throw off the remnants of the former enemy domination in 95 Ibid., 153. 96 A. A. Gorsky, “About the So-Called ‘Big’ Horde” [Russian], Rus, Russia. Middle Ages and Modern Times 3 (2013): 60.

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From the very beginning of his reign, Ivan III behaved not as a vassal and not as an ally of the Great Horde. For example, he did not appear in the Horde for the jarlig, which was perceived as a direct challenge to Khan Ahmed. In 1465 Ahmed launched a campaign against Moscow, but the Crimean attack confused his plans. In 1471, the inhabitants of Vyatka moved to the Volga, took and plundered the capital of the Horde, Sarai.98 Enraged, Khan Ahmed decided to punish Moscow and, in the summer of 1472, led his troops against it. The Polish king Casimir IV did not fulfill his promise to support the Horde, and Ahmed single-handedly laid siege to Aleksin99 on the Oka river. Ivan III repelled Ahmed’s troops, and the khan was forced reduce the amount of tribute requested from Moscow from 7000 to 4200 rubles. Solovyov believes that Ahmed and Ivan III made peace, since in 1474 Nikifor Basenok brought 600 Tatars and 3200 merchants from the Horde, and 40,000 horses for sale.100 Gorsky reminds that Basenok brought rich gifts to the khan, which were supposed to smooth out the fact of non-payment of the tribute for 1471 and 1472.101 Still, in 1475, Ivan III again stopped paying tribute to the Great Horde. This decision could potentially bring another war, but at that moment Khan Ahmed was busy fighting Crimea. The unknown author of the Kazan Chronicle claims that the reason for the new war was the execution of the Tatar ambassadors, who were sent by Khan Ahmed to Russia to collect tribute. Allegedly, Ivan III refused to pay the tribute to the khan, trampled “the image of his face,” and executed the Horde ambassadors. But not all historians believe in the reliability of this source.102 In the spring of 1480, Ahmed, in alliance with the Polish king Casimir IV, again prepared a campaign against Russia.103 At the same time, the brothers of Ivan III, Boris and Andrey, raised a mutiny, remembering their grievances. In the face of a threat from Ahmed, Ivan III sent Ivan Ivanovich Zvenets-Zvenigorodsky   97 Spuler, Golden Horde, 152.   98 PSRL, vol. 23, 159.   99 PSRL, vol. 18, 242. 100 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 76. 101 Gorsky, Moscow and the Horde, 157. 102 Borisov, Ivan III, 405. 103 PSRL, vol. 12, 200.

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to the Crimea to conclude an alliance with Mengli I Giray against Khan Ahmed and Casimir IV. Mengli I Giray signed an agreement with Moscow, but he included an insurance in the text of the agreement: it contained guarantees of his safe passage to Moscow in case of any misfortune.104 When he learnt about the discord between Ivan III with Boris and Andrey, Ahmed moved to Russia with his main forces, but he marched slowly, waiting for the approach of Casimir IV.105 On June 8, the main forces of the Moscow army went on the campaign under the command of the twenty-two-year-old Ivan the Young, son of Ivan III. In July, Khan Ahmed appeared in the upper reaches of the Don. Upon learning of this, Ivan III went to Kolomna, where he placed his headquarters. According to Borisov, with this choice Ivan III closed the way for the Tatars to Moscow along the Kolomna road. From there he threatened Ahmed’s right flank if he went for a breakthrough in the Serpukhov area. In the same way, Ivan III could quickly transfer his forces towards Ryazan if the khan moved there. Fearing to be hit by a double blow from Ivan III and Ivan the Young, Khan Ahmed led his army towards Kaluga in order to pass through the Ugra. Ivan III sent Ivan the Young and Andrey the Younger to the Ugra106 and ordered them to block all the fords and sailing points.107 The duke himself went to Moscow. On October 3, the Russian troops were on the Ugra. As a result of the competent strategy of the Russian military leaders, including Prince Daniel Dmitrievich Kholmsky, who councelled Ivan the Young, the detachments of Khan Ahmed could not cross the Ugra108 and remained on the right bank of the river. The last battles for the crossing took place on October 11. Ivan III showed hesitation, but made peace with his brothers Andrey and Boris. At this decisive moment, the Rostov Archbishop Vassian Rylo wrote his famous letter, the Message to the Ugra.109 Vassian directly accused the advisors of Ivan III of betrayal, and the grand duke himself of indecision. He called on the grand duke to remember the brave Russian princes, including Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy. Vassian tried to convince Ivan III that the power of the Horde 104 M. V. Krivosheev, “Russia and the Crimean Khanate from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries. Historical and Geopolitical Essays” [Russian], Research Notes of the International Banking Institute 5 (2013): 142. 105 PSRL, vol. 18, 267. 106 Borisov, Ivan III, 403–404. 107 PSRL, vol. 6, 224. 108 Ibid., 224. 109 Ibid., 225–230.

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khans over Russia was illegal, since Batu had come as a robber and reigned over Russia, “although he is not a king, and not from a royal family.”110 Vassian claimed that by opposing Ahmed, Ivan III would break no oaths, since Ahmed’s power was illegal. In contrast, to emphasize the legality of Ivan’s power, Vassian calls him “tsar,” and his state, a “kingdom.” According to Gorsky, the use of such terminology was supposed to emphasize the sovereignty of the power of Ivan III.111 M. B. Plyukhanova suggests that Vassian’s language was strongly influenced by Vissarion, the spiritual mentor of Princess Sophia, who tried to organize a crusade to liberate Constantinople.112 Ivan III was still in doubt and sent his ambassador Ivan Toporkov to Ahmed with gifts, urging the khan to leave and not rob the Russian ulus. Ahmed tried to intimidate the Russians, saying: “God will give you winter, and the all rivers will stand, and there will be many roads to Russia.”113 Considering the seriousness of the situation, Ivan III made peace with his brothers and accepted their conditions: the transfer of the former patrimony of Yury Vasilyevich of Dmitrov. Then princes Andrey and Boris rushed to the grand duke to help, and their arrival decided the matter. Khan Ahmed did not dare to take battle with the united Russian forces and on November 11, 1480 he left the banks of the Ugra.114 Rus sighed freely. Commenting on these events, Presnyakov emphasizes: The events of 1480 were meaningful not only because they ended the dependence of Great Russia on the power of the khan and made the Grand Dukedom of all Russia a sovereign state, in the original sense of the word. They also strengthened and accelerated the elimination of the patrimonial divisions of power in favor of state autocracy. Having got rid of a major danger, Ivan III did not keep the promises he made to his brothers. Only Andrey the Elder received part of Yury’s fatherland, Mozhaysk, but even this was given to him in the form of a grand ducal award, and not according to the rules of division of a patrimony between brothers by order of their

110 Ibid., 228. 111 Gorsky, Moscow and the Horde, 170. 112 M. B. Plyukhanova, “‘Message to the Ugra’ and the Question of the Origin of the Moscow Imperial Ideology,” [Russian] Proceedings of the Department of Old Russian Literature 61 (2010): 465. 113 PSRL, vol. 6, 231. 114 Ibid.

The Origin of the Russian Autocracy mother, the grand duchess.115 … Ownership of specific estates becomes a relic of the dying antiquity. Princes rule their estates in complete submission to the grand duke, in the precarious position of temporary owners, over whom the threat of grand ducal disgrace looms. Any misdeed may be punished with the loss of their patrimony.116 … It depends on the grand duke to give something, not by right, but as a gift or a grant.117

The changes in the relations between Moscow and the Golden Horde did not go unnoticed in Poland. In particular, in the Jan Dlugosz’s History of Poland, Ivan III is characterized as “a great spirit and an active husband” (magni animi et factivi-tatis erat vir), who liberated Russia “from the heavy Tatar yoke” (iugo duro Thartarorum).118 Dlugosz welcomes the liberation of “all Moscow” from the Tatars, because before that Ivan III had to fight against the Catholics on the side of the “Tatar emperor.” Dlugosz describes a humiliating ritual: the Moscow prince was forced to go out to meet the ambassador of the Tatar “Caesar,” who sat on his horse, and humbly give him a cup of mare’s milk, licking the drops that have fallen on the horse’s mane; to spread a precious sable fur coat under the feet of the ambassador; and to listen to the decree of the emperor, which was read by the ambassador, on his knees.119 Matthias Mechovius writes in the same spirit in the Polish Chronicle. He calls Ivan III “a calculating princeps” who conquered those to whom he previously paid tribute, as well as “the lands of Asiatic Scythia, stretching far to the east and north, [represented] by various peoples and languages.”120 At this time, great changes broke out in the Great Horde. Upon his return home, Khan Ahmed disbanded his army. The head of the Nogai Horde, Ibak Khan, with his mirzas Musa and Yamgurchi, made use of this. On January 6, 1481, they killed Ahmed and reported this to Moscow. Having received this information, Ivan III, in a letter to the Crimean khan, Mengli I Giray, expressed the hope that his ally would remain “together with me [in the fight] with every enemy of ours,” regardless of “who will be the king on that throne in Ahmed’s place.”121 115 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 291. 116 Ibid., 292. 117 Ibid., 292. 118 Dlugossius, Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, vol. 12, 442. 119 Ibid. 120 Mechovius, Chronica Polonorum, 370. 121 Pochekaev, Tsars of the Horde, 264–265.

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After the death of Khan Ahmed, the power in the Great Horde passed to his sons Murtaza, Sayid Ahmad II, and Sheikh Ahmed. The new rulers posed a rather serious threat to the Moscow state and the Crimean Khanate. The R ­ ussian ambassadors, who arrived in Crimea in April 1481, did not blame Mengli I Giray for the lack of Crimean support during the war with Khan Ahmed, but asked Mengli I Giray to detain the new ruler of the Horde if he suddenly attacks the Moscow possessions.122 As noted by Pochekaev, at the turn of the sixteenth century, Sheikh Ahmed persuaded the Nogais to plunder Crimea. Mengli I Giray asked Ivan III to send ten thousand soldiers to help him. However, the complete destruction of the Great Horde and the strengthening of the Crimea were not beneficial to Moscow, so Ivan III offered Sheikh Akhmed an alliance and promised even more payments for stopping the raids than his father had received. While the khan hesitated, his subjects went to Crimea.123 The Turkish Sultan Bayezid II requested that Sheikh Ahmed left the possessions of Mengli I Giray and moved to the Southern Bug, but soon Sheikh Ahmed’s soldiers killed the Turkish ambassador, which angered Istanbul. In 1502, Mengli I Giray attacked Sheikh Ahmed and burned Sarai. From that moment on, the Crimean khans asserted their power and began to call themselves the rulers of the “Great Ulus.” Sheikh Ahmed asked for asylum from Bayezid II, but was refused. He ended up in ­Polish captivity, was released in 1527, and died in the Astrakhan Khanate.124 Moscow and Kazan also had a long history of rivalry. Ivan III tried to corrupt the khanate from within, nominating his candidates for the throne. In 1467, the Kazan mirza, dissatisfied with the rule of Ibrahim (son of Mäxmüd), offered the Kazan throne to Mäxmüd’s brother Qasim. With the support of Moscow, Qasim came to Kazan, but did not achieve success with his intrigues. Enraged, he gathered his army to attack the city. In this war, Qasim was supported by Moscow.125 Although Qasim did not secure the Kazan throne for himself, Ibrahim was defeated and agreed to peace on Moscow’s conditions. After his death in 1479 Ibrahim was succeeded on the Kazan throne by Ali (Ilham), who was called Aleham in Moscow. Ali was the son of Ibrahim’s elder wife, Fatima. He had two brothers, Xodayqol and Melik-Tagir. Ibrahim had 122 Borisov, Ivan III, 426–427. 123 Ibid., 281. 124 Ibid., 281. 125 Yu. G. Alekseyev, “Campaigns of Russian Troops under Ivan III: Some Issues of Strategic Leadership” [Russian], in Proceedings of the Department of Russian History from Ancient Times to the Twentieth Century, ed. A. Dvornichenko (St. Petersburg: SPU, 2006), 39.

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two further sons from Nur Sultan (widow of the second Kazan khan, Xälil): Muhammad Amin and Abdullatif. In 1482 Ilham approached the border of Rus. In response, Ivan III gathered an army in Nizhny Novgorod. The parties quickly made peace, but soon Ivan III accused Ilham of violating the agreement. Ilham was also rejected by the Kazan aristocrats who were in favor of his brother, Muhammad Amin, supported by his stepfather, the Crimean khan Mengli I Giray. In 1485, Muhammad Amin expelled Ilham. In 1486 Ilham came back, but in 1487 he gave the throne to Muhammad Amin, who entered into an alliance with Ivan III. In 1489, Ivan III declared to the Nogai ambassadors: Aleham the king was with us in truth, and letters were written between us and him, to be a friend to each other, and an enemy to each other’s enemies. So he said to us and so he wrote down in the letters together with us. But he did not hold to it, and did not work to achieve our good. And we, seeing his untruth, trusting in God, sent [people] to capture him; and by God’s mercy, we imprisoned him. And on that throne in Kazan we put our brother and son, Muhammad Amin the king. Our enemy Aleham the king, by God’s grace, is now in our hands, and we will not let him go.126

D. A. Kotlyarov notes: “Ivan III calls his protégé in Kazan, Mohammed Amin, brother and son, recognizing him as the ruler of a sovereign state, but at the same time, pointing to his subordinate position in relation to himself. After all, he was seated on the Kazan throne by the will of the grand duke.”127 In 1496 the citizens of Kazan transferred the throne to the Nogai Mamuk. Ivan III sent troops to Kazan, but he was convinced of the stability of the situation. Mohammed Amin fled to the Russians. After the death of Mamuk, supporters of the overthrown dynasty nominated Ilham’s younger brother Abdullatif. In May 1497, Abdullatif ascended the throne.128 In December 1501, Ivan III returned Muhammad Amin to the throne, but he grew tired of Moscow’s control. In the spring of 1505, Ivan III sent

126 D. A. Kotlyarov, “‘Serving the Tsar’—Khan Muhammad Amin of Kazan and the Grand Dukes of All Russia” [Russian], Bulletin of the Udmurt University 3 (2010): 24. 127 Ibid., 24. 128 B. E. Nolde, The History of the Formation of the Russian Empire [Russian], trans. L. F. Sakhibgareeva, ed. I. V. Kuchumova and V. A. Tishkov (St. Petersburg: Dmitry Bulanin, 2013), 136–137.

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Ambassador Klyapik to Kazan, but he was arrested. Kazan started a war against Russia, and Moscow began to gather troops in Murom.129 Overall, it can be noted that the disintegration of the Golden Horde has created more room for Moscow to maneuver geopolitically. Moreover, barely freeing itself from the Golden Horde, the Moscow state tried to take control of the post-Horde space.

6.5.  RUSSIA AND WESTERN EUROPE Ivan III quite successfully maneuvered between the West and the East. Under him, the isolation of Russia from Europe, inherent in the Northeast of Russia since the middle of the thirteenth century, became a thing of the past. Contacts were being established with the Papal Curia and the Holy Roman Empire, an alliance with Denmark was concluded, the exchange of embassies with the cities of Northern Italy began.130 After the marriage of Ivan III to Sophia Palaiologos, many Greeks appeared in Russia. Relatives of Sophia, Dmitry and Foma Ivanovich Rale, arrived in Moscow. Nikula and Emmanuel Angelov became the courtiers of Ivan III. The Greeks Dmitry and Yury Trakhaniot also took root in Russia.131 Ivan III maintained good relations with Hungary, where Matthias Corvinus ruled. In 1482, the Hungarian embassy arrived in Moscow. The parties agreed on an alliance against Poland. Ivan III asked the Hungarians to deliver to him: 1) craftsmen who know how to cast cannons and shoot them; 2) “thoughts” (engineers); 3) silver smiths for making large and small vessels; 4) architects for the construction of churches, chambers, and cities; 5) mining craftsmen, skilled in the extraction of gold and silver ore, as well as in the separation of metals from the earth. Ivan III told Matthias: “We have silver and gold, but we do not know how to clean ore. Serve us, and we will serve you with everything that is in my state.”132 At the same time, Ivan III ordered the Moscow ambassadors to monitor Matthias’s relations with Turkey, Poland, and the Holy Roman Empire. In 1489, a representative of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III, Nikolaus Poppel, arrived at Moscow. His king had only recently learned that in 129 Ibid., 137–138. 130 T. V. Chernikova, “The Beginning of the Europeanization of Russia in the Time of Ivan III” [Russian], Bulletin of MGIMO University 5 (2011): 107. 131 Ibid., 110. 132 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 497–498.

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addition to the principality of Lithuania, subject to Poland, there was an independent Russian state in the northeast.133 On behalf of Frederick III, Poppel offered Ivan III the royal crown, but asked to keep this matter a secret from Poland: “The Lendians are very afraid that when you become king, the entire Russian land, which is now under the Polish king, will retreat from him and obey you.”134 In response, Ivan III declared that he did not need anyone’s patronage: And what you have said to us about the kingdom, we, by God’s grace, are rulers on our own land from the beginning, from our first ancestors, and we have the order from God, as our first parents, so do we; we ask God that he will always allow us and our children to be as we are now sovereigns on our own land, and as for ordinances, we have never wanted them to come from others, and so we do not want them now.135

On March 22, 1489, the Russian embassy headed by Yury Trakhaniot came to the Emperor Maximilian. He received instructions from Ivan III: I. Show the emperor, the Roman king Maximilian, and his son the embassy letter. Assure them of the sincere affection of Ivan. II.  Agree on mutual friendly embassies and free communication between both powers. III. If they ask: does the grand duke intend to marry his daughter to the margrave of Baden?—then answer that this alliance is indecent for the celebrity and power of the Russian sovereign, the brother of the ancient Greek kings, who, moving to Byzantium, ceded Rome to the popes. But if the emperor wishes to woo our princess for his son, then he will not be denied and will be given hope. IV.  Search out useful artists, mining craftsmen, architects, etc. in Germany and take them into the Russian service.136

On July 16, 1490, Yury Trakhaniot returned to Moscow with the new ambassador of Maximilian I, Georg Delator. Ivan III ordered Delator to convey to Maximilian his readiness 133 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 134. 134 Ibid., 135. 135 Ibid., 135. 136 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 506.

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Between East and West to be in eternal love and harmony in order to help each other in all cases. If the King of Poland and his children fight with you, my brother, for Hungary, your fatherland, then let us know and we will help you diligently. Also, if we begin [a campaign] to obtain the Grand Dukedom of Kiev and other Russian lands, which Lithuania owns, we will notify you, and you will help us diligently, without deception. Let our ambassadors and merchants travel freely from one land to another. For this, I kiss the cross for you, my brother. In Moscow, in the summer of 6998 (1490), August 16.137

In 1492, Mikhail Snoops arrived in Moscow with a letter from Maximilian I and his uncle, the Austrian Archduke Sigismund, who asked to allow Snoops to study Russian wealth beyond the Urals. However, Ivan III politely refused this request: “From friendship to you, we kindly accepted your man, but did not let him into distant countries where the Ob River flows, because of the inconvenience of the way; for our people themselves, who go there to collect tribute, are subjected to considerable labor and disasters.”138 At this time, Ivan III resumed the struggle for the Baltic States and gave a tough rebuff to Livonia, which attacked Pskov in January 1480. In the winter of 1481, Ivan III himself attacked Livonia and restored the status quo. In 1483, in Narva, Russia signed an armistice with the Livonians for twenty years.139 In 1492, Ivan III laid the foundation of the Ivangorod fortress opposite Narva. Alarmed, the Livonians offered Moscow peace, but the negotiations collapsed when a Russian person accused of a crime was burnt to death in Reval. The Livonians told the Russians: “We would burn your prince too, if he did the same with us.” In response, Ivan III said: “May God judge my deeds and punish my insolence.”140 After that, forty-nine merchants from Lubeck, Hamburg, Greifswald, Reval and Dorpat were captured in Novgorod. The Hanseatic trade in Novgorod was stopped and moved to Riga, Dorpat, Reval, and Narva. In 1493 Russia signed an agreement of “love and brotherhood” with Denmark. According to the modern Danish historian Karsten Pape, this treaty “was concluded between King Hans of Denmark and the grand duke of Moscow, Ivan III, with the aim of jointly conquering Sweden and establishing diplomatic

137 138 139 140

Ibid., 506–507. Ibid., 510. Ibid., 497. Ibid., 518.

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and commercial relations between the two countries.”141 Soon, Denmark and Russia joined forces to start a war with Sweden (1495–1497). As a result of this war, the Danish king became the sovereign of Sweden and gave Ivan III a number of territories in Finland. Ivan III developed close relations with Italy. He hired the famous architect Aristotele Fioravanti, who taught Russian craftsmen to burn red bricks.142 In 1479, Fioravanti completed the construction of the third Dormition Cathedral in Moscow, and then, at the request of Ivan III, began casting cannons. Following Fioravanti, other craftsmen arrived in Moscow: Pavlin Debossis, who cast the Tsar Cannon, and the creators of the Palace of Facets, Pietro Antonio Solario and Marco Ruffo. In 1498–1504, Dmitry Ralev and Mitrofan Karacharov went to Italy, where they were instructed to find “craftsmen.” Soon the necessary masters arrived from Venice, among whom was Aloisio the New, the creator of the Archangel Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin.143 Modern Russian historians suggest that one of the reasons for Italy’s rapprochement with Russia was the desire of the Italians to involve Ivan III in the fight against Turkey.144 Possibly, the plan to marry Ivan III to Sophia Palaiologos was initiated by the Italian “money manager” Jean-Baptiste de la Volpe, who was known during his time in Russia as Ivan Fryazin.145 Thus, under Ivan III, Moscow’s foreign policy underwent significant changes. As Platonov notes: Before Ivan III, the Moscow principality submitted and lost to the pressure of the West; now the grand duke of Moscow himself begins to attack his neighbors and, increasing his possessions in the west, openly expresses his claim to annex all Russian lands to Moscow.146 … Ivan III … was looking for friendships and alliances in Europe. During his rule, Moscow entered into diplomatic relations with Denmark, with the emperor [of the 141 K. Pape, “Title of Ivan III according to Danish Sources of the Late Middle Ages” [Russian], St. Petersburg Slavic and Balkan Studies 2 (2016): 65. 142 T. V. Chernikova, “The Beginning of the Europeanization of Russia in the Time of Ivan III” [Russian], Bulletin of MGIMO University 5 (2011): 112. 143 T. A. Matasova, “On the Goals of the Moscow Embassy in the ‘Italian Countries,’ 1498–1504” [Russian], Rus, Russia. Middle Ages and Modern Times 2 (2011): 55. 144 Idem, “The Unfolding of the Italian Policy of the Moscow Princes in the Fifteenth Century” [Russian], Bulletin of Moscow University, series 8: “History” 1 (2010): 31. 145 E. Ch. Skrzhinskaya, “Moscow Russia and Venice in the Times of Ivan III,” in her Russia, Italy, and Byzantium in the Middle Ages [Russian] (St. Petersburg: Aleteiya, 2000), 215. 146 Platonov, Full Course of Lectures, 167.

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Between East and West Holy Roman Empire], with Hungary, with Venice, and with Turkey. With new strength, the Russian state gradually entered into European international relations and began its communication with the educated countries of Europe.147

*** On October 29, 1505 Ivan III died. Before his death, he divided the state between his sons Vasily, Yury, Dmitry, Simeon, and Andrey. Vasily got two thirds of the country’s territory and sixty-six large cities, while other sons got thirty cities all together. Ivan III also spoke about the fate of escheated inheritance in his will: If any of my sons dies without leaving either a son or a grandson, then all his lands will go to the Moscow land and to my son Vasily of Tver. His younger brothers will not intervene in this. If the deceased has left a daughter, then my son Vasily, having received this inheritance, will give it away [as her dowry] when she is married. And what the deceased has given to his wife—regions, villages, and money—my son Vasily will not meddle with her inheritance until her death.148

Undoubtedly, Ivan III Vasilyevich entered Russian history as the creator of the Moscow centralized state and, at the same time, as the creator of the Russian autocracy. One cannot judge whether it was bad or good for the historical destiny of Russia. This was the historical fact: none of Ivan III’s predecessors spoke so harshly and decisively about the essence and nature of the power of the Moscow sovereign, no one before him claimed complete unconditional domination over other Russian princes. The Yaroslavl, Rostov, and Tver princes lost their former independence, as they went into the service of the grand duke and received from him their ancestral estates as gifts. Accordingly, as noted by Platonov, the status of Ivan III also changed: “Previously, surrounded by the same rulers as himself, Ivan was one of the many appanage princes, albeit the most powerful; now, having destroyed these princes, he turned into the single sovereign of a whole nation.”149 147 Ibid., 167. 148 Spiritual and Contractual Letters, 362 149 Ibid., 156.

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With harsh, sometimes completely illegal, violent actions, Ivan III brought Novgorod to its knees and deprived it of all political sovereignty, including also such important attributes as the city veche. From now on, the Novgorod veche bell was supposed to ring in Moscow along with the other bells. The main foreign policy achievement of Ivan III was the liberation of the Moscow state from the rule of the Golden Horde. Moreover, he began to fight for control over the post-Horde space, interfering in the internal political processes of the new khanates and using them as his allies in the international arena. This grandiose change was noticed by Karl Marx, who writes: At the beginning of his reign (1462–1505), Ivan III was still a tributary of the Tatars; the appanage princes still challenged his power; Novgorod, the head of the Russian republics, ruled over Northern Russia; the PolishLithuanian state sought to conquer Muscovy; finally, the Livonian knights were not yet disarmed. Towards the end of his reign, we see Ivan III sitting on an independent throne; next to him is the daughter of the last Byzantine emperor; Kazan is at his feet; the wreckage of the Golden Horde flocks to his court; Novgorod and other Russian republics are enslaved; Lithuania has been deprived of a number of its possessions, and her sovereign is an instrument in Ivan’s hands; the Livonian knights are defeated. At the beginning of Ivan’s reign Europe was barely aware of the existence of Muscovy, squeezed between the Tatars and Lithuanians. Now, the amazed Europe was stunned by the sudden appearance of a huge empire on its eastern borders. Sultan Bayezid himself, before whom Europe trembled, for the first time heard the arrogant speech of the Muscovite.150

Shmurlo writes that Ivan III stood at the turn of two eras: He is a prince-gatherer, same as his predecessors; he has the same goals, the same methods, and the same means as those. A true descendant of Kalita, he is just as calculating, deliberate, and careful in his actions, he avoids decisive measures, and anything risky, he waits patiently until the fruit ripens completely and falls off by itself. One thing set him apart from his ancestors: he is happier than them. He lived at a time when the fruit was already ripe, and the goal was achieved. There was no reason for 150 K. Marx, “Exposing the Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century,” https://scepsis. net/library/id_883.html.

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Between East and West him to go to the Kulikovo field, fight the Tatars and risk his future: Khan Ahmed will stand on the bank of the Ugra and, without compulsion, will withdraw to his Volga steppes. There was no reason to besiege Tver: it will open the gates by itself and humbly recognize his power. As soon as he approaches Novgorod, he threatens—and the end comes to the veche bell, the end of Novgorod freedom. Without bloodshed and without much effort, rich and vast lands will merge with the ancestral homeland of the Moscow prince.151

According to modern Russian historians, It was Ivan III who outlined the directions along which the Russian state began to expand in the future. It was he who built Ivangorod in the Baltics, sent research expeditions to the north and the Trans-Ural region, pacified Kazan, established diplomatic contacts with some Transcaucasian states, Turkey, and the Crimean Khanate, and began an open struggle with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania for primordial Russian territories. On the international scale, he brought his state to a significantly higher level than before. Denmark, the Holy Roman Empire, and the Italian city-states sought friendship with him. He knew how to think and act on a large scale, with a perspective for the future. He outlined a plan for the development of the Russian state that his son, grandson, and great-grandson, and even the sovereigns of the seventeenth century strove to realize. For all of them, his covenants served as a guide to action, and his deeds served as a role model.152

151 Shmurlo, History of Russia, 97. 152 Bokhanov, Morozova, Rakhmatullin, Sakharov, and Shestakov, History of Russia from Ancient Times to the Present Day, 336.

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Figure 7. Nikolay Semenovich Shustov. “Ivan III Overthrows the Tatar Yoke, Tears Apart the Image of the Khan, and Orders to Kill the Ambassadors” (1862).

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CHAPTER 7

The Last Gatherer of the Russian Land

V

asily III Ivanovich (r. 1505–1533) continued the policy of his father. According to Platonov, “Vasily III inherited his father’s lust for power, but did not have his talents. All his activities were a continuation of what his father did. What Ivan III did not have time to accomplish, Vasily finished.”1 Still, one should not underestimate the personality of Vasily III. He was not just a pale shadow of Ivan III.

7.1.  STRENGTHENING THE STATE POWER Having ascended the throne, Vasily III tried to protect himself from possible political excesses. Ivan III initially saw his eldest son Ivan the Young as his heir. After Ivan the Young’s death in 1490, the same attention was given to his son Dmitry. Dmitry ruled together with his grandfather and was even crowned with royal regalia. After Ivan III’s death Vasily III ordered Dmitry chained in iron. Dmitry died on February 14, 1509.2 Under Vasily III, the formation of autocratic power accelerated. As Shmurlo writes, The external expression of the political independence of the Moscow prince was found in the titles of the tsar and autocrat, which began to come into use in the official papers of that time: under Ivan III, in relations

1 Platonov, Full Course of Lectures, 167. 2 Perekhov, History of Russia, 103.

The Last Gatherer of the Russian Lan with the Livonian and Teutonic Orders and with the cities of Reval and Lubeck; under Vasily III, also with the German orders, and even with the German emperor, with the pope, with Denmark and Sweden (see Herberstein’s testimony), and also in the matters of internal government. Emperor Maximilian recognized Vasily III as the “Caesar and owner of All Russia.” With these titles, the Moscow princes wanted to declare that they were no longer tributaries of the Tatars and were free to dispose of their land regardless of the pressure of outside will, that none of the other sovereigns had the right to interfere in their internal affairs. The modern meaning of the term “autocrat”—an sovereign not bound by laws—developed only after Ivan the Terrible.3

Commenting on the title of Vasily III, Marcin Belsky, a sixteenth-century Polish historian notes in his World Chronicle (Kronika, to jest Historya Swiata) that none of Rurik’s heirs had such a “majestic title.” Herberstein, a diplomat from the Holy Roman, wrote about Vasily III: With the power he has over his subjects, he far surpasses all the monarchs of the whole world. He also completed what his father had begun, namely: he took away from all the princes (principles) and all other (nobility) the fortresses [and castles]. Even to his own brothers, he does not entrust fortresses, not trusting them. He oppresses everyone equally with cruel slavery, so if he orders someone to be at court or go to war or rule any embassy, he is forced to do all this at his own expense. An exception is the [young] children of the boyars, that is, noble persons, with a more modest income.4 … His power he applies to the spiritual as well as to the laity, disposing of the life and property of each of the advisers that he has freely at will; none is so important as to dare to disagree with him or to rebuff him in any matter. It is difficult to understand whether the people, due to their rudeness, need a sovereign-tyrant, or from the tyranny of the sovereign, the people themselves become so rude, insensitive and cruel.5

3 Shmurlo, History of Russia, 90. 4 S. Herberstein, Notes on Muscovy [Russian], trans. A. I. Maleina and A. V. Nazarenko, introduction A. L. Khoroshkevich, ed. V. L. Yanina (Moscow. Izdatel′stvo Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1988), 72–73. 5 Ibid., 74.

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It was not for nothing that the chroniclers called Vasily III “the last gatherer of Russia.”6 In particular, the grand duke of Moscow expanded the fund of state land ownership in Novgorod, where by the end of the fifteenth century, 964 boyar sons had received land gifts, and by the beginning of the sixteenth century, more than 1400 boyar children had served in the Novgorod militia.7 Then Vasily III took over Pskov, even though this city more than once acted as an ally of Moscow and even helped the Moscow princes to conquer Novgorod. In 1509, in violation of custom, Vasily III sent to Pskov his governor, Prince Ivan Mikhailovich Repnya-Obolensky, who began to conflict with the local community. Soon the Pskovites complained to the grand duke of the governor’s oppression. Vasily III summoned the Pskov mayor to Novgorod, where the Moscow boyars treacherously seized them, saying: “You are caught by God and the Grand Duke Vasily Ivanovich of all Russia.” On January 12, 1511, the clerk Tretyak Dolmatov announced the will of Vasily III to the Pskovites: If your fatherland wants to live as in the old days, then you must fulfill my two orders. [First, see to it] that you don’t have a veche and that the bell of the veche is removed. [Second,] you shall have two governors, and in the suburbs there will be no governors. If this is fulfilled, you will live as in the old days. If not, then God will harden the heart of the sovereign: he has a lot of readily accessible power, and bloodshed will be the lot of those who do not act according to the sovereign’s will.8

On January 13, the veche bell called the Pskovites for the last time, and the veche capitulated to Vasily III. The same day the bell was removed. Karamzin writes with obvious sympathy for Pskov: For a long time the Pskovites depended on the sovereign of Moscow in matters of foreign policy and recognized him as the supreme judge, but the sovereign respected their laws, and his governors judged in accordance with them, the legislative power was weighted, and many litigations were decided by the people’s officials, especially in the suburbs. The mere election of these officials was already flattering to the people. By destroying

6 Klyuchevsky, Works, vol. 2, part 2, 107. 7 R. G. Skrynnikov, Great Tsar Ivan Vasilyevich the Terrible [Russian], vol. 1 (Smolensk: Rusich, 1996), 46–47. 8 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 235.

The Last Gatherer of the Russian Lan the veche, Vasily uprooted the entire old tree of the original citizenship of Pskov, although damaged, but not yet dead, still leafy and fruitful.9

On January 24, Vasily III arrived in Pskov. He ordered to expel 300 noble families from the city, and to transfer their lands to the Moscow boyars. Grigory Morozov and Ivan Chelyadnin became the new governors in Pskov. D. I. Ilovaysky argues that Vasily III took with him to Moscow two veche bells: a large one and a smaller one.10 However, while all historians agree that the large bell was used in Pskov to announce the beginning of the veche, there is, as yet, no common view on the origin, the function, and the proper name of the smaller bell. The fact of removal of bells from Pskov had a symbolic meaning: the city lost its autonomy. In 1513, after the death of the childless prince Fyodor Borisovich Volotsky, his Volokolamsk principality was abolished. Five years later, in 1518, Vasily III liquidated the Kaluga principality, ruled by his brother Simeon, as well as the Starodub principality, owned by Prince Vasily Simeonovich following the death of their owners. Vasily III also liquidated the largest Southern patrimony, the Novgorod-Seversk principality, which was headed by Vasily Ivanovich, grandson of Dmitry Shemyaka. Following the accusation made by Vasily Simeonovich of Starodub, Vasily Ivanovich was suspected of sympathizing with Lithuania and unwillingness to fight in the Crimea. In 1517, Vasily Ivanovich proved his innocence, but Vasily III did not hand over Vasily Simeonovich’s messenger to him, saying: “This man was in Lithuania, in captivity and heard about you in Lithuania, so how could he not tell us? We cannot give this man to you.”11 Later Vasily Ivanovich was arrested again. He died in prison is 1529. Soon Ryazan also parted with its independence for good. In 1517, Vasily III learned that the Ryazan prince Ivan Ivanovich intended to marry the daughter of the Crimean khan. Ivan Ivanovich was captured. Moscow governors were sent to Ryazan cities. In 1521, Ivan Ivanovich fled to Lithuania. There, he took possession of the town of Stakliškės, where he died in 1533 or 1534. Thus, the Moscow grand dukes united almost all the lands of Ancient Rus, with the exception of those that were part of the Lithuanian principality.   9 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 552. 10 D. I. Ilovaysky, Tsarist Russia (Moscow and the Tsarist period. First Half of Sixteenth Century) [Russian] (Moscow: AST, Astrel′, 2008), 19. 11 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 281.

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However, some historians believe that the lands annexed to Moscow did not make up a single whole: This is indicated by the absence a united system of taxation. For example, in the Novgorod land, the taxation unit was called obzha, in Perm—luka, in Pskov—vyt′, in the North—malen′kaya soshka, and so forth. In addition, the Novgorod ruler and governor had the right to independent diplomatic relations with Livonia and Sweden. The newly incorporated lands were also ruled separately, by independent state departments led by stewards. The Great Russian lands were managed by the grand steward, who did not mix with the rest of the state officials. This territorial administration, a rudiment of the former fragmentation of Russian lands, persisted for a long time and became a feature of the emerging state apparatus.12

By expanding his possessions, Vasily III tightened his personal political power. His style of government caused serious discontent among the old Moscow aristocracy. The well-known Russian diplomat Ivan Nikitich Beklemishev stated bluntly: “It is better to adhere to the old customs and to favor people and to honor the old; but now our sovereign, having locked himself with three people by his bed, does all sorts of things” (that is, takes important state decisions after consulting with only a small circle of trusted people).13 Beklemishev was publicly beheaded on the Moskva River in 1525. Vasily III also pursued an autocratic policy in relation to the church. In 1511 he forced the Josephite Metropolitan Simon to leave his post. Simon was replaced by the non-possessor Varlaam (1511–1521), and then the Josephite Daniel (1521–1539). Both Varlaam and Daniel were installed by Vasily III without a council.

7.2.  STRUGGLE WITH LITHUANIA FOR THE WESTERN RUSSIAN LANDS After the death of Ivan III, his son-in-law Alexander (the grand duke of Lithuania and the king of Poland) wrote to Plettenberg, the Master of the Livonian Order, that time had come to attack the “enemy of the Christian faith” together. 12 Bokhanov, Morozova, Rakhmatullin, Sakharov, and Shestakov, History of Russia from Ancient Times to the Present Day, 353–354. 13 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 59.

The Last Gatherer of the Russian Lan

Plettenberg suggested waiting for the end of the armistice of 1503. Alexander agreed, but asked to put pressure on Vasily III to make him more compliant.14 However, Alexander underestimated Vasily III, who sought to regain the West Russian lands. As Solovyov writes: We saw that Ivan III had already declared Kiev and all Russian cities his patrimony. Now, the boyars of his son began negotiation demanding Sigismund to return the ancestral patrimony of their sovereign: Kiev, Polotsk, Vitebsk, and other cities, which the king had wrongly appropriated. This demand became common, it became a necessary form in all negotiations with Lithuania. This form has an important historical significance: it shows the nature of the struggle between two sovereigns, one of whom was called the grand duke of Lithuania and Russia, and the other, the grand duke of All Russia. No matter how the negotiations ended, no matter on what conditions a new peace or an armistice was concluded, Moscow considered it necessary every time to present the rightful claims of the grand duke or the Tsar, a descendant of St. Vladimir, to all the Russian lands that now belonged to Lithuania. There was fear that a silence about these rights will give reason to think that the Moscow sovereign forgot about them, refused them. This custom, introduced by the sovereigns of Moscow, is very characteristic of all their policy: once you have assigned yourself a goal, never lose sight of it, constantly remind yourself and others of it. This insistence shows an extraordinary loyalty [of the Moscow princes] to the tradition of their fathers and grandfathers. This loyalty helped the Muscovite state to achieve its goal—to become the All-Russian Empire. What the father took for himself, the son did not refuse.15

The difficult political situation in Lithuania contributed to the success of Vasily III. On August 20, 1506, Alexander died (or was killed) without leaving an heir. Vasily III decided to fight for the Lithuanian throne, since his sister Helena Ivanovna was the widow of the late Polish king. The head of the Lithuanian-Russian party, Prince Mikhail Lvovich Glinsky, also hoped to become the grand duke of Lithuania. However, in October 1506, the brother

14 Ibid., 219. 15 Ibid., 256–257.

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of the late king, Sigismund I the Old, became the grand duke of Lithuania, and the Poles elected him as king on December 8 of that year. As Gudavičius notes, The Poles … emphasized that they understood the renewal of the union [between Poland and Lithuania] precisely as a union, and acted as if Sigismund was simply elected as the grand duke of Lithuania at the same time [that he was considered for the Polish crown]. So, the Lithuanians dispensed with the participation of the Poles in the election of their grand duke, and the Poles ignored his election in Lithuania.16

To survive, Glinsky made a speech before the new king in which he cleansed himself of any suspicion regarding his desire for the throne and promised faithful service.17 Sigismund I requested that “the Grand Duke Vasily conceded all Lithuanian cities, townships, lands, and waters that his father took during previous wars.”18 The king hoped to win over the rulers of the Crimea and Kazan Khanates, as well as Vasily III’s brother, Yury Ivanovich of Dmitrov. However, Yury did not dare to oppose his brother, and Kazan chose to keep the peace with Moscow. On the other hand, after the collapse of the Great Horde in 1502, Crimea was not interested in an alliance with Russia. The war with Lithuania began in March 1507. On August 9, the Russian troops defeated the Crimean army on the river Oka. At the suggestion of Vasily III, the Nogais threatened the Crimea, and the Crimean Khanate withdrew from the war. In February 1508, Prince Glinsky opposed Sigismund I, and in May he went over to the side of Moscow. Vasily III promised to let Glinsky keep all the cities that he would take from Sigismund I, but Glinsky could not take away either Minsk or Slutsk from the king. In September 1508, Russia and Lithuania signed an eternal peace, which confirmed the transfer of the Seversky cities and the surrounding lands to Russia. Vasily III now achieved official recognition of his father’s conquests. Many Lithuanian princes joined the Russian service, including Vasily Glinsky, the future father-in-law of Vasily III. In 1512, Vasily III learned that the dowager Queen Helena was being insulted and made an inquiry to Sigismund I. The king said that there was no 16 Gudavicius, History of Lithuania, vol. 1, 515. 17 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 221. 18 Ibid., 222.

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violence done to Helena, and she was only asked not to go to Breslavl because of the insecurity of border places. But after this it became known that Helena suddenly died.19 The royal secretary Jodocus Ludovicus Decius, reflecting the official point of view of Poland, argued in his work On the Times of the Reign of Sigismund (De Sigismundi regis temporibus, 1521) argued that the death of Helena became the reason for a new war between Moscow and Lithuania. Another reason he mentioned was Vasily’s desire to consolidate his power, especially after he received from Maximilian I, the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the royal title (regia corona).20 Upon learning that Sigismund I was preparing to march on Moscow, Vasily III decided to launch a preemptive strike. The Livonian ambassadors informed Plettenberg that Vasily III declared in the Duma: “As long as my horse walks and my sword chops, I will not give rest to Lithuania.”21 In his campaign against Lithuania, Vasily was joined by his brothers Yury and Dmitry Zhilka, as well as the governor Patrikeev-Schenya and Obolensky-Repnya. In 1513 the Russian army attacked Smolensk and failed. A new campaign against Lithuania was prepared more carefully in 1514. The Moscow prince drew up his plans for the war, considering the intelligence data regularly received from Smolensk through Russian agents. In addition, the Russian army was seriously reinforced with artillery. Vladislav Grabensky, an early twentieth-century Polish historian, claims that German engineers and gunners took part in this military campaign on the side of Moscow.22 In the 1514 war, Moscow was officially supported by the House of Habsburg, which hoped to take Bohemia and Hungary away from Jagiellonian dynasty. As Ilovaysky writes, In the winter of 1514, the Caesar’s ambassador [Schnitzenpeiner] arrived in Moscow directly from the Teutonic Master Albert, where, in the name of the emperor, he concluded a formal agreement with the grand duke regarding an alliance against the Polish king. With a letter of agreement, he went to Germany, accompanied by Moscow ambassadors, and Maximilian swore an oath to confirm the agreement.23 19 Ilovaysky, Tsarist Russia, 24. 20 I. L. Decius, De Sigismundi regis temporibus, vol. 3 (Cracow, 1521), 85. 21 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 556. 22 Grabensky, History of the Polish People, 160. 23 Ilovaysky, Tsarist Russia, 26.

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However, A. I. Filyushkin writes that Maximilian refused to ratify the agreement, and made his own proposal, which in turn was rejected by Vasily III.24 A significant role was played by Prince Glinsky, who traveled around the outskirts of Smolensk, intimidated the Smolensk people, threatened them with the invasion of the Russian army, and promised them blessings if they switched to the service of the Russian sovereign.25 Indeed, Vasily III promised to expand the rights of the Smolensk residents, reduce or abolish taxes and duties.26 According to A. N. Lobin, Vasily III’s consent to the confirmation of all previous rights and the introduction of new preferences to the residents of Smolensk was a serious temptation to surrender the fortress to the mercy of the victor. The second year of the war had shown to many that the “grand duke of Moscow” had significant resources to use towards achieving his goals. The inhabitants, of course, treasured their rights and benefits, which Smolensk received under the kings Alexander and Sigismund, moreover, they were ready to defend them with arms in hand; but it was quite natural that they wanted all their rights to be applied in practice, and not just see them as nice words in the certificates of honor. The freedoms and liberties promised by the king, which were so dear to the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in practice often turned out to be empty phrases. Their privileges could not actually protect the inhabitants from the encroachments of the sovereigns and the mercenaries, who continued to plunder the population with “inhuman cruelty.”27

Finally, Smolensk opened its gates to the Moscow army. On July 31, 1514, Daniel Shenya entered the city and led the people to swear an oath of allegiance to Vasily III, who arrived in Smolensk on August 1. Celebrations of the Russian victory began in the city.28 Karamzin conveys well the spirit of these events taking place in Smolensk: 24 A. I. Filyushkin, Vasily III [Russian] (Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 2010), 200–202. 25 I. B. Mikhailova, “On the Question of the ‘Capture of Smolensk’ in 1514” [Russian], Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana 2 (2011): 44. 26 Ibid., 46. 27 A. N. Lobin, The Capture of Smolensk and the Battle of Orsha in 1514 [Russian] (Moscow: Fond “Russkie rytsari,” 2015), 23. 28 The events associated with the capture of Smolensk in 1514 are in many ways similar to the events around the Crimea in March 2014: in both cases there was a thorough work of

The Last Gatherer of the Russian Lan Surrounded by military dignitaries, Vasily, through crowds of jubilant people, arrived at the palace of the ancient princes of the Monomakh tribe and sat on their throne, among the boyars and governors. There, he summoned the most noble citizens, announced mercy to them, gave them a letter of privilege and a governor, Prince Shuisky, approved property rights, personal security, and freedom, vowed to preserve the statutes of Vytautas, Alexander, and Sigismund, treated everyone to dinner, gave away sables, velvet, damask, and gold coins. Leaving Barsanuphius on the bishop’s throne, he allowed the former mayor Sologub to go to Lithuania, as well as all the royal soldiers, giving out a ruble for each person. To those of them who voluntarily signed up for our service, he gave two rubles and a lunsky [London, or German] cloth. He did not take away the land either from the nobles or the churches, did not bring anyone out of Smolensk, nor a lord, nor a citizen, he assigned a salary to serving people. Happy at heart, the sovereign expressed only love and indulgence to the new subjects, rejoicing that he had accomplished the intention of his great father and had added such a gem to his conquests.

“The capture of Smolensk,” says the chronicler, “seemed like a bright holiday for all of Russia. It is flattering to take away someone else’s things, to the glory of the sovereign alone, but to return their own is pleasure for the people.29 A different atmosphere reigned in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and in Poland. As Gudavičius writes about the loss of Smolensk: Having owned a large East Slavic center for a whole century, Lithuania lost it for another century. This last century determined the belonging of Smolensk to the Russian, and not the Rusyn (Belarusian) people. Having captured this important stronghold, the Russian army moved into the inner regions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. This defeat made a depressing impression.30

military intelligence, a combination of propaganda and military means. The Russian celebrations in March 2014 are even stylistically similar to those of 1514, although these events are almost 500 years apart. 29 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 559. 30 Gudavicius, History of Lithuania, vol. 1, 527.

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According to Ilovaysky, Vasily III decided not to give Smolensk to Glinsky: The grand duke, of course, did not return Smolensk to Russia so as to make it a special region ruled by a native of Lithuania. This ambitious man, having been deceived in his calculations, decided to betray Vasily and go back to Lithuania again, about which he started secret negotiations with Sigismund.31

And yet, Glinsky was not lucky: he was ambushed, captured by Mikhail Bulgakov-Golitsa, imprisoned, and sent to Moscow.32 According to Lobin, with the capture of Smolensk, the prospect of capturing the Dnieper frontier appeared. On August 7, the army of Princes Schenya (Schenyatev) and Vorotynsky moved to Mstislavl. With them were the “princes and boyars of Smolensk,” who were supposed to persuade their former fellow tribesmen to enter the Russian service. The prince of Mstislavl “met them and did them obeissance, so that the sovereign grand duke would have mercy on him and take him into his service with the patrimony, and he vowed allegiance to the grand duke, along with the governor and all his people.” Five days later, Krichev and Dubrovna swore allegiance. These cities surrendered at the first appearance of the Russian horsemen, without even trying to resist, as they had done in previous years, but Orsha held out against the governor from May to September. This can be explained by the fact that the garrison of Orsha was reinforced by Jacob Spergaldt’s mercenaries, while in three other cities there was no infantry.33 Contrary to expectations, on September 8, 1514, Russian troops were defeated near Orsha by the Lithuanian commander Konstanty of Ostrog, who had escaped from the Russian captivity. After that, Sigismund I publicly announced that he had captured eight supreme Russian governors, thirty-seven secondary military leaders and 1,500 nobles, and destroyed thirty thousand soldiers. He wrote to the European monarchs that the Muscovites were not Christians, but Asian barbarians who conspired with the Turks and Tatars to destroy Christendom.34 31 Ilovaysky, Tsarist Russia, 28. 32 Ibid. 33 Lobin, The Capture of Smolensk, 24. 34 Idem, “The Battle of Orsha in 1514 in Modern Belarusian Historiography and the Problem of Criticizing Historical Sources” [Russian], Studia Slavica et Balcanica Petropolitana 2 (2011): 37.

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After the battle at Orsha, some cities came under the rule of Lithuania. The Bishop of Smolensk Barsanuphius and the noble inhabitants of Smolensk wrote to Sigismund I: “If you go now to Smolensk yourself or you send the governor with many people, you can easily take the city.”35 Konstanty laid siege to Smolensk, but could not take it. Shuisky hung the conspirators, except Barsanuphius, on the city walls, in full view of the Lithuanian army.36 On January 25, 1515, the Pskov governor Saburov captured Roslavl. In the spring, Russian troops burned Braslav and Druya, and the Lithuanians and the Crimeans devastated the Seversk land. Next year, the Czech-Hungarian king Vladislaus died and Sigismund I, together with Maximilian I, took custody of Vladislaus’s young son Louis.37 Thus, the military alliance of Maximilian with Vasily III sunk into history. In 1517, Russian troops defeated the Lithuanians at Opochka in the Pskov land and washed away the shame for the defeat at Orsha. On November 1, negotiations began with the mediation of Herberstein. At the same time, Emperor Maximilian wrote to the Master of the Teutonic Order, Albert of Brandenburg: “It is not good if the king is deposed, and the Russian tsar is strengthened.”38 Herberstein urged Vasily III to surrender Smolensk, referring to the example of Maximilian, who surrendered Verona to the Venetians. But Russian diplomats gave a strong rebuff on behalf of Vasily III: “our brother Maximilian, the chosen Roman Caesar and the highest king, knows to whom he gave Verona by Venetian custom, and we do not have that in the custom, nor do we want to have our own fatherland given away.”39 In 1518, Russian troops were defeated near Polotsk, but on August 2, 1519, they won at Sokal. In the meantime, Maximilian died and his negotiations with Albert ended.40 Vasily III promised financial assistance to Albert, so that he could attack Poland. Plettenberg, Master of the Livonian Order, wrote to Albert: “I live near the Russians and I know their custom: they promise a lot, but give nothing.”41 However, the Moscow ambassador Zamytsky brought money, and in 1520 the Teutonic Order attacked Poland, but in 1521 Albert was defeated and concluded an armistice with Poland for four years. 35 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 247. 36 Ibid. 37 Ilovaysky, Tsarist Russia, 32. 38 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 260. 39 Ilovaysky, Tsarist Russia, 34. 40 Ibid., 35. 41 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 567.

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Meanwhile, the Kazan Khanate joint the Crimea and opposed Moscow. Against this joint threat, in 1522, Lithuania and Moscow signed an armistice for five years. Moscow retained Smolensk, but refused to return its prisoners. In 1526, Vasily III turned to the mediation of Charles V, King of Spain, and his brother, Archduke Ferdinand of Austria. The truce between Moscow and Lithuania was extended until 1533. The Roman Curia also offered its mediation to Moscow, hoping to involve Vasily III in the anti-Turkish coalition. Vasily III avoided direct participation in the anti-Turkish league, but entered into negotiations. Although the creation of the anti-Turkish league went beyond the real possibilities of the Moscow state, with the suggestion of a hypothetical participation in a coalition that had not yet been created, Vasily III demonstrated the potential of his country in the European arena. In general, the Western direction of Vasily III’s foreign policy was quite successful. The peace treaty of 1508 with Sweden was extended in 1513 and then again in 1524. In 1509, 1521, and 1531 truces was concluded with Livonia. In 1514, a ten-year truce was concluded with the Hanseatic cities. The German merchants received their trading grounds and their church back. The Hansa promised not to offend the Russian churches and districts in its cities. In 1511, an alliance was concluded with John, king of Denmark, and in 1517 with the new king Christian. Danish merchants were allowed to create trading grounds in Novgorod and in Ivangorod.42 In 1507, a ship arrived in Moscow from Denmark with a large amount of military cargo: copper, lead, tin, gunpowder, and molds for casting guns. In 1513, Italians arrived from Lubeck with experience in sieging fortresses. In 1528, the embassy of E. Trusov and T. Lodygin, with the assistance of the Pope, hired a bombardier foundry master.43 Francesco Da Collo wrote about the Moscow’s acceptance of foreign service: Foreigners from any country are freely allowed to enter the country, and moreover, they are not only welcomed, but also showered with favors; the prince immediately commands them to be dressed in the best clothes and to make them comfortable; if they are artisans, they should be engaged in the corresponding art, but if they are soldiers, they are especially pampered.44 42 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 275. 43 O. V. Skobelkin, “Hiring Foreigners for Military Service by the Moscow State in the Sixteenth Century” [Russian], VSU Bulletin, series “History. Political Science. Sociology” 2 (2010): 159. 44 F. Da Collo, Reporting about Muscovy [Russian] (Moscow: Nasledie, 1969), 58.

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But not all foreigners thought so. For example, Herberstein argued that only those “who, knowing nothing of their customs, would believe their promises and gifts,” go to Moscow.45

7.3.  MOSCOW’S STRATEGY TOWARDS KAZAN Relations between Moscow and Kazan were very difficult and contradictory. Khan Muhammad Amin refused to recognize Vasily III, and the grand duke went to war against Kazan, but in 1506 both of Moscow armies were defeated. Tatishchev explained these defeats by the unsuccessful command of Vasily III’s brother, Dmitry Ivanovich Zhilka, prince of Uglich: When the military commanders came to Moscow, the grand duke asked them what happened near Kazan and how it came to pass that so many soldiers were killed, wanting to find some fault with the commanders. But they complained about Prince Dmitry Ivanovich, saying that he did not listen to them and insulted hs commanders, and, having done badly, did not go to Moscow, but went straight to Uglich. The grand duke sent for him and intercepted him in Pereyaslavl-Zalessky, commanding to guard him closely.46

Kazan offered Lithuania to conclude an alliance against Moscow, and Lithuania agreed. However, Muhammad Amin understood that Moscow has more resources than Kazan. Therefore, already in 1507, having received assurances of peaceful intentions from Moscow, he freed Ambassador Klyapik and refused an alliance with Lithuania, especially since Prince Alexander died in 1506 and Sigismund I the Old (r. 1506–1548) came to power (he was crowned on January 20, 1507). In 1518, Muhammad Amin died, and the citizens of Kazan asked Moscow to send Abdullatif to Kazan. Abdullatif had initially come to Moscow as a captive, and then Yuryev was granted to him. In return, the citizens of Kazan promised to consult with Moscow on the issue of electing their rulers. Vasily III did not believe these promises and did not release Abdullatif, giving him Kashira instead.47 Mehmed I Giray, who ascended the Crimean throne in 45 Herberstein, Notes on Muscovy, 108. 46 V. Tatishchev, Russian History [Russian], vol. 3 (Moscow: AST Ermak, 2005), 479. 47 B Nolde, The History of the Formation of the Russian Empire, 139–140.

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1515, also supported Abdullatif. However, Vasily III made a bet on the Qasim’s prince Shah Ali (Shahghali), who belonged to the anti-Crimean branch of the Borjigin. In April 1519, Shah Ali ascended the Kazan throne. However, knowing that his elevation was due to the will of the grand duke of Moscow as approved by the meeting of the all-Russia council in 1519, the young Shah Ali Khan did not enjoy his authority. As noted by Solovyov, Shah Ali aroused the dislike of the Kazan people by the fact that in everything he preferred the benefits of the Moscow prince to their own, relying on the governor who was with him. As a result of this state of affairs, suggestions from the Crimea found easy access, the nobles drew up a conspiracy, and when in the spring of 1521 Mehmed I Giray’s brother, Sahib, appeared with the Crimean army at Kazan, the city surrendered to him without resistance. Shah Ali and the grand duke’s governor were given freedom to leave for Moscow, but the ambassador and Russian merchants were robbed and detained.48

Thus, with the support of the Crimean Khan Mehmed I Giray and his suzerain, the Turkish Sultan, Sahib I Giray ascended the Kazan throne. Sahib I Giray was initially aggressive towards the Moscow state. On May 26, 1521, the Tatars and the Mari plundered the Unzha lands, and on July 4 they laid siege to the city of Unzha. The active actions of the new Kazan khan were supported by the Crimea. At the end of June 1521, the Crimean khan suddenly crossed the Oka and struck a blow at the Russian army, located in the region of Serpukhov and Kashira. The Moscow forces under the command of Prince Dmitry Belsky were overturned by the superior forces of the enemy. The Crimeans broke into the deep regions of Moscow’s Russia, plundering them.49 On June 29, Moscow was in a state of siege, as the population from the devastated regions fled to the capital. Panic gripped the country. Vasily III entrusted the defense of Moscow to his son-in-law, the Tatar prince Peter, while he fled to Volokolamsk and began negotiations with the Crimean khan. Having accepted Vasily’s gifts, Mehmed I Giray promised to lift the siege and leave if Vasily pledged to be the eternal tributary of the Crimean

48 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 265. 49 Ibid., 265.

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khan, “what his father and ancestors were like.”50 This document was signed, but later it was stolen from the Crimeans by the Ryazan governor Ivan Vasilyevich Khabar, for which he received the rank of boyar. After the capitulation of Moscow, the slave markets of Astrakhan, Kafa, and Istanbul were filled with Russian captives. According to Solovyov, there were exaggerated rumors that the Crimeans had captured over 800 thousand people. Such booty pushed the Crimean khan to new campaigns against the Moscow state.51 In the spring of 1523, Sahib I Giray ordered the assassination of the Moscow envoy Vasily Yuryevich Podzhogin, which was a de facto declaration of war. The government of Vasily III began preparing a new campaign against Kazan. To this end, the Moscow army advanced towards the Sura River, which was then the border between the Moscow state and the Khanate of Kazan.52 There, the construction of Vasilsursk (Vasilgrad) began.53 Before the year’s end, “the goal of the 1523 campaign was achieved. Having subdued the population of those areas of the khanate, which supplied people for the most combat-ready part of the khan’s army, the Moscow warriors swore in the Kazan Mordovians and Mari people, as well as the Tatars.”54 In Vasilgrad, a military garrison remained under the command of A. S. Strigin-Obolensky, V. Saltykov, and M. Bokeev. On May 12, 1524, Vasily III again sent an army to Kazan, which was nominally led by Shah Ali, and in fact commanded by Belsky.55 Expecting war, Sahib I Giray asked the Crimean Khan Saadet I Girey for help in December 1523. Saadet I Giray sent no help,56 but he promised to threaten Moscow with a potential conflict with the Ottoman Empire.57 Facing the threat of an inevitable war with Russia, Sahib I Giray renounced the Kazan throne in 1524 and returned to Crimea, where he became khan in 1532.58 His nephew Safa Girey, thirteen years old in 1524, became the Kazan khan and ruled until 1549.59 50 Krivosheev, “Russia and the Crimean Khanate,” 47–48. 51 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 267. 52 B. Khamidullin, “The Gireys on the Kazan throne: The Era of National Revival” [Russian], Gasirlar avazy—Echo of Centuries 1–2 (2016): 4. 53 D. A. Kotlyarov, “‘The Whole Land of Kazan’ in 1521–1551” [Russian], Ancient Russia: In Time, in Individuals, in Ideas 5 (2016): 378. 54 I. B. Mikhailova, “Moscow and Kazan: Military Campaigns of 1523 and 1524” [Russian], Bulletin of the Leningrad State University named after A. S. Pushkin 4, no. 2 (2015): 37. 55 Ibid., 38. 56 Ibid., 39. 57 Kotlyarov, “‘The Whole Land of Kazan’ in 1521–1551,” 379. 58 Khamidullin, “The Gireys on the Kazan Throne,” 4. 59 Nolde, The History of the Formation of the Russian Empire, 143.

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In the same year, the Turkish ambassador to Moscow declared that Kazan was under the protection of the Ottoman Empire. The very presence of the Giray dynasty, who originated from the Ottoman-dependent Crimea, on the Kazan throne meant that the Ottomans had the opportunity to appoint the Kazan khan.60 In response, Vasily III laid siege to Kazan, but failed. According to Karamzin, the Russian soldiers could have taken the city, but they coveted rich gifts and “left the land of Kazan without glory and with a disease from which many people died, so that hardly half of the army survived. The main commander, Prince Ivan Belsky, lost the sovereign’s mercy, but the metropolitan asked the grand duke to forgive him.”61 Russians lost almost all ships and more than fifty thousand soldiers, and Kazan, at least forty-five thousand soldiers, that is why an armistice was concluded.62 On November 15, 1524, the Kazan ambassadors, Ulan Appai and Prince Bakhty-Kilday came to Moscow with a petition “from all the land of Kazan stating their guilt and [complaining] about King Safa Giray. And the sovereign granted their petition and their request. And in March he sent his ambassador to Kazan, Prince Vasily Danilovich Penkov, along with Deacon Ofonasya Kuritsyn.”63 Following this petition, Vasily III agreed to the rule of Safa Girey in Kazan, with the formal submission of the Kazan people to the grand duke’s will. The embassy sent to Kazan in March 1525 conveyed a statement from the grand duke about the transfer of commerce from Kazan to Nizhny Novgorod. In order not to provoke a new campaign, the citizens of Kazan agreed to this condition, which undoubtedly dealt a strong blow to the economic interests of the Khanate of Kazan. Apparently, this event determined the delay of the signing of the peace treaty from Kazan’s side.64 In March 1526, Kazan ambassadors, princes Kazy and Chura and bakshi (ambassador) Tevel, arrived in Moscow. In 1528, new ambassadors arrived from Safa Girey, princes Tabai and Dana, and bakshi Ibrahim. The second embassy declared that the khan admitted some grievances he inflicted on the grand duke, and wanted to correct himself. The Kazan ambassadors returned to their homeland together with the grand ducal ambassador Andrey Pilyemov, before whom they swore an oath supported by a written šert (contract) 60 History of Russian Foreign Policy from Late Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Century, 136. 61 Karamzin, History of the Russian State, 574. 62 Khamidullin, “The Gireys on the Kazan Throne,” 4. 63 Kotlyarov, “‘The Whole Land of Kazan’ in 1521–1551,” 379. 64 Ibid., 379–380.

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signed by “the king and all the land of Kazan.” Safa Girey sent princes Mamysh, Kurat, and Shir Mergen Chyurachikov to Moscow. In response, Vasily III sent Prince Ivan Fyodorovich Paletsky to Kazan. But Paletsky only reached Nizhny Novgorod, when the news was received that Safa Girey “broke his truth and oath and inflicted great dishonor on the ambassador of the grand duke, Andrey Pilyemov.”65 To avenge this dishonor, it was decided to march to Kazan in May 1530. On July 16, the assault on Kazan began. The Tatar army left the city, headed by the eldest son of Mirza Mamai, along with Prince Yaglych, as well as the Astrakhan Tatars. The Moscow regiments won this battle. The Kazan people sent out envoys, led by Prince Bulat, and Ulan Appai and Prince Tabai admitted their guilt. The envoys vowed to send an embassy to Moscow, “not leave the side” of the Moscow sovereign, and not to appoint a khan, waiting for the grand duke to “grant” one to them. Having accepted the proposals of the Kazan citizens, the army returned to Moscow.66 At the end of 1530, Kazan ambassadors, Prince Tabai, Prince Tevekel, and bakshi Ibrahim, arrived to Vasily III with a petition on behalf of the khan, the other princes, and “from all the people of the Kazan land” who desired to improve relations between Moscow and the Kazan Khanate. At the direction of Vasily III, who wished to avoid bloodshed from both the Russian and Kazan sides, šert notes were written, on which the Kazan diplomats swore. An agreement was reached about the return of Russian prisoners and artillery captured by Kazan in 1530.67 The Russian ambassador Ivan Polev brought this treaty to Safa Girey, but the khan refused to approve the treaty and almost executed the ambassador. Soon Safa Girey fled from Kazan, and on June 29, 1532, Vasily III’s protege, the fifteen-year-old Jan Ali, came to power. The situation has temporarily stabilized. As Kotlyarov states, “The Khanate of Kazan again found itself in the sphere of political influence of the Moscow state. The new khan was too young to have a real impact on the internal life of the Kazan state. On his behalf, the Princess Gawharshat, Prince Bulat Shirin, and Mirza Kachig Alei administered the affairs of the state.”68 Regular diplomatic relations were established between 65 66 67 68

Ibid., 380. Ibid., 380. Ibid., 381. Ibid., 382.

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the Moscow Rus and the Khanate of Kazan. In the fall of 1532, the inhabitants of the Kazan Khanate swore loyalty to the Moscow sovereign and corresponding letters were signed by the khan, the nobility, and by the “the whole land of Kazan.”69 In fact, the Khanate of Kazan became a Moscow protectorate.70

7.4.  THEORY “MOSCOW, THIRD ROME” O. V. Volter notes that the idea of a new Orthodox capital appeared in the South Slavic lands as early as the fourteenth century.71 P. N. Milyukov mentions that the Bulgarian Tsar Alexander and the Serbian Tsar Stefan Dusan dreamed of conquering Constantinople and creating a Serbian-Greek or a Bulgarian-Greek empire. Both called themselves “tsars” and “autocrats.” After the Turks conquered the “new” Constantinople, Tarnovo in Bulgaria, in 1393, the Southern Slavs began to look for a new source of eschatological hopes. This source was Moscow, the capital of another Orthodox country.72 After the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 1453, the grand duke of Moscow was firmly perceived as the main defender of global Orthodoxy, and Moscow, as a “new Constantinople” or the “Third Rome.” In Russia, the foundations of the concept of the “Third Rome” were laid by Metropolitan Zosimus. In his work Exposition of the Easter Cycle (1492), he traced the line of succession from Jerusalem to Constantinople to Moscow. Zosimus begins his reasoning by saying that the completion of the cosmic cycle (7000 years) returns the world to the “initial time.” He recalls a Gospel prophecy: “But many who are first will be last, and many who are last will be first,” and gives his own interpretation: “the first” are the Greeks, and now, when the first 7000 years after the creation of the world have passed, the Greeks must become “the last,” and their role is transferred to Russia. “And now … the blessed and Christ-loving Grand Duke Ivan Vasilyevich, the sovereign and autocrat of all Russia, [shall become] the new Emperor Constantine to the new city of

69 Ibid., 383. 70 Khamidullin, “The Gireys on the Kazan Throne,” 5. 71 O. V. Volter, “Russian National Ideology of the Period of Strengthening of Russia as a Centralized State—the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth Centuries” [Russian], News of Higher Educational Institutions. Sociology. Economy. Politics 1 (2009): 29. 72 M. V. Paleolog and S. M. Chistova, “‘Imperium sacrum’ as a Spiritual and Political Basis of the Russian Imperial Paradigms” [Russian], Forestry Bulletin 4, no. 19 (2015): 153.

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Constantine—Moscow and the entire Russian land and many other lands of this sovereign.”73 The concept of “Moscow, Third Rome” was also developed in the Epistle to the Stargazers by Elder Philotheus, a monk of the Pskov Eleazarov Monastery, written around 1523 and addressed to the clerk M. G. Munekhin (also called Misyur), who was the emissary of the Moscow grand duke in Pskov. It also appears in his letters to Vasily III and Ivan IV. It should be noted that such high-ranking monks (called “elders”) considered themselves entitled to send messages and instructions to the Moscow grand dukes in order to warn them of impending political cataclysms and suggest ways and methods of strengthening the Moscow state. According to N. V. Sinitsyna, the immediate reason for writing the Epistle was the then widespread astrological predictions about the allegedly impending global change in 1524. These predictions came to Russia as well, causing concern in church and government circles. It was necessary to refute them. Elder Philotheus wrote one such refutation. Another was authored by Maximus the Greek, who approached the problem from a theological standpoint. He contrasted astrological determinism with the thesis about free will of man and about divine providence, which directs the entire life of mankind. This leaves no room for the influence of heavenly bodies.74 Interestingly, Philotheus also touches upon the theme of stars, but he thinks rationally and skeptically asserts that “all that is blasphemy and fables.”75 His main goal is to explain that after the fall of Constantinople, the function of the Christian Roman Kingdom passed to Russia. Philotheus denies for the “Latins” (Catholics) the right to succession of the “Roman Kingdom,” and confirms that the Orthodox Moscow possesses this right, for “if we worshiped incorrectly, the Lord would not have taken care of us.”76 In his opinion, one cannot rely on the “seduction” of Catholics, for they are heretics who, of their own free will, rejected the Orthodox Christian faith, in which they had been for 770 years. They were deceived (“flattered”) by the Emperor 73 Documents of Old Russian Canonical Law [Russian], part 1, Documents from the Eleventh to the Fifteenth Century, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiya M. A. Aleksandrova, 1908), 798–799. 74 N. V. Sinitsyna, “Third Rome. The Story of One Idea” [Russian], interview by Vitaly Kaplan, September 6, 2014, http://foma.ru/tretij-rim.html. 75 Elder Philotheus, “Message about Unfavorable Days and Hours” [Russian], in Russian Idea: Collection of Works of Russian Thinkers, ed. E. A. Vasilyev, foreword A. V. Gulyga (Moscow: Airis-press, 2002), 26. 76 Ibid., 27.

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Charlemagne and the Pope Formosus. The essence of the theory “Moscow, Third Rome: is set out in the words of Philotheus about the reign of Vasily III, where he explains that the Moscow monarch is now the only true ruler of the world: … Let’s say a few words about the current glorious reign of our most luminous and high-throne sovereign. In the whole celestial empire, he is, for Christians, the only the tsar and preserver of God’s holy thrones: the holy universal apostolic church, which arose instead of the Roman and Constantinople [churches] and exists in the God-saved city of Moscow, the church of the holy and glorious Dormition of the Most Pure Theotokos, which alone in the universe shines brighter than the sun. So know, Godlover and Christ-lover, that all Christian kingdoms have come to an end and have come together in the single kingdom of our sovereign, according to the prophetic books, and this is the Russian kingdom. Two Romes fell, and the third is standing, and the fourth will never be. The Apostle Paul many times mentions Rome in the epistles; in his interpretations he says: “Rome is the whole world.”77

Soon after the epistles of Elder Philotheus were republished in Russia in 1861, heated discussions began in scholarly communities about the theory of “Moscow, the Third Rome.” Thus, V. S. Ikonnikov in his work Experience of Research of the Cultural Significance of Byzantium in Russian Historiography (1869) proposed to consider the concept of the Third Rome in the context of the development of the imperial ideology of Russia. For him, Philotheus’s doctrine was evidence of the birth of a new Moscow ideology: Byzantium fell, Moscow took its place, and Philotheus expressed a new understanding of the role of Muscovy as a third empire in world history.78 In 1917, the idea of “Moscow, Third Rome” became strikingly relevant. According to N. Berdyaev, the “Third Rome” was now the Communist International with its messianic idea of communism. Berdyaev interpreted this substitution as a crisis of the Russian messianic idea:

77 Ibid., 30. 78 According to “‘Moscow, Third Rome’: The History of a Speculation,” http://arzamas.academy/ materials/324, which summarizes Marshall Poe, Moscow, the Third Rome: The Origins and Transformations of a “Pivotal Moment” (Washington: The National Counci for Soviet and East European Research, 1997).

The Last Gatherer of the Russian Lan The Russian people did not realize the messianic idea of Moscow as the Third Rome. The religious schism of the seventeenth century showed that the Moscow kingdom was not the Third Rome. Least of all, of course, the Petersburg empire was the implementation of the idea of the Third Rome. There was a crisis. The messianic idea of the Russian people could take either an apocalyptic or a revolutionary form. And then an amazing event took place in the fate of the Russian people. Instead of the Third Rome, Russia managed to implement the Communist International, and many features of the Third Rome were transferred to the Communist International. The Communist International is also a sacred kingdom and it is also based on Orthodox faith. The Communist International is not an International, but a Russian messianic idea. This is the transformation of Russian messianism. There is an identification of two messianisms, the messianism of the Russian people and the messianism of the proletariat. The Russian workers’ and peasants’ people is the proletariat, and the entire world proletariat, from the French to the Chinese, becomes the Russian people, the only people in the world.79

Modern Russian researchers pay considerable attention to the concept “Moscow, Third Rome.” A. N. Bokhanov notes that Philotheus was well aware of important milestones in the history of Christianity associated with the unity and the separation of the Orthodox and the Catholic churches. Philotheus speaks not just of the “separation” of the churches, but of the “falling away” of the Western Church from Orthodoxy, that is, of the heretical temptation that caused the collapse of the first Rome. The second Rome, the Orthodox Constantinople, was punished with complete desruction after the betrayal of Orthodoxy and the transition to “Latinism.” Philotheus connects the concepts of “falling away” and “fall” in the sense of “destruction,” as he explains that the reasons for the collapse of the first and second Romes were not historical or political but spiritual.80 According to Uspensky, the “Roman Kingdom,” embodied in the Moscow state, is understood as a kingdom where the true Christian faith is preserved. The concept of Rome takes on an ideal meaning: Rome is where the Lord is.81 79 N. A. Berdyaev, The Origins and Meaning of Russian Communism [Russian] (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo “E,” 2017), 467. 80 Bokhanov, Autocracy, 216. 81 Uspensky, Sketches on Russian History, 103–104.

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The “Third Rome” is not just Moscow—it is the Russian kingdom centered in Moscow, the Russian Church, and its main see, the Kremlin’s Dormition Cathedral. Z. V. Udaltsova notes that the theory “Moscow, Third Rome” suited the West, since the declaration of Moscow as the heiress of the Byzantine Empire inevitably pushed Russia against Turkey. The European states and the papal throne were already interested in including Russia in the anti-Turkish coalition, and the dynastic marriage of Ivan III to Sophia Palaiologos was supposed to reinforce the Russian claims to the role of the successor of Byzantium.82 For N. S. Zhukov, the concept “Moscow, Third Rome” was intended “to consolidate the official ideology and policy of the autocratic state, to give it a national and isolationist character, to separate it from from Europe.”83 The new ideology was supposed to reflect the growth of Russian patriotic consciousness after the liberation from the Golden Horde and the fall of Constantinople. It also reflected the transition to a centralized state. The “Third Rome” theory was developed for internal use and was not perceived as a foreign policy doctrine or as a plan for the conquest of Constantinople.84 A. S. Usachyov notes that the concept of “Moscow, Third Rome,” formulated by Philotheus in the sixteenth century, did not immediately become widespread in Moscow’s Russia. This is due to two circumstances. First, Philotheus was only one of a number of writers who, in one way or another, influenced the formation of the Muscovite ideology. Secondly, the “provincial” status of Philotheus also played a role: he was not included in the circle of scribes grouped around the Moscow metropolitans, with whom the origin of the key documents of that time, the Nikon Chronicle, the Wedding Rite, and the Book of Royal Degrees, was associated. This determined the marginal status of his mythologeme, which is not recorded in the largest monuments of historical and political thought of this time. It appears only in separate sources of the late sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries, and after the schism in the Russian Church it exists in the marginal group of Old Believers.85

82 Udaltsova, “Responses to the Conquest of Constantinople,” 21. 83 N. S. Zhukova, “The Essence of the State Ideological Concept ‘Moscow, Third Rome’” [Russian], Philosophy of Law 4 (2010): 116. 84 Sinitsyna, “Third Rome,” 243. 85 A. S. Usachyov, “Third Rome or Third Kiev? (Moscow Kingdom of the Sixteenth Century in the Perception of Contemporaries)” [Russian], http://opentextnn.ru/old/history/historiografy/index.html@id=4864.

The Last Gatherer of the Russian Lan

Overall, the concept “Moscow, Third Rome” came to foreground at the most important turning points in Russian history. Each time, it had its ardent adherents as well as harsh critics. This concept was in demand in the Time of Troubles and in the era of Peter the Great, when the Russian Empire arose, and St. Petersburg acted as the new Third Rome. With each century, the theory “Moscow, Third Rome” was more and more filled with geopolitical content, reflecting the growing ambitions of the Russian state, which sought to expand its borders. *** The main threat to the political stability of Moscow was the absence of an heir to Vasily III. In such a situation, the transition of the Moscow grand ducal throne to the brother of Vasily III, prince Yury of Dmitrov, became real. Vasily III could not agree with this outcome of events. To change the situation, Vasily III forced his wife Solomonia Yuryevna Saburova to become a nun, and in 1526 he married the niece of the imprisoned Mikhail Lvovich Glinsky, Elena Vasilyevna Glinskaya. Maximus the Greek and the other members of Vaily’s circle all objected to this marriage. But Vasily III was supported by Metropolitan Daniel and Vassian Toporkov, Bishop of Kolomna. On August 25, 1530, an heir, Ivan, was born to Vasily III, although rumor attributed the paternity to a boyar called Ovchina-Telepnev-Obolensky. Taking care of the continuation of his line, Vasily III concluded an agreement with his brother Yury in 1531, according to which Yury renounced his claims to the throne, and swore allegiance to Vasily III and his son Ivan. Vasily III died on the night of December 3–4, 1533, having managed to establish a boyar commission, which was called upon to preserve the order of governing the country. Yet, Vasily III’ hopes for stability in the country did not come true. How to assess the results of the reign of Vasily III? First, one can agree with many historians who note that the reign of Vasily III was a direct continuation of the policy of his father Ivan III and the previous Moscow princes. Solovyov noted: For a long time, all the princes of Moscow and even all the princes of Northern Russia in general shared the same legend, the same aspirations and goals. Moreover, they usually used the same means to achieve them. Hence, all these princes are strikingly similar to each other, merge into one image, appear for the historian as one person.86 86 Solovyov, History of Russia since Ancient Times, vol. 3, books 5–6, 294.

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Second, under Vasily III, the formation of the Russian autocracy accelerated. Vasily III turns into a real Russian tsar, who possessed unlimited power both in relation to the lands under his control and in relation to his many subjects. In case of any protests from the clan nobility, Vasily III immediately launched the mechanism of political repression, as if anticipating the terror of his son, Ivan IV. Third, Vasily III eliminated the remaining vestiges of the apanage system in Russia. He pacified Novgorod and plundered it with a tough hand, put an end to the remnants of the independence of Pskov and Ryazan, and liquidated the Volokolamsk, Kaluga, Starodub and Novgorod-Seversky principalities. Fourth, one can agree with Klyuchevsky, who notes that under Vasily III the Great Russian nationality was formed, which now found itself under one state power: This gives a new character to the Moscow principality. Until now, it was one of several great principalities of Northern Russia; now it became the only one and therefore it became national: its borders corresponded to the limits of the Great Russian nationality. This fact can be expressed this way: the completion of the territorial collection of Northeastern Russia by Moscow turned the Moscow principality into a national Great Russian state and thus communicated to the grand duke of Moscow the significance of the national great-Russian sovereign.87

Indeed, under Vasily III, an unprecedented territorial expansion of Moscow is observed. So, according to R. Pipes, in comparison with 1462, the territory of the Moscow state has grown six times by the time of Vasily’s death, when it amounted to almost 2800 thousand square kilometers.88 Vasily III also made significant adjustments to the foreign policy of the Moscow state. In particular, he corrected the mistakes of his father Ivan III regarding the Hanseatic League, strengthened diplomatic, trade, and economic ties with Western Europe, achieved serious success in the Baltic region, dealt a powerful blow to Lithuania and annexed Smolensk, and also continued pressure on the Khanate of Kazan, although along the way he suffered a series of defeats.

87 Klyuchevsky, Works, vol. 2, part 2, 107. 88 Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (2012), 116.

The Last Gatherer of the Russian Lan

Finally, during the reign of Vasily III, ambitious geopolitical projects arose, including the theory “Moscow, Third Rome.” Of course, at the time of its appearance, this theory was not yet considered an official foreign policy doctrine, but it had a huge impact on the development of Russian geopolitical thought and on the subsequent Russian history.

Figure 8.  Adolph Iosifovich Charlemagne. “Meeting of the Grand Duke Vasily III Ioannovich with the Ambassadors of Emperor Charles V near Mozhaysk” (1887).

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ince gaining independence in 1991, new horizons opened for the young post-Soviet states of the Eurasian continent in the field of economics, politics, culture, and science. Sovereignty has become a powerful catalyst for the formation of a new cultural, civilizational, and geopolitical identity in the states of Central Asia, including my own country, Kazakhstan. Scholarly interest to the history of statehood, as well as to the issues of Turkic ethnogenesis, has sharply increased. This change in scientific interest involved working with huge arrays of sources, as well as valuable foreign literature on the history of Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Based on historic research, today we can confidently assert that the Kazakh statehood is closely connected with the Ulus Jochi, which had a powerful influence on the entire history of Eurasia, including the process of formation of the Moscow centralized state. A close examination of the history of Moscow state also gives insights into the history of Ulus Jochi and may become a paradigm for studying the formation of states in other regions and epochs. The question this book asks is how the small town of Moscow, which appeared on the map around 1147, was able to rise above other, more ancient and powerful Russian lands and become the nucleus of a centralized Russian state. As the previous chapters have shown, in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries the Moscow principality, at the origins of which was the RostovSuzdal prince Yury Dolgoruky, was only one of many appanage principalities, and not the strongest one. Therefore, it is impossible to argue that the rise of Moscow was predetermined by the entire course of Russian history. However, it is possible to find out why Moscow managed to achieve superiority and defeat its competitors, including Tver. In my view, the rise of Moscow and the subsequent formation of the Moscow centralized state was primarily the result of internal political and socio-economic processes in Russia itself. At the same time, external factors, including geopolitical and ideological influence, as well as military pressure from the East, especially the Golden Horde, and the West, represented by Byzantium, the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, the Roman Catholic

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Church and the Scandinavian states, played an important role in shaping the political, economic, cultural and civilizational image of the Moscow centralized state. The formation of the Moscow principality took place in difficult conditions, when Northeastern Russia, like all the lands of the former Kievan Rus, was under the control of Ulus Jochi (Golden Horde). Rus retained a certain autonomy, but all of the important issues, including the fate of the grand ducal throne in Vladimir, were decided by the Horde khans, and the Russian princes found themselves in the role of petitioners. For a long time, the Moscow principality remained on the sidelines of the conflicts between the Horde and the stronger principalities. According to many historians, this was even beneficial for Moscow, which had the opportunity to accumulate strength for the subsequent geopolitical breakthrough. Indeed, the Moscow princes Daniel Alexandrovich, Yury Danilovich, Ivan Kalita, Simeon the Proud, and Ivan the Fair were able to find a common language with the Golden Horde, in contrast to Tver, whose princes alternatively sought the khan’s jarligs or raised anti-Tatar uprisings. Starting with Ivan Kalita, the Moscow princes strove to strengthen and expand their land at the expense of other Russian principalities. They widely used military force or threats, bought up land from other appanage princes, and imposed their governors on other cities. Of course, it is possible as much as necessary to ask what the princes of Moscow gathered: land (according to Klyuchevsky) or power (according to Presnyakov). One thing is clear: it was a single process in which the princes of Moscow, with the support of the Horde, got their hands on everything if they had half a chance. Since 1304, the strengthened Moscow competed with Tver, whose princes also claimed the grand ducal throne of Vladimir and, in fact, the power over Northeastern Russia. Having approximately equal positions with Tver, Moscow acted more pragmatically and rationally, not wasting its energy on the fight against the Golden Horde. It is necessary to recognize the fact that Ivan Kalita and his successors perceived the Horde khans as legitimate “kings,” acted in relation to the Golden Horde as obedient vassals, and, if necessary, together with the Tatars, used military force against those who raised anti-Horde uprisings. However, it would be wrong to perceive the Tver princes as “patriots of the Russian land,” and the Moscow princes as “traitors.” Thanks to his pragmatic policy, Ivan Kalita received monopoly right to collect tribute for the Golden Horde. Of course, not all money reached Sarai, which allowed the princes of the Kalita line to accumulate strength and turn Moscow

Conclusion

into the center of Northeastern Russia. To replenish its treasury, Moscow more than once resorted to forceful pressure on other Russian principalities. As the descendants of Alexander Nevsky, who gained fame as the ruler of Novgorod, the Moscow princes tried to keep Novgorod under their control. This powerful city, which had its own geopolitical and economic interests, did not want to act in the wake of Moscow. It had an important place on the Russian border, where it repelled the attacks of the Swedish and German knights, who rarely made their way far into the Russian territory. Apart from the knights, the Russian princes competed with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It had absorbed a significant part of the lands of the former Kievan Rus and was a direct rival of Moscow in the process of unification of the Russian lands. Yet, despite numerous obstacles and external threats, Moscow became a promising geopolitical player, a political, economic, and religious center of Northeastern Russia. With some reservations, the reasons for this development are easy to enumerate: they include the geographical position of Moscow at the intersection of trade routes, the security factor, a powerful influx of population and service people into the Moscow land, and Moscow’s fairly competent policy towards Ulus Jochi. It should also be recognized that, regardless of the subjective intentions of the Horde khans, to a certain extent, they also contributed to the gradual rise of the initially small and inconspicuous Moscow principality. The transfer of the metropolitan see from Vladimir-on-Klyazma to Moscow, as well as the skillful diplomacy of the highest church hierarchs, who were able to establish constructive relations with the Horde and even receive certain economic privileges and security guarantees from it, also played a rather significant role. During the reign of the Kalita line, there was an increase in the grand ducal power, and this trend continued in subsequent centuries. By the middle of the fourteenth century, the strengthened Moscow principality exerted considerable influence on Northeastern Russia, but was still dependent on the Ulus Jochi. Moscow was burdened by this dependence and was waiting to demonstrate its increased power to the weakening Horde. This historic mission fell to the lot of Prince Dmitry Ivanovich Donskoy. Dmitry Donskoy played an extremely important role in Russian history. The beginning of his reign fell in the period of the “Great Zamyatnya” in the Ulus Jochi. In this situation, the young prince, with the help of Metropolitan Alexius, found the right approach and began a long diplomatic game with the Horde rulers. Dmitry Donskoy acted confidently within Northeastern Russia, as evidenced by his tough steps against a number of Russian appanage princes. If

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necessary, Dmitry created various alliances and coalitions. The territory of Moscow also expanded, and the princely power was strengthened, due to decisions taken by the veche institutions both in Moscow and in neighboring lands.1 In the new geopolitical conditions, the growing Moscow principality was opposed by the alliance of Mikhail Alexandrovich of Tver and his son-in-law Algirdas, grand duke of Lithuania. More than once, this alliance thwarted the ambitions of Dmitry Ivanovich, but the Moscow prince outplayed Tver in the Horde, turning the Horde officials into his allies. As a result, the Grand Duchy of Vladimir was assigned to the Moscow princes and stayed in their hands. The main achievement of Dmitry Donskoy was his victory at the Kulikovo field, where almost all the princes of Northeastern Russia gathered under his banners. Of course, this was a victory only over Mamai, and not over the Golden Horde, nevertheless, Russia showed that it was capable of winning victories over the Tatars. The moral significance of the victory was so great that even Tokhtamysh’s stunning invasion and plundering of Moscow could not completely neutralize the growing Russian power. The victory over Mamai led to the emergence of some outstanding publicistic works, among which were A Word about the Life and the Repose of the Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich, Tsar of Russia, Zadonshchina, and The Legend of the Mamai Massacre. These works are known together as the “Kulikovo cycle.” They include such mandatory elements as calling the Moscow prince “tsar” and/or “autocrat”; proclaiming the political and dynastic continuity of Moscow rule in relation to the Kiev and Vladimir-Suzdal periods of Russian history; insisting on the all-Russian significance of the Moscow princes, as their titles usually include the phrase “all Russia”; praising the Moscow princes as the defenders of Orthodoxy and the liberators of Russia from the Horde. None of these works suggest that Russia threw off the yoke as soon as Mamai was defeated. Nevertheless, during the reign of Dmitry Donskoy, the Golden Horde evidently began to lose control over Russia. Vasily I Dmitrievich did not have many of the outstanding qualities of his illustrious father, however, thanks to his caution and prudence, the Moscow principality survived under high pressure from other states. Despite the deeprooted fear of the Golden Horde, Vasily I sought consent from the khans for certain territorial acquisitions, relied on the military force of the Horde to solve internal Russian problems, evaded paying tribute, and only in 1412 he bowed his head to the new Horde khan. 1 Dvornichenko, Russian History, 278.

Conclusion

Under Vasily I, the Moscow principality expanded its territory at the expense of Nizhny Novgorod, Suzdal, Murom, Tarusa, Bezhetsky Verkh, Vologda, and the Perm region. There were failures as well. Vasily I and Metropolitan Cyprian failed to completely subjugate Novgorod to Moscow, politically as well as ecclesiastically. Attempts to annex the Dvina land to Moscow also failed, since the local population could not come to terms with Moscow’s tyranny. The growing Tver did not agree to Moscow’s control, and Moscow was not ready for an equal alliance. As a result, Tver began to draw closer to Lithuania. Moscow’s relations with Lithuania were ambivalent. Initially, due to family ties between Vasily I and Vytautas, Vasily I supported his father-in-law and his encroachments on Smolensk and Ryazan. Then Vasily I broke off the alliance with Lithuania and opposed Vytautas’s plans and designs. Vytautas’s grand victory over the Teutonic Order in the famous Battle of Grunwald (1410) contributed to the growth of Lithuania’s international authority and drew to Vytautas various regions in the Northeastern and Northwestern Russia. This led to new Lithuanian attacks on Novgorod and Pskov in 1412–1413. The reign of Vasily I Dmitrievich ended with a new rapprochement with Vytautas, which was due to the concerns of the grand duke of Moscow regarding the fate of his family after his death. On the whole, Vasily I did a lot to preserve and strengthen the Moscow principality, but made many strategic mistakes in the field of foreign policy, turning family and dynastic ties into a yoke around the neck of his own state. It is no coincidence that at the end of his reign, Moscow had to follow Lithuanian foreign policy decisions. As Presnyakov notes, The time of Vasily Dmitrievich is difficult for Great Russia. It is a time of unstable, exhaustingly tense relations, continuous hopeless conflicts, for the definite and lasting resolution of which the grand duke did not have the necessary power and means. The grand duke seems to rush between different alliances and splits; he does not have the inner strength to formulate and consistently resolve the complex tasks arising from the international situation of Great Russia. The leadership of the destinies of Great Russia, which was the goal and internal justification of his power—in the understanding of its carriers and the Russian society—now and then escapes from the hands of Grand Duke Vasily.2 2 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State, 238.

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Vasily II Vasilyevich (the Blind) proved to be a skillful politician who knew how to turn numerous failures in his favor. He could be arrogant and cruel, but after his torture he aroused pity from his enemies, both outside of Russia and from among the appanage princes. Under Vasily the Blind, the merger of the Moscow patrimony with the territory of the grand ducal principality of Vladimir and Suzdal was completed. His successors only had to annex the weakened Tver, the semi-dependent Ryazan, Rostov, and Yaroslavl, crush the Novgorodians and Pskovites and begin to win back their fatherland (Smolensk and the Seversky cities) from Lithuania. The main event that determined the content of the reign of Vasily the Blind was the feudal war of 1425–1462, in which the supporters of the centralized Russian state gained the upper hand over the appanage princes of the Kalita line. Vasily’s opponents—Yury Dmitrievich of Zvenigorod and his sons—Dmitry Shemyaka, Vasily Kosoy, and Dmitry Krasny—were brave and courageous politicians who were not afraid to challenge the Moscow prince. But neither their outstanding personal qualities, nor large-scale support from the Northern “pre-bourgeois” (as Zimin states) cities helped the appanage princes to win, especially since the Moscow boyars were now not used to serving a small-scale prince. Moreover, Vasily’s opponents had no consistent strategy: during the war of 1425–1453 the children of Yury Dmitrievich first sided with their father, then went over to the side of Vasily II, then quarrelled with each other and joined different sides. Neither did they have a clear political program, although some Soviet and Russian researchers, including Nosov, Zimin, and Dvornichenko note Dmitry Shemyaka’s plans to create a Russian state in the North. Perhaps the state of Dmitry Shemyaka could have been based on greater respect for the communal order, but it was never built. Importantly, the war of 1425–1453 took place against the background of numerous Tatar raids, as a result of which Vasily II was even taken into shameful captivity and paid a huge ransom. The loss of money was a strong blow to national pride and the state treasury. Nevertheless, it was under Vasily the Blind that the mass transition of the Tatars to Moscow service began. At the same time, Vasily II had to defend the Moscow state from the territorial claims of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which was trying to crush Novgorod, Pskov, and the Smolensk lands. However, Lithuania failed to achieve its plans. One can, of course, assume that if Vytautas had lived a little longer, Moscow could have faced new powerful challenges. Likewise, Moscow could have faced big problems if Svidrigiello had stayed in power and began to independently implement Algirdas’s “all-Russian program.”

Conclusion

It is also worth noting that Vasily the Blind positioned himself as a defender of Orthodoxy. He rejected the decision of the 1439 Council of Florence and supported the autocephaly of the Russian Church. After the fall of Constantinople (1453), Moscow claimed the role of the main and only stronghold of the global Orthodoxy. Ivan III Vasilyevich entered the Russian history as the creator of the Moscow centralized state and of the Russian autocracy. None of his predecessors spoke out so harshly about the essence and nature of the Moscow sovereign’s power, no one before him claimed complete and unconditional domination over other Russian princes. Ivan III was the first to call himself “tsar” and “sovereign of all Russia.” He posed as a direct heir of the Byzantine autocracy and even made the two-headed Byzantine eagle the state emblem of Russia. Thus, the historical, civilizational, and cultural continuity between Moscow, Rome, and Byzantium was fixed. At the same time, Ivan III considered the experience of Ulus Jochi. As Pipes noted, If we want to find out where Moscow learned the science of ruling (not as an ideal, but as a real institution), we should turn to the Golden Horde. … The Golden Horde provided the first example of centralized political power that the Russian princes came up against. For a century and a half, the khan was their absolute master. His power and greatness almost completely erased the image of the Byzantine Basileus from their memory. The latter was something very remote, a legend; none of the appanage princes had ever been to Constantinople, but many of them knew the road to Sarai very well.3

The famous orientalist Vasily Bartold also notes: “… in all countries that were part of the Mongol Empire, from China to Western Asia and Russia, we see, starting from the Mongol era, a more solid and better organized political formations than before.”4 Ivan III “completes the gathering of power and the restructuring of the internal relations of the Muscovite state on new foundations, completes the political unification of Great Russia, and leaves his successors with a system of 3 Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (1993), 104. 4 V. V. Bartold, “The Current State and the Tasks of Studying the History of Turkestan” [Russian], in his Compositions, vol. 9 (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), 512.

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fiefdoms.”5 He deprived the Yaroslavl, Rostov and Tver princes of independence, and when these princes went into his service, they received from him their own estates as grants. Ivan III began as one of the many appanage princes, but eventually he turned into the single sovereign who ruled the whole nation.6 Of fundamental importance for Ivan III was the subordination of Novgorod, which represented an alternative way of development for Russia. Committed to republican traditions and open to cooperation with the West, Novgorod was dangerous for Moscow. However, its obsession with gaining trade benefits was its weakness, as it motivated Novgorod to support the appanage princes during the war of 1425–1453. Moscow reacted negatively to the rapprochement of Novgorod with Lithuania and Poland, seeing in this a betrayal of Orthodoxy and Russian national unity. Thanks to the military campaigns of 1471 and 1477–1478, Ivan III brought Novgorod to its knees, deprived it of its sovereignty, and liquidated the city veche. The veche bell was supposed to ring in Moscow along with the other bells. Together with Novgorod, Moscow received its huge territories that stretched to the White Sea and to the Urals, that is, the rich Russian North. In order to strengthen the Moscow centralized state, Ivan III commissioned the nationwide Code of Law, which was approved in 1497. Undoubtedly, the very fact of its appearance was a positive event, as it contributed to the consolidation of the state and the unification of its legislation. Although, some of the legal norms of this code hung like a yoke around the neck of the Russian peasantry. Not without sarcasm, one of the modern Russian historians notes: “The Code of Law of 1497 was imbued with the state’s concern for itself. It became an important measure of strengthening the political unity and the central power.”7 The main foreign policy achievement of Ivan III was the liberation of the Moscow state from the rule of the Golden Horde. Great Stand on the river Ugra (1480) was a milestone event on this path. Russia took revenge for the centuries-old submission to the Golden Horde and began to emerge as a great power. Moscow began to fight for control over the post-Horde space, intervening in the internal political processes of the new khanates and using them as its allies in the international arena. 5 Presnyakov, Formation of the Great Russian State. 6 Platonov, Full Course of Lectures, 156. 7 V. V. Fortunatov, History: Textbook. Third-Generation Standard. For Undergraduate Students [Russian] (St. Petersburg: Peter, 2012), 116.

Conclusion

Relations between Moscow and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which could also claim the role of the unifier of the Russian land, developed in a complicated manner. Ivan III fought with a vengeance against Lithuania, the eastern lands of which (including Kiev and Smolensk) were considered the property of the Russian princes. Ivan III saw these lands as his legal “patrimony” and fought for them with Lithuania more than once (he went to war in 1487–1494, and again in 1500–1503). At the same time, Ivan III intensified diplomatic and trade relations with Germany, Italy, Denmark, and Hungary. Relations with the Hanseatic League, Livonia, Poland, and Sweden were more complicated. Ivan III considered many Baltic lands to be his “patrimony” and demanded that the bishop of Yuryev and, by implication, the Livonian Order paid tribute to Pskov.8 The arrest of forty-nine Hanseatic merchants seriously damaged the prestige of Russia and its trade with the West. At the same time, thanks to the alliance with Denmark during the Swedish War (1495–1497), the Moscow state made a number of territorial gains in Finland. The results of the reign of Ivan III in the field of domestic and foreign policy were stunning. The emergence of a powerful, vast, and independent Moscow state on the world political arena was a real shock for the West and the East. From now on, neither European nor Asian states could ignore Moscow in their foreign policy. Vasily III became a direct successor to the state building activities of Ivan III and all previous Moscow princes. Under him, the process of the formation of the Russian autocracy was significantly accelerated. The grand duke of Moscow gradually turned into a real autocratic tsar with unlimited power both in relation to the lands under his control and in relation to his many subjects. In the event of any protests from the Russian lands or the clan nobility, Vasily III immediately launched a flywheel of political repression, as if anticipating the terror of Ivan the Terrible during the years of the oprichnina. Vasily III eliminated the remaining vestiges of the apanage system in Russia. He pacified Novgorod and plundered it, put an end to the remnants of the independence of Pskov and Ryazan, and liquidated the Volokolamsk, Kaluga, Starodub and Novgorod-Seversky principalities. During the time of Vasily III, the Great 8 The so-called “Yuryev tribute” was for Ivan III a motive for more aggressive policy towards the order. The history of this concept is buried in legends, see F. D. Podberyozkin, “When and How the ‘Yuryev Tribute’ Appeared” [Russian], News of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, series “Humanities” 64, no. 3 (2019), https://vestihum.belnauka.by/jour/ article/view/533?locale=ru_RU.

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Russian nationality was formed, which now found itself under one state power. Territorial expansion also intensified: by the time of his death the territory of the Moscow state increased six times in comparison with 1462. Vasily III made adjustments to the foreign policy of the Moscow state. He corrected the mistakes of Ivan III and resumed the centuries-old cooperation of Russia with the Hanseatic League, significantly strengthened diplomatic, trade, and economic ties with Western Europe, achieved serious success in the Baltic region, took Smolensk from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and continued to pressure the Khanate of Kazan, although he suffered a number of defeats along the way. It was during the reign of Vasily III that ambitious geopolitical projects emerged, including the theory “Moscow, Third Rome,” according to which the Moscow state was the stronghold of the global Orthodoxy. Of course, at the time of its appearance, the concept of “Moscow, Third Rome” was not an official foreign policy doctrine, but it had a significant impact on the development of Russian geopolitical thought and on all subsequent development of Russia, as it reemerged at fateful and turning points of its history. Thus, the main result of the efforts of the Moscow grand dukes was the liberation of Russia from foreign domination and the formation of a centralized Moscow state. Despite all sorts of internal political collisions, as well as continuous wars with foreign powers, each subsequent grand duke of Moscow transferred to his successor or heir much more territory than he received from his predecessor in his time. Ivan III and Vasily IV almost completed the liquidation of the appanage principalities by 1533. The Moscow patrimony finally merged with the Grand Duchy of Vladimir into a single patrimony that belonged to the Moscow sovereigns. Over the centuries, Russian historiography worked with the thesis that the main role in the process of the rise of Moscow and the formation of the Moscow centralized state was played by internal factors, which were enumerated earlier in this book. Of course, they cannot be excluded. At the same time, one should not ignore the external factors, which are extremely important. The Moscow state was formed in a fairly complex geopolitical environment, balancing between East and West. A whole complex of external factors acted simultaneously. Each of them arose with different intensity at different stages of the formation of the Moscow centralized state. Below is a list of the most significant external influences. 1. For centuries, Russia was under the control of Ulus Jochi. The Moscow grand dukes learnt from the Mongols, as they developed the

Conclusion

administrative practice, law and judiciary, financial, customs, and tax systems, and the military strategies of the Moscow state. Willingly or unwillingly, the Golden Horde khans contributed to the strengthening of the Moscow principality. They also showed a very lenient and tolerant attitude towards the Russian Church, which later joined with the Moscow princes and opposed Ulus Jochi.   It should be noted that Mongol influence continued after the liberation of Rus. The post-Horde states exerted a significant influence on the domestic and foreign policy of Moscow, and even after the conquest of the Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberian khanates, Moscow paid tribute to the Crimean Khanate for a long time.   I agree with Charles Halperin’s opinion that the Russians borrowed some (but not all) Mongolian institutions, even though Moscow did not claim the role of the legal successor to Ulus Jochi and did not adopt its political and cultural identity. The Moscow state and the Russian autocracy were formed under the strong influence of the Golden Horde, even if this complicated process was also influenced by other forces from the East and the West. One must admit that the concept of the so-called “Mongol-Tatar yoke” is outdated and untenable.   In my opinion, this overly politicized concept does not allow for an objective and differentiated assessment of the complex and diverse nature of the relationship between Russia and the Golden Horde. Russia was conquered, but not occupied by the Mongols. Moscow and the Horde created a special military-political alliance, thanks to which Russia could feel relatively secure. So, it is more appropriate to talk not about a “yoke,” but rather about the incorporation of Northeastern Russia into Ulus Jochi, and the symbiosis of Moscow and the Golden Horde. 2. Taking into account the fact that from 988 to 1448 the Russian Church was a metropolitanate of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and seventeen of the twenty-three metropolitans of Kiev of that period were Greeks,9 it is impossible not to recognize the Byzantine influence on

9

Zh. S. Syzdykova, “The Problem of the Formation of the Russian Imperial System. Byzantine and Golden Horde Heritage” [Russian], Innovations and Investments 10 (2015): 64.

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the Moscow state. This idea is well put forward by John Meyendorff,10 although some Russian historians dispute this influence.11 I agree with Donald Ostrovsky, who believes that the civil administration was strongly influenced by the Mongols, and the church by the Greeks.12 The Byzantine influence was observed in the court ceremony, in state symbols, in the growth of foreign policy ambitions of the Moscow princes, in the choice of the church hierarchs, in the formation of the diplomatic department and other state structures, including the treasury. 3. One cannot discount the influence of the West represented by the Catholic Church, the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, and other countries. The complex and contradictory interactions between Rus and the West did not stop during the Mongol period. The Catholic Church hoped for that Russia would abandon Orthodoxy, and the German and Swedish knights tried to squeeze Russia out of the Baltic States and take control of Novgorod and Pskov. At the same time, the interaction of the Moscow state with the West was not limited to religious or military conflicts. There were periods of peaceful coexistence and trade cooperation, including with the cities of the Hanseatic League. The Moscow state was interested in attracting European engineers, miners, gunsmiths, architects, artists, and other craftsmen. Moscow politicians also studied with interest and used the subtleties of Western diplomacy for their own causes. All this suggests that in the fifteenth century there was an early, albeit superficial, Europeanization of Russia.13 4. Particularly noteworthy are Moscow’s relations with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. From the middle of the thirteenth century, it began to expand to the lands of Kievan Rus and significantly succeeded in this matter. As it grew stronger, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 10 J. Meyendorff, Byzantium and the Rise of Russia: A Study of Byzantino-Russian relations in the Fourteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 11 S. F. Vititnev and A. V. Shmeleva, “Byzantine Civilization and Its Influence on the Historical Fate of Russia as a Subject of Comprehension within the Framework of a Conservative Socio-Political Discourse” [Russian], Bulletin of the Moscow State Regional University 2 (2020): 97–122. 12 D. Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols. Cross-Cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier? 1304–1589 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 180. 13 T. V. Chernikova, “The Beginning of the Europeanization of Russia in the Time of Ivan III” [Russian], Bulletin of MGIMO University 5 (2011).

Conclusion

became a powerful rival to Moscow. Following Algirdas’s program it aimed towards the capture of all Russian lands, beginning with Smolensk, Novgorod, and Pskov. At the same time, the Moscow princes claimed the “historical lands” of Russia, considering them their patrimony. The religious factor (namely, acceptance of Catholicism, furthered by the union of Lithuania with Poland and the Florentine union of 1439) prevented the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from realizing its plans. In contrast to the Orthodox Moscow state, the Lithuanian claims to Russian lands often looked like a Polish-Catholic expansion.14 However, if the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in alliance with Poland and Tver, had won a victory over Moscow, the entire history of Russia, Europe, and the whole world could follow a completely different scenario. A. P. Bakhtin believes that the plans of the Lithuanian princes were thwarted by the Teutonic Order, even though it suffeed a defeat from Lithuania in the famous Battle of Grunwald. “The Teutonic Order was more often an ally than an enemy of Russia.”15 According to Bakhtin, the Teutonic Order diverted the military, material, and human resources of Lithuania and prevented it from fighting Moscow. From 1309 to 1344, the Teutonic Order made forty-five campaigns in the Lithuanian lands, and from 1348 to 1404, thirty-four campaigns.16 Thus, one can conclude that the process of state building in the Moscow state was influenced by both the East and the West. However, the intensity of these influences varied in different periods of the history of the Moscow state. The Moscow princes tried to use these external influences in their own interests, although these attempts were not always successful and effective enough. Overall, we can assert that in the political practice of the Muscovite state, ancient Russian, Byzantine, European, and Golden Horde traditions were closely intertwined. For centuries, these distinct trends competed and clashed with each other. The echoes of this confrontation can be heard to this day. However, was the creation of the Moscow centralized state inevitable? This question remains relevant, although, as one knows, history does not allow the 14 Yu. V. Malinovsky, “Moscow Russia and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: The Struggle for Supremacy in the Russian Metropolis (from the Second Half of the Fourteenth Century to the 1450s)” [Russian], Readings in Memory of Yevgeny Petrovich Sychevsky 13 (2013): 7. 15 A. P. Bakhtin, “The Teutonic Order as a Factor in the Formation of the Moscow State” [Russian], Kaliningrad Archives 3 (2001): 323. 16 Ibid., 334.

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subjunctive mood. Under a certain set of circumstances, the unification processes in Russia could have been led by Tver, Novgorod, or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and not necessarily by Moscow. Within the framework of these alternative scenarios, the united Russian state could escape excessive centralization and follow the traditions of the Russian veche democracy as they were laid in the Novgorod Republic, or else learn form the experience of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation and from Poland. However, for various reasons, Tver, Novgorod, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were unable to take on the mission of unifying Russia. As a result, the Moscow princes gained the upper hand, betting on the autocracy with all its advantages and inevitable shortcomings. After gaining independence, establishing autocratic power and concentrating human and material resources, the Moscow sovereigns were able to pursue a much larger-scale, more purposeful, and confident foreign policy than many rulers of that era. The Moscow state continued its offensive along the entire perimeter of its borders, especially in the southern and eastern directions. As noted by Michael Khodarkovsky, together with Spain, Muscovy was one of the first European states to undertake expansion into territories inhabited by peoples professing Islam or polytheistic religions. In these territories, it introduced a system of government, which later, when it was applied by other European states, became known as colonial.17 Khodarkovsky emphasizes that the emergence of the “hypertrophied” state in Russia, its expansionist nature, and specific forms of government can be explained by the fact that the Moscow state, and, after it, the Russian Empire were classic examples of frontier societies. In other words, these were states with open borders that for a long time could not be clearly defined or effectively protected.18 The Muscovite state of the fifteenth and the early sixteenth centuries successfully used various methods of strengthening its influence and expanding its territorial limits. It skillfully applied military and diplomatic methods, sometimes including direct blackmail and bribery of foreign politicians and legislators. As Carrer d’Ancausse states, Until the beginning of the sixteenth century, the development of Muscovy, its collection of Russian lands, battles, and alliances against the Mongols 17 M. Khodarkovsky, “In What Ways Russia was ‘ahead of ’ Europe, or Russia as a Colonial Empire” [Russian], Political Conceptology 2 (2013): 85. 18 Ibid.

Conclusion or together with them served the policy aimed at building and preserving the state. When this state begins to grow, when the contours of the empire begin to take shape, it is necessary to constantly move forward, occupy all new space, otherwise one can say goodbye to the dream of creating a real powerful state.19

In general, the Muscovy had some features of an empire. It had a strong permanent autocratic power, with a centralized and unifiied state structure. The Muscovy state embraced many ethnic groups at various stages of development, who were positioned in a clear hierarchy, headed by the dominant Russian ethnos. There was also a disdainful attitude towards non-Slavic ethnic groups, as evidenced by the application of such derogatory epithets as “filthy” and “basurmane” to the Turkic peoples and/or Muslims. As mentioned before, there were no clear state borders, especially in the southern and the eastern directions. The borderlines were neither stable nor constant; for a long time Moscow maked its future outlines on the world map with a dotted line. The movement of this line was the evidence of constant territorial colonial expansion, and the newly conquered territories were quickly covered with strongholds that became bases for future expansion. The newly discovered lands were automatically joined to the Russian state, and tribute was collected from the conquered peoples, regardless of their opinion and desire. Private and state initiatives combined in the acquisition and development of new lands. Already within the framework of the Moscow state, certain prerequisites were created for Russia to turn not only de facto, but also de jure into a real empire in the following centuries. The official transition was made by Peter the Great, who said aloud what his predecessors did not dare to say. It now seems that Russia is a unique historical, civilizational, cultural, and geopolitical phenomenon, whose importance does not diminish over time. Any attempts to throw Russia off the world chessboard look doomed to failure, as rulers and strategists of various states and historical eras have demonstrated more than once. As mentioned earlier, this book should not be perceived as an ultimate guide to certain problems of Russian history. Today, history studies are of special importance, since many problems of the twenty-first century in the field of geopolitics and international relations have their roots in deep antiquity or the Middle Ages. It is no coincidence that today there is a powerful surge of 19 Carrer d’Ancausse, Eurasian Empire, 19.

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interest in the history of the past centuries. In many countries of the West and East, there is a process of rethinking the historical past, new scientific schools and directions are being created, numerous monographs are being published, an active search for various sources is being conducted, and heated scientific discussions on controversial problems of history are underway. In the context of this study, for example, in Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, many pages of the historical past are being revised. The history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and its relations with Poland and the Moscow state are being rethought, sharp but useful scientific discussions on the history of Kievan Rus and its heritage are taking place. In Kazakhstan there is a great interest in the history of ancient and medieval states. The modern independent countries of Central Asia are busy searching for their geopolitical and civilizational identity. An important part of these discussions is the history of the Ulus Jochi, which is directly related to the ethnogenesis of the Turkic peoples and the formation of Turkic states. Historical, archaeological, and ethnographical research institutions are combining efforts, and new research structures are being created that are engaged in in-depth study of the history of the Mongol Empire and Ulus Jochi. The history of the Moscow state is also part of their studies, as it is intimately connected with the existence and the heritage of Golden Horde. My book is an example of exploring this connection. The formation of new historical and political schools is a complex, lengthy, and contradictory process. All the more important for us is a close and constant dialogue with the long-established scientific schools of the countries of the West and the East. Experience, research developments, and rich traditions of recognized academic centers worldwide will play an important role in the development of strong historical schools in the new independent states of Central Asia. I would genuinely welcome further academic discussion on this subject from scholars all around the world.

Map 1.  Johann Gottfried Philipp Abelin and Lukas Kilian. “A plan of Moscow,” also known as “Sigizmund’s Plan,” dedicated to Sigismund II, King of Poland and Sweden (1610).

Ancient Geographical Maps of Moscovia, Europe, and Asia

Map 2.  Gerard Mercator and Henricus Hondius. “Tartaria” (1606).

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Map 3.  Gerard Mercator and Henricus Hondius. “Nova Europae Descriptio” (1606).

Ancient Geographical Maps of Moscovia, Europe, and Asia

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Map 4.  Abraham Ortelius. “Asiae Nova Descriptio” (1574) from Theatrum Orbis Terrarum (Spectacle of the Globe of the Earth)—the world’s first geographical atlas, consisting of fifty-three large-format maps with detailed explanatory geographic texts, which was printed in Antwerp on May 20, 1570 and reflected the state of geographical knowledge at that time.1

1 “The World’s First Geographic Atlas,” The Earth Chronicles of Life, October 28, 2020, https://earth-chronicles.com/histori/the-worlds-first-geographic-atlas.html

Ancient Geographical Maps of Moscovia, Europe, and Asia

Map 5.  John Speed. “A Newe Mape of Tartary” (1626).

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Map 6. Anthony Jenkinson and Frans Hogenberg. “Russiae, Moscoviae et Tartariae Descriptio” (1562). This map was compiled by the English merchant, diplomat, and traveler A. Jenkinson (1529–1610), who was the ambassador to Russia under Ivan the Terrible; from 1557 to 1571 he repeatedly visited Russia as a representative of the Moscow trading company. The result of these travels was not only official reports, but also the most detailed map of Russia at that time. 2

2 “A Review of Historical Maps of Russia. Map of 1562 by Anthony Jenkinson,” Steemit.com, https://steemit.com/history/@gildar/a-review-of-historical-maps-of-russiamap-of-1562-by-anthony-jenkinson.

Ancient Geographical Maps of Moscovia, Europe, and Asia

Map 7.  Richard Blome and Thomas Burnford. “A Generall Mapp of the Kingdoms of Tartaria” (1682). Blome first began engraving maps for his Geographical Description of the Four Parts of the World in 1667. The completed volume was in small folio, and contained twenty-four maps. Blome’s principal handicap in the production of the atlas was the lack of a mapmaking production in England comparable with that in Europe. Also, to finance his work, he promised his sponsors to add their coats of arms to certain maps.3

3 “A Mapp of y Kingdome of Tartary,” Raremaps.com, https://www.raremaps.com/gallery/ detail/59204/a-mapp-of-y-kingdome-of-tartary-blome

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Map 8.  Semen Ulyanovich Remezov. “Ethnographic Map of Siberia” (seventeenth century). Remezov was a Russian historian, architect and geographer. He compiled three collections of maps, charts and drawings of Siberia. Leo Bagrow, a Russian historian of maps, notes that Remezov’s works show some idiosyncratic details in line with Muscovite cartographic tradition.4

4 Early Maps Of Siberia Digitized, https://blogs.harvard.edu/houghton/early-maps-ofsiberia-digitized/

Ancient Geographical Maps of Moscovia, Europe, and Asia

Map 9.  Jan Willemsz Blaeu and Hessel Geritsz. “Map of Russia” (1614). The top left corner has an inset plan of Moscow with a seventeen-point key. On the right is a prospect of Archangel, Russia’s only northern port until the founding of St. Petersburg in 1700. Three figures in Russian dress stand above. The map was compiled from manuscript maps and works by Isaac Massa. The inset plan of Moscow has been attributed to the Crown Prince Fyodor Godunov.5

5 “Tabula Russiae ex autographo, quod delineandum curavit Foedor filius Tzaris Borois desumta … MDCXIIII,” Raremaps.com, https://www.raremaps.com/gallery/detail/6395 1op/tabula-russiae-ex-autographo-quod-delineandum-curavit-foedo-blaeu.

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Map 10.  Jan Willemsz Blaeu and Hessel Geritsz. Fragment of “Map of Russia” (1614).

Ancient Geographical Maps of Moscovia, Europe, and Asia

Map 11.  Fra Mauro’s map (1460). The main difference of this map from previous medieval European maps is the display of paved roads that connect the regions and cities of Russia. Probably, the merchants who traded at the Italian ports of the Northern Black Sea region helped in the creation of this map. In the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries they travelled between Surozh (Sugdeya), Tana, and Moscow, and reached Pechora in search of birds of prey, highly valued in the West and East. This map shows trade routes along the Don and the rivers of the Moscow region, as well as a complex network of northern rivers.6

6 “Tartariya, ili kak skryli tsely kontinent,” Jumanji-moskva.ru, https://jumanji-moskva.ru/ tartariya-ili-kak-skryli-celyi-kontinent-poslednyaya-bitva.html.

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Index Abdullah, 75, 77 Abdullatif, 171, 193–94 Acre, 35 Adriatic Sea, 34 Afanasyev, Yu. N., 51 Ahmed, Khan, 166–70, 178 Akhiezer, A. S., 146, 164 Akimbekov, S. M., xxviii, 74, 83, 87–88 al-Athir, Ali ibn, xxi, 29 Albert, John, 161 Albert of Brandenburg, 191 Aleksin, 166 Alexander, Bulgarian Tsar, 198 Alexander Mikhailovich, 61–65, 68, 79, 92 Alexander the Great, 50 Alexander Vasilyevich of Suzdal, 64 Alexius, Metropolitan, 76, 93, 95, 209 Algirdas (Olgerd), 68, 76–77, 79–82, 90, 92, 95, 98, 101, 113, 126, 164, 161, 210, 212, 219 Ali (Ilham), 170–71 Aloisio the New, 175 Alta River, 24 Akimbekov, S. M., xxviii, 74, 83, 87–88 Alekseyev, Yu. G., xxi, 142 Andrei Alexandrovich, 56–58 Andrei Yaroslavich, 42, 45–46 Angelov, Emmanuel, 172 Arapsha (Arab-Shah), 83, 88 Arrignon, Jean-Pierre, xxv Astrakhan, 35, 39, 101, 170, 195, 197, 217

Augustus, xxvi, 148, 164 Azak (Azov), 101 Azov Sea, xxvi Azerbaijan, 29 Badakhshan, 28 Bakhrushin, S. V., 11, 123 Bakhtin, A. P., 219 Bakhty-Kilday, 196 Baltic Sea, 40 Barsanuphius, Bishop, 191 Bartold, Vasily, 214 Basenok, Fyodor Vasilyevich, 136 Basenok, Nikifor, 166 Batu, 19, 30–34, 43–46, 53, 74–75, 88, 100, 168 Bayezid II, Sultan, 170 Bazilevich, K. V., 11 Bechtold, R., 75 Beijing, 28–29 Begich, Mirza, 83 Beklemishev, Ivan Nikitich, 184 Bela IV, 34 Belarus, xxix, 220 Belev, 129 Belozersk, 3, 9, 61, 67, 84–85, 109 Belsky, Marcin, 181 Belsky, Simeon Ivanovich, 162 Berdibek, 74–75 Berdyaev, N., 200 Berke, Khan, 31, 46–47, 49 Bezhetsk, 64, 80, 129

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Between East and West Bezhetsky Verkh, 110 Biakont Danila, 99 Bielski, Marcin, xx Birger Magnusson, 40 Bobrok, Dmitry, 84, 113 Bochkaryov, V. N., 124 Bogdanov, A. P., 50 Bogolyubov, 32 Bohemia, 187 Bokeev, M., 195 Bokhanov, A. M., 147, 201 Boleslav II, 24 Boretsky, Isaac Andreevich, 152 Boris Alexandrovich of Tver, 126, 131–32, 139, 141 Boris Konstantinovich of Gorodets, 83, 92, 106 Boris Konstantinovich of Suzdal, 78 Boris Vasilkovich, 44 Borisov, N. S., xxi, 17–18, 21, 56–57, 61–65, 130–31, 134–35, 138–39, 141–43, 145, 156, 167 Brenok, Mikhail, 84–85 Bryukhaty, Alexander Fedorovich, 150 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, xxix Bug River, 57 Bukhara, 28–29 Bulat, Prince, 197 Bulat Shirin, Prince, 197 Bulat Timer, Khan, 102–3 Bulgakov-Golitsa, Mikhail, 190 Bulgaria, 147, 198 Burundai, 32 Byzantine Empire, xiv–xv, xvii–xxvi, 23–24, 93, 138, 140, 145–46, 148–49, 154, 173, 198, 200, 202, 207, 213 Byzantium. See Byzantine Empire Casimir III, 157 Casimir IV, 127, 153, 158, 161, 166–67

Caspian Sea, 29 Carpentier, Elisabeth, xxv Carpini, Plano, xx, 35 Central Asia, xxix, 28, 75, 87, 207, 222 Čepaitienė, R., xxviii Chagatai, 30–31 Charlemagne, Emperor, 200 Charles V, King, 192, 205 Chelyadnin, Ivan, 183 Chelyadnya, Mikhail Andreevich, 99 Cherepnin, L. V., xxi, 13–14, 16, 21, 58, 68, 77, 91–92, 106–7, 109, 123, 137, 143, 151, 158–59 Chernigov, 4, 24–26, 33, 45, 163 Chernyavsky, Mikhail, xxiii–xxiv China, 28, 75, 89, 213 Christian, David, xxiii Collo, Francesco da, xx, 192 Constantine Monomakh, 148 Constantine XI Palaiologos, Emperor, 140, 146 Constantinople, xiv, 69, 93, 138–40, 169, 198–202, 213, 217 Crimea, 33, 75–76, 161–63, 166–67, 170, 183, 186, 188n28, 192, 194–96 Cromeri, Martini, 66 Crummey, Robert O., xxiv Cyprian, Metropolitan, 93, 98, 108–110, 118–19, 210 Czartoryski, A. V., 137 d’Ancausse, Carrer, 63, 154, 220 Daniel, Metropolitan, 203 Daniel Alexandrovich, 12, 53–54, 56–57, 71, 208 Daniel Romanovich of Galich, 33–34, 45, 49–54 Danilevsky, I. N., 51 Dasht-i Kypchak, 34 Debossis, Pavlin, 175

Index Decius, Iodocus Ludovic, xx, 187 Delator, Georg, 173 Denmark, xiv, xvii, 35, 172, 174–75, 178, 181, 192, 215, 218 Dewey, Horace, xxiii Dlugosz, Jan, xx, 115, 156–57, 169 Dorpat (Yuryev), 48, 51, 174 Dmitrov, 16, 26, 76–77, 80, 102, 126, 128, 142, 150, 168, 186, 203 Dmitry Borisovich, 55, 77 Dmitry Konstantinovich, 76–78, 89, 92, 106–7 Dmitry the Fearsome Eyes, 59–61 Dolgoruky, Yury, passim Don, 84, 101, 167, 233 Donskoy, Dmitry Ivanovich, xix, 15, 19, 72–73, 77–85, 88–96, 98, 105, 108, 118, 122, 128, 135, 154, 167, 209, 210 Dorogobuzh, 163 Dubnya, 26 Dvina land, 109–110, 118, 211 Dvina River, 155 Dvornichenko, A. Yu., xxi, 21, 34, 61, 70, 86, 93, 95, 124, 133–34, 156, 212 Dyuden, 55 Dzyarnovich, O. I., xxviii Eaton, Henry L., xxiii Edigu, Emir, 99–102 Eidintas, Alfonsas, xxvii England, 122, 229 Eremey Konstantinovich, 79 Eric X Knutsson, 40 Fasi, Ulf, 40 Fedor Romanovich of Belozersk, 85 Fedorchuk, 63 Fennell, John, xxi, 42, 51, 58 Ferdinand, Archduke, 192

Filyushkin, A. I., 188 Finland, 48, 175, 215 Fioravanti, Aristotele, 175 Formosus, Pope, 200 Franklin, Simon, xxiv Frederick III, 172–73 Fryazin, Ivan. See Volpe, Jean-Baptiste de la Fyodor, Prince, 59, 108, 183 Galich, 3, 14–15, 29, 33–34, 45, 49–50, 61, 67, 77–78, 119, 121–22, 126, 128–29, 132–34, 142 Galicia-Volhyn, xxv, 20, 34, 49 Galitskiy, Daniel, 51 Gawharshat, Princess, 197 Gediminas, Prince, 49, 60, 164 Genghis Khan, 27–31, 89 Genoa, 35, 140 Georgia, 29 Germany, 173, 187, 215 Gerasim of Kolomna, 84 Glinskaya, Elena Vasilyevna, 203 Glinsky, Mikhail Lvovich, 185–86, 188, 190, 203 Golden Horde, xiii–xv, xvii–xx, xxiii, xxix, 5, 7, 11, 15, 17, 20, 35, 37–38, 45–47, 51, 66, 72, 76, 82, 86–88, 96, 99–102, 104, 128–29, 136, 142, 145, 165, 169, 172, 177, 202, 207–8, 210, 213–14, 217, 219, 222 Goldfrank, D. M., xxiii Gonneau, Pierre, xxv Gorodets, 26, 54, 56, 78, 83, 104, 106 Gorokhovets, 26 Gorsky, A. A., xxi, 18–21, 57–58, 66, 69, 76, 87, 99, 166, 168 Gostomysl, 148 Grand Duchy of Lithuania, xiii–xv, xvii, xx, xxv–xxvii, xxix, 68, 72, 76, 81, 89, 104, 116–19, 127, 144, 160,

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Between East and West 162–63, 165, 178, 188–89, 209, 212, 215–16, 218–20, 222 Greifswald, 174 Grekov, B. D., 123 Grousset, Rene, 63 Grunwald, 115, 119–20, 211, 219 Gudavičius, Edvardas, xxvii, 113, 162–63, 186, 189 Gumilyov, L. N., 17, 21, 86 Gurlen, 91 Halperin, Charles, xxi, xxiii, 38–39, 47, 51, 90, 96, 103, 128, 217 Hamadani, Rashid al-Din, xxi, 30, 33 Hamburg, 174 Hans of Denmark, King, 174 Hartinger, Ambassador, 147 Heart, 28 Henry II the Pious, 34 Herberstein, Sigismund von, xx, 181, 191, 193 Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, xiv, xvii, xxvi, 207, 218, 220 Horodlo, 116–17 Howes, Robert Craig, xxiii–xxiv Hungary, 33–35, 49, 164, 172, 174, 176, 187, 215 Ibrahim, 170 Ibrahim, bakshi, 196–97 Igor, 23 Ikonnikov, V. S., 200 Ilovaysky, D. I., xxi, 183, 187, 190 Ilyin, V. V., 146, 164 Innocent IV, Pope, 47–48 Isidore, Metropolitan, 138–39 Istanbul, 195 Italy, xiv, xxvii, 136, 172, 175, 215, 218 Ivan of Mozhaysk, 131 Ivan Dmitrievich of Pereyaslavl, 56–57

Ivan Fedorovich, 85 Ivan Fyodorovich of Ryazan, 126, 135 Ivan Ivanovich the Fair (r. 1353–1359), 65, 67, 70–71, 76, 208 Ivan Mikhailovich, 107–8 Ivan IV the Terrible, xxiv, 133, 146, 199, 204 Ivan II the Red, xix Ivan III, xix, xxiv, 143, 145–180, 184–85, 202–4, 213–16 Ivan Vsevolodovich, 44 Ivan Vsevolozhsky, 99, 121 Izhora, 40 Izyaslav, 24–25 Jadwiga, 93 Jalal ad-Din, Khan, 104 Jan Ali, 197 Jani Beg (r. 1342–1357), 67–68, 75, 84, 103 Jin Empire, 27 Jochi, 27, 30–31, 75 Jogaila, 84, 92–93, 98, 100, 111, 114–16, 164 Jonah, Archbishop, 136, 152–53 Jonah, Metropolitan, 133, 138, 140–41 Juvayni, Ata-Malik, xxi, 32 Juzjani, Minhaj al-Siraj, xxi, 30, 46 Kagarlitsky, B. Yu., 35 Kalita, Ivan, xix, xxiv, 1–2, 5, 11, 61–67, 71–72, 77, 99, 135, 143, 146, 208 Kalka River, 30, 32, 88 Kaluga, 142, 167, 183, 204, 215 Kafa, 195 Karakorum, 43–45 Karamzin, N. M., xxi, 1–2, 35, 41, 44, 50, 65, 69, 85, 94, 100, 102, 104, 159, 182, 188, 196 Karelia, 48 Karnaukhov, D. V., 85, 157 Kashin, 55, 68, 80–82, 141

Index Kashira, 193–94 Kasimov, 132 Kavgady, 59 Kazakhstan, xiii, xxviii, 207, 222 Kazan, passim Keenan, Edward, xxiv Kęstutis, 79–80, 98 Khabar, Ivan Vasilyevich, 195 Khizir, Mahmud, 75 Khodarkovsky, Michael, xxi, 220 Kholm, 159 Kholmsky, Ivan Vsevolodich, 110 Kholmsky, Daniel Dmitrievich, 167 Khorasan, 29 Khorobrit, Mikhail, 44 Khrustalyov, D. G., 35, 40, 42, 44 Khulna Khan, 75 Khwarazm, 29 Khwarezmid Empire, 28 Kideksha, 32 Kiev, xx, 2–4, 23–24, 26, 29, 33–36, 44–46, 58–59, 69, 81, 93, 96, 101, 112, 119, 127, 139–40, 153, 161, 163, 174, 185, 210, 215, 217 Kievan Rus, xix–xx, xxiv–xxv, xxix, 24–25, 33, 36, 72, 124, 208–9, 218, 222 Kildibeg, 75 Kirdyapa, Vasily, 92, 106 Kirpichnikov, A. N., 91 Kissinger, Henry, xxix Klin, 26, 159 Klug, Ekkehard, xxvii, 60, 63, 92, 131 Klyapik, Ambassador, 193 Klyazma, 4, 26, 128 Klyuchevsky, V. O., xxi, 4–7, 9, 17–18, 21, 26, 53, 71, 85, 118, 163, 204, 208 Koirijak, 100 Kolomna, 15–16, 32, 57–58, 84, 90, 92, 101, 112, 128–29, 142, 167, 203 Konchaka (Agafya), 59–60

Konstantine of Belozersk, 109 Konstantin Dmitrievich, 126 Konstantin Romanovich of Ryazan, 57–58 Konstantin Vasilyevich of Rostov, 78 Konstantin Vasilyevich of Suzdal, 67–68, 70 Konstanty of Ostrog, Hetman, 163 Konyavskaya, E. L., 107 Koporye, 41 Korostyn, 155 Koshka, Feodor, 99, 103 Koshkin, Ivan, 99, 121 Kosoy, Vasily, 125, 128–29, 131, 133, 143–44, 212 Kostomarov, N. I., xxi, 57, 94 Kostroma, 14, 17, 26, 32, 53n147, 54–55, 59, 64, 67, 89–90, 92, 102, 126, 142 Kotlyarov, D. A., 171, 197 Kotlyarov, Y., 115 Kozelsk, 33, 104 Krasny, Dmitry, 129, 133, 143–44, 212 Kromer, Marcin, xx Ksnyatin, 26, 55 Kuchka, Stepan Ivanovich, 26 Kuchlug, Prince, 28 Kuchkin, V. A., xxi, 26, 122 Kulikovo field, 5, 17, 85–88, 95, 178, 210 Kushkumbaev, A. I., xxviii Ladoga, 40 Lama, 4 Laumulin, M. T., xxviii, 31 Lavrov, Alexander, xxv Levitsky, G., 111, 150 Lind, J. H., 40 Lithuania, passim. See also Grand Duchy of Lithuania Livonia, 48, 139, 147, 174, 184, 192, 215

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Between East and West Lobin, A. N., 188 Lopasnya, 4, 70 Louis, 191 Lubeck, 174, 181, 192 Lurie, Ya. S., xxi, 12 Lykov, Alexander Vladimirovich, 121 Lyubavsky, M. K., xxi, 6–7, 25, 34 Lyubutsk, 80, 112, 163 Lyuby, A., xxviii Magnus IV, 67 Mamai, 74–75, 77, 79, 81–89, 91, 96, 154, 197, 210 Mansur Ulan, 121, 128 Maria Yaroslavna, Grand Duchess, 150–51, 156 Martin, Janet, xxiv Marx, Karl, xxvii, 177 Matthias Corvinus, 172 Mavrodin, V. V., 11–12, 123 Maxim, Metropolitan, 59 Maximilian Emperor, 173, 181, 188, 191 Maximus the Greek, 203 Mäxmüd, 132, 170 Mechovius, Matthias, 157, 169 Mehmed I Giray, 193–94 Melik, Simeon, 85 Mengli I Giray, 167, 169–71 Meschera, 106 Meyendorff, John, 218 Mitchell, Robert, xxiv Miechowita, Maciej, xx Mikhail Alexandrovich of Tver, 70, 79, 82, 90, 95, 107, 210 Mikhail Andreevich of Vereya, 130 Mikhail Borisovich Tverskoy, 158–59 Mikhail Vasilyevich, 68, 81 Mikhail Yaroslavich of Tver, 55–60, 81, 159 Mikhailova, I. B., xxi, 125, 135

Mikulin, 82 Milyukov, P. N., xxi, 198 Mindaugas (Mindovg), 48–49 Mirgaleyev, I. M., 43 Miroshnichenko, Yu. R., 33 Mirza Kachig Alei, 197 Mitrofan Karacharov, 175 Mongol Empire, 27, 43, 46, 213, 222 Mongolia, 28 Monomakh, Vladimir, 24–25, 148 Morgan, David, xxiv Morozov, Grigory, 183 Moscow, passim Mozhaysk, 16, 58, 131–32, 135, 142, 162, 168, 205 Mstislav (1125–1132), 25 Mstislav Mstislavich Udaly, 29 Mstislav Romanovich, 29 Mstislav Svyatoslavich, 29 Mstislavl, 190 Muhammad, Khan, 79, 193 Muhammad Amin, 171, 193 Muhammad II, al-Dīn, Shah, 28–29 Muminov, A. K., xxviii Munchaev, S. M., 20, 66 Munekhin, M. G., 199 Munke (Men-gu), 45 Murid, 75, 77 Murom, 33, 53–54, 102, 196, 118, 137, 172, 211 Murtaza, 170 Mustafa, 130 Mustafa Muratovic, 140 Nalivaiko, R. A., xx Narva, 174 Naurus, 75 Neal, Jeffrey L., xxv Nekomat, 82 Nepryadva River, 84 Nerekhta, 15

Index Nerl River, 26 Neva, 40–41 Nevryuy, 45–46, 57 Nevsky, Alexander Yaroslavich, passim Nezhatina field, 24 Nizhny Novgorod, 4, 7, 9–10, 14, 21, 63, 67, 70, 78, 83, 89, 91–92, 100, 102, 106–7, 118, 126, 130, 142, 171, 196–97, 211 Nilus of Sora, 149 Nogai, 54–55, 57 Nogai Mamuk, 171 North Caucasus, 29, 35 Northern Dvina, 15, 61 Northeastern Russia, 3–4, 6–7, 14–15, 19, 26, 34–35, 40, 44, 46, 55–56, 62, 65–66, 72, 78, 81–82, 86, 95 Nosov, N. E., 124, 212 Novgorod, passim Novgorod-Seversky, 204, 215 Novogorodok, 159 Nyanka, Filip, 32 Ob River, 174 Obolensky Striga, Ivan Vasilyevich, 136–37 Ofonasya Kuritsyn, Deacon, 196 Ogedei, 31, 34, 43 Oka, 4, 8, 15, 35, 70–71, 81, 83–84, 89, 100, 109, 117, 132, 134, 166, 186, 191, 194 Olga, Princess (r. 945–962), 23 Oleg, 23–25 Oleg Ivanovich of Ryazan, 70, 79–80, 82, 89, 92, 112, 114 Olgerd. See Algirdas Onon River, 27 Opochka, 191 Opoki, 159 Ordu-Malik, 75

Orsha, 190–91 Ostej, 90 Ostrovsky, Donald, xxiii, 38, 218 Paletsky, Ivan Fyodorovich, 197 Pape, Karsten, 174 Patrikeyev, Vassian, 149 Peipsi Lake, 42 Penkov, Vasily Danilovich, 196 Pereyaslavl, 4, 15, 24–25, 33, 41, 45–46, 54–58, 67, 76, 80, 90, 138, 193 Perekhov, Ya. A. 53, 77, 117, 127 Perfushkov, Gregory Mikhailovich, 137 Perm, 118, 147, 164, 184, 211 Persia, 75, 89 Peter, Metropolitan, 59 Philip, Metropolitan, 152, 154 Philotheus, Elder, 199–202 Photius, Metropolitan, 117–19, 121–22, 126, 134 Pimen, Metropolitan, 93 Pipes, Richard, xxi, xxix, 37–38, 160, 204, 213 Pisa, 35 Platonov, S. F., xxi, 7–9, 48–49, 69, 85, 102, 116, 133, 175–76, 180 Plava River, 115 Plettenberg, 184–85, 187, 191 Pliguzov, A. I., xxi, 79, 82–83, 86, 91 Plyukhanova, M. B., 168 Pochekaev, R. Y., xxi, 31, 43, 170 Podolia, 98, 112 Podzhogin, Vasily Yuryevich, 195 Pokrovsky, M. N., 10–11 Poland, xv, xx, xxv–xxvi, xxix, 33–35, 49, 84, 93, 100, 111, 113, 115–16, 126–27, 139, 156–57, 161, 163–65, 169, 172–74, 184, 186–87, 189, 191, 214–15, 218–20, 222 Polevoy, N. A., xxi

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Between East and West Polo, Marco, xx Polotsk, 24, 33, 49, 60, 127, 161, 164, 185, 191 Polotsky, Andrey, 80 Poppel, Nikolaus, 172–73 Presnyakov, A. E., xxi, 71, 102, 107–8, 113, 117, 123, 143, 150, 159, 168, 208, 211 Prince, Dineley J., xxiv Pronina, N. M., 46 Pskov, passim Pyotr Dmitrievich of Dmitrov, 126 Qasim, 132, 170, 194 Rale, Foma Ivanovich, 172 Ralev, Dmitry, 175 Repnya-Obolensky, Ivan Mikhailovich, 182 Reval, 174, 181 Roman Curia, xiv, xvii, 192 Roman Mikhailovich of Bryansk, 114 Romanov, 151 Rostislav, 24 Rostov, 3–4, 9, 15, 25–26, 32, 44, 47, 55, 61, 64, 68, 77–78, 84, 90, 102, 128–29, 134, 140, 142–43, 147, 150, 167, 176, 207, 212, 214 Ruffo, Marco, 175 Rurik, xxvi, 23, 37, 148, 153 Rusa, 15, 136 Russia, passim Ryazan, 3–4, 7–9, 12, 32, 53, 57–58, 70–71, 77, 79–83, 89, 92, 95, 102, 108, 112, 114, 119, 126, 130, 135, 138, 140, 143, 150, 1543, 157, 159, 161, 163–64, 167, 183, 195, 204, 211–12, 215 Ryazanovsky, V. A., xxii, 36 Rylo, Vassian, Archbishop, 167–68 Rzhev, 26, 59, 104, 129, 132, 142

Saadet I Girey, 195 Sabitov, Zh. M., xxviii, 46 Sabur, Fedor Ivanovich, 121 Saburova, Solomonia Yuryevna, 203 Safa Girey, 195–97 Sahib I Giray, 194–95 Saltykov, V., 195 Samarkand, 28–29, 101 Samogitia (Zhmud), 49, 111–12, 115 Sarai, xviii, 6, 38, 43, 47, 50, 54, 56, 65, 75–76, 82–83, 88, 166, 170, 208, 213 Sarai-Berke (New Sarai), 101 Sarykhozha, 80 Savelyev-Rostislavich, N. V., 85 Sayid Ahmad II, 170 Schenk, Frithjof Benjamin, xxvii, 52 Seleznyov, Yu. V., xxi, 34 Semyon Mikhailovich, 54 Sergius of Radonezh, 84, 93, 97, 99 Serkizov, Andrey, 85 Serpukhov, 90, 92, 101–2, 104, 135, 141–42, 167, 194 Shadi Beg, 103 Shah Ali (Shahghali), 194–95 Shaskolsky, I. P., 40, 42 Sheikh Ahmed, 170 Shelon River, 154 Shemyaka, Dmitry, 125, 128–35, 143–44, 183, 212 Shenya, Daniel, 188 Shepard, Johnatan, xxiv Sheshnya, 26 Shevkal (Chol-Khan), 62 Shikhmat, 98 Shilyaev, A., 115 Shir Mergen Chyurachikov, 197 Shmurlo, E. F., 34, 49–50, 85, 140, 146, 160, 177, 180 Shoshi, 4 Shtykov, N. V., xxi

Index Shuisky, F. Yu., 151–52, 189, 191 Siberia, 27, 35, 39, 230 Sigismund, 127, 185 Sigismund, Archduke, 174 Sigismund I, 186–87, 190–91, 193 Simeon Konstantinovich of Dorogobuzh, 79, 90 Simeon the Proud, 65–71, 208 Simon, Metropolitan, 184 Sinitsyna, N. V., Sit River, 32–33 Sixtus IV, Pope, 146 Smirnov, P. P., 11–12, 21 Smolensk, passim Smolich, I. K., 139 Snoops, Mikhail, 174 Sol Galichskaya, 15 Solario, Pietro Antonio, 175 Solovyov, S. M., xxi, 2–4, 41, 44–45, 60–61, 66, 76, 82, 85, 94, 105, 108, 112–13, 115, 146, 164, 166, 185, 194–95, 203 Sophia, Princess, 119, 168 Sophia Palaiologos, 146 Spuler, Bertold, xxi, xxvii, 83, 87, 89, 100–101, 165 St. Petersburg, 52, 203, 231 Staritsa, 159 Starodub, 26, 163, 183, 294, 215 Stefan Dusan, Serbian Tsar, 198 Stolberg, Eva-Maria, xxvii Strigin-Obolensky, A. S., 195 Stryjkowski, Maciej, xx, 84–85 Subedei, 32, 34 Sura River, 195 Suzdal, 7, 9, 17, 25–26, 32, 36, 42–43, 45–47, 54–56, 58, 64, 67, 69–70, 76–78, 86, 96, 106–7, 118, 130, 142, 207, 210–212 Sverdlov, M. B., 48 Svidrigiello, 126–27, 144, 212

Svyatopolk, 24–25 Svyatoslav (r. 964–972), 23 Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich, 44–45 Sweden, xiv, xvi, 35, 46, 48, 67, 174–75, 181, 184, 192, 215, 218 Tabai, Prince, 197 Taidula, 75 Tarnovo, 198 Tarusa, 102, 106, 118, 211 Tatishchev, V. N., 26, 193 Teginya, Mirza, 127 Temirgaliev, R. D., 46 Temur Qutlugh, 99–102, 113 Terek River, 100 Tevekel, Prince, 197 Timur (Tamerlane), 87, 99–103, 165 Timur-Khoja, 75 Timur-Malik, 99 Theognostus, Metropolitan, 69 Tmutarakan, 24–25 Tode Mongke, Khan, 54 Toglubai, 74 Tokhtamysh, Khan, 83, 87–93, 95–96, 98–107, 111, 113, 165, 210 Toporkov, Ivan, 168 Toporkov, Vassian, Bishop, 203 Toqta, Khan, 55, 57, 59 Torzhok, 32–33, 59, 64, 67, 80, 82, 104, 109–110 Trakhaniot, Yury, 172–73 Trubetskoy, N. S., xxi, 35, 163 Tsamblak, Gregory, 119 Tschebotarioff Bill, Valentine, xxiv Turakina, 43–44 Tver, passim Udaltsova, Z. V., 202 Udovik, S. L., 34 Uglich, 3, 17, 26, 61, 104, 129, 131–32, 135, 141–42, 193

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Between East and West Ugra, 108, 115, 147, 167–68, 178, 214 Ukraine, xxix, 222 Ulaghchi, Khan, 46 Ulan Appai, 196–97 Uliana Alexandrovna, 92 Ulrich von Jungingen, 115, 120 Ulugh-Muhammad, 127–30, 132 Ulus Jochi. See Golden Horde Unzha, 26, 194 Upper Tobol, 99 Urus Khan, 81–83, 99 Usachyov, A. S., 202 Uskenbay, K. Z., xxviii, 30 Uspensky B. A., 148, 201 Ustinov, V. M., 20 Ustyug, 132, 134–35, 142 Uzbeg, Khan, 59–60, 64–65, 67 Vasilko Konstantinovich, 32 Vasilko Romanovich, 49 Vasilsursk (Vasilgrad), 195 Vasily I Dmitrievich, 98–112, 114–15, 117–19, 122, 127, 210–11 Vasily II Vasilyevich (the Blind), xix, 15, 121–39, 142–43, 145, 151, 212 Vasily III Vasilyevich, xix, 129, 132, 156, 180–200, 203–5, 215–16 Vasily Davydovich of Yaroslavl, 67 Vasily Dmitrievich, 99–102, 105, 110, 118, 122, 127, 211 Vasily Simeonovich, 183 Vasily Mikhailovich, 141 Vasily Vsevolodovich, 44 Vasily Yaroslavich of Serpukhov, 133, 135, 141–42 Venice, 35, 140, 175–76 Vernadsky, G. V., xxii–xxiii, 36–37, 86, 88–89, 98–99, 130 Verona, 191 Vilimas, D., xxviii Vissarion, 168

Vladimir, 6, 9, 15, 27, 32, 44–47, 50, 53–59, 62–67, 70, 76–80, 82, 86, 90–91, 94, 98, 123, 142, 145, 147, 150, 153, 159, 208, 210, 212, 216 Vladimir (r. 980–1015), 23–24, 148 Vladimir, the youngest son of Yury Vsevolodovich, 27, 32 Vladimir Andreevich, 137, 151 Vladimir Andreevich of Serpukhov, 70, 78–79, 84, 92, 101–2, 104–5, 109, 128 Vladimir Dmitrievich of Pronsk, 79–80 Vladimir Konstantinovich, 44 Vladimir-on-Klyazma, 59, 72, 209 Vladimir-Suzdal, 9, 32, 46, 69, 96, 210 Vladislaus, 191 Volga, 4, 8, 14, 26, 31–32, 34–35, 64, 76, 82–83, 99–101, 109, 129, 132, 134, 151, 166, 178 Volga Bulgaria, 32 Vologda, 15, 110, 118, 129, 132, 142, 211 Volokolamsk, 110, 142, 149, 183, 194, 204, 215 Volotsky, Fyodor Borisovich, 183 Volotsky, Joseph, 149 Volpe, Jean-Baptiste de la, 175 Volter, O. V., 198 Vorskla, 102, 108, 113–14 Vozha River, 83 Vseslav, 24 Vsevolod, 24–25 Vyacheslav, 24–25 Vyatka, 106, 134, 137, 142, 147, 164, 166 Vyazma, 108, 115 Vyshgorod, 151 Vytautas, 79, 98, 100–102, 108, 110–22, 126–27, 144, 189, 211–12 Wallachia, 34, 98 Wenden, 48 William of Rubruck, xx

Index Wittfogel, K., xxvi–xxvii Wladislaw, 127 Władysław II, 100 Xi Xia, 27–28 Yaglybai, 75 Yaik, 99 Yakub, 132 Yanov, A. L., 152 Yaroslav the Wise, 24–25 Yaroslav Vsevolodovich, 33, 40, 43–44, 58 Yaroslav Yaroslavich (r. 1264–1272), 45, 53–54 Yaroslavl, 4, 9, 14, 32, 67, 84, 97, 128, 134, 143, 150, 155, 158, 161, 176, 212, 214 Yury Danilovich, 57–60, 71, 208 Yury Dmitrievich, 119121–23, 125–28, 133, 143–44, 212

Yury Ingvarevich, 32 Yury Ivanovich of Dmitrov, 186 Yuri Patrikeyevitch, 121 Yury Vasilyevich of Dmitrov, 150, 168 Yury Vsevolodovich, 27, 32–33, 39 Yuryev, 193 Yuryev-Polsky, 26, 54, 56, 76 Yushkov, S. V., 12 Zakzhevsky, A. B., xxviii Zhilka, Dmitry Ivanovich, 193 Zhongxing, 28 Zhukov N. S., 202 Zimin, A. A., xxi, 14–16, 21, 124, 133, 212 Zosimus Metropolitan, 198 Zubtsov, 26, 82, 159 Zvenets-Zvenigorodsky, Ivan Ivanovich, 166 Zvenigorod, 26, 78, 119, 142, 151–52

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