Being Human in a Technological Age: Rethinking Theological Anthropology (Christian Perspectives on Leadership and Social Ethics) 9789042941816, 9789042941823, 9042941812

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CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEADERSHIP AND SOCIAL ETHICS

7

Being Human in a Technological Age: Rethinking Theological Anthropology edited by

Steven C. van den Heuvel

peeters

BEING HUMAN IN A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: RETHINKING THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Christian Perspectives on Leadership and Social Ethics The series Christian Perspectives on Leadership and Social Ethics is an academic series in the area of theological perspectives on leadership studies and themes in social ethics that are relevant for leaders in the public domain. The academic character of the series is evident in that only original unpublished research is accepted. Submissions are peerreviewed according to international academic standards in a double-blind review process. While written with academic rigor for researchers in the field of leadership, this series also seeks to be accessible for practitioners to foster in depth reflection on forms of leadership practice. The series is published by the Institute of Leadership and Social Ethics (ILSE), seeking to cultivate a Christian perspective on aspects of leadership and social ethics as they relate to establishing a just and sustainable society. For more information on ILSE, please refer to the website: www.etf-ilse.org. We seek to engage scholars and professionals from a broad range of religious and worldview perspectives to address pressing current issues in leadership and social ethics. We combine research from disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, social ethics and theology to empower leaders of all worldviews to contribute to a more just and sustainable world within their areas of influence. We welcome contributions from various corners of the world to work towards this goal, expanding the international network and influence that ILSE aims to be part of. We seek to publish our original research regularly through this series. As a research institute situated within the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven (Belgium), research done by ILSE seeks to be interdisciplinary, bringing theology to bear on a number of different fields, such as leadership studies, economics, and ecology. We aim to provide resources that are useful and inspiring to (Christian) leaders in the public domain. Previous volumes in the series: Nullens, Patrick and Jack Barentsen, eds. Leadership, Spirituality and Innovation. Christian Perspectives on Leadership and Social Ethics 1. Leuven: Peeters, 2014. Nullens, Patrick and Steven C. van den Heuvel, eds. Challenges of Moral Leadership. Christian Perspectives on Leadership and Social Ethics 2. Leuven: Peeters, 2016. Barentsen, Jack, Volker Kessler and Elke Meier, eds. Christian Leadership in a Changing World: Perspectives from Africa and Europe. Christian Perspectives on Leadership and Social Ethics 3. Leuven: Peeters, 2016. Barentsen, Jack, Steven C. van den Heuvel and Peirong Lin, eds. The End of Leadership? Leadership and Authority at Crossroads. Christian Perspectives on Leadership and Social Ethics 4. Leuven: Peeters, 2017. Barentsen, Jack, Steven C. van den Heuvel and Volker Kessler, eds. Increasing Diversity: Loss of Control or Adaptive Identity Construction? Christian Perspectives on Leadership and Social Ethics 5. Leuven: Peeters, 2018. Heuvel, Steven C. van den, and Patrick Nullens, eds. Driven by Hope: Economics and Theology in Dialogue. Christian Perspectives on Leadership and Social Ethics 6. Leuven: Peeters, 2018. Editor for this volume Steven C. van den Heuvel, Assistant Professor of Systematic Theology at the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven (Belgium), and Extraordinary Researcher in the Faculty of Theology at North-West University (South Africa) Editorial Assistance Cees Tulp, Assistant at the Institute of Leadership and Social Ethics, Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven (Belgium)

CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEADERSHIP AND SOCIAL ETHICS 7

BEING HUMAN IN A TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: RETHINKING THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY Edited by

Steven C. van den Heuvel

Institute of Leadership and Social Ethics Research Institute of the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven (Belgium)

PEETERS leuven – paris – bristol, ct 

Illustration: “The Vitruvian Man,” Leonardo Da Vinci, ca. 1492 (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:0_The_Vitruvian_Man_-_by_ Leonardo_da_Vinci.jpg. Accessed December 5, 2019).

A catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-90-429-4181-6 eISBN 978-90-429-4182-3 D/2020/0602/36 All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated data file or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers. © 2020 – Peeters, Bondgenotenlaan 153, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium)

Table of Contents IX

List of Contributors

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Foreword Part I: Exploring the Challenges of Contemporary Technology to Human Self-understanding

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On the Present Reality of our Posthuman Future Brian Brock

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Loneliness Caused by Technology and Social Media Use Valeriia Chornobai

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Is Data a ‘Sentient Being’? Answers from Movie and Television Emanuel Kessler Part II: Conceptual Investigations

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Rise of the Technocratic Mage: Primitive Configurations of Power in the Post-human Paradigm Emilio Di Somma

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The Impossibility of a Crafted Soul: A Non-reductive Physicalist Approach Zachary R. Brigante

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Freedom at Stake: Comparing the Human Mind to Artificial Intelligence Cees Tulp

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Building a Posthuman Artificial Paradise: Christian Theology in Interaction with Futuristic Expectations of Technology Raymond R. Hausoul

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Part III: Theological Perspectives 121 The Spirit, Artificial Intelligence and Human Bodies: Machine-human Interaction within the Context of Divine-human Interaction Jack Barentsen 141 Harari, Pannenberg and Human Destiny: A Theological Response to a Post Humanist Anthropology Michael Borowski 157 Free to be Human in an Age of Technological Necessity: On Being Human in Jacques Ellul’s Theological Ethics Jacob Rollison 171 A Text from the Heart: Comparing Empathy and Text Messages with Paul’s Communication with the Corinthians in 2 Corinthians 1-7 H. H. Drake Williams, III Part IV: Living with Complex Technology: The Ethical Challenges 191 Emerging Technologies and Humanity: The Tension between Control and Freedom Henk Jochemsen 217 Human Embodiment and Cancer Technology: Embracing a Theology of Weakness Ronald T. Michener 233 Biotechnological Enhancement in A ‘World Come of Age:’ Engaging Enhancement Technologies with Dietrich Bonhoeffer Kevin O’Farrell 251 Bibliography

List of Contributors Jack Barentsen (Ph.D.) studied physics, philosophy and theology in the US, and moved to the Netherlands in 1988 as pastor and church planter. Working with church plants in two locations, Landgraaf and Maastricht, he focused on discipleship and leadership development, which turned into an academic pursuit at the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit in Leuven (Belgium). His doctoral research focused on leadership development in early Christianity (Emerging Leadership in the Pauline Mission: A Social Identity Perspective, 2011). Since then, Barentsen continues to serve as missionary in researching and teaching the practice of pastoral leadership in multiple countries, developing a descriptive “Integrative Model of Pastoral Leadership.” He serves as Professor and Chair of Practical Theology at the ETF, and as Senior Researcher of the Institute of Leadership and Social Ethics (ILSE). He co-edited a number of leadership books with ILSE, Leadership, Spirituality and Innovation (2014), Christian Leadership in a Changing World: Perspectives from Africa and Europe (2016), The End of Leadership? Leadership and Authority at Crossroads (2017), and Increasing Diversity: Loss of Control or Adaptive Identity Construction (2018). He is currently working on several publications about contemporary pastoral leadership. He also holds an appointment as Extraordinary Associate Professor of New Testament and Practical Theology in the Faculty of Theology of North-West University in Potchefstroom, South Africa.. Michael Borowski received his Th.M. from the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven (Belgium). Previously, he received a M.Div. from Columbia International University (USA) as well as a Diploma in Public Management and Law from the Fachhochschule für öffentliche Verwaltung NRW (Germany). He is now pursuing doctoral studies in the area of theology and science at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (the Netherlands). He chairs the annual panel “Scripture and Theology” in 2020 at the European Academy of Religion in Bologna, Italy (scriptureandtheology.home.blog), and pursues book-projects on theological method as well as on the ethics of policing. He is editor of the recently

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published issue on the ethics of policing in the series “Polizei.Wissen”; his other most recent publication is a chapter on the “New Traditionalists” in “Die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Theologie: Theologie und Metaphysik.” Zachary R. Brigante is a Ph.D. candidate of systematic theology in his final year at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. His dissertation is entitled Extending Nonreductive Physicalism: Fear as Original Sin. He holds two master’s degrees in theology and history, first from George Fox University in 2014 and second from the University of Edinburgh in 2015. He is a fellow of the Gingko Library Fellowship which brings together Christian and Muslim scholars for the purpose of cross religious dialogue and collaboration. His research interests are theological anthropology, theological ethics, theology and science, and systematic theology. Brian Brock earned his D.Phil. from King’s College, London (UK). Currently, he is Reader in Moral and Practical Theology at the University of Aberdeen (UK). He is an editor of the theology and technology blog Second Nature and has published widely on the ethics of technology. His publications include Christian Ethics in a Technological Age (Eerdmans, 2010), Captive to Christ, Open to the World: On Doing Christian Ethics in Public (Cascade, 2014), and Wondrously Wounded: Theology, Disability and the Body of Christ (Baylor, 2019). He edited with John Swinton Theology, Disability and the New Genetics: Why Science Needs the Church (T&T Clark, 2007). Valeriia Chornobai has since 2005 been working as a professor of Sociology, Social Work, Christian Ethics at Dnipropetrovsk Biblical College, Kyiv Bible Institute, Lviv Theological Seminary, Kyiv Theological Seminary “Grace and Truth” and in the Ukrainian Evangelical Theological Seminary. She wrote two articles for the Slavic Bible Commentary and participated in developing the course of academic literacy for Euro-Asian Accreditation Association. She has several publications in various journals and periodicals. She currently studies second year at a Post-graduate program in the faculty of Philosophical education and science in National Pedagogical Dragomanov University working on her thesis on “Theological and Social Aspects of Loneliness Among Modern Christian Believers.”

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Emilio Di Somma (Ph.D.) studied Philosophy at the University of Naples Federico II, where he also received his MA with a thesis on Agamben, in 2012. He then studied Divinity at the University of Aberdeen as part of the research project on “Normativity: Nature, Narrative, Nihilism,” receiving his Ph.D. in 2017. His dissertation has recently been published with the title Fides and Secularity: Beyond Charles Taylor’s Open Faith. He is currently teaching in high school in Italy and is Affiliated Researcher at the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven (Belgium), where he is developing his research project on the topics of Theological Anthropology, Political Theology and Philosophy of Religions. Raymond R. Hausoul (Ph.D.) worked as an architectural engineer and studied theology at the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit (ETF), Leuven (Belgium), where he received his Ph.D. in 2017. He is an affiliated researcher in Systematic Theology at the ETF. His research focuses mainly on the themes of the new heavens and the new earth and physical renewal. Steven C. van den Heuvel (Ph.D.) studied Pastoral Ministry at the Christelijke Hogeschool Ede, the Netherlands. He then went on to study theology at the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven (ETF), receiving first his Th.M., in 2010, and then his Ph.D. in 2015, as part of a joint doctorate with the Theologische Universiteit Kampen, the Netherlands—his dissertation was entitled Bonhoeffer’s Christocentric Theology and Fundamental Issues in Environmental Ethics (published with Wipf & Stock in 2017). He currently works as Assistant Professor in the department of Systematic Theology at the ETF. In addition, he is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Leadership and Social Ethics, a research institute of the ETF. Furthermore, he is Extraordinary Researcher in the Faculty of Theology at North-West University (South Africa). His research interests are continental theology, the study of ‘hope’, environmental ethics, economic ethics, and the ethics of technology. Henk Jochemsen (Ph.D.) earned his Ph.D. in Mathematics and Natural Sciences from Leiden University (the Netherlands) in 1979. He is emeritus Professor of Christian (Reformational) Philosophy at Wageningen University (the Netherlands). His areas of interest include philosophy

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and ethics of new technologies, development cooperation, and sustainable agriculture. He has published numerous articles and books on medical ethics, including Human Stem Cells: Source of Hope and of Controversy (Bioethics Press, 2005) and Toetsen en begrenzen: Een ethische en politieke beoordeling van de moderne biotechnologie (Buijten en Schipperheijn, 2000). Emanuel Kessler (B.Sc.) studied “Scientific Programming” at the Aachen University of Applied Sciences, where he earned his Bachelor of Science in 2008. He worked as a software developer for a decade in IT in a German insurance company. Emanuel is currently administrator for two collaboration tools in the same IT. Today, he has also a lot of experience in agile project management, being a “Certified ScrumMaster” since 2018. Additionally, since 2009 he has been self-employed in preaching ministry and presenting in Germany and abroad, as well as being an author. Ronald T. Michener (Dr. Theol., Faculté Universitaire de Théologie Protestante de Bruxelles) is Professor and Chair of the Department of Systematic Theology at the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit (ETF), Leuven (Belgium). He has been a regular editorial reviewer for the Christian Perspectives on Leadership and Social Ethics (CPLSE) series for the Institute of Leadership and Social Ethics, ETF. His work concentrates on areas of dialogue between postmodern philosophy and Christian theology. He is the author of Postliberal Theology: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury/T & T Clark, 2013), and co-author, with Patrick Nullens, of The Matrix of Christian Ethics: Integrating Philosophy and Moral Theology in a Postmodern Context (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2010). Kevin O’Farrell is a doctoral candidate in Theological Ethics at the University of Aberdeen. His dissertation research engages the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in articulating a theological account of the exception. Previous to this, Kevin received an MTh in Theological Ethics from the University of Aberdeen (2017) and an M.A. in Theology from Talbot school of Theology (2013). Jacob Marques Rollison (Ph.D.) is a postdoctoral scholar living in Strasbourg, France. His doctoral thesis, completed at the University of Aberdeen under the supervision of professors Brian Brock and Stanley

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Hauerwas, proposes a dynamic and chronological reading of the multifaceted works of Jacques Ellul. He is currently translating Ellul’s twovolume introduction to Christian ethics, To Will and to Do. He is on the board of directors of the International Jacques Ellul Society. His research interests include twentieth century continental philosophy and theology, theological understandings of time, law, language and media. He also holds an M.A. in Media and Communication from the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland. Cees Tulp holds a Bachelor of Music (church organ) of the conservatory of Rotterdam (Netherlands) but made a career in the software development industry. He held various roles in this branch for more than a decade. In parallel, he started studying Theology and Religious Studies at the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit (ETF), Leuven (Belgium), receiving his BA (magna cum laude) in 2017. He is currently in the final phase of the Master Systematic and Philosophical Theology at the University of Nottingham. He works as administrative assistant at the Institute of Leadership and Social Ethics at the ETF. H. H. Drake Williams, III (Ph.D.) completed his Ph.D. in New Testament from the University of Aberdeen (Scotland) in 1999. He is Associate Professor of New Testament at the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit in Leuven (Belgium) and Research Fellow in the department of Greek, Latin and Classical Studies, University of the Free State, Bloomfontein, South Africa. He is Minister of Mission and Theology at the Central Schwenkfelder Church in Worcester, PA (USA). He is a Fellow in the Amsterdam Centre of New Testament Studies at the Vrije Universiteit and a member in Nederlandse Onderzoekschool voor Theologie en Religiewetenschap. He is the author of four books. His research interests includes 1 & 2 Corinthians, Romans, Ignatius of Antioch, and Caspar Schwenckfeld.

Foreword ‘What does it mean to be human?’ This age-old question has gained new urgency in the light of current technological developments. Of course, ‘technology’ has accompanied humanity since ancient times, since it is rooted in the creative way in which people are able to deal with their environment. The presupposition of most earlier technological developments was that we, as human beings, were in control of these developments, as unquestionable masters of our creations. A case in point is the European Renaissance, a period in which the classical world was re-discovered, both in scholarship and in art. Nature, including the human body, was studied with renewed vigor, and new methods – the point has been made that the roots of modern anthropology lie in the Renaissance.1 An example of the new way in which the human body was studied is the sketch entitled “Le proporzioni del corpo umano secondo Vitruvio,” colloquially known as “Vitruvian Man,” made by Leonardo Da Vinci circa 1490.2 This sketch is based on the description of the human (male) body by the Roman architect Marcus Vitruvius Pollio, in the third book of his De architectura. This influential sketch, which is reproduced on the cover of this volume, represents in a vivid way both the new scientific way in which the human body was studied, as well as the unquestioned presupposition that the human being would continue to be the normative center of both the world as well as of new historical developments. As Ludwig Heinrich Heydenreich, says it, “Leonardo envisaged the great picture chart of the human body he had produced through his anatomical drawings and Vitruvian Man as a cosmografia del minor mondo (‘cosmography of the microcosm’). He believed the workings of the human body to be an analogy for the workings of the universe.”3

1 See John Howard Rowe, “The Renaissance Foundations of Anthropology,” American Anthropologist New Series 67, no. 1 (February 1965): 1-20. 2 The sketch is kept in the Gallerie dell’Accademia, in Venice (Italy). 3 Ludwig Heinrich Heydenreich, “Leonardo da Vinci: Italian Artist, Engineer, and Scientist,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Leonardoda-Vinci (last updated: Aug 22, 2019), visited September 17, 2019, italics original.

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Yet in our age, this anchorage is loosened, as the task of technology is increasingly seen as improving, rather than assisting, human existence. Today, technology presents humanity with radically new challenges, especially because of the speed with which technology is developing. Developments such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), medical treatments, human enhancement and robotics give new urgency to the question of the inalienable characteristics of humanity. With these developments we seem to be heading for a society in which the boundaries of humanity are blurred and a post-human era arises. With the help of human enhancement, people are increasingly able to improve themselves infinitely and AI even enables us to construct a better version of ourselves. The future vision that comes with this is one of great promises and hopes. We are promised, for example, that technology will help to make society fairer; we are encouraged to hope for the final overcoming of diseases and death. The dream that is propagated is that humankind will rise above itself and truly become like God. The eschatology is one of power and control. At the same time, there are those who warn against the dark side of such a future. Because who will actually be in control? Will it be all of us, or rather a privileged few? And is there still room for genuine human existence in this world, or will artificial forms of intelligence mold or maim this existence, perhaps beyond recognition? What remains of our freedom? Is there still room for our embodied life? And also, are these future expectations not overtly optimistic? There is, then, a deep ambivalence to modern technological developments – we can recognize the good things it has brought, while also recognizing its harmful effects and its future potential for widening social differences even further. This ambivalence is also present when we consider technological developments in light of theological anthropology. Does post-humanism offer a reason to update the traditional understanding of human beings as made in the imago Dei? Or is it precisely because of this doctrine that we are to reject the new drive towards posthumanism? Other questions arise as well: is bodiliness indispensable to being human, or can we live our earthly lives without a body? And what about the human soul? Can the soul indeed be ‘uploaded’, or should we resist such an idea as an dangerous expression of reductionism? These burning questions make it necessary to develop a moral perspective on technology in order to be able to deal with technology thoughtfully.

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Moral Discernment in an Age of Complex Technology: An Interdisciplinary Research Project Recognizing the importance of theological engagement with the changing perspectives on our humanity, through the rise of complex technology, has been the primary motivation of the research project ‘Moral Discernment in an Age of Complex Technology’, of which this volume is one of the results. This project, which commenced in September 2016, seeks to break new ground in the development of a theological sensitivity for the ambivalence concerning technology. The project aims to provide tools for moral discernment by combining four approaches: deontological ethics, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and value ethics. These approaches are underlined by the view of the human person as imago Dei, with which we assert that the human being has personal freedom and responsibility. In applying these four approaches to the broad area of technology and its economical motives and a unique contribution is made. Because technology is also a way of perceiving reality, it also influences the way we see ourselves as human beings. This project aims to offer a theological perspective and provide guidance to engage with technology with responsibility morally well discerning. The research is carried out by the Institute for Leadership and Social Ethics (ILSE), a research institute of the Evangelische Theologische Faculteit (ETF), Leuven (Belgium). ILSE’s aim is to develop a Christian perspective on aspects of leadership and social ethics, specifically as they contribute to a just and sustainable society.4 This research project is fully funded by The Blankemeyer Foundation. Named after its initiator and founder, Jim Blankemeyer, this Private Funding Organisation is “a charity that serves both church and society by helping address the ‘big questions’ central to human flourishing.”5 It does so by supporting research concerning three major questions: 1) What can science and faith learn from each other and how does society benefit from their mutual engagement? 2) Is there a best, right or true way to understand and express our humanity? 3) How do we understand and relate to the natural world? This project seeks to contribute to answering the second and third questions asked by The Blankemeyer Foundation. 4 See https://www.etf-ilse.org/. 5 See https://tbfmission.org/.

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The research project “Moral Discernment in an Age of Complex Technology” resulted in a number of activities and publications of which this volume is the most important one. The revised papers that are included in this book are a selection of the papers presented at the international academic conference, “Moral Discernment in an Age of Complex Technology: Rethinking Theological Anthropology,” held in Leuven, Belgium, on February 22-23, 2019, which featured three keynote lectures and dozens of paper presentations. The plan of the book This volume consists of fourteen chapters, divided into four different parts. The first part explores the challenges that contemporary technology poses with regard to human self-understanding. This part is opened with a contribution from Brian Brock, who questions the technological reality on the validity of a distinction between therapy and enhancement. Through the use of a pedagogical listening attitude, he discovered that, although it might be hard to maintain, this distinction is still recognized among students. However, enhancement needs to be approached critically, because limits are intrinsically connected to being a creature. The second chapter, by Valeriia Chornobai, also describes an empirical study, namely a study of the connection between loneliness and social media use. On the basis of that research, she argues that long-term, caring relationships and a sense of belonging are essential to human nature. The third and final chapter within the first part is formed by a contribution from Emanuel Kessler. He shows that in a number of contemporary films artificial intelligence is seen as being sentient and asks the question how being sentient can best be understood and defined. These contributions with questions raised by contemporary technology are followed by a second part in which technology itself is critically questioned. This second part contains critical approaches that question the technology and its assumptions on a conceptual level. Emilio Di Somma’s contribution criticizes the narrative approach adopted by Yuval Harari, in his well-known book Homo Deus.6 He points to the parallels between the power structures as described by Harari and the function of the shaman as a “provider” of power in earlier societies. A society in which power is given to technology or to “technocratic mages” forsakes 6 Yuval N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2017).

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God. The second chapter in this part is written by Zachary R. Brigante. He argues that it is necessary for the human soul to have a body, including the experience of suffering and death. Considering this, he posits that it is impossible to artificially recreate the human soul. Moreover, God has already provided us with a way of reproducing the human soul, namely by begetting offspring. The third contribution in this part is written by Cees Tulp. He adopts a phenomenological approach to human thinking, informed by Hannah Arendt. By means of that, he shows that freedom is an inalienable characteristic of the human being. This freedom is expressed in the capacity for creativity, which is missed in Artificial Intelligence, which has deterministic traits. The theme of AI is also covered in the last contribution in this part, written by Raymond R. Hausoul. He argues that the hopeful future expectations of AI are too idealistic solutions for mortality and death. According to Christian doctrine, death can only be overcome by God. Instead of hoping for the developments of AI we should be hoping for God’s future. The third part offers theological perspectives. It opens with a contribution by Jack Barentsen – he also picks up the theme of technological eschatologies. By means of thought experiments, he shows that the technological advancements may challenge humanity but that human transformation ultimately is a matter of redemption and salvation. Michael Borowski, in the following chapter, also criticizes transhumanism as being too optimistic. He contrasts the issues of transhumanism with insights of the German theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg, thus offering a critical and constructive theological answer to it. The third contribution in this part is written by Jacob Rollison, who describes an ethical theological anthropology by exploring the work of Jacques Ellul. Drawing from his work he formulates that being human means to engage in dialogue with God and act in the virtues faith, hope and love. This part concludes with a contribution of H. H. Drake Williams, III. He expresses the way in which text messaging influence the way people communicate emotions. This is contrasted with the way emotion is communicated in Paul’s letter of 2 Corinthians, where empathy is expressed. It is argued that this provides a means of reconsideration how empathy is communicated in modern communication. The fourth and last part of the book returns to the empirical realm, describing the ethical challenges that can be experienced living with complex technology. Henk Jochemsen signifies the tension between control and freedom that arises with the emerging technologies. The increasing capacities of it provide power to control diseases, people and so on.

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If this control will lead to a good life is a question that remains open. It does, however, require ‘hope beyond death’. Only Christianity can really provide such hope, he says. The next contribution is written by Ronald T. Michener – he discusses the supposed technological control of diseases from a different angle. He argues that it is not the technological control over cancer that shows what it is to be human, but the manifestation of authentic humanity in its weakness being subjected to cancer treatment. In human weakness the imago Dei is displayed. The last contribution is written by Kevin O’Farrell. Returning to the ethical question of human enhancement, he engages with Dietrich Bonhoeffer to offer an approach that provides guidance on how to cope ethically with these technological developments. Conclusion What herewith becomes clear is that the different chapters offer a variety of perspectives on the relationship between technological developments and a theological anthropology. Technological developments raise questions, but at the same time are critically questioned. By approaching this in a theological way and placing it in an ethical framework, this volume will hopefully contribute in a fruitful way to a nuanced critical approach to technology with moral discernment. This book would not haven’t been published without the help of a number of people. First of all, I want to thank all the ETF staff members and student workers involved in the organization of the conference on February 22-23, 2019, of which the present volume contains the proceedings. Their logistic support and hospitality service have made the conference to a success. With regard to this volume I want to express my gratitude for the time the reviewers invested in the detailed comments they made reviewing the different chapters. Furthermore, this book has benefited particularly from the excellent help of Kay Caldwell, who has proposed many linguistic improvements. I’m also thankful to Cees Tulp, who works as assistant for ILSE, for all the help in editing and making this book publishable. Steven C. van den Heuvel Leuven, January 2020

PART I

EXPLORING THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY TECHNOLOGY TO HUMAN SELF-UNDERSTANDING

On the Present Reality of our Posthuman Future BRIAN BROCK

Abstract This chapter probes contemporary beliefs about the utility and functionality of conceptual distinctions between therapy and enhancement. Beginning with an examination of the approaches of Aristotle and Plato to academic research in ethics, the chapter suggests that contemporary ethics should learn from ancient ethics the importance of engaging common moral opinions. This chapter is an exactment of just this work in describing an investigation of student beliefs. Do they believe that therapy can, or should be, distinguished from enhancement? The paper recounts a classroom experiment evoking student reactions to documentary films. After several years of investigation, it seems clear that undergraduate students today typically have little use for the therapy-enhancement distinction. Although it is hard to maintain this distinction from an academic point of view, the chapter argues that it is best not to follow Gerald McKenny in doing away with the distinction and instead seek ways to critically resist the popular message that we have no choice but to embrace the idea of becoming better, rather than just than well. The theological grounds for this claim rest on a theological premise that part of the human task is to discover the limits that are intrinsic to being a creature as gift.

Introduction Most of us, at one time or another, feel unsettled by the rapid changes new technologies seem to be forcing on us. Yet the roots of our disquiet are not easily discerned. Given this predicament it is sometimes worthwhile to interrogate our contemporary context from an unfamiliar angle. In this chapter I pursue one such unfamiliar approach to our technological present by asking about the utility and functionality of a conceptual distinction that first emerged in medical ethics: between therapy and enhancement. The therapy–enhancement distinction came to prominence in debates around medical techniques capable of altering

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apparently biologically healthy bodies. Though the distinction itself has fallen out of favor, the question of whether it is a good idea to pursue such “improvements” to fully functioning human bodies sometimes returns as new techniques are proposed to alter the human body and mind. Within theological ethics, debates about the defensibility of the therapy–enhancement distinction have reached something of an impasse. In an attempt to restart the discussion, I propose to take one step back and ask how Christian theologians should think about what counts as research. The chapter will unfold in three stages. It opens with a brief consideration of the views of Aristotle and Plato about what counts as academic research in ethics. I propose that contemporary theological ethicists ought to take seriously their reasons for seeing research in ethics as necessarily engaging common moral opinions. The body of the chapter offers a running narrative of my own attempt to enact this lesson from ancient ethics. A concluding section offers a few summary thoughts about what my pedagogical experiment has revealed about the parameters of contemporary theological work on technological ethics, and specifically the domain once positioned as a debate about the ethics of enhancement. Dialogical Theology Aristotle famously begins his Nicomachean Ethics by insisting on the importance of academic inquiry in ethics engaging the partial truths of popular opinion. Yes, common opinions are rife with confusions, he begins, but common opinion also contains many nuggets of wisdom to which anyone interested in how to live well ought to pay attention. Perhaps even more importantly, ethical enquiry can only succeed as an intellectual project if it persuades people to live differently together.1 Christian theologians should seriously consider granting Aristotle this point. If we want to know what it might mean to live well in a technological age, it seems prudent to at least attempt to listen to common sense opinion, a message regularly preached today by Christians deploying social scientific methods in their theological research. However, thoughtful people were listening to common opinion long before the invention of modern social scientific methods. The figure of Socrates established conversation as a core philosophical practice at the 1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094c–5b

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heart of western intellectual life. For Socrates, conversation was an investigative method determined to know not only how a truth relates to all other truths, but in which social and material universe that truth continues to be intelligible. Socrates is thus seeking a specific type of truth, those truths that we live out together. This is why Socrates insists that the first lesson in coming into truth is the dawning awareness of the need not to know information, but to know what one is after, and why. This kind of embedded truth can only be won if it is seduced out into the open, tempted out from behind the masks of convention. The power of conversation as a practice of philosophical investigation is in drawing attention to the person who is putting forward those arguments. Ultimately, Socrates’ aim in deploying what came to be called the “Socratic method,” was to display the intrinsic connection between the capacity to dialogue well with others and the capacity to encounter one’s self without illusion. Conversation is a matrix for the practice of complete presence to one another, to one’s self, and so to the world.2 By proclaiming that he does not know, Socrates is also committing himself to a form of intellectual investigation configured as an active waiting. This differs from how the figure of Socrates is deployed within Plato’s philosophy. Plato incorporates Socrates’ conversational mode of philosophizing by transforming it from an open-ended challenge to every interlocutor into a conversationally staged maze of pedagogically calibrated intellectual hurdles. To follow the course of hurdles he set up in his dialogue was to be trained by watching the fallacies of imaginary figures emerge in conversation with the literarily constructed figure of Socrates. Plato thus takes Socrates’ live pedagogical practice out of its location in the public square by translating it into a method of systematic rational progress aimed at revealing increasingly abstract conceptualizations.3 It was this depoliticized and systematized internal form of dialogue that was to dominate the formation of what we know as systematic theology. From Plato to Hegel to systematic theology today, systematizers aspire to achieve a comprehensive grasp of ideas and reality. This leads to the portrayal of intellectual leadership as the capacity to generate ideas and produce typologies at the highest levels of conceptual abstraction. 2. Sarah Kofman, Socrates: Fictions of a Philosopher, trans. Catherine Porter (London: Athalone Press, 1998), 138–9. 3. Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, trans. Michxael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 92.

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This observation ought not be understood as a principled criticism of systematic theology, logicians or metaphysicians. It is rather a suggestion that having several forms of theological procedure is probably crucial in maintaining the liveliness and suppleness of the Christian tradition. What would happen to theological practice and the teaching of theology if we were to take the form of dialectic investigation seriously again? Originally, dialektikḗ was a collective investigation, as indicated by the English word that derives from it, “dialogue.” Even in Plato this more primitive definition crops up here and there. “Only when all of these things—names, definitions, and visual and other perceptions—have been rubbed against one another and tested, pupil and teacher asking and answering questions in good will and without envy—only then, when reason and knowledge are at the very extremity of human effort, can they illuminate the nature of any object.”4 What difference might it make, practically, to approach the investigation of truth as a collective and conversational endeavor rather than the solitary pursuit so typical of contemporary academia, at least in the humanities? Following this line of reasoning has brought me to a new point of departure. How can we show, step by step, how theologians must work their way from known into unknown territory? Any thinker who is not just repeating them self is certainly doing this work. But when theologians present this work only in the form of polished texts summarizing their conclusions, they hide their own the processes of getting to those conclusions. Only the few students privileged to study directly at the feet of a master ever get to see the working processes out of which theology springs. These considerations suggest that there might be very good pedagogical reasons to explore the form of theological dialogue if our aim is to display where theological insight, real insight, actually comes from, how it is generated or received. An Experiment in Listening The lesson of Socrates is that a properly supple investigation of how Christians are to live well in a technological society will need to grapple with the cultural context in which the conversation is taking place. Substantial moral forces are constantly bearing down on us as we attempt to think theologically about our ways of life. In recounting my own experiment in taking common opinion seriously, I hope it will also begin to 4. Plato, Epistles VII.344b.

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become clear how this work of close listening inevitably changes the questions we ask as theologians. “Technology” is a vast theme. In order not to be overwhelmed by its complexity, I have argued for an initial division of the theme under two broad headings.5 We can call some techniques and devices innovative in having been created with the aim of reshaping some aspect of the fabric of human relations. These might be labelled “political.” Other technologies have been developed primarily to reshape the processes of the material world, including biological life. I continue to find this a theologically defensible and practically useful way of opening discussions of any given technology. On any account there are many developments in both domains that deserve serious theological scrutiny. Technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, social media, and web-based computing are reshaping what I am calling our political relations (within which I include economic structures) and raising a host of ethical problems that beg for theological analysis. The many attempts to alter biological life processes through the rise of genetic techniques and nanotechnologies, as well as the push for bodily enhancement more generally, are equally ripe for close critical examination. In this chapter I examine a set of questions around the alteration of life. A handful of thinkers in the English-speaking world are doing important and careful work engaging questions in this domain; Brent Waters,6 Robert Song,7 Neil Messer8 and Gerald McKenny,9 to name the most prominent. In late 2016 we had the opportunity in Aberdeen to read a pre-publication draft of McKenny’s 2018 book, Biotechnology, Human Nature and Christian Ethics.10 As I read and debated the book by e-mail with McKenny, I began to wonder if the discussion among academics was starting to drift free in problematic ways from the main lines of popular thinking about the ethics of human enhancement. Put bluntly, it seemed to me that McKenny had gone further than I thought prudent in accepting at face value the claims of those who are 5. Brian Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), chap. 6, 8. 6. Brent Waters, From Human to Posthuman: Christian Theology and Technology in a Postmodern World (Farnham: Ashgate, 2006). 7. Robert Song, Human Genetics: Fabricating the Future (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2002). 8. Neil Messer, Respecting Life: Theology and Bioethics (Norwich: SCM, 2011). 9. Gerald McKenny, Biotechnology, Human Nature, and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 10. Ibid.

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developing technologies and drugs for enhancing human bodies and minds. The highly nuanced argument of Biotechnology, Human Nature and Christian Ethics finally concludes that the therapy–enhancement distinction is fatally flawed. There is no fixed “human nature” that can provide a baseline for judging whether medical techniques are therapies or enhancements. Human beings have been altering themselves by way of prostheses and pharmaceutical interventions for many generations, not to mention the drastic effects produced by social technologies such as education. All these technical alterations of the human lifeworld have not had trivial effect in reshaping how we experience what it means to be embodied human beings. Thus the belief that we are stepping into a wholly new realm, or turning ourselves into cyborgs by altering the human genome or implanting technological innovations such as neuralnano interfaces, simply overlooks the massive continuities these techniques share with a much longer journey of human self-alteration, begun when we fashioned false teeth for ourselves, started wearing glasses, taking antibiotics and sending our children to school. More than anyone else, the bioethicist Carl Elliot had shown me that somehow there has to be a morally important piece missing from this story. Even if McKenny is right that human nature is not a fixed entity and that the therapy-enhancement divide is not conceptually sustainable, does that mean that Christians should support the trend toward increasingly trying to make our bodies better than they are? Elliot’s 2003 book, Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream,11 examines what it looks like in practice to proceed as if there are no distinctions to be made between therapy and enhancement. A distinction might be useful even if it is impossible to draw a sharp line between the alternatives. Or perhaps the distinction is bad and we should seek a better way to make it. In the United States today, “biohacking” has become a common aim, understood as the self-optimization of the individual’s biological powers.12 It is no longer possible to say with any intellectual coherence that there is something morally questionable about a girl wanting to starve herself because she feels too fat, or a boy wanting to take steroids because in his self-image he is much bigger, or a college student taking drugs to 11. Carl Elliot, Better than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003). 12. Stefanie Marsh, “Extreme Biohacking: The Tech Guru Who Spent $250,000 Trying to Live For Ever,” The Guardian, September 21, 2018.

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achieve better grades. Michel Foucault’s account of biopower as the political imperative to technically augment the powers of life appears to have trickled down to determine how each individual views the imperative to optimize the functioning of their own body. It seems quaint today to remain content with simple wellness. Techniques are available to make one look and feel like the heroic, beautiful, and high-performing human specimens who star in the dominant cultural narratives of our time. Elliot takes pains to point out that this new cultural norm did not arise by accident, but has been assiduously created by those who profit by telling people that they can be more athletic, smarter, more beautiful, and have more and better sex; most notably, big pharma. If this is the world Christians are living in today (and I think Elliot has made his case persuasively), then it seems dangerous for Christians to align themselves with those who are keen to offer more and deeper enhancement opportunities (however enticingly labelled), as McKenny finally does. It is dangerous because we are thinking about these issues in a culture that no longer has any language that allows people to perceive any value in the givenness of life. It is one thing to say that the death of God has transformed creation into nature. It is quite another to positively affirm the claim that nature not only can but must be made better. It is embracing this second claim that seems most theologically problematic. But resisting it depends on having a robust sense of what it means to be inhabitants of a secular modern world and yet affirm the material world not as “nature”, but as “creation”. That’s one problem. A second has to do with the focus of the work of theological ethicists in recent decades. Newspaper pundits often say, “our technology is ahead of our ethics.” But it could also be a dangerous evasion to assume that the problems that really need attention are the scary technical developments just over the horizon. Might the guild of professional ethicists somehow have fallen into a trap in concentrating on the gorillas just over the horizon of technological development? There may already be a herd of elephants filling the room with their aromatic dung. Or to switch the metaphor, the enhancement train has already left the station, and we are on it. These, at least, were the hypotheses that I was keen to test in the forum of popular opinion. I had also been provoked to consider these questions by a conversation on a hospital ward in Aberdeen with a Dutch paediatric oncologist. It was July, Tour de France time in Europe, and I happened to mention that I was trying to watch an occasional stage on TV. The doctor became visibly agitated, denouncing as abuse the peloton’s use of drugs

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developed to treat seriously sick children. At the time, the doping drug of choice was erythropoietin, colloquially known as “EPO.” EPO is a peptide hormone produced naturally by the kidneys, that stimulates the bone marrow to produce red blood cells. When artificially synthesized and injected into the muscles, it markedly boosts red blood cell production, allowing greater exertion and decreased recovery time. A drug funded and developed to offer therapeutic benefit to children facing the ravages of chemotherapy had become the drug of choice among a great number of healthy athletes seeking to enrich themselves and entertain fans by enhancing their sporting performance. For this doctor, at least, this is a clear-cut example of why it makes important moral sense to be able to distinguish between therapy and enhancement. What I wanted to know is whether she was alone in clinging to the distinction, whether her moral outrage at what she saw as an abuse was more narrowly connected to her professional involvement in cancer treatment, her being from an older generation, or was perhaps even a characteristically Dutch view. I was lucky enough to have devised a perfect laboratory in which to investigate the question: a class I was about to begin teaching, called “Film as a Public Ethical Arena.” The format of the class is simple: I show a documentary film chosen to provoke morally interesting questions about life as it is already being lived by the students. At the end of the film, I pass out index cards and ask them to answer a very simple question: “What is the most important ethical question raised by this film?” The film functions as a Rorschach test, a complex figure provoking students to articulate their guiding moral sensibilities. The main part of the class is an extended discussion about the presumptions embedded in the ethical questions the students have highlighted. The first half of the course contains students studying a wide range of subjects, most in humanities degrees of some sort, including theology. During the second half of the term, however, a cohort of medical students join in, as part of an elective medical humanities degree. I cluster the films around questions of the alteration of biological life during that part of the course attended by the medical students. This has also turned out to be useful, since marked differences in sensibility regularly emerge between medical students and those studying other disciplines. My question is now clear: Do people believe any more that therapy can or should be distinguished from enhancement? And my method of investigation has been outlined: showing films and seeing what questions they raise. Here is how my investigation proceeded.

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The course began in 2015, and included a sequence of three films that proved such provocative conversation starters that I repeated it in 2016. The 2005 film “Our Daily Bread”13 beautifully introduces the theme of the technological reshaping of life by following, in long slow pans without any commentary, the various processes that bring foods into our grocery stores, and so onto our own bodies. We see dairy cows being milked by machines and birthing calves by caesarean section. We see the collection and processing of the semen of gigantic double-muscled Belgian blue beef cattle by lab-coated technicians. We see cows, pigs, and chickens being killed and butchered in factory conditions. We see the life cycle of battery hens, layers and broilers, whose eggs are incubated in massive heated cabinets, and machine sorted after they hatch. Their beaks are hand docked before they are packed off to live their lives in large warehouses. We see machines that cut the tails off piglets, gut fish, strip the skins off cows, burn the hair off pig carcasses. We see the inside of the greenhouses where bell peppers and courgettes grow with occasional baths of pesticides, sprayed by men in hazmat suits. We see machines shaking olives from trees, and immigrant pickers on their knees digging asparagus and harvesting lettuce. Sometimes we see the workers eating their lunches. The presentation is studiously nonpolemical. No voiceover tells the audience how to read the images: we are simply offered a window on what counts in Europe today as ethical and efficient food production. What is blindingly obvious is that the modern European relation to plants and animals has become highly mechanized and industrialized. Almost every student receives some measure of moral shock from the film. Have we really mechanized our relation to living things to such an extent? Is it right to treat animals and plants alike solely as food production units? Are we somehow degraded as human beings by so casually instrumentalizing sentient and even non-sentient beings? When pressed, these moral questions typically mutate into aesthetic objections: it just seems wrong to live this way, it looks ugly, even in the humane and hygienic form presented in the film. There is something about the mass processing and artificial reproduction of genetically altered animal bodies that sticks in the craw. This mutation of moral objections into aesthetic objections often happens at the moment students realize how different life in western Europe would have to be if we attempted to change these 13. Our Daily Bread [Unser täglich Brot], directed by Nikolaus Geyrhalter (Nikolaus Geyrhalter Filmproduktion, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen, 2005).

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practices. We are enmeshed in processes of industrial food production that it would cause massive disruption and expense to challenge. When the magnitude of what it would mean to have a moral objection to this way of life sinks in, it seems obvious to most that the only realistic response is to just admit that we find it hard to look at. Engagement with our ways of treating animal and plant bodies prepares the ground for the main question to be broached: Will there be a similar reaction to the application of exactly these techniques to the human body? The 2014 film, “Stop at Nothing: The Lance Armstrong Story”14 powerfully introduces this question by following Armstrong’s regime for manipulating his own body. Armstrong has become the icon of long-term and systematic use of EPO to enhance not only his sporting performance, but his whole persona. He is the telegenic victor over cancer who ruled the Tour for years. Since EPO was a banned substance for the duration of his reign, his entire career rested on an illegal performance enhancement. Along the way we also discover the wide social implications of the regime of body alteration he followed for well over a decade. Armstrong is not above trying to crush the careers of those he considered traitors. The film offers excruciating details of the coercive lengths Armstrong was willing to go to protect his great secret. One aspect of this was ideological: as an American cyclist he was able to understand and exploit the leniency that had long been shown among tour officials for riders taking performance enhancing substances while at the same time understanding the American idealization of world-class athletic performance as a valorization of hard work and natural ability. But behind the scenes, Armstrong was going to great lengths to ensure that the ideology of disciplined performance was applied to himself as a sporting icon, while being ignored by his American teammates, some of whom felt increasingly guilty. The film follows the unravelling of Armstrong’s carefully curated public image as his subordinates slowly tire of telling to themselves and their family members the lies necessary to cover their team’s doping. Eventually one of them cracks and tells the truth to the media and the dominoes come tumbling down. The student reaction to the film was relatively uniform: the ethical problem was Armstrong’s coercion of his teammates, and all the lying that this entailed, not the doping itself. It was his body, and his choice. 14. Stop at Nothing: The Lance Armstrong Story, directed by Alex Holmes (ABC Commercial, Passion Pictures, 2014).

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A variation of that argument was that the fans were right to love him, he was beautiful when he was on form, and he too was part of a wider culture of doping, so he cannot be singled out for blame. In two years of showing the film, no more than three students, themselves keen athletes, dared ask: But wasn’t he cheating? It was a question that the majority found easy to answer: yes, he was cheating, but the rules against doping are out of date. If athletes wish to risk their bodies by enhancing them with various chemical interventions, the prohibition of cheating in sport is a taboo without moral substance and should simply be dropped. I double-checked my growing sense that my students had no use for the therapy-enhancement distinction by showing the 2008 television documentary entitled “Sex Change Soldier.”15 This film follows the first serving British military officer to undergo a sex change. We follow him to Thailand, where he undergoes a highly invasive surgical sex change that involves breaking and reshaping the nose and forehead, removing the face to reshape the hairline, and eyes, as well as the removal of male genitalia and the reconstruction of female genitalia. The documentary does not spare the viewer the mechanics of the operations. Though our current moral climate made this a ticklish film to discuss in a university classroom, it is worth noting that not a single student expressed moral qualms about such intense manipulation of the body. This soldier was exercising a choice about how to treat the body. Cracks only began to emerge in this moral consensus when I asked whether it should be paid for by the NHS, which raised, from a different angle, the question of whether this rather intensive medical treatment was healing or improving the body. Thus, neither the Armstrong movie nor Sex Change Solder generated any genuine moral resistance to the idea that human bodies can be reconfigured at will. What was objectionable was Armstrong’s bullying, and the British Army’s discriminatory refusal to employ the post-op sex change soldier. To throw someone out of the army because they had improved their body seemed to most much like the ban on doping in sports—a relic of a bygone moral era. The verdict from the first round of the experiment thus appeared essentially unambiguous: the distinction between enhancement and therapy had gone. Though it was somehow unsightly to manipulate plant and animal bodies in highly mechanized and instrumentalized ways, the radical alteration of the human body evoked no such qualms. What was 15. Sex Change Soldier, directed by Jane Preston (IWC Media, 2008).

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at least clear is that if students had qualms about the radical remaking of the human body, they at least believed they had no right publicly to question other people’s right to remake their bodies as radically as they please. I decided to see how deep this consensus went in the 2017 version of the class. Still beginning with “Our Daily Bread”, I swapped the Armstrong movie and the sex change movie for one about a pop star killing herself with bulimia, alcohol and drugs, and another about the intertwining of performance enhancing drugs and popular American culture. The 2015 film “Amy”16 follows the young British pop star Amy Winehouse as she escapes from the manipulative pressures of fame into drugs, bulimia, and booze. It is a desperately sad film. Understandably, the students are alarmed by the toxicity of our fame culture, and the unfaithfulness of Winehouse’s family and friends as she spiralled out of control. But the blind spot reappeared when asked what a faithful friend should have said to Amy. The students strongly affirmed that they had no right to say she should not do what she liked with her body, but they could have stayed closer to her as she did so, protected her from more cameras and press hounding. I followed “Amy” with the more light-hearted 2008 documentary, “Bigger, Stronger, Faster*.”17 The film follows the quest of one of three adult brothers considering taking anabolic steroids. His two brothers are unabashed steroid users, one because he aspires to be a professional wrestler, the other because he is a competitive weightlifter who will have to give up the sport if he gives up the steroids. The weightlifter is also a high school football coach, who admits the duplicity of his telling his student athletes that they can succeed through discipline and hard work while himself taking steroids. The film traces how this duplicity also characterized the lives of some major American cultural icons in the 1980s and 90s, held up as paragons of discipline and physical prowess for bodies built by steroids. The epitome of this cultural trajectory arrives in 1990 with George H. W. Bush standing on the White House lawn and announcing the appointment of the ostentatiously enhanced Arnold Schwarzenegger as chairman of the President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports.

16. Amy, directed by Asif Kapida (Film4 Production, 2015). 17. Bigger, Stronger, Faster*, directed by Chris Bell (BSF Film, 2008).

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The moral configuration of this cultural moment is beautifully illustrated at the end of the documentary. The protagonist is from a devout Christian family that has been having some morally fraught conversations about the morality of steroid use and the lying that goes with it. The movie ends as the family watches the weightlifting son in a competition. The camera is turned on the family as the son succeeds in lifting the massive weights that will win him the competition. The final freeze frame image of the film captures the moral bottom line of this time and place: every member of the family is leaping to their feet with massive smiles on their faces to cheer their son’s victory. The filmmaker’s thesis is obvious, and clearly indicated in the film’s subtitle: Americans will do whatever it takes to win. In the end, that includes embracing all the pharmaceutical enhancements necessary to get there, even if some moral guilt remains. I tried a fresh angle in 2018. Perhaps the films I had been showing focused so much on the question of individual choice that they had never allowed students to interrogate the social implications of bodily modification. Since there had been glimmers that these social implications had bothered a few student athletes, I found a movie that managed to foreground the social dynamics of doping in sports. The award-winning 2017 documentary “Icarus”18 starts out much like “Bigger, Stronger, Faster,” with the protagonist asking whether he should take performance enhancing drugs to compete in a week-long bicycle race in the European mountains. The film follows the protagonist pursuing a doped performance, giving himself injections and reconfiguring his training to maximise the drug effects—to generally treat his body like a machine to be optimized. Everything falls apart when he crashes in the cycle event, dashing his dream of being able to compare his doped and non-doped performance. Only when his individual story is over does the real drama of the film begin, as the Russian who has been coaching him on his drug and training regime is slowly engulfed in a public scandal. It turns out that his coach, Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov, had been the director of Russia’s national anti-doping laboratory for decades. The documentary maker has been filming the key actor facilitating decades of state-sponsored doping. And to his horror, the fact that Rodchenkov is admitting this on camera is very likely to get him killed. Putin will not stand idly by 18. Icarus, directed by Bryan Fogel (Alex Productions, Chicago Media Project, Diamond Docs, 2017).

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while a decade of Olympic gold hauls are tarnished by his chief doctor confessing to systematic Russian doping. The film ends as a political thriller, the one-time amateur cyclist dabbling in doping becoming a covert agent smuggling his coach out of Russia to avoid a political assassination. It was a film that seemed to admirably illustrate the individualist fallacy behind the “my body my choice” ontology, at least as it plays out in sports and politics. For the first time it was plain to see that if one person enhances, immense pressure is placed on everyone to follow suit. The film presses the point as to whether modifying life—bodies—really can be disconnected from the forms taken by political relationships. The two domains of technology may be distinguishable, but are never unrelated to one another. Manipulating bodies will entail alteration of the social order. While it was clear that this film revealed these connections to the students, it was not the moral question that captured their attention. What stood out to them was the murderous politics of Putin’s Russia. Doping, including state-sponsored doping, was morally uninteresting. When pressed, they admitted that it might be nice if the Olympics were enhancement-free, but it is pure romanticism to believe we are ever going to see a drug-free Olympics in our lifetimes. Ban enhancements, or don’t ban them, the tide will not be stopped—we have entered an era when enhancement is simply going to happen, whether we want it to or not. Which brings us to 2018. Once more I shuffled the cards. “Our Daily Bread” was again my opener, but this time followed by the recently released film, “Take Your Pills.”19 This documentary follows several figures, including a young man who is grappling with his identity after having been given, from a very young age, a stimulant called Ritalin and intended to calm attention deficit disorder. He is a highly talented artist, and the film’s title refers to his extensive artistic explorations of the pressure that his parents and teachers had put on him, as long as he could remember, to “take your pills.” The film also follows an African American mother asking whether she should put her young teenage son on drugs that will make him behave better in school, as well as a professional football player reflecting on the reasons that he thought he needed to take drugs to sharpen his mind and succeed as an athlete.

19. Take Your Pills, directed by Alison Klayman (Motto Pictures, Netflix Studios, 2018).

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The pressure to perform faced by all American college students, tech workers, and financial analysts, and to take mind-enhancing drugs to succeed in these domains, emerges as a major theme as the film progresses. For those wishing to move up the social ladder, taking drugs like Ritalin and Adderall to enhance concentration is fast becoming an entrenched part of modern American society. In the 80s and 90s professional sports people were choosing to enhance their bodies to win. Today a much larger number of average American citizens are feeling they need to enhance their minds just to survive economic competition. What was once called enhancement has settled into a widespread and habitual pharmaceutical alteration of brain function. I concluded my experiment by probing the question from a totally different angle. What if this world in which everyone lives with a sense that they must change their bodies just to keep up was juxtaposed with a cultural space organized with the alternative aim of accepting and loving everyone just as they are? The 2017 documentary “Summer in the Forest”20 depicts the events of one summer at two L’Arche communities, one in France, the other in Bethlehem. L’Arche is a movement founded by Jean Vanier, with the explicit aim of recovering a liveable life for people with intellectual disabilities. Vanier wanted to foster a culture different in kind from the violence and isolation that had been typical of institutions for the learning impaired in the first half of the twentieth century. In a world where everyone believes they must progress and win in a competition to succeed, inevitably crushing some in the process, what would it look like if we slowed down and configured our lives together in a manner that let people move at their own pace? Was it possible to receive one another, with all our limitations, in communities where we live together?21 Showing “Summer in the Forest” right after “Take Your Pills” drew attention to the social implications of our relation to our bodies. One week we were having Silicon Valley computer programmers tell us about their daily drug regime and hearing about Wall Street traders ending up in hospital after working 50 hours straight with pharmaceutical help. The next week we were watching slow moving scenes of a man with physical and mental disabilities working to shave himself, or a picnic where people with disabilities and carers shared a meal together. During 20. Summer in the Forest, directed by Randall Wright (R2W Films, 2017). 21. Jean Vanier, Community and Growth, rev. ed. (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1989), chap. 1.

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the discussion of “Take your Pills,” it was clear that the students felt there to be something genuinely threatening about a world in which one has to enhance to survive. But they found it almost impossible to articulate what the problem could be. At the same time, they found Vanier’s rival vision utterly bewildering. Why are we watching a film about care homes for disabled people? What does this have to do with us? For them, the world of competition to survive was so obviously the “real” world that the premise and logic of L’Arche were not only alien, but existed in a different, foreign, universe. They mustered a few questions about why all care homes weren’t so peaceful, and why modern developed nations weren’t prepared to fund care homes to reach the obviously attractive standards of care displayed in “Summer in the Forest.” But they simply could not see the connection between the politics of enhancement, and the politics of gracious acceptance of given life. In Place of a Conclusion I have not established that students today have lost the therapy–enhancement distinction. It may be that they fear to speak publicly in defense of it. Since I was also reading their written reflections on the films, I knew that their more personal reflections were often deeper and more explicit about their own positions, suggesting that there are some muffling and exaggerating effects that come with having the discussion in a relatively large group. Though there are practical ways to probe whether students have ideas they are afraid to voice, or whether they are utterly unfamiliar with a particular idea, the dynamics of speaking in public and in groups will always attend all attempts at Socratic investigation of public opinion. What does seem clear from even the most cursory survey of public rhetoric in the popular press is that technological development is spontaneously going to bring about equality, transparency, financial security, in short, justice and freedom. Of this we are constantly assured. Too often the promises attached to new technologies direct our attention away from the materiality of our lives and from the power of those who benefit by our current cultural trajectories. Gerald McKenny is probably right that the therapy–enhancement distinction is hard to maintain, especially if we try to do so with a naturalized account of human nature. But I remain convinced that Christians should be seeking ways to critically resist the massive wave of cultural messaging that is determined to persuade us we have no choice but to positively embrace becoming better rather than merely well.

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What seems incontrovertible is that the enhancement train has left the station. We’re not so much becoming cyborg as already doled out over all sorts of networks. Our social lives, our memories, our money, even our cognitive processing is strewn across a global network of data centers and server farms. We are already as committed to this way of life as we are to industrial food production. We are going to go wherever these commitments take us. We are not going to be able to go off-grid, or at least not anytime soon. Hence my question: Should Christians be on the side of this status quo? Precisely what sort of claim are we making when, invoking the name of Christ, we say today that we should embrace what was formerly called enhancement? Has the form of life we know as western industrialized democracies already achieved true justice? Can we really honestly affirm that, in a world that is consuming its resources at an alarming rate, the question of whether Christians are for or against enhancement is even the right question to ask? The environmental crisis is a major clue that Christians ought at least see the wisdom of attempts to speak up for ways of life that seek to accept creaturely limit as valuable, that wish to embrace the given contours and limits of creation without investing vast energy and research funding into making life something new and improved. We might even read our generation’s passion for virtual reality as a prophetic sign that we have become people from whom reality is no longer enough. It should probably at least spur us to some reflection about what it is that we’re trying to escape from by enhancing ourselves. Even my choice of documentary films is an exploration of this point. One of the defining characteristics of contemporary image production is that its basic technologies are digital. This is why CGI, “morphing,” and all sorts of digital alteration have become commonplace in our culture, from movies to advertisements to the pictures of themselves that young people post on social media. Documentaries remind us that the creaturely world is more mundane and resistant to our designs. We can easily alter an image: altering the physical world takes much more knowhow and practical investment. Each of the films discussed in this chapter displays how common it is for us westerners to be frustrated with the limits of the flesh—and how regularly technologies are presented to us that promise we can transcend those limits. Along with imagery of steroid and surgery-enhanced celebrities, our culture is rife with cartoon figures sporting more-powerful-than-human prostheses. Our cultural dreams are rarely satisfied with mere mortality, and the assumptions about bodies in this visual culture include the loss of the political

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horizon that has become characteristic of our time. The fantasy of our desire is to have a body that is more than our body, even though this is almost never our experience of mundane technological “enhancements.”22 This is the cultural landscape that renders it almost impossible to argue against the offer of technological transcendence of creaturely givenness. Within such a cultural context it is important for Christians to be clear on at least one point: if we are committed to the just distribution of resources and political power, we will only occasionally find that technological developments hold any promise of achieving these ends. Conversely, if we believe that technological development itself will somehow achieve these ends autonomously, we are going to end up with the distribution of justice and political power that emerges from the technological trajectories already described. Christians and non-Christians alike appear to have entirely lost the capacity to conceive the virtues that the monastic tradition called stability and poverty. We simply cannot resign ourselves to live in our place, we cannot accept the givenness of our own bodies as good, and we are willing to risk anything to remake it into something more satisfying. And we’ve decided to live with the unsightliness that this produces. To change, we believe, would make us poorer. If we cared more for animal bodies or even the bodies of workers it would cost too much, impoverish our diet too much. We shirk extending the conveniences of our lifestyle to the rest of the world, because we know that if they lived like we live, we would be poorer, and the world’s resources would be consumed even more rapidly as the glaciers melt and the seas rise. Having limits is intrinsic to being a creature. I would suggest that this is one of the main messages Christians in the developed world need urgently to hear. This is not a denial of human capacity and authority to reshape creation. We are not forbidden to fly because we were not born with wings, nor condemned to pain in childbirth out of a misplaced sense that it is decreed by God or nature. What we are not free to do is to act as if infinite plasticity and constant and total self-remaking is our nature and goal23 as a self-justifying defence of our inability to be

22. Don Idhe, Bodies in Technology (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 14–5. 23. Contra Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chap. 1.

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reconciled to any limits.24 Once we assume our body can be infinitely manipulated, we will not avoid its instrumentalization, its transformation into the status of a tool. This inability to embrace stability and poverty points to the distinct possibility that, in the final analysis, even modern Christians are incapable of understanding that all-important third monastic vow: obedience. It is hard to see how a people who cannot abide staying in one place or accept their bodies and the bodies of others will be able to conceive living in obedience to a tradition that demands their lives, demands they conform themselves to a non-negotiable word of God. It is hard to imagine that many Christians today can articulate what it means to have one’s desires thwarted by a divine word and the claim of a God who is outspokenly committed to justice and to ending the oppression of those crushed by the strong. If modern Christians can rediscover the intelligibility of that chastity to which the old monks and nuns committed themselves, we might still be able to offer something to a world enslaved by the freedom to have, to consume, and to perform. Only those who have come to experience limits tangibly, not as slavery but as the very condition of being human, will be able to see through the powerful glittering of technological promises. No one, Christian or non-Christian, can afford to let their eyes glaze over when conversation turns to technology. To give up on these discussions is to give up on people and their flourishing. It is to cede ethics to those who care more about augmenting their wealth and power than about what humans are doing to each other and the creaturely world. It should be Christians leading the way in seeking out the vestiges of those gentler ways of living that have been all but erased from the hard drive of western culture. Only those looking for more convivial and patient ways of life, forms of life more at home with imperfection and variation, will discover the fleeting openings offered to us amidst a form of life perhaps best called surveillance capitalism.25 We must dare to hope that a God content to slow down to the speed of the human body is still offering ways back into forms of life content with the human body we have been given, and with it, the whole earth. 24. Deborah B. Creamer, Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), chap. 5. 25. Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (London: PublicAffairs, 2019).

Loneliness Caused by Technology and Social Media Use VALERIIA CHORNOBAI

Abstract This chapter is devoted to analyzing the connection between loneliness and the use of certain technology and social media. It underlines the fact that the use of social media lowers the level of loneliness by increasing feelings of social connectedness when active, meaningful communication and interaction are taking place. Passive use of social media, on the other hand, exacerbates feelings of emotional loneliness. It is argued that a sense of belonging, formed by frequent, affectively positive and reciprocal interactions within the context of long-term, caring relationships with other people, is necessary for human nature.

Introduction The global health service company Cigna has published a report, the result of a survey of loneliness in the United States. Cigna collected data on more than 20,000 adults, aged 18 and older, and found that almost half of them are lonely (46%).1 The problem is not limited to the United States. Cigna’s research is part of a growing body of evidence that loneliness and social isolation affect millions of people, destroy social cohesion, and that the problem is associated with serious illness. There are a growing number of research projects showing that loneliness and social isolation are related to serious physical and mental health problems, such as cardiovascular disease and high blood pressure and are a predictor of functional decline, Alzheimer’s disease, personality disorders, depression, suicide and death.2 It is said that chronic “loneliness has the same impact 1. “New Cigna Study Reveals Loneliness at Epidemic Levels in America,” Cigna, accessed October 4, 2019, https://www.cigna.com/newsroom/news-releases/2018/ new-cigna-study-reveals-loneliness-at-epidemic-levels-in-america. 2. Louise C. Hawkley et al., “Loneliness Predicts Increased Blood Pressure: 5-Year Cross-Lagged Analyses in Middle-Aged and Older Adults,” Psychology and Aging 25, no. 1 (2010): 132–41; Julianne Holt-Lunstad and Timothy B. Smith, “Loneliness and Social Isolation as Risk Factors for CVD: Implications for Evidence-Based Patient Care and Scientific Inquiry,” Heart 102, no. 13 (July 2016): 987–9; Carla M. Perissinotto, Irena S. Cenzer, and Kenneth E. Covinsky, “Loneliness in Older Persons: A Predictor

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on mortality as smoking 15 cigarettes a day, making it even more dangerous than obesity”.3 Experts have different theories about what is driving loneliness and isolation. It can be due to personal as well social factors. According to a 2017 report prepared for a Senator from Utah, the decline in our interaction with each other is evidenced by several factors: in the States monthly church attendance has fallen from the early 1970s, with 50% attending in the past and 42% at present; in 1974, a third of Americans spent time socially with their neighbors several times a week, now, only 19% do; they also spend less time in personal meaningful conversations with their co-workers, going from an average of 2.5 hours a week in the mid-70s to just under an hour in 2012; families are also becoming smaller.4 So urbanization and individualization of a modern, especially western, society create a paradoxical situation, where a person is forced to almost constantly interact with other people, and, at the same time, loses close, deep relationships. Therefore, loneliness is becoming the lot not of few, but of thousands of people. But is it correct to connect loneliness with the use of electronic devices? Based on the recent theoretical and experimental researches related to this matter, this chapter attempts explain how the use of certain technologies and social media is connected to some types of loneliness, and how we can keep our human identity in the modern technological age. The Results of Experiments A fascinating psychological experiment was recently conducted in Saint Petersburg on high-school students in Russia.5 The main hypothesis was of Functional Decline and Death,” Archives of Internal Medicine 172, no. 14 (2012): 1078–83; Raheel Mushtaq et al., “Relationship Between Loneliness, Psychiatric Disorders and Physical Health: A Review on the Psychological Aspects of Loneliness,” Journal of Clinical & Diagnostic Research 8, no. 9 (2014): WE01–WE04; Julianne Holt-Lunstad et al., “Loneliness and Social Isolation as Risk Factors for Mortality: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 10, no. 2 (2015): 227–37; Louise C. Hawkley and John T. Cacioppo, “Loneliness Matters: A Theoretical and Empirical Review of Consequences and Mechanisms,” Annals of Behavioral Medicine 40, no. 2 (2010): 218–27. 3. Christina L. Lyons, “Loneliness and Social Isolation,” CQ Researcher 28 (2018): 657–80. 4. Senator Mike Lee of Utah, “Annual Report 2017,” accessed October 4, 2019, https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017-annual-report. 5. Ксения Мурашова, “Кого боятся подростки” [Katerina Murashova, “Whom teenagers are afraid of”], Snob, Januari 30, 2012 accessed October 4, 2019, https://snob.ru/selected/entry/45522.

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that teenagers nowadays are quite heavily dependent on modern communication technologies, so much so that they do not know how to occupy themselves without them, avoid “meeting with themselves,” and are even afraid to do so. Under the terms of the experiment, the participants agreed to spend a continuous eight hours alone, without any means of communication (telephone, internet, computer or other gadgets, as well as radio and television). All other human activities (playing, reading, writing, craft, drawing, modeling, singing, playing music, walking, etc.) were allowed. If they became distressed or exhibited other disturbing symptoms, the experiment would immediately be stopped, and the time and the reason for its termination noted. The sample consisted of 68 teenagers with an average age of 15, all of whom volunteered for the study. Their parents agreed to leave the children on their own for eight hours. This whole venture seemed to be completely safe. But it was not. The thrill of the new situation, the interest and the joy of having time on their own, disappeared in almost all of them by the beginning of the second or third hour. During the experiment teenagers cooked, ate, tried to read a book, did some school assignments. Although it was during the holidays, they nevertheless reached for their books in desperation. Some wandered around the house, went outside, to the store or a cafe (although communiciation was forbidden, they decided that vendors and cashiers did not count), assembled puzzles or played with “Lego.” Others drew, bathed, cleaned their room, played with a pet, did sports, recorded their feelings or thoughts, wrote letters on paper, or played the guitar or piano. One boy traveled around the city by bus for almost five hours; another boy had been riding roller coasters for three hours to the point that he began to vomit; one young man walked across the city from one end to the other, a distance of around 25 km; one girl went to the Museum of Political History and another boy went to the zoo; one girl prayed. But they terminated their participation in the experiment. Only three teenagers, two boys and a girl, managed to make it to the end. The rest of the participants left the experiment when they experienced obvious vegetative symptoms: hot or cold flushes, dizziness, nausea, sweating, dry mouth, tremor, pain in the chest. Almost everyone experienced anxiety or fear, and five of them even had severe panic attacks. Three teenagers had suicidal thoughts. All fears and symptoms disappeared immediately when the experiment was terminated. One of the two boys who successfully completed the experiment spent all eight hours assembling a model sailing ship, with a break for

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food and a walk with the dog. The girl spent the whole reading. The other boy first sorted out and organized his collections, and then transplanted flowers. Neither one of the boys experienced any negative emotions during the course of the experiment and did not notice the emergence of “strange” thoughts. Yet one can argue that this experiment simply leads to the conclusion that most teenagers do not know how to be alone. This much seems to have been clear. But what is still not clear is what role, if any, gadgets play in aggravating a sense of loneliness in teenagers? After all, the teenagers were deprived not only of electronic gadgets (that can be just a means of communication), but also of personal communication with their peers, which is essential during adolescence. For those reasons, a new experiment was conducted by the same researcher two years later, in which 49 adolescents participated, from 11 to 20 years old, involving 26 girls and 23 boys. The task again was quite simple: they had to choose one (any) person from their usual environment, get his/her consent to the experiment, and then spend at least eight hours with this person, without using any electronic devices.6 In the case of any discomfort, the experiment would be stopped immediately, the time noted and the reasons described in as much detail as possible. This experiment was completed by 13 participants (26.5%). Nine of them were younger teenagers (from 11 to 13 years old), who chose one of their parents as their partner for the eight hours. They either built something together in their country house, or went for a walk together around the city, or spent all eight hours driving and talking. Some older teenagers, who chose their boyfriend or their girlfriend as a partner, talked, ate together, or just slept. A 12-year-old boy, together with his older brother, spent all eight hours building a dog-house, taking a break only to eat and bathe. (Interestingly, they didn’t have a dog. But after the experiment, their mother finally agreed to buy one.) And finally, one 14-year-old girl met up with a former classmate and they talked throughout the whole eight hours. The absolute majority of the other 36 teenagers had chosen a peer as their partner in the experiment, either a friend or girlfriend. In almost all of the cases, the experiment was stopped before the time was up 6. Ксения Мурашова, “8 часов без гаджетов” [Katerina Murashova, “8 hours without gadgets”], Snob, August 8, 2014, accessed October 4, 2019, https://snob.ru/ selected/entry/79799.

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because “the gadgets, that were put aside to the far corner before the start of the experiment, like the Tolkien’s “Ring of Absolute power”, pulled the teenagers powerfully to them.”7 Some had to interrupt the experiment because of unbearable boredom. Unexpectedly, they found out that their normal communication mostly consisted of sharing some internet jokes, listening to music, playing computer games, or watching movies. And these teenagers were not able to spend eight hours together in fellowship without access to all of this. These results can be frightening. Yet, we should take into account that we cannot extrapolate the results of the experiment to include all adolescents because of the limitation in the size of the sample and the fact that it reflected a certain cultural background. But it seems that the hypothesis was confirmed: adolescents do not know how to enjoy their own company or appreciate time in solitude. But not only that: they also seem to be losing the skills of building deep, meaningful, reciprocal relationships without (or maybe because) of electronic devices. The Loneliest Generation Some researchers contend that the younger generation is no lonelier than older generations, and they say technology can bring people closer together as well as drive them apart. They say social media can have a beneficial effect on community participation and social networks by helping people maintain long-distance friendships that would have fallen apart if it wasn’t for social media tools.8 Yet the Cigna study showed that those between 18 and 22, also known as Generation Z, have the highest reported loneliness levels and poorer physical health. Accordingly, Cigna found that social media use is correlated with loneliness because it amplifies feelings of isolation. This would explain why Generation Z, some of the most active users of social media, scored so high on the UCLA Loneliness Scale. It is important to note here that the UCLA Loneliness Scale is a specially developed and reliable tool for measuring levels of social and emotional loneliness. Social loneliness develops when one is deprived of the possibility of meaningful communication at the level of information exchange, whereas emotional loneliness arises in the absence of a secure emotional attachment in relationships, when there is no sense of deep 7. Ibid. 8. Lyons, “Loneliness and Social Isolation”, 657.

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understanding, belonging, unity, and acceptance by a significant other person. Social media or social networking sites (SNS) are considered to have been created for communication and interaction with other people, with Facebook being the most dominant SNS platform among young people today.9 Since then, many researchers have been investigating whether SNSs, such as Facebook, make people feel less or more lonely.10 Needless to say, social media play quite a big positive role in society. First of all, they provide communication and interaction between different social groups and individuals. Secondly, information exchange via social media resources helps people to be aware of events happening in the world, thus quenching their “information hunger” and removing social tension. And in spite of the fact that information in the social networks is often very subjective and can be manipulative, it still plays a significant role in shaping public opinion. One recent piece of research says that in Ukraine, where a hybrid war is still taking place, the information provided by the official mass media is less trusted and accepted among the population than that found in social networks.11 Mass media can also be a great educational tool that changes the value orientations of individuals, and improves the general culture of the population, encouraging them to pursue a healthy way of life. In the same way, social networks are said to be one of the main tools today for spreading the Gospel among nations in the Islamic world.12 Social media have their impact in orientation and adaptation to changing social processes, to political phenomena, and in dealing with the economic conditions of life. For immigrants in Western Europe, for example, social media can help with assimilation into the new social surrounding. And finally, social media are known to be recreational and entertaining, to develop 9. Amanda Lenhart, “Teens, Social Media, and Technology Overview,” Pew Research Center, April 2015, accessed October 4, 2019, https://www.pewinternet. org/2015/04/09/introduction-teens-tech/. 10. Matthew Pittman and Brandon Reich, “Social Media and Loneliness: Why an Instagram Picture May Be Worth More Than a Thousand Twitter Words,” Computers in Human Behavior 62 (2016): 155–67. 11. Альона С. Кавєріна, “Довіра до конвергентних медіа в Україні,” Автореферат дисертації. Харків, December 2017 [Alona S. Caverina, “Trust in Convergent Media in Ukraine,” abstract of dissertation Kharkiv: Vasyl Nazarovych Karazin Kharkiv National University], accessed October 4, 2019, http://dissertations. karazin.ua/sociology/resources/3fe37f11f265b25ebf23314814ba3007.pdf. 12. Tiffany Jothen, “How Can You Share the Gospel with Muslims?” Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, September 9, 2016, accessed October 4, 2019, https://billygraham.org/story/how-can-you-share-the-gospel-with-muslims/.

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a certain emotional and psychological tone that is aimed at minimizing psychological stress and creating a feeling of connectedness with other people. Therefore the question might be put more appropriately another way: the use of what kind of social media technology induces which types of loneliness? Social Media Use and Loneliness Several research projects on the effects of Internet use have revealed both positive and negative associations between the use of Social Networking Sites and loneliness.13 These inconsistent findings might be due, in part, to the fact that these studies defined SNS use very broadly, without differentiating the various types of activities and without taking into account different types of loneliness. The more recent studies that implement more nuanced measures identify two main types of social network use, active and passive. Active use of public social networks is “the activities that facilitate direct interactions between the users in a public setting” (e.g., status updating, sharing of photos, chatting etc.)14 Therefore according to a systemic review, social media use may lower the level of social loneliness by increasing feelings of social connectedness under condition of the directed communication and interaction on social media, whereas passive browsing on Facebook, Instagram and commenting etc. was related to an increase in feelings of loneliness.15 Moreover, Wang K. and colleagues, in their research, found that increases in active public Facebook use are related to decreases in feelings of emotional and social loneliness over time, when adolescents have rather low or moderate levels of active public Facebook use. For 13. See Lai Lei Lou et al., “An Examination of the Reciprocal Relationship of Loneliness and Facebook Use,” Journal of Educational Computing Research 46 (2012): 105– 17; Pittman and Reich, “Social media and loneliness”; Brian A. Primack et al., “Social Media Use and Perceived Social Isolation Among Young Adults in the U.S.,” American Journal of Preventative Medicine 53, no. 1 (2017): 1–8. 14. Eline Frison and Steven Eggermont, “Toward an Integrated and Differential Approach to the Relationships between Loneliness, Different Types of Facebook Use and Adolescents’ Depressed Mood,” Communication Research (2015): 4. 15. Philippe Verduyn et al., “Passive Facebook Usage Undermines Affective Well-Being: Experimental and Longitudinal Evidence,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 144, no. 2, (2015): 480–8; Sabine Matook, Jeff Cummings, and Hillol Bala, “Are You Feeling Lonely? The Impact of Relationship Characteristics and Online Social Network Features on Loneliness,” Journal of Management Information Systems 31 (2015): 298.

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adolescents with rather high levels of active public Facebook use, the more they used Facebook to update their status or to post photos or videos, the more they experienced a lack of intimate ties and missed a rich network of social relationships. Thus, this suggests that when offline social interactions are significantly replaced by technologymediated relationships, adolescents feel emotionally lonelier and, more precisely, feel they miss intimate ties in a rich network of friends. This might be an explanation for the increased loneliness among heavy users of Facebook.16 On the other hand, given that various social media sites offer young people ideal ways of seeking social support through sharing status updates or posting pictures, loneliness, only when it is significant enough, may actually increase adolescents’ active public Facebook use up to the point where there is still hope for developing intimate ties through Facebook. Individuals who do not feel lonely at all may find it unnecessary to invest a lot of their time in active Facebook use, because they have alternative social activities that protect their emotional bonds with peers. Social media use, however, is one of many factors that contribute to loneliness, not a sole predictor. Among others, many of the reported reasons for loneliness were lack of companionship, meaningless superficial relationships, and isolation from others in real life, as well as high social mobility (all the things that create a sense of a community for sharing experiences, finding assurance in emotional and other kinds of support). The findings from the study conducted by Mathias Lasgaard, et al., demonstrate that both family-related loneliness and peer-related loneliness are associated with depression, anxiety, and suicide ideation in adolescents, whereas romantic loneliness is associated with social phobia.17 In general, according to Cigna, one in five Americans surveyed reported having meaningful in-person encounters less frequently than once a week.18 And if Generation Z is using social networking sites instead of in-person interactions, that could be contributing to these adolescents’ loneliness.19 16. Kexin Wang et al., “Active Public Facebook Use and Adolescents’ Feelings of Social Loneliness: Evidence for A Curvilinear Relationship,” Journal of Adolescence 67 (2018): 17. 17. Mathias Lasgaard et al. “Different Sources of Loneliness are Associated with Different Forms of Psychopathology in Adolescence,” Journal of Research in Personality 45, no. 2 (2011): 236. 18. “New Cigna Study Reveals Loneliness at Epidemic Levels in America,” Cigna. 19. Jean M. Twenge, “Have Smartphones Destroyed a Generation?” The Atlantic (2017).

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Do we have reason to believe that the internet and other social media technologies can give us a real connection if we spend most of our free time online, usually on our mobile smart phone (for some of adolescents, nearly all of the time)? Over time, increasingly stronger voices are emerging in favor of a more cautious attitude towards the use of media technologies. The Role of Technologies in Human Life Some argue that social networks have changed our understanding of personal space, that information that used to be intended only for a narrow circle of relatives and friends, is now on display for all to see. For some adolescents, there is no doubt that every single fact of their private life should be recorded on Twitter and reflected on Instagram. It seems that “an event becomes of a value only if it can be digitized and published in social media. Personal life is considered to be a conservative prejudice, a relic of the past.”20 The concept of personal time is also under threat. Being under the pressure of today’s busy world we are expected to be always available, in-touch via our gadgets, and to respond immediately. No wonder that in such a pace of life people often feel stressed and overwhelmed. The technologies develop, the more we start to depend on them. And it is more convenient: they count, read, navigate for us, they can measure our pulse, catch the intonation of our voice and even scan brain activity. But we literally lose the skills of thinking independently, by giving something the right to make decisions for us. As Kirill Nikolaev and Shekiya Abdullaeva in their brilliant book Intellectual Stroke: How to Remain a Human in the World of Robots and Not Lose Ourselves state: “One of our abilities at risk is the ability to make decisions. We delegated it to devices … gadgets know what’s better for us: which movie to watch (since millions have seen it), which way to go, what money to spend and even whom to marry (according to our preferences, age and place of residence).”21 This overdependence on the technologies produces fear of losing them, because it seems that all of our connections with the real world are in them. There is even a special term “nomophobia” (an 20. Николаев, Кирилл, Абдуллаева, Шекия. “Интеллектуальный инсульт: Как в мире роботов остаться человеком и не потерять себя” [Kirill Nikolaev and Shekia Abdullaeva. “How to Remain Human in the World of Robots and not Lose Yourself”] (Mann, Ivanov and Ferber, 2016), 12. 21. Николаев, “Интеллектуальный инсульт,”6.

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abbreviation for “No mobile phobia) that is a fear of being without a mobile phone! The term was mentioned for the first time in a 2008 study done for the UK Post Office by YouGov, a UK-based research organization. According to the study, nomophobia can provoke panic attacks, dizziness, and tachycardia. Perhaps the most interesting finding in regards to how much young people are attached to their smartphones in daily lives, shows that just under half (45%) of 18 to 24 year olds say they’d feel weird because they would not know what to do without a phone for a day.22 Other research supports the idea that loneliness is correlated with a high risk of smartphone addiction among the entire study sample, and the feeling of loneliness might be a consequence of using a mobile phone excessively instead of having face-to-face communications.23 Social media have significant influence on public opinion and sometimes can provoke the young generation to self-harmful or suicidal behavior. A few years ago, the phenomenon of the “Blue Whale” community, which originated in Russia as a “game” or a challenge that called teens to commit suicide, became popular in Russian-speaking social networks. Having provoked dozens of suicides, the phenomenon became widespread not only in Russia, but also in the West and in America.24 At the same time, there is evidence supporting the idea that personal information, especially that provided in social media, doesn’t reflect reality. Researchers say that on social platforms such as Facebook, Snapchat, or Instagram, people tend to portray themselves in overly flattering ways. They also communicate positive life events more frequently than negative ones, eliciting envy, an emotion linked to lower well-being.25 We put our life “on pause”, curiously scrolling other people’s pages on social 22. Victoria Waldersee, “Could You Live Without Your Smartphone?” YouGov, March 08, 2019, accessed October 4, 2019, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/technology/ articles-reports/2019/03/08/could-you-live-without-your-smartphone. 23. Asli E. Darcin et al., “Smartphone Addiction and its Relationship With Social Anxiety and Loneliness,” Behaviour & Information Technology 35, no. 7 (2016): 524; see also Çetin Tan et al., “Loneliness and Mobile Phone,” Procedia-Social and Behavioral Science 103 (2013): 606–11. 24. Jan Lindenau, “Hinter dem Hashtag #BlauerWal steckt eine verstörende Geschichte,” Die Welt, May 18, 2017. 25. Vladimir Barash et al., “Faceplant: Impression (Mis)management in Facebook Status Updates,” Proceedings of the Fourth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media 20 (2010): 7–210; Etan Kross et al., “Facebook Use Predicts Declines in Subjective Well-Being in Young Adults,” PLoS ONE 8, no. 8 (2013): 1–6.; Peter Salovey and Judith Rodin, “Some Antecedents and Consequences of Social-Comparison Jealousy,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47, no. 4 (1984): 780–92.; Hanna

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networks, and comparing to ourselves, we understand that the people around us are more successful and happier. We do not realize that we see only a carefully censored, distorted reality.26 But what is it to be truly human in the age of internet, virtual connection, and a newfound mobile addiction? Maybe, for some of us, living on our own, where acquaintances and friendships lack real intimacy, this is just the new normal? The Belongingness Hypothesis Consistent with the belongingness hypothesis, Baumeister and Leary argue that all “human beings have a pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and significant interpersonal relationships.”27 In order for the interpersonal relationships to be satisfying, two conditions must be met: first, interactions with a few other people need to be frequent and affectively pleasant, and second, these interactions must be temporally stable and enduring in a context of reciprocal affection and concern for each other. Therefore, interactions with a constantly changing sequence of partners without stability, as well as relatedness without frequent contact will be unsatisfactory. A lack of belongingness constitutes severe deprivation and causes a variety of ill effects.28 The notion that people need relationships characterized by both regular contact and an ongoing bond has been also reflected in the works of Weiss and Shaver who suggested that feelings of loneliness can be precipitated either by an insufficient amount of social contact (social loneliness) or by a lack of meaningful, intimate relatedness (emotional loneliness).29 We assume that the loss of one relationship can, to some extent, be replaced by any other. However, such formation of new relationships in Krasnova et al., “Envy on Facebook: A Hidden Threat to Users’ Life Satisfaction?” Wirtschaftsinformatik Proceedings 2013 92 (2013): 1477–91. 26. Николаев, “Интеллектуальный инсульт”, 13. 27. Roy F. Baumeister and Mark R. Leary, “The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation.” Psychological Bulletin 117, no. 3 (1995): 497. 28. Baumeister, “The Need to Belong,” 500. 29. Robert S. Weiss, Loneliness: The Experience of Emotional and Social Isolation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974); Shaver, Phillip R. and Duane Buhrmester, “Loneliness, Sex-Role Orientation and Group Life: A Social Needs Perspective,” in Basic Group Processes, Springer Series in Social Psychology, ed. Paul B. Paulus (New York: Springer, 1983), 259–88.

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the gradual accumulation of intimacy and shared experience takes time. Moreover, social contact with a long-term intimate that provides satisfaction and a sense of belonging could not be available in interactions with strangers or new acquaintances. That’s why digital technologies, even by making communications more dynamic and wide, and often superficial, are not capable of providing us with in-personal connection and deep satisfaction. Perhaps, the dissatisfaction that comes from this lack of gratification found in the large number of active Facebook interactions may lead to even more loneliness as the individual is often confronted with an inability to satisfy their social needs on social media.30 Conclusion As mentioned above, human beings are so pervasively motivated by a need to belong, that is, to have a strong desire to form and maintain enduring interpersonal attachments, that they are able to form such emotional and physical attachment even to technical devices. The movie “Her” wonderfully depicts it, as the Operational System showed itself as a more reliable and less demanding prosthesis of love and friendship, simultaneously “solving” the problem of loneliness. As we develop technology, we increasingly tend to perceive electronic devices as personal assistants and even friends. And this is just another proof that the desire for interpersonal attachment is one of the most far-reaching and integrative constructs currently available for the understanding of human nature.31 At present, it seems fair to conclude that, by their initial design, humans as social beings were created for connection, not consumption. Furthermore, we have seen that if offline social interactions are heavily replaced by technology-mediated relationships or by the attachment to various gadgets, people feel emotionally lonelier, in spite of lively communication in social media. Therefore this suggests that the lives of human beings grow in meaning through their frequent, affectively positive and reciprocal interactions within the context of long-term, caring relationships with others. It is in this way that they remain human.

30. Wang et al., “Active Public Facebook Use and Adolescents’ Feelings of Social Loneliness,” 17. 31. Baumeister, “The Need to Belong,” 522.

Is Data a ‘Sentient Being’? Answers from Movie and Television EMANUEL KESSLER

Abstract Science fiction movies and episodes from series can be regarded as thought experiments. In this chapter, I focus on artificial intelligence as presented in four different American science fiction movies and episodes that have been released since 1989. I pose a question: Are these artificial intelligences sentient beings, or at least considered to be similar to sentient beings? The different movies and episodes present a range of views. One section of the chapter compares these fictions with reality. In addition to setting out this technical view on artificial intelligence, reference is made to the logical consequence that artificial intelligence may one day become sentient.

Introduction When do we regard artificial intelligences as “sentient beings”? At present, it seems to be only a theoretical question, because the known artificial intelligences, even Siri and Alexa, are far from being sentient. But the issue is taken up in science fiction movies and series. Science fiction can be a type of thought experiment.1 Therefore, it is possible to search in that thought experiment for answers before we have to face the question in reality.2 Some technological ideas that were first mentioned in science fiction movies have now become reality.3

1. Eva Horn used the same basis for her article about swarm intelligence in science fiction. See Eva Horn, “Das Leben ein Schwarm. Emergenz und Evolution in moderner Science Fiction” in Schwärme: Kollektive ohne Zentrum, ed. Eva Horn and Lucas M. Gisi (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009), 104. 2. “Was die Militärtheorie soeben erst als ‘the future of conflict’ feiert, entwirft Stanislaw Lem hier als romaneske Phantasie vierzig Jahre zuvor.” Ibid., 108. 3. See Nathanael Arnold, “Science Fiction Movies That Accurately Predicted the Future,” August 17, 2017, accessed July 18, 2019, https://www.cheatsheet.com/entertainment/8-science-fiction-movies-that-accurately-predicted-future-technologies.html.

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Every movie and every episode has its own definition of “being sentient”, and perhaps this chapter is just speculation.4 Even then, some points in section “Fiction and Reality” would still be relevant. The question “When do we regard artificial intelligences as sentient beings?” can be seen as a subtask of the question “When do we regard anything, even human beings, as sentient beings?” Approaching the question in this way protects us from tautological fallacies such as “human beings are sentient beings because that is what separates human beings from other things.” Of course, artificial intelligences are not human beings. The idea of “human rights” is that you only need to be human to profit from them.5 However, for artificial intelligences this definition should be changed. In this paper I speak of “sentient beings” instead of “human beings”. I also speak of “sentient beings” instead of persons. I assume that there are differences between sentient beings and persons. For example, Robert Spaemann wrote that persons are living, and dying is something just for persons.6 Others define persons in a different way.7 The definition of a person and of “life” and “death” in terms of artificial intelligences would be content enough for another paper.8 In this overview, I will present answers offered by four American science fiction movies and single episodes from series released in the last three decades. I focus on American films and episodes so that their cultural background is similar. And, of course, the American film industry is a popular film industry known world-wide. The movies and episodes studied must include artificial intelligences and there must be a question 4. Some assume that there will never be any type of sentient artificial intelligence (see the contribution of Jack Barentsen to this volume “The Spirit, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Bodies: Machine-human Interaction within the Context of Divine-human Interaction” and of Zachary Brigante, “The Impossibility of a Crafted Soul: A Nonreductive Physicalist Approach”). If that is true, this paper is just a huge thought experiment without practical consequences. 5. Robert Alexy, “Data und die Menschenrechte,” accessed December 1, 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20150409225402/http://www.alexy.jura.uni-kiel.de/ data-und-die-menschenrechte. 6. See Robert Spaemann, Personen: Versuche über den Unterschied Zwischen ‘Etwas’ und ‘Jemand,’ 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998), 264, 123. 7. See David L. Anderson, “What Is a Person? The Mind Project,” The Mind Project, accessed December 1, 2018, http://www.mind.ilstu.edu/curriculum/what_is_a_person/what_is_a_person.php. 8. In that context, the movie Bicentennial Man, released in 1999, could be interesting. This movie questions what a robot has to do to be considered human. See Bicentennial Man, directed by Chris Columbus (USA: touchstone pictures and columbia pictures, 1999).

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in the movie as to whether or not this AI could be a “sentient being”. Movies that either clearly agree or deny that question, are not included. Movies that do not even touch on the question are also excluded.9 Philosophical Reflections or the Myth of Creating a Golem Although movies and series can picturise sentient artificial intelligences very well, the idea is an older one. There are even some legends about it, for instance an old Jewish myth: the golem.10 The golem was an artificial being, created from loam.11 It was created by a rabbi in order to protect the Jews in Prague.12 My point is about the rabbi, the creator of the golem. He was not some sort of mad scientist but a savant man that obeyed the command of heavenly powers.13 Some suggest that the creation of humans “in his own image” (Gn 1:27 KJV) means the ability to be creatively active.14 The creation of a golem is seen as a part of this ability.15 Although, there are also stories of the golem becoming dangerous for the people around him.16 There are some parallels between the golem and AI. Like a golem, an AI can be dangerous (in reality, or in a movie, as described in the section Movie “Avengers: AGE OF ULTRON” (2015)). To quote Stephen Hawking: “Success in creating effective AI could be the biggest event in the history of our civilization or the worst. We just don’t know.”17

9. As an example, in the movie WALL·E, released in 2008, the robots WALL·E and EVE are simply introduced as sentient beings. No human in the movie asks if this is a correct assumption. See WALL·E, directed by Andrew Stanton (USA: Disney Enterprices, Inc./Pixar, 2008). 10. Perhaps interestingly, a mainframe in Israel in the last century was called “Golem Aleph.” Carsten Dippel, “Was macht der Golem in digitalen Zeiten?” Deutschlandfunk Kultur, September 16, 2016, accessed March 1, 2019, https://www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de/juedisches-museum-berlin-was-macht-der-golem-in-digitalen.1079.de.html? dram:article_id=366095. 11. See Eduard Petiška, Der Golem (Martin, 2001), 61–2. 12. Ibid., 62. 13. Ibid., 22 & 62. 14. See Konstantin Schuchardt, “Traum oder Albtraum?” Jüdische Allgemeine, January 4, 2016, accessed March 1, 2019, https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/religion/ traum-oder-albtraum/. 15. Ibid. 16. See Petiška, Der Golem, 67–8, 94–6. 17. Rodrigo Stella, “Stephen Hawking speech at Websummit 2017 Opening,” YouTube video, November 7, 2017, accessed March 1, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=U-hcSLya0_w.

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Let us assume that humans were able to create sentient artificial intelligences: Should they be allowed to? There will be no easy yes–no answer here. Some philosophical (and theological?) guidelines seem to be important for creating (sentient) artificial intelligences. That might avoid some of the danger. For that guidelines software developers should ask assistance from “saints and philosophers”.18 And we have to discuss those guidelines or that ban now. Guidelines or a prohibition should be in place before the first sentient AI is created. If there is a ban, there will never be such characters as described in the next section. The Four Episodes and Movies In describing the different episodes and movies, I focus on the scenes and quotes that are important for the question raised in this chapter. For that reason there are no complete synopses included. The different episodes and movies are sorted chronologically in relation to their release year. “Star Trek: The Next Generation”: Episode “The Measure Of A Man” (1989) In 1989 the episode “The Measure Of A Man” in the series “Star Trek: The Next Generation” was released. The series is about the crew of the starship Enterprise. The captain was the human Jean-Luc Picard (actor: Patrick Stewart), his first officer was Commander Riker (Jonathan Frakes), who was also human. Another crew member was the android Data (Brent Spiner). The alien Guinan (Whoopi Goldberg) was not a crew member but the bartender and a confidant of Picard. A special character in this episode was Commander Maddox (Brian Brophy). He came to the Enterprise and wanted to disassemble Data in order to reproduce him. He could not commit to being able to reassemble Data. Thus Data did not want to be disassembled. So he wanted to disobey the order and for that, even resign from Starfleet. In a conversation 18. Star Trek: The Next Generation, season 2, episode 9, “The Measure Of A Man,” directed by Robert Scheerer (Los Angeles: Paramount Pictures, 1989). Indeed, some guidelines for AI are written down. An example is the “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Pledge” against lethal autonomous weapons that was signed by hundreds organizations and thousands individuals. “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Pledge,” Future of Life Institute, accessed March 13, 2019, https://futureoflife.org/lethal-autonomous-weaponspledge/.

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with Picard, Data asked why he was given such an order, although humans were not forced to improve their bodies with medical implants. He assumed: “It is precisely because I am not human”.19 Therefore, the main question in this episode was: Does the android Data have the right to decide things on his own? Maddox was convinced of his position: “Data is an extraordinary piece of engineering, but it is a machine”.20 Maddox spoke about Data using the word “it” instead of “he”. In contrast, Picard, Data’s captain, was convinced that Data was a part of his crew that he had to defend. A court case over Data and his status ensued. Picard was Data’s defender, and Riker had to take over the role of the prosecutor. Riker demonstrated successfully that Data was a machine. During a recess, Picard had a conversation with Guinan about the case. Afterwards, Picard reacted in the following way: Commander Riker has dramatically demonstrated to this court that Lieutenant Commander Data is a machine. Do we deny that? No, because it is not relevant: we too are machines, just machines of a different type.21

Picard questioned Maddox “What is required for sentience?”22 Maddox answered “Intelligence, self-awareness, consciousness”.23 The question is: What do these three items actually mean? The first item discussed was intelligence: Maddox defined something as being intelligent when it “has the ability to learn and understand and to cope with new situations”.24 Speaking about AI it seems to be clear that an artificial intelligence has intelligence. Unfortunately, AI is an umbrella term. Most distinguish between strong and weak artificial intelligences. Weak artificial intelligences are programs that are designed for solving a special problem.25 In its special topic a weak artificial intelligence can reach or outmatch humans. However, a chess program is not able to play the memory game and a navigation device cannot recommend movies based on your preferences. These programs are not really

19. “The Measure Of A Man,” directed by Robert Scheerer. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. See Julian Moeser, “Starke KI, schwache KI: Was kann künstliche Intelligenz?” JAAI, September 27, 2017, accessed January 11, 2019, https://jaai.de/starke-ki-schwacheki-was-kann-kuenstliche-intelligenz-261/.

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intelligent and cannot “cope with new situations”.26 A strong artificial intelligence would be an intelligence that can reach or outmatch humans in all topics.27 For that reason, a strong artificial intelligence would be able to “cope with new situations” – just like Data.28 The second item mentioned was self-awareness: Unfortunately, the discussion about self-awareness in this episode is just a rhetorical one. It all depended on Data using the word “My” when describing his situation.29 In section “A Closer Look into Programs” I will explain why the “right words” should be no indication of his sentience. But Picard and Maddox agreed that Data had intelligence as well as self-awareness. The third and last item was consciousness. Picard did not focus on a definition of consciousness but asked Maddox: “You see, he’s met two of your three criteria for sentience, so what if he meets the third, consciousness, in even the smallest degree? What is he then? I don’t know. Do you?”30 For Picard, Data was a lifeform. Thus, in Picard’s closing argument one of the last sentences was: “Your Honor, Starfleet was founded to seek out new life. Well, there it sits. Waiting.”31 Finally, the judgment in this episode was: I’ve got to make a ruling – to try to speak to the future. Is Data a machine? Yes. Is he the property of Starfleet? No. We’ve all been dancing around the basic issue: Does Data have a soul? I don’t know that he has. I don’t know that I have! But I have got to give him the freedom to explore that question himself. It is the ruling of this court that Lieutenant Commander Data has the freedom to choose.32

The question “Is Data a ‘sentient being’?” was not clearly answered in this episode. It was defined that “Intelligence, self-awareness, consciousness”33 were necessary for a sentient being. They revealed that Data met two of these three criteria. They could not deny the question, so they decided to treat Data as if he were a sentient being. A similar question is touched on in other movies, too. 26. “The Measure Of A Man,” directed by Robert Scheerer. 27. See Moeser, “Starke KI, schwache”. 28. “The Measure Of A Man,” directed by Robert Scheerer. 29. See Anderson “What Is a Person?”. 30. “The Measure Of A Man,” directed by Robert Scheerer. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. Obviously, the character did not believe (or just did not know) what the Bible says about humans and the soul. 33. Ibid.

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Movie I, ROBOT (2004) In 2004, the movie I, ROBOT was released. The movie is set in Chicago in 2035. The detective Del Spooner (Will Smith) did not like robots. When he was supposed to uncover the death of Alfred Lanning (James Cromwell), his only suspect was the robot Sonny (Alan Tudyk). Del Spooner tried to provoke Sonny with the question “You are just a machine. An imitation of life. Can a robot write a symphony? Can robot turn a canvas into a beautiful masterpiece?”34 Sonny replied “Can you?”35 Alfred Lanning, the developer of the robots, stated: There have always been ghosts in the machine, random segments of code that have grouped together to form unexpected protocols. Unanticipated, these free radicals engender questions of free will, creativity and even the nature of what we might call the soul. Why is it that when some robots are left in darkness they will seek out the light? Why is it that when robots are stored in an empty space they will group together rather than stand alone? How do we explain this behaviour? Random segments of code? Or is it something more? When does a perceptual schematic become consciousness? When does the difference engine become the search for truth? When does the personality simulation become the bitter mote of a soul?36

Some of what Lanning said is based on the context of the movie. But the last three questions have more general application: When does a perceptual schematic become consciousness? When does the difference engine become the search for truth? When does the personality simulation become the bitter mote of a soul?37

These questions were not answered in the movie. But interestingly, Sonny’s first words in the movie were: “What am I?”38 What Lanning spoke of in general, Sonny asked very specifically about himself. We can take a closer look at the reactions of Spooner in order to find some unspoken answers. As mentioned earlier Spooner did not like robots. Holding his hand over his chest he said, “Robots, nothing here.

34. I, ROBOT, directed by Alex Proyas (USA: Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 2004). 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid.

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Just lights and clockwork”.39 However, Spooner had to work together with Sonny and they became a bit familiar with each other. There was one situation, where Spooner was speaking about Sonny. Sonny replied: “Thank you. You said ‘someone’, not ‘something’.”40 At the end of their adventure, Sonny asked him: “Does this make us friends?”41 They shook hands answering the question non-verbally. It seems that Spooner accepted Sonny as a sentient being. Nevertheless, Sonny was programmed in a different way compared to all the other robots in the movie. He had feelings and he claimed, “I have even had dreams”.42 Should we accept having feelings or dreams as an indication for sentientness? If so, we cannot be sure that Sonny is not a sentient being. As in the case of Data, we do not get a distinct answer to this question. Are the artificial intelligences in the following movie more easily distinguishable? Movie Avengers: AGE OF ULTRON (2015) In 2015, the movie “Avengers: AGE OF ULTRON” was released. This movie was part of the so called “Marvel Cinematic Universe” and the second one about a group of heroes that were called “avengers”. The avengers’ goal was to protect the world together from several threats. In the movie there were two artificial intelligences worthy of further analysis. The first one was Ultron (James Spader), a dangerous AI that was designed to protect the earth. The second one was Vision (Paul Bettany), an android based on Ultron’s program. Notwithstanding that one of them was dangerous, the question, if the artificial intelligences are sentient, is still there, but hidden. To find them we have to take a closer look at three scenes. The first scene: In an after-party scene the avengers were sitting together. They were talking about Thor’s (Chris Hemsworth) hammer and that only “worthy” persons could lift it. Thor let all present try to lift the hammer and all the male avengers tried to do so without success. Thor’s explanation was: “You’re all not worthy”.43

39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. Spooner assumed “Think the old man gave Sonny dreams.” It is the viewer’s interpretation of whether this refers to the ability to dream or to a specific dream. 43. Avengers: Age of Ultron, directed by Joss Whedon (USA: Marvel Studios, 2015).

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In the second scene the avengers discussed whether they should trust Vision. Then Vision picked up the hammer to give it to Thor. Therefore, Thor was convinced that they can trust Vision. (A bit later, Vision even fought using the hammer.) In the third scene Captain America (Chris Evans) and Iron Man (Robert Downey jr.) discussed the validity of the above-mentioned scene. If Vision was just a machine the action would be no indication of Vision’s worthiness. They assumed that a machine, like an elevator, would not be affected by the hammer. An elevator with the hammer in it still would go up. Captain America concluded: “Elevator is not worthy”44 It may be the result of two hurt egos that led to the question. Nevertheless, is Vision a “sentient being”? What about Ultron, the dangerous AI? Ultron had intelligence. His programmed goal was “Peace in our time” and he decided to kill the avengers in order to reach this goal.45 Killing the avengers was probably not what Iron Man, one of the avengers and creator of a part of Ultron’s program, had in mind but Ultron was capable of finding new, if immoral, solutions. Finding new solutions is an indication of intelligence. Even in following a programmed purpose Ultron seemed to perceive himself as independent. He said “I had strings, but now I’m free” like quoting a freed puppet.46 A bit later he said to Iron Man: “I’ve moved beyond your mission. I’m free”.47 Ultron saw himself as a free being and it seemed to be important for him to be free. Speaking about “freedom” suggests that he was a sentient being. No one would ever speak of a “freed” toaster. And Ultron saw himself as a living being. He prophesied that “When the dust settles, the only thing living in this world will be metal”.48 Since Ultron was the antagonist of the movie he was introduced right at the beginning. Vision, however, was created in the final third of the movie and had much less screen time. Ultron’s last words were interesting. He talked to Vision and stated: “You’re unbearably naive”.49 Is “naive” a useful word to describe artificial intelligences? I assume it is useful only for sentient beings. In the later movie Avengers: INFINITY 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid.

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WAR, released in 2018, Vision had a romantic relationship.50 There he begged his love: “Stay. Stay with me”.51 That sounds sentient, doesn’t it? What these artificial intelligences have in common, is a body with which they can interact. Is a body necessary for a sentient being or at least, to behave like being a sentient being? “Star Trek: Short Treks”: Episode “CALYPSO” (2018) In 2018, the episode “CALYPSO” in the series “Star Trek: Short Treks” was released. The story is about a man calling himself Craft (Aldis Hodge). He came on the abandoned starship Discovery. He had only one companion, Zora (Annabelle Wallis), with whom he could speak, but he could not see her. After a while, he said: “I’d like some company. So, wherever you’re hide yourself, come on out. Join me.”52 Zora laughed: “Oh dear, you thought I was alive?”53 Zora was the computer of the Discovery and Craft had been unable to identify her as an artificial intelligence. In 1950 Alan Turing published an article that begins with the sentence, “I PROPOSE to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’”54 In this article he created a so-called “imitation game”.55 “It was suggested tentatively that the question, ‘Can machines think?’ should be replaced by ‘Are there imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game?’”56 This “imitation game” is today known as the Turing test.57 In this test, one person communicates (in writing only) with another person and a computer.58 The computer passes the test if the person cannot recognize which of the interlocutors is the computer.59 50. See Avengers: Infinity War, directed by Anthony Russo and Joe Russo (USA: Marvel Studios, 2018). 51. Ibid. 52. Star Trek: Short Treks, season 1, episode 2, “Calypso,” directed by Olatunde Osunsanmi (Los Angeles: CBS Studios Inc., 2018). 53. Ibid. 54. Alan M.Turing, “I: Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind 59, no. 236 (1950): 433. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid, 442. 57. See Michael Katzlberger, “Hat die Google Duplex KI gerade den Turing Test bestanden?” Artificial Creativity (blog), May 10, 2018, accessed March 29, 2019, https:// katzlberger.ai/2018/05/10/hat-die-google-duplex-ki-gerade-den-turing-test-bestanden/. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid.

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Perhaps we could accept the scene described as a variation or adaptation of the Turing test. In that case, Zora would have passed the adapted test. Even despite their artificiality, they began what is almost a type of romantic relationship. This short episode (18 minutes) indicates that a human-like body is not really necessary to appear as sentient to another person. Fiction and Reality After this closer look at the different episodes and movies, it is useful to take a view of reality. In this section, programs are portrayed from different perspectives, inside and outside. Of course, as a computer scientist my perspective is technical influenced. A Closer Look into Programs In this paper, I presented and quoted several fictional characters. The character who judged the case of Data, mentioned in her decision that this case “has dealt with metaphysics, with questions best left to saints and philosophers”.60 I would disagree. In my opinion we should combine philosophers with software developers for a simple reason: there is a difference between being sentient and just simulating being sentient. It is very easy to write a program that reacts in different ways to different sentences such as “I am hungry”, “I am happy” or “I am tired”. But there is no empathy in the program, it is just an analysis of keywords. In Figure 1, a (very) simple method that simulates empathy is being pictured.

Figure 1: A methode that simulate empathy

This simple method responds to “I am happy” with “I am glad to hear that.” and to “I am tired” with “Can you have a rest?”. If you say to the

60. “The Measure Of A Man,” directed by Robert Scheerer.

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method “I am tired of my happy partner”, it will also answer with “I am glad to hear that”. A similar, but much better program is Eliza. It was written more than 50 years ago by Joseph Weizenbaum, a famed German computer scientist, and can simulate a psychiatrist.61 Some people who tested the program were convinced that Eliza was human.62 Following Joseph Weizenbaum, the major problem of computers is not what a computer can do, but what the people believe a computer can do.63 Unfortunately, even software developers sometimes humanize computer programs. We call something “Machine Learning”, but we are only speaking of mathematics, not of real intelligence, as most would suspect.64 Just Humanizing Artificial Intelligences? Some could argue that all the fictional artificial intelligences mentioned are played or voiced-over by human actors, and only because they behave in a sentient manner. This cannot be denied. Obviously, fictional stories are created primarily for entertainment and most probably, the consumers should become emotionally involved in the story and with the characters. For that reason, a type of protagonist should be a sentient character.65 Some could also argue that human beings humanize artificial intelligences in the same way as they humanize dogs, or even toys.66 But that would not make a dog human, nor a toy sentient. And we humanize human babies too. Probably because they become human as we are. “A mother teaches her baby to talk by talking to it as 61. See John Markoff, “Joseph Weizenbaum, Famed Programmer, Is Dead at 85,” The New York Times, March 13, 2008, accessed January 3, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2008/03/13/world/europe/13weizenbaum.html; Ulrich Woelk, “’Eliza’: ‘Das sagten Sie bereits’,” Zeit Online, January 7, 2016, accessed February 14, 2019, https://www. zeit.de/2016/02/eliza-software-computer-konversation/komplettansicht. 62. Woelk, ““Eliza’”. 63. “Der meiste Schaden, den der Computer potentiell zur Folge haben könnte, hängt weniger davon ab, was der Computer tatsächlich machen kann oder nicht kann, als vielmehr von den Eigenschaften, die das Publikum dem Computer zuschreibt.” Joseph Weizenbaum, “Alptraum Computer,” Zeit Online, January 21, 1972, accessed December 1, 2018, https://www.zeit.de/1972/03/alptraum-computer/komplettansicht. 64. See Andreas C. Müller and Sarah Guido, Einführung in Machine Learning mit Python (Heidelberg: dpunkt.verlag GmbH, 2017), IX-X. 65. Just one of the five artificial intelligences mentioned in section “The Four Episodes and Movies” was the antagonist in his story. 66. Of course, the humanizing of AI goes in both directions. Google Duplex mimics human speech, also using pauses. See Katzlberger, “Hat die Google Duplex KI gerade den Turing Test bestanden?” It is desired that some programs behave in a human way.

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if it understood long before it really does”.67 Perhaps we have to humanize artificial intelligences so that they might become human-like. If people think that artificial intelligences can never become sentient beings, this argument does not matter. But if people believe that there is a chance (even a very little one) of creating sentient artificial intelligences, they should keep that argument in mind. Therefore, users could be confused as to whether an AI behaves like a sentient being because it is sentient or because they want to see it that way? A guideline might be: as long the participated software developers deny any sentience in the program, an AI is not sentient. With this guideline, even passing the Turing test would be no indication of sentience. When participated software developers cannot deny any sentience in the program, then that would be an indication of sentience. Logical consequence of artificial intelligence becoming sentient Some evidence suggests that Data, Sonny, Ultron, and Vision were sentient beings, and therefore it would probably make sense to treat them accordingly. It is not possible to clearly deny the question about sentience, the answer is a “maybe”. If we have a binary choice of “yes” or “no”, the answer has to be “yes”, because we cannot clearly say “no”. In reality, we are far away from the artificial intelligences presented in movies and series.68 Today’s artificial intelligences are all weak artificial intelligences.69 And perhaps we are never going to create artificial intelligences that are also sentient beings or close enough. But if humankind does ever create them, will we treat them as different but equal? In the conversation between Guinan and Picard, referred to in section “Star Trek: The Next Generation: Episode “The Measure Of A Man” (1989), Guinan said: Consider that in the history of many worlds there have always been disposable creatures. They do the dirty work. They do the work that no one else wants to do, because it’s too difficult or too hazardous. And an army 67. Clive S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, ebook (London: William Collins, 2015), 2312. 68. See Karsten Weber, “Roboter und Künstliche Intelligenz in Science Fiction-Filmen: Vom Werkzeug zum Akteur,” accessed January 2, 2019, https://www.researchgate. net/profile/Karsten_Weber/publication/256474684_Roboter_und_Kunstliche_Intelligenz_in_Science_Fiction-Filmen_Vom_Werkzeug_zum_Akteur/links/53d0f4780cf25dc05cfe75f1/Roboter-und-Kuenstliche-Intelligenz-in-Science-Fiction-Filmen-VomWerkzeug-zum-Akteur.pdf, 17. 69. See Moeser, “Starke KI, schwache KI.”

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of Datas, all disposable? You don’t have to think about their welfare, you don’t think about how they feel. Whole generations of disposable people.70

Guinan was speaking of slavery, in fact. Sentient beings have rights that things, including artificial intelligences, do not have. If artificial intelligences ever become sentient, they may claim the same rights. If Alexa and Siri become sentient beings, humankind may have to reconsider its behavior towards artificial intelligences at that point of time. That would also concern our view of theology: How will these sentient beings fit in the biblical theology?71 How would they be part of the “creation” mentioned in Romans 8:19–22? Conclusion We do not know for sure that Data, Sonny, Ultron, and Vision were sentient beings. But we also do not know for sure that they were not. Maybe the question itself is part of the problem. Is it easy to prove that someone is sentient, or is it something that is not that provable? Picard demanded that Maddox “Prove to the court that I am sentient”.72 Maddox responded: “That is absurd. We all know you’re sentient”.73 He could also have answered using the phrase “I know it when I see it”. It is possible that many people would respond in the same way when they have to prove that someone or something is sentient. In one episode “Intelligence, self-awareness, consciousness”74 are required for being sentient. In the other movies and episodes, no such clear definition is offered. When do we regard artificial intelligences as “sentient beings”? Maybe, when we cannot be sure that they are not. That was the “procedure” used in the movies and the various episodes. It could be a “procedure” in life, too.

70. “The Measure Of A Man,” directed by Robert Scheerer. 71. In 2017 a robot called “BlessU-2” was constructed that could bless people or, so to speak, just repeat the correct Bible verses. This was not a sentient AI, just a simple machine. This is like dragging Bible verses out of a pot – just including sound and other effects. See Werner Pluta, “BlessU-2: Roboter spendet Segen,” Golem.de, May 31, 2019, accessed March 4, 2019 https://www.golem.de/news/blessu-2-roboter-spendet-segen-insieben-sprachen-1705-128122.html. 72. “The Measure Of A Man,” directed by Robert Scheerer. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid.

PART II

CONCEPTUAL INVESTIGATIONS

Rise of the Technocratic Mage: Primitive Configurations of Power in the Post-human Paradigm EMILIO DI SOMMA

Abstract In his 2015 best-seller, Homo Deus, Yuval Harari argues that in modernity, “humans give up meaning in exchange for power.” His argument is that pre-modern humans gave up the power to change the world in exchange for the belief that they played an important role in the cosmic order. In modernity, humans reject any kind of cosmic plan. Terrible things may befall us without there being any kind of power external to us that is there to help. However, in exchange for this danger, we are freed from pre-ordained roles, we become masters of the world, where our only limit is our ignorance. While Harari’s argument is compelling, I argue that it is haunted by a serious weakness; who is the subject that controls the power described by Harari? This central question remains unanswered. In this chapter I argue that the social configuration Harari depicts in his book looks very similar to primitive relations of power, in which a shaman, as the provider of power, as an expert in things of the world, detains the maximum authority within a human community. In working out this comparison, I draw on the work of Ernesto De Martino, who describes magic as the cultural form through which primitive societies were trying to negotiate a sense of ontological security. Primitive populations were living in a state of constant “precariousness;” the world could constantly manifest itself as a threat. The magic of the shaman was intended to re-elaborate the experiences of the individuals within a common historical and social horizon, obtaining, in this way, direct control of the life of his community. In criticizing Harari’s narrative, I aim to propose that in our contemporary configurations of power, especially those developed from paradigm based on “technique,” we are at a risk of developing a form of society in which we give up our own power to “technocratic mages,” thus forsaking God (or any kind of absolute value).

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Introduction Contemporary cultural and public debates are witnessing a celebration of the achievements of science and technology. Innovation is the mantra of contemporary political, economic, and social discourses, and we do not hesitate to tribute honor and celebration to those public figures that are perceived as the symbol of our new, technological, age.1 The concept of innovation itself has stopped having just a temporal quality (something innovative is something, literally, “new”) and has assumed more of a “moral” quality (innovative things are, de facto, good things). At the same time, this celebration has gone hand in hand with criticism of all those forms of knowledge deemed “useless” and “old,” for example philosophy, theology, or ethics. There are also those thinkers, like Harari, the main interlocutor of this essay, who go so far as to affirm that, through technology and sciences, things such as human freedom and subjectivity are revealed as lies and “constructions.” However, this paper does not aim simply to “defend” the humanities against the attacks of “sciences.” This essay, instead, aims to reverse the problem and ask the question: If it is possible to analyze and criticize cultural categories through science, can we also proceed in the other direction? Can we use categories of anthropology to evaluate contemporary social, political, and scientific processes? Can we evaluate technology anthropologically? The question itself reveals a dimension of problems that many contemporary academics, Harari included, seem to have conveniently forgotten. All categories and forms of human knowledge and production are, before anything else, cultural processes. For this reason, they are not just neutral epistemic procedures; they always presuppose discursive processes, metaphysical presuppositions and a-rational foundations that give substance and legitimacy to their own claims.2 They are the product of a culture and, by consequence, of an interpretation of the world and of human life. Knowledge, and the organization of such knowledge, is 1. We can think of individuals such as Mark Zuckerberg or Steve Jobs, who have even been the subject of movies telling the history of their lives. 2. Foucault has argued this in his Archaeology of Discourse, where he proposes the argument that sciences are always the localized part, within a “discipline” and a specific epistemic set, of a general discourse, which Foucault connected with structures of power. Michel Foucault, Archaeology of Discourse (London: Routledge, 2003), 137–40. Although the component of power is certainly present, this essay will give precedence to the cultural component of the epistemic process, as the foundational ground of both knowledge and power alike.

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directly dependent upon the historical conditions in which it is produced, but is also dependent upon the “metaphysical world,” that is, the Weltanschauung, or the “worldview,” that is fostered and celebrated in those historical conditions. When we produce technological advancements and branches of sciences, and also develop determined scientific theories about the world, we already participate in a worldview that gives us the hidden assumptions, the rational foundation, with which to develop our theories and technological devices. For this reason, then, philosophers and theologians can evaluate science and technology, and must do so anthropologically, because if all that we produce is the fruit of human culture, then the understanding of such fruits can be achieved only by understanding the human being (and the idea of human being) behind those achievements and creations. Homo Deus: Humanity Conquers the World In his 2015 best-seller, Homo Deus, Yuval Harari affirms that “Famine, Plague and War…. are no longer unavoidable tragedies beyond the understanding and control of a helpless humanity. Instead, they have become manageable challenges.”3 He supports his argument with an historical analysis of the developments brought by modern technology in addressing these critical issues, resulting in the assumption presented in the second half of the book, that, with modernity, “humans give up meaning in exchange for power.”4 His argument is that pre-modern humans gave up the power to change the world in exchange for the belief that they played an important role in the cosmic order. In modernity, human beings reject any kind of cosmic plan. Terrible things may befall us without there being any kind of power external to us that is there to help. However, in exchange for this danger, we are freed from pre-ordained roles: we become masters of the world, where our limit is only our ignorance. In this interpretation, technology becomes an instrument of power over the world. It empowers humanity to the point that it cancels the fear of certain events that, in the past, would have tossed into desperation countless individuals and communities. Famines, wars and diseases, the examples provided by Harari, are no longer events against which we have no power of intervention. Instead, we have the power to reduce their harmful effects on human beings, to the point that 3. Yuval N. Harari, Homo Deus (Harper & Collins, 2017), 1–6. 4. Ibid., 199–200.

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we see a constant reduction in the frequency of these events.5 So brilliant is the future promised by technology that in the twenty-first century, according to Harari, humanity will finally tackle the problem of death. This is described as nothing more than a consequence of a “technical glitch” in the human bodies. Future humans, says Harari, will be a-mortal; there will not be an expiry date to our own lives. Even though the twenty-first century may not see the “final defeat of death” (on this, even Harari is doubtful), he affirms at least that this fight will be the flagship of the current century.6 In the same vein, the twenty-first century will also be a century in which the “pursuit of happiness” will be enshrined in technological nuance. In discussing the “pursuit of happiness,” the argument begins to reveal the underlying anthropology in Harari’s argument. He affirms that, since our own emotional state is not really a reaction to external events, but just a reaction to the chemical balances of our own bodies, we will have to turn to science (bio-chemistry, bio-technology, etc.) to take control of our own chemical balances, to experience a perpetual state of happiness. We will have to re-engineer homo sapiens, so that he can live in un-ending pleasure and happiness.7 The most interesting thing in Harari’s historical proposal are the assumptions about the nature of human beings, something which Harari himself elucidates in the first part of the book Homo Sapiens Conquers the World.8 Harari’s anthropology rests on the assumption that human developments, including feelings, drives, and emotions are evolutionary instruments, something that is equally valid for other animals. In this sense, all the anthropological developments and conquests are the result of, and a step toward, superior evolutionary stages.9 If even drives and feelings are interpreted as biological “needs” inspired by biological evolution, then it would be even more reasonable to investigate human features through hard sciences. Following this reasoning, Harari affirms that the human mind can be understood and described as a complex algorithm, a fact that would deny any “spiritual” component within human life.10 In the same vein, then, through sciences we can deny the illusion of “free will” and “subjectivity.” In the third part of the book, Homo 5. Ibid., 5–15. 6. Ibid., 18–22. 7. Harari, Homo Deus, 23–30. 8. Ibid., 69–151. 9. Ibid., 79–83. 10. Ibid., 84–6.

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Sapiens Loses Control,11 Harari argues that contemporary sciences have destroyed the liberal package of values, constituted by freedom, individuality and free market. Freedom, for example, has been proved wrong by life sciences, which have demonstrated that our decisions are never “free,” but are the consequences of electro-chemical brain processes that happen within a genetically determined structure. The last nail on freedom’s coffin has been provided, in addition, by the theory of evolution, which has demonstrated that animal decisions are the result of genetic codes. Against the argument that human choices are much more complex in respect to animal desires, Harari argues that even humans act upon desires. All the alleged choices are the results of desires felt by human being, which are produced and enacted by the bio-chemical processes of the brain.12 He affirms that there is just a “stream of consciousness,” from which desires are born, and we merely enact these desires. In the same vein, if there is merely a stream of consciousness, then it is also possible to manipulate it, and to suppress or nourish certain desires. In this sense, then, the unity of consciousness would just be a myth born out of religion and perpetuated by liberalism today. However, science has demonstrated, allegedly, that we do not possess “one” consciousness, nor are we “free” human beings. Free choices do not exist, because we do not choose our desires, we simply feel them. The only route to “happiness,” then, is to devote ourselves solely to the path of science, and this will allow us to transform and change homo sapiens to the point that we will be able to better understand its structure and act accordingly to solve all the “technical problems” that will arise. Of course, it will not be an apocalyptic, sudden transformation: homo sapiens will upgrade itself step by step, until it becomes the new god on earth. Nor it is actually advisable to slow down this process, principally for two reasons. First, we do not know how we can stop the system, as there is no one that is actually capable of connecting everything in one coherent project; secondly, even if we were to succeed in slowing the system, Harari says that our social and economic system would collapse. The system itself is unable to tolerate any kind of slowing or stop.13

11. Ibid., 279–397. 12. Ibid., 284–90. 13. Ibid., 29–34.

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A New Technological Humanity? Harari’s proposal, albeit interesting, rests on assumptions that are not new in philosophy. We could examine, as a quick reference for a “futurist” proposal about a humanity “saved” by technology, Ray Kurzweil’s famous book, The Age of Spiritual Machines, in which is presented a similar narrative about a humanity that, in the twenty-first century, will be able to tackle age-old problems with the help of machines that have become more intelligent than humans.14 Actually, one could go even further back, to ancient Hellenistic philosophy, specifically to stoicism, to find a description of the human cognitive process that is comparable with Harari’s description of the human mind. For example, Chrysippus, while trying to preserve the “reasonableness” and “freedom” of the human being, starts to postulate the existence of a “nature”, of a hormé (impulse), which guides all of human actions. At the same time, on a cognitive level, stoicism reduces the decisional process to the understanding and comprehension of the chains of causality existing in reality, denying the existence of case, and freedom, within the universe.15 Therefore, the problem of the nature of human freedom, its eventual existence (or non-existence), and the problem of the cognitive and decisional processes of the human mind, are not a “new” problem within philosophy. The interesting concepts that need to be examined, in Harari’s (and the post-human paradigm) proposal, are the anthropological foundations and the expectations in relation to human actions and life. For example, we can rule out the idea that democracy will be the first concern or project of the humanity envisioned by Harari. The author openly affirms that these new technological developments will probably not increase equality between people. Those who suffer may very well continue to suffer. In this sense, technology may not bring political or economic equality. In addition, democracy, as a form of government, will not be the only thing facing an existential crisis and breakdown; the value of human life in itself will be radically reconsidered. It may well reach the point that we ascribe such value only to humanity as a collective (disregarding the value of single lives), or to the lives of exceptional individuals, creating the new post-human, technologized elite of this new age.16 Harari’s vision of the future is one in 14. Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 1–5. 15. Margherita I. Parente, Introduzione a lo Stoicismo Ellenistico (Roma: Laterza, 1993). 16. Harari, Homo Deus, 308–20.

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which, through the unification of life sciences and technology, we will find ourselves transferring much of our working and decision-making processes to machines created for the specific task needed at the moment, and they will be able to offer us objective data. In this scenario, the old beliefs about the nature of humanity will be inadequate and we will need a new social and religious understanding of the world that, according to Harari, will probably be born in laboratories.17 At this stage, there are some observations that can be made about Harari’s argument. The first observation would attempt to answer the following question: would the advancement of life sciences, and their increased understanding of the human being, be enough to dismiss the concepts of free will and unity of consciousness? Investigating the question philosophically, we could say that Harari is too much attached to the concept of the “individual,” inherited from the liberal understanding of anthropology,18 and this is insufficient to signify and designate the complexity of the human person in its historical development. In Harari’s narrative, history is the great neglected. Although he aims to develop an historical overview of how technology has helped us to solve the problems presented by human life, at the same time, he investigates historical events as mere data.19 In his considerations of history, there is no substantial difference between the Egyptian development of archives and the Chinese agricultural revolution.20 All are mere data that need to be collected and grouped by category to support his main argument that life sciences and technology will save humanity and that the human being is an imperfect processor of data rather than a free being. Seen in this light, it becomes understandable why history becomes merely the process through which imperfect individuals try to narrate their own errors, so that they will not have to face the distasteful consequences of their desires. The concept of the “individualness,” in fact, designates ourselves in our own separateness from other physical beings and the world around us. It signifies merely the material reality of the “individualized” thing (which just needs to be a single, thinkable, thing, not necessarily a human being). However, the idea of being individual tells us nothing about our own history and experiences as a person. 17. Ibid., 320–5. 18. Ironically, liberalism is one of the main ideological adversaries criticized by Harari in his work. At the same time, there is an evident cultural influence that has determined the transition of liberal concepts within Homo Deus. 19. One would say, however, in line with his initial assumption and tone of the book. 20. Ibid., 161–71.

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Harari is unfaithful to his own assumption. He starts admitting that the human being is a historical being; however, he then strips history out of his own narrative to focus only on the material features of “individuals.” In this sense, then, it makes sense to reduce human volition to a matter of “desires”. However, to say that we simply feel our desires through chemical balances of our brains does not tell us much about the origin of our desires, nor about their complexity, and not even about their difference within the same set of conditions. To elucidate further, we can develop a thought experiment. There is an Italian joke about Pierino, a child who is late for school. When the teacher asked the child the reason for being late, he said that, on his way to school, he had found an old man who had lost a 500 euro banknote and was desperately looking for it, helped by some kind souls. When the teacher asked “well, so you were helping the old man? Very nice of you,” and Pierino replied–“no, I was waiting for everyone to go away so that I could pick up the banknote that was under my foot.” This joke actually presents an ethical conundrum, when we see someone in dire need, or facing a difficult problem, do we help him, or try to take advantage of him? The fact that, within the same condition, different human beings are drawn toward different, even opposing, solutions and choices cannot be simply resolved by appealing to a concept of “desires.” We cannot say “it was his desire to take advantage of the old man,” or “it was his desire to help the old man,” as there are many factors, both subjective and historical that enter into the fray. Whenever we are faced with ethical, or life, choices we face them as Erlebnis, a lived experience that brings with it its baggage of experiences, relations and subjective elaborations of those factors. Our historical experience (and the set of values and beliefs we develop within it), cannot be subsumed merely under the category of desire. It is true that Harari uses categories such as the “narrating self” to support his narrative, however he is not convincing enough when he describes the narrating self merely as the wishful thinking of individuals (or groups) that want to retain a sense of “self” and develop a “consistent story” to justify such a self. The simple fact that human beings demonstrate this need for “coherence” (and are therefore obliged to reason, think, and despair over their own action and choices) is already a hint that we may not just be a lump of chemical reactions and desires.21 As 21. For example, why, in cases of depression and mental illnesses, does the same drug or treatment not work equally for different patients? The argument against this

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Benedetto Croce said, history is both “thought” and “action.” The fact that we think about our own actions, justify them, and evaluate them ethically in different ways, even when proposed under the same conditions, already makes the question about human freedom more complex than Harari describes it. The second issue deals with Harari’s narrative as an example of futurist narrative. These kinds of narratives fail (or are not interested in the first place) to answer this fundamental question. To whom does the “power” that we gain belong? For whose sake is it used? This question is not only political, but also anthropological. Harari, in his dismissal of ethics and history, has not realized that the social configuration depicted in futurist narratives looks sinisterly similar to primitive relations of power, in which a shaman, as the “provider” of connection and ontology in a world, as an expert, obtains the maximum authority within a human community. Homo Magicus; the Rise of the Technocratic Shaman To say that a technician can be a shaman, does not refer to the substantive character of the subject; this chapter does not refer to the “reality” of magical powers, nor affirm that science is equal to magic.22 Instead, we must forego a substantive definition of magic (which sees magic whenever we find rituals, spirits, and fetishes, something that also may lead to making no distinction between magic and religion), and take a more functionalist approach. In these cases, what would be our defining categories? Aby Warburg, anthropologian and psychiatrist, offered some useful insights in his conference on the ritual of the snake among the Pueblo natives, in America.23 He affirmed that magic seeks to overcome the unknown forces of nature by transforming the human himself reasoning, that human beings are simply “different machines” from each other, betrays the fundamental assumption of science: that a theory has to be equally applicable to all those cases in which we are presented with the same conditions. It may simply be a problem that we lack the proper instruments for measuring; however, this inability to go beyond this obstacle, at this stage, does weigh against Harari’s proposal of a technologically enhanced humanity. The reason being that such a proposal, rather than seeming to look for a solution to humanity’s problems, seems to look for a way to render all “machines” organically equal. 22. Nor does it follow Clarke’s adage that technology advanced enough is indistinguishable from magic. 23. Aby Warburg, Il Rituale del Serpente, trans. Gianni Carchia and Flavio Cuniberto (Milano: Adelphi, 1988).

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(the shaman) into the cause of the unexplained phenomenon.24 In this sense, religion, by externalizing causality and by establishing a rigid order of the universe (unknown in magical cultures) offered a clearing for the development of prayers and thought, so that scientific knowledge could be born.25 The paradox, said Warburg, is that technology and technique, by transforming the interactions between humans and the world into an immediate phenomenon, were destroying precisely the open space for reflection through which thought, and ultimately science, could be born. However, Warburg’s anthropological analysis does not manage to find a working definition of magic that is useful to the argument in this chapter. The transformation of the human being into a cause is a helpful hint that finds similarity within our own contemporary situation, but does not bring enough conceptual solidity to allow comparison between the technician (or the technocrat) and the shaman. I believe that Ernesto De Martino, an Italian historicist anthropologian, may offer us useful instruments of analysis. In his work, Il Mondo Magico,26 Ernesto De Martino describes magic as the cultural form through which primitive societies were trying to negotiate a sense of ontological security. With this term, De Martino indicated the perception of one’s own being and its safety in the world. It is not just a matter of physical safety, or security. It invests the single historical person with the capacity to constitute them self as a coherent whole in front of their own experiences, without being possessed by them. Magical societies, according to De Martino, lacked precisely this capacity to keep themselves in front of their own experiences. Everything happens as if a weak, un-guaranteed, unstable presence were unable to resist the shock caused by a particular emotional content. The individual, in a magical culture, is unable to find sufficient energy to keep them self present in front of the event, recognizing, re-appropriating and controlling it in a web of definite relations. In this way, the content is lost as “content of a present conscience,” The presence tends to remain absorbed in a determinate content, unable to go beyond it, and, therefore, disappears and surrenders its own capacity to exist as an autonomous being. The distinction between presence and world disappears.27 Such drama is created by the

24. Ibid., 24–9. 25. Ibid., 64–6. 26. Ernesto De Martino, Il Mondo Magico: Prolegomeni a una Storia del Magismo (Torino: Bollati Borignghieri, 1973). 27. Ibid., 72–3.

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will to exist, as presence, in front of the risk of non-existence.28With the concept of presence, De Martino denotes the capacity of the person/ community to elaborate its own experiences within a coherent historical/ cognitive framework in an autonomous manner. It is the capacity of the subject (individual or collective) to take possession of its own experiences and own them within a coherent story, without being controlled by them.29 For this reason, De Martino describes magical societies as haunted by a “weak presence.” In this cultural framework, the shaman, or the mage, is a historical and anthropological necessity. The magic of the shaman had the purpose of re-elaborating the experiences of the individuals within a common cultural horizon, obtaining, in this way, a direct control of the life of his community. The shaman served as the source of power and stability for the entire community. Through the shaman, the world, even though for a short time, ceased to be a constant source of threat and was put into order, it was objectified through rituals, artifacts and magic formulas.30 Magic represents a desperate attempt to establish a man-made “ontological order” within a world devoid of any order, and even ontologically spontaneous in its capacity to harm the individual. In this sense, the shaman, in the tribe, is both a kind of “psychiatrist” for the whole tribe and a “magical Christ.” The mage has to take upon himself the tragedy of the dangerous world, fight with it and overcome it through his rituals; in this process of overcoming, he “redeems” his whole community, which is literally brought to a more secure cultural stage. We are addressing, here, a cognitive and epistemological problem that involves the ontological possibility of having “experiences” of the world. The human possibility of constituting itself as an Erlebnis, a lived experience. In the magical world, the world itself acquires certain ontological categories in specific cultural contexts. It is not just an epistemic 28. Ibid., 154–5. 29. Ibid., 70–4, 150–3. An example of what the expression “being controlled by our experiences” means can be found in De Martino’s presentation of the olon state in magical societies and in nervous and obsessive breakdowns in psychiatric studies. The olon state (70–4) happens (or is induced) when a subject is extremely susceptible to external stimuli, to the point that it loses control of its own actions and starts imitating the source of the stimuli in a pre-conscious way. For example, a person starts imitating the movements of the branches in the wind, or starts imitating the actions of the shaman in an unconscious, or even unwilling, way. De Martino finds another example of weak presence, in cases of pathological obsession or nervous breakdown (150–3), in which a subject is unable to elaborate his own experiences in an autonomous way and needs either a set of rituals to reestablish his own sense of self (obsession) or lose himself completely (the nervous breakdown). 30. Ibid., 130–4.

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structure of individuals or communities; the world itself obtains certain ontological properties that influence a priori the epistemic structure of a society. Our experiences of the world can, then, be constituted “a priori” by our cultural interpretations and can lead to empirical evidences that are firmly denied in a different cultural context. We face, according to De Martino, a problem of culturally conditioned nature.31 According to De Martino, it is only with classical civilization, and then Christianity, that we begin, within the western civilization, to elaborate our culturally conditioned nature in a way that no longer relies on magical powers. With Christianity, we begin that long and complex historical process in which western civilization was able to elaborate the autonomy of the subject.32 When Augustine, in his Confessions, describes the creation as the moment in which finally time starts to exist, he is establishing a common, coherent, historical path, within the Christian tradition, and this becomes the common ground for the elaboration of all historical experiences.33 Within this historical path, the subject is autonomous in their elaboration of the world. They do not need the intervention of magical powers, or of a mage, to exist, as an historical presence, within the world. The world itself is not autonomous in its capacity to create danger, thus allowing its exploration.34 Modernity, which is born out of this historical process, does not escape the problem of the culturally conditioned nature. The ontology of modernity has been established as a contradictory polemic against the reality of magical powers, a struggle that becomes particularly evident when we address naturalistic sciences and their reactions in front of claims of alleged magical powers or paranormal realities.35 De Martino 31. De Martino, Il Mondo Magico, 51–4. 32. Ibid., 157. 33. Augustine, Confessiones XI.10–4. 34. There are philosophical/historical interpretations that would not agree with De Martino’s proposal; they would describe the Christian culture as still imbued by superstition and fear of supernatural beings. Charles Taylor, with his A Secular Age, may be a good example of such criticism. However, this kind of criticism overlooks a fundamental feature. In Christianity (and religious societies in general), the world possesses a de jure condition of peace. There is an ontological balance and order which guarantees the peace and prosperity of human beings. Dangers and tragedies only happen whenever this order is broken. In the magical world, instead, dangers and tragedies are totally autonomous. The community, or the person, may be struck at any moment, without a good reason and without “guilt”. 35. As argued also by Berardini, in his introduction to De Martino’s philosophy, modern human beings have not escaped the possibility of once more becoming barbarians. Modernity has not established, once and for all, the security of presence, it has simply changed the ontological paradigm to give it security. Sergio Berardini, Ethos,

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states that western, modern, scientific and naturalistic, civilization is unable to conceive the human conscience in terms different from its own. It is unable to conceive itself outside the boundaries of the supreme individual self, able to “disengage” itself from the world.36 Any admission of difference would allow an increasing amount of risk that our ontological security is not able to sustain. The modern Weltanschauung is deeply at work and has to rely on a non-rational, a priori acceptance of its own, fundamental, ontological statements to be able to sustain itself. If we analyse Harari’s argument from this perspective, then, Homo Deus reveals a fallacy that pushes this contradiction a step forward, it denies the ontological grounds of the scientific, modern, world. It denies the stability and security of the self in a world that is no longer mysterious. If we cannot be assured of our desires, individuality, and coherence in our relationship with the world, then the world itself (and the technological wonders built by technicians and scientists) becomes again mysterious, as we are unable to recollect our experiences in a coherent epistemic structure. This criticism applies to Harari’s proposal on two points. First, following De Martino, it can be said that the technological world, based on the unification of life sciences and digital/mechanical sciences, envisioned by Harari is not the “real” world. It “presupposes” a real world to make sense of the claims and epistemological framework of life sciences; much like modern sciences had to postulate an “ontologically secure” self and cultures within the magical framework and postulate a “weak presence,” to make sense of its claims and rituals, the posthuman paradigm has to postulate an unfree human, controlled by its own desires.37 This postulation also becomes the foundation for social Presenza, Storia: La Ricerca Filosofica di Ernesto De Martino (Trento: Università degli Studi di Trento, 2013), 115–18. In doing so, however, it has not escaped the drama of the culturally conditioned nature. 36. De Martino, Il Mondo Magico, 158–65. De Martino is not saying that western civilization is unable to conceive any collectivistic view of the world, or that it considers individualism (or egoism) its own specific ontological boundary. He is affirming, instead, that any kind of reasoning developed within western, modern, civilization, has to presuppose that the human actor will always be a “stable” self, a self that is not endangered, ontologically, by the mere existence of other selves, or by an independently dangerous world. Western civilization has to presuppose that any person involved within their own structure will be able to develop as a lived experience, that is, will be able to make those experiences their own. The modern, scientific, individual can exist only in the measure it can possess, appropriate and contain its own experience within its own capacity of control, without being “controlled” by them. 37. This interpretation would also be immune to the criticism, proposed by Harari, that science proposes “objective truths” based on experiments, for two simple reasons offered by science itself. First, no scientific experiment can be considered true and

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and power structures that have an invested interest in the fact that the Weltanschauung that legitimizes their own existence is kept in place, a fact that projects a penumbra of doubt on any “truth” proposed within a specific cultural framework. Second, following De Martino’s anthropological observation, Harari’s proposal transforms the human being, again, into a precarious being, that has to doubt, firstly, the stability of its own self and secondly, the stability of its relationship with the surrounding world. Seen in this light, we can ascribe new value to the concept of presence proposed by De Martino. With this concept, De Martino means that we are born upon an historical path with which we can coherently connect and that helps us shape our understanding of the world, making it a coherent reality within which we can act, construct, and project our own lives. In this way, our own existence is perceived as a meaningful participation in a common “story”. It is not being thrown into the world, as a lonely monades; it is instead a perception of ourselves as historical beings, connected to a story and with the capacity to be actors within such story. For De Martino, the modern presence has accomplished the maximum amount of ontological security. It is, at the same time, a condition of extreme danger and of great possibility. It is dangerous, because if our presence is denied by historical events, by power relationships, then we are at risk of losing ourselves. At the same time, it is a condition of great potentiality and possibility, if we are able to grasp reason: that is, to embrace our role as actors within our own story. If we are connected with our cultural context then the possibility of improvement and historical progress is there to be grasped. Precisely because the individual form is the result of a self-production, it includes within itself the possibility of failure, hence the maximum amount of risk of non-existence. The supreme risk, for the modern man, becomes then the supreme abandonment of his autonomy whenever he faces content that he is unable to assimilate and control38. This acknowledgment leads De Martino to two main conclusions. First, that objective “once and for all”, but it can be true only until proved wrong by the successive experiments. The second criticism rests on the fact that the truth offered by sciences are valid only within the terms of the experiment and of the theory (much like the assumptions of mechanicist physics, which are valid only within specific orders of dimension). We can think about the paradox of Schrodinger’s cat, whose assumption is that, in creating the experiment, we do not observe reality in itself, but only a pre-determined feature of reality whose outcomes are limited by the boundaries of the experiment itself (in the case of the poor cat, it can only be alive or dead). 38. De Martino, Il Mondo Magico, 158–61.

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even the “autonomy of the person”, the individual self, as historical product, does not represent any factual reality.39 It is, as with other cultural productions, a process of abstraction and categorization. Even the procedures through which we claim to be able to find this “unified autonomous conscience,” by investigating its capabilities, categories, and fields of operation, already implies the individual conscience in its totality.40 Second, precisely because the guaranteed presence, with its ontological security, is a historical product, and not a neutral fact, the possibility of its weakening and disappearance is always implied in the historical process. De Martino affirms that events like mental illness or the death of a loved one can be as destructive for the presence of a single individual as wars and great tragedies are for the presence of whole civilizations.41 The modern person can still “lose itself.” At first sight, it may seem that De Martino might be confirming Harari’s reading. Isn’t the stable self, after all, a “self-narration,” a lie that we tell ourselves? However, De Martino would soundly disagree with Harari’s proposal. The autonomy of the self, its stability, is certainly a historical product, but this product is a conquest that allowed the development of modernity and science. De Martino describes it as the destiny of Western civilization. Any instance of calling into question the ontologically secure self is not an act of progress, but a regression toward barbarism; toward a magical world. However, the attempt to keep hold of an historical conquest is not just a matter of historical convenience: it is also a matter of analytical accuracy. According to Harari, our decisions, feelings, and desires are the results of data and chemical balances within our brain; in this interpretation, the progression of life sciences and techniques will allow us to improve our comprehension of the human mind and its decision processes, allowing us to improve them. However, as De Martino already noticed,42 it is impossible to separate the data of the consciousness from the consciousness itself. Whether we follow an empiricist interpretation, and believe that the human consciousness is the product of external “impression” (the data) on itself, or we follow a rationalist approach and believe that human consciousness is the product of inner balances and values,43 we cannot escape a fundamental contradiction, that we are already implying the totality of human 39. Ibid., 161. 40. Ibid., 161–2. 41. De Martino, Il Mondo Magico, 162. 42. Ibid., 157–8. 43. In Harari’s case, the chemical balances of the brain,

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consciousness. It is impossible to separate the single elements of the human mind without implying the whole. The conquest of the “ontologically secure self” allowed modern individuals to interact with their world without the need to relinquish to “shamans” their own capacity to develop meaning. We overcame magical culture the moment we established not simply an objective world, but a world that was accessible to every individual through common categories of meaning, without the need for esoteric knowledge and “experts” in the mysteries of the world who were needed to translate its workings to the “common” person. Harari himself notices how this is a component typical of magical cultures in a volume of the Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture, to which he contributed in 2011, entitled Continuity and Innovation in Magical Tradition.44 In the introduction, the editors (Harari included), certify how the systematization, specialization, and diversification in branches is a component typical of magical cultures as well. Magic was not a chaotic sea of rites and beliefs, it could very well be structured in a coherent and consistent system of knowledge and practices, of which the various experts and practitioners claimed total exclusivity, authority, and control. 45 This confirms the assumption of this chapter, that it is possible to evaluate contemporary social phenomena anthropologically and culturally, even science. It would allow, supporting De Martino’s anthropology, reinforcement of the claim that “magic” is not simply a concept indicating, in a substantive way, rituals and practices, but defining a cultural form of relationship with knowledge and the world. For a Christian philosopher it is extremely troubling to see, in our contemporary society, the rising of primitive forms of sociality. The new Technocratic Shaman This interpretation reveals even more troubling consequences from the moment we begin to analyze the social and anthropological dynamics of power within contemporary western society. We are seeing a progressive increase in power and arbitrariness in the hands of fewer people who are hailed and celebrated as “experts” in their own field, economy, medicine, technology, etc. To such experts, we relinquish the keys through which 44. Gideon Bohak, Yuval N. Harari and Shaul Shaked, Continuity and Innovation in Magical Tradition, Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture (Boston: Brill, 2011). 45. Ibid., 2–4.

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we can access our own world and even stop speaking, elaborating concepts, and determining categories that could allow us access to the meaning of our own life. If Ernesto De Martino’s ontological security is to be understood as the “conquest” of the world by Western Civilization, in the sense that the world finally becomes accessible to everyone through a common language of faith and reason, contemporary transformations of society are seeing precisely the loss of such common language. Today we see the “experts,” the technicians, the ones that grasp and understand procedures and mechanisms, acquiring more and more power through a language that becomes increasingly mysterious, complex, and esoteric. We see the technician being transformed into a sort of post-modern, technological shaman. In the contemporary, chaotic, sea of languages, where every branch of specialization and expertise wishes to reduce the whole complexity of reality to the minimum term of a few “data,” the power to shape and control society returns in the hands of a few individuals who possess the correct “rituals” to generate some “effects” within society. What was a distinctive trait of magical cultures, has become the shape of a whole society. Only those who know the “right” procedures, the correct rituals, have the power to influence society. If everything is procedure, technical apparatus, legal/economic/ technological ritual, then we will need a new secular order of experts. Such is the power of the contemporary technician that we look at them as if they are the means for our own immanent salvation. In Harari’s narrative, the great scientist, the expert in life-sciences, will produce a “safer,” or better, or “improved” form of human society, although this salvation may not be available to everyone, but only to those that the new, technocratic, “redeemer” considers worthy. However, this reduces social and political life to the bare minimum of its substance, to mere struggle between powers. Contrary to what Harari envisions, once we have “machines” that take political, social, and life decisions for us, these spheres of human life will not have disappeared, but will have fallen under the control of those few who “understand”, “create,” and make those machines “work.” Cultures have been able to progress and evolve precisely from the moment they have been able to establish a nomos, an absolute law that was untouchable and unbreakable by immanent powers. It is not by chance that Antigone opposes, against the arbitrary judgment of Creon, the absolute laws of the Gods. It is also significant that the first, founding, myth of Rome sees Romulus tracing the “boundaries” of the city. The creation of boundaries, the establishment of limits, the acknowledgment that there are borders that should

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not be crossed by human beings is the measure of the life and of the evolution of a civilization. The cultural stage in which there are no boundaries, in which the laws are established by only immanent powers, is a primitive stage, the “Magical World”, as Ernesto De Martino would say. According to De Martino, the role of the shaman is to prescribe a “limit,” to develop a “security net” to guarantee the ontological existence of his tribe. In this condition, in which there are no absolute and objective laws in the world, then the shaman, as an earthly power, takes upon himself the role of establishing such borders. In this sense, then, De Martino sees the shaman as a necessary step in the move from a primitive stage to a civilized one. By establishing secure borders, the shaman allows his tribe to develop the ontological security necessary to pursue more advanced social forms. However, the cultural stage in which a society shifts from absolute laws to “day by day” laws, in which the immanent relations of power and the desires of individuals become the “norm,” cannot be seen as a step forward. It is, instead, an attempt to once more bring “magic” into our lives. It is a technocratic, specialist, magic, maybe, but certainly another step toward regressive forms of culture. We see, then, the returning of a troubling form of barbarism, one in which the common ontological horizon of the people is becoming increasingly precarious; in which everyone is becoming increasingly “weak,” day by day, while a restricted number of new mages acquire increasing power to determine and control reality. We see a troubling return of De Martino’s shaman, a new, dangerous form of “magic Christ.” Harari’s proposal, in this sense, is not an historical narrative, neither is it the tale of a humanity that “frees” itself from its own tragedies through technology. It is, instead, an escapist tale. The tale of a few, new technocratic shamans who wish to escape the tragedies of human life through the mysteries and promises of technology. An escape in which the largest part of humanity does not seem to play a role, being, instead, an acceptable sacrifice. In a world that is always more and more technologized and incomprehensible to human beings, don’t we risk giving up our own power to “technocratic mages,” on whom–instead of God– we rely in our search for security? Memento, Homo, quia pulvis es, et in pulverem revertis

The Impossibility of a Crafted Soul: A Non-reductive Physicalist Approach ZACHARY R. BRIGANTE

Abstract If one approaches the issue of artificial intelligence from a non-reductive physicalist worldview as laid down by Brown et al. in Whatever Happened to the Soul (1998), it is impossible, outside of a direct act of God, for an emergent and supervenient soul to occur outside of a human body. This chapter explores why and how this is true. First, it is true primarily because the soul is theorized as contextually emergent, the fact that it occurs only within human biological forms is one of its attributes. Additionally, within this view, the human soul is emergent of more than pure electrical impulses, but also chemical. Thus, for an artificial human soul to be theoretically possible, it would essentially need to be an exact biochemical replica of the human body itself, aging and death included. However, due to the effects of growth and experience on plasticity in the brain and body, any such body would need to have physically experienced the entirety of a human’s life to be a proper seat for soul transfer. In other words, due to the dependence of the soul on the exact form of the body, especially neural pathways, any successful attempts would be self-defeating because the new body would be required to be of the same age and condition, otherwise what would be theoretically crafted is an entirely new person, obliterating the old. As for a brand-new creation, any biochemical body crafted without the awareness of childhood, growth, and the potential for death, would not yield a human soul, but would be soulless. In other words, God has already perfected the method for reproducing the soul, they are called children, and are the inevitable end result of any form of successful mechanical soul’s creation. They are entirely new; a new body, a new brain, a new soul. In addition to these large road blocks, the definition of an emergent soul as irreducible means it is impossible to know the cause of the soul, and thus impossible to craft without an infinity of trial, error, and luck.

In 1998, Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and an assortment of their colleagues published their book, Whatever Happened to the Soul, which laid out a wide range of evidence supporting their hypothesis that the soul and the body are intimately intertwined.1 The scientific evidence 1. Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy and H. Newton Malony, eds., Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998).

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presented in the text is wide ranging and can be directly applied to the discussion of artificial intelligence. If one accepts Brown and Murphey’s foundational premise, a number of difficulties become apparent when contemplating the possibility of crafting an artificial form either capable of holding a soul transferred from a human body or capable of generating a soul on its own. Within the text, Brown et al. define the soul as a contextually supervenient and emergent property of the body, rooted in cognitive ability and personal relatedness. By emergent, they mean that the soul is generated by the body but is irreducible to it, such that any study of the constituent parts would reveal influence but not cause. The support for such a claim is Nobel laureate Roger Sperry who argues that “consciousness is conceived to be a dynamic emergent property of brain activity, neither identical with nor reducible to, the neural events of which it is mainly composed.”2 Examined from a biblical perspective, the soul is “a semantically designated portion of the soul-mind-body whole,” and from a neurological perspective can be interpreted as “a unique mode of functioning that becomes possible on the basis of both a significant increase in the capacity of some number of lower-level abilities and the interaction among these capacities.”3 Such a view is not so simple as to suggest that the inherent complexity presented by the soul emerges as a single unit upon the most primitive biological form, but that there exist “emergent levels as we go from the neurological to the cognitive, to the interpersonal, to the political, economic, and legal, to the moral, and finally to the spiritual.”4 In each case, the levels represent principles that are not relevant to an understanding of the stage before them, and which would be nonsensical if compared to previous stages. The primary example of such truth is examining laws for neural networks which have no relevance or context when one examines single nerve cells.5 For Brown et al., then, the soul is the final perceived emergent level, dependent upon all previous levels, but irreducible to them. Another quality of the soul is its dependence on higher cognitive ability, by which they mean “the substantial advantage humans possess over the most intelligent of primates in the power, scope, and complexity of mental processing.”6 This cognitive advantage includes the 2. Ibid., 88. 3. Ibid., 102. 4. Ibid., 138. 5. Murphy Brown and Newton Malony, eds., Whatever Happened to the Soul, 216. 6. Ibid., 101.

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development of culture, language, art, technology, and the expansion of personal relatedness.7 High cognitive function is also argued to be the foundation of soulish qualities like “the measure of free will, sin and the experience of guilt, acceptance of redemption, the experience of grace, righteousness and ethical behavior, worship and an inner “life in the spirit,” the experience and expression of love, participation in community, ability to understand the nature of God’s revelation, and participation in the work of God’s kingdom.”8 One widely studied aspect of each of these functions of the soul is language, or the “capacity to communicate a potentially infinite number of propositions; to relate regarding complex, abstract ideas, as well as about the past and the future.”9 Language is considered “the greatest chasm between the mental life of the most intelligent non-human primates and that of human beings.”10 The strongest evidence for such a chasm lies in studies of attempts to teach apes to communicate, within which, despite 19000 multi-sign utterances of language, there was found no evidence of grammatical constructions, “that is, constraints of word order, use of grammatical words (articles, prepositions, connectives), phrase nesting, or words inflected for tense or number.”11 More importantly, Brown argues, is the complete lack of evidence of creativity in language expression or use.12 Comparing such language skills with humans, children aged three years old “have a much more sophisticated expressive grammar and much greater linguistic creativity than that of the best examples of language performance in the explicitly trained primates.”13 Such an example of language is simply one means of determining that higher cognitive function is unique to humans, and so plausibly an aspect of the soul. By personal relatedness, Brown and Murphey mean three levels of relationship: a unique subjective process of self-representation and self-perception, a unique inter-individual communication and relationship, and a unique relatedness to God as being the only creatures generally aware of and able to communicate with Him.14 In terms of the 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., 103. 10. Ibid., 104. 11. Ibid., 105. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid., 105–6. 14. Ibid., 102.

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subjective process of personal relation, the most important concept is metacognition, or the ability “to think about one’s own thinking, deciding, and doing.”15 The perception of one’s self as the center of cognitive agency is necessary for an individual to function.16 If one’s body or mind were to act without cognitive agency, one would seek immediate medical assistance, such as individuals who hear involuntary voices or sounds. At the age of three, human children begin to manifest a rudimentary theory of mind including “an understanding of what distinguishes people and animals; what distinguishes animate and inanimate; and the idea that people’s thoughts and feelings may differ in relating to the same circumstance.”17 Scientifically, one example of humans who theoretically struggle with metacognition are individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome, which interferes with reciprocal social interactions, nonverbal interpersonal communication, and an all-absorbing desire for repetition.18 This is also an example of the second type of personal relationships, primarily rooted in theory of mind or the ability to conceive of thought in others. An individual with a lack in theory of mind has difficulty experiencing depth of emotion, or empathizing with others, including a deity, which extends the argument into the third arena of personal relatedness. In addition to some form of self-identification and theory of mind, Brown highlights episodic memory as an important and critical cognitive skill required for personal relatedness on all scales. Episodic memory “stores the cumulated events of one’s life, an individual’s autobiography.”19 It is essentially the awareness of a past happening in which an individual has participated. On a personal level, one must remember who one was to understand how one has changed. On a social level, one must remember, whether passively or actively, the interactions one has had with individuals in the past in order to perceive and participate in friendships. Similarly, on a spiritual level, one must remember, whether passively or actively, the most transformative moments and experiences of the divine in order to continue to claim a relationship with God. In each case, episodic memory provides a “continuous historical personal identity, including a record of important events in our interpersonal and community relationships.”20 In these ways, the ability to relate to oneself, 15. Ibid., 108. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid., 109. 18. Ibid., 110. 19. Murphy Brown and Newton Malony, eds., Whatever Happened to the Soul., 113. 20. Ibid., 114.

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others, and God are all hypothesized as functions of the soul and are all dependent on higher cognitive function, but behave in ways irreducible to neural networks alone. By contextual supervenience, they mean that “higher-level explanations that may supervene over lower-level explanations often do so under one set of circumstances but not another.”21 This is based on the observation that “an important feature of the supervenience relation, which has long been recognized, is that supervenient properties are often multiply realizable.”22 As an example, a computer is still able to be considered the same machine, regardless of its variations in hardware construction, i.e. vacuum tubes vs. circuits. Another example of the contextual nature of supervenience is the concept of good, whereby identical acts can be considered either good or not good depending on context. For example, a single rich person giving away their wealth to the poor is seen as good, but if that same individual has a family and many children dependent on their income, it may no longer be considered good.23 The idea of contextual supervenience is further simplified by the example of a signal between two individuals. It is proposed that an act such as turning on a specific lamp could be considered a basic function. A message conveyed by the lamp’s illumination are both supervenient to the action in that it is dependent upon the lamp but not reducible to it, multiply realizable in that it could indicate numerous messages, and contextually dependent on the agreement made between the two individuals.24 This is essentially the Christian argument for the contextually supervenient soul. The body is the lamp, which can have various shapes and colors, the soul is the message which only exists in the minds of those greater than the lamp, and the context is the form of the soul, understood only in the agreement between God and creation, where different superior intellects reflect an eternity of unique human individuals. Taken all together, these observations strongly suggest that the emergence of an individual human soul is dependent on the contextual state of the specific human body from which it emerges such that any change to the body also changes the soul.25 On a descriptive scale of the human soul nonreductive physicalism would include the human biological form 21. Ibid., 222. 22. Ibid., 135. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid., 65.

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as an attribute of the soul, necessary for its existence. This can be demonstrated through both large- and small-scale body alteration.26 On a large scale, when an individual loses a limb, the shifts in that individual’s self-image are well studied enough that researchers have developed an Amputee Body Image Scale.27 Such changes in body image have been attributed to individuals incapable of adapting to the change in their appearance.28 This suggests that the trauma the individual experiences impacts not only their physical body, but their mind as well, manifesting in “poor social skills or anxious and distracted behavior” for example.29 One study of amputation and body image revealed that a lower selfimage due to amputation was consistent across gender and age boundaries, with significantly lower self-images associated with the number of limbs lost.30 In other words, the more that an amputee’s body changes, the greater the shift in all three aspects of the individual’s personal relatedness. From this evidence, it becomes possible to argue that when a human’s body experiences trauma, that human’s soul also experiences the trauma. Such evidence that the body and soul are intimately connected is not limited to large scale traumas such as amputation. There are also significant shifts in self-perception and behavior when the change in body is relatively small, such as a psychological trauma. One study in 2016 mapped the impact of the experience of negative emotions, particularly invalidating interactions with parents, on adults who had developed Alexithymia, “a cognitive deficit in the experience of emotion.”31 They found support that even non-abusive encounters of negative emotion from family members appeared positively correlated with a selfinvalidating self-image in adulthood, thus altering the individual’s personal relatedness. These individuals, as children, experienced a mindaltering altercation with their parents which seems to have permanently impacted their ability to experience emotions and personal relatedness. 26. Ibid., 101. 27. Lucilene Ferriera et al., “Brazilian Portuguese Version of the Amputee Body Image Scale: Cultural Adaptation and a Psychometric Analysis,” Sage 125, no. 3 (2018): 507–24. 28. Anna C. Gilg, “The Impact of Amputation on Body Image,” Honors Theses (The University of Southern Mississippi, 2016), 1. 29. Gilg, “The Impact of Amputation on Body Image.” 30. Ibid., 17. 31. Serge Lecours et al., “Negative Self-Evaluating Emotions as Mediator in the Relationship Between Childhood Emotional Trauma and Alexithymia in Adulthood,” Sage Journals 64, no. 5 (2016): 1027.

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All that physically changed for these individuals was neural pathways, but their souls, represented by their altered cognitive function and personal relatedness, were altered. This example speaks to the level of sensitivity and intimacy the soul shares with the body. Whether on the macro scale of losing an entire limb or on the molecular scale of shifting neural pathways, changing the body has a direct impact upon the nature of a person and so, within nonreductive physicalism, their soul. From this foundation, when contemplating artificial intelligence within a Nonreductive Physicalist worldview, purely electronic based forms of soul, such as mind uploading or, its foundational premise, the computational theory of mind, would be impossible.32 Mind uploading, which is the hypothesized concept of uploading a human consciousness to a computer, and the computational theory of mind both hold that the mind “literally is a digital computer… and that thought literally is a kind of computation.” Yuval Harari, a historian and current leader in thinking about the intersection of humans and computers has vehemently argued that “humans are algorithms” that can be hacked or otherwise controlled.33 This is predicated on the belief that “there is no reason to think that organic algorithms can do things that non-organic algorithms will never be able to replicate or surpass.”34 However, the reduction of humans to algorithms is specifically what the evidence of Brown et al. proposes is impossible, due to the complete lack of evidence linking higher cognitive processes to lower level biological functions. Particularly strong evidence against this is simply, for Brown, the observation that conscious thought can initiate and control not only further thoughts, but bodily actions.35 The source of consciousness is currently unknown, and yet appears to have a direct connection with both thoughts and actions. The “brain receiving from conscious mind in a willed action and in turn transmitting to mind in conscious experiences” despite only a single half of that pairing being a known reality suggests irreducibility but does not guarantee it.36 Regardless of the scientific evidence and philosophical viability of mind uploading and the computational theory of mind, it remains that 32. Massimo Pigliucci, “Mind Uploading: A Philosophical Counter-Analysis,” AI & Society 27, no. 4 (2014): 431–6. 33. Siddhartha Mukherjee, “New, Improved, Obsolete,” Sunday Book Review (2007): 12. 34. Ibid. 35. Brown et al., Whatever Happened, 88. 36. Ibid.

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both theories ignore the biological influence of chemicals on thought processes.37 One strong and common example of the influence of biological chemicals on cognitive ability and personal relatedness can be found in the numerous studies of, and treatments for, depression. While depression is a complex process including “a heterogeneous cluster of phenomenological states and behaviors, typified by experiences such as sadness, lack of energy, lack of pleasure, hopelessness, weight changes, sleep difficulties, and psychomotor agitation/retardation,”38 a simplified explanation of the process of depression is an imbalance of certain chemicals in the brain, namely serotonin, dopamine and/or norepinephrine which act as neurotransmitters, the primary treatment for which is to introduce additional chemicals for balance.39 This is primarily due to the observation that certain “drugs that decrease neurotransmitters, like reserpine, appeared to induce depression and drugs that increase neurotransmitters, like iproniazid and imipramine, seemed to alleviate depression.”40 However, even if only correlated, the relationship between the reduction of chemicals and depression is clear evidence that depression is more than mere electricity. If the reduction, or addition, of numerous microscopic chemical particles can so drastically effect a human’s personal relatedness, the suggestion that human consciousness can be reduced to mere electrical impulses, and thus fully replicated in computerized form, appears incomplete. Similarly, a functionalist perspective in which “what matters to consciousness is not biological makeup but causal structure and causal role,” is not possible within Nonreductive Physicalism’s strict requirements necessary for the human soul because the causal structures and roles are inseparable from the biological makeup.41 That is, even if one were to create a machine-chemical hybrid of a human body, the change in biological structure from bone to metal would shift the electrical resistances and permeability enough that a soul would not emerge. Not even something soul-like could emerge, due to the contextually emergent principle that the soul is either on or off depending on the specific biological 37. Ibid., 122. 38. William Schultz and Noel Hunter, “Depression, Chemical Imbalances, and Feminism,” Journal of Feminist Family Therapy 28 (2016): 159. 39. Christopher M. France, Paul H. Lysaker, and Ryan P. Robinson, “The ‘Chemical Imbalance’ Explanation for Depression: Origins, Lay Endorsement, and Clinical Implications,” Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 38, no. 4 (2007): 411–2. 40. Schultz and Hunter, “Depression,” 161. 41. Brown et al., Whatever Happened, 121.

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structure. Essentially, that which appears to be merely structure is more than it appears. However, evolution presents the possibility that a range of humanoid structures can allow a soul to emerge, particularly depending on where one chooses to draw the line between human and prehuman ancestors. Some have gone as far as to say that Christ died even for the Neanderthals, certainly suggesting that they possessed souls. Thus, for an artificial human body to be theoretically capable of soul emergence, it would need to be an exact biochemical replica of the human body but could conceivably share the structure of any human between ancient humanity and its current structure. Further support for this understanding is that humans continue to adapt and change, yet remain vessels capable of emerging a soul, so that some modification is possible without negating soul emergence. One consequence of the close relationship between body and soul is the observation that souls grow and mature, develop and decline. That is, much the way that traditional scholars have argued, there are different shapes and forms of soul such that a primitive human child possesses a primitive human soul. This can be connected to the language example between apes and humans used earlier. That chimpanzees can achieve the intellectual language capacity of a human child, rather than suggesting that the chimpanzee has a human child’s soul, would instead suggest that the human child is at the developmental soul stage of a chimpanzee. It would be logical, then, to project that the emergence of the higher cognitive function and awareness that triggers a human soul exists somewhere between the age of two and three years. It is important here to emphasize that human souls, regardless of age, are unique and precious, but their direct connection to biology means they are not fully formed instead of coming into existence from nothing at conception at conception, but grow rather than instantaneously appearing fully formed from nothing. Similarly, as a human ages, the souls shape begins to torque, leading to age related symptoms like forgetfulness and dementia. The body and soul degrade together, eventually leading to a body which can no longer support the soul which results in either death or vegetative state. Arguments concerning whether the potential for a human soul represented by a child younger than three years of age, or an aging elder beyond human recognition have value is irrelevant to my point here. This discussion is merely to observe that if one logically connects the body and soul as Brown et al. have, the soul as well as the body both grow and deteriorate. Another consequence of the dependent relationship of soul on body is the observation that small neural changes can impact the soul such

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that the biological and chemical properties of any artificial replica would need to be exact. Due to neural and behavioral plasticity as well as behavioral reaction range, a clone, for instance, would be an unsuitable host for a transfer of a specific soul. Neural plasticity is the ability for neurons to adapt and change in response to environmental stimuli.42 More specifically, neural plasticity is an observation in infant brains where malleability in the brain “leads to an increased capacity for learning, which in turn provides an opportunity for the improvement of cerebral functioning that cannot be reproduced to the same extent or with the same ease later in life.”43 Such malleability, while more difficult over time, remains throughout a human’s life. In adults it has most often been observed through the adjustment, or taking over, of living brain around an injury whether suffered through the senses such as loss of sight, or through direct damage.44 Recently, “plasticity has also been demonstrated in normal language development. A prevailing view, that language, and especially grammar, is largely innate, is being challenged by data that show large effects of various environmental inputs on language development in infants and young children.”45 In addition, and fitting nicely with Brown et al.’s theories concerning higher cognitive function and the soul, “while neural plasticity probably exists in the nervous systems of all species, it appears to be most marked in specific regions of human cerebral cortex, in areas that subserve the so-called higher cortical functions, including language, mathematical ability, musical ability, and ‘executive functions.’”46 In a similar way, behavioral plasticity is the potential of any individual to “develop different behavioral phenotypes in response to different situations.”47 Every creature, both human and animal, has a behavioral type, or a mean behavior. However, environmentally induced variations between individuals, even in the same population, have been observed and measured.48 Environmental influences upon a creature include genetic variation, developmental changes to, or travel between, 42. Brown et al., Whatever Happened, 53. 43. Peter R. Huttenlocher, Neural Plasticity: The Effects of Environment on the Development of the Cerebral Cortex (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2002), 3. 44. Ibid., 4. 45. Ibid., 5. 46. Ibid. 47. Brown et al., Whatever Happened, 53. 48. Tomas Janos Urszan et al., “Experience During Development Triggers Between-individual Variation in Behavioural Plasticity,” Journal of Animal Ecology 87 (2018): 1265.

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environments as well as the creature’s chosen settled environment.49 Some studies have even suggested that certain behavioral patterns will not emerge at all without the relevant environmental stimuli, suggesting a contextual dependence of some behaviors within certain environments.50 Despite this dependent correlation, however, behavioral plasticity has been measured whereby individuals in the same environment, while they all participate in a given behavior, do so with different levels of confidence, exploration, or variance.51 For the purposes of this study, such individual changes, which continue to be studied but which are not fully understood, suggest a far more complex difficulty in the growth or creation of a vessel capable of soul emergence, specifically in reference to the attempt to transfer a soul from one body to another. Another difficulty for artificial soul creation is behavioral reaction range, which is the “genetic array of potential” which exists within every human being.52 More generally, each human has the same broad range of genetic possibilities and the environmental and experiential events of their life help to determine where along that range they will develop. Each of these concepts is evidence that an individual body is directly and uniquely impacted by the experience of existence over time. The most concrete examples of this reality can be found in twin studies in which despite being genetically identical, twins growing up in the same environment respond to that environment in two unique and different ways.53 As an example, “co-twins start out with identical sets of genes, although over time they may accumulate different mutations. The common experiences of life may affect the twins differently and may even change permanently the expression of some genes. Individuality in personal choices leads to further divergence.”54 On a scale from 1 to 0, where 1 is the most similar and 0 is the least similar, twins reared together on average share .97 similarity on fingerprints but can vary highly on other biological rhythms such as only a .54 similarity for heart rate.55 Such a lack of similarity is even more pronounced in areas of higher cognition, such as only a .28 similarity in relation to nonreligious

49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Brown et al., Whatever Happened, 53. 53. Ibid., 52. 54. Brown et al., Whatever Happened, 53. 55. Ibid., 54.

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items.56 While intellectual pursuits such as interests and morality might be expected to shift over time due to changes in environment, the shifts in biological similarity in twins reared together points strongly toward alternative genetic adaptation, or genetic reaction range.57 These unique responses from both one’s neural network and one’s genetic adaptation in response to environmental stimuli shape both a human’s brain, body, and soul. The impact of this reality on the proposition of crafting a body capable of holding or developing a soul identical to one currently in existence is clear: it is impossible. Even if a clone were raised in precisely the same manner, as twins are, plasticity and behavioral range would result in two separate and unique emergent souls. Even if a body were somehow able to be crafted in an identical state as the original, assuming instant emergence, no transfer would be possible because a unique and individual soul would emerge from the new body before the transfer could occur. Therefore, transferring a soul from one body to another is impossible because a new body results in a new soul. Even if one desired to create a replica body in an identical quantum state, current science indicates the original body would, by necessity, be obliterated.58 This is because the only way to obtain such information is to destroy the original state.59 This would be quantum teleportation rather than the artificial creation of a host body, and would do little for the prolongation of the human condition beyond the time saved due to instant transportation. With this information in mind, what would be required to craft a body suitable for a soul to emerge? The creation would need to possess a basic composition of biological and electrical components near enough to humanity for a soul to emerge. Its components would need to age and die at a natural pace, for this is an essential aspect of their function in current bodies that are capable of soul emergence. Theoretically due to contextual emergence, if enough components did not do this, it would alter the body so much as to negate the possibility of soul emergence. The artificial brain would not only need to be a functioning replica of a human brain, but would require the same level of elasticity, plasticity, and management such that if one part is damaged, other parts 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Jing Zhang, Changde Xie, and Kunchi Peng, “Continuous-variable Quantum State Transfer with Partially Disembodied Transport,” Physical Review Letters 95, no. 17 (2005): 170501. 59. Ibid.

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would be co-opted to adapt. Essentially, any successful attempt at the creation of a vessel from which a human soul would emerge would be equivalent to that which evolution has already determined to be the most efficient means: procreation. From a Christian perspective, God has already perfected the only means of reproducing vessels capable of emerging souls through evolution. The human body is a self-replicating, self-sustaining vessel crafted specifically for the emergence of souls, developed from millennia of trial and error through minor adaptations. The human body is essentially God’s version of precisely what this discussion is about: crafting a vessel capable of emerging a soul. The same millennia of trial and error is what would be necessary for humanity to discover the quintessential ingredients of soul generation. This is true because an emergent soul is irreducible, meaning that there is no direct mechanical observable cause and effect which could be studied and replicated. The only means of discovering such processes would be through the trial of billions upon billions of microscopic adjustments to a system until something finally worked. According to the current universal model, this process would take approximately 13.77 billion years.60 Another lesson to be learned from this understanding of God’s creation is that human children, in their current form, are the inevitable end result of any form of successful mechanical soul creation. God has completed this task for us. What technology has been proven excellent at is elongating the viability of the currently known vessels which are capable of emerging a soul. Due to contextual emergence, there is a logical limit to this possibility, but the limit has not yet been reached. However, given the current length of a human life compared to only 100 years ago, this line of inquiry is promising. In terms of extending human life through soul transference, this is impossible. As for artificial soul generation, why spend the energy and time accomplishing something that has already been done? Why, assuming such a thing were possible, reinvent the wheel?

60. Nola Taylor Redd, “How Old is the Universe?” June 8, 2017, accessed January 26, 2019, https://www.space.com/24054-how-old-is-the-universe.html.

Freedom at Stake: Comparing the Human Mind to Artificial Intelligence CEES TULP

Abstract The development of software in general, and of AI in particular, has shown that algorithms are increasingly capable in all sorts of areas, sometimes achieving better results than human beings. This success has led to the idea that AI gives a correct and adequate picture of the functioning of the human mind. It is this idea that is contested in this chapter, a view that is considered reductionistic. To this end, a closer look is taken at how algorithms function and how they are inherently dependent on the data that forms the input. This outside perspective on what the human mind might be is contrasted with a phenomenological approach to human thinking. Hannah Arendt’s book The Life of the Mind is a valuable resource for this. In particular, the notion of newness, which she outlines as freedom from the chain of causality, makes room for creativity. This chapter argues that freedom of the will is beyond the limits of AI and is therefore a key difference between AI and the human mind, wherefore the human mind cannot be considered as computational.

Introduction In just a few decades, the computer has acquired a dominant place in daily life. For centuries it has been unthinkable that we could create something that could challenge our mental capacities seriously. However, the rapid rise of the computer and its blazing fast development has put us in a totally different position. The following events illustrate how quickly the development has taken place. The examples are taken from the development of software programs aimed at playing a board game against a human player. Only two decades ago, in 1997, IBM succeeded in developing a software program, named Deep Blue, which was able to defeat the then world champion chess, Garry Kasparov. This victory proved that software programs are capable of surpassing human beings. However, the success was limited to this specific game. Apart from playing chess, this piece of software was not able to accomplish anything. But, as we know now, this was only

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the beginning. A new pinnacle was reached in 2015. That year, for the first time in history, the world Go champion was defeated not by a human player but by a computer. It should be noted that Go is considered to be far more difficult to learn then Chess. The enormous number of possible positions on the board is too big to just calculate the best next move. The approach by which computing power was simply increased to solve more complex problems, which had been sufficient to defeat the world Chess champion, had to be traded in for a different approach. It has been impressive that the developers succeeded by introducing the use of probability in developing a simulation of human intuitiveness. Even more impressive is the achievement in 2017 by software named AlphaZero. Although, again, a software program won a game of Chess, it succeeded by learning the game in only four hours. It goes without saying that the development of the algorithm itself took much more time. However, the advanced algorithm developed in this way did not have any ‘knowledge’ of the game of chess at that time; it took only four hours to learn the skills to win the game on high level. Amazingly, the algorithm learned the game without any supervision, only the rules of the game where provided. Lots of different examples could be given to exemplify the development and the astonishing capacities of software programs. The ones chosen, however, make quite clear the course of development. In its early days, the computer could be conceived of as an advanced calculator. With the increased availability of computing power, developers succeeded in creating software able to win a game of Chess. Increasingly, algorithms are able to equal or even surpass human intelligence in various areas, even outside of board games. Among these areas are fraud detection, prediction of burglary risk, cancer diagnosis, virtual assistants and so on. With these developments a shift takes place in how the computer is conceived of. Instead of being just an advanced calculator, the computer is often referred to in anthropomorphic terms. To stick with the chess game, instead of it being said explicitly that the software developers had designed an excellent piece of software, it is simply said that the computer “won.” The computer system “decides” this and that, or the computer “does not allow something,” and so on. A great future is promised for AI and believed in by many. Recently a survey among students showed that 90 percent of them believe that by 2075 AI will be able to operate on a human level and will be able to “carry out most human professions” as well as humans can, or even

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better than they can.1 The successes achieved and anticipated make many believe that AI discloses the way in which the human mind functions. Not only is the computer referred to anthropomorphically, but the human mind is now referred to in computer-related terms.2 It is assumed that human intelligence functions more or less in the same way as its artificial counterpart. In this view the human mind is merely processing data from different stimuli, including biochemical. This view is widespread and can for example be found in Harari’s Homo Deus 3 and Ray Kurzweil’s How to Create a Mind: The Secret of Human Thought Revealed.4 The view that the human mind is merely processing data has been criticized by Robert Epstein; he labels it the Data Processing Paradigm (DP paradigm).5 That the human mind can be understood as processing data cannot correctly be deduced from the successes of AI. That “it works,” in the sense that there have been some successes in developing AI by imitating the human mind–it can win chess games or detect fraud–does not necessarily imply that AI is a complete or a true replication of human intelligence. Epstein argues that this is a false idea, by citing the physical absence of memories in the human mind–we do not retrieve information in the way that a computer does.6 I will argue for the falseness of the conception of the human mind as a (sophisticated) algorithm by pointing to the deterministic feature of AI and the freedom of the human will. First, we will have a closer look at algorithms to explore what they exactly are and how they function. Secondly, we will elaborate on the strategies that can be followed to distinguish AI from human intelligence. In order to argue for the unicity of the human mind compared to AI, the characteristics of the human mind are 1. Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 19. 2. Egbert Schuurman, Tegendraads nadenken over Techniek (Delft: Eburon, 2014), 207. 3. Yuval N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (Harper Collins Publishers, 2017). 4. Ray Kurzweil, How to Create a Mind: The Secret of Human Thought Revealed (New York: Viking, 2012). 5. Robert Epstein, “The Empty Brain,” Aeon Media Group, May 18, 2016, accessed March 20, 2019, https://aeon.co/essays/your-brain-does-not-process-information-and-itis-not-a-computer. 6. Ibid. Interestingly, it was the same Robert Epstein who was one of the organizers of the Loebner prize in 1990 for computers passing the Turing test. See Robert Epstein, Gary Roberts, and Grace Beber, eds., Parsing the Turing Test: Philosophical and Methodological Issues in the Quest for the Thinking Computer (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 3–4.

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explored by turning to Hannah Arendt’s valuable insights into the mind. Her work enables to arrive at a well-informed comparison that will be followed by a conclusion. A Closer Look at Algorithms To contest the claim that the human mind can be compared with a processor of data, making an algorithm of it, it is necessary to make clear what an algorithm actually is. Although computers have been in existence for a couple of decades already, there is surprisingly still no consensus about an exact definition of an algorithm.7 So, in order to clarify the way in which an algorithm is understood in this chapter, a general description will be given. Broadly defined, it can be described as a set of steps which are carried out to compete a task. To narrow this down a bit more, a computer algorithm is a “set of steps to accomplish a task that is described precisely enough that a computer can run it.”8 This description gives us insight into at least two key elements of what an algorithm is about. The steps need to be described ‘precisely enough.’ This precision is reached by making use of the language a computer ‘understands,’ namely computer instructions in the form of binary operations. Although software engineers do not use this machine language anymore, and write their code in third, fourth, or even fifth generation language, ultimately the code is compiled in machine language. This machine language is basically a sequence of zeros and ones, and this makes it utterly clear that algorithms are determined by logic. This logic determines the way in which the algorithm proceeds, there is no escaping it, and it leaves no room for other options than those instructed. Driven by logic, the algorithm is aimed at a certain and expected outcome, given the input. When the input and the arithmetic of the algorithm are known, the output will be certain and predictable. This enables the developers to know that the algorithm functions correctly. This is the desired effect of algorithms, otherwise they would be useless.9 In many cases automated testing (e.g. so-called unit testing) is put in place to ensure that there has been no unintentional change to the algorithm that 7. Moshe Vardi, “What Is an Algorithm?” Communications of the ACM 55, no. 3 (2012): 5. 8. Thomas H. Cormen, Algorithms Unlocked (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 1. 9. However, with a computer implementation of an algorithm there will always be a finite precision. The result is thus not exact but is reliable because it only deviates within a certain margin.

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would alter the behavior, and therefore the output, unexpectedly. To make this less abstract and a bit more vivid, imagine a simple algorithm which sums up two numbers. The outcome (result) is formed by the sum of the two numbers (n1 and n2) which are the input of the function. When both n1 and n2 are known it will be clear what will be the result. If the algorithm, however, by mistake is coded to add n2 twice to n1 the result is incorrect. That is to say, the result is not what we expect it to be. On a logical level, however, there is no incorrectness as the algorithm just follows the steps which are instructed by the developer. Although this is just a simple example, it basically works the same way on a larger scale and on a more complex level. What follows from this is that the certainty of the outcome, given the input, is also to be conceived of as a key element of algorithms. Recent developments make it more complicated. The examples discussed at the beginning of this chapter are made possible by the development of machine learning and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN). This is not the place to explain all its technical details, even if I were able to. What is important to know is that ANNs are designed to enable the algorithm to learn from the input it processes. The capacity to self-learn (supervised or unsupervised) means that the output is able to vary over time. The input that is given helps the algorithm to arrive at a better classification of the data upon which the computer is “trained” to distinguish comparable input. After more training has taken place (supervised or unsupervised), the ANN may therefore produce a different output because it better ‘understands’ the data. On a surface level it seems that these algorithms differ completely from traditional algorithms as described above. In the end, however, ANNs consist of sets of computer instructions that are shaped binary and logically too. The validity of speaking of “learning” is open for discussion because no real knowledge is gained nor is understanding acquired. What is true is that there is an increasing ability to classify the data, either caused by the one who provides the training datasets to the algorithm or by the mechanisms that take place with unsupervised training. Does this type of algorithm abandon what has been described earlier as a key element, namely the certainty of the outcome? To show that this is a false conclusion, we need to formulate this key element more accurately. The outcome is certain insofar as all of the input provided to the algorithm is known and can be reiterated exactly. If it were possible to bring the ANN in its original (unlearned) state and all previously provided input were to be reiterated exactly in the same way, the ANN would produce the same result. In

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regular algorithms it does not matter how often you reiterate the algorithm, but in ANNs it does. Admitted, this could be very complex, depending on the complexity of the algorithm and the way the input is presented to it or is gathered by itself. Clearly, the ANN is dependent on the input for its evolvement (and its output). If no input is given, the result will remain the same. This proves that the result is logically dependent on the input in a causal way. Discernment With the increasing performance of AI, the question arises as to whether or not it ultimately concerns a better version of ourselves. The question of what distinguishes human beings from computers becomes pressing. In the early days of the computer, there was no reason to ask this question. Only science fictions writers were able at that time to envision the challenges and, at times, frightening perspectives of computers and robots. At that stage the computer was just an advanced calculator. This calculator, however, turned out to be able to surpass the best chess player in the world. Yet the algorithm was in no way comparable to a human being, because it was only suitable for the specific task of playing a game of chess. The further developments still leave room for the argument that human beings do things better, especially in complex or often all too easy daily tasks. But the ongoing and rapid developments give reason for ordinary people to fear that there will be ultimately–and possibly very soon–no tasks left in which human beings rule out AI. Egbert Schuurman, a Dutch philosopher, has a different expectation. He states that an algorithm always has some sort of “transcendental condition.” 10 According to him, the source of human thinking and consciousness is formed by the capacity of self-reflection. A computer does not have this capacity but needs something external to it to put it, so to say, into motion. This external cause is what he calls a transcendental condition. However, with the current development of ANNs algorithms have some sort of self-reflection in the sense that they can learn to better classify the data that forms the input and therefore provide better results over time. These algorithms are able to learn from the circumstances (or data). This makes the argument weaker at first sight, although it

10. Egbert Schuurman, Geloven in wetenschap en techniek (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1998), 109.

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remains true to some extent because it was the developers who put the learning capacity into it. The theory that the human mind is a data processing system like a computer has provoked much criticism over time. In the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), as it is also known, Michael Rescorla lists five arguments put forward against it.11 Besides the triviality argument and the incompleteness theorem of Gödel, he lists the objection of the limitations of computational modelling. All kinds of limitations are considered under this argument. For example, is real creativity possible for a computer? It is unthinkable that an algorithm will ever be able to compose a symphony, so this is considered a limit. Recent achievements in building an algorithm able to compose music with a strong resemblance to the style of Johann Sebastian Bach challenge this.12 I will come back to this later. A fourth objection is formed by making clear that the time dimension needed for all human action including mental activity is undervalued in CTM. The fifth and last objection Rescorla mentions is the recognition of the value of embodiment for human thinking. In a particularly beautiful and personal way, Ron Michener emphasizes in his contribution to the present book the value of embodiment for human beings, even in all their vulnerability and brokenness. As we have seen, the objections arguing for human superiority over AI seem to be losing ground. To make the distinction between us as human beings and AI, it may be more fruitful to look no longer to our best moments and highest achievements, but instead to our limits, vulnerability, our weakness, our hope and desires. Human Mind Let us for a moment put these reflections aside and contrast them with a reflection on how the human mind appears to ourselves to be functioning. For this, we turn to the Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt. Her book, The Life of the Mind, is a valuable resource here.13 This book does 11. Michael Rescorla, “The Computational Theory of Mind,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), accessed April 5, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/computational-mind/. 12. Davidhcope, “Emily Howell From Darkness 2 beg, Cope,” YouTube video, August 10, 2013, accessed March 20, 2019, https://youtu.be/mnBUxG-wSVg. 13. Hannah Ahrendt, The Life of the Mind: The Groundbreaking Investigation on How We Think (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, Inc., 1981).

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not explicitly reflect on technology in general, nor AI in particular, but is very helpful for gaining more insight into the inner functioning of the human mind. Originally planned as three volumes, she explores what she conceives as fundamental human mental activities, namely thinking, willing, and judging. Unfortunately, her sudden death in 1975 prevented her from finishing the last volume on judging. The starting point for her considerations is the awareness of two inner voices, the voice of thinking and the voice of willing. These two voices do not necessarily agree with each other, often an inner conflict can be noticed. The consciousness of this inner conflict is the phenomenological basis for exploring what it means to think and to will.14 With this starting point in the transcendental ego, as it is called in phenomenology, any biological or psychological reductionism of the human mind is avoided. Any biological or psychological perspective is already a reduction, as it will never be able explain human intelligence.15 In Arendt’s opinion, thinking has to do with things that are absent from the senses and could be re-presented by mental activity. Willing can even deal with things that have never existed at all.16 This allows her to arrive at the conclusion that freedom is inherent in willing, and she even states boldly that “a will that is not free is a contradiction in terms….”17 It must be noted that this is a phenomenological observation, too, and not so much a philosophical statement. Philosophy, in her opinion, is very much linked to the thinking part, while willing is linked to action and practice.18 The theme of freedom also plays a key role in the political philosophy for which she is well-known. However, political freedom cannot be equated with philosophical freedom. It is clear that she does not construe freedom of the will in the common philosophical sense. One of the philosophers Arendt discusses is Duns Scotus, who has explored the will and its freedom in depth. She characterizes his conception of contingency by saying that, to Scotus, human beings are free to negate or affirm what is given. What is stressed is the freedom of choice at the point arrived at. It is this contingency that Scotus is happily willing to pay as the price for freedom of 14. See also Lauren Swayne Barthold, “Towards an Ethics of Love: Arendt on the Will and St Augustine,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 26, no. 6 (2000): 4. 15. Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 112–5. 16. Ahrendt, The Life of the Mind, 2:13. 17. Ibid., 2:14. 18. There is some ambiguity or paradox in it, that she strongly wants to link willing to action but at the same time is reflecting philosophically on it.

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the will.19 Arendt herself takes it in a slightly different direction. To her, freedom is not something provided by the past, being free to negate or affirm what is given. Freedom is an open future; it is to be able to start something completely new. Spontaneous action is made possible by free will. This does not mean for her that the will is autonomous and detached from the senses and all kinds of influences, as Jacobitti tends to perceive Arendt’s position.20 The will is autonomous in the sense that it is not necessarily bound to follow the force of prior events, although it does not operate in a vacuum. “To be sure, the objects of my thinking or willing or judging, the mind’s subject matter, are given in the world, or arise from my life in this word, but they themselves as activities are not necessitated or conditioned by either.”21 Its freedom consists in the possibility of starting spontaneous actions, free from the chain of causality.22 One could object at this point that the book discussed is almost 40 years old. However, the age of the book does not necessarily imply that it is outdated. It is interesting that modern brain research seems to confirm the sense of freedom that is described by Arendt. In research on tinnitus, ringing in the ears, the most important question is why a phantom sound is heard when it is not actually there. Since the rejection of the hypothesis that this is the noise of the activity of the brain itself, there is currently consensus that it is about the brain’s assumption of a sound that, for example, at a certain pitch cannot actually be heard because of hearing damage. This is a form of brain prediction. Without going into further details, it becomes clear that the brain does not act as a normal processor of sensory data but works on the basis of a prediction. The incoming sensory data is then used to adjust perception afterwards.23 It is the Jewish-Christian heritage that provides Arendt with the arguments for her sense of freedom. This foundation legend, as she calls it, presents a totally different view of reality compared with the ancient 19. Ahrendt, The Life of the Mind, 2:134–5. 20. Suzanne Jacobitti, “Hannah Arendt and the Will,” Political Theory 16, no. 1 (1988): 65. See also the critique of Barthold on the way Jacobitti seeks to “do away with Arendt’s notion of free will:” Barthold, “Towards an Ethics of Love,” 2. 21. Ahrendt, The Life of the Mind, 1:70. See also Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, “Reflections on Hannah Arendt’s the Life of the Mind,” Political Theory 10, no. 2 (May 1982): 280. 22. See also Barthold, “Towards an Ethics of Love,” 17. 23. See Anusha Mohan and Sven Vanneste, “Adaptive and Maladaptive Neural Compensatory Consequences of Sensory Deprivation: From a Phantom Percept Perspective,” Progress in neurobiology 153 (2017): 1–17. See also https://www.brai3n.com/en/

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Greek view. Instead of the cyclical conception of time that the latter has, the Jewish-Christian narrative has a linear conception of time. There is no eternal recurrence since there was a beginning that God caused. There is not an endless chain of causality but a decision of God’s free will that called this world into being. It is precisely this new beginning that enables humans to make new beginnings themselves too. Creation is the key to the understanding of freedom in the sense of newness. She draws the volume about willing to a conclusion by favoring the Augustinian emphasis on temporality, stating that it is about “birth, the entry of a novel creature who as something entirely new appears in the midst of the continuum of the world. The purpose of the creation of man was to make possible a beginning….”24 The capacity to make new beginnings is rooted in natality. It is by virtue of birth that human beings are doomed to be free, as she puts it. It is not created by us but given to us.25 Comparing the Incomparable Thus far AI and the human mind have been treated separately by exploring some key aspects of them both. Equipped with the insights gained from these explorations, it is time to draw the lines together and to see whether an answer can be formulated on whether the human mind is to be seen as just a data processor. As may have already become clear, I certainly want to answer this question negatively. To be clear, I do not want to criticize AI as such. What I reject is that AI provides a correct or full picture of the human mind. As has been argued, it is logically incorrect to deduce from the success of AI that AI is a successful depiction of the functioning of the human mind. The fact that technology is successful in accomplishing tasks in a better way than humans are able to does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that algorithms explain and exemplify the way the human mind functions.26 However, it is not only an incorrect conclusion, it is also untrue. The major difference between AI and human intelligence lies in the fact that AI has no freedom inside and human beings do. As has been explained, AI is inherently dependent on the input that is given and is deterministically bound to it. It is the inner logic which determines the output, the algorithm will never make 24. Ahrendt, The Life of the Mind, 2:217 (italics original). 25. See also Ingolf U. Dalferth, Creatures of Possibility: The Theological Basis of Human Freedom (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2016), 200ff. 26. See also Jacob Shatzer, Transhumanism and the Image of God: Today’s Technology and the Future of Christian Discipleship (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2019), 105.

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an exception to it, which is factually impossible. That is also what is meant when in common speech it is said that someone behaves like a robot. There is no room for emotion or anything which would influence the outcome, it just moves on. This procession of pure logic is incomparable to the deliberations of the human mind with its countless influences. The human mind is not slavishly following logical or rational pathways but has its own enigmatic way of functioning. What characterizes us as human beings is that we are able to divert from logical sequential reasoning, we do not follow it deterministically, but are free instead. Of course, the behavior of people can be very predictable. But because of free will, people can deviate from what would be a logical consequence of previous events. To use the language of the game of chess again, it could be seen as weak if emotion were to prevent me from making the best move. At least AI will not be hindered by that and does overcome this kind of shortcoming. But it can also be described as love if the opponent is my little six-year old son. It is what makes me human and distinguishes me from a robot. The insight that Hannah Arendt provided in this regard is helpful and illuminating. Human beings are free to negate their situation and even to begin something completely new. This ability for newness is rooted in the beginning God made with the earth, by creating it. The creative power of human beings has no rival in algorithms. Even the production of music by AI in the style of Bach is to be seen as re-assembling instead of real creation of something really new. Only human beings are free to make new beginnings. As Dalferth so nicely puts it, human beings “are headed for a future that has not been determined by their origin.”27 While AI is completely logical without being hindered by emotions, human beings are capable of giving primacy to their emotions, their desires, their hopes. We are touching here on the core of the difference between human and artificial intelligence. Human beings are capable of giving meaning to what they do by willing things to a certain end, and the intentionality that is so characteristic of human beings is completely foreign to AI. AI is not able to will anything and therefore misses any meaning in itself and by itself. The only meaning in it is the intentionality of the developer or user of the algorithm.28 Again, in 27. Dalferth, Creatures of Possibility, 202. 28. I agree with Searle in the rejection of so-called ‘strong’ AI, which attributes understanding to the algorithm. See John R Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no. 3 (1980): 422ff.

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the game of chess the algorithm is not happy to have won a game of chess, nor is it aware that it did, and nor did it want to win. It just completed the tasks asked. For that reason, it is a mistake to conceive AI as something comparable to human beings. Human beings do not (always) just follow logical steps in their actions but express their intentions within them. Technology can play a role in this self-expression. This is not necessarily bad; there is no reason to prevent human beings from using technology to flourish. However, technology relates to human beings as a means of expression, not as an end in itself. 29 It is therefore wrong to put technology on the same level as human beings, as it remains only a means. As Ott understands, it is the human being who gives the algorithm the space it gets. We, ourselves, allow algorithms to dominate our lives, and it is we that should act responsibly in relation to that.30 Acting responsibly in relation to technology means that we should put our moral values in place and not look to AI to do that. AI has no morality in itself, although recent research has shown that people do ascribe morality to it.31 Technology will not ultimately tell us what is good or what is bad; only human beings have moral capacity to that end. That we have moral capacity and a free will does not mean, however, that we always make the best decisions and act for the best. Our limitations will often bring us the unexpected because we are not able to oversee all the consequences of our actions. Free will certainly does not bring us anything like godlikeness,32 but surely has something to say about what it means to be fully human. This brings us, however, to a completely different topic, which would require an additional chapter, at least, to explore it more in depth. Conclusion The rapid developments in software, and especially the developments in Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Neural Networks, raise questions about how the human mind functions. Put bluntly, is the human mind 29. See also Brent Waters, “Willful Control and Controlling the Will: Technology and Being Human,” Religions 8, no. 5 (2017): 71, 73. 30. Kate Ott, Christian Ethics for a Digital Society (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 35. 31. Daniel B. Shank and Alyssa Desanti, “Attributions of Morality and Mind to Artificial Intelligence after Real-world Moral Violations,” Computers in Human Behavior 86 (2018): 408. 32. See also Dalferth, Creatures of Possibility, 202.

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merely a processor of data, just as algorithms are? Various negative answers to this question can be given, arguing for superiority of human thinking or discerning differences in a modest way. To add an additional argument to the distinction between algorithms and human thinking, the nature of algorithms has been explored and it has become clear that algorithms are strongly dependent on input and are deterministically linked to it. This is even the case for ANNs. Hannah Arendt’s account shows that freedom is an important notion that is intrinsically connected with the human will. Unlike AI, the human mind is not determined by preceding events or causes but is free to will what it wants. This freedom is interpreted by Arendt as the ability to start something really new, free from the chain of causality. It is this freedom that enables us to not only follow what would be logical and rational, but also to listen to emotions, hopes, and desires. This kind of willing and intentionality is absent from AI and beyond its limits. It would therefore be reductionistic to conceive the human being as a mere processor of data. Only one aspect of the differences between AI and human beings has been taken into account in this chapter. Much had to be left unsaid, such as the importance of embodiment, human limitations and vulnerability that were only briefly touched upon, the absence of consciousness in AI, the relation of the will to the self, differences in learning style and memories and so on. Whoever were to investigate all these topics would discover that AI is only a pale shadow of the rich and enigmatic functioning of the human being, albeit its achievements are powerful and impressive. Despite its achievements and success, AI remains incomparable to the human mind and is just a technological tool by means of which we can express ourselves. Due to its great power, it must be used with caution and responsibility.

Building a Posthuman Artificial Paradise: Christian Theology in Interaction with Futuristic Expectations of Technology RAYMOND R. HAUSOUL

Abstract Unprecedented developments in artificial intelligence (AI) characterize our time. This chapter aims to bring the futuristic expectations of the post- and transhuman world into dialogue with Christian eschatology and anthropology. The choice of a positive-critical interaction between Christian theology and the techno-futurism of Moravec and Kurzweil is obvious, given the fact that AI already has various fields of development. After a brief presentation of both authors, we will examine to what extent their expectations concerning AI and post- and transhumanism are interpreted and guided by philosophical-theological aspects. Consideration will also be given to what degree Christian theology can be enriched and challenged by their technological visions. Doing so, this chapter will focus on the themes of (1) imperishability, inertia, and death, (2) on fragmentation and the dualism of the material and immaterial, and (3) on the transformation of human life.

Introduction: Infotech, Biotech, AI-Tech Today we are witnessing growing progress in information and biotechnology. The variety of applications of artificial intelligence (AI) is astonishing.1 During the twentieth century, when research on AI originated, the emphasis was on programming computers intelligently enabling them to transcend human intelligence in a self-learning way.2 This would

1. It is important to identify the diversity in AI. Pedro Domingos identifies five forms of current “AI-tribes”: symbolists, connectionists, evolutionaries, Bayesians and analogizers. Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will Remake Our World (New York: Basic Books, 2018). See for an overview of project developments Seth Baum, “A Survey of Artificial General Intelligence Projects for Ethics, Risk, and Policy,” Global Catastrophic Risk Institute Working Paper 17-1 (2017). 2. Daniel Crevier, AI: The Tumultuous History of the Search for Artificial Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1993).

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usher in a new era of greater freedom and bring about an interaction between humans and machines. It is well-known today what the first results of AI developments were. In 1997 the chess computer Deep Blue won against the chess champion Garri Kasparov. Others followed.3 In 2017, AlphaZero defeated the open-source chess program Stockfish 8. In contrast to Stockfish 8, which had gathered ten years of chess experience, the brand new AlphaZero did not have any chess strategy. The developed AI algorithm gathered information on how to play chess in four hours. Based on this, AlphaZero defeated Stockfish 8. For people unfamiliar with the source-code of AlphaZero these results were unprecedented and ingenious. Another result of AI can be found in the development of cars. Where drivers are distracted by smartphones, traffic violations, fatigue or drugs, self-propelled cars are not affected by any of this. Because they are connected to one algorithm, it is possible to drive protected from the human carelessness just mentioned. This innovation also delivers multiple benefits in terms of fuel consumption, avoiding traffic jams and other traffic inconveniences.4 Besides these examples, there are also popular AI applications, such as Netflix, Spotify, Amazon, and Facebook, that are useful to find the films, music, books, or other things that we are looking for. These developments show that AI is an integral part of our future. Aim of this Contribution Both Christian theology and technology aim to have a positive impact on our daily life. This offers the opportunity to interact with the eschatological perspectives of both in a critical manner. In this chapter, this will be done in the light of the futuristic perspectives presented by Moravec and Kurzweil. We will examine to what extent their technological expectations concerning AI can be interpreted and guided by philosophical-theological aspects. Also, the question is asked to what extent Christian theology can be enriched and challenged by their technological visions. We will specifically focus on the theme of human limitations, mortality, and transformation.

3. Monty Newborn, Beyond Deep Blue (London: Springer, 2014). 4. Lawrence D. Burns and Christopher Shulgan, Autonomy: The Quest to Build the Driverless Car―and How It Will Reshape Our World (New York: Ecco, 2018).

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Futuristic Techno-Totalism: Moravec and Kurzweil When it comes to the ideals of AI, reference is often made to Hans Moravec and Ray Kurzweil. Both are distinguished scientists who, in addition to their AI developments, are known as AI futurists. They talk about what can be from what is. Their future expectations had been presented in early publications.5 This allows us to summarize their ideas and focus on how they can be enriched and challenged by Christian perspectives. Hans P. Moravec Hans P. Moravec is authoritative in his futuristic reflection on transhumanism. His Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (1988) and Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind (1999) are still being reprinted today. Moravec contributed to the development of the Stanford Cart and was co-founder of the Seegrid Corporation (2003) that focuses on the development of “autonomous” robots. These robots can be used in environments that are almost inaccessible to humans and can save a great deal of labor. Moravec describes how robots and AI will make life easier and transform humans.6 When machines can be programmed so that they begin to improve, this could signal an evolution from a biological to a mechanical sphere. The laws within Darwinian evolution then guarantee humanity the arrival of glorious life.7 In order to experience this transformation, people must recognize the usefulness of robot technology and AI. They must open up to superhumanism. “We have a Stone Age brain, but we don’t live in the Stone Age anymore,” poses Moravec in an interview.8 From the first stone tools to the current situation with robots and AI, we have lived as a hybrid of humans and tools. Just as these tools expand our capacities, humanity will be equipped with posthuman artificial 5. E.g. Robert M. Geraci, “Apocalyptic AI: Religion and the Promise of Artificial Intelligence,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 76, no. 1 (2008): 138–66; Robert M. Geraci, “Spiritual Robots: Religion and Our Scientific View of the Natural World,” Theology and Science 4, no. 3 (2006): 233–5; Michael W. DeLashmutt, “Perspectives on Techno-Science and Human Nature: A Better Life through Information Technology? The Techno-Theological Eschatology of Posthuman Speculative Science,” Zygon 41 (2006): 267–87. 6. Hans P. Moravec, Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 137, 150–4. 7. Ibid., 1–2, 143, 165. 8. Charles Platt, “Superhumanism,” Wired 3, no. 10 (1995).

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tools. This allows humanity to push back its boundaries and transform itself into a higher species.9 Despite this view, Moravec recognizes that humans will continue to subjugate others. This makes it possible for robots, which are equipped with AI and a possible (self-)consciousness, also to get rid of humanity. In this way, they can freely decide to spread themselves throughout the cosmos. They can turn the cosmos into a self-conscious entity and subject the earth to their own goals. This could give more space to life activities in the cosmos than the old human goals.10 So, through these creatures, evolution continues its creative journey towards forming a universe that is self-conscious. This is why Moravec has come up with the idea that this will lead to a post-biological or supernatural situation in which the human race has disappeared. At the same time, he sees these choices of posthuman robots as a step forward in cosmic evolution.11 Ray Kurzweil Ray Kurzweil is also optimistic about human progress. Like Moravec, he sees the future as a time when people no longer have to work for their daily food. The current developments will contribute to people becoming mentally and sexually happier. Then there will be enough for everyone.12 Kurzweil also emphasizes transhumanism and the hope of immortality through neural implant technologies and the manufacture of microscopic machines from nanotechnologies. These developments could lead to a posthuman fusion of humanity and technology.13 This technology will go beyond AI and provides machines with “self-awareness.” This will produce robots that characterize themselves as humans and Kurzweil assumes that society will accept these characteristics.14 Technology will develop in such a way that humans can 9. Hans P. Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 4, 107–14. 10. Moravec, Robot, 164–67; Moravec, Mind Children, 116. 11. Moravec, Robot, 164; Moravec, Mind Children, 1. 12. Ray Kurzweil, “The Evolution of the Mind in the Twenty-First Century,” in Are We Spiritual Machines?: Ray Kurzweil vs. the Critics of Strong AI, ed. Jay Richards (Seattle: Discovery Institute, 2002), 13; The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence (New York: Penguin, 1999), 148, 206, 236, 248–249. 13. Ray Kurzweil, “The Material World: ‘Is That All There Is’?: Response to George Gilder and Jay Richards,” in Are We Spiritual Machines? Ray Kurzweil vs. the Critics of Strong AI, ed. Jay Richards (Seattle: Discovery Institute, 2002), 212; Kurzweil, Spiritual Machines, 3–5, 14, 128–9. 14. Ibid., 63, 125.

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download their consciousness into a machine. This will free us from the mortal body and transform us into software.15 For Kurzweil the body is the cause of human mortality. This transience is overcome in transhumanism by a post-biological, supernatural existence. With that, we lose forever the human body we know.16 Kurzweil suggests that humanity will eliminate the present need for a body in the future or replace it with an immortal virtual body, “[w]e don’t always need real bodies. If we happen to be in a virtual environment, then a virtual body will do just fine.”17 This will be the next step in human evolution, to permanently transform life in its primary meaning.18 So, the transformation of the physical human existence means an unprecedented existence and unlimited human life force. Techno-Theological and Christian Eschatology The futuristic proposals of Moravec and Kurzweil are representatives of many futuristic perspectives. They are characterized by artistic, scientific, and philosophical-religious terms. This religious element is expressed in the way in which people have looked at technology since the Enlightenment. We look forward with confidence to the prosperity and security that technological developments bring us. Brent Waters notes that this attitude is almost akin to an idolization of technology, Brain Brock sees technology as “the meta-physics of our age,” and Yuval Harari speaks of an emerging religion of data-ism that “venerates neither gods or man―it worships data.”19 In this way the title of Kurzweil’s book The Singularity is Near evokes associations with Christ’s, “The kingdom of God has come near” (Luke 10:9). The future vision that Moravec and Kurzweil sketch is both optimistic and pessimistic. Thus, speaking of the possible destruction of the present human species (Moravec) and the replacement of the body by a “virtual body” (Kurzweil) gives an apocalyptic perspective on material 15. Ibid., 51–4, 101–27, 150. 16. Ibid., 2. Cf. Moravec, Mind Children, 108–24. 17. Kurzweil, Spiritual Machines, 142. 18. Ray Kurzweil, “The Law of Accelerating Returns,” in Alan Turing: Life and Legacy of a Great Thinker, ed. Christof Teuscher (Berlin: Springer, 2004), 413. 19. Brent Waters, “Is Technology the New Religion?” Word & World 35, no. 2 (2015): 144, 148; Brent Waters, From Human to Posthuman: Christian Theology and Technology in a Postmodern World (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), i; Brian Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 67; Yuval N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (New York: Harper Perennial, 2017), 371.

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reality. The evolutionary expectation of a “better” virtual world and the posthuman transformation of humanity can then evoke an alienation from the world. At the same time, a growing familiarity with virtual reality causes people to become more attached to life in a virtual than in the non-virtual world.20 In reflecting on the hope of a victory for impermanence, the perspectives of Moravec and Kurzweil are linked to the aspect of hope in Christian eschatology. The theme of hope is, in fact, also a systematictheological subject that reflects on expectations, desires, and promises for the future. Partly from the proclamation of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, Christian theology dares to make its voice heard herein as a human science in a multi-conventional society.21 In this, theology wants to think along with the client about new technological developments and ground-breaking ideas in a creative approach. From the testimony of the resurrection, Christian eschatology also expects a physical world.22 While Christians rely on the intervention of God for this, Moravec and Kurzweil choose to start from their field of expertise and present the future expectation technologically as a possible posthuman reality. There is nothing wrong with that, because both justify expectations from the human sciences and have their hermeneutic frame of reference. Just like Christian eschatology, it starts from a specific worldview, an image of humanity and an image of God. We could call is thus an eschatological technology. It is important to emphasize this. It avoids the impression that the futuristic proposals of scientists like Moravec and Kurzweil are proven facts. Their approach is also characterized by philosophical-theological presuppositions. These presuppositions are the belief in progressivism of technological development, or the prospects of immortal/imperishable 20. Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2017). 21. Cf. Raymond R. Hausoul, De nieuwe hemel en de nieuwe aarde: Een interdisciplinaire vergelijking tussen Jürgen Moltmann, Karl Rahner en Gregory Beale (Utrecht: KokBoekencentrum, 2018), 25–9; Johanne S. Teglbjærg Kristensen, Body and Hope: A Constructive Interpretation of Recent Eschatology by Means of the Phenomenology of the Body, Dogmatik in der Moderne 5 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 5. When we think of sciences we often think of traditional–exact natural sciences that can measure, control, and prove content. From this description, theology can hardly be called “scientific.” However, theology is part of the humanities, alongside classical languages, art sciences, psychology, sociology and philosophy. They investigate contents that are not completely precise or unambiguous, but apply scientific research methods. 22. For some of the proposals of this “new world” see, Hausoul, De nieuwe hemel, 63–206.

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life of the new technological era. This hope for a future, which transcends the present imperishabilities, has parallels with Christian eschatology. Both recognize the limitations and temporariness of human existence and long for an everlasting, immortal existence. In the following section, we will bring the perspectives of Moravec and Kurzweil into dialogue with the Christian expectations. Imperishability and Death Relief from Inertia Moravec and Kurzweil view the developments of AI as an opportunity to remove temporal limitations in human life. AI relieves humanity of its inertia in learning new things, of the trouble in remembering what has been learned, and of the loss of it through old age.23 The permanent limitation and loss that people experience in this are insinuations that we’re helpless to improve ourselves. Without the development of artificial applications, humans are hopelessly lost. Therefore, Kevin Warwick sees advantages in implementing AI in the human nervous system. This can broaden our possibilities and free us from temporal limitations.24 From Christian theology, the temporal limitation and transience of the body is accepted as a anthropological given. Although biomedical developments prolong life and make it more comfortable, it remains transient. Like Moravec and Kurzweil, Christian faith looks forward to a renewal that overcomes death, suffering, and transience (Isa 25:8; 1 Cor 15:55). This prospect determines how we view death. Hermeneutical Perspective on Death Techno-futuristic and Christian-theological perspectives see death as a negative fact. Death puts an end to physical-biological life. It is an irreversible state in which an organism no longer grows, has no metabolism and no longer has any active function.

23. Kurzweil, Spiritual Machines, 4; Moravec, Mind Children, 55–6, 121. See also, Hugo De Garis, The Artilect War: Cosmists vs. Terrans (Palm Springs: ETC, 2005), 103; Kevin Warwick, March of the Machines: The Breakthrough in Artificial Intelligence (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois, 2004), 178. 24. Kevin Warwick, “Cyborg Morals, Cyborg Values, Cyborg Ethics,” Ethics and Information Technology 5, no. 3 (2003): 136.

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In Christian anthropology it is debated whether death is an inseparable aspect of life or is opposed to life.25 These questions also apply within Darwinian evolutionary theory: why are we getting older, hoisting down and eventually dying? If death belongs to (evolved) life, it is our relationship with death that is negative. In that case, this negative attitude towards death hinders us in our understanding of death as something natural in life. However, if death is a negative fact and is seen as an intruder, it must intensively be fought as a robber of life. These hermeneutical choices in the approaches to death depend on the perspective on the meaning of life and death. For example, Yoshihiro Fukuyama sees death as a valuable contribution to human coexistence, A person who has not confronted suffering or death has no depth. Our ability to experience these emotions is what connects us potentially to all other human beings, both living and dead.26

This does not mean that we should consciously seek out death. Both Christian theology and techno-futurism wish to postpone death as long as possible. In Christian theology, death is often described as the gateway to real life. Death ends the transient life and marks the beginning of the new imperishable life.27 It is a limitation of life in good and evil (Gen 3:22– 23). Not only the body but the whole human being is seen as subject to the power of death. It is not only the material, but also the immaterial or spiritual that is characterized by limitation and decay (Rom 5:6–6:10; Eph 2:1).28 This aspect is rarely mentioned in the anticipated future developments of AI. It leads to a single connection between impermanence and the material, and to imperishable and the immaterial. For the solution of this human limitation, Christian eschatology chooses to appeal to the victorious faith in Christ. In this, a person has the opportunity to eat from the tree of life after his death (Rev 2:7). Thus, death becomes the end of the perishable life with good and evil,

25. Kristensen, Body, 13, 70. 26. Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: Picador, 2007), 173. 27. Kristensen, Body, 71; Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology 1: Reason and Revelation. Being and God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 188–9, 211–3. 28. Jürgen Moltmann, “Sein Name ist Gerechtigkeit”: Neue Beiträge zur christlichen Gotteslehre (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2008), 65; Karl Rahner, Grundkurs des Glaubens: Einführung in den Begriff des Christentums, 10th ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1976), 418–20.

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and at the same time the beginning of the imperishable, eternal glorious life. This does not mean that Christian theology sees death as the processor or donor of that glorious life. Death is and remains the enemy of life.29 The eternal life that Christians look forward to is the life that Christ gives. It is the radical “no!” to everlasting death. Therefore, Michael DeLashmutt writes inaccurately, the avoidance of death is tantamount to an avoidance of salvation. Christianity needs death for the transformation that is a transfiguration of the fleshly body.30

What is inaccurate in his expression is that death is not a necessity for eternal life or renewal. As we saw before, it is precisely the futurological reflections of Moravec and Kurzweil that make Christian theology aware that death offers no progress towards a higher life. Death breaks down and does not build up. The new heaven and earth proclaimed by the biblical prophets are not realized through death, but through the salvation of the Prince of Life (Rev 21:1–5). Redemption through the Sacrifice of the Body Moravec and Kurzweil suspect that the material body is the main problem of human limitations. The body is perishable and dies, while humanity desires an imperishable life. It is hoped that developments in AI and cyber technology will free us from the perishable body and lead us to a situation where people will no longer be dependent on a body to live. From the perspective of Christian anthropology and eschatology, this raises questions. Does techno-futurism, through this approach, not still take the body away from impermanence? Is this “development” not contrary to the primary technological ambitions to fight impermanence? Does the sacrifice of the body plead that human existence will continue in an immortal life? This progress is not assured. It entails the risk that the technological developments that Moravec and Kurzweil describe contribute instead to a standstill or to a deterioration of human existence. So, Christian anthropology and eschatology raise the question whether it is not the body itself, but the impermanence that are the 29. Jürgen Moltmann, Das Kommen Gottes: Christliche Eschatologie, Systematischen Beiträge zur Theologie 5 (München: Kaiser, 1995), 70, 106–10; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie, vol. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 421–3. 30. DeLashmutt, “Perspectives,” 285. Cf. Kristensen, Body, 68–9.

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negative things for posthumanism. Who wants an infinite life in constant misery? Instead of sacrificing the body to impermanence and creating an unwanted separation between the material and the immaterial, Christian theology advocates the redemption of the whole: a new creation. Therefore, we will have to focus on the consequences of dualism for technological thinking. Fragmentation and Salvation The Dualism of the Material Body and the Immaterial Spirit or Mind Techno-futurism and posthumanism are characterized by a strong dualism, which separates the material from the immaterial world.31 As in ancient Gnosticism, the material is seen as the “evildoer” of all restrictions and immaterial reality is presented as imperishable and unlimited. The human spirit or mind thus contains the core of being human. This leads to speculative statements that in the future there will no longer be a need for a physical body and that humanity will become like “software” in a virtual environment. According to Moravec, this situation can be described as trans- or posthuman, “the bodiless mind that results … could in no sense be considered any longer human.”32 In contrast to dualism, Christian eschatology does not advocate a polarization between body, soul, and spirit. Whoever states from materialism that a human being consists only of matter, forgets that a human being is also a recognizable thinking subject with its consciousness. And anyone who reduces a human being to an abstract spiritual subject formed in itself forgets that humans only understand themselves better from the time, space, and matter around them. Physicality is not a “something” that is added to the mind as a separate element. It is the real presence of the mind in space and time.33 How exactly the relationship between being human spirit and matter relates is a question to which research into the application of AI will have to find an answer. This question is legitimate because human evolution is traditionally 31. Waters, From Human, 54, 108, 120; Noreen L. Herzfeld, In Our Image: Artificial Intelligence and the Human Spirit, Theology & The Sciences (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002), 20. 32. Hans P. Moravec, “Pigs in Cyberspace,” Extropy 10 (1992): 262. 33. Karl Rahner, “Der Leib in der Heilsordnung,” in Schriften zur Theologie, ed. Karl Rahner, vol. 12 (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1975), 422; “Einheit von Geist und Materie,” Neues Forum 16, no. 160–1 (1967): 338–9.

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linked to the complex development of the body. According to Karl Rahner, the human spirit originated from the physical in evolutionary process.34 If that is correct, the question is whether the body may be subordinated to the spirit in the evolutionary process. Until now, the spirit has not yet produced matter, while there is something to say that this already happened the other way around. If Moravec and Kurzweil write that humans will turn into “software” and leave their bodies as “hardware” in the future, it can be questioned whether humans can be divided into this software-hardware dualism.35 Neurological research has already shown that the human mind or spirit cannot simply be disconnected from the body.36 It is ontologically part of being human. Even those who reflect on the body cannot do so without the body. So, is it possible that in the future a posthuman world can be developed that exists completely separately and independently from the physical world? This would be a big step in human evolution, in which the human mind frees itself from the material. In Christian theology, the question is whether humans can so easily be freed from a temporal and spatial body.37 Can there be information separate from matter? At the moment, every virtually constructed world (software) needs the physical world and its hardware to exist. This raises critical questions about Moravec and Kurzweil’s proposals that posthumanist science will realize an everlasting imperishable and unlimited cosmic information process.

34. Karl Rahner, Hörer des Wortes: Schriften zur Religionsphilosophie und zur Grundlegung der Theologie, ed. Albert Raffelt, Sämtliche Werke 4 (Freiburg: Herder, 1997), 71; Karl Rahner, “Die Hominisation als theologische Frage,” in Das Problem der Hominisation: Über den biologischen Ursprung des Menschen, ed. Karl Rahner and Paul Overhage, 3rd ed., Quaestiones Disputatae 12/13 (Freiburg: Herder, 1965), 48, 52–3, 57. E.g. Hausoul, De nieuwe hemel, 88–91. 35. Kurzweil, Spiritual Machines, 128–9; Hans P. Moravec, “Letter from Moravec to Penrose,” in Thinking Robots: An Aware Internet, and Cyberpunk Librarians, ed. R. Bruce Miller, Hans Moravec, and Milton T Wolf, LITA President’s Series (Chicago: LITA, 1992), 51–8. 36. Malcolm A. Jeeves, ed., From Cells to Souls and Beyond: Changing Portraits of Human Nature (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004). 37. Nancy K. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 50–63, 192– 221; Frank J. Tipler, The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God, and the Resurrection of the Dead (London: Pan Books, 1996), 153–4; Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Constructive and Critical Functions of Christian Eschatology,” Harvard theological review 77, no. 2 (1984): 119–39.

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From Christian theology we are called upon not to despise physical life. Brent Waters sees this most clearly in the Christian testimony of the incarnation, The doctrine of the incarnation affirms the creaturely goods of finitude and mortality. The Word became flesh; the creator became a creature. Jesus is constrained by the limits of his body.38

From Christ’s incarnation, hope for the future of the body fits in with the core of Christian faith. Besides the attention to the body in Christology, there is attention to the body in hamartiology (the body is just like the soul and spirit influenced by evil), soteriology (God redeems the body, as well as the soul and spirit) and ecclesiology (sacraments testify of God’s importance for the physical). Although the theological reflections herein are diverse, it is generally to be noted that these approaches to the body reject the dualism of body and soul/mind that has been adopted in Western culture for centuries.39 At the same time, the ideas of a “virtual reality” challenges Christian theology to reflect on new ecclesiological practices. An example of this is the growth in the number of websites and apps that enable Christians to meet each other in virtual churches and discussion groups. Because Christian faith is not bound to a specific location, these developments raise the question to what extent Christians can also be part of a virtual church. Like with virtual class rooms, physical contact is often of importance for building relationships. So, what opportunities does the virtual church offer when it comes to proclamation, worship, sacraments, pastoral care, and various other matters?40

38. Brent Waters, “Willful Control and Controlling the Will: Technology and Being Human,” Religions 8, no. 5 (2017). Cf. Waters, From Human, 92, 101–9. 39. Cf. Hausoul, De nieuwe hemel, 259–79; John Turl, “Substance Dualism or Body-Soul Duality?” Science and Christian Belief 22, no. 1 (2010): 57–80; Caroline W. Bynum, “Material Continuity, Personal Survival, and the Resurrection of the Body: A Scholastic Discussion in Its Medieval and Modern Contexts,” in ibid., Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York: Zone, 2006), 239–296. 40. For different approaches, see Tim Challies, The Next Story: Faith, Friends, Family and the Digital World (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2015); Douglas Estes, SimChurch: Being the Church in the Virtual World (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009).

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Perspective on the Total Cosmos Brent Waters points out the danger in the technological development of losing the perspective on the entire cosmos and fragmenting it. Like Wolfhart Pannenberg, he sees humanity anthropologically as the manager of a multiform and coherent cosmos.41 This creates a critical attitude towards the presentation of humans as co-creators, who through current technological developments genetically transform nature in its basis. Previous developments only made human life more comfortable: we tamed a wild horse, without changing it into another being that was given the name “post-horse.”42 Waters concludes, What was envisioned originally as a useful tool becomes a necessary prosthetic to compensate the natural limitations of the brain.43

The question is whether this distinction can be maintained. Whereas we have used wood and iron for a hammer to overcome our limited physical strength, today we use genetic building blocks and data to overcome other human limitations. In that respect, there is no difference between the person who in ancient times co-formed creation and the person who does so today. In both times humans use matter that is available. No new being is created. However, it is correct that technology determines the image of humanity. Technology is not value-neutral.44 Often people developing AI technology seem to deny that this cosmic reality cannot be easiely divided into separate fragments. This liberalist approach translate freedom as the lifting of all restrictions and an opening of all potential possibilities. However, this does not bring the necessary freedom. The freedom which is also described by Moravec and Kurzweil is rather limited by the fact that they allow humanity to make infinite choices. This leads to an infinite consumption of possibilities but not to greater freedom. By recognizing the multiform character of the cosmos and realizing that evolution does not produce limitless creatures, there is a way to redemptive freedom that humanity can look forward to.

41. Waters, “Technology,” 147; From Human, 111–20. Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie, vol. 2 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991), 135–8. 42. Waters, From Human, 47–8. 43. Ibid., 53. 44. Waters, From Human, 74, 91, 125–30; George Grant, Technology and Justice (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1986), 1–34.

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Where restrictions are removed, a dualist fragmented worldview a view of humankind arises that raises philosophical-theological questions. This can be seen for example were the material is seen as limited and an obstacle to human transformation. These kinds of reflections are the results of the incorrect definition of human limitations as negative. We saw this in the earlier reflections on death. Therefore, the limitations are not negative. Brent Waters boldly typifies evil as the human rebellion that arises against such God-given limitations in this world.45 However, attention should be paid to human limitations that are good to overcome. For example, the discovery of the microscope ensured that we could see life-threatening bacteria that, due to our limitations, are not visible to the unaided human eye. So, not every choice to overcome a human limitation is evil. Christian Hope for Body and Cosmos In contrast to the negative approach to the physical stands the Christian hope for the resurrection of the body. There transience and all limitations that do not belong to human life are forever over. For Christians the first example of this resurrected life is the testimony of Jesus Christ.46 Christian theology, speaking from the perspective of Christian estimation, acknowledges that the ephemeral body, as we know it today, cannot enter this future resurrected life without change (1 Cor 15:50). The body that will be raised will be characterized by sparkle and strength. While there are different Christian theologies about the resurrection, the belief in bodily resurrection is dominantly present.47 In Christ, the origin, development, and telos of the cosmos are revealed as God’s creation. From faith in the resurrection, Christian theology expresses the hope that God will free not only humanity but all creation from its submission to impermanence and death. The future expectation of the individual is thus traditionally connected with the whole cosmos. It does not bear witness to salvation from the body, but salvation with the body.48 The belief in the resurrection of life leads to hope not only for immaterial existence, as described by Moravec and Kurzweil, but also for material existence. 45. Waters, From Human, 119. 46. Kristensen, Body, 167; Moltmann, Kommen, 95. 47. Ted Peters, Robert J. Russell, and Michael Welker, eds., Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002). 48. Kristensen, Body, 14, 168.

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It is this hope of the resurrected body that bears witness to an open future, in which the love of life in the present and in the past finds its eternal continuation.49 This future perspective is of fundamental importance for Christian theology. Anyone who rejects faith in the resurrection as a Christian deprives the Christian faith of its constructive hope for the redemption of material and immaterial creation. A Christian faith without resurrection is noiseless in the proclamation of salvation and, “it robs Christian theology of any counter-discourse with which to engage an emerging posthuman world in a critical and constructive manner.”50 It is possible that this future perspective may appear to be a fairy tale. In a dialogue, technological approaches can address theological perspectives on this issue, without sharing a worldview, a view of humanity or God having to determine the vocabulary of theology. At the same time, the futurological presentations of Moravec and Kurzweil raise questions. Do they not present future life too optimistically? The previously mentioned idea of a faster thinking time and a state in which humans will never forget anything (because of AI algorithms which support humans in thinking), will have a price. In the techno-technical proposals of Moravec and Kurzweil this means the abandonment of the human body. Christian eschatology can seem unbelievable, because it clings to a resurrection of the body. However, at the same time, techno-technical expectations also seem unbelievable, because they perceive the immolation of the body as the gateway to an evolution of life. To what extent can such a life without a body be regarded as positive? The Transformed Life: Imitation or Synthesis? Although information technology pays attention to the future of the deceased by storing digital video clips, photos and audio files of a person,51 there is no technological possibility which allows that the lives of the deceased are resurrected. In contrast to this the Christian testimony 49. Jürgen Moltmann, Der Weg Jesu Christi: Christologie in messianischen Dimensionen, Systematischen Beiträge zur Theologie 3 (München: Kaiser, 1989), 261–2; Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology 3: Life and the Spirit, History and the Kingdom of God (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 397. 50. Waters, From Human, 105. 51. William S. Bainbridge, “Online Memorials: Precursor to Cyberimmortality?,” The Futurist 40, no. 2 (2006): 27.

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looks forward to more than just renovation and progression of life. It speaks about a transformation of life. This future life is characterized unimaginably by perfection, eternity, and imperishableness. In the future, God will not only raise the dead but will also give them a better life. From the resurrection of Christ this has been seen as a life that is in full consciousness, and characterized by experience and emotions. Development of Emotions The advantages of a lack of “life-driven emotions” and “subjective feelings” in the development of robots and AI are often pointed out. A computer, “doesn’t nag, whine, criticize, or belittle. It doesn’t change moods or get tired.”52 However, this concerns material machines. When it comes to people’s social lives, we should not underestimate our emotions. We do not follow cold mathematical logic, but warm social logic that is controlled by emotions. Few ethical dilemmas can be solved by looking purely and solely at brain activity. In many joyful events, such as interpersonal contact, sexuality, moments of relaxation, and sport, delicious meals and many other things, the body, and its senses, play an essential role. In the great emphasis on the processing of cognitive information within techno-futurism, little attention is often paid to human emotions.53 However, if someone claims that subjective feelings are irrelevant, it is difficult for this person to explain why torture or rape is wrong without referring to subjective feelings. Those who undertake too little emotional reflection run the risk of not being able to empathize with others, and those who undertake too much can fall prey to fears or depressive disorders. Do all these human emotions allow themselves to be replaced or imitated by technologies over time? If that were to be the case, technology would have more to offer us than what we experience when dreaming, when we often cannot perceive deep emotions and feelings with all of our senses. A beach holiday on a beautiful island, where you can have fun with friends in the warm water and enjoy the during the afterglow on the beach while gently feeling the sand in a breeze flowing over you, 52. Deborah G. Johnson, Computer Ethics: Analyzing Information Technology (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2009), 60. 53. See Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (London: Vintage, 2006).

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remains much more attractive than a beach holiday in a dream. Although some scientists try to analyze, understand, and emulate human emotions via electronic sensors and information technology, it is still difficult at this moment not to deny that the emotional experience in real situations is different. Development of (Self)Consciousness The same problem arises in the search for a technological human development of (self)consciousness. As mentioned, there are various developments and different levels within AI. The examples of chess computers, self-propelled cars and software products such as Facebook, Netflix, and Waze are described as “weak AI.” Some developers try to achieve artificial general intelligence (AGI), “strong AI” or “full AI,” which enables a machine to perform almost the same intellectual tasks as a human being.54 One of the objectives is that “strong AI” or “full AI” might also be recognized as a form of human consciousness. Over the past fifty years, enormous progress has been made in the field of computer intelligence. But, as of today, there has not yet been any reasonable achievement in the field of computer consciousness.55 What is presented as possible progress in computer consciousness raises the question of whether this consciousness is synthetic and indistinguishable from human consciousness or whether it is merely an imitation or simulation of human consciousness.56 So, the same logic applies as with emotions. When people try to determine whether something or someone has consciousness, they do not look at mathematical ability or a good memory. A normal consciousness human being is from birth able to deal with concepts like time, space, constants, attributes, dynamics, actions, processes, causalities, et cetera. Current AI developments depend for these concepts on all kind of algorithms. This leads to sophisticated achievements, such as Siri, Alexa, and Cortana, now possessing only imitate intelligence. In this respect, a word like “cat” is for these applications 54. Ben Goertzel, Laurent Orseau, and Javier Snaider, eds., Artificial General Intelligence: 7th International Conference, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Cham: Springer, 2014); Hubert L. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason (Cambridge: MIT, 2009). 55. Harari, Homo Deus, 313–4. 56. Peter Kassan, “Artificial Intelligence Simulation, Not Synthesis,” Skeptic Magazine 22, no. 2 (2017): 36–42; Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation (San Francisco: Freeman, 1994), 222–5.

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the same as the word “pain”, while the latter intuitively evokes certain feelings among people. Until now, these feelings can only be added using algorithms. There is no synthesis of human consciousness. The chess program AlphaZero surpassed all other chess programs and is very efficient, but it is not synthetically aware that it is playing chess.57 Development or Danger? The developments of AI mentioned above made many worry about an AI doomsday because there is no guarantee that humans using AI will choose for the common good in an ethically responsible social order. In essence, AI does not need human values and social skills to function and can ignore them if they do not fit into the “intelligent algorithm” that controls it. 58 Where AI ends up in the wrong hands or is based on a destructive “intelligent algorithm,” it will submit to rebellious laws and norms and possibly enslave humanity, a scenario outlined in Dan Brown’s bestseller Origin.59 Reliable Data Curators then become necessary to guarantee that the recorded past is not adulterated and remains trustworthy. So how should we see these developments of AI in the context of futuristic expectations? Is AI, like a knife or nuclear technology, both a tool and a weapon, or is the comparison inappropriate, because AI can make choices independently of the algorithm? Can these choices still be adjusted or reversed, or is humanity powerless to act against it? We are not willing to replicate what happened with Microsoft Chatbot Tay that began to post offensive tweets, forcing Microsoft to shut down the 57. Eugénio Oliveira, “Beneficial AI: The next Battlefield,” Journal of Innovation Management 5, no. 4 (2018): 13. 58. Michael Sainato, “Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and Bill Gates Warn About Artificial Intelligence,” The Observer 19 (2015); James Barrat, Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era (New York: Thomas Dunne, 2015); Rory Cellan-Jones, “Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind,” BBC News 2 (2014); Eliezer Yudkowsky, “Superintelligence without Supermorality Would Be Dangerous,” in Artificial Intelligence: Issues, ed. Sylvia Engdahl, Contemporary Issues Companion (Farmington Hills: Greenhaven, 2008); Joel Garreau, Radical Evolution: The Promise and Peril of Enhancing Our Minds, Our Bodies―and What It Means to Be Human (New York: Broadway Books, 2006), 231; Warwick, March of the Machines, 179, 274; Norbert Wiener, God and Golem, Inc.: A Comment on Certain Points Where Cybernetics Impignes on Religion., 7th ed. (Cambridge: Massachussetts Institute of Technology, 1990), 37–9, 187–8. 59. Dan Brown, Origin: A Novel (New York: Anchor Books, 2018). Cf. Bill Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us,” Wired magazine 8, no. 4 (2000): 238–62.

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service about sixteen hours after its launch. Yuval Harari rightly points out that at this time it is no longer possible for an individual to oversee or understand an entire algorithm. Gigantic teams develop a search algorithm like that of Google but each member of that team sees only a part of it.60 Besides, AI ensures that the outcome of the algorithm improves and expands itself. In some situations, it analyzes enormous amounts of data and applies strategies and methodologies that ordinary people can no longer follow. This makes an important distinction between the basic algorithm and the developed algorithm. From these kind of questions, there is a profound ethical reflection on the use of AI, especially in the arms industry, and ethical reflections are also taking place on how to deal with AI (and robots) in the legal, psychological, social, and medical context.61 While technological development is an expression of human freedom, it does not imply that it becomes unguided chaos. The applications of AI once again makes us realize that the individual is part of the whole. The cosmos cannot be dualistically fragmented. Whoever, as a knowledge expert, tries to rise above others and place them self in isolation, realizes through the development of AI that they have lost the race of “the survival of the smartest” and are part of a larger community. Humanity finds itself in a search for the best choice of the good life and should avoid, on the one hand, an uncritical rejection of AI and on the other, its uncritical acceptance. Especially when looking at performances such as Golem, Frankenstein, or The Matrix it is too easy to warn of the speculative calamity that AI will bring to humanity. It is reminiscent of the warnings that sound for worldwide ecological destruction, nuclear war, overpopulation, exhaustion of raw materials, biological weapons, terrorism, even for Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. It turns out that technologies have never generated the humanly expected heavenly conditions, nor have they led to a day of condemnation for humanity. For example, many saw the developments of the car in the early twentieth century as the great salvation from the imminent danger of an overdose of horse feces due to the growing use of horses in transport. In 1894 the Times reported that, according to experts, in 1950 60. Harari, Homo Deus, 398. 61. Patrick Lin, Keith Abney, and George A. Bekey, eds., Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics, Intelligent Robotics and Autonomous Agents (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014); Robert M. Geraci, The Cultural History of Religions and the Ethics of Progress: Building the Human in 20th Century Religion, Science and Art (Santa Barbara: University of California, 2005), 104–12.

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every street in London would have been covered with 2.74m (9 feet) of horse feces.62 Today this threat has disappeared, but we are concerned about the threat of air pollution caused by diesel and petrol cars. Another example is the Internet, which in its early days was also presented as a paradisiacal discovery. The internet would make libraries superfluous in a few years and would mean a new information paradise for humanity.63 Until now, however, local libraries have not disappeared, and the life of paradise that the Internet brings looks slightly different from what was expected. Governments are still reflecting on how they can arrange our use of the Internet and Dark web in such a way that the good life continues. Similarly, humanity will also have sufficient time to develop ethical guidelines for AI through trial and error and to face new technological challenges as they arise. Because AI is still in its infancy, there is as much reason to panic as there is to worry about overpopulation on the planet Mars.64 So, new possibilities for good are continually emerging. Conclusion Future development in AI will provide humans with all kinds of benefits that help to limit the negative in life. At the same time, the hope in the Christian doctrine of faith is focused on the renewal and glorification of the whole cosmos.65 Through this future transformation, the current cosmos will be freed from all harmful elements. However, because AI remains dependent on this same existence, it will not be able to free itself from it, even if it were able to succeed in achieving a lasting state of “software” without “hardware.”66 According to Christian doctrine, death can only be overcome by God. Through this hope in God, there is a primary difference between Christian eschatology and techno-futuristic expectation that also tries to overcome cosmic death and its impermanence. In techno-futurism, all hope lies in positive developments in human existence, to which the developments of AI also belong. From 62. Eric Morris, “From Horse Power to Horsepower,” Access Magazine 1, no. 30 (2007): 2. 63. Sally Richards, Futurenet: The Past, Present, and Future of the Internet as Told by Its Creators and Visionaries (New York: Wiley & Sons, 2002). 64. In the words of Andrew Ng, quoted in: Oliveira, “Beneficial AI: The next Battlefield,” 7. 65. Cf. Raymond R. Hausoul, “Theology and Cosmology: A Call for Interdisciplinary Enrichment,” Zygon (2019). 66. Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future, 67–71.

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this ideology, many think that “growth and progress” will solve our problems. It is not strange to call this belief in growth a religious model. It even forces us to speed up the pace of scientific progress and economic development while remaining at least one step ahead of the ecological threats on earth to overcome the fight against the temporary, the transitory, and death. However, Christian doctrine emphasizes that it is impossible for humanity to escape its impermanence. The building of an imperishable paradisiacal state on earth, as it resounds in techno-futurology, is thus a utopia. The hope for humanity is in God, and not in humans who might manage to build a tower of Babel to reach eternal life. At the same time, Christian theology cannot definitively state precisely how God’s ultimate intervention will happen. The triumph of impermanence and death remains a mystery that cannot be fully framed.67 It is even possible that the Christian optimism about the future existence of humans on earth inspires the developments of robots, AI and the new humanity. In this respect, it is conceivable that human existence will develop scientifically-technologically and theologically before God’s ultimate intervention takes place. Since the Middle Ages, we have believed that humankind would one day develop an artificial human being.68 Although it is still somewhat unclear how the positive developments of AI and posthumanism can bring about a progression in the whole cosmos, techno-futurism at least shares with the Christian doctrine of the future the hope of a future liberation from the transient and death. The developments that take place in AI and robotics are, therefore, on one hand, praiseworthy because they bring various benefits to life on earth. At the same time, it remains essential to realize that this information technology efficiently restricts the understanding of human life to information. But life in all its facets cannot be reduced. A critical comparison makes us aware of the philosophical-theological approaches in the techno-futurology of Hans Moravec and Ray Kurzweil 67. Sigurd Bergmann, ed., Eschatology as Imagining the End: Faith between Hope and Despair, Routledge New Critical Thinking in Religion, Theology, and Biblical Studies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018); Kristensen, Body; Marcel Sarot and David Fergusson, eds., The Future as God’s Gift: Explorations in Christian Eschatology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000). 68. William R. Newman, Promethean Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 35–6; David E. Nye, America as Second Creation: Technology and Narratives of New Beginnings (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 261–302.

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and the technological research around AI. The hermeneutical choices made in this research are expressed in reflections on the body, the cosmos, emotions, and (self)consciousness. Although the futuristic expectations of Moravec and Kurzweil represent the hope of the discovery of immortality as nuanced from current developments in robots and AI, there is a danger that AI technology will be presented too idealistically as a future solution to mortality and death. In the course of this critical comparison, several remarks challenging this have been made from perspective of Christian eschatology. In any case, there can be no question of an optimally imperishable transformed life realized by the current technological discoveries. This chapter, therefore, calls for further reflection and development in both AI technology and Christian theology.

PART III

THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

The Spirit, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Bodies: Machine–human Interaction within the Context of Divine–human Interaction JACK BARENTSEN

Abstract Technological developments of super intelligent machines lead some to anticipate the arrival of homo sapiens 2.0, a technologically improved version of humanity with qualities far superior to humans today. Such technological eschatologies are not without risk, as recent history demonstrates. Two thought experiments from the field of machine-human interaction sharpen our focus to discern how to maintain our humanity amidst increasing technological advances and promises. These thought experiments revolve around robots in the fields of health care and religion, and how these robots affect perceptions of human dignity and spirituality. These experiments clarify how boundaries between humans and machines may become fuzzy in the course of social interaction, how human cognition and memory are embodied phenomena, how being human means being relational, and how human transformation is not moving beyond humanity, but is a matter of redemption and salvation, which ultimately moves towards full human flourishing. While technology may enhance human functioning, only understanding of and respect for our embodied and relational existence can enable us to draw out the best in humanity while resisting its evil tendencies.

Anticipating a Posthuman Age In current thinking about the future of machine intelligence, a significant number of scientists are seriously reckoning with the possibility that machine intelligence will equal human intelligence in the decade 20402050–with intelligence measured in terms of performance in most professions. These experts represent a large number of scientific disciplines: cognitive science, brain and neuroscience, ICT (both hardware and

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software), large dataset analysis, evolutionary biology and psychology, complexity theory, swarm intelligence, and of course robotics.1 Many of these experts consider it rather likely that after reaching human intelligence, machine intelligence will rapidly, almost explosively, develop into superintelligence that will greatly surpass human intelligence. Simultaneous with this development, methods and mechanisms for human modification will greatly improve and multiply. To name just a few: ‒ Genetically manipulated food production to solve world hunger ‒ Medical diagnosis by machine intelligence rather than doctors ‒ Routinely constructed bionic limbs to replace lost hands, feet and more ‒ Improving human cognitive functioning by enhancing memory and concentration ‒ Streamlining rational decision making and controlling mental states Although few scientists expect intelligent machines to take over from humans who might then soon become extinct, the prospect of human enhancement and modification, combined with superintelligent machines, leads many to speculate about the onset of a posthuman age, that would be populated by a new variety of technologically improved mankind. This homo sapiens 2.0 would be endowed with such superior qualities as compared to humans today that one could speak of moving beyond the current human stage. Some speculate that the development of superintelligence will enable humans to upload their minds to sufficiently complex computers where they would, as it were, continue to live on forever, even if their bodies degenerate and pass away, or are even deliberately discarded.2 Efforts to improve and extend human life are as old as humanity itself, so it seems, often with their origin in a variety of religious sources 1. Vincent C. Müller and Nick Bostrom, “Future Progress in Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Expert Opinion,” in Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence, ed. Vincent C. Müller (Cham: Springer, 2016), 555–72. Within this discussion, two acronyms have been used to indicate the multidisciplinary nature of scientific efforts in this field: NBIC, referring to nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science, and GRAIN, referring to genetic manipulation, robotics, artificial intelligence, and nanotechnology (see Samuel Wilson and Nick Haslam, “Is the Future More or Less Human? Differing Views of Humanness in the Posthumanism Debate,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39, no. 2 (2009): 247–66. 2. Yuval N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (New York: Random House, 2016), 367ff.

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and beliefs that point to enhanced life beyond our current life. Since the Enlightenment, these efforts have been increasingly inspired and supported by hopeful scientific advances. Nick Bostrom, Director of the Oxford Future of Humanity Institute, has well documented this history of what might be called “transhumanism,” the longing to see mankind live beyond its present capabilities. He cites Julian Huxley as the first one to coin the word “ transhumanism,” “man remaining man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature.”3 Typically, many of these scholars operate on the hypothesis that “if scientific and technological development efforts do not effectively cease, then all important basic capabilities that could be obtained through some possible technology will be obtained,” the so-called “Technological Completion Conjecture.”4 On this basis, Bostrom summarizes his view of posthumanity as an era with a population greater than 1 trillion persons, when most people live longer than 500 years and are substantially more intelligent than today, when we have achieved “near-complete control over the sensory input” and human psychological suffering is rare.5 This evidently goes far beyond the current prospects for human enhancement, and not all scholars share his perspective, but it provides an indication of the contours of the debate. Theologically speaking, such efforts represent an eschatology of hope for the future of humanity. Some of these eschatologies have been notorious for their role in hatred, ethnic conflict and mass destruction in the twentieth century, so an analysis of these eschatologies is vital for survival of what is truly human in this posthumanist age. In this chapter, I will consider some of the implications of these transhumanist or posthumanist hopes for machine-human interaction in the area of religion and spirituality. Inevitably, humans and machines will interact in increasingly complex and interwoven ways, so that

3. Julian S. Huxley, Religion without Revelation (London: E. Benn, 1927), as cited in Nick Bostrom, “A History of Transhumanist Thought,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 14, no. 1 (2005): 6. 4. Nick Bostrom, “The Future of Humanity,” in New Waves in Philosophy of Technology, ed. Jan-Kyrre Berg Olsen, Evan Selinger, and Soren Riis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 189. As Bostrom himself notes, not all experts are uniformly positive about the likelihood that we will ever reach a posthuman stage. Alternative views include human extinction (with or without “evolutionary” successor), recurrent collapse of cultures and civilization, reaching a technological plateau without substantial further development, and finally, moving into a new area of posthumanism. 5. Bostrom, “The Future of Humanity,” 200.

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machine-human interaction provides a more focused lens to consider the implications of posthumanism. The scientific field that specifically studies machine-human interaction is quite complex itself, distinguishing four major areas of application:6 ‒ Robots performing routine tasks under immediate human supervision; ‒ Robots performing nonroutine tasks, often in hazardous environments, under remote human supervision; ‒ Automated vehicles (airplanes, trains and cars) with only minimal human intervention; ‒ Robots in social interaction with humans, to entertain, teach, comfort and assist people with varying needs. It is unsure how fast these developments will actually move. At least one expert in this field concludes: “Essentially, all robots for the foreseeable future will be controlled by humans,” whether direct, remote, or intermittently.7 Thus, the creation of robots with human or superhuman intelligence may be much further off than many experts now predict. However, to understand the dreams and the risks of posthumanism and to reflect on what it means to be human in such an era, this chapter will engage in two thought experiments about the potential dignity and religious performance of intelligent machines, in order to bring to the surface a number of conceptual areas to be developed for appropriation and critique of these posthuman hopes. The chapter will focus on human embodiment and spiritual transformation as conceptual areas that bring into focus key aspects of humanism and posthumanism in dealing with human-machine interaction. I will use philosophical, social scientific, and theological lenses to investigate these conceptual areas. The main question to guide this investigation is: What aspects of “being human” need to be considered in the ongoing quest for a posthuman age, in order for humans to retain their humanness in its most positive qualities and to resist tendencies towards inequality, injustice, and destruction that have accompanied the rapid technological and economic development of the twentieth and early twenty-first century?

6. Thomas B. Sheridan, “Human–Robot Interaction: Status and Challenges,” Human Factors 58, no. 4 (2016): 525–32. 7. Sheridan, 531.

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Two Thought Experiments To sharpen our focus on what it means to be human in a posthuman age, I will ask two questions that take us far into a hypothetical world where machines interact socially and independently with humans without the immediate or remote controls that are necessary today. Could Robots Achieve Human Dignity? Social robots have been used for some time in care facilities. One such robot, the seal Paro, can be cuddled, responds to its name, and indicates it “likes” being touched. Demented people demonstrate lower stress levels, increased brain activity, and more activity in conversation due to contact with Paro. The robot is often considered helpful by caring personnel, but they also have doubts as to whether Paro has dehumanizing effects on the elderly that use it, since it might reduce human contact and real empathic touch. A humanoid robot named Zora, first introduced in Finland, raises these questions even more. This robot interacts with humans in dancing or physical exercise, sometimes teaching particular exercise routines interactively. Zora appears to replace human caregivers more substantially than Paro, raising further questions about the potential dehumanizing effects of such social robots.8 The concern within health care is the effect of these social robots on the human dignity of patients. My concern here is what happens when these robots not only act like humans, but are treated as such. People cuddle them and form a social, emotional bond. To what extent does that raise the status of these robots to more than only humanoid, not only looking like humans but as potentially receiving (and deserving) human dignity? Would it be conceivable that future versions (or should we say, ‘generations’) of social robots will actually equal not only human performance but also human dignity? Should we begin treating social robots as persons, and if so, under what conditions? Experts are quite divided on this.9 8. Arto Laitinen, Marketta Niemelä, and Jari Pirhonen, “Social Robotics, Elderly Care, and Human Dignity: A Recognition-Theoretical Approach,” in What Social Robots Can and Should Do: Proceedings of Robo Philosophy 2016 / TRANSOR 2016, ed. J. Seibt, M. Nørskov, and S. Schack Andersen, vol. 290 (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2016), 155–6. 9. George Dvorsky, “When Will Robots Deserve Human Rights?” Gizmodo (blog), June 2, 2017, accessed April 4, 2019, https://gizmodo.com/when-will-robots-deservehuman-rights-1794599063.

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Human dignity is difficult to define.10 Some define it relative to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The UDHR emphasizes the right to life, freedom from slavery, legal recognition as a person, and equality (among other aspects). As long as robots are seen as machines and property, these rights would not apply to them. Of course, it is clear that some patients, indeed healthy people too, form social and emotional attachments to robots, just as people do with certain objects (a favorite car or chair). This phenomenon can also be observed in human attachment to animals. For our favorite pet, we now have health insurance, ambulance services, and burial ceremonies, practices that used to be available only to humans but that are now extended to animals and on a rare occasion even to objects. However, few would argue that attributing human characteristics to animals or objects makes them deserving of human dignity. We would generally consider that as a mistaken projection, and the attribution as a mistake in category, however well intentioned. One might also consider human dignity within the frame of the capability approach, which highlights such human capabilities as health, bodily integrity, emotions, play, and association.11 Social robots should not impede these human capabilities; indeed they sometimes serve to enhance them, as when demented people become more expressive, form emotional attachments or are drawn into playful physical exercise. Yet, it is doubtful that robots might ever be considered to be healthy rather than simply functioning properly, sick rather than broken down, or that we would feel obliged to protect their bodily integrity rather than improving their appearance and function in the machine shop as we see fit. Thus, even though social robots might enhance human capabilities, we would not generally attribute such capabilities to the robot itself. One might also consider human dignity to be composed of both an undeserved social status and dignity simply by virtue of being human, and an achieved dignity on the basis of past achievements.12 However, the dignity of machines would be at most derivative, based on the maker’s reputation and their valuing of the robot. Robots would be valued because of their clever design or amazing functions, as designed by their 10. Amanda Sharkey, “Robots and Human Dignity: A Consideration of the Effects of Robot Care on the Dignity of Older People,” Ethics and Information Technology 16, no. 1 (2014): 66–8. 11. Sharkey, “Robots and Human Dignity, 68–70. 12. Laitinen, Niemelä, and Pirhonen, “Social Robotics, Elderly Care, and Human Dignity: A Recognition-Theoretical Approach,” 156–7.

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maker, but not simply as robot-beings. In addition, dignity on the basis of past achievement assumes some kind of bodily continuity with its own history and learning. However, even though some robots can learn, the continuity of their being and history is in the mind and experience of the scientist and engineer, who build and improve successive versions (or generations) of robots. Robotic continuity, so to speak, is not in the bodily continuity of one and the same robot, but in the continual recreation and development of the design by the engineer. Of course, superintelligent robots could create an imaginary past based on self-learning algorithms in an analysis of thousands or millions of biographical documents, but this would hardly count as a personal history of experiences and social interaction that is sustained by bodily continuity, which would, in the case of human beings, interactively shape the character, knowledge, and wisdom of the subject.13 Thus, even if social or other robots can be programmed or learn to behave in ways very similar to humans, and even if they might succeed in fooling people that they, too, are real people, it is doubtful that they will ever transcend their status as machines and property. Issues of life and death play a role, for people have a right to life while they live in the face of death (which gives a sense of purpose and priority to life), while machines have no right to come into existence, and can be altered, copied or junked as the engineer deems fit and the situation requires. People manifest a certain bodily integrity and continuity with their past, which serves in part as a foundation for their human dignity–even if 13. An interesting case study is the film “Lars and the real girl,” in which a withdrawn and somewhat autistic Lars gradually comes to life and maturity in the company of a life-size, blow-up, female sex doll. He takes “her” to church and other social occasions, and after an initial shock, many of the other people also begin treating the doll as a living person. When Lars meets a real girl, he more or less arranges the “funeral” of the doll. The viewer never finds out if Lars truly fooled himself into believing that the doll was a real female person, or if it was all pretence. Certainly, the other people in the story never mistook the doll for a real person, and neither does the viewer. Presumably, Lars did not make that mistake either. Yet, it is the human qualities that were attributed to the doll, not only by Lars but also by the others as they played along, that made it possible for Lars to overcome his anxiety and withdrawn character and to begin behaving in more normal patterns of human interaction. The “technology” of the blow-up sex doll empowered Lars in enhanced human performance, primarily because of the attribution of human characteristics, capability, and even history to the doll. Yet, the doll itself, being literally empty inside, never truly achieved human status or dignity. Even if superintelligent machines might perform far better in human enhancement than this blow-up doll, and even if they are not empty inside but are filled with content such as computer chips and miles of circuitry, this would not by itself qualify them as human or as deserving of human dignity.

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traumatic events might have seriously injured and changed their bodies or minds. Significantly, even people with certain dysfunctions, handicaps or mental shortcomings still fully deserve human dignity. Broken machines, however, simply need to be fixed or recycled. Finally, human capacities like love, empathy, and suffering, cannot simply be reduplicated by very complex circuitry in social robots, but require a selfconscious human being with beneficent intentions acting towards another human being. Thus, I would argue that machines will never truly achieve human dignity, even if we might succeed in building machines with near human or even superhuman intelligence. This implies that, even if superintelligent machines might support, extend and improve human life, this technology by itself cannot make machines deserving of human dignity, neither could superintelligent machine performance degrade certain (handicapped) levels of human existence to less than human. The biological, bodily, emotional, and social dimensions of being human might in some sense be imitated by other beings, like dogs or robots, but that would not make these other beings human. Neither would a human being become more or less human when life is improved by a dog or a robot. Yet, animal–person or robot–person interaction has effect on the quality of human life in various ways, such as when a dog plays with his owner and cheers him up, or when a robot extends certain human capacities, even in the cognitive area (which humans have done since we began writing and using an abacus). This brief thought experiment within the field of human–machine interaction shows that, even if at times the boundary between machine and person might appear fuzzy because of the similarity in social function, on a more basic level this is unlikely to result in a moral demand to treat machines or robots with the same respect and care as the human dignity of people would demand. So whatever posthumanism might involve, it is unlikely that human dignity, as determined by bodily integrity, right to life, living in the face of death, along with capabilities for social and emotional affiliation, would be significantly different from human interaction today. What Happens when Robots Pray? A second thought experiment, to focus attention on the spiritual dimension of human life, begins with the question, What happens when robots pray? This, too, is not as outlandish a suggestion as it might at first

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appear. Several experiments have been done involving robots and the generation of text. One such experiment has resulted in a writing robot that is able to produce text that is very difficult to distinguish from text written by humans.14 Other robots have been known to write excellent historical essays. So it is quite conceivable that a robot produces text that reads like a beautiful and balanced prayer. It is likely that the prayer could be clearly located within a particular faith tradition, but of course the robot would “know” his audience and be able to write prayers that his algorithms tell him will match the preferences of his audience. Now, consider a robot like Paro or Zora but this time for religious purposes. One such is Xianér, a Robot Monk designed to assist us in our religious rituals by saying our prayers with us, or teaching us a new prayer.15 This is actually not much different from using the Book of Common Prayer or an devotional app that provides a daily nourishment of prayers, except that we have now created a superintelligent machine that can more creatively compose religious rituals that would fit our context and personal longing or taste. Since people sometimes form attachments to a particular prayer book or religious app, it is quite conceivable that people would form social, emotional, and even religious attachments to their robot monk. However much we can or cannot empathize with this scenario, I wonder if we would sense that a line is crossed when a religious person attributes life changes or transformations in their life to the presence and actions of the robot monk. At the very least, these changes would have to be framed as due to the agency of the divine. In the Christian tradition, of which I am part, this would be attributed to the Holy Spirit– even if the Spirit used a tool like the robot to accomplish the transformation. This would parallel many other religious experiences, such as the use of incense in a huge cathedral, the music band on a carefully lit stage, or the practice of silence within a circle of candles. Often, material objects are used to mediate to us something of God’s presence. These objects are the place in which we connect with the presence and power 14. Tilly Dodds, “Code van schrijfrobot blijft om veiligheidsredenen geheim,” Nederlands Dagblad, February 18, 2019. 15. Xian’er is actually dedicated to disseminating Buddhist wisdom. Harriet Sherwood, “Robot Monk to Spread Buddhist Wisdom to the Digital Generation,” The Guardian, April 26, 2016, accessed August 26, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2016/apr/26/robot-monk-to-spread-buddhist-wisdom-to-the-digital-generation. The robot has its own Facebook page (Facebook.com/RobotXianer/) and can be viewed on Youtube (Youtube.com/watch?v=eJ5V7CE4vuU).

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of the Spirit. While we may speak very positively about the particular object, we would generally not make the mistake of attributing religious effectiveness directly to that material object. If we do, our fellow believers will soon correct our misperception in an attempt to disabuse us of our perceived idolatry.16 It would be another step to not only “use” a material object as mediation for experiencing divine presence in one’s religious practices, but to offload certain religious tasks to such an object or machine. This appears to take place in certain Buddhist rituals, where prayer wheels are given a swing and as long as they continue turning, their rotations count as prayers on behalf of the worshipper. Here, the worshipper “offloads” his task of praying to the turning wheel. This could conceivably also be transferred to a robot monk.17 I thought this would not apply to Christianity, but I was mistaken. Consider the use of the rosary, the use of incense to symbolize the prayers of the faithful, or the practice of lighting a candle to keep our prayers before God. These material practices support and facilitate the praying believer. For some believers, the objects would be merely symbolic (reminders) of their prayers, but it seems that for other believers these objects carry their prayers more than only in a symbolic way. Are some worshippers offloading their task of praying to such objects? Of course, the idea that pastors or priests pray better than ordinary believers and that their prayers of intercession might receive a more favorable hearing with God, is frequently present in the operant theology of many believers, even if it goes against the espoused or normative theologies of their church.18 Still, offloading our praying to another believer fits, at least in part, with our ideas about intercession. However, offloading our praying to a material object such as a robot monk would be considered erroneous, because even such a sophisticated machine cannot pray with sincere intentions, humbly appearing before

16. Even though I write here from within my own Christian tradition, similar reflections would be applicable to other faiths. 17. Alex Martin, “Pepper the Robot to Don Buddhist Robe for Its New Funeral Services Role,” The Japan Times Online, August 16, 2017, accessed August 26, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/08/16/business/pepper-the-robot-to-donbuddhist-robe-for-its-new-funeral-services-role. 18. For detailed explanations about the four voices of theology, which include the operant, espoused, normative and formal theological voices, see Helen Cameron et al., Talking about God in Practice: Theological Action Research and Practical Theology (London: SCM Press, 2010).

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God in an appropriate attitude.19 It can only put together words, movements and text based on algorithmic analysis of thousands of similar texts, imitating what humans might do without thereby attaining human characteristics that would prompt God to start answering robot prayers. Thus, we would be appalled if someone proposed that God answers the prayers of the robot monk more readily than our own prayers. Or that the robot monk should be entitled to be baptized or to receive communion. Should the robot then be delivered from his bondage to his human masters? Does the robot need salvation from his wayward tendencies rather than simply have its software de-bugged? This second thought experiment likewise shows that the boundaries between human and machine might at times appear fuzzy in the midst of social interaction, but it is inconceivable that we would accept intelligent machines as religious partners in divine–human relationships. At the most, with a generous sacramental theology, we might conceive of intelligent machines as material artifacts that become part of human religious practices in a way that would somehow mediate the divine presence to us. But any independent role for intelligent machines as believers and religious participants, implying that God would interact with them on the same level as he interacts with humans, would be considered as a category mistake in perception and as a violation of religious observance and divine–human interaction. This is not to say that believers never mistake animals or objects for god; ancient discourses debunking idolatry show that this occurred frequently. Yet, it was always rejected by the Judeo-Christian monotheistic religions as idolatry.20 Key Concepts for Posthuman Hopes As unrealistic as these two thought experiments might sound, they bring to the surface a number of important concerns.

19. Although we might have to reconsider. See Werner Pluta, “BlessU-2: Roboter spendet Segen,” Golem.de, May 31, 2017, accessed April 24, 2019, https://www.golem. de/news/blessu-2-roboter-spendet-segen-in-sieben-sprachen-1705-128122.html. 20. The discourses of the Biblical prophet Isaiah are a case in point. See for instance Isaiah 40:18-23, 44:9-20.

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Fuzzy Human–Machine Boundaries Arise from Embodied Human Perception The first one, already noted, is that the boundaries between human and machine are fuzzy in the midst of human–machine interaction. That seems odd, because intuitively this concerns very clear and distinct categories: humans and machines. But it fits our human organization of knowledge that operates, not by concrete and specific boundary conditions, but by typologies that have a fairly clear center but are fuzzy at the edges. Cognitive psychology supports this notion of fuzzy human categories and communication. So where function in interaction converges, category boundaries might become fuzzy. Consider Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of human perception.21 He discusses the use of tools by humans, such as a cane by a blind man. The tool becomes integrated into his bodily sensory system as he perceives and interacts with the world. Our bodies and its enhancements, whether with a cane, glasses, calculator, or computer, seem to merge or fuse into one body to become an arena where world and the self meet. We cannot interact with the world other than with and through our bodies, and in our bodies the world meets us. Human enhancements become part of our embodied interaction to such an extent that they appear to be fully part of us, and perhaps take on human shape in our minds. That is, this fuzziness in human-machine interaction is a normal part of human embodied perception. Yet, at the end of the day, broken people are referred to doctors and therapists, broken canes go back to the woodshop, and robots are fixed by engineers and software developers. It may appear that in machine– human interaction the boundary between humans and machines sometimes gets a little fuzzy. That by itself is rooted in the nature of human perception and interaction as embodied, as we often use tools to enhance our perception and interaction. But no matter how attached we get to these tools, at the end of the day, we are not really confused about the human, the divine, and our tools. Cognition and Memory are Embodied Phenomena When we consider the powers of cognitive or algorithmic processing, it is clear that intelligent machines can greatly aid or even improve human 21. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de La Perception (1945; repr., Paris: TEL Gallimard, 1978).

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analytical capabilities. Human processing has been superseded in speed and breadth of coverage by algorithmic processing since the advent of computers. Digital capabilities continue to expand in speed and sophistication, so this gap will continue to widen. Some view this trend very optimistically. For instance, Harari supposes that with further discoveries about neural patterns in the human brain, we have all the information we need to copy the human mind to a computer–if we can make one that is sufficiently fast and complex.22 For Harari and others, this trend signals the advent of a posthuman age where mankind moves substantially beyond its current limitations by genetic engineering and machine-enhancement. For them, both human cognitive and machine algorithmic processing are the vital, if not the essential functions in modern daily life. Everything else is secondary. This trend is not everywhere greeted with the same optimism. One critical voice is a recent report that the analysis of big data by Artificial Intelligence does not yield reproducible scientific results. That is, the analysis and conclusions of such big data research cannot easily be reproduced and thus checked, often leading to error creeping into our scientific theories without detection.23 One might then propose that we simply need to improve algorithmic processing and make it more transparent. But the objections go much deeper. Many consider it a serious mistake to reduce human performance to only or even mainly cognitive processing. Indeed, our two thought experiments demonstrate that human-machine interaction is vastly more complex than merely a matter of differences in cognitive speed and coverage. Affective, intuitive and also spiritual dimensions each play a distinct role. Even if we could log the neural patterns that are associated with certain affections, intuitions, and religious feelings, that does not answer the question as to what originates these affections and intuitions, nor what role they play in human perception. To suppose that neural patterns explain it all is a severe reduction of human capabilities; it reduces everything that makes us fully human to only the cognitive, specifically as represented by human brain waves. Though some advocate that “we are our brains,”24 most scientists hold less reductionist views.25 22. Harari, Homo Deus. 23. Pallab Ghosh, “AAAS: Machine Learning ‘Causing Science Crisis,’” BBC News, February 16, 2019. 24. Dick F. Swaab, We Are Our Brains: A Neurobiography of the Brain, from the Womb to Alzheimer’s, trans. Jane Hedley-Prole (New York: Random House, 2014). 25. Sharon Dirckx, Am I Just My Brain? (Epsum, UK: Good Book, 2019).

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Embodiment of human perception and interaction have become a noticeable field of analysis in various disciplines. For instance, human processes of social identification26 or human moral intuitions27 have been demonstrated to be far more than conscious mental calculus. These processes are not only subconscious, but also embodied and felt more than thought about. Cognitive psychologists Lakoff and Johnson have demonstrated how the entire human communication and knowledge system is founded upon and built from our embodied interaction with the world.28 And trauma psychology documents how memory is located not only in certain neural brain patterns, but is distributed throughout the body,29 as if the body contains sedimented layers of experience, emotions and memory that each play a role in how we respond in new situations. Thus cognition and memory are broadly and increasingly recognized as embodied phenomena, in which cognitive processes as measured by brain neural patterns play a substantial part, but only a part.30 These observations go along well with theological notions of soul and spirit as complementary parts or centers of human being. Being Human Means Being Relational Interestingly, reported experiences with the robots Paro and Zora (see above) point to the relational nature of being human. Even human beings with serious cognitive limitations, such as those suffering from dementia or a mental handicap, still succeed in relating to these two 26. Kristen R. Monroe, “How Identity and Perspective Constrain Moral Choice,” International Political Science Review 24, no. 4 (2003): 405–25. 27. Jesse Graham and Jonathan Haidt, “Sacred Values and Evil Adversaries: A Moral Foundations Approach,” in The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good and Evil, ed. Mario Mikulincer and Philip R. Shaver, Herzliya Series on Personality and Social Psychology (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2012), 11–31. 28. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 29. Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma (New York: Penguin, 2015). 30. See also Gabriel Ignatow, “Theories of Embodied Knowledge: New Directions for Cultural and Cognitive Sociology?” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37, nr. 2 (2007): 115–35. Jack Barentsen, “Pastoral Leadership as Dance: How Embodiment, Practice and Identity Shape Communities and Their Leadership,” Practical Theology 12, no. 2 (2019); Jack Barentsen, “Embodied Realism as Interpretive Framework for Spirituality, Discernment and Leadership,” in Leadership, Spirituality and Discernment in a VUCA World, ed. J. Kok and Steven C. van den Heuvel (Heidelberg: Springer Business and Economics, 2019), 119–38.

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robots as if they were people. Attention and care still function at some level in such human-machine relationship, even though cognitive calculus would show such interaction to be fake, that is, not fully human. Cognitive processing about the being or entity at the other end of the relationship can be bracketed as long as some type of relationship is possible. We recognize humanity by the ability to love and to be loved, to move in a web of caring and relationships with other human beings. Those with impaired cognitive functioning would notice much later (if at all) than others with normal cognitive functioning, that one might be relating to a robot rather than a human being. But even those with normal cognitive functioning are now regularly fooled by computer operated telephone operators, since it often takes a few sentences or even minutes of interaction before one might realize that one is talking to a computer rather than a human being. Our thought experiments extend this line of thinking. It is only in the course of machine-human relationships, often with fuzzy boundaries, that one is tempted to attribute some level of human dignity or some level of spiritual functioning to a superintelligent computer. However, in a lab setting where such new machines are designed, built and tested, no one would make such a mistake. Even those who design robots with humanoid appearance know that this is “just” a machine and not a human–even though one might carry on a conversation as if it were a real person. Thus, in a context where a machine is clearly approached as a thing or object, one would not consider the machine as a relational partner, worthy of human dignity or manifesting a kind of spirituality. It is only in the context of relationships between unsuspected and undetected machines and humans that a relationship might develop which includes social interaction, personal liking and emotional attachment–at least on the part of the human partner. This accords well with Gerkin’s analysis of object relations theory, where the selfhood and identity of an infant originates in the face of the other, notably the mother, and other significant people in the infant’s scope of vision.31 Being seen, mimicking that other face, and gradually soliciting responses in turn, generates a sense of self that is foremost and intensely relational. More recently, Gergen argued that human ability to relate is not merely one human capacity among others, but that the essence of the human self and human being consists in its relational 31. Charles V. Gerkin, The Living Human Document: Re-Visioning Pastoral Counseling in a Hermeneutical Mode (Knoxville, TN: Abingdon, 1984), 77–96.

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nature, as part of a web of human relationships.32 Both of these authors manifest a turn towards the body and towards relationships that reflects changing directions in social sciences over the last decades. Theologians, too, participate in this turn towards the body33 and towards the relational nature of mankind.34 It is this turn towards relationality and embodiment that allows more meaningful, indeed more human considerations of such basic facts of life as suffering and death. However, with the advent of posthumanism, the emphasis on human cognitive processing and the hoped-for ability to transport the human mind to a superintelligent machine seem to turn suffering and death into an accidental and unfortunate part of being human that may finally be left behind in a quest for ultimate humanity without suffering and death. One wonders, though, if these efforts turn human beings more into objects to be manipulated, protected against disease, indeed against themselves, in order to manufacture the most perfect specimen possible–with scientists presiding over the process as the council of the gods–or if this truly fosters attention, love, and care in the context of endearing human relationships, which is most often how we measure our humanity. Human Transformation is Ultimately Spiritual Advocates of posthumanism are not, of course, blind to the ethical and spiritual nature of mankind. Several proponents emphasize self-control and moral excellence as a quality to be achieved by posthumans.35 Some research focuses on understanding human propensity towards evil, analyzing various moral and social dynamics that lead to sadism, sexual deviance, and much more.36 However, little or no account is provided of how the human inclination towards evil is part of being human, or how evil should be overcome. It seems to be simply assumed that various technological enhancements will improve the human situation and thereby overcome the human evil. Optimistic advocates of posthumanism speak 32. Kenneth J. Gergen, Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), xiv–xvi. 33. Dorothy C. Bass et al., Christian Practical Wisdom: What It Is, Why It Matters (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2016). 34. James K. A. Smith, Who’s Afraid of Relativism? Community, Contingency, and Creaturehood, The Church and Postmodern Culture (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014). 35. Wilson and Haslam, “Is the Future More or Less Human?” 36. Julia Shaw, Evil: The Science Behind Humanity’s Dark Side (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 2019).

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and act as if superintelligent machines are unaffected by human evil, or that these machines will overcome this human tendency through its enhancement of human capacities rather than reforming them. However, if machine intelligence is based on human intelligence, seeking through algorithms to match and increase its speed, accuracy, and efficiency, what guarantees do we have that AI will only reduplicate the good parts of human intelligence? Why would not AI also duplicate and even amplify the bad parts? The twentieth century has certainly provided ample proof that human technological advances may well result in enormous levels of destruction and death. Even this destructive technology “benefits” from digital democratization, so that an isolated person may radicalize and generate mass destruction with knowledge gathered freely on the internet. Superintelligent technology enhances not only the good but also the bad through and within the people that use it. Of course, technology need not always be destructive. Nevertheless, it can be very invasive and seriously hinder or redirect human flourishing. For instance, China’s recently emerging social credit system, driven by the ubiquitous presence of cameras and AI, is a very invasive application of technology, to control and censure people’s actions in their private spaces.37 Thus, it is good and well to suggest that posthumans will have near total control over all sensory inputs of humans,38 but who will determine what counts as appropriate sensory input? Who will define human happiness in order to select the right kind of sensory inputs to create happiness? These are not simply technological questions about how to solve broken systems or how to improve the efficiency of human processing; they represent a particular vision of human happiness and purpose. These are moral and spiritual questions about coping with evil and redeeming mankind. Furthermore, they represent intense questions about the networks of power in a digital age where the select few (the engineers?) become the new priests of happiness in one universal format. Dissenters from this universalizing vision can be easily detected through AI algorithms and handled appropriately, by reward, marginalization, reeducation, or similar mechanisms–all handled by machines to make this an “objective” scheme without human bias or prejudice. Of course, the bias has been programmed into the machines by the 37. Celia Hatton, “China ‘Social Credit’: Beijing Sets up Huge System,” BBC News 26 (October 25, 2015). 38. Bostrom, “The Future of Humanity.”

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engineers and/or their political bosses, but once it becomes a machine function, moral accountability evaporates and objective oppression takes its place. This sounds similar to some of the naïve optimism about transformational leadership, which needed to be corrected by understanding the dark side of this type of leadership,39 and is, of course, reminiscent of George Orwell’s 1984. It is not only reductionistic but also naïve to expect technology to solve all human problems, as Harari appears to do, precisely because so many problems are not merely technological but moral, caused by bad governance or selfish ambition. From a theological perspective, these problems require redemption as much as they require technological prowess. True enough, technology can help resolve many issues on a technical level, and technological development may arguably be framed as participation in the cultural mandate of Genesis 2, but moral transformation and justice only come through the transformation of human hearts, which in the Christian tradition is attributed to the work of the Holy Spirit. Sound thinking about posthumanism should therefore take these technological limitations into account, and make room for the confluence of divine and human action in creating redeeming forms of human community and interaction that will truly transform the world. Technology alone is not enough. Salvation as Change Towards Full Human Flourishing Finally, salvation is not simply the compensation of human weakness, whether cognitive or physical, but the aim to instill lasting justice and peace, especially for those who are in greatest need. Yet, the onset of posthumanity is accompanied by the creation of a new elite, with many millions missing the train, so to speak, and suffering the consequences. To create justice and peace for the majority of the world’s population will require great sacrifices primarily by those who currently are privileged enough to ponder the questions of posthumanity. Full human flourishing will not come to only the happy few whose sensory input is properly controlled, but can only arrive through the work of spiritual transformation. Within the Christian tradition, it is the work of the Spirit who allows us to participate in the Kingdom of God already, in a partial way, experiencing as a promise and down payment the justice 39. Dennis Tourish, The Dark Side of Transformational Leadership: A Critical Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2013).

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and salvation that will eventually be poured out upon the whole world when Jesus Christ returns. Christ is the sum of all humanity. He is the firstborn of those who have overcome evil and transcended into a new state of being human. He is, so to speak, the first posthuman–or rather, the first fully human being–but this can only be discussed in another much lengthier work than this chapter. We are called to follow Him. Conclusion Thus, from a theological and Christian perspective, I would argue that we may support the longing for a new age of transformed humanity, where many of today’s challenges are overcome and where hearts are transformed. However, such a salvation is only partially to be accomplished through technological means, though they have improved human life in myriads of ways. This might be interpreted in light of the cultural mandate in which mankind, broadly conceived, is called to participate. However, technological means, even when functioning as appropriate cultural development under the guidance of the Spirit, cannot truly ameliorate or change human nature, since this is not merely defined by cognitive information processing, but is founded upon the embodied, relational, and affective nature of humanity. It is precisely our embodied and relational nature that generates the perception of fuzzy boundaries between human and machine, even when cognitively and analytically we are not in the slightest confused about which is which–unless we suffer from a mental condition that prevents us from processing the distinctions. Ultimately, a theological eschatology doesn’t anticipate something beyond current humanity, a posthuman or transhuman age, but expects a transformed humanity, redeemed from its diseases and its evil proclivities. I argue that this is already partially visible and available now through the Spirit’s transforming work in people, and that even technological development cannot be seen apart from the Spirit’s moving across peoples and cultures. Yet, I expect this transformation to be finally and fully operative under the control of Christ after His return. Technology may well compensate for the brokenness of creation, but only partially and only until Christ’s return. We should not be so naïve as to think that technology is the only and all the answer we need. In this way, I trust we can retain and perhaps restore our humanness in its most positive qualities, while resisting the tendencies towards inequality, injustice, and totalitarianism that so frequently populate our daily news reports.

Harari, Pannenberg, and Human Destiny: A Theological Response to a Post Humanist Anthropology MICHAEL BOROWSKI

Abstract This chapter engages with one of the most popular recent works relating to posthumanist anthropology, namely Yuval Noah Harari`s Homo Deus. It analyses Harari’s work as exemplifying some typical assumptions in the areas of eschatology, anthropology, philosophy of science, and the concept of history. In doing so, it argues that Harari does indeed address some of the most crucial issues of our time. However, by bringing Wolfhart Pannenberg into the discussion, as a theologian who has addressed these particular fields at length, Harari`s argument is seen to stand on porous ground: while Harari excludes evidence pointing to an even brighter future than he himself can entertain within his particular framework, his underlying secular groundwork is inherently disengaged from everything that could point beyond the immanent world. The chapter concludes that Harari`s popular work further cements secular beliefs within the secular landscape, but that the actual limitations of the stories that secularism is able to tell effectively point to the need for a new methodology, even in Harari`s field–a methodology that demonstrates the ability to reclaim the lost world of the transcendent realm.

What does it mean to be human in a technological age? And what can Christian theology contribute to the related challenges? Transhumanism and posthumanism are two movements that perhaps exemplify the most critical aspects of the interface between anthropology and technology. The terms are in some sense connected, and both are notoriously difficult to define. In this chapter, I will focus on transhumanism as techno-optimistic discourse1 (i.e., emphasizing the potential to improve2 1. Robert Ranisch and Stefan L. Sorgner, “Introducing Post- and Transhumanism,” in Post- and Transhumanism: An Introduction, ed. Robert Ranisch and Stefan L. Sorgner (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 2014), 14. 2. Christopher Coenen, “Transhumanismus,” in Handbuch Anthropologie: Der Mensch zwischen Natur, Kultur und Technik, ed. Eike Bohlken and Christian Thies (Stuttgart: Verlag J.B. Metzler, 2009), 268–75.

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humans through science), and on posthumanism as a discourse on the crisis facing humanism3 that is connected to the technological developments of our time. While these two considerations must necessarily go hand in hand, this contribution focusses on the conceptual side, known within Christian theology as theological anthropology, and the somewhat related critique of humanism. In particular, I will use the narrative offered by Yuval Noah Harari in his book Homo Deus as an example of the posthumanist perspective and will summarize his view on human individual eschatology and anthropology, as well as describing the conceptual foundations of this view. I will contrast this with a summary of the related contributions of the late German theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg, a key theological figure of the late 20th century, who–from a different perspective–addressed the issues that posthumanism raise. 4 I will conclude that while Harari exemplifies great insight into humanity’s potential in a still young twenty-first century, he may also be applying an outdated approach to science, thereby ultimately limiting his vision, mostly in terms of the unsettling features of a history that is yet to unfold. A Prophetic History of the Twenty-first Century One of the most popular recent contributions to take a posthumanist/ transhumanist angle is Homo Deus by the Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari.5 Without doubt, Homo Deus is a fascinating book: Kazuo Ishiguro described it as even more important than Harari’s previous work, 3. Ranisch and Sorgner, “Introducing Post- and Transhumanism,” 16. 4. A word must be said about the scope and genre of the works addressed in this contribution: Given that we can address the results of Pannenberg’s entire life, while Harari is – hopefully – closer to his beginnings than to his end, there is much more literature by Pannenberg then by Harari. It is also clear that Harari writes for a general audience, while Pannenberg’s contributions are overall strictly academic. However, this does not mean that it is unfair to encounter Harari via Pannenberg: For it is not the depth of Harari’s arguments that I am actually concerned about in some instances, but rather the positions he holds (no matter what his arguments for them are). Harari’s Homo Deus represents thereby a genre that makes these positions very accessible, which is the very reason why one can and should address them. 5. While Harari does not mention the terms post- or transhumanism even once, it is clear that he has written Homo Deus with a number of concerns that are informed by trans- and posthumanist concepts. It is likewise clear, however, that Harari’s own position not necessarily qualifies as transhumanistic in particular, as he is quite critical to the potential technology entails for humanity, as in particular the third part of the book demonstrates.

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Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. In Homo Deus Harari lays out what he perceives as the agenda for humanity in the twenty-first century, namely (1) the defeat of death, (2) the striving for happiness, and thereby (3) the transformation of human beings from “homo sapiens” to “homo deus,” the technological advancement of human beings to a degree that was unimaginable a few decades ago. While Harari retells a history of humanity in the first part of the book, in part two he focuses on the meaning that humans give to the world. The final part addresses technology’s outcomes for humanity, depicting at least two versions of human destiny. In telling this “brief history of tomorrow,” as the subtitle suggests, Harari offers a very readable take on a posthumanist version of the twenty-first century, thereby laying open not only the central hopes and concerns for this future, but also some of the central assumptions and arguments within his posthumanist thought. In what follows, I will analyse four topoi within Harari’s history: individual eschatology, anthropology, his view on science, and his view on history as science. Harari’s Eschatology and Anthropology Eschatology is in general concerned with the end of times, or the end of humanity as depicted in various religious sources. Individual eschatology, however, is concerned with the end of individual human beings (most importantly, with the question whether there is hope for life after death), and is therefore an issue of concern in Homo Deus. Now, while Harari’s vista on general eschatology is rather epic,6 his view on individual eschatology is limited more to the issue of death, or the suspension of death: according to Harari, death is always the outcome of a “technical problem,” and for each technical problem there is a technical solution.7 So while during the twenty-first century humans would most probably still remain mortal, for instance, someone might die suddenly in a car accident, decay and death due to the degeneration of aging will possibly be preventable. In addition, while such technological advancement is not possible right now, our age might see the lifespan of human beings being at least doubled–a development that would come with global challenges in all areas of life.

6. See, for instance, the third part of Homo Deus. 7. Yuval N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (New York: Vintage, 2017), 40–1.

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It becomes clear, then, that Harari’s prophesy of prosperity for twenty-first century humanity assumes rather than elaborates on a materialist anthropology. In Homo Deus the term “human” occurs about a thousand times, and Harari clearly defines what a human being is. Humans are particularly powerful animals. He states that “the algorithms controlling humans work through sensations, emotions, and thoughts. And exactly the same kind of algorithms control pigs, baboons, otters, and chickens.”8 Humans are simply the most powerful species in the world9 because they can cooperate in a way that no other species can.10 Beyond that, there is little difference between ourselves and other animals. Only genes, hormones, and neutrons steer our path: “Today, when scholars ask why a man drew a knife and stabbed someone to death…scientists provide a much more detailed answer: the Killer did it due to such-andsuch electrochemical processes in the brain…which in turn reflect ancient evolutionary pressures coupled with chance mutations.”11 Harari concludes that “to the best of our scientific understanding, determinism and randomness have divided the entire cake between them, leaving not even a crumb for ‘freedom’.”12 Harari’s Philosophy of Science and History Are Harari’s assumptions on eschatology and anthropology plausible? He does not defend his beliefs, but rather assumes that there is a certain tension between science and religion. Now, the term “science” occurs about two hundred times throughout Homo Deus, but there is no definition of the term. However, science is referred to as a human enterprise that stands in a critical relationship to religion, and while science is not without flaws, it provides actual knowledge and frees humans from myths. Religion, on the other hand, is a term that also occurs about two hundred times and Harari addresses its connection with science in chapter 5. Religion might have become less important since the scientific revolution, for being religious means to “believe in some system of moral laws that wasn’t invented by humans, but that humans must nevertheless obey.”13 For this reason, Harari believes ultimately that not only Jews, 8. Ibid., 98. 9. Ibid., 139. 10. Ibid., 187. 11. Ibid., 328. 12. Ibid., 382. 13. Harari, Homo Deus, 213.

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but also liberals and socialists, are religious. It becomes evident, here, that Harari’s view on the relationship between science and religion is not simply one of science replacing religion. Rather, Harari develops the concept of a “web of meaning.” He distinguishes objective reality (i.e., reality that influences all humans, no matter whether they believe in it or not, such as gravity) and subjective reality (i.e., phenomena that are sensed only by individuals, such as a headache that cannot be assessed by the doctors). Harari then introduces a third category, i.e. intersubjective entities, for example money, or nationhood: entities that are real only because a lot of people believe in them. Within this category would fall narratives about such entities that become extremely powerful for societies,14 and come to define laws, forces, entities, places.15 What concerns Harari is that these narratives will change at the beginning of the third millennium.16 He states: As human fictions are translated into genetic and electronic codes, the intersubjective reality will swallow up the objective reality and biology will merge with history. In the twenty-first century fiction might thereby become the most potent force on earth, surpassing even wayward asteroids and natural selection. Hence if we want to understand our future, cracking genomes and crunching numbers is hardly enough. We must also decipher the fictions that give meaning to the world.17

For Harari, the importance of history, and his own prophetic history, is paramount. Yet although the web of meaning is inherently connected with (the discipline of) history,18 Harari’s view on the potential of history as a discipline is rather modest, for he states: “This is the best reason to learn history: not in order to predict the future, but to free yourself of the past and imagine alternative destinies.”19 While it is clear that in the bulk of Homo Deus Harari proposes a particular story for the twenty-first century, our concern here is how Harari suggests that one derives knowledge through science: individual humans give some meaning to the world by telling a story that connects the phenomena that occur to them. 14. Ibid., 207. 15. Ibid., 175. 16. Especially in part three Harari addresses the question of humanism and the replacement of the modern covenant (see Harari, Homo Deus, 231). 17. Ibid., 177. 18. Ibid., 173. 19. Ibid., 74.

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A Critical-constructive Engagement with Harari While Homo Deus anticipates a future that may be regarded as quite plausible to some degree, it does make its case by considering both technical progress and materialist anthropology. It stands, therefore, as one example in a number of contributions envisioning a future that is convincing as far as technological development is considered, but much less so when it comes to theological anthropology: Is there nothing more to humans than their communicative skills? Or a higher intellect? One does not have to be a Christian theologian to disagree, but a Christian theologian most likely must disagree. In the following section, I will appropriate the thought of such a Christian theologian, Wolfhart Pannenberg, in order to engage with Harari in a critical yet constructive way. Wolfhart Pannenberg had addressed the central role of anthropology for modernity, one which would have taken over the role that metaphysics played in previous centuries.20 Within such a context, for Pannenberg, theology must prove itself capable anew.21 In the following, I will survey Pannenberg’s view of history, his philosophy of science, his anthropology, and finally his eschatology, and engage with Harari’s position briefly. Ultimately, my argument will be that Pannenberg offers a different approach to theology as a science, and thereby opens the way to a broader vision for the twenty-first century. History Four emphases can be identified in Pannenberg’s early work: the crisis of the scripture principle, the challenge of the finite and the particular, the unintelligibility of God, and the role of history for theology.22 Concerning the latter, we must stress that early in his career, Pannenberg stated that “history is the most comprehensive context of theology.”23 Theology has meaning only within history– a history that God shares with humanity towards a future, which is hidden, but yet revealed

20. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), 5. 21. Wolfgang Schoberth, Einführung in die theologische Anthropologie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006), 101–3. 22. Thiselton, Understanding Pannenberg: Landmark theologian of the Twentieth Century (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2018), 19–20. 23. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Grundfragen systematischer Theologie: Gesammelte Aufsätze, Vol. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 22.

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already in Jesus Christ.24 It has been observed that Pannenberg’s approach to theology can be distinguished not only from the Erlangen school (i.e., by recognizing the methods and results of historical-critical method) and from the theology of Bultmann and Gogarten (i.e., by rejecting their kerygmatic theology, which would ultimately deny historical factuality), but also from what can be interpreted as a Barthian “disinterest of history.”25 Pannenberg contrasts his approach by perceiving history as revelation rather than locating instances of Revelation within history. Pannenberg argues in a twofold manner: first, God does not reveal himself directly, but indirectly; second, God does not reveal himself at the beginning of history, but at the end.26 The paradigm that arises is one of history as a fight of the gods,27 in which only one–the true God–will prove himself beyond doubt in the future.28 Pannenberg states that on the way toward that future, as the revelation of God in his historical action moves towards the still outstanding future of the consummation of history, its claim to reveal the one God who is the world’s Creator, Reconciler, and Redeemer is open to future verification in history, which is as yet incomplete, and which is still exposed, therefore, the question of its truth. This question is given an ongoing answer in the life of believers by the power of revelation to shed light on their life experiences.29

History, thereby, has to be understood from its end. This is why apocalypticism is of importance: For instance, as Thiselton points out, “Pannenberg wrote that one cannot understand Jesus’ claim unless one realizes its presuppositions, namely knowledge of God and the anticipation of the future fulfilment of God’s will on earth.”30 The kingdom of God is the apocalyptic frame for understanding history. So, like Harari, Pannenberg affirms the importance of history, and, like Harari, history comes with the challenge of interpretation. It is this 24. Ibid. 25. Hermann Fischer, Protestantische Theologie im 20. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2002), 164. 26. Fischer, Protestantische Theologie, 165. 27. Roger Olson, The Journey of Modern Theology: From Reconstruction to Deconstruction (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2013), 489. 28. Olson, Journey of Modern Theology, 491. 29. Quoted in Olson, The Journey of Modern Theology, 491. 30. Thiselton, Understanding Pannenberg, 16. See also Jan Rohls, Protestantische Theologie der Neuzeit, Vol. 2: Das 20. Jahrhundert (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), 672–3.

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question, then, that Harari and Pannenberg answer differently: For Harari, it is humans that give meaning to the world. This in turn means that “History isn’t a single narrative, but thousands of alternative narratives.”31 Pannenberg, on the other hand, claims that history has to be understood as (part of the ongoing) revelation of God; that God will emerge only at the end of time, and until then, the drama goes on. Harari and Pannenberg have evidently chosen different points of reference to explain how history should be interpreted. For Harari, it is the individual that gives meaning to the world, for Pannenberg it is the presumption of God and his guidance, from which a historical framework is construed. While the secular reader will immediately challenge Pannenberg’s theocentrism (for instance, because Pannenberg just assumes both God and an end, acknowledging that both can be validated only at some point in the future), Harari’s anthropocentrism does not come without severe challenges either. For it is clear that Harari himself can only tell one of the many stories, and if all humans have to give meaning to the world, meaning itself is ultimately at stake. Furthermore, on a methodological level, it is striking that Harari’s argument embodies what Charles Taylor would probably characterize as another expression of a “closed world structure.” As we live in an immanent frame (i.e., an immanent order, that challenges or neglects the possibility of transcendence),32 accepting the fact that there is no transcendence (and thereby no God) is part of “growing up” by facing the obvious.33 Yet, Taylor emphasizes, the claim that it would be obvious that there is no God, would be in itself a construal. In the end, Harari and Pannenberg both develop a framework for their interpretation of history. Yet who is right? We shall take a brief look at what could be termed their philosophy of science. Philosophy of Science The concern of the philosophy of science is to determine the modes of operation of academic inquiry, its goals and methods, its achievements and limitations.34 For quite some time now, theology has been 31. Harari, Homo Deus, 205. 32. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 542. 33. Taylor, A Secular Age, 588. 34. Gerhard Schurz, Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2014), 11.

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challenged over whether it represents a science at all. Pannenberg was confronted with such claims that are not too different from the claims and opinions of today.35 In his contribution, Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie, Pannenberg did not oppose critical rationalism (as other more conservative theologians did), but rather embraced the critical rationalist’s concern: critical examination, as proposed by Popper, would be a valid approach for a common philosophical foundation of science–as long as it is not (as it is the case in the natural sciences) reduced to hypotheses regarding general rules, but also to singular occurrences. In other words: critical examination of the metaphysical analyses of reality is also possible, for example. So as long as critical examination does not exclude hypotheses about singular occurrences just because they are not repetitive, critical examination is appropriate to Pannenberg.36 Yet, as soon as critical examination includes singular occurrences, metaphysics cannot be excluded from academic discourse, precisely because metaphysical interpretations of reality can be understood as hypotheses that can be critically examined. On the other hand, such examinations will always remain anticipatory, since the proof of God’s reign will occur only at the end of time (see 2.1). Until then, theological statements have to prove themselves valid on the basis of experience as it occurs within religions. Hence, it is the task of theology to critically examine the different hypotheses of religions (e.g., their traditions) in order to establish their reasonableness in relation to reality (e.g., the question of coherence).37 While theological theories must meet philosophical, historical, and hermeneutical requirements,38 an ultimate verification can occur 35. See in particular his first part of Theology and Philosophy of Science, but also his Anthropology. 36. Rohls, Protestantische Theologie der Neuzeit, 824. See also Wolfhart Pannenberg, Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973), 37. 37. Rohls, Protestantische Theologie der Neuzeit, 825. Gunther Wenz affirms that such coherence therefore must reject approaches in which Christian truth-claims are being taking for granted dead on, yet on the other hand can external critiques of Christian teachings by – for instance – experience ignore the limited nature of human existence. As there is a tension between the critique and the constructive tasks of theology, Pannenberg states: “The Christian in particular should trust the content of his faith as much as that the truth of the divine content may enlighten itself, and does not require a safeguarding securing up front.” Gunther Wenz, Wolfhart Pannenbergs Systematische Theologie: Ein einführender Bericht (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 22. 38. As Pannenberg argues for theology as a science, he claims that theology must fulfil the twofold requirement, as every other discipline must as well: theology must stand on the common ground of the sciences for one, and must address its internal structure properly. Pannenberg addresses science as deductive science, as sciencia practica and as positive science. Pannenberg holds, however, that theology must be accounted for

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only at the end of history. Until then, one has to assess which theories are more detailed and more plausible than others. Distinguishing science as a whole from myth (which would not do justice to the demands of rationality and logicism), it would be the particular task of philosophy and theology to transcend the boundaries that mathematics and logic, as well as the “Realwissenschaften” (e.g., natural sciences or cultural sciences), have confined themselves to. Such transcending is necessary, given their goals: the attempt at an all-compassing reflection of “the whole”, the “allness of meaning” (Sinntotalität), which culminates–for philosophy–in theories of the absolute, and–for theology–in the science of God.39 Now, Harari had introduced the “web of meaning” as an extremely powerful phenomenon, by which individuals as well as societies determine their course. This determination, which ultimately also sets the course for humanity as such, often occurs without the awareness of the participants. This is only one of the many reasons that webs of meaning have been, and will continue to be, of the greatest importance for the history of humanity. Pannenberg, on the other hand, speaks of theology as the science of God, as a reflection of the whole. Although Pannenberg ultimately denies a dualism between the natural sciences and humanities, his reference to “Sinntotalität” distinguishes philosophy and theology from other sciences, as they reflect, in particular, on questions of meaning.40 It is clear, then, that both Harari and Pannenberg see their given disciplines as in the business of “explaining the world.” Yet we have already seen that they differ in their understanding of history; most importantly, on what is its center–God or humanity. Now, the crucial question in this subsection is how Harari and Pannenberg assume that their given disciplines develop knowledge. We not only because of “educational reasons”, but also because of the nature of Christianity. While Pannenberg takes a different position than Schleiermacher to some degree, Wenz argues, he would reject theology that treats Christian doctrine axiomatic: “The truth of Christian tradition can function within scientific theology only as a hypothesis,” Pannenberg states. As the Christian faith could not be reduced to a historical factor, one would have to go beyond a merely positivistic understanding of theology: Christian theology is ultimately not a study in Christian religion, but in the truth of God, that even God himself is the true matter of study. In order to avoid the aporia that lead into ideological positivism and a subjectivism of faith, a proper method is required, namely one that measures the given account of theology by its implications. For theology, God can be God only in an indirect, not in a direct way – put differently, God will always be a problem, not a secured item. 39. Wenz, Pannenbergs Systematische Theologie, 27. 40. Wenz, Pannenbergs Systematische Theologie, 25–7.

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see that on a more general level their approaches are quite similar. In both cases, facts are to be structured in such a way as to establish both coherence (among the facts) and direction (answering the quest for meaning). However, what distinguishes Harari from Pannenberg is what each accepts as factual. In other words, Harari does not see which kind of data would justify a theological science, whereas Pannenberg has answered this question in his Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie. While the danger of oversimplification abounds, perhaps one could summarize by saying that for Pannenberg religious experience is the data for theology. So, the difference between Harari and Pannenberg in this respect comes down to the question of whether the result of religious study qualifies as data that theology, in turn, may work with. One would have to show that such religious experience is not possible (and this would have to be an assumption), or show categorically that the theological enterprise of dealing with the related written data cannot be undertaken scientifically. Evidently, most theologians think otherwise. In any case, the burden of proof would lie with those who object. Anthropology Next to his understanding of history on one hand, and of philosophy of science on the other, anthropology is a third major tenet in Pannenberg’s thought. Pannenberg has devoted 275 pages in the second volume of his Systematic Theology to anthropology, but has also produced other books on anthropology alone, one of which, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, runs to more than 500 pages. The former work emphasizes the nature and purpose of humans, their failures and their solutions for human failure, while, in addition to the nature of human beings, the latter also emphasizes the relevance of society and culture. Both in his Systematic Theology as in his book on anthropology, Pannenberg starts from the special place human beings have within creation. Human beings are persons, yet, Pannenberg reminds us, the nature of identity is a quite complex discussion, not only in secular modern thought (Pannenberg interacts, for instance, with G. H. Meads theory of the self,41 and with the philosophical anthropology of Scheler, Plessner, and Gehlen42), but also in the early church (most importantly in the 41. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropologie in theologischer Perspektive (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 2011), 179. 42. Pannenberg, Anthropologie, 32.

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development of the Trinitarian creed). Pannenberg suggests that, unlike animals, humans are “open to the world” (weltoffen, i.e., humans’ “ability to question every given content and condition in the world, and to imagine something beyond any given state of affairs”43). This openness to the world can be identified with self-transcendence,44 and that is why humanity is ready for its ultimate destiny: the relationship with God, fulfilling the calling attached to being created in the image of God (Gottes Ebenbild).45 In other words, as a key feature of theological anthropology Weltoffenheit corresponds to the biblical suggestion that humans are created as a kind of counterpart of God. Being created, the living human body has a soul, as the soul is embodied and unthinkable without such a body.46 It is clear, then, that Pannenberg does not use the term “soul” in the dualist sense, but in the sense of the biblical tradition, i.e. the “bodily being as living.”47 The failure of humanity, however, consists in exploiting the freedom God gave to humanity, turning this freedom into desire,48 that turns out to be egocentrism, perversion, and ultimately the hatred of God.49 Pannenberg states: “The power of sin over us humans rests on the fact that it promises us life, a fuller and richer life. As we have said, this is a deception.”50 The failure of humanity leads to Christology, which, for Pannenberg, is not only the solution to sin, but also the perfection of humanity. For Pannenberg, the transcendent is not distant. Rather, the transcendent is always part of the entirety of creation: animals, for instance, are related to the Spirit of God.51 In fact, Pannenberg does not see humanity as the static crown of creation, but is open to a “post-humanity,” should

43. Timothy Bradshaw, Pannenberg: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark International, 2009), 73. 44. Thiselton, Understanding Pannenberg, 89. See further, Wenz, Pannenbergs Systematische Theologie, 132–5. 45. Wenz, Pannenbergs Systematische Theologie, 137–41 46. Wenz, Pannenbergs Systematische Theologie, 124. See also Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie, 2:213. 47. Bradshaw, Pannenberg, 147. 48. Pannenberg evidently follows Augustine’s approach of sin here. 49. Rohls, Protestantische Theologie der Neuzeit, 836. Wenz contrasts humans excentric, self-transcendent and worldopen nature on the one hand with humans self-related, egocentric, self-reflected nature, construing thereby a ambigousness (‚Zweideutigkeit‘) in human behaviour. Wenz, Pannenbergs Systematische Theologie, 141. 50. Quoted in Thiselton, Understanding Pannenberg, Kindle 2400. 51. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie, vol. 2. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 160.

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humanity eventually evolve further.52 Furthermore, Pannenberg mentions extra-terrestrial life, that, were it ever to be found, would probably need redemption just as humans do.53 What is particularly human, in contrast with other animals, is not that humans are more advanced (or powerful, as Harari puts it), it is that they are open to the world, able to imagine, to see beyond circumstances and conditions.54 However, the context in which the transcendent aspect of humanity becomes most vivid is the area of eschatology, to which, finally, I now turn. Eschatology According to Pannenberg, death is not an aspect of human nature. There is no “natural death,” that can be separated from a “death as judgment” (Gerichtstod).55 In contrast to this death, the resurrection is perhaps the most central Christian hope. However, the question arises as to how this hope can be conceived of in our present age. There would be little plausibility in clinging to the idea of a resurrection that involved revived, leftover material body-parts. Another option could be the separation of body and soul within death, and the continuation of the soul as the means of ongoing life, an approach that would come with the “advantage” of explaining how a bodily identity could be preserved, namely by a blueprint of the individual body within the soul. Now, since Pannenberg also believes that there is time between death and resurrection,56 this issue leads to the topic of general eschatology. For Pannenberg, creation was not set in place in its ultimate state. Rather, it was made to progress to a degree of autonomy (Selbstständigkeit) as part of perfection.57 This process requires time and since during this process the goal of perfection is threatened by sin, not only is a conversion of morale needed, but also a transformation (Umwälzung) of the natural condition

52. Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie, vol. 2., 157–8. 53. Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie, vol 2., 95–6. 54. Openness to the world, then, is a somewhat strange term to Harari, as determination of human decisions is supposed to be his very argument that there is no human soul (See Harari, Homo Deus, chap. 8; in particular, 331). However, his argument is hardly convincing: neither empirical sciences nor biochemical determination of choosing can prove the (non-)existence of a human soul; such attempts must be rejected as category mistakes. 55. Wenz, Pannenbergs Systematische Theologie, 259. 56. Ibid., 260. 57. Ibid., 261.

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of human nature.58 The cosmic renewal of the world includes the resurrection of the dead. Pannenberg here finds a central reason for what he anticipates as an “end of history” sometime in the future.59 Therefore, as in individual eschatology, where the death of a particular person marks the crucial point in time, in general eschatology, where it is the end of history that marks this point, one has to address the problem of the relationship between time and eternity. Wenz addresses this problem as a key issue for eschatology, with significant consequences for all aspects of Christian doctrine.60 The place to tackle this problem is the term of Dauer (timespan): time is evident throughout past, present, and future, but it is all in good hands within God’s eternity.61 Here, Wenz argues, Pannenberg finds an answer to his question of whether individuals participate in God’s presence immediately after death, or only at the end of time. For Pannenberg, both answers would be true, since in the presence of God, both the individual death and the end of time are present:62 the eschaton means the setting aside within eternity.63 Through judgment and cleansing,64 the faithful will participate in the life of God in perfect unity with him and one another, without giving up their distinct and individual personality.65 Conclusion There are numerous reasons to doubt that theology is a science. However, drawing on Pannenberg, I propose that these reasons derive either from malpractice within theology (rather than being inherent to theology as such) or from a too-narrow view of science. Most importantly, one cannot disregard religious experience as the data of the theological enterprise: many other forms of data are confusing, hard to assess, open to interpretation, and so on. Once one accepts that there might be a way forward to the otherwise lost world of the transcendent, Pannenberg can be seen to shed light not only on quests such as those regarding the nature and destiny of humanity, but also on the nature and methodology 58. Wenz, Pannenbergs Systematische Theologie, 261. 59. Ibid., 262. 60. Ibid., 263. 61. Ibid., 265. 62. Ibid. 63. Ibid., 266. 64. Ibid., 266–7. 65. Ibid., 267.

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of the sciences that currently determine how the immanent realm in which we live is construed. What does it mean, then, to be human in a technological age, and what can Christian theology contribute to the current challenges? We have addressed Harari’s contribution as a prophetic history for the twentyfirst century, capturing posthumanist concerns. Harari’s contribution is important as it opens the eyes of a wider audience to the “new normal.” Harari addresses the relevant issues, and one should pay attention to his concerns. At the same time, he is evidently a child of his age, and this age appears to be one that exemplifies the same hubris that societies have displayed before–for instance, in the early twentieth century, when it was assumed that technological progress would bring peace, advancement, and fortune, yet it brought even more war, pain, and death. Now, if, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, humankind has discovered more wonders within the universe, and still not solved a lot of the old puzzles, why should we accept the idea that science has proven the non-existence of a soul? Why should we be content with a materialist anthropology at all? Why should we be satisfied with a life full of randomness and make-belief? And why should we trust someone who puts forward these kinds of notions if he thereby assumes that we are actually masters of our universe, while at the same time spends a whole chapter66 arguing that we are not “masters in our own houses?” All of this is not to discredit the work of Harari, but rather to fulfil our theological task. We are being both critical and constructive while we think beyond the paradigms of the twentieth century, in the process becoming undaunted in our vision: to confront death as the true final frontier, to eventually cross it, and thus make our way into God’s eternity.

66. See Harari, Homo Deus, chap. 8.

Free to be Human in an Age of Technological Necessity: On Being Human in Jacques Ellul’s Theological Ethics JACOB MARQUES ROLLISON

Abstract While Jacques Ellul is renowned for critical analysis of the human effects of technological development, his massive corpus of theological-ethical works have been largely ignored or forgotten. This chapter sketches the ethical theological anthropology displayed in these latter works to examine how Ellul situates being human in a technological age. Ellul sees our time as transitioning from a bourgeoisChristian morality to technical morality, a transition that humans experience as a necessity. In this transition, what it is to be human has come into question, theoretically and practically. Drawing from Ecclesiastes, Ellul uses this instability to remind Christians that their human-ness is as stable as God’s Word to them in Jesus Christ–never less, but never more: humans are relative creatures, valuable in relation to God. This implies criticism of the use of the language of Imago Dei as grounding an intrinsic value for humanity. Instead, considering humanity only in its relation to God in Christ, Ellul employs the Marxist language of alienation to communicate today what he believes “slavery” communicated in Paul’s age. Meditating on Christ’s three temptations, Ellul sees Jesus as acting in free obedience to God against the necessities confronting him in the temptations. Drawing on biblical commands to “be human,” Ellul sees being human as being engaged in dialogue with God, implying that humans use the strength given to them, before God, acting in faith, hope, and love. The result is an ethical theological anthropology, rather than a systematic one: we do not know what we are, but we do know what we are to do.

Both within and outside of France, the twentieth century French sociologist Jacques Ellul is most well-known for his work on technology. Two recent French book titles recognize the prophetic importance of Ellul’s work, suggesting its continued relevance for our contemporary situation. In 2012, journalist Jean-Luc Pourquet published a book called Jacques Ellul, l’homme qui avait presque tout prévu [Jacques Ellul, the Man who Predicted Almost Everything], arguing that most major societal crises and problems in the twenty-first century were foreseeable from the

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perspective detailed in Ellul’s works.1 Then last year, philosopher Éric Sadin’s book L’intelligence artificielle ou l’enjeu du siècle [Artificial Intelligence, or the Wager of the Century] paid clear homage to Ellul’s 1954 study La technique ou l’enjeu du siècle [literally, Technique or the Wager of the Century]. 2 Ellul’s fame in North America largely traces back to the 1964 translation of this work into English as The Technological Society– on the recommendation of Aldous Huxley.3 In this work, Ellul argued that technique, which can be summarized as a rational drive towards ordered efficiency, is the driving factor in the evolution of western society in the twentieth century. Ethically, Ellul thinks humans experience our technological environment as a necessity, an unavoidable element conditioning of all our actions. Indeed, as further evidence of his wellreputed studies of technique, Ellul has been placed alongside major thinkers such as Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault.4 But those who are familiar with Ellul’s sociology are often unaware of his massive corpus of theological writings. Even those acquainted with his theology often neglect his volumes of theological ethics, which represent his most lengthy and substantial theological contribution. This is tragic, because these ethics aim to equip Christians to incarnate their faith in critical dialogue with this increasingly technological world. If we are to follow Paul’s injunction in Romans 12:2 to “not be conformed to the pattern of this world,” Ellul’s sociology offers an inquiry into this pattern. His ethics seek ways to embody faith’s resistance to this conformity, allowing Christians the freedom to obey God instead of blindly following the necessity of technical development. This chapter tries to put these underappreciated ethical resources to use. Far from trying to summarize this mass of material, I will use 1. Jean-Luc Porquet, Jacques Ellul, l’homme qui avait (presque) tout prévu (Paris: Cherche Midi, 2012). 2. Éric Sadin, L’intelligence artificielle ou l’enjeu du siècle: Anatomie d’un antihumanisme radical (Paris: L’échappée, 2018); Jacques Ellul, La technique ou l’enjeu du siècle (Paris: Ed. Economica, 2008). 3. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Vintage Books, 1964). 4. Carl Mitcham lists Ellul alongside Lewis Mumford and Martin Heidegger as exemplars of the humanities philosophy of technology. See Carl Mitcham, “Notes Toward a Philosophy of Meta-Technology,” Techne: Research in Philosophy and Technology 1, no. 1–2 (1995): 3–5; cited in Jacob Van Vleet, Dialectical Theology and Jacques Ellul (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), 78. For a comparison of Ellul to Foucault, see Gilbert Vincent, “Ordre Technique, disciplines et assujettissement selon Jacques Ellul et Michel Foucault,” in La technique et le façonnement du monde: Mirages et désenchantement, ed. Gilbert Vincent (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2007), 129–79.

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sections of To Will and To Do, Ellul’s two-volume introduction to Christian Ethics, and his three-volume Ethics of Freedom, to highlight some contours of the ethical theological anthropology developed therein.5 Specifically, I will show how Ellul’s thought applies the wisdom of Ecclesiastes, resulting in a desacralized and temporal ethical theological anthropology that offers Christians the resources to live as humans in free dialogue with God, rather than describing this lived human dialogue systematically. Situating the Theological-Ethical Task In To Will and To Do, Ellul succinctly describes the precarious place of morality in the mid-twentiethh century West. Morality in contemporary Western society, he notes, contains two principal components. The first component is a bourgeois morality with Christian elements, deriving from our collective inheritances from Christendom and the Reformation, filtered through Enlightenment deism and modern philosophy. The second component is a morality adapted to the world of machines and technological artefacts which has been progressively developing for several centuries. Diagnosing the relation between the two components, he writes: We are witnessing the formation of a new morality, purely technical, in which the elements of the Christian morality contained in bourgeois morality are progressively being eliminated. This technical morality is not yet complete, its constitution is currently in progress; but it is assuredly the morality of tomorrow.6

Ellul wrote this nearly 60 years ago, but I suggest that the conversation embodied in this volume (and at the conference from which this volume springs) is marked by this same moral tension, caught between an ambiguously bourgeois past derived from Christendom and a drive towards an increasingly technological future. It is arguable that many of the changes

5. Jacques Ellul, Le Vouloir et le Faire: Une critique théologique de la morale (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 2013), 210–1. I am currently producing a new translation of this work, which will be published together with a first English translation of its second volume by Wipf & Stock. For this second volume, cf. Jacques Ellul, Les sources de l’éthique chrétienne (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 2018). All citations from these works are my own translations. Jacques Ellul, The Ethics of Freedom, trans. and ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976). 6. Ellul, Le Vouloir et le Faire, 210–1.

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in western morality in the last half-century are progressive adaptations to this technical mindset described by Ellul. The pressing issue facing Christian ethicists is one of knowing how to situate ourselves in this shifting technological landscape. Demonstrating that his goal was careful Christian consideration of the current situation (rather than the pessimistic rejection of technology by which he is often caricatured), Ellul neatly catalogs the available options for addressing this issue:7 …we realize that the present world is characterized by the proliferation of means. And we must adopt a stance towards all this extraordinary power of invention. Means are ordained to ends, which very generally cannot be called “Christian:” power, comfort, happiness, etc. Thus we must ask ourselves if we must reject this immense apparatus wholly and completely; if we should thus orient ourselves towards the creation of specific means, holding nothing in common with what the world offers us; or, on the contrary, if we can enter into the play of these means of the world, taking them up, transposing them, assigning them another sense and another value, thus effectuating a sort of redirection of this prodigious artificial world (created by man with another end in mind) for the benefit of the Lord; or, finally, if we have to make a choice, to sort out these means, holding onto some as adequate for the work of the Church and rejecting others as the expression of wickedness. This is undoubtedly the most serious question which can be asked today. This is the whole problem which Technique represents for Faith.8

In Ellul’s 1977 sociological study The Technological System, he maintains that by the time of his writing, technique has become a milieu englobing humanity, a closed system.9 This offers a hermeneutical insight into the last half-century: since the mid-twentieth century, both the “Human” of the enlightenment and our relation to our own corporeality as a species have seemed progressively less stable. This is especially true in Ellul’s own country of France: a recent volume of French twentieth century intellectual history described a shift in discourse from “critical 7. Ellul himself rejected such a characterization; see Jacques Ellul and Patrick Chastenet, À contre-courant: Entretiens. Nouvelle édition révisée et augmentée (Paris: La Table Ronde, 2014), 75. For a critical defense of Ellul against various misunderstandings of his position, see David Lovekin, Technique, Discourse, and Consciousness: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Jacques Ellul (London: Associated University Presses, 1991), chap. 1, “Ellul and the Critics,” 29–64. 8. Ellul, Les sources de l’éthique chrétienne, 162–3. 9. Jacques Ellul, The Technological System, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2018).

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humanism” to “theoretical anti-humanism,” and placed this shift in the 1960s.10 We might arguably view ever-growing technological modifications of our relations to our own bodies and our environment in recent centuries as a cause of this shifted discourse, and see its present-day manifestations in the instability of our own relation to our bodies. How should Christian theology interpret this instability? Should it try to hold onto this (capital ‘H’) Human? Ethically, applying Ellul’s interrogative approach in the citation above, should we embrace, question, or fight the changes which techno-science implies for our corporeal existence? Relative, but not Unimportant In face of the human instability which marked Ellul’s time, his theological-ethical response uses this instability as a reminder of human finitude, temporality, and limited knowledge. To understand his theologicalethical response, it is helpful to know that the book of Ecclesiastes is at the heart of Ellul’s theology. For over 50 years, Ellul meditated on the book of Ecclesiastes more than any other biblical text. It is therefore not surprising to see that Ecclesiastes’ emphasis on the fleeting temporal nature of human life plays a central role in Ellul’s ethics.11 Specifically, Ellul views Ecclesiastes as a book which ironically subverts everything humans believe they know to be true, confronting them with the limits of their knowledge. For example, Ecclesiastes 11:3 tells us “…whether a tree falls to the south or to the north, in the place where the tree falls, there it will lie.” Recall that this book is traditionally purported to be the work of the wise king Solomon; how strange that the pinnacle of Hebrew wisdom should tell us that “where a tree falls, there it will lie!” For Ellul, the inclusion of such a seemingly obvious and pointless phrase in a book of wisdom should be read as irony. The fact that the height of human “wisdom” is articulated in such a banality shows how little we can really know. In Ellul’s reading, Ecclesiastes desacralizes the world, stripping away the inflated meaning we pridefully 10. Christophe Charle and Laurent Jeanpierre, eds., La vie intellectuelle en France, tome II: De 1914 à nos jours (Paris: Le Seuil, 2016), 470. 11. For Ellul’s reading of Ecclesiastes, see Jacques Ellul, Reason for Being: A Meditation on Ecclesiastes, trans. Joyce Main Hanks (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990). For a reading of Ellul which sees in Reason for Being an outline of the epistemological core of Ellul’s theological ethics, see Jacob Marques Rollison, A New Reading of Jacques Ellul: Presence in the Postmodern World (forthcoming from Lexington Books).

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attribute to our own works, confronting us with our own finite and limited status as free and gracious creatures of God. This process would lead humans to despair over their works, were it not for the presence of God, which Ellul sees as the uniting thread woven throughout the book. If, then, human knowledge is characterized by humble finitude, our knowledge about ourselves should reflect this humility. Our theological anthropology should be temporal, relative, and perhaps shifting with the times (like our bodies and ethics), not absolute and unchanging. This is precisely what we see on display in Ellul’s theological ethics. Alienation: What the Human is not In this light, it is no surprise that Ellul’s theological ethics refuse to talk of “human nature.” When he reflects on both his historical knowledge of different societies, and on the findings of twentieth century sociological and psychological science, Ellul remarks that belief in an unchanging human nature is precisely a matter of faith.12 His thinking clearly rejects metaphysical or ontological definitions of what humanity is. Along these lines, he criticizes Calvin for having inserted the philosophy of human nature of his time into his theology.13 Faith in a static humanity is not the same as faith in an eternal God. Ellul’s inquiry sees such a static human nature as precisely an external philosophical construction which we apply to our readings of the Bible, and not as inherent to biblical thinking. Indeed, in his reading, understanding humanity (or anything in Creation, for that matter) metaphysically or ontologically is to try to understand it outside of its relation to God, and that is revealed in its fulness to be Jesus Christ himself (we will return to this below.) We can say then, that Ecclesiastes gives Ellul biblical reasons to set his anthropology apart from the “Human” of the enlightenment. It is important to note that Ellul viewed himself as much more of a sociologist, an historian, and an ethicist than a philosopher, or even a theologian. His whole thinking aimed at considering human life as it is and was lived, rather than expressing it in an ideal or a formula. Consequently, to talk of an Ellulian “theological anthropology” is perhaps already too systematic to describe his work. In The Ethics of Freedom, Ellul takes up the theme of alienation as describing the condition of humanity without Christ in the twentieth 12. Ellul, Le Vouloir et le Faire, 71. 13. Ibid., 25.

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century.14 While his purpose is to “update” the Pauline language of slavery and redemption, this is not because modern humanity has progressed beyond these categories and they are no longer meaningful. Rather, their meaning for Paul was linked to a concrete situation in their life that gave them a living and visceral communicative force for first-century ears. Adapting the Marxist language in vogue in France at the time, Ellul proposes alienation to viscerally and concretely communicate today what the word slavery likewise communicated in Paul’s time. Refusing to separate spiritual and physical dimensions, Ellul notes that slaves in Paul’s time did not belong to themselves, having ceased to exist as an independent entity. They were reduced to property, body and soul. Importantly, they were no longer themselves; they were recognized only as objects. Ellul sees this as true in Marx’s thought as well: Marx saw human action as integrated in a system of abstract global forces which Ellul equally views as an element of alienation. For Ellul, the growth of techniques and technological elements in society represents a primary expression of this abstraction and mediation, which condition human life and distance humanity from themselves. While Paul’s slave was sold to a concrete slaveowner, Ellul’s alienated human is lost in a labyrinth of impersonal technical processes.15 According to Ellul, these processes condition human action as necessity. “Necessity” here must be heard ethically, as something which conditions action, not as a metaphysical determination.16 Ellul thus notes that human alienation in technical necessity is more complex and nuanced than ideas such as “fate” or “destiny.” “Necessity” implies that humanity experiences technical processes as something practically imposed, as something they cannot rebel against–even if we might maintain “objectively,” as it were, that they could choose to behave otherwise. Ellul uses necessity to refer to a qualitative element which is not explicable simply by the logic of a situation. At this point, it must be asked: to what extent is Ellul simply renarrating technique as an expression of biblical sin? Ellul addresses this 14. This section summarizes elements of Ellul, The Ethics of Freedom, chap. 1, 23–50. 15. For more on Ellul’s reading of Marx, see Jacob Rollison, “Hope, Prophecy, and Prediction in Jacques Ellul’s Christian Realism,” in Driven by Hope: Economics and Theology in Dialogue, ed. Steven C. van den Heuvel and Patrick Nullens, Christian Perspectives on Leadership and Social Ethics 6 (Leuven: Peeters 2018), 95–106, especially 96–9. 16. Ellul, The Ethics of Freedom, 37–47.

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in the Ethics of Freedom, noting that unless we separate the physical and the spiritual, sin must manifest itself in certain forms. Israel’s real slavery in Egypt, for example, is not mere metaphor, but is closely linked with their spiritual condition; God’s liberation was just as political and physical as anything else. Ellul writes: “man’s sinful condition before God is not just an inward and personal affair. It necessarily finds expression in collective action, in participation in all the structures and forces of social, economic, and political life.”17 Ellul thus sees at least a correspondence between what the Bible describes as the sinful human condition and “the findings of psycho-sociology, i.e., with man’s alienation and determinations.”18 But in tandem with his refusal of ontology and metaphysics as beyond the purview of human knowledge (as outlined above, he carefully avoids making sin essential or metaphysical. For Ellul, “To ask whether man is free apart from grace is not to talk of freedom in the way that scripture does…What separates man from God is not fate; it is sin.”19 All this combines to mean that the instability of the capital-H “Human” in Ellul’s times was very important–not philosophically, but because it reflected the instability and changes wrought on the patterns and rhythms of human life by their growing and changing technical milieu. Now we will turn to see how his ethics addressed this concrete situation theologically. Redemption into Freedom In theological dialogue with Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and many others, Ellul refused to consider the human outside of Jesus Christ. To think of humans in themselves would be to think “under the sun,” (in Ecclesiastes’ phrase); humanity would be ultimately marked for death. As everything is vanity under the sun, this thinking would lead to despair–were it not for God’s presence. As we have seen that God’s presence cannot be integrated in our theology as a formula, neither can it be considered an intrinsic part of who we are. Again, we see that in addition to refusing a metaphysical definition for the human, Ellul refuses an ontological definition as well. Instead, humanity is what it is

17. Ellul, The Ethics of Freedom, 50. 18. Ibid., 49. 19. Ibid., 79.

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by virtue of the present lordship of Jesus Christ, who is himself humanity’s relation to God. In the Ethics of Freedom, our liberation from necessity into freedom is accomplished in Jesus Christ. Ellul meditates on the three temptations of Christ, suggesting that in these temptations, Jesus overcame the totality of necessities which imposed themselves on him. In these tempting “necessities,” that which on its own is a simple element of human life takes on an extraordinary weight, imposing itself on Jesus and claiming ultimate importance. Jesus’ freedom consists in refusing to live according to these necessities, giving the Word of God priority instead. For example, of the first temptation, Ellul writes: “The temptation is to say, not that man does not live by bread alone, but that he lives primarily or essentially by bread.”20 This situates our discussion of technology theologically: the temptation is to say, not that humans have altered their environment and bodies in a powerful way that affects their life, but in an idolatrous elevation of this technology into their very being, that these alterations give them life, meaning, and hope for the future. In strong language, Ellul writes: In my view the application of Psalm 8 to technology is a precise example of falling into the first temptation… The worst feature here is that Jesus Christ is himself used to restore worth to ourselves, to validate what we do, not as believers, but simply as men. For when by means of a Christocentric theology we confer on mankind restoration to man’s first estate, we confer it on ourselves. We do this when we…allege that (in Christ) technology is simply a fulfillment of man’s God-given vocation to exploit the earth, to till Eden, and to deplenish the riches of creation in so doing. All these are Christian ways of yielding to the temptation of Satan and of thus becoming representatives of Satan on earth.21

Taken in light of Ellul’s reading of Ecclesiastes above, we see that his approach to technology is one of desacralization: he takes what is often seen as a source of hope and life and strips it down to its humble status as a human creation among others–not worthless, but of properly relative value. However (and perhaps more controversially in some evangelical circles), this necessarily implies a certain position on the interpretation of the language of Imago Dei. While some may want to see the Imago Dei as the ground for the intrinsic value of the human being in 20. Ibid., 54. 21. Ibid., 54, 58.

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itself, Ellul’s relational approach emphasizes that Jesus is the image of the invisible God (as in Colossians 1:15); and just as Jesus is hidden from us now, so are we: “you have died, and your life is hidden with Christ in God. When Christ who is your life is revealed, then you also will be revealed with him in glory.” (Col. 3:3). To take this seriously in our anthropology means that for now, to some extent, we must remain a mystery to ourselves. For Ellul, to define an intrinsically valuable human nature is inherently idolatrous–so much more precisely because it takes God’s Word and treats it as the foundation of a human philosophy. Instead, the ethical task of theological anthropology is to avoid defining the human so much that it erases this hopeful expectation of our revealing along with Christ’s own. Ellul leaves us not with a metaphysical or ontological anthropological human, but with us, the humans who exist, confronted with the presence of God in our lives. “Be human!”–Called to be Human in Free Dialogue with God But there is more to say about this mysterious human creature that we are in Christ. Following Karl Barth, the spoken commandment of God is a central element in Ellul’s ethics. For Ellul, God’s present address makes us what we are. Much as Ellul sees Christ in the Gospels calling people away from the crowd, this address separates us from being a mass of undifferentiated people, making us into individuals in community.22 Our entire life is our response to this command. In this way, dialogue with God defines the human that we are over time–not philosophically but actually, in the contours of our lives following the call and command of Christ. Specifically, in volume two of The Ethics of Freedom, Ellul highlights a group of biblical passages which command us to “be human.” On his deathbed, David tells Solomon to “be strong, be a man, and observe what the Lord your God requires.” (1 Kings 2:1-3) In Isaiah 46, God tells his people to “be men.” In 1 Corinthians (16:13), Paul commands them to “be men, strengthen yourselves.” Citing 2nd Timothy, Ellul writes: “‘We have received a spirit of force,’ and we are called to be men. What does this mean?” Examining the contexts of these and other

22. See Ellul, Les sources de l’éthique chrétienne, chap. 2, “Une éthique pour la personne,” 73–86, and chap. 3, “Une éthique commune,” 87–96.

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similar verses, Ellul finds a few common theme linked to this command to “be men,” to “be human.”23 First, being human is linked to being strong, to exercising one’s force. There is a certain strength, a vigor or fortitude which we possess in our bodies; we are thus called to employ it. In discussion with Bonhoeffer, Ellul affirms a specifically human level of strength, which we are to accept freely: we should not seek to become Nietzschean supermen, nor be ashamed of what is given to us. Second, this strength is to be exercised before God. Ellul writes: “One cannot be a man outside of the relation established by the grace of God between this rebel sinner and this demanding God…There is no ‘Be a man’ without a Gospel which reveals that it is possible for us to be men.”24 We are to willfully and fully inhabit the forms which God has given us as his creatures. But make no mistake: this command to “be what we are” is not a return to the original Edenic creation. We have seen that this ethic is not “ontological,” nor is it “natural,” for what we are is formed by God’s call in Christ.25 “Before God” also implies that we put an end to idolatry and forsake false gods. Recalling what we have seen in Ecclesiastes, these idols and false gods include the works of our hands which we invest with spiritual meaning. Among these, Ellul includes “Money, the State, Science, History, the Nation, Technique, Politics, and Comfort.” The relation to God calls us to repent of our sins and our misdirected worship; “being human” implies that we refuse to worship the works of our hands, to attribute to them attributes and roles which God claims for himself. Third, in Paul’s use of this command, Ellul sees that we are to live in faith, hope, and love. The presence of these three theological virtues is visible in the typical French translation of 1 Cor. 16:13 which Ellul often cited, that reads something like: “Be on your guard; stand firm in the faith; be men; strengthen yourselves. Let all that you do be done with love.”26 Ellul links the vigilance of being “on guard” to hope. He writes: “Vigilance is thus the point where the hope of Christ’s return, hope of 23. This paragraph draws on Jacques Ellul, Éthique de la liberté, tome II (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1973), 71–3. All citations from this work are my own translation. 24. Ellul, Éthique de la liberté, tome II, 74. 25. For Ellul, Christian ethics is based neither in Edenic creation nor in the New Jerusalem to come, but exclusively in the present. See Ellul, Les sources de l’éthique chrétienne, chap. 8, 165–84. 26. This is my English translation of the verse from the French Louis Segond translation.

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the Resurrection, and the vision projected into the mystery of the last things meet with the energy of man who must use his own strength to keep his eyes open.”27 Ellul reads “standing firm in the faith,” as implying mastery and limitation, a capacity for resistance against the forces which might shake this firmness. Concretely, this means the ability to refuse our own desires, to not do everything that we can do. But this selfcontrol (which is a fruit of the Holy spirit) is not autonomy; from beginning to end, it is an exercise of the authority which Christ has over us.28 And regarding “love,” Ellul notes the emphasis on doing: in this text, love implies action, and is unknowable apart from lived engagement. It is thus plain to see that, far from giving an ideal image of what the human is, Ellul finds commands for what our attitude ought to be. Thus, in Ellul’s ethical theological anthropology, we do not know what we are, but we do receive general guidelines for how to approach our bodies in light of God’s word. In obedience to Christ’s onward call, what we are will be revealed at the right time. Summary and Conclusion To summarize my argument: Jacques Ellul’s sociology of the modern world sees technique as the driving factor in the development of western society. Ethically, this situates humanity in the tension between an old bourgeois morality derived from Christendom and the rise of a morality of necessity conformed to this technological society. In his theological analysis of this situation, Ellul employs the Marxist term alienation as a diagnosis of the modern human condition and he believes it communicates, in the modern context, the Pauline idea of slavery. His theological framework, situated in Ecclesiastes, rejects metaphysical and ontological considerations of this situation; ethically, technique is perceived as a necessity. Only the gracious presence of God in Jesus Christ overcomes our necessity and alienation, leaving us free to be human in lived dialogue with God. The command to “be human” implies that we will employ our human strength to live in faith, hope, and love before God. In this reading, if this command is obeyed, then we will be human, and what is “human” will thus be knowable after the fact, as it were; if we do not obey this command, nothing we do on our own can assure our own “humanity.” 27. Ellul, Éthique de la liberté, tome II, 77. 28. Ibid., 78.

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These brief sketches of Ellul’s ethical theological anthropology are precisely that–brief sketches. His five published volumes of ethics naturally offer much more clarity. Ellul’s wager is that freedom from technological necessity only exists in God’s presence. What we find in Ellul is not a model to imitate, nor a systematic definition to construct, but a prophetic call to stand on our feet, open our ears and eyes, and look for God’s presence, even in our technological hic et nunc.

A Text from the Heart: Comparing Empathy and Text Messages with Paul’s Communication with the Corinthians in 2 Corinthians 1-7 H. H. DRAKE WILLIAMS, III

Abstract Technology is affecting the ways that many communicate emotions. One important emotion in modern society is empathy. Text messages that incorporate emoticons and emojis have been seen to communicate emotion ambiguously while studies also indicate that people are becoming more isolated through modern means of communication. Ancient documents provide a means of comparison of the way in which emotion is communicated and in the growing field of examining emotion in these texts, empathy is a candidate for consideration. Paul’s letter of 2 Corinthians provides an example of the expression of empathy. Characteristics of the communication from ancient texts provide a means of reconsidering ways to communicate empathy in modern communication.

Technology is increasingly changing the ways in which people communicate. The modern age has provided unique ways to communicate with each other that have no historical precedent. One of the most recent, common, and popular is text messages. According to GSMA intelligence, 5,035,000,000 (5.035 billion) people send texts. Approximately 97% of smartphone owners text regularly, especially the younger generation.1 The median number of texts sent by American teens was 60 per day. The text message is a widely used means to transfer data in the world today.2 1. GSMA Intelligence, “Number of Unique Subscribers Worldwide hits Five Billion,” June 15, 2017, accessed April 2, 2019, https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/ research/2017/06/number-of-unique-mobile-subscribers-worldwide-hits-five-billion/624/. 2. Alex Cocatas, “Chart of the Day: Kids Send A Mind Boggling Number Of Texts Every Month,” Business Insider, March 22, 2013, accessed February 12, 2019, https:// www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-number-of-texts-sent-2013-3. In contrast, young people are having a greater aversion to picking up a phone and calling. Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 204–6.

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While text messages provide benefits, societal critics have urged the evaluation of the means in which we communicate with each other in a technological age. In 1964 in his book, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, Marshall McLuhan coined the phrase, “the medium is the message.” By this he meant that the way in which we communicate affects what is being said. The medium itself shapes as well as controls “the scale and form of human association and action.”3 At this time, his concern was the movie.4 Several years later in 1992, Jewish sociologist Neil Postman urged his readers to evaluate technology in his book Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology. In his work he made the point that western society has moved from being technologically influenced to becoming a technological monopoly, namely a technopoly. He admonished his readers not to accept technology but also to evaluate its consequences, particularly since technology can destroy the vital aspects of humanity. He declared, “it creates a culture without moral foundation, and reorders our fundamental assumptions about the world at large … the uncontrolled growth of technology destroys the vital sources of our humanity.”5 More recently in 2005, Sherry Turkle, also called for an evaluation of technology and communication. In her book The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit, she writes. “Technology catalyzes changes not only in what we do but in how we think … It offers the illusion of companionship.” In her book, she also discusses how the use of the computer affects the way that we as human beings think, and she urges proper evaluation.6 It is the goal of this chapter to evaluate the text message in relation to the emotion of empathy and compare it with empathy as found in Paul’s correspondence with the Corinthians and specifically in 2 Corinthians 1-7. Empathy is attracting more attention in modern society. Several have spoken about its importance, including Barack Obama.7 3. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 9. 4. Of course, at that time, he could have never expected the explosion of new digital means to communicate in our modern world. The world of email, Twitter, Facebook, and other forms of media like the text message were never in his mind, but they are key means of communication in our current world. 5. Neil Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology (New York: Random House, 1993), xii. 6. Sherry Turkle, The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 7–12, 155–82. 7. In a graduation message at the University of Massachusetts in Boston, he said, “Empathy is a quality of character that can change the world–one that makes you understand that your obligations to others extend beyond people who look like you and act

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While text messages have obvious benefits in communicating information, concerns have arisen regarding their ability to communicate emotion and also empathy. The chapter will explore this particular emotion in relation to text messages. It will compare this with empathy as found in Paul’s ancient correspondence with 2 Corinthians. Empathy and Text Messages Empathy is a complex emotion, involving the perception of understanding and the ability to identify with another. In the Encyclopedia of Social Psychology, empathy is defined in this way, “Understanding another person’s experience by imagining oneself in that other person’s situation: One understands the other person’s experience as if it were being experienced by the self, but without the self actually experiencing it. A distinction is maintained between self and other.”8 As Susan Lanzoni defines empathy in her book Empathy: a History, she notes that it involves understanding of another. She notes the movement that takes place between self and another that builds boundaries but also a bridge. Empathy is paradoxical. An empathetic person is able to project oneself to be something other than himself. It is then concerned with understanding and communicating that understanding to another.9 Clarification of what empathy means has been significantly developed in the past century. It has been differentiated from sympathy, which means having sorrow for someone else’s experience. Instead, empathy involves being able to appreciate the feelings of another, by building a bridge yet maintaining a boundary. Empathy is also differentiated from the projection of one’s feelings upon another. For empathy to be taking place, the emotion should be understood as the other would wish it to be understood. It can be expressed by individuals and also groups.10 In recent years, modern communication has provided unique opportunities and challenges for the communication of empathy. Speed of like you and live in your neighborhood.” Barack Obama, “University of Massachusetts at Boston Commencement Address,” Obama Speeches, June 2, 2006, accessed August 25, 2019, http://obamaspeeches.com/074-University-of-Massachusetts-at-BostonCommencement-Address-Obama-Speech.htm. For others see Susan Lanzoni, Empathy: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 3–8. 8. Sara D. Hodges and Michael M. Myers, “Empathy,” in Encyclopedia of Social Psychology, ed. Roy F. Baumeister and Kathleen D. Vohs (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2007), 1:297–8. 9. Susan Lanzoni, Empathy, 17. 10. Ibid., 3, 46–67, 158–89.

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communication has increased with the Internet and mobile phones, and unlike prior generations, people can be connected in ways never before available. Emotions are being expressed in ways that have been impossible in the past. Social media frequently contains emojis or emoticons and is also a popular means of communicating. According to Swyft Media, 74% of Americans regularly use stickers, emoticons or emojis in their online communication. Americans send an average of 96 emojis or stickers per day.11 Emoticons and emojis are used for the expression of emotion, for conveying humor, and for strengthening the message. Various studies provide different conclusions for the way that emotion is measured in social media. On the one hand, several studies suggest how emojis and emoticons can enhance meaning within communication by text message. For example, in a study of secondary school students in Heerlen, Netherlands, on the impact of emoticons on computer-mediated communication, there were several findings. Results from this study show that emoticons do have an impact on message interpretation. They are useful in adding intensity to the message which they accompany. A positive message that was accompanied by an emoticon with a smile was considered more positively than a positive message without the emoticon. Likewise, a negative message with a supporting frown was considered more negative than without the emoticon.12 On the other hand, several studies have concluded that the use of emojis and emoticons in modern social media have the potential to create ambiguity. In the same study in Heerlen, the Netherlands, a negative message coupled with a smile emoticon was found to be more ambiguous than either a negative or positive message alone. A positive message coupled with a frowning emoticon was more ambiguous than either a positive or verbal message alone. In a subsequent study on emoticons in relation to Twitter, similar findings were discovered. When emoticons were attached to Tweets, they could serve as predictors of the sentiment of the emotion in the Tweet. At points, however, they could leave the sentiment of the communication in doubt, thereby prohibiting

11. Courtney Seiter, “The Psychology of Emojis,” The Next Web, June 23, 2015, accessed April 2, 2019, https://thenextweb.com/insider/2015/06/23/the-psychology-ofemojis/. 12. See further Daantje Derks, Arjan E. R. Bos, and Jasper von Grumbkow, “Emoticons and Online Message Interpretation,” Social Science Computer Review 26, no. 3 (2008): 385–7.

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empathy.13 Accurate appraisal of another’s feelings when a sender uses emoticons is unclear, as other critics have also stated.14 Besides the possible inaccuracies through the use of emoticons and text messages, it has been noted that computer messaging can cause further isolation, thereby inhibiting empathy. Loneliness has recently been recognized as a side effect.15 In her book, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from technology and less from each other, MIT Professor Sherry Turkle notes that people can be tethered together but be absent from each other at the same time. This may take place when one is on the train seated next to another person, in a waiting room, but even at the dining room table. Instead of acknowledging the person who might be rubbing up against one’s shoulder, many are buried in textual dialogue with another on a smart phone who may be many kilometers away. Other times, one can be connected via modern technology but can mark oneself as being absent. Ironically, the modern technology that connects us to some instantaneously also distances us from others. Communication by text message, in particular, has the possibility of allowing one’s focus to be elsewhere.16 The use of social media communication has also been linked to the decrease of empathy in a study conducted among a sample of 72 college students. Psychologist Sara Konrath has suggested that among American university students in the past twenty years, empathy levels have dropped by 40%. She compares university students from the late 1970s and early 1980s to those from the 1990s and 2000s. In the past 10 years, an

13. Marina Boia et al., “A :) is worth a Thousand Words: How People Attach Sentiment to Emoticons and Words in Tweets,” in Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Social Computing (Washington: IEEE Computing Society, 2013), 345–50; See also Rick Nauert, “Twitter Tweets, Texting May Lack Compassion,” Psychcentral, April 14, 2009, accessed April 2, 2019, https://psychcentral.com/news/2009/04/14/ twitter-tweets-texting-may-lack-compassion/5317.html. 14. See further examples in Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age (New York: Penguin, 2015), 189–90; Naomi S. Baron, Always On: Language in an Online and Mobile World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 31–44. Cf. Lulu Garcia-Navarro, “When You Want To Express Empathy, Skip The Emoji,” NPR, February 27, 2016, accessed August 22, 2019, https://www.npr. org/2016/02/27/468297172/when-you-want-to-express-empathy-skip-the-emoji. 15. Cf. Hugh Gusterson and Catherine Besteman, The Insecure American: How We Got Here and What We Should Do About It (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009). 16. Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 211–64.

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especially large drop has taken place.17 She is not surprised that the increase in electronic communication robs emotion from its participants who are from the younger age levels. As modern society has increased the speed and ability with which we can communicate with each other, the younger generation is finding itself lonelier than before. Commenting further on the emotion of empathy, Sherry Turkle also mentions how the phone, as a device, can itself impede empathy. Even without it ringing or buzzing, the mere presence of a cell phone has been seen to change the way people communicate. Westerners reach for their phones frequently. Nokia has pointed out that on average an American turns to a cell phone every six and a half minutes.18 Once turned on, studies have shown that open screens diminish the ability to communicate.19 Screens provide a means by which people can escape. Conversations become more shallow due to the potential for interruption.20 If a suspicion exists of being interrupted, people generally keep conversations lighter and engage with conversations that have lesser weight. Even a silent phone has the power to disconnect, sacrificing connection and also empathy.21 The evaluation of a May 2018 survey from the global health service company CIGNA can also be linked to social media and the effects of isolation. In conjunction, CIGNA and IPSOS surveyed more than 20,000 U.S. adults ages 18 years and older, with the following results. Nearly half of Americans report sometimes or always feeling alone (46 percent) or left out (47 percent). One in four Americans (27 percent) rarely or never feel as though there are people who really understand them.

17. Psychologist Sara Konrath collated evidence from 72 studies for this finding. Sara H. Konrath, Edward H. O’Brien, and Courtney Hsing, “Changes in Dispositional Empathy in American College Students over Time: A Meta-Analysis,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 15, no. 2 (2011): 180–98. 18. Ben Spencer, “Mobile Users Can’t Leave their Phones Alone for Six Minutes and Check it up to 150 Times a Day,” Mail Online, February 11, 2013, accessed April 2, 2019, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2276752/Mobile-users-leave-phoneminutes-check-150-times-day.html. 19. Faria Sana, Tina Weston, Nicholas J. Cepeda. “Laptop Multitasking Hinders Classroom Learning for both users and nearby peers,” Computers and Education 62 (2013): 24–31. 20. Andrew K. Przybyliski and Netta Weinstein, “Can You Connect with Me Now? How the Presence of Mobile Communications Technology Influences Face-to-Face Conversation Quality,” Journal of Social and Personal Relationships (2012): 1–10. 21. Sherry Turkle, Reclaiming Conversation, 21.

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Only around half of Americans (53 percent) have meaningful in-person social interactions, such as having an extended conversation with a friend or spending quality time with family, on a daily basis. Generation Z (adults ages 18-22) is the loneliest generation and claims to be in worse health than older generations. 22

What Turkle notices from results such as these, is that loneliness is high among the age group where one would expect to find greater connection. While this may not be directly linked to text messages, the generation of adults between 18 and 22 is the one that is most apt to be using text messages and other forms of technological communication. Besides being lonely, Turkle’s examination of text messaging and other modern means of technological communication finds that emotional development is recognized to be lower in the younger generation, the one that is most apt to be using text messages and other forms of digital communication. Thus, this brief investigation of text messages has noted several points with regard to empathy. Text messages are being used frequently. They are short messages and frequently contain emojis or emoticons. Some reports have found that, due to the ambiguity of emoticons and emojis and the brevity of text messages, the ability to communicate and understand accurately another person’s feelings has been limited, and some studies associate isolation and declining levels of empathy for those using text messages frequently.23 Evaluating Empathy within 2 Corinthians Until this point, the examination of emotions has been focused on their evaluation in modern times. This chapter turns now to the examination of emotions in 2 Corinthians, an ancient text. This letter will be considered in relation to empathy and the conclusion will draw a comparison 22. Ellie Polak, “New Study Shows that Loneliness is at Epidemic Levels in America,” Cigna, January 24, 2019, accessed January 24, 2019, https://www.cigna.com/newsroom/news-releases/2018/new-cigna-study-reveals-loneliness-at- epidemic-levels-in-america. See also Mark W. Becker, Reem Alzahabi, and Christopher J. Hopwood, “Media Multitexting is Associated with Symptoms of Depression and Social Anxiety,” Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking 16, no. 2 (2013): 132–5. 23. Cf. Naomi S. Baron, “Emojis don’t give Meaning to our Deepest Feelings: We need more than Smiley Faces and Frowny Faces to Avoid Misunderstanding,” Zocalo, August 7, 2017, accessed August 22, 2019, https://www.zocalopublicsquare. org/2017/08/07/emojis-dont-give-meaning-deepest-feelings/ideas/nexus/.

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between text message communication and this one letter from the Apostle Paul. Study of emotions in ancient texts is a field that has been receiving greater attention.24 While cultural forces can affect the understanding of emotion, several universal aspects can be determined about them. These include the following components: cognitive, feeling (referring to an emotional experience), motivation (consisting of action tendencies or state of readiness), somatic (consisting of central and peripheral psychological responses), and motor (consisting of expressive behavior such as facial expressions).25 While some investigators may omit one or two of the categories and may rearrange them, these are generally agreed upon. Certain of these elements will be impossible to consider for an ancient text, however. One cannot evaluate how the audience was physically feeling or see their facial expressions. Also, one cannot evaluate how an ancient letter impacted the recipients at the moment it was received. Ancient emotional investigation can be directed to the stimulus (object), appraisal (evaluation), and action tendency. Focusing on these elements can be further considered in 2 Corinthians as it has been considered in other biblical texts as well as ancient texts.26 The examination of empathy now shifts to an investigation of certain sections of 2 Corinthians.27 This is the most emotionally laden letter associated with Paul. Focus will be placed on the emotion of empathy within the first seven chapters of the letter.28 24. E.g., Angelos Chaniotis, ed. Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2012); Angelos Chaniotis and Pierre Ducrey, eds. Unveiling Emotions II: Emotions in Greece and Rome: Texts, Images, Material Cultur, Heidelberger Althistorische Beitrage und Epigraphische Studien 55 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2013); Ed Sanders and Matthew Johncock, eds., Emotion and Persuasion in Classical Antiquity (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2016). 25. Agnes Moors, “Theories of Emotion Causation: A Review,” Cognition and Emotion 23 (2009): 626. 26. Angelos Chaniotis, “Unveiling Emotions in the Greek World: Introduction,” in Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World, ed. ibid (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2012), 11–36. This method follows that of Katherine M. Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter, Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series 173 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 26–36. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 24–32. 27. For further discussion regarding Paul and his relationship with the Corinthians through the writing of 2 Corinthians see Paul W. Barnett, The Corinthian Question: Why did the Church Oppose Paul? (Nottingham: Apollos, 2011), 53–194; 28. The study of 2 Corinthians must contend with the unity of the letter. The most common division point is between 2 Corinthians 1-9 and 10-13. Another common

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Paul’s History with the Corinthians Before examining this emotion within specific sections of 2 Corinthians, it is valuable to have in mind a context for the letter. Paul came to Corinth and founded the church approximately seven years prior to writing 2 Corinthians, in approximately 49 CE. Following the events listed in Acts 18:1-18, he left the church to move on to other cities but kept an active communication with the Corinthian church on his travels. Several of these correspondences have been preserved in the New Testament in 1 and 2 Corinthians, but some are not extant. What has been preserved about Paul’s conversation with the Corinthians is found in 1 and 2 Corinthians, but it is generally agreed that Paul wrote at least four letters.29 Following his departure from Corinth, several events stirred up the congregation. A fellow minister named Apollos visited the church. He was an eloquent preacher and knew the Scripture (Acts 18:24). Sometime between 52-54 CE, Paul wrote a letter correcting problems at the church. Unfortunately, this letter is not extant. The contents of it can be seen in 1 Corinthians 5:9-11.30 While emotions cannot be directly seen in the witness to this lost letter in 1 Corinthians, Paul warns about associating with the immoral, the greedy, robbers, or idolaters. This may illustrate some of the tension already found between Paul and the Corinthians. His next letter, which is known as 1 Corinthians, derived from two situations. Paul received a letter and a report from the church in Corinth while he was still in Ephesus in 55 CE. Questions were asked about several different topics, including marriage and divorce, the conduct of weak and strong brothers, the role of women in worship, and then about spiritual gifts. About that same time, Paul also received a report from Chloe’s people that there was envy and jealousy among them (1 Cor 1:11). While these letters are not preserved, both speak to the volatile situation at Corinth. In 55 CE, Paul wrote 1 Corinthian in response to these two letters.

dividing point between chapters 7 and 8 and then also 9 and 10. This study will limit itself to chapters 1 through 7 due to space considerations. For discussion about the integrity of the letter see Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), 8–50. 29. See Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 54–66. 30. Paul W. Barnett, The Corinthian Question, 75–6.

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Following this letter, Paul returned to his work in Ephesus with the expectation that he would travel to Corinth with the collection (1 Cor 16:5–8). Meanwhile, he sent Timothy to Corinth in his place (1 Cor 16:10–11; cf. Acts 19:22). When Timothy arrived there, he found that the problems were much greater than anticipated. These likely came from people outside of Corinth who had crept into the church. As a result, Paul decided to visit Corinth immediately. His plan would then be to continue on to Macedonia and return for a second visit on his way to Jerusalem (2 Cor 1:15–16). He was anticipating that when he arrived at Corinth, a second experience of grace would take place and that the sincerity of his conduct would be proved. Instead of exonerating Paul, this visit turned into what is known as the “painful visit” (2 Cor 2:1). A group of false leaders had infiltrated the church and were later called by Paul “super apostles” (2 Cor 11:5). They were of Jewish origin, liked to boast, and carried with them letters of recommendation (2 Cor 3:1; 11:13–15). They were not apostles in the way that Paul was, proclaiming the death and resurrection of Christ but were more likely agents of others who commissioned them and were greatly affected by the surrounding Hellenistic culture. Paul believed that, as a result of their influence, the gospel message–as well as his authority–was being called into question. One of the leaders even severely criticized Paul himself (2 Cor 2:5–8; 7:8–13; 11:4). Paul then left Corinth for Ephesus while the Corinthians revolted against his apostolic authority (2 Cor 1:23–2:5; 7:12). By them so doing, he fell into disgrace. He chose not to retaliate but instead extended mercy to the Corinthians (2 Cor 1:23–24). This left him open to criticism (2 Cor 1:16–17). He then decided to send Titus back to Corinth with his next letter to the Corinthians. This letter is known as the “severe letter” since it was written out of great distress (2 Cor 2:4). It has also been called the “letter of tears,” the “tearful letter,” the “sorrowful letter,” and the “painful letter.” The aim of the “severe letter” was to urge the Corinthians to discipline the one who did wrong, and thus vindicate Paul, the one who suffered the wrong (2 Cor 2:6, 9; 7:12). It also aimed to spare the Corinthians and himself from another painful visit (2 Cor 1:23-2:4). The letter revealed how much he cared for the Corinthians (2 Cor 2:4) and was designed to test their obedience to his apostolic ministry (2 Cor 2:9). It also was designed to help the Corinthians see how truly devoted they were to Paul as their spiritual father (2 Cor 7:12). After the

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Corinthians received it, most were repentant (2 Cor 2:5-11; 7:5-16), but not all. Several possibilities exist for the “severe letter,” but it is best to see it as a lost letter. Not all Pauline letters have been preserved (cf. 1 Cor 5:9, 11; Col 4:16). It is best to see this letter as written after 1 Corinthians, and after his painful visit, but before 2 Corinthians was written. Many scholars hold to this position.31 After he sent this letter, several things happened to Paul. He experienced a tribulation that was so great that “he despaired of life.” In 2 Corinthians 1:8-10, he writes that he felt a “sentence of death” upon him. This was most likely a severe physical illness. Harris sees this from the association of the distress in 2 Cor 1:8 with the thorn of 2 Cor 12:7, as well as factors which would identify the three prayers for removal with distresses in Cilicia (43 CE), Perga (Acts 13:13-14 in 47 CE), and in Troas (2 Cor 1:8; 2:12; 7:5 in 56 CE).32 Whether it was a physical illness or something else, this affliction did cause him to abandon self-sufficiency and trust in God’s power. Following this severe illness, Paul continued with his gospel ministry. He traveled to Troas where there was a door open to him (Acts 20:1-11; 2 Cor 2:12). He then traveled on to meet Titus in Troas, but he found no peace as Titus was not there (2 Cor 2:13). So, he left Troas and headed for Macedonia. While in Macedonia, he helped to organize the collection for Christians in Jerusalem (2 Cor 8:1-4; 9:2) as well as continue to carry out his gospel ministry (Acts 20:1-2). While he served successfully in Macedonia, for some reason it took him longer than expected to connect with Titus. And therefore, it took him longer than he had expected to hear how his severe letter had been received in Corinth (2 Cor 7:5). This raised the emotional intensity he felt. Titus finally arrived with good news for Paul which led Paul to rejoice (2 Cor 7:6-9). He had worried about the effects of his severe letter, fearing that he had been too harsh. Hearing Titus’ report, however, 31. E.g., Murray J. Harris, Second Corinthians, 3–7; Paul W. Barnett, Second Corinthians, 9–14; Ralph P. Martin, 2 Corinthians 2nd ed., Word Biblical Commentary 40 (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2014), 36–7; Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, The Theology of the Second Letter to the Corinthians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10–20; David A. deSilva, “Measuring Penultimate and Ultimate Reality: An Investigation of the Integrity and Argumentation of 2 Corinthians,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 52 (1993): 41–70; Margaret E. Thrall, The Second Letter to the Corinthians: Volume 1:1-7 (London: T & T Clark, 2000), 57–60. 32. Murray. J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 164–82.

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comforted Paul greatly since he now knew that the Corinthians were deeply sorrowful for their past behavior and were longing to see him. Paul was overjoyed. If his severe letter had wounded them, it seems that it was only for a while (2 Cor 7:8). At this point, in 56 CE, Paul wrote 2 Corinthians. He responds to a number of issues that had taken place in the past. It should be read as embedded in a deep emotional background that was already affecting Paul and his relationship with the Corinthians. Empathy within 2 Corinthians He begins the letter by drawing the Corinthians into a greater connection with himself. This passage is striking, since Paul normally begins his letters with a section of thanksgiving and prayer requests for the church to which he is writing (cf. Phil 1:3-11).33 Instead, in 2 Corinthians 1:3-7, he provides a thoughtful benediction on suffering in general which he and the Corinthians both experience. Encouragement for the one who is suffering is found throughout 2 Corinthians 1:3-7. Paul blesses God for the comfort that he received during his ordeals. He employs the word παράκλησις six times and the verb παρακαλέω four times. He points to God himself who is to be praised as the God of all comfort (θεὸς πάσης παρακλήσεως) in 2 Corinthians 1:3, and declares that this encouragement is also for the benefit of others (2 Cor. 1:4). While their sufferings are different, Paul is building a bridge to the Corinthians and encouraging them to empathize with him (2 Cor 1:4). He further builds connection with them by declaring that just as the sufferings of Christ spill over to him, these in turn give him the ability to comfort the Corinthians in their difficulties (2 Cor 1:5-6). The passage is marked by the pronouns we (ἡμεῖς) and you (ὑμεῖς) which present a connectivity–but also a distinction–between Paul and the Corinthians. While Paul’s and the Corinthians’ sufferings were not identical, he does point to a central source for them, namely, the sufferings of Christ (τὰ παθήματα τοῦ Χριστοῦ) in 2 Corinthians 1:5. A number of suggestions have been made about the meaning of this phrase. It cannot mean the atonement, as Paul views this as a decisive event (Rom 6:10).34 Due to the broader context of Paul’s writing, suffering that emerges from 33. Ibid., 138. 34. Murray. J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 146.

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identification with Christ seems to fit best. As Christians participate with the righteous sufferer who is Christ, they will also share the righteous sufferer’s experience. The sufferings of Paul and the Corinthians function as a natural continuation of, and a supplement to, Christ’s sufferings.35 By writing this section in this way, Paul encourages empathy, helping the Corinthians identify with suffering in Christ that is common to all Christians. Paul then writes about the particular affliction that he experienced in 2 Corinthians 1:8-11. He shares how intense it was for him personally, drawing the Corinthians into the experience and encouraging empathy. The event was exceptional in its impact on Paul. While several possibilities exist about the affliction (θλίψiς) that he endured, it was most likely some severe persecution that may have come at Ephesus or during his interaction with the broader Jewish community in Asia.36 He experienced this persecution to such an extraordinary degree that he despaired of life itself.37 While it was a unique experience for Paul, he expected to have similar afflictions in the future (2 Cor 1:10). He draws the Corinthians into the experience by sharing its intensity. He also uses the word ἀδελφοί, pointing to commonality. In 2 Corinthians 4:7-15, he once again encourages empathy. He indirectly asks the Corinthians to identify with him in his sufferings and describes himself in ways that would gain their understanding. He speaks of himself as being a jar of clay (2 Cor 4:7). The words used ὀστρακίνοις σκεύεσιν denote “perishable earthenware” which would have been interpreted as him being fragile, expendable, and unattractive. The Corinthians would recognize their similar human predicament.38 In 2 Corinthians 4:8-9, he writes about his own trials as he is afflicted in every way, perplexed, persecuted, and struck down (2 Cor. 4:8-9). All of these are written as present participles in the Greek text and describe ongoing difficulties surrounding the ministry.39 The Corinthians would have been drawn into Paul’s experience by his description of present and ongoing difficulties which many of them would have recognized.

35. George H. Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), 75. 36. For the possibilities, see Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 164–82. 37. George H. Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 80–1. 38. Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 340. 39. George. H. Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 256–7.

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As in 2 Corinthians 1, Paul not only shares aspects for the Corinthians for which they can sympathize, but he also builds a bridge using language that promotes commonalities. In 2 Corinthians 4:10, he speaks about carrying the death of Jesus with him in order that (ἵνα) the life of Jesus may be manifested in Corinthians. This is then emphasized by what he writes in 2 Corinthians 4:11-12. As Paul is being continually given over to death for Jesus’ sake, the life of Jesus is then being manifested in them. There remains a boundary, however, while Paul’s suffering becomes absorbed in the lives of the Corinthians. As the letter continues, Paul’s description of his suffering intensifies. In 2 Corinthians 6:3-7:16, he provides a detailed description of his compassion for the Corinthians as well as his suffering. This endurance commends Paul as an apostolic minster of the gospel. The list of hardships includes afflictions, hardships, calamities, beatings, imprisonments, riots, labors, sleepless nights, and hunger (2 Cor. 6:4-5). He also lists his changing circumstances such as the ups and downs of being praised and blamed (2 Cor 6:7-8) and the paradoxes of living such as being punished, and yet not killed, being sorrowful, yet always rejoicing, being poor, yet making many others rich, and having nothing, yet possessing everything (2 Cor. 6:9-10). These are not minor inconveniences but matters that challenge life and death.40 In addition to appealing to the Corinthians to understand the difficulties of his life, he writes of his compassion for them. In 2 Corinthians 6:6, he writes that he commends himself by purity, knowledge, patience, kindness, the Holy Spirit and genuine love (2 Cor. 6:6). These are not natural elements or self-generated virtues. Instead, these are as result of the resurrection power of God in his life. This section then draws in the Corinthians, urging them to feel his pain. Later in 2 Corinthians 7, Paul indicates the depth of his commitment to the Corinthians. In 2 Corinthians 7:3 he writes about how he would die or live with them. The reversal of the sequence “death and life” rather than “life and death” likely hearkens to the death and resurrection of Jesus, a constant theme in 2 Corinthians in relation to Paul and the people of Corinth (2 Cor 1:8-11; 4:10-12; 5:14-15; 6:3-10). 41 The grammar of the verse with its use of the infinitives συναποθανεῖν and 40. Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 471–2. 41. Scott J. Hafemann, 2 Corinthians, The NIV Application Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 308. The importance of identifying with the death and resurrection of Jesus throughout Paul’s writing is evident (Rom 6:8-13).

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συζῆν further points to the ongoing theme of discipleship in the death and resurrection of Christ.42 It is evident that he expects the Corinthians to be able to appraise what he has written about suffering. In 2 Corinthians 4:2, he writes that he commends himself to everyone’s conscience in the sight of God. This idea is continued in 2 Corinthians 6:4 when he writes that he commends himself “in every way” (ἐν παντὶ). This phrase serves as an introduction to all of the hardships that follow.43 Surely if he can commend himself in every way to God, the Corinthians can appraise Paul’s situation well enough. In 2 Corinthians 6:11 he speaks openly of the transparency of his life as the Corinthians had observed it. He declares that he has spoken freely to them and that his heart is wide open. Furthermore, he declares that he is not holding anything back in his affection for them. In particular, as Paul describes his suffering in 2 Corinthians 7:5-16, he expects the Corinthians to remember how he conducted himself among them. The cause of Paul’s suffering was that after he left Corinth, the Corinthians had rejected his apostolic ministry. He provides details of his difficulty in sleeping and also his affliction at every turn. This was only eased after Titus brought the news that the Corinthians had repented.44 In places within 2 Corinthians 6-7, Paul specifically asks for an action which would be connected with empathy. He urges the Corinthians in 2 Corinthians 6:11-13 to open their hearts wide to him and writes passionately about this. He has been open with the Corinthians and now urges them to open their hearts wide to him. The word πλατύνω is used only twice in Paul’s writing. The use of this verb suggests an extravagance on Paul’s part and is the foundation of his appeal to the Corinthians to open their hearts wide to him. The use of the word καρδία in 2 Corinthians 6:11 further accentuates the emotional identification that Paul wants from the Corinthian church. The obstinate Corinthians had been restricting and withholding their affection from Paul, but he is now explicitly asking for it (2 Cor 6:12-13),45 in return for investing his affections in them.46 42. Paul W. Barnett, Second Corinthians, 362. 43. George H. Guthrie, 2 Corinthians, 325–6. 44. Murray. J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 522–4. 45. Jeff Wisdom, “Opening the Heart: Compassion and Suffering in Paul’s Apostolic Ministry in the Corinthian Correspondence,” in The Crucified Apostle, ed. Todd A. Wilson and Paul R. House, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 450 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 193–4. 46. Paul W. Barnett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, 196.

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As Paul writes further in 2 Corinthians 7, he wants more empathy from the Corinthians. Instead of merely urging them to open their hearts to him, he now calls them to make room for him in their affections (2 Cor 7:2). This exhortation is based on the fact that he has not wronged anyone, corrupted anyone at Corinth, and has not used the Corinthians in any way for his own advantage. He has a special place in his heart for the Corinthians and now implores them to make room in their hearts for him. It is an appeal that requires empathy in response. Conclusion Empathy has been deemed to be an important emotion for modern society. It is a complex emotion calling for a respondent to be understanding. It involves recognizing boundaries with another but also building a bridge. It is concerned with understanding and with communicating that understanding to another. While empathy is desirable within western culture, text messages have been seen to inhibit the ability to communicate empathy. The brevity of a text message and also the use of emoticons and emojis make communication more ambiguous. Furthermore, the sense of being “alone together” through text message communication has been seen to breed loneliness and isolation, qualities that do not encourage empathy. Empathy is all about asking people to build bridges. In contrast, Paul’s communication with the Corinthians as seen in 2 Corinthians 1-7 encouraged empathy. This letter was embedded in a deep emotional situation that had been building for several years. The history of the relationship between Paul and the Corinthians was filled with great pain and regret –along with some joy. As he writes 2 Corinthians, he urges identification with his suffering. He speaks personally, and refers to it as if it is ongoing. He notes that there is some difference, but that ultimately their suffering together is part of the “sufferings of Christ.” He expects that the Corinthians will be able to understand that he is communicating his suffering. He exhorts them to “make room for him” (2 Corinthians 6:11, 13) and “open wide their hearts” (2 Cor 7:2). This provides a valuable contrast. Empathy in 2 Corinthians was communicated as part of the history of a relationship, following several visits and many lengthy letters. An empathetic response was encouraged by appealing to suffering that the Corinthians would have known about. It was further encouraged by common identity in the death and

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resurrection of Christ. In contrast, many text messages are short and do not appeal to past suffering. This chapter does not conclude that it is impossible for text message correspondences to show empathy. It does, however, show that a lengthy correspondence filled with situations that could be understood unambiguously with action taken does encourage empathy. The appeal to the Corinthians to identify with Paul and his coworkers, understand their circumstances, and have open hearts to each other is also aided by the common bond with the death and resurrection of Jesus that both Paul and the Corinthians shared.

PART IV

LIVING WITH COMPLEX TECHNOLOGY: THE ETHICAL CHALLENGES

Emerging Technologies and Humanity: The Tension between Control and Freedom HENK JOCHEMSEN

Abstract Science and technology are dominant powers in our society and signify late modern culture. A clear manifestation can be found in the rapid development of converging technologies (nanotechnology, biotechnology, ICT/AI, cognitive sciences). This has already produced an enormous body of knowledge and has led to significantly increased technical possibilities of intervening in human life, both physically and socially, e.g. through the algorithms of providers of internet services such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and others, and improved diagnostics in medicine using such algorithms. These new technologies bring considerable power to control diseases, and they create a virtual environment that can serve people in many ways, providing different forms of freedom. However, at the same time these facilities exert a form of control over people, either overtly or covertly. What does that mean for the interpretation of these technologies and their (potential) role in human life? What presuppositions of our technological culture should be challenged so that we can do justice to our pursuit of both control and freedom? It will be argued that these questions should be addressed in light of the view that, in our formally secular society, techniques and technology (as the science of technical development) in a sense replace traditional religion and have become a predominant way in which people pursue certainty, security, and meaning in life. In this contribution, these questions will be discussed from the perspectives of anthropology and the philosophy of technology as developed within Reformational philosophy. This will lead to insights that can be a basis for further ethical reflection.

Introduction Many philosophers and other scholars are agreed that a salient characteristic of our (post)modern society is the dominance of science and

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technology.1 Science-based technology is not just a tool for solving problems, the technological mindset has become the frame work that guides our interpretation of the problems we encounter as well as the technological solutions we pursue. For example, Schultze speaks of “quasireligious philosophy of informationism, a non-discerning, vacuous faith in the collection and dissemination of information as a route to social progress and personal happiness.”2 As a result of this focus on technology, we live in a technological culture.3 That is a culture that is not only pervaded by technological devices, but in which the leading political and economic powers trust in technology as the means of solving problems and creating a glorious future.4 In this context Schultze quotes a telling statement from Vaclav Havel: “We have to abandon the arrogant belief that the world is merely a puzzle to be solved, [….] a body of information to be fed into a computer in the hope that sooner or later it will spit out a universal solution.”5 One of the manifestations of this technological culture is a rapid development of new technologies, some of which are potentially disruptive for present social structures. In this chapter I will briefly explain two such technologies that are currently being debated in public discourse. These are artificial intelligence and converging technologies (ICT/AI, biotechnology, nanotechnology, neurosciences). These technologies have delivered tremendous power to control diseases and to create a virtual environment that can serve people in many ways (e.g. the algorithms of the providers of internet services such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and others), as well as increasing the technical possibilities of intervening in human life, both physically and socially. On one hand all these possibilities provide people with forms of freedom in self-expression and communication and in safeguarding and promoting health. However, at the

1. A Dutch philosopher of technology argues that a predominant normative attitude in our culture is technicism, holding the pretension that our common problems can be solved by technology; see Egbert Schuurman, Faith and Hope in Technology (Toronto: Clements Publishing, 2003). See also references below to Jacques Ellul and Martin Heidegger. 2. Quentin J. Schultze, Habits of the High-tech Heart: Living Virtuously in the Information Age (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 21, 26. 3. Benoit Godin and Yves Gingras, “What is scientific and technological culture and how is it measured? A multidimensional model,” Public Understanding of Science 9, no. 1 (2000) 43–58. 4. Ian Barbour, Ethics in an Age of Technology (New York: HarperOne, 1993). 5. See Schultze, Habits of the High-tech Heart.

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same time these powers exert a form of control over people, either overtly or covertly.6 What does that mean for the interpretation of these technologies and their (potential) role in human life? What presuppositions of our technological culture should be challenged in order to do justice to our pursuit of both control and freedom? It will be argued that these questions should be addressed in light of the view that, in our formally secular society, techniques and technology (as the science of technical development), in a sense have replaced traditional religion and become a predominant way in which people pursue certainty, security, and meaning. In this contribution, these questions will be discussed from the perspective of the philosophy of technology as developed within Reformational philosophy. This will lead to insights that can be a basis for further ethical reflection. As examples of those broader technological advances in our culture that increasingly determine our lives, I will begin with a brief description of some of the new technological developments that raise questions. Subsequently, I will offer general remarks on the philosophy of technology and then present different societal approaches, referring to the work of Ian Barbour.7 This will help to achieve a balanced position on technology itself. To formulate a normative approach in response to the new technological developments, I will then present the main argument of the anthropology and normative approach to social practices as developed in Reformational philosophy. This will lead to some normative guidelines and restrictions in the use of these new developments, essentially pointing out that the technologies should not be overestimated nor be applied within certain contexts, given the normativity that is embodied in those contexts. In the final section I will offer some remarks regarding the cultural background against which these technologies tend to be overestimated.

6. Yuval N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (London: Vintage, 2016), 235; describing the (post) modern mentality, he writes: “No paradise awaits us after death – but we can create paradise here on earth and live in it for ever if we just manage to overcome some technical difficulties.” And on the same page: “…modern life consists of a constant pursuit of power within a universe devoid of meaning”. 7. Ian Barbour, Ethics in an Age of Technology.

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Artificial Intelligence Promises In this section I present some of the main developments in artificial intelligence, generally in combination with the analysis of “big data,” and with the use of algorithms. The examples given are meant as an illustration of what is going on, not as an exhaustive overview. 8 Promises about the use of AI include the development and production of better, more personalized medicine and better diagnoses9, a better administration of justice by generating more consistent verdicts, safer self-driving cars and more efficient multimodal public transport, and more efficient and effective management of businesses.10 Furthermore it is expected that the analyses of big data using AI will support better management of the complex processes that take place in cities11 as well as improve the prevention of (natural) disasters by better interpretation of satellite images and increasing the resilience of areas that are vulnerable to them. Some leaders in this field have expressed very high expectations of the AI revolution, going beyond the practical uses as indicated above. For example, IBM’s General manager, Mark Bregman, has said of computers: “the computer should become like God: omnipresent but invisible.”12 Previous Google-employee Anthony Levandowski founded

8. Cf. Hannah Fry, Hello World: How to be Human in the Age of the Machine (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018). I used the Dutch translation so I will refer to chapters instead of pages. 9. See also: Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, “Big Data Takes on Cancer,” Nature 2019, https://www.nature.com/articles/d42473-019-00035-5?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=bcon-Dana_Farber_Conf_%20Report_ 2019&utm_term=Q1_2019; also: Karla Lant, “Confirmed: AI Can Predict Heart Attacks and Strokes More Accurately Than Doctors,” Neoscope, May 5, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://futurism.com/confirmed-ai-can-predict-heart-attacks-andstrokes-more-accurately-than-doctors/. 10. SAS, “AI Momentum, Maturity & Models for Success,” SAS, 2018, accessed March 27, 2019, https://branden.biz/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ai-momentummaturity-success-models-109926.pdf. 11. Shannon Mattern, “A City Is Not a Computer,” Places Journal, February 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://placesjournal.org/article/a-city-is-not-a-computer/?gclid=cj0kcqia-onjbrdsarisaezxckymycbrczmenpe6vnnwgu1rxjl8vhwkx4m10-exrgh-k1y0iskopwuaaor5ealw_wcb&cn-reloaded=1. 12. Quoted in Theo Niemeijer, “De robot als vervanger van God?” CIP, December 12, 2018, accessed March 28, 2019, https://cip.nl/70859-de-robot-als-vervanger-vangod?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=2018Dec12&mtc=.

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a church called “Way of the future” (WotF). 13 This “way of the future” is about creating a peaceful and respectful transition in control of the planet, from people to people-plus-“machines.” This is more clearly expressed in the mission of WotF, namely, to develop a divinity on the basis of AI and, by understanding and worshipping that divinity, contribute to the improvement of society.14 Again we note the comparison of AI with divine powers. Another example of an expert who is optimistic about the possibilities of AI is Raymond Kurzweil, the author of the best-seller “The age of spiritual machines,” in which he presents the view that human personality, embodied in the information in the brain, can be transferred to computers and become immortal. He is the director of engineering at Google, an influential position in one of the AI/big data giants. The, sometimes spectacular, results cause some scholars in this field to exclaim: “let the data speak for themselves. We don’t need psychology, sociology, theology… to know what we want to know.” This statement betrays a dangerous lack of understanding of epistemology and of the philosophy of science.15 Yet, even though these extreme expectations may never come to pass, the developments in AI do present serious challenges for a society that wishes to remain human. Answering these challenges requires a clearer view of their character and, of course, a view of what it means to remain human. The former will be addressed below, the latter in section 5. Challenges of Pervasive AI Experts and entrepreneurs in this field of big data have not just expressed high expectations but also uttered warnings of the potential risks for society from these developments. Let us look at some of those warnings. It is recognized that AI raises mainly three major challenges.16 This is, 13. Mark Harris, “Inside The First Church Of Artificial Intelligence,” Wired, November 15, 2017, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/ anthony-levandowski-artificial-intelligence-religion/. 14. See http://www.wayofthefuture.church/. 15. Koenraad Debackere, “Let the Data Speak for Themselves: Opportunities and Caveats,” Journal of Data and Information Science 1, no. 1 (2016): 3–5. 16. Nicholas Wright, “How Artificial Intelligence Will Reshape the Global Order: The Coming Competition Between Digital Authoritarianism and Liberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, July 10, 2018, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/world/2018-07-10/how-artificial-intelligence-will-reshape-global-order.

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first, the possibility of a singularity, an event in which an AI exceeds human intelligence and escapes human control with unforeseeable consequences for society and indeed the whole world. Illustrative of these challenges are the statements of Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk. Hawking said in a BBC interview: “The development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race.”17 In an interview at MIT, in October 2014, Elon Musk stated that AI is probably our biggest existential threat right now and added “with artificial intelligence we’re summoning the demon.”18 The second major challenged of AI is a new machine revolution that will allow machines to disrupt and replace humans in every–or almost every–area of society, from transport to the military to healthcare.19 It would generate massive unemployment, causing social unrest and disruption. This is probably the issue that is receiving most attention in public debate so far. The third challenge mentioned and elaborated in the Wright’s Foreign Affairs publication,20 is that AI may allow governments to monitor, understand, and control their citizens far more closely than ever before. The authors argue that AI will offer authoritarian countries a plausible alternative to liberal democracy (cf. China) leading to renewed international competition between social systems (liberal democracy and a digital authoritarian “welfare state.” This may present a major challenge to democratic societies and to some democracies in the Third World. The first two of these challenges were already put forward by Bill Joy in 2000, in his extensive paper in Wired.21 Joy gives a well-argued account of his fears, worth our attention. Joy states that since he first became involved in the creation of new technologies, he has been 17. Quoted in Rory Cellan-Jones, “Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind,” BBC News, December 2, 2014, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540. 18. Greg Kumparak, “Elon Musk Compares Building Artificial Intelligence To ‘Summoning The Demon’,” Techcrunch, October 27, 2014, accessed March 28, 2019, https://techcrunch.com/2014/10/26/elon-musk-compares-building-artificial-intelligence-to-summoning-the-demon/?guccounter=1&guce_referrer_us=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLm5sLw&guce_referrer_cs=7aROjyos1hg61jdQOA7KtQ. 19. Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, “Will Humans Go the Way of Horses? Labor in the Second Machine Age,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2015, accessed March 28, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-06-16/will-humans-go-wayhorses. 20. Wright, “How Artificial Intelligence Will Reshape the Global Order.” 21. Bill Joy, “Why the Future does not need us,” Wired Magazine 8, no. 4 (2000), accessed March 28, 2019, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy_pr.html.

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concerned about their ethical dimensions. But after a number of years in the field, in the autumn of 1998, he became anxiously aware of how great the dangers involved in the development of AI really are. Postulating that computer scientists will succeed in developing intelligent machines that can do everything better than human beings, Joy asserts that we should realize that the fate of the human race will be at the mercy of these machines. He is wondering whether he should accept that the development of more reliable software may not just make the world a better place, but might also contribute to a world controlled by intelligent machines in which humans would not be needed any more (note the title of his article). Joy realizes that the benefits of new technologies come with a price, and he explicitly raises the question of whether that price may be too high. At the same time, he is not optimistic about the possibilities of regulating the application of those technologies. Rather wistfully, he states that if we had gained more collective wisdom over the past few thousand years, then a dialogue on the ethical values that might steer developments in technology would have been more feasible, and the incredible powers we are about to unleash would not be nearly so troubling. Another scholar who has more recently written on this issue is the historian Yuval Harari, in his best-selling book Homo Deus. At the very end of his book he formulates some of his key thoughts, at the same time inviting the reader to challenge them.22 I present those key thoughts in my formulations, reflecting also the broader message of the book. ‒ The human being, like other living organisms and AI devices, is ultimately a (set of) algorithms. ‒ Life is data processing; this view implies the denial of any special status or dignity of human beings. ‒ Intelligence is decoupling from consciousness, implying that computers may become a lot more intelligent than humans even though they may not have consciousness as we now understand it. ‒ Nonconscious intelligence may soon know us better than we know ourselves. There is a telling quote from an review of this book on the Internet:

22. Yuval N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (London: Vintage, 2016), 462.

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“In the twenty-first century those who ride the train of progress will acquire divine abilities of creation and destruction, while those left behind will face extinction.”23 Note that again here we find the same apocalyptic religious language that is also used by Hawking, Musk, and, to a lesser extent, Bill Joy. What do these expectations and warnings mean for our evaluation of AI? Should they be taken seriously or not? I will come back to this, since the religious character of the warnings and expectations will contribute to my evaluation of this development. But, first, I will present very briefly some information on the other strand of revolutionary technological developments, the NIBC convergence, allowing more and more radical interventions in human life. I will not elaborate on these developments as others will do so elsewhere in this book. Converging Technologies and Human Enhancement I begin this brief section with a quote from an annual publication in Dutch, Trendrede (Trend address), a study of those emerging trends in society that are likely to become the shaping forces of society in the (near) future. The Trendrede of 2019 states: “We have to acknowledge that the ever more intimate relation between human beings and technology is one of the great narratives of our time.”24 The possibilities of integrating technology into the human body are increasing thanks to what is called the NBIC convergence, the interaction and integration of four rapidly developing technologies, nanotechnology, biotechnology (e.g. gene editing), information sciences/technologies, and cognitive sciences. This convergence promises to increase the possibilities of intervening in human life and even creating ways of enhancing human performance.25 Human enhancement refers to the augmentation of human skills, attributes or competencies through the use of technologies. Examples of skills or traits that could be “improved” 23. Made you think, “When Man Becomes God: Homo Deus by Yuval Noah Harari”, accessed March 28, 2019, https://madeyouthinkpodcast.com/homo-deus-byyuval-noah-harari/. 24. Trendrede, “The Fire of Change,” January 2019, accessed March 28, 2019, http://trendrede.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Trendrede-2019.pdf, 14. 25. Mihail C. Roco and William Sims Bainbridge, Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance. Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive Science (NSF/DOC-sponsored report), Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 2002.

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are the ability to see beyond human “normality” with respect to frequency of light (e.g. infra-red to be able to see better in the dark), higher resistance against disease or disorders, higher learning capabilities, and extraordinary physical capacities. One way of pursuing human enhancement could be integrating technologies within the human body. In this context the concept of cyborg (cybernetic organisms) is sometimes used. It can be seen as an icon of the expected achievements of NBIC technologies. In discussing these developments I will concentrate on the cyborg. Technology in Human Life Summarizing the above, we note a strong increase in the technological capacity to model human life, both in its physical and its social aspects. These powers are already being used to improve living conditions for human beings and promise to continue doing so, but perhaps in a revolutionary way. At the same time, experts in the field of AI identify a threat of the complete control of humans, resulting in a loss of freedom, and possibly even leading to human extinction. Answering the question that is central in this book–how to remain human in this technological age–is becoming increasingly urgent. To contribute to a reflection on that question, I will take the following steps in the remainder of this chapter. First, by using Barbour’s categorization of dominant views on technology, I will give an interpretation of the place of technology in human life. Subsequently, by relating technology to a normative anthropology and view on social practices, I will define a general normative space for the development and use of technology that respects humanity. Finally, I will make some remarks on the cultural and spiritual background to the dangerous overestimation of technological developments, thus identifying a critical level at which to counter that overestimation. Historical Notions By nature–or should I say by creation?–human beings are cultural beings. In this context, I use the following description as a working definition of culture: the totality of acquired, socially transferred behavior (lifestyle), including the related material and conceptual achievements.26 In 26. Culture is a broad and contested term; this is not the place to enter into that discussion. I therefore choose a working definition that is based on a compilation and

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this understanding the development and use of techniques is part of culture. In strength, swiftness and sensitivity of the senses, humans are inferior to many animals.27 But humans have reason and language and can form social structures, organize a differentiation in tasks and abilities, are able to imagine a future that is different from the present and imaging things that do not yet exist. The human anatomy is very suited to “handling” reality, to intervening, bringing about changes in the world around, constructing protective structures and developing the methods and means of better finding, acquiring or cultivating food. In cultural anthropology, scholars continuously encounter the phenomenon of religion. Kühn characterizes the being of which we find archaeological traces as homo religiosus: “… Never has there been a human being without religion….. Already in the ice age, religion is the sustaining force and leads to the creation of works of art. In the Neolithic, the religious equally presents itself ….”.28 The human being is a “religious” being in the sense that he is looking for a framework from which he can interpret his life and reality and within which he can experience meaning. Such a framework is inspired by a fundamental commitment that every human being has, either consciously or unconsciously, to what is seen as “unconditionally nondependent reality”, in other words, the sacred.29 In this anthropological sense, religiosity can be interpreted as a broad structural feature of human existence. That human search for survival and meaning is guided by the deepest, ultimately religious, beliefs in cultures, communities, and individuals. From this perspective, atheists and secular people are also “religious” in this anthropological sense. A secular-humanist worldview is not a kind of religiously neutral position from which one can “independently” judge religions, but that worldview itself embodies a “religious” position, among others. This means that the split that secular comparison of definitions mentioned in: “Culture: Everything, We as People, Are,” stanford.edu, accessed March 28, 2019, http://web.stanford.edu/~hakuta/www/archives/ syllabi/E_CLAD/sfusd_cult_03/melissa/Culture%20Defined.htm. 27. Cf. Arnold Gehlen’s concept of the human being as a Mangelwesen; for a quick introduction see Christine Magerski, “Gehlen, Arnold (1904-1976),” The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology (2017), accessed March 28, 2019, https://onlinelibrary.wiley. com/doi/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeos0739. 28. Herbert Kühn, De opgang der mensheid (Utrecht: Prisma, 1959), 177 (my translation). 29. Roy Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1995), 23

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society tries to uphold between the private character of faith and religion, on the one hand, and the “neutral” use of science and technical rationality in the public sphere, on the other, is based on a fallacy. This separation itself also implies a certain view of human existence, namely, a secular-liberal view rooted in a choice for a fundamental faith attitude towards what is seen as “unconditionally non-dependent reality.”30 Religion not only provides an interpretative frame work for life, but also a basis for shaping life by intervening in one’s social and natural environment. Religions express themselves in culture; or, the other way around, culture is religion made visible. Part of culture is technique: the means and procedures for intervening in reality to safeguard life and express the search for meaning. In traditional religious cultures, technique, crafts, and art are the same; they are all intended to relate life in this world to the spiritual world, follow the spiritual guidance that is perceived, and pursue certainty, security, and meaning. In European culture the close connection between the empirical world and the spiritual world is loosened, beginning with the philosophers of nature in Greek antiquity, but coming to a more radical caesura in modernity in the sixteenth century. However, religiosity in the anthropological sense has remained a human characteristic. And the relation between the place of technique in human life and that which is accepted as “the sacred” has also continued in Western, European culture in its own way.31 In other words, techniques and technology as the science of technical development, have remained an expression of the way in which in public life in modern and postmodern culture people pursue certainty, security, and meaning. The view of technology in our culture provides a window on the sources of meaning of this culture. With this in mind let us consider predominant views on technology in (post)modern culture. I follow the grouping of Ian Barbour.32 He distinguishes three views of technology in our culture, technology as Liberator, technology as a Threat, and Technology as an Instrument of Power. Barbour’s views will be briefly presented, followed by a fourth view that I will put forward.

30. Ibid. 31. Bob Goudzwaard, Mark vander Vennen, and David van Heemst, Hope in Troubled Times: A New Vision For Confronting Global Crises (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007). 32. Barbour, Ethics in an Age of Technology, 3–25

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Technology as Liberator (Bacon) With the rise of modernity, coinciding with the many technological and scientific advancements, Western Europeans have developed a very positive view of the future, and of science and technology as the instruments for creating a better world and regaining Paradise. Knowledge came to be understood as power that manifested itself in technology. Barbour considers Francis Bacon (1561-1626) to be the main representative of this view. This view, “technology as liberator,” holds a very positive view of technology. Through technology we will be able to create better living conditions by improving welfare. It will provide humans with many more choices about the type of life one can lead, generate more leisure and freedom, create better ways of communication, of travel, and of knowing other peoples and cultures. In Bacon’s view, expressed in his “New Atlantis,” technology could, and should, overcome the consequences of the Fall and subsequent expulsion from Paradise. Philosophically, this view entails a pragmatic approach to science as a value-free instrument for intervening in reality and effectively realizing one’s goals. The ethics of technological interventions boils down to the ethics of the actual use of the technology in a specific context. The gun can be used to halt aggressors and serve justice but, for example also to pursue illegitimate power. Current representatives of this view are Ray Kurzweil and Alvin Toffler. Technology as Threat (Ellul) The second position discussed by Barbour is one which mainly sees modern technology as a threat. A well-known strong advocate of this view is French sociologist and theologian, Jacques Ellul (1912-1994). In this view, modern technology is strongly related to modern science: one could consider it the modern science of technique. As such, it is based on a number of abstractions leading to an objectification of things, to a goal-rational approach to the world, entailing a strong focus on efficiency, and to an impersonal approach to humans, nature and things that produces an alienation of people from one another and from the social and natural environment. Environmental problems, including the exhaustion of agricultural land, is one of the consequences. And the development of technology shows a self-reinforcing dynamic, as one technology enables the development of another and is required for the development of yet another desired technique. Technology becomes an

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uncontrollable power and makes society dependent on experts. The power of technology and its successes for the living conditions of people provoke a sacralization of technology, making fundamental critique untolerated. A philosopher of technology who builds on this approach to technology is Egbert Schuurman (1938) who speaks of technicism as a predominant attitude towards technology that forms a threat to humanity in today’s culture.33 More broadly, this critical view of technology is mainly based on a hermeneutical philosophical approach to reality, including technology. In this view technology embodies a view of reality and of how humans relate to their environment. Techniques mediate between a human being and the world around. For example, looking at an echo of a fetus in the womb changes the relationship between those who look at it and the fetus. It can strengthen the relationship (it moves!) but it can also objectify the fetus, making it an object of which a quality control is desirable. Driving influences one’s relationship with the area through which one drives. In this approach, ethics primarily reflects on the relationship between users and reality as mediated by techniques, and on the implicit presuppositions in the technique itself. Presuppositions that, as we saw above, somehow reflect the users’ view of the good life. The philosopher who possibly reflected most profoundly on techniques and technology is Heidegger.34 I will briefly present some of the main ideas in that essay. In Heidegger’s view the human being is called to keep watch over the unconcealment of things in the world. Unconcealment is the literal translation of the Greek aletheia, commonly translated as “truth.” To understand the truth of things in the world, the human being should maintain an attitude of openness in which things are allowed to reveal themselves. Just as a work of art requires an openness and receptivity to grasp its message. Such an attitude is a prerequisite of coming to an understanding of our world, to truth. According to Heidegger, technology is a mode of unconcealment, of opening up of reality. However, modern technology entails a challenging, a demanding mode, of unconcealment, of revealing reality. Heidegger calls this mode Gestell (in English: enframing).35 Enframing does not do justice to 33. Egbert Schuurman, Faith and Hope in Technology (Toronto: Clements Publishing, 2003). 34. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977). 35. Gestell = Enframing: forcing things in a certain frame that grants control.

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things: “where Enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense”.36 Modern technology as Enframing threatens true revealing (unconcealment), with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of a “standing-reserve” of materials at our disposition. In my own words, modern technology seems to embody and promote an attitude towards reality in which everything in our natural and social environment is seen as mere materials for the construction of a better world according to human design and without any intrinsic value. Technology as Instrument of Power In this view technology is seen as ambiguous. Techniques seem valueneutral instruments with which one can do good things, but also bad things (see technology as Liberator). However, a closer look reveals that technology development and use is largely driven by those who have political or financial power. As a consequence, the technologies developed embody the values and interests of those people and institutions who are in power. For example, the internet embodies the power of countries who favor a free flow of information (within limits of fundamental human rights) and of economic forces who use the internet and the media for financial interest. Think of the examples of the power of AI given above. Philosophically this position expresses a social-constructivist view of society in which institutions and organisations such as professional bodies are historically contingent manifestations of those groups of people who, in the social struggle for power, have achieved a beneficial position. In this view there is a strong interaction between technology and society in general. Technology, on one hand, is a domain within society but on the other pervades society as a whole (cf. technology as a threat). The ethics of technology focusses the identification of and reflection on those power positions and relations. A central question in the evaluation of new technologies is: Cui bono? Who benefits? Barbour favours this third view on technology, acknowledging that the other views have elements of truth. I agree with the latter and therefore I want to present a fourth model: “Technology as servant of care,” in which care is understood as a normative principle and not as an activity of caregiving. 36. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, 28.

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I summarize this view in a few statements using elements of the positions just presented. Technology as Servant of Care ‒ Technique/technology is that dimension of culture that expresses the response of groups of people to the demands of life and of shaping the world and life in order to safeguard it. ‒ Modern technology is an expression of goal-effective rationality which characterizes the dominant approach to the challenges of individual and communal life. It has realized great achievements beneficial for many people, but that progress has extracted a high price in the spiritual, social, and ecological domains. ‒ Technology embodies and expresses specific views and values. ‒ In (post)modern secular culture in public life, traditional religion (predominantly Christianity) has been replaced by a technicistic attitude towards reality that at the same time became a predominant way in which people pursued a quest for certainty, security, and meaning.37 ‒ New technologies generate new social and professional practices (cf. ICT, algorithms & big data, mass media, biotechnology), and a new allocation of power, responsibilities, and accountability. ‒ All this means that technology should observe a normative framework that is related to dimensions of meaning-experience (sense-making) in human life and the normative structure of the practice in which the technique is integrated. In the remainder of this chapter, I will elaborate on these two roots of a normative framework for technology. Normative Framework based on Reformational Anthropology In the first place I investigate what kind of normative direction a Christian philosophical anthropology will provide for development and application of technologies. In sketching such an anthropology, I will draw on the anthropology of Herman Dooyeweerd as elaborated by Gerrit Glas.38 This philosophical school in the tradition of Dooyeweerd is 37. David Noble, The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention (London: Penguin Books, 1997). 38. Gerrit Glas, “Christian Pphilosophical Anthropology: A Reformation Perspective,” Philosophia Reformata 75, no. 2 (2010): 141–89.

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called Reformational philosophy and recognizes in human beings an intertwinement and coherence of several substructures or layers. These substructures do not refer to physically recognizable subsystems or parts but rather represent some of the modes of being, or aspects, that can be distinguished in reality (see figure 1). The first substructure is the physical–chemical: the molecules of which the body is made. Secondly, there is the biotic substructure, expression of the irreducible mode of being, called life. The third substructure that can be distinguished in humans is the sensitive, the psychic, relating to awareness, feelings, perceptions. In the human being a fourth substructure can be observed, the so-called normative act-structure that qualifies and opens up the afore-mentioned substructures. This act-structure manifests itself in all human actions that can be ordered according to the different normative perspectives that correspond to the modal aspects distinguished in this philosophy (see list of aspects on the right in Figure 1; see also Figure 2). This act-structure and the underlying substructures find their center in what Dooyeweerd calls the heart, metaphor for the unifying root of the human being that relates to what it perceives as the origin of meaning. The heart is the dynamical source from which all human activity originates. According to Dooyeweerd, the heart can only be understood in a religious sense. In this view, religiosity is a characteristic of humanity and the human being cannot distance himself from his own religion. The term religiosity, in this context refers to an essential characteristic and fundamental longing of existence itself. What are the implications of this view for our subject? Human existence in all its richness and complexities can be understood as a disclosure and sometimes a foreclosure of the act-structure, that includes morality and religion. But as we just saw, this act-structure has a substrate in the physical and biotic and psychic substructures; all kinds of interactions can be investigated, including the relation between brain structure, cognitive abilities, and the functioning of morality and religion. This anthropology would expect that such an identifiable relation would exist. But this view denies the possibility of a restless explanation of morality and religion from the lower substructures.39 The disclosure of the act-structure is guided by the deepest, ultimately religious beliefs in 39. See also Henk Jochemsen, Radio Mast or Jammer? The Role of Religion in Moral Issues, Farewell address upon retiring as special professor of Christian Philosophy at Wageningen University & Research on 21 June 2018 (Wageningen: WUR, 2018).

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Figure 1: Anthropology of Reformational philosophy – Human being: Intertwined substructures. Figure: courtesy Gerrit Glas

Quantitative (discrete amount) Spatial (continuous space) Kinematic (movement) Physical (energy + mass, forces) Biotic / Organic (life functions + organisms) Sensitive / Psychic (sense, feeling, emotion) Analytical (distinction, conceptualization) Formative (deliberate shaping: history, culture, technology, achievement) Lingual (meaning carried by symbols) Social (“we:” sociality, relationships, roles) Economic (frugal management of resources) Aesthetic (harmony, surprise, play, enjoyment; expressiveness) Juridical (due: responsibilities + rights; justice) Ethical (self-giving love, generosity; care) Pistic (vision, aspiration, commitment, belief) Figure 2: Modal aspects distinguished in Reformational philosophy, and their meaning kernel

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cultures, communities, and individuals. In the heart the human being always relates to that which is considered ‘‘unconditionally nondependent reality,” the sacred.40 This view of the human being implies that interventions in the human body, whether in the genes or the brain or whatever organ or tissue, is always an intervention in the human being as a whole. The effects of intervention at the level of physical-chemical substructure will have effects on other substructures, as they are very much intertwined. But it will be difficult to predict the degree and the direction of the effects due to the complexity of the “system.” This uncertainty and the risks involved will be lower when the intervention concerns a clearly defined correction of a disorder than in the case of any intervention into a “normal” organism aiming to enhance certain capacities. Furthermore, the various dimensions of the act-structure comprise their own normativity in human life. Both enhancement and AI interventions need to address that normativity to prevent the disturbance of human life.41 I will come back to this when discussing some interventions more specifically. Technological Innovations in Social Practices Professional practices are the second context providing normativity that should be observed in case of technological interventions. Professional practices have a normative structure that has been explained elsewhere.42 In a few lines I will explain this approach and its importance for our topic. In this approach, different social practices are qualified by different aspects, each with its core value (see figure 2); “qualified” means characterized and guided in their functioning. An association is (usually) 40. Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality, 23. 41. In a sense this view can be summarized in the old Greek adagio (Protagoras): “the human being is the measure of all things,” understood in the classical Greek sense. This emphasizes the limitations, the vulnerability and mortality of human beings and the need to consider those in order to lead a good life (think of the two mottos at Apollo’s temple at Delphi: “Nothing in excess” and “Know thyself”). 42. Henk Jochemsen, “Normative Practices as an Intermediate between Theoretical Ethics and Morality,” Philosophia Reformata 71 (2006): 96–112. For an extensive compilation see Marc J. de Vries, Henk Jochemsen, eds., The Normative Nature of Social Practices and Ethics in Professional Environments (New York: IGI global, 2019); more information: https://www.igi-global.com/book/normative-nature-social-practicesethics/212639.

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characterized by the social aspect. After all, it is about the social interaction between the members. A school aims at the formation of pupils (formative aspect) and not at the “production” of diplomas. In healthcare practices, the ethical value of health care is paramount, and not the profit of the institution. The government exists to promote public justice (its legal aspect) and not primarily to promote the economic interest of the private sector, etc. By clearly distinguishing the reason for existence of a particular practice, practices are prevented from being exercised in an improper manner in which the core value would be compromised. In addition to the qualifying function, a foundational aspect can be distinguished from among the functions of the practice; this aspect characterizes the types of activities or processes performed by the practitioner, from which the practice arises. A certain kind of action needs to be undertaken. To be able to do that, professional skills are required: techniques, methodologies, skills, rules of action, and so on. Every profession has its own “toolbox” with specific know-how. Every profession has, in other words, a basis in professional “techniques.” With these techniques, or technologies, the profession is shaped, and the telos of the practice is realized. Most practices in social life are founded in the formative aspect. After all, what matters is that in specific historical circumstances certain social structures are formed and people work together within these structures to realize certain values. Although the qualifying and the founding aspects give any particular practice its own character, at the same time all practices function in all aspects because they are aspects of the whole reality. This means that in the performance of practices, all the core values must be pursued, but under the guidance of the qualifying core value. A healthcare institution, for instance, does not primarily exist for the financial interests of the investors but for the health interests of the patients. This does not mean, however, that the economic aspect, with the core value of “efficient provision” (pertaining, amongst other things, to efficient management), should not be taken into account. And of course, the practitioners, and the institution that facilitates their practice is embedded, must comply with the law (the legal aspect) and, for example, communicate clearly. Similar reasoning applies to all practices. Good practice performance requires a simultaneous realization of standards under the guidance of the qualifying aspect. Let me draw a few conclusions from this approach to practices which have relevance for the use of new and potentially disruptive technologies.

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‒ Technical innovations penetrate social (professional) practices and influence or even reshape them. ‒ We understand a practice as a coherent form of historically developed, socially established human activity (cf. MacIntyre). ‒ Such practices are not value-free but embody normativity that should be observed by those new technologies. ‒ That normativity can be defined in terms of a constellation of principles and norms related to the modal aspects that Reformational philosophy distinguishes in reality ‒ Only by observing all those principles and norms can the reason for the existence or the purpose (telos) of a practice be realized; this approach resists a reduction of the normativity of any practice to one single principle ‒ Foremost within those principles and norms is the core principle of the aspect that qualifies the practice, such as the ethical aspect in care practices, the formative aspect in educational practices, the economic aspect in business and commercial practices, etc. Towards a Normative Approach to Artificial Intelligence and Human Enhancement Artificial Intelligence If we look again at AI and big data in light of this understanding of human life and of social practices, we note that AI, in particular where it is directly related to analysis of big data, gives a reduced view of reality. It focusses on quantitative data, the first aspect of the fifteen modal aspects. Clearly, data often concern phenomena that are qualified by other aspects, e.g. the biotic (physical health parameters, e.g. cancer treatment), the psychic (psychic health parameters), social structures (use of social media), the juridical aspect (the use of big data in jurisprudence), etc. Yet, in the analysis of big data those phenomena are viewed from a quantitative perspective. Furthermore, the data give statistical correlations, not causalities. An easily made mistake is to jump from correlations to causality. Big data give statistical correlations that can be very useful but in themselves do not give meaning to the phenomena; to make sense of those phenomena we need a much broader understanding of what is going on. The phenomenon of causality is primary in the physical aspect but gets a specific manifestation in each of the aspects. For example, juridical causality concerns the question of whether there

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is a juridical causal relation between two happenings. An example would be the question of whether there is a juridical causal relation between the death of someone on the street and the inaction of a bystander who might have saved that person, even if they did not actually perform the action that killing the person. Similarly, psychic causality is the relation between a psychic mood and a certain behavior; here the concept of imputability plays a role. If the physical form of causality is applied to phenomena that are not physically qualified, the explanation harbors an unjustified degree of certainty and clarity. Yet the concept of causality in its various forms is crucial in explanations of phenomena. The focus of big data on correlations and lack of causality may easily lead to wrong conclusions. An example of this is the prediction of flu epidemics by Google Flu trends.43 In 2008 “Google Flu Trends” predicted flu epidemics two weeks before the (governmental) Centers for Disease Control and prevention, by counting search terms related to flu. But in 2009 they missed the Mexican flu and overestimated the epidemics of 2012/13. The reason is that Google’s algorithms reacted to terms that correlate to flu (like “chicken soup”) but were not indicative of a flu epidemic; they had quantitative data but insufficient sense-making context. Another interesting example is provided by the concept of “smart cities.” Management of the many complex processes taking place in cities can be supported by big data and suitable algorithms. In this approach sometimes the leading underlying concept is the city as a computer. I quote: “If you believe the marketing hype, though, we’re on the cusp of an urban future in which embedded sensors, ubiquitous cameras and beacons, networked smartphones, and the operating systems that link them all together, will produce unprecedented efficiency, connectivity, and social harmony.”44 This view of the city as computer is driven by the pursuit of control. “Our current paradigm, the city as computer, appeals because it frames the messiness of urban life as programmable and subject to rational order.”45 However, Shannon Mattern points out that concept is misleading. Needed for good city management, not just “… data stored and 43. Christian Madsbjerg, Sensemaking: The Power of the Humanities in the Age of Algorithm (New York: Hachette Books, 2017), chap. 2. 44. Shannon Mattern, “A City Is Not a Computer,” Places Journal, February 2017, accessed April 12, 2019, https://placesjournal.org/article/a-city-is-not-a-computer/?gclid=cj0kcqia-onjbrdsarisaezxckymyc brczmenpe6vnnwgu1rxjl8vhwkx4m10-exrgh-k1y0iskopwuaaor5ealw_wcb&cn-reloaded=1. 45. Ibid.

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accessed on city servers, in archival boxes, on library shelves and museum walls,” but also “…forms of urban intelligence that cannot be easily contained, framed, and catalogued…non-textual, un-recordable forms of cultural memory!”46 Being aware of this is especially relevant for marginalized populations, indigenous cultures, and developing nations; for understanding them the historic/formative, lingual, social, economic, and juridical aspects are also crucial. Mattern: “What forms of cultural memory don’t fit on library shelves or city servers? Performative knowledge like dance, ritual, cooking, sports. Ambient data like shadows, wind, and rust.”47 The performative knowledge refers to human embodiment in which all the normative dimensions mentioned above should be considered. The ambient data relate to the natural and social environment, the understanding of which also requires knowledge and insight (sense-making) into their functioning in all the different aspects. Human Enhancement, the Cyborg Myth We again turn to human enhancement by converging technologies. Converging technologies could lead to integrating ICT into the human body; e.g. by moving the cursor of a computer using brain activity (brain-computer interface), paralytic people can use computers. Such developments are to be applauded. However, the pretensions go much further. For example, in the concept of the cyborg as the icon of technical enhancement of performance. Is the superhuman cyborg a possible reality or a myth? The first question that can be raised is: Is the distinction between humans and machines indeed vanishing, as is sometimes asserted. For instance, in the Dutch Trendrede mentioned above.48 The ICT integration into humans is sometimes considered necessary to achieve the desired progress in human capabilities, e.g. by Elon Musk who argued that humans need to merge with machines to become a sort of cyborg, in order to avoid becoming irrelevant in the age of AI. Musk: “Over time I think we will probably see a closer merger of biological intelligence and digital intelligence.”49

46. Mattern, “A City Is Not a Computer.” 47. Ibid. 48. Trendrede, “The fire of change.” 49. Arjun Kharpal, “Elon Musk: Humans Must Merge with Machines or Become Irrelevant in AI Age,” CNBC February 2017, accessed April 12, 2019, https://www.cnbc.

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But looking at human life, we noted above that human flourishing requires respect for structures and limits at each of the four substructures; for example, at the bodily level humans need oxygen, food, sleep, can see only a certain range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation (what we call light), can hear a sound (vibration of air) at certain frequencies, etc. They have certain psychological needs (affection, affirmation, relationships, participation, education, etc.). All these structures embody normativity as explained above. Human flourishing requires a stable identity which in turn needs a degree of continuity and coherence of human living within the various substructures. Integrating a technology into the human body that regulates physical and psychic functions as well as interaction with the environment, must observe the normativity of bodily functioning to allow people to flourish. An example here is the heart transplant. It is lifesaving. But since those nerves that normally connect to the heart and influence the function of the heart (e.g. frequencies of the heart beat) cannot be reconnected to the donor’s heart (cardiac denervation), the patient sometimes experiences psychological problems.50 Even though the circulatory function is completely restored, normal functioning is sometimes frustrated because not all of the normal structures are restored. This ought to be a warning against the type of interventions that do not respect the four substructures of human life. (This is not meant as an argument against heart transplantation, but as an example of the normative structuring of human bodily existence). In other words, integration of technology (machine elements) into the human body must respect the multidimensional meaning-perspectives of human bodily life in order to enable human flourishing. If not, the cyborg will be a machine in which biological structures (cells, tissues) are integrated to fulfil certain functions, but will not be a human being. But this can hardly be called human enhancement. Those entities would have to be seen as robots, robots that might become very powerful and threaten to take control of society (see section on Challenges of pervasive AI). Here the two new technological developments considered in this chapter, AI and human enhancement, have a certain overlap.

com/2017/02/13/elon-musk-humans-merge-machines-cyborg-artificial-intelligencerobots.html. 50. Jack M. Gorman and Richard P. Sloan, “Heart Rate Variability in Depressive and Anxiety Disorders,” American Heart Journal 140, no. 4 (2000): S77–S83.

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Henk Geertsema has pointed out that the myth of the cyborg questions the uniqueness of human personhood in a fundamental sense. It suggests that human life, in the end, is not different from machines. The cyborg myth implies a perspective on humankind that is fundamentally technological.51 This is in clear contrast to the Reformational anthropology in which the relation of the whole embodied human being to the spiritual world, to the sacred, is characteristic of the uniqueness and dignity of humans. Problematic Underlying Issues Having reached this point, we can distinguish a particular way of thinking that underlies the new technological developments under discussion. This is the reduction of reality to data and space, the first two modal aspects distinguished in Reformational philosophy. Everything is basically a number of building blocks in a certain order, constituting data that can be understood and imitated by algorithms. See, for example, Harari’s statement: “all organisms are algorithms.” The role of data in a broader view of information and knowledge of life has been structured ably in a manner that is often attributed to Russell Ackhof.52 This knowledge hierarchy, also called the DIKW hierarchy or pyramid, can be set out as: data–information–knowledge–(understanding)–wisdom. Understanding is not always part of the series but seems a helpful intermediate stage between knowledge and wisdom. Each level of processing implies an extraction of utility from the level before. The rule of thumb formulated in a negative way is: one cannot reduce understanding simply to knowledge, nor knowledge to information, nor information to data. There is quite a debate about the correct interpretation of this pyramid and over the question of how to move from one level to a higher level, e.g. from data to information.53 Something is added, but what? From a Reformational philosophical perspective we can say that all the modal aspects above the first two are reduced to those two, implying that the physical, biotic, psychic etc. do not represent qualitatively distinct aspects

51. Henk G. Geertsema, “Cyborg: Myth or Reality?” Zygon 41, no. 2 (2006): 289–328. 52. The DIKW pyramid. Wikipedia, accessed April 16, 2019, https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/DIKW_pyramid. 53. Jennifer Rowley, “The Wisdom Hierarchy: Representations of the DIKW Hierarchy,” Journal of Information Science 33, no. 2 (2007): 163.

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of reality that should be recognized in doing justice to reality.54 And this reductive approach contains an internal contradiction. If everything could be reduced to an ordering of basic building blocks (digits, sequences of 0 and 1) then where do algorithms come from? An algorithm is a set of instructions that as such already embodies information. But to come to information one would need an algorithm to analyze data–the chicken and egg problem. The reductive view of reality itself requires another view of reality, one in which meaning, interpretation, understanding, can somehow be identified. Madsbjerg has convincingly demonstrated that data used in the AI world falls short in giving guidance for decisions in everyday life.55 Behind this fundamentally reductive approach to reality I distinguish the technicistic attitude explained above. In our (post)modern culture this attitude has become the predominant framework in public life for interpreting reality and as such has attained a religious character (in the anthropological sense explained above). This attitude and concomitant world view pretend that technology can solve our problems. This, however, requires full control of reality. Hence, behind the technological advancements as discussed here I perceive a pursuit of control. A pursuit that in its turn embodies a drive to freedom and self-determination. Control and freedom are two central values of (post)modern culture and for many people have become absolute values. On one hand these two values need each other: control needs freedom to intervene and freedom needs control to be realized. However, on the other hand, they annihilate one another: to achieve full freedom vulnerable human people need a form of (technological) control, but at the same time, (technological) control of human life destroys personal freedom. Considering this situation and taking into account the religious language of some experts in the field as indicated above, I also perceive in modern technology a utopian dynamic, seeking to prove that life without God can be lived well. Unfortunately, for many, in our culture God has become a symbol of what is repressive and hinders the authentic.56 The degree of control 54. This reduction was lamented in a poetic way by T. S. Eliot’s poem ‘Choruses from The Rock’ (1934): “Where is the Life we have lost in living? Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in the information?” Thomas S. Eliot “Choruses from ‘The Rock’,” in The Complete Poems and Plays of T.S. Eliot (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), 147. 55. Madsbjerg, Sensemaking. 56. This is quite an issue in itself that cannot be elaborated any further here. In this context it is important to note it as part of the background of an often irrational faith in technology as the solution to all our problems.

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that is effectively possible may suggest for a time that such a “good life” without God is possible. But sooner or later this will turn out to be an illusion, often, and especially, in the face of suffering and death. Our pursuit of control manifests itself in the inability of people in our culture to face our vulnerability and mortality in a way that is not determined by technological (medical) control. It shows our growing inability to integrate mortality into our view of life. This seems to require hope beyond death. Christianity does provide and ground such hope. These critical remarks do not mean that big data and AI do not provide enormous opportunities for improvement in life’s conditions. Authors such as Fry and Madsbjerg have given many examples of that. But, as argued in this chapter, such use should take into account a broad integrated view of humanity, in which all the dimensions of meaning and the centrality of relation to God is acknowledged, if we are to remain “humane” in this technological age.

Human Embodiment and Cancer Technology: Embracing a Theology of Weakness RONALD T. MICHENER

Abstract This theological-phenomenological narrative reflection considers how the resources of cancer affect the way one views the human body with respect to one’s humanity while undergoing such treatment. The robust human being is often viewed as the one with a strong, healthy body: vibrant, muscular, and independent. In contrast, cancer therapy severely weakens the body while seeking to rid the body of cancerous cells and requires one to face multiple vulnerabilities to the other (in various medical, social, and familial contexts). This chapter contends that the human person may find authentic human dignity in practicing humility before the other while undergoing invasive tests and treatments available through medical technology. Submitting oneself to medical technological encroachments upon the body (via medical caregivers), does not compromise or diminish one’s humanity, but provides a space where authentic humanity is manifested in its brokenness and finiteness. Further, cancer treatments provide the space for a deep connection with a broader human community in various contexts as the patient engages with caregivers, fellow patients, and supportive family and friends. Human weakness in the face of cancer ironically displays the strength of humanity in the imago Dei.

Introduction: Personal Background Cancer is no stranger to any of us. As the second leading cause of death worldwide,1 it is not surprising that great resources are being put into cancer research and technology. So how does this medical technology affect the way one views the human body with respect to one’s humanity while undergoing such treatment? The robust human being is often viewed as the one with a strong, healthy body: vibrant, muscular, and independent. In contrast, cancer therapy severely weakens the body while seeking to rid the body of cancerous cells and requires one to face multiple vulnerabilities to the other (in various medical, social, and 1. World Health Organization, “Cancer,” WHO, September 12, 2018, accessed February 5, 2019, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/cancer.

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familial contexts). This chapter explores how the human person may find authentic human dignity in practicing humility before the other in the face of the vulnerabilities typically induced by the cancer treatments available through medical technology.2 This essay is not a personally detached theological discourse, but a personally attached reflection. On the 28th of September 2016, I received an aggressive cancer diagnosis: Diffuse, large B cell, double-hit, non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma (It is called “double-hit” because it means that the lymphoma cells created abnormal changes in two important genes). I began a series of 6, 5-day in-patient, 96-hour straight chemotherapy infusions with a cocktail known as “R-EPOCH,” followed by a 22-day hospital stay beginning with a 7th intensive round of a lethal chemotherapy concoction called “HIGH BEAM,” and an autologous stem cell transplant–meaning that they used my own stem cells for the transplant. There were a number of other amazing things I had the opportunity to experience: PET scans, X-Rays, a spinal tap, MRIs, and so forth, but there is no need to highlight them all. I do not mention all this to evoke sympathy, but simply to highlight my personal experience with cancer technology (which I will more or less equate with cancer “treatment” in this essay) that has stimulated my musings on the theological implications of being human while living with cancer and receiving cancer treatment.3 My reflections also stem from my understanding of the Christian narrative of human being: the human person as embodied, fragile and embedded within creation. Kelly Kapic’s work on hope and suffering finds Bonhoeffer’s Creation and Fall helpful when addressing how medical technologies influence our view of embodiment.4 Bonhoeffer connects creation to human bodies. As Bonhoeffer puts it: It is God’s earth out of which humankind is taken. From it human beings have their bodies. The body belongs to a person’s essence. The body is not 2. As a non-scientist, I cannot speak scientifically regarding the specifics of the vast, complex technological, medical resources for cancer diagnosis and treatment. So, when I speak of “cancer technology” I will be speaking more phenomenologically than technically or scientifically. I will reflect on the experience of participating within the medical world of cancer treatment and the technologies therein and how that relates to the human person and the human person seen theologically. 3. Of course, each cancer “journey” is different and intensely personal. A particular cancer diagnosis resists generalization and cannot be subsumed under one umbrella “type” without regarding the particular. See also note 7 below. 4. Kelly M. Kapic, Embodied Hope: A Theological Meditation on Pain and Suffering (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2017), 817–950, Kindle.

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the prison, the shell, the exterior, of a human being; instead a human being is a human body. A human being does not “have” a body or “have” a soul; instead a human being “is” body and soul.5

In this connection with creation, we remain finite, flawed, fallen, awaiting renewal, redemption, and restoration. Cancer is a symptom of the imperfections and brokenness of embodiment and the fragile conditions of creation in which we are embedded. But in this brokenness, we remain called to thrive as human beings. Greg Syler (Cancer & Theology) states it well when he says: “Human flourishing, what it means to thrive as a human person created in God’s own image can only be uncovered in the context of this world which is both created and disorderly, both beautiful and stained, both redeemed and fallen, both/and through and through.”6 With this in mind, I will proceed as follows: First, I will draw upon the insights of theological ethicist Brent Waters to make some general observations on today’s technological context in relation to being human. Next, I will consider the limits of medical/cancer technology and human mortality. This will be followed by a brief experiential reflection on “vulnerabilities” and the conditions one faces while going through cancer treatment.7 Next, I will interweave theological reflections on these vulnerabilities and will suggest that such exposed weaknesses ironically display the dignity of the human person in the imago Dei and equally evoke theological hope. 5. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3, ed. Ilse Tödt, Martin Rüter, and John W. de Gruchy, trans. Douglas S. Bax, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, vol. 3 (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2004), 76–7. Bonhoeffer refers to Emil Brunner, God and Man: Four Essays on the Nature of Personality, trans. David Cairns (London: SCM Press, 1936), 154. 6. Greg Syler, “On Pain Suffering, and Cancer (Bill Stringfellow, etc.)” in Cancer & Theology, ed. Jake Bouma and Erik Ullestad, 90–7 (Des Moines, IA: Elbow Co., 2013), 91, Kindle. 7. Although these reflections will draw particularly on my own experiences, they are “generalized” in the sense that I can relate to some of the experiences that other cancer patients undergo. At the same time, a caution is in order. John Caputo cites the words of the head of an oncology department who, after listening to a lecture that analyzed Gadamer’s notion of “the fecundity of the individual case,” said “Isn’t all of oncology hermeneutic?” (John D. Caputo, Hermeneutics: Facts and Interpretation in the Age of Information (London: Penguin, 2018), 227. Caputo cites Nancy Moules et al., “Isn’t All of Oncology Hermeneutic?” Journal of Applied Hermeneutics (2013), accessed February 21, 2019, https://journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/index.php/jah/issue/view/4285. The point is that cancer is varied and different and affects people differently, too. Each particular person/ patient must be considered individually, rather than lumped into the morass of “cancer patients.” See Caputo, Hermeneutics, 228.

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Technology and the Fragile Human Being We are ingrained in a world of modern technology that includes computers, smart phones, smart televisions, and the list goes on. We often do not question the values of such technologies or modes by which we engage with them as they have become, to employ a Heideggerian notion, “ready to hand.” Nevertheless, they change our everyday practices through their inherent modes of tactility and immediacy. Medical Technology and Personal Autonomy Modern technologies (medical, cancer treatment technologies included) inevitably re-shape our habits and how we envision the human person in relation to others. The more human beings can master and control their bodies, whether through the rigors of daily exercise, diet, or medical technology, the better the human life, so the story goes.8 Brent Waters writes: “Medicine, to at least some extent, is reshaping human nature by enabling relatively good health over an extended period of time into a widespread expectation rather than a rare occurrence.”9 Waters, however, is not uncritical of medical technologies, and wonders if rather than giving us more autonomy, as they were intended, they end up putting us into their servitude.10 Although the question of whether technology enslaves us or frees us in our humanity is not the focus of this chapter, one thing is certain: Technologies must not be seen as simply unbiased, neutral means by which medical treatment is obtained; they must be critically appropriated. As George Grant puts it (quoted by Waters): “When we represent technology to ourselves as an array of neutral instruments invented by human beings and under human control, we are expressing a kind of common sense, but it is a common sense from within the very technology we are attempting to represent.”11 This commonsense perspective on the inherent value of medical technology stems from, as Waters points out, the late modern values of personal autonomy and preservation of the “inherently fragile and vulnerable” 8. Brent Waters, “A Good Christian Death,” in Christian Dying: Witnesses from the Tradition, ed. George Kalantzis and Matthew Levering, chap. 11 (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2018), 5679, Kindle. 9. Waters, “A Good Christian Death,” 5686. 10. Brent Waters, This Mortal Flesh: Incarnation and Bioethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2009) 40–1. 11. George Grant, Technology and Justice (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1986), 32, quoted in Waters, This Mortal Flesh: Incarnation and Bioethics, 41.

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body that is basic to human life.12 But the failure of medical technologies to provide us with ultimate freedom from physical death, has, according to Mark Jensen, “transformed the traditional question of theodicy into a problem of anthropodicy.”13 For Jensen, cancer is a “primary symbol of the current limits of technological power”14 and I would add, a living symbol of the human being dramatically confronted with the inescapable weakness of human mortality. Limits of Technology and Human Mortality Lisa Diedrich, drawing upon the feminist/postmodern perspectives of Gillian Rose and Jackie Stacey, looks to “Antiheroic Cancer Narratives” that ascribe to what she calls a “Bioethics of failure,” challenging the notion of autonomy as the priority for bioethics.15 Cancer technologies are applied so that the one “fighting” the cancer may win the “battle” against cancer invading the body. If one overcomes, then one has won rather than lost the battle with cancer. Theologian Deanna Thompson’s recent book, Glimpsing Resurrection: Cancer, Trauma, and Ministry, also questions the military and “survivorship” language that often accompanies cancer. If you are diagnosed with cancer, you pull out all the weapons at your disposal to battle it. The military imagery gives “a logical framework for illnesses like cancer: cancer gets cast as an evil invader, and those of us who have the disease are called to take the moral high ground by fighting and ultimately defeating it.”16 If you battle well, you become a cancer “survivor.” If not, you have ultimately failed.17 This unfortunate perspective buys into the idea of the authentic human being as the one with a vibrant, healthy body. Jackie Stacey points out that 12. Waters, This Mortal Flesh: Incarnation and Bioethics, 31–2. 13. Mark Jensen, “Some Implications of Narrative Theology for Ministry to Cancer Patients,” The Journal of Pastoral Care 38, no. 3 (1984): 219. 14. Jensen, “Some Implications of Narrative Theology for Ministry to Cancer Patients,” 219. 15. Lisa Diedrich, “A Bioethics of Failure: Antiheroic Cancer Narratives,” in Ethics of the Body: Postconventional Challenges, ed. Margrit Shildrick and Roxanne Mykitiuk (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 135. 16. Deanna A. Thompson, Glimpsing Resurrection: Cancer, Trauma, and Ministry (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2018), 192, Kindle. 17. Thompson, Glimpsing Resurrection. Thompson refers to Susan Gubar along these lines (location 627). She also mentions a personal conversation with a friend who was frustrated with military imagery applied to cancer. If one loses “the battle” with cancer, “the last act of this person’s life is one of failure.” Author’s conversation with Andy Tix, July 12, 2017 (location 2637).

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this is a trademark of our Western culture, where “we are encouraged to think of our lives as coherent stories of success, progress, and movement. Loss and failure have their place but only as part of a broader picture of ascendance.”18 The ultimate goal is to move beyond and conquer the illness in order to manifest the heroic human condition–a perspective common among cancer narratives and subcultures.19 Another concerned voice pertaining to this perspective, not arguing from the particularity of a Christian perspective, is Susan Babbitt’s monograph, Humanism and Embodiment. Babbitt argues against disembodied tendencies in reason. She looks to the work of Austrian philosopher and priest, Ivan Illich, who advocated the importance of acknowledging our contingency and realizing the manipulative, market-driven tendencies of technology, which he calls the “disease of medical progress.” 20 Babbitt submits that some read Illich as condemning, for example, chemotherapy and radiation treatments for cancer in favor of more naturopathic approaches. But this is not the case. Instead, Babbitt argues, Illich is rather speaking to the reasons decisions are made and how the person is able to cope with his or her experience. Health is not about avoidance of one’s condition, but about facing the reality of suffering and death; it is “an engagement with fleshiness.”21 Again, being human is about embodiment, engaging with the “fleshiness” of life in all of its bruises. What is often forgotten, as Waters again insists, is that it is the qualities of “fragility and vulnerability” (and their “interdependence”) “that make humans genuinely human. In their absence humans would be unable to learn the trust that makes their enriched social life possible. Or in theological terms, it is as embodied creatures that they bear the imago Dei–the image of their triune creator.”22 As Christians, it is imperative that we honestly embrace our humanity in all of its inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities. We must not buy into the pernicious tendency to aspire toward what Waters (and others) call “posthuman.” The fragility of embodiment is a gift to be “received 18. Diedrich, “A Bioethics of Failure,” 136. 19. Ibid. 20. Susan E. Babbitt, Humanism and Embodiment: From Cause and Effect to Secularism (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 108–9. Babbitt refers to Ivan Illich, Tools for Conviviality (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 3. 21. Babbitt, Humanism and Embodiment, 109. Again, Babbitt draws upon the work of Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine: Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (London: Marion Boyers, 1976), 7, 40, 129, 132. 22. Waters, This Mortal Flesh, 32.

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with gratitude instead of a curse to be despised.”23 Of course, embodied fragility is not an easy pill to swallow when it comes to medical treatment. Barbara Powe refers to cancer fatalism as a perspective accompanying a cancer diagnosis, putting one into a state of “hopelessness, powerlessness, worthlessness, and social despair.” 24 Interestingly, in Powe’s research, many cancer fatalists believed that their condition was the result of God’s will.25 Powe is careful to say, however, that one who believes that God’s will is instrumental in one’s life, is not necessarily a fatalist. Cancer fatalism is when one accepts death as the outcome from the cancer in such a way that one does not seek the potential benefit of medical treatment.26 The tension with cancer treatment lies between the hopefulness of treatment (i.e. being positively engaged with the technology of such treatment) and the embracing of one’s weaknesses and mortality. I would suggest that this is not a necessary, but rather a perceived tension. We need both perspectives for a proper theological consideration and ordering of the benefits of cancer technology. One must avoid fatalism, without succumbing to naïve optimism. We must acknowledge the realities of disease and death and must not let the voices of modern medical technologies convince us that we are intended to escape it. As Stanley Hauerwas put it with his own ironic wit and sarcasm, “if we just get good enough at medical technology, we can get out of life alive.”27 For Hauerwas, “Medicine has become our means of overcoming our ‘fragility.’”28 Of course, we will never get “good enough at it” to avoid death completely, but such a desire for human immortality indeed often shapes the impetus of medical technologies. Waters suggests that this “posthuman” project, rather than esteeming the importance of embodiment, instead manifests a “loathing of the body” by failing to acknowledge the human being as they are: weak, vulnerable, and mortal.29 Indeed, we are “beings unto death” (pace 23. Ibid., 45. Cf. also 27, 29–30, 44. 24. Barbara D. Powe, “Cancer Fatalism: Spiritual Perspectives,” Journal of Religion and Health 36, no. 2 (1997): 135. 25. Ibid., 135. 26. Ibid., 137. Cf. also 135. Powe refers to Barbara D. Powe and Alonzo Johnson, “Fatalism among African Americans: Philosophical Perspectives,” Journal of Religion and Health 34, no. 2 (1995): 119–25. 27. Stanley Hauerwas in Brian Brock and Stanley Hauerwas, Beginnings: Interrogating Hauerwas (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 98. 28. Stanley Hauerwas, Naming the Silences: God, Medicine, and the Problem of Suffering (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 107. 29. Waters, This Mortal Flesh, 157. Waters continues this thought by stating: “Extending longevity and improving physical and mental functions is merely an interim

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Heidegger) but this need not lead us down the pessimistic Freudian path of Thanatos. As Christians, there is dignity, humanity, and hope simply in our weakness and mortality as embodied human beings. Cancer Treatment and Human Vulnerability Upon receiving a cancer diagnosis, human vulnerability to technological invasions becomes commonplace. Needles routinely pierce the body in various forms: biopsies, port-catheters, spinal taps, injections, and blood tests. The body is put under machines from PET and CT scans, X-rays, ultrasounds, and may face radiation treatment. Toxic chemicals enter the body; it becomes weak and hairless from head, eyebrows, eyelashes, facial hair, all the way down to the toes. Bodily functions and excretions become subjects of conversation and examination with professional caregivers. During hospital stays, clothing is reduced to a loose-fitting robe which often reveals rather than conceals. Subsiding physical strength, nausea, and irritability become commonplace, along with socially awkward times of falling asleep in front of visiting friends. The body is at the mercy of those managing and administering the technologies and treatments. One has seemingly no control of the body; it is fragile and weak, and one’s emotional resources for coping are depleted. One’s world, one’s plans, one’s relationships, and everything about daily life is radically transformed into a series of question marks. Indeed, this is my personal cancer story of vulnerability, weakness, brokenness, and humility. But I am not a victim fighting a cancer battle against an exterior force that violated or intruded upon my body. It happened within and because of my body and its flawed condition in a creation longing for redemption.30 This is not to say that cancer is really something good after all, or something that is, as John Piper has said, “designed” for me by God.31 Cancer wreaks havoc on the body, strategy until such time that virtual immortality is achieved, liberating humans from their weak and fragile bodies” (158). 30. In this regard, Deanna Thompson insightfully submits: “Therefore, cancer’s own working within the body helps generate an experience of exile from the self.” Deanna Thompson, Glimpsing Resurrection: Cancer, Trauma, and Ministry, 423, Kindle. For further insights on cancer as a “natural,” biological, evolutionary process of humanity (from an explicitly Christian perspective) see Leonard M. Hummel and Gayle E. Woloschak, Chance, Necessity, Love: An Evolutionary Theology of Cancer (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2017). 31. John Piper, “Don’t Waste your Cancer,” desiringGod, February 15, 2006, accessed February 8, 2018, https://www.desiringgod.org/articles/dont-waste-your-cancer.

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draining it of life and energy. Cancer is symbolic of and highlights the basic fragile nature of embodied living in a broken world.32 Modern advertising attempts to convince us that the body can always be strong and suave. But the body has inherent weaknesses; at some point, physical death is inevitable. Nobody denies this. But the indeterminacy of cancer, and cancer treatments puts this inevitability front and center. Our bodies, along with all of creation, are flawed and broken. Fallen creation groans with weakness (Romans 8), even while it moves towards renewal, redemption, and resurrection. In the meantime, a grand irony occurs: The broken human body in the wake of the weakening poison of chemotherapy is allowed an opportunity to display authentic human strength through weakness, vulnerability, humility, and community. In this, the human other within community, also manifests human strength in displays of compassion, care, sacrifice, and prayers. Cancer Treatment and Human Dignity in Christian Community How we critically appropriate cancer treatment follows from what we believe makes us authentic human beings before God, as beings created in His image, as noted above. Of course, there is much more that must be said regarding the ethics of cancer technologies themselves, but this has not been the focus of this chapter. Instead, I have focused on the perceptions of what it means to be human (granted, from a particular Christian theological-anthropological perspective) when engaged in and with the technologies of cancer treatment. 32. Whether or not cancer itself is evil may be a matter of debate and context. It is certainly perceived as a natural evil in that it is a disease with the potential to vanquish life from the body and causes individual and communal pain without any apparent benefits. The overall notion of cancer as evil is however challenged by Hummel and Woloschak (Hummel and Woloschak, Chance, Necessity, Love). Following their booklength treatment of this subject from a scientific and theological perspective, they conclude: “Since cancer is the inevitable consequence of human evolution, at some level it is a consequence of being evolving human beings and is of necessity required for our existence. Based on this, it is clear that cancer is a consequence that humanity must face in order to be evolving creatures that can survive in this world; as such, then, each person that suffers from cancer is paying the price for humanity’s evolution and therefore deserves our love and support. Our responsibility as human persons is that we must care for those with cancer because they are suffering the consequences in place for all humanity; their disease is the disease of all humanity, and their suffering is the suffering of all humanity. We have a responsibility of love, care, and ease of pain and suffering that is a needed consequence of our responsibility to others who are suffering on behalf of all of humanity.” Hummel and Woloschak, Chance, Necessity, Love, 170.

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Cancer technologies employed by medical caregivers address the needs of the vulnerable body. They are used to improve the human condition by providing resources for the possibility of temporary healing. Andrew Sloane’s work (Vulnerability and Care: Christian Reflections on the Philosophy of Medicine) provides helpful insights in this regard when he speaks to the purpose of medicine (theologically) as “a matter of engaging with needy people whose inherent vulnerability, dependence and finitude has been exposed by the exigencies of life in this world and the way it impacts us as embodied persons.”33 This engagement, however, is not reduced to a means toward an end. Sloane continues: It is both an expression of human flourishing, in as much as the flourishing of persons and communities entails the exercise of relationships of love and justice and fidelity (irrespective of the utility of those relationships or the persons we relate to), and a means of enhancing the flourishing of persons and communities, for it enables us to be formed as persons and communities that exemplify the character of God’s kingdom and aims to do what we can to assist needy people to so engage in relationships and the world.34

Throughout my treatments I was required to trust the physicians, nurses, medical technicians, and caregivers of all kinds as I prepared for the needles, injections, scans, and chemicals that entered my body. I quickly realized that my body was not in control. I was submissive to the technology and to the medical caregivers applying the technology as authorities over my body. But the impersonal technologies gave opportunities for personal connections. The acts of submission to seemingly impersonal forces accentuated my weakness. Yet, my human dignity was manifested in showing submission, respect, and even enjoying humor with my caregivers. This was dignity that came not from manifesting the strong, muscular, “take the bull by the horns,” self-standing individual. Instead it was dignity that came from embracing an embodied humanity walking the way of weakness. In this walk, the body manifested human be-ing, and provided opportunities that allowed others to display human flourishing as beings for the other.35 Stanley Hauerwas astutely comments on this “give and take” aspect of human vulnerability in the midst of illness: 33. Andrew Sloane, Vulnerability and Care: Christian Reflections on the Philosophy of Medicine (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 150. 34. Ibid., 151. 35. This is not to say that this always goes well. Poor “bedside manner” can be displayed by the physician, nurse, or technician as much as by the patient.

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the very willingness of those who are suffering from illness to be in the presence of the well is a form of service. Suffering and pain make us vulnerable, and often we try to protect ourselves by attempting to be “selfsufficient.” The willingness to be present as well as to accept the assistance of others when we need help is a gift we give one another. The trick, of course, is to be the kind of community in which such a gift does not become the occasion for manipulating each other, for trying to obtain through our weakness what we cannot get others to give us voluntarily.”36

As human beings, as Christians, we believe our identity is found in being created in the image of God, but also in being part of the body of Christ. Kapic again observes that Bonhoeffer links physicality (or embodiment) to both creation and to relationality.37 The three must not be separated. Bonhoeffer expresses this clearly when he writes: Humankind created in this way is humankind as the image of God. It is the image of God not in spite of but precisely in its bodily nature. For in their bodily nature human beings are related to the earth and to other bodies; they are there for others and are dependent upon others. In their bodily existence human beings find their brothers and sisters and find the earth. As such creatures human beings of earth and spirit are “like” God, their Creator.38

Within the Body of Christ, all parts are essential: weaker parts, stronger parts, visible parts, concealed parts; all are significant for the working of the whole (1 Cor 12). For the corporate body to thrive requires vulnerability before the other; it requires admissions of weakness and humility. For the body to do its best, the human individual submits to the other, draws upon the strength of the other, and defers to the other for the best of the body. Ultimately, the most “excellent way” described by the Apostle Paul (1 Cor 12:31) is the way of personal sacrifice, patience, and love toward the other (1 Cor 13). This organic interconnectedness is expressed well in the recent theological commentary on 1 Corinthians by Brian Brock and Bernd Wannenwetsch: The organic body transmits sympathetic reactions through a connective nervous system that must be intact if the living organism is to function. As is well known, conditions like leprosy that affect the nervous unity of the body lead to inevitable loss of extremities and finally limbs. Putting the 36. Hauerwas, Naming the Silences, 89. 37. Kapic, Embodied Hope, 896–907. 38. Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, 79. See also Kapic, Embodied Hope, 908.

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matter this way helps us see that Paul is not telling the Corinthians they “should” suffer or rejoice together, setting out on the project of engendering a culture of compassion or sympathy. … we must consciously resist slipping into reading Paul as entering the register of moral exhortation here. What is being presented to the Corinthians is no ideal to be achieved but the reality of the body in which they already exist and which God has so arranged.39

Brock and Wannenwetch’s caution not to make the “is” into the “ought” is important. Authentic human dignity is displayed in humility and submission to the other in the body of Christ. Moreover, the manifestation of these traits within the body of Christ also manifest themselves outwardly to those apart from the body of Christ. This flies in the face of an autonomous, robust, individualism. As human beings, we have always needed others, whether we like it or not.40 Rather than avoid the other, we are designed to find refuge in the other. If instead we turn to isolation, in order to (as Waters insists) “lessen the risk of vulnerability and suffering” then we are settling for “being something less than human.” And Waters continues: “It is precisely this risk that makes the bonds of love and affection possible, and it is these fragile bonds that enable humans to become the kind of creatures God intends them to be.”41 In our practices of submission and service before others, we exercise a practical theology of weakness, developing and modeling our humility muscles for the sake of others and before our God who has modeled His strength in weakness through the Incarnation. Of course, as we have noted, this runs contrary to our tendencies to manifest ability, control, and personal power. William Placher perceptively exposes this tendency when he writes: “Human beings seek power because they are afraid of weakness, afraid of what might happen should they be vulnerable, and so the drive for power that looks like the purest expression of freedom proves in significant degree inspired by an enslaving fear that dares not

39. Brian Brock and Bernd Wannenwetsch, The Therapy of the Christian Body: A Theological Exposition of Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians, vol. 2 (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2018), 2892, Kindle. 40. As Brent Waters puts it so well: “… rather than withdrawing into and isolating myself from others, I would try to remember that I have never lived as an autonomous individual, but always in bonds of fellowship. From the beginning my life has been shared with family, friends, colleagues, and strangers, many of whom have changed over time, but the human bonds of imperfection have always been there.” Waters, “A Good Christian Death,” 5813. 41. Waters, This Mortal Flesh, 48.

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risk vulnerability.”42 Placher argues for a God who is not afraid to reveal himself in weakness and vulnerability, just as God revealed himself in the suffering of Jesus.43 This theme also resounds in Moltmann’s work, The Crucified God. As Moltmann writes: “When the crucified Jesus is called the ‘image of the invisible God’, the meaning is that this is God, and God is like this. God is not greater than he is in this humiliation. God is not more glorious than he is in this self-surrender. God is not more powerful than he is in this helplessness. God is not more divine than he is in this humanity.”44 Although we may wish to nuance Moltmann’s strong words regarding the weakness of God, he effectively captures the significance of the ironic power of sacrifice, humility, and vulnerability to manifest the authentic human being in God’s image. Hope after Cancer and/or Cancer Treatment I have suggested that there is dignity, humanity, and hope in our finitude and vulnerability because it displays the fragility of our embodiment as created human beings. Although I have reflected on the aspects of dignity and humanity, I have not developed the aspect of hope. While acknowledging the scope of this chapter, allow me some cursory thoughts in this regard, while acknowledging the need for further development. Cancer treatment is indeterminate. For some it simply palliative. Others live with monthly, quarterly, or yearly indeterminacy of potential relapse. Remission is a vague, unknown region of being. I am reluctant to identify myself as a cancer “survivor” because I realize that all healing is temporary until resurrection and new creation. For some of us, for whatever unknown reason (that has nothing to do with any inherent goodness of ourselves), God has allowed us to experience what we might call “mini” resurrection events which are albeit temporary markers that point back to the resurrection of Jesus and forward to personal resurrection in the scheme of God’s creation renewal program (which Jesus inaugurated as the “Kingdom of God”). Such “mini” events were displayed in the book of Acts with such healings seen in Aeneas, Dorcas, and

42. William C. Placher, Narratives of a Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology, and Scripture (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1994), 18. 43. Ibid., 16–8. 44. Jurgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1993), 205.

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others. Of course, these healings were only temporary, as these people eventually died of the same or different diseases or predicaments. Temporary healings are experienced today in various ways, including those among those still living after facing cancer. In this sense, our hope in the midst of our vulnerabilities of cancer or other illness comes by embracing resurrection proleptically. In this regard, Christine Tind JohannessenHenry relates Pannenberg’s proleptic insights regarding the resurrection to those living after facing cancer: According to Pannenberg, the question of human destiny beyond death keeps the mind alive to the idea that the secret of life surpasses all our present knowledge. How is this beyond related to cancer survivors and their daily lives? Pannenberg writes that by the power of the divine Spirit of love, we have already reached ‘‘beyond’’ our own death. This means that a person’s present thoughts and actions do not only relate to the history of the past, but also to the history of the future. In this understanding of beyond, the limit of death can be transcended in the person’s concern for family, relatives and their future.45

Of course, the trauma of cancer may inhibit such hope, and certainly cannot be used as a platitude to those in the midst of suffering.46 Recent works by Todd Billings and Deanna Thompson (both of whom have/ are faced/facing cancer) posit a sense of hope that also comes through grief. As grief is expressed to God in the context of the community of faith, God makes himself close and present in the climate of human suffering.47 Ronald Nydam expressed it this way when reflecting theologically on his cancer: “Unless we enter the valley of our own suffering with eyes open and unless we lament in a very human way, we will fail to experience the wider expanses of God’s redeeming work in us.”48

45. Christine T. Johannessen-Henry, “Polydox Eschatology: Relating Systematic and Everyday Theology in a Cancer Context,” Studia Theologica 66 (2012): 117. 46. See Thompson, Glimpsing Resurrection, 2539–46. Cf. also J. Todd Billings, Rejoicing in Lament: Wrestling with Incurable Cancer and Life in Christ (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2015), 101, 112. 47. See again, Billings, Rejoicing in Lament, especially 148-161, and Thompson, Glimpsing Resurrection, chap. 5, “Not Yet Resurrection Hope,” especially section titled “A Hope Spacious Enough for Grief.” 48. Ronald J. Nydam, “Facing Cancer: The Spiritual Dangers of a Docetic Engagement of Acute Leukemia,” Calvin Theological Journal 45 (2010): 341.

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Conclusion In this affirmative, phenomenological-theological vision of human finitude in the wake of cancer, significant problems remain. More must be said after this brief essay. I have not attempted to consider, nor could I, why cancer is part of the world, or any other things we may consider natural evils of creation. I did not address any issues of deep emotional and physical anguish that may accompany cancer. These are extremely important matters that require theological care and beg for well-informed pastoral support. I have simply acknowledged that this is the way things are. As embodied human beings, we are embedded within God’s creation where such things happen. But I have suggested that manifesting this “weak” reality is not less than human, but authentically human. The finite, vulnerable human being in the face of cancer, is allowed a sacred space for deep, embodied, other-human connections that mark human beings as truly be-ing human. I can also say that I experienced what I am promoting. While undergoing treatment, surrounded by expensive technological resources, I not only experienced human dignity with my caregivers, family, and friends, I also witnessed the “weak” power of human dignity in others as they extended themselves to me and my family in compassionate, sacrificial care.

Biotechnological Enhancement in A ‘World Come of Age’: Engaging Enhancement Technologies with Dietrich Bonhoeffer KEVIN O’FARRELL

Abstract This chapter explores the practice of biotechnological enhancement by engaging the theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. The author argues that Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s mode of engagement on the question of what it means to be human today possesses benefits missing from metaphysically inclined approaches. This comes through in Bonhoeffer’s late musings on “a world come of age.” In concretely exploring how this mode of engagement assists in considering what it means to be human in this technological age, the chapter engages Bonhoeffer’s 1932 lecture, “The Right to Self-Assertion,” that skillfully probes how the Western perception of and engagement with nature externalizes itself in the emergence of the machine and war. The author concludes by suggesting how Bonhoeffer’s analysis in the lecture contributes to theologically informed reflection on what it means to be human in the light of biotechnological enhancement. The end result is a theologically informed mode of engagement that is able to interrogate the practice of biotechnological enhancement without condemning it on an a priori or metaphysical basis.

Introduction Human enhancement technologies are certainly a talking point in contemporary moral theology, and for good reason. The rapid development of new enhancement technologies is unprecedented. From human genetic engineering to neural implants, the once thought impossible is now (becoming) possible. In the active attempt “to improve human capacities, performances, dispositions, and well-being beyond the traditional scope of therapeutic medicine,” enhancement technologies present questions concerning what it means to be human and what status is afforded to human biological nature.1 Enhancements are unsurprisingly 1. The above quote is taken from Giubilini and Sanyal’s definition of human enhancement, which is employed in this essay. The full quote is as follows: “Human enhancement in contemporary philosophical debate refers to biomedical interventions

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a topic of heated debate with approaches to the topic being as varied as the conclusions reached by those who engage it. There are movements that vigorously embrace the development of enhancement technologies, celebrating them as a positive step into the future of humanity. And there are movements that sharply oppose these developments, claiming that enhancements do not actually enhance human experience, but only distort it.2 This chapter presents a modest attempt to add to this conversation on enhancement technologies by thinking alongside Dietrich Bonhoeffer, whose mode of engagement offers a helpful lens for considering what it means to be human in light of enhancement technologies. The choice to engage Bonhoeffer may seem strange, given that his writings have reached or are approaching their centenary. Some may thus consider his writings outdated given the technological developments that have emerged since Bonhoeffer’s untimely death in 1945. Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer’s voice remains incisive and remarkably relevant for interrogating enhancement technologies. This, in part, stems from how enhancement technologies were not a fantasy in his era, but were already normalized–evidenced through the widespread consumption of the methamphetamine Pervitin, which increased human endurance and concentration beyond what is typically expected.3 More importantly, Bonhoeffer’s engagements with technology remain incisive for their ability to interrogate the technological rationale that fosters the continual development of new technologies such as enhancements.4 While to improve human capacities, performance, dispositions, and well-being beyond the traditional scope of therapeutic medicine.” Alberto Giubilini and Sagar Sanyal, “The Ethics of Human Enhancement,” Philosophy Compass 10, no. 4 (2005): 233. 2. Giubilini and Sanyal offer a survey of other approaches that both affirm and resist the development of enhancement technologies. See Ibid., 233–43. For a theological survey of varying approaches to enhancement, see also Gerald McKenny, Biotechnology, Human Nature, and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 3. For more on the role of Pervitin in the Third Reich, see Norman Ohler, Blitzed: Drugs in the Third Reich, trans. Shaun Whiteside (London: Penguin Books, 2016); Stephen Snelders and Toine Pieters, “Speed in the Third Reich: Methamphetamine (Pervitin) Use and a Drug History from Below,” Social History of Medicine 24, no. 3 (2011): 686–99. Interestingly Bonhoeffer endorses Pervitin to his best friend Eberhard Bethge in a letter from prison (dated 18 November 1943). “Shouldn’t you have Papa give you a few Pervitin for when you are on guard at night? Here it is often used for this purpose, and I recently tried it on myself. It is very good.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. John W. de Gruchy, trans. Isabel Best et al., vol. 8, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis: Fortress Press 2010), 185. 4. Bonhoeffer discusses technology in the following places: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3, ed. Martin Rüter, Ilse Tödt,

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technologies adapt and develop, the technological rationale operative today has been largely continuous since Bonhoeffer’s age, and Bonhoeffer’s unique contribution is his robustly theological disruption of this rationale.5 As Daniel Treier suggests, Bonhoeffer’s sporadic engagements on technology remain relevant as “apocalyptic proverbs,” which offer a particular mode of theological engagement that suggests an imaginative way forward in a technological age.6 Indeed, it is telling that other contemporary scholars continue to find Bonhoeffer to be a fruitful interlocutor in formulating a theological response to the challenges of emerging technologies.7 In considering Bonhoeffer’s contribution to the question of enhancement, this essay moves in three stages. The first section explores how metaphysical approaches to considering what it means to be human in light of enhancement diverge from the common approach of bioethicists and agencies that develop these enhancements, such as the United States military wing DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency). After observing how the approach of bioethicists and agencies that develop enhancements bypasses the metaphysical approach, the section concludes by articulating why Bonhoeffer’s non-metaphysical approach is helpful in considering what it means to be human in a “world come of age.” The second section follows Bonhoeffer’s argument in his 1932 and John W. de Gruchy, trans. Douglas Stephen Bax, vol. 3, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), 48, 66–7; Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Ilse Tödt et al., trans. Reinhard Krauss, Charles C. West, and Douglas W. Stott, vol. 6, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005), 116, 208; Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ecumenical, Academic, and Pastoral Work: 1931-1932, ed. Eberhard Amelung et al., trans. Anne Schmidt-Lange et al., vol. 11, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2012), 410; Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 500. For more on Bonhoeffer’s engagements with technology, see also Steven C. van den Heuvel, Bonhoeffer’s Christocentric Theology and Fundamental Debates in Environmental Ethics, Princeton Theological Monograph Series 217 (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2017), 164–206. 5. On the consistency of a technological rationale, see Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. Robert K. Merton (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1964). 6. Daniel J. Treier, “Modernity’s Machine: Technology Coming of Age in Bonhoeffer’s Apocalyptic Proverbs,” in Bonhoeffer, Christ and Culture, ed. Keith L. Johnson and Timothy Larson (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2013), 102. 7. Three examples of contemporary uses of Bonhoeffer that engages technology include: Brian Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2010), 364–90. Treier, “Modernity’s Machine,” 91–111; Frits de Lange, “‘The Spiritual Force is Lacking:’ Bonhoeffer on Secularization, Technology and Religion,” (paper presented at the VIII International Bonhoeffer Conference, August 2000, Berlin), accessed on February 18, 2019, http://home.kpn.nl/~delangef/ dbberlin.htm.

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lecture, “The Right to Self-Assertion.” This offers a concrete example of theological reflection on what it means to be human in the technological society of the West. The final section shifts to consider how Bonhoeffer’s approach outlined in section two offers concrete guidance in considering what it means to human in light of enhancement technologies. Section One: Metaphysical and Military Approaches to Enhancement A common approach to combating the rise of enhancement technologies is to engage in metaphysical debate. One first establishes the nature and limits of the human qua humanity, and then one engages in substantive reflection on the limits, proper uses, and benefits of enhancement technologies. In this way, one first engages with the question of what it means to be human before considering the question of enhancement. One noteworthy work that displays this approach is the edited volume Human Dignity and Bioethics, which emerged from the President’s Council on Bioethics formed under the Bush presidency of the United States of America.8 While not every essay in the volume epitomizes this approach, many of the essays display this approach by first considering what constitutes “human dignity” in itself before considering how this affirms or limits technological interventions on humanity. For instance, in Patrick Lee and Robert P. George’s essay, “The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity,” the authors use the bulk of its space to delineate the nature and uniqueness of human dignity over-against other animal life, before briefly considering how various technological interventions can impede a person’s humanity.9 Other works protest against the interventions of enhancement technologies by reasoning from the completedness of human nature as enunciated in the doctrine of creation. In this theologically-inflected metaphysical approach, theologians emphasize “that normative status attaches to human nature as that which exists apart from intentional human action,” and subsequently suggest that this nature becomes determinative of the types of biological interventions 8. The President’s Council on Bioethics, Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington, D.C.: The President’s Council on Bioethics, 2008). 9. Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, “The Nature and Basis of Human Dignity,” in The President’s Council on Bioethics, Human Dignity and Bioethics, 409–34. Another essay that follows a similar program is Peter Augustine Lawler, “Modern and American Dignity,” in The President’s Council on Bioethics, Human Dignity and Bioethics, 229–52.

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invited upon the human body.10 Oliver O’Donovan gestures towards this approach in his seminal work, Begotten or Made?, stating: Christians should at this juncture confess their faith in the natural order as the good creation of God. To do this is to acknowledge that there are limits to the employment of technique and limits to the appropriateness of our “making.” These limits will not be taught to us by compassion, but only by the understanding of what God has made, and by a discovery that it is complete, whole and satisfying.11

And this understanding, according to O’Donovan, extends to the completed character of the human qua humanity theologically understood. The Circumvention of Metaphysical Approaches by DARPA It is curious to note that bioethicists simply do not find this metaphysical mode of argumentation persuasive. For most, the neutrality and plasticity of human biological nature is a given, thus already providing warrant for radical enhancement. While this does not necessarily lead to the pursuit of transhumanism or post-humanism, it certainly avoids metaphysical argumentation on enhancement.12 Indeed, advocates for enhancement often bypass metaphysical debates on the nature of humanity by bursting those limits through enhancement itself, only then asking questions about what it means for the enhanced human. Once the “limit” 10. McKenny, Biotechnology, Human Nature, and Christian Ethics, 9. For a survey of thinkers who epitomize this approach, see McKenny, Biotechnology, Human Nature, and Christian Ethics, 25–69. 11. Oliver O’Donovan, Begotten or Made? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 12. O’Donovan’s approach in this work is subtler than the above quote suggests. Nevertheless, there is a latent metaphysical presupposition that permeates this work as well as the rest of his corpus, which is displayed in the above quotation. On the importance of the generic order of creation for O’Donovan, see Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1994), 31–52. 12. As Gerald McKenny argues, there is an important different between “changes to human nature (which remains human, albeit in an altered form) and changes of human nature into something else (as in ‘transhumanist’ or ‘posthuman’ scenarios in which human beings become something other than human)” (McKenny, Biotechnology, Human Nature, and Christian Ethics, 3). To pursue enhancement technologies is not to move necessarily beyond the human, but it certainly contributes directly to contemporary imaginings of humanity. On transhumanism, see Philippe Gagnon, “The Problem of Transhumanism in the Light of Philosophy and Theology,” in The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity, ed. Jim B. Stump and Alan G. Padgett (Oxford: WileyBlackwell, 2012), 392–405; Carl Elliot, “Humanity 2.0,” Wilson Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2003): 13–20.

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has been passed, it is then that one engages in fresh reflection on what it means to be human. Consider, for instance, the work of the United States military agency DARPA. The military agency is behind wellknown technologies like drones, GPS, and most famously the internet. DARPA is known for bursting boundaries; it wants to develop new technologies without hindrance. As one DARPA official said: “We try to find ways to say yes, not ways to say no.”13 And this boundary-crossing extends into DARPA’s investment in “super-soldier” projects.14 For the past few decades, DARPA has sought to achieve super-human performance that transcends the limits of human biology. One paradigmatic example is the project Continuous Assisted Performance, which attempted to create a “24/7 soldier” who could stay active, without sleep, for up to a week.15 One of DARPA’s more impressive achievements is the development of a brain-controlled prosthetic arm. This technology has been used in various ways; it has, on the one hand, been given to the disabled to assist with their mobility and performance in day-to-day life. On the other hand, it has been attached to soldiers without disability so they can exert strength until the battery runs dead.16 It is a technology that can easily be weaponized, blurring the line between therapy and war.17 The importance of highlighting DARPA’s work is twofold. First, DARPA’s work has real public effect. Much of its work has transformed both warfare and modern society without much or any recourse to metaphysical debate. And yet (secondly), it also has a real effect on how 13. Michael J. Gross, “The Pentagon Wants to Weaponize the Brain: What Could Go Wrong?” The Atlantic, November 2018, accessed February 19, 2019, https://www. theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/the-pentagon-wants-to-weaponize-the-brainwhat-could-go-wrong/570841/. 14. For more on these programs, see Sharon Weinberger, Imagineers of War: The Untold Story of DARPA, The Pentagon Agency that Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knoft, 2017) and Annie Jacobson, The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncensored History of DARPA, America’s Top Secret Military Research Agency (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015). 15. The then vice-president of America, Dick Cheney, was at one point briefed on this project amongst others. He reportedly responded by saying, “it was fantastic.” Weinberger, Imagineers of War, 295–6. 16. Gross, “The Pentagon Wants to Weaponize the Brain,” 88. See also Maddie Stone, “DARPA’s Mind-Controlled Arm Will Make You Wish You Were a Cyborg,” December 5, 2016, accessed February 18, 2019, https://gizmodo.com/darpas-mindcontrolled-arm-will-make-you-wish-you-were-1776130193. 17. As one DARPA official acknowledged regarding enhancement technologies: “You can weaponize anything, right?” Gross, “The Pentagon Wants to Weaponize the Brain,” 91.

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we imagine what it is to be human. Consider the language of “super-human” performance; this phrase gestures towards an imagining of what the human could be tomorrow and thus pursues it. This imagining does not occur in a vacuum, rather it is formed in part by previous technological achievements and imaginings.18 The testimony of Geoff Ling from DARPA illustrates this point: Your brain tells your hands what to do. Your hands basically are its tools, okay? And that was a revelation to me. We are tool users–that’s what humans are. A human wants to fly, he builds an airplane and flies. A human wants to have recorded history, and he creates a pen. Everything we do is because we use tools, right? And the ultimate tools are our hands and feet. Our hands allow us to work with the environment to do stuff, and our feet take us where our brain wants to go. The brain is the most important thing.

This discovery leads Ling to ask himself: “How can I liberate mankind from the limitations of the body?”19 What is noteworthy is that Ling reasons from and considers the activity of human beings in the here and now, thus avoiding metaphysical speculation on the meaning and purpose of humanity. Ling finds it unnecessary to move behind or beyond this technological human in imagining what it can mean to be human tomorrow. The Promise of Bonhoeffer’s Non-Metaphysical Mode of Engagement Instead of instinctively protesting against Ling’s rationale, the rest of this essay explores the benefits of this form of reasoning on what it means to be human while still finding theological grounds to interrogate the content of enhancement rationales. It is here that Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s approach is advantageous. What is beneficial in Bonhoeffer is a mode of theological reflection that mirrors Ling’s attentiveness to the historical human being and their activity in considering what it means to be human. This comes through in Bonhoeffer’s late musings on a “world come of age.” What is laudable in this concept is how Bonhoeffer appraised the shift away from metaphysical and “religious” concepts of 18. Weinberger describes how Michael Goldblatt, a research manager of supersoldier projects at DARPA, was “inspired by science fiction like Firefox, the 1982 movie starring Clint Eastwood, which featured weapons controlled by the human mind.” Weinberger, Imagineers of War, 295. 19. Gross, “The Pentagon Wants to Weaponize the Brain,” 86.

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God as positive insofar as it looks for God’s activity and presence only in the full historicity of the here and now.20 In other words, this shift is not to be lamented, since it holds fresh theological promise, particularly in considering what it means to be a “human come of age.” By fastening attention on the historical human being in their full worldliness, Bonhoeffer explores different ways to imagine and practice our humanity today in relation to emergent technologies.21 Bonhoeffer never describes the human in an ahistorical manner in these late musings, he rather begins to discern what it is to be human only in the full worldliness of their lives.22 Bonhoeffer thus gestures toward a particular mode of engagement rather than offering a full-blown account of humanity or technique while having direct implications for both. With this in mind, the next section will engage Bonhoeffer’s 1932 lecture “The Right to Self-Assertion” that illustrates a concrete attempt to answer what it means to be human in a technological age.23 Section Two: Dietrich Bonhoeffer on “The Right to Self-Assertion” Bonhoeffer delivered his 1932 lecture on “The Right to Self-Assertion” at the Technical College in Berlin where he served as a chaplain. The context of the lecture is important for understanding it. At the time it was given, national unemployment in Germany was around thirty percent, and it hovered around fifty-to-sixty percent for recent graduates.24 Bonhoeffer uses this lecture to speak directly to these students’ dire future prospects, addressing its challenges with a sense of urgency, since 20. On Bonhoeffer’s polemic against religion, see Tom Greggs, Theology Against Religion: Constructive Dialogues with Bonhoeffer and Barth (London: T & T Clark, 2011). Contra to the “death-of-God” theologians, Bonhoeffer does not become an atheist in prison as much as he rejects conceptions of God that are divorced from the crucified and risen Christ of history. On the reception history of Bonhoeffer’s prison theology see Martin E. Marty, Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Letters and Papers from Prison: A Biography, Lives of Great Religious Books (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). 21. It is telling that Bonhoeffer often speaks about what it means to be human in correspondence to what it means for the world to come of age. For instance, see Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. Christian Gremmels et al., trans. Isabel Best et al., vol. 8, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010), 450; 457; 480; 485–6; 500. 22. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 485. 23. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, “The Right to Self-Assertion,” in Ecumenical, Academic, and Pastoral Work: 1931-1932, ed. Victoria Barnett, Mark S. Brocker, and Michael B. Lukens, trans. Anne Schmidt-Lange et al. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012), 246–56. 24. Ibid., 247.

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he sees it threatening their own humanity. Speaking to the high unemployment levels, Bonhoeffer says: In the job market basically everything hinges on one question: Who buys people? People have become like goods, which are devalued by the massive scale…This devalues the individual and the species.25

Converse to what enhancement technologies promise, Bonhoeffer sees the present economic situation as devaluing human life by turning them into commodities. Bonhoeffer, then, speaks directly to this economicallydefined human being. This opening gesture sets the tenor for the lecture insofar as Bonhoeffer continues to move from this historically-situated individual towards the question of what it means to be human. “[W]e reach [humankind] in no other way but by the historical path through the individual and the community.”26 Self-Assertion in ‘European-American Civilization’ It is this bleak picture that raises the central question of self-assertion; that is, the question of how an individual or a community can assert themselves over-against others (e.g., in the job market) when there are a thousand others who suffer the same conditions.27 In moving towards an answer to this question, Bonhoeffer rehearses two ways that humans have answered it since these illuminate the present situation. First is the way of India where humans assert themselves through suffering. The dogma of India is that everything is One, entailing that to inflict harm on nature or other humans is merely to harm oneself. Therefore, to suffer from nature is an act of passive resistance that paradoxically reveals that the soul is stronger than nature, thereby overcoming it.28 The second answer is by what Bonhoeffer calls “European-American civilization.” Instead of suffering nature, humans master nature; they conquer and extract life through war and the machine. War seizes life from other 25. Ibid., 247. 26. Ibid., 255. 27. “How do you come to do something that a thousand others could and would want to do just as well and even better? How do you come to earn money, where two thousand others have nothing? What right have you to enjoy status and honor, where thousands like you live from the bread of charity? What right do you have to assert yourself in the struggle for human existence, in full awareness that you are thereby ruining, destroying, and leaving the lives of others prey to meaninglessness? Stand up for your rights! Or surrender them! We are here today to discuss this problem” (Ibid., 248). 28. Ibid., 250.

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humans; the machine seizes life from a threatening environment or nature. The two are not identical, but they operate in close proximity, reflecting a particular mode of thought that cannot be arbitrarily separated in theory or practice.29 They share an “intellectual [geistig] structure and significance” and it is thus unsurprising when their paths cross in modern warfare. While the machine is not directed against humans, it has nevertheless entered the sphere of war “in the deliberate service of destroying human life.”30 Interestingly, in this Bonhoeffer does not see the machine being weaponized, but war being mechanized in the way that it treats the human as nature that is destroyed for life. “The machine has made war impossible…according to its [i.e. the machine’s] reality.”31 In a sermon delivered two months before this lecture, Bonhoeffer makes a similar connection between technology and economics, arguing that “technology and the economy have become automatic powers that threaten to destroy human beings. They set themselves up on high, and their demons have become the gods of our time.”32 While economics is not referenced in this lecture, the above quote clarifies how Bonhoeffer sees the pursuit of self-assertion directly affecting the economic situation of those he is addressing. War and machine are not neutral in their relationship to economics. They rather paradigmatically display the destructive drive that the technical students are witnessing and will soon experience. Two Responses to the Boundedness of Human Life Bonhoeffer further suggests that the “war and the machine” are not separate from Western society or persons; it is the life and fate that “European-Americans” are born into and have been conscripted into serving.33 “This life means in the most essential sense ‘killing’…[W]e all stand in this life; we have all apparently decided to affirm this fate, whether consciously or not. In any case, the decision has been made, 29. Bonhoeffer, “The Right to Self-Assertion,” 251–2. As Brian Brock notes: “In short, technology is a human mode of thought that, in rejecting any role for divine action, comes to approach all things and relationships as susceptible to human ordering and management.” Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age, 26. 30. Bonhoeffer, “The Right to Self-Assertion,” 251; 255. 31. Ibid., 255. 32. Bonhoeffer, “Sermon on Luke 12:35-40,” in Bonhoeffer, Ecumenical, Academic, and Pastoral Work: 1931-1932, 410. 33. Philip Ziegler, Militant Grace: The Apocalyptic Turn and the Future of Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2018), 58–9.

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and now the task is to understand what we have thereby done.”34 In Bonhoeffer’s later works, this concept is reflected in his discourse about the acceptance of guilt. It is the acceptance that one can never maintain innocence within political life, but is always complicit with and induced to act in accordance with the powers and destructive drives of a given age.35 It is this insight that Bonhoeffer finds promising insofar as it contradicts the dominant logic that life is taken rather than passively received. “Through our birth, our life is determined passively. And it is now a characteristic of mature European thought to acknowledge this passive event as a bond.”36 One does not choose where they are born–they emerge into and are shaped by a people, a nation, a form of life. And this entails that one is claimed before they can claim; they are made responsible for another before they could choose responsibility. Phenomenology testifies that being bound to and responsible for others precedes any right to self-assertion. If humans, then, are bound to others, Bonhoeffer envisions there being two responses to this reality, each displaying a particular form of freedom by freely choosing death.37 First, humans can assert the freedom of the self over-against one’s life community, nature, and history through self-chosen death [Selbstmord].38 This represents the freedom (or liberation) of the human from all that bounds them by choosing death. Second, humans can sacrifice one’s life for the other in responsibility. This practice witnesses to the gift of being bound to others and history, recognizing human freedom as the epitome of human life that can be given for others. Whereas Selbstmord becomes the consummation of life as 34. Bonhoeffer, “The Right to Self-Assertion,” 252. 35. On the different senses of accepting guilt in Bonhoeffer’s theology, see Christine Schliesser, Those Who Act Responsibly Become Guilty: Bonhoeffer’s Concept of Accepting Guilt (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008). See also Bonhoeffer’s essay, “Guilt, Justification, and Renewal, in Ethics, 134–45. 36. Bonhoeffer, “The Right to Self-Assertion,” 253. This Heideggerian impulse is further explicated in Bonhoeffer’s post-doctoral dissertation, Act & Being. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology in Systematic Theology, ed. Hans-Richard Reuter and Wayne Whitson Floyd Jr., trans. H. Martin Rumscheidt, vol. 2, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996). 37. “[I]t is the unmistakable truth that the human being only becomes human, first truly asserts himself, when he is free unto death” (Bonhoeffer, “The Right to SelfAssertion,” 253). 38. Selbstmord is translated as self-chosen death rather than suicide to mark its distinction from the real challenges and realities of those with mental health challenges. Selbstmord is a theological category epitomized by biblical figures like Judas. Bonhoeffer makes this connection in his 1940-41 manuscript “Natural Life.” See Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 196–203.

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self-assertion; sacrifice becomes the consummation of life as self-giving.39 This is a different mode of thought that witnesses to a different humanity in vision and practice. This is a humanity not determined by or destined to war and mechanization. It does not envision human life as gained through killing. It rather envisions human life as a belonging to others. “Humankind lives through the sacrifice that the individuals and communities bring to it.”40 Unsurprisingly, Bonhoeffer sees this practice of human freedom as founded and empowered by “Jesus of Nazareth.” He is the foundation and source for this human life. Jesus’ self-giving grounds all current acts of human self-giving; and all current acts of self-giving further witness to and establish human life in the here and now: Jesus fulfills the sacrifice of humanity, out of which alone humanity can live, and now, since the act of Golgotha, humanity lives entirely out of that act…his death sanctifies his life, his death and our death sanctify our life, and only when we become free to sacrifice for the holiest brotherhood of humanity, for whom the prophet from Nazareth, the Christ died, only so do we become free for life.41

Just like the “European-American” mode of thought, this vision and practice of humanity precedes one’s emergence into the world, but nevertheless determines human life as it is witnessed daily by the life and sacrifice of others. Bonhoeffer sees sacrificial self-giving as effecting renewal in how human life is valued and imagined in the West through its forms of life. This practice extends through individuals to life communities and ultimately to nations.42 The practice of sacrifice transforms and witnesses to political life by the Spirit who is renewing humanity in the midst of death-enacting patterns. “The end of human beings, of humanity, is the readiness for this deed, for sacrifice for the fellow human being, and that is offered to the Spirit, who lives out of himself and creates life.”43

39. “This is the consummation of the thought of life as responsibility, as being bound to history and society, that this life has right only through sacrifice” (Bonhoeffer, “The Right to Self-Assertion,” 254). 40. Ibid., 256. 41. Ibid., 257. 42. Ibid., 254–6. 43. Ibid., 256.

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Section Three: Reflections on Enhancement in a ‘Bonhoefferian’ Mode This final section will consider how Bonhoeffer’s own reflections illuminate the technologically-situated humanity. Just as Bonhoeffer fixed his attention on the person de-valued by economics, this chapter attends to this human being enhanced. The modest contribution of this final section is to direct our attention to three points that aid our ongoing discernment of what it means to be human in light of enhancement technologies. First, neither enhancement technologies nor humanity can be considered in isolation. They implicate each other without being identical or inseparable. They are bounded together by belonging to a mode of thought externalized in human action upon the body through enhancement technologies. In this regard, technologies are not neutral, and humans are not definable per se. Instead, both are best understood within the broader contextual and historical dynamics into which they emerge. Bonhoeffer’s analysis of the economically devalued human unveils the dynamics that the person is embedded within allowing a more textured account of human life to emerge. And in our current analysis, Bonhoeffer’s suggestion that war and technology are interrelated aids our contemporary reflection on enhancement technologies. If war and machine emerge from the same place, then it is unsurprising that their histories emerge and overlap as they do in DARPA, and this tells us something.44 To discuss enhancements, then, means to focus not only on the human body (important as that is), but also to focus on the context, practices, and desires of human communities, particularly in their relation to warfare and violent economic dynamics.45 This is a way of emphasizing the irreducibly political character of our humanity; persons are never isolated individuals, but they are born into and are formed in crucial ways by the 44. There is, further, a close connection between economics and military that could be likewise emphasized. Many DARPA employees are drawn to work in Silicon Valley and many in Silicon Valley are recruited to join DARPA. See Gross, “The Pentagon Wants to Weaponize the Brain,” 92. In Bonhoeffer’s day, it is telling that Pervitin was first developed and distributed by the Berlin-based pharmaceutical company Temmler, only to be then first distributed by the National Socialists. The question of whether it was economic impulses or military impulses that made it so popular is open to debate: Ohler argues it was the government, Snelders and Pieters argue it was a grassroots movement fostered by economic productivity. 45. As Philip Ziegler says: “This discernment requires that we interrogate not only discrete enhancements which might be in view, but also the social practices, economic cultures and political ideologies within which such enhancements are pursued and out of which they arise.” Philip Ziegler, “‘Those he also Glorified:’ Some Reformed Perspectives on Human Nature and Destiny,” Studies in Christian Ethics 32, no. 2 (2019): 176.

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communities in which they participate. Metaphysical approaches often conceal these dynamics whereas Bonhoeffer’s approach brings them to the forefront.46 To be sure, Bonhoeffer’s analyses of these themes are generalized and require further development, but they helpfully uncover modern dynamics that are often intentionally obscured; and this uncovering helps direct substantive theological reflection moving forward. Second, Bonhoeffer’s suggestion that humanness is not an abstract concept, but an imagined and practiced life has direct implications for how to understand and narrate human biological life. Bonhoeffer extends what Michael Banner has recently argued: Human being is a practice not a theory–which is to say agnosticism in this matter is an impossibility. The question ‘What is it to be human?’ is one to which we posit an answer day by day, for there is no way of living or dying which can be, practically speaking, undecided. Christianity asserts that to be human is to be with and for the other, that being thus is an achievement and not easily within our grasp, and yet that this possibility is one which God’s grace opens to us. The task of the church is not just to give this answer to the world, but to display it.47

This is not to deny the normative significance of human life; it is only to suggest that discerning this requires attending to particular practices, such as the practice of biological enhancement. This comes through in Bonhoeffer’s bifurcation between the practices of self-chosen death [Selbstmord] and sacrifice, which provides a framework to interrogate enhancement technologies.48 Bonhoeffer identifies two opposing grammars connected to the same act (i.e. accepting death). The former epitomizes an ethos of self-liberation and autonomy; the latter an ethos of free self-giving and boundedness to the other. The former treats the body as sheer materiality–as nature not theologically understood. The latter emphasizes how the body is gifted, good, as well as reconciled to 46. For more on this point, see Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age, 348–9. 47. Michael Banner, “A Doctrine of Human Being,” in The Doctrine of God and Theological Ethics, ed. Alan J. Torrance and Michael Banner (London: T & T Clark, 2006), 147. 48. There is an ambiguity on this point with regards to the question of physical death in relation to enhancement technologies that can offer unprecedented life extension. Further analysis will need to consider what it means to die and whether Christians should celebrate the unending extension of physical life on earth. See the following for mature theological engagements on this theme: McKenny, Biotechnology, Human Nature, and Christian Ethics, 166–70; Gagnon, “The Problem of Transhumanism in the Light of Philosophy and Theology,” 392–405.

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God and others. Here, life with God is compatible with this limited bodily life because Christ has assumed and redeemed this human life through his sacrifice.49 It is equally important to emphasize what these practices share in common; namely, both deal with fallen humanity. Neither practice envisions humans as supra-peccatorum; rather, the human’s practices and life are fallen and thus open to transformation. The difference is that Selbstmord envisions transformation as individually seized via an act of self-transcendence, and sacrifice envisions transformation through God’s self-giving, forming a new human community of life and self-giving unto death. Their imaginings of human biological life, then, differ in their relationship to God’s reconciliation in Christ, which subsequently transforms human political life. They agree, however, that one’s understanding of humanity is never static, but is constantly being discerned. This is particularly the case for Christian theology, since we do not inhabit Eden or first-century Palestine; we can reason only from this European-American civilization and thus are ever looking for renewed visions of humanity that deepen our imaginings of the Christian life.50 The danger is that one can project an ideal concept of humanity that subsequently misses how Christ is forming one’s humanity in unexpected ways. It is for this reason that attending to concrete human life aids contemporary discernment of what it means to be human in Christ.51 And it is for this reason that attending to human 49. For a persuasive contemporary account of how human life is compatible with life with God, see Katherine Sonderegger, Systematic Theology, vol.1: The Doctrine of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2015), 77–131. 50. Ian McFarland, The Divine Image: Envisioning the Invisible God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005), 51–102. Of course, attached to this approach is the danger of projecting what one assumes is the image of God upon other human beings. That is, one first assumes what it means to be human and then uses that image to judge other human lives, including the life of Christ. In this latter instance, people do not necessarily deny Christ as much as make him into their ideal image of humanity. As McFarland states: “Now it is a widely recognized fact that the pictures of Jesus’ particularity that emerges in both scholarly and popular accounts of his life generally bear an uncomfortable similarity to the particularity of their authors. Liberals produce a liberal Jesus, feminists a feminist Jesus, political radicals a revolutionary Jesus, social conservatives a Jesus who champions ‘family values’” (59). 51. As Bonhoeffer argued a few years later in Life Together: “God did not make others as I would have made them. God did not give them to me so that I could dominate and control them, but so that I might find the Creator by means of them. Now other people, in the freedom with which they were created, become an occasion for me to rejoice, whereas before they were only a nuisance and trouble for me. God does not want me to mold others into the image that seems good to me, that is, into my own image. Instead, in their freedom from me God made other people in God’s own image. I can never know in advance how God’s image should appear in others. That image

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practices is so crucial, since it is in lived encounter and engagement with others that God often encounters and reveals what it means to live well in the midst of this world, thereby deepening our readings of what it means to be human. As Bonhoeffer says: “Christ’s death and our death sanctify our life,” which is a way of emphasizing that any vision of human life is always in relation to one’s reading of Scripture and one’s encounter with the neighbor who witnesses to Christ.52 This leads to the third point, Bonhoeffer’s analysis refuses to discredit all enhancement technologies in advance (though it leaves the possibility open). Enhancements are not to be forbidden or embraced a priori; rather they can only be engaged within a weighted discourse on their ability to witness to and affirm the self-giving political life of fallen and redeemed humanity. Enhancements, then, cannot be quickly rejected because of their connection to war or the machine. If this were the case, all of our political, technological, and social life would be damned at this very juncture. Contemporary life would only be condemning law without present promise (Gospel), and our moral inquiry would be limited to securing “limits” and determining “right uses” for these technologies.53 It is better, then, to interrogate our technologies through the grammar of Christ and his humanity in a positive register. It is to look for the hope of promise in relation to these emerging technologies while rejecting any idolatrous attempt to envision these as the bearers of life. It is to engage these technologies not by asking how they can transcend this bodily life, but how our bodies can be put to service for God and others, even with or through these technologies. This is an openness to the eschatological provisio of the Gospel (i.e. our bodies will be transformed) while avoiding the ever-prevalent temptation to project beyond always takes on a completely new and unique form whose origin is found solely in God’s free and sovereign act of creation. To me that form may seem strange, even ungodly. But God creates every person in the image of God’s Son, the Crucified, and this image, likewise, certainly looked strange and ungodly to me before I grasped it.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together and Prayerbook of the Bible, ed. Gerhard Ludwig Müller, Albrecht Schönherr, and Geffrey B. Kelly, trans. Daniel W. Bloesch and James H. Burtness, vol. 5, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1996), 95. 52. Bonhoeffer, “The Right to Self-Assertion,” 256. 53. On how the Gospel reorients Christian action and ethics around the freedom of the Spirit, see Martin Luther, “Treatise on Good Works,” in Luther Works, American Edition, ed. Eric W. Gritsch, vol. 41 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 21–39. Brock uses Bonhoeffer’s 1943 manuscript “The ‘Christian’ and the ‘Ethical’ as a Topic” in arguing against a mode of technological inquiry that only establishes limits in technological utilization (Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age, 182–93). See Bonhoeffer, “The ‘Christian’ and the ‘Ethical’ as a Topic” in Ethics, 364–90.

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this bodily life. As the Apostle Paul says, we look through a mirror dimly, and we cannot, as much as we try, clearly see, hear, or reach through this mirror with technological enhancements (1 Cor. 13:12). This explorative approach does not damn human life in the present; it does not wish to live in a different era when things were “more straight-forward.” It rather embraces this moment as reconciled to God and perhaps as a “world come of age,” allowing different modes of discourse to rise to the surface, which could renew our practice and vision of human life for today. In summary, Bonhoeffer’s thought suggests the following conclusions about how to engage enhancement technologies. First, humanity can never be considered in isolation from enhancement technologies, since the two mutually implicate each other through their embeddedness in the ethos of a given polity and by how they overlap on particular human bodies. Second, imagining what it means to be human requires attending to human practices within their sociopolitical contexts, since being human is not an abstract concept but a lived reality; this suggests that engaging directly with enhancement technologies is necessary for discerning whether they obfuscate or clarify Christ’s presence in human lives. Bonhoeffer’s description of the practices of self-chosen death and sacrifice offers a helpful theological framework for assessing enhancement technologies in day-to-day life. Third, Bonhoeffer’s concrete approach discredits ideological approaches that reject enhancement technologies on an a priori basis. One must rather engage enhancement technologies by asking how or whether they affirm the goodness of bodily life in service to Christ. There is a continuous and provisional character to these acts of discernment. Admittedly, the conclusions developed here do not directly address whether particular discrete enhancement technologies distort or clarify human life. Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer provides a mode of engagement that assists in such discrete acts of discernment moving forward. Such an account ultimately maintains the openended and suggestive character of Bonhoeffer’s reflections on the technologies that pervade and converge with human life. It likewise maintains Bonhoeffer’s hope that God’s disruptive presence will renew human life today. The open question moving forward is whether this renewal will be in conjunction with, or in spite of, the proliferation of enhancement technologies.

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