Being and Belonging: A Comparative Examination of the Greek and Cypriot Orthodox Churches’ Attitudes to ‘Europeanisation’ in Early 21st Century [1 ed.] 3631760302, 9783631760307

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This book examines and compares, from an interdisciplinary perspective of Religious Studies and International Relations, the conduct and rhetoric of the Orthodox Churches of Greece and Cyprus vis-à-vis the ‘Europeanisation’ process. This study focuses on the conditionality of their sense of belonging in the European Union (EU) as their predisposition is dependent, in part, on their sense of being, as well as on their perception of an ideal type of Europeanness. In this context, this book offers insights on how the Greek and Cypriot Churches, as soft power actors of domestic and European capacity, perceive Europeanness and Otherness; thereby, the compatibility of the personified Greek and Cypriot states with the EU as a post-Westphalian political-cultural entity comes into view.

Georgios E. Trantas specialises in Religion, Politics and Cultural Diplomacy in Southeastern Europe. He has earned his Ph.D at the University of Erfurt where he has also been a pre-doctoral and post-doctoral Fellow. His academic interests also include migration and the formation of religioscapes.

ISBN 978-3-631-76030-7

ESKO 16_276030_Trantas_SG_HCA5 151x214 globaL.indd 1

Georgios E. Trantas · Being and Belonging: Greek and Cypriot Orthodox Attitudes to ‘Europeanisation’

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ERFURTER STUDIEN ZUR KULTURGESCHICHTE DES ORTHODOXEN CHRISTENTUMS

Georgios E. Trantas

Being and Belonging

A Comparative Examination of the Greek and Cypriot Orthodox Churches’ Attitudes to ‘Europeanisation’ in Early 21st Century

www.peterlang.com

12.07.18 18:48

Being and Belonging

Erfurter Studien zur Kulturgeschichte des Orthodoxen Christentums Herausgegeben von Vasilios N. Makrides

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Note on the quality assurance and peer review of this publication Prior to publication, the quality of the works published in this series is reviewed by the editor in collaboration with external referees.

Georgios E. Trantas

Being and Belonging A Comparative Examination of the Greek and Cypriot Orthodox Churches’ Attitudes to ‘Europeanisation’ in Early 21st Century

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Zugl.: Erfurt, Univ., Diss., 2016 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress Cover illustrations: Top left: the premises of the Representation of the Church of Greece to the European Union, Brussels; top right: the premises of the Representation of the Church of Cyprus to the European Union, Brussels. Bottom left: Entrance to the European Commission Charlemagne Building, Brussels; bottom right: array of European Union flags at the courtyard of the Berlaymont Building, Brussels. © Georgios E. Trantas

Printed by CPI books GmbH, Leck. D 547 ISSN 1612-152X ISBN 978-3-631-76030-7 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-631-76032-1 (E-PDF) E-ISBN 978-3-631-76033-8 (EPUB) E-ISBN 978-3-631-76034-5 (MOBI) DOI 10.3726/b14315 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Berlin 2018 All rights reserved. Peter Lang – Berlin ∙ Bern ∙ Bruxelles ∙ New York ∙ Oxford ∙ Warszawa ∙ Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com

Acknowledgements The present book was initially submitted as a PhD thesis, the research for which was conducted under the auspices of the Chair of Religious Studies – Orthodox Christianity, Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Erfurt. The content has since been revised and adapted to meet the respective publication requirements and specifications. First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere and wholehearted gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Vasilios N. Makrides, an overall accomplished and internationally renowned academic whose guidance, motivation, support and knowledge depth has been decisive in designing and carrying out my research, and further, in writing this thesis. Being a genuinely interested mentor, an actual Doktorvater, rather than a distant supervisor, I could not have asked for a better one, as he combined both professional and personal virtues; I will therefore always be in debt to him and cherish the entire academic experience. In addition, I would like to thank the DFG-Graduiertenkolleg 1412 – Kulturelle Orientierungen und gesellschaftliche Ordnungsstrukturen in Südosteuropa [Cultural Orientations and Social Structures in Southeastern Europe] under the aegis of which I was offered the opportunity to expand my knowledge base via getting involved into an interdisciplinary group and was granted the funds to carry out my project. Further, I wish to thank all my interviewees for their trust and readiness to share with me their information, knowledge and insights into political and religious affairs of domestic as well as international significance, and of relevance to my research project. Last but not least, I wish to thank my good friend and colleague Eleni Tseligka (Staffordshire University) for her collaboration in parallel projects where our research interests overlapped.

Abbreviations AKEL Progressive Party of Working People (Gr.: Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού) CEC Conference of European Churches CNA Cyprus News Agency COMECE Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community (Commissio Episcopatuum Communitatis Europaeae) CROCEU Committee of the Representatives of Orthodox Churches to the European Union CSC Church and Society Commission DIKO Democratic Party (Gr.: Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα) DISY Democratic Rally (Gr.: Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός) ECHR European Court of Human Rights EC European Communities ECB European Central Bank ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDEK  Movement for Social Democracy (Gr.: ΕΔΕΚ  – Κίνημα Σοσιαλδημοκρατών) EEC European Economic Community EMU European Monetary Union EOKA  National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (Gr.: Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών) EPP European People’s Party ESIR English School of International Relations EU European Union EUROKO European Party (Gr.: Ευρωπαϊκό Κόμμα) FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia HSCC Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus HSCG Holy Synod of the Church of Greece IGO Intergovernmental Organisation IMF International Monetary Fund IR International Relations LOOCEU Liaison Office of the Orthodox Church to the European Union MEP Member of European Parliament MNA Macedonian News Agency NAM Non-aligned Movement

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NGO Non-governmental Organisation OCC Orthodox Church of Cyprus OCG Orthodox Church of Greece OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Gr.: Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) RCCEU Representation of the Church of Cyprus to the European Union RCGEU Representation of the Church of Greece to the European Union ROC Russian Orthodox Church SSCMEA Special Synodical Committee for the Monitoring of European Affairs UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UOC Ukrainian Orthodox Church USA United States of America WCC World Council of Churches WCRC World Communion of Reformed Churches

Table of Contents 1 Introduction and preliminaries��������������������������������������������������������������� 13 1.1 Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13 1.2 Object of research – the Orthodox Churches of Greece and Cyprus���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 14 1.2.1 Why Them? Why Then?������������������������������������������������������������������� 14 1.2.2 Comparability������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 19 1.3 Literature review�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22 1.4 Methodological approach���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25 1.5 Theoretical background synopsis��������������������������������������������������������������� 29 1.6 Importance of study (scientific contribution & originality)������������������� 32

2 Europeanness – the Problématique of adherence���������������������������� 35 2.1 Defining Europeanisation and the Problématique on European identity������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 35 2.2 Perceptions of Europeanness – conditionality of Belonging������������������� 58 2.2.1 The Orthodox Church of Greece���������������������������������������������������� 58 2.2.2 The Orthodox Church of Cyprus��������������������������������������������������� 73 2.3 Churches and their offices of representation to Brussels: functions and purposes�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 87 2.3.1 The Orthodox Church of Greece���������������������������������������������������� 87 2.3.2 The Orthodox Church of Cyprus������������������������������������������������ 103

3 State personification – the state through the eyes of the corresponding churches��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 115 3.1 A detailed account of the theoretical framework���������������������������������� 115 3.2 The group-person’s articulation of Being and political culture������������ 133

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3.2.1 The Orthodox Church of Greece������������������������������������������������ 133 3.2.1.1 Being under threat��������������������������������������������������������� 133 3.2.1.2 Heterodefinition (not being) and otherness���������������� 142 3.2.1.3 The ark of the nation’s identity and its benign mutation�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 149 3.2.1.4 If the (chosen) nation is Orthodox, then so must be the state���������������������������������������������������������������������� 155 3.2.1.5 Church‒state relations�������������������������������������������������� 159 3.2.2 The Orthodox Church of Cyprus������������������������������������������������ 178 3.2.2.1 Latent, conditional ethnarchy�������������������������������������� 178 3.2.2.2 Antitheses, kinship and self-perception��������������������� 193 3.2.2.3 Church‒state relations�������������������������������������������������� 202 3.2.2.4 Post-ethnarchic soft power������������������������������������������ 212

4 Readjustment to the post-Westphalian era������������������������������������� 225 4.1 “Reverse Westphalia” and the interplay with geopolitics and culture�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 225 4.2 National churches’ response to challenges and their agenda adaptation��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 245 4.2.1 The Orthodox Church of Greece������������������������������������������������ 245 4.2.2 The Orthodox Church of Cyprus������������������������������������������������ 268

5 Dawn of the debt crisis and initial reactions���������������������������������� 291 5.1 The Protestant ethic and Homo Economicus������������������������������������������ 291 5.2 The Orthodox Church of Greece������������������������������������������������������������� 299 5.3 The Orthodox Church of Cyprus������������������������������������������������������������ 309

6 Conclusions��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 319 7 Sources and bibliography������������������������������������������������������������������������ 333 7.1 Primary sources����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 333 7.2 Secondary sources������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 347

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7.3 Interviews��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 360 7.4 Bibliography����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 361

Appendix��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 373 Questionnaire (semi-structured)�������������������������������������������������������������������� 373 Transcribed interview samples������������������������������������������������������������������������ 374

1  Introduction and preliminaries 1.1 Introduction The object of the present endeavour, as stated explicitly by the rather descriptive title, is a comparative research concerning the recent and contemporary standpoints of the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) and the Orthodox Church of Cyprus (OCC) respectively towards Europeanisation, which, as a top-down political-cultural convergence process, has given rise to conditionality concerning their sense of belonging in the European Union (EU), given their traditional and historically confirmed Eastern Orthodox scepticism towards the West in general, and Europe in particular; a disposition, dependent in part on their sense of being, hence their self-view and their perception of an ideal type of Europeanness. We shall proceed to argue later on in the document that both churches have fulfilled their roles as socio-political actors on many historical instances more than adequately and that, most importantly, they continue to do so, variably i.e., mainly by being vocal with their views and particularly on issues of culture, identity, even governance and national sovereignty. This inevitably affects developments in both states at a governmental and social level, as it is not completely uncommon for the aforementioned actors to ultimately influence decision-making procedures, either directly or via the laypeople. We focus our research particularly on the period starting in the year 1998 up until 2010, which is obligatory by necessity terminus ante quem for primary and secondary sources – albeit with some flexibility concerning relevant literature, which extends to July 2015. During the era in focus, monumental political changes transpired regarding Greece, Cyprus and their EU status and prospects; including intense clerical political interventionism and archbishopric enthronements in both states. Yet we will proceed to argue that the two cases are by no means identical despite their common characteristics. If anything, because of the latter, they are definitely comparable, while their crucial differences as well as similarities emanate by and large from their diverse historical, cultural and political backgrounds alike. It follows that because of the influential role the two churches play – sometimes whether they wish it or not – the outcomes of this research project are bound to be important, especially considering that no such comparative investigation has taken place to date.

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1.2 Object of research ‒ the Orthodox Churches of Greece and Cyprus For brevity and practicality, if we were to sum up the main research question that permeates this project in one sentence, it would be phrased this way: “How do the two Churches compare in terms of conduct and rhetoric in relation to Europeanisation and Westernisation?”, which ought to be complemented by two sub-questions, so that we may further establish a proper conceptual framework, namely: “How do the Greek and Cypriot Churches self-articulate culturally, and how is Europeanness and Otherness perceived?”, and also “What are the characteristics of the personified Greek and Cypriot state and their embedded cultures, and, how is the culture-based European equivalent of state personification – as bloc-actor – perceived by the churches of Greece and Cyprus?”. One realises immediately then that opting to conduct a comparative research on the two aforementioned churches is neither incidental nor a choice of convenience. For, even though they do not appear as typical cases of such study, their comparison, coupled with their examination as individual instances, is expected to shine a light on unknown issues, emergent themes, and grey, understudied areas.

1.2.1 Why Them? Why Then? Both actors have had their share of archbishopric ambivalence, scepticism and antithesis to the imitation and imposition of the Western model, during the period of interest no less. No wonder, with vested interests being at stake, given that they both enjoy their own types of special relationship with the corresponding states of Greece and Cyprus, while entrenched church‒state interdependence is mutually evident. What is more, this relationship is culturally – in Greece constitutionally too – safeguarded and upheld by the sweeping majorities of the two corresponding peoples. But legalistic and majoritarian1 approaches aside, their history alone would to a certain extent suffice to perpetuate a role that has been consolidated centuries ago. For a number of reasons, which will be fully explained in the present document, there is no doubt that these are and have been systemic institutions diachronically.

1 Majoritarianism – meant here as political philosophical tradition, not to be confused with the majoritarian electoral system – is based on the assumption that majority in a society, whether that may be religious, ethnic or ideological entails entitlement, essentially, to have precedence over smaller groupings. See Ronald Dworkin, “The Majoritarian Premise and Constitutionalism”, (2003).

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Hence, it follows that integration into a greater bloc-actor system, which is no other than the EU, could very well entail a lesser role for any given national church, as this applies even to Member States themselves and their shifting of powers upwards anyway. Not to mention that given the particular churches’ adherence to a static model in terms of traditionalism, institutional organisation and modus operandi, one would not be out of order to label them “change-resistant”. We should also not fail to mention that they have displayed relentless devotion to the form of national sovereignty that is currently being challenged by Europeanisation, because of which emerges among others the fear of identity erosion. Any given society and its institutions are called upon to be self-retheorised and to reform accordingly, in concert with the prerequisites of membership to the EU, which is essentially a bloc-actor aiming in principle  – fluctuations notwithstanding – to federalise, a fact that the ongoing deepening and harmonisation processes demonstrate. This necessitates a synthesis and adaptation of collectivities2 and convictions thereof, thus, collective institutional and structural personifications to converge; which in turn requires a new sense of being and belonging, whereby the issue of compatibility comes into play. By being, we are referring to the collective self-perception and self-personification; this by extension reflects on the entity of the state in the present case, while by belonging, we are referring to the compatibility between others’ personifications and self-personifications, which renders the aforementioned convergence possible. In the present case for instance, the EU is also permeated by a value system on the basis of which it is personified as an entity too. Years before the emergence of the EU as a bloc-actor, Hans Morgenthau based the definition of “culture patterns” on the occurrence rate of particular distinctive qualities and the degree to which those were valued, when compared to other nations. And according to those patterns, one could roughly determine national characters.3 This paradoxical and yet quite frequent socio-political phenomenon is no other than the personification of the state, by which one attributes moral values and behaviours to a fictitious “group-person”, an institution.4 And that is because society sees its reflection upon the state, while it simultaneously identifies with the state’s inherent values, as most of the individual behaviours owe their existence to 2 Meaning peoples as bodies, collective wholes, seen from a sociological perspective. See for instance Siniša Malešević and Mark Haugaard (eds.), Making Sense of Collectivity: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Globalisation (2002). 3 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (2006), pp. 140–41. 4 Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (2001), p. 137.

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pre-existing institutions and norms outside the realm of the individuals’ control, such as language, religion, morality and wealth; they do not constitute a rational, but an unconscious choice.5 In the same way, as the individual adopts the societal conscience rather than invent a unique, personal one, emerges the question of an equivalent pattern of behaviour in a society of states.6 Such is the EU. Consequently by being and belonging, we define “the perception of adherence to the social institution process as prescribed and conditioned by the latter, and to that end, the framework, requirements and provisions of collective self-articulation which formulate identity, and the extent to which this is coterminous with other analogous collective self-articulations”. This definition can be applicable to actors, agencies and structures. Of course, the passage from the nation-state to the nations-state7 – to coin yet another term if we may – i.e., a formation of an international legal entity such as the EU, eventually is deemed difficult for all, particularly for the churches of interest, which have undergone incomplete and selective modernisation processes in the first place. Evidently they do not define themselves as Western, and, what is more, they contribute to the establishment of kinships and antitheses, while in sum partake in the cultural physiognomy formulation and ultimately state personification. As for the temporal parameter, which mainly draws from history, it has engraved its own mark on eastern Orthodoxy, and thus, centuries-old painful memories continue to have some bearing on the Greek-Orthodox psyche. To put it bluntly, grudges from the past live on. Hence, accountability for events of huge historical significance, especially traumatic ones, is attributed to the West.8 To name a few of symbolic character, the Great Schism of 1054,9 the sacking of Constantinople by the crusaders in 1204 and10 the abandonment of fellow Christians 5 Emile Durkheim, “Social Facts”, (1994), pp. 433–40. 6 Carr, pp. 146–47. 7 We define it as a legal, multinational entity/person that comprises federalised nationstates, adherent to the same rules, constitutional or founding treaties, governed by the same institutions, while being equally a sovereign entity/actor in its own right. 8 Vasilios N. Makrides and Dirk Uffelmann, “Studying Eastern Orthodox Anti-Westernism: the Need for a Comparative Research Agenda”, (2003), pp. 87–120, (p. 91). 9 It was when churches were fragmented to Western Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, following a period of discord on matters of theology, authority and ultimately jurisdiction. See Aidan Nichols, Rome and the Eastern Churches (2010). Also, Steven Runciman, The Eastern Schism. A Study of the Papacy and the Eastern Churches during the XIth and XIIth Centuries (1955). 10 Even though the purpose of the Fourth Crusade was to free Jerusalem of the Muslims, it was Constantinople that was sacked instead, which solidified the division between

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to the Ottoman invader, with well-known consequences. To make things worse, the privileges which the Orthodox Church enjoyed during the Ottoman occupation contributed to the perpetuation of a mutually convenient status quo and estranged East and West even further to the extent that with the passage of time, it became commonplace assertion that Europeans are inherently “Others” even nowadays in the Balkan region.11 As for the period of interest, namely the decade from 2000 to 2010, it was chosen because of political developments at an EU level with the states of Greece and Cyprus being involved or directly affected, including major events that transpired in the same period concerning the two churches as well. For instance Greece, having qualified for induction to the Eurozone in 2000, entered the single currency on 1 January 2001 and one year later had Drachmas replaced. Parenthetically, we may add that the Greek Euro (€) coins bear no Orthodox Christian symbolisms whatsoever.12 The visit of Pope John Paul II to Greece on 4–5 May 2001, the first in almost 1000 years, certainly qualifies as a noteworthy event. Also, with the best interests of the church at heart, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece Christodoulos (in office 1998–2008) developed an effortlessly observable affiliation to the European People’s Party (EPP), as well as inaugurated the Brussels Office of Representation of the Church of Greece to the EU in 2003, which operated already since 1998.13 In 2008, Christodoulos passed away, and Hieronymos II was elected archbishop by the Holy Synod. Cyprus on the other hand acquired full EU membership officially on 1 May 2004. On 1 January 2008, the Cypriot Pound, a reminiscent of colonialism, was abolished and replaced by the Euro at an excellent exchange rate (0.585274 per 1.00 €), thus ushering the country into the core of the EU, the Eurogroup; Cypriot Euro (€) coins bear no Orthodox Christian symbolisms either. Meanwhile in 2006, archbishop Chrysostomos I14 (in office 1977–2006) passed away and following elections the Archbishop of Nova Justiniana and All Cyprus Chrysostomos II

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the Roman Catholics and the Eastern Orthodox and triggered the decline of the already withering Byzantine Empire irreparably. See Jonathan Phillips, The Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople (2005). Makrides and Uffelmann, p. 106. Peter Mackridge, “Cultural Difference as National Identity in Modern Greece”, (2008), pp. 297–319, (p. 315). Anastassios Anastassiadis, “An Intriguing True-False Paradox: The Entanglement of Modernisation and Intolerance in the Orthodox Church of Greece”, (2010), pp. 39–60 (p. 53). He succeeded Makarios III in 1977.

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was enthroned.15 One year later, in 2007, and subsequent to the resolution of the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus, the Brussels Office of Representation of the Church of Cyprus to the EU was established. Between the year 2000 and 2010, Orthodox anti-westernism was manifested from the top ranks of the Greek clerical hierarchy, by the Late Archbishop Christodoulos no less. His rhetoric was an amalgam of nationalist, traditionalist views against Europeanisation and globalisation, i.e. against the West in general; he even cautioned the public of the upcoming erosion of Hellenic culture and identity by the globalist “New World Order” and its pawn, the EU, as a pressing eschatological matter.16 In addition to this, he targeted secularism and the potential separation between church and state, as he held that the church represented the broad masses of the people, whom he generously flattered by exalting them as “chosen ones” and God’s favourites. A characteristic example of this tumultuous church‒state relationship is the “identity card crisis” of the year 2000; namely, the abolition of one’s religious conviction reference on his/her identity card, which Christodoulos opposed with every fibre of his being, albeit failed to prevent.17 Drawing in part from an anachronistic attitude, he condemned well-established ideas related to the Enlightenment and opposed modernisation as irrelevant to the domestic culture. This position is apparently at odds with his aforementioned rapprochement with Brussels; it constitutes a paradox as well as a stratagem to benefit from the EU while maintaining his public hard-line rhetoric intact at the same time. Yet, as of late, more and more voices underline that his pessimism was right on the mark concerning his worries on Europe’s future on employment, religiosity, cultural, fiscal and demographic issues, underlining his insightfulness with a mutatis mutandis prophetic hint – but not literally – via mostly populist outlets. On the other hand, archbishop Hieronymos II, who succeeded Christodoulos, has been moderate in his public discourses, yet he is known to have expressed, both his Euroscepticism and interventionist intent – within reason  –, but in a subtle, diplomatic manner. Always though, he is portrayed as

15 Farid Mirbagheri, Historical Dictionary of Cyprus (2010), p. 189. 16 Yannis Stavrakakis, “Religion and Populism: Reflections on the ‘Politicised’ Discourse of the Greek Church”, (2002). 17 Public protests of massive participation as well as an unofficial referendum organised by the OCG took place, in order to prevent the state from removing the reference of one’s religious convictions from the official citizen’s identity card. This caused a tremendous amount of grief for the government of Prime Minister Kostas Simitis (in office with PASOK, 1996–2004).

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indifferent to the mundane, hence to politics, apart from philanthropic activities or issues that have a direct bearing on the church. The Late Archbishop Chrysostomos I of Cyprus had a completely different approach. He may not have been as outspoken and assertive, nor did he address the public as frequently as Christodoulos, but he did intervene into the affairs of the state on particular occasions concerning the occupation of the northern part of the island. He was known for his patriotic fervour, all in all though he was withdrawn during the period of interest, mainly because of his poor health, which rendered him incapacitated, physically and mentally. This coincided particularly with the period when Cyprus was underway to become a full EU member and thereafter, so he could not possibly intervene in any way. On the contrary, his successor Chrysostomos II utilises the media to express his views regarding domestic and international politics regularly. Impressively enough, he has revealed his soft spot for Russia in a pan-orthodox context and his wariness of Western allies, if not his utter disappointment, even revisiting the era of non-alignment by resorting to history in order to validate his views. All things considered, the sum of Hierarchy impinges on public life and opinion frequently, even through Sunday sermons of political content.18 In a nutshell, the distinctiveness of the states and their churches, together with the vast dissimilarity of their archbishops’ idiosyncrasies, has certainly brought about fluctuations and reoriented attitudes, and in sum, it has been a decade of notable developments, significant to all implicated actors.

1.2.2 Comparability Comparative studies between neighbouring states might not be the usual safe practice due to spillovers and overlaps between one another, yet distinct differences both at a state and at a church level render the Orthodox Church of Greece and the Orthodox Church of Cyprus legitimately comparable. After all, it is not the states that are being compared but rather two particular institutions; not to mention that location does not function as a methodological hindrance, quite the opposite in fact. Approaching the states geographically, the observer cannot but appreciate the decentralised position of Cyprus, an island which is detached from the European continent – linked only by means of air and sea – and is actually located in close proximity to Africa, Asia Minor and the Middle East, and a cultural

18 World Trade Press, Cyprus Society and Culture (2010), p. 14.

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physiognomy cannot be devoid of either history or geography.19 And the GreekCypriot one, considering the historic background as opposed to the remoteness from Greece, is burdened with an uncomfortable disharmony. Location dictates one identity, the Cypriot, whereas history and culture dictate another, the GreekOrthodox;20 it also worth noting that it is not uncommon for the Greek heartland to be perceived precisely as such, and to be called motherland in Cyprus. Thereby, this disconnection renders identity independent of Cypriot space, as if it were a floating notion. Evidently this disproportionate historic-geographical analogy, coupled with the distance from the rest of the European continent, generates a vacuum. In contrast, Greece is well attached to the European continent. Being a part of the Balkan Peninsula, it is connected to a significant stretch of land which contains a complex sum of mountainous regions, lakes, rivers, as well as stable man-made links (railroad, highways, etc.) that facilitate a connection with the neighbouring states northwards and by extension to central Europe. Apart from that, identity here is entopic21 by default when a vast array of figures of memory is taken into account. At this early stage then, all things considered, the spatial parameter is definitive of a predisposition towards Europe, which differs when Greece and Cyprus are examined. The states and their churches equally adhere to different historical backgrounds despite their common characteristics; therefore, it should be emphasised that they are by all means comparable. As stated earlier, both churches shared attitudes of wariness, even hostility towards the West, and to some extent they still do but variably, yet this emanates from different historical experiences. For instance, the form of perpetuated archbishopric ethnarchy that Cyprus experienced from the end of the Frankish and Venetian period up to the twentieth century, never occurred in Greece; on the contrary, the autocephaly acquired in 1833 by the OCG was a sign of secularisation under the Bavarian king Otto, who was imposed as a compromise between the Great Powers of the time within the bounds of their “Grand Game”.22 In contrast, Greek-Cypriots associated to 19 Caesar V. Mavratsas, “Greek-Cypriot National Identity: A Clash between Geography and History”, (2010), pp. 145–60 (p. 146). 20 Ibid., p. 152. 21 See Artemis Leontis, Topographies of Hellenism: Mapping the Homeland (1995). 22 When competition between the British and the Russian Empire for Central Asia was combined with the growing weakness of the Ottoman Empire, the “sick man of Europe”, it was proven to the benefit of Greece that declared its independence while the Great Powers were torn between dismantling a regime that was unable to reform, or the rule

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their already since 431 autocephalous church, all forms of political, social and cultural life.23 What is more, this was solidified by the privileges provided to any Cypriot archbishop by Emperor Zeno, from year 478.24 This association lived on in the collective psyche even under British rule, when the OCC was stripped off its previous Ottoman privileges and had no official political office, duties and jurisdiction. It goes without saying that this was a cause of bitterness. Also, while until the early twentieth century the already independent state of Greece grew in size and later affirmed its status in the world with the valuable assistance of the Great Powers, Cyprus struggled with British colonialism – the only European state to have experienced this – and acquired de jure independence as late as 1960. Yet, to further the differentiation between the Greek and Cypriot case, having been part of the Commonwealth inevitably affected Cyprus in being familiarised with the West in its own unprecedented way as far as states within Europe are concerned. Further, Archbishop Makarios III (1913–1977) had the unheard of, multifaceted role of ethnarch, archbishop (period applies to both properties 1950–1977) and president (1960–1977). Additionally, his policies of non-alignment estranged Cyprus from the West amidst the Cold War,25 while Greece was a Western loyal ally with the blessings of the church. Not to mention the illegal, according to international law and innumerable United Nations’ (UN) resolutions, Turkish invasion and occupation, followed by a forced unilateral illegal partition of the island, which led Greek-Cypriots to rally round their church, notions alien to relatively safe Greece and other post-Second World War European states.

of law, i.e., the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. But the Treaty of London (1827) between Russia, England and France resulted in the recognition of Greece’s independence, and the appointment of Prince Otto and his regency. See Thomas W. Gallant, From the War of Independence to the Present (2016), as well as John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, Modern Greece: A History since 1821 (2010). 23 The third Ecumenical Synod provided this form of administrative independence for fear of the jurisdictional claims by the Church of Antioch. See Andreas M. Wittig, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in Griechenland: Ihre Beziehung zum Staat gemäß der Theorie und der Entwicklung von 1821–1977 (1987). 24 Those were the imperial privileges to (a) sign with red ink (cinnabar), (b) bear the purple cloak and (c) carry the imperial sceptre instead of an Episcopal crosier. See: Andreas N. Mitsides, ‘Το Αυτοκέφαλο της Εκκλησίας της Κύπρου’, (2008), as well as Kleitos Ioannides, The Church of Cyprus: History and Culture of two Millennia (1999). 25 Joseph S. Joseph, Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics – From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union (1997), p. 60.

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1.3  Literature review It would be fair to say that even though there is a vast array of exemplary works that examine both churches of interest from many perspectives and in an interdisciplinary way, there is a complete lack of comparative studies like the one we have undertaken, which means that any theory on the matter will have to come from this project. Although each church has been examined individually, it is mainly the OCG that was in the academic limelight in a way that bears relevance to the present concept, while literature, particularly on the OCC and especially on the period in focus, is scarce and thematically very different to our research agenda. Still, it is essential to mention the works that help shape the present contribution. The broader relationship of the EU with religious groups, and particularly with Eastern Orthodox ones, has been given considerable attention by Lucian N. Leustean. He has dealt with the involvement of religious organisations and institutions into the mechanisms and bureaucracy of the EU, as well as their activity in decision-making centres therein, such as in Brussels and Strasbourg, which renders them acknowledged actors. Thereby, their level, modes and impact of their representations is scrutinised, particularly on further European integration and the policies thereof, when filtered through the values of national and transnational religious groups.26 With regard to Orthodoxy and modernity, or rather its inclination and potential towards modernisation, it has been pointed out that although Orthodoxy has a very vivid historical consciousness and a preoccupation with the past and its own traditions, it retains an uneasy relationship with history on the whole. As a consequence, out of the temporal distortion, it is characterised by inattentiveness when it comes to modernity.27 But Agourides has not shunned the difficult task of tackling the, Byzantine in origin, ideologeme of “chosen peoples” and its inevitable consequences on the collective psyche, surviving elements of which touch on the relations to the West no less, as he has also written extensively on church‒state relations in Greece diachronically.28 Consequently Orthodoxy lost the track of Western historical time-lapse and with it, major developments – proper game-changers – such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Scientific and Industrial Revolution, 26 Lucian N. Leustean (ed.), Representing Religion in the European Union: Does God Matter? (2013), as well as Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). 27 Savvas Agourides, Οράματα και Πράγματα (1991), p. 327. 28 Savvas Agourides, Θεολογία και Κοινωνία σε Διάλογο (1999).

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and the Enlightenment. Bishops much rather prefer the anachronistic yet comforting nostalgic gaze to the “idyllic past”, which, not surprisingly, replicates itself,29 as is predictably the traditional pattern of self-perpetuation. On the other hand, Yannaras does not hesitate to validate the well-known Huntingtonian distinction and the cultural fault lines which demarcate otherness based on religiosity. In fact he goes on to identify Greekness and Orthodoxy as one, coherent notion of identity, whereby the Frankish heterodox background – infused with the Enlightenment ideas – is ipso facto alienated, and the theory of “transfusion”, i.e. Metakenosis (Gr.: Μετακένωσις) by Adamantios Korais (1748–1833) is frowned upon as it implies cultural inferiority on behalf of the Orthodox East.30 However, moving from the rather general to the particular, there have been works with regard to the timeframe and object of our research that have provided us with more relevant material and theories. Makrides, for instance, clarifies that anti-Westernism is not solely restricted to the religious sphere but it is essentially a social, cultural and political phenomenon, ergo, to attribute it to Orthodoxy would be an oversimplification, if not naivety to neglect of an array of hard evidence which demonstrate the parallel existence of pro-European trends, such as the ongoing interecclesiastical dialogue, the well-disposed attitude of a new generation of theologians, or the representations of national churches to the EU in Brussels.31 He has also dealt with the era of archbishop Christodoulos extensively, introducing not only the “expressive interventionism” utilised in order to promote the agenda of the church, but also the frictions and conflicts that emerged therefrom, with “the interweaving of church and state in everyday life”,32 complicating the state of affairs even more. Victor Roudometof raised the spatial issue that inevitably surfaces in light of globalisation, where de- and re-territorialisation33 are facts of life, which challenge

29 Sabrina Ramet, “The Way We Were – and Should be Again? European Orthodox Churches and the ‘Idyllic Past’”, (2006), pp. 148–75 (p. 148). 30 Christos Yannaras, Orthodoxy and the West: Hellenic Self-Identity in the Modern Age (2006). 31 Vasilios N. Makrides, “Orthodox Anti-Westernism Today: A Hindrance to European Integration?”, (2009). pp. 209–24. 32 Vasilios N. Makrides, “Scandals, Secret Agents and Corruption: the Orthodox Church of Greece during the 2005 Crisis – Its Relation to the State and Modernisation”, (2010), pp. 61–88 (p. 83). 33 Meaning the departure/migration of a culturally, religiously, linguistically and/or ethnically coherent community from its place of origin and re-establishment of it and its aforementioned traits elsewhere.

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the role not only of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople but also of the national churches in a shrinking world where religioscapes34 are in a state of flux;35 a concept that he revisited when he stressed the localism that characterised the Orthodox Church of Greece and its activities after 1998.36 As regards Cyprus, its church passed gradually from the ethnarchic model of Archbishop Makarios III, to a synodical one. Yet a social by-product has been a dichotomy in religious mentalities, which has been channelled towards the two ends of the ideological-political spectrum, namely expressed in the form of conservatism as opposed to more mainstream worldviews, in tune with the gradual modernisation and urbanisation in the Greek-Cypriot part of the island.37 By and large though, the period concerning the past rather than the immediate present has attracted much more attention, with research ranging from the Ottoman period up to Makarios III where the diachronically hegemonic role of the church as natural leader is investigated, e.g. by Marios Constantinou38 or Georgios Theodoulou.39 However, due to the period they focus on, they do address the era of Chrysostomos II. It should be stated though that Michael40 has gone into great depths to evaluate the role of the Cypriot church during the Ottoman era, bringing about valuable insights, which may mutatis mutandis apply to the contemporary state of affairs; the nineteenth century in particular and the problematic shift to the Westphalian System,41 i.e. the opposite of the nowadays condition, always in conjunction with the church.

34 Human, cultural geography that is spatially demarcated by its religious symbolisms in the public sphere. 35 Victor Roudometof, “Greek-Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality: Religious Responses and Institutional Disputes”, (2008), pp. 67–91. 36 Victor Roudometof, “The Evolution of Greek-Orthodoxy in the Context of World Historical Globalisation”, (2010), pp. 21–38. 37 Victor Roudometof, “Le Christianisme Orthodoxe au sein de la République de Chypre: Développement Institutionnel et Attitudes Religieuses”, (2009), pp. 60–68. 38 Marios Constantinou, “Rethinking Max Weber’s Sociology of Domination in Colonial Context: A Micro-Macro Framework for a Theory of Authority Relevant to the Case of Cyprus”, (2006), pp. 99–132. 39 Georgios Theodoulou, The Origins and Evolution of Church-State Relations in Cyprus with Special Reference to the Modern Era (2005). 40 Michalis N. Michael, Η Εκκλησία της Κύπρου κατά την Οθωμανική Περίοδο (1571– 1878): Η Σταδιακή Συγκρότησή της σε Θεσμό Πολιτικής Εξουσίας (2005). 41 An arrangement after the thirty years war (1618–1648) between mainly, central European Protestants and Catholic states, which secured sovereignty (non-intervention) and territorial integrity for nation-states but stripped the church off its powers to

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Concerning bibliographic resources then, one will find it impossible to discover systematic comparative research material in the particular thematic area, examined from an International Relations (IR) angle; only works that examine the two cases independently and from a Religious Studies historical-theoretical perspective. What is more, it has been pointed out that what is missing, therefore, is the comparative analysis and examination of two or more Orthodox cultures not only in terms of anti-Western discourses and practices, but also in terms of their interrelations, the transfer of ideas from one Orthodox culture to the other and their differences. In this way, the inter-Orthodox exchange of antiWesternisms may come to light and many trans-Orthodox aspects of this phenomenon will be revealed.42

1.4  Methodological approach In order to attain a good understanding of the object of research, a previous insight in representations of the collective church-minds in the form of knowledge, perception, worldviews, ideologies and attitudes, stemming from and directed to the micro and macro levels of each respective institution/structure, was a conditio sine qua non. Hence, we resorted to a comparative qualitative content analysis – an “umbrella term” –, essentially broken down to thematic analysis; and given that according to Patton, “any qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings”43 is categorised as qualitative content analysis, this fully qualifies as such. Whereby, at a macro level, it had a direct reference to the structures, i.e. churches of interest, followed by a qualitative field research at a micro level, where carefully selected persons were interviewed; with the major entities analysed here and therefore deemed units of analysis, being the Orthodox Church of Greece and its counterpart, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. The combination of primary resources comprising pre-existing raw data from an array of carefully selected sources on the one hand, and interviews from three particular types of informants on the other, which basically means approaching the unit of analysis from both a macro- and a micro-level perspective, has contributed significantly in terms of validity, functioning in fact as methodological triangulation.

administer policies and command armies. See Benjamin Straumann, “The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular Constitution”, (2008), pp. 173–88. Also, David Armstrong, “The Evolution of International Society” (2008). 42 Makrides and Uffelman, pp. 87–120, (p. 115). 43 Michael Q. Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods (2002), p. 453.

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Right from the outset, the aim was to accurately define the attitudes concerning Europeanisation and Westernisation that permeate the two churches, compare them and shed light on potential exchanges between them regarding their overall viewpoints and conduct. A major concern was not only “what?”, but also “why and how?” meaning: Why do they assume their rhetoric and conduct, and, are there similarities? What patterns emerge and how do they compare? Do they overlap? Are there any trade-offs between them or do they function completely autonomously? Where do those patterns stem from: culture, theology, history, all of the above, none? What are the effects of discourse being exercised via means of mass communication and information? It is self-evident that an extensive literature review was initially conducted. The resources that have been utilised comprise not only academic bibliographical sources, analyses and theories concerning the object and timeframe of research here, but also historical accounts concerning both states and churches, distanced from original events that transpired during the period of interest. Those partly constitute the background and explanatory framework that was employed as a means of interpretation, against which the analytical evaluation took place, in order to explain why and where patterns emanate from; whereas qualitative content analysis helped identify, capture and determine them. Our primary resources generally comprise interviews, news footage, broadcasts, speeches, official records, newspaper reports, in general evidence and raw data produced in the period of interest, indicative of values, norms, ideologies, priorities, in order to capture the existing churches’ positions of the time. This raw data was drawn from a spectrum of resources comprising broadly appealing media and theme-specific web-based portals, archives and databases. The key areas of interest have been the means of justification and lines of reasoning of the units of analysis, which entails a systematic examination of their standpoints’ public manifestation using communication and broadcast mediums as a vehicle. The particular primary and secondary resources utilised were narrowed down to the following, after we examined which ones would be the most reliable, accurate and representative: Ekklesia (Gr.: Εκκλησία), i.e. the official monthly bulletin of the Orthodox Church of Greece was the main source of information. The complementary resources via which it was rendered possible to verify the acquired information were: Kathimerini (Gr.: Καθημερινή) a highly esteemed Greek daily newspaper with a steadily broad readership; the official website of the Orthodox Church of Greece;44 and the official website of the Representation of the 44 http://www.ecclesia.gr/.

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Church of Greece to the EU.45 As for the Cypriot case, the resources examined are equivalent to the aforementioned, specifically: our main resource was Apostolos Varnavas (Gr.: Απόστολος Βαρνάβας), i.e, the official monthly bulletin of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus; while the complementary ones were Phileleftheros (Gr.: Φιλελεύθερος), the Greek-Cypriot daily newspaper with the highest circulation; Simerini (Gr.: Σημερινή) the second most popular Greek-Cypriot daily newspaper. The reason for opting to examine two Cypriot newspapers instead of one is that we have no day-to-day empirical contact with events in the island like we did with Greece. Further, the official website of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the official website of the Representation of the Church of Cyprus to the EU were utilised.46 Those have been referenced and cited using the Oxford system in accordance with the Modern Humanities Research Association (MHRA) Style Guide, edition of 2013. According to this, normally all bibliographic information is included in full in the first instance within the footnotes – somewhat different to their listing in the bibliography and resources section –, only to be shortened when a reference is reused thereafter. However, due to the bulk of resources being referenced frequently just once, we have taken the liberty to apply the abridged reference version extensively for reasons of homogeneity and economy of footnote space, which would otherwise be exceedingly extended; we thus reserved the fully detailed references for the bibliography section exclusively. Also, loc. cit. and op. cit. are not used because this citation method considers them too vague. The empirical phase of the qualitative field research was carried out via indepth semi-structured interviews and the sample was prominent figures of public life and decision/policy-making, opinion leaders who express their views and/or engage in discourses within the predefined thematic framework. They were semi-structured, in order to allow open, flexible discussions to take place and remove the interview aura with a set of techniques that are dependent on social skills, charisma and compatibility. We opted to gather data from informants of particular background because understanding and analysing their views entails a reference to ones’ structure adherence. In both societies, it is customary to view as such, the priest, the politician and the scholar. Hence, the people interviewed were coming strictly from corresponding sectors: church hierarchy, 45 Initially http://www.regue.org/. Notably this website is now down, and its domain name has been taken by another party. Instead, an alternative one has been set up (http:// www.regue.eu/en/). 46 URLs, (http://www.churchofcyprus.org.cy/) and (http://www.churchofcypruseu.com/) respectively.

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academia and government. All three groupings partake in the cultural physiognomy formulation and are essentially opinion leaders. The sample may actually be a source of normativity, but so is the EU, i.e., a normative power. Furthermore, the sample’s relevance rests on the fact that the church is not an exo-social institution; on the contrary, it pursues an active role as an actor, but not without some form of legitimacy. More to the point, the informants of choice were expected to come from fully relevant positions and offices, while in many cases, they have a say and complement each other in the eyes of their societies by unwritten, traditional, customary law – known as ethimiko dikaio (Gr.: εθιμικό δίκαιο); not to mention that this triptych of authority figures is often seen as societal refuge, variably of course.47 The likelihood of the sample being biased is minimal if existent at all, given that informants are coming from the whole breadth of the socio-cultural and political spectrum, hence the triptych, which provides validity. Direct thematic relationship to the units of analysis necessitates members of the clergy being interviewed. Apart from that, all academics are related to the topic, and politicians have either directly or indirectly been involved due to their office and in any case constitute a form of linkage themselves within both an institutional and a social framework. Therefore, they were treated as such and called upon to express their views. However, it should be emphasised that anonymity has been preserved at all times. Confidentiality secured a degree of trust whereby discussions took place in a rather relaxed manner that allowed room for revelations that could have, most probably, not been disclosed otherwise. Yet, they have been recorded, archived and remain in possession of the author; hence, there is proof when necessary, provided of course that anonymity remains safeguarded by any enquirer too, and guaranteed in written. It entails of course that elite interviews do not come in bulk, but the methodologically required number of fifteen has been exceeded by one. It is self-evident that the settings were located in Greece and Cyprus with state capitals, Athens and Nicosia at the epicentre, but also Brussels, Bonn, London and Canterbury, where academics, high-ranking clerics and state officials are to be found. It should be made clear that the analysis concentrated on emergent themes and not on physical linguistic units. Therefore, instances of themes represent expressions of ideas and views, which in turn produced descriptions or typologies. Analysis then has been purely qualitative, whereby no statistical occurrence rates

47 Politicians are in the limelight; as it is, scholars are called to express their views at times of crises or to otherwise enlighten when needed and the clergy is ever present in the public sphere.

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ought to be expected and reflexivity is methodologically inherent. Via the qualitative content analysis, broken down to thematic analysis, raw data was translated into categories or themes, which emerged inductively by inference and interpretation. That is, by means of inductive reasoning, ultimately an open-ended process, themes and categories came gradually to light from the body of data. And as stated earlier, this approach was applied on material drawn from communication and broadcast mediums, as well as interviews’ texts. At the same time of course, literature resources containing theories and material referring to our object of research contributed in identifying emergent themes but with limited consequences on the inductive nature of the overall approach. The thematic areas that surfaced via analysis provided a framework for dividing categories into chapters accordingly, along with their subcategories, which were integrated coherently under the broader main groupings as subchapters. Finally, it should be noted that all material that has been utilised in one way or another (websites, recordings, transcripts, etc.), has been copied, stored and archived, being thus available for access and verification.

1.5  Theoretical background synopsis It logically follows that the theoretical framework is thematically linked to the corresponding chapters that were generated as described above, and it is clearly permeated by interdisciplinarity, as is the case with our research project anyway. In other words, the theories being utilised and even challenged when required are ranging from religious and cultural studies to international policy and diplomacy, thus allowing particular emergent themes to be dealt with via the appropriate theoretical tools. For instance, in the second chapter, the notion of Europeanness and the process of Europeanisation are seen primarily through the lens of the so-called English School of International Relations (ESIR), where theorists such as Barry Buzan,48 Martin Wight49 and Hedley Bull50 are taken into consideration in order to examine the EU beyond the utilitarian level of interest-driven cooperation, focusing more on the potentially overlapping value systems, cultural traits and ideas which function as connecting tissue of an international society. But apart from

48 Barry Buzan, From International to World Society?: English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation (2004). 49 Martin Wight, Power Politics (1978). 50 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (1977).

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that, neo-functionalist approaches such as those of Radaelli51 and Featherstone52 are utilised to define the EU as a structure and its exigencies thereof. The constructivist key elements on the construction of identity and citizenship as viewed by Dell’ Olio53 are taken into account, whereas Vergara54 provides valuable views on the essence and foundations of Europeanness. Then in chapter three, Edward Hallett Carr55 and his theory of state personification from the perspective of IR plays a key role in exploring this phenomenon, particularly through the lens of the churches in focus. It should be pointed out that this too is fully compatible with the aforementioned IR theorists and the English School. But Cornelius Castoriadis56 is also employed as a means of understanding the mechanisms of being, i.e., the notion as a by-product of religiosity among others, in order to further explain how the group-person and its sense of belonging is perceived, in particular within the context of a society of states as seen earlier. In the fourth chapter, the phenomenon of “Reverse Westphalia” as described by Valaskakis, delineates the framework within which the European order of things is modified in the form of nation-state relativisation, with geocultural consequences among others; hence, from Mackinder57 to Spykman58 and Davutoğlu,59 we establish the importance of the rimland where Greece and Cyprus are located and evaluate the dynamics of this particular region, so that we may examine how the churches of interest perceive and conduct themselves in light of this framework as soft power actors. Beyer60 provides the necessary background in terms of reflexivity and variability of identity construction, the sense of belonging in relation to religious convictions and spatial sacred symbolisms in the era of globalisation; regarding the same notions, Roudometof61 is also taken 51 Claudio M. Radaelli, “The Europeanisation of Public Policy”, (2003), pp. 27–56. 52 Kevin Featherstone, “In the Name of ‘Europe”, (2003), pp. 3–26. 53 Fiorella Dell’Olio, The Europeanisation of Citizenship: Between the Ideology of Nationality, Immigration and European Identity (2005). 54 Javier Vergara, “The History of Europe and its Constituent Countries: Considerations in Favour of the New Europe”, (2007), pp. 15–22. 55 Carr, pp. 136–46. 56 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society (1987). 57 Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, (1904), pp. 421–37. 58 Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (1944). 59 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (2001). 60 Peter Beyer, Religion in the Context of Globalisation: Essays on Concept, Form, and Political Implication (2013). 61 Roudometof, “Greek-Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality”, (2008), pp. 67–91.

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into consideration, especially as far as church organisations and their stance towards this phenomenon is concerned. Additionally, the theoretical input of Leontis62 helps mark out the importance and meaning of space via the inextricable connection between topos and logos as parameters of entopia, i.e., location and narrative as factors of spatial fulfilment. As regards the debt crisis period that is being dealt with in the fifth chapter, the initial attitude of both churches is evaluated by means of the Weberian63 approach that links Protestantism and capitalism, which is the paradigmatic socioeconomic model in the West in general and Europe in particular, as opposed to Greece and Cyprus. Poggi64 provides a “real-world” hermeneutic, which essentially puts this value systems’ application in perspective. The opposite, i.e., the collectivist heritage that has co-determined mentalities and hence courses of action, is described by Hirschon,65 who essentially delves into the works of Yannaras in order to argue on the contemporary Greek-Orthodox particularities and make a distinction between the individual and the person. Those constitute a value system based on kinship and ascribed relationships which have by extension socioeconomic effects, applicable to both Greece and Cyprus, the churches of which are directly linked to this issue by definition. We also deal with the challenges that the Homo Economicus faces amidst the debt crisis in Daniel Cohen’s view,66 while Colin Crouch67 and his views on Post-Democracy are also utilised as a means of critique to the EU, especially considering that his points frequently resemble those of the Orthodox Church of Greece throughout the past decade and its Cypriot counterpart as of more recent. Still, apart from the synoptic outline above, intended to provide the reader an overview beforehand and not a detailed account at this point, it would be more productive and useful to delve in much more detail into the theoretical framework later on in the text. Particularly in the beginning of each chapter where it would be more relevant and in immediate connection with the corresponding findings and analyses and thus accounted for in a more structurally practical way. So these theories will be revisited properly. 62 Leontis. Topographies of Hellenism (1995). 63 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1950). 64 Gianfranco Poggi, Calvinism and the Spirit of Capitalism: Max Weber’s Protestant Ethic (1983). 65 Renée Hirschon, “Indigenous Persons and Imported Individuals: Changing Paradigms of Personal Identity in Contemporary Greece”, (2010), pp. 289–310. 66 Daniel Cohen, Homo Economicus: A (Lost) Prophet of Modern Times (2014). 67 Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (2004).

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1.6  Importance of study (scientific contribution & originality) Churches, the Eastern Orthodox in particular, continue to hold a key role as regards national consciousness. By extension, when their corresponding states are being met with the challenge of alignment with a broader political constellation of states and their values, churches emerge either favourable or directly opposite to such projects, on the basis of their value systems and their compatibility with their institutions. When the hypothesis of Eastern Orthodox cultural uniqueness and its role in the EU is taken into account, one cannot ignore Orthodoxy’s political dimensions that include it as a significant variable in the whole concept; this is attested by the opening of a Liaison Office of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, or the corresponding Offices of Representation on behalf of autocephalous churches in Brussels, where EU institutions and churches engage in dialogue and cooperation.68 One cannot presuppose the outcomes of an open-ended research in advance, but a general framework of expectations was feasible from the outset, such as a certain eurosceptic attitude, even resistance to Europeanisation. On the other hand, some degree of realist, pragmatist prevalence which dictates conformity to the achiev­ able was expected, and also, an interest-oriented attitude of both churches and close church‒state relations aspirations. Even though deduction is not our approach of choice, norms as indicators of their respective forms of anti-Europeanisation or Euroscepticism already existed inevitably, leaning for the most part towards an attitude differentiation between the two institutions. What is more, any signs and evidence of trade-offs in terms of inspiration, ideas, policies or direct cooperation between the two institutions of interest were self-evidently in focus as well. All things considered, the contribution of the research project outlined above partly rests on its originality, namely, the fact that no comparative study as such has ever taken place in this particular field. This importance is further reinforced by the worldwide religious resurgence that has been noteworthy, which in turn upgrades the role of the church as socio-political actor with an inevitable consequence on issues of culture, and ultimately, a sense of being and belonging. National identity is back into play, and traditionalist organisations allegedly thrive on the prospects of the occasion, with the European project suffering from such changes of wind. Therefore, the Orthodox Churches of Greece and Cyprus have a historical task ahead. Apart from that, it is self-evident that both Greece and Cyprus are actors of high geopolitical significance in an increasingly volatile region; 68 Lucian N. Leustean, “Eastern Christianity and the Liberal International Order”, (2015), pp. 168–90.

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therefore, their attachment to the EU is deemed vital, and yet, their membership is troublesome due to alleged cultural differences that spill over the aspects of this broad partnership. However, Greece is the first Orthodox state to have ever joined the EU, with Cyprus the second. Athens, Nicosia – together with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople – constitute diverse pillars of GreekOrthodox culture; consequently, they are worthy of a comparative investigation regarding their attitudes towards Europeanisation. Not to mention that with the intra-European religioscapes being in a state of flux due to increased mobility, the ever-present spatial parameter adds complexity to the whole situation. At this point, it should be stressed that no such research as the one we present has ever taken place, and it should be underlined that this has been investigated thoroughly. This explains the lack of literary and academic resources on comparative research between the aforementioned churches, and, on the topic as stated, while at the same time it renders originality self-evident. Apart from that, this topic has never been approached from the perspective of IR, either generally or particularly, so much that there have been publications addressing precisely the theoretical vacuum of examining religion in that context and the consequences of this neglect. Therefore, the present endeavour within the corresponding theoretical framework qualifies as an innovative element in its own right. Hence we expect to provide this area of interest not only with new findings, but also with further discussion points of theoretical contribution, based on existing foundations such as the ESIR as well as the theory of State Personification, and to that end offer, an additional apposite vocabulary to address neglected and emergent aspects of the theme in focus; that might be suitable for a broader usage and applicable to other cases too.

2 Europeanness – the Problématique of adherence The present chapter deals initially with the multiplicity of available viewpoints in the dominant IR disciplines, through which, crucial notions are appreciated and defined. Ranging from mechanistic and structuralist approaches of Europeanisation to cultural, value system oriented evaluations of Europeanness, it is demonstrated how the whole endeavour of clearly demarcating a fuzzy notion such as the latter, as opposed to the clear limitations of the former, generates a problématique regarding the criteria of adherence to the EU. This is not without consequence for the churches of interest as it is further explained. For, they conceptualise Europeanness in their own ways and thus relativise their terms of belonging in the EU, while taking variable stances to Europeanisation; both via rhetoric and actual political involvement, exercised domestically and through their offices of representation in Brussels.

2.1 Defining Europeanisation and the Problématique on European identity It all started on 9 May 1950 when Robert Schuman’s1 suggestion for joint management of coal and steel production was heeded by France and Germany, resulting in the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The corresponding treaty that was signed on 18 April 1951, following ratification – applicable as of 23 July 1952  – by “the inner six”, namely, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, was to become the humble beginning of an ever growing, ambitious project.2 And the Founding Fathers of the EU3 set the foundations for the political entity that we know today, which, gradually and from treaty to treaty grew to a union of twenty-eight members, while

1 He was the Foreign Minister of France at the time (1948–1952) and is considered one of the Founding Fathers of the EU. His suggestion aspired to prevent future wars between France and Germany by means of interdependence. 2 Consilium, A Union of law: from Paris to Lisbon tracing the treaties of the European Union (2012), p. 6. 3 Konrad Adenauer, Joseph Bech, Johan Willem Beyen, Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi, Walter Hallstein, Sicco Mansholt, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, Altiero Spinelli. See European Union, ‘The Founding Fathers of the EU’, (2014).

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another group of queuing candidates is at the doorstep, waiting to join. Now, the EU looks nothing like its initial form, it has much more complex purposes, scope, organisation and institutions: it has its own Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the European Court of Auditors.4 Hence, in a nutshell, it is a fully institutionalised political entity that comprises the three branches of government and more, as if it were a sovereign state: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It may often be taken for granted but its progress has been unparalleled, such that it has come to the point that we are now in a position to discuss its very essence, an overarching identity. Yet, one must concede right from the outset that to attempt to delineate the socalled European Identity – if such a thing exists at all – is easier said than done, not to mention that it is quite open-ended in terms of outcomes. Additionally, in order to tackle the whole issue, it is imperative to deal with notions that are inextricably connected with it: the process of Europeanisation and the condition of Europeanness. The former is important due to the connotations it triggers, given that to be able to “Europeanise” a structure or an institution, entails that there exists a form of Europeanness, measurable qualitatively, quantitatively or both. This, in turn, means that Europeanness itself ought to be the standard and the measure of the process thereof. An array of complications emanate though, from, among other things, the collectively representative nature that Europeanness ought to possess, in order to at least approximate a form of European Identity. It is a given that all Member States of the EU are cosignatories of binding agreements and treaties, which impose a numbers of prerequisites and duties, as well as suggest the commitment those Member States have willingly and wittingly made, by accepting a set of predetermined terms and conditions in order to achieve European integration. In that plain, legalistic sense, the process of Europeanisation is falsely presented as a mere bureaucratic arrangement that needs to be met, so that an array of diverse regimes may converge along the way and all of them together become compatible, within the bounds of a descriptive and prescriptive, regulatory, organisational blueprint. Yet this is not the case, but rather an aspect of it. Apparently, Europeanisation is not, and most probably cannot be, a stand-alone process that will eventually work when all counterparts emulate this blueprint systematically and methodically. If anything, because it touches on another sensitive, intangible notion, called Europeanness, which is laden with cultural baggage: identities, particularities, sense of belonging etc. In addition 4 Consilium, The European Union Facts and Figures (2014), pp. 4–5.

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to this, there is also the problem of definitively pinning down the contested and fuzzy concept in focus. There is a broad spectrum of theoretical approaches that attempt to define Europeanisation, ranging from structural, mechanistic conceptualisations to civilisational and socio-cultural frameworks of analysis, whereby Europeanness comes inevitably into play. It seems that the deeper the latter is fathomed by a culture and the more it identifies with it, the easier it is for Europeanisation to be implemented. Therein rests the interdependence between the process and the condition/notion of interest, between Europeanisation and Europeanness, which, among other things, constitute means to an end, namely European integration; even federalisation to the true Europeanists. Europeanisation, as a process – an admittedly broad, all-encompassing term – according to Radaelli consists of: processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies,5

being therefore defined in an equally all-encompassing manner, which, by the way, confirms the, throughout the presently examined literature, postulation of intangibility; even though Radaelli himself offers an articulation of a systematised conceptual approach, strictly referring to institutions, structures and governance spread throughout the EU, which directly impinge on the domestic policies of all Member States. However, a second look reveals the implicit convergence of cultures that certainly affect the “ways of doing things”, not to mention shared beliefs that cannot be completely devoid of principles; overall, there can be no such convergence without any reference to ethos then, as we will demonstrate shortly afterwards. The above-mentioned author, apart from providing us with a definition, distinguishes Europeanisation to domains such as “Domestic Structures”, or those of “Public Policy” and “Cognitive and Normative Structures”; the latter especially is further analysed in “a) Discourse, b) Norms and values, c) Political legitimacy, d) Identities, e) State traditions – understanding of governance, f) Policy paradigms, frames, and narratives”.6 This dimension of “Cognitive and Normative Structures”, along with its contents, is treated distinctively by its own author first and foremost, as the capacity of the EU to exert 5 Claudio M. Radaelli, “Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?”, (2004). 6 Radaelli, “The Europeanisation of Public Policy”, pp. 27–56, (p. 35).

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influence on values and norms is clearly acknowledged;7 therefore, the susceptibility of institutions – why not national churches too then – towards transformation along the lines of a corresponding programme as such is not excluded. Concerning the term “Europeanisation”, Featherstone, leaning towards examining things from the perspective of social sciences, holds that “[…] it can range over history, culture, politics, society, and economics. It is a process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests”.8 In that sense, given the broad reach and potential of this process, while agencies are empowered to affect structures and vice versa, both the former and latter exist in a relational mode with each other, and, what is more, their actions may be causes of widespread outcomes; in this complicated schema where a structure is an agency and an agency is a structure as well, existing within a relational concept, domestic consequences may be amplified by even seemingly small EU obligations.9 But alternatively, Europeanisation can be seen as a concept beyond governance, as the shifting of powers upwards – to Brussels – and of institutional adaptation. Inevitably, “Europeanisation as modernisation”10 would enter this discourse, and it refers mainly, if not solely, to the so-called geographic and economic European periphery that is expected to conform to the Western European norm. It follows that the EU enlargement policy has some type of political-economic reform in store for the newcomers, aiming to assimilate them with the mainstream economic and political model of the EU core Member States, which happen to prosper and exert significant influence thereby.11 We may parenthetically note though, that this dimension of “Europeanisation as modernisation” applies to those Member States that deviate from the predetermined obligations, terms and conditions. In any case, the crux of the matter here is that the paradigm takes after the Western European model. Yet, modernisation is itself contested with the transformation of the global status quo in general and the inclusion of post-communist states in the EU, within the bounds of the European enlargement in particular. Modernity is being thus reviewed, and a multiplicity of modernities is actually conceded as a fact.12 This is not to say of course that this is necessarily the case in practice, given the disparity of power between 7 Ibid. 8 Featherstone, pp. 3–26, (p. 3). 9 Ibid., p. 4. 10 Thomas M. Wilson, “Europeanisation, Identity and Policy in the Northern Ireland Borderlands”, (2007), pp. 49–60, (p. 52). 11 Ibid. 12 Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities”, (2000), pp. 1–29.

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Member States and the imposition of policies and domestic structural models to newcomers and peripheral states – small powers – which are often deemed inadequate by the Western European states that set the paradigm. Amidst the 2000s, this possibility, i.e., of a new model of modernity being shaped outside the Western European paradigm and with the new Member States in consideration, was discussed exhaustively as it was expected to even reshape Europe and reconstitute political modernity, together with the new geopolitical reality of the time.13 Yet, as to whether that was plausible or not is highly debatable judging by the debt crisis that put an array of institutions and certainties to the test, by clearly demonstrating who has the upper hand. Apart from modernisation, another dimension of the process in focus would be that of “Europeanisation as the reconstruction of identities”.14 Broadly used, this perception is often the first that springs to mind, but in our view, it may probably be catalytic in the whole project, even though it is frequently overlooked. This form of Europeanisation is intended to relativise the notions of territoriality and peoplehood, which are dominant principles in the modern order of things in Europe, while reviewing and retheorising culture and identity within the framework of the EU project; this includes EU policies and their impact on, and interaction with the Member States and their domestic political-cultural identification.15 It is then a force of transformation par excellence. Social constructivists, more often than nought, steer clear of the neofunctionalist approach of reducing the European project to an institutional framework of analysis where all focus is on governments functioning within the EU order; rather, they perceive society as being in a state of flux, always in the making, as they, at the same time, take into account the historical evolution of modernity within a globalised environment, i.e., the conditions where Europeanisation is in action. For that reason, they advocate a different course of action, namely, to focus on societal and cultural dynamics instead of institutions as they see potential in a bottom-up, post-positivist approach. After all, both structure and agency exist within the given socio-cultural environment and they are not immune to such influences; they may be descriptive of their condition and state of affairs but not explanatory. Ergo, to understand them, one ought to understand their context first, as well as the social actors and the processes at work that

13 Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanisation (2005), p. 19. 14 Thomas M. Wilson, pp. 49–60, (p. 52). 15 Ibid.

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co-formulate it.16 One easily realises, therefore, how differently Europeanisation is perceived across the spectrum of approaches and most importantly how this affects the analytical process thereof. On the one hand, for neo-functionalists and structuralists, the issue is most frequently the level of analysis within the institutional structure whereas on the other, for constructivists, it is the cultural dynamics. However, it is obvious not only that there can be no structure without agency and vice versa,17 but also that there is an evident interdependence and interrelation between structures and units.18 Structures, after all, cannot exist without agencies, while the latter exist exclusively within the former.19 “Society does not exist independently of human activity (the error of reification). But it is not the product of it (the error of voluntarism)”.20 Giddens attempts to overcome the antithesis of dualism, offering a synthesis based on overlaps and convergences.21 In sum Giddens’ structuration theory, promotes duality instead of dualism, viewing structure and agency as two sides of the same coin, and dualism as artificial.22 Yet, it is known to the reader already from the previous chapter that we too perceive Europeanisation as more than a convergence of institutions and governance regimes, as those are not exo-social,23 stand-alone entities and cannot be

16 Delanty and Rumford, pp. 2, 7 and 15. 17 Colin Hay, “Structure and Agency”, (1995), pp. 189–206, (p. 189). 18 Barry Buzan, “The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered”, (1995), pp. 198–216, (pp. 213–14). 19 One has to wonder if there are actual grounds for a dispute when, according to Wendt, “theories of international relations can and must endogenise – or explain change – in both agency and structure”; see Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr, Agency, Structure, and International Politics: From Ontology to Empirical Inquiry (1997), p. 9. This allows versatility in the use of the ‘level of analysis’ approaches, since “one person’s agency is another person’s structure”. See Hay, ‘Structure and Agency’, pp. 189–206, (p. 191). 20 Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences (1998), p. 36. 21 The fact that an agency can act and produce results entails power and capability. Power, of course, depends on resources and varies among individuals; therefore, it is relational. Yet, agencies have always some form of power at their disposal, the amount of which changes due to circumstances but also over time. This phenomenon, known as “the dialectic of control”, directly affects the balance of power; See Derek Layder, Understanding Social Theory (1994), p. 125 and 138. 22 Hay, pp. 189–206, (p. 197). 23 In the sense of dwelling and functioning outside the social structure or in its periphery; the same applies to a society of states and the corresponding values and principle that allow the formation of a system within an anarchical – lacking a high authority with

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devoid of socio-cultural values, norms and “ways of doing things”, hence, in a nutshell, immune to culture. That is where Europeanness comes into play, as a catalyst, definitive of the success of the European project and a criterion as well. It should not be taken for the equivalent of European identity though, but as an approximation of it, parallel, at best, to the national identity that is still the dominant one. So let us henceforth, as a convenience, call Europeanness a quality. Being a fuzzy concept, Europeanness can only be roughly delineated – and not accurately defined in a few sentences – via the route of Europe’s past up to nowadays, where the core building materials of the European civilisation can be located, leading to a possibly overarching European paradigm; that, actually, would be to some extent in tune with the constructivist approach. The typical approach of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) though, would be more down to earth, practical, in that this quality was introduced via political decisions after the Second World War (WWII). To avoid the farcical repetition of history, the initially economic format gradually assumed a political form with an identity content that co-existed with the national, in order to live in peace, prosperity and the implementation of the values and principles of the United Nations (UN) on human rights;24 which is not far from the truth either. Europe, the continent, may be geographically distinct but that is far from enough to determine its “substance” that spills over what the EU is about. The starting point ought to be values that are applicable in the Western world generally and the EU particularly. Because when examined from a cultural perspective, the notion of “Europe” connotes an idea and a paradigm that can be deemed regulatory of norms, values and ethics as well as an outcome of them. In turn, Europeanness means in our view their endorsement and practice so that they determine one’s way of life, or on a macro-level the ways and customs of whole social groupings. The foundations of Europeanness according to Vergara,25 rest in the background that has over the centuries generated the humanist identity via a number of factors, conditions and historical fermentations, in order to eventually be able to conceptualise Europe: “Greek culture, Roman jurisprudence, Christianity, and the political legacy of the Germanic peoples”.26 Greek culture set the cornerstone by contributing with its emphasis on human rationality and logical inference, the capacity to impose order where and when necessary – global system as such. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (1977). 24 G. E., Interview with the author, 27 November 2013. 25 Vergara, pp. 15–22. 26 Martín Ramirez (1969), pp. 181–82 in Vergara, pp. 15–22, (p. 16).

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philosophy and metaphysics, whereby it constituted up to the seventeenth century the dominant influence of European culture in aesthetics, epistemology, as well as science and politics. Roman law set the social and civil administrative foundations concerning a given geographical jurisdiction, and was still applicable mutatis mutandis until well within the era of modernity. In turn, Vergara holds that Christianity came and established the equality of men ontologically, thus filling an until then significant vacuum of dignity as regards humanity and its purpose, to be reunited with its creator, which was henceforth rendered a pananthropic value. As for the influence of the Germanic peoples, it was mainly their contribution to the political balance between society and power within the framework of a civic organisation. And those constitute the foundations of the European personality,27 which, as a term bears significant weight and meaning, such that it will be revisited and dealt with properly, in the third chapter. While addressing the background of Europeanness further, it is worth mentioning that the new influential philosophical genres that emerged after the Middle Ages were European; Humanism, Rationalism, Empiricism, made their mark and are still relevant as components of a cultural leitmotif. The new world, the Westphalian System, the emergence of the state as political sovereign entity and the inter-Christian frictions in the continent that gave rise to the secular, modern nation-state, as we know it, were all processes and developments within the European realm that affected the further gestation of the European personality.28 The aforementioned frictions were of notable consequence, which of course has a bearing on the present project as regards the intangibility of Europeanness, even in the heart of Europe: the surfacing of two different anthropological typologies that stemmed from two Christian denominations, the Protestant and the Catholic. On the one hand, the anthropocentric viewpoint advocated that human freedom is attainable by, and for itself by means of its own human nature; therefore, it would be dependent mainly on one premise, the individual. On the other hand, the theo-centric in origin view of Catholicism, although conceding human free-will and individual autonomy in principle, suggested that the limitations of the human being pointed to the attainment of transcendental freedom via the spiritual aspect of man. All in all, the outcome was a European divergence that the Renaissance humanism set in motion, which emanated from

27 Vergara, p. 16. 28 Ibid., p. 17.

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the formerly unifying factor of religion and affected the further development of socio-cultural and political models within Europe.29 In contrast, what is attempted today is to achieve a European singularity that will overcome the fragmentations and divisions of the past, those, in fact, which emerged in Europe originally. And the entity that is being pressured and challenged the most is no other than the sovereign nation-state and with it, the theoretical and cultural foundations that legitimise and perpetuate it; for, if there is a European personality, it follows that there is a national personality as well. This entails the retheorisation and review of identity. Ironically enough, this singularity could be perceived as a regionalist view of Europe that takes after the medieval impression of the continent, when borders were unclear, distinctions were roughly delineated, sovereignty was questionable and contested, and above all, it transcended borders and jurisdiction as it was dependent on the idea of a God who was the legitimising catalyst in ruling the this-worldly domain.30 The heavenly legitimacy notwithstanding, a postmodern development as such, where sovereignty and power are diffused, does not eliminate one identity whilst providing a substitute, but rather is permissive of multiple, parallel identities that in turn allow room for belonging simultaneously to multi-level spatial entities: ranging from the narrowly perceived locality and extending to broader spatial entities – region, state, etc. – up to the European level, in an inclusive manner.31 Not that religion is obsolete, quite the opposite. Indeed the EU is secular beyond the shadow of a doubt, with the Treaty of Lisbon guaranteeing that explicitly. Yet, it rests on, very much, Christian foundations. Christian Democrats and their parties attest to that, as well as almost all European monarchies that are legitimised by their corresponding churches; Member States with national churches, Christian teaching and an array of informal institutions that stand by the respective state or even depend on it. Not to mention that the church is very often a source of legitimacy domestically.32 But in any case, religion does by no means determine EU citizenship, nor do any cultural traits whatsoever. In that sense, citizenship, at first glance, appears to be less complicated, a bureaucratic view of identity; a formality of belonging and Europeanness seen from a legalistic point of view, although even this is not free of content and connotations, as, actually, in essence, when examined properly it is not just a legality. It 29 Ibid. 30 James Anderson, “Singular Europe: An Empire Once Again?”, (2007), pp.  9–29, (pp. 15–17). 31 Ibid. 32 Delanty and Rumford, p. 48.

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can be legislated, and it certainly is, but citizenship has a social bearing as it allows or inhibits one to partake in a community and be a communicant of its corresponding rights and obligations,33 based solely on ones’ typical formalities of belonging. Hence, the insider is protected as being a part of the legislated whole, whereas the outsider is excluded, thus delineating the limitations of community and polity. The latter though is based on the premise of an identity and an active exercise of community membership which is a determinant and precedent of citizenship.34 The EU model of citizenship, albeit post-national and flexible in terms of belonging and of being a citizen, is still based on the archetypal processes of inclusion and exclusion,35 but it should not be confused and conflated with the national model of citizenship. The EU version of citizenship and identity is multicultural by default and ought to be constitutionally guaranteed, together with the post-national civic and political premises. Of course, it still remains anchored to the nation-state where culture is domestically preserved, but at the same time, the EU citizenship does not depend on the premise of tradition, but rather on de-traditionalised common values, applicable and representative of the post-Westphalian European political entity.36 Constructivists, though, identify key areas which are deemed instrumental in the construction of Europe as a political entity via Europeanisation, where first and foremost the aforementioned form of citizenship plays a key role, especially within the Schengen area and wherever visa requirements have been waived off. Because, as a result, the freedom of movement that it provides modifies people’s perception of identity by offering the actual experience of other cultures, lifestyles and all elements of everyday life that contribute to one’s identity hybridisation.37 In our view, the EU is not the equivalent of the nation-state, nor can it become such in the foreseeable future. It deals with issues that are above and beyond the control and powers of the former, but it is still based on a bloc of nation-states, exists via the delegation of powers from them and functions as a bloc-actor. Yet, by possessing powers that exceed all of its Member States combined by offering some form of post-national citizenship, alternative parallel identities, and with bearing the heritage of a centuries-long fermentation of cultures and values, it is as a whole more than the sum of its parts, and that is where Europeanness emanates from. In that sense, Europeanisation may somewhat resemble 33 Dell’Olio, p. 7. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., p. 18. 36 Ibid., pp. 91 and 145. 37 Delanty and Rumford, p. 18.

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an international regime, technically of course, contained and determined geographically and politically within a given area and range of jurisdiction, and it is being legitimised by its European personality that stems from the quality and substance of Europeanness, a quality that emerged out of the aforementioned fermentations of cultures and values. But to avoid possible negative connotations that are bound to the term “regime”, we ought to first clarify that we are referring to the Regime Theory of the Liberal IR school of thought and define it before we proceed any further: Regimes can be defined as a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.38

All the above permeate without question the political foundations of the EU; to some extent then it is indeed an international regime, it was after all so in its humble beginning when it had the form of “European Communities”. As regards norms, the EU is a normative power, but not just in a given issue area, for it rather exerts influence and imposes directives on a very broad spectrum of domestic and international issues that affect numerous aspects of the EU citizens’ lives. After all, the EU legislation overrides domestic laws, a fact which is quite indicative of how national sovereignty is now perforated and interdependence is being promoted. In light of the debt crisis especially, there has been a massive effort to promote the latter by the federalists. A key term here though would be that of “rectitude”, which entails that some sort of intra-European understanding of morality and common virtues prevails in seeing the implementation of norms, rules and common decisions through. This unity is not strictly based on interest alone then, because in order to exist, let alone last, a minimum of reciprocity, trustworthiness and a spirit of multilateralism are required. Self-evidently, this applies to the political aspect of the EU and shows that a coherent, homogeneous if possible, political culture is a prerequisite, and further, it justifies the reasons that the EU accession is wholly conditional. As we have implied earlier via our brief review of the European historical milestones that co-determined those common values, the connecting tissue of the EU is or ought to be its Europeanness, and if so, it entails that it is also at its 38 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables”, (1982), pp. 185–205, (p. 186).

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core civilisational; whereby a minimum value system consensus between Member States ought to be expected. If “[…] the broadest construction of cultural identity is the civilisation”,39 then there is already a departure point for defining and delineating the common ground of European identity. Likewise, civilisation is defined as the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people.40

If we concede that this definition holds true, it follows that at least at a European level, the means of cultural identification that allow us to determine a broader sense of belonging – inclusively but also exclusively – are civilisational par excellence and geographical at the same time. However, not all are prepared to agree with this view, and what is more, Europe may be seen as multi-civilisational, or rather, a civilisational constellation that comprises Northern, Southern, Western and Eastern influences, while from a geopolitical perspective it encompasses the “western Judaeo-Christian, Russian-Slavic and Islamic-Turkish civilisations”;41 hence, the aforementioned coexistence of multiple modernities, as those have been shaped and interpreted by their respective societies. Not to mention, this entails being constantly subject to change via discourse, in accordance with the constructivist approach. Yet, in our view, this is more of a globalist than a Europeanist perspective, heavily infused by wishful thinking, looking to construct a Cosmopolis that is by contemporary social standards unattainable; this means that it cannot be constructed from the bottom-up within the context of a social discourse so easily. More to the point, it is hard enough to maintain a cohesion as it is because, to put it simply, the problem with such constellations is that the social groupings they comprise rarely meet or overlap. Therein of course rests a contradiction, given that societies nowadays are more or less already multicultural, wittingly or not. Therefore, universal values are an easier common point of reference concerning the quality of Europeanness. In fact, speaking of values, it would not be amiss to view the EU as an evolved version of an “international society”, or a “society of states”. Thus, we are introducing the ESIR into the theoretical framework that is being utilised in order 39 Simon Murden, “Culture in World Affairs”, (2008), pp. 417–433, (p. 421). 40 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (2002), p. 43. 41 Delanty and Rumford, pp. 36–37.

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to deal with the concepts at hand with as much pluralism as possible. This particular approach can be deemed as a compromise between classical realism and liberalism, the two opposites that emanate from different philosophical perspectives (e.g., Hobbes on the one hand, Locke on the other) and views on the human nature itself, and they extend to the theorisation of international affairs (e.g., Self-Help vs. Interdependence, Relative Gains vs. Absolute Gains, etc.); the English School is neither strictly interest-oriented nor utopian – as liberalism has been pejoratively called. It leaves in fact room for values to be perceived as decisive in the formation and maintenance of a society of states. Stemming from the rationalism of Grotius, the notion of an International Society presupposes the existence of common interests and mutatis mutandis identities between parties, such as states, which may collectively agree to the establishment of institutions, norms and rules, not unlike Regime Theory actually. But this approach goes to a greater depth, permissive of more powers and authority to be allocated to the core shared institutions of such a society; also it is genuinely concerned with the nature, the substance of it, in an ontological way, whereas epistemologically it has a lot in common with constructivism and methodologically it utilises history.42 Hedley Bull, a renowned proponent of the aforementioned theory maintained that an arrangement as such exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.43

However, this definition is heavily permeated by the collective European historical narrative and the Westphalian System that produced what eventually came to be the state system, along with the essential preconditions of national sovereignty and absolute rule domestically, hence non-intervention from the outside. In fact, it is worth mentioning parenthetically that a “family of nations” as such, especially from the sixteenth century and onwards, did emerge amongst the Great and Major European powers and their subdivisions of the time: the hereditary monarchies of Great Britain, France, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Lombardy; the elective monarchies of Hungary and Bohemia, the Papacy, the British Empire, Poland; and the republics of Italy, Switzerland, Belgium and Venice.44 The purpose 42 Buzan, From International to World Society?, p. 7. 43 Bull, p. 13. 44 George G. Wilson, “The Family of Nations Idea and Japan”, (1912), pp. 246–55, (p. 246).

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was that of the determination of sovereignty, equality amongst “family members” – term used as a convenience – and power management in a broad sense. Apart from that though, this grouping stemmed from common values which, among others, imposed the burden of safeguarding “the standard of civilisation”45 as they called it, whereby the insiders enjoyed the aforementioned equality and in contrast the treaties with the outsiders were unequal, justified by the argument that those of the outer circle were “uncivilised”.46 Yet, this is not to say that the contemporary equivalent of the “family of states” has the same mindset; we are merely pointing out that there is a long tradition within Europe to come together and form coalitions, alliances and other types of cooperation, based on cultural and civilisational criteria. Bull himself drew inspiration mutatis mutandis from this long European tradition. The state was deemed the highest sovereign power within a global anarchical system of states, given the absence of a higher regulatory authority. But unlike the Realist school, here the “balance of power” is not seen as the main constraint and constituent of order within the international anarchical system;47 order, rather, can be achieved via the workings of the “society of states”. But for the latter to exist and be functional, an array of prerequisites, namely cultural criteria, has to be met when historical instances of such state groupings are examined: whereby language, religion, customs and aesthetics rendered the establishment of a society of states possible in the past, even if it was utilised as an excuse for colonial domination and a reason for critique towards the questionable “pedigree” of the English School.48 Another outstanding element of the ESIR is its identification and similarities with the emergent pattern of normativity that governs the EU, which is de facto and de jure deemed a normative power anyway, and the “society of states” respectively. In both cases, norms, rules, regulatory frameworks and institutions are expected to maintain order, equality and cooperation. Further, although religion has already been mentioned, its distinctive role in shaping value-based interethnic and international societies  – such groupings emerged before nationalism also – and even ruling over them deserves to be addressed separately in light of this discussion. The division of the Roman Empire (395) first and foremost allowed for religiosity to determine the formation of 45 The racist predisposition is quite obvious, but the example is merely used to demonstrate a diachronic intra-European inclination towards the establishment of an international, continental regime. 46 Armstrong, p. 38. 47 Bull, (1977). 48 Armstrong, p. 38.

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multiethnic yet cohesive constellations. For example, the Eastern Byzantine Empire, the heart of Orthodox Christianity and its capital Constantinople adheres to the aforementioned criteria, as it successfully lasted for a millennium. It conducted highly sophisticated politics and employed equally skilled diplomats, pioneers of the time in their line of work.49 But religious diplomacy was in part a means in achieving all that in the first place. For instance, the Christianisation missions of Cyril and Methodius qualify as such; or their invitation to Moravia by prince Rostislav as part of a diplomatic manoeuvre to counterbalance the German penetration and evade any potential political suzerainty to the Franks.50 In the West, the political authority of religion was even more evident, particularly in the Middle Ages. There, the supranational reach of the papacy ruled over the Catholic domain. Of course, the keyword here is “authority”, which is what the pope had in contrast to the rulers who possessed power instead, yet, the European “international society” – here the term is loosely used as a convenience – was undoubtedly affected. Edicts determined the extent of relations with other convictions and ranged from trade to alliances, legitimised by canon law; rules on diplomatic conduct were also determined as well as others that shaped the content of treaties. All that was to a certain degree imposed even by the threat of excommunication – excluding secular or disobedient rulers of course – and as a system that was served by the priesthood has been rightfully described as “a massive international bureaucracy”;51 even the notion and doctrine of “just war” was craftily elaborated, thus indirectly allowing the papacy to indulge in the exercise of power, directly or indirectly.52 By no means of course are we implying that this dated, pre-modern European heritage could or should be taken as a model for the present or the future. We simply wish to demonstrate that, all things considered, there exists a multifaceted, historically confirmed tendency for Europe to wish to join together; as a legal, political, cultural and/or religious entity. In addition, the interethnic, overarching papal authority attests to that possibility while it highlights a difference with the Orthodox autocephaly system that facilitated the identification of the church with particular ethnies53 and corresponding mutatis mutandis proto-national formations, followed by full-blown nations afterwards. 49 50 51 52 53

Ibid., p. 42. Dennis P. Hupchick, Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism (2002), p. 41. Martin Wight, (1977), in Armstrong, pp. 36–52, (p. 43). Armstrong, ibid. Before the emergence of nationalism, it is impossible and scientifically unacceptable to use the term ‘nations’. We therefore opt to resort to the usage of the term ‘ethnies’,

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Still, one pending, self-imposed question that runs through this chapter is: which Europe is it that we are dealing with, where does it begin and where does it end? Although this is a frequently asked question regarding the EU, it has yet to be answered conclusively and definitively, permitting thus the observer to resort to various assumptions. Still the notion of identity, especially of the kind that concerns us, cannot be devoid of a spatial reference, however fuzzy its foundations and demarcation may be; it somehow needs to be fixed in place because otherwise Europeanness would be short of one crucial point of reference when it comes to such entities. Here though, the problem is that when examining the issue geographically and geopolitically, ambivalences and contradictions emerge immediately and give out the impression that the spatial determination of the EU is in a state of flux. A typical misunderstanding is to equate Europe with the EU, which happens very frequently, both with the American as well as with European broadcast media that use this term as a convenience. This inevitably spills over societies too. Looking at the map of the Eurozone members (see image 1), one easily sees that this could be interpreted as partial and incomplete given that only eighteen (for the time being, and as the present document is being written) have joined in the common currency, leaving room for an implicit existence of a first tier EU, based on an evidently not so careful54 selection of its members. Regardless, the political reality is that they constitute, for better or worse, the “fiscal inner circle” of the EU and as such demonstrate that the EU, when it comes to its substructures and their hierarchy, therefore and by extension the hierarchy of states and state groupings, is not a single layer or single tier entity.

given the ethnic foundations of nationality and the constitution of the latter by beliefs, myths and generally collective linguistic, historical, narrative and often religious references that permeate given population units as means of kinship. See Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (1995), p. 57. 54 This remark is solely based on the problems that the common currency is burdened with, lingering on since late 2008 and have been the cause of discord between Eurozone adherent Member States; instigated by the debt crisis that scourges mainly the European South, this discord has given rise to a lengthy and at times intense debate as to whether cultural incompatibilities reflect on fiscal and economic policies, and even to deterministic arguments, which, based upon that premise, seek to dismiss the possibility of further European Integration. Others, more extreme, call the whole project unfortunate.

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Image 1:  The Eurozone55

As soon as one compares the above-depicted map (image 1) with the one that includes all Member States cannot help but identify the dissimilarities (see image  2) made visually obvious that not all states necessarily share common goals, aspirations and roles, nor do they share a common vision. But most outstanding of all is the fact that Europeanness and Europeanisation are, it appears, subject to change and interpretation. For, one may ask oneself whether Norway and Switzerland, both willingly opting to stay at a safe distance from the project and maintain political autonomy and sovereignty, are any less European; in other words, if they would need to undergo Europeanisation, should they decide to join the Union or the currency itself in the foreseeable future. They would most probably not unless of course Europeanisation would only mean ad hoc structural or particular institutional changes and the shifting of sovereignty and delegation of powers upwards to Brussels; but other than that, their political culture and their capacities as contributors and communicants of the European personality would not be contested, for, though normatively, they are considered European par excellence. Yet, impressively enough, on the official website of the EU (Europa.eu), those two in particular are grouped together with the rest of the countries that have not joined, opted out, never applied for accession or received

55 See interactive maps on the EU website, European Union, “How the EU works – Countries”, (2014).

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candidacy status, or are simply not eligible to apply in the first place, under the title “other European Countries”56 (see image 3). But they are also subcategorised as Schengen countries, which in itself attests to an obvious, special relationship; one that is permissive of commercial and economic freedoms, the trade of goods and the population movement without having to surrender any sovereignty. Further, as regards the Schengen cosignatories (see image 4), Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania will eventually join in but Ireland and the United Kingdom have opted out, for various reasons each, thus directly impinging on the equal enforcement of the acquis communautaire57 for all. Image 2:  The Member States of the EU58

56 European Union, “How the EU works – Countries”, (2014). 57 Also known as the European acquis, in its entirety it is ever evolving and adapting since 1958 as the legally binding document that includes the common rights and obligations of all the EU Member States, as well as candidates that wish to join the Union; namely, it gets embedded in the domestic legislation. It involves an enormous array of content, comprising Treatises principles and political objectives, legislation, declarations, resolutions, agreements, etc. 58 European Union, “How the EU works – Countries”, (2014).

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Image 3:  Other European countries59

Image 4:  Border-free Schengen area60

Another point of friction has to do with the European enlargement that has been fervently supported by the British and clearly articulated in the Thatcherite 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid.

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programme of countering a potential deepening,61 whereby the Union would remain conveniently loose, essentially a trade area with weak institutions and in that way the Franco-German influence would be kept in check.62 In contrast, and especially amidst the 2000s, the previously pro-enlargement German sentiments shifted diametrically, reaching a sweeping 84% in favour of a deepening, as opposed to a mere 6% for enlargement. The French even changed their constitution so that any further enlargement would previously have to be approved via a referendum in light of a potential, probably unpopular, Turkish accession.63 In any case, as far as the European enlargement is considered, just by looking at the map of candidates for potential accession (see image 5) yet another spatial pattern emerges, namely of a possible, future EU. Regardless if that would be a remote possibility that is viewed with objections and concern, as it has been that case as of recent, among federalists no less. More to the point, prior to the 2014 European elections, Jeanne-Claude Juncker64 stated in his EPP programme that one of his foreign policy objectives was that no further enlargement will take place under his Presidency of the Commission. With his main argument being that the addition of thirteen new members in the past ten years needed to be digested so that the new condition is consolidated,65 he was well aware of its sweeping unpopularity already; not to mention, of any further policy as such. But this is also telling of the spatial mutability of the EU, owed to a major extent to a latent cultural compatibility concern.

61 Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister and head of the Conservative Party, the “‘Tories”, (1979–1990) openly opposed the idea of an EU deepening as this would weaken in her view the position of the UK and it would prove detrimental to the British national interests. Although downright Eurosceptic, she preferred to “keep a seat at the table” rather than leave and have no say in the European affairs, connoting thus that the EU membership was a necessary evil for Britain. 62 Charles Grant, Europe’s Blurred Boundaries: Rethinking Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy (2006), p. 7. 63 Ibid., p. 9. 64 The current, 12th President of the European Commission; he was a candidate with the EPP for this post. 65 See Jeanne-Claude Juncker’s European People’s Party programme of April 2014 on the issue: Jeanne C. Juncker, “My Foreign Policy Objectives”, (2014).

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Image 5:  Potential EU members66

All in all then, when one browses through the various maps above, from a geo­ political perspective, there emerges a disparity of spatial determination. This multiplicity of spatial distinctions reveals the plurality of levels of belonging in the EU, and therefore of identity, given that there is no unitary narrative that can legitimise an overarching and definitive spatial reference, whereby Europeanness could be fixed in place. And a fairly straightforward means towards constructing a form of identity is via symbolisms. Symbolism comes in plurality of means and expressions such as objects, rituals and forms of discourse, which in sum are systems, combinations of other constellations of symbols. And their role among other things is to provide points of reference and shared codes among those who endorse them.67 Although comprising a broad spectrum of cultures rich in symbolism, the EU itself has adopted four basic symbols that are expected to create and henceforth trigger direct connotations linked to its entity and personality. Those would be: the European flag, the twelve stars of which “symbolise the ideals of unity, solidarity and harmony among the peoples of Europe”;68 the European anthem, which actually

66 European Union, “How the EU works – Countries”, (2014). 67 François Foret, “Symbolic Dimensions of EU Legitimisation”, (2009), pp. 313–24. 68 European Union, “EU Symbols”, (2014).

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is an excerpt of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony69; May 9 is Europe Day in commemoration of Robert Schuman, a founding father who made his contribution to the European vision on that day in 1950; and finally the EU motto “united in diversity”,70 as representative of the EU and its cultural, linguistic and traditional richness, coupled with the togetherness of Europeans under the unifying institutions of the EU.71 To this constellation of symbols, perhaps we ought to add the common currency, at least for the members of the Euro area. Yet, there has been no significant progress so far in reaching substantial legitimacy of the EU via those symbolic means.72 As regards the European flag, its primary role is to signal the establishment and function of a political entity in an almost utilitarian way. However, there exist descriptions and explanations of the origin and meaning of its symbolism that sometimes resemble urban legends, being thus often an ambiguous and subject to interpretation symbol. An example to our point would be the press release on the occasion of the flag’s 40th anniversary (7 December 1995), where quoting Paul M. G. Levy,73 it was stated that “the number 12 is highly symbolic because it is the number of the zodiacal signs, the number of Hercules’ labours, of the Apostles, of the sons of Jacob, of the hours in a day and months in a year”.74 Of all symbols, we put emphasis on the flag intentionally given that it is the uppermost symbolism of sovereignty, whereby emanates the legitimate exercise of power and authority within a given geography.75 The most tangible, obvious and apparent “symbols of the Union”, as earlier mentioned, have variable resonance; the anthem and motto are not widely recognisable “totems” amongst EU and non-EU citizens, in contrast to the flag and currency. However, less emphatic manifestations of the EU’s presence and status in the world, such as the border signs, passport and driver’s licence contribute to the symbolic tangibility by performing functions and make a psychologically notable

69 The “Ode to Joy” was brought to life by Friedrich Schiller’s lyrical aptitude (Ode’s German title “An die Freude”) and Ludwig van Beethoven’s composition merit (final movement of the “Ninth Symphony”). 70 European Union, “EU Symbols”, (2014). 71 Ibid. 72 Foret, pp. 313–24. 73 Paul Levy is upheld and celebrated as the “spiritual father” of the European flag and was also the first to become a European civil servant. In addition, he served between 1949 and 1966 as press director of the Council of Europe. 74 Foret, (2009). 75 Ibid.

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statement. But on a global level, apart from the flag, the European Commission’s Representations with physical presence in circa 130 countries are the second most important “totem”.76 In closing the section referring to symbolisms  – for the time being  – we inevitably return to religion. Because religion, namely Christianity, has also been employed to help interpret the meaning that is supposedly conveyed by the European constellation of symbolisms: the number of the stars as emanating from the equal number of apostles; the colour blue has been attributed to Virgin Mary as representative of her; Europe Day in May, as an indirect reference to her month according to the Catholic tradition (Month of Mary); even the beatification of Robert Schuman has been suggested. Certainly, none of the above-mentioned claims have ever been endorsed, but still they are evident of a demand from below.77 Regarding Schuman, it may seem trivial but it appears that the St Benoit Institute in Metz mounted a serious campaign for that purpose, securing the backing of former French President Jacques Chirac78 no less, towards canonising the man whom Konrad Adenauer called “a saint in a business suit”.79 Of course symbols could not suffice to represent what the EU stands for, but they do have an effect, especially when combined. However the delineation of Europeanness is incomplete as a full, authoritative and hegemonic European identity construct has yet to emerge, thus ambivalence on a symbolic level is still present. On the other hand, this is a constantly-under-construction, open-ended project, and in that sense, as there are multiple meanings of Europeanness, there is a corresponding range of polysemic symbolic interpretations. But ultimately what symbolic constellations are intended to represent is a foundation of common values and the successful unification process.80 The very foundations of the EU were expected to support a very different entity to what it has come to be today. Yet, the core of the founding states set an example for the next that joined in. After all, the founders of it had a say in formulating their creation to their image. The project evolved, the political entity grew in size, prestige and power, and became institutionally the 76 Ian Manners, “The Symbolic Manifestations of the EU’s Normative Role in World Politics”, (2006), pp. 66–84, (p. 74). 77 Ibid. 78 President of the French Republic from 1995 to 2007. 79 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “Vatican resists drive to canonise EU founder”, (19 August 2004). 80 Johan Förnas, Signifying Europe (Chicago, IL: Intellect, 2012).

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supranational equivalent of a nation-state, mutatis mutandis that is. It was dictated by the political conditions first and foremost that for such a project to succeed, there would have to be some form of structural homogeneity between members, which led to the process of Europeanisation out of necessity. Along the way, it was discovered that for this process of convergence to work, mentalities ought to meet at some point. Interdisciplinary approaches have tackled the issue from various perspectives and for various purposes, but in any case, the discussion of identification with the EU is pending. To deny that this political entity is in search of an all-encompassing identity would be extraordinary, given that it has reluctantly adopted ways of portraying itself in such ways that give away this aspiration. It has yet to be clearly defined though, culturally, temporally, spatially and symbolically, even though the qualities of Europeanness exist already, and admittedly they stem from the paradigm of the “inner circle” of Member States. All things considered then, it would be futile to actually endeavour to unearth a supposedly existing European identity; rather, it would be more productive and realisable to pursue the attainable, i.e., to outline the European personality; one that acknowledges its roots but is primarily determined by common values, moulded by the social and political fermentations of European history, within a certain geographical demarcation, conveyed by widely approved symbolic means. The question is if and to what extent the delineation of an already fuzzy concept coincides with the way the Church of Cyprus and the Church of Greece perceive it to be and possibly with the way they personify it.

2.2  Perceptions of Europeanness – conditionality of Belonging 2.2.1  The Orthodox Church of Greece In the beginning of the 2000s, the Orthodox Church of Greece (henceforth OCG) had an overall assertive attitude about most aspects of socio-political life, mainly driven by the communicational prowess of Archbishop Christodoulos (1998–2008). It follows that the EU could be no exception even though it was viewed and portrayed in a number of ways – ranging from coherent to ambivalent, even contradictory standpoints – depending on the period, the context, the person and often the immediate exigencies thereof. For instance, the EU has been atypically hailed as exemplary in dealing with heresies and questionable religious movements. Namely, in the 12th PanOrthodox Conference on corresponding issues, satisfaction was expressed for the fact that the “church of scientology” did not receive permission to operate,

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although it was pointed out that special care would be necessary so that no EU directive might be permissive in the future too.81 It was stressed that most EU states had already taken such measures by establishing institutions for the protection of the public, and that Greece should harmonise with the EU’s predominant attitude and do the same.82 Not only did the EU set the example in the eyes of the OCG, but it also appeared to be indirectly standing up to the threats that the dominant religion could potentially experience. It was in that optimistic, short-lived, period when fermentations within the EU and between churches allowed for a participatory tendency and a broad discourse on the future of Europe, which, old wounds and grudges aside, was expected to bring the members of the European family closer. The OCG had put together a Special Synodical Committee for the Monitoring of European Affairs (henceforth SSCMEA), parallel to the Office of Representation that is located in Brussels, and with a domestic role and function. In one occasion, when the aforementioned committee had a meeting with the Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community (COMECE), Metropolitan of Philippoi Prokopios (in office since 1974) expressed the conviction that the Church of Greece approaches the EU as a church of a religiously homogeneous Member State, the people of which, in their sweeping majority, are Orthodox Christians and people whose religious tradition and cultural heritage the church is expected to serve; whereby the upgraded presence in Brussels was considered a ministration of the Church and the people. Accordingly, willingness to work together with other churches and convictions being represented in Brussels was expressed, but also with European institutions in a broader sense.83 In this overall expression of Europhilia, one detects an inclination to co-shape the EU on the one hand, and on the other, willingness for concessions to meet halfway. In the same meeting, Bishop Homeyer84 replied

81 Kyriakos Tsouros, “ΙΒ΄ Πανορθόδοξος Συνδιάσκεψις Εντεταλμένων Ορθοδόξων Εκκλησιών και Ιερών Μητροπόλεων δια Θέματα Αιρέσεων και Παραθρησκείας”, (2001), pp. 20–22, (p. 21). 82 Ibid. 83 Archimandrite Ignatios Sotiriadis, “Συνάντηση Ειδικής Επιτροπής Παρακολουθήσεως Ευρωπαϊκών Θεμάτων με την Αντιπροσωπεία της COMECE”, (2001), pp.  23–27, (p. 24). 84 Roman Catholic Bishop Joseph Homeyer, appointed at the Diocese of Hildesheim in 1983, retired in 2004; he has also served as President of the COMECE from 1993 to 2006.

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by stressing the need to go beyond 120485 and start a new quest, and even took it one step further as he held that the EU respects the cultural traditions that each country has, but there exists a notion of Western ideas being exported eastwards. At which point, he claimed that the opposite must take place as well, or else it may be misunderstood as Western colonialism. More impressively, he held that it would be appropriate to speak of the Europeanisation of the EU, because it needs both of its lungs, i.e., the Western and the Eastern to be able to move forward.86 This grand suggestion by Bishop Homeyer was happily endorsed by the OCG. After all, the equality of Member States ought to entail that as self-evident, though in practice it is not, and equally this condition ought to be applicable between their institutions, such as the churches in this case. The Europeanisation of the EU as a notion on the one hand pointed to the vacuums and fuzziness of the concept, while on the other, it opened a window of opportunity for this longawaited discussion to take place; in particular since 1204, according to the bishop and there were no objections to that by his counterparts. By the same token, it would not be amiss to consider the Papal apology in Athens87 as part of this broader discourse of making amends, of meeting the Eastern Orthodox halfway and ultimately converge politically; if anything, for the sake of completing the puzzle of Europeanness as perceived by the OCG and its Western counterparts for the Europeanisation of the EU; in other words, the infusion of the EU with the common, ideal type cultural qualities of Europeanness. Here then emerges a pattern: the aspiration to co-shape the EU, based on the aforementioned understanding of its essence and quality of Europeanness and an explicitly articulated view that its Judaeo-Christian cultural background ought to serve as a basis for the EU and its institutions, whilst being a convergence and departure point at the same time. In fact, the perception of the EU as Christian because of its Europeanness has been taken for granted time and again. In one of his speeches to the Greek MEPs in 2001, Christodoulos stated that Europeans share Christianity as a common cultural denominator and substitutes

85 The fourth Crusade of 1204 has been recorded as traumatically monumental by the OCG, in that it was marked by the siege and sacking of Constantinople by heterodox, yet fellow Christians. 86 Sotiriadis, “Συνάντηση Ειδικής Επιτροπής”, pp. 23–27, (pp. 25–26). 87 The interest of the press on the visit alone was noticeable worldwide, not to mention the lament for the “disastrous sack of the imperial city of Constantinople”, see Stanley (2001).

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such as laïcité should not be sought for.88 Referring to the vision of the founders of the European Economic Community (EEC), he held that it stemmed not only from a coalition of economic and political interests, but also from a common religious and cultural tradition; in fact, he cited Thomas Elliot to claim that Europe’s cultural foundations are Jerusalem, Athens and Rome,89 which is not entirely at odds with plausible views, definitions and institutional particularities as those seen earlier in 2.1. Yet, he proceeded in dismissing as unscientific the views that European culture was based on the Enlightenment as well, and was to some extent affected by Islam too; to which he added that Charlemagne (Ger.: Karl der Große) was enthroned in 800 by the Pope of Rome as the King of Franks and Romans, a title that only the Emperor of Constantinople could hold. It was, according to Christodoulos, an act towards the division of Europe which was finalised by the Schism of 1054. Europe was unified until 800 in his view, but with the schism, Western Europe deprived itself of the spirituality of the East for 1000 years and chose the way of rationalism and scholasticism, being as a result trapped in spiritual dead ends.90 Here, the old grudges – causes of intra-European “Otherness”,91 apportioned mostly to the West for the most part – contribute to the differentiation of standpoints as regards the physiognomy of Europe, whereby Europeanness and the EU do not necessarily coincide, while the latter has been often described as devoid of the former, given that Europeanness was consistently linked, among others, with shared Christian values. Further, apart from the obvious past traumas that linger on and to a certain extent because of them, there exists limited acknowledgement and partial acceptance of Western Europe. It is deemed incomplete without its Eastern counterpart and because of this vacuum, Europeanness is unfulfilled and Western Europe is left wanting; limping to the future in the absence of the essential Eastern Orthodox influence, oblivious of what is imperative for its own good according to the late archbishop. In sum, this perception reveals the “conditionality of belonging” and the terms that permeate it. Particularly concerning Europeanness as a whole, the conditionality of the terms of belonging is twofold: 88 Archbishop Christodoulos, “Η Πορεία και ο Ρόλος της Εκκλησίας στην Ευρώπη του 20ου Αιώνος”, (2001), pp. 95–99, (p. 96). 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 The quality of being different, of not belonging in a group due to non-adherence to its characteristics and criteria of self-identification; what is more, the epitome of Otherness as such would be the diametrically opposite of a social identity, i.e. full heterogeneity.

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first, the Europeanisation of the EU by taking into account and endorsing the spirituality of the East – in the form of a, shall we say, “reverse Metakenosis”92 – the worldview and attitudes towards ways of life that this suggests, and second, the respect and preservation of any given national physiognomies and cultural particularities the EU comprises at the same time. In principle, the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece (hereafter HSCG) itself, approved of the EU. It greeted the 20th anniversary of Greece’s induction to the EEC, describing it an event of historical significance for Hellenism, pointing out however that the founders and architects of the EU had the conviction that they were creating a Society of Nations, with common values and traditions. Yet the Synod disapprovingly maintained that today Europeans experience a new reality, for, in the name of an atheist state (EU) of undefined structure and functions, and existential principles and values, there exists a marginalisation of the church and a polemic against it, what is more disregarding the peoples.93 Adding that the values of the church cannot be modernised because then they would resemble constitutional articles that can be revised, they further hinted to their future actions, stating in their message that the church will not cease to remind the EU of its European heritage, the legacy of the founding fathers.94 This statement above is an example that encapsulates some basic contradictions in the theorisation and perception of the EU but also contains a strong political element. The self-evident secular character of the EU is opposed as “atheist”, a strong term that entails downright rejection in its harshness. Then, church values are being defended even though they are not being attacked, no requirement of canons being put forward; what the church feels will be challenged is rather the model of cooptation between church and state, because it identifies itself with the people and by extension with the state and vice versa. Thus, modernity’s content is partly challenged and by this, definitive traits of Western history and culture, while at the same time the founding fathers are upheld as if they did not adhere to those values. Also, the term “Society of Nations” was misused, apparently by mistake. Société des Nations was none other than the French caption of the short-lived League of Nations, a forerunner of the United Nations (UN), i.e., a totally different institution to the EU. Most certainly, it was meant to delineate a future political entity, an actor that is unified by morality, compatible 92 Metakenosis stands for the transfusion of the civilisational paradigm from the West back to its cradle, Greece, via the Enlightenment according to Korais. 93 Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, “Μήνυμα για την Ένταξη της Ελλάδος στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση”, (2001), p. 281. 94 Ibid.

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value systems and cultures; and admittedly to some extent, it overlaps with the Society of States as envisaged by the English School of IR. In any case though, the fact of the aforementioned discourse itself would be above and beyond any church’s office and faculty to deal with in the first place, being by definition a political and this-worldly affair rather than spiritual. The confusion of terms merely attests to that. Still, the predisposition towards preserving the nation-state intact within the EU is obvious. But it is also revealing of intentions. For, even though it was mentioned earlier that the necessity of convergence by meeting halfway was initially acknowledged, one detects reluctance on behalf of the OCG to reciprocate and a distinct attitude of defensiveness concerning the nation-state. To which the church usually responds that it is not nationalist but Europeanist. For example, Christodoulos wrote that for the church, tradition is not the customs that must be kept alive artificially, but an experience of socialisation (communion) as conveyor of spirit; nor does the church suggest dated ways of life, but while endorsing new ways, it urges not to lose sight of the truth of the human being as a person.95 Thus he expressed his concern on the erosion of spirituality, attributing it to the globalist support for individualism as opposed to the Greek-Orthodox particularity of personhood. Here though he accuses the EU of a globalist, normative intent of cultural homogenisation. In fact, he further argued that there is no worse form of racism than forcing those who need you to become like you, calling globalisation ecumenism’s mockery and a mockery of society as it promotes competition.96 And then he put forward the dilemma of the human being today having two options: to either try the same rationalist ways again, or to progress based on Christian principles, values and the morality which he/she is now oblivious of.97 Therefore not only an array of ethically protestant, but essential tenets of Western liberal democracy are rejected because of their effects on spirituality; not only resistance to change – a common characteristic of old organisations – is evident, but the Western flank of the EU is urged to rectify its erroneous ways98 and approach the Eastern paradigm, within the context of EU’s Europeanisation. Hence, by being one-sided in expecting only the others to adjust, reluctant to reciprocate as stated earlier, the previous terms of belonging are being revised as well. 95 Christodoulos, “Παγκοσμιοποίηση: Νέοι Ορίζοντες ή Απώλεια Προσανατολισμού;”, (2001), pp. 499–502, (p. 500). 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid., p. 502.

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This spirited expressiveness, a tendency towards drama, has been often adorned with eurosceptic conspiracy theories. The vocal, late archbishop occasionally resorted to that. In a speech to the hierarchy, he exclaimed that plans are already being implemented, which aim to the destruction of Hellenism, the forgery of history and the undermining of society; by promoting the abolition of the nation-state, to the benefit of a multicultural, multiracial and multireligious society, which in his view aspires to injure the church in order to be quiet and contain itself to a neutral role. Already in the EU, he observed, there are governments that distance the state from religion. At the same time, there are European programmes in store, which will cast Christianity to the historically condemned past and solidify the acceptance of irreligious neutrality.99 Here, the concern for the church’s role being at stake is more than evident and hence what was formerly described as exemplary attitude towards religiosity on behalf of the EU is swiftly discarded. This is in part owed to the possibility that church‒state relations might come under threat, if a potential directive that required separation were to be integrated into the domestic legislation.100 Yet, here the EU is portrayed as a villain with anti-Hellenic intent, and at an administrative level as being predominantly Christian no more, so evidently, as a secularist “Other”. This phenomenon is in part attributed to the so-called enemy syndrome, where imaginary enemies are always a possibility given the strategic location of the country, which is essentially a passage, and the pending, unresolved issues with neighbouring countries. This renders Greeks very sensitive to this syndrome which is evolving to a national neurosis, regardless of the validity of the presumed threat.101 One should bear in mind the context of the time though, while the Identity Card crisis102 was at its peak, and that 99 Christodoulos, “Τα Κύρια Σημεία της ενώπιον της Ιεραρχίας Ομιλίας του Μακαριωτάτου Προέδρου αυτής κ.κ. Χριστοδούλου”, (2001), pp. 849–58, (p. 853). 100 An additional perceived threat that would be the constant transformation of religioscapes due to increased mobility renders jurisdiction increasingly problematic, given that a nationally constrained actor finds itself in a broader and more diverse political-cultural environment; being an emergent theme in its own right, the latter will get the proper attention it deserves in the fourth chapter. 101 Agourides, Θεολογία και Κοινωνία σε Διάλογο, pp. 153–54. 102 The legislation towards the removal of religious convictions from the ID cards within the bounds of a privacy protection act in 2000 infuriated the church that engaged in a direct confrontation with the government and sought to conduct a referendum against this. For further details, see Vasilios N. Makrides, “Between Normality and Tension: Assessing Church-State Relations in Greece in the Light of the Identity (Cards) Crisis”, (2005), pp. 137–78.

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period was highly emotional for the church, although this was self-inflicted. The rhetorical focus on the Hellenic rather than the European perspective of self-image and being was of course no coincidence, as the whole discursive activity of the time revolved around identity. Archimandrite Ignatios Sotiriadis,103 as arch-secretary of the SSCMEA, on at least one occasion focused on the differences between East and West, essentially labelling the latter as incomplete without Orthodox Christianity and its own theorisation of Hellenism. The Orthodox, having not experienced – due to the fall of Constantinople on 29 May 1453 and the subsequent Ottoman status quo – phenomena like the Renaissance and Humanism, the Protestant Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, they were not challenged to give in to temptation and marginalise the Orthodox Church, “the mother and wet-nurse”.104 Nor did they ultimately aim to autonomise the individual from any transcendental authority, which gradually occurred in West European countries; i.e., in the spheres of influence of the Roman Catholic Church and the Reformed Christianity, which were “injured ideologically” in their transition from the Middle Ages and thereafter in the course of European history. Thereby, via their intellectuals, ancient Greece was “rewritten”, while the Byzantine thought was neglected and Europe lost the Byzantine civilisation irreparably.105 The analogy of the fall of Constantinople, coupled with the circumstantial positive – in his view – outcomes/by-products of a historically traumatic event as recorded by many members of the hierarchy in retrospect, bears a remote resemblance to the era of Loukas Notaras and Gennadios Scholarios, mutatis mutandis of course. This is not meant as a preference for the Ottoman rule, i.e. for the “Turkish turban instead of the Latin Tiara”, which indicates the antipathy for the West and points to the lesser of two evils,106 but merely as an indication of the perpetuation of this antipathy. Of course this is no innuendo, but rather a hint that the old differences, infused with new narrative elements in the process,

103 High-ranking cleric; among others, he has served in Brussels at the RCGEU, and he has been appointed secretary of the Synodical Inter-Orthodox and Inter-Christian Committee since 2013. 104 Sotiriadis, “Βυζάντιο: Μήτρα Πολιτισμού και Παράγων Ιδεολογικής Ενοποίησης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ομοσπονδίας Κρατών (ΕΟΚ)”, (2002), pp. 56–61, (p. 57). 105 Ibid. 106 The phrase “Better a Turkish turban than a Latin tiara” is attributed to Loukas Notaras, last Grand Duke of the Byzantine Empire. See Doukas, Decline and fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks (1975), and Steven Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople 1453 (1965).

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linger on, what is more, being partly reproduced by the church. But to attribute this antipathy to Orthodoxy would be an oversimplification, for parallel variants of anti-Westernism are at work at the same time and they are widespread in the broader region. Not to mention that in the lapse of time, they have “bled” within one another and as a result the multifaceted blend that emerged is equally political, cultural and societal.107 Yet, Sotiriadis goes on to suggest that although misunderstood, the Byzantine paradigm of the Orthodox Eucharistic community may be instrumental in the unification and cohesion of the European federation, so that it may emerge ecumenical out of its monism and isolation.108 To put it bluntly, Europe is portrayed as materialist and Godless, hence incomplete yet again and in dire need to overturn its Weberian demystification by endorsing the model, which for centuries was rejected on behalf of the West as too mystical and backward. In exactly the same spirit, Christianity was hailed as a key feature in constructing a common European identity by the HSCG; therefore, this view represented the church hierarchy in its entirety. In a contradictory encyclical (No. 2740), it was held that Europe was founded by Christian-democrat politicians such as Adenauer, Monet, etc. with the prospect of an entity based on European civilisation in mind, namely Christianity and Greco-Roman culture. And that, unfortunately, as of recent, theories emerged, according to which Islam, Judaism and the Enlightenment – and by extension atheism – have exerted their share of influence. In addition to this, according to the encyclical, there is a tendency to marginalise the church and keep it from intervening socially and spiritually. The synod on the other hand expressed its disagreement, believing that only with and in Christ, there is freedom, democracy and justice, as the rationalistic ideas that dominate Europe have led to dead ends.109 The major contradiction here rests on the fact that Adenauer, Monet and the founders of the EU in general, albeit some of them Christian-Democrats were still adherents to the Enlightenment and rationalism. In addition, it is disregarded that the very foundations of what has evolved as the EU were very much rationalistic, market and economydriven, and in a nutshell, based on practical, down-to-earth motivation and purposes. It should not escape us of course that in the heart of the argument dwells the aforementioned insecurity concerning the church’s role that was expected to be solidified by having a say in this-worldly affairs and participate in policy 107 Makrides, “Orthodox Anti-Westernism Today”, pp. 209–24, (p. 214). 108 Sotiriadis, “Βυζάντιο: Μήτρα Πολιτισμού”, pp. 56–61, (pp. 58–59). 109 HSCG, “Εγκύκλιος 2740 – Θέμα: Το Μέλλον της Ευρώπης και η Εκκλησία της Ελλάδος”, (2002), pp. 467–70, (p. 468).

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and decision-making procedures as we will see later on. As for rationalism, the encyclical closes with the observation that many non-Orthodox Christians in Europe have lost their faith, are oblivious to the experience of the Mysterious Life, and have become indifferent and materialists.110 How this has come to be was tackled by Archimandrite Sotiriadis, who, in an inter-Orthodox convention in Heraclion, Crete (17–18 March 2002), discussed the issue of Europe’s lost soul, wondering how it was lost and whether it was actually discarded by Europe itself. In fact Jacques Delors111 (1992) was quoted from the outset, as his view that “if in the next ten years we do not provide Europe with a soul and insist in focusing on its economic aspect then the game is lost”,112 was seen as central to the overall argument; because the European citizen, according to the archimandrite, in his/her historical, ideological, philosophical, political adventures and endeavours essentially denied God. Instead he/she embraced and deified rationalism, thus setting oneself as the centre of the world, while via the Enlightenment was rendered atheist and materialist. By the same token, for a neglect that was deemed intentional, Europe was criticised because almost no reference to religion whatsoever was to be found in the founding treaties and no church had a function as such in the European institutions.113 However much utilitarian it may appear to persist in the acknowledgement of churches as legal entities, stemming from a paradigm shift, the phenomenon was neither politically exceptional nor strictly Greek-Orthodox, if we consider that the former President of the Commission Jacques Delors was indeed against the lack of reference of the Judeo-Christian foundations of Europe in the EU constitution. What is more, the same applies to the, then, President of the European Commission Romano Prodi114 (1999–2004) who underlined this need of a written reference to the Christian heritage of Europe as well.115 But none of them, even remotely, ever uttered a word against the Enlightenment and its decisive

110 Ibid. 111 Apart from his service in the European Parliament, the French politician has been President of the European Commission three times. 112 Quote originally in Jacques Delors, Η Ευρωπαϊκή Πρόκληση (Athens: Ekdoseis Lampraki, 1992). See Sotiriadis, “Εισήγηση στη Διορθόδοξο Συνάντηση με Θέμα την «Προτεινόμενη υπό της Ορθοδόξου Εκκλησίας Στάση του Ευρωπαϊκού Συντάγματος έναντι των Θρησκειών και των Εκκλησιών»”, (2003), pp. 288–93, (p. 288). 113 Ibid. 114 Former Italian Prime Minister and President of the EU Commission. 115 Konstantinos Cholevas, “Οι Θεμελιωτές και Υποστηρικτές της Χριστιανικής Ευρώπης”, (2003), pp. 683–84.

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contribution to the European physiognomy; whereas in contrast the OCG has done so repetitively, although in turn it expected from the EU acceptance of an alien Byzantinesque model, hardly applicable even in Greece anymore. This is by and large owed to a misperception of Europeanness and an aspiration to a multilateral agreement on an overarching, organic European identity. In a clearer articulation of what Europeanness is and what it is not, Christodoulos stressed in a speech that Christianity may not be European par excellence but Europe is Christian nonetheless, while before Christianity Europe was a mere geographical space; and further, that it is essentially the Greco-Roman civilisation coupled with Christianity that gave Europe a physiognomy, its foundations. The organic nature of the European entity here is detected in that the call for a political union was ever constant, for Europe, despite nationalism, always sought for a Christian commonwealth, because on a cultural and spiritual level, it was always unified according to the archbishop. Plato, Cicero, Shakespeare, Goethe and a series of others belong equally to all Europeans.116 All feel at home culturally when in Louvre or Prado, or in capitals such as Florence, Amsterdam and Vienna. Having said that, he referred to the simultaneous processes of exclusion that permeate identity: peoples of an albeit brilliant culture, yet alien to the European spirit, should not join the EU, as it is certain that if Europe were to yield to momentary geopolitical conditions, it would actually overthrow its own cultural identity.117 He did not express himself any differently when addressing the MEPs of the European People’s Party in Brussels, on 8 October 2003, asking the rhetorical question of “what kind of Europe do we want?”.118 He said, and perhaps rightfully so, that judging by the Commission and the EU Parliament one may assume that it is unclear to the MEPs as well; adding that the reference to Christianity had not been requested in order to obstruct the secular state but as an act concerning European consciousness. He actually admitted that the question was not so much the constitution itself, but the intention regarding candidates who do not adhere to “our” civilisation, because accession on the basis of transitory geopolitical exigencies incorporating the southern and eastern Mediterranean would be a historic farce. To him, that kind of Europe would be a monstrosity and a melting pot, in which case, he wondered, “why call it European Union?”, whilst clarifying that the churches of Europe, the OCG included, did not seek to impose 116 Christodoulos, “Η Παρουσία της Εκκλησίας στον Ορίζοντα της Ευρώπης”, (2003), pp. 346–50, (p. 347). 117 Ibid., p. 349. 118 Christodoulos, “Ομιλία στους Ευρωβουλευτές του Ευρωπαϊκού Λαϊκού Κόμματος”, (2003), pp. 694–96, (p. 695).

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Christianity but to make sure that the European will not feel a stranger in his/ her very home.119 By taking Christianity for granted as a component of European consciousness, of Europeanness as a quality, there exists, one may concede, an expected corresponding mode of doing things on behalf of the personified European culturalpolitical entity. And Christodoulos, along with the synod, consistently made it known to the public that Europe was exactly that. But they were not alone in this, as the Catholic Church and several governments fully agreed on this view, openly or not. Also, it entails that otherness, given that “a concept of community is built on the simultaneous operation of processes of inclusion and exclusion”,120 is a valid ex negativo way of demarcating one’s identity, and the implicit “Other” here – insinuated in a geographical and geocultural sense – is Muslim Turkey. In another attempt to interfere in international politics, the archbishop, having made it clear beforehand that given the political circumstances the Commission and the Parliament were themselves puzzled as regards the fuzziness of Europeanness, he proceeded to at least delineate Europe in terms of what it is not; a normative perception to be sure, admittedly commonplace Europe-wide, but, be that as it may, one that was employed to influence policies and decision-making based on the essentialisation thereof. On top of that, Islam is explicitly portrayed as a threat to European culture that has been upheld, time and again, as the one all-encompassing element of the European personality, which dwells within the diachronic spontaneity and impetus of the European peoples to join together. But in fairness, it was not only Christodoulos, the vocal and outgoing expressive interventionist121 who identified Europe thus. Even the generally calm and moderate Archbishop of Albania Anastasios has pointed out, metaphorically speaking of course, that the European “genome” is dominated by Christian “genes” in terms of culture.122 And if it is imperative for Europeans in general to embrace the fundamentals of their collective being, for the Greek-Orthodox, it is even more important to emphasise on the Christian identity of Europe according 119 Ibid., pp. 695–96. 120 Carlo Ruzza and Oliver Schmidtke, “The Northern League: Changing friends and foes and its political opportunity structure”, (1996) pp. 179–208, (pp. 196–97). 121 Expressive interventionism, in practice articulated and demonstrated by the archbishop, indicative of an intent to utilise all available technology and means in order to be present in the public sphere, communicate and exert influence on this-worldly affairs. See Makrides, “Scandals, Secret Agents and Corruption”, pp. 61–88, (p. 65). 122 Archbishop of Albania Anastasios, “Η Διαχρονική Μετοχή της Χριστιανικής Πίστεως στην Οικοδόμηση της Ευρώπης”, (2003), pp. 351–56 (p. 356).

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to the HSCG, for an additional two reasons: (a) the actually United Europe, at a spiritual level at least, had already existed during the first 1000 years of Christian history, when the whole of Europe was Orthodox prior to the schisms, and (b) the Greek language is ecumenical, given that the dissemination of the bible was based on the Greek prototype, which is attested by the amount of originally Greek words in Western vocabularies,123 thus rendering Europeanness a Christian Orthodox and Greek affair in its own right, based on the spiritual foundations of Europeanness and on the medium via which they were conveyed. By this though, the message that Europe is at least just as much a Greek as any other European ethnie, puts Greekness back into the epicentre of Europeanness as a term of belonging despite differences and frictions. This is in turn permissive of the right to have a say and intervene when the church sees fit. Archbishop Hieronymos II (in office since 2008) may have an overall different agenda, priorities and personality compared to his predecessor, but he did not break this pattern. In fact, when dealing with this theme at a conference in Serres, Greece (17 February 2009), he maintained that in the eyes of the church the EU is not just a political-economic cooperation between states; as a cultural space, it is the spiritual height of Christianity, and therefore, to defend the European unity is not a political act to the church, but a spiritual duty. To that end, he claimed, the first priority would be the preservation of every people’s spiritual unity and particularities. Hence, differences should not be flattened, adding though that European citizens must realise that peoples can only be united when bonded by spiritual ties.124 Be that as it may, the rhetoric remains by and large unaffected in prioritising the preservation of national identities while stressing that the churches have a spiritual role that inevitably spills over mundane affairs, precisely because of the Christian core and simultaneously connecting tissue of Europeanness. Thus, it appears that the overall attitude towards the theme in focus is not person-dependent, as the organisation, the institution of the OCG, has its own mode of continuity as regards high politics, whereas diversification in low politics (e.g., as a charitable support system for refugees) may occur parallel to that. The above view of rhetorical continuity is reinforced by the repetitive pattern of concerns about cultural and spiritual erosion. In his message within the bounds of the 3rd conference of the SSCMEA (31 March 2009), Hieronymos II 123 HSCG, “Η Εκκλησία της Ελλάδος και η Χριστιανική Ταυτότητα της Ευρώπης”, (2003), pp. 905–07, (pp. 905–06). 124 Archbishop Hieronymos II, “Μήνυμα στην Ημερίδα των Ευρωπαϊκών Θεμάτων στις Σέρρες”, (2009), p. 154.

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conceded on the one hand that the presence in the European state of affairs is a reality and a self-evident fact, but on the other he held that the truth is that spiritual values as well as cultural and social conditions have been eroded to some extent; particularly in the way of understanding the historical past, which in turn has consequences in further planning by the cosignatories of the EU. Further, he complained that the challenges of rationalism and the adoption of a rhetoric that is devoid of any metaphysical belief are being used as alibis whereas spirituality is being looked down upon and marginalised.125 Hence, as stated above, the emergent pattern remains pretty much unaffected and the rhetorical priorities remain the same; cultural identity comes first, followed by the emphasis on the cornerstones of European identity, with Christianity being prominent. Imitating his predecessor, Hieronymos II turned to great intellectuals of earlier times such as Thomas Elliot, Paul Valery, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos and others, who maintained that the three spiritual cornerstones of contemporary Europe are Christian faith, ancient Greek literature and Roman, or more correctly in his view, Byzantine-Roman law, noting that the countries that partake in the EU seek common solutions without losing their religious and cultural identity.126 In addition, for utilitarian reasons that will be addressed later on in a more relevant context, in a memo to the, then, President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso (2004–2014),127 the aforementioned convictions were officially expressed by the current archbishop too. Therein he wrote that he considers it imperative to see the role of Orthodoxy and in a broader sense Christianity, as part of a viable development and fulfilment of the European vision, even at a political level; while reminding yet again that the founders of the European idea had as a basis Greek civilisation, Roman law and the Christian tradition of the European continent, and ultimately the merging of those three set up the European spirit.128 If anything, rhetorical consistency is evident, even though active

125 Hieronymos II, “Μήνυμα στην Γ΄ Ημερίδα της Ειδικής Συνοδικής Επιτροπής Παρακολουθήσεως των Ευρωπαϊκών Θεμάτων στο Διορθόδοξο Κέντρο της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος στην Ιερά Μονή Πεντέλης”, (2009), pp. 231–32, (p. 231). 126 Hieronymos II, “Μήνυμα του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Ιερωνύμου στην Ημερίδα της Ειδικής Συνοδικής Επιτροπής Παρακολουθήσεως των Ευρωπαϊκών Θεμάτων (Βέροια, 2 June 2009)”, (2009), pp. 390–91, (p. 390). 127 Former Portuguese Prime Minister and the 11th President of the EU Commission. 128 Hieronymos II, “Υπόμνημα προς τον Εξωχότατον Πρόεδρον της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής κ. José Manuel Barroso”, (2010), pp. 535–38, (p. 537).

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involvement and interventionism on behalf of the current archbishop ranges from mild to indifferent. However, to endeavour a comparison between Hieronymos II and his predecessor on their dissimilar predisposition to get openly involved in political and, in this case, European affairs, one may detect that there is more than meets the eye. The often too forward interventionist intent on behalf of Christodoulos was admittedly unfiltered and at times populist. Yet that depended by and large on his audience, which, given the context and atmosphere of the times such as the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia, expected clear-cut anti-Westernist positions that reflected their own emotional condition, rather than a pragmatic and analytical phraseology that would offer a different perspective. Be that as it may, his systematic interference contributed to the general discussion. Christodoulos may have had a domestic eurosceptic profile  – fluctuating, depending on political developments  – but at the same time, he was generating literature, triggering and encouraging public discourse and was in practice very active in trying to co-formulate a European physiognomy and to influence with his alliances in Europe the preamble of the constitution.129 Now, in contrast, there is no active engagement. Hieronymos II is genuinely not interested in Europe as he is indifferent to politics in general, for, idiosyncratically, he is genuinely not a political person per se. He speaks out ad hoc when particular issues emerge, but these are the boundaries of his interventions more or less. In that sense, certainly, there is a void in the post-Christodoulos era in terms of any positive engagement with the whole concept of European identity.130 In addition, because he is a quieter person, the voices of ultra-conservative hierarchs who are attracted by political extremes have acquired more publicity, filling the communicational void with their own views. Expressed in a less diplomatic manner, as of recent, one can come across the belief within the hierarchy that the relationship with the European partners is too difficult to be seen as permanent, that at some point a rupture will occur, largely owed to the lacking of a life-giving spirit that ought to sustain an organisation as such. In short a soul, above and beyond economics, technology, consumerism and non-Christian worldviews. There emerges the rhetorical question of the survival of a people without spiritual ideology.131 Also, there exists a contemporary school of thought based on historical grievances, as already seen, which is still dominant within the SSCMEA no less. In this case, it is stressed

129 F. E., Interview with the author, 29 April 2014. 130 Ibid. 131 T. I., Interview with the author, 14 January 2014.

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that the difficulties between East and West are diachronic, holding the latter accountable for the most part. For instance, their arrogance has been noted by Basil of Caesarea, according to whose account the Westerners turned their gaze eastwards “with a raised eyebrow”. But much later on, to condense the historical references, the dominant worldview on behalf of the Westerners is by and large Carolingian in essence.132 This comes in direct contradiction with what Orthodox Greece has to contribute: “neither technology nor industry, but rather spirituality, meaning, which is what this ‘new home’ really needs”; noting also, that there was genuine concern on behalf of the OCG on the Treaties of Maastricht and Lisbon as well as the European Constitution. Yet, it is also pointed out that in the process “it is the Greek people who might lose their souls instead”.133 Yet a difference of attitude is traceable amongst the hierarchy domestically, which is to some extent expressed via the SSCMEA and the office of Representation of the Church of Greece to the European Union (hereafter RCGEU) in Brussels. The latter may regard the Hellenic-Christian background as equally fundamental as its domestic counterparts, but not in a one-dimensional way. There, it is thought of as a stable basis for an ecumenical dialogue; the capacity to remain in a state of dialogue-readiness is firmly stressed as a prerequisite for Hellenism to secure its healthiness, for its essence to be preserved, whereas, “when it is upheld alone in isolation, with disregard for the broader environment, it becomes hysterical and morbid”.134 It is then made clear that the cleft here emanates from differences of perception of how Hellenism justifies its existence and its compatibility with Europeanness. The more the emphasis on past divisions and introvert self-awareness of being collectively, the further the distance from the heart of Europe, and, in contrast, the richer the extrovert experience of European exchanges with an outlook to the future, the easier the further integration. All this of course is not inconsequential; on the contrary, it is telling of the variability Europeanness is perceived, depending on the intra-ecclesiastical actor, but all things considered one observes an emergent pattern of perception nonetheless.

2.2.2  The Orthodox Church of Cyprus Archbishop of Cyprus Chrysostomos I was not in a position to contribute to the overall EU discourse, hindered as he was by his poor health condition 132 K. D., Interview with the author, 23 May 2014. 133 Ibid. 134 C. T., Interview with the author, 29 October 2013.

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already from the year 2000, a fact that did not pass unnoticed by those eyeing the throne.135 Yet, canonical obstacles did not allow his easy replacement, so the awkward situation lingered on, which gave rise to an unprecedented polyphony that was not always harmonious and consistent; i.e., up until the election of Chrysostomos II on 5 November 2006. Apart from that, as a result, the bulk of discursive material on the issue of Europeanness on behalf of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus (for brevity OCC) is less, compared to what has been generated by the OCG. Starting intentionally with an extraordinary example, in order to demonstrate the aforementioned awkwardness and polyphony – in the particular sample, somewhat a cacophony – one would have to mention the statement of the Metropolitan of Kyrenia Paulos,136 who, in expressing his opposition to a bizonal and bicommunal federation, urged the people not to wait passively for mount Pentadaktylos to shake off the invaders, but to strive for their rights and reject the unjust, as he said, solution of a bizonal federation.137 His view on the particular plan is not in focus here, but the expression he used later on, saying that the modern “Scribes and Pharisees” of the international community are planning the handing over of Cyprus to the foreign conquerors and spoke of “the antichrists of the West and heathens of the East, who are planning the destruction of Cyprus”.138 Even though the institution is religious, the content is political par excellence. Also, one detects traces of history, particularly of the so-called Latinocracy, Turkocracy and Anglocracy,139 which all of them had their variably oppressive character in common as regimes, religiously no less. Not to mention the military occupation of the island and the bloody oppression of any uprising. In addition, this is not a usual form of anti-Westernism, given that Cyprus has the atypical – for a European state – experience of British colonialism up until the first half of the twentieth century. The emotional outburst is even more understandable if one considers the role of the West, especially of the USA and UK that led to the invasion of 1974 and the ongoing occupation; hence, the wounds are not just fresh, historically speaking, they are still open. And yet this example is actually an exception within the period in focus, which was more exploratory for the OCC. In fact, the prospects of an EU-assisted solution differentiated the view of “Anglo-Americans” in particular from that of Europeans in general. 135 Grigoris Kalokairinos, “Για την Τιμή και το Χρήμα”, (19 November 2000), p. 39. 136 Elected and enthroned in April 1994. 137 “Αντίχριστοι και Αλλόθρησκοι”, (8 May 2000). 138 Ibid. 139 The Frankish, Ottoman and English rule respectively.

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This is attested by the wish that within the framework of a united Europe, the struggles of the Cypriot people would soon find vindication, expressed via the Christmas Encyclical of the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus (HSCC), year 2002. This encyclical was in fact the first not to be issued by the Primate of the Church himself, at least in the recent recorded decades,140 and it is equally important to note that there was no specific reference to the developments of the time concerning the Cyprus Problem, namely the submission of the draft Annan Plan141 back then. Thus the lack of leadership and initiatives on behalf of the OCC comes into view, as well as the awkwardness in having to cope without its expected ethnarchic assertiveness. But in any case, the EU is portrayed as a realm of justice, unity and solidarity, in contrast to the UN that has been time and again described as an American plaything. Generally speaking though, the Cyprus Problem notwithstanding, during the pre-accession period the church had identified itself with the idea of joining the EU, a prospect which had fascinated the people anyway. Parallel to that, the already extensively disseminated values and ideals of the Orthodox faith in combination with the European ones were held as a mixture of the elements that “make up a good man”. But the former archbishop who was still theoretically in office was weak and could not therefore take public positions in any phase of the pre-accession period or until the archbishopric elections.142 The vacuum that the political life was experiencing because of what we may henceforth call “ethnarchic absenteeism” can be further underlined if we take into consideration that even Dimitris Christofias of the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL), general secretary of the Communist Party of Cyprus (1998– 2009), stated on 10 June 2004, in the festivities in honour of Apostle Varnavas organised by the HSCC, that in a multicultural Europe where civilisations and cultures meet and particularities ought to be respected as well, the OCC has a

140 Giorgos Stylianou, “Ι. Σύνοδος: Δικαίωση στα Πλαίσια της Ε.Ε.”, (25 December 2002). 141 The UN initiative dating back to 2002, named after its Secretary General Kofi Annan (1997–2006), together with the EU, the USA and the Guarantor Powers of the Republic of Cyprus (Greece, Turkey, Great Britain) was intended to help towards the reunification of Cyprus prior to the accession of the latter to the EU in 2004. The fifth and final version of a “Comprehensive Solution to the Cyprus Problem” failed to materialise: the Turkish-Cypriot community approved it by 64.9%, but the GreekCypriots rejected it by 75.8%. See Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann (eds.), Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond (London: Tauris and Co., 2009). 142 H. L., Interview with the author, 4 March 2014.

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role to play and contribute to the smooth integration process and participation in European affairs. Also, he expressed his hope that the church would assume its share of responsibilities to the fulfilment of the Cypriots’ goals.143 Clearly, the public sphere was in need of a compass as there was no clear sense of direction concerning Europeanisation and adaptation to the exigencies of the time; the political establishment was always legitimised and the tone and agenda were set by the OCC’s public discursive content and guidance, essentially a form of exertion of power, even though the institution of the Ethnarchy was officially discarded with the constitution of 1960 and the corresponding political arrangement. The same issue was put forward to the former Bishop of Tremithus Vasileios144 (1996–2007), who, dealing with international affairs, was in a way an informal foreign minister of the synod. In an interview to Giorgos Fragkos of Phileleftheros, he was asked about the absence of the church amidst the pre-accession processes. His reply was that in principle the church did not respond negatively to this development and therefore gave its consent to the prospect of the country’s EU accession; in other words, silence was in its own right a form of participation. In fact, he brought up the example of the Greek Church and its negative reaction as a case in point, out of fear for religious and cultural identity loss, something that did not actually occur with the OCC, noting the lack of Euroscepticism. Differences of course were acknowledged but without demonstrating the previously seen insecurity of the OCG; indeed, he held that although the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution led to the desacralisation and secularisation of European societies, thus doubting the ecclesiastical authenticity, the OCC is viewed as privileged in that it did not undergo all that. On the contrary, it maintained its societal and national relevance due to its autocephaly.145 But differences aside, instead of being described as incomplete, Europeanness as such was seen as an end of a work in progress that emanates from the identity that a united Europe seeks to assume. Thereby the church may contribute with its spirituality, tradition and the inspiration of hope, being by and large a positive influence in the process of European integration; i.e. being the means, among others, to an end – that being Europeanness – as stated above. What is more, in a readiness to recognise the positive predisposition of the EU to Orthodoxy, the bishop said that Europeans understand the particularities and traditions of the 143 “Χριστόφιας: Πικρία αλλά και Αισιοδοξία”, (11 June 2004). 144 Elected on 11 May 2007 Bishop of Constantia and Ammochostos, now residing at the temporary Bishopric of Paralimni. 145 Giorgos Fragkos, “Η Ορθοδοξία έχει τη Δύναμη να προσφέρει Ψυχή στην Ευρώπη”, (13 June 2004).

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Orthodox Church, which has a contribution to make in the quest for Europe’s soul, in citing Jacques Delors.146 Yet, the decisive element here is that Europe is viewed as Christian par excellence while remaining inclusive and good-willing as regards its Eastern side, with the historic milestone of the Enlightenment being deemed as an integral part of an under construction Europeanness and not as an obstacle. That is, its components are on the one hand identified, but the whole is not, as its values are stressed as central instead. The view of Europeanness primarily as value-based Christian, ergo resulting in the EU to be seen in a positive light, was further emphasised by the HSCC, which held the accession to the Union as promising in its Christmas message of 2004. Because, being based on indissoluble, diachronic Christian values, it was believed that it would facilitate an easier vindication concerning the Cyprus Problem, the safeguarding of their national entity and the rights of the GreekCypriots.147 It is then notable that, essentially, what is being attributed to the EU is a moral higher ground that stems from its very Europeanness, while the latter is disengaged to the eyes of the synod from the seemingly anti-Westernist, but actually anti “Anglo-American” predisposition. In the same spirit, the Metropolitan of Kyrenia Paulos, in a speech of his, said that “the Republic of Cyprus, as an equal EU member now, irritates Attila because Turkey stubbornly refuses to recognise it” and that while Turkey awaits its accession to the European family, “it behaves like an Asian satrap”.148 The initial optimism if not enthusiasm, is evident in the self-view of the OCC as European and the shifting of the centre of gravity of otherness to the East. Also, the trust in the European institutional morality and solidarity is evident yet again, while at the same time a clear distinction is made as he targets the “Anglo-Americans” who try to impose an unfair solution to the Cyprus Problem149 – in particular the Annan Plan – but without generalising against the West in its entirety. This attitude stemmed from a genuine conviction that the EU would prove itself dependable, and even though the OCC was basically headless, the consensus pointed to an EU that was primarily characterised by solidarity, a by-product of its physiognomy as we mentioned above. Likewise, the Metropolitan of Paphos Chrysostomos, who afterwards came to

146 Ibid. 147 “Η Αγία και Ιερά Σύνοδος της Αγιοτάτης Αποστολικής Εκκλησίας της Κύπρου”, (25 December 2004). 148 Metropolitan Paulos, “Ομιλία σε Τιμητική Εκδήλωση της Ιονικής Εστίας”, (2005), pp. 219–24, (p. 223). 149 Ibid., p. 224.

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be the successor to the archbishopric throne, urged all to get behind the government in light of the benefits that the EU membership was expected to yield.150 That was a clear departure point from the “ethnarchic absenteeism” that was interrupted, not to return again as it turned out, for a few months later, the enthronement took place. Not to mention that meanwhile, the Metropolitan of Paphos Chrysostomos had an already more frequent presence in the public sphere. The OCC acknowledged the vacuum and was relieved to have an active, functional leadership again. Notably, Vasileios, Bishop of Tremithus, upon the enthronement of Chrysostomos II and while addressing him, did not fail to mention among others the critical timing of his ascension to the throne, given the national problem and the course it had taken, but also the accession of Cyprus to the EU and the international state of affairs with its socio-political changes and volatility. He added to that the increasing violence, the clash of peoples, civilisations and religions.151 In a nutshell, the enthronement was not only imperative but it came, not a minute too soon. As for the EU, the Bishop of Tremithus said that the Church of Cyprus will not only benefit from it, but it is also expected to contribute to the European integration, by promoting the faith, the tradition and the values of the Orthodox Church. In that sense, the systematic organisation of the presence of the church at the decision-making centres was deemed urgent and imperative. But most importantly, he held that the EU accession differentiates the way of pastoral ministry, given the background of globalisation.152 So, this rendered the aforementioned departure point multifaceted in meaning and intentions. The previous awkward inaction was to be succeeded not only by open participation domestically, but also by a fully fledged involvement in European affairs via the new means church diplomacy had in store (offices of representation to Brussels) and if possible the co-formulation of Europeanness, to which the OCC was already well disposed. In the same event, the newly enthroned Archbishop of Nova Justiniana and All Cyprus Chrysostomos II outlined his priorities within the duties of his post, such as the safeguarding of education, i.e., the Hellenic education, as decisive for the nation. He expressed no objection that contemporary conditions, such as the EU, need to be taken into consideration as societies become increasingly multicultural and that education should guide to the spiritual responsibility of the global citizen, 150 Metropolitan of Paphos Chrysostomos, “Ομιλία κατά το Άνοιγμα της Έκθεσης ‘Ελληνορθόδοξη Ζωή και Πολιτισμός στην Κατεχόμενη Κύπρο’”, (2006), pp. 325–30, (p. 328). 151 Mitsides, “Τα κατά την Ενθρόνισιν του Νέου Αρχιεπισκόπου”, (2006), pp. 469–516, (p. 483). 152 Ibid., p. 486.

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but at the same time the Greek identity must not be undermined, and a balanced approach was deemed necessary, but neither absolutism of the nation nor of the ecumene were described as desirable.153 There begins a differentiation that was to be sustained and at times intensified. The initial enthusiasm that we referred to earlier was to be replaced by a down-to-earth perception and portrayal of the EU on the one hand, and a conditionality of the terms of belonging on the other. The up to then, somewhat, idealisation of Europeanness is seen through a more pragmatic lens, but also the capacity to modify it is reviewed. Instead the focal point was the domestic sense of identity and its preservation, as a vehicle to take part in the broader European scheme as an equal; namely, to participate with one’s particularities, but with moderation and restraint, thus respecting the constraints of political and cultural realities. And of course a clear articulation of the archbishop’s positions on genuinely political issues was back as expected, regarding the EU no less. For example, in greeting the 15th World Congress of the Greek-Cypriot Diaspora, he called for unity regarding the Cyprus issue, away from partisanships, and condemned the rhetoric of the “bizonal, bicommunal federation”154 proposed solution that has no particular content, being in essence the Annan Plan with a different name.155 Further he stated that it is not possible for the global community and especially Europe to demonstrate sensitivity in secondary affairs, such as animal welfare or expiry dates of goods, and shut its eyes before the humiliation of human dignity. For three years already Cyprus was an EU member, and yet, he complained, there had been no actual support in safeguarding the rights of Cypriots when the ethnic zone divisions are taken into account; because the freedom of movement is not applicable in this particular scenario of a solution. He therefore stressed that there needs to be a focus on European legislation and human rights.156 The pragmatism demonstrated by the archbishop is directly linked with the actually anticipated EU attitude rather than the one the OCC longed for, with immediate consequences on the perception and portrayal of the EU and the way 153 Ibid., p. 504. 154 This model of a solution to the Cyprus Problem was half-heartedly accepted by Makarios III, given that he had actually run out of options, but was later on rejected by his successor, Archbishop Chrysostomos who was known for his fervent patriotism. It would be safe to say that the antithesis to this proposed solution on behalf of the OCC is now – since the late 1970s – consistent. 155 Archbishop Chrysostomos II, “Χαιρετισμός της Α.Μ. του Αρχιεπισκόπου στο 15ο Παγκόσμιο Συνέδριο Αποδήμων Κυπρίων”, (2007), pp. 546–51, (pp. 549–50). 156 Ibid.

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Europeanness affected its policies. The deconstruction of the previous image of European indissoluble qualities and values, i.e., the former perception of Europeanness, was intended as a form of call for the EU to see eye to eye and act according to its value system, even if that was implicitly viewed as utopian rather than realistic; hence the disillusionment. The latter was expressed on other, more spiritual aspects of Europeanness rather than the political ones that by extension reflect those values they derive from. During his official visit to the Vatican and precisely upon that matter, Chrysostomos II stated that “our” common home, the cradle of Western civilisation and the home of the Christian spirit, is experiencing a crisis and disorientation via atheism, secularisation and decadence. And that the contemporary society, although stemming from evangelical traditions and values, denies its own Christian roots, whereby he called for an intra-European mission of re-evangelism.157 In sum, he attributed the situation to the negative effects of globalisation, but also he put forward the issue of the erosion of Europeanness, owed by and large to its lost spirituality, proposing his take on tackling the problem, whereby he suggested what Europeanness really is in his view: above all, Christian. But despite differences he drew no separation line between East and West as he, among others, cited President Tassos Papadopoulos (1934–2008);158 “Cyprus was always European, even before the establishment of Europe. With its accession to the EU Cyprus returned home”;159 therefore, he left no shadow of doubt as regards the sense of belonging originally. But it should not necessarily entail that intra-European differences constitute an exclusively Christian Orthodox concern. In addition, in the context of a European modus vivendi and despite – because of, too – the schism of 1054 the OCC, like the OCG, engaged into ecclesiastical dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church given the self-evident common ground that unites them. In an interview to Aristeidis V. Protaxis for the newspaper Phileleftheros, Cardinal Walter Kasper160 verified the good relations between the OCC and the Vatican at both an institutional and a personal level, but waived off syncretism as irrelevant, emphasising on the mutual understanding between churches and at the same time the preservation of their particularities and identities: i.e., the recognition 157 Metropolitan Georgios, “Επίσημη Επίσκεψη της Α.Μ. του Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου στο Βατικανό”, (2007), pp. 587–628, (p. 616). 158 Tassos Papadopoulos was the President of the Republic of Cyprus from 2003 to 2008. 159 Metr. Georgios, “Επίσημη Επίσκεψη της Α.Μ. του Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου στο Βατικανό”, p. 616. 160 German Roman Catholic Cardinal, former President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity as of 1999.

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and appreciation of differences. But he also mentioned the dogmatic commonalities and most importantly that both churches are facing common challenges, such as that of Islam, the secularisation of the church and a new movement of sects and heresies. Hence, it would be productive for the churches to have a common language concerning such issues.161 Therefore bridging their differences in the prospect of what the twenty-first century bears, in terms of threats especially, was deemed a priority, while the role of the church is upgraded within the EU and potentially beyond it. After all, both churches strived to exert their influence so that the preamble of the Treaty on European Union, in other words the EU constitution, would include a clear reference to the Judeo-Christian cultural roots of Europe. Bishop Vasileios of Tremithus, in an article originally written in 2004 but published on the official website of the OCC in 2009, delved into the differences between East and West by apportioning part of the division thereof to the entrenched orientalist positions including those of the Western academia, where emphasis was put on the prevalent societal, cultural and political developments of the Roman Catholic and Protestant West. Therefore, with viewpoints emanating from such positions and while ignoring the parallel particularities of the Orthodox East their perception is affected, resulting in scepticism and negativity.162 Yet, in turn, the bishop attempted to condense the fundamentals that shaped Western Europe with relation to the fermentations between church and society there: ranging from the papal authority, to the Reformation (Luther, Calvin, etc.), the Enlightenment, Humanism and the French revolution, singling out especially the last three as central to the rise and establishment of secularisation. Whereby, religiousness and religiosity boils down to one’s preference; an option that was made available via the societal de-ecclesiasticalisation and de-socialisation that ultimately facilitated individualism. At which point bishop Vasileios, in order to further clarify the differences in focus, pointed out the international jurisdiction and reach of the papal authority in contrast with the system of autocephaly that linked church and nation in unison. However, bearing the European unification in mind given the Cypriot EU membership, he could not entirely avoid references to the co-formulation of the bloc-actor in light of the further unification; namely, in the sense that churches have a role to play in forging a durable union that comprises more aspects than the political ones, in 161 Aristeides V. Protaxis, “Ενότητα διατηρώντας τη Διαφορετικότητά μας”, (28 December 2008). 162 Bishop Vasileios Karayiannis, “The Church of Cyprus and the European Union”, (2009).

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search of Europe’s soul, to quote Jacques Delors. At which point, in the light of the rhetorical question on modifications of the traditional pastoral mission, the answer was based on the foundations of Europe, which inevitably affect its physiognomy: Hellenic civilisation with its thought and value system, Roman law and its structures of governance, and Christianity. The bishop maintained here that the Orthodox Church has its own contribution to make, out of the capacities it obtained via the church Fathers who first sought to bring the aforementioned civilisational elements together, and its millennia-long history of tradition and civilisational fermentations that rendered it an agent of the values thereof.163 The OCC was then in no doubt regarding its place in Europe, nor its compatibility with it, given its self-perception as a vehicle of Europeanness in its own right. But above all it seems that the alleged “soul of Europe” emerges as the proverbial Holy Grail and the key of European integration, something that the EU cannot do without. Faith as the “spiritual common denominator”, a cornerstone of Europeanness, coupled with more utilitarian but generally quite multifaceted purposes in store, rendered the representation in Brussels essential. One of the archbishop’s announcements on the day of his enthronement was that he would upgrade the representation of the Church of Cyprus to the EU, considering especially that the UN had become the instrument of the only superpower that directs things according to its interests instead of justice and morality, which entails that the Greek-Cypriots should place their hopes on Europe.164 We should note though that this was before the disillusionment that was addressed earlier; still, during the inauguration ceremony which followed this effect, there is no break of pattern. The archbishop in his speech said that although the initial idea of European unification was economic, soon it was realised that economic power by itself would not suffice as the foundation of European unification and integration, and that Europe ought to be unified upon the basis of diachronic principles and values. Thereby the church opened the office in Brussels to work on the same values and principles.165 However, as regards the perception of both Europeanness and the self, contrary to the case of the OCG, there is no intra-ecclesiastical divergence or disparity between institutional departments. The office of Representation of the Church of Cyprus to the European Union (RCCEU) remains in line with the rhetoric in 163 Ibid. 164 Georgios, “Τα Εγκαίνια των Γραφείων της Εκκλησίας της Κύπρου στις Βρυξέλλες”, (2009), pp. 313–23, (p. 313). 165 Ibid., p. 318.

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its homeland while it expresses views largely held domestically, unlike its Greek counterpart. Simply, in this case, the OCC presents an overall homogeneous stance towards the EU. It appears then that there is a genuine concern about the direction of Europe, as the main problem diagnosed there is identity erosion, noting that there may have been a vision of the founding fathers,166 but it is withering as it gets filtered through the national interests of Member States, whereby the potential contribution of Orthodoxy surfaces in the form of spirituality and meaning. When the church – any given church in Europe – is not up for this pastoral function, these spiritually thirsty people will eventually resort to “drinking even turbid water to quench their thirst, without knowing that what they drink is not enlivening, that it does not quench their spiritual thirst but harms them”, as it is drawn from any pseudo-outlets available.167 In contrast, Orthodoxy is held as intact concerning this form of crisis and therefore capable of providing its services, because the European is allegedly lost without spirituality; materialism is dead end and the vacuum is replenished with “spiritual and religious substitutes or hallucinations such as the American dream”.168 Eventually though, the understanding of what the EU is about, reached a level of maturity by the end of the 2000s as it was examined from an array of angles and in a more holistic and political way, i.e. as a bloc-actor. First of all, the search for European identity as a work in progress is acknowledged by Vasileios, Metropolitan of Constantia-Ammochostos,169 as it is noted that Europe is seeking its self-determination through a set of “values”, partly drawn from traditional sources, either religious or cultural. Actually those values are referred to in the European Treaties time and again, where Article 2 of the Constitution clearly defines them, as well as the place and stead of those values in the EU. They are adamantly referred to as fundamental: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, to name a few; needless to say that they are binding to all Member States.170 Yet, concerning the notion of values, Metropolitan Vasileios pointed out that even though in the European Constitution a broad reference is made to the religious and cultural background of Europe and hence the values of European societies, the term is used 166 We have already commented on the possibility that there is a misunderstanding of the Founding Fathers’ positions and an exaggeration on their visions. 167 E. R., Interview with the author, 8 November 2013. 168 Ibid. 169 Metropolitan Vasileios, “Οι Αξίες της Ορθοδόξου Εκκλησίας και η Ενωμένη Ευρώπη”, (2010). 170 Ibid.

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predominantly in its legal meaning and consolidation. However, he held that the history of the European continent is simultaneously the history of values as well. The admittedly oversimplified triptych according to which Europeanness, as is – stereotypically – known, derives from the foundations of Hellenic civilisation, Roman law and Christian faith may hold true, but this format does not cease, however, to be problematic because the issue is more complex when taking into account the example of Christianity.171 The actual experience from the application of evangelical principles in practice, even before the division of the Eastern Churches and the West, was different; Eastern Christianity, not as to the content of faith itself but as to the ecclesiastical tradition and practice experience, was different from that of the West. In addition to this, Europe was affected historically and culturally, to a small extent of course, on the one hand directly or indirectly by Judaism and Christianity and on the other hand by Islam.172 The Metropolitan goes as far as to accept the broader influences of what came to be the European civilisation as we know it in a more inclusive and realistic manner, by actually linking the impersonal legalistic aspect with the historical complexity of the region, without resting on a convenient perception of a geoculturally unadulterated European continuum. He was therefore consistent in his view of Europeanness as an under construction process, already since the time when he was Bishop of Tremithus. Further on, he made a distinction of the gradual Europeanisation that transpired via processes that impinge directly on the structure rather than the cultural content, which is affected by extension and not deliberately for the sake of reshaping Europeanness alone. In fact, referring to the European constitution, he held it as indicative of the processing and fermentations since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951; as an economic entity up until the Maastricht Treaty when the EEC becomes the EU – regardless if there are states that do not wish its implementation.173 So the metropolitan, in an attempt to communicate the content of those treaties in simple terms – or at least his take of the overall project and structure – explained that European integration boils down to the following: (a) The geographical integration of the Member States, with relaxation or complete abolition of their borders between them and the free movement of the citizens of Europe; (b) the economic integration of the European market, where the introduction of the euro is estimated to have

171 Ibid. 172 Ibid. 173 Ibid.

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positive effects beyond the expected, although the recent economic crisis shows major weaknesses of the finance system;174 (c) the political integration, which comes down to developing a common foreign policy for all Member States of Europe and the establishment of a defence mechanism for Europe; (d) the legal integration, which aims to the legal harmonisation between Member States of the Union, where the European Constitution is the culmination of this legal process, and the legislation voted by national parliaments, which are part of the so-called European acquis, to which the metropolitan commented that few in Cyprus realise the weight of this, whereas the vast majority remains unsuspecting as to what actually Europe means and the consequences thereof; (e) he then pointed out that it was those political, economic and legislative fermentations that led to a new perspective, that of the cultural basis of Europe where the motto “united in diversity” in the preamble of the constitution indicates the physiognomy of the EU.175 But interestingly enough, Europeanness is inclusively appreciated in its entirety, regardless and beyond the constraints of the EU and its Member States – which do not encompass the entire realm of the continent, thus distinguishing Europe from the EU – taking into account the presence of all existing denominations of Christianity and their manifestations, from moderate to extreme, including the Islamic and Jewish communities. In addition to this, the end of old certainties is taken into account, which essentially means the successive ideological transformations that have transpired, with the last episodes to date being the fall of communism and the dominance/dissemination of the capitalist system. In this – unusual for a hierarch but perhaps expected when in light of an ethnarchic church – way, the hitherto mosaic of European history and by extension of Europeanness is unfurled and examined from as many angles as possible, in order to reach an understanding of the object under scrutiny. His concern had to do with the negative aspects of this process that, in the lapse of time and with the further implementation of Europeanisation as a process, inevitably surface, such as the forfeiture or abandonment of traditional religious, national and cultural values, and the values of ecclesiastical and political authority in Europe, in short secularisation, even though this is not a strictly European phenomenon.176 Still, it affects mainly Western Europe and it is a by-product of the French Revolution that, given the overall background of the West, triggered a crisis of values 174 Ibid. Also, note that Cyprus had not encountered the Greek experience of the debt crisis yet, nor the bail-in that eventually took place. 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid.

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and in turn, the de-ecclesiasticalisation of former Christian societies. But to the degree that this phenomenon concerns Eastern Europe, the metropolitan does not shy away from apportioning accountability to the communist regimes that pursued dechristianisation through their propaganda. Another cause of concern that was mentioned was the “silent revolution” and consequently the abandonment of traditional values and adoption of new ones that for the most part serve individualism, which affects all societies and what essentially differs is the degree and pace.177 But apart from that, especially concerning the countries of interest, it has been maintained by the metropolitan that the restructuring of the physiognomy of the EU bears some special parameters for the Orthodox societies, namely Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Bulgaria, etc. What they all had in common was a social, cultural, religious and ethnic homogeneity. This was allegedly not perforated by tourism, some traditional customs notwithstanding, but by the liberalisation of the economy and by migration.178 The aim of the metropolitan further on as regards the meaning of the accession of Cyprus to the EU had to do with the clarification and understanding of what it actually entails; that it is much more than legality, demonstrated by the acquisition of a European passport. It has to do with the cultivation of a consciousness that the Orthodox Cypriots adhere to a broader social, economic and cultural realm. As a consequence, what has been to date known as the identity of a corresponding citizen, i.e., from a religious perspective Orthodox and ethnically Greek, is being directly challenged and influenced by the broader context of the EU and insinuated by the constitutional motto “united in diversity”. At which point surfaces the question, “since the EU maintains that it wishes to preserve this physiognomic diversity of cultures, peoples and values, how shall this be achieved given the political, economic and legislative harmonisation?”.179 The general concern then does not escape the basic pattern around Europeanness and Europeanisation, but in this case the approach is much more analytical, informed and focused. Distinctions on the aspects which are inevitably being affected reveal the process of a general pro­ blématique on the cultural erosion that EU conditions and processes may entail, a reservation concerning the actual intent and end goal behind them, but there is no mention of a conditionality of belonging in the EU. Merely, a call on the Greek-Cypriots to better understand what they “married” into.

177 Ibid. 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid.

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Yet, when all is said and done, actions speak louder than words, a fact that renders the actual policies of the churches and their institutions under scrutiny, beyond their day-to-day rhetoric while within the context of the EU, crucial in understanding and evaluating their overall attitudes.

2.3 Churches and their offices of representation to Brussels: functions and purposes 2.3.1  The Orthodox Church of Greece In a par excellence political gesture, articulated by a press release on 19 December 2000, the HSCG communicated its stance on specific legislative European affairs. In particular, the Holy Synod discussed among others the issue of the decision of the EU summit in Nice, France, following the suggestion of the French Presidency that any reference to Christian or religious tradition as a factor of shaping common consciousness among EU citizens ought to be removed from the European Charter of Human Rights. It was therefore decided that protest, sorrow and concern had to be expressed to President Jacques Chirac, the president and members of the European Commission regarding the aforementioned decision, as well as to inform the Ecumenical Patriarch on the matter, the heads of the autocephalous Orthodox churches, the Christian church leaders of Europe, the Greek president, the prime ministers of the Member States, the MEPs, the Council of European Churches and the COMECE.180 In particular, in the letter that was sent to the President of the French Republic at the time of Jacques Chirac, the HSCG expressed its grief for the removal of the statement that Europe forms the common consciousness of its members via its cultural, humanitarian and religious heritage, and its replacement instead by the statement that it has awareness of its spiritual and moral heritage. The grief expressed in that letter derived from the fact that an intention to distance the European citizens from their Christian heritage was on sight. Further, the synod protested because the EU citizens had not been asked in the first place and thus doubted the legitimacy of the decision, as it called the rights of the Presidency and the Commission into question regarding the particular matter. Especially since Christianity was decisive in co-shaping the European culture, value system, arts and crafts. Finally, it called upon the president’s democratic sensitivities to correct this false decision.

180 HSCG, “Δελτίον Τύπου της 19ης Δεκεμβρίου 2000”, (2001), pp. 43–45, (pp. 43–44).

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Also, an identical one was sent to the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi, and the prime ministers of the EU.181 Likewise, in attempting to influence the EU via the domestic route, Christodoulos hosted on 9 February 2002 the Greek commissioner to the EU Anna Diamantopoulou (1999–2004) and the EU MPs in an official luncheon. There he voiced his concern on social European problems and the potential role of the Orthodox Church in dealing with them. Additionally he expressed his opposition to an EU that is based on solely economic criteria, biotech and bioethics, but above all he repeated his position that Europe’s spiritual foundations are Christian, and surely it is not desired to abolish them. He then held that no European nation is prepared to discard its historical roots and traditions, let alone the Greek people, who deservedly take pride in the characteristics of their identity.182 The above-mentioned forms and levels of institutional communication leave little room for doubt as regards the priorities of Christodoulos and the HSCG. European affairs certainly topped an agenda that largely dealt with political issues already, domestically and internationally; in fact this type of correspondence is in its own right and by definition international ecclesiastical diplomacy in practice,183 while albeit functioning as a pressure group domestically, it would not be amiss to identify the effort of the OCG and its archbishop as one that sought to co-formulate the content of European treaties of crucial content. But this is not meant as a suggestion that this process was a solely Eastern Orthodox endeavour. For example, during the official visit of Pope John Paul II to Athens, the archbishop said that it is time to work together in order to keep Europe a Christian land and not let it become an atheist state (état laïque) that renounces its Christian identity; an EU that respects minorities, but also the freedom of peoples “to maintain their faith, language, education and identity, in a word, their spiritual identity”.184 In turn, the collaboration in light of the future European challenges was made more obvious one year later, when the OCG reciprocated. The visit, following the invitation of Cardinal Walter Kasper, dealt with the dialogue and exchange of ideas and experiences on burning issues concerning the EU, where the formulation and submissions of suggestions as well as 181 Theologos Apostolidis, “Η Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος – προς τον Εξωχότατον Πρόεδρον της Γαλλικής Δημοκρατίας και Πρόεδρον της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενώσεως κ. Jacques Chirac”, (2001), pp. 87–88. 182 HSCG, “Δελτίον Τύπου της 12ης Φεβρουαρίου 2002”, (2002), p. 194. 183 Neither the OCG nor the OCC use this term; it is applied here as a convenience. 184 “Η Προσκυνηματική Επίσκεψη του Ρωμαίου Ποντίφικος στην Ελλάδα”, (2001), pp. 377–94, (p. 383).

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the constructive presence of the Christian Churches in the under construction new European reality, came under examination. It was clearly stated that the issue was not a theological dialogue – there were vehement intra-ecclesiastical reactions against it anyway – but the establishment of cooperation in order to jointly contribute to the formulation of the European Constitution.185 In a nutshell, although Christodoulos was a protagonist for a number of reasons, the future articulation of both the European physiognomy and structure was an inter-ecclesiastical affair. To that end, the HSCG stepped forward, bearing the European constitution in mind, thus openly participating in a political discursive process with particular legislative suggestions in the encyclical No. 2740, which was intended to inform the public on the position of the church, with regard to the future of all Orthodox Greeks in the EU of the twenty-first century. Therein the obligation to co-formulate the physiognomy of the EU was emphasised. Suggestions included (a) the full and explicit consolidation of religious freedom and of basic human rights, and the ban of deceptive proselytism; (b) respect of European peoples’ common consciousness concerning their Christian roots and their diachronic spiritual heritage, without injuring the principle of religious freedom; (c) relations between church and state, which have a diachronic depth for any given peoples, to be left to the domestic national legislation of each state within the framework of religious freedom as stated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 11, so that tensions regarding religious traditions that define national identity may be avoided.186 Further it stressed how challenges are constantly being experienced, which basically stem from rationalism, and it is easily forgotten that Europe emerged from the Greco-Roman civilisation and the Christian faith and teachings. Further it was held that the OCG does not request to take part in the decision-making processes but in the discussion on the future of Europe, declaring that they stand close to the people at the decision-making level of the EU and they will stand by the Greek Presidency, praying that it will deal with the difficult problems such as the EU army or the Cyprus Problem, among others, suggesting finally that there can be no other motto than “For a more humane Europe”.187 Yet an even more emphatic sample of legislative interventionism surfaced when the OCG felt being under threat by the “Women and Fundamentalism”

185 HSCG, “Η Επίσημη Επίσκεψη της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος στο Βατικανό – Δελτίο Τύπου της 10ης Μαρτίου 2002”, (2002), pp. 170–74, (p. 170). 186 HSCG, “Εγκύκλιος 2740”, pp. 467–70, (pp. 468–70). 187 Ibid.

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European Parliament resolution188 and appealed against it. The reason was not so much the resolution itself, but rather that it indirectly impinged on church‒state relations. According to the special consultant of the synod and honorary vicePresident of the Greek Supreme Court Anastasios Marinos, the rationale was that in accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU ought to respect the domestic legislation and state law, which define the church‒state relations. Yet, in the resolution of interest, “secular state” and “secularisation” are clearly stated as such. What is more, it is further mentioned that the European Parliament considers church‒state separation as the most acceptable form of governance in a democratic society and invites the Member States to preserve their secular character; also, the resolution condemns the exclusion of women from high-ranking positions in the church hierarchy. This allegedly constitutes a contradiction considering the resolution’s emphasis on secularisation; ergo, why interfere when the separation of church and state is preferable,189 wondered Marinos. As for the individual right to religious freedom, the declaration was deemed incomplete on behalf of the OCG particularly with regard to the lack of significant constraints on sects and cults. Further, it was pointed out that considering the variety of religions in Europe, the possibility of proselytism cannot be excluded, hence the corresponding provisions of the European Parliament to hinder it were deemed inadequate. In sum, despite declaring religious freedom, this resolution ended up essentially being antireligious and antichristian in the view of the HSCG.190 It should be underlined though, that via legal means, the HSCG pursued to annul a resolution of the EU Parliament that as such was not binding anyway. The acquis of the EU may take precedence over national law but resolutions do not, as they fall into the category of recommendations that entail no obligation for the addressees. This fact, among others, reveals an overly defensive attitude for an issue of no actual consequence. Yet another letter of analogous content and intent on behalf of the HSCG was handed over personally by the archbishop on 20 February 2003 to Valéry Giscard D’Estaing.191 The gesture itself, a demonstration of diplomatic involvement, conveyed the message of equal counterparts engaging in dialogue, thus rendering

188 It was in favour of Member States’ secularisation and the equality of genders towards priesthood and corresponding hierarchy posts. 189 Anastasios Marinos, “Προσφυγή κατά Ψηφίσματος του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου ‘Γυναίκες και Φονταμενταλισμός’”, (2002), pp. 588–90, (p. 589–90). 190 Ibid. 191 Former French President (1974–1981) and an EU Federalist.

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Christodoulos a political agent.192 Once again, the future as well as the Christian background of Europe was being dealt with, and the known positions were repeated via a top-level lobbying act. This time, from the outset, it was stressed that 97% of the Greeks have been baptised, therefore the ongoing dialogue concerned them as well. Also the Christian tradition of Europe, the inherent identity traits, heritage, but most importantly a set of suggestions was repeated, such as those in the earlier-mentioned encyclical No. 2740,193 all impinging on the discussion about the impending European constitution. And apparently it worked for a while. Because Giscard D’Estaing actually acknowledged his counterpart and his authority by replying to the letter; whereby he expressed his joy in meeting the archbishop on 20 February and further on thanked him for his crucial remarks. He then proceeded in informing him on the ongoing processes so far and suggested that the reference to the religious heritage of Europe would be easier to find its place in the foreword, the preamble, rather than in Article 2. Additionally, he made clear that it was his intention to include the declaration No. 11 of the Treaty of Amsterdam in the final document, according to which the regulation of church‒state relations should be left to the domestic legislation of each Member State.194 Therefore, Christodoulos was indeed – temporarily – assuming political function at a European level, for D’Estaing engaged in actual dialogue and exchange of views on purely legislative affairs of content and meaning, not mere formalities referring to the general issue without actually getting into the particulars. However, as if being part of a strategic design to mobilise diverse agencies, the same exact suggestions as the ones made to Giscard D’Estaing were proposed to Dora Bakoyanni,195 who was the mayor of Athens back then (2003–2006), therefore of no international office or function. In any case though, she was deemed influential as she was invited to take part in a workgroup under Romano Prodi and was hence asked by the HSCG to exert her influence for the sake of

192 This is worth noting as extraordinary for an autocephalous national church as is in this case, whereas domestically, the accesses of the OCG to the political establishment are pretty much a given, therefore they do not impress the observer. 193 Christodoulos, “Επιστολή της Ιεράς Συνόδου προς τον κ. Valéry Giscard D’Estaing”, (2003), pp. 206–08. 194 Valéry G. D’Estaing, “Επιστολή του Προέδρου της Συντακτικής Συνελεύσεως για το Μέλλον της Ευρώπης κ. D’Estaing στον Μακαριώτατο Αρχιεπίσκοπο Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Χριστόδουλο”, (2003), p. 284. 195 Also, Greek MP, Minister of Culture (1992–1993), Foreign Minister (2006–2009).

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her country regarding the European matters.196 Again, the vision of Adenauer, Monet, et al was mentioned, as well as the stereotypical triptych of Greek, Roman and Christian foundations of the European civilisation, followed by the complaint regarding the claims that Islam, Judaism, the Enlightenment – and by extension atheism – have also contributed to it, signing the alarm that there exists a tendency to marginalise the church; then the suggestions on the fundamental principles of Europe were stated as quoted in the encyclical above.197 And likewise, i.e., by putting pressure on a European level via the indirect domestic route, there was yet another letter, this time to the Greek MEPs, with the expressed intention to inform them on the positions of the church concerning the European constitution. But in fact this letter was far more than informative, as there were specific legislative guidelines being outlined and not just ideas. The proposed set of instructions was intended to directly affect the European constitution and the way that it would determine Europeanness, hence to lay down the terms and conditions of belonging on the one hand and preserve/safeguard the church institutions and their autonomy on the other. In particular, the reference to the foundations of European identity, namely Christian religion, Hellenic education (paideia, Gr.: παιδεία) and Roman legal tradition was deemed imperative, yet the church was prepared to go along with Giscard D’Estaing’s suggestion that this reference ought to be made in the preamble of the constitution and not in Article 2, as it did not contradict the distinction between church and state, while it paid due respect to the identity values of the European spirit.198 Also, the OCG considered the reference to all intentions and purposes of the EU as imperative, not only to human rights and terms that secure the legal and financial condition; others too ought to be added such as social solidarity, life and dignity of the person, rights to education, health, residence, the protection of children, the elderly, the family and the sick, the establishment of the businesses’ social responsibility, charity and promotion of culture. The reference to religious tolerance was considered as absolutely justified, yet viewed the constitutional confirmation of the following as imperative: a) the preservation of the legal status quo of the churches and religious communities in each state as an element of national identity; b) the ban of harmful proselytism; c) the right of every canonised Christian church to define and review its constitutional charter and worship, based on its dogmas 196 Apostolidis, “Επιστολή της Ιεράς Συνόδου προς την Δήμαρχον Αθηναίων”, (2003), pp. 208–09, (p. 209). 197 Ibid. 198 Archbishop Christodoulos and Theologos Apostolidis, “Επιστολή της Ιεράς Συνόδου προς τους Έλληνες Ευρωβουλευτές”, (2003), pp. 282–83.

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and traditions and not on secular legislation; d) the respect and recognition of Christian holidays, as is already customary, concluding with wishes for the speedy and successful unification of Europe.199 Needless to say that the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union was at the top of the church’s agenda, a fact made evident in the declaration thereof issued by the HSCG. There Apostle Paul was portrayed as instrumental in the construction and legitimation of Europe, the harbinger of the message of the Resurrection and it follows that this was a departure point for the OCG. Because according to the synod, as the peoples of Europe, who, until then were but “sweepings carelessly piled together”,200 by endorsing his message they formed a civilisation, thereby Paul was described as Europe’s father and progenitor. Thus Europe was invited to honour its Christian roots and history, while the European political establishment was directly targeted as accountable for this neglect because it intentionally resisted and avoided such references. Notably, in light of this attitude, the suggested draft was not considered to be a constitutional treaty but an “Affirmation of European Cultural Decline”.201 Despite wishing for the best, it was deemed imperative for Europe to rectify its ways, else failure would be imminent. The latter would be the outcome of Europe’s soul being allegedly sold for the sake of geo-economic exigencies, thus calling for cultural and civilisational cohesion; otherwise, disintegration was predicted as a high likelihood.202 Via a damning declaration as such, the HSCG introduced a dilemma that was based on the premise of cultural cohesion, which, it alone could guarantee the future of the EU; yet, by resorting to the questionable argument of Paul’s progeny, it historically depleted an otherwise political claim. So much has transpired in the old continent that it would be impossible to narrow its contemporary physiognomy down to a single source of influence, let alone attribute it to one person, whoever that might be. Also the OCG came into direct confrontation with the European political establishment, which demonstrated the futility of pressures being exerted with the end goal of the EU’s “constitutional de-secularisation” in mind. Not that the archbishop was not taken into account, quite the opposite, but politicians were very cautious in dealing with controversial affairs such as religion and their attitude was more or less the same towards all major religious leaders. We should not forget that in those efforts the OCG was in concert with 199 Ibid. 200 HSCG, “Declaration on the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union”, (2003), pp. 493–94, (p. 493). 201 Ibid. 202 Ibid.

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the Vatican. As proof of the above stands the reply of José Luis Zapatero, Prime Minister of Spain (2004–2011) at the time, who expressed his understanding of the archbishop’s concern about the constitutional treaty of the EU; yet, no direct reference to the Christian foundations of Europe was made due to disagreements. Still, he reminded him that the religious dimension is still present as churches are acknowledged and taken into account, and what is more, they are left to be dealt with by domestic legislation.203 As regards the issue of the degree of secularism that ought to permeate the EU or not, the HSCG and the SSCMEA, in particular, examined this dispute from the perspective of two well-established Western viewpoints, particularly in dealing with the matter of banning/abolishing all religious symbols in the public sphere. On the one hand, the French, under President Jacques Chirac, abolitionist approach of all religious symbols in the public sphere and on the other hand the British, where e.g. religious freedom allows the Sikh to work in the public sector wearing their traditional attire. The archbishop claimed that no one has the right to prevent one from openly bearing a symbol of one’s faith, any symbol. “If the headscarf is banned today, tomorrow the cross will follow. In the spirit of religious freedom Orthodoxy is against such regulations”.204 However much utilitarian this stance might have been, it was certainly intentionally tolerant, permeated by multicultural equality, the central aim of which was to express a full disagreement with the adoption of a model such as the French laïcité and all that it entails legislatively. The director of the representation office in Brussels (since 2000), Bishop of Achaia Athanasios, has demonstrated a more balanced and mellow attitude. In referring to the draft foreword as published on 29 May 2003, where it was stated that values, human rights, law and generally the founding principles of Europe are the Greek and Roman Civilisation, the cultural, religious and humanistic heritage, which is permeated by a “spiritual impetus” and the philosophical currents of the Enlightenment, he argued that in his view, that indeed the lack of any reference to Christianity leaves a vacuum. The exclusive reference to the Enlightenment as fundamental without mentioning Christianity ignores history and is unacceptable, especially in such a document. Admittedly other religious cultures have exerted some degree of influence; yet by no means did they play a role as significant as Christianity. The crux, in his view, is “why” and “how” Europeans are brought together in a viable union. What constitutes 203 José Luis Zapatero, “Επιστολή του Πρωθυπουργού της Ισπανίας προς τον Μακαριώτατον Αρχιεπίσκοπον Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Χριστόδουλον”, (2004), p. 885. 204 HSCG, “Η Θέση του Αρχιεπισκόπου για τα Θρησκευτικά Σύμβολα”, (2004), p. 25.

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a European soul above and beyond the Euro and economic interests, comprising principles and values verified by historical evidence.205 Therefore, his focus was on a more balanced – i.e., religiously inclusive – portrayal of the European essential characteristics, and not against references to the Enlightenment and its socio-political corollaries for Europe. But since the proposed treaty draft was never ratified and therefore failed to establish a constitutional basis for the EU, attention was diverted elsewhere, to future acts with more potential. For that purpose, the HSCG turned to Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis (2004–2009) and with a letter on 27 February 2007, conveyed to him that being always concerned with the developments at a political and social level and in symphony with the government in all that is related to international and European policies, they decided to forward him their take of a suggestion to be adopted by the governments of the EU in the upcoming “Berlin Declaration”,206 which was scheduled for March. Their initiative had to do with the inclusion of a paragraph where the Christian principles and values of Europe would be explicitly stated, noting that the document had also been suggested by the other churches of Europe to another six Member States;207 to no avail though. Yet to steer clear of misunderstandings, as already mentioned, the initiative was not strictly Orthodox. Following the failure to include a reference to Europe’s Christian roots in the final document, Pope Benedict XVI criticised the “Berlin Declaration” vehemently, claiming that Europe “could not be built by ignoring its people’s identities”.208 One emergent pattern that permeates the aforementioned representative cases in point would be the intent of the combined forces of the actively involved churches to shadow-legislate, which, if successful, would therefore mean: a) the de facto acknowledgement of the churches as political actors and subsequently b) the de jure establishment of that model, the aforementioned

205 Metropolitan Athanasios, “Δήλωση σχετικά με το προτεινόμενο Προοίμιο στο Σχέδιο Συντάγματος της Ε.Ε.”, (2003), p. 427. 206 The “Berlin Declaration” where the 50th birthday of the Treaty of Rome was celebrated, offered the heads of state an opportunity to get together and discuss the future of Europe in light of the attempt of the constitutional act that was already a dead letter. The document of the “birthday card”, albeit nonbinding, was expected to presuppose a future charter that need not be called a constitution. 207 HSCG, “Προς τον Πρωθυπουργόν κ. Κωνσταντίνον Καραμανλήν περί των Χριστιανικών Ριζών της Ευρώπης”, (2007), p. 183. 208 Ian Traynor, “As the EU Turns 50, Pope Says it’s on Path to Oblivion”, (26 March 2007).

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“constitutional de-secularisation”, whereby the churches had every reason to pursue their chances of any such development. In addition, within the framework of the above church policies, the connections that Christodoulos had developed with the EPP, even if they were meant as a means to an end, can be considered as pro-European; because in some ways, like the pope, they shared his views on the origins of Europe and its overall cultural physiognomy. Yet, he often resorted to an alienating rhetoric, especially when his audience was not strictly Western European but Greek. For example, in his greeting during the works of the EPP’s conference in Thessaloniki (21–22 October 2004), he mentioned yet again the European constitution, referring to the Greco-Roman and Christian heritage and he emphasised the latter especially. He further stated that any accomplishment, material, scientific or technological, must yield to the dignity and uniqueness of the human person else we may be led to crooked roads. And then, he referred to the chronicles of the Byzantine period when pilgrims visited the tomb of saint Demetrius from all over Europe – Lusignans, Iberians, Scythians and Celts – and took home with them vials of Myrrh. And he did not forget to mention the Christianisation of the Slavs by saints Cyril and Methodius.209 The latter was no coincidence. In a rather utilitarian sense, Archbishop Christodoulos envisaged the impending European enlargement as instrumental in the consolidation of Eastern Orthodoxy in the EU and its upgrade as a potent actor, one that would be able, out of sheer population size alone and therefore distribution of power in the parliament, the commission and other institutions, to introduce its own suggestions and “Orthodoxise” the EU; to instil into the dominant value system and physiognomy, corresponding Orthodox ideas and support them accordingly. Hence the, if possible, deeper co-formulation of the European physiognomy by exerting pressure/influence, not only with regard to legalities but to the extent and essence of the EU was also part of the agenda. Namely, on 7 May, the archbishop visited the President of the Duma, the Russian parliament, Gennady Selezney. There Christodoulos made a special reference to the help from Russia when Greece was under the Ottoman yoke and looked to the “Orthodox brothers” for help.210 He went as far as to claim that Greece should work towards bringing Russia into the EU as well as the 209 Christodoulos, “Οικοδομούμε την Ευρώπη δια της Συμφιλιώσεως και της Συνεργασίας”, (2004), pp. 825–26. 210 However, it should be parenthetically stated that, had we come across analogous references of appraisal on behalf of the OCG for the Western European Philhellenic movements in Germany, France or Great Britain for instance, we would have certainly cited them too.

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homodox states of Eastern Europe. Main reason apparently was the Orthodox faith, whereby the obstruction of globalisation’s invasion and Western proselytism at the expense of Orthodoxy would be easier.211 The archbishop was not that direct when addressing a Western audience though. For example, he was unable to participate in the international conference “Cristianesimo e Democrazia nel Futuro dell’Europa” (1 July 2002), so he sent a message which was read out instead. Among the participants was Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, and Pat Cox, President of the European Parliament (2002–2004). There he attempted to outline his vision of Europe, albeit by generalising and after claiming the self-evident desire for a democratic and humane Europe, he demarcated it geographically within the area starting from the Atlantic Ocean up to the Urals, with common elements of identity being its rich cultural heritage, while maintaining the principles stemming from Athens, Rome and Jerusalem;212 thus, albeit hesitantly and discretely at first, the spatial inclusion of Russia was introduced into the Western European discourse too. Further, the European enlargement had as a result the accession of Cyprus, effective as of 1 May 2004, for which the Greek-Cypriots were unsurprisingly congratulated, but it was also noted that an array of states of significant Orthodox communities would enter the union too. And with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the Orthodox element would be strengthened even more. The Greek Church naturally was pleased for that, yet it reminded the Ekklesia readership of Christodoulos’ view that there is a place in the EU for Orthodox Russia too, since an actually united Europe ought to include the heritage of Cyril and Methodius as well, including the peoples that constitute the Orthodox civilisation and the Byzantine Commonwealth as Dmitri Obolensky called it.213 Whereby this was evidently rendered by definition a political aspiration, even though to what extent it was realistic is in retrospect highly debatable. In any case, successful or not, what we shall henceforth call the “Christian-Orthodox Easternisation of the EU” may be defined as “the policies and processes that aspire to instil the EU with elements of the Eastern 211 Archimandrite Agathaggelos Charamantidis, “Η Ειρηνική Επίσκεψις του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος Χριστοδούλου εις την Εκκλησίαν της Ρωσίας”, (2001), pp. 455–94, (pp. 462–63). 212 Christodoulos, “Προς το Συνέδριο ‘Cristianesimo e Democrazia nel Futuro dell’Europa’”, (2002), pp. 569–71, (pp. 569–70). 213 Cholevas, “Η Διεύρυνση της Ευρώπης”, (2003), pp. 376–77. See also Dimitri Obolensky’s, The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500–1453 (1971) and The Principles and Methods of Byzantine Diplomacy (1961).

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Orthodox value system and embed its corresponding priorities into the institutional organisation and principles of the EU and its founding treaties”. Hieronymos II on the other hand has hardly ever pursued any political claims or goals at a European level, let alone attempt to co-formulate or influence the EU legislation. It was a conscious decision and it remains so. His pattern of attitude is mostly identified in the concession that the church may have a distinct role, yet he has clarified that it may not take part in discussions and decisionmaking processes nor do they wish to cross the line of duties. But if circumstances allow it, they would respond responsibly to potential resources made available by the EU, “utilising productively anything that is to the benefit of the people, without eroding the Hellenic-Orthodox faith or derogating the identity of Christian Europe”.214 The general views on the tenets that ought to permeate the moral, cultural and historical basis of the EU remain more or less unaltered, as well as the underlying suspicion of what there may be in store that may be proven detrimental to his – and the church’s – ideal type of Europeanness. But a utilitarian aspect within this position is evident too, and it emerges time and again; still in terms of attitude, his, is characterised by the symbiosis of both the instrumental and the transformative element. In fact, the archbishopric withdrawal from the European limelight coincided with the healing of the injuries that Christodoulos had partly caused to the relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and Patriarch Bartholomew personally, but it was not inconsequential as regards the EU policies. Bilateral relations were indeed mended with Hieronymos’ visit to Bartholomew. Their discussion was characterised by harmonious cooperation and solidarity which healed the previous discord. But among others they talked about both their representation offices to the EU in Brussels, and recognising the need for a unanimous Orthodox voice in Europe, they agreed to take measures towards the necessary institutional changes,215 a turning point which was indicative of the change in philosophy and shift in EU policies from Christodoulos to Hieronymos II. More to the point, a gesture of international meaning and significant weight that pointed to the harmonisation of policies, especially with regard to Europe, would certainly be the common appearance of Hieronymos II and Bartholomew 214 Hieronymos II, “Μήνυμα στην Γ΄ Ημερίδα της Ειδικής Συνοδικής Επιτροπής Παρακολουθήσεως των Ευρωπαϊκών Θεμάτων”, pp. 231–32, (p. 231). 215 Archimandrites Elpidoforos Lampriniadis and Kyrillos Misiakoulis, “Πρακτικόν Συμφωνίας κατά τας Διμερείς Συνομιλίας εις τα Πλαίσια της Ειρηνικής Επισκέψεως εις το Οικουμενικόν Πατριαρχείον του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Ιερωνύμου”, (2008), pp. 361–62.

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in the ceremony of Zappeion, Athens (8 January 2014) for the Greek presidency of the European Commission. Not only that, but they made sure to demonstrate the message of undisputable unity towards the European vision that they share, making it evident by being side by side constantly.216 It follows that concerning European affairs, the centre of gravity likewise shifted, to Athens to be exact, even though the RCGEU was by 2009 well-established. In light of the post-Christodoulos status quo, the role of the SSCMEA was essentially upgraded given that its purposes were reviewed anew. In a conference on intercultural dialogue in Veroia (2 June 2009), its duties and aims were described, including communication with the institutions of the EU, such as the European Parliament or the Commission’s Representation in Athens, in order to mutually exchange and utilise information of ecclesiastical and social interest and intervene in the EU via its institutions when deemed necessary; to take part in funded EU programmes for the education and training of its employees, both clerics and laymen; to secure funding for building and restoration projects of monasteries, churches, monuments, etc.; to communicate and cooperate with the embassies of European states in Athens; and to cooperate with the representation office in Brussels, director of which is the Metropolitan of Achaia Athanasios.217 Particularly the references to funding were less than necessary though, given that the office in Brussels had already no authority to intervene in the disbursement of funds from the EU, yet its presence in decision-making centres and institutions rendered it valuable to that end. Not to mention that for that reason, i.e., the physical presence, systematic and direct communication with European institutions was easier too. And self-evidently, merely “flying the flag” in Brussels, as a par excellence ambassadorial gesture of presence, stature and prestige, renders the OCG an international actor in its own right, one that is being diplomatically represented. Diplomatic representation is after all directly linked with prestige; and with the presence of imposing and centrally located premises at a symbolic level prestige is being connoted, not to mention that permanent representation is a sine qua non, given that “diplomacy is a continuous rather than episodic process”.218 This aspect has been preserved, but the otherwise shifting of the centre of gravity to Athens demonstrates a contraction. But this seems to be

216 G. A., Interview with the author, 25 January 2014. 217 Archimandrite Hieronymos Karmas, “Ο Ρόλος του Γραφείου της Ειδικής Συνοδικής Επιτροπής στη Διαμόρφωση του Ευρωπαϊκού Γίγνεσθαι”, (2009), pp.  542–43, (p. 542). 218 Geoff R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (1995), p. 35.

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in tune with Hieronymos’ idiosyncrasy too, who is “an admittedly exceptional, honest man, but has no international interests whatsoever”.219 However, to begin with, the office of representation in Brussels ought to be attributed to Christodoulos personally, who, might have had an ambivalent rhetoric but its establishment was a pro-European action. This decision was not overly popular in the synod, some metropolitans openly opposed it as questionable, but it was out of sheer determination that he proceeded with it. This opposition is attributed to a number of reasons; “when one speaks no foreign languages, has a limited knowledge base, no contact with the foreign press, has never exchanged views with a foreign, EU based discussant, it is difficult to see the merit in it”.220 Perception is thus restricted to the local conditions and particularities of decision-making, opinion formulation, worldviews and EU perception. Therefore the understanding of why and how this office would be of use was permeated by such constraints. Until 2008, Christodoulos dealt with this difference of opinion personally in the synod, often bridging the chasm, dealing with demands or even taking the heat in order to defend his work against claims that closing the office might be preferable in order to cut back on expenses.221 In the words of Bishop Athanasios of Achaia, the director of the office, as published in “Romfea”, Christodoulos used to say about the question of closing the office that came up every now and then, that bishoprics are many and tend to multiply, but there is only one office of representation, emphasising on the pains it took to open it in the first place and recognising its value and mission.222 The committee in Athens, the SSCMEA, was also founded by Christodoulos so that there would be an institution there too, and, with the then archbishop as coordinator, there existed a productive exchange between the office in Brussels and the committee in Athens, a good quality of cooperation. But as soon as he passed away, the former level of good cooperation was affected as well, to both institutions’ detriment of course. “Now the representation needs to often reply to questions concerning its usefulness, as if turning the time fifteen years back, but then again the trust that feeds the synodical system is lacking, Orthodoxy is experiencing issues of coordination and collective spirit”.223 It would not be amiss then to hold that there is a noticeable divergence between the domestic and the 219 M. D., Interview with the author, 17 December 2013. 220 C. T., Interview with the author, 29 October 2013. 221 Ibid. 222 “Ο Αχαΐας απαντά για τις Δραστηριότητες του Γραφείου των Βρυξελλών”, (30 July 2012). 223 C. T., Interview with the author, 29 October 2013.

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international, namely European, attitude of the perception of the affairs thereof and by extension of policy conceptualisation in general. Whatever the circumstances though, the main purpose of founding the RCGEU was no other than to bring the church in touch with the European state of affairs. That is, to depart from the fragmented understanding of Europe which is by and large owed to the domestic character of the church; one that is fragmented in localities – bishoprics equals eparchies – which may constitute the core, the basic cell, but do not coincide in their theorisation and perception of the EU in an organised way, such as that of the RCGEU with its direct and immediate experience of Brussels.224 The activities of the latter over the years comprise participation in conferences, representation of the OCG to international religious organisations as a member, i.e. the Conference of European Churches (CEC) or the COMECE, meetings with heterodox and homodox high-ranking clerics, influential EU politicians, ambassadors, MEPs, and observation of parliamentary committees’ activities in Brussels. The representation, as was intended, secured a presence at key levels therein and constituted such a level in itself, notably in a critical period – that is something Christodoulos was well aware of and worked to that end  – when Greece was the only Orthodox country in the EU, in which case, to abstain as a church from such a presence/representation would not be sensible.225 It was also intended to help the metropolitans grasp that they are not just heads of a public legal person but European citizens too. And in that way, to understand that many issues that Greece must deal with at a local level have actually more to do with decisions, directives and mentalities shaped in Brussels; so it was meant to introduce them to the corresponding frame of mind, where the EU membership is a given, a reality.226 And indeed several hierarchs observed the European Commission at work through Athanasios of Achaia whose work actually coincided with the EU presidency of Greece back then.227 In fact, it was the very period when Giscard d’Estaing had included Thucydides in the preamble of the draft constitutional treaty, and Greek MEP Marietta Giannakou (2009–2014) introduced an amendment that referred to pananthropic values, including the Judaeo-Christian ones – “but the European left protested and the rest is history”.228 We ought to parenthetically

224 Ibid. 225 Ibid. 226 Ibid. 227 G. E., Interview with the author, 27 November 2013. 228 Ibid.

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mention that the latter is further verified by Yannis Valinakis,229 who in a letter to Christodoulos informed the archbishop that during the works for the European Constitution in the second half of 2003, under the Italian EU Presidency, Greece had not supported the inclusion of a reference to Christian values. In contrast, during the Irish presidency and after the national elections, this did occur and to that end a coalition with other like-minded states was formed. It is worth noting that a relevant letter of seven Member States (Italy, Poland, Malta, Portugal, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovakia), sent on 21 May 2004, was not made known to Greece, neither to the Netherlands which also wished to co-sign it.230 In any case, upon appointment by Christodoulos, Athanasios, fit for the role, took it upon himself to establish a network of connections with the entire Western system, but it does not necessarily follow that the church in its entirety underwent a type of osmosis as such.231 For example, it was his initiative to contact the Greek EU Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou in order to organise suitable activities in the European Parliament and elsewhere for the Greek metropolitans to attend, so that they could experience what the EU is about, first hand. Yet, their interests were more utilitarian and anchored locally, domestically, rather than focused on an EU orientation, which was the purpose of their presence in Brussels anyway, judging by their enquiries on European funds for their eparchies.232 In that sense, the church as a whole does not project the image of openness, readiness for discussion and exchange of experiences. Europe is more often than nought underestimated, seen as a distant entity, useful for utilitarian purposes. So it has no role in European affairs, nor does it wish to. There are exceptions, such as the RCGEU which is acquainted with the European state of affairs and has a role that emanates from its functions and purposes, but it does not have a following.233 But even the aforementioned utilitarianism was at times overshadowed by Euroscepticism. For instance, “the monks of Athos had to be convinced to accept the ‘Catholic funds’ – as they called them – to repair and renovate old monasteries that qualified as cultural heritage” when Minister of Culture, Dora Bakoyanni first legislated the linkage of cultural expenses with

229 Greek Deputy Foreign Minister (2004–2009). 230 Yannis Valinakis, “Συμπερίληψη Χριστιανικών Αξιών στο Ευρωπαϊκό Σύνταγμα”, (2004), p. 625. 231 A. N., Interview with the author, 4 December 2013. 232 Ibid. 233 Ibid.

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economic development. It should be noted that since then, more than 20 billion Euros have been supplied for that purpose.234

2.3.2  The Orthodox Church of Cyprus As it has already been explained, Archbishop Chrysostomos I could not possibly piece together a political agenda with reference to the EU and actively pursue it; for self-evident reasons, therefore, the consequences of “ethnarchic absenteeism” connoted a vacuum of actions together with the scarcity of rhetorical, discursive activity. The hierarchy was preoccupied with a great deal of problems including the canonical difficulties to declare the throne void, consequently the problem lingered on. Thus the voices referring to priorities were sporadic and expressed mostly out of individual initiatives rather than being outcomes of systematic, ad hoc discussions within the synod; which is indicative of an exploratory, touch and go approach. One example that fits this description would be a speech addressing the audience of the third global youth conference of the Greek-Cypriot Diaspora, when Chrysostomos, still the Metropolitan of Paphos then, said that Cyprus must, within the framework of the EU and as an equal partner, find the ways to steer clear of pressures from allies and enemies and divert focus to its national interest, namely to a viable solution of its problem.235 Therefore, the main preoccupation was independent of any other policy that was by and large of secondary importance, compared to the solution of the Cyprus Problem. Also, reservations were evident too, but the EU membership was deemed by the soon to be archbishop as crucial given that it offered a seat at the table, and hence additional diplomatic tools and a venue for political manoeuvres. A utilitarian approach admittedly, but also realist and more down to earth when compared with the enthusiasm two years prior to that; i.e. when the Republic of Cyprus had set one foot at the door of the EU and the metropolitan of Paphos equated it with vindication of the liberation struggle of 1955–1959 and the aspiration for union with Greece, the renowned Enosis.236 In fact he had invited the fighters of that era to the Bishopric 234 M. D., Interview with the author, 17 December 2013. 235 Metropolitan Chrysostomos, “Προσφώνηση στο Τρίτο Παγκόσμιο Συνέδριο Νεολαίας Αποδήμων Κυπρίων (ΝΕΠΟΜΑΚ) και στην Ετήσια Συνεδρία του Κ.Σ. ΠΟΜΑΚ-ΠΣΕΚΑ”, (2006), pp. 335–38, (p. 337). 236 “Πάφου: Σαμπάνιες για την Ένωση”, (19 April 2004). In 1949, bishop Makarios demanded from the British colonial governor a referendum regarding the question of unification with Greece. The request was declined yet the Ethnarchic Council organised and conducted an unofficial one in 1950. The “yes” vote won by an overwhelming

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Palace’s premises in Paphos, in order to celebrate together the realisation of what they yearned for back then, saying that the Enosis with the motherland had finally been achieved via the route of European accession.237 In fact the European prospect dates back to the 1970s, when the Republic of Cyprus and the European Economic Community signed a customs union agreement, and this relationship was further consolidated with the application for EU membership of 4 July 1990. The international policy re-evaluation was influenced by Greece’s strategic orientation to the EEC and the weakness of the Non-Aligned Movement to exert significant influence; hence, during the 1990s, the pursuit of the EU accession was intensified. On the other hand, the international community considered that the EU would be able to facilitate a solution or at least contribute to it significantly.238 The EU was truly prepared to contribute to a future solution and was actively involved in preparing – and tempting – the Turkish-Cypriots for a future reunification, should there be a window of opportunity, not to mention that it wanted to reward them for their EU orientation and stance to the Annan Plan. Hence, particular programmes were developed in order to facilitate the future implementation of the EU acquis, their European Integration as well as help towards the rapprochement of the two largest communities of Cyprus. To that end, the Financial Aid Regulation was developed, in order to establish the acquis groundwork, and support the political and economic development of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Also, the Green Line Regulation aimed at the establishment of direct trading between the Turkish- and the Greek-Cypriots, while assisting the economic development of the former. The aspiration of these programmes was to render the implementation of the EU acquis possible without exceptions and overcome its suspension in northern Cyprus, according to Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaties.239 When Cyprus finally got its archbishop, policies took shape as he outlined his priorities on the day of his enthronement, one of which was, as head of the church, to inform foreign diplomats, friends abroad, institutions and raise 95.71% albeit only Greek-Cypriots voted. See Nancy Crawshaw The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece (1978), and Pavlos Tzermias, Geschichte der Republik Zypern (1998). 237 Ibid. 238 George Kyris, “The European Union and the Cyprus Problem: A Story of Limited Impetus”, Eastern Journal of European Studies, 3 (1), (2012), pp. 87–99, (p. 88). Victor Roudometof and Irene Dietzel, “The Orthodox Church of Cyprus”, (2014), pp. 161– 80, (p. 167). 239 Kyris, p. 93.

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awareness on the national issue, thus helping the government. To that end, he announced that he would utilise the many opportunities that the EU accession would offer and that it was his intention to upgrade the office of representation that deals with those affairs.240 It is telling though, that even amidst the uncertainty as regards the EU policies of the OCC, the synod in Cyprus realised the strategic role that an office in Brussels would play, contrary to their counterparts in Greece. Back in 2004, the ecumenical patriarch actually showed interest in this, while meeting with Chrysostomos of Paphos in Montenegro. In fact, Chrysostomos was told that a Cypriot representation office to the EU would be inappropriate as Orthodoxy is one and unitary, and that it is embarrassing for every single church to have its own instead; so Bartholomew offered to facilitate the representation of the OCC via the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s liaison office, to which the metropolitan replied that this would be a synodical matter.241 Realistically though, this could never have worked for either side; it is only an indicative example of the significance such representations have at a level of cultural diplomacy, symbolically and instrumentally. In any case, practical parameters, directly linked to the status quo of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in Turkey, the – lack of – relations between the latter and the Republic of Cyprus and all the probable constraints this entails, would not allow such an arrangement as the one suggested by Bartholomew to be productive, especially considering the priorities and agenda of the RCCEU, which would be difficult for the Ecumenical Patriarchate to pursue as conflicting with the Turkish EU accession bid. In fact, when the director of the office, Bishop of Neapolis Porfyrios, was enthroned and appointed, the archbishop, while referring to the office of representation in Brussels, set as its utmost priority the national issue in his address. For that purpose to be served, according to Chrysostomos II, bishop Porfyrios would have to enter the heart of European and international diplomacy where decisions are made and convincingly claim the rights of the Cypriot people in accordance with the European acquis.242 It ought to be mentioned that the office was established just a few months after the archbishop’s election; what is more, all three candidates for the archbishopric throne, namely the metropolitans of Lemessos, Kykkos and Paphos were of the same opinion

240 Mitsides, “Τα Κατά την Ενθρόνισιν του Νέου Αρχιεπισκόπου”, pp. 469–516, (p. 509). 241 Vasos Vasileiou, “Πατριάρχης: Να σας εκπροσωπήσουμε στην Ε.Ε.”, (12 May 2004). 242 “Η Εκλογή, η Χειροτονία και η Ενθρόνισις του Χωρεπισκόπου Νεαπόλεως Πορφυρίου”, (2007), pp. 772–89, (p. 777).

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that the representation in Brussels was imperative for both spiritual and national reasons, leaving no room for doubt regarding their priorities.243 The agenda and priorities of the OCC became clearer after the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 and were further crystallised with Chrysostomos’s II enthronement. Thereafter, not only did he announce the policies and priorities of the OCC regarding an emphasis on the European activities; actions such as the establishment of the Office of Inter-ecclesiastical Relations and European Affairs headed by bishop of Mesaoria Gregorios, and of the RCCEU in Brussels, headed by bishop of Neapolis Porfyrios, were indicative of how much he valued the opportunities that the EU membership had to offer.244 Within this context, it was deemed an utmost priority to preserve, protect and recover as much as possible of the Greek-Orthodox cultural heritage in northern Cyprus. It is estimated that the 1974 invasion and occupation resulted in the loss of approximately 520 places of worship, such as churches, chapels, monasteries, some 23.000 icons, a number of which, of high value as they date back to the twelfth century, and several other artefacts and items. Of the aforementioned buildings, many have fallen in disrepair, but at least 130 churches have been ransacked, while valuable items, including frescoes, icons and relics became merchandise internationally. Seventy-seven churches have been converted to mosques, eighteen have become buildings of military and/or medical function, thirteen are used as agricultural facilities and others are being utilised by the tourist industry as hotels and restaurants.245 Indeed the RCCEU was in 2007 already in place, with its inauguration planned to take place on 18 March 2009 by Archbishop Chrysostomos II. Its official aims were – and still are – among others to demonstrate and raise awareness on the illegal occupation of Christian places of worship and other monuments of the kind by Turkish forces, located in the northern part of the Cypriot Republic; to inform about the continuing destruction, desecration and pillage of these monuments, the stealing and illegal export of more than fifty thousand Byzantine icons, frescoes and other artefacts; to observe all issues related to activities, research and developments in the EU which may be of interest to the Church of Cyprus, in order to formulate and articulate suggestions to corresponding European institutions; and to participate in the dialogue for peace, friendship and cooperation

243 E. R., Interview with the author, 8 November 2013. 244 Roudometof and Dietzel, p. 172. 245 Ibid.

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between European peoples, with respect to the particularities of national and cultural identities in Europe.246 Likewise, before the inauguration, at the airport of Larnaca, the archbishop stated that there were plans to inform the EU officials and raise awareness with exhibitions, conferences and lectures in the premises of the office in Brussels, where the officials shall be invited to take a closer look and evaluate the situation. But this was not its only purpose; the church felt the obligation to reproach Turkey to all European institutions for the ongoing occupation of 37% of Cypriot territory  – essentially territory of the “European family”  – and to inform the EU partners of the ongoing destruction, desecration and plunder of monuments there.247 He further informed that a tremendous effort had been mounted to date so that the OCC would be allowed to repair the church buildings, but to no avail, whereas on the Greek-Cypriot side the mosques have been maintained and restored. As for the stolen icons, many of the ecclesiastical treasures were traced and found in European and other auction houses, and following coordinated actions of the government and the church they were repatriated, after of course considerable amounts of money were shelled out. He finally said that he firmly believed that Turkey should not be viewed by the EU partners as a big market and be lenient to it, but as a state that must comply with the European ideals and institutions.248 At which point he stressed that if Turkey ignores their appeals, they will have no other option but to turn to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and seek justice.249 Judging by the above, one detects the clear focus, an agenda of primarily national priorities, hence a national role  – inherently nonetheless  – a readiness to work with and utilise the EU institutions, and in short those elements that constitute what qualifies as church diplomacy. But between the lines a reprimand was also in store, for it was mainly European auction houses that handled stolen goods, and most importantly, Member States that fare with the national interest as compass were targeted for being oblivious of their own European values, which shows that expectations did not exceed realism on behalf of Chrysostomos II. At the same time, perhaps because of that, no aspiration to co-formulate the EU or “shadow-legislate” was expressed.

246 “Εγκαινιάζεται το Γραφείο Αντιπροσωπείας στην Ε.Ε.”, (2009), pp. 222–23. 247 Georgios, “Τα Εγκαίνια των Γραφείων της Εκκλησίας της Κύπρου στις Βρυξέλλες”, p. 315. 248 Ibid., p. 319. 249 Ibid., p. 320.

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In contrast, particular EU policies were supposed to be influenced a propos Turkey and its possibilities of accession, an unchanging objective as long as the Cyprus Problem lingers on. Needless to say, this also concerns the RCCEU, in addition to its purposes as outlined above. More or less these are issues that the government of Cyprus deals with, but in this case the RCCEU is more issue-focused and systematic; through the dissemination of relevant information, memos, meetings, exhibitions, conferences, excursions of MEPs to Cyprus, and things that are not made public such as extensive correspondence with key political persons at an EU level.250 All the events take place at the premises of the office and in the EU Parliament, often in cooperation with the Conference of European Churches (CEC) and the CSC (Church and Society Commission). Lately the RCCEU is trying to function more autonomously and dynamically as Orthodox, together with the other Homodox representations, and hence it has been more active with the Committee of the Representatives of Orthodox Churches to the European Union (CROCEU).251 It is generally acknowledged that Bishop Porfyrios of Neapolis has been very effective in tracing and reclaiming stolen artefacts and has spared no effort to make the issue of Cyprus’s cultural heritage destruction known. He has collaborated closely with the Cypriot MEP Eleni Theocharous (since 2009), e.g., to organise exhibitions, conferences and made it possible with the expenses of the church for foreign MEPs to travel to Cyprus and see for themselves the situation in the occupied territory. In short, the RCCEU works towards making the Cypriot problem and its consequences known.252 Parallel to the above-mentioned activities, the OCC has mounted an apparently analogous and coordinated campaign to the same ends. Following the invitation of the President of the European Commission Barroso, e.g., the archbishop visited Brussels on 14 May 2007 in order to take part in the conference of the following day and he repeated there that under the Turkish occupation, more than 500 churches have been destroyed and desecrated or stripped off, including even frescoes and mosaics, to become merchandise in Europe and America.253 To which, in the subsequent press conference, chancellor Merkel notably stated that we cannot speak of human dignity as long as churches and other religious monuments are being destroyed in several countries, as it happens in the northern part of Cyprus.254 Another such example would be the 250 E. R., Interview with the author, 8 November 2013. 251 Ibid. 252 H. L., Interview with the author, 4 March 2014. 253 Mitsides, “Η Α.Μ. ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος στις Βρυξέλλες”, (2007), pp. 355–57, (p. 355). 254 Ibid., p. 357.

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official visit of Chrysostomos II to the Vatican. On Friday 15 June, the archbishop met with the Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, where he offered him a photo-album that showed the “before and after the invasion” condition of the churches in the occupied territory. He asked him to exert his influence, politics and legalities aside, to help so that their maintenance would be allowed. He pointed out that Cyprus is the only Christian country in the Middle East and therefore Europe’s outpost in the region, warning that a negligence of Europe to Cyprus, hence negligence of basic EU principles, would result in the loss of Cyprus as vital space of the EU, in a region where Islam is dominant. The Italian prime minister replied that he would put the issue forward in the next meeting, either of the heads of state, or of governments of the EU.255 To that end, again in harmony with the overall OCC agenda, the Monastery of Kykkos Museum together with MEP Panagiotis Demetriou organised a photo exhibition in the European Parliament that was launched on 28 May 2008 and remained open to the public for approximately a week. It was a sum of thirty photos depicting the condition of the Christian monuments, and it aimed at informing the European citizens too.256 Many outstanding individuals were there, such as the President of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering, the President of the European Peoples Party Joseph Daul and among other numerous officials the representatives of the Cypriot and the Greek Churches in Brussels, namely Bishops Porphyrios and Athanasios. The aim of this exhibition, according to the Metropolitan of Kykkos and Tillyria Nikiforos, was to raise the awareness of the EU Parliament, the EU and the international community to exert pressure in order to have the places of worship returned to their rightful owner, the Church of Cyprus, so that to have them repaired and restored.257 Unsurprisingly Chrysostomos II has not kept the EPP at a distance as he attempted to make use of what it could yield to the benefit of Cyprus and the OCC – another instrument that the EU membership had facilitated. So on 13  April 2010, while visiting Brussels and with the opportunity of attending the event dedicated to the places of worship and religious freedom in Cyprus,258 he met with the 255 Georgios, “Επίσημη Επίσκεψη της Α.Μ. του Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου στο Βατικανό”, p. 609. 256 “Φωτογραφική Έκθεση στο Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο στις Βρυξέλλες, με Θέμα «Τα Θρησκευτικά Μνημεία στην Κύπρο: Όψεις και Πράξεις μιας Συνεχιζόμενης Καταστροφής»”, (2008), pp. 468–69, (p. 468). 257 Ibid. 258 Co-organised by the RCCEU, the Church and Society Commission that is under the aegis of CEC and the MEP Mrs. Eleni Theocharous.

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President of the EPP at the time, Joseph Daul.259 Once again, he raised the issue of the destruction of Cyprus’s religious heritage in the occupied territory and the religious oppression of “the Enclaved”,260 clarifying though that the conflict in Cyprus is not religious. To which Daul replied by expressing the solidarity of the EPP to the Church of Cyprus and its support for safeguarding religious freedoms and salvaging the monuments of the Cypriot religious and cultural heritage, which at the same time is European and global too, pointing out that he had visited the island and was personally aware of the situation.261 Most importantly, in the same event that took place in the premises of the European Parliament, MEP Theocharous was more direct and assertive; she asked President Emmanuel Barroso to intervene personally so that particular steps might be taken to the aforementioned ends.262 One cannot overlook the cooperation between Greek-Cypriot officials of both the church and the state in the particular case. Also, another EU institution that Chrysostomos II turned to was the ECHR. At first he warned, via a broadcast of the Church Of Greece radio station on 9 January 2008, that he intended to appeal to the ECHR against Turkey as the occupation forces obstruct the repair of churches and the freedom to pray in them.263 And having allowed a reasonable amount of time and with no change for the better, it was announced in 2009 that with the initiative of the archbishop, Cyprus was preparing to file a law suit against Turkey in the ECHR in order to stop the ongoing destruction of churches, and to safeguard part of the national and cultural heritage in the occupied territory. The church claimed that it had to resort to that measure because of the

259 Vasilis Vasileiadis, “Συνάντηση του Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου κ.κ. Χρυσοστόμου με τον Πρόεδρο του Ευρωπαϊκού Λαϊκού Κόμματος”, (14 April 2010). 260 The Enclaved (Gr.: Εγκλωβισμένοι) are communities of Greek and Maronite Cypriots, approximately 20,000, who resided in villages behind the line of fire after the invasion of 1974 and remained there. Today there are less than 500 left. See the website of the Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus in Washington for the UN Security Council Reports on the issue: http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index. php?module=page&pid=21. 261 Vasileiadis, “Συνάντηση του Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου κ.κ. Χρυσοστόμου με τον Πρόεδρο του Ευρωπαϊκού Λαϊκού Κόμματος”. 262 Yannos Charalampidis, “Άμεση Παρέμβαση της Ε.Ε. για να διασωθεί ο Πολιτιστικός Θησαυρός στα Κατεχόμενα”, (15 April 2010), p. 15. 263 Cholevas, “Ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος Κύπρου καταγγέλλει τις Κατοχικές Δυνάμεις”, (2008), pp. 47–48.

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deliberate destructions on behalf of Turkey and its refusal to cooperate in order to rebuild and repair those monuments that had been defaced.264 The instrumentalisation of European institutions towards the achievement of political, diachronic national goals is evident, and from that perspective, it may appear utilitarian. Indeed, according to Chrysostomos II, the main expectation of the accession and membership is to play a catalytic role in finding a viable and fair solution to the Cyprus Problem. To that end the church develops connections and a communication network with and within the EU institutions so that they can experience and understand the situation first hand. But still, the OCC holds the EU membership as meaningful and valuable, although they do not consider everything that is coming from there well and good. Regardless of differences, as proof of this importance stands the office of representation to Brussels under Bishop Porfyrios, as well as the decision to set up the Office of Inter-ecclesiastical Relations and European Affairs under Bishop of Mesaoria Gregorios. In exchange, in the archbishop’s words, what Cyprus has to offer is not an army or a major economy; its contribution is its historical, cultural, religious and spiritual heritage.265 All in all, the OCC is positively predisposed to the European orientation and in favour of interreligious dialogue, regardless if the Cyprus Problem is always taken into consideration. After all, this inevitably includes a religious dimension and from that perspective the EU has something positive to offer in the form of a good practices’ transfer and the corresponding mitigation of differences. For example, the EU has helped restore and renovate Apostle Andrew and other church buildings in the occupied zone; the same applies to Muslim buildings in the free areas.266 The crux of the matter is that the Cypriot church is engaged and mobilised within the EU; it utilises its institutions and in that sense, in effect it legitimises the political structures of this complex actor/entity. As for the cooperation between the representations of interest, given the difference of direction outlined earlier, one should not expect them to plan and act as one unit. There are of course exchanges as well as evidence of cooperation at a level of low politics, but we cannot speak of a common agenda by any means, because of their different orientations.267 When conditions allow it, services that benefit one counterpart may be facilitated by the other. For example in May 2007, when the archbishop of Cyprus visited Brussels, among others he paid a 264 “Η Εκκλησία της Κύπρου θα καταφύγει στο Ευρωπαϊκό Δικαστήριο Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων για την Καταστροφή 522 Εκκλησιών”, (2009), p. 223. 265 “Εκκλησία της Κύπρου – Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση”, (2010), pp. 191–94, (pp. 192–93). 266 G. M., Interview with the author, 24 February 2014. 267 R. C., Interview with the author, 22 February 2014.

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visit to the Greek church’s office of representation, where he later took part in a reception in his honour hosted by the director Athanasios of Achaia, where he had the opportunity to discuss with outstanding EU individuals the situation in Cyprus268 and network accordingly. Another example, with reference to low politics, would be an exhibition of the works of Greek and Greek-Cypriot painters hosted by the RCGEU, intended to put forward a suggestion of a cultural entity. Thereby was demonstrated that those two counterparts, contrary to stereotypes of indiscriminate bilateral cooperation between Greece and Cyprus in general, do not work together just to form a common front with the intent of confrontation with any other given entity or actor.269 So there are elements of cooperation where agendas overlap.  On behalf of the OCG, it is argued that cooperation depends on one’s challenges and burning issues – for instance, the OCC has to deal with the problem of the military occupation  – whereas the priorities of the SSCMEA are different. As regards working with the Cypriot representation, the intention is to share a common argumentation when dealing with EU institutions. Just like CEC or the COMECE express themselves in unison, the Orthodox try to do so too. This is not as effective though, while the organisational aspect cannot yet match that of the Catholics or the Protestants; partly because of the focus on national issues and interests, unlike their Western counterparts. In a nutshell, the Cypriot is preoccupied with different things than the Greek, the Romanian or the patriarchal representation which has a different targeting.270 Therefore, there is a degree of cooperation as it would be expected of the five Orthodox churches there, i.e. the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which was the first to establish its presence in Brussels, then consecutively the Russian church, the Greek, the Cypriot and the Romanian. The committee that comprises the Orthodox representations (CROCEU) and is meant to function as a unitary instrument was founded only recently, in 2010, with its purpose being to deal with Orthodox issues at an EU level collectively.271 But particularly the bilateral relations obey to the constraints of the agendas and their priorities, which has nothing to do with how close the two churches are. Christodoulos was, and Hieronymos II is, really fond of Cyprus, having especially the recollection of the national uprising

268 269 270 271

Mitsides, “Η Α.Μ. ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος στις Βρυξέλλες”, pp. 355–57, (p. 357). C. T., Interview with the author, 29 October 2013. K. D., Interview with the author, 23 May 2014. E. R., Interview with the author, 8 November 2013.

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of 1955–1959 still in mind and the perception of the island as crucified and in need of assistance.272 In any case, evidently there exist differences, both intra-ecclesiastically and between churches, in the form of disparities and heterogeneous perceptions of Europeanness – to be fair, an almost intangible concept as it is – as well as policies and strategies concerning the process of Europeanisation. As we have argued repeatedly the explanation partly rests not only on how the EU is perceived, but on the compatibility of the latter with the churches’ perception of the “self ”; which in this case, would be the state as a member of the EU and an embodiment of the collective psyche at the same time. In other words on how being determines belonging – or the degree of belonging at all for that matter – in a society of states. The European personality on the one hand, as Vergara puts it, with the personification of the state on the other, as defined by Carr.

272 Ibid.

3 State personification – the state through the eyes of the corresponding churches This chapter deals with the phenomenon of state personification, the ascription of morality, behaviour and ultimately personality to the fictitious group-person by the two churches of interest to their respective states. It is looked into how this is possible and by what theoretical means it may be described and explained. The importance of this rests upon the presumption of the OCG and the OCC that there exists a particular diachronic typology of personhood which is still applicable and to a major extent presupposes, prescribes, legitimises and ultimately imposes a political culture; this, in turn, is expected to affect state institutions and decisionmaking procedures. Our task is to determine the key characteristics that those two, when personified, bear as far as their national churches are concerned.

3.1  A detailed account of the theoretical framework At this point, it would be inevitable to proceed in dealing with the notion of being as defined earlier, without first making a case about how crucial it is. The sense of being by and large determines the sense of belonging, as it indirectly and unwittingly, as far as the actor shaped by it is concerned, dictates and conditions an actor’s identity features and particularities. In turn, the latter, depending on the equivalent determinants of other actors, who, when combined together form a society, impinges on the conditionality of belonging in a structure that, as such, is based upon the premise of compatibility. On the whole, this is essentially a set of terms and conditions that, when met, render that society functional; more to the point they render it a society indeed. The terms and conditions that permeate such an identity framework may very well comprise a vast array of attributes that determine the behaviour of an actor. Therefore, here we are preoccupied with why actors behave in particular ways, taking into account their personality or personhood. But as regards a structure such as the EU or any society of states for that matter – thereby the ESIR is our approach of choice – group religiosity and its role in the formation of political culture has been underestimated diachronically. As a result, there exists a vacuum in the way IR theories understand and interpret religion and the dynamics thereof. What is more, sporadic exceptions notwithstanding, the potential contribution of Religious Studies theory is still being by and large ignored. This neglect has corresponding consequences on the understanding of the world in general, ranging from state behaviour to regional

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particularities and the potential political function of religious organisations as actors, as hermeneutic instruments have been based on inefficient theories, binary and normative perceptions, or exclusivist foundations. Yet, several notable failures of IR theoretical frameworks – for example in addressing phenomena such as Balkanisation, post-communist secessionism, the “Arab Spring”, which is now but an inaccurate euphemism, theocratic political formations, radicalisation, recent cases of intolerance in Europe such as PEGIDA (Ger.: Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, i.e. Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West), etc. – and their suggested interpretation typologies that are devoid of religiocultural considerations have given rise to literature that attempts to address the issue, or rather, stress the need for an approach as such. It would be fair to say that this discussion is relatively recent, permeated by lots of scepticism on behalf of IR scholars, but still necessary. Monica Duffy Toft, wishing to stress how much religion matters in IR, very colourfully writes, “We missed the significance of the Iranian revolution, we ignored the power of the Pope, and we missed September 11”.1 And these are but a few examples that point to the obvious vacuum. First and foremost, the approaches that dominate the theoretical spectrum, i.e. Realism and Liberalism, are permeated by their secular foundations. They originated in the political environment of the Westphalian System of state sovereignty where the roles of church and state were very clear, with the former pushed to the periphery as regards administrative affairs and decision-making. Hence, the church was co-opted, subordinated to the state and had surrendered its power. Also, their intellectual forefathers, such as Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau for Realism, or Kant and Locke for Liberalism, had in mind the paradigm of a fully secularised state and a corresponding international system.2 Not only that, but religion was marginalised, seen as a problem for the state as a cause of war in Europe and a complication that ought to remain strictly in the private sphere. Therefore, churches should be devoid of power and authority, and of no capacity to exert influence.3 On the one hand, the Realist school of thought is preoccupied with the survival of the state within the anarchical system of the global society, where no actual regulatory authority stands higher than the state, neither any greater power  – not de jure that is. Therefore, power is at the epicentre, and its 1 See Monica Duffy Toft, “Religion Matters in International Relations”, (5 January 2010). 2 Daniel Philpott, “The Religious Roots of International Relations Theory”, (2015), pp. 76–86, (p. 76). 3 Ibid., p. 81.

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management and exertion is the means towards the state’s survival and the preservation of its interests. In that sense and within the context of capacities and weaknesses as decisive in the realisation of any aspirations, the religious parameter is marginalised to say the least, as something of little relevance to the big picture. Regardless if it may constitute in itself a cause, a means or a premise; as long as it possesses no power to do something or modify the balance of power within a broader perception of relative – to other actors – gains.4 The Liberals on the other hand, believe in the rational pursuit of any actor to act upon its interests; this facilitates and necessitates cooperation between them in order to reach the desired result through concessions, bargains and a mutual understanding, thus leaving no room for religion in their manoeuvres. Constructivism though is more permissive of the notion of religion. There, ideas are held as important in the formulation of a state’s behaviour, which ultimately depends on the collective perception of identity, acknowledging that the latter cannot escape being affected by religion; hence a religion-based identity is conceptually better accommodated there.5 However, religion has become a concern amongst think tanks, the academia and the diplomatic corps, which indicates its re-emergence as a this-worldly issue. Despite its acknowledgement, a present-day and updated analytical approach that demonstrates the relevance of religion to IR is lacking. Particularly in the form of a structural element of the contemporary international system that has to be taken into consideration, i.e., as an identity determinant in the context of globalisation and not as a symptomatic cultural phenomenon of limited weight.6 The overall attitude of diplomatic circles does not make this endeavour any easier, given that politics is preoccupied with what religion “does” instead of what it “is”,7 which is attested by their dismissive attitude, as they say: “We don’t do religion; we don’t do theology; we do international politics”.8

4 Sebastian Rosato, “The Sufficiency of Secular International Relations Theory”, (2015), pp. 176–83, (pp. 176–77). 5 Ibid., p. 178. 6 Pasquale Ferrara, “Globalisation and Post-Secularism – Religions and a Universal Common Identity”, (2012), pp. 61–70, (p. 61). 7 Ibid., p. 67. 8 Ibid., p. 68.

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This disconnect is generally traced in how little available literature one may come across on the way that religion functions as a legitimating factor in IR.9 Namely, as of late it has been maintained, thus validating our arguments, that: there are three reasons to believe that religious legitimacy should be influential in international relations. First, normative factors are having an increasing influence on international relations. Second, the growing literature on instrumentalism demonstrates that other cultural factors such as nationalism and ethnicity have provided legitimacy for political activities. Third, identity is clearly an influence on international politics and religion is an influence on identity.10

Needless to say that we are of the same opinion with Fox and Sandler, as it has been made known time and again in this document. Sensitive subjects, bound with taboos to some extent, have been left out the limelight for quite a long time. Religion, gender, race, ethnicity and other identity variables had no place in the IR disciplines, and even the English School with its value system permissiveness was reluctant to incorporate them in its analytical framework for decades.11 Variables that have to do with identity were seen as alien, belonging to the reflectivist12 – therefore irrelevant to IR – hermeneutic approaches. For a long time, it was unthinkable to endorse explanatory tools that dealt with elusive notions. Very few, with Martin Wight13 being a bright exception, were prepared to incorporate culture and religiosity in an explanatory framework as Wight did with his English School theory.14 In fact, we may presume that it was not really the theoretical inflexibility that obstructed the broadening of hermeneutic means, but it was rather the positivist scholars who were not in favour of such a turn. This was detrimental in that variables of potentially valuable explanatory contribution were left out. Because in their own ways, all major disciplines  – some admittedly less than others – may have room for this parameter, especially

9 Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religions into International Relations (2004), p. 36. 10 Ibid., p. 45. 11 Nukhet A. Sandal and Patrick James, “Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding”, (2010), pp. 3–25. 12 Approaches were roughly divided to two distinct categories: the rationalist Realist and Liberal on the one hand and the reflectivist approaches on the other; the latter do not endorse rational choice as their primary explanatory instrument. See Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, (1988), pp. 379–96. 13 The author of the authoritative Power Politics and the forefather of the English School of IR. 14 Sandal and James, pp. 3–25, (p. 4).

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in the contemporary international environment where religion is still relevant and politics need to adapt.15 After all, the notion of a society that does not perceive itself as something is inconceivable. Never does a society imagine itself as a mere expendable sum of replaceable individuals who happen to reside in a given geographical territory, communicate with a language and superficially observe their customs. Their adherence to this society rests on their own will – wittingly or not – to partake in its meaningful norms, myths, values traditions and perpetuate it.16 A broad, inclusive cultural physiognomy perception needs to be able to provide answers to identity and particularities questions by descriptions that provide sufficient and convincing definitions on how the parameters of temporality, spatiality, historicity, collective aspirations and traumas, internal and external relationships, permeate identity; significations as such provide answers that exceed reality or rationality. Otherwise, without them, chaos would ensue.17 Indeed, we may infer at this point, to make a connection with IR, that by and large this description clearly points to the elements that constitute the fibre of society beyond positivist rationalism. Likewise, God, regardless of any theological background that delineates such an entity or notion, does not in itself constitute a “real” or “rational” signification, but rather the epicentre of a constellation of symbolisms. God is the object that is in fact being signified; therefore, the core signification of an organisation, a system of signifiers, and at the same time that which exceeds the constraints of being real or rational, being thus an imaginary signification.18 Yet, if we concede – and we do in this case – that “history is impossible and inconceivable outside of the “productive” or “creative imagination”,19 God and religion by extension become automatically structural elements of the social and political reality, inseparable from the latter; even if they stem from the collective imaginary, it does not entail that they are imagined and unreal. Then, for a typology of a society as described by Castoriadis, we may infer that in being more than the sum of its parts, it is essentially a synthesis that cannot possibly be articulately defined by reductionist means, or by nitpicking variables while leaving out those that are difficult to measure, such as religion, a major identity determinant. In sum, religion is one of the sources that people draw worldviews from, it shapes their norms, beliefs and ultimately behaviour, both at an individual and a social level; it is a source of identity, a determinant of one’s 15 Ibid. 16 Cornelius Castoriadis, La Montée de l’insignifiance, les carrefours du labyrinth (1996). 17 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 146. 18 Ibid., p. 140. 19 Ibid., p. 146.

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sense of being that by extension creates a network of kinships, which bears an intrinsic sense of obligation for the like-minded, wherever they may be. Thereby emerges the interventionist tendency internationally and even the likelihood – or the complete lack of it – of conflict might be determined in that context, or at least influenced significantly.20 It is not out of mere chance that religion has made a comeback since the 1990s, and its renewed importance for politics cannot be overlooked.21 At a global scale, one observes that the previous certainties of religious subsidence and secular expansion now seem to be embarrassingly irrelevant, as religious tradition with its gaining impetus puts modernity to the test, what is more amidst the geocultural centre of the West.22 Wherefrom emerges a validation of Eisenstadt’s “Multiple Modernities” theory, which sees the aforementioned certainties of the classical sociological milieu being contradicted by a reality that was unforeseen half a century ago; back when almighty modernisation would spread out and establish the Western, initially European, paradigm wherever there existed a society that was susceptible to the sweeping modernisation that would henceforth alter its institutional structures, inevitably.23 But this has not come to pass, not yet anyway. Instead of one sweeping cultural paradigm that modernity would bring about via Westernisation, a multiplicity of such has surfaced, each of its own nature and characteristics, revealing the possibility of other parallel modernities that do not necessarily have the Western patterns as points of reference.24 In that way, an array of collective identity typologies, respective to their own distinctive modernity versions, is observable; classifiable variably and ranging from “civil, primordial and universalistic, to transcendental or ‘sacred’”,25 they have generated, depending on their content, their own political delineations in accordance with their cultural ones. In turn, it followed that a spatial dimension would capture and reflect the boundaries of those collectivities, expressed in the form of territorial relevance. Not to mention that the ideologisation of collective identities has also ensued.26 To this we might add that the spatial parameter does not necessarily demarcate borders but areas where communities of distinct cultural identity may reside, including secular Europe. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Fox and Sandler, p. 176. Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, (2006), pp. 1–25, (p. 1). Ibid., p. 2. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities”, pp. 1–30, (p. 1). Ibid., pp. 2–3. Ibid., pp. 6–7. Ibid., p. 7.

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Hence emerges the postsecular argument on the transformation of religious communities and religions too, which have adapted to their socio-political democratic environments without losing their relevance to modern societies; in that sense, postsecularism is described as an amendment of secularism, according to the deterministic thesis of which, the gradual fading of religion in the public sphere until its disappearance was erroneously anticipated. It turns out that religion remains still a source of meaning, norms, a moral compass ultimately that is essential and relevant to modern day society; it exceeds politics, and even though it is personal, it is not private.27 To recognise the facets of the postsecular function of religion is to acknowledge the bearing on corresponding cultural autonomy. This may not necessarily mean a direct linkage to politics, but on the other hand, it cannot be excluded. Especially if we consider the aspects of life that religion addresses with reference to morality and society, which is also telling of the turn from secularism to postsecularism.28 So, taking the above into account, we argue that at a theoretical level, (a) along with the reversal of the Westphalian System which introduced an essentially secular status quo, the equivalent reversal of the privatisation of religion29 has erroneously not been taken into consideration and this calls for a retheorisation; (b) there is no validity in the private/public sphere distinction, because identity, self-perception, essentially being, cannot be dichotomised in accordance with strictly rationalistic, legalistic, bureaucratic or normative differentiations; (c) political culture is not devoid of religiocultural factors and corresponding predispositions and by extension this touches on the behaviour of actors – level of analysis notwithstanding – therefore it is imperative to examine actors from that perspective as well. It is not enough to be concerned with what actors do if the reasons behind actions are neglected, as it is with the dominant traditions, where even though the unit of analysis within an international secular structure, e.g. the EU, to a certain extent may be influenced by religion, this parameter is systematically neglected. But it should not have to be so. As regards the EU in particular, it has often been pointed out that the processes of integration have been overwhelmingly technocratic, which may have been the most productive way to approach the project initially, given the Second World War that was still recent and the Cold War that was dominating the

27 Wilhelm Gräb, “The Transformation of Religious Culture within Modern Societies: From Secularisation to Postsecularism”, (2010), pp. 113–30, (p. 113). 28 Ibid., p. 118. 29 See Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”.

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international geopolitical order.30 It is worth noting that merely by mentioning the term “War” twice in a sentence that refers to the twentieth century alone demonstrates the constraints and conditions that governed the design of the EU over the years. In any case, in such a political status quo, it was rendered possible to proceed with a number of integration policies ranging from the Schengen zone to the consecutive enlargements and the introduction of the common currency (€), with the maximum possible consensus. But parallel to that, the de-politicisation of politics and the almost stealthy creation of a unitary entity has come at a cost,31 because it was one-sided, to put it bluntly, in the sense that no attention was paid to the European personality, the collectively accepted EU personification or an overarching pattern of it; what is more, with a reference to shared, commonly accepted representations of it in the form of symbols, memories, practices, but also social and spatial representations. However, what we have is variable socially, geographically and nationally.32 With the EU in a state of flux, it follows that religious identity perceptions as civilisational demarcation are gaining ground;33 all the more a reason then to take the variable of religion into account together with the institutions that represent it. In the second chapter, we have demonstrated that not only do the churches under examination attribute a personality or an ideal type as such to the EU, a certain physiognomy of Europeanness, but we have also pointed out instances of political involvement towards the co-shaping of this physiognomy by way of its religiocultural background delineation. Regardless if their effort turned out to be less than fruitful, merely the involvement that shows the existence of room for such manoeuvres, coupled with the representations in Brussels, indicates the potential of churches to function as actors, as well as their capacity to exercise cultural diplomacy and soft power. It follows that this is linked to the personification of the state, which interests us as a factor of compatibility with the European society of states and its collective personhood. The latter may be officially devoid of any particular, explicit religious identification as one would expect, but even so, an effort to delineate a European personality has been made. In the preamble of the Treaty on European Union, albeit in the most inclusive possible way, perhaps so that the presumed, past cultural homogeneity will not become a hindrance to the multi, or intercultural future, there is an abstract reference 30 Jeffrey T. Checkel, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “The Politicisation of European Identities”, (2009), pp. 1–28, (p. 2). 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., p. 4. 33 Ibid., p. 14.

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to the historical, religiocultural physiognomy of Europe. Therein one reads the following:34 DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law, RECALLING the historic importance of the ending of the division of the European continent and the need to create firm bases for the construction of the future Europe […].35

When all is said and done then, the convenience of personhood attribution is broadly used even though the group-person is not, well, a person per se. This notion rests in the Hobbesian “Artificial Man”, Leviathan. Following the era of absolute personal rule when the ruler was identified with the state, the latter became increasingly complicated given the constitutional and administrative evolution of polity and state machinery. The formerly straightforward personal involvement and accountability of the monarch became less and less relevant, and personhood, with its corresponding moral responsibility, was shifted to the “Artificial Man”, who was now embodied by the state; thus emerged the personification of the latter,36 as a convenience that accommodated a paradigm shift in polity. And in that way, it was rendered possible to agree upon a regime of international law, where the convenient assumption of the personified state facilitated the attribution of duties to it as well as rights.37 This much-discussed controversy, however bothersome for the vast majority of IR theorists who refuse to engage into the accuracy or fallacy of the attribution of personality to the state, has led to the astounding lack of literature upon the matter. Even today, that the notion of state personhood is by and large ascertained, scholars opt to avoid dealing with the nature of this phenomenon.38 But still, for a different reason and not out of inclination to positivism, we too find it futile to assess whether the state can indeed be personified and if so, how, as we rather endorse the view that “to deny personality to the state is just as absurd as to assert it”.39 It is a practical necessity as is the equally fictitious existence

34 Capital letters are being used exactly as in the Treaty document. 35 Official Journal of the European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”, (2012), p. 15. 36 Carr, p. 136. 37 Ibid., pp. 136–37. 38 Alexander Wendt, “The State as Person in International Theory”, (2004), pp. 289–316, (p. 315). 39 Carr, p. 137.

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of a “legal person” or a “legal personality” of international institutions. It is the equivalent of corporate responsibility where a structure is much too complicated to trace its functions to one individual. The same applies to the evolution of polity that necessitated the equivalent adaptation so that the international system could be functional. Yet, this does not mean that this fictitious person is only and strictly a convenient legality. Companies, banks and institutions are bound to be held accountable or praised, depending on their conduct, and therefore capable of moral behaviour, thus being personified. The state is the epitome of the phenomenon thereof, and it is impossible to consider an international system otherwise,40 especially when taking into account the inherently anarchical nature of the international society where no higher regulative authority exists.41 Actually, to even acknowledge a state as an actor is in itself a form of personification, as in that way qualities such as “rationality, identities, interests, beliefs”42 are being ascribed. And, even though scholars may disagree on what constitutes a “state-person”, or even if all states, including the “failed” ones, may qualify as such, all schools of thought, the liberal, the realist, the constructivist, etc., seem to agree that state personhood is a fact that is meaningful.43 After all, it is not only the “corporate personality”, the roots of which are traced back to the medieval times, or the, since the eighteenth century, ascription of personality to the state; it is the systematic commonplace perception and practice of the people, the media and the political establishment to view the state that way, whether this “person” is fictitious or not.44 Abstractions materialise as embodiments that are comprehensible by the broad masses and the elites alike, whether it is public figures or institutions that are linked to such connotations, which facilitate personification.45 And to be sure, when the state is personified, characteristics that are normally attributed to individuals become applicable to it as well; hence, one ascribes rationale, intent, personality and ultimately identity.46 Likewise, in defining state personhood from a rationalist perspective, its four main properties are:

40 Ibid. 41 Bull, (1977). 42 Wendt, “The State as a Person”, p. 289. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Kathleen M. McGraw and Thomas M. Dolan, “Personifying the State: Consequences for Attitude Formation”, (2007), pp. 299–327, (p. 299). 46 Ibid., p. 301.

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(1) a unitary identity that persists over time; (2) beliefs about their environment; (3) transitive desires that motivate them to move; and (4) the ability to make choices on a rational basis, usually defined as expected-utility maximisation. These properties mean that persons are above all intentional – purposive or goal-directed – systems.47

And may we point out that intentionality is de facto self-evident, else what is the point of an actor, given that all approaches recognise the state as such, if not to act upon one’s attributes? Also, it is continuity that necessitates the perception of the state as a person, for it secures that obligations and rights can be honoured, beyond the temporal constraints that apply to an individual. Anniversaries, achievements and loan repayments are made possible via this continuity which guarantees institutional functionality; for the state itself and the institutions within it, the most essential ones first and foremost.48 For example, a treaty or an international agreement is not binding for the ministers who sign it personally but for the states and the institutions – ministries, banks, etc. – that they represent. It follows that their future counterparts in office will have to honour the previous agreements and in that way observe the continuity of the personified state. This means that the latter adheres to norms, rules and expectations to honour the state’s obligations that international morality – which is impossible without personifying the state – requires. In turn, international morality entails a commonly accepted code of conduct among a society of states.49 In that same way, a citizen, (a German, a Greek etc.) believes that Germany or Greece have duties to fulfil and what is more, their international reputation, trustworthiness and relations depend on meeting their obligations to one another.50 Even though the realist would argue that international morality does not exist while stressing the significance of power as the utmost – and measurable – variable in the international system, and the liberal would presume international morality is no different to that of the individual, the English School traces its predisposition to Carr’s – albeit a realist himself – middle ground. There, the ability of a state to be measured as a worthy, reliable counterpart when it observes obligations that emanate from its societal moral stature reflect by extension on the nation-state and determine its standard of behaviour to foreigners. That does not mean of course that an individual’s emotional capacity to love or hate governs formal state conduct. The state resembles rather a corporation, an institution, 47 48 49 50

Wendt, p. 295. Carr, p. 137. Ibid., p. 138. Ibid. p. 139.

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which is incapable of experiencing the emotional variants of a human person; it possesses qualities that can be codified, as rules and legislation. But even so, it has been often observed that human qualities such as that of generosity are attributed, when for instance an organisation offers humanitarian aid.51 Likewise, expectations of what can only be defined as an individual’s morality might be expected of the state as well; even if that would mean to bypass or waive off formally agreed obligations altogether, demonstrating thus compassion and generosity. In fact, it is expectations as such that may trigger and generate this kind of behaviour on behalf of a state, or a group-person for that matter, which when all is said and done would have actually performed an act of altruism.52 For example, as such qualifies the African Debt Relief that was initiated by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with thirty-six countries so far receiving special assistance, and more beneficiaries – provided that they qualify by meeting particular criteria – expecting the same treatment.53 Criticisms – and responses to them – aside, what matters here is the capacity and will of grouppersons to demonstrate morality. However, this is not the commonly expected behaviour of the group-person. Possessing morality that may facilitate the functionality of the international society is one thing, but being compassionate and charitable is quite another and it might be expected of other organisations or institutions, with the church being one. Yet, the primary duty of the state is to preserve itself and safeguard its interests, unless of course the latter conveniently coincide with being benevolent.54 On the other hand, the individual may expect from the state quite the opposite of one’s moral fibre, i.e., behaviours that one finds immoral when interests demand it; thus, apportioning one’s moral accountability to the group-person transpires, which again, is rendered competent of morality, of personhood in other words. This social type of morality then, that of the group-person, does not expect or demand a dutiful attitude and the equal demonstration of morality to all actors without exception; fellow members of the same grouping, whether those of a state, a religion or a community take precedence. Whereby emerges the question of morality being applicable to a society of states. We concede, to

51 Ibid., pp. 140–43. 52 Ibid., p. 144. 53 IMF, “Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative”, (30 September 2014). 54 Carr, p. 144.

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begin with, that a society of states is a fact, as much as international morality is also real; therein, states have moral obligations as units of this structure.55 There are of course limitations to its coherence and harmony. We may perhaps consider the distinction made by Tönnies (1887) on the nature of society where a distinction between community (Ger.: Gemeinschaft) and society (Ger.: Gesellschaft) is made. The former is ridden with premodern characteristics of small-scale units with close-knit relationships and shared identity among its members; whereas the latter is based on norms, rules and mutually acceptable interaction patterns. The notion of community is not fully applicable here according to Buzan;56 international society is rather permeated by a shared political culture. Hence, we turn to Bull when it comes to the fundamentals of this concept, the primary objective of which is a basic consensus and understanding between states that wish to coexist in a regulated system, to the extent that this is possible, given that we are discussing its limitations at present. Within reason then, the maintenance of order in any society presupposes that among its members, or at least among those of its members who are politically active, there should be a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life.57

The English School therefore recognises, even if the international society is anarchical, that institutions, mechanisms, international law and principles play a role as well, and as a result, order is to some extent viable among the members of this society that have a common understanding of political culture and the will to partake in it. In short, the essentials are there to some degree and they are employed via diplomacy.58 As for its limitations, they are twofold: first, equality between the members of this society is not self-evident, and the greater the scale of the international society the lesser it is applicable; second, the interests of the state always take priority over the sum of the society members.59 Kinship is key in understanding the perception of equality, as positive predisposition towards those that have more in common should be expected, thus a keener sense of moral obligation as well. Geography, language, customs, beliefs, symbols, together with means of communication and a degree of uniformity in education, function

55 Ibid., p. 147. 56 Buzan, From International to World Society?, p. 110. See also, Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie, Vierte und fünfte Auflage (Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1922). 57 Bull, p. 53. 58 Hidemi Suganami, “The English School in a Nutshell”, (2010), pp. 15–28, (p. 15). 59 Carr, p. 147.

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as connecting tissue between states in the broader structure of the international society.60 This inevitably spills over the greater good or the narrower perception of it. It is therefore sensible to presume that international and state morality, as perceived and expressed by an actor’s personality, is a means towards international order, but notably, a source of power too. According to Hans Morgenthau, the father of classical realism, national character and national morale – regardless of their qualitative nature that renders them intangible – are of utmost importance in the international scene and the way a nation-state may carry itself, project its power and convincingly determine its limitations or make a case towards a particular end. This depends on the dominant “culture pattern domestically” and the way it affects the national personhood, expressed via an occurrence rate of certain qualities, the frequency and persistence of which is telling of the collective intellect and character, i.e. of the characteristics that delineate national character, and, in short, make a nation distinguishable from others.61 Likewise, a dominant religion, one that has been well established institutionally, culturally and historically, regardless of constitutional arrangements, codetermines the personality of the state, as it is a structural element of the collective psyche, wittingly or not. This in turn, may be internationally applicable to a society of states such as the EU. Indeed religion has the power to divide communities, but it may function as an element of unity and cohesion as well. By setting the criteria and standards of membership, it may reward compatibility by encompassing broad masses of likeminded people.62 We therefore suggest that it would be productive, considering the earlier-mentioned theoretical vacuum, to infuse the ESIR with religion as an independent, qualitative variable. For, this approach essentially compromises the two opposites of realism and liberalism that diachronically engage in a great debate; it acknowledges the possibility of a society of states in spite of the overall anarchical system; it overcomes the constraints of material capabilities and hard power; it does not suffer from the naivety of utopianism;63 it fits the theoretical requirements of examining the EU while being permissive of the discussion on identity, which rests at the core of the issue in our view and is generally central to the European project. State personification is therefore crucial, as this society of states, the EU, is heavily permeated by values, not only interests, and even the 60 61 62 63

Ibid., p. 148. Morgenthau, pp. 140–41. Steve Bruce, Politics and Religion (2003), p. 80. The liberal school has been called been called “utopian” pejoratively, among others, because of its perception of human nature as basically benign.

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balance of power is maintained via a dialectic of checks, indirect control and interdependence within the EU structure, stemming from the powers that have been shifted upwards to Brussels. Most importantly, it will be rendered possible to examine the role of the churches in focus as personification partakers and actors domestically, with an institutional capacity to act upon their views as agencies within the European structure. We acknowledge of course that there exists a degree of critique on the grand narrative behind our approach of choice, but we are prepared to address it. In light of the expansion of the international society, especially since the fall of communism, it has been held that this approach remains by and large faithful to its Eurocentric foundations. Indeed, to some extent this holds true, but both Bull and Watson argue that it is not their viewpoint, but rather what history imposes. That is, Europe is where the English School originated in the first place; there begun the exchange of diplomatic missions; there was the continuity of the state conceived; and it was in Europe that the rule of law was upheld as an international regulatory instrument and code of conduct. However widespread may the institutional model be, the birthplace and testing ground of the prototype is Europe anyway;64 in other words, it is its background that renders it Eurocentric, whereas cultural relativism would be permissive of alternative models. Be that as it may, in our case, the approach is suitable, almost tailor made, given that the institutions we are examining as well as our central theme is European par excellence, and therefore we are not suffering any contradictions. More to the point, Wight has actually argued that state-systems have diachronically relied on their cohesion, which depended on their very civilisational identity that they shared with their counterparts, from the Hellenic and the ancient Chinese to the modern European; thereby, it was easier to those that took part in such systems to reach a consensus on the architecture and function of their shared institutions, drawing among others from their historical past.65 This is no cause of concern in our case though. The Huntingtonian distinction notwithstanding, the standard conduct of the European system had been adopted right from the start both by Greece and Cyprus, with the latter being to some extent an exception due to British colonialism, but this is among others an element that renders the two churches of interest comparable to begin with.

64 Richard Little, “Reassessing the Expansion of the International Society”, (2013), pp. 19– 24, (p. 19). 65 Andrew Linklater, “Civilisations and International Society”, (2013), pp. 25–28, (p. 25).

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The critical distinction that provides us immunity as regards the critique that is based on the expansion of the international society and its cultural/civilisational consequences is that the one we are dealing with, apart from its civilisational homogeneity, is regionally coherent. Barry Buzan has explicitly made the linkage between regional international societies and international organisations, while Stivachtis and Weber have shown how institutions such as the Council of Europe or organisations such as NATO and the EU fall under this category; with the latter especially, being a case of sub-global international society.66 In that sense then, it is possible to actually speak of communities in the expanded international society, overcoming Buzan’s earlier-mentioned constraints, based on the distinction made by Tönnies between Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. The existence of a sub-global, regional community is a possibility because it is not just formalities and legalities that hold it together; it is a level of shared identity, of regional and cultural homogeneity within a heterogeneous broader system, with the EU being a distinctive case of that sort.67 To that we may add that as regards the objections concerning the allegedly Eurocentric character of the ESIR, we may counterargue that it actually constitutes a genuinely non-American approach that offers a different angle to the IR theory, thus contributing to a much-needed theoretical pluralism; as opposed to the somewhat one-sided mainstream methods that do not take into account the increasingly multipolar world where multifold cultural perspectives arise, corresponding to the emerging powers.68 And with that we consider that possible objections or critique on the applicability of the ESIR in our case are within reason curtailed. As for the OCG and the OCC, they, as it happens with most national churches, are actors too, as is the case with the corresponding religious communities and the bodies of faithful. What is more, religion is competent to possess and wield significant amount of power that may in turn determine policies and the behaviour of state-actors. First of all, it constitutes a significant source of legitimacy that can be used to persuade or dissuade. Peoples who adhere to particular religions may put pressure on their policy and decision-makers, either of their own or of another state. In fact, such is the versatility of religious legitimacy that even questionable political programmes may be made implementable when religious support for them is adequate. So much that even policy makers who invoke religion 66 Yannis A. Stivachtis, “The English School and the Study of Sub-global International Societies”, (2013), pp. 43–50, (p. 44). 67 Ibid., p. 47. 68 Gian Luca Gardini, “Who Still Cares About the English School, and Why?”, (2010), pp. 7–11, (p. 10).

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to their own benefit may experience it being used by others to their detriment.69 However it may be used politically, the fact remains that it is a source of legitimation and it is clearly demonstrated by the ample usage of symbolisms, terms and gestures in the public sphere by numerous politicians.70 This may entail some restrictions in policies, as religion is governed by kinships and antitheses, but in the case of the EU, with its historically confirmed Christian background, this is not that troublesome. What poses as a limitation and a means of legitimacy at the same time, is the fact that religion is culture-specific. The invocation of any given religious conviction does not necessarily have a positive impact in attracting or encompassing other bodies of faithful; the reference to Jesus, e.g., certainly presupposes the kind of audience it would appeal to. But, by the same token, the more culture-specific in terms of religion a public appeal is, the more convincing it will be for its target group, while all-encompassing, interreligious suggestions are significantly less persuasive.71 It is of course also the formalities per se that render churches actors of national and international stature, jurisdiction notwithstanding. Organised, proper institutions of diachronic weight and prestige, like the Roman Catholic Church or the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, have an immensely established stature in the international affairs. They may put pressure, legitimise, champion regimes, lobby and mobilise.72 In that sense, their acknowledgement as actors leaves no room for doubt. In a very diplomatic way, they have been indirectly recognised as such by the EU, which, other than that, always makes sure to steer clear of being attributed any religious preference. More to the point, church representations and religious organisations in Brussels constitute an attestation of this institutional recognition, but this is further solidified by Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union as well, where it is stated that 1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. 2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of philosophical and nonconfessional organisations. 3. Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations.73

69 Fox and Sandler, p. 43. 70 Ibid., p. 176. 71 Ibid. p. 44. 72 Ibid. p. 177. 73 Official Journal of the European Union, “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union”, p. 55.

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And Article 17 has been received with satisfaction by the churches, even though they strived for much more as demonstrated in the previous chapter, because at the end of the day, they cannot simply be divested of their socio-political role and functions. After all, being a source of political legitimacy means that they constitute, most importantly, proprietors of power themselves; “soft power” in particular. While “hard power” and its successful exercise depends on a combination of “sticks” and “carrots”, with the intention of coercion so that the weaker party conforms and yields to the will of the powerful, “soft power” is on the other hand co-optive. The former, whether via economic capabilities or military, might  – merely the threat of its use should usually suffice – seeks to shape the behaviour of actors by imposing; therefore, the common denominator in achieving the desired goals is coercion in short.74 One easily detects there the classical realist predisposition to power management and limited regard for the works of an internationally perceived morality, especially by a society of states. Whereas our approach of choice – not that we reject realism and the effects of the balance of power when it favours one side overwhelmingly over the other, but we consider the ESIR a more suitable instrument in this particular case for our analysis  – takes “soft power” into account as essential. Because it too is capable of considerable influence, it is able to co-opt by setting an attractive example, by determining a convincing agenda or by projecting enviable values that others would wilfully imitate. This is an alternative, soft way to mould an actor’s behaviour. “Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others”,75 it is to get others to endorse one’s values rather than impose and coerce. We should be clear though, persuasion or influence do not necessarily qualify as means of soft power exertion, but rather the capacity to appear attractive or equally to present an attractive case. It is thus to appeal to one’s intrinsic impulse, whether it emanates from an emotional basis or a value system. When shared values instigate agreement and cooperation, when the end-goal is compatible with them and, most importantly, the cause is righteous, the possibility to engender one to contribute to the fulfilment of those values becomes appealing.76 What is more, hard power is not a prerequisite for an actor to be able to possess soft power too; therefore, variable types of actors may be in the position to affect developments to their benefit. The Vatican, for instance, is a case in point that demonstrates the naivety of Stalin’s sarcastic question on the number

74 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004), p. 5. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., pp. 6–7.

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of divisions that the Pope commands.77 Soft power may be drawn primarily from three sources: (i) culture, namely one that others may identify with, beyond the realm of the actor who utilises it, (ii) political values, particularly when those are observed loyally domestically as well as abroad, and (iii) foreign policies that are legitimate and morally sound. Given that all the above applies, the more inclusive and encompassing the culture and its corresponding shared values and interests, the broader their acceptability and the higher the degree of attraction they will project; whereas the more parochial and exclusivist the culture, the smaller the chances to actually generate and project soft power.78 When all is said and done then, culture is central in that sense and so is the type of religion that codetermines it, which in turn sets the boundaries in terms of capabilities and opportunities to the actor that wishes to utilise it. Especially when it comes to Orthodox churches that wish to carry out such manoeuvres within the EU.

3.2 The group-person’s articulation of Being and political culture 3.2.1  The Orthodox Church of Greece 3.2.1.1 Being under threat We may consider it a given from the outset that the OCG is a competent actor domestically, one that possesses soft power and the will to exercise it at times. The main reason behind it is its appeal to the masses via a dominant form of state personification that includes the identification of the latter with a distinct religious physiognomy. A few examples of the discursive material we accumulated would help demonstrate the variable ways in which state personhood is perceived by the church, but also how this is being communicated to the Greek society. In his New Year’s Day message of 2001, Archbishop Christodoulos invited all to stand firmly by their Orthodox faith, claiming that it is the one premise that provides a sense of security, cohesion and strength. Further, he called on them all who believe in the same Christian values, acknowledge the human being as a person and long for the community of persons, to cooperate towards that end. For, he held, in that country the church with the Hellenic-Orthodox tradition is a

77 Ibid., p. 9. 78 Ibid., p. 11.

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capital that constitutes non-expendable wealth, which can inspire solutions even to day-to-day problems and concerns.79 The person that the late archbishop was referring to is no other than the individual, seen through the lens of the Orthodox, collectivist culture. At the epicentre of the institution of the Greek society rests collectivism as a cultural cornerstone, where kinship gives priority to the immediate support systems of family, nuclear as well as extended, and determines loyalties and roles, but most importantly, it is a conveyor of identity. Notably, this model withstands the test of time and of socio-political changes.80 In contrast to the individual, the person is by definition a relational being who draws identity indirectly from the networks in which he or she is embedded.81 This collectivist typology is responsible for subordinating the individual to the group through values or expressions of them such as philotimo (Gr.: Φιλότιμο), which is hardly translatable; but in any case the “inner circle” of kinship is suspicious of outsiders, introvert in the sense of exposing shortcomings or failure to them, and quick to hold extraneous factors or even fate as accountable. At a national level, the same qualities apply just as much.82 We may infer that philotimo, a moral obligation to the group which takes precedence over the individual, who in this case is rather a person, i.e., primarily a group member, reflects on the way the church perceives society; to be more accurate, the latter is ideally expected to function more as community. By extension, the OCG considers it self-evident that the state ought to ideally bear the same collectivist qualities, what is more, when the international system, whether an international society in general (world), or an international community (EU) in particular, is dominated by antithetical individualist values. This attitude was communicated by Archbishop Christodoulos in a conference organised by the Youth Bureau of the Archbishopric of Athens (31 January 2004), where he persisted in presuming ecumenicity as paradigmatic; namely, as this has been taught by Jesus Christ, his disciples, the Church Fathers, etc., and as Orthodox Christians experience it. For, it is characterised by solidarity as well as respect for the differences and identity of every nation. This is how the church sees the

79 Christodoulos, “Ιερά Αρχιεπισκοπή Αθηνών: Μήνυμα Πρωτοχρονιάς 2001”, (2001), p. 11. 80 Hirschon, pp. 289–310, (p. 297). 81 Ibid., p. 305. 82 Keith R. Legg and John M. Roberts, Modern Greece: A Civilisation on the Periphery (1997), pp. 75.

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EU as well, with the presupposition of preserving particularities.83 In contrast, the archbishop complained that globalisation imposes a model of life which is not cultural but rather a way of conduct that ultimately facilitates the needs of the global market. That is why the church rejects it, because by this the powerful dominate the weak and it is based on egocentrism and utilitarianism.84 The state-person according to the OCG is under constant existential threat, should its identity be compromised. So much that the “enemy syndrome” as described by Agourides – to which we referred earlier – tends to become an element of state personification in its own right. Instances of presumed foreign threats to the Greek cultural physiognomy and hence to its socio-political equilibrium are ample. In the “12th Pan-Orthodox Conference of the Delegates of Orthodox Churches and Dioceses on Matters pertaining to Heresies and Parareligion” (Larisa, 30 October to 30 November 2000), it was maintained that the “new order” corrupts the Orthodox peoples significantly, especially at a level of intelligentsia and leadership, which in the case of Greece is attested by the identity card issue and the conflation of the church with heresies; especially by opinion leaders and decision-makers. Allegedly, the erosion is evident in the contemporary confusion and syncretism of which the pan-Orthodox conferences have been warning since the 1980s.85 We must be clear though, the state is at the core of the discussion and the crux is its identity, or to be precise, the collective cultural identity that in turn defines the personhood of the state. Interestingly enough, the previous archbishop appeared to be more insecure about this institution rather than the church itself, of which he showed to be confident. In a speech of his to the Greek MEPs, he characteristically stated that Orthodoxy has lived in multiculturalism for 2000 years and it is still going strong; the state is at stake, he noted, not the church, explaining the church’s wish to preserve the particularities of Greeks as a people. Then he clarified, they do not want to impose anything to anyone, but neither to be oppressed.86 The church is here, impervious to external threats, but not the state, which needs the support of the OCG in order to deal with existential challenges. To that end, education ought to be employed if the threat of individualism were to be successfully deflected. Hence the self-perceived durable institution had 83 Christodoulos, “Από τον Νεολαίο του Έθνους στον Νεολαίο της Οικουμένης”, (2004), pp. 94–97, (p. 96). 84 Ibid. 85 Tsouros, pp. 20–22, (p. 20). 86 Christodoulos, “Η Πορεία και ο Ρόλος της Εκκλησίας στην Ευρώπη του 20ου Αιώνος”, pp. 95–99, (p. 98).

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suggestions for the one under threat. Christodoulos believed that from the second half of the twentieth century and onwards, Greek society has failed to answer the question: “what do we need education for?”87 He then conceded though that all are responsible, including the church, but in any case “here we are nowadays, having replaced education (paideia, Gr.: παιδεία) with knowhow, which is suitable for pseudo-societies, sums of people” who do not have, nor do they seek education, but are merely taught to produce and consume.88 The reference to the impersonal individualistic society, points to the value system that ought to permeate the Greek collectivist society. But given the institutional role of the educational system, it is the state that is by extension affected by a potential paradigm shift, from collectivism to individualism. Not that the church has not been targeted, allegedly, far from it; considering the OCG’s self-perception as the main pillar of the state’s national identity, if anything, to destabilise and reshape the latter, means to debunk the former. Christodoulos actually narrowed the foes of Greek culture down to somewhat heterogeneous groupings. He held that behind the offensives against the church there are paleoMarxist, or antichristian neo-liberal and technocratic Euro-elites, or good-willing but prejudiced people who see church as an obstacle to their destructive work, or true progress as they understand it. Those elites, in his view, are not interested in culture, or the human being.89 In short, the role of the church as the backbone of the state and therefore a structural element of its personhood is reaffirmed, as is the threat from the outside that seeks to reshape its identity. We should mention though that at the time (2005) the church was under immense pressure due to a number of major scandals and it needed to divert focus from that, hence attributed allegations to anticlerical conspiracy. Regardless, this discourse on the whole was circulated in the public sphere while the state regained the upper hand.90 In any case, Christodoulos persisted in pin pointing the threats to identity and state, singling out globalisation, its uses and its causes. In a public venue, the 3rd  Congress of the Holy Bishopric of Athens,91 he actually wondered if the term “globalisation” is applicable at all, claiming that, if one wishes to not 87 Christodoulos, “Πρότυπα για τη Σύγχρονη Πολιτική και Οικονομική Δραστηριότητα”, (2005), pp. 468–70, (p. 468). 88 Ibid. 89 Christodoulos, “Μήνυμα δια τον Διάλογον Εκκλησίας-Κοινωνίας”, (2005), pp. 622–23, (p. 623). 90 Makrides, “Scandals, Secret Agents and Corruption: the Orthodox Church of Greece during the 2005 Crisis – Its Relation to the State and Modernisation”, pp. 61–88, (p. 74). 91 9th of May 2006, Stadium of Peace and Friendship (Gr.: Στάδιο Ειρήνης και Φιλίας).

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mince one’s words, it would be closer to the truth to call it “Americanisation”. On which matter he cited David Rothkopf,92 who, in a conference organised by the prestigious “Foreign Policy” magazine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, had clearly stated, that it is to impose the American model, according to Christodoulos.93 Jacques Attali,94 who also took part, explicitly warned that “Globalisation leads to the destruction of national identities and states, and their replacement by greedy non-state entities which will impose the values that befit them”. And he concluded thus: “The salvation of civilisation is in your hands”.95 The message of imminent destruction of unique cultural ways of life, ergo of distinct national identities, was intensified and conveyed in a dramatic tone, what is more, the foe was yet again Western. More to the point, the way that globalist-driven disparities and frictions cause injury to any given culture was vividly articulated by the encyclical No. 2853 of the HSCG, where among others, it was stated that facing globalisation and experiencing disappointment with political decisions, societies are governed by insecurity, and, that there lies a notable conflict between the local and the global, as regards cultures and civilisations.96 Notably, there is a very different take on the Huntingtonian approach on a clash, which here is not described as being between civilisations per se, but between globalisation and local, national cultures. The impeding injury to collectivism and the God-fearing state-person has also been attributed to the nineteenth-century Western intellectuals’ endeavours who sought to lead man to his so-called coming of age, that is, a life without God, which to Christodoulos was equated with contemporary idolatry. In fact he listed the nowadays’ idols as follows: (1) the first idol of the human being is the human being itself, i.e. self-deification. Yet close to God, man experiences eternity, whereas when self-deified, one is captive of his vices and chooses temporariness and death. (2) The second is rationality. From Thomas Aquinas and onward the Western man attempts to explain everything with rationality, even that which is beyond him. This developed rapidly with Protestantism and

92 CEO and editor of the Foreign Policy Group. 93 Christodoulos, “Εκκλησία και Παγκοσμιοποίηση: Μπροστά στη Μεγάλη Πρόκληση”, (2006), pp. 329–34, (p. 331). 94 Acclaimed economist, advisor to former French President Mitterand. 95 Christodoulos, “Εκκλησία και Παγκοσμιοποίηση”, (p. 331). 96 HSCG, “Εγκύκλιος 2853: 25η Μαρτίου 1821–25η Μαρτίου 2007. Από την Ελληνική Επανάσταση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ολοκλήρωση”, (2007), pp. 178–80, (p. 180).

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the Enlightenment.97 Consequently, rational rules are imposed against natural laws, e.g. the rationalist approach to abortion where individuality eliminates the communality of life. Individuality at the expense of communality has many consequences such as refusal to defend the country or sacrifice oneself; or the imposition of “enlightened” high-ranking minorities on weak majorities. (3) The third idol is economy, where the powerful take advantage of the poor while making false promises of a better world which the poor will never actually see, a form of pseudo-Messianism.98 (4) As a result of the third follows the fourth idol that has been imposed on the postmodern man and it is globalisation, which is being portrayed as inevitable. It promotes homogenisation and syncretism of cultures, i.e. ideas and religions, being essentially global totalitarianism. (5) The fifth is ethnoracialism. The Western man cannot conceive the lessons of the Near East, i.e. Christian ecumenicity combined with patriotism, and strangely enough, the followers of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, via which nationalism emerged, are those who today promote the idea of multiculturalism. (6) Sixth is ideology. Its absolutisation gives birth to inhuman occurrences, witnessed in the twentieth century via Nazism and communism.99 (7) Seventh but not least is authority, as man likes to dominate. Whereby interests via the privilege of authority are imposed and in turn cause injustice, social incoherence and unrest.100 Archbishop Hieronymos on the other hand may have not been that sharply critical of the Enlightenment, its endeavours and by-products, but his predisposition has not been friendly either. In a day event of the SSCMEA at the Holy Monastery of Penteli (5 November 2009), he suggested that scholarly cleric-scientists, inspired by the theological tradition that was formulated by the Great Fathers of the church and continued in the Byzantine and postByzantine period, consciously linked theology with sciences, thus adding a new perspective in fostering the latter. Whereas the efforts during the Middle Ages and the European Enlightenment to disconnect sciences from faith led to tragic outcomes of inhuman science, the sole purpose of which is success, regardless of the human being’s actual needs. Science without God’s presence is egoistic, self-interest-oriented, and often dangerous and catastrophic.101 97 Christodoulos, “Παύλειος Θεολογία και Σύγχρονος Ειδωλολατρεία”, (2006), pp. 511–17, (p. 513). 98 Ibid., p. 514. 99 Ibid., p. 515. 100 Ibid., pp. 516–17. 101 Hieronymos II, “Μήνυμα του Μακαριωτάτου στην Ημερίδα της Ειδικής Επιτροπής Παρακολουθήσεως Ευρωπαϊκών Θεμάτων”, (2009), pp. 777–78.

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Evidently, as far as value systems go, the preference for the Eastern Orthodox model is a constant for the OCG; one that is better and more suitable to the Greek society and more fitting to its purpose and needs, and as such it ought to be preserved when erosion is looming. More to the point, a perhaps exaggerated position that attests to the defensive attitude of the church towards Western incoming influences came from Archimandrite Spyridon Katramados, the General Secretary of the Synodical Office of Pilgrimage Tours and Development of Religious Tourism. To be sure, he does acknowledge the benefits of tourism, yet its negative aspect has concerned him as well. In his view, the influx of tourists that amounts to millions of people, of numerous convictions, cultures and customs may erode the peoples’ cultural and religious identity in the receiving country. The means of mass communication of course are far more accountable but tourism speeds up the process, because actual people who are physically present set a direct imitation example. In short it is a challenge to the traditional Hellenic-Orthodox way of life.102 Also, it has on occasion been viewed as detrimental to the dignity of the Greeks too, given that Greece’s heavy industry has become what was once resented, to become “the waiters of the Europeans”.103 Such views may appear too conservative but the truth is that it was intended to point out the hazards of a hugely beneficial industry for Greece’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for fear that Hellenic-Orthodoxy might be eroded. However, very rarely does one come across self-critique and reflection from within the ranks of the church on the dominant views of the sociocultural nation-state ideal type; that would be an exception. As such can only be deemed the concern on behalf of the Archimandrite Athenagoras Dikaiakos,104 who, on one occasion, was worried that the church is viewed by society as a relic of a bygone, illustrious past that has stooped to opposing progress; that secularised celebrations of Byzantine grandeur are utilised to decorate an authority, now devoid of ideals and visions. Worst of all, society perceives it as a conservative structure in concert with the secular authority, ultimately, as one of its many accessories. He also warned that it should not escape the clergy that instead of shedding light to

102 Archimandrite Spyridon Katramados, “Τουρισμός και Χριστιανική Μαρτυρία”, (2008), pp. 616–22, (p. 616). 103 K. D., Interview with the author, 23 May 2014. 104 As archimandrite he has served as the director of Archbishop Hieronymos’ office since 2008; since May 2010 he is the Metropolitan of Ilion.

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the present while taking the prospect of the future into account, they resort to slogans and self-righteous references to the past.105 Be that as it may, Hieronymos II has followed the route of Christodoulos in believing that the threats to Greece’s sociocultural equilibrium are valid. Namely, he held that the tendency and pursuit of “certain circles” to dechristianise the Greek society and alienate it from its original traditions is evident, and noted that “those who oppose us are not outside and remote anymore; they are in now”.106 Therefore, the pattern of the persecuted cultural identity that is dominant in Greece, and by extension the way that it reflects on state personhood as being targeted and in peril, remains unadulterated in the eyes of the OCG; which begs the question, of who the foe might be and how otherness codetermines what the state is not. It appears that the latter is essential in the way the OCG perceives national identity, for one way or another the threats to the state and its personhood imply a form of otherness that is instrumental in distinguishing it from its counterparts. But this does not agree with the widespread perception among the political elites domestically, regardless of party membership that Greeks “have to catch up with something”,107 which is diametrically antithetical to the church’s dominant views on the subject. That is, to draw alongside the historic episodes that have been missed to Greece’s detriment: the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and all that, which arrived in Greece rather late, as cultural imports. For example, when Rigas Feraios108 translated “L’École des amants délicats” in Greek, he intended to establish channels through which the Enlightenment could be imported in Greece; in that sense, Europeanisation entails the endorsement and embedding of practices in a short period of time while others did this in centuries.109 And evidently this has been problematic. Greece’s Europeanisation in the sense of transfusion of good practices over the last approximately thirty years does not 105 Archimandrite Athenagoras Dikaiakos, “Διάλογος Εκκλησίας και Κοινωνίας. Οι Δυσκολίες Επικοινωνίας τους”, (2008), pp. 497–502, (p. 499). 106 Hieronymos II, “Εναρκτήριος Oμιλία του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών & Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Ιερωνύμου στην Ι.Σ. της Ιεραρχίας”, (2009), pp. 692–94, (p. 693). 107 P. T., Interview with the author, 17 December 2013. 108 Gr.: Ρήγας Φεραίος, also known as Rigas Velestinlis (Gr.: Ρήγας Βελεστινλής), born 1757, died 1798; Greek national hero and adherent to the Modern Greek Enlightenment. Rigas was trying to prepare a broader insurrection of the Balkan peoples against the Ottomans, but was captured and executed. See Michael W. Weithmann, Griechenland: Vom Frühmittelalter bis zur Gegenwart (1994), as well as Alexandra Stouraiti and Alexander Kazamias, “The Imaginary Topographies of the Megali Idea: National Territory as Utopia” (2010). 109 P. T., Interview with the author, 17 December 2013.

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mean imitation or erosion, and such fears are unfounded. In fact, the more Europe is unified, the more the national characteristics intensify, because of overcompensation, i.e., the reflexive exaggerated emphasis on national traits as a defence mechanism so to speak.110 As a result, Greeks are one of few peoples in Europe who speak of “Hellenicity” and their own particularities with such intensity, thus presenting themselves as more patriotic than the rest. And indeed, in the lapse of time no real Europeanisation occurred in the sense of an adoption of good practices. As a result, amidst the debt crisis, a great deal needs to be done within a tight schedule. Many directives have not been integrated in the national legislation, especially with reference to privileged groups such as trade unions, regulated professions, etc. Bearing this is in mind, many maintain that Greece is leaning towards the East; and this holds true perhaps to some extent, as a conflict within the Greek psyche.111 In addition, concerning collectivism, even though the church has a long tradition in being active within the community, it has not managed to reinforce this culture diachronically without persisting in dogmatic views that ultimately oppress people. And if one were to define Greekness by way of collective shortcomings, one must admit that the predisposition for cooperative practices is missing, whereas cynicism, emotionalism and lack of collaboration are dominant; and no top-down project or policy functions in vitro, without being processed within a social framework beforehand.112 “Collectivism is a myth, Greeks are egocentric; essentially it is every man for himself and cooperative actions have only lately begun to take place”.113 This is by and large the consensus among top politicians who dominated the scene in Greece throughout the period of interest, even though they might be coming from different ideological backgrounds; this attests to a divergence between the publicly expressed intention – but no significant recorded practice to be fair, rather reluctance – of the state’s two major parties up until the debt crisis eruption, to function in a clearly pro-European mode, legislatively and executively, and that of the church that opposed it, thus dichotomising state personhood. Identity dictates one thing, as a by-product of intrinsic political culture, while political reality imposes another, out of the membership to a bloc-actor that takes precedence over the national polity.

110 G. E., Interview with the author, 27 November 2013. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113 M. D., Interview with the author, 17 December 2013.

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3.2.1.2 Heterodefinition (not being) and otherness At this point, we ought to introduce our own classification of not being as an integral element of being that codetermines the perception of the self. For reasons of convenience, we call it Heterodefinition, which in a sentence would be “to define oneself ex negativo, i.e., by criteria and means of antithesis and otherness, hence to determine identity by exclusion, by what one is not, whereby not being is rendered a determinant of being”. As regards the OCG, Heterodefinition is in part embedded in the perception of collective identity and state personhood. This applies to the stance of the OCG towards the Catholic West and the Vatican. Prior to the visit of the pontiff to Athens in 2001, Archbishop Christodoulos almost apologetically said that that the faith of the Orthodox is not threatened, that the pope comes as a pilgrim and that to refuse him would be a sign of insecurity and rudeness, having been invited by the Greek state. After all, he clarified that neither joint prayers nor negotiations on matters of faith would take place, urging the body of believers to trust the church for it handles the matter responsibly.114 And being in tune with the collective emotions that he appeased, when the visit did take place, the archbishop, having welcomed the pope, received him with theologically charged words, by stating the dogmatic differences that keep the two churches apart, but also by referring to the collective ecclesiastical and national memories that burden their relationship, putting forward the need for an apology on behalf of the Christian West.115 Even when the Greek archbishop visited Russia between 5 and 14 May 2001, he appeared to still dwell on this issue. In a brief interview there, among others, Christodoulos mentioned the pope’s apology in Athens and wished that it would be substantiated in practice by actual deeds of repentance.116 In that way, Christodoulos implicitly and diplomatically demonstrated the antitheses that are still present, and at the same time the inclination towards fellow Orthodox Russia, where he confided among friends and natural allies. In one gesture, otherness and kinship were signalled. Likewise, emphasis was put on the grudges of the past that linger on when Cardinal Walter Kasper reciprocated Christodoulos’ visit to the Vatican by visiting Athens on 11 February 2003. The cardinal was also received by Amvrosios, the Metropolitan of Kalavryta and Aigialeia, who presided over the Synodical Committee for Inter-Orthodox and Inter-Christian Relations back then. Having 114 Press Office of the HSCG, “Δεν κινδυνεύει η Πίστη των Ορθοδόξων διεκήρυξε ο Μακαριώτατος Αρχιεπίσκοπος”, (2001), pp. 359–60. 115 “Η Προσκυνηματική Επίσκεψη του Ρωμαίου Ποντίφικος”, pp. 377–94, (p. 381). 116 Charamantidis, pp. 455–94, (p. 455).

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welcomed him, Amvrosios made a reference to the former Soviet states, which are experiencing an aggressive expansionist policy by the Vatican.117 Still, after outlining several contemporary social issues, he turned to the question of strengthening the bonds between the Orthodox and the Roman Catholics given that the times demand it. Yet he then admitted that the obstacles are plenty, as the West may be inclusive by nature and therefore tolerant, but the East is the exact opposite, i.e., conservative and stern. Whereby, a chasm in terms of spirit divides the two, yet the times demand that they cooperate. He therefore posed the question of “how the time can be turned 1000 years back, to overcome chasms, forget passions and hatreds, and heal the wounds”; only to answer, “by agreement to the essentials and tolerance in secondary matters”.118 However, he persisted, in an emotionally charged manner, in focusing on the differences between East and West; by saying that the Christian Byzantium, and with the contribution of the West no less, was lost forever, and with it, the prestige of the East. “In the place of the Life-giving Cross the crescent was raised, Vasilevousa119 fell and Constantinople fell in aphasia. In turn, the Orthodox countries of the European continent were driven to captivity by the Ottoman dominance, whereby Turkey set foot in European soil”. Finally, he claimed, “at this moment, the Islamisation of Europe emerges as the visible, great threat of our times”.120 In addition to this, he then referred to contemporary differences and proceeded to suggestions in order to bridge them. Notably, he outlined a few bold terms and conditions for that matter, although earlier he conceded that the times are critical and cooperation is necessary; terms such as the abolition of proselytism, the withdrawal of Catholicism from Greece as well as from Orthodox churches in former Soviet countries, even the papal infallibility. On behalf of the Orthodox, he mentioned the necessary mitigation of the negative attitude of the Athonite monks as well as of the old-Calendarists, equally the negativity of a part of the press and of high-ranking Orthodox clerics. Of course he mentioned a few positive aspects of this relationship too, such as the conversion of Roman Catholic churches in

117 Metropolitan Amvrosios, “Προσφώνησις του Μητροπολίτου Καλαβρύτων και Αιγιαλείας κ. Αμβροσίου, Προέδρου της Συνοδικής Επιτροπής επί των Διορθοδόξων και Διαχριστιανικών Σχέσεων προς τον Εκλαμπρότατον Καρδινάλιον κ. Walter Kasper”, (2003), pp. 201–04, (p. 202). 118 Ibid. 119 Gr.: Βασιλεύουσα, attributed as an adjective to Constantinople to denote that it was the reigning city, the city of cities. 120 Amvrosios, pp. 202–03.

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Europe to Christian Orthodox, the papal visit of 2001 to Athens, or the opening of a permanent representation in Brussels which ended an introvert attitude.121 Apart from the easily detectable one-sided nature of these suggestions and the power politics that are interwoven therein, as well as the weight of history and all those which cannot be undone and overshadow this relationship, one deciphers two variants of otherness that run through the metropolitan’s reception speech, both with the West and the Muslim East. The former is depicted as a necessary evil, imposed by rationality rather than affiliation, whereas the latter as an old foe and a future threat at the same time; the only form of kinship that emerges here is that to the fellow Orthodox former Soviet states, for obvious reasons, i.e., alignment due to natural compatibility. But in any case, traces of Heterodefinition are detectable. Particularly as regards the otherness that divides and distinguishes Christianity from Islam, the OCG has had an interesting attitude. On 13 March and with a slight majority, the report of María Izquierdo Rojo122 on women and fundamentalism was approved by the EU Parliament. Among others, it was requested by all three monotheistic religions, integral as they are of the European culture, to denounce fundamentalism. Yet the synod protested that, unfortunately no distinction was made between religions; and given than in their sweeping majority the European peoples are Christians, the wrong impression was made, hopefully by mistake, that Christianity exhibits fundamentalist tendencies. They, in turn, fully and categorically agreed that any kind of women’s mistreatment in Muslim countries must be rebuked, let alone their condemnation to death for the sake of honour. But it was pointed out that such practices are unknown to Christianity; that, such practices, never had anything to do with the Orthodox faith and its teachings.123 In this press release, Islam is singled out explicitly as a religion of fundamentalist tendencies, as a culture outside the European cultural paradigm and definitely a barbaric “Other” par excellence. Yet, the sentiment shifted as regards the perceived as communicants of barbarity when Christodoulos received President Mohammad Khatami.124 Certainly, it is common courtesy and diplomatic protocol to keep up appearances with officials, let alone heads of state. So the archbishop welcomed the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran warmly upon his visit to the Archbishopric in 121 Ibid. pp. 203–04. 122 Spanish MEP from 1989 to 2004. 123 Press Office of the HSCG, “Δελτίον Τύπου της 20ης Μαρτίου 2002”, (2002), pp. 276–77. 124 Shia theologian, Iranian Minister of Culture (1982–1992) and President (1997–2005).

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Athens on 15 March 2002, namely as the president of a friendly state, and in the archbishop’s view, “leader of an admirable people which the Greeks honour since the antiquity”.125 In addressing him, the archbishop said that the Christian ideal of one unitary ecumenical polity could not be realised in the Middle Ages’ Europe and the schisms could not be avoided. Meanwhile, the historically new peoples, called by the ancient ones “barbarians”, saw the world as a field of competition and dominance rather than a venue of civilisation with a spiritual direction. Further in the future of Europe, he claimed that its destiny was left to nationalism, wherein racism was bred and world wars.126 All in all though he suggested engagement into interreligious dialogue in order to solve problems and to that end that religions ought to be more actively involved. But particularly regarding Islam he referred to the brilliant Shiite teachings which ought to give the Muslim peoples strength.127 The distinction here shows how the archbishop steered clear of sweeping generalisations concerning Islam. But most importantly: (a) barbarity was attributed to Western Europe’s historical past and its peoples, and a reference was made to link totalitarianism with its cultural foundations, in contrast to the East; and (b) antiquity was employed in order to legitimise the continuity of collective Greek personhood since the ancient times by reflection, through acknowledging the equivalent qualities to the Iranian people and their Persian background. Personification is neither Western nor Eastern oriented then, but rather in between, a class of its own. A sense of ambivalence is conveyed through another press release, where a contradictory attitude on the rights of women and prescribed gender roles was revealed, especially when compared to the one reacting to the report of María Izquierdo Rojo. In a statement of his, Archbishop Christodoulos expressed his sorrow for the resolution of the European Parliament to legalise abortion, claiming that the utmost Christian value, i.e., respect for human life, is being sacrificed on the altar of the so-called right of woman to decide freely on what concerns her own body. In a nutshell, that it comes down to the “might is right” principle – with “might” being allegedly the woman, as opposed to the powerless embryo – which stems from a utilitarian, individualistic way of life, ultimately an act which

125 Christodoulos, “Προσφώνηση προς τον Ιρανό Πρόεδρο Μοχάμεντ Χαταμί κατά την Επίσκεψη Αυτού στην Αρχιεπισκοπή Αθηνών”, (2002), pp. 249–51, (p. 249). 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid., pp. 250–51.

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is indeed crooked and immoral.128 The cleft can be identified in the way culture is held responsible, and indeed the accountability of individualism is brought up yet again to remind where the fault lines of value systems within Europe can be traced. The attempt of Heterodefinition here is somewhat questionable though, when one considers that abortion in Greece has been legalised, in a broad legal sense, already since 1978 (bill: 821/1978) and explicitly since 1986 (bill: 1609/1986). But to be fair, otherness is a two-way street. Occidentalism may be frequently symptomatic of an introvert stance but even so, it goes hand in hand with orientalism and more accurately at present, Balkanism. The HSCG was astounded to be informed that the Museum of Europe, which would be housed in the building complex of the European Parliament and was expected to be open to visitors in 2006, according to a letter of protest by MEP Alexandros Alavanos129 on 24 November 2003 to the President of the EU Parliament Pat Cox, it was intended to convey that the history of Europe starts in the second half of the tenth century, while the Byzantine history of Europe was intentionally ignored. The OCG found this controversial in content, divisive, Western-centric, hegemonic and, what is more, anti-scientific. Therefore, the synod agreed and aligned itself with the question that enquired on who and by what scientific right issued and assigned a birth certificate for the existence and theorisation of European history from 1000 AD and onwards; in what sense and by what criteria was Latin Christianity chosen as the departure point that marked the beginning of European history; and finally why was Byzantium and its rich contribution to the history of Europe considered the “humble neighbour”, they wondered.130 Naturally from a historical perspective both sides could make a case in support of their own arguments, but the crux of the matter is purely political and cultural; it is about a conscious choice to symbolically signal that the predominant facets of the European personality, emanate from an exclusivist perspective instead of encompassing the cultural contribution of all Member States as inclusively as possible. After all, this would be coterminous with the “united in diversity” EU motto. In that way, the “Us and Them” parameter is introduced, functioning as an orientalist vehicle of Heterodefinition. The Western familiarity is here at odds with the Eastern peculiarity or mysteriousness – and backwardness quite often  – upholding the perception of two  – unequal  – worlds being 128 Press Office of the HSCG, “Δήλωση Μακαριωτάτου για το Πρόσφατο Ψήφισμα του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου σχετικά με τη Νομιμοποίηση των Αμβλώσεων”, (2002), p. 609. 129 Greek MEP from 1984 to 2004. 130 HSCG, “Ανακοίνωση για το ‘Μουσείο της Ευρώπης’”, (2003), p. 882.

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apart.131 What is more, Said believes that orientalism as an object of study, formally no less, came to be in the Church Council of Vienna in 1312 when chairs in “Arabic, Greek, Hebrew, and Syriac at Paris, Oxford, Bologna, Avignon, and Salamanca”132 were established. To further specify the typology of Western exclusivism that Southeastern Europe has to deal with, it ought to be mentioned that it is not merely orientalism that permeates this relationship; it is Balkanism. From that perspective, otherness is less straightforward given that geography does not apply. The Balkans are a part of the European continent, Christianity is predominant in the region, albeit Orthodox; therefore, the fault lines are to be found elsewhere. There dwells Europe’s cultural “Other” although this other is European as well; negativity surfaces, infused with a self-righteous Western view of the region that generates an “Us and Them” discursive pattern, where the West and Europe are willingly differentiated from the Balkan “Other”.133 Greece has been an exception in that sense, being considered a part of the Western bloc in the post WWII era, when Europe was divided and redrawn between the Allies and their spheres of influence in accordance with the polity that was to be dominant; in Winston Churchill’s words, “Athens alone – Greece with its immortal glories – is free”.134 But Orthodoxy was never excused or exempted. Having been already rejected by Voltaire as a carrier of “detestable superstition”,135 it never quite escaped the Western controversial perception of backwardness.136 On the antipode, the occidentalist end of Heterodefinition is just as rejecting of the West and its physiognomy, as it demonstrates its own pattern of selfrighteousness – rightfully or not is not the question at present. This has happened on one occasion, while the OCG, presuming that it had the moral higher ground, heavily and bitterly criticised the mistreatment of homodox Serbs. Needless to say that religiocultural kinship, socially widespread in Greece, played a significant role in this. So, while conveying its solidarity to the Serbian Patriarch following the NATO bombings of Kosovo, the synod also expressed its concern and grief for the events in the region and the injustice against Serbia, i.e., “the 131 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (2003), pp. 43–44. 132 Ibid., pp. 49–50. 133 Maria Todorova, “The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention”, (1994), pp. 453–82, (p. 455). 134 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilisation on the Mind of the Enlightenment (1996), (p. 2). 135 Larry Wolff, The Enlightenment and the Orthodox World: Western Perspectives on the Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe (2001), (p. 138). 136 Ibid., p. 147.

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bombings that turned the country into a territory of debris and sorrow, with the pretext of humanitarian intervention by the civilised world”. The HSCG stated further that “the destruction of religious monuments in Kosovo constitutes the most terrible page of the European dark ages, and brings disdain upon European civilisation”.137 Resentment here is more than evident as the vocabulary used by the OCG to differentiate itself from the West was exceedingly bitter. That being said, we should point out that this articulated what the collective psyche was encountering at the time, which in turn was being reflected on state personhood via the unpopular and reluctant alignment with the policies of NATO. The intensity with which this otherness is being experienced at times was prominently visible in the New Year message of 2007 by Christodoulos. With emotionally charged words, he voiced his outlook, claiming that the previous year’s memories are mostly bad, contrary to the wishes of the church, as times seem to be all the more “decadent and morbid”. He further stated that the most shocking thing is that the “supposedly most civilised and modernised peoples of the world excel in barbarity and immorality” when it befits their interests; but in turn, he criticised the self-destructive, suicidal apathy to the “new world order”. Because he thought, people passively comply with the denationalisation and dechristianisation of the public sphere without even considering the consequences.138 The epitome of otherness though is accompanied by the perception of ill intent on behalf of the West, which aims at inflicting injury to the state, partly because of the idiosyncrasy and particularities of its personhood. Within the OCG hierarchy, it is not rare that one may come across the view that the Great Powers by no means wanted the revival of the Byzantine Empire; on the contrary, they wished that the Greek state ought to be as small as possible. For that reason, the Greek space is constantly shrinking since 1922. That is why Greeks were persecuted from Asia Minor in 1922, in 1955 from Constantinople, in 1974 almost half of Cyprus was lost, and now the Aegean Sea and the islands are in peril. As a result, Hellenism is shrinking.139 Here then, even though the foe in all cases mentioned is Turkey, otherness with the West, therefore with the Great and the Major Powers, is prominent. For fear that a Byzantine resurgence might occur, with the corresponding cultural repercussions, the Greek state is believed to be diachronically and systematically oppressed by its Western partners and allies, whereas the realist, interest-oriented aspect of international politics – which, to be sure is 137 HSCG, “Έκφρασις Συμπαραστάσεως προς τον Πατριάρχην Σερβίας δια τας Τραγικάς Εξελίξεις εις Κοσσυφοπέδιον”, (2004), pp. 255–56. 138 Christodoulos, “Μήνυμα Πρωτοχρονιάς 2007”, (2007), pp. 6–7, (p. 6). 139 K. D., Interview with the author, 23 May 2014.

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not preoccupied with anything other than the national interest, and this school of thought dominated the previous century – is not taken into account. To the church, the image of the persecuted state and nation is self-evident, and thereby imprinted on the state’s personhood.

3.2.1.3  The ark of the nation’s identity and its Benign Mutation But there emerges the church, a self-proclaimed guardian of the nation and by extension the central pillar of the state, which fulfils this moral obligation by being the ark of tradition, language and identity; first and foremost, within its ranks and for itself. For example, in the regular meeting of the Synodical Committee for Ecclesiastic Education and the Training of Parish Clergy in December 2001, the issue of education and edification of the clerics was discussed. In particular, the  inadequate competence in the Greek language was brought up, especially of the younger clerics, who have not been taught the polytonic system at school and therefore have a weakness in using the traditional, written form of the church.140 This self-imposed obligation stems, among others, from the ties of the OCG with Hellenic education (paideia, Gr.: παιδεία), which were established in the fourth century AD by the fathers of the church, as it was underlined. In turn, it was transmitted by Byzantium and then reborn in the context of neoHellenism so the latter coexists with Orthodoxy diachronically.141 Generally, the diachronic contribution to the Greek letters was emphasised there. But that is only one of the patriotic roles that the OCG ascribes to itself, interwoven as it is with the Greek group-person and its polity. After all, Christodoulos has explicitly stated in public, in a speech to the Greek MEPs of the European Peoples’ Party in Brussels on 8 October 2003 that the church perceives itself as the ark of the people’s psyche, of the values and traditions that it, itself, embodies.142 Yet, having been accused of nationalist tendencies he felt inclined to clarify things. In a sermon of his on 7 October 2001, the archbishop made a distinction between patriotism and nationalism. The reference to the country (fatherland) is not nationalist as many want to call it, he said. Rather it is patriotic; it is an intrinsic need from within one’s soul, as is the need of visions. The references to the country then, are about the Greek people, the genos (Gr.: Γένος, a broader

140 Archimandrite Klimis Koutsomytis, “Προς Αντιμετώπισιν του Ζητήματος της Πλημμελούς Γνώσεως της Ελληνικής Γλώσσης”, (2001), pp. 19–20, (p. 19). 141 Ibid. 142 Christodoulos, “Ομιλία στους Ευρωβουλευτές του Ευρωπαϊκού Λαϊκού Κόμματος”, (2003), pp. 694–96, (p. 694).

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kinship grouping of common descent), religion, language, i.e., the elements of the Greek particularity and identity. It is about the history and tradition of the land.143 He then went on to counterargue that he who does not honour one’s fatherland and ancestors, the heroes and those who struggled and fell, sacrificing themselves for the ideals of this ethnie and culture, is unworthy of being called Greek.144 Patriotism then is presented here as a quality that exists in its own right, with the church being fully entitled to observe it, out of a self-evident moral obligation towards a stand-alone notion as such, given that Greekness is earned, depending on those criteria; else, by the same token, the OCG would find itself less than dutiful, less than worthy, contradicting in part its historical and sociopolitical raison d’être. This is key in understanding the place of the church as central in shaping the group-person. Even though the state is a distinct legal entity, the OCG sees in it characteristics that stem from its patriotic contribution and considers it flesh of its flesh, in the sense that the church has co-shaped it. Christodoulos, in the ordainment of the new Bishop of Salona Theologos Apostolidis on 14 October 2001, took the opportunity to make this known to the body of faithful. He justified it by saying that the long tradition of martyrs, saints and fighters of the country wants the clergy not only as spiritual leaders and shepherds of the people, but also as heads of national claims and interests even though this may be misunderstood, stating that the church honours this tradition and that it will continue to do so.145 Essentially, this attitude is ethnarchic; it deems the church as the ark of national integrity, physiognomy and continuity, thereby institutions overlap and fault lines between them become unclear. Another example, representative of that typology, would be the message of the HSCG to the people on the occasion of the celebration on 25 March,146 according to which, this national holiday is an opportunity to remember the role of the church and the cloth in the years of slavery and the struggle for liberation. The church, it was noted, became the spiritual mother who sheltered her children despite the dangers and difficulties. From the beginning of the Ottoman 143 Christodoulos, “Εκ του Καθεδρικού Ιερού Ναού (7.10.2001)”, (2001), pp. 909–10, (p. 909). 144 Ibid., p. 910. 145 Christodoulos, “Εκ του Καθεδρικού Ιερού Ναού (14.10.2001)”, (2001), pp. 910–12, (p. 911). 146 National holiday that is celebrated with the participation of the army, schools, politicians and church. It is about the Greek Independence Day marking the uprising and liberation struggle against the Ottomans, commenced on 25 March 1821.

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occupation, the church worked for the preservation of religious and national conviction. The simple priest or monk took upon himself the task of schooling and education, either overtly or secretly, it was held.147 According to the same message, the central role of the clergy is also evident in self-governance locally where the church was at the epicentre of the community. Additionally, in numerous uprisings, the church was the prime instigator. Whereby the fighters of 1821 expressed their appreciation for the church’s national role at all times; after all, their ideals were Hellenic-Orthodox according to the synod.148 Not much has changed since 2005, and expectedly this attitude is still dominant in the OCG hierarchy. Actually, in part, the consensus is still that Christodoulos was ahead of his time, perceptive and able to read the signs of the times. In fact, the national element within the church is solid, unyielding and the hierarchy is entrenched in that position.149 If one should ask, “why did the clerics sacrifice themselves for the Greek nation, patriarchs too, given that the flock was multiethnic”, the answer from within the OCG’s ranks would be, “because they made their own personal transcendence, in the sense that they exceeded themselves; for, they believed they adhered to a nation which reigned supreme in the East”, thereby they had this duty and obligation.150 Isaiah of Salona is brought up as an example of this statement,151 who, “upon concluding his liturgy left his cloth on the altar and took up arms instead; he took Athanasios Diakos152 with him and they went to fight, so, essentially, what he did was that he subjugated his priesthood to the cause”, to become a national hero. “We have deposited blood and life for this nation here; it is not easy to defy that”.153 Yet again, the role of the church as ark of the nation, its identity, and henceforth indirectly of the state, is deeply ingrained within the ranks of the hierarchy. It is no pretext, it is genuine belief and indeed a raison d’être, which, as perceived by the OCG, defines the state’s personhood.

147 HSCG, “Μήνυμα προς τον Ευσεβή Λαό για τον Εορτασμό της 25ης Μαρτίου”, (2005), pp. 188–89, (p. 188). 148 Ibid. 149 K. D., Interview with the author, 23 May 2014. 150 Ibid. 151 Bishop of Salona Isaiah (1780–1821) fought for the liberation cause of 1821 and he was the first bishop to fall fighting. 152 Greek national hero (1788–1821), he was captured and tortured to death by the Ottomans after the battle of Alamana, central Greece (Fthiotida). 153 K. D., Interview with the author, 23 May 2014.

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But its endorsement has not been fully unconditional. The church identifies itself with a physiognomy that it too has forged, for Hellenic identity is one thing but Hellenic-Christian is quite another; and the state is the latter. Not that Hellenism is rejected in its entirety, but it is rather mutatis mutandis endorsed as an adapted element within a greater whole  – Christianity  – in order to befit the Orthodox constraints. The OCG is happy to acknowledge this selective appropriation. In referring to this, Archimandrite Ignatios Sotiriadis quoted the renowned theologian George Florovsky, who wrote in 1939 that in the spiritual heritage of the Christian peoples, all the traditional shapes and forms are from the beginning to the end Hellenistic or Hellenic. This form of Hellenism has indeed been somehow canonised, it is a Christian Hellenism.154 But in a sense, even the Church itself is Hellenistic. Pointing out that Florovsky has even suggested for the churches to be more Greek, to become truly Catholic, truly Orthodox, as many deficiencies in the modern development of the churches can be attributed to the loss of that Hellenic spirit, hence the above-mentioned creative suggestion for the future.155 This does not mean to say that the church here is at ease with the concept of Hellenism. The conditioning of the latter has been time and again emphasised as a prerequisite for its appropriation within Orthodoxy. Metropolitan Titos156 has written that in the context of Orthodoxy, the Christian and the Hellenic spirit were united harmoniously. But, the term “Hellene” was synonym of the idolater. The ancient Greek mythology and the Dodekatheon (Gr.: Δωδεκάθεον), i.e. the twelve deities of Olympus, which was the dominant religion of antiquity, were elements, alien and unacceptable to Christianity, which intended to abolish this demonolatry and all its extensions and lead people to the knowledge and freedom of the one true God.157 Orthodoxy, Titos claims, with the great fathers of the Church, saw in Hellenism that apart from the barren and dangerous idolater spirit from which it ought to guard itself, that there was a splendid, brilliant and creative spirit which shone through the works and the culture of great philosophers, poets, orators, mathematicians, astronomers, doctors, together with the laws and organisation of a democratic polity.158 There was also another 154 Sotiriadis, “Βυζάντιο: Μήτρα Πολιτισμού και Παράγων Ιδεολογικής Ενοποίησης”, pp. 56–61, (p. 57). 155 Ibid., p. 58. 156 Ordained the Metropolitan of Paramythia, Filiata, Geromerion and Parga in July 1974. 157 Metropolitan of Paramythia Titos, “Η Ορθοδοξία και ο Διαχρονικός Ρόλος της στην Ιστορία”, (2002), pp. 255–58, (p. 256). 158 Ibid.

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marvellous instrument, writes Titos, the Greek language, which was spoken by all known peoples around the Mediterranean and beyond, which could express the most delicate and highest ideas of Christianity. Hence Orthodoxy utilised the language in which it preached the word of the Gospel throughout the world; the Greek spirit on the other hand was sanctified and beautified, offering itself to the services of the Church of Christ. It is this marvellous mixture that we see in the wise and grandiose works of the great fathers of the Church.159 The conditioning of Hellenism followed by its appropriation by Orthodoxy is for the OCG a watershed, with the whole process being clearly defined as Kali Alloiosis (Gr.: Καλή Αλλοίωσις), i.e., Benign Mutation, a change for the better. This, in fact, has been the central theme in the very first lecture in the People’s University of the Church, which was conducted by the Metropolitan of Pergamon Ioannis (Zizioulas),160 followed by a discussion and concluded by the remarks of Archbishop Christodoulos. There, the Metropolitan said that the issue needs to be discussed as it has to do with cultural self-consciousness and the definition of Greek identity in an era of massive reforms, cultural transformations, unifications and uncontrollable globalisation currents. All this creates an internal problem to the Orthodox Greeks, and in turn demands an answer to the question: “With which Hellenism are we proceeding into Europe and what is the relationship of Orthodox ecumenism and the West?”161 Within that framework, the metropolitan pointed out the Benign Mutation of the ancient Greek spiritual tradition, by the selective nitpicking of its positive content, the renewal via new content of Greek names and philosophical terms, and third, by the existential review and transformation of ancient Hellenism in matters that deal with the relations of God and the this-worldly domain, between God and humanity. This was achieved by the “development of Christian Theology, Cosmology and Anthropology in conjunction with Christology, Soteriology and Eschatology”;162 Hellenism, as it was transformed by Christianity, is inconceivable without the Orthodox Church, which is the social expression of Hellenism,163 deduced the metropolitan. 159 Ibid. 160 Titular Metropolitan since 1986 – given that there is no Greek-Orthodox population left in Pergamon, Asia Minor – under the aegis and jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. 161 Evaggelos D. Theodorou, “Η Καλή ‘Αλλοίωσις’ του Ελληνισμού δια του Χριστιανισμού”, (2002), pp. 812–13, (p. 813). 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid.

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It appears though that frictions and antitheses of this type are ever present, whether as nuisance or cause of concern. In a speech of his, Archbishop of Tirana and all Albania Anastasios pointed out that parallel to the euphoric emotions for the European unification, it is inevitable to be concerned with where the continent is heading to, culturally. This critical era to some extent resembles the spiritual conflict of the fourth century, namely, the old antithesis between the ancient Greek, i.e. Hellenic, and the Christian thought, which returns in new shapes and forms. For instance, in the shape of the modern, secular rationalism and eudemonism as opposed to the Christian mindset and way of life.164 Likewise, Christodoulos has indicated this shift. Referring to the Olympic Games, he cautioned the public that the ancient Greek civilisation was a civilisation of the shape. “The beautiful, the brave, the able, the righteous, were perceived as marvellous self-evidently”. Therefore Greeks would dedicate their bodies to the Gods, as the Olympic Games were a religious event. “It took the Son of God, apostles and others to preach in Greece so that the Greeks would be taught that the one true God does not want all that, but rather a clean soul”.165 Still, Christodoulos wished that the church would take part in the Cultural Olympiad that preceded the upcoming Olympic Games in Athens, and he made that known to Evangelos Venizelos, Minister of Culture back then (2000–2004). Regarding the Cultural Olympiad and the announcement that all cultures that are permeated by temporality, spatiality and have their own narrative would take part in it, Christodoulos noted that the Orthodox Church encompasses all those elements having time, place and narrative of its own. Therefore, it was exceedingly eligible to take part and reveal the diachronic continuity of its culture, noting also that, after all, it is the church and its holy monasteries that salvaged the masterpieces of ancient Greek philosophers and poets, together with Byzantine works of art. He further requested that the church ought to be involved in promoting the diachronic traditions of Hellenism, having in fact already established a Synodical Committee for the Olympic Games of 2004.166 This does not signify a completely harmonious symbiosis, for Orthodoxy is still indirectly competing with Hellenism when it deals with the Western cultural influences that have a bearing on lifestyle and identity, as well as when the ancient world becomes the centre of attention, i.e. in the Athens Olympic Games of 164 Anastasios, pp. 351–56, (p. 353). 165 Christodoulos, “Για τους Ολυμπιακούς Αγώνες”, (2004), p. 621. 166 Archbishop Christodoulos and Archimandrite Theologos Apostolidis, “Ελληνική Δημοκρατία – Η Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος, Αριθμ.: Πρωτ. 377– Διεκπ. 193”, (2001), pp. 89–90, (p. 89).

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2004. But this also attests to which culture reigns supreme and which is bygone, which appropriates the other in this dialectic of power and dominance, over a by and large resolved issue. After all, the OCG sees in the national identity that permeates the state as a person, a reformed version of Hellenism, one that has undergone a cultural reformation, namely Orthodoxisation, and, being benignly eroded, it has become the dominant physiognomy of modern Greece, minor fluctuations over time notwithstanding. In the same spirit, Makrides maintains that the Hellenic-Christian construct, regardless of contradictory elements under the surface, has evolved in a historically organic way that surpasses the linear interruptions in the course of time, for the collective psyche has imposed its own compromises beyond the antinomies and complexities of history; therefore, it experiences no split personality or fundamentally conflicting worldviews.167

3.2.1.4  If the (chosen) nation is Orthodox, then so must be the state (The) society (Koinonia, Gr.: Κοινωνία) is the church, for, who is the society of Greece, who are the citizens of Greece, if not the body of the faithful! Now it has been diluted by migration but prior to that by “Greek” one meant “Orthodox”.168

Another exaggerated, perhaps, example of how the OCG perceives yet another aspect of state personhood in conjunction with the national psyche, would be the national narcissism that the OCG emits at times, when its rhetoric is permeated by the ideologeme of Greeks, Orthodox Greeks, being God’s chosen ones. And may we parenthetically add how ironically Hellenic par excellence this is, considering the inclination of the ancient Greek gods towards taking sides and demonstrating favouritism, e.g. throughout the Homeric epic poems and the Greek mythology. Be that as it may, such instances have been known to demonstrate a distinctive pattern of a nation and a state on the run; one that manages to persevere and overcome hardship, because it is exceptional in some way, but at the same time, one that suffers precisely due to its “outstanding” particularities that set it apart from its counterparts and triggers their envy, entangling it into a vicious circle. For instance, with the opportunity of the 50th anniversary of the inauguration of the church “Panagia Soumela” Pilgrimage (15 August 2002), Christodoulos referred to other anniversaries which coincide with the celebration of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary, also with the eighty years since the Catastrophe of 167 Vasilios N. Makrides, Hellenic Temples and Christian Churches: A Concise History of the Religious Cultures of Greece from Antiquity to the Present (2009), p. 275. 168 T. I., Interview with the author, 14 January 2014.

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Asia Minor and the eighty-three years since the Pontic Greeks’ Genocide. With reference to which, he said that the diachronic adventures of Hellenism, which deprived it of the unforgotten Homelands, have proven how resilient the cell of the Greek genos is; that the nation resembles the phoenix that rises from the ashes; that Greeks are descendants of heroes and they must not forget their Orthodox faith, which is the rock upon which they may hang on to, their tradition which teaches respect for the other, the family as resilient core, and the country which never required of them to be nationalists. Concluding finally that, “we may be cosmopolitans, we may be Europeans, but above all we are Greeks”.169 It is no coincidence that the same pattern has been repeated seven years later by Christodoulos’ successor. Namely, on 15 August 2009, i.e., the same anniversary, in his sermon at the monastery of “Panagia Soumela” in Vermio, Archbishop Hieronymos II said that the uprooted Greeks of Pontos, Asia Minor and Cyprus, know well that they are not just another people being tested, random masses that happened to experience misfortunes, but the people of God. The favourite people for whose sake Jesus Christ was crucified. God’s people then might be hurt, persecuted and often left on their own, but never orphaned and abandoned. Ultimately, he carried on, the Orthodox have a mother, intertwined as they are with the Mother of God and her pain.170 She is on our side and suffers with us in the often tragic course of our history. She is the protector when the enemies of our kind plot our annihilation. She is our general in our victorious struggles for faith and country; our redeemer, our liberator.171

This is unlike Hieronymos, but we should add that during the period in which this exclamation took place, the Greek debt crisis was surfacing and the tension was increasing, both nationally and internationally. The upheaval run through all societal layers and rhetorical utterances were often less than measured, even disproportionate, by state officials no less. But whatever the circumstances might have been, the fact that Hieronymos idealised the Greek nation and upheld it as chosen by God remains. It appears that grandiose aspirations originated from Byzantium where the Hellenistic culture, via Christianity, was coupled with the Hebrew biblical tradition of the chosen people, whereby the belief that the eternal Kingdom of Christ was now realised as it had been foreseen by the Prophets; 169 Press Office of the HSCG, “Ο Μακαριώτατος στην «Παναγία Σουμελά» για τον Εορτασμό της Κοιμήσεως της Θεοτόκου”, (2002), pp. 611–12, (p. 612). 170 Hieronymos II, “Ομιλία κατά την Πανηγυρική Θεία Λειτουργία στην Ιερά Μονή Παναγίας Σουμελά Βερμίου”, (2009), pp. 526–28, (p. 526–27). 171 Ibid., p. 527.

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albeit not under a Jewish but a Roman reign instead, thus generating an ideologeme that was reproduced during the Byzantine and post-Byzantine era, yet never in fully explicit terms, as it was insinuated instead.172 However this underlay of eschatological grandeur has contributed in the formation of national narcissism. By extension, given the national, historical and political dimensions that rest in the epicentre of such views, state personhood is being inevitably conflated with the collective psyche, with the latter bleeding into the former. Whereby, the selfperception of being blessed and persecuted at the same time, expressing grandiose aspirations while acknowledging the susceptibility to suffering at the hands of enemies, and yet being impervious to annihilation as long as God oversees his favourite people, entangles the state in expectations and moral obligations that cannot always – if ever, actually – be realised. Not to mention that it imposes and establishes an unbreakable bond with the church, else the state might relinquish God’s favouritism, which has seen the nation through, over the millennia. This has been communicated explicitly by the OCG, and may we remind, by stressing that the church is not at stake but the state may well be, deducing in sum that if the nation is Christian Orthodox, then so must be the state. Precisely upon the matter of conflating Orthodoxy with nationality and state personhood, Christodoulos has wondered in what way is the church connected to the state in the soul of the Greek, only to clarify in advance that the issue is not constitutional, legal or financial, nor does it have anything to do with the church’s assets, or with the clergy as civil servants. Most European states were established in the recent centuries, consisting often of different or even enemy groupings, adding that the notion of the nation emerged only in the eighteenth century.173 Whereas Greeks are a people, he claimed whose identity features are common faith, language and education, which is not merely a result of political fermentation, but rather an unbroken 3,000-year-long tradition.174 Therefore, when the church urges all politicians to understand the meaning of the nation’s essential features and not destroy them by copying foreign examples, it simply wants to salvage this reality; because, if the identity elements of the Greeks were to be overthrown, then they would certainly become a nation with an expiry date. For what will the consequences be if the church is replaced by a committee,

172 Agourides, Θεολογία και Κοινωνία σε Διάλογο, pp. 15–17. 173 Christodoulos, “Εκκλησία και Λαός: Μια Αδιάσπαστη Σχέση”, (2001), pp. 590–92, (p. 590). 174 Ibid., p. 591.

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the language by a means of communication and education by “know-how”?175 A statement as such certainly validates the assumption that to the OCG, the constantly-under-Western-threat state identity cannot spare to discard its national religion without this being to its character’s detriment. Still, even though the legalistic aspect of identity was of no concern according to Christodoulos, but rather the essence of it, the ID card issue emerged nonetheless. In encyclical No. 2711 of the HSCG (22 February 2001), it is mentioned that according to studies, the Roman Empire-Byzantium was the longest lasting power of the Western world because it was founded on culture, in which the Orthodox Church was a protagonist. This civilisation survived because tradition, which connects the person with society, material with spirit, history with the eschaton (Gr.: Έσχατον)176 and man with God, carried on after the fall of Byzantium. Further, it is stated that the ID issue reveals plans of a western tradition to be ushered into the country, while in contrast there is an effort to maintain the domestic tradition and offer it to the Europeans who need it. Adding that Greeks too have a tradition of living, and by maintaining it they will survive; as they have a civilisational model of social organisation, which must be put forward because it may help in the organisation of Europe.177 Even though the issue surpasses legalities, contradiction and ambivalence were not avoided as an official document’s content was conflated with the loss of the domestic political culture and way of life. Likewise, in a message of his, on Mary’s Ascension and the start of the Struggle of National Independence – both celebrated annually on 25 March – Christodoulos stated that the Holy Mother of God heard the prayers of the martyrs and neo-martyrs of the Greeks and liberated them. But now Greece stands before a new challenge of its history in its course within the EU.178 Yet, he maintained, nowadays it is not a barbarian conqueror that the nation faces, but rather, the erosion in a world dominated by atheism and egocentrism, syncretism and amorphous civilisation. In this era, the political system seeks to undermine the people’s spirituality and culture. But they will not have it their way, he warned. The Greeks have proven with the issue of the ID cards and at all times with their actions that they maintain their spirit and with the church at the head, “they offer their spiritual and cultural ministry to the United Europe without a 175 Ibid., pp. 592–93. 176 The finality of the Divine Plan is meant here. 177 Apostolidis, “Η Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος – Εγκύκλιος 2711”, (2001), pp. 294–96, (p. 295). 178 Christodoulos, “Επί τω Ευαγγελισμώ της Θεοτόκου και τη Ενάρξει του Αγώνος της Ανεξαρτησίας”, (2002), pp. 247–48, (p. 247).

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trace of smugness but also without any inferiority complex”.179 Further the archbishop warned that they should all know that the church is an effective force of resistance against all who think it possible “to overthrow the spiritual heritage of the Greeks, deplete human dignity, and distort the Truth by presenting their tyranny in the form of so-called human rights, the mystery of life into a mechanistic phenomenon and the human being from God’s image to an instrument of their intentions”.180 In that way, it is asserted, both implicitly and explicitly, that the nation is above all Orthodox and it follows that so must be the state, given that this is the foremost tenet of Greekness – combined with language and tradition. This was affirmed on another occasion as well, much later. When Metropolitan Alexandros181 received the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in his diocese, in his welcoming speech that took place in the Church of St Vasileios, 21 September 2009, he repeated the above-mentioned pattern when he said that the people of Greece, the people of Arcadia, bear in their souls Jesus Christ, Greece, Orthodoxy and traditions equally. “The Greek has lived without a home, without a country, even without an openly expressed national identity, but never without Christ, Church and clergy”.182 Therefore, to the OCG, being a Greek-Orthodox is a primary attribute of identity, selfstanding, before, above and beyond the state; and from that perspective, it defines and determines the latter.

3.2.1.5  Church‒state relations Evidently all this has consequences on the relations between the legal entity of the state and the institution of the church, given that state personhood affects the way they interact. This applies to cases when the church gets involved in purely this-worldly affairs of domestic legislature by drawing that sense of entitlement from its traditional relationship with the nation and the state-person; i.e., the predecessor and progenitor of the legal person that the church proclaims has, in a way, mothered, and it is responsible for its well-being. Particularly in the period in focus, examples of that sort of interference are ample. 179 Ibid., p. 248. 180 Ibid. 181 Elected Metropolitan of Nafpaktos and St Vlasios in 1984 and switched diocese by becoming Metropolitan of Mantineia and Kynouria in January 1995. 182 Metropolitan of Mantineia Alexandros, “Προσφώνησις προς τον Οικουμενικόν Πατριάρχην Βαρθoλομαίον κατά την Eπίσκεψίν του εις Τρίπολιν από τον Σεβ. Μητροπολίτην Μαντινείας και Κυνουρίας κ. Αλέξανδρον”, (2009), pp. 602–03, (p. 602).

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The Identity Cards affair, first and foremost, fits that category. Drawing from a church‒state relations model, emergent from the history of Southeastern Europe and the Byzantine administrative paradigm, the OCG conducted itself in a manner which is antithetical to the Western political culture. And in line with this, Christodoulos attempted to renegotiate the place of the church in the Modern Greek state, while seeking to engage in a power struggle with the government, and to prove that the state institutions ought to consider the church institutions as their equals.183 Thus, a purely legislative issue was being dealt with politically by the church, which resorted to a referendum in order to get its message across. In fact, a special synodical committee was set up for the collection of signatures. In one of its meetings where the referendum was discussed, Metropolitan Hierotheos184 said that the referendum request is serious, and it concerns the deliverance of cultural identity, the preservation of freedom of the person, the so-called democratisation of democracy, the rescue of the freedoms of the people, the containment and monitoring of “Eurocracy” and the further development of civil society.185 In that way, the OCG appointed itself as a regulatory, state-monitoring institution, a function that rather resembles those of Non-government Organisations (NGOs), or a pressure group. This is furthermore contradictory with the strenuous efforts that the church was mounting in order to avoid becoming a civil society addendum to the state via a secularist distinction of roles. Be that as it may, an extensive signatures’ petition that requested the referendum, did take place. On 28 August 2001, Metropolitan Hierotheos announced the results, the will of the people as he called it upon the matter, where, from the sum of 3,025,245 and 3,008,901 valid signed documents, based on Article 44 of the constitution called for a referendum on the optional or non-inscription of religious conviction on the citizen’s Identity Card. Apart from that Hierotheos held in his announcement that the church is bound by duty to preserve the dogmas and traditions, as well as the spiritual identity and particularity of the people. And that is because, theologically, all those who have been baptised take part in it, but it is also an institution that preserves an important tradition, researched and admired by foreigners, and explained that the church does not do politics; it unites the people, rather than divide them.186 He further stated that the church 183 See Makrides, “Between Normality and Tension”, and “The Orthodox Church of Greece”, (2014). 184 Metropolitan of Nafpaktos and St. Vlasios since 1995. 185 HSCG, “Δελτίον Τύπου της 8ης Ιανουαρίου 2001”, (2001), pp. 47–48, (p. 48). 186 Metropolitan of Nafpaktos Hierotheos, “Ανακοινώσεις του Μητροπολίτου Ναυπάκτου και Αγίου Βλασίου κ. Ιερόθεου για τις Ταυτότητες”, (2001), pp. 688–93, (p. 688).

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requested dialogue with the government, and found no response although it submitted realistic suggestions which were not accepted; it could not ignore the discontent and indignation of the majority of citizens, since, according to surveys, those who wished the optional or compulsory inscription of religious conviction amounted to more than 80%.187 And then he involved the EU into this, arguing that with the great debate on the institutional evolution of the EU, Greeks must realise the value of their cultural tradition and the role it is intended to play in Europe. That they must consider that in Greece, the church with the metropolitanates, parishes and monasteries constitutes a broker of culture and a spiritual oasis, which can appease the human being and solve one’s existential problems; such, that cannot be solved by humanistic wishes, devoid of a meaning of life.188 This was completely in tune with Christodoulos, who, in referring to the size of the demonstrations and gatherings known as Laosynaxeis (Gr.: Λαοσυνάξεις) and the amount of signatures of the petition, thanked the people for the overwhelming support, claiming that they spoke in their own brave and civilised way for the preservation of the fathers’ heritage and the evasion of erosion, which interests them by priority. He also thanked the Greeks of Diaspora who “live in civilised countries” and expressed their solidarity.189 Yet, he went on to complain that this church of sacrifices and struggles was not treated appropriately by a group of powerful people of the state; a group that went as far as to pose the counterfeit excuse that the removal of religious conviction was an EU directive. He pointed out that respect, or its lack, to the religious sentiments of the people and the pursuit of gradual dechristianisation of the country rests at the heart of the problem, warning that Greece, in dealing with ordeals and contemporary dangers does not have the luxury of distractions, the fanaticism or ruptures that an “autocratic modernisation” causes.190 Here then a direct confrontation with the government is articulated, indicative not only of the church‒state relations at the time, but of the balance of power between the two, given that the church, with the massive demonstrations and the amount of signatures it had raised, made an excellent soft power display of social mobilisation. Not that personal conduct does not play a role in affecting a whole 187 Ibid., p. 689. 188 Ibid., p. 693. 189 Christodoulos, “Ανακοινώσεις του Προέδρου της Ιεράς Συνόδου Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ.κ. Χριστοδούλου επί του Θέματος της Δημοψηφισματικής Πρωτοβουλίας για την Αναγραφή του Θρησκεύματος στις Ταυτότητες”, (2001), pp. 683–87, (p. 684). 190 Ibid., pp. 686–87.

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institution; at this point, it may be worth mentioning an example of that kind that indicates how Christodoulos’ relationship with the government of Prime Minister Kostas Simitis had started on the wrong foot. Before the archbishop was even enthroned, due to some discussions on constitutional reforms that had to do with corresponding article references to the dominant religion of the state, he made some vitriolic and even insulting comments about the parliament. As a result, contrary to protocol Prime Minister Kostas Simitis was absent from his inauguration, although he was the prime minister. Instead, it was the president of the parliament who was present, but he made sure to make a by definition political statement, putting the role of the church in place and in accordance with the views of the government.191 Still, even though the EU was exempted for a while and all the blame was apportioned to the Greek government of the so-called modernisers192 it did not last long. This is because the ECHR, with its verdict of 12 December 2002, rejected the appeal of Greek clerics and laymen who requested to have their religious conviction displayed on their ID cards and other public documents as unacceptable and unfounded.193 This decision was received with scepticism to say the least. The ECHR was being accused of intentionally wrapping up the case without a public hearing, whereby the “European judges” did not allow those who appealed to explain their arguments. In fact, the verdict of the ECHR considered even the optional inscription of religious conviction on public documents to be a violation of the citizens’ religious freedom.194 Still it was stressed that from a legal perspective the verdict is not binding to any Greek government as there was no public hearing, and additionally that it was not the church that appealed but merely Greek citizens. Finally, the article ends with the promise/warning that “the last chapter in the struggle for the inscription of religion on the citizen’s ID has not yet been written!”.195 Rather controversial, yet not as much as the ID crisis, has been the issue of Human Rights and the legislative processes thereof. In a letter to Prime Minster Kostas Simitis, Christodoulos reminded him of a previous synodical document (protocol No.: 560/259/3.2.2000) where the astonishment and bitterness of the 191 G. E., Interview with the author, 27 November 2013. 192 This refers to government of Kostas Simitis, head of Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the party of the centre-left social-democrats. 193 Cholevas, “Το Ζήτημα της Αναγραφής του Θρησκεύματος”, (2003), pp. 214–17, (p. 214). 194 Ibid., p. 217. 195 Ibid.

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HSCG was expressed, for not being invited to participate with its own representative in the National Committee for Human Rights. The OCG expressed its keen interest in this, and more to the point, it had already established its own equivalent synodical committee that comprised some of the most renowned lawyers, producing work of high scientific quality, significant for the national committee. The letter ended by appealing to the prime minister to satisfy this “by all means self-evident and just request”.196 Involvement as such, interference perhaps, constitutes a by definition attempt to shadow-legislate, domestically this time. Merely the fact that the OCG had established a synodical committee to complement the national one is an indication of such an unsolicited intent. Regarding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, after referring extensively to the global humanitarian aspect, Christodoulos stated that there are disenfranchised and unfortunate people in Greece too; not only the unemployed and the youth, the future of Greece, who on their search for work are forced to compromise, to concede injury to their dignity and succumb to dishonest exploitation.197 Equally, he referred to immigrants in Greece whose misery is caused by the locals. But most importantly he referred to the human right to worship privately as much as publicly, alone or in groups, and that is precisely what no one can take away, he said; no one can make the Greek people give up their tradition or dictate them the way they experience and express their faith. They stand by what their parents handed to them and with that rich heritage they make their way to the United Europe.198 In that way, it was demonstrated that the religious rights of the Greek people might be at stake, hence the church’s involvement in a legislative issue. Yet things got more complicated when the HSCG decided to write to Daniel J. O’Grady, the Assistant Director of the Political Matters Section of the American Embassy in Athens, regarding the sensitive issue of human rights and an unflattering report issued by the State Department on religious freedom in Greece. This letter was a complaint and a clarification upon specifics of constitutional provisions and legislation: ranging from the right to worship, the salaries of the clergy, to the OCG being a Legal Party of the Public Law by exception, the building permits for religious structures following government authorisation, proselytism and other

196 Christodoulos and Apostolidis, “Περί Συμμετοχής Εκπροσώπου της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος εις την «Εθνικήν Επιτροπήν δια τα Δικαιώματα του Ανθρώπου»”, (2001), pp. 12–13, (p. 12). 197 Christodoulos, “Για την Παγκόσμια Διακήρυξη των Δικαιωμάτων του Ανθρώπου”, (2001), pp. 48–49, (p. 48). 198 Ibid.

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issues.199 And indeed, several points were rightfully dealt with a corrective reply, if anything to restore fairness. Be that as it may, the crux is that the OCG assumed the role of a diplomatic counterpart as it engaged in a dialogue of that kind with the American Embassy, essentially bypassing the state, which was by definition responsible to deal with any inaccuracies on behalf of the State Department report. After all, the content was purely legislative and constitutional, but apart from that, the involvement of the church validated the context of the report that insinuated the existence of a special, preferential church‒state relationship. Suffice it only to mention that the church appeared as a state substitute or a delegate institution, authorised to interfere in state affairs, if we consider the last paragraph of this letter: Of course, the Church of Greece has an excellent organised Legal Service, and is willing at any time to grant the text of whatever Law requested, as well as the Law’s modifications (if they exist). And of course, those texts are gladly and willingly granted to you.200

In other words, the OCG functioned here as if it were a state institution, one that may exercise diplomacy and provide legislative and constitutional interpretations when required. The question is, if the state shared those points of view, or if the church drew legitimation from the way the state is personified, which often allows room for interventionism should the church wish it. It was the latter, we infer. At the epicentre of this rests of course the church‒state relationship. Under a different government, that of New Democracy201 (Gr.: Νέα Δημοκρατία) and Kos­ tas Karamanlis,202 which was well disposed towards the church, theoretically at least, the question of separation resurfaced. Speaking to the synod on 10 October 2006, in a regular meeting, Christodoulos, in expressing his discontent said that the announcement of the prime minister regarding a potential constitutional review, allowed certain anticlerical circles to reanimate the discussion on the separation of church and state. The Greek National Commission for Human Rights actually submitted to the parliament a draft bill to that end. There, they suggested among others the cremation of the dead, the obligatory civil wedding and the abolition: (a) of proselytism as an offence, (b) of the respective metropolitan’s consent on the erection of temples and heterodox buildings, (c) of the oath, and (d) the discontinuation of the clerics’ payroll. But most of all, the relegation of

199 Apostolidis, “Hellenic Republic – The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, No. Prot. 890–Disp. 496”, (2001), pp. 291–93. 200 Ibid., p. 293. 201 The major centre-right, conservative liberal party. 202 Prime Minister of Greece from 2004 to 2009; nephew of Konstantinos Karamanlis (1907–1998), a historical figure of major political magnitude.

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the church to a private legal entity,203 said the archbishop. And he continued by assuming that what they essentially wanted to do was introduce the French antitheist and anticlerical spirit of the French Revolution and the Enlightenment, which is alien to Greece and the traditions of its people. Meanwhile though, in May, the prime minister had stated that there are no such plans to change the existing arrangement.204 But the church’s legislative interests have not been contained to its relations with the state and the corresponding religious matters. For instance, on 27 March 2001, in a letter to the President of the Hellenic Parliament Apostolos Kaklamanis,205 the synod dealt with the introduction of a decree to the constitution regarding the exemption of conscientious objectors from compulsory military service. There, the HSCG took it upon itself to point to the government, the parliament and the Revision Committee of the Constitution that such right, i.e. the exemption from military service for reasons of an individual’s conscience, does not stem from any convention nor is it recognised as such by any European authority or institution. In fact, it was brought to the attention of Mr Kaklamanis that the European Court as well as the ECHR do not obstruct a Member State’s prerogative to refrain from recognising such right, but on the contrary, they acknowledge the prerogative to issue penalties for those who refuse to fulfil their military obligations.206 Further, the HSCG assured the President of the Greek Parliament that the legal evidence thereof had been thoroughly and responsibly investigated, thus allowing no room for doubt whatsoever. The letter ended with the wish that the parliament would take those facts into serious consideration “for the good of our beloved country”.207 Evidently the synod went through a great deal of trouble to investigate the legalities of an issue, way beyond its jurisdiction, beyond even its concern normally. They actually utilised what means they had at their disposal in order to make a convincing case, motivated by their patriotic sentiments, it seems. But in that way, they demonstrated their general legislative interests on state affairs. Likewise, they wrote to Prime Minister Kostas Simitis regarding an upcoming vote in the EU Parliament on the rights of women, on an issue guaranteed to attract the church’s attention. Namely, therein they made known that the church 203 Christodoulos, “Προσφώνησις ενώπιον της Τακτικής Συνόδου της Ιεραρχίας”, (2006), pp. 726–39, (p. 729). 204 Ibid., p. 730. 205 The longest serving President of the Greek Parliament, from 1993 to 2004. 206 Apostolidis, “Hellenic Republic – The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, No.: Prot. 1191–Disp. 533”, (2001), pp. 285–87, (p. 285). 207 Ibid., p. 287.

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opposes entirely the suggested view that a woman has the right to decide if, when and how many children she may have, with the term “if ” directly referring to abortion. Abortion, they maintained, is after all contradictory to the Charter of Human Rights where it is stated that every person has a right to live. This whole emphasis on the rights of women to solely decide on such issues leads to absolute individualism which directly injures the rights of the others.208 Yet another example, which together with the aforementioned ones, is indicative of the plurality of socio-political issues that the OCG thought relevant to its agenda is a letter to the Minister of Justice, at the time, Anastasios Papaligouras.209 The HSCG writes to the minister that they had been informed by the press of a bill which would allegedly suggest the abolition of the Sunday holiday, so that the judicial system would be able to award justice sooner as an immense number of trials had accumulated. Yet the institution of the Sunday holiday has been established since 1909, ratified later by the Geneva treaty, and to observe it is binding by the constitution, therefore it cannot be abolished. Sunday, held the Synod, is an opportunity for the working people to rest, and in the case of Greece where the sweeping majority of people are Christian Orthodox, it is also an opportunity for them to exercise their religious duties unobstructed, which is the utmost expression of religious freedom guaranteed by Article 13 of the constitution.210 But the most interesting case of interference with the affairs of the state, by far, would be education which is an area where the OCG has a degree of jurisdiction, given that the ministry of education is at the same time responsible for religious affairs, with corresponding overlaps and claims. Not least, because education is a means of moulding one’s mind and as such it is deemed crucial in the making of collective self-perception, and ultimately, in the bottom-up formation of identity that in turn reflects upon the widely perceived state personhood. By the same token of course, this is subject to change, modifications, even manipulation according to the OCG. Regardless of jurisdiction, the latter considers itself the torchbearer of education since the Ottoman times, essentialising the myth of the “secret school” (Gr.: κρυφό σχολειό). Legend has it that the Ottomans prohibited the access to even basic education, forcing thus the church to take the initiative to secretly school the Greek pupils and instil the Orthodox faith in them. Even 208 Christodoulos and Apostolidis, “Ελληνική Δημοκρατία  – Η Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος, Αριθμ.: Πρωτ.2013–Διεκπ.922”, (2001), pp. 551–52, (p. 551). 209 In office between 2004 and 2007. 210 Archbishop Christodoulos and Archimandrite Chrysostomos Sklifas, “«Επιστολή προς τον Υπουργόν Δικαιοσύνης» (κ. Αναστάσιον Παπαληγούραν)”, (2004), pp. 795– 96, (p. 795).

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though there is no truth in this legend, the church insisted on its preservation in the taught materials of the elementary schools’ textbooks of 2007. This is indicative of the interference of the OCG but also of its soft power, given that this affair cost the then Minister of Education Mrs Marietta Giannakou her re-election.211 In that spirit, with the opportunity of the three Hierarchs’ celebration, Archbishop Christodoulos pointed out the dangers of the alien to the Christian spirit, multicultural education. Such as, the introduction of religious studies instead of the existing module on the study of religion, the removal of the icon of Christ from the classroom, even the rewriting of school books to avoid promoting the virtues and accomplishments of the Greek nation. This generates the illusion of respect for the “Other”, but instead it will be the vehicle to uproot the soul of the nation via the abolition of its memory.212 There is hardly any doubt that the archbishop was keenly interested in the preservation and perpetuation of the existing cultural paradigm in Greece. For that reason, he persisted in the educational model that he saw fit for the purpose, especially in conjunction with the demographic currents that could potentially alter the social physiognomy and by reflection the expected state behaviour, a direct by-product of political culture that brings the continuity of the group-person into question. Based on the above, the classroom was deemed the cornerstone of either the nation’s preservation or its irreversible erosion; therefore, moulding the youth’s micro- and macroconsciousness was at the epicentre of the church’s approach. Thereby Christodoulos wished to clarify from the start that intercultural education does not mean acceptance of every particularity. He warned that it does not only lead to the creation of ghettoes, but also of neighbourhoods where customs may be observed without legal or moral intervention. Also that it creates exosocial victims of exploitation. So the theory of full and uncritical acceptance of the foreigner, although it may be presented as anti-racist and liberal, is a deeply inhuman facet of a cynical social racism according to the archbishop.213 In contrast, he claimed, education, Agoge (Gr.: Αγωγή) means “taking one from where he/she is, to another level and teaching one to consider it one’s own, thereby to endorse it”. Apparently, he was suggesting assimilation as the ideal approach, hence he continued that, Agoge, education, is essentially culture, which is defined by society, thereby Agoge is the main institution of social integration.214 Whereas, 211 Roudometof, “The Evolution of Greek Orthodoxy” (2010), pp. 27–28. 212 Theodorou, “Η Διαπολιτισμική Αγωγή”, (2002), p. 109. 213 Christodoulos, “Η Διαπολιτισμική Αγωγή στα Πλαίσια της Ορθόδοξης Πίστης και Διδασκαλίας”, (2002), pp. 94–99, (p. 94). 214 Ibid.

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on the other hand, the dominant perception that emanates from what Christodoulos viewed as “the American model” tries to accomplish integration “by way of human rights”.215 With education being of utmost importance to the OCG, it entails that the school curricula would not be left to the state exclusively, especially as regards the religious education modules, regardless if the state had a different view. On 15 November 2004, Christodoulos wrote to the Pedagogical Institute, informing the president that the synod, being ever vigilant and concerned for the development of the Christian consciousness of the Greek students, is keenly interested in the content of the respective books intended for primary and secondary education. Accordingly, they were alerted by the news that the Pedagogical Institute was proceeding in editing new books without taking the church into account, as it is obligated by law, whereas modernist theologians had been called for that task instead. Given that such cooperation is required by law, the institute was warned that an invitation would be expected so that the HSCG would not need to protest intensely.216 The main issue here is not only that the church had the legal right to approach the matter the way it did, which is indicative of the church‒ state intertwining; but also that it wished to contribute to the educational process, having the moulding of the collective micro- and macroconsciousness as its main objective. Not to mention, that, to put it bluntly, the OCG wished to control what would be taught about its own affairs, as it had a vested interest in the long run. This tension with state institutions was not a brief one actually. On 27 November 2006, Christodoulos wrote to Marietta Giannakou, the Greek Minister of Education and Religious Affairs (2004 to 2007), noting that the HSCG, in practising its legal and constitutional rights, examined the new schoolbooks of religious education and needed to point out that despite the improvement, they had an excessive historical‒religious character of intense rationalist protestant traits, mainly of German theology which is incompatible with the Orthodox Christian faith. As a result, the Christian Orthodox dogma was undervalued as well as the confessional and ecclesiological character of the course.217 He further complained that the fringe elements of ecclesiastical history were overstressed at the expense of the church’s image, as isolated events were upgraded 215 Ibid., p. 95. 216 Christodoulos and Sklifas, “Προς τον Πρόεδρον του Παιδαγωγικού Ινστιτούτου περί των Βιβλίων των Θρησκευτικών”, (2004), p. 884. 217 Archbishop Christodoulos and Archimandrite Kyrillos Misiakoulis, “Προς την Υπουργόν Εθνικής Παιδείας και Θρησκευμάτων περί του Περιεχομένου των Νέων Βιβλίων του Μαθήματος των Θρησκευτικών”, (2006), pp. 855–58, (p. 856).

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as significant and/or were being generalised.218 It was thus concluded that there exists an attempt to deconstruct the Orthodox Christian teaching and turn the lessons from confessional, catechetic and ecclesiological to religious-historical with protestant shades, having as primary pretext the principle of multiculturalism, inter-religiosity and modernisation.219 Therein one detects the omnipresent Western cultural threats that penetrate society via their systematic dissemination through the educational system. Christodoulos attributed the crisis that society and education were undergoing to individualism. Where the human being is no longer relational and therefore functions in accordance with mere codes of ethical conduct, devoid of coordinates, being hence a member of a cruel, impersonal, consumerist, therefore materialist society; adding that, the role of modern and postmodern education since 1989 has been adapted to the requirements of commercial competition. The late archbishop thought that the individual, having been shaped by ethical instead of Christian teachings, finds no meaning in life, and assumed that Kant as well as his followers must have realised that ethics cannot create community and as a result the individual is not liberated but alienated. The market, he concluded, formerly a part of life now becomes its epicentre. Success in those terms is the measure of the individual’s assessment. Whereby a society established with the individual as priority now crushes him/her.220 We are not discussing of course if the schoolbooks were good or not, but rather the intent of such interventions, especially when those are directly linked to the collective micro- and macroconsciousness and state personification. But notably, on one occasion, the sixth-grade history textbook was the cause of trouble that extended beyond the Greek state, to Cyprus. Needless to say that the HSCG reacted swiftly; they claimed that their basic objections concerning the book had to do with the elimination of the church’s contribution to national causes and secondly with the falsification of history in order to beautify events, which may otherwise annoy the Turks.221 Further they stressed that they did not know if there has ever been any other book that had caused such negative reaction, such as that of the education minister of Cyprus towards his Greek counterpart; even the Greek president himself. Not to mention that the modern history of Cyprus 218 Ibid., p. 857. 219 Ibid., p. 858. 220 Christodoulos, “Μεταλλαγμένη Ιστορία. Η Εξαλλοίωση της Ιστορίας και της Μνήμης”, (2007), pp. 516–23, (p. 518). 221 HSCG, “Απόψεις της Ιεράς Συνόδου της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος για το Βιβλίο της Ιστορίας της ΣΤ΄ Δημοτικού”, (2007), pp. 261–66, (p. 262).

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was presented in such a way that it caused pan-Cypriot reaction.222 It was an admittedly controversial history book that was actually withdrawn by Evripidis Stylianidis,223 following the massive uproar that it caused. It entails that the OCG emerged vindicated, as it had contributed in the safeguarding of Greece’s national history and the way it was presented at school; it had found itself aligned with the sweeping majority of the people and fulfilled one of its roles that for itself constitute a raison d’être. Frictions were not limited to Christodoulos’ era. Although not as frequently as his predecessor, Hieronymos II has showed an interest too, especially in the religious education courses and the optional module attendance at schools  – which is still discussed, but now for all pupils regardless of creed. In any case, in a letter to minister Stylianidis (30 September 2008), the archbishop enquired on the situation. Because the synod, having been informed that the exemption from religious courses was impending via three encyclicals of the Ministry of Education, wondered what would finally come to be, given that the encyclicals were not anticipated and this caused confusion in schools. He indicated that it was already known to the minister that the church has a keen interest in education, which has been repeatedly expressed in a number of ways. To that end Hieronymos wished to point out that as time passes without clarifying via an encyclical, that which the minister had personally stated to him and the media, the climate in schools would be disrupted. Also, he noted, the delay concerning clarifications of the exemption criteria causes unrest to the hierarchy as well.224 Hieronymos II may have been more discrete, but Ekklesia, the official monthly bulletin of the OCG, did not cease to convey the church’s concerns. Stavros Giagkazoglou, advisor to the Pedagogical Institute, wrote there that one of the basic educational priorities in the EU is to provide students with the necessary elements which are deemed necessary for a harmonious multicultural coexistence; within this context, it entails that they ought to gain knowledge of other religious traditions and values. However, as of recent, the Council of Europe recommended to its members the teaching of religions in a historical-religious model of instruction in order to contribute to the formulation of a democratic society.225 Yet, strangely enough, protested the author, this has been presented by the media as a legally binding EU directive by which the physiognomy of religious courses ought to 222 223 224 225

Ibid., p. 264. The Greek Minister of Education and Religious Affairs (2007–2009). Hieronymos II, “Επιστολή περί του Μαθήματος των Θρησκευτικών”, (2008), p. 701. Stavros Giagkazoglou, “Το Μάθημα των Θρησκευτικών και το Ζήτημα της Απαλλαγής”, (2008), pp. 706–13, (p. 710).

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change, just because the EU dictates it.226 Be that as it may, intent for moulding the youth’s micro- and macroconsciousness dominates this discourse nonetheless, regardless if the objective is multi- or monocultural. At the depth of this, rest the physiognomy of the state and its relations with the church. The latter has a centuries-long background of overlaps and several versions of coexistence. Parenthetically and very briefly, if we were to roughly distinguish between past typologies as such, we ought to mention that the consensual legislative arrangement of the institutional framework and the distinct roles in the relationship between church and state, established the principle of the “mutuality and reciprocity” (synallelia, Gr.: Συναλληλία), in order to extinguish the painful consequences of the “non-relatedness, also potentially competitiveness” (parallelia, Gr.: Παραλληλία) as well as those of “subordination” (ypallelia, Gr.: Υπαλληλία).227 Instituted by Emperor Justinian I (527–565), the system of the Byzantine “symphony” (Gr.: Συμφωνία) circumscribes the legal framework within which “constitutional, administrative, criminal, and ecclesiastical laws” were observed thereafter.228 This established the empowerment of the church institution, if not its superiority to the state within the delimited harmony of their missions and objectives, and commanded the respect, unity, unanimity, cooperation and reciprocity, given that both institutions were considered interlinked and complementary, with the state being primarily responsible for the this-worldly affairs, while the church for the other-worldly. However, the caesaropapist exclamation of Leo III (717–741) “Βασιλεύς εἰμι καί ἱερεύς” (meaning, both king and priest am I) is indicative of the room for arbitrary interpretation. When at its peak and during the late Byzantine period, the “symphony model” was permeated by the supremacy/domination of the emperor over the affairs of the church institution. In any case, this centuries-long paradigm died away, together with the Byzantine Empire, but as long as it existed it indicated the distinction, rather than the separation, between church and state. Yet it still has a bearing on the collective Orthodox imaginary.229 226 Ibid., p. 711. 227 Vlasios I. Feidas, “Η Λειτουργία των Διακριτών Ρόλων Εκκλησίας και Κράτους και η Ευθύνη της Πολιτείας”, (2001), pp. 232–47, (p. 235). 228 Cyril Hovorun, “Is the Byzantine ‘Symphony’ Possible in Our Days?” Journal of Church and State, 59 (2), (2016), pp. 280–96. 229 See Cyril Hovorun, “Is the Byzantine ‘Symphony’ Possible in Our Days?”. Also, Makrides “Political Theology in Orthodox Christian Contexts: Specificities and Particularities in Comparison with Western Latin Christianity” (2017), and Feidas, “Η Λειτουργία των Διακριτών Ρόλων”.

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Christodoulos seems to have had a preference for it. Among others, in his message to the conference Cristianesimo e Democrazia nel Futuro dell’Europa, which he opened in a proud manner as he emphasised that Greeks have the privilege as well as the historic responsibility to be able to read the original texts that refer to the Athenian Democracy; he went on to maintain that religion and state, with education included, were interwoven back then.230 And what is more, he referred to Orthodox Christianity and the “symphony model” as the ideal arrangement.231 Not that he ignored that such a condition was unattainable. He acknowledged reality, but at the same time, he attributed it to imposed secularism. In fact, in a speech to the OCG hierarchy, he claimed that the first signs of the final blow to the relationship between church and state, as several centres of power have prescribed, have emerged, i.e., the privatisation of religion, the institutionalisation of compulsory civil wedding, the removal of icons and symbols from classrooms and courtrooms, the abolition of religious courses in their current form and its reshaping to general religions’ study, the censorship of history, the abolition of religious oath in public services, the armed forces and blessing rites in the parliament.232 However, he soon afterwards explained that the church was not at odds with the government, nor had it broken the relationship with it. For instance, for his visits to Russia and Serbia, a military or a governmental plane was granted upon request, while, disagreements aside, the archbishop had not ceased to be an institutional agent of the Greek state and therefore deserving of honours appropriate to his office.233 But if the government of Prime Minister Simitis was less than understanding concerning the archbishops’ expectations and attitude within the bounds of a mutually uneasy relationship, that was not the case with his successor Karamanlis, in name at least, because other than that, little changed. For instance, now the archbishop was acknowledged. When the two men met, he stressed that they were on a new page in terms of church‒state relations, where there would be mutual respect between the two highest institutions of the nation.234 Likewise, when he met in succession with the new minister of education, Mrs Marietta

230 Christodoulos “Προς το Συνέδριο ‘Cristianesimo e Democrazia’”, pp. 569–71, (p. 569). 231 Ibid., p. 570. 232 Christodoulos, “Τα Κύρια Σημεία της ενώπιον της Ιεραρχίας Ομιλίας”, pp. 849–58, (p. 852). 233 Ibid., p. 854. 234 Press Office of the HSCG, “Συνάντηση του Μακαριωτάτου με τον Πρωθυπουργό”, (2004), p. 291.

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Giannakou, he repeated that church‒state relations enter a new calm phase of mutual respect.235 However, along with Hieronymos II came a new era where church and state do not necessarily identify with each other, with corresponding consequences as regards the church’s approach thereafter and its expected political behaviour. On Thursday, 7 February, the new archbishop was elected. It was past 13:00 when the lantern of the cathedral was lit to signify the event in the presence of the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs Evrypidis Stylianidis, who dutifully assured that everything went smoothly and “to the letter”.236 For the record, out of seventy-four hierarchs, the newly elected archbishop received forty-five votes, while Metropolitan Eustathios of Monemvasia and Sparta received twentyseven; additionally, there were two blank ballots, thus Hieronymos was elected in the second round.237 Already as Metropolitan of Thebes and Levadeia (1981–2008), he had differentiated himself, as he warned that confusion was more than evident in the identity crisis of the church and the erosion of ecclesiastical spirit, which sometimes emanates from the synod and spreads to the rest of the clergy. He therefore urged the hierarchy to redefine their positions and conduct else they would all the more resemble a religious party or an ideologically cohesive organisation.238 Hence, it follows that right from the outset, i.e., his enthronement speech (16 February 2008), he left no room for misunderstandings. The newly elected archbishop clarified that he had no programmatic announcements or declarations to make, yet he was adamant on the role of the church and his policies in that regard. The church, he said, may be making its course through history but it is not of this world, and it is not interested in opposing anyone or anything, but to change the world. The clerics, likewise, have no business countering views and ideologies, nor do they have the right to join forces with any ideological-political faction against another. Because then the church would be a religious party instead, self-constrained in its own ideas. Of course, the church has no right to remain silent and indifferent to 235 Press Office of the HSCG, “Συνάντηση του Μακαριωτάτου με την Υπουργό Εθνικής Παιδείας και Θρησκευμάτων”, (2004), pp. 292–94. 236 Cholevas, “Ο Νέος Αρχιεπίσκοπος Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Ιερώνυμος”, (2008), pp. 165–66. 237 Press Office of the HSCG, “Η Εκλογή του Νέου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Ιερωνύμου”, (2), (2008), p. 158. 238 Metropolitan Hieronymos, “Αποσπάσματα από την Εισήγησιν του Σεβασμιωτάτου Μητροπολίτου Θηβών και Λεβαδείας κ. Ιερωνύμου περί του Διαλόγου Εκκλησίας και Κοινωνίας”, (2006), pp. 742–43.

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the people’s or society’s problems, major or minor. Yet he was adamant that the hierarchs are no political men but ecclesiastical. Whereby the church’s duty is to express itself, not to doubt institutions and get into political or partisan rivalries, but only when principles and values decay and undermine God’s people.239 Therefore, the arrangement of distinct roles is to be preserved with full consciousness of the difference of missions between church and state.240 Yet he did not fail to mention that in the era of globalisation, crisis of ideologies, of pseudo-intellectualism, the trivialisation of artistic and spiritual creation and their subjugation to voracious consumerism, the church has an inescapable duty to contribute to the production of culture. He then made an extensive reference to the necessarily charitable character of the church towards all weak and needy, immigrants included, whereby the term “Christian” may be justified in practice and not solely via hymnology and prayer.241 A significant change of policy in comparison to that of his predecessor was in acknowledging the role and jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which is pivotal for Orthodoxy in an era of global fragmentation where globalisation is promoted as a solution. He stressed therefore that the unity of the Orthodox is the major issue.242 The timing of Hieronymos’ ascension to the archbishopric throne was crucial, as it transpired when the OCG was losing social sway and the bureaucratic/ functional structure of the church was weakened. Resistance to change though, particularly to the direction he wished to turn the church, emerged from the most conservative – if not fundamentalist – faction of the hierarchy, which challenged his role and authority. To which Hieronymos responded by seeking to amass the necessary “political” capital; he gained the social and religious legitimacy needed for his reorientation of the OCG, by democratising and depoliticising the church’s administration and made sure to restore relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.243 Hieronymos’ attitude ushered a new era on the whole then; in church‒state relations as well as the OCG’s own policies, this indicated that to some extent the function of the church is person-dependent. Hence, even though cooperation 239 Hieronymos II, “Ενθρονιστήριος Λόγος του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Ιερωνύμου”, (2008), pp. 196–202, (p. 196). 240 Ibid., p. 198. 241 Ibid., p. 199. 242 Ibid., p. 200. 243 Konstantinos Papastathis, “Authority and Legitimisation: The Intraecclesial Strategy of Archbishop Ieronymos of Athens”, Religion, State and Society, (2011), 39 (4), pp. 402–19.

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with the state carried on, it was limited within the aforementioned constraints he had set. This was reaffirmed in the meeting in the Inter-Orthodox Centre of the Holy Monastery of Penteli on 30 September 2008, concerning the cooperation between church and state. The meeting was attended apart from the archbishop, by the Holy Synod and the heads of the economic departments of the church, by the Interior Minister Prokopis Pavlopoulos (2004–2009), the Finance Minister Giorgos Alogoskoufis (2004–2009), and it dealt with the development of church structures to the benefit of the society. The archbishop stated that it is definitely imperative for church and state to maintain their distinct roles and avoid interference with the matters of one another, yet there are issues which necessitate a symphony relationship model of balanced equality for the benefit of the people.244 The main topic of discussion was the best possible utilisation of the 2007–2013 development programme known as ESPA (Ethniko Strategiko Plaisio Anaforas, Gr.: Εθνικό Στρατηγικό Πλαίσιο Αναφοράς, i.e., National Strategic Reference Framework),245 while, according to Hieronymos, for a number of reasons, the church did not make the most of previous European programmes.246 Henceforth he claimed that the church’s objectives would be summed up to the following: health, culture, education, technology, environment, human capital development, social care and quality of life improvement. For, he clarified that nowadays the problem for Hellenism is not survival in a hostile environment as in the past, but in an ever changing world. Technological advancements alone, given the chain reaction that they cause economically and socially, lead to an inevitable reorganisation of humanity. Therefore, in the new structure of panhuman society Hellenism has nothing to fear in the sense of values. The danger lies in not being able to utilise its spiritual equipment, either because it has long been neglected or due to the erosion that foreign modernisms have caused, which cannot be harmonised with the spirit of Greek tradition. And he concluded that the meeting that day was one of the weapons towards survival, attributing many contemporary problems to the illness of individualism; moreover, they undermine church‒state relations, but they can be dealt with. To that end, the remedy would 244 Hieronymos II, “Ομιλία του Μακαριωτάτου στο Διορθόδοξο Κέντρο της Ιεράς Μονής Πεντέλης (Συνάντησις Συνεργασίας μεταξύ Εκκλησίας και Πολιτείας)”, 2008, pp. 695–97, (p. 695). 245 The National Strategic Reference Framework 2007–2013 determines the best practices and utilisation of EU Funds within the framework of an EU Cohesion Policy, so that there exists a strategic targeting and consistency οf EU-funded investment. 246 Hieronymos II, “Ομιλία του Μακαριωτάτου στο Διορθόδοξο Κέντρο της Ιεράς Μονής Πεντέλης” pp. 695–97, (p. 696).

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be the cooperation between those two institutions.247 Therefore, identity issues and perceived threats were now viewed from a different perspective that took the global fermentations into account without assuming an overly defensive attitude to change. In contrast, the emphasis was put on self-review and critique while filtering the incoming cultural influences. Not to mention of course the inescapable international reality of economic interdependence, because when all is said and done, the ESPA programme was essentially money from the EU, on which the church relied in part as well, in order to see its objectives being realised. In a nutshell this attitude can be deemed realistic and in tune with the times. Actually when asked, Hieronymos outlined his differences with his predecessor on policies and worldviews in his own words. In an interview to the Sunday newspaper To Vima (Gr.: Το Βήμα), he said that to Christodoulos the church had a messianic character for the salvation of the nation and a role in all things thisworldly. And, while admitting that national issues are not to be underestimated, there exists a state which has the role and the means to deal with them, and in that sense, it would be unfortunate and dangerous for him to take initiatives in such matters.248 As for the perils that may lay ahead, he maintained that many of the phenomena being described as globalisation have happened before, such as the Roman Empire; it is not a new experience that should cause panic then. To which he added that the primary core that is being utilised for the creation of national identity is religion indeed; the ancient altar, the shrine, which applies generally to nations, not just Greeks. Hence, even though the church is a component of national identity, that does not mean that one needs to be fervid about it at all times. One needs limits and a distinction of appropriateness.249 This further attests to the difference an individual’s idiosyncrasy can make for the rest of the organisation when he occupies such a high-ranking office as that of the archbishop. Contrary to views that consider this of limited significance, this phenomenon emerges as decisive in the design of the OCG’s policies. Personalities are of great importance. The current archbishop for instance, being by nature reserved and sensible, is not keen on publicity nor does he enter into politics when asked, he rather expresses an ecclesiastical view. Christodoulos was different; he invited the press wherever he went in order to broadcast his views.250 247 Ibid., p. 697. 248 Stefanos Kasimatis, “Συνέντευξη του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Ιερωνύμου στο Βήμα της Κυριακής, 8 Φεβρουαρίου 2009”, (2009), pp. 122–26, (pp. 122–23). 249 Ibid., pp. 125–26. 250 G. A., Interview with the author, 25 January 2014.

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It transpired in a period when a social trend towards the church coincided with the media availability. More often than nought, clerics used to say eccentric things in their sermons but with the presence of the media this was transformed into political discourse, which, by many politicians, was deemed too intrusive for the secular state of affairs, because churches that function within a democratic framework are expected to be cautious.251 Christodoulos was the kind of figure who had a political dimension, a weighty one in fact. But to his defence, populist currents were on the rise then, and in effect, his public discourses were responsive to popular demand. He may have been too direct, when in sensitive issues a more analytical, scientific approach is more appropriate; but his target group was not susceptible to that.252 Hieronymos, being a different personality is a discrete man as is fitting to the church. The downside perhaps is the cacophony that surfaces every now and then, which is owed to the extreme positions that are voiced by a few hierarchs. Perhaps if the HSCG was more active in issuing decisions, there would be less vacuums available in the public sphere for the extreme voices to fill, and by that tarnish the image of the church.253 Truth be told, right after the inauguration people expected Hieronymos to focus on actual church activities and priorities, and in many ways he has; already from the time he was in Levadeia he was passionate with welfare, because this is part of who he is. At the same time, for many there is some disappointment, which also stems from his idiosyncrasy, concerning the maintenance of church‒state relations. In a quiet way, he has defended the present current status quo. What keeps church‒state relations intact is the impact it would have on the general population, which sees it through a national identity lens. Politicians fear that the church will campaign against it.254 And internally the hierarchy is a complicated structure upon which the archbishop’s work by and large depends. The OCG is generally permeated by democratic processes within the synod, where often fermentations stem from differences of opinion and conflicting views. One must bear in mind that hierarchs are the recipients of influences and pressure from corresponding communities in their eparchies, which affects their popularity therein; also they are susceptible to the expectations that emanate from their roles and duties.255 The synodical model has problems with the formation of subgroupings within the synod as well: organised abstentions, minorities, opposition, 251 252 253 254 255

G. E., Interview with the author, 27 November 2013. C. T., Interview with the author, 29 October 2013. E. R., Interview with the author, 8 November 2013. F. E., Interview with the author, 29 April 2014. G. E., Interview with the author, 27 November 2013.

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generally processes that often resemble the inner function of a political party. For instance, there has been agreement with Hieronymos and an education minister on a number of issues; yet, further progress was hindered by the synod.256 The OCG is divided. On the one hand, there is an anachronistic worldview where the ecclesiastical activity is intertwined with the ethnarchic, because they mingled too much with political affairs that concerned the church only indirectly.257 On the other hand, there are those who do not wish this interference. Generally speaking, within the church, there exists a struggle and fermentation of ideas which is very intense, but not publicly visible, because it is obscured by all the formalities and the low profile as of relatively recent. All in all, the situation is improving under Hieronymos, and when all is said and done the Orthodox Church is more democratic than the Catholic.258 The important thing is that regardless of fluctuations that surface at times, mostly owed to personal attributes and approaches and worldviews of hierarchs, the way the Greek state is personified by the OCG remains diachronically consistent.

3.2.2  The Orthodox Church of Cyprus 3.2.2.1  Latent, conditional ethnarchy For practical reasons, it would be best to begin with making some clarifications and distinctions on the personification of the Republic of Cyprus, especially as seen through the lens of the OCC. The Cypriot identity, i.e., if there is a unitary one, its spatial demarcation notwithstanding, is multilayered given the multiethnic and multiconfessional character of the overall demographic synthesis. Hence the distinction we made in the first place – and in separate chapters too – between the temporal, cultural, and then the spatial dimension of identity. Also, the Cypriot republic is equally complex in its inclusiveness and impossible to personify in a conventional ethnocentric, nationally oriented manner. It follows that the OCC personifies an ideal type of the state which is based on one dominant cultural, national entity; one that is inclusive of minorities, which, although respected in full, do not determine state personhood, nor the corresponding international behaviour of the state. Nikos Peristianis259 considers this a shortcoming and has called upon the OCC to review its ethnarchic position and adapt to the contemporary exigencies 256 257 258 259

A. N., Interview with the author, 4 December 2013. M. D., Interview with the author, 17 December 2013. P. T., Interview with the author, 17 December 2013. Sociologist and chairman of the board at the University of Nicosia.

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and conditions, in an interview to Frixos Dalitis of Phileleftheros;260 hence, to acknowledge the fact that the Cypriot society is not ethnically homogeneous, as was the case in the past, but quite the opposite, which calls for multiethnic coexistence. Its target group may still be a majority but not the Cypriot population in its entirety and in that sense the church does not identify with the state. The state does not represent the homogeneous population that used to be the Cypriots, particularly when the majority were Greek-Cypriots, not to mention the demographic analogy when the two communities were divided. But the ethnarchic role was abolished with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus anyway. To which Peristianis adds that the role of the church in educational and national affairs must only be consultative, as a respectable institution of long tradition like others;261 meaning essentially that the OCC is post-ethnarchic, but out of historical inertia, it still considers itself as ethnarchic, giving priority to the nation while the republic, the state, comes second. In fact, the OCC had already been adamant in the way it perceives the Cypriot entity and its corresponding personhood, whereby implicitly its continuing ethnarchic role was advocated. This has transpired within the bounds of the synod’s critique on the suggested educational reform, with a letter to the Minister of Education and Culture Pefkios Georgiadis (2003–2007) no less. Among others, it was expressed to him that the Holy Synod disagreed with the working committee and its attempted introduction of the notion of a new nation-state in Cyprus. What is more, it stressed that the committee ignored the particularities of the Cypriot reality, for the Republic of Cyprus has never been a nation-state nor is it expected to become one.262 This attitude has been justified by Archbishop Chrysostomos II, who has explained that it is the situation that imposes it. When asked about the role of the church and whether it ought to be ethnarchic or consultative, he replied that as long as a part of Cyprus remains occupied, the church will be ethnarchic. It will care for the people so that they may live in the land of their fathers, and it will never allow that they may resort to seeking a homeland elsewhere.263 As regards education, when asked about the appointment of the respective minister he said that the president always takes the church into account before finally assigning 260 Frixos Dalitis, “Εθναρχική τότε, Συμβουλευτική σήμερα”, (15 November 2006). 261 Ibid. 262 Christina Kyriakidou, “Από «Ιερά Εξέταση» περνά η Εκπαιδευτική Μεταρρύθμιση”, (11 August 2005). 263 Antigone Solomonidou-Drousiotou, “Αρχιεπίσκοπος Χρυσόστομος Β΄: Πικραθήκαμε και πικράναμε, αλλά αυτά ανήκουν στο Παρελθόν”, (24 December 2006).

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one, clarifying that the church had the Hellenic-Christian education under its protection for centuries and it wishes to carry that on.264 What was meant to be conveyed here is that the Republic of Cyprus is above and beyond the typical conceptualisation of identity, nationhood, personhood, essentially classification as far as states go. This has of course consequences on the role of the church that was ethnarchic, therefore politically hegemonic for centuries, since its fifth century autocephaly and the imperial privileges that we have already mentioned. But apart from that, the constitutional abolition of the ethnarchic institution in 1960, given that thus the republic was legally brought into being, was an attempt towards an unfulfilled goal. The mutatis mutandis normality that permeated the state was interrupted by widespread social and political unrest, and climaxed with the Turkish invasion and ongoing occupation. It follows that with the polity annulled and repressed any de jure settlement was de facto a dead letter. Thus, special, abnormal conditions were shaped, detrimental to a possible bi, or multicultural and essentially, primarily spatial Cypriot identity that would be reflected on the personification of the state. The latter is not personifiable by such conventional means and criteria given the circumstances; the status quo that emerged is not legitimate but a by-product of international law violation that left the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus in a serious predicament. In light of this, out of necessity to salvage and safeguard the remaining national integrity and make claims in the name of the ethnically, linguistically and religiously Greek-Cypriot community, as far as the OCC is concerned its ethnarchic role still stands. Therefore, what remains of the territorial integrity of the state, is personified via the aforementioned criteria, i.e., as Greek-Orthodox, even though constitutionally this is not the case. Before we proceed any further, we ought to endeavour contributing with our own take of a definition of Ethnarchy, suitable to the present case but generally applicable as well: “Ethnarchy, that is, the office of an ethnarch or an ethnarchic council, is the form of governance, an institution and a regime, whether appointed and legitimised by custom and tradition, or a higher authority; it is the rule over a people on the basis of its ethnically, linguistically and religiously homogeneous dominant culture within a given geographical area of jurisdiction”. It is considered institutionally legitimate when lacking other formal types of representation and administration or when the existing administration is lacking legitimacy. Its point of reference is not necessarily citizenship as it may not even

264 Ibid.

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exist, but as long as the nation or prior to that the homogeneous community, the ethnie, exists, it legitimises itself on the basis of the latter. Ethnarchy, albeit conditional as we have seen, comes naturally to the OCC as a self-evident, inherent obligation that generates identification between the people and the church. This was actually exclaimed in a way on Sunday 6 May 2007, when after the liturgy in the church of Evaggelismos Palouriotissis, Christodoulos, who was visiting Cyprus, was awarded by Chrysostomos II the utmost honorary distinction of the OCC, i.e., the gold medal of Apostle Varnavas.265 Among others, in addressing his Greek counterpart the Archbishop of Cyprus said that, because of the geographical location of the island and its isolation from the main geographical Greek body, it was the church that took it upon itself to safeguard the national consciousness of its flock. Centuries, victims and sacrifices have identified the church with the people and its historical course.266 In short, they have been forged together under the natural leadership of the church, which was there long before the emergence of the state. In that sense, it was hardly surprising that Chrysostomos II, being consistent in his stance, stated on 31 December 2009, with regard to his interventions in extra-ecclesiastical matters, that “the Church has experienced in its centuries-old course dictatorships, oppressive atheist Emperors, and survived because it is not man-made. It is God’s creation and he protects it so it need not be afraid”.267 Likewise, back when he was still the metropolitan of Paphos, following the commemoration service of the previous day (18 May 2003) in honour of the eleven fallen of the local community, from the church of Apostle Andreas of Empas, he stated that the Holy Synod’s press release dealt with national issues mainly, because of the immediate threats to Cyprus. He put emphasis though on the fact that the church is not under threat, but the state, being man-made, is;268 as has the Byzantine Empire vanished but its church remains there, even if it is under the rule of the conqueror, adding that, regardless of the health problems of the then archbishop, the church has a say in the national issue and the hierarchs are in unison.269 He thus legitimised an enduring ethnarchic pattern, based on the premise of existing threats, lasting

265 Mitsides, “Η εις Κύπρον Επίσκεψις της Α.Μ. του Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος Χριστοδούλου”, (2007), pp. 208–68, (pp. 246–47). 266 Ibid., p. 249. 267 “Εκκλησία Κύπρου  – Δηλώσεις του Αρχιεπισκόπου κ. Χρυσοστόμου για τον Κοινωνικό Ρόλο της Εκκλησίας”, (2010), p. 64. 268 Akis Ethelontis, “Πάφου: Kινδυνεύει η Πατρίδα, όχι η Eκκλησία”, (19 May 2003). 269 Ibid.

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persecution and the church’s own moral obligations to preserve the GreekOrthodox identity, with the latter being after all more durable than the state. The OCC does not refrain from reminding the public of the historically ethnarchic role of the church. Chrysostomos, as Metropolitan of Paphos, issued a declaration claiming that the Cypriot people, “under the yoke of several oppressors for eight centuries, did not assimilate nor bow to them”. It was Cyprus’s Hellenic past, and its ancestors that had established soundly the values-foundations of its people; and Orthodoxy, which clearly differed from the faith of the conquerors, became a source of endurance and courage. The Church, he added, throughout this difficult and lengthy period comforted and sustained the Cypriot people. As another ark it safeguarded the ideals of its kin from the foreign oppressors and prepared the struggle.270 The ark metaphor is no coincidence, given that Cyprus has indeed seen many conquerors and oppressive regimes in the lapse of time, whereby the only steady form of authority and identification reference point was their church, as other forms of governance and government succeeded each other consecutively, constituting therefore a variable; whereas the church remained a constant. As archbishop, Chrysostomos II elaborated on that parameter of the island’s historical distinctiveness in a speech of his at the University of Athens, 9  July 2008. He mentioned facts that justify the aforementioned type of leadership, such as, having the prestige of autocephaly while enjoying imperial privileges as a geographical outpost in the periphery of the Byzantine Empire, whereby it follows that the Cypriot Church inevitably identified its destiny with that of its people, noting that especially during the Ottoman rule and later under the English colonial rule, the church was the only organised institution to which the subjects could resort and their only hope.271 Further he mentioned that following unsuccessful attempts of liberation, when Cyprus was taken over by the English (1878), Cypriots thought that time was ripe for their national restoration as it had happened with the Ionian Islands (1864) which were handed over to Greece. Yet their hopes were belied when the island was annexed as a colony (1925). At which point, by and large, the archbishop made an extended reference to all struggles of emancipation and the central role of the church in all of them.272 270 Metropolitan Chrysostomos, “Διακήρυξη του Μητροπολίτου Πάφου Χρυσοστόμου για την 50η Επέτειο της Έναρξης του Εθνικοαπελευθερωτικού Αγώνα”, (2005), pp. 99–101, (p. 99). 271 Chrysostomos II, “Η Συμβολή της Εκκλησίας της Κύπρου στους Αγώνες του Ελληνισμού”, (2008), pp. 350–64, (pp. 352–53). 272 Ibid., p. 356.

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To which he bitterly added that Cyprus was therefore present via the church, in all struggles of the nation. But, unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the nation – meaning Greece – when Cyprus was in need.273 This argument underlines the role dictated by conditions and necessity to take over, lacking any other option, given after all the autocephaly background that infused the OCC with a long experience in governance and state affairs; based above all on the collective sense of identity which was embodied institutionally by the OCC and was personified in the latter up until the mid-twentieth century, impressively enough. Revisionist political approaches – predominantly coming from the left, e.g. AKEL – notwithstanding, such that show an inclination to the deconstruction of this concept, the consensus among politicians and officials in Cyprus as regards the contribution of the church to national causes does not differ much from the views within the hierarchy. The diachronic depth of its resonance to the populace, the extent of its sway historically, is often demonstrated by referring to 9 July 1821 when the pre-emptive capital punishment of the sum of the hierarchy took place, by decapitation and hanging, in order to intimidate and discourage any potential popular uprising against the Ottomans, like the one in Greece.274 Archbishop Kyprianos (1756–1821) was hanged publicly in Nicosia, three bishops and numerous priests were beheaded; the massacre took place in correlation with the outbreak of freedom struggles in Moldova and Wallachia, followed by those in Central Greece and Peloponnese.275 In addition, the church had on many occasions utilised its wealth to assist the Greek army and Greece in tough periods, as it had funded the Cypriot people’s revolts that struggled for unification (Enosis, Gr.: Ένωσις) with Greece;276 the repeatedly suggested promise by the English to hand Cyprus over to Greece in 1915 on the condition that Greece would enter the war,277 and again in 1940 and 1949 merely attests to that. And later too, e.g., during the era of Chrysostomos

273 274 275 276 277

Ibid., p. 359. G. M., Interview with the author, 24 February 2014. Tzermias, p. 19. H. L., Interview with the author, 4 March 2014. With the declaration of the First World War, Cyprus was annexed by the British. In 1915, Britain offered Cyprus to Greece provided that the latter would aid Serbia against the Bulgarian offensive. However, the offer was withdrawn as the Greek throne and the government insisted on neutrality. Yet, memorandums and resolutions calling for unification continued throughout the war as well as in the years afterwards. See Heinz A. Richter, “The Grand Game, the Balkans, the Congress of Berlin and Cyprus”, in Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism 1878–2006, (2006), pp. 11–17.

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I emerges the same pattern. It is in fact easily discernible as he was quite direct, even undiplomatic in his utterances. He was strongly against the bicommunal solution and would not hear a word about it; he wanted all forces, all those who were able to bear arms to mobilise and liberate the country, and he had opened the church coffers to that end. Therefore he did not merely, theoretically identify with the potential liberation struggle of the Cypriot people but in practice as well.278 In sum the OCC always emerged as a stronghold and a bastion of Cypriot Hellenism, which resisted the erosion assaults, irrespective of origin: Turkish, Arab, Catalan, Frankish, Papal, etc. The preservation of Cyprus is owed primarily to the church.279 The ethnarchic church led on all occasions as the national prime mover, being rooted in the collective psyche as the embodiment of the state, the ark of nationhood and the main determinant of Greek-Cypriot personhood, irrespective of the constitutional definition of the state and the legal status of the OCC within it; in other words, it is perceived as ethnarchic par excellence, as a constant, whereas the state, given the predicament it is in and the uncertainties that permeate it, is considered a variable. Given the aforementioned conviction of special conditions that render the abolition of ethnarchy null and void, the continuing threats and victimisation perpetuate it, reproducing thus, during the presidency of Tassos Papadopoulos particularly, the pattern the was dominant in the era of Makarios III; to whom the island and Cypriot Hellenism were one and the same thing, as he considered the former the homeland and domain of the latter and the island’s division inconceivable, even if that meant unification with Greece eventually.280 Therefore, ethnarchy is deemed valid as long as martyrdom lasts, until vindication. The martyrdom aspect of the Greek-Cypriot group-person surfaces time and again, as part of the collective psyche and as a major determinant of the OCC’s political agenda. In his speech at the opening of a photo exhibition, the theme of which was Greek-Orthodox life and culture in the occupied territory, Chrysos­ tomos, being the Metropolitan of Paphos at the time, bitterly pointed out how day-to-day lives of Greek-Cypriots, their weddings, school and communal feasts, celebrations, their joys and sorrows are depicted in the photos, reflecting the lives and the past of generations on the land of their fathers.281 In the same spirit, as 278 H. L., Interview with the author, 4 March 2014. 279 Ibid. 280 Neofytos Loizides, “Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus”, (2007), pp. 172– 89, (pp. 181–82). 281 Chrysostomos, “Ομιλία κατά το Άνοιγμα της Έκθεσης ‘Ελληνορθόδοξη Ζωή’”, pp. 325–30, (p. 327).

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archbishop, in his Christmas encyclical of 2006, he noted that the drama of their homeland does not leave them to rest and forget, given that on festive days the memory of the occupied territory, the desecrated and still churches and the abandoned graves of their ancestors weigh heavy; and he added that much more painful than that is the remembrance of the missing and their martyred relatives.282 Needless to say then that the diachronic sense of persecution that partly emanates from a long history of servitude to an array of consecutive foreign reigns is unwavering because of the still unresolved Cyprus Problem. Merely the invasion of 1974 and the period thereafter is broadly perceived as traumatic, and this trauma can be healed, ideally, with the return of the displaced Greek-Cypriots – refugees – to their ancestral homes. This vision is being actively perpetuated by the OCC, which emerges as a champion of vindication. In that sense, the nine occupied districts of Akanthous, Ammochostos, Karabas, Keryneia, Kythrea, Lapythos, Leykonoiko, Lysis and Morphou constitute symbols of the aforementioned vision, as they represent a loss which is appropriated in an OCC rhetoric which assumes contours that range from nationalist to religiocultural; all in all, to the raising awareness campaign, the value of heritage is considerable.283 When opportunity arises, the OCC puts this issue forward as a priority in principle, thereby this reflects on the Greek-Cypriot group-person. On the occasion of the Easter of 2005 for instance, the HSCC issued an encyclical where, apart from reminding that it observes with a sense of prudence, duty and responsibility as ever with all struggles of its people, it continues to pray and work towards a fair solution, which secures the freedom and deliverance of the island and the nationalreligious survival of its people in their ancestral homes. “Without emotions of hatred or animosity for the Turkish-Cypriots, who, like the Greeks are victims of the Turkish invasion, the synod strives for the implementation of human rights in Cyprus, for all its native, legal citizens”.284 We observe therefore that the discursive content quickly becomes political in its core when opportunity arises. Especially when it comes to an encyclical, which is in written, hence, designed with intent to put forward its own appreciation of the matter. This concept is legitimised in light of a perceived active threat. When Paulos, Metropolitan of Kyrenia, following the invitation of Metropolitan Amvrosios visited Panagia Tripiti (6 May 2005), patron saint of the city of Aigion, Greece, he said that he came from the martyred island to convey the pain and sacred

282 “Ενωμένοι γύρω από Κυβέρνηση και Ηγεσία”, (25 December 2006). 283 Roudometof and Dietzel, pp. 162 and 173. 284 HSCC, “Συνοδική Εγκύκλιος επί τη Εορτή του Πάσχα”, (2005), pp. 179–81, (p. 180).

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desire of his refugee flock for the liberation of Keryneia – his province – as well as all Cyprus.285 To that he added his conviction of an active threat that is attested by the daily FIR and seas violations by the Turks, which is amplified, he said, “by the pharisaic and hypocritical major powers that shamelessly and provocatively support the unfair positions of Turkey and FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), insulting the intelligence of the Greeks”,286 leaving hence, no room for doubt as regards potential perils. Likewise, the pattern was repeated when the Archbishop of America Demetrios (since 1999) visited the island on 25 January 2006 following the invitation of the president and the Holy Synod. Namely, at the end of the dinner reception, the functioning head of the synod Metropolitan of Paphos Chrysostomos said that Turkey “barbarically assaulted Cyprus, made 1/3 of the people refugees, desecrated churches”. Also, it erodes the demographic character of the country, pursues at a first level to legitimise the de facto end results of the invasion and at a second level plans the occupation of the whole island.287 Turkey especially, is considered unresponsive to gestures of good will, intransigent and unreliable, as it only hopes to indirectly solidify a fait accompli acknowledged by the signature of the Greek-Cypriots no less.288 As archbishop too, Chrysostomos II warned that the threat is deadly and there is no room for complacency. And as the settlement of the occupied territory continues with increasing intensity, coupled with the waves of illegal migrants encouraged by Turkey, it leads Greek-Cypriots inexorably to becoming a minority in their homeland. The precedent of Imvros and Tenedos289 is not a remote scenario any more but a nightmarish reality in his view. Finally, Chrysostomos II appealed to all, the president, the government and the “national centre” – meaning mainland Greece, the ancestral home – to work as one towards a solution.290 285 Metropolitan Paulos, “Πανηγυρικός Λόγος στην Εορτή της Υπεραγίας Θεοτόκου της Ζωοδόχου Πηγής, της Επιλεγόμενης Τρυπητής”, (2005), pp. 184–89, (p. 184). 286 Ibid., p. 188. 287 “Ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος Αμερικής στην Κύπρο”, (2006), pp. 30–36, (pp. 30–32). 288 Chrysostomos II, “Είθε το Ανατέλλον 2009 να είναι Έτος Απελευθέρωσης της Πατρίδας μας”, (25 December 2008). 289 Those two islands located at the northeast Aegean, in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty (Article 14) were handed over to Turkish jurisdiction, while maintaining their relative autonomy. Yet the demographic synthesis was heavily diluted while the Greek minority was oppressed. The few remaining Greeks render the presence of the minority nominal now. For details see: Hellenic Republic – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Η Ελληνική Μειονότητα και τα Ιδρύματά της στην Κωνσταντινούπολη, την Ίμβρο και την Τένεδο”, (4 January 2011). 290 Chrysostomos II, “Είθε το Ανατέλλον 2009”.

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In short, we have established that the Turkish presence is perceived by the OCC as a constant, realistic threat; which, at the same time, constitutes the grounds for the informal perpetuation of the ethnarchic church role. Communication with the public is emotionally charged with the reminders of persecution and potential peril and laden with political messages; these constitute guidelines towards approaching the Cyprus Problem from particular perspectives, thus setting the content and priorities of the political agenda. In other words, while functioning as an ethnarchic authority by definition, the OCC explicitly suggests its own solution to the national issue, with the latter being ultimately the raison d’être of the ethnarchic institution’s conditional continuation. Which brings us to the notorious291 Annan Plan, the biggest issue that has as of recent been responsible for the ethnarchic reanimation and mobilisation of the OCC. But the truth is that the hard-line, entrenched positions of the church, ought to be expected considering that they are diachronically unaltered in principle. The framework concerning potential optimal solutions to the Cyprus Problem, from Makarios III to Chrysostomos I, was more or less consistent and for a long time constituted the negotiation basis, if and when that were to transpire. On 28  October 1998,292 Chrysostomos I expressed his concern for the transfer of settlers to occupied Cyprus, intended to erode the overall demographic synthesis of the island, noting that in the event of a bizonal federation, those would be able to move into the free areas unobstructed. According to the Cyprus News Agency he was strongly in favour of the restoration of human rights for both Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, while he considered the withdrawal of Turkish armed forces and settlers a prerequisite.293 Additionally he believed that a bizonal, bicommunal solution would actually not secure human rights as it would be based on territorial partition, according to the Macedonian News Agency (3 April 2000).294 In considering such solutions unfair, he drew the line, urging that by no means should any such suggestions be taken into consideration and no retreat from this

291 Characterised as such by a Greek-Cypriot MEP who wishes to remain anonymous. 292 A national holiday for Greece and Cyprus, marking the anniversary of “No” (Gr.: Όχι). It was when Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas, on 28 October 1940, responded negatively to the Italian ultimatum for unobstructed passage and free selective territorial occupation by the Axis’ armed forces, which essentially meant the war declaration against the latter. 293 Cyprus News Agency (CNA), “Δηλώσεις του Aειμνήστου Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου Χρυσοστόμου Α΄”, (23 December 2012). 294 Macedonian News Agency (MNA), “Δηλώσεις του Aειμνήστου Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου Χρυσοστόμου Α΄”, (23 December 2012).

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position should be accepted;295 in fact in his view, no shape or form of dichotomy should in any way be accepted, in the hope that the Greek-Cypriots would salvage what is left, as he believed that unless the invader was forced to leave, the survival of the Cypriot people would be impossible. Because, if Turkey were to solidify its control of a part of the island, it would be completely lost to Hellenism and gradually Greek-Cypriots would become a minority in their own land.296 Considering the background, reactions to the Annan Plan were well within the diachronic framework of the OCC’s approach, assuming an ethnarchic attitude no less in communicating that to the public. Metropolitan of Kyrenia Paulos, having expressed his deep disappointment with the course of negotiations on the Annan Plan, unleashed his severe critique towards both the political establishment and the people. He held the former accountable for their concessive policies and the latter for apathy, while the abolition of the Republic of Cyprus was attempted, and called upon them all to assume their responsibilities accordingly.297 In that he had the support of the Metropolitan of Paphos Chrysostomos who noted, while congratulating him, that if he were the Metropolitan of Kyrenia, he would have been even more critical, as he thought it self-evident to maintain a hard-line stance, particularly when being the head of that Metropolis.298 Further he declared the support of the synod to President Tassos Papadopoulos, being aware of his efforts, but he warned that the church is fully conscious of its national role and it will not hesitate to make use of extreme measures, meaning a referendum, should things go wrong. All in all he expressed his pessimism as regards the intentions of the other side and the involvement of the EU, as he underlined that the Zurich agreement, which was better, lasted only three years and the epilogue was the Turkish occupation of a part of the island.299 A month later, Metropolitan Chrysostomos went on to submit the church’s ideas on the matter. He held that the EU accession prior to the negotiations would offer a vantage point with regard to the Greek-Cypriot claims, especially when compared to the existing circumstance where the government made a considerable concession by accepting to engage into talks with the Annan Plan as a basis. He clarified however that the church supports the president fully, albeit urging him not to hesitate to condemn the process in the event that it did not lead to a 295 Chrysostomos I, “Nα μη δεχθούμε το Άδικο”, (25 December 2000). 296 “Δεν συνθηκολογούμε με την Αδικία”, (7 January 2001). 297 Akis Ethelontis, “Η Ρομφαία του Κυρηνείας Παύλου πέφτει επί των Κεφαλών Ηγετών και Λαού”, (19 February 2004). 298 The city of Keryneia is occupied, perhaps lost indefinitely, hence the sensitivity. 299 Ethelontis, “Η Pομφαία του Κυρηνείας Παύλου”.

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fair and viable solution.300 For, he noted, that the plan of the UN Secretary General and the additional terms were accepted under unbearable circumstances, i.e., strict timeframes, the commitment to conduct separate referendums, the arbitrational role of the UN Secretary General and the pressures of powerful foreign actors. He further stated that the plan comprises several aspects that render it insulting to every notion of justice, therefore unacceptable and a cause of insecurity and disappointment for the majority of the Greek and the Christian minorities of Cyprus, showing that ultimately the failure of negotiations was to be anticipated.301 The weight and social penetration of such, by definition, ethnarchic interventions of exclusively political content and obvious instruction, is attested by the initiative of the United States Ambassador to Cyprus Michael Klosson (2002– 2005) to meet at the Archbishopric palace with the Metropolitans Chrysostomos of Paphos and Vasileios of Tremithus on 9 March 2004. The ambassador repeated to them that the plan is balanced and that through negotiations the majority would be satisfied. Be that as it may, the hierarchs stated that the Americans acknowledge the role of the church and the influence it has on the people,302 demonstrating the inherent ethnarchic dimensions that permeate the OCC. Within the same context took place a political, ethnarchic gesture on behalf of the brotherhood of the Holy Monastery of Kykkos, which constituted a manifestation of soft power at work. The brotherhood had invited the body of the faithful to a prayer for peace in Cyprus and an end to the trial of its people. Thousands responded positively; they crowded the monastery and chanted a special prayer to the Virgin of Kykkos for a positive outcome. Nikiforos, Bishop of Kykkos,303 then spoke to the gathering and stressed that foreign ombudsmen, as well as the UN Secretary General must get the message that if the Annan Plan is produced to the Greek-Cypriots without essential improvements, such that would render the solution fair, functional, viable and democratic, it would not pass. And he noted that the people would reject it irrespective of pressures, threats, blackmails and consequences, and said, citing former President Spyros Kyprianou (1977– 1988) that “we cannot commit suicide out of fear that we might die”.304 Further he continued claiming that the Cypriot people refuse to accept any stillborn and 300 Ethelontis, “Προσβλητικό Κείμενο θεωρεί το Σχέδιο Ανάν ο Πάφου”, (3 March 2004). 301 Ibid. 302 “Ο Κλόσον σε Ιεράρχες”, (10 March 2004). 303 Nikiforos was the Bishop of Kykkos (2002–2007) until Kykkos and Tillyria became a Metropolis, and he its Metropolitan since 2007. 304 “Νικηφόρος: Ο Λαός θα πει «Όχι» σε τυχόν Θνησιγενή Λύση”, (23 March 2004).

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lethal solution that would be destructive to their homeland, and they refuse to legitimise and consolidate the dichotomy and the fait accompli of the Turkish occupation with their signature.305 And it was less than a week later (28 March 2004) that the Metropolitan of Paphos Chrysostomos explicitly and adamantly stated on behalf of the OCC that the church dares already to call upon the people to say “no” to the Annan Plan, albeit declaring unwavering loyalty to the president, understanding his efforts and the tremendous pressures he experiences. In fact he informed the press that the HSCC in its next session (29 March 2004) would deal with that issue.306 In addition, Metropolitan of Kyrenia Paul urged the people to oppose the threats and scaremongering of the Annan Plan supporters with a “thunderous no”; noting that “the arrogance of the plan’s architects and those who advertise it will be humiliated by the loud rejection of the thousandfold betrayed but insubordinate Cypriot people”.307 Yet, a shift from explicit rejection to downright condemnation transpired when the fourth amended version of the plan was introduced. Such was the aversion to it that Metropolitan Chrysostomos, calling it the worst so far and an abomination, said that its instigators and authors should be ashamed of themselves. Hence, he urged the people once again to rise to the occasion when the time of the referendum comes and say “a proud and national no”. But when asked if it would be more sensible of the HSCC to wait for the closure of the negotiations and the return of the political leaders before proceeding to this announcement, he replied that the hierarchs already knew what the pursuits of the Turks were and those do not change with negotiations; therefore, there was no reason to wait for the president.308 This was the definition of ethnarchic function, given that the synod not only substituted the head of state, but most importantly presupposed his reaction by assuming a hard-line position from which he could not retreat – not that he wished to, on the contrary his standpoint was identical to the church’s – for he would appear unpatriotic and weak. In that way, the OCC instructed the government and the public in one gesture, demonstrating immense political power. The awareness of this capacity is also evident in the statement of Metropolitan Chrysostomos that the church is not a follower, but

305 Ibid. 306 “Η Εκκλησία λέγει από τώρα «Όχι»”, (29 March 2004). 307 Ibid. 308 Ethelontis, “Θα Έπρεπε να ντρέπονται οι Εμπνευστές και Συντάκτες του Σχεδίου, λέει ο Πάφου”, (31 March 2004).

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in contrast it shows and leads the way, as it must not go with the flow.309 He held once again that the plan was catastrophic and therefore only those who obey foreign interests will say “yes”, whereas those who heed the voice of the motherland will refuse, adding that, in which case, the church would be prepared to offer a large part of its holdings in order to put together a fund for the compensation of refugees and warned that there is no turning back in the event that the majority votes in favour of the Annan Plan.310 And indeed, the church’s call that was identical with that of President Tassos Papadopoulos was heeded and the sweeping majority of Greek-Cypriots voted against the plan. But in this process, it was revealed how susceptible the GreekCypriot public is to variable expressions of ethnarchic polity projections, and the extent to which the state in its current condition is still personified via its traditional, “natural” leadership and its corresponding perception of international morality. Yet, in conjunction with the latter, another aspect of its personification is the remainder of a non-alignment mentality that sets Cyprus apart from the West, being as such a dimension of otherness in its own right. There is ample literature wherein the stance of both President Papadopoulos and the OCC are more or less portrayed as counterproductive, if not nationalist. We maintain, their emotive intent and effect of rhetoric aside, that neither is true, and more to the point, were the Annan Plan to be approved, it would be legally binding for better or for worse. Thus the choice between realism and good faith appears to have been easy. For, one cannot examine the issue without taking into account the international political scene and the actors therein. For instance, the UN cannot act independently and disregard the interests of its most powerful members and richest contributors, nor can it disregard power politics. Turkey, a guarantor power, an influential regional actor and a major NATO contributor that can afford to allocate 40.000 troops in Cyprus, has had considerable leverage in the Cyprus Problem. The island of Cyprus is strategically located and the Republic of Cyprus has been caught amidst international political ends; on the one hand, for some it serves as a convenient barrier to Turkey’s EU accession, while on the other as an obstacle to Turkey’s Western strategic orientation.311 London and Washington backed a UN re-launch of negotiations in the early 2000s, with the prospect of facilitating Turkey’s accession in exchange for its 309 Ethelontis, “Πάφου: «Μόνο όσοι ακούν Ξένα Κέντρα θα πουν το Ναι»”, (7 April 2004). 310 Ibid. 311 Farid Mirbagheri, “The United Nations and the Cyprus Problem”, The Cyprus Review, 22 (2), (2010), pp. 149–58, (pp. 153–54).

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favourable position and cooperation in a prospective Iraqi invasion. Given that Turkey could be tempted to enter negotiations only under the condition that the fait accompli would be taken into account, if not legalised, the UN had neither leverage nor incentive to insist in the implementation of its own General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, and in the imposition of international law; and both clearly favour the Greek-Cypriot side. In fact concessions to Turkey were such that the Annan Plan was rendered unacceptable.312 The EU considered it a prerequisite that its own indissoluble principles and values including the acquis would be applied in any agreement. This comes in sharp contrast, however, with the UN’s negotiators requirement that constraints ought to apply to the Greek-Cypriots’ freedom of movement and access to their legally owned properties in northern Cyprus, which contradicts the EU principles of freedom of establishment and non-discrimination, among others. In fact, the exemption would not be applicable to other EU citizens. Apart from the unprecedented abandonment of basic and founding EU principles, such restrictions have been deemed economically detrimental in terms of trade freedom, budgetary provisions, growth capacity, etc. Not to mention that according to the final version of the plan, Cyprus would thereby commit to Turkey’s accession, render the exploitation of its fossil fuel reserves subject to the Ankara Agreement and relinquish the island to military operations without the requirement of consent on behalf of the guarantor powers; it would become a de jure second class Member State, as well as a second class state in the international society of states. Needless to mention how disruptive all the above would be in the functioning of the EU as well.313 The process of Europeanisation itself entails the unrestricted implementation of the well-known “four freedoms”, i.e. goods, services, capital and labour, which are part and parcel of the European integration; when the Greek-Cypriots advocate a “European solution”, they mean it in this context. However, to the Turkish-Cypriots, a “European solution” does not necessitate Europeanisation per se, but rather a solution along the lines of the Annan Plan, with transition periods and derogations from the acquis.314

312 Jean-François Drevet and Andreas Theophanous, “Cyprus and the EU: Appraisal and Challenges”, Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute, Policy Paper 58 (2012), p. 15. 313 Drevet and Theophanous, pp. 15–17. 314 Thomas Diez and Nathalie Tocci, “The Cyprus Conflict and the Ambiguous Effects of Europeanisation”, The Cyprus Review, 22 (2), (2010), pp. 175–86, (pp. 182–83).

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3.2.2.2  Antitheses, kinship and self-perception By and large, the Annan Plan brought forth connotations of the group-person’s being, in which the post-colonial trauma, in conjunction with the non-alignment era, followed by the Turkish invasion and occupation were reanimated amongst hierarchs. Therefore, yet again, the emergent anti-Westernist pattern has been distinct in the selective way it was expressed, because it steered clear of generalisations as it targeted particular states, and in that sense it was not cultural but rather political. This is observable particularly during the period of the initial enthusiasm with the European accession and its prospects, for this attitude has not been invariable throughout the period of interest. When the fourth version of the Annan Plan was introduced, Metropolitan Chrysostomos held that the church was already well aware of the predetermined development. Because “small Cyprus” of the 700.000 inhabitants counts much less than Turkey of the 70 million to the mighty of this world, such as the USA and Britain, calling upon the people to reject it as he expected that as an EU Member State, Cyprus would have an advantage;315 whereby one observes a clear distinction between Western powers, namely the European family of a perceived cohesive observation of international morality on the one hand, and the “AngloAmerican” power politics on the other. In the same spirit, following the plan’s rejection, Metropolitan of Kyrenia Paulos held in a speech of his that the defeatist attitude, the acceptance of the post-invasion status quo, as well as the constant retreats and concessions of previous governments to the conspiracies of the “Anglo-Americans”, gestated this “outrageous and unacceptable plan”, which only for keeping up appearances bears the name Annan.316 But, he stressed, with the “emphatic and proud no” of the Greek-Cypriot people, which was expressed consciously and democratically, “the tricks of the concessive were uncovered, the unfounded scaremongering failed and the Republic of Cyprus was salvaged, entering the European Union intact”.317 Yet, he said, while, as an equal EU member it strives to consolidate and secure its entity and claim a solution in accordance with European conditions, which will secure the human rights of all legal inhabitants of the island, there are those who “hypocritically and maliciously speak of its supposed isolation. Those voices confuse European partners and suggest that Greek-Cypriots wish no solution. Additionally they encourage the ‘Anglo-Americans’ to continue to provoke the people’s sentiment by supporting 315 Ethelontis, “Θα έπρεπε να ντρέπονται οι Εμπνευστές και Συντάκτες του Σχεδίου”. 316 Paulos, “Ομιλία σε Τιμητική Εκδήλωση της Ιονικής Εστίας”, pp. 219–24, (p. 220). 317 Ibid., p. 222.

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the illegal, subordinate to Turkey, administration”.318 In that way, Paulos contemplated the decades-old pattern of antitheses, but made the aforementioned clear distinction between the “Anglo-Americans” and the EU. However, this is not to be confused with Europhilia or a sense of common, shared identity with the EU counterparts, but as a strategic, security choice; whereby, being part of the European chessboard would allow some degree of interdependence with the counterparts of the union and some leverage at a decisionmaking level. Apart from that, there was of course the implicit domestic pressure on political formations in order to avoid complacency with allegedly treacherous Western political powers in favour of the Annan Plan. Metropolitans Paulos and Chrysostomos warned that there would be orchestrated attempts to that end. The former suggested that a few politicians have been compromised and are subservient to foreign directives, thus demonstrating a defeatist attitude and making corresponding suggestions; he also complained that foreign circles were preparing to intervene, utilising all means, ranging from ineffective UN pressure to printed material in the form of flyers and booklets, expected to arrive from abroad, in order to campaign in favour of the plan and divert the public opinion.319 But if the example above shows an implicit pattern of antithesis, there have been others that overtly demonstrate how the colonial era reverberates in contemporary, post-cold war issues. With the occasion of the 50th anniversary since the beginning of the liberation struggle against colonialism, Metropolitan Chrysostomos proudly pointed out that even at times when the English Empire was considered insurmountable by other, more populous and powerful peoples, the Cypriots, “weak and unarmed, with the blessings and material support of the Church, took up the gigantic task of liberation in which others should have long ago engaged”.320 He stressed that foreign interests and international conspiracies did not allow the result of the struggle to be worthy of the sacrifices of the people; own mistakes and new foreign conspiracies have brought Greek-Cypriots to a precarious position today. Hence he called upon the political leadership not to yield to obstacles and difficulties that the foreign powers put in place and to not cease to seek a fair solution to the national problem.321 In that way, the same pattern of antitheses is reproduced, as seen above. 318 Ibid. 319 Ethelontis, “Kλείστε τα Μάτια και τα Αφτιά στο «Ναι», λέει ο Πάφου”, (19 April 2004). 320 Chrysostomos, “Διακήρυξη του Μητροπολίτου Πάφου Χρυσοστόμου”, pp. 99–101, (pp. 99–100). 321 Ibid., pp. 100–01.

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But the analogous phenomenon is observable as regards kinship as well, and in that way, it completes the reanimated post-colonial, non-alignment attitude. This was demonstrated in a symbolic way when the unveiling of the statue of Makarios III, the former president, was planned to take place in Havana, Cuba on 23 May 2005. Also, for the ceremony, it was arranged for the Honorary President of The Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK), Vasos Lyssaridis and Bishop Nikiforos of Kykkos to head the Cypriot representation. Notably, they would also meet with Fidel Castro.322 Subsequently, upon returning from Cuba, Nikiforos stated at the Larnaca Airport, among other things, that the purpose of his journey was primarily to take part in the unveiling, but he also had the opportunity to visit institutions and get closer with the Cubans; further, he conveyed “the emotions of love, respect and solidarity of the Cuban people, who, just like us, is struggling for the utmost possession of individual freedom and national independence”.323 After the end of the cold war, the OCC proceeded in the exercise of cultural diplomacy with a gesture that was well within the context of non-alignment. And notably, this was in tune with the politics of the state whilst enjoying a broad approval by the opposition in Cyprus, such as AKEL. Indicative of this was the visit of President Papadopoulos to Moscow in January 2006 too. There he met with Alexy II, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia (1990–2008) who notably told him concerning the complicated Cyprus Problem, not to rush to any decisions towards its solution, claiming that such plans must enjoy the support of the people.324 Parallel to that, other forms of differentiation both from the East and the West add to the emergent pattern that is to a major extent owed to politics and history, above and beyond any oversimplified Huntingtonian types of religiocultural distinction. Moreover, the non-aligned post-colonial pattern is also evident. In the exhibition about the life of the Greek-Orthodox in the occupied territory of Cyprus, Metropolitan Chrysostomos very bitterly said that via the exhibition, the disrespect of the Turks to their culture was arraigned and their mania for destruction. The photos that depict the current condition of Greek-Orthodox monuments are also a damning accusation “against the mighty of this world”, he added, “who have averted their eyes from this abomination, and they continue to provocatively disregard the pillage of the Greek-Orthodox religious and cultural heritage”.325 Thereby, it was not only Turkey or the “Anglo-Americans”, 322 323 324 325

“Αποκαλυπτήρια Ανδριάντα του Μακαρίου στην Κούβα”, (20 May 2005). “Μήνυμα Κύκκου από την Κούβα”, (1 June 2005). “Μη βιαστείτε για Λύση, προέτρεψε ο Αλέξιος”, (22 January 2006). Chrysostomos, “Ομιλία κατά το Άνοιγμα της Έκθεσης ‘Ελληνορθόδοξη Ζωή”, pp. 325–30, (p. 327).

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the usually accused, who were targeted but the rest of the major powers as well. After all, the EU membership gave rise to expectations of questionable fulfilment potential. Even the restoration of the OCC through its new constitutional charter was damning of the West and the Latinocracy, as it re-established a full synod canonically anew. The session of the HSCC was actually a festive event and reflected the historical significance of the new constitutional charter, as among the officials were the President of Cyprus, party leaders, the Chief Justice and the Greek ambassador. In his speech, the archbishop stated that this work was not just regulatory, but it also healed centuries-long wounds and restored a traditional order. So, with the acquisition of a full Holy Synod, the church was restored to its previous prestige, thus settling a matter that lingered for eight centuries, saying that “what the malice and enmity of the Latins imposed and the caprice of history maintained is now over”.326 Apart from that, he added that the charter regulates the “symphony model” of relations with the state,327 as well as introduces a new way of electing bishops: the people can vote for any eligible cleric and the Holy Synod may choose one of the three with the most votes. So neither the people are disregarded nor the canons.328 It is interesting to observe how long the centuriesold antitheses may take to overcome as is the case with the above example, which demonstrates, when added to the previously mentioned parameters of the postcolonial character and the non-aligned orientation, facets of the Greek-Cypriot personhood, uncommon to other EU Member States, while at the same time, based on the latter, it is grouped together with corresponding peripheral ones. This has been evident in the way the OCC sees Cyprus’s place in the world as it condemns the imperialist policies of the major Western powers while identifying with the weak, in the second and the third world. It has been written in Apostolos Varnavas, therefore it enjoys the approval of the OCC, concerning human rights and the reason this necessity emerged; namely, that especially from the Middle Ages and particularly in the last three centuries, the need to reinforce and safeguard any form of rights was imperative due to the moral degradation of both individuals and societies but also of states and nations. Life, freedom, physical integrity, freedom of expression, civil rights, education, property and generally several aspects of personal, family, social and political life have been injured by those who proclaimed a better life on earth in the name of Jesus and 326 “Πανηγυρική Συνεδρία της Ιεράς Συνόδου επί τη Ψηφίσει του Νέου Καταστατικού Χάρτη της Εκκλησίας της Κύπρου”, (2010), pp. 496–507, (pp. 496–97). 327 Ibid., p. 498. 328 Ibid., p. 503.

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the Christian values.329 Mainly motivated by greed, the “well-known people of Europe” moved to any possible direction to “supposedly spread the light of the Gospel to the people of other continents, while actually, carrying the sword and the bayonet they oppressed, tortured and drained others’ national wealth, institutionalised slavery”, and not by accident the theology of Latin America evolved to theology of liberation to contribute to the recognition and implementation of human rights. It then claimed that this distancing from the healthy principles of morality led the people, of Europe especially, to violent reactions against the aforementioned individual and social conditions, which gradually led to the establishment of basic human rights.330 Whereby the whole of Europe, that which engaged in colonial activities, is adamantly condemned. Especially as of late, when the initial enthusiasm with the EU was dampened, the OCC started seeing Europe through a different lens and in that way the differentiation between the colonial oppressors and the rest faded. From the top ranks of the hierarchy, we have been told that being in the EU there were expectations which have been contradicted. Given that there democracy is at its best, human rights are highly regarded, that there is respect for one another, it was believed that by entering the EU Cyprus would be at home; whereby a solution to the Cyprus Problem would be found. This means essentially, that, being a Member State, the solution in turn would be based on the corresponding principles that permeate the European states, “but interests did not allow the Europeans to deliver democracy, justice, respect to human rights and all which they in theory proclaim”.331 This has given rise inevitably to second thoughts as regards the qualities, scope and purpose of this relationship: Personally I often thought it would have been better, had we not headed to the EU; that we should have stayed on our own. We have been preserved by the third world, the nonaligned, and the only “weapon” we have today is our democracy, our entity; and that is not owed to the great powers, the well-governed European states, but to the “barefoot” of the third world that recognised us as an equal state, which lately joined the EU.332

Not that politics is the only criterion by which the OCC determines the antitheses between Cyprus and the West. Cultural differences are acknowledged without hesitation. Not least, because there is no identifiable inferiority complex on

329 Andreas N. Papavasileiou, “Τα Δικαιώματα – από μια άλλη Σκοπιά”, (2005), pp. 51– 56, (pp. 54–55). 330 Ibid. 331 K. C., Interview with the author, 25 February 2014. 332 Ibid.

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behalf of the church, and also because the Greek-Cypriot particularities are not held as detrimental to this relationship, but rather as beneficial. Living in the region of the Middle East entails that they perceive themselves as somewhat oriental, as having an oriental flavour about them, but at the same time we are told that they were Europeans before joining the EU.333 However, being recipients of European directives of an equivalent cultural paradigm, their conflict with the local value system and religion is acknowledged as quite antithetical to the domestic culture.334 In addition, within the same context, it is held for instance that the West needs Greece and Cyprus more than they need it. They might both be experiencing economic difficulties, but it is believed that they will overcome them, whereas Europe might never heal its spiritual vacuum, which is deemed its major problem; “for, the Orthodox Christians, under the Ottoman yoke, kept God close to their hearts and survived, by a theology that is involved in peoples’ lives”, while the West developed a very different culture via Catholicism and Protestantism. As a result, while in Europe defunct church buildings are being sold, in Greece and Cyprus new ones are being built.335 When Greece joined the EEC, it was said that the land of Philokalia336 (Gr.: Φιλοκαλία) entered the community, which is still pertinent, we are told; “Europe has a spiritual thirst and it is our duty to satisfy that need, to step forward as Orthodox without an inferiority complex”.337 From that perspective, it is evident that culturally, within the same argument, European otherness is delineated parallel to the kinship to Greece, which brings us to the issue of Greek-Cypriot personhood being viewed in conjunction with the “national centre” by default, instead of demarcated autonomously by strictly spatial criteria. Regardless of the historical conjuncture that may be variable as regards the state of Cyprus, ranging from its very existence to the extent of its sovereignty, the aforementioned identity and group-person determinant is a constant in the eyes of the OCC; it conveyed that when the Annan Plan – its fourth amended version – was discussed. Then, Metropolitan Chrysostomos invited the people to listen to the voice of the church that is always concerned with their survival, 333 Ibid. 334 Ibid. 335 E. R., Interview with the author, 8 November 2013. 336 A collection of ascetic-mystical texts from the Eastern Orthodox world and spirituality (including the Hesychastic tradition) written between the fifth and fourteenth century. G. E. H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware, The Philokalia: The Complete Text, Vols. 1–4 (London: Faber and Faber, 1983). 337 E. R., Interview with the author, 8 November 2013.

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to shut their eyes and ears to those who press them to say “yes”, in order to be in a position to keep on living in the land of their fathers, “which has been Greek for 3,500 years”.338 Metropolitan Paulos of Kyrenia went as far as to say that those who are in favour of the plan, are complicit to the injustice and will therefore miss out on the heavenly Kingdom.339 This presents an example of the spatial perception as being a Hellenic heritage that not only remains so, but it is ever transferable and constitutes a legitimation of the national cause. At the same time, Orthodoxy is nationalised and Hellenised to serve the same purpose, while the two cultural elements combined, yield a temporal continuum of culture and identification for the OCC. Paulos demonstrated the same perception of nationhood in his visit to Aigion on 6 May 2005. There he exclaimed that Orthodox Greeks are heirs to the Orthodox tradition which intends and necessitates the Holy Mother, not only to be the protector of the Orthodox, but especially the Greek nation’s champion, calling upon the assembly to invoke her intervention in the burning national issues, like the Cypriot, the Aegean, the FYROM dispute, and “have her as insurmountable wall”, given the perilous times.340 He further said to the gathering that the “Anglo-Americans” insist on referring the Greek-Cypriots to “the unfair and racist plan of their making”, which bears the name of the UN General Secretary only as pretence, and which the people with the sweeping majority of 76% “buried for evermore”. And exclaimed further that “however much they strive to keep Cyprus crucified they will fail; Cyprus will rise and Hellenism will be glorified because it is God’s will”.341 This pattern emerges time and again when a point towards persecution, vindication, historical entitlement or final victory is being made, constituting thus a common denominator which appears to rest in the epicentre of collective national personhood, beyond and above the constraints of the state that is in a state of flux. For instance, when the Archbishop of America Demetrios visited Cyprus, as Chrysostomos of Paphos made a reference to the injustices that they have suffered with the quiet approval of the major powers, he added that it might be insignificant to the world leaders, but history of course memorialises, “not the countless Persians, but the 300 who stood against them, defending principles

338 Ethelontis, “Kλείστε τα Μάτια και τα Αφτιά στο «Ναι», λέει ο Πάφου”. 339 Ibid. 340 Paulos, “Πανηγυρικός Λόγος στην Εορτή της Υπεραγίας Θεοτόκου Τρυπητής”, pp. 184–89, (p. 188). 341 Ibid., p. 189.

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and values”.342 Likewise, it has been held that Greeks – and in that sense all ethnic Greeks are meant as one entity – have often been outnumbered, yet that did not hinder them from attempting the undoable; one has only to consider Thermopylae, Makrygiannis or the anti-colonial struggle. But the issue is, maintained Chrysostomos, to retrace that which preserved them, and once they have found their roots, “Hellenism will shine again”.343 This seems to be a dominant view among hierarchs. Metropolitan Chrysostomos has said that Greek-Cypriots are small in numbers and militarily weak, but they have a moral stature and a history of millennia, from which they draw examples and teachings.344 Greekness then, is a conditio sine qua non for the OCC as far as the Cypriot physiognomy is concerned. The Hellenic element was notably implied on a par excellence Christian occasion, in the Christmas encyclical that was read in the corresponding liturgy of 25 December 2006. It was written therein, among others, that despite the sorrow that stems from the recollection of the occupied territory, Greek-Cypriots have a duty towards their ancestors as well as descendants to keep the memory alive and create the conditions for liberation. Because it is “unfit for Christians to relinquish rights connected with spiritual and national freedom, let alone them especially, who have a glorious pre-Christian past of struggles for the prevalence of justice and freedom”,345 wrote Archbishop Chrysostomos II. In addition to this, it is quite notable that “Cypriotness” is not part of the OCC’s vocabulary, as Cyprus is thought of as a part of a greater whole, i.e, the Greek nation; therefore, it is neither personified as a self-standing state and nation nor is it susceptible to such interpretation, regardless of the geophysical detachment. Chrysostomos II openly professed that when Christodoulos visited Cyprus in 2007. Having mentioned the geographical distance between mainland Greece and Cyprus, he asked Christodoulos to convey to Greece, its people and leadership a message of his: that they are neither distant relatives, for whom the “national centre” must have some sympathy, nor are they part of the Greek Diaspora, residents of a foreign land who are in need of support to preserve their language and customs; “but they are native inhabitants of this land, genuine Greeks, for 3.500 years. And they do not plead; they demand, rightfully, the alignment of the whole nation. They want to hear the word ‘liberation’ – which has been 342 “Ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος Αμερικής στην Κύπρο”, pp. 30–36, (p. 32). 343 E. R., Interview with the author, 8 November 2013. 344 Chrysostomos, “Ομιλία κατά το Άνοιγμα της Έκθεσης ‘Ελληνορθόδοξη Ζωή”, pp. 325–30, (p. 328). 345 “Ενωμένοι γύρω από Κυβέρνηση και Ηγεσία”, (25 December 2006).

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removed from the Greek vocabulary lately”, he stressed – and to see actions towards that direction as well.346 The same utterance was repeated one year later, when Chrysostomos II visited Athens. Namely, he stated that he, at least, does not differentiate between Greece and Cyprus, as Cypriots are a living part of the nation in the Eastern Mediterranean and that it must remain that way. He noted that Cyprus is a projection of the nation, the projection of Europe and it must not be allowed, after 3.500 years of Hellenism, to be the last generation of their kind, pointing out however that the church will not give up the cause, that it will carry on the diachronic lineage with the help of the “national centre” in Athens.347 Openly and without hesitation Chrysostomos II put the notion of “Cypriotness” into question as regards its validity, opting for a two-layered personification, i.e., the local and the national. The former obeys the territorial and geophysical constraints whereas the latter overcomes them, drawing inspiration rather, from the narrative of the Enosis instead of endorsing the nation-building prerequisites of a Cypriot Republic which is not based on ethnoreligious homogeneity. With that as a point of reference, it is no surprise that the archbishop aired his negative views of the domestic political system, holding it accountable for the developments in the Cyprus Problem. During his visit to the church of St Nicolaos of Nikaia, in the broader vicinity of Piraeus, he said that consecutive political leaderships in Cyprus have turned the problem to anything but one of invasion and occupation, which is the red line of the OCC, as they have actually made it a bicommunal problem. He then requested from the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis to have a say in the national issue; it does not suffice to proclaim his support to the Cypriot government because if things take a turn for the worse, the Greek government must assume its share of responsibility. Finally, he urged all Greeks to be vigil, as he took for granted that the Turks will be persistent with the Cyprus Problem while being assertive in the Aegean and Thrace as well, suggesting that ethnic Greeks should all stand their ground collectively and not budge.348 In that way, Chrysostomos II presumed Greek potential political interference as legitimate, obligatory and essential, whereby once again the two-layered state personification emerged, and clearly, in his view, the national element which is broader and all-encompassing, takes precedence over the local, which is an extension of the former and not self-standing. This constitutes 346 Mitsides, “Η εις Κύπρον Επίσκεψις της Α.Μ. του Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών”, pp. 208– 68, (p. 251). 347 “Αρχιεπίσκοπος: Εθνικό Κέντρο η Αθήνα”, (17 December 2008). 348 “Επίθεση Αρχιεπισκόπου κατά Πολιτικών”, (1 June 2009), p. 5.

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of course a view that does not take an array of international legal issues, agreements and constraints into account; however, it outlines the Greek-Cypriot personhood perception on behalf of the OCC vividly and suggests that there ought to be a unitary foreign policy between Greece and Cyprus accordingly.

3.2.2.3  Church‒state relations From the aforementioned take on the group-person in conjunction with the deeply ingrained ethnarchic background, it follows that education is fundamental in the preservation and reproduction of a collective identity. In turn this touches on church‒state relations given that the hierarchy wants to have a say in them, which by extension means interference in the legislation thereof. Friction between the two institutions has lasted for years, with the object of dispute being essentially the purpose of education, with clear references to collective identity perception and the educational system as a means of moulding the youth’s micro- and macroconsciousness to that end. In 2003, the cabinet appointed a committee of specialists to examine the educational system of Cyprus and return with suggestions for an educational reform. Upon concluding its work on 31 August 2004, the committee submitted a report with its suggestions to the minister of Education and Culture. The latter, in turn, forwarded the report to all members of the Holy Synod for remarks, critique and comments.349 The HSCC replied with extensive commentary on all points under scrutiny. It was first of all noted that even though the committee had met with scientists, institutions and several civil society representatives, parents, students, teachers, etc., this committee did not see it appropriate to discuss with the Church of Cyprus, although the latter has a keen interest in education, since it carried all the weight of education during the long years of servitude. Not even for special educational matters such as the teaching of “religious education”, the modules and exams to enter Theological schools, etc.350 Having expressed its agreement in a series of changes, minor amendments notwithstanding, the synod outlined its categorical disagreement in what they believed to be key issues. Namely, they observed a silent devaluation of the “religious education” module and a view that runs through the whole report, which is also clearly stated on page 67 of it, that of a “broader Neo-Humanistic Education”, at odds with any national or religious educational dimension and according to the synod, 349 Bishop Georgios, “Η Εκκλησία της Κύπρου απέναντι στην Εκπαιδευτική Μεταρρύθμιση”, (2005), pp. 259–71, (p. 259). 350 Ibid., p. 261.

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historically and educationally one-sided. For, it is noted, the rupture between education and religion expresses a, now dated, perception of the Enlightenment that emerged because of distinctive conditions in the modern Western-European history, which naturally cannot be an all-encompassing model.351 Further, the synod expressed its disagreement with the viewpoint the committee tries to introduce, that of a new nation-state in Cyprus, accusing the committee of ignorance – the mildest expression in their view – concerning the particularities of Cypriot reality. The Cypriot Republic has never been a nation-state nor is it intended to be, held the Holy Synod adamantly, while it also expressed its disagreement with the polemic of the report against the “Hellenic-ethnic” model of education, manifested by the persistent request for independence from the Greek educational paradigm and Greece itself; in addition, it conveyed its discontent with the unequal attention given to the cultural identity of the country, as the report leaves the impression of devaluation of the dominant identity of the Cypriot people, which is Greek, as opposed to all the other small ethnic groups.352 Finally, the HSCC noted that it would like to restore the issue of the representation of the Church in the committees where decisions are being made concerning education, and in which other institutions take part.353 In sum, in its eight-page long critique, the HSCC appears concerned with the potential religious erosion and national disorientation of the Greek-Cypriots, as the committee seems to doubt the possibility of moulding good citizens within a framework of national tradition, which it calls conservative, reactionary Hellenic-ethnic-religious, disregarding what education the people who founded the corresponding sovereign states had. All in all, the synod found the suggested system “philosophically suspended”.354 The HSCC openly and directly requested to take part in the reform of the educational system as a counterpart that is second to no one, claiming its historically grounded entitlement to do so. The objective was to secure the guidelines that ought to permeate the central features that make a model Greek-Cypriot citizen, while dismissing entirely the possibility of a self-standing Cypriot identity. In that way it basically rejected the nation-building towards the latter construct, wishing its perception of identity – directly linked to the “national centre”, mainland Greece, as we saw earlier – to be embedded into the educational reformed programme, in order to perpetuate its vision of a unitary Hellenic-Orthodox personhood. From the day of his enthronement, Archbishop Chrysostomos II 351 352 353 354

Ibid., pp. 264–66. Ibid., pp. 267–68. Ibid., p. 271. Kyriakidou, “Από «Ιερά Εξέταση» περνά η Εκπαιδευτική Μεταρρύθμιση”.

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was adamant that the church has and will continue to have a role in the matters of education and shaping of the youth. Likewise Bishop of Arsinoi Georgios,355 explained to the newspaper Simerini (28 November 2006), that the church preserved education during the tough times when there was no other institution to carry out that task. There are those who claim that the times have changed, and society is multicultural, but people must realise that panhuman values stem from the Greek and Christian ideals. Therefore, they must not abolish what got them through so far, for the sake of an ostentatious terminology.356 And pressures within this context, when exerted domestically, yield some results. Initially, in 2006, the Education Ministry proposed a bill on the exemption of students from attending the religion module, but it was retracted because of widespread reactions. When it was reintroduced two years later, it contained a significant modification: the right to exemption was reserved only for students and pupils who were not Orthodox Christians.357 However, exceeding the boundaries of Cyprus, given that Greece and Cyprus have functioned as communicating vessels at a level of education ministries with the former supplying the latter with textbooks, when the controversial sixth-grade history book was issued in Greece  – only to be withdrawn later on (see subchapter 3.2.1)  – the problem was inevitably exported to Cyprus. The uproar caused was unanimous across the political system, which called it a forgery of history and requested that it ought to be discussed in the parliament and parallel to that, to have it temporarily withdrawn until a final decision was made. It was, in short, a scandal. Needless to say, Chrysostomos II condemned the particular publication for the sixth grade and called it a forgery as well. Thus the OCC came forward, ready to hire the right scientists and finance the issuing of a new book, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education.358 In that way, the church offered to get involved in a state issue, demonstrating again its view of the church‒state relations’ qualities. This was hardly surprising given that right from the outset, i.e. his enthronement speech on 12 November 2006, the archbishop was adamant concerning this matter. He said then that the Orthodox Church in general has been the national education guardian of all Hellenism, and likewise in Cyprus. Indeed, he conceded, Cyprus is a member of the EU now and the multicultural character 355 Georgios was Bishop of Arsinoi between 1996 and 2006, when he was subsequently elected Metropolitan of Paphos (since 2006). 356 Cholevas, “Η Εκκλησία της Κύπρου υπέρ της Ελληνορθοδόξου Παιδείας”, (2006), p. 904. 357 Kyriakidou, “Απαλλαγή από Θρησκευτικά μόνο σε μη Ορθόδοξους”, (17 April 2008). 358 Kyriakidou, “Ξαναγράφεται η Κυπριακή Ιστορία”, (9 February 2007).

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of its society cannot be denied, yet its education cannot demote the identity of the majority of Cypriots, which is Greek. This, he elaborated, does not mean nationalism or national narcissism but merely nurturing of traditional values and self-understanding. Absolutisation of the nation leads to nationalism but the absolutisation of globality leads to cultural flattening; this entails massification, loss of identity and surrender without resistance to cultural imperialism.359 To that end, i.e. the preservation of cultural physiognomy, Chrysostomos II suggested, via his greeting on the celebration of the Three Hierarchs, to both the Greek and the Cypriot ministries of education to re-examine their policies concerning the modules of “ancient Greek”. As he said, the language of the scriptures, of the Holy Liturgy and of the Three Hierarchs is by and large unknown to nowadays’ students, which entails the danger of losing contact with their roots. For, the ancient Greek language, he noted, is not just the mirror of their civilisation upon which the wealth of the, aptly characterised, “language of the Gods” is being reflected; it is in its own right the vessel of Hellenic-Christian values, via which the youth will shape their virtuous character.360 In that way, he submitted his direction and guidance to the state and the “national centre” as he calls it; which encompassed an indiscriminate, unitary appreciation and endorsement of the Hellenic and Christian eras and stages of the Greek and Greek-Cypriot history, culture, hence identity. This attitude applies at all times, so when the Minister of Education Andreas Dimitriou (2008–2011) questioned it within the context of the educational reform in 2008, the church opposed him categorically.361 At the epicentre of this conflict was the history schoolbook, or rather, revisionist statements that the minister had made about it, portraying the Greek-Cypriots negatively as opposed to the Turkish-Cypriots. To that the archbishop reacted by saying that education is Hellenocentric and history would not be forged, explaining further that the minister should bear in mind that he represents the Greek community, which is Orthodox. He stressed that the government should better forget about doing anything detrimental to education, because the church is ever present and vigilant; he clarified though that he has nothing against the Turkish-Cypriots, but he merely defended historical accuracy.362 Further, the OCC, in making its stance known to the public, with a press release expressed its concern for the distortion of history in the Greek schoolbooks of the island. There it mentioned that 359 Cholevas, “Ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος Κύπρου για την Παιδεία”, (2007), p. 308. 360 Kyriakidou, “Αρχιεπίσκοπος: Μάθημα Αρχαίων στα Σχολεία”, (30 January 2008). 361 “Eπίθεση Αρχιεπισκόπου κατά Υπουργού Παιδείας”, (10 November 2008). 362 Ibid.

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what was being attempted was to question the contribution of the church to the survival of the nation and its liberation from any conquerors. Also, it noted that the purpose of the school should be among others the spiritual and emotional advance of the students, in accordance with the principles of Orthodox Christianity and Greek tradition; adding however that certainly schools must cultivate tolerance, acceptance and understanding as they prepare the future Cypriot and European citizen, who seeks the spirit of friendship and European unification.363 Be that as it may, the antithesis with the political leadership was firmly established, indicating the opposing views on church‒state relations and national identity, which has a bearing on the personification of the Republic of Cyprus. The latter was, in our view, the actual and primary point of dispute between those institutions, given their divergence on the optimal future of the country and the “model citizen” to that end. Chrysostomos II maintained that for the reform to be successful, it ought to be based on history, tradition and heritage, religion and culture, essentially to be focused on the ancestral moral principles and values, as they have withstood the test of time. So its purpose ought to be to produce moral and spiritual personalities, cultivate patriotism, and a moral obligation to live and work as virtuous members of a society, not as individuals.364 The term “Hellenic-Christian” was, and still is, non-negotiable for the OCC, although Chrysostomos II conceded in an announcement of his (24 January 2010) that a declaration on the purposes of education should not contain that term as it would not strictly refer to Greek-Cypriots, but all citizens, including the Turkish-Cypriots. However, it had been stressed by the archbishop, as well as other members of the corresponding committee dealing with the educational reform, that apart from the general declaration there ought to be a special declaration as well, particularly on the purposes and objectives of the education of GreekCypriots, where the usage of the term would be applicable.365 It would not be out of order, all things considered, to deem this overall attitude as an example of shadow-legislative practices in order to direct society and the state, and strategically utilise the educational system towards enhancing preferable identity tenets. The latter is not always the objective of all interventionist attempts. There have been pressures at a decision-making level concerning more mundane issues, linked to the day-to-day citizens’ lives. However, at the same time, this demonstrates a pattern towards blurring the fault lines between church and state 363 “Εκκλησία Κύπρου – Ανησυχία της Ι.Σ. για το Μάθημα της Ιστορίας”, (2009), p. 141. 364 “Εκπαιδευτική Μεταρρύθμιση με Θρησκεία και Πολιτισμό”, (28 February 2009), p. 14. 365 “Ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος για την Παιδεία”, (25 January 2010), p. 2.

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nonetheless; for instance, in wishing to instil traditional values in state legislation about abortion, divorce and family planning in general. This framework of government initiatives has self-evidently been a cause of intense reaction on behalf of the church. In particular, when the matter of decriminalising abortion was brought into discussion in September 2001 by MP Eleni Mavrou,366 it became a major issue at once, as she proposed, while in presence of the General Prosecutor Alekos Markides in the Parliamentary Committee of Human Rights, that it should not be considered a crime by law. To which Markides responded that there was no intention to abolish the existing legislation but neither to prosecute anyone involved in such activity. Mavrou though commented on the inactive law that even so, there is still the feeling of guilt when a woman commits an act that is formally illegal. Markides acknowledged that, as well as the fact that negligent medical practice may be the result of committing a formally unlawful act.367 On behalf of the OCC, on the other hand, it was maintained that abortion was permitted by the existing legislation anyway, expressing however the archbishopric downright opposition to this practice, even when pregnancy is the outcome of rape.368 It was further explained that there had been such cases in which the OCC had provided housing and subsidy until those women gave birth. Thereafter, their children were put up for adoption to childless families; or even cases where women could not, or did not wish to keep their children for several reasons, but they were supported by the church accordingly. The church, it was explained, considers from the very instance of conception that there exists a human life, which no one can take away. Therefore, concerning the existing legislation of the time, it was deemed sufficient by the OCC, given that under special conditions and following medical counsel abortion was possible.369 At this point, it would not be productive, perhaps, to engage in a parallel discussion on human rights and abortion. But in relation to our focal point it is worth noting that the reach of the church has been enough to affect legislation at times, even when the further particulars and details of a bill touched on such sensitive, complex issues; which is indicative of the church‒state dynamic. The stance of the OCC has been analogous towards the bureaucratic but most importantly executive jurisdiction of issuing divorces, which touches on the 366 2001–2006 MP with AKEL, 2006–2011 Mayor of Nicosia and 2012–2013 Cypriot Minister of Internal Affairs (AKEL). 367 Vasos Vasileiou, “Θέμα Αποποινικοποίησης Εκτρώσεων”, (26 September 2001). 368 Ibid. 369 Ibid.

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family institution, the primary nucleus of society, essentially, via an extension of governance. Following discussions so that the church may retain its place in the Family Courts for the issuing of divorces, a parliamentary committee was examining the matter in order to reach a compromise.370 However Christodoulos Taramountas371 was adamant that the church could by no means claim a role in any legal processes concerning family. He held that with the Republic of Cyprus at the doorstep of the EU – it was January 2004 – such a gesture would constitute a deviation from the European acquis and the corresponding values. He noted that in no law-abiding state is the involvement of the church in the judiciary acceptable, which applies to all religions and creeds in Cyprus, urging the OCC to come to terms with that. He characterised the overthrow of the system legally unacceptable and persisted that since 1989, when a constitutional amendment took place, such jurisdiction was revoked from the Church Courts and divorces were assigned to family Courts.372 This led to a confrontation that resulted from the diametrically opposite view of the OCC on this matter. Following the meeting of 23 January 2004 between the representation of the synod and the president of the parliamentary committee who dealt with the issue, Metropolitan of Paphos Chrysostomos stated that the church insists that the president of a mixed court should be a cleric. The parliament on the one hand considered the constitutional amendment of 1989 dated, whereas the church, which at first opposed it now appeared ready to endorse it.373 In any case, there was no agreement whatsoever given that there was no common basis for discussion, when in fact the actual point of dispute boiled down to the legitimacy of mixed courts. Again, this is indicative of the divergence of opinion on the nature of church‒state relations, in a European context especially. As regards this issue in its theological and historical dimensions, Bishop of Neapolis Porfyrios had the opportunity to outline the church’s perspective in the 2nd Catholic and Orthodox informal Forum in Rhodes (18–22 October 2010), as a representative of the OCC. There he underlined that in Cyprus church‒state relations have always been close and to a major extent healthy, i.e., to the degree that there was a distinction of roles and mutual support. Namely, in sectors 370 Christakis Giannakos, “Βέτο για την Έκδοση των Διαζυγίων από την Εκκλησία”, (18 January 2004). 371 Elected MP with DISY in 2001, switched to European Party (EUROKO) in 2004 and remained in office until 2006. 372 Giannakos, “Βέτο για την Έκδοση των Διαζυγίων από την Εκκλησία”. 373 Vasileiou, “Τελειώνει ο Μήνας του Μέλιτος Εκκλησίας και Πολιτείας”, (24 January 2004).

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where the state allowed room for action to the clergy, such as education and family law between 1960 and 1990, the positive outcomes were obvious in all aspects of social life. However, in areas where the state managed to reduce the influence of the church, e.g. family law, there were consequences as this was detrimental to fundamental institutions: marriage and family were eroded.374 As regards the church on the other hand, to the extent that the clergy utilised their scope of action as granted and defined by the constitution and the laws of the Republic of Cyprus without interfering with objects irrelevant to their mission, the benefits were multifold. Namely spiritual, which is the primary mission of the church, but at the same time social, therefore by extension, they enhanced the entity and political power of the Cypriot state.375 Even though this statement is balanced and favours the distinction of roles for the benefit of both institutions, one observes that close relations between church and state are deemed necessary. Theoretically, this might be an optimal arrangement when the cultural, political and historical particularities of Cyprus are taken into account, but an agreement on the clear distinction of roles has been difficult, let alone the avoidance of interference. At present, the majority of the hierarchy and the current archbishop are essentially closer to the model of Christodoulos, than e.g. Hieronymos II, regarding their outlook and worldviews. But it is heritage that provides the underlay for that because the church has resonance to a very broad sociopolitical spectrum.376 It would not be amiss to say that it is a special case, above and beyond the usual, especially when compared to its Greek counterpart. One should bear in mind that the OCC played a central role concerning almost all dimensions of Cypriot social life, throughout its course in the lapse of time until 1960, when the state in its more or less current form was established and a new political life emerged.377 However until then it was the ethnarchic church, i.e., the ethnarchic council, which was actually the authority of the Greek-Cypriot community; it represented them and was the decision-making authority. Therefore, there exists a diachronic political culture in the background concerning the overall attitude of the OCC. Each and every archbishop expresses himself more or less like the politicians; he has a particular view on all issues and it is often weighty, especially regarding the Cyprus Problem. In addition, he possesses

374 RCCEU, “Σχέσεις Eκκλησίας-Πολιτείας: Οι Θεολογικές και Ιστορικές τους Διαστάσεις”, (27 October 2010). 375 Ibid. 376 R. C., Interview with the author, 22 February 2014. 377 G. M., Interview with the author, 24 February 2014.

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social penetration, resonance and power, with which no party can compete, so it follows that an archbishop is always taken very seriously.378 This is a fact that both the church and the political system realise and act upon it within their own constraints. An example of the church’s power acknowledgement would be the fact that Nikos Anastasiadis379 took the initiative to request from Metropolitan of Paphos Chrysostomos a meeting with the HSCC in April 2006, which was promptly accepted. The reason for it was to inform the hierarchy on the results of the European People’s Party summit in Rome and the resolution that required the withdrawal of the Turkish armed forces;380 a gesture that de facto recognises the political capacity of the church. The OCC on the other hand has not held back from putting its soft power capacity into practice, quite the opposite actually. On 5 August 2007, Chrysostomos II, commenting on the upcoming presidential elections, introduced the conditions for the candidate the church would support for the post. In particular he said that in a democracy all are allowed to have a voting preference and that the church would not support any candidate. However, he clearly stated that whoever identifies oneself with the “lines of the church” is on their side, justifying this by claiming that the church ought to express itself for the benefit of the Greek-Cypriots. In which case, any candidate was invited to follow the church’s line in the sense that it was the “national line”, whereby any agreement or disagreement on behalf of the OCC would be aired. Not only that, but suggested that the federation proposed by Makarios III was a painful retreat that aimed to the survival of the people then, different to the solution that Chrysostomos II thought as optimal.381 At this point, it would be helpful to briefly outline the ethnarchic role of Makarios III in order to demonstrate that the above statement was a departure point. He was then, an ethnarch, “the leader of an unredeemed ethnoreligious people […] and had to lead his people to enosis with its ‘national centre’”.382 He led the transition from British colonialism to modernity, introduced the formation of the Ethnarchic Council in 1948, with him as President and with the OCC resembling a political party. He pushed to overthrow the post-colonial status quo, struggled for independence and championed and politically legitimated the Enosis with Greece. At the later stages of his 378 Ibid. 379 President of DISY since 1997, and the president of Cyprus since 2013. 380 Ethelontis, “Ο Αναστασιάδης στην Ιερά Σύνοδο”, (8 April 2006). 381 “Δικοί μας όσοι ακολουθούν τη Γραμμή της Εκκλησίας”, (6 August 2007). 382 Sia Anagnostopoulou, “Makarios III, 1950–77: Creating the Ethnarchic State”, (2013), pp. 240–92, p. 241.

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life he shifted towards the politically attainable, yet his realist approach was even equated to treason.383 Albeit a controversial figure both domestically and abroad, his legacy and the myth concerning his person render him a most notable figure in the political life of the island, and it still resonates. What is notable here is that Chrysostomos II opted to break from Makarios’ political turn. Amidst the fermentations of the pre-election period, the archbishop did not withhold his preference after all, as he decided to go against the current. Namely, the majority of Democratic Party (DIKO) decided to support the candidacy of Dimitris Christofias, general secretary of AKEL, which displeased Democratic Rally (DISY). Meanwhile, Chrysostomos II openly expressed his support for DISY’s Ioannis Kasoulidis;384 urging namely the people to vote for him en masse.385 Yet, we should underline that the OCC did not come forward with a unitary attitude. In his open intervention, the archbishop had the support of Metropolitan of Lemessos Athanasios (as of 1999), but the Metropolitans Nikiforos of Kykkos and Neofytos of Morfou (since 1998) differentiated themselves, noting that the church is not supposed to intervene in politics, adding that given that the presidential elections are not a synodical matter, it never occupied the synod, neither did the latter reach any decision thereof. The archbishop on the other hand found this to be well within his duties and that it should not cause any surprise, and justified it as the church’s interest in the well-being and survival of the Cypriot Hellenism in its own land, not in the church’s own gains.386 However, he revealed that a stratagem had been planned in order to influence who would be nominated for the presidential candidacy. In fact he explained that the church supported Papadopoulos’ candidacy initially, siding with the prominent DISY members who would do the same, and in the event that Papadopoulos would not make it to the second round, they would support Kasoulidis; which the church did, having first made a deal with DIKO to secure their support for Kasoulidis in the second round. However things did not go as planned, because at the last minute DIKO decided, democratically, to cooperate with AKEL.387 The archbishop’s presence was prominent in the presidential election too then. It appears that he had a preference for DISY and he tried to shift his weight in order to sway the public to that direction, albeit unsuccessfully as Christofias became president. But that is not to be confused as a constant stance or a form 383 Ibid., p. 280. 384 MEP from 2004 to 2013, Cypriot foreign minister since 2013. 385 “Στήριξη προς Δ. Χριστόφια από το ΔΗΚΟ”, (21 February 2008). 386 “Παρασκήνιο από τον Αρχιεπίσκοπο”, (22 February 2008). 387 Ibid.

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of partisanship; prior to that he was a keen supporter of Papadopoulos, during the period of the impending referendum especially. On the antipode, there is the phenomenon of DISY, the centre right – which has transformed, given that in 2004 it was in favour of the Annan Plan – and they are now in power. There one identifies the transformative element in the archbishop’s rhetoric, hence he appears as ambivalent, given that on the one hand he comes across as eurosceptic while on the other he has sided with a clearly EU friendly party. But then again, he too, in his own way is a politician who is in close contact with society, and he sees the necessity in supporting the president for the sake of stability, especially amidst the economic crisis, while Anastasiadis treats him as an equal partner instead of assuming a rejectionist attitude, owed to his secularist predisposition.388 And as regards the archbishop’s Euroscepticism, he may see things from the Greek-Cypriot perspective exclusively, but to his defence it is not easy not to, when living next to the results of the occupation and under the weight of the corresponding bitterness.389 However, if Bülent Ecevit390 said that now “the game is lost” when Cyprus joined the EU, it is no minor detail,391 and it is indicative of the gains from the accession and membership. All the above underlines the fact that close church‒state relations are deeply ingrained in the political culture, from the time that they identified with each other. In addition, they permeate a multiplicity of functions, ranging from the judiciary to the legislature and the government. Thus the church is rendered at least a soft power with a capacity to exert influence on both domestic and international affairs, drawing its resonance from its contribution to the complex personification of the Greek-Cypriots collectively.

3.2.2.4   Post-ethnarchic soft power It would certainly be amiss to argue that the OCC enjoys at least a soft power status domestically, without making a reference to the archbishopric elections, which, due to their irregular and typically seldom occurrence, constitute a major event. And if one takes into account how much they resemble actual political elections, with massive participation, mobilisation of mechanisms, bureaucracies and lengthy preparations beforehand, it becomes apparent that among others,

388 L. E., Interview with the author, 12 March 2014. 389 H. R., Interview with the author, 13 March 2014. 390 The Turkish prime minister (1974, 1977, 1978–79, 1999–2002), who ordered the invasion of Cyprus in 1974. 391 H. R., Interview with the author, 13 March 2014.

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they exhibit a significant extra-ecclesiastical, socio-political dimension; hence, all the more a reason to consider them worth examining. We have already mentioned that the health of Archbishop Chrysostomos rendered him incapacitated physically and mentally. The problem lingered during the first half of the decade in focus due to indecision, canonical impediments, but also intense competition and personal strategies that involved dilatory tactics. In any case, the stalemate was such that the intervention of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople was called upon to settle the issue and so it was. In Chambésy in the Canton of Geneva, Switzerland, in the premises of the Orthodox Centre of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Council of the Extended Synod discussed on 17 May 2006 the declaration of the throne of the Church of Cyprus as void, following four years of prolonged serious illness of the Archbishop Chrysostomos. The Synod was presided by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.392 Out of the twenty-two participants, fifteen voted for the declaration of the throne as void whereas seven against, via secret ballot. Those seven were, notably, the Patriarch of Antioch, the Metropolitans of Paphos, Kytion, Keryneia and Lemessos, and the Bishops of Salamina and Arsinoi.393 Whereby the throne was finally declared void and the rest was left for the Church of Cyprus to sort out. Then begun the pre-election period that demonstrated vividly how closely knit the OCC is with the Greek-Cypriot community, and how definitive of its political culture, even judging by the organisational preparations and formalities, as they involve all Greek-Cypriots and most of the dimensions of the socio-political life of the state. It would be indicative of the pre-election mobilisation to mention that in order to attract voters, the corresponding staff of the candidates organised open public gatherings and campaigned door to door. In fact the teams of the Metropolitan of Lemesos and the Bishop of Kykkos, who had started their campaigns years before, focused on the metropolitan peripheries of Paphos and Kition, considering them more promising in terms of voting potential. At the same time, they were strategically focusing on the Archbishopric periphery, given that from the 1.400 representatives who finally are nominated by the public to vote for the archbishop, 400 get elected there.394 Other methods that generally candidates employed, bearing close resemblance to typical political campaigns that take after the UK example, included postal services that worked fervently in order to distribute announcements referring to gatherings on time, or generally 392 “Η εν Σαμπεσσύ Γενεύης συνελθούσα Διηυρυμένη Σύνοδος δια το Ζήτημα της Ασθενείας του Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου”, 2006, pp. 202–27, (p. 202). 393 Ibid., p. 226. 394 Vasileiou, “Από Πόρτα σε Πόρτα για τις Αρχιεπισκοπικές”, (6 September 2006).

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promotional material. In addition, unprecedented canvassing395 took place as well. It turns out that the election staff knew about the particulars of the voters, e.g. if they were fugitives or not, and paid home visits to convince the electorate of their suggestions.396 However, considering that it was up to the citizens who were eligible voters to elect their representatives, who in turn would vote for their archbishop of choice, the campaigns were hardly a surprise. It would not be an exaggeration to say that they resembled those of political parties. In any case, a brief description of the scope and intricate processes of the archbishopric elections would help convey that as well. The election of the representatives was set to take place on 24 September 2006. For that, the electoral registers were to be drawn in accordance with the state records for both the autochthonous and those, adherent to refugee parishes. Also, all Orthodox Christians, Cypriots and foreigners of eligible age, i.e. eighteen years or older, could register to vote at their parishes.397 As eligible candidates for representatives/electors, qualified those who were Greek-Orthodox, permanent residents of Cyprus, aged twentyfive years or older at the time and they were registered with their corresponding parishes or communities, where they too could submit their candidacy.398 As for the candidates for the archbishopric throne, as eligible to stand for election were those who were active metropolitans and bishops, as well as all unmarried clerics who were qualified for a post in the arch-hierarchy. That is, thirty years or older, with a recognised theology degree, of impeccable morality, piety and faith, with at least five years of service as clerics, in accordance with Article 60 of the Charter of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, as it stood in 2006.399 In addition to this, it should be stressed that the whole process was lengthy and painstaking in terms of organisation, considering especially that it had not taken place for twenty-nine years, after the death of Makarios III. The entire process comprised three phases. Starting from compiling the election catalogues, followed by the secret ballot by which the representatives of every community and parish were nominated. As polling stations, churches and schools were used. As stated earlier, in the archbishopric periphery, including Ammochostos, 400 representatives were to be elected, while in each metropolitan periphery – i.e. Paphos, Larnaka, Keryneia, Lemesos, Morfou – corresponded 200, therefore in sum, 1,400 special 395 Door to door campaign. 396 Vasileiou, “Εκστρατεία από Πόρτα σε Πόρτα”, (20 September 2006). 397 Chrysostomos, “Εκλογή Νέου Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου”, (2006), pp.  288–320, (pp. 288–89). 398 Ibid., p. 291. 399 “Έτσι θα εκλεγεί ο Nέος Aρχιεπίσκοπος”, (10 September 2006).

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representatives/electors.400 Then within twenty-two days following their election, the special representatives would be called by an encyclical to elect 100 general representatives. Those had to be Greek-Orthodox, permanent residents of Cyprus, registered in the election catalogue of their respective metropolitan periphery, above thirty years of age, and must have never been deprived of their ecclesiastical rights by decree of any church authority, prior to the elections. It would rest then upon the sum of the Electoral Assembly to decide who occupies the throne. This comprises the elected clerics and laypeople, the general representatives, and the ex officio members; i.e., all metropolitans, bishops, abbots and theologians who meet a series of criteria. The members of the Electoral Assembly finally cast their votes in two different ballot boxes – one for the general representatives and one for the ex officio members – which having been counted by the Holy Synod, determine as winner the one who receives the absolute majority. In the event that this is not accomplished, the process is repeated, this time with only two candidates, those who topped the votes in each ballot box, unless it is the same person in both, in which case the second is the one who gets the majority of the combination of votes. Then, follows the third voting of all electors, in the same ballot box, and the majority yields the archbishop. Finally, in the unlikely event of a tie, it comes down to the Holy Synod to elect one by secret vote and if that produces a tie too, then it is decided by a draw, which is the last resort.401 All these intricate processes merely demonstrate how much of a social bearing the archbishopric elections have. But apart from that they are indicative of the importance of the pre-election campaigns as they codetermine the final outcome to a major extent. For one thing, the entire Greek-Orthodox community is involved in a democratic procedure as electorate. They, essentially, as an ethnoreligiously homogeneous entity, which is documented, catalogued and grouped together, are invited to elect a religious and cultural leader, therefore to be accordingly – ethnoreligiously – represented. This renders the OCC an authority in its own right, regardless of the constitutional basis of a function as such, because it encompasses the group-person’s sense of identity, expressed through a par excellence representative democratic procedure. From those sources, it draws both formal and informal legitimacy as a post-Ethnarchic actor; the state has its own polity but the church maintains a special role as an informal political organisation.

400 Ibid. 401 Ibid.

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Considering the social relevance that the elections had and the significance of the result, it is no surprise that politics got involved and preferences were revealed, which further corroborates the aforementioned role of the church as actor. Namely, Dimitris Christofias, General Secretary of AKEL, came forward to state that as long as the church involves the public in its elections, allowing them to have a say, politicians too have a right to take part in the process. Parallel to that, AKEL’s communication machinery publicly promoted the Bishop of Kykkos.402 Inevitably Metropolitan Chrysostomos, the regent to the archbishopric throne, reacted by warning AKEL that they would regret their involvement. He said in particular that the church is perennial while parties and people, being transitory, come and go. And further he challenged them that should they persist, he would in turn feel free to express himself and intervene, as every now and then political elections take place too. It is worth mentioning though that apart from that Christofias noted that the candidates had spent millions for their campaigns.403 This too denotes the significance of those elections, as the magnitude of extra-ecclesiastical mobilisation clearly shows. From the same perspective as that of the pre-election period, the general secretary of AKEL explained the reasons for the party’s preference as regards the archbishopric elections in a public party gathering on 19 September 2006;404 he defended his right to a clear stance concerning the elections, and justified this by considering it a duty, as he said, to prevent the church from assuming religiously bigoted positions. Also, he added that the church and its archbishop ought to steer clear of nationalist, chauvinistic worldviews, as well as ethnarchic aspirations, noting that this institution ended when it completed its life-cycle with Makarios III. And he concluded by calling upon the people, especially of the left-wing conviction, to go and vote, emphasising on the significance of the archbishopric elections.405 It ought to be parenthetically mentioned that the campaigns, amongst rhetoric and oppositions, brought about an ambivalent perception of identity that challenges the earlier-mentioned concept of Cyprus as being a projection of the “national centre”, located in mainland Greece. It mainly has to do with Metropolitan Athanasios, who having spent time in Vatopaidion – the renowned Monastery in Athos, Greece – was thought of as an outsider whose locality had been eroded. In that way, Greekness is selectively raised, while in that period “Cypriotness” 402 Vasileiou, “Αρχιεπισκοπικές: Ο Πάφου προειδοποιεί το ΑΚΕΛ”, (12 September 2006). 403 Ibid. 404 Vasileiou, “Εκστρατεία από Πόρτα σε Πόρτα”. 405 Ibid.

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was upheld as a quality, whereby one observes an inconsistency and an instrumentalism in managing locality perception, which pretty much depends on the exigencies of the occasion.406 Be that as it may, the elections yielded a winner, and on Sunday 12 November 2006, the newly elected Archbishop of Nova Justiniana and All Cyprus, Chrysostomos II was enthroned. And right from the enthronement speech the public was made to understand that there was a political programme in store. Beforehand Bishop of Tremithus Vasileios set the tone in addressing the new archbishop, by saying that the church is called upon to contribute constructively to the solution of the national problem, by promoting the rights of the Cypriot people to interecclesiastical organisations as well as bilaterally. Also, to work for the salvation and maintenance of ecclesiastical monuments in the occupied territory, which constitute a part of the cultural and religious heritage of the Cypriot people and for the return of the fugitives to their homes; also the withdrawal of the occupying army and the settlers, and the reunification of the island.407 Then archbishop Christodoulos in his address did not break the pattern as he stressed that contemporary political conditions notwithstanding, the Cypriot Church has been historically ethnarchic and that it continues to play a significant role, especially in terms of raising awareness towards the resistance against the “new world order” and promoting national interests.408 When the turn of Chrysostomos II came to make his speech, he mentioned that within his priorities was the expansion of the synod in order to become a full synod of an autocephalous church, as it was until the Latinocracy of the thirteenth century.409 But then the discursive content became by definition political as he expressed his concern about the plans of an educational reform where the system would be disconnected from the Greek educational paradigm and Greece.410 The new archbishop did not fail to focus on the national issue too, claiming that there is no rest while 37% of Cyprus is occupied. For fourteen centuries before Christ Cyprus was Hellenic, he said, and for sixteen, it has struggled and fought to remain such. To which he added that the pioneer of those struggles was always the church. And although partly relieved of such responsibilities and duties since the establishment of the state, it does not cease to be concerned about the survival 406 L. E., Interview with the author, 12 March 2014. 407 Mitsides, “Τα κατά την Ενθρόνισιν του Νέου Αρχιεπισκόπου”, pp.  469–516, (pp. 485–86). 408 Ibid., pp. 493–94. 409 Ibid. p. 502. 410 Ibid. p. 506.

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of Hellenism at the edge of the Mediterranean. He pointed that it will stand by any given government, which does not write off the motherland and the rights of the Greek-Cypriots, and it will check and advise when a deviation from that course is noted. To which he diplomatically added that the voice of the muezzin does not bother the Greek-Cypriots nor do they have any quarrel with their Turkish-Cypriot compatriots, clarifying that they have lived together peacefully for a long time, and that what bothers the church is the illegal occupation and the violation of human rights by the Turkish forces.411 In addition, in referring to the Enclaved, he expressed his grief, saying that he feels for them and honours their patriotic contribution, but even though it hurts him, he cannot visit them. For, he can neither directly nor indirectly legitimise the illegal regime of the occupation, stressing that this is beyond his powers and beliefs.412 Those could very well be the programmatic priorities of a newly elected president as his speech was permeated by political content with references to very complex issues that require careful handling. It was the exercise of soft power in shaping the socio-political dynamics regarding particular affairs, thus setting red lines on what policies can be acceptable. He therefore demarcated the framework of negotiation flexibility and set chosen entrenched positions from which there ought to be no retreat. So, indeed, the ethnarchic model of governance may be long bygone but its heritage is a post-ethnarchic OCC with soft power capacity; with much more sway among the public, its own funds and estates, its well-established structure, a long history, in a nutshell, an organisation of significant capability, with which no civil society addendum or NGO can withstand comparison, with the exception of a select few, internationally renowned ones. To this fact, the Greek-Cypriot political establishment cannot afford to turn a blind eye, so they acknowledge it. Giorgos Lillikas413 attested to that while in office. He held that the OCC has a role in the promotion of the Cyprus Problem in the EU, given the increased sensitivity therein when it comes to religious affairs and the destruction of the corresponding national and cultural heritage in the occupied territory. He considered the church more suitable for that role in fact, believing that it would better convey the consequences of the ongoing occupation. In addition, having already engaged in talks with the church, he added that given the geographical location of Cyprus and its relations with neighbouring states in conjunction with 411 Ibid., pp. 507–08. 412 Ibid., pp. 509 and 511. 413 Greek-Cypriot foreign minister (2006–2007), former minister of industry, trade and tourism (2003–2006).

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major ones, the Cypriot interests could be further promoted with the assistance of the OCC.414 However, this has not been a constant position regardless of the ruling party and its political priorities. In which case, when both AKEL and DISY challenged this role as well as the legitimacy in expressing views on the sensitive national problem, whereby the OCC emerges as politically assertive, the latter did not settle for a lesser role but stepped forward and claimed what it considered rightfully proper for its function. Even though Chrysostomos II reassuringly repeated that the church does not claim an ethnarchic role or a political channel of expression, he insisted that the OCC will continue to have a say in the national problem whether some like it or not, because it has the right to do so. Essentially his argument was based on the inherent duties that stem from the millennia-long leadership in national struggles to maintain Cyprus both Greek and Christian, which is owed exclusively to the church.415 What is more, in late 2007, the OCC announced that it would take the initiative to devise a plan for the solution of the Cyprus Problem. It was namely mentioned by Chrysostomos II that the purpose was to formulate a national line that would be accepted by all political parties, which would then be submitted to the United Nations and the European leaders. To that end, the archbishop revealed that he was prepared to appoint an interdisciplinary team of specialists.416 This type of assertiveness indicated that Chrysostomos II was determined to be vocal about the Cyprus Problem and intervene when he saw fit, just like he had announced. This was not always welcome though, especially when his publically aired critique was particularly sharp and aimed at giving political instruction. On the occasion of the national holiday of 9 July 1821, he gave a speech at the University of Athens and some comments he made amidst negotiation talks irritated the political establishment. He said that the Greek-Cypriot side was self-trapped in its approach and it indirectly legitimised the ethnic cleansing via references to Greek and Turkish-Cypriot constituent states, for the first time. He also held that the accession to the EU had not been utilised, while on the other hand the myth of a conciliatory Mehmet Ali Talat417 had been falsely built, and warned of new painful losses to come. Notably though, both AKEL and DISY reacted intensely. AKEL accused him of essentially refusing to comply with the solution of a federation, which was at odds with the majority of the people who 414 415 416 417

“Σε Ρόλο Διαφωτιστή η Εκκλησία”, (23 December 2006). “Θα έχουμε Λόγο στο Κυπριακό είτε το θέλουν Κάποιοι είτε όχι”, (24 August 2007). “Σχέδιο Λύσης θα καταρτίσει η Εκκλησία”, (3 December 2007). The leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community between 2005 and 2010.

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supported the policies of Christofias. In fact, AKEL inferred that if the people are the Ecclesia, then the archbishop is at odds with it and therefore he should be concerned. DISY on the other hand noted that the less the archbishop gets involved in politics, the more he salvages his prestige. The archbishop, however, remained undaunted. He replied to Anastasiadis of DISY that his prestige does not depend on him or anyone else, and called upon everyone to stop being annoyed by his interventions because they do so in vain, as the church especially, has got that right.418 Regardless of political reactions which had been presumed to be well founded, the OCC could not just be ignored ad infinitum, given its soft power status. Because even though the latter had been occasionally dismissed as an ethnarchic reminiscent, the fact remains that it is a source of legitimacy, even though antitheses between Chrysostomos II and Christofias in particular have been atypically constant during and after his presidency. Even when they were at daggers drawn, as head of state Christofias could not help but welcome this legitimation even if it meant the acknowledgement of the church as a post-ethnarchic soft power. For example, on 30 July 2008, Chrysostomos II set off on a series of meetings in order to acquire a more complete view of the developments around the Cyprus Problem. For that reason, he met consecutively with Marios Karogian,419 followed the next day by a meeting with President Dimitris Christofias and then separate contacts with the ambassadors of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.420 Even if this were exclusively a gesture, it is of high value as it conveys recognition of the OCC as actor. As for the meeting with Christofias on 31 July, the archbishop declared his support afterwards. He stated namely that he was convinced by the president’s commitment to remain loyal to the principles he is expected to serve as he reassured him that he would claim all that is fair within the bounds of a viable solution, whereby Chrysostomos came satisfied out of the meeting. Most notably though, he stated that the president went as far as to confide in him things that were better kept secret, let alone shared with another.421 This demonstrates how much the archbishop valued his acknowledgement as a political agent at the head of a corresponding actor. And in exchange he offered his legitimation, in the form of a schematically described, “political blessing”.

418 “Η παρέμβαση Αρχιεπισκόπου άναψε Φωτιές στο Εσωτερικό”, (11 July 2008). 419 He was the President of DIKO (2006–2013) as well as President of the House of Representatives (2008–2011) at the time. 420 “Η Εκκλησία στηρίζει τις Συνομιλίες”, (31 July 2008). 421 “Ο Πρόεδρος Χριστόφιας έπεισε τον Προκαθήμενο της Εκκλησίας”, (1 August 2008).

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The latter was more than welcome by the then head of the opposition Nikos Anastasiadis too. DISY, within the context of its broken relations with the other parties and facing an intensification of antitheses concerning the national problem, attempted a rapprochement with the archbishop upon the basis of overlapping views; via a common language concerning the solution without eroding the realist front of the party, while aspiring to a convergence with the church. This initiative on behalf of DISY marked a new period in its relations with the archbishopric palace.422 Regardless if there was no common ground on all issues, what is more noticeable here is that this was deemed a necessary political move by Anastasiadis, which balanced the dynamics of the political scene; parties aside, to seek the church’s “political blessing” as a form of legitimation, corroborates our aforementioned argument about the church being an actor, and actually, a post-ethnarchic soft power. The OCC certainly lived up to this. As we saw earlier, the archbishop had expressed his intention to put together a team of experts in order to devise a plan for a solution, suggest it to the parties as a negotiation platform, and further unanimously submit it to the UN and the European leaders. It may have not transpired entirely in that way; nevertheless, the OCC did proceed in putting a document together. The HSCC opted to do so in order to convey the positions of the church and the document was to be prepared by a committee of appointed hierarchs. So it was decided on the Synodical meeting of 4 May 2010. In fact, the decision was unanimous, especially given that the discussion was on the basis of principles according to the Metropolitan of Paphos Georgios (as of 2006).423 This can be interpreted as a wise move on behalf of the OCC, to steer clear of technical and political particulars that may touch on the negotiations and step into the realm of diplomacy, thus emerging as a substitute of the state; which would be detrimental to the OCC’s initial intentions and plans anyway, given that it would jeopardise both the state’s and the church’s credibility. Metropolitan Nikiforos of Kykkos clarified and elaborated on the church’s particular intervention. He explained that the OCC would not intervene to the parties’ affairs neither in the formulation of the negotiations’ tactics, nor the handling of the Cyprus Problem in terms of particulars. Its intention was to publish positions based on principles when their processing and compiling would be completed. It would intervene as it did with the Annan Plan and the referendum and other occasions if those principles were violated, whereby the survival of

422 Kostakis Antoniou, “Γέφυρες προς Αρχιεπίσκοπο”, (26 January 2010), p. 4. 423 “Η Εκκλησία καταθέτει τις Θέσεις της στο Κυπριακό”, (5 May 2010), p. 3.

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Hellenism and Christianity in their land would not be jeopardised.424 Nikiforos noted that the OCC supports its positions in moderation and consistently, and, in a unitary voice. And to justify the intervention, he argued that the hierarchy had sacrificed itself in the past for the people, and it stood there, before many conquerors, as the strongest institution. It survived as it will continue to do so, it wields power and it will utilise it to the benefit of the people and the country. Further, he clarified that what matters is the official stance, which will be codified and published, reassuring though that the church intervenes in order to put forward principles as points of reference, for the good of Cyprus and not to substitute the state. In that spirit, he clarified that the ethnarchic role is a thing of the past since the Emancipation. However, it is legitimate to be concerned about the people who, in their vast majority, essentially constitute the Ecclesia.425 In few words, the main lines of reasoning as regards political interventions comprise the arguments on the personification of Cyprus, ergo of the republic and the state, while at the same time, they perpetuate the role of the church in a postethnarchic context. Finally on 18 May 2010, the OCC submitted its positions on the Cyprus Problem, in the form of a declaration where the outline to a solution was drawn. First of all in the message it was adamantly stated that the church is above and beyond parties and it does not take part in politics, but it is rather guided by its conscience. Having expressed its abhorrence and disappointment for the continuing human rights’ violation of the Cypriot Hellenism, it declared its determination to stand against the forgery of its rights and stressed its commitment to the immutable human and national rights of the people, and its solidarity to the struggle for justice and freedom.426 However, moving from the general to the particular, unsurprisingly the framework to a solution did not deviate from the firmly and consistently held positions of the HSCC. There was no reference to a “bizonal, bicommunal federation” as it was not deemed an optimal model of polity. It was rather typically stressed instead that the solution should be fair, functional, viable and democratic, compatible with the European acquis, the UN principles and the Security Council resolutions. Also, it should secure the human rights and freedoms of all legal residents, i.e., Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, Maronites, Armenians and Latins. The church declared thereafter that it aspires to an independent state of one unitary sovereignty, citizenship and international 424 “Δεν υπάρχουν Ομαδοποιήσεις Ιεραρχών”, (6 May 2010), p. 10. 425 Ibid. 426 Mikaella Loizou, “Θέσεις για το Κυπριακό κατέθεσε χθες η Εκκλησία”, (19 May 2010), p. 3.

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personality, without foreign guarantor powers, the EU and the UN Security Council notwithstanding; free of occupational forces, barbed wires and settlers, with the right of the fugitives to return to their ancestral homes being guaranteed. Finally, in its message the HSCC urged all political powers to stand united, for upon that depends the survival of the nation; hence, a unitary position towards the national problem was essential.427 This, of course, is not the right setting to discuss and evaluate the proposed framework for a solution to the Cyprus Problem. But when all is said and done, this declaration does indeed indicate the presence of the OCC at the epicentre of the Cypriot political scene. Guidelines and direction to the public as well as the political system are evident, demarcating the entrenched positions from which no retreat is conceivable in the view of the OCC. It contains an agenda, a purpose, and what is more, it clearly demonstrates which is the raison d’être behind the latent ethnarchic tendencies that allow the church to emerge as a soft power when necessity calls for it; i.e., when injury to the group-person seems likely.

427 Ibid.

4  Readjustment to the post-Westphalian era This chapter deals with the changes that the post-Westphalian era has ushered in, in conjunction with the EU membership; especially considering the increased mobility within the latter in particular, which is in fact a regional/continental instance – amplified of course due to the border free Schengen Zone – where migratory waves have intensified exponentially over the past twenty-five years. This bears cultural consequences inevitably, challenges previous certainties and gives rise to actors and institutions  – churches included  – often beyond and above the nation-state. At the same time, the OCG and the OCC, being autocephalous national churches, are facing jurisdictional constraints on the one hand, which hinders them from utilising Greek-Orthodox religioscapes established by corresponding diasporic communities abroad; while on the other, being themselves anchored in their states and their national interests, are tempted to indulge into exercising a geopolitical/geocultural role, along the lines of the permissiveness of the post-Westphalian arrangement as regards non-state actors, which is within their soft power capacities.

4.1 “Reverse Westphalia” and the interplay with geopolitics and culture The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) that ended the Thirty Years’ War in Central Europe between Catholics and Protestants and between rulers, for faith, doctrine and power, ushered in a new political paradigm, i.e., the foundations for what has evolved into the international state system as we know it. From the medieval arrangement which was in decline, power was diffused among principalities with sovereign rights over territory, and although the ultimate goal was to establish durable peace in Europe, what this gave rise to was a paradigm shift that would determine the global order.1 Further, the nineteenth century gave birth to the notion of IR, for with the European state system of the seventeenth century already digested and established, it inevitably became the global paradigm.2 Thereby the notion of sovereignty emerged, which involves “the rightful entitlement to exclusive, unqualified, and supreme rule within

1 Kimon Valaskakis, “Westphalia II: The Real Millennium Challenge”, (2000). 2 Jürgen Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts (2011), pp. 566 and 570.

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a delimited territory”.3 Exclusive rule means that no ruler has the right to intervene in the affairs of other states; unqualified, therefore within any given sovereign state, respective rulers have complete authority; and supreme, which means that there is no legal or political authority higher than the state. In other words, sovereign states are a) equal members of the international society, and equal with regard to international law, b) they recognise no higher authority than themselves and there is no superior jurisdiction to theirs, and finally, c) their governments have exclusive jurisdiction within their own frontiers. Of course actual sovereignty was always debatable to some extent given that it realistically obeys constraints that emanate from power and the cultural, economic, political, military and technological parameters that determine it. Therefore, to formally possess sovereignty is quite different to the independence that comes with the capacity to pursue policies, hence the inequality of states in practice.4 After all, in the nineteenth century, it was the balance of power that permeated this system and even though the Great Powers utilised the Westphalian arrangement to resolve issues diplomatically, regional conflicts such as the Crimean War did transpire nonetheless, as well as alliances or assistance to small powers, if anything, in order to maintain the balance of power.5 Be that as it may, former certainties and conventions as such, which permeated the international system, are now being formally challenged as the sovereignty of the state is being eroded by globalisation in general and European integration in particular. Anderson in fact has identified parallels with the medieval state of affairs, mutatis mutandis of course, viewing a “Europe of Regions” as the equivalent of the medieval metaphor in the sense of blurry intra-European borders, state sovereignties partially pooled together and shared between Member States, within a context of overall porous inside/outside institutional differentiations;6 hence, the multilayered identities and their equivalent sense of belonging spatially, whether that might be national, regional or European, in tune with the postmodern perspective.7 Former Ambassador of Canada to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Kimon Valaskakis (1995–2000), identifies five “systemic pillars” that secure the viability of the Westphalian System, which

3 4 5 6 7

Anthony McGrew, “Globalisation and Global Politics”, (2009), pp. 15–33, (p. 24). Morgenthau, p. 322. Valaskakis., “Westphalia II”. Anderson, “Singular Europe: An Empire Once Again?”, pp. 15–16. Ibid., p. 17.

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evolved in the lapse of time and matured together with the system in a threeand-a-half-centuries’ fermentation: a) National governments are the sole holders of (legal) sovereignty. b) Sovereignty is exercised over physical territory. c) National governments are not only legally sovereign but are also the most powerful players of the world system. d) The only enforceable international law is that based on treaties between sovereign countries. e) War is a legitimate instrument of IR.8 The first pillar, from the era of state personification being expressed and identified with the actual person of the ruler – of which the utterance of Louis XIVth “L’Etat c’est moi” is representative – to the democratic delineation of sovereignty by Locke and Rousseau as delegated to the ruler by the people, therefore it may be withdrawn, it became the common denominator and the axiomatic conditio sine qua non, that sovereignty may solely be exercised by national governments. Sovereignty over territory is self-evidently a constant, it is legally consolidated and it determines the physical boundaries of the state and the resources it controls within them; it is intertwined with history and symbolisms, and blood has been shed for it diachronically. As for the third pillar, it was materialised initially through the shifting of power from the Catholic Church – not willingly of course – to the secular rulers whereby church and state were de facto separated, up to the eighteenth century and onwards when national goals and interests took precedence thereafter;9 hence church and state separation eventually became the norm de jure as well, as it has been attested by an array of Western constitutions. International law, the fourth pillar of the Westphalian System especially since the eighteenth and nineteenth century when IR became an integral part of politics, was rendered instrumental in maintaining the viability and functionality of the system. Treaties between sovereign states reaffirmed the concept of sovereignty through mutual consent between signatories, balance of power and its corresponding coercion and capitulation notwithstanding. Be that as it may, treaties generated international law. Even though the purpose of the Westphalian Peace was to avoid war, when things get to a point of an extreme impasse and no other way of resolution is possible, it was acceptable to resort to conflict; however, that is permeated by rules as regards the type of weaponry, engagement

8 Valaskakis, “Westphalia II”. 9 Ibid.

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and victory. Later, in the nineteenth and twentieth century, further rules were introduced, from proper war declaration to the prisoners’ treatment, as well as the UN Charter where war may conditionally be considered legitimate.10 However, these systemic certainties have come under pressure from newly emerging political realities that introduced a new set of ideas on how institutions ought to function in the age of globalisation. Governments nowadays do not hesitate to shift powers to any possible direction: sideways, thus giving way to the markets, downwards, to the level of sub-national administration, and upwards, to supranational institutions and entities such as the EU, with the latter especially, embodying the epitome of the phenomenon that Valaskakis calls “Reverse Westphalia”, at the expense of the nation-state and the forms of governance that to date were by and large taken for granted. Whereby national governments do not monopolise sovereignty anymore; with Brussels being granted authority increasingly, the European Commission concentrates power over Member States while national legislation gives way to European Law within the framework of European integration. Most importantly, the Treaty of Rome which is the legal document that determines European integration incorporated no legal provision towards the revocation of this process, hence it is deemed irreversible.11 By extension, the impact on the first pillar of the Westphalian System entails consequences for the national churches, being institutions that adhere to the nation-state. The erosion of national borders – the second pillar of territorial sovereignty – between EU members that are cosignatories of the Schengen Treaty, whereby free movement of people and extended intra-European migration means the relativisation of space and the formation of religioscapes anew, is also an issue of concern for national churches of given spatial jurisdiction. For that reason, expats may be associated with a different religious authority, albeit of the exact same creed and denomination. This would be the case if, for instance, a Greek migrated to Germany or a Greek-Cypriot to the UK, entering therefore, in the event that they were practising Orthodox Christians, the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople; i.e, the religious authority of that denomination worldwide, with the exception being other patriarchates and/or autocephalous churches. Other than that, increased mobility means not only that their audience is not fixed, but also that depending on their integration, expatriates become susceptible to endorsing foreign, often antithetical, value systems.

10 Ibid. 11 Ibid.

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The third pillar, that of nation-states being the sole and absolute actors in the international system, is also being eroded by the emergence of non-state actors such as international organisations, e.g. the OECD, Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), e.g. the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the UN, lobbies and interest groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and generally civil society.12 In this context and considering the neglected parameter of the emergent postsecular environment, it would not be out of order for churches to claim their part and role as civil society organisations and recognised actors. After all, we have already established that de jure the EU acknowledges them as such through the Lisbon Treaty, while it de facto engages with their offices of representation in Brussels, as we have also demonstrated that the churches of interest – and not only them – possess the capacity and at times the will, to function as soft powers within a socio-political framework. Wes should mention that the secularist trend intended for them precisely the role of civil society addendums together with a clear separation from the state and its affairs. In passing, we may refer to the other two challenges to the pillars of the Westphalian order, which are not linked with the functions of the churches in focus particularly as regards the problématique at present; hence, they are mentioned just for the record. Concerning the fourth one then, of treaties constituting the basis for international law, it is notable that in fact the latter in its current form is actually challenging state sovereignty via the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention when necessary by the UN, such as in Kosovo. Also, crimes against humanity by a government, even against its own people, are much harder to carry out these days and still remain an equal member of the international society without consequences, including foreign interference/intervention.13 Finally, the fifth pillar, which considers war a last resort measure between states’ irresolvable disputes, is hardly applicable any more as contemporary conflicts adhere to a different typology where engagement rules and official war declarations are not the case. Apart from the informal economic, trade and fiscal confrontations, the clashing opponents are usually not sovereign states but ethnic sub-groupings

12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. In addition, it deserves to be mentioned that the UN, precisely in the event of humanitarian crises, has adopted the article known as Responsibility to Protect (R2P); however, military intervention has been selective, regardless of atrocities being committed, thus demonstrating the role national interests play as far as Great Powers and the UN Security Council are concerned and their will to intervene. See Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, The United Nations in the 21st Century (2007).

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engaged in civil conflict or even religious.14 But churches do not command armies, not the ones we are examining anyway. It is essentially the deepening of the EU, the transfer of powers upwards to Brussels that causes this paradigm shift. European decision-making takes precedence over national prerogatives, while governance takes a supranational form, and it is being exercised by the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the European Parliament. This, still under construction, system has been labelled as a temple, namely the “Temple of the European Union”, which, as a political construct relies on supranational policies, common foreign and security policies, and cooperation at a level of policing and justice.15 Further deepening of course is in sight. The main reason why the Westphalian reversal has anything to do with the OCC and the OCG as organisations is because the process of Europeanisation comes with consequences that call for an adaptation of several institutions, the aforementioned ones included. Because among others they have identified themselves with the state, being essentially nationally dependent entities that exist within the bounds of the state and because of the latter, as those are ultimately national churches. And now they are expected to retrace their steps in a changing world where the state loses relevance. We have demonstrated this earlier, in the way they both personify their states and perceive their own roles therein. But, furthermore, one has to take into consideration the function of those churches during the period in which the Westphalian order was on the rise and they became ex negativo national, partly because of that order. To better capture the dimensions of their reorientation, we ought to take into account the pattern of the nineteenth-century developments especially, which repeats itself in reverse while bearing an analogy with nowadays; i.e., a return to the previous condition of politically weakened regions and centralised power, as opposed to the shift from the discarded Eastern Orthodox ecumenical, patriarchal model for the sake of autocephalous national churches, which is the role they defend in the face of the challenge that the reversal of the Westphalian System poses. We should note the major difference between the OCG and OCC backgrounds though: the former was founded in the nineteenth century and was divested of the Millet system authority, whereas the latter enjoyed increased autonomy much earlier and was vested with political privileges already since the fifth century; therefore, their

14 Ibid. 15 Wolfgang Merkel and Sonja Grimm, The Limits of the EU: Enlargement, Deepening and Democracy (2007), p. 4.

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respective autocephaly statuses had different points of reference and grounds for being founded in the first place. In the case of the OCG, before being brought into life its flock adhered to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, under the Ottoman theocratic Millet system which distinguished between communities on the basis of religious affiliation and granted limited powers of self-governance to religious authorities accordingly. However, following the intervention of the Great Powers and the coalition of the Triple Entente, which comprised France, England and Russia, following their final victory over the Ottomans, via the Treaty of Adrianople on 14 September 1829, and then the London Protocol of 3 February 1830, the newly founded state of Greece was recognised and established, under the aegis of its protecting powers.16 Following negotiations they finally agreed that Otto von Wittelsbach, the underage Bavarian prince, was a suitable candidate to the Greek throne, a decision that would be ratified by the Fifth National Assembly of 1832 at Nafplion, the first capital of Greece. Meanwhile between 1833 and 1835, the country would be run by regency until Otto would come of age.17 The appointed regent, Georg Ludwig von Maurer (1790–1872), together with the cleric, theologian, scholar and advisor on religious matters Theoklitos Pharmakides (1784–1860) believed that the church should be independent from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople that was under Turkish rule, and in 1833 the OCG was founded,18 albeit unilaterally as it was not recognised as autocephalous by the Ecumenical Patriarchate until 1850 when this was settled via a synodical tome.19 The important thing is that the founding act of the OCG took place within and because of the Westphalian order that involved a secular state system, with the nationalisation and cooptation of the church as essential. And from that perspective, the nation-state is existentially indispensable for the OCG, formally no less. Further, Orthodoxy has been embedded in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century historiography, into a national identity linear and uninterrupted continuum from the antiquity and onwards, while it adapted to the sociopolitical and cultural exigencies of the times, with the only exception being the separation from the state.20 16 Andreas M. Wittig, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in Griechenland: Ihre Beziehung zum Staat gemäß der Theorie und der Entwicklung von 1821–1977 (1987), pp. 32–33. 17 Ibid., p. 34. 18 Ibid., p. 79. 19 Ibid., p. 107. 20 Effi Gazi, “Revisiting Religion and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Greece”, (2009), pp. 95–106, (p. 101).

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The OCC on the other hand, albeit facing the same post-Westphalian challenges, has quite a different background. Being geographically in the presumed administrative region of Antioch, the latter demanded that the Church of Cyprus ought to be under its jurisdiction. Hence for fear that the autocephaly would be lost to Antioch, even though it already was in a position to ordain its own bishops, it was decided by the third ecumenical council of Ephesus (431) to recognise the Apostolic Church of Cyprus as autonomous and autocephalous.21 Up until the founding of the state of Greece, the OCC was the undisputed authority of all Greek-Orthodox inhabitants of the island. Thereafter though, the newly founded state of Greece emerged as an alternative entity of authority and belonging, able to play the Cypriot church’s national, protective role, what is more, acknowledged as such by the people, being thus a new point of reference in the nineteenth century.22 The OCC had to nationalise its political content in view of the likelihood of relevance loss due to the dominant nationalist sentiment of the time. As its flock was transformed to a national Greek community, likewise the OCC adapted its pastoral rhetoric to nationalpolitical, so that it would be able to maintain its status as natural leadership of the Greek-Orthodox ethnoreligious community.23 In addition, within the bounds of the Ottoman reforms that sought to eradicate theocracy and establish a modern polity – mainly because of the pressure of the Great Powers – at a first reading the OCC appeared to be losing the absolute authority granted previously by the Millet system. However, its institutionalisation as a legal person of authority, allowed the church to maintain its place as the head of the Greek-Orthodox community. In fact, by the end of the Ottoman dominance, the church in practice constituted the state, as its functions organisationally and structurally resembled, rather, those of a polity.24 More to the point, during the British colonial rule and even though the church enjoyed no political privileges, lacking traditional right-wing parties that could represent the people the OCC fulfilled that role too, being for the Greek-Cypriot Hellenism the “avant-garde gatekeeper”.25 Enjoying broad popular support as it instigated a considerable anti-colonial mobilisation, it was essentially a people’s church,

21 Kleitos Ioannides, The Church of Cyprus: History and Culture of two Millennia (1999), p. 41. 22 Michael, p. 243. 23 Ibid., p. 300. 24 Ibid., p. 314. 25 Constantinou, pp. 99–132, (p. 121).

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a “Volkskirche”.26 It constituted the central pillar of the armed revolt, as the guerrilla war against the British was led by Archbishop Makarios, while the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) was headed by General Georgios Grivas–Digenis (1897–1974).27 For both churches then, albeit for different reasons, the erosion of the nation-state while they have meanwhile identified themselves with it – existentially in the case of the OCG and conditionally for the OCC – and the shifting of powers to Brussels is neither simple nor easy a challenge. To complicate things even more, it is not only the churches that have had an uneasy relationship with the West, including Europe; their corresponding states have not had a much better record. Both the Hellenic and the Cypriot Republic, for different reasons, have found the EU to be a necessary evil and the EU was usually seen through an instrumentalist, utilitarian lens, rather than as a selfevident ally and partner. To put it bluntly, the sense of belonging was just not there; a necessary trait perhaps, in order to consider the EU deepening as part of the greater scheme of things, into which a state willingly and wittingly engages, else it feels like a sacrifice – and perhaps it is when it clashes with the collective sense of identity. Greece, for one, does not belong to the West according to Huntington. The Western Civilisation may have been born there, but it eventually left home and while being disseminated elsewhere it grew, evolved and assumed a shape that does not befit Greece’s political culture. So, even though historically Greece is ever present in the Western hemisphere, as far as organisations such as the EU and NATO go, it is also “an anomaly”, a difficult partner, not harmonised with the general political orientation therein.28 Examples are ample right from the outset, before even the Maastricht Treaty when Greece obstructed a number of common policies as an European Communities (EC) member, when PASOK was in office during its first two terms (1981–1989): such as, the hindrance to

26 Theodoulou, p. 82. 27 Joseph, p. 19. General Grivas (nom de guerre: Digenis, Gr.: Διγενής) was a controversial figure. Apart from his struggle with the freedom fighters/paramilitaries EOKA – terrorists to the British colonial regime – for Cypriot independence and Enosis with Greece, when a significant shift was noted in Makarios’ policy, i.e. Enosis was a sine qua non no more, Grivas actively sought to overthrow him. To that end, he collaborated with the Greek junta regime of Ioannides, within the context of a broad conspiracy of international geopolitical interests. See Andreas Constandinos, “US-British Policy on Cyprus, 1964–1974”, The Cyprus Review, 23 (1), (2011), pp. 17–48. 28 Huntington, pp. 162–63.

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the condemnation of Libya for its intervention in Chad in November 1981; the distancing of the Greek government from sanctions against the Soviet Union when martial law was imposed in Poland in January 1982; in August 1983, it proposed a moratorium on the re-armament of NATO; also, it obstructed the issuing of a unanimous EC condemnation of the Soviet Union for shooting down a Korean airliner in September 1983,29 to name a few indicative examples. Not to mention the consistently pro-Arab stance and the questionable association with Syria, Libya and the Palestinian authority, to the detriment of Greece’s western strategic interests and alliances; suffice it to mention that the state of Israel was not recognised until Konstantinos Mitsotakis became prime minister with New Democracy and mended this in April 1990.30 As for the EU being characterised essentially as a necessary evil for Greece, one might only consider the background of the accession decision to realise that it was a strategic move with the national interest topping the agenda. Following the British patronage, Greece entered the American sphere of influence and protection after the Second World War and the Greek Civil War of 1946– 1949, being consistently oriented towards the West as the only option available outside the Eastern Bloc. This was rather short-lived however as the disappointment with NATO, because of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the constant claims in the Aegean, estranged Greece from the USA, leading it to the 1981 EC membership as the only reasonable option available, within a geopolitical and security context and not out of a genuine European federalist aspiration.31 However, even in that sense, Greece’s expectations exceeded what the EU could provide, thus yet another disappointment awaited the euphoric with the EU prospects Mitsotakis’ government. National security, what is more with an eye on Turkey, was not guaranteed by the European partners and parallel to that, solidarity as regards the problem with the FYROM was deemed insufficient as Greece had hoped for unilateral support with no grey areas and ambivalences.32 For the Republic of Cyprus joining the EU meant a turning point and a radical strategic reorientation, again within the context of a realist utilitarian foreign policy and not out of a sense of belonging in the West per se. First of all, the 29 Heinz-Jürgen Axt, “National Interests on Top of the Agenda – Greece’s Role in Common Foreign and Security Policy”, (1997), pp. 153–97, (p. 157). 30 Ibid., p. 159. 31 Heinz-Jürgen Axt, “Financial Transfers and Security: Why Greece Favoured the Maastricht Treaty on European Union”, (1997), pp. 99–134, (p. 122). 32 Ibid., pp. 128–29.

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colonial experience has played a major part in this. Even though Britain was gradually withdrawing from its colonies, it had no plan to leave Cyprus given that its strategic location rendered it valuable. It was a bastion of instrumental use concerning the place of Britain in the Middle East and the preservation of its Great Power status; therefore, it was not just colonialism that kept them on the island but a strategic part of a foreign policy and a sign of prestige internationally.33 To make things worse, Turkey was a close British ally, adamantly anti-Soviet and well-placed geostrategically, which meant that London could not afford to displease Ankara, such a valuable ally, for the sake of Cyprus; if anything, because it would not befit the British national interest.34 Meanwhile, hopes of unification with Greece were curtailed by political realism on behalf of the “national centre” because of Western intervention. The plebiscite’s result for Enosis with Greece, conducted by the Ethnarchic Council in 1950, yielded an astounding 96% in favour of unification with Greece, legitimising thus the claim and the diplomatic pressure to that end, to no avail however. It is indicative that Greek Premier Marshall Plastiras35 refused to even receive the volumes of the plebiscite, while the then Foreign Minister Georgios Papandreou36 went as far as to exclaim that “Modern Greece breathes with two respiratory organs, one British, one American, and therefore it cannot afford suffocating itself with the Cyprus Problem”.37 Thus, following the 1959 agreements of London and Zurich, in 1960 Cyprus was granted independence instead and thereafter emerged as a republic. In the meantime, Cyprus was already engaged in the activities of the NonAligned Movement (NAM).38 In 1955, i.e., prior to independence and his election as president, Makarios attended the conference in Bandung, Indonesia. Likewise, he attended the Belgrade conference of 1961 when the Movement was officially established. What is more, Cyprus hosted the NAM conference of 1988 in Nicosia, and notably, this membership was terminated as recent as May 2004,

33 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “British Strategic Priorities and the Cyprus Question, 1954– 1958”, (2006), pp. 199–210, (pp. 201–03). 34 Ibid., p. 205. 35 He served three terms, namely: 3 January to 8 April 1945; 15 April to 21 August 1950; 27 October 1951 to 11 October 1952. 36 Vice-president of the Plastiras government (1950–1952). 37 Constantinou, pp. 99–132, (p. 125). 38 A group that comprises 120 member-states and 17 observer-states, which do not identify with the policies of great or major powers nor do they accommodate great power blocs.

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when Cyprus joined the EU,39 although it still attends meetings as a guest.40 Within the framework of its non-aligned foreign policy orientation, the Cypriot government turned to Moscow time and again for all sorts of assistance, from military to diplomatic, especially when the need emerged to counterbalance the Western diplomatic hassle towards a solution that befitted the West.41 All that demonstrates that neither the churches of interest nor Orthodoxy need be considered anti-Western by definition, given that an array of political developments, notably recent ones, have burdened an already uneasy relationship with power politics that had nothing to do with cultural compatibility in the first place. Otherwise, it would mean, judging by the diachronically Turkish-friendly Western diplomatic predisposition, that Turkey is permeated by Europeanness more than Greece or Cyprus; therefore, it would be absurd to consider Orthodoxy’s Occidentalism as the definitive criterion here. The aforementioned particularities would be of little significance at present if they had not co-determined the post-Westphalian geopolitical landscape, coformulated the corresponding agenda and readjusted priorities; with churches included in a geocultural sense. At this point though, in order to steer clear of misunderstandings, we must make a few clarifications given that the term “geopolitics” has been intertwined with very questionable ideas in the past. Here it is meant strictly as la géographie politique and not as Geopolitik. The former takes into account the human cultural and civilisational presence within a given spatial field of action where ways of life, “genres de vie”, affect the states located there. This is in stark contrast with the past German concept of Geopolitik, particularly in the first half of the twentieth century, with its absolutisation of space and the neglect for human presence therein, reducing the approach to its strictly geographical aspect and to the services of the state.42 Of course since then geopolitics have been academically restored and retheorised. Needless to say, it is the géographie politique, a fully compatible approach with the ESIR that we opt for, which too is culture – and therefore religion – inclusive. As regards the area where both Greece and Cyprus are located, it appears that the Eastern Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe are diachronically deemed very crucial. According to Sir Halford J. Mackinder and his famous “Heartland” 39 It is not permitted by the EU to become or be a Member State of the latter and maintain a full NAM membership at the same time. 40 Republic of Cyprus – Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Cyprus and the Non-Aligned Movement”, (23 April 2008). 41 Joseph, p. 60. 42 Geoffrey Parker, Geopolitics: Past Present and Future (1998), p. 47.

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thesis, the latter rests where Russia is located and it is of absolute importance in terms of geostrategic power, thereby he called it the “pivot area” (see image 6), as it provides accesses to all directions and capacity to strike, the north notwithstanding. The “great inner marginal crescent” where among other states, Greece and Cyprus are located, is the first peripheral zone of the geographical pivot, therefore strategically crucial.43 He thought that the vast particular region which is situated at the meeting point of Europe and Asia, including the Middle East, Central Asia, north of the subcontinent and extending to the Far East, was the absolute vantage point geostrategically, so much that he wrote his renowned verses where he claimed that: Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World.44

The well-known geostrategist Nicholas J. Spykman however, did not entirely share this point of view. He agreed on the importance of the Eurasian landmass, the world-island, but he considered the surrounding inner crescent – where incidentally Greece and Cyprus are located – far more important as it encases the pivotal area. So he renamed the crescent to “rimland” and upgraded it to the utmost strategic area, which, if dominated by a single power, then Eurasia would be subjugated to it.45 For that reason, he rephrased the famous verses on the “Heartland” thesis, replacing them with his “Rimland”, claiming instead that “Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world”.46 We actually do not endorse or essentialise this geographical determinism, and by extension, nor do we choose between the two theses, yet we do consider them indicative of the significance of the region as they validate, albeit from different standpoints, the geopolitical importance of both Greece and Cyprus.

43 Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, pp. 421–37, (p. 436). 44 Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (1942), p. 106. 45 Spykman, p. 44. 46 Ibid., p. 43.

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Image 6:  The Geographical Pivot of History and Surrounding Crescents47

47 Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, pp. 421–37, (p. 435).

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The latter is further attested by Ahmet Davutoğlu,48 who, as an academic, evaluated both Greece and Cyprus very highly along those lines. As regards Greece – and Turkey – he considers the Aegean the most important marine hub of the Eurasian World Continent on the north-south axis. It is in close proximity to three continents, namely Europe, Asia and Africa, and offers access to all three of them without any land obstruction, being thus evaluated as a sea of a firstclass geostrategic value. This is further amplified by an array of other, peripheral elements; for instance, the Aegean has played a definitive part in facilitating the geopolitical, geostrategic, geoeconomic and geocultural interplay of the Balkan Peninsula with Asia Minor and the Middle East. Also, it contains a complicated network of thousands of islands and islets, which, combined, form together strategic passages and sub-axes that increase the overall significance of the Aegean.49 Cyprus on the other hand occupies a central location globally, being equally close to Europe, Asia and Africa, while, together with Crete, they form an axis where sea lanes meet. Located amidst the narrows that divide Asia from Europe and the Suez Canal, which in turn separates Asia and Africa, it constitutes a stable basis that renders possible to oversee the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea and the sea lanes of Aden and Hormuz, the most important water connections between Eurasia and Africa. Not to mention that one cannot overlook the fact that even though British colonialism is a thing of the past, Britain still maintains a military base there nonetheless, as neither can one overlook that the island was the epicentre of major crises during the cold war. Cyprus then occupies a location that can directly affect the strategic connections between Asia and Africa, Europe and Africa, as well as Europe and Asia, constituting the cornerstone of strategic balances in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans and North Africa.50 Suffice it to quote perhaps a segment from the conclusions of the European Commission on the application of Cyprus to join the EU, where all those elements that constitute a state geostrategically and geoculturally significant coexist. Namely, it reads that Cyprus’s geographical position, the deep-lying bonds which, for two thousand years, have located the island at the very fount of European culture and civilisation, the intensity of the European influence apparent in the values shared by the people of Cyprus and in the conduct of the cultural, political, economic and social life of its citizens, the wealth of its contacts of every kind with the Community, all these confer on Cyprus,

48 Former Turkish Foreign Minister (2009–2014) and Prime Minister (2014–2016). 49 Davutoğlu, (2001). 50 Ibid.

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beyond all doubt, its European identity and character and confirm its vocation to belong to the Community.51

Yet, as already stated, geography alone does not suffice to grant a state power. For Brzezinski,52 it is the combination of four domains that accomplish that, i.e. military, economy, technology and culture, noting that the latter especially is where America excels in its appeal to youths worldwide.53 Martin Wight believed that power comprised the combination of population size, strategic geographical location and size, economy and industrial output. Apart from that, he valued unquantifiable qualities very highly such as education, administration, finances, technology, but above all, moral cohesion.54 The latter can be described as a shared sense of belonging that is permeated by homogeneity and common aspirations for the whole, which rests above and beyond its constituents, being therefore more than the sum of its parts. On that, Davutoğlu holds that the elevation from the individual level of microconsciousness to the social, cultural and historical level of macroconsciousness and the exertion of influence upon that basis is actually a search for maturity and fulfilment as perceived by any given cultural/civilisational region. And as a region, he defines the area that is demarcated by the section between geopolitical, geocultural and geoeconomic boundaries and is permeated by a cohesive inner strategic outlook.55 Based upon that premise, geopolitical frictions and conflicts merely reflect the disparity between the regions of sovereignty as described by border definitions on the one hand, and on the other, the regions that are delineated by geophysical, economic and cultural geography;56 which brings about the significance of distinguishing between borders and geopolitical zones, where legal borders do not necessarily identify with the latter, because they emanate from culture and history. The tension emerges then from the disparity between political borders and geopolitical frontiers which by and large determine the dynamics of the Eurasian geopolitics. More analytically, to demonstrate the significance of the cultural parameter, it is worth noting that Davutoğlu, in his mathematical function of power, considers as constant data history, geography, population size and culture, whereas the 51 European Commission, “Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership – Extracts doc/93/5”, (30 June 1993). 52 Academic and former USA National Security advisor (1977–1981). 53 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (1997), p. 24. 54 Wight, p. 26. 55 Davutoğlu, (2001). 56 Ibid.

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variable ones comprise economy, technology and military competence. Further, he maintains that the constants are not easily changeable; therefore, they are crucial in the way they determine power, when combined of course with the above-mentioned variables and not as stand-alone parameters, coupled as well with strategic mentality, political will and strategic planning. Culture comprises psychological, social, political and economic elements that are based on a value system, generated within a particular geographical space, within a given historical framework where identity encompasses the sense of belonging. Seen from that perspective, culture is the linkage between the constants and the variables of power, and it actually motivates the latter.57 Therein the religious convictions of a society have a central part to play, especially when they determine one’s sense of identity to a major extent, bypassing the metaphysical aspect of religion and rendering it to cultural-political motivation and collective target setting. In which case, the religiocultural parameter legitimises national objectives and political pursuits, in both the domestic and the international arena. It is worth noting that this applies to both Greece and Cyprus. In the special Eurobarometer survey of 2010 on biotechnology, 79% of the Greek respondents replied positively when asked if they believe there is a God, while 88% of Greek-Cypriots replied the same, with the European (EU 27) average amounting to 51%.58 However, when asked what they considered themselves to be in terms of creed the percentages rose, with 94% of Greeks and 93% of Greek-Cypriots answering that they are Orthodox Christians.59 This is indicative of group-religiosity as a primary determinant of the collective sense of identity above the individual level, for a self-proclaimed Orthodox Christian answered as part of a group, while as an atheist provided an individual’s perspective, hence the quantitative disparity. However, a major post-Westphalian challenge is the relativisation of space, even though the regional, geocultural parameter remains decisive. The nationstate encompasses a cultural variety that follows naturally the general mobility of labour, people and corporations in Europe especially, and even though it remains in place it is not impermeable to those changes. De- and reterritorialisation functions as a destabilising factor as it imposes cultural-spatial clusters within the state. The sense of belonging thus assumes the community as central point of reference, irrespective of the broader territorial, national or regional, paradigm. Therefore, it does not necessarily depend on broader identity cohesion nor does 57 Ibid. 58 T.N.S. Opinion & Social, Special Eurobarometer 341 / Wave 73.1, “Biotechnology” (2010), p. 204. 59 Ibid., p. 379, see tables section.

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it adhere to a clear spatial mapping, rendering thus distance and central cultural locations less relevant. Belonging in a community may be applicable in that sense, even though spatially there may exist no common or central territorial reference between its members.60 This phenomenon was expected to trigger a wave of modernisation, bringing communities to the same temporal wavelength. However, sociological expectations have not been validated by reality, as glocalisation, a plurality of localities within a global context of mobility, has enhanced diversity without sweeping cultural differences away, in a deterministic sense of modernisation, religious privatisation and ultimately full integration and homogeneity.61 We have observed then that the pre-existing attributes and major determinants of identity are transferable via reterritorialisation and not fixed in place, the place of origin in particular. Religion, being a floating notion that does not adhere to spatial appropriation in the way politics do, is heavily permeated by the collective sense of belonging at a level of community without being spatially anchored; this on the other hand does not entail that the notion of a homeland and a central, original point of reference is completely absent.62 The connotations that the heartland and the diasporic community bear, however, are by-products of their spatial differences that bleed into their narrative content. The heartland is the ark of purity and consistency with the archetypal paradigm, whereas Diaspora embodies the erosion, adulteration and hybridity of identity; essentially a departure from the authentic, along the lines of integration or assimilation.63 Not that it has to be so, as it is rather a typology that is being described here at a level of perception and not necessarily fact as regards authenticity. Be that as it may, the crux of the matter is that by the processes of de- and reterritorialisation, an array of religioscapes has been formed, i.e., “subjective religious maps  – and attendant theologies  – of immigrant, or diasporic, or transnational communities who are also in global flow and flux”.64 The GreekOrthodox religioscapes however have a background that can be traced back, before the nation-state came to be, and they have diachronically been subject to fluctuations linked with economic, political and cultural developments over 60 Nikos Papastergiadis, The Turbulence of Migration: Globalisation, Deterritorialisation and Hybridity (2000), pp. 115–16. 61 Beyer, pp. 43–44. 62 Ibid., p. 121. 63 Ibid., p. 132. 64 Elizabeth McAlister, “Globalisation and the Religious Production of Space”, (2005), pp. 249–55, (p. 251).

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time. For example, the Greek Enlightenment emerged geographically outside the boundaries of Modern or Classical Greece, identifying rather with the locations of intense commercial activity where ethnic Greek clusters were formed, i.e. in the geographical triangles of Bucharest – Jassy – Budapest, or Venice – Trieste – Vienna, where Greek-Orthodox communities supported a school system that included modern philosophy and science in the curriculum.65 This was located outside the reach of the church and its geographical learning and monastic centres of Constantinople – Athos – Patmos.66 Following the gradual dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and its Millet system alike, the modern synthesis emerged in terms of identity retheorisation, whereby the previously religious Greek-Orthodox element was nationalised in the nineteenth century and onwards. This altered the premodern perception of the notion thereafter, and the modern synthesis moved towards the correlation and identification of the church with the nation.67 This evolved into the earlierdiscussed challenge for the churches in the post-cold war era, when the globalist trends intensified with the Orthodox churches being by definition entrenched in the previously dominant arrangement, which secured them a place as guardians of the national memory, while perceiving themselves as the national Lieux de Mémoire in their own right.68 In that sense, globalisation with its post-national dynamic constitutes a threat for the nation, the state and the national identity of any given peoples. Because, it reverses the modern synthesis where churches, being nationalised, assumed a clear spatial point of reference within the bounds of the state; and what relativises the latter is detrimental to the former as well.69 In passing it ought to be stressed though, that given that the nation-state had not emerged until the nineteenth century, corresponding, internationally located communities qualified as ethnoreligious, not national, and we therefore take the liberty to term them as religioscapes, which demonstrated a pattern of hybridisation and adaptation while their adherence to community and sense of belonging was spatially relativised. However, identity before and after the emergence of the nation-state is distinguished differently, and considering that the Millet system determined not just a sense of belonging but also a milieu of administrative jurisdiction based on group-religiosity as a primary criterion, we consider it more proper to use the term 65 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “Cultural Change and Social Criticism: the Case of Iossipos Moisiodax”, (1989), pp. 667–76, (p. 669). 66 Ibid., p. 670. 67 Roudometof, “Greek Orthodoxy, Territoriality, and Globality”, pp. 67–91, (p. 71). 68 Ibid., p. 73. 69 Ibid., p. 74.

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“religioscapes” sparingly. Alternatively, to refer to ethnoreligious communities in that sense would be an accurate term as well. Yet, whether a religioscape or an ethnoreligious community, the observable fact is not new; after all the term “Diaspora” is in itself Greek (Gr.: Διασπορά) and is indicative of the diachronicity of the phenomenon of mobility, as it is often pointed out in migration studies. In any case, to attribute the difficulties that the Orthodox churches are presented with to their own inflexibility exclusively, would be an unfair oversimplification. It appears that the relation of Hellenism with the homeland is permeated by an insider/outsider distinction, from the emergence of the modern synthesis and onwards especially. This was intensified after the founding of the Greek state in 1830, characteristically traced in the memoirs of Makriyannis who clearly draws a classification between the locals, fighters of the uprising who got nothing in return for their sacrifices in the liberation cause, and the outsiders, i.e. politicians like Mavrokordatos, Kolettis etc., the Phanariots, or those from the Ionian islands. Those are portrayed as different and outlandish because of their liberal ways and their love for music and theatre, as opposed to the local purity that they eroded with their foreign-bred customs.70 It appears that location is of utmost importance to Greeks, who, with their strong sense of locality, tend to attribute references, citations, narratives, myths and geocultural symbolisms, in short logos, to their spatial points of reference. Logos, the narrative, in turn, determines and shapes the place.71 Topos, i.e., location, on the other hand, as a physical site assumes, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth century, a more possessive shape in the collective psyche where it becomes idealised, even transcendental as, via logos, it is portrayed in a paradisiacal, heavenly context.72 Entopia, which derives from the term “ntopios” (Gr.: Ντόπιος), i.e. autochthonous, indigenous, was coined by Minister of Public Works Constantinos A. Doxiadis (1937–1951) to describe a community’s harmonious spatial fulfilment, en- topos, i.e. in-place.73 Being an architect and urban planner, his viewpoint was primarily aesthetic, yet central to his entopia was the theme of a community’s temporal and spatial association with the place, where autochthonous culture, in tune with the climate and the natural habitat, generates forms of expression that signify the embodiment of logos as if it sprouted 70 Yanna Delivoria, “The Notion of Nation: the Emergence of a National Ideal in the Narratives of ‘Inside’ and ‘Outside’ Greeks in the Nineteenth-Century”, (2009), pp. 109–21, (pp. 111–12). 71 Leontis, p. 5. 72 Ibid., p. 70. 73 Ibid., p. 113. See also Constantinos A. Doxiadis, Building Entopia (1975).

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from the land; a genuine image of entopic culture befitting the Greek landscape, independent from foreign influences.74 The church’s spatial role on the other hand rests in creating “heterotopias” as Foucault calls them; places of different order, other places that encompass “a sort of simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space”.75 Church buildings constitute places of different order, being heterotopic in their otherworldliness. Greeks and Greek-Cypriots alike have been known to build churches or establish parishes as points of reference for their communities, especially during the 1970s and 80s. This of course applies when a community is firmly established in place and it marks its territory. However, when this is the case, migrant communities enter the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople when outside the domain of Cyprus and Greece. Not to mention that religioscapes in their current form are more often than nought in a state of flux because of increased mobility, which means that the influence of both churches of interest is limited abroad, which constitutes another post-Westphalian challenge. In sum, when considering the overall paradigm shift with its temporal, spatial, institutional and cultural consequences, it is deemed imperative to examine the reaction of the OCG and the OCC in light of this context. Because, in spite of the challenges and revision of previous certainties, the EU is open to the involvement of soft powers; whereby cultural diplomacy – the actual extra-ecclesiastical object for churches nowadays in our view, their Spielraum, their playing field – can be exercised across the board between actors and institutions, which leaves room for the churches to engage into the utilisation of the post-Westphalian system. We do bear in mind however that states and societies themselves face difficulties in coming to terms with the current – and ongoing – state of affairs; hence, there is no reason why national churches should be an exception to this.

4.2 National churches’ response to challenges and their agenda adaptation 4.2.1 The Orthodox Church of Greece Christodoulos never shied away from expressing his concern on how this postWestphalian, post-national model would work in practice, seeing the EU first and foremost as a domain where antagonism and balance of power are neither 74 Ibid., p. 115. 75 Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias”, (1997), pp. 329–57, (pp. 332–35).

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alien nor irrelevant. In a speech of his to the Greek MEPs, he reminded the gathering right from the outset that the actual Ecclesia (Gr.: Εκκλησία), meaning the social dimension of the institution, comprises the clergy and people and in that sense it is legitimate that the course into twenty-first-century Europe should concern the Ecclesia, including the church.76 Having argued for the legitimacy of his engagement in this issue, he went on to articulate his worry that a small ethnic, national and cultural minority such as the Greeks, amidst the sum of European peoples, would not be equal at an EU decision-making level. But what is more, he was apprehensive with how it would be possible for the Greek national and cultural characteristics and particularities to be preserved – to the safeguarding of which he was openly in favour – amidst the sum of approximately 500 million European citizens. In addition, feeling that Greece was entering unchartered waters, he was sceptical of the very function of the EU parliament of the 27 or the European Commission for that matter, seeing Greece as weak and outnumbered; by the same token, how much of every state’s national sovereignty would be ceded in the process was a major issue as well.77 Distrust towards the EU, almost hostility at times, had been publicly made known, even though the tendency to take part in shaping its future and its physiognomy was ever present. But that depended on the venue, the audience and the circumstances. For example, during the Pope’s visit to Greece in 2001, he emphasised the hard work needed in order to co-shape a united Europe, part of which would be to welcome the new Orthodox members. At which point he made a special reference to Cyprus that “has suffered greatly under a barbaric dichotomy, ethnic cleansing and desecration of its Christian monuments” and yet, complained Christodoulos, “it has never received a word of sympathy from the pontiff, even though he regularly intervenes in favour of several peoples in the world”.78 In that way, together with the pope he implicitly targeted Europe at one go. Whereas in terms of hostility, in his sermon on 2 December 2001 at the Cathedral of Athens, he implicitly referred to the EU when he said that he felt that “Greeks have a new Marathon ahead of them; namely that they have the new Persians who have come claiming the abolition of their faith, language and tradition”.79 Yet this divisive rhetoric was indicative of a lack of coherent

76 Christodoulos, “Η Πορεία και ο Ρόλος της Εκκλησίας”, pp. 95–99, (p. 95). 77 Ibid. 78 “Η Προσκυνηματική Επίσκεψη του Ρωμαίου Ποντίφικος”, pp. 377–94, (p. 382). 79 Christodoulos, “Εκ του Καθεδρικού Ναού Αθηνών (2 December 2001)”, (2002), pp. 38– 39, (p. 39).

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planning as regards an extrovert outreach via cultural diplomacy on the basis of religion or otherwise, as he focused on the domestic duties. That somewhat changed soon thereafter though as he engaged into by definition political activities at a European level. Still, the evidence of a central planning remained to be seen as, more or less, one observes ad hoc attempts to exert pressure rather than a cohesive diplomatic strategy. As such qualifies the handing over in person of a Synodical letter to Valéry Giscard D’Estaing on 20 February 2003. As we saw earlier, this letter contained a set of suggestions similar to those stated in encyclical No. 2740,80 in accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 11, aiming to have them incorporated into the under construction European constitution.81 However, one cannot overlook the fact that at the time Giscard D’Estaing, his indisputable prestige notwithstanding, did not occupy an office as an EU official; therefore, his capacity to act in favour of a particular side, regardless of his positive predisposition, was limited to his personal stature. This gesture of debatable diplomatic value validates our aforementioned presumption on the ad hoc initiatives in the place of strategy. It appears that the primary concern of the late archbishop was the erosion of the state and the loss of the church’s relevance with it. He therefore thought that a Christian Europe would be a more church-friendly domain, whereby the role of the church, even in the post-Westphalian arrangement would be preserved. To that end, he often utilised his domestic audience, including the political system. After all he expected the latter to support his pursuits in Brussels. With reference to the European physiognomy and the role of the church, should the EU constitution be devoid of any reference to Christianity, Christodoulos, in his speech after the liturgy at Apostle Paul’s on 29 June 2003, said that the European civilisation can only be comprehended within a framework of discourse with Christianity.82 And he proceeded to warn that the suggested constitution, devoid of reference to Christianity, divests Europe of its own essence, without which its civilisation is incomprehensive. Further, he said that it essentially renders the church an NGO, an institution whose church buildings resemble network branches, as if it were a lobby like many others. This, in the archbishop’s view, does not just hush up an institution, but obscures it and directly denies it as a means to the salvation of man. So, ultimately, the draft constitution merely acknowledges the church’s 80 See chapter two for details. 81 Christodoulos, “Επιστολή της Ιεράς Συνόδου προς τον κ. Valéry Giscard D’Estaing”, pp. 206–08. 82 Christodoulos, “Ομιλία στον Πανηγυρικό Εσπερινό του Αποστόλου Παύλου (βράχος Αρείου Πάγου, 29.06.2003)”, (2003), pp. 497–501, (p. 499).

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right to exist, along with other spiritual institutions. After so many centuries, noted Christodoulos, “the constitution has managed to drag Europe back to 313 A.D., the age of Licinius;83 in that the churches are being simply put up with”. Further, still as regards the EU constitution and Christodoulos’ pressures, in yet another speech to the Greek MEPs on 8 October 2003 in Brussels, he brought into the discussion the vision of the Commission and the EU Parliament for Europe. He namely doubted that they are clear on what they envisage, adding that any potential enlargement eastwards, outside and beyond the European civilisational adherence is inconceivable. To that end, he clarified that Christianity is useful, in order to demarcate Europe culturally and prevent it from turning into a melting pot.84 However, in that way, he ushered in a geopolitical dimension to the whole problématique. Being consistent and precise in that sense, Christodoulos hosted a dinner in honour of the Greek MEPs on 7 February 2004, where he outlined his views and criticised the stance of a group of European politicians, who in the name of Realpolitik and the EU interests saw the accession of Turkey as inevitable. The archbishop held that the realist diktat is not destiny, but rather the by-product of political effort and competence, and wondered what the reaction of the “votecraving realism” would be if Israel, Algeria or Morocco applied for EU candidacy.85 On the other hand, he urged politicians to work for the interests of the nation, but also exclaimed that regardless of political decisions, the Church of Greece together with other churches would not be hampered to fight for the preservation of European civilisation,86 whereby he identified the European with the national interest in a convenient overlap. Lobbying continued in the same mode; i.e., by approaching Greek politicians in order to secure their support and aspiring in that way to indirectly set initiatives in motion in Brussels. In that spirit, the HSCG, given than in the near future there would be negotiations anew regarding the European Constitution, sent a

83 Ibid., p. 500. Also, Licinius I (263–325), Roman Emperor (308–324), co-issued with Constantine I the Edict of Milan whereby toleration was granted to Christians in the Roman Empire. 84 Christodoulos, “Ομιλία στους Ευρωβουλευτές του Ευρωπαϊκού Λαϊκού Κόμματος”, pp. 694–96. 85 Christodoulos, “Ομιλία στο Γεύμα προς Τιμήν των Ελλήνων Ευρωβουλευτών”, (2004), pp. 98–100, (p. 100). 86 Ibid.

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letter to Petros Molyviatis87 on 13 May 2004, kindly asking him, as the Greek Government had a positive attitude towards Christian churches, to support the recognition of Europe’s Christian cultural heritage accordingly.88 To which the foreign minister replied on 25 May 2004, informing the archbishop that he did in fact intervene in the ad hoc meeting that took place at a level of foreign ministers with regard to the issue at hand. In particular, he pointed out that Greece shares the view of other Member States, which wish the inclusion of a reference to Europe’s Christian heritage in the preamble of the constitution, as well as that Greece views it as a matter of historical, political and cultural importance and not as a declaration that would alienate other peoples and states.89 A responsive attitude indeed, indicative of the government’s views which happened to be in tune with those of the church, whereby the symbiosis of the two as regards the EU constitution preamble at least, was easy. At the same time, Christodoulos was making sure to establish communication channels with the newly elected MEPs and keep them close. So on 23 June 2004, a letter of congratulations on behalf of the HSCG was posted to them. The Holy Synod congratulated them on assuming their new duties as MEPs, namely, as representatives to the EU of the Greek people and the nation. Then the church’s certainty was expressed that, via their actions, words and activities in general, they would not only express the views of the majority of the Greek people, but also that they would promote, everywhere and always, the cultural particularities of the Greeks and their Hellenic-Orthodox self-consciousness and tradition.90 Further, after reminding them of the OCG’s open issues with the EU, the HSCG went on to inform the recipients of the letter that the office of representation in Brussels was at their disposal for any kind of cooperation;91 thereby, whether in or outside Greece, the church hoped to remain an interlocutor of the MEPs and be in a position to indirectly put forward its positions in the European parliament.

87 Twice appointed Greek Foreign Minister, (2004–2006) and briefly from 17 May to 21 June 2012. 88 Christodoulos and Sklifas, “Η Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος – Επιστολή προς τον Υπουργόν Εξωτερικών περί της Αναφοράς του Χριστιανισμού εις το Ευρωπαϊκόν Σύνταγμα (Πέτρο Μολυβιάτη)”, (2004), p. 421. 89 Petros Molyviatis, “Επιστολή του Υπουργού Εξωτερικών προς τον Μακαριώτατον Αρχιεπίσκοπον”, (2004), p. 422. 90 Christodoulos and Sklifas, “Συγχαρητήρια Επιστολή προς τους Νέους Ευρωβ­ ουλευτάς”, (2004), pp. 503–04, (p. 503). 91 Ibid., p. 504.

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Being unwaveringly worried though that the post-Westphalian state of affairs would be significantly detrimental to Greece and the EU from a geocultural perspective, Christodoulos made sure to communicate that to the Greek commissioner and MEPs. In his toast at the lunch that took place in Athens, 27 February 2006, in honour of the Greek commissioner Stavros Dimas (2004–2010) and the MEPs, he said that it has become apparent that the European policy, with the opening of negotiations on Turkey’s accession, yielded to geopolitical criteria, which are alien to Europe’s spiritual and social entity and at the expense of social and cultural criteria. The archbishop attributed that to the lack of a cohesive European geopolitical policy perception which serves Europe’s future, the vacuum of which was filled by national or hegemonic interests. However he considered it a healthy sign that the European citizens rejected the constitution, because essentially what they did was to reject the abolition of their cultural identity; that also demonstrated that they do accept differences, as long as those solidify their society and culture.92 He added that the church supports the European vision and works to that end, pointing out that the office of representation in Brussels takes part in all venues where inter-ecclesiastical cooperation is promoted, among other numerous activities such as the organisation in Athens of the World Council of Churches conference. Whereby he clarified that what the OCG essentially wants is to resist those tendencies that wish the European to be a mere tenant of space, devoid of identity, ultimately a passive receiver of his future.93 What is notable here, ambivalence aside, is a simultaneous pro-European stance that condemns short-sighted national strategies, putting into the picture corresponding hegemonic aspirations to the detriment of the European vision in the long run. In that sense, one detects a shift from the national interest as the central point of reference, to the Christian European culture, which does not oppose cultural particularities; hence, it is in accordance with the Member States’ national interests as well, as those are perceived by the OCG. Realising that both the EU and its Member States are on the same boat, thereby being faced with the same threats, Christodoulos signalled a warning to the President of the Commission Manuel Barroso on 22 June 2005. As with the policies of enlargement, the archbishop was concerned with the European social cohesion that was threatened in his view by the combination of unemployment, of the youth especially, and migration. Job insecurity is amplified by the

92 Christodoulos, “Πρόποση στο Γεύμα προς Τιμήν του Επιτρόπου της Ελλάδος στην ΕΕ και τους Έλληνες Ευρωβουλευτές”, (2006) pp. 190–92, (p. 191). 93 Ibid., p. 192.

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fact that immigrants replace native workers. The former require no rights to be observed, contrary to the latter, and have less demands from their employers, as a result work security and quality of life are at peril, which reflects on social cohesion, held Christodoulos.94 In addition to this, he believed that migration in itself constitutes a critical problem; the withering population due to increasingly lower birth rates, coupled with often illegal migration as means opted for by the EU in order to tackle the demographic decline, was deemed by Christodoulos the wrong way to deal with it, naive and oblivious of the long-term social consequences. For that reason, he urged the commissioner to divert humanitarian funding directly to the places of immigrants’ origin, outside European soil.95 And in retrospect, some of the archbishop’s worries that stemmed from the increased workers’ mobility due to globalisation of labour – social dumping, wage stagnation – have been proven to be well founded. Yet at the epicentre of the OCG’s diplomatic agenda remained the national interest and the major issues thereof, not the post-Westphalian arrangement Europe-wide, which in fact solidified the church’s determination to intensify its diplomatic efforts to the benefit of state and nation, channelling thus its focus regionally. After all, its reach into the European institutions was limited, in contrast to its capacity to exercise cultural diplomacy where Orthodox Christianity is acknowledged the most, and even where strategic depth allows it; i.e. to function as soft power where there existed a playing field, compared to the EU where Orthodoxy is second class in terms of power, social penetration, resonance and soft power potential. The Balkans, Greece’s backyard in a geocultural sense, was a par excellence area for such manoeuvres as was the eastern Mediterranean, which is most important to Greece’s interests as it provides a strategic advantage and constitutes a vital area; both of them combined, not only form a spatial continuum with Greece adjoining them geographically, but also a geocultural unit with Greece in its epicentre. This allows room for multifold political activity, cultural diplomacy included. And indeed, during Christodoulos’ era, the OCG was proactive in both territories. For instance, Foreign Minister Georgios A. Papandreou (1999–2004) visited the archbishop (13 June 2002) following the invitation of the latter. Their meeting lasted two hours and the discussion revolved around two issues. First, the archbishop wished to be informed on the national matters of which he was

94 Christodoulos, “Letter to the President of the European Commission about the Social Problems of Europe”, (2005), pp. 462–64, (p. 462). 95 Ibid., p. 464.

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concerned and interested, and second, they discussed the developing initiative of the church in the Balkans and Palestine. The foreign minister himself stated that the extrovert policy of the church is a useful instrument and aspect in the cultural and religious presence of the country throughout the world, having previously mentioned that there is a close cooperation with the church regarding both the Balkans and the Middle East.96 So the playing field was permissive, the state acknowledged the potential and the church got eagerly involved. In that spirit, with the national interest at heart and in tune with the Greek foreign policy framework, before the above-mentioned meeting in fact, Christodoulos visited the peace-keeping Greek armed forces of Kosovo (20 January 2001), greeting them as representatives of Greece and Orthodoxy. Also, the archbishop underlined that Greece’s role in the region had been acknowledged by its allies as well.97 Then, Christodoulos visited the historic monastery of Gracanica where he was received by the Bishop of Raska and Prizren Artemios. There he urged them not to abandon their centuries-old land and expressed his solidarity. After that, he met with the Patriarch of Serbia Paul,98 to whom he handed over on behalf of the HSCG a bank cheque of twenty million drachmas for the erection of a bishopric building in the region.99 This was a significant diplomatic signal that signified the country’s prestige as guarantor of stability in the region, capable of projecting power in its near abroad and of facilitating geocultural symbolic gestures. It was also a gesture of allegiance and solidarity with the Orthodox peoples and an exercise of cultural diplomacy on behalf of the OCG. But this was not at odds with the Greek interests as the extended secessionism was – and still is – a cause of unrest, for it was believed that it could extend and destabilise the region, thus validating once again its nickname as the “powder keg” of Europe. With an eye on the EU, Christodoulos made an official visit to the Church of Romania from 4 to 12 June 2003. Among others, he mentioned the common faith and culture that the two peoples share, as well as that the OCG would assist in any way the Greek government in its efforts as EU presiding state, towards the European accession of Romania in 2007, which would strengthen the presence 96 Press Office of the HSCG, “Συνάντηση του Μακαριωτάτου με τον Έλληνα Υπουργό Εξωτερικών”, (2002), pp. 537–38, (p. 537). 97 HSCG, “Ο μακ. Αρχιεπίσκοπος κ. Χριστόδουλος Επικεφαλής Αντιπροσωπείας στο Κοσσυφοπέδιο”, (2001), pp. 105–08, (p. 105). 98 Paul, known also as Pavel (Stojčević) of Serbia, was the Archbishop of Peć, Metropolitan of Belgrade and Karlovac and Patriarch of Serbia (1990–2009). 99 HSCG, “Ο μακ. Αρχιεπίσκοπος κ. Χριστόδουλος Επικεφαλής Αντιπροσωπείας”, pp. 105–08, (p. 108).

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of Orthodoxy in the EU.100 He added that the churches, of course, do not have the final word on the decisions for the future of Europe, but they do possess the capacity to play a decisive role in the formation of civil society.101 Whereby he demonstrated that he was aware of the role he aspired to play together with the OCG as a soft power actor and an agency within the European structure. One observes there that the Westphalian reversal was seen as a window of opportunity as well and not only as a challenge, as long as the church readjusted its orientation within the bounds of the contemporary geopolitical state of affairs and claimed a role therein. An issue that touches on national prestige, which is a vital dimension of a state’s diplomatic arsenal if it aspires to exercise cultural diplomacy and project its power abroad – and possibly on sovereignty and territorial integrity as well – was the dispute with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over its constitutional name. Regarding the use of the term “Macedonia” as the constitutional name of FYROM internationally, by its press release of 5 March 2001, the synod expressed its concern and explicitly declared that it opposes its use as it constitutes historical forgery, as well as paves the way for territorial claims and non-existent minority issues.102 This press release was in tune with the encyclical No. 2535 issued on 5 June 1992 by the synod and was submitted attached to a letter by the late Archbishop Serapheim.103 Further, via the press release, the synod expressed its expectation that the government and the political system will rise to the occasion, abide by the decision made by the council of the party leaders and not stray from previously agreed unanimous political decisions.104 In that way, the OCG demonstrated publicly and beyond the shadow of a doubt, where it stood as regards the well-known dispute; apart from that, it attempted to hold the political system to its pre-existing resolution upon the matter and hinder any deviation from it. Essentially, it sought to impose its views as red lines that would delimit a compromise, with the backing of the public no less. Christodoulos remained proactive in that direction, and he took the initiative to associate his heterodox counterparts with the issue in the hope that he would elicit their direct or indirect support, whether in the form of a statement 100 Archimandrite Epifanios Oikonomou, “Χρονικό της Επισήμου Ειρηνικής Επισκέψεως του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Χριστοδούλου στην Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία της Ρουμανίας”, (2003), pp. 523–34, (pp. 523–24). 101 Ibid., p. 527. 102 Press Office of the HSCG, “Δελτίον Τύπου της 5ης Μαρτίου 2001”, (2001), p. 262. 103 Archbishop of Athens and All Greece between 1974 and 1998. 104 Press Office of the HSCG, “Δελτίον Tύπου της 5ης Μαρτίου 2001”, p. 262.

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or otherwise. To that end, he wrote to the Pope of Rome on 17 November 2004. Unsettled by the recognition of FYROM as “Republic of Macedonia”, i.e. its constitutional name, by the US administration, the archbishop outlined the rationale on behalf of the Greek side regarding the name of the neighbouring state. This comprised objections and arguments of political, linguistic, geographical and historical nature, in attempting to make the pope aware of the problem from the Greek perspective, and potentially win him over, though this was not explicitly requested; he did close with a plea for solidarity however, but to no avail.105 The response came in the form of a letter on 28 December 2004 by Cardinal Angelo Sodano.106 There, it was conveyed that the Holy Sea acknowledges the complexity of the issue and wishes that a solution shall be reached, but essentially the reply was permeated by careful neutrality, which is not what Christodoulos was hoping for.107 Likewise, the World Communion of Reformed Churches (WCRC), disappointed the archbishop with its letter of 10 January 2005 signed by Setri Nyomi,108 while, regarding the name issue of FYROM, his concerns were duly noted and it was wished that a fair and just solution shall be reached, but again they made sure to take no sides in this dispute;109 therefore, his efforts to politicise a regional issue in his discourse with the Catholics and the Protestants was not fruitful at all. In contrast, this was not the case with the Serbian Patriarchate which had a vested interest, not as regards the name dispute, but as regards the Archbishopric of Ohrid and the jurisdiction thereof.110 Namely, the Serbian Patriarchate communicated its extreme distress to the OCG concerning the incarceration, 105 Christodoulos “Επιστολή προς τον Πάπα της Ρώμης περί της Ονομασίας του Κράτους των Σκοπίων”, (2004), pp. 797–98. 106 Vatican’s Cardinal Secretary of State from 1991 to 2006. 107 Cardinal Angelo Sodano, “Επιστολή της Γραμματείας του Κράτους του Βατικανού περί της Ονομασίας της Π.Γ.Δ.Μ.”, (2005). p. 8. 108 General Secretary of the WCRC since the year 2000. 109 Setri Nyomi, “Επιστολή των Εκκλησιών της Μεταρρυθμίσεως περί της Ονομασίας της Π.Γ.Δ.Μ.”, (2005), p. 9. 110 Archbishop John (Jovan VI), upon proceeding into canonical and ecclesiastical unity with the Orthodox Church of Serbia, suffered his expulsion by the police and his illegal prosecution and imprisonment, being falsely accused of “instigation of ethnic, racial and religious hatred, discord and intolerance”, which caused the international condemnation of Skopje. The actual point of dispute was political, as the administration did not approve of the declaration of the Orthodox Archbishopric of Ohrid as autonomous, but rather under the jurisdiction of the non-canonically selfproclaimed Macedonian Orthodox Church. See Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries, The Balkans: A Post-Communist History (London: Routledge, 2007), as well as Aleksander

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prosecution and illegal imprisonment by the state of FYROM of the Metropolitan of Veles John (Jovan VI) (in office since 2000), of the canonically established Archbishopric of Ohrid, which is within the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Serbia.111 Christodoulos made sure to disseminate the injustice done to the person of Jovan VI and the violation of his rights. On 16 August 2005, he wrote to the UN Secretary General Mr Kofi Annan to inform him of the aforementioned predicament. He explained that the Archbishop of Ohrid had done no wrong nor did he break any laws, other than remaining faithful to the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate and the respective obligations that stem from his position as canonical representative of the Serbian Orthodox Church, i.e. being into communion with the Mother Church. He thus underlined that the imprisonment was completely unjust and appealed to the UN Secretary General to exercise his influence and intervene so that John would be released from prison.112 The exact same letter was also sent to the President of the European Commission Manuel Barroso, Secretary General of the Council of the EU Javier Solana (1999–2009), VicePresident of the US Dick Cheney (2001–2009), US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (2005–2009) and other officials of high stature including outstanding clerics and diplomats.113 This course of action was within the bounds of Christodoulos’ duties and position, given the entitlement he had as a hierarch to pursue this case, although his motives were political. His motivation was similar in his involvement with Cyprus and the fact that he considered it an extension of an overall regional policy framework, which required that the two countries and churches should act in coordination. Christodoulos had extensive contacts with the Greek-Cypriot political leadership and the local church, even during the period when the archbishop of the OCC was incapacitated. On 9 March 2001, e.g., when he received the President of EDEK Vasos Lyssaridis, he held that the Cypriot Hellenism is not prepared to accept nationally damaging solutions and expressed his solidarity to the Greek-Cypriots, underlining the church’s duty to keep the people’s morale high. Further, he stated Zdravkovski and Kenneth Morrison, “The Orthodox Churches of Macedonia and Montenegro: The Quest for Autocephaly”, (2014), pp. 240–62. 111 Patriarch of Serbia Paul, “Επιστολή του Μακαριωτάτου Πατριάρχου Σερβίας κ. Παύλου προς τον Μακαριώτατον Αρχιεπίσκοπον Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Χριστόδουλον περί των Εκκλησιαστικών Προβλημάτων στο Κράτος των Σκοπίων”, (2004), pp. 8–9, (p. 8). 112 Christodoulos, “Επιστολή προς τον Γ.Γ. του ΟΗΕ κ. Κόφφι Ανάν περί της Φυλακίσεως του Αρχιεπισκόπου Αχρίδος κ. Ιωάννου”, (2005), pp. 612–13, (p. 612). 113 Ibid., p. 613.

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that being a people small in numbers, the Greeks – Greek-Cypriots included – must preserve their spiritual identity else they will be crushed by the powers that flatten history and traditions. And he finally concluded that political and ecclesiastical leaders must always cooperate in order to achieve national and spiritual ends.114 This rhetorical context was repeated when Christodoulos received the President of the Republic of Cyprus Glafkos Klerides115 on 2 May 2001. They talked primarily about the Cypriot issue and the major powers that often try to impose unfair solutions out of self-interest. The president stated that the Cypriot Hellenism, relying on its long history and tradition, language, and most of all religion, will not yield to pressures but will claim a fair solution to the end. In turn, the archbishop assured him that the heart of Metropolitan Hellenism beats on the same rhythm as that of Cypriot Hellenism, and that both he personally as well as the OCG demonstrate their solidarity to their Cypriot brothers in any shape or form.116 Apart from seeing Greece and Cyprus as one Hellenic-Christian geocultural unit, Christodoulos’ interventionism was legitimised and utilised by Klerides and vice versa. Entrenched political positions concerning the Cyprus Problem, from which no retreat would be acceptable, were solidified by being introduced to the public as a sound policy; in other words, by drawing the line, the archbishop gave direction and suggested constraints to the Greek government and its degree of flexibility as guarantor power, while, by emphasising on cultural homogeneity, he underlined its moral obligation for unyielding political and other support. At the same time, the weakened  – due to lack of leadership  – OCC found support in its Greek counterpart, while Christodoulos was having an impact on the island’s public opinion and political system, establishing an era of close linkages to Cyprus. Parallel to that, Cyprus’ accession to the EU was hailed as a milestone of strategic importance, judging by his correspondence with the Greek prime minister and the Cypriot president respectively. One identical letter, dated on 7 April 2003, intended for both Simitis and Papadopoulos, conveyed right from the outset an unspeakable joy on the upcoming accession of Cyprus to the EU. The accession itself was viewed as a means of assistance in the effort towards solidifying 114 Press Office of the HSCG, “Συνάντηση του Μακαριωτάτου με τον Πρόεδρο του Κινήματος Σοσιαλδημοκρατών κ. Βάσο Λυσσαρίδη”, (2001), p. 357. 115 Glafkos Klerides has been in office as president twice, between 23 July and 7 December 1974 and then from 1993 to 2003. 116 Press Office of the HSCG, “Συνάντηση του Μακαριωτάτου με τον Πρόεδρο της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας”, (2001), p. 441.

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the respect to the European peoples’ consciousness of their Christian heritage and roots, as the crucial contribution of Christianity to the European Civilisation was stressed. In addition, this development was greeted as a sign of hope that the critical, national issue would be solved, thus justifying the joy of the Cypriot Church’s faithful people – who, in the letter are being described as homogeneous in blood, religion and language with the Greek nationals.117 Therefore, in the face of the Westphalian reversal, an ethnocentric, instrumentalist pattern surfaces yet again; but this time, it emerges in a nationally extended way, given the holistic perception of Greece and Cyprus as one geopolitical and geocultural unit, which ought to advance its own interests within the EU, while, in turn, being mutatis mutandis unified by the acquis communautaire. It is no secret that it was imperative for the OCC too, that the acquis had to be fully utilised to the benefit of the Republic of Cyprus while the Annan Plan was being negotiated and drawn. Suffice it to mention, or rather recall, that even though the OCC considered the EU accession of Cyprus very encouraging, it still considered it important to remind the EU partners that Nicosia is the last dichotomised European capital, and that any new solution plan should be harmonised with the fundamental principles of human rights and the acquis communautaire.118 This would secure free movement for Greek-Cypriots; essentially, repatriation to their homes, full implementation of their human rights in the occupied north and the lifting of their refugee status, with all the benefits such measures would entail. But there exactly  – among other reservations  – was the problem with the Annan Plan, i.e. the full application of the acquis. So, consistent with its selfappointed role and in tune with the OCC, the OCG did not hesitate to communicate its viewpoints. Namely, the HSCG maintained that the Annan Plan had caused them a great deal of concern. Prior to expressing their views, it was clarified that they had discussed with the Foreign Minister Papandreou, and had received and conferred with the Cypriot hierarchs Chrysostomos of Paphos and Paulos of Kyrenia in their Synod. They, in turn, conveyed to their Greek counterparts the climate in the island regarding the plan as well as their own views. Also the HSCG consulted experts on the issue. As a result, taking all the above information into account, they published their positions, whereby they urged for caution regarding potential pitfalls in the plan at the expense of the island’s “Hellenicity”. Cyprus, stressed the HSCG, is a full EU member, and on the basis 117 Archbishop Christodoulos and Bishop of Salona Theologos, “Επιστολή της Ι.Σ. προς τον Πρόεδρον της Ελληνικής Κυβερνήσεως επί τη Εντάξει της Κύπρου εις την Ευρωπαϊκήν Ένωσιν”, (2003), p. 254. 118 Cholevas, “30 Χρόνια Κατοχής στην Κύπρο”, (2004), p. 565.

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of the EU acquis and the European Charter of Human Rights, they expressed the hope that all Cypriots regardless of ethnicity or creed will enjoy the prosperity and freedom of a unified, democratic state entity.119 Christodoulos was openly critical. On 22 February 2004, he urged all to pray, for those days the future of Cyprus was at stake, for he considered the Annan Plan harmful as it would deHellenise the island. He referred to pressures being applied, and essentially to an imposed solution, which by extension may have an impact on other national issues as well, e.g., Thrace and the Aegean dispute.120 Remaining faithful to his one, unitary geocultural entity perception of Greece and Cyprus, on 29 March 2004 and on behalf of the HSCG, Christodoulos wrote to Chrysostomos I  – doubtful that he could read, given his poor mental and physical health  – on the occasion of the anniversary of the Cypriot liberation struggle. He made a reference to Archbishop Makarios III, General Georgios Grivas–Digenis and the OCC, which played its Ethnarchic role with consistency and responsibility.121 But most notably, he made a clear reference to a free and peaceful Cyprus, where the Greek-Cypriot majority and the Turkish-Cypriot minority would coexist harmoniously, while Orthodoxy, Greek history and the Greek flag would be preserved there intact.122 In short, he suggested a hardly realisable solution based on the 1960 status quo, with the island being essentially Greek and ultimately with the prospect of an Enosis. Needless to say, this attitude was reaffirmed, with a widespread public resonance no less when Christodoulos visited Cyprus from 29 April to 6 May 2007. Synoptically, it would be helpful to offer an overview of the context before we get into the crucial particulars; he was received very warmly and with all honours by the OCC, party leaders, the president, the president of the parliament, the local authorities, army, police, as all showed their appreciation. Wherever he went, he was welcomed by crowds with rose-petals and waving Greek and Cypriot flags.123 The coincidence of views between the Cypriot hierarchs and the Greek

119 HSCG, “Οι Εργασίες της Τακτικής Ιεράς Συνόδου της Ιεραρχίας της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος”, (2003), pp. 685–93, (p. 691). 120 Press Office of the HSCG, “Ομιλία του Μακαριωτάτου για την Κύπρο και για την Αξία της Συγχωρήσεως”, (2004), p. 153. 121 Christodoulos, “Δια την Επέτειον του Κυπριακού Αγώνος”, (2005), pp. 281–82, (p. 281). 122 Ibid., p. 282. 123 Cholevas, “Η Σημασία της Ειρηνικής Επισκέψεως του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Χριστοδούλου στην Κύπρο”, (2007), pp. 346–48, (p. 347).

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archbishop was astounding as regards the preservation and strengthening of the Greek-Cypriots’ national and religious consciousness: Christodoulos invited the Cypriot Hellenism to remain faithful to Orthodoxy, the Greek language, to honour their heroes, study their history, and respect tradition and the institution of family. Chrysostomos II on the other hand referred to the 3500 years long history of Hellenism on the island, which should guide the church, the state and the people alike.124 With a closer look however, one detects the facets of cultural diplomacy in the symbolic and rhetorical vehicles that were meant to convey notions and political views; such that validate our take of the emergent pattern here, where the notion of a geocultural unitary entity is encouraged as the two churches appear to be in harmonious political unison and mutual understanding. In addition, in this context, sense of identity and political agenda priorities are clearly deemed interdependent and indivisible. Archbishop Chrysostomos II received his Greek counterpart at the airport of Larnaca. Among others he stated that to him this was not a mere customary visit but, in such hard times, a gesture of solidarity to the Cypriot people who are in a constant struggle for freedom. Also, he said, God who loves justice cannot but help in the cause, as long as the flag is not lowered, he continued; yet freedom will not be granted, it will be earned with God’s help.125 The next day, 30 April 2007, in the cathedral of St John the Theologian, Chrysostomos II addressed Christodoulos by saying that in his tour of Cyprus he would meet the same people as in Greece, of the same ancient roots, the same historical responsibility, the same customs and ultimately a people of the same blood, religion and language.126 To which Christodoulos responded by verifying this homogeneous identity perception – indeed within the context of a unitary nation personification – that mainland Greeks share the pain and sorrow of the Cypriots more than anyone else could, because to them they are, and always will be, their brothers of their own flesh and blood.127 And based on that, he held that the common struggles and threats they face, necessitate that they stand united and unyielding in their national and religious values; but in the EU as well, Christodoulos held that they ought to mobilise all Orthodox Christian peoples, not only to instigate the respect of the non-Orthodox, but to promote the Orthodox spirituality along 124 Ibid., p. 348. 125 Oikonomou, “Χρονικόν Επισήμου Ειρηνικής Επισκέψεως του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Χριστοδούλου στην Ορθόδοξη Αυτοκέφαλη Εκκλησία της Κύπρου (Α΄ ΜΕΡΟΣ)”, (2007), pp. 349–87, (pp. 350–51). 126 Ibid., p. 354. 127 Ibid., p. 355.

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with the ecclesiastical and cultural tradition of their churches within Europe, where Christian principles are being denied and the irreligious state is being promoted.128 Whereby, secularisation as part of the broader Europeanisation process was targeted and seen as an opportunity to mobilise the emerging Orthodox periphery of Europe at the same time, as a post-Westphalian actor, whether in the form of civil society, soft power or both. Interdependence and indivisibility between the sense of identity and political agenda priorities remained ever present and rendered cultural diplomacy central, given that Christodoulos’ views on the Cyprus Problem were resonant across the board. More to the point, when he was received by Tassos Papadopoulos, the latter described his visit as historic and congratulated the archbishop for his positions on the Cypriot issue and the support regarding the Annan Plan. Further, the president praised church‒state relations in Cyprus and expressed his satisfaction with the quality of cooperation with archbishop Chrysostomos II on national and broader social issues. He also said that it would be ridiculous to claim that the Church, which has long been ethnarchic, has no role to play in national matters.129 Christodoulos responded to this that the HSCG examined the Annan Plan and realised it would dissolve the national entity of the island and would ultimately de-Hellenise it. He promised, having acknowledged Papadopoulos’ genuine patriotism, that the OCG will always be there for them and praised him for his relationship with the Cypriot archbishop.130 In the same spirit, in addressing Christodoulos, Metropolitan Nikiforos of Kykkos said it was a great honour to receive the archbishop of “Mother Greece”,131 while likewise, Metropolitan Georgios of Paphos, upon receiving Christodoulos said among others, that he comes from the “geographic space of their dreams, the Jerusalem of their national visions, and that in him, he saw the reflection of the Acropolis and the Parthenon as he awakens ancient yearnings, visions which the ancestors lived and died with.” But also that he is no stranger in Paphos as his views on the national matters, having been broadcasted, were received very positively;132 Metropolitan of Kition Chrysostomos (in office since 1973) welcomed Christodoulos as the archbishop of the motherland who brought to mind the truly

128 129 130 131 132

Ibid., p. 356. Ibid., p. 361. Ibid., p. 362. Ibid., p. 368. Ibid., p. 372.

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delightful days of antiquity;133 Bishop – in July the same year upgraded to Metropolitan – of Tremithus Vasileios, upon receiving the archbishop, stressed that the town of Paralimni is connected geographically and spiritually with “the two historical, cultural, religious and national lungs with which Cyprus breathes”, the tomb and the monastery of Apostle Varnavas, founder and patron of the Cypriot Church, i.e. the Christian lung, and Salamina, the Hellenic lung.134 The epitome of resonance concerning the aforementioned identity and policies’ interdependence, however, can be identified in the words of Chrysostomos II. When he addressed Christodoulos during the archbishopric concelebrations in the church of Palouriotissa, he urged his Greek counterpart to convey to the Greek people and leadership the request, not to be viewed as distant relatives to whom the “national centre” ought to be sympathetic or as Diaspora in need of support to maintain language and culture. But as natives, genuine Greeks for 3500 years, who do not plea, but demand the solidarity of the whole nation and wish to hear the word “liberation”, which has been deleted from the Greek vocabulary, as well as see actions to that end.135 In replying, Christodoulos expressed his optimism for the future of Cyprus, for being an equal EU member creates hopeful conditions,136 revealing yet again his utilitarian and strategic perception of the EU. Within that domain, to Christodoulos, Greece and Cyprus formed a geocultural unit, the churches of which could exert pressure and when combined could function as soft powers, given the post-Westphalian opportunity that could upgrade their status. What is more, the OCC was ready to cooperate to that end. The same cannot be said about Hieronymos II though, because he had a diametrically different approach and was distanced from politics, not to mention geopolitics. After all, soon after his enthronement, the debt crisis altered the agenda. Be that as it may, the OCC signalled its intention to carry on along the lines of the previous arrangement. On the occasion of Hieronymos’ II enthronement and during the ceremonial dinner, apart from the congratulations and the formalities dictated by the circumstance, the archbishop of Cyprus did not fail to utilise the opportunity to make his expectations known. He referred to Greece as motherland of common language and origin, and as a Jerusalem of national visions to the Cypriot Hellenism. Therefore, as of his day of enthronement, 133 Oikonomou, “Χρονικόν Επισήμου Ειρηνικής Επισκέψεως του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Χριστοδούλου στην Ορθόδοξη Αυτοκέφαλη Εκκλησία της Κύπρου (Β΄ ΜΕΡΟΣ)”, (2007), pp. 436–79, (p. 439). 134 Ibid., p. 446. 135 Ibid., p. 469. 136 Ibid., p. 472.

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Hieronymos II was considered by Chrysostomos II as one of the main supporters of the national survival of Greek-Cypriots in their ancestral land. Given that the Greek people and their religious leadership were ever by their brothers’ side, the same expectation applied to him as well; a personal meeting soon was also suggested in order to discuss matters in more depth.137 Of course during the period of geocultural assertiveness, Christodoulos took the initiative to engage with the Russian political establishment and secondarily with the corresponding church, which has a closely knit relationship with the state. During his visit there, among others he met with the President of Russia Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin on 8 May 2001. There he expressed his weariness of globalisation and the New World Order, whereby not only economic aspirations are being pursued, but also “these processes seek to crush cultures and traditions as if they were steamrollers, aiming to annihilate and homogenise all particularities of the human person; and they use all unorthodox means”.138 Yet, Christodoulos argued, Orthodoxy with its rich heritage is the cornerstone of spirituality. In the Orthodox space, the “symphony model” that permeates the relationship between church and state, which in Greece is constitutionally established, is the ideal arrangement of distinct roles for the progress and prosperity of the people.139 It appears then that the archbishop wished to counterbalance the penetration of Europeanisation in the early 2000s by pointing to an alternative status quo, hence the Russian example of church and state as well as the suggestion of resistance to the immanent “Reverse Westphalia” within the EU. Moscow did not mind this at all as it jumped to the opportunity to take advantage of this flux OCC orientation and bring Greece via cultural diplomacy into its own sphere of influence. Putin reciprocated and paid Christodoulos a customary visit on 6 December 2001, where he was accompanied by a multitudinous entourage that comprised important government and parliamentary Russian officials, which rendered the visit even more prestigious from a symbolic perspective.140 The archbishop praised the leader of the “great Russian republic”,141 and its people with whom “Greeks are bonded by unbreakable, eternal bonds” as Christodoulos stressed, for the close relations he has nurtured with 137 Chrysostomos II, “Προσφωνήσεις κατά το Επίσημον Γεύμα – Εκκλησία Κύπρου”, (2008), p. 208. 138 Charamantidis, pp. 455–94, (p. 468). 139 Ibid. 140 Press Office of the HSCG, “Επίσκεψη στον Μακαριώτατο του Προέδρου της Ρωσικής Ομοσπονδίας κ. Vladimir Putin”, (2002), pp. 40–42, (p. 40). 141 Ibid., p. 41.

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the Russian church and the attention he pays to Orthodoxy. He also thanked him for his attitude in the national issues of Greece, especially the matter of Cyprus which is occupied, noting that the presence of Orthodox Russia in the global scene is of considerable weight and equally important in the inter-Orthodox relations; he did not fail to mention the close relations between the OCG and its Russian counterpart either.142 This rapprochement was further attested by the visit of the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Borisovich Ivanov (2001–2007) on 4 April 2002. Upon receiving him, the archbishop underlined the historical bonds of faith, friendship, brotherly solidarity and spirituality that bind the two peoples and churches. He referred to the respect and appreciation that President Vladimir Putin shows to the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Alexy II, and expressed his admiration for “the brave country of Russia that honours its heroes and martyrs, and the brave Russian people”.143 He also expressed his concern regarding the dramatic situation in the Middle East. What is exceedingly notable here though is that in his reply, Sergei Ivanov referred to the common geostrategic conditions with regard to the two countries, as well as the identical threats and challenges they are faced with.144 In that way, he brought to notice a crucial geostrategic dimension that was pervaded not only by cultural overlaps, but most importantly by intersecting national interests. This geopolitical assertiveness came at a cost, for given the extended political activities of Christodoulos in an area much broader than that of his authority, he inevitably entered the vital space and jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which brought about an ecclesiastical antagonism of noticeable magnitude, at an EU level as well as domestically. Following a long period of friction and discord, the newly elected government of New Democracy (2004) got involved as this problem was detrimental to its prestige and exerted its influence in order to help resolve it. After all, this already had consequences on the coherence of the synod with hierarchs being torn between sides;145 as for the European aspect of the issue, the fact that autocephalous churches were being represented individually in Brussels instead of collectively via one ecumenical office, had already irritated the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

142 Ibid. 143 Press Office of the HSCG, “Επίσκεψη στον Μακαριώτατο του Υπουργού Άμυνας της Ρωσικής Ομοσπονδίας κ. Σεργκέι Ιβανόφ”, (2002), pp. 289–90, (p. 289). 144 Ibid. 145 G. E., Interview with the author, 27 November 2013.

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In any case, regardless of the political intervention and the synodical decisions that defused the situation, Christodoulos maintained in his synodical address of 5 October 2004 that even though the wounds heal, the concerns remain. More to the point, he suggested that the synod needed to answer a series of fundamental questions regarding the future of the OCG a propos the post-Westphalian reality. Whereby he wondered if and to what extent the church is “a living or a provincial, marginalised institution, whether it is independent and self-luminous, or it accepts self-censorship by which it voluntarily restricts its Episcopal responsibility”;146 whereby he asked whether the OCG wishes to restrict itself into its home when “the world is now a mere neighbourhood and the EU a reality. In that sense, if it is prepared to endorse new ways of pastoral service”, which the times impose, or to maintain dated ways that do not reach modern people. Posing thus ultimately, the critical question of taking into account the contemporary international conditions, which require a “geopolitical pastoral consciousness” or remain hostages of old mentalities, which obstruct the church’s initiatives, and likewise, whether to remain silent or promote Greek Orthodoxy outwards, particularly to Europe.147 Hence, the late archbishop admittedly practised what his geopolitical pastoral consciousness dictated. However, the Ecumenical Patriarchate considers geopolitics to be its exclusive domain. That is why Bartholomew questioned the use of the OCG’s autonomous representation to Brussels; because he disagreed with the notion of an equally autonomous geopolitical approach and favoured a unitary one, which could be consistently carried out by the Liaison Office of the Orthodox Church to the European Union (LOOCEU) instead. An additional parameter to the already delicate balance though is that Brussels favour the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a measure to counterbalance the equivalent power of Moscow, given that the Baltic States fall under its jurisdiction and therefore offer Moscow a foothold within the EU.148 In other words, the assertiveness of the OCG added to the complication of the European chessboard with its Russian rapprochement, and in a final analysis, neither the OCG nor Greece appeared to be rewarded with a clearly positive cost/benefits balance. Parallel to that, the Russians embraced Christodoulos out of self-interest.149 His successor Hieronymos II changed all that and mended the discord as we have already seen, as he withdrew from the geopolitical game and restored the status quo, even as far as appearances go, with the public appraisal of the 146 Christodoulos, “Προσφώνησις ενώπιον της Ι.Σ.”, (2004), pp. 750–53, (p. 751). 147 Ibid. 148 C. T., Interview with the author, 29 October 2013. 149 G. A., Interview with the author, 25 January 2014.

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ecumenical patriarch. From 9 up to 11 May 2008, the archbishop visited the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and on the first day upon receiving him, the patriarch addressed him by saying that this first visit is in itself a great ecclesiastical event, but additionally it verifies the homogeneity between the two sides; most importantly because it is carried out by a clear-headed, patient, charismatic hierarch.150 Hieronymos II responded to this that his presence there was not intended to settle a debt, but to open a new chapter, as imposed by the times and their common identity.151 He noted that conditions had matured; therefore, previously pending differences could be set aside, stressing the lack of any other alternative than to mend the rift. However, he warned that the negative effects of modernity in the ecclesiastical body are unfortunately still present; yet, he underlined that the OCG had now realised that it is not appropriate to function in tandem with the ever transforming terms and conditions of social and political schemes.152 In the evening at the ceremonial dinner, in tune with the spirit of rapprochement with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Hieronymos II sought to depoliticise and denationalise the role of the church by saying that ecumenicity in its diachronic dimensions is fundamental, and naturally, “as a foundation of every ‘today’ its purpose is not to serve ephemeral phenomena nor flat realism”. Free of such temporal burden, he said, the ecumenicity of the church is not of this century; “it points to the eternal and as part of the greater Ecclesiastical sum it knows no ethnarchy, this-worldliness, exclusions, rejection and qualitativeness as measurement units of its being”,153 which is directly antithetical to the national interest-oriented raison d’être of the OCG that his predecessor and many hierarchs had envisaged. Further, as regards the representation to the EU in Brussels, it was settled according to the bilateral agreement of the OCG and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, in keeping with the spirit of unitary Orthodox expression therein, that the two cosignatory churches would proceed to the necessary institutional changes.154

150 Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, “Προσφώνησις της Α.Π.Θ. του Οικουμενικού Πατριάρχου κ. Βαρθολομαίου κατά την Επίσημον Υποδοχήν του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Ιερωνύμου εν τη Αιθούση του Θρόνου”, (2008), pp. 329–32, (p. 329). 151 Hieronymos II, “Αντιφώνησις του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών κατά την Επίσημον Υποδοχήν εν τη Αιθούση του Θρόνου”, (2008), pp. 333–35, (p. 333). 152 Ibid. 153 Hieronymos II, “Αντιφώνησις του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών κατά τo Δείπνον εν τω Σισμανωγλείω Μεγάρω”, (2008), pp. 341–42, (p. 341). 154 Lampriniadis, and Misiakoulis, pp. 361–62, (p. 362).

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Indeed Hieronymos has a clear image of where and how he wishes to lead the OCG as he worked towards depoliticising it and unhinging it from partisanships, including the eradication of the previous mentality. However, it is debatable whether this plan is fully realisable given that he is lacking the explosive personality that might be necessary to see it through.155 And it appears that he is aware of that. Domestically, in the ad hoc session of the hierarchy of 24 June 2008, he told the panel that he had studied intensively and in depth the accumulated issues that the church has to deal with; domestic ones as well as those concerning the rapidly changing and de-Christianising world, the cultural and social developments, and conveyed his awareness of the expectations.156 Yet, he suggested that this calls for a tranquil, substantial and theologically sound planning on how to proceed, warning that there is no room for individual strategies and initiatives, as the times do not allow for vain self-promotion when a synodical approach is called for. And he warned that his silence is not a sign of passiveness but a conscious choice, clarifying that there is a time to speak and a time to be quiet, so he stated that isolated, autonomous interventions, especially when stemming from personal ambitions and aspirations, do not serve the interests of the church.157 On the one hand, the head of the OCG might change as it happens, yet the extent to which the church follows suit is not to be taken for granted as the organisation is not person-dependent or leadership-dependent, as is the case with the Vatican. Be that as it may, it would not be off the mark to suggest that the geopolitical pastoral consciousness that permeated the OCG during the era of Christodoulos has ceased to be the norm, and regardless of delicate balances within the hierarchy, policies have indeed changed. Concerning the Greek Diaspora of well-established communities and corresponding religioscapes throughout Europe, Christodoulos was ever sceptical and even dismissive of the presumed Greekness of the outsiders, who in the succession of generations lose their identity. When he warned, e.g. of symptoms of such erosion domestically, he brought up the Greek Diaspora. He namely wondered, for how many generations the nation will survive if Greece attains a polity which does not support faith, language and national education, prompting the attendants to look at the Greek Diaspora for an answer, as they clearly maintain their

155 A. N., Interview with the author, 4 December 2013. 156 Hieronymos II, “Εισήγηση του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Ιερωνύμου στην Έκτακτη Σύγκλιση της Ιεραρχίας”, (2008), pp. 489–92, (p. 489). 157 Ibid., p. 490.

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features for a maximum of three generations.158 That is not to say that customary exchanges of visits have not taken place, but the actual exercise of policies or the attempt to that end is not detectable, especially in the EU where the presence of diasporic communities, and hence the existence of corresponding religioscapes, is evident; after all, those fall strictly into the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and its local metropolitanates. Hieronymos II on the other hand abstained from engaging into such activities too, given that his priorities, amidst the debt crisis especially, were humanitarian; also since his enthronement, as already stated, it was clearly communicated and evident in his public discourses that his rhetoric and priorities were depoliticised. The OCG however considers “flying the flag” a national contribution and an ambassadorial function, whereby Greece is promoted at a symbolic level; not necessarily in the EU but anywhere that there is engagement in diasporic or missionary and humanitarian activities, hence in that sense the state is represented indirectly to its benefit.159 Also, the indirect presence of the OCG takes place via the recruitment of human resources all over the world, e.g. Germany, the USA, even in Jerusalem where the flock is Arab and its pastors are Greek.160 This does not entail of course any consequences in priorities or the exercise of cultural policies at all. But it is instrumental in the preservation of a sense of identity where Greek diasporic communities are located, in which case the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople is central, and from that perspective there is a degree of cooperation with the OCG. However, by no means are national policies being pursued.161 In sum then, the OCG has not reacted in any distinguishable strategic way as far as the potential of religioscapes goes, as it acknowledges the insurmountable difficulties to even design a strategy in that flux field. Not to mention the implications, this would raise in the event of interference outside its ecclesiastically legitimate domain; after all, the reach of national churches internationally is limited, as they are primarily domestic actors in contrast to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.162 And in that context, the common presence of Hieronymos and Bartholomew in Zappeion (30 June 2014), when Greece took over the EU presidency,163 qualifies as a gesture of high symbolic value to that end, thus delineating the aforementioned arrangement framework. 158 Christodoulos, “Εκκλησία και Λαός: Μια Αδιάσπαστη Σχέση”, pp. 590–92, (p. 592). 159 T. I., Interview with the author, 14 January 2014. 160 K. D., Interview with the author, 23 May 2014. 161 G. A., Interview with the author, 25 January 2014. 162 H. R., Interview with the author, 13 March 2014. 163 Ibid.

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4.2.2  The Orthodox Church of Cyprus Even though Chrysostomos I did not have any active involvement in intraEuropean affairs as his health did not allow it, in his peak he left his own mark with regard to a diplomatic, nationally oriented mobilisation, both as a hierarch and as an informal ethnarch. Following the death of an ethnarch by definition, Makarios III on 3 August 1977, he took up duties as regent in accordance with the Church’s constitution and organised elections. The assembly of the elected representatives declared him Archbishop unanimously on 12 November 1977, and he was enthroned the next day.164 The Cyprus Problem was central in his daily efforts and concerns, and he consistently promoted it as an issue of invasion and occupation; to him the primary question was the liberation of Cyprus and the occupied territory. For the national cause he visited Greece, Great Britain, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Holland, Belgium and Germany. His most notable visit was to the White House and President Jimmy Carter (22 May 1979), where the president apologised to the archbishop for his country’s responsibility for the invasion.165 He repeatedly appealed to both the Orthodox and heterodox Churches, the Pope, the World Council of Churches, the Council of European Churches, America, the Middle East, the UN, UNESCO, the Council of Europe and other organisations; he put forward the issue of invasion and occupation, stressed the withdrawal of the occupying military force and the settlers as imperative, as well as requested the confirmation of the fate of the missing and the safe return of the refugees to their homes. It should also be noted that he made a significant contribution to the reinforcement of military defence works, the National Guard and generally the armed forces.166 He has acted as a diplomat then, he understood the instrumental aspect of the church as soft power and what is more, he tried to reinforce the state with hard power as an additional bargaining tool. It would not be out of order to maintain that the OCC has accumulated a great deal of ethnarchic experience, as we have already demonstrated; hence, it has functioned as a central actor in the political arena, and it has developed an acute understanding of the value of geopolitics in designing and promoting an agenda internationally. It was no surprise then that the venue and opportunities that the EU had to offer was seen as instrumental; not to mention that the 164 Frixos Kleanthous, “Αρχιεπίσκοπος Κύπρου Χρυσόστομος – Συμβολή στο Έργο και στην Προσφορά του”, (2006), pp. 228–41, (p. 232). 165 Ibid., pp. 237–38. 166 Ibid., pp. 239–40.

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intra-European Westphalian reversal is fully in tune with the implementation of the European acquis throughout the island, which is a very high priority for the OCC as regards the terms and conditions of a solution. A hint of that was shown when Chrysostomos II visited Brussels on 14 May 2007. In meeting José Manuel Barroso there, who had invited him, the archbishop referred to the geographical location of Cyprus as a bridge of three continents where consequently numerous conquerors have passed, but at the same time, a peaceful modus vivendi with other religious convictions was always found, recalling also the example of his own childhood. But, he added that under the occupation, more than 500 churches have been destroyed and desecrated or stripped off their ornaments, even frescoes and mosaics, only to become merchandise in Europe and America.167 In that way, the archbishop demonstrated a grasp of the relationship between the spatial and the religiocultural parameter as attested by the Christian Orthodox monuments and ruins in northern Cyprus, which was actually the object of his visit. This was part of an overall well and consistently observed cultural diplomatic pursuit that has been served by the archbishop, politicians, the office in Brussels and the church institutions, as we have established already when we examined the EU policies of the OCC. The truth is that the OCC had rather high expectations of the EU; that is why the synod with its Christmas message of 2002 expressed the hope that the struggles of its people would find their vindication via the European accession and membership.168 Yet realism readjusted such aspirations, even to the degree of disappointment, given that initially it was expected that the EU partners would assist Greek-Cypriots in promoting their case on the basis of human rights without exceptions.169 But the EU has not always been sympathetic. For example, the European Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen (1999–2004) had warned that in the event that the Greek-Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, the so-called green line170 would be rendered a de facto outside border, adding that the EU would be responsible to make sure that the Turkish-Cypriots would not suffer from that.171 Following the plan’s sweeping rejection, the European Commission was allegedly infuriated with the government of Papadopoulos and their campaign, and by an announcement it conveyed its regret for the outcome while it congratulated the Turkish-Cypriot side for demonstrating its willingness for a 167 168 169 170 171

Mitsides, “Η Α.Μ. ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος στις Βρυξέλλες”, pp. 355–57, (p. 355). Stylianou, (2002). K. C., Interview with the author, 25 February 2014. The UN buffer zone since 1974. “Ντε Φάκτο Σύνορο η Πράσινη Γραμμή λέγει ο Φερχόιγκεν”, (16 April 2004).

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solution; it also thanked the UN Secretary General and his team for their close cooperation with the commission in designing their plan.172 However, disappointments and discords notwithstanding, the reasons for joining the EU still stand. Whether it is the archbishop or the average GreekCypriot who is being asked, the expected assistance first and foremost boils down to a solution based on human rights and freedoms and the acquis communautaire. Essentially this means freedom of movement and settlement, which was not a provision of the Annan Plan therefore it violated both aforementioned principles.173 This is something that the archbishop exclaims at any given opportunity. It is not expected of the EU to solve the problem, but to get more involved and essentially codetermine the agenda with suggestions in accordance with the acquis. Of course there exists a geopolitics and energy reserves interplay, in conjunction with the volatile balances in the region, while Cyprus is an EU gateway to the Middle East; and, if those reserves become “European”, it is self-evident that they will be managed with responsibility and contribute to the security of the region while the EU will benefit as well, but it is recognised that this complex situation exceeds the EU.174 However, affairs of religiocultural heritage and monuments are well within its management capacities. For instance on 14 May 2007, Chrysostomos II had the opportunity to promote the issue of stolen treasures and destroyed or desecrated Christian Orthodox monuments in northern Cyprus. In the conference of mono­ theistic religions in Brussels, he raised awareness on that, informed EU officials and announced future efforts towards the repatriation of stolen icons. Notably, he caused the reaction of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who said that the EU cannot turn a blind eye in the face of destruction.175 Also, the archbishop called upon the EU and religious leaders to exert pressure on Turkey, so that the churches would be restored. To that he received positive replies from Barroso and Merkel, who presided of the EU then, even though they refrained from using the term “churches” and spoke of holy places and ancient monuments instead.176 Romano Prodi emerged as a keen supporter to this cause. After meeting the archbishop on 14 June 2007 in Rome, the latter stated that the Italian prime minister promised that he would bring the matter to the following European Council later that month in order to discuss it with President Papadopoulos and 172 Paulos Xanthoulis, “Πλώρη για Άρση του «Εμπάργκο» έβαλε η Ε.Ε.”, (25 April 2004). 173 G. M., Interview with the author, 24 February 2014. 174 Ibid. 175 Xanthoulis, “Μέρκελ: «Δεν μπορούμε να κλείσουμε τα Μάτια»”, (16 May 2007). 176 “Πίεση προς την Τουρκία ζήτησε ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος”, (17 May 2007).

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the other heads of Member States; he further reassured the archbishop that they would work together to put pressure on Turkey to stop this.177 It must be noted that this was from the start one of the main goals of the office of representation in Brussels, which is indicative of an overall strategy. This was actually stated in the inauguration ceremony of the RCCEU by the archbishop personally in the presence of Cypriot and foreign officials, MEPs and representatives of the OCG, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. To which he added that if Turkey wishes to join, it must be allowed to the Greek-Cypriots to return to their churches, restore and use them.178 This indicates how instrumental and strategic was the EU membership to the OCC, regardless of drawbacks along the way, which is not uncommon for a bloc-actor where a number of national interests may at times intersect, combine or conflict with each other. But it also reveals a consistency in pursuing a well-defined agenda of cultural diplomacy. The same priorities on behalf of the OCC were observed in the exchanges with the Vatican. In June 2007, Chrysostomos II paid his planned visit, within the context of his programmatic statements to inform the decision-making and influential centres on the Cypriot Issue; with the first in line – after the planned visit to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople for reasons of deontology, which was postponed due to election tensions – being that to the Vatican and Pope Benedict XVI, notably the first after Makarios III, who visited it as the President of the Republic of Cyprus.179 Chrysostomos II was received by the Secretary of State, Cardinal Tarcisio Bertone (2006–2013) who showed a genuine interest in the situation in Cyprus, as well as the Maronites and the Christian monuments in the occupied territory. The archbishop explained how a number of churches were demolished; others converted to museums, mosques, stables, storage houses, barracks, etc. The cardinal expressed his sorrow that in a European country in the twenty-first century, personal freedoms and human rights are being violated and religious freedoms are obstructed. He henceforth promised to instruct the 142 nuncios of the Vatican who are accredited worldwide, to enlighten and promote the claim of the Cypriot Church.180 He also promised to do the same with the Vatican-owned media. Later, at dinner, the cardinal repeated his commitment to help as much as he could in order to restore justice in Cyprus so that all 177 “Πρωτοβουλία Πρόντι για Διάσωση Μνημείων”, (15 June 2007). 178 Yannos Charalampidis, “SOS για την Πολιτιστική μας Κληρονομιά”, (19 March 2009), p. 13. 179 Georgios, “Επίσημη Επίσκεψη του Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου στο Βατικανό”, pp. 587– 628, (p. 587–88). 180 Ibid., p. 592.

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Christians, regardless of creed, can fully enjoy the religious freedoms guaranteed by the UN and the EU.181 Also, during dinner in honour of the Cardinal Walter Kasper, the archbishop called upon the cardinal’s German origins and hence his understanding of a divided country, and asked him to exert his influence in order to help towards the reunification of the island, the withdrawal of the occupation army and settlers, and the return of the refugees to their homes, to which the cardinal replied that he would do so.182 On Saturday 16 June when he met with the Pope, he repeated the misfortunes that have to do with the violation of human rights, the division of the island and the desecration of cultural heritage.183 Accounting on the results of this campaign, Foreign Minister Georgios Lillikas commented that it was indeed very successful. Apart from talks of general European interest, he found such approaches very beneficial to the Cypriot interests because they allow for alliances to be formed towards the preservation of the cultural and religious heritage in the north, as well as promote the positions towards the reunification of the island and the coexistence of the two communities. Further, he said that there would be more activities of that sort in the future as the archbishop had more such visits in mind, expecting them to disseminate more symbolic messages as such;184 which indicates a degree of coordination between church and government, and in this case between church and foreign ministry. Pope Benedict XVI reciprocated and on 4 June 2010 he visited Cyprus. The archbishop addressed him by referring among others to the Cyprus Problem and brought up the most burning issues thereof, such as the occupation, the problems of the refugees, the Anatolian settlers and the condition of the cultural monuments. Of course, especially concerning the latter, he asked for the pontiff ’s assistance yet again.185 On a rather political tone, Chrysostomos II stressed that Cyprus is a bridge between Middle East and Europe, a strategic crossroads and a place of dialogue, and underlined that Cyprus will never forget this international event,186 referring to the prestigious and rich in symbolisms visit. A key request to the pontiff by the archbishop was to intervene, so that it would be made possible for an abbot and a small entourage of approximately four monks to settle in the occupied monastery of Apostle Varnavas. It was explained that this 181 182 183 184 185

Ibid., pp. 593–94. Ibid., pp. 606–07. Ibid., p. 617. “Εκστρατείας Συνέχεια από Αρχιεπίσκοπο”, (18 June 2007). Pavlos Chatziprodromou, “Επίσκεψη στην Κύπρο του Πάπα Ρώμης Βενέδικτου 16ου”, (2010) 298–315, (pp. 301–302). 186 Eleni Mavroudi, ‘Επίσκεψη με Πολλά Mηνύματα’, (7 June 2010), p. 6.

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was very significant to the OCC whose patron and founder is Apostle Varnavas; because of that the HSCC, following the election of Chrysostomos II, declared the monastery “Stavropegian” (Gr.: Σταυροπήγιο), which means that from then on it adheres to the archbishop instead of the local bishop.  In addition, the Pope requested and was given a memo on the Cypriot treasures and icons that were located in Germany, so that he would assist in their repatriation.187 Thereby, consistency was demonstrated by the OCC in pursuing the agenda of cultural diplomacy; and a degree of escalation is detectable via the request to assist in the repopulation of the Apostle Varnavas monastery, in order to establish a foothold in the occupied territory where religiocultural monuments are to be found, markers of a pre-existing religioscape under persecution, instrumental in the overall OCC policy. It must also be noted that the Pope respected the sensitivities of the Greek-Cypriots and did not cross over to the occupied territory – which could be interpreted as legitimation of the post-invasion regime – where Salamina, the first station of Apostle Paul is located, nor did he visit the occupied Maronite villages.188 In order to provide a very brief background on the bonds between the Pope and the Maronites,189 it is worth mentioning that they are Catholics and constitute the third largest religious community of the island after the Christian Orthodox and the Muslims, and as such they interest the Vatican intensely and directly. In fact the interest is so acute that the Pope intervened in the drawing of the Annan Plan so that the Maronite villages would be excluded from the overall scheme, which

187 Militsa Polemitou, “Βοήθεια από τον Πάπα για τον Απ. Βαρνάβα ζήτησε η Κύπρος”, (9 June 2010), p. 12. 188 Ibid. 189 Their settlements in Cyprus date back to the eighth century AD and have had their own clergy since the twelfth century. They suffered suppression and restrictions over the centuries and their numbers withered, to recover under the British colonial administration (1878–1960). They had their religious and political rights and status consolidated with the emergence of the Republic of Cyprus. The government has provided them with two churches in Nicosia and Limassol, and a primary school in Nicosia, yet most attend Greek-Cypriot schools. Their population nowadays amounts to approximately 4.800 people, of which the vast majority fled to the South when the interethnic conflicts (1963) transpired. In the occupied territory of the north, their population of circa 200 people resides in the villages of Kormakitis, Agios Asomatos, Agia Marina and Karpasia. See Irene Dietzel, The Ecology of Coexistence and Conflict in Cyprus: Exploring the Religion, Nature, and Culture of a Mediterranean Island (2014); also, Irene Dietzel and Vasilios N. Makrides, “Ethno-Religious Coexistence and Plurality in Cyprus under British Rule (1878—1960)”, Social Compass, 56 (1), (2009), pp. 69–83.

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resulted in a curve that formed a pocket within the occupied territory, in direct communication of course with the free parts.190 Therefore, the Maronites are high in the Pope’s agenda. Suffice it to say that they have managed to reclaim Kormakitis – a small village located in the cape north of Morphou and east of Keryneia in the occupied territory – which is owed by and large to the Vatican’s intervention.191 Apart from that, Maronites are a link between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriots; they set up communication channels and meetings between the Pope, the OCC and President Nikos Anastasiadis; they constitute a big part of the DISY constituency, essentially a Hellenocentric party; they have their own representation in the parliament where they control approximately five seats, and in a nutshell they are well-networked and have a sway that affects several actors; which means that for church diplomacy to be successful one has to broaden one’s soft power via alliances that increase influence in an extended geopolitical space.192 Within the same context, the Cypriot archbishop engaged in an analogous regional activity parallel to his endeavours with the EU and the Vatican, where he promoted the same agenda as above. For example, he visited Egypt between 22 and 27 July 2007, where among other things the programme included a meeting with the Grand Imam of Egypt Dr Tantawi, to whom he handed an album with the well-preserved Muslim monuments and places of worship on the free side of the island, as opposed to the Christian ones in the occupied territory and asked for his assistance.193 The imam replied positively and promised to convey the message further and support it wholeheartedly.194 On Thursday 26 July, he visited the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011), whose positions on the Cyprus Problem were clear: withdrawal of the occupying forces and settlers, implementation of the UN resolutions and respect for the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus.195 In addition, in an admittedly belated change of strategy that is in part owed to a shift in the regional balance of power and the bilateral relations between Turkey and Israel,196 the Republic of Cyprus, with the backing of the OCC, 190 H. L., Interview with the author, 4 March 2014. 191 L. E., Interview with the author, 12 March 2014. 192 Ibid. 193 Georgios, “Επίσκεψη του Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου στον Πατριάρχη των Κοπτών και Ειρηνική Επίσκεψή του στο Πατριαρχείο Αλεξανδρείας”, (2007), pp. 629–45, (p. 632). 194 Ibid., p. 633. 195 Ibid., pp. 634–35. 196 Up until the so-called neo-Ottoman doctrine of international policy, Turkey had a security-oriented dogma that was introvert in the sense of non-intervention in the

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strengthened its ties with Israel in light of the regional rearrangement of foreign policies. This, it is maintained by the OCC, is to the mutual benefit of the two countries; it includes Greece as well, and ultimately “it crosses the Atlantic”.197 Chrysostomos II held that Cyprus should have had engaged in a cooperation with the Jewish lobby decades ago, as that would have helped with the national issue, without that being detrimental to the good relations with the Arab world at the same time. He namely added that he is personally in touch with the Israeli Chief Rabbinate as well as Israeli state officials and they do not object to Cyprus’ good relations with the Arabs, nor do they take an issue with that.198 The archbishop had the conviction that Cyprus constitutes an outlet to Israel, which could benefit both states, clarifying that being a regional power in the Middle East, inevitably entails antagonism with Turkey; because the latter wishes to control the region that until recently was overseen by Israel, hence Cyprus should have had already taken advantage of the situation, years ago in fact.199 Needless to say that the OCC offered to provide its services should that be required, although there was very little – if any – room to function as soft power in a post-Westphalian sense, contrary to its more intense involvement within the framework of the EU, where institutional accesses have been formally established. Be that as it may, the rapprochement with Israel was already being processed at a governmental level with the blessings of the archbishop. Markos Kyprianou200

Middle East, already from the era of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. However, with the resurgence of moderate Islamism in the late 1990s and the ascension of the AKP (Tur.: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, i.e. Justice and Development Party) as the undisputed political power in the country, Ahmet Davutoğlu implemented his own design and vision of a foreign policy. This resulted in a more assertive stance in the overall region, extending from the West Balkans eastwards to central Asia and southwards to Yemen, including the Eastern Mediterranean. It follows that a conflict of interest with the neighbouring states – Greece, Israel, and Egypt – resulted in a reorientation and redistribution of alliances. See SEESOX, Old Alignments and New Neighbourhoods: Turkey’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World, International Conference, Oxford 30 April – 2 May 2010 (South East European Studies at Oxford [SEESOX]: Oxford, 2011), and loannis N. Grigoriadis, “The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy”, ELIAMEP, Working Paper Nr. 8, (2010). 197 E. R., Interview with the author, 8 November 2013. 198 Mikaella Loizou, “Πότε θα αξιοποιήσουμε τους Εβραίους;”, (28 August 2010), p. 4. 199 Ibid. 200 Republic of Cyprus Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2008 to 2011.

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met with David Harris201 who was heading the representation of the American Jewish Committee, which, in the words of the foreign minister, is a very influential lobby in the decision-making centres in the USA. That could be instrumental in securing the support of the American government in issues of common interests.202 Apart from the Cyprus Problem, they discussed the intention of the Cypriot government to render the state an important actor in the region, due to the EU membership on the one hand and the proximity to the Middle East on the other, which secures a better understanding of the particularities in the region and a mediating role between Brussels and the states in the Eastern Mediterranean. To that he added that Cyprus is the only state there that has good relations with Israel, while at the same time it maintains an open channel with – almost – all states in the region, which could be utilised by the international community.203 Immediately then one observes the overlaps between the archbishop’s and the foreign minister’s views, and identifies the full agreement in key issues as regards the regional role of Cyprus in conjunction with the EU membership and its potential in ceasing the opportunity with the change of geostrategic tides; i.e., when Turkey shifted to the neo-Ottoman doctrine of international policy. This should not be mistaken for an unequivocal Westernisation of the OCC’s standpoint and attitude though. It was not a full reorientation in light of the changes that the Westphalian reversal brings, but rather an adjustment with the national interest at the epicentre of its policies. Thus, traditional ties and alliances have not been severed, and formal as well as informal ties with Russia have been maintained intact, if not reinforced. There exist ample instances which attest to that, while they demonstrate the multifaceted and complex relationship between Cyprus and Russia and the instrumental role of the OCC therein as a significant institution. A formality that demonstrates this was a ceremony that took place on 12 May 2008 in the Archbishopric Palace. There, in the presence of members of the HSCC and the Russian embassy, the archbishop awarded the departing ambassador Andrei Nesterenko the Gold Medal of Apostle Paul and addressed him by thanking him for his services as ambassador of the “great and Homodox country”, stressing his personal ethos, but also his support to the Cypriot people and its struggles towards freedom and the application of pananthropic rights and

201 The Executive Director of the American Jewish Committee (AJC); URL: https://www. ajc.org/. 202 Loizou, “Πότε θα αξιοποιήσουμε τους Εβραίους;”. 203 Ibid.

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values.204 Regardless of the expected courtesies that a ceremony as such entails, the symbolic value of this event is very high as it demonstrates the religiocultural bonds between the two states by exception – it is only but a few foreign officials that enjoy such honours upon leaving their post – and underlines the acknowledgement of the church’s role in this. More to the point, Chrysostomos II returned satisfied from his visit to Moscow in July 2008, bringing words of support on behalf of the church and the people of Russia; namely in his statement at the Larnaca airport he said that the talks with his counterparts, including the Russian patriarch, were meaningful and brotherly and that both sides are at each other’s disposal.205 Most importantly, he met with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (in office since 2004) who renewed his government’s support to the Cypriot people.206 In that sense, the context where the OCC is an actor and a mediator in the Russian-Cypriot relations is present yet again, what is more with the church performing its role in a purely political realm. In exchange the OCC offered the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) its unwavering support in sensitive matters. In light of the Russo-Ukrainian church dispute – Ukraine wished to declare its own autonomous Patriarchate in Kiev while ROC insisted that it represents the local church via its own metropolitan – and following the appeal of Sergey Lavrov to Chrysostomos II, it was decided that the OCC ought to abstain from the festivities in Kiev on the 1020th anniversary (2008) of the baptism of the Kievan Rus.207 In a statement issued for that reason, it was announced that the OCC would not participate, essentially meaning that they would not legitimise the event, neither via its archbishop nor via representation, because it was assumed that the event was part of a broader effort to legitimise the establishment of a patriarchate there, much to the dismay of Moscow. In fact the ROC deposed the patriarch that Kiev had pronounced with the backing of the Ukrainian government.208 However, there existed a complication parallel to this, for the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople to which the OCC adheres was bound to be present, as Bartholomew was invited by both the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and the president of the country. Yet, it was noted that the OCC was also invited by the same institutions, so during 204 “Απονομή του Χρυσού Παρασήμου του Αποστόλου Παύλου της Ιεράς Αρχιεπισκοπής Κύπρου εις τον Αποχωρήσαντα Πρέσβυν της Ρωσίας Αντρέι Νεστερένκο”, (2008), pp. 261–62. 205 “Η Ρωσία ανανέωσε την Υποστήριξη στην Κύπρο”, (21 July 2008). 206 Ibid. 207 Vasileiou, “Προτίμησαν τη Μόσχα από το Κίεβο”, (22 July 2008). 208 Ibid.

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the visit to Moscow, the details of the issue were discussed; it was also added that Chrysostomos II was honoured there with the Cross of St Vladimir, the utmost tribute of the Patriarchate of Moscow,209 which was apparently intended to denote the close relations between Moscow and Nicosia, which entails obligations inevitably. A further potential complication rested on the antagonism between the Ecumenical and the Russian Patriarchate, as the latter has raised claims concerning the jurisdiction of the former globally, over diasporic Russian and former Soviet communities. At the time relations between the two were reaching critical mass, which made the simultaneous presence of Alexy and Bartholomew in Kiev raise discussions and political implications. There were articles in the Turkish press, e.g., that maintained that the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin got involved and requested from his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan210 to talk Bartholomew out of going to Kiev.211 In a statement of Chrysostomos II on the other hand, which was published on the official ROC website, it is clearly stated that the mother church of the UOC is the Russian and not that of Constantinople; therefore, only ROC can grant the Ukrainian church autocephaly; and so it has done accordingly, maintained Chrysostomos II, by granting extended autonomy already. Metropolitan of France Emmanuel, who is adherent to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, commented on the decision that the Cypriot archbishop made, with a high degree of sobriety, claiming that the Ecumenical Patriarchate understands that it was based on by and large political criteria, that it too wishes that the Cyprus Problem will be solved, and that they have no complaints and understand the circumstances that pervade the issue.212 Whereby, judging by the reaction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, it was essential that the OCC maintained a solid policy towards Russia, especially for an issue that bears sovereignty implications as such. Further indications of this closely knit relationship rest in the numerous exchanges between multifold actors and agencies from both sides. For instance, following the invitation of the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Alexy II, Chrysostomos II visited Russia from 15 to 20 July 2008. In their common liturgy in the Church of the Assumption, the archbishop replied to his address that by their common liturgy they declared the unity of all Christians “from small Cyprus to God-guarded Russia” and all over the world; and thanked on behalf of 209 Ibid. 210 Turkish Prime Minister between 2003 and 2014; President since August 2014. 211 Aristeidis Vikettos, “Κρίσιμη μέρα για Φανάρι – Μόσχα”, (26 July 2008). 212 Ibid.

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the Cypriot people the Russian government, church and people for the constant, diachronic support “in the struggle for physical and national survival”.213 He consolidated his opinion by saying that especially since 1974 this solidarity was evident, but also referred to the patriarch personally, who, with his intervention to Vladimir Putin, saved Cyprus by vetoing the adoption of the Annan Plan by the UN Security Council as a resolution. On that he conveyed the gratitude and respect of the Orthodox Christians of Cyprus for the contribution of the Russian Church, stating that they know that while the unfair and unviable solution was being promoted by Turkey and its allies, England and USA, they could count on Russia.214 In that way, Chrysostomos II was adamant on the alliance between the two states and their actors, and the way that the OCC classified its strategic priorities publicly and beyond the shadow of a doubt. We must note however that entrenching oneself in positions that one cannot easily retreat from is not an advisable diplomatic practice because that leaves little room for manoeuvres and may be detrimental.215 Be that as it may, the archbishop did not see this as an occasional but as a deeply rooted alliance; when awarded the Cross of St Vladimir on 18 July by Alexy II, he thanked and stated that Cyprus always looked to Russia for help, referring to Russian clerics who assisted the Cypriots during the Latinocracy and Turkocracy, or to Makarios III, who requested assistance on several occasions and received it.216 On 19 July in the monastery of St Daniel, the seat of the Patriarchate, there were talks between the two heads of churches. The patriarch referred to several issues, where among others he conveyed the reassurance of the Russian government that it will continue to respond to the initiatives of the ROC on behalf of the OCC, so that the positions of the latter will be taken into consideration in formulating policies towards the Cypriot Issue. In turn, the archbishop expressed his willingness to cooperate with the Russian church in a series of issues, especially concerning the Russian community in Limassol, to the needs of which he would attend.217 This climate was lasting, judging by the visit of the Russian President Medvedev to the archbishop on 7 October 2010 during 213 Mitsides, “Επίσημη Επίσκεψη της Α.Μ. του Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου στην Εκκλησία της Ρωσίας”, (2008), pp. 323–49, (pp. 327–28). 214 Ibid., p. 329. 215 See Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations guidelines for sensible, classical realist diplomatic practices that are diachronically applicable. 216 Mitsides, “Επίσημη Επίσκεψη του Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου στην Εκκλησία της Ρωσίας”, p. 341. 217 Ibid., pp. 344–47.

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his brief stay in Cyprus, for the president reassured the archbishop that his country’s solidarity to Cyprus will continue.218 But the OCC’s Russo-Cypriot exchanges have not been restricted to political and religious actors and agencies. For example on 18 October 2010, the archbishop awarded the Russian businessman and philanthropist Andrey Klishas, the medal of St Paul. The president of the company group Norilsk Nickel Moscow was honoured, as the archbishop said in his address, for his contribution to the promotion of the orthodox spirit and the traditionally close ties between Cyprus and Russia, as well as his moral and material generosity to the people, but especially to the Church of Cyprus.219 It would be more accurate then to maintain that the aforementioned kinship exceeds and precedes the context of the Westphalian reversal that enabled non-state actors to get more actively involved into various affairs. The Russo-Cypriot state relations have been close for decades – the Republic of Cyprus itself is only a few decades old – and they cover a spectrum of international politics, diplomacy and economic relations, including the approximately eighty thousand Russians who own housing property in Cyprus and many of whom are permanent residents. Therefore, those relations are also cultural and demographic – in Limassol alone live circa thirty thousand Russians  – and are beyond the control of foreign ministries when social and cultural life is concerned.220 Another aspect of international active involvement of the OCC, which also pre-existed the Westphalian reversal, would be that with Greece, i.e., what hierarchs in Cyprus frequently call the “national centre”. We addressed that already when we referred to the visit of Metropolitan Paulos to Aigion and Panagia Tripiti (6 May 2005), where he essentially described all pending and potential national issues of Greece and Cyprus into common national ones, irrespective of state, thus conflating them into one international policy framework.221 Likewise, when the President of the Hellenic Republic Karolos Papoulias (2005–2015) visited Cyprus and paid a visit to the Archbishopric Palace on 16 October 2005 as well, he was addressed by Metropolitan Chrysostomos as his “Excellency

218 “Ο Πρόεδρος της Ρωσικής Ομοσπονδίας στην Ιερά Αρχιεπισκοπή”, (2010), pp. 517– 20. 219 “Επίδοση στον κ. Andrey Klishas του Παρασήμου του Απ. Παύλου της Ιεράς Αρχιεπισκοπής Κύπρου”, (2010), pp. 525–27, (p. 525). 220 R. C., Interview with the author, 22 February 2014. 221 Paulos, “Πανηγυρικός Λόγος στην Εορτή της Υπεραγίας Θεοτόκου της Τρυπητής”, pp. 184–89.

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Mr President of the motherland”.222 To which he added that the OCC, throughout the hard times, preserved on the one hand the Orthodox faith and on the other the notion of the “Eternal and immortal Mother Greece”.223 He stressed that the Holy Synod attached great importance to the president’s visit and perceived it as an expression of his great affection and interest, and by extension as the love and interest of Greece and all Greek brothers wherever they may be. To which he added that this was a much needed message to convey that GreekCypriots are not alone, that all Greece and the whole nation stands by them.224 More intense references of that kind, and plenty, were made during the visit of Christodoulos to Cyprus, where emotions of bitterness and abandonment are not uncommon when the tumultuous relationship between the two states is taken into account. Wherefrom the frequent requests of Chrysostomos II stem, i.e. for Greece to act as a “national centre” as we saw earlier when he complained that the Greek-Cypriots are no Diaspora. Therefore, with Christodoulos’ visit, it was attempted among others to mend this. So, Chrysostomos II, in welcoming him said that his visit, the first in forty years of the head of the Greek Church, was long awaited and was interpreted as a gesture of solidarity in difficult times when the Turkish intransigence and cynical provocation was on the rise, according to the host archbishop.225 Christodoulos’ reassuring reply conveyed a message of brotherly love on behalf of mainland Hellenism and the exchange continued on April 30, in the cathedral of St John the Theologian in Nicosia; there Chrysostomos II welcomed Christodoulos once again and said that his visit was not interpreted as a friendly gesture, a necessity, or a formality but as intended to reinforce the national sentiment and the morale of the people.226 But apart from public utterances, following the meetings, discussions and works of the six-day visit, in a document signed by both archbishops a number of conclusions and decisions had been put on paper on 5 May 2007 in the Archbishopric Palace. Particularly the points that had to do with their bilateral cooperation and the reinforcement of the “national centre” notion, can be summed up to the following: the special relationship between the two churches remains strong and so their cooperation includes all aspects, i.e. missionary, social, pastoral and national; to both churches, the reinforcement of the national consciousness of 222 “Ο Πρόεδρος της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας”, pp. 384–89, (p. 384). 223 Ibid., p. 385. 224 Ibid. 225 Mitsides, “Η εις Κύπρον Επίσκεψις της Α.Μ. του Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών”, pp. 208– 68, (p. 210). 226 Ibid., pp. 212–13.

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the Greeks and the strengthening of their cultural identity remains a primary duty; the complementary assistance to the political leaderships of Cyprus and Greece in international forums and organisations towards the solution of the Cyprus Problem was deemed necessary for the full restoration of international law, meaning the withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces, the return of the refugees to their homes, the solution of the humanitarian problem of the missing people, respect for human rights and the safeguarding of the desecrated cultural heritage in the occupied territory; the systematisation of bilateral communication was deemed necessary, the granting of scholarships and common action to support Greek language and history;227 and finally, it was deemed vital that the two churches ought to cooperate when taking part in inter-Orthodox, interChristian and inter-religious dialogues.228 Evidently, the Westphalian reversal in conjunction with the EU accession opened new pathways for the utilisation of their soft power and civil society status as institutions; thereby the bilateral relationship between the OCC and the OCG seemed more promising in that field, as it offered additional venues to promote their combined agendas. Therefore, this upgraded the existing special relationship which stemmed from the common self-perception of being, and the fact that Greece was one of the three guarantor powers together with Turkey and the UK. Hence, they demonstrated the will to redraw their strategies and join forces where applicable, while recalling that “national centre” concept under the aegis of which Chrysostomos II wished to function. Both points were articulated in his speech at the University of Athens on 9 July 2008, where he underlined that the EU accession had not been fully utilised, but also that as long as the resolutions of the UN and the decisions of the EU reinforce the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey’s effort to legitimise the invasion and occupation cannot be realised, adding that the only way for Turkey and its allies to alleviate that is the dissolution of the state. Essentially, that was the objective of those resolutions; which is why they persist in the establishment of a new state, hence the Annan Plan.229 Thus the instrumental value of the EU membership was indicated, regardless if several of its members have not been solid partners at all times. As regards the special relationship with Greece, the “national centre”, he articulated the aforementioned bitterness while stressing the need that it ought to start acting like one. Namely, he held that Greece must undertake its responsibilities to a part of 227 Ibid., p. 244. 228 Ibid., p. 246. 229 Chrysostomos II, “Η Συμβολή της Εκκλησίας της Κύπρου στους Αγώνες”, pp. 350– 64, (p. 360–61).

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the nation which is in peril.230 He complained that the Greek-Cypriots have felt the bitterness of abandonment many times: when they were forced out of their homes in 1974, it remained at a safe distance, alleging remoteness itself as an excuse; a few years ago, part of the political establishment advised them to accept the Annan Plan, which would lead to a national tragedy, for which Chrysostomos II expressed his certainty that they knew that; today, he claimed, they have comfortably settled behind the “you decide and we support you” motto. “But we cannot be alone in times of peril. We are the offspring of the same origination, whereby, common are the problems and common is the destiny of Hellenism”.231 In a nutshell, he perceived the notion of “national centre” as self-evident, and with it, the combined foreign policies accordingly. Being consistent in that, he had a number of contacts in Greece where he met with the President of the Greek Parliament Dimitris Sioufas (2007–2009), the Health Minister Dimitris Avramopoulos (2006–2009) and talked about a variety of issues. To the president of the parliament particularly, with whom they talked about the Cyprus Problem, he said that it was important to convey to them the Greek-Cypriot concerns because the “national centre” must always be aware of circumstances and developments. However, we must note that he did not see Prime Minister Karamanlis because of the heavy schedule of the latter, nor Archbishop Hieronymos II; they did speak over the phone though.232 However, the Greek prime minister within the bounds of his official visit to the island did pay a visit to the Archbishop of Cyprus on 24 April 2009. Their discussion revolved round diplomatic and international affairs concerning the Cyprus Problem, and, when asked, the archbishop stated that judging by what Prime Minister Karamanlis told him in person and his overall statements during his visit, it was clear that the prime minister and his government stand by the Cypriot Hellenism.233 Clearly then, regardless of the variable responsiveness that his counterparts demonstrated over time, Chrysostomos II pursued a national orientation parallel to the internationalisation of the church within the post-national, post-Westphalian context, where Greece was to him a point of reference. It appears that joining the EU allowed for more inter-institutional flexibility whereby the OCC could be more assertive when joining forces with natural allies such as the OCG and exert influence more efficiently as soft power. 230 231 232 233

Ibid., p. 363. Ibid., p. 364. Aristeidis Vikettos, “Το Εθνικό Κέντρο πρέπει να γνωρίζει”, (19 December 2008). “Εκκλησία Κύπρου – Επίσκεψη του Πρωθυπουργού της Ελλάδος στον Αρχιεπίσκοπο Κύπρου”, (2009), p. 380.

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An emergent issue, given the course of things, as already mentioned and defined, would be that of religioscapes in Europe and elsewhere, ranging from the well-established diasporic communities to the more recently expatriated, who make the most of the labour market mobility and form socio-cultural clusters of evident ethnoreligious characteristics, often visible in the public sphere; those have time and again been addressed as valuable human assets and as a national extension of pressure in the receiving state. For that reason, the OCC has repeatedly attempted to approach them and ask them to function as pressure groups abroad. Already as metropolitan of Paphos, Chrysostomos addressed the Council of Hellenes Abroad at their conference in Nicosia on 23 August 2005 and raised this issue. He held in his speech that their national morale has not been eroded, nor their patriotism, as it happens with many of those who remain in the homeland, out of habit, convenience and routine. He attributed this phenomenon to a values’ erosion, because of which people have become myopic and cannot differentiate between “good” and “goods”. But there he drew a line as he claimed that the expatriates, out of nostalgia’s pain, can still evaluate what the father’s home, birthplace and village church mean. For that reason, he claimed that Cypriots can rely on their Diaspora, which, after all, lives where the decision-making centres are, and a well-studied intervention by them on the Cypriot issue could be proven of great benefit.234 To raise awareness on the urgency of the matter, he warned them that Cyprus remains today the last cradle of Hellenism outside the Greek state; “Hellenism in Constantinople has been exterminated, in Northern Epirus it is withering, and Greek-Cypriots are now the lamp of Hellenic civilisation, alone in the fringes of the Mediterranean and no one has the right to extinguish it”. Thus he brought them face to face with their responsibility, as he said that the solution will not come from the UN, which he did not trust at all, but rather from Europe and the principles it stands for235  – it was the period before the disillusionment with the EU apparently. On the other hand, despite the “Turkophile stance of the only superpower, the US”, Chrysostomos spared no contact when it came to the national problem. That is why he besought the Archbishop of America Demetrios during his visit to Cyprus on 25 January 2006, to utilise his prestigious position, to spare no pain and effort in order to put forward the Greek-Cypriot viewpoint and try as hard as he could to convince the leaders of America regarding their perspective. He clarified that their problem is not

234 Metropolitan Chrysostomos, “Προσφώνηση στο Συνέδριο του Συμβουλίου Αποδήμου Ελληνισμού”, (2005), pp. 215–318, (p. 315). 235 Ibid., pp. 316–17.

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so much the loss of properties or the sacrifices and blood that has already been shed, as in the dialectic of time and history this will be forgotten, but rather their fatherland and the peril of its permanent loss.236 But that was rather a parenthesis and not part of a systematic communication with the heads of Greek-Orthodox Churches worldwide for that purpose, for if there has actually been a consistent effort to approach the Diaspora, it was via conferences where their councils could be accessed directly. So once again the Metropolitan of Paphos Chrysostomos, in the annual world conference of the Cypriot diasporic youth argued as above. After mentioning that it is very difficult for the soul of the Greek to be detached from the homeland, “as it has been known already from the Homeric times when the yearning for it was proclaimed by those away from it”,237 he stressed that they have not been eroded by day-to-day materialism and comfort, so they can appreciate values such as homeland and national dignity. Also that they can better evaluate what ancestral home means, being far away from it. On the other hand, they reside where the decision-making centres are, so a well-calculated intervention may be proven very beneficial; hence, he expressed the view that only a very close relationship between the Diaspora and the Cypriot government can create the conditions for “the survival of Hellenism at the edge of the Mediterranean”.238 The same attitude permeated Chrysostomos’ discourse with the Diaspora when he became archbishop.  In the sixth congress of the World Council of Hellenes Abroad, he put emphasis on how important it is, especially at times as hard as the contemporary, for “Panhellenes” coming from all over the world to get together and discuss their problems.239 He called upon the Diaspora though to be wary and invited them not to lose their identity, urged them not to assimilate, because few as they are among numerous ethnicities they are in danger of extinction. On the other hand, he called upon the “national centre” as well not to be eroded, but also “not to be introvert and petty, because Greeks outside the state are not second-class Greeks, for they feel strongly, more than those at home, and they reside in decision-making centres”.240 For that reason, the archbishop stressed that the state must support and coordinate them in their efforts 236 “Ο Αρχιεπίσκοπος Αμερικής Δημήτριος στην Κύπρο”, pp. 30–36, (p. 32). 237 Chrysostomos, “Προσφώνηση στο Τρίτο Παγκόσμιο Συνέδριο Νεολαίας”, pp. 335– 38, (p. 335). 238 Ibid., p. 336. 239 Mitsides, “Η Α.Μ. Αρχιεπίσκοπος Κύπρου στην ΣΤ΄ Παγκόσμια Συνέλευση του Συμβουλίου Αποδήμου Ελληνισμού”, (2006), pp. 564–70, (p. 565). 240 Ibid., p. 567.

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to keep their descendants Greek and not disappoint them. Finally, he invited the “Panhellenes”, under the guidance of the Greek and the Cypriot governments to influence not only the public opinion but also the governments of the countries they live in to the benefit of Greek-Cypriot interests, noting that this would be their highest contribution to the national struggle.241 Indeed Chrysostomos II maintained a coherent pattern. At the same time however, he raised a number of issues: a very notable, outstanding feature was basically repeated, especially when referring to the Greek diasporic communities in sum; that of Hellenes being addressed with no particular spatial ancestry distinction, as all Hellenic Diaspora is supposed to act in unison for the sake of national interests. But he also raised awareness on potential identity erosion via assimilation, which would be detrimental to their cohesion and hence to the efficiency of their actions, and he urged governments to get better organised and coordinate with each other and the Diaspora. This reveals the archbishop’s scepticism as regards the full utilisation of such communities, but also his strong belief in their potential, should they function properly. Also, his speech revealed the OCC’s restrictions to act outside its jurisdiction, because other than encouraging and urging towards particular directions, he demonstrated limitations on actually engaging in particular activities and proactively taking control of the situation; instead he had to be content with what his domestic rhetorical interventions could produce. As regards identity he was particularly persistent and adamant on its safeguarding. In the fifteenth world congress of the Cypriot Diaspora, referring to the matter of language preservation, he stressed how vital it is to one’s personality as well as to the physiognomy of a people in general, for language reflects elements of history, thought, mentality and culture, as well as serves in materialising collective values. It is essentially a basic element of national self-consciousness, of which the children of the Diaspora must not be deprived; else they will cease to be Greeks, he warned. To that end, he offered the support of the church. Not that identity is restricted to language, it is general education that forms and enlightens one, pai­ deia, via the learning of tradition, values and history in diasporic schools.242 From within the ranks of the OCC, it is acknowledged that those people feel a sense of belonging in their country of origin and their church. The OCC raises no claims, on the contrary it fully respects the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s authority; but it is also pointed out that even though a number of clerics, even bishops, are recruited

241 Ibid., p. 568. 242 Chrysostomos II, “Χαιρετισμός της Α.Μ. του Αρχιεπισκόπου στο 15ο”, pp. 546–51, (p. 547–48).

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from Greece and Cyprus, eventually migrants assimilate after two or three generations, they forget their language and particularities, because their education is neglected.243 As for the clerics, despite their hard work little is accomplished when the family does not help to that end. It is therefore believed that the church on the other hand does even more than its share in connecting the Diaspora with the homeland, yet it is the communities and organisations that must work zealously for the national interests; else those efforts will be futile.244 The truth is that the aforementioned erosion that causes the OCC’s concerns over what may become of the Greek-Cypriot Diaspora and its role in the affairs of the state may not be far from the truth, in the sense that it constitutes a socio-cultural reality in Cyprus. The major outbound migratory waves took place around the period of independence acquisition and this did not occur by chance. Many of them in the UK are in their second generation and they have been “Briticised” in the process, not to mention those who had undergone that mutation even before they left, who constitute a class of their own. The former did not grow up in the island, and they are lacking the networks of personal, communal and social connections through which they ultimately socialise in the Greek-Cypriot community. They even have a nickname, “Charlies” (Gr.:  Τσάρλιδες).245 So as a British and Greek-Cypriot cultural hybrid  – perhaps in some ways they lean more towards the British influence that pervades mentality, worldview, socialisation and relationships  – they find themselves significantly differentiated from the local norm, which generates a vacuum between the two groups.246 It is also very important in Cyprus for one to be autochthonous, which draws from two dimensions: to be the offspring of indigenous parents on the one hand, but also to be raised in Cyprus on the other. Because that way one learns to speak the local dialect, which is the distinctive element by which Cypriots recognise one another, it is a signification of spatial identification, owed by and large to growing up in place. The subjective element regarding the Diaspora and language identification with the place may be a sign of differentiation even between brothers. That, by extension cannot be overlooked by a church which considers itself to be the representative of the indigenous residents, the autochthonous, which demarcates culture and civilisation geographically, being ultimately an integral part of their self-image.247 243 K. C., Interview with the author, 25 February 2014. 244 Ibid. 245 R. C., Interview with the author, 22 February 2014. 246 Ibid. 247 Ibid.

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As for the matter of coordination and organisation, in the annual conference of the Cypriot Diaspora on 24 August 2009, Chrysostomos II, in all honesty, did not hide his disappointment for the lack of it between diasporic organisations; however many the sacrifices, without perseverance and coordination they will bear no fruit. Undoubtedly, he conceded, they work and toil but to no avail. In contrast, he brought up the example of the Jewish Diaspora, who, less than the Greeks in numbers, have managed with coordination and organised work to align the policies of the states they reside with the interests of their country.248 Not only can they be elected MPs, senators, mayors, disproportionately more in analogy to their numbers, but also to impose policies, whereas even if Greeks get a few of their own elected, they influence no one due to lack of coordination. It is a disadvantage that is rendered greater when one considers the loneliness of the Greek nation in the world; most nations more or less have their relatives, their natural support systems: Arabs, Anglo-Saxons and Slavs are families of states, whereas Greeks are alone with no brother nation to turn to, which calls for more coordination, elaborated Chrysostomos II.249 In fact, he has tried to be more assertive in the USA by taking the initiative to promote the issue of the destruction of Christian monuments in the occupied territory and essentially the eradication of such identity traces there. In cooperation with the Greek-Cypriot ambassador in Washington, they have tried to disseminate the issue via informative DVDs to influential target groups, such as the evangelists who had significant sway over the Bush administration and constitute even now the solid core of the Republican Party electorate.250 But still, regions and states outside the OCC’s jurisdiction are formally and essentially beyond its control. In the USA for instance, where the presence of the Greek Diaspora is strong and quite organised in comparison with Europe, it was Archbishop Demetrios who acted in coordination with the Greek lobby in order to deter a meeting between Hillary Clinton251 and Mehmet Ali Talat.252 Amidst festivities on the Greek Independence Day where he met with the American President Barack Obama (2009–2017), he urgently saw Hillary Clinton – with whom he 248 “Το Συνέδριο των Αποδήμων”, (2009), pp. 468–73, (p. 472). 249 Ibid., p. 473. 250 Dimitris Filippidis, “Κύπρος και Ελλάδα ν’ αποκτήσουν Επιθετική Νοοτροπία”, (22 February 2009), pp. 70–71, (p. 71). 251 US Secretary of State (2009–2013). 252 Head of the Turkish-Cypriot community (2005–2010), the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus which remains unrecognised by the UN and the rest of the world, Turkey notwithstanding.

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maintains a good relationship – and shortly afterwards the news of an impending meeting with Talat was refuted, and as Demetrios explained, it was leaked hurriedly and without prior confirmation.253 Other than that, it is worth mentioning that within the bounds of the day’s event, Demetrios put forward three central issues, the Cyprus Problem, the dispute between Greece and FYROM on the constitutional name of the latter, and religious freedoms in Turkey.254 None of those issues concern the Greek Diaspora of America directly, nor do they have anything to do with their lives in the USA. The role that Demetrios assumed was not that of the head of a community, but of a pressure group and perhaps that of a soft power spokesperson, acting on behalf of national interests overseas. Apart from the reach of a religiocultural diasporic soft power, this demonstrates the limitations that underline how such tasks could not be undertaken by the OCC, or the OCG for that matter; for they lack the physical presence in place, networking and resources, thereby jurisdiction is the least of their worries in playing a role abroad, post-Westphalia or not. Not that this ecclesiastical limitation does not apply, on the contrary it is active, acknowledged and respected by the OCC, which does not cross the lines that draw the jurisdictional distinction. Chrysostomos II had explicitly stated to Greek-based media that the Cypriot church abides by the canons of the Ecumenical Councils and stands by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which has the coordinating and regulatory role in Orthodoxy by definition.255 However, an issue with the changing, shrinking world of increased mobility and the establishment of distinct religiocultural localities does exist and could not be overlooked. For that reason, the fourth Pre-Synodical Pan-Orthodox Conference that took place between 6 and 13 June 2009 in Chambésy, Geneva, dealt with that theme among others. Its purpose was to prepare the Ecumenical Synod of the Eastern Orthodox Church, due to take place in the future in order to examine all those issues that accumulated over the years – centuries in fact – since the last Ecumenical Synod took place. In any case, one of the issues in the agenda that causes frictions between churches was the Orthodox Diasporas, which emerged in the nineteenth century and expanded by the intensifying migratory trends in the twentieth century; hence a canonical organisation concerning the amount of communities abroad outside the boundaries of the autocephalous churches, was

253 Filippidis, “Διπλωματικός Πυρετός και Πιέσεις”, (30 March 2009), p. 12. 254 Ibid. 255 “Η Ορθόδοξη Διασπορά επί Τάπητος”, (8 June 2009), p. 40.

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high in the agenda as a major topic for discussion. But as we mentioned above, the OCC stood by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and raised no claims.256 In the background of this rests an imminent, latent friction and contest that aims to challenge the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which enjoys the support of the Greek-speaking churches. The Ecumenical Patriarchate makes use of the twentyeighth canon of the Second Ecumenical Synod and maintains that it has the sole and exclusive ecclesiastical jurisdiction in America, Australia, Western Europe and Asia according to Metropolitan Serapheim.257 Whereas on the other hand, the Russian Patriarchate, which enjoys the support of the Slavic churches and the Patriarchate of Antioch, maintains that the aforementioned regions are open to ecclesiastical activity to all autocephalous Orthodox Churches,258 while the presence of their members in those regions gives them the canonical right to set up nationally adherent Orthodox churches locally, answerable to their homelands’ autocephalous ones. As a result, contrary to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople to which diasporic Greeks adhere, several nationalities – Russians, Serbs, Romanians etc.  – have established corresponding, nationally dependent churches abroad, hence, in effect, some of the autocephalous churches that remain loyal to the Ecumenical Patriarchate are, e.g., those of Cyprus, Greece, Albania, Czechoslovakia, and the Patriarchate of Alexandria and all Africa, the jurisdiction of which has been respected by national churches so far as exclusive.259 This broader framework of inter-ecclesiastical politics to some extent explains the manner the balance of power has been accommodated in the way we have described, and more particularly, the attitudes of the OCC and the OCG as regards the post-Westphalian arrangement, given that they have to take the international environment into account. From that perspective, one observes that even though they have been actively engaged in promoting primarily national interests, they had to be careful not to disturb this sensitive balance at the same time, whether willingly, as in the case of the OCC, or with the encouragement of the government, as it happened with the OCG during the era of Christodoulos.

256 Ibid. 257 Serapheim was the Metropolitan of Johannesburg and Pretoria from 2001 up to 2010 when he was transferred to the Metropolis of Zimbabwe and Angola where he now serves (2010). 258 Metropolitan of Johannesburg Serapheim, “Το Πρόβλημα της Διασποράς στο Χώρο της Ορθοδοξίας”, (16 December 2009), p. 10. 259 Ibid.

5  Dawn of the debt crisis and initial reactions In this chapter, we are dealing with the initial reactions of the OCG and the OCC towards the debt crisis that scourges both states, while taking their differences into account in terms of the particulars of each case. Their responses and generally the discursive material of that period are indicative of tendencies, worldviews and ultimately morality as regards economic affairs and corresponding policies. Therein the issue of Europeanness is to be found yet again, not in a legalistic or structuralist sense, but rather as a paradigmatic and dominant system of economic values that permeate the West, being ultimately a determinant of the way of life thereof. Hence, it touches on the issue of compatibility of the latter with its Greek and Greek-Cypriot equivalent as perceived by the corresponding churches.

5.1  The Protestant ethic and Homo Economicus Our intention is not to engage into an evaluation of economic theories and their great debates on, e.g., the approaches that adhere to neoliberalism or Keynesianism, nor to explore the devil in the detail of deregulation, privatisation and reforms – often prerequisites of Europeanisation – but to establish a value-based framework of the broad paradigm that has come to be the predominant one, especially since the fall of communism. Yet when referring to the Western and, particularly in our case, to the European concept of an overarching economic culture and its corresponding state of affairs, from a social value-based perspective, it is a sine qua non to begin with its Weberian theoretical foundations. Not surprisingly, Max Weber’s monumental work on the Protestant Ethic stems from principles that are effortlessly traced back to religiosity. That which appears to be exceeding the bounds of rationality and touches rather on piety and virtuousness as the presumed core of this ethic, boils down to the accumulation of wealth, not as a means to an end, but as an end in its own right. Thereby, life’s day-to-day pleasures and temptations that one might as well give in to are out of order, as the point in accumulating wealth is not its enjoyment, it is the process itself – an utmost objective – while at the same time, eudemonism and by extension its forms of materialism, money and assets notwithstanding is frowned upon. This constitutes the main principle of capitalism, i.e., the pursuit for the increase of capital.1 Morally, this approach to life is considered justified under 1 Weber, p. 53.

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the condition that accumulating money for the sake of money, for the creation of capital, is done via strictly legal means and in accordance with one’s calling, talent and competences. In that sense, the individual fulfils his/her purpose in life by making the best use of one’s talent in order to respond to the obligation of exercising one’s calling as regards professional activities, or prowess in utilising an existing capital for that matter.2 Therein the spirit of capitalism is held to encompass morality in itself. Entrepreneurship exceeds the purpose of simply sustaining the entrepreneur, as it becomes a measure by which the worth of the businessman is evaluated; and not merely in one’s line of work but generally as a human being. Thus the practice of capitalist economic activity is a test to that end. It determines one’s self-perception as it occupies the centre of the entrepreneurs’ life, and by extension dignity, via constituting the trial of his/her competence to act upon the calling of virtuous and profitable economic conduct and demonstrate the necessary personal qualities.3 Apart from the above-described primary purpose, where enjoyment has little if any place, capital is expected to generate further wealth and be handled with an outlook into the future, whereby further profits ought to be made. Hence the entrepreneur engages into activities that will secure this prerequisite, thus indirectly functioning as the capital’s steward rather than owner; because it must be handled responsibly and be at least maintained and preserved, thus in that sense the entrepreneur’s business is personified and attributed its own operative individuality and entity. This bears immediate temporal consequences as the entrepreneur disregards and neglects the impulse for consumption or the obligations that tradition may impose, because focus is placed on the future, when the returns of past and present investments are due to be harvested;4 only, to be in part reinvested and put aside, in a long-lasting monetarist, entrepreneurial course of action. In that way, the equivalent entrepreneurial perception of time becomes distorted, in the sense that it becomes infused with the life-cycle of the business, which, as we earlier stated, becomes personified and assumes an entity form of its own. Along these lines, any traditional cyclical time perception becomes linear. The prospect of traditional repetitiveness, where the corresponding collectivist milestones regularly occur, is replaced by the planned investment and enterprise turnovers that the future ought to bring, thus perpetuating and extending time

2 Ibid., p. 54. 3 Poggi, p. 40. 4 Ibid., pp. 41–43.

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in an irregular, non-repetitive manner; thereby individualist milestones, such as dividends, revenues and investment returns are by default irregular and do not transpire on recurrent calendar dates. It follows that the cyclical and linear perceptions of time are incompatible with each other as far as the spirit of capitalism is concerned, therefore tradition is rendered redundant. We should mention in passing that this is partly owed to the variable perception of time, which depends on cultural factors. The influence of tradition, together with cultural memory, renders time multidimensional in the sense that it differentiates its mundane, this-worldly dimension from its transcendental one. With cultural memory as a vehicle, tradition is preserved and perpetuated, and with it, in turn, the collective self-perception and sense of being; for, at a symbolic level, the narrative that is being reproduced and disseminated, laden with monuments, rituals, texts and generally “figures of memory”, functions as a unifying catalyst and relativises the this-worldly temporality.5 The temporal distortion to which this phenomenon gives rise is “sacred time”. Divested of linearity, this perception of the concept of time is permeated by regular, repetitive reoccurrence, wherein figures of memory and their observation depend on the particularities of a given tradition. In that way, the transcendental content of a narrative is reanimated regularly, allowing the circular temporal flow and the corresponding occurrence rate of figures of memory to maintain tradition and transcend the ephemeral by reintroducing the otherworldly symbolisms periodically.6 As stated already, this dimension of temporality is not in tune with the spirit of capitalism, because, if anything, it endorses tradition, the keen observation of which, namely traditionalism, is diametrically antithetical to the Protestant ethic’s key principles, as it indirectly hinders the accumulation of wealth by its inherent resistance to change;7 and the latter, change, is a prerequisite for capitalism’s acute sense of emergent opportunities out of market fluctuations, such that allow the further investment of capital. More to the point, Weber notes that to engage into business activities in a manner as such does not come naturally, i.e., the accumulation of wealth as an end in itself, without enjoying the fruits of one’s labour, let alone indulging in excesses. Along those lines then it is not uncommon for pre-capitalist, traditionalist social groupings – with the workforce first

5 Jan Assmann, and John Czaplika, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity”, (1995), pp. 125–33, (p. 129). 6 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane (1957), pp. 68–70, (p. 104). 7 Weber, pp. 58–59.

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and foremost – to resist the intensification of labour in order to increase productivity; and this, to capitalism, is equated with backwardness.8 In addition, the capitalist worldview is legitimised via the economic moralisation that the Protestant ethic provides. Namely, albeit according to the Old Testament the pursuit of wealth for the sake of wealth is considered an abhorrent expression of greed, putting to practice one’s calling and labouring virtuously for the attainment of it, was thought of as a sign of God’s blessing. What is more, it indicates and further proves one’s faith as a means to exercise a form of this-worldly asceticism; it is exactly this worldview that triggered the dissemination of an equivalent way of life that led Weber to call this “the spirit of capitalism”. Because when one’s toils and labour generate wealth, which is not spent but rather saved and invested, while at the same time consumption and indulgence is confined by self-imposed austerity – hence more capital is left for investment – then it is rendered possible to speak of an ascetic-like, therefore by definition, virtuous activity;9 hence the moralisation we mentioned above. This, essentially, ideological framework has codetermined the economic standard of the West and it was by and large equated with the way of life that was deemed economically optimal there, for more than a century. As a standard then, it gave rise to the paradigmatic Homo Economicus, a model for imitation, via which a normative typology was ushered in; that of a rationalist, self-interested actor who seeks to function along the lines of the aforementioned Weberian principles, among others.10 However, the sustainability of the Homo Economicus paradigm and its applicability within the EU has come under question, as of late especially and in light of the debt crisis, while the disparities between state economies of the Eurozone are more than evident. In fact, there exist a number of views, questioning if and to what extent the consecutive worldwide crises can actually be attributed to the Homo Economicus, or to the gradual erosion, mutation, even “death” of this model. In short, it remains yet unclear whether the problem is Homo Economicus or the absence of the latter. Be that as it may, this paradigm has become a core issue of a broader discussion on the optimal economic reorientation. The crisis that originated in the USA spread across a great part of the world with Europe being injured heavily, although it appears that the latter bears no responsibility for the emergence of the debt crisis; rather, it is the carelessness of

8 Ibid., p. 60. 9 Ibid., p. 172. 10 Elizabeth Anderson, “Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms”, (2000), pp. 170–200, (p. 170).

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Wall Street that brought this about.11 Paradoxically enough, and given the geopolitical twenty-first century tensions, the USA had granted massive amounts of loans and economic by-products of that sort, assuming thus the role of the “world banker”; while at the same time, China, in applying the principles of its own seventeenth-century mercantilism instead, relied upon the doctrine of trade surpluses, i.e. to consume less and produce more, which empowered it significantly towards the USA.12 Aesop’s proverbial fable of “The Cicada and the Ant” seems quite appropriate an analogy. It follows that the imbalance above weakened the Americans and rendered their economy fragile compared to the Chinese. Likewise, the German trade surpluses have weakened the Eurozone. We might mention in passing that this goes back to the mercantilist philosophy that sees economy as a form of war, with the winner being the side that has a surplus as opposed to the losing side, the one with the deficits. In stark contrast, liberalism, which is predominantly Western par excellence, considers all participants of international trade winners; it was founded by the eighteenth-century critics of mercantilism, and as a system, it dominated nineteenth-century England and the USA from the twentieth century thereafter.13 Back to the Old Continent where Germany run on consecutive trade surpluses, economic morality occupied the public sphere, with the German populist press and tabloids accusing Greece of carelessness and irresponsibility at best14; whereas their Greek counterparts, responded with allegations of latent European domination intent on behalf of Germany. In practice, Cohen believes that the common currency has come to be a “golden prison” that resembles the economic austerity of the 1930s; namely, the EU has been self-trapped into a vicious circle of deficit reduction at the expense of growth, followed by new austerity measures in order to cover the additional deficit caused by recession, caused by austerity, ad infinitum; the theory of self-entrapment finds vindication in that, with the Euro being a hard currency, devaluation in order to stimulate growth with a competitive currency, i.e. the Drachma, is not an option. As a result, the cure imposed on vulnerable states has been worse than the illness itself, given that it resembles the function of the gold standard15 that gave rise to the unpleasant 11 Cohen, (2014). 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Eleni D. Tseligka, “Becoming the Other – Stereotyping of Greeks by the German Press”, Continuum – Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 30 (6), 2016, pp. 627–35. 15 Abandoned throughout the twentieth century as it hindered the expansion of monetary supply within the market, thus depriving it of stimulus and deepening recessions,

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side effects of currency antagonism, although it was intended to avert such developments.16 Consequently, the once intended political union with the prospect of integration has been curtailed, for, the technocratic approaches have subdued politics, the founding principles have not been thoroughly observed and European unification in the sense of deepening has yet to take place; because the forces of the market do not solidify the collective sense of belonging, on the contrary they give rise to national hostility, awakened by antagonisms. “At times of crisis, Homo Economicus becomes embittered, if not vengeful”. Therefore, Cohen comes full circle as he returns to economic morality, but this time of a different kind; he suggests that competition alone could not possibly suffice to organise society and the world, for that would be an anthropological delusion. He recommends that competition ought to be counterbalanced by cooperation and a new deal that would review a series of principles, starting from the European states; as it had happened with Christianity, when it offered an alternative to the Roman Empire and a world that had long ceased to make sense.17 Otherwise, if politics surrender to economics and the nation-state – or the “nations-state” (EU) as we defined it in the first chapter – gets superseded by the market state, then what we are left with is ultimately Post-Democracy, as Colin Crouch calls it. Within the context of globalisation, where major businesses have increased mobility, the latter may exert pressure on governments in order to push for taxation reforms, labour market deregulation, etc.; else they might threaten to take their ventures and investments elsewhere.18 To that we may point out that, among others, fiscal policies and deregulation are well within the scope of the process of Europeanisation. In that sense, certainties of the twentieth century have now come under review; as part of a social contract, the welfare state along with public services, for instance, were areas which the further democratisation had brought about and protected as fundamental institutions. The social state coexisted with the market sector throughout the advanced capitalist world; yet, the social state was beyond the reach of the market, not subject to competition and profit. However, as stated earlier, this cannot be taken for granted any more, being challenged by extensive commercialisation.19 causing an economy slowdown and deflation. There are theorists who attribute the Great Depression of the 1930s to the gold standard. 16 Cohen, (2014). 17 Ibid. 18 Crouch, pp. 32–35. 19 Ibid., pp. 78–79.

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Needless to say that such developments, where, together with the Protestant ethic and the dominance of the Homo Economicus within a globalist economic environment, the fermentations which facilitate the emergence of a post-democratic status quo are directly antithetical to the Orthodox Christian value system and basic principles. Individualism is kept at a distance by default, as, to the Orthodox, the human person is a relational being and only in that framework, i.e., in being in communion with others, can the human being be in an existential fulfilment. Not that the person is devoid of individuality; the latter is a primary, core level of being and self-awareness, yet completion is accomplished via the person’s full, communal expression, else one is incomplete. From that perspective, individuality is not rejected, but by itself alone, it does not suffice to render one a person.20 One does not have to examine the positions of any given national autocephalous church to come to that realisation, merely the standpoint of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew is enough to convey this differentiation. In the first panEuropean conference organised by the OCG in 2003, concerning the values and principles needed in order to put the EU together, he was adamant: social justice, the fair reward of the worker, balanced distribution of wealth, a fair chance to all, are principles taken from Christian teachings. And he noted that, to only mention certain principles and values, as it happens with the draft European constitution, without reference to their Christian background it conveys only a partial truth.21 In the same spirit, a propos the Ecumenical Patriarchate, we have been told by one of its high-ranking clerics that the church’s constitution is the Holy Scripture. Therefore, to the church, the principle of social justice is not a debatable issue, it is self-evident. For, it is not acceptable to toy with empty stomachs; to consider that the goods of nature, which God provided, are intended for few, but for all. From that perspective, equal wealth distribution is self-evident and not a question of party policies or ideology.22 In a nutshell, the Protestant ethic is irrelevant here, and Homo Economicus is a fundamentally unacceptable concept to Orthodoxy. However, both Greece and Cyprus are EU Member States, members of the European Monetary Union (EMU), active participants of the international community, and susceptible to the economic reality thereof; to function outside and despite the international system is not a viable option since the end of the cold war. Accordingly, with their particularities, advantages and disadvantages, they 20 Hirschon, pp. 304–05. 21 Bartholomew, “Αρχαί και Αξίαι ως Βάσεις δια την Οικοδόμησιν της Ευρώπης”, (2003), pp. 341–45, (p. 345). 22 G. A., Interview with the author, 25 January 2014.

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were called upon to react, as is commonly the case, to the challenges of this ecosystem in which willingly and wittingly partake. More to the point, EU membership was deemed by both a strategic goal, which meant the adherence to a bloc-actor that constitutes a constant and a safe haven in an otherwise flux international system/structure. This necessitates adaptation to corresponding prerequisites and responsibilities. The outcome of the Heads of State Maastricht meeting in December 1991 was the approval of the Treaty on European Union, thereby among others, the will to converge and establish an economic and monetary union and adopt a single currency, the European Currency Unit (ECU). Of course, the agreed convergence process entailed particular criteria, the observation of which would determine a state’s participation in the third stage of the EMU. Further, the European Council’s resolution of June 1997 established the exchange rate mechanism for the 1999 Eurozone, which also contained/regulated the exchange rate fluctuations of Member States outside the Euro area. In 1998, eleven Member States met the Maastricht criteria, as did Greece in 2000, albeit the need for structural reforms was duly noted, while following enlargement Cyprus adopted the common currency in 2008.23 The EMU has boosted growth and prosperity, but it is still dealing with a crisis, the consequences of which have been harsher for the economically weaker Member States. Prior to the EMU, Member States were more careful with their current account deficits. Currency stability could not be taken for granted; hence, any hints of a foreign exchange crisis were enough for a sensible government to practise financial and economic discipline. The elimination of the external constraint though has been perceived as a carte blanche by some Member States to live beyond their means, i.e., to achieve growth by amassing public and private debts beyond reason, thus inviting trouble. The elimination of the external constraint has been identified as one of the root causes of the crisis.24 The debate is still ongoing, but there is a degree of consensus that apart from “concealed” increased government spending, the crisis should also be attributed to the non-enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact,25 a fact that encouraged irresponsibility and a lax 23 Angelos Delivorias, “A History of European Monetary Integration”, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), Briefing: March 2015, pp. 4–5. 24 Edmond Alphandéry, “The Euro Crisis”, Fondation Robert Schuman – European Issues, No. 240, (2012), p. 5. 25 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is a set of rules and conditions agreed between EU Member States, intended to observe, coordinate and safeguard public finances and fiscal policies, see “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union”.

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attitude towards reforms, the acquisition of large sovereign debts by Eurozone banks, and the underestimation, thus under-pricing, of risk by financial markets and credit-rating agencies, which led to unrealistic convergence of governments’ bonds prices in the Eurozone.26

5.2  The Orthodox Church of Greece Time and by extension data mining restrictions do not allow for a full examination of the debt crisis period. After all, it extends well beyond our initially planned and intended research time span; the crisis is still ongoing as these lines are being written and it will most likely continue, if not worsen, by the time the dear reader browses through this text. Therefore, merely the bulk of data available from primary resources, what is more, for two states and institutions, would suffice for a self-standing project dealing with the debt crisis alone as focal theme. However, given that it started at the end of the period under scrutiny here, it is worth taking into account the initial reactions; because reflexive as they were, with the OCG and the OCC unaware of the economic complexities in their entirety, including the further implications and the possible duration of this predicament, the initial discursive content reflects accordingly an unfiltered, unfathomed predisposition as regards the issue itself and, ultimately, genuine stances towards the EU. This is exactly what we are dealing with at present. In the case of Greece, in very simple terms, especially over the first decade of the 2000s, the state resorted to public borrowing expenses that exceeded its public income by far. In addition, the 3% trade deficit cap, which is a requirement and a rule for all Eurozone members, was not observed; suffice it to say that following revised calculation, it was estimated to over 15% and gave rise to the term “Greek statistics”, which was used to blatantly describe that Greece had been dishonest concerning its obligations, that it had “cooked the books”. Also, in 2009, the government debt-to-GDP ratio exceeded 130% and rose to 146% in 2010. When the global financial downturn emerged, Greece’s weaknesses were revealed, with its immense, undisclosed amount of borrowing coming inevitably to light. Thus, Greece had no available borrowing resources as the markets were reluctant to lend money at a reasonable rate – its solvency outlook collapsed exponentially –; other than the European Commission, the IMF and the European Central Bank (ECB), Greece had no option. Those three, known as the Troika by

26 Delivorias, p. 6.

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euphemism, have already bailed out27 the state twice – €110 billion in 2010 and another €130 billion in 2012 – shaved off another €40 billion of its debt,28 but in exchange Greece has had to conform to an unpleasant austerity programme and carry out structural reforms, most of which are still due, in order to balance its books and become actually solvent again. At a social level, this meant that with the shrinkage of the GDP, unemployment rose sharply while private income plummeted and non-performing loans skyrocketed. In a sentence, low income households suffered the most with the downgrade of living standards, a consequence of austerity. Indeed, the Greek debt crisis may have been triggered by the international financial crisis of 2008; yet, the underlying causes that can be identified in fiscal and external deficits were already there. From the adoption of the Euro, i.e. the accession to the EMU, up to 2007, the yearly public debt increased steadily but it was under relative control – €7 to €12 billion, notwithstanding the Olympic year 2004 when it reached €16  – and Greece remained credible as regards its obligations, while the interest rates were favourable. Between 2008 and 2009, however, Greece’s debt increased by €56 billion, and entered a period of negative growth.29 Interest rates increased exponentially and the situation was further worsened by factors such as the pressure on the private sector’s balance sheets due to Greece’s expanding external deficit, and due to the fact that some 75% of Greece’s public debt was in the hands of foreign banks, which pressured the Greek economy significantly. Furthermore, the immense borrowing signalled desperation on behalf of the state, to avert a looming recession and the social problems that it would entail.30 But it is interesting that the OCG had already communicated its discontent with the economic aspects of the European project; much earlier than the outbreak of the debt crisis. In June 2001, not unlike the general attitude of Eastern Orthodoxy towards economic morality and good practices, Christodoulos explicitly rejected the works and by-products of globalisation; notably, it was still a period of prosperity and optimism. However, the late archbishop clarified that 27 Loans with an interest rate significantly lower than that of the markets, intended to prevent bankruptcy; in the case of Greece, it was also meant to contain the situation there, for fear of contagion to the rest of the heavily indebted economies, such as those of Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland. 28 BBC News, “Eurozone Crisis Explained”, (27 November 2012). 29 Nicos Christodoulakis, “Crisis, Threats and Ways Out for the Greek Economy”, Cyprus Economic Policy Review, 4 (1), (2010), pp. 89–96, (pp. 89–90). 30 Ibid., pp. 91–92.

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globalisation in the sense of borders’ abolition is not something new to Christians, as the church evolved within the bounds of the Roman Empire where multiple ethnicities dwelled under one state authority, while people as persons are bound by ecumenism. But he maintained that the endorsement of the freedom of markets leads to interest as priority and to the exploitation of the weak. He clarified that the church does not support statism nor does it oppose free economy; it merely suggests that the human being should not be the means to an end, but the end in its own right. After all, the market is supported not only by globalisation, but also by the abolition of insurance, pension, or of state-funded schools and hospitals.31 In that way, what Christodoulos suggested is not far from what much later Crouch called Post-Democracy. And again during the same period he held, as regards inequality of wealth distribution and essentially social justice, that what the OCG envisages is a society in which disparities will not lead to the social injustice of an immensely rich select few and the vast majority living in anguish and deprivation.32 What rested in the foundations of his discontent was, among others, the European lack of identity, which in his view was compensated by economic instruments and a degree – limited, because deepening has not been the case as of yet – of fiscal Europeanisation. Christodoulos thought it indicative of the above assumption that no consensus was reached, so that the faces of pioneers of the European spirit would be depicted on Euro (€) notes and coins, representative of every country; e.g. Goethe, Mozart, Cervantes, Pascal, Dante, Shakespeare, etc. To the archbishop even that disagreement on commonly acknowledged figures as contributors to the European identity reflected vividly the communication difficulties in creating the common physiognomy of Europe.33 Hence, he believed that Europe was proceeding in a technocratic fashion rather than steering to a spiritual vision, which would differentiate the citizen from the person.34 Believing that the cornerstone of Europeanness would be religiosity, the HSCG concurred that the common currency is not enough; that economy by itself does not suffice to forge a diverse sum of peoples into one mental unit. Only the reference

31 Christodoulos, “Παγκοσμιοποίηση: Νέοι Ορίζοντες;” pp. 499–502, (pp. 499–500). 32 Christodoulos, “5ος Κύκλος Διαλόγου Ορθ. Εκκλησίας και Κοινοβ. Ομάδος Ευρωπαϊκού Λαϊκού Κόμματος – Ευρωπαίων Δημοκρατών”, (2001), pp. 497–98, (p. 497). 33 Christodoulos, “Ομιλία προς τους Έλληνες Ευρωβουλευτές”, (2002), pp. 89–93, (p. 89). 34 Ibid., p. 92.

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to common religious and cultural values can function that way, and it should be explicitly named.35 Being consistently concerned with the post-democratic contours of globalisation, Christodoulos wondered what this process actually is. Namely, to what extent it is an economic-technological tendency and to what extent an ideology, and whether it upgrades the quality of life of this world’s poor, or reduces the average European quality of life to a competitive level of poverty, where welfare and education are lacking; if it seeks the implementation of international law and democracy worldwide, or the transformation of states to obedient ones; or even the marginalisation of religion in the private sphere while imposing the secular state.36 Therefore, the concept of Homo Economicus and the globalist orientation towards the corresponding value system were clearly deemed detrimental on principle; to the nation-state, to society and even to the European project itself. Upon the latter, Archimandrite Chrysostomos Savvatos,37 focusing on the social model that the economic union necessitates, noted that thereby emerges a European identity crisis, as, culture, ways of life and ultimately one’s sense of being are challenged. Precisely because the common European currency presupposes homogeneity of economic cultures and mechanisms, it is not free of cultural implications. The Western exclusivist attitude, he maintained, since its sole founding principles are those of humanism and individualism combined with the aspiration to create a multination, entails the risk of cultural erosion which leads to competition of cultures instead of coexistence.38 The sweeping effect of this constitutes to the archimandrite “economic idolatry”.39 The socioeconomic concerns of Europeanisation were such that Christodoulos wrote to the President of the Commission (22 June 2005) in order to address particular aspects of the EU’s initiative known as the “Lisbon Strategy”,40 which

35 HSCG, “Η Εκκλησία της Ελλάδος και η Χριστιανική Ταυτότητα της Ευρώπης”, pp. 905–07, (p. 906). 36 Christodoulos, “Η Εθνική και Θρησκευτική Κληρονομιά στον Συγκλίνοντα Κόσμο της Παγκοσμιοποιήσεως και των Νέων Τεχνολογιών”, (2005), pp. 361–64, (p. 362). 37 Professor at the University of Athens (2003) and Metropolitan of Messinia (2007). 38 Archimandrite Chrysostomos Savvatos, “Το Νέο Ευρωπαϊκό Μοντέλο Κοινωνίας και η Συμβολή των Χριστιανικών Εκκλησιών της Ευρώπης”, (2005), pp. 391–96, (pp. 391– 93). 39 Ibid., p. 396. 40 This was an economic agenda with focus on productivity, growth and social cohesion. Based on sustainability and innovation, it was supposed to reform the European economy between 2000 and 2010, thus rendering it knowledge-based and dynamic.

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emerged from the conclusions of the Lisbon European Council of 23–24 March 2000, as well as those of the Brussels European Council of 22–23 March 2005. There, special emphasis was placed on the “modernisation of the European social model through investment in man and in the construction of an active welfare state” for which he expressed his contentment; because those did not deviate from basic principles on access to shelter, food, health and education. However, the archbishop underlined that too much emphasis on competitiveness and profitability would be proven socially detrimental, complaining that the Lisbon Strategy was not up to the standards Christianity and European civilisation necessitate; whereby he brought up a sentence from Paragraph 24 of the Lisbon Strategy document: “human capital is Europe’s most important asset and as such it must be at the centre of its policy priorities”.41 The above-mentioned examples clearly indicate a predisposition concerning the EU’s socioeconomic affairs and constitute a harbinger of what ought to be partly expected when the debt crisis surfaced in Greece. Not that one could presume how Christodoulos would handle the situation, as that would be speculation; we are merely delineating the principles that the OCG has observed over the years prior to the eruption of the debt crisis. Of course by then, the OCG had a new archbishop and we have already established that Hieronymos II, his socioeconomic views notwithstanding, had a different approach on the optimal way of doing things. “He is known for his integrity, such that, combined with his humility and selflessness, makes it difficult to even offer him a present. Instead, all one can offer him is assistance in dealing with the humanitarian issues and the expanding poverty; which makes it easier to help towards the channelling of funds, because one knows already that the money will end up where it was intended to go in the first place”.42 However, being so distanced from politics may at times be a disadvantage, but he could not manage all tasks singlehandedly anyway, given his unwavering focus on welfare. After all, that is the raison d’être of the church, at this stage especially.43 Indeed, in December 2009, he was invited to a cabinet session by Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou, where he displayed no interventionist intent. Instead his focus was on philanthropy and potential initiatives in light of the looming debt crisis. To that end, he suggested a closer church‒state collaboration, so that the frozen assets of the former could be put to better use, namely to reinforce the philanthropic Upon review, by the end of the decade, it was conceded that the Lisbon Strategy had by and large failed. 41 Christodoulos, “Letter to the President of the European Commission”, pp. 462–64. 42 M. D., Interview with the author, 17 December 2013. 43 Ibid.

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institutions. In that way, a much-needed additional turnover would be generated so that to put together a welfare-fund. In fact he requested from the ministers to help speed up processes related to the church’s welfare work that gets entangled in bureaucracy.44 Apart from that, the OCG took part in the share capital increase of the National Bank of Greece, thus demonstrating its patriotic dimension. The HSCG announced its unanimous decision to take such action so that its social functions may be secured and continued, and at the same time to contribute to the country’s efforts for growth. In order to do that, it was decided to resort to taking a bank loan of €27 million, which was not actually greeted without reservations by all metropolitans, for that would be a major investment. The objection had to do, among others, with the risks that this would entail, suggesting that the OCG should use its own reserve capital instead. Be that as it may, the synod finally agreed. We should also note that prior to that, Hieronymos II warned the hierarchy to abstain from politicising its rhetoric, because that is not the suitable institutional place and role for the church, and also that it would undermine its work.45 Even though a sense of duty permeated this course of action, it demonstrated that the archbishop did not wish to enter the political domain at all. But even though there was an effort to publicly show that the hierarchy expresses itself unitarily, the crisis, with the anxiety that it triggered, enhanced the tendencies of divergence within the OCG. On the one hand and in line with the archbishop’s framework on the OCG’s action and public discourses, there existed a tendency towards maintaining this attitude that Hieronymos II had established, officially no less, already via his enthronement speech. Whereby, any intervention in the political affairs of Greece, in that period especially, would be detrimental to both church and society. The former would suffer the wear and tear the debt crisis causes to any major institution that deals with it; the latter, given the way it was being tested, needed the church to conduct itself in selfrestraint and sobriety, generally to play a unifying role and not excite spirits further. Instead it was deemed imperative that the OCG should enhance its social welfare activities, especially for the weakest social groups.46 On the other hand, the still pending issues would require settlement, especially those that were the source of discord within the hierarchy, matters of political contours; such as the erection of a mosque in Athens, the migration policy, the religious education 44 Nikos Papachristou, “O Αρχιεπίσκοπος στο Υπουργικό”, (23 December 2009). 45 Papachristou, “Η Εκκλησία, με Δάνειο στην Αύξηση Κεφαλαίου της Εθνικής Τράπεζας”, (6 October 2010). 46 Papachristou, “Η Εκκλησία να τονώσει το Προνοιακό Έργο της”, (26 December 2010).

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module, de-Christianisation, etc., but above all, the national issues. Those still were of utmost importance to several hierarchs who, regardless of the change of policy followed their own agenda, believed it their duty to intervene. Not to mention that some of the hierarchs were concerned with the possibility that among Greece’s obligations towards its creditors for structural and institutional reforms might be the separation of church and state.47 However, the fact that under Hieronymos II the OCG has not been militant does not mean that it refrained from expressing its own standpoint and interpretation of the causes of the crisis. This has been expressed, on the one hand, in the form of self-critique and reflection. On 12 March 2010, the HSCG issued the encyclical No. 2894 where it was attempted to communicate the church’s general view on the crisis. To avoid misunderstandings, it was made clear from the outset that the church may not be of this world but it functions within it, for spiritually it operates within history, as it also operates within society without necessarily practising politics. Given that the crisis is multifaceted politicians examine its political causes, whereas the church sees the theological ones and tries to treat the symptoms. To that end the sermons of the Church Fathers were brought up, as, in cases like the present one, they sharply criticised those who profit at the expense of the people while urging them to help the poor at the same time. Whereby the synod observed that in modern-day society there is a great imbalance between consumption and production; so, when a country improves the average quality of life without producing equivalently, it will be inevitably led to a crisis, as it happens in family life too, when loans are spent on luxuries. For which, according to the encyclical No. 2894, those primarily responsible are those who at times dealt with politics, by not only directing the people improperly, but by exciting them even more and by misusing taxes that ought to be effectively utilised. When they do not speak the truth, they disrespect those who entrusted them with the government, held the synod, thus holding the political system as the primary culprit of the crisis.48 However, still within the same context, this view was further elaborated and expanded. Via its pamphlet Pros ton Lao (Gr.: Προς τον Λαό) No. 44, i.e. “To the People”, which was distributed to the public in November 2010 by churches across Greece, the synod communicated its stance on the issue. First, given the situation, it posed the rhetorical question any reasonable person would ponder, namely, why

47 Ibid. 48 Archimandrite Kyrillos Misiakoulis, “Θεολογική Θεώρηση της Οικονομικής Κρίσεως (Εγκύκλιος 2894)”‚ (2010), pp. 150–52.

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the necessary measures were not taken sooner, and why all the pathogenic aspects that Greece abruptly attempts to change were not dealt with on time; in short, why things had to come to this. To the synod, already the disparity between production and consumption attested to the spiritual crisis that permeates not only the leadership, but the people as well. A leadership that did not want to speak the truth, set the wrong examples, and utilised clientelism just to remain in power, so it essentially undermined the interests of the country and the people. On the other hand, the people surrendered to indulgence, easy money, and never wondered about the reality of it all. The essence of the spiritual crisis boils down to the lack of meaning in life and the entrapment in egocentric instincts, inferred the synod, and noted that it is what the “traders of nations so ruthlessly utilise”.49 Which means that the crisis may be utilised by profiteers and other immoral benefactors of Greece’s misfortune in the view of the hierarchy; yet, responsibility rests first and foremost on both the political system and the people; both made the most of a situation for their own gains, and however much politicians are held primarily accountable, the people are held as complicit, being aware of the way the entire system functioned. In fact, it would not be out of order to say that the OCG did not shy away from identifying the domestic causes of the crisis, contrary to populist politicians who easily resorted to putting the blame elsewhere. This does not mean, however, that the European partners were not criticised. The prerequisites in exchange for the bailout were deemed very harsh and detrimental to Greece’s social cohesion. In speaking to the ad hoc assembly of the Holy Synod on 11 May 2010, Hieronymos II said that rising unemployment and the tough economic austerity measures are very worrying, while the conduct and ways of reaction on behalf of Greece’s EU partners cause embarrassment. To which he disapprovingly added that the ruthless political-economic reality, the quest for “plastic happiness, which is presented as such by a global fraud system based on profit accumulation, by which the rich states get richer and the poor get poorer, is not ante but intra portas”.50 Thereby, he attributed to the EU an ambivalent role, to say the least, in the case of Greece’s predicament, while condemning the global individualist economic system and its profit-oriented priorities; to that he counter-suggested the collectivist alternative. In his memo of 19 July 2010 to José Manuel Barroso, he emphasised the enhanced role of the church given the dire situation, where the need for a more radical action is

49 HSCG, “Η Εκκλησία απέναντι στη Σύγχρονη Κρίση”, (2010), pp. 837–39, (pp. 837–38). 50 Hieronymos II, “Εισήγηση του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Ιερωνύμου προς την Έκτακτη Σύγκληση της Ι.Σ.Ι.”, (2010), pp. 306–07.

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greater. Of course, he added, it is not going to perform miracles or substitute the state, but it will continue to act along the lines of its own beliefs regarding the place of the human being as a person and not as an individual.51 And being consistent in maintaining that attitude, he insisted on 5 October 2010 when he addressed the hierarchy that the crisis is primarily spiritual, therefore moral. The economic crisis might be the symptom, he underlined, but the illness is existential. Therefore, the main manner to deal with it is theological. In that context, the differentiation between the individualist and the collectivist model was repeated, by stressing that the faith of the Orthodox is Christ-centric and ecclesial-centric, whereby it favours the person instead of the individual and thus begets collective cultural achievements.52 In support of his point, he stressed that, economists, not theologians, had been warning that the crisis of institutions, the disregard for morality and indifference for people’s lives, would make the problems visible sooner or later. Self-indulgence, from a theological perspective, has led to an arrogant management of resources, tolerance to greed, and wealth accumulation at the expense of the weak and the poor. He went on to point out that the contemporary world had the illusion that “this hubris would remain consequence-free”, and now that they are actually experiencing the consequences of it in the way lives are organised – as if there is no God therefore anything goes – “we are called upon to deal with the folly of individualist culture, which was built with the construction materials of modernist arrogance”.53 In other words, even though initially the endemic pathogeny of the domestic political system in conjunction with the careless lifestyle in Greece was acknowledged as a root cause, in a broader sense, the crisis was attributed to the internationally overarching paradigm of the individualist and profit-oriented Homo Economicus as well, merely an imported model to Greece, albeit without Hieronymos II using that exact term. This pattern was evident in the already-mentioned pamphlet Pros ton Lao, where apart from sociopolitical self-assessment there was also sharp critique in store for Greece’s creditors, self-evidently with the EU included as several of them are European institutions. Hence the hierarchy, pressured by the circumstances, reached out to the people who were, and still are, experiencing difficulties. It was notably asserted in the pamphlet that Greece, as it appears, is no longer free but essentially governed by its creditors; thereby, the OCG came forward in order to 51 Hieronymos II, “Υπόμνημα προς τον Εξωχότατον Πρόεδρον της Ευρωπαϊκής”, pp. 535–38, (p. 535). 52 Hieronymos II, “Προσφώνησις ενώπιον του Σώματος της Ιεραρχίας”, (2010), pp. 733– 36, (pp. 733–34). 53 Ibid., p. 735.

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respond to the expectation of many, to take a stand concerning the current events. And so it did, underlining that from a social perspective a massive overhaul of rights is attempted by using an unprecedented argument; “the creditors demand those measures”. And in light of this, the government “declares the country occupied and executes the orders of Greece’s overlords – the creditors”. This astounding statement was complemented by the question of whether the creditors’ demands concern strictly economic matters or the spiritual and cultural physiognomy of the country.54 Only to add that the church is the only organisation one can rely on, because the church is essentially everybody. But ultimately, it was noted, the unity between the pastor and the flock is the actual target of the “traders of nations” and they try to undermine it, because they know that with the pastor out of the way the sheep will be easy to subjugate; reminding further, that “as it has been maintained by many economists, the crisis is engineered to be used as an instrument by powers which are not philanthropic”.55 Essentially then, the synod considered the country under occupation following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Greek government and the Troika, as an act that undermined the national and social interests. What is more, in their view, it surrendered a great deal of sovereignty, thus rendering the country a protectorate of its creditors who have a secret malevolent agenda. And further, the demands that it subscribed to, would under different circumstances cause massive uproar. Even though this is no commonplace rhetoric – still, we have already noted that our wish is to record the initial reactions – it is characteristic of the sentiments that followed the signing of the first bailout agreement. However, it has not gone away but rather subsists among top hierarchs. Yet, for fear of social unrest, more often than nought the OCG opts for a reserved, calm attitude. Still, it is believed that the system – politicians, businessmen, bankers – and several other unknown “centres” corrupted the people, who, in turn, falsely believing that their standard of living was upgraded, borrowed and consumed above their means, ending up with non-performing loans; i.e. that they were essentially tricked into this, only to be led to a condition that is worse than before. Someone, then, made way for the moneylenders.56 In addition, the conviction that there exists a vast difference of economic value systems is no secret. And with the emergent status quo that the MoU between the Greek government and the Troika brought into being, talk of suzerainty to the

54 HSCG, “Η Εκκλησία απέναντι στη Σύγχρονη Κρίση”, pp. 837–39, (p. 837). 55 Ibid., p. 839. 56 K. D., Interview with the author, 23 May 2014.

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West is rife, stressing that the hegemony of the Protestants is always callous. It is argued that Protestants are being nurtured with a mentality that considers power and money a sign of God’s blessing; “from Switzerland to New England and the USA, banks resonate the Calvinist theology”. Hence, we have been told, the Europeans, the bankers and the creditors are not prepared to lose, even one Euro of their profits: So, as long as the prospect of profit seems valid, they will sustain Greece’s economy, else, it is anybody’s guess; until then we will remain suspended, pressured, not out of their love, but because there is something in it for them; since 1204 they bleed the East dry.57

Even indirect solidarity with the third world has been expressed – a form of dissociation, perhaps, with the West in general and of disenchantment with the EU in particular. It was namely argued that they decorated their metropolises with the riches that they looted from Egypt, India, Ethiopia, Central and South Africa, Latin America; the riches and cultural symbols of peoples and nations. Yet, it was explained that this was not meant as aversion towards the Europeans but rather towards their oppressive regimes over time throughout the world, adding that their mentality is not much different nowadays.58 One detects then that together with the reflexive self-critique that targeted the political system and conveyed disappointment with the domestic moral fibre and standards, including the Greek society, latent anti-Westernism resurfaces and enters the general discourse. Within this framework, disenchantment with the EU primarily emanates from the realisation that the latter is permeated by a predominantly technocratic way of doing things and not by necessarily Christian values, particularly as those are meant by the OCG. In addition, therein, the cultural differences are also identified, with regard to economic principles, directly linked to the individualist, Protestant ethic, which gave rise to the Homo Economicus; notions that are considered alien to the collectivist Orthodox paradigm.

5.3 The Orthodox Church of Cyprus Cyprus’ case is different and similar to Greece’s at the same time. Contrary to the latter’s immense – commonly considered unviable now – government debt-to-GDP ratio, Cyprus’ was 61% in 2010. However, the government was exposed to a different kind of debt, which it could not possibly service: that of the private sector with the banks first and foremost, because eventually it might be that the government 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid.

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would have to deal with it, i.e. bail them out. This was precisely Cyprus’ problem, as the same year, the banking sectors’ debt amounted to the astounding nine times the size of its GDP. What is more, in Cyprus two-thirds of the banking assets belonged to domestic institutions, essentially being integral parts of Cyprus’ economy. It exceeded by far, then, the government’s capacity to support such a large banking sector.59 The country’s banking sector was highly regulated until the year 2000, functioned in an old-fashioned way of person-dependent banking and emphasis on the retail branch, with little expertise in risk assessment, project appraisal and global, open economy markets. Moreover, Cyprus’ competitiveness suffered immensely during the 2000s; indicatively, its current account deficit of 2008 reached 16%, while otherwise it was as high as 10% between 2007 and 2010. Further, its seemingly good fiscal deficit prospects – e.g. the 2008 3.5% surplus, and debt of 48.9% of its GDP – appeared thus due to windfall revenues from the real estate bubble and overconsumption. High liquidity resulted to excessive lending and high-risk activities, while the overinvestment in real estate took place at the expense of productivity. In addition, the government failed to grasp the extent of the problem that the contagion of the Greek crisis and its debt haircut would cause, and its reaction to the issues that the global crisis brought to light, was belated.60 When the Cypriot economy underwent a more thorough examination internationally, it was acknowledged that even though it represented a small fragment of the EU economy, i.e. 0.2%, it demonstrated an increased degree of complexity. It is telling of the latter that there was notable divergence between the announcements of the IMF the EU and the ECB, and that it took 271 days since Cyprus’ application for assistance to reach an agreement; President Dimitris Christofias exacerbated the situation further with apportioning all blame on the banking sector and supervisory bodies, whereas the Governor of the Central Bank, Athanasios Orphanides (2007–2012), blamed the public finances and the way that the Greek debt “haircut” (PSI: Public Sector Involvement, to which Cyprus was exposed) was managed. This resulted in a prolonged debate and inaction. Overall, it has been assessed as a “perfect crisis”, comprising amassed private and public debt, a banking crisis and severely declining competitiveness.61

59 Buttonwood (alias), “Euro zone crisis: Sad Cyprus”, (12 March 2013). 60 Sofronis Clerides, “The Collapse of the Cypriot Banking System: A Bird’s Eye View”, Cyprus Economic Policy Review, 8 (2), (2014), pp. 3–35. 61 Stavros A. Zenios, “The Cyprus Debt: Perfect Crisis and a Way Forward”, Cyprus Economic Policy Review, 7 (1), (2013), pp. 3–45, (pp. 4–6).

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Like Greece – and being exposed to the latter, combined with the oversized financial sector, the increasing non-performing loans and the overleveraged real estate market – Cyprus had lost the trust of the lenders as its bonds were quickly downgraded. So, in exchange for an emergency rescue amounting to €10 billion in March 2013 supplied by the EU and the IMF, a bail-in62 was agreed. Thereby, uninsured deposits63 over €100.000 suffered a haircut of 47.5%; Bank of Cyprus’ shares were offered to depositors with interest on the frozen  – due to capital controls – funds; Laiki Bank was shut down with some of its assets transferred to the Bank of Cyprus; and former Laiki Bank depositors, together with Russian and Ukrainian companies, became shareholders of 18% of the Bank of Cyprus. Notably, €8 billion was lost from uninsured deposits.64 It would be worth establishing a pre-existing value system framework though before referring to the church’s reaction to the bail-in in order to better appreciate the corresponding mindset predisposition. In 2005, Deacon Christos Vourgias, in an article of his in Apostolos Varnavas, the official bulletin of the OCC, wrote that the globalist promise of a better life without economic deprivation constitutes a degeneration of vital semantic notions; because economy is meant to describe the administration of the family home, including the correct upbringing of the offspring and the harmonious symbiosis of family members, yet the term has been reduced to a solely monetary level. In that way, he linked globalisation with materialism and cultural imperialism, for, he continued, the evangelists of globalisation portray their favourite concept as panacea in the age of social and political confusion. And when ideas are deified, God is ideologised and the created human becomes creation of an idea instead. Following the failure of the industrial revolution on the one hand and that of communism on the other to solve man’s problems, globalisation emerges in turn. This new offspring of western civilisation, functions like a huge magnet of only positive polarities – impossible – to attract all the negative elements of humanity and infuse them with “positive content”. People resemble willing slaves, wrote the deacon, denouncing the freedom with which they have been created; whereas, in his view, Orthodoxy would be the suitable antipode to this, because it views the human 62 The case when depositors, bondholders and creditors have to resort to writing a percentage of the borrower’s debt off, by actually losing a part of their holdings/deposits. In that way, the indebted institution that is facing bankruptcy is helped stay afloat. 63 The EU requires that its members guarantee bank deposits which amount up to €100.000. 64 Kerin Hope and Andreas Hadjipapas, “Milder than Expected Final Terms for Cyprus Bail-in Unveiled”, (30 July 2013).

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being as a psychosomatic unit with material but also spiritual needs. In that way, the person finds its right place, for every person is deemed as a unique and unrepeatable personality.65 It is taken for granted then that globalisation and the Western set of socioeconomic ideas and values is alien, controversial and in any case antithetical to the Orthodox optimal way of life, which indirectly applies to the Protestant ethic and the individualist Homo Economicus who thrives in competition. In that sense, the OCC does not consider its wealth and assets an end in itself. On the contrary, prior to the bail-in and as post-Ethnarchic institution that cares for the national interests, on 31 December 2009 and in light of the Greek predicament, Chrysostomos stated that if necessary, they were prepared to give away all church’s estates and assets to save the country. In spite of the global recession it actually gave away €1.5 million more than the previous year in charities.66 Yet, this does not entail indifference to profitability and neglect of the OCC’s businesses, quite the opposite actually. When asked about it in an interview to “Stock Watch”, January 2010, – the Cypriot economic crisis was looming then – Chrysostomos II clarified that the church is not an economic organisation, but above all spiritual and philanthropic, and in that sense, this is not always cost effective. However, he did point out that what does not grow dies; therefore, growth is imperative. For that reason, he said that the OCC is prepared to proceed to further investments. When asked if those included plans to expand abroad he was adamantly negative to that prospect; not out of doubt for the profitability or the business risks that such a step would entail, but out of obligation to carry out the OCC’s moral duties and invest in Cyprus instead. The archbishop said with determination: “We are not interested. We are not leaving Cyprus. Even if it were ‘turkified’, God forbid, we would stay”.67 He thought it a major blunder not to set an example by staying in the land of the forefathers, whatever the cost. So profit and wealth accumulation is certainly not an end in itself but rather the means to an end; which, in this case would be, among many other things, the perpetuation of a post-Ethnarchic organisation that symbolically, and to some extent administratively, anchors national identity spatially, and solidifies the presence of the Greek-Orthodox Cypriots; even under extreme circumstances, which would call for the institutional reanimation of Ethnarchy. 65 Deacon Christos Vourgias, “Μια Προσωποκεντρική Πρόταση Ζωής στην Εποχή της Παγκοσμιοποίησης”, (2005), pp. 195–203, (pp. 197–200). 66 “Εκκλησία Κύπρου – Δηλώσεις του Αρχιεπισκόπου κ. Χρυσοστόμου”, p. 64. 67 Iro Efthimiou, “Η Εκκλησία δεν είναι μόνο Οικονομικός, αλλά πάνω απ΄ όλα Πνευματικός και Φιλανθρωπικός Οργανισμός”, (20 January 2010).

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In August 2011, acknowledging the dimensions the crisis could potentially assume, Chrysostomos II admitted that it is very serious, but Cyprus, being a small country can easily take an economic turn for the worse or the better. Stressing the importance that the collective mentality and way of life plays, he praised the Greek-Cypriots. He said that they are hard-working and organised, and to validate that, he brought up the Turkish invasion of 1974, when one-third of the population left their homes with nothing, and within a decade they had set up homes anew, thus dealing with the catastrophe constructively. Whereas, concerning the mainland Greeks, those of the “national centre”, he noted that if they do not change their mentality and attitude towards life they will not escape their impasses and their troubles will be far from over.68 This comparison was intended to underline the potential and resilience of the Greek-Cypriots, who, even as refugees, managed to overcome their economic predicament at least; also, the reference to mainland Greeks rather targeted corruption, which, it appears, was paramount and therefore a primary cause of Greece’s troubles. In addition, he wished to dissociate the two crises and their causes, for fear that they might falsely be conflated as identical. Chrysostomos II actually said that the Greek people have a mentality that damages them irreparably and they must change. They aspired to luxuries they could not really afford, resorted to tricks in order to maximise their EU funding and applied for loans above their repayment means; that, coupled with below par politicians facilitated the inevitable crisis. He urged therefore for collective hard work and domestic solidarity.69 Interestingly enough then, even though he sees all Greek-Orthodox as one ethnoreligious cultural body, essentially one nation, he does not hesitate to differentiate between subnational and essentially territorial, collective mentalities when it comes to the causes of two different crises. In the case of Greece, he held all politicians and society accountable, whereas in the case of Cyprus he apportioned almost all responsibility to the government of AKEL and Christofias. Yet, that does by no means imply that the archbishop had a positive view of the underlying Western and European paradigm of economic culture, nor of its Protestant background which gave rise to an antithetical to the Orthodox value system. Needless to say that this applies in multiple to the Troika; 18 November 2012, when the bail-in was still being processed, Chrysostomos II conceded that Cyprus had not utilised its EU membership to the least, blaming the domestic 68 Papachristou, “Συνέντευξη του Μακαριωτάτου στο Εκκλησιαστικό Πρακτορείο Ειδήσεων Amen.gr”, (8 August 2011). 69 Neofytos Neofytou, “Συνέντευξη Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου στην Eφημερίδα «Χαραυγή»”, (26 March 2012).

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inaction and indecisiveness, rather than the EU. However, he warned that if the Troika actually wished to liquidate assets for non-performing loans, the banks would collapse and everyone would become poorer; assets would be transferred to the rich few for next to nothing. And he stressed that if that is the ethos they wished to introduce in Cyprus, it would not just be the church’s right, but its duty to react: “I will protest if I have to, with all my heart, because the church must stand by its people”.70 And further he expressed his concern that they ultimately want to take over everything including the natural gas reserves, “God’s gifts”, which could render Cyprus, in his view, one of the richest countries in Europe. But he did note that Cyprus was to blame as well, for being unprepared and therefore desperate for a deal so that the state would stay afloat.71 Therefore, as the bail-in approached, the morality and values’ discourse assumed broader dimensions as a central cause of the crisis. Notably, even within self-critique remarks, the Western model was still targeted as a catalyst, while, being endorsed, it eroded the Greek-Cypriots. In other words, the archbishop identified in the foundations of the economic problem a spiritual and moral crisis; primarily of values followed by a fiscal crisis, in a word greed that possessed rich and poor. Yet he considered the crisis reversible, had the right measures been taken on time; thus, he targeted the government. Concerning the EU, he regarded it the greatest accomplishment of the twentieth century but he expressed concerns of its durability in light of the crisis. Particularly on the dominant European values, he held that Europeans – the Orthodox Christians notwithstanding – are only nominally religious and stressed that in order to “find themselves” they would need to be re-evangelised, in the words of the pope.72 With the bail-in only approximately a month ahead, tensions had risen and Cyprus was being increasingly targeted by the press in Europe, with allegations of Russian money laundering. When asked about that in his interview for the German magazine Stern, Chrysostomos II commented that the other Member States should not pretend to be saints, for there are significant amounts of “black money” in England, France and Germany. He characteristically said that the interviewer should better ask the German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (2009–2017) about it. Further, defending the Cypriot policies, he justified the presence of offshore companies as they particularly appreciated the low corporate 70 Manolis Kalatzis, “Θα βγω να διαδηλώσω κατά της Τρόικας”, (18 November 2012), p. 16. 71 Ibid. 72 Yannis Seitanidis, “Συνέντευξη Μακαριωτάτου στην Eφημερίδα «Καθημερινή»”, (22 November 2012).

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tax of only 10%. As for the planned bail-in, he reacted vehemently in saying that the church would not allow the EU to destroy the banking sector, and that most Member States are not interested in Cyprus, for, in their eyes, it is but “a tiny speck in the ocean”.73 Generally speaking, the archbishop felt that small Cyprus was caught, yet again, in a game of interests between powerful players and in the process it was being trampled in an exchange of chess moves between the EU and Russia, with Cyprus being the host of Russian deposits. However, Chrysostomos II defended the friendly Russo-Cypriot relations, President Putin, and exclaimed that the OCC would not allow the EU to “chase Russians out of Cyprus”.74 The European attitude was perceived as punitive. Amidst the heavy atmosphere of March 2013, the archbishop told the “National Herald” that the “cunning Europeans” indeed wished to punish the Greek-Cypriots, being “only nominally partners”; that they are actually “brutal self-seekers” who wish to take advantage of the situation to their benefit. He even suggested leaving the Eurozone when the economic conditions allow it, and predicted the dismantling of the Eurozone eventually, for such behaviours among partners as those of the North would only strengthen centrifugal tendencies. In fact, even his tone regarding Greece’s predicament had shifted, from critical to sympathetic, as he held that it was being strangled while people starved; and that by the domino effect Portugal, Spain and Italy would probably follow.75 The bail-in constitutes in that sense a turning point as the previously predominant self-critique on lifestyle choices and indulgence, even though it was continued, it was now being coupled with disapproval of the perceived as interest-oriented, hostile politics of the major powers within the EU, which gave rise to disappointment and disenchantment. But alongside that, the latent ethnarchic role made its resurgence, once again out of duty, given the urgency of the situation. So, in line with this attitude, on 31 March 2013 after the liturgy at the church of St Basil in Strovolos, the archbishop consistently demonstrated this interpretation of the situation. Hence he repeated that the issue is primarily spiritual, because there was widespread greed, materialism and megalomania, as most believed that money and high offices would bring happiness. But none of that lasts, and had moderation prevailed instead, the economic crisis would not have transpired. Thus he emphasised that Greek-Cypriots are primarily responsible. 73 “Συνέντευξη του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου κ.κ. Χρυσοστόμου στο Γερμανικό Περιοδικό STERN”, (14 February 2013). 74 Ibid. 75 Theodoros Kalmoukos, “Συνέντευξη του Μακαριωτάτου στον «Εθνικό Κήρυκα»”, (23 March 2013).

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However, he noted that the European partners sought to punish them and that the hostility Cyprus had experienced those past few days was indescribable.76 Be that as it may, he reassured that the OCC will stand by its people, especially those suffering the most, saying that the church’s belongings are the people’s belongings. In addition, he demonstrated a clear predisposition towards supporting the government and assuming an active role in the country’s economic regeneration.77 Disenchantment with Europe remains though, regardless if responsibility is apportioned primarily domestically. At the epicentre of this, rests the question of values. Namely, it is believed amongst high-ranking members of the OCC hierarchy that the EU has become a market above all, with a few states – mostly Germany – profiting and the European south struggling. This generates discontentment as the inequality between Northern and Southern partners is amplified and hence European integration resembles all the more a Sisyphean task. “Because solidarity has not been actual but was filtered through national interests. Therefore interests supersede values”.78 On the other hand, in Cyprus, the “American dream” carried many people away; but even so, it is an opportunity for self-critique and improvement, and to address the major issue of corruption; “a gangrene that must be dealt with else there will be no resuscitation”.79 Therefore, the problem is dual, the post-democratic market state that the EU promotes on the one hand and the domestic materialist erosion on the other. And especially as regards the former, one cannot help but identify Cohen’s view in those statements, on the inadequacy of Homo Economicus, if not the embitterment he causes when left institutionally unchecked. The aftertaste of punishment is still at large as well, infused with value system contours. “I think we have been deceived, as of late Europe punished us; with its attitude, economically speaking, it has disheartened us” we are told.80 And the error of Europe’s ways is located at its very foundations because it was intended to be a primarily economic entity. Along these lines and given the culture that permeates them, i.e., interest-oriented, unity does not seem achievable to the high ranks of the OCC. As an example, the European constitution was brought up, which, lacking a clear reference to God, essentially lacked a common unifying 76 CNA, “Η Εκκλησία θα σταθεί δίπλα στο Λαό και θα κάνει το παν για να του Συμπαρασταθεί”, (31 March 2013). 77 Ibid. 78 E. R., Interview with the author, 8 November 2013. 79 Ibid. 80 K. C., Interview with the author, 25 February 2014.

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element. Not to mention that the lax observation of principles and values, as they are superseded by interests, is ultimately detrimental to the National Problem.81 Therefore, the OCC does not consider itself Eurosceptic per se, but rather disappointed with the way things develop, devoid of primarily Christian values – economically speaking as well – as a catalyst towards unification; rather, the EU is for the most part considered unilaterally identified with the Western perception of a group-person leitmotif, and thus externally personified. But, it must be pointed out that even years before the monumental bail-in, Chrysostomos II was always in favour of a state reform, which would render Cyprus’ economic structures more efficient and the state attractive to foreign investors; the church supported this course of action already since the EU accession. The major problem was the indecision of all leading political parties because of the political cost. In that sense, the OCC has not hindered reforms, therefore bitterness genuinely stems from decisions that have destroyed basic pillars of the economy, e.g., the bail-in that shrunk the banking sector – portfolios from a sum of €70 billion were reduced to €47 billion – and affected all aspects of economic activity; suffice it to mention that Cyprus was left without crucial banking functions for about a year because of the capital controls.82 Regarding its earlier-mentioned active economic involvement, one ought to take into account that the OCC suffered heavy losses by this ordeal as well. Prior to the crisis, it had contributed to Cyprus’ growth as a major trust with holdings comprising hotels, factories, construction, mining, etc. And with its economic strength, apart from reinforcing the economy it played a significant social role.83 Ever since the bail-in, according to Chrysostomos II, the OCC has lost approximately 60% of its income. From the banks alone, the yearly dividends lost, amount to roughly €9.5 million, therefore to make ends meet and contribute to the real economy at the same time, property had to be sold and some of the turnover had to be reinvested in real estate, renovation and regeneration, which maintained a degree of cash flow in the local market and offered employment.84 Indeed the OCC found itself in a difficult situation of very limited liquidity, land that lost its value, holdings’ losses in the Bank of Cyprus, it struggled to maintain its portfolio in the Hellenic Bank, and still it found the means to carry out its philanthropic activities. They help the unemployed; do fundraisings; shipped

81 Ibid. 82 G. M., Interview with the author, 24 February 2014. 83 H. L., Interview with the author, 4 March 2014. 84 Neofytou, “Συνέντευξη Αρχιεπισκόπου Κύπρου στην Eφημερίδα «Χαραυγή»”.

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humanitarian relief to Greece in the form of food and money while being active in missions in Africa.85 It ought to be mentioned that the archbishop is aware of the differences in the public’s attitude towards churches’ business activities between Greece and Cyprus, while, although in Greece there is widespread reservation, the GreekCypriots are at ease with such conduct. This touches on the aforementioned latent ethnarchy that gets triggered when especially difficult circumstances demand it, which fully applies to the case in focus. When asked about it, Chrysostomos II actually differentiated between business activities in the strict, capitalist sense, i.e., essentially profitability as an end in itself, in contrast to investment as a means to an end, where he clarified that the latter is what the OCC engages in. The purpose of church’s investments is to sustain itself and in turn be allowed to offer its services to the people. Hence, the OCC may proceed in investments, but it is still not involved in entrepreneurial activity, because it is not a profit organisation, he explained.86 And linked to the case in point, whereby the latent ethnarchic role is reanimated ad hoc, the archbishop brought up the liberation struggle as an example, for, economically, without a doubt it was the church that supported it. And he further elaborated that the OCC is ever vigilant, the national issue included, and as long as that issue remains unresolved the church will not cease to voice its concerns or make its presence known in the public sphere; it is required by popular demand.87 Therefore, as long as the Cyprus Problem lingers on, smaller or bigger crises may well be linked to it, for they could potentially affect the end result of solution processes, given that crises weaken the negotiating position of the Republic of Cyprus. The OCC has remained proactive throughout the troublesome period of the debt crisis. Archbishop Chrysostomos II, deemed charismatic even by anticlerical circles, has not hesitated to come forward and introduce into the public discourse aspects of self-critique, or to vehemently condemn political choices; whether those might be domestic or international. However, the OCC has contributed to the domestic stability and offered its support to the government out of the urgency of the situation. But the EU has been further deconstructed in the process, being portrayed as a self-interested, individualistic organisation in the service of the mighty, devoid of values that the OCC considers politically and socially imperative.

85 L. E., Interview with the author, 12 March 2014. 86 Seitanidis, “Συνέντευξη Μακαριωτάτου στην Eφημερίδα «Καθημερινή»”. 87 Ibid.

6 Conclusions One must concede that there exists no unitary definition of Europeanness, nor does the process of Europeanisation function as all-encompassing and inclusive, as it ultimately entails conformity with a Western-European – successful from several points of view  – social, cultural and political paradigm. In addition, Europeanness, as a state of being and a fuzzy concept that implies identity, is permeated by conflictual terms and conditions when Europeanisation’s prerequisites are taken into account. Both notions, when combined, imply ways of doing things, include worldviews, value systems and political cultures, hence Europeanisation is uniformity and convergence-dependent; it is multilayered, ranging from legalities to the actual sociocultural embedding of the latter, as they ultimately affect ways of life and require a broader sense of belonging. Indeed, in that sense, Europeanisation is all-encompassing as it touches on aspects of social, economic, political and cultural life, on history, while it affects multiple institutions with the structural changes it imposes, affecting thus the relationship of the citizen with the state. In addition, the EU itself, with the institutions it comprises, all the more demonstrates the tendency to resemble a federal entity; however, given the problématique of Europeanness, such convergence is still lacking the necessary deepening. And amidst this fermentation where institutions meet cultures, churches such as the OCG and the OCC, with a given historical and political background and mindset towards the West, are called upon to re-examine their positions and try to retrace themselves within the context of the EU; culturally, institutionally, and in conjunction with the partners therein. Essentially the emergent question then, is that of belonging, which is inevitably dependent on being. The OCG and the OCC have had their own frameworks of conditionality towards being integral parts of the greater European sum, thus raising the issue of compatibility of the national personhood with that of the EU, if any; in that respect, identity – however much arbitrary this term might be when referring to social and national groupings, subject to change in the lapse of time – was consistently of the essence to both churches. The OCG under Christodoulos demonstrated a will to co-shape the EU, with Christianity being held as the overarching common denominator, under the aegis of which, all Member States could pool their sense of belonging together. However, a significant prerequisite within a “conditionality of belonging” framework, was that the Western flank of the EU should not aspire to unilaterally shape Europeanness: it ought to endorse the spirituality of the East, thereby

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declaring in practice respect for the corresponding cultural particularities and the principle of equality between the EU counterparts. In Christodoulos’ view, this bloc-actor was found wanting in terms of spirituality, as laïcité imposed a top-down materialist model, to the detriment of the Union. Hence, while on the one hand, the European peoples mutatis mutandis personified the EU via a Christian lens, their institutional structures denied it. Hieronymos II has not demonstrated a different ideal type perception of the EU; he personified it along the lines of his predecessors’ principles, sharing in short the same core convictions, with only the manner of expressing them differing. Consistently then, the OCG expressed the willingness and preparedness to belong, under the condition that there existed a clear demarcation of what that greater sum to which it subscribed were, emphasising that it ought to be explicitly Christian, among others. By and large, under Christodoulos, the OCG conducted itself along those institutional and political lines. Hence its course of action included functioning as soft power, not least in coordination with the Vatican in order to co-formulate European treaties, and, most importantly, to exert influence concerning the EU constitution and the delineation of an ideal type of European identity; which, we may infer, topped the OCG’s agenda. To that end, the HSCG, spearheaded by Christodoulos, took the initiative to contribute with its own suggestions; namely, via encyclicals, bulletins, press releases, letters, speeches, dinners and several other means, it sought to establish a network of contacts with diverse agencies and actors domestically and abroad, which would promote the church’s ideas and assist in its legislative interventionism. However much ambitious a plan it was to essentially “shadow-legislate” at an EU level, if successful, it would render the churches involved de facto political actors, and, it would de jure establish a form of “constitutional de-secularisation”. Archbishop Christodoulos also envisaged to “Orthodoxise” the EU, considering the impending enlargement as an opportunity to shift the intra-European institutional balance of power via the consolidation of Eastern Orthodoxy. To that end, even the accession of Russia was often suggested, to no avail of course. In contrast, Hieronymos II, who has been significantly distanced from political aspirations, let alone actions, introduced drastic changes followed by a deep de-politicisation of the OCG, which, in turn, affected its European agenda. At the same time, the rift with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople was mended and vital political space was consciously left to the latter, while the OCG prioritised its domestic role and weakened its formerly intense, EU-oriented international presence; thereby the contraction and reorientation to Athens constitutes a point of departure from its previous approach, stemming from the major

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difference in philosophy between Christodoulos and Hieronymos II. Along these lines, no in-depth connection with the EU can be observed during this phase, as the domestic dimension of the OCG had not appropriated a sense of Europeanness, contrary to its EU representation, the RCGEU, which maintained a consistent profile. The OCC on the other hand had idealised the EU during the period of “ethnarchic absenteeism” in the early 2000s, thus differentiating its narrative from that which portrays the “Anglo-Americans” in strongly negative contours, mainly due to colonialism and their role in the era of the Turkish invasions and occupation; whereas the EU was expected to shift its weight to the benefit of the Greek-Cypriots, in accordance with its principles and norms. Therefore, the accession was greeted with joy. Within the context of this predisposition, Europeanness was seen rather as a work in progress that had not yet reached maturity; therefore, it was not met with harsh critique. However, its Christian dimension of identity was again taken for granted, but facets of East/West differentiation, such as the controversial view of the Enlightenment, were not essentialised as it happened in the case of the OCG; rather, they were downplayed and seen inclusively as elements of the, still, “under construction Europeanness”. With the enthronement of Chrysostomos II that marked the end of ethnarchic absenteeism, followed an adjustment of the previous attitude; namely, the church’s priorities became more focused on national issues, and the initial enthusiasm was replaced by EU pragmatism. Eventually, it was realised that however indissoluble the principles and values of the EU – and integral parts of the European personality no less – they did not necessarily entail a more active and determined participation in influencing developments to the benefit of the Republic of Cyprus, as was, overoptimistically perhaps, anticipated by the OCC. In that way, Chrysostomos’ II realism was proven well founded. However, he had a clear and structured agenda as regards the utilisation of the EU accession, the EU policies of the OCC and the strategic role of the RCCEU. The utmost overarching priority was to exercise cultural diplomacy and raise awareness on various aspects of the national issue. Contrary to the OCG and its overambitious aspirations, the OCC made sure to formulate a realistic agenda of national priorities within the context of the Cyprus Problem, which has been carefully observed and has yielded tangible results concerning reclaimed national heritage treasures. In addition, the RCCEU together with the government and the MEPs has at times functioned in noticeable coordination. This applies to issues such as human rights, where the acquis communautaire is essential as regards both the process of Europeanisation and the notion of Europeanness

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that codetermines the European personality. This has been taken seriously into account along with the instrumentalisation of European institutions as the OCC sought to implement its policies, while in tune with the EU mindset. In other words, the promotion of corresponding moral, civil and political principles was craftily designed to coincide with the OCC’s end goals. Judging by the fundamentally different agendas it is no surprise that the bilateral cooperation between churches and offices of representation has been limited to their few overlapping affairs, regardless of their diachronic mutual affinity, owed by and large to their shared sense of identity. Kinship, i.e. belonging, is of course closely knit with the collective sense of being, and of the determinants that co-shape and define this – which is more than the mere sum of its parts – religion is considered central. This renders it in turn, however much falsely neglected by IR theory, an integral qualitative constituent of the nation-states’ personification and by extension behaviour, oftentimes; thereby the churches of interest constitute actors in their own right. They possess soft power, and within the postsecular contemporary environment, the emergent post-Westphalian arrangement, especially of the European society of states, opens up new possibilities to act upon that. The way they have done it though, given the constraints that permeate them institutionally and the limitations of soft power, is directly linked to the way they personify the states they adhere to, in conjunction with their perception of European personality. The OCG has frequently emphasised the individualism/collectivism antitheses and portrayed, particularly under Christodoulos, the EU’s individualist cultural influence as detrimental to the Greek people’s particularities, therefore as a threat to the group-person’s identity and state personhood. And Hieronymos II has not had a significantly different stance in essence, judging by the position that Greece’s dechristianisation and alienation from its own cultural paradigm was well within the framework of Europeanisation. In that sense, Europeanness and Greekness have been portrayed as mutually exclusive, and otherness, as an additional element of self-perception in the distinct form of Heterodefinition that has been essentialised time and again. To the threat of cultural erosion then, the OCG has been tempted to counter-suggest and appoint itself as an ark and a guardian of the nation’s identity, making that a diachronic, mostly based on perceived historical obligation, raison d’être, within the context of preserving tradition, cultural particularity and essentially the ideal type of national physiognomy; which the OCG has in part conditioned and is therefore fairly accountable for its perpetuation. It follows that when seen in this light of being under Western threat, the further secularisation of

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a par excellence Orthodox nation, a primary constituent of identity together with language and tradition, would reflect on the state’s eroded personhood. Therefore, Europeanisation and the endorsement of Europeanness as part of the collective self, essentially a contradiction, ought to be deterred. Given that the OCG views itself as an integral element of the state’s psyche and physiognomy, it finds it self-evident that this should be institutionally so as well. Interactions of that sort have been known to include the interventionism of the church in affairs of the state, acting at times as a pressure group, as a state institution or attempting to shadow-legislate; whether by mobilising the masses or otherwise, the OCG has mounted a considerable effort to avoid becoming a mere civil society addendum via modernisation, devoid of a say on important issues of general concern. In sum, regardless of minor fluctuations that mostly stem from the hierarchs’ variable personalities and characters, the framework and contours of state personification by the OCG is more or less consistent. In Cyprus, respectively, state personification in conjunction with its compatibility with Europeanness is more multilayered and complicated. Namely, the notion of “Cypriotness” is heavily contested as there is no unitary, all-encompassing perception of identity in the view of the OCC, such that could match the criteria which correspond to the personification of the Republic of Cyprus, based primarily on its spatial dimension. To the OCC, it is rather the ethnocultural dimension that ought to principally determine state personhood, on the basis of a majoritarian standpoint where the republic is Greek-Cypriot, while respecting the constituent ethnic minorities in full; the Republic of Cyprus is not perceived as a nation-state by the OCC, and what is more, explicitly. It is viewed, rather, as a conditional construct that emerged out of extraordinary circumstances and it does not correspond to a national identity, whereas the institution of the church does, and as long as the National Problem remains unresolved, the extraordinary circumstances apply; by extension the church, which, together with the nation constitute one indivisible, interdependent unit, may legitimately exercise a latent ethnarchic role when it is deemed appropriate. Cyprus cannot be conventionally personified, because its current status quo exceeds the typical conceptualisation of identity and nationhood, not to mention that it is subject to change, constituting thus a variable; whereas the OCC, out of a centuries-long established course and status, in contrast to the young and vulnerable republic, constitutes a constant for the Greek-Cypriot community. It is perceived as an inherent obligation by the church, a moral obligation and ultimately a raison d’être to function as an ethnarchic authority, until the Cyprus Problem is resolved. This reflects on the ideal type nation-state personification as viewed by the church.

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Another source of personhood as acknowledged by the OCC would be Greece, the “national centre”. In that sense, not only the historical, ethnic, religious and linguistic dimensions of identity are infused via this kinship, but also the spatial, whereby Cyprus is rendered a geographical – albeit admittedly remote  – extension. Within this context, the Hellenic element of identity is stressed as a crucial determinant of the latter, a sine qua non that attaches a constituent to a greater whole, whereby its physiognomy is completed. With Greece and Cyprus being conceptually conflated, emerges a personhood synthesis that by and large obeys the geographical constraints on the one hand, where the spatial, local particularisation of identity is inevitable; whereas on the other, the Enosis-infused narrative overcomes it, abiding by primarily ethnoreligious criteria. To the extent that Chrysostomos II has called for a joint foreign policy framework between the two states. In addition, otherness, particularly towards the West, has been fluctuant, depending mostly on political developments and complemented by lasting or residual sentiments of the immediate historical past rather than cultural differences. Not that the dissimilarities with the Catholics and Protestants have not been acknowledged, but under no circumstances have they been essentialised. The Annan Plan for instance falls into this category where politics is prioritised; it awakened post-colonial and non-alignment sentiments, references to the Turkish invasion, and animosity directed to the “Anglo-Americans”; but in that way a distinction was made between the latter and the EU which was expected to make a positive contribution, and therefore no pattern of indiscriminate anti-Westernism was observable. However, as negotiations progressed in an undesirable manner and without significant EU interventions as regards the keen observation of the acquis communautaire, the image of the self-seeking West gradually homogenised the OCC’s perception of the latter as primarily interest-oriented, at which point the impression of a society of states that is on principle unified by values, hence personified as such, faded. In addition, the domestic, collective group-person that the OCC acknowledges as a legitimate entity is, contrary to the laïcité-moulded EU, religious par excellence, namely Christian Orthodox. The ethnarchic background that coformulated the group-person is reflected on church‒state relations in the form of interventionism, shadow-legislative attempts and openly expressed electoral preferences, contrary to the EU paradigm. This stems from a well-established, diachronic political culture that is visible in the public sphere where church and state often overlap, and it constitutes yet another aspect of the greater complex Greek-Cypriot personhood.

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It follows that the way state personification is perceived by the churches of interest affects their respective interactions with the international environment, within the EU and beyond. As formerly consolidated certainties subside via the reversal of the Westphalian arrangement, the emergent forms of governance, power and authority redistribution, give way to a plethora of actors and agencies to get involved into sectors that were previously out of bounds. This, combined with the rising postsecular currents, constitutes an opportunity for churches to claim their own vital space as civil society institutions and soft powers, given especially that the religiocultural dimension of politics functions as a source of legitimacy; and thus, institutionally, to utilise the Westphalian reversal, although it destabilises their basis, the nation-state. Christodoulos was concerned that this post-national challenge had potential threats in store for Greece, out of sheer demographic size, which alone would outnumber and overshadow the Greek representation in the European decisionmaking centres. In turn, the relativisation of the state could entail the downgrading of its institutions, the church included. In addition, being – especially in the early 2000s – preoccupied with domestic affairs, he assumed a defensive stance. But as his EU involvement was intensifying, this attitude gradually reversed; after all, he had already keenly advocated the office of representation in Brussels as a necessity, thus acknowledging the signs of the times. However, the OCG’s agenda was lacking focus as no pattern of a cohesive central strategy can be identified, one that could be observed in the dealings concerning the EU, other than a strategic end goal: an explicitly and constitutionally self-proclaimed Christian Europe. To that end, Christodoulos focused on lobbying Greek politicians, mostly and more consistently MEPs and distinguished political figures who had somehow contributed to the European project, but to no avail; even though he acted together with the Vatican in order to codetermine the preamble of the EU constitution. This vividly demonstrates the limitations of religious diplomacy and its soft power depths when it comes to challenging the well-established laïcité. Parallel to those efforts and in tune with his “geopolitical pastoral consciousness”,1 Christodoulos mounted a geopolitically coherent effort to reinforce the OCG’s – and by extension Greece’s – near abroad religiocultural presence, in order to establish a strategic depth foothold where applicable; i.e., where a playing field actually existed, contrary to the EU core institutions that were impervious to cultural influences, which it notably aspired to change. Instead, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean, with Greece connecting 1 Christodoulos, “Προσφώνησις ενώπιον της Ι.Σ.”, pp. 750–53, (p. 751).

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them, formed a coherent space where cultural diplomacy was an option. In the Balkans, Christodoulos had the opportunity to carry out a series of culturally symbolic diplomatic activities, whether in the form of visits, gestures, correspondence or soft power projections as a potentially leading figure of internationally acknowledged weight. He even got involved in sensitive national issues in the region, as he attempted to win over the support of his heterodox EU counterparts, but with very little, if any, success. All in all, neither the Westphalian reversal nor the EU membership functioned as a vehicle and a game changer to the benefit of the OCG’s aspiration to expand its influence in the region. As regards the Eastern Mediterranean, Christodoulos considered Greece and Cyprus as one unitary national, geocultural entity, which ideally ought to function as such in terms of international policy. This resonated well in the island of Cyprus as the Greek archbishop put together a small network of positively inclined contacts from the political system and the hierarchy there. Particularly his position that Greece should at all times provide its unyielding support as guarantor, politically or otherwise, was more than welcome. In accordance with those proclamations, the OCG emerged as an ardent supporter of the Cypriot EU accession, but also of the Annan Plan’s rejection. Generally, the predisposition towards an agenda, permeated by a mutual understanding and coordination, based upon joint interests and unitary identity perception within a commonly acknowledged strategic geocultural framework, was evident in the Cypriot hierarchy and among select political elites. However, Chrysostomos’ II ascension to the OCC’s throne in 2006 and Christodoulos’ passing in 2008 did not allow for a sufficient temporal window of opportunity in order to see this scheme through, in full deployment; and Hieronymos II, with his diametrically different, apolitical approach, could not observe this agenda further, regardless of his fondness of Cyprus. Christodoulos demonstrated his post-Westphalian geocultural assertiveness via the engagement with Russia as well, viewing it as an alternative paradigm to Europeanisation’s church‒state suggested model and the weakening of the nation-state thereof. Moscow reciprocated as it sought to attract Greece into its own sphere of influence; through cultural diplomacy, which entailed the involvement of the church, but also via direct references to shared geostrategic interests, threats and challenges, which completed this rapprochement. This overall geopolitical assertiveness, however, irritated the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople as its vital space and jurisdiction was being perforated, especially considering its parallel tension with the church leaderships of both Moscow and Athens at the time. Not to mention that this course of action served the Russian interests at a level of cultural diplomacy within the EU,

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whereas the latter favours the Ecumenical Patriarchate to Moscow. All in all, via his self-imposed mission to change Europe, serve the national interests and expand the sphere of influence of the OCG, in light of the EU paradigm shift and within the context of a given geopolitical pastoral consciousness, Christodoulos almost disturbed delicate balances, but not quite. In turn Hieronymos II ended the geopolitical experimentations, sought to depoliticise the church and mended the relationship with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This rapprochement reinstated the philosophy of ecumenical, unitary Orthodox expression and representation. This meant though, the contraction back to Athens and the withdrawal of the, until then, autonomous geopolitical approach, both in the relations with the EU and with Greece’s near abroad, where strategic depth affirmation practices via cultural diplomacy are applicable. As for the Greek-Orthodox diasporic communities and their religioscapes in the EU, Christodoulos was neither a keen advocate of their mobilisation potential, nor of their aptitude to yield significant results as pressure groups; nor are there traces of such activities – customary exchanges notwithstanding – which could demonstrate the actual exercise of such policies. It follows that given the overall approach of Hieronymos II, he abstained from any kind of religiocultural political engagement as such. Regarding the constraints and opportunities of the post-Westphalian era, the OCC functioned very differently compared to its Greek counterpart. First and foremost, the accumulated ethnarchic experience rendered it acutely receptive and capable of formulating a coherent agenda in tune with the times, as well as appreciative of the EU’s instrumentality towards implementing it. The latter constituted an excellent venue to labour for the application of the acquis communautaire, hence the emphasis on human rights and freedoms it entails without exception, as part and parcel of a possible solution agreement to the Cyprus Problem. This was consistently pursued; not out of naïveté that the EU would step in and sever the Gordian knot, but rather out of the conviction that it would sponsor a solution upon that basis, being consistent with applying its own binding principles. Apart from that, by craftily incorporating religiocultural and spatial dimensions into the broader cultural diplomacy project of the OCC, Chrysostomos II, in coordination with MEPs, ministers, the RCCEU and other religious institutions, sought to raise awareness on the destruction of Christian monuments, the Greek-Cypriot national heritage and the eradication of traces of the previously established Greek-Orthodox presence in the Turkish-occupied territory of Cyprus. Notably, this has been a central function of the office of representation in Brussels. Eventually, having made sure that top political figures in

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the EU and leaders of the most powerful states therein acknowledged the situation, this well-coordinated campaign yielded results, as several national treasures were returned and the EU funded the restoration of churches and other monuments. The aforementioned consistency was observed in the pursuit of the same agenda – from variable angles and with different focal points, depending on the actors the OCC was engaging – in the exchanges with the Vatican, which helped broaden its soft power base, with Egypt where the government consensus was sweepingly in favour of the Republic of Cyprus, and most importantly with Israel. This, especially, followed the overall regional rearrangement that transpired with the shift in the Turkish foreign policy doctrine and had the full backing of the OCC; albeit in this case, the latter was not the protagonist, it offered its legitimation as soft power nonetheless. Parallel to the above activities and within the bounds of a post-Westphalian role to which the OCC was no stranger, the special relationship with Russia remained intact. The OCC and the ROC have oftentimes served as the links and mediators between states and governments on either side, functioning thus in a purely political manner within a corresponding domain. Numerous actors have been involved, ranging from ministers in crucial offices, to heads of state and businessmen of major calibre, who covered a correspondingly diverse array of bilateral affairs. Such systematic, multidimensional and multi-level initiatives consolidated an alliance that by and large precedes and exceeds the Westphalian reversal. The same applies to the relationship with the “national centre”. Just like his Late Greek counterpart Christodoulos, Chrysostomos II believed in a holistic, unitary foreign policy theorisation of all national issues irrespective of state. The attachment, due to shared identity perception together with common national interests, led not only to the frequent usage of the terms “national centre” and “Mother Greece”, but also to the drawing of a draft agreement on 5 May 2007 in the Archbishopric Palace in Nicosia, which formally upgraded the cooperation of the two churches to the level of a political doctrine, with co-signatories being Christodoulos and Chrysostomos II. This was partly made possible by the relativisation of national borders via the EU membership, which was deemed permissive of inter-institutional flexibility; more to the point, to Chrysostomos II, the aforementioned post-Westphalian relativisation resembled an indirect Enosis. As for the Greek-Orthodox religioscapes of the EU, those were considered valuable human assets that, with the right central organisation and coordination, could function as vehicles of political pressure and influence in the receiving state, which is what Chrysostomos II urged them to do, time and again.

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However, he was well aware of the constraints and limitations of his jurisdiction, i.e., he had no institutional means to put his ideas into practice. In addition, he was adamant that he would stand by the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s leading role in such affairs, given especially the intensifying antagonisms that the latter faces and the challenges to its jurisdiction. In that sense, even if there existed room for involvement in diasporic affairs, Chrysostomos II would not take advantage of it, for fear that this might disrupt the status quo – a shift in the OCC’s position would probably interfere with the balance of power accommodation – and by extension undermine the Ecumenical Patriarchate. And in that sense, the presumed playing field, as it evolves within the EU in the form of mobile Greek-Orthodox religioscapes, even though the latter may be emergent, is not actually of use to either church in focus. At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century and onward, preexisting, value-based perceptions of a “conditionality of belonging” surfaced yet again as a result of the debt crisis. The Protestant ethic and the Homo Economicus model, to which the former eventually gave rise, became the overarching paradigm in the West in general and in the EU in particular; yet, those constitute heavily contested models that ought not to serve as exemplary as far as Orthodoxy is concerned. Ultimately, this disparity points to a broader problématique, of whether the European bloc-actor assumes post-democratic shades and contours via its endorsement of market-state principles and values, which the debt crisis has brought to light. In that respect, the initial reactions of the OCG and the OCC demonstrated an authentic predisposition towards a suggested value system and a corresponding way of life. Already when the Greek economy was giving off the impression that it was in bloom, the OCG not only objected to the Western economic paradigm, it noted that Europeanness could not be built upon a common currency, but rather on shared, core determinants of identity. However, as the consequences of austerity were becoming all the more visible socially, Hieronymos II, regardless of his objections on those economic policies, consistently stood by his depoliticised attitude and recommended self-restraint to the hierarchy, making sure that the church would not agitate spirits and disrupt social order. More to the point, irrespective of government, the OCG has demonstrated its philanthropic dimension via a plethora of social welfare activities. But even though this attitude has been by and large maintained, there have been instances of publically expressed views, and those have been twofold. On the one hand, via its reflection and self-critique, the HSCG attempted to underline the primary domestic causes of the crisis: as such were identified the improvement of quality of life without an equivalent

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economic growth and productivity to support it, indicative of a spiritual vacuum that allowed room for false outlets to be ushered in, in the place of a meaning in life, telling of chronic governmental inadequacy. From that perspective, accountability was apportioned to the people as well, who indulged into those vacuous temptations and got entangled in the corrupt system’s tentacles. On the other hand, weaknesses as such – to turn to the criticism that was directed to the EU partners  – were utilised by the alleged “traders of nations”,2 the individualist profiteers, for their own self-seeking ends. In that spirit, the alternatives produced by the Troika, in which the EU takes part, were deemed insensitive and socially disintegrating. Further, the austerity measures were considered a Trojan horse, whereby, via the signing of a memorandum of understanding, Greece’s creditors secured control, not only of the economy, but of the state itself, which to the HSCG constituted capitulation to the Troika, thus the country was under occupation thereafter, a mere protectorate of its creditors/overlords. To the OCC, the Protestant ethic and the subsequent values of the Homo Economicus was not any less of an alien paradigm, antithetical to the collectivist culture of the Orthodox. It was actually, yet again, the erosion of the latter that triggered the crisis; and notably, Chrysostomos II differentiated between mentalities in mainland Greece and Cyprus, thus dissociating the two parallel crises and their root causes. However, he too identified as primary cause a spiritual and moral crisis that preceded and facilitated the economic one, while at the same time, he targeted AKEL’s government. Be that as it may, in the OCC’s view the role of Cyprus was instrumental to the – only in name – EU partners who sought to pursue their own ends, by taking advantage of Cyprus’s predicament. Even worse, the bail-in was explicitly characterised as punishment; at which point, disenchantment with the EU peaked as it was now perceived to be a domain of unequal partners, interests and ultimately, of exercise of power. Still, there reemerged the dutiful, latent ethnarchic role, despite of the OCC’s heavy economic losses to offer relief and welfare, even abroad, in the form of humanitarian aid. When all is said and done, being, and by extension belonging, has been fundamental in the dealings of both churches of interest with the EU during the decade of interest. Examined from an IR perspective, one cannot help but notice, that, what they were essentially preoccupied with was a vacuum; one that emanated from the alleged top-down neglect and timidity to correlate the European personality with a broader kinship basis, relevant to state personification. Politics abhors vacuums though, and the latter tend to be filled with certainties, in which 2 HSCG, “Η Εκκλησία απέναντι στη Σύγχρονη Κρίση”, pp. 837–39, (pp. 837–38).

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case the OCG and the OCC were well within the essence of this problématique, as they were attempting to address – often clumsily and through the lens of their own terms and conditions of belonging – an issue, which, to their defence, exceeded their duties and capacities in the first place. Because, even amidst their anti-Westernist variants, their criticisms and their addressing of antitheses rested on the question of an overarching common denominator, which would legitimise the collective European group-person. And, all things considered, in light of – not necessarily or strictly ecclesiastical/religious – eurosceptic and centrifugal tendencies, this problématique is still at large; even though the arguments to that end often appropriate anachronistic mindsets. However, via our attempt to shed light upon aspects of the examined churches’ rhetoric and conduct, we infer that in the long run, paradoxically, due to the ambivalence that permeated their largely utilitarian and realist practices as opposed to their expressed perceptions of the EU, they did not generate Euroscepticism per se; rather, they suggested their own ideal type of the EU, and by and large attributed the setbacks of the Europeanisation process to the EU personification vacuum and the fuzziness of Europeanness. The latter, in turn, ought to be blended with the overarching constituent elements of political culture across Member States and ultimately, to be consolidated by the religioculturally inclusive and exclusive Christian common denominator, as both the OCG and the OCC suggested.

7  Sources and bibliography Note: All web-based and online accessible material has been downloaded, stored and archived, as have been all interview recordings and their transcripts, for future reference and verification of the research material used in fulfilment of this research.

7.1  Primary sources Alexandros, Metropolitan of Mantineia and Kynouria, “Προσφώνησις προς τον Οικουμενικόν Πατριάρχην Βαρθoλομαίον κατά την Eπίσκεψίν του εις Τρίπολιν από τον Σεβ. Μητροπολίτην Μαντινείας και Κυνουρίας κ. Αλέξανδρον” [Address to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew during his Visit to Tripolis by the Most Rev. Metropolitan of Mantineia and Kynouria Mr Alexandros], Ekklesia, (9), (2009), pp. 602–03. Amvrosios, Metropolitan of Kalavryta and Aigialeia, “Προσφώνησις του Μητροπολίτου Καλαβρύτων και Αιγιαλείας κ. Αμβροσίου, Προέδρου της Συνοδικής Επιτροπής επί των Διορθοδόξων και Διαχριστιανικών Σχέσεων, προς τον Εκλαμπρότατον Καρδινάλιον κ. Walter Kasper” [Address by Metropolitan of Kalavryta and Aigialeia Mr Amvrosios, President of the Synodical Committee on Inter-Orthodox and Inter-Christian Relations, to His Eminence Cardinal Mr Walter Kasper], Ekklesia, (3), (2003), pp. 201–04. Anastasios, Archbishop of Tirana, Durrës and all Albania, “Η Διαχρονική Μετοχή της Χριστιανικής Πίστεως στην Οικοδόμηση της Ευρώπης” [The Diachronic Participation of Christian Faith in the Building of Europe], Ekklesia, (5), (2003), pp. 351–56. Apostolidis, Theologos, Archimandrite, “Η Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος – προς τον Εξωχότατον Πρόεδρον της Γαλλικής Δημοκρατίας και Πρόεδρον της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενώσεως κ. Jacques Chirac” [The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece – to His Excellency the President of the French Republic and President of the European Union Mr Jacques Chirac], Ekklesia, (2), (2001), pp. 87–88. –, “Hellenic Republic  – The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, No.: Prot. 1191 – Disp. 533”, Ekklesia, (4), (2001), pp. 285–87. –, “Hellenic Republic – The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, No.: Prot. 890 – Disp. 496”, Ekklesia, (4), (2001), pp. 291–93.

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–, “Η Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος – Εγκύκλιος 2711” [The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece  – Encyclical 2711], Ekklesia, (4), (2001), pp. 294–96. –, “Επιστολή της Ιεράς Συνόδου προς την Δήμαρχον Αθηναίων” [Letter of the Holy Synod to the Mayor of Athens], Ekklesia, (3), (2003), pp. 208–09. Athanasios, Titular Metropolitan of Achaia, “Δήλωση σχετικά με το Προτεινόμενο Προοίμιο στο Σχέδιο Συντάγματος της Ε.Ε.” [Statement about the Suggested Preamble of the Draft Constitution of the EU], Ekklesia, (6), (2003), p. 427. Bartholomew, Archbishop of Constantinople-New Rome and Ecumenical Patriarch, “Αρχαί και Αξίαι ως Βάσις δια την Οικοδόμησιν της Ευρώπης” [Values and Principles as Basis towards the Building of Europe], Ekklesia, (5), (2003), pp. 341–45. –, “Προσφώνησις της Α.Π.Θ. του Οικουμενικού Πατριάρχου κ. Βαρθολομαίου κατά την Επίσημον Υποδοχήν του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ. Ιερωνύμου εν τη Αιθούση του Θρόνου” [Address by His Holiness the Ecumenical Patriarch Mr Bartholomew during the Official Reception of His Beatitude the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece Mr Hieronymos in the Throne Chamber], Ekklesia, (5), (2008), pp. 329–32. Charamantidis, Agathaggelos, Archimandrite, “Η Ειρηνική Επίσκεψις του Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος Χριστοδούλου εις την Εκκλησίαν της Ρωσίας” [The Official Visit of His Beatitude the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece Christodoulos to the Church of Russia], Ekklesia, (6), (2001), pp. 455–94. Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, and Apostolidis, Theologos, Archimandrite, “Περί Συμμετοχής Εκπροσώπου της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος εις την «Εθνικήν Επιτροπήν δια τα Δικαιώματα του Ανθρώπου»” [On the Participation of a Church of Greece Representative in the “National Human Rights Committee”], Ekklesia, (1), (2001), pp. 12–13. –, “Ελληνική Δημοκρατία – Η Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος, Αριθμ.: Πρωτ. 377 – Διεκπ. 193” [Hellenic Republic – The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, Protocol No. 377 – Proc. 193], Ekklesia, (2), (2001), pp. 89–90. –, “Ελληνική Δημοκρατία – Η Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος, Αριθμ.: Πρωτ. 2013 – Διεκπ. 922” [Hellenic Republic – The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, Protocol No. 2013 – Proc. 922], Ekklesia, (7), (2001), pp. 551–52. –, “Επιστολή της Ιεράς Συνόδου προς τους Έλληνες Ευρωβουλευτές” [Letter of the Holy Synod to the Greek MEPs], Ekklesia, (4), (2003), pp. 282–83. Christodoulos Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, and Misiakoulis, Kyrillos, Archimandrite, “Προς την Υπουργόν Εθνικής Παιδείας και Θρησκευμάτων περί του Περιεχομένου των Νέων Βιβλίων του Μαθήματος των Θρησκευτικών”

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[To the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs on the Content of the New Books of the Module of Religious Education], Ekklesia, (11), (2006), pp. 855–58. Christodoulos Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, and Sklifas, Chrysostomos, Archimandrite, “Η Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος  – Επιστολή προς τον Υπουργόν Εξωτερικών περί της Αναφοράς του Χριστιανισμού εις το Ευρωπαϊκόν Σύνταγμα (Πέτρο Μολυβιάτη)” [The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece  – Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Reference to Christianity in the European Constitution (Mr Petros Molyviatis)], Ekklesia, (6), (2004), p. 421. –, “Συγχαρητήρια Επιστολή προς τους Νέους Ευρωβουλευτάς” [Congratulatory Letter to the New MEPs], Ekklesia, (7), (2004), pp. 503–04. –, “«Επιστολή προς τον Υπουργόν Δικαιοσύνης» (κ. Αναστάσιον Παπαληγούραν). Η Ιερά Σύνοδος της Εκκλησίας της Ελλάδος” [“Letter to the Minister of Justice” (Mr Anastasios Papaligouras). The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece], Ekklesia, (10), (2004), pp. 795–96. –, “Προς τον Πρόεδρον του Παιδαγωγικού Ινστιτούτου περί των Βιβλίων των Θρησκευτικών” [To the President of the Pedagogical Institute on the Religious Education Module Textbooks], Ekklesia, (11), (2004), p. 884. Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, and Theologos, Bishop of Salona, “Επιστολή της Ι.Σ. προς τον Πρόεδρον της Ελληνικής Κυβερνήσεως επί τη Εντάξει της Κύπρου εις την Ευρωπαϊκήν Ένωσιν” [Letter of the Holy Synod to the President of the Greek Government on the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union], Ekklesia, (4), (2003), p. 254. Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, “Ιερά Αρχιεπισκοπή Αθηνών: Μήνυμα Πρωτοχρονιάς 2001” [Holy Archbishopric of Athens: New Year’s Message for 2001], Ekklesia, (1), (2001), p. 11. –, “Για την Παγκόσμια Διακήρυξη των Δικαιωμάτων του Ανθρώπου” [On the Universal Declaration of Human Rights], Ekklesia, (1), (2001), pp. 48–49. –, “Η Πορεία και ο Ρόλος της Εκκλησίας στην Ευρώπη του 20ου Αιώνος” [The Course and Role of the Church in 20th Century Europe], Ekklesia, (2), (2001), pp. 95–99. –, “5ος Κύκλος Διαλόγου Ορθ. Εκκλησίας και Κοινοβ. Ομάδος Ευρωπαϊκού Λαϊκού Κόμματος – Ευρωπαίων Δημοκρατών” [5th Cycle of Dialogue between the Orthodox Church and the European People’s Party Parliamentary Team – European Democrats], Ekklesia, (6), (2001), pp. 497–98. –, “Παγκοσμιοποίηση: Νέοι Ορίζοντες ή Απώλεια Προσανατολισμού;” [Globalisation: New Horizons or Loss of Orientation?], Ekklesia, (6), (2001), pp. 499–502.

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–, “Εκκλησία και Λαός: Μια Αδιάσπαστη Σχέση” [Church and People: An Indissoluble Relationship], Ekklesia, (7), (2001), pp. 590–92. –, “Ανακοινώσεις του Προέδρου της Ιεράς Συνόδου Μακαριωτάτου Αρχιεπισκόπου Αθηνών και Πάσης Ελλάδος κ.κ. Χριστοδούλου επί του Θέματος της Δημοψηφισματικής Πρωτοβουλίας για την Αναγραφή του Θρησκεύματος στις Ταυτότητες – Αθήναι 28 Αυγούστου 2001” [Announcements of the President of the Holy Synod His Beatitude Archbishop of Athens and All Greece Mr Christodoulos on the Issue of the Referendum Initiative ον the Display of Religious Affiliation on Identity Cards – Athens 28 August 2001], Ekklesia, (8), (2001), pp. 683–87. –, “Τα Κύρια Σημεία της ενώπιον της Ιεραρχίας Ομιλίας του Μακαριωτάτου Προέδρου Αυτής κ.κ. Χριστοδούλου” [The Main Points of the Speech before the Hierarchy of His Beatitude its President Mr Christodoulos], Ekklesia, (10), (2001), pp. 849–58. –, “Εκ του Καθεδρικού Ιερού Ναού (7.10.2001)” [From the Cathedral (7.10.2001)], Ekklesia, (10), (2001), pp. 909–10. –, “Εκ του Καθεδρικού Ιερού Ναού (14.10.2001)” [From the Cathedral (14.10.2001)], Ekklesia, (10), (2001), pp. 910–12. –, “Εκ του Καθεδρικού Ναού Αθηνών (2.12.2001)” [From the Cathedral in Athens (2.12.2001)], Ekklesia, (1), (2002), pp. 38–39. –, “Ομιλία προς τους Έλληνες Ευρωβουλευτές” [Speech to the Greek MEPs], Ekklesia, (2), (2002), pp. 89–93. –, “Η Διαπολιτισμική Αγωγή στα Πλαίσια της Ορθόδοξης Πίστης και Διδασκαλίας” [Intercultural Education within the Framework of Orthodox Faith and Teaching], Ekklesia, (2), (2002), pp. 94–99. –, “Επί τω Ευαγγελισμώ της Θεοτόκου και τη Ενάρξει του Αγώνος της Ανεξαρτησίας” [On Feast of the Annunciation of Mary and the Commencement of the Struggle for Independence] Ekklesia, (4), (2002), pp. 247–48. –, “Προσφώνηση προς τον Ιρανό Πρόεδρο Μοχάμεντ Χαταμί κατά την Επίσκεψη Αυτού στην Αρχιεπισκοπή Αθηνών” [Address to the Iranian President Mohammad Khatami during his Visit to the Archbishopric Palace of Athens], Ekklesia, (4), (2002), pp. 249–51. –, “Προς το Συνέδριο ‘Cristianesimo e Democrazia nel Futuro dell’Europa’” [To the Congress ‘Christianity and Democracy in the Future of Europe’], Ekklesia, (8–9), (2002), pp. 569–71. –, “Επιστολή της Ιεράς Συνόδου προς τον κ. Valéry Giscard D’Estaing” [Letter of the Holy Synod to Mr Valéry Giscard D’Estaing], Ekklesia, (3), (2003), pp. 206–08.

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7.3 Interviews A. N., Interview with the author on 4 December 2013, Athens, (2013) [Recording in possession of the author]. C. T., Interview with the author on 29 October 2013, Brussels, (2013) [Recording in possession of the author]. E. R., Interview with the author on 8 November 2013, Brussels, (2013) [Recording in possession of the author]. F. E., Interview with the author on 29 April 2014, Athens, (2014) [Recording in possession of the author]. G. A., Interview with the author on 25 January 2014, Bonn, (2014) [Recording in possession of the author]. G. E., Interview with the author on 27 November 2013, Brussels, (2013) [Recording in possession of the author]. G. M., Interview with the author on 24 February 2014, Nicosia, (2014) [Recording in possession of the author]. H. L., Interview with the author on 4 March 2014, Brussels, (2014) [Recording in possession of the author]. H. R., Interview with the author on 13 March 2014, London, (2014) [Recording in possession of the author]. K. C., Interview with the author on 25 February 2014, Nicosia, (2014) [Recording in possession of the author]. K. D., Interview with the author on 23 May 2014, Athens, (2014) [Recording in possession of the author]. L. E., Interview with the author on 12 March 2014, Canterbury, (2014) [Recording in possession of the author].

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Appendix Questionnaire (semi-structured) Note: The following are general discussion themes, including possible direct questions. However, given the semi-structured nature of the interviews, the informants were given maximum flexibility to direct the discussion themselves, as long as that remained within the framework of the research object. • How would you describe your professional/institutional interaction with the church? • Can you distinguish institutional variability between hierarchs? • How do you perceive the idea of a European culture? • Is there a characteristic European Identity? o If yes, how would you describe it? • Whose is Europe? • Would you like to evaluate the Western cultural model? • Who is the “Other”? (If any) • Could you describe the basic tenets of Greekness/Greek-Cypriotness (identity)? • Are there differences? o In what ways? (Value systems?) • Is history still relevant? o Is the West still a foe by religious-historical standards? • Is geography relevant? (Considering population movement & jurisdiction?) o  What is the place of the national church in the European, international environment? Challenges? Responses? • Representation in Brussels: o Are particular goals pursued? o Is it mainly a matter of “diplomacy via presence”? o What purposes does it serve? o Does it affect decision making? o  Is there an institutional cooperation with the representation of the Patriarchate? Cyprus? Others? • Which are the most important reasons to be a member of the EU in your view? • What is the role of the national church in a unified Europe? o Does the national church overlap with the patriarchate?

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o How does this binary representation affect the state and the nation? o Is there a balance of power at play? o Do the Churches of Greece and Cyprus cooperate with one another? o Is cultural diplomacy being exercised? Which are the church’s views on the nation-state surrendering sovereignty to the EU? o Is the nation-state becoming obsolete? § How do you feel about it? § How does it affect the church? How would you define Europeanisation? o (Part of globalisation?) Has the church helped or hindered the process of Europeanisation? o Does it affect the domestic culture? § Political developments & trends? § Should it? Is the church a reflection of society? How has the crisis affected your views? Who do you blame? If Greece/Cyprus had a destiny, would Europe/EU be it? Alternatives?

Transcribed interview samples Note: These are excerpts from interviews and not the entire dialogues, segments of which have been intentionally left out in order to preserve the anonymity of our informants and the confidentiality of particular pieces of information, which have been disclosed in discretion. The samples presented here correspond to each church of interest: namely, the first to the OCG and the second to the OCC. Also, in the transcripts “Q.” stands for “Question” and “A.” for “Answer”. A. N., Interview with the author on 04 December 2013, Athens, (2013) [Recording in possession of the author] Q.: Could you give me an impression of the church’s political influence according to your career experience? A.: Even though I experienced church and politics in my constituency initially, where things are more conservative, I cannot say that it has ever been an obstacle, it was rather the opposite; in that sense, it cannot be described as a hindrance. In the lapse of time and in retrospect, I believe that the church’s influence is gradually reducing. So, it may be influential, but it does not determine decisions or developments.

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Q.: Is that invariably so? A.: Well, it depends on one’s personality too. The late archbishop (Christodoulos) for example was a political person; from his archbishopric office he endeavoured to play the role of a political leader. To put it bluntly, he perceived himself as the head of the church’s party, so to speak. Q.: How has the representation in Brussels carried out its duties? What goals have been pursued? A.: Few of us have really occupied ourselves politically with such affairs; even fewer had people of such specialisation in their cabinets. From our posts, we focused on interreligious and inter-confessional dialogue, and we cooperated with the churches and their corresponding states on social issues. However, the Protestant churches function rather as NGOs, whereas in Italy and Greece, governments are involved as well. In any case, amidst this effort to engage into dialogue, there was the well-known friction with the Patriarchate, concerning whether there ought to be one single or multiple Orthodox representations in Brussels. Then came Bishop Athanasios of Achaia, appointed by Christodoulos; a well-educated cosmopolitan man, who quickly engaged into establishing connections with the Western system, but it was just him. Therefore, the church in its entirety did not undergo a kind of osmosis as such. I remember distinctively, for example, that he organised an event in the European Parliament in Brussels, so that the metropolitans could get an impression of how decision-making processes work; ultimately, to learn something out of the whole experience. Q.: How did that work out? A.: Well, what do you think they were preoccupied with, for the most part? European funding for their metropolitanates; no sign of a church that wants to open up, engage into dialogue, to exchange experiences, to establish a brotherly connection at the end of the day. Europe is underappreciated, it is distant, a mere source of funds. This is my impression so far. There are exceptions; certainly, there is bishop Athanasios, for instance, who does his share and more; yet this does not get endorsed and appropriated domestically and as regards the latter there is nothing that he could do. Q.: Things have changed with Hieronymos however, have they not? A.: I have had the opportunity to officially cooperate with him, and in my view, it is very fortunate that he is the archbishop now. It takes very little motivation nowadays for the people to take to the streets; if there were someone with an explosive personality instead of him, he would have made it happen. But Hieronymos is a prudent man, who, mind you, keeps deadly balances in the synod; he has no broad and solid footing there. He tries, but it comprises fractions.

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Q.: Surely, those who differentiate themselves have no significant social resonance though, do they? A.: They possess power nonetheless! Q.: Would it not help if Hieronymos were more outspoken? I mean that, he leaves vacuums with his seeming absence from the public sphere and other hierarchs might fill them, even with eccentric rhetoric. A.: He does speak. But his rhetoric is not inflammatory, as is that of several others who often take it to furthermost extremes, on politics, sexuality, etc., and they attract the attention of the sensationalist press. Hieronymos knows well to which direction he wants to turn the church; he has tried systematically to eradicate partisanship, to depoliticise it, he embraced the immigrants, generally he has healed wounds. Well, perhaps he is lacking the explosive personality required to see his plan through. The synodical model has several problems in its functionality. They put together organised absences, oppositions, strategic moves that fully resemble party politics, to the extent that Hieronymos might agree on something with a minister and then the synod would block it. There have been mixed committees, comprising metropolitans and ministry representatives, which could not have yielded any result whatsoever, given the background of complications; bureaucratic, legal and others. Q.: A few final words to sum it up perhaps? A.: All in all, the church evolves; having experienced the entire course of things from the 1980s to date, there is a significant difference, so yes, it does evolve, but, without being a pioneer and therefore without leaving its own mark. It follows social tendencies and due of its survival instinct it appropriates them accordingly. It certainly has not played a role as such in the European affairs; it does not appear to have a definitive view on those matters and what is more, nor does it even wish to. There are exceptions, as I said earlier, like Athanasios of Achaia, whom people know and respect at an EU level but he has no following domestically. As for the crisis, Christodoulos might have headed the demonstrations as a right wing alternative to Tsipras, hypothetically and contextually speaking of course. G. M., Interview with the author on 24 February 2014, Nicosia, (2014) [Recording in possession of the author] Q.: Let us begin with the domestic political culture in conjunction with the church. A.: The Church of Cyprus is very special and exceeds the processes of the state in contrast to Greece. It has played a central role throughout the course

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of the Cypriot society up until 1960, when the state was established in its contemporary form. It is since then that a different political culture, political life if you like, has been founded. Because until then, the authority of the Greek-Cypriot community was the ethnarchic church, i.e., the Ethnarchic Council; it represented them and made all corresponding decisions. Therefore, there is a diachronic culture regarding the attitude of the church. Any given archbishop expresses himself publicly, more or less like the politicians; he has a distinct view on all affairs, and quite often a weighty one, especially with reference to the Cyprus Problem. Notably, he has resonance, social penetration, and a form of power over society. All realise that and are aware of it, a reality with which no political party whatsoever can compete; hence any archbishop is taken very seriously. Q.: Does that apply to the European affairs? A.: The church is well disposed to the European orientation, the interreligious dialogue. And the Cyprus Problem has a purely religious dimension about it as well; thus, the EU can contribute positively via the transfer of good practices and the mitigation of differences. Also, EU assistance has been utilised for the restoration of St Andrew and other church buildings in the occupied areas for example. The same applies to Muslim monuments in the free areas. Q.: Has the positive predisposition changed with the crisis? A.: For years now, we have been saying that the state is in need of reforms; yet, no party has taken the political cost by introducing such processes. And the church was in favour of reforms for years. After all, that would have reinforced the existing investment potential, considering especially the economic capabilities of the church. The contemporary archbishop in particular was a supporter of the smaller and more efficient state, since he noted the incompetence and unwillingness of the state to provide the necessary assistance to foreign investors. They (the church) have always maintained that, especially since the EU accession and onward, when direct quantitative comparisons with other Member-States were possible. Q.: How about the bail-in though? A.: Chrysostomos is embittered with some decisions, as the whole society is, especially with those of the Eurogroup, which destroyed the basic pillars of the economy. For example, the decision for a deposits’ haircut, the bailin, shrunk the banking sector and its portfolios have been reduced from €70  billion to €40 billion approximately. And, essentially the banks are defunct (capital controls); imagine a Central European country being left without essential banking functions for a year in the place of Cyprus!

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Q.: Does that change things then? A.: The reasons that led Cyprus to join the EU still stand. Whether the average Cypriot or the archbishop is concerned, above all rests the possible support towards a solution to the Cyprus Problem, in accordance with the terms dictated by Human Rights and freedoms, i.e. the European acquis; and, second, for this little dot in the Eastern Mediterranean to progress and offer its citizens a prosperous day-to-day life in terms of peace and security, we all look to the EU in awe to prevent the worst, or what some are planning for us, from happening. And because this is related to energy, geopolitics and volatile balances, if the energy resources become European, it is self-evident that a safer management will follow. Likewise, we are the gateway of the EU to the Middle East. Q.: Would you care to elaborate on how the EU will affect things to Cyprus’ benefit? A.: We do not expect the EU to come and solve the Cyprus Problem, but to have a more active involvement in the formulation of a solution. For the time being, the main factors are the UN, the USA, England particularly, Turkey, and amidst this fermentation, in order to balance powers and influences, we believe, and this is the archbishop’s position as well, that a more active EU involvement could keep the suggestions’ content in check, so that what is being discussed and agreed upon, may conform with the acquis communautaire. The freedom of movement and establishment; imagine the refugee from Keryneia not being eligible to that right! The Turks, in order to preserve their inner majorities in the areas they control, oppose this principle. A bad solution that does not grant the refugee the right to return to one’s home; yet, it allows other European citizens to buy it, which is very far off the acquis and the Human Rights. This is something that the archbishop states at any opportunity. As for the energy issues, those exceed even the constraints and capacities of the EU; what it can offer is the know-how, rules and regulations concerning the protection of the region as well as the means of extraction and transport. It has a role to play and it has the will. There are considerable natural gas reserves and at the same time, the EU has significant energy needs. Those are located within the limits of a Member-State’s Exclusive Economic Zone. If it does not lend a hand towards the safe management and mining, the great interests will come rushing in. Cyprus has two choices: it will either utilise the reserves to the benefit of the people and its partners, or others will, for their own ends. Cyprus alone is lacking the size.

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Q.: However, the times when an actor could impose its will by force are bygone; right? A.: I am not so sure! With all that is happening in Syria, in Ukraine and elsewhere, what could happen is that they would let us annihilate each other. It has happened before. The Republic of Cyprus was a bicommunal state. In 1963, amidst a series of events that had transpired and following serious communication problems, as a Turkish-Cypriot car refused to stop for police inspection and shots were exchanged, a prostitute was by chance killed; and out of the blue a state fell apart because of intercommunal hostilities that originated in Nicosia. The English returned as arbitrators in 1963, and the commander of the bases divided the island using a green-coloured marker. The divisive lines are still fresh, and the situation is volatile and fragile. We must be aware of who we are, what was before us, what we wish to exist after us, what we can, and how, in order to devise a plan, maintaining sometimes very delicate balances. Q.: Is Greece present in this balancing act? A.: There is always good communication regardless of persons, both in politics and churches, between Cyprus and the Metropolitan Body (Greece).

Erfurter Studien zur Kulturgeschichte des Orthodoxen Christentums Herausgegeben von Vasilios N. Makrides Band 1

Vasilios N. Makrides (Hrsg.): Religion, Staat und Konfliktkonstellationen im orthodoxen Ostund Südosteuropa. Vergleichende Perspektiven. 2005.

Band 2

Klaus Buchenau: Kämpfende Kirchen. Jugoslawiens religiöse Hypothek. 2006.

Band 3

Angelos Giannakopoulos: Tradition und Moderne in Griechenland. Konfliktfelder in Religion, Politik und Kultur. 2007.

Band 4

Kristina Stoeckl: Community after Totalitarianism. The Russian Orthodox Intellectual Tradi­ tion and the Philosophical Discourse of Political Modernity. 2008.

Band 5 Nicolai Staab: Rumänische Kultur, Orthodoxie und der Westen. Der Diskurs um die nationale Identität in Rumänien aus der Zwischenkriegszeit. 2011. Band 6

Sebastian Rimestad: The Challenges of Modernity to the Orthodox Church in Estonia and Latvia (1917–1940). 2012.

Band 7

Łukasz Fajfer: Modernisierung im orthodox-christlichen Kontext. Der Heilige Berg Athos und die Herausforderungen der Modernisierungsprozesse seit 1988. 2013.

Band 8

Alexander Agadjanian: Turns of Faith, Search for Meaning. Orthodox Christianity and PostSoviet Experience. 2014.

Band 9

Thomas Heinzel: Weiße Bruderschaft und Delphische Idee. Esoterische Religiosität in Bulgarien und Griechenland in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. 2014.

Band 10 Mihai-D. Grigore: Neagoe Basarab – Princeps Christianus. Christianitas-Semantik im Vergleich mit Erasmus, Luther und Machiavelli (1513-1523). 2015. Band 11 Vasilios N. Makrides / Jennifer Wasmuth / Stefan Kube (Hrsg.): Christentum und Menschenrechte in Europa. Perspektiven und Debatten in Ost und West. 2016. Band 12 Alena Alshanskaya: Der Europa-Diskurs der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche (1996–2011). 2016. Band 13

Stamatios Gerogiorgakis: Futura contingentia, necessitas per accidens und Prädestination in Byzanz und in der Scholastik. 2017.

Band 14 Alexander Ponomariov: The Visible Religion. The Russian Orthodox Church and her Rela­ tions with State and Society in Post-Soviet Canon Law (1992–2015). 2017. Band 15 Isabella Schwaderer: Platonisches Erbe, Byzanz, Orthodoxie und die Modernisierung Griechenlands. Schwerpunkte des kulturphilosophischen Werkes von Stelios Ramfos. 2018. Band 16 Georgios E. Trantas: Being and Belonging. A Comparative Examination of the Greek and Cypriot Orthodox Churches’ Attitudes to ‘Europeanisation’ in Early 21st Century. 2018. www.peterlang.com

This book examines and compares, from an interdisciplinary perspective of Religious Studies and International Relations, the conduct and rhetoric of the Orthodox Churches of Greece and Cyprus vis-à-vis the ‘Europeanisation’ process. This study focuses on the conditionality of their sense of belonging in the European Union (EU) as their predisposition is dependent, in part, on their sense of being, as well as on their perception of an ideal type of Europeanness. In this context, this book offers insights on how the Greek and Cypriot Churches, as soft power actors of domestic and European capacity, perceive Europeanness and Otherness; thereby, the compatibility of the personified Greek and Cypriot states with the EU as a post-Westphalian political-cultural entity comes into view.

Georgios E. Trantas specialises in Religion, Politics and Cultural Diplomacy in Southeastern Europe. He has earned his Ph.D at the University of Erfurt where he has also been a pre-doctoral and post-doctoral Fellow. His academic interests also include migration and the formation of religioscapes.

Georgios E. Trantas · Being and Belonging: Greek and Cypriot Orthodox Attitudes to ‘Europeanisation’

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ERFURTER STUDIEN ZUR KULTURGESCHICHTE DES ORTHODOXEN CHRISTENTUMS

Georgios E. Trantas

Being and Belonging

A Comparative Examination of the Greek and Cypriot Orthodox Churches’ Attitudes to ‘Europeanisation’ in Early 21st Century

www.peterlang.com

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12.07.18 18:48