Belonging to the West: Geopolitical Myths and Identity in Modern Greece: A Study of Analytical Geopolitics 9004686894, 9789004686892

Citation preview

geopolitical myths that shape its identity, the book illuminates the multifaceted factors driving Greece's pro-European strategy and foreign policy. By introducing and using Analytical Geopolitics as a pioneering approach, the book provides a historical-structural framework and expands the role of myth in understanding international relations. ANTONIOS NESTORAS, Ph.D. (1983), is the Deputy Executive Director of the European Liberal Forum (ELF) and Adjunct Professor at the Brussels School of Governance, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). He currently serves as the Editor of

G E O P O L I T I C S

A N D

ELF’s Technopolitics Series and the Chief Editor of the Future Europe

GEOPOLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3 Series Editor: David Criekemans 9 789004 686892

issn 2666-6669 brill.com/geop

R E L A T I O N S I N T E R N A T I O N A L

of the Eurocrisis, Greece's commitment remains steadfast. By analyzing the

A N D

and the West. From the early days of European integration to the challenges

G E O P O L I T I C S

and political myth, tracing Greece's enduring determination to align with Europe

GEOP

BELONGING TO THE WEST: GEOPOLITICAL MYTHS AND IDENTITY IN MODERN GREECE Antonios Nestoras

belonging. This thought-provoking book explores the intersection of geopolitics

I N T E R N A T I O N A L

Uncover the fascinating story of Greece's unwavering quest for European

R E L A T I O N S

21 mm

BELONGING TO THE WEST: GEOPOLITICAL MYTHS AND IDENTITY IN MODERN GREECE A Study of Analytical Geopolitics Antonios Nestoras

Belonging to the West

s and Identity in Modern Greece

Geopolitics and International Relations Series Editor David Criekemans (University of Antwerp

volume 3

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/geop

Belonging to the West Identity in Modern Greece A Study of Analytical Geopolitics

Antonios Nestoras

leiden | boston

Cover illustration: A map created in 1564 by Ferrando Bertelli, based off Nikolaos Sophianos’s 1540 Totius Graeciae Descripto. Original publication: Salamanca, Antonio. “Graeciae Chorographia.” Claudio Duchetti. 1558. Public Domain. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Nestoras, Antonios, author. Title: Belonging to the West : geopolitical myths and identity in modern Greece : a study of analytical geopolitics / Antonios Nestoras. Other titles: Geopolitical myths and identity in modern Greece : a study of analytical geopolitics Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill - Nijhoff, 2024. | Series: Geopolitics and international relations, 2666-6669 ; volume 3 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2023039364 (print) | LCCN 2023039365 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004686892 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004686908 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Geopolitics–Greece. | Greece–Relations–Europe. | Europe–Relations–Greece. | Political culture–Greece. Classification: LCC dF854.n478 2024 (print) | LCC DF854 (ebook) | DDC 320.1/209495–dc23/eng/20230925 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023039364 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023039365

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 2666-6669 isbn 978-90-04-68689-2 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-68690-8 (e-book) Copyright 2024 by Antonios Nestoras. Published by Koninklijke Brill , Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Brill Wageningen Academic, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress. Koninklijke Brill reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

To my incredible parents, who empowered me with their sacrifices throughout my life And to my beloved daughters, life’s greatest gift and uttermost responsibility This book, and its author, is but a link in the chain of their love

Contents

List of Maps and Tables ix

1 Introduction 1 1 Explanations Based on Interests and Identity 5 2 The Constitutive Role of Political Myth and Geography 15 3 Political Myth and Geopolitical Analysis 29 2

A Short History of Geopolitics 39 1 From Classical to Critical Geopolitics 39 1.1 Classical Geopolitics, Rise and Demise 39 1.2 Geopolitics’ Revival and Critique 41 1.3 Postmodern, Critical Geopolitics 43 1.4 Textual Deconstruction in Critical Geopolitics 44 1.5 The Critique of Critical Geopolitics 45 2 From Critical to Analytical Geopolitics 50 2.1 Myth and Political Myth 50 2.2 Political Myth, ir, and Geopolitics 54 2.3 Toward an Analytical Geopolitics 59 3 A Structural-Historical Method of Analysis 67 3.1 Geopolitical Myths as Structural Objects 67 3.2 Types and Form of Geopolitical Myths 69 3.3 The Functions of Geopolitical Myths 72

3

Geopolitical Mythmaking in Modern Greece 76 1 Excursus: Locating “Greece” in Space and Time 76 2 Imitating the West and the Greek Enlightenment 81 2.1 The Great Idea as a Foundational Geopolitical Myth 82 2.2 Modern Times, Modern Space: Enlightenment, Science, and Geography 88 2.3 Centrality, Continuity, and Affinity in Greek Political Geography 93 2.4 Interim Conclusion: The Diffusion of Belonging 99 3 Opposing the West and Greek Romanticism 106 3.1 Absolutism, Religion, and the Russian Expectation 107 3.2 Romantic Historiography and the Byzantine Revival 117 3.3 Western Dependence and the Limits of Opposition 126 Interim Conclusion: Opposition and Adaptation of  133

viii

Contents

4

Belonging to the West and European Integration 138 4.1 Western Dependence from the Turn of the Century to World War II 139 4.2 Belonging to the West from the Civil War to European Integration 143 4.3 Europeanization, Modernization, and the Geopolitics of the Euro Crisis 152 Interim Conclusion: Ritualization and Sacralization of  164  171 Belonging to the West  171 The Making of an Efficient Geopolitical Myth 177 : A Research Agenda 185



References 195 Index 233

Maps and Tables

enlargement between 1981 and 2007 4 Totius Graeciae Descriptio, the whole of Greece according to Nikolaos Sophianos (Tolias, 2006) 80 Territorial expansion of Greece, 1832–1947 84

Tables Existing explanations for Greece’s European integration Overview of Classical, Critical, and Analytical Geopolitics Possible lines of inquiry in Analytical geopolitics 75 Sacred and secular maps printed in Greek, 1665–1820 91 Areas of Greek cartographic interest, 1665–1820 91 The Great Idea: analysis of key narratives and stories 104 The Russian expectation: analysis of key narratives and stories 136 The Byzantine revival: analysis of key narratives and stories 136 Summary of narratives used during the 2015 “bailout referendum” 168 Belonging to the West: analysis of key narratives and stories 169 , adaptability, intertextuality: the qualities of the myth of belonging 174 Summary of geopolitical oppositions and adaptations in the Greek mythmaking process 181 13 Geopolitical myths and narratives according to type/relation to topographical space 193

chapter 1

Introduction In 1977, in a televised parliamentary debate that became viral long before the arrival of social media, the leader of the main opposition party was criticizing the government for its decision to accede to the European Communities. “The only thing with which we agree with the government,” he said, “is that the decision—the choice—of acceding to the Common Market is the most critical decision taken for the nation, which was taken on the altar of the ‘belonging to the West’.” The Greek prime minister, with what seemed to be genuine surprise or indignation, abruptly interrupted the speech of the opposition leader, saying, “Greece belongs to the Western World, owing to tradition or by way of interests, Greece belongs to the Western World.” He continued: “Just like other people belong to the Non-Attached, the East or the African world—we belong to the West.” The immediate response from the opposition leader elicited wild applause from the left wing of the parliament: “We prefer to belong to the Greeks.”1 The prime minister was Konstantinos Karamanlis, leader of the center-right New Democracy party and a central figure in the restitution of democracy after the collapse of the military junta in 1974 (Woodhouse, 1982). He was also the driving force behind the accession of Greece to the European Communities (EC)—a legacy that earned him the nickname “leader of the Greek nation” (or Ethnarch in Greek). The leader of the left opposition was Andreas Papandreou, founder of PASOK, a populist party that started from a radical left and Eurosceptic posture in the 1970s, only to define mainstream pro-European and progressive social-democrat politics in Greece in the 1990s. From a first reading of this historic parliamentary exchange, it is easy to recognize that Papandreou did not diverge far from the leitmotifs of left populist rhetoric against European integration (see, e.g., Dinan, 2004, pp. 165–188; Gillingham, 2003, pp. 105–129). From the opposite side, with an air of self-evident common sense, Karamanlis used the standard Cold War verbal performance to defend his position, which is often criticized as cultural stereotyping bordering on cultural determinism (Westad, 2013, p. 169). According to Karamanlis, however, Greece belonged to the West as other states belonged to other worlds.

1 Several video clips of this famous parliamentary exchange are available online; see, for exam-

© Antonios Nestoras, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004686908_002

2

chapter 1

In Karamanlis’s statement “we belong to the West” the term belong may be taken to mean that Greece is a member of the West, is allied to, an adherent of, associated with the West; or it may be taken to mean that Greece is suited to the West, has a rightful place in the West (not least because Greece “created” the West), has the right cultural qualities to be assigned to the West;2 or it may even mean that Greece is a “property” of the West, or, better, depends on the West, but in which case, this dependence does not carry an entirely negative connotation, since it also grants security and confidence in a small state on the margins of Europe. In this sense, another look at this famous exchange between the two Greek statesmen, and especially Karamanlis’s statement, also hints at the central function of Europe and the West (by and large, the two terms are interchangeable in public debates) as the touchstone of Greek politics, deciding a diverse area of issues ranging from identity to economic and social policy, strategy, foreign policy, and nearly every other major cleavage in Greek politics (Featherstone, 2014, pp. 1–16). This observation—the concept of Europe as the touchstone of Greek strategic thought and foreign policy—is the starting point of this study. Considering the country’s geographical, political, economic, and cultural situation, Greece’s history of infatuation with Europe and the West is rather puzzling. By and large, Greece is situated on the margins of the European continent and in direct proximity to the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia Minor. In terms of both geography and ethnology, Greece belongs to the Balkan Peninsula (see, e.g., Kitromilides, 1996). The Greeks share with the Serbs, the Albanians, the Bulgarians, and the rest of the Balkan people the same location, the same geographical remoteness from Western Europe, more or less the same historical path to modernity, and the same birth certificate from the rapture of nationalisms in the territories of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.3 However, Greece has followed a different, definitely faster trajectory—a shortcut perhaps—within the club of Western European nations. In terms of culture, Greece may have to showcase a range of Western attitudes and values, but there is also a strong and at times dominant undercurrent of Eastern mentali ties and beliefs—notably in religious terms—that set Greece quite apart from Western European countries. Finally, in terms of strategy and foreign policymaking, despite being a melting pot for rival intellectual, political, and cultural In both cases, the translation of the statement from Greek to English as “we belong West” could also be accepted, without any essential consequences for the purposes of this study. On the shared physical geography of the Balkan countries see, Reed et al. (2010).

INTRODUCTION

3

forces, Greece has only rarely exhibited the behavior of a “swing” state. In many respects, Greece’s geopolitical anchoring to Europe and the West seems to transcend both time-specific and geographical circumstances, which, at the very least, is a sign of persistent, underlying dynamics that influence Greece’s strategic thinking and foreign policy. This puzzle becomes even clearer if we focus on a specific period of time, perhaps the second half of the 20th century, which includes Greece’s NATO membership and later accession to the EC, which formalized Greece’s Western European choice. Since the end of World War II, the Greek state has constantly sought to take an active role in the process of transatlantic and European integration. Greece came out of World War II fighting a civil war with the Allies on its side, joined NATO in 1952, entered into an Association Agreement with the EC in 1962, and, immediately after a seven-year-long military dictatorship, applied for full EC membership in 1974. In the face of geographical remoteness from Western Europe, a relatively small economy, and a “Balkan make-up,” Greece managed to secure EC accession as early as 1981. To make this statement from another perspective: for 26 years, from the Greek accession in 1981 up to the European Union (EU) enlargement in 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria), Greece did not share any land border with a fellow EU Member State (see Map 1). More recently, in the late 1990s, Greece scrambled to join the eurozone, whereas after 2010 and during a lengthy economic crisis that included a shocking 25 percent GDP drop in five years—the worst performance in Europe and unprecedented in the previous five decades, during peacetime (see Argyriades, 2013)—Greece grudgingly agreed to successive bailout agreements and austerity measures in order to remain in the eurozone, despite few successes and a lot questions raised regarding democratic legitimacy and accountability (Featherstone, 2011). The euro crisis has left the Greek political system in ruins (Verney, 2014; Kompsopoulos & Chasoglou, 2014). However, despite both political upheaval and the fact that successive governments have altered Greece’s attitude toward EU bailout negotiations, in general, the country’s anchoring in Europe has been maintained (Clements et al., 2014). In the end, the policies of severe economic austerity and the questions of legitimacy have not shaken the core of pro-European sentiments within the Greek parliament (Tsirbas & Sotiropoulos, 2016), despite the Grexit drama in 2015 and the spectacular rise of Euro sceptic left and right populist forces in the country. For the far right, see Ellinas (2013); see also Lodenius (2014). For the far left, see, for example, Stavrakakis & Katsambekis (2014).

enlargement between 1981 and 2007 Source: European Communities in 1981 - By Kolja21 CC BY 3.0, Wikimedia Commons. The European Union in 2007 - By Julio Reis CC BY-SA 2.5, Wikimedia Commons

INTRODUCTION

5

There seems to be something arcane about it, but Greece has exhibited a consistent pro-European and pro-Western attitude in spite of the country’s geographic remoteness from Western Europe; its idiosyncratic culture and “Balkan make-up”; later, its deteriorating economic position inside the eurozone; and finally, the rise of Eurosceptic political forces. Judging from the outcome so far, despite everything, and in the face of the recent populist surge, Greece’s own classification as European has remained unaffected. The question, then, is why Greece’s geopolitical alignment with Europe and the West has proven so resilient despite strong external and internal challenges. In this apparent continuity of Greek foreign policy, may we assume the presence of inescapable, underlying factors that influence the country’s strategic choices? And if so, what are those factors? Is it a matter of national interest, as many have suggested, namely the interest of Western powers to keep Greece on their side, or the interest of Greek elites to attach themselves to Europe and the West? In this case we should assume that this pro-European consistency is the perpetual outcome of a sober, rational calculation of costs and benefits on behalf of the actors involved, or perhaps that certain international configurations, such as power relations and unequal development, impose certain limitations and opportunities, threats and rewards, which dictate a specific course of action. Or is it identity, as others would have it, either as a genuine expression of collective consciousness or as an imported self-image that is a product of cultural domination? And in this case we should hypothesize instead that when we talk about Greece’s pro-European strategy, in reality we are faced with the history of an idea—the idea of Europe and the West in the Greek imagination—and we must trace its development into a sense of purpose and identity, an expression of a collective consciousness that longs to belong to Europe and the West. Or is it all the above factors together? And if yes, what kind of process, with what kinds of rules or explanatory framework, could account for this multiplicity of factors and their evident persistence that traverses ideological contexts and international orders, the alternation of governments, and the constant rearrangement of the balance of power? 1

Explanations Based on Interests and Identity

The first hypothesis is that Greece’s traditional attachment to Europe and the West is best explained by a variety of external and internal interests that dictate and enforce the terms of their relations. This means that at all times the inter ests of major Western powers and those of Greek political and economic elites

6

chapter 1

have been to ensure that the country remains within the Western sphere of influence. From the Western point of view, the interest would be to extend its control, or to limit that of others, to use Greece’s resources or to take advantage of the country’s strategic location. From the Greek point of view, the objective then would be to guard against, for example, Soviet or Turkish threats. Both points of view resemble a neorealist argument, according to which Greece is subordinated to the workings of the international system and its perennial quest for balance—in the form of either Waltz’s balance of power theory or Walt’s balance of threat theory (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1985). If we refocus on the postwar period, for example, Cold War dynamics and systemic pressures—in other words the Western bid for containing and balancing the Soviet threat—would be the imposing factor of Greece’s Western choice. Notably, John Lewis Gaddis pointed to the role played by the main Western powers (chiefly the United States and the United Kingdom) in ensuring Greece would fall on their side in the Cold War and not that of the Soviet Union (see Gaddis, 1997, pp. 38–43; Gaddis, 2005). Between 1946 and 1949, this division between the West and the Soviet Union had a counterpart in the struggle between left and right that culminated in the Greek Civil War as McNeill wrote at the time, Greece had become a “bone of contention” that took “a larger interest from the light which events in Greece can throw on the pattern of world politics which seems so rapidly to be dividing all the nations of the world into two great rival camps” (McNeill, 1947, p. 7). Although it was later revealed that the Soviet Union was not interested in actively aiding the Greek Communists, the Greek Civil War quickly became a test case for both the policy of American containment and that of intervention during the Cold War. From an economic (but not neorealist) point of view, Pelt has also shown how the Greek state relied for the reconstruction of a devastated economy first on Britain, then the United States, and finally West Germany (Pelt, 2006). Greek efforts to rebuild their economy were necessarily dependent on Western aid, which also emerged as a foreign policy tool during the Cold War (Candilis, 1968). In line with Gaddis, McNeill, and Pelt, but from a more critical perspective, a number of other authors have examined Western intervention in order to explain Greece’s choices (or lack thereof) starting with the Greek Civil War This was one of the main findings of Iatrides (2016). For containment, see Iatrides (2005a). For intervention and the Truman Doctrine, see Nachmani (2010) and Jones (1997). For American aid in Greece in particular, see McNeill (1970).

INTRODUCTION

7

for the duration of the Cold War (see Kofas, 1989; see also Miller, 2009). Some critical approaches focus on the mistakes made by the Western great powers in their meddling in Greek affairs, mistakes that may have even caused the Greek Civil War (see, e.g., Frazier, 2016). Others focus on their successes, as in the case of U.S. foreign policy appropriating the notion of liberty in classical Greece—namely tampering with Greek national identity—in order to articulate a favorable concept of Hellenism with anti-communist properties and in this way to further their Cold War narratives in the country (Lalaki, 2012). Greece, along with other minor powers, struggled to maintain its nominal independence from the great powers during the Cold War (Kuniholm, 2014); inevitably, however, some of these interventions and the country’s economic dependence eventually found resonance within Greece itself, whose elites understood the importance of “choosing sides” and saw Europe and the West as sources of prosperity and effective shields against the spread of communism (Hatzivassiliou, 2011).8 In the face of an expansionist and invasive Soviet Empire—as the neorealist story goes—Greek elites saw the country’s integration within the structures of Europe and the West as the best path to security. In a similar vein, the increasing power and aggressiveness of neighboring Turkey may have obligated Greece to “balance” by entering into an institutionalized political alliance of prosperous states (see Hatzivassiliou, 1995; Veremis, 1982; Wilson, 1979; Stivachtis, 2002). Even though the European institutions did not contain elements of a military alliance, NATO and the EC were always related as institutional manifestations of the Western strategic vision—­ especially during the Cold War (Lundestad, 1998). In this context, a U.S.-led NATO functioned as an institutional framework that, even though it did not prevent tensions and crises between Greece and Turkey, nonetheless played a key role in de-escalating these crises and preventing conflict.9 Hence, in the 1970s Greece may have basically functioned as a Western client state, dependent on Western power and financial support (Coufoudakis, 1988). But Europeanism and Atlanticism in Greece during those decades was also sold as an attempt to counterbalance Turkish power and its perceived threat (Rizas, 2008a).10 Although this does not mean that NATO and the EU are the same thing, Greece’s subscription to both institutions could represent 8 9

For an eyewitness account, see McGhee (1997). Rizas, S. (2009). Managing a conflict between allies: United States policy towards Greece and Turkey in relation to the Aegean dispute, 1974–76: Cold War in the Aegean. Cold War History (3), 367–387; and Moustakis, D. F. (2004). The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO. London: Routledge For the accession in particular, see Karamouzi (2014).

8

chapter 1

an intention to neutralize Soviet influence, safeguard the fragile democracy in the country, and counterbalance the perceived threat from a traditional rival. At first glance, especially if we choose to focus on the postwar era, it seems rather obvious that a “Western” and “European” conviction among the Greek national elite and the interests of the main Western European powers in keeping Greece on their side coalesced in a dominant geopolitical narrative around the idea that Greece is inherently European and Western. And while there should be no doubt that domestic security concerns and the international context played an important role in animating the process of Greek accession to NATO and the EC, this process and the weighted importance of each of these factors cannot be properly understood without considering a sort of determination to be European and Western, a sense of belonging to the West, which is repeatedly expressed in Greek history. Such determination may well find its sources long before the postwar era on which neorealist approaches tend to focus. Similarly, even if in theory the Turkish threat was used in public discourse, especially in the period between the Cyprus crisis of 1974 and EC accession in 1981 (Heraclides, 2010), the argument that Turkish power and aggression turned Greece toward Europe in search of security is problematic. In fact, part of Greece’s accession strategy was to downplay the security dimension with Turkey in order not to make the EC think that it would be accepting a member with heavy political baggage; and the Karamanlis governments of the 1970s adopted a relatively soft line on Turkey after the Cyprus invasion in 1974, precisely to address European fears (Heraclides, 2007). Indeed, this softening of national interests because of the participation in European integration is a recurring theme in studies of Greek foreign policy: it is a reversal of the argument that a united Europe would provide much needed security against Turkey. Instead of securing its national interests, Greece softened its stance on Turkey and minimized its foreign policy objectives.11 The softening motif continued for the most part in the 1980s and 1990s even though, in contrast to other countries, the end of the Cold War found Greece still in troubled waters: the fall of the Soviet Union did not significantly alter the threat level (or its perception) from Turkish power and aggression (Moustakis & Sheehan, 2000). A policy of Greek–Turkish friendship and a significant push for the complete “Europeanization” of Greek foreign policy that accompanied the country’s EC membership continued even after the For the process of Europeanization in general, see Featherstone & Radaelli (2003) and Featherstone & Kazamias (2001). For the Greek case in particular, see Ioakimidis, P. (2000a), Valinakis (1994), and Couloumbis (1994).

INTRODUCTION

9

two countries almost went to war in 1996 (the so-called Imia incident). In a grand refutation of Walt’s balance of threat theory, Greece agreed to Turkey’s status as a candidate country for EU membership in 1997 (Agnantopoulos, 2013). Domestic party politics and the interests of specific political elites in the country may partly explain the Greek–Turkish rapprochement in the late 1990s (Blavoukos et al., 2012; see also Chryssogelos, 2015). However, the fact remains that Greek expectations that Europe would act as a security provider or a bulwark against Turkey always ended in frustration and disappointment (see Tsakonas & Tournikiotis, 2003). And this fact is very problematic if we approach Greece’s pro-European choice as a rational cost–benefit calculation. The second hypothesis is that the sense of belonging to the West is not a matter of a rational cost–benefit calculation or a fixed interest but instead a soft prefix to the Greek identity, which, in this way, traverses specific time boundaries and contexts. Indeed, the concept of identity, in conjunction with the so-called linguistic turn in the social sciences, has gained significant traction as an analytical tool in political science and international relations (IR).12 To start with, identity is considered a socially constructed concept, a set of relations that imbues the actors with a specific way of thinking about self and others and, by extension, a way of defining interests and courses of action (see, e.g., Hopf, 2002). The concept of identity has been considered so central to IR that it would be difficult to imagine world politics, people, states, and the international system without it (Burke, 2006, p. 394). A world without identities would be a “world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than anarchy” (Hopf, 1998, p. 175). In the final analysis, as Campbell puts it, “identity is an inescapable dimension of being. No body could be without it” (Campbell, 1992, p. 9). In general, social identity theory recognizes identity building as the sine qua non of the emergence and consolidation of political, social, and cultural entities.13 In particular, the formation of national identities is seen as the development of national self-awareness by the identification of similarities among members of a national group and their differences from a comparison group (“othering”).14 Identities are central to the functioning of the international sys tem because they “provide a frame of reference from which political leaders can

Seminal readings in this literature include Campbell (1992), Katzenstein (1996), Lapid & Kratochwil (1996, pp. 3–20), and Lebow (2008). For a comprehensive review of this literature, see Brown (2000) and Stets & Burke (2000). For a theoretical discussion, see McSweeney (1996). For applied examples, look no further than Neumann (1999) and Morozov & Rumelili (2012).

10

chapter 1

initiate, maintain, and structure their relationship with other states” (Cronin, 1999, p. 18). In other words, identities constitute interests.15 In this context, there is a growing literature of studies on Greek nationalism and its relation to cultural production and identity formation drawing from various theoretical traditions such as postcolonialism, historiography, and ethnology. The argument here is that the “making of Modern Greece” involved the parallel formation of a Greek identity imbued with a sense of belonging, a dimension of close similarity and affinity with Europe and the West. In this respect, many scholars have tried to show how the making of modern Greece, the development of national identity, and a close affinity with the West took place within the context of intellectual movements, inbound from Europe, such as the Enlightenment, the Romantic movement, and later nationalism (Kitromilides, 2013; Beaton & Ricks, 2009). This theoretical conception is applied not only to Greece but also to other Balkan nations and political traditions (Kitromilides, 1983). However, what seems to set Greece apart is the claimed “universal significance” of the classical Hellenic past, which prejudiced the thought of European intellectuals and formed, in return, the backbone of modern Greek identity (Tsoukalas, 1999). In this return of the classical past, the intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment and all subsequent generations of thinkers, scholars, and elites played an important role in developing a national identity and imbuing the Greeks with a sense of history, purpose, and place in the world from the start of the Greek War of Independence in 1821 (Mackridge, 2009). Furthermore, the inbound intellectual stimulus was complemented by an influence coming—quite literally—from the ground up, meaning the antiquities, the classical monuments, the ancient tombs and temples dotting Greece, which, alongside the development of modern archaeology, influenced the production of national identity and the interpretation of history (Hamilakis, 2007; see also Lalaki, 2012). In the final analysis, this interpretation relies on a historical continuum that starts from classical Greece, passes through Renaissance Europe, and returns in modern Greece through the Enlightenment. At the heart of this claim lies the assumption that, ever since the siècle des Lumières directed the Greek-speaking world toward nationhood, Greece’s relationship with Europe has become the center of gravity of the country’s iden tity and subsequently the touchstone of its strategy and foreign policy. Even as Greece’s pro-European policy was grounded on a reasonable prospect for economic growth, national security, and a favorable international context, the One of the main arguments in Wendt (1994).

INTRODUCTION

11

country’s identity discourse and its consistent attachment to Europe and the West indicates a pattern that transcends the interests of Greek elites and major Western powers. Scholars that could be classified under the postmodern label also examine the same course of intellectual stimuli, the same identity formation and nationbuilding process, albeit from a critical standpoint. Following the path opened by Said’s analysis of orientalism (Said, 1979), hence belonging to a strand of postcolonialism studies, there is a growing literature that views Greece’s identity and relations with Europe and the West through a neo-orientalist framework of power relations. In this view, Greece’s self-awareness and its own perceptions of identity, as well as Greek understandings or uses of Europe and the West, depend on patronizing cultural representations of classical Greece contained in Western scholarship and power projection. Modern Greece then becomes an idea developed by the practice of intellectual and scientific inquiry in the West, a historically formed contingency enacted in the colonialist representations of Greece as European (Koundoura, 2007; Gourgouris, 1996) or in the imagination, for instance of German Hellenists, in works of art and the travel literature of the late 18th century (Guthenke, 2008; Tsigakou, 1981). What is more, in Greece’s case, its idealized classical past might have been useful for Europe not only to apply a cultural colonialism to Greek territories, but also to use it instrumentally as a foundation of its own cultural myth—which lies at the core of the Enlightenment project—and expand and consolidate its grip throughout its colonial possessions (Gourgouris, 1996). The logical extension of such ontological and methodological choices is what Herzfeld suggests, that Greece may have always been a “crypto-colony” of Western European powers, namely Britain, the United States, and more recently Germany.16 In this respect, Greek national identity and culture is not a self-directed discourse of a nascent nation-state but derives instead from a neoclassical model imported from the West (Herzfeld, 2013), and therefore, in Herzfeld’s own words, “much of what Greeks have thereby been constrained to consider as truly Greek seems to have less to do with ancient Greek cultures and polities than with the values of their so-called protectors in Western Europe (Herzfeld, 2013, p. 492; see also Tsoukalas, 2002). From the same postcolonial vantage point, choosing an ethnographic and historiographical approach, the same author uses the Greek case to expose Western cultural representations of others as a “global struggle for cultural and political dominance,” on the geopolitical margins of which the Modern Greek identity emerged (Herzfeld, For a definition of crypto-colonialism, see Herzfeld (2002).

12

chapter 1

2014, p. 42). Herzfeld also acknowledges that Greece’s classical past made a symbolic contribution to the original construction of the West, but that did not spare modern Greece from the European practice of othering (the binaries of Europe/Others and West/Others) that Herzfeld (2014, p. 219) understands as the standard Eurocentric instrument of discursive control and domination. Again, it is clear, to some extent at least, that Greek perceptions of Europe and the West and Western representations of classical and modern Greece frame a specific discourse that is intrinsically linked with national self-awareness, perceptions of similarities among the members of the Greek nation, some affinities with the “Western world,” and a purposeful distinction from other “worlds.” However, both varieties of historical approaches to a Greek identity—that is, the more traditional and the postmodern one—share a number of problematic positions. First, in ontological terms, there is the self-conscious, and most of the time self-defeating, reliance on a decentered definition of “identity.”17 Here, the most salient critique is that identity “tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its ambiguity)” (Brubaker, 2001, p. 66). The multiplicity of definitions of identity does not help locate a concept that is ambiguous by default. Hence, and for the time being, the concept of identity (as a social construct or otherwise) remains impenetrable and notoriously difficult to operationalize. As Onuf has put it, identity is “one of the most fashionable concepts” but also “one of the murkiest—so difficult to fathom that [ … ​] I have been reluctant to use it” (Onuf, 2003, p. 26). Thus it should not come as a surprise when Fearon notes that, “[g]iven the centrality of the concept to so much recent research— and especially in social science where scholars take identities both as things to be explained and things that have explanatory force,” the lack of a coherent definition “amounts almost to a scandal” (Fearon, 1999, p. 2). In this respect, it is also not a surprise that in Greece’s case—as in many others—despite a surplus of research that examines the country’s strategic decisions and overall behavior, the identity and historical continuity of the nation (Hellenism) has been treated consciously or unconsciously as a metaphysical or dogmatic entity (Liakos, 2008). Second, apart from the multiplicity of definitions of identity, we also deal with a multiplicity of identities. There is no such thing as a fixed or stable iden tity: the identity of a state is constituted in time, achieved momentarily, and constantly reproduced through repetition (Campbell, 1992, pp. 9–11). This For a critical review, see Brubaker & Cooper (2000). For an overview of the divisions within identity theory and an attempt to reconcile them, see Vignoles et al. (2011).

INTRODUCTION

13

means that when we talk about identity as an object of study, we talk about a snapshot, a still frame, a single static image that we artificially freeze in time. And hence, if the concept of identity is socially constructed, so is the concept of identity as the object of our study. In other words, identity is an essentially contested concept; or, more specifically, identities themselves, or whatever cultural parameters and norms they rely on, are contested within societies (cf. Zehfuss, 2001). As an essentially contested concept, both within societies and in academia, perhaps it is problematic to accept identity as the “basis” of state behavior; rather, it should be seen as another property of the state itself.18 In this respect, Greece is a showcase of the multiplicity of identities and their inherent contested nature. In fact, we can talk not of a single Hellenism but of Hellenisms in plural: a multiplicity of cultural peculiarities, historical interpretations, representations of self and of others, and theories (often incompatible with one another) concerning the position of Greece in the world.19 Perhaps, then, identity should be accepted not as a value or a set of values, but as a range of values—a range of possibilities. In this case, however, we would have to open a whole new chapter of epistemological debates and re-evaluate the methods, validity, and scope of our studies of identity. This brings us to the third and final issue with historical studies of Greek identity. Both approaches discussed above undertake, either in earnest or in critical stances, to write a continuous history of an idea, a process of evolution, and they are both working on the assumption that a nucleus of concepts and representations developed into a dominant narrative or a cultural imperative that produces specific strategic decisions and behaviors. Intentionally or not, they are both undertaking to write a complete history of Greek identity: to find its origins or its sources; to describe its emergence and development; to isolate, measure, and interpret the motivation of collective subjects that design, manipulate, and use identity for their purposes. Especially with regard to the last point, the only difference is that although more traditional approaches locate motivation and agency with Greek elites and intellectuals, postmodern approaches problematize this position and assign agency to Western structures of knowledge production about classical Greece—even though we have to admit here that Hellenism struggles to come to terms with its classical tradition long before the “rise” of the West (Kaldellis, 2008). Regardless, considering the problems linked to the multiplicity of definitions of identity and the coter minous multiplicity of identities, a project of a total history with identity at its crux becomes equally problematic. This is what Wendt seems to suggest in his later work; see Wendt (1999). This is obvious, for example, in the use of the plural form in Zacharia (2008).

14

chapter 1

To sum up, it seems that the existing explanations for Greece’s geopolitical attachment to Europe and the West can be sorted according to the importance they assign to the role of either interests or identity and the differing degree of Greek independence or Western domination in the process of interest and identity formation (see Table 1). The above explanations seem to either accept a restricted scope of application or adopt an inconclusive epistemological attitude, which limits their explanatory potential. On the one hand, if we focus on interests, some of the existing explanations of Greece’s geopolitical attachment to Europe and the West do not seem to be interested in explaining the long historical process that underlies Greece’s strategy and foreign policy. As a result, the analysis of Greek geopolitics rarely exceeds the narrow limits of a specific histori cal period, a context, or even an event. On the other hand, if we focus on identity, the existing literature engages with the historical pattern of Greece’s alignment with the West, but the process by which this happens remains impenetrable. In comparison, the sense of purpose that underscores this book is to accept that Greece’s strategic tendency to identify with Europe and the West continuous historical process and not merely a matter of contextual rational calculations; but instead of focusing on Greek identity or culture, the idea is to fuse the literatures of Geopolitics and political myth in order to approach Table 1  Existing explanations for greece’s european integration

Interests

Balance of power and of threat Systemic pressures interests of Western states in concerns and rational cost– keeping Greece on their side (e.g., benefit calculations (e.g., Soviet European interests in the Near East and Turkish threats) and Cold War geopolitics) European intellectual Western representations movements stimulated the uses of classical Greece imposed formation of a genuine a self-interested understanding of Greek national identity national identity (e.g., Greece as a to the European identity “crypto-colony” of the West) (e.g., European and Greek Enlightenment)

INTRODUCTION

15

belonging to the West as a geopolitical myth that has had an enduring presence in modern Greece, from the Greek Enlightenment to the euro crisis. 2

The Constitutive Role of Political Myth and Geography

So far, we have outlined the uses of interest and identity as objects of the study of Greek history in relation to Europe and the West. The former seems to be limited in scope when considering Greece’s long-standing attachment to Europe and the West. The latter, although it enables at least a long view of this attachment, has its own ontological traps, not least of which is the attempt to write a history of an idea or an identity, complete with a beginning and an end, an origin and a destination, a form and a motivation. These explanations are all useful in understanding the interplay between the macro-level of global geopolitics and ideological forces and the micro-level of Greek strategy and foreign policy decisions. To some degree, the explanations based on interests and identity or sovereignty and domination are not always mutually exclusive (in the sense that they can be two competing processes that nonetheless run in parallel).20 They rather form a spectrum, a set of factors produced by different degrees of refraction, which sometimes are based on the observer’s position or wavelength. Taken together or even separately, they all have some potential to explain Greece’s sense of belonging to the West. Nevertheless, it seems that they are also quietly overlooking what could perhaps be a central political process in modern Greece that makes this sense of belonging possible. In other words, these explanations point to the presence of underlying factors (i.e., motivation of elites, geopolitical dynamics, interpretations of history) that influence Greece’s pro-Western strategy, but they rarely describe how these underlying factors are verbalized to become embedded in domestic debates and to be consumed by the domestic public—in essence, how they acquire a form that can have a real political effect on Greece’s strategic profile.21 20

Multi-causality is a well-noted concern in IR and related literatures such as security stud ies, historical sociology in , and foreign policy analysis; see, respectively, Bennett & Elman (2007), Tannenwald (2015), Hobson (1998), and Eun (2012). Paschalis Kitromilides’s (2013) Enlightenment and Revolution is a notable exception to this rule, and hence a major inspiration for this study, although the scope of his work stops at the end of the Greek Enlightenment and the establishment of the Greek state. But his analysis of the appropriation of the European Enlightenment by Greek intellectuals still speaks to the uses of Europe as a cornerstone of Greece’s strategy, security, and identity.

16

chapter 1

To make this last point clearer, we could ask: if national security concerns and cost–benefit calculations are motivating Greece’s strategic anchoring to the West, how are these concerns justified in domestic political debates? If systemic geopolitical pressures and the interests of the West itself are dictating the terms of Greece’s relations with Europe and the West, how are these external influences integrated and streamlined into the national domain—how are they sold, one could say, to the Greek public? Similarly, if the logic that Greece unequivocally and irreversibly belongs to Europe and the West is the climax of an epic journey of Greek identity from the Pnyx of Athens to the seat of the European Parliament in Brussels, how was this identity voiced and propagated in popular culture, official documents, political speeches, and articles in the press? Finally, if Greece’s Western orientation is merely a reflection of power relations, a projection of Western representations of Greece’s classical past— alas, just another testament to Western cultural domination—how have these representations become so interwoven with Greece’s own intellectual production as to be considered common sense or, even worse, a manifestation of the national consciousness? The answer to all these questions perhaps lies in an intermediary level, between the macro-level of world politics and the micro-level of national decisions. This intermediate, discursive level may be considered as an interface between the material conditions of the international system (i.e., economic inequality, military power, and national interests) and our perceptions thereof (i.e., self-awareness, identity). It may also refer to an interface between actual geography and our geographical imagination (i.e., our actual position in the world and representations of geography). In other words, between an interest and a decision, or between an identity and a decision, between our perception of the world and a state decision, there is a process of deliberation, a discursive layer of speeches, conversations, and texts, official documents, parliamen tary proceedings, and televised debates. This is how a perceived interest or an abstract concept of identity becomes something intelligible to the elites and the public, an object that can have a real political effect. At the core of this discursive layer, at the core of our oral or written speech, are the stories we tell in order to justify our decisions, generate legitimacy, and prepare the ground for political action. In the context of political competition, people express both their interests and their perceived identity with stories in narrative form. Security concerns are justified using simple or complex stories; the interests of the great powers are reported as variations of, or in reference to, a story; national identity is articulated in narrative form with stories about the past; the reflection of power relations penetrates a country’s own intellectual production and its social fabric as macro-historical narratives. And although

INTRODUCTION

17

it is difficult to separate a national interest independently from the person who articulates it, as much as it is difficult to isolate a national identity from the norms that do or do not constitute it, it is quite possible in comparison to locate and single out the stories that people tell in order to express both their interests and their identities. We may not be able to reach a final decision on whether identity constitutes interest, whether there are some interests that are independent from an identity (e.g., human security), or whether the two are mutually constitutive and in constant flux. But in the case of myths, we have an intellectual product that “contains” both of them even if they are indistinguishable from one another. Besides, in contrast to both interest and identity, which are abstract concepts, the stories we tell have an actual material reality—as a printed book or article, or nowadays as a digital file or a YouTube video. Stories are not simply intellectual products; from the moment they are printed or otherwise recorded, they become tangible and material, accessible and measurable, and closer to actual decision-making than other kinds of abstract notions such as interests and identities. With this in mind, returning to the question why Greece’s geopolitical anchoring to Europe and the West has proven so resilient despite strong external and internal challenges, the working hypothesis here is that a set of key narratives and storylines concerning Greece’s past, its cultural profile, and its location in the world constitute a myth of “belonging” to Europe and the West, which has an enduring influence that traverses historical contexts and a legitimizing effect on Greek politics and—due to its geopolitical nature—especially on strategic and foreign policy decisions. There are three key narratives that constitute the belonging myth (involving an accompanying grid of stories that support them): the centrality of the Greek world between East and West, the continuity of the Greek nation from the classical to the modern era, and Greece’s cultural affinity with Europe and the West. These narratives were initially diffused in the era of the Greek Enlightenment (1760–1820) and were later adapted to fit changing international contexts and to deal with the emergence of rival geopolitical myths and narratives. The first of these rival myths stemmed from a philosophical reaction to the Enlightenment’s liberal core: it involved the expectation that Russia would intervene in favor of the Greek cause of independence and was based on an alternative narrative of a religious affinity (up to the 1870s). The second rival geopolitical myth emerged with the coming of the Romantic movement in Greece: it spoke of the revival of the Byzantine Empire and was based on an alternative nar rative of continuity from the classical to the modern era but coming through Byzantium as a sort of a medieval Hellenism (up to the 1920s).

18

chapter 1

Rival myths and narratives were superseded in the latter half of the 20th century when, in the context of the Cold War, belonging gained a dimension of dependence on the West as a way to achieve national security and territorial integrity (up to the 1980s). Greece’s accession to the EC in 1981, and the ensuing Europeanization process, ushered in a period during which belonging to the West was turned into a ritual by following a strict pattern of institutional behavior, up to the point where, at the turn of the 21st century, it became unequivocal common sense, an apparent truth that needed no justification and left no room for dispute. Eventually, the function of the belonging myth as a “sacred” political truth played a significant role in the existential euro crisis that gripped the country after 2009. A focus on belonging to the West as a myth and the decomposition of its constituent narratives and stories has the potential to complement in various interesting ways our understanding of Greece’s consistent European choice, up to this point based on either interests or identity formation—not least because it straddles and brings together two literatures, so far distinct from each other: one on geopolitics and the other on political myth. Geopolitics has a troubled past and a challenging present as a distinct inquiry into domestic and international politics. On the one hand, there is a lineage of classical geopolitical thinkers who acknowledge space as a material container of politics and try to pin down the actual impact of physical geography on the political process.22 In their work, geography and other accompanying material factors (e.g., mineral reserves) is an independent variable that influences the power, the culture, and the behavior of a state. Considering how difficult it is to measure the “true value” of physical geography in any given situation, the past of Geopolitics is shadowed by accusations of posing as a pseudo-science, a field of scholarship dotted with political biases and an instrumental use of geography for political purposes. On the other hand, there is the postmodern approach of “Critical” Geopolitics that understands space as a social construction subject to power relationships. Geography is thus what people make of it, and geopolitical theories are mere discourses imposed on society by privileged, powerful elites—the secu rity community, politicians and the media, academics and think tanks (see, e.g., Dalby, 1990a; Agnew & Corbridge, 1995; Tuathail, 1996; Tuathail & Dalby, 1998). Therefore, if political understandings and uses of space—the discourses of geopolitical theories—enchain the state apparatus to an undesirable way of thinking, speaking, and acting, the declared purpose of Critical Geopolitics In chronological order, see, for example, Ratzel (1903 [1897]), Mackinder (1904), Spykman (1942, 1944), Cohen (1963), Gray (1988, 1991), Cohen (2003), and Gray and Sloan (2005).

INTRODUCTION

19

to deconstruct geopolitical theories, to expose their artificiality and their true function in the political process as instruments of power and control. Nevertheless, there are some issues with this approach too. Discourse is, of course, already a prominent concept in social science that can showcase a range of applications, including history and sociology (­Jenkins & Munslow, 2004; Munslow, 2013), cultural and postcolonial studies (Hall, 1992; Williams, 1992), political science and international relations (Apter, 1997; Dryzek, 1994; Milliken, 1999). Similarly, studies of Critical Geopolitics have also been consistently keen on exploring the potential of discourse analysis in problematizing geopolitical thought, identity, and the political implications of the representation of space.23 Therefore, the impression that discourse can be a useful concept in geopolitical analysis is already in place; what is missing is conceptual and methodological consistency (Müller, 2008). Another issue with Critical Geopolitics is that the focus on deconstruction is not neutral, to the extent that it “can only take place through reapplying the very form of meaning-construction that is deconstructed” (Müller, 2013, p. 53). Consequently, “deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work” (Derrida, 1997, p. 24). In other words, the effort of Critical Geopolitics to undermine geopolitical texts and to turn them against themselves implies an alternative form of meaning construction—and, just like that, Critical Geopolitics seems to make the same mistake with the geopolitical theories it is criticizing. Still, this double standard is casually dismissed by Critical Geopolitics using the self-image of a social movement with emancipatory aims (Kelly, 2006).24 This reveals that Critical Geopolitics, like other critical approaches in political science, is preoccupied mostly with the motives of the people who theorize or “practice” geopolitics: the governing elites and the intellectuals of statecraft, their constructed identities, and the instrumental use of these identities for their own selfish reasons (Reuber, 2000, p. 40). To this extent, the responsibility for the critique of geopolitical theories is based on the self-righteous morality of Critical Geopolitics and an array of theoretical approaches and methods that are often incompatible with each other and with the overall objectives (Redepenning, 2007). The excessive focus on the text and the motive of the author as a complete detachment from material reality has been denounced even by prominent 23 24

Examples abound; see, for example, Häkli (1998), Tuathail (2000), Kuus (2002), and Dalby (2016). After all, the purpose of critical theory is to “to liberate human beings from the circum stances that enslave them” (Horkheimer, 1982, p. 244).

20

chapter 1

postmodernists in the field of Political Geography (see, e.g., Harvey, 1990). And, in general, this kind of critique is already falling out of fashion (and “running out of steam”) (see Latour, 2004, p. 231). A way forward could be a more realist—but still critical—approach that maintains some distance from both classical and Critical Geopolitics. It seems that both classical and Critical Geopolitics make “true” or “false” claims about certain geopolitical theories. However, if we assume that the material and social properties of space are inseparable—and, more than that, mutually constitutive, in a New Materialist sense—then a geopolitical theory cannot really be evaluated based on its correspondence (or not) to an external reality.25 Instead, it would be better to ask geopolitics to merely accept the “face value” of these theories and to study their real effect on politics. This can be best described as a pragmatic shift in geopolitical analysis that deals not in deconstructing geopolitical ideas but in understanding how they create behavioral patterns, how they mobilize the public and legitimize policies. It is exactly on this point that the literature on political myth can make a significant contribution to Geopolitics, both because it offers an object of study that is by default neutral and free from true/false analyses and because it can act as an interface between actual material parameters of geography (and power) and our understandings or instrumental use of these parameters. The pragmatic shift in geopolitical analysis includes a shift from text and discourse to the concept of geopolitical myth, a shift from morality and a critical-­political agenda to a positivist stance, and a shift from material/ideational debates to the study of myth as an object with both material and ideational dimensions that has real effects on strategic and other political decisions. The study of myth appeared first in the field of cultural anthropology and was concerned with the narrative forms of stories, fairy tales, legends, and folklore in human societies and cultures. Classical mythologists compiled massive anthologies of myths in order to examine their form and create categories of myths according to their structural similarities and differences (see, e.g., Hamilton, 2013; Frazer, 2009). Later mythologists examined the role of myths in the development of human cultures and societies, stressing function over form (see, e.g., Malinowski & Redfield, 2015; Malinowski, 2011; Eliade, 2009; Radin, 1950).

25

New materialism comes as a reaction to both positivist/empiricist essentialism and the inherent relativism of postmodern social constructivism to claim that matter and mean ing cannot be understood separately, and that material conditions are co-constructing the social world. For an introduction, see Coole & Frost (2010).

INTRODUCTION

21

The functional understanding of myth, instead of centering on the myth’s narrative form, focuses on its function as a source of patterns of social and individual behavior that give a sense of meaning and direction to human societies. Myths are “lenses” through which we view the world (Bennett, 1980) or, in other words, “cognitive schemata,” social frameworks for “organizing and filtering procedure for the reception of new information, be it the combination of sights and sounds into images of physical objects or the complex perception of social situations” (Flood, 2002, p. 81). Political myths in particular are narratives and stories about the origins, the evolution, and the mission of the state (Della Sala, 2016). In this respect they give meaning to the state’s existence and provide a reason for being (Blumenberg, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As such they generate legitimacy for political rule in general (Jones, 2010; Barthes & Lavers, 2000) and consequently they can form the basis for legitimizing political authority and/or foreign policy (Della Sala, 2010). That is not to say that political myths are merely fairy tales: although they are not necessarily antithetical to knowledge and reason, and they may not be scientifically verifiable, they still have a verifiable effect on political actors and processes (Munz, 1956, p. 1). With this in mind, following the functional definition of myth, a political myth is a dramatic narrative that creates models of political behavior and identity. If a myth models individual or social behavior in everyday or heroic contexts, then a political myth represents a society’s political behavior under normal or desperate circumstances. And if a myth is narrated in search of a meaning of life, significance, and a society’s reason for being, then a political myth usually gives meaning and direction to a nation or any other polity. So how does political myth relate to geopolitics? We could use the term geopolitical myths in those cases where political myths, in addition to the above, also have a distinct geographical connotation or signification that generates a sense of place for a society or a nation. Such cases include, for example, when myths describe the relative position or direction of the state on the world map; designate allies and enemies relative to the points of a compass or other specified positions; create a sense of locational awareness; or create a sense of belonging by specifying a location as the property of the state or the state as a member of a particular group or organization, as having an affinity for a special region, or as being rightly placed in a specified position. Politics is a struggle and is open by default to opposition between compet ing beliefs and ideologies, but it is also open to opposition between competing geopolitical myths. In other words, political forces that compete for power may also be driven and legitimized by different perceptions of space and geography.

22

chapter 1

Of course, the premise here is that the location of the state, or what a nation might think about its place in the world, is shrouded in political controversy. Conceivably, then, geopolitical mythmaking is an intrinsic property of political competition and therefore different understandings of our sense of purpose and belonging, of our place in the world, can create sharp divisions in politics. In this respect, it makes much sense to speak about myths and geopolitics, especially if the latter is also understood as the opposition between political forces with differing geographical imaginations. Accordingly, mythmaking in geopolitics refers to a gathering of myths concerning the geographic location of the state. Geopolitical myths should not be considered as solid, immovable objects sculptured in time but should be conceptualized instead as a process. This mythmaking process has the potential to legitimize and frame some political decisions to the extent that it produces a limited range of political possibilities. In other words, geopolitical myths and mythmaking as a system of logic or an ensemble of statements, stories, and narratives with distinct geographic signification is a political process that generates legitimacy and influences the behavior of a state in the international system. In other words, this approach accepts mythmaking as a social reality in which the “real” effect of geopolitical myths can be observed and measured. The proposed analysis of geopolitical myth focuses on a regular group of narratives and stories, claiming no knowledge of hidden meaning and agendas behind them (in this sense, myth is neutral or value-free). A story is a specific account of past events or a report of contemporary developments. A narrative is a collection of stories or a series of events that signify a particular feature of the nature of a nation or a state. Therefore, geopolitical myths and mythmaking as a connected series of narratives and stories, or a group of interrelated statements, utterances, texts, or discussions that use geographical terms and significations,26 are not used here to supersede explanations that were based on calculations of interest and on the concept of identity, but they differ from them in theory and in practice. First, the study of a geopolitical myth does not assume the existence of a great unity of statements and concepts in such a way that they define a distinc tive theory of identity or a singular source of influence, such as the existence of an interest. In other words, a myth is not a series of statements that function as the source or the expression of an identity or the façade of interests. Instead This definition confers with discourse in the Foucauldian sense as a group of statements that belong to the same formation and are thus subject to the same rules of formation; see Foucault (2010, p. 121).

INTRODUCTION

23

it is an ensemble of statements that appear and are repeated regularly in the public discourse about strategy and foreign policy. Second, myth does not assume the existence of historical continuity. In other words, it does not require a beginning and an end or a nucleus of core statements that evolve and develop into an identity or a perceived national interest with time. Put differently, myth is not constituted in time according to a more or less linear or sequential trajectory. Instead of continuity, mythmaking is characterized by regularity. Third and foremost, the analysis of geopolitical myth as a group of regular statements is aiming not for an interpretation of history, of meaning, and of motivation but simply for a description of discursive events. In other words, the analysis of myth is not an interpretation of a “spirit of history,” of a collective consciousness that thinks of and articulates some statements, or of a hidden motivation on the part of the speaking subject. Instead, it is an analysis of the statements and their objects, the statements and the concepts that they produced, the statements and the theories they gave rise to. This theoretical framework will need further development and elaboration in the next part of the study. Nevertheless, the approach that is already materializing is one that could be termed Analytical Geopolitics: an inquiry into geopolitical myths, their constitutive elements (i.e., the key narratives and storylines that support them), and their success or acceptability in terms of their legitimacy footprint on the political process. Analytical Geopolitics does not make true or false claims on geopolitical myths and does not evaluate their veracity. Rather, it is an evaluation of whether and how the narratives and stories that constitute a myth create the conditions for political action. In principle, Analytical Geopolitics should aim to avoid any metaphysical and moral claims and attend only to objective realities that can be examined in myths and their attainment of a common sense status (not in a hidden logic of language or a hidden agenda of the speaker). This positivist approach aspires nonetheless to have a critical agenda to the degree that it exposes common sense, tradition, and singular interpretations of history for the social constructs that they are, modeled in geopolitical myths and a mythmaking process of appearance and repetition.27 Yet its ambition is to be at the same time a pragmatist approach in that it will insist on “the cultivation of a stubbornly realist attitude—to speak like William James—but a realism dealing with [ … ​

Again, compare with Foucault, who was “happy to be [a positivist]” (2010, p. 16). Later he referred to the same attitude as a “happy positivism” in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, given December 2, 1970; see Shapiro (1984, p. 133).

24

chapter 1

matters of concern, not matters of fact.”28 In other words, the aim is to evaluate geopolitical statements not in terms of their correspondence with an external reality (the world) but in terms of their function, influence, and practical application inside the sociopolitical sphere where the geopolitical imagination is self-sufficient.29 In these respects, Analytical Geopolitics may replicate the epistemological and ontological principles of analytical philosophy: the latter emerged as a rejection of both materialism (i.e., everything, even consciousness, is constituted in matter or material interactions) and idealism (i.e., reality is a mental construct, essentially immaterial, and no concept can be known independent from the thinking mind).30 Similarly, Analytical Geopolitics keeps a distance from both Classical Geopolitics (i.e., material geography, location, and resources play a key role in politics) and Critical Geopolitics (i.e., immaterial ideas about geography, power, and place influence political behavior). The ambition is to introduce a theoretical contribution to the field with the use of myth as the object of geopolitical analysis, and a critical realist philosophical stance that transcends the teleological approaches of classical and Critical Geopolitics. To return once again to the research question: why has Greece’s geopolitical orientation toward Europe and the West stayed consistent despite strong external and internal challenges? The claim that is developing is that there exists a geopolitical myth of belonging to Europe consisting of key narratives and storylines about Greece’s past, its cultural profile, and its location in the world. The belonging myth has historically clashed with alternative, opposing myths but has emerged as a dominant geopolitical myth that can complement our understanding of Greece’s strategic decisions and pro-European profile. Both interests and identity may be responsible for the above conceptions and for Greece’s overall “position” in the world. For example, Greece’s selfawareness as a state that belongs to the European family could have been generated from within, that is, from the interests and preferences of Greek elites, or imported from outside, that is, from the interests and preferences of European elites. In some respects, however, it is equally important to examine the 28 29 30

The emphasis originally given by Latour (2004, p. 231). For classical pragmatism, see, for example, James (1995). For the continuing relevance of pragmatism in the contemporary debate, see Putnam (1996) and Kloppenberg (1996). For a detailed examination of the emergence of analytical philosophy, see Hylton (2000). For a detailed discussion of the traits shared between analytical approaches in philoso phy, see Glock (2009).

INTRODUCTION

25

discursive dimension of Greece’s historical relations with Europe and the West and specifically this feeling of belonging as part of an ensemble of geopolitical myths (stories and narratives)—and their struggle with other competing stories and narratives. How? Not as a stand-alone causal mechanism for Greek strategy, but, nonetheless, as a complete system of logic and political competition that has an intrinsic value on its own. The geopolitical mythmaking of modern Greece consists of a group of statements that are constantly repeated in history and that mediate Greece’s attitude toward Europe and the West. They have a regular geographical form and revolve around the notion of Greece’s proximity to Europe and the West. Within the Greek geopolitical mythmaking, the sense of belonging to the West is a foundational myth, which nevertheless coexists with rival theories, such as the representation of Russia as a strategic partner and a more exceptional or eclectic strategic profile that draws inspiration from the Byzantine heritage of the Greek nation. And although these alternative myths operate mostly on the margins of public discourse, they have a crucial role to play in defining the sense of belonging. In other words, the statements that make up the theory of belonging to the West acquire meaning and political significance only when matched up against their apparent rivals. The myth of belonging is defined not only by its own regularity of appearance but also by its clash with rival theories—and, in particular, what sets the belonging myth apart from the competition, what makes it more efficient than others, is an important subquestion that illuminates the most essential features of mythmaking. This approach is very different both from conventional histories of ideas and from critical interpretations in that it is not looking for a complete explanation of history or a grand scheme of a collective subject (e.g., an elite); it is neither an empirical approach (what is) nor a normative one (what ought to be); and it is neither a validation (true or false) nor a deconstruction of what is indisputably a social artifact, such as the myth of belonging to the West. In fact, the theoretical framework will be one dimensional, the single purpose being to describe how geopolitical myths operate as political instruments to legitimize and call for specific strategic and foreign policy actions.31 In particular, what we will be looking for is those qualities that can make a myth successful enough to become “sacred” (Bouchard, 2007), rooted so 31

How myths are created in the first place is an equally interesting issue. However, a genealogy of myth could be an impossible operation since its origins can go as far back as pre modern times. In any case, the origins of the myth do not influence its subsequent uses.

26

chapter 1

deeply in what people consider to be common sense that any doubts about its truthiness is enough to shake the foundations of the polity or the policy for which it serves as the basis of its legitimacy (Bell, 2003). First of all, a successful myth needs to be able to adapt or relate to any given circumstances that delineate the setting of a historical period, a political situation, or an ideological movement (adaptability) (Della Sala, 2010, p. 7). Second, it needs to evolve through time and, without having an individual or temporal origin, to contain a sort of a “timeless message” (continuity) (Della Sala, 2010, p. 9). Third, a successful myth needs to be formed in many texts and other forms of discourse, to have its meaning shaped by an interrelationship between statements, a sort of frame of reference or reference system just like the ones used in academic research and writing (intertextuality). These qualities—the timeless message and the almost mystical origins; the adaptability that transcends historical, political, and ideological contexts; and the frame of reference—are what make the myth a source of legitimacy for the polity, the policy, the politician. The narratives and stories that make up the myth of belonging were present when Greek-speaking theologians of the 14th century described the (then rising) West as a “light source,” and when, four hundred years later, in the 18th century, Greek political geographers used more or less the same metaphor to call on the Greek-speaking world to imitate the “noble and enlightened” European nations. The Greek Enlightenment charted the intellectual path of this light from classical Greece to Europe and then to modern Greece, and this same allegory of a torch race was used by diplomats and politicians in the 20th century to rationalize Greece as an adherent of the West during the Cold War. The first generation of politicians in modern Greece placed the country between East and West, in the dead center of the world, and this same placement was again used by their latest successors to rationalize Greek accession to the European Communities, and so forth. The narratives and storylines constituting the myth of belonging to the West dominated the public discourse and the political process in order to legitimize and frame strategic decisions, foreign policy, and a worldview that has become common sense, or that hinges on premises of reasoning considered so self-evident as to be accepted without argument. In this respect, Karamanlis’s formulation—Greece belongs to the West— served, and still serves, as a maxim for this myth, repeated as a powerful political slogan during electoral speeches, parliamentary sessions, talk shows, editorials and opinion articles, academic debates, and, most recently, referen dums. The influence it has exerted on Greek politics since the late 1970s, with regard to Greece’s accession process to the , owes to the fact that it is the spearhead of a long line of thinking about the position of Greece in the world,

INTRODUCTION

27

a line that extends from the 18th century to the present, from the first stirrings of a modern national consciousness to the accession of Greece in the EC— and beyond, to the current geopolitical predicament amid a sea of economic, social, and political distress. Greece belongs to the West is much more than a sentence or a proposition, a political slogan or a cultural maxim: it is a statement that relates to an intricate web of other such statements, an archive of texts and speeches, books and leaflets, letters and treatises, political rallies and televised debates, a huge and elaborate archive of ideas and expressions generated by a mythmaking process with distinctive geopolitical terms and significations. This geopolitical mythmaking affects Greek strategic thought and foreign policy because it shapes Greek self-awareness, the relationship of the country and its people with other nations, and, by extension, the position of the country on the world map. Moreover, Greece belongs to the West is a statement defined by its opposition to another type of statement, such as Papandreou’s noted witticism in the aforementioned debate, according to which Greece belongs to the Greeks. Indeed, Greece is widely regarded as an adherent of the West, a core member of the European Union, an essential component of European history, the cradle of Western civilization even, righteously the birthplace of democracy, philosophy, and nearly every other academic discipline. Nevertheless, this myth of belonging to the West, however dominant it may seem, did not rise to prominence as common sense without opposition. Quite the contrary, if politics is the opposition between ideologies, worldviews, and systems of thought that compete for power, then the idea that Greece belongs to a group of nations called Europe or the West, although dominant, has elicited fierce opposition in Greece (but also in Europe).32 On the surface, and in the long run, it seems that Greece was oriented toward Europe and the West from the end of the 18th century (the period of the Greek Enlightenment) up to its accession to the EC in 1981. This orientation was more or less stable, despite the shifting international contexts—the changing balances of power; the coming and going of intellectual, social, and cultural movements—and despite the indefiniteness and variability of national interests, the alternating political forces and their interpretations of Greek history or identity. In the longue durée of Greek history, the myth that Greece belongs to the West manifests variably as a dominant theoretical tra dition, the result of a long-drawn-out evolution of identity, a primary interest or strategic imperative, and a guiding vision or geopolitical principle. On a On this theme, see, for example, a recent polemic, Bottici & Challand (2014, pp. 94–101), and more extensively Bottici (2008).

28

chapter 1

deeper philosophical level, this longing for belonging, this placing of Greece inside Europe and the West, has haunted the collective consciousness, variously posing as a matter of fact, as established historical knowledge, or as a teleology. Beneath the surface of changing governments, the creation and the dissolution of political parties, the various constitutional orders, and the adaptive but firmly pro-European foreign policy—beneath this impression of continuity of tradition, identity, and interest, there exists a history of discontinuity, of moments of crisis and change, a series of great transformations. In other words, a statement such as Greece belongs to the West does enclose an essence of the Greek national identity, a cultural determinism, a natural predisposition toward a real political object, or the path to a manifest destiny. Instead it is a single occurrence, a part of the whole, and just one statement among many that together make up the unique geopolitical mythmaking of modern Greece. This is a myth that contains geopolitical ideas concerning friends and foes, rules of cultural attraction and disdain, perceptions of security and fear; it is a myth through which geopolitical concepts emerge and acquire meaning (e.g., Greece as a continuous entity in space and time, or Europe and the West as a unity defined by a cultural regularity). It is a myth that contains different strategies and principles, each sponsoring a different view of Greece’s position and mission in the world (e.g., narratives such as belonging to the West or to the East or an exceptional case altogether, a country without an equivalent). And, finally, it is a myth that encompasses and fosters a clash between those strategies in particular, and in this way it forms an incomplete, if not unending, political process that has had an enormous impact on Greek politics, and especially on strategy and foreign policy, throughout modern Greek history—from the Enlightenment to the euro crisis. This is a system of geopolitical mythmaking that makes the world intelligible for the nation and at the same time generates traction for certain national decisions, no matter where they come from. A multiplicity of interests and identities may be the root causes of Greece’s historical pro-European strategy, but on the discursive level, between the imposing reality of global politics and the domestic perceptions of national interest, between self-awareness and for eign representations, this myth of belonging to the West has also been told, retold, and related to complementary or opposite myths. In the final analysis, this struggle between rival geopolitical myths or narratives in Greece frames a central mythmaking process and the “making of” a geopolitical myth of belonging that decides the position of Greece in the world, its behavior, and its strategic orientation.

INTRODUCTION

3

29

Political Myth and Geopolitical Analysis

Up to now, starting from the initial observation that the concept of Europe tends to function as the touchstone of Greek strategy and foreign policy, this study has tried to develop the hypothesis that this tendency hinges on a central geopolitical mythmaking process or an intellectual debate expressed in a huge archive of written, spoken, or implied narratives and storylines. In this regard, belonging to Europe and the West is approached as a geopolitical myth that has a tremendous effect on the Greek worldview and, by extension, legitimizes and calls for a pro-European and pro-Western Greek foreign policy. As a result, this study moves to the general direction of problematizing the position of belonging to the West as the speaking collective conscience of Modern Greece, the axiomatic principle of a system of thought, and the geopolitical imperative that is supposed to define not merely Greek strategy and foreign policy, but the totality of modern Greek history. In other words, by not accepting belonging to the West as a geographical truth, a historical necessity, or a teleology, the main claim of this study is that this “truth apparent” is a geopolitical myth that has evolved historically and undergone major transformations in its struggle with opposing narratives; furthermore, this struggle between rival geopolitical myths in modern Greece frames a mythmaking process that decides the position of Greece in the world, its behavior, and its strategic orientation. In order to do so, the research aims to break down the belonging myth into its constitutive parts (narratives and storylines); prove their continuous presence and effect in different historical periods, intellectual contexts, and texts (or in other words their continuity, adaptability, and intertextuality, respec tively); examine the features or processes that set the belonging narratives apart from the competition (what makes it more efficient than others); and finally to transpose these narratives and their corresponding dynamics onto modern predicaments, so as to better understand more recent developments and strategic decisions—for example, the resolve to remain a member of the eurozone despite the economic and political disadvantages. The intention here is not to examine how this geopolitical myth was formed, to trace its origins in internal inspiration or external domination, nor to explain how the longing to belong to Europe and the West emerged due to material circumstances and contextual nationalistic interests. The analysis will not merely shout that the “emperor has no clothes.” The assumption has already been given that Greece belongs to the West is a social construct, so this study is not meant as an exercise in vanity, as is often seen in the deconstruction of a

30

chapter 1

common sense and the reconstruction of another, nor it is delivered as another blow to the already flattened field of geopolitical theories. Likewise, the objective is not to examine how the myth of belonging affects the strategic choices of the country and its foreign policy decisions—from the trivial to the existential. It would be senseless to claim that geopolitical mythmaking can explain Greece’s entire historical trajectory and strategic orientation. Here also, there is no intention to refute or supersede existing explanations that work with interests, intentions, and strategic imperatives or traditions and identities. On the contrary, the ambition is to complement in various interesting ways our understanding of Greece’s European choice, so far based either on interests or identity formation, by examining the mythmaking process that justifies both rational calculations and perceptions of identity. To focus on myth is not to trace the origins or the causes of Greece’s strategic decisions throughout history. It is also not an attempt to provide a complete causal explanation for Greece’s consistent pro-European choices. Instead, it should be taken as an effort to improve our understanding of this topic by adding a complementary, discursive layer to the existing explanations. To prove the claim, the ambition is to provide evidence to support not the objective truth or falseness of the myth, but its objective reality as a political instrument that generates traction and legitimacy for selected strategic decisions (while it excludes others). This matters because the property of myth as a source of legitimacy and mobilization for the public is a key concern in the whole literature of political myth. A myth is not merely a descriptive narrative but is also a legitimacy generator, a motivating force, and a “determination to act” (Sorel & Jennings, 2009, p. 32; Cassirer, 2013). Myths are useful political instruments that justify the authority of the government and the legitimacy of its actions (Schöpflin & Hosking, 2013; Schöpflin, 1997; Lincoln, 1989). Every political entity uses myths that symbolize the essence of its nature, the shared values and features of the members of its community (Obradovic, 1996, p. 196; Jones, 2010). The effectiveness of myth depends on narrative qualities, such as intelligibility, that help the process of becoming widely accepted as an apparent, even sacred, truth (Strath, 2005; Ricoeur, 2010; Bottici & Challand, 2014; Bouchard, 2013, 2014). But, overall, the central purpose of political myth is to generate legitimacy and support for political action (Della Sala, 2010, p. 5).33 As discussed earlier, in the case of Greece there are fixed and permanent geographical and other conditions that should complicate (or even exclude) 33

For the examples of the British monarchy and the EU integrations, see, respectively, Smith (1999) and Della Sala

INTRODUCTION

31

the representation of Greece as part of the West. The fact that, instead, belonging to the West evolved into a dominant strategic imperative is another indication that geopolitical myths may not belong to the realm of the real, but as discursive devices they have real, lasting, and reproducible effects in domestic and international politics. Regarding the case study, the objective is to apply this analytical framework to a Greek mythmaking process that hides a fascinating story of myth as a legitimizing factor and a powerful, consistent call for political action. The methodology of this research is qualitative primary source analysis, since the aim is to contrast and compare narratives and storylines, to expose their relation and the process by which they acquire meaning and create legitimacy. In particular, the main corpus of documents draws from the following sources: the work of Greek political geographers of the 18th century (available in the digital archive of the University of Athens), the Greek printed press (from various historical periods), the works of Greek historiographers from the late 19th century, the diplomatic archives of the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the political archive of Konstantinos Karamanlis (from archives and several publications). The Greek Enlightenment is important because that is the period that coincides with the establishment of the Greek state, the formation of a national identity, and the emergence of a locational awareness. If we are to claim that belonging to Europe is a foundational geopolitical myth, we need to focus on the period in which the Greeks (or at least their intellectuals) were originally forced to think in terms of a nation-state and locate themselves—and their new state—on the world map. The work of political geographers of that period is one of “the major intellectual manifestations of the Greek enlightenment” (Kitromilides, 2013, p. 88). For the Enlightenment in general, the role of geography also played a significant role in the making of its philosophical ideas and political projects (Withers, 2007). Similarly, although it may seem counterintuitive, the intellectuals that defined the Greek canons of historiography in the late 19th century were also concerned with geopolitical understandings of both space and time. The first attempts to provide a complete scholarly history of modern Greece necessarily had to speak in geopolitical terms. This is not surprising because in general the geographic imagination of an individual or a group, their understandings of space (geography) and time (history), acts as “a primary means of individ uation and social differentiation” in relation to others (Harvey, 1990, p. 419). If time and space are a means of distinguishing oneself from others, then in this regard the historiographers of the late 19th century were only continuing

32

chapter 1

the work of political geographers of the previous century—to the extent that they too were trying to locate Greece in space and time and distinguish it from other nations. The Greek printed press in various periods is also important because it captures the public opinion of its time. In the past, it was widely agreed that public opinion is too volatile and incoherent to have a significant impact on foreign policy (Holsti, 1992). This previous consensus is now challenged by new evidence that points to the fact that although it is dependent on domestic structures (i.e., institutions or cultural and social norms), public opinion does matter for foreign policy in liberal democracies (Risse-Kappen, 1991). It is difficult to measure the actual effect of public opinion on foreign policy, but the media constitutes a useful interface for the relationship between the two (Soroka, 2003). Here again we encounter a familiar cause–effect debate, in the sense that it is difficult to determine whether it is the elites that influence public opinion through the media (i.e., the idea of manufactured consent) or the other way around. A not-so-easy way around such a simplistic either/or dilemma is to assume that both are true, that the media is just another factor that shapes public attitudes and influence on foreign policy, or that mass media and public opinion are not two separate things but a single system of bidirectional cause and effect (Baum & Potter, 2008; Glasser & Salmon, 1995, p. xxi). Accordingly, in the case of Greece also, the press has always been a vehicle for the discussion of ideas concerning national identity and foreign policy (Mystakidou, 2004, pp. 13–27, 54). Editorials and articles in Greek newspapers discussing domestic and international affairs have often spoken in geopolitical terms and have contributed to the propagation of narratives and stories; hence, they are extremely useful in an analysis of the mythmaking process in Greece. In the 20th century, the public servants and diplomats of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as an elite bureaucracy, played a significant role in conceptualizing and implementing the project of the country’s accession to the European Communities. The role of institutions and bureaucratic politics in foreign policy is generally known (Drezner & Lechtreck, 2003). Institutions and bureaucracies are supposed to be imbued with ideas and beliefs that shape interests, foreign policy outcomes, and, by extension, international politics.34 A literature on bureaucratic politics also focuses on the role of bureau cracies in decision-making. Actor-specific theories, and individual or group See, for example, Goldstein & Keohane (1993). From a constructivists point of view, see Finnemore, (1996) and Checkel (1997). Starting with Allison, G. T. (1971), Allison & Halperin (1972), and Halperin (1974).

INTRODUCTION

33

dynamics, have also been suggested to be at the intersection of all social sciences that deal with human decision-making and to provide the groundwork of IR (see Hudson, 2005). In the same fashion, the pro-European movement in Greece, especially after World War II and between 1947 and 1967, has been approached as a project of elite bureaucracies and prominent intellectual or political figures in Greece (Stefanidis, 1985; see also Kōnstantopoulou, 2011). This is not to say that the foreign affairs bureaucracies were all powerful and able to direct policy by themselves. Charismatic leaders and their agendas are never totally obscured by bureaucracies.36 Konstantinos Karamanlis is a fine example of a Greek prime minister who had a personal agenda and took foreign affairs—and especially European affairs—in his own hands, severely limiting the role or the effect of foreign affairs interest groups in decision-making (see Stefanidis, 2001). Furthermore, Karamanlis is widely identified as the most prominent political actor in Greece’s pro-European choice: as prime minister he spearheaded the project of European accession (Minotos, 2002; Kontogeorgis, 1985). His personal archive is an important collection of pro-European beliefs and arguments (Minotos, 2008). To conclude, the official documents from diplomats and foreign policy officials between 1948 and 1968, as well as Karamanlis’s vast personal archive of articles, speeches, and parliamentary interventions, can be considered important containers of geopolitical narratives and storylines and pertinent to an analysis of geopolitical myths and their legitimizing effect on foreign policy.37 The ambition here is to focus on primary sources that span two centuries of history and to examine different periods, each of which produced vast amounts of texts and documents, books of scholarship and historical treatises, political speeches and private letters, all of which fall under different labels and categories, different domains and subjects of study. Similarly to discourse analysis, the main problem in this approach is “the building-up of coherent and homogeneous corpora of documents” (Foucault, 2013, p. 11). The principle that guides the selection of texts and documents in my analysis is the search for typical uses of the key narratives and storylines that make up geopolitical mythmaking in Greece from across a number of domains, namely treatises of Political Geography and Historiography, the press, political speeches, and official state documents. Considering that the available sources are virtually inexhaustible, this selection of statements is by no means a closed corpus. 36

See Krasner’s (1972) remarkable polemic to Allison’s Essence of Decision And a smaller note for the secondary sources: the study relies on, and is deeply indebted to, a handful of canonical works of Greek intellectual history and foreign policy, namely Kitromilides (2013), Dimaras (2009), and Svolopoulos (2014a).

34

chapter 1

By default, this is also the first and most important limitation of the study: that it is virtually impossible to create a closed corpus as there will always be another and then another statement or text or author that discusses in some way the same narratives, or that uses the same or similar stories and makes reference to the myth of belonging for this or that reason. However, although it is difficult to substantiate the claim that individual statements or uses of narratives and storylines are representative, or the most representative, of a given period, an entire corpus of texts that traverse historical periods and contexts and refer to the same narratives and stories may indeed indicate the continuous existence of a myth. In other words, the significance of the myth can be substantiated by the fact that a wide array of intellectual debates have used the particular narratives and storylines that constitute this myth. Still, in terms of methodology, primary source analysis is mixed with a macro-historical approach that spans two centuries of modern Greek history. Instead of focusing exclusively on recent events (e.g., the Cold War or the euro crisis), this study tries to trace a particular pattern of behavior (i.e., Greece’s pro-European choice) that appears to have contemporary relevance, but also continuity in time. After all, this is what history does best: using the past to illuminate the present (Appleby et al., 1995, p. 9). Therefore, a historical approach is necessary and in line with recent developments in the study of international politics, namely the historical turn in IR, which contends that the study of history is indispensable to the study of international politics (Suganami, 2015, p. 257). History and international relations have a long, symbiotic relationship (Hobson & Lawson, 2008, p. 415). IR scholars of all approaches and on all levels of analysis have employed history in their research, albeit with many methodological question marks (see Lawson, 2012). The most pertinent of these question marks is the postmodern ontologi cal divide that permeates all social science, and which in history could be summed up as: is there a history or is it many histories? Is it possible to have an objective view of the past or is the past almost completely lost to us and open to innumerable interpretations? This “problem of history” dividing classical historians and postmodern historians is also transferred into to limit history being employed as a methodological approach (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). Therefore, the questions regarding the use of a macro-historical approach in combination with geopolitics and political myth might be considered a second limitation of this study. However, as explained earlier, the aim of this study is not to provide a complete history of Greek geopolitics; the aim of this study is to highlight a few critical periods that can facilitate the analysis of the belonging to the West myth, of thinking about geography and space and the position of Greece in the world. Although the scope of analysis extends

INTRODUCTION

35

from the 18th century to the present, from the Greek Enlightenment to the euro crisis, it is not the objective of this study to be historically thorough and to provide a complete reconstruction of Greek history. This entails the risk of making the research look cursory and inattentive to detail. Yet the long view, even if selective at times, is strictly necessary and appropriate in an effort to trace patterns of statements on a very specific topic, namely geopolitical mythmaking in modern Greece. It is important to note in this respect that the study does propose a new periodization or a new longue durée of history, identity, and politics of modern Greece. As mentioned previously, these expositions are already available, and, after all, such an intention, if it were not simply pedantic, would certainly be impossible to achieve within the set limits of a study. On the contrary, the focus on a few critical periods as “snapshots” or “still images” of history is a much better use of resources. In this way one can compare these images in order to spot differences or similarities, to identify patterns, and to describe a system of formation of geopolitical myths. Therefore, the historical analysis is limited to the following selected periods: Greek Enlightenment and Independence, 1770s–1840s: This is the period shortly before and after the Greek War of Independence (1821–1827) and the establishment of the modern Greek state (1831–1832). The textual examination in this period focuses on the corpus of a Political Geography literature that produced a particular geographical knowledge and shaped the myth of belonging to the West. Greek political geographers, politicians, and other intellectuals, caught between the expanding ideas of the European Enlightenment and the receding lines of traditional Ottoman authority, were the first to refer to Greece’s cultural affinity with Europe and to call for the urgent cultural improvement of the Greek nation by imitating the arts, sciences, and governance of the great European powers. European “otherness” denoted Greece’s potential for reclaiming the grandeur of the ancient past—in juxtaposition with the threat, the experienced oppression, and other traumas linked to Ottoman rule. Greek nationalism and the Romantic movement, 1850s–1920s: In contrast to the previous period, the Romantic movement provided the intellectual context of this period, during which the myth of belonging to the West clashed with an eastward narrative framed by religious and cultural differences with Western Europe. The textual examination in this period will focus on the writ ings of a small group of intellectuals, mainly historians, who introduced the formal historiographical canon of continuity in Greek history from classical to modern Greece, through the Byzantine era. This “Byzantine revival” was incompatible with earlier notions of European affinity and imitation and it gave rise to a more eclectic, nationalist, and irredentist Greek strategy.

36

chapter 1

Postwar European integration, 1940s–1980s: The geopolitics of the Cold War provided the perfect context for the ascendancy of the myth of belonging to Europe and the West. Especially during the first period of the Cold War, Greek diplomats and politicians articulated the most astute and complete expression of the belonging myth. The texts examined in this period include official documents of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the participation of Greece in European integration as well as the political discourse of Konstantinos Karamanlis, the statesman who is credited with Greece’s accession to the European Communities. It is in this period that the myth of belonging to Europe and the West develops into a coherent strategy, a pro-Western foreign policy with concrete, set objectives—namely, Greece’s membership in the EC. A third limitation concerns the use of a single case study, which is, however, alleviated through the segmentation of the research into the aforementioned historical periods. Apart from substantiating the continuity and adaptability of the myth of belonging, these critical snapshots of Greek history serve another purpose. Namely, they provide the research design with case studies within the main case study. The hope is that this segmentation will partially succeed in supporting some general theoretical remarks about the use of myth in geopolitics, despite the focus on one case study. As Kegley puts it, “to succeed partially is not to fail completely [ … ​] goals (should be) downgraded to better fit capacities [ … ​] this prescribes reduction in the level of generality sought [ … ​] More of the peculiar, unique and particular can be captured at a reduced level of abstraction and generality” (Kegley, 1980, pp. 12, 19). In other words, the singular focus on a case study, although not ideal by any standard, can generate results that can foster future comparative research and richer understandings of geopolitical myths and their role in framing strategic thinking and foreign policy. This study sets out to deliver three main contributions: two with regard to the case study that should improve our understanding of Greece’s proEuropean, pro-Western behavior, and a theoretical contribution to the field of Geopolitics that should increase its explanatory potential and relevance. First, it demonstrates the objective reality of a belonging to the West myth across time, texts, and contexts as a device that generates traction and legitimacy for Greece’s geopolitical attachment to Europe and the West. So far, explanations based on interests and identity correctly point to several underly ing factors (i.e., motivation of elites, geopolitical dynamics, identity formation) that influence Greece’s pro-Western strategy, but the existence of a myth of belonging enables us to examine how these factors are embedded in domestic debates, articulated or used by political actors, and consumed by the domestic

INTRODUCTION

37

public. The fact that Greece’s geopolitical attachment to the West and its European integration has proven so resilient, to the extent that it is now considered an apparent truth, is not purely a matter of rational interest calculations, a by-product of systemic equilibria and power structures, or the result of identity formation. Greece’s geopolitical attachment to Europe and the West is also determined by a geopolitical myth that has legitimized and framed proEuropean policies in the country. Second, it shows that this belonging myth is the product of a long-drawnout mythmaking process in Greece that started with the diffusion of key geopolitical narratives during the Greek Enlightenment and has had a continuous presence through the Romantic and the modern eras, encountering opposition from rival myths and narratives but also adapting to changing international contexts, overcoming the opposition of rival myths, and becoming a ritualistic experience in the context of EC membership (Europeanization) to achieve a sacred status. As a result, the belonging myth is dominant in many respects, but it has struggled with opposing myths and narratives. This struggle between rival geopolitical myths in modern Greece is an element of a wider mythmaking process that decides the position of Greece in the world, its behavior, and its strategic orientation. Belonging to the West is a geopolitical myth that is widely accepted as an apparent truth, but it was, and still is, subject to political opposition from rival geopolitical myths and narratives that are latent in Greek society. This explains why and how severe geopolitical predicaments, such as the euro crisis, can re-ignite fiery debates in Greek politics that challenge both traditional interests and identity, but also the country’s sense of place inside and outside Europe. Overall, a better understanding of the interplay between geopolitical myths and Greek strategic choices will also help us evaluate the resilience—and perhaps the limits—of Greece’s pro-European attitude within the context of a systemic crisis caused by the country’s steep economic decline, Europe’s own existential political crisis, and the broader relative decline of European power globally. Third, with regard to the theoretical framework, the overall ambition is to outline a new path of inquiry as Analytical Geopolitics, which makes heavy use of the literature on myth and political myth. In combination with a criti cal realist stance (i.e., looking for the generative mechanisms of social events that cannot be simply reduced to dependent and independent variables) and a pragmatist philosophical position (i.e., the study of the real effect of a social object and not its ontological correspondence with an external reality), the use of myth as an object of geopolitical analysis can align the Geopolitics field with similar epistemological shifts in and social science in general.

38

chapter 1

In recent decades, Critical Geopolitics, like other critical approaches in social science, has taken up the mission of exposing geopolitical theories as discourse, instruments of power, or ridiculous, immoral, and necessarily dangerous fallacies. While it has been a highly successful and illuminating run, perhaps it is indeed “running out of steam” or missing the larger picture. Deconstructing theories, interpretations, and myths does not mean that they have or can become a thing of the past. Myths in particular are essential elements of any social human community, and geopolitical myths are espe cially vital for the modern territorial state. It is important to have a neutral theoretical framework that can examine their real effects in politics.

chapter 2

A Short History of Geopolitics 1

From Classical to Critical Geopolitics

1.1 Classical Geopolitics, Rise and Demise Although our fascination with the intimate relationship between space and power goes back to ancient and Hellenistic times, to scholars such as Herodotus, Aristotle, and Strabo, the emergence of Geopolitics as a separate field of inquiry is linked to the territorial competition between states toward the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. As long as the European explorers were expanding the limits of the world, geographers were occupied with making maps, measuring and classifying. When all “terra incognita” was lifted, facing the possible exhaustion of their subject matter, geographers contemplated other paths of inquiry. The first geopolitical theories, what we now sometimes call Classical Geopolitics, approached geography as a resource of power, as the terrain for interstate rivalry, and as the root cause of national cultural traits and historical patterns of state behaviors. In the United Kingdom, Sir Halford Mackinder (1861–1947), a leading figure of the British New Geography, was such an intellectual pioneer. In The geographical pivot of history, Mackinder (1904) pronounced that at a time when states were no longer able to expand their borders to unclaimed territories, they should direct their efforts instead toward relative efficiency within a closed territorial system. Consequently, geography should also divert its purpose to “extensive survey and philosophic synthesis,” for the correlation between natural environment and political organization was so obvious as hardly to be worthy of description; and hence, geographers should search for a “formula” for the practical value for statecraft, which would reveal at least some aspects of geographical causation in the history of the world (Mackinder, 1904, pp. 421– 423). In this respect, Mackinder’s Geographical pivot was a programmatic dec laration of a new path of academic inquiry into international politics. As such, it already contained some of the ontological and epistemological themes that still frame geopolitical theory today, including the pertinence of geography to strategic decision-making, geographic determinism, but also the prospect of a conceptual geography and the link between space, culture, and strategy. In the United States, Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) wrote influence of sea power upon history (1890) and The interest of America in sea power (1897), in which he was preoccupied with the profound influence of maritime commerce © Antonios Nestoras, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004686908_003

40

CHAPTER 2

and naval forces on the strength, security, and wealth of nations. Mahan wrote that, in order to become a great power, a country needed to secure an insular base with an easily defensible coastline and rely on sea power in order to develop national security and global dominance. Therefore, in its bid for great power status, the United States had a tremendous interest in building up its maritime capabilities (Mahan, 1917, 1918). In Germany and Sweden, Ratzel laid the foundations of German geopolitik in his Politische Geographie (1897), which were later developed and refined in Kjellen’s Der Staat als Lebensform (1917) into an organic theory of the state (Kjellen, 1917; Ratzel, 1903). Just as a strong pack of wolves could claim the hunting grounds of a weaker pack, Ratzel’s Lebensraum implied that a strong state that needed more living space could claim more territory from weaker states. In turn, Kjellen propagated the idea that states were dynamic entities that grew naturally as they acquired more power. The engine for growth was the state’s culture, and the more vigorous and “advanced” the culture, the more justified it was to expand its territory. Soon these ideas were introduced to the German general public by Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), a former army general, editor of a popular magazine, and host of a weekly radio show (Flint, 2005, p. 21). This kind of reasoning for German foreign policy at a time when Hitler’s popularity was surging and the Nazi Party was thrashing the remnants of the Weimar Republic prompted Life magazine to frame Haushofer as the “philosopher of Nazism” (quoted in Tuathail, 1996, p. 115). From then on, the mark of Nazism would brand geopolitik as a pseudo-science: “for a whole generation afterwards the [ … ​] discredited geopolitik tended to cast doubt on the integrity of political geography as a whole” (Parker, 1983, p. 1072). And after World War II, on both sides of the Atlantic, “the overall picture of the 1950s and 1960s is one of geopolitics being avoided and relegated to the historical sections of texts in both political geography and political science, and the word itself having little currency in academic or policy debates” (Hepple, 1986, p. 23). In a way, the rise of geopolitical thought as a popular subject also brought its demise, not only by flagging Geopolitics’ potential for use in politics, but also by way of a quiet denouncement of its basic premises. Indeed, the classical theories developed in parallel in Britain, the United States, and Germany, and they all shared several common features. For one, they all based their “objective” and “scientific” truths on the privileged position of the observer, who happened to be male, white, and a member of an aca demic or military elite but who did not, however, pose as a neutral, unbiased, and disinterested scholar; instead, they were all passionate proponents of a strategy and a foreign policy, and they were all too candid about their concern

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

41

with state power. Mackinder wanted to balance German and Russian power in continental Europe, Mahan was preoccupied with the position of the United States on the world stage, and Haushofer was debating German foreign policy questions such as colonization and eastern expansion. Their geopolitical theories offered state-centric images of the world and images that were framed by power politics, notions of empire, and territorial expansion. 1.2 Geopolitics’ Revival and Critique Given Geopolitics’ ideological stain and poisoned relationship with the academy, it is peculiar that in the aftermath of World War II, a number of scholars dared to take on the subject with initial success, which in due course sparked a renewed academic interest in Geopolitics. Even before the end of the war, Nicholas Spykman (1893–1943), professor of International Relations at Yale University, stated that “geography does not argue. It simply is” (Spykman, 1938, p. 236). Later, Spykman went on to devise a U.S. strategy in “terms of geography and power politics” that considered “the implications of its geographic location in the world” (Spykman, 1942, p. 8). A couple of decades later, Saul Cohen discussed both Mackinder and Spykman (Cohen, 1963, p. 59) in his own attempt to develop a framework of geopolitical analysis for the “description of geographical settings as they relate to political power [ … ​] the spatial frameworks that embrace interacting political power units” (Cohen, 1963, p. 25). As a rule, despite these influential works that re-engaged with geography as a determinant of state strategy and international politics, geopolitics remained a taboo subject in mainstream academic debates. With the notable exception of Raymond Aron,1 scholars of IR belonging to the realist tradition, such as Kenneth Waltz and Hans Morgenthau, were content simply to acknowledge space as the most stable factor in international politics (see, e.g., Waltz, 1979, p. 131; Morgenthau, 1993, p. 124). Other realist views of geography were limited to its quality as state territory that contributes to a nation’s wealth and power or the relative effects of land and sea power on interstate relations (Levy & Thompson, 2010, p. 8), but this was as far as the resemblance to Classical Geopolitics would go. According to Gray and Sloan (2003, p. 1), the turning point for the revival of Geopolitics was the publication of the memoirs of Henry Kiss inger (1979). Kissinger’s definition of geopolitics was merely “an approach that pays attention to the requirements of equilibrium” (Kissinger, 1979, p. 914)—a definition that consigned Geopolitics to being merely a variant of the Realist tradition in . Regardless, it is still conceivable that the continuous use of the See chapter 7, “On space,” in Aron (1966, pp. 181–209).

42

CHAPTER 2

term geopolitics by Kissinger is the reason behind the current popularity of the term in the public discourse. Today, Colin Gray is a front runner of what appears to be a revival movement for Geopolitics.2 Gray’s “inescapable geography” frames Geopolitics as “the spatial study and practice of international relations [which] explains the dynamic spatial dimension to some persisting patterns of conflict in international relations” (Gray, 1999, 2005, pp. 18, 28–29). As geography remains a constant, it imposes a “pervasive and enduring limitation [ … ​] upon the power of states” (Gray, 2006, p. 137). Hence, in the long run, physical geography creates geostrategic imperatives for states in the international system.3 Continuing this thread of thought, a number of scholars have returned to pronounce that the spatial dimension of politics is undeniable and should be considered, for all intents and purposes, as an inherent element of international politics— especially as conflict and war over territory is a recurring motif therein (see, e.g., Hansen, 1997; McDougall, 2003). This is the main thrust of a revivalist wave of scholars that continues the classical tradition well into the 21st century (see, e.g., Dussouy, 2001; Cohen, 2003). This renaissance of geopolitical theories in the 1990s was met with bellicose criticism by academic circles in political and human geography.4 The main line of this criticism is that the revival of Geopolitics relies on the mass production of strategic global perspectives with simplistic understandings of geography and space, and an even more primordial concern for the effective use of force (or the threat to use force) in international relations. Much like Classical Geopolitics, the critics claim, modern variants act as a conservative ideology of military and foreign policy elites, rather than an objective path of inquiry; and geopolitical theories, as always, are based on “skepticism about international diplomacy and law; [ … ​] a belief in the importance of resources such as oil, gas, coal and minerals; [ … ​] and finally a willingness to urge intervention [ … ​] where national security interests were at stake” (Dodds et al., 2013, p. 5). Recasting accusations of geographical determinism that benefits the elites in power, the critics of Geopolitics dismiss the materialist framework (physical geography and a pallet of other factors that determine power) in which it operates. This framework, they claim, takes the existing power structure for granted and acquires a self-image as an instrumental form of knowledge and 2 For a selection of the work of this prolific writer, see, for example, Gray (1988, 1991, 2005, 2006) and Gray and Sloan (2005). 3 The best example of this assumption is Brzezinski (1997). 4 For an exhaustive discussion of geopolitical schools and publications in the 1990s, see Mama douh (1998).

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

43

rationality (Tuathail, 2003). Although geopolitical theories are supposed to advance a claim to knowledge from the exercise of pure reason alone, based on indisputable facts (e.g., “you can’t argue with geography”), to give an absolute description of the world uncontaminated by the social experiences of the observer, what they are doing instead is producing “situated knowledge.” If the experience and social perceptions of the observer taint all claims to knowledge, it is impossible to separate Geopolitics from the subjective conditions and the social, national, or ethnic discourses that created it in the first place. Geopolitical theories—as the critique goes—are not only state- and ethnocentric readings of the world, but, more than that, they are designed to further the political agendas of powerful elites (Tuathail, 1996, p. 59). And, as a result, Geopolitics is a “social, cultural and political practice, rather than [ … ​] a manifest and legible reality of world politics” (Tuathail, 1998, p. 2). From this critical angle, Geopolitics “enframes all foreign policy practices [...] and can be better understood as the spatial practices, both material and representational of statecraft itself” (Tuathail, 1998, p. 3). 1.3 Postmodern, Critical Geopolitics This extensive body of literature, labeled Critical Geopolitics, takes a militant stance against Geopolitics as a practice of statecraft.5 This literature is driven by a determination to offer previously excluded and emancipatory views from “material practices across spaces that help to consolidate worldwide orders of political economy” (Tuathail & Dalby, 1998, p. 18). These orders include “routinized rules, institutions, activities and strategies through which the international political economy operates” (Agnew & Corbridge, 1995, p. 15). Critical Geopolitics is quite disparate and lacks a single theoretical and methodological framework, but it operates on a common postmodern and post-structuralist denominator: an interest in the systematic deconstruction of geopolitical texts and discourses. If measured by the proportion of contributions to relevant journals within the discipline, this approach appears to be the predominant perspective in academic Geopolitics (Redepenning, 2007, p. 91). In general, Critical Geopolitics is branded as a “subfield of human geog raphy that investigates the geographical assumptions and designations that enter into the making of world politics” (Dodds et al., 2013, p. 6). It examines the ways human agency and social practices shape international politics, how they confine it to space by dividing the world into socially constructed regions is self-styled. Mamadouh (1998, p. 244) locates the origin of the term in the PhD thesis defended by Tuathail (1989). Otherwise the term might have been coined in Dalby (1990a). Dalby describes the term also in Dalby (1989).

44

CHAPTER 2

or blocs (Agnew, 1998, p. 2; Tuathail & Agnew, 1992, p. 190). For Critical Geopolitics, geography in the political discourse is not a fact but an artifact made by people and their territorial techniques, and geopolitical thinking is a practice that assigns political and even ideological significance to places (Dodds & Sidaway, 1994, p. 518). Geographical claims in politics are not an accurate representation of reality, but an intentional simplification based on dubious assumptions: borders, states, blocs of states, areas and regions that hold some interest for states; any object in the international system is determined not by a physical reality but by what people think of it (Barnes & Duncan, 1992, p. 2). Hence, geopolitical thinking is not innocent; it is an intentional technique of statecraft, a manipulative instrument of power, a method of developing interests and identities. The purpose of Critical Geopolitics is not to describe how geography, as a container of all that is human and social, influences international politics. Quite the opposite, what Critical Geopolitics wants is to examine the political process that creates geographical understandings of the world. If the purpose of Critical Geopolitics is uniform, the method is not. Since its inception in the 1990s, Critical Geopolitics has never shown signs of internal theoretical coherence, and there seems to be no intention to provide a singular theory or method of geopolitical analysis. And although it is common for Critical Geopolitics to borrow various methodological elements from critical theories, such as Marxism, post-Marxism, feminism, and postcolonialism, in order to cover the field with a theoretical coating, post-structuralism seems to provide the main theoretical thrust of the field. 1.4 Textual Deconstruction in Critical Geopolitics Critical Geopolitics’ approach to textual deconstruction follows the typology of Tuathail and Dalby, according to which the general practice of geopolitics can be analyzed in formal, practical, and popular geopolitics (Dalby, 1998, p. 5). The deconstruction of formal geopolitics is preoccupied with the work of geopolitical theorists, strategists, and other intellectuals—the intellectuals of statecraft, as O Tuathail and Dalby call them—such as the aforementioned Mackinder and Ratzel (see Dodds & Sidaway, 2004; Wolkersdorfer, 1999). Texts from contemporary theorists have also been deconstructed (see, e.g., Tuathail, 1994a, 1996, pp. 231–249; Sparke, 1998; Ingram, 2001). In the context of practical geopolitics, the deconstruction is directed at the texts (official documents, policy documents, and reports) produced within state institutions (see, e.g., Daby 1990b; Bialasiewicz et al., 2007; Dodds, 1994). Finally, in the context of popular geopolitics, Critical Geopolitics is concerned with the deconstruction of texts found in popular culture mediums, such as the printed media and motion pic tures, images, religious texts, and works of art (Carter & McCormack, 2006;

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

45

Dittmer, 2005; Dittmer & Sturm, 2016; Culcasi, 2006; Dodds, 2006, 2007; Bernazzoli, 2010; Sharp, 2001). Textual deconstruction in Critical Geopolitics needs to be understood in the context of the so-called linguistic turn in the social sciences: for human geographers, postmodernism and deconstruction provided an opportunity for their discipline to “attain a pivotal role in the social sciences and humanities” (Dear, 1988, p. 262). Moreover, textual deconstruction in Critical Geopolitics refers mostly to Derrida’s practice of reading texts (Müller, 2013, p. 51). A text for Derrida is not a “finished corpus of writing, some content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential traces” (Derrida, 1979, p. 84). To put it simply, any text can have multiple meanings. In Derrida’s deconstruction, the task is to uncover the binary arrangement of every meaning: what is said and what is not said, what is spoken and what is silenced. The opposing meaning of a statement is always present in the text, and owing to this, binary configuration every text contains its own refutation. By bringing the opposite into being, by subverting and contesting the primary meaning, by showing that the opposite is also possible, the primary meaning is revealed to be arbitrary because it relies on the exclusion of the opposite and, thus, any geopolitical idea contains within it the possibility of its own deconstruction. This polysemy alludes to meaning as contingent, contextual, and relative. Therefore, for Critical Geopolitics, any given text is one of many possibilities of representing the world and every geopolitical claim is a practice of exclusion of alternative meanings. This is the strategic conjecture on which Critical Geopolitics bases its alternative readings of world politics: the ontological assumption of polysemy allows Critical Geopolitics to build up its attack on the knowledge claimed by classical geopolitical theories, official texts, and popular artistic production with the hope of showing that the spatial language of international politics, the perceptions of geography that underline geopolitical thinking about interstate relations, do not include a natural relation with an outside reality. Instead, they constitute a one-sided practice of producing seemingly objective meaning, one that is so much affected in the language, the texts, and the institutions that constitute the fabric of the social world that it is no longer felt as artificial. 1.5 The Critique of Critical Geopolitics The problem with deconstruction is of course that the logic of a binary, ide ological practice that underlines every “text” applies also to texts of Critical itself. Put differently, deconstruction is not entirely innocent, or

46

CHAPTER 2

neutral, as an exercise that creates meaning at the same time that it tries to remove it from other texts: “deconstruction can only take place through reapplying the very form of meaning-construction that is deconstructed” (Müller, 2013, p. 53); in other words, “operating necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old structure [ … ​] the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work” (Derrida, 1997, p. 24). In this sense, textual deconstruction in Critical Geopolitics contains the seeds of its own negation in the form of an everpresent reconstruction. The assault on traditional geopolitical thinking may have been successful, to the extent that Critical Geopolitics has managed to challenge conventional opinions and to permit different angles or excluded interpretations of international politics. But Critical Geopolitics does not always succeed in avoiding the same errors it is protesting in classical geopolitical thought: the effort of Critical Geopolitics to undermine geopolitical texts and to turn them against themselves implies an alternative form of meaning construction; and in this respect, and in this respect only, Critical Geopolitics becomes a mirror image of Classical Geopolitics. Although Critical Geopolitics questions the validity of geopolitical knowledge, it offers an alternative reading of the world that advances its own claims to truth. Here, the questioning of the author’s motives and social situation is not applied with the same force and vigor. The critique, the alternative reading of a geopolitical text, appears to position itself as an objective interpre tation, coming from an observer with superior insight and perception of the world. In her comments on Tuathail’s Critical geopolitics, Sharp notes that he “is a geo-grapher, and his book, like the texts of those he seeks to critique, contains silences and a will to power in his own cartography of international relations”; his deconstruction seems to adopt the same “view from nowhere” with the objects of his deconstruction and “just as the geopoliticians that come under Tuathail’s scrutiny present themselves as all-knowing observers of the world and predictors of its political future, so too does he stand apart, detached and all seeing of their works” (Sharp, 2000, pp. 361–362). And, thus, in its effort to show how geopolitical theories are one-sided perspectives on international politics, Critical Geopolitics advances its own perspective and its version of a total history of any given idea (see Stephanson, 2000). But in this way, the grand illusion attributed to Classical Geopolitics—that of seeing everything from nowhere, the “godtrick,” as Haraway puts it (Haraway, 1991, For a similar critique, see also Sparke (2000).

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

47

p. 189)—returns like a ghost in new sheets. But if the texts of Critical Geopolitics reconstruct geographical knowledge from their own perspective, it is valid to ask if Critical Geopolitics is at all possible and what exactly its purpose is (Smith, 2000, p. 366). Still, this partiality seems to be naturalized in Critical Geopolitics’ self-image as being part of a social movement with emancipatory aims (Kelly, 2006). In fact, Critical Geopolitics never concealed this central objective. But, having its roots in critical theory, Critical Geopolitics can hardly take this as a condemnation.7 After all, the purpose of critical theory is “to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer, 1982, p. 244). Likewise, the avowed ambition of Critical Geopolitics is to levy a different knowledge of geography, to displace the conceptual infrastructure of Geopolitics, and to replace conventional wisdom in international politics (Tuathail, 1994b). To put it with a certain degree of banality: Critical Geopolitics has an agenda to change the world. And this agenda is at least as much political and ideological as it is academic. The ideological opponents of Critical Geopolitics are the alleged military and foreign policy elites that promote their political agendas, create a threatening “other,” and thus justify their desired security policies. In Critical Geopolitics, “the ‘making of identities’ and their strategic instrumentalization for geopolitical purposes move into center stage” (Reuber, 2000, p. 40). And the goal is to displace/replace the geopolitical identities of these elites with others that are less militaristic and more diplomatic, less masculine and more feminine, less belligerent and more pacifistic. The implicit statement here is that if all knowledge is biased and contains false claims of truthfulness and universality, it is far preferable to choose an honest knowledge, a knowledge that admits its own partiality and seeks to subvert the social constructs imposed by the elites—but for all the best reasons!8 In this context, Critical Geopolitics seems to suggest that assumptions based on lofty goals and benign motives are far preferable to others, that “there is good reason to believe vision is better from below the brilliant space platforms of the powerful” (Haraway, 1991, pp. 190–191)—and, thus, the decon struction of geopolitical texts and the reconstruction of Critical Geopolitics’ own partiality is disguised as a responsibility for critique framed by a selfrighteous morality. Indeed, Critical Geopolitics seems to be shot through with Then again, the theorists of Classical Geopolitics would also frown when accused of “imperialism,” “colonialism,” or social prejudice. This is in line with feminist thinking on the issue of situated or positioned knowledge; see, for example, Haraway (1991).

48

CHAPTER 2

notions of morality, which are frequently used as an attempt to fuse together theoretical approaches and methods that are often incompatible (Redepenning, 2007). From this angle of theoretical incoherence or eclecticism, the acceptance of an all-powerful elite that directs discourse and meaning in the social world gives the false impression of internal coherence of the geopolitical discourse, and it implies (an almost metaphysical) uniformity of motives among geopolitical actors. This point of view in Critical Geopolitics disrespects a fundamental poststructuralist principle, which is that the meaning of the text is beyond the author’s control—that is, Barthes’s proclamation of the “death of the author” (Barthes, 1977). In every case, Critical Geopolitics quietly admits to a recentering of human agency that contradicts poststructuralist assumptions concerning the displacement of the author as the subject or cause of texts and discourses.9 Even if one approaches this theoretical caveat claiming a rapport between Critical Geopolitics and Marxist and post-Marxist critical theory (i.e., Geopolitics as the ideology of an elite that dominates a subaltern social group), here again Critical Geopolitics is somewhat eclectic, with its theoretical assumptions adopted from the post-Marxist tradition. Indeed, Marxists share the underlying assumptions of realist and empiricist approaches to discourse (Howarth, 2010, p. 4) in believing that discourses represent “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings” for specific purposes (McAdam et al., 1996, p. 6; see also Snow & Benford, 1988). But, in addition, the materialist theory in Marxism requires a reference to underlying economic and political processes or, in other words, a material foundation of ideological or discursive phenomena (Howarth, 2010, p. 12). Conversely, however, Critical Geopolitics examines space as an exclusively textual occurrence. It makes no effort to scrutinize and include in its analysis the material factors that impose geopolitical understandings of space; instead, the focus stays only on textually constructed meanings of space as the conscious expression of the method of domination of some elite. Even by postmodern standards, the dismissal of some sort of material underpinnings for geopolitical discourse puts Critical Geopolitics at the risk of an infinite regression of socially constructed meanings (including its own); this stale “textuality” has drawn criticism even from prominent post-Marxists in the field of Political Geography (see, e.g., Har vey, 1990). See also a relevant discussion in Müller & Reuber (2008, pp. 461–464).

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

49

Despite this criticism, the field of Geopolitics is greatly indebted to the contribution of critical approaches in pioneering the linguistic line of enquiry. However, the overall impression one gets from the methodological inconsistencies and the moralization of the field is that this kind of criticism is losing impetus and enthusiasm. Therefore, the debate on the application of discourse analysis and textual deconstruction in Geopolitics should move beyond business as usual. Elsewhere, the argument has been made that, despite their differences, Critical and Classical Geopolitics may in fact complement each other, and that combined they have the potential to explain fully the role of spatiality in international politics (Kelly, 2006, p. 50). The theoretical framework is not going to invest in this well-intentioned optimism. Instead, it will join recent efforts to redefine and reframe the study of world politics by examining the interplay between geography, power, and global dynamics from an interdisciplinary perspective that moves further away from postmodern and critical epistemologies (Criekemans, 2022). Instead, in the next sections this study discusses how the literature of Geopolitics stands to gain from engaging with the growing literature on myth and its role in the political process. Myth is understood here as a discursive device for creating timeless patterns of social and individual behavior that gives a sense of meaning and direction to human societies. Consequently, political myth functions as a dramatic narrative that creates models of political behavior. This study proposes the concept of geopolitical myth as a narrative with distinct geographical connotations and terminology, which has the added function of placing and directing a nation or a country and its people on the world map. The overall ambition is to develop an analytical framework—or at least some of its opening principles—for examining these cases of geopolitical mythmaking. This is what hereafter is termed Analytical Geopolitics: an inquiry that aims to break down geopolitical myths into their constitutive elements and examine their function in the political process. If the critique of Critical Geopolitics is valid, then the field needs to move toward a different mode of inquiry, to revitalize its research agenda and become more practical. For this to happen, the field needs to make a number of conscious epistemological shifts. These include a shift from text and discourse to the concept of geopolitical myth; a shift from deconstructing geopo litical theories and texts to understanding how they create behavioral patterns, how they mobilize the public and legitimize policies; in other words, a shift from morality and a critical-political agenda to a positivist-pragmatist stance, not dealing in true/false evaluations or material/ideational debates, but rather with the “real” effects of myths on strategic and other political decisions.

50 2

CHAPTER 2

From Critical to Analytical Geopolitics

2.1 Myth and Political Myth The study of myth appeared in the field of cultural anthropology and was concerned with the narrative forms of stories, fairy tales, legends, and folklore in human societies and cultures. Classical mythologists such as Edith Hamilton and James George Frazer compiled massive anthologies of myths from various cultures in order to examine their form and erect taxonomies of myths according to their structural similarities and differences (Hamilton, 2013; Frazer, 2009). Their momentous efforts did not offer an explicit definition of myth, but they did facilitate the classification of a story as myth by assessing its structural correspondence to this or that category. Instead of focusing on the structural categorization of myths like Hamilton and Frazer, later mythologists examined the role of myths in the development of human cultures and societies—they examined myth not according to its narrative form but in terms of its function in a society. Branislaw Malinowski understood myths as enabling the members of a culture to engage in a specified desirable activity, as a written or spoken social convention or, as he put it, a “charter for social action” that explains to people how to live (Malinowski & Redfield, 2015). More specifically, Malinowski reasoned that myth “expresses, enhances and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man [ …​ ] It is not an idle tale, but a hard-worked active force; [ … ​] a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom” (Malinowski, 2011, p. 23). Similarly, Eliade (2009) argued that the principal function of myth is to establish examples to follow and imitate, a model of behavior upon which societies shape the values and ideals of individual and social performance. Not unlike certain religions, with their symbolical explanations of moral code, myth is always illustrative of morally acceptable or otherwise desirable behavior, so much so that, according to Radin, this illustrative theme “often is so completely dominant that everything else becomes subordinated to it …” (Radin, 1950, p. 370). In other words, “function over form,” and here Radin’s observation is yet again very suggestive of the expedient nature of myth, which is to capture and preserve a pattern of individual and social behavior. Claude Lévi-Strauss, another key mythologist, also stressed this function of myths as capturing and preserving in time a behavioral pattern. In particular, Lévi-Strauss invoked a powerful image of myths as “instruments for the oblit eration of time” that, like music, denote a “synchronic totality” that freezes the passing of time and results in a “kind of immortality” (Lvi-Strauss , 1996, p. 16). What Lévi-Strauss means with this eloquent analogy, it seems, is that

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

51

when it comes to music and myth, external time or historical time is quite irrelevant. All that matters is the internal sequence of notes and events, which, given the right qualities (e.g., the evocation of powerful emotions, which we will discuss in a later section), can transcend temporal boundaries. Elsewhere he explains that “a myth always refers to events alleged to have taken place long ago. But what gives myth an operational value is that the specific pattern described is timeless; it explains the present and the past as well as the future” (Lévi-Strauss, 1979, p. 85). Here again, the principal function of myths is to enable a social code of conduct to transcend time, to preserve and perpetuate or, borrowing from Lévi-Strauss’s eloquence, to “immortalize” patterns of thought and behavior. Linked to this immortalization of patterns of thought and behavior, there is another function of myths according to Lévi-Strauss, one that also has an effect on their narrative form. As an anthropologist, Lévi-Strauss was concerned with human nature and the development of culture and society. He saw human nature as operating with a set of basic antinomies or dualities, that is, good/ bad, light/darkness, heaven/hell, and he was convinced that these dualities also appear in myths. And in this respect, the function of myths is to use symbolism in order to mediate these dualities and help the members of a culture to overcome them, to choose sides, to follow the right way (Lévi-Strauss, 1984). This aspect of myth hints as well at their potential to create meaning in a society or culture. In terms of the function of myths as a source or a channel of meaning, LéviStrauss believed that systematic relations determined the meaning of myths and/or the parts of myths. In other words, a myth is not a fixed, immovable object but a network of statements, stories, and interconnected narratives. Lévi-Strauss described this property of myth as a “web of signification” and with the analogy of a good handyman or a bricoleur, who stitches or sews together little pieces to produce a whole. A myth is usually a collection of disparate, fragmented elements of culture, apparently disparate but fused together to form a coherent picture. In this picture, the tiniest details, however gratuitous, bizarre, and even absurd they may have seemed at the beginning, acquire both meaning and function (Lévi-Strauss, 1971, p. 562). In sum, although there is no explicit universal definition of myth, there is indeed an “implicit consensus in the way that the concept of myth is used” (Baeten, 1996, p. 24). The functional understanding of myth, instead of centering on the narrative form of stories, tales, and folklore, focuses on myth as a discursive device for creating timeless patterns of social and individual behav ior that give a sense of meaning and direction to human societies. Myths are “lenses” through which we view the world (Bennett, 1980) or, in other words,

52

CHAPTER 2

“cognitive schemata,” social frameworks for “organizing and filtering procedure for the reception of new information, be it the combination of sights and sounds into images of physical objects or the complex perception of social situations” (Flood, 2002, p. 81). A clarification is in order here: although it is easier to associate myths with primitive or ancient civilizations, mythmaking is also a feature of modern cultures and societies. It is not only the case that modern societies may re-enact a myth as a means of invoking the image of a long-lost mythical age, as Honko (1984) has correctly noted. Nor is it only the case (deplorable for some, such as Barthes (Barthes & Lavers, 2000)) that contemporary ideologies still create myths or that that magical and religious symbols still mystify modern popular culture. Rather, the work of mythmaking is an underlying pattern of human society and culture that transcends time-specific and ideological contexts. In his Work on Myth, for example, Blumenberg claims that myth is an answer to a very human problem, that of coping with a rather complex, intimidating, and ultimately unpleasant reality where the possibilities are endless and the meaning of life, the reason for being, is elusive. This is an existential angst that a simple, meaningful narrative can alleviate. And mythmaking is to some extent a quest for meaning and significance (Blumenberg, 2010; see also Jun & Kerényi, 1963).10 As Sabine and Thorson put it, “it is the mark of a modern mind to be able to explicitly create a ‘myth’ as a way of influencing others” (Sabine & Thorson, 1973, p. 14). Henry Tudor (1973, p. 14) also claimed that “political myths are [ … ​] a feature of advanced societies.” Therefore, myths should be considered not as the cultural product of a primitive, immature, or infantile humanity, but as a constant and “socially significant product of humanity’s irrepressible urge to construct meaning” (von Handy, 2002, p. 333). By and large, social organizations use myths in narrative form in order to explain their origins, mission, or reason for being and to provide a sense of belonging to their members (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Nation-states, as social organizations themselves, also draw from their past, their collective memory, to form national narratives and shape their identities with their view set on their common future (Bell, 2003). In this sense, being political lies at the heart of mythmaking. Already at the beginning of the 20th century, in a controversial exaltation of myth and violence, the French political philosopher Georges Sorel cap tured the essence of myth as a powerful political instrument—in his case, an instrument that could push for revolution and social change (Sorel & Jennings, The concept of significance is also used by Bottici (2010, p. 123).

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

53

2009, p. 28). Similarly, but from the exact opposite side, the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer denounced the political uses of myth by the state to incite hate and violence (Cassirer, 2013). Sorel was reflecting on the possibility of a social awakening that could unite the proletariat in a general strike that could overthrow the bourgeoisie. Cassirer was trying to understand the intellectual origins of Nazism in Germany and how it managed to mobilize the masses to commit horrible crimes. Sorel thought that myth could be a force for good. Cassirer saw myth as a dangerous tendency of human society that needed to be kept in check. But they both considered myth as essentially opposite to reason. This diametric opposition between Mythos and Logos lies at the root of an intellectual debate that spans the period from antiquity to the Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution to the contemporary uses of myth.11 From Plato to Cassirer, myth was and still is seen as an irrational belief, a deplorable trick of nationalists, a political—and academic too—taboo. A casual look through newspapers, magazines, and social media timelines will yield articles that refer to “the top ten myths about abortion” or “the myth of losing fat fast,” articles that dispel and debunk myths. Casual usage reveals a public image of myth as falsehood, caricature, or fantasy (Baeten, 1996, pp. 35–36). In the academy, Cassirer’s intellectual heritage of myth as the enemy of truth and history continues to this day in the works of scholars such as Vladimir Tismaneanu, who sees myths as “sets of beliefs whose foundations transcend logic” and are immune to empirical facts (Tismaneanu, 2009, pp. 9–10; see also Steiner, 1990, pp. 8–9), so much so that they have the power to displace reality (Tismaneanu, 2009, p. 27). Elsewhere, John Girling understands myth as a possible “reaction” to the “‘sterile’ rationality of politics, economics and law” (Raymond, 1995, p. 1). Ideological abuses of myth also feature prominently in the work of Christopher Flood (2002). There is also, however, a growing interest in myth that eschews the casual pejorative definitions of political myth and the clear-cut distinctions of myth versus reason, fiction versus reality, and truth versus fantasy. “Myth and history, in a very special sense, are interdependent,” wrote Peter Munz as far back as 1956 (p. 1). “They fertilize each other; and it is doubtful whether one could exist without the other.” Historians, he claimed, tend to claim that everything they do not believe is a myth, and “they aim at replacing human phantashy [sic], mythology, by the products of historical research, history” (Munz, 1956, p. 1). For Bottici and Challand (2012, p. 23), these distinc tions may even sometimes represent an ideological trap. For Baeten (1996, p. 37), they reveal a natural human tendency to label as myth everything that For a full discussion of the intellectual origins and historical development of this debate, see Bottici (2010) and Flood (2002).

54

CHAPTER 2

is “other”—something that “belongs to some other culture, some other time, some other cosmology.” In the same vein, Della Salla (2010, p. 5) argues that political myths “have some grain of truth in them,” that they are “born in facts, but then they take on a life of their own in the hands of storytellers and listeners.” In his “Defence of Nationalism,” David Archard (1995) claims that not all national myths are dangerous and that surviving political myths may also be linked to facts or be based on reality. Most importantly, however, and regardless of its relation to reality, political myth is a valid and topical subject for political science and history because it can shape beliefs, inspire and mobilize the public, and influence the political process. So, after all, what is a political myth? First and foremost, the most distinguishing feature of the political myth is its subject matter, which needs to relate to politics, a political action or decision (Tudor, 1973, pp. 16–17). With this in mind, following the functional definition of myth, a political myth is a dramatic narrative that creates models of political behavior and identity. If a myth models individual or social behavior in everyday or heroic contexts, then a political myth represents a society’s political behavior under normal or desperate circumstances. And if a myth is narrated in search of a meaning of life, significance, and a society’s reason for being, then a political myth usually gives meaning and direction to a nation or any other polity. So what does this have to do with Geopolitics? 2.2 Political Myth, ir, and Geopolitics The concept of political myth and its analysis has recently featured also in the study of International Relations. Nevertheless, the vast majority of IR scholars working with myth focus on the analysis of the discipline itself and more specifically on how the study of IR has been grounded on myths concerning its analytical concepts (e.g., the concept of anarchy and the balance of power), its theoretical traditions (mostly realism and neorealism), significant historical events (e.g., the Yalta conference), and world history in general. By and large, this literature falls under the broad categories of postmodern and, more specifically, post-structuralist approaches. From their critical standpoint, the IR discipline itself is based on political interpretations of history (Buffet & Heu ser, 1998), and theories are almost always a collection of myths that serve as axiomatic truths (Weber, 2014). Accordingly, the application of myth in has often been an attempt to expose the notions of sovereignty and the Westphalian Treaty as the mythical origins of the modern international system (Teschke, 2003; Osiander, 2001); to expose the mythical status of the end of World War for the First Great Debate (Carvalho et al., 2015; Wilson, 1998); to reveal the artificiality and mythical

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

55

function of the concept of the balance of power in the thought of classical IR scholars (Little, 2009); or to uncover the Eurocentric mythology of IR (Hobson, 2012). In general, the concept of myth in IR has been used as “untruths” that serve as either a “powerful paradigmatic narrative or a deeply engrained commonly held belief” (Bliesemann, 2016, p. 1). Therefore, their application of the myth concept to IR has been “mostly reduced to a ‘myth-busting’ or ‘uncovering’ role of sorts” (Bliesemann, 2016, p. 15). Apart from myth, the concept of narrative has also been employed in order to study the practice of storytelling on politics and international affairs. Yet another “turn” in social science, the “narrative turn,” deals with narratives as “basic forms of social life” (Czarniawska, 2005, pp. 1–3). Narratives, then, are also crucial in politics as they can express political identities as well as impact our very understanding of reality (Shenhav, 2006). As a result, narratives can be a sort of lens through which we view the world or raw data of an external reality, but they can also be instrumentally used to bring about political violence and social change (Graef & Lemay-Hebert, 2018). In other words, much like myths, narratives can allegedly be abused for political ends, in a way that they displace facts and logic and replace them with emotion and pathos (Patterson & Monroe, 1998; Polletta & Callahan, 2017). In this sense, narratives are only a mode of communication, and their usage represents the motivation, agenda, and strategic objectives of their user. Along the same lines, strategic narratives work as “means and methods of persuasion and influence” that states use (in a complex media setting) to sway target audiences (Miskimmon et al., 2014). The approach of myth as inherently false, of narrative as a dubious political instrument of influence and power, and the attempt to expose this falseness or instrumentalization bears a substantial resemblance to the deconstruction of geopolitical theories from critical approaches. This is a view of myth and narrative as something detached from a material reality, an artificial construct that needs to be exposed and uncovered. However, there is another path that leads to myth, narrative, and storytelling in IR, and it passes through a more functional definition of myth and more specifically its psychological function for individuals and nation-states alike. Writing about the most profound level of human experience and psychology, the comparative mythologist Joseph Campbell claimed that myths in general have the potential to “to bring the human order into accord with the celestial [ … ​] The myths and rites constitute a mesocosm—a mediating, middle cosmos through which the microcosm of the individual is brought into relation to the macrocosm of the all” (Campbell, 2011, p. 150). This function starts from a more reflective, philosophical understanding of myth that interacts with core char acteristics of a people, a country, a nation-state.

56

CHAPTER 2

From this angle, and drawing influence from Blumenberg (2010), Chiara Bottici (2010) argues that political myths respond to a deeper need for significance (see also Bottici & Challand, 2012, 2014). For Blumenberg and Bottici, significance is the essential need of the human consciousness—both individual and social—not only to create meaning about the world and our existence, but also to create such a meaning in a way that the world will feel less indifferent to our being. Significance means to “have a place” in a vast and indifferent world. Significance is not teleology, nor an ultimate meaning in religious terms, but a sense of purpose and of belonging, a sense of orientation and place. In this philosophical context, political myth seems almost to be an existential introspection, a collective “soul searching.” As such, it also reveals a psychological dimension of myth that speaks to the nature of the state and its relations with other states. This psychological dimension—the need for significance, meaning, and purpose in the world—bonds well with the concept of “ontological security,” which borrows analytical terms from psychiatry and political psychology to apply them to international relations. In The Divided Self, R. D. Laing (2010, pp. 41–42) refers to ontological security as the condition in which a man may have a sense of his presence in the world as a real, alive, whole, and, in a temporal sense, a continuous person. Such a basically ontologically secure person will encounter all the hazards of life [ … ​] from a centrally firm sense of his own and other people’s reality and identity. The individual, then, may experience his own being as [ … ​] as a continuum in time; as having an inner consistency, substantiality, genuineness, and worth [ … ​] He thus has a firm core of ontological security. Psychiatry, political psychology, and international relations are not complete strangers, of course. In particular, a body of literature has used the concept of ontological security in order to explain perceptions of threat and state behavior (see, e.g., Huysmans, 1998; Mitzen, 2006a, 2006b; Steele, 2014; Chernobrov, 2016; Rumelili, 2016). Ontological security has also been discussed in con nection with the concept of myth (Della Sala, 2016). This makes much sense, because the connection between the concept of ontological security and the function of myth as grounding the significance of the individual and the social community could not be more obvious from the above extract. First and foremost, Laing’s “substantiality, genuineness and worth” speaks also to the society’s need for significance, meaning, and purpose in the world. His concern with a person’s “inner consistency” and temporal continuity also

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

57

corresponds to another function of myth, namely Cassirer’s “operational value” of “timeless patterns,” or its “timeless message” according to Della Salla (2010, p. 9). According to Blumenberg (2010, p. 34), myths are “stories that are distinguished by a high degree of constancy in their narrative core and by an equally pronounced capacity for marginal variation.” And this is because, “in light of the continual change in their present conditions [ … ​] human beings are impelled to go back to their political narratives [and] revise them” (Bottici, 2010, p. 187), or because the very “sense of self” depends on the thinking subject’s ability to “keep the narrative going” (Giddens, 1991, p. 37). In any case, internal consistency and adaptability create the sense of a myth’s timelessness and in this way contribute to Laing’s ontologically secure, “whole,” and “continuous” person—community, society, nation. So, talking about myths of the nation-state in particular, they may also involve emotive elements that generate feelings of belonging, sense of place, and, we could say, strategic attachment. Indeed, there is growing attention to the central role that emotions play in world politics. The modern study of neurophysiology suggests that identity or consciousness and sense of being are both intrinsically linked to emotion (a somatic and by extension very material experience). In other words, identity is the consciousness of the feeling, experiencing self (see Damasio, 2008, 2012, 2018). Thinking that emotions are politically consequential has made the study of emotions a rapidly growing field in IR (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014). Private and individual, as well as collective and political, emotions become embedded in institutions, and thus, as much as characterizing private reactions to external phenomena, emotions structure the social world (Crawford, 2000). To the extent that they encompass feelings that structure relations within and between groups in international politics, emotions, especially shared emotions, go hand in hand with identity (Mercer, 2014). Feelings, emotions, and national identity in Geopolitics are also what Gertjan Dijkink (1996) touches upon in National identity and geopolitical visions. In nine country-specific essays, Dijkink explores whether there is continuity in national values and foreign policy, and how such geopolitical visions are shaped by national and international events. His concept of a geopolitical vision is an ensemble of “ideas concerning the relation between one’s own and other places, involving feelings of (in) security or (dis) advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy” (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11). A geopolitical vision is a spatial interpretation of national identity on the world map that has “at least a them-and-us distinction and emotional attach ment to a place” (Dijkink, 1996, p. 11). Dijkink’s typology of geopolitical visions identifies the following constituent elements: a claim on the naturalness of

58

CHAPTER 2

territorial borders; geopolitical assumptions about interests, threats, and responses; other countries as a model to follow or to reject; a national mission; and an impersonal (even divine) force. Moreover, John Agnew’s (1987) definition of the concept of place in Political Geography establishes a connection between emotions and feelings on the one hand and identity and consciousness on the other. Agnew suggests that places consist of three interrelated components: location, locale, and sense of place. Location is connected with material properties of the place, whereas locale refers to the institutions that mediate social life and politics in a place. The third component, however, the sense of place, is ultimately a function of peoples’ identity. In other words, the sense of place is a collective identity tied to a place. This collective identity can include a feeling of belonging, an attachment to a place, which provides a grounding sense of certainty and a feeling of location in a world that is otherwise characterized by recurrent change (Campbell, 1992). The point here is that feelings of belonging, emotional attachments to a place, location and purpose in the world, may find a perfect medium of delivery in political myths. Examining the complex dynamics between geographical locations, identities, and material factors in shaping geopolitical processes is crucial in understanding geography’s impact on political behavior and decision-making (Nestoras, 2001). In the same vein, both Carl J. Friedrich (1963, p. 97) and Anthony Smith (2009) stress the emotional load that myths can deliver in politics and that accompanies the “cold rationality of reason of state” (Friedrich, 1963, p. 97). Channeled through politics, myths can provide cohesion and unity to human communities such as the nation-state (Schöpflin & Hosking, 2013; Nancy, 2012). Politics, as a struggle for the power to influence the direction of a community, is by default a good conduit for opposition between competing beliefs, ideologies, and myths. Political forces that compete for power and, thus, for the capacity to direct the foreign policy and strategy of a state may be driven and legitimized by different perceptions of space and geography, different readings of the world map. Of course, the premise here is that the actual location of the state and what people think about their place in the world in relation to other places are shrouded in political controversy and open to interpretation. Conceivably, then, mythmaking is an intrinsic property of political competi tion and therefore different understandings of our significance, of our sense of purpose and belonging, of “our place in the world,” can create sharp divisions in politics. In this respect, it makes much sense to speak about myths and geopolitics, especially if the latter is also understood as the opposition between political

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

59

forces with differing geographical imaginations. Accordingly, mythmaking in geopolitics refers to a gathering of narratives, stories, and statements concerning the geographic location of the state. In turn, and once more following the functional definitions of myth, a geopolitical myth is defined by its function and subject matter: it is a dramatic narrative with distinct geographical terms or connotations, which generates an emotional attachment to a territory, a sense of place, a feeling of belonging, or a sense of orientation and direction on the world map. In turn, these geopolitical myths lend legitimacy to specific patterns of strategic behavior. Geopolitical myths can be intrinsic to strategic behavior and foreign policy, but at no point should they be understood as grand schemes of history that represent the progress of a society or a state toward a desired position. A geopolitical myth is not the result of a necessary or inevitable historical trajectory. The historical emergence and development of a geopolitical myth should not be a history of how a state finds its rightful place in the world. Yet it is possible that the geopolitical profile of a nation-state is shot through with a particular myth that emerged historically. Therefore, the geopolitical literature could move closer to an inquiry that aims to analyze geopolitical myths, their forms, their function, their constitutive variations, and their footprint on the political process. 2.3 Toward an Analytical Geopolitics Analytical Geopolitics should serve as a method of examining geopolitical myths through analysis of the key narratives, storylines, and statements in which they are expressed. Geopolitical myths cannot be immediately defined in simple terms as, for example, a singular statement. Instead they are complex systems that are expressed over time, in multiple formats and contexts. A geopolitical myth such as Greece belongs to the West or Europe is a global actor is not intelligible (what does it mean?) unless we reduce it to simpler terms, unless we break it down into its constituent concepts and propositions, unless we explain its deep internal structure, which has evolved historically. Therefore, Analytical Geopolitics should aim at discovering the key constituents of geopolitical myths (narratives, storylines, and statements) and the manner in which these constituents relate to each other. As discussed earlier, for Geopolitics to move in the direction of an Analytical Geopolitics, it needs to make a number of conscious ontological and epis temological shifts. The first of these is to move beyond the materialist/idealist debate in Geopolitics. The intricate relationship between politics and geography is implicit in domestic politics and international relations. This relationship may be obvious

60

CHAPTER 2

beyond demonstration; what is more puzzling and contentious, enigmatic even, is the sociopolitical process that mediates it. Is geography an external reality that contains, limits, and determines political decisions? Or is power, applied in specific ways, responsible for the social construction of geography, a discourse that confines political actions? Classical Geopolitics acknowledges space as a material container of politics. Geography is thus an independent variable that determines the power, the character, and the behavior of the state. Critical Geopolitics understands space as a social construction imposed on society by privileged, powerful actors. Geography, then, is only what people make of it. Despite their differences, classical and Critical Geopolitics adhere to common, implicit “rules of engagement,” without which their confrontation would not have been possible. Their confrontation becomes possible only by an implicit acceptance of the assumption that our perception of space should be evaluated on the basis of its correspondence to an external reality. Classical Geopolitics makes statements that claim to represent physical geography and the limitations or opportunities that it causes for the states that exist within it. Critical Geopolitics looks to refute these claims as false, misguided, or politicized—basically to prove that Geopolitics is an entirely discursive practice, which misrepresents geography by default. With every deconstruction, Critical Geopolitics advances its own claims and interpretations, which are not necessarily truer but are at least (critical scholars claim) better, fairer, and more ethical. In this way, the duality of politics and geography (which lies at the heart of the Classical Geopolitics enterprise) and the will to represent it, its will to knowledge and truth, is never deconstructed; it is merely reversed. Simply put, everything would be easier if we could tell where the external world (i.e., actual geography) “ends” and where the observer’s mind (i.e., geographical imagination) “begins.” Classical thinkers make the positivist argument that geography is inescapable, immutable, because its parameters and features can be measured and compared, and therefore it is valid to look for regularities, dependent and independent variables, and law-like forms. In contrast, critical scholars choose the exact opposite, interpretive stance that claims that geography is only what people make of it, and that nothing—at least nothing meaningful—exists independent of their thinking. This divide is largely irreconcilable, but it is possible and meaningful to move beyond it. The problem in this ontological divide is that the material and the ideational properties of geography seem to be indistinguishable from one another. In line with an emerging literature on New Materialism that comes as a reac tion to both positivist/empiricist essentialism and the inherent relativism of

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

61

postmodern social constructivism, matter and meaning, material conditions and mental representations, cannot be understood separately, and a material reality is at all times co-constructing the social world.12 However, matter here “does not refer to an inherent, fixed property of abstract, independently existing objects” (the essentialist concept) but rather “to phenomena in their ongoing materialization” (Barad, 2007, p. 151). In other words, human imaginations, representations, and their social constructs are not independent of the environment, and material objects (such as geographical features, in the case of Geopolitics) can be considered active elements—Latour (2005, p. 54) refers to these objects as “actants”—of the production process of social constructs and the social world in general. This co-constitution of the social by both material conditions and mental processes in the human mind can be framed within the meta-theoretical, philosophical stance of critical realism in order to help geopolitical analysis move beyond the material/ideational and positivist/interpretivist divides. Critical realism is not a research project, a methodology, or a theory, but a philosophy of science that can inform both positivist-empirical and critical-interpretative approaches in social science.13 (Despite its diversity, critical realism does exhibit certain common traits or “general trends” that make up a distinct philosophical stance (Price & Martin, 2018, p. 89)). The world we study in social sciences—the social world—may be based on the natural world, but it is not reducible to facts and measurements taken from the natural world, in the same way that biological organisms are dependent on chemical reactions but are not reducible to them.14 The implication of this is that many important features of the social world may not be easily verifiable and quantifiable, at least not in a way that warrants or supports theories, models, or other law-like forms that establish linear cause–effect explanations of social phenomena. Therefore, critical realism allows some space for human beliefs, values, and contexts to be present and play a role in our knowledge or understanding of reality. In other words, critical realism allows room for interpretations of reality. This does not mean, however, that social science does not have anything meaningful to say about the world or that knowledge of the social world is impossible. Indeed, there is an external world that has an objective ontology, 12 13

14

For an introduction, see Coole & Frost (2010). The philosophy of social science that is called critical realism is attributed mostly to the work of Roy Bhaskar during the late 1970s. See in particular Bhaskar (1975, 1979). Other scholars associated with critical realism include Archer (1995), Steinmetz (1998), Sayer (2000), and Vandenberghe (2015). This is Roy Bhaskar’s argument of the “stratification” of nature that supports a “transcen dental realism”; see Collier (1994).

62

CHAPTER 2

and our understanding of and our attempts to systematically record and explain this ontology is rather limited by our own nature as observers. Nevertheless, claims about reality may be justified even if or despite the fact that they are historically situated and laden with beliefs and values. To sum up, critical realism is a mix of realist ontology (i.e., there is an objective reality that can be known) with a relative epistemology (i.e., there are limits to our knowledge of this external reality) and a critical spirit that does not relativize the whole field (i.e., knowing our limits, we can still justify our knowledge). A range of IR scholars have recently drawn from this critical realist mix in order to clarify the philosophical underpinnings of IR and open up new paths of inquiry (Jackson, 2016); problematize and reconceptualize centerpiece IR notions such as state power (Jessop, 2007); rethink core ontological elements of IR investigations such as agency, structure, and causation (Kurki, 2008; Wight, 2008); or examine the sociological implications of IR study objects such as international organizations (Joseph, 2014). It seems that in IR, critical realism can be helpful in lessening the tension between postpositivists (e.g., neorealism–neoliberalism) and postmodern interpretivists (e.g., constructivism). In Geopolitics we are yet to see a similar philosophical movement. Nevertheless, in the context of the material/ideational and positivist/interpretivist divides, as discussed previously, critical realism does seem to offer a way forward. Geopolitics (and the “practice of geopolitics”) relies on certain broad beliefs and on situated preconceptions of the observer about the nature of geography that inform their investigations. Instead of ignoring the beliefs and the situation of the observer or fatally accepting them as a condition that renders geopolitical inquiry impossible, it might be possible to critically approach them while claiming a certain knowledge of the geopolitical condition of the world. The ambition of Analytical Geopolitics proposed in this study is exactly that: to combine explanatory and interpretive accounts of Geopolitics as a historical inquiry into geopolitical artifacts that affect political action—an inquiry that looks for patterns of behavior as well as for the facts, events, and mental representations (and the complex relationship between them) that cause these patterns. Consequently, the second shift toward Analytical Geopolitics involves the understanding of myths as geopolitical artifacts exactly because myths constitute an interface between material features, events, and representations of geography. As already discussed, myths are neither true nor false; they are low-resolution representations of a historical event or a general external situ ation, but they are laden with facts and data from the external world. Myths

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

63

are therefore in a unique position to encapsulate both material and mental dimensions of geography, both the explanatory and interpretive elements of a geographical reality. Instead of deconstructing texts, Geopolitics should be decomposing myths into their constitutive narratives and storylines. Instead of exposing their artificiality, it should be investigating the internal logic and structure that gives them their power. This also means that the artificiality of geopolitical myths is irrelevant to the motivation of the author or the speaking subject in general. Instead of focusing on explaining the motives of individuals, groups, and foreign policy establishments, Analytical Geopolitics takes on the notion of myth as a neutral object of study. This neutrality implies not that there are no hidden intentions, agendas, and ideologies, but that these should not be matters of concern. Looking at the continuity, intertextuality, and adaptability of geopolitical myths, their real power does not lie with the people that use them; it lies hidden under layers of repetitions through texts and speeches of different authors. After all, this could be a problem of what came first, the chicken or the egg? How can we know whether the use of a geopolitical myth by some intellectual of statecraft reveals his or her interests, or whether this myth in some of its preceding variations shaped the interests, intentions, and worldview of the said intellectual? For Analytical Geopolitics, myths, no matter how expedient for certain political agendas, are not the ideological product of a social class, a group, or a state, nor can they be equated with an ideology or practice such as imperialism or colonialism. For sure, as Henry Tudor claimed, every political myth has an ultimate purpose, as they are rarely if ever used for their aesthetic value, but this purpose should not “detain us long” because a myth “may well be used for one purpose at one time and for a different purpose on another [ … ​] both can be real, and this is because the purpose of a myth depends entirely on the circumstances in which it is told and the intention of the man who tells it” (Tudor, 1973, pp. 73–79). If we reduce complex geopolitical myths to their simpler constituent narratives, we will end up with a few irreducible or non-verifiable propositions. In other words, there can exist multiple understandings of space, multiple geopo litical representations and statements, but Analytical Geopolitics should not make true or false claims about myths and question their veracity. What we need to ask instead is whether the myth, the narrative, the story creates a real political effect, between the storyteller, the listener, the broader society and its political processes. A myth that survives over time is one that continues to transmit “a message that captures and shapes the normative and cognitive

64

CHAPTER 2

frames of a political community” (Della Sala, 2016, p. 530). Therefore, what Analytical Geopolitics can and should do is to examine the effect of these messages on politics and society at large. The third shift consequently refers to the revision of the critical agenda of Geopolitics, in line with a Latourian idea of moving from “matters of facts to matters of concern” (Latour, 2004). The view of truth as something external to the social world, something irrelevant, something that belongs to a metaphysical order of things that cannot be analyzed does not mean that Analytical Geopolitics is meaningless. After all, we can still examine the impact of religious beliefs on society, for example, without having to answer the fundamental question concerning the existence of God. In the social world, the real is anything that is a source of legitimacy for action, a trigger for an outcome, anything that has a real observable effect. Leaning on critical theory, Geopolitics has focused recently on condemning politicians, intellectuals, and society at large for abusing geography for their own political purposes. Although Critical Geopolitics questions the principles on which geopolitics—as a practice of statecraft—is based, it offers alternative readings of the world that advance its own claims to truth and its own political agenda. This critique appears to position itself as an alternative interpretation, coming from an observer with good intentions and superior insight on the world, but it rests on its own set of beliefs and biases—such is the fate of every interpretative effort (see, e.g., Gadamer, 2014; Schleiermacher, 1998). In this social critique, the deconstruction of geopolitical texts is of paramount importance. There is no objective material reality worth speaking of; there is only our own imagination subordinated to ideological agendas. Hence, Analytical Geopolitics is different from critical approaches in the sense that it is not aiming to expose the artificiality of a geopolitical myth as a reflection of power relations or an instrument in the service of a hidden immoral agenda—while at the same time it does not offer an alternative interpretation of a possible reality. To put it simply, even if, for the sake of argument, we accept that there are no objective facts in geopolitical theories (or anywhere else for that matter), even if we accept that our view of the world, our maps, our borders, our strategy, like most of our intellectual artifacts are artificial constructs (they are, after all, produced by human beings), even if we accept all that, then these artificial constructs take on a life of their own, sometimes irrespective of the intentions and the agendas of their creators, and they leave a significant foot print on our political processes. But why and how does that happen? Why does an obvious social construct, such as a geopolitical myth, become so embedded in public consciousness that it is accepted as common sense? Where does its truthiness come from? What forms does it take? What is the deep structure of

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

65

a geopolitical myth that allows it to transcend time and context and achieve such levels of consistency and adaptability? What is its function in the political discourse, and most of all, how does it overcome competition from rival myths and narratives to achieve a sacred status as an apparent truth that frames and generates legitimacy for specific decisions and policies? These are the questions we should be asking when thinking about revitalizing geopolitical inquiry. Analytical Geopolitics can be an analysis of the artificiality of geopolitical myths with an emphasis on the effect of this artificiality on politics. What that means in practice is that Analytical Geopolitics is a pragmatist approach in the way that it prefers to study the level of the real and insists on “the cultivation of a stubbornly realist attitude—to speak like William James—but a realism dealing with [ … ​] matters of concern, not matters of fact.”15 This is a pragmatic shift from ontology to agency, which is still in line with a new materialist way of thinking (minus the political activism) about matter as a “thing/power” actor, stripped of essentialist features, but full of an agential power to act and influence political processes (see Bennett, 2004). In this sense, research should be concerned with studying not what matter is but what it does.16 Even if the issue were finally settled (which it is not) and we accepted that there are no objective facts in our social world, there would be plenty of matters that should concern us instead, and which, regardless of their correspondence to an external reality, would still have a very real effect on the political process. So far, this section has discussed three ontological and epistemological shifts to consider in paving the way for a future research agenda (for a full overview, see Table 2). The first is the engagement with the meta-theory of critical realism that can break the deadlock between both materialist/idealist and positivist/interpretist approaches; this would have an overall benefit in the aims and the methods of geopolitical analysis. The second shift is the move from deconstructing texts, exposing motives, and reconstructing meaning toward the analysis of geopolitical myths, meaning the analysis of the key narratives and storylines in which geopolitical myths are expressed. In other words, it is the decomposition of myths into their constituent parts and the investigation of their relations with each other that affects and legitimizes political action. Myth is an object of study that 15

The emphasis was originally given by Latour (2004, p. 231). For classical pragmatism, see, for example, James (1995). For the continuing relevance of pragmatism in the contempo rary debate, see Putnam (1996) and Kloppenberg (1996). For an elaborated New Materialist approach to social research, see Fox & Alldred (2017, pp. 151–175).

66

CHAPTER 2

Table 2  Overview of classical, critical, and analytical geopolitics

Classical geopolitics Critical geopolitics Analytical geopolitics Space/power

Space as a container of politics

Materialism vs. Idealism View of geopolitics

Materialist

Strategy in terms of A practice of geography and power statecraft that politics establishes power structures

A process that legitimizes and calls for political action

Object of study

Implications of Geopolitical geography for politics theories and practitioners

Geopolitical myths and patterns of behavior

Method

Qualitative and quantitative survey— theoretical synthesis Motivation of Strategic actors considerations and objective interests

Power shaping spatial representations Idealist

Text deconstruction and discourse analysis Promotion of political orders and the interests or biases of ruling elites Critical theory

Philosophical Positivism stance Agenda Explain patterns/ recommend policies interpret/ emancipate society

Distinctive but impossible to separate Pragmatist

Analysis/ decomposition of geopolitical myths Secondary to the structure and function of geopolitical myths Critical realism Better understanding of complex space–power relationships

encapsulates both material and interpretive elements and acts as an interface for various other parameters (such as interests and identity). The third shift is a pragmatic turn in Geopolitics that involves an analytical focus on the face value of the myth, not on evaluating geopolitical theories based on their correspondence with an external reality. Geopolitical myths are neither true nor false, neither fiction nor reality, neither the necessary consequence of a material reality nor the distorted reflections of the human mind. They may be a social construct, but they are also laden with facts. Most

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

67

importantly, however, they are political devices, and as such they are a matter of concern for Analytical Geopolitics. This concern implies that our analysis should focus not on exposing their artificiality, but on how their form, constituent elements, and function give them the power to captivate different authors, express different times, adapt and persevere in the face of constantly changing contexts—ultimately, again, how they generate traction and legitimacy for specific strategic and foreign policy decisions. The study now describes in some detail what a method of Analytical Geopolitics might look like (see also Nestoras, 2022). 3

A Structural-Historical Method of Analysis

3.1 Geopolitical Myths as Structural Objects In analytical terms, a geopolitical myth is a structural object; it is structural because it is an assembly of constitutive elements (namely, narratives and stories, which will be discussed shortly) that make up a complex whole; and it is an object in so far as it is a material thing that can be read in printed texts, seen in maps, and spoken or heard of in speeches. In this respect, the geopolitical myth is an interface for physical geography and our perceptions of physical geography, a point where reality and perceptions intersect to produce a structural, material order of things. This order of geopolitical myths is separate, autonomous, and irreducible to its parts (reality and perception), but most importantly it also has the additional analytical benefit of being measurable and commensurable (a quality that its parts are lacking). A geopolitical myth is not an exact depiction of external reality in so much as it is not entirely a product of an ideological imagination. Rather, it is a device that fuses them to make them both suitable for political use—and this is the core of its analytical value for geopolitics and for politics in general. If mythmaking is a process that creates, transmits, and passes down mean ing, direction, and accepted behavioral norms from generation to generation, then a geopolitical myth has the distinctive feature of generating a sense of place for a society or a nation. It is a method with which societies transform external reality into a comprehensive rationale or a keen awareness of their place on the world map. At the core of this process generating a sense of place is a relational series of narratives and stories being told and retold, printed and reprinted, used and reused in political discourse. Being a structural object, a geopolitical myth does not hold a sublime or autonomous meaning in itself, but rather its meaning

68

CHAPTER 2

depends on specific narratives and stories, and in particular on the relationship between them. Statements such as “we belong to the West” or concepts such as the “heartland” make no sense without the key narratives and the specific stories that constitute them. Myths by themselves are nothing more than clichés, an incomprehensible gathering of innuendos; it is narratives and stories that organize and signify meaning inside a myth. A story is a specific account of past events or a report of contemporary developments. A geopolitical narrative is a collection of stories or a chronological series of events that signify a particular feature of the nature of a nation or a state, its location on the world map, or its relation to other places. The sequence of stories defines both the temporal and the spatial organization of the narrative, the cause-and-effect logic (i.e., the plot), and ultimately the overarching geopolitical consequences for the polity to which it refers. Stories are the fundamental building blocks of a myth, whereas the narrative is the order and manner in which these stories are presented to the reader. Within the narrative, collections of stories and reported events are organized in such a way as to reveal the geopolitical condition, character, or profile of the state. If a geopolitical myth is a set of narratives that in turn refer to a time series of stories, then this structural line of inquiry also needs to be historical. If a geopolitical myth is constituted also in time, then the first thing that Analytical Geopolitics needs to do is to substantiate its historical existence (continuity), record its marginal variations that allowed it to adapt to different contexts (adaptability), and identify its appearance in different texts, mediums, and formats (intertextuality). Continuity is understood here as being omnipresent throughout the history of the nation-state and especially at those critical junctions that defined its geopolitical behavior. Continuity can be evaluated based on the usage of a myth by political actors including intellectuals, politicians, bureaucracies, and the media in their debates concerning strategic policies and decisions. If substantiated by a historical investigation into the development and evolution of a geopolitical myth, it can account for the myth’s capacity to deliver a “timeless message.” A myth’s marginal variation or adaptability also works in the same way, by elevating the geopolitical myth above and beyond specific intellectual, ideological, and sociopolitical contexts. Finally, intertextuality should be understood as a property that increases the credibility of the myth—and hence increases its truthiness and acceptability. Similarly to how academic research builds authority by citing previous publications, a geopolitical myth gains credibility by referring to previous myth versions but also to past reitera tions of its constitutive narratives and stories. and intertextuality of the belonging myth confer with what Bouchard calls “piggybacking,” the quality of an efficient myth to “build on old,

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

69

well established myths and symbols so as to partake of their authority. ( … ​) To this end, the new myth is presented as a simple extension or a corollary of the latter. The strategy is particularly useful when proponents of radical changes seek to make them more palatable to dissenters by wrapping them in a veil of continuity” (Bouchard, 2016, p. 361). More importantly, however, it is necessary to notice the weighted significance and consequence of adaptability. Bouchard defines adaptability as the “capacity to live on through changing settings and challenges, thanks to a process of constant redefinition and renegotiation” (Bouchard, 2016, p. 361). He also enumerates two more qualities of myths, namely polysemy, that is, the capacity to have several meanings or to be ambiguous enough to harness consent from disparate social groups and audiences; and relevance, that is, the capacity to retain meaning regardless of a change in setting (Bouchard, 2016). What we are looking at, therefore, is a set of qualities that can make a myth successful enough to become sacred (Bouchard, 2007), rooted so deeply in what people consider to be common sense that any doubt about its truthiness is enough to shake the foundations of the polity or the policy for which it serves as the basis of its legitimacy (Bell, 2003). These qualities—the timeless message and the almost mystical origins; the adaptability that transcends historical, political, and ideological contexts; and the frame or reference—are what make the myth a source of legitimacy for the polity, the policy, the politician. To sum up, a geopolitical myth is a structural object constituted in narratives and stories and their relationship or arrangement in time. Accordingly, a structural-historical approach to analyzing geopolitical myths is necessary and predicated on evaluating the three core properties of myth, namely, continuity, adaptability, and intertextuality. Eventually this approach branches out into two lines of inquiry: one that deals with the types and forms of geopolitical myths, and another that deals with their function as instruments for legitimacy and mobilization for political action. 3.2 Types and Form of Geopolitical Myths A first line of inquiry will have to classify the types of geopolitical myths and analyze their form, meaning the relationship between their constitutive key narratives and storylines. This is an endeavor that will involve the accumula tion of raw data across countries and across time periods or both. With regard to their type, the specific aim should be to create comparative collections of geopolitical myths, whereas when it comes to form, the objective should be an in-depth historical analysis. Vincent Della Sala provides the best typology of political myths, which should also be useful in analyzing geopolitical myths (Della Sala, 2016). In terms of ranking, Della Sala distinguishes between primary derivative

70

CHAPTER 2

myths. Primary myths provide the basic justification and reason for being of a political community (Della Sala, 2016, p. 527).17 They are essentially stories of creation that explain the existence of the political community. They introduce the core principles, norms, and assumptions about the community in question and provide the basic rules for the formation and appearance of secondary or derivate myths. In turn, derivative myths are a bundle of other myths that provide ways to understand not only the reasons the group exists but also how and why it lives according to a certain normative map (Della Sala, 2016, p. 527). In terms of content, Della Sala also makes several distinctions between foundational myths, myths about the exceptionalism of a state, transformation myths, and myths about the state as a fortress (Della Sala, 2016, pp. 528–529). Foundational myths explain the creation of the state as having a deterministic, preordained, or teleological purpose (as a matter of destiny). Transformation myths are foundational myths that nevertheless trace the roots of the state to a groundbreaking or revolutionary change that caused a displacement of the old social and political order and created a new one—the new state. Redemption from old sins; an intellectual, philosophical, or political revolution; the dawn of a new national or class conscience—these are all possible elements of a transformation myth. Exceptionalism myths explain the virtues and the qualities that make a state unique and the mission that these unique features bestow on the state and its people. Finally, fortress myths describe the state as a place of safety and refuge that separates those who are inside (the people) from those who are outside (the Other). Geopolitical myths may combine several types and content from the above categories. Considering, however, that myths about the state also involve an emotional attachment to a place and that the state is necessarily a territorial unit, all myths about the state also include a significant geopolitical element. They tie the state to a territory, they naturalize the national borders, or in other terms they legitimate the state’s sovereignty over a particular geographical area. The aim of collecting, classifying, and chronicling geopolitical myths is also to understand how these myths use different combinations of types and content to enhance their legitimizing effect. When dealing with types of myths, Analytical Geopolitics might also be concerned with the linguistic features of myths in relation to their social and cultural contexts. What are the key words, phrases, clusters of words, and figures of speech that the speakers or the authors, in general the speaking sub jects that deliver the myth, use in various mediums and contexts? In addition, As a source of inspiration for this primary group, Della Sala points to Eliade (2005) and Lincoln (1989).

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

71

if we consider the myth as a system of logic, how does the speaking subject arrange this logic in a specific reiteration of the myth? Linguistic features and the formal logic of myth may also be crucial in determining how a myth functions as a political tool that simplifies complex policies, delivers an emotional load to the public, and generates feelings of belonging and solidarity or enmity and threat. Ultimately, again, the goal is to investigate those linguistic aspects of geopolitical myths that generate legitimacy for strategic and foreign policy decisions. Here, we are speaking of both qualitative and quantitative content analysis. Such close readings of the texts that contain myths—and perhaps their historical evolution—may show us what kinds of analogies, similes and metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoche are crucial in enabling the myth to play a role in politics. Rhetorical appeals to emotion, reason, and authority are also of interest, as are other characteristic features of speaking and writing, such as choice of words and syntax, that are more closely related to formal logic. In this regard, this line of inquiry for Geopolitics could also engage with the critical discourse analysis that has been developed by linguists such as Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and Teun van Dijk (see, e.g., Fairclough, 2003, 2010, 2013; Wodak & Meyer, 2016; Dijk, 2000, 2010a, 2010b). Critical discourse analysis may offer the right tools for analyzing the syntax of myths and the figures of speech that it uses (especially the use of metaphor; see Musolff, 2006, 2016; Semino, 2008; Goatly, 2007), the study of issues that relate to the actual publication and the target audiences of texts that communicate myths, as well as an analysis that takes into account the wide intellectual and social contexts that are crucial in the making of texts that communicate myth. Similarly to critical discourse analysis, these tools then may be used to examine specific aspects of the communication of myth in various mediums, such as the media, literature, and political speeches.18 Collections of myths should allow us to refine our taxonomical criteria, understand cross-country variation, and perhaps yield meaningful comparative insights about the structure and use of myths when we are talking about geopolitics. If collections lend themselves to horizontal analysis that allows us to make comparisons of various myths from different countries, then the historical analysis of myth should be understood as a vertical analysis of their its internal structure, their constituent narratives, and the relationship between

For the mass media, see Dijk (1985a) and Richardson (2009). For literature, see Dijk (1985b). For political speeches and the use of metaphor, see Charteris-Black (2011, 2014).

72

CHAPTER 2

Narratology, the examination of how narratives produce and distribute meaning, makes up a whole subfield of inquiry in literary and popular culture studies.19 A common theme of narratology is that the narrative form plays a key role in ordering time and space and in this way giving meaning to historical representations (White, 1987). Consequently, geopolitical myths, and myths in general as a narrative form par excellence, may also set up an ordering of time and space and in this way reveal a geopolitical knowledge that gives a sense of place. The historical analysis of geopolitical myths is an examination of the way in which their constitutive narratives and stories structure a geopolitical understanding of a nation’s place in the world. A historical analysis of myth is not a historical record, nor is it an interpretation of the origins and the emergence of a myth, nor a linear account of their reiterations in order of their appearance. Certainly, an analysis of the historical development and evolution of myths is crucial in highlighting their contingency and artificiality; however, it is far more important to use the historical approach in order to reveal the variations of myths and analyze them according to their constituent parts. The point here is to chronicle the repetitions of myths, their various versions and usage in politics, but also their interaction or opposition with alternative or rival myths, when applicable. In this way we should look to substantiate both their “high degree of constancy” and their “marginal variation,” as Blumenberg puts it (2010, p. 34; see also Bottici, 2010, p. 187), and to gauge their adaptability—which gives them a sense of timelessness and continuity. The Functions of Geopolitical Myth The three properties of myth that concern Analytical Geopolitics are also key indicators of the myth’s effectiveness as a legitimacy generator and as a call for political action. The conditions of truthiness, the property by which a myth becomes widely accepted as an apparent truth, if developed further, can serve as an operational indicator of the legitimacy effect of myth. We have already discussed the function of myth as a dramatic narrative that creates patterns of individual, social, and political behavior. Political myths may provide a sense of temporal continuity, an emotional attachment to a place, a sense of belonging, direction, and purpose in the world. But it seems to me that the legitimizing effect of myth—the idea that it has the potential to legitimize and frame specific policies and decisions—is the most interesting and at the same time the least developed concept in the literature. For an introduction, see Bal (2017).

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS

73

Indeed, the understanding of myth as a source of legitimacy and mobilization for the public spans the literature from Sorel and Cassirer all the way to Bottici and Della Sala. Sorel saw myths not merely as “descriptions of things” but as expressions of a “determination to act”: in his mind, the myth of the general strike was “the only idea that could have value as a motivating force” (Sorel & Jennings, 2009, p. 32). In The myth of the state, Cassirer (2013) singles out the myth of the Aryan race as the key idea that legitimized Nazi brutality. More recently, Lincoln (1989) has suggested that myths lend credibility and authority when used in politics and therefore are extremely useful tools for politicians. Similarly, in Myths and nationhood, Schöpflin and Hosking (2013) regard myths as political instruments that justify the authority of the government and the legitimacy of its actions. In the same edited volume, Schöpflin includes the establishment of political legitimacy as one of the functions of myth (Schöpflin, 1997). Myth provides in simple, legible form all those “symbolic values within which people share an idea of origin, continuity, historical memories, collective remembrance, common heritage and tradition, as well as a common destiny” (Obradovic, 1996, p. 196)—this is rather like legitimacy in pill form. And it seems that as an artificial construction, any political community needs these kinds of stimulants in order to legitimize the use of power and authority (Jones, 2010). The very existence and sovereignty of a state or the reason for being of an international institution may hinge on the acceptance of a myth that legitimizes the form and function of the governing body.20 All in all, “one of the central purposes of political myth, then, is to generate legitimacy for political rule” (Della Sala, 2010, p. 5). The legitimacy effect of myth may be commonplace among scholars. However, why and how does that legitimization take place? How does a myth become so embedded in public consciousness that it is accepted as an absolute truth? Most importantly, where does its truthiness and acceptance come from? In asking those questions, we ask how a myth becomes successfully imprinted on the public mind while in competition with a multitude, perhaps, of alternative myths, narratives, and stories. In this regard, Strath (2005), Ricoeur (2010), and Bottici and Challand (2014) all link in some way the success of a myth with the qualities of its narrative form, for example, its wide recognition and intelligibility, or how comprehensible it is to the audience. Gérard Bouchard (2013, 2014) describes a more complete image of a mythmaking process that begins with the spreading of the myth to the wider public (diffusion), continues with a series of 20

For the examples of the British monarchy and the EU integrations, see, respectively, Smith (1999) and Della Sala

74

CHAPTER 2

actions modeled on the myth’s narrative core (ritualization), and ends with the myth becoming a thing of mysterious and sacred significance (sacralization). Bouchard’s three-stage mythmaking process for the making of a successful myth is a wonderful concept that makes mythmaking more familiar to the outsider; it demystifies the packed concept of myth and its role in the political process. It is also very helpful in conceptualizing how a myth becomes widely accepted. Bouchard also talks about the specific conditions a myth should meet in order to become accepted: in terms of content, a definition of community and its territory, the invention of threats and adversaries, and so forth; and in terms of its qualities, symbolic power, adaptability, and a reference to previous myths. Consequently, the legitimacy and mobilization effect of myth depends on its acceptability. In turn, acceptability is dependent on wide recognition and intelligibility, and how comprehensible the myth is to the public. Acceptability in terms of recognition, intelligibility, and comprehension refers to an implicit quality of myth that we might term truthiness. Recall here that myth is a neutral term—neither true nor false; neither fact nor fiction; neither fantasy nor reality. By truthiness, we refer not to the veracity of the myth, nor to its correspondence to an external reality, but to its potential to appear as truth, its quality of being felt to be true even if it is impossible to verify. This understanding of truthiness seems to be of the utmost importance for the success or acceptability of myth and in consequence for its potential to legitimize political authority, policies, and decisions. It is crucial therefore to analyze those properties of myth that cause its truthiness.

This chapter presented three possible lines of inquiry and methodology for Analytical Geopolitics (see Table 3): a comparative analysis of types and content of geopolitical myths, with which we could create collections and catalogues that allow us to gain insight into common characteristics and crosscountry variations of myths (including a linguistic analysis, which would offer valuable insight into the specific style and the emotional appeal of myths as literary devices); a historical examination of specific geopolitical myths, which would allow us to analyze myths according to their constitutive elements; and a functional analysis to gauge their effect on policy- and decision-making based on their acceptability, truthiness, and legitimacy.

75

A SHORT HISTORY OF GEOPOLITICS Table 3  Possible lines of inquiry in analytical geopolitics

Aim Result

Better understanding of … ​

Type

Form

Function

Comparative Analysis Collections and catalogues

Historical Analysis

Functional Analysis

Differences, similarities, and cross-country variation

Constituent key Truthiness, narratives and stories acceptability, effectiveness Constancy, Legitimacy effect adaptability, on policy- and intertextuality

chapter 3

Geopolitical Mythmaking in Modern Greece 1

Excursus: Locating “Greece” in Space and Time

The historical focus of the next section on the 18th and early 19th centuries will eventually come across a fundamental difficulty concerning “Greece” as an object of study. What we now call Greece did not exist before the 1830s, and of course, even after that, up to the mid-20th century, the Greek state did not encompass the entire present-day territory. Before anything else, it is best to address this ambiguity about locating Greece in space and time. In classical antiquity, the system of Greek city-states lacked political unity but at least there existed an understanding of a basic common culture and heritage that was usually designated as “Hellas” and “Hellenes” or “Hellenic,” as opposed to anything non-Hellenic or barbaric (see, e.g., Mitchel, 2007). Language was a common denominator with regard to Greek ethnicity (Anson, 2009). It was the Romans that condescendingly called the Hellenic populations of the Greek city-states system—then a province of the Roman Empire—“Graeculi” (quoted in Henrichs, 1995). In the medieval period, after the partition of the Roman Empire, the rulers and the populations of the eastern part—the Greek-speaking part—continued to call themselves Romans. After the Ottoman conquest, “Rum” was used to distinguish the Greek Orthodox or “Roman Millet”—and usually Greek-speaking subjects—of the Ottoman Sultan (see Clogg, 1986).1 Later, medieval historiography of the early modern period replaced “Roman” with the terms “Byzantine” and “Byzantium,” which was the name of the ancient Greek city that preceded Constantinople (the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire and modern-day Istanbul), but it was not in use for more than a millennium. As a result, this designation of the Eastern Roman Empire as Byzantium, even though the Imperium Romanum and the Roman laws ruled the East for more than a thousand years, caused much confusion in Western scholarship of the period.2 According to Bury (1979), the term Byzantium was introduced arbitrarily in order to differentiate the Eastern Greek-speaking part 1 Today, surprisingly, the Turks refer to the Greeks as “Yunans,” derived from “Ionians,” the name of the ancient Greek tribes that inhabited Asia Minor The first use of the term Byzantine is generally considered to be Wolf (1568); see Ostrogorski (2009, p. 27); Kazhdan & Constable (1982, p. 12); Millar (2006, pp. 2, 15). © Antonios Nestoras, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004686908_004

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

77

of the Roman Empire from Charlemagne’s Holy Roman Empire, which was at the time making a claim for the imperial legacy of Rome. In the modern period, the name Greece was not officially used until after the Greek War of Independence, which achieved statehood for the Greek nation in 1832 and created the fully independent Kingdom of Greece. Today, although the official name of the country is the Hellenic Republic, the name Greece and its derivatives are in common use in most Western languages. The Greeks, however, still prefer to call themselves Hellenes and their country Hellas or more colloquiadlly “Hellada.” As a consequence, roughly between the 15th and 19th centuries we have to deal with a mosaic of antiquarian or modern names and the variable selfidentification of Greeks (Kaplanis, 2014). This mosaic of names—Graeci, Hellenes, Romans, and Byzantines, Rum and then again Greece and Hellas or Hellenic Republic—while it does not signify a single political entity, does create an essential image of a people or a nation (ethnos in Greek, hence the word ethnicity in English) with “some form of unity other than the strictly political” (Just, 2016, p. 73). In the prevailing contours of modern Greek studies and historiography, this unity is based on the common language, culture, and self-awareness of the people who inhabited a broad but not conventionally bordered geographic region, a people who in a way were still fulfilling the criteria given by Herodotus, being as they were “of the same stock and of the same speech, and shared common shrines of the gods and rituals and similar customs … ​.”3 There are other arguments, however, that run counter to this line of reasoning. For example, if one chooses to focus on the Byzantine period, it can be argued that the Eastern Roman Empire did not consider itself as strictly Hellenic, despite the preponderance of the Greek language. Furthermore, there was no well-defined Greek ethnos or nation prior to the establishment of the Greek state, either in terms of culture or in terms of geography: the elements of a conceivable common culture were disparate, and the Greek-speaking populations were spatially dispersed, mostly in parts of the Ottoman Empire and in various Western European countries (Just, 2016). Regarding the first argument, although during the Roman period and espe cially after the Christian conversion the Hellenic label was largely abandoned or diminished, it was later revived to contribute to the Greek identity and

Quoted in Koliopoulos and Veremis (2002, p. 1). This cultural continuity is of course evoked by seminal studies such as Papanoutsos (1956, pp. 7–8) and Svoronos (2005).

78

CHAPTER 3

cultural character of Byzantium.4 Furthermore, despite the geographical and essential dispersal of Greek cultural elements, ethnic nationalism and political radicalism inspired by European events such as the French Revolution ushered the Greek-speaking world into the modern era, causing an awakening of the Greek nation or the revival of a distinctive national identity (Svoronos, 1980; Stavrianos, 1974; Kitromilides, 1980; Prousis, 1994). After all, despite its essentially contested nature, the concept of nation should not be identified only with the official political community of a state, as it has often been used in “far more potent and variable ways than simply designating a people united under a state” (Ting, 2008, p. 453). In this respect, it is therefore valid to speak of a Greek nation for at least several decades before the official establishment of the modern Greek state. The following sections will assume that in a loosely defined geographic region there existed a population with a common culture and—most importantly—a common language, and that within that population there existed “constant factors which help to elucidate the attitudes, policies and institutions of presentday Greece [ … ​] the most fundamental among them is the sense of continuity that the Greek language inspires in its users” (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002, p. 3). Myths, political myths, and, by extension, geopolitical myths are first and foremost a linguistic phenomenon—and, in an analysis of geopolitical myths, geography and language are inextricably linked. Therefore, the perception of geography in the Greek-speaking world is one of the constant factors that underline the policies, in particular the foreign policy, and even the strategic culture, of present-day Greece. In other words, it may often be the case that the existence of a common language and, by extension, common myths precedes the making of a nation and the establishment of a state.5 According to Smith’s “ethno-symbolic” approach to the study of nationalism, symbols, myths, and memories—and by extension necessarily language—all belong to the “ethnic cores” from which the “group” draws in order to create a sense of sameness, identity, and history (see Smith, 1999).) Consequently, especially for the first section of this study dealing with the period shortly before the establishment of the Greek state, the term Greekspeaking populations will be used to refer to the people that inhabited the 4 These are the two different stages of the reception of classical tradition in Byzantium according to Kaldellis (2008). 5 The above assumptions fall squarely within the primordial interpretations of the nation, which argue that nations have premodern origins, and especially in Anthony D. Smith’s con tributions to the field (see Smith, 2008). For the opposing modernist view, there is no better place to start than Anderson (2016).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

79

Eastern Mediterranean basin, mainly in territories ruled by the Ottoman Empire, and had the Greek language or the Orthodox religion or both as a least common denominator. Likewise, the term Greek-speaking world will refer to those geographic territories where, although the ethnic composition was very complicated, the Greek-speaking element was pre-eminent without controlling state institutions; loosely defined, this geographic region has the Aegean Sea and its archipelago at the center and encompasses an area from southern Italy and the Ionian Islands to the shores of Asia Minor, and from the Danubian Principalities to Crete. Significant Greek-speaking minorities also existed around the Black Sea (Pontic Greeks) and Eastern Mediterranean basins, from Odessa to the Dardanelles Straits, Constantinople, Cyprus, and Cappadocia and Alexandria.6 The existence of Greek-speaking populations in these locations does not imply their naturalization as “Greek,” either in terms of ethnicity, culture, or nationality. Rather, it is an opening attempt to consider the Greek-speaking populations of the time as a geopolitical cluster, a group of people with a common linguistic, cultural, and geopolitical condition.7 The geopolitical nature of the development of the concept of Greece in modern times is also evident in cartography and cartographic conventions.8 Classical antiquity, Graeco–Roman culture, and Christianity during and after the Eastern Roman Empire—all sorts of Hellenisms—have all been active elements in “mapping Greece” throughout the centuries (Tolias, 2001). For example, the Totius Graeciae Descriptio [Description of all Greece], a large mural map of Greece from classical times to the Byzantine Empire, made in Rome in 1540 by Nikolaos Sophianos, was crucial in the dissemination of the idea of the Greek world as a distinctive entity with a common history and language and had a lasting effect on Greek cartography and modern Greek territorial identity (Tolias, 2006). In contrast, modern Greece (or simply Greece) will refer explicitly to the period following the establishment of the Greek state. In 1830, the Treaty of London recognized the claims of the Greek revolutionaries to separate state hood. Initially an autonomous state under Ottoman suzerainty, Greece was established for the first time as a fully independent kingdom with conventional For a detailed examination of spoken Greek dialects in various regions during the Ottoman period, see Horrocks (2014, pp. 381–405). This idea of a linguistic or otherwise cultural unity of the Greek-speaking world without the presence of a nation-state has been used before to examine, for example, the diffusion of the Scientific Revolution in the region; see Dialetis et al. (1999). See George Tolias’s research based on the Margarita Samourka Map Collection (one of the most important collections of its kind in private hands in Greece), which consists of 1,700 maps of Greece (Tolias et al., 2011).

Map 2 Totius Graeciae Descriptio, the whole of Greece according to Nikolaos Sophianos (Tolias, 2006) Source: A map created in 1564 by Ferrando Bertelli, based off Nikolaos Sophianos’s 1540 Totius Graeciae Descripto. Original publication: Salamanca, Antonio. “Graeciae Chorographia.” Claudio

80 CHAPTER 3

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

81

geographic borders, formal institutions, and international recognition two years later, in 1832, with the Treaty of Constantinople. The small kingdom, then comprising only the Peloponnese, the Cyclades, and Central Greece, was the vehicle with which the Greek-speaking populations returned to the stage of world history—this time as a budding nation-state. Finally, this excursus to explain the concept of the Greek-speaking world and its non-identification with modern Greece was important for another reason, namely because this extraterritorial dimension of the Greek state (i.e., the Greek-speaking populations that were living outside the initial borders of the kingdom) soon became a basic parameter not only for the exercise of foreign policy but also for the entire political life of the country (Skopetea, 1988, p. 259). The next sections discuss in some detail how the Greek-speaking world adapted to modern understandings of space and time. Modernity had a profound effect on Greek self-consciousness. The terms Neo-Hellenes, New Greeks, and simply Greeks refer exclusively to this new, 19th-century self-consciousness. 2

Imitating the West and the Greek Enlightenment

This section traces mythmaking in modern Greece from the middle of the 18th century to the creation of the modern Greek state in the 1830s and 1840s. It is safe to claim that this period contains a historical phenomenon that is called the Greek Enlightenment (about 1760s–1820s), which refers to an intellectual movement considered to be the extension of the European Enlightenment in the Greek-speaking world. The Greek Enlightenment, like its European counterpart, acted as a conduit for the philosophical attitudes of the Scientific Revolution, which enabled the Greek-speaking populations to completely change their perceptions of the natural world and reconsider their place within it. Geography—along with physics—was one of the main systematic inquiries into the nature of the external world. Geographical works of the era played a crucial role in the emergence of the self-awareness and the sense of place on the world map of the Greek-speaking populations. This sense of place was expressed by a distinctive literature of Political Geography with an ensemble of stories concerning Greece’s history and relations to other nations that included the description of the West as “enlightened” and “noble”; the contrasting portrayal of the “dark” and “despotic” East as an existential threat; the contrast of the “glorious” classical past with the “mis erable” condition of the Greek world under Ottoman oppression; and, most of

82

CHAPTER 3

all, the dramatic story of Greek “decline” and “rebirth” through which the West was enlightened in the past and the East would be enlightened in the future. This initial grid stories framed three key narratives, namely, the centrality of the Greek world between East and West, the continuity of the Greek nation from the classical to the modern era, and its cultural affinity with Europe and the West. In turn, these three narratives legitimized and framed what became known as the Great Idea, a concept that can be understood as a geopolitical myth about the modern Greek state (which was eventually established c. 1830s). Usually considered as a starting point of Greek nationalism and irredentism because of its subsequent interpretations, the Great Idea is taken here to be instead a concluding point that expresses the mythmaking process of the Greek Enlightenment and to denote the underlying basis of Greek national awareness and position in the world (i.e., to be a foundational geopolitical myth of the Greek state). To the effect that the Great Idea is a primary myth and a precursor of belonging to Europe and the West, it also represents the first stage of widespread dissemination (diffusion) in the making of belonging into a sacred myth that explains the consistency of Greece’s geopolitical attachment to Europe to this day. 2.1

The Great Idea as a Foundational Geopolitical Myth Because of its geographical position, Greece is the center of Europe. With the east on its right and the West on its left, Greece is destined to enlighten the east through its rebirth as it enlightened the West with its decline. In the spirit of this oath and this great idea, I always saw the plenipotentiaries of the Nations assembling to decide not for the destiny of Greece any longer but for the whole Greek nation.9

9 Original in Greek, my translation from the minutes of the meeting ΛΑ’ (pp: 190–192) of the Grand Assembly in 1844: “Διά την γεωγραφικήν αυτής θέσιν η Ελλάς είναι το κέντρο της Ευρώπης. Ισταμένη και έχουσα εκ μεν δεξιών την Ανατολήν, εξ αριστερών δε την Δύσιν προώρισται να φωτίση δια της αναγεννήσεως αυτής την Ανατολήν ως δια της πτώσεως αυτής εφώτισε την Δύσιν. Εν τω πνεύματι του όρκου τούτου και της μεγάλης ταύτης ιδέας είδον πάντοτε τους πληρεξουσίους του Έθνους να συνέρχωνται διά να αποφασίσωσιν ουχί πλέον περί της τύχης της Ελλάδος, αλλ’ όλοκλήρου του Ελληνικού έθνους.” The entire speech of I. Kolettis and the Resolution concern ing the Autochthons and Heterochthons of the National Assembly was first published in Kyriakidis (1892, pp. 494–500).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

83

The above extract is from a speech that Ioannis Kolettis, the first elected Prime Minister of Greece (1844–1847) and leader of the French Party,10 delivered in the Grand Assembly of the Kingdom of Greece in 1844. Kolettis’s speech is widely recognized as the enactment of the so-called Great Idea (Greek: Μεγάλη Ιδέα, Megáli Idéa). The concept of the Great Idea is frequently presented as the continuation and political expression of messianic folklore from the Ottoman era that refers to the liberation of Constantinople and the Greek-speaking territories of Asia Minor. As such, the Great Idea is considered as the ideological origin and justification of Greek nationalism and irredentism in the 19th century (see Zakythenos, 1976). Indeed, the Great Idea functioned as the core justification of Greek foreign policy for almost a hundred years after its iteration, well into the 20th century. It has always been present as a driving political factor in every major milestone of Greek foreign policy and strategy, including the Greek–Turkish War of 1897; the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913; and the period during and after World War I and Greece’s Asia Minor Campaign against the Ottoman Empire (Tatsios, 1984; Ploumidis, 2013; Prott, 2016; Finefrock, 1980; Miller, 2009). Consequently, the Great Idea generated legitimacy for Greece’s involvement in military conflicts and several consecutive territorial expansions. In the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, Greece expanded in all possible directions: westward to the Ionian Islands; northward to Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace; southward to Crete; and eastward to the Aegean Islands and the coast of Asia Minor (see Map 3). However, between 1844 and 1923, the Great Idea also saw several interpretations and transformations (Kremmydas, 2010). Sometimes acting as an end in itself and other times as a means to an end, a precondition or legitimation of this or that policy, the ideological content of the Great Idea changed several 10

The first political parties were the result of the process of the integration of the aforementioned traditional elites of Greek society into the political system of a modern nationstate. The interest of the West in Greek matters was also evident. The patronage of great powers assigned names to the first political parties in Greece, and as a consequence the British, the French, and the Russian political parties gradually formed. However, despite the naming of the parties according to their great power patronage, their political power originated not from material or ideological support from Britain, France, or Russia, but from their ability to guarantee control over state resources for the elite groups that formed them. Although the first Greek political parties were modeled on their European counterparts, they were, in principle, associations of local kindred groups and factions inter connected by loose bonds and that rallied around one leader or small leading group. A ‘patronage-protection system’ held the parties and the elite groups together in a relation of exchange and mutual service. See Diamandouros (2002) and Petropulos, J. A. (1968).

84

CHAPTER 3

NORTHERN EPIRUS occupied by Greece (1912-14, 1914-16) then returned to Albania

WESTERN THRACE

Black Sea EASTERN THRACE

MACEDONIA Thessaloniki

Constantinople Sea of Marmara (Istanbul)

Imbros Tenedos

EPIRUS THESSALY IONIAN ISLANDS

Aegean Sea IONIA Smyrna (lzmir) Athens

Ionian Sea

DODECANESE

Mediterranean Sea CRETE

Territorial expansion of Greece (1832-1947) Kingdom of Greece, 1832

lonian islands, ceded by United Kingdom, 1863

Conference of Constantinople (1881) Treaty of Bucarest (1913) and Florence Protocol (1914) after the Balkan Wars Western Thrace, ceded by Bulgaria (1923) Acquired through the treaty of Sevres (1920), returned to Turkey through the treaty of Lausanne (1923)

Map 3 Territorial expansion of Greece, 1832–1947 Source: Territorial Expansion of Greece (1832–1947) by Historicair, translation by Rursus, CC BY-SA 3.0

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

85

times and adapted to changing political contexts, but for most of the first century of modern Greece it permeated all social, political, and intellectual struggles (Kremmydas, 2010, p. 18). Conversely, and according to Kitromilides, this interpretation of the Great Idea as an irredentist program is a later product of Greek Romanticism, whereas Kolettis’s original concept of the Great Idea makes no reference to Byzantium and so is better understood in the context of the Greek Enlightenment (Kitromilides, 1998). First of all, Kolettis’s speech was delivered in the National Assembly in the context of the dispute between the indigenous populations of the regions inside the borders of the new kingdom (autochthons in Greek) and the outlanders (heterochthons in Greek) (Skopetea, 1988, p. 259). The latter were a multitude of scholars, local militia, refugees, and other enthusiasts who fled to Greece after independence to staff the newly established public institutions, from regions still under Ottoman control, including the Aegean and Ionian islands, Crete, Epirus, and Thessaly.11 Within the context of this divisive dispute, the Great Idea aspired to the political and geographical unification of Greek-speaking populations. Kolettis, himself a heterochthon from Epirus—a Vlach (Clogg, 2015, p. 47)—evoked a vision of a greater national entity that would consist not only of the people who were then living in the independent Greek Kingdom, but of all the populations of the Ottoman Empire who could identify themselves as Greek. The distinction between Greece as a state entity and the “whole” of the Greek nation 11

The antagonism between the autochthons and the heterochthons became increasingly intense in the period 1833–1843 but dated back to the years of the Greek Revolution. This was due to the way positions were filled and offices were appointed in the newly established Greek Kingdom. As many of the heterochthons were educated and consequently had the knowledge and the necessary abilities to staff the state apparatus and make an elementary bureaucracy work, they were preferred by the regency of Otto for these positions. However, this was not only because of their knowledge and experience in bureaucratic matters. The sponsorship of the heterochthons was directly connected with the policy applied by the regency and Otto against the traditional social elites of the regions that had revolted, that is, their exclusion from positions and offices to bring about their political enfeeblement. In the context of the Grand Assembly meeting in 1844, the reason for the debate on the dispute between the autochthons and heterochthons was the third article of the drafted constitution that defined citizenship and which was necessary for the qualifications of state employees. Whereas the participation of the entire indigenous population in the revolution was taken for granted, there was an effort to exclude the het erochthons from offices in public service on the pretext that they had not taken up arms in the revolution. The objective was to purge the state offices of the dozens of heterochthons who had been appointed in order to loosen the hold of the traditional elites on the Greek state. And in the context of the Grand Assembly, it was achieved. For more on this issue, see Dimakis (1991).

86

CHAPTER 3

ascribed therefore to an “ethnic” and “utopian” interpretation of the nation— as opposed to the “civic” interpretation promoted by the supporters of the autochthons—and this is why it is supposed to reflect the brewing nationalism of the new state and Greece’s irredentist expansion.12 The distinction between state and nation, so explicit in Kolettis’s Great Idea, would eventually open the door to irredentist interpretations that would adapt and transform it according to the prevailing state ideology. The extra-Helladic perspective of the Greek state, the Greek-speaking populations that were living outside the borders of the kingdom, soon became a basic parameter not only for the exercise of foreign policy but also for the entire political life of the country (Skopetea, 1988, p. 259). Furthermore, Kolettis’s speech and the meaning of his Great Idea were much denser than this contextual understanding. In fact, Kolettis had introduced the term in the political discourse, quietly, a decade earlier: “The Great Idea fermented in the naturally active spirit of the Greeks since the beginning of the nineteenth century,” Koletis wrote as Minister of the Interior in 1835, “and it triggered the Greek revolution as a passionate and generous intention to move closer to Greek antiquity and reproduce the glorious classical past.”13 What is more interesting, a few years before Kolettis, Georg Ludwig von Maurer, a Bavarian statesman, legal historian, and member of the regency of King Otto (son of Louis I, King of Bavaria, chosen to fill the throne of Greece), made similar reflections on the destiny of Greece as the light-bearer of Western civilization.14 “The destiny of Greece is to disseminate the light of the European civilization to Asia and beyond,” Maurer wrote, “and her geographical position helps to this end” (Maurer, 1976, p. 421). Greece was the cradle of European civilization for Maurer and, thus, Europe had a moral obligation to reciprocate for the “education” it had received—civilization could then return to Asia and to the countries of the East. 12 13

14

For a contemporary opinion following the same understanding of the Great Idea and its consequences for national self-awareness, see Diamandouros et al. (2010). Original in French [translation mine]: Une des grandes idées qui fermentèrent dans les esprits naturellement actifs des Grecs depuis le commencement du 19 siècle et qui firent éclater la révolution grecque fur cette intention de leur part ardente et généreuse de se rapprocher de leur antiquité et de reproduire chez eux se passe classique et glorieux The first years after the revolution were expectedly turbulent; the first governor chosen by the great powers, Ioannis Kapodistrias, was murdered. The Belgian prince chosen by the European monarchies to lead the new kingdom refused to accept the throne. The Bavar ian King Otto, who finally ascended to the throne, was a minor, and until Otto came of age in 1835 it was the members of the regency who were charged with the government of the country, as defined by international agreements. Georg Ludwig von Maurer, a German statesman and legal historian, was a member of that regency.

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

87

These records strengthen further the idea that Kolettis’s Great Idea could equally be a concluding point for the Greek Enlightenment as much as the starting point of Greek Romanticism. They illustrate also the deeper philosophical underpinnings of Kolettis’s Great Idea, which, beyond serving as a state ideology, an inauguration of Greek nationalism, and a call for an irredentist territorial expansion, also makes symbolic use of narratives and stories about the origins of the Greek nation, its position on the map, and its mission in the world. These narratives and stories point to the Great Idea as a foundational geopolitical myth that evoked the collective memory of the nation and moved to shape modern Greek understandings of space and geography. The geopolitical nature of the Great Idea is present throughout the extract from Kolettis’s speech, but it is especially evident in the first sentence, which leaves no doubt about the place of Greece on the world map: Greece is the center of Europe. What lies around the center? The East on the right and the West on the left, worlds apart from each other. The first thing that Kolettis does in his introduction of the Great Idea is to establish the centrality of Greece in Europe. Between two worlds, Greece is then assigned a mission of enlightenment of the East, as the torchbearer of European civilization. In turn, Greece’s national mission is based on the premise of a temporal and spatial continuity of the Greek nation throughout history, from its decline, namely the classical era, to its rebirth, namely the modern era. Finally, the same progression in this passage, from Greece’s decline to the enlightenment of the West and from there to the rebirth of the modern state, leaves no doubt about the de facto affinity of Greece with Western European nations. In essence, if we reduce it to simpler terms, if we break it down to its constituent elements, and if we try to explain its deep internal structure, the Great Idea is a gathering of narratives, stories, and statements concerning the geopolitical location of modern Greece. It is a dramatic narrative (continuity from decline to rebirth) with distinct geographical terms (centrality between East and West), which generates an emotional attachment to a territory, a sense of place, a feeling of belonging or resemblance (affinity with the West) and eventually a sense of direction on the world map (eastward) and an impersonal if not divine mission (reinforced by invoking the oath). It is this dimension of the Great Idea as a geopolitical myth that generated legitimacy for specific pat terns of Greece’s geostrategic behavior in the next hundred years. In other words, the Great Idea was in fact an ensemble of ideas underlying the relation between Greece and other places, involving feelings, emotions, and traumatic memories, grand schemes for a collective mission, ultimately a set of ideas envisioning a road map for strategy and foreign policy. These ideas were not formed in vitro, in the head of a prime minister and in the context

88

CHAPTER 3

of a Grand National Assembly. They were part of a wider mythmaking process that was present in the Greek-speaking world before the formation of the new state. The narratives of centrality, continuity, and affinity as key constituent narratives of the Great Idea, the stories supporting them, their meaning and relation to each other, underwent a long process of formation that goes at least as far back as the period in history known as the Greek Enlightenment. It was the European Enlightenment that ignited the hope of the Greekspeaking world for liberation from the Ottomans and thus the potential for cultural progress. The revolt that resulted in the Greek War of Independence (1821–1829) conveyed not only a demand for national freedom, but also a thirst for liberal values that would transform Greek society. In parallel to animating the emergence of the Greek identity, the European Enlightenment also impregnated the geopolitical imagination of the Greeks with modern, secular understandings of space and time. The Greeks were forced to develop a worldview, to capture a geopolitical image of the world, their position on the world map, and their relation to other nations. 2.2 Modern Times, Modern Space: Enlightenment, Science, and Geography The definitive establishment and international recognition of the Greek state c. 1833 was an unprecedented experience for the Greek-speaking populations inhabiting the territories of the Ottoman Empire. Greece was the first of many modern nation-states that emerged from the diverse human geography of the Balkans, where the authority of multinational empires had reigned for centuries. The revolutionary constitutions proclaimed that this nation-state aspired to become modern and European; later, the centralized government and the first state institutions were modeled on those of Western Europe. Modern Greek studies are generally aware of the extraordinary influence of Europe on matters of national identity and foreign policy. Studies of Greek nationalism, and the formation of national identity in particular, are conscious of the role of European ideas, the concept of Europe, and European perceptions of Greece in legitimizing the self-identity of the Greek nation (Svoronos et al., 2004). Contemporary Greek historiography also acknowledges various ideological uses of Europe in Greece (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2007). Europe as a concept, an idea, or a reference point in domestic political discourses is ever-present throughout modern Greek history (Featherstone, 2014). Last but not least, comprehensive studies of the emergence of the modern Greek iden tity make extended references to the fundamental impact of the European Enlightenment on the self-consciousness and the sense of purpose of Greek speakers (Kitromilides, 2013; Myrogiannis, 2012).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

89

The Greek world and the wider Balkans followed a significantly different trajectory into modernity through the Enlightenment than Western European nations (Hirschon, 2014, p. 155). The deferring of national appropriation of the Enlightenment was not an experience for Greece and the Balkans (Porter & Teich, 2007). Nevertheless, as the Greek-speaking world and most of the Balkans lived under Imperial Ottoman rule for centuries, their introduction to modernity was not synchronized with that of the West. The new nation-states in the European periphery made an entrance to international society laden with memories from their imperial past (Ejdus, 2017). Therefore, when the Greek-speaking populations of the Ottoman Empire were exposed to the European Enlightenment, they were required to rapidly develop a new self-awareness in relation to other people, other times, and other places. The geographic imagination of an individual or a group, their understandings of space (geography) and time (history), are generally understood as “a primary means of individuation and social differentiation” in relation to others (Harvey, 1990, p. 419). For the Enlightenment in particular, geography played a crucial role in the making of its philosophical ideas and political projects (Withers, 2007). Eventually, the ideas carried by the European Enlightenment into the Balkans and specifically to the Greek-speaking populations of the region enabled the Greeks to capture an image of the modern world, to develop a sense of place and belonging, and to conceive of themselves as part of an international system consisting of nation-states. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that history and geography were the main areas of interest for those Greek scholars who copied and translated for their Greek-speaking audiences the major works of the Western European Enlightenment (Myrogiannis, 2012, p. 45). By and large, books on geography, modeled on European trends and published by the Greek diaspora in Europe and elsewhere, were key expressions of the Greek Enlightenment as a project of social and intellectual criticism, defined by perceived national needs as expressions of the humanism of the European Enlightenment. The movement of modern Greek historiography in the 18th century involved the making of a version of Greek history that was compatible with the cultural context and the historical theory of the Enlightenment (Myrogiannis, 2012, p. 65). The formation of a modern Greek historical consciousness was devel oped by transactions between the “Self” and the “Other” on three levels: the Greeks compared themselves with the “Europeans” and the “Turks” but also to the “Ancients.” To begin with, self-consciousness was intrinsically linked to the consolidation of continuity between ancient and contemporary Greeks; the former were considered the ancestors of the modern nation precisely

90

CHAPTER 3

because of the experience of living in the same space and speaking a version of the ancient language (Myrogiannis, 2012, p. 71). Next, the Greeks were able to conceive of themselves and the situation in which they found themselves by capturing a sense of the contemporary world. This was made possible by a comparison of the Greeks’ own condition with that of other nations (Myrogiannis, 2012, p. 81), a comparison that involved the assignment of feelings of insecurity to the “Turks” and the collective predicament of the Greeks under Ottoman rule, as well as the denotation of Europe/West and the European nations as a socio-geographical space of culture, progress, and national freedom. This ensemble of temporal transactions between past, present, and future condition of the Self in relation to the Other gave the New Greeks “the initial feeling of their separateness in modern international society” (Myrogiannis, 2012, p. 87) and the understanding of a community with a common destiny. Perceptions of geography and an emerging sense of place were equally essential to these temporal comparisons: the Greeks embraced their new social and cultural history while they expanded their worldview and became aware of their geographical position. Consequently, “the emergence of an articulate geographical literature was one of the major intellectual manifestations of the Greek enlightenment” (Kitromilides, 2013, p. 88). In the context of the Greek Enlightenment, “the development of both geographical culture and cartographic production occurred,” and indeed this period was “a decisive time for the course of Greek cultural history and the shaping of Greek national awareness” (Tolias, 2010, pp. 1–2). The number of maps produced during this period in comparison with the previous centuries is staggering. In the period between 1750 and 1820 (roughly that of the Greek Enlightenment) there were 77 secular maps printed that did not depict some sort of sacred geography (i.e., referring to the Holy Lands). This represented an increase of around 800 percent from the previous century (Table 4) (Tolias, 2010, p. 6). In a period of just 24 years, between 1796 and 1820, the production of secular maps was almost double that of the previous 120 years, between 1665 and 1795. In contrast, between these two periods the principal area of cartographic interest by far was the geography of the world and the continents, as well as Greece and Greek regions, whereas maps produced in the previous years were mostly concerned with the sacred geography of the holy lands and other regions of religious interest (Table 5) (Tolias, 2010, p. 8). After the print ing of Nikolaos Sophianos’s Totius Graeciae Descriptio in 1540, and for more than two centuries, there was no map published in Greek that depicted Greece as a distinct geographical region (even Sophianos’s map was only partially labeled in Greek).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

91

Table 4 Sacred and secular maps printed in greek, 1665–1820

Sacred maps

Total

1665–1700 1701–1750 1751–1795 1796–1820 Total maps

Table 5 Areas of greek cartographic interest, 1665–1820

1665–1700 1701–1750 1751–1795

1796–1820 Total

World & the Continents Greece Athos & Greek Regions Moldavia & Wallachia Palestine & Sinai Total maps

The Scientific Revolution is commonly considered the historical period that formed the foundations of modern science and modern scientific attitudes.15 To the extent that, during the Scientific Revolution, science was established for the first time as the only authoritative form of knowledge about the external world, it may indeed be argued that it forever changed the way we understand the world and our place within it.16 This new scientific paradigm had an immense and profound influence on the intellectuals of the Enlightenment.17 15

16 17

For a detailed presentation of the Scientific Revolution, its philosophy, and epistemological commitments, see Sarasohn (2006); the relativist, post-modern point of view is not missing from this debate of the history of science either. For an exposé of the Scientific Revolution as situated knowledge, see Shapin (2018). This is the conclusion of Cohen (1994). This is widely accepted in the history of science and the study of the Enlightenment see, for example, Henry (2007).

92

CHAPTER 3

(There is some debate in the literature about which of the two came first, the Enlightenment or the Scientific Revolution, but here it will suffice to say that these two pillars of modernity were coterminous.) Geography as a form of knowledge about the natural world was part and parcel of the Scientific Revolution and, by extension, the Enlightenment (Withers, 2005). In this regard, geography also had a role to play in the development of the group of philosophical positions, scientific attitudes, political norms, and social arrangements that we have come to call modernity (Livingstone, 1990). This interweaving of the Scientific Revolution as stimulus for the ideas of the European Enlightenment, the Enlightenment as a carrier for the ideas of the Scientific Revolution, and the role of geography as a principal scientific inquiry about the natural world was replicated to some extent also in the Greek-speaking world. The Greek Enlightenment as a historical phenomenon has been approached mainly as a literary or philological experience, but it was rather a diverse intellectual movement, within which the idea of modern science occupied a central position (Kitromilides, 1990). The fundamental ontological and epistemological stances of the Scientific Revolution spread in parallel to the liberal ideals of the European Enlightenment, and geography together with physics were the main fields of scientific inquiry (Nicolaidis, 1999). As the European Enlightenment expanded to include the Greek-speaking world, it enabled Greek speakers to think in modern terms about space and time and to start to develop as such a new national awareness, not only with regard to their cultural specifications, but also with regard to their location on the world map. Consequently, the introduction of the Greek world to modernity also unlocked different levels of comparison between the Greeks, the Ottomans, and the Europeans that were previously not practiced. Thus, the political geographers of the Greek Enlightenment started to describe the continents of the world, to catalogue their various regions, and to examine the Greek-speaking world and its regions. However, at the same time, they also started to compare continents and regions, to assign meaning to compass directions, to compare and contrast the Greeks with the Europeans and the Turks, and to compare and contrast the latter two, in terms of culture, social norms, economic position, good governance, technological advancement, and the arts and sciences. The next section focuses on the distinctive body of literature by Greek political geographers of the Enlightenment that accompanied the cartographical production. This will make it possible to isolate the key narratives briefly dis cussed above—namely centrality, continuity, and affinity with the West—and to trace their evolution in the mythological backbone of the Great Idea. If the

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

93

Great Idea was a geopolitical myth, a system of narratives and stories that were expressed over time, in multiple formats and contexts, then to reduce it to simpler terms, to break it down to its constituent narratives and propositions, is to explain its deep internal structure and logic, which legitimized and defined Greek strategy and foreign policy for the next hundred years. 2.3 Centrality, Continuity, and Affinity in Greek Political Geography One of the first works of Political Geography in modern Greek was The geography, old and new of Meletios of Athens (b. Meletios Mitrou), published in the 1690s and subsequently republished in 1728 and 1807. Meletios’s sociocultural geographical approach describes in detail the nations of Europe, in which he includes Greece (Meletios, 1728). Throughout his work, Meletios repeats several times that the splendid and glorious ancient Greece had become small and miserable, obscured by the barbaric Ottoman Empire (pp. 247–250, 356– 361, 415–416). Turkey itself is placed in the chapter about Asia and is literally equated with “what is commonly referred to as the East” (p. 444). Conversely, Europe is referred to with genuine admiration for the achievements of its culture. Europe is advantageous and wise, distinguished and refined, a geopolitical entity enlightened with virtue (pp. 41, 100, 125, 231–232). In 1760, Gregorios Fatzeas echoed the same themes in his translation of Patrick Gordon’s Geographical grammar (Fatzeas, 1760; Gordon & Senex, 1749). Fatzeas’ work was truly global in scope. But special focus is given to the European nations that are described in shining colors: France in particular is elevated to a high degree of development as a principal model of modern civilization. The country is associated with the abundance of consumer and luxury goods and the dexterity of its population (Fatzeas, 1760, I, p. 222). According to Fatzeas, the French had reached the highest degree of virtue and morality, while the French language had been perfected to the point that it had become a universal language of wisdom and science (I, pp. 239–240). Describing the British Isles, Fatzeas went as far as to liken Britain’s “splendor” and “bliss” to an earthly paradise or the Garden of Eden, while the British people are described as moderate, inventive and intelligent, tolerant, and magnanimous (II, pp. 211– 222). Fatzeas reserves special praise for liberalism and religious tolerance in the British form of government (II, pp. 225–227). In contrast, Fatzeas’s geographical grammar, just like Gordon’s, divides Turkey into two parts, one European and one Asian: the European part includes Greece and the Balkan territories, whereas the Asian—which falls squarely in the East—includes Anatolia and the easternmost territories of the Ottoman Empire (Fatzeas, 1760, II, p. 369). Again, the splendor of Western Euro pean nations contrasts profoundly with Fatzeas’s description of Greece’s

94

CHAPTER 3

contemporary situation. The wisdom and high moral standards of the ancients were degraded due to the “barbaric tyranny of the Turks” (II, pp. 142–144). For Fatzeas, Greece “lost her brilliance and gloriousness” when it yielded to Turkish tyranny, barbarism, and cruelty (II, pp. 145–146). A few years later, in a different but similar vein, Nikiphoros Theotokis utilized a comparative Political Geography, which was reminiscent of Montesquieu’s idea of the Spirit of Laws and his classification of political systems (Theotokis, 1804; see also Kitromilides, 2013, p. 95). Theotokis examines the European nations in order to assign a special cultural quality to each of them. In general, the Europeans are noble, cultivated in the arts and the sciences, freedom-lovers, technologically advanced, and well governed—whether republican or monarchical (Theotokis, 1804, pp. 65–200). These qualities are then contrasted with the decadence that had befallen the Greek lands under the despotic authority of the Turkish Sultan (pp. 201–207). In geographical terms, Theotokis classifies Greece as part of the European territories of the Ottoman Empire, along with other Balkan ethnic groups, whereas Turkey itself rightfully belongs to Asia and the East (pp. 207–209). In 1790, the publication of Daniel Filippides’s Modern geography continued along the same path, increasing the sophistication and complexity of these narratives. Filippides begins with a lamentation in the preface of his work about the wretched and miserable Greek condition (Filippides, 1791). He then commits the first part of the treatise to describing the scientific geographical theories and methods of his time, although he proceeds instead—much like his antecedents—with a political, social, and human geography that includes a glorifying panorama of Western European civilization. Europe, even though it is not the largest part of the world, is superior in sciences, arts, and orderliness, rule of law, and power; as a result, Europe dominates the world and it should be considered the “first part of the World” (p. 91). The modern geography of Filippides also positions Greece in Europe, but Filippides introduces two significant innovations in Greek Political Geography of his time. The first is an initial attempt to justify Greece’s positioning with one of the first chronological timelines of Greek history from the classical era to modern times, foreshadowing future systematic efforts to establish a temporal continuity and a link between ancient and modern Greeks. The second and most important innovation is a passionate appeal for the imitation (mimeses) or replication of European values and forms of governance in the Greek world. Filippides claims that the Greeks should mime the European nations in the perfection of their language and spirit as the first step in attaining the supe rior European standards in philosophy, nobleness, and governance (Filippides, 1791, pp. 95–96).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

95

At the heart of the appeal for imitation is the argument that classical Greece is after all the source of contemporary European wisdom and intellectual prowess—therefore, the cultivation of the Greek language would allow philosophy “to return to her first nest” (Filippides, 1791, p. 97). The dramatic tone of this story is perfected by Filippides’s story of how the ancient Greek colonies and settlements in the West civilized the barbaric nomads of Europe like “a sting that embroidered European civilization” (p. 130). Filippides’s narrative then makes a full circle to return to the introductory lamentation on the current misery of the Greeks and the—already recognizable from his predecessors—condemnation of the despotic Ottoman Empire (p. 136). Meletios, Fatzeas, and Theotokis introduced the deep contrast between the “enlightened,” civilized Europe and the “dark,” barbaric Turkey that Filippides reiterated in his own work. But, in Neoteriki Geographia, Filippides inserted a dynamic movement to this static contrast. The Greeks, positioned as they were between the East and the West, should make a conscious effort to move closer to the latter by imitating their habits and their values, their morality and their affection for the highest forms of art, and their forms of governance and political culture. This imitation of Western civilization should not be heralded as something alien or imported after all. As far as Filippides was concerned, for the Greeks it was nothing short of a return to their classical roots. At the turn of the 19th century, a few years before the start of the Greek War of Independence, another treatise of Political Geography by Dionysios Pyrros (1818) sharpened Filippides’s storylines and their dramatic elements. Pyrros also started with an expression of grief for the current condition of humble Greece but proceeded in the same sentence to talk about its rebirth (p. 6 (στ After a long presentation on Western European nations, Pyrros concluded that Europe was the home of the “most civilized and noble nations of the world,” the best and most delightful among the continents (p. 119). Again, in dark contrast, the despotic Ottoman Sultan came from a lineage that originated in “the depths of Asia” and was responsible for the subjugation of Greece, the great and legendary land of ancient times, the “miracle of the world,” and the “educator of all human generations” (p. 154). According to Pyrros, the arts and sciences and philosophy bloomed in classical Greece; the Greeks at the time were “shining with wisdom and virtue, but the light of philosophy and virtue has long been extinguished”; the people were barbarized and suffered under successive alien yokes—the latest and most vicious being the Ottoman Turks (pp. 155–156). The dramatic form of death and rebirth is crystal clear in Pyrros’s Political Geography: the ancient Greeks educated the European nations in the past, when they were superior in morals, virtue, and gallantry compared to every other nation in the world. The New Greeks could restore the glamor of

96

CHAPTER 3

their ancestors by imitating the West and reclaim their rightful place in history (p. 160).

∵ The first key narrative to appear from combining the stories from the above geographical literature speaks of the centrality of the Greek world between two distinct geopolitical units: the East, which equaled the Ottoman Empire and darkness, and the West, which equaled Europe and light. The geopolitical mythmaking of Greek political geographers included stories that established an intense dichotomy. On the one hand, there was the description of Europe/ the West as noble, superior, and enlightened; on the other hand, there was the rejection of the despotism, barbarism, and obscurity of the Ottomans/ the East. Significantly, Greece was placed between East and West, occupying a dramatic position between darkness and light, between good and evil. Apart from placing Greece at a central position between East and West, the second key narrative in the works of Political Geography during the Greek Enlightenment speaks of a dramatic plot of decline and rebirth that creates a linear history from the classical to the modern era and establishes the temporal continuity of the Greek nation. Classical antiquity as a source of modern Greek awareness seems to have been a major concern of the historical and geographical inquiry of the Greek Enlightenment. Temporal continuity warranted that the Self existed in time and endured through time, and that gradually, a sense of genuine duration would develop that could manifest as unity, identity, and self-awareness. Put differently, self-awareness was intrinsically linked to consolidating the continuity between ancient and modern Greeks; the former were considered the ancestors of the modern nation precisely because of the experience of living in the same space and of speaking a version of the ancient language (Kitromilides, 2013, p. 71).18 The historical element of the geographical works of Pyrros and Filippides encompasses the continuity of Greece from the classical to the modern era by identifying ancient Greeks as the ethnic ancestors of modern Greeks through stark comparisons of Greece under Ottoman rule with the splendor and glory of the ancients. The lamentations of Greece’s miserable contemporary condition 18

Incidentally, Kant viewed geography as “the foundation of history” and claimed that geog raphy and history fuse to “fill up the whole span of knowledge [ … ] geography that of space, history that of time” (from Physische Geographie (1802), quoted in Unwin (1992, pp. 70–73).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

97

were useful in urging readers to think about the past, the present, and the future of the Greek-speaking world, to motivate them to action and create a sense of community and cultural unity. This met the need of a newborn nation for political legitimation, historical depth, and a uniform identity, which obliged historiography to become instrumental in nation-building.19 Racial, ethnic, and religious or linguistic coherence, the ancient roots of the nation in tradition and folklore, and its uninterrupted historical timeline became part of historiographical inquiry (Caire-Jabinet, 1994, pp. 66–72)—continuity, enduring in time, became an essential element of national consciousness. In the case of the Greek Enlightenment, this temporal continuity was intrinsically linked to a third key narrative that tells the story of the intimate relationship between Greece and the nations of Western Europe. It speaks of Greece’s cultural affinity with the West, which also touches upon the dramatic arc of decline and rebirth and prescribes a certain behavior or mission for the Greeks. The story is that of the great Greek colonization in the first millennium bce, when, as the story goes, the Greek city-states began to look beyond Greece for land and resources and founded for this reason numerous colonies across the Mediterranean, mainly in Italy, France, and Spain. The Greek colonists transmitted, the story continues, all the classical ideals to Western Europe— assumed to have been at that time merely a compendium of uncultured, barbaric tribes. The Enlightenment therefore is considered to be a return of the light that shows Greece the way out from Ottoman obscurity. The narrative arc of transmission from ancient Greece to Western Europe through the Mediterranean colonies and then back again to modern Greece via the Enlightenment consolidates national continuity, while at the same time, and by necessity, it also creates an essential cultural link and a kinship between modern Greece and Western Europe. It is necessary to note here that all three narratives—centrality, continuity, and affinity—and their accompanying stories were not confined to Political Geography but quickly dispersed in every direction of scientific inquiry of the Greek Enlightenment. For example, the revered classical past was a major fomenting factor for the revolutionary fervor that led to the Greek War of Independence (Clogg, 1996); and the East/West dichotomy and the dramatic con trast between Europe and Turkey was a commonplace for Greek intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment and had a lasting effect on the formation of Greek self-awareness (Pesmazoglou, 2014). And finally, for years to come, various interpretations of Greek antiquity and its relation to modern times played a

This is a principal function of national myths, according to Hobsbawm (2017).

98

CHAPTER 3

key part in defining modern Greek culture in many ways and on different levels (Tziovas, 2014; see also Tzouma, 2007; Lekkas, 2001). The intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment comprised a distinct type of people that had a common set of underlying principles, one of which was to prepare the Greek nation for a cultural change but also for revolution and national independence (Leontsini, 1997). Among the prominent figures that emerged during the Greek Enlightenment, Adamantios Korais stands out as one of the most prolific writers, translators, and fervent preachers of European Enlightenment ideals in the Greek-speaking world.20 Korais was an eyewitness to the French Revolution and an ardent supporter of the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment. A medical doctor trained in Montpellier, Korais was also a formidable scholar of the Greek classics. He launched an ambitious project of editing and publishing the entirety of the Greek classics for his contemporaries. He called it The Hellenic library, and in 16 volumes he introduced an authoritative new canon of Greek literature—while at the same time he made a real, material contribution to the establishment of the temporal continuity of Greek civilization from classical Greece to modernity. Significantly, he is still cited as a figurehead of the Greek Enlightenment and a “great teacher” to the Greek nation. In his Prolegomena (1802), he also framed the West and the “noble” European nations as a “guiding light” for a nation in search of an exit from the dark ages of history, embodied, in Korais’s view, by the barbaric Ottoman rulers (and Orthodox priests). For Korais, the seeds of the arts and sciences that set Europe “alight” were sowed in ancient Greece and survived in classical Greek literature (Korais, 1986, p. 39). He chastened modern Greeks for neglecting their cultural heritage and urged them to follow the example of their glorious ancestors by imitating European nations (pp. 39–40, 47). This narrative of cultural transfer from classical Greece to modern Greece through Western Europe had a special place and a special name in the work of Korais—he called it Metakenosis (Papaderos, 1970), which loosely translates as (cultural) retransmission. For Korais, this cultural change was not a strictly theoretical concept; its actual practice should be reflected first and foremost in the modern Greek language, which should resemble more closely that of the ancients. Korais’s linguistic project involved the creation of a language and an accompanying grammar that was cleansed of what he considered barbaric, Turkish, and plebeian influences (Jeffreys, 1985). The language issue for Korais was another facet of the

20

For the importance of Korais to the Greek Enlightenment (and the reception of the Greek Enlightenment by later generations in Greece), see Kitromilides

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

99

issue of continuity in the Greek nation; if the nation could speak more like the ancients, then the direct descent from them could be substantiated. Korais, among others, also adopted the storyline that the ancient Greeks “educated” the Western European nations, even as modern Greeks remained ignorant and listless under the burden of the Ottoman yoke. Again, if the New Greeks were to resemble their glorious ancestors—if they were to become noble, learned, and mighty—they needed to pick up the “torch” of the ancient Greeks from the West. Obviously, Korais and other intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment adopted the leitmotifs developed in the Political Geography literature by authors such as Meletios, Theotokis, Fatzeas, Filippides, and Pyrros. In sum, the formation of a new temporal and spatial awareness spurred by the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment was concomitant to the development of a distinct geopolitical vision of the world and the position of the New Greeks within it. The political geographers and other intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment played a crucial role in the development of this geopolitical vision. Three key narratives and a number of accompanying stories about the past spoke of the geopolitical position of the Greek-speaking world as an entity between East and West (centrality), descending from classical Greece (continuity), and having a distinct cultural bond with the West (affinity). These narratives and stories framed the relation between Greece, Europe, and the Ottoman Empire and in particular assigned feelings of security and advantage to Europe/the West, whereas the East was associated with political oppression and existential threat from the Ottomans. Ultimately, apart from defining the contemporary condition of modern Greece at the time, these dichotomies also prescribed a collective mission: to restore classical greatness by adopting the Enlightenment and imitating European nations. 2.4 Interim Conclusion: The Diffusion of Belonging In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, roughly during the period of the Greek Enlightenment, the Greek-speaking world and later the newly established modern Greek state exhibited a clear geopolitical attachment to Europe and the West (the two terms were used interchangeably during this period). On an intellectual, but also institutional, level, there is reason to believe that there existed a systematic effort by various actors to ensure that the Greek world would be rightly placed inside Europe. First of all, there was the unprecedented production of cartographic and geographic surveys that depicted modern Greece as an integral part of the European continent. Then there was the overall goal of the Greek Enlightenment, as embodied in the work of Korais namely the cultural and political imitation of Europe and the West. In this early stage, this geopolitical attachment shaped the creation, consolidation,

100

CHAPTER 3

and development of modern Greece; the system of government, the constitutions, and the state institutions were all based on blueprints from the noble and enlightened European nations; the first King of Greece was a Bavarian prince; the first political parties were named “French,” “English,” and “Russian.” Despite the distance in geographic, economic, and cultural terms, why did Greece lean from the beginning on the great European powers for statebuilding and security? One may look at some of the inexorable material conditions that made this geopolitical attachment possible and probably necessary. First and foremost, there was the actual security threat coming from a much larger and immensely more powerful Ottoman Empire. Connected to this security threat from the Ottoman Empire was the promise of security deriving from the imbalance of power weighing in favor of Europe. The Industrial Revolution, which triggered an explosion of power and economic growth in the West, had not yet touched the Greek-speaking world or the Ottoman Near East more generally (Jones, 2008; see also Vries, 2013). Furthermore, since the 1700s the Ottoman Empire had begun a gradual decline due to internal and external factors, such as ethnic unrest, a decaying economic infrastructure, and foreign intervention (Quataert, 2013, pp. 37–54). As a matter of fact, the Ottomans (with help from Egypt) had crushed the Greek revolution on the field of battle, and, to a large degree, the Greek War of Independence was successful thanks to what is now considered the first humanitarian intervention by the European great powers—three out of five, to be exact Heraclides & Dialla, 2015). In 1827, the combined naval forces of the United Kingdom, France, and Russia destroyed the Ottoman armada at the Battle of Navarino and paved the way for more interventions (namely a Russo-Turkish war and a French military expedition in Peloponnesus) and eventually the recognition of Greece as a sovereign and independent state.21 Therefore, it was in the interest of the Greeks to lean on the West in order to counterbalance the threat coming from the East. Another way to approach the initial geopolitical attachment of Greece to the West is by examining the emerging Greek national identity and sense of place not as a rational interest calculation, but rather as a collective cultural conscience. Here, the argument is that Greek classical antiquity and the European Enlightenment were both crucial for the development of modern Greek 21

There were significant chance factors that also played a role in the naval engagement of the fleets at Navarino, but by and large, the combined European fleet was sent to Greece to guarantee the end of hostilities and prevent the ultimate defeat of the Greek rebels. For a detailed account of the diplomatic and military dimensions of Navarino, see Wood house (1969).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

101

identity. The ideas of the Enlightenment and other modes of European thought contributed to the “making of modern Greece”; consequently, being European is integral to Greek identity, and the geopolitical attachment to the West is part of the self-image of the Greeks as a political community.22 In this regard, it can be said that the emerging Greek identity already framed the interests of the Greek-speaking world and the newly established Greek state. When it comes to the emergence of a Greek identity, however, there is also a literature that comes from the opposite direction, claiming that this identity is not a self-directed reflection of Greek history but a projection of European power and cultural-colonial practices. From this perspective, interpretations and political uses of the Greek classical past are imported from the West and, therefore, “much of what Greeks have thereby been constrained to consider as truly Greek seems to have less to do with ancient Greek cultures and polities than with the values of their so-called protectors in Western Europe.” Consequently, modern Greek identity is a by-product, a marginal outcome, in the West’s “global struggle for cultural and political dominance” (Herzfeld, 2014, p. 42). Essentially, the same approach has been applied to the wider region of the Balkans, to people who have more or less common historical trajectories to modernity that grant them a common distinctive character. For example, in the footsteps of Said’s Orientalism, Vesna Goldsworthy argued that the Balkans were invented in Western political discourses and artistic production as a “wild east” on the threshold of Europe (Goldsworthy, 1998). Equally, the denotation of the Ottoman Empire as an evil or despotic empire stuck in the Dark Ages was another branch of orientalism in the Near East (see Adamr, 2017Çirakman, 2001; Kaiser, 2000).Top of Form In a similar fashion, Todorova’s “Balkanism” intended to show how the instrumental use of a geographic label—Balkans, Balkanization—created geopolitical perceptions that played, and are still playing, a central role in the politics of the region (Todorova, 2009; see also Bjelić & Savić, 2002). The crux of the argument in all these approaches is that Western projections of Greece and the Balkans in general deeply affected the identity, the self-awareness, and by extension the political behavior of Greeks and other people in the region. However, all the above approaches (based on both security interests and the Greek identity) somewhat disregard the fact that the international environment at the time of the Greek Enlightenment and the struggle for independence was utterly unfavorable to the Greek cause (Woodhouse, 1952, p. 45).

22

For this approach, see Kitromilides (2013), Myrogiannis (2012), and Beaton & Ricks

102

CHAPTER 3

The Congress of Vienna and especially the treaty of the Holy Alliance were established to prevent liberal, ethnic, and secular uprisings that would endanger the imperial order on the continent (see Jarrett, 2014; Fischer-Galati, 1953; Knapton, 1941). Indeed, there was a predominant pro-Greek sentiment in the public opinion of the great powers, an intellectual tradition that recognized classical antiquity as a European patrimony and was anxious to see Greece liberated from the centuries-old Ottoman rule (Philhellenism) (Kasaba, 2003). Nevertheless, given that the Greek War of Independence was a national revolution spurred by the ideals of the Enlightenment, which risked the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, it did not have the official blessing of the great European powers. It is difficult, therefore, to fully explain the geopolitical fixation of Greek intellectuals and later revolutionaries on Europe and the West, based on their genuine hope for support and security. It has been suggested that the Greek War of Independence, the extreme persistence of the revolutionaries, combined with the brutality of the Ottoman reaction, were significant factors in changing the stance of the great powers and even in the eventual dismantling of the Holy Alliance (Svolopoulos, 2014a, p. 21). This, however, still does not justify any interest calculation that predicted European support. It is equally difficult to accept that the conservative European powers, who were united against Greek independence, were at the same time conducive to a cultural-colonialist projection of a Greek identity that actually favored a liberal, ethno-national revolution. Besides, from an analytical point of view, it makes no difference whether these perceptions originated in Western practices of “cultural colonialism,” as argued by Herzfeld, Goldsworthy, and Todorova, or in the minds of the Greek intellectuals themselves. Finally, with regard to origins, when scholars talk about the emerging Greek national identity as the “making of modern Greece,” they explicitly cite the Enlightenment as the root of modern Greek identity—and therefore Europe as a fundamental concept defining Greece’s geopolitical priorities. In other words, they implicitly recognize the emergence of Greek identity as a primarily modern experience. Here, what is overlooked, however, is that the origins of identity—Greek or otherwise—may also be traced further back to premodern, ancient, or medieval times (Smith, 1994). For example, as in the aforementioned treatise by Pyrros, the Turks were portrayed as the latest thread in a series of eastern-bound invasions of the Greek-speaking world that stretched from the Persian Wars in the 5th century bce to the fall of Constantinople in 1453. For millennia, between the 5th cen and the 19th century, the Greek-speaking world endured and was also

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

103

defined by a series of invasions originating from the East. More than a dozen invading tribes and people, from the Persians to the Mongols to the Seljuk Turks, reached the shores of Asia Minor and moved into Europe through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. This subordination to Asia and to westbound invasions from Anatolia conforms with what Mackinder (1904, p. 423) believed about European civilization being “the outcome of the secular struggle against Asiatic invasion.” For a millennium, according to Mackinder, a series of nomadic, horse-riding tribes—the Huns, the Mongols, the Khazars—invaded the heart of the European continent from the East, stimulating a reactive selfconsciousness of the European people (pp. 425–427). A major difference is that the Greek-speaking world of the Eastern Mediterranean also experienced a wave of invasions coming from the Latin West. From the Roman subjugation of the Greek city-states, to the fall of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade in 1254, to the Venetian dominion over the Greek islands during the Renaissance, the Aegean and the Straits have also been a transit area for European ideas and armies looking for access to Asia, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean Basin. Therefore, if the Crusades stirred and united Europe in a way that marks the beginning of modern history, as Mackinder (1904, p. 431) writes, then the Crusades, especially the Fourth Crusade that involved the capture of Constantinople in 1254, also marked the realization on behalf of the Greek-speaking Eastern Roman Empire that Western Europe was beginning to show signs of a distinctive cultural unity—under the spiritual and political leadership of the popes (see, e.g., Page, 2008). (For a related example, in 1354, in the first translation of Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, Demetrios Kydonis spoke of the “new light” that was coming from the West (quoted in Giannaras, 2006, p. 9). Starting from the late Byzantine period, with Greek-speaking intellectuals translating and debating the theological work of Aquinas, this designation of the West as an enlightened entity became a standard theme in Greek relations with the Europe (Giannaras, 2006, pp. 73–80).) Essentially, however, the Aegean archipelago was to the West what Asia Minor was to the East: a beachhead from which to wrest control of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Straits of Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea were the gateway to Anatolia and from there to the closed heart of Central Asia. Therefore, the central positioning of the Greek-speaking populations may have been inevitably shaped also by Western expeditions looking to gain access to Asia as much as it was by Eastern invasions that were looking to penetrate con tinental Europe. So, overall, we can say with a certain degree of confidence that there is at least some evidence to suggest that the modern Greek identity

104

CHAPTER 3

and the pro-European orientation as a fixed element of this identity is not an exclusively modern artifact—it cannot be entirely attributed to the Enlightenment. Again, however, from an analytical point of view, the origins of a modern Greek identity are not as important as the way that it was articulated in public discourse. What is important is that Greece’s geopolitical orientation toward Europe and the West, whether it was a rational interest calculation or a matter of identity—imported from abroad or homemade, it does not matter—was expressed in a number of key narratives and stories. And these narratives and stories form a coherent structure, a geopolitical myth of belonging that defines a community and its territory, its position in relation to an enemy and an ally, a highly symbolic object that legitimizes and frames Greece’s pro-European geopolitical orientation. At this stage, the emerging myth of belonging is dense but highly intelligible, thanks to the fact that all the explanatory elements discussed above—the actual security threat; the uneven economic and technological development; the ancient, medieval, and modern elements of an emerging national awareness—are all encapsulated in its narratives and stories that speak of the temporal and spatial continuity of the Greek world, its centrality in-between East and West, and its affinity with Europe (see Table 6). This inclusiveness is a quality that increases the acceptability and the wide recognition of the myth—in other words, its truthfulness—and by extension its potential for legitimization and mobilization. Table 6  The great idea: analysis of key narratives and stories

Geopolitical myth

Narratives

Stories

Centrality

– The liberal and enlightened West – The despotic and dark East – “Greece is the center of Europe [with] the East on its right and the West on its left” – A glorious past vs. a miserable present – Philosophy “returns to her first nest” – Decline and rebirth – The Greek colonies civilized barbaric Europe – “The sting that embroidered European civilization” [Greece] enlightened the West

The Great Idea Continuity “Greece is destined to enlighten the East” Affinity

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

105

The Greek-speaking world and the wider Balkan Peninsula in the 18th and 19th centuries were considered—and to some extent they still are—to be in a position that straddles East and West (see, e.g., Stavrianos, 1974; Stoianovich, 1992; Winrow, 1993). Arguably, the Greek-speaking world was beaten and hammered into shape, forged by fiery East–West interactions, and contemporary Greek geopolitical narratives still frame the centrality of the region (see, e.g., Rasku, 2007).23 (However, this sense of being “in-between” was by no means unique to the Greek-speaking world; see Scopetea, 2003) The bottom line is that the transmission of the ideas of the European Enlightenment through the Balkans played a key role in the development of national self-awareness (see Kitromilides, 1994; Roudometof, 1998; Trencsényi & Kopeček, 2007). The period of the Greek Enlightenment also corresponds therefore to what Gérard Bouchard describes as the first stage of a three-stage mythmaking process that creates a sacred, that is, effective, myth. Diffusion refers to the initial spreading of the myth or of some of its elements to the wider public, which is followed by a series of actions modeled on its narrative core (ritualization) and ends with the myth becoming an apparent truth, an object of sacred significance (sacralization) (Bouchard, 2013, 2014). The political geography and the cartography of the Greek Enlightenment contributed to the wider recognition of the belonging myth. They offered the most appropriate medium for the expression of its geopolitical narratives and stories because they corresponded with the need for a modern self-awareness and a sense of place driven by the expansion of the European Enlightenment and the relative recession of Ottoman authority. In this regard, the transmission of both the European Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution through the Greek-speaking world in particular provided the intellectual infra structure for the diffusion of the narratives and stories that make up a distinct geopolitical myth about the position of modern Greece in the world. In 1844, after statehood was achieved, the emerging myth of belonging found its first clear political expression in the lines of Kolettis’s speech about the Great Idea of the Greek nation. The key narratives and stories articulated and diffused by the intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment were also the core of the Great Idea—without them, Kolettis’s speech and his geopolitical vision are not intelligible. First of all, Kolettis conjured an image of a world that placed Greece in a central position—the “center of Europe”—between East and West. Further, ’s dream of a philosophy that “returns to her first nest,” along with Apart from politics, this discourse of Greece being between East and West is predominant also in studies of modern Greek art and literature, for example in Dimaras (1968).

106

CHAPTER 3

his earlier unsophisticated argument that the Greek colonies civilized the barbaric nomads of Europe like “a sting that embroidered European civilization,” were eloquently refined by Kolettis as the “enlightenment of the West with Greece’s fall.” Consequently, the Great Idea reproduced the same feelings of cultural affinity and closeness to Europe that the 18th-century Greek intellectuals introduced in their writings. The story of the despotic and dark Ottoman Empire associated with the East was present as well. Kolettis’s Great Idea framed the East as barbaric, uncivilized, and unenlightened; thus, the Greeks had a mission to carry their newly found enlightenment to the East. Kolettis took the argument a step further by identifying a collective mission for the Greek nation: the enlightenment and ennoblement of the East. This turned out to be the thrust of the Great Idea: Kolettis placed national self-awareness on a new footing and expressed a collective mission for the political and geographical unification of the Greekspeaking populations under the flag of a Greek nation-state. In essence, therefore, the Great Idea was the end product of a mythmaking process that took place within the Greek Enlightenment, roughly during the years between 1760 and 1820. At the same time, it was also the starting point of a series of strategic and foreign policy decisions that resulted in the territorial expansion that defined the Greek state up to the beginning of the 20th century. For example, it is fascinating to see the same language, the same narratives and stories, employed, for example, in the official declaration of the First Balkan War in 1912 against Turkey, when Greece justified the aggression as a “crusade of progress, civilization, and liberty against Asian conquerors” (quoted in Adamr, 2017, p. 13). Despite its transformations, or rather adaptations (which we will discuss in the next chapter), the myth, with all its constituent narratives and stories, survived almost intact, offering legitimacy to the newly established Greek state and mobilizing support for its strategy and foreign policy for several decades to come. 3

Opposing the West and Greek Romanticism

The previous section traced mythmaking in modern Greece from the middle of the 18th century to the creation of the modern Greek state in the 1830s and 1840s. Within this period the Greek Enlightenment, as an extension of the European Enlightenment, acted as a conduit for new perceptions of the natu ral world and the emergence of a modern self-awareness and sense of place among the Greek-speaking populations. This sense of place was expressed by a distinctive literature of Political Geography and the diffusion of three key

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

107

narratives, namely, the centrality of the Greek world between East and West, the continuity of the Greek nation from the classical to the modern era, and Greece’s cultural affinity with Europe and the West. In turn, these narratives underlined the core tenets of the Great Idea, a precursor of the belonging myth that legitimized and framed Greek foreign policy as far into the future as the 1920s. This section will examine the opposition to the belonging myth posed by alternative myths—a process that also resulted in the gradual adaptation of the belonging narratives—such as the myth of Russian expectation (i.e., Russia as an alternative role model for Greece and a great power willing to defend Greek aspirations for ascendancy), as well as the myth of the Byzantine revival (i.e., the restitution of what was considered a medieval Greek Empire). The Russian expectation developed in parallel to the initial diffusion of the belonging narratives (1760–1820) as a reaction to the philosophical expansion of the European Enlightenment in the Greek-speaking world. In sum, Russian enlightened despotism and religious conservatism offered a reactionary alternative to European secularism and liberalism. The Byzantine revival materialized much later (1850s), driven by the coming of the Romantic movement with its emphasis on the medieval and folklore elements of the nation—which can also be considered as a reactionary alternative to the classicism of the Enlightenment. At this stage the geopolitical mythmaking process included an adaptation of the affinity narrative to include the Orthodox religion, and an adaptation of the continuity narrative to include the Byzantine Empire as the link between classical and modern Greece. The textual examination will continue from the same corpus of Political Geography literature during the period of the Greek Enlightenment that also shaped the initial contours of an alternative affinity with Russia. The focus will then shift to the works of historiographers that dealt with the issue of national continuity. The last part will examine the limits of opposition and the adaptation of a narrative of Western dependence that ushered Greece into the 20th century. 3.1 Absolutism, Religion, and the Russian Expectation What is regularly given less prominence in the history of modern Greece is that the European Enlightenment was not the only driver of the Greek War of Independence and by extension not the only reference for the emergence of a modern Greek self-awareness. In parallel to the Greek Enlightenment (1760– 1820) and the Greek War of Independence (1821–1829), until after the formal establishment of the Greek state—in other words, the formative years of mod ern Greece—there existed also a special cultural and ideological relationship with Russia that fostered Greek revolutionary fervor and later influenced the

108

CHAPTER 3

emergence of Greek nationalism (Nicolopoulos, 1985). Before proceeding to the analysis of the narratives and stories that emerge with regard to Russia, it is important to mention here a number of background issues to put this relationship in context. The first issue is the well-documented economic links that developed between the Greek diaspora and Russia in the 1700s and 1800s, which influenced the development of Russian ports in the Black Sea (e.g., Odessa) and defined the grain trade in the Eastern Mediterranean (see Saul, 1970). The second is the Russo-Turkish antagonism in the Black Sea, the Balkans, and the Aegean, which had generated a series of wars between 1768 and 1812, an increased Russian presence in these regions, and, as a consequence, a special Russian interest in the Greek-speaking world (Kitromilides, 2013, p. 185; see also Ragsdale, 1988; Zorin & Levitt, 2014, pp. 24–60). Third, on a philosophical level, the concept of enlightened despotism or absolutism, which has been associated with Russian rulers such as Catherine II, was influential for some intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment (as we will discuss below), and this influence mirrors the ephemeral fascination with Russia among the figureheads of the European Enlightenment, such as Voltaire and Diderot.24 Finally, what is by far the most important contextual element of Greek– Russian relations, for the purposes of this study, during the period of the Greek Enlightenment in the 18th and 19th centuries is the fascination of the Greek-speaking world with a set of religious, messianic prophesies of deliverance from Ottoman captivity with the support of Imperial Russia. Whereas the achievements of the European people were a guiding light toward individual and national enlightenment, freedom, and cultural edification, the Russian expectation was not based on a political logic of history; instead, it was perceived as a God-given necessity (Kitromilides, 2013, pp. 120–123). Russians (known in Greek folklore as “ksantho genos,” the “fair nation” or “blonde race”) appeared in these religious stories as God-appointed redeemers of their Greek brothers in the Orthodox faith. Ottoman captivity was a collective earthly purgatory for the sins of the Byzantine Empire, whereas its restitution through Russian intervention was a millenarian promise of redemption. Greeks’ attraction to Russia was adorned with stories concerning their long-lasting cultural and religious ties with Russia.25 24

Voltaire’s attraction to Catherine the Great is notorious and evident throughout their cor respondence; see Gorbatov (2006). The most important document expressing the beliefs and stories concerning Russia as the redeemer of the Byzantine Empire is the so-called Agathangelos, a collection of prophesies that is supposed to have been written by a monk in the 13th century, although

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

109

Russia was also keen to be perceived as the protector of the Orthodox faith and of Christians living in the Ottoman Empire. Moscow relied on its own political myths and nationalist tendencies in order to claim the title of the “Third Rome” (Ostrowski, 2007). The myth of the Third Rome, too, was enmeshed in national exceptionalism and anti-Western sentiments (Østbø & Kolstø, 2016). Russian messianism is also an enduring geopolitical representation rooted in the Orthodox faith (Duncan, 2014). Therefore, it was highly compatible with the faith-fueled traditional Greek expectations of redemption from Ottoman captivity and the restitution of the Byzantine Empire with messianic Russian intervention. This irrational belief in Russian intervention, which was “too mythopoetic to be attributed to mere tactical considerations in [the Greeks’] struggle for personal and collective emancipation,” enticed the Greek-speaking world for centuries. However, the dream of the Russians restoring the Byzantine Empire became a concrete hope during the reign of Peter I and, even more so, that of Catherine II in the 18th century (Nicolopoulos, 1985, p. 42). Peter I, the Great (reigned from 1672–1725), instituted a series of cultural and social reforms that had immense consequences for the standing of Russia as a great European power and, as a result, captivated the imagination of both European and Greek scholars of the Enlightenment (see Cracraft, 2006). Peter’s reign, for example, featured in Fatzeas’s geographical treatise as a triumph of cultural change based on the tenets of the European Enlightenment (Fatzeas, 1760). According to Fatzeas, Peter the Great was the first Russian emperor to “defend the muses, after he brought them from the kingdoms of Europe” and to establish an educational system that did not differ from its European counterparts (Fatzeas, 1760, I, p. 187). The Russian people were learned in the European languages and had adopted the high ethical standards of the European nations (I, p. 188). The Tsar taught his people everything he learned from his journeys to the European capitals with the aim to ennoble them and enable them to overcome their “evil habits” (I, pp. 188–189). Fatzeas then proceeded to describe in detail the enlightened Russian monarchy that had made this later scholarship attributes the text to Theokletos Polyeides, an Athonite monk of the 18th century. The version used in this study was the 11th edition of a reproduction of the original printed in Athens [date not disclosed] and available from the Anemi digital library. Ο Αγαθάγγελος :ήτοι προφητείαι περί του μέλλοντος των εθνών και ιδίως περί της Ελλάδος : οπτασία ερανισθείσα εκ παλαιών χειρογράφων μετ ακριβούς ερμηνείας όλων των συμβησομένων.11η έκδ.Αθήναι :Μιχ. Σαλίβερος Α.Ε.,[χ.χ.] [Agathangelos: prophesies about the future of nations and especially of Greece: a vision compiled by older manuscripts, with an exact interpretation of events. Athens: M. Saliveros].

110

CHAPTER 3

cultural change possible (I, pp. 189–194). Fatzeas’s account of Peter the Great followed the publication of two hagiographies of the Russian Tsar and an increase in bilateral relations (such as the organization of frequent visits of Greek intellectuals to the Russian imperial court) at the outset of the 18th century (Kitromilides, 2013, pp. 175–177). In Fatzeas’s volume of Political Geography, Russia was a part or an extension of Europe, an easternmost European country that was receiving the same kind of intellectual influences that Greece was receiving from the West. And it was, of course, far more successful in the implementation of the tenets of the Enlightenment. In other words, the Greek world perceived Russia during the reign of Peter the Great as a success story of European Enlightenment. Catherine II, the Great, was crowned Empress of Russia in 1762. Catherine’s stated intention, just like Peter I before her, was to modernize Russia, and in theory at least, she appeared to have been influenced by the liberal ideas of the European Enlightenment. Catherine’s genuine commitment to Enlightenment ideals and her influence on European intellectuals has been evaluated elsewhere, as has, generally speaking, the concept of enlightened despotism or absolutism.26 The influence of Catherine as an enlightened monarch is evident in the thought of Evgenios Voulgaris (1716–1806), one of the most important figures of the Greek Enlightenment.27 Voulgaris was an Orthodox priest who pioneered the introduction of philosophical concepts of the Enlightenment in the Greekspeaking world, such as logic and religious tolerance. He translated Voltaire into Greek and published philosophical and theological treatises in Germany, and in 1772 he accepted Catherine’s patronage and joined the Russian imperial court as a librarian.28 From there, he undertook the task of a Greek translation of Catherine’s Nakaz—the Empress’s instruction to the Russian Legislative Commission regarding the introduction of a modern code of laws. It could be argued that the Nakaz was the manifesto of enlightened despotism; ideas of the European Enlightenment, such as Montesquieu’s rule of law, permeated the text, but Catherine’s foremost objective was to strengthen autocratic rule.29 Voulgaris added his own voice to the Greek translation of Catherine’s Nakaz, expressing his high hopes for enlightened despotism as a force for cultural 26 27 28 29

For Catherine the Great and the Enlightenment, see Dmytryshyn (1974). For enlightened despotism or absolutism in general, see Scott (1994). For the central role of Evgenios Voulgaris in the Greek Enlightenment, see Kitromilides (2010b, p. 39). All biographical elements taken from Batalden (1982). Both classical and more recent histories of Russian modernization agree on this interpre tation; see Dukes (1977, p. 43), Hosking (1997, p. 98), and Dixon (1999, p. 172).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

111

change in the Greek-speaking world (Voulgaris, 1770). He shared the same optimism as some of the Western European intellectuals had that the strong political hand of an enlightened despot could enact the necessary reforms for a cultural change in line with the ideals of the Enlightenment. Catherine’s program for legal and administrative reform was, for Voulgaris, a road map for the emancipation of the Greek-speaking population from the fetters of Ottoman tyranny.30 It was not only spiritual emancipation Voulgaris was hoping for; in the Greek version of the Nakaz his commentary refers to Catherine as a magnanimous monarch and a “protector” of the “conterminous” or fraternal nations (Voulgaris, 1770, pp. 8–16). In the pages that follow this salutation, Voulgaris considers the practical assistance that the Russian military might be able to offer the Greeks, especially in the Aegean Sea, as a counterweight to Ottoman power (pp. 17–24). But most importantly, Voulgaris refers his reader to a certain strand of prophecies that thrill the “simple people,” citing the Russians as the “Blonde Race,” which is supposed to triumph over the Turks, liberate the Greeks, and return the Greek East to greatness (p. 18). Indirectly at least, Voulgaris endorsed these prophetic visions and linked them with the political agenda of Russian enlightened despotism; in effect, he provided a rational expression for religious, mystic superstitions—and in so doing he amplified the message of the Russian expectation and its capacity for penetrating the conservative and devout Greek-speaking populations, who proved to be less open-minded to the secular ideas of the European Enlightenment (Kitromilides, 2013, p. 178). In a later essay titled “Reflections on the current critical times of the Ottoman state” (Voulgaris, 1854) (the essay was published anonymously, but both Kitromilides (2013, p. 183) and Batalden (1982, pp. 29–30) believe the evidence is substantial to attribute it to him), Voulgaris introduced the idea that the behavior of the European powers was an obstacle to the realization of Greek independence. In fact, then, Voulgaris was the first Greek intellectual to blame the West for being too soft and accommodating vis-à-vis the collapsing Ottoman Empire. Considering the possibility that the Ottomans could regroup and avoid collapse, Voulgaris (1854, pp. 8–9, 18–22) claimed that European idleness was effectively obstructing Greek independence. Russia, on the contrary, although Catherine was always mindful not to disrupt the European equilib rium, was the only great power that could keep the Ottomans in check (p. 42). Nevertheless, Voulgaris closed the essay by presenting his case that the creation For the reform agenda of Catherine , see Madariaga (1982, pp. 139–163).

112

CHAPTER 3

of a Greek state in the European territories of the Ottoman Empire would pay service to European equilibrium (p. 43). To some extent, Voulgaris’s “Reflections” effectively anticipated the Eastern Question and the need to manage the European territories of the collapsing Ottoman state in a way that would not disrupt the European balance of power. Voulgaris also recognized the space for territorial expansion that a collapsing Ottoman Empire would provide when Greece managed to achieve statehood. Hence, dissatisfied with the reception of the European Enlightenment in the Greek world, Voulgaris turned to Russian enlightened despotism for an effective alternative. Voulgaris’s publications after his acceptance of Catherine’s patronage presented a range of counter-strategies for achieving national independence and cultural change in place of the project of imitation of the European powers, with which the Greeks shared a common past and a cultural affinity. Voulgaris’s perception of Europe as inhibiting Greek revolutionary aspirations later became a major theme of opposition for political forces in Greece that ranged from being suspicious of to being openly hostile toward the West. Voulgaris’s depiction of Russia was much more attractive to conservative and traditional elements in Greek society: after all, Russia could also be seen as a country on the margins of Europe that had chosen a different path from modernity. Russian rulers had the power and the resolution to elaborate a program of modernization that was based on the European Enlightenment but also respected the sensibilities and the particularities of the Russian people. The top-down approach of “enlightened despotism” and the attempted compromise between modernity and tradition were the two elements of the Russian model that made it so attractive to Voulgaris and his followers. In his “Reflections” Voulgaris urged his compatriots to pay attention to the Russian path to modernity and the rapid transformation of the Russian nation—previously considered barbaric, almost savage—which had enabled it to reach the highest levels of eminence, power, and glory (Voulgaris, 1854, pp. 24–25). When Voulgaris published his essays from St. Petersburg, the only formal Greek-speaking political force was the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (which also administered an influential community of mystics and monk-scholars in the secluded monasteries of Mount Athos). Voulgaris, a high-ranking priest himself, had headed both the Patriarchal and the Athonite Academies in the past; he was expelled from both by the church hierarchy due to his philosophical inclinations toward the Enlightenment. He was qui etly exiled in Germany, from where he was free to publish his philosophical treatises, before moving eastward to St. Petersburg. Numerous other members

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

113

of the priesthood and common people alike followed, more or less, the same trajectory. To the extent that the Enlightenment challenged church authority, all religious seats of power—including the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople—approached it cautiously as a possible existential threat (McInelly & Kerry, 2018). The Greek Orthodox Church, however, was doubly hostile to the notion of cultural transformation according to European standards out of fear of the possible conversion of Orthodox populations to Catholicism (Kitromilides, 2013, pp. 274–276). Conversely, the Church was far more comfortable with the conservative foundations of enlightened despotism than with the secular and progressive objectives of the Western European Enlightenment. Moreover, the Ecumenical Patriarchate maintained excellent relations with the Russian Orthodox Church and its hierarchy, while the monastic community of Mount Athos, the Holy Mountain, played a major part in the elaboration and dissemination of the prophetic visions concerning the intervention of the “Blonde Race” in favor of Greek independence (Hatzopoulos, 2009). As a consequence, Voulgaris’s conversion to enlightened despotism, and the fact that his patroness was an Orthodox ruler, not only put the Greek Orthodox Church at ease regarding his latest publications but also provided the Church with an alternative narrative based on a rational understanding of international politics and the balance of power. A Russian expectation in the lines of a messianic, religious tradition had stirred the Greek-speaking Orthodox populations for centuries; but there was no formal political expression of an alternative cultural model that deviated from the path illuminated by the European Enlightenment. That changed with Catherine and her endorsement in the Greek-speaking world by Evgenios Voulgaris, for whom the Russian expectation was no longer a mere prophecy but had become a distinct possibility. Yearning for revolution, there were several other Greek intellectuals apart from Voulgaris who fomented the Russian expectation. Among them, Athanasios Psalidas (1767–1829) is the most interesting case. Psalidas’s first publication, titled Real Bliss (Psalidas, 1791), came out amid the fighting of the second Russo-Turkish war and was dedicated to the Russian Empress. Although he shared with Voulgaris the same hope for Russian intervention in favor of the Greeks, Psalidas used a different narrative than the aged Greek prelate of the Russian court. Instead of relying on prophecies or the analysis of international relations, as Voulgaris did, Psalidas returned to the Greek Enlightenment’s earlier themes of ancient glory and the lamentation of the current Greek pre dicament under the barbaric Ottoman rule. In his dedication to Catherine the Great, Psalidas did not hesitate to deploy barefaced flattery, comparing

114

CHAPTER 3

the Empress to Plato and claiming that her deeds demanded that the ancient gods—Zeus, Ares, Athena, Apollo, and the Muses—arise and watch; he then went on to visualize Greece as a once splendid woman, now wretched and miserable under the barbaric Turkish yoke, who extends her arm to Russia for redemption (p. 6 [χ.σ]). Works such as those of Fatzeas, Voulgaris, and Psalidas adapted the affinity narrative to allow it to include religious elements in the geopolitical mythmaking process. All of them lamented the position of the Greek nation in Ottoman captivity, but instead of imitating the “enlightened” West, they proposed that Greece should follow Russia’s alternative model of reforms, an alternative system of governance, and a trajectory toward European modernity that was by default more sensitive to the particularities of the Orthodox religion. The call to imitate Russian modernization efforts came in a religious disguise, combined with sacred prophecies and myths about the “Blonde Race.” But it also came in a rational version, based on the analysis of international relations and the European equilibrium of power. In this way, some long-standing and pervasive religious folklores (which already had a “mythopoetic” quality) were transformed into a concrete geopolitical narrative of cultural affinity with Russia. Indeed, toward the end of the 18th century, the vicissitudes of international politics seemed to favor the Russian expectation. On the one hand, the Russo-Turkish antagonism in the Black Sea, the Balkans, and the Aegean had generated a series of wars in 1768–1774, 1787–1792, and 1806–1812, all of which ended with Russian victories that were celebrated by the Greek-speaking populations (and by Voulgaris himself) as a sign that the prophecies were coming true (Kitromilides, 2013, p. 185). On the other hand, Russian foreign policy in the Balkans did not miss the opportunity to increase its influence in the region and, of course, to cause internal problems for the Ottoman Empire (Ragsdale, 1988; see also Zorin & Levitt, 2014, pp. 24–60). Not only the expansion of the European Enlightenment, but also Russo-Turkish antagonism, Russian propaganda, and the growing Russian expectation, with the blessings of the Orthodox Church, were contributing factors in the outburst of revolutionary fervor among the Greek-speaking population at the beginning of the 19th century. The redemption that Voulgaris and Psalidas hoped for did not come, not even after the Russian military victories in 1774 and 1792. In both cases the Greek-speaking populations had done their part and revolted against the Otto mans; in both cases Russia failed to support the rebellions to the end, despite their triumph against the Ottomans. Both revolutions ended in immense pain and bloodshed for the Greek rebels. Consequently, Greek intellectuals became

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

115

increasingly disillusioned with enlightened despotism and the Russian expectation lost its luster (Kitromilides, 2013, p. 191). This disappointment was all the more notable in Psalidas’s abrupt conversion from a fomenter of the Russian expectation to a fierce critic of Russian policies toward the Greeks. Just three years after the publication of Real Bliss, Psalidas published a denouncement of the Russian expectation, which also included a thorough assault on Voulgaris’s philosophical standpoint (Psalidas, 1795, p. 192). If Voulgaris started out as a radical intellectual inspired by the Western European Enlightenment then retreated to more conservative views in his later years spent in Russia, Psalidas travelled in the opposite direction: initially an arduous supporter of the Russian expectation, he quickly turned to adopt a more radical philosophical stance along the lines of the European Enlightenment. Nevertheless, the Russian expectation was not erased from Greek geopolitical thought thereafter, nor was the notion of enlightened despotism. The representation of Russia as the redeemer of the Greek Byzantine Empire receded, but its emergence delineated one of the spaces within which Greek geopolitics would unfold from then on. The narrative of affinity with Europe and the West, although already intrinsic to Greek self-awareness and sense of place, was set against an opposing narrative of religious affinity with Russia. The legacy of these early raptures of failed Greek revolutions at the turn of the 19th century that were looking eastward to Russia instead of westward to Europe meant that the myth of belonging to Europe and the West was subject to geopolitical opposition. The enduring influence of Russia as an alternative geopolitical focus that legitimized and mobilized opposition to an unconditional belonging to Europe and the West was obvious in the political life of the first decades of the independent Greek state. Before the revolution, radical liberal ideas coexisted with the prophetic visions of Russian intervention among a surge of revolutionary pamphlets and publications (Koumarianou, 1971). After independence, the political struggle to influence the strategic orientation of the newborn Kingdom of Greece also took place between those two geopolitical poles and their opposing affinity narratives. The issue of Greece’s strategic orientation was linked to the deviating interests of Russia , and France in the newly recognized state, and this deviation gave rise to the first political parties in Greece, which were named according to their support for a foreign great power. The English, French, and Russian political parties all agreed on the necessity of foreign intervention in Greek affairs but differed on their professed power of choice. As a matter of fact, apart from variations in their organization, geographic coverage, and popular

116

CHAPTER 3

support, the key identifying characteristic of these parties was their foreign orientation (Petropulos, 1968, pp. 96–107, 134–143; see also Hering, 2006). In the first decades after the revolution (partly due to the heavy dependence of the state economy on foreign loans (Lignadis, 1975)), foreign intervention in Greece was internalized as an accepted political practice, one that should be actively pursued and welcomed; as a result, the strategic and geopolitical orientation of the country emerged as the principal cleavage in Greek politics. The French Party was a wide coalition of sociopolitical groups, united behind the charismatic Ioannis Kolettis. The party’s political strategy was to foster tensions at the local level in order to obtain benefits at the central political level (Petropulos, 1968, pp. 85–86, 88–89, 98–100, 136). In contrast, the British Party’s popular support was significantly lower; however, with a declared objective of institutional modernization, its influence was stronger within a restricted circle in the upper echelons of society and in particular among prominent individuals in the public administration and in the Greek diaspora (Petropulos, 1968, pp. 242–248). The Russian Party maintained strong ties with Russian diplomatic officials and its local support extended to the entire Greek territory, including the regions that were still part of the Ottoman Empire.31 Concerning Greece’s orientation, the Russian Party of course vowed to establish ever-closer relations with its fellow Orthodox country and supported Ioannis Capodistrias as the first Governor of Greece (Capodistrias had previously served as joint Foreign Minister in the service of Alexander I of Russia). Most of all, the Russian Party concentrated its political action around the abstract idea of the “defense of Orthodoxy” in Greece; it embodied an intellectual trend in the newborn Greek state that was seeking in Russia an alternative model of modernity, a model of coexistence between secular and ecclesiastical power that did not move in one direction only, from the West to the East. It is worth noting here that the same cautious reaction to cultural transfers coming from the West was observed in both the Russian and Ottoman empires.32 Apart from the foremost issue of foreign intervention and Greece’s strategic orientation, as well as the fundamental concern about defending religion and traditional values, the Greek political parties were divided over the system of governance of the kingdom. The British and French parties called for a constitutional monarchy, whereas the Russian Party had more authoritative inclina tions and favored absolute power for the Greek monarch. In other words, the

For the origins and structure of the Russian Party, see Petropulos (1968, pp. 111–119). For a literature review of this reactionary phenomenon, see Kappeler (2011).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

117

Russian Party appeared as the main proponent of enlightened despotism and a direct political descendant of the Russian expectation. With regard to the system of government of the Greek state, the radical liberalism of the Enlightenment was initially defeated; the hope for the establishment of a liberal democracy was incompatible with the general political environment in the country at the time. At first, the position of governor echoed the dictums of enlightened despotism, whereas later absolute monarchy emerged as the only possible solution to the morose state of affairs in the administration of the Greek state. Consequently, the Russian Party enjoyed at least one period of prevalence between 1837 and 1840 that Petropulos (1968, pp. 270–343) called “Russian ascendancy.” Ultimately, the ascendancy of the Russian Party was short-lived, but it exerted a strong influence on the country’s strategic orientation, the role of religion in relation to the state, and the system of governance for the newly established Kingdom of Greece. Enlightened despotism challenged the dominance of liberal ideals in the Greek-speaking world. The transformation of religious stories into a rational expectation framed Russia as a real geopolitical option and set it against the ideological secularism of the European Enlightenment. In turn, these messianic stories outlined an alternative affinity narrative based on religion that competed with the cultural—but secular—affinity with Europe and the West. Furthermore, it opened up more opportunities for opposition: if religion and tradition were to be accepted as legitimate concerns in the debate concerning the degree and character of the modernization of the Greek state, then the Byzantine Empire—not only classical antiquity—could also be an appropriate referent for Greek nationalism. In the 1850s, the advent of Romanticism in Greece acted as a stimulus for further opposition in the confrontation between religion and secularism, between tradition and modernity, and between classicism and medievalism. 3.2 Romantic Historiography and the Byzantine Revival Romanticism was an intellectual movement that first took shape in European literature; from there it expanded to influence the visual arts and politics. Scholarship does not agree on an exact definition and periodization of the Romantic movement, but the broad definition describes “[a]n eighteenth- and nineteenth-century concept of an era informed by the profound experience of momentous political, social and intellectual revolutions” (Saul, 2009, p. 1). These profound and momentous revolutions dealt with many themes and found various ways to express themselves, but they shared a conscious reactionary qual ity: they came as a reaction to the core principles of the Enlightenment, such as scientific objectivity, rationalism, classicism, and humanism. According

118

CHAPTER 3

to Isaiah Berlin, in essence Romanticism was a “Counter-Enlightenment”— a conscious or unconscious desire for an emotional expression of subjective experience as opposed to the objectivity of Reason, an attempt to contradict and reverse the rationalization of nature, the nation, and the individual (­Berlin & Hardy, 2000, pp. 34–47, 57–59, 183–206; see also Mali & Wokler, 2003; McMahon, 2002). It is no paradox that an intellectual movement imported to Greece from Europe was also a contributing factor to opposition to the central geopolitical function of Europe and the West in Greek politics. To the extent that the Romantic movement emerged from a crisis of European modernity—for example in England (Kaiser, 1999), in Germany (Kohn, 1950), and elsewhere— it was also linked with nationalist movements and the depreciation of common, humanist ideas of European origin. The first stirrings of Romanticism in Europe coincided with the rebirth of the Greek nation (Dimaras, 2009, p. 3). But, like the Enlightenment before it, Romanticism reached Greece fashionably late, decades after attaining its peak of influence in continental Europe. Regardless of the timing, the spread of Romanticism in Greece and among the Greek-speaking populations that were still part of the Ottoman Empire is, in itself, a confirmation of the continual exposure of the Greek East to Western philosophies and ideas. This observation holds even though the conditions for the emergence of Romanticism in Greece, as well as the interplay of Romantic impulses with politics (for instance), were different than those of Western Europe (Dimaras, 2009, pp. 4–6). Romanticism had different configurations within national contexts, but despite some differences, Greek Romanticism followed the same emotional directives as the wider European movement: it headed a medievalist revolt against the austere classicism of the Enlightenment in favor of adoration of folklore, the spirit of the people, and the nation, which had a lasting effect on the emergence of nationalism (Beaton, 1988). In general, Romantic idealism nurtured conceptions of the uniqueness and the grandeur of the nation and its people. Romantic artists and intellectuals conceived the premises of nationalism and, in turn, nationalism became a key vehicle of Romanticism Within such a nationalistic context, the centerpiece concept of Greek geopolitics—the focus on classical antiquity, affinity with and imitation of Europe—became problematic. As a result, the elements of Europe that were connected with the European Enlightenment For the example of German nationalism, see Kohn (1950).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

119

were cast aside as incompatible with the Greek national identity (Exertzoglou, 2015, p. 10). During the Enlightenment, Europe was a role model, a guiding light to help Greece attain its true identity. In the context of the Romantic movement, Europe became an obstacle to the attainment of the true Greek identity, and expressions of Romanticism in Greece drew inspiration from sources of a distinctively “Eastern” character (Dimaras, 2009, p. 10). In imitating the West, the generation that came of age after the revolution was discovering reasons to oppose it—put in Romantic terms, the Greeks realized that even though their “minds” belonged to the West, their “hearts” belonged to the East. One of the key constituent elements of the Romantic movement, and certainly the most conducive to the development of opposition to the key narratives and stories that had sustained geopolitical mythmaking during the Enlightenment, was the spiritual revolt against austere classicism. In other words, whereas the admiration of classical antiquity was a leitmotif of the Enlightenment, Romanticism turned to heroic tales from the Middle Ages for inspiration. The Romantic rejection of rationalism and its fondness for medieval folklore influenced historians as much as it influenced the art of writers and painters (Sreedharan, 2004, pp. 128–150). In England, Thomas Carlyle claimed that history is nothing but the biography of great men and published “On Heroes, Hero Worship and the Heroic in History”; in France, the Restoration and the July Monarchy rediscovered the past and promoted history as a grand discourse of legitimation for the new regime (Crossley, 1993). Political legitimacy and the construction of national space and identity dominated the concerns of historians during the Romantic period (Berger, 2017). In due time, historiography became an essential component of nationalism (Hobsbawm, 2017). Racial, ethnic, and religious coherence, the ancient roots of the nation, and its historical continuity became part of a national, Romantic historiography; the focus on national tradition and folklore shaped the understandings of national continuity; and enduring over time became a constituent element of the national consciousness (Caire-Jabinet, 1994, pp. 66–72). Likewise in Greece, Romantic historiography was concerned with the concept of racial or ethnic continuity from classical antiquity to the present. Classical Greece was already a source of modern consciousness and a major theme of the political, philosophical, and geographical production of the Greek Enlightenment. Continuity, as discussed, was a constituent narrative of the Greek sense of self and of place, and a prerequisite for the narrative of Greece’s affinity with Europe and the West. The appearance of a systematic historiog raphy during the Romantic period developed and consolidated this continuity in a different way.

120

CHAPTER 3

Whereas the 18th-century political geographers and other intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment attempted to establish Greek historic continuity by linking modern Greeks directly with their “glorious” ancestors, Romantic historians maintained that the Roman and Byzantine periods, as well as the centuries of Ottoman captivity, were necessary historical units to complete the continuity of the nation—a missing link supposedly overlooked until then in the long sequence of uninterrupted Greek history. Thus, they attempted to establish a link between classical, Byzantine (medieval), and modern Hellenism with the aim to settle once and for all the issue of Greek continuity. The study of medieval texts turned out to be of paramount importance for nationbuilding in Greece (Beaton, 2008)—and, in this way, Byzantium became a formative influence for Greek historiography and the Greek modern identity (Ricks & Magdalino, 2016). The revival of Byzantium in Greek historiography as the history of medieval Hellenism grew into a “national crusade” of a distinct Romantic character that shaped Greek historiography (Beloudes, 1982). The pretext for this crusade was the publication of the History of the Morea Peninsula in the Middle Ages by the German historian Jacob Philip Fallmerayer (1830).34 Itself perhaps a product of the Romantic movement, Fallmerayer’s treatise passed judgment on the continuity of the Greek race and the descent of modern Greeks from the ancient Greeks. Fallmerayer argued that the ancient Greek civilization became extinct around the 5th century ce. Hence, he claimed that modern Greeks were not descendants of ancient Greeks but, on the contrary, they were a race mixed with Slav and Albanian populations who settled the territories linked to classical Greek antiquity. Responding to Fallmerayer by reflecting on Byzantium made sense: Fallmerayer traced the end of Greek civilization to the Byzantine period and so the official historiography needed to emphasize the Byzantine Empire’s Greek character in order to oppose the German historian on a scientific level. The problem was that a majority of the intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment including Adamantios Korais, shared a deep contempt for the Byzantine Empire as an era of deviousness, religious obscurantism, and ecclesiastical supremacy in state affairs. In line with the secular movement of the Age of Reason, the Greek Enlightenment imagined the Byzantine period as a Greek equivalent of the Dark Ages. As a result, opposition to Fallmerayer assumed the form of opposition to the authority of the Enlightenment’s conception of history. Morea is another name for Peloponnese in Greece.

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

121

Two historians, Spyridon Zampelios (1815–1881) and Constantine Paparrigopoulos (1815–1891), played prominent roles in this opposition; in many ways they devoted their works to developing a historical scheme that encouraged the conceptualization of Greek continuity from antiquity to modern times. Zampelios was the first to be charged with completing the task of opposing Fallmerayer. According to Dimaras (2009, p. 150), Zampelios’s work actually “marks the passage from conscious classicism to romanticism.” Born in Lefkada, and having studied in Corfu (Ionian Academy) and Pisa, he had become familiar with Western European intellectual and ideological tendencies (Soldatos, 2003). In 1852, in the Folklore songs of Greece, published after a historical study on medieval Hellenism, Zampelios presented a tripartite conceptualization of Greek history—namely ancient, medieval (Byzantine), and modern. Five years later, in 1857, he published his Byzantine studies. On sources of the new Greek nationality from 800 to 1000 A.D., where he introduced the term Greek Christian to denominate the fused civilization that emerged from the combination of Hellenism and Christianity. In responding to Fallmerayer’s allegations, Zampelios claimed that the ancient Greek civilization had not faded away but was reshaped in its meeting with Christianity. According to him, the Byzantine Empire functioned as the melting pot that fused these two different traditions (classical Greece and Christianity), and this fusion gradually became dominant and created the physiognomy of the Greek Empire. In this way, Zampelios located the emergence of the modern Greek ethnicity in the Middle Ages and cited Byzantium (the Greek version of the Middle Ages) as an organic link that ensured the continuation of Greek civilization from antiquity to modernity (Koubourlis, 2005). If Zampelios set the foundation stone in the construction of the new concept of continuity in Greek historiography, Paparrigopoulos undertook the colossal task of erecting a historiographical edifice narrating millennia of uninterrupted Greek history. Paparrigopoulos was born in Constantinople, studied in France and Germany, and became permanently installed in Greece in 1834. Initially he worked as an employee at the Ministry of Justice, then taught in the secondary education sector, and in 1851 he was elected professor of history at the University of Athens.35 His first piece of writing was the study On the set tlement of some Slavic nations in the Peloponnese (Paparrigopoulos, 1843). From then on, the goal of his whole life’s work was to refute Fallmerayer’s theories concerning the discontinuity of the Greek nation. All biographical elements from Dimaras (1986).

122

CHAPTER 3

In his celebrated History of the Greek nation, from antiquity to modern times, which was published in five volumes from 1860 to 1874, he compiled what he conceived to be a complete national history (Paparrigopoulos, 1865). In this work he adopted the tripartite examination of periods already introduced by Zampelios and used it as a tool for the narration of the course of the Greek nation down the centuries. Paparrigopoulos continued the work of Zampelios in many ways, including in giving a Byzantine flavor to the content of the emerging Greek nationalism (Kitromilides, 1998). His work was pivotal in the consolidation of Greek nationalism, an ideology that followed similar trajectories to the emergence of national movements in Central and Southeastern Europe under the spell of Romanticism (Kontos, 1986).36 In his first lecture as a professor, published simultaneously in the newspaper Pandora, Paparrigopoulos (1851) set the tone of his criticism of what he saw as excessive classicism: national continuity without recourse to Byzantium, the medieval Hellenism, was itself a historical construct. Much later, referring again to Fallmerayer, he insisted that every “attempt in the West” to write a Greek history from antiquity to the present was based on a forged notion of continuity, a unity of the Greek civilization, which was “abridged” and “incomplete” (Paparrigopoulos, 1878, p. 832). Paparrigopoulos’s intention was to heighten the sense of a void between classical and modern Greece, a void large enough to fit what he saw as 13 centuries of neglected Greek history. Paparrigopoulos succeeded in filling this void. Inspired by a national consciousness seeking affirmation of its temporal continuity, Paparrigopoulos voiced the broader concerns of Romantic nationalism in Greece (Svolopoulos, 2006, p. 46). A number of Greek scholars maintained the tenets of the Enlightenment and remained faithful to its historical classicism; according to their idea of historiography, Byzantium and the years of Ottoman captivity, perceived as the Greek Middle Ages, had no appeal and no worth (Svolopoulos, 2006, pp. 47–48, 68). However, Paparrigopoulos and others of his “Romantic Group” succeeded in altering the conceptualization of Greek history and identity (Petmezas, 2009). This alteration accentuated religious, cultural, and political differences between Europe and Greece. The narrative of continuity, which emerged as a key element of “belonging” to the West, was largely based on Greece’s classical antiquity and its cultural affinity with Europe. In contrast, under the spell of the Romantic movement, the alternative continuity was based on the Byzantine roots of modern Greece and became a point of resistance to the belonging 36

For similar developments in the Balkans and Central Europe, see Trencsanyi and Kopecek

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

123

myth. Zampelios, Paparrigopoulos, and other members of the Romantic Group, as they adapted the narrative of national continuity in the Romanticist context, also altered the ideological foundations of the new Greek state and especially the “purpose” or the “mission” assigned to Hellenism (Dimaras, 2009, pp. 325– 405). Apart from a new historiographical paradigm, the addition of Byzantium to the continuity narrative had overwhelming geopolitical consequences. First, the notion of the centrality of the Greek state between East and West changed. Greece was no longer simply a part of Europe—a part of the whole— but had a distinctly unique nature that included both Eastern (Byzantine) and Western elements. For instance, the statutory role of the brand-new University of Athens, where Paparrigopoulos served first as professor and then as dean, was to convey Western civilization to the East, to function as a bridge between the two worlds, and therefore to create the conditions for Greece’s political hegemony in the East (Kremmydas, 2010, pp. 76–77; Lappas, 2004, p. 105). However, “Greece is eastern in customs, language and religion, but western in science and the system of governance,” one professor wrote in 1847, “therefore, [Greece] needs to become a bridge that will bring European ideas and inventions, capitals and goods to the East”—that is, to become a “model of a state in the East” (Lappas, 2004, pp. 127–128). Similarly, Markos Renieris, another member of the Romantic Group, adapted key narratives of Greece’s continuity and centrality, writing in 1853, in French, that the “oriental and the western parts are immortalized in Greece, as if God himself has written in the face of the Greece race: you will be the heart of the world, you will be the eternal link between the Orient and the West.”37 In general the spatial representation of the Romantics was similar to that which arose during the period of the Greek Enlightenment; the big difference, however, was that for Renieris and the Romantic Group, Greece was “no longer an integral part of the West in its eternal dialectical confrontation with the Ottoman East. [Greece] is now the dialectical synthesis of contending European ideologies”; in other words, Greece was in a “mediating position” between East and West (Petmezas, 2009, pp. 130–131). Romanticism and the revival of Byzantium played a major role in this movement away from seeing Greece as an integral part of the West to it being conceived as a mediating partner with a distinctive identity. Second, the naturalization of what could be considered Greek territo ries changed. If modern Greece is modeled on classical antiquity, then its “C’est que la parti orientale et la parti occidentale sont immortelles en Grèce; c’est que le Dieu même a écrit sur le front de la race grecque: tu seras le cœur du monde, tu seras le lien éternel entre l’Orient et l’Occident,” quoted in Petmezas (2009, p. 130).

124

CHAPTER 3

spatial extension includes the geographical area strictly associated with ancient Greece, such as Attica, Cyclades, and the Peloponnese. In contrast, a concept of temporal continuity that passes through Byzantium implies a spatial continuity that necessarily includes core territories of the Byzantine Empire, such as Macedonia, Epirus, and Thrace, Asia Minor from Cappadocia to Trebizond, and of course Constantinople. Indeed, Paparrigopoulos endorsed the separation between a geographically defined Greek state and a Hellenism that included all the Greek-speaking populations of the Ottoman Empire; subsequently, he also endorsed the Great Idea as an “ambitious, grandiose and enlightened” intention to create a state that would encompass the whole Greek nation—a state that could realize the national mission (Svolopoulos, 2000, pp. 27–28; 2006, p. 38). In fact, therefore, the Byzantine revival strengthened the Eastern component of the Great Idea (Kremmydas, 2010, p. 48). The Romantic conception of national continuity was utterly effective in appropriating the political command of the Great Idea and in interpreting its collective mission as a distinct program of territorial expansion. This was possible because the Byzantine revival represented space as a national patrimony, a sort of cultural heritage bequeathed by the ancients to the Byzantines and to the New Greeks (Diamantis, 2003); this heritage was “misappropriated” by the Ottoman Empire, a “race” of people that was “alien” to the Greek lands. At the same time, the defunct state of the Ottoman Empire filled the Greek-speaking world with anticipation of further territorial gains for the nascent Greek state. With the instrumental use of maps, the Great Idea enabled the naturalization of the European territories of the Ottoman Empire as Greek (Peckham, 2000). As a result, even though Kolettis’s speech did not seem to imply an irredentist program, proponents of the Byzantine revival interpreted the Great Idea as a call for the aggressive aggrandizement of the nascent Kingdom of Greece (Kremmydas, 2010, p. 28). Greek newspapers were also major contributors to the Romantic interpretation of the Great Idea as an irredentist movement. From early on, the Greek press developed as a means for the propagation of national ideas that shaped the emerging Greek identity before and during independence (Mystakidou, 2004, pp. 13–27). After the establishment of the Greek state, the press became a tool in the hands of politicians, a transmitter of official state ideologies (Mys takidou, 2004, p. 54). To illustrate the dramatic change in the content of the Great Idea: after independence, the newspaper Aeon served as a prominent media outlet for anti-Western and anti-European narratives up to the 1850s. With titles such as “Hellas and the West” (1846), “The inhumanity of the papacy” (1852), and “The rage of the papacy” (1853), Aeon’s editorials claimed that the West was

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

125

conspiring against the Kingdom of Greece, or that the Catholic Church was more dangerous than the Ottomans themselves.38 Likewise, Aeon was fiercely opposed to the French Party and Ioannis Kolettis; consequently, it appeared to be critical of the Great Idea (Kremmydas, 2010, pp. 29–34). In an article published after Kolettis’s death, Aeon claimed that Kolettis had been nothing but a mouthpiece for the French, who actually coined the term Great Idea (“Great Idea”, 1847). However, after the development of the Byzantine revival in Greek discourse, Aeon made an abrupt and complete reversal of position on the Great Idea. In the 1850s, the newspaper aligned with the Romantic interpretation of the Great Idea. In a series of editorials such as “The dusk of the Turkish Empire and the dawn of the Greek East” (1853) and “The Greek Empire” (1853), the newspaper propagated the Great Idea as a Byzantine revival. Other newspapers and magazines circulated similar concepts related to the Eastern narrative. Among them was the newspaper Pandora (and later New Pandora), of which Paparrigopoulos was one of the chief editors. In an editorial titled “The cores of national unity” (1854), Pandora claimed that the ancient Hellenism immersed in Christianity (“baptized” was the wording of the article) and the modern Hellenism embodied by the “temporary” Kingdom of Greece constituted the “dual core” of the “Greek race” (pp. 63–66), whereas Athens and Byzantium (Constantinople) were the “ancestral hearths” of these cores (pp. 64–65). The article concluded that the two reinforced each other in order to undertake the “fight for Faith and Fatherland” and realize the unity of all those elements that make up the “Greek Race” (p. 66). In the early 1860s, the complete transformation of the Great Idea into a bellicose, irredentist program was apparent in Aeon’s first pages: ‘the Greeks are undoubtedly the People [ … ​] holding the historical destiny of the East’, wrote the editor, and ‘Athens ought to exist as the Acropolis of Hellenism [ … ​] the Nation should pick-up the weapons of the offensive and in time to sally forth in order to fulfill its destiny [ … ​] The final conclusion is that what is lacking is the mastermind who will direct the Great Idea of the nation’ (“The present and Hellas”, 1860). In the 1870s, the call to arms by Aeon and similar outlets, such as Rigas and Helios, was amplified by the theory that the Ottoman Empire was entering a phase of prolonged disintegration. The unfolding of the Eastern Question, the Russo-Turkish war, and the appearance of the principle of self-determination in the West advocated in favor of a general uprising of the so-called unre deemed Greek populations. These editorials echoed the concerns of the Russian Party over the fact that neither the regency nor King Otto was Orthodox.

126

CHAPTER 3

One of the main articles in Rigas argued that “the shining of the [Ottoman] crescent is slowly, but clearly eclipsed, a new historical circle begins in the East” (“Regarding the history”, 1877). Elsewhere, in Helios, it was claimed that “the life of Turkey [ … ​] may be prolonged only through successive mutilations [ … ​] this idea is public knowledge and today England is actively backing the partition of Turkey” (“The present position”, 1876). Rigas articulated the irredentist interpretation of the Great Idea, writing: “the fatherland is not the [ … ​] Greek Kingdom, it is Hellas of democracy from the Adriatic to the furthermost point of the Mediterranean basin” (“The historical truth, 1877), and a dozen years after Aeon, it repeated the call to arms with a main article titled “Rise up” (1877). Europe again featured as a major point of criticism in Rigas for its inactivity and lack of support for Greek efforts (“The mercilessness”, 1877), whereas the newspaper claimed that the story of Greece was the story of “civilization against barbarism in the East” (“The necessity”, 1877). For most of the second half of the 19th century, the same anxieties, the same concepts and metaphors, were commonplace in the Greek press of the independent kingdom, but also in those outlets that were printed and circulated among the Greek-speaking subjects of the Ottoman Sultan (Mystakidou, 2004, pp. 109–111). At the end of the 19th century, Greek newspapers and their readers were stirred by an irredentist project enmeshed in the Romantic myth of a Byzantine revival. Romantic historiography altered the national continuity narrative to add Byzantium as the Greek Middle Ages and the missing link between classical and modern Greece. This addition had severe geopolitical implications for the nature, position, and orientation of the Greek state and created all sorts of opportunities (historical, cultural, and political) to oppose the key geopolitical narratives of the Greek Enlightenment. The Byzantine revival, but also the Russian expectation, was limited, however, by the material (economic, military, etc.) conditions of the Greek state, practices of foreign interventions, foreign loans, the presence of competing nationalisms in the Balkans, and a Pan-Slavic movement that was prompted by Russian influence. Eventually, the mythmaking process of the 19th century came to a close with a narrative of Western dependence that materialized in the 20th century as a dominant myth of belonging to Europe and the West. 3.3 Western Dependence and the Limits of Opposition The peak of the Russian expectation can be located between the Crimean War (1853–1856) and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878, following another crisis in the so-called Eastern Question.39 Despite the Russian defeat, the war in 39

For background information about the Crimean War, the Eastern Crisis, and their rele vant significance within the context of the Eastern Question, see Macfie (2014, pp. 27–45).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

127

Crimea ignited Greek hopes for Russian intervention in the Ottoman Empire and instigated revolutionary urges in the Greek-speaking territories that were not yet part of Greece (Kremmydas, 2010, p. 39). Considering that Britain and France allied with the Ottomans against Russia (because they also feared increased Russian interference in the Balkans, Greece, and the Middle East), Russia appeared as an alternative option to the more cautious policy of Western European powers toward the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern Question. Ironically, it was a Russian victory in 1878 that revealed the ambiguousness, the inherent contradictions, and, in a word, the limits of the myth of a Russian expectation. Three factors seem to have played a major role in excluding the myth of a Russian expectation from Greek geopolitical mythmaking. The first was the overall decline of Imperial Russia’s power and standing among the major European players that took place in the second half of the 19th century (which ultimately led to the collapse of the Tsarist regime) (Charques, 1977; Seton-Watson, 2017). The second was the general decline and eventual collapse of the autocratic state, which also ended the belief in the power of enlightened despotism to bring about social change (Bushkovitch, 2012, pp. 272–293; see also Bartlett, 2005). Third and foremost was the contradictory involvement of Russia in the Balkans (which involved the encouragement of revolutionary feelings among the south Slavs) and the so-called Pan-Slavic movement, which gave an expiration date for the Russian expectation in Greek geopolitics. Pan-Slavism was the idea of Slavic unity that emerged as a reaction to the cultural assimilation of Slavs living in the Habsburg Empire by the predominant German and Magyar elements.40 The Slavic populations developed different approaches to the idea of Slavic unity, which remains to this day an existing intellectual current among Slavs (see, e.g., Makowski, 2013). At that time, how ever, between the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878, in the hands of the Tsars the Pan-Slavic movement turned into a potent foreign policy tool in Central and Eastern Europe (Hunczak, 2000; see also Petrovich, 1985). Since the reign of Catherine the Great, Russia had shown a keen parallel interest in Slavic affairs as well as Greek affairs; and, in fact, the movement for the unity of all Slavic peoples demonstrated the same Russophile attitude as conservative, religious elements in Greek society (Levine, 1914, p. 666). Russia was keen to play the conservative (counter-Enlightenment) and religious cards in order to increase its influence in the Orthodox East. In this regard, after the Russo-Turkish war of 1768–1774, Russia was acknowledged as the protector of For the best treatises on the subject of Pan-Slavism, see Kohn (1960) and Erickson (1964).

128

CHAPTER 3

the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire (see, e.g., Gerd, 2014, pp. 24–29, 64–83). This parallel Russian influence on the Slavs of the Balkans was contradictory to the Greek myth of Russian expectation because, in the context of the Eastern Question, the interests of the Christian nations and their respective nationalisms differed to a great extent. Pan-Slavism in general and the Bulgarian and Serb nationalisms in particular coveted the same Ottoman territories (Macedonia, Thrace) that were included in the Greek vision for a revived Byzantine Empire. In turn, as a result of these nationalistic rivalries, Pan-Slavism and Russian interference in the Balkans became topics of debate in the Greek political discourse of the second half of the 19th century (Stavridi-Patrikious, 2003). The adherents of the Great Idea as a Byzantine revival in particular defamed Russia by association with the Pan-Slavic movement. Parts of the Greek press presented the Pan-Slavic movement as a serious existential threat. Already in 1852, for instance, the main article in the newspaper Elpis stated that “Russia is ready to devour the Byzantine Empire” at the first opportunity (Elpis, April 19, 1852). Elpis denounced Russia’s influence over other Christian nations and saw in Pan-Slavism the “wakeful enemy of Hellenism” (Elpis, April 19, 1852). The most representative example of this anti-Russian sentiment was an anonymous publication persuasively titled Hellenism or Russism (1854), which appeared in the midst of the Crimean War.41 The author of the text questioned the usual arguments of Russian supporters in Greece, cultivated suspicion about the intentions of the Russian Tsar, and confronted the basic tenets of the Russian expectation. He based his critique on the exposition of supposedly confidential correspondence between Britain and Russia, along with a complex interpretation of international politics and Russia’s interest in the Balkans: the centerpiece of his anti-Russian crusade was the alleged fact that the Russian Tsar disapproved of the “attempt to reconstruct the Byzantine Empire” (Dosios, 1856, p. κα’). The author of Hellenism or Russism claimed that the Russian Tsar was fearful of the collapse of the Ottoman state and its replacement by a Greek Empire that “would hold the scepter” of the Byzantine emperors, and therefore he was seeking to eliminate the possibility of the “Greek race erecting in Byzantium the throne of its Emperors” (Dosios, 1856, pp. κδ’–κε’). The text claimed that Russian supporters 41

Its full title is Hellenism or Russism? The private and confidential correspondence between England and Russia concerning the Eastern Question, with prologue and commentary historical research has attributed this publication to Constantinos Dosios, a Greek from Monastir [modern-day Bitola], who later served as Member of Parliament and Minister (see Kremmydas, 2007, p. 49, n. 22).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

129

in Greece were partaking in Russian conspiracies and intrigue with the aim to obstruct the development of the Greek state, which is “the best material for the reconstruction of the Byzantine Empire” (Dosios, 1856, p. πα’).42 For the author, the Tsar and his supporters in Greece were feigning their defense of the Orthodox faith; their true goal was the promotion of Pan-Slavism, and for this they “fight openly every idea, every trend that is Greek” (Dosios, 1856, p. κζ’). At the same time as being anti-Slavic and anti-Russian, the author of Hellenism or Russism also articulated a fine example of the myth of Byzantine revival. The author claimed—inaccurately, according to Kremmydas (2010, p. 54)— that the demand of the Greek Revolution was the recovery of the Hagia Sophia in Constantinople (Dosios, 1856, p. πθ’). Nonetheless, in the same passage, the author makes a reference to Homer and Themistocles in order to remind the reader—along the lines of the intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment—of the glory and fame of the Greek ancestors. Apart from expressing and justifying anti-Russian sentiments, the author of Hellenism or Russism is also a case in point for the Romantic interpretation of the Great Idea as well as the instrumental use of Byzantium as a vital link between ancient and modern Greece. Eventually, there were also voices that tried to dispel Greek fears of the PanSlavic movement. The newspaper Aeon stated in 1860 that the idea of the Slavic threat was conceived in the West; that criticism of the Patriarchate of Constantinople was directed by Western Catholic propaganda; and that “we are being unfair and we damage the East, when we attribute the Pan-Slavic Movement to Russia, even though Pan-Slavism is the work of the West” (“Panslavism”, 1910). The same newspaper claimed that, in any case, the independence of the Slavic people in the Balkans (such as the Bulgarians) could not harm the establishment of “the Greek State of Byzantium” (Aeon, August 17, 1911). Despite these counter-narratives, the “Slavic threat” allegedly embodied in the Pan-Slavic movement exposed the contradictions (and the limits) of Russian intervention on behalf of the Greeks. The Greeks and the Slavs (mainly Bulgarians) would settle the score much later, in the Second Balkan War; but in March 1878, following the Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish war (1877– 1878), the Treaty of San Stefano was an irreversible blow for the representation of Russia as an alternative geopolitical focus in the Greek mythmaking process. The treaty recognized significant territorial gains for Romania, Ser bia, and Montenegro at the expense of the Ottomans, and most importantly it established a de facto independent state of Bulgaria that included most of and Thrace, both Ottoman territories that were also claimed by the A special, albeit subtle, reference is made to the alleged conspiracy of the Russian Party to overthrow the regency and the King in the 1830s.

130

CHAPTER 3

Greeks. The European great powers deplored this territorial expansion as an unacceptable Russian foothold in the Balkans and managed to overturn much of it three months later in the Treaty of Berlin.43 Despite its eventual upending, the Treaty of San Stefano and the role of Russia in forcing the establishment of a Greater Bulgaria infuriated the Greeks (Svolopoulos, 2014a, pp. 72–74). Although Russian influences continued to subsist in Greek society throughout the 19th century (typically through Greek translations of Russian literature (see Dialla, 2014; Ilinskaya, 2006), the credibility of Russia as a geopolitical focus for Greece was irreversibly damaged. The gradual devaluation of Russia as an alternative geopolitical pole also had a reflexive implication for the waning course of the myth of Byzantine revival. In general, considering that Greece was not powerful enough to defeat the Ottoman Empire alone, the deflation of the Russian expectation meant that the Greeks had to count on Western support for the realization of their imperial hopes. Apart from the “loss” of Russia, there were other factors that made it clear that the military and economic power of the Kingdom of Greece was too limited to pursue the Great Idea as a purely aggressive, irredentist program. First, there was the direct competition with the rising tides of Balkan nationalism. The Byzantine revival confronted its limits when faced with Bulgarian, Serbian, and later even Turkish nationalism (Svoronos, 2007, p. 97). The second factor was the fact that territorial expansion had been proven to be possible through purely diplomatic means.44 The need for territorial expansion remained, and the term Great Idea continued to serve as the main reference point for politics; however, the peaceful annexation of new territory consolidated a realization that the geopolitical vision of the Great Idea could also be served by diplomatic attachment to the Western great powers. The third factor was that the Kingdom of Greece was severely indebted due to foreign loans from Western European powers and was reliant on their financial support 43

The Treaty of Berlin marks a critical point in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire recognition of sovereignty for Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro in addition to that of Greece half a century before, set up the stage for the confrontation of nationalisms in the Balkan and their territorial expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. For more, see Yavuz & Sluglett (2011). After King Otto’s deposition in 1862, a large majority in a referendum elected Prince Alfred of Great Britain (second son of Queen Victoria) as the next King of Greece. The attempt at a formal royal association could also have been a wild bet for the acquisition of the Ionian Islands, which were under British rule. The British prince did not accept the throne after all, but the Ionian Islands did change hands peacefully in 1863, as a gift to Prince William of Denmark, the new Greek monarch. See Clogg (1979, p. 82).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

131

and goodwill to avoid bankruptcy.45 In other words, the financial situation of the Greek state put it in a position of external dependence. And, finally, this dependence was amplified by the developing practice of foreign intervention in the form of gunboat diplomacy and the threat of use of force by the great powers.46 As a result, toward the end of the 19th century, a narrative of Western dependence began to emerge that also revealed the limits of the Byzantine revival myth. And at this point, the alignment with Europe and the West seemed to gain ground again over the Russian expectation and the frail myth of a Byzantine revival. This change of pace was obvious in the Athenian press: days before the enthronement of the new king in 1863, the newspaper Athena wrote: “The greatest need [ … ​] is the expansion of the current geographical borders of Greece [ … ​] we want to prove that [this expansion] is not only in the interest of Greece, but also in the interest of Turkey and of Europe” (Athena, March 7, 1863). Specifically, Athena made reference to the economic unsustainability of the Kingdom of Greece in its current state, as well as to the failed revolutionary waves caused by the Crimean War (Kremmydas, 2010, p. 67). The next editions of the newspaper kept some distance from the “corrupt administration of King Otto” (Athena, March 11, 1863) and maintained that in order to realize the Great Idea, it would be “necessary to beg the protecting powers, if they please, to complete the task they started, by intervening and convincing Turkey” (Athena, March 14, 1863). Thereafter, the alignment with the West developed into a storyline of Greek impotence and dependence on the West. Even though territorial expansion was still considered the principal strategic objective, it was deemed possible only through Western intervention. The newspaper Elpis, one of the first newspapers to dispel the Russian expectation, wrote in 1866: Everyone acknowledges that in its current state, the Kingdom of Greece is unable to sustain a monarchy, unable to develop or to subsist with dig nity. Everyone acknowledges the need to call upon Europe in order to look at us with a favorable gaze, since the principle of nationalities and self-determination is little by little becoming the standard of European politics. (Elpis, 26 July 26, 1866) External debt had increased dramatically (more than 100 percent) between 1878 and 1893, when Greece eventually went bankrupt; see Reinhart et al. (2015 pp. 312–313). For gunboat diplomacy in general, see Cable (1994). For the British policy of gunboat diplomacy in Greece in particular, see Lowe (1998, pp. 49–53).

132

CHAPTER 3

In the same article the newspaper denounced the call to arms for territorial expansion as radical charlatanism (the newspaper called the proponents of irredentism “sans-culottes”). Perhaps the most important element of Western dependence, according to Elpis, was the fact that the kingdom’s revenues were not sufficient to pay for the running costs of a state in war and to repay the loans owed to the Western powers (Elpis, 26 July 26, 1866). In the following decades, the 1870s and the 1880s, Greece’s apparent diplomatic and economic dependence on Europe set the tone for the ascendancy of the narrative of Western dependence. Despite a brief repetition of war cries in the year marking the 50th anniversary of the Greek War of Independence (Kremmydas, 2010, pp. 80–89), the Russian expectation and the Byzantine revival were in recession and the narrative of Western dependence was on the rise. In the press, a bitter realization began to take form: “[W]hat the supremacy of the enlightened ideas in this new era of our national existence proves, is that a new truly Great idea is rooted in the people [ … ​] that Greece ought to do today through peace and [enlightenment] what the forefathers achieved through steel”(Neologos Athenon, 29 March 29, 1875). Elsewhere, the call for peace stemmed from the realization that [w]e, the Greeks, being small and weak, are not ourselves alone the masters of our fate, we do not exercise control over the fate of the Eastern world, we are not able to hold the political initiative [ … ​] neither to con vince nor to blackmail Europe in order to serve us justice by establishing a Greek state that includes the entirety of the ancient and, until now, purely Greek territories. (Efthini, April 9, 1877) The interpretation of the Great Idea as the restitution of the Byzantine Empire slowly faded away from the beginning of the 1880s (Kremmydas, 2010, p. 107); or else it was forced to adapt to what was feasible and diplomatically tolerable to the great powers (Skopetea, 1988, p. 292). In domestic politics, the emergence of the Western dependence narrative was mirrored by a renewed interest in political, social, and cultural change according to Western European models. In what can be seen as a direct descendant of the call for imitation of the West, roughly from 1875 to 1895, the administrations of Harilaos Trikoupis enacted an ambitious plan of reforms. The appearance of Trikoupis (his family had long supported the English Party) For a detailed biography, see Tricha (2009).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

133

and his Modernist Party (Neoterikon) marked the beginning of a long period of modernization of the political system, economic organization, and governance. The main thrust of Trikoupis’s modernization project was a historic public investment and infrastructure program, which depended on public spending and was financed with foreign loans (see Tricha & Detournay, 2001). When the combination of major public spending, foreign loans, and increased taxation failed to stimulate economic development, Greece was obliged to declare bankruptcy in 1893. The servicing of foreign loans was suspended and Greece was put under international financial supervision, exacerbating the feeling of dependence. In 1897, following another Greek insurgency on the island of Crete (still under Ottoman control), Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Greek Army was utterly defeated in less than 30 days and the “Unfortunate War,” as it was later called, ended with a white truce imposed by the great powers.48 In fact, this was the debut of the Greek armed forces, and their military disaster showcased Greece’s limited capabilities on the field of battle (see Pizzo, 2012)—this humiliation, conceivably more than any other, demonstrated that perhaps there was no alternative to Western dependence. 3.4 Interim Conclusion: Opposition and Adaptation of Belonging The dissemination of the narratives of belonging to Europe and the West in the Greek-speaking world during the Enlightenment in the 1700s and early 1800s was met with a strong reaction driven by the arrival of the Romantic movement in Greece around 1850s. The generations after the Greek Revolution (1821–1829) were still guided by the geopolitical vision of the Great Idea, which was a product of the Enlightenment, but they also operated in the intellectual and cultural contexts of their time. To many, Russian enlightened despotism offered an alternative to the Enlightenment’s liberalism with minimal psycho-cultural dislocation: a different route to modernity, or a fine compromise between liberalism, religion, and tradition. Most importantly, the Romantic predilection for the medieval, instead of the classical focus of the Enlightenment, facilitated the emergence of the Byzantine Empire as a referent for Greek nationalism, irredentism, and, consequently, the interpretation of the Great Idea as a program of territorial expansion. The new intellectual and cultural contexts were essentially antiliberal and anti-classicist.

48

For a detailed account of the Greco-Turkish war in 1897 and its aftermath, see Yanoulo poulos (1999).

134

CHAPTER 3

This did not mean that they were also fundamentally anti-European or antiWestern. The liberal core of the Enlightenment had gone cold across Europe and, for a time, as discussed, the intellectuals of the European Enlightenment at least considered the pros and cons of absolutism as an alternative system of governance that could impose the necessary reforms on states and societies. Romanticism, too, was a European intellectual movement, but it did not share the same ideals as the Enlightenment. In this respect, there is nothing fundamentally anti-European in Greece’s perceived special relationship with Russia or the particular focus on the Byzantine Empire as a medieval form of Hellenism. Greek strategy and foreign policy during the second half of the 19th century may be considered revisionist, as it was constantly seeking to adjust the borders and expand the territory of the Greek state. But, throughout this time, Greece also sought to establish formal royal associations with Europe; practiced a cautious and pragmatist diplomacy toward the great powers, which took advantage of their differing interests in the region; and almost always welcomed their intervention in matters of Greek interest. Despite the anti-liberal and anti-classical attitude, there was no great discontinuity in Greece’s geopolitical attachment to Europe. The Greek-speaking world was still an extension of the intellectual movements on the continent; Greek intellectuals were again following European trends and modes of thought; and Greece constituted an integral—however marginal or peripheral—part of Europe. Despite this marginality, and despite an idiosyncratic, apparently Eastern culture that included references to Russia and Byzantium, Greece’s geopolitical alignment with Europe and the West proved resilient even in the seemingly unfavorable context of the late 19th century. An explanation for this resilience based on identity is problematic because this is exactly the period when Greece’s identity moved furthest away from any European equivalent. As discussed, during the late 19th century, Greek self-awareness in relation to Western European modernity was heavily influenced by an Eastern/Orthodox link with Russia and a perception of Byzantium as an Eastern/Greek empire. Especially in this period, it is difficult to argue that being European was part of a native Greek identity, because it seems that Russia and Byzantium were also significant ingredients in the making of modern Greece. The argument of an identity imposed by European powers does not hold up either: in the latter half of the 19th century, Europe experienced its own soul-searching, and the conduct of the great powers in the region was far from unified, if not directly contradictory. Similarly, this contradiction is also evident if one approaches Greece’s geo political attachment to the European powers as a function of national interest.

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

135

The Eastern Question, which provides much of the diplomatic context for the period, was an arena for the conflicting interests of the great powers. As a matter of fact, Greece actively sought to take advantage of these conflicts in order to promote its own interests, which were not singularly aligned with any great power. Put differently, much of the revisionist conduct of the Greek state tested the limits of the patience of the great powers, which were still cautious about territorial expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the material conditions that framed Greece’s geopolitical dependence on Europe—that is, the limited capabilities of the Greek armed forces, superior Ottoman power, and dependence on diplomatic and financial support from Europe—were once again inexorable. But they were also disregarded to a significant degree by Greek irredentism, nationalism, and the implementation of the Great Idea as a program of territorial expansion. In other words, leaning on Europe in order to materialize the Great Idea appeared at times as a great expectation, more than a rational calculation. In this regard, it makes more sense to approach Greece’s geopolitical attachment to the West as a pervasive myth that sometimes appears as a rational calculation and other times displays a dreamlike quality, of an identity that transcends the material conditions of the external world. From this angle, the basic geopolitical contours of the Great Idea that were produced by the Greek Enlightenment remained largely the same: the key narratives of centrality, continuity, and affinity still framed Greece’s geopolitical condition. But they were adapted to match the changing intellectual and cultural contexts (e.g., Romanticism). The mythopoetic elements of Orthodox messianic folklore, mixed with a philosophical interest in enlightened despotism, adapted the affinity narrative to frame Russia as an alternative geopolitical option and create a reasonable foundation for the myth of the Russian expectation (see Table 7). The alternative affinity of the Russian expectation included the realization that there were cultures or geopolitical blocs different from those of Europe with which Greece could relate; and this created mythmaking opportunities, legitimacy, and mobilization for old and new political and cultural forces in the country (i.e., intellectuals, the Greek Orthodox Church, and the Russian Party). In turn, the intense emotional aesthetics of the Romantic movement had a major impact on Greek historiography, which also adapted the continuity narrative and to a lesser degree the centrality narrative. The work of Zampelios and Paparrigopoulos adapted the continuity narrative to match the Romantic era and highlighted the Byzantine heritage as a unique, essential, and neces sary component of Greek identity, which developed into a concrete myth of a Byzantine revival (see Table 8). The alternative continuity of the Byzantine

136

CHAPTER 3

Table 7  The Russian expectation: analysis of key narratives and stories

Geopolitical myth

Key narratives

Storylines

Russian expectation

Affinity

– The “Blonde Race” as a redeemer. Religious myths and prophecies of Russian intervention – Enlightened despotism in Russia as an alternative to European Enlightenment – Classical antiquity, but also – Orthodox Christianity – Muslim Ottoman Empire in the East as a threat to the unredeemed Orthodox populations Catholic/Protestant Europe and the West threat or barrier to Greek aspirations in the East

Russia will intervene to liberate Orthodox Christians from Ottoman captivity

Continuity Centrality

Table 8  The byzantine revival: analysis of key narratives and stories

Geopolitical myth Key Narratives Affinity

Byzantine revival

Continuity The restitution of a Greek Empire in the Byzantine territories occupied by the Ottomans Centrality

Storylines – Religious myths and prophecies of redemption from captivity (the “Blonde Race”) – Enlightened despotism in Russia as an alternative to European Enlightenment – Medieval Hellenism (Byzantium) as the missing link between ancient and modern Greece – Decline and rebirth of the Greek/Byzantine Empire – The fusion of ancient Greek culture with Christianity as an East/West synthesis (Hellenic-Christian civilization) – Greek exceptionalism

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

137

revival inevitably influenced Greek nationalism and found an astute political expression as an interpretation of the Great Idea. In its Romantic interpretation as a Byzantine revival, the Great Idea legitimized and framed an irredentist policy of territorial expansion. For reasons already discussed, the Russian victory against the Ottomans in 1878 and the “Unfortunate War” of 1897 mitigated the intelligibility and the practical value of the Russian expectation and the Byzantine revival respectively and ushered in a narrative of Western dependence. Neither myth, however, was completely discredited. They both seem to have emerged as a reactionary opposition to the diffusion of key narratives of belonging during the Greek Enlightenment. However, they also contributed to the adaptation of these narratives and set the stage for a new era of dominance of the myth of belonging. Despite the apparent opposition and the difference in representations, the key narratives expressed in the Great Idea (continuity, centrality, affinity) remained the same. In this sense, the myths of Russian expectation and Byzantine revival are derivative myths that emerged as active components of the mythmaking process in modern Greece. Rather than undermining the belonging myth, the opposing myths of Russian expectation and Byzantine revival contributed to its resilience and enduring relevance in that, by incorporating some of the belonging narratives, the belonging myth becomes hegemonic—that is, it defines the basic contours of the mythmaking process and the “rules of engagement” of mythmaking contestation.49 Greece’s special cultural ties with Russia are frequently referenced in religion-conscious, anti-modernity discourses in the country that at times frame a Greek–Russian entente in matters of strategy and foreign policy. The legacy of the Russian expectation is that it introduced religion (i.e., the Orthodox Christian world) as an element of the geopolitical mythmaking process. In turn, this alternative religious affinity may occasionally legitimize and frame a Greek foreign policy that pivots between Europe and Russia. Similarly, the Byzantine heritage remains a considerable referent for modern Greek identity and nationalism. Significantly, the tripartite classification of Greek history (ancient, medieval/Byzantine, and modern) remains the historiographical standard. The fall of the Byzantine Empire and the subsequent Ottoman captivity still frames Greek security concerns and attitudes toward neighboring Turkey This concept of a discursive hegemony and the framing of a common sense has been used to explain the lasting impact of Thatcherism on British politics and its shaping of ‘New Labour’ in the 2000s; see Heffernan (2001) and Phillips (1998).

138

CHAPTER 3

However, all these elements interact and are largely subsumed by a dominant myth of belonging to Europe and the West, which, as we shall see in the next section, entered the stages of ritualization and sacralization in the 20th century. Greece’s participation in European integration, especially after World War II, will be examined as a series of actions that bestowed a ceremonial quality upon the myth of belonging to Europe and the West. 4

Belonging to the West and European Integration

The first stage of the mythmaking process during the Greek Enlightenment (1760–1820) involved the initial diffusion of key geopolitical narratives, namely, the centrality of the Greek world between East and West, the continuity of the Greek nation from the classical to the modern era, and its cultural affinity with Europe and the West. These narratives were linked to the emergence of a modern self-awareness and sense of place for the Greek-speaking populations—a precursor of the belonging myth that was expressed by a distinctive literature of Political Geography/Cartography and culminated in a strategy of imitation of Europe and the West. The second stage of the mythmaking process was a Romantic reaction (c. 1850–1890) to the initial diffusion of geopolitical narratives that involved their opposition with alternative interpretations of affinity and continuity framing the myths of Russian expectation (i.e., Russia as an alternative role model for Greece and a great power willing to defend Greek aspirations for ascendancy), as well as the myth of the Byzantine revival (i.e., the restitution of what was considered a medieval Greek Empire). The opposition process eventually resulted in the gradual adaptation of belonging narratives into a myth of Western dependence. This section traces the third stage of mythmaking in modern Greece from the turn of the 20th century to Greece’s postwar participation in European integration and, more recently, the euro crisis. By and large, in the course of the 20th century, Greek geopolitical mythmaking continued to revolve around the three familiar key narratives (continuity, affinity, centrality) and the myth of Western dependence. However, especially after World War II, Greece’s formal participation in the European integration process and, in turn, its Europeani represents an essential phase of ritualization of dependence; in other words, a series of actions regularly and invariably followed to make Greece and Greek foreign policy more modern, more Western, and more European (a ritual of imitation). Consequently, the myth of belonging, formally articulated and affirmed by membership in 1981, turned into a sacred myth, that is, an

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

139

apparent truth treated with reverence and regarded as too valuable to question. The euro crisis is then treated as a showcase of the sacralization of the belonging myth. 4.1 Western Dependence from the Turn of the Century to World War II The first half of the 20th century was an extraordinarily dense political period for Greece (and for the whole European continent), and possibly any attempt to summarize this period is destined to be cursory. This is because, in the course of less than 40 years, roughly between 1912 and 1949, Greece underwent two regional wars (the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913) (Hall, 2010); a disastrous war with Turkey that ended with the Asia Minor Catastrophe (1919–1922);50 participation in World War I; a devastating involvement in World War II, including the Nazi occupation; and two severe national break-ups, first the National Schism and the coup d’état of 1916 and then the Greek Civil War (1946–1949). However, as far as this research is concerned, what is most important is to substantiate three things: first, that the mythical legitimation driving much of Greek foreign policy during this period was still the Great Idea as a myth of Byzantine revival, albeit dependent on support from Western Europe; and second, that this myth was entirely discredited after the Greco-Turkish war of 1919–1922 and the Asia Minor Catastrophe, which marked the end of irredentism and the complete dominance of the narrative of Western dependence. In this period Greece witnessed unprecedented territorial expansion and population increase (more than double). The conclusion of the Balkan Wars saw the annexation of Epirus, Macedonia, and the islands of the North Aegean Sea; the Treaty of Sevres after World War I momentarily extended Greek control over Eastern and Western Thrace and a part of Asia Minor (around the greater region of Izmir), whereas Constantinople and the straits were officially put under international administration. In the aftermath of World War II, Italy ceded the Dodecanese islands to Greece. While Greece was accomplishing tremendous territorial gains at the expense of the Ottoman Empire—until 1923—the myth of the Great Idea was still functioning as justification for the mobilization of both state resources and public support. According to Eleftherios Venizelos, the Great Idea had been accomplished with the Greek expansion stipulated in the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 (quoted in Christopoulou, 2014, p. 265). Venizelos is a mythical figure of Greek politics—the “Greatest Greek states man since Pericles,” according to Margaret MacMillan (2005, p. 357). He served For a historical overview of this war, see Richter (2016).

140

CHAPTER 3

as Greece’s Prime Minister eight times between 1910 and 1933 and thus defined the first half of the 20th century in Greek history.51 Indeed, no one came closer to accomplishing the Great Idea than Venizelos, who acknowledged the central position of the myth as the “foundation of [Greece’s] national life” (Kitromilides, 2008, p. 256). But Venizelos also belonged to a generation of Greeks who were conscious of the limits of Greece’s military power as well as the importance of Western intervention in Greek affairs. He confessed that he never counted on military power in order to secure new territories; instead, he counted on alliances and the interests of the Western European powers (Zannas, 1978, p. 68). Although in 1910, at the beginning of his premiership and on the eve of the First Balkan War, he subscribed to an irredentist interpretation of the Great Idea, he remained open to the idea of Greco-Turkish as well as inter-Balkan cooperation (Zannas, 1978, pp. 256–258). He also embodied a combination of nationalism and modernization (Mavrogordatos, 2015, pp. 10–13)—or, in other words, a realistic compromise between the Eastern and Western narratives in Greece. As Prime Minister he articulated a rationalized idea in the Greek Parliament according to which the East had “enough space” to reach a fair distribution of the Ottoman territories for all the Balkan peoples (Journal of Parliamentary Debates, 1912–1913, p. 291). He anticipated the alliance of Greece with Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria against the Ottoman Empire, knowing the limits of the Greek armed forces (Journal of Parliamentary Debates, 1912–1913, p. 290). Venizelos was concerned with the feasibility of the Great Idea, which he found to be “nebulous” and overly ambitious (Journal of Parliamentary Debates, 1912–1913, p. 140). He was careful to insist that the Greek populations in Turkey not instigate frivolous revolutions (Journal of Parliamentary Debates, 1912– 1913, p. 148). This formal departure from the traditional interpretation of the Great Idea played a role in the acute division of Greek politics into Venizelists and anti-Venizelists; his supporters were conscious that Venizelos put forward his own version of the Great Idea—not an instinctive, almost mystical, drive for the revival of the Byzantine Empire, but one that was prudent, feasible, and conditional on the favorable predisposition of the West. For Venizelos, national integration through the Great Idea should have been the natural “homecoming” of Hellenism to its “ancient territories” (Journal of Parliamentary Debates, 1912–1913, p. 555). And so, his version of the Great Idea was not based solely on territorial expansion and irredentist compulsions, but 51

For a study of Eleftherios Venizelos’s extraordinary political career from a Cretan rebel to a world-renowned statesman, see Kitromilides

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

141

also included a keen affinity with the principles, values, and democratic ideals represented by the Western European allies of the Entente: he saw World War I as the fight of the “free Europe against the barbaric, authoritarian militarism” (Christopoulou, 2014, p. 263, n. 44). His opponents accused him of “European Patriotism,” and his conviction was that it was Greece’s duty to cooperate with Western Europe in crushing German militarism (Mavrogordatos, 2015, p. 37). It should be noted that the Ottoman Empire was a belligerent in World War I, allied with the Central Powers, and that Venizelos’s perceptions were similar to the conventional Greek representation of the Turks as “barbaric,” “tyrannical,” and “obscurantist.” There was no doubt in Venizelos’s mind that Greece should not remain a distant bystander in the war: in 1917, as Prime Minister, he declared that Greece would join the war on the side of “the democratic nations, which fight for the freedom of the world against the Central European powers, whose allies are [Greece’s] hereditary enemies” (quoted in Mavrogordatos, 2015, p. 37). Furthermore, Venizelos had formed the opinion that the alliance with Britain and France would further serve Greek interests (Mavrogordatos, 2015, p. 36); this became even more obvious to him on the eve of World War I. He thought that Britain was seeking Greece’s cooperation and her “aggrandizement”: an alliance with Britain was the only way to “keep what we have and expand anew” (Mavrogordatos, 2015, p. 50). Indeed, Britain was sustaining Venizelos’s opinion: after the cessation of the Ionian Islands some decades earlier, Britain was now offering the cessation of Cyprus in exchange for Greece’s participation in the war on the Entente’s side; the British even made promises concerning the annexation of territories that belonged to Bulgaria at the time, namely Western Thrace (Mavrogordatos, 2015, p. 71). Venizelos’s firm conviction that the patronage of the great powers was the only option for Greece brought Greece to the brink of a civil war. In 1917, Venizelos and the Liberal Party returned to power after a naval blockade, the occupation of two Greek islands (Corfu and Thasos), and the invasion of Athens by the allied forces, interventions that led to the forced abdication of his archrival, King Constan tine. After that, his opponents dubbed Venizelos an agent of the great powers. Nevertheless, despite his triumphs, Venizelos lost the 1920 elections; his that ended with the utter defeat of Greek forces in Anatolia in 1921, the genocide of the Greeks (and Armenians) of Asia Minor and the Black Sea in 1922, and the ensuing exchange of populations in 1923 (see Hofmann et al., 2011; Hovannisian, 2008). As with most genocides and similar war atrocities, Turkey contests the historical accuracy of the term and the outcome.

142

CHAPTER 3

defeat essentially cancelled the territorial gains acquired through the Treaty of Sevres in 1919. The region of Smyrna (Izmir) in Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace were returned to Turkey with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. With the exchange of populations, the issue of irredentism was permanently settled as well. The definitive end of the myth of the Great Idea—interpreted as a Byzantine revival—materialized in the 20th century after the Greek–Turkish war of 1919–1922. After 1923, what was left of the Great Idea was only Greece’s cultural affinity with the West and its efforts to establish a modern state according to Western European standards. In July 1928, shortly after he again became Prime Minister of Greece, Venizelos declared from Thessaloniki that the Liberal Party had been called on to “constitute a modern state, which, in the interior will have the mission to raise the moral, the spiritual and the material standards of the people, in the exterior to be an element of peace and harmony among the nations” (quoted in Christopoulou, 2014, p. 267). Consequently, Venizelos launched a program of modernization and reform according to Western European standards of liberal democracy and capitalism that was void of any notions of irredentism or references to the Great Idea (see Tzokas, 2002). Following a century of belligerence and the search for identity and a sense of place, as well as a relentless desire for national aggrandizement, Greece was coming to terms with the idea that the process of territorial expansion had reached its limits. The only remaining goal was to ensure national independence and the integrity of the newly acquired territories (Svolopoulos, 2014b, p. 273). This was the first time in the short life of the independent Greek state that Greece was interested in safeguarding the status quo, and the strategic attachment to the West was deemed paramount in the attainment of this objective. This new direction in Greek foreign policy was once again aligned with what was happening in other European capitals in the deadly aftermath of World War I. The spirit of peaceful cooperation among nations was the only thing capable of motivating a frightened and devastated Western Europe. This ideal istic urge gave birth to the notion of a free, united, and democratic Europe. The concept of “constant and methodical, economic and political cooperation” among the states of Europe was welcomed in Greece by Venizelos as “a project that corresponds to the noblest of the inspirations and to the true interests of the European peoples” (quoted in Svolopoulos, 2014b, p. 277). Three decades into the 20th century, the only narrative that remained standing was an alteration of Greece’s affinity with Europe, which had turned into a complete dependence on Western power and financial support. Soon thereafter, in the aftermath of World War , desperate economic conditions,

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

143

the Greek Civil War, the perceived communist threat, Cold War dynamics, the threat of nuclear warfare, and the emergence of the concept of interdependence and collective security were some of the factors that reinforced Greek feelings of insecurity and were overcompensated for with a policy of Western orientation. The Greek Civil War in particular and Cold War geopolitics provided the perfect context for the ascendancy of the myth of belonging. Most of all, Greece’s relentless and systematic participation in the process of European integration bestowed a ceremonial quality upon the myth of belonging to Europe and the West. 4.2 Belonging to the West from the Civil War to European Integration As with other European nations that experienced Nazi occupation, the end of World War II and the gradual retreat of German troops left Greece in political, economic, and social disarray (Conway, 2017). Fighting between the communist guerillas that had led the resistance during occupation and the republican forces that remained loyal to the self-exiled monarch and his government had erupted even before the end of the war and the retreat of the Germans (this first stage of the conflict is now known as the “First Round”).53 Immediately after the end of the war the Greek communists launched the second stage of the insurgency to take advantage of the German retreat, press for material support from the Soviet Union, and seize power in the country (the “Second Round”). Although the United States and Great Britain as well as the Greek government correctly perceived the insurgency as an effort to bring Greece into the Soviet sphere of influence, it was generally accepted that the insurgency was an own initiative of the Greek communists and that Moscow did not directly support or guide the communist revolution in Greece (see Iatrides, 2005b). However, more recent scholarship following the opening of East European archives points to heavy involvement of the Soviet Union in the conflict, including the provision of weaponry and military equipment to the com munist rebels—albeit via proxies of the Soviet bloc, such as Tito’s Yugoslavia (Marantzidis, 2013). The longest and most dramatic phase of the conflict (the “Third Round”), which lasted approximately three years, from 1946 to 1949, was what gave the Greek Civil War international dimensions and broader historical significance due to the active involvement of the United States (Iatrides & Rizopoulos, 2000, p. 87). The threat of a Soviet takeover of Greece was one of the crucial factors For the standard historiographical division of the Civil War in three distinct stages or three “rounds,” see Gerolymatos (2003). For a detailed account of the three rounds, see Woodhouse (2002).

144

CHAPTER 3

that shaped the U.S. policy of intervention (Truman Doctrine), in which many scholars locate the origins of the Cold War.54 In turn, U.S. involvement in the Greek Civil War is considered the first Cold War victory (Olkhovsky, 1991). Foreign intervention in the conflict had already started in 1944 with the “second” liberation of Athens by British troops after the communist rebels had seized the capital from the retreating German forces, while, in addition, the Greek government was already dependent on foreign aid coordinated by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) (Vlavianós, 1992, p. 4). British involvement in Greece continued, comprising political guidance and economic support, before the decision to withdraw aid in 1947, which in turn compelled the United States to become involved (Frazier, 2016, pp. 75–119, 120–131). This distinctive international dimension of the Greek Civil War put the country at the center of the postwar world that was being constructed; Greece was “one of the first battlefields [ … ​] of the two worlds, eastern/communist and western/capitalist, that confronted each other for decades in the context of the Cold War” (Klapsis, 2011, p. 275). By necessity, the Greeks realized therefore that there was a new international system in the making and that they were sitting, again, directly atop a new geopolitical rift, or, according to Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, the Greek Prime Minister in 1945, “on top the most difficult and most narrow crossroad of the world” (Kanellopoulos, 1945). At the time of the Battle of Athens between British troops and the communist insurgents in December 1944, the diplomat, poet, and later Nobel laureate George Seferis wrote in his diary that the “idyllic Plaka [the neighborhood below the rock of Acropolis in Athens] is the place where the first battle between the British Empire and the Soviet Russia took place. It was really the first battle of the Western with the Eastern World” (Seferis, 1986, pp. 373–374). The Civil War and the coming of the Cold War necessitated a radical adap tation of previous geopolitical narratives to fit the new categorizations of the postwar world. Greek strategic thought, self-awareness, and sense of place needed to adapt to the changing dynamics of the Cold War (Hatzivassiliou, 2007). Irredentism was revived under the label “National Claims,” albeit on a significantly smaller scale, dealing almost predominantly with the small area of “Northern Epirus” (a region of Albania with a significant plurality of Greeks) and the well-known question of Cyprus’s unification with Greece (Stephanidēs, 2007). Anti-Western and anti-European sentiments were redirected toward the

See, for a recent example, Gerolymatos (2016). For the link between the Greek Civil War and the origins of the Cold War, see Sfikas (2005).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

145

United States,55 whereas, from the opposite side, as Greece’s northern neighbors were all within the Soviet sphere of influence, the Slavic threat and Russian interference were adapted according to Cold War terms as the communist threat.56 For the majority of politicians, scholars, intellectuals, and other commentators of the time, the issue of Greece’s strategic orientation was not diplomatic (i.e., a careful consideration of the interests and preferences of the main actors); it was predominantly geographic and historical (i.e., Greece’s geopolitical position and its history determined the attitudes of the great powers) (Mikelis, 2011, esp. pp. 262–265). And the solution to the problems and challenges posed by the new Cold War environment, which involved a mounting sense of geopolitical isolation and insecurity, was to consolidate Greece’s strategic attachment to Europe and the West. Eventually, Greece’s Western orientation was “adopted anew by the majority of the leading representatives of the political world and the public opinion” as a “more steady and effective support for the interests of the independent Greek state,” which was a “natural continuation of perceptions that have been dominating for more than a century” (Svolopoulos, 2014a, pp. 228–289). This strategic decision was made clear, in a more formal manner, in the official diplomatic conduct of Greece in the context of its participation in the emerging process of European integration. On January 22, 1948, addressing the House of Commons, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin referred to the need for a “consolidation of Western Europe.” He argued that cooperation treaties should be signed first with the country’s “near neighbours,” but then, to go beyond the circle of our immediate neighbours [...] to consider the question of associating other historic members of European civilisation [...] in this great conception. Their eventual participation is of course no less important than that of countries with which, if only for geographical reasons, we must deal first. We are thinking now of Western Europe as a unit. (Bevin, 1947–1948) The idea of Western Europe as a unit resonated with the Greek diplomatic service, which immediately adopted the geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War and accordingly started developing narratives of Greece belonging to the West. 55 56

For the emergence of anti-Americanism in Greece, see Zinovia (2015). For a study of Soviet foreign policy in the Balkans as a continuation of the Imperial Rus sian policy of Pan-Slavism, see Koumas (2011).

146

CHAPTER 3

The day after Bevin’s speech, the Greek Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Panayiotis Pipinelis, visited the British Ambassador in Greece and asked for clarification concerning the question of associating “historic members of European civilization” with Western Europe. In a communication to the Greek embassies in London, Washington, Paris, and Rome, Pipinelis (1948) recounted his meeting at the British Embassy: the British Ambassador, Pipinelis said, explained to him that Bevin had referred specifically to France, Italy, and the Benelux countries, but he did not explicitly exclude Greece from Bevin’s “great conception.” Pipinelis commented that, in his interpretation of Bevin’s speech, the Western European countries “were defined in cultural, not in geographical terms” and that the Greek government would be positively predisposed to such an interpretation. However, the British Ambassador replied that London was obliged to limit this formal cooperation to only a handful of European powers. He then asked the Greek Ambassador in London to pursue the matter further by seeking a meeting at the British Foreign Office. In September 1948, a delegation of Greek MP s participated in the second congress of the European Parliamentary Union (EPU), a private organization founded by Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi—a pioneer thinker of the European integration movement and the first recipient of the Charlemagne Prize from the city of Aachen. The Greek delegation submitted a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning its conduct in the congress. In the report it is mentioned that a member of the Greek delegation, Pantelis Rozakis, communicated a message from the Greek government saluting the efforts to create a “European Union” and the work of the EPU in this respect (Mpakopoulos, 1948). The message of the Greek government cited the ancient “Amphictyonic League” (loosely translated as a “league of neighbors”) as a precursor to the union of European states that would end the “fratricidal feuds” among the peoples of Europe.57 Greece, the message continued, situated in the crossroad of East and West, has suffered in the course of the thirty centuries of its history many incursions and disasters [ … ​] in the present [as in the past], Greece is struggling not only for its own 57

The Amphictyonic Leagues were ancient religious associations of Greek tribes that assumed the form of an alliance. The most well-known amphictyony was the Delphic or Great Amphictyonic League, which declined in the 3rd century bce. It is interesting to note here that, in 1826, Simon Bolivar also used the simulacrum of the Amphictyonic League in order to bring together in a permanent alliance the young republics of Latin America. As a result, the Congress of Panama is also known as the Amphictyonic Con gress; see Reza (2004, 2006) and Townsend (1976).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

147

survival, but also for the survival of the European civilization. For this reason, the Greek Nation believes that the realization of this European ideal [for unity] will vindicate the blood of its children shed in the fields of battle. From the European Unity [ … ​] Greece may hope to enjoy peace and prosperity. In another instance, Giorgos Mpakopoulos, the author of the report and a member of the Greek delegation to the EPU congress, repeated the simulacrum of the Amphictyonic League as the ancestor of a federation of states, but he elaborated that the League had enabled the ancient Greeks to defend and save their civilization, and I could say, Europe, which was threatened by the uncivilized hordes, coming from the East. And perhaps it is not improbable that Fate reserves for all of us the same tragic glory. (Mpakopoulos, 1948) In his report, Mpakopoulos concluded that the idea of a United States of Europe was already a distinct possibility and that Greece “ought not to be absent, not even for a moment, or to lag behind in this effort, because of its tradition, but also because of an imperative interest” linked to its membership in a possible European Union. In a speech to the Greek Association for European Cooperation, Pipinelis also made clear that the division of Europe into spheres of influence was antithetical to Greek interests and that the official policy of the Greek government after the war was to support the idea of a European Union (Pipinelis, 1949). In the 1950s, Greek diplomats were given instructions to repeat at every opportunity that Greece was committed to European values and would be useful to the West in the regions of the Near East and the Middle East; at the same time, Greece was dependent on a union of the European continent in order to secure its economic development and defend against the menace of communism coming from the east (Zamarias, 1954). An internal report from the Political Directorate of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1962 reiterated that Greece’s participation in European integration was vital both for economic and political reasons (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Directorate B, 1962). One of the dangers that the authors of the report pointed to was that a possible exclusion of Greece from European integration would create in Greek public opinion the impression that Greece was relegated to a “peripheral status” far from the core of the European con tinent. The document also points out that the non-participation of Greece in a political organization that had the goal to defend the values of European

148

CHAPTER 3

civilization was incompatible with the history of the country as the birthplace of these values. Overall, in diplomatic practice from the Greek Civil War up to the beginning of the 1960s, Greek diplomats, politicians, and civil society (e.g., nongovernmental organizations such as the Greek Association for European Cooperation) pushed for Greece’s participation in European integration, claiming that Greece had a rightful place at the heart of Europe, citing both the cultural achievements of classical Greece and its sensitive geographic position, given the geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War. Throughout this period Greece’s official membership was limited to the Council of Europe. In 1962, however, amid internal political instability, Greece became the first country to sign and ratify an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1967, a group of colonels overthrew the legally elected Greek government and established the first postwar military dictatorship in Western Europe (Sakkas, 2004). The Colonels’ Junta sold itself as a legitimate authoritarian “revolution” on the premise of the failure of the political system to govern the country (Couloumbis, 1974). The regime committed gross violations of human rights and civil liberties and as a result they were widely condemned by individual Western European governments. Collectively, the EEC was quick to freeze the Association Agreement in order to apply political pressure on the colonels (Coufoudakis, 1977). In 1969, the regime also pulled out of the Council of Europe to avoid another open condemnation of its authoritarianism in Greece (Varsori, 2008). The seven-year-long junta seems to have been a bizarre break from the official line of Western orientation that Greek diplomacy deployed for 20 years after the end of World War II. For a time, the suspension of the Association Agreement and the withdrawal from the Council of Europe threatened to upend the established geopolitical attachment with Europe and the West. Nevertheless, there is no evidence to suggest that this break was due to inherent anti-Western or anti-European ideological tendencies of the regime. Quite the reverse, there was a strong case that the colonels had links to the CIA and the regime was silently sanctioned by the United States (which may explain in part the rise of anti-Americanism during and after the dictatorship).58 The British also followed a pragmatist policy of publicly condemning but working with the regime on a number of military and strategic issues (see Nafpliotis, 2013). 58 The CIA connection is mentioned in Sakkas (2004, p. 245). For the—disputed—case of continuous American intervention in Greece that also led to the Colonels’ Junta, see Kas-

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

149

Furthermore, perhaps in order to bypass their European isolation, the colonels made it publicly clear on many occasions that they were on good terms with the United States (see Rizas, 2008b, pp. 430–433). All the above were also in line with NATO’s reluctance to denounce the regime, choosing instead to give priority to Cold War strategic concerns—despite the fact that NATO members were united in their condemnation of the Greek junta (Pedaliu, 2011). Regularity returned after seven years with the restoration of democracy in 1974, and Greece’s effort to create a formal link to Europe and the West recommenced as strongly as ever thanks to Konstantinos Karamanlis, who put all his—considerable—political weight behind the country’s bid for full membership in the European Communities. Karamanlis was the founder and leader of the center-right New Democracy party and a central figure in the restitution of democracy after the collapse of the military junta (Woodhouse, 1982). He was also the driving force behind the accession of Greece to the EC—a legacy that earned him the nickname “the leader of the Greek nation” [or Ethnarch in Greek]. Karamanlis was living in exile, in Paris, when the Colonels’ Junta lost power. Four days later, he returned to Greece to assume the office of Prime Minister.59 It was not his first term as Prime Minister;60 since the 1950s he had supported consistently and decidedly Greece’s policy of participation in European integration, a policy that he believed would “define the fate of the country for many centuries” (quoted in Kontogeorgis, 2003, p. 50). This is why, according to his assessment, he “fought for eighteen years to integrate [Greece] in the European Community” (Karamanlis, 1978). Approximately one year after the restoration, on July 12, 1975, Karamanlis submitted Greece’s application for full membership to the EC. Greece’s official motive was to ensure the consolidation of democracy in the country (Karamouzi, 2014, pp. 14–34), which was in line with European efforts for stabilization and democratization in Southern Europe (Varsori, 2009, p. 10; see also Karamouzi, 2014, pp. 35–62). But Karamanlis was also justifying full membership in terms of national security and economic development (Kontogeorgis, 2003, p. 50). With Karamanlis, the myth of belonging to Europe and the West found its most astute expression to date. The Greek statesman used a distinctive set of belonging narratives that touched on the familiar triptych of the centrality of the Greek state, the continuity of the Greek nation from ancient times, and its 59

He arrived in Athens on board the official aircraft of the President of France, Valery Gis card d’Estaing, with whom he had developed a close friendship. He was first elected Prime Minister in 1955.

150

CHAPTER 3

special affinity with European civilization. Rational interest calculations were among his priorities, but his argumentation was distinctively narrative in form and spoke to deeper Greek concerns about national identity, self-awareness, and sense of place. As Giscard d’Estaing put it, Karamanlis “wanted to hook Greece on Europe [ … ​] the argument he made was stronger than any interest calculation. There cannot be a civilization or a culture in Europe that is cut off from its source” (Giscard d’Estaing, 1995). Continuity and affinity between classical Greece, Europe, and modern Greece was the main thrust of Karamanlis’s discourse during the process of Greek accession to the EC. He never missed the chance to repeat, for example, that he saw European civilization as a “common civilization,” which is a “synthesis of the Greek, Roman and Christian spirit. A synthesis in which the Greek spirit introduced the idea of Liberty, Truth and Beauty” (Karamanlis, 1978; see also Karamanlis, 1980b). It is evident that Greece’s cultural affinity and feeling of belonging with Europe and the West also derived from this continuity. In this respect, the storyline was that in terms of culture, classical Greece was the cradle of European civilization and liberal democracy. “In terms of geography, Greece belongs to the Balkans. In civilizational terms, Greece not only belongs to Europe, but it is the source of the European civilization [ … ​] even the name ‘Europe’ is Greek. This why, Greece was on the side of the West, for the simple reason that Greece herself felt she belonged to the West” (quoted in Massip & Druon, 1982, p. 33; see also Karamanlis, 1991). Elsewhere he stated, “the spirit of the ‘blissful city’ of Pericles, surpassing geographic and temporal limits, became the ideal of human societies and the foundation on which the European civilization was built” (Karamanlis, 1983). Even outside Europe, he never stopped repeating the key narratives of continuity and affinity; on an official trip to China he compared Greece and China, saying, “the Chinese civilization enlightened the Far East and Asia in general, just like the Greek thought became the foundation of European civilization and enlightened the West.”61 Karamanlis even played with the storyline of the tripartite continuity of ancient, medieval, and modern Hellenism and its worldwide cultural significance, also referring to the cultural affinity between Greece and Europe. Elsewhere he spoke of “[t]he Classical age of Greece [ … ​] which is a patrimony of the whole world and the Byzantine age, which paved the way for Christianity in Europe” (Karamanlis, 1982). Remarkably, Karamanlis also recycled previously used storylines concern ing the Slavic threat and the Western dependence of the Greek state in his From a speech during an official trip to China in 1979. Quoted in Kartakis (2004, p. 202).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

151

domestic sparring with the far left and the social-democrats, whom he accused of trying to cut Greece off from its historic position in Europe and the West. On matters of foreign policy his vision of the world was defined by a division between East and West, and he blamed the far left for dragging the country to the feet of Moscow, and the social-democrats for dragging it to the complete “unknown” (Karamanlis, 1976, 1979a). He often used versions of the Slavic threat fused with Cold War geopolitics, saying in parliament, for example, I defined my foreign policy according to the fixed interests of my country. What are those interests? The interests that are defined by our geographic position and our history. The road of Eastern Europe to the Mediterranean passes through our national territory. Ever since the era of Peter the Great, Greece never stopped receiving pressure from the Slaviccommunist [sic] mass [ … ​] this threat is more fearful now that we have a strong communist party that is entirely devoted to Moscow. (quoted in Genevoix & Trollope, 1973, p. 89) Being cut off from the West, on which so much depends, Greece “will find herself alone in the world, without solidarity and especially in a time when the international affairs forces each country to pursue maximum security” (Karamanlis, 1980a). To some extent, Karamanlis preferred to institutionalize this dependence with Greece’s accession to the EC as a critical “organic link” that would “secure her future, putting her out of her eternal loneliness” (quoted in Massip & Druon, 1982, p. 33; see also Karamanlis, 1991). According to Karamanlis, [t]he critical geographic position of the country obliges her to receive, but also to ask for the protection of the Great [Powers]. After her independence, Greece found herself isolated in a hostile environment. [ … ​ many times the political parties have asked for foreign interventions. If I aimed with such persistency for the accession of Greece in the European Community, I did it because I wanted, among other things, to relieve her from this need to look for protectors. (quoted in Massip & Druon, 1982, p. 33) In this way, Western dependence would not be a weakness; rather, it would provide a natural geopolitical advantage to a country that belonged to the European family of nations. In a famous parliamentary debate Karamanlis said, “Greece belongs to the Western World, owing to tradition or by way of

152

CHAPTER 3

interests, Greece belongs to the Western World. Why do you repeat that ‘we belong to the West’? Just like other people belong to the Non-Attached, the East or the African world—we belong to the West.”62 The text that summarizes the myth of belonging, with all its key narratives and forms, is none other than Karamanlis’s historic speech on the occasion of the signing of Greece’s accession to the EEC (Athens, May 28, 1979). On that day, Karamanlis repeated in one stretch all the storylines variously used during the accession process. He mentioned all the rational calculations that justified the accession (i.e., the guarantees of national independence, democratic freedoms, and economic development), but he also called Europe a “familiar space” for Greece, with its Greek name and culture based on Greek, Roman, and Christian foundations—a common culture. He talked of the political and institutional change that Greece would undergo within the EC, but he also talked of Greece’s value at the crossroads of East and West, as the “Mediterranean balcony of the Common Market” and a bridge that could help promote the European idea beyond the West. “Greece today,” he ended, “accepts definitively its historical challenge and its European destiny” (GorillaGrodd1979, 2013). Karamanlis’s formulation—Greece belongs to the West—served and is still serving as a maxim for what we call here the belonging myth, repeated as a powerful political slogan during electoral speeches, parliamentary sessions, talk shows, editorials and opinion articles, academic debates, and, most recently, referendums. The influence it has exerted on Greek politics since the late 1970s with regard to Greece’s accession process to the EC is due to the fact that it is the spearhead of a long line of thinking about the position of Greece in the world, a line that extends from the 18th century to the present, from the first stirrings of a modern national consciousness to the accession of Greece to the EC—and beyond, to the current geopolitical predicament amid a sea of economic, social, and political distress. 4.3 Europeanization, Modernization, and the Geopolitics of the Euro Crisis Greece’s accession to the European Communities on January 1, 1981, was a defining national moment. As was intended, accession ushered in a prolonged period of political stability, although domestic political party dynamics and ideological rhetoric did play an apparent role in Greece’s attitude inside the EC

Several video clips of this famous parliamentary exchange are available online; see, for example, Constantinos (2009).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

153

Indeed, shortly after the accession, in October 1981, PASOK, the socialist party of Andreas Papandreou, came to power. Considering that PASOK made a conscious effort to represent the “losing side of the civil war” (Gunther et al., 1995, p. 5), the peaceful governmental transition in 1981 was a good indication of democratic consolidation in the country (Pagoulatos, 2002, p. 4). PASOK’s socialist instincts, which drove its critical stance toward European integration before the accession, also kicked in shortly after its rise to government in 1981. The Greek government reacted negatively to a number of issues ranging from matters of implementation of EC rules and norms to European foreign policy and was subsequently isolated in the EC (see Ioakimidis, 1994). Eventually, however, PASOK softened and, by the end of the decade, abandoned its rhetoric about a “special relationship” with the EC. In the 1990s (after a brief spell in the opposition benches between 1990 and 1993) the successive PASOK governments of Papandreou and Kostas Simitis supported the “federal” integration model as well as the development of joint policy in new areas (education, health, and environment), the strengthening of supranational institutions (EU Commission and Parliament), and the development of a joint foreign and security policy by the Union. In the late 1990s Greece supported every idea and process of deepening European integration in every sector, demonstrating “a commitment to economic and institutional Europeanization” (Pagoulatos, 2002, pp. 4–5, 8). The concept of Europeanization has become key to the analysis of contemporary European developments and especially the impact of European integration on the Member States. In its broader definition, Europeanization “involves a response to the policies of the European Union” (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003, p. 3). More specifically, Europeanization may refer to institutional and political transformation caused by European integration, but also to more profound transformations concerning ideas, discourse, and selfawareness (Radaelli & Exadaktylos, 2012, p. xi). The literature on Europeanization focuses on institutional, political, and ideological change, including the diffusion of civilizational norms and cultural habits, as well as changes in central governments but also in subnational authorities and political parties (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003, p. 6).63 Consequently, the concept of Europeanization has also found an application in explaining changes in foreign policy 63

For examples of studies on Europeanization as institutional and political change, see Knill (2001), Grabbe (2006), Adshead (2005), Bulmer & Burch (2005), Ladrech (2010), and Poguntke (2008). For examples of studies on Europeanization and the diffusion of cultural norms, see Borneman & Fowler (1997), Smith (2001), Guiraudon (2001), and Ólaf sdóttir et al. (1997).

154

CHAPTER 3

(see, e.g., Wong & Hill, 2012; Moumoutzis, 2011; Alecu & Müller, 2012; Gross, 2011). Greece has been studied as an interesting case of Europeanization, in which adaptational pressures deriving from EU membership have indeed induced a number of political and institutional changes, including economic policies, a trend of decentralization, and the strengthening of civil society, in the context of the modernization of the state (Ioakimidis, 2000b; see also Ioakimidis, 1997).64 In other words, in the case of Greece, Europeanization did not come about spontaneously as a result of EU membership but involved a conscious effort to modernize the state according to European standards. Indeed, after 1996, this modernization was the basis of PASOK’s ideological drive in Greek politics and the underlying principle of Simitis’s administrations until 2004 (Moschonas, 2001). With regard to Greek foreign policy, a similar pattern of Europeanization can be observed, which also coincides with PASOK’s “modernization” governments from 1996 to 2004 (Economides, 2005). The degree of Europeanization of Greek foreign policy is argued to be “limited” or incomplete (Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 2005, 2011). Greece’s particular security circumstances and its peculiar decision-making model of foreign policy have been cited to qualify the country as a special case among the EU Member States (see Kavakas, 2000; Ioakimidis, 1999). There is, however, a general consensus that EU membership also put considerable pressure on Greece’s priority setting and actual conduct of foreign policy, which is observable especially after the mid-1990s, among others in the cases of Greek–Turkish rapprochement and Greece’s recognition of Turkey as a candidate country, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, and, more recently, the signing of the Prespa agreement, which is meant to settle the naming dispute with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (Pagoulatos, 2002, pp. 16–18). Indeed, Greece makes a good case for Europeanization showing a trend in changing national institutional structures due to the emergence and consolidation of European governance and the erosion of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, the adaptational pressures of Europeanization are not enough to cause domestic change; other mediating factors are necessary as well. Cowles et al. (2012, pp. 1–2) identify five such mediating factors, namely, multiple veto points in the domestic structure, the facilitation of formal institutions, a country’s organizational and policy-making cultures, the differential empower ment of domestic actors, and learning. Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) also For Europeanization regarding economic policies, see Pagoulatos (2000).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

155

acknowledge the institutional restraints of EU regulation on domestic politics and decision-making; however, they, too, consider that mediating factors can be found in each Member State that usually qualify Europeanization, such as economic vulnerability, capacity to carry out changes, and finally, the compatibility of EU policies with domestic particularities and the discourses that influence policy preferences (see also Schmidt, 2002, n.d.). The argument made here is that geopolitical mythmaking in Greece may be one of these factors that mediated Europeanization as modernization in the Greek political context. The narratives of belonging to Europe and the West, diffused and adapted in previous centuries, formed a dominant myth that legitimized Europeanization. In this respect, Pagoulatos’s formulation is rather interesting, stressing that “it should be emphatically underlined that Greece’s successful integration in the European Union has also de facto conclusively resolved what once used to be an existential identity question [ … ​] what once was expressed as wishful thinking rather than a given fact (‘we belong to the West’), at least in the geopolitical and historical sense stands today beyond dispute” (Pagoulatos, 2002, p. 28). Full membership in the core of the Western European countries turned into a ritualization of the myth of belonging, which was re-enacted in every European Council meeting, every ministerial meeting, and mobilized support for changes deriving from membership in the EU. In this way, especially after 1981, belonging to the West became a commonsensical, apparent truth that should be “beyond dispute.” In theory, the EU deliberately avoids political myths linked to nationalistic tendencies (Ifversen, 2011); and, from the opposite direction, national myths are held to be incompatible with the common European project. However, there has been significant mythmaking involved in “the making” of the European Union itself. For example, Ian Manners (2010) has identified at least six myths connected with Europe’s position as a unitary global actor. Similarly, Vincent Della Sala (2016) has identified two sets of political myths that relate to the EU’s origins and its perceived exceptionalism, and more specifically, among others, they trace the EU’s foundation to the Renaissance and the Enlighten , speak of the EU’s role in ensuring peace and prosperity on a continent ravaged by nationalism, and prescribe to the EU the mission of exporting democracy to the world. Greece may well be a curious case of a Member State whose national myths are not incompatible with those of the EU. Quite the opposite, EU and Greek national myths can exist together without conflict, and by extension they can mediate adaptational pressures deriving from EU membership. Accordingly, Greek governments have used EU membership to legitimize and garner support for contentious reforms. In other words, “major decisions

156

CHAPTER 3

in Greek politics have been largely justified by national actors in the name of Europe” (Dimas, 2011). As Tsoukalis put it, “EU policies and rules can sometimes serve as convenient scapegoat for unpopular policies at home. Greek governments have frequently made use of the European scapegoat whenever domestic support was short in supply. They have tried to capitalise on the generally high levels of public support for the EU at home” (Tsoukalis, 2019; see also Tsoukalis, 2004). If ever there were a case of using EU membership to legitimize and support contentious reforms in Greece, it was the euro crisis. The Greek debt crisis started sometime around 2010;65 after that, Greece entered a protracted period of economic recession and of implementing economic adjustment programs and their relevant memoranda of understanding following agreements with its lenders. Greek governments enacted a dozen rounds of tax hikes, spending cuts, and reforms from 2010 to 2015. Despite these reform efforts, however, the country did not have access to foreign loans and required bailout loans in 2010, 2012, and 2015 from the International Monetary Fund, the Eurogroup, and the European Central Bank, on top of a 50 percent “haircut” on its debt owed to private banks in 2011. From the beginning of the crisis, the government of Giorgos Papandreou (son of Andreas Papandreou, founder of PASOK and Prime Minister himself), justified the reforms effectively “in the name of Europe”—in other words, as a necessary step for the economic security of the country, as obligations stemming from eurozone membership, and by extension as a prerequisite for keeping Greece in the eurozone.66 In April 2010, in what was later called the “Kastelorizo Proclamation,” Papandreou compared the Greek economy to a “sinking boat” amid a “storm of problems” and claimed that it was a “national imperative” to formally ask the EU to step in and assist Greece by providing a “safe harbor that will allow us to rebuild our boat with robust and reliable materials” (Papandreou, 2010). Eventually, however, the protracted socioeconomic displacement also upset the Greek political system and brought to the fore populist forces from the radical left and the nationalist right. The austerity measures (tax hikes, spending cuts, and administrative reforms) that accompanied the bailouts continued to trigger local riots, demonstrations, and general strikes across the country. These 65

66

There is no reason to enter into a highly controversial economic-political discussion, but a wide variety of factors in the crisis have been cited by different sources. The Greek Ministry of Finance and the European Commission listed five main causes, namely poor GDP growth, government debt and deficits, budget compliance, and data credibility; see Greek Ministry of Finance (2010). This was a continuation of using Europe as a scapegoat to support contentious reforms;

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

157

waves of anti-austerity protests, known as the Indignant Citizens Movement, began as non-partisan and peaceful protests, but they often turned violent and sent ripples throughout the political system. In 2011, under populist pressure, the caretaker government of Lucas Papademos (the former Vice-President of the European Central Bank) replaced PASOK. In 2012, a PASOK-ND grand coalition under Antonis Samaras finally managed to secure a parliamentary majority after a double election, which had, however, already upended the Greek political system (see Dinas & Rori, 2013; Voulgaris & Nikolakopoulos, 2014). The euro crisis in Greece had created the setting for a spectacular rise of populist forces from both the left and the right of the political spectrum, emerging as a response to austerity in the guise of an anti-systemic, anti-establishment critique of neoliberal economic practices.67 The political system was being rearranged according to a cleavage between mainstream pro-European and populist Eurosceptic forces led by the radical left SYRIZA (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2019).68 In 2014, in view of an imminent populist takeover, Prime Minister Antonios Samaras called for the mobilization of “persons who believe in the European prospect of the country” that could broaden the ruling coalition, which he was leading (allwebnews, 2014). In January 2015, SYRIZA won an early parliamentary election and Alexis Tsipras formed a government with the populist right ANEL party as a junior partner. SYRIZA’s win confirmed the impression that the crisis was reshaping the Greek political system and seemed to represent a complete break with how the mainstream political parties had dealt with the economic crisis in the past (Tsirbas, 2016). The parliament at large after the 2015 elections was comprised of a shockingly large majority of radical parties (left-wing SYRIZA, right-wing nationalist ANEL, communist KKE, and neo-Nazi Golden Dawn counted 194 out of 300 seats in the Greek parliament). Taken together, the intensity of the crisis and the sheer parliamentary power of radical and populist forces hinted at the possibility that the condemnation of EU-imposed austerity may have been concealing in fact an anti-European agenda. Even though the polls suggested that some 75 percent of the Greek electorate remained “committed to Europe” and were firmly in favor of staying in the eurozone, SYRIZA’s win may have represented not only a rejection of austerity measures, but also a more profound downgrading of Europe’s value for Greece, one that had been in the making throughout the financial and economic 67 68

For the left, see Spourdalakis (2014) and Stavrakakis & Katsambekis (2014). For the right, see Ellinas (2013). This new populist divide was also evident in the media; see Papathanassopoulos & Gian nouli (2019).

158

CHAPTER 3

crisis. The economy was at the core of the crisis, but the political confrontation between pro-European forces and Eurosceptic populists also touched on issues of national sovereignty and independence (Halikiopoulou, 2012); therefore, it contained a crucial foreign policy dimension. In this respect, the euro crisis may have also created the setting for a re-politicization of foreign policy issues that were not subject to public scrutiny before the crisis in the context of the Europeanization process, and, gradually, “new foreign policy conceptions began to hatch where disengagement from the EU was seen as a precondition for the end of austerity and the re-establishment of social sovereignty in Greece” (Chryssogelos, 2019, p. 612). SYRIZA’s anti-Western sentiments were visible from the beginning of the crisis. In official party documents SYRIZA identified the EU as a “dominant political system,” “fully subservient to the capitalist strategy,” that was staging an “assault” on the European peoples. These narratives blamed the “neoliberal” elites—the Troika—for imposing austerity and causing a “humanitarian crisis” in Greece (SYRIZA, 2015a). On the level of international affairs, SYRIZA also criticized U.S. “imperialist and neocolonialist strategies” in the Middle East and denounced NATO as a “dangerous tool of intervention and destruction of the new world order.” Another party resolution said that Greece should close NATO military bases in its territory and withdraw the country from the Alliance (SYRIZA, 2015a, 2015b). Overall, the idea that Europe and the United States were to blame for the war in Syria and for the ensuing refugee crisis was a leitmotif used throughout the first year of SYRIZA’s government. With regard to the migration crisis, SYRIZA blamed Europe and the United States—importantly, fused together under the label of the West—for funneling arms and credit to the Islamist and extremist opposition and starting the civil war in Syria (SYRIZA, 2015a, 2015b). In the summer of 2015, migrant deaths in the Mediterranean reached more than 3,600 despite life-saving actions by government organizations and civil society (IOM, 2015). The day after the most dramatic of these deplorable deaths, the drowning of a threeyear-old Syrian–Kurdish boy in the Aegean Sea that made global headlines, Prime Minister Tsipras released a recorded message: “the picture of a threeyear old, drowned in the Aegean Sea,” Tsipras said, “is a powerful punch in the stomach for all of us—and especially for Europe.” Tsipras accused Europe of being indifferent initially and then embarrassed by this “world drama”—a drama, he said, that was “created by the erratic foreign policy and the military interventions from the West” (Tsipras, 2015). In another instance, Prime Min ister Tsipras declared that frontline countries such as Greece and Italy had been called on to manage an enormous problem, repeating that this problem is “a result of the military intervention by the West in these countries and

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

159

particularly in Syria and Libya, previously in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Prime Minister of Greece, 2015b). While Greece was coping with the seventh consecutive year of recession, Gallup found that more than one in three Greeks (35 percent) approved of Russia’s leadership, while fewer than one in four (23 percent) approved of the EU’s leadership (Gallup, 2015). Consequently, when Tsipras became Greece’s Prime Minister in 2015, he was quick to shake Vladimir Putin’s hand in Moscow, declaring that the official objective of his visit was to restart Greek–Russian relations. In the course of their joint statements after the meeting, Tsipras referred to the strong historical and religious links between Greece and Russia, which had also sealed the Greek War of Independence. But Tsipras also insisted on Greece’s freedom to seek multidimensional alliances and reclaim her geopolitical role (naftemporiki.​gr, 2015). This language can be attributed to Nikos Kotzias, Tsipras’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was a long-time advocate of an “autonomous-energetic” foreign policy that would take advantage of international dynamics and the emerging powers in order to develop “multi-dimensional alliance systems”; in other words, in a changing world, Greece cannot belong—only—to the West (Kotzias, 2010). In turn, according to Kotzias, a multidimensional alliances policy could help Greece counterbalance German hegemony and the “European Empire,” which had relegated the country to the status of a “debt colony” (Kotzias, 2013). In an official visit to Moscow, Nikos Voutsis, the SYRIZA chairman of the Greek parliament, declared: “After all, for us Russia is Europe. Russia is an integral part of European history and culture [ … ​] the dialogue between Russia and the EU [ … ​] is a dialogue between two parts of Europe.” For this reason, he continued, “we believe that there cannot be a satisfactory security architecture in Europe without the inclusion of Russia.” According to Voutsis, for years the Greek radical left had a “strategy for a new European architecture [ … ​] a unified Europe from the Urals to Gibraltar” (ToVima, 2016). It can be argued that this rhetoric—anti-European, anti-American, antiWestern, and at the same time pro-Russian—was not limited to SYRIZA and Greece but was in line with the rise of populism across Europe. And although the affiliation of the European far right with the Kremlin is naturally the most pronounced (Klapsis, 2015), there is also an unmistakable pattern of alignment between radical left positions in Europe and foreign policy thinking in Mos cow (Kreko & Gyori, 2016). On the one hand, for the European far right, Putin’s uninterrupted reign since 1999 represents a victorious expression of their own neoconservative ideology and the governing potential of right-wing values (Klapsis, 2015, pp.

160

CHAPTER 3

17–21). In Central Europe, the Hungarian far right party Jobbik relays Russian geopolitical visions of Eurasianism (Juhasz & Gyori, 2015). To the east, in Slovakia, a multifarious far right resonates with skewed reinventions of both “Eurasianism” and “Pan-Slavism” (Gyori et al., 2015a). Further to the south, in Greece, the Kremlin has of course exploited domestic disappointment over European economic governance, but it has also played with twisted notions of patriotism, religious zeal, and apocalyptic prophecies (Gyori et al., 2015b). On the other hand, the European far left could be drawn to Russia by historical communist links and Putin’s anti-capitalist and anti-Western mannerisms (Kreko & Gyori, 2016, p. 7). Indeed, after its 2015 victory in Greek parliamentary elections, SYRIZA became one of the most successful and influential populist parties in Europe; and although European populists start from different ideological grounds, their perceptions of Russia converge when this serves their Eurosceptic agendas (Chryssogelos, 2011, p. 17). In other words, across the populist spectrum, which includes SYRIZA, Putin’s Russia was seen as a strategic ally for European states and a counterweight to the “ever closer” European Union. Nevertheless, it is also impossible to miss the correspondence of SYRIZA’s populist narratives with the enduring geopolitical mythmaking process in Greece. Apart from the populist motifs, SYRIZA also relied on familiar storylines that traditionally frame anti-European and anti-Western narratives in Greece. SYRIZA presented Europe and the United States—the West in general—as an overpowering structure, a neoliberal elite that manipulates the country, barring it from fulfilling its economic potential (Greece as a “debt colony”), while at the same time it condemned its dependence on European and international financial surveillance. After forming a government, they immediately turned to Russia to seek an alternative source of funding and support, without hiding their anti-liberal disposition. What is even more fascinating is that the mainstream pro-European opposition also used familiar storylines and narratives concerning Greece’s strategic orientation toward Europe and the West opposition of narratives became all the more evident during the run-up to the 2015 referendum. The announcement of the “bailout referendum” in June 2015 opened the most dramatic chapter in the Grexit discourse. The referendum was introduced to allow the population to decide whether to accept the bailout The single currency itself was often cited in Greece and abroad as a possible external cause of the crisis; see, for example, “Greece is trapped by the euro” (2015) and “The Euro is a straitjacket for Greece” (2015). When Greece faced two extreme options of defaulting or exiting the euro, the term “Grexit” was coined by the Citigroup economist Ebrahim

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

161

conditions of the third memorandum proposed jointly by the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank. However, it was quickly transformed as a vote to stay in or leave the eurozone— and by extension the European Union. Proponents of Grexit argued that leaving the eurozone and reintroducing a national currency would dramatically boost exports and tourism while discouraging expensive imports and thereby give the Greek economy the ability to recover and stand on its own feet. For example, Paul Krugman (2015) suggested that the Greek economy could recover from the recession by exiting the eurozone and returning to its national currency, the drachma. That would restore Greece’s control over its monetary policy, allowing it to navigate the trade-offs between inflation and growth on a national basis, rather than that of the entire eurozone. Opponents argued that the proposal would impose excessive hardship on the Greek people, as the short-term effect would be a significant consumption and wealth reduction for the Greek population. Even though public opinion in Greece was generally in favor of defaulting on the debt, other polls showed that the vast majority of Greeks did not support the idea of leaving the eurozone (“Greeks want to stay”, 2015). The government argued that that a “No” vote represented a rejection of the austerity terms demanded by the creditors and strengthened the Greek negotiating position within Europe. The SYRIZA government considered Europe’s terms for a third bailout loan to be blackmail, an undemocratic ultimatum that would curtail Greece’s sovereignty and independence. Tsipras made it clear that the referendum was not about Greece’s eurozone membership, which was “a given that no-one could question” (Prime Minister of Greece, 2015a). He also made it clear that SYRIZA was not challenging the position of Greece in Europe, but, on the contrary, the EU’s ultimatum was contrary to European values and a “humiliation for the Greek people”; that Greece was “the country that gave birth to democracy” and so needed to give a strong democratic response to the EU; and that “Greece is and will remain an integral part of Europe and Europe an integral part of Greece. But Europe without democracy will be a Europe without identity and without a compass” (naftemporiki.​gr, 2015). The supporters of the “Yes” vote—ND PASOK, and a number of smaller parties in the center, among them an allegedly grassroots movement entitled Menoume Europi (Stay in Europe)—were quick to cast the referendum as a decision on Greece remaining in the eurozone, and perhaps even the European Rahbari and was introduced by Rahbari and Citigroup’s Global Chief Economist Willem H. Buiter on February 6, 2012. See Atkins (2012).

162

CHAPTER 3

Union. Apart from framing the referendum as a cover-up attempt to leave the eurozone and the EU, the YES coalition used narratives of cultural affinity with Europe and security within an alliance of Western liberal democracies, revealing that the geopolitical myth of belonging and the key narratives that historically define Greece’s relations with Europe and the West are constant even in contemporary formats and contexts. Antonis Samaras, the leader of the New Democracy party and former prime minister, blamed Tsipras for bringing the country to a dead end, facing a deplorable agreement and Greece’s “exit from Europe.” He also accused him of leading the country to hold a referendum that essentially asked people to vote “Yes or No to Europe,” which would lead to a clash with Greece’s allies and the country’s eventual expulsion from the common currency. According to Samaras, “the European identity is a conquest of Greece,” and so his party “stands with democracy and Europe, in favor of the European prospect of the country; because any other position would be pernicious, socially and nationally for our fatherland” (“Samaras: Outside or inside Europe”, 2015). Evangelos Venizelos, the leader of PASOK, described the referendum as a coup that put in danger the European course of the country and its “historical acquis” (ToVima, 2015). Stavros Theodorakis, the leader of To Potami, portrayed SYRIZA as the “lobby of drachmae” that wished to “take the country out of the European Union and [and] throw it off a cliff. [ … ​] We will fight altogether for a strong Greece, standing in the heart of Europe” (Theodorakis, 2015). Menoume Europi recalled the values of the Enlightenment that were never internalized in Greek society and politics. Kostas Karamanlis, the nephew of Konstantinos Karamanlis and a former prime minister himself, in a taped message to the Greek people, described Greece’s participation in the European Union, and even more so in the hard core of Europe [the eurozone], as a “vital need”; he said that remaining in Europe is not vital for economic and social reasons, but above all for reasons of national security, which needs to be the “supreme criterion” of any decision, and the decision to leave the heart of Europe would be the first step toward the exit from the EU. He ended his message saying that “Europe is our home. I believe that Greece is an integral part of the United Europe, and this we need to reaffirm, decisively” (MaκPress, 2015). The bailout conditions were rejected by a majority, 61 percent to 39 percent, with the “No” vote winning in all of Greece’s electoral regions. Despite the result, in a dramatic turnaround, Prime Minister Tsipras reached an agreement with Greece’s creditors on a three-year bailout. The issue of Greece’s member ship in the eurozone was, temporarily at least, settled. subscribed to the mainstream positions concerning austerity and signed, with reluctance,

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

163

another bailout agreement with Europe and the International Monetary Fund. This “paradoxical resilience” of SYRIZA may have been a function of the power of populism to bring together and represent disparate social groups and manipulate the political context according to the issue at hand (Andreadis & Stavrakakis, 2017). It may also be that under certain circumstances, such as those at the time of the referendum and in its aftermath, the “economic institutions and material constraints can play an important role in taming populist actors and socializing them into the standard rules of the liberal democratic regime” (Aslanidis & Rovira, 2016). Concerning the referendum and its result, the most likely explanation is that those voters who sided with NO to score a landslide victory were never convinced that the result would affect Greece’s EU membership, whereas the voters who were convinced that a NO vote would jeopardize Greece’s position in Europe voted YES.70 However, this does not necessarily mean that SYRIZA’s blend of open confrontation with the EU and pro-Russian mannerisms was just a negotiating tactic aimed at spurring a change in EU economic policy (from “austerity” to “growth”). As a matter of fact, SYRIZA appeared predisposed to review Greece’s role in Europe and to support, among other things, a more equidistant position between Europe and Russia. The Issue of Greece’s strategic orientation and allegiance definitely resurfaced during this time. This goes to show that in a gateway state on the margins of Europe, the issue of the strategic orientation of the country is never permanently settled, and that given a critical opportunity—such as the euro crisis—certain political forces within Greece might be able to contest the axiomatic belief that Greece belongs to the West. The reaction of the opposition, however, is also telling of the sanctity of the myth of belonging that delegitimized any attempt, no matter how implicit, that would jeopardize Greece’s position in “the heart of Europe.” Greece’s EU membership was framed as a sacrosanct historical achievement that embodies Greek national identity, a “historical acquis” that should be beyond political scrutiny, a national achievement regarded with great respect and reverence, too valuable to be interfered with in the context of a referendum. The geopolitics of the euro crisis in Greece may have played out in the con text of a very specific political struggle with a given set of material (economic) conditions. However, a plethora of narratives and stories that have traditionally defined the geopolitical mythmaking process in the country and its strategic This is suggested by polling results before the referendum; see Jurado et al. (2015). This is substantiated further by evidence regarding the top Google search results during the referendum: the side top result was “yes to Europe,” whereas the term Europe was not in the top results for the side; see Askitas (2015, p. 5).

164

CHAPTER 3

orientation also informed the arguments used in the political discourse. The dualities between East and West—Europe versus Russia and the emerging world, the liberal values of the Enlightenment versus the authoritarian tendencies of an alternative system of governance, national security premised on Greece’s dependence on Europe and the West versus sovereignty and national independence, and so on—all these opposite narratives and storylines belong to a central political process, an intellectual debate, and a written record of ideas about Europe and the West that have been present throughout modern Greek history—from the Enlightenment to the euro crisis. 4.4 Interim Conclusion: Ritualization and Sacralization of Belonging For most of the 20th century, the Greek state had a consistent strategic orientation toward Europe and the West. Greece came out of World War II fighting a civil war with the Allies on its side and has pursued active participation in the process of European integration ever since. Greece was a founding member of the Council of Europe, joined NATO in 1952, signed an Association Agreement with the European Communities in 1962, and applied for full EC membership in 1974. In the face of geographical remoteness from Western Europe (it did not share a land border with any EU Member State until 2007), a relatively weaker economy, and a “Balkan make-up,” Greece managed to secure EC accession as early as 1981. By the late 2000s, Greece had joined the eurozone and was a case in point for its foreign policy’s Europeanization. During the euro crisis, despite a shocking economic dislocation (a 25 percent drop in GDP in five years, unprecedented for any state in peacetime)(see Argyriades, 2013) and a spectacular rise of right-wing and left-wing Eurosceptic populists,71 Greece signed a series of bailout agreements and austerity measures in order to remain in the eurozone, despite few successes and many questions raised regarding democratic legitimacy and accountability (Featherstone, 2011). Even during the Great Recession, the European anchoring of the country was maintained (Clements et al., 2014). In the end, the policies of severe economic austerity and the questions of legitimacy have not shaken the core of pro-European sentiments inside the Greek parliament (Tsirbas & Sotiropoulos, 2016). Judging from the outcome so far, despite everything, and in the face of the recent populist surge, Greece’s own classification as European has remained unaffected. We return now to the question of why Greece’s geopolitical alignment with Europe and the West has proven so resilient despite strong external and inter nal challenges. Why has Greece been such an ardent supporter of European For the far right, see Ellinas (2013) and Lodenius (2014). For the far left, see, for example, Stavrakakis & Katsambekis (2014).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

165

integration? Greece’s attachment to Europe and the West, especially in the 20th century, is regularly attributed to the interests of the major Western powers and those of the Greek political and economic elites that have drawn the country into the Western sphere of influence. In the postwar period, for example, Cold War dynamics and systemic pressures—in other words, the Western bid to contain and balance the Soviet threat—was the imposing factor of Greece’s Western choice.72 Notably, John Lewis Gaddis pointed to the role played by the main Western powers (chiefly the United States and the United Kingdom) in ensuring that Greece ended up on their side in the Cold War, not on the side of the Soviet Union (see Gaddis, 1997, pp. 38–43; 2005).73 Western intervention may also have been a factor in Greece’s choice, or lack of choice, in the matter during the Cold War (see Kofas, 1989; Miller, 2009; Nachmani, 2010). Another factor was the economic reliance of the Greek economy on European and American financial aid (Pelt, 2006). Indeed, Greece and other minor powers struggled to maintain their nominal independence from the great powers during the Cold War (Kuniholm, 2014). Inevitably, however, some of these interventions found resonance within Greece itself, whose elites understood the importance of “choosing sides” and saw Europe and the West as sources of prosperity and effective shields against the spread of communism (Hatzivassiliou, 2011).74 Moreover, in a similar vein, the increasing power and aggressiveness of neighboring Turkey may have obligated Greece to “balance” by entering into an institutionalized political alliance of prosperous states (see Hatzivassiliou, 1995; Veremis, 1982; Wilson, 1979; Stivachtis, 2002).75 In this context, a U.S.-led NATO functioned as an institutional framework that, while it did not prevent tensions and crises between Greece and Turkey, nonetheless played a key role in de-escalating these crises and preventing conflict (Rizas, 2009). Thus, by and large, Greece’s subscription to both institutions might have represented an intention to neutralize Soviet influence, safeguard the country’s fragile democracy, and at once increase security and promote the national interest, especially in view of the perceived threat coming from Turkey.

72 73 74 75

This is a neorealist argument, according to which Greece is subordinated to the international system and its power equilibrium; see Waltz (1979) and Walt (1985). For this line of argumentation, with a focus on the Greek case, see Woodhouse & Clogg (2003). The Russian side did not sit idle during this time either; see Stavrakis (1989). For an eyewitness account, see McGhee (1997). Even though the European institutions did not contain elements of a military alliance, NATO and the EC were always related as institutional manifestations of the Western stra tegic vision (Lundestad, 1998).

166

CHAPTER 3

However, concerning the latter, even if in theory the Turkish threat was used in public discourse, especially in the period between the Cyprus crisis of 1974 and EC accession in 1981 (Heraclides, 2010), the argument that Turkish power and aggression made Greece turn toward Europe in search of security is problematic. In fact, part of Greece’s accession strategy was to downplay the security dimension with Turkey in order not to make the EC think that it would be accepting a member with heavy political baggage; and the Karamanlis governments of the 1970s adopted a relatively soft line on Turkey and the Cyprus question, precisely to address European fears (Heraclides, 2007). Indeed, this softening of national interests because of the participation in European integration is a recurring theme in studies of Greek foreign policy: it is a reversal of the argument that a united Europe would provide much needed security against Turkey. As discussed, however, the literature on the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy showcases the country as an example of a Member State that gradually adopted minimal interpretations of national interests. The bottom line is that, time and again, and especially in the context of European integration, Greek expectations that Europe would act as a security provider or a bulwark against Turkish power and aggressiveness ended in frustration and disappointment (see Tsakonas & Tournikiotis, 2003). Furthermore, the Soviet threat stopped existing after 1989, and on top of that, in the context of the euro crisis, the endemic pressures deriving from eurozone membership are one of the main reasons for the shake-up of Greek democracy and its party system in the 2010s. Nevertheless, Greece is determined as ever to remain an integral part of Europe—of the heart of Europe—and this makes an interestbased explanation somewhat problematic. While there should be no doubt that the security concerns and the new international context of the Cold War played an important role in animating the process of Greek accession to NATO and the EC, this process and the weighted importance of each of these factors cannot be properly understood without considering a sort of determination to be European and Western. Again, it seems obvious that the Western and European conviction of the Greek national elite and the interests of the main Western European powers in keeping Greece on their side—either for strategic reasons in their confron tation with the Soviet Union or in their effort to shape a common European identity—were in accord and perhaps coalesced in a geopolitical identity fixed around the idea that Greece is inherently European and Western. There is evidence to suggest that both Greeks and Europeans have made instrumental For these two arguments see, respectively, Karamouzi (2014) and Verney (2007).

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

167

use of Greek history to shape a favorable perception of national identity; just one example of this is the use of classical antiquity as Cold War propaganda (Kazamias, 2014). But, as discussed previously, first, this determination to be European, this identity, may well find its sources long before the postwar era or even the 20th century. Second, Europe and the West were not the only source of a Greek identity; in fact, the alternative identity referents from the Greek past are latent in Greek society and are occasionally activated under certain circumstances. Indeed, this conforms with what Diamandouros called the “underdog” culture in Greece, which traditionally opposes political efforts to make the country and the society more European, more Western, more modern. According to Diamandouros, this culture involves “a siege mentality combined with a distinctly defensive perception of the international environment” and “a pronounced sense of cultural inferiority towards the Western world, coupled with a hyperbolic and misguided sense of the importance of Greece in international affairs and, more generally, in the history of Western civilisation” Diamandouros, 1994, p. 28). This culture, which spans the political spectrum horizontally from left to right, may also be related to the diachronic presence of Euroscepticism in Greece, which conforms to some extent to the Europewide history of Euroscepticism but also has peculiar characteristics that link it back to Greek history, culture, and distinct geopolitical visions (Verney, 2011; see also Verney, 2013). We have already mentioned the pro-Russian and anti-liberal affinities articulated by Greek populist parties during the euro crisis, which also conforms to the wider populist trends in Europe. But religion is another source of the “underdog” culture in Greece that is similarly latent in society. Religion has been an element of a general trend of critiquing the influence of Europe in Greece (Fokas, 2013), and this critical trend has produced what has been described as a Neo-Orthodox current of ideas that use religion and Byzantium as ideological referents (Makrides, 2016). In this context, Greek Orthodox theology leads a trend of anti-Westernism as a sort of rivalry between Hellenism and the West, which spills over into other fields and eventually informs public debates and attitudes (Kalaitzidis, 2013). Thus, what we see in the 20th century is that Greece’s geopolitical attach ment to Europe and the West is not simply a rational cost–benefit calculation, nor is it a linear expression of Greek identity. To some degree, the explanations based on interests and identity or sovereignty and domination are not always mutually exclusive (in the sense that they can be two competing processes that nonetheless run in parallel). They rather form a spectrum, a set of factors produced by different degrees of refraction, which at times are based on the

168

CHAPTER 3

observer’s position or wavelength. Taken together or even separately, they all have the potential to explain Greece’s geopolitical attachment to Europe. Nevertheless, they also seem to be quietly overseeing a mythmaking process that underlines both interest considerations and perceptions of Greek identity and perhaps constitutes a central political process in modern Greece that makes a sense of belonging to Europe and the West possible, legitimizes it, and mobilizes public support in its favor. This mythmaking process is not a stand-alone causal mechanism for Greek strategy and foreign policy, but, nonetheless, it appears as a complete system of logic and political competition that has an intrinsic value on its own. In the period under examination in this section, the key structures of continuity, affinity, and centrality remained the same, but the stories that accompanied them were different—they were adaptations of previous stories, adapted to the current international context. Especially in the second half of the 20th century, both the various interests in Greece and abroad, as well as some existing threads of Greek national identity, were justified with a myth of belonging that legitimized and framed Greece’s participation in European integration (see Table 9). The discursive dimension of Greece’s attachment to Europe and the West in this period, however, illustrates that this myth of belonging is the product of a process, part of an ensemble of geopolitical stories and narratives that have been in the making since the establishment of the Greek state in the 19th century. Table 9  Summary of narratives used during the 2015 “bailout referendum”

Government (SYRIZA and ANEL)

Opposition (ND, PASOK to Potami)

Europe as a controlling, “colonial” entity

Europe as Greece’s “home” and “safe harbor” Financial assistance from Europe only way out of the crisis International isolation outside Europe; as Greece’s only option for

Europe (“Greece as a debt colony”) Greece should look to Russia countries for alternative allies/lenders (“multidimensional alliance system”) Anti-liberal and authoritarian dispositions; cultural ties with Putin’ Russia

Recalling the values of the Enlightenment and cultural affinity/ change needed

GEOPOLITICAL MYTHMAKING IN MODERN GREECE

169

The narratives and storylines used throughout the process of the Greek accession to the EC bear a striking resemblance to the geopolitical concepts introduced in the 18th century by the Greek Enlightenment: Greece’s continuity in time and space as the cradle of Western civilization and the birthplace of democracy; the centrality of the Greek state as a bridge (or a crossroads) between the West and the East; and, of course, the unshakable idea that Greece belongs to Europe and the West—that it belongs in a space defined by common culture, values, and history and not by borders and geography (see Table 10). What makes this period different, however, is that during the process of European integration and the ensuing Europeanization process of Greece, the myth of belonging became increasingly ritualized, in the sense that the proEuropean choice was first formalized, simplified (there was no interest calculation or identity debate, simply a belonging that imposed certain pressures), and repeated at regular intervals and in various fields (domestic and foreign policy, economic and social policy, etc.). In the context of the process of European integration, the myth of belonging relied on the familiar structure of continuity, centrality, and affinity with the West and developed into a dominant myth with a central role in Greek politics. For Greece, Europe was a space defined by common ideals and values, not by geography, and it was a “familiar space” because it had a Greek name. Classical Table 10  Belonging to the west: analysis of key narratives and stories

Geopolitical myth

Key Narratives

Belonging to the West

Greece is an integral part of Europe West

Centrality

Storylines

Europe as a “familiar space” defined by common ideals and values, not in geographical terms Europe and the West Greece as the source of European civilization Greece as the cradle of European civilization and democracy Classical Greek culture surpassing geographical and temporal limits Greece as the crossroads between East and West Greece as the Mediterranean “balcony” of Europe and the West overlooking the East

170

CHAPTER 3

Greece, which equally surpassed temporal and geographical limits, was the source of this common European civilization and the cradle of its system of governance. In addition, the geographic position of the country gave it intrinsic value as a cultural and economic hub situated at the crossroads between East and West. Therefore, in terms of history, culture, and even geography, the story goes, Greece has a rightful place in Europe—Greece belongs to the West. For most of the 20th century and to this day, the same themes make up a dominant geopolitical myth of belonging in Greece that legitimizes a constant Western orientation and dependence on European integration for national security reasons, economic development, and social progress. The euro crisis demonstrated the level of sacralization of the myth of belonging. The reaction of the mainstream pro-European opposition to the bailout referendum and their effort to delegitimize any attempt, no matter how implicit, to jeopardize Greece’s position in the heart of Europe attests to the sacro sanct status of the myth of belonging. Thus, the referendum was perceived as a hostile operation, “a coup,” that sought to upend Greece’s EU and Western orientation, which was framed as a historical achievement that embodies Greece’s vital national interests and Greek identity, an apparent commonsensical truth that should be beyond debate.

chapter 4

Conclusions 1

Belonging to the West as a Geopolitical Myth

Looking at Greece’s long-standing geopolitical attachment to the West, its successful institutional integration with Europe, and its continuing resolve to remain a core EU member despite the economic setback and political upheaval caused by the euro crisis, it is indeed important to examine the longterm factors that underline such consistent behavior. Explanations based on interests and identity correctly point to several such underlying factors (i.e., motivation of elites, geopolitical dynamics, identity formation) that influence Greece’s pro-Western strategy, but the myth of belonging enables us to examine how these factors were embedded in domestic debates, articulated or used by political actors, and consumed by the domestic public. The belonging myth is not an exact depiction of the external world (i.e., national interests and the international system), just as it is not entirely a product of collective self-reflection and representation (i.e., national identity). Rather, the myth of belonging to the West fuses these two dimensions in a narrative form and makes them both suitable for political use, such that they can have a real effect on Greece’s strategic decisions. To put it simply, the public can interpret a statement such as “we belong to the West” as “we are Europeans” or “we have a European identity,” but also as “we have an interest in being European” because we are in a sensitive security position (e.g., threatened). In other words, a myth can manifest at times as a rational depiction of the external environment and other times as identity, speaking to the deeper psychological needs of a society for security. The narrative form of the belonging myth can legitimize and frame both the interests of the modern Greek state in a given period and the expression of a Greek national identity or sense of place in the world. The master narrative of belonging marks the decline of classical Greece that eventually led to its subjugation by the Romans and later the Ottomans. Conversely, the study of classical Greek texts in the Latin West triggered a major transfer of knowledge that ushered in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. This transfer of knowledge was then reversed with the expansion of the Enlightenment to the Greek-speaking world, which is seen as the major fac tor that led to the rebirth of modern Greece. In short, the narrative arc begins with the ancient Greeks enlightening Europe throughout classical antiquity; © Antonios Nestoras, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004686908_005

172

CHAPTER 4

it continues with Greek knowledge helping Europe to emerge from the Dark Ages; and it concludes with the homecoming of the classical heritage through the Enlightenment back to Greece in the modern era. In Bouchard’s terms, this is a “mythification” based on a master narrative arc of decline and rebirth. The decline of classical Greece is “a structuring event acting as an anchor” that generates an “imprint” of trauma and enduring suffering on the Greek collective consciousness; but at the same time this imprint translates into an assembly of values and ideals, an ethos that is embodied by the Greek struggle for independence and cultural change inspired by classical antiquity.1 In the case of the decline and rebirth arc, the plot involves a number of transitions and dramatic actions that cause those transitions. In Todorov’s terms, the initial state of equilibrium (i.e., the apogee of classical Greek civilization) is disrupted by the decline and subjugation of the Greek city-states, which is confirmed after centuries of living in captivity with the deplorable state of the Greeks under Ottoman rule. The struggle for independence is an attempt to repair this disruption; but the reinstatement of the initial equilibrium cannot take place unless the Greeks consciously seek out cultural change through imitation of Europe and the West and, more than that, the enlightenment of the whole Greek East according to the Western European model (Todorov, 1971). The analytical examination of geopolitical mythmaking in modern Greece shows that there is indeed a pattern of continuity, adaptability, and intertextuality that underlines the myth of belonging. In the 18th and 19th centuries, roughly between the 1760s and 1820s, the intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment—especially the geographers of the period—interwove a decline and rebirth narrative with stories that estab lished the chronological order, the protagonists and antagonists, and the location of the unfolding drama in a way that made it comprehensible and meaningful in the context of the Enlightenment. At this stage, mythmaking involved the description of Europe and the West as enlightened and noble; the contrasting portrayal of the dark and despotic East as an existential threat; and the contrast of the glorious classical past with the miserable condition of the Greek world under Ottoman oppression. The Great Idea was the geopolitical conclusion of this period that incarnated a dramatic story of Greek decline and rebirth, through which the West was enlightened in the past and the East would be enlightened in the future.

For Bouchard’s mythification process, see Bouchard (2016, p. 358); see also Bouchard (2017).

CONCLUSIONS

173

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in the context of new geopolitical developments, great power competition, and their face-off on the Eastern Question, these narratives were adapted to express a rising sense of dependence on Europe and the West. In the second half of the 20th century, diplomats and politicians adapted the same key narratives to the emerging Cold War dynamics and the process of European integration. The stories and narratives they used also spoke of Greece’s continuity in time and space as the cradle of Western civilization and the birthplace of democracy; the centrality of the Greek state as a bridge, a crossroads, or a balcony between the West and the East; and, of course, the unshakable idea that Greece belongs to Europe and the West, defined by common culture, values, and history and not by borders and geography. The key narratives that constituted the making of the belonging myth— namely the continuity of the Greek nation, the centrality of the Greek state between East and West, and the cultural affinity with Europe and the West—have evolved through time, shaped by the interrelationship of stories and events and not by their moment-by-moment significance. In this sense, belonging to the West does not make much sense unless it is considered in the context of a long thread of narratives that go back to the Greek Enlightenment and that have been used by historians, journalists, political geographers, diplomats, and politicians throughout modern Greek history (see Table 11). The continuity and adaptability of its constituent narratives substantiate an objective reality for the belonging myth, that is, political actors have constantly diffused and utilized its constituent elements in their various forms. Similarly, the interdisciplinary usage of the narratives substantiates a material (textual) reality for the belonging myth, in the sense that political actors have expressed its constituent elements in different mediums, subjects, and texts, and their meaning has been shaped by an interrelationship between these different expressions. Taken together, the continuity, adaptability, and intertextuality of the myth of belonging substantiate that we are dealing with—as Eliade (2009) would say—a “living” myth, an incarnation of values and ideals that create a behavioral model. Overall, the belonging narratives codify a primordial and abstract belief in Greece’s glorious—and so distant that it is almost mythical—past, which could be explained as a psychological need for an “origins myth” that builds some distance from an undesirable present (cf. Malinowski, 2011). In turn, these origins transform into a “pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom,” a call for social action, namely the call for cultural imitation of Europe (Westerniza tion) in the Greek Enlightenment (Malinowski & Redfield, 2015). The narrative form operates with the basic antinomies or dualities of Lvi-Strauss : the stories

Great power

1870s–1920s

1940s–1980s

Enlightenment

1760s–1840s

West

Imitating the West

Adaptability

Cold War Belonging to the European integration West

Eastern Question

Context

Period – Continuity of the Greek nation since the classical antiquity – Centrality of the Greek world/state between East and West – Affinity of the Greeks with European/ Western cultures

Continuity

Table 11  Continuity, adaptability, intertextuality: the qualities of the myth of belonging

– – – – –

Political geographers Cartographers Intellectuals Politicians Diplomats Press

Intertextuality

174 CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

175

of the enlightened European nations of the West versus the dark and barbaric Ottomans in the East call upon the members of the community to choose sides and follow the right way (Lévi-Strauss, 1984). These dualities create an illusion of simplicity and a “cognitive scheme” that shows the way out of a very complex situation (Flood, 2002, p. 81). The New Greeks drew from their past, like other nations did, in order to form national narratives that could change their common future (Bell, 2003). Therefore, the belonging myth is political in nature in the sense that it calls for a decisively political action (Tudor, 1973, pp. 16–17); but it also responds to a fundamental psychological need of the New Greeks for “significance” and “ontological security,” in other words the need to have a sense of continuity and worth, but also a sense of having a rightful place in the world (see Blumenberg, 2010; Bottici, 2010; see also Bottici & Challand, 2012, 2014).2 The narratives of belonging serve these needs remarkably well: the satisfaction of ontological security (i.e., the continuous self) is integrated in the continuity narrative; but, on top of that, the grandeur with which the ancient past is adorned, as well as the imitation of the West and the enlightenment of the East, facilitate the emergence of “national significance” and worth. The continuity narrative, between the mythical status of the ancient Greeks and the deplorable situation of the modern Greeks during the Ottoman period (and at various other stages of Greek history), creates a dramatic and emotional stage that gives epic proportions to the Greek struggle for independence. The constant emotional load of the belonging myth throughout modern Greek history should not be underestimated as it complements the “cold rationality of reason of state” (Friedrich, 1963, p. 97; A. D. Smith, 2009) and provides cohesion and unity to the (Greek) nation (Schöpflin & Hosking, 2013; Nancy & Connor, 2012). Decisively, the belonging myth is also geopolitical in nature in the sense that the same dramatic narrative that creates a sense of unity and of purpose also uses geographical terms or connotations that generate a sense of place on the world map. Apart from creating feelings of security or insecurity, superiority (towards the East) and inferiority (towards the West), the belonging myth also creates what Dijkink (1996) calls an emotional attachment to a place. This is because spatial continuity is an essential condition for temporal continuity, or in other words, the continuity narrative in the belonging myth naturalizes the territories historically linked to classical Greece. As it regulates elements of the New Greek identity with emotions and feelings, it grounds these feelings in a specific territory (Agnew, 1987; see also Campbell, 1992). In turn, the centrality 2 For the link between myth and ontological security, see Della Sala

176

CHAPTER 4

and affinity narratives complement this sense of place with a sense of direction, first by placing the Greek territory in-between two worlds, and second by signifying a movement from the West to the East. Belonging to the West is a geopolitical myth that has evolved historically, shaped a sense of place, located modern Greece in space and time, and legitimized and framed a pro-European and pro-Western strategic behavior and culture. In analytical terms, belonging to the West is a complex myth, meaning an assembly of constitutive elements (namely, narratives and stories) that make up a complex whole. Its constitutive narratives have permeated modern Greek history since the independence of the Greek state in the early 19th century. Operating on the level of the fundamental decisions concerning the nature of the Greek state, the myth of belonging interfered with all aspects of domestic and foreign policy. The analysis has substantiated the objective reality of the belonging myth across time, texts, and contexts as a political instrument that generates traction and legitimacy for Greece’s geopolitical attachment to Europe and the West. However, the belonging myth is the result of a central political process— a mythmaking process—not a grand scheme of history that represents the interests of an elite or the objective progress of Greek society toward a desired condition. It is not a history of how Greece found its rightful place in the world. The myth of belonging to the West is not the result of a necessary or inevitable historical trajectory. Belonging to Europe and the West is a dominant geopolitical myth, which, nevertheless, has struggled with opposing myths and alternative narratives, namely the Russian expectation and the Byzantine revival. This struggle between rival geopolitical myths in modern Greece is an element of a wider mythmaking process that determines the position of Greece in the world, its behavior and strategic orientation. As the euro crisis has demonstrated, severe geopolitical predicaments can ignite fiery debates in Greek politics that concern national interests, identity, and sense of place. In sum, belonging to the West is a geopolitical myth that is widely accepted as an apparent truth, but it was, and still is, subject to political opposition from rival geopolitical myths and narratives that are latent in Greek society. The premise here is that the mythmaking process is never permanently settled. Mythmaking in geopolitics refers to a gathering of narratives and stories concerning the geographic location of the state. Fundamentally, the geopolitical location of a state is always shrouded in political controversy and open to interpretation; and so, mythmaking is an intrinsic property of political com petition. Political forces that compete for power and, thus, for the capacity to direct the foreign policy and strategy of a state may be driven and legitimized

CONCLUSIONS

177

by different perceptions of space and geography. Politics, as a struggle for the power to influence the direction of a community, is by default a good conduit for opposition between competing beliefs, ideologies, and geopolitical myths. Again, at the core of the belonging myth and its power to generate a sense of place is a relational series of narratives and stories that people have chosen to tell and retell, print and reprint, use and reuse in political discourse. In simple terms, the statement “we belong to the West” makes no sense unless we analyze the key continuity narratives and the specific stories that constitute it. However, in parallel to this continuity there is a secondary but significant dimension of discontinuity in the form of opposition, with rival myths and narratives that have forced the belonging narrative to adapt to changing international and domestic contexts. Hence, it is also important to examine the “making” of belonging into a dominant myth, to discuss what sets the belonging myth apart from the competition, what makes it more efficient than others. 2

The Making of an Efficient Geopolitical Myth

To start with, the continuity and intertextuality of the belonging myth conform with what Bouchard calls “piggybacking,” the ability of an efficient myth to build on old, well established myths and symbols so as to partake of their authority. [ … ​] To this end, the new myth is presented as a simple extension or a corollary of the latter. The strategy is particularly useful when proponents of radical changes seek to make them more palatable to dissenters by wrapping them in a veil of continuity. (Bouchard, 2016, p. 361) More importantly, however, it is necessary to note the weighted significance and consequence of adaptability. Bouchard defines adaptability as the “capacity to live on through changing settings and challenges, thanks to a process of constant redefinition and renegotiation” (2016, p. 361). He also enumerates two more qualities of myths, namely polysemy, that is, the capacity to have several meanings or to be ambiguous enough to harness consent from disparate social groups and audiences; and relevance, that is, the capacity to retain meaning regardless of a change in setting (Bouchard, 2016, p. 361). Efficient myths are “stories that are distinguished by a high degree of constancy in their narrative core and by an equally pronounced capacity for marginal variation” (Blumen , 2010, p. 34). And this is because “in light of the continual change in their present conditions [ … ] human beings are impelled to go back to their political narratives [and] revise them” (Bottici, 2010, p. 187); or because the very “sense

178

CHAPTER 4

of self” depends on the thinking subject’s ability to “keep the narrative going” (Giddens, 1991, p. 37). To this end, internal consistency and adaptability create the sense of a myth’s timelessness and in this way also contribute to Laing’s ontologically secure, “whole,” and “continuous” person—community, society, nation (2010, pp. 41–42). Continuity and intertextuality (piggybacking) as well as adaptability (plus polysemy and relevance, in Bouchard’s terms) are all qualities that may constitute an efficient and successful myth. The former two are inward looking qualities that deal mostly with the narrative form of the myth and that enable it to act as a unifying social reference and a charter for political action. Adaptability, however, is the quality that allows the myth to take into account external factors such as foreign interventions or systemic pressures (e.g., the Cold War and the process of European integration). In other words, an efficient myth has a layered internal consistency, but also an external responsiveness. The myth of belonging to Europe and the West has exhibited these qualities throughout its historical emergence, which also follows closely the three stages—diffusion, ritualization, and sacralization—of a mythmaking process that makes an efficient myth according to Bouchard. Diffusion refers to the initial spreading of the myth or of some of its elements to the wider public, which is followed by a series of actions modeled on its narrative core (ritualization) and ends with the myth becoming an apparent truth, an object of sacred significance (sacralization) (Bouchard, 2013, 2014). The period of the Greek Enlightenment enabled the rapid diffusion of the belonging narratives throughout the Greek-speaking world. Based on this master plot, the political geographers of the Greek Enlightenment developed three key narratives: the continuity of the Greek nation from the classical to the modern era; the centrality of the Greek-speaking world between the barbaric East and the enlightened West; and the cultural affinity of Greece with Europe and the West. In parallel to their emerging national identity and self-awareness, the Greek-speaking populations also developed a geopolitical vision regarding their position in the world. In 1843, a decade after Greek independence, the diffusion of the belonging narratives culminated in the so-called Great Idea, a geopolitical myth that legitimized and framed Greek strategy and foreign policy for almost one hundred years. The Great Idea in its enlightened form was a precursor to the belonging to the West myth. It established that in political, historical, and cul tural terms, modern Greece belonged to Europe and the West (and therefore should adopt the sociopolitical norms and standards of the Western European nations). Moreover, according to the Great Idea, Greece’s purpose in the world should be to enlighten the East, that is, to extend the Enlightenment

CONCLUSIONS

179

influence eastward to the territories occupied by the Ottoman Empire. After the long, tumultuous revolution, the Great Idea bequeathed to the Greekspeaking populations a much-needed sense of direction. The Great Idea did not dissolve the centrifugal trends in Greek politics, but it provided an arena for the struggle over political power and control of the state. Kolettis’s 1843 speech in the Grand National Assembly had inspired three different interpretations of the Great Idea (see M. L. Smith, 2009, pp. 1–20): the ambition of the Greek Enlightenment to disseminate the Greek cultural heritage to the East; the Romantic compulsion to revive the Greek Byzantine Empire; and the irredentist, nationalistic offshoot of redemption for the Greekspeaking populations in Ottoman captivity. Therefore, the Great Idea constituted at once a culminating point and a battlefield for geopolitical narratives, fighting for the focus and the character of national strategy and foreign policy. Political contestation over the meaning of the Great Idea ushered in a period of opposition to the belonging narratives that began with the recession of Enlightenment ideas (c. 1850s) and the appearance of the Romantic movement in Greece. Mirroring the Romantic reaction to the Enlightenment, mythmaking in Greece looked away from the classical past and directed its gaze toward the Middle Ages and Christianity. This led to the emergence of opposing geopolitical myths: first, the myth of the Russian expectation, that is, Russia as a defender of Orthodoxy and an alternative role model for Greek aspirations for ascendancy in the East; and later, the myth of a Byzantine revival, that is, the restitution of the Eastern Roman, Greek-speaking, Byzantine Empire. The development of the Russian expectation and the Byzantine revival introduced new storylines in the mythmaking process in Greece. The prospect of Russian intervention and the hope that the New Greeks could resurrect the Byzantine Empire emerged as two alternative geopolitical myths that opposed the image of Greece as an integral part of Europe and the West. Religion and the Church, Romanticism and the new generation of Greek historians altered the geopolitical narratives created by the intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment. The new political forces that developed in Greece facilitated a discontinuity in the key narratives of Greece’s foundational geopolitical myth, especially with regard to the continuity of the Greek nation and its affinity with the West. For the former, the difference was the historical and chronologi cal account of the continuity of the Greek nation; for the latter, the difference lay mainly in the model chosen for the cultural, political, and social identity of the nascent Greek state. Imitation of the European nations and cultural affinity with the West receded, to the benefit of an alternative geopolitical representation. Europe and Western liberalism were seen as obstacles to the realization of the Great

180

CHAPTER 4

Idea; and the Greeks developed a parallel narrative of affinity with Russia based on religious mythopoetic elements that narrated Russia as the defender of the Orthodox faith and the redeemer of the Greek nation. The work of proRussian intellectuals, reinforced by Russia’s intervention in the Balkans and the political backing of the Orthodox Church, facilitated the transformation of the Russian narrative from a superstition into a system of logic, a potential geopolitical discourse full of concepts, beliefs, and representations of space. The “Blonde Race” was no longer a prophecy, but a vigorous great power; the Greek redemption was not merely the rumblings of an oracle, but a discernible possibility among the vicissitudes of international politics; the authoritarian leanings were a set of beliefs to describe an ideal form of government, worlds apart from the liberal utopias of Western European intellectuals. Ultimately, the Russian expectation fused into a distinct geopolitical alternative based on a rationalized narrative of foreign (Russian) intervention. On a philosophical level, this geopolitical opposition between the (Catholic) West and the (Orthodox) East came as a reaction to the political and social radicalism of the Age of Reason from the traditional, conservative forces of the Greek East. The ideas of the Enlightenment gave way to the repetition of age-old religious differences. The Greek Church, still suspicious of Western influence, was strengthened in a nationalistic context. The Greek Orthodox elements in society were eager to use religion as a means of national individuation. Instead of imitating European standards, reactionary elements in Greek politics and society considered that Europe was in fact an obstacle to the nation’s efforts to manifest its destiny. In terms of politics, after the Greek Revolution, this geopolitical opposition between Russia and the West was also obvious in the opposition between the Russian and the British and French parties. In parallel, the generations after the revolution, entranced by the combined ecstasy of nationalism, Romanticism, and irredentism, also pursued a maximalist interpretation of the Great Idea in the restitution of the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine revival was based on slightly different accounts of the key narratives of centrality and continuity, adding the Byzantine era as the link between classical and modern Greece. In line with the Romantic movement that prompted it, the formalized historiography involved an emphasis on the Byzantine tradition, which it assumed to be integral to the modern Greek identity. This accentuated Greece’s differences with the West and created another point of tension between opposing narratives in Greek geopolitics. The opposition between these interpretations, between their constitutive myths and storylines, marked a very competitive period of geopolitical myth making in Greece (see Table 12). Momentarily, the myth of belonging to the

181

CONCLUSIONS

Table 12  Summary of geopolitical oppositions and adaptations in the greek mythmaking process

Period

Opposition/Adaptation

1850s–1860s – Enlighten the East – Imitate the West 1870s–1920s – Russian expectation – Byzantine revival

⇒

⇒

1920s–1980s – Western ⇒ dependence

– Russian expectation – Byzantine revival – Western dependence

– Belonging to the West

Triggers – Romanticism/Nationalism – Russo-Turkish antagonism – Western support for the Ottomans – “Slavic threat”/Pan-Slavic movement – Defeat in 1897 Greco-Turkish war/Asia Minor Catastrophe 1922 – Foreign interventions/ Foreign debt – Communism – Cold War geopolitics European integration

West was confronted with serious resistance. New stories were introduced about Greece’s temporal and spatial history, and the Great Idea was transformed into a nationalist and irredentist program of territorial expansion. The proponents of Russian intervention longed for the supremacy of Orthodoxy, tradition, and authoritarianism. Similarly, the advocates of a Byzantine revival envisioned the creation of a Greek Empire that would reclaim the territories of medieval Hellenism in the East. However, both the Russian expectation and the Byzantine revival encountered the limits of their recognition and intelligibility. Toward the end of the 19th century, Russian interference in the Balkans and its instrumental use of the Pan-Slavic movement cast shadows over the narrative of the Russian expectation and discredited the Kremlin as an alternative ally. In parallel, successive military and financial interventions by the great powers reinforced the stories of powerlessness and dependence on Western support. Ultimately, the defeat in the Greek–Turkish war of 1919–1921 put an end to Greek imperial aspirations. A series of events leading to the Asia Minor Catastrophe and the massacre of the Greek-speaking populations in the region transformed the Byzantine revival from a feasible political project to an

182

CHAPTER 4

impossible dream. The ensuing exchange of the remaining populations was also the definitive end of Greek irredentism in the region of Asia Minor. Eventually confronting the limits of the Russian expectation and the Byzantine revival, the belonging narratives underwent adaptation to include a new story of Western dependence; Greece was no longer an integral part of Europe and the West but was dependent on the power and the interests of the great powers. However, this dependence did not have an entirely negative connotation, since it also assumed that belonging grants access to political, economic, and even military support and thus actually increases national security. Thus, the coming of the Romantic period sidestepped the Enlightenment project of the Great Idea, and stories of Western dependence overtook the myth of the Byzantine revival, to make way for the eventual appearance and ascendancy of the myth of belonging to the West. The appearance and ascendancy of the myth of belonging to the West found a perfect context in the geopolitics of the Cold War and the process of European integration. The East–West divide of the Cold War breathed new life into the centrality narrative, and the Greeks conceived their position as central between Soviet communism and Western liberal democracy. Greece’s participation in European integration was considered to be of paramount importance for economic development and for safeguarding liberal democracy in the country. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, Greek diplomats and politicians justified full membership in the European Communities with the familiar key narratives of continuity from classical Greece, affinity with Europe and the West, and centrality between East (communism) and West (liberalism). In particular, Karamanlis’s “we belong to the West” and his use of these narratives served and is still serving as a maxim for what we call here the belonging myth, repeated as a powerful political slogan in electoral speeches, parliamentary sessions, talk shows, editorials and opinion articles, academic debates, and, most recently, referendums. The influence it has exerted on Greek politics since the late 1970s, with regard to Greece’s accession process to the EC owes much to the fact that it is the spearhead of a long line of thinking about the position of Greece in the world, a line that extends from the 18th century to the present, from the first stirrings of a modern national consciousness to the accession of Greece to the —and beyond, to the current geopolitical predicament. Greece’s formal participation in the European integration process and, in turn, its Europeanization represents an essential phase of ritualization of the belonging myth; that is, a series of actions regularly and invariably followed to make Greece and Greek foreign policy more modern, more Western, and more European (a ritual of imitation). The end of the 20th century found the myth of

CONCLUSIONS

183

belonging functioning as a dominant official policy of the Greek state, sanctified by Greece’s accession to the EC. The euro crisis stands as testament to the sacralization of the belonging myth and, by extension, Greece’s geopolitical attachment to Europe and the West, which is now revered as an apparent truth beyond any dispute. In times of relative stability, belonging to the West is an almost banal part of Greek politics that carries a lot of ideological baggage; in watershed moments, such as the euro crisis and especially the Grexit “moment” of the referendum, belonging to the West, as a sacralized myth, represented a “saintly quality” or a “sublime ideal” usually linked to religious practices (see, e.g., Gentile, 2006). In other words, belonging to the West, as a sacred myth, has a symbolic power that shapes the political experience to such an extent that no debate can take place outside the myth’s framework; questioning Greece’s linear and unrelenting European integration at the time of the referendum was akin to questioning the identity of modern Greece and, by extension, its very existence as a political community (cf. Schöpflin, 2001, pp. 1–2). The fact that Greece’s geopolitical attachment to the West and European integration has proven so resilient, to the extent that it is now considered an apparent truth, is not purely a matter of rational interest calculations, a byproduct of systemic equilibria and power structures, or the result of identity formation. Greece’s geopolitical attachment to Europe and the West is also determined by the historical emergence of the belonging myth that has justified, legitimized, and framed pro-European policies in the country. The belonging myth is the product of a long-drawn-out mythmaking process in Greece that started with the diffusion of key geopolitical narratives during the Greek Enlightenment and had a continuous presence through the Romantic and the modern eras, encountering opposition from rival myths and narratives but also adapting to changing international contexts, becoming a ritualistic experience after EC membership (Europeanization) and achieving a sacred status that was obvious during the euro crisis. To a large extent, this tripartite mythmaking corresponds with what Bouchard identifies as the process of making an efficient myth. The innovation here is the introduction of opposition and adaptation as two separate, inbetween stages. Adding the opposition stage opens the door to politics in the mythmaking process, as the dynamic contestation of a myth’s diffusion by rival myths (action/reaction), but also as an explanation for the adaptive quality of the myth. Mythmaking in modern Greece did not happen in a straight line, despite the apparent wide acceptability of the belonging myth. The narratives of belonging were efficient because they retained a nomi nal continuity but also had the capacity to make marginal variations, playing

184

CHAPTER 4

on the polysemy of geopolitical terms (e.g., East/West) and the transformation of their meaning according to the context, in response to an external event and in the frame of their opposition with rival myths and alternative narratives. The most pronounced example is the narrative of centrality, which consistently expresses a division between East and West, albeit with varying criteria: from the initial antinomy of Dark Ages vs. Enlightenment, to the meaning of East and West adapted to the Cold War duality of communism vs. the “free world.” Similarly, in the narrative of affinity, the definition of Europe as a cultural rather than a geographical space is constant, but it leaves room for variation to include some European states and exclude others, to develop a narrower version referring to the European Communities and, again, to adapt to the Cold War in order to include the United States. A similar observation of constancy and marginal variation can be made for other narratives and stories of the belonging myth as well: the designation of Greece as the birthplace of democracy and, by extension, of Western civilization; Greece’s description as a bridge and as a crossroads (for goods and people, for ideas, or for armies?); and so on. Perhaps most of all, in the now mythical statement of Konstantinos Karamanlis, “we belong to the West,” the term belong itself may be taken to mean that Greece is a member of the West, is allied to, an adherent of, and associated with the West (an integral part); or it may be taken to mean that Greece is “owned” by the West, is in the hands of the West, is dominated by the West (dependent); or even that Greece is suited to the West, has a rightful place in the West, has the right cultural qualities and is assigned to the West (a “home” and “safe harbor”). The myth of belonging to the West is an efficient and successful product of the above mythmaking process in modern Greece. It does not offer a standalone explanatory mechanism for Greece’s European integration, but it does offer an ancillary explanatory potential in the sense that it complements, on the one hand, realist explanations based on interest and rational calculations, and on the other hand, postmodern, constructivist explanations based on identity. In other words, Greece exhibits a consistent pro-European attitude because both its interests and its perceptions of identity have been framed in the historical emergence and consolidation of the myth of belonging to Europe and the West The mythmaking process that defined the myth of belonging constitutes a central political process in modern Greece that makes a sense of place and strategic orientation possible despite internal and external challenges, that is, the geographic and cultural particularities of the country or its economic and political dislocations. As the preceding analysis has shown, the key narratives

185

CONCLUSIONS

and storylines that constitute the belonging myth have been developed in parallel to the establishment of the modern Greek state; they have a continuous presence that ignores time limits and contexts; and they have been used in various forms in critical moments, by a wide array of political actors and in different intellectual contexts. As a result, belonging to Europe and the West has become an apparent truth, beyond dispute—a sacred geopolitical myth that has an enduring and dominant influence and that traverses historical, political, and intellectual contexts. In these respects, Greece is a case in point for the usefulness of combining political myth and geopolitics. Indeed, myths may also have distinctive geopolitical uses or implications. And the application of Analytical Geopolitics to the Greek case—as the analysis of the key constitutive narratives and historical variations of the belonging myth, its opposition to rival narratives and myths told in the process of its emergence and consolidation, and, by extension, its contextual adaptations—contributes to a better understanding of the fundamental drivers of the country’s foreign policy and its consistent strategic attachment to Europe and the West. The ambition of this study was to showcase the potential of Analytical Geopolitics as a framework for examining the fundamental tendencies or behav ioral patterns of states. Yet the future of Analytical Geopolitics as a distinct path of inquiry that focuses on the concept of geopolitical myth, its historical emergence and rivalries, is conditional on, first, further research concerning the role of myth as an interface that fuses interests and identity; second, the application of the proposed analytical framework to several equivalent cases in order to amass comparative results and corroborate different types and forms of geopolitical myths; and third, the possible practical applications of these results for coterminous policy-making fields such as public diplomacy and nation branding. : A Research Agenda is a decomposition of geopolitical myths into the key narratives and stories through which they are expressed. Geopolitical myths are complex systems that are expressed over time, in multiple formats and contexts. Thus, geopolitical myths, such as Greece belongs to the West, are not meaningful unless we reduce them to simpler terms, unless we break them down to their constituent concepts and propositions, unless we explain their deep internal structures that have evolved historically. Geopolitical myths should not be considered as solid, immovable objects sculpted in time; they should be conceptualized instead as the product of a

186

CHAPTER 4

historical process. The emergence of geopolitical myths, from their initial dissemination to their opposition by rival myths and narratives, from their adaptation to their ritualization and transformation into sacred truths of domestic political discourse, frames a central sociopolitical process, a mythmaking process, a gathering of myths concerning the geographic location of the state and its political meaning. The mythmaking process can mediate the intricate relationship between politics and geography, that is, the “geopolitical,” and produce a limited range of political possibilities. In this process, a geopolitical myth constantly acts as an interface between the external world and our perceptions, between interests and identity formation, which, contrary to constructivist approaches, for Analytical Geopolitics can be considered mutually constitutive. Both interests and perceptions of identity can be expressed in the narrative form of a geopolitical myth, or, from the opposite side, a geopolitical myth can manifest regularly either as an interest calculation or as the expression of a collective identity, or as both at the same time. In this way, a geopolitical myth gives them both a simple narrative form that increases their intelligibility, acceptability, and truthiness—a form that can be used to gain legitimacy, support, and mobilization in the political process. The material and ideational properties of geography and, in consequence, the rational calculations or the interpretive identity elements deriving from geography are not distinguishable from one another. As Roy Bhaskar put it, the social world may be based on the natural world, but it is not reducible to facts and measurements taken from the natural world, in the same way that biological organisms are dependent on chemical reactions but are not reducible to them.3 The multi-variability of the social world means that material and ideational or interpretive factors can be simultaneously present, active, and mutually interacting at all times. Put simply: there is an objective reality that can be known, but there are limits to our knowledge of this external reality; knowing our limits, we can still qualify our knowledge of the world.4 What concerns us here is the ability of a myth to invariably shape and express those factors in its narrative form—and in this way to eschew the materialist/ideational and the positivist/interpretivist divides in the geopolitical literature. In our case study, people may claim to belong to Europe because they share a set of common values and a similar historical trajectory with other people, 3 This is Roy Bhaskar’s argument of the “stratification” of nature that supports a “transcenden tal realism”; see Collier (1994, pp. 107–136). This is an epistemological move we have seen in but that we have yet to see in Geopolitics. See, for example, Jackson (2016), Jessop (2007), Kurki (2008), and Wight (2008).

CONCLUSIONS

187

but at the same time they may find it in their interest to be part of a regional integration. The ideational (identity) component and the material (interest) component are barely distinguishable from one another, and most importantly, they are rarely used separately in the political discourse (their separateness is rather artificially constructed in academic discourse). This is normal, and it could not be any other way, as far as both logic and emotion are usually deployed in rhetoric and political debates. In the final analysis, however, they are both expressed in a narrative form: identity formation usually follows a chronological order that involves a plot, and even hardcore national interests such as security are almost always narrated in terms of the history between states and/or a chronology of events that builds up the sense of insecurity. If these narratives and their supporting stories are disseminated effectively—if they prove to be resilient over time, malleable into different means and formats, and adjustable to changing contexts (i.e., they have the qualities of continuity, intertextuality, and adaptability)— then we may consider that they form a myth that has an objective and material reality. If they manage to overcome the unavoidable opposition that follows their diffusion, if they adapt and form a ritual, then we may consider that they have given rise to a dominant geopolitical myth that appears as a sacred truth. Recall, however, that myth remains a neutral term—neither true, nor false; neither fact, nor fiction; neither fantasy, nor reality. By truth, or better by the truthiness of the myth, we refer not to the veracity of the myth, nor to its correspondence to an external reality, but to its potential to appear as an apparent truth, its quality of being felt to be true even though it is impossible to verify. Myths, then, are low-resolution representations of a historical event or a gen eral external situation, but they are laden with facts and data from the external world. And so, they are in a unique position to fuse and deploy both material and ideational or interpretive elements of an external reality. In consequence, Analytical Geopolitics does not make true or false claims on geopolitical myths and does not evaluate their veracity. Rather, it makes an evaluation of whether and how the narratives and stories that constitute a myth and the mythmaking process that creates it also create the conditions for its efficiency, success, and, in consequence, the potential of a geopolitical myth to legitimize a sense of place, a feeling of belonging, or an affinity with a specific region and frame a strategy or a foreign policy decision. In line with a pragmatic, critical realist stance, Analytical Geopolitics accepts mythmaking as a sociopolitical process in which the “real” effect of geopolitical myths can be observed and evaluated. The important thing, as Della Sala puts it, “is whether the story serves to connect the storyteller and the listener to a broader construction of a political community and its forms of

188

CHAPTER 4

political power. A myth that survives over time is one that continues to transmit a message that captures and shapes the normative and cognitive frames of a political community” (2016, p. 530). So, in principle, Analytical Geopolitics insists on “the cultivation of a stubbornly realist attitude—to speak like William James—but a realism dealing with [ … ​] matters of concern, not matters of fact.”5 This approach continues to function with a critical agenda to the degree that it exposes the artificiality and historical contingency of myths as commonsensical, sacred truths. Although Analytical Geopolitics does not evaluate geopolitical myths in terms of their correspondence with an external reality (the world), it does do so in terms of their emergence, function, and practical application inside a sociopolitical mythmaking process. Analytical Geopolitics also eschews any speculative moral claims, for example regarding a hidden agenda on the part of the speaker, and attends only to objective realities that can be examined in myths and their attainment of a common sense status. Leaning on critical theory, Geopolitics has focused on condemning politicians, intellectuals, and society at large for abusing geography for their own political purposes. This critique appears to position itself as an alternative interpretation, coming from an observer with good intentions and superior insight of the world, but it rests on its own set of beliefs and biases—such is the fate of every interpretative effort (see, e.g., Gadamer, 2014; Schleiermacher, 1998). Hence, Analytical Geopolitics is different from critical approaches in the sense that it does not aim to expose the artificiality of a geopolitical myth as a reflection of power relations or an instrument in the service of a hidden immoral agenda—while at the same time it does not offer an alternative interpretation of a possible reality. In this sense, a geopolitical myth differs from the concept of discourse as it has been used in Critical Geopolitics. For Analytical Geopolitics, geopolitical myths are connected series of narratives and stories that use geographical terms and significations, which emerge historically and compete constantly in a mythmaking process. The study of a geopolitical myth does not assume the existence of a great unity of statements and concepts in such a way that they define a distinctive theory of identity or a singular source of influence, such as the existence of an interest. A myth is not a series of statements that function as the source or the expression of an identity or a false representation of interests. Instead it is simply an ensemble of narratives and stories that appears reg ularly in the public discourse and has an impact on strategy and foreign policy. The emphasis originally given by Latour (2004, p. 231).

CONCLUSIONS

189

Going back to the case study, there was no effort to strictly identify the myth of belonging with a particular social or political group, or with the interests of internal or external powers. There were several social groups and political forces that adopted and promoted the strategic agenda enclosed in the myth of belonging to the West. However, these forces were not always the same. For example, the Greek Orthodox Church historically has maintained an ambiguous stance on the subject, from being openly hostile to European modernity, to being moderately skeptical; from engaging in constructive dialogue with European values, to adopting them selectively or to accepting without conditions the political commitments arising from Greek membership of the European Communities. An examination of the discontinuities in the historical emergence of the belonging myth might also show that as the pro-European strategy was elevated to the position of a state ideology, the social groups that aligned with this discourse were not always the same. Similarly, there should be no doubt that incoming intellectual movements from Europe fostered the emergence of modern conceptions of space and time in the Greek-speaking world, which led to the development of a new selfawareness. However, Western perceptions of Greece were not the only, and certainly not the predominant, elements in the formation of Greek identity. True, in parallel to a cultural osmosis, there existed also the reality of uneven development (scientific, economic, etc.) between Europe and Greece, as well as a vast difference in the forms of government and the level of personal freedom. Nonetheless, the external responsiveness of the narratives and stories of belonging to reflect the power equilibrium was complemented by their internal qualities of adjusting to domestic dynamics and outlasting the competition. In conclusion, instead of deconstructing texts, Geopolitics should be decomposing myths into their constitutive narratives and storylines. Instead of merely exposing their artificiality, it should be investigating the internal logic and structure that gives them their power. This also means that the artificiality of geopolitical myths is irrelevant to the motivation of the author or the speaking subject in general. Instead of focusing on explaining the motives of individuals, groups, and foreign policy establishments, Analytical Geopolitics takes on the notion of myth as a neutral object of study. This neutrality does not imply that there are no hidden intentions, agendas, or ideologies, but it does argue that these should not be matters of concern. Looking at the continuity, intertextuality, and adaptability of geopolitical myths, their real power does not lie with the people that use them; it lies hid den under layers of repetition through texts and speeches by different authors. For Analytical Geopolitics, myths, no matter how expedient for certain political agendas, are not the ideological product of a social class, a group, or a state, nor

190

CHAPTER 4

can they be equated with an ideology or practice such as imperialism or colonialism. To be sure, as Henry Tudor claimed, every political myth has an ultimate purpose, as they are rarely if ever used for their aesthetic value; but this purpose should not “detain us long” because a myth “may well be used for one purpose at one time and for a different purpose on another [ … ​] both can be real, and this is because the purpose of a myth depends entirely on the circumstances in which it is told and the intention of the man who tells it” (Tudor, 1973, pp. 37–39). Irrespective of the intentions and the agendas of their users, myths leave a significant footprint on our political processes. Why and how does that happen? Why and how does a geopolitical myth become so embedded in public consciousness that it is accepted as common sense? Where does its effectiveness come from? What is the deep structure of a geopolitical myth that allows it to transcend time and context and achieve such levels of consistency and adaptability? What types and forms does it take? What is its function in the political discourse? And most of all, how does it generate legitimacy for specific decisions and policies? These are some of the questions that Geopolitics should be asking for each and every country case—and indeed, Greece is hardly alone in exhibiting geopolitical myths that frame a historical strategic behavior or an opposition between rival myths that set out the basic strategic parameters for geopolitical competition, both nationally and internationally. In this regard, there are many cases equivalent to the Greek one that can be examined with the proposed toolkit of Analytical Geopolitics. With regard to the form of geopolitical myths, the objective should be an in-depth historical analysis, whereas when it comes to type, the specific aim should be to create comparative collections of geopolitical myths. To start with, the well-documented American myth of Manifest Destiny as a set of stories that accompanied an expansionist project to civilize and remake the West in the model of the United States, justified with a narrative of the superiority of American culture, bears a fascinating resemblance to the Greek Great Idea and its constitutive narratives (see, e.g., Merk, 1970; Weinberg, 1999). Manifest Destiny, much like the Great Idea, may also be a case in point for the complex mediation of geopolitical myths between national identity formation, national interest, and foreign policy.6 Moreover, in the Greek sense of centrality and expansion to the East at the expense of a crumbling, uncivilized Ottoman Empire, there is an analogy that can be drawn with the American frontier myth

6 In the case of Manifest Destiny, as in the Great Idea, territorial expansion was more con cerned with national stability than a search for security from external threats; see Hietala (2003).

CONCLUSIONS

191

of the West as a wide-open land of opportunity at the edge of civilization.7 American history and directional perceptions are full of symbolism and myth, as well as narratives of national mission that often assumed a religious and millenarian guise (H. N. Smith, 2009; Burns, 1973; Cherry, 2015; Tuveson, 1980). Russia shares similar religious geopolitical visions to those of Greece that still inform national identity, strategy, and foreign policy that can be traced back to the Enlightenment and Russia’s uneasy relationship with European modernity. Russian self-awareness as the defender of the Orthodox faith— Moscow as the Third Rome—religious history, and messianic narratives and stories still inform the geopolitical vision of the country and Moscow’s sense of place and mission in the world, especially in relation to Europe and the West (see, e.g., Sidorov, 2006; Engström, 2014; Suslov, 2015, 2018). In contrast, a history of colonialism and imperialism used to define Great Britain’s place and “civilizing” mission in the world; but what is more fascinating in the case of Britain is its rich history of narratives and stories that may constitute a myth of the island, which expresses the opposite feelings of isolation and insularity (see, e.g., Kincaid, 2007). If there is indeed a dual tendency between Empire and Island in British strategy and foreign policy, this would make a fantastic case for a mythmaking process that revolves around the opposition between rival myths and narratives—especially if traces of this duality or opposition can be found in the context of Brexit. Germany also exhibits the historical emergence of a geopolitical mission, although it moves in the opposite direction from the United States, looking eastward; there, “a varied cast of German writers, artists, philosophers, diplomats, political leaders, generals, and Nazi racial fanatics have imagined (often in very different ways) a special German mission in the East, forging a frontier myth that paralleled the American myths of the ‘WildWest’ and ‘Manifest Destiny’” (Liulevicius, 2011, back cover; see also Kakel, 2014). Moreover, in an affinity narrative that mirrors Greece’s affinity with Europe and the West, again through comparing practices with the Ottomans in the East, the Ger mans developed a sense of Europeanness or Westerness in comparison with the Eastern position of—and a perceived threat from—Russia (Gassner, 2011). The EU as a whole may also be ripe with geopolitical myths. We have already mentioned how Ian Manners (2010) has identified at least six myths that are connected with Europe’s position as a unitary global actor, and the political myths that Vincent Della Sala (2016) has identified relating to the EU’s origins and its perceived exceptionalism. Another, even obvious, path of inquiry could deal with the geopolitical demarcation of Europe itself, that is, how various For the frontier myth, see the relevant Slotkin (1998, 2006, 2008) trilogy.

192

CHAPTER 4

European countries and institutions see, imagine, and apply some kind of geographical limits to Europe, from the Congress of Europe to the European Union. The geopolitical content of Europe today (answering the question who “belongs to Europe?”—which makes for an interesting reversal of our case study) may actually be itself a product of a long historical mythmaking process, which is still contested. There is a Europe that is part of a transatlantic community, which has been created to keep Russia out of Europe (quite literally), but there is also a view of Europe as part of a Eurasian supercontinent that ranges from Lisbon to Vladivostok.8 Finally, Greece’s narrative of centrality between East and West, seems to follow a general pattern in Europe that Wolff (2010) traces back to the invention of Eastern Europe by the European Enlightenment. Consequently, we see a plethora of states such as Greece, on the “periphery” of Europe, developing narratives of centrality between East and West (and affinity with Europe): Russia, sharing cultural and religious idiosyncrasies with Greece, has also been historically “torn” between Europe and Asia (Bassin et al., 2015). Poland, like Germany, used Russia to counter-define its affinity narrative with Europe; Finland developed geopolitical narratives that were torn between centrality and marginality in the East, the West, and the North; Belarus was also undecided “in between”; even Turkey, interestingly enough, developed a centrality narrative of a “bridge” between East and West that was followed by an EC membership bid and a Westernization debate that mirrored the Greek one in time, but also in character and intensity.9 The vertical, in-depth analysis of several country cases will shed more light on the patterns of geopolitical behavior, the constitutive narratives and stories of specific and otherwise well-documented myths, their stages of historical emergence, and their residual or latent effect on the current geopolitical predicaments of each case. The insights gained will illuminate the form and deep structure of geopolitical myths (i.e., their meaning and significance as they emerge from the constitutive narratives), their historical emergence or current level of acceptance and status (e.g., is it still active? Do political actors, no matter how marginal, still represent it?), the degree of their efficiency and their potential for legitimacy and mobilization in the political process, and so forth.

8 Eurasianism is usually identified with Russian foreign policy and geopolitical practice; nev ertheless, the concept of Eurasia resonates with European political and social forces; see Laruelle & Gabowitsch (2012) and Laruelle (2017). For a critical point of view, see Tsygankov (2003). See relevant chapters in Maxwell (2011).

CONCLUSIONS

193

In turn, these vertical insights will provide enough comparative data in order to inquire further into the types and forms of geopolitical myths and, more importantly, to expand the research agenda with more horizontal, but also more intriguing, questions, such as which geopolitical myths seem to be more compatible with regional (e.g., European) integration, or which myths are more responsive to external stimuli and foreign interventions, under what conditions we may witness a rekindling of opposition between rival geopolitical myths and narratives, and so on. Looking forward to such classification of geopolitical myths and their narratives, it is already possible to describe a few categories according to their meaning and the locational awareness they prescribe to states, for example, myths and narratives that steer the state in a particular direction or provide a directional sense (north/south, east/west); myths that locate the state in the center or on the margins of a region; myths that speak about the continuity of a state in a territory or describe a territorial loss as a discontinuity in the nation’s history; myths that narrate the interests of a global empire or myths that account for isolationist or “island” stories; myths of belonging and of alienation, or affinity and aversion, toward a region; myths that connect/disconnect or open/ close a state or a region to a topographical space; and conceivably many more (see Table 13). The majority of those geopolitical myths and narratives already mentioned are well documented in the literature, but, as discussed in the beginning of the study, they have been approached as fantasies—purely a product of the imagination that needs to be dispelled. Indeed, in recent decades, “myth busting” has been taken up as a mission by critical approaches in the social sciences, including IR and Geopolitics. And although the endeavor has been quite successful and extremely enlightening, we run the risk of believing that these myths have stopped having an impact on society and politics just because they have been exposed and dispelled. Table 13  Geopolitical myths and narratives according to type/relation to topographical space

Centrality ≠ Marginality Proximity ≠ Distance

Continuity ≠ Discontinuity Belonging ≠ Alienation Directional Connection ≠ (north/south and east/west) Disconnection Affinity ≠ Exceptionalism Accessibility ≠ Inaccessibility

194

CHAPTER 4

In other words, we run the risk of believing that myths are a thing of the past. But what if all these myths are simply latent in a society, subsisting on marginal stories, legends, and symbols, simply waiting for the proper moment to come back in the mythmaking process? Or else, what if the residues of myths such as Manifest Destiny, the Great Idea, and the narratives of Empire and of exceptionalism are still present in one form or another, still play some part in strategy and foreign policy, and still have the potential to challenge what we now consider common sense? Myths have been indispensable for every collective enterprise and every social construct, including the modern state. Myths give people the “unprecedented ability to cooperate flexibly in large numbers”; and even if we agree, for the sake of argument, that “myths exist only in people’s collective imagination” (Harari, 2015, pp. 30–31)—in other words, that they have no material foundation in an objective reality—even then, myths are here to stay for as long as people create, control, and partake in the government of social collectivities. In this regard, perhaps the social world is largely a mythopoetic world—not entirely ethereal, but intelligible and experienced only through an aesthetic gathering of myths and narratives, stories and plots, histories and chronologies, legends and folklore, and so many other literary devices that embody our collective understanding of—and participation in—the social world. Analytical Geopolitics is in some ways an aesthetic study of myth and by extension the geopolitical fabric of the modern state: how people imagine, create, and use myth; what happens in their minds when they see, hear, or read a myth; and, most importantly, what happens in politics when a geopolitical myth emerges and dominates the political discourse. What kind of general patterns of behavior does a geopolitical myth create? This is an inquiry into the material conditions and mental representations (and their fusion in narrative form) that create patterns of state behavior. In the past decade, there has been a lot of talk about the return of geopolitics, according to which the state and foreign policy elites have revisited simplistic geopolitical schemata and the instrumental uses of geography in order to challenge the status quo or simply to find a place in a new (post-Cold War) world (see, e.g., Guzzini, 2012; Favro, 1998; Mead, 2014). However, a critical reflection on myth, politics, and geography might show that geopolitics never left in the first place. Simply deconstructing myths and exposing them as fan tasies or immoral instruments of power politics does not mean that they are no longer active ingredients in the everyday life of a society, or in the government of the modern state. And perhaps no amount of criticism, fact checking, and textual deconstruction can eradicate myths, at least not without undermining the foundations of the social world or our ability to understand it.

References Adamr, F. (2017) Ethnonationalism, Irredentism, and empire. In K. Boeckh & S. Rutar (Eds.), The Balkan wars from contemporary perception to historic memory, pp. 13–55. Palgrave Macmillan. Adshead, M. (2005). Europeanization and changing patterns of governance in Ireland. Public Administration, 83(1), 159–178. Agnantopoulos, A. (2013). The Europeanization of national foreign policy: Explaining Greek support for Turkey’s EU accession. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 13(1), 67–87. Agnew, J. A. (1987). Place and politics: The geographical mediation of state and society. Allen & Unwin. Agnew, J. A. (1998). Geopolitics : Re-visioning world politics. Routledge. Agnew, J., & Corbridge, S. (1995). Mastering space. Routledge. Ahrweiler, H. (2011). Hē politikē ideologia tēs byzantinēs autokratorias [The political ideology of the Byzantine Empire]. Psychorios. Alecu, F. N., & Müller, P. (2012). Dimensions and mechanisms of the Europeanization of Member State foreign policy: State of the art and new research avenues. Journal of European Integration, 34(1), 19–35. Allison, G. T. (1971). Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Little. Allison, G. T., & Halperin, M. H. (1972). Bureaucratic politics: A paradigm and some policy implications. Brookings Institution. allwebnews. (2014, December 11), Samaras Diaggelma [Video File]. https://www .dailymotion.com/video/x2d1b3g. Anderson, B. (2016). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. Verso. Andreadis, I., & Stavrakakis, Y. (2017). European populist parties in government: How well are voters represented? Evidence from Greece. Swiss Political Science Review, 23(4), 485–508. Anson, E. M. (2009). Greek ethnicity and the Greek language. Glotta, 85, 5–30. Appleby, J. O., Hunt, L. A., & Jacob, M. C. (1995). Telling the truth about history. Norton. Apter, D. (1997). The legitimization of violence. NYU Press. Archard, D. (1995). Myths, lies and historical truth: A defence of nationalism. Political Studies, 43(3), 472–481. Archer, M. (1982). Morphogenesis versus structuration: On combining structure and action. British Journal of Sociology, 33(4), 455–483. Archer, M. (1995). Realist social theory. Cambridge University Press. Argyriades, D. (2013). Greek exit from the crisis—a pressing and much-needed public service reform. Social Sciences (2), 78–90.

196

References

Aron, R. (1966) Peace and war: A theory of international relations. Praeger. Askitas, N. (2015). Calling the Greek Referendum on the nose with Google Trends. Available at SSRN 2633443. Aslanidis, P., & Rovira, K. C. (2016). Dealing with populists in government: The SYRIZA– ANEL coalition in Greece. Democratization, 23(6), 1077–1091. Atkins, R. (2012, December 23). A year in a word: Grexit. Financial Times. Baeten, E. M. (1996). The magic mirror: Myth’s abiding power. State University of New York Press. Bal, M. (2017). Narratology: Introduction to the theory of narrative. University of Toronto Press. Barad, K. (2007). Meeting the universe halfway. Duke University Press. Barnes, T. J., & Duncan, J. S. (1992). Writing worlds: Discourse, texts and metaphors in the representation of landscape. Routledge. Barthes, R. (1977). The death of the Author. In R. Barthes, Image, music, text: Essays selected and translated by Stephen Heath (pp. 142–148). Fontana Press. Barthes, R., & Lavers, A. (2000). Mythologies. Penguin. Bartlett, R. P. (2005). A history of Russia. Palgrave Macmillan. Bassin, M., Glebov, S., & Laruelle, M. (2015). Between Europe and Asia: The origins, theories, and legacies of Russian Eurasianism. University of Pittsburgh Press. Batalden, S. K. (1982). Catherine II’s Greek prelate Eugenios Voulgaris in Russia 1771– 1806. East European Monographs, 115. Columbia University Presss. Baum, M. A., & Potter, P. B. K. (2008). The relationships between mass media, public opinion, and foreign policy: Toward a theoretical synthesis. Annual Review of Political Science, 11(1), 39–65. Beaton, R. (1988). Romanticism in Greece. In R. Porter & M. Teich, (Eds.), Romanticism in national context (pp. 92–108). Cambridge University Press. Beaton, R., & Ricks, D. (Eds.). (2009). The making of modern Greece: Nationalism, romanticism, & the uses of the past (1797–1896) (Vol. 11). Ashgate. Bell, D. S. A. (2003). Mythscapes: Memory, mythology, and national identity. British Journal of Sociology, 54, 63–81. Beloudes, G. (1982), Ο Jacob Philipp Falmerayer και η Γένεση του Ελληνικού Ιστορισμού / O Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer kai e genese tou ellenikou istorismou. Mnemon. Bennett, A., & Elman, C. (2007). Case study methods in the international relations subfield. Comparative Political Studies, 40(2), 170–195. Bennett, J. (2004). The force of things. Political Theory, 32(3), 347–372. Bennett, W. L. (1980). Myth, ritual, and political control. Journal of Communication, 30(4), 166–179. Berger, S. (2017). History writing and constructions of national space: The long dom inance of the national in modern European historiographies. In M. Carretero, S. Berger, & M. Grever (Eds.), Palgrave handbook of research in historical culture and education (pp. 39–57). Springer.

References

197

Berlin, I., & Hardy, H. (2000). The roots of romanticism. Pimlico. Bernazzoli, R. (2010). “The end of autocracy”: Analysing representations of the AustroHungarian dissolution as the foundation of US hegemonic discourse. Geopolitics, 15(4), 643–666. Bevin E. (1948, January 22). Address in House of Commons, Third session of the ThirtyEight Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Dir. of publ. Hansard, no. 446. Bhaskar, R. (1975). A realist theory of science. Verso. Bhaskar, R. (1979). The possibility of naturalism. Humanities Press. Bialasiewicz, L., Campbell, D., Elden, S., Graham, S., Jeffrey, A., & Williams, A. J. (2007). Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy. Political Geography, 26(4), 405–422. Bjelić, D & Savić, O. (2002). Balkan as metaphor: Between globalization and fragmentation. MIT Press. Blavoukos, S., & Bourantonis, D. (2012). Policy entrepreneurs and foreign policy change: The Greek–Turkish rapprochement in the 1990s. Government and Opposition, 47(4), 597–617. Bliesemann, G. B. (2016). Myth and narrative in international politics: Interpretive approaches to the study of IR. Palgrave Macmillan. Blumenberg, H. (2010). Work on myth. MIT Press. Borneman, J., & Fowler, N. (1997). Europeanization. Annual Review of Anthropology, 26, 487–514. Bottici, C. (2008). Europe, war and remembrance. In F. Cerutti & S. Lucarelli (Eds.), The search for a European identity: Values, policies and legitimacy of the European Union. Routledge. Bottici, C. (2010). A philosophy of political myth. Cambridge University Press. Bottici, C., & Challand, B. (2012). The myth of the clash of civilizations. Routledge. Bottici, C., & Challand, B. (2014). Imagining Europe: Myth, memory, and identity. Cambridge University Press. Bouchard, G. (2007). Mythes et sociétés des Amériques. Québec Amérique. Bouchard, G. (2013). National myths: An overview. In G. Bouchard (Ed.), National myths: Constructed pasts, contested presents. Routledge. Bouchard, G. (2014) Raison et Dèraiso n du France: Au Coeur des Imaginaires Collectifs. Boréal. Bouchard, G. (2016). Social myths: “A new approach. Philosophy Study, 6(6), 356–366. Bouchard, G. (2017). Social myths and collective imaginaries. University of Toronto Press. Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: Past achievements, current problems and future challenges. European Journal of Social Psychology, 30(6), 745–778. Brubaker, R. (2001). Au-delà de l’“identité.” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 4,

198

References

Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond “identity.” Theory and Society, 29(1), 1–47. Brzezinski, Z. (1997). The grand chessboard: American Primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. Basic Books. Buffet, C., & Heuser, B. (1998). Haunted by history: Myths in international relations. Berghahn. Bulmer, S., & Burch, M. (2005). The Europeanization of UK government: From quiet revolution to explicit step-change? Public Administration, 83(4), 861–890. Burke, A. (2006). Identity/difference. In M. Griffiths (Ed.), Encyclopedia of international relations and global politics (pp. 394–396). Routledge. Burns, E. M. N. (1973). The American idea of mission: Concepts of national purpose and destiny. Greenwood Press. Bury, J. B. (1979). The Cambridge medieval history. Vol. 4, The Byzantine Empire. Part 1, Byzantium and its Neighbours. Cambridge University Press. Bushkovitch, P. (2012). A concise history of Russia. Cambridge University Press. Buzan, B., & Little, R. (2017). International systems in world history: Remaking the study of international relations. Oxford University Press Cable, J. (1994). Gunboat diplomacy 1919–1991. Palgrave Macmillan. Caire-Jabinet, M. P. (1994). Introduction à l’historiographie. Nathan. Campbell, D. (1992) Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity. Manchester University Press. Campbell, J. (2011). The masks of God: Primitive mythology. Souvenir Press. Campbell, J., & Sherrard, P. (1968). Modern Greece. Praeger. Candilis, W. O. (1968). The economy of Greece, 1944–66: Efforts for stability and development (Foreword by Xenophon Zolotas). Praeger. Carter, S., & McCormack, D. P. (2006). Film, geopolitics and the affective logics of intervention. Political Geography, 25(2), 228–245. Carvalho, B., Leira, H., & Hobson, J. M. (2015). The big bangs of IR: The myths that your teachers still tell you about 1648 and 1919. Historical International Relations, 2, 321–346. Cassirer, E. (2013). The myth of the state. Yale University Press. Charques, R. (1977). The twilight of imperial Russia. Oxford University Press. Charteris-Black, J. (2011). Politicians and rhetoric: The persuasive power of metaphor. Palgrave Macmillan. Charteris-Black, J. (2014). Analysing political speeches: Rhetoric, discourse and metaphor. Palgrave Macmillan. Checkel, J. (1997). Ideas and international political change. Yale University Press. Chernobrov, D. (2016). Ontological security and public (mis)recognition of international crises: Uncertainty, political imagining, and the self. Political Psychology, 37

References

199

Cherry, C. (2015). God’s new Israel: Religious interpretations of American destiny. University of North Carolina Press. Christopoulou M. D. (2014). Ο “Ονειροπόλος Πραγματοποιός”: Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα, 1909–1920 [A dreamer doer: Eleftherios Venizelos and the Great Idea, 1909–1920]. In N. Padakis (Ed.), Ελευθέριος ΒενιζέλοςFrance Διαμόρφωση της Πολιτικής Σκέψης του, Ιδεολογικές Αφετηρίες και Επιρροές [Eleftherios Venizelos: The shaping of his political thought, ideological beginnings and influences]. National Research Institute Eleftherios Venizelos. Chryssogelos, A. (2011). Old ghosts in new sheets: European populist parties and foreign policy. Centre for European Studies. Chryssogelos, A.-S. (2015). Foreign policy change in a polarized two-party system: Greece and Turkey’s EU candidacy. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 15(1), 19–36. Chryssogelos, A. (2019). Europeanisation as de-politicisation, crisis as re-politicisation: The case of Greek foreign policy during the eurozone crisis. Journal of European Integration, 41(5), 605–621. Çirakman, A. (2001). From tyranny to despotism: The Enlightenment’s unenlightened image of the Turks. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 33(1), 49–68. Clements, B., Nanou, K., & Verney, S. (2014). “We no longer love you, but we don’t want to leave you”: The eurozone crisis and popular Euroscepticism in Greece. Journal of European Integration, 36(3), 247–265. Clogg, R. (1986). A short history of modern Greece. Cambridge University Press. Clogg R. (1996). Sense of the past in pre-Independence Greece. In Anatolica: Studies in the Greek East in the 18th and 19th centuries (pp. 7–30). Ashgate. Clogg, R. (2015). A concise history of Greece. Cambridge University Press. Cohen, H. F. (1994). The Scientific Revolution: A historiographical inquiry. University of Chicago Press. Cohen, S. B. (1963). Geography and politics in a world divided. Random House. Cohen, S. B. (2003). Geopolitics of the world system. Rowman & Littlefield. Collier, A. (1994). Critical realism: An introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy. Verso. Constantinos, M. [mavridiskonstantinos]. (2009, November 9). Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής – Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου [Video file]. https​://​www.​youtube.​com​/​watch?​ v​=vp9Kh2JWam8 Conway, M. (2017). The Greek Civil War: Greek exceptionalism or mirror of a European civil war? In P. Carabott & T. D. Sfikas (Eds.), The Greek Civil War: Essays on a conflict of exceptionalism and silences (pp. 17–40). Routledge. Coole, D., & Frost, S. (2010) Introducing the new materialisms. In D. Coole & S. Frost (Eds.), New materialisms: Ontology, agency, and politics (pp. 1–43). Duke University Press.

200

References

The cores of national unity. (1854, May 1). Pandora, 99, pp. 63–66. Coufoudakis, V. (1977). The European economic community and the “freezing” of the Greek association, 1967–1974. Journal of Common Market Studies, 16, 114–131. Coufoudakis, V. (1988). Greek foreign policy since 1974: Quest for independence. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 6(1), 55–79. Couloumbis, T. A. (1974). The Greek junta phenomenon. Polity, 6(3), 345–374. Couloumbis, T. A. (1994). Introduction: The impact of EC (EU) membership on Greece’s foreign policy profile. In P. Kazakos & P. Ioakimidis (Eds.), Greece and EC membership evaluated (pp. 189–198). Pinter. Cowles, M. G., Caporaso, J. A., & Risse-Kappen, T. (2012). Transforming Europe: Europeanization and domestic change. Cornell University Press. Cracraft, J. (2006). The revolution of Peter the Great. Harvard University Press. Crawford, N. C. (2000). The passion of world politics: Propositions on emotion and emotional relationships. International Security, 24(4), 116–156. Criekemans D. (Ed.) (2022). Geopolitics and International Relations. Grounding World Politics Anew. Leiden & Boston: Brill Nijhoff. Cronin, B. (1999). Community under anarchy: Transnational identity and the evolution of cooperation. Columbia University Press. Crossley, C. (1993). French historians and romanticism: Thierry, Guizot, the SaintSimonians, Quinet, Michelet. Routledge. Culcasi, K. (2006). Cartographically constructing Kurdistan within geopolitical and orientalist discourses. Political Geography, 25(6), 680–706. Czarniawska, B. (2005). Narratives in social science research: Introducing qualitative methods. SAGE. Dalby. S. (1989). Discourses of peace and war: Towards a postmodem geopolitics. Occasional Papers in Geography. No. 46. Dalby, S. (1990a). American security discourse: The persistence of geopolitics. Political Geography Quarterly, 9(2), 171–188. Dalby, S. (1990b). Creating the second Cold War: The discourse of politics. Pinter. Dalby, S. (2016). Creating the second cold war: The discourse of politics. Bloomsbury. Damasio, A. (2008). Descartes’ Error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. Random House. Damasio, A. (2012). Self comes to mind: Constructing the conscious brain. Vintage. Damasio, A. (2018). Strange order of things: The biological roots of culture. Knopf Doubleday. Dear, M. (1988). The postmodern challenge: Reconstructing human geography. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 13(3), 262–274. Della Sala, V. (2010). Political myth, mythology and the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies (1), 1–19.

References

201

Della Sala, V. (2016). Europe’s odyssey? Political myth and the European Union. Nations and Nationalism, 22(3), 524–541. Derrida, J. (1979). Living on. In H. Bloom, M. P. De, J. Derrida, G. Hartman, & J. Miller, Deconstruction & criticism (pp. 75–176) Continuum. Derrida, J. (1997 [1967]). Of grammatology. Johns Hopkins University Press. Dialetis, D., Patiniotis, M., & Gavroglu, K. (1999). The sciences in the Greek speaking regions during the 17th and 18th centuries: The process of appropriation and the dynamics of reception and resistance. In K. Gavroglu (Ed.), The sciences in the European periphery during the Enlightenment: Archimedes (New Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Vol. 2) (pp. 41–71). Springer. Dialla, A. (2014). Επανεξετάζοντας τη διχοτομία Δύση – Ανατολή: Tατηςλλαπλά πρόσωπα της Ρωσίας στον ελληνικό 19ο αιώνα, στο Αρώνη-Τσίχλη, Κ. και λοιπτης (επιμ.) Η Ελλάδα της Νεωτερικότητας: Κοινωνικές κρίσεις και ιδεολογικά διλήμματα (19ος–20ός αιώνας). Παπαζήσης. Diamandouros, N. P. (1994). Cultural dualism and political change in postauthoritarian Greece. Working Paper 50. Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Madrid. Diamandouros, N. P., Dragōna, T., & Keyder, C. (2010). Spatial conceptions of the nation: Modernizing geographies in Greece and Turkey. I.B. Tauris. Diamandouros. (2002). Οι Απαρχές της Συγκρότησης του Σύγχρονου Κράτους στην Ελλάδα, 1821–1828 [The origins of the formation of the modern state in Greece, 1821–1828]. ΜIET. Diamantis, A. (2003). Ο Χώρος ως Εθνική Ιδιαιτερότητα και η Βυζαντινή Πρωτοτυπία του Κ. Παπαρρηγόπουλου [Space as national exceptionalism and the Byzantine innovation of K. Paparrigopoulos], Τα Ιστορικά, 20(38). Dijk, T. A. (1985a). Discourse and communication: New approaches to the analysis of mass media discourse and communication. W. de Gruyter. Dijk, T. A. (1985b). Discourse and literature. Benjamins. Dijk, T. A. (2000). Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach. SAGE. Dijk, T. A. (2010a). Discourse and context: A sociocognitive approach. Cambridge University Press. Dijk, T. A. (2010b). Discourse and power. Palgrave Macmillan. Dijkink, G. (1996). National identity and geopolitical visions: Maps of pride and pain Routledge. Dimakis I. (1991). Η πολιτειακή μεταβολή του 1843 και το ζήτημα των αυτοχθόνων και ετεροχθόνων [Τhe constitutional change of 1843 and the issue of autochthons and heterochthons]. εκδ. Θεμέλιο. Dτηςras, K. (1968). Ιστορία τηςτηςοελληνικής Λογοτεχνίας ατηςτις Πρώτες Ρίζες ώς την Εποχή μας [History of new Greek literature from the first roots to our age]. Ίκαρος.

202

References

ποχή μας [History of new Greek literature from the first roots to our age]. Ίκαρος. Dimaras, K. (1986), Κωνσταντίνος Παπαρρηγόπουλος/Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos. MIET. Dimaras, K. (2009). Ellēnikos rōmantismos [Greek Romanticism]. Ermēs. Dimas, C. (2011). In the name of “Europe”: Analysing prime ministerial discourse from EU membership to the Greek financial crisis. In K. E. Botsiou & A. Klapsis (Eds.), The Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy yearbook 2011: The global economic crisis and the case of Greece (pp. 141–154). Springer. Dinan, D. (2004). Europe recast: A history of European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. Dinas, E., & Rori, L. (2013). The 2012 Greek parliamentary elections: Fear and loathing in the polls. West European Politics, 36(1), 270–282. Dittmer, J. (2005). Captain America’s empire: Reflections on identity, popular culture, and post-9/11 geopolitics. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 95(3), 626–643. Dittmer, J., & Sturm, T. (2016). Mapping the end times: American evangelical geopolitics and apocalyptic visions. Routledge. Dixon, S. (1999). The modernisation of Russia, 1676–1825. Cambridge University Press. Dmytryshyn, B. (1974). Modernization of Russia under Peter I and Catherine II. Wiley. Dodds, K. J. (1994). Geopolitics in the Foreign Office: British representations of Argentina 1945–1961. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 19(3), 273–290. Dodds, K. (2006). Popular geopolitics and audience dispositions: James Bond and the internet movie database (IMDb). Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 31(2), 116–130. Dodds, K. (2007). Steve Bell’s eye: Cartoons, geopolitics and the visualization of the War on Terror. Security Dialogue, 38(2), 157–177. Dodds, K., Kuus, M., & Sharp, J. P. (2013). The Ashgate research companion to Critical Geopolitics. Ashgate. Dodds, K. J., & Sidaway, J. D. (1994). Locating Critical Geopolitics. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 12(5), 515–524. Dodds, K., & Sidaway, J. D. (2004). Halford Mackinder and the “geographical pivot of history”: A centennial retrospective. The Geographical Journal, 170(4), 292–297. Dosios, C. (1856). Hellenism or Russism? The private and confidential correspondence between England and Russia concerning the Eastern Question, with prologue and commentary. Drezner, D., & Lechtreck, R. (2003). Ideas, bureaucratic politics, and the crafting of foreign policy. Peace Research Abstracts, 40(4). Dryzek, J. S. (1994). Discursive democracy: Politics, policy, and political science Cambridge University Press. Dukes, P. (1977). Russia under Catherine the Great. Oriental Research Partners. Duncan, P. J. S. (2014). Russian messianism: Third Rome, revolution, communism and after. Routledge Taylor & Francis.

References

203

The dusk of the Turkish Empire and the Dawn of the Greek East. (1853, July 28). Aeon, 1378. Dussouy, G. (2001). Quelle géopolitique au XXIe siècle? Complexe. Economides, S. (2005). The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. West European Politics, 28(2), 471–491. Editorial. (1863, March 14). Athena, 3129. Ejdus, F. (2017). Memories of empire and entry into international society: Views from the European periphery. Routledge. Eliade, M. (2005 [1954]). The myth of the eternal return (W. Trask, Trans.). Princeton University Press. Eliade, M. (2009). Myth and reality. Waveland Press. Ellinas, A. A. (2013). The rise of Golden Dawn: The new face of the far right in Greece. South European Society and Politics, 18(4), 543–565. Engström, M. (2014). Contemporary Russian messianism and new Russian foreign policy. Contemporary Security Policy, 35(3), 356–379. Erickson, J. (1964). Panslavism. (No. 55) Historical Association. Eun, Y.-S. (2012). Why and how should we go for a multicausal analysis in the study of foreign policy? (Meta-)theoretical rationales and methodological rules. Review of International Studies, 38(4), 763–783. The euro is a straitjacket for Greece. (2015, June 30). New York Times. Exertzoglou, C. (2015). Εκ δυσμών το φως; : εξελληνισμός και Οριενταλισμός στην Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία (μέσα 19ου–αρχές 20ού αιωνα) / Ek dysmōn to phōs?: Exellēnismos kai Orientalismos stēn Othōmanikē Autokratoria (mesa 19ou–arches 20ou aiōna). Ekdoseis tou Eikostou Prōtou. Fairclough, N. (2003). Critical language awareness. Longman. Fairclough, N. (2010). Analysing discourse: Textual analysis for social research. Routledge. Fairclough, N. (2013). Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language. Routledge. Fallmerayer, J. P. (1830). Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea wahrend de’ Mittelalters. J.G. Cotta‘schen Buchhandlung. Fatzeas G. (1760). Geographiki Grammatiki (Vols. 1–3). http://www.lib.uoa.grhellinom nimon/.​ Favro, A. (1998). The return of geopolitics? Telos, 111, 180–182. Fearon, J. (1999) What is identity (as we now use the word)? Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University. Available at chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj /http​://​www.​web.​stanford.​edu​/​group​/​fearon​​-​research​​/​cgi​​-​bin​​/​wordpress​/​wp​​-​content​​ /​uploads​/​2013​/​10​/​What​​-i​ s​​​​-​Identity​​​​-​as​​​​-​we​​​​-​now​​​​-​use​​​​-​the​​​​-​word​​​​-.​pdf Featherstone, K. (2011). The JCMS Annual Lecture: The Greek sovereign debt crisis and EMU: A failing state in a skewed regime. Journal of Common Market Studies, 49(2), 193–217. Featherstone, K. (Ed.). (2014). Europe in modern Greek history

204

References

Featherstone, K., & Kazamias, G. (Eds.). (2001). Europeanisation and the southern periphery. Frank Cass. Featherstone, K., & Radaelli, C. (Eds.). (2003). The politics of Europeanization. Oxford University Press. Filippides, D. (1791). Geographia Neoteriki. http​://​www.​lib.​uoa.​gr​/​hellinomnimon​/.​ Finefrock, M. M. (1980). Ataturk, Lloyd George and the Megali idea: Cause and consequence of the Greek plan to seize Constantinople from the allies, June–August 1922. The Journal of Modern History, 52(S1), D1047–D1066. Finnemore, M. (1996). National interests in international society. Cornell University Press. Fischer-Galati, S. A. (1953). The nature and immediate origins of the Treaty Of Holy Alliance. History, 38(132), 27–39. Flint, C. (Ed.). (2005). The geography of war and peace: From death camps to diplomats. Oxford University Press. Flood, C. (2002). Political myth. Routledge. Fokas, E. (2013). Religion in the Greek public sphere: Debating Europe’s influence. In G. E. Demacopoulos & A. Papanikolaou (Eds.), Orthodox constructions of the West. Fordham University Press. Foucault, M. (2010). Archeology of knowledge. Routledge. Foucault, M. (2013). Archaeology of knowledge (2nd ed.). Taylor and Francis. Fox, N. J., & Alldred, P. (2017). Sociology and the New Materialism: Theory, research, action. SAGE. Frazer, J. G., (2009). The golden bough: A study in magic and religion. Oxford University Press. Frazier, R. (2016). Anglo-American relations with Greece: The coming of the Cold War, 1942–47. Palgrave Macmillan. Friedrich, C. J. (1963). Man and his government: An empirical theory of politics. McGrawHill. Gadamer, H.-G. (2014). Truth and method. Bloomsbury Academic. Gaddis, J. L. (1997). We now know: Rethinking Cold War history. Clarendon Press. Gaddis, J. L. (2005). The Cold War: A new history. Penguin Press. Gallup. (2015). Gallup poll: More Greeks approve of Russia’s leadership than EU’s. Retrieved 15 May 15, 2018, from http​://​www.​gallup.​com​/​poll​/​181460​/​greeks​​-​approve​​​​ -​russia​​​​-​leadership.​aspx.​ Gassner, F. (2011). Becoming a Western nation: German national identity and the image of Russia. In A. Maxwell (Ed.), The East–West discourse: Symbolic geography and its consequences (pp. 51–72). Peter Lang. Genevoix, M., & Trollope, D. (1973). The Greece of Karamanlis. Doric Publications. Gentile, E. (2006). Politics as religion. Princeton University Press. Gerd, L. A. (2014). Russian policy in the Orthodox East: The Patriarchate of Constan (1878–1914). De Gruyter.

References

205

Gerolymatos, A. (2003). Greek democracy on trial: From insurgency to civil war, 1943– 49. In E. Inbar (Ed.), Democracies and small wars. Taylor & Francis. Gerolymatos, A. (2016). The international civil war: Greece, 1943–1949 (pp. 122–137). Yale University Press. Giannaras, C. (2006). Orthodoxy and the West: Hellenic self-identity in the modern age. Holy Cross Orthodox Press. Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern age. Polity Press. Gillingham, J. (2003). European integration, 1950–2003: Superstate or new market economy? Cambridge University Press. Giscard d’Estaing, V. (1995, March 12). Interview with the Greek newspaper Ελευθεροτυπία. Glasser, T. L., & Salmon, C. T. (1995). Public opinion and the communication of consent. Guilford Press. Glock, H.-J. (2009). What is analytical philosophy? Cambridge University Press. Goatly, A. (2007). Washing the brain: Metaphor and hidden ideology. John Benjamins. Goldstein, J. L., & Keohane, R. O. (1993). Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change. Cornell University Press. Goldsworthy, V. (1998). Inventing Ruritania: The imperialism of the imagination. Yale University Press. Gorbatov, I. (2006). Catherine the Great and the French philosophers of the Enlightenment: Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot and Grimm. Academica Press. Gordon, P., & Senex, J. (1749). Geography anatomiz’d, or, The Geographical grammar: Being a short and exact analysis of the whole body of modern geography after a new and curious method. Printed for J. and P. Knapton. GorillaGrodd1979. (2013, August 7). Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής – Η Ελλάδα στην ΕΟΚ, Ζάππειο 28 Μαϊ 1979 [Video file]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QIf SAIRAdI.​ Gourgouris, S. (1996). Dream nation: Enlightenment, colonization, and the institution of modern Greece. Stanford University Press. Grabbe, H. (2006). The EU’s transformative power: Europeanization through conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. Graef, J., da, S. R., & Lemay-Hebert, N. (2018). Narrative, political violence, and social change. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43(6), 1–13. Gray, C. S. (1988). The geopolitics of super power. University Press of Kentuky. Gray, C. S. (1991). Geography and grand strategy. Comparative Strategy, 10(4), 311–329. Gray, C. S. (1999). Inescapable geography. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 22 161–177. Gray, C. S. (2005). In defence of the heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder hundred years on. In B. Blouet (Ed.), Global geostrategy: Mackinder and the defence of the West (pp. 17–35). Routledge.

206

References

Gray, C. S. (2006). Strategy and history: Essays on theory and practice. Routledge. Gray, C. S., & Sloan, G. R. (2003). Why geopolitics? In C. S. Gray & G. R. Sloan, Geopolitics, geography, and strategy. Frank Cass. The Great Idea. (1847, September 10). Aeon, 809–811, 10–17 September 1847, Greece is trapped by the euro. (2015, July 7). Washington Post. The Greek empire. (1853, August 18). Aeon, 1384. Greek Ministry of Finance. (2010, January 15). Update of the Hellenic Stability and Growth Programme. European Commission. Retrieved October 9, 2011, from https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/20_scps​ /2009-10/01_programme/el_2010-01-15_sp_en.pdf.​ Greeks want to stay in eurozone, two polls show. (2015, June 28). Kathimerini. Gross, E. (2011). The Europeanization of national foreign policy: Continuity and change in European crisis management. Palgrave Macmillan Guiraudon, V. (2001). European courts and foreigners’ rights: A comparative study of norms diffusion. International Migration Review, 34(4), 1088–1125. Gunther, R., Diamandouros, N. P., & Puhle, H.-J. (1995). Introduction. In R. Gunther, N. P. Diamandouros, & H.-J. Puhle (Eds.), The politics of democratic consolidation: Southern Europe in comparative perspective (pp. 1–32). Johns Hopkins University Press. Guthenke, C. (2008). Placing modern Greece: The dynamics of Romantic Hellenism, 1770–1840. Oxford University Press. Guzzini, S. (2012). The return of geopolitics in Europe? Cambridge University Press. Győri, L., Krekó, P., Milo, D., Marušiak, J., Széky, J., & Lencsés, A. (2015a). Marching towards Eurasia: The Kremlin connections of the Slovak far-right. Political Capital Institute & Social Development Institute, Budapest. Gyori, L., Kreko, P., Chryssogelos, A., Ayiomamitis, P., Takács J. (2015b). “Natural allies”: The Kremlin connections of the Greek far-right. Political Capital Institute, Budapest. Häkli, J. (1998). Discourse in the production of political space: Decolonizing the symbolism of provinces in Finland. Political Geography, 17(3), 331–363. Halikiopoulou, D., Kyriaki, N., & Vasilopoulou, S. (2012). The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism. European Journal of Political Research, 51(4), 504–539. The Balkan wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War. Routledge. Hall, S. (1992). The question of cultural identity. In S. Hall, D. Held, & A. G. McGrew (Eds.), Modernity and its futures (pp. 274–316). Polity Press. Halperin, M. (1974). Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy. Brookings Institution. Hamilakis, Y. (2007). The nation and its ruins: Antiquity, archaeology, and national imagination in Greece. Oxford University Press. Hamilton, E. (2013). . Little, Brown.

References

207

Hansen, D. G. (1997). The immutable importance of geography. Parameters, 27(1), 55–64. Harari, Y. N. (2015). Sapiens: A brief history of mankind. Vintage Books. Haraway, D. J. (1991): Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature. Routledge. Harding, S. (1991). Whose science? Whose knowledge? Cornell University Press. Harvey, D. (1990). Between space and time: Reflections on the geographical imagination. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 80(3), 418–434. Hatzivassiliou, E. (1995). Security and the European option: Greek foreign policy, 1952– 62. Journal of Contemporary History, 30(1), 187–202. Hatzivassiliou, E. (2007). Εμφύλιος πόλεμος και πρόσληψη του κόσμου : μεταλλαγές στις ελληνικές στρατηγικές αντιλήψεις στη δεκαετία του 1940 [Civil War and world perception: changes in Greek strategic perceptions in the 1940s]. In I. Mourelos & I. D. Michailidis (Eds.), Ο ελληνικός εμφύλιος πόλεμος : μια αποτίμηση : πολιτικές, ιδεολογικές, ιστοριογραφικές προεκτάσεις [The Greek Civil War: an evaluation: political, ideological, historiographical implications]. Ελληνικά Γράμματα. 85–103 Hatzivassiliou, E. (2011). Greece and the Cold War: Front-line state, 1952–1967. Routledge. Hatzopoulos, M. (2009). From resurrection to insurrection: “Sacred” myths, motifs, and symbols in the Greek War of Independence. In R. Beaton & D. Ricks (Eds.), The making of modern Greece: Nationalism, romanticism, & the uses of the past (1797–1896) (pp. 81–95). Ashgate. Heffernan, R. (2001). New Labour and Thatcherism. Palgrave Macmillan. Hellas and the West. (1846, November 9, 16). Aeon, 737, 739. Henrichs, A. (1995). Graecia Capta: Roman views of Greek culture. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, 97, 243. Henry, J. (2007). Science and the coming of Enlightenment. In M. Fitzpatrick, P. Jones, C. Knellwolf & I. McCalman (Eds.), The Enlightenment world (pp. 10–27). Routledge. Hepple, L. W. (1986). Colston symposium on “Geography and politics.” Butterworth Scientific. Heraclides, A. (2007). Hostile neighbours. Greece Turkey: The Aegean conflict. Sideris (in Greek). Heraclides, A. (2010). The Greek–Turkish conflict in the Aegean: Imagined enemies. Palgrave Macmillan. Heraclides, A., & Dialla, A. (2015). Humanitarian intervention in the long nineteenth century: Setting the precedent. Manchester University Press. Hering, G. (2006). Ta politika kommata stēn Hellada, 1821–1936 [Political parties in Greece, 1821–1936]. Morphōtiko Hidryma Ethnikēs Trapezēs. Herzfeld, M. (2002). The absent presence: Discourses of crypto-colonialism. South Atlantic Quarterly, 10 (4), 899–926. Herzfeld, M. (2013). The European crisis and cultural intimacy. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 13

208

References

Herzfeld, M. (2014). Cultural intimacy: Social poetics in the nation-state. Routledge. Hietala, T. R. (2003). Manifest design: American exceptionalism and empire. Cornell University Press. Hirschon, R. (2014). Cultural mismatches: Greek concepts of time, personal identity, and authority in the context of Europe. In K. Featherstone (Ed.), Europe in modern Greek history. Hurst. The historical truth. (1877, June 20). Rigas, 31. Hobsbawm, E. J., (2017). Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality. Cambridge University Press. Hobson, J. M. (1998). The historical sociology of the state and the state of historical sociology in international relations. Review of International Political Economy, 5,(2), 284–320. Hobson, J. M. (2012). The Eurocentric conception of world politics: Western international theory, 1760–2010. Cambridge University Press. Hobson, J. M., & Lawson, G. (2008). What is history in international relations? Millennium, 37(2), 415–435. Hofmann, T., Bjørnlund, M., & Meichanetsidis, V. (2011). The genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the state-sponsored campaign of extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor, 1912–1922 and its aftermath: history, law, memory. Aristide D. Caratzas. Holsti, O. R. (1992). Public opinion and foreign policy: Challenges to the Almond– Lippmann consensus. International Studies Quarterly, 36(4), 439. Honko, L. (1984). The problem of defining myth. In A. Dundes (Ed.), Sacred narrative: Readings in the theory of myth. University of California Press Hopf, T. (1998). The promise of constructivism in international relations theory. International Security, 23, 171–200. Hopf, T. (2002). Social construction of international politics: Identities & foreign policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999. Cornell University Press. Horkheimer M. (1982). Critical theory: selected essays. Continuum. Horrocks, G. (2014). Greek: A history of the language and its speakers. Wiley Blackwell. Hosking, G. (1997). Russia: People and empire. Harvard University Press. Hovannisian, R. G. (2008). The Armenian genocide: Cultural and ethical legacies. Transaction Publications. Howarth, D. R. (2010). Discourse. Open University Press. Hudson, V. M. (2005). Foreign policy analysis: Actor-specific theory and the ground of international relations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1), 1–30. Hunczak, T. (2000) Pan-Slavism or Pan-Russianism? In T. Hunczak & H. Kohn (Eds.), Russian imperialism from Ivan the Great to the revolution (pp. 82–105). University Press of America. Hutchison, E., & Bleiker, R. (2014). Theorizing emotions in world politics. International Theory, 6 (

References

209

Huysmans, J. (1998). Security! What do you mean? From concept to thick signifier. European Journal of International Relations, 4(2), 226–255. Hylton, P. (2000). Russell, idealism, and the emergence of analytical philosophy. Clarendon Press. Iatrides, J. O. (2005a). Reconsiderations – George F. Kennan and the birth of containment: The Greek test case. World Policy Journal, 22(3), 126. Iatrides, J. O. (2005b). Revolution or self-defense? Communist goals, strategy, and tactics in the Greek Civil War. Journal of Cold War Studies, 7(3), 3–33. Iatrides, J. O. (2016 [1972]). Revolt in Athens. Princeton University Press. Iatrides, J. O., & Rizopoulos, N. X. (2000). The international dimension of the Greek Civil War. World Policy Journal, 17(1), 87–103. Ifversen, J. (2011). Myth in the writing of European history. In S. Berger & C. Lorenz (Eds.), Nationalizing the past: Historians as nation builders in modern Europe. Palgrave. Ilinskaya, S. (2006). Η Ρωσική Λογοτεχνία στην Ελλάδα, 19ος αιώνας [Russian literature in Greece]. Ελληνικά Γράμματα. Ingram, A. (2001). Alexander Dugin: Geopolitics and neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia. Political Geography, 20(8), 1029–1051. The inhumanity of the papacy. (1852, June 8). Aeon, 1264. Ioakimidis, P. C. (1994). The EC and the Greek political system: An overview. In P. Kazakos & P. C. Ioakimidis (Eds.), Greece and EC membership evaluated (pp. 139–153.). Pinter. Ioakimidis, P. C. (1997). Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και Ελληνικό Κράτος: οι Επιπτώσεις από την Συμμετοχή στην Ενοποιητική Διαδικασία [The European Union and the Greek state: the consequences from the participation in the integration process]. Themelio. Ioakimidis, P. C. (1999). The model of foreign policy-making in Greece: Personalities versus institutions. In S. Stavridis (Ed.), The foreign policies of the European Union’s Mediterranean states and applicant countries in the 1990s (pp. 140–170). Macmillan. Ioakimidis, P. C. (2000a). The Europeanisation of Greece’s foreign policy: Progress and problems. In A. Mitsos & E. Mossialos (eds.), Contemporary Greece and Europe. (pp. 359–372). Ashgate. Ioakimidis, P. C. (2000b). The Europeanization of Greece: An overall assessment. South European Society and Politics, 5(2), 73–94. IOM (International Organization for Migration). (2015, December 8). Mediterranean arrivals, fatalities. IOM Press Release. https://www.iom.int/news/iom-monitors -mediterranean-arrivals-fatalities. Jackson, P. T. (2016). The conduct of inquiry in international relations: Philosophy of sci ence and its implications for the study of world politics. Taylor and Francis. James, W. (1995 [1907]). Pragmatism: New name for some old ways of thinking. Dover Publications.

210

References

Jarrett, M. (2014). The Congress of Vienna and its legacy: War and great power diplomacy after Napoleon. I.B. Tauris. Jeffreys, M. (1985) Adamantios Korais: Language and revolution. In R. Sussex & J. C. Eade (Eds.), Culture and nationalism in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe. Slavica Publishers. Jenkins, K., & Munslow, A. (2004). The nature of history reader. Psychology Press. Jessop, B. (2007). State power: A strategic–relational approach. Polity Press. Johnson, A. H., Johnson, R. A., & Atkinson, C. T. (1978). The age of the enlightened despot, 1660–1789. Greenwood Press. Jones, E. L. (2008). The European miracle: Environments, economies and geopolitics in the history of Europe and Asia. Cambridge University Press. Jones, E. (2010). The economic mythology of European integration. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(1), 89–109. Jones, H. (1997). “A new kind of war”: America’s global strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece. Oxford University Press. Joseph, J. (2014). The social in the global: Social theory, governmentality and global politics. Cambridge University Press Journal of Parliamentary Debates (1912–1913). Legislature ΙΘ’, Session A, Meeting 31, 21 June 1913. Juhasz, A., & Gyori, L. (2015). “I am Eurasian”: The Kremlin connections of the Hungarian far-right. Political Capital Institute and Social Development Institute, Budapest. Jung, C. G., & Kerényi, K. (1963). Essays on a science of mythology. Princeton University Press. Jurado, I., Konstantinidis, N., & Walter, S. (2015, July 20). Why Greeks voted the way they did in the bailout referendum. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog. https​://​blogs.​lse.​ac.​uk​/​europpblog​/​2015​/​07​/​20​/​why​​-​greeks​​​​-​voted​​​​-​the​​​​-​way​​​​-​they​​​​-​did​​​​ -​in​​​​-​the​​​​-​bailout​​​​-​referendum​​/.​ Just, R. (2016). Triumph of the ethnos. In E. Tonkin, M. McDonald, & M. Chapman (Eds.), History and ethnicity (pp. 71–88). Routledge Kaiser, D. A. (1999). Romanticism, aesthetics, and nationalism. Cambridge University Press. Kaiser, T. (2000). The evil empire? The debate on turkish despotism in eighteenthcentury French political culture. Journal of Modern History, 72(1), 6–34. Kakel, C. P. (2014). The American West and the Nazi East: A comparative and interpretive perspective. Palgrave Macmillan. Kalaitzidis, P. (2013). The image of the West in contemporary Greek theology. In G. E. Demacopoulos & A. Papanikolaou (Eds.), Orthodox constructions of the West. Ford ham University Press. Kaldellis, A. (2008). in Byzantium: The transformations of Greek identity and the reception of the classical tradition. Cambridge University Press.

References

211

Kanellopoulos, P. (1945). Ελλάς και Μεγάλη Βρετανία [Greece and Great Britain]. Ελληνική Φωνή. Kaplanis, T. (2014). Antique names and self-identification: Hellenes, Graikoi, and Romaloi from late Byzantium to the Greek nation-state. In D. Tziovas (Ed.), Reimagining the past: Antiquity and modern Greek culture. Oxford University Press. Kappeler, A. (2011). Spaces of entanglement. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 12(2), 477–487. Karamanlis, K. (1976, June 12). Speech in the Greek Parliament. Available in E. Kartakis (Ed.), Ο Πολιτικός Λόγος του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή [Τhe political discourse of Konstantinos Karamanlis]. Institute of Democracy: Konstantinos Karamanlis, 2004. Karamanlis, K. (1978, May 4). Speech in front of the Mayor of Aachen as a laureate of the Charlemagne prize. Available in E. Kartakis (Ed.), Ο Πολιτικός Λόγος του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή [Τhe political discourse of Konstantinos Karamanlis]. Institute of Democracy: Konstantinos Karamanlis, 2004. Karamanlis, K. (1979a, January 16). Speech in the Greek Parliament. Available in E. Kartakis (Ed.), Ο Πολιτικός Λόγος του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή [Τhe political discourse of Konstantinos Karamanlis]. Institute of Democracy: Konstantinos Karamanlis, 2004. Karamanlis, K. (1979b, May). Speech on the signing of the Greek Accession to the European Communities. Zappeion Megaron. Available in E. Kartakis (Ed.), Ο Πολιτικός Λόγος του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή [Τhe political discourse of Konstantinos Karamanlis]. Institute of Democracy: Konstantinos Karamanlis, 2004. Karamanlis, K. (1980a, January 11) Speech in the Greek Parliament. Available in E. Kartakis (Ed.), Ο Πολιτικός Λόγος του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή [Τhe political discourse of Konstantinos Karamanlis]. Institute of Democracy: Konstantinos Karamanlis, 2004. Karamanlis, K. (1980b, December 31). Interview with Le Soir. Available in E. Kartakis (Ed.), Ο Πολιτικός Λόγος του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή [Τhe political discourse of Konstantinos Karamanlis]. Institute of Democracy: Konstantinos Karamanlis, 2004. Karamanlis, K. (1982, November 25). Speech to the General Assembly of UNESCO. Available in E. Kartakis (Ed.), Ο Πολιτικός Λόγος του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή [Τhe political discourse of Konstantinos Karamanlis]. Institute of Democracy: Konstantinos Karamanlis, 2004. Karamanlis, K. (1983, September 4). Speech to the 12th International Conference of Clas sical Archaeology. Available in E. Kartakis (Ed.), Ο Πολιτικός Λόγος του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή [Τhe political discourse of Konstantinos Karamanlis]. Institute of Democracy: Konstantinos Karamanlis, 2004. Karamanlis, K. (1991, June 12). Speech during an official commemoration of 10 years from the Greek accession to the , in front of the Ambassadors of the Member States. Available in E. Kartakis (Ed.), Ο Πολιτικός Λόγος του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή

212

References

[Τhe political discourse of Konstantinos Karamanlis]. Institute of Democracy: Konstantinos Karamanlis, 2004. Karamouzi, E. (2014). Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974–1979: The second enlargement. Palgrave Macmillan. Kartakis, E. (Ed.). (2004). Ο Πολιτικός Λόγος του Κωνσταντίνου Καραμανλή. Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute of Democracy and Roes Publications. Kasaba, R. (2003). The Enlightenment, Greek civilization and the Ottoman Empire: Reflections on Thomas Hope’s “Anastasius.” Journal of Historical Sociology, 16(1), 1–21. Kassimeris, C. (2009). United States intervention in post-war Greek elections: From civil war to dictatorship. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 20(4), 679–696. Katzenstein, P. J. (1996). The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics. Columbia University Press. Kavakas, D. (2000). Greece. In I. Manners & R. G. Whitman (Eds.),The foreign policies of European Union Member States (pp. 144–161). Manchester University Press. Kazamias, A. (2014). Antiquity as Cold War propaganda: The political uses of the classical past in post-civil war Greece. In D. Tziovas (Ed.), Re-imagining the past antiquity and modern Greek culture (pp. 128–146). Oxford University Press. Kegley, C. W. (1980). The comparative study of foreign policy: Paradigm lost? Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina. Kelly, P. (2006). A critique of Critical Geopolitics. Geopolitics, 11(1), 24–53. Kazhdan, A. P., & Constable, G. (1982). People and power in Byzantium: an introduction to modern Byzantine studies. Dumbarton Oaks. Kincaid, P. (2007). Islomania? Insularity? The myth of the island in British science fiction. Extrapolation, 48(3), 462–471. Kissinger, H. (1979). The White House years. Little, Brown. Kitromilides, P. (1980). Republican aspirations in southeastern Europe in the age of the French Revolution. Consortium on Revolutionary Europe. Kitromilides, P. (1983). The Enlightenment East and West: A comparative perspective on the ideological origins of the Balkan political traditions. Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, 10(1), 51–70. Kitromilides, P. (1994). Enlightenment, nationalism, and orthodoxy: Studies in the culture and political thought of Southeastern Europe. Variorum. Kitromilides, P. M. (1996). “Balkan mentality”: History, legend, imagination. Nations and Nationalism: Journal of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, 2, 163–191. Kitromilides, P. M. (1998). On the intellectual content of Greek nationalism: Paparrigo , Byzantium and the Great Idea. In D. Ricks & P. Magdalino (Eds.), Byzantium and the modern Greek identity. Ashgate.

References

213

Kitromilides, P. (2008). Eleftherios Venizelos: The trials of statesmanship. Edinburgh University Press. Kitromilides, P. M. (2010a). Adamantios Korais and the European Enlightenment. Voltaire Foundation. Kitromilides, P. M. (2010b). The Enlightenment and the Greek cultural tradition. History of European Ideas, 36(1), 39–46. Kitromilides, P. M. (2013). Enlightenment and revolution: The making of modern Greece. Harvard University Press. Kjelleen, R. (1917). Der Staat als Lebensform. S. Hirzel. Klapsis, A. (2011). Ο ελληνικός εμφύλιος πόλεμος στο διεθνές σύστημα: ένας ιδεολογικός πόλεμος με στρατηγικό περιεχόμενο [The Greek Civil War in the international system: an ideological war with strategic content?]. In P. Ifaistos, K. Koliopoulos, & E. Hatzivassiliou (Eds.), Η έναρξη του Ψυχρού Πολέμου, 1941–1950: στρατηγικά ή ιδεολογικά αίτια (pp. 274–297). Institute for International Relations, Panteion University. Klapsis, A. (2015). An unholy alliance: The European far right and Putin’s Russia. Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. Kloppenberg, J. T. (1996). Pragmatism: An old name for some new ways of thinking? The Journal of American History, 83(1), 100–138. Knapton, E. J. (1941). The origins of the Treaty of Holy Alliance. History, 26(102), 131–140. Knill, C. (2001). The Europeanisation of national administrations: Patterns of institutional change and persistence. Cambridge University Press. Kofas, J. V. (1989). Intervention and underdevelopment: Greece during the Cold War. Pennsylvania State University Press. Kohn, H. (1950). Romanticism and the rise of German nationalism. The Review of Politics, 12(4), 443–472. Koliopoulos, G. S., & Veremis, T. (2002). Greece: The modern sequel. Hurst. Koliopoulos, G. S., & Veremis, T. (2007). Greece: The modern sequel: From 1831 to the present. Hurst. Kompsopoulos, J., & Chasoglou, J. (2014). The collapse and transformation of the Greek party system. Socialism and Democracy, 28(1), 90–112. Kōnstantopoulou, P. (2011). Documentary history of Greece, 1943–1951: Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. Papazisis. Kōnstantopoulou, P., & Theodōropoulos, V. (2003). The participation of Greece in the process towards European integration. Vol. 1, The crucial twenty years, 1948–1968. Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Service of Diplomatic & Historical Archives. Kontogeorgis, G. (1985). I Ellada sten τηςurope: I Poreia pros tin enosi kai i politiki tou Karamanli [Greece in Europe: The Path to the Union and the policies of Karaman ]. Giovanis.

214

References

τηςtogeorgis, G. L. (2003). Η πορεία της ενώσεως των Ευρωπαϊκών Λαών και η Ελλάδα. In Tτης. Konstantopoulou της), Η Συμμετοχή της Ελλάδας στην Πορεία προς την Ευρωπαϊκή Ολοκλήρωση. τομ. 1 (pp. 41–65). Υπηρεσία Διπλωματικού και Ιστορικού Αρχείου Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών. Kontos, D. (1986). Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos and the emergence of the idea of a Greek nation. University Microfilmsτηςrnational. Korais, A. (1986). Προλεγόμενα στους Αρχαίους Έλληνες Συγγραφείς και η Αυτοβιογραφία του [Prolegomena to the ancient Greek writers and his autobiography]. Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τραπέζης. Kotzias, N. (2010). Greek foreign policy in the 21st century: For a new, energetic, democratic and patriotic strategy in the era of globalization. Patakis [in Greek]. Kotzias, N. (2013). Greece, a debt colony: European empire and German hegemony. Patakis. Koubourlis, I. (2005). La formation de l’histoire nationale grecque: L’apport de Spyridon Zampelios, 1815–1881. Institut de recherches neohelleniques, Fondation nationale de la recherche scientifique. Koumarianou, A. (1971). Ho typos ston agōna, 1821–1827: Epimeleia Aikaterinē Koumarianou. Ekdotikē Hermēs. Koumas, M. (2011). Ένα υπόδειγμα παραδοσιακής ρωσικής πολιτικής: Οι κρίσεις στο βόρειο κρηπίδωμα, 1945–46 [An example of Russian traditional policy: the Northern Tier crises of 1945–46]. In P. Ifaistos, K. Koliopoulos, & E. Hatzivassiliou (Eds.), Η έναρξη του Ψυχρού Πολέμου, 1941–1950: στρατηγικά ή ιδεολογικά αίτια (pp. 178–195). Institute for International Relations, Panteion University. Koundoura, M. (2007). The Greek idea: The formation of national and transnational identities. Bloomsbury. Krasner, S. D. (1972). Are bureaucracies important? (or Allison wonderland). National Affairs. Kreko, P., & Gyori, L. (2016). Russia and the European far left. Institute of Statecraft. Kremmydas, V. (2007). Apo to Spyridōna Trikoupē sto sēmera: To Eikosiena stis nees historiographikes prosengiseis. Hidryma tēs Voulēs tōn Hellēnōn gia ton Koinovouleutismo kai tē Dēmokratia. Kremmydas, V. (2010) Η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Μεταμορφώσεις ενός εθνικού ιδεολογήματος [Τhe Great Idea: Transformations of a national ideology]. Τυπωθήτω. Krieger, L. (1975). An essay on the theory of enlightened despotism. Political Theory, 3(4). Krugman, P. R. (2015, May 25). Grexit and the morning after. New York Times, The Con science of a Liberal. Kuniholm, B. R. (2014). The origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great power conflict and diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece. Princeton University Press.

References

215

Kurki, M. (2008). Causation in international relations: Reclaiming causal analysis. Cambridge University Press. Kuus, M. (2002). Sovereignty for security? The discourse of sovereignty in Estonia. Political Geography, 21(3), 393–412. Kyriakidis, E. (1892). Ιστορία του Σύγχρονου Ελληνισμού 1832–1892 [History of contemporary Hellenism 1832–1892]. Εκδόσεις Ιγγλέση. Ladrech, R. (2010). Europeanization and national politics. Palgrave Macmillan. Laing, R. D. (2010). The divided self: An existential study in sanity and madness. Penguin. Lalaki, D. (2012). On the social construction of Hellenism: Cold War narratives of modernity, development and democracy for Greece. Journal of Historical Sociology, 25(4), 552–577. Lapid, Y., & Kratochwil, F. V. (Eds.). (1996). The return of culture and identity in IR theory. Lynne Rienner. Lappas, K. (2004). Πανεπιστήμιο και Φοιτητές στην Ελλάδα κατά τον 19ο αιώνα, Historical Archive of Greek Youth, General Secretariat of Greek Youth, 39/Center for New Greek Studies, Athens. Laruelle, M. (2017). Eurasianism and the European far right: Reshaping the Europe– Russia relationship. Lexington Books. Laruelle, M., & Gabowitsch, M. (2012). Russian Eurasianism: An ideology of empire. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Latour, B. (2004). Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern. Critical inquiry, 30(2), 225–248. Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. Oxford University Press. Lawson, G. (2012). The eternal divide? History and international relations. European Journal of International Relations, 18(2), 203–226. Lebow, R. N. (2008). Identity and international relations. International Relations, 22(4), 473–492. Lekkas, P. E. (2001). To paihnidi me ton hrono: Ethnikismos kai neoterikotêta [Playing with time: nationalism and modernity]. Ellêniká Grámmata. Leontsini, A. G. (1997). Enlightened intellectuals in modern Greek society. The European Legacy, 2(3), 400–404. Levine, L. (1914), Pan-Slavism and European politics. Political Science Quarterly, 29(4), 664–686. Lévi-Strauss, C. (1971). The naked man. Harper & Row. Lévi-Strauss, C. (1979). The structural study of myth. In T. A. Sebeok (Ed.), Myth: A sym . Indiana University Press. vi-Strauss , C. (1984). Structural anthropology. University of Chicago Press. vi-Strauss , C. (1996). The raw and the cooked. University of Chicago Press.

216

References

Levy, J. S., & Thompson, W. R. (2010). Balancing on land and at sea: Do states ally against the leading global power? International Security, 35(1), 7–43. Liakos, A. (2008). Hellenism and the making of modern Greece: Time, language, space. In K. Zacharia (Ed.), Hellenisms: Culture, identity, and ethnicity from antiquity to modernity (pp. 201–236). Ashgate. Lignadis, T. (1975). Η Ξενική Εξάρτηση κατά την Πορείαν του Νέο-Ελληνικού Κράτους (1821–1945) [Foreign dependence in the course of history of the modern Greek state, 1821–1945]. [No publishing details given] Lincoln, B. (1989). Discourse and the construction of society: Comparative studies of myth, ritual, and classification. Oxford University Press. Little, R. (2009). The balance of power in international relations: Metaphors, myths, and models. Cambridge University Press. Liulevicius, V. G. (2011). The German myth of the East: 1800 to the present. Oxford University Press. Livingstone, D. N. (1990). Geography, tradition and the Scientific Revolution: An interpretative essay. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 15(3), 359–373. Lodenius, A.-L. (2014). Right-wing extremism in Europe: Country analyses, counterstrategies and labor-market oriented exit strategies: Country analyses Sweden. In Projekt “Gegen Rechtsextremismus,” Forum Berlin (pp. 75–103). Friedrich-­EbertStiftung. Lowe, J. (1998). Britain and foreign affairs, 1815–1885: Europe and overseas. Routledge. Lundestad, G. (1998). Empire by integration: The United States and European integration, 1945–1997. Oxford University Press. Macfie, A. L. (2014). The Eastern Question 1774–1923. Routledge. Mackinder, H. J. (1904). The geographical pivot of history. The Geographical Journal, 23, 419–441. Mackridge, P. (2009). Language and national identity in Greece, 1766–1976. Oxford University Press. MacMillan, M. (2005). Peacemakers: The Paris conference of 1919 and its attempt to end war. John Murray. Madariaga, D. I. (1982). Russia in the age of Catherine the Great. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Mahan, A. T. (1917). The interest of America in sea power: A present and future. Little, Brown. Mahan, A. T. (1918). The Influence of sea power upon history, 1660–1783. Little, Brown. Makowski, K. A. (2013). Approaches to Slavic unity: Austro-Slavism, Pan-Slavism, NeoSlavism, and solidarity among the Slavs today. Instytut Historii Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza. MaκPress. (2015, July 2). Makpress ΚΩΣΤΑΣ ΚΑΡΑΜΑΝΛΗΣ ΠΑΡΕΜΒΑΣΗ ΔΗΜΟΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ. [Video File]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue =1&v=99aNbAphFq8

References

217

Makrides, V. N. (2016). Byzantium in contemporary Greece: The Neo-Orthodox current of ideas. In D. Ricks & P. Magdalino (Eds.), Byzantium and the modern Greek identity. Routledge. Mali, J., & Wokler, R. (2003). Isaiah Berlin’s counter-Enlightenment. American Philosophical Society. Malinowski, B. (2011 [1926]). Myth in primitive psychology. W.W. Norton. Malinowski, B., & Redfield, R. (2015). Magic, science and religion. Martino Publishing. Mamadouh, V. D. (1998). Geopolitics in the nineties: One flag, many meanings. GeoJournal, 46(4), 237–253. Manners, I. R. (2010). Global Europa: Mythology of the European Union in world politics. Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(1), 67–87. Marantzidis, N. (2013). The Greek Civil War (1944–1949) and the international communist system. Journal of Cold War Studies, 15(4), 25–54. Massip, R., & Druon, M. (1982). Caramanlis, un Grec hors du commun. Stock. Mavrogordatos, G. T. (2015). 1915: Ο Εθνικός Διχασμός /1915: Ho ethnikos dichasmos. Patakes. Maxwell, A. (Ed.). (2011). The East–West discourse: Symbolic geography and its consequences. Peter Lang. McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1996). Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings. Cambridge University Press. McDougall, W. A. (2003). Why geography matters … ​but is so little learned. Orbis, 47(2), 217–232. McGhee, G. C. (1997). On the frontline in the Cold War: An ambassador reports. Praeger. McInelly, B. C., & Kerry, P. E. (2018). New approaches to religion and the Enlightenment. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. McMahon, D. M. (2002). Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French counterEnlightenment and the making of modernity. Oxford University Press. McNeill, W. H. (1947). The Greek dilemma. Gollancz. McNeill, W. H. (1970). Greece: American aid in action 1947–1956. Twentieth Century Fund. McSweeney, B. (1996). Identity and security: Buzan and the Copenhagen school. Review of International Studies, 22(1), 81–93. Mead, W. R. (2014). The return of geopolitics: The revenge of the revisionist powers. Foreign Affairs, 93(3), 69–79. Meletios M. (1728). Geographia, Palaia kai Nea. Accessible from http​://​www.​lib.​uoa.​gr​ /​hellinomnimon​/.​ Mercer, J. (2014). Feeling like a state: Social emotion and identity. International Theory, 6(3), 515–535. The mercilessness [analgesia] of Europe. (1877, August 4). Rigas Merk, F. (1970). Manifest Destiny and mission in American history. Alfred A. Knopf.

218

References

Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363. Mikelis, K. (2011). Μικρές δυνάμεις, σε μεγάλα παιχνίδια; Η έτηςξη του Ψυχρού Πολέμου στην Ελλάδα, υπό το πρίσμα της ιστορίας των ιδεών [Small power in great games? The start of the Cold War in Greece, from a history of ideas perspective]. In P. Ifaistos, K. Koliopoulos, & E. Hatzivassiliou (Eds.), Η έναρξη του Ψυχρού Πολέμου, 1941–1950: στρατηγικά ή ιδεολογικά αίτια (pp. 255–273), Institute for International Relations, Panteion University. Millar, F. (2006). A Greek Roman Empire: power and belief under Theodosius II (408– 450) (Vol. 64). University of California Press. Miller, J. E. (2009). The United States and the making of modern Greece: History and power, 1950–1974. University of North Carolina Press. Milliken, J. (1999). The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods. European Journal of International Relations, 5(2), 225–254. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Directorate B. (1962, February 12). Memorandum on the position of Greece towards the political organisation of the European Communities. Minotos, M. (2002). He Europaiki Epilogi tis Kibernisis Karamanli, 1957–1959 [The European choice of Konstantinos Karamanlis government, 1957–1959]. Thesis. Minotos, M. (2008). The content of the Konstantinos G. Karamanlis archive: Its European dimension. Revista General de Información y Documentación, 18 (2008), 239– 256. Ediciones Complutense. Miskimmon, A., O’Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2015). Strategic narratives: A response. Critical Studies on Security, 3(3), 341–344. Mitchell, L. G. (2007). Panhellenism and the barbarian in archaic and classical Greece. Classical Press of Wales. Mitzen, J. (2006a). Anchoring Europe’s civilizing identity: Habits, capabilities and ontological security. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), 270–285. Mitzen, J. (2006b). Ontological security in world politics: State identity and the security dilemma. European Journal of International Relations, 12(3), 341–370. Morgenthau, H. J. (1993). Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace. Alfred A. Knopf. Morozov, V., & Rumelili, B. (2012). The external constitution of European identity: Russia and Turkey as Europe-makers. Cooperation and Conflict, 47(1), 28–48. Moschonas, G. (2001). The path of modernization, PASOK and European integration. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 3(1). Moumoutzis, K. (2011). Still fashionable yet useless? Addressing problems with research on the Europeanization of foreign policy. Journal of Common Market Studies (3), 607–629. Moustakis, D. F. (2004). The Greek–Turkish relationship and NATO. Routledge.

References

219

Moustakis, F., & Sheehan, M. (2000). Greek security policy after the Cold War. Contemporary Security Policy, 213, 95–115. Mpakopoulos, G. (1948, September 28). Member of Greek Parliament, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report on the work of the second conference of the European Parliamentary Union and the actions of the Greek delegation. Müller, M. (2008). Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the field of Critical Geopolitics: Towards discourse as language and practice. Political Geography, 27(3), 322–338. Müller, M. (2013). Text, discourse, affect and things. In K. Dodds, M. Kuus, & J. Sharp (Eds.), The Ashgate research companion to Critical Geopolitics (pp. 49–68). Ashgate. Müller, M., & Reuber, P. (2008). Empirical verve, conceptual doubts: Looking from the outside in at Critical Geopolitics. Geopolitics, 13(3), 458–472. Munslow, A. (2013) Discourse and culture: The creation of America, 1870–1920. Routledge. Munz, P. (1956). History and myth. The Philosophical Quarterly, 6(22), 1–16. Musolff, A. (2006). Metaphor scenarios in public discourse. Metaphor and Symbol, 21(1), 23–38. Musolff, A. (2016). Political metaphor analysis: Discourse and scenarios. Continuum Publishing. Myrogiannis, S. (2012). The emergence of a Greek identity (1700–1821). Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Mystakidou, A. (2004). Η Μεγάλη Ιδέα στον Τύπο του Γένους: ο Τύπος στην Ελλάδα και στην Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία, 1800–1923 / He megale idea ston typo tou genous: Ho typos sten Hellada kai sten Othomanike Autokratoria (1800–1923). Patakes. Nachmani, A. (2010). Civil war and foreign intervention in Greece: 1946–49. Journal of Contemporary History, 25(4), 489–522. Nafpliotis, A. (2013). Britain and the Greek colonels: Accommodating the Junta in the Cold War. I.B. Tauris. naftemporiki.​gr. (2015, June 26). Το διάγγελμα του Αλέξη Τσίπρα. [Video File]. https​://​ www.​youtube.​com​/​watch?​v=​ t2jZc8cicoA.​ Nancy, J.-L., & Connor, P. (2012). The inoperative community. University of Minnesota Press. The necessity. (1877, June 12). Rigas, 24.​Neumann, I. B. (1999). Uses of the other: “The East” in European identity formation. Manchester University Press. Nestoras, A. (2021). Place-identity and renewed materialism in geopolitics: towards an analytical approach?. SN Social Sciences, 1(5), 119. Nestoras, A. (2022). Analysing Geopolitical Myths: Towards a Method for Analytic Geopolitics, in: Criekemans D. (Ed.) (2022). Geopolitics and International Relations. Grounding World Politics Anew. Leiden & Boston: Brill Nijhoff, pp. 194–218. Nicolaidis, E. (1999). Was the Greek Enlightenment a vehicle for the ideas of the Scientific Revolution? Balkan Studies (1), 7–19.

220

References

Nicolopoulos, J. (1985). From Agathangelos to the Megale idea: Russia and the emergence of modern Greek nationalism. Balkan Studies, 26(1), 41–56. Ο Αγαθάγγελος :ήτοι προφητείαι περί του μέλλοντος των εθνών και ιδίως περί της Ελλάδος : οπτασία ερανισθείσα εκ παλαιών χειρογράφων μετ’ ακριβούς ερμηνείας όλων των συμβησομένων. [Agathangelos: prophesies about the future of nations and especially of Greece: a vision compiled by older manuscripts, with an exact interpretation of events] (n.d.). M. Saliveros. Obradovic, D. (1996) Policy legitimacy and the European Union. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(2), 191–221. Ólafsdóttir, H., Gudmundsdóttir, A., & Ásmundsson, G. (1997). The Europeanization of drinking habits in Iceland after the legalization of beer. European Addiction Research, 3(2), 59–66. Olkhovsky, P. (1991). The Greek Civil War: An examination of America’s first Cold War victory. Comparative Strategy, 10(3), 287–296. Onuf, N. (2003). Parsing personal identity: Self, other, agent. In F. Debrix (Ed.), Language, agency and politics in a constructed world (pp. 26–49). M.E. Sharpe. Osiander, A. (2001). Sovereignty, international relations, and the Westphalian myth. International Organization, 55(2), 251–287. Østbø, J., & Kolstø, P. (2016). The new third Rome: Readings of a Russian nationalist myth. Ibidem-Verlag. Ostrogorski, G. (2009 [1969]). History of the Byzantine state. Rutgers University Press. Ostrowski, D. G. (2007). “Moscow the third Rome” as historical ghost. In S. T. Brooks (Ed.), Byzantium, faith, and power (1261–1557): Perspectives on late Byzantine art and culture (pp. 170–179). Metropolitan Museum of Art. Page, G. (2008). Being Byzantine: Greek identity before the Ottomans. Cambridge University Press. Pagoulatos, G. (2000). Economic adjustment and financial reform: Greece’s Europeanization and the emergence of a stabilization state. Special issue on “Europeanization and the southern periphery,” South European Society and Politics, 5(2), 191–214. Pagoulatos, G., (2002). Greece, the European Union, and the 2003 presidency. Notre Europe. Pan-Slavism and Hellas. (1860, August 12). Aeon, 1910. Papaderos, A. (1970). Metakenosis: Griechenlands kulturelle Herausforderung durch d. Aufklärung in d. Sicht d. Korais u.d. Oikonomos. Hain. Papandreou, G. (2010, April 23). Ο Πρωθυπουργός [Official YouTube channel of the Greek Prime Minister.] Δήλωση Πρωθυπουργού από Καστελόριζο [Video File]. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=4pC_d1M82uQ Papanoutsos, E. P. (1956). Neoellēnikē philosophia [New Hellenic philosophy]. I.N. Zacharopoulos.

References

221

Paparrigopoulos, K. (1843). Περί της Εποικίσεως Σλαβικών τινών Φύλων εις την Πελοπόννησον / Peri tis epoikiseos Slavikon tinon fylon eis tin Peloponnison. Antoniadou. Paparrigopoulos, K. (1865). Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους: από τον Αρχαιοτάτων Χρόνων μέχρι των Νεοτέρων / Istoria tou Ellinikou ethnous: Apo ton arhaiotaton chronon mechri ton neoteron, charin ton pollon. Passari. Paparrigopoulos, K. (1878). Histoire de la civilisation hellénique, par M.C. Paparrigopoulo. Hachette. Papathanassopoulos, S., & Giannouli, I. (2019). Media coverage of Greece’s September 2015 election campaign: Framing and interpreting the issues at stake. In S. Salgado (Ed.), Mediated campaigns and populism in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. Parker, G. (1983). A Political Geography of Community Europe. Butterworths. Patterson, M., & Monroe, K. R. (1998). Narrative in political science. Annual Review of Political Science, 1(1), 315–331. Peckham, R. S. (2000). Map mania: Nationalism and the politics of place in Greece, 1870–1922. Political Geography, 19(1), 77–95. Pedaliu, E. G. H. (2011). “A discordant note”: NATO and the Greek junta, 1967–1974. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22(1), 101–120. Pelt, M. (2006). Tying Greece to the West: US–West German–Greek relations 1949–1974. Museum Tusculanum Press. Pesmazoglou, S. (2014). “Europe”, “Turkey” and Greek self-identity: Antinomic mutual perceptions. In K. Featherstone (Ed.), Europe in modern Greek history. Hurst. Petmezas, S. D. (2009). From privileged outcasts to power players: The “romantic” redefinition of the Hellenic nation in the mid-nineteenth century. In R. Beaton & D. Ricks (Eds.), The making of modern Greece: Nationalism, romanticism, & the uses of the past (1797–1896). Ashgate. Petropulos, J. A. (1968). Politics and statecraft in the kingdom of Greece, 1833–1843. Princeton University Press. Petrovich, M. B. (1985). The emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856–1870. Greenwood Press. Phillips, L. (1998). Hegemony and political discourse: The lasting impact of Thatcherism. Sociology, 32(4), 847–867. Pipinelis, P. (1948, January 24). Permanent Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Communication to the Embassies of London, Washington, Paris and Rome [A.Π. 18.184]. Pipinelis, P. (1949, April 4). Speech in front of the Greek Association for European Cooperation. Δελτίο Πληροφοριών Ελληνικού Συνδέσμου Ευρωπαϊκής Συνεργασίας, τομ. Pizzo, D. (2012). Greco‐Turkish War (1897). In G. Martel (Ed.), The encyclopedia of war. Wiley-Blackwell. Ploumidis, G. S. (2013). From the old to the new greater Greece: The bellicose evolution of the Greek Great Idea, 1912–13. Etudes Balkaniques, 49

222

References

Poguntke, T. (2008). The Europeanization of national political parties: Power and organizational adaptation. Routledge. Polletta, F., & Callahan, J. (2017). Deep stories, nostalgia narratives, and fake news: Storytelling in the Trump era. American Journal of Cultural Sociology, 5(3), 392–408. Porter, R., & Teich, M. (1988). Romanticism in national context. Cambridge University Press. Porter, R., & Teich, M. (2007). The Enlightenment in national context. Cambridge University Press. The present and Hellas. (1860, July 27). Aeon, 1903. The present position of the Eastern Question. (1876, January 23). Helios, 31. Price, L., & Martin, L. (2018). Introduction to the special issue: Applied critical realism in the social sciences. Journal of Critical Realism, 17(2), 89–96. Prime Minister of Greece. (2015a, July 1). Message of the Prime Minister concerning the call for a referendum. Official YouTube channel of the Prime Minister of Greece. [Video File] https​://​www.​youtube.​com​/w ​ atch?​time_​continue​=1&​v​=wlrkjqCiIe0.​ Prime Minister of Greece. (2015b, August 7). Statement of the Prime Minister of Greece on the issue of the refugee inflow. http://www.primeminister.gov.gr/2015 /08/07/13931. Prott, V. (2016). The politics of self-determination: Remaking territories and national identities in Europe, 1917–1923. Oxford University Press. Prousis, T. C. (1994). Russian society and the Greek revolution. Northern Illinois Univer­ sity Press. Psalidas A. (1791). Vera Felicitas – Alithis Evdaimonia, Vol. 1. Available online from http://bit.ly/2Eo4Jqb. Psalidas A. (1795), Kalokinimata, iti Enghiridion kata Fthonoy ke kata tis Logikis tou Evgeniou. Putnam, H. (1996). Pragmatism: An open question. Blackwell. Pyrros, D. (1818). Geographia Methodiki. Available online from http://www.lib.uoa.gr /hellinomnimon/. Quataert, D. (2013). The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922. Cambrige University Press. Radaelli, C. M., & Exadaktylos, T. (2012). Research design in European studies: Establishing causality in Europeanization. Palgrave Macmillan. Radin, P. (1950). The basic myth of the North American Indians. Rhein-Verlag. The rage of the papacy. (1853, April 11). Aeon, 1348. Ragsdale H. (1988). Evaluating the traditions of Russian aggression: Catherine II and the Greek project. The Slavonic and East European Review, 66, 91–117. Rasku, M. (2007). On the border of East and West: Greek geopolitical narratives. University of Jyväskylä Ratzel, F. (1903 [1897]). Politische geographie. Oldenbourg. Raymond, G. (1995). Malraux: Politics and the temptation of myth . Avebury.

References

223

Regarding the history of the Turks. (1877, June 21). Rigas, 32. Redepenning, M. (2007). Die Moral der Critical Geopolitics. Geographische Zeitschrift, 95, 91–104. Reed, J. M., Kryštufek, B., & Eastwood, W. J. (2004). The physical geography of the Balkans and nomenclature of place names. In H. I. Griffiths, B. Kryštufek, & J. M. Reed (Eds.), Balkan biodiversity (pp. 9–22). Springer. Reinhart, C. M., Trebesch, C., & National Bureau of Economic Research. (2015). The pitfalls of external dependence: Greece, 1829–2015. Centre for Economic Policy Research. Reuber, P. (2000). Conflict studies and Critical Geopolitics: Theoretical concepts and recent research in Political Geography. GeoJournal, 50(1), 37–43. Reza, G. A. (2004). El Congreso Anfictionico de Panama (1826). Determinaciones hispanoamericanas de su desenlace. Revista De Historia De América, 134, 185. Reza, G. A. (2006). El congreso anfictíonico de Panamá una hipótesis complementaria sobre el fracaso del primer ensayo de integración altinoamericana. Red Araucaria. Richardson, J. E. (2009). Analysing newspapers: An approach from critical discourse analysis. Palgrave Macmillan. Richter, H. A. (2016). The Greek–Turkish war, 1919–1922. Verlag Franz. Ricks, D., & Magdalino, P. (Eds.). (2016). Byzantium and the modern Greek identity. Routledge. Ricoeur, P. (2010). Time and narrative, Vol. 3. University of Chicago Press. Rise up. (1877, June 16). Rigas, 28. Risse-Kappen, T. (1991). Public opinion, domestic structure, and foreign policy in liberal democracies. World Politics, 43(4), 479–512. Rizas, S. (2008a). Atlanticism and Europeanism in Greek foreign and security policy in the 1970s. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 8(1), 51–66. Rizas, S. (2008b). Η Ελληνική πολιτική μετά τον Εμφύλιο πόλεμο. Κοινοβουλευτισμός και Δικτατορί. [Greek politics after the civil war: parliamentarism and dictatorship]. Kastaniotis. Rizas, S. (2009). Managing a conflict between allies: United States policy towards Greece and Turkey in relation to the Aegean dispute, 1974–76: Cold War in the Aegean. Cold War History, 9(3), 367–387. Roselle, L., Miskimmon, A., & O’Loughlin, B. (2014). Strategic narrative: A new means to understand soft power. Media, War & Conflict, 7(1), 71–74. Roudometof, V. (1998). From Rum millet to Greek nation: Enlightenment, secularization, and national identity in Ottoman Balkan society, 1453–1821. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 16(1), 11–48. Rumelili, B. (2016). Conflict resolution and ontological security: Peace anxieties. Rout ledge. Sabine, G. H., & Thorson, T. L. (1973). A history of political theory. Dryden Press. Said, E. (1979). Orientalism. Vintage.

224

References

Sakkas, J. (2004). The Greek dictatorship, the USA and the Arabs, 1967–1974. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 6(3), 245–257. Samaras: Outside or inside Europe, the essential question of the referendum. (2015, June 27). Kathimerini. https​://​www.​kath—​erini.​gr​/​821080​/​article​/​­epikairothta​/​politikh​ /​samaras​​-​-​e3w​​​​-​h​​-​mesa​​​​-​sthn​​​​-​eyrwph​​​​-​to​​​​-​oysiastiko​​​​-​erwthma​​​​-​sto​​​​-​dhmoyhfisma.​ Sarasohn, L. T. (2006). The Scientific Revolution. Houghton Mifflin. Saul, N. E. (1970). Russia and the Mediterranean: 1797–1807. University of Chicago Press. Saul, N. (2009). The Cambridge companion to German romanticism. (Cambridge companion to German Romanticism.) Cambridge University Press. Sayer, A. (2000). Realism and social science. SAGE. Schleiermacher, F. (1998). Hermeneutics and criticism and other writings. Cambridge University Press. Schmidt, V. (2002). Europeanization and the mechanics of economic policy adjustment. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6), 894–912. Schmidt, V. A. (1997). Discourse and (dis) integration in Europe: The cases of France, Germany and Great Britain. Daedalus, 167–198. Schöpflin, G. (1997). The functions of myth and a taxonomy of myths. In G. Hosking & G. Schöpflin (Eds.), The myths of nationhood. Hurst. Schöpflin, G., & Hosking, G. (2013). Myths and nationhood. Taylor and Francis. Scott, H. M. (1994). Enlightened absolutism: Reform and reformers in later-eighteenthcentury Europe. Macmillan Education. Scopetea, E. (2003). The Balkans and the notion of the “crossroads between East and West.” In D. Tziovas (Ed.), Greece and the Balkans: Identities, perceptions and cultural encounters since the Enlightenment (pp. 171–176). Ashgate Seferis, G. (1986). Μέρες Δ΄ 1 Γενάρη – 31 Δεκέμβρη 1944. Ikaros. Semino, E. (2008). Metaphor in discourse. Cambridge University Press. Seton-Watson, H. (2017). The decline of Imperial Russia: 1855–1914. Routledge. Sfikas, T. D. (2005). The Greek Civil War. In M. P. Leffler & D. S. Painter (Eds.), Origins of the Cold War: An international history (pp. 134–152). Routledge. Shapin, S. (2018). The Scientific Revolution. University of Chicago Press. Shapiro, M. J. (1984). Language and politics. Blackwell. Sharp, J. P. (2000). Remasculinising geo-politics? Comments on Gearoid O’Tuathail’s Critical Geopolitics. Political Geography, 19(3), 361–364. Sharp, J. P. (2001). Condensing the Cold War: Reader’s digest and American identity. University of Minnesota Press. Shenhav, S. R. (2006). Political narratives and political reality. International Political Science Review, 27(3), 245–262. Sidorov, D. (2006). Post-imperial third Romes: Resurrections of a Russian Orthodox geopolitical metaphor. Geopolitics (2), 317–347.

References

225

Skopetea, E. (1988). To “Protupo basileio” kai hē Megalē Idea: Opseis tou ethnikou problēmatos sten̄ Hellada (1830–1880) [The “Model Kingdom” and the Great Idea, views of the national problem in Greece (1830–1880)]. Ekdoseis Polutupo. Slotkin, R. (1998). The fatal environment: The myth of the frontier in the age of industrialization, 1800–1890. University of Oklahoma Press. Slotkin, R. (2006). Regeneration through violence: The mythology of the American frontier, 1600–1860. University of Oklahoma Press. Slotkin, R. (2008). Gunfighter nation: The myth of the frontier in twentieth-century America. University of Oklahoma Press. Smith, A. D. (1994). The problem of national identity: Ancient, medieval and modern? Ethnic and Racial Studies, 17, 375–399. Smith, A. D. (1999). Myths and the memories of the nation. Oxford University Press. Smith, A. D. (2008). The ethnic origins of nations. Blackwell. Smith, H. N. (2009). Virgin land: The American West as symbol and myth. Harvard University Press. Smith, J. (2001). Cultural aspects of Europeanization: The case of the Scottish Office. Public Administration, 79(1), 147–165. Smith, M. L. (2009), Ionian vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919–1922, with a new introduction. Hurst. Smith, N. (2000). Is a Critical Geopolitics possible? Foucault, class and the vision thing. Political Geography, 19(3), 365–371. Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. International Social Movement Research, 1(1), 197–217. Soldatos, C. (2003). Σπυρίδων Ι. Ζαμπέλιος (1815–1881): Ο Ιστορικός του Βυζαντινού Ελληνισμού, ο Θεμελιωτής της Ιστοριογραφίας, ο Αρχιτέκτονας της Διαχρονικής Ενότητας του Ελληνισμού/ Spyridon I. Zampelios (1815–1881): Ho historikos tou Vyzantinou Hellenismou, ho themeliotes tes neoellenikes historiographias, ho architektonas tes diachronikes henotetas tes Hellenikes historias. Poreia. Sorel, G., & Jennings, J. (2009). Reflections on violence. Cambridge University Press. Soroka, S. N. (2003). Media, public opinion, and foreign policy. Press Politics, 8(1). Sparke, M. (1998). From geopolitics to geoeconomics: Transnational state effects in the borderlands. Geopolitics, 3(2), 62–98. Sparke, M. (2000). Graphing the geo in geo-political: Critical Geopolitics and the revisioning of responsibility. Political Geography, 19(3), 373–380. Spourdalakis, M. (2014). The miraculous rise of the “phenomenon SYRIZA.” International Critical Thought, 4(3), 354–366. Spykman, N. J. (1938). Geography and foreign policy. American Political Science Review (2), 213–236.

226

References

Spykman, N. J. (1942). America’s strategy in world politics: The United States and the balance of power. Harcourt, Brace. Spykman, N. J. (1944). The geography of the peace. Harcourt, Brace. Sreedharan, E. (2004). A textbook of historiography, 500 B.C. to A.D. 2000. Orient Longman. Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2014). Left-wing populism in the European periphery: The case of SYRIZA. Journal of Political Ideologies, 19(2), 119–142. Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2019). The populism/anti-populism frontier and its mediation in crisis-ridden Greece: From discursive divide to emerging cleavage? European Political Science, 18(1), 37–52. Stavrakis, P. J. (1989). Moscow and Greek communism, 1944–1949. Cornell University Press. Stavrianos, L. S. (1974). The influence of the West on the Balkans. In C. Jelavich & B. Jelavich (Eds.), The Balkans in transition: Essays on the development of Balkan life and politics since the eighteenth century. Archon Books. Stavridi-Patrikiou, R. (2003). Ιδεολογικές διαδρομές. Πολιτική γλώσσα και κοινωνία 1871– 1909 [Ideological paths: political discourse and society 1871–1909]. In V. Panagiotopoulos (Ed.), Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού, 1770–2000 [History of modern Hellenism, 1770–2000] (pp. 171–186). τ. 5ος, Αθήνα, Ελληνικά Γράμματα. Steele, B. J. (2014). Ontological security in international relations: Self-identity and the IR state. Routledge. Stefanidis, I. D. (1985). The Greek pro-European movement (1947–1967). Hellenic Review of International Affairs, 5(6), 234–270. Stefanidis, I. D. (2001). Pressure groups and Greek foreign policy, 1945–67. Hellenic Observatory, London School of Economics & Political Sciences. Steiner, G. (1990). In Bluebeard’s castle: Some notes towards the redefinition of culture. Yale University Press. Steinmetz, George. (1998). Critical realism and historical sociology. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 40(1), 170–186. Stephanidēs, G. D. (2007). Stirring the Greek nation: Political culture, irredentism and anti-Americanism in post-war Greece, 1945–1967. Ashgate. Stephanson, A. (2000). Commentary on Gearoid O’Tuathail’s Critical Geopolitics. Political Geography, 19(3), 381–383. Stets, J. E., & Burke, P. J. (2000). Identity theory and social identity theory. Social Psychology Quarterly, 63(3), 224–237. Stivachtis, Y. A. (2002). Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean region: Security considerations, the Cyprus imperative and the EU option. In T. Diez (Ed.), The European Union and the Cyprus conflict: Modern conflict, postmodern union (pp. 34–53). Manchester University Press. Stoianovich, T. (1992). Between East and West: The Balkan and Mediterranean worlds A.D. Caratzas.

References

227

Strath, B. (2005). Methodological and substantive remarks on myth, memory and history in the construction of a European community. German Law Journal, 6(2), 255–271. Suganami, H. (2015). Narrative explanation and international relations: Back to basics. Historical International Relations, 1, 257–284. Suslov, M. D. (2015). “Holy Rus”: The geopolitical imagination in the contemporary Russian Orthodox Church. Russian Social Science Review, 56(3), 43–62. Suslov, M. (2018). “Russian world” concept: Post-Soviet geopolitical ideology and the logic of “spheres of influence.” Geopolitics, 23(2), 330–353. Svolopoulos, K. D. (2000). H Εξωτερική Πολιτική του Χαρίλαου Τρικούπη: Διαχρονική Θεώρηση [The foreign policy of Harliaos Trikoupis: a timeless theoretical perspective]. In K. Aroni-Tsichli & L. Tricha (Eds.), Ο Χαρίλαος Τρικούπης και η Εποχή του [Harilaos Trikoupis and his time]. τηςPapazisis. Svolopoulos, K. D. (2006). H Γέννηση της Ιστορίας του Νέου Ελληνισμού / Hē genēsē tēs historias tou neou Hellēnismou. Vivliopoleion tes “Hestias,” I.D. Kollarou & Sias. Svolopoulos, K. D. (2014a). Ελληνική Εξωτερική πολιτική, 1830–1981 [Greek foreign policy, 1830–1981]. Βιβλιοπωλείο της Εστίας. Svolopoulos, K. (2014b). Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος και Διεθνής Κοινωνία, 1898–1930 [Eleftherios Venizelos and the International Society, 1898–1930]. In N. Padakis (Ed.), Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος: Η Διαμόρφωση της Πολιτικής Σκέψης του, Ιδεολογικές Αφετηρίες και Επιρροές [Eleftherios Venizelos: the shaping of his political thought, ideological beginnings and influences]. National Research Institute Eleftherios Venizelos. Sv oronos, N. G. (1980 [1953]). Histoire de la Grτηςoderne: Nicolas Svoronos. Presses Universitaires de France. Svoroonos, N. G., (2005). To hellēniko ethnos: Genesē kai diamorphōsē tou Neou Hellēnismou [Hellenic nation: the birth and development of Newτηςllenism]. Ekdoseis Polis. Svoronos, N. G. (2007). Επισκόπηση της Νεοελληνικής Ιστορίας. Θεμέλιo. Svoronos, N. G., Asdrachas, S., & Vagenas, N. (2004). To hellēniko ethnos: Genesē kai diamorphōsē tou neou hellēnismou. Polis. SYRIZA. (2015a). Political declaration of the SYRIZA inaugural congress. Retrieved June 22, 2017, from http​://​www.​syriza.​gr​/​pdfs​/​idrytiki_​diakiriksi_​syriza.​pdf.​ SYRIZA (2015b). Political declaration on the migration crisis. Retrieved June 22, 2017, from http​://​www.​syriza.​gr​/​theseis​/​pros_​diavoulefsi_​metanasteytiko.​pdf.​ Tannenwald, N. (2015). Process tracing and security studies. Security Studies, 24(2), 219–227. Tatsios, T. G. (1984). The Megali idea and the Greek–Turkish war of 1897: The impact of the Cretan problem on Greek irredentism, 1866–1897. Columbia University Press (East European Monographs). Teschke, B. (2003). The myth of 1648: Class, geopolitics, and the making of modern inter national relations. Verso.

228

References

Theodorakis, S. (2015, June 27). Political declarations. TVXS. https://tvxs.gr/news /ellada/theodorakis-potami-kalei-ton-elliniko-lao-se-antistasi. Theotokis N. (1804). Stoicheia Geographias. Available from http​://​www.​lib.​uoa.​gr​ /​­hellinomnimon​/.​ Ting, H. (2008). Social construction of nation: A theoretical exploration. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 14(3), 453–482. Tismaneanu, V. (2009). Fantasies of salvation: Democracy, nationalism, & myth in postcommunist Europe. Princeton University Press. Todorov, T. (1971). The two principles of narrative. Diacritics, 1(1), 37–44. Todorova, M. N. (2009). Imagining the Balkans. Oxford University Press. Tolias, G. (2001). Totius Graecia: Nicolaos Sophianos’s map of Greece and the transformations of Hellenism. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 19, 1–22. Tolias, G. (2006). Nikolaos Sophianos’s Totius_ Graeciae_ Descriptio: The resources, diffusion and function of a sixteenth‐century antiquarian map of Greece. Imago Mundi, 58(2), 150–182. http​://​doi.​org​/1​ 0.​1080​/0​ 3085690600687214.​ Tolias, G. (2010). Maps printed in Greek during the Age of Enlightenment, 1665–1820. E – Perimetron, 5(1), 1–48. Tolias, G., Samourka, M., Navari, L., & Ethnikon Hidryma Ereunōn (Greece). (2011). Mapping Greece, 1420–1800: A history: maps in the Margarita Samourkas Collection. Oak Knoll Press. ToVima. (2015, June 27). Venizelos: The political scam transforms into a referendum. https://www.tovima.gr/2015/06/27/politics/benizelos-i-politiki-apati-metekselis setai-twra-se-praksikopima/. ToVima. (2016, December 14). Voutsis from Moscow: For us Russia is Europe [in Greek]. Townsend, E. A. (1976). El Congreso Anfictiónico de Panamá y su significación actual para los países latinoamericanos. Universidad Nacional Federico Villarreal, Programa Académico de Educación, Departamento de Ciencias Histórico Sociales. Trencsanyi, B. A., & Kopecek, M. (2006). National romanticism: Formation of national movements. Central European University Press. Tricha, L. (2009). Charílaos Trikoúpēs: Mía biographikḗ periḗgēsē. Ekdóseis Kápon. Tricha, L., & Detournay, B. (2001). O Charilaos Trikupēs kai ta dēmosia erga =: Charilaos Trikoupis et les travaux publics. Kapon. Tsakonas, P., & Tournikiotis, A. (2003). Greece’s elusive quest for security providers: The “expectations–reality gap.” Security Dialogue, 34(3), 301–314. Tsardanidis, C., & Stavridis, S. (2005). The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy: A critical appraisal. Journal of European Integration, 27(2), 217–239. Tsardanidis, C., & Stavridis, S. (2011). Greece: From special case to limited Europeanization. In C. Hill & R. Y-P. Wong (Eds.), National and European foreign policies: Towards Europeanization (pp. 111–130) Routledge.

References

229

Tsigakou, F. M. (1981). The discovery of Greece: Travellers and painters of the Romantic era. Thames and Hudson. Tsipras, A. (2015, September 14). Political declarations. Augi. https​://​www.​youtube.​com​ /​watch?​v=​ 9rumzg1Rv5c.​ Tsirbas, Y. (2016). The January 2015 parliamentary election in Greece: Government change, partial punishment and hesitant stabilisation. South European Society and Politics, 21(4), 407–426. Tsirbas, Y., & Sotiropoulos, D. A. (2016). Europe at the epicenter of national politics: The attitudes of Greek political elites towards the European Union and the economic crisis. Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung, 41, 86–105. Tsoukalas, C. (1999). European modernity and Greek national identity. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online, 1(1), 7–14. Tsoukalas, C. (2002). Irony of symbolic reciprocities: The Greek meaning of “Europe” as a historical inversion of the European meaning of “Greece.” In M. Malmborg & B. Stråth (Eds.), The meaning of Europe: Variety and contention within and among nations. Berg. Tsoukalis, L. (2019). Greece in the EU: Domestic reform coalitions, external constraints and high politics. In A. Mitsos & E. Mossialos (Eds.), Contemporary Greece and Europe. Routledge. Tsoukalis, L. (2004). The future of Greece in the European Union. In T. A. Couloumbis, T. C. Kariotis, & F. Bellou (Eds.), Greece in the twentieth century (pp. 319–329). Frank Cass. Tsygankov, A. P. (2003). Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia’s geopolitical thinking after the Soviet break-up. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36(1). Tuathail, G. Ó. (1989). Critical Geopolitics: The social construction of state and place in the practice of statecraft. Doctoral dissertation, Syracuse University, New York. Tuathail, G. Ó. (1994a). The critical reading/writing of geopolitics: Re-reading/­writing Wittfogel, Bowman and Lacoste. Progress in Human Geography, 18(3), 313–332. Tuathail, G. Ó. (1994b). (Dis) placing geopolitics: Writing on the maps of global politics. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 12(5), 525–546. Top of FormTuathail, G. Ó. (1996). Critical Geopolitics: The politics of writing global space. Routledge. Tuathail, G. Ó. (1998). Postmodern Geopolitics? The modern geopolitical imagination and beyond. In G. Ó. Tuathail & S. Dalby (Eds.), Rethinking geopolitics (pp. 16–38). Routledge. Tuathail, G. Ó. (2000). A geopolitical discourse with Robert McNamara. Geopolitics, 5(1), 129–144. Tuathail, G. Ó. (2003). Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and risk security. In C. S. Gray & G. R. Sloan (Eds.), Geopolitics, geography, and strategy Frank Cass.

230

References

Tuathail, G. Ó., & Agnew, J. (1992). Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy. Political Geography, 11(2), 190–204. Tuathail, G. Ó., & Dalby, S. (Eds.). (1998). Rethinking geopolitics. Routledge. Tudor, H. (1973). Political myth. Macmillan. Tuveson, E. L. (1980). Redeemer nation: The idea of America’s millennial role. University of Chicago Press. Tziovas, D. (2014). Re-imagining the past: Antiquity and modern Greek culture. Oxford University Press. Tzokas, S. (1999). Ho Charilaos Trikoupēs kai hē synkrotēsē tou neoellēnikou kratous: Odoiporiko ston 19o ai. Themélio. Tzokas, S. (2002). O Elevtherios Venizelos ke to encheirima tou astikou eksynchronismou 1928–1932: I oikodomisi tou astikou kratous [Eleftherios Venizelos and the project of civic modernization]. Themelio. Tzouma, A. (2007). Hekato chronia nostalgias: To autoviographiko aphēgēma Ethnos [A hundred years of nostalgia: the autobiographic narration of the nation]. Metaichmio. Unwin, T. (1992). The place of geography. John Wiley & Sons. Valinakis, Y. (1994), Security policy. In P. Kazakos & P. Ioakimidis (Eds.), Greece and EC membership evaluated (pp. 199–214). Pinter. Van Kisten, J. (1994). Kings of the Hellenes: The Greek kings, 1863–1974. Alan Sutton. Vandenberghe, F. (2015). What´s critical about critical realism? Routledge. Varsori, A. (2008). The EEC and Greece from the military coup to the transition to democracy 1967–1975. In K. Svolopoulos, K. E. Botsiou, & E. Hatzivassiliou (Eds.), Konstantinos Karamanlis in the twentieth century, Vol. 1 (pp. 317–338). Konstantinos C. Karamanlis Foundation. Varsori, A. (2009). Crisis and stabilization in Southern Europe during the 1970s: Western strategy, European instruments. Journal of European Integration History, 15(1). Vaughan–Williams, N. (2015). International relations and the problem of history. Historical International Relations, 1, 215–233. Veremis, T. (1982). Greek security: Issues and politics. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Verney, S. (2007). Justifying the second enlargement: Promoting interests, consolidating democracy, or returning to the roots? In H. Sjursen (Ed.), Questioning EU enlargement: Europe in search of identity (pp. 19–43). Routledge. Verney, S. (2011). An exceptional case? Party and popular Euroscepticism in Greece, 1959–2009. South European Society and Politics, 16(1), 51–79. Verney, S. (2013). Euroscepticism in Southern Europe: A diachronic perspective. Taylor and Francis. Verney, S. (2014). “Broken and can’t be fixed”: The impact of the economic crisis on the Greek party system. International Spectator, 49

References

231

Vignoles, V. L., Schwartz, S. J., & Luyckx, K. (2011). Introduction: Toward an integrative view of identity. In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L. Vignoles (Eds.), Handbook of identity theory and research (pp. 1–27). Springer. Vlavianós, C. (1992). Greece, 1941–49: From resistance to civil war: The strategy of the Greek communist party. Macmillan. von Handy. A. (2002). The modern construction of myth. Indiana University Press. von Maurer, G. L. (1976 [1832]). Treatise on the Greek people, their institutions and their laws since the beginning of the revolution. Voulgaris, E. (1770). Eisigisis tis Aftokratorikis Megaleiotitos Aikaterinas B’. Voulgaris, E. (1854 [1772]). Stochasmoi eis tous Parontas Krisimous Kairous tou Othomanikou Kratous. Voulgaris, I., & Nikolakopoulos, I. (2014). Εισαγωγή: ο Εκλογικός Σεισμός του 2012 [Introduction: the electoral earthquake of 2012]. In I. Voulgaris & I. Nikolakopoulos (Eds.), 2012: O Διπλός Εκλογικός Σεισμός [2012: the double earthquake elections]. Themelio. Vries, P. (2013). Escaping poverty: The origins of modern economic growth. V & R Unipress. Walt, S. M. (1985). Alliance formation and the balance of world power. International Security, 9(4), 3–43. Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international relations. Addison-Wesley. Weber, C. (2014). International relations theory: A critical introduction. Routledge. Weinberg, A. K. (1999). Manifest destiny: A study of nationalist expansionism in American history. Quadrangle Books. Wendt, A. (1994). Collective identity formation and the international state. American Political Science Review, 8(2), 384–396. Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press Westad, O. A. (2013). Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, interpretations, theory. Routledge. White, H. (1987). The content of the form: Narrative discourse and historical representation. Johns Hopkins University Press. Wight, C. (2008). Agents, structures and international relations: Politics as ontology. Cambridge University Press. Williams, P. (1992). Colonial discourse/postcolonial theory. The Year’s Work in Critical and Cultural Theory, 2(1), 138–153. Wilson, A. (1979). The Aegean dispute. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Wilson, P. (1998). The myth of the “First Great Debate.” Review of International Studies, 24, 1–16. Winrow, G. (1993). Where East meets West: Turkey and the Balkans. Alliance Publishers. Withers, C. W. J. (2005). Geography, science, and the Scientific Revolution. In D. N. Liv ingstone & C. W. J. Withers (Eds.), Geography and revolution (pp. 75–105). University of Chicago Press.

232

References

Withers, C. W. J. (2007). Placing the Enlightenment: Thinking geographically about the age of reason. University of Chicago Press. Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (2016). Methods of critical discourse analysis. SAGE. Wolf, H. (1568). Corpus Historiae Byzantinae. Francofurtum. Wolff, L. (2010). Inventing Eastern Europe: The map of civilization on the mind of the Enlightenment. Stanford University Press. Wolkersdorfer, G. (1999). Karl Haushofer and geopolitics: The history of a German mythos. Geopolitics, 4(3), 145–160. Wong, R. Y.-P., & Hill, C. (2012). National and European foreign policy: Towards Europeanization. Routledge. Woodhouse, C. M. (1952). The Greek War of Independence. Hutchinson’s University Library. Woodhouse, C. M. (1969). The Battle of Navarino. Dufour. Woodhouse, C. M. (1982). Karamanlis: The restorer of Greek democracy. Oxford University Press. Woodhouse, C. M. (2002 [1976]). The struggle for Greece, 1941–9. Hurst. Woodhouse, C. M., & Clogg, R. (2003). The struggle for Greece: 1941–1949. I.R. Dee. Yanoulopoulos, Y. (1999). Η Ευγενής μας Τύφλωσις … ​: Εξωτερική Πολιτική και “Εθνικά Θέματα” από την ήττα του 1897 έως τη Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή [Our noble blindness …​ : foreign policy and “national issues” from the 1897 defeat to the Asia Minor catastrophe]. Βιβλιόραμα. Yavuz, M. H., & Sluglett, P. (2011). War and diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877– 1878 and the Treaty of Berlin. University of Utah Press. Zacharia, K. (Ed.). (2008). Hellenisms: Culture, identity, and ethnicity from antiquity to modernity. Ashgate. Zakythenos, D. A. (1976). The making of modern Greece: From Byzantium to independence. Blackwell. Zamarias, H. (1954). Greek Ambassador in Brussels to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. [Α. Π. 595/Β/Ι]. Zannas, P. A. (1978). Ελευθέριος Κ. Βενιζέλος: Ημερολόγιο, Αναμνήσεις, Μαρτυρίες, Αλληλογραφία / Eleutherios K. Venizelos: Hemerologio, anamneseis, martyries, allelographia. Hermes. Zehfuss, M. (2001). Constructivism and identity: A dangerous liaison. European Journal of International Relations, 7(3), 315–348. Zinovia, L. (2015). Greek Cold War anti-Americanism in perspective, 1947–1989. Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 13 Zorin, A. L., & Levitt, M. C. (2014). By fables alone: Literature and state ideology in lateeighteenth–early-nineteenth-century Russia. Academic Studies Press.

Index Adaptability 174, 178 Affinity vii, 93, 104, 136, 169, 174, 193 Agnew, John 18, 43, 44, 58, 175, 195, 230 anti-Americanism 145, 148, 226, 232 Asia 2, 76, 79, 83, 86, 93–95, 103, 124, 139, 141, 150, 181, 192, 196, 208, 210, 225, 232 Asia Minor 2, 76, 79, 83, 103, 124, 139, 141, 181, 208, 225, 232 Asia Minor Catastrophe 139, 181 Balance of power 14 Balkans 88, 89, 101, 105, 108, 114, 122, 126–130, 145, 150, 180, 181, 218, 223, 224, 226, 228, 229, 231 Balkan Wars 83, 139 Belonging to the West i, iii, viii, ix, 37, 138, 143, 169, 171, 174, 176, 181 Bevin, Ernest 145, 146, 197 Blumenberg, Hans 21, 52, 56, 57, 72, 175, 177, 197 Bottici, Chiara 27, 30, 52, 53, 56, 57, 72, 73, 175, 177, 197 Bouchard, Gerard 25, 30, 68, 69, 73, 105, 172, 177, 178, 183, 197 Britain 6, 11, 40, 83, 93, 115, 127, 128, 130, 141, 143, 191, 197, 211, 216, 219, 224 Byzantine Empire 17, 79, 107–109, 115, 117, 120, 121, 124, 128, 132–134, 136, 137, 140, 179, 180, 195, 198 Byzantine revival ix, 35, 107, 124–126, 128–132, 135–139, 142, 176, 179–182 Byzantium 17, 76, 78, 85, 120–126, 128, 129, 134, 136, 167, 198, 210–212, 217, 220, 223, 232 Campbell, Joseph 9, 12, 55, 58, 175, 197, 198 Cartography 138 Cassirer, Ernst 30, 53, 57, 73, 198 Catherine the Great 108, 110, 113, 127, 202, 205, 216 Centrality vii, 93, 104, 136, 169, 174, 193 Classical Greece 119, 170 Cold War 1, 6–8, 14, 18, 26, 34, 36, 143–145, 148, 149, 151, 165, 166, 173, 174, 178,

181, 182, 184, 194, 200, 204, 207, 209, 212–215, 217–220, 223, 224, 231, 232 Common Market 1, 152, 200, 203, 210, 217, 218, 220 Constantinople 76, 79, 81, 83, 102, 103, 112, 113, 121, 124, 125, 129, 139, 204 Constructivism 232 Continuity vii, ix, 68, 93, 104, 119, 136, 150, 169, 174, 178, 193, 206 Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard von 146 Council of Europe 148, 164 Criekemans, David ii, 49, 200, 219 Crimean War 126–128, 131 Critical Realism 222 Critical theory 66, 208 Dalby, Simon 18, 19, 43, 44, 200, 229, 230 Deconstruction vii, 44, 201 Della Sala, Vincent 21, 26, 30, 56, 64, 69, 70, 73, 155, 175, 187, 191, 200, 201 Diffusion vii, 99, 105, 178 Dijkink, Gertjan 57, 175, 201 Ecumenical Patriarchate 112, 113 Enlightened despotism 117, 136 Enlightenment vii, 10, 11, 15, 17, 28, 31, 53, 81, 88, 89, 91, 92, 96–99, 101, 102, 104, 105, 107, 109–113, 115, 117–120, 122, 127, 133, 134, 155, 162, 164, 168, 171, 172, 174, 178–180, 182, 184, 191, 199, 201, 205, 207, 212, 213, 217, 222–224, 228, 232 Enlightenment, European 15, 35, 81, 88, 89, 92, 98, 100, 105–115, 117, 118, 134, 136, 192, 213 Enlightenment, Greek vii, 10, 14, 15, 17, 26, 27, 31, 35, 37, 81, 82, 85, 87–90, 92, 96–99, 101, 105–108, 110, 113, 119, 120, 123, 126, 129, 135, 137, 138, 169, 172, 173, 178, 179, 183, 219 EU ix, 3, 4, 7, 8, 30, 73, 153–159, 161–164, 168, 170, 171, 191, 195, 199, 200, 202, 204, 205, 210, 226, 229, 230 EU enlargement ix, 4, 230 EU integration 30

234 Eurasian 192, 210, 211 Eurasianism 160, 192, 196, 215 Europe 2, 3, 5, 7–12, 14–17, 24–29, 31, 35–37, 41, 59, 82, 86–90, 93–105, 107, 109, 110, 112, 115, 117–119, 122, 123, 126, 127, 131–139, 141, 142, 145–152, 155–173, 176, 178–180, 182–186, 189, 191, 192, 196, 197, 200–206, 208–210, 212, 213, 215–218, 220, 221, 222, 224, 228–230, 232 Europe and the West 2, 5, 7, 10–12, 14–17, 24, 25, 27–29, 36, 82, 99, 102, 104, 107, 115, 117–119, 126, 131, 133, 134, 136, 138, 143, 145, 148–151, 155, 160, 162, 164, 165, 167–169, 172, 173, 176, 178, 179, 182–185, 191 European integration ix, 1, 3, 8, 36, 37, 138, 143, 145–149, 153, 164–166, 168–170, 173, 174, 178, 181–184, 205, 210, 213, 216, 218 Europeanization viii, 8, 18, 37, 138, 152–155, 158, 164, 166, 169, 182, 183, 195, 197, 198, 200, 204–206, 209, 215, 218, 220, 222, 224, 225, 228, 232 European Parliamentary Union 146, 219 Euroscepticism 167, 199, 230 Fatzeas, Gregorios 93, 95, 99, 109, 110, 114, 203 Filippides, Daniel 94–96, 99, 105, 204 Foucault, Michel 22, 23, 33, 204, 225 France 23, 83, 93, 97, 100, 115, 119, 121, 127, 141, 146, 149, 197, 224, 227 Geographical grammar 93, 205 Geography vii, 15, 18, 39, 60, 81, 88, 92, 95, 199, 200, 205, 207, 216, 225, 229, 231 Geography, Political vii, 20, 33, 35, 48, 58, 81, 93–97, 99, 106, 107, 110, 138, 197, 198, 200, 206, 209, 215, 219, 221, 223–226, 230 Geopolitical Analysis vii, 29 Geopolitics, Analytical iii, vii, viii, ix, 23, 24, 37, 49, 50, 59, 62–65, 67, 68, 70, 72, 74, 185–190, 194 Geopolitics, Classical vii, 24, 39, 41, 42, 46, 47, 49, 60 Geopolitics, Critical vii, 18–20, 24, 38, 39, 43–49, 60, 64, 188, 202, 212, 219, 223–226, 229

INDEX Germany 6, 11, 40, 53, 110, 112, 118, 121, 191, 192, 224 Gray, Colin 18, 41, 42, 205, 206, 229 Great Idea vii, ix, 82, 83, 85–87, 92, 104–107, 124–126, 128–133, 135, 137, 139, 140, 142, 172, 178–182, 190, 194, 199, 206, 212, 214, 221, 225 Greek Civil War 6, 139, 143, 144, 148, 199, 207, 209, 213, 217, 220, 224 Greek debt crisis 156 Greek-speaking world 10, 26, 78, 79, 81, 88, 89, 92, 97–103, 105, 107–111, 113, 117, 124, 133, 134, 171, 178, 189 Greek War of Independence 10, 35, 77, 88, 95, 97, 100, 102, 107, 132, 159, 207, 232 Haushofer, Karl 40, 41, 232 Hellas 76, 77, 124–207, 220, 222 Hellenic 10, 76–98, 136, 205, 206, 213, 220, 221, 226, 227 Hellenism 7, 12, 13, 17, 120–125, 128, 129, 134, 136, 140, 150, 167, 181, 202, 206, 210, 215, 216, 226, 228 Historiography vii, 33, 117 Imitating the West vii, 81, 174 International system 198 Intertextuality 174 Irredentism 144, 195 Karamanlis, Konstantinos 1, 2, 8, 26, 31, 33, 36, 149–152, 162, 166, 182, 184, 202, 204, 211–213, 218, 230, 232 Kingdom of Greece 77, 83, 115, 117, 124, 125, 130, 131 Kissinger, Henry 41, 212 Kitromilides, Paschalis 2, 10, 15, 31, 33, 78, 85, 88, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 101, 105, 108, 110, 111, 113–115, 122, 140, 212, 213 Kolettis, Ioannis 82, 83, 85–87, 105, 106, 116, 124, 125, 179 Korais, Adamantios 98, 99, 120, 210, 213, 214, 220 Kotzias, Nikos 159, 214 Latour, Bruno 20, 24, 61, 64, 65, 188, 215 Lévi-Strauss, Claude 50, 51, 173

235

INDEX Macedonia 83, 124, 128, 129, 139, 154 Mackinder, Halford 18, 39, 41, 44, 47, 103, 202, 205, 216 Mahan, Alfred Thayer 39, 41, 47, 216 Manifest Destiny 190, 191, 194, 217 Mediterranean 79, 97, 103, 108, 126, 151, 152, 158, 169, 209, 224, 226 Meletions, Mitrou 93, 95, 99, 217 Modern Greece i, iii, vii, 10, 11, 29, 76, 198 Modernization viii, 152, 202 Moscow 109, 143, 151, 159, 191, 208, 220, 226, 228 Myth vii, 49, 50, 52, 53, 65, 73, 196, 197, 203, 209, 215, 217 Myth, Geopolitical i, iii, vii, viii, 67, 69, 72, 76, 82, 171, 177, 219 Mythmaking 176, 183 Myth, Political vii, 15, 29, 50, 54 National identity 57, 201 Nationalism 54, 181, 196, 201, 207, 212, 221, 228 National myths 197 NATO 3, 7, 8, 149, 154, 158, 164–166, 218, 221 Nazism 40, 53 New Democracy Party 1, 149, 162 New Materialism 60, 204 Ontological security 56, 198, 218, 226 Orientalism 101, 223 Orthodox Christianity 136 Orthodox Church 113, 114, 135, 180, 189, 227 Ottoman 2, 35, 76, 77, 79, 81, 83, 85, 88–90, 93–102, 105, 106, 108, 109, 111–114, 116, 118, 120, 122–130, 133, 135–137, 139–141, 172, 175, 179, 190, 208, 212, 222, 223 Ottoman Empire 2, 77, 79, 83, 85, 88, 89, 93–96, 99–102, 106, 109, 111, 112, 114, 116, 118, 124, 125, 127, 128, 130, 133, 135, 136, 139–141, 179, 190, 212, 222 Pan-Slavism 127–129, 145, 160, 208, 215, 216, 220 Papademos, Lucas 157 Papandreou, Andreas 1, 27, 153, 156, 220 Paparrigopoulos, Constantine 121–125, 135, 201, 202, 212, 214, 221 PASOK 1, 153, 154, 156, 157, 161, 162, 168, 218 Peter the Great 109, 110, 151, 200

Pipinelis, Panayiotis 146, 147, 221 Political Myth vii, 15, 29, 50, 54 Psalidas, Athanasios 113–115, 222 Putin, Vladimir 159, 160, 168, 213 Pyrros, Dionysios 95, 96, 99, 102, 222 Realism 224 Ritualization viii, 164 Roman Empire 76, 77, 79, 103, 218 Romanticism vii, 85, 87, 106, 117–119, 122, 123, 134, 135, 179–181, 196, 202, 210, 213, 222, 224 Russia 17, 25, 83, 100, 107–112, 114–117, 127–130, 134–138, 144, 159, 160, 163, 164, 168, 179, 180, 191, 192, 196, 198, 202, 204, 208, 209, 213–216, 218, 220, 224, 228, 229, 232 Russian expectation ix, 107, 108, 111, 113–115, 117, 126–128, 130–132, 135–138, 176, 179–182 Russo-Turkish War 232 Sacralization viii, 164 Samaras, Antonios 157, 162, 195, 224 Slavic threat 129, 145, 150, 151, 181 Smith, Anthony 30, 47, 58, 73, 78, 102, 153, 175, 179, 191, 225 Social construct 208, 228 Spykman, Nicholas 18, 41, 225, 226 SYRIZA 157–163, 168, 196, 225–227 Theotokis, Nikiphoros 94, 95, 99, 228 Third Rome 109, 191, 202 Tsipras, Alexis 157–159, 161, 162, 229 Tuathail, GO 18, 19, 40, 43, 44, 46, 47, 224, 226, 229, 230 Turkey 7–9, 93–95, 97, 106, 126, 131, 137, 139–142, 154, 165, 166, 192, 195, 199, 201, 207, 214, 218, 221, 223, 231 United States 6, 7, 11, 39, 40, 143, 145, 147, 148, 158, 160, 165, 184, 190, 191, 198, 212, 216, 218, 223, 226 Venizelos, Eleftherios 139–142, 162, 199, 213, 227, 228, 230, 232 Voulgaris, Evgenios 110–115, 157, 196, 231 Walt, Stephen 6, 9, 165 231

236 Waltz, Kenneth 6, 41, 165, 231 Western dependence 107, 126, 131–133, 137–139, 150, 151, 181, 182 World War I viii, 3, 33, 40, 41, 54, 83, 138, 139, 141–143, 148, 164

INDEX World War II viii, 3, 33, 40, 41, 138, 139, 142, 143, 148, 164 Zampelios, Spyridon 121–123, 135, 214 225

geopolitical myths that shape its identity, the book illuminates the multifaceted factors driving Greece's pro-European strategy and foreign policy. By introducing and using Analytical Geopolitics as a pioneering approach, the book provides a historical-structural framework and expands the role of myth in understanding international relations. ANTONIOS NESTORAS, Ph.D. (1983), is the Deputy Executive Director of the European Liberal Forum (ELF) and Adjunct Professor at the Brussels School of Governance, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). He currently serves as the Editor of

G E O P O L I T I C S

A N D

ELF’s Technopolitics Series and the Chief Editor of the Future Europe

GEOPOLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3 Series Editor: David Criekemans 9 789004 686892

issn 2666-6669 brill.com/geop

R E L A T I O N S I N T E R N A T I O N A L

of the Eurocrisis, Greece's commitment remains steadfast. By analyzing the

A N D

and the West. From the early days of European integration to the challenges

G E O P O L I T I C S

and political myth, tracing Greece's enduring determination to align with Europe

GEOP

BELONGING TO THE WEST: GEOPOLITICAL MYTHS AND IDENTITY IN MODERN GREECE Antonios Nestoras

belonging. This thought-provoking book explores the intersection of geopolitics

I N T E R N A T I O N A L

Uncover the fascinating story of Greece's unwavering quest for European

R E L A T I O N S

21 mm

BELONGING TO THE WEST: GEOPOLITICAL MYTHS AND IDENTITY IN MODERN GREECE A Study of Analytical Geopolitics Antonios Nestoras