Becoming Something Else : Society and Change in India's North East [1 ed.] 9781443886338, 9781443883610

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Becoming Something Else

Becoming Something Else: Society and Change in India's North East Edited by

N.William Singh, Malsawmdawngliana and Saichampuii Sailo

Becoming Something Else: Society and Change in India's North East Edited by N.William Singh, Malsawmdawngliana and Saichampuii Sailo This book first published 2015 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2015 by N.William Singh, Malsawmdawngliana and Saichampuii Sailo and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-8361-1 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-8361-0

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ................................................................................... vii Introduction ................................................................................................ ix Impact of the Developmental Plan on the Perception of Social and Cultural Change in Mizoram ................................................................ 1 Zokaitluangi Shifting Marriage Practices—the Magar Community of Sikkim .............. 13 Amit Manger Institutional Changes in the Toto Community— A Discourse on Tradition and Modernity .................................................. 29 Anil Kumar Biswas and Mrinal Kanti Basak Zu and the Mizos—Change and Continuity .............................................. 41 Grace Lalhlupuii Sailo and Henry Zodinliana Pachuau Aspects of Social and Cultural Changes— Mizo Society and Colonial Rule ................................................................ 55 S. Haukhanlian Mate and Vanrammawii Ideas, Institutions and Social Change in Sikkim ....................................... 63 P. Newton Singh Social Change and Women in Assam ........................................................ 75 Nazmul Hussain Interrogating Social Change—the Cinematic Representation of Hybrid Identity Formations ................................................................... 81 Rukmini Kakoty Migration and Social Change in Sikkim .................................................... 95 Sunil Pradhan

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The Social and Cultural Transformation of the Damai Community— A Study of Sikkim Society ...................................................................... 107 Ridhima Sundas Rituals, Beliefs and the Traditional Occupation of Brewing Liquor in Chakpa Andro ..................................................................................... 115 Puthem Jugeshor Singh Why English? A Historical Study from the Mizo Perspective ................ 125 Lalrinchhani Society and Women—An Analysis of Social Change in Lali by Biakliana ................................................................................. 133 Vanlalchami List of Contributors ................................................................................. 141

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Acknowledgements are due to the contributors who made this edition possible. They bring forth old issues with a fresh touch on the ongoing complexities in India’s northeast. We would also like to thank Prof. Bimol Akoijam of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Prof. R. L. Hangloo, Vice Chancellor of Kalyani University, West Bengal for their inspirations and the impact they have on young research scholars. We would also like to acknowledge our respective family members for their moral support on our embodiment of research work. At times, we the researchers painfully abide the lonesome journey of life in lost thoughts, looking for words and issues benefitting us, and sometimes hurting us. Family makes those moments less gloomy and cherished. We would also like to acknowledge Laldinpuii, Andy Lalfakzuala and Jerusha Lalremruafeli, who painstakingly went through every word on every page of this edition and for their input in making it more appealing. We would also like to take this opportunity to thank Carol Koulikourdi, Adam Terry and Amanda Millar of Cambridge Scholars Publishing for their full cooperation in making this edition possible. N. William Singh Malsawmdawngliana Saichampuii Sailo Aizawl, Mizoram

INTRODUCTION: METAPHORS AND DISCONTENTS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN INDIA’S NORTHEAST N. WILLIAM SINGH

Patterns of change among the communities of India’s northeast are not extolled by the communities; rather, the communities dissent and question the patterns of change by recalling a sense of belonging and rootedness. The general consensus on change in India’s northeast is simple: “change is dissent in India’s northeast; because change overturns the socio-cultural fabric of these communities.” Institutionalisation based on rational-legal perspectives without customary linings invites dissent. Change in India’s northeast brings forth contradiction and is totally non-fitting contextually. In the first section, this introductory chapter revisits some of the best research papers and commentaries written on India’s northeast and attempts to link them up with the parameters of social change. Later, in section II, this chapter disseminates the central idea of change that brings uncomfortable transformations witnessed in the not-so-well documented communities of India’s northeast. The chapters in this edited volume are written by young scholars who grew up in these societies with a sense of belonging and rootedness. They dissect the anatomy of social change and examine both its welcoming and discomforting aspects.

I Economic backwardness and the communication gap are considered the objective factors to be solved. In a more problematic manner, tribalism, Christianity, conflict, insurgency, ethnic homelands, the modern ethos in conflict with customary belongings, elite conflict (Chaube 1975) and subnationalism (Baruah 2009) are broadly considered to be the negative

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symptoms of contemporary India’s northeast. No community remains stagnant, and the historical situation is subject to the process of social change. Change and transformation were incepted in India’s northeast through various agencies, one of the foremost being the colonial administrators who introduced modern education, alphabets for Mizo, Naga and Khasi, print dictionaries for the communities to read Western books and become acquainted with the values of Western modernity, translations of the Holy Bible into native languages, and who imposed rational laws and abolished head-hunting and enmities between habitations and villages. They gave their best shot at putting the communities of India’s northeast under an effective rational law. The colonial construction of India’s northeast can be termed as an “administer with a difference.” Preconceived and stereotyped labelling of the natives effectively colonized the fundamentally different and inferior subjects. That is the reason why stereotypical and derogatory tags, such as “primitive,” “wild,” “poor” and “tribal,” were attributed to the least understood communities of India’s northeast. The colonial construction of wildness and primitiveness were inherent to colonizers to justify their colonizing projects, accompanied by euphemisms like "civilizing mission" or “the white man's burden." Colonial administrators brought missionaries to civilize and sanitize the natives, paving the way forward. Colonial memories of India’s northeast exist not just in the archives and in photographs—missionaries still exist in the minds and souls of the communities, and missionary activities persist actively in spreading awareness, educating the poor and spreading religious harmony, and their records also fill up the bookshelves of many archives. Colonial administration is a closed chapter in the present scenario in India’s northeast, but the missionary chapters cannot be closed because they are difficult to understand and are still active in the corners of India’s northeast. The cultural division between the planes and hills of India’s northeast was manifested by the Inner Line Policy (ILP) of 1872–3, which is still in force. This is a policy measure inserted by colonial administrators to create a political cleavage between the planes and the hills for easier administrations in governing the hill areas. Communities from the planes of India still view ILP sceptically, seeing it as an extension of the colonial

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imperialist policy which post-independence India simply adopts. This creates politics of tension between the hill and non-hill communities of India’s northeast (Rao 1979). Christian Missionaries also believed that ILP generates a separatist tendency among the hill and non-hill settlers. There are no unifying aspects in ILP. Furer-Haimendorf (1945), while characterizing the rebellions of aboriginal tribes of peninsular India as "defensive movements," distinguished the occasional uprisings of the frontier tribes in India’s northeast as "more in the nature of resistance to the establishment of Government's authority than a challenge to the administration." Northeast India fell under British colonial rule during the mid-nineteenth century and was amalgamated into a polyglot of the newly independent Indian republic. Communities from India’s northeast remain in the limelight, but for disturbing reasons. We hear in the evening news, breaking news and newspaper headlines only bad issues about India’s northeast, such as its being backward, its uncivilized tribes, its conflict zones, its being insurgent prone, its ethnic homelands movements, discrimination from central India, and so forth. We rarely notice good news about India’s northeast, except regarding music, boxing and footballers. Institutional changes accompany badly formulated policy orientations towards India’s northeast. The region has a separate ministry headed by a central cabinet minister known as the Department for Development of the Northeastern Region (DONER), set up in 2001 as a part of this reorientation of India’s northeast. It is the sole ministry looking after India’s northeast. The idea itself is odd (Miri 2002). It also has a separate body called the Northeastern Council (NEC), established in 1971 by an act of the Indian parliament. The NEC plans for development and sustainability, but fails to make sustainable changes in India’s northeast. The discomforting question is—where is the sustainability in India’s northeast? This region is more dependent than any other part of India. From electric power to basic consumer goods, the NEC fails to deliver for every household. India’s growth and development story cannot be festive if India’s northeast remain cornered and stereotyped by the central Indians. India will never glow when its northeast remain gloomy. The role of agency in each society is peculiar. Also, the structure of each society in India’s northeast is fundamentally different in terms of

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language, culture, rituals and religious affiliations. The elite play a significant role in incepting social change within the communities of India’s northeast (Chaube 1975). The hill districts of Assam were administered separately from the planes in the colonial period. After independence, the hill districts emerged into separate hill states precisely because of their compactness of elite articulation.

India’s northeast as the other Indian Ignorance of the Indian northeast’s existence by other parts of India is a syndrome often felt in today’s India. Indian independence is just 66 years old, while Assam’s statehood is as old as Indian independence. The remaining seven states of northeast India are not that old. People from central India do not even know the state capitals of the eight northeastern states. A PhD scholar from the University of Delhi once asked me “Is Shillong the state capital of Assam?” I replied: “What’s your score in geography?” Former Army chief General Shankar Roy Choudhury, sitting in his bungalow at Kolkata, once remarked live on a national news channel (NDTV): “Frankly speaking, Northeast India does not exist to the Indian mainland mindset.” Indian army and air force chiefs served tenures with different capacities in India’s northeast and still talk in these outrageous terms. Indian government employees—administrators, defence personnel, scientists, judges, police officials and telecommunications and revenue employees—dislike transfer orders from central India to the northeast. The legacy of poor governance, weak local leadership and violent ethnic politics constitute the living nemesis of India’s northeast. New Delhi counts on other regional parties to form coalition governments, while regional parties from India’s northeast cannot impact seriously on New Delhi’s political graph. Thus, a fractured political theatre exists. New Delhi provides financial resources in the name of democracy. Promises of infrastructure growth and incepting industrial facilities were strongly heard during election warm-ups in New Delhi and India’s northeast states, but after the elections became quiet again. The Gandhi family (Rahul, Sonia) came to India’s northeast before the elections, but have been rarely seen since.

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Displaced Communities within the Conflict Theatre of India’s northeast The state of displaced communities in India’s northeast is alarming, and its complication continues to confound bureaucrats and politicians in New Delhi. Violence between the Bodo community and Bengali Muslims surfaced again and again on questions of land, sons of the soil and the nativism mindset. Some Muslims in Assam have spent their entire lives in refugee camps. An estimated 0.8 million people are displaced in this troubled part of India due to ethnic violence and secessionist movements. Indian laws on protective measures provide the potential for the creation of ethnic homelands. For instance, the sixth schedule of the Indian constitution protects customary laws of communities and traditional rights to decide on questions of land and agrarian matters. Policies adopted by India turned the communities of India’s northeast into more vivid communities, and language groups into ethnic blocks demanding ethnic homelands. Bodoland, Dimasaland, Maraland, Gorkhaland, Kukiland and Greater Nagaland are such cases in point. Enmity and “othering” between communities erupt due to ethnic homeland consciousness and autonomous district councils that are safeguarded by the sixth schedule of the Indian constitution. "Ethnic ties in Northeast India do not neatly coincide with state boundaries, especially given the nature of the boundaries between states shaped by the political logic that I describe as a cosmetic regional order” (Baruah 2005). This is the root cause of what Baruah calls "Northeast India's durable disorder," which is a reflection of the complex "ethnoscape" of the region and the political failure of the colonial state of British India and the postcolonial state of India. The disillusioned ethnic groups of the region organised their respective militias or revolutionary organisations on ethnic lines to address their grievances and dissatisfaction with the existing order and sought autonomous districts within the states. They were forced to be part of political accidents or politically framed strategies. Communities in India’s northeast do not live in distinct areas; different communities overlap and community habitations cut across various autonomous district councils. Claims of ethnic homelands ignite violence and eventually internal displacements. Episodic killings between Naga and Kuki (1993–7) and Hmar and Paite (1997–8) are testaments to the Sixth

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Schedule’s ineffectiveness. Stability in India’s northeast has simply failed due to the emerging unjust patterns of change. Ethnic conflict in India’s northeast is not just on questions of land and resources, but also on the fear of the loss of identity and belonging (Oinam 2003). The redrawing of the political map of northeast India in the postcolonial period was a hurried exercise in political engineering. It was an attempt to manage the independentist rebellions among the Nagas and the Mizos and pre-empt radical political mobilisation among other discontented ethnic groups. “From today's vantage point this project of political engineering must be pronounced a failure” (Baruah 2005). This failure gave birth to resistance movements. India’s northeast has vast forests above natural resources filled with the largest number of ethnic militias or underground revolutionary groups. It was a failure because the "cartographic surgery" or "political engineering" was carried out without considering the precolonial traditional territories of the various distinct ethnic groups of the region. India’s northeast introduced insurgency to India. In 1952, Nagaland under A. Phizo started actions of secessionist violence, and similar separatist and secessionist violence has become entrenched in Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura and Assam since the late 1970s. Insurgency is multiplying in this region and has not been resolved, with many peace attempts failing. There cannot be lasting peace in India’s northeast because the sense of alienation, negligence, discrimination and sidelining harpoons the peaceniks of Mizoram and Sikkim. Violence, insurgency and secessionism rock the newspaper headlines of Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura every single day.

Mapping Changes in India’s northeast Change in India’s northeast has fascinated “responsible social scientists” who examine the political and economic aspects of social change. In other words, change has multiple entities. Development has been the main theme for post-independence India. Post-1947, India’s northeast transformations have occurred in four main parameters: tribal culture, language, territory and religious beliefs. These parameters are neither independent nor isolated from each other, often working in combination. India’s northeast is a polyglot of discrete formations of communities. Language, territory, religion, common origin and a host of other cultural

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elements separate one community from another. A significant change is the emerging political awakening of identity revivalism with political translations beginning in India’s northeast in the 1970s. A bewildering number of salient ascriptive identities (Baruah 2005; Hazarika 1994) have disturbed the traditional bond between communities. Despite continuing anti-New Delhi sentiments, the core of the contemporary conflict in India’s northeast comprises local rivalries and resource disputes between tribal areas, between hill and plane areas, and between “sons of the soil” and migrants from the Bengal planes, Nepal or central India (Weiner 1978). New Delhi invests in state and group leaders in the northeast by distributing substantial financial and coercive resources, tolerating the erosion of democracy and the rule of law (Lacina 2009). This support allows local autocratic leaders to consolidate power and repress violence against what New Delhi considers the most sensitive targets, such as key infrastructure and industrial facilities. The Northeastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971 failed to solve ethnic habitations. The act divided many habitations of various communities of India’s northeast and dissected these communities, merging the slices of these habitations into a legal state apparatus. This was an accident from the state’s perspective, while from a community perspective it was an insult. Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel (1997) observed in Asia that the statecraft of pre-existing highly developed native states, with their own conceptions of territorial integrity and boundaries (though different from the European model), powerfully influenced colonial administrations so that colonial borders were often superimposed on much older political and religious divides. The mistake with re-organising frontiers (colonial) and state (postcolonial) was there even during the colonial period. Peter Robb (1997, 257–8) labels this process of chalking out frontiers as “unscientific": I began by thinking that we ought to refuse to take any cognizance of what may happen beyond the borders: but the more I thought about it and the more I considered the impossibility of restraining the Nagas, the less practicable did that policy seem. This conclusion is unsurprising because that colonial line/ boundary was "imaginary" and "not based on tribal boundaries or natural obstacles" like rivers, mountains and hills and was thus quite unfamiliar to the Nagas. (Arthur Elliott’s letter to Lord Ripon on May 28, 1881)

The pre-colonial setting of India’s northeast was fluid and flexible, while the post-colonial settings have been less so, with boundaries becoming

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more acute among the communities. Identity polarisation occurs more severely in post-independence India. India’s northeast communities became ethno-political blocs. Identity markers were polished, and revivalist trends set in for various communities. The resultant effect is that the various social formations in India’s northeast looked to their primordial cultural assets to define and consolidate their boundaries. At present, changes in India’s northeast social formations are often gripped with issues of ethnicity and identity politics among tribal communities, as well as non-tribal communities. The consolidation of identities along the lines of tribe and community had already been incepted. The socio-cultural boundaries provide resources for ethnocultural mobilisation among some communities in India’s northeast, mainly due to the evolvement of identity politics and ethnic mobilisation. Post-independence India and New Delhi’s approach to the tribes of India’s northeast have radically altered from the time of the colonial administrators. The colonial policy of maintaining the status quo for forest settlers was replaced by development, modernisation and an integrationist ethos. This slogan of change coerced by New Delhi found many sceptics among the communities in India’s northeast. Rather than celebrations, there has been dissent with loud noises of protest against the bureaucrats and policy makers sitting in swanky offices in New Delhi. The post-independence period witnessed the acceleration of social change and the modernisation of various tribal groups in India’s northeast. Inserting a modern ethos toward a community never becomes modern and rational in a pure sense. Communities want development and progress by blood, and do not welcome the individualist and profit motive underpinnings of modernity at all. The integrationist policy of inserting a modern ethos on tribal communities fails on many counts. Many communities have shown varying degrees of strain in accepting and adjusting to the demands of integration, which often has an assimilation overtone.

Amidst Violence, Conflicts and Signs of Transition Ethnic self-consciousness and consolidation along the lines of tribes, community and language groups have become increasingly manifest in recent years across the entire region of India’s northeast. Vilifying others and outsiders, terminologies like “us” and “they” circulate among its communities. This comic perception of who constitutes the “insiders” and

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who are “outsiders” enhanced the gaze for blood and belonging, claims for resources, land, jobs, assets and deprivations of habitations. Regionalism along social and ethnic lines has been the dominant marker of postindependence social change. The emergence of non-tribal culture among the tribal social formation has diluted the traditional tribal way of life in India’s northeast. Communities often demand specified territories as politico-administrative units, which have recently multiplied. The platform for the smooth integration of tribals and non-tribals, of various language groups, of locals and immigrants and of various religious communities, appears to be dissented. The consolidation of the ethnic upsurge in India’s northeast can be foreseen as a strategy of adaptation of the indigenous inhabitants in contemporary times. Peace remains rarer and rarer in the present scenario, and discontent can be heard among the various communities. Unsettled conditions and the cry for progress are entangled in the whole political decision-making process. Post-independence history showcases social unrest and mass stirrings in India’s northeast.

Less Appreciation and More Sadness on Change in India’s northeast An expert committee called Transforming the Northeast, commissioned by the Government of India (1997), point out: “There are four deficits that confront the Northeast: a basic needs deficit; an infrastructural deficit; a resource deficit, and, most important, a two-way deficit of understanding with the rest of the country which compounds the others.” Transforming India’s northeast confronts senses of isolation, negligence, backlogs, gaps in basic minimum services and poor infrastructure, producing a vicious circle of economic stagnation and unemployment, which in turn leads to militancy and hampering investment. Examining social change in India’s northeastern communities opens up new trends and perspectives. Ugly debates on the nature of social change in India’s northeast are often the talking point in many seminars and conferences. Less appreciation simply describes the theoretical framework for theorizing social change. It is less appreciative simply because communities in India’s northeast often complain that communal ties and the sense of family have been hijacked by the outsiders in the name of progress. For India’s northeast, progress and development does not mean

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better lives and progress. The scenario at present is contrary to progress— class distinctions are more acute, the poverty rate is rising, farmland shortages are predominant, and winners are less predominant in the communities of India’s northeast. There are many woes, and people rarely have cause to celebrate. Social change in India’s Northeast is a force to reckon with, and an epistemological engagement worth documenting. Ferdinand Tonnies’s (1887; 1957) conceptual dichotomy of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft captures the images of change among communities in India’s northeast, where customary social ties, social interactions, roles, values and beliefs are transforming into indirect interactions, impersonal roles, formal values and beliefs. The catalyst for such transformations from community towards state often remains absent. Traditionally, individuals in the community-based society of India’s northeast were regulated by common mores and beliefs. Close and strong personal relationships, strong families and relatively simple social institutions have been diluted on many grounds due to Gesellschaft elements that have sprung up rapidly during post-independence India. In earlier times, India’s northeast societies denied indirect social control due to their direct sense of loyalty whereby an individual revered the village chief. Communities started forming associations granted by the Indian Societies Registration Act of 1860, enacted during the colonial rule in India. Associations divide the community into a variety of interest groups, taking precedence over the individual's self-interest that lacks a level of shared mores. These associations are often led by elites for progress or selfinterest. Elements of both Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft interplay in dayto-day life among the communities of India’s northeast. India’s Northeast is also a part of Zomia (Scott 2009). Zomia represents the largest remaining region of the world where people resist being fully incorporated as a nation state. India’s northeast communities were selfgoverning peoples a few hundred years ago. Today, they form the other Indian with a different culture, religion and lifestyle. The fact is that communities in India’s northeast felt that they were being ruled not by their own laws, but by imposed laws from colonial to post-independence times. The Indian state’s projection as a perfect state is often confronted by India’s northeast because these communities’ knowledge of the federal and sovereign state exists beyond their mentalities. The term “state” is difficult to digest in the forest and hill habitations of India’s northeast.

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Hill peoples are best understood as runaway, fugitive, maroon communities who have, over the course of two millennia, been fleeing the oppressions of state-making projects in the valleys—slavery, conscription, taxes, corvee labor, epidemics, and warfare. Virtually everything about these people’s livelihoods, social organisation, ideologies, and (more controversially) even their largely oral cultures, can be read as strategic positioning designed to keep the state at arm’s length. Their physical dispersion in rugged terrain, their mobility, their cropping practices, their kinship structure, their pliable ethnic identities, and their devotion to prophetic, millenarian leaders effectively serve to avoid incorporation into states and to prevent states from springing up among them. (Scott 2009, ix–x)

II Disseminating the Edited Volume Despite tragedies, conflicts, policy paralysis, ethnic homelands, corruption by elites and resistance to state-making projects, this volume hopes to shed some light and fresh perspectives on India’s northeast by measuring the nature of change in some of its not-so-well-known communities. Social changes in these communities represent turning points in the life of a society, passing from one kind of articulation to another. The chapters in this volume are written by a group of young scholars examining the communities they live and grew up in, viewed in both sceptical and progressive ways. The first chapter, “Impact of the Developmental Plan on the Perception of Social and Cultural Change in Mizoram” by Zokaitluangi, analyses the negative aspects of development based on sampling research. She attempts to delineate the psychological impact of society due to a one-sided understanding of development. Policy makers acknowledge and implement developmental plans as powerful tools of social change. There is a growing awareness among social scientists on the importance of psychology to foster development programmes and for the successful implementation regarding individual behaviour, further to development at the national level. Any developmental plan is designed to change an individual’s behavioural variables (Berry 1980) involving their creative cultures, such as his attitude, motivation or cognitive variables, and the level of analysis tends to be socio-psychological (Kelman & Warwick 1973). The authenticated impact of a developmental plan can be excavated from the perceived social and cultural change of the people for whom the

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plan was designed and implemented, and the same would manifest whether the developmental plan was a success or a failure. One hundred and eighty female subjects were sampled on the basis of a multi-stage sampling procedure, with respondents (thirty in each) for the six groups representing three levels of regional “development” (low, moderate and high) and two types of “beneficiary” (non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries of the development programme) on selected variables. This chapter incorporates an open-ended schedule to illustrate the perceptual domain of people regarding perceptions about socio-cultural change. The results reveal the differential patterns with regards to the two main variables of “development” and “beneficiary” on the perceived sociocultural change of the population studied. The results clearly represent the importance of psychology in understanding the human mental faculty for designing a developmental plan and its successful implementation, as it remains at the centre of the development discourse. The second chapter, “Shifting Marriage Practices—The Magar Community of Sikkim” by Amit Manger, examines the changing forms of the traditional ways of life of the Magar community in Sikkim. Sikkim is a multi-ethnic society, and the three main ethnic communities are Lepchas, Bhutias and Nepalis. The Nepali community is further sub-divided into diverse groupings such as the Magar, which has unique socio-cultural practices, the most interesting of which is the cross-cousin marriage practice. However, this system is fading away in contemporary Magar society due to various factors like health and education. The chapter captures the changing mindset of the Magar community, why it evolves and its impact on marriage practices in contemporary Magar society. In this context, an attempt is made to reflect on the process of social and cultural transformation taking place. This chapter also highlights the socio-historical changes occurring in the Magar community due to the process of modernisation. The third chapter, “Institutional Changes in the Toto Community—A Discourse on Tradition and Modernity” by Anil Kumar Biswas and Mrinal Kanti Basak, examines change in the Toto tribes of West Bengal, which have the smallest demography in this region with a total number of 1,066. The Toto belong to the Mongoloid stock. They are of medium height with sturdy bodies and brown skin. They have straight hair, with scanty beards and moustaches. Their eye-folds are epicanthic like the Mongoloids. The

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existence of the Toto tribe was first documented by Babu Kishen Kanta Bose (a British Government employee) of Rangpur in 1815. He noticed them in a village called Lukepur under the Falakata tahasil of western Duars and the Totopara village in Jalpaiguri district. Toto habitations were also traced by D. Sunder in his survey and settlement operation in 1895. The government’s attention was first drawn in 1955 by Roy Burman. He resided in and documented the border village of Totopara on the northern frontier of Bengal. Before this period, the government did not intervene in the affairs of the Toto, and Toto tribes were not recognised as Scheduled Tribes in the first Indian Constitution Order of 1950. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes lists modification order of 1956 recognized the Toto as Scheduled Tribes. Due to this status, the Toto undoubtedly qualified for receiving special assistance from the government. Due to the unmindful categorisation, the census reports did not upgrade the demographic figure of Toto in 1961. During the sub-plan planning for tribal areas, the Government of India stressed the need for taking special care for the “Primitive and Isolated Tribal Groups.” As per the definition of the Delhi Workshop, Birhors were identified as a “primitive Tribe” and the Toto were identified as an “Isolated Tribe” in West Bengal. The fourth chapter, “Zu and the Mizos—Change and Continuity” by Grace Lalhlupuii Sailo and Henry Zodinliana Pachuau, delineates the changing forms of brewing and consumption of Zu (rice beer) in the Mizo society, a traditional phenomenon in its society and culture. However, the brewing of Zu for commercial purposes was not known of or recorded, and the abuse of Zu and any person misbehaving due to drunkenness were not considered taboo. Due to the spread of Christianity in Mizo society since 1894, however, the consumption of Zu became taboo and was eventually prohibited by the Church. Despite restrictions, the drinking of Zu continues. Zu was once a traditional beverage with social values, but has become an important commodity with a market value in recent times. The volume of illegal Zu has also increased to a large extent. Along with it, social problems such as alcoholism, crime, family breakdowns and violence within and outside families have become more evident. The illegal brewing of Zu is now a public concern. The MLTP (Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition) Act of 1995 was enacted for the total prohibition of import, transport, manufacture, possession, sale and consumption of liquor in Mizoram.

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The government as well as civil societies failed to define the banning of illegal Zu brewing, and the demand for Zu is persistent. Families involved in the brewing and selling of liquor have little voice and are subjected to police as well as social atrocities. Their trade is a vicious circle primarily the result of poverty. There is an imperative need to understand the issues associated with Zu in Mizoram, and this chapter highlights the perceptions of consumers using in-depth interview, focus group discussion and participatory techniques. The lived experiences of families engaged in the brewing and selling of illicit liquor are also highlighted in case studies. The fifth chapter, “Aspects of Social and Cultural Changes—Mizo Society and Colonial Rule” by S. Haukhanlian Mate and Vanrammawii, measures the dilution of traditional values of the Mizo society. The British occupation followed by the introduction of Christianity in the Lushai Hills brought social transformation in Mizo society in many ways. As a result, some indigenous social practices were abolished. Some of the existing social customs and practices have been modified and some new patterns introduced to the Mizo society. The authors refer to this transformation as a process called “introduction, abolition and modification.” This chapter recounts social and cultural changes among the Mizos due to the introduction of Christianity and Western education, presenting an in-depth analysis of Mizo society regarding marriage and divorce, the status of women, customs connected with birth rites, death rites, burial and superstitions. The sixth chapter, “Ideas, Institutions and Social Change in Sikkim” by P. Newton, locates the ideas which inform institutional change in Sikkim. Sikkim was once a theocratic state with institutions like a monarchy, feudalism and Lamaism in full swing. However, Sikkim underwent change when new ideas of liberal democracy with principles of liberty, equality and citizenship started penetrating it during the 1960s and 1970s. There were forms of resistance from the traditional institutions, most importantly from the monarchy, but the new wave of democracy became too strong and ultimately the old institutions collapsed and gave way to the introduction of new kinds of institutions. The chapter delineates the process of resistance and reconciliation between the old and new institutions and how this process shapes the modern Sikkimese society and polity. The seventh chapter, “Social Change and Women in Assam” by Nazmul Hussain Laskar, claims that social change is evident based on new

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instances, continuity of time and new events. Identifying significant change involves alterations in the underlying structure of an object or situation over time. For instance, the lives of people alter as a result of changes in the economy, urbanisation, communications and technology in general. Materialistic factors like economic production and technology and idealistic factors like values, beliefs and ideologies play a great role in bringing change to the society. The chapter explains social change in the context of women by examining social structures that address inequality. This chapter explains how social change affects women’s lives and how women are also agencies of social change. The chapter examines the processes and structures that demand the role of women, especially women’s agency in bringing social transformation to Lower Assam. The eighth chapter, “Interrogating Social Change—Cinematic Representation of Hybrid Identity Formations” by Rukmini Kakoty, is an analysis of hybrid identities due to social transformations, viewing cinema and emerging literatures as an agency that helps in the formulation of hybrid identities. In this new age of immense blending and intermixing of cultures and languages, the term hybridity has gained new importance. However, the true sense of the term cannot be restricted to the mixing of elements only, being interpreted in different lights, which is why the term may sometimes remain ambiguous. Globalisation allows people to move to different countries, and diasporic communities have been identified by scholars like Homi Bhabha (1994), Paul Gilroy (1993) and Stuart Hall (1992) as creating an opportune position for hybridity to work. Diasporic communities are unique communities placed between two or more societies, a position that is apt for cultural mixing and the creation of new forms of identities. These new identity formations are catalysts for changes in societal relations and structure. Homi Bhabha (1994) defined hybridity as a process of bringing “newness to the world.” This chapter looks at diasporic cinema depicting diasporic lives to study the changes in the diasporic identity formations. Apart from commercial cinema, there has been a growth of a new kind of cinema by diasporic and “exiled” filmmakers that Hamid Naficy (2001) calls “accented cinema,” which depicts transformations in diasporic communities. This chapter explains the social and cultural dimensions of new identity formations and how hybridity works upon diasporic communities placed between cultures and societies.

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It also attempts to link hybridity and diaspora through cinema depicting the Indian diaspora. Two movies, Mississippi Masala (1992) and Bhaji on the Beach (1993), are cases in point. Mississippi Masala, directed by Mira Nair, is the story of an Indian family settled in America after being expelled from Uganda in the 1970s. Bhaji on the Beach, directed by Gurinder Chadha, is about a group of Indian diasporic women who take a day trip to the United Kingdom. Both Gurinder Chadha and Mira Nair are diasporic filmmakers of Indian origin. Through these two movies, this chapter examines the transformation of ideas and belief systems in the younger generation of diasporic individuals and the differences with their migrant parents. The ninth chapter, “Migration and Social Change in Sikkim” by Sunil Pradhan, explains two waves of migration affecting the social and cultural transformation of space and place in Sikkim. The first wave of migration occurred due to the flight of Tibeto Sikkmese (Bhutias) from Tibet. Enmity between two schools of Buddhist thought led to the migration of Bhutias from Tibet, subsequently taking refuge in Sikkim and altering the Lepcha way of life. The Bhutias were able in due course to consecrate Phuntshok Namgyal as the first ruler of Sikkim during the mid-fifteenth century. Sikkim’s cultural and social realties were in sync with the statemanaged theocracy prior to statehood. The second wave of migration occurred due to Gurkhas seeking refuge in Sikkim. The British presence in the Indian subcontinent and the Gurkha expansion paved the way for a second wave of migration from Nepal to Sikkim. The industrious Newars from Kathmandu valley and the British Resident Commissioner in Gangtok brought in the Nepalese to work in plantations and mines. The settlement brought major transformations to Sikkim’s cultural and social spaces by accommodating the new culture brought in with the migration. The Sikkimese identity as portrayed reflected the synthesis of varieties of cultural identities. The chapter discusses the social change of Sikkimese society by looking at the waves of migration and the interaction of different cultures that ultimately produced the present-day Sikkimese society. The tenth chapter, “The Social and Cultural Transformation of the Damai Community—A Study of Sikkim Society” by Ridhima Sundas, explains the shrinking musical caste groups known as Damai. Social and cultural transformation also entails the development and woes for the society. Change is an outcome of internal forces (within a community, such as customs and values) and external forces (outside forces such as the

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processes of modernisation and urbanisation). These forces work together in bringing transformations to the socio-cultural practices of the Damai community. Transformations in the Damai are not always smooth and involve a complex process because diverse unintended forces (inclusion and exclusion) play a determining role in forecasting the changes among them. The Damai community faced various kinds of prejudice, humiliation and stigmatisation and had not been allocated a position of pride in Hindu society. The Damai still live in separate settlements, perform socially defiling tasks and suffer from numerous types of physical atrocities. The community’s position in Sikkim has remained distinct from other scheduled castes of the country. This chapter focuses on the history of the Damai community. Despite its inferior status, it pursues education and aims for higher positions in various fields to achieve vertical mobility. The chapter intends to capture the nature and direction of this transformation by analyzing the socio-economic profile of the Damai community. The eleventh chapter, “Rituals, Beliefs and the Traditional Occupation of Brewing Liquor in Chakpa Andro, Manipur” by Puthem Jugeshor Singh, explains the diluting forms of the traditional occupation of brewing and its necessities in cultural matters and ritual practices of the Chakpa Andro community of Manipur. The Chakpa Andro belongs to the Scheduled Caste community in the Imphal East district of Manipur. The community traditionally pursued occupations of brewing liquor and this is a significant cultural practice. Brewing liquor by Chakpa Andro communities is socially and culturally accepted. Liquor is indispensable in the cultural practices and rituals of Chakpa Andro and is connected to events such as births, marriages and deaths other social functions. This occupation also generates income alongside agriculture. Chakpa Andro women played a substantial role in brewing liquor, and brewing remains in the sociocultural fabric of the community. In earlier times, brewing liquor defined its socio-economic and cultural practices. However, these traditional activities have been transformed due to legal reforms and trade perspectives. At present, there is transformation in the production of liquor. Market demands have expanded brewing liquors and the traditional ritual tag has often been sidelined. Rather, brewing liquor becomes market oriented and driven by illegal consumption. Such ethos have radically altered the picture of the socio-economic parameters of the Chakpa Andro community. Brewing liquor beyond legal measures has become a major

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source for livelihood. This chapter focuses on the rituals, customs and beliefs of the Chakpa Andro and their links with brewing liquor. The twelfth chapter, “Why English? A Historical Study from the Mizo Perspective” by Lalrinchhani, is a study of the language politics that exists in Mizoram as a result of the colonial influence. It traces the Mizos’s historical affinity for English and how their scorn for Hindi, the official language of India, has developed. This chapter argues that an adulation of the West due to the Mizo sentiment is against the Indian sentiment. This chapter renders the essence of the English language in Mizoram and the relevance of post-colonial literature and the Orientalist influence in measuring the gap between a Western language (English) and an Orientalist language (Hindi). The central argument in this chapter reveals the essence of marginals within the marginality. The last chapter, “Society and Women—An Analysis of Social Change in Lali by Biakliana” by Vanlalchami, delineates the status of the female Mizo character and its representation based on a short Story “Lali” written by Biakliana in 1936, translated into English from the vernacular by Dr Margaret. L. Pachuau. It was published in The Heart of The Matter (2004) by KATHA publications. It is a text in which the writer examines sensitivity and the plight of the Mizo Women and their marginal role. This chapter records and rewrites their daily routine through the story of the Mizo female protagonist Lali. The story highlights the unequal treatment of women in Mizo society and at the same time vividly records and depicts the Mizo society of the 1930s in the early years of conversion to Christianity. Through the story of Lali, the text highlights the change in religion, with the Mizo society embracing the Christian teachings. The text records the history of Mizo society undergoing transition from a preChristian tribal society to a post-Christian institutionalized society with all the confusion that this imposed on its individual members. This chapter also voices the need for the development of women’s status in Mizo society while recording a time in history that was one of the most important eras in it becoming what it is today.

References Baruah, Sanjib. 2005. Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of North-east India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. —. 2009. India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

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Baud, Michiel & Willem van Schendel. 1997. “Towards a Comparative History of Borderlands.” Journal of World History 82: 211–42. Berry, J. W. 1980. “Social and Cultural Change.” In Handbook of Crosscultural Psychology:Social Psychology, Vol. 5, edited by H. C. Triandis & R.W. Brislin. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. The Location of Culture. New York: Routledge. Chaube, S. K. 1975. “Interethnic Politics in Northeast India.” International Review of Modern Sociology 5 (2): 193–200. Cline, Lawrence E. 2006. “The Insurgency Environment in Northeast India: Small Wars and Insurgencies.” British Journal of Political Science 192: 191–210. Furer-Haimendorf, Christoph Von. 1945. "Aboriginal Rebellions in Deccan." Man in India 25 (4): 208–17. Gilroy, Paul. 1993. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. London: Verso. Government of India. 1997. Transforming the Northeast: Tackling Backlogs in Basic Minimum Services and Infrastructural Needs High Level Commission Report to the Prime Minister. New Delhi: Government of India, Planning Commission. Hall, Stuart & Paul Du Gay. 1996. Questions of Cultural Identity. London: Sage Publications. Hazarika, Sanjay. 1994. Strangers in the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s North East New Delhi: Viking. Hazarika, Sanjay. 2003. “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society in the Northeast.” The Little Magazine 3: 5–6. Kelman, H. C. & D. P. Warwick. 1973. “The Ethics of Social Intervention, Goals, Means, and Consequences.” In The Ethics of social intervention, edited by G. Bermant & D. P. Warwick, 3–33. Washington DC: Wiley. Khongreiwo, Rammathot. 2009. “Understanding the Histories of Peoples on the Margins: A Critique of "Northeast India's Durable Disorder.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 34 (4): 437–54. Lacina, Bethany. 2009. “The Problem of Political Stability in Northeast India: Local Ethnic Autocracy and the Rule of Law.” Asian Survey 49 (6): 998–1020. Miri, Mrinal. 2002. “Northeast: A Point of View.” Public lecture. www.manipuronline.com/Features/May2002/Northeast14_2.htm. Naficy, Hamid. 2001. An Accented Cinema: Exilic and Diasporic Filmmaking. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

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Oinam, Bhagat. 2003. “Patterns of Ethnic Conflict in the North-east.” Economic and Political Weekly 3821: 2031–37. Rao, V. Venkat. 1979. “Politics of Tension in Northeast India: Antecedents.” Indian Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 592–617. Robb, Peter. 1997. “The Colonial State and Constructions of Indian Identity: An Example on the Northeast Frontier in the 1880s." Modern Asian Studies 312: 245–83. Sarma, Atul. 2005. “Why do the North-eastern States Continue to Decelerate?” Man and Society: A Journal of Northeast States 11: 1–18. Scott, James C. 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. Tonnies, Ferdinand. 1887. Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Translated by Charles Price Loomis as Community and Society. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. Weiner, Myron. 1978. Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. 

IMPACT OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL PLAN ON THE PERCEPTION OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE IN MIZORAM ZOKAITLUANGI

One of the largest research traditions in social science is perhaps the study of socio-cultural change and development. There is an increasing awareness among social scientists that the present economic and institutional levels of analyses are insufficient for dealing with the phenomenon of social and cultural change. It is true that intervention in designing social change can only be brought about by the joint efforts of social scientists and policy makers. However, this is only possible when social scientists with their own disciplines understand the impact of social change and the relationship between antecedents and consequents. Berry (1980) reviewed cross-cultural studies on social change and pointed out that psychological studies must discover the locus, sources, directions, dynamics and sequence of socio-cultural change and development. Since psychology is concerned with the individual level of change, the locus of social change involves attitudinal, motivational and cognitive variables. The sources of change can be conceptualised as external or internal, and psychologists are largely concerned with the internal sources of social change. Given the strong theoretical and research ties in cross-cultural psychology, there are two paradigms for researches: (i) Acculturation, which is the process of one culture dominating another, resulting in a two-way flow of change; (ii) Development, which implies the deliberate change of culture in one particular direction (Berry 1980). Acculturation is a process that takes place in every society when some group is dominant and others are subordinate (less privileged). When one dominant cultural group interacts with another culture, the direction of change is generally set by the dominant one. The antecedents to change

2

Perception of Social and Cultural Change in Mizoram

are: attitudes and beliefs (Inkeles 1977), achievement orientation (McClelland 1961), authoritarian variables (Hagen 1962), social adjustment (Nguyen & Benet-Martínez 2013), operant condition (Guthrie 1970), personality (Wallace 1968), value differences (Kagitcibasi 1997), health and well-being (Penne 1995), indigenous beliefs (Jahoda 1961), depression (Su et al. 2013), work ethic (Weber 1905), and the “culture and personality” of “value orientation” (Mead 1967). These provide empirical bases on the differences with regard to the psychological characteristics within and between cultures, and describe these processes as the crucial factors that determine the strength of behaviour of people across cultures for development. The directions of change appeared in the available empirical literatures as: (i) the direction of becoming “modern” in the usual sense of modernisation of world culture; (ii) the direction of a “traditional lifestyle” where there is a reaffirmation of characteristic values; and (iii) some novel lifestyle on a dimension of the “traditional-modern” axis (Berry 1980). The development paradigm is where deliberately planned social change in a society is attempted. In a developing country, a variety of government agents are engaging in promoting development to pursue people to accept and adapt their ways of doing things, which are regarded as more appropriate to emerging changes in the world around them, and which are different from what they have known. Yet, these innovations are not accepted among the projected population. The net outcome of the development plan tends to fall far behind the goal set for them. Social scientists reconsidered the place of traditional values in the developmental plan as a necessity for endogenous development, as development is centred on men. The idea of the man as the centre of development, along with his abilities, creative faculties and sociocultural factors, are now recognized as the determining factors (antecedents) and ultimate results (consequences) of development. The assertion of cultural identity for integrity and dignity is fundamental to any development on meeting the true needs and aspirations of peoples to ensure genuine fulfilment. The awareness forms the basis to demonstrate a theoretical conceptualisation and the associated psychological problems of social and cultural change at the individual level. At the individual level, two psychological variables are implicated: external (behaviour and belief brought in by educator, missionaries,

Zokaitluangi

3

traders, colonial officials) and internal (psychological features, attitudes, values, cognition, personality) antecedents. Triandis (1972) has made a distinction between objective (e.g. roads, factories) and subjective culture (e.g. people’s cognition and behaviour associated with those objectives in the form of values). His explanation of subjective culture explains differences in belief systems, attitude structures, stereotypes, norms, roles, ideologies, values and task definitions. Triandis and Brislin (1984) also emphasised the impact of a cultural meaning system rather than the objective culture in understanding cross-cultural differences. This presumption is part of what has been called emic-etic distinction (Pike 1966). An “etic” approach describes social phenomena in universal terms, using elements that can be generalized across cultures, while the “emic” approach is concerned with cultural specific aspects of the concept, such as attitude differences across the culture (Scheafer 2013). Triandis and Brislin (1984) mention that findings may have universal elements but one should not conclude that they are universal until they have been obtained in more than one setting and with diverse populations; the same is supported by Van De Vijuer and Poortinga (1982). The economic and technological growth occurs only gradually with technological advances (Hagen 1962), but this is not sufficient for social and cultural change. Other elements, such as material resources as well as the social and psychological factors, must also be present and must be structured in certain ways. Thus, the key to growth “seems to be largely internal rather than external” (Hagen 1962), and the central feature lies in the concept of “traditionalism” where “behaviour is governed by customs not law.” At the traditional stage of world history, economic productivity was low. The present study incorporates attitudinal and value patterns and perception of people within the framework of development paradigms of social and cultural change. Inkeles and Smith (1974) focus on the development of the modern idea as a prerequisite to economic growth from psychological modernity which involves norms, values, beliefs and worldview. Inkeles and Smith distinguished seven basic characteristics of the modern individual: (i) openness to new experience with people and ways of doing things; (ii) increasing independence from traditional authority figures and a shift in allegiances to government, trade unions, and the like; (iii) belief in the efficacy of science and medicine, coupled with (iv) reduction in fatalism, (v) ambition for achievement of

4

Perception of Social and Cultural Change in Mizoram

occupational or educational goals for oneself or one’s children, (vi) increased interest and activity in political and civic affairs, and (vii) striving to keep up with new international or national significance. Recent research on migration (Scott & Scott 1989) has shown that many choices of lactatio adaptation are made on the basis of the imperfect knowledge of one’s own desires and needs. Given the theoretical and methodological ties of economic, political, sociological, anthropological and psychological approaches to sociocultural change and development, this chapter aims to elucidate the independent and interaction effects of the levels of regional “development” (low, moderate and high), and “beneficiary” (nonbeneficiary and beneficiary of development programmes) variables based on a set of behavioural measures. The motive for this chapter is to decipher the perception of Mizoram society on socio-cultural change and development. To achieve the objective, leads were taken from the changing social systems, practices and quantitative index of development (Zokaitluangi and Singh 1993). This chapter aims to answer questions such as: (i) how far the development efforts are related to psychological change at the individual level, (ii) whether the beneficiaries of development programmes possess more psychological characteristics as compared to those who do not opt for such programmes, and (iii) to what extent the development programmes are successful in achieving (inducing) change at individual levels.

Hypotheses In light of the literature it was expected that: (i) Subjects of differentially developed regions (low, moderate and high) would experience different perceived socio-cultural change and development depending on levels of regional development. (ii) Beneficiaries were expected to possess perceived socio-cultural change and development as compared to non-beneficiaries. The expectations on measures of the dependent variables were exploratory in nature.

Sample The subjects were sampled on the basis of a multi-stage sampling procedure. The first phase consisted of the development of a quantitative

Zokaitluangi

5

index on development, based on the Census Report (2011), to distinguish the levels of regional development on three districts of Mizoram as low, moderate and high. The analysis of the results revealed the highest level of regional development for Aizawl followed by Lunglei, and the least for the Chhimtuipui district of Mizoram. The second phase of sampling consists of the location of blocks from the three districts, concerning the villages wherein various development programmes have been and are being implemented for the development of beneficiaries in the desired direction. At this stage, four blocks from the three districts were prepared with the consideration of a number of extraneous variables (through all sources) to obtain well-matched samples for study. The third phase of sampling consisted of the selection of 180 respondents (30 in each) for the 6 groups (3 development x 2 beneficiaries) for the conduct of the study. This was done by following a random sampling procedure from the respective lists of respondents prepared during the second phase of sampling, which were matched in terms of extraneous variables to obtain truly representative samples for study. Only female respondents were included in the study as females are observed to be cooperative and industrious, taking part in all spheres of life from the kitchen to the Jhum land (farmland), and most of the development programmes have been sanctioned in the name of females by the financing and organizing agencies. Embedded within this perspective was the analogue that females are the roots of social heritage, which is instrumental in the observance of the traditional socio-cultural systems and practices, and above all as the primary agent of socialisation.

Design of the Study This chapter aims at a two-way classification of variables to elucidate the independent and interaction effects on the levels of regional “development” (low, moderate and high) and “beneficiary” (nonbeneficiary and beneficiary of development programmes) as dependent variables. The inclusion of 30 respondents under each of the 6 groups of the design (3 development x 2 beneficiary), with 30 replications under each, represents a substantial sample size for inferential analysis.

6

Perception of Social and Cultural Change in Mizoram

Test Materials and Perception of Development The construction of the perception of socio-cultural change experienced by respondents in Mizoram consists of the item selection relevant to socially relevant (and pertinent) concepts for assessing differences in experiencing change. For this purpose, the respondents were individually initiated for discussion pertaining to the perceived prospects and problems of development, and their responses on various dimensions were recorded (and noted by the researcher), subsequently being content analysed by well-trained observers. The three major areas, with four subscales in each area, were prepared and arranged in a seven-point scale. Half were randomly reversed to counteract the response biases of subjects and to ensure that subjects cannot go down the list and check all the scales at the same point. The scores of one individual can be analysed as well as the data for groups of individuals (Kerlinger 1983). For scoring and analysis purposes, the numerical system (1–7) for each of the sub-scales measuring any of the factors was used (Begum 1992), which was based on the pilot study of the population. The test material includes three major areas of social and cultural change experienced in Mizoram: (i) Changes experienced (desire for luxury, better communication, increase of corruption, more interaction with other cultures); (ii) Unfavourable changes experienced (aiming for luxurious lifestyles, no respect for elders, corruption, more settlement of non-Mizos inside Mizoram); and (iii) favourable changes experienced (better education, better communication, stable government, more modern technology).

Results and Discussion Subject-wise indices of the perceptions of people regarding development for the 6 groups (3 development x 2 beneficiaries) were prepared with regard to the pertinent issues of social importance on perceived development. The content analysis began with an analysis of intercoder reliability. The overall observations of the content analysis made by welltrained observers (showing the inter-rater reliability coefficients between the ranges of 0.65–0.72) revealed a number of issues. However, the topranking three pertaining to the perceived social and cultural change experienced by the subjects with four sub-scales, each with relevance to the “development” and “beneficiary” independent variables, were put together in Table 1.1 below.

Zokaitluangi 7

Factor s

55 71 81 71 94 81 86 91 74 89 74

55 51 97 57 63 92 89 100 64 66 95 101

Desire for luxury

Better communication. Increase of corruption Interaction with other cultures Luxurious lifestyle No respect for elders Corruption More settlement of nonMizos inside Mizoram Better Education Better communication Stable government More modern technology

71

Low (Mean)

Sub-factors Moderate (Mean)

106 97 103 52

72

100 85 72

103

73 51

95

High(Mea n)

Levels of development

10.41** 6.98* 10.30** 15.92**

4.56*

9.74** .78 4.56*

13.18**

11.19** 14.58**

11.00**

X2

141 102 130 128

148

97 145 133

139

90 92

98

Non Beneficiary (Mean)

120 125 157 99

112

137 126 102

102

125 127

123

Beneficiar y(Mean)

Beneficiary

1.48 4.59* 2.54 3.70

4.48*

6.81** 1.33 4.08

5.68*

5.69* 3.54

2.83

X2

Table 1.1. Mean scores of the different groups on subscales of the perceived social and cultural changes experienced by the whole sample

Changes experienced

Favourable Unfavourable changes changes

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Perception of Social and Cultural Change in Mizoram

The results revealed the mean score differences on dependent variables among different levels of development. The analyses on the mean scores of development from their experience showed the following significant differences: (i) In changes experienced, the highly developed region scores highest, followed by the moderate and low developed region, on “desire for luxury,” “better communication” and “more interaction with other culture,” but the reverse trend was found on “increase of corruption”; (ii) On unfavourable changes experienced, the highly developed region scores highest, followed by the moderate and low developed region, on “no respect to elders,” “corruption” and “more settlement of non-Mizos inside Mizoram,” except on “aiming for a luxurious lifestyle”; and (iii) In the favourable changes experienced, the highly developed region scores highest, followed by the moderate and low developed region, on “better Education,” “better communication” and “stable government.” The reverse was found for “more modern technology.” On a mean score comparison between levels of beneficiary on developmental plan: (i) changes experienced—the highly developed region scores highest, followed by the moderate and low developed region, on “better communication,” but there are reverse scores on “more interaction with other cultures”; (ii) unfavourable changes experienced— the highly developed region scores highest, followed by the moderate and low developed region, on “no respect to elders” and “aiming for a luxurious lifestyle,”; and (3) favourable changes experienced—the highly developed region scores highest, followed by the moderate and low developed region on “better communication.” The overall results showed that differences in socio-cultural change experienced among different levels of “development” and “beneficiary” were assumed to be motivated by developmental programs as evinced by a series of studies in the Indian context (Sinha 1984; Muthayya 1980, 1982; 1988; Muthayya et al. 1983, 1984; Alexander 1983). The findings echo earlier researches, which say that there is differential pattern of motivation and aspiration between the villages from developed and undeveloped villages. Villagers from the developed region were individualistic and egocentric, unconcerned about the problems of the village, community or nation (Sinha 1984); the economic motivation was higher in the privileged group and this group expressed radical and scientific values (Lal et al. 1982), attitudinal and value differences (Inkeles 1977), and value difference (Kagitcibasi 1997) across cultures with different directions of change (Berry 1980).

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The present study clearly highlights the expected psychological differences in the order of levels of development and beneficiaries of development programmes, suggesting the psychological importance of a genuine assessment of needs and the appropriate design of development based on the internal needs of the targeted population (Hagan 1962). Dawson (1967) rightly says that traditional concepts must be drawn from the cultural life of the group involved, and should sample widely from the culture of the people, with the knowledge of emic-etic cultural distinction (Pike 1966), especially the attitudinal differences across the culture (Schiefer 2013), and that one way for one culture may not be appropriate for another (Van De Vijuer & Poortinga 1982).

References Alexander, K. C. 1983. Social Conditions of Weaker Sections: A Study in Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh. Hyderabad: National Institute of Rural Development. Al-haj, M. 1988. “The Changing Arab Kinship Structure: The Effect of Modernisation in an Urban Community.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 36: 237–58. Bardo, J. W. & V. Dokmeci. 1992. “Modernisation, Traditionalism and the Changing Structure of Community Satisfaction in Two Subcommunities in Istanbul, Turkey A Procrustean Analysis.” Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monograph 1183: 271–92. Berry, J. W. 1980. “Social and Cultural Change.” In Handbook of Crosscultural Psychology Social Psychology, Vol. 5, edited by H. C. Triandis and R. W. Brislin. Boston and Toronto: Allyn and Bacon, Inc. Begum, H. A. 1992. Women’s Work: A Study on attitude towards Women’s Livelihood Activities in Bangladesh. New Delhi: Sterling Publication. Government of Mizoram. 2011. Statistical Handbook of Mizoram. Muka Printing Press, Aizawl. Guthrie, G. 1970. The Psychology of Modernisation in the Rural Phillipines. Quezon City: Atenco de Manila University Press. Hagen, E. 1962. On the Theory of Social Change. Homewood: III Dorsey Press. van Hemert, D. A., F. J. R. Van de Vijver, Y. H. Poortinga & J. Georgas. 2002. “Structural and Functional Equivalence of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire within and Between Countries.” Personality and Individual Differences 33: 1229–49.

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Hofstede, G. 1980. Culture’s Consequences International Differences in Work—Related Values. Beverly Hills: Sage. Inkeles, A. 1977. “Understanding & Misunderstanding Individual Modernity.” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 8: 135–76. Inkeles, A & D. Smith. 1974. Becoming Modern Individual Change in Six Developing Countries. Cambridge: MA Harvard University Press. Jahoda, G. 1961. “Aspects of Westernisation.” British Journal of Sociology 12: 375–86. Kagitcibasi, C. 1997. “Individualism and Collectivism.” In Handbook of Cross-cultural Psychology vol. 3, edited by J. F. Berry, M . H. Segall, and C. Kagitcibasi, 1–49. London: Allyn & Bacon. Kelman, H. C. & D. P. Warwick. 1973. “The Ethics of Social Intervention, Goals, Means, and Consequences.” In The Ethics of Social Intervention, edited by G. Bermant and D. P. Warwick, 3–33. Washington: DC Wiley. Kerlinger, F. N. 1983. “Foundations of Behavioural Research.” Delhi: Surjeet Publications. Lal, R., S. K. Singh & R. Sharma. 1982. “A Psychological Study of Privileged and Underprivileged Farmers with Respect to Value Orientation, Economic Motivation and Risk Preference.” Research in Psychology 11: 53–62. McCleary, R. M. & R. J. Barro. 2006. “Religion and Economy.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (2): 49–72. McClelland, D. C. 1961. The Achieving Society. New Jersey: Van Nostrand. Mead, M. 1967. Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples. Boston: Beacon. Muthayya, B. C. 1980. The Rural Disadvantaged: A Psycho-social Study in Karnataka. Hyderabad National Institute of Rural Development Mimeo. —. 1982. “The Rural Disadvantaged: A Psycho-social Study in Punjab and Madhya Pradesh.” Journal of Rural Development 12: 143–260. Muthayya, B. C. & L. P. Hemalatha. 1984. “Attitude to Repayment of Loans A Study in Five States.” Journal of Rural Development 32: 107–47. Muthayya, B. C., K. K. Naidu & N. Annesuddin. 1983. “Receptivity & Reaction to IRDP A Study in Three States.” Journal of Rural Development 26: 318–50. Nguyen, A. M. D. & V. Benet-Martínez. 2013. “Biculturalism and Adjustment A Meta-analysis.” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 44: 122–159.

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Penne Babu, J. W. 1995. Emotion, Disclosure and Health. Washington DC: APA. Pike, K. L. 1966. Language in Relation to a United Theory of the Structure of Human Behaviour. The Haque: Mauton. Scheafer, D. 2013. “Cultural Values and GDP Growth Related Attitude a Comparison of Individual With and Without Migration Background Across 24 Countries.” Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology 442: 245– 62. Scott, W & R Scott. 1989. Adaptation of Immigration: Individual Difference & Determinants. Sydney: Pergamon Press. Sinha, D. 1984. “Some Psychological Dimensions of Rural Development.” Journal of Social and Economic Studies 11: 8–14. Su, J. C., R. M. Lue & S. Oishi. 2013. “The Role of Cultural and Self Construal in the link between Expressive Suppression and Defensive Symptoms.” Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology 422: 316–31. Triandis,H.C.1972.TheAnalysisofSubjectiveCulture.NewYork:Wiley. Triandis, H. C. & R. W. Brislin. 1984. “Cross-cultural Psychology.” American Psychologist 39: 1006–16. van de Vijver, F. J. R. & Y. H. Poortinga. 1982. “Cross-cultural Generalisation and Universality.” Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology 13: 387–408. Wallace, A.C. 1968. Culture & Personality. New York: Random House. Weber, M. 1905. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism New York: Scribners. Zokaitluangi & L. N. Singh. 1993. “A Study on Achievement Cognition among Mizos.” Unpublished Data, Department of Psychology, NorthEastern Hill University, Mizoram Campus, Aizawl.

SHIFTING MARRIAGE PRACTICES— THE MAGAR COMMUNITY OF SIKKIM AMIT MANGER

Sikkim is a melting pot of various cultures, comprising scrumptious cuisine, lively people, a devoted religion, a jovial language and indigenous art and crafts. Magar is one of the ethnic groups of Sikkim with a unique culture and customs. Magars are autochthonous tribes of the central and lower parts of the mountains between Jingruk (Rapti of Gorakpur) and the Marsiangdi River of the Himalayas. Anthropologists and historians subscribe to the migration theory of the Himalayan hill tribes, and the Magar is no exception. Hermanns wrote: “Magars came from Bokim, a land behind Nepal somewhere in Tibet.” Chemjong opined that Magars came to Sikkim from “Shin” and settled, building jongs (forts or castles) and calling the place Magar jongs. Magars are also known as “Mang” or “Mong,” or Mongol people. The Chinese and Burmese people called them “Mang” or “Mong” for Mongolians, and “ar” or “arwn” means children (Subba 2006, 345–6). The Magar belong to the Heptal tribe who entered Nepal during 1100 AD (Vansittart 1993). According to Iman Singh Chemjong, two groups from the northern and southern parts of Nepal came and were divided into branches. Earlier, Magars lived mostly in the Gandaki region of western Nepal where a huge tract of land called Magarat was the kingdom of the Magar king. The Gorkha king of the Shah Dynasty conquered the kingdom of Magar. After this, Magars settled in large numbers in the region. Though there is no written historical record, there is some evidence to show that they came from central Asia in groups like the Gurungs (Gurung & Lama 2004, 269). Magars are also found in northeastern states of India like Sikkim, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, and in some parts of Bhutan.

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Historical Interpretation and Migrations of the Magars According to ancient history, the Huns and Heptals were chased away by the powerful Chinese rulers from central Asia and Mongolia. The descendants of Huns (i.e. Gurungs) and Heptals (Magars) were weak due to the internal differences amongst them. They ultimately reached the western parts of ancient Nepal and began a new life. The Magars brought cattle with them. The Gandaki region of ancient Nepal was covered with dense forest, and there was no human habitation. The Magar first started as nomadic people, and gradually settled and learned the art of cultivation (Ibid., 269–70). Sarat Chandra Das, in his diary A Journey to Lhasa, mentions that in the valley of the Kangwachen river there was a fort of the Magar king Santu Salisen. Tibetans had driven away the Magar from the region. The history of Sikkim mentions that during the eleventh century, Tibetans fought with Magars and Lepchas to take their villages near Soren and Barantar of Sikkim near the river Magarjung. In south Sikkim at Kitam there used to be a palace of the Magar king known as Gari Dara. Some years back, the ancient remains of cut stones and weapons were found in the Badamtam tea estate in Darjeeling. The Magars were one of the dominating and militant communities of Nepal who, along with the Chettries and Gurungs, were overthrown by the Newar dynasty of Nepal in 1769. The Magars were esteemed for their military prowess. According to Risley (1894), their original homeland was in western Nepal from where they migrated to eastern Nepal and finally to Sikkim. Hooker (1891) views them as aborigines of Sikkim who were driven westwards by the Lepchas. According to the 1921 census there were a total of 4,194 Magars in Sikkim. They lived mainly in south Sikkim but were also scattered in its eastern district. Magar villages are situated on the forest slopes with an average altitude of 4,000–6,000 feet above sea level. The Magars speak the Mangari dialect at home but communicate in Nepali with other groups, and use the Devanagari script (Gurung & Lama 2004, 11). The Magar community is divided into a number of exogamous and patrilineal thars with equal status. The origin of the thars cannot be traced. Regulating marriage alliances is the main function of the thars, which might have one or more gotras (lineages). Marriage alliances are made on

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the basis of these patrilineal ancestral gotras. Atrayee, Tali, Ram and Atrisha are some of the gotras found among the Magars. Gotras are instrumental at the time of rituals, especially during marriage and death, as the Brahman uses gotra terminologies during the time of ancestor worshiping after death (Singh 1993, 119). The Magar tribe is divided into seven clans: Ali, Bura, Burathoki, Gharti, Pun, Roka and Thapa. All have equal social status and inter-clan marriages are usual and normal (Hitchcock 1965, 207).

Marriage Marriage has been defined as a union between a man and a woman such that children born to the women are recognized as legitimate offspring of both parents. Marriage creates new social relationships and reciprocal rights between the spouses and kins, and establishes what the rights and statuses of the children will be when they are born. Every society recognizes procedures for creating such relationships and rights, and for making it known that they have been created (Mair 1972, 91). LeviStrauss (1969) views marriage as predominantly a process of exchange between one man and other men, or between one domestic group and others, and sees the positive aspects of marriage rules devices through which exchange is directly regulated, giving rise to what he calls an “elementary structure of kinship.” Most of the societies prohibit marriage with certain relatives. However, some societies compliment this prohibition by prescribing marriage with preferred cousins and relatives. Two kinds of cousin marriages are sometimes distinguished: between those who are children of siblings of the same sex (parallel cousin), which is prohibited, and between the children of siblings of the opposite sex (cross cousin), which is prescribed (Dumont 1983, 232). Parallel cousin marriage is the most preferred type among the Muslims, but the scope of this chapter does not take this into consideration. Theoretically, there are three types of rules in cross-cousin marriage: Bilateral, Matrilateral and Patrilateral. In Bilateral cross-cousin marriage, the spouses are the mother’s brother’s child and the father’s sister’s child. Two intermarrying groups exchange women as wives and thus constitute a self-sufficient unit. Levi-Strauss called such marriages “closed” or “restricted” exchanges, and correlated them with disharmonic transmission. In opposition to this type, Levi-Strauss stressed the different perspectives

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of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. In this type, a man marries his mother’s brother’s daughter, wherein line B takes wives from line A and gives wives to line C, generation after generation. Intermarriage is thus asymmetrical, and if society is conceived as a number of discrete groups giving and receiving women in marriage, the simplest system is that of a circle at the end of the series Z that receives from Y and gives to A (called the “Circulating Connubium” by Kulp [1921]). Levi-Strauss (1969) termed it “generalized exchange.” The matrilateral rule, under which a man may only marry his MBD (mother’s brother’s daughter) or a woman of his FSD (father’s sister’s daughter), shows the effect of bilateral rule. Synchronically, there is no direct sibling exchange, although it remains justifiable in terms of indirect sibling exchange if the marriage system remains closed. Diachronically, men of lineage B may acquire wives from lineage A in perpetuity, but may not reciprocate by giving their daughters in marriage to men of A. Conversely, they cannot receive daughters from the lineage to which they give daughters. There is nothing in the rule that would prevent lineage C from giving its daughters in perpetuity to lineage A, so that there remains a minimum number of descent groups needed to form the self-sufficient social unit to form a connubium. The rule contains the possibility of a circular system of marriage alliance through which the brides move in one direction only (Uberoi 1993, 275–6). The identity of the intermarrying group emerged from the network of relationships, for one group is not closely dependent on any other single group, or there exist two successive generations which are distinguishable. Relatives belonging to different generations within the same group of kin are terminologically equated. Intermarriage is directionally oriented to a group which gives its daughters, and as a result there is a probability of differences of status between wife-givers and wife-takers (Ibid., 234). The most preferred form of marriage is usually with the matrilateral crosscousin. The significance of this rule has been discussed with reference to two tribes of the highland region in the interior of Burma regarding the Kachins and the Puram. The rules are that a man must take his wife from his mother’s lineage; the bride need not actually be his first cousin. The effect is that every lineage must have a permanent relationship with two others, receiving wives from the one and giving wives to the other. People who actually marry in this way are the small lineage segment living close together, which Edmund Leach termed as local descent groups. It is

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possible that every group has a wife-giving relationship and a wife-taking relationship with a number of others. This division of an individual’s social universe signifies the range of persons with whom they are likely to be in contact in the course of their life. The potential affine is of two kinds: those whom they may marry and those whom their sisters and daughters may marry. It remains a way of giving coherence to the social relationships of a small-scale society. Wife-giving lineages are superior to wife-taking lineages in the establishment of principles by which any individual knows whether they can claim respect or must give respect. In Kachin society, lineage is ranked and wife-takers are the vassals of wifegivers (Mair 1972, 88). The rules of cross-cousin marriage are fascinating because they not only form the basis of a unique kind of social structure but also explain the theory of exogamy and other theories of marriage prohibition, although in practice people often marry distant cousins and perhaps should marry their first cousins on one side. It would be a heinous offence to marry a relative equally close or distant, showing that marriage prohibitions in general cannot be explained as an extension to the more distant kin of the prohibition of incest. Cross-cousin marriage is most commonly found in patrilineal societies.

Matrilateral cross-cousin marriage in other Communities Studies have shown that the cross-marriage practice is also prevalent among other communities. The practice of consanguineous marriage is linked to geography, tradition, local history and socio-economic status. Historical events and natural calamities may further lead to inbreeding. Nevertheless, the factors that perpetuate inbreeding include geographic isolation, religion, economy, social and cultural customs and ideology. For example, the inhabitants of Anikara are proud of their royal ancestry and do not want to mix with the descendants of neighbouring commoners. The inhabitants of Kurodani (Japan) do not want to marry with neighbouring villages to keep their technique of handmade papermaking secret. Other reasons for inbreeding are due to avoiding or reducing the flow of property beyond the family circle and to maintain kinship bonds. Consanguinity is also not restricted to Islamic and Hindu societies. On average, 20–40% of marriages in southern India are between close relatives, with uncle-niece and first cousin unions usually with the mother’s brother’s daughter. China represents a special problem because

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little or no information is available on consanguinity since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Before World War II, the marriage of first cousins with the mother’s brother’s daughter was quite common among the Han, who make up 90% of the total Chinese population (Fujiki et al. 1992, 864–5). Marriage rules that prevailed during the dynastic era of China’s history generally tolerated matrilateral cross-cousin and matrilateral parallel cousin marriages. Since the 1980s, cross-cousin marriages have been prohibited for genetic reasons in mainland China and in Taiwan. At present, this type of marriage continues in many villages (Zhaoxiong 2001, 347). Genetic and demographic studies also show that within large human demographics consanguineous marriage is still strongly favoured (Fujiki et al. 1992, 864). It is imperative to analyse the kinship terminologies to understand the practice of cross-cousin marriage as they influence kin structure in the society.

Kinship Terminology The generic terms for “wife giver” and “wife receiver” in the Magar community are Maiti and Bhanja, respectively. In the Nepali language, Maiti means a married woman’s parental home. A man’s Maiti is always identical to his mother’s, whereas a woman’s Maiti is always different from her mother’s. However, a man’s Maiti is also identical to his father’s. Primarily in cross-cousin marriage, the son’s generation always repeats the marriage direction of the father’s generation, and so on downwards. The term Bhanja (or Bhanij in Nepali) refers to the sister’s son. In marriage usage, this meaning extends to define the sister’s son, the daughter’s husband, the brother’s daughter’s husband, the husband’s sister’s son and all those who receive or can receive a girl as a wife from their own kin group. Hence, Bhanja (sister’s son) means the wife receiver (Oppitz 1982, 379).

Magars and Matrilateral cross-cousin marriage The Magars are perhaps the only undisputed Himalayan ethnic group whose traditional form of marriage is matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. That is to say a man marries his real or classificatory mother’s brother’s daughter and no one else. Matrilateral cross-cousin marriage governs the entire network of Magar relations. It produces an elementary structure of kin in the Magar community, which is generated by bilateral and

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patrilateral cross-cousin marriage, and at least three distinct kin groups are necessary. Each of them denotes their marriageable girls to one of the other kin groups, always in one and the some direction, and always receives marriage spouses from another. The system of matrilateral crosscousin marriage therefore presupposes a kin group that functions as the “wife giver” to that of ego, and another that functions as the “wife receiver.” In this manner, an indirect circle of exchange is established, integrating all kin groups of the society that participate in the rotation of women. Scholars like Augusta Molnar (2013) worked on Kham Magar in the northern district of Rolpa, Rukhum in the Rapti zone and parts of Dhaulagiri along the upper tributaries of the Sani Bheri, Barigad and the Rapti river in Nepal. Molnar found that the preferable marriage rule is matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. An individual cannot marry into the lineage whose women are classificatory sister’s children (Bhanji), and permitted marriage among the Magar remains within a thar but not within a localized lineage. Kham Magar is divided into Pun, Roka, Gharti and Buda, and each type is further subdivided into various forms. For example, Pun is further subdivided into Dharlami, Ulunge and Ledda. Pun can marry with Pun, but Dharlami Pun cannot marry with Dharlami Pin. Most of the preferences are to marry within the local area, and most of the lineages have bride-giver (Maiti) and bride-taker (Bhanja) relationships to all other lineages. Families justify matrilateral cross-cousin marriage when there is no living relative or remembered ancestor common to both families. In the north, especially in Taka (Nepal), the lineage group is quite large, and marriage within it is quite common. In Taka, the rule is that no marriages are permitted within fourteen generations. The first marriage concentrated between two lineages within the localized lineage groups is referred as “breaking the bone,” a conception based on the belief common to many groups in Nepal that males contribute the bone and structural parts of the body while females contribute the flesh and soft parts. If one translates this into bride-giving and bride-taking relationships, the rule forbids the reversal of existing relationships—a lineage cannot take a bride from a lineage to which it has traditionally given brides or vice-versa. Matrilateral cross-cousin marriage is common among the Magars. Marriage between matrilateral cross-cousins was once arranged while the

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couple were still children, although this is no longer standard practice. Kinship terms bear out the originally heavy stress on the marriage rule. Although a few marriages are still arranged, it has become more common for children to choose their own spouses. However, the tight web of bridegiving and bride-taking relationships and the use of classificatory kin terms greatly limit the choice of marriage partners (Molnar 2013, 15–17).

The Significance of Matrilateral cross-cousin marriage among Magars Certain significant reasons exist for Magar matrilateral cross-cousin marriage patterns. Magars prescribe marriage with MBD, and on the other hand Magar strictly proscribe the marriage with FSD. Magars basically prescribe MBD marriage due to the strong belief in the marriage pattern, which also provides a continuation of the relationship among the family members and community. The Magars follow the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage pattern because the bondage and relationship between the brother and sister become weak after the sister is married off. To avoid the situation of separation, they carry forward the cross-cousin pattern of marriage. They also believe that the relationship between the bride’s family and groom’s family will remain intact as long as the bride survives. After the bride’s demise, the relationship between the families fades out because she is the one who keeps in touch with these two families. The bride is the intermediary between two different families, maintaining the existing relationship, and it is therefore essential to follow the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage pattern in the Magar community. Magars have an explicit marriage system pattern in which one family always receive a bride from one family and another will always give a bride to another family. Implying that the bride taker cannot be a bride giver, this is a one-way process. This form of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage can be seen from the perspective of Levi-Strauss’s generalized exchange. Levi-Strauss focused upon the circulation of women. A man marries his MBD; a given line B takes wives from line A and gives wives to line C generation after generation. Intermarriage is thus asymmetrical, and a society is conceived as a number of discrete groups giving and receiving women in marriage. The simplest system is that of a circle at the end of the series Z, which receives from Y and gives to A (Dumont 1982, 234).

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The Magars have to maintain and follow the specified route. In order to maintain this route, the Magars strictly prohibit FSD marriage. If the sister’s daughter marries with the brother’s son they will face problems with the family as well as the entire community. When anyone breaks the law of marriage, especially proscribed marriage, then the Magar community removes the married couples from the society and no one can protect them. Basically, the marriage of FSD is strictly prohibited among the Magars because they believe that the daughter belongs to the mother’s blood and the son the father’s blood. Therefore, preference is given to MBD marriage and avoidance is practiced in the case of FSD marriage. FSD marriage is regarded as marriage between one’s own brother and sister in the Magar community. Another reason behind the restriction on FSD marriage is due to the Magar religion, which is Hindu. Kanyadan (the bride-giving ritual) is normally performed in Hindu marriages by the bride’s father. However, if the bride’s parent has passed away then the mother’s brother has to conduct this ritual. Zhaoxiong (2001) did extensive work on cross-cousin marriage in rural China, highlighting some of the important significance relating to matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. Aspects of Zhaoxiong’s accounts of cross-cousin marriage are also prevalent among the Magar community in Sikkim. These communities of rural China favour MBD marriage while FSD marriage is prohibited. Numerous arguments have been put forth to explain this, five of which are: (1) An inclination towards hypergamy (2) An inclination to expand the circle of kinship (3) The psychological relationship between mother and daughter associated with disparity in their positions in the household (4) Fold wisdom about procreation concerning the return of bone and flesh (5) The emotional and psychological relationship between bride and mother-in-law (Zhaoxiong 2001, 349). Regarding hypergamy, Hsu and Cooper mention that the bride’s family being of lower status than the groom’s proscribes FSD marriages. It is not unusual to find marriages in which the father’s sisters marry into families of equal or slightly lower status in rural China (Hsu & Cooper 1993, 90– 106). The prohibition shrinks the circle of kin and reduces the numbers of relatives, which may be of help but does not hold since MBD and MSD marriage have the same effect.

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The suggestion that FSD marriage would put strain on the motherdaughter relationship is also false. Hsu mentions that the practice of second cousin FSD marriage challenges this argument. The difficulty with this argument is that it regards differences between the mother’s and daughter’s position in the household as a literal reality, and consequently mother and daughter experience an exaggerated status related to the psychological tension. Certainly, a young wife in her husband’s house has less privilege than she enjoys in her parent’s house, but no woman is destined to maintain such a privileged position indefinitely. According to Kulp (1921) a boy inherits the blood of his father and a girl inherits the blood from her mother. For that reason, FSD marriage is prohibited and MBD and MSD were prescribed based on the bond and flesh folk belief. Fei’s (1946) approach to MBD marriage is more conducive for a good psychological and emotional relationship between the bride and the groom and the mother-in-laws are from the same household. Gallin (1963) also observed that people from rural areas of China opined that FSD marriage is almost incestuous and so close that the children of the union are likely to be stupid. FSD marriage is therefore discouraged and a great emphasis is given to the patrilineal relationship according to the principle of lineage. An observation is that if individuals marry their close kin, their children are likely to be mentally retarded or handicapped. The Magars have a specific pattern of marriage system, which is matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. Due to various factors, the Magars started an inter-caste marriage system. As per the Magar traditional pattern of marriage, a MBD has to marry with the father’s sister’s son (FZS), which may be descriptive or classificatory. If the mother’s brother’s has only one daughter then the parent cannot give the daughter to another without the consent of the sister’s son. To marry an MBD is a customary right among the Magars. In the case where the MBD is married to others then the daughter’s parent has to pay a fine to the FZS. In this case, if the MBD does not want to marry the FZS, the FZS can forcefully marry his MBD. There will not be any objection from the parents or the Magar community. In cases when the MBD/FZS is physically and mentally imbalanced then individuals can marry with others. But, before they marry, permission from the parents remains mandatory for the Magar community.

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The Magars have certain conditions on inter-caste marriages. When a Magar individual marries a bride from outside the Magar community then the family of the Magar groom has to invite twelve different clans of Magars from twelve different Magar villages, called Bara Thung. The clans discuss the inter-caste marriage and generally come to an agreement. This agreement is all about the conversion of the non-Magar bride into the Magar. The twelve clans of the Magar community announce two written agreements and each group will keep one agreement with the other given to the family. When a Magar marries outside of their community then members of the family lose self-esteem with regards to other members of the community. As a result, the community starts maintaining a social distance from the family. The Magar community inter-dining becomes a tool of sanctioning the transgressing family. When the Bara Thung occurs, the Magar family heralds the end of inter-dining between particular families in the Magar community. To re-initiate the inter-dining culture, twelve different clans of Magar have to dine with the socially excluded family. This signifies that the Magar family can now participate in community inter-dining and regain the social status lost among the community members. The twelve different Magar sections thus declare the bride as their sister as individuals of the Magar community. If a girl marries a man from a non-Magar community the family has to invite the Bara Thung. The twelve clans make a clear agreement that basically states that the girl who marries outside of the Magar community is no longer a part of it. If anything happens to her family the Magar community will not be responsible for her, and if she passes away than the family has to observe the death rituals. This agreement clearly shows that the girl now has no interventions in her parental house. Members of this family face humiliation from other members of the Magar community; interpersonal relations are marred and they are virtually ostracized. The Bara Thung solves issues by inter-dining among the community only when an agreement is announced. Inter-dining serves as a symbol to end the relations between the daughter and the family, with the girl’s father shaving his head to show the relation between the girl and the family is now dissolved. A similar gesture is performed at the time of death of a family member, highlighting the seriousness of the action. This institution of Bara Thung of the Magar community plays a significant role in case of inter-caste marriage.

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Causes of Shifting Marriage Patterns among the Magar Community In the present scenario, the Magar marriage pattern has been changing due to numerous factors, which include influences due to the modern educational system, the changing occupational system and the transforming consensus among the Magar community. In the past, Magars had their own practice of marriage, which was the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage system that was unique from other communities of the eastern Himalayan region. Matrilateral cross-cousin marriage is still prevalent among the Magar community. As compared to the past, this practice of marriage is on the decline. Modern education and enlightenment among the people, allowing them to understand cultural phenomena in a comprehensive manner, come into play in the decline of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. Modern education greatly influences the intellectual capability and rationality of individuals in the Magar community. Education empowers the younger generations of Magars with exposures to new dimensions and views, resulting in cooperation with members from other communities. Such interactions result in an emotional attachment and a preference for inter-caste marriages. This factor may be attributed as one of the foremost reasons leading to the transformation of the Magar marriage pattern. Employment is another important factor leading to a changing marriage culture among the Magars. In the past, the Magars lived in isolated areas with their own traditional occupations, i.e. agriculture. The Magars had limited options for occupation, thus minimizing their interaction with other communities. However, the Magars now have employment opportunities in other sectors, like the industrial and governmental sectors, and have started to intermingle with members from different communities. Intermingling and job opportunities impact the traditional marriage pattern of the Magar community because interaction has diluted the barriers, resulting in more inter-caste marriages. Katang, located in south Sikkim, is a Magar-dominated area, also inhabited by Tamangs and Lepchas. Such close proximity with Tamangs and Lepchas has resulted in inter-caste marriage in the Magar community. Though they prefer to go by their tradition of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, traditional matrilateral cross-cousin marriage has considerably decreased and inter-caste marriages are on the rise. The migration of one

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community from one place to another seriously alters the existing culture of the particular community, as in the case of the Magar in Katang. In the past, the Magar were the only community in Katang and followed their traditional marriage pattern. Due to the migration of other communities to Katang, the Magar pattern of marriage changed. Magar and Tamang have their own cultural value systems and many individuals among these communities practice inter-caste marriage due to the close interaction and emotional bondage between the different communities. The changing attitudes and outlook of the Magar community determine the changing marriage pattern. These days, perceptions regarding the matrilateral cross-cousin marriage have changed, although parents remain instrumental when it comes to the child’s marriage. In contemporary times, parents are more liberal compared to older generations, because parents are exposed to a progressive mindset and concord with their children’s happiness and decisions when it comes to selecting spouses of their choice, even if it is beyond their own caste. In the earlier period, decisions regarding marriage remained completely within the domain of parents. Magar tradition prescribed that boys had to marry with MBD and girls with FZS. The Magar marriage pattern was more rigid in the past as compared to the present. Now, the children have the freedom to select their spouses resulting in an exponential increase of inter-caste marriages among the Magar community. Cultural assimilation with other communities also alters the marriage pattern of the Magars. Close interaction with other communities has an impact on one’s culture. It is a form of enculturation whereby people adopt the behaviour pattern of the surrounding area. Based on the interviews conducted with older generations from the Magar community, it is clear that since the Magars have started to live with other communities, like the Rai, Chettris, Tamang and so on, their marriage patterns have changed. For other communities, marriage between MBD and FZS is prohibited as they are considered to be brothers and sisters. The probability of inter-caste marriage among the Magars has now increased due to the waves of modernisation and globalisation that influence their lifestyles. Besides all these factors responsible for change, some members of the Magar community continue to practice the matrilateral cross-cousin pattern of marriage. This chapter highlights that people who are less educated, pursuing a traditional occupation and

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located in an isolated area, generally abide by the norms of the traditional Magar marriage patterns. However, this observation cannot be generalised as many of them still marry with MBD or FZS, and if not they at least marry within their own communities.

References Augusta, Molnar.2013. “Marital Pattern and Women’s Economic Independence: A Case Study of Kham Magar Women.” CNAS Journal, http://magarstudiescenter.org.np/wpͲcontent/uploads/2010 /03/kham-magar.pdf. Cooper, E. & M. Hsu. 1993. “Patterns of Marriage in Rural Zhejiang.” Journal of Asian Studies 52 (1): 90–106. Dumont, Louis. 1982. “Marriage Alliance,” http://www.saintmarysu.cawebfilesmarriage_alliance.pdf. Fei, Xiaotong. 1946. “An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and its Change.” American Journal of Sociology 52 (1): 1–17. Fujiki, N & Y Kohli, T. Kato,M. Hirayama,T. Mutoh,M. Nakanaga, A. Tokuda, S. Nakazaki, M. Dochin & K. Mano. 1992. “Genetic Disease Patterns in Japan.” A Review on Human Biology 64 (6): 32–49. Gallin, Bernard. 1963. “Cousin Marriage in China.” Ethnology 2 (1): 104– 8. Gurung, S & M. P. Lama. 2004. Sikkim Study Series Culture (Part 1). Sikkim: Information and Public Relation, Government of Sikkim. Hitchcock, J. H. 1965. “Sub-Tribes in the Magar Community of Nepal." Asian survey 4 (3): 28–46. Hooker, J. 1891. Himalayan Journals or Notes of a Naturalist. London: Ward, Lock, Boulder & Co. Kulp, D. H. 1921. Country Life in South China. New York: Columbia University Press. Levi-Strauss, J. C. 1969. Elementary Structures of Kinship. Boston: Beacon Press. Lucy, Mair. 1972. An Introduction to Social Anthropology. London: Oxford University Press. Oppitz, Michael. 1982. “Death and Kin among The Northern Magar.” Kailash IX (4): 37–442. Risley, H. H. 1894. The Gazetter of Sikkim. Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press. Subba, J. R. 2006. History, Culture and Custom of Sikkim. Delhi: Gyan Publishing House.

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Singh, K. S. 1993. “People of India Sikkim.”Anthropological Survey of India Vol XXXIX. Calcutta: Seagull Book. Uberoi, Patricia.1993. Family, Kinship and Marriage in India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Vansittart, Eden. 1993. The Gurkhas. New Delhi: Anmol Publications. Zhaoxiong, Qin. 2001. “Rethinking Cousin Marriage in Rural China.” Ethnology 40 (4): 14–28.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE TOTO COMMUNITY— A DISCOURSE ON TRADITION AND MODERNITY ANIL KUMAR BISWAS AND MRINAL KANTI BASAK

The Toto tribal population numbers 1,346, based on the 2011 Census of India. Totos belong to the Mongoloid stock. They are of medium height with sturdy bodies and brown skin. They have straight hair and sparse beards and moustaches. Their eye-folds are epicanthic like other Mongoloid groups. The existence of the Toto tribe was first reported by Babu Kishen Kanta Bose, a British Government employee of the Rangpur Collector during 1815 (Gait 1901). At present, the Totopara village is located in the Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal. The Indian Government’s attention was first drawn towards Totos under a curious set of circumstances (Roy 1969). In 1955, Roy Burman was assigned by the Government of India to the Totopara village at the northern frontier of Bengal to document a report on the Toto tribe (Chakraborty & Chattopadhyay 1964). The Toto tribe was excluded from the list of Scheduled Tribes in the first Indian Constitution Order of 1950 (Majumder 1983). Later, The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes list Modification Order 1956 granted Scheduled Tribe status to the Toto tribe (Das 1969).

The Geo-Physical Condition of Totopara Totopara village is bounded in the north by the Tading Hill, which is a noseband east-west spur of the Himalayas, close to Indo-Bhutan border. The south-west edge of Totopara touches the Houri-Kungning-Tee and

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Titi forests. To the east, Totopara is bounded by the Merem-Tee and MuTee (Torsha) rivers. Due to heavy rains and depredation by wild animals, Totos construct their houses on raised platforms like the other tribal communities of northeast India. Several types of rocks and minerals are found in and around Totopara village, along with lead, dolomite, carbonates of lime and calcareous tufa. Several types of food crops like red pepper, wild cinnamon and soap nut are also found around the village, which is within a lush, green tropical forest typical of the area.

Origin of the Toto Community The term “Toto” was derived from the name given to them by their neighbours. The neighbouring language offers clues. In the Bhutia language, the word Toto means “image.” The word Toto-fong in the Limbu language means “roasted meat-eaters” or “the people who feast on roasted meat” (Burman 1985). The Totos are inveterate meat eaters and often do so by simply roasting it on a fire. In the Rabha language, Taptap means “quickly.” DHE Sunder (1895) mentioned that Totos were unable to say when they settled, but alleged that they had been in Totopara for many generations. They speak a language of their own. J. Milligan (1916) in his Survey and Settlement Report of 1916, made no comment on the origin of the Toto tribe. B. Mukharjee (1931, in Burman 1985) noticed that Totos have physical features close to those of the Bhutias. In 1951, A. Mitra (1953) wrote a few accounts about the origin of the Totos. Roy Burman (1957) mentioned that there were various myths or traditions among the Totos about their origins and sources of migration. According Burman, Totos settled in different areas in the neighbourhood of Deingoho garden, which is in present-day Bhutan. There were no territorial unities among the tribes during the eighteenth century. The genealogy of the settlement of the Totos in Totopara can be traced back to the middle of the eighteenth century. Michael Aris’s (1980) & J. C. White’s (1971) work on Bhutan revealed that small groups of similar people are also found in the western part of Bhutan. They are known as Tok-top and settled in two permanent villages south of Spagra called upper Toktokha and lower Toktokha.

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Tok-top males wear a peculiar garment woven from nettles called pakhi crossed over the chest and knotted at the shoulders, very much like the dress of the Lepchas. The other connection provided for the Toto people living in the Jalpaiguri district of West Bengal by an anthropologist was that they were an emigrant group from Bhutan. S. K. Pathak, a Tibetologist, opined that Totos migrated from the Tromo valley of Jelep-la in western Bhutan (Sanyal 1979). There is a myth about the origin of the Totos (Biswas 2011a; 2012). According to this myth, Totos were early inhabitants of Cooch Behar and led a nomadic life depending on hunting, gleaning and partly on the seasonal Jhooming (slash and burn agricultural practices). Once upon a time, Totos set out hunting but did not find any animals throughout the day. Just before sunset, they were able to kill a Sambbar (Deer) and returned to their shelter. They consumed the meat of the Sambbar deliciously in the night, but kept its head for the next morning. During the night, the headman of the Totos was ordered by a divine voice to offer the same animal which they had killed in the evening. The next morning, with great surprise, the headman found that the head which they had preserved was not that of the Sambbar, but of a cow instead. According to the instruction given to them by their supreme God, the headman, in consultation with the village elders, decided to offer penance. Meanwhile, the king of Cooch Behar State was informed of this fast. In this situation, Totos migrated to Bhutan and started living there. After a few years, the Totos were outraged by the Bhutias, and were taken as Zapo (slaves). Then one day, seventeen Totos managed to escape under the cover of darkness late in the night. These seventeen Totos attacked a small village on the way while the villagers were deep asleep. The male members of the village were killed in the encounter, and the Totos occupied the houses and captured the women. There, they started life anew. (Personal interview by the authors 2013)

According to the Totos, the particular village mentioned in the myth is the present Totopara, which is the only existing Toto settlement in India. The exact identity of the community defeated by them is not clearly known. Some Totos believed that they belonged to the Rabha community. They also narrated that out of the seventeen ancestors of the Totos, only thirteen persons survived after the fight in the village. According to them, the thirteen clans of the Toto ancestors were the founders of Totopara village. To save themselves from the Bhutias and to protect their separate identity, Totos chose a secluded place that was cut off from the outside world.

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The story narrated may be wholly or partially related to the Toto tribe. At present, there is no scope to verify it. Besides the present Totopara village, earlier there were four other Toto villages within the boundary of the present Jalpaiguri district: (i) Totpara in Falakata, (ii) Tatpara in Alipurduar, (iii) Tatpara in Dhupguri, and (iv) Tatpara in Mal. At present, the Totos live in Totopara, and no Totos are found at Tatpara in Dhupguri and at Tatpara in Mal.

Traditional Village Administration of the Totos Totopara village was under the jurisdiction of Bhutan for about 80 years until it was annexed by the British after the Indo-Bhutan war of 1864–5 (Chakraborty & Chattopadhyay 1964). During this period, Totos were the Zapos (slaves) of Bhutan under the supervision of the Bhutanese Zinkaf (Bhutanese aristocrats) and Pow (Bhutanese officials). The long association with Bhutan transformed the Toto’s traditional organisation and their administration system. The Toto village organisation was a dual administrative system parallel to the Bhutanese system prevalent before the emergence of the monarchy during 1907 (Majumder 1978; 1983; 1984; 1991; 1998). The main administration of the Toto village was a community council known as Latchi-Jangoa (The General Council of Toto). According to Toto tradition, an individual attaining adulthood was automatically included as the member of the Latchi-Jangoa. In exceptional cases, the eldest son of a family may substitute his father. The Latchi-Jangoa was the supreme decision-making body of the Toto community headed by the Subba (head priest) or Kazi (village elder). Latchi-Jangoa professed two different characters, religious or secular, depending on the agenda under their deliberation. The religious authority of the Toto tribe was known as Subba. Subba had two duties: holding the office of the spiritual head and as judge. He performed worship, and conducted the festivals of the village. Roy Burman (1957) termed the Subba the “head priest” of the Totos. The Subba also functioned as the decision-making body on all religious affairs and as coordinator of religious functions. In the past, individuals of Toto tribes had the liberty to become priests or even be selected as a Subba of the community depending on personality, attitude and aptitude, and not necessarily on the basis of heredity.

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Earlier, Totos never went to any judicial court or police station to settle their disputes; instead, they lodged their disputes to the Kazi for settlement in the village council (Burman 1985). The Kazi, in consultation with the village council consisting of the village elders, settled the disputes according to their socio-religious custom. Such disputes included divorce and adultery. The Subba was entrusted to collect the Dao-Khajna (capitation tax) of the village during the Bhutanese regime, as well as dispose of disputes with the help of the Gapu (the secular executive head of the village). As the supreme authority of the village, the Subba was entitled to receive one day of free labour from each family of the Toto tribe during farming and the construction of dwellings. The Subba was also privileged with nGang-pui (a messenger) to assist him whenever he called for them. The family of nGang-pui was also exempted from rendering any further free labour services to the Subba. There are two types of priestly professionals among the Totos: the Pows perform all the religious functions under the supervision of the Subba, while the Yong-tongs (common priests) assist the Pows and the Subba during community worship. The Leti-gehuas (musicians) sing songs during the Toto religious occasions. Totos select a number of Leti-gehuas based on the nature of the ritual. Totos believe that most of their songs were revealed in dreams and Leti-gehuas are authorised to receive the divine message of the song. Totos believe in different types of superstition. They believe that evil spirits are liable for their disease, and only by performing magic and rituals can one can get rid of disease. The Baidangis (exorcists) play an important role in Toto society in thwarting evil spirits. Gapu is the second most important person after the Subba in Toto villages, being responsible for the supervision of the secular affairs of the village. The Gapu settles the disputes relating to land, the collection of capitation tax and quarrels among villagers. After the annexation of the Toto village by the British Government in 1864, the Gapu was entrusted with the task of collecting capitation tax at the rate of Rs 2 per family (Gait 1901). During the Bhutia period, the Subba was authorized to undertake capitation tax. The Subba and Gapu were selected from the “Diring Chan Gobei” and “Dankobei” clans, respectively. These posts were not

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hereditary in the beginning, but became so over four or five generations. The Gapu’s role thus became more important from the administrative aspect. In 1992, the adopted son of Shirang Toto, the erstwhile Kazi, was selected as Kazi after the demised of the Gapu Dinesh Toto in 1983. The LatchiJangoa took the decision to select his son Sugrib Toto as the Gapu during 1991. Sugrib did not succeed in exerting his power because the people at large did not accept him as their Gapu wholeheartedly. With the abolition of the community property system, the authority of the Gapu also lost its relevance. The Subba held a superior position stemming from earlier times. Roy Burman (1957) explained that the 13 clans of the Totos were further divided into two segments—one segment looked over trade spots with Cooch Behar and Mainaguri, while the other was responsible for the carriage of goods between Totopara and the high hills. The latter group was supervised by the Subba and his men while the former was supervised by the Gapu. The British government, after the annexation of Totopara, recorded the community land of the Totos in the name of Gapu during 1895 (Milligan 1916). The Gapu became the liaison official between the Toto community and the British governmental officials.

Changes in Traditional Administration of Totos The traditional organisation of the Toto tribe is undergoing change due to the introduction of the Panchayat system and Parliamentary voting practice. Totopara came under the jurisdiction of the Panchayati Raj institution in 1957. The 73rd Amendment Act of the Indian Constitution introduced Panchayati Raj institutions in all of India, which altered the traditional community structure of the Totos. Central and State government projects and schemes are now implemented due to the Panchayati Raj institution in rural India. Both traditional and new institutions function simultaneously in Totopara. Previously, the Subba was entitled to one day’s free labour from each family of Totos for farming and domestic work. The Subba, Gapu and nGang-puis are exempted from rendering any free labour to other families. Totos are at present obliged to provide labour to the Forest Department for five to six days annually for cleaning the jungles along the international boundary lines between India and Bhutan.

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Roy Burman (1957) mentioned that Totos used an indigenous healing system. Even after the introduction of the modern medical system, Totos still cling to their traditional practices of exorcism. The Baidangis or exorcists still play an important role among them. The exorcists use Marua [dried leaves], putting them in a flat basket to ascertain the nature of the disease, the name of the deity or sprit responsible and the particular Sangai-Lawmei [penance] to appease it. The Baidangis prepare such folk medicines from the locally available herbs. Dr Ashis Dutta introduced modern medicines among the Totos in 1956 (Biswas 2012). In 1967, the Swedish Mission established a dispensary at Totopara and appointed a compounder. At present, there is a primary healthcare centre in Totopara. The introduction of modern medicine in Totopara remained confined within the world of their superstition due to the lack of sincere and sympathetic efforts by the modern medical practitioners and welfare organisations. The status of the nGang-Puis is also increasing in Totopara due to the growth of the Toto population and its changing administrative divisions. The number of nGang-Puis has increased to six to cater for the needs of six different localities. There is practically no clan restriction in the selection of the nGang-Pui. Any efficient person suitable for this office can be selected from any clan of the village. The Demsha [community hall] is the space for the Totos’ annual worship and a courthouse serves for the disposal of intracommunity litigations. Two sacred drums used during worship or for raising the alarm when necessary are preserved at the Demsha today. In recent years, the Demsha has been replaced by a brick house with corrugated sheet roofing, signalling a major departure from the past. It was customary for Totos to use only the locally available natural craftsmanship for the construction of the Demsha. The Demsha still has a few roles to play in today’s Toto society. As a primitive tribal community, the Totos were intimately related to their surrounding natural environment, solely depending on the mercy of nature in the past. The Totos still perform rituals on various folk beliefs. They were animist, believing that each natural being had a soul or spirit. Following the introduction of a modern administrative system and education, the Toto’s animist belief is on the verge of extinction.

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In Toto tradition, the Subba and Gapu were invited to participate in the occasion of marriage ceremonies. During marriage ceremonies, the couple was given new names in the presence of the Subba and Gapu, and this remains an important part of the ceremony. At present, this ceremony of new naming is losing its importance, particularly in the case of educated individuals who cannot be given a new name when they are registered in the admission book of the school or a college they belong to. Due to implementation of various developmental schemes, the name of a person once registered in the government record is taken as final for their identity. As such, the essence of ceremonial naming has declined.

The Impact of Modern Education in the Tradition-Bound Toto Community Since 1951, voluntary organisations and government agencies started functioning in Totopara for the socio-economic development of the Totos. Bharat Mahajati Mandali, a voluntary organisation, played a crucial role for the introduction of modern education. Primary education was introduced by the Mandali at Totopara on 1951 by setting up a welfare centre. In 1951, Jogendra Sarkar was appointed as the first welfare organiser and teacher for imparting primary education in Totopara (Biswas 2012). The government of West Bengal took over the welfare centre from the Mandali in 1955, and Dilbahadur Rana was appointed to impart education to the children. During 1955, the number of enrolled students was only 20. A primary school was built in 1964 at Totopara, and Santosh Bhattacharjee took charge as teacher-cum-welfare organizer. According to Bhattacharjee: Perhaps there is no other tribal community in India which is as backward as the Totos educationally. So far, only 15 to 16 persons have learnt to write their signature during the past 20 or 21 years, even though educational efforts were initiated way back in 1952. (Personal interview with the authors 2013)

The Swedish Mission constructed a school building at Totopara during 1965 (Biswas 2011b). Later, the school was renamed Toto Kalayan Bidyamandir during 1969–70. The Swedish mission appointed John Ekka,

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a Swedish National, as a primary teacher in 1967. By 1972, this school was recognised by the District School Board. During 1991, a total of 162 students enrolled in Toto Kalyan Bidyamandir. Another primary school was installed by the integrated Tribal Development Project at Poargaon. Teachers were appointed by the District Board. An English-medium nursery school was established by a Christian couple in 1991. The Swedish Mission also established a junior high school at Totopara in 1980, and installed adult education centres between 1976 and 1980 (Biswas 2011a). The Social Education Department under the Government of West Bengal conducted five non-formal educational centres at Totopara during 1989– 90. At present, Totopara has one primary school, one high school and one middle school. Totos now send their children to school to receive modern education. Totopara presently has five university graduates. The first Toto woman to graduate was Rita Toto in 2010. The introduction of modern education has moved the Toto society away from tradition. Variations can be observed among the literate and illiterate members of Toto families on interpersonal relations, affecting the tradition and integrity of the family. Cleavages between the tradition-bound illiterate members and literate members are gradually increasing. Despite the changes and the Totos’ exposure to the outside world, the society still follows the broad principles of mutual reciprocity. Totos were an isolated tribe in West Bengal. The 1901 Census of India indicates that the total number of Totos was only 171. Their population increased to 1,346 according to the 2011 Indian census. The Totos profess new socio-economic networks causing a breach in their attachment to traditions. Though the present period can be marked as one of rapid progress, it can also be marked as problematic, creating identity crisis and the disintegration of Toto tradition. The Toto family was its primary and basic institution, and marriage was a crucial part of this. Totos strictly followed endogamy within the Toto community, which enabled the Totos to maintain their separate identity. Toto customs gave new names to Toto couples at the time of marriage as well as for divorced woman. This ceremonial naming has lost its significance.

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Traditionally, a Toto couple had to start a separate household after marriage. This was an important pre-condition so as to gain membership of the Latchi-Jangoa (General Council of the community). A Toto father leaves the dwelling for the Jhoom house after the marriage of the eldest son. At present, due to the implementation of government housing schemes, the housing patterns of the Totos are also transforming.

References Aris, M. 1980. Bhutan: The Early History of a Himalayan Kingdom. New Delhi: Vikash Publication. Biswas, A. K. 2011a. “Witchcraft Practice among Tribals in India.” Contemporary Research in India 1 (4): 22–45. —. 2011b. “Universalisation of Education.” Kurukestra 59 (7): 13–17. —. 2012. “Decentralisation of Elementary Education in India.” Kurukestra 60 (11): 23–7. Burman, U. N. 1985. Uttar Banglar Sekal O Aamar Jiban Smriti (in Bengali). Jalpaiguri: Published by the Author. Chakraborty, P & K Chattopadhyay. 1964. “Some Aspects of Toto Ethnography.” Bulletin of the Cultural Research Institute 3 (374): 68–78. Das, A. K. 1969. The Totos: Cultural Research Institute. Calcutta: Government of West Bengal. Gait, E. A. 1901. Census of Bengal. Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press. Government of West Bengal. 1975. Sub Plan for the Tribal Areas of West Bengal. Calcutta: Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe Welfare Department. Majumder, B. 1978. “Toto Upajatir Pujaparban O Samajik Riti-Niti” (in Bengali). Tribitta: North Bengal Special Number 10. Cooch Behar: Published by the Author. —. 1983. “Toto Upajatir Samaskritik Pariprekshit-Vyadhi O Chikitsa.” Manabman 4. Calcutta: Pavlov Institute. —. 1984. The British and the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan. Patna: Bharat Bhawan. —. 1991. A Sociological Study of the Toto Folktales. Calcutta: Asiatic Society. —. 1998. The Totos. Calcutta: Academic Enterprise. Milligan, J. 1916. Report of the Survey and Settlement Operations in the Jalpaiguri District, 1906–1916. Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press. Mitra, A. 1953. Census 1951: West Bengal District Hand Book on Jalpaiguri. Calcutta:

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Superintendent of Government Printing. Roy, B. 1969. Census 1961: West Bengal, District Hand Book on Jalpaiguri. Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing. Roy Burman, B. K. 1957. “Drama of Two Drums: Mayu Festival of the Totos.” Indian Folklore 2 (1): 45–65. Sanyal, C. C. 1979. The Meches and the Totos: Two Sub-Himalayan Tribes of North Bengal. Siliguri: North Bengal University Press. Sunder, D. H. E. 1895. Survey and Settlement of The Western Duars in The District of Jalpaiguri, 1889–95. Calcutta: Bengal Secretariat Press. White, J. C. 1971. Sikkim and Bhutan: Twenty One Years on The North East Frontier, 1887–1908. New Delhi: Vibek Publication.



ZU AND THE MIZOS— CHANGE AND CONTINUITY GRACE LALHLUPUII SAILO AND HENRY ZODINLIANA PACHUAU

Mizo society has changed erratically over the hundred years between 1910 and 2010. Mizo social identity has become ambiguous, and a few historical, empirical and critical approaches facilitate the understanding of social change in Mizoram. Mizoram was under British colonial administration from 1890–1947 leading to changes in the erstwhile Lushai Hills, which, away from the mainstream with their majestic green grandeur, knew little about other civilisations. H. Z. Pachuau (2011) mentions in detail the chronology of changes experienced in Mizoram dating as far back as 1891. Chapman & Skyes (1968) highlight that the influence of the British colonial regime in Mizoram remains the major agency for the transformation of Mizos. The advent of Christian missionaries in the Lushai hills during 1894 brought about a new social order and the evangelisation of the Mizo society (Sangzuala 1998).

Zu in Mizo Society Consumption of Zu, traditional rice beer, was a common phenomenon in Mizo society (McCall 2003). In Mizo culture, Zu was made from husked rice through a process of distillation. Earlier, the brewing of Zu was carried out collectively by the village youth, and entire villages gathered to drink it on festive occasions such as Chapchar Kut, Mim Kut, Thalfavang Kut, marriage ceremonies and village feasts given by the chief or persons of high dignity. Both women and men drank on festive occasions and ceremonies (Dev & Lahiri 1983). The male youths of the village would drink together in the Zawlbuk [bachelor dormitory]. The brewing of Zu for commercial

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purposes was not documented in the Mizo history. Zu consumption and any person misbehaving due to Zu were controlled by members of the Zawlbuk (Zawla 1989). Chapter 2 Verse 33 of the Mizo Customary Law indicates that any antisocial behaviour as a result of drunkenness will be dealt with by the leaders of the community (Awia 2009). The brewing and drinking of Zu had social significance and was functional in nature (Hauhnar 2012). In recent times, perceptions have emerged regarding people who consume Zu and those who refrain from it. Any Mizo who indulges in Zu is subjected to social stigmatisation and ostracism (Halliday 2009), so those who do not drink it have a higher social status than those who do. Despite social and religious restrictions, drinking Zu remained a common phenomenon in Mizo society (Varte 2012). Zu is now considered an important commodity with a market, value and is seen as profitable to the common person. The reason for the brewing and selling of Zu becoming profitable could be attributed to the sudden restriction brought forth by Christianity. The commercialisation of Zu is also related to the socioeconomic factors such as poverty and unemployment (Lalnuntluangi 2004). The volume of Zu trade and consumption has increased exponentially over the past decade. Alcoholism, crime and domestic violence became more evident (Lalengmawii 2008) due to illicit trade and consumption of Zu. The MLTP (Mizoram Liquor Total Prohibition) Act, 1995 was enacted by the Mizoram government to ban the importing, transport, brewing, possession, sale and consumption of liquor. Numerous measures have been undertaken by the state officials to implement the Act. However, the MLTP made its own lapses and the illicit liquor trade and brewing continue within Mizoram (Robin 2011). The measures taken by Mizoram state to implement the MLTP Act have failed. Despite repeated arrests, heavy fines and the confiscation of utensils and items used in brewing, the Zu menace persists. The measures taken by the Excise Department, the Police and the Supply Reduction Service (SRS) were accused of violating the human rights of the people as their means of sustenance were taken away without the provision of alternative earning avenues. The Mizoram government has also failed to curb vigilante violence. The Young Mizo Association (YMA), an influential non-government

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organisation, took the law into its own hands under the garb of controlling drugs and alcohol. The resulting atrocities endured by families who were brewing and selling Zu were so severe that they allegedly led to deaths (Sangkima 2004). This created an apprehension among the population and people began to question the legitimacy of actions taken by the Young Mizo Association. The level of public interest in Zu in Mizoram cannot be questioned. There are still numerous debates about the continuity of the MLTP. Drinking liquor is very much alive while Mizoram state laws have failed to halt the Zu menace. The Mizoram government as well as civil societies cannot help when a Mizo wishes to drink. Phunchawng village has a population of less than 2,000 persons. It is situated along National Highway 54 on the Aizawl-Lengpui Airport road. Phunchawng has been in existence since 1990. Residents mainly comprise migrants from Myanmar, Manipur, Tripura and Assam. The community is known for brewing liquor and is often frequented by the Mizoram Excise officials, the police and the erstwhile SRS (Supply Reduction Service), who often destroy breweries and confiscate utensils and materials used in the brewing process. Participant observation was adopted to interact with the people of Phunchawng to build rapport so that people could relate issues like illicit brewing, poverty, unemployment and domestic violence. Key informant interviews and data revealed that 80% of Phunchawng households engaged in the liquor trade and the brewing of Zu. Families involved in the brewing and selling of Zu are subject to police and social atrocities (Sailo 2008), and their status in society is amongst the lowest in Mizo society (Zothansanga 2008). Their trade is a vicious circle primarily due to poverty. In some cases, such trade becomes generational, and if not the children are subjected to an environment that is not at all conducive for their present psycho-social well-being (Lalrinmawia 1995). Phunchawng is prone to strife and other problems. More than half of the community members live in rented houses. Most of the houses have a distillery. Women and other members of the household are involved in the process of brewing and selling Zu. Many migrants from Myanmar are employed in brewing Zu in makeshift distilleries. Sometimes, brewing is done at the nearby forest due to frequent police raids.

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Focus group discussions and the case study method were adopted to collect primary data at Phunchawng, consisting of a participatory rural appraisal (PRA) with six members of the community, focus group discussion with seven members, and in-depth interviews with five families involved in the Zu trade, which were considered in case vignettes.

Findings from the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) A participatory rural appraisal was conducted with six people engaged in the liquor trade, who were asked to identify the cause effects of the liquor trade and give their opinions on the impact of the trade. It revealed the following: The causes of involvement in the liquor trade are: (1) Poverty (2) Lack of opportunities for gainful employment as an alternative to the illicit trade of liquor (3) Lack of governmental initiatives to alleviate poverty. Effects of the involvement in the liquor trade are: (1) Criticism from the larger society (2) Non-participation in religious and social activities (3) Conflict in personal and family lives (4) Vulnerability to the habit of alcoholism (5) Blame by the larger society for any social conflict. The PRA indicates that negative and unfavourable life situations led most individuals and families to the liquor trade. Such circumstances are mostly identified as a result of poverty and lack of opportunities or access to opportunities for development. Poverty seems to be the driving force for resorting to the liquor trade as a means of survival. Individuals lack resources, skills and access to alternative means of income and are therefore motivated to make money through brewing and selling liquor.

Findings from the Focus Group Discussion Keeping in mind the law enforced by the Mizoram government against liquor and the various activities undertaken by NGOs against Zu, a focused group discussion on the MLTP Act was conducted to gather information and opinions from Zu brewers and traders. The discussion reveals the effectiveness of the MLTP Act and also its failure. The findings of the discussion are as follows:

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(1) The MLTP Act is a positive and necessary act in itself. (2) It is important to curb the problem of alcoholism and alcoholrelated deaths in the state. Stakeholders and the civil society must implement the act in an appropriate manner. (3) Liquor brewing and consumption have always been part of Mizo culture, and hence their total prohibition is next to impossible. (4) The import and sale of Burmese liquor should be checked and prohibited as this has resulted in many deaths in recent years. (5) Good quality liquor, either company produced or the traditional Mizo Zu, may be promoted. (6) The undertakings of the YMA and non-government organisations must be carried out in a way that promotes the livelihood and standards of the people. The present action made by nongovernment organisations destroys the life of the people and further increases their poverty. People engaged in the liquor trade are of the opinion that the MLTP Act is necessary in tackling the problem of alcoholism and the increasing alcohol-related deaths in Mizoram. The Act leads to the increase in the market value of local liquor, thus creating a profitable income base for many traders. The discussion is aimed at the repealing of the MLTP Act and towards the reduction and regulation of the Zu trade. The initiatives undertaken by the governmental and non-governmental organisation are against the rights and opportunities of the people.

Case Vignettes In-depth interviews were conducted with six families involved in the liquor trade. The cases are discussed as follows.

Case 1 The Zotea (real name withheld) family migrated to Phunchawng during 1998 to sell liquor. They originally hailed from Champhai (close to the Mizoram-Myanmar border). Neither Mr Zotea (35) nor Mrs Zotea (27) had a job. Both studied only up to the middle-school stage. The Zotea family found it difficult to make ends meet and was driven by economic necessity; they took to brewing and selling Zu. Presently, they reside in a rented house with their three-year-old son and Mr Zotea’s nephew, who is 25 and is a high-school dropout. He helps them in their distillery, which saves them from hiring extra labour.

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The family participates in Church activities. They claimed that even though they are involved in the liquor business, they do not drink. Mr Zotea is an important asset to the Church because of his writing skills. Mrs Zotea has health problems. Due to their economic constraints, the family cannot bear the medical bills. Their family income ranges from Rs 2,000 to Rs 3,000 per week. However, there are times when the Zotea family cannot generate any income at all. The nephew is also an active member of the Church youth group and once gave up drinking, but started again as work in the brewing business makes him highly vulnerable to the habit of Zu consumption. Because of this, the nephew gradually refrained from Church activities.

Analysis of the case The case of the Zotea family can be associated with the strain theory, whereby unfavourable circumstances such as poverty, lack of developmental opportunities and education drove them to the liquor trade. The fact that the Zoteas do not drink and are active members of the Church reveals that their involvement in the Zu trade is strictly economic in nature. Mr Zotea’s interest in literary activities could have been put to better use, but due to “differential association” and a lack of opportunities, the family remained stagnant. The nephew who gave up drinking has now gone back to his old habit, and this may also be seen as a cause of differential association, whereby the environmental situation offers favourable reasons for drinking. Refraining from religious and social responsibilities may be a “labelling.”

Case 2 Mr. Tluanga’s (real name withheld) family moved to Phunchawng in January 2006. They originally hailed from Saiha (a south Mizoram town close to the Arakan region of Myanmar). After his marriage in 2002, Mr Tluanga (36) worked as a taxi driver in Aizawl. Being a habitual drinker, he found it difficult to make ends meet and support his family. The Tluangas decided to move to Phunchawng and sell liquor. Mrs Tluanga (22) is a high-school dropout. The couple have two children. Mr Tluanga’s elder sister (a divorcee) stays with them and helps them in their business. Besides her, the Tluangas hire two male youths to help them in their Zu brewing and trading.

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The family produces about 30–50 litres of Zu per day and earns up to Rs 10,000 per month. However, there are times when the Tluanga family cannot produce any Zu due to the vigilance of Mizoram Excise official raids. The family has no savings and half of their profits are spent on paying their assistants, house rent, children’s education and daily needs. The Excise Department has caught Mr Tluanga three times and sent him to the Mizoram District Jail. However, his friends bailed him out after two weeks. On other occasions, one of his assistants went to jail instead of him, for which the assistant was paid a handsome amount. The Tluanga family’s liquor barrels were often destroyed and confiscated by the Mizoram Excise officials. His family was fined huge amounts of money on many occasions. Usually, the family supplies huge quantities of Zu to regular customers, ranging from older men, women, young boys and even young ladies. Apart from them, the Tluanga family has regular customers who come to drink Zu in their house.

Analysis of the case The above case represents a family that initially had the means and opportunity to live on a reasonable income. Due to Mr Tluanga’s alcoholism, the family resorted to illegal means of earning a living. “Social learning” and “differential association” may be applied in this case, since association with fellow alcoholics as well as liquor traders reinforced the Zu drinking habit and trade.

Case 3 Mr Rama (real name withheld) and his family migrated to Phunchawng in 2005 after marriage and started their Zu trade and brewing as a means of income. They hailed from Myanmar and have no intention of going back as living and working there were difficult due to army conscriptions. They sell 20 litres of Zu daily at Rs 500 per 10 litres to regular agents. The Rama family does not entertain unknown customers. The task of brewing is mostly done by Mr Rama and his wife’s younger brother who lives with them. According to the Rama family, the Zu business provides them a good income to meet their everyday needs and allows them to send their children to school. Their families in Myanmar are poor and cannot afford education. The family also supports Mrs Rama’s youngest brother who is

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studying in Aizawl. The Zu trade involves many risks. The Rama family prefers to continue its Zu trade because of the socio-economic security provided by it.

Analysis of the case The challenges faced by the Rama family can be understood as a consequence of poverty and its related effects. The strains of the illicit trade are considered more favourable to the living standards in their village back home in Myanmar. This is an indicator of the harsh realities that drive many families to resort to illegal or antisocial means to make a living. This case highlights the clear picture of the situation in Myanmar where families are subjected to poverty and driven to other areas in search of opportunities in order to earn better incomes.

Case 4 Mr Ali (real name withheld) hails from Karimganj, Assam. He came to Phunchawng to work as a caretaker on a farm in 2003. He married a local (Mizo) girl in 2007. Mr Ali found it difficult to support his family with his meagre income at the farm. He started as a helper in another family’s brewery and later started brewing and selling his own Zu. The couple lost their first daughter (at two months old) in February 2008. The family earns Rs 8,000–10,000 per month, and may make up to 50 litres of Zu twice a week, but there are also times when there is no production at all. Mr Ali does not entertain anyone in their house but sells large amounts to regular customers, who in turn sell the Zu at higher rates in and around Aizawl city. Mr Ali has not been sent to jail for his illegal brewing activity. There were occasions when Mizoram Excise officials and social vigilantes raided his distillery and pardoned him after he paid a fine of Rs 1,500. Mr Ali’s family faces anxiety, stress and constantly lives in fear of being caught. They have often thought of giving up Zu brewing and trading, but the lack of alternatives compelled them to continue the illicit trade and brewing.

Analysis of the case Mr Ali is a hardworking man and initially worked as a caretaker. The conditions to which he was exposed within Phunchawng community and

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the need to earn for his family coerced him into the illicit Zu trade. From the case, the risk involved in the liquor trade is not the only factor for continuity. This is because the economic security brought about by the trade has greater significance in taking up brewing and trading.

Case 5 Mrs Biaki (real name withheld) is a 53-year-old woman. She hails from a locality of the Aizawl city. She married at the age of 18 and has three children. Her husband was an alcoholic, and the family suffered from the resulting domestic violence. Her husband eventually left her for another woman after which Mrs Biaki stayed with a relative. Initially, she sold shoes to earn a living while her children were in their father’s custody. She remarried in 1997 and the couple settled in Phunchawng, where they worked as caretakers on a farm. Mrs Biaki’s second husband was also an alcoholic. The family became involved in Zu brewing and trade over time, which eases her livelihood and provides a good source of income. Mrs Biaki is also a habitual drinker and started drinking Zu after settling in Phunchawng. The couple did not have any children and soon after their marriage failed. Mrs Biaki then rented a house and eventually started selling liquor on her own. Her monthly income was about Rs 8,000 per month. She does not brew liquor but sells the ready-made Zu brewed by other families. About ten Zu drinkers visit her house on a daily basis. She has learned to live an independent life after two divorces and keeps in touch with her children now and then. They have tried to persuade her to live with them but she refuses. Mrs Biaki prefers her kind of life and feels comfortable living at Phunchawng. Her main problem remains economic security. She is getting older and has no plans as to how she will manage her life in the future.

Analysis of the case Mrs Biaki’s case reveals the effects of alcoholism that lead to marital breakdown, thereby causing emotional stress and economic insecurity for a person, which ultimately leads to habitual drinking and involvement in the liquor trade. Besides this, the vulnerability of women is also highlighted because of the lack of security for a divorced woman.

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Case 6 Mr Lala (real name withheld) and his wife are young migrants from Myanmar. Before their marriage, Mrs Lala went with her family when they migrated to Champhai, where her parents sold Burmese goods. Mrs Lala is a high-school dropout. After she left school, she lived with her maternal uncle at Phunchawng to help with his liquor business. Mr Lala came to Phhunchawng to work as a labourer in a relative’s distillery. The couple met at Phunchawng and were married in 2008. When they married, Mr Lala was 22 and Mrs Lala just 17. After marriage, they started to brew and sell Zu with the help of some friends with the hope that their new business would help earn some income and support their newly formed marriage.

Analysis of the case The above case illustrates the vulnerability of children due to the Zu trade. Mr and Mrs Lala were exposed to the illicit trade at very young ages. Both were high-school dropouts and lack educational qualifications due to poverty. Their early marriage is another factor that forced them to take up illicit Zu brewing and trade due to a lack of decent opportunities and social support to live a decent livelihood.

Evaluation of the Cases (1) Poverty is one of the main factors that compels individuals and families to resort to Zu brewing and trade. (2) The lack of alternative employment opportunities is another important factor. The involvement in the liquor trade is attributed not only to the individual’s lack of fundamental coping skills, but also to the attractive profits and high demand of Zu in Mizoram. (3) Marital breakdown and divorce increase the tendency of resorting to the liquor trade. (4) The lack of proper educational facilities increases the dropout rates and the individual’s vulnerability to the liquor trade. (5) Alcoholism is also a factor compelling individuals to resort to the liquor trade. (6) Women and children are seen as more vulnerable due to the liquor trade. A husband’s drinking behaviour compels his wife to become

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involved in illicit liquor brewing. Family situations also cause children to become involved in the liquor trade. (7) Differential association is also a factor that causes individuals to resort to the liquor trade. In Phunchawng, a high tolerance among the community exists on the illicit trade. (8) The liquor trade provides income for the families. It is of an unstable nature due to high rents, debt and fines paid to the YMA, Police and Excise personnel. (9) The liquor trade involves risk and stress for many families in Phunchawng, who constantly live in fear from the Police, YMA and Excise. Individuals and families involved in the liquor trade remain anxious about making a living and supporting their family, as well as their children’s futures. The social stigma due to their illegal source of income contributes much to their anxiety. (10) Those involved in the manufacturing of liquor are highly susceptible to becoming habitual drinkers or alcoholics. This is particularly true for male members of the family who are mostly engaged in Zu brewing. Brewing involves hard work and males often resort to drinking to relieve their stress after a hard day’s work. Only a few individuals have the will and determination to refrain from drinking. (11) The liquor trade involves social stigma and labelling. Individuals and families involved are often victims of discrimination in the larger society. (12) In some cases, the liquor trade is found to be purely economic in character. Some families involved do not drink at all and are also active members of the Church and the community.

Conclusion Understanding the change and continuity of Zu in the Mizo society needs an empirical and comparative analysis. Popular belief on the change and continuity of the brewing, consumption and selling of Zu has been restricted due to religion. In the past, Zu played an important role in Mizo traditional rituals and festivities, and it acted as a socializing agent. There was no evidence of social problems due to Zu. Therefore, Zu was functional because it had cultural value. Even today there exists recognition of the cultural values of Zu simply because it was a cultural belonging perceived to be engrained among Mizos since old times. Further, the socializing significance of Zu persists.

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Zu is perceived as dysfunctional in modern times. A person who is involved with anything to do with Zu is considered to be far from God and their behaviour is labelled as antisocial. A person who does not drink is seen to conform to God’s wish and contemporary Mizo society’s norm. Religion is indeed an important element of social control. This chapter reveals new emerging trends and forces beyond religion, which lead to the continuity of Zu in Mizo society. Disintegration of the cultural value of Zu also increases its economic value. Changes have paved the way for earning an income due to the contemporary values attached to it. In Mizo traditional society Zu had no economic value. Change took place as a result of new social and political influences. In Mizo society, Zu consumption persists with different social meanings. Marital conflicts and breakdown, divorces, habitual drinking and alcoholism, and environmental factors are some of the social meanings attributed to contemporary meanings of Zu.

References Awia, M. C. 2009. Mizo Hnam Dan. Aizawl: Mualchin Publication & Paper Works. Chapman, E. & M. Skyes. 1968. Mizo Miracle. Madras: The Christian Literature Society. Dev, B. J. & K. D. Lahiri. 1983. Lushai Customs and Ceremonies. Delhi: Mittal Publications. Halliday, R. S. 2009. An Evaluation of The Care Provided for Substance Abuse Addicts in Mizoram. Delhi: ISPCK. Hauhnar, M. 2012. Khawithlar (R. Zuala Thu Leh Hlate). Aizawl: Gilzom Offset. Lalengmawii, K. 2008. “Psycho-social Challenges of Children of Alcoholics in Rangavamual.” A Project Report Submitted to the Department of Social Work, Mizoram University. Lalnuntluangi. 2004. “Alcoholism as a Community Problem in Saron Veng.” A Project Report Submitted to the Department of Social Work, Mizoram University. Lalrimawia. 1995. Mizoram: History and Cultural Identity 1980–1947. Delhi: Spectrum Publications. Lalrinawma, V. S. 2005. Mizo Ethos: Changes and Challenges. Aizawl: Mizoram Publication Board. McCall, A. G. 2003. Lushai Chrysalis. Aizawl: Tribal Research Institute.

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Pachuau, H. Z. 2011. “NGOs in Mizoram-Retrospect and Prospect.” Contemporary Social Scientist 1 (1): 63–71. Robin, K. 2011. “Sahria Ku: Death of a Mara tradition.” Contemporary Social Scientist 1 (2): 109–14. Sailo, G. L. 2008. “Case Studies of Families Engaged in The Liquor at Phunchawng.” A Project Report Submitted to the Department of Social Work, Mizoram University. Sangkima. 2004. Essays on the History of The Mizos. Delhi: Spectrum Publications. Sangzuala, C. 1998. Mizo Hnam Zia Leh Khawtlang Nun Siamthatna. Aizawl: Synod Publication Board. Varte, C. L. 2012. “A Study of the Impact of Alcohol on The Mizos.” A Project Report Submitted to the Department of Psychology, Mizoram University. Zawla, K. 1989. Mizo Pi Pute Leh An Thlahte Chanchin. Aizawl: Gosen Press. Zothansanga, M. 2008. “Alcoholism as a Community Problem in Rangvamual.” A project Report Submitted to the Department of Social Work, Mizoram University.

ASPECTS OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGES— MIZO SOCIETY AND COLONIAL RULE S. HAUKHANLIAN MATE AND VANRAMMAWII

British occupation followed by the introduction of Christianity in the Lushai Hills (erstwhile Mizoram) brought social transformation to the Mizo society in many ways (Parry 1988). As a result, indigenous social practices faded out, while some of the existing social customary practices were modified and new phenomena were introduced into the Mizo society (Lloyd 1991). This chapter reveals the transformation of Mizo society due to the introduction, abolition and modification of non-Mizo external cultures, beliefs and practices, broadly defined as the social transformation of the Mizo society. The social transformation of the Mizo society can be summed up in three words: introduction, abolition and modification. This chapter attempts to elucidate the social and cultural changes of the Mizos influenced during the British Colonial rule. It specifically deals with changing forms of Mizo marriage and divorce, the status of women in Mizo society, and Mizo customary practices connected with birth rites, death rites, burial and superstitions.

Marriage and Divorce During pre-Christian Mizo society (which was animist), marriage was a civil contract (McCall 1971). Marriage price also played an important role during the marriage arrangements of the Mizo society (Hluna 2001). After the adoption of the Christian faith by the Mizos in 1904, the marriage system changed, which resulted in a hybrid custom (Nag 1993). Few Mizo customary practices are preserved in the present, and more new elements have been introduced since the adoption of the Christian faith.

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Earlier, Mizo marriage performed a series of rites, ceremonies and rituals for both the evil and good spirits (Ray 1982). These practices are no longer practiced due to the proselytization of Mizos. However, the old custom of distributing the Man tang [bride price] and offering feasts to the relatives during marriage ceremonies continues. With the onslaught of Christianity by 1904, Mizo marriage became more than a civil contract (Nag 1998). It is now a religious ceremony requiring a solemn marriage vow between the bride and the groom at a church. At present, Mizo marriage is solemnized at the altar of the Christian church by the pastor or the priest within the framework of Christian doctrines. The exception is that the marriage price and its distribution to other closer relatives remains the same as earlier practices (Hluna 1992). The giving of the bride price continues today; it has increased during recent times and differs from what it was during the pre-Christian era. In recent times in Mizo Christian marriage, both the bride and the groom have the freedom to choose the kind of marriage ceremony dress (a suit or a gown or traditional Mizo attires) they like. Whereas in the early days prior to the onslaught of Christianity, most couples wore Mizo Puanchei (the Mizo customary dress for women wrapped around their waist) on their wedding day. At present, both the bride and groom dress in garments of their own choice, which are the Western outfits of a white flowing wedding gown and veil for the bride and a blazer suit for the groom. In the earlier Mizo society, marriages were social in nature (Lalrinmawia 1995). There are different ways of celebration after the marriage. During the marriage ceremony in the earlier days of Mizo society, volunteers served tea, cakes and other delicacies to the guests (Nunthara 1996). In some cases, the tea and snack items were served to the people prior to the ceremony. A public feast was given to the guests who attended (Kipgen 1996). There was no reception in the groom’s house. Invitees used to present gifts to the couple on the day of the marriage. The giving of gifts to the groom by the guests was not practiced in the earlier Mizo society. This was a recent addition introduced by the Christian missionaries. Sangkima (1992) mentions a few changes that Christianity brought to the Mizos regarding marriage, such as the giving of gifts both in kind and in cash.

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With the onslaught of Christianity, many customary Mizo practices of marriage were abolished (Nag 1993). For example, throwing water at the bride when she moved from her father’s house to the groom’s house was no longer practiced. Eavesdropping (mostly by young men) on the couple on their first night together is now out of the picture due to a preference for civilised life and thinking. The practice of consuming Zu (rice beer) during the celebration was abolished in recent times, mostly due to the pressure from the Churches and civil society organisations of Mizoram. Now, serving tea and snacks during Mizo marriages has replaced the serving of Zu. Many unhealthy practices of the past were given up and most of the Mizo marriage practices are at present organised within the purview of the Church doctrines in contemporary times (Hminga 1987). Many changes are present in the Mizo-Christian marriage. However, traditional Mizo practices like courting before marriage, activity of an intermediary in the process of marriage and marriage bride price are still practiced. During pre-Christian Mizo society, divorce between a Mizo couple was not complicated. Until today, there are no major modifications during divorce arrangements between Mizo husbands and wives. The only change in recent times is that the Christian faith does not allow any kind of divorce. Divorce became rarer among the active members of the Church. On the other hand, divorce occurs among people who are not so active in the Church activities. Divorce now does not occur based on whims but on sufficient legal grounds and cases have been greatly reduced in contemporary Mizo society. The introduction of Christianity and Western education in the Mizo society has changed the meaning of the Mizo institution of marriage and divorce.

Status of Women During pre-Christian Mizo society, the position of the Mizo woman in the family and society was very low (Hluna 2001). Her position in the social life was subordinate and wretched, like an orphan girl serving as a maid in the family of a cruel and selfish man (McCall 1971). The low status of women in the pre-modern Mizo society changed primarily due to the advent of Christianity and the employment opportunities provided for women at the government services.

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Christianity is still considered a primary instrument for the transformation of women’s status (Kipgen 1996). The introduction of Christianity and Western education transformed the mindsets of the Mizo society. Western education also empowered Mizo women on many counts, allowing them to leave the bondage of Mizo tradition. At present, many Mizo women represent in the public sphere. They share the responsibility of their families and society at large with their male counterparts. At present, many Mizo women serve in administration and other positions. Mizo women’s positions in religious matters have witnessed transformations (Hluna 2001). Many women have received education from the theological colleges. They serve as active workers in missionary activities. A series of conferences on women and religious affairs has occurred in contemporary Mizo society. There is a growth of women members in the Church and in religious activities like preaching and missionary work. The introduction of Christianity and modern education transformed the status of Mizo women, enabling them to achieve a position of parity with their male counterparts. Nowadays, women in Mizo society perform better than the Mizo men. For instance, Mizo women have higher pass percentages in graduate exams, and lower dropout rates in college. Mizo women have the freedom to take part in every walk of life—official, commercial and social.

Custom of Birth During the pre-Christian Mizo society, the male child was more preferable than the female. When a male child was born, the Upa (Mizo elder) blessed him as Mipa huaisen sai kap tur (a valiant male, deemed to be an elephant killer) and a female child was greeted as Se man tur (she will cost a Mithun meat). In the present Mizo society, all such metaphorical preferences for male or female are absent. The births of both male and female children are hailed with the same joy (Nunthara 1996). Some parents in contemporary Mizo society even prefer a female child to a male child. When a child is born, the child is taken to the Church and prayers are offered for them by the pastor or a Church elder. When a mother died during or after childbirth in the pre-Christian Mizo society, the baby would be smothered and buried with her because of the belief that it had no chance of survival without the mother. Such a drastic

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way of life was abolished by the Christian missionaries who came to Mizoram and enlightened the Mizos on how to take care of orphan babies. In this manner, the lives of many Mizo babies were saved. At present, such disturbing Mizo customary practices no longer exist. During pre-Christian Mizo society, the birth of twins was regarded as dreadful (Lalbiakthanga 1978). Mizos believed either one of the twins to be an incarnation of Ramhuai (an evil spirit), and in earlier Mizo society either one of the twins was abandoned in the jungle (Parry 1988). However, with the onslaught of Christianity this belief was eliminated. Now, twins are no longer regarded as dreadful but are appreciated.

Customs of Death and Burial With the Christian Gospels, Mizos professed modifications of the traditional customary practice of burying the dead (Lalbiakthanga 1978). During earlier times, Mizos buried the corpse near the person’s house. There were no exceptions for the burial of the village chief and his wife (Lalrimawia 1995), in which case Kuang-ur [burial rituals] were practiced. The corpse was put inside a wooden coffin that was placed near a wall in the dead person’s house and a special hearth was built. A bamboo tube was fixed to the bottom of the coffin with the other end running into the ground. The coffin was sealed and made airtight. The body rotted in the heat and the liquefied flesh drained through the bamboo tube underneath the house. The process usually lasted about three months, by the end of which only dry bones were left, which were collected and kept in a special basket. Christianity changed such obnoxious customary Mizo practice (Ray 1982). The practice of Kuang-ur and burying of the dead near the house was abolished by the Christian Missionaries (Hminga 1987). This was replaced by a common burial ground or cemetery for every village or locality to bury the dead, which is known as Thlanmual (cemetery). All dead bodies, whether of chief or commoner, rich or poor, were all buried in the Thlanmual, showing an equal treatment to all the dead in the Mizo society (Sangkima 1992). When a person dies, a Church bell tolls to apprise every one of the event. Sometimes, it is announced from the information centre of the village. People in the locality come together to console the bereaved family. They sing Christian hymns together. If the deceased passes away after the

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afternoon, their body is kept throughout the night and young people sing Christian hymns in the deceased’s house. During earlier times in Mizo society, as soon as the death was announced young ladies collected firewood and rice for the bereaved family from every family in the area. The young ladies were not supposed to do their normal work in domestic spheres for at least a few days. Young Mizo men volunteered to dig the grave of the deceased. Friends and relatives brought extra supplies of food or money to buy necessary things for the funeral. The singing of Christian hymns continued for many days in the deceased’s house both day and night after their burial. With regards to death, different names are given to it according to its nature. As such, the names Awmlai [natural death], Sarthi [unnatural death], Raicheh [death at child birth] and HlamZuih [death of babies three months old and younger] were given to the deceased. All these typologies of death are still recognised in the Mizo society. The only change is that in today’s Mizo society hardly any death is treated as HlamZuih, except if the child is less than a week old.

Superstition In traditional Mizo society, the Mizos were animist. Their faith and belief made them extremely superstitious. As a result, Mizos suffered from many difficulties in their day-to-day lives. For instance, it was believed that if two members of the same family undertook two separate journeys in opposite directions on the same day misfortune would befall either one. Such a conception is still prevalent among the few Mizos in contemporary times. With the advent of Christianity, Mizo adherence to superstition underwent a few minor changes (Kipgen 1996). They now no longer interpret superstition as seriously as they did in the past. Christian missionaries helped the Mizos to discard many of their superstitious beliefs. Due to the influence of Christianity Mizos usually avoid beliefs, such as some places being the abodes of evil spirits. The influence of Christianity and the British administrators had a limited impact on Mizo superstitious belief. They could not completely uproot the beliefs and practices in the Mizo society. Complete annihilation of superstition from the Mizo society was not possible and the teaching of

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Christianity did not attempt to alter all the indigenous rituals, which did not exist in opposition to the Christian gospels. As a result, superstition and omens still prevail in the present Mizo society.

References Hluna, J.V. 1992. Education and Missionaries in Mizoram. Guwahati: Spectrum Publications. —. 2001. “Role of Women in The Politics of Mizoram Through The Ages.” Paper Presented at a Refresher Course, Aizawl. Hminga, C. L. 1987. The Life and Witness of the Churches in Mizoram. Mizoram: The Literature Committee. Kipgen, M. 1996. Christianity and Mizo Culture. Aizawl: The Mizo Theological Conference. Lalbiakthanga. 1978. The Mizos: A Study in Racial Personality. Guwahati: United Publishers. Lalrimawia. 1995. History and Cultural Identity, 1890–1947. Assam: Spectrum Publications. Lloyd, J. M. 1991. History of the Church in Mizoram. Aizawl: The Synod Publication Board. Mc Call, A. G. 1977. Lushai Chrysalis. Calcutta: Firma KLM. Nag, C. R. 1998. Mizo Polity and Political Modernisation. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing. —. 1993. The Mizo Society in Transition. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing. Nunthara, C. 1996. Mizoram: Society and Polity. New Delhi: Indus Publishing. Parry, N. E. 1988. A Monograph on Lushai Custom and Ceremonies. Aizawl: Tribal Research Institute. Ray, Animesh. 1982. Mizoram: Dynamic of Change. Calcutta: Pearl Publishers. Sangkima. 1992. Mizo: Society and Social Change. Guwahati: Spectrum Publications.

IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN SIKKIM P. NEWTON SINGH

Sikkim was once a theocratic state with institutions like a monarchy, feudalism and Lamaism. Sikkim underwent change when liberal democracy, with principles of liberty, equality and citizenship, started penetrating the society during the 1960s. Sikkim during the 1960s and 1970s was at a crossroads, and there were resistances from the monarchy and elites of Sikkmese society against the liberal wave. The new wave of democracy became a choice (not an option) during 1970. Ultimately, the old institutions of theocracy collapsed and gave way to the introduction of new kinds of institutions, which are democratic elements in Sikkim. This chapter discusses the process of resistance and reconciliation between the old and new institutions that shaped the contemporary Sikkimese society and polity. Sikkim became a part of the Indian union in 1975. There are three major ethnic groups in Sikkim: Lepcha, Bhutia and Nepalese. Lepcha and Bhutia are regarded as the indigenous groups. Nepalese are numerically and politically dominant in contemporary Sikkim. Nepalese as an ethnic category includes various ethnic groups1 and their unity in the Nepalese category was sustained by their collective experiences of exploitation under Sikkim’s feudal monarchy.2 However, there are growing signs of ethnic assertion with claims and aspirations specific for each community in today’s Sikkim.3 In 1972, the Sikkimese political system presented a rare example of a tug of war between the theocracy and the liberal democracy. While the former was well entrenched in Sikkimese society, the latter came to be accepted in theory.4 In 1975, Sikkim became a part of India, and the Sikkimese polity underwent a process of integration among tribalism, Lamaist traditionalism and liberal democracy. Sikkmese tribalism is mainly

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identified with ethnic institutions, and Lamaist traditionalism was a product of the theocratic practices of Tibetan origin.5 The Chogyal (ruler), the clergy, the Kazis (landlords) and the monks were in favour of the Lamaist tradition; however, the majority of the Nepalese population disfavoured the monarchy and demanded democratic polity. In 1979, the first general election of the Sikkim state assembly was fought on the basis of adult franchise without the “parity system.”6 In each election, a dominant party has won almost all the 32 seats of the assembly. The present SDF (Sikkim Democratic Front) government is in its fourth term with all 32 seats occupied. Growing signs of opposition from within the SDF in the present political dispensation in the form of the “Golay Phenomenon” have also emerged recently. Whether or not democracy has been well entrenched in the Sikkimese body politics is a worthy question that calls for a separate discussion. This chapter explains social change through the prism of political institutions and Sikkimese social foundation.

Understanding Change in Sikkim Increasing contact and exposure to new patterns are the factors for social change in Sikkim. People in Sikkim abandon their old institutions, patterns of behaviour and even places of residence in favour of new ones after exposure to the modern and cultural contacts. Exposure to Western liberal ideas of democracy or democratic intrusion into Sikkimese social structure were the beginnings of democracy in Sikkim.7 Joel S. Migdal8 argues that cultural contacts are not a sufficient condition of change. He emphasized the historical weakening of institutions and elaborated two different sets of reasons for abandoning traditional patterns and commitments. The first was the desire, on the part of those with sufficient resources and wealth, to achieve recognition and success in a system wider than that of the village. For them, social mobilization, the abandonment of the old, meant the simultaneous adoption of new ways associated with modernity. A second set of reasons for abandoning the old concerns that group of people who had relied on the functioning of the traditional institutions to protect and serve them, and who lacked the resources to advance in the wider status system.

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Discussing the role of the state in social change, Migdal developed a model of state-society relations called the state-in-society approach, emphasizing the “process of interaction of groupings with one another and with those whose actual behavior they are vying to control or influence.”9 His argument is that states cannot be understood sui generis but must be conceptualised through their relationships with society. Discussing the origin of democracy in agrarian society, Manus I. Mindlarsky10 discussed three models for the development of democracy during the period 1973 to 1987. The first model suggests that agricultural density is related to land inequality, which in turn leads to increased political rights in formerly tribal/hereditary polities. The second model centres on political violence as a consequence of this land inequality, which in turn leads to increased political rights after violent political upheaval. The third model suggests urbanisation and trade process, along with economic development, which lead to increasing demands for political rights. His models capture Sikkim’s transition from feudal monarchy to democracy.

Traditional Institutions in Feudal Sikkim Sikkim has been described as a traditional society11 in which a variety of social forces are in operation in the form of institutions. The early history of Sikkim emerged from the breakup of the Tibetan Monarchy in the tenth century and the subsequent struggle among the rival Buddhist sects for political supremacy. Sikkim was settled during the thirteenth century by herders from Khams in eastern Tibet who embraced the Nyingma, or unreformed, sect of Tibetan Buddhism. These settlers were joined by the displaced nobles from Bhutan in the east, rapidly gaining ascendancy over the indigenous Tibeto-Burman Lepchas. Under the aegis of a powerful monastic establishment, a secular monarch with the title of Chogyal12 was installed during the seventeenth century to rule over territories that extended southward into the Terai and westward as far as the Arun River in eastern Nepal.13 In terms of shaping a distinct identity, Lamaism was the most important institution to Sikkimese society. With the consecration of Phuntsog Namgyal as the first ruler and a lama incarnation, a tradition emerged in which most of the succeeding rulers were incarnate monks from sacred monasteries. The two sects of Lamaism prevalent in Sikkim were

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Nyingmapa and the Kargyupa.14 Until today, most of the important monasteries in Sikkim belong to either of the two sects of Lamaism. The Chogyal descendants ruled in unbroken succession until 1975. Membership in the ruling elite of monarchs and lamas was based on pure Tibetan ancestry, but the indigenous Lepchas were incorporated into the administrative hierarchy as provincial revenue functionaries and as village headmen with hereditary privileges. Lepchas were recruited into the monastic structure. By the turn of the twentieth century, nearly one out of every ten males of Sikkim’s Buddhist population was attached to one of the country’s 35 monasteries.15

Nature of Sikkimese Feudalism Describing the nature of feudalism in Sikkim, A. C. Sinha16 termed it “frontier feudalism” with four major attributes: (a) a quasi-divine and quasi-charismatic legitimacy of rulers, (b) a lack of clarity in ruler’s location in the regional power structure, (c) a shifting seat of political authority, and (d) a significance attached to the products of the pastoral economy. The political structure of theocratic Sikkim combined three distinct segments: the clergy, the aristocracy and the commoners. Buddhist monasteries were established and huge estates were attached to them. These monasteries were the centres of theological training for the clergy. Some of the monasteries were maintained with support from the state exchequer and served as administrative centres. Monasteries were crucial not only from the socio-ritual point of view, but also for the economic and political considerations. The clergymen held important administrative positions and managed the affairs of the state.17 In the traditional Sikkimese economic system, all land belonged to the ruler (Chogyal), who gifted portions of it to his chattels, courtiers and Kazis (landlords) in return for their services. The Kazis were regional landlords looking after the territories of Sikkim. The Kazis had no proprietary rights on lands, although they did have a hereditary title to their office. Kazis held land on behalf of the ruler, and appointed the village headman (Mandal) who could rent out the arable land towards the individual farming families or cultivators. The revenue administration was in the hands of the local aristocracy, whose omission and commission were hardly scrutinized. Such a land lease system continued until 1950, when it was abolished.18

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Peasants paid taxes in kind and provided labour tribute according to the discretion of local revenue functionaries. Revenues that were not claimed by the Chogyal were assigned to monasteries and landed nobility. Monasteries also derived support during festivals when people gathered for ritual performances and offered donations of food and other goods. The revenue system remained intact until the British assumed administrative control of Sikkim during the 1880s.19

Sikkim During the Colonial Period and the Inception of New Ideas Sikkim emerged as the lynchpin for British aspirations to open Tibet during the later decades of the nineteenth century, which led the British to establishment a formal protectorate over Sikkim, thereby giving the British government exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of the kingdom. Formal relations between British India and Sikkim began when the British East India Company signed the Treaty of Titalya during 1817, after the conclusion of the Anglo-Gorkha War (1814–16). The Tumlong Treaty of 1861 allowed the British government to intervene in the internal affairs of Sikkim but left the ruler of the kingdom sovereign.20 The exact political standing of Sikkim remained ambiguous: “Sikkim was never a feudatory ‘native state’… but neither was Sikkim independent or entirely autonomous.”21 The British presence in Sikkim transformed its ethnic, economic, fiscal and administrative structure. John Claude White wrote: “Chaos reigned everywhere, there was no revenue system, no court of justice, no police, no public works, no education for the younger generation … the coffers were empty.”22 It was during White’s tenure (1888–1908) that a system of taxation was introduced and a land tenure system incepted, as was a system of monetary economy. He also introduced horticulture, cottage industries and sericulture. Many Nepalese arrived during this period and developed agriculture on a large scale, primarily farming rice and cardamom, using the techniques of terrace farming. Under his administration, Sikkim turned out to be a well-integrated, peaceful corner of British India. New infrastructures were developed including dispensaries, schools and a road transport system. Nepalese immigration in Sikkim can be understood through two different waves: the Gorkha incursion from 1770 to 1815 and the British induced

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settlement efforts from 1861 onwards. During the 1860s, the British with Sikkimese collaborators settled many Nepalese in the sparsely populated southern and western tracks of Sikkim. This policy was driven by the British desire to balance the pro-Tibetan Nepalese Bhutias, or Sikkimese of Tibetan descent, with pro-British India Nepalese.23 During the 1891 Census, the Nepalese Sikkimese outnumbered the Lepchas, who are considered the first inhabitants of Sikkim, and Bhutias or settlers from Tibet who came to Sikkim during the mid-seventeenth century. .

The immigration of Nepamul Sikkimese brought about significant changes in Sikkim. British subjugation made the ruling class adopt many nonTibetans into the Sikkim political system. Among the most obvious results of this assimilation, mention may be made of the evolution of Kazis and Newar Thikadars as landlords and the appointment of non-Tibetans as civil servants.

Independent India, Sikkim and the Emergence of Modern Political Institutions Sikkim continued as a protectorate of India after India attained independence on August 1947. The Sikkimese monarch and India signed (a) the Standstill Agreement24 on 1948 and (b) the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty25 of 1950. By the 1940s, the growing consciousness for the need of a political reform emerged in Sikkim. Anti-feudalist sentiments and reformist forums emerged during the 1940s in Sikkim. The Praja Sudharak Samaj was one such forum formed during the early 1940s. Other forums like the Praja Sammelan and Praja Mandal were subsequently formed. The objectives of these forums were mainly abolition of forced labour, oppression of the landlords and payment of land rent directly to the state bankers rather towards the Kazi. On December 7, 1947, three forums merged to form the Sikkim State Congress, which was the first political party of Sikkim. The party demanded (a) abolition of landlordism, (b) formation of an interim government as a precursor to a responsible and democratic government, and (c) accession of Sikkim to the Indian Union.26 As a response to the Sikkim State Congress party, Palden Thondup Namgyal founded the Sikkim National Party. The party sought to safeguard the Lepcha-Bhutia interests and stood for an independent Sikkim with the special treaty with India. In 1949, the Sikkim State

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Congress brought the ruling Chogyal into an agreement to install a fivemember interim government. The first popular government of Sikkim was installed on May 9, 1949 under the leadership of the state Congress. However, it proved to be short lived as it was dismissed in the very next month by the Government of India. An election was held for the first time in 1953 on the basis of the parity system. By 1955, a High Court was established and a Chief Judge appointed. Four district magistrates at the level of the four districts and a Chief Magistrate at Gangtok were established. The year 1955 also witnessed the growth of other political parties like the Swatantra party, the Sikkim National Congress, the Scheduled Caste League and Sikkim Janata party through alignments or splits of the then-existing parties. Another development was the emergence of politics along ethnic lines. During the fifth general election of 1973, there were three political parties fighting essentially on ethnic lines, which were evident from the election results. The political development after 1973 was significant for Sikkim for it brought about dramatic change in the Sikkimese political landscape. Political parties with a Nepalese support base started political demands such as fully fledged democracy, a written constitution, fundamental rights, the one-man-one-vote principle based on adult franchise and abolition of the parity system.

Sikkim in Search of Identity, Resistance and Reconciliation During the 1960s and 1970s, a shared Sikkimese national identity27 emerged despite the ethnic differences. However, the construction of a Sikkimese identity was dominantly along Tibeto-Burman identity. Palden Thodup Namgyal, in his 1965 coronation, stressed Tibeto-Burman. Although two-thirds of the Sikkimese population spoke Nepalese, the Chogyal remarked that: “many in this group are not ethnically Nepalese but are of Mongoloid stock, suggesting that most Nepalese Sikkimese are not Indo-Aryan but rather culturally Buddhist with ancestral links to Mongolian tribes, who had migrated from the Tibetan plateau to Nepal and their ancestors, and finally to Sikkim.”28 Another factor that provided a basis of common identity was that most Sikkimese deeply revered their Buddhist ruler and venerated Mount Kanchendzonga as the guardian deity, a constant reminder of a shared landscape if not shared traditions. Efforts were also made on school education and curriculum to make them more suitable to the special conditions and character of Sikkim.

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The parity system, a unique electoral system, was introduced during the first Sikkim Council elections in 1953. It divided the electorate into Bhutia Lepcha and Nepalese Sikkimese, thus highlighting the basic differences between the two major communities. By 1961, the Sikkim Subject Regulation was accepted.29 The electoral system undercut efforts for creating a common identity and became a valid point of contention between the communities. There were efforts for international recognition of Sikkim along the lines of Bhutan as a Himalayan Kingdom. Demands for the revision of the treaty between Sikkim and India of 1950 grew, especially after 1965. By 1967, the Chogyal announced Sikkim’s goal as political freedom. With the objective of projecting Sikkim’s distinct identity, the national flag, national anthem and the Sikkim guard were unanimously incepted in 1967 by the Chogyal and the political parties. Due to the growing wave for democratization, massive protests against the Chogyal emerged in April 1973. They led to a breakdown of law and order all over Sikkim. Finally, the ruler requested the Government of India intervene and restore law and order. In May 1973, an agreement was signed between Sikkim and India to envisage the future constitutional setup and Sikkim’s relationship with India. The agreement included the establishment of an independent judiciary, a guarantee of the rights of the minorities and, most importantly, a cabinet responsible to the state assembly. In 1974, the Government of India introduced the 35th Constitutional Amendment Bill in the Indian parliament giving Sikkim the status of an associate state of India and representation in Indian parliament. The bill was passed on September 7, 1974. In the 36th Amendment Act, Sikkim became a constituent state of the Indian Union.

Today’s Sikkim Sikkim has been a constituent state of the Indian union since the formal merger in 1975. Modern democratic practices like elections and institutions have become well entrenched in the Sikkimese polity. There still exists a continued legacy of traditional institutions, though those of socio-economic and political natures are not so profound. Traditional institutions like Tibetan Lamaism and the reverence for this tradition still

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exist, despite ethnic differences. Monasteries from different sects still command importance in the politics of Sikkim. Sikkim is the only state in secular India where Sangha (the local council) is accorded political representation in the state legislature assembly. This may be understood as a reflection of the process of reconciliation between the traditional and modern institutions in Sikkim. There is a separate ecclesiastical department in Sikkim to look after the affairs of the Sanghas and monasteries. The administrative bodies of local governance that were operational during the Chogyal period, like Dzumsa in north Sikkim, continue to survive even after the introduction of the Panchayati Raj Act in the state, and they still command significant respect among the local communities in matters relating to village administration, including dispute settlement. One may even infer that the present democratic dispensation has been much influenced by the values associated with traditional institutions. A. C. Sinha,30 in describing the contemporary political culture, reflected that the “patron-client relationship permeated both private and public domains alike,” and “the present democratic polity of Sikkim has greatly benefitted from its inherited political ideology of the Lamaist past.” Since 1979 and the first democratic election in Sikkim there has been only one dominant political leader without opposition. Such a nature of democracy is contestable, for the essence of democracy is not merely a passive obedience from the citizens, and this requires a separate discussion. The Lamaist tradition influenced the modern democratic dispensation in a significant way. One may even term the modern polity “political feudalism.” The existence of tradition and modernity in Sikkim may not necessarily be one of mutuality, as there is an ongoing contestation between them. An example is manifested in those movements against the construction of dams and other projects in Sikkim, which particularly invoked the tradition. The Affected Citizens of Teesta (ACT) is one such movement. Such groups use their sacred texts both symbolically and instrumentally and have been successful in opposing the implementation of the Rathongchu hydroelectric project in Sikkim. Religious texts became the performative actors in the context of opposition and cannot be treated as sacred texts guiding the religious understanding

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of Sikkim. The Rathongchu Hydroelectric Project was finally shelved in 1997. The main reasons cited by the Government of Sikkim for the closure were escalating ethnic tensions, preserving Yoksum (a sacred site) as a sacred landscape and respecting the religious sentiments of the Buddhists, checking environmental destruction caused in the area by frequent landslides, the escalating costs of construction and gaining a favourable public opinion before the general elections scheduled for 1998.31 Historic (re)interpretation reflects the negotiations in a multi-ethnic Sikkim. Sikkim today exhibits a confluence of both tradition and modernity. It is not a case of a total replacement of the old with the new. There are aspects of contestation, reconciliation and accommodation. Understanding social change in Sikkim therefore has to be understood in this context.

Notes  1

The category includes groups such as Limbu, Rai, Magar, Yakha, Khombu, Mechi, Gorkha, Newars, Gurungs, Tamangs, Chhetry, Bahun and Sunwar. 2 Vibha Arora, (2005), “Text and Context in Sikkim, India,” in Reading Religion in Text and Context: Reflections of Faith and Practice in Religious Materials, Elisabeth Arweck and Peter Collins (eds) (Aldershot: Ashgate), 85. Also see, A. C. Sinha, (2008), Sikkim: Feudal and Democratic (New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company). 3 The assertion of Kirati Identities is one such example. For details please see T. B. Subba, (1999), Politics of Culture: A Study of Three Kirat Communities in the Eastern Himalayas, (Chennai: Orient Longman Hyderabad). 4 Sinha, Sikkim: Feudal and Democratic, 298. 5 Ibid., 16. 6 A representative system whereby elected seats in the State Council were divided equally among the Bhutia-Lepcha and the Nepalese community. 7 Sinha also argues that liberal democracy in Sikkim emerged from the intrusion of some aspects of worldwide democratic culture into Sikkemese political structure. See Sikkim: Feudal and Democratic, 16. 8 Joel S. Migdal, (1974), “Why Change? Toward a New Theory of Change Among Individuals in the Process of Modernization,” World Politics 26 (2): 189–206. 9 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Seattle: University of Washington), 23. 10 Manus I. Midlarsky, “The Origins of Democracy in Agrarian Society: Land Inequality and Political Rights,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (3) (1992): 454–77. 11 Traditional society is understood as that wherein religious beliefs and social organizations are closely related. 12 The term, however, was a new designation in place of the old Tibetan nomenclature of Maharaja, which came to be used from the period of Palden

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 Thondup Namgyal. See Sinha, Sikkim: Feudal and Democratic, 111 (the Maharaja turned Chogyal). 13 Richard English, (1985), “Himalayan State Formation and the Impact of British Rule in the Nineteenth Century,” Mountain Research and Development 5 (1); Convergences and Differences in Mountain Economies and Societies: A Comparison of the Andes and Himalayas, 66–7. 14 Monasteries all over Sikkim belong to these two sects. The Pemayangtse monastery, the Tashiding and Phensang belong to the Nyingmapa sect, while Ralang, Phodong and Rumtek belong to the Kargyupa sect. 15 English, “Himalayan State Formation and the Impact of British Rule,” 67. 16 Sinha, Sikkim: Feudal and Democratic, 55. 17 Ibid., 56. 18 Ibid., 56. 19 English, “Himalayan State Formation and the Impact of British Rule,” 67. 20 Jacky Hiltz, “Constructing Sikkimese National Identity in the 1960s and 1970s,” Bulletin of Tibetology 39 (2) (2003): Gangtok: Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, 69. 21 Leo Rose, quoted in Ibid., 69. 22 J. C. White, (1909), “Sikkim and Bhutan: 21 Years on the North East Frontier, 1887–1908,” quoted in Sinha, Sikkim: Feudal and Democratic, 93. 23 Hiltz, “Constructing Sikkimese National Identity in the 1960s and 1970s,” 71. 24 The Constituent Assembly of India adopted a resolution on January 22, 1947 to the effect that a committee should deal with the special problems of Sikkim, and as a result on February 27, 1948, a standstill agreement was signed between the Sikkim Durbar and the Government of India. 25 Article II of the Treaty reads: “Sikkim shall continue to be a protectorate of India and, subject to the provisions of this treaty, and shall enjoy autonomy in regard to its internal affairs.” 26 L. B. Basnet, (1974), Sikkim: A Short Political History (Delhi: S. Chand & Co.). 27 Hiltz, “Constructing Sikkimese National Identity in the 1960s and 1970s,” 71. This idea of shared Sikkimese national identity is contested by Sinha. 28 Ibid., 71. 29 The regulation clearly defines the status of Sikkim Subjects and other provisions for acquisition and loss of said status. It has been repealed. 30 Sinha, Sikkim: Feudal and Democratic, 299. 31 Arora, “Text and Context in Sikkim, India,” 84.

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References Arora, Vibha. 2005. “Text and Context in Sikkim, India.” In Reading Religion in Text and Context: Reflections of Faith and Practice in Religious Materials, edited by Elisabeth Arweck and Peter Collins. Aldershot: Ashgate. Basnet, L. B. 1974. Sikkim: A Short Political History. New Delhi: S. Chand & Co. Hiltz, Jacky. 2003. “Constructing Sikkimese National Identity in the 1960s and 1970s.” Bulletin of Tibetology 39 (2): 56–79. English, Richard. 1985. “Himalayan State Formation and the Impact of British Rule in the Nineteenth Century.” Mountain Research and Development 5 (1): 66–7. Midlarsky, M. I. 1992. “The Origins of Democracy in Agrarian Society: Land Inequality and Political Rights.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (3): 454–77. Migdal, J. S. 1993. State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Migdal, J. S. 1974. “Why Change? Toward a New Theory of Change among Individuals in the Process of Modernization.” World Politics 26 (2): 189–206. Sinha, A. C. 2008. Sikkim: Feudal and Democratic. New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company. Subba, T. B. 1999. Politics of Culture: A Study of Three Kirat Communities in the Eastern Himalayas. Hyderabad: Orient Longman. White, J. C. 1909. Sikkim and Bhutan: 21 Years in the North East frontier, 1887–1908. New Delhi: Lotus Publishing.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND WOMEN IN ASSAM NAZMUL HUSSAIN

Identifying significant change involves showing alterations in the underlying structure of an object or situation over a period of time (Berch 1982). Social change may be defined as the significant alteration of social structure and cultural patterns through time (Harper 1993, 4). The term “significant” here has a judgmental intonation that depends largely on the beholder. Social change occurs within a social structure through a network of social relationships, in which interaction between persons or groups has become routine and repetitive. Social structure includes social roles, groups, organisations, institutions and society at large. The pace and nature of change depend on the culture of a society. Social change in the context of women’s lives raises two broad and interrelated questions: (i) What are the most fundamental specific social structures that require alteration in order to alter women’s lives of inequality? (ii) How does this change occur? How does culture change? Before answering these questions, it would be pertinent to discuss the causes that bring about change and the resultant inequalities.

Causes of Social Change The general observation on the lives of people alters with the passage of time. As a result, change unfolds in the economy, urbanisation, communications and technology in general. These are the overt causes, and there are also covert and subtle causes. Causes of social change can be grouped into two broad categories. Oppenheimer (1970) mentions the first as materialistic factors, such as economic production and technology, and the second as idealistic factors, such as values, ideologies and beliefs. Karl Marx opined that the forces of production are central in shaping society, and through social change, which can be understood through

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developing sophisticated systems of production, human beings progressively come to control the material world and subordinate it to their purpose (Giddens 1993, 655). Marx did not perceive a gender-based division of labour in his analysis of the modes of production and social change. The modes of production and control of economic resources had been male dominated since earlier times. This single factor accounts for women’s inequality and the slow pace of progress. Any alterations in the material factors also enhance change in the lives of women (Kabeer 1996). Besides the economy, resources, wealth and technology are material factors that have immense potential to change social structures. Technological innovations increase the alternatives available to a society, and as such to women. But the question of how many women have the capacity to access the recent technologies to alter their unequal situations remains. Other factors that enhance change are the ideas, values and ideologies of a society. Ideas include knowledge and beliefs, values and assumptions about what is desirable and what is not. In this context, ideology means more or less organised combinations of beliefs and values that serve to justify or legitimize the forms of human action (for example democracy, capitalism, socialism) (Harper 1993, 68). Max Weber, the proponent of this line of explanation of social change, was of the view that material factors alone do not bring about change; they have to be combined with the ideational factors of a society that cause change. Feminist literature reveals examples in which the ideology of a society acts as a barrier to women’s development (see Kabeer 1996; Pietila & Vickers 1990; Bhatt 1989; Fox & Biber 1984). However, ideologies can also provide much-needed solidarity among women to enhance change. Here, the role of individuals who are ultimately the source of ideas is important. The feminist scholar J. S. Chafetz (1998, 135–60) dealt with two analytically distinct but empirically related avenues towards change in the social system that can reduce gender inequality. There are distinct social processes that produce such change without the wilful or conscious intervention of people committed to producing it. Also, in specific times and places, people (mostly women) organised with a conscious attempt to change women’s status. Arguing from a broadly Marxian perspective, Chafetz associated gender stratification mainly with the structure of

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productive work activities. By analyzing the unintended changes in the gender division of work, she focused on technological change and the demographic profile of society. Technological change promotes equality for the gender division of labour in two ways. First, it enlarges the demand for workers in types of roles previously monopolised by men with newly emerging or expanding jobs so that a new source of labour must be found (Oppenheimer 1970; Berch 1982, in Chafetz 1998). For example, highly industrialised countries where technological innovations took place at a very high speed, especially in electronics and communications, witness change in the gender-based divisions of labour. With the rise in production after World War II, demand attracted educated, married and unmarried women toward the labour force. However, gender discrepancy remains pervasive. As reported by Fox and Hesse Biber (1984), genders remain largely segregated into different types of occupations and industries, and women’s jobs pay considerably less than men’s. Increases in the demand for female workers result in a shortage of male adults, as in the cases of war and migration (Bisnath & Elson 2001). Another pervasive change occurs for both men and women during conflict situations arising out of external aggression or internal unrest. However, women and children are the worst affected by conflict situations. There are instances of women being victimised during war, such as in Palestine, Afghanistan, El Salvador and Bosnia. In India’s northeast, societies have been deeply afflicted due to armed conflict, secessionism and the troublesome sociopolitical situations. Relief camps in Assam bear testimony to women’s conditions due to ethnic conflict during the recent past in the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts (BTAD). The lives of women in the insurgency affected areas have altered drastically because of the presence of the paramilitary forces as well as armed activists. A large number of women were raped, abused and tortured by the paramilitary forces, changing their lives permanently.

Women’s Agency and Social Change Women’s empowering agency emerged based on women as a distinctive category in the development discourse (Pietila and Vickers 1990) Women’s agency in Assam emerged with the objective to transform them.

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Various women’s groups in Assam evolved through influences from women’s writings. Women’s agencies in Assam rely on the concerted initiatives of individuals and more specifically on international agencies like the United Nations Organization (UNO). In its early years, women’s issues in Assam were seen primarily in the context of human rights. Later, women’s agencies in Assam were confined to the Commission on the Status of Women and the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly, which dealt with social and humanitarian matters. During the 1980s, several organizations of the UNO ensured that women should be integrated into the developmental efforts. They introduced a Division for Women with its central agency, the UNDP program on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and Women in Development (WID) units within the various bodies of the UN (Kabeer 1996, 2). These efforts helped in bridging the gap of gender inequality. Research and policy intervention on women’s conditions are apparent in different parts of the world. The realisation of the retrograde nature of women’s conditions led to a scrutiny of cultural stereotypes responsible for women’s backwardness and the serious efforts at changing their social existence. Gender disaggregated statistical data began to attract the attention of policy planners. The agenda of women today is for their empowerment. Women’s agencies in Assam engage in activities with objectives like the development of autonomy, self-control and confidence through group solidarity. Efforts are made to secure the redistribution of power between societies and groups. It is also acknowledged that women’s agencies in Assam have the highest potential to facilitate the empowering of women. The exemplary achievement of the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in India is internationally acclaimed. SEWA has a unit in Assam and is a trade union. It organised more than fifty-thousand women workers in the state of Gujarat in an attempt to empower them. Established in 1972, it is a vibrant group of head loaders, garment vendors, junk smiths and vegetable hawkers, doing business with full empowerment. These women tackle a multitude of problems surrounding the working and living conditions of self-employed women working in many different trades and occupations (Bhatt 1989). There are also other groups spread over the country in pursuit of women’s empowerment.

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Agenda for Action An analysis of the different efforts during the last three decades towards women’s empowerment led feminist scholars in particular to reconsider the strategies for achieving women’s empowerment. Different scholars and feminist groups have pointed out that the new economic order and market economy have further marginalized poor women and men and have led to the further subordination of women. Scholars argue that women’s empowerment can be attained through political mobilization, consciousness raising and education (Bisnath and Elson 2001). In addition, changes in laws, civil codes, systems of property rights and the social and legal institutions that underwrite male control and privilege are assumed to be essential for the achievement of women’s equality. Many scholars argue that enabling conditions for women’s empowerment include participatory democracy, critical self-reflection and collective action. As a goal, it also requires long-term systematic strategies aimed at challenging prevailing structures as well as the building of state accountability. The proactive steps required to change the present condition of women in Assam so as to attain equality are the following: ¾ Education and health are the basics for quality living. Women, especially in developing countries, figure very low in these indices. All-out efforts will be required to change this situation. ¾ Women’s access to credit has to be increased through the system of micro-credit. The experience of SHGs has been very encouraging in a number of developing countries, including India. Micro-credit can solve not only women’s practical needs but can also lead to an increase in their earning potential. ¾ In order to enable women to adjust to the technological changes and take advantage of them, specific and focused interventions through education and training would be needed. While planning such initiatives, the different levels and backgrounds of the women need to be attended to, such as rural-urban, educated-illiterate, backward-forward communities, and so on. ¾ Training would be needed in the form of enterprise development so as to facilitate women’s increased access to business. This can be done through specific aptitude training and skill development in business management, marketing skills and so on.

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¾ Appropriate strategies to develop personal power (from within) and collective power (from solidarity with other women and men) are urgently needed. ¾ Adequate strategies dealing with women in difficult situations, like armed conflicts or in disaster situations of floods, droughts and earthquakes, need special attention. Packages that look into health, nutrition and education and more especially in the line of building confidence and self-worth are urgently required in such situations. Any attempt at changing the unequal situation of women and restoring gender justice would call for an understanding of the structured nature of gender relations and positive action at both micro and macro levels. The gender-based division of labour is the root cause of inequality and needs to be changed. The change in the division of labour will have to occur both at the household level and in the public sphere in order to produce greater gender equality. Equality in income as well as in the representation in the key social and political positions to effect policy planning is urgently needed.

References Berch, B. 1982. The Endless Day: The Political Economy of Women and Work. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Bhatt, Ela. 1989. “Organising The Self Employed Workers: An Experiment.” Paper Presented at the Regional Consultation on Strategies for Women’s Development, Colombo. Bisnath S. & D. Elson. 2001. “Women Empowerment Revisited.” UNIFEM, Progress of the World’s Women: A Biennial Report. http://www.unifem.undp.org/progressww/empower.html. Chafetz, J. S. 1998. “Gender Equality: Towards a Theory of Change.” In Feminism and Sociological Theory, Ruth A. Wallace (ed.). New Delhi: Sage Publications. Fox, M. F. & S. Hesse Biber. 1984. Women at Work. Palo Alto: Mayfield. Giddens, A. 1993. Sociology. Cambridge: Polity Press. Harper, C. L. 1993. Exploring Social Change. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc. Kabeer, N. 1996. Reserved Realities, Gender Hierarchies in Development Thought. New Delhi: Kali for Women. Oppenheimer, V. K. 1970. The Female Labor Force in the United States. Berkeley: University of California Press. Pietila, H. & J. Vickers. 1990. Making Women Matter: The Role of the United Nations. London: Zed Books.

INTERROGATING SOCIAL CHANGE— THE CINEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF HYBRID IDENTITY FORMATIONS RUKMINI KAKOTY

Globalisation has brought the term hybridity into the limelight. Diasporic communities have been identified by scholars like Homi Bhabha (1994), Paul Gilroy (1993) and Stuart Hall (1996). Diasporas are unique communities placed between two or more societies, a position apt for cultural mix through the creation of new forms of identity. Bhabha (1994) defined hybridity as a process of bringing newness to the world. This chapter examines diasporic identity formations by exilic filmmakers labelled as accented cinema. Accented cinema depicts the transformations of diasporic communities (Hamid Naficy 2001).

Hybridity Hybridity means anything ranging from a mix of various genes. Hybridity in social sciences refers to a mix of different cultures, religions and belongings. In the colonial past, an individual with mixed parentage (parents belonging to different racial and cultural backgrounds) could be deemed as a hybrid (métissage). In the postcolonial era, the term “hybrid individual” refers to any individual with influences of more than one culture, religion, tradition, language and so on.

Homi Bhabha and Hybridity Homi Bhabha explains hybridity by drawing from the Derridian concept of difference.1 Bhabha explained that hybridity involves an internal difference or “splitting”2 between cultural diversity and cultural differences. Hybridity that is an outcome of cultural differences does not denote any culture or ethnicity but is related to the relationship between the coloniser (powered) and the colonised (powerless).

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Hybridity for Bhabha is not a combination or mixture of genres, but results from cultural conditions that he labelled as the “third space,” wherein the coloniser and the colonised dwell in ambivalent positions. This encounter between the colonised and the coloniser produces a third space, which is neither a victory of one over the other nor a combination of the two (Bhabha 1994). It is a hybrid space that includes the split selves and ambivalent identities of both. Both the coloniser and the colonised are not distinct, whole or independent entities; instead, their identities are interdependent. Hybridity is that cultural difference or the third space where tension, disruption and disjuncture between the colonised and the coloniser exist. Hybridity prevents the compartmentalisation of identities into pure boxes. For Bhabha (1994, 5), this interstitial passage between fixed identifications opens up the possibility of a cultural hybridity that entertains the difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy. Hybridity challenges the notions of identities through transgression of the received ideas of pure traditions. For Bhabha, hybridity is heresy (in Prabhu 2007, 1–18). Hybridity is not merely a misinterpretation of sacred text but a subject matter or the content of a tradition that became overpowered in the process of translation. Hybridity defines a moment where the univocal discourse of colonial authority is challenged in translations. Bhabha believes that “newness” enters the world through hybridity (Bhabha 1994).

Hybridity and Diaspora Diaspora, etymologically, means the voluntary movement of people after the process of decolonisation. Robin Cohen (1997), in Global Diasporas, gave the classification of diaspora based on certain conditions, which are: victim, labour, trade, imperial and cultural. Home, away and belonging are also crucial aspects of defining diaspora. For a diasporic community, home is where it is from and away connotes where it is. Home is a desired place to which the diaspora wants to return and away is the place to which it has arrived and exists. The place where it resides (i.e. away) is a combination of the roots (home) and the routes it traversed to get there. This challenges the essentialist way of belonging to a particular place, nation or ethnicity. Belonging is no longer a membership or connection to a single place or nation.

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The claims on homogeneity by a nation or an imagined community3 are overthrown by the presence of the “other” inside. A diasporic community possesses a double consciousness that alters the perception of belonging, thereby challenging homogenisation. “Doubleness,” as Samir Dayal (1996) conceptualises it, is not a “just this” or “just that” situation. Diasporic double consciousness is the ambivalent position of allegiance, or hesitation to belong, to the homeland and host nation. This signifies a position of neither in nor outside the narratives of nation (Bhabha 1994). Doubleness acts as the interstitial agency that breaks the borders of culture (Samir Dayal 1996, 46–62). To a diasporic community, the idea of home connects to an idea buried in language, religion, custom or folklore, wherein loyalty and emotions are attached. Home is an imagination (Anderson 1993). This belongingness is an idea that holds the diaspora community together while it is away from the home (which is imagined), and helps in mobilising it. Home, according to Avtar Brah (in Kalra & et al. 2005), is a mystic place of desire in the diasporic imagination. For the children of the diasporic community, the homeland is seen as an illusory place whose image is fractured but still has an emotional influence (McLeod 2010, 205–36). Identity for a diasporic community comes from the migration experience and their experience in a host nation (Kraidy 2005). In the midst of demands for assimilation into the host society, diasporic identity carves out an identity that pulls together different nations and cultures and at the same time refuses to belong to just one of them (Krishna 2009). Hybridity entails exclusionary, fixed and binary notions of identity among the diaspora discourse (Brah & Coombes 2000). Hybrid identities are not complete in them and remain in flux, open to change (Young 1995).

Diasporic Cinema and its Interstitiality A diasporic community tends to express its differences with the acceptance of new cultures, which are the products of hybridisation. Hybridity in a diasporic community is reflected through art, music and cinema. For instance, Paul Gilroy (1993) explains that the formation of black music was influenced by slavery, due to which the African population came in contact with one another. The Indian American subculture of the second generation of Indian-American youths tried to establish its identity through music and dance (Maira 1999).

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Diasporas brought to the fore a whole new array of films that depict the lifeworld of diasporic communities, and their struggles and achievements in relation to their hosts and home societies. Hamid Naficy (2001) defined accented cinema as showcasing diasporic lives and storylines directed and produced by exilic and diasporic filmmakers. Migration adds to the creativity of filmmakers because it deals with the authenticity of the emotions and pains of the diasporic community (Prabhu 2007). Diasporic film or the accented cinema deals with themes crisscrossing nationality, ethnicity, gender and class (Syrotinski 2007). Placed in the cleavage of different societies, diasporic filmmakers showcase the struggle and tension between the host and home society. Diasporic films are heavily accented (Desai 2004). Such films bring ethnicity and other social backgrounds of the characters to the fore. Accented films are generally bilingual, multilingual or multi-accented, which helps to create an atmosphere of the presence of the marginal (Kapchan 1999). Moreover, the music and songs used in these films are usually different from the mainstream music and have influences from the homeland traditions and cultures. These films represent a medium for revealing the struggle for recognition and establishing a unique identity for the diasporic community. Such films express the tension of homogenisation to the dominant society (Ciecko 1999). Mississippi Masala (1991) directed by Mira Nair, and Bhaji on the Beach (1993) directed by Gurinder Chadha, deal with diasporic experiences, and depict different generations of Indian diaspora and the transformation of identities.

Mississippi Masala The movies depicts’ an Indian family who were expelled from Uganda during the 1970s. Jay, who is a barrister, born and brought up in Uganda, gives an interview to the BBC stating that Idi Amin is mad and evil to have ordered for the expulsion of all Asians. The movie opens with a tense scene in Kampala, Uganda during 1972, with Ugandan police stopping a car driven by Jay and his friend Okelo. The movie expresses tension and anxiety with the radio in the background stating a new beginning for Uganda. At a fireplace, Okelo tells his friend Jay to leave Uganda with his wife Kinnu and daughter, Mina. At this point Jay resists:

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Okelo: You are scared to leave Uganda. Jay: Why should I go? This is my home.

Jay, who is of Indian origin, was born and brought up in Uganda, which for him is his “home.” His emotions are attached to the place and the expulsion seems to be uprooting him from the permanency of his home. Okelo: Not anymore, Jay. Africa is for Africans. Black Africans.

The statement of Okelo contrasts the whole idea of Jay’s notion of home, very much embedded in rootedness, permanency and safe refuge, and any displacement of the foundation of this belief comes as a blow for Jay. Jay breaks down and a little girl (his daughter, Mina) comes running in with the sounds of her anklets (payal) at every step. This sound reminds him of India which, for Jay, is no more a home, but which still has some strings attached to it. Jay looks out of the window of his Mississippi home during this soliloquy, but a Ugandan landscape is shown with rivers and lush green lands. This scenery has become a fragment of Jay’s idea of home that he tries to hold onto. The idea of his homeland is static and uncontaminated by the present. On the other hand, Mina is shown as a grown up lady who works for their family motel while Kinnu runs a liquor shop in a black neighbourhood. During a wedding reception, one of the uncles gives a speech on how they should try to maintain a link with their homeland and asks everyone to join him for a prayer. In another scene, every one of the family is shown praying in front of an idol while one of the elders is chanting, translating the prayer into English for the younger generation. The older generation tries to hold on to the traditions of their homeland and pass them onto the younger generation. Throughout the movie, it is expressed that though the younger generation receives traditions and customs, they actively reframe those to suit them in their environment. Mina meets Demetrius, her lover who is an African American. At one point, Mina describes her identity as a mixed Masala to Demetrius, which becomes the crux of the movie and an expression of her unique identity. Mina: Three years in Mississippi, but before that in London and before that in Africa. I have never been to India.

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Knowing that Mina, who is from India, has never been there amuses Demetrius. Mina: I am a mixed Masala. Demetrius: What’s Masala? Something religious? Mina: No, a mix of hot spices.

The dialogue reveals an overall effect of the movie. It is clear how Mina perceives herself, her identity and her affiliations. Since she has origins in India but was born and brought up in other places, it makes her identify with all of them. Though she calls herself Indian, she is also very much aware of all the other places that have built up her identity. She has not tried to fix her identity and has kept it fluid and open. The element of rootedness in an identity is absent for her, and thus her “roots” have been replaced by “routes.” She reflects the double consciousness of a diasporic individual and a hybrid (Dayal 1996) Jay has definitely not taken up Mississippi or any other place as his home, and calls it a stranger’s land. For him, his land of origin, i.e. India, does not represent his homeland. The film ends with Jay visiting Uganda. He goes to his old home, which is now in disrepair. His little flower garden, an image of which comes to him at home, is no more. The picture in his imagination is now shattered with the news of Okelo’s death. He writes to his wife in Mississippi that he would return and would not like to pursue his lawsuit. Jay’s idea of home changes from how he pictured it and this lifts his belief in his uncontaminated home. The film traverses the anxieties of Mina’s identity with the utmost endeavour for homeland by Jay. She layers her identity, which helps her to move through it easily. One thing that comes out in Mina’s character is that the accumulated identities do not bother her and instead she is much more comfortable with the layered identities. For Jay, the foremost concern is to hold on to whatever is left of his home. Diasporic community women become the carriers of tradition and culture and are conferred with the responsibilities of carrying on the traditions of their adopted homeland to the next generation. Kinnu tries to abide by her responsibilities by imparting received knowledge to her child. She is shown in the movie as an independent woman who does not have any qualms with running a liquor shop in a black neighbourhood. She encourages her daughter to socialise with the eligible Indian bachelors. When she comes to know about Mina’s relationship with Demetrius she

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vehemently opposes it—not outwardly in terms of the colour of the skin but in terms of family background and the work he does. Mina: I love him. That’s not a crime, is it? Kinnu: You call this love when all you have done is bring such shame on our heads. Who is he? What do you know about him? What about his family? Mina: This is America, ma. No one cares. Kinnu: We care for your father and I. You are our only child, if we don’t care, who will?

This conversation shows the character of a mother who has the responsibility to take care of her girl in terms of traditions and customs. Mina’s freedom and courage to fall in love with a black man point to the failure of the mother to control her according to the societal norms. Mina tries to remind her mother of the place that they currently live in where such things do not matter.

Bhaji on the Beach Gurinder Chadha’s movie Bhaji on the Beach was released in 1993. The movie showcases the lifeworld of Indian diasporic women who go on a trip to Blackpool together. The movie starts with a dream sequence of Asha looking at a huge God statue. The film then reveals the stories of Indian women in their adopted homeland. Jinder is leaving her husband with her daughter and filing for a divorce. She is despised by the older Indian women because she is considered indecent by the diasporic community. Her husband lives with his parents and the divorce comes as a shock to them. The mother-in-law wants her son to go and bring back her grandchild, blaming Jinder for all the troubles: Mother-in-law: I can’t go to the temple anymore, everyone is asking. Ever since she has stepped into the house it has been trouble and nothing. And now she has brought the English courts. She wants a divorce.

Asha sympathises with Jinder’s husband Ranjit. Her mother does not support Jinder. Simi organises a trip with the Saheli women’s group and the younger girls who support her. There is a difference of opinion between the younger and the older women regarding Jinder’s decision. While Simi tries to help her in her distress, the older women blame her for the divorce.

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Harshida, who is about to enter medical college, seems to be the ideal daughter, but because of her unexpected pregnancy she loses her dignity in the eyes of the other women. Before leaving for Blackpool with the other ladies, Harshida visits her boyfriend, Oliver, who is black. Pushpa, Veena, Harshida, Jinder, Simi and Asha are joined by a woman from Mumbai, Rekha, who is dressed in Western clothing. Seeing her, the older women clad in sarees (wraparound Indian dresses) and traditional salwar kameez (north Indian dresses) become apprehensive. Her way of dressing reminds them that Indian traditions and customs are maintained by older diasporic women. Simi boards the van and gives a little speech on patriarchy and how women are bogged down by Indian women wearing Western outfits: Simi: It is not often that we women get away from the patriarchal demands made on us in our daily lives, struggling between the double yoke of racism and sexism that we bear. This is your day, have a female fun time!

During this moment, Pushpa, Asha and Veena are appalled. They do not understand what Simi means. The older women are ignorant about their own exploitation and for them it is the right way of leading a life. Women who do not follow the traditional way should be looked down upon, the older generation believes. As their journey starts, a musical track, “Summer Holiday” by Cliff Richard, plays in the background. During their journey, the women sing Punjabi folk songs. On their way they also encounter a racial attack by white boys. When they reach Blackpool, all the ladies are equally excited and Rekha, on seeing all the lights and colours, exclaims in excitement: “Bombay!” It hints at how the women hold onto the ideas of their homeland. At the beach, Simi lays out boxes of home-cooked Indian snacks like pakodas (fried vegetables) and samosas (Indian snacks). Pushpa sits on a chair by the beach where she notices a black family beside her. Seeing the black family she immediately checks her purse: Simi: Look at poor Jinder! Veena: I hear her husband used to beat her. Pushpa: These modern girls can’t adapt and those with jobs are worst. Asha, you know her in-laws. Is it true?

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Asha: No, she must have done something. My own daughter, the other day I was telling her that it’s the woman who makes the family. You know what she did? Next day she shaved her head. (All the women laugh). Asha: You think it’s funny? I was teaching her morals from back home. Rekha: Home? What home? How long has it since you been “home”? Look at you, your clothes, the way that you think!

Although the diasporic women have been away from their homeland, they have created certain pictures in their minds about its traditions. In communities living outside their homeland, the responsibility to maintain that link through traditions and customs is given to the women. The younger women no longer want to carry the burden of culture and tradition on their shoulders. Rekha, from Mumbai (Bombay), tries to show the reality of India. She becomes an icon that might not conform to the ones imagined by the diasporic women as uncontaminated and pure. She points out their clothing and way of thinking, which, for her, were long forgone by India, the homeland itself: One of the young girls: This is the twentieth century you know! Pushpa: Hai Ram! Now chaos has come! Veena: That will kill your family you know! Pushpa: It is not colour, it is culture. Veena: And why black boy? What’s wrong with our men?

Pushpa curses Harshida after coming to know about the pregnancy. And as soon as they know that the father of the child is a black man all the older women are scandalised. Harshida, regarded as the best and proudest among them, becomes a point of disgrace because of her plight and loving an individual of another race. Pushpa tries to hide her racist sentiments in the name of culture. According to them, if an Indian girl is with a black man then this is a failure on the part of the whole society. However, the younger girls try to oppose Pushpa’s opinion. The younger girls are no longer concerned with upholding values in the societies and have moved away from the older ways of representing themselves as Indian. They are striving to free themselves from the clutches of the Indian patriarchal system. Asha meets a British actor named Ambrose who takes her to see the theatre where he works and which he calls home. He speaks of how there used to be an opera, royal premier and classics stage that was their popular culture and which is now lost. He admires Asha for sticking close to her

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tradition without letting it go. Time and again, Asha hallucinates the large figure of God in front of her, which reminds her of her responsibilities towards her children and husband. Towards the end, she confronts God: Asha: But I haven’t done anything wrong. I went to college, my life was not meant to be like this. Duties, honour, sacrifice … what about me? I was a good singer at college, I never had headaches and I wasn’t born selling bloody newspapers.

Her frustration at being locked up with her family responsibilities and not being able to pursue her own talents turns her anger towards God. This dream sequence reveals the plight of a woman’s mind trapped by the traditional Indian patriarchal system. The responsibility of family and carrying on traditions for diasporic women has become a double burden for them. However, Ambrose admires her for upholding traditions, which for her has become a burden. The Indian woman (Asha) and the white man (Ambrose) hold different meanings of tradition and culture. Ambrose laments the diminution of what he thinks his culture is and Asha confronts the fact that she as a woman has to carry her culture as a burden. Another scene in the movie that brings out the difference of opinion among the younger and older generations of Indian diasporic women on societal norms and morals is the interaction between Pushpa, Veena and Harshida. Inside a coffee shop, Pushpa and Veena put their homemade food boxes on the table, which infuriates the owner of the coffee shop. She comes over to their table and declares that anything other than English food is not allowed there, and going back to her counter she makes racist comments: White lady: No manners! Veena: No shame! White lady: They want to get back from where they come from. Pushpa: We should never have come to this country. White lady: They breed like rabbits! Pushpa: If the baby dies it will be a blessing for everyone. Thank God I never had a daughter. What for? To curse me like this?

Harshida, who has been tolerating both the comments on her moral standards and racial background, can no longer take it and walks up to Pushpa, throws coffee at her and goes to the counter to shout at the lady. Harshida rebels against the way Pushpa perceives her as a spoilt girl, and also against the racial attack from the lady. It reveals the picture of double victimhood of women in a diasporic community, as a victim of racial

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assault and a victim of patriarchy. Harshida’s outburst is a small attempt on her part to free her from this double yoke of racism and patriarchy. Her idea of morality is different from that of the older women and she does not deem herself a carrier of Indian culture. However, Harshida also redefines her Indian identity by attacking the Indian patriarchal system of knowledge as well as racism. The movie gives a clear idea of the Indian patriarchal system (Desai 2004), revealing the tension of diasporic women in carrying tradition from “back home” into the foreign land. The interaction between the older and younger generations of Indian diasporic women indicates a transformation in the mindsets of the younger women who have tried to forget the Indian patriarchal system and establish their own identity with a different approach. The dress sense of the characters reinforces the idea of change and transformation. While the older women are clad in traditional sarees and salwar kameez, the younger generation accepts the Western style of dress. Simi wears a leather jacket over her salwar kameez and Harshida uses dupattas (a cloth worn around the neck), while bags made out of traditional handlooms are accepted. Both Mississippi Masala and Bhaji on the Beach bring out the notion of hybridity in the diasporic community. Mira Nair successfully portrays the dilemma, pain and anxieties of all three members of the family in the first movie, revealing the transitions and changes in the younger generations. Unlike her father, Mina is very comfortable in identifying with many lands without having a homeland, and unlike her mother she forgoes the burdens of being a woman and frees herself from being a culture carrier for the society. The hybridity in her character is brought out by the interaction between culture, gender and nation (Bhavnani 2000). Jay, in his desperate attempts to save his idea of his homeland, finds new ways to perceive it. Although originally an Indian, he takes Uganda to be his homeland and at the end of the movie, when his ideal picture of home is contaminated, he finds a new way to perceive it. Mina has a different way of understanding her own identity, which certainly does not come from the rootedness to any particular space. Her identity cannot be acknowledged in the lines of nation, ethnicity or culture. She is truly placed in the interstices of different societies, nations and cultures. Her identity draws from all the different spaces she has been in to form something new, which does not belong to a few individuals. The hybridity in these contact zones tends to help the characters free themselves from essentialising their identity and rootedness.

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Bhaji on the Beach deals with the issues of patriarchy in diaspora. The difference of opinion among the women demonstrates the idea of change in the younger generation. Since the younger generation has a more fragmented idea, or no idea at all, of their home, its ways of perceiving it become different from the older generation, which tries to maintain a link with it by following moral values. Women are deemed to be responsible for passing down traditions and morals to generations and are more entangled in the networks and links that they try to establish and retain with their home. Bhaji on the Beach depicts the younger generation’s retaliation and rebellion against the imposition of such links to a homeland. They try to re-establish their identities in their own ways, and do not try to lay their identity on the land that the older generation perceives as home. They rather create a fluid identity or identities that cannot be fixed or rooted to any nation or ethnicity. These transformations in perceiving their homeland identities raise the issues of hybridity.

Notes  1

Différance was coined by Derrida from the French word difference. They are pronounced the same but it is only through writing them that one can locate the difference. Thus, it combines the notions of differing and deferral. 2 For Bakhtin, it is between the intentional and organic hybridity. It is the act of bringing together and separating at the same time. 3 For Benedict Anderson, the nation is the collective imagination of the people. It is the imagination of the homogeneity within the group that holds them together in a community. Thus, nation is an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983).

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References Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on The Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Bhabha, Homi. 1994. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. Bhavnani, Kum-Kum. 2000. “Organic Hybridity or Commodification of Hybridity? Comments on Mississippi Masala.” Meridians 1 (1): 187– 203. Brah, Avtar & Annie E. Coombes. 2000. Hybridity and Its Discontents: Politics, Science & Culture. London: Routledge. Ciecko, Anne. 1999. “Representing the Spaces of Diaspora in Contemporary British Films by Women Directors.” Cinema Journal 38 (3): 67–90. Cohen, Robin. 1997. Global Diasporas: An Introduction. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Dayal, Samir. 1996. “Diaspora and Double Consciousness.” The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association 29 (1): 46–62. Desai, Jigna. 2004. Beyond Bollywood: The Cultural Politics of South Asian Diasporic Film. New York: Routledge. Gilroy, Paul. 1993. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. London: Verso. Hall, Stuart & Paul Du Gay (eds.). 1996. Questions of Cultural Identity. London: Sage Publications. Kalra,Virinder S., Raminder Kaur & John Hutnyk. 2005. Diaspora and Hybridity. London: Sage Publications. Kapchan, Deborah A. & Pauline T. Strong. 1999. “Theorizing the Hybrid.” The Journal of American Folklore 112 (445): 239–53. Kraidy Marwan M. 2005. Hybridity or the Cultural Logic of Globalisation. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Krishna, Sankaran. 2009. Globalisation and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first Century. USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Maira, Sunaina 1999. “Identity Dub: The Paradoxes of An Indian American Youth Subculture.” Cultural Anthropology 14 (1): 29–60. McLeod, John. 2010. Beginning Postcolonialism. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Naficy, Hamid. 2001. An Accented Cinema: Exilic & Diasporic Filmmaking. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Prabhu, Anjali. 2007. Hybridity: Limits, Transformations & Prospects. Albany: State University of New York Press.

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Syrotinski, Michael. 2007. Deconstruction and the Postcolonial: At the Limits of Theory. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Young, Robert J. C. 1995. Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race. London: Routledge.

MIGRATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN SIKKIM SUNIL PRADHAN

Sikkim has witnessed two waves of Bhutia migration. First, during the early part of the thirteenth century, Tibeto Sikkimese (Bhutias) from Tibet migrated toward Sikkim (Chakrabarti 2012). Later, during the early part of seventeenth century the Bhutias migrated from Tibet towards Sikkim (Census of India 2011). The Bhutias took refuge in Sikkim and amalgamated with the Sikkimese Lepcha way of life. The Bhutias consecrated Phuntshok Namgyal as the first ruler of Sikkim during the mid-fifteenth century. Gorkhas were originally from Nepal, and migrated from Nepal to Sikkim during the latter part of the nineteenth century (Subba et al. 2009). The industrious Newars from Kathmandu valley and the British Resident Commissioner in Gangtok brought the Nepalese to work in plantations and mines (Risley 1928). The migration of Bhutias and Gorkhas brought major transformation to Sikkim, which is examined in this chapter. Migration is an ongoing phenomenon in the Himalayas, creating a significant impact on the host society. Sikkim is nestled in the Eastern Himalayas, bounded by Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and west Bengal. Sikkim bears the social characters of all its neighbouring nations. For instance, the influence of Tibetan Buddhism remains dominant due to the entrenchment of the Buddhist religion and culture in Sikkim. Sikkimese society is not a stable society in many aspects. A stable society reflects an idea of social order without having any effect on everyday social reflections. In contrast, social change reflects changes in politics, economics and the modes of production and comes with a baggage of modernity in contemporary Sikkim.

Himalayan Migration Migration refers to the movement of people from one place to another, and can be voluntary or involuntary. Human migrations have occurred

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throughout the history of human evolution in the search for food and shelter, and most importantly when groups of people move for a variety of reasons. In contemporary times, migration can be categorised as internal, external, seasonal and return. The choice of a new place relies on certain positive factors like climate and a better food supply. The overriding factor for the migrant situation also includes the attitude of the host community or the government. The host country bears a lot in admitting migration as this involves a large volume of people. Better avenues and security are the chief reasons among the pull factors migrants look to. Trans-Himalayan migration depends on food, better livelihood and climate. The Himalayan culture represents a physical entity divided into many sovereign states. Socially and culturally, Himalayan society exists as a unit (Sinha 2006). Migration in the Himalayas has undergone transformations. The contemporary mode of migration in the Himalayas is generally crosscultural migration (Subba & Sinha 2004). Migration from one region to another within the Himalayas has an immense impact on the host community (Sinha 2006). The imprint of Tibetan cultural markers is immense in certain areas of the Himalayan societies, including Sikkim. The human tendency to migrate is rooted in the belief that the grass is greener on the other side of the fence. Such a belief befits migration as a phenomenon in the socio-economic and political realms of human activity. Social change and migration are related. They vary in scope, focusing at the micro-level of individuals and families, the meso-level of communities and regions, and the macro-level of nation states and the global economy (Massey et al. 1998; Portes 1999). Tibeto-Bhutias migrated between the twelfth century and the early nineteenth century, while Nepalese migration was pushed by early Gorkha conquests, and British ascendancy in Sikkim during the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries proved that it would be a melting pot of diverse groups. This resulted in new a social formation induced by the social cultural interaction, thereby producing a synthesis of cultural production in Sikkimese society.

Early Sikkim Earlier inhabitants of Sikkim were Lepchas and Limboos (Sikkim.nic.in). The territories of a once-contiguous region displaced the Limboos among Sikkim, Darjeeling and eastern Nepal. The orthodox historical

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interpretations of Sikkim remain as narratives of the royal patronage (Lama 2003). The Limboos do not figure in historical narratives, despite being an integral part of the Sikkimese social fabric. There are resemblances between the Limboos and Lepchas in terms of language, folktales and religious beliefs. A famous Lepcha proverb says: “If a Lepcha girl is not able to find a Lepcha groom, a Limboo groom would be okay.” However, the blood brotherhood treaty between Khay Bumsa from Kham and the Lepcha chief Thekong Tek did not mention the Limboos. Instead, it mentioned that Thekong Tek bought forth good luck in worldly affairs for Khya Bumsa. After meeting Tekong Tek he became fertile enough for his descendants to reign in Sikkim. This narrative was a deliberate attempt by the ruler to construct truth through myth. Like many oral histories and folk stories, a particular narrative has merged semihistorical material with mythical and legendary elements; so much so, in fact, that it is difficult to determine what is historically viable and what is mythical (Mullard 2011, 71) The Bhutias migrated from Tibet to Sikkim due to the internal religious tussle between two Buddhist schools of thought (Upadhyay 2010). They migrated towards the south of the Himalayas, which is the present-day Sikkim. The Bhutias referred to this abode as Denzong (the valley of rice). They migrated from Tibet to Sikkim during the thirteenth century. According to Saul Mullard (2011), there is some degree of certainty that there were different migrations to Sikkim, which occurred at different times and came from different locations both within Tibet and along the Himalayan ranges and continued well into the twentieth century. The movement of people from Tibet and across the Himalayas made it impossible to locate a particular region from where the Tibeto-Sikkimese, as the collective ethnicity portrayed in contemporary political movements, originated (Mullard 2011, 37). The Tibeto-Sikkimese, whose ethnonym as Bhutia is actually a representation of heterogeneous groups of people tracing their origin from the Ha Pa (Bhutan) clan, were associated with the ruling aristocracies of the Sakya Yuan period (Mullard 2011, 37). The Bhutia migration to Sikkim was revealed in the narratives of the consecration of Phuntshok Namgyal during the seventeenth century. The subsequent interaction between Bhutias and Lepchas flourished under the Blood Brotherhood theory of myth with the veneration of Mt Kanchendzonga as the guardian deity.

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The power of myth as historical narrative entails two different insights. First, throughout the history of Sikkim, the mythical narratives of the Lepcha-Bhutia alliance were overwhelming and dominant. Second, the dominant historical narrative of the state formation suited only one point of view. The seventeenth-century document on tri-lateral negotiation between Bhutia, Lepcha and Limboo chiefs, instating a Bhutia chief as the first ruler of Sikkim, known as the Lho-Mon-Tsong Sum Agreement, entailed the story of three lamas consecrating Phuntshok Namgyal as the first ruler in present-day Yoksumin (West Sikkim), and is a major historical narrative on the early history of state formation in Sikkim.

Lamaism and State Formation One of the major changes that took place in Sikkim was the introduction of Lamaism as a state religion of Sikkim. Lamaism is a mixture of Buddhism with a preponderating amount of mythology, mysticism and magic, involving the doctrine of incarnate lamas and the worship of canonised saints (Risley 1928, 245). The Lepchas were the earlier practitioners of the Bon religion. Today, the Lepchas mainly profess Lamaism and Bon simultaneously. Yuksom (the ruler of Sikkim) was pivotal in Sikkimese history, state formation and the consecration of Phuntshok Namgyal. Accounts of the introduction of Lamaism to Sikkim (from Tibet) are largely mixtures of myth and legend (Risley 1928, 242). Guru Rinpoche,i the guardian saint of Sikkim, visited Sikkim during the seventeenth century. The prophecy of Guru Rinpoche consecrated Phuntshok Namgyal as the first ruler of Sikkim. In the prophecy of Guru Rinpoche, four noble brothers shall meet in Sikkim and arrange for a government. The council of the meeting between three reverend lamas—Lhatsun Chenbo, Sempah Chenbo and Rigdsin Chenbo—met at Yoksum and led to the emergence of the state of Sikkim.ii Lhatsun Chenbo stated: “Here we are three lamas in a new and irreligious country and we must have a dispenser of gifts (i.e. a king) to rule a country on our behalf” (Risley 1928). The other two Lamas considered their case for selection to the throne of Sikkim. Lhatsun Chenbo intervened and did not come to an agreement as per the prophecy of guru Rinpoche. Since the three Lamas had come from different places, it was their noble cause to find someone from the east whose name was Phuntshok.

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After dispatching messengers toward the east, they found Phuntshok somewhere near Gangtok. He was a descendent of Khye Bumsa who arrived from Kham in Tibet. Phuntshok was consecrated by the lamas as the first Chogyal (Ruler) of Sikkim. Lhatsun Chenbo exhorted him to rule the country religiously under the surname Namgye (Risley 1928, 249). This happened in 1641 cc. Another perspective on the state formation of Sikkim delves into wider issues of a treaty signed by different signatories—the Treaty of Lho-MonTsong of the seventeenth century. The treaty provides the major historical interpretation of Sikkimese state formation. The Iron Hare Year of the seventeenth century in the Tibetan calendar does not correspond to the year of Sikkim’s state formation as either 1641 or 1642, as reflected in the historical narratives. The rare seventeenth-century document was actually signed in 1663. This treaty ended internal conflict in Sikkim’s political history.

State Formation and Emergence of the Elite Tibetan migration into Sikkim led to the inception of aristocratic elites, or Kazis.iii The Sikkimese state formation during the seventeenth century emerged from multi-ethnic independent or semi-independent proto-states due to war and diplomacy (Mullard 2011, 196). According to Mullard, religious tradition played little part in the creation of Sikkim but played a major role in the legitimisation of the young state. Sikkim’s state formation was heralded with the signing of a treaty when leaders of various Sikkimese proto-states agreed (having been defeated in a war) to accept the leadership of the first Namgyal Dynasty (ibid.). The stateformation process in Sikkim was due to internal dissent between nobles and queens for succession. The state of Sikkim was at war with Bhutan, and more aggressively with Nepal following the rise of the Gorkha there.iv The signatories of the treaty were allowed to retain control over their former proto-states as inheritable estates, thus forming an early aristocratic class. A balance of power among the status quo was maintained with the subjects and territories. The aristocratic class mobilized its power to collect taxes and revenues in the name of the ruler. Proto-states were converted into vast estates, sustaining the feudal economy of Sikkim for two centuries. Internal turmoil among the nobles and families close to the Namgyal dynasty led to the rise of the Lepcha aristocracy and decline of

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the Tibeto Sikkimese aristocracy (Mullard & Wongchuk, in Mullard 2011, 175). Education in early Sikkim was family-based, emphasising life skills. Buddhist education was prevalent in Sikkim, and monasteries like Tashiding, Tolung, Pemayangtsev and Sangacholing catered for monastic education.

Early Gorkha Conquests of Sikkim, British Raj, Nepalese Migration and Inception of the Elite Earlier, the Sikkimese territory extended up to the Arun River in Nepal (Sikkim.nic.in). The Limboos and Magars inhabited this region, directly under the control of Sikkim based on the Royal notification from Chogyal of 1779 to the people of Morang (in Nepal), stating the appointment of a feudal aristocrat named Padama Rindzing as the new tax collector of the region (Mullard 2011, 176). The territorial expansion of the Gorkha under Prithivi Narayan Shah brought people from other parts of Nepal to eastern Nepal and towards the present-day West Sikkim district. Gorkha expansion led to the emergence of occupational caste services in Sikkim. It was during the late eighteenth century that the Nepalese invaded Sikkimese territory up to Tista (Teesta), including the present-day south district and the western district of Darjeeling. The Anglo Nepal war of 1814–16 restricted Nepalese expansion into Sikkim. The treaty of Sugauli in 1816 and the treaty of Titaliya in 1817 contained Nepal’s growing ambitions. Anglo Sikkimese relations inaugurated the British intention of opening the Tibetan frontier through Sikkim for trading British goods and services from India. The land grant deed of Darjeeling by Sikkim during the mid-nineteenth century with the East India Company proved to be a major pull factor for Nepalese migration to Sikkim. The rapid economic development of Darjeeling as a British sanatorium brought migrant Nepalese to work in plantations and military recruiting depots for Gorkha soldiers in the British Indian Army. Sikkimese migration to Darjeeling further expanded labour markets and the economy in Darjeeling. The treaty of Tumlong, 1861 guaranteed British supremacy

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in Sikkim. The British inroads were completed with the appointment of John Claude White as the first British political officer in Sikkim in 1888. On Claude White’s initiation, migration was further entrenched to eastern Sikkim, much to the displeasure of the Sikkimese royalty. He was instrumental in granting land lease agreements to the Nepalese in Sikkim. The sole motive was to elevate the coffers of the state economy. The revenue was meagre by any standards. Nepalese migration during the nineteenth century transformed Sikkimese polity and economy. Unlike Tibeto Sikkimese migration, Nepalese migration into Sikkim came in several waves and often in great numbers from the different parts of Nepal. It took place when British imperialism flourished in Sikkim. Sikkim is the anglicised version of the word “Sukhim,” which means “New Home” for the Nepalese. For the Bhutias it is “Denzong,” or “the valley of rice.” For the Lepchas, Sikkim is “Mayel Lyang,” or “paradise.” The Nepalese brought with them a different culture, language and beliefs. The most important was the Nepalese work culture, which is still considered in Sikkim as more enterprising than others. The Nepalese assisted the British in building infrastructure like roads for connecting Tibet with British India for trade during the 1890s. The trade between British India and Tibet impacted Sikkimese society, and there was an emergence of Lepcha elites during this era. They became enterprising and explored trading ventures by assisting the British with logistic support. The British in the meantime secured a policy to settle Nepalese labourers with land lease contracts through Newars. One of the major social changes that took place in Sikkim after Nepalese migration was that its economy increased ten-fold. Large tracts of forest were cleared and settlements were encouraged by the British. A new system of taxation called Dhuri Khazana (house tax) was introduced by the British, which filled up the state revenue. Most of the hilly terrain of Sikkim was converted into terrace fields contracted to private individuals who also generated revenue for the state. The transition of agricultural practise from Jhum cultivation to terrace cultivation was a major turning point in Sikkim in 1900. It paved the way for the inception of private property in Sikkim, where everything needed a royal sanction.

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The emergence of Newars as an aristocratic elite brought a new character to Sikkimese society. Newari elites were called Thekedars and Tibeto Sikkimese elite, and Lepcha elites were called Kazis. The aristocratic elites controlled the economy. They were granted the sole authority to recruit labourers for ferrying trading goods from Tibet to Kalimpong and vice versa. This was often done with an exchange or a payment. The dominance of Kazis and Thekedars in Sikkim resulted in discriminatory forms of social practices like jharlangi and kaalo bhari. In Sikkim, people’s sufferings, woes and tribulations came to be symbolised by terms like Kalo Bhari, Jharlangi, Theki Bheti and Kuruwa. The changing demography of Sikkim resulted in the emergence of elites in the villages. An intermediary class was also formed at the village and block levels. It sustained aristocracy and the feudal model of economy by assisting the Kazis and Thekedars in collecting revenue, and delivering judicial and executive functions. The very base of the Sikkimese economy is still premised on a feudal model after two centuries of polity and economy. The Newars played a crucial role in strengthening the Sikkimese economy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.vi They started minting coins known as Dheba Paisa and Cheptey Paisa in the name of the Sikkimese ruler. They were also given vast tracts of land in Sikkim to mine copper. One of the fundamental reasons for leasing lands to Hindu Newars was that mining was considered as taboo for the Tibetan civilisation. However, Sikkimese coins were not circulated because of the imposition by the Gorkhas. Newar traders were responsible for large-scale migration for agriculture and terracing barren lands. The Newars were given important positions in the Sikkimese monarchy to execute services to the palace, including the duties of judiciary, settling disputes and the introduction of the modern prison system.

From Land Tillers to Citizenship The idea of citizenship was unknown in Sikkim until the arrival of the Nepalese during the eighteenth century. Subsequently, the Nepalese outnumbered the Bhutias and Lepchas in the nineteenth century. An effective mechanism arose to check migrants so as to differentiate the outsiders and the insiders, accentuated as a public policy in Sikkim by the 1960s.

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Sikkim Subject Regulation (SSR) was passed in 1961 by the Chogyal. When the act was drafted there was a public outcry as it did not include the Nepalese. The controversy abated when the act was amended in 1962, providing Sikkimese citizenship to every rightful citizen. For the first time, a uniform codified regulation was introduced to govern subjects who were once outside the framework of modern notions of citizenship and rights. The general populaces barring the elites were the land tillers.

Urbanisation and Education Urbanisation in a few pockets of Sikkim represents the major sociocultural transformation of the Sikkimese landscape. Bazars (Haats) gradually developed in Sikkim. Haats blossomed in the fully fledged urban centres of Sikkim. Newars traded dominantly and set up business centres. Prior to British ascendancy and the arrival of the Nepalese in Sikkim, a capital revenue system in Sikkim did not exist. It was customary to pay revenue in the form of food grains and agricultural products to the monarch as tax. Trade was carried out on the basis of a barter system, which existed until the late twentieth century, where oranges were exchanged with hens or roosters and broomsticks with bamboo caskets. In 1849, British officials ordered that the coins of Nepal should be accepted as legal tender in Sikkim. Modern education was introduced in Sikkim during the latter part of the nineteenth century by the Christian missionaries. Enlightened individuals like Sidkyong Tulku and Phak Tshering Kazi initiated the development of modern education from the Chogyal’s Durbar (Lama 2003, 117). Schools were set up and relevant syllabi were framed. The Nepali language was included as the second language and became a medium of instruction in Sikkim schools, though most texts were in English. The Sikkim Chogyal started sending boys and girls to public schools in India, and they later went on to serve the bureaucracy in the post-merger years with India in different capacities.

Emergence of a Political Culture and Democracy Political consciousness developed in the remote pockets of Sikkim mainly due to education. The undemocratic policies of the Zamindar (middlemen revenue collectors) came under attack. The formation of the Member Party in Sikkim fought against feudalism and demanded democratic values.

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With the foundation of the party in 1940, the theocratic and feudal political structure of Sikkim faced off with the Western secular and liberal democracy. Nepali peasant leaders like Khadananda Dahal, Dharanidhar Dahal, Maha Singh Limbu, Jai Narayan Sapkota, Trilochan Sapkota and Jerman Lepcha incepted the party (Upadhyay 2010). The party represented a social movement in Sikkim that was capable of turning the tables of Theocracy under the Namgyal rulers in Sikkim in the mid-1940s.

Miteri Saino The practice of fictive kinship ties known as Miteri Saino among the Nepalese was adopted by the Lepchas and Bhutias in forging new relations. When such a kinship tie was contracted between two individuals, entire relatives were bound with strong blood relations, while a marital alliance between the two sides was often considered taboo. The role of fictive kinship ties was immense in Sikkimese society between Nepalese and Bhutia Lepchas during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, it was found that one individual forged fictive kinship ties as many as three or four times with different individuals. Such a change in social relations is a dynamic feature of social relations in today’s Sikkimese society.

Measuring Social Change and Stability in Sikkim The fundamental truth of the Sikkimese society is that change and stability coexist. Many observers dispelled fears of Lepchas losing their cultural identity. Lepchas have maintained their distinct identity despite the influence of Lamaism, Nepali (language) and Nepalese culture. It is surprising to find Lepchas fluent in Lepcha and Bhutia, or vice versa. Lepchas are equally fluent in Lepcha, Bhutia and Nepali. Lepchas still practice the Bon religion and yet profess Lamaism religious practice. Theocracy is no more in Sikkim. The democratic government of today’s Sikkim gives priority to stabilizing certain social formations that occurred earlier. For example, monastic education is still funded by the Government of Sikkim. The department of ecclesiastical affairs tends to the welfare of monasteries that are centuries old and were incepted during the Namgyal era. Surprisingly, monasteries in Darjeeling also fall under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical department of Sikkim. The reservation of seats in the Sikkim Legislative Assembly for Monks is another landmark example of

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social change and stability in the co-existence. Monasteries today play an important role in shaping the mentality of the Sikkimese people who profess Buddhism, Christianity and Hinduism. Even non-Buddhist Nepalese visit monasteries to offer prayers and seek blessings. The Sikkimese have high respect for Lamas and encourage their children to hold similar high respect in the society. The Tamangs, Gurungs, Sherpas and a few sections of the Newars are Buddhists who are otherwise misrepresented as the Hindu Nepalese in Sikkim. The presence of Tibetan rituals and language in the field of religious affairs reveals the survival and stability of the present Sikkimese society. The Tibetan language is predominantly used in religious conventions whereas Nepali remains the dominant lingua franca of Sikkim.

Notes  i

Guru Rinpoche is regarded as the patron saint of Sikkim who introduced Buddhism to Tibet. He is also revered by the name Guru Padmashamva. ii The Three Lamas who met in Yoksum were believed to have possessed mythical powers and are believed to have entered Sikkim from Tibet by flying in the air. Different chronicles mention different dates of their presence in Sikkim. iii Kazis are believed to be of mixed heritage belonging to the Tibeto-Sikkimese and Lepcha clans. In the first half of the seventeenth century the Tibeto-Sikkimese were very powerful, but the Barfungpas, whose lineage is of Lepcha descent, later emerged as powerful after their regent was named king. However, Lepcha Kazis are known to practice Tibeto-Sikkimese customs and rituals rather than observing Lepcha rituals. With the passage of time the title of Kazis was bestowed on individuals by royal sanctions. iv Kalimpong in west Bengal was annexed by Bhutan and parts of western and southern Sikkim and Darjeeling were annexed by Nepal under the Shahs. The peace deal brokered by the British after the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814–16 maintained the status quo between Sikkim and Nepal. v The monastery located in western Sikkim still accepts monks belonging to the pure Bhutia lineage. vi The First Newar who set up the mint in Sikkim was Laxmi Das Pradhan. Later, his descendants served the Chogyal under different capacities either as Rai Sahibs or Thekedars.

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References Census of India. 2011. New Delhi: Government of India. Chakrabarti, Anjan. 2012. “Migration & Marginalisation in the Himalayan Kingdom.” Journal of Exclusion Studies 2 (1): 36–48. History of Sikkim. 2015. www.sikkim.nic.in. Lama, Mahendra P. 2003. Sikkim: Society, Polity, Economy, Environment. New Delhi: Indus Publishing Pvt House. Massey, Douglas. S, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino & J. Edward Taylor. 1998. Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. Mullard, Saul. 2005. “History from the Hidden Land: Some Preliminary Remarks on a Seventeenth Century Sikkimese Chronicle.”Bulletin of Tibetology 41(1):55-86. Portes, Alejandro. 1999. “Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems and Opportunities.” In The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience, C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz and J. DeWind (eds), 21–33. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Risley, H. H. 1928. The Gazetter of Sikkim. Delhi: Low Price Publications. Sinha, A. C. 2006. “Search for Kirat Identity Trends of De-Sanskritization among the Nepamul Sikkimese.” Peace and Democracy in South Asia 2 (1): 1–25. Subba, Tanka Bahadur, A. C. Sinha, D. R. Nepal & G. S. Nepal. 2009. Indian Nepalis: Issues and Perspectives. New Delhi: Concept Publishing House. Subba, Tanka Bahadur & A. C. Sinha. 2004. The Nepalis in North-East India: The Community in Search of Indian identity. New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company. Upadhyay, Rajen. 2010. “Member Party.” Sikkim History Hunter Blogspot. http://sikkim-historyhunter.blogspot.in/2010/04/memberparty-first-political-party-of.html.

THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE DAMAI COMMUNITY— A STUDY OF SIKKIM SOCIETY RIDHIMA SUNDAS

The Damais are known as the musical community among the Gorkhas due to their adherence towards musical traditions. They are regarded as the treasurers of the Gorkha community. Carol Tingey (1994), in her work Auspicious Musicians in Changing Society: The Damai Musicians of Nepal, defined Damai as the Hindu tailor-musician performers of ensembles known as the local patronage system or bali ghar bista in Nepali language. Damais are known as bali ghar bista throughout Nepal (Tingey 1990). Ram Saran Dharnal writes about the musical instruments of Gorkhas, especially of the Damai community (in Bagdas 2010, 47), describing it as a historically auspicious yet untouchable occupational caste of professional musicians and tailors. The term Damai came from the kettledrum Damaha used in the Panchai (the family of five instrument of Nepali folk music), Naumati (the family of nine instruments of Nepali folk music) and Baja ensembles (Winch 2010). Traditionally, Damai musicians performed music at festivals and ceremonies. Their festival ensembles are well documented in films and the works of scholars. Damais are placed on the lower strata of the Hindu caste of the Gorkha community. They enjoyed high regard and a frontline position during religious and cultural ceremonies. Bhim Thatal (2010), a Nepali folk music researcher, says that the Damais that play Gorkha musical instruments today are none other than the nephews of Brahmans of the Gorkha community.

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There is a myth in the Damai community that a Brahman once asked his nephew to work, but the nephew kept on playing some kind of beating instrument. The Brahman then told the nephew to keep on playing with the drum of earth and stick of wood by staying aloof. The Damais today stay aloof while playing in these musical bands (Thatal 2010, 42). Maria Helffer, in her 1969 article Castes dle Musicians on Nepal, describes the Damais as not only carrying the treasure of Nepali music, but also as presuming it to be a sign of “good luck” in the Gokha society (in Tingey 1990, 67). Clayton (1995) also mentions the Nepali musical culture rhythms when Damais beat and blow in the Naumati (musical) ensemble. Tingey (1990) and Darnal (2005) trace the Panchai Baja, Naumati Baja and Nagara Baja (musical rhythms) from the Middle Eastern-Central Asian kettledrum ensemble called the Tabl Khana, which preceded the Naubat and Naqqara Baja ensembles used by Rajputs from northern India who fled to the Himalayan foothills during the period of Muslim conquest from 1303 to 1568 cc. According to Tingey (1994), migrant Rajputs brought musicians with them during the fourteenth century and introduced them after establishing their rule. Their kettledrum ensembles developed as important traditions in both court and temple and eventually took on popular roles. The large kettledrum (Nagara) remains the major instrument that continues to be played by Damai musicians (Tingey 1994; Bam 2005). The Damai’s presence in Sikkim was historic. Before the merger of Sikkim as a federal unit of India, they played a crucial part in Sikkimese culture. Sikkim is a multi-cultural state where Gorkhas and Nepalese constitute three-quarters of the total population. The presence of the Damai in Sikkim was a product of territorial snatches and boundary pushpull factors between Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan. Sikkim experienced sets of political upheavals and the shifting nature of territory with regard to governance over the region. From 1642, during the days of Phungtsog Namgyal to 1706, the area of Sikkim stretched to the Arun river of Eastern Nepal (Thatal 2010). In 1706, Sikkim lost Kalimpong and its eastern territories to Bhutan. In later years, the grandson of Prithvi Narayan Shah occupied much of the territory of Sikkim (Thatal 2010). With the Sugauli treaty between Nepal and the British East India Company after the Indo-Gorkha war on December 2, 1815, Sikkim recovered its lost parts from Nepal by supporting British

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colonial administration to fight the Gorkha war against Nepal (Thatal 2010). The Treaty of Sugauli followed with the recruitment of Gorkhas from Nepal for Military service and for plantation work in the hills of Darjeeling and the adjoining areas of Sikkim. Following the treaty, the colonial administration encouraged the people of Nepal to migrate for economic development to Darjeeling and the adjoining parts of Sikkim, and this made for a good flow towards Sikkim (Bam 2005). Due to the reallocation of boundaries and power shifts between these three Himalayan states, the population and cultural units acquired a space for mobility and expansion, which resulted in the presence of Gorkhas, Nepalese and Damais in Sikkim. Earlier, the Damais represented a community in Sikkim with expertise in the traditional folk music of the Nepali community. The Damai community is an indissoluble section of the Nepali community in Sikkim. Sikkim is known for its richness in folk culture and tradition where the Damai play an important role due to their augmentation toward their folk culture and tradition. In the changing socio-economic scenario, it is often said that Damais are receding from their musical tradition. Detachment from the subject of their historic expertise has created strain among the well-wishers of traditional folk music and culture. The Damai community’s socio-economic conditions are rarely addressed in the media and institutional research. The present socio-economic condition of the community needs acknowledgement in explaining why it is detached from its tradition. This chapter explains the socio-economic status of the Damai community of Sikkim. Certain questions pertaining to Damai cultural practice and the socioeconomic condition in Sikkim need answers. These questions are: (1) What are the socio-economic conditions of the Damai community in Sikkim? (2) What are the roles of the Damai community in the cultural space of Sikkim? (3) How does the Damai community perceive its social behaviour? Methodologically, a household survey was adopted to answer the above questions. Both qualitative and quantitative data were collected and interviews were conducted with individuals of the Damai community in

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Sikkim in Nepali as well as in English according to the preference of the respondent. This study was conducted in Singtam interior and Gangtok-Sichey of the east district of Sikkim. It aims to understand the Damai’s socio-economic status through a demographic study of the community in two different places. Singtam interior and Gangtok-Sichey were selected due to their respective rural and urban locations to understand the social problems facing the Damai community in both. The fieldwork lasted for a month. The first respondent was interviewed on April 3, 2012 and the concluding respondent was interviewed on May 4, 2012. The total sample size taken was 50, with 25 from each of the two locations, comprising 29 males and 21 females, respectively.

The Variables The questionnaire comprised 14 questions divided into two categories. Ten basic questions were asked to understand the literacy rate, monthly income and sex ratio of the Damai community, including information on government jobs, private sector jobs, traditional occupations and agricultural farming with income earning capabilities. Government service signifies any job under the state or central government. The private sector entails any job under a private company. Traditional occupation includes tailors, a member of a musical troop (such as the Nepali musical instruments Nau-Mati and Panache-Bajaa troops), agricultural farming, cattle rearing and any others means of earning like driving, carpentry, masonry and portering. The last four questions aimed to understand the relationship of the Damai community with the rest of the Sikkimese society. The questionnaires in this study help in understanding the impact of changing socio-economic trends on cultural and traditional occupations of the Damai community and their view on the preservation of their traditions.

Socio-Economic and Cultural Overview of the Damai Community in Sikkim All 50 respondents have families. In the Damai community, there are more females in most of the families. Male and female respondents were equally

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considered in gathering information about their family incomes. The data revealed that 6 respondents serve in the government services. The gathered data from the questionnaire revealed that urban populations of the Damai community are in more advantageous positions for getting government jobs. Four respondents from rural areas work for the government, while 12 respondents work for government services among the 50 respondents from the urban area. An urban base of the Damai community has easy access to job prospects. Government services are predominantly employed by the urban set of Damai communities. Four respondents in the urban Damai community are employed in the private sector. Private-sector jobs include pharmaceutical companies, the hydel project and managerial work in hotels. Twenty-four respondents are engaged in traditional Damai occupations in the rural area. In the urban area, 2 out of 50 respondents are engaged in such traditional occupations. Traditional occupation here means the cultural folk bands of Panchebaaja, Naumati baaja and tailoring works. Respondents engaging in the traditional jobs were all above 30 years of age. Tailoring as a side occupation is found among the Damai community members who also engage in the Panche-baaja and Nau-mati baaja cultural folk bands, which are from the rural areas, mainly to supplement their income-earning capabilities. In both rural and urban areas, respondents from the Damai community were satisfied with their traditional occupation and opined that in recent years the craze for traditional occupations among the youth has lessened. Ratna Banadur Darjee from Gangtok-Sichey has a tailoring outlet in Lalabazar in Gangtok. He says that tailoring does not attract the younger generation anymore. According to him, educated youths of the Damai community are more attracted to government services and lucrative private sector jobs. Even the youths who could not attain the necessary education for government or private sector jobs are seeking options other than traditional Damai jobs. The reason behind this, as he says, is that “Damai youths think that the tailoring occupation would deteriorate their social status.” Respondents engaged in cultural folk bands cling on to traditional occupations due to hereditary compulsion. Padam Bahadur Bardewa, a 47year-old respondent from Singtam interior, opined that it was his

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responsibility to continue his forefathers’ choice. He continued: “Though the people of this community have pride in folk music skills, the present youth generation is not interested in that occupation as it aspires to a prosperous life.” In his opinion: “youths perceive other means of occupation, though in some cases they turn away from their forefathers’ occupation to get employment equal to other castes.” He justified his opinion by saying: People who engaged in Panche-baaja and Nau-mati baaja are predominantly from the Damai community and are regarded as lower caste. Whenever questions on people engaged in the profession come, the perception of the other caste is lessened. Apart from this, the Damais’ traditional profession could not give continuity in regard to income since it is not a full-time occupation. A Damai band is paid Rs 10,000 to 15,000 per day during social ceremonies, but that is not even a subsistence income.

Individuals who engage in the band have to seek other means of livelihood until they are called to perform. Damai parents cannot encourage their children to get involved in this profession, but some have to continue with the traditional occupation by compulsion. Eighteen respondents are engaged in occupations like farming, cattle rearing, masonry, carpentry and being a security guard. Their family incomes varied depending on their professions. Five families lived with a daily income of Rs 200 or a monthly income of Rs 6,000. Twenty-five families earned an income of Rs 200 to 300 or a monthly income of Rs 6,000 to 9,000. Eight families had a monthly income of Rs 9000 to 12,000. The first three categories of income reflect that 60% of the total Damai community in the east district lives on Rs 300 daily, or less than Rs 9,000 per month, and only 24% earns more than 12,000 per month. The income depends on the nature of their work. The urban section of the Damai community is more advanced in the case of earnings. Some respondents from the Damai community have government jobs, which are numerically superior to the rural inhabitants. Education plays a major role in the income differences between the two sets of the Damai community. The urban Damai community is more conscious of education. Two respondents have Master’s degrees and are from the urban Damai community. Twelve respondents have graduation degrees, with 66.67% of those graduates coming from the urban

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community and 33.33% from the rural. In all, 24% of the respondents could not write or read; surprisingly, 41% of these were below the age of 20. The community depends on government schools for their children’s education; 15.78% of the respondents’ children attend private schools and 84.22% governmental schools. To conclude, the Damai community plays a vital role in sustaining the cultural continuum of Sikkim. The community occupies a low position in the social composition. The Damai community attachment and involvement in the day-to-day life of Sikkim are immense and cannot be sidelined. The Damai community is not only a section of the Sikkimese society; it represents its folk and cultural identity. The heartbeat of Nepali culture rhythms can be heard when a Damai beats the Nau-mati drums in Sikkim. In Sikkim, cultural and folk traditions are the crucial contributions made by the Damai community. The Damai community enjoys a constitutional safeguard through the reservation of the Scheduled Caste for their socio-economic betterment. Damai community individuals are visible in government and private sector services, agricultural farming and in businesses. The Damai community needs adequate constitutional and social security, and still cannot represent influentially in the public sphere. It has faced social prejudices in contemporary Sikkim. Matrimonial relations within the families of the Damai community are avoided by the upper caste of Sikkimese society. Deep-rooted beliefs in social rites and taboos among upper castes often discriminate against the Damai community in contemporary Sikkim. The traditional occupation of the Damai community needs to be brought into the purview of sustainable security. A proper constitutional and policy framework should be designed to provide social equality and occupational protection. The government and other social organisations should elevate equal opportunities to end caste-based differences in the Damai community. Similarly, financial grants and the establishment of government-aided institutions for the preservation and promotion of such folk-musical tradition ensure adequate justice for the historic contribution of the Damai community. At present, many Damai youth remain insensitive towards their cultural tradition and historic importance. The Sikkim state administration needs to preserve the Damai cultural heritages. If policymakers do not treat the Damai community and their cultural treasure properly, the Panche baaja

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and Nau-mati baaja historic folk musical sensation will remain only in books, to be read as history, and as remnants in a museum for future generations.

References Bagdas, Bhawani. 2010. “Bhalakusari.” In Naikey: Swarnajayanti Smarika, Subhas Sundas (ed.). Gangtok: Sikkim Damai Samaj. Bam, Motiraj Karnalika. 2005. “Paikelahruko Bharat.” Paper Presented at the Royal Nepal Academy, June 12, 2005. Clayton, M. 1995. “Auspicious Music in a Changing Society: The Damai Musicians of Nepal by Carol Tingey.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 58 (2): 395–6. Thatal, Bhim. 2010. “Naumati Baaja: An Introduction to The Nine Musical Instruments of Nepali folk Music.” In Naikey: Swarnajayanti Smarika, Subhas Sundas (ed.), 24–46. Gangtok: Sikkim Damai Samaj. Tingey, Carol. 1990. The Heartbeat of Nepal: The Panche-Baaja. Kathamandu: Royal Nepal Academy. —. 1994. Auspicious Musicians in Changing Society: The Damai Musicians of Nepal. New Delhi: Heritage Publication. Winch, Peter. 1990. The Idea of a Social Science and its Introduction to Philosophy. London: Rutledge.

RITUALS, BELIEFS AND THE TRADITIONAL OCCUPATION OF BREWING LIQUOR IN CHAKPA ANDRO PUTHEM JUGESHOR SINGH

The people of Manipur are divided into different social communities classified as valley (non-hill) settlers and hill settlers. Chakpa communities are the valley settler communities of Manipur. Chakpas are also referred to as Lois (the weaker section). The Chakpa settled in the peripheral areas of the valley of Manipur. Andro, Sekmai, Pheiyeng, Leimaram and Khurkhul are the well-known Chakpa villages, and Chakpa Andro is one of the indigenous communities. This chapter focuses only on the Chakpa Andro community ritual, tradition and customary practices associated with the brewing of liquor. This chapter is based on personal, in-depth interviews with selected members of the village engaging in the brewing of liquor, encompassing interaction with women engaging in brewing and piggery. The main livelihood of Chakpa Andro depends on brewing liquor. In earlier times, Chakpa Andro had less social interaction with other communities of Manipur (Basanta 2008). The Chakpas were considered to be the outcaste in Manipuri society (Khomba 2004). However, such a notion changed over time. This chapter focuses on the cultural activities, rituals, social ceremonies and social relation and beverage culture of Chakpa Andro, and explores the occupational dynamics of Chakpa Andro and the economic significance of brewing liquor. Despite modern technology, traditional occupation remains the backbone for the income earning and subsistence economy of the Chakpa Andro community in Manipur. The Chakpa belong to the Schedule Caste community (the lower sections) of the Manipur social structure, and Chakpa Andro has engaged in brewing liquor since early times (Khomba 2004). Brewing liquor was acknowledged both socially and culturally among the Chakpa Andro community (Kriti 2004). Liquor is an essential requirement during the rituals and cultural practices of the Chakpa Andro

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community. During rituals (birth, marriage, adulthood ceremonies and death), cultural practices and social occasions, the Chakpa have used brewed liquors since time immemorial (Devi 2002). Manipur is a dry state at present. The Manipur Anti Liquor Prohibition Act (MLPA) of 1991 forbids any individuals or families to brew and sell liquor, meaning any communities in Manipur cannot brew and sell liquors based on the legal sanctions. However, Manipur state exempted the Chakpa Andro community from brewing liquor, which was primarily due to their traditional rights associated with it (Ashok 2005).

Chakpa Andro The Chakpa Andro community settled in Andro village (in the eastern part of Imphal), commonly known as Chakpa Andro. There are various subclans of the Chakpa Andro community. Each sub-clan has a separate deity and ritual practices. Chakpa Andro therefore practices a range of different customs and traditions. It is believed that the origin of Chakpa Andro is associated with the creation of Malem [earth]. There is an oral tradition associated with Chakpa Andro’s origin, which believes that humankind originated from Amumbi leishalok [a dark corner, the origin of people] (Ashok 2005). According to Kriti (2004), the Chakpa Andro Lois [weaker section] are the descendants of the eldest son of Leimeral Sidabi [the immortal being], who was condemned to live in a desolate place on account of his foolishness. Ashok Kumar (2004) articulated in his book, Chakpa Androrol Puya [Chakpa Andro Folktales]: “In the beginning of creation, the supreme creator Atingkok Laimaru Achiba created then emerged in the form of Chakpa Andro Maharaba.” Chakpa Andro preserves its rich heritage of culture and tradition, and practices the conventional authority of village administration (Kriti 2004). This mode of village administration differs heavily from the other communities of Manipuri society. It has its own conventional mode of administration, which is under the control of the Loishang (the supreme authority of village). Members of the Loishang are well disciplined and revered with respect and regard from the community. The Khullakpa [Chief] is the head of the village. The administration of Khullakpa is

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further divided into Ahallup [the senior group] and Nahallup [the junior group]. Chakpa Andro strictly follows the age-old customary practices and traditions. The customary laws of Chakpa Andro are prevalent. Andro is one of the tourist spots of Manipur, and Androgee Mei [Andro’s fire] is well known. Chakpa Andro believes in worshiping fire, and still practises fire worship in the Loishang (a sacred place or a temple). A recent survey revealed that the Chakpa Andro community has a total of 1,810 households, with a total population of 11,798 (2011 Census of India). There are 308 government employees in Chakpa Andro, out of which only 11 are women. The remaining population engages in agriculture and its allied occupations like brewing liquor, pottery, piggery, carpentry and fishing traps.

Tradition and Culture of Chakpa Andro The Chakpa Andro community practices traditional occupations like brewing liquor and piggery. It has a distinct identity in Manipur. It follows norms relating to cultural hereditary, traditions and rituals. Chakpa Andro has a long tradition of brewing and drinking liquor during ceremonies and social events. During religious festivals and social gatherings, serving liquor remains mandatory. Chakpa Andro observes rituals like Yupan Thapa (ritual practices performed to a five-day-old boy and a six-day-old girl), Lai Haraoba (annual deity worshipping), Yumshengba (sanctification of the household) and Heerukaba (community offerings by married men after six months of marriage). Liquor brewed in their household is served to the guests to fulfil the ceremonies. Without serving brewed liquor to the guests, the rituals are considered to be incomplete. Brewing liquor remains an important customary practise of the Chakpa Andro community, where every household brews it for social as well as domestic purposes. But, until recently, households gave up brewing liquor and took up occupations related to farming as other sources for earning income and livelihoods.

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Occupational Variants of Chakpa Andro The Chakpa Andro community pursues various occupations, engaging in agriculture as a primary occupation until recently. Brewing liquor, piggery and pottery remain secondary occupations. Agriculture depends on the amount of rain from the annual monsoon. Studies in the Himalayan foothills have shown that agriculture and harvesting cannot be pursued more than once a year due to the limited availability of water (Sarmistha & Kynch 2000). Income generated from agriculture cannot cover family needs (Ajala 2008). After harvesting crops, the Chakpa Andro community engages in other occupations like poultry and the collection of firewood from nearby hills to minimise family expenditures. The brewing of liquor, pottery and piggery are the perennial occupations of Chakpa Andro. Most of the households in Chakpa Andro have brewed liquor until recent times. Pottery was common to the women of Chakpa Andro. Women also engage in occupations like weaving, sericulture, basketry, carpentry and fishing traps. 

Brewing Liquor in Contemporary Times Brewing liquor is a traditional occupation of the Chakpa Andro community. Liquor is known as Yu in the Manipuri lingua franca. The Chakpa Andro community brews varieties of Yu such as Yu Kalei [superior liquor], Pukyu-Waiyu [mild liquor] and Atingba [rice beer]. Brewing liquor is also the main source of livelihood and income generation for the Chakpa Andro community. Brewing liquor is mainly done by the women, who prepare and process it besides their domestic work and household chores. Women cook the rice that has to be brewed. The rice is mixed with Hamei (an ingredient in brewing liquor), which is then mixed with Yanglee (a tree root). The mixed portion of the rice is then transferred to a pot and fermented for five to six days. Chakpa Andro women possess the unique skill of brewing liquor. Women from every household learnt how to brew liquor from their elders. The Chakpa Andro community’s way of brewing liquor follows the traditional procedure. The modern mode of brewing has not yet been adopted by the

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Chakpa Andro community. The income generated from the brewing of liquor is the major source of livelihood in Chakpa Andro. The brewing of liquor gives women a substantial role and they make an economic contribution to the community.

Liquor, Rituals and Beliefs Chakpa Andro observes rituals, tradition and customary practices based on deity worship and beliefs. Rituals are offered before the process of brewing liquor. The Chakpa Andro community believes that liquor is the purest form of liquid. The myth of Chakpa Andro is that liquor was used by their deity and forefathers. In earlier times, the Chakpa community used Pukyu-Waiyu [mild liquor] after their daily work. This was used by the youth, women and elders. Generally, this type of liquor was used during community work and social services. Mild liquor was served to the workers during resting time. The people of Chakpa Andro believed that mild liquor does not have any health effects. However, Atingba [rice beer] and Kalei [superior liquor] were prohibited to the children, women and youths because of its high alcohol content. The Chakpa Andro community’s rites of passage during birth, adulthood, marriage and death ceremonies involve offering brewed liquor to the guests. Most of these ceremonies are completed with a community feast as well as spontaneous music and dance. Chakpa Andro celebrates festivals and rituals with brewed liquors. Rituals are a must for ceremonies such as marriage, child naming and death in the Chakpa community. All community feasts and rituals cannot be initiated without the serving of brewed liquor. The Yupanthaba (birth ritual) ceremony is compulsory in Chakpa Andro. Yupanthaba is followed by the Yumshengba (purification of home) ritual. The functional aspect of the Yumshengba ritual is for the protection of the infant from evil spirits (Ashok 2005). Liquor is offered to God according to the customs of Chakpa Andro. They believe that it protects the child from evil so as to secure their good health. Pakhangphaba signifies adulthood. Initiation to adulthood is marked by the recruitment of Ashin-Arangba [messengers], Chakthongloi [a cooking crew], Ngingolmacha [relatives] and Khangjel [in laws]. Ashin-Arangba

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and Chakthongloi are vital for any social gatherings like the marriage, birth, death, adulthood and community festivals of the Chakpa Andro community. The Ashin-Arangba volunteer to make arrangements for the guests during social occasions. The Chakthongloi volunteer to cook food. Such groups are recruited for the Chakpa Andro community to sustain the community needs without helpers from outside. Recruitment to such a group also marks the initiation of adulthood (Kirti 2004). At the time of recruitment, members of the Ashin-Arangba and Chakthongloi offer liquor to the former members as gestures. On such an occasion, they mostly use Pukyu-Waiyu [mild liquor]. The Chakpa Andro community believes in love marriage. They avoid engagement or arranged forms of marriage. Their ways for getting married involve pairing up and loving each other on the first count. The pairs who love each other can make proposals to parents or use a customary marriage proposal practice called Mouniba. At the time of marriage, liquor is offered to the bride’s parent. The groom’s family brings liquor, sweets and meat for all the guests. The sharing of food and liquor is an important act in the Chakpa Andro marriage ceremony (Devi 2002). Members of the groom's family and their relatives make offerings to the family deity. They pay obeisance to their in-laws before escorting the bride to the groom's house. Such obeisance is marked with ritual offerings and the serving of brewed liquors to the deity. Death ceremonies are marked by particular rituals depending on the child’s age and gender (Basanta 2008). For a one-year-old, the body of the child has to be cremated. The Muksha (cremator) washes the body before cremation with brewed liquor. This is a customary practise for the Chakpa Andro community, because they believe that it purifies the soul (Khomba 2004). The Chakpa Andro community offers liquor to their deities to cleanse the spirit of the body. In this ceremony, Pukyu-Waiyu [mild liquor] is offered to the family deity and elders of the locality. Floral invitations are offered to invitees at the death ceremony. A rich family invites a large number of invitees in matters of death rituals, and a poor family vice-versa.

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Regarding the religious practices of the Chakpa Andro community, the use of brewed liquor is a must. Brewing is a part of their socio-cultural tradition and is pivotal for them. Traditionally, all households brewed liquor for social as well as domestic purposes.

Livelihood The Chakpa Andro community does not have many resources for a secure livelihood. It engages in various kinds of occupation to provide a sustainable livelihood. Despite agriculture being the primary occupation, brewing liquor also supports the livelihood of many families of the community. Occupations like pottery and piggery also provide a livelihood for the community. Livelihood is the aggregate measure of how people or the given population, down to households of a single person, make their living. It should be within the limits imposed by the environmental, social, economic and political conditions of the society in which they live. This determines the totality of human welfare of a household at the micro level, and a community, a region or a nation at the macro level (Sarmistha & Kynch 2000). Liquor-brewing households earn higher incomes than those depending on piggery and pottery. Many Chakpa Andro households brew liquor to yield better livelihoods. The brewing of liquor improves their earning capacity and creates a better livelihood pattern for the community. The income generated from brewing is used to meet the basic needs of the family.

Changes There is an increasing demand for Chakpa Andro brewed liquor from the other communities of Manipur. This has resulted in more liquor being brewed. At present, the households in Chakpa Andro brew liquor beyond their domestic and ritual needs. That is why the production of liquor in Chakpa Andro increases and now goes beyond the use of traditional needs and cultural practices. In all, 1,050 households out of 1,810 in Chakpa Andro engage in brewing liquor as well as pig farming. The economic inter-linkage of brewing liquor and piggery is that the waste product from brewing is used as staple food for pigs. Brewing and piggery cannot be separated in Chakpa Andro.

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Brewing families in the Chakpa Andro community rear large numbers of about 20–30 pigs in a season. Piggery and its success depend entirely on the brewing of liquors in Chakpa Andro. The brewing of liquor needs labour and has a relatively high risk of production failure. Brewing liquor also takes time. The Manipur Government’s policy towards brewing liquor is not favourable. It imposes restrictions under the MLPA of 1991 to other communities, but exempts the Chakpa villages on customary grounds. The MLPA does not allow the marketing of brewed liquors outside of the Chakpa villages, and this remains a flawed directive. Besides, an antialcohol movement exists in Manipur, and voluntary organisations and NGOs are totally against alcoholism and brewing liquor. Brewing liquor is the traditional occupation and social requirement of the Chakpa community in Manipur, and became a new economic opportunity to support their livelihood. The market demand for brewed liquors increased manifold during the last five years in Manipur, and they are marketed through illegal means. The income generated from brewing liquor improves the care and nutritional status of the children in the Chakpa Andro community. The income generated from brewing mostly meets the families’ needs. This leads to the better earning capacity of many households in the Chakpa Andro community. The Government of Manipur and NGOs need to come up with an intervention programme or policies to improve the brewing by providing the necessary equipment. Manipur should legalise the brewing of liquor because it is easily available and alcoholism exists. Despite Manipur being a dry state, liquor is freely and illegally available on its narrow lanes.

References Ashok, R. 2005. “Women’s Livelihood from Homemade Beer (Chhyang) and Whisky (Raksi) in a Peri Urban Village: A Case Study of Ghumrachok in Rajrayogini Village Development Committee Kathmandu District.” Tribhuvan University Journal 25 (1): 61–78. Ajale, O. A. 2008. “Livelihood Patterns of the ‘Negede Weyto’ Community in Lake Tana Shore, Bahir Dar Ethopia.” Ethiopian Journal of Environment Studies and Management 1 (1): 58–76.

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Basanta, N. 2008. Modernisation Challenges and Response: A Study of the Chakpa Community of Manipur. New Delhi: Akansha Publications. Devi, L. B. 2002. The Lois Manipur: Andro, Khurkhul, Pheiyeng and Sekhmai. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Khomba, P. Khuman. 2004. “An Outline Study of The Chakpa.” In Manipur Past and Present, Naorem Sanachaoba (ed.), 345–61. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Kumar. L. Ashok. 2004. “Ethnology of Chakpa.” In Manipur Past and Present, Naorem Sanachaoba (ed.), 256–71. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Kirti, M. 2004. “Archaeological Study of Chakpa.” in Manipur Past and Present, Naorem Sanachaoba (ed.), 145–62. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Sarmistha, Pal & Jocelyn Kynch. 2000. “Determinants of Occupational Change and Mobility in Rural India.” Applied Economics 32 (12): 1559–73.

WHY ENGLISH? A HISTORICAL STUDY FROM THE MIZO PERSPECTIVE LALRINCHHANI

On the eve of India’s Independence, several ethnic groups in its northeast made efforts to create a history of their own. The Mizos during that time were the assertive tribes consistently revolting against their amalgamation with the Indian nation. When India achieved Independence in 1947, Mizoram was an autonomous district under the Assam state jurisdiction. Mizoram gained the status of a Union Territory from the Indian Government on January 21, 1972 after a number of revolts and uprisings within the state (Hermanaa 1999, 147). It is this history that changes the mindset of Mizos towards the Indian Government as well as “Indians” in general. Mizoram has endured many changes during the last hundred years. The region was annexed by British India during 1890–91 and eventually came to be known as the Mizo Hill District of Assam. After India attained Independence from British rule in 1947, Mizoram became an autonomous hill district of the Assam state. Following the historic peace accord of 1986, Mizoram became a state of the Indian Union in 1987 (Pachuau 1998, 80). Before the onset of British rule in India’s northeast, several states— Tripura, Assam and Manipur—had already developed a profound religious and cultural linkage with India that dated back several centuries (Hodson 1980). The sanskritisation of indigenous people of the Brahmaputra valley began in the twelfth century. Hinduism became the most dominant religion of the region and the native’s languages, which are part of the TibetoBurman language family, were replaced by the Sanskritic Assamese (Masahary 1989, 165). The Tipras of Tripura also embraced Hinduism during the fifteenth century (Mackenzie 1884, 269–70). In Manipur, Hinduism was adopted as the state religion by the Raja of Manipur around the year 1705 cc (Hodson 1980).

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The fertile plains of India’s northeast were annexed one after another, but the hill territories remained untouched by the foreign agencies for a long time (MacKenzie 1884). Due to frequent raids by the hill tribes on the British subjects on the plains of Assam, British government attention was drawn and the subsequent annexation of the hill region continued during the late nineteenth century (Pachuau 1998). Mizoram was annexed by the British during 1890–91. It was followed closely by the missionary endeavours. Until today, the Mizos affectionately narrate the stories of the Christian Missionaries as a civilising duty (Lalrawnliana 1995). English was usually enforced on the British colonised subjects. In some cases, native languages were systematically prohibited. After Indian Independence, the continued use of English began to be questioned by the former British colonised subjects. Many Mizo writers were educated under the Christian Missionaries. These indigenous writers recounted how students were demoted, humiliated and punished for speaking their native language in the colonial schools (Khiangte 1993). In response to the methodical imposition of colonial languages, writers and activists from India’s northeast campaigned for the complete return of the use of indigenous languages (Hminga 1987). In India, a tussle between the English language and the vernacular languages prevailed during the rule of the British Government. The infamous “Macaulay’s Minute” (1835) fostered the feeling of approbation that English was the only language that could encourage the intellectual improvement of colonised subjects and their pursuing higher studies. Macaulay challenged the Orientalist position by claiming that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia. Macaulay’s disregard for the vernacular languages of India’s northeast had an immense effect on the colonised subjects. At present, the impoverished class in India’s northeast opine that English is mainly spoken by the upper class and educated class. This is the reality of language in India’s northeast. Also, rural Indians are still apprehensive about learning English. Two substantial reasons from the outset are, first, the continuing hatred for anything connected with the British, and second, the perceived notion that English is spoken by the elite and educated Indians. Historically, the attitude of India’s northeast towards English is quite different from the other parts of India. The British came to the Indian

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plains to take the available resources; the same cannot be said of the hilly northeast states. A sincere observer would conclude that there was nothing to take from this region two-hundred years ago that would have changed the fortunes of the societies of India’s northeast. The British who first came to India’s northeast were mostly Christian Missionaries (Kipgen 1997). The natives fondly revered the Missionaries and highly praised their contributions, which were not meagre. Among the Indian northeastern states, Mizoram was the last heralded by Christian Missionaries. Mizoram encountered socio-political and religious changes during the last decade of the nineteenth century. The inception of the British administration in 1889 followed by the introduction of Christianity in 1894 put the whole Mizo society in an unprecedented socio-political imbalance (Hminga 1987). The first Missionaries to Mizoram were J. H. Lorrain and F. W. Savidge, who arrived on January 11, 1894. Christian Missionaries patiently learnt the local language, and introduced Mizo alphabets through Roman script and modern education in Mizoram (Ngurliana 2008). Rev. William Williams remembered the Mizo language as a language, “most musical and its intonation remarkably beautiful. It falls with tender melody on the ear. I believe that it will be like Welsh, a good pulpit language.” (Khiangte 1993, 13) To make a new script for the Mizos was beyond imaginable for the British Christian Missionaries. They modified the Roman scripts and re-arranged them in such a way that they made the right kinds of sound. This opened up the possibility to learn English for the Mizos during the early part of the twentieth century. The impacts of Christianity on Mizo culture are numerous. Mangkhosat Kipgen (1997) mentioned that the tremendous transformation by the Good News on the Mizos within a short span of 50 years was really wonderful. Christianity changed the religious faith of the people, altered their whole outlook and incepted a new way of life (Kipgen 1997, 213). Christianity transformed the ideology of the Mizos physically as well as spiritually. A cultural distinction can therefore be drawn between the pre-Christian and Christian eras. With the establishment of churches and school buildings, the Mizo village chiefs’ houses and Zawlbuk [bachelor’s dormitories] faded out. Socialisation shifted from Zawlbuk towards the Church. Christianity spread through the whole of Mizoram. Personal hygiene, modern

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education and sanitation improved greatly. These attempts were the early emphasis of the Christian Missionaries in Mizoram, who encountered and attempted to thwart Mizo beliefs on evil spirits. The Mizo writers, like C. L Hminga, emphasised the uplift and liberation of Mizo women by Christian Missionaries (Hminga 1987, 296). Christianity also changed the Mizo mindset. Before, Mizos romanticised a place called Pialral [Paradise, or Heaven]. The quandary was that the whole Mizo community could not enter paradise. Christian Missionaries instead promised a place called Vanram [Heaven], which was inclusive of everyone in the Mizo community, whether rich or poor. Christianity blessed the Mizos physically, spiritually and intellectually. One can argue that Western Theology is exclusive and ignores the Mizo worldview, creating a superiority complex towards the Mizo Christian mentality. According to H. Vanlalauva (a Mizo Theologist), Mizos inherited a Western conservative evangelical theology that totally neglected the Mizo religion, culture and traditions. As a result, almost all the values of Mizo culture were marginalised and considered as pagan. Christianity inevitably took the form of the Western image in Mizoram (Ngurliana 2008, 21). The immediate consequence of Christianity was the affection and admiration of Western culture and almost anything connected to the West. This admiration also resulted in an appreciation of the English language. Mizoram today embraces English as its second language, and it is an important identifier of the higher, elite and educated classes. The bond between Mizos and the English language is a different story compared to other parts of India. English has never been scorned in Mizoram, but treated with respect and admiration. It is considered a language of opportunity, a knowledge that opens up advancement for the people. The language of the colonisers connects Mizos with modernity. Mizos therefore relate more towards English than Hindi, India’s official language. Language cannot be separated from culture and tradition. Few Mizos are aware that the domination of English over the native tongue can result in the simulation of Mizo tribal culture. Mizos still view English as a language of invincible imagination and liberation. Although English is

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appreciated, an unhealthy relationship between English and the native Mizo language can be observed in the Mizo society by a few individuals. The affinity for English and the trepidation towards learning Hindi are portrayed most clearly by examining the current education system in Mizoram. English-medium schools and institutions thrive in the region, while the same is difficult in the case of Hindi. The impact of Hindi and its progress are slow, considering the scale of investment from Central Government grants to promote it. The Mizos are reluctant to speak it, but those who migrated for higher education started to realise the importance of Hindi for employment opportunities and cultural exchange. Hindispeaking Mizos in Mizoram are relatively few compared to the English speakers. Experts are of the opinion that Hindi will be an important bridge that connects these people with the rest of India. Identity consciousness is an immense problem that prevents Mizos and northeastern Indians from assimilating the Indian culture. From the outset, India’s northeastern facial features set them apart from the rest of Indians. It is a dilemma, and the rest of India is apprehensive about accommodating the tribals of India’s northeast wholeheartedly and without racial prejudice. Xenophobia still invades human nature. Neither mainstream Indians nor India’s northeast is liberated from this predicament. It is poignant to confess that India’s northeast has witnessed a mounting incursion of mainstream Indians. Thus, they feel threatened. Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh are states shielded by the policy of the “Inner Line Permit,” which forbids non-locals from buying and owning properties in India’s northeast. A person who is not a native of the land, even if they are an Indian citizen, is considered a foreigner and cannot enter without authorisation. As much as an “Indian” is made to feel foreign within Mizoram, the same is also true for a Mizo staying outside their homeland. Mizos are often associated with Chinese, Nepalese and other Mongoloid races and their lifestyle often reminds the mainstream Indians of these similar races and cultures. In spite of accommodating Mizos in the mainstream culture, they are often forced to feel different and foreign in their own country. Mizos eventually isolate themselves from other Indians. The lack of communication forbids integration in mainstream India. As long as a language barrier exists, the gap between Mizos and mainstream India will prevail.

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The March 1966 Mizo National Front (MNF) uprising was a revolt against the Government of India, aimed at establishing a sovereign state for the Mizos. The Mizo National Front was established on October 22, 1961 (Lalrawnliana 1996, 3). On March 1, 1966, the MNF circulated inside Mizoram the “Declaration of Mizoram Independence,” which gave 12 insightful reasons why they were revolting against the Government of India (Hermanaa 1999, 147). After launching coordinated attacks on the Indian Government offices and security force outposts in different parts of the erstwhile Mizo district of Assam, the MNF decided to cut off all connections with the Government, claiming that they were liberated. The MNF released an open declaration: We, therefore the representatives of Mizo people meeting on this day, the first of March, in the year of our Lord, nineteen sixty six appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World for the rectitude of our intention so, in the name and by the authority of the good people of this country solemnly publish and declare that Mizoram is, and of rights ought to be free and Independent, that they are absolved from all allegiance to India and its Parliament and all political connections between them and Government of India is and ought to be dissolved and that as free and independent state, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, established commerce and to do all other Acts and things which Independent state may of right do. (Hermanaa 1999, 103–4)

During Government of India Army operations to suppress the rebellion, the Indian Air Force carried out airstrikes in Aizawl in 1966. This remains the only instance in Indian history of carrying out airstrikes on its own civilian territory. Pu Biakchhunga, one of the leaders of the MNF, wrote that two Indian Air Force Jet fighters bombed Aizawl on March 5 and 6, 1966. The Indian Army simultaneously entered Mizoram and raided the region by using machine guns against the technologically inferior Mizo rebels. The Indian Army personnel were ambushed on several occasions by MNF volunteers, but they were outnumbered by the Indian armed forces. Many innocent Mizos were captured and assassinated, and many Mizo women were brutally raped. The Indian armies were mainly from mainland India, and spoke Hindi as their mother tongue. Their actions during the insurgency operations had a major impact on the minds of the Mizos, and did not fade from their memories.

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Mizoram has now been peaceful for more than 28 years. However, the discomfort towards mainland India is very much intact in Mizo’s minds. The mental effect from the killing of their loved ones and the raping of innocent Mizo women resulted in contempt for people who speak the language of the Indian army, i.e. Hindi. Despite commendable efforts from the Central Government to integrate the northeast into mainstream India, it proves a hard nut to crack even today. Although the situation has changed considerably, the voice of the Mizo people regarding the Government of India still determines their attitude towards mainstream India and their lack of interest in the language of those who once ruled them with tyranny and despotism: Our people are despised, persecuted, tortured, manhandled and murdered without displaying justice while they preach and profess before us and throughout the world what they have institute for us a separate administrative set up in conformity with the principle of democracy. To conceal their evil and selfish design religious assimilation and Hindu indoctrination they preached to have established which we cannot accept as it leads to suppression of Christianity. (Lalrawnliana 1995, 113).

References Hermanaa, C. 1999. Zoram Politics Thli Tleh Dan. Vol. 1. Aizawl: Presscom. Hminga, C. L. 1987. The Life and Witness of the Churches in Mizoram. Lunglei: Baptist Church of Mizoram. Hodson, T. C. 1980. “Manipuris.” In Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, James Hastings (ed.). Edinburgh: T&T Clark. Khiangte, Laltluangliana. 1993. Lehkhabu Ramtiam. Aizawl: LTL Publications. Kipgen, Mangkhosat. 1997. Christianity and Mizo Culture. Aizawl: Mizo Theological Conference. Lalrawnliana. 1995. Zoramin Zalenna a Sual, Vol. 1. Aizawl: RM Press. Mackenzie, A. 1884. The North-East Frontier of India. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Masahary, R. N. 1989. “Aryanisation and Hinduisation of the Bodos.” In Proceedings of Northeast India History Association. Shillong: NEIHA. McCaulay Minute. 1835. www.english.uscb.edu. Ngurliana. 2008. “Towards a Mizo Christian Theology: Gospel and Culture in the Mizo-Chin Christian Context with Special Reference to Myanmar.” PhD Thesis, Birmingham: University of Birmingham.

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Pachuau, Lalsangkima. 1998. “Ethnic Identity and Christianity in NorthEast India: A Socio-historical and Missiological Study with Special Reference to Mizoram.” Dissertation, New Jersey: Princeton University.

SOCIETY AND WOMEN— AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN LALI BY BIAKLIANA VANLALCHAMI

Colonialism and its remnants have a strong hold on northeast India’s cultures. The British colonial administration and Christianity changed the culture of tradition and modernity altered the tribal way of life. The effects of modernity for diluting the tradition of the Mizos were reflected in the Mizo literature. Missionaries introduced a Mizo script, which was utilised as tool by writers to recreate the diminishing and changing culture of the Mizo society on paper. Modern education brought tremendous positive changes, which eventually contributed to the development of Mizo literature. Literature is the reflection of human life in words. The first Mizo short story Lali, written by Biakliana in 1936, depicts the social fabric of early Mizoram (Khiangte 2011). Mizo society has undergone a transition from a tribal society towards a Christianised society by shredding the tribal deity belief. Lali reproduced the dilemma at that juncture of Mizo social transition during the 1930s. The short story was later translated by Margaret Lalmuanpuii Pachuau (2004) as a chapter in The Heart of the Matter (2004). This chapter focuses on both the original text of Lali, which is just eighteen pages long, and its original translation into English. The short story focuses on the female protagonist Lali and entails the division of gender roles of earlier Mizo society when women were marginalised. The short story reveals the quandaries witnessed in Mizo society due to the introduction of the colonial administration and the subsequent conversion to Christianity. The short story narrates Mizo women’s domestic life, division of labour, internalised marginality, misogyny, violence, Mizo patriarchy and self-negation. The story opens with the female protagonist Lali weaving a pawnpui.1 She is forced to leave her weaving for a while and calls her mother, “Ka nu

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could you finish this portion with Thani [Lali’s sister]? I have to go and fetch water” (Pachuau 2004, 196). Before they leave to fetch water, Lali’s father comes home drunk and shouts at his wife from the veranda, “Zovi, hurry up and give me my dinner; I am starving” (197). Lali’s mother, who was about to finish a portion of the weaving, argues with her husband and receives a beating. About this incident Lali retorted angrily: “Isn’t it just like him … As it is we have to cook dinner and fetch water” (197). The role of Mizo women in the home and the society was eternally bounded by chores. The short story depicts it well. Daily chores were the basic duties of Mizo women in the family and Mizo society. The division of labour based on gender deemed it unmanly to cook, weave or even carry water. The incident in the story depicts the misogynist attitude towards the women of Mizo society. Mizo women were often the victims of domestic violence. Lali’s mother is beaten simply because she cannot attend to her drunken husband’s whim, as she is weaving a blanket for the family for the harsh winter to come. The husband feels that he has the right to beat his wife. The low status of Mizo women in the family and society’s not giving credit for their work in order to nurture their families are disturbing accounts the story depicts. In another account of the story, Lali goes with Thani to fetch water. Lali tells her friend she wishes that her brother, who has gone to the plain, will bring back some skeins of thread for her to weave a Puanchei (a wraparound skirt).2 Lali says to Thani: “I wanted skeins of thread from the plain to weave a Puanchei for myself; but as we are weaving this blanket I do not have time for that perhaps this is our fate” (196). These accounts depict the internalisation of Mizo women’s marginal status and why Mizo women easily accepted their fate, with no option but to be silent bearers of the unequal treatment bestowed upon them. The short story details the unequal treatment of men and women of the Mizo society. It also narrates change brought by the British colonialism and Christianity to Mizo women. The story was written during 1936. Thani asks, “What is the lesson for tomorrow’s Sunday School? Oh, I remember you’re no longer in the primary section. You’ve been transferred to the junior” (198). Christianity could not liberate Mizo women from their domestic chores, but ensured they learnt in Sunday schools. Lali is weighed down by the tremendous amount of household chores, and she sadly tells Thani:

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I haven’t read the lesson yet. I don’t have the new text and there’s been too much work. Tomorrow’s Sunday so I’ll have to fetch water again after the service tonight. There’s rice to pound. My brother took all that I had pounded, and now I have to pound some everyday. (198)

Lali’s brother does not buy the threads for her Puanchei. Instead, he buys a shoe for himself. After dinner, Lali pounds the rice with her mother, and they finish only a portion of it. The Church bell rings and, after the service, Lali goes to fetch water. Mizo women had to continuously do household work. Zualtea (Lali’s brother) is not even asked to tend the fire while Lali pounds rice. If Lali refuses to pound the rice or fetch water she would be considered a misfit in the Mizo society. The story depicts how Mizo society kept women at the margins. The influence of the Church, and the way Church administers the value and moral system of Mizo society, are evident when Lali’s Sunday routine is narrated: “Sunday mornings were reserved for Bible study lessons while her mother cooked” (199). The story narrates how Mawia (Lali’s friend), “had been a boarder in their house since childhood.” The reins that the Church holds in Mizo society’s moral system are narrated as, “The two friends Mawia and Lali taught together at Sunday School, lending a distinct sense of respectability to their humble dwelling” (199). In Lali, the story reveals the forms of Mizo society in transition where its members are in a dilemma due to the changing belief system from animist to Christianity. Lali chides her Sunday school pupils for bunking class and drinking alcohol. The change in belief system affects both the moral and traditional ways of life. This is evident when Lali scolds her pupil Mana: So, you’ve been drinking on the sly. How could you! And why? … Don’t ever do this again, for these are only for the wicked. You’ll fall prey to gossip and hatred...and everyone will mock you … Don’t you see the evil of it? Drinking is a sin. (200)

The story considers the Church on matters relating to one’s membership or right to be a part of it. Lali further warns Mana: You drank on the sly, taking advantage of your elders being in church. And that’s sinful. In fact, some of these men who lured you have been stripped of their church membership. (200)

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This conversation records the inculcation of the fear of sin, which is an example of the values taught by the Church. These replaced the ethnic cultural value and belief system of the Mizo society they inherited from their ancestors. A strong patriarchal society in which daughters and mothers had no voices in the family and could only marry are clearly depicted in the short story. Lali receives a proposal for marriage from Rozika, who belongs to a wellto-do family. Lali is disgusted with him because she knows that he has a sly character and is also a womaniser. Nevertheless, Lali’s father, relishing his good fortune, is vehement in marrying her off to Rozika. Lali tries her best to make her father understand her point, even though she knows, “that her father would still have the final say” (205). When her mother takes Lali’s side, her father angrily retorts, “The marriage will take place, even if I have to beat you to consent” (206). Lali’s father tells his son Zualtea to call his uncle Pu Manga to tell him to put up the wedding banners. An unfortunate incident occurs when Zualtea disobeys his father’s orders. In a fit of raging anger, Lali’s father throws a piece of firewood at his son, which makes him whimper with pain. Lali’s mother instinctively runs to her son’s side, crying to her husband that he has hurt his son. The father blames his wife for spoiling their children and slaps them. Taia (another son), seeing his father’s violence, tries to restrain him but to no avail. Lali’s mother once again suffers at the hands of her husband. She decides that she will have to retreat to her brother’s house for a while. Her husband shouts, “Don’t ever come back! I’ll hack you to pieces” (206). The chain of events surrounding Lali’s proposal depicts the lifeworld of Mizo women in their society. They were looked upon as objects in a world where labour was most important; a society where love marriage was rare and women bore the brunt of their economic conditions. For they are sold off like cattle and cattle buyers buy the best and the most hardworking of them all. Women and fences are but disposables. We men beat them and leave them at a whim. In the olden days, the value of slaves was dependent on their health and strength. We look at women today in much the same way. (203)

After marriage, Lali leaves her family home. She immediately cuts herself off from any binding she has to her home and expects to never go back if

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divorce happens. She does not hold the rights to any property. In her husband’s home, she works from dawn to dusk. Women who returned to the parental home due to marital fights were looked down upon and treated with suspicion in the Mizo society. Even Lali’s mother does not to return to her parental home; instead, she goes to stay at her brother’s home. The short story reveals the endurance of the strongest women who succumbed to domestic violence, which was no fault of theirs. The attitude of Mizo society is depicted when the family row takes place. Neighbours come and ask in bemused suspicion, “Lali, where has your mother gone?” (207). Lali answers, hiding her sadness, that, “she must be around” (207). The incident depicts the need for self-negation by a woman, where she never puts her own needs first but has to live a life deprived of self in a society dictated on patriarchal lines. The incident reveals a certain irony in the depiction of women’s marginal existence within the Mizo society. The writer, Biakliana, was sentimental for the plight of women. He clarified that Christianity was the only answer for the betterment of their status: The dreaded habit of slavery was abolished due to the painstaking efforts of Christians and other noble hearted men who invested time, labour, money and talent for the cause … Who shall lead Mizoram’s enslaved women into the light of freedom? (203)

Christianity could not change the status of the Mizo women. Mizo society maintained its age-old traditional and cultural value system with regards to the role of women and their status, even in the midst of cultural change. The story also reveals the confusion following that adoption of a new religion or culture which could transform Mizo society into something else. Mizo society is a tribal society, and Christianity also witnessed resistance from cultural practices like hunting, drinking liquor and agriculture. In the short story, Lali’s father and some older men do not want to convert. They prefer Mizo culture and tradition. Lali’s father’s drinking habit and misogynistic behaviour cannot be comprehended. Lali’s father’s refusal to convert could be due to his sentimental attachment to Mizo culture and tradition. The Christian converts regard him as a misfit. One may argue that he reacts naturally against an outside

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force that changed the Mizo social value and belief system, culture and tradition he holds dear. The story reveals two sides of the Mizo society. First, Christianity ushered towards Mizo society, and second, the quandaries of religious conversion and cultural change in Mizo society. The story also depicts how Mizo society negotiated with modernity. It portrays repentance and acceptance of the Christian faith through the incident surrounding Zualtea’s sickness and his death, which brings selfrealisation for the father leading to his repentance. In his grief, Lali’s father is constantly reminded of Zualtea’s last words: “Ka pa (my father) will you come to heaven too?” (211), which finally leads him to accept the Christian faith: Zualtea has left us for his heavenly home, to be with Jesus … “My heart is saddened … How wicked I have been. Words fail me. But from now on I shall belief. (121)

Christianity becomes entrenched in the Mizo society at the end. The story ends with Lali being saved from the dreaded marriage to Rozika, while Lali’s husband is suspended from the church because of immoral conduct with another girl. This portrays the role of Christianity and how the church became the lawmaker in every aspect of Mizo society. Rozika would not have been suspended if Christianity was not present in the Mizo society, and Lali would suffer at her husband’s will. Christianity freed her from this bondage. The story was the first Mizo short story. It captures the Mizo culture, tradition and society of the 1930s. The author is sympathetic to the plight of women, which he witnessed in his own society. The story is also sensitive towards the transition and change that Mizo society was going through. The story ends on an optimistic note, reiterating the biblical belief that the “word rules, darkness is cast aside and light sets all men free.” The story beautifully weaves together the elements of women’s victimisation and subjectivity in Mizo society in transition in just 18 pages. If one reads the text closely in light of the above analysis of its depiction of social transition and considers the depiction of the status of women per se, one is tempted to ask questions like—even though the story was written in 1936, has the status of women really changed for the better? Is

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the social transition as recorded in the story still an ongoing process or are the individuals in the society well adept to this social change? And is contemporary Mizo society still in a transitory stage, clinging to its tribal roots and beliefs, while at the same time embracing the Christian teachings?

Notes 1

Pawnpui may be described as a blanket woven from cotton thread into which cotton wool is stitched. See the Dictionary of the Lushai Language by James Herbert Lorrain. 2 Puan may be described as a woven traditional lower garment worn by both men and women, with one edge tightly fastened around the waist or under the armpits across the breasts by women. Puanchei is a multi-coloured puan on a white background. See the Dictionary of the Lushai Language by James Herbert Lorrain. 3 Zu may be described as an alcoholic drink made from the fermenting of rice.

Work Cited Biakliana. 2004. Lali. Translated by Margaret Lalmuanpuii Pachuau. In The Heart of the Matter, 196–214. New Delhi: Katha.

References Laltluangliana, Khiangte. 2011. Biakliana Robawm. Mission Veng: LTL Publications. Lorrain, James Herbert. 1940. Dictionary of the Lushai Language. Calcutta: The Asiatic Society.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Amit Manger, PhD Scholar, Department of Politics and International Relations, Sikkim University. Anil Kumar Biswas, Department of Political Science, Acharya B. N. Seal College, Cooch Behar, West Bengal. S. Haukhanlian Mate, Professor, Department of History, Government Saitual College, Mizoram. Grace Lalhlupuii Sailo, Assistant Professor, Department of Social Work, Mizoram University, Aizawl, Mizoram. Henry Zodinliana Pachuau, Assistant Professor, Department of Social Work, Mizoram University, Aizawl, Mizoram. Puthem Jugeshor Singh, PhD Scholar, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Lalrinchhani, Research Scholar, Department of English, School of Humanities, Mizoram University, Aizawl, Mizoram. Mrinal Kanti Basak, Department of Philosophy, Acharya B. N. Seal College, Cooch Behar, West Bengal Nazmul Hussain Laskar, PhD Scholar, Department of Political Science, Assam University, Silchar. P. Newton Singh, Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and International Relations, Sikkim University. Ridhima Sundas, PhD Scholar, Department of Sociology, Sikkim University. Rukmini Kakoty, PhD Scholar, Department of English, Sikkim University.

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Sunil Pradhan, PhD Scholar, Department of Politics and International Relations, Sikkim University. Vanlalchami, Assistant Professor, Department of English, Government T. Romana College, Aizawl, Mizoram. Vanrammawii, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Government Saitual College, Mizoram. Zokaitluangi, Professor, Department of Psychology, Mizoram University