‘Be Clear Kashmir will Vote for India’: Jammu & Kashmir 1947-1953: Reporting the Contemporary Understanding of the Unreported [1 ed.] 0367343002, 9780367343002

Citation preview

‘BE CLEAR, KASHMIR WILL V O T E F O R I N D I A’ The central point that this volume makes is that much of what happened in Jammu & Kashmir in the critical first few years (1947-53) needs a more careful reassessment. It is argued that there were little voices of ordinary people that should have been heard but were ignored. The political discourse that took centre stage even as it appeared more assertive and representative of mass public opinion was, however, as is now clear only a clever and misleading political move. Much of the source material upon which the author has based his study has till now remained unstudied and uncited – rare hard to find books, pamphlets, articles in journals, magazines and newspapers, official and party reports and so on. The volume takes the reader back in time to a kind of ring side seat. Kashmir’s cultural and historical legacy, the invasion, the issue of the plebiscite, the United Nations and the ceasefire, the Praja Parishad and most important of all the political scene and its key players – Prime Minister Nehru, Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Sheikh Abdullah. Based on the nature of its sources the volume breaks free of a stereotyped approach to understanding the origin of what we commonly term today as the ‘Kashmir problem’. The volume argues that contemporary views recorded as they are in the heat of the moment with natural spontaneity often contain hidden lines and new light. Not surprisingly contemporary versions tell us a story very different from mainstream conventional writings on Jammu & Kashmir. This timely volume will radically influence the existing discourse on Jammu & Kashmir. Raghuvendra Tanwar is Emeritus Professor and has taught modern history at Kurukshetra University for about thirty-nine years, superannuating as Senior Professor in 2015. He has also been the University’s Dean Academic Affairs and Dean Social Sciences. Tanwar’s major publications are Reporting the Partition of Punjab: Press Public & Other Opinions 1947 (2006); Politics of Sharing Power: The Punjab Unionist Party 1923-47 (1999); Bansi Lal: Life & Times (co-author) (2012); Frankly Speaking: Essays and Opinions (2012). He has been General President of the Punjab History Conference (2017) and the first President of the Contemporary Section of the Indian History Congress (2008). He was a National Fellow (Research Awardee) of the University Grants Commission (2002-5) and is also a Member of the Indian Council of Historical Research, New Delhi.

Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group http://taylorandfrancis.com

‘Be Clear, Kashmir will Vote for India’ jammu & kashmir 1947-1953 Reporting the Contemporary Understanding of the Unreported

R A G H U V E N D R A T A N WA R

ROUTLEDGE

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

MANOHAR 2019

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Raghuvendra Tanwar and Manohar Publishers & Distributors The right of Raghuvendra Tanwar to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Print edition not for sale in South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan or Bhutan) British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-34300-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-32489-5 (ebk) Typeset in Adobe Garamond Pro 11/13 by Manohar, New Delhi 110 002

MANOHAR

Contents

p re fac e in t ro d u c t i on

17

1. Jammu & Kashmir: A Historical Perspective – Religion Culture and Tradition

47

2. The Invasion of Jammu & Kashmir: Public Opinion Turns Anti-Pakistan

71

Understanding the Basics  17 Placing the Book in Perspective  20 Overview of Some Important Studies  23 Contemporary Writings and Reports  34

1500 Years of Hindu Rule  47 Kashmir Takes to Islam  48 The British Sell Kashmir but Retain Influence – Dogra Rule  49 Increasing Interest in Kashmir – How Europeans Saw it  52 Geo-Strategic Importance  53 How People in India Saw Jammu & Kashmir: Shiva Bhumi 54 A Society Deeply Interwoven  56 The Political Scene – Important Features 1947  58 Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah  63 Gandhi-Nehru in Defence of Abdullah  65

India Taken by Surprise   71 Restrictions on the Press and Entry into Jammu & Kashmir  72 Summer Examinations  75 The Legacy of Poverty  76

9

6 C O N T E N T S Mahatma Gandhi in Srinagar (August 1947)  77 Early Reports of the Invasion and the People’s Response  78 Ramchandra Kak Dismissed: Nehru-Mountbatten Come Out in Support  82 First Hand Reports on Pakistan’s Involvement  85 Invaders were Inhumanly Violent  91 Indian Army Welcomed as Bachao Fauj (Saviour) 93 The Ballad of Mir Maqbool Sherwani: A Modern Kashmiri Ballad  97 Invasion Fortified Hindu-Muslim Relations  99 Was Kashmir Different?  100

3. Nehru Puts Abdullah Incharge: Beginning of the Political Whirlpool

110

4. ‘Pilgrimage of Hindustan to Lake Success (UN) the Hotbed of International Intrigue’: Nehru sees Kashmir as a World Problem

159

Partition of India on the Basis of Religion was a Mistake  110 Early Miscalculation and Misjudgments   111 Why did the Maharaja Delay Accession  113 Nehru Puts Sheikh Abdullah in Command  115 Sheikh Abdullah Takes Control  119 Obstruction of Abdullah will Lead to Disaster  121 Nehru Guides Abdullah  124 Sardar Patel and Abdullah  125 Sheikh Abdullah Supports India but Always with a Catch  127 Jawaharlal Nehru: How and why he Took to the Idea of a Plebiscite  130 United Nations and Plebiscite: Nehru Raises the Issue in Parliament  137 Kashmir Conflict: A Drain on Financial Resources  140 Independent Kashmir: Did the Idea Have Support  142 Seeking to Know what Jammu & Kashmir Wanted   145

Mountbatten and the United Nations  159 Reference to the United Nations – Most Saw it as a Mistake  162 ‘Our Intention is a Civilized Manner’: Nehru  164 India Cannot Expect Justice at the United Nations  166 The Ceasefire: Why?  168 Nehru’s Perception  169 ‘Jammu & Kashmir is a Case for Special Treatment’: Nehru  176

CONTENTS 7

5. ‘Accession Still in the Melting Pot’ The Praja Parishad: Nehru-Mookerjee and Abdullah

180

6. The Dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah Pakistan Prime Minister Meets Nehru: Talk of Plebiscite and Partition of Kashmir

246

Sardar Patel Sidelined on Kashmir  181 Abdullah Changes Track: Puts the Onus on the Praja Parishad   183 ‘Attempts to Confuse and Confound People’  185 Abdullah Has Lost Goodwill  188 The Praja Parishad and its Context   194 Praja Parishad Agitation in Jammu (IB Report)  196 ‘Praja Parishad a Reaction to Aggressive Nationalism of Kashmir’: Balraj Puri   200 Communal Divide and Regional Bias  201 Praja Parishad Plea to the President of India  203 Jammu & Kashmir in Parliament: Nehru and Mookerjee Some Extracts   205 Nehru Records his Assessment of Kashmir: Again Supports Special Treatment for Jammu & Kashmir  211 Jammu & Kashmir: Another Historic Debate in Parliament  213 The Praja Parishad Gains Support  222 Nehru Annoyed with The Tribune 226 Nehru and Dr. Mookerjee – Yet Another Clash  228 Nehru, Mookerjee and Abdullah Exchange Letters on Jammu & Kashmir  229 Nehru Hits at the Praja Parishad: Mookerjee Comes Out in Defence  232 Mookerjee Speaks on Jammu & Kashmir Across India   232 The Arrest of Dr. Mookerjee – Detention and Death  234 Government Charged with Negligence  235 Mookerjee was Given All Care: Nehru  236 Rammanohar Lohia on the Handling of Jammu & Kashmir by the Government of India  239

Even Nehru and Katju Disenchanted with Abdullah  248 ‘Filled with Deeply Penetrating Sadness’: Indira Gandhi  251 Karan Singh’s Version  253 Abdullah’s Farewell to Nehru  255 Nehru had Defended Abdullah in Parliament Exactly a Year Earlier  257

8 C O N T E N T S Reactions to Abdullah’s Dismissal  258 Mridula Sarabhai Stands in Support of Abdullah – Nehru Annoyed  259 Pakistan’s Reaction to Abdullah’s Dismissal: Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Insists for a Meeting  262 Pakistan Prime Minister in New Delhi  262 Nehru Assesses Kashmir Post Abdullah: Possibility of Partition   265 Nehru-Mohammed Ali Meeting: Minutes  267

co n c lu s i o n 279 b i bl i o g r a ph y 295 in d ex 303

Preface

M 

y  wife and i have been regular visitors to Kashmir for          many many years now. Quite often the thought of having      a second home in Kashmir has crossed our minds, but with the law being what it is, this is obviously not possible. We have experienced the calm of Srinagar and its surroundings during long periods of peace and quiet and also seen it erupt at short notice. We were in Srinagar when the Amarnath land transfer agitation (June 2008) took place and were scheduled to return on the day following the incident. We had shifted for the last two days of our visit to the outskirts of the city with our close friends – the Khans. In view of the sudden disturbances our host decided that he would himself drive us to the airport, because the route involved passing through some of the most notorious stone throwing areas of Srinagar. Initially our hosts had thought of arranging a police escort, but interestingly this was considered a more dangerous option. The Khans were and are influential people, well known in the area and the chances of being targeted by the stone throwers were perhaps less. This proved to be a miscalculation. As we drove through dangerously fast, at several turns a small group of young men – mostly in their teens would suddenly emerge, throw their stones and disappear. Clearly there was an organized pattern. However dramatic this experience may have been, we soon got over it. What happened next is what remains etched in our minds. As we drove along the Dal Lake we were stopped at a security

10 P R E FA C E check post. We were then asked to disembark. Satisfied that we were visitors, the duty constable then began questioning our host. The manner in which all this happened and the manner in which our host had to explain the purpose of our being on the road even though there was no restriction or curfew was disheartening. I was left wondering if this could happen to someone like him, one can well imagine the state of ordinary people. The scenes at the airport were obviously chaotic. There were several people with bandages, including a honeymooning couple from Mumbai – all were victims of stone throwing. People had rushed in from all over the state and were trying to purchase seats at famine prices. The irony was that the valley had seen prolonged peace in the preceding weeks – the tourist season had been in full flow. Within hours everything had changed. And yet Kashmir is not something that one can give up so easily. As flights approach Srinagar what you see down below are small hamlets and settlements, countless streams running in all directions, meadows and orchards all guarded as it seems by huge snow clad mountains on both sides. From the air everything seems so heavenly and peaceful. It is only when the plane touches down and you see the fortifications and defence readiness at the airport itself that the present reality of Kashmir dawns on you. Even as it is easy to note the tension around, Kashmir’s past and history of religious harmony and co-existence cannot also be missed. Facing north, look west from the Dal Lake, Kashmir’s holiest of shrines the mid-seventeenth century historic and beautiful Hazaratbal dominates the skyline. Look east, just beyond the banks of the lake on a small hill top is the Shankaracharya temple that has been there for close to two thousand years. The religious and historical significance of the temple apart, the view is magical – boats criss-crossing the lake, streams of smoke emerging from the kitchens adding to the distant haze. If one is an early riser the sounds of the pre-dawn aarti flowing from the temple can be heard sometimes preceding, more often mixing with the sounds of the first ‘azan’ of the day. The experience is mystical and haunting. We have walked the streets of Srinagar and its suburbs and met and interacted with countless people. We have good friends in Kashmir University and its colleges. Whether it is among academic circles or

P R E FA C E 11

among the ordinary Kashmiri, struggling to stay afloat, the yearning for peace and return to happier times is more than evident. This is naturally more among the older generation who have seen better times. I once asked a young attendant at the Taj Dal View hotel as to why the occupancy level of the hotel was so low at the time even though its location is perhaps the most beautiful in the country. He was just a school passout but surprisingly he was fluent in English. In a way what he said is what really made me think on the lines on which this book is based. The media in this young man’s version was projecting a point of view that was not representative of the mass of public opinion. The people he said wanted peace. Peace and return to normalcy was not necessarily an attractive proposition for the politically active and perhaps even other ‘elitist’ groups. It was the media that had pushed Kashmir further away. A small but influential section of Kashmir’s people he said wanted to ensure that the issue of resolving the crisis was always kept on the ‘back burner’, a low priority. I checked on this insight of the young attendant at the Taj with the friendly owner of a bakery which we have often visited. I was surprised to note the similarity of understanding. As he put it – the number of ordinary people who would come out in support of protecting a tourist will greatly outnumber those that will cause harm to him. For many years now we have used the same man to drive us around Srinagar. The driver’s father who had seen a ‘happy Kashmir’ was even more perceptive. ‘Look closely and observe carefully’ he said, ‘it is a small section of people who have kept the issue at boil’. He noted how the children of most of these influential people were now studying in foreign lands, those who were left behind have nothing better to do than learn to throw stones. As I moved towards the last phase of this book I was hardly surprised to realize that this basic division has probably been there all along, perhaps even in 1947 itself. The frequent visits and interactions with all kinds of people have led me to believe that just as in the present times perhaps even in the pre and post partition years, the common Kashmiri may have had expectations that were not in tune with what the ‘big leaders’ were saying or claiming.

12 P R E FA C E My wife having spent a lifetime teaching and researching gender issues made an interesting observation when she noted how in recent years more and more women students in Kashmir University had taken to wearing the ‘hijab’. The result is that today it would be difficult to note a school going or a University student without the head being covered. Of course there is nothing wrong in this. But the point is something else. A senior faculty member of the Kashmir University, a colleague of my wife, pointed out that this was a development that is only perhaps 10-15 years old. She told us how Srinagar was once a place of high fashion and women students of the University enjoyed every moment of it particularly the hairstyling and hair colouring. But what was now happening was obviously quite unnatural. Was this happening as a result of some kind of duress or fear? Was there a concerted organized effort unfolding to a plan? Anyone who has observed Jammu & Kashmir in recent years can also not miss the manner in which the youth in particular are beginning to take to the streets on the smallest of pretexts, particularly in the valley. Just as in the case of women students one can easily also notice that among men students too there is an increasing tendency to dress in an Islamicized manner. Again nothing wrong with this, but the point really is, is this all happening in a normal course or is there something more to it. How can we forget that Islam in Jammu & Kashmir has always had its own distinctive features, references and an element of enchanced refineness. While one could suggest several reasons for expression of such community based identity, one important reason is possibly that it is a reaction to exclusivist politics that tends to isolate communities – something that has become noticeable around the world increasingly so in India. These and several other impressions are what we often carried back on our return from the state. It was with this background that sometimes in 2012, I submitted a major research project to the University Grants Commission. The UGC had earlier supported another major study when it sanctioned to me a fully paid National Fellowship (Research Award) in 2002. The work was published as Reporting the Partition of Punjab 1947: Press, Public and other Opinions, in 2006 by Manohar in Delhi and Vanguard in Lahore. In the present case the study was also inspired by an impression

P R E FA C E 13

that the ordinary, the common Kashmiri – of whichever faith, in whatever region was probably reading the developing problem in a different light as compared to the political players who claimed to represent them. If this was the basic hypothesis, it was pointless seeking to substantiate the thesis on the basis of the existing well known studies and writings. The idea thus was to seek a hitherto untried path by revisiting the major events and political developments through the views of contemporaries or near contemporaries. As the study progressed it was encouraging to note that not only was my thesis proving correct but the picture that had begun to form was interesting, important and quite different from much of what had already been published. It soon became clear that very much like in our present times, when there is always much more to understand than what one sees, hears or reads, in the 1940s and 1950s too the situation was quite the same. The period starting from about May 1947 to the time when Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed (August 1953) can in a way be identified as the first phase of what we normally speak of as the ‘Kashmir Crisis’. Hence the idea to generally limit the study to this period. I have explained at length in the Introduction how this book differs from other mainstream writings on Jammu & Kashmir. But one thing to which I must draw attention even here is that the main structure of the book is based on several contemporary points of view that appeared in small booklets and monographs, newspaper and magazine articles which have remained mostly unacknowledged. They find no reference in the bibliographies of important studies. Most of these have been lying untouched in the book shelves of libraries and research centres across the country. For over five years now I have actively sought out such writings. The Allama Iqbal Library of Kashmir University, the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi and the Pratap Singh Library, Srinagar have proved extremely valuable in this context. Likewise the National Library of India, Kolkata and book stores in Srinagar, Jammu and Shimla enabled the access of long forgotten and out of print copies of books that have been used for this study. For copies of the Kashmir Affairs I must thank the family of Balraj Puri which gave me access to the late Professor’s private library in Jammu.

14 P R E FA C E I have worked at the Jammu & Kashmir State Archives in Jammu as well as Srinagar. Sadly just like everything else they too are in a condition of unbelievable neglect. I have raised this issue whenever and wherever I could. In Jammu the archives is housed in a building that was condemned for demolition over 50 years ago. The Srinagar archives is hardly better. The Microfilm Repository of the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi remains one the best resources for old newspapers. The Manuscript Section of the Library that was earlier very cautious and perhaps selective in allowing access to files of Jawaharlal Nehru’s writings on Jammu & Kashmir thankfully has now become quite liberal. Over the years I have had the chance to discuss the broad lines of the work with several friends who have worked in Jammu & Kashmir and who perhaps understand conditions on the ground more closely. When you are in service and still have stakes and the issue of discussion is Kashmir, being a bit cautious is quite understandable. Other friends have been more open perhaps. Some have agreed and supported the thesis, others have had reservations. But two things are common to all of them, they have been long time dear friends and know Kashmir and Jammu exceedingly well. Prof. Nilofer Khan, Dean Student’s Welfare, Kashmir University and Dr. Yasmeen Ashai, Principal Government College Srinagar helped me develop a deeper under­ standing and guided me to important resources. In Jammu I have benefitted from long discussions with Prof. Shailender Jamwal and Prof. Jigar Mohammad of the Deptt. of History, Jammu University. Prof. Poonam Dhawan, the Dean Academic Affairs at Jammu University and Dr. Shashi Kaul of Parade College, Jammu too have been very helpful. Jawahar Lal Kaul is literally a son of the soil. With 40 years in the print media including stints with the Times of India and the Indian Express he was honoured with the Padamashri in 2016. Having grown up in Kashmir just as the trouble had begun to brew and moved around with his father who worked in the postal department of pre and post 1947 Kashmir, Kaul’s insight is the closest one can get to the reality. I have greatly benefitted from his understanding. Like Kaul, Arun Kumar, the force and spirit of the Jammu & Kashmir

P R E FA C E 15

Study Centre has traversed Jammu & Kashmir for years. A man of grass root understanding his insight has been of great help. He has been encouraging and supportive. The list of those who have assisted in this study over the years is long I must thank the very hardworking researcher Devesh Khandelwal for his assistance. Suman Lamba and Priya Mohan have helped me with the Microfilms and Aslam Khan with the translations. Puneet Chopra has been of great help. What can you write of someone you have been married to for over 40 years. Pushing, nudging, encouraging, standing firm, one thing is for sure, this book would not have been possible without the constant support of my wife Reicha. Given a chance I would love to spend the coming years with our loving children and grand children, at other times just enjoying the sunsets at our home in Goa. Amazing as wives can be even as this book is nearing completion she has already started her ‘motivational’ talk for the next. Siddharth Chowdhury has painstakingly worked on this manuscript and made insightful observations. My earnest thanks. I am especially grateful to Ramesh Jain and Ajay Jain for taking up this volume – my third from Manohar. Kurukshetra March 2019

Raghuvendra Tanwar

Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group http://taylorandfrancis.com

Introduction

UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS

I

n the years that followed freedom from colonial rule (1947)    it was natural for the Indian state to seek the establishment of a     ‘national unity’ that could draw its strength from its federal structure and also have in position a strong and effective centre of power. By implication this also meant that divergent regions and diverse socio-political groups were expected to fall in line with the demands of a consolidating and resurgent India. This brought along several new contentious issues. Many of the problems that followed were also rooted to the fact that India had been hurriedly divided by the departing British on the basis of the country’s religious demography. This was a myopic colonial view that had distorted the very character of the country, indeed belittled and undermined the historical process through which India and its people had grown over centuries of time. It was also natural that different regions and groups of people, rich in terms of their exclusive culture, language, common experiences, shared history and in many cases bonded by the ties of faith should attempt to question this new vision for independent India as also the assertion of a centralized and enforced unity. Many such attempts were made in different regions, some fizzled out, others proved more resilient. The British had operated their colonial administrative control in the sub-continent in two basic forms. In a greater part of the country it was by direct administrative control whereas in other regions it was

18 I N T RO D U C T I O N managed through the Princely states. Such states had their own ruling families. The independence of the ruling families however was nominal. Whatever their size or importance, the Princely states were made to accept the British Crown as the paramount power. As curtains came to be drawn on British rule in India, the last Viceroy Lord Mountbatten decreed to the Princely states the right to choose and join either of the two dominion states – India or the yet to be created new dominion of Pakistan. In retrospect it is not difficult to understand why and how this was the first big mistake made by the British as also the Indian leaders in the context of the transfer of power. Two main norms had generally speaking guided the plan to divide India which of course was also a pre – condition for the transfer of power and the grant of independence. The over-riding one was the composition of the population of a given region based on religion. Linked with this was the norm of geographical contiguity. The idea being to divide regions in a manner that territories were created and lines redrawn so that the people of one religious faith were separated from the other. In the case of a majority of states, indeed virtually all the states with the exception of two, this involved no major problem or issues. When we keep in mind that the number of such states was in excess of 500, the importance of the cases wherein issues actually did emerge cannot be understated. The Princely state of Jammu & Kashmir or just Kashmir as it was then commonly known, was uniquely situated. It was not only the largest in terms of size among all Princely states but also had borders with other nations, being on the edge of the Indian sub-continent. But even more peculiar in this case was the fact that while the state’s populace was largely Muslim (above 77 per cent in 1947) the ruling family was Hindu. The ruler in 1947 was Maharaja Hari Singh. The state in addition also had a long and contiguous border with the new dominion of Pakistan, then known as West Pakistan. The political construct of a Muslim majority state being ruled by a Hindu and with a contiguous border with Muslim Pakistan came in course of time, especially after Maharaja Hari Singh had signed the Instrument of Accession, to be seen and presented as a ‘Hindu India’ having bullied a Muslim Pakistan. This also became in the months and years that followed the partition of India, the essence of the dispute that we commonly term today as the ‘Kashmir Problem’.

I N T RO D U C T I O N 19

In India however the idea that two religions could or should be seen and accepted as the basis for dividing the country had always been questioned by a vast majority of people irrespective of what faith they belonged. Infact this whole policy had been accepted mainly by the top leadership with the fact remaining that the people of India had no say in this hugely consequential decision. Kashmir had for ages been seen and accepted as a part of the composite Indian frame. A shared language, a shared history, shared customs, shared food, dress and art, music and culture – these are all essentials of what constitutes nationhood. Could Kashmir be different just because at some time in its history people had converted or were forced to convert their faith. Pakistan’s case in its most basic form has rested thus on the ground that a Hindu ruler did not enjoy the right to decide the future of his Muslim subjects. From this followed the view that the Maharaja did not have the right to sign the Instrument of Accession and merge his state with India. This claim has obviously also rested on the understanding that all Muslims of Jammu & Kashmir if given a choice would have chosen to merge with Pakistan and that if they were not able to do so it was only because India was not allowing this to happen. To place in clearer perspective the developing tangle in Kashmir, attention needs to be drawn to two princely states and their actions at about the same time. Hyderabad located in the centre of India had an area of 80,000 square miles. It had a Muslim ruler, ruling over a predominantly Hindu population. Supported and guided by British intermediaries and of course Pakistan he insisted that he had the right to refuse signing the Instrument of Accession. The tussle ended when Indian troops took control of Hyderabad in September 1948. Junagadh too had a Muslim Nawab ruling over the people who were over 80 per cent Hindu. Influenced by his Pakistan based advisors the Nawab announced his intention of joining Pakistan. Pakistan accepted the request of accession on 13 September (1947) obviously with the hope that Junagadh could be used as a counter against India in Jammu & Kashmir. As the Indian state asserted itself the interim government of Junagadh realizing its folly handed over Junagadh back to India. The next move was surprising. Several views have been around as to why Delhi decided to conduct a referendum. Ramchandra Guha suggests it was to pacify Mountbatten who was angry that

20 I N T RO D U C T I O N Junagadh had been taken over without his being in the loop. The result was not surprising – 91 per cent came out in favour of India. For Pakistan, Jammu & Kashmir’s union with it was critical not just in terms of geo-strategic issues or that its major irrigation networks flowed into its plains through the state but also for the more important reason namely that, if the Muslim majority of Kashmir opted for India it would be a serious setback for those who had initiated and propelled the two nation theory based on religion and enforced the division of the sub-continent. It is this perception of the crisis that made in the course of time the question of plebiscite so important. PLACING THE BOOK IN PERSPECTIVE

Over the past seven decades not many issues have generated in South Asian history as much interest among scholars as Jammu & Kashmir. Not unexpectedly, be it in terms of public perception or the number of publications, two generally different versions have come to dominate the discourse on the region. Most of such writings however generally follow the lines adopted in the early seminal works that created in the first place the broad structure of research on the theme and set up the fundamentals of discourse. The brief references made to select studies, most of which have been benchmarks of sound scholarship on Jammu & Kashmir naturally constitute only a small part of what has actually been published. By drawing attention to some select studies, the idea is only to give a general view of how the issue has been seen over the years. In a way this volume too joins the line, but with a small difference. The difference so to say revolves around the submission that notwithstanding all the literature that is available on Jammu & Kashmir there remain almost an equally large number of contemporary points of view that have not been adequately taken note of. Many of such writings appeared as small booklets or articles almost as immediate contemporary reactions, some appeared a bit later. This book is not in this sense yet another study of Kashmir in the usual and conventional sense. What has infact been attempted is to draw attention to hitherto oversighted versions, opinions and writings

I N T RO D U C T I O N 21

with focused emphasis on the immediately contemporary times. We could perhaps call it the first phase of the dispute – 1947-53. The central point of this study therefore is that there were little voices of ordinary people that should have been heard, but were swept away by holders of bigger stakes and opinions that were more assertive even if misleading and misrepresentative. This study has proceeded in a way on the understanding that much of what happened in Jammu & Kashmir during the years 1947-53 in terms of the physical and verbal behaviour of people as well as what was written and published with regard to the events in Jammu & Kashmir in the contemporary sense needs a fresh reading and more careful understanding. This belief is based on the fact that a large number of writings appeared in the form of small pamphlets, booklets, newspaper and magazine articles, etc., but were generally overlooked in most studies undertaken on the issue in later years. Thus we have a picture that has grown with time. This book suggests that this picture is incomplete and needs a careful revisit. As students of history know too well, contemporary views recorded in whatever form – newspapers, reports, diaries or just simple notes, expressed as they are in the heat of the moment with natural spontaneity are likely to contain hidden meaning and new light. As such there is always the possibility of adding to our existing understanding of a given problem. Having said this, one has no doubt to keep in mind that opinions recorded in the heat of the moment can also be biased, personal and possibly overridden with anger and emotions. This study is not also a stereotype in the sense of producing a chronological and sequenced order of events. What it attempts to do infact is, to focus attention on some key issues and concerns. An attempt has thus been made to highlight immediately contemporary reactions and opinions with regard to issues, events and key players. This study also seeks to draw attention to circumstances and events that appear to have influenced crucial decisions that went on to have far reaching consequences. 1. Kashmir’s cultural, religious and historical legacy. 2. The so called ‘tribal’ invasion. Was it supported and sponsored by the Pakistan Military?

22 I N T RO D U C T I O N 3. The issue of the plebiscite. The common Kashmiri – what did he want with regard to his future ? 4. The Praja Parishad movement. What was its nature ? How did it impact events ? 5. Sheikh Abdullah, his importance and role. Did he play the role Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had expected of him? How did his politics influence the course of the state’s future? 6. Did the problem start of being as complicated as it became in course of time ? Meaning thereby, was the issue handled with decisiveness and clarity ? What did the contemporary observers generally think of the crisis? Basically this study seeks to understand the problem from the reactions, the writings and views of immediately contemporary people. In doing so it thus breaks free of a stereotyped approach to understanding the issue. The main sources accessed are newspapers, small booklets and publications, pamphlets and diaries, etc. Articles published in magazines, letters to editors, all in their own way carry their own tales of history. The idea is to draw out views in the contemporary sense, a kind of first hand reporting of events. Perhaps the most important problem with most of the writings on Jammu & Kashmir is the tendency of such studies to focus essentially on the political side of the story, the conflict and complications. For some reason what we find missing or only superficially referred to is the basic character of the people of the region, the historical, cultural and religious legacy. No doubt Kashmir had a Hindu ruler, ruling over a largely Muslim population and there were as a result the usual clashes and situations of tension and strife so common all over the sub-continent. But in the case of Kashmir, these were usually localized and soon forgotten. The best example of the Kashmiris love for co-existence and peace is perhaps that even as the neighbouring Punjab was drenched in communally inspired violent bloodshed (1947), Kashmir remained relatively peaceful. This stands out even more when we see that Kashmir has a long border with the areas that were the most disturbed in 1947. Pakistan had sponsored as is well known the invasion in October 1947, in the hope that the Kashmiri masses would rise and revolt

I N T RO D U C T I O N 23

against Maharaja Hari Singh, the ‘Hindu ruler’. While Pakistan had expected the Kashmiris to stand up and revolt in support of Pakistan, what happened was the opposite. All communities rallied and fought against the invaders alongside the Indian forces. The state had never seen such a picture of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and other minorities standing together and fighting to save their state from Pakistan. Not surprisingly many writings of the early contemporary years show that there was huge goodwill for India in the minds of the masses of the state. This is important and highly relevant to the hypothesis of the present study also because the invasion of 1947 was inspired by ‘jihadist’ sentiment. This study draws attention to some very important contemporary versions that tell us a story very different from the mainstream writings. But first let us briefly review some major studies that have appeared over the years and remain essential readings on Kashmir. OVERVIEW OF SOME IMPORTANT STUDIES

One of the charges that Pakistan has consistently used against India is that Maharaja Hari Singh, the last ruler of Jammu & Kashmir, signed the Instrument of Accession to declare merger with India not only under duress but even more so as a part of a conspiracy that involved senior Indian leaders and possibly Viceroy Mountbatten himself. The well-known British historian Alastair Lamb, was among the first to suggest this in the acclaimed study Crisis in Kashmir.1 This thesis even though relatively old remains the platform from which several subsequent writings took off. These include Robert G. Wirsing’s India Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute.2 Wirssing questions the ‘fairness’ of the boundary question itself and suggests that Jammu & Kashmir, because of its geographical contiguity should naturally have gone to Pakistan. While quoting heavily from Lamb’s second important contribution,3 Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, Wirsing writes that, ‘Nehru’s views about Kashmir politics were accepted by the Viceroy and his staff without dispute’.4 He draws extensively from Lamb’s theory of conspiracy, that is that, India exerted pressure on Hari Singh to sign the document of accession in favour of India. Lamb had also gone on to suggest that the ‘tribal’ invasion that led to the panic reaction of Maharaja Hari Singh was an internal affair of Kashmir.

24 I N T RO D U C T I O N Even more important was Lamb’s suggestion that Pakistan had little or nothing to do with the invasion5 of Kashmir in the autumn of 1947. Lamb also suggests that the essence of the conflict is rooted in the context of the ‘one nation’ theory of India as against the ‘two nation’ theory of Pakistan and that once the partition of India had been accepted on grounds of religion there was sufficient cause for India to accept the principle of partition in the context of Jammu & Kashmir as well. Lamb contributed a third major study on the issue – Birth of A Tragedy.6 This was more or less a reassertion of the earlier thesis, first made in 1966. The important issue raised in this work was that, ‘a powerful Congress politician had directly involved himself in all the planning that was involved in the eventual Indian acquisition of Jammu & Kashmir’.7 Two Nations and Kashmir8 was published in 1956. This was probably the first important study that raised questions against the merger of Jammu & Kashmir with India. In a way C.B. Birdwood reflected even if indirectly the British perception of the dispute in the post Mountbatten era. Birdwood pointed out that if any Princely state of India was so situated, so as to lay a claim of being independent of both India and Pakistan, it was Jammu & Kashmir. He substantiated his observation by referring to the size of the state, its geographic location of being on one extreme corner, unlike Hyderabad for example.9 Birdword gave considerable importance to Mahatma Gandhi’s visit to Srinagar in early August 1947. Interestingly this is among the first important studies that also suggested that the invasion of Kashmir (October 1947) was probably without the knowledge and approval of Mohammed Ali Jinnah. He also went on to say that, even if Jinnah was aware and was inclined to stop the invasion, his advisors and officials ‘would have laughed away the advice’ and continued helping the invaders. He points out that the tribal fighters and the Pakistan regular soldiers who had joined the invasion were pushed into action after brainwashed to believe that the invasion had taken on the colour of a Jihad.10 In this sense Birdwood is among the very few early European scholars to have at least acknowledged the fact that Pakistan was directly involved in the invasion of Kashmir in 1947.

I N T RO D U C T I O N 25

Among good studies in more recent times and in line with the works of Alastair Lamb and Birdwood are the two works of Victoria Schofield – Kashmir in the Crossfire11 and Kashmir in Conflict.12 Fairly balanced with a tilt no doubt towards Pakistan’s perception of the issue, Schofield makes out a case against Maharaja Hari Singh’s decision of acceding to India. She quotes Allama Iqbal, the acclaimed poet, who had commented on the poverty of the Kashmiri: ‘In the bitter chill of winter shivers his naked body whose skill wraps the rich in royal shawls’. She also refers to a representation made by one, Sheikh Hardmen to Viceroy Reading, drawing attention to how Hindus dominated the entire state administration and trade, even though they were a mere 4 per cent of the population. Commenting on the tribal invasion Schofield points out that while the common view in Pakistan was in support of the (tribal) invasions, in Lahore’s intellectual circles it was seen as a serious mistake. She quotes Faiz Ahmad Faiz, then Editor of the Pakistan Times: ‘. . . we could see that everything is lost’, suggesting that Pakistan did not stand to gain from the invasion.13 What stands out in this study is that Schofield, quotes a report from the London Times (13 January 1948) which suggest that clearly the Pakistan Army had played an important role in the invasion. Schofield’s Kashmir in Conflict, adds significantly to her first work. To begin with like Alastair Lamb, she too suggests that Mountbatten trusted Nehru and his colleagues for advice on Kashmir even more than his own Political Department officials.14 Nehru’s Kashmir policy she suggests was based in a major way aimed at disproving Jinnah’s two nation theory. Nehru believed and wished to prove that Kashmir’s merging with India on her own will was the answer to the concept of dividing India on religious lines. As we shall see later Nehru remained virtually obsessed with the concept of ‘seeking the support of the Kashmiri masses’. This obsession if we call it so, was perhaps the result of the fact that without his acceptance, however, hard the British may have tried the idea to partition India on the grounds of religion could never have gone through. Nehru had seen first hand the consequences of the partition plan accepted by him and his colleagues. Having realized that results of the partition had been disastrous he now sought to make amends. He obviously wished to

26 I N T RO D U C T I O N reiterate to the world that he remained as great a secularist as he had always been. This is what made the support of the Kashmiri masses so important in his ‘Kashmir Policy’. Schofield also makes out a strong case, suggesting that the tribal invasion was a spontaneous support in favour of the oppressed residents of the Poonch region. The study points out that Maharaja Hari Singh had begun to cut down recruitment to his army from the region which had a long history of contributing recruits for the forces. She further adds that when the disbanded troops returned home after World War II (71,667 in all, of them 60,408 were Muslims) they found not only their lands unfit for cultivation but also that taxes had been increased. To further complicate matters the oppressive and unpopular Dogra troops were deployed for tax collection. Infact she points out that a ‘No tax campaign’ had been going on in the Poonch region since early 1947.15 Schofield also reemphasized the issue raised by Birdwood almost 45 years earlier, that Sikhs and Hindus had attacked the Muslims to force them to move out of the Jammu region in the partition violence of 1947.16 In this she cites from a work contributed by the former editor of The Statesman (Calcutta), Ian Stephens.17 With regard to the Jihadi element of the tribal fighters, Schofield quotes George Cunningham, Governor of the North West Frontier Province. Cunningham had said that he had been approached by tribal chiefs to send in more fighters to avenge the atrocities committed by the Sikhs during the partition of Punjab violence. Some works of the older order that must be mentioned include the two important studies of Prem Nath Bazaz.18 Bazaz was a Kashmiri Pandit whose writings generated much controversy. In the first study he explained how and why the tribals from the Frontier Province had come forward to support the people of the Poonch region. Interestingly he also says that even as the invaders looted and raped, the same was done even by some units of the Indian army in the early days of the conflict.19 He points out that the idea of the tribal invaders was to liberate Kashmir from the rule of the Dogras. The second work of Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible raised the issue and to which Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru often referred, that, ‘Muslim aspiration for freedom from autocratic rule was not a

I N T RO D U C T I O N 27

communal issue’.20 It is in the context of this issue that the second work of Bazaz is important. He explains how Islam in Kashmir could not be compared with Islam elsewhere. ‘A Kashmiri Muslim is an enigma to his co-religionists outside the valley because he fails to respond to the call of fanaticism’. Bazaz also quotes Walter Lawrence: ‘Holymen of Arabia spoke to me with contempt of the feeble flame of Islam that burns in Kashmir’.21 P.N.K. Bamzai’s major work on Kashmir was his A History of Kashmir.22 But it is Bamzai’s other work Kashmir and Power Politics23 to which an extended reference needs to be made here. Bamzai comes out clearly in favour of the argument that the Kashmiri people were never in favour of the ‘two nation theory.’ He states this by rejecting the concept of ‘two nations’, that is Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan and says that both had their roots in their long common past, meaning that the list of similarities among Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Hindus was far longer than the differences.24 Bamzai has dealt with the question of the signing of the Instrument of Accession and the delayed initiative on the part of Maharaja Hari Singh. He takes a stand that is in sharp contrast to several contemporary sources and suggests that Hari Singh delayed his assent to the merger of his state with the Union of India because he was already ‘toying’ with the idea of an ‘independent’ state.25 Bamzai has also suggested that Pakistan strangulated Kashmir by stopping essential supplies so as to coerce it into acceding to Pakistan. The study also notes that invaders were infact equipped with arms and other equipment by the Pakistan army. Among several other examples of Pakistan’s involvement in the invasion, Bamzai also points out that the whole operation was led by one Major General Akbar Khan under the disguised name of General Tariq. 26 Navnita C. Behera, Demystifying Kashmir27 is a very important study. It shows how Kashmir was central to Nehru’s notion of secularism and that the conflict also involved several other issues. She explains that Kashmir was not just about Muslims being pitted against Hindus but that Kashmir had been a land where diverse co-existence was a way of life for centuries. Essentially she also argues that the ‘conflict revolved around many complex and multilayered issues’. Behera makes an insightful observation in pointing out that in

28 I N T RO D U C T I O N accepting the idea of a plebiscite, Nehru infact created a third stake holder in the form of the people against the existing two – Sheikh Abdullah and Maharaja Hari Singh.28 India, she observes, was keen for a plebiscite on the existing electoral rolls once the invaders were expelled. While admitting that by referring the issue to the United Nations, Nehru had made a big mistake, at the same time however she points out that Nehru probably did so mainly to avoid an open war. As we shall see later, this was one of the reasons that Nehru recorded (in a top secret note) with regard to the reference of the conflict to the United Nations. If things went against India at the United Nations Behera suggests, it was mainly because of the role of British officials in connivance with Pakistan.29 Chitralekha Zutshi has made an outstanding contribution in the form of her Kashmir’s Contested Pasts: ‘. . . nationalists claimed Rajatarangini as embodying not the dry history of facts and figures, but the true historical spirit of the literary and cultural heritage of a nation and its people. . . . Stein . . . designated the text as an example of a regional narrative. . . .’ A brilliant thesis that brings out the literary grandeur and complexities of Kashmir’s past.30 Prem Shankar Jha’s The Origins of A Dispute: Kashmir 194731 is a very insightful study that has used several new sources to give us a fairly detailed and credible account of events that unfolded rapidly in the period 1946-48. M.J. Akbar has written extensively on Kashmir. Among his several important studies is Kashmir Behind the Vale.32 While explaining the rise and popularity of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Akbar draws attention to the repressive nature of Maharaja Hari Singh’s rule. Among examples he notes that 20 people were killed in three days in 1946. ‘Nehru’ he says ‘stood by the National Conference in 1946 – the people stood by Nehru in 1947’. Akbar also points out that when Hari Singh ordered the arrest of Abdullah, Nehru conveyed his displeasure by arranging the nomination of Abdullah as President of the All India States Peoples Conference in 1946. 33 Even as there are several theories that attempt to unsolve the reasons of why the Maharaja acted hesitatingly in signing the document of accession, Akbar explains the delayed decision of Hari Singh in the context of accession to India: ‘. . . stuck to silence as a policy . . .

I N T RO D U C T I O N 29

frightened by Jinnah’s Islam and in India by Nehru’s democracy. . . .’34 Akbar also suggests that the government of India’s Department of States did not exert sufficient and timely pressure on Hari Singh. Interestingly the study absolves Nehru with regard to the conflict’s reference to the United Nations, pointing out that the decision to do so ‘was a Cabinet decision’. This contention coming from a scholar of Akbar’s standing is frankly surprising. Since it stands well established that any major decision with regard to Kashmir was invariably a Nehru decision. It is unthinkable as we know for a decision of such magnitude to have been taken by the Cabinet without the direction and approval of the prime minister. Countless indeed are the instances when Nehru decided on a course of action and associated others only to project the course of action as having a broader consensus and greater support. Like Akbar, Tavleen Singh has written extensively on Kashmir. Her work was among the first major critiques of the government of India’s handling of the problem. She makes out a compelling case.35 Maroof Raza, an ex-army officer and a well regarded working journalist in his War & No Peace36 to an extent draws a similar conclusion with regard to the so called uprising in Poonch as does Akbar. Raza too suggests that the uprising in Poonch was a genuine rebellion against Dogra oppression and that the tribal chiefs of the North West Frontier Province jumped in to loot the region.37 Yet another study that draws out a similar conclusion is that of F.M. Hassanain’s.38 He brings out forcefully the view that heavy taxes were the main cause of the Poonch rebellion- ‘even animals were taxed’.39 The problem with this study in particular is that having assumed that the Dogras were the villains the study sets out to prove it. Yet it remains without doubt an important study. Sumantra Bose40 makes out a case of how the invasion of the valley was infact well planned. It explains the increasing popularity of the National Conference and more importantly the support given by the Indian National Congress. Pointing out that a majority of landowners and moneylenders who were effected by the economic reforms of Abdullah were Hindus. Bose notes that effective implementation of land reforms had created a lobby of considerable influence against Sheikh Abdullah. Bose comes out in support of Abdullah and even

30 I N T RO D U C T I O N suggests that his support for the merger was initially unambiguous. It notes that Abdullah began to weaken in resolve with regard to the Instrument of Accession only after he had come to believe that the government of India was not earnest with regard to the provisions of the Instrument of Accession. Well, the other side to this view is Abdullah’s support for the merger was never without pre-conditions. Looked at carefully, irrespective of what he was saying in public statements, the conditions Abdullah had set for supporting the Accession were almost akin to disapproval of the process. More on this later. A recent study by Shaokat Ahmad Gani, Kashmir Accession,41 makes the interesting observation that: ‘. . . examination of the Instrument of Accession (shows) that it was the wisest of steps taken by a ruler of Jammu & Kashmir. It would have been the complete and amicable solution to the problem of the common. . . .’42 Gani makes out a strong case of why the arrest and dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah (1953) was a mistake and that the issue could have been resolved if he had been given a chance to explain.43 Andrew Whitehead, the well known BBC correspondent based in India for many years (since 1992) suggests44 that initially a vast majority of Kashmiris stood in approval of the accession to India. Things began to change only later. Balraj Puri has written extensively on Kashmir and for some years he even brought out a small journal by the title Kashmir Affairs. He notes that a great part of India’s policy in Kashmir revolved around the personality of Sheikh Abdullah and his close friend Prime Minister Nehru. In his extensive writings – newspapers, research journals, books and all, Puri has touched on virtually every aspect of the issue.45 One of the important points that Puri makes is that, ‘mistakes upon mistakes’ were made and the problem that was easily resolvable in the early stages simply began to slip away. He explains at length how the concerns of Jammu were overlooked – the entire policy remained Kashmir centric. This saw the origin of the Praja Parishad and its movement. C. Dasgupta was an Indian Foreign Service Officer. His War & Diplomacy notes how a vast majority of Kashmiris were keen to join India in 1947.46 The study also throws light on the controversy that

I N T RO D U C T I O N 31

surrounded the accession of Junagadh and how it was a mistake to have raised the issue in the first place. He clearly establishes the role of the Pakistan army in the invasion of Kashmir.47 Akbar Khan (Director of Weapons and Equipments in the Pakistan Army), has highlighted Pakistan’s version of the story in his important study, Raiders in Kashmir.48 This study was published in 1970. Coming from an insider of the Pakistan military establishment it naturally drew extensive attention. Interestingly, by the time this book was published Pakistan’s policy with regard to its role in the invasion of Kashmir in 1947 had undergone considerable change. From a mode of outright denial of its role followed in the early years it had changed to justifying Pakistan’s direct involvement in the events of late 1947. After this book the discourse of Pakistan’s being involved or not in the invasion became irrelevant. Another book of recent times that requires a mention is by yet another journalist, Arif Jamal.49 He had worked for the Pakistan Times. Jamal prefaces the study by drawing reference to the Bombay terrorist attack of 2008. His main thesis is that soon after Hari Singh had signed the Instrument of Accession, an enraged Mohammed Ali Jinnah was ready for war. Mountbatten was however able to persuade him and one of the conditions conceded in the process by Mountbatten to Jinnah was that a plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations could be considered. Several issues that have long been associated with the conflict in Kashmir have complex legal dimensions. H.S. Gururaj Rao made a valuable contribution in explaining the legal aspects of the dispute.50 To begin with he brings out that, the conflict was never in the initial days a Hindu versus Muslim issue, because a vast majority of Kashmiris actually favoured accession to India. Referring to the issue of a plebiscite he notes that it was Mountbatten who actually first referred to the option of a plebiscite in his letter to Maharaja Hari Singh.51 Importantly he brings forth forcefully that the United Nations resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 do not constitute a formal binding on India.52 While most studies have retained focus on the political aspects of the conflict, Iftikar Malik53 in an article has suggested that among other things Pakistan’s obsession with Kashmir also has an economic

32 I N T RO D U C T I O N dimension. He points out that a large part of the irrigation network is dependent on the rivers that flow down from Kashmir. Sumit Ganguly has published very important works on Kashmir. Much of what went wrong in Kashmir he suggests is traceable to unclear policies and that the Indian state was unable to decide with conviction. Importantly Ganguly also suggests that communal politics dominated the discourse. 54 Another work by Ganguly, The Kashmir Question,55 contains an article by Hussain Haqqani.56 Haqani explains that Kashmir has become a matter of life and death for the rulers of Pakistan. He makes out an argument that it is an overriding impression of insecurity that prevails in Pakistan with regard to Kashmir. A reference to writings on Kashmir and serious research on it must necessarily draw attention to the several important contributions of A.G. Noorani, an outstanding scholar. The Kashmir Dispute (2 vols.) in particular is essential reading for the richness of source material and views on it.57 Sheikh Abdullah’s autobiography Atish-i-Chinar58 is important reading. The volume brings out all the ups and downs, of how Abdullah thought he had been grievously hurt by intrigues in Delhi. He talks of his closeness to Nehru and regard for Gandhi. How he thought the Dogra rulers had harmed his people. Understandably it virtually side steps the consequences of his politics and the manner in which he encouraged Islamic nationalism if not fundamentalism in Kashmir as against the Jammu region. Another essential reading to understand the mind and working of Sheikh Abdullah is that of Y.D. Gundevia.59 In sum, Gundevia tried to establish that the Sheikh had indeed been wronged and that he never distinguished between a Hindu Kashmir and a Muslim Kashmir and was a secular leader. Karan Singh’s Heir Apparent: An Autobiography followed by his Sadar-i-Riyasat: An Autobiography,60 are essential reading not only for the richness of their contents, the first hand version of events, but also for the sheer pleasure of curious reading. It would be difficult if not impossible to attempt decoding Kashmir without reading Karan Singh. Pandit Ramchandra Kak, the Prime Minister of Jammu Kashmir

I N T RO D U C T I O N 33

was the man who was in the centre of it all. Held to be the villain by the Congress leadership and obviously enemy number one for Sheikh Abdullah. His version of events was until recently hardly known. Radha Rajan has now brought out a monograph (2017) Jammu & Kashmir Dilemma of Accession: First Hand Account of the Tumultuous Events. Much of what she noted is not only new in the discourse but quite surprising as well. For one that Maharaja Hari Singh was seriously thinking of a federation with other rulers. Then we have the line that both Jawaharlal Nehru and Gandhi consciously encouraged Sheikh Abdullah to take charge and so on. The study is very important for the other side of the story. It is based on some personal papers of Kak, that until now lay hidden in the archives of the India Office Library in London. In this category of first hand contemporary versions are the contributions of Mehar Chand Mahajan. Mahajan was Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir after Kak. He was generally considered Sardar Patel’s man. He played a key role in the post accession phase and even in the accession phase itself.61 Looking Back was a kind of turning point in the understanding of the day to day developments. Mahajan threw light on several new dimensions of the conflict. Sometime later the Sulakhni Devi Mahajan Trust published his Accession of Kashmir to India. This carried a preface by the well known historian V.D. Mahajan. The work contains interesting observations: ‘. . . India accepted the accession very reluctantly . . . the Governor General was not keen for the accession’. Mahajan even notes that Mountbatten felt that ideally Kashmir should have gone to Pakistan.62 The most important issue that Mahajan brought out of course was that, Nehru was keen to put Sheikh Abdullah in command because he believed that once power was in the hands of a popular mass leader such as Abdullah, Kashmir’s accession to India could be more comfortably discussed and the exercise would be and also appear to be more credible.63 Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects is an outstanding study in recent years. Mridu Rai notes: ‘. . . Yet paradoxically post 1947 Indian secular nationalism has played no small a role in keeping alive a sense of the regional and religious particularity of Kashmir at the same time as it has worked towards effacing it. . . . India claimed Muslim majority

34 I N T RO D U C T I O N Kashmir as its prize a vindication of its secular credentials and a repudiation of Muslim Pakistan’s communal politics’. In sum Rai suggests that it was the Indian nation that stressed the ‘Muslim nature of Kashmir to volarize its achievement’.64 Coming now to the very important work of Jagmohan,65 whose commanding view and indepth understanding are the result not only of his scholarship but also of two eventful terms as Governor of Jammu & Kashmir. Unlike some of the more articulate and complex works of ‘professional historians’ Jagmohan’s work is an absolute must for understanding the clear perspective and unfolding of events. It is conventional history. For example in about 75 pages devoted by him to ‘Survey of History’ Jagmohan has been able to convey a convincing summary. Likewise are the chapters on the early signs of the emerging problem – ‘Roots: Hidden Veins.’ Another chapter deals with the political ‘softness’ of handling the issue. And finally to Ramchandra Guha’s India After Gandhi.66 In the chapter ‘Securing Kashmir’ Guha notes: ‘. . . Once Abdullah had been Nehru’s man in Kashmir. By the summer of 1952 however it was more that Nehru was Abdullah’s man in India.’ The master historian goes on: ‘. . . six years had elapsed since the invasion of 1947 – enough time for the world to forget it and to remember only that the valley was Muslim and so was Pakistan. Besides the Kashmiri leader so long paraded as India’s own, had now been put into jail by the Indian government. . . .’67 Without doubt the best reading for a comprehensive understanding of how things happened in Kashmir in the early days of the problem. CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS AND REPORTS

It has earlier been explained how this study is essentially a study of views and comments as well as more detailed studies in the immediately contemporary sense. Books, booklets, articles in newspapers and magazines, reports specially prepared for organizations – a large number have been studied. Some of the more important are briefly cited here as well as at more length later in different chapters. Two such contemporary versions are A Report on Kashmir and Conspiracy on Kashmir. Both show that Abdullah had lost contact with ground realities and had become increasingly unpopular. Some

I N T RO D U C T I O N 35

sections of the people had even begun to charge him, that by shifting his stand on the issue of the State’s merger with India he had betrayed the faith of the people. It was in such circumstances that he tried to divert attention and raise other issues that were essentially communal in nature. By appealing to communal sentiments Abdullah sought to restore his goodwill. This approach not only turned the clock back but added sinister new dimensions to an issue that was in the initial years believed to have been resolvable and was certainly not inspired by communal agendas. Kashmir the Basic Facts was published by the Bombay Chronicle. 50,000 copies of this brochure were circulated free of cost. It showed the nature of the tribal invasion and Pakistan’s direct involvement in it. In the same context interestingly while acclaimed historians Alastair Lamb, Victoria Schofield and even Lord Birdwood have quoted The Times (London) frequently in their works with regard to the invasion of Kashmir in October 1947, a crucial report of The Times that refers to the planned nature of the tribal invasions and Pakistan’s direct involvement has, however, been overlooked. The report that was filed from New Delhi records rather interesting details. It quotes Abdul Latif Khan, Chief of the Malikdin Khel, who claimed that they had arranged for 60,000 tribals to invade the valley and that they would never withdraw – ‘once blood has been shed it shall be avenged’. He made this statement in the presence of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan who was on a tour to the Khyber. The Statesman cited the report submitted by R.L. Batra, the Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir, giving minute details of the invasion and the kind of equipment that was used, clearly establishing the Pakistan connection.68 The paper also reported a Radio Pakistan’s version that the tribal invasion was being monitored and controlled by the ‘Azad government’ operating from somewhere in Poonch. It is important to note that the vast corpus of writings on Kashmir in the present context generally overlooked the level of co-existence that had prevailed among the Muslims and Hindus before an organized and systematic effort was made to disturb it. It is therefore natural that several contemporary sources tell a story that is fairly heartening and very different from most of the acclaimed studies. Let us take some examples. At the peak of the crisis, when the invasion of Kashmir had just

36 I N T RO D U C T I O N begun, in an editorial the Statesman69 emphasized that most Kashmiris were infact rejecting the basis upon which Pakistan was laying claim to Kashmir, particularly when Pakistan by accepting the accession of Junagadh had itself ignored the norm of geographical contiguity and religious composition. A nine page booklet was published by one Longono Reccardo titled Democratic Kashmir.70 He recorded how people in the valley were happily living together and that divisions were being forced by vested Western interests. Several other reports point out how the insurgents had failed to divide the people of the villages that lay enroute to Srinagar.71 The idea among the insurgents as implanted by their handlers was to sow seeds of communal polarization, so that the majority community could come out in support of the invaders. K.A. Abbas, was commissioned by the then popular magazine Current to assess the situation in Kashmir following the emerging crisis. He was by then already a writer of repute. He visited the region thrice over a period of six months in 1949. His article appeared on 26 October (1949): . . . the creator of the two nation theory has eaten into the vitals of public opinion . . . it is difficult if not impossible for most Indians to imagine that a substantial number of Muslims will prefer to stay in secular India . . . let us be clear, Kashmir will vote for India because the whole weight of the Kashmiri national movement is on the side of secularism, on the side of India.72

D.N. Kalhan had toured Jammu & Kashmir in 1955. Based on his travels he contributed several articles to the Hindustan Times (New Delhi) These were compiled and published by Lalla Rookh Publications (Srinagar) in 1955. These articles discuss the ongoing development works in the region and attempt to clear the doubts that remained with regard to the accession of the state to India. They also point out that by and large the masses of Jammu & Kashmir were happy that they had become a part of the Indian Union following the completion of the accession process. The manner in which studies conducted in later years exaggerated the events in the days following the signing of the Instrument of Accession can be seen in the case of the condition of Srinagar city. Some scholars have observed that Srinagar was in panic as the tribal

I N T RO D U C T I O N 37

invaders moved towards the city, so much so that Maharaja Hari Singh fled. And yet an Associated Press (AP) reporter noted: ‘. . . Srinagar is almost normal . . . usual regularity and orderliness.’ The report also cited how people from all walks of life had volunteered to be trained to defend the city. The report also states that: ‘one can see such people being trained in weaponry etc. in gardens, parks and playgrounds.’73 Other things apart this report clearly shows that most people viewed the invasion as that of an ‘enemy’. Surprisingly it is Pakistan Times that carried this report. The reason could be that the acclaimed poet and India ‘lover’ Faiz Ahmad Faiz was then editor of the paper. The geo-strategic location of Jammu & Kashmir had also added an international world wide interest in its affairs. Newspapers and magazines had been carrying reports and article devoted to Kashmir for decades prior to the outbreak of the dispute. However several booklets that appeared in the 1950s on the issue, also refer to theories of Western conspiracies and their interest in Kashmir. These include the Marxist Harikishan Singh Surjit’s,74 Kashmir and Its Future. Another one on similar lines was written by P.S. Sodhbans.75 Sodhbans puts the blame for the crisis on the British and the Americans. Sumanth S. Bankeshwar in his Conspiracy in Kashmir however while saying that the arrest of Abdullah (1953) was no doubt wrong, noted that the theory of the Americans having had a hand in the conflict was planted by the Soviets.76 A more detailed study walking the imperial conspiracy road was made by Vijay Kumar, who quoted the New York Herald Tribune,: ‘Overthrowing Sheikh Abdullah is of concern far beyond the borders of the little state of Kashmir.’ 77 These were the years when the ‘Cold War’ was at its peak and such charges were common. The Soviets were well ahead in the propaganda game. The Times London, covered the conflict with full space. While accepting that the tribal invasions certainly had the involvement of Pakistan’s forces and its civil government, it also took the stand that Maharaja Hari Singh was initially inclined to join Pakistan because of trade links and geographical contiguity. It suggested that Hari Singh was later pressurized by India to change his stand. The Times also reported that Pakistan too had tried to coerce the Kashmir ruler

38 I N T RO D U C T I O N in its favour by stopping supplies of essential items like salt, sugar, grain, coal, etc.78 G.E.C. Wakefield was Chief Secretary to both Maharaja Pratap Singh and Hari Singh. Recollections: 50 years in the Service of India was published in 1942.79 His account not only gives a first hand version for the decades of the 1920s and 1930s, it is helpful to understand the events and circumstances that enabled the rise of Sheikh Abdullah and the nature of government of Hari Singh. William Barton compiled reports sent by the Resident of Kashmir to London for the year 1939-40. This work explains the reasons for the growth of the National Conference and its importance particularly with regard to the number of Hindus and Muslims in government employment. They Came to a Mountain by Pat Miles is an important study from India’s point of view on the issue.80 For the early political events, that is of the Kashmir prior to Abdullah, a good study is that of G.S. Raghvan.81 Raghvan was a reputed journalist who later edited the Hindustan Times, Nation and Hindu Herald. Our Summer in the Vale of Kashmir was a study by F.W. Denys.82 This makes it probably the first study of Kashmir by an American. Essentially a traveller’s account of the times. For the early years the Provincial Gazetter of Kashmir & Jammu (1909) by Walter Laurence with later reprints is of great importance particularly for understanding the total perspective. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was virtually a part of every important story that unfolded in Jammu & Kashmir from 1931 onwards. From the face of the opposition to Dogra rule and the so called freedom struggle and of course later as head of the government. Virtually everything revolved around him. He was handpicked by Prime Minister Nehru to resolve the issue. It was natural for his dismissal and arrest to attract extensive interest of scholars. Many welcomed the development, others thought the government of India had made a mistake. Several articles in the Observer83 and the Hindustan Times84 for example welcomed the removal of Abdullah. Likewise several studies of the time have also noted that Sheikh Abdullah had without sufficient reason been put in the ‘dock’. Mridula Sarabhai a well known Gandhian and close associate of Nehru, was

I N T RO D U C T I O N 39

a great admirer of the Sheikh. She wrote a short booklet Call for Impartial Inquiry.85 Supporting the Sheikh she said that he should not have been removed and that it was a section of the media that had built an unwarranted hype against Abdullah. There are also a large number of writings published as the Government of India’s stand relating to the crisis. These were mostly produced by the Information Services Department or by the Publicity Department of the Government of Jammu & Kashmir. These include The Kashmir Question 1947-1956 (1956) and Kashmir: A Factual Survey (1956). ABC of the Kashmir Question was the government of India’s official version starting from the invasion (1947). The Government of Jammu & Kashmir also brought out a booklet Kashmir Through Many Eyes. Interestingly it quotes the Soviet Union’s leader N.A. Bulganin: ‘Question of Kashmir as one state of India has been decided by the people.’ Perhaps the most exhaustive document stating India’s stand as early as 1948 was the Indian White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir that was published in 1948. As things had become increasingly complicated following the removal of Sheikh Abdullah the governments in Srinagar and Delhi had launched several publications to put forth the government’s point of view. Kashmir was published by the Publication Division of the Government of India. It carried several articles on the crisis. Shah Mohammad Mazhar Imam wrote an article ‘Kashmir an Integral Part of India.’86 Likewise was Mazbool Ahmad’s ‘Irrevocability of Accession.’87 Mohammad Ismail in his article titled ‘Kashmir an Integral Part of India’ dealt with how the Muslim population of India was strongly in support of the government’s stand on Kashmir.88 Prime Minister Nehru was frequently cited by the journal. One such article was ‘Nehru on the Kashmir Question: The Basic Facts’.89 Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed the man who succeeded Sheikh Abdullah was very fond of coming out in print on issues he felt were of public concern. A Reply to Critics (9 pages) is one example. In this he notes that: ‘Kashmir can progress only as a part of India. Our destiny is linked to the people of India – we shall not look towards America or Pakistan.’ Another short booklet and important also for its photographs is by K.N. Menon, Facts About Kashmir.90 It provides evidence of the

40 I N T RO D U C T I O N invaders with heavy weapons particularly the sophisticated weaponry they were equipped with. The Truth and Kashmir by S.R. Kulkarni91 had an interesting Foreword by the well known historian R.K. Mukerjee. In essence it narrated the Indian version of the story. Balaraj Madhok was a founding figure of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. He wrote extensively on the crisis in Kashmir.92 His writings some of which we have already taken note of are important for understanding the perspective of the main opposition to the government of India’s policy on Kashmir. His party, the Bhartiya Jan Sangh had published several reports and other documents on Kashmir and the Satyagrah in Jammu. These include The Kashmir Problem and the Jammu Satya­ graha an Objective Study. J.K. Banerji’s, I Report on Kashmir93 is a very important contemporary assessment for understanding the mind of Abdullah in the early days of the problem. Banerji had conducted a long interview with Abdullah, extending into several days. This was published in 1948, that is at a time when Abdullah was apparently and more for public consumption supporting Jammu & Kashmir’s accession to the Union of India. Banerji infact was among the first to indicate that Abdullah was already thinking in terms of an independent Kashmir – a ‘New Kashmir’ as he calls it. In 1956 Swami Bhashakarananda came out with a short booklet (35 pages)94 that explained why the removal and arrest of Sheikh Abdullah was a good decision. The Social & Political Study Group based in Srinagar had published several booklets and brochures on the political developments in the state. Conspiracy in Kashmir (1954) is important. On similar lines is another booklet published in New York by the Free Kashmir Centre (1962) Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee had written extensively on the issue. Many of his writings had appeared in newspapers. A large number of his speeches to were published by leading national papers. In Integration of Kashmir for example he made out a strong case as to how the handling of the problem was flawed and how the lack of timely and stern decision making was bound to cause serious problems for India in later years.95 Balraj Puri is among the leading scholars to have written on the

I N T RO D U C T I O N 41

crisis in the state. We have already discussed some of his writings. His journal Kashmir Affairs was an important reference source in the early 1960’s. Balraj Puri was among the first to draw attention to how the surcharged nationalism of Kashmir had created a similar and counter reaction in Jammu. He was no supporter or well wisher of the Praja Parishad, yet he said that the Praja Parishad enjoyed support of the people of Jammu because it drew attention to their problems.96 There is a large amount of literature on the reference of the problem to the United Nations and how the United Nations consciously failed to see India’s side of the story. One such publication is that of V.B. Raju.97 In this context a reference must also be made of the interesting use of illustrations and cartoons that was undertaken by several newspapers and magazines to draw attention to the crisis, particularly the role of the Security Council. Hori Lal Saxena98 came out in 1949 with a short book that dealt with Sheikh Abdullah and his work. It drew attention to little known issues that led to the crisis. Dr. Rammanohar Lohia too wrote extensively on Kashmir.99 His Will to Power & Other Writings is a major study of the problem. It is a powerful critique of the handling of the crisis. The Collected Works of Dr. Rammanohar Lohia (vol. IV) too have some very good articles on Kashmir.100 Kashmir and the Conspiracy Against Peace101 was written by Rajbans Krishan. It is very helpful in understanding the sequence of events that led to the Kashmir problem being referred to the United Nations. It also explains how the United Nations was biased against India. S.N. Shivpuri’s, The Grim Saga was one of the first detailed studies that dealt with the political scene of the years 1947-53.102 K.L. Gauba’s, Inside Pakistan is well known among those who are familiar with Gauba’s writings on the partition of India. This is important in our context with regard to a chapter on Kashmir.103 He makes an interesting observation: ‘Pakistan could not be complete without its Central “K”.’ Maurice Cohen, came out in 1955 with an aptly titled monograph Thunder Over Kashmir. Cohen argued on standard Western lines.104 As early as in 1949 N.S. Phadke drew attention to how there were several people even in the Kashmir government who were already talking of a ‘free Kashmir’. It is a firsthand narrative. For example it

42 I N T RO D U C T I O N makes an interesting reference to how some officials in the state government had even started saluting each other with ‘Jai Kashmir’. This number was no doubt and fortunately very small.105 For Democratic Foreign Policy was published by the Democratic Research Society in 1951. It is a compilation of speeches delivered by acclaimed Parliamentarians in Parliament on matters of foreign policy. Some have important references to Kashmir. These include the speeches of H.N. Kunzru, Syama Prasad Mookerjee and M.R. Ranga. A reference to all of these appears later in this volume. The Kashmir Democratic Union published in 1952 a strong critique of Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference government. The title of this 42 page booklet was Does India Defend Freedom or Fascism in Kashmir? It talked of corruption, denial of liberties, spreading of communalism. It made a strong case, calling upon India to stop supporting Abdullah. Likewise another publication brought out by the Kashmir Democratic Union was titled Behind the Iron Curtain in Kashmir. This booklet of 78 pages was written by Jagan Nath Sathu. It draws attention to the authoritarian and despotic rule of Abdullah and how his period of governance was a ‘one man show’. An important part of this study is also drawn from media versions in the immediately contemporary sense. The Tribune, was published first from Lahore and after September, 1947 from Simla (Shimla). It was the most widely circulated news daily of the Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir. Every edition of the paper was studied from 1947-1953. Contemporary press reports as we know often tell a story that is very different from more conventional sources. The first and spontaneous reports of events tend to be more creditable, as they are unadulterated and uninfluenced by later developments, incidents and opinions. Reports carried by The Tribune adequately establish this. Likewise several other dailies have also been studied at length. These include the Statesman, the Civil & Military Gazette; the Pakistan Times, the Hindustan Times, and Hindustan (Hindi). Issues of Panchjanya and the Organiser have also been studied. The Ranbir and Roshni were two Urdu papers that carried almost opposing opinions. The Ranbir was not only the oldest paper but usually took up the nationalist cause. Roshni often was the key spokesman against Abdullah.

I N T RO D U C T I O N 43

As a student of contemporary history would know the private papers and correspondences of important and relevant leaders are a basic source material. Apart from Mahatma Gandhi it is difficult to think of any other leader across the world perhaps who has written as much as Jawaharlal Nehru. The Selected Works edited very ably by historians of acclaim over the years are almost always a treat to read. Long letters and notes running into several pages, mostly dictated late in the night as was Nehru’s habit are fascinating not only for the story they tell but as much for the style. Impulsive, emotional, angry, persuasive or simply the language and approach of a senior statesman. Like Nehru, of as much importance are the correspondences of Sardar Patel. He wrote much less but we can have a complete picture only when we study them both together. The Correspondence of Sardar Patel edited by Durga Das makes for very interesting reading in the context of Jammu & Kashmir. Proceedings of Parliament (initially the Constituent Assembly) are as always a treat to read. In the context of Jammu & Kashmir there is no better way to getting a complete feel of the issue. Parliament was a different world in those times. Great parliamentarians like Nehru and Syama Prasad Mookerjee spoke for hours together. In the context of this study however what has been of most importance and indeed rewarding are a bundle of hitherto mostly unpublished letters, memos and notes of Jawaharlal Nehru. Presently placed in the Manuscript Section of the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi. As one goes through this volume it would be easy to note the importance of these papers. NOTES 1. Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir: 1947-1966 (London, 1966). 2. Robert G. Wirssing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: Regional Conflict and its Resolution (London, 1994). 3. Alastair Lamb, Kashmir a Disputed Legacy 1846-1990 (Karachi, 1993). 4. Wirssing, India Pakistan, p. 31. 5. Lamb, Crisis, p. 51. 6. Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy (London, 1994). 7. Ibid., p. 71. 8. C.B. Birdwood, Two Nations & Kashmir (London, 1956).

44 I N T RO D U C T I O N 9. Ibid., p. 40. 10. Ibid., p. 68. 11. Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Crossfire (London, 1996). 12. Schofield, India Pakistan & The Unending Conflict (London, 2003). 13. Schofield, Kashmir in Crossfire, p. 139. 14. Schofield, India Pakistan, p. 29. 15. Ibid., p. 41. 16. Ibid., p. 200. 17. Ian Stephens, Pakistan (London, 1963). 18. Prem Nath Bazaz, Azad Kashmir (Lahore, 1951) and Kashmir in Crucible (New Delhi, 1967). 19. Bazaz, Azad Kashmir, p. 33. 20. Bazaz, Kashmir in Crucible, p. xiii. 21. Ibid., p. 110. 22. P.N.K. Bamzai, A History of Kashmir: Political, Social, Cultural from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (New Delhi, 1975). 23. P.N.K. Bamzai, Kashmir & Power Politics: Lake Success to Tashkent (New Delhi, 1967). 24. Ibid., p. 14. 25. Ibid., p. 91. 26. Ibid., p. 97. 27. Navnita C. Behera, Demystifying Kashmir (Delhi, 2007). 28. Ibid., p. 37. 29. Ibid., p. 34. 30. Chitralekha Zutshi, Kashmir’s Context Pasts: Narratives Sacred Geographies and the Historical Imagination (Oxford, 2014). 31. Prem Shankar Jha, The Origins of a Dispute: Kashmir 1947 (Oxford, 2003). 32. M.J. Akbar, Kashmir Behind the Vale (New Delhi, 1991). 33. Ibid., pp. 91, 95. 34. Ibid., p. 97. 35. Tavleen Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors (Viking, New Delhi, 1995). 36. Maroof Raza, War & No Peace Over Kashmir (New Delhi, 1996). 37. Ibid., p. 26. 38. F.M. Hassanain, Freedom Struggle in Kashmir (New Delhi, 1988). 39. Ibid., p. 146. 40. Sumantra Bose, Kashmir Roots of Conflict: Path of Peace (New Delhi, 2003). 41. Shaokat Ahmad Gani, Kashmir Accession & its Manipulation (Srinagar, 2009). 42. Ibid., p. 126. 43. Ibid., p. 57. 44. Andrew Whitehead, A Mission in Kashmir (New Delhi, 2007), p. 16. 45. It was very inspiring to see how his family had preserved his writings in their personal library (Jammu). When I visited the Puri family, Prof. Puri

I N T RO D U C T I O N 45

was very unwell, yet his family was kind and considerate in giving me access to the Library. Prof. Puri passed away some months later. 46. C. Dasgupta, War & Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48 (New Delhi, 2002), p. 22. 47. Ibid., p. 39. 48. Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir: Story of The Kashmir War 1947-1948 (Karachi, 1970). 49. Arif Jamal, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (New Delhi, 2009) p. 60. 50. H.S. Gururaja Rao, Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem (Bombay, 1967). 51. Ibid., p. 86. 52. Ibid., p. 127. 53. Raja Thomas, Perspectives on Kashmir (Oxford, 1992). 54. Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge, 1998). 55. Sumit Ganguly (ed.), The Kashmir Question (London, 2003). 56. Ibid., Haqqani ‘Pakistan’s Endgame in Kashmir’. 57. A.G. Noorani, The Kashmir Dispute, 1947-2012 (New Delhi, 2013) (2 vols.). 58. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, Atish-i-Chinar (New Delhi, 1986). Khushwant Singh later translated it. This appeared in an abridged version as Flames of the Chinar: An Autobiography (New Delhi, 1993). 59. Y.D. Gundevia, The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah (Dehradun, 1974). 60. Karan Singh, Autobiography (Oxford Revised Edition, 1994). The first edition was in 1989. Also Sadar-i-Riyasat: An Autobiography 1953-1967 (Delhi, 1985). 61. M.C. Mahajan, Looking Back (London 1963) followed by Accession of Kashmir (Delhi 1967). 62. Ibid., p. 20. 63. Ibid., p. 10. 64. Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects (New Delhi, 2004), p. 296. 65. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulance in Kashmir (New Delhi, 2017), 12nd Edition. First Edition, 1992. 66. Ramchandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the Worlds Largest Democracy (Macmillan, 2007). 67. Ibid., p. 259. 68. Statesman, 26 October 1947. Also see 3 November 1947 for Mahatma Gandhi’s statement. 69. Ibid., 28 October 1947. 70. Longono Reccardo, Democratic Kashmir (Srinagar, 1957). 71. Statesman, 31 October 1947. 72. Current, vol. 1, no. 5, 1949. 73. Pakistan Times, 6 November 1947.

46 I N T RO D U C T I O N 74. Harkishan Singh Surjit, Kashmir & its Future (Delhi, 1955). 75. P.S. Sodhbans, Genesis of the Kashmir Problem (Delhi, 1952). 76. S.N. Bunkeshwar, Conspiracy in Kashmir (Banglore: Society for Defence of Democracy, 1955). 77. Vijay Kumar, Anglo American Plot Against Kashmir (Bombay, 1954). 78. Times (London), 13 January 1948. 79. G.E.C. Wakefield, Recollections: 50 Years in the Service of India (Lahore, 1942). 80. Pat Miles, The Came to a Mountain (London, 1951). 81. G.S. Raghvan, The Warning of Kashmir (Allahabad, 1931). 82. F.W. Denys, Our Summer in the Vale of Kashmir (Brayman Washington, 1915). 83. Observer, 15 August 1953, 31 August 1953, 9 September 1953. 84. Hindustan Times, 11 and 12 August 1953. 85. Mridula Sarabhai, Call for Impartial Inquiry (Delhi, 1958). Her other writings on Kashmir include: Against Public Interest: Externment & After (Delhi, 1961) and Popular Demand of Jammu & Kashmir (New Delhi, n.d.). 86. Kashmir, vol. VIII, no. 6, June 1958. 87. Ibid., vol. VII, no. 8, July 1957. 88. Ibid., vol. VIII, no. 5, 1958. 89. Ibid., vol. VII, no. 8, 1957. All the cited issues of Kashmir are accessable at the Kashmir University’s Iqbal Library Research Centre. 90. K.N. Menon, Facts About Kashmir (New Delhi, 1953). 91. S.R. Kulkarni, The Truth and Kashmir (New Delhi, 1957). 92. Balraj Madhok, Kashmir Centre for New Alignments (1963) & Kashmir Divided (n.d.). 93. J.K. Banerji, I Report on Kashmir (Calcutta, 1948). 94. Swami Bhashakarananda, The Kashmir Cauldrom: Sheikh Abdullah and Mridula Sarabhai (place and date not identifiable). 95. Integration of Kashmir (n.d., place, 17 pages). 96. Balraj Puri, The Jammu Kashmir Tangle (Delhi, 1966). 97. V.B. Raju, Illegalities of the Security Council (Ahmadabad, 1965). 98. Hori Lal Saxena, Sheikh Mohmmad Abdullah & The Kashmir Muddle: A True Story of Kashmir & All that Happened in the State since 1931 (Srinagar, 1949). 99. Rammanohar Lohia, Will to Power & Other Writings (Bombay, 1956). 100. Mastram Kapoor (ed.), Collected Works of Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, vol. IV (New Delhi, 2011). 101. Rajbans Krishna, Kashmir & The Conspiracy Against Peace (Bombay, 1951). 102. S.N. Shivpuri, The Grim Saga (Calcutta, 1953). 103. K.L. Gauba, Inside Pakistan (Delhi, 1948). 104. Maurice Cohen, Thunder Over Kashmir (London, 1955). 105. N.S. Phadke, Birth Pangs of New Kashmir (n.d., but probably 1949).

CHAPTER ONE

Jammu & Kashmir: A Historical Perspective Religion, Culture and Tradition

1500 YEARS OF HINDU RULE

W 

  ith a history that is full of turbulence and turmoil      Kashmir still retains the distinction of being the cradle of       not just Hinduism but perhaps Buddhism as well. Without going back too much in time it is important to note that Kashmir was not only a part of the great Ashokan empire, but it was Emperor Ashok who founded the city of Srinagar and also introduced Buddhism into Kashmir. An unbroken chain (with a brief break in the early sixth century ad) of Hindu rulers ruled the region since the time of Ashoka upto about the thirteenth century ad. The most famous in this long chain of Hindu rulers extending to over 1500 years was King Lalitaditya. Lalitaditya as is not commonly known was one of India’s great Hindu rulers. His vast empire included Afghanistan, parts of Turkey and even parts of Central Asia. Srinagar during his reign was a major centre of trade, commerce and learning. It was a great age by any standards. The dynasty collapsed as a result of misrule by his successors by about the middle of the ninth century ad. Among the Hindu rulers that followed, an important reference needs to be made of Jaya Simha (ad 1128-55) of the Lohara dynasty. He ruled for about 28 years in the tradition of Lalitaditya and Avantivarman.

48

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

The period is referred to as a ‘golden age’, a period of Aryan renaissance.1 It was following the death of Jaya Simha that followed a period of decline and decay. A final fatal blow was struck to the long period of Hindu rule in ad 1320 by Dulacha, a Mongol warrior. The region was reduced as an account puts it to ‘a region before creation.’ 2 In typical Mongol style – women and children were taken away as slaves, no one was spared. Dulacha ‘entered the valley as a lion enters the cave of a deer.’ The story goes on, in sum Kashmir thereafter saw its first Muslim ruler. This rule was at first short lived and ended in ad 1323 with the death of Rinchana who had embraced Islam to smoothen out things. KASHMIR TAKES TO ISLAM

Muslim rule in Kashmir commenced more effectively with Shah Mir (1339-42). Shah Mir was enlightened and fair in his dealings. He treated Hindus and Muslims alike. His grandson Shibab-ud-din (1354-73) proved an effective and powerful ruler. He took the title of Qutub-ud-din (1373-89). It was his successor Sultan Sikandar who adopted a fanatical approach in matters of faith and government. Conversion was taken up on a large scale. This was to the extent that even the chief minister who was a Hindu with the name of Suha Bhatta had converted to Islam. The zeal of conversion that followed is understandable. Kashmir became a part of the Mughal empire under Akbar in 1586. The Mughals gave Kashmir relative governance and peace. Even though floods and famines continued to impact the people, food and other supplies were assured just as Kashmiri goods came to be seen and be traded across the vast Mughal dominions. To deviate a bit from the sequence of events. In a recent study Mohammad Ashraf has taken the present crisis in Kashmir back to the times of Akbar. He says that ‘. . . the worst day in the history of Kashmir was (is) 14 October 1586, that is the day when the Mughal forces entered Srinagar’.3 The point that Ashraf probably seeks to make is that Kashmir was forced to be identified with the rest of India following its annexation by Akbar. During Aurangzeb’s reign Kashmir saw 14 Governors. Like in



J A M M U & K A S H M I R : A H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

49

other parts of the empire Kashmir too faced the impact of a disintegrating empire following Aurangzeb’s death in 1707. Those who were appointed Governors rarely came to Kashmir and chose to govern through deputy governors. It was in this troubled time that Ahmad Shah Abdali was invited to invade Kashmir. The Afghans took Kashmir in 1753. Plunder, loot and torture followed. Ruthlessness was the mark of the time. So suppressed was the Kashmiri that a mere 3000 Afghans was all it took to keep them under control. THE BRITISH SELL KASHMIR BUT RETAIN INFLUENCE – DOGRA RULE

Kashmir passed to Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1819 thus bringing to an end Kashmir’s nightmare of Afghan rule. The Sikhs ruled for 27 years. Of these Ranjit Singh ruled for 17 years. Like other parts of his kingdom Kashmir too was restored to some extent in terms of general governance. Ranjit Singh did not however visit Kashmir even once. In 1846 Kashmir was taken over by Gulab Singh from the British for the payment of a price as a part of the Treaty of Amritsar that had resulted from the defeat of the Sikhs at the hands of the British. Unlike other parts of his kingdom Ranjit Singh had not given much attention to Kashmir. The Kashmiri peasant’s legendary poverty had got only worse. Gulab Singh had paid a hefty price for getting Kashmir. Once again it fell on the Kashmiri peasant to refurbish Gulab Singh’s treasury. But Gulab Singh’s taking over the control of Kashmir had another significance as well. Gulab Singh was a General and feudatory of Ranjit Singh who was already ruling the Jammu region. His coming to power in Kashmir meant that a Hindu ruler had returned to rule Kashmir and its associated regions after a gap of almost 550 years. Maharaja Ranbir Singh who succeeded Gulab Singh added to his kingdom the territories lying north of Kashmir. Jammu & Kashmir with about 84,500 sq. miles of territory thus came to be the largest Princely State of British India. With a border that came to touch China, Afghanistan and Russia, its geo-strategic importance soon began to attract world attention. This attention led to several issues and events in the post World War II years – the years of the Cold War.

50

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

One of the great mysteries in the unfolding of these early events is, as to why the British decided to hand over the beautiful region to someone else. It was most unusual by the norms of European colonialism. There are several important writings available to us on this. Among recent writings that are comprehensive and explain events as they unfolded, one comes from Jagmohan4. Jagmohan has referred to how even some of the well known British officers had questioned the decision of not retaining the state as a part of the empire. The famous Younghusband of the ‘expedition to Tibet’ fame, is among those who questioned the rational of selling of the state after the hard fought battles with the powerful Sikh empire. Kashmir as these officers insisted was acquired by the British as a compensation of war. In retrospect however it is not difficult to understand why the British decided to separate with Kashmir. The answer lay perhaps in the lesser known classical British colonial approach in such matters. Jagmohan has quoted from a note by Lord Hardinge to the East India Company (19 March 1846) which explains the decision to sell the state to Gulab Singh: ‘. . . a Rajput dynasty will act as a counterpoise against the power of the Sikh Prince the son of the late Ranjit Singh and both will have a common interest in resisting attempts of any Mohammaden power of establishing an independent state on this side of the (River) Indus. . . .’5 Several contemporary versions that appeared in the years after the sale of Kashmir to Gulab Singh have explained the action. It was: ‘. . . one of the political mistakes that we make in a hurry to appease the demon of economy . . . we threw away by diplomacy what we won by the sword. . . .’ 6 Robert Thorp noted: ‘. . . We deliberately sold millions of human beings into slavery for a few pieces of silver. . . .’7 Thorp died in 1868 and had been married to a Kashmiri girl. Notwithstanding several writings that have criticized the transfer of Kashmir to the Dogras, there are writings that point out that it was the best option for the British because the British could not have managed to hold on to Kashmir without first annexing the Punjab. May be things would have been different if the Punjab had been annexed a few years earlier. This decision of the British to sell Kashmir saw four Dogra Maharajas ruling Kashmir – Gulab Singh (1846-57); Ranbir Singh



J A M M U & K A S H M I R : A H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

51

(1857-85); Partap Singh (1885-1925) and finally Hari Singh (192552). It must also be noted that even though Jammu & Kashmir had acceded to India in 1947 and soon after Sheikh Abdullah had got most powers into his hands, technically Dogra rule was abolished only in 1952. But perhaps of even greater importance is that though the state was sold to Gulab Singh, the British had no intention of over-looking its importance or weakening their hold and influence over it. As early as 1852, an officer on special duty had been posted to keep an eye on Maharaja Gulab Singh. In 1867 a Trade Agency was set up in Leh. This enabled the British to control trade and the trade routes into central Asia. In 1884 a Permanent Political Agent was deputed to Srinagar. As had happened in several Princely states, in Kashmir too all powers came virtually to rest in the Resident. This was to the extent that even travel to Kashmir by non-Kashmiris now required official permission.8 It is also important to remember that when the British handed over Kashmir to Gulab Singh, the world was a different place. Colonial rivalries were no doubt widely in context, but the compulsions of the ‘cold war’ that followed the end of World War II were still decades in the future. For Britain its foreign policy had through the nineteenth century been influenced by the ‘Ghost’ of Russia. The three Afghan Wars were not just with regard to the strategic importance and significance of Afghanistan. It was the potential of Russian influence that was actually the cause of major concern. It is in this context that the sustained British interest in Kashmir should not be difficult to understand. The chief concern of the British in India at the time was the possibility of Russia’s expansion towards the sub-continent. This was the main reason why a Resident was appointed, even as there was considerable resistance from the ruler in Kashmir. Oliver St. John had joined as the first Resident on 25 September 1885. Maharaja Partap Singh was soon charged with involvement in treasonable correspondence with the Russians. By 1889 the power with regard to key decisions had come to rest in the Resident. Perhaps the most powerful as also one sided version of the British policy to sell ‘Cashmere’ as also the rule of the Dogras is that of

52

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Arthur Brinckman. Brinckman was a missionary. He raised the issue of how the Russian threat was well placed and that the Raja was inclined towards the Russians: ‘. . . Does England willfully forget the existence of such a spot as Cashmere which might have been one of the fairest jewels of her crown. . . .’ As early 1867 this gentleman had drawn up a list of 51 allegations against the rulers of Kashmir.9 INCREASING INTEREST IN KASHMIR – HOW EUROPEANS SAW IT

For most Western observers, Kashmir was important for a host of reasons – strategic location, trade, sheer beauty of the region and even mining. As Knight put it in his classic study: ‘. . . on the high roof of the world the three greatest empires of the Earth meet – Great Britain, Russia, China. . . .’10 Knight also noted: . . . no European is allowed to enter the old part of the town (Srinagar) . . . the ruler has built several bungalows in the Munshi Bagh area for the Europeans . . . about 300 of our own now visit the valley every year . . . even now a passport is required along with permission from the Resident . . . the state is now being thrown open. . . .11

This important study also makes probably the first reference of how the British had begun to think in terms of investing funds and even building a railway to exploit the natural resources of Kashmir. The industry, the little there was of it, was controlled by the Maharaja and the British had begun to talk in terms of getting some interest in it: ‘. . . The proposed railway connecting Srinagar with lines in India should prove an unmixed benefit – negotiations on the subject have long been in progress. . . .’.12 Knight gives extensive detail of corruption and plight of the peasantry: ‘. . . The Kashmiri has two great objects of life, to earn his basic living from his fields and escape the curse of Kashmiri-begar. . . .’13 Wakefield had travelled to Kashmir almost 20 years before Knight. His version of Kashmir is far happier: ‘. . . The finest breed of cattle and horses may be reared here. . . .’ 14 Of the law and order he writes: ‘. . . The Hindoo (Hindu) code of law is in force in the country and although mild with penalties and not very severe it appears to answer the purpose. Public order is well kept, serious crimes are unheard of



J A M M U & K A S H M I R : A H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

53

. . . what strikes the visitor is the security of persons and property enjoyed. . . .’ W. Henderson who was OSD in Kashmir had infact issued a note – ‘Local Rules for Guidance of Visitors’. Wakefield also writes of another rule that was enforced at the time: ‘. . . Cows and buffaloes are under no circumstances to be slaughtered in the territories of his Highness. . . .’ 15 From the ruling family’s point of view the British intervention had both its advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage was that British officers often guided the government into some progressive policies and were perhaps more objective when it concerned more complex and sensitive issues. The key point thus is that, for good or bad the British were as much responsible for the governance of the state as were the Dogra rulers. GEO-STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

In the overall historical perspective and something that is commonly overlooked is that well before, indeed decades before the region became the centre of contention between India and Pakistan, it had begun to draw the world’s attention. When we talk of a geo-strategic location being important, one must understand that unlike say today, the 1940s were very different. World War II had just ended and the world was already divided in blocks – the cold war as such was in full flow. Kashmir was located in an exceedingly important geo-strategic location. Stories were published on its locational importance among others by the National Geographic (1946); the New York Times (15 January 1950); The Times, London (22 June 1949). At the height of the cold war some even suggested the region’s possible use as a launch pad for military action against the USSR. The end of the Raj and the hurried manner in which the British left India was a part of the broader unfolding of events across the world. Even though World War II had come to an end following the surrender of Japan, lines had already been drawn for a new kind of conflict. Be it Korea, Germany and several other parts, leading powers were competing for areas of influence. This was the kind of general feeling across the world when the issue of Kashmir’s accession to India

54

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

came on the scene. It is quite possible that had the world been somewhat different in the 1940s, the problems in Kashmir may never have grown into what they became. The level of interest taken by the Western press in a sense came as a surprise to leaders in India. The British press or at least an important part of it clearly took a stand against India on Kashmir. The Daily Express, Manchester Guardian and even the Economist were infact singled out by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru for their vicious one sided reporting. Things had gone to such an extent that Nehru even advised the Ministry of External Affairs to take up the issue with the Commonwealth Relations Secretary.16 The issue of Jammu & Kashmir being eyed by several foreign powers as a frontier against the Soviet Union was much debated in the 1940s. In a headlined story ‘Kashmir centre for international intrigue’ The Tribune reported: ‘These imperialists have built their invisible frontiers against the visible Soviet frontier and it is their ardent desire that Kashmir be dragged into Pakistan. . . .’17 HOW PEOPLE IN INDIA SAW JAMMU & KASHMIR: SHIVA BHUMI

In the pre-partition years, it was difficult for most people in India to have imagined that Kashmir could have been seen as anything other than as a part of India. Like many others the Organizer pointed out how: ‘. . . Historically Kashmir has been a part of India. Still we have the temple of Shankaracharya dominating the valley . . . The Hindu Kingdom of Kashmir is one of the oldest in history, it is the spiritual home of the Hindus. . . .’18 In another article it referred to the region as the: ‘. . . Head of Bharat Mata – a window that opens into Afghanistan, China, USSR and Tibet. . . .’19 For most people the age old bonding of Jammu & Kashmir with the rest of India was unignorably evident. Maulana Saeed Mohammad Masoodi made this more than clear when he spoke in Parliament on 11 August 1951: ‘. . . the history of Kashmir shows us that it has been a part of India since antiquity. . . .’20 Repeatedly and without a break we find this widespread belief that the region was an integral part of India, just like any other state. As



J A M M U & K A S H M I R : A H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

55

Mahatma Gandhi too put it: ‘. . . The Kashmiris have one culture and so far as I can see they are one people. I could not distinguish between a Kashmiri Hindu and a Kashmiri Muslim. . . .’21 It is important to understand the overall impression that the common Indian had always had with regard to Kashmir. Dr. S.C. Chatterji was one of 11,000 people chosen from all over India in 1961 to undertake the then very arduous Yatra (pilgrimage) to the Sri Amarnath cave shrine, usually considered to be among the most holy of Hindu shrines. He wrote a long essay of his journey describing in detail his experiences and impressions22: . . . Pahalgam . . . is in the heart of what is known as Shiva bhumi, the realm of Lord Shiva. Most of the surrounding places, lakes, meadows and hill peaks are named after the Lord. In a neighbouring village a spring . . . washes the stone slab image of Bhrigu Rishi, one of the founders of Indian astrology . . . four miles from Srinagar is Pandrensthan which was the old capital of Kashmir founded by king Ashoka . . . a small distance from the route is a low spring in the middle of which stands a beautiful stone temple called Meru Vardhana Swami . . . it was a place of pilgrimage in the olden times. About two miles ahead there is a stone quarry where stands an imposing statue of Lord Ganesh . . . About 9 miles from Srinagar is a sacred spot dedicated to Goddess Jawala. . . . A little further is the site of the ancient city of Awantipur founded by King Avantivarman who ruled Kashmir in the 9th century. A few miles ahead is Bijbihara which is called the Kashi of Kashmir. There existed here a grand temple that was demolished by Sikandar Shah in the 14th century. Nearby was built a stone temple by Maharaja Ranbir Singh on the left bank of the river Vitasta. On the right bank of the river there was a small plateau named after Lord Vishnu. There are also two spots here where the goddesses Jaya & Vijaya are worshipped . . . Anantnag is named after a satellite God Anant . . . a few miles from Pahalgam is a temple dedicated to the Sun God. This temple was built in the 8th century by the great king Lalitaditya. . . .

Dr. Chatterji ended this essay by: ‘. . . Night after night I had a dream in which the immortal Lord Amarnath whispered – men may come and men may go. But I shall remain here forever.’ For centuries such sentiment and emotional bonding has come down from generation to generation. It is important to understand that in the decades leading to 1947, the issues in Kashmir were never perceived by common people to be in terms of Hindu or Muslim.

56

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Hinduism was far too deep rooted to be dislodged just and merely because the religious demography of the population had changed. Even if this were a parameter to alter Kashmir’s historical legacy of bonding with the rest of India it must be kept in mind that over 40 million Muslims had remained in India after 1947. A very interesting and important point was made in this context by the ever so brilliant Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia: ‘strangely there were several Muslims who favored the state’s accession to India while on the other hand there were several Hindus who favoured its accession to Pakistan. . . .’ 23 In an interview (Nagpur) Dr. Lohia had also said: . . . should Kashmir be handed over to Pakistan on the ground of religion (it will) drive deeper the poison of religious fanaticism into the body of Asia . . . to appease Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir would necessarily result in making India and all Asia a still greater prey to forces of fanaticism and disruption . . . Kashmir which is a part of India shall stay a part of India . . . because the people of Kashmir as an integral part of the people of India wish it. . . .24 A SOCIETY DEEPLY INTERWOVEN

Kashmir has had a traumatic past. History records long periods of extreme misrule and yet the Kashmiri has for ages been known for his love of peace and coexistence. Rulers came and went yet the common Kashmiri continued unchanged. . . . In Kashmir one may not be astonished to witness the Hindus and Muslims equally holding in reverence the Hindu shrines and the Muslim Khanqahs situated closely or in the same premises . . . although with the advent of Islam conversions took place in Kashmir as in other parts of India yet no one can deny that Muslims adopted Hindu customs giving in return some of their own. . . .25

Krishan Lal had also quoted the famous lines of Sir John Marshall: ‘. . . Seldom in history of mankind has the spectacle been witnessed of two civilizations so vast and so strong developed yet so radically dissimilar as Hindu and Muslims mingling together. . . .’ 26 In an outstanding essay Jigar Mohammad notes:



J A M M U & K A S H M I R : A H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

57

. . . For Abul Fazl Kashmir was a land of the Brahmanism, Buddhism and Islam. . . . The Mughal’s respect and regard to the religious sanctity and popularity of the Vishnu, Saiva, Durga and Nag temples . . . show that they were treated as some of the dominant religious identities of Kashmir . . . the Mughal emperor Jahangir viewed the Kashmiri Brahman as one of the ancient settlers of the state . . . the Mughals treated Sanskrit as a long lasting medium of literary and religious activities. Akbar ordered the translation of Kalhan’s Rajatarangini into Persian. . . .27

Jigar Mohammed also cites Mirza Haidar: ‘. . . First and foremost among the wonders of Kashmir stand her idol temples which are built of blocks of hewn stone, fitted so accurately one upon the other that there is absolutely no cement used. . . .’ 28 Another study notes: . . . Kashmir can be rightly proud of its cultural heritage . . . ancient monuments of Kashmir have a grandeur that is unique . . . they represent . . . absorbing influences from the best of Gandhara and Gupta art . . . with the background of Buddhist artistic tradition Kashmiri artisans evolved a distinct style of Hindu temple architecture. . . .29

Bangroo also noted: ‘. . . There is no town or village no river or lake no island where the king did not build a sacred foundation. . . .’30 The Organizer too drew attention to Kashmir’s age old bonding with Hinduism: ‘. . . Historically Kashmir has been a part of Hindu India. Referendum cannot change Geography. The temple of Shankaracharya still dominates the valley . . . Hindustan will lose Kashmir by the wrong interpretation of the word determination. . .’.31 Bashir Ahmad Sultan in an insightful article explained how Kashmir had remained deeply related to India: ‘. . . Kashmir always remained uniquely related to India, the racial, social, political, commercial and religious relationship between the two only rarely became exploitative. . . . Men and ideas travelled across opening new vistas and academic discourses. . . .’ 32 The Imperial Gazetteer (1909) notes: . . . The valley of Kashmir is holy land and everywhere one finds remains of ancient temples and buildings . . . called by the inhabitants the houses of the Pandavas. These ancient buildings though more or less injured by iconoclasts, vandal builders, earthquakes and as Cunnigham thinks gunpowder. . . . p. 31. 33

58

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

The Gazetteer (1909) also notes: ‘. . . Srinagar means the city of Sri or Lakshmi the goddess of fortune. . . .’ 34 The Gazetteer had made another important observation: . . . The Kashmiri is unchanged . . . warriors and statesman came and went . . . Islam came in on a strong wave on which rode a fanatical king and a missionary saint and history records that Kashmiris became Musalmans. But close observers of the country see that the so called Musalmans are still Hindu at heart. Their shrines are on the exact spots where the old Hindu sthans stood. . . .35

Laurence also refers to the despotic rule of Sultan Sikandar: ‘. . . was a gloomy fanatic who destroyed nearly all the temples . . . burnt 7 maunds of sacred threads worn by the Brahmans . . . offered conversion, exile or death. . . .’36 In 1950 Gordeon Walker Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations asked Kashmir’s former Prime Minister Ramchandra Kak as to how it could be possible for India to retain Kashmir in view of its demographic composition, almost 95 per cent being Muslim. Kak’s reply is said to have pointed out that it was: . . . a misunderstanding of the whole position to treat the status of the valley of Kashmir, as affecting only its residents and to think of deciding its future with reference only to the composition of its population. Kashmir had from time immemorial been an important constituent of the corpus of Hindu religion, thought and practice and for that reason had since the dawn of history enjoyed a reputation and consideration wholly independent of its politically or economic importance . . . the entire Hindu population of India was intimately concerned with the fate of Kashmir. . . . It was not a case of individual temples or shrines but of the whole country being reverenced as a holy land. . . . If the Jews could get back Israel after 2000 years of exile why should it be considered extraordinary if India wanted to retain Kashmir which was already in its possession. . . .37 THE POLITICAL SCENE – IMPORTANT FEATURES 1947

The political scene in Jammu & Kashmir on the eve of its accession to India can at best be described thus as unstable and generally complex. Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference were clearly



J A M M U & K A S H M I R : A H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

59

the main players. Prime Minister Nehru had once described the importance of Abdullah: . . . Everyone who knows Kashmir knows also the position of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah there. He is the Sher-e-Kashmir, beloved of the remotest valleys of Kashmir. Numerous songs and popular legends have grown around his personality. . . . Does anyone think we are going to desert him or his comrades in Kashmir. . . .38

But unlike the general impression that has prevailed, it was not just a one man game. It is important to draw attention to this issue because generally speaking most studies have been inclined to give the impression that Sheikh Abdullah was all that mattered in Kashmir at the time. There is need also to point out that in a good majority of writings there has been a tendency of suggesting that most of what went wrong could be traced to Maharaja Hari Singh – the villain and Abdullah was the one who stood for everything that was right. It must also be remembered that Jammu & Kashmir was India’s largest Princely state in 1947 and that though the National Conference may have been influential in Kashmir it had only limited influence in Jammu and the Ladakh regions. For some reason or reasons the government of India more particularly Prime Minister Nehru had come to believe that Abdullah held the key and the answers to everything that was of importance. In this whole process as we can clearly see the problems related to Jammu & Ladakh were understated. In this sense it can be suggested therefore that the single most important element of the political scene in the state was the close and personal bonding of Abdullah and Prime Minister Nehru. Much of what happened was thus invariably traceable to either of the two. In a way they were both the key and the lock. Nehru’s involvement in Kashmir, going to the level it did, was influenced not just by the fact that he was the Prime Minister and also the Minister for External Affairs and had also retained the charge of Jammu & Kashmir under his direct supervision. Nehru had an innate bonding with Kashmir and the Kashmiri. Letters and notes drafted when Nehru was in Kashmir are often identifiable even without reading the place of writing or dictation. Like anyone who has a love

60

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

for the mountains, his presence in Kashmir always put him at ease. Not surprisingly some of his key advisers like himself were Kashmiri by descent. Then there was the Muslim League. Its policies and actions had divided even a country like India – what was a state like Jammu & Kashmir. Its numbers in terms of its followers were small in Kashmir. After 1947 it received sustained support and guidance from the League leadership in Pakistan. The League’s main political agenda was to spread fear among Kashmiri Muslims that there would be no place for them in India after the British left. Exaggerated stories of discrimination were picked up from across India and circulated in the state.39 When Pakistan came into being it was probably the League volunteers who ensured that a large number of homes flew the Pakistan flag (16 August 1947). To counter the move National Conference supporters hoisted black flags on their homes.40 The Indian National Congress was not directly of much relevance in the valley. It chose to walk in Abdullah’s shadow. Then there were smaller splinter groups – Moulvi Yusuf Shah in Srinagar for example. Others included the Muslim Conference, Kashmiri Pandit Conference, Kisan Mazdoor Conference, Kashmir Rajya Hindu Sabha. The Maharaja was of course at the centre of it all. The Dogra Rajputs were predominantly residents of the Jammu region. Over the decades they had come to occupy key positions in the government. The love of the Dogras for the uniformed services, a trait that prevails even today, saw them hold key positions in the Maharaja’s army and also the state police. The main minority in the Kashmir valley were of course the Pandits. As time would show they would pay the price for their religious identity, intellect, education and importance. The Kashmiri Pandits had from the earliest of times been like the repositories of knowledge in Kashmir. This love for education naturally put them at an advantage in terms of government employment, trade, commerce and other avenues such as banking. In a way they were the true and age old custodians of all that was Kashmir and Kashmiriyat. Interestingly even though the relations of the Pandit minority had never been good with Abdullah and his National Conference, the Pandits were among the most vocal in seeking the release of Abdullah



J A M M U & K A S H M I R : A H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

61

after he had been arrested on the Maharaja’s orders. Their paper the Daily Martan played an important role in this.41 The Kashmiri Pandits had somehow come to believe that Abdullah would lend his full support to the merger of Jammu & Kashmir with India. The Kashmiri Pandits in this sense were by far the leaders in building public opinion on the question of the merger. Their numbers were small but their general influence supported by their innate understanding of the events gave to them an importance that was far more than was merited by their demographic strength. It is this that made the National Conference, the Muslim League and above all Abdullah very vary of them. An interesting point that needs emphasis is that the Kashmiri Pandits often found themselves closer and in support of Kashmiri Muslims if an occasion arose.42 This is before the policy of causing a division was adopted in earnest. Nehru made an interesting reference to the Kashmiri Pandits in a long letter that he wrote to Sardar Patel who had not been keeping well and had been away from Delhi for some time. Nehru had raised several other issues in this letter. On Kashmir he noted: . . . I am worried about the internal political situation in Kashmir. Owing to lack of supplies and trade and continuous radio and other propaganda from Pakistan, the morale of the civil population is rather low. Pakistan Radio from Murree carries on a vicious and intensive propaganda and there is nothing to meet it on our side. I regret to say that many of the older generation of Kashmiri Pandits are not behaving well. They are grousing all the time and talking almost as if they were agents of Pakistan. They seem to have convinced themselves that ultimately Pakistan will come in. If so, then why fight Pakistan? All this is largely due to our lack of propaganda approach. . . .43

Kashmir with its geo-political location had for long been of interest both to the Soviet Union and after 1949 to China as well. The Communist Party and communism as such even as numbers were limited were important enough particularly in Kashmir to merit repeated references by Prime Minister Nehru. This extract from his letter to Abdullah in June 1949 is interesting: . . . The Communist Party of India has been functioning for the last year in a most peculiar and distressing way. It is not the way of communism. It is just terrorism and killing. . . .

62

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

. . . No person with the least love of India could have functioned in that way, though their present methods can only lead to ruin and misery in India. They have unfortunately come to the conclusion that the India they want can only come into existence after widespread ruin and misery and chaos. This is not only a counsel of despair but is extreme folly, because chaos in India would certainly not lead to the betterment of the Indian people for a generation or more. We would go back to primitive conditions and it may be that foreign intervention will follow. . . . . . . You know that I have no grievance against communists as such or against communism and I have liked many of the young men and women who are associated with communism in India. But almost against my will, I have come to the conclusion that their present policy in India is an extremely dangerous one not only for our country but also for the bigger causes of Asian progress and world peace. And so, I combat them though I try to do so with as little illwill as possible. . . . . . . If the Communist Party is bent on giving this trouble in India, it stands to reason that they will not ignore Kashmir. In any event they would not have ignored Kashmir, more especially because Kashmir is a vital spot today as between India and Pakistan, because dynamic changes are taking place there and because it is a frontier country with the Soviet Union not far away. It is inevitable that Communists should take interest in Kashmir. They may be wise enough to behave differently there for the present, but their policy must remain the same. Hence the need for utmost vigilance. Another aspect of it is the reaction of foreign Ambassadors and observers as well as the United Nations Commission. Nearly all of them react violently to Communism. There is not need for us to make them think unfavourably of the Kashmir Government. . . .44

The Communists for some reason were attracting much attention in the press. Their numbers were small but influence in comparison was far more. But the general impression was not favourable. The Ranbir an influential Urdu daily noted: ‘ . . . the Communists neither love Kashmir nor India . . . Moscow is their Lord and Stalin is their Guru. . . .’ 45 Interestingly this report also added that the Communist party was keen that Sheikh Abdullah should remain in detention so that they could conduct their propaganda without any hindrance.46 Another report infact even suggested that it was the Communist friends of Abdullah who had put in his mind the idea of raising the ‘Quit Kashmir’ slogan against Maharaja Hari Singh.47



J A M M U & K A S H M I R : A H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

63

SHEIKH MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH

Sheikh Abdullah was awarded the degree of M.Sc. Chemistry by the Aligarh Muslim University. He returned to Kashmir to take up the job of a school teacher, a position that normally went to a Matriculate. He appears to have come to believe that this was because he was a Muslim living in a Hindu ruled state. This apart and as earlier noted the Kashmir of the time was not a happy land. Poverty and corruption were widespread. There was it is said yet another side to the story – that of discrimination against the Muslims. The Kashmir to which Sheikh Abdullah had returned after his Masters from Aligarh Muslim University in the early 1930s was in difficult times. Long years of misrule and insensitive handling had reduced the beautiful people and their enchanting land to extreme difficulties. As the Statesman noted: ‘The unfortunate Kashmiri is placed between the devil and the deep sea. . . . The cultivator gets only Rs. 20 out every Rs. 100 that his crops are worth.’ The report also drew attention to the widespread corruption in the Kashmir valley.48 As if the poverty to which the region and its people had been reduced was not bad enough, not an occasion was spared by the state to drive home among the people the point that even though the majority of the population was Muslim the rulers were Hindus. To give an example of the insensitive nature of the rulers in the late nineteenth century. The mourning period that followed Maharaja Ranbir Singh’s death, happened to coincide with the festival of Bukr Eid (1885). The state passed orders that no animals were to be slaughtered as mark of respect to the late ruler’s memory. The Statesman commented: . . . The Mahomedans seem outwardly to have greatly acquiesced in the orders from Jammu but they probably feel that their hostility to the Hindus has been considerably intensified . . . Cashmere (Kashmiri) Mohammedans is a patient being nonetheless there is a great danger that from some trivial cause a serious disturbance may one day break. . . .49

Srinagar had witnessed a major riot on 13 July 1931.50 Even the (one sided) Enquiry Committee Report that followed noted, how the ‘grievance of paucity of employment is a genuine one: . . . the main desire of the Mohammedans is to have a larger representation

64

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

in state services. . . .’ This report also noted that Muslims were discriminated in employment because of their educational backwardness. ‘For example it said that of 36 post office clerks only four were Mohammedans, of 30 postmen only 1 was a Mohammedan. . . . The scholarship selection board in 1927 granted 12 scholarships in which only one went to a Mohammedan. . . .’51 Sustained misrule had as a matter of fact put Kashmir in the threshold of a major political transformation by the beginning of the 1930s. Sheikh Abdullah had learnt of the plight of the common Kashmiri and saw in it a political opportunity. His decision to place his politics on a ‘communitarian’ stage was therefore absolutely well timed: ‘. . . The loss of right is a loss to all, whether he is a Muslim or a non-Muslim . . . I appeal to the non-Muslims that they should stand shoulder to shoulder with us to take part in the emancipation of the people and the freedom of the nation from poverty and slavery. . . .’52 In these early days that Abdullah took to public life he was conscious of the manner in which the people of Kashmir – both Muslims and Hindus differed from the Muslims and Hindus of the rest of India. It was this overriding feeling that greatly influenced his politics in later years and also brought him close to Nehru – a kind of mutual endorsement based on a commitment to secular politics clubbed with a socialistic mindset. As Abdullah said in his autobiography: ‘Nehru and I were ideologically close to one another. . . .’53 The New Kashmir vision and the founding of the National Conference were clear signs that Nehru’s intellectual charm had also cast a spell over Abdullah. No one could have imagined that a small but provocative public speech given by the then insignificant person Abdul Qadar against the Maharaja would convert into a turning point of politics in Kashmir. Qadar was working as a cook with a European family visiting the valley. He was arrested and charged with sedition. The crowd that gathered and sought his release was fired upon by the state police. Ten people were killed. Interestingly the Enquiry Committee Report that followed too said: ‘. . . grievance of paucity of employment is a genuine one . . . the main desire of the Mohammadans is to have larger representation is state service. . . .’54 Kashmir was thus on the verge of a major political transformation.



J A M M U & K A S H M I R : A H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

65

Sheikh Abdullah had landed in Kashmir at just about the perfect time. The mantle he took upon himself carried with it complex responsibility and required a vision that was clear and committed. In 1944, the National Conference had announced its objective of ‘Naya Kashmir’. This talked of democracy, economic and political reforms and other issues. On 10 May 1946, the National Conference launched a campaign against Maharaja Hari Singh – ‘Quit Kashmir’. Abdullah started the campaign by issuing surcharged communal appeals against the Maharaja, emphasis remaining on his being a ‘Hindu Dogra’. As Abdullah built up his hype of hatred against the Dogras and Hari Singh, he found in the Kashmiri peasantry a fertile and receptive audience. Poverty was widespread. As things began to slip away from the hands of the ruling dynasty, containing Abdullah appeared the only way out. The Maharaja ordered the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah on 20 May 1946. Thus as India was racing towards its freedom, Jammu & Kashmir was confronted with a peculiar and unique set of political issues. As Abdullah’s fate would have it, he had on his side the one man who mattered the most – Jawaharlal Nehru. In the months and years that followed, this binding friendship would become the focal point in the unfolding of events – that we also know as the ‘Kashmir Crisis’. GANDHI-NEHRU IN DEFENCE OF ABDULLAH

Mahatma Gandhi too was fond of Abdullah and spoke of him frequently. Gandhi had visited Srinagar in August 1947. The local press had said that one of the main reasons for Gandhi’s then proposed visit was to manage the release of Abdullah. 55 By 1946 Nehru and Abdullah were already close friends. To the world however the friendship was revealed soon after Abdullah’s arrest on 20 May 1946. Nehru rushed to Kashmir in support, but was detained at the border. A note written by someone in Nehru’s party described the scene: ‘. . . He violently trampled his foot on the floor and told them that one day the Maharaja of Kashmir would have to repent and apologise to him for the discourtesy shown to the Presidentelect of the Indian National Congress. . . .’56 Nehru’s concern for Abdullah is unmissable in virtually everything

66

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

he wrote on Kashmir. His bonding with Abdullah was such that he gave to the political stand that Abdullah was taking against Hari Singh, the form of a struggle for freedom: The story of this brave struggle against the armed forces of State has not ended by this trial. That story will go on till it reaches the logical end which can only be the establishment of freedom in Kashmir within the larger framework of a free and independent India. Meanwhile Sheikh Abdullah and many of his colleagues lie in prison and to them we send our comradely greetings. 57

In February 1947 the British government formally announced their intention to leave India. The actual plan was announced on 3 June. Lord Mountbatten visited Srinagar soon after the historic announcement of handing over power was formally made public. Mahatma Gandhi too visited Srinagar in the first week of August (1947). Much was made of both these visits. Gandhi’s visit in particular was seen as India’s attempts to ‘bully’ the Maharaja and make him accede to India. A coincidence perhaps, soon after Gandhi left Srinagar the Maharaja removed his Prime Minister Ramchandra Kak and also ordered the release of Sheikh Abdullah (29 September 1947). We have noted the reference made by Radha Ranjan in a recent study to the private papers of Ramchandra Kak. It has until recently been a trend to hold Kak responsible for many of the decisions of Maharaja Hari Singh, especially the delay in declaring his intention to merge with India. Kak’s version however puts the onus on one Swami Santdev. It was he, Kak suggests, that led Hari Singh to being in two minds. Kak also holds this Swami responsible for his own (Kak’s) dismissal as well.58 As the Princes of British India quickly announced their decision to merge with India, the Maharaja in Kashmir was unable to make up his mind. The longer he took, the more complicated the situation became. A few days after the release of Abdullah, reports had begun to indicate the collecting of a large number of armed men on the new border of Kashmir with the new dominion of Pakistan. Some of these reports infact had appeared in August 1947 itself. The first report of the massive invasion sponsored and supported by Pakistan were received by the army commanders in India on 24 October in the form of the capture and burning down of Muzaffarabad. Even



J A M M U & K A S H M I R : A H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

67

though the full scale invasion had actually started on 22 October. A day later the Maharaja approached India for assistance and also wrote to Viceroy Mountbatten on 26 October seeking to accede to India. With first light on 27 October, Indian troops landed at the Srinagar air strip and rushed straight into battle. Thus what started off as an effort to assist the Maharaja and save Kashmir and especially Srinagar developed into a full scale war. Its other fall out was Abdullah’s coming to power at first in a limited manner and then completely. Acharya Kriplani, President of the Indian National Congress was in Srinagar in May 1947. Several studies have suggested that one of the purpose of his visit was to put pressure on Maharaja Hari Singh to accede to India. But interestingly something very important to which he also drew attention has usually been overlooked. Kriplani had explained how Hari Singh was keen to accede to India and that it was not correct on the part of the National Conference to raise the demand of ‘Quit Kashmir’ against Hari Singh: ‘He is not an outsider’. He appealed to the National Conference in particular to give up the call of ‘Quit Kashmir’59. This report of The Tribune is important because it was well known that Abdullah and his party had enjoyed the support and confidence of Prime Minister Nehru. In a way it was being understood at the time that Abdullah had raised the demand of ‘Quit Kashmir’ knowing fully well that Prime Minister Nehru would not disapprove of it. A detailed reference has been made later as to why Maharaja Hari Singh appears to have been in a double mind when confronted with the Instrument of Accession. A brief reference however is required here too. Radha Rajan suggests that Hari Singh held the Indian National Congress and in particular Jawaharlal Nehru responsible for the role that Abdullah had played against him (Hari Singh). Hari Singh was unable to get over the manner in which several leaders of the Congress, particularly the Prime Minister had identified themselves with the National Conference and lent their weight to the agitation against him.60 NOTES 1. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence, p. 48. 2. Ibid., p. 49.

68

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

3. Mohammad Ashraf, ‘How Old is the Kashmir Problem’, in Kashmir First: The Kashmir Story, vol. I (Srinagar, 2008), p. 30. 4. Jagmohan, op. cit., pp. 72-3. 5. Ibid., p. 73. 6. Dugsal, Letters from India and Kashmere (Kashmir) (1874) cited M.L. Kapur, Kashmir Sold & Snatched (Jammu, 1968), p. 9. 7. Robert Thorp, Cashmere Misgovernance, ed. F.M. Hassnain (Srinagar, rpt. 2011), p. 15. 8. For later years see Basta (bundle) no. 95, File 148/57, S.N. 2323, Jammu Kashmir State Archives, Jammu. 9. Kashmir Papers, ed. G.N. Gauher and Shahwar Gauher (Srinagar, 2011). 10. E.F. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet: A Narrative of a Recent Travel in Kashmir, Western Tibet (London, 1905), p. viii. 11. Ibid., p. 41. 12. Ibid., p. 64. 13. Ibid., p. 66. 14. W. Wakefield, The Happy Valley: Sketches of Kashmir and the Kashmiris, (London: Samson Low, 1879), p. 84. 15. Ibid., p. 289. 16. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru [hereafter SW ] (Oxford, 1998, 2nd Series), vol. 16, pt. I, p. 393. 17. The Tribune (Simla, 10 December 1947). 18. Organizer, 15 January 1948. 19. Ibid. 20. Kashmir Through Public Eyes (Srinagar). 21. The Kashmir Story (Publication Division Govt. of India), p. 19. This view was stated by Gandhi when he returned from Kashmir in August 1947. He also referred to the same at a prayer meeting in New Delhi and also did so on several other occasions. 22. ‘Pilgrimage to Amarnath’, Kashmir Affairs, no.12, July-August 1961, p. 21. 23. Collected Works of Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, ed. Mastram Kapur (New Delhi, 2011), vol. IV, p. 37. 24. Ibid., June 1951, p. 59. 25. Krishan Lal, ‘The Culture of Kashmir’, Jammu and Kashmir State Research Biannual, vol. I, no. 2, 1976 (Acc. Allama Iqbal Library, Kashmir University). 26. Ibid., p. 51. 27. Jigar Mohammed, ‘Mughal Perception of Kashmir 1586-1707’, in G.M. Khawaja and Gulshan Majeed (eds.), Approaches to Kashmir Studies (Srinagar, 2011), pp. 49-52. 28. Ibid., p. 50. 29. Virendra Bangroo, ‘Indigenous Architectural Heritage of Kashmir’, in Khawaja and Majeed (eds.), ibid., pp. 250-5.



J A M M U & K A S H M I R : A H I S TO R I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

69

30. Ibid., p. 253, cited Kalhan’s Rajatarangni. 31. Organizer, 15 January 1948. 32. Mir Bashir Ahmad Sultan, ‘Kashmir’s Socio-Political Heritage’, in Khawaja and Majeed (eds.), op. cit., p. 147.   For the hugely important references with regard to literary works and the use of Sanskrit though the ages in Kashmir see R.N. Safaya, ‘Ancient Kashmir a Centre of Sanskrit Learning’, Kashmir, vol. 8, nos. 7-8, July-August 1958 (Acc. Research Library Kashmir University Srinagar); R.K. Mookerjee, ‘Cultural Links Between India & Kashmir’, Kashmir, vol. 3, no. 5, May 1953 (Acc. Research Library Kashmir University Srinagar); R.N. Kaw, ‘Contribution of Kashmir to Sanskrit Literature’, Jammu & Kashmir University Review, vol. 5, no. 2, December 1962 (Acc. Iqbal Library, Kashmir University). 33. Walter R. Laurence, Kashmir & Jammu Imperial Gazetteer (1909, rpt. Srinagar, 2012), p. 31. 34. Ibid., p. 129. 35. Ibid., p. 38. 36. Ibid., p. 24. 37. Radha Rajan, Jammu & Kashmir: Dilemma of Accession (New Delhi, 2017) p. 139. 38. M.J. Akbar, Kashmir Behind the Vale, p. 91. 39. When a Urdu newspaper in Allahabad carried a story of how Muslims appear not to be in a position to benefit from the forthcoming partition – a story was planted to counter the view and further provoke sentiment in the state. See Roshni, 2 August 1947. 40. Ibid., 17 August 1947. 41. See The Tribune, 1 June 1947, Ranbir and Kashmir Chronicle were other papers that sought Abdullah’s release. 42. Report of ASP Annantnag 6 September 1945 Basta 147, Serial 3601, File No. PR 128/I/45, Jammu & Kashmir State Archives, Jammu. 43. Jawaharlal Nehru Papers (Sonia Gandhi) [hereafter JN(SG)], File No. 9, Manuscript Section [hereafter MSS], Nehru Memorial Museum & Library New Delhi [hereafter NMML], Nehru to Patel, 30 May 1948. 44. JN(SG) MSS. NMML, Nehru to Abdullah (Secret Personal), 4 June 1949. 45. Ranbir (Urdu), Srinagar, 14 June 1947. 46 Ibid., 47. Ibid., 1 June 1947. 48. Statesman, 20 March 1886. 49. Ibid., 29 September 1885. 50. Report of the Riot Enquiry Committee 1931 (Acc. Sir Pratap Singh Library, Srinagar), p. 28. 51. Ibid., p. 17.

70

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

52. Abdullah’s address, Annual Session Muslim Conference, December 1933, cited Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity and The Making of Kashmir (Delhi, 2003), p. 208. 53. Abdullah, Flames of the Chinar: An Autobiography, abridged edition by Khuswant Singh (New Delhi, 1993), p. 71. 54. Report of the Riot Enquiry Committee 1931, p. 28. 55. Ranbir (Urdu), 11 June 1947. 56. This note does not carry the name of its author or the date. See JN(SG), MSS, NMML, 1946. 57. As was Nehru’s habit he frequently recorded his view in the form of notes that were usually circulated to concerned people. This note on the general condition in Kashmir was dictated on 24 September 1946. See JN(SG), File I, MSS, NMML. 58. Radha Rajan, Jammu & Kashmir: Dilemma of Accession, pp. 129-32. 59. The Tribune, 20 May 1947. 60. Radha Rajan, Jammu & Kashmir: Dilemma of Accession, p. 108.

CHAPTER TWO

The Invasion of Jammu & Kashmir Public Opinion Turns Anti-Pakistan

INDIA TAKEN BY SURPRISE

E

ven a cursory reading of contemporary reports would easily     establish that much was wrong with the way that things were         being managed in Kashmir in the months leading to the exit of the British from India. Starting March 1947, the Punjab was on the boil. The attention of the political leadership both in Lahore and Delhi was naturally on ensuring a smooth transfer of power. The civil service in New Delhi as also in Lahore and Simla was mostly in transit mode. There were desertions of administrative and police posts on both sides. It just did not occur to anyone or so it seems that issues in Jammu & Kashmir too required a more closer watch. The result was that the government of India’s policy with regard to the state was more in the form of reacting to developments rather than one of taking an initiative. Surprisingly the new dominion of Pakistan with a virtually non-existent civil administrative system at the time appeared more organized with regard to Jammu & Kashmir and worked to a plan. It is this early planning and action on the part of Pakistan that took India by surprise in the autumn of 1947. . . . The second half of 1947 was a period of the worst economic depression. Owing to Pakistan’s blockade (of roads) and to the fact that the road to Jammu too was blocked import and export was at a stand still in Kashmir.

72

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

There were no visitors, no trade and therefore no earnings. . . . Apples from last year’s harvest are still lying unsold . . . a fruit vendor told me that an apple garden which was usually sold for Rs.2,500/- fetched now only Rs. 500/. . . .1

There was an acute shortage of essential supplies in the entire state starting about December 1946. A report said that the government had sent 30,000 tonnes of rice from Bhawalpur and another 15,000 tonnes from Jammu to the valley. It was to be distributed at government regulated prices.2 The price of rice was no doubt brought under control. For example it was retailing at Rs. 11 to 14 per 40 kg.3 But this was not the case with other major items. The result was a network of black marketing. The widespread prevalence of corruption in the different wings of the government was nothing new in Kashmir. As one report put it: ‘. . . Government servants with salaries of Rs. 200/- had Rs. 10,000/- in banks. . . .’4 Rawalpindi was the major point of entry to Kashmir. It had been so for ages. The riots and mass murder of the minorities mainly the Sikhs in Rawalpindi in March 1947 led to a complete break down of all communication and transport.5 This led to a further crisis of supplies. An emphasis would be in place to note that this story of corruption in the managing of food supplies has remained consistent in Kashmir throughout. In some cases when newspapers reported stories of corruption, influential and corrupt officers even turned the tide by charging the press for spreading ‘alarm and disaffection’.6 Several reports also raised the issue of corruption in the judiciary. Some suggested it was totally hand in glove. A long report noted that upto 90 per cent of the judiciary was corrupt.7 RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRESS AND ENTRY INTO JAMMU & KASHMIR

Another impression that one comes away with from reports of the first half of 1947, is the tendency of putting restrictions on newspapers and press reporters. There was a ban on the Blitz and Peoples Age both of which were published from Bombay (Mumbai).8 This ban had resulted from some of the stories done by Blitz and Peoples Age with regard to misrule and mishandling of the situation by Maharaja Hari Singh.



T he I nvasion A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir

73

Ranbir was a major player among newspapers in Kashmir. Published in Urdu, it was the only paper that supported the nationalist view point. It was directed to suspend publication and was charged with sections of the ‘Order for Public Safety.9 The paper was spearheading the campaign to seek release of Sheikh Abdullah, who was then in detention. The state enforced for a long time a very effective control on the press. This continued even under Abdullah, indeed even more ruthlessly than during the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh. Nehru too was once a victim and shared his unhappiness. In July 1946 Nehru had visited Srinagar. Many of the reports understated the response to his visit. Some even said a mere 500 people had turned out to receive him. A person who was in Nehru’s team noted: . . . In Srinagar for the first time I learned how news agencies can distort facts. Both the A.P.I. and U.P.I. are heavily subsidized by the State. The U.F.I. representative is a relative of Prime Minister Kak. I was astonished to find an A.P.I. report in The Tribune that in Srinagar about 500 people gathered to greet Nehru. Certainly independence and freedom of the press are more important than the independence and freedom of India. Bribery and corruption are bad enough anywhere, but in journalism they are a crime and a ‘sin against the Holy Ghost.’10

Blitz was among the papers that Hari Singh had banned in the state. An interesting exchange of letters between Nehru and the editor of Blitz will help give an idea of how seriously Nehru took the press and also its criticism. The Blitz had carried some stories on the ‘in house’ politics of the Congress. This had annoyed one group. Nehru had written to R.K. Karanjia (editor) a angry letter. Karanjia replied in a six page letter: . . . Though I lost the permit and quota of paper promised to me for my Daily, the experience was worth the sacrifice, for I had received my first lesson in Congress power-politics and inter-axis straight from the horse’s mouth as it were. I am sure I need not go into details, for you will understand. . . . . . . Soon afterwards, Malik Wahedna, a member of my staff, interviewed Maulana Sahib and brought back to me the latter’s off-the-record revelations about the antics of the Congress ‘pseudo-leaders’. Chagla and many others confirmed the heart-rending story. My respect for the Congress organization, however, prevented me from exposing this racket till, with your assumption

74

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

of the Congress President-Government, this game of scuttle became insufferably revolting. . . . . . . Here, again, I do not think I need enter into details, because they must be well known to you. High politics aside, the controversy has begun to pervert the people’s press. Sheikh Abdullah and the whole Kashmir struggle have been blacked out of our newspaper chains on orders from above. Secret circulars and whispering campaigns are doing their round discrediting Sheikh Abdullah as a Muslim Leaguer and Black-marketeer. Similar propaganda has been turned against Maulana Sahib. The manner in which your own incident in Kashmir was sought to be distorted made some of us see red. Capitalist influences in league with a section of Congress leadership are making every effort to blackguard you as a communist and anti-Hindu?11

This trend of containing the press continued for several years even after the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India had been completed. All journalists visiting Kashmir were required to seek prior permission. This included not just foreign journalists but also Indian. The duration a journalist could stay within the state was clearly stated. This rarely exceeded 2-3 weeks. In some cases this was just a few days, as was the case with A.M. Rosenthal of the New York Times.12 Interestingly during the period that Sheikh Abdullah was heading the government (1948-53) the restriction on journalists was selective. Those in support of Abdullah had no restrictions.13 Papers that were banned by Abdullah included Parbhat, Organiser, Milap and Partap.14 There is also another side to the restriction on the entry of foreign journalists into Kashmir particularly the Dras, Kargil and Ladakh areas. The Prime Minister’s office probably had some inputs that some foreign journalists were part of an anti-India exercise. Nehru was in Sonemarg when he learnt that an American journalist had been issued a permit by the Defence Ministry to enter Ladakh. A ‘Top Secret Flash’ telegram was sent from Sonemarg to M.O. Mathai (Nehru’s P.A.) in New Delhi: . . . I understand that Defence Ministry Kashmir Permit Section has issued permit for Ladakh to American Woman Correspondent probably representing Colliers Magazine. I am surprised to learn of this, as about a year ago I issued express instructions that on no account whatever should any foreign journalist, or indeed any foreigner, be allowed to go to Ladakh. Please enquire from Defence Ministry why this permit has been issued and why express



of & KEashmir I A’ ‘ BT E he C L EI nvasion AR, KASHM I R J ammu W I L L VOT FOR IND

75

instructions are not being followed. Enquire also from External Affairs Ministry if they know anything about this. . . .15

Mathai replied a few hours later: . . . Regarding third message about foreign correspondents visiting Ladakh, the facts are as follows. Recently a permit was issued to Miss Jean Lyon, Representative of the Toronto Star Weekly, to accompany Kazmi, Director of Education, Kashmir Government, to Kargil in a jeep. Defence Ministry did not make reference to Kashmir Government because she was going to Kargil with a senior officer of Kashmir Government. Defence Ministry referred her application to Military Intelligence Bureau who perceived no objection to permission being granted. She was recommended by B.L. Sharma, Principal Information Officer. I happen to know this elderly lady. She is extremely friendly towards India and unusually progressive for an American. But of course I had nothing to do with the permit. In any event she could not take advantage of the permit as it reached her too late. . . . . . . Another application from Miss Margaret Well, Visiting Correspondent of the Toronto Star Weekly as well as United National Journal, for permission to visit Ladakh is pending with Defence Ministry. Prime Minister’s general instructions will be strictly followed in this case. Thus it is clear that no person has been given a permit to visit Ladakh. . . .16

This appears to have been incorrect because in April 1953 the Prime Minister again raised the issue in a confidential note to the Defence Ministry: . . . I think I once enquired about permits being given for visits to Jammu and Kashmir State. I have found sometimes quite undesirable person getting these permits. I am referring to foreigners especially. The Kashmir Government has written to me pointing this out. . . . . . . Who is in charge of this issue of permits in the Defence Ministry and what conventions or rules are followed in this respect. I hope it will be remembered that no foreigner is allowed to go to Ladakh. I gather that there are a large crowd of M.R.A. people in Kashmir and that some of them are trying to go to Ladakh. This permission should not be given.17 SUMMER EXAMINATIONS

The summer of 1947 also saw a very peculiar situation arising with regard to students enrolled in Jammu & Kashmir colleges. The state’s

76

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

colleges were affiliated with Punjab University Lahore. With the university, likely to be divided after partition the question arose as to with which university the colleges of Kashmir would be affiliated. The East Punjab districts that were to come to India were to get their own university only after August (1947) As a result, for many months the colleges of Jammu & Kashmir had no university.18 On its part the authorities of Punjab University (Lahore) keeping in mind the disturbed conditions in Punjab – both East & West had decided to postpone the annual examinations of 1947 from May to September 1947. But what is important to note is that in the case of Kashmir, the examinations were actually conducted by Punjab University Lahore in May 1947. This was probably done because conditions in Kashmir were considered to be normal at the time or perhaps not as disturbed as the neighbouring Punjab. THE LEGACY OF POVERTY

Another issue in the context of the months leading to the crisis of 1947 is that the divisions and differences that appear to have emerged between the majority and minority communities were more political in nature rather than a result of common sentiment. Indeed if there was a division it was more the result of the common Kashmiri’s historic legacy of poverty. As Knight had put it as early as 1905: . . . The Kashmiri cultivator is quite reckless about accumulation of arrears (revenue) . . . He knows the state cannot recover them . . . ejectment from his miserable home is no great punishment . . . the Kashmiri has two great objects of life, to earn his bare living from his fields and to escape the curse of Kashmir’s – begar. . . .19

Begar or forced labour was earlier limited to the peasantry of the majority (Muslim) population, but by around 1900 the minority were also forced into it. Most of this forced labour was done on building of roads.20 In this sense what separated and divided the Kashmiris was not religion but economic hardship. As Hori Lal Saxena wrote, describing the conditions of 1947. ‘. . . Every one of the communal demands put forward by any communal group is in the final analysis a demand for jobs. . . .’21



I nvasion ofI RJ ammu & KEashmir I A’ ‘ BTEhe CLE AR, KASHM W I L L VOT FOR IND

77

Interestingly even Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had initially believed that the problem is Kashmir ‘was social and economic and not political. . .’.22 But as it turned out after centuries of harmony and co-existence, the Kashmiris too had come to experience the politics of division. When we observe the political scene particularly in the Kashmir region in the weeks after August (1947) something that stands out increasingly is the effort of small groups of people trying to generate a sentiment of separation based on religion. By the time that the mercenaries, the so called tribal invaders and Pakistani regular troops disguised as tribals entered the valley (mid-October 1947), an organized attempt was already being made to convince the Kashmiri Muslim that their future lay with Pakistan. MAHATMA GANDHI IN SRINAGAR (AUGUST 1947)

Acharya Kriplani, Senior Congress leader and then also President of the Congress as we have earlier seen was in Kashmir in May 1947. He referred at length to how the Muslims and Hindus were living in harmony.23 Just a few weeks before Kashmir was overrun by the invaders, Mahatma Gandhi too as we have also seen was in Kashmir. The visit was historic on many counts. Perhaps the most important was the manner in which both the Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims welcomed him: ‘. . . Scenes of unbounded enthusiasm were witnessed in Kashmir today when Gandhi arrived here . . . he was given a tremendous ovation by eagerly waiting crowds . . . the whole city (Srinagar) is agog with activity as if the Mahatma has brought a new zeal and new life. . . .’24 About 20,000 people attended Gandhi’s prayer meeting on 3 August: ‘. . . As verses were recited from the Quran and the Bhagwadgita, Kashmiri girls sang a prayer bhajan. . . .’25 On his return to New Delhi Gandhi devoted his prayer meeting of 6 August to the impressions he had formed of Kashmir and the Kashmiris: ‘. . . Kashmiris have one language, one culture and so far as I can see they are one people. I could not distinguish readily between a Kashmiri Hindu and a Kashmiri Muslim in the large gathering that I saw and it was very difficult for me to know Muslim or Hindu. . . .’26

78

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

EARLY REPORTS OF THE INVASION AND THE PEOPLE’S RESPONSE

It is very interesting to read of how the Kashmiri masses actually reacted to the slogans of a ‘holy war’ raised by the Pakistan invaders in 1947. Those assigned by the Pakistani commanders to lead the invasion were taken aback when they saw Muslims and non-Muslims resisting the invasion. This is not something that they had expected. What they found was that the Kashmiris irrespective of being Muslim, Hindu or Sikh resisted the invaders because they were treated as outsiders who had violated Kashmir. I have repeatedly emphasized that however hard some of the leaders may have tried, on the ground among common people there remained an innate bonding. The spontaneity with which Muslims and Hindus as also Sikhs joined hands to resist the invaders is something that stands out in contemporary reports. As Dr. Lohia put it: ‘. . . The magnificent challenge which the people of Kashmir have so bravely presented to Pakistan must awaken response in every Indian’s heart and whatever traces of the two nation theory are still present within the Indian Union must be wiped out. . . .’ 27 On 17 October (1947) The Tribune carried a big headline ‘Armed Gangs from Pakistan raid Poonch’ – ‘Economic Blockade of Kashmir in Progress’. Rana Jung Bahadur, then officiating editor of the paper, also reported on the acute shortage of essential commodities like petrol, salt, wheat, kerosene and clothes. This first report did not suggest or indicate the level of the intrusion that had taken place. It did suggest however that if an alternate road connection from the Indian side of the border (with Pakistan) was not urgently put in place, Jammu & Kashmir, particularly the valley could be in serious trouble. The first report that the so imagined tribal invasion was actually a full fledged well armed invasion came out on 18 October. ‘The situation on the Pakistan Kashmir border appears to be quite serious. We are told that people in thousands from Pakistan armed with modern weaponry have raided Poonch. . . .’28 From 19 October onwards papers began to carry detailed reports of how armed men had assembled in large numbers equipped with



he J ammu ‘T BE C LIEnvasion A R , K A S H Mof IR W I L L VOT& E FKOashmir R I N D I A’

79

modern including heavy weapons and even artillery along key points on the border.29 In the first stage over 500 lorries were reportedly used to cross the border into Kashmir.30 This report also drew attention to how Radio Pakistan had launched a devoted propaganda channel in support of the invasion. One of the key elements of the Pakistan propaganda was that the people of Poonch had risen in revolt against Maharaja Hari Singh and the invasion was infact an ‘in house’ rebellion in Kashmir. Several studies have supported this view. In sharp contrast are views that suggest that the crisis in Poonch was the result of the joint effort of leaders of the Indian National Congress and the National Conference.31 Another study suggests: ‘. . . it must be concluded that events in Jammu & Kashmir between March and October 1947 unfolded as they did because Gandhi, Nehru, Sheikh Abdullah and Mountbatten acted in tandem and unity of purpose. . . .’32 On 21 October (1947) Prime Minister Nehru wrote a long letter (Secret/Personal) to the Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir Mehar Chand Mahajan. This letter is extremely important for several reasons. For example even as the newspapers had already drawn attention to the scale of the invasion Prime Minister Nehru is still not as it appears from the letter fully aware. But more important is that in the 9th paragraph, Nehru is infact advising Mahajan to delay the accession of the state to the Union. In common discourse as we know the blame for this delay has usually been passed on to Maharaja Hari Singh. The full text of this letter places things in clearer perspective also with regard to Pakistan’s internal political condition: . . . I have written to you separately in answer to your letter. We are making arrangements to send salt and some other necessaries to Kashmir very soon and to bring back from Kashmir some of the special article that Kashmir produces for sale in India. 2. I am writing to you this second letter however, to repeat what I have already told you. You will no doubt realize that the future of Kashmir is of the most urgent importance to us. For me it is both a personal and a public matter. It would be a tragedy, so far as I am concerned, if Kashmir went to Pakistan. That, I am sure, would ruin it for a considerable time. 3. Pakistan are terribly anxious to get Kashmir and I can well understand their anxiety. They are already a tottering State. They look to Kashmir for

80

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

a means of recovering. They intend to raise capital in America on the strength of Kashmir by giving special privileges, leases etc. for development there to Americans. All their present policy is to get help from America. I do not think that even the accession of Kashmir will give much stability to Pakistan. But it will certainly mean the over-running of Kashmir by adventurers and others. No Kashmiri can welcome this prospect. 4. Because of this urgent need of Pakistan to get Kashmir’s accession to them, they are straining every nerve to that end. Everything else, like the Junagadh affair, is an accessory to this end. I am given to understand that the top-ranking leaders of Pakistan are continually approaching the Kashmir National Conference leaders and making every kind of promise to them. They apologise to them for their past behaviour and promise them something approaching independence if only they will agree to Kashmir acceding to Pakistan. They are even prepared to give the right of accession. You can understand how such offers might create an impression on some people’s minds. Fortunately, however, Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues are bitter against Pakistan and want to keep away from them at all costs. 5. At the same time they are in a quandary. At any time, and more particularly at the present juncture, it is impossible for them to rouse their own people unless they can get them to defend their own freedom. Once they have the sensation of freedom, they will also have the necessary urge to defend it. Otherwise at most they will be passive spectators of tragedy. 6. It is clear that the only proper solution of the Kashmir problem today lies in the fullest cooperation between the Maharaja and the people of Kashmir as represented by the National Conference. That cooperation can only come when the people feel that they are more or less running the show. 7. That is why I suggested to you the urgency of taking some step like the formation of a Provisional Government. Sheikh Abdullah, who is obviously the most popular person in Kashmir, might be asked to form such a Government. In law there need be no major change and the Maharaja’s powers would, therefore, continue. But in practice the burden would fall on the new Interim Government. There should also be an announcement of fresh elections in the near future to the Assembly. The date need not be fixed just yet. This will prove to the people that the State authorities mean business. 8. Although we have not specifically said that there should be a plebiscite or referendum in Kashmir, we have accepted a policy in regard to States which necessarily leads to a referendum where there is a dispute. We cannot, therefore, object to it. The best way is to have an ordinary election to the State Assembly at a suitable time. Long before this there should be the new



J ammu ‘T B Ehe C LIEnvasion A R , K A S H Mof IR W I L L VOT& E FKOashmir R I N D I A’

81

Interim Government in power only then will a change come over the Kashmir scene and the people will develop some enthusiasm. 9. In view of all the circumstances I feel it will probably be undesirable to make any declaration of adhesion to the Indian Union at this stage. This should come later when a popular Interim Government is functioning. I need not tell you about the urgency of the situation and the dangers inherent it it. 10. May I suggest to you to get the landing ground for aeroplanes prepared for winter use ? This is important so that rapid communication might be kept up.33

This letter also points out that Prime Minister Nehru has foreseen the urgent need of keeping Srinagar airport open during winter. Nehru also refered to the plebiscite and ofcourse the importance of Abdullah. A few days later Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession. There are two divergent views with which one can read Nehrus advise to Mahajan to delay (if he can) the signing of the Instrument of Accession by Maharaja Hari Singh. Abdullah as Nehru took him was a man of the masses and carried the potential of swinging public opinion in India’s favour. If this could happen the merger would carry weight and credibility. Such a possibility was a natural Nehru idea – idealistic democratic and appealing to the world powers. On the other hand is the date of the letter 21 October 1947. Thousands of Pakistan supported mercenaries equipped with all kinds arsenal had gathered on the borders – the first reports of the invasion were already in. As Nehru himself would later admit even a day’s delay would have resulted in disastrous consequences. By the time Maharaja Hari Singh signed the document, the invasion of Kashmir had assumed war like dimensions. Sadly whatever the Prime Minister’s intentions the world would believe that the Maharaja had acted under fear and duress. Nehru received the first detail report of the invasion through R.L. Batra the Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu Kashmir. It was reported that Batra explained to the Prime Minister the true nature of the invasion, in particular the crossing of the Krishanganga bridge by over 2,000 men and the subsequent looting and burning down of Muzzafarabad.34 An arial survey of the town gave a clear picture of how the invading force had ruthlessly destroyed the town.35

82

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

KAK DISMISSED: NEHRU-MOUNTBATTEN COME OUT IN SUPPORT

Several reports described at length the nature of the invasion and the animal like behaviour of the regimented invaders. But before we look into these reports a reference needs to be made to some other reports that draw attention to the government of India’s intelligence network failure. ‘Disastrous delays and fatal follies’ was a big headline given by The Tribune. 36 The report noted how Maharaja Hari Singh had been deceived and kept in the dark by a group of conspirators including his Prime Minister, Ramchandra Kak. So much so that the man incharge of the Armoury was infact a Muslim League and Pakistan sympathizer. Important information and details had been regularly conveyed to the Pakistan authorities. The report was extremely critical of the government of India, charging it with sleeping over secret intelligence inputs. It was openly discussed in the region as to how there was virtually no communication link or even a proper road network that was linked to India. No one had bothered to ensure adequate fuel dumps for emergency movement or even items of daily need. Some British officials, the report said were the key planners of Pakistan’s invasion and the entire operation. They were obviously keen to keep the region out of India. As the report put it: ‘. . . The Indian Union’s and Kashmir government’s disastrous delays and fatal follies have practically ensured Pakistan’s success if it (Pakistan) does still not succeed we shall say God is Great. . . .’37 Several views have been around for decades with regard to why the Maharaja’s forces did not resist the invasion in the initial days. One version of recent origin attributed to Ramchandra Kak, the man who was removed as Prime Minister on 11 August 1947, is that following his dismissal (Kak’s) the entire administration had collapsed. Among those who were removed within a few days of each other were the Chief Secretary, Inspector General of Police, the Governor of Kashmir and even the head of the Kashmir army. 38 This version also suggests that most of the Muslims in the Maharaja’s forces had joined the raiders.39 Several studies and even some contemporary press reports have noted that Kak was one of the key players who tried to push things



J ammu ‘TBhe E C LI Envasion A R , K A S H Mof IR W I L L VOT& E FKOashmir R I N D I A’

83

in Pakistan’s favour. A few days before Sheikh Abdullah was released (September 1947) from prison, Maharaja Hari Singh had ordered the house arrest of Kak. What is interesting in these sequence of events is that as Kak’s detention continued it was Lord Mountbatten who first raised the issue of Kak’s release. Nehru’s letter to Mountbatten gives reasons for the detention: You will remember writing to me about Kak who used to be the Prime Minister of Kashmir. A little before Sheikh Abdullah’s release from prison, the Maharaja placed Kak under house arrest because a number of charges had been brought against him. This house arrest was continued by the State Government after Sheikh Abdullah’s release and till recently when he was taken away from his house and put under closer confinement in a part of the Cantonment buildings in Srinagar. He is kept there now and I understand that he is living in comfort. . . . . . . I asked Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. about him and gave him your message. Bakshi told me that they have had no desire to proceed against him unnecessarily but certain recent events had forced their hands. They had information that roundabout 12 of February last a large scale attack was being planned on all fronts in Jammu and Kashmir State by the invaders; it had also been arranged that local uprisings should be coordinated with this attack. Kak was found to be connected with these intrigues in Srinagar itself and many agents of Pakistan and the raiders used to visit him daily in this connection. When this evidence came before the State authorities they decided to nip the trouble in the bud and took some action accordingly. Apart from this the action was to prevent Kak from communicating with these agents who had infiltrated into Srinagar. It was, therefore, considered safer to place him under close arrest. A brother of Kak’s who is an advocate in Srinagar was also involved in these intrigues. . . .40

Kak continued to be in detention for most of 1948 even as pressure increased on Nehru for his release. Besides Mountbatten, Sir Stafford Cripps and even C. Rajagopalachari (then Governor-General of India) wrote to Nehru for his release.41 Nehru wrote several letters to Abdullah and Maharaja Hari Singh in favour of Kak in the following days. Most of these were marked ‘Secret’: My dear Sheikh Abdullah, You will remember my speaking to you about Mrs. Margaret Kak. Since then, I understand that Kak has been sentenced on one of the charges preferred against him. Presumably there are some other charges. . . .

84

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

. . . When in London, I received several letters from her. Lord and Lady Mountbatten also spoke to me about her on several occasions. Raja ji has now written to me about her and I enclose his letter to you. . . . . . . I do feel that in the circumstances, it would rebound to the credit of the Kashmir Government to allow Kak to leave Kashmir. He may be asked to give an undertaking that he will not seek to return to Kashmir without the express permission of the Government. This will protect your interests substantially and it will show to the world that you are not interested in just punishing him. Otherwise, this matter will drag on to be a source of irritation. . . . . . . As I told you, my difficulty has been that the charges against him are of a trivial kind which do not impress people much. His real sins were much more serious. To sentence him after long trial on a small issue makes people think that he was blameless in regard to the really serious charges brought against him. . . . . . . I hope, therefore, that you and your Government will take the view I have suggested about and save yourself trouble in future. . . .42

Nehru also wrote to Hari Singh on 17 November 1948: . . . I wrote to Sheikh Abdullah suggesting that R.C. Kak might be released on any suitable condition if necessary. He might be, for instance, be allowed to go outside Kashmir on condition that he did not come back without the permission of the Government and that he did not take part in any propaganda against the Government. . . . . . . I have just heard from Sheikh Abdullah that his Cabinet have accepted my advice and that he has addressed you on this subject. I hope you will give your approval. . . .43

As things were not moving fast enough for Nehru’s liking Nehru again wrote to Hari Singh, on 21 November 1948. The force behind the whole exercise appears to have been Mrs. Kak, who was in constant touch with Mountbatten and even Stafford Cripps:44 . . . I returned from Srinagar this evening. While there, I discussed with Sheikh Abdullah and his Cabinet the case of R.C. Kak. I was informed that they had not yet had your reply to the reference they had made suggesting release on certain conditions. I trust that you will send your reply soon approving of their recommendation. . . . . . . My own view is, which I communicated to the members of the Cabinet there, that it will be desirable for Mr. Kak to be allowed to leave Kashmir and not to return to the State without the State Government’s express



TEhe ‘B C L IEnvasion A R , K A S H Mof I R WJ ammu I L L VOT & E FK Oashmir R I N D I A’

85

permission. Probably this will be accepted by them. I do not think, however, that any mention of this need to be made at this stage by you. . . .45 FIRST HAND REPORTS ON PAKISTAN’S INVOLVEMENT

A report somewhat on similar lines that appeared a few weeks after the invaders had been checked and expelled gave a detailed account of how the invasion was planned and fully supported by the Pakistan government and its military establishment. This infact was a long article by K.R. Palta. Palta had earlier been with the Indian National Army.46 Initially he said an effort was made by Pakistan to influence the Kashmir masses through a propaganda blitz. But when it was realized that this was not having the desired impact a plan was drawn to invade Kashmir. The plan was organized in the North West Frontier Province under charge of one Khan Abdul Qayyam and was guided and monitored by some British officers. The Deputy Commissioners of Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Abbotabad were asked to arrange all civil supplies including uniforms. Palta also noted that the British advisors were keen for the invasion to be timed for December by when snow would have made the air strip in Srinagar unusable. The invasion had to be preponed because the plan was learnt to have been leaked. The report made the very important revelation that the Pakistan authorities had started to plan the forceful occupation of Kashmir from August (1947) itself. It also said that the British had infact suggested that small armed groups be pushed into Kashmir on a regular and routine basis. The main body of invaders were to be sent in only at the opportune time. The main invasion comprised of wild ferocious tribals. They were properly equipped and were given a few rupees each. Once all this was in place troops from the regular frontier force and other Regiments of Pakistan were given leave to take command of these men. Many of these regulars were ex-INA men. Dewan Shiv Saran Lal, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan in a statement issued in Delhi (5 October 1947) gave details of how the invading force was collected on the border. The recruitment process for the force was organized by Sheikh Mehboob Ali the political agent of Malkand. This report also points out how the

86

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

followers of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, had tried to persuade their fellow tribals not to join the invading force. When it was decided to prepone the attack there was pressure on the Deputy Commissioner to expedite the supplies. Uniforms were stitched at the Gobind Girls High School and the trained men were housed in several buildings in Hazara including the Arya Girls High School. Hundreds of lorries were lined up to transport the men into Kashmir. And it was common talk among these men that they would celebrate Id in Srinagar. Interestingly the report also states that a large number of the Maharaja’s troops had been bribed to let the invaders into Kashmir without resistance. What is surprising is that officials in the Kashmir administration appear to have been well informed through ‘unofficial sources’ of the impending invasion and yet they let things go unchecked. Khan Yahya Jan, an important leader of the Frontier province was reported to have met Maharaja Hari Singh and informed him of the plans that had been made to invade the state. A very important feature of Palta’s long article is that it clearly establishes that if the governments in Srinagar and New Delhi had been even routinely observant and careful the invasion of October 1947 may never have materialized or at least would not have led to such extensive loss of life and property. Palta also noted that many Muslim families that were settled on the route of the invasion were advised by people from across the border to move out. Likewise even Europeans were evacuated in an organized manner to leave the area. So much so that vehicles were especially sent for the purpose. One John Bull, was the one who organized the evacuation of the Europeans. Important Muslim families whose children were studying in schools in Srinagar too were taken away well in time. Palta also noted that one reason for the government to have overlooked all the vital information that it had received was that Maharaja Hari Singh was convinced that Pakistan would not do anything to cause harm to him.47 Palta’s article as such explained at length how Pakistan had planned the invasion. However some reports also gave another version. Soon after the actual invasion had begun there was mention for example of how Pakistan had sponsored and supported the plan mainly to



‘B C L IEnvasion A R , K A S H Mof I R WJ ammu I L L VOT & E FK Oashmir R I N D I A’ TEhe

87

divert attention from its growing internal problems. The invasion the report said was expected to rally support for the government: . . . raids were the outcome of internal complications which Pakistan was unable to solve . . . it was done to divert attention and to justify the establishment of Pakistan . . . the invasion was launched to avoid pessimism in people and to retain their enthusiasm and to divert attention from its own class war that had broken out. . . .48

A note has earlier been made of how several British officials and other Europeans had been actively involved in planning the invasion. A couple of years later a very detailed report issued by the government of India substantiated these early reports: . . . It goes without saying that the British government was aware of the large scale preparations going on in Pakistan for an invasion of Kashmir . . . Sir George Cunningham had written about it to Sir R. Lockhart. . . . About two weeks before the raids most Englishmen were evacuated from Kashmir by the British High Commissioner. . . .49

Perhaps the most comprehensive review of Pakistan’s actual involvement in the planning and execution of the invasion of Kashmir was made by Michael Brecher in 1953.50 Initially Brecher notes: ‘. . . the question of Pakistan’s role in the initial invasion remained un-clarified.’ He suggests that Pakistan ‘benefitted from the benefit of doubt’ and also the argument that Pakistan’s leaders were fully aware that the consequences of their complicity in the invasion could prove favourable for India and disastrous for Pakistan. However eye witness accounts gradually emerged and several reports were carried even in papers and journals that were not friendly to India. Brecher quotes a report of the News Chronicle: ‘. . . there is evidence that the expedition (invasion) had strong support and is being conducted with tactical skill. . . .’51 Brecher was probably the first Western scholar who contributed a major study on the developments in Kashmir. For one, the study as earlier noted leaves little about with regard to Pakistan’s involvement. Attention is drawn once again to Brecher’s point of view because he is among the first Western scholars to have suggested that for Pakistan the acquisition of Kashmir was infact a matter of faith. He quotes a statement of Sheikh Abdullah to make his point. Kashmir’s staying

88

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

out of Pakistan he too says exposed the fallacy of the two nation theory which was the very basis of the partition plan.52 Pakistan had come into being on the belief that Hindus and Muslims were ‘two nations’ and needed to live separately. While India as a whole paid a huge price for partition, Punjab and Bengal had shouldered a major part of the pain. There are also other reports that have explained and testified the extent of Pakistan’s involvement in the invasion. Moorehead noted in the London Observer: ‘. . . everywhere recruitment is going on not only in the tribal territory but in Pakistan itself. . . .’53 Kingsley Martin, editor of New Statesman & Nation noted: ‘. . . nor can there be any question that encouragement and aid have been given by Pakistan to the invaders. . . .’54 Yet another report on Pakistan’s direct involvement was by an American soldier Russel K. Height, who himself was a part of the invasion army. In an interview with Robert Trumbell of The New York Times Russel Height mentioned how petrol and supplies were arranged and camps were organized by Pakistani officers. As for ammunition he said it was completely supplied by the Pakistan army.55 The force that invaded Kashmir was thus a mixture of tribals, released prisoners, demobilized troops, regular troops and officers, some supposedly on leave.56 Several papers in India also carried stories clearly showing Pakistan’s direct involvement.57 It is interesting to note how the role of some important people in Pakistan who tried to influence events in Kashmir has actually been overlooked by later studies devoted to Jammu & Kashmir. We have virtually nothing on how an organized attempt was made to influence public opinion well before the raiders entered the valley or infact even before India had been partitioned. The Tribune had reported as early as in July (1947) that Dr. Malik Hayat Khan, Principal, Islamia College, Lahore had visited Kashmir and that thereafter a large number of his students were regularly entering the valley and trying to influence the peasantry in favour of merging with Pakistan. They had made Pahalgam as their base camp. These students were known to spread out into the villages to build public opinion against India.58 A letter written from Lahore to someone in Jullundur (Jalandhar)



A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir T he I nvasion

89

mentioned how Pakistan had released prisoners from its jails to join the invading forces.59 This perhaps also explains the animal like manner in which the invading force behaved in Kashmir. Hans Raj Khanna an advocate in Amirstar wrote to The Tribune drawing attention to programmes on Pakistan Radio that were devoted specially towards people in Kashmir. These programmes focused on inciting people against India and to join the invaders.60 Another report pointed out how students from Lahore were given leave and vacations to go to Kashmir and mobilize opinion in favour of Pakistan.61 It was common talk in the valley that the invasion was infact planned only after Pakistan realized that its other efforts to influence opinion in Kashmir had not borne any fruit.62 It was this failure to organize the common Kashmiri in its favour that led the Pakistan authorities to introduce the Muslim League National Guard into Kashmir. Alongside the League’s National Guard, demobilized army men were also sent into Kashmir. Lahore witnessed daily protest marches in which the participants carried placards – ‘we must conquer Kashmir’.63 On the Indian side as it became clear that Pakistan had engaged its militant organizations like the Muslim League National Guard there was a demand to resist the organized Pakistan exercise by enlisting support of ‘organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Akali Dal.64 There was even a demand to enlist in this proposed force for defending Kashmir the thousands of young men who had lost everything in the partition riots. These were homeless youth roaming round the Punjab or passing time in the Refugee Camps. When India later took the matter to the United Nations, Pakistan’s representatives went to great lengths to prove that they had nothing to do with the invasion. Interestingly many years later Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan when speaking in Jakarta (7 December 1960) had this to say: ‘. . . where Muslims were fighting for freedom naturally we in Pakistan went to their help. . . .’65 Mahatma Gandhi commented on the invasion for the first time on 2 November 1947. He said it was now clear that Pakistan was involved in the invasion. Interestingly he also appealed to the Islamic world to understand India’s point of view and lend it support.66 The following day Gandhi again commented on the invasion in the post

90

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

prayer statement. He said he was sad to learn that many former Indian National Army personnel were playing a frontal role in the invasion.67 Capt. Rashid Ahmad, Khurshid Anwar, Capt. Azam and Maj. Aslam were some of the better known INA men who were reported to have been actively involved.68 Mohammed Ali Jinnah who was seriously unwell at the time was in Lahore on 30 October 1947 to address the Convocation of Punjab University. This was his first public appearance after the formation of Pakistan. It is interesting to note that even as Jinnah appeared worried, he did not make any mention of the ongoing invasion of Kashmir where developments had assumed war like dimensions by the end of October and were attracting world wide attention.69 V.K. Krishna Menon, India’s High Commissioner in London issued India’s first official response (9 November 1947). He noted that the events in Kashmir were not ‘raids’ but a full fledged invasion that was sponsored and supported by Pakistan. Incidentally he also said that: ‘. . . if the situation requires we will welcome plebiscite by the United Nations. . . .’70 Menon’s reference to the plebiscite was naturally with approval of Prime Minister Nehru. This reference to the possibility of a plebiscite from an important international platform went on in the course of time to add several new dimensions to the conflict. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s early reaction to the actual invasion was somewhat guarded: ‘. . . Is Pakistan so weak so as to prevent armies from crossing its territory to attack another country . . . or is it willing that this should happen. . . .’71 The Prime Minister’s reaction is obviously surprising because by now virtually every report coming out of Kashmir was clearly establishing the military like nature of the operation, particularly the kind of arms, heavy artillery, vehicles, etc., that were being used.72 These reports were later confirmed. As the invasion was checked and the Indian forces got the upper hand, a large number of arrested men gave extensive details that left little doubt as to how the whole campaign had been managed by Pakistan. One of the arrested was Kudrat Shah who belonged to the 48 Transport Company of the Pakistan Army. Another similar case is that of Abdul Haq who was in service policeman.73 A long list of such names was widely known at the time. A small booklet Invasion of Kashmir has given extensive detail of the transport vehicles that



T he I nvasion A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir

91

were organized for the invasion by officials in Pakistan. We even have registration details of some buses and trucks. For example truck No. FPH 209 was owned by M.Shaikh Transport of Abbotabad. A large number of vehicles owned by government contractors were confiscated and put into the operation. 74 The involvement of the Pakistan military establishment stood well established within a few days of the starting of the invasion. Several operational measures and moves adopted by the invaders were of well trained military men. For example Pakistan’s intelligence had begun to relay misleading signals to disrupt the Indian Air Force sorties.75 INVADERS WERE INHUMANLY VIOLENT

On 31 October 1947 a spokesman of India’s Ministry of Defence released a report detailing the operation led by Lt. Col. D.N. Rai.76 The Fauji Akhbar gave a full picture of the heroic scene: . . . by now the enemy was already at Baramula, the strategic bottleneck which opens into the Srinagar valley. Once the invaders were allowed to enter and fanout into the Srinagar valley. Once the invaders were allowed to enter and fanout into the Srinagar plain the game was up . . . estimated at about 2000 to 5000 (invaders) at Baramulla with his (Col. Rai’s) woefully inadequate force he had to decide to give immediate battle or wait till reinforcements arrived. If he had taken the latter course it might have proved too late and invaders might have reached Srinagar. He choose the former and crashed into the invaders column at Baramula with one company leaving a second in his rear and a third to guard the air field . . . at the end the invaders fled in utter disorder leaving 500 dead on the field . . . on 8 November Baramula the key to Srinagar was recaptured and the security was underwritten. . . .77

Col. Rai gave his life in this operation. Like Muzzafarabad, Baramulla too was virtually burnt down and looted. The property destroyed and burnt in the 13 days that the invaders had occupied Baramulla included – 3 temples, 2 hospitals, 400 houses, 1 college and 4 schools. In addition another over 1000 homes were looted. No shop or commercial establishment was spared.78 One of the most gruesome incidents of the invasion was also reported from Baramulla. A retired British officer, Lt. Col. Dykes, his wife and children were killed

92

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

brutally. Several children of the Convent where they were staying were also abducted or killed.79 Prime Minister Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah visited Baramulla on 12 November 1947. Some women met Nehru and told him of how the retreating Pakistan invaders had pulled even the ear rings of women by ripping their ears and of the killings, rapes and violence. Nehru reacted by saying: ‘. . . You have had a taste of what Pakistan means. . . .’80 Such was the nature of violence indulged in by the tribals in Baramulla that even some volunteers of the Muslims League National Guard are reported to have resigned in disgust.81 Prime Minister Nehru spoke at length in Parliament on the invasion on 25 November 1947. He explained how Pakistani’s involvement was established.82 This statement of the Prime Minister in Parliament is important from another point of view as well. This was infact one of the rare times when he differed with the Viceroy in his reading of a situation. Soon after hearing of the invasion Mountbatten had written to Sardar Patel: . . . Fortunately the tribesmen are presumably out for loot and since the valley has a very small proportion of non-Muslims they are bound to loot and massacare their own co-religionists whilst the forces of India support Sheikh Abdullah against them. This I feel will gain us a political advantage. . . . There was no indication anywhere of Pakistan Army officers taking part . . . I am sending a copy of this to the Prime Minister. . . .83

It is obvious that the Viceroy had either been misinformed or consciously chose to divert attention away from the true nature of the invasion. One could go a step further and even question as to was it possible for the Viceroy to have not known of the direct involvement of the Pakistan government in the invasion keeping in mind that the Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army was a British officer at the time of the invasion. In retrospect the question of Pakistan’s involvement in the invasion appears little more than academic. The fact is that even before the actual partition of India, when it was not even clear as to the stand that the rulers of the Princely states would take, influential people in what later became Pakistan, had already built a network of people in support of Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir. A note has earlier been



A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir T he I nvasion

93

made of how Dr. Malik Hayat Khan, Principal of Islamia College Lahore, had visited Kashmir in early July (1947).84 Extensive literature has been available ever since the crisis broke out – the key question has always been – what if India had not taken up the task to expel the invaders, or perhaps delayed the intervention? How did the local populace react to the air landing of Indian troops in Srinagar and the active role of the Air Force in particular. Surprisingly very little attention has been given to the first and spontaneous reactions and views to these early developments. Likewise and quite surprisingly the brutal and violent nature of the so called ‘tribal invaders’ too has drawn little attention. This is surprising because virtually every contemporary report and opinion draws attention to the animal like behaviour of the invaders and to the feeling of widespread relief that was felt when the Indian forces had landed in Srinagar. INDIAN ARMY WELCOMED AS BACHAO FAUJ (SAVIOUR)

The Statesman was perhaps the first to give a detailed report drawing attention to how the invading force had moved around in a planned and organized manner. It further pointed out that if India had delayed its intervention by a couple of days, Srinagar could have been lost to India.85 One example of being well trained and guided was the fact that the first action of the invading force was to capture the power plant that supplied power to Srinagar.86 The result was a complete blackout in Srinagar for several weeks. The valley had been completely cut off – phone lines were cut, the rail and road connection through Sialkot was cut. The result was a severe shortage of virtually all essential commodities. When the issue was raised with Pakistan its authorities responded by saying that even if the road and rail connections were in order there were no supplies that could be spared, ‘because the Refugees that had entered Pakistan were to be looked after.’87 The city of Srinagar was without power for weeks. There was just one generator that supplied power to the palace, the Cabinet room and the house of Sheikh Abdullah.88 The Tribune like the Statesman spared a lot of its very limited space

94

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

for the unfolding crisis. It gave a detailed report of how Indian forces landed on the air strip in Srinagar and rushed straight into action.89 Interestingly the Indian troops came to be known among the local Kashmiris as Bachao Fauj or ‘saviour army’. Its headquarter in Srinagar was in the Palidium Cinema in the heart of the city.90 What is also important to understand with regard to the true nature of the invading force is that they appeared to have been directed to spread fear among the minorities. Several reports indicated that Hindus and Sikhs were specially targetted. The number of such reports were far in excess to those that said that they attacked and looted the majority community with equal brutality and in doing so did not distinguish between the two. The invaders were mostly well trained and took the villages by surprise. Reports pointed out that the militia entered villages by creeping in with herds of cows knowing that troops would not open fire at the cows.91 The major centres that saw the Hindus and Sikhs being targeted were Muzzaffarabad, Baramulla, Mirpur and Poonch. A large number of women were reportedly killed by families to save their honour.92 One report placed the number of Sikhs killed or reported missing to over 25,000 out of a total population of about 66,000.93 The number of Hindus who were killed or reported missing was about 18,000.94 Pandit Keshav Bandhu, Minister for Refugees in the Emergency Cabinet (Kashmir) released figures of the Refugee Campus. He said that in the 36 camps in the state there were about 40,000 refugees. This included 10,000 Hindus and Sikhs each and over 20,000 Muslims.95 A large number of reports had appeared on the brutality of the invasion, but before we draw attention to some of them it is important to mention that even as the invaders may have sought out Sikhs and Hindus in particular they were in many cases equally brutal with Muslim families. Sheikh Abdullah infact even went on record saying that they violated mosques and ‘converted them into brothels. . . .’ He even invited observers from other Islamic countries to come and see for themselves what the invading forces had done.96 One could provide a long list of similar incidents but one report in particular requires a special mention. Jag Mohan and Ved Prakash



T he I nvasion A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir

95

were among about 12,000 Hindus and Sikhs who were made captive by the invaders after they had occupied Mirpur. These two men had somehow managed to escape. They reported that this particular unit of the invaders was led by a Captain wearing the badge of the 8 Punjab Regiment (Pakistan). The captive civilians were moved from Mirpur to Alibeg. By the time they reached only about 2,900 of the Hindus and Sikhs had survived. They also reported the abduction of a large number of women. They said that this particular unit of the invaders was known to kill people with hatchets to save on ammunition.97 One of the most detailed first hand, a virtual eye witness account of the manner in which the invaders went about their business was given by Krishna Mehta in a short book published in 1954. In July 1947 the Kashmir government had posted her husband Duni Chand Mehta as wazir-e-wazarat Muzzafarabad.98 Krishna Mehta’s family was the first actual witness to the crossing of the Krishanganga bridge. ‘. . . I cannot say for certain how many women and children that day gave up their lives in the river. . . .’99 She and her children were lucky to survive even though her husband and the 23 policeman assigned to him were all killed. It was only after Indian troops had taken charge of Baramulla that some calm returned to the area. What is of significance in her version is: . . . The local Muslims now openly sided with the Hindus when the tribesman (invaders) broke into Hindu homes with the intent to carry away the women . . . Islam seemed to be in two minds about the danger to its faith. Native notions of right and wrong happily blended with a keen practical sense and produced the right attitude in the local Muslims. . . .100

A very interesting reference Krishna Mehta makes is of the scenes that were witnessed once the news spread in the region that the Indian army was rapidly neutralizing the invaders and the leading Indian regiment was of the Sikhs: . . . The tribesman had lost morale and were beating a retreat. The officers of the Pakistan army were it was reported even beating the tribesman to force them to fight. Thousands fled the scene and as they passed through the villages they laid their hands on whatever they could find. Some of the raiders who were killed while retreating were found to have their pockets

96

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

stuffed with amputated human limbs. This was because perhaps they did not have the time to remove the rings and bangles so they cut of the arms and ankles of the women who had worn them. . . .101

The Pakistan officers who were part of the force spread wild rumours, Krishna Mehta notes, saying that the Sikh troops were specially searching for Muslim families. Most of the locals were worried that they would be held responsible for the killings. She explained to them that this was not how the Indian army operated. Kashmir the Basic Facts was a small document published by the Bombay Chronicle. It too described the horrors of the invasion: ‘. . . they committed savage atrocities against men women and children and reduced to scorched earth the towns and villages through which they passed. . . .’102 Birth Pangs of New Kashmir a small booklet of 49 pages by N.S. Phadka gives yet another first hand graphic account of the brutality of the invaders.103 He describes the beastly and monstrous lust – the rape of every women, even the aged and infirm. This is also perhaps the most graphic account of the last moments of the great Indian hero Brig. Rajender Singh, who resisted the invaders upto the end while defending the Mahora power house. This is also a very dependable account of how a regular Engineering unit of the Pakistan army rebuilt a diversionary bridge after Brig. Rajender Singh had blown up the main bridge to delay the advance of the invaders.104 This delay as it later turned out proved instrumental in saving Srinagar. As the invaders destroyed several bridges to stall the movement of the Indian troops, meetings of the Public Works Department were held in New Delhi to rebuild the roads and the bridges. A meeting was especially held to build the damaged bridges.105 A reference was earlier made of how the invaders had tied Maqbool Sherwani to a tree and shot him 14 times. Phadke gave details of how the brave Sherwani had tried to organize the local villagers to resist the invaders.106 Even Brig. Rajender Singh after being captured was shot in both legs and arms. His body was never found. An American poet Charles Wharton had visited Kashmir in 1948. He wrote a poem in honour and memory of Maqbool Sherwani and sent a copy to Nehru, who also forwarded it to Abdullah.



A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir T he I nvasion

THE BALLAD OF MIR MAQBOOL SHERWANI: A MODERN KASHMIRI BALLAD

India has had her heroes, Her knights and Martyrs of old; But the ancient fire burns deep in her, And a tale is still to be told. Mir Maqbool Sherwani Was a Muslim of Kashmir, A simple man of the merchant class, No chieftain of mark was here. The savage tribesmen of Pakistan Proclaimed it a holy war, With the shout of ‘Allah Akbar!’ That the Moguls had raised of yore. In a torrent they burst the border To ravage and to slay. “Down with the Unbelievers With their idols of stone and clay!” “Hark ye!” said Mir Sherwani, “We are all of the self-same breed. Shall we murder our fellow-townsmen For the sake of a severing creed ? “We have lived together as brothers, For such is the Indian way, That each should name however he will The power to whom we pray.” The plain folk of Baramula, Muslim and Hindu and Sikh, They heard from the lips of Sherwani What their own hearts bade him speak. They chose him for their leader And held against raid on raid. For they knew the Indian Army Was hurrying to their aid. But at last their fortune failed them, Their gallant leader was taken.

97

98

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Lashed to the post of an apple shop He stood, but with soul unshaken. ‘Confess yourself a traitor, Cry, “Hurrah for Pakistani!” His merciless captors ordered. They reckoned ill of their man. They nailed his hands with his arms outspread As the bitterest scorn they knew, To fetter a proud Kashmiri To the felon doom of a Jew. They pressed a crown of jagged tin Deep down on his bleeding brow. They had writ on it ‘Death to the renegade!’ What answer was left him now ? Through the bedlam din of the tumult His voice rang firm in the short, ‘Long live united India!’ Till the crack of the guns rang out. Next day, when the town was rescued. They laid his body to rest In the mosque of the Muslim faithful, And long will his name be blest. In the village of Baramula By Hindu, Muslim and Sikh, The man whose valor made good the words That their hearts had bidden him speak.107 The horrors of Phadke’s account aside it is another note made by him that merits even more attention and something that most of the studies on Kashmir have overlooked: . . . The raiders marched on destroying the beautiful city of Baramullah, Rampur, Pattan and Sangru  . . . (had reached) only three miles from Srinagar . . . the story took a sudden turn from this time onwards . . . the Indian army mercilessly chasing back the raiders over 70 miles . . . it is a story of relief and returning joy for the people of Kashmir. This thrilling story, coupled with thousands of smaller tales of the suffering and humiliation and death which raiders had written in indelible letters on dozens of towns as they had



A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir T he I nvasion

99

marched towards Srinagar is the key to understanding of the present psychology of Kashmir’s people and of the complete trust and loyalty which they cherish for India and also of the utter hatred which they entertain for Pakistan. . . .108 INVASION FORTIFIED HINDU-MUSLIM RELATIONS

Much has been written on how the timely landing of Indian troops saved Srinagar from falling into the hands of the invaders. Sheikh Abdullah too ofcourse later claimed considerable credit for the resistance and for organizing the defence of Srinagar. What is quite interesting with regard to the contemporary reports dealing with the defence of the valley and Srinagar in particular is that while the later versions have generally given much of the credit to Sheikh Abdullah for his role in galvanizing the people to fight the invasion, contemporary reports indicate the people had reacted spontaneously, Abdullah or no Abdullah. Infact contemporary reports clearly show that it was the Indian army that was seen as the saviour of Kashmir. Several reports have also detailed how Hindus and Muslims fought the invaders and supported the Army. Srinagar was saved only because the Army got full support from both the communities.109 As things settled down Prime Minister Nehru sent R.S. Patwardhan, a senior leader of the Socialist Party to Kashmir to report on his reading of the conditions. Patwardhan made an interesting observation: ‘. . . the raiders had proved a boom in disguise, a social revolution, Kashmiri Muslims who refrained from weapons and from joining the army have now lined up to join the Home Guard. . . .’110 He had also noted: ‘. . . gladdens one’s heart to see a state with 80% Muslims fighting against Pakistan and proclaiming faith in democratic secular India. . . .’111 Importantly the joint resistance put up by the Kashmiris, both Muslim and Hindu was also seen as a clear indication that mass opinion was with India. Sheikh Abdullah was in these early days among the major proponents of this view point.112 Another very important development that followed the expulsion of the invaders was the widely prevalent feeling of hostility towards the invaders and even Pakistan.

100

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Bandipur is about 50 kms. from Srinagar. Local villagers had managed to capture several of the fleeing raiders. They were then tried in an open court. The scene was described by an eye witness. ‘Villagers sat on the hill side as locally appointed (village) judges passed the judgement. The captured men were in hand cuffs. All seven were made to return what they had looted. One could not distinguish in this gathering between Hindu and a Muslim.’113 As we have already noted the purpose of the invasion as envisaged by military planners in Pakistan was to instill fear among those Kashmiri Muslims who were not willing to side with Pakistan and persuade those who were undecided. Obviously the Hindu-Muslim unity that emerged from the invasion proved a setback to Pakistan and derailed the plan of occupying Kashmir with the support of Muslims. Those who planned the invasion had obviously not understood the Kashmiri ethos. WAS KASHMIR DIFFERENT?

A very unique feature of Kashmir, something that applies as much today as it did in 1947, is not withstanding all the poverty, the problems and so on, life usually comes back to normal rather quickly and also that a part of the state may be having a serious problem at a short distance away, life would be virtually normal in another part. After all that had happened by the end of November, trade and commerce were well back to normal in Srinagar. One report noted that when an army unit stopped a group of children going from a village towards Baramulla, the teacher who was with them did not even know that a war like situation was on. 114 Another reason in rural Kashmir for such conditions is also probably the remoteness of the villages, the difficult access and so on. Was Kashmir different ? As we shall see, several senior public figures in India including Gandhi spoke on several occasions to emphasize that the issues in Kashmir were not to be seen as a Hindu-Muslim question. Perhaps the most important single result of the invasion that stood established was that even the people of Kashmir had refused to see the condition as one of differences between Hindus and Muslims.



A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir T he I nvasion

101

It is also important to understand that when Hindus and Muslims resisted the invasion shoulder to shoulder they were infact only upholding tradition. A note has also been made of how influential Pakistani leaders had throughout 1947, even before the emergence of Pakistan as a separate nation, organized networks in Kashmir to influence public opinion in its favour. Obviously this was done because there was apprehension in the ‘to be’ Pakistan that Kashmir might choose to stay away from Pakistan. Having said this, it is not to suggest that there were no incidents of clashes or tensions between the two communities. But more important than the differences is the nature of the differences. Two examples of the kind of issues that usually led to tension are typical of the times. To go back a few years. In August 1945 a communal clash took place in Anantnag. The incident was summarized by one M.K. Dar for being placed on official record: ‘. . . A Sadhu is reported to have walked down a hill side to ease himself (31 August 1945) some local Mohammadans who were around objected, telling the Sadhu that the place was a graveyard. Heated words were exchanged resulting in tension and stone pelting.’115 Several other Sadhus too joined in support of the offending Sadhu, the incident soon took a more serious turn. Interestingly this report also points out another interesting side to the incident. The ASP Anantnag in his report of the incident filed on 6 September 1945 noted: ‘. . . Pandits of the area gave a cold shoulder to the plea of the local Police to help resolve the dispute between the Sadhus and the Mohammadans, but they refused to do so – saying they had nothing to do with it. . . .’116 There are two key points that emerge from the incident. The first that it was not a Hindu-Muslim issue. If it had been so the Pandits of the area would not have taken the stand that they took with regard to the Sadhus. It is well known that Kashmir has for long attracted Sadhus from all over the country. One reason for this apart from Kashmir’s climate and natural beauty is the countless number of temples, places of worship and shrines devoted to Hindu Gods and Goddesses that have existed in the region from the earliest of times. The report also pointed out that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed himself reached Anantnag to resolve the issue but the Sadhus refused

102

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

to relent.117 I followed up the reports of the incident in the newspapers. I was not surprised to find that there were reports of widespread use of intoxicants among the Sadhus who travelled through Kashmir at the time and that occurrence of such incidents was not uncommon. The incident also perhaps reasserts the view that Hindus and Muslims have coexisted in Kashmir for ages and such incidents when they did occur usually remained localized and almost always found early resolution. This incident stretched a bit longer only because the Sadhus were only passing through the area and were not local residents. What is noteworthy in this report of the ASP, Anantnag is that the local Pandit residents declined to intervene on behalf of the Sadhus as the Sadhus had probably expected.118 One could perhaps also suggest that the Pandits were inclined to retain their cordial relations with their Muslim neighbours rather than take sides in support of mendicants who were just passing through. There was also the general impression that many among such Sadhus were rowdy elements who were addicted to intoxicants. On 29 August 1945, a Janmashtami procession was underway in Jammu. It started from Mandir Jeewan Jawala Sahi. As the procession reached Bhabrian bazaar some of the youth in the procession shouted Pakistan Murdabad, however, the procession passed off peacefully. Later when it reached the Ghas Mandi a small group of bystanders responded by shouting Pakistan Zindabad. Soon there were heated exchanges and something that comes naturally in Kashmir – stone pelting. Some miscreants also threw soda water bottles. The result was five Mohammadan shops were looted and damaged and likewise one shop owned by a Hindu.119 This small incident too was typical of the times. A group of miscreants, usually young men from both sides was all that was required to set the fuse on fire. But what is of more importance is that such incidents were in no way reflective of any undercurrent or hatred among the majority and minority communities. This needs an emphasis when we keep in mind what was happening in neighbouring Punjab. Rawalpindi which saw unprecedented violence in March 1947, in which Sikhs and Hindus were killed in large numbers, we must not forget is only a few hours drive from Srinagar. It must also be remembered that on the whole and by and large Kashmir, had kept itself remarkably aloof



T he I nvasion A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir

103

from all that happened in the Punjab through most of 1947. Kashmir saw violence and killing mostly after October (1947) that is following the invasion. It can be said that on the ground and among ordinary people there was on the whole a feeling of harmony and co-existence. This is some­ thing upon which virtually everyone who visited Kashmir in the spring and summer of 1947 has commented. This feeling continued, indeed was strengthened following the return of peace and the expulsion of the invaders from Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah came on to claim in the days that followed that it was he who was responsible for the return of peace and harmonious coexistence among Hindus and Muslims. Many like Prime Minister Nehru accepted this on face value. At the same time other leaders like Home Minister Patel, who were perhaps closer to reality and saw through the game had refused to give Abdullah the credit he sought with regard to the manner in which even ordinary people came out in support of resisting and repulsing the invaders. Most people oversighted religious belonging and joined hands because the invaders were looked upon as foreigners and were not welcome. There were only a few reports that refer to the invaders being seen as jihadis or co-religionists. Every report filed from the ground, to re-emphasize the point draws attention to the element of communal harmony even during the peak days of the invasion. I have not come across any important report that has shown the local Muslim community joining the invaders to cause harm to the local minority. On the other hand the number of reports that show the Muslims of Kashmir standing by the Hindu families even in remote villages that lay on the invasion’s route are large in number.120 What is also perhaps very important and of course interesting is that not only did the Kashmiri Muslims stand by their Hindu neighbours during the invasion but they came out openly in support of the Indian forces that had landed in the valley to expel the invasion.121 The significance of this reaction of the Muslim population must be seen in relation to the Kashmir region in the weeks after August (1947) when small groups were trying to generate a sentiment of separation based on religion. By the time that the mercenaries and

104

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Pakistani regular troops disguised as tribals entered the valley, an organized attempt was already being made to convince the Kashmiri Muslim that their future lay with Pakistan. Gandhi devoted his post prayer address of 30 December 1947 to the invaders of Kashmir:122 ‘. . . It is on the Kashmir soil that Islam and Hinduism are being weighed, if both pull their weight correctly and in the same direction the chief actors will cover themselves with glory. . . .’ What was significant in this statement was Gandhi’s view that Kashmir’s ruler was a Hindu and a vast majority of his subjects were Muslim. The invaders had called it a ‘holy war’ because they said they were seeking to free their Muslim brethren from Hindu misrule. There were no doubt a few aberrations. While most local Muslim families did their best to ensure that Hindus were protected from the invaders yet in some cases they did not resist the temptation of getting hold of household goods that were left behind by fleeing Hindu families. Soon after the Indian troops had taken control of the situation, the raiders retreated rapidly. But even while retreating they ransacked houses and looted whatever they could find. Krishna Mehta (to whom a reference has earlier been made) notes that a Maulvi offered to give shelter to her and her children. The Maulvi said that her family would be safer in his house as it was unlikely to be searched, being the house of a Maulvi. This proved correct in course of time. But when the Mehta family moved in to the Maulvi’s house they were surprised to note that some of the furniture that had been looted from their house was lying in the Maulvi’s house.123 This incident is mentioned only to give an idea of how things were at the ground. It cannot however be concluded that the invaders were more considerate with the Kashmiri Muslims. One difference, how­ ever, that was major was that Muslim women did not commonly face the same fate as the Hindu women. Reports of the time are filled not just by the nature of violence and fear that was created among the peace loving Kashmiris but also by the level of communal harmony and the expression of religious solidarity that came to be in place among all three major communities. What truly stands out in the unfolding of events was that in all villages



T he I nvasion A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir

105

and towns that were liberated from the control of the invaders there was unity and harmony among the communities. Another very interesting development picked up from the time that the raiders had been expelled and peace restored was the manner in which people exposed those that had helped the raiders. Many of the raiders were also captured. In many places there were reports that the local villagers formed their own courts and handed out punishments. We have already taken not of the village of Bandipur, for example about 50 km from Srinagar where seven such people were tried by a public gathering of all communities. Interestingly public opinion following the invasion was extremely anti-Pakistan. So much so it was commonly said that the proposed referendum should be held only after the invaders have been completely expelled,124 because it was well known that many of the raiders had stayed back and merged with the local population particularly in remote and shepherd communities. In many cases the local people with whom they merged were not even aware that such people were part of the invading tribals or were not residents of Kashmir. NOTES 1. N.S. Phadke, Birth Pangs of New Kashmir (Bombay, 1948), p. 15. 2. The Tribune, 22 January 1947. 3. Ibid., 28 March 1947. 4. Basta No. 147, Serial 3601, File PR 128-I/45 weekly report ending 3 Sep­ tember 1945, Jammu & Kashmir State Archives, Jammu. 5. The Tribune, 14 March 1947. 6. See Report of Tehsildar Baramullah having sold ‘atta’ (flour) through the black market reported by Daily Aftab, Basta No. 58, Serial No. 1488 PR 10 May 1958. 7. The Tribune, 6 April 1947. 8. Ibid., 21 March 1947. 9. Ibid., 28 June 1947. 10. There is no reference to the person who recorded this. See JN(SG), File I, MSS, NMML. 11. JN(SG), File 2, MSS, NMML, Leter of R.K. Karanjia, ed., Blitz to Jawaharlal Nehru, 15 January 1947.

106

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

12. Basta No. 95, File No. 148/57, No. 2323, Jammu & Kashmir State Archives, Jammu. 13. Jagan Nath Sahu, Behind the Iron Curtain in Kashmir (Delhi, 1952). 14. Kashmir Problem & Jammu Satyagraha (Bharatiya Jan Sangh, n.d.). 15. JN(SG), File 143-II, MSS, NMML, August 1952. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid., File 177, 25 April 1953. 18. The Tribune, 6 July 1947. 19. Knight, Where Three Empires Meet, p. 66. 20. Ibid., p.70. 21. Hori Lal Saxena, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and the Kashmir Muddle: Being a True Story of Kashmir and all that Happened Since 1931 (New Delhi, 1949), p. 66. 22. Statesman, 28 October 1947. 23. The Tribune, 27 May 1947. 24. Ibid., 3 August 1947. 25. Ibid., 4 August 1947. 26. Ibid., 7 August 1947. 27. The Collected Works of Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, vol. IV, extract from report of the sub-committee on the Kashmir problem, 1948. 28. The Tribune, 18 October 1947. 29. Ibid., 18 and 19 October 1947. 30. United Press Report, cited by The Tribune, 27 October 1947. 31. Rakesh Ankit, The Origins of the Kashmir Dispute and Pakistan (PSP Monograph no. 2, 2013, Jamia Millia, New Delhi). 32. Radha Rajan, Jammu & Kashmir Dilemma of Accession, p. 30. 33. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML. 34. Statesman, 26 October 1947. 35. The Tribune, 18 November 1947. 36. Ibid., 2 November 1947. 37. Ibid. 38. Radha Rajan, Jammu & Kashmir Dilemma of Accession, p. 69. 39. Ibid., p. 71. 40. JN(SG), File 7, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Mountbatten, 9 March 1948. 41. JN(SG), File 14, MSS, NMML, also JN(SG) 15-II. 42. JN(SG), File 14, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Abdullah, 28 October 1948. 43. Ibid., File 15-I, Nehru to Hari Singh, 17 November 1948. 44. JN(SG), File 15-II. 45. Ibid. 46. The Tribune, 1 December 1947. 47. Ibid. 48. The Tribune, 6 November 1947.



A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir T he I nvasion

107

49. People, 26 November 1950, cited by Rajbans Krishen, Kashmir and the Conspiracy Against Peace, p. 5. 50. Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (New York, 1953). 51. Ibid., p. 30 where he cites News Chronicle, London, 27 October 1947. 52. Ibid., p. 53. 53. Ibid., p. 30. 54. Ibid. 55. New York Times, 29 January 1948, cited, ibid., p. 31. 56. Also see ABC of the Kashmir Question (Information Services Govt. of India n.d.). 57. Times of India, 1 November 1947; Hindustan Times, 13 January 1948. 58. The Tribune, 25 July 1947. 59. Ibid., 10 December 1947. 60. Ibid., 6 January 1948. 61. Ibid., 10 December 1947. 62. Ibid., 29 December 1947. 63. Ibid., 5 December 1947. 64. Ibid., 10 December 1947. 65. Also see ABC of the Kashmir Question, p. 14. 66. Statesman, 3 November 1947. 67. The Tribune, 4 November 1947. 68. Ibid., 16 November 1947. 69. Statesman, 31 October 1947. 70. The Tribune, 10 November 1947. 71. Civil and Military Gazette, 4 November 1947. 72. For example Statesman, 31 October 1947; The Tribune, 2 November 1947. 73. The Tribune, 16 November 1947. 74. Invasion of Kashmir (Bombay, n.d., but probably 1949), p. 5. 75. The Tribune, 3 January 1947. Also M.C. Mahajan’s statement with regard to the Pakistan Radio’s propaganda, 29 October 1947. 76. The Tribune, 1 November 1947. 77. The Fauji Akhbar, 26 March 1948. 78. Ibid., 15 November 1947. 79. Ibid., 4 November 1947. 80. Statesman, 13 November 1947. 81. Ibid., 29 November 1947. 82. The Tribune, 14 December 1947. 83. Durga Das (ed.), Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. I: Mountbatten to Patel (Ahmadabad, 1971), pp. 68-9. 84. The Tribune, 25 July 1947. 85. Statesman, 29 October 1947. Also the Fauji Akhbar, 26 March 1948. 86. The Tribune, 28 October 1947. Also see Hindustan Times, 3 November

108

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

1947. In this report Nehru was quoted as saying that Srinagar was saved in the nick of time. 87. Ibid., 29 October 1947. 88. Ibid., 16 November 1947; 18 October 1947 and 29 October 1947. 89. Ibid., 31 October 1947. The Tribune after being dislocated from Lahore and having lost all its assets and reopened from Simla. In these days there was also a serious shortage of newsprit. 90. Ibid., 30 October 1947. 91. Ibid., 23 October 1947. 92. Ibid., 11 January 1948. 93. Also see statement of the Maharaja of Patiala in which he states that Sikhs were specially targeted. 94. Ibid. 95. Ibid., 20 January 1948. 96. Ibid., 18 November 1947. 97. Organizer, 1 January 1948. 98. Krishna Mehta, Chaos in Kashmir (Calcutta, 1954). 99. Ibid., p. 51. 100. Mehta, Chaos in Kashmir, p. 83. 101. Ibid., p. 85. 102. Kashmir the Basic Facts (Bombay Chronicle, n.d.) this was probably published in mid-1948. 50,000 copies were printed and circulated free of cost. 103. N.S. Phadke, Birth Pangs of New Kashmir. 104. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 105. The Tribune, 12 October 1947. 106. Ibid., 15 November 1947. 107. JN(SG), File 21-II, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Abdullah, 23 June 1949. 108. Phadke, Birth Pangs, p. 17. 109. The Tribune, 1 November 1947. This long report gives extensive detail of the resistance and the fight. 110. Ibid., 4 January 1948. 111. Ibid., 4 January 1948. 112. Ibid., 14 January 1948. 113. Ibid., 18 November 1947. 114. The Tribune, 31 October 1947. 115. Basta 147, S. No. 3601, File No. PR 128-I/45 Weekly Report ending 3 September 1945, Jammu & Kashmir State Archives, Jammu. 116. Ibid. 117. Ibid. 118. Ibid. 119. Basta 147, S. No. 3601, District Magistrate Report filed to Dy. Chief Secretary, 1 September 1945, Jammu & Kashmir State Archives, Jammu.



T he I nvasion A M M U of J ammu & K ashmir

109

120. For example see Statesman, 31 October 1947; The Tribune, 30 October 1947. 121. The Tribune, 30 October 1947. 122. Ibid., 31 December 1947. 123. Mehta, Chaos in Kashmir. 124. See The Tribune, 22 December 1947, 14 January 1948 and Civil & Military Gazette, 11 November 1947.

CHAPTER THREE

Nehru Puts Abdullah in Charge: Beginnings of the Political Whirlpool

I

n the previous chapter we have taken note of how mass public    opinion in Jammu & Kashmir was clearly anti-Pakistan. It has      also been pointed out that the attempt to divide people and build support for Pakistan on religious lines had not only failed but virtually backfired. It is only natural that the next question that arises and we should seek to understand is that inspite of such goodwill for India why did things begin to slip out of hand. For one it is certain and stands clearly established that mistakes were made, perhaps even repeatedly. To understand the broader political scene one could start with the issue of the partition of India itself. PARTITION OF INDIA ON THE BASIS OF RELIGION WAS A MISTAKE

India’s struggle for freedom from colonial rule was a long and arduous one. Men and women from all over, of varying backgrounds joined the struggle. Thousands of such people have gone unsung, unrecognized and unrecorded in the pages of mainstream history. As time passes questions are naturally being raised. Have we for example downsized and downplayed the consequences and the horrors of partition ? Was the partition of the country a fair price for freedom? Was not the exit of the British from India almost certain after the end of World War



N ehru P uts A bdullah A M M U in C harge AMMU

111

II? Why then did India hurry into accepting as a precondition the country’s partition and so willingly pay such a heavy price ? The list of the errors of judgments is obviously very easy to make in retrospect. But one thing is clearly evident and this is that even as the decision makers in New Delhi and London rushed ahead with the plan to partition India so as to create the new dominion of Pakistan, several field officers who understood the pulse of the people as was the case with Sir Evan Jenkins the Governor of Punjab held very different views. Many such officers, Jenkins in particular repeatedly warned that the Punjab was likely to witness unprecedented violence and bloodshed if the plan to partition it was rushed through.1 Every word that Jenkins had said, proved dead right. What appears a rather pleasant aberration in this chain of events is that Kashmir stood out for the manner in which it kept aloof from the violence in neighbouring Punjab. In Jammu & Kashmir whether the signing of the Instrument of Accession was a thoughtful decision or was unduly expedited and forced by the conditions that emerged from the invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 remains a part of our discourse. One of the several theories that have been around for many years is that of General Frank Messervy who was Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army from 15 August 1947 to February 1948. Even though there is virtually no other evidence to support what the General said, his observation on the issue however must draw attention even if only for the importance of the position he held. In an article, ‘Kashmir’ he said that the plan for the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India had already been finalized well before the invasion.2 EARLY MISCALCULATION AND MISJUDGEMENTS

A large amount of literature is available with regard to the unfolding of events, their sequence and the role of key players. We have already dealt with some such writings. Published about four decades after the unfolding of the crisis, Jagmohan’s version does not fit into the broader outline of the study, in terms of this study’s emphasis being on contemporary sources. But what makes it very important is that Jagmohan was also twice the Governor of Jammu & Kashmir, both in very troubled times:3

112

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

. . . The Maharaja was indecisive, Jinnah was impatient. Pandit Nehru was caught between the stark realities of the situation and his idealism. Sheikh Abdullah with streaks of megalomania and duplicity . . . was nursing secret ambitions to carve out a Sheikhdom for himself and his coterie. . . . Each one of them imagined different outlines of the plot and believed the drama would end the way he (they) desired . . . mistakes after mistakes were made . . . one miscalculation gave rise to another. And Kashmir soon found itself in the whirlpool of national and international controversy and conflict. . . .4

Let us now go back to 1947 and the weeks that followed the invasion. The Tribune carried a big front page report on 28 October 1947: ‘. . . our complacent political dreamers and conceited administrative bunglers have brought us to the brink of a precipice. We may any day be hurled down to sure destruction. . . .’ This report of The Tribune then went on to discuss several decisions that were at the time thought to be seriously wrong. Referring to the Junagadh issue and why India should not have raised it, it said:5 . . . Strangely enough it was forgotten that the Indian statement regarding Junagadh could be used by Pakistan in Kashmir . . . invaders have burnt down Muzaffarabad. Those who know the importance of these Kashmir towns will laugh at those who have put forward a list of miserable Junagadh villages as our gain. . . .6

On 2 January 1948 Nehru had addressed an important press conference on the issue. When a reporter asked how the case of Junagadh was different from Kashmir, Nehru was angry. He dismissed the question saying there was no parallel.7 The report further discussed a list of others issues and decisions that led to the emergence of the crisis. It said that immediately after the announcement of the plan to divide India was known, the government of India should have put troops in position. Above all it noted arrangements should have been made for physical connectivity in terms of roads, bridges and communication links. Adequate food and fuel supplies should have been arranged considering that Kashmir’s only link for such supplies was through what became Pakistan after 15 August, 1947.8 A couple of days later in another scathing report The Tribune said: ‘. . . when the Muslim League was gathering strength . . . when the storm was brewing under their very nose . . . they (Indian government)



N ehru P uts A bdullah A M M U in C harge AMMU

113

overnight arrived at the indicated understanding, had all this been done a few weeks earlier thousands of Hindu and Sikh lives and women would have been saved agony of being violated. . . .’9 The tribals and regulars of the Pakistan Army as we have seen had crossed into Kashmir by end of October, but the full dimensions of the invasion came to be known only later. Just at about the time that the invasion was getting underway Sheikh Abdullah had met Home Minister Sardar Patel. A report of the meeting quoted Abdullah in terms of what he had told Patel: ‘. . . Accession to one or the other (India or Pakistan) is not our immediate concern . . . our priority is attainment of responsible government . . . Kashmir can not decide immediately.’10 Almost seeking an excuse with regard to making any commitment he also said: ‘disturbances in other parts of the country have affected the Kashmiris. Their doubts and fears will have to be removed.’11 The Home Minister had already read Abdullah better than anyone else and knew that in the future Abdullah would increasingly play the Islamic card. Kashmir’s demography was the stage from where he continued to play his future politics. In a report carried on 2 November 1947, The Tribune reported on general opinions of ordinary Kashmiris. It noted how India had itself to blame for letting the matter drift and failing to forsee the situation that was likely to develop. Maharaja Hari Singh’s indecision was only a small element in the chain of events it said, a greater part of the responsibility lay in terms of the indifferent manner in which India had handled the crisis. By raising the Junagadh issue India only gave to Pakistan a chance to tell the world that India was adopting a double standard stand on Kashmir.12 It was common talk on the streets that all along, the Muslim League had spread a network of its sympathizers to push things in favour of Pakistan. India took no note of it:13 ‘To those who are heavily wrapped up in complacency and inter­ nationalism,’14 a report said, ‘there was need to realize that continued indifference would prove very dangerous’. WHY DID THE MAHARAJA DELAY ACCESSION

Jammu & Kashmir Dilemma of Accession is a recent addition in the existing discourse on Kashmir. It infact carries an interesting version of events that is said to have come from the private papers of Ramchandra

114

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Kak, who was not only the Maharaja’s Prime Minister but also till August 1947 his closest advisor. This version says that the Maharaja had no intention of acceding to either India or Pakistan. This view of the Maharaja was it said influenced by a ‘Godman’ Swami Santdev. It also says that in June 1947 the Rajas of Sirmur, Mandi and Jubbal were guests of Maharaja Hari Singh in Srinagar. Kak was said to have been present when Maharaja Hari Singh showed to his guests a document that indicated that he was thinking in terms of a federation. The next morning this book says Kak briefed the Maharaja of the impracticability of the whole idea. Santdev however had convinced the Maharaja of the idea and was able to retain the Maharaja’s confidence and Kak was soon replaced. 15 It is only natural that Maharaja Hari Singh has in most studies has been held responsible for a great part of the problem. His Prime Minister Ramchandra Kak is also said to have been responsible for much of what happened. The private papers of Kak suggest however that both the Maharaja and Kak were influenced into the stand they took because of the manner in which the Congress and Jawaharlal Nehru (not named) had ‘boosted’ Sheikh Abdullah (meaning against Hari Singh). This had been going on for the previous eight years.16 A detailed reference has earlier been made to an important letter by Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir Mehar Chand Mahajan in which (para 9) Nehru had advised Mahajan to ensure that no early decision was announced with regard to the State’s accession to India.17 It is obviously difficult to say whether this advice of Nehru had any influence on Hari Singh or not. But it has to be kept in mind when we assess Hari Singh’s role in the development. A general view that the problem in Kashmir was self created by India with prolonged indifference to the region also appears to have been widely prevalent at the time. The most common belief was that the national leadership that was handling Kashmir was out of touch with reality. In sum this actually meant that Prime Minister Nehru who was personally handling the affairs of Kashmir was not doing it effectively. Perhaps the best example of the common view that India’s policy on Kashmir was too casual and ‘soft’ can be seen in a statement issued by none other than the man who had resigned as President of the Indian National Congress. In the context of Kashmir Acharya



N ehru P uts A bdullah A M M U in C harge AMMU

115

Kriplani was quoted as having said: ‘If we do not take a firm stand and prepare against the menace we shall like Chamberlain’s England realize our folly. . . .’18 The Tribune also pointed out, how too much of idealism was letting the situation slip out of hand: ‘. . . Only those who live in the cloud and have not their feet on the ground can have any doubt. . . .’19 The Tribune which was covering developments at length had repeatedly reported that people wanted action against workers of the Muslim League and the small and scattered pockets of Pakistan sympathisers mainly located in Srinagar. Interestingly one report even noted that Pakistan was so confident of Kashmir’s future that it even planned to build a residence for Jinnah in Srinagar.20 A note has already been made of how Kashmir’s geo-strategic location had drawn the attention of several world powers to the unfolding of events in the region. But surprisingly this perception of the problem was not something that was limited to the press or higher levels of leadership infact it had become common talk. It was being discussed that Kashmir was being seen by powers like the United Kingdom and the United States as a frontier against the Soviets. This report of The Tribune warned or rather appealed to the Indian authorities to talk and act tough otherwise it would be too late.21 In sum therefore a combination of factors contributed no doubt to the overall creation of the problem. Yet it seemed obvious to most people that had timely action been taken with a practical and tough approach the problem would not have assumed the form it came to have. NEHRU PUTS SHEIKH ABDULLAH IN COMMAND

In a more general way the moment it became clear that India was being divided as a precursor to the coming of independence and that it was almost a precondition laid by the British to leave India an element of uncertainty had come to prevail in most Princely states that were located in potentially dividable locations. Jammu & Kashmir being a Princely state was however different in this sense from say the Punjab and Bengal on whose division rested the entire scheme that was to give birth to the new dominion of Pakistan. While Punjab

116

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

came to experience complete anarchy from about May 1947 onwards, things in Jammu & Kashmir were not so bad. The invasion in October however had changed all this to complete chaos, with no semblance of government remaining. The main result of the Pakistan supported invasion and the full scale hostilities between India and Pakistan that followed was the disintegration of the Maharaja’s rule. The invasion itself had impacted life in the state, having touched virtually everything of significance. Whether Maharaja Hari Singh would have signed the Instrument of Accession had the invasion not taken place or would have done so with more lapse of time is an issue that can be debated unendingly. As of now there are no documents that support either theory – that he singed under duress or did so on his own. If at all there is any element of evidence that relates to this issue, it suggests the Maharaja had made up his mind to merge with India. A note has already been made of the views of General Messervy in the matter. He was commander in Chief of Pakistan’s army from 15 August 1947 to February 1948. He had said that the accession by the Maharaja had already been planned well before the invasion. One fact that remains however is that Sheikh Abdullah was able to convert the crisis to a situation that greatly suited his own political vision of Kashmir. Kashmir was without government at its most critical time - the three days that lay between its accession to India and the handing over of government to the emergency administration of Abdullah on 31 October 1947.22 Nehru himself informed Abdullah of the decision to ‘hand over’ Jammu & Kashmir to him. The letter also broadly reflects on the prevailing conditions in the state: ‘troops have arrived in the nick . . . a day’s delay would have been fatal. . . .’ Nehru also wrote: Kashmir has formally acceded to the Indian Union and that the Maharaja is going to invite you to form an Interim Government after the Mysore pattern. In the emergency before us we cannot meticulously be careful about details or strict legal position. Till the raiders are driven out of Kashmir you or anyone else will have little chance of doing anything else except meet this menace. . . . . . . You need not take trouble to sit down and study carefully the Mysore arrangement. Generally-speaking it means that you form the Government including the present Prime Minister, Mahajan, who retains his title.



N ehru P uts A bdullah A M M U in C harge AMMU

117

Presumably you will be called the Chief Minister. All this is a little confusing in nomenclature and the functions might also be a little confusing to begin with. In theory Mahajan will be just one member of the Ministry with no special powers to over-ride the others. The Maharaja will in law retain all his powers, but in practice he should abide by the advice of his Ministry like a constitutional head. There are some matters which the Maharaja has stated he reserves for the present. We need not argue about these matters now. . . . I do not know what the next step of the Maharaja will be. If he wants to see you and you can spare the time to visit him, you might do so and present the names of your Ministry. If, however, you cannot leave Srinagar, then you should postpone your visit for the present. The defence of Srinagar and the valley is the first consideration. In any event the Maharaja should formally appoint you Chief Minister with power to act. You will function specially in the valley as you are there. When your Ministry is complete you will naturally meet all together and lay down generally policy to be pursued. This too should be largely confined to defence at present, other matters to be left over till the immediate peril is passed. . . . . . . The immediate need is, however, defence. It is clear that our troops have arrived there in the nick of time. One more day’s delay might have been fatal. If they could have gone two or three days earlier, it would have been much better. However we must be thankful for having got there just in time. I must say that the whole operation has been a remarkably fine achievement. We decided yesterday afternoon to send these troops by air this morning. Our resources are limited in planes. We mobilized them in the course of the evening and the night, and the troops went off early in the morning and some in the afternoon today. By the afternoon they were in action. This is a smart piece of work which shows very good organization. Tomorrow morning more troops will be flying over. This process will be continued the day after. . . . We are sending more and more rifles, sten guns etc., for arming the civil population. In this matter you will please consult Hiralal Atal and the Battalion Commander. You should choose able-bodied young men, Muslim, Hindu etc. to be armed in this way and form them in a kind of Home Guard. The duty of these persons should be to guard Srinagar and other towns in the valley, also the airport. Our troops will thus be relived for offensive operations. I hope you will impress upon all our people to act in a strictly disciplined way during this emergency. No looseness or weakness should be tolerated; nor should any destructive elements be allowed much scope. . . .

118

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

. . . The statement which you gave to Kachru has been sent to the press and will appear tomorrow. . . . . . . I have sent long accounts of developments in Kashmir to our Ambassadors and representatives abroad in London, Washington, New York, Moscow and Nanking. I propose to keep them fully informed as this is a matter of world concern. It is just conceivable that the question might be raised in the United Nations General Assembly. We have to be ready for that. . . . . . . I am sending Rs. 5000/- with Kachru. I shall send another 5000/- in two or three days with someone else. I do not want to send larger sums at the time. Presumably there will be no lack of funds for governmental purpose. This money is for non-governmental purposes. . . . . . . Kachru can remain there or come away as you desire. If he is useful to you, keep him, or send him back for a few days. He will be there as my secretary, that is this will be his official capacity in liaison with your Government. You can use him as such. . . .23

The arming of the workers of the National Conference and the giving of virtually unlimited powers to Abdullah were essentially decisions taken by Prime Minister Nehru. A day after appointing Abdullah, Nehru wrote to the Army Chief of General Staff: . . . In the Sitrep about Kashmir there is a reference to the desirability of arming the personnel of the National Conference. Brigadier Atal and 0/01 Sikh Officer Commanding I Sikh have recommend this. It is obvious that it is urgently necessary to form some kind of Home Guard there which should be armed. It is also clear from the reports that the only persons who can do it are the leaders of the National Conference. In terms of the settlement with the Maharaja of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah is to be in charge as Chief Minister and will form the Ministry. What steps have been taken so far in this matter is not clear. But in any event this is going to be done very soon. Meanwhile Sheikh Abdullah should be treated as such by our troops as there is no other authority there. We are communicating both to the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah on this subject. Meanwhile in order to avoid delay, instructions might be sent to Brigadier Atal and O/C 1 Sikh that they should cooperate with Sheikh Abdullah in arming persons selected by Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues to form a Home Guard. The sooner this is done the better. . . .24

About a month later Nehru wrote to Maharaja Hari Singh. Again a typical Nehru piece – part advice, part order and part threat. The



A M M U in C harge AMMU N ehru P uts A bdullah

119

Prime Minister is clearly angry with Mehar Chand Mahajan, a Patel favourite who is Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir. . . . Mr. Mahajan does not fit in with any of these dynamic forces in Kashmir today and unfortunately comes in their way. The occurrences in Jammu and round-about towards the end of October and early in November are associated in the public mind, whether rightly or wrongly, with Mr. Mahajan’s administration and they have had a disastrous result. . . . . . . I am therefore quite clear in my mind that it is not possible for any setup to be framed in Kashmir with which Mr. Mahajan is associated. . . . . . . The question obviously is not a personal one but one of larger policy. It is to be a decided clearly on whom we rely. No campaign can be conducted in half-hearted way with divided allegiance. If Sheikh Abdullah is to be made responsible he is to be relied upon completely and supported fully. He can of course be advised but it would be exceedingly wrong to weaken his authority and effectiveness. It would be still more wrong to support in any way any group or individual who opposes that authority. Sheikh Abdullah should have the closest touch with you so that he should know your mind and you should know his. If anyone comes in between you and him the whole structure cracks up and conflicts persist. . . .25 SHEIKH ABDULLAH TAKES CONTROL

Abdullah had been released from detention on 29 September 1947. This infact also marks the beginning of the capture of political power by his National Conference in Jammu & Kashmir. In the days that followed, Abdullah, led his party workers in resiting the invaders. But it is interesting to note that in contemporary reports his role of saving Srinagar so to say, does not figure as prominently as it was made out to be in later versions. As earlier mentioned there are reports that even mention that Abdullah was actually even aware of the invasion plans before it actually began. We have already noted that the possibility of the invasion taking place was the best known secret in the valley. Surprisingly the Intelligence network failed to pick up the impendening danger. No doubt the National Conference workers played a prominent role in resisting the invasion, but to suggest that it was the National Conference alone that saved Srinagar would be stretching the point too far. The countless Muslim, Sikh and Hindu families who came

120

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

out to fight and assist the Indian troops against the invading force were not National Conference workers but ordinary Kashmiris who opposed the invasion as they would an enemy. Infact for most ordinary Kashmiris the invasion was seen as the action of an enemy rather than as of people who had come to help their fellow Muslim brethren. Yet it is this impression that Abdullah was the principal saviour of Kashmir and the one man who successfully organized the defence of Srinagar in October-November, 1947 that won him support in New Delhi. From 31 October 1947 to 5 March 1948 the reigns of government in Jammu & Kashmir were held jointly or so it was said between Maharaja Hari Singh and Abdullah. This dichotomous position not only led to friction but was only partially acceptable to Abdullah. He had his way when he managed to become head of the so called Interim Government. The result of this critical decision, that is, allowing Abdullah to head the government came in course of time to have huge implications. In many ways it is from the moment that Abdullah took charge that the so called crisis in Kashmir actually begins. In this sense the placing of Abdullah in the position of control was the first major mistake on the part of the government of India. Just two days after Abdullah took charge Nehru wrote a detailed letter – a guiding and advisory kind to Kanwar Dalip Singh. Dalip Singh was a friend of Nehru and the Prime Minister wanted him to assist the government in handling the developing crisis in Kashmir. Among several other important issues in the early days of the problem that emerge from this letter is that the Prime Minister stood committed to a plebiscite. The other thing that also comes out from this letter is that the administration was not running smoothly. The letter on the file shows that the original draft, contained lines (in brackets) that reflect on the Prime Ministers working: . . . Our main objective in the Kashmir State at present is to rid it of the invader and to establish peace, law and order. When this is done some kind of plebiscite or referendum of the people will have to be arranged, in order to decide the question of accession and the future of Kashmir. The defence of Kashmir has a military and civil aspect. Indeed all military undertaking depend to a large extent on the civil background and the morale of the population. In Kashmir particularly today it is most important that there should be full cooperation between the civil government and the military



N ehru P uts A bdullah AMMU A M M U in C harge

121

as well as between the population and both the government and the military. In order to ensure this is a popular government and has been established under Sheikh Abdullah’s leadership, it is essential that there should be no friction. . . .26 (between the Maharaja and the Prime Minister on the one hand and Sheikh Abdullah who is the head of the administration) OBSTRUCTION OF ABDULLAH WILL LEAD TO DISASTER

As was customary with him, on 6 November (1947) Nehru recorded ‘A Note on Kashmir’ on the ground condition in the state and how different issues were to be handled. Clearly he is not happy, but in typical Nehru style he wishes to push things through, delays, unwarranted bottlenecks are irritating him. Abdullah ofcourse enjoys his unflinching support: . . . The civil authority vests in Sheikh Abdullah as Head of the Administration. Nevertheless it is not strictly clear as to what the position is. It is not necessary to waste time over considering and clearing up the legal position. The practice should be such as to avoid legal difficulties and at the same time to get things done quickly. There is obviously a difference in approach apart from suspicion as between the Maharaja and some of his advisors and Sheikh Saheb and his colleagues. It is difficult to change all this because people’s minds cannot be changed suddenly. But any intelligent appreciation of the position would indicate that a pull in different directions is harmful and must be avoided. . . . . . . Both from the point of view of defence and the larger national and international points of view it was decided that Sheikh Saheb should function as Head of the Administration. If so it naturally follows that he must be fully trusted and he must not be interfered with. It is impossible to follow two contradictory policies at the same time and a limited trust can only lead to ineffectiveness and injury to the cause. It is for the Maharaja and his advisors, therefore, to put the fullest trust in Sheikh Saheb and give him a free hand. Naturally where there are two opinions, they should be discussed and criticism made where necessary of any particular course of action. Any obstruction of or non-cooperation with Shiekh Abdullah can only lead to disaster from every point of view, including the Maharaja’s. . . . . . . At the same time Sheikh Abdullah must realize that as far as possible nothing should be done which puts unnecessary difficulties in the way of the Maharaja. The Maharaja has functioned, not very wisely, as an autocrat all his life and it is no easy matter for him to change his ways completely.

122

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

He should have the feeling of consultation and important matters being referred to him for his opinion. He should not have the feeling of being ignored completely as this will raise unnecessary difficulties. . . . . . . The Maharaja should function as a Constitutional Head following the advice of the Head of the Administration, that is Sheikh Saheb, with the right of drawing Sheikh Saheb’s attention to any matter he likes. . . . . . . Owing to the accession of Kashmir State to the Indian Union, all matters which bring the state in contact with the outside world have to be dealt with by the Union or through the Union. The State authorities have to function through the Union for this purpose as well as for defence and communications which are the direct charge of the Union, statements of policy should be made carefully so as not to conflict in any way with the policy of the Union. Otherwise there will be confusion. . . .27

In para 19 of this note the hint of the Prime Minister is obviously towards Abdullah: ‘. . . Statements of policy should be made carefully so as not to conflict . . with the policy of the Union. . . .’ The Prime Minister’s complete faith in Abdullah appeared in the earlier period to get stronger by the day. On 13 November (1947) he wrote to Maharaja Hari Singh: . . . But the real point is that no satisfactory way out can be found in Kashmir except through Sheikh Abdullah. If that is so, full confidence must be placed in him. There is no half-way house between full confidence and a half and half affair which has little advantage and many disadvantages. Even if a risk has to be taken in giving this full confidence, that risk has to be taken. There is no other way as far as I can see it both from the short term point of view and the long-term one. Sheikh Abdullah is earnestly desirous of cooperating and is amenable to any reasonable argument. I would suggest to you to keep in close personal touch with him and deal with him directly and not through intermediaries.28

Nehru appears greatly impressed with Abdullah in these early days. So happy that he even gives him the credit of being ‘open and amenable to reason’. As virtually everyone who has written on Abdullah would testify this is one quality he did not posess. Nehru’s intrinsic dislike for the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and his great admiration for Abdullah form the part of several records and correspondences in the Nehru papers. Here he suggests that Kashmir can be saved only by Abdullah and not the RSS:



AMMU N ehru P uts A bdullah A M M U in C harge

123

. . . The fate of Kashmir is not going to be decided by the RSS, not even of Jammu, and the sooner this is appreciated the better. The only person in the State, who, as an individual, will have the biggest say in the matter will be Sheikh Abdullah. If anyone can save Kashmir, it is he and not the RSS or anyone else. If by any chance the UNO intervenes, it is Sheikh Abdullah and his following that will impress them and show them that the people of Kashmir are fighting for their freedom against the raiders. The RSS will merely support Liaquat Ali Khan’s case against us. . . .29

That Abdullah enjoyed the support and confidence of Prime Minister Nehru was clearly established. Several good studies have suggested that Nehru saw in Abdullah the person who could ensure that the Kashmiri masses were ‘at heart’ with India. Nehru obviously did not want a Muslim majority Kashmir to merge with India without the good will of the people. Prime Minister Nehru was perhaps singularly most representative of the view that Abdullah had played an important role in saving Kashmir during the invasion and was the man who held complete control over public opinion. This belief made Abdullah appear far more important in the opinion of Nehru than he actually was in common contemporary perception, even in Kashmir itself. Abdullah in this sense had played his cards remarkably well. Why were Mahatma Gandhi and Prime Minister Nehru so much is support of Sheikh Abdullah? Much has been written on this, but very little as to why it was so. Perhaps the most obvious answer is that Abdullah was solely representative of the forces that opposed the Muslim League and the supporters of Pakistan in the state. To give an example of how Abdullah had risen in stature in the minds of Indian leaders, an incident that took place soon after his release on 29 September 1947 is quite illustrative. In the first public meeting he addressed after being released he retained his focus against Pakistan and how its supporters were destablising the state. The report that covered the meeting noted how some activists associated with a newly formed group ‘Anjuman Tehreek’ (Aligarh) walked out of the meeting.30 Likewise in his first address at the Hazrat Bal after his release he once again cautioned the well wishers of Pakistan saying that ‘they have closed their eyes. . . .’31 Roshni which was known for its pro-

124

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Pakistan views even said that Abdullah by criticizing Pakistan was infact being anti-Muslim and anti-Islam. It charged Abdullah for being a supporter of the Hindu Congress and infact an ‘agent and Advocate of Sardar Patel’.32 This was obviously quite an allegation when we keep in mind that Abdullah and Patel were not exactly on the best of terms. Abdullah was also warned that he had no right to speak on behalf of the 40 lac Muslims of Kashmir without knowing their views. It also said that Abdullah ‘. . . by making friends beyond Muslims. . . .’ was working against Islam. 33 NEHRU GUIDES ABDULLAH

After placing Abdullah in the position of command Prime Minister Nehru had started the practice of writing long letters, guiding Abdullah on important issues. This was done in an earnest and concerned manner. At times one wonders how the Prime Minister was able to pull out time for micro detailed directions. On 1 November (1947) he wrote: . . . Dwarkanath Kachru is taking this letter and I have asked him to stay with you and not to come back soon. You can utilize his services in any way you like; but in the main he will be a kind of liaison between me and your Government. He is clearheaded in many matters, specially political, and should be able to help you. . . . . . . With the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union, all dealings with Pakistan should be through the Indian Union. Any direct contacts should be avoided as these will create complications. . . . . . . You know that we fully realize the weaknesses and suspicions of the Maharaja. Yet legally-speaking it was only he who could get Kashmir State to accede to the Union. This affects the position and nothing should be done to vary it. . . . Our first duty is defence and to push out the invaders. At the same time we have to keep in mind the whole political background and avoid saying or doing anything which might create complications and difficulties. We have also to think of the possible referendum or plebiscite in the future. It is too early to do anything definite about this except to prepare people’s minds to some extent. The people must be made to feel that the question



N ehru P uts A bdullah AMMU A M M U in C harge

125

of accession will have to be decided finally according to their own wishes. How this is to be done can be determined later. As far as I can see, it should be done under the auspices of the United Nations. . . . . . . The attitude that the Pakistan Government has taken in its latest statement makes the position both difficult and clear. We can hardly deal with them on that basis. Their demand, of course, will be for us to withdraw our troops. We are certainly not going to do that till Kashmir is free of the invader and there is no danger of further invasion. But we have no intention of keeping our troops there afterwards. . . . . . . I am asking Kachru to take back the Rs. 5000/- and give it to you. I think you should keep this for special non-official expenditure. It is not always possible to draw upon Government funds quickly.34

The Prime Minister as we can see was looking after Abdullah to the extent of even arranging funds for ‘non-official’ purposes.35 SARDAR PATEL AND ABDULLAH

Abdullah as we have seen had obviously impressed the Prime Minister but even his best was not good enough for the pragmatic, clear headed and no-nonsense Home Minister Sardar Patel. Patel thought of Abdullah as a hindrance that lay on the road to Kashmir’s full and final integration with the Union. If Patel was somewhat more considerate towards Maharaja Hari Singh36 it was only because like the other princely states Hari Singh was thought to be the key to the integration of his state and Abdullah was technically not relevant. Patel saw no reason for Kashmir to be treated differently as compared to the other Princely states. Abdullah in his view as such had no role. Even before the formal announcement with regard to the transfer of power was made (3 June 1947) Patel had very matter of factly stated that he saw so reason why Kashmir should not remain with India. It is this approach to the issue that made Abdullah appear of no significance in Patel’s scheme of things.37 If one were to closely assess the statements issued by Abdullah in the early days of his taking charge of things in the state, it would appear that Sardar Patel was closer to being correct with regard to how Abdullah should have been handled. This is suggested and as we

126

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

shall see later, because even though Abdullah was singing all praises India and its democratic polity, etc., we can not find even one statement where he has talked of unconditional accession or an accession of Kashmir that could precede a reference to the people. On the contrary he always indeed without an exception talked of ‘first we need to be free – then we will consider the question of accession.’ For example a typical Abdullah statement in the early years of his heading the government in Kashmir would read: ‘. . . our struggle is not merely the affairs of the Kashmir people it is the war of every son and daughter of India.. every Indian has to participate and contribute in every form. . . .’38 By early March (1948) Abdullah was in full control of the government in Jammu & Kashmir. It was clearly for Abdullah an objective achieved and not surprisingly he sought to celebrate the occasion in a big way. Invitations were sent out across India to important leaders. Sardar Patel noted his reaction to the celebrations in a letter to Nehru: . . . Had I come to know of it earlier I would certainly have expressed my view that these celebrations would be inappropriate . . . I would urge upon you . . . that the celebrations are in as sober a key as possible . . . it is particularly inappropriate that there should be any salutes of guns. . . . Those guns would sound hollow for only less then hundred miles away our men are losing their lives in order to protect the valley. . . .39

Nehru was equally unhappy. He replied to Patel the next day: . . . I have your letter of the 5th May about the Kashmir celebrations. I entirely agree with you. When I decided to go to Kashmir I had no idea of these celebrations except that I had vainly heard of some celebrations chiefly to attract visitors. I was rather taken aback when I saw the programme. Lady Mountbatten was also due to go with me, but Mountbatten did not like the idea of her associating herself with political functions and so she has dropped out. . . . . . . When Sheikh Abdullah was here a few days ago, I spoke to him somewhat on the lines of your letter and more particularly said that there should be no gun firing. I am now sending him a telegram, a copy of which I enclose. I am afraid, however, that there is bound to be some kind of a tamasha, for Kashmiris love this kind of thing. . . .40



A M M U in C harge N ehru P uts A bdullah AMMU

127

SHEIKH ABDULLAH SUPPORTS INDIA BUT ALWAYS WITH A CATCH

As he settled down into his new role Abdullah introduced several key land reforms which went down well with the people. Abdullah repeatedly issued statements that if taken on face value would appear unambiguous and would seem to leave little scope for any misreading with regard to his professed loyalty to India and support for the state’s merger to the Union. But even in such statements there was the proverbial hidden catch: ‘. . . Kashmir had never accepted the two nation theory . . . we will live like brothers and no power on earth can separate us. . . .’41 ‘. . . we want to link the destinies of Jammu & Kashmir with India . . . the ideals before India & Kashmir is one. . . .’42 I must admit that till some years ago I too had taken such statements on face value and had come to believe that at heart Abdullah was indeed keen for an unconditional merger. But the rider was always there. It is clear that he visualized Kashmir as distinct from India and there was always the question of the ‘will of the people’. This concept and coinage of the term ‘will of the people’ was without doubt Abdullah’s construct. And yet he continued issuing statements that appear to make him a staunch supporter of the accession that is only if one went by the ‘headings’. If closely observed the story was different. On 27 November 1947 the Sheikh addressed a public meeting in Srinagar. The Pakistan invaders had by then been pushed back and things were relatively in control. This public meeting is important mainly in view of the response to what Abdullah said in the meeting: ‘. . . Kashmir had acceded to the Indian Union because of economic need . . . so far as economic relations are concerned our fate is interlinked with India, we have joined neither to satisfy Pandit Nehru nor Gandhi but to save ourselves from poverty . . . Kashmir is now a part of India and the prestige and security of Kashmir is the prestige and security of India. . .’.43 There was thunderous applause when Abdullah told the huge meeting that Kashmir was now a part of India.44 On another occasion Abdullah said: ‘. . . there was no reason why the people of Kashmir should now fall a prey . . . and vote for Pakistan. Kashmir’s decision to join India was not a hasty step. . . .’45 ‘. . . we

128

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

want to link the destinies of Jammu & Kashmir with India . . . the ideals before India & Kashmir is one. . . .’46 What is interesting is that this pro-India stand generally continued till about the end of 1950. Some typical Abdullah statements at the time would read: ‘. . . people of Kashmir have implicit faith in India’ (Calcutta, December, 1950); ‘. . . today we tie our destinies with the rest of India. . . .’ (Madras, December, 1950), ‘All classes and communities support Kashmir’s participation in the Indian Union;’47 ‘. . . there is no geographical obstruction to the marriage of Kashmir with the Union. . . .’48 And yet as time would show all this loud talk was only skin deep – Abdullah’s heart and mind were never in what he was publicly saying. One reason why he was taking such a public stand could be that he understood the public feeling on this and did not wish or rather was not inclined to be seen as walking a path different from the public opinion of his state. When he did change his public stand and began to take a more ambiguous path, it was only because by then an element of communal difference had been introduced into Kashmir’s discourse. This we can easily notice by about the end of 1950. This view of Abdullah when seen in total perspective of his actions obviously appears as an aberration. No doubt he made several other such statements, the list is long and some of which we have already seen. But we can not find even one example or an action of Abullah in which he stood committed to the merger without preconditions. Sadly the Prime Minister, with all his good intentions notwithstanding, accepted Abdullah’s statements on face value and overlooked his actions and perhaps also what Abdullah was leaving unsaid. Several contemporary versions have dwelt on how Abdullah indulged in double speak. One for the consumption of the Indian leadership and for the sake of public opinion in India and the other for the ordinary people of Kashmir. As Bhaskaranand, who had travelled widely through Kashmir at the time put it: ‘in the valley Abdullah played the communal card and elsewhere he simultaneously tried to keep pace with nationalist leaders and nationalist sentiment. . . .’49 It is in this serious misjudgement of Abdullah by particularly the Prime Minister that lay the basis for the several complications that



N ehru P uts A bdullah AMMU A M M U in C harge

129

came to develop in later years. With every passing day and month things got more and more complicated. But one of the first indications that Abdullah had things in his mind of which even the Prime Minister had no inclination can be seen from 1949 itself. In a letter addressed to Abdullah marked ‘Secret and Personal’ Nehru appears optimistic and hopeful with regard to the crisis being solved. More importantly he virtually reprimands Abdullah, though with uncharacteristic mildness: ‘. . . Personally, I have a hunch that this Kashmir issue will be settled before this year is out, and settled naturally largely in our favour. That is just a hunch and I will not proceed to argue about it. . . . . . . When in London, my attention was drawn to your interview with the Daily Mail correspondent. I was rather taken aback by this and it created a slight sensation among political circles in London. I wish you had not given that interview, because this kind of thing leads to wrong interpretations. On my return here, I found Gopalaswami Ayyangar was also rather upset about it. A proposal may be worth considering. But you and I happen to be in responsible positions and cannot throw out suggestions in the air. I am afraid the suggestion you made will have a bad effect on the U.N. Commission. We are passing through a very delicate state in this business and the less we say, the better. . . .’ 50

Nehru also wrote to Krishna Menon telling him of how unhappy he was with Abdullah with regard to the interview: . . . A bigger headache in regard to Kashmir is the internal situation there. Sheikh Abdullah an excellent man and a very effective popular leader, rather lacks political foresight and has a knack of saying the wrong thing. He is influenced greatly by odd groups. His recent interviews in the British Press about the independence of Kashmir have irritated me very much. He is coming here with some of this colleagues tonight for full discussions. . . .51

The Prime Minister’s concern, perhaps even shock continued for several days. It is not clear as for whom a long note was drafted, but here too Nehru is deeply upset with Abdullah’s talk of freedom for Kashmir: ‘. . . So far as we are concerned, Kashmir is a State which has acceded to the Indian Union on three subjects, namely Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. We must discharge our duty by defending Kashmir from aggression and allowing the will of the people to prevail. We have been

130

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

parties to the establishment of a democratic regime in Kashmir which is cooperating with the Government of India. We are convinced that Kashmir’s future lies with India. . . .’ . . . A recent statement made by the Prime Minister of Kashmir that Kashmir might be an independent country has given rise to a great deal of surprise and confusion in the minds of many people. Sheikh Abdullah, the Prime Minister of Kashmir, has himself clarified the position by a subsequent statement. It seems obvious that Kashmir cannot function with real independence situated where she is, and any attempt to keep it as an independent area between great countries will lead to continuous conflict and difficulty and Kashmir will never settle down to a normal. . . .’52

Another habit that Abdullah adopted in the early days was of referring to and attacking Pakistan in his speeches and statements. Nehru the idealist that he was did not approve of this and advised Abdullah in his elderly statesman like manner: . . . May I suggest to you to avoid referring to Pakistan in your public addresses. This kind of thing is taken advantage of by our opponents in the Security Council to show that you are so entirely opposed to Pakistan as to be incapable of being impartial at the time of plebiscite. This is a small matter, I know there is no reason to give a handle to our opponents. . . .53 JAWAHARLAL NEHRU: HOW AND WHY HE TOOK TO THE IDEA OF A PLEBISCITE

The partition of India had brought along unprecedented violence, death and destruction. In common perception the responsibility for most of it lay at the doors of the government of India. It was natural for the Prime Minister to show to the world that with regard to Kashmir, India was not pushing or forcing the state’s accession. Everything that Nehru did, every action he took seemed to suggest that Kashmir’s Muslim majority demographic composition was weighing on him. The Prime Minister obviously did not want a Muslim majority province to accede to a non-Muslim majority India without the support of the state’s people. There was also a general view that by accepting the partition of India as the price for freedom based on the belief that Muslims were entitled to a separate dominion, the Indian National Congress had misjudged the mass opinion of India. Having conceded the two nation



N ehru P uts A bdullah AMMU A M M U in C harge

131

theory, how was India to explain to the world that it perceived Kashmir to be a part of India even though over 70 per cent its populace was then Muslim. Prime Minister Nehru sought to resolve this moral dilemma which he saw for himself by taking a stand that the Kashmiri populace would publicly come out in favour of India. For some reason the Prime Minister appears in these difficult days more concerned with what the world would think rather than establishing India’s claim on the basis of age old traditions, cultural and historical legacies that bound Jammu & Kashmir to India. As for Abdullah he had understood the Prime Ministers’ emotional bonding and mind in the matter and played upon Nehru and his sentiment to his best abilities. With over 500 small and big Princely states having exercised their right with regard to merging themselves with the Union of India no questions were raised. There were the exceptions of Junagadh and in a different context Hyderabad but these too were resolved in course of time. Every former ruler was considered as the person who enjoyed the ultimate right to decide. Only Maharaja Hari Singh’s decision was not thought to be sufficient. For some reason Prime Minister Nehru considered Abdullah perhaps even more important than the Maharaja himself. This was the main reason that led the Prime Minister to ignore the fact that Hari Singh had signed the state’s accession and the issue of seeking public opinion through the goodwill of Abdullah was not quite relevant. Many years later in what is considered one of the very credible accounts of these events, Prem Shankar Jha noted: . . . it was the Maharaja who made up his mind first, and Nehru who remained the main stumbling block to accession with his insistence that the Maharaja must first get the backing of the majority of the people through Sheikh Abdullah. Had Nehru been more accommodating as Patel clearly wanted to be, Kashmir would have acceded to India well before the raiders invaded the State. The accession would have been incontestable not only on legal grounds . . . but what is more important, because it would more demonstrably not have been made under duress. . . .54

A reference has earlier been made to how Prime Minister Nehru actually advised Mehar Chand Mahajan on the lines that it would be: ‘Undesirable to make any declaration of adhesion to the Indian Union at this stage.’ And this was on 21 October 1947, that is just

132

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

five days before the Accession was actually signed by Maharaja Hari Singh.55 The most probable reason for this approach to the issue was possibly Nehru’s idealism and conviction of getting the accession through by ‘the will of the people’. This letter of course makes no such mention. ABC of the Kashmir Question was a small booklet published by the Government of India’s Information Service (probably in 1949 or 1950). What is interesting in this version of the government is that even as Prime Minister Nehru himself had first floated the idea of seeking the people’s view on the question of accession, the Information Service makes out a case that suggests that the issue of plebiscite was not of much significance: . . . The British Government has in the last 20 years transferred power to a large number of its colonies, but it has never thought of ascertaining the wishes of these colonies by holding a plebiscite. In India itself no plebiscite was held to determine either whether the people of the sub-continent of India wanted freedom or whether the majority of Muslims living in the country wanted partition. The United Kingdom came to the conclusion that independence should be given and the country should be partitioned because it was satisfied that the Indian National Congress on the one hand and the Muslim League on the other represented the people on the issue. . . .56

In the weeks that followed, several issues got clubbed together. At the core however remained the point of how could the Maharaja have given his approval for the merger of his state with the Union of India without the assent of his people. More so when the Maharaja was a Hindu and a vast majority of his subjects were Muslim. After all this version suggested, the essence of the partition plan was based on Hindu-Muslim lines. This came to be the stand of all those who disputed the accession. Muslim Pakistan was projected as the aggrieved. It did not matter, that the Transfer of Power Plan did not make any reference to such a need. Not even one of the Princely states that merged with the Union did so by taking their people into some kind of confidence. Jammu & Kashmir had been made into a class by itself. Perhaps even more important is that the demand for or any reference to the need of a plebiscite did not come from the people of Kashmir. The common man had no interest in a plebiscite until



N ehru P uts A bdullah AMMU A M M U in C harge

133

the time that some leaders planted the idea itself. This was a role played mainly by Abdullah. Gandhi had visited Kashmir in the first week of August (1947) He referred to the visit at length in the prayer meeting (6th August) on his return to New Delhi. He reportedly said: ‘. . . no hesitation in saying that the will of the Kashmiris was the supreme law in Kashmir and Jammu . . . (I) am glad to say that the Maharaja and Maharani have readily acknowledged this. . .’.57 He also said that ‘common sense dictated that the will of the Kashmiris should decide the fate of Kashmir & Jammu. . . .’58 Gandhi’s reference to the question of the ‘will of the Kashmiris’ also had another very important reference. As the report put it: ‘he hoped that the question would be decided between the dominions, the Maharaja and the Kashmiris. If the four (this included Pakistan) could come to a joint decision much trouble would be saved.’59 This view of Gandhi appears to have formed during the course of his meeting with a delegation of the National Conference in Srinagar. Abdullah was in detention but it is obvious that those who met Gandhi conveyed the views of their leader. The National Conference it appears believed that a plebiscite would demolish the claim of its political opponent the All Jammu Kashmir Muslim Conference that the Kashmiri Muslims were all for Pakistan.60 The counter view to this is that in some probability the National Conference took this stand because their leader (Abdullah) was aware of Nehru’s mind on the issue and in any case the party believed that a plebiscite would make Nehru even more dependent on them than he already was. One of the major implications of the statement that Gandhi made at the post prayer meeting was that by referring to Pakistan as being a stake holder, India accepted for all purpose that Pakistan too was now a party to the problem. Interestingly the National Conference delegation seemed confident that the Kashmiri Muslims would not support any merger with Pakistan. But at the same time they did not make any mention or suggest that they would support a merger with India. While trying to understand the background of how Prime Minister Nehru took fancy to the idea of a plebiscite it is important to understand the mind of his trusted friend Abdullah. Abdullah as we

134

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

know even as he enjoyed the complete support of the Prime Minister and ruled Kashmir on his behalf, virtually remained non-committal on the issue of unconditional accession to India. This game of hide and seek, played by Abdullah and his colleagues got increasingly complex as time passed. One can imagine the disenchantment and disillusionment of Prime Minister Nehru, when Abdullah had to be dismissed in 1953. The same Abdullah who was thought to be the saviour of Kashmir – the Sher-i-Kashmir, as the Prime Minister fondly called him. There was yet another version at the time as to how the idea of a plebiscite came into being as far as Prime Minister Nehru was concerned. This version was carried by the the Statesman. This report suggested that soon after his meeting with Jinnah in Lahore, Mountbatten had a meeting with Nehru. He persuaded him to suggest a plebiscite as the way to resolve the crisis.61 There is yet a third version to how Nehru moved into the idea of a plebiscite. This view is that, it was Mountbatten who prevailed on Nehru to do so. A letter from Nehru to Mehar Chand Mahajan infact clearly states this. This letter was written a day before the Viceroy left for Lahore. If we go by this version the issue of an ‘impartial plebiscite’ was therefore decided not after Mountbatten returned from Lahore but well before he had left for Lahore. Jinnah, obviously in this sense did not have much to do with it.62 On the same day that the Statesman, headlined the story Lahore’s Civil & Military Gazette too prominently reported that Nehru was for a Referendum: ‘Government of India is prepared for a Referendum when law and order is restored’.63 It further quoted Nehru: ‘. . . we sent troops only on the condition that accession will have to be considered by the people of Kashmir later, we were anxious not to finalize anything in a moment of crisis. . . .’64 The truly dramatic moment in the context came when Nehru in an address over All India Radio (4 November, 1947) said: ‘. . . we are prepared when peace, law order are restored to have a referendum under international auspices. . . .’65 Lahore saw widespread jubilation, following Nehru’s address, almost as if Kashmir had chosen to merge with Pakistan. The same day Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali



AMMU N ehru P uts A bdullah A M M U in C harge

135

made an impassioned plea to Kashmir’s Muslims: ‘choice before Kashmir is freedom or death . . . if India succeeds Muslims will be exterminated as they have been elsewhere in India. . . .’66 Sheikh Abdullah too appears to have been convinced that a plebiscite was now assured. Initially he said that it could take place in the spring of 1948, but also added that it may not take place at all, in view of all that had happened (the invasion, ongoing conflict)67 Prime Minister Nehru, whatever be the reason was clearly in favour of a plebiscite in the initial stage of the problem. As we will see later the doubts that he began to have, appeared much later. There are two notes or rather letters of Nehru of the same date – 21 November 1947 that clearly establish his stand on the issue. One is a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan: . . . I have repeatedly stated that as soon as the raiders have been driven out of Kashmir or have withdrawn and peace and order have been established, the people of Kashmir should decide the question of accession by plebiscite or referendum under international auspices such as those of the United Nations. It is clear that no such reference to the people can be made when large bodies of raiders are despoiling the country and military operations against them are being carried on. By this declaration I stand. . . .68

The second is a typical Nehru letter to Abdullah in which Nehru deals with not only the issue of the plebiscite but also the United Nations and how backing out of the plebiscite would hurt India’s case and image. But what is interesting is that, however, much the Prime Minister may have been talking of it, in the back of his mind one can perhaps see that he would have been very happy if the plebiscite was not held or perhaps delayed. These are interesting and important lines: . . . Dwarkanath writes to me that there is strong feeling in the leadership of the National Conference against a referendum. I know this and quite understand it. In fact I share the feeling myself. But you will appreciate that it is not easy for us to back out of the stand we have taken before the world. That would create a very bad impression abroad and more specially in UN circles. I feel, however, that this question of referendum is rather an academic one at present. We have made it clear and indeed it is patent enough that there can be no referendum till there is complete peace and order in Kashmir

136

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

State and all the raiders have been pushed out. As far as I can see this desirable consummation will not be achieved for some months yet. In the Poonch area it is quite possible that these raiders might continue to function in the hills and it might not be worthwhile for us to make a major effort to push them out during the winter. Thus for some months the question of referendum does not arise in any practical form. These months will be full of developments and these developments will govern future events including the possibility of having a referendum. If this struggle lasts for several months, the chances of a referendum automatically fade out. . . . . . . If we said to the UNO that we no longer stand by a referendum in Kashmir, Pakistan would score a strong point and that would be harmful to our cause. On the other hand, if circumstances continue as they are and the referendum is out of the question during these next few months, then why worry about it now? Indeed I have seen an argument in an English newspaper partly supporting our viewpoint about the referendum and saying that other events are deciding the issue and that in any event there can be no referendum before the spring. . . . . . . There is no difference between you and us on this issue. It is all a question of the best tactical approach. I would personally suggest to you not to say anything rejecting the idea of a referendum but to lay stress on the fact that the people of Kashmir, by their heroic resistance are deciding the issue themselves. . . .69

Nehru wrote on regular basis to the Chief Ministers of the States. These letters make interesting reading. Most of the letters were lengthy even by Nehru standards and always touched on several issues. Issues could range from say shortage of food grain in a part of the country to complex matters of foreign policy. He also usually shared thoughts and experiences of recent travels. Every such letter after October 1947 had some paragraphs on Kashmir. In the letter of 22 November 1947 he noted: . . . But it would be folly to imagine that we are out of the wood in Kashmir. Kashmir is vital to us from many point of views. Kashmir is also vital to Pakistan and so there is an inherent conflict in the situation, whatever form or shape it might take. In spite of our intense desire that Kashmir should remain with India we have offered a referendum of the people, in pursuance of our general policy. We are prepared to take that risk rather than abandon our principles. We hope and believe that the referendum will result in Kashmir remaining with India. But it is obvious that no referendum can take place till Kashmir is free of the raider. . . .70



A M M U in C harge N ehru P uts A bdullah AMMU

137

UNITED NATIONS AND PLEBISCITE: NEHRU RAISES THE ISSUE IN PARLIAMENT

Nehru’s speech in Parliament (25 November 1947) was historic on many counts. He spoke at length. But as some reports suggested, an element of anxiousness was clearly noticeable in the otherwise always confident and composed Nehru. As time went on opponents cited the stand elaborated by Nehru in this speech in Parliament as among the serious misjudgments if not outright mistakes of the time: ‘we did not want a mere accession from the top,’ the Prime Minister told Parliament, ‘. . . we wanted accession in accordance with the will of the people, we were interested in a decision in Kashmir in view of its geographical frontiers touching USSR, China, Afghanistan . . . the caravan trade routes pass through Kashmir. . . .’71 Another report of the same speech added the Prime Minister having said: . . . In order to establish our bonafides we have suggested when people are given a chance to decide, it should be done under an international tribunal such as the UNO . . . our policy is above board, we can defend it at any time before the world . . . when Kashmir did not decide . . . we were of course interested in the decision . . . Kashmir is intimately connected with the security of India . . . we did not put even the lightest of pressure . . . (meaning on the Maharaja). . . .72

Long after things had gone out of control on 31 July 1953 Nehru wrote a special letter to Bhim Sen Sachar, in which he also made an interesting observation with regard to Kashmir: ‘you know that we have considered the problem of Kashmir as symbolic of many things, including our secular policy in India. . . .’73 The Prime Minister also explained to Parliament in this address how Pakistan had greatly aggravated the situation by stopping supplies and openly supporting the invading force. He also talked of how the people of Kashmir had resisted the invaders and supported the Indian troops. A copy of this speech by the Prime Minister in Parliament is also in the Nehru papers. This was a long answer given by him to a ‘short notice question’. This is perhaps the best overview we have of the problem towards the end of November 1947. Some excerpts:74

138

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

. . . The House is aware that on the lapse of Crown Paramountcy on the 15th August this year, Kashmir did not accede to either Dominion. We were of course virtually interested in the decision that the State would take. Kashmir, because of her geographical position with her frontiers merging with three countries, namely, the Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, was intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. Economically also Kashmir is intimately related to India. The caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India pass though Kashmir State. . . . . . . Nevertheless we did not put the slightest pressure on the State to accede to the Indian Dominion because we realized that Kashmir was in a very difficult position. We did not want a mere accession from the top but an association in accordance with the will of her people. Indeed we did not encourage any rapid decision. Even in regard to a standstill agreement no speedy steps were taken by us although the matter was under consideration, even though Kashmir had entered into a Standstill agreement with Pakistan soon after the 15th August. . . . . . . We learnt later that serious external pressure was being applied on Kashmir by the Pakistan authorities refusing to send to Kashmir supplies vital to the needs of people, such as foodgrains, salt, sugar and petrol. Thus an attempt was being made to strangle Kashmir economically and thus force her to accede to Pakistan. This pressure was serious because it was not easy for Kashmir to obtain these essential supplies from India on account of the difficulty of communications. . . . In September news reached us that tribesman of the North West Frontier Province were being collected and sent to Kashmri border. In the beginning of October events took a grave turn. Armed bands moved into Jammu Province from the neighbouring districts of West Punjab committed serious acts of depredation on the local inhabitants, burnt villages and towns and putting a large number of people to death. Refugees from these areas poured into Jammu. . . . . . . On the Jammu side of the border the local inhabitants, who are chiefly Hindu and Rajput in that area, took retaliatory measures and drove out the Muslims living in those border villages. In these border conflicts a very large number of villages were destroyed or burnt by both parties on either side of the frontier. . . . . . . The raiders from West Punjab into Jammu Province were increased in numbers and spread out over that Province. The Kashmir State Army which had to meet these raids at numerous points soon found itself broken into small fragments and gradually ceased to be a fighting force. The raiders were highly organized, had competent officers and modern arms. They



A M M U in C harge N ehru P uts A bdullah AMMU

139

succeeded in occupying a considerable part of Jammu Province, more especially in the Poonch Area. Poonch town, Mirpur, Kotli and some other places held out. . . . . . . About this time the State authorities asked us to supply them with arms and ammunition. We agreed to do so in the normal course. But in fact no supply was made till events took a more serious turn. Even at this stage no mention was made of accession to India. . . . . . . The leader of the popular organization in Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, President of the Kashmir National Conference, was released from prison during this period and we discussed the situation in Kashmir with him as well as with representatives of the Maharaja of Kashmir. We made it clear to both of them that while we would welcome the accession of Kashmir we did not want any hurried or forced accession and we would rather wait for the people to decide. Sheikh Abdullah was himself of this opinion. . . . . . . On the 24th October we heard that large armed bands consisting both of tribesmen from the Frontier and ex-service men had broken through Muzzaffarabad and were marching to Srinagar. These raiders had crossed Pakistan territory and they were equipped with Bren Guns, Machine Guns, Mortars and Flame-throwers and had at their disposal a large number of transport vehicles. They moved rapidly down the Valley, sacking and burning and looting all along the way. We gave earnest consideration to this situation in our Defence Committee on the 25th and 26th October. The position on the 26th morning was that the raiders were marching towards Srinagar and there was no military detachment capable of stopping them. They had been stopped for two days near Uri by the State forces under a gallant commander who resisted this advance to the point of death. These two days thus gained were very valuable. . . . . . . We were asked at this stage both on behalf of the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah to accept the accession of the State to the Indian Union and to intervene with the armed forces of the Union. An immediate decision was necessary, and in fact it is now clear that if we had delayed the decision even by 24 hours Srinagar would have fallen and would have suffered the tragic fate that befall Muzaffarabad, Baramulla and other places. It was clear to us that we could not possibly accept under any circumstances this ruin of Kashmir by brutal and irresponsible raiders. This would have been a surrender to frightfulness and fanaticism of the worst type and it would have had the most serious consequences all over India. To intervene at that stage was no easy matter and was full of risks and danger. Yet we decided to face this risk

140

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

and intervene because any other course would have meant ruin to Kashmir and dangerous to India. . . . . . . In accepting the accession however we made it perfectly clear to the Maharaja that his Government must be carried on in future according to the popular will and that Sheikh Abdullah should be charged with the formation of an interim government on the new model adopted in Mysore, Sheikh Abdullah, in our opinion, had undoubtedly the support of large majority of the people of Kashmir, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. Further we made it clear that as soon as law and order have restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by reference to the people. . . . . . . In order to establish our bonafides we have suggested that when the people are given the chance to decide their future this should be done under the supervision of an impartial tribunal such as the United Nations Organization. . . .75 KASHMIR CONFLICT: A DRAIN ON FINANCIAL RESOURCES

On the same day that the Prime Minister had spoken at length in Parliament he wrote a letter to Sri Prakasa, India’s High Commissioner in Pakistan (Karachi). The letter contains a reference, perhaps the only reference to how the ongoing conflict in Kashmir was causing a huge drain on financial resources. Interestingly the Prime Minister did not make any reference to this in his very important address in Parliament the same day. That the issue was weighing on him is apparent from the letter to Sri Prakasa. Nehru did also refer to the plebiscite in this letter: . . . In Kashmir an internal revolution is taking place under Sheikh Abdullah’s leadership. New forces are arising and a new set-up of Government gradually taking shape. It is difficult to prophesy what will happen four or five months later. We are committed to a plebiscite and we stand by it. But developments during the next few months will naturally govern decisions later. . . . . . . Kashmir is going to be a drain on our resources, but it is going to be a greater drain on Pakistan. In a military sense we are stronger. The position however is this that even if we were somewhat weaker than we are, we cannot desert the people of Kashmir to whom we have given our pledge. Kashmir gives us an example of communal unity and cooperation. This has had a



N ehru P uts A bdullah A M M U in C harge AMMU

141

healthy effect in India and any weakening in Kashmir by us would create a far more difficult communal situation in India. . . .76

As things appeared to be racing out of India’s advantage in the United Nations, a worried Nehru had written to Maharaja Hari Singh. He shared his concern about the dispute having now become a problem region for the world. But this letter is also important for the manner in which Nehru continues to believe that the conduct of a plebiscite alone holds the answer: ‘. . . We hope to succeed sometime or other in the military sphere to a very large extent. But there can be no doubt that ultimately Kashmir’s fate will be decided by the people of Kashmir. If we win them over in sufficient numbers, it is well and good. If not, then we cannot hold them at the point of the bayonet. We have neither the desire nor the capacity to do this and indeed the present day world will not permit us to do it. Therefore the real political problem is to win the people of Kashmir in large numbers. This can only be done by and through Sheikh Abdullah and his organization. Indeed we are there today because of Sheikh Abdullah’s influence and popularity with the people. We have stressed this repeatedly in the Security Council.’77

We have just noted how the financial cost of the conflict was weighing on the Prime Minister. This worry stayed with him throughout the conflict and even after the end of hostilities. It was becoming increasingly difficult to strengthen security details in far flung areas. A note dictated by Nehru on 28 August 1953 in Srinagar (telegram) is important to understand the working of the Prime Minister and his habit of micro managing things as also the increasing cost of the war. The note was marked to his P.A. (Mathai) Transport: Defence Ministry’s calculation about cost are not understood here at all and must have been based on some old inflated rates. Calculations made here demonstrate that cost of horse transport not more than air transport atleast to Dras and Kargil. Recently civil air company demanded rupees five lakhs for transporting one thousand tons to Dras and Kargil. Horse transport costs about same amount. Not clear therefore how Defence Ministry arrived at their figures. Apart from this, it is important to spare our aircraft as far as possible and to keep using horse transport for use in emergency, apart from giving employment to large numbers of people. . . . . . . Quoted rates are often much more than those actually settled. General

142

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Mahadeo Singh has found by experience that horse transport is not more expensive. . . . . . . Air Force has already carried three-fourth of total allotment to Leh, Kargil and Dras. We have now agreed that remaining stocks for Dras and Kargil should be sent by horse transport, but Air Force will continue transport of Leh. . . . . . . Where possible, horse transport should also be used in place of jeeps as wastage of jeeps on mountain roads is very great. . . . . . . These are agreements arrived at today’s conference. Request Defence Ministry and other Ministries concerned to expediate sanctions. . . .78 INDEPENDENT KASHMIR: DID THE IDEA HAVE SUPPORT

Even though Nehru’s first official announcement appeared on 4 November it was well known that the Prime Minister was inclined towards the conduct of a plebiscite from the very beginning. The Tribune had already been discussing the issue in its columns, almost making an attempt to prevent the government of India from following the plebiscite seeking path. It questioned the relevance of the move emphasizing that Maharaja Hari Singh had acceded to India in a manner that was constitutionally correct and was completely similar to the manner in which the other rulers of the Princely states had acceded: ‘It is perilously foolish to reopen the issue . . . suicidal doctrine which India is following.’ The Tribune also questioned the logic of singling out Kashmir for the plebiscite: ‘. . . it would be stunning to see the government fulfill the designs of the British imperialists by Referendum. . . .’79 The issue of singling out Kashmir to seek the ‘people’s opinion’ was opposed at the time across the country. Dr. Moonje, the President of the Hindu Mahasabha issued a statement from Bombay (Mumbai) in early December 1947: ‘. . . It has been a great mistake to single out Kashmir for a Referendum . . . on return from the frontier (the NWFP) I had warned 20 years ago that one day India will have to defend itself against the tribals. . . .’80 The Organiser dedicated a special issue to the events in Jammu & Kashmir. It said, it was not rational to decide a major issue in the country by a vote in a small part of it:



AMMU N ehru P uts A bdullah A M M U in C harge

143

. . . Historically Kashmir has been a part of India. Still we have the temple of Shankaracharya dominating the valley. A Referendum can not change geography. Hindus lost Kashmir by the wrong interpretation of the word Dharma and Hindustan will lose Kashmir by the wrong conception of the word self determination . . . the Hindu Kingdom of Kashmir is one of the oldest in history – it is the spiritual home of the Hindus. . . .81

Another article on the same issue drew attention to the region’s geo-strategic significance – having borders with Afghanistan, China, USSR and Tibet: ‘It is like a window that opens into a neighbour’s house . . . it is the Head of Bharat Mata. . . .82 Among ordinary Kashmiris the general impression had usually been that Kashmir had always been an integral part of India. Before the October 1947 invasion of Kashmir there were small pockets no doubt that may have suggested or talked of a Kashmir that was independent of both India and Pakistan. But one thing is clear that there was virtually no major support for Pakistan. This point is important and requires repeated emphasis, because of the Muslim majority nature of Kashmir’s populace. Ranbir did a rather bold and courageous story questioning the idea floated by a handful of people that Kahsmir could even consider being independent. Pakistan had never been an option – the talk was of being separate even from India. ‘Azad Kashmir’ will be like a keep of several countries’.83 The Report also said: ‘. . . those who talk of a free Kashmir are unable to explain its feasibility’, ‘we all know it could be like a small blanket that can cover either the head or the feet but not both.’84 In the months leading to the partition of India the general talk in Kashmir was that by not following the other Princes of the Indian states, most of whom had spontaneously announced their merger with the Union of India, the Maharaja of Kashmir was harming or had harmed the interests of Kashmir. Several organizations of the minorities mainly comprising the Hindus who were about a million in number in 1947 had been pleading for announcement of the merger of the state with India. Interestingly the National Conference workers too were openly of the view that the people of Kashmir were in favour of India by vast majority.85 A report of The Tribune also noted that among the small section

144

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

of people who were in support of independence i.e., not joining either of the dominions there were as many Hindus as Muslims.86 It is these small instances that serve as important evidence to substantiate the suggestion that Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir in view of its Muslim majority was totally misplaced in 1947. An interesting development took place in Srinagar in the beginning of July 1947. The Associated Press (AP) representative in Kashmir was a friend of the Prime Minister of Kashmir Ramchandra Kak. Kak appears to have prevailed upon his friend to do a story on the possibility of Kashmir becoming an independent country. The AP correspondent in his report had suggested that Kashmir’s assumed independence was almost imminent. But just as everyone who had contributed to the story was surprised, there was a big reaction to this report. It is the nature of the reaction that actually lifted the veil over the realities as they prevailed on the ground. The masses of Kashmir it is obvious were not in favor or in support of what the AP report had concluded.87 We have earlier seen Kak’s version of the events. He suggests that he did not play any role in influencing the Maharaja and that it was the Maharaja who had been thinking in terms of a federation. Kak’s version is also interesting in that he suggests that one of the major reasons for the Maharaja acting in manner in which he did was that the Congress party had been hand in glove with the National Conference. And also that it was the Congress and its leaders that had strengthened Abdullah and encouraged him to raise the demand of asking Hari Singh to quit Kashmir.88 Mahatma Gandhi’s visit to Kashmir, which took place in early August (1947), and to which a reference has also earlier been made drew a strong editorial from The Tribune. The editorial reflected on the sentiment of the people. It also perhaps sought to brief Gandhi on the common perception of things. Gandhi was as we know a regular reader of The Tribune: . . . from time immemorial Kashmir has remained the resplendent crown of India and it should continue to adorn its head . . . Gandhi will not find it at all difficult to show that the state must not even remotely entertain the idea of declaring itself sovereign. For its sovereignty will be unreal and ephemeral. Its independence and glory can be maintained only by its remaining an integral part of India, by entering the Constituent Assembly. . . .89



N ehru P uts A bdullah AMMU A M M U in C harge

145

We can proceed with some level of certainty that when Prime Minister Nehru suggested, indeed announced the plan for a plebiscite he did so believing it was the best and most fair thing to do. Whether he did so on the advise of friends like Viceroy Mountbatten is obviously only of academic interest. The fact that remains is that in doing so the Prime Minister for some reason overlooked the fact that not one ruler of a Princely state whose number exceeded 500 had sought to seek the views of their subject people while signing their respective State’s accession to the Union of India. Prime Minister Nehru’s decision with regard to seeking the view of the people assumes critical importance because no political group of any significance infact had raised such a demand. No doubt Abdullah had all along been talking of ‘freeing his people and considering the question of accession only thereafter.’ But even in the case of Abdullah when we consider his statements and view them in a broader perspective it is not difficult to realize that for Abdullah ‘freeing his people’ meant little more than capturing power for himself and his National Conference. Many years later (1958) in an interview he had told N.C. Chatterjee that he had never demanded a plebiscite. This of course was incorrect because Abdullah did not spare one occasion to discuss Kashmir without a reference to first securing freedom. In this sense therefore the two people who mattered the most when the issue of concern was Jammu & Kashmir – Prime Minister Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah, their view with regard to the so called ‘will of the people’ was very similar to each other. SEEKING TO KNOW WHAT JAMMU & KASHMIR WANTED

For some reason, even though so much has been published on the issue we have very little with regard to what the people of Kashmir particularly the Muslims actually wished in the context of their political future. It was only natural for India and even perhaps the world to know the minds of the Kashmiri people. Many national leaders, journalists and others commissioned specially for the purpose had travelled in the region to gauge public opinion and the response to the state’s merger with the Union of India.

146

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

On 17 June (1947) Srinagar’s popular Urdu daily Ranbir carried a story saying that it had learnt from reliable sources that Maharaja Hari Singh was toying with the idea of some kind of ‘free’ state for Kashmir. The paper was of the view that the Maharaja should seek the opinion of his subjects in the matter. It also said that it was certain that a majority of Kashmir’s people were in favour of merging with India.90 This probably makes Ranbir the first important public stage from where a demand for seeking the views of the people was made. What is very important is that far from there being support for Pakistan the debate in the Urdu press in particular is infact placed squarely against the possibility of the state’s merger with Pakistan. Ranbir was playing an important part. Soon after the transfer of power plan had been announced and the Princely states had begun to speak on the option of choosing either of the dominions that was provided in the plan, in Kashmir lead stories were raising important questions. ‘Partition of India and Kashmir’, questioned the policy of partition and said the Indian National Congress and Jinnah had divided India. It also said that very soon Muslims of Pakistan would realize that by separating from India they have been losers: ‘. . . by parting with India they have left the support and shelter of a nation that has weathered many storms. . . . As for Pakistan it is already drowning in deep waters and it will only ensure that Kashmir too sinks with it. . . .’91 A couple of days earlier the paper had done another story – ‘What is the Issue’. The story went on the line that even the talk of ‘Swarajya’ for Kashmir must mean linking with India. ‘Kashmir’ it said ‘could not imagine joining Pakistan, which is barely surviving.’ 92 Yet another story on how Pakistan was not an option was titled ‘For How Long Will This Continue’. The policy of wait and see has pushed Kashmir to the door of Pakistan, it said ‘. . . Kashmir can not allow it self to be destroyed by merging with Pakistan . . . it will lose its identity. . . .’93 A very interesting debate infact continued on the economic feasibility of Pakistan as an independent dominion for several months after Pakistan had come into being. As Maharaja Hari Singh kept up the suspense by not signing in favour of India or Pakistan, efforts were made to convince Kashmir’s Muslim population of the bright future of Pakistan. ‘. . . Pakistan has enough agricultural production,



AMMU N ehru P uts A bdullah A M M U in C harge

147

mines and perhaps even oil. . . .’ 94 The idea was to negate the impression that if Kashmir chose to merge with Pakistan its financial future would not remain secure.95 The widely respected socialist leader Achyut Patwardhan noted: ‘. . . overall the picture is bright . . . it gladdens one’s heart to see a state in which 80% are Muslims fighting against Pakistan and proclaiming their faith in a secular democratic India’.96 The well known academic figure of the then Punjab, Prof. Ruchi Ram Sahni was of same view. He had said: ‘. . .glad to see that public opinion in Jammu & Kashmir is daily growing in favour of India.’97 Several freelance commentators and those who travelled in Kashmir at the time pointed out on the basis of what they saw and the conditions that prevailed that mass public opinion was clearly in support of the Maharaja’s decision to merge Kashmir with India. Current was a popular magazine at the time. It commissioned the well known novelist and poet Khawaja Ahmad Abbas to travel through the state and gauge public opinion as to how the Kashmiri masses had responded to the accession of the state to India. In the article that Abbas contributed he first explained how the Kashmiri Muslim was much different from the stereotyped Muslims and Pathans of the western districts of Punjab and the Frontier Province. Historically the Kashmiri Muslim had always been peace loving and coexisting with others had been a way of life. This view of Abbas was quite similar to several other studies that had discussed communal relations between communities in the state. Abbas noted: . . . .there are those who believe that because of its Muslim majority, Kashmir is as good as lost to us. . . . The two nation theory has eaten into the vitals of public opinion . . . it is difficult if not impossible for most Indians to imagine that a substantial number of Muslims will prefer to stay in India. . . . Let us be clear, Kashmir will vote for India the whole weight of Kashmir is on the side of India against the ideology of Pakistan. . . .98

Like Abbas, N.S. Phadke was in Kashmir just as the problem was beginning to develop. He published his impression in a small booklet. Interestingly Phadke had come close to Sheikh Abdullah and had the chance to discuss issues with him at length. He was among the first to suggest that whatever Abdullah may have been saying in public, at heart, he retained serious doubts on the accession. Phadke

148

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

emphasized on how ‘freedom, before accession’ was Abdullah’s essential objective.99 But it is the other points raised by Phadke in this important assessment that we need to take more note of: . . . The Kashmiri man does not bother himself about what England and America and other big powers think or do. His political ideology is straight and simple. There is not a shred of doubt in his mind that the raiders are backed by Pakistan and that Mr. Jinnah has always entertained secret ugly designs on Kashmir. He knows that there will be no freedom in Kashmir until Pakistan is completely beaten . . . it is true that the people of Kashmir will definitely ratify the accession to India thanks to the atrocities perpetuated by the raiders. . . .100

Interestingly Phadke even while he talks of how some Kashmiris gave the impression of seeking independence yet they wished to have little to do with Pakistan. We have earlier noted Phadke’s assessment of the poor state of economic activity in the second half of 1947, resulting from Pakistan’s blockade and the invasion. Phadke went on to note: ‘. . . Although nobody thinks of having business deals with merchants of Pakistan, the Jammu road is clear and imports and exports have begun to flow between Kashmir and India . . . there would be no shortage of supplies from India too. . . .’101 Phadke also noted: ‘. . . people in Kashmir know very well that their lives and properties have been saved only because of India’s intervention . . . they cherish a deep unshakable sense of loyalty to India. They stand as a united people communal differences have been sunk in common patriotism. . . .’102 Phadke’s reading of the situation is important for the reason that he was among the biggest admirers of Abdullah and also of his ‘New Kashmir’ which vaguely translates to an ‘independent Kashmir’. Thus when a person like him records an impression that is clear in suggesting that the vast majority of ordinary Kashmiris saw their future, their economic security and prosperity in India, the observation assumes the need of serious attention. The Jawaharlal Nehru papers contain a note dictated by Nehru on 17 April 1949. The note was sent in response to an office memorandum issued by the Home Ministry in November 1948. Basically the Home Ministry had drawn attention to people of Jammu & Kashmir seeking employment in the government of India. Ideally and in most situations



A M M U in C harge AMMU N ehru P uts A bdullah

149

this should have been seen as a very welcome development. But surprisingly the Prime Minister appears to be discouraging the trend, perhaps more pointedly in government departments: . . . This direction was no doubt justified from several points of view and I think that in such matters we should proceed in consultation with the Government of Jammu & Kashmir and with their cooperation. In particular we should avoid doing something which induces people in Kashmir to migrate to Delhi and elsewhere in search of employment. Competent persons are required in Kashmir and incompetent persons are useless anywhere. Nevertheless it might be worthwhile to consider this question afresh and permit, in special cases, the temporary employment of people here if they are otherwise suitable. This might perhaps be limited to Kashmir refugees who have been here for a long time and not newcomers. Some of them are quite good, but long unemployment is having its effect upon them and they are deteriorating. . . . . . . I am putting this forward as suggestion which might be taken up with the Kashmir Government and some way found which fits in with the Kashmir Government’s desires and needs and yet afford some possibility of employment for Kashmiri refugees here who have been stranded for a long time. Naturally appointments must be on merit and they have to be temporary. . . .103

Even as Nehru was not keen to encourage well qualified Kashmiris to join government service in Delhi and other parts of India he is clearly in favour of encouraging ‘bonafide’ tourists to visit Kashmir: . . . It seems to me very desirable to encourage bonafide tourists to go to Kashmir. This is necessary both from the point of view of the economy of the State and to produce better psychological conditions and normalcy. At present the rules are too difficult. Even wives of senior officers cannot easily get permits, because of the roundabout procedure. Of course we have to check undesirables. But a way should be found to permit bonafide people to go there without trouble. I am writing to the Defence Ministry about this. . . .104

One of the serious results of the disturbed conditions was that ever since the invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 the flow of visitors had been adversely impacted. Revenue generated from tourism was a major source of income for a vast section of population. As the Prime Minister Nehru put it: . . . One of the unfortunate results of the tension and confusion in Kashmir,

150

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

and more especially in Srinagar, during the last two months or so was to scare away the tourists. The valley of Kashmir depends a great deal upon the tourist traffic. This year a large number of visitors went to the Valley and, as a result, innumerable shopkeepers and others invested their savings in goods for sale. In June internal controversies produced troubled atmosphere and the tourists started to fade away till hardly any remained. The whole economic life of Srinagar was powerfully affected by this. . . . . . . We could do much to help the State and its people at this stage by encouraging visitors to go to Kashmir. As a matter of fact, in some ways the latter half of August, September and October are the best months in the Valley. Our Railway Ministry is considering what steps they can take in the way of offering concessions to visitors to Kashmir and they will probably make an announcement fairly soon. We should also try to encourage the sale of Kashmir arts and crafts. . . .105

The same day Nehru wrote to the Railway Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri: . . . I enclose a copy of a letter I am sending to Chief Ministers. I hope your Railway Board is examining the question of concessions for visitors to Kashmir. Of course, you must wait for a few days to allow things to quieten down in Kashmir. Meanwhile, we should work out our own schemes and proposals. . . . . . . The approach to this matter might be two fold: (1) Just concessional rates by train to Pathankot, and (2) What I suggested to you on the telephone that is some inclusive rates for travel and stay in the Valley. This will necessarily have to be done in co-operation with Kashmir Tourist Bureau who would then make arrangements for the stay and transport of visitors in the Valley, etc. . . .106

To understand the emphasis on tourism in more correct perspective we need once again to go back to Michael Brecher. Attention is sought to be drawn to this work for two main reasons. One that Brecher actually spent time among the Kashmiris and second and more importantly he contributed an assessment in the form of a sub-chapter ‘Attitude of the Kashmiris to a plebiscite’.107 Brecher is perhaps the only contemporary commentator from the West who has explained why many foreigners who were in Kashmir at the time of the outbreak of the conflict appear to have gathered the impression that a plebiscite could have gone in favour of Pakistan.



N ehru P uts A bdullah A M M U in C harge AMMU

151

In 1951, Brecher interviewed over 200 Kashmiris in different locations of the valley. Brecher has suggested that the impression of most foreigners with regard to the plebiscite was incorrect and misleading: ‘. . . The reasons are to be found in the nature of the social milieu in which the average foreigner and tourist moves. He comes in contact only with those people whether in Srinagar or the hill stations who are almost entirely dependent on the tourist trade for their livelihood. . . .’ The obvious issue that arises then is why did those whose economic interests were linked to the tourist trade think on these lines or rather the way they did ? Several reasons contributed to the impression. The major communication link, the Jhelum valley road that links Srinagar to Rawalpinid was open round the year. Where as the road link with India was undependable because of the Banihal Pass and was closed for most of the winter.108 Interestingly there was also the impression that with far more Europeans residing in Pakistan and with a greater British presence in Pakistan the flow of tourists would be greater if Kashmir was to merge with Pakistan through the plebiscite. When we keep in mind the size of the new dominion of Pakistan, the number of British who stayed on in the region was many times more than the Europeans who stayed back in India after 1947. One important reason for this was the bonding that the Europeans had developed with feudal families particularly in the Punjab. The lavish entertainment and hunting expeditions only added to the attraction for the foreigners. Brecher also pointed out that the number of Kashmiris who controlled the high end tourist trade was very small – perhaps single digit in terms of the percentage of population. But as happens so often they were well connected, vocal, organized and put together this gave them and their opinion a level of importance far greater than was merited by their numbers or standing in Kashmir society. Then there was a second category of Kashmiri people who thought in terms of merging Kashmir with Pakistan. This community was greatly vocal and talked of religious affinity. But this small section cut little ice with the common Kashmiri who had only recently experienced the invasion in which the raiders all of whom were without an exception Muslim. Memories of the brutality and the heartless nature of the invaders were too recent to have been forgotten.

152

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Brecher further suggests that some of Sheikh Abdullah’s reform measures – mainly the land reforms had played an important role in dissuading the Kashmiri peasantry from thinking of aligning with Pakistan. In sum Brecher suggests that, but for for about 10 per cent of Kashmir’s population: ‘. . . the overwhelming majority . . . favors the continuation of the present pro Indian government of Jammu & Kashmir. . . .’109 As we shall see later even as Sheikh Abdullah began to lose mass support towards the middle of 1952, the Kashmiri populace as Brecher put it, retained ‘attraction to India’. Another reason for this was ‘the Indo-Kashmir Agreement of July 1952’.110 Longono Recardo was another European in Kashmir in the early months of the crisis. He noted how the Hindus and Muslims were not only living in harmony but were virtually indistinguishable.111 D.N. Kalhan was in Kashmir in 1950. He wrote several articles for the Hindustan Times. These were later compiled and published. One common view that runs through most of these writings is that by and large the masses of Kashmir had welcomed Jammu & Kashmir’s accession to India. The main reason Kalhan, cites is that the common man foresaw his economic future and well being in India.112 Kalhan also in specific draws attention to the large number of developmental works. He says that the uncertainity with regard to the accession had disappeared within a couple of years. Balraj Madhok who wrote extensively on the issue had retained another important point. As early as 1951 he pointed out that even if the events in Kashmir were to be considered as a crisis – the issue was between India and Kashmir. Meaning thereby that Pakistan was a non-entity in the developments.113 For decades now India has been insisting that the problem in Jammu & Kashmir and issues that require resolution are all limited to being between the state of Jammu & Kashmir and the Union of India. Several similar issues that are known to have pushed things to an edge in the context of relations with many of the other newly merged states had got resolved in due course. Pakistan as such, as India has for long maintained had no connection with such issues. What is interesting is that the perception of Pakistan having intervened in the Kashmir issue for reasons other than any concern for the



A M M U in C harge N ehru P uts A bdullah AMMU

153

Kashmiris is a view that has prevailed among the common people almost from the first days of the outbreak of the problem. As early as in 1954 a short booklet Conspiracy in Kashmir noted: ‘. . . Pakistan and Kashmir are interrelated not for the people of Kashmir nor for the people of Pakistan, Kashmir is a factor that is maintaining Pakistan’s unity. . . .’114 This observation is quite important. It is well known that from the day that Pakistan emerged as a separate dominion it did not see even a single week of political stability or a future that appeared smooth and certain. The crisis in Kashmir that developed as a result of Pakistan’s adventuristic approach to the interpretation of the partition plan went on in course of time to be a blessing to it. The conflict in Kashmir converted itself into a point of rallying – a catalyst that enabled and continues to enable the troubled state to hold its people and the state togather. Several scholars infact even in Pakistan have commented that the Kashmir issue has infact enabled a section of Pakistan’s elite including the army to retain relevance and to capture power and influence.115 What can therefore be suggested is that the common Kashmiri viewed the accession of the state to India as part of a natural historical process and also visualized in the accession the potential for a better future. We must also keep in mind that for centuries the Kashmiri masses have suffered the curse of poverty. Their best hope as most belived to break free of the curse was to be a part of India. Religion had never dominated the Kashmiri’s way of life, it certainly did not do so in the early years of the problem. Issues related to religion were a much later introduction in the discourse. On 3 June, the day that Mountbatten announced the transfer of power plan, Ranbir did an editorial explaining how Kashmir’s integrity could be ensured only by aligning with India. It said that: ‘Pakistan was like a sword hanging on Kashmir’. Very importantly it raised the issue of how ‘for the common Kashmiri economic freedom and prosperity were not the only concerns.’116 As things began to heat up in the Princely states with regard to the signing of the Instruments of Accession a process that was to follow the transfer of power and lapse of paramountcy more pressure was built in Kashmir as well. Ranbir said: ‘. . . every well wisher of

154

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Jammu & Kashmir desires merger with India . . . even if Kashmir seeks freedom it can only be with India . . . every Kashmiri should ask its leaders to join India. . . .’117 There also appears to have been some mention of Kashmir staying away from both India and Pakistan and infact maintaining some link with the United Kingdom. Ranbir came out strongly against any such move.118 A few days later (10 June) another report in the paper noted: ‘. . . all our prosperity is linked to joining India . . . we must join India – whether a Hindu King or a Muslim Nawab is of no concern. . . .’ Another issue that stands out in the early days rather emphatically is that the idea of ‘Azadi’ was an idea that was tactfully implanted among common people and was essentially of interest only among influential and important sections of the Kashmiri people. What is perhaps of most importance is that not withstanding the all out effort of the important political activists based in Pakistan and a few even in Kashmir the masses were unable to visualize their future in terms of just Hindu or Muslim or being a part of Pakistan. It is this rather simple and uncomplicated understanding of the conditions that ruled out the possibility of the common people of Kashmir choosing Pakistan as an alternative to India. NOTES 1. This is what the Governor of Punjab Sir Evan Jenkins recorded of his assessment: ‘In the time available it will be quite impossible to make a clean job of partition . . . after 15 August, there will be appalling confusion. . . .’ Transfer of Power, vol. XII (81), 12 July 1947.   Earlier he had noted: ‘A peaceful partition of Punjab is most improbable . . . will excite anger among all Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus . . . communal rioting will spread rapidly. . . .’ Transfer of Power, vol. XII (274), 1 May 1947 to Mountbatten. 2. Frank Messervy, ‘Kashmir’, Asiatic Review, January 1949, pp. 469-83. 3. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence (reference here 12th edn., 2017). 4. Ibid., p. 82. 5. Nawab Mohmmad Mohabat Khan had decided to merge Junagadh with Pakistan following the option given to the princely states to choose either of the dominions. A majority of the population was Hindu. But insisting that the Nawab did not enjoy the right to accede to Pakistan in view of the



A M M U in C harge AMMU N ehru P uts A bdullah

155

demographic construct of his people, the government of India exposed itself to the same charge as was made by Pakistan with regard to Kashmir where a Hindu ruler ruled over state in which a vast majority were Muslim. However there was a major difference. India already had over 40 million Muslims, unlike Pakistan where the number of Hindus that remained after 1947 was negligible. India had also of course conducted referendum in February 1948 in which 91 per cent voted in support of merger with India. 6. The Tribune, 28 October 1947. The significance of the views of The Tribune are to be understood in terms of its being the most respected daily of the region. Gandhiji had once called it the most important paper in terms of its political assessment. Even as it suffered huge losses in the riots that followed the partition of Punjab, it relocated in Shimla and continued to retain a chain of reporters in Jammu & Kashmir. It was perhaps the only paper that covered grassroot stories and other such reports in relation to Kashmir. 7. Ibid., 3 January 1948. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., 30 October 1947. 10. The Tribune, 19 October 1947. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid., 2 November 1947. 13. Ibid., 23 November 1947. 14. Ibid. 15. Radha Rajan, Jammu & Kashmir: Dilemma of Accession, pp. 73-4. 16. Ibid. 17. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML. 18. The Tribune, 23 November 1947. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., 13 January 1948. 21. Ibid., 10 December 1947. 22. Hindustan Times for several related reports, 3 November 1947. 23. JN(SG), 4, MSS, NMML. 24. JN(SG), 4, MSS, NMML, Nehru’s Memo to the Chief of the Army Staff, 29 October 1947. 25. JN(SG), 4, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Hari Singh, 30 December 1947. 26. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Dulip Singh, 1 November 1947. The bracketed lines were deleted by the Prime Minister after he had dictated them. 27. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML, ‘A Note on Kashmir’ by Prime Minister Nehru. 28. Ibid. 29. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Kanwar Dulip Singh, 21 November

156

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

1947. Also JN(SG), 4, ‘The only person who can effectively deal with the situation is Sheikh Abdullah. I do not suppose he can convert the confirmed Muslim Leaguers and the like. But there is always a middle mass of opinion which is influenced by events and experiences.’ 30. Roshni (Urdu), 12 October 1947. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML. 35. Ibid. 36. See for example, Sardar Patels Correspondence, vol. I, no. 49, p. 45. 37. Ranbir (Urdu), 1 June 1947. 38. Kashmir Calling (Kashmir Bureau of Information, New Delhi) (Rajagopalachari Papers, V Instalment, Serial No. 74, NMML). 39. SPC, vol. VI, p. 186. 40. JN(SG), File 9, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Patel, 6 May 1948. 41. The Tribune, 26 September 1949. 42. Hindustan Times, 2 December 1949. 43. The Tribune, 30 November 1947. 44. Ibid. 45. The Tribune, 26 February 1949. 46. Hindustan Times, 2 December 1949. 47. The Tribune, 19 July 1947. 48. Ibid. 49. Swami Bhaskaranand, The Kashmir Cauldron (Simla, 1956), p. 35. 50. JN(SG), File 23-I, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Abdullah, 10 May 1949. 51. Ibid., 14 May 1949. 52. Ibid., File 23-II. 53. JN(SG), File 8, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Abdullah, 3 April 1948. 54. Prem Shankar Jha, The Origins of a Dispute (New Delhi, 2003), p. 49. 55. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML, Letter of Nehru to Mehar Chand Mahajan, Prime Minister Jammu & Kashmir, 21 October 1947. 56. ABC of the Kashmir Question (n.d.), Acc. NMML, New Delhi. 57. The Tribune, 7 August 1947. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. Statesman, 4 November 1947. 62. SW, vol. IV., p. 294. 63. Civil & Military Gazette (hereafter CMG), 4 November 1947. 64. Ibid. 65. The Tribune, 5 November 1947.



A M M U in C harge AMMU N ehru P uts A bdullah

157

66. CMG, 5 November 1947. 67. Ibid., 11 November 1947. 68. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML, Telegram from Prime Minister India to Prime Minister Pakistan. 69. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Abdullah 21 November 1947. 70. JN(SG), MSS, NMML. 71. Statesman, 26 November 1947. 72. The Tribune, 26 November 1947. 73. SW (Second Series), vol. 23, p. 306. 74. Ibid. 75. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML, copy of Nehru’s answer in Parliament. The copy shows 24 November as the date, the answer was given on 25 November 1947. 76. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML. 77. JN(SG), File 8, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Maharaja Hari Singh 3 April 1948. 78. JN(SG), File 143-II, MSS, NMML (Top Secret Telegram from Nehru in Srinagar to M.O. Mathai PA to the PM). This was telegram language. 79. The Tribune, 30 October 1947. 80. The Tribune, 15 December 1947. 81. Organizer, 15 January 1948. 82. Ibid. 83. Ranbir, 10 June 1947. 84. Ibid. 85. For report The Tribune, 25 July 1947; 30 July 1947. 86. Ibid., 25 July 1947. 87. See ibid., 4 July 1947. 88. Radha Ranjan, Jammu & Kashmir: Dilemma of Accession, pp. 48, 53, 62. 89. The Tribune, 4 August 1947. 90. Ranbir, 17 June 1947. 91. Ibid., 10 June 1947. 92. Ibid., 8 June 1947. 93. Ibid., 7 June 1947. 94. Roshni, 27 October 1947. 95. Ibid., This was an article by Sannah Ullah and Akhtar Kashmiri. 96. The Tribune, 4 January 1947. 97. Ibid., 1 July 1947. 98. Current, 26 October 1949 99. N.S. Phadke, Birth Pangs of New Kashmir (n.d., probably 1949) 100. Ibid., p. 26-7. 101. Ibid., p. 20. 102. Ibid.

158

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

103. JN(SG), File 22-II, MSS, NMML – Memo by Nehru for the Home Ministry with copy to Kashmir Secetariat. 104. Ibid., File 23-II, Nehru to Patel, 30 May 1949. 105. JN(SG), File 193, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed with a copy to Lal Bahadur Shastri, Minister Railways, 10 August 1953. 106. Ibid. 107. Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir. Brecher was associated with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid. 110. Ibid. 111. Longono Ricardo, Democratic Kashmir (9 pages). 112. D.N. Kalhan, Report on Kashmir (Srinagar, n.d.). 113. Balraj Madhok, Kashmir Divided (1951), Madhok was a senior member of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. 114. Conspiracy in Kashmir (Srinagar, 1954). 115. See for example Ishtaq Ahamad, p. 451. 116. Ranbir, 10 June 1947. 117. Ibid., 12 June 1947 118. Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

‘Pilgrimage of Hindustan to Lake Success (UN) the Hotbed of International Intrigue’ Nehru sees Kashmir as a World Problem

I

n chapter 3 we have seen how the invasion of Jammu & Kashmir    by well armed and trained militia led and guided by regular officers      of the Pakistan army had turned by the end of year into a full fledged war. India’s decision to seek intervention of the United Nations drew extensive criticism at the time and has continued to do so ever since. MOUNTBATTEN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Prime Minister Nehru had met Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali late in the night on 21 December 1947 at Government House, New Delhi (Rashtrapati Bhawan). Before meeting Liaquat Ali, Nehru had a long meeting with Lord Mountbatten. This meeting with Mountbatten was scheduled only for a few minutes but lasted for over an hour. The meeting with Liaquat Ali thus got delayed and started only at 10 p.m. Nehru recorded the minutes of this ‘conversation’ as he called it. These minutes are important in the context of understanding how the idea of referring the dispute to the United Nations actually gripped Nehru’s mind:

160

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

. . . Lord Mountbatten referred to the great increase in the prestige of India all over the world if we could bring about a settlement, and to our immediately applying ourselves to the various internal problems which demanded our attention. The settlement of course should essentially be on the lines we have repeatedly laid down, i.e. reference to the U.N.O. to stop the fighting and when this is done and peace and order restored a plebiscite under U.N.O. auspices. . . . . . . Lord Mountbatten also said that Liaquat Ali Khan was greatly exercised at the possibility of the Government of India repudiating or going back on the financial settlement arrived at. These settlements according to Liaquat Ali Khan had taken place nearly a month ago and nothing had been done yet to implement them. Was the matter going back to the Arbitral Tribunal for decision?. . . . . . . I stated in reply that there was no question of our challenging or repudiating the financial agreements arrived at. The only question that arose was when to make the payments. We would stand by the agreements and the Arbitral Tribunal would not be concerned with them. Our difficulty was that if we made any payments now, when a kind of undeclared war was going on between us, that money would be used in carrying on that war against us. It would be foolish for us to make those payments until this Kashmir business had been settled. . . . . . . Lord Mountbatten said that the money was really Pakistan’s, i.e., it was a joint fund and this part of it therefore belonged to them. He appreciated however our difficulty but would suggest that we should not emphasise this fact of non-payment in our talks as this would raise further difficulties. We might make it clear that so far as the financial agreements were concerned we did not challenge them. . . . . . . Lord Mountbatten said he agreed with that reference, but could we not add to it that after law and order has been restored U.N.O. would supervise and carry out a plebiscite as we had previously declared ? I said that we could not add this to our reference. It was entirely a separate matter and much would depend on developments. We were committed not only by our settlements but also by our general policy to allow the people of Kashmir decide their future. Indeed it was not possible in the present context of things, for us to hold Kashmir against the will of the people. But we were definitely of opinion that this could not be tied up on the present reference to UNO. In that reference there would no doubt be a historical narrative which would contain mention of the fact of our offering a plebiscite under UNO auspices. Apart from that there would be no further mention of this.

Plate 1: Jawaharlal Nehru with Abdul Samad Khan (centre) and Sheikh Abdullah, July 1945, Tangmurg, Kashmir. Courtesy: Nehru Memorial Museum & Library (NMML), New Delhi.

Plate 2: Jawaharlal Nehru with Abdul Ghaffar Khan to his left and just behind (in white coat) Mohammad Yunus. Also seen is Maulana Azad, a key member of Nehru’s core team on Kashmir, June 1945. Courtesy: NMML, New Delhi.

Plate 3: Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah on a ‘shikara’ on the Dal (Srinagar). Nehru later addressed the open annual session of the National Conference, 24 September 1949. Courtesy: NMML, New Delhi.

Plate 4: The geo-political importance of Kashmir attracted international attention particularly during the cold war years. Jawaharlal Nehru is seen with Sheikh Abdullah at a symbolic signage that points towards countries which had borders with Kashmir, 4 July 1949. Courtesy: NMML, New Delhi.

Plate 5: An apparently worried Jawaharlal Nehru as the invasion of Kashmir became a full fledged war. Defence Minister Sardar Baldev Singh and Chief of the Army Staff Gen. K.M. Cariappa are also seen, as an unidentified officer is besides the Prime Minister, at a border area November 1948. Courtesy: NMML, New Delhi.

Plate 6: Maharaja Hari Singh, Begum Abdullah, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Maharani of Kashmir at the Shalimar Bagh (May 1948). Courtesy: NMML, New Delhi.

Plate 7: Maharaja Hari Singh greeting Prime Minister Nehru on Nehru’s visit to Kashmir, May 1948. The Prime Minister had frequently noted his dislike for Hari Singh. Courtesy: Photo Division, Soochna Bhawan, New Delhi.

Plate 8: Sardar Patel as Home Minister had hosted an ‘At Home’ to meet rulers of the princely states of Central India. Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir had also been especially invited, New Delhi, 20 April 1948. Courtesy: Photo Division, Soochna Bhawan, New Delhi.

Plate 9: By the end of 1948 the Indian army was generally in control of the situation in Kashmir and the ongoing conflict. Prime Minister Nehru with Gen. K.M. Cariappa, Srinagar, 20 November 1948. Courtesy: NMML, New Delhi.

Plate 10: Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru were close friends. Nehru had unflinching trust in Abdullah. Abdullah is seen welcoming the Prime Minister in Srinagar (1949). Courtesy: NMML, New Delhi.

Plate 11: Sheikh Abdullah seen taking oath as a Member of the Constituent Assembly of India, 16 June 1949. Courtesy: Photo Division, Soochna Bhawan, New Delhi.

Plate 12: Sheikh Abdullah in the Constituent Assembly with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, 16 June 1949. Courtesy: Photo Division, Soochna Bhawan, New Delhi.

Plate 13: Sheikh Abdullah in the Constituent Assembly. Satya Narain Sinha the senior Bihar leader is seated to his left, 16 June 1949. Courtesy: Photo Division, Soochna Bhawan, New Delhi.

Plate 14: Sheikh Abdullah had hosted a reception at the Kashmir Arts Emporium in New Delhi, 18 November 1949. Sardar Patel was at the reception. The Sardar and Abdullah were not on good terms. Abdullah in his Autobiography has noted ‘Sardar Patel did not count me among his friends’. Patel is on record several times disapproving of Abdullah’s politics and working. Courtesy: Photo Division, Soochna Bhawan, New Delhi.

Plate 15: Jawaharlal Nehru had a deep bonding with Kashmir. Stress, overwork or an issue of health, it was Kashmir that always beckoned him. This remarkable photograph shows Nehru water surfing on the Dal, 14 June 1951. Courtesy: Jim Burke, Life (New York).

Plate 16: Jawaharlal Nehru with Bakula Rinpoche, Leh, 8 July 1949. Rinpoche was a highly respected leader of Ladakh. He represented Ladakh in the Jammu & Kashmir Assembly from 1949 to 1967 and in the Lok Sabha from 1967 to 1977. Courtesy: NMML, New Delhi.

Plate 17: A pensive Jawaharlal Nehru with V.K. Krishna Menon in Kashmir. Courtesy: NMML, New Delhi.

Plate 18: Jawaharlal Nehru with Yuvraj Karan Singh at the Convocation of the Jammu & Kashmir University, Srinagar, 24 September 1949. Sheikh Abdullah is also seen. Courtesy: NMML, New Delhi.

Plate 19: Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee seen here with Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed (Srinagar, August 1952) In less than a year Dr. Mookerjee lost his life while in detention in Srinagar (22 June 1953). Courtesy: Photo Division, Soochna Bhawan, New Delhi.

Plate 20: Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee had visited Srinagar at the invitation of the Sadar-i-Riyasat Karan Singh. The two are seen here (August 1952). Courtesy: Photo Division, Soochna Bhawan, New Delhi.

Plate 21: Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee with Sheikh Abdullah (Srinagar, August 1952). Courtesy: Photo Division, Soochna Bhawan, New Delhi.

Plate 22: The Shankaracharya temple has a commanding view of Srinagar. Also known as the Jyeshteshwara temple it sits on top of the Shankaracharya hill. The temples dramatic history goes back as some say to about 2564 bc, others put it at about 200 bc. It has been restored and repaired several times through the ages both by Hindu and Muslim rulers. The present structure goes back to c. ad 1200. Dedicated to Lord Shiva it came to be associated with the great philosopher saint over 1000 years ago. Courtesy: John Burke, 1868, Heritage photo gallery, Srinagar Airport.

Plate 23: Almost as soon as Pakistan had come into being (August 1947) it was faced with a series of crisis, the most serious of which was the tribal unrest. The Pakistan sponsored and supported so called ‘tribal invasion’ in this sense proved a blessing for Pakistan as it diverted attention to Kashmir. Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali are presented as happily looking on as invaders are pushed into Kashmir. Jinnah is shown remarking: ‘What will we do if the Kashmir outlet is closed’ (Shankar’s Weekly, 25 July 1948).

Plate 24: The decision taken by India to accept the United Nation’s proposal for a ceasefire was widely criticized at the time. A large part of the state had been taken over by the invading force when the ceasefire’ was enforced (Shankar’s Weekly, 22 August 1948).

Plate 25: Swayamvar is an ancient Indian tradition where the bride to be was free to chose her partner. This classic illustration shows Kashmir deciding in India’s favour. Sardar Patel who was Minister for Home and Affairs of State is being garlanded by the ‘Kashmir’ maiden much to the shock and dismay of Pakistan and other world leaders – British Prime Minister Attlee and possibly Stalin (in the background) (Shankar’s Weekly, 24 October 1948).

Plate 26: Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had been very generous as assets were divided between India and Pakistan in 1947. This apart he had cordial relations with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Liaquat Ali. Several agreements were reached. This illustration depicts Pakistan’s betrayal in the form of the invasion of October 1947 (Shankar’s Weekly, 3 October 1948).

Plate 27: India’s reference of the dispute in Jammu & Kashmir to the United Nations had drawn widespread criticism at the time. Nehru later admitted that India could not expect any justice from the highly polarized UN. This classic illustration truly sums up India's predicament (Shankar’s Weekly, 11 July 1948).

Plate 28: India had sought intervention of the United Nations with great hope. The UN essentially sidetracked the issue leaving Jawaharlal Nehru disillusioned (Shankar’s Weekly, 25 July 1948).

Plate 29: Indian forces had clearly fought themselves into a commanding position in the war in Kashmir that broke out following the invasion in October 1947. When India suddenly agreed to the United Nations proposal for a ceasefire the decision was widely criticized. Several observers had noted that UN was not serious about the ceasefire and if India had delayed it, possibly much of what became POK could have been recovered (Shankar’s Weekly, 9 January 1949).

Plate 30: As early as 4 November 1947 a report of the Statesman had suggested that the idea of a plebiscite was planted in Prime Minister Nehru's mind by Lord Mountbatten. Subsequently Nehru appears in two minds. In private he appears against it, but in public he supported it. In August 1953 Pakistan's Prime Minister Mohammed Ali and Prime Minister Nehru issued a joint statement following several rounds of talks (17-20 August) in which the conduct of a plebiscite was greatly emphasized. Nothing of course came out of it, not a single step in the direction was ever taken (Shankar’s Weekly, 30 August 1953).

Plate 31: It was generally well known at the time that Kashmir was all for India and Prime Minister Nehru should not have bothered about international points of view. Liaquat Ali Pakistan’s Prime Minister all dressed to impress and befriend the ‘Kashmir maiden’ as Dixon the mediator holds Nehru’s attention (Shankar’s Weekly, 3 September 1950).

Plate 32: India found itself in a difficult position at the United Nations (Shankar’s Weekly, 8 April 1951).

Plate 33: Jawaharlal Nehru had personally ensured that Sheikh Abdullah was brought to power in Jammu Kashmir. Initially Abdullah appears to have started of on the lines that Nehru had expected. But in a couple of years it became clear that he was working to his personal agenda. Within a year of this remarkable illustration by Shankar, Abdullah was dismissed. The five men on one side are Nehru, Ayyangar, President Rajendra Prasad, Maulana Azad and Katju. With the exception of the President, this was Nehru’s core team on Kashmir (Shankar’s Weekly, 27 July 1952).

Plate 34: Sheikh Abdullah was expected to ensure the unconditional merger of Kashmir with India. Ironically he became the main hurdle. A dismayed Nehru is seen with his key advisers on Kashmir, Maulana Azad and Kailash Nath Katju trying to appease Abdullah who is shown standing aloof and defiant (Shankar’s Weekly, 19 July 1953).

Plate 35: By 1953 issues in Kashmir had become complicated. Prime Minister Nehru had been singularly responsible for placing Abdullah as head of government in Kashmir. It was natural for him to have felt betrayed and let down. Abdullah was dismissed on 10 August 1953 (Shankar’s Weekly, 9 August 1953).

Plate 36: Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed had replaced Sheikh Abdullah as Prime Minister of Kashmir. In his very first official correspondence sent to Prime Minister Nehru (Telegram 10 August 1953) he referred to the activities of several foreigners in Srinagar. The United Nation’s Office he said was being used as a base for anti-India propaganda by some foreigners. Nehru himself had often directed the concerned officers to be very careful and selective in issuing travel permits to foreigners particularly journalists for Kashmir (Shankar’s Weekly, 15 August 1953).

Plate 37: Jawaharlal Nehru was personally supervising affairs in Jammu & Kashmir. By 1952 the tangle was complex. His friend Abdullah had become a major problem (Shankar’s Weekly, 13 July 1952).

Plate 38: The decision to seek the United Nation’s intervention in the dispute in Kashmir drew widespread criticism in the country. Prime Minister Nehru too had later said that justice could not be expected from the United Nations (Shankar’s Weekly, 18 December 1949).



P I L G R I M A G E O F H I N D U S TA N TO L A K E S U C C E S S

161

Our demand would be that aggression must cease and the raiders should withdraw. It was possible that as a consequence of UNO taking action in this matter, whether by sending a Commission or otherwise, other developments might take place. We would deal with them as they arose. . . . . . . There was a great deal of talk round about this position. Lord Mountbatten was anxious that I should somehow talk on the plebiscite in some form or other so as to enable Liaquat Ali Khan to put it across his people who were greatly excited about Kashmir. . . .1

Incidentally Mountbatten also told Nehru of how seriously ill Jinnah was: ‘Lord Mountbatten mentioned also casually that Mr. Jinnah had been given a maximum of six months by his doctors and he was very ill.’ The fact that it was Mountbatten who prevailed on Nehru to take the dispute to the United Nations also becomes fairly certain from a letter that the Prime Minister wrote to Mountbatten on 26 December 1947, that is just a few days before India actually went on to seek the United Nation’s intervention: . . . Your suggestion that the question should be referred to UNO and that they should be asked to send a commission involved a great many difficulties. First of all according to Pakistan they are no parties to this fighting. The actual invaders therefore were people with no formal standing as a State. We cannot ask UNO to arbitrate between raiders and the Dominion of India. We cannot bring Pakistan into the picture when they deny complicity. It must be remembered that all the fighting has taken place on Kashmir State territory i.e., Indian Dominion territory. We have not thus far touched Pakistan territory. We are the aggrieved party. Are we to seek the cooperation of the invaders and those who have done us this grievous wrong and appear jointly before the UNO ? I do not think that would have been a proper procedure for us to adopt. . . . . . . Nevertheless your suggestion for a reference to UNO was accepted by us in the only way it seemed feasible and in accordance with facts. This was for us to draw the attention of UNO to this invasion and to the fact that Pakistan was aiding and abetting it, and ask them to call upon Pakistan to refrain from doing so. This would inevitably be a unilateral reference. To say that it was an agreed reference would make it a collusive one without any force. Of course when UNO has siezed with the matter other developments may take place. If Mr. Liaquat Khan wants an excuse to put before his people then he would have that excuse when we make a reference to UNO. . . .2

162

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

REFERENCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS – MOST SAW IT AS A MISTAKE

Ever since the outbreak of the dispute there has generally been a view that it was probably a mistake to have referred the issue to the United Nations. Importantly Nehru himself had in a ‘Top Secret’ letter to Abdullah shared a similar view. 3 Infact it is this reference of the issue to the United Nations that distinguished the dispute from other such disputes. What the reference of the problem to the United Nations did was it turned an internal dispute into an issue that attracted the interventional right of other countries that actually had no connection with the issue. In sum the matter now became one of international concern. By early April (1948) the Prime Minister was deeply worried. Writing to Maharaja Hari Singh he shared his anxiety with how the issue had now become a ‘world problem’. Once again he emphasized the importance of Abdullah: . . . As you know Kashmir has become a world problem and the Indian Union has poured its resources into this conflict. We shall deal with it militarily of course. But even more important than the military aspect is the political aspect of the problem. All our difficulties in the UNO are due to this political aspect. All our military victories will yield little result if we do not work up this political aspect. As I have pointed out to you, the only way to do this is through Sheikh Abdullah and his organization. Our opponents and enemies realize this fully and have therefore insisted on Sheikh Abdullah being pushed out of the administration. If he is weakened in any way, our whole case becomes weak and no account of legal argument can help us.4

The same day Nehru also wrote to Abdullah (Secret & Personal) conveying his disillusionment with the Security Council: ‘The Security Council drags on and we have almost reached the stage when we can ignore it for all practical purposes. But we have still to avoid taking a false step which might injure us.’ 5 In retrospect it seems fairly ironical that when Prime Minister Nehru decided to refer the conflict to the United Nations Security Council on January 30 December 1947, the first person to say that India had committed a mistake was the Pakistan High Commissioner in India, Zahid Hussain:6



P I L G R I M A G E O F H I N D U S TA N TO L A K E S U C C E S S

163

. . . It would have been better if the dispute had been mutually settled by negotiation between India and Pakistan and the reference to the United Nations had been avoided. Kashmir occupies a strategic position and other powers will be naturally interested in its future. Members of the United Nations are more inspired by other motives. . . .7

The same day (2 January) Nehru addressed a big press conference in New Delhi. He explained the unfolding of events, the invasion, deployment of Indian forces, Pakistan’s refusal to back out from supporting the invaders, threats to India’s security and the great effort at saving the valley and Srinagar from the invaders. He explained the reasons of why the government sought the Security Council’s intervention as also the issues raised by India. Briefly, these were:   i. To prevent Pakistan’s civil officials and its army from participating in or assisting the invasion. ii. To ensure that the invaders were prevented from using Pakistan’s territory for the purpose of the invasion. iii. To prevent Pakistan from giving to the invaders supplies of any kind that might prolong the conflict.8 In this sense it was considered at the time to be a reference only for a limited purpose. Nehru also explained that India was committed to all the agreements including the transfer of Pakistan’s share from the Reserve Funds of the Reserve Bank. The doubts in this regard had arisen because Pakistan was likely to use the funds against India in Kashmir. The Prime Minister also said that ‘he (we) had chosen to go to the United Nations so that the world should know that India was ready for scrutiny.’ Prime Minister Nehru’s intentions were obviously earnest and the decision to seek the U.N. intervention was thought to be the best option. But this however was not what was the common perception. The Tribune in an exceptionally long article suggested that Nehru had led India to the United Nations because India was unsure of defeating the invaders. In doing so we have humiliated ourself: . . . The proposed Indian pilgrimage Lake Success (U.N.) will be perilous to Hindustan, particularly because it has allowed its position to be weakened by permitting itself to be entangled in Junagadh. If it (India) was free not

164

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

to recognize the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan, Pakistan would be free not to recognize Jammu Kashmir’s accession to it (India) . . . As we have said if we run to Lake Success without driving the raiders out of our territory we shall demean and ruin ourself completely. . . .’9

What The Tribune essentially said was that if India failed to expel the invaders, going or not going to the U.N. was of no significance. Besides to seek external help even as Indian troops were in the thick of battle was akin to admitting defeat. It also added that by going to the U.N. the government had only demoralized the armed forces in Kashmir. If at all there was need to go to the U.N. it should have been done only after expelling the raiders. Most importantly, The Tribune’s report put in perspective how some of the big military powers had always been taking interest in the developments in Kashmir due to its geo-strategic location. By seeking U.N. intervention India had now virtually legitimized the interest and intervention of other countries who infact were already the key players in the U.N. It was well known The Tribune added that for the western powers Kashmir was an important barrier against the Soviets.10 ‘OUR INTENTION IS A CIVILIZED MANNER’: NEHRU

Nehru as we know was very sensitive to press and public perceptions. He was in Jaipur on the 4 January 1948. In his address at a public meeting in Jaipur he once again dwelt at length on the Kashmir question and the decision to seek the United Nation’s intervention: . . . We have referred the Kashmir question to the Security Council because our intention is that whatever we do should be done in a civilized manner. . . . You must realize that more then 90% of the people of Kashmir are Muslim and we have gone there to help them. They are with us and are fighting the Pakistan forces. . . .11

The Tribune carried a report based on how people viewed India’s decision of seeking U.N. intervention. It summed up saying that most people thought it was futile and unnecessary.12 One of the main reasons of why the decision to seek United Nation intervention was thought to be a mistake was that it would perhaps give to the invading



P I L G R I M A G E O F H I N D U S TA N TO L A K E S U C C E S S

165

force a free passage back into the Pakistan. 13 After the kind of atrocities that had been committed this possibility was considered unacceptable. On January 10 The Tribune carried yet another front page report that was both detailed and incisive. It explained the general feeling of the time, particularly among those that were in public dealing or associated with decision making. This report is one of the very important readings of the complicated situation that had emerged: . . . Observers here (New Delhi) feel that India would not have an easy time in making the Security Council keep to the narrow reference made by India . . . the British delegation would influence the Security Council and the Anglo-American bloc would get more active . . . we (The Tribune) have been vigorously advocating the untying of the Kashmir knot with the point of the sword and also opposing the pilgrimage of Hindustan to Lake Success, the hot bed of international intrigue and the graveyard of righteous causes. At first tremendous pressure was put an Pt. Nehru to induce him to visit London to discuss with the British cabinet the Kashmir problem . . . (Pt. Nehru’s) whole being is saturated with idyllic idealism . . . his refinement and political nobility have been dexterously exploited and he has been persuaded to go to the wrong place and seek justice in a wrong atmosphere . . . the doubts and fears that have appeared in certain vigilant and critical New Delhi quarters are neither ill founded nor exaggerated. It would seem surprising why the Indian cabinet did not assert itself and prevent the issue from being referred to a body in which those very elements were supreme which were interested in its being solved in a particular manner. . . . The first move that the UNO is most likely to make is to ask both the raiders and the Indian troops to ‘cease fire’ that itself will place New Delhi at a disadvantage. The outlawed raiders will be raised to the position of recognized invaders and New Delhi will have to accept the right of murderers and free booters and adbuctors of women to remain in possession of their ill-gotten gains. The ‘Azad Kashmir’ government composed of desperadoes and marauders will control the Jammu Kashmir soil – legally according to the writ of the UNO. This control may ultimately prove to be the thin end of the wedge which may split up the state . . . Pakistan can have no business to interfere nor has the Security Council any local standi in the matter . . . the Security Council has unquestionably acquired a local standi in the Kashmir business and the ceasefire order which may be issued by it will terminate the Indian Union’s military process of combing out the raiders, worse things may flow when we emerge from the deep waters of Lake Success we may find our self amidst the sad ruins of the happy valley. . . .14

166

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

INDIAN CANNOT EXPECT JUSTICE AT THE UNITED NATIONS

The general perception that appeared common place was that the Indian leadership lacked decisiveness and courage: . . . The complacency of our Indian leaders in the face of grave provocation is simply astounding . . . they (Pakistan) know that our fear of them is greater than what they need fear at our hands and hence they are anxious to exploit that fear to their advantage . . . we still talk in India of our moral obligation. . . . The world is now passing through Kalyug in which only those nations will survive who safeguard the traditions of the race and their integral heritage. . . .15

This letter while appealing to India’s leadership to be tough also explained why it was important to be practical when the nation’s future was at state. The Tribune which was then the sole daily with a national standing north of Delhi, received a large number of letters that held the government of India responsible for the mess. In actual this really meant Prime Minister Nehru. The reference of the dispute to the U.N. was considered in most of the letters as the ultimate blunder in a series of mistakes. ‘Withdraw quickly From Lake Success’ was the title of a Tribune editorial on 10 January 1948: . . . When the injurious thought that it might seek the intervention of the U.N.O. . . . crossed the mind of the Nehru government and we got wind of it we opposed New Delhi’s contemplated move vigorously . . . we pointed out that it was absurd on its part to think of appealing to the Security Council . . . if it planned to run away from the battle field because it felt that it could not have success there, then there was not the remotest possibility of its achieving success at Lake Success (U.N.). . . . Even a novice in the diplomatic field knows that victories in that domain elude those that have embraced failure. . . . It should have been obvious to New Delhi . . . that Pakistan was created by British chicanery as a buffer state and future base of operations against its sworn enemy (USSR) . . . Nehru government should not have gone at all . . . pittable innocence. . . .16

Jawala Prasad Singhal’s article was even more forthright. It cited a long list of incidents where the U.N. had failed to resolve any issue: . . . There was a simple question before the U.N. Tribesmen had invaded



P I L G R I M A G E O F H I N D U S TA N TO L A K E S U C C E S S

167

Kashmir with the aid of Pakistan . . . India wanted the U.N. to stop Pakistan from aiding the invasion . . . in an ill fated hour the generous hearted and fair minded Nehru introduced the clause of plebiscite in the acceptance of the accession, for now it is returning with its vengeance and in what an ill fated hour he referred the matter to the UNO. . . . He loses by his gentlemanly conceptions in a world of intriguing diplomacy. If he had invaded Pakistan straight way and attacked the tribal bases then the UNO would have come begging to him to stop. . . . Is Pt. Nehru prepared to place all facts about the genocide committeed by the Muslim government against Hindus in Calcutta, Naokhali, Rawalpindi, Multan, Sialkot, the NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan fully before the UNO. . . . It is an insult to India to treat India and the invaders on an equal footing . . . India is trying to remove communal questions from its politics. . . .17

One of the main reasons of why the decision to seek U.N. intervention was thought to be a mistake was also that it would perhaps give to the raiders a ‘free passage’ back into Pakistan. In yet another article The Tribune said: . . . There is a popular didactic story that virtually every Indian school boy knows. The story runs thus. A ragged and tired Sadhu walking along the bank of a river on a cold day espied something black and fluffy in it. Imagining that it was a fine heavy blanket that would give him the much needed warmth and comfort and without caring to pause he jumped in, as he clutched the floating object, to his fright and bewilderment he found himself in the hold of a fully grown bear. He tried frantically to leave the blanket, but the blanket would not leave him. When the Sadhu took the plunge, there was nobody to warn him. . . . But the Nehru government had the danger signal hoisted by hundreds of its well wishers and friends . . . it (the government) leapt into the lake in defiance. . . . Now every one of the politicians and statesman associated with the Nehru government’s plunge into Lake Success has realized that Hind (India) is in the deadly embrace of power politics. . . .18

The story also cited references from the international press which was discussing how Indian public opinion had been shocked by the proceedings of Lake Success. Part two of this feature appeared the following day: ‘The Nehru government should manage immediately to terminate its reference to the U.N. This is the only way in which the Indian Sadhu can be rescued. . . .’

168

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

THE CEASEFIRE: WHY?

As we have noted, in common perception the reference of the Kashmir issue to the United Nations was generally seen as a big mistake. For no apparent reason, people believed, the issue was converted into an ‘international concern’. This apart it also impacted the resolve of the troops on the ground. At the same it must also be noted that the manner in which the Indian Army and the transport wing of the Air Force had responded it was fairly certain that they had instilled fear among the enemy and the raiders were on the run. Within hours of landing at the Srinagar air strip the Indian forces had the invaders fleeing. Several press reports reported the comic scenes of fleeing Pakistani invaders and troops. The huge sacrifice of the Indian troops and the success they achieved is what raised the next big question. Why did the government of India accept the cease fire and allow Pakistan to occupy a major part of Kashmir’s territory. It is only natural that for a vast majority of ordinary people with limited ability to understand or appreciate the nuances of diplomacy and international relations the issue of the problem being taken to the Security Council was only of limited interest. But even so for ordinary semi-literate Kashmiris, what was not understandable was why the conflict was suddenly stopped even though the invading force was in full panic and was retreating with fear in great haste. Attention has already been drawn as to how in some cases Pakistani officers who were coordinating the invasions infact warned and even physically assaulted the tribal mercenaries, so as to ensure that they did not run away from the rapidly advancing Indian Army. On 13 August 1948 the United Nations Security Council passed the third of its Resolutions on Jammu & Kashmir. This infact was the most significant, the earlier ones were simply advisory and general. Part I of this Resolution called for an immediate cease fire and the ending of operations. The acceptance of the line of control that resulted from the cease fire came in course of time to be a live sore. As Balraj Madhok, put it as early as in 1951: ‘. . . Handling of Kashmir will prove a major problem for India in the years to come. It would be futile to beat one’s head when the problem has gone out of control. . . .’19



P I L G R I M A G E O F H I N D U S TA N TO L A K E S U C C E S S

169

NEHRU’S PERCEPTION

Coming back to Prime Minister Nehru and how he read the problem. Nehru’s assessment of the problems that had come to be in his ‘loved’ Kashmir at the time that is after the dispute had been referred to the Security Council are perhaps most emphatically expressed in his address to the Jammu Kashmir National Conference (24 September 1949) at Srinagar.20 The speech explains at length Nehru’s views on the issue of the plebiscite and other issues with regard to the invasion. In a lengthy public speech, lengthy even by Nehru’s standards he said: . . . It was a simple straight forward case. Here was a state . . . on the whole it was peaceful and suddenly a neighbouring country started attacking looting and murdering. This is the crux of the problem quite simply . . . we always bear the beginning of this problem in mind . . . we had decided before Kashmir was attacked that the people should decide about their future . . . we said we would accept Kashmir’s accession to India, but since we always hold that the decision should be by the people referendum must be held at some future date before the accession takes place . . . we sent in our troops not to attack or occupy but for protection of the people and at their invitation. . . . We do not wish to keep a single soldier here if Kashmir is safe. . . and if people tell us they do not need us any more. . . unless we are fully convinced that the problem has been solved . . . we can not withdraw our troops. . . . Broadly there are two or three issues involved. First . . . the ultimate decision rests with the people of Kashmir . . . let me tell what I had in mind two years ago when this subject came up (1947) it was my opinion that the best way to decide was by plebiscite . . . what ever is done ultimately will be done only by the consent of the people of Kashmir.

Interestingly Nehru then spoke on the two nation theory, trying to explain to the public that the fact of Kashmir’s being a Muslim majority state was not sufficient reason for Pakistan to lay claim: ‘. . .we can not accept the two nation theory . . . instead of fighting with them (Muslim League) we told them that if they wished to leave they could do so with pleasure. . . . So it would be wrong to apply it to Kashmir and say that since Muslims live in Kashmir, so let them go. . . .’21 On 5 June 1952, Nehru wrote a long letter to Sheikh Abdullah. The letter was marked ‘Secret and Personal’. As Abdullah appears to

170

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

have decided to depose Maharaja Hari Singh by an amendment to Kashmir’s Constitution, Nehru pleads in this letter with Abdullah not to do so in a hurry as Parliament too will have to undertake a similar amendment. This long letter goes into 15 large paragraphs which in sum see the Prime Minister of India virtually pleading with Abdullah to resist and be patient and not do anything in haste, particularly as any such action may raise questions with regard to the accession of Jammu Kashmir to India:22 . . . to depose Hari Singh . . . seems to me not to be a wise approach we all know that he is not at all a desirable person and that he ought to go. But it does make a difference how one brings that about . . . (public) will look upon this as a discourteous act and a certain measure of public sympathy might well go to him even though he does not deserve it. . . . It would be better for him to abdicate and fade away. . . .23

This letter appears almost a connivance, even though it would be improper to suggest that a man as democratically minded as Nehru could have connived with Abdullah on a issue of such constitutional significance. It becomes even more fascinating when we look back in collective retrospect and see the same Abdullah being deposed and arrested just about a year later. What was Prime Minister Nehru’s assessment of the situation in Jammu & Kashmir in about 1952, that is by when Abdullah appears to have started an open shift in his political stand ? This long note was meant ‘For Sheikh Sahib’ and was marked ‘Top Secret’. It is no doubt a masterly drafted document that puts in remarkable perspective the Prime Minister’s thinking on the issue.24 The first paragraph is classical Nehru: . . . I am writing this note to convey to you my own basic views about the situation in Kashmir. During the last five years or so I have naturally given a great deal of thought to the various factors governing this situation – military, political, economic and others. I have tried to make my approach as objective as possible. Naturally, to some extent, I am influenced by my own personal feelings and attachment to Kashmir. Thus, it may be said that I have two approaches – that of the Prime Minister of India and the personal one. As a matter of fact, however, I have not found any conflict between those two. Some difficulties have arisen occasionally in my mind, because I was not sure if my approach, personal or official, was completely in line



P I L G R I M A G E O F H I N D U S TA N TO L A K E S U C C E S S

171

with your approach. So far as I was concerned, you represented to me what the people of Kashmir wanted to be done, and as that was a paramount consideration for me, in the ultimate analysis I would accept that in preference to my own views. As a rule, there was no such conflict or difficulty. . . .

Nehru also noted that he had from the beginning been clear in his mind as to the policy being followed with regard to Jammu & Kashmir. Explaining the need for the reference of the conflict to the United Nations Security Council he wrote: . . . From October, 1947, to the end of 1948, the military situation was paramount and our attention was mostly given to that situation. Even then we thought of the political aspects, as they were important. Owing to the reference to the United Nations certain international aspects came into the picture also. Whether that reference to the U.N. was a right step or not is now an academic question. We took it primarily to avoid the extension of the war elsewhere, i.e., its becoming an all out war between India and Pakistan. We thought that would be a dangerous development, bad for India and Pakistan. This judgement had little to do with success in the war. By normal standards, we could expect to defeat Pakistan, but the cost would have been heavy and there was always the possibility of international complications. Anyhow, we referred the matter to the U.N. . . .

The note then explains at length the question of continuing the war or declaring a ceasefire and the consequences of the decision either way. As we know the decision to accept the ceasefire and the status quo with regard to the territories held by both the dominions has commonly been considered a huge mistake: . . . So far as continuing the war was concerned, it was clear to me that while gradual success would come to us, no quick or effective decision was likely. We might carry on the war in Kashmir itself for a considerable time, gaining some successes and advancing our fronts, but this would be a long drawn out affair and would not put an end to the conflict or the problem. There was a possibility of the war extending beyond Kashmir State, i.e., becoming an all-out war between India and Pakistan. That was not a prospect to be welcomed, and it was much more likely at that stage that there might be foreign intervention in such a war. Even that war, apart from foreign intervention, would not be a very easy or quick one. We had definite superiority from the military and industrial point of view, but that superiority was not so great as to overwhelm the enemy. And then there was always the

172

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

question of what foreign powers might do either in interfering or in aiding Pakistan in other ways. . . . The result of all this thought, and my own powerful inclination to avoid war on a big scale which brought disaster in its train, whatever the result led me to certain definite conclusions towards the end of 1948. These conclusions were that the only possible way of putting an end to this conflict was by accepting, more or less, the status quo then existing. We were not prepared to give up any territory we possessed to Pakistan. But we might, for the sake of peace and a settlement, agree to their holding what they then had. I was doubtful if Pakistan would accept this. If not, then we continued where we were. . . . . . . This conclusion was not a very pleasant one to me but logically I could not help arriving at it. When I met Attlee (British Prime Minister) and Bevin and Liaquat Ali Khan (Pakistan’s Prime Minister) in London in the last quarter of 1948, I mentioned this briefly to them saying that it was entirely a personal suggestion because of my desire to end this conflict. I was not at all sure how far my own Government or the Kashmir Government would agree to it, because they felt strongly on this question of Pakistan aggression. Liaquat Ali Khan refused to consider this matter on this basis and there it ended. . . . . . . At the end of 1948 we agreed to ceasefire. I think it was a right move, but the question was not properly approached. We could have got the ceasefire on a somewhat better line if we had given more thought to it. However, that is a past mistake. . . . . . . Since then we have had the ceasefire and all kinds of talks with the U.N. people have gone on without much result. Throughout this period, my old conviction has taken root in my mind that the only feasible solution, short of resumption of war, was the acceptance of the status quo, more or less. War I ruled out for a variety of reasons, unless it was thrust upon us by Pakistan. But we could never be sure about Pakistan and hence we had to keep in readiness all the time. Partly to prevent any sudden eruption in Kashmir on the part of Pakistan, and partly to make our own policy quite clear, we declared repeatedly that any attack by Pakistan across the ceasefire line would mean full war between India and Pakistan. That has been the position even-since. . . .

Having admitted that the question of the ceasefire was not properly handled and indeed was a mistake, Nehru then explained to Abdullah how in his mind Kashmir was not the only cause of dispute with Pakistan at the time. He also put in perspective how it was important for Pakistan to keep the Kashmir dispute at boil:



P I L G R I M A G E O F H I N D U S TA N TO L A K E S U C C E S S

173

. . . It must be remembered that Kashmir is not the basic cause of friction and conflict between India and Pakistan. It is a resultant of that basic conflict, though, undoubtedly, it has added to it. Thus, in 1950, we were very near war with Pakistan on an entirely different issue which arose in Eastern Pakistan and West Bengal and Assam. From this it follows that even if the Kashmir issue was solved, it would not necessarily end that basic conflict which can only be resolved either by war or by a natural course of events and acceptance of things as they are. War, of course, was normally ruled out, as I do not think it solves any problem. So we aimed at a gradual lessening of tension between India and Pakistan by tackling other problems that arose and development of trade and other relations. This has not been very successful, but it is true that tension has relaxed considerably, in spite of the fire-eating propaganda of Pakistan. Progressively, even that propaganda has become more and more artificial and has been kept up by the Government of Pakistan for its own political and other purposes. The fact is that the whole basis of Pakistan, politically, is unstable and they dare not stop all that propaganda for fear of political consequences. But there is some evidence that the people of Pakistan do not react to that propaganda and are getting a little tired of it. The Government of Pakistan is like someone riding a bicycle. They feel that the moment they return to normalcy, the bicycle stops and they fall down.

The Prime Minister then made out a case of seeking good relations with Pakistan and why it was important for both: . . . I am convinced that in the long run India and Pakistan must come closer together and have more or less friendly relations. But we have to live down past events and passions and it is very difficult to produce normal behaviour for some time to come. All we can do at present is to prevent anything which adds to the tension. . . .

Nehru also recorded two critical references - one with regard to allowing Pakistan to retain that part of Kashmir which it had come to occupy following the ceasefire and the issue of the ‘wishes’ of the people of Kashmir. He states that there was no way that Pakistan could take Kashmir, but yes if the people of Kashmir wanted India ‘out’, India would have to go. What exactly did the Prime Minister mean by this is not clear. The complete note does throw some light: . . . What is the position of Jammu and Kashmir state vis-à-vis India? Looking at it objectively, this State is of importance, both from the strategic and

174

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

other points of view, to both India and Pakistan. Hence, the conflict between the two. We are not prepared to give in to Pakistan on that issue, even though it means war. The utmost we can do is to give in so far as that area is concerned which is occupied by Pakistan. That itself, strategically, is a disadvantage to us. But we are prepared to accept that disadvantage for the sake of peace. If the whole of the state went to Pakistan, it would be danger to the north of India and there would be continuous tension between us and the party controlling that state. Thus, purely from the point of view of India’s national interest, we cannot agree, unless circumstances force us, to see this part of Kashmir state go to Pakistan. There are no circumstances visible that can force us to do this. Pakistan cannot. The United Nations cannot override our wishes in this matter. . . . . . . This is an objective statement from the point of view of India’s national interest. There is the other aspect which we have stressed and which is important. This is the wishes of the people of Kashmir. If the people of Kashmir clearly and definitely wish to part company from India, there the matter ends, however we may dislike it or however disadvantageous it may be to India. But, as I have stated above, I see no chance whatever of any proper plebiscite determining this question, because the plebiscite itself raises highly controversial issues in regard to the conditions governing it and all that. So, ruling out the plebiscite we have to accept the present leadership of Kashmir and the Constituent Assembly there as representing the will of the people of Kashmir. If the Constituent Assembly told India to get out of Kashmir, we would get out, because under no circumstances can we remain here against the expressed will of the people. As far as I know, the Constituent Assembly will not do such a thing and therefore the question does not arise for me. . . . . . . Speaking now for a moment purely as a Kashmiri, I think that it would be the ruin of Kashmir if Pakistan took possession of it. I need not dilate on this issue, but I am convinced of it. . . . . . . Certain alternatives have been mentioned, such as an independent State of Jammu & Kashmir. I think that this is inconceivable, and what is worse it will mean not peace or normality, but continuing tension and conflict between various forces in and out of Kashmir, because Kashmir is so important strategically that these forces will try to control the so called independent Kashmir. India will not tolerate Pakistan gaining an upper hand here and Pakistan will, no doubt, be equally unwilling to see India gain the upper hand. The result will be that Kashmir will continue to be the scene of conflict between India and Pakistan, even though it might be called independent. There is a possibility of other powers coming in more



P I L G R I M A G E O F H I N D U S TA N TO L A K E S U C C E S S

175

especially if the United Nations has a voice in the matter. In any event, Kashmir could not be independent and will not be peaceful or normal either. . . . . . . Another suggestion has been made that the Valley of Kashmir should stand by itself as some kind of an independent State guaranteed by India and Pakistan and the U.N., Jammu going to India and the other areas going to Pakistan. This is completely unworkable and there is not a ghost of a chance of the little Valley of Kashmir surviving under those conditions. If the whole of Kashmir State as an independent entity cannot really survive and is likely to become a cock-pit for other powers, the Valley by itself can much less survive either economically or politically. It would disappear with great rapidity as a separate entity. . . .

Nehru’s assessment of the situation also appears in a letter he had written to the Chief Ministers. On 16 June 1952 Prime Minister Nehru as was his habit wrote a long letter to the Chief Ministers. The letter covered several issues. Paragraphs 17 and 18 were devoted to Jammu & Kashmir. . . . The recent decision of the Constituent Assembly in Kashmir have excited a great deal of interest all over India. During the last four and a half years and more, the war and other developments in Kashmir has made people all over India vividly conscious of that beautiful valley. We are not merely interested in it as a part of India but our emotions have been roused and anything that happens there, therefore affects us much more in some ways than developments elsewhere might do. It is easy to understand, therefore that recent happenings there have created a great deal of interest all over the country. There were some misunderstandings and once misunderstandings come in they are not easy to remove. Some people thought that the leaders of Kashmir were not playing quite fair with India and might even think of breakway from India. Naturally this thought was rather painful. As a matter of fact, if one thing is certain it is this: that not only the leaders but the great mass of the people in Kashmir want to be associated with India and want the accession of Kashmir to India to continue. So far as we are concerned, whatever our feelings might be, we have made it repeatedly clear that it is for the people of Jammu and Kashmir State to decide about their future. We are not there on sufferance or as an imposition on others. We are there because we were invited to go there to save Kashmir from a brutal invasion and rack and ruin. We have continued to be there because the people of Kashmir wanted us and because of the responsibility for defence that we

176

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

undertook by virtue of the accession. I have no doubt in my mind that the leaders of people of Kashmir are anxious to continue this accession to India and if there is a plebiscite on this point it will be in India’s favour. . . . . . . This important fact must therefore be kept in mind when we consider other problems. It should also remembered that Kashmir’s accession to India was, like that of all other States at the beginning, on three subjects only, namely, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. Much later the other States acceded in regard to many other subjects also. Kashmir remained where it was for a variety of reasons, among them being the fact that the United Nations were seized of this problem and we did not wish to appear to bypass them in this matter. Indeed, in the Constitution of India, we made special provision for the Jammu and Kashmir State in the transitional provisions. . . .25

Attention has been drawn to this letter for the reason that it reflects the feeling of a Prime Minister who is optimistic and still carries the impression that leaders in Kashmir were with India. By leaders obviously his reference is to his friend Abdullah. This letter also stands out for something very important that the Prime Minister said and something that has not been a part of common academic discourse. The Prime Minster noted that there was nothing unusual in that Jammu and Kashmir had merged with the Union only with regard to three key areas – Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. It was not unusual he said because several other Princely states too had done the same. In pointing this out to his Chief Ministers all of whom were the Prime Minister’s old friends, the Prime Minister obviously sought to suggest a line of thought and indeed action that no misjudgments and mistakes had been made in Kashmiri in the past few years. In any case as we know it was not long before every single state had merged completely with the Union. Jammu & Kashmir remained at the time the only exception. ‘JAMMU & KASHMIR IS A CASE FOR SPEICAL TREATMENT’: NEHRU

When we seek to understand Prime Minister Nehru’s personal assessment of the unfolding crisis in Jammu & Kashmir one has necessarily to also understand his views on sensitive issues like Kashmir’s integration, the issue of two flags and application of the



P I L G R I M A G E O F H I N D U S TA N TO L A K E S U C C E S S

177

Indian Constitution without conditions in Kashmir. In this context there is a long note dated 3 July 1952 aptly titled ‘Integration of Kashmir with the Indian Union’.26 The note like the large number of others is a typical Nehru note – descriptive, exhaustive, the heart and mind all very sensitively mixed up and ofcourse making for fascinating reading. The note was the final guiding draft of what would come to be known in history as the Delhi Agreement. It was announced in Parliament by the Prime Minister on 24 July 1952. The note is titled ‘Constitutional Relations of Kashmir with India’. The heads under which issues were listed and discussed were: Head of the State; Citizenship; Fundamental Rights; Supreme Court; National Flag; President of India; Financial Integration; Emergency Powers. From this note it is infact fairly clear that the Prime Minister from the beginning had reconciled to Kashmir being different from the other Princely states that had recently merged with the Indian Union. In the months that followed, this view of the Prime Minister put him in confrontation with several leaders, particularly Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee. To this we will come back in the next chapter. In the note the Prime Minister said: . . . The first question that arises is this: all constituent units of the Republic of India have exactly the same relation to the Union as embodied in our Constitution . . . or can there be a variation. . . . It must stand on exactly the same footing, then there is not much room for argument and Kashmir must line up with others. . . . This is not a practical proposition and even from a larger point of view it is desirable to have certain flexibility in our Constitution therefore, we proceed on the basis of some special treatment of Jammu & Kashmir state in this connection. . . .

Once we read Nehru’s mind in this broad general manner, the rest is easy to grasp. For example he sees no problem in Kashmir also having a separate flag ‘but not as a rival of the National Flag. . . .’ With regard to the Supreme Court: ‘the question to be considered is whether the Supreme Court should be the highest appellate tribunal for Kashmir also. . . .’27 The general view that Kashmir was different and needed a different handling is something that comes out emphatically in the historic meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, on 20 July 1952. The

178

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

minutes were finalized in the form of a note by the Prime Minister himself. Among those present were Sheikh Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, Mirza Afzal Beg and Girdhari Lal Dogra. The meeting had been preceded by several discussions held between 14-20 June (1952). These discussions were led from the Kashmir side by Mirza Afzal Beg. This note is extremely important and in many ways creates the background for several of the complications that followed in the months and years after. A reading will show that the government of India had virtually conceded to Sheikh Abdullah and his team a greatly autonomous system. It was the State Legislature not the Parliament of India that had the powers to decide and regulate rights and privileges of its citizens, the ownership of property and like matters. With regard even to Fundamental Rights, the State was given special powers to deal with the ‘peculiar situation’, and the Fundamental Rights as applicable to the rest of India were denied to the State’s people. The reason: ‘. . . very special precaution had to be taken against people infiltrating for espionage, sabotage to create trouble. If by full application of Fundamental Rights these could not be dealt with surety, the situation may deteriorate. . . .’ With regard to the National Flag: ‘. . . for historical and sentimental reasons connected with the freedom struggle in Kashmir they (Abdullah etc.) wanted this symbol to continue. . . .’ Even with regard to the application of Article 352 which dealt with the proclamation of emergency by the President of India in times of war or even internal disturbances, it was diluted to say that in times of internal disturbances the concurrence of the State government would be required for application of the article in the case of Jammu & Kashmir.28 Looked at carefully the government of India had virtually handed over Kashmir to Sheikh Abdullah, retaining for itself the duty to take care of Kashmir’s finances. The main reason for having reproduced at length extracts from these notes, is the importance Prime Minister Nehru is giving to Abdullah even at this (mid-1952) stage. Within a year of Nehru’s writing this historic note he would have to oversee if not personally approve Abdullah’s removal as the head of government in Jammu & Kashmir as also his arrest and subsequent imprisonment.



P I L G R I M A G E O F H I N D U S TA N TO L A K E S U C C E S S

179

He would atleast have to refrain from intervening, that is if we assume and accept that he had no role in the removal. What is it then, that went so dramatically wrong? NOTES 1. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML. 2. JN(SG), File 4, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Mountbatten 26 December 1947. 3. JN(SG), File 143-I, MSS, NMML, Top Secret Note – Nehru to Abdullah, 25 August 1952. 4. JN(SG), File 8, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Hari Singh, 3 April 1948. 5. Ibid. 6. The Tribune, 3 January 1948. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. The Tribune , 4 January 1948. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., 5 January 1948. The full Jaipur speech is available in the S.W. (Second Series), vol. 5, pp. 174-8. This is reproduced from the National Herald. 12. The Tribune, 8 January 1948. 13. Ibid., 8 January 1948. 14. The Tribune, 10 January 1948. 15. Letter to Editor R.K. Dutta (Simla), The Tribune, 13 January 1948. 16. The Tribune, 10 January 1948. 17. Ibid. 18. The Tribune, 24 February 1948. 19. Balraj Madhok, Divided Kashmir (Lucknow, 1951), pp. 157-9. 20. Transcribed from tapes of the All India Radio see SW (Second Series), vol. 13, pp. 231-43. 21. Ibid. 22. JN(SG), 132-II, MSS, NMML. 23. Ibid., p. 4. 24. JN(SG), 143-I, MSS, NMML. Note dated 25 August 1952. 25. JN(SG), 134 II, MSS, NMML, letter Nehru to Chief Ministers, 16 June 1952. 26. SW (Second Series), vol. 18, pp. 423-5. 27. Ibid. 28. SW (Second Series), vol. 18 – Notes: ‘Status of Kashmir in Indian Union’, pp. 402-3; ‘The Nature of Relationship between India & Kashmir’, pp. 405-10.

CHAPTER FIVE

‘Accession Still in the Melting Pot’ The Praja Parishad: Nehru-Mookerjee and Abdullah

S

heikh abdullah as we have seen had been picked by Prime    Minister Nehru in 1947 as the one man who was expected to          be the redeemer of India’s point of view. In less than five years he was destined to be dismissed and arrested. This remarkable story is as complex and intriguing as it can get. But if contemporary opinions are taken note of it would not be difficult to understand that the Prime Minister, all his good intentions notwithstanding, had placed his confidence in the wrong man. Most biographers of Jawaharlal Nehru have drawn attention to how very often emotions and intuitive impulses guided him even when it came to major decisions. He was trusting and always well meaning. This basic trait guided him to a highly personal equation with Abdullah. Such equations are workable as history repeatedly shows only when both the main characters are on a similar wavelength. But it is clear that Abdullah was made of a different metal. Nehru trusted him as a friend and gave him charge of Kashmir even as there were other options. The unpleasant question really is should the Prime Minister have put all his stakes in one man knowing very well that even the slightest of disturbance was sufficient to have wrecked the equations. It was commonly known just as much among close observers of the history of Jammu & Kashmir as also ordinary people that



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

181

everything and anything related to Jammu & Kashmir at the time was handled on behalf of the government of India by Prime Minister Nehru and a very small and close group of people. It is also well known that conventionally the affairs of Jammu & Kashmir should have been under the charge of Sardar Patel who as Union Home Minister was looking after the affairs of all other Princely states. Infact quite unusual by his own high standards and also quite uncharacteristic by his known temprament Patel had once expressed his unhappiness at the manner in which Nehru had retained the running of Kashmir affairs to himself. SARDAR PATEL SIDELINED ON KASHMIR

Patel as records show was infact quite keen to participate in the handling of the developing crisis in Kashmir from as early as mid1946. The Congress Working Committee had discussed Nehru’s report on Kashmir in the first week of August (1946) in Wardha. After doing so the CWC decided to associate Sardar Patel with the managing of affairs related to Kashmir. Maulana Azad was also associated with Patel. Patel even wrote to Pandit Ramchandra Kak, the Prime Minister of Kashmir: ‘. . . they have appointed me to pursue the matter where Panditji left it . . . I propose to visit Kashmir as soon as I am free. . . .’1 Even though Nehru had from the beginning been incharge of Kashmir, perhaps the only reference we have of him putting this on record is in a small note addressed by him to President Rajendra Prasad (25 May 1953): ‘. . . The only three persons who had an intimate knowledge and touch with developments during the last several years in Kashmir were Maulana Azad, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar and myself. . . .’2 This issue of the affairs of Kashmir being handled by the office of the Prime Minister and by N. Goplalaswami Ayyangar who was Minister without portfolio in the Union Cabinet rather than the Minister that handled the other states needs some more emphasis. A small incident that took place in December 1947 serves sufficiently to explain the difficult working arrangement that was managing Kashmir.

182

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Ayyanagar had passed instructions to the East Punjab government and to the army authorities to provide 150 vehicles to the civil authorities in Kashmir. He had done this without keeping in loop the Ministry of States. In a curt letter Sardar Patel advised Ayyanagar: ‘I feel that this question should have been dealt with by the Ministry of States . . . in future the Kashmir Administration may be asked to deal with that Ministry direct’.3 Ayyanagar wrote back to Patel the same day: . . . I am the last person to wish to poach into any other Ministry’s preserves and shall proceed to disconnect myself and my Ministry from all matters relating to Kashmir, including the negotiations in progress connected with the setting up of an interim government there. . . . You are a frank and direct man and I am sure you will appreciate my frankness and directness. . . . 4

A very hurt Patel wrote back to Ayyangar the next day: . . . I am rather pained to read your letter. . . . My letter was intended to merely ensure that the subject matter was dealt with in the Ministry concerned. There is a background to it. A transaction of as large as Rs. 20 lakhs was put through by the Prime Minister’s Secretariat with Sheikh Abdullah without the Ministry concerned coming to know of it until at a late stage. . . .5

Subsequently Patel infact even offered to withdraw the letter. What Patel did not know at this stage however was that Ayyangar had also marked a copy of this exchange of letters to Prime Minister Nehru. The Prime Minister while intervening in the matter wrote to Patel: . . . I must confess I am greatly surprised to read this. . . . The present issue relates to Kashmir. This raises all manner of connected issues . . . and that is why I have to take personal interest in this matter . . . Ayyangar has been especially asked to help in Kashmir matters . . . he has to be given full latitude . . . I really do not understand where the State’s Ministry comes into the picture except that it should be kept informed. . . . In any event I do not understand why the States Ministry should intervene and come in the way of arrangements being made. All this was done at my instance and I do not propose to abdicate my functions in regard to matters for which I consider myself responsible. May I say the manner of approach to Gopalaswami was hardly in keeping with the courtesy due to a colleague.6

Patel’s answer to the Prime Minister’s letter appears in volume I,



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

183

of Sardar Patel’s Correspondence (SPC) as a draft copy. The editor has noted that the letter was not sent because Patel had by then been persuaded to drop the controversy. This is what Patel had drafted: ‘. . . Your letter has been received just now at 7 p.m. and I am writing immediately to tell you this. It has caused me considerable pain . . . your letter makes it clear to me that I must not or at least can not continue as a member of government and hence I am hereby tendering my resignation. . . .’7 Even as the incident was resolved a far more serious difference of opinion with regard to the situation in Kashmir had developed by the end of 1947. Pakistan was claiming that a vast sum of about Rs. 55 Crore was due to it in the form of the cash balance reserve that was held by the Reserve Bank of India after the transfer of power and formation of Pakistan. Whether this was factually correct remains besides the point. The issue evolved into a major crisis with Nehru and Gandhi on one side and Patel on the other. Patel’s stand was that the armed conflict had destroyed the amicability of any agreement that may have been signed: ‘. . . We cannot be asked to make payment of the cash balance when an armed conflict is in progress. . . .’8 For the second time in a matter of weeks Patel had reached a point of quitting the government on a matter relating to Kashmir. Several studies have suggested that even though the last of Gandhi’s historic fasts (January 1948) was to restore communal harmony, one of the lesser known reasons was the issue of the transfer of the cash balance to Pakistan. As The Tribune put it: ‘Families had been slaughtered for small bags of grain, silver bracelets and more often for nothing and now when it involved Rs. 55 crores there was talk of peace. . . .’9 ABDULLAH CHANGES TRACK: PUTS THE ONUS ON THE PRAJA PARISHAD

A large amount of literature of various opinions is available with regard to why Abdullah gradually began moving away from the stand he had earlier taken or atleast given the impression of taking with regard to the issue of the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India. Of the many such explanations in the contemporary context, one reason that Abdullah gave more emphatically was the Praja Parishad

184

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Satyagraha. But what appears more likely is that Abdullah got in the Satyagraha an opportunity to assert more emphatically a point of view that fitted into his broader scheme of wriggling out of the stand or the position he seems to have promised to Prime Minister Nehru. In sum Abdullah said the Praja Parishad Satyagraha had made the Muslim majority of the state feel insecure. He termed the Praja Parishad and the Satyagraha as communal. Many of those who witnessed the developments first hand including Gundevia10 and B.N. Mullick11 have said Abdullah had become a victim of conspiracies. Some contemporary media versions have however suggested that Abdullah had a change of heart following the Praja Parishad Satyagraha in Jammu. This because the Muslim majority of the state had begun to feel insecure following the Satyagraha. The list of theories is naturally long. Let us first therefore look at the Praja Parishad Satyagraha and was there adequate reason for Abdullah to have used the Satyagraha as the explanation indeed the reason for his major shift of stand with regard to the accession of the state to India. A view has prevailed for long, led mainly by Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference that his (Abdullah’s) pro-India stance weakened and got diluted because the Praja Parishad Satyagraha had given a communal turn to the events. This in turn, it was also said, scared the Muslim majority of Jammu & Kashmir, thus creating in the minds of the Muslim masses of the state an element of doubt with regard to their future in ‘Hindu’ India. By implication it was suggested that the Praja Parishad Satyagraha had thus endangered Jammu & Kashmir’s supposed ‘unconditional accession’ with the Union of India. Several major studies too have sustained this view. But interestingly contemporary sources with important exceptions no doubt, tend to suggest that the Praja Parishad stand was thought to be in national interest and enjoyed widespread support. The point that was made by several contemporary observers is and as we shall see at length that by singling out the Praja Parishad Satyagraha, Abdullah in a way grasped with both hands an opportunity that infact enabled him to follow more openly a policy that had been in his mind all along. In New Delhi these early signs were being seen as the first steps of a ‘betrayal’. In this context we must not forget and as already pointed out, that Sardar Patel had raised the flag as early as



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

185

in July 1950 itself. He expressed very clearly that Abdullah’s intention as emerging from his statements and actions were beginning to generate doubt with regard to his stand on the issue of Kashmir’s accession to India. Not surprisingly supporters of the National Conference had begun to say that Abdullah would have proclaimed his pro-India stand more strongly and perhaps as a result thereby the accession of Kashmir would never have been questioned, if the Praja Parishad movement had not taken place. ‘ATTEMPTS TO CONFUSE AND CONFOUND PEOPLE’

The basic problem here is that such a reading of the situation proceeds on the assumption that Abdullah was indeed pro-India and in full support of the accession from the beginning and it was the Parishad’s Satyagraha that made him change his mind. In this sense it is argued that Abdullah had never at any stage given his whole hearted support to the accession. He always insisted on ‘freedom first’ followed by ‘will of the people’. These were ambiguous terms that concealed more than they revealed. There was thus no question of his having to change his stand because of the Parishad’s agitation. Taking a note of some contemporary opinions will perhaps substantiate the argument. Jawahar Lal Kapur was an advocate and Secretary of the Praja Socialist Party (Ambala City) and Yogin Chand was Labour Secretary of the party at Ambala. This is what they said in a letter to The Tribune: . . . We have closely been following the trend of events in Kashmir before and after the agitation started by the Parishad. . . . Kashmir is not a party question and should be dealt with on a National level . . . the halting and half hearted manner in which he (Abdullah) has acceded fearing that his power might decrease is responsible for all this . . . Abdullah’s statements (against the Parishad) are attempts to confuse and confound the people . . . it is essential that the following steps must be taken to save the situation from further deterioration i) The Union Flag be flown on every government building. It is under this flag that blood has been spilled like water and the present regime in Kashmir exists because of India’s soldiers. . . . ii) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India should be extended to Kashmir. iii) There should be complete integration of Jammu & Kashmir.12

186

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Hori Lal Saxena, Editor of the Nationalist in a study published in 194913 commented for example on the fear that the National Conference government had created in the minds of the minorities in Kashmir: ‘. . . we found that the condition of the minorities in Jammu & Kashmir was no better if not worse than Pakistan . . . not one single member of the minorities dared to meet us in public and hardly any one was willing to give anything in writing for fear of being locked behind bars. . . .’14 Saxena then commented on the status of recruitment to government employment: . . . As regards government service the criterion for appointment till the establishment of the new government (Abdullah’s) on 5 March 1948 had been efficiency and merit . . . but immediately after the establishment of Abdullah’s government the pratice was changed and promotions and appointments have been made indiscriminately . . . in the police department especially it was announced that only Muslims should apply . . . the share of land owners (in the crops) has been decreased from ½ to ¼, recovery of debts has been made impossible15. . . .

Saxena also made some important observations that shed early light on Abdullah’s mind and actions. As happens so often, ordinary citizens who have their eyes and ears on the ground are able to reach more correct assessments as compared to the government and its leaders not withstanding all their intelligence networks and other infrastructure. Saxena said: . . . even today he (Abdullah) refuses to accept unconditional accession . . . the question is, is he or is he not the leader of Kashmir’s Muslims. If he is, his views should be of the Kashmir people. If he is not, he should not be paraded before the Indian people as such. . . . He should not be compared with Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan etc. . . .16

Saxena discussed several other issues that have usually been ignored in the context of Abdullah’s unsure political stand. He quoted Abdullah as saying: ‘. . . Thanks to our Prime Minister (Nehru) the Constituent Assembly has already made Kashmir Independent through Article 370. . . .’17 With regard to the plebiscite: ‘. . . we cannot decide as long as we are slaves. . . .’18 He cites Abdullah as having said that: ‘. . . the whole propaganda that the Kashmir National Conference stands for unconditional accession to India is false and untrue. . . .’19



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

187

Interestingly Abdullah, as also pointed out by Saxena was among the very few senior leaders of Jammu & Kashmir who termed the Pakistani sponsored invasion particularly in Poonch as a ‘people’s movement’.20 Saxena further explained how the communal divide existed only in the minds of the leaders. The reality he says was that the differences between ordinary people both Hindus and Muslims were essentially economic in nature: ‘. . . Every one of the communal demands put forward by any communal group is in the final analysis a demand for jobs. There is also of course a demand for additional seats in the legislatures but that too is looked upon chiefly as the power to exercise patronage. . . .’21 Bhaskaranand (Paramhans Sanyasi) published a small booklet in 1956,22 based on his travels in the valley a few years earlier. He drew attention to how Abdullah had started playing the communal card while simultaneously trying to keep pace with India’s nationalist leaders. He is perhaps one of the very few contemporary commentators who has said that Abdullah was aware in advance of the Pakistan sponsored invasion in the autumn of 1947. Bhaskaranand had quoted a story by Horace Alexander (Hindustan Times, 7 April 1948) which said that Abdullah and his colleagues were even prepared to accept a vote in favour of Pakistan. He quoted another story from (Hindustan Times, 12 April 1952) in which Abdullah was reported to have said that any discussion of complete merger with India ‘. . . is unrealistic, childish and savouring of lunacy. . . .’ . . . on the 27th September, 1947 Sheikh Abdullah and his associates were released from jail . . . the release was hailed by Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs alike. . . . All were looking forward with high hopes that Sheikh Abdullah would declare that he was whole heartedly with India . . . but to the disappointment and even annoyance of the large audience at the speech he delivered at Hazuribagh . . . Abdullah seemed to speak with mental reservations, persons who knew Abdullah’s way of thinking felt he would probably be looking out for the highest bid from among the three contestants – India, Pakistan and Britain. . . .23

Bhaskaranand went on to charge Abdullah: . . . So, step by step but by rapid strides, Sheikh Abdullah rose to be the virtual dictator of the Jammu and Kashmir State and the Maharaja was compelled by the Government of India to yield him the power. It was amazing that the very first act Sheikh Abdullah did after becoming the ‘Head

188

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

of Administration’ of the Jammu and Kashmir State, was to pat on the back the very officials and communal-minded persons who had aided and abetted the invasion of Kashmir, by the Pakistanis! To the best of my knowledge, a list of about 100 persons in the Jammu and Kashmir State Government, with a “who’s who” in Kashmir was prepared by an alert Indian Intelligence Officer, then working in Kashmir, who, to all intents and purposes, were Pakistan agents and were enjoying protection and patronage from Sheikh Abdullah. Sheikh Abdullah was at pains also to restore land and property to those very marauders of the areas bordering on Pakistan, who had indulged in subversive activities and wholesale massacre of the members of the minority community, abduction of their women folk, incendiarism and what not. Those patriotic officers who protested against this perverse policy of Sheikh Abdullah, including a Brigadier, a Governor and an Intelligence Officer where either sacked, pensioned off or reverted as “undesirables”. Sheikh Abdullah’s concern even for Pakistani-minded criminals could be contrasted with his callousness and even contempt for the distress and miseries of the refugees, huddled up like frightened sheep, in Srinagar and Jammu. Without food, shelter and succumbed to starvation and disease, uncared, unwept as municipal statistics can show. To the astonishment of every rational being, Sheikh Abdullah not only at this critical moment released the Muslim Conference leaders like Ch. Ghulam Abbas, but also the most notorious Muslim convicts like Kamal serving life imprisonment and arranged their exit to Pakistan. Even disloyal Government officials were allowed to escape across the border. He was good enough to provide free convoy facilities and was at the border to bid them good bye, after being closeted with them for hours. . . .24

Bhaskarananda went on: . . . As Sheikh Abdullah’s nationalism gradually began to wear thin and loose and the hideous form of a communal fanatic began to emerge, any Hindu or Sikh who dared remind Sheikh Abdullah of his creed, profession and promises and protested against his parochial policies and tyrannies was branded as an R.S.S. fellow and thrown out of the National Conference. Thus, his regime became a recruiting agency for the new organization of Praja Parishad in Jammu and anti-Abdullah party in Kashmir. . . .25 ABDULLAH HAS LOST GOODWILL

Madhu Limaye and Sadiq Ali were respected and nationally known leaders of the Praja Socialist Party. They too had travelled through Kashmir to assess the situation and prepare a report for their party.



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

189

They said that they met a cross-section of people to seek answers to Abdullah’s unclear stand on issues such as the states accession. The most common view the report records was that Abdullah had rapidly lost goodwill and popularity among the masses because of misrule and the deteriorating economic condition of a vast majority of households: ‘. . . to regain his popularity he raised the alluring cry of independence and diverted the attention of the people. . . .’ This approach Limaye and Sadi Ali also noted, hardened the attitude of the Hindus, but won him friends in the majority community. Perhaps the most significant revelation that comes from this report is that, it suggests that in his close circles Abdullah welcomed the Jammu Praja Parishad agitation and would have been happy to see Jammu join India on its own: ‘This would leave the remaining part of the state to the whims of Abdullah’.26 Likewise, another contemporary study holding similar views is Conspiracy in Kashmir. This 74 pages long booklet gives a commonly held view of how Abdullah became unpopular. His popularity it says rested on democratic and anti-imperialist pronouncements. But he soon lost touch with popular sentiments and began to play to the tune of the ‘Western powers’. To regain his popularity ‘. . . he turned the clock back by mobilizing popular fervor through appeals to communal and religious sentiments.’27 K.N. Katju was a close friend and confidant of Prime Minister Nehru. He was earlier a Minister of State in the Union Cabinet and following the demise of Sardar Patel, looked after the Home Ministry. Like was the common practice between Nehru and some of his close advisors on Kashmir, detailed notes were usually circulated with impressions and opinions on the problem. A note was marked Secret and submitted to Nehru by Katju on his return from Jammu & Kashmir on 3 July 1952. It is important enough to be reproduced in full: . . . I was in Kashmir for a little less than three weeks. I stayed with a friend who is comparatively in humble circumstances and thus had greater opportunities of meeting people of all shades of opinion. . . . . . . The Kashmir Administration appears to be weak. It may be due to the fact that the people at the helm did not have much administrative experience before they assumed power. Another contributory factor is the lack of an efficient permanent service. Added to that is the likely interference

190

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

of the local leaders of the National Conference who are often inclined to meddle in administrative matters. The common talk in Kashmir is that the rank and file of the National Conference members have added to their material fortunes during the last three or four years. The cumulative effect is that the Government comes in for a lot of criticism. . . . . . . Sheikh Abdullah’s Ranbirsinghpura speech was followed by a speech which he delivered at the Hazrat Bal mosque. It is said that he criticized the Government of India in strong language and said on that occasion that if the Government of India so wished they could take away their army. He is reported to have further said that if the Government of India has spent considerable sums of money over Kashmir, that was in pursuance of their own ideals, and the people of Kashmir could not be under any obligation to the Government of India on that account. The fact, however, remains that Sheikh Abdullah exercises considerable personal influence over the people of Kashmir. That could not, however be said about his influence on the people of Jammu. The elections to the Kashmir Assembly were all unanimous. It is commonly held that members from the Jammu province do not have much influence in their own province. It also appears that the people of Jammu to do not have an adequate voice in the administration of the state. . . . . . . It appears that sinister forces are at work to wean away Sheikh Abdullah from his pro-Indian stand. Some of the members of his Cabinet are reported to be unsympathetic to India, and are said to have greater sympathies with Pakistan. Mr. Mirza Afzal Beg is one of them. Mr. Sadiq, President of the Constitutent Assembly is said to have more leanings for communism. Mr. Pyarelal Bedi and his friends who are said to be avowed communists appear to have some influence with Sheikh Abdullah. They are laying before him the ideal of an autonomous Republic. Mr. Mirza Afzal Beg and some communalists who share his views are interested to keep Kashmir out of the ambit of Indian influence. They wish the accession of Kashmir to India even on the three subjects to be more limited. . . . . . . Two officers of the Government of U.P. whose services have been let to the Government of Kashmir, are exercising an unhealthy influence on Sheikh Abdullah. They are Mr. Kidwai, the Chief Secretary and Mr. Kazmi, the present Director of Education in Kashmir. It appears that they have been telling the Kashmir Prime Minister about the supposed hardships of the Indian Muslims and the likely fate that would await the Kashmir Muslims once Kashmir fully accedes to India. . . . . . . Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed is one of the strongest pro-India elements in Kashmir. He feels that much of the misfortunates of Kashmir is due to



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

191

the fact that the question of the accession is still in the melting pot. He holds the view that once Kashmir accedes to India, all the present troubles would be over. It appears, however, that his personal influence over the Kashmir Cabinet at present is at a lower ebb. He is reported to be at loggerheads with Mirza Afzal Beg, and at present, the latter is more in the confidence of Sheikh Abdullah. . . .28

One important point that this note of Katju suggests is that by mid-1952 even among the closest advisors of the Prime Minister, meaning thereby the highest centre of power, Abdullah had begun to be thought of and discussed as the one who was now a suspect. Everyone who understood Nehru was more than aware that the Prime Minister did not take to well to any suggestion that suspected Abdullah of any wrongdoing. It must have taken some conviction on Katju’s part to have recorded what he did. Sumanth S. Bankeshwar in a small booklet questioned the very basis of what he called the ‘root of the problem’, namely Abdullah. He said that the first mistake the government of India made was to select a person as dictatorial as Abdullah to head the government in such a troubled region.29 Bankeshwar also noted that once Abdullah had been selected – for good or bad, his dismissal was hardly an answer. Abdullah cited as we shall see in the following pages the Praja Parishad Satyagraha as one of the reasons that raised in his mind an element of doubt with regard to the future of Jammu & Kashmir as a part of the Union of India. But more importantly even as Abdullah began to express his doubts with regard to the accession with increasing frequency, the common perception of ordinary Kashmiris remained that their life and economic prosperity would be better if the state was merged with India. Several versions to this effect were published in the early years. Kashmir in Crisis was one such. It said ‘Independence’ would expose Kashmir to intervention from big powers. It also pointed out that Kashmir and Kashmiris enjoyed huge good will and support in India.30 Several reports of the time also suggest that the uncertainty with regard to the accession had disappeared within months and the issue was not infact a major part of common public discourse. Such reports pointed out there were two major constituents who worked over time

192

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

to draw attention to the issue – one Pakistan and the other, influential National Conference leaders who had come to realize that the more fluid the situation remained, the more it suited them and their political and economic interests. D.N. Kalhan who had toured Jammu Kashmir in 1955 wrote at length that the ongoing development works in the region had removed the doubts that remained with regard to the accession of the state to India.31 By the beginning of 1953 it was reasonably well known that the dispute is Kashmir had already or was doing so rapidly, slipping out of hand. The general perception of the situation as it prevailed was written in letters from Kashmir to Dr. Rammanohar Lohia. Even though several theories came to be floated in the years that followed Abdullah’s coming to power as to why he appears to have diluted his support to the accession of Kashmir to India. The main of course is the Praja Parishad Satyagraha, which we have already discussed. We need to go back a bit to 1949 perhaps to see and understand the true mind of Abdullah. And obviously this was much before the Praja Parishad had come into being as an organization of any significance. Sardar Patel’s Correspondence (vol. I) contains an important exchange of letters between N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Sardar Patel on one hand and Ayyangar and Sheikh Abdullah on the other. As the final drafts of the Constitution were in the making, Abdullah was having a lot of problem with the drafting of Article 306-A and some other issues. I am not going into the details of these articles for the simple reason that when viewed in totality the content was hardly an issue – the issue was more fundamental and something that Abdullah was keeping to his heart. On 15 October Ayyangar wrote to Patel: . . . Sheikh Abdullah and two of his colleagues had a talk with me . . . it was a long drawn out argument . . . there was no substance at all in the objections. . . . I told them that I had not expected that after having agreed to the substance of our draft . . . they would let us down. . . . In answer Sheikh Abdullah said . . . that in the discharge of his duty to his own people he found it impossible to accept the draft. . . .32

Abdullah wrote a long letter a day later (17 October). Abdullah



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

193

explained how he had all along been against the draft and how he had not got a chance to move an amendment or express his views in the ‘Open House’. ‘. . . I and my colleagues have been extremely pained . . . in case I fail to hear from you within a reasonable time, I regret to say that no course is left open for us but to tender our resignation from the Constituent Assembly.’33 The next day Ayyangar wrote back and explained to Abdullah how his stand and statements were incorrect: . . . I am unable . . . to appreciate your suggestion . . . to rectify the position, there is nothing . . . which needs rectification . . . I do not consider . . . any justification for your entertaining any idea of resignation from the Constituent Assembly. The step if taken would produce the most unwelcome and serious repercussion in Kashmir, India and the world. 34

Ayyangar had marked Abdullah’s letter to Sardar Patel. Patel was as usual forthright and in three simple and small paragraphs he summed up his opinion of Abdullah and of the consequences of what he (Abdullah) was insisting upon in this letter to Ayyangar. . . . I find there are substantial changes over the original draft, particularly in regard to the applicability of fundamental rights and the directive principles of state policy . . . you can yourself realize the anomaly of the state becoming part of India and at the same time not recognizing any of these provisions . . . whenever Sheikh Sahib wishes to back out he always confronts us with his duty to the people. Of course he owes no duty to India or to the Indian Government or even on a personal basis to you and the Prime Minister who have gone all out to accommodate him. In these circumstances any question of my approval does not arise. If you feel it is the right thing to do you can go ahead with it. . . .35

The point is that, this was the Abdullah of 1949. Where then was the issue of his having changed. The circumstances in say July/August 1953 were only scarcely worse than they were in 1949. The almost five years that Abdullah retained power even after this kind of correspondence on a matter of such importance was perhaps only a dangerously long rope. This was a ‘rope’ that Abdullah used with great cunning to spread his roots and make himself even more indispensable in the eyes of the Prime Minister than he already was. It is in this context that it is suggested that decisive action in the early

194

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

stages of the developing crisis could possibly have made a historic difference. It is important to note that close and careful observers of Abdullah had begun to take a serious note of the changes that had begun to occur in his stand on key issues. Here too it was none other than Sardar Patel who first raised the issue with Prime Minister Nehru. What Patel flagged was in addition to the stand Abdullah was taking in the drafting of key Articles of the Constitution: ‘. . . I am getting rather worried about Kashmir particularly the attitude of Sheikh Sahib, his failure to deal with the Communist infiltration . . . the National Conference and Sheikh Sahib are losing their hold on the people in the valley. . . .’36 THE PRAJA PARISHAD AND ITS CONTEXT

When a note is taken of how Abdullah used the Praja Parishad to virtually free himself of any obligation he may have held towards his close friend Prime Minister Nehru, one must understand the circumstances that led to the origin of the Praja Parishad organization and the political initiatives it took. On 17 April 1949 Prime Minister Nehru recorded for Sardar Patel a long note. Marked Top Secret and Personal it draws attention to the increasing complications in Kashmir and the first signs of the developing problem in Jammu: . . . Two days ago, Ayyangar sent me a copy of a report of one of our Intelligence Officers who had been sent to Kashmir. This report was a very interesting and revealing document. In this report, among other things, a reference was made to a growing Hindu agitation in the Jammu province for what is called a zonal plebiscite. This idea is based on the belief that a plebiscite for the whole of Kashmir is bound to be lost and therefore let us save Jammu atleast. You will perhaps remember that some proposal of this kind was put forward by the Maharaja some months back. It seems to me that this kind of propaganda is very harmful indeed for us. Whatever may happen in the future, I do not think Jammu province is running away from us. If we want Jammu Province by itself and are prepared to make a present of the rest of the State to Pakistan, I have no doubt we could enrich the issue in a few days. The prize we are fighting for is the valley of Kashmir. . . . . . . This propaganda for a zonal plebiscite is going on in Jammu, in Delhi



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

195

and elsewhere. It is carried on by what is known as the Jammu Praja Parishad. Our Intelligence Officer reported that this Praja Parishad is financed by the Maharaja. Further that the large sums collected for the Dharam Arth Fund, which are controlled by the Maharaja, are being spent in propaganda for him. All this is resulting in producing a most peculiar and unfortunate situation. . . . . . . We know that Sheikh Abdullah and some of his colleagues have been very unwise in their public remarks and they have improperly criticized the Maharaja and asked for his removal. I had a long talk with Abdullah last night and again pointed out to him very forcibly how unfortunate and wrong his attitude was in this particular matter and how it was creating difficulties not only for us but for himself. He repeated his old complaints, which included the very facts that our intelligence officer has stated. He promised that he would say nothing about this Maharaja in future, but he was very unhappy about it. . . . . . . This morning Cariappa came to see me. He has recently been to Jammu and Kashmir and he gave me his report. He said that this tussle between the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah was having a very bad effect not only in the State but in the Army.37

Nehru’s reading of the Praja Parishad was overridden with anger. This opinion was consistent. In a top secret and personal letter to Home Minister Katju (4 January 1953) he used the term ‘the most poisonous kind and even notes that the ‘Partition helped them and they had their bloody way for some time.’ ‘. . . Being suppressed to some extent then they assassinated Gandhiji. . . .’38 In the same letter the Prime Minister adds: ‘. . . there is a measure of sympathy for these communal organizations (among officers) and Syama Prasad Mookerjee has intimate contacts with many of them and influences them?. . . .’ What is truly surprising is that the key organization upon which the government depended for such critical information, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) did not exactly think on the same line as the Prime Minister. Importantly the Home Minister under whom the IB functioned was not only a Kashmiri but was on close personal terms with the Prime Minister. A top secret IB report was signed by its Director B.N. Malik on 7 January (1953). Thereafter it was seen by five other officials in the chain and was read by Nehru the very next morning (8 January).

196

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

PRAJA PARISHAD AGITATION IN JAMMU (IB REPORT) . . . The Praja Parishad agitation in Jammu is being conducted on the slogan of full accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to India. The form of the agitation is to take out processions with Indian national flags and try to hoist them on public buildings. When obstructed by the police, the processionists, on some occasions, have turned violent and attacked the police and the magistrates with brickbats and sticks and have thereby invited lathi charge and tear gas and even firing on three or four occasions. So far the casualties on the side of the satyagrahis have been four killed and several wounded and the arrests number over 800. There have been some talks of resorting to some other forms of civil disobedience but there is evidence that the organizers are waiting for instructions from the Jan Sangh leaders in India. . . . . . . There is universal desire amongst the non-Muslims of the State that the State should fully merge with India and accept the Indian Constitution, and there is regret that the terms of the Indo-Kashmir agreement do not provide for complete accession. Due to the stalemate in the U.N. Security Council over the Kashmir questions, a feeling has grown amongst the people that India will not allow a plebiscite to be held in Kashmir and therefore, consider that there is no reason to make any special concessions to the Muslim population to obtain their votes. Holding that the present position will continue permanently, the non-Muslims apprehend that under the Indo-Kashmir agreement they will be eternally subordinated to the Kashmiri Muslims. Even in some otherwise well informed circles there is suspicion that the Kashmir Government is heading towards independence and the non-implementation of certain portions of the Indo-Kashmir agreement, whilst providing for a separate Head of the State and Flag, is pointed out as a proof of this assumption. In spite of the sincere pronouncements of the National Conference leaders that accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India is permanent, suspicion continues and vitiates the atmosphere in this state. . . . . . . Unfortunately, the National Conference never had deep roots in Jammu. The persons who have been elected to the National Conference from Jammu are considered to be people with little influence in that area. Therefore, the people of Jammu feel that they have got no real voice in higher counsels of the State. Thus there is a political vacuum which leads to a state of frustration and generates the prevailing dissatisfaction and discontent. . . . . . . These political and economic grievances, some of which arise out of genuine misgivings and some are bred out of distrust, are being exploited



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

197

by several groups of persons who have their own axes to grind and who want to bring down the present Government or force it to accede to their respective demands. These groups are: (1) the R.S.S.S. (2) the supporters of the Maharaja’s rule, (3) the Zamindars and landlords, (4) the Rajputs, (5) the ex-Servicemen, (6) Refugees, and (7) other vested interests. . . . . . . The R.S.S., which works in the name of the Praja Parishad in this State, is interested in the complete merger of Jammu & Kashmir with India and changing it from a secular country to a Hindu Rashtra. ‘One President, one flag, one Constitution’ is a slogan which goes extremely well amongst the Hindu intelligentsia of Jammu who naturally desire their State to be fully merged with India, and to those persons who are not politically-minded the Praja Parishad leaders represent that all their present difficulties can be solved only if the State fully accedes to India. . . . . . . The supporters of the Maharaja’s rule, who have lost their former position of power and glory, desire even a partial restoration of the monarchical system and, failing to achieve this, follow a dog-in-the-manger policy by discrediting the present Government. The common people of Jammu have little sympathy for the Maharaja and therefore his erstwhile supporters do not make his removal an open issue but exploit their economic grievances and political frustration. . . . . . . The zamindars and landlords of Jammu are disgruntled because they have been dispossessed of their holdings. . . . . . . The Hindu Mahasabha has also openly supported the movement but has allowed the agitation in India to be carried on by the Jan Sangh. The R.S.S. leaders have kept themselves out of the limelight probably because their political wing, the Jan Sangh, is leading (the) agitation. . . . . . . The Praja Parishad leaders have so far avoided any form of communal agitation and in their speeches have stressed that the move is not against the Muslims or the Kashmiris but is against the Government only. However the communal character of such an agitation cannot be concealed and there are dangers in areas like Rajauri where there is mixed population, demonstrations by the Praja Parishad and counter-demonstrations by the National Conference may lead to communal troubles. It is therefore dangerous to allow this form of agitation to continue for a long time in such a sensitive area. . . . . . . Such a movement may also ultimately affect the morale of the troops. Dogra ex-servicemen have many relations in the Indian Army, some units of which are posted in Jammu and large-scale disaffection amongst the exservicemen is bound to have repercussions sooner or later on the active Service Personnel. Therefore it is desirable that a solution should be found both politically and administratively to put an early and to this agitation. . . .

198

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

. . . It is not possible to win over the hard core of Sanghis or the supporters of the Maharaja or zamindars who form the spearhead of this movement in Jammu. Therefore their hostile activities have to be repressed by strong action and they must be isolated from the people. At the same time it is necessary to look into some of the causes which have generated such a large volume of discontent, dissatisfaction and distrust and take steps to find remedies for real grievances. Some well-informed people who realize the full implications of the Praja Parishad agitation and some Hindu National Conference workers have suggested that the following three steps, if taken, will meet some of the legitimate grievances of the people and remove some of their suspicions and thereby isolate the trouble-makers from the people at large: 1.  Financial integration of the State with India. 2. Extending the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India over the courts of Jammu and Kashmir. 3.  Declaration of Fundamental Rights. . . . Other steps, which must be already under the serious consideration of the Government, and which may be expedited are the re-employment of ex-servicemen, re-establishment of the Ex-Soldiers Board, execution of the Community Projects, rehabilitation of the refugees, and the recognition of Dogri as the mother-tongue of the Dogras for primary education. It is believed that if these steps are quickly taken, the atmosphere in the State will completely change. . . . . . . With regard to the agitators, the following steps are necessary and may be taken: 1. Cases of conspiracy to overthrow the Government and commit illegal acts should be instituted against the leaders of the movement and warrants issued for their arrest so that they may be executed even in India. 2. Prominent sympathizers should be recruited as Special Police under the Police Act and given certain duties, failure to perform which will make them liable to prosecution. 3. More internal check on the movements of the leaders may be exercised. . . . 39

There is an element of irony when we realize that the same Intellegence Bureau would a few months later stand out in support of the dismissal and arrest of Abdullah. Just a few days before Nehru had seen the IB assessment report on the Praja Parishad he had written to Abdullah. One can easily note the Prime Minister still trying to keep Abdullah in good humour:



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

199

My dear Sheikh Sahib, I have read in this morning’s newspapers the report of a speech you delivered yesterday in Jammu. If I may say so, it was an excellent speech, firm and friendly. More particularly, your references to the Dogras were happy. . . . . . . I need hardly tell you that I have been giving constant thought to these developments in Jammu. I have occasionally written to you. But I would have preferred, of course, a talk. Unfortunately that could not take place. My own inclination is always to go to the heart of the seat of trouble whenever and wherever it occurs and to deal with it in my own way. That way is apart from the normal governmental way which, of course, has to be pursued. Ultimately where one has to deal with people, especially in considerable numbers, it is the human approach that tells and not mere logic or governmental action, though both are necessary. Where the human approach is lacking, no real solution comes of any problem even though that problem may be suppressed for some time. It is because I find that human approach in your recent speech in Jammu that I felt happy. . . . . . . More and more I have felt that a positive human approach is not only necessary but will pay dividends as it always does. This is so especially in the case of people like the Dogras and the Rajputs, who do not shine in intelligence or logic, but who are always receptive to a friendly approach. Unfortunately they have a feeling that they are disliked and condemned and so they develop a sudden attitude which is on the verge of despair. They are tough people in their own way. Occasionally their toughness goes in the wrong direction. We have had plenty of dealings with them in Rajasthan, Madhya Bharat and many other parts of India. We have had trouble from them also and we have also succeeded often in winning over the very persons who created trouble as well as those who sympathized with them. So I speak with some experience of this kind of persons. I have little doubt that they have had this feeling of sullenness at what they thought was the bad treatment given to them. As you pointed out in your very good analysis of the Jammu situation, which you sent me, the Dogras and the Rajputs have been a ruling group in Jammu and, to some extent, all over the State. The fall from the status, therefore, which was inevitable, has been all the greater because of this. They required rather careful and tactful and friendly treatment. They got, I think, justice, as you have shown in your appraisal. But some thing more was necessary. There were unfortunately frequent references to them as being a bad lot. Some of the speeches of Afzal Beg were very unhappy and led to this strong feeling of resentment among these Dogras and Rajputs of Jammu. Instead of being the ruling group they felt that they had been suddenly put down and made a ruled group and another group. . . .

200

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

. . . I am quite sure that Maharaja Hari Singh is helping the mischiefmakers, though to what extent I do not know. I have no sympathy for him. But for the present we have to judge every step by its affect on the general situation. Any step that might be used by the mischief-makers to help them has to be avoided. I mention this in regard to certain orchards that belong to Hari Singh. I understand that these orchards are being resumed by the State. I was under the impression that all orchards were being treated in this way. But apart from this, to do this just at the present moment does not appear to me a very wise move. It will irritate the Dogras and the Rajputs. In war as in any political conflict, one has to deal with the major front and not add to one’s troubles by having numerous fronts. Also one has to undermine the morals of the opponent, not encourage it by any action or procedure. . . .40 ‘PRAJA PARISHAD A REACTION TO AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM OF KASHMIR’: BALRAJ PURI

Balraj Puri was no friend of the Praja Parishad. Based in Jammu he wrote extensively on different aspects of the problems of the state. Many of these writings later appeared in the journal Kashmir Affairs that was started and edited by him: . . . The origin and growth of the Praja Parishad was largely due to local causes. It was essentially a reaction to the aggressive trends in the local nationalism of Kashmir and a protest of a region which felt politically ignored and condemned. . . . The wholesale rejection of the nomination papers (election) of the Praja Parishad candidates allegedly in a pre-planned manner . . . provided a further provocation to the people of Jammu. The resentment that was accumulating in Jammu due to numerous other reasons could get only one outlet in the form of the Praja Parishad. . . .41

About a year later Puri, wrote another article for Kashmir Affairs. At first he quoted an article from Janta (1953) by Gurucharan Singh Bhatia while explaining the nature of the Praja Parishad: ‘. . . National Conference and Praja Parishad represent urges of the aggressive local nationalism of Kashmir and Jammu respectively. The outbursts of the Kashmir leaders against Jammu helped Praja Parishad in mobilizing public support. . . .’42 Puri while explaining the issues in Jammu, also said that: . . . any policy of appeasing Kashmir at the cost of Jammu is wrong . . . often



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

201

it has happened that those who voiced the feelings legitimate grievances of the Jammu people were coerced into silence in the name of larger interests, many who persisted were dubbed as anti national. . . . It is forgotten that Jammu province is predominantly Hindu. It is no fault of theirs. If they have grievances they must not be considered communal. . . . These two regions profess two religions which determines and influences . . . their outlook on life . . . there is no doubt, widespread dissatisfaction and feeling among the people of Jammu that they are being discriminated against and neglected . . . this feeling might have been generated because of the political importance given to Kashmir. But it is also a fact that authorities have not been responsive to public opinion in Jammu. . . . In my opinion the trouble lies in the non recognition of Jammu as an entity. . . .

We have noted that even the Intelligence Bureau report had drawn attention to the disquiet among the Hindus of the Jammu region particularly after Abdullah had taken charge of the government. For some reasons however prior to the Praja Parishad the Hindus of Jammu had not been able to organize and consolidate themselves politically. Kanwar Bansi Lal Beri in an insightful article published in Ranbir noted how the Hindus were lacking a strong voice. The article also drew attention to the manner in which leaders of political parties like the Congress, the Muslim League and even National Conference were hardly concerned with the welfare of common people and spent most of their time running after offices of influence and power.43 COMMUNAL DIVIDE AND REGIONAL BIAS

What Puri thus emphasized was that Abdullah’s working and policies had alienated the people of Jammu. This alienation was for several reasons. This included allocation of development grants, recruitment to Government jobs and so on. Interestingly the person who was especially deputed to assist the government in Jammu & Kashmir as Prime Minister (Chief Minister) Mehar Chand Mahajan too pointed out and he did so as early as in December 1947 that Abdullah was being unfair and injudicious in running the government: ‘. . . the administration here is on Hitlerian methods . . . there is no rule of law’. He pointed out how a large number of people were in jail without trial. He also noted how Maharaja Hari Singh had told Abdullah

202

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

about certain officials who were suspected to be Pakistan sympathizers yet Abdullah retained them. One was even appointed a Governor. . . .’ Mahajan cited several more instances and explained how Abdullah had become ‘a law unto himself.’ 44 He wrote again on 24 December (1947) with a long list of charges against Abdullah. In this letter a major issue that he raised was appointments of unqualified people to important positions on communal grounds.45 That Sheikh Abdullah had begun to increasingly see matters in terms of Muslims and Hindus emerges in an important letter that Sardar Patel wrote to Prime Minister Nehru in which he pointed out some provocative observations of Abdullah. This again was as early as September 1948.46 Abdullah had made some charges in a press conference in New Delhi to which Patel responded in a letter to him: ‘. . . You have also referred to the Muslim fanaticism of Pakistan and the Hindu fanaticism of East Punjab . . . nothing justifies your dubbing a whole province as having succumbed to any kind of fanaticism. . . .’47 The fact that Abdullah had begun to ignore Jammu in terms of developmental priorities was well known. But by 1952 complaints had also begun to reach Nehru with regard to Ladakh. A note by M.O. Mathai for Nehru’s consideration draws attention to this: . . . I should like to draw PM’s attention to attached press cutting from the Hindustan Times Evening News dated 13 May 1952, which contains a statement in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, by the Head Lama of Ladakh to the effect that not a single pie has been provided for Ladakh in the Kashmir Government Budget. . . . . . . I am not suggesting that PM should write to Sheikh Sahib about this; but I think, taking everything into consideration, the Central Government should give some special attention to the forgotten region. I have heard reports from decent people to the effect that the amount of Rs. 10,000/which PM sent to Sheikh Sahib for famine relief in Ladakh, hardly reached the poor people there. Of course, Sheikh Saheb must have sent the money to the man incharge in Ladakh, but I do not know what type of man is there in Ladakh. . . . . . . I think it will be desirable, from every point of view, for the Central Government to allot one Community Project to Ladakh if possible.48

But coming back to Balraj Puri. Puri infact went back several years and explained how the Parishad had begun to gain popularity. Even



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

203

though the Parishad had been in existence since November 1947 it was only in 1949 that serious note was first taken of it, this is when Prem Nath Dogra joined it. Many of its members were arrested in 1948. The Parishad organized an agitation for their release. Since they were able to manage the release, the agitation got a shot in the arm. This story of repressive arrests and release continued for different reasons. On one occasion when some students protested against the hoisting of the National Conference flag in a Jammu college, they were arrested and victimized. Several senior leaders too were arrested. Things had reached a stage that Gopalaswami Ayyangar had to intervene and secure the release of the students and leaders. The repressive polices of the government only served to further it’s (the Parishad’s) cause. But Sheikh Abdullah and Prime Minister Nehru thought otherwise. Both had agreed that the repressive policies of the government had successfully contained the movement.49 Nehru wrote to Abdullah not only admitting to the repression but sharing a view that the Parishad would soon fade away: ‘. . . I think it would be good tactics to take advantage of the fading out of the Satyagraha to tone down the repressive activities (of the government).’ 50 PRAJA PARISHAD PLEA TO THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA

By the beginning of 1952 the problems and issues for which the Praja Parishad had been raising its voice had begun to draw countrywide attention. The Executive Committee of the Jammu & Kashmir Praja Parishad had met for four days (17 June to 20 June) in Jammu (1952) Several matters of far reaching consequence were discussed. The key point that emerged was that the Constituent Assembly of Jammu & Kashmir was not representative of the state and comprised people mainly from one party and one region.51 The manner in which the Constitution of India and the very character of the Republic was sought to be defied was also discussed. The adoption of a distinct flag was a challenge – it was like creating a ‘republic within a republic’. For the first time an indication also emerged of the probability of the Praja Parishad starting a nation-wide agitation on the issue. A long memorandum was also submitted at the time to the President of India – this document is of significance in understanding the Praja

204

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Parishad and its objectives. The 2000 word document touched on several issues. At first it mentioned how the people of Jammu were wanting to merge with the rest of India just like other states. Attention was then drawn to how the Abdullah government had curtailed liberties of people in Jammu by the use of Article 50 of the Defence of Kashmir Rules and the Public Security Act. There was in operation a large scale censorship even with postal letters. The memorandum mentioned how workers and students had been arrested for protesting when the National Flag was not used and in its place the National Conference Flag was used at a public function in Jammu. It said that Jammu & Kashmir was the only state where people could not approach the Supreme Court for redressal of legal issues. Coming to recruitment it said that most key positions in the government were filled with National Conference people and in most cases from one community. The memorandum noted how the boundaries of districts in the Jammu region were altered. In the case of Udhampur which was a Hindu majority district, it was divided in a manner that its mineral and forest rich areas were merged with Doda which was a Muslim majority district. Likewise Riasi district was split and a new Rajouri Poonch were created. It noted how the minorities were systematically pushed out from the Muslim majority areas. Another very interesting issue raised in the representation was that while Indians from other parts of India were discouraged from settling in Jammu & Kashmir, a large number of people from Kazakhstan and Turkistan were welcomed and given citizenship rights. Similarly Pakistanis had been allowed to settle in the state in large numbers. The memorandum said that when it was learnt that the Constituent Assembly would ratify the accession, people had prepared to contest the election. But Abdullah ensured that 39 of 41 nomination papers of the Praja Parisahd were rejected. The memorandum infact demanded that a judicial commission should find out how this happened. It also explained how the National Conference was keen only for a loose bond with India. It wanted the support and finances from India but wished to retain all power. Explaining why the Praja Parishad was even willing to accept a separation of Jammu & Ladakh from Kashmir the memorandum said:



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

205

. . . We of Jammu claim the right to determine our future. . . . Had Kashmir valley held with us . . . we need not have made this demand . . . it was our desire that the entire state including those parts which are still held by Pakistan should form an integral part of India . . . but till that happens we can not agree with Mohammad Abdullah that like Kashmir valley we also should accede to our own motherland with reservations . . . imagine for a moment any other part of India whether in the east or the west or south placed in that ackward predicament in which we are and then you will probably agree that the same demand would have been made by the people of the region . . . we want the Constitution of India to apply to Jammu. We want to have the protection of the Supreme Court. . . as all Indians we want the same flag. . . .52 JAMMU & KASHMIR IN PARLIAMENT: NEHRU & MOOKERJEE SOME EXTRACTS

On 26 June 1952 Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee raised the basics of the Kashmir issue in Parliament. He had already written to Sheikh Abdullah and had spoken on similar lines on several occasions earlier. He charged Prime Minister Nehru in Parliament for having taken the ‘separate flag’ issue lightly. Infact he said that Nehru had tried to minimize the gravity. ‘. . . There be only one state flag . . . and that was the Union Flag . . . the major question was could there be a Republic within a Republic’. Dr. Mookerjee appealed to Nehru to: ‘. . . exercise statesmanship and inert strength of will and determination that Sardar Patel had exercised. . . .’ He wanted Abdullah to think of himself first as an Indian and then as a Kashmiri. He sought to know how the government could consider giving to Abdullah the right to chose and deny to the people of Jammu & Kashmir the same right.53 Several members participated in this important discussion on Kashmir. N.C. Chatterjee had spoken at length. He drew the House’s attention to how so much had gone wrong in Kashmir but people had kept silent lest it weakens India’s case – it was a self-denying ordinance. N.C. Chatterjee also said: . . . Uptil now India had placed herself under a self-denying ordinance with regard to Kashmir. There was a general feeling of reluctance to say anything which might help Pakistan in its anti-India propaganda. But unfortunately, some of the recent speeches of Sheikh Abdullah as the Chief Minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir compel us to speak out our mind; specially

206

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

the resolutions passed by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly compel us to review the constituent position and both the Government of India and the House of the People should address themselves seriously to the situation which is now facing us. . . . . . . Mr. Alan Campbell Johnson has said in his book ‘Mission with Mountbatten’ that when Shiekh Abdullah was nominated to represent India at Lake Success, there was uneasiness in high quarters because he was known as a ‘flamboyant personality’ and when a flamboyant personality makes flamboyant speeches, always difficulty comes into being. We maintain that our Government has bungled badly over the Kashmir issue. The biggest bungling was to refer the Kashmir problem to the UNO. The big leaders were afraid and succumbed to the machinations of the imperialists, supposed to be friends of India. The sooner we get out of the UNO and withdraw this problem, the better for India and for Kashmir. The second bungling, was the ‘ceasefire’ order. While the valiant Indian Army had gone into Kashmir and was chasing the marauders and aggressors who were helped by Pakistan and the whole territory was going to be cleared by our valiant soldiers, this unfortunate ‘ceasefire’ order went. The result is that Kashmir territory, which is under the law, under the Constitution and by all canons of morality and justice Indian territory, one third of it – more than that – is today occupied by these illegal trespassers who are still sticking to it and we are passive spectators and cannot do anything. . . . . . . The third bungling to my mind, that is the most tragic thing which has happened in Indian history – was this offer of a plebiscite, which should never have been given. I maintain and I say with all earnestness that under the law, under this Constitution, accession to the Dominion of India under Section 6 of the Government of India Act, as amended after the Indian Independence Act, was final and irrevocable, and there ought not to have been any question of plebiscite. This tragic offer of plebiscite led to all this result and we are faced today with a serious situation. Indian blood had been shed on the valley of Kashmir. 150 crores of rupees of the Indian taxpayers money have been spent there and more will to be spent there and more will have been spent there and yet we are not out of the woods. Not only that, this is responsible for the uncertain situation and for the pandering to communalism which the Government of Kashmir is today doing. Look at it. Sheikh Abdullah says: ‘How can I tolerate any party demanding fullest accession, fullest integration to India ? How can I face the Kashmir Muslims?’ That is an astonishing statement. What about the poor Hindus of Jammu and Kashmir ? What about the people of Jammu. . . .54



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

207

Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee drew the House’s attention to how Abdullah was encouraging discrimination in the policy of recruitment: . . . Regarding the Government services, posts are being advertised reserved for Muslims. Is there any other State or administration where posts have been reserved for the majority community ? – Is this secularism ? Even officers are being encouraged to join the National Conference. They are allowed to join as members of the political party and they also hold administrative jobs. It is an unheard of thing. If you have officers like that who will also be directly concerned with a political party, naturally what the consequences will be, you can realize. . . .55 . . . I especially request the Prime Minister to have some patience with those who differ from his policy in relation to Kashmir. It is no use our throwing stones at each other. It is no use our calling each other communalists or reactionaries. He should realize that on certain points there are fundamental differences between his approach and what we consider should be the national approach regarding this problem. It may be that after we discuss the matter in detail not only amongst ourselves, but with the representatives of Kashmir, we may be able to arrive at a satisfactory solution. Whatever I shall speak, I shall speak from that point of view. We are anxious to find a satisfactory solution so that Kashmir may remain within India so that the great sacrifice which India has made along with the people of Kashmir during the last five years may blossom into fruits which will benefit the people of the entire nation. That is our anxiety. . . . . . . On the constitutional aspect, my friend N.C. Chatterji has spoken, and shall not repeat his arguments. It will be for Dr. Katju to answer as to how far strictly under the Constitution the recent acts of the Kashmir Assembly, and the recommendations of that body, can be deemed to be justifiable and acceptable in view of the provisions of the Constitution. But I shall go beyond the limits of the Constitution for the time being. There is the question of the flag. The Prime Minister the other day at the press conferences tried to minimize the gravity of this decision taken by the Constituent Assembly. Sheikh Abdullah spoke two days ago, and he said ‘Oh, of course, we will recognize the Union Flag’. There is no question of his recognizing the Union Flag. The Union flag is there is spite of anybody, and that is the flag of free India. If you want to accept the principle that any State may have its own flag, you immediately create difficulties and you do not know where they may stop. It is no point to say that the Maharaja of Kashmir had his flag. I know the Maharajas in different parts of India have their flags. Our own Governors have their flags. The question is: Can

208

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

there be a State flag ? Should India accept the position that barring the use of the flag of the Union of India any other flag should be allowed to be used ? If I may use the expression when the principle of monogamy is to be introduced here, it should be introduced in relation to the use of one flag for the whole of India. You cannot have divided loyalty. Sheikh Abdullah has said: ‘we will treat both flags equally.’ You cannot do it. It is not a question of fifty, fifty. It is not a question of parity. It is a question of using one flag for the whole of India. India that includes Kashmir. There is no question of having a separate Republic of Kashmir having a separate flag. It is not a small matter. I have no time, other wise, I would have read brilliant extracts from the speech delivered by Pandit Nehru before the Constituent Assembly when he had the present flag of India accepted as the National Flag of the country. He expressed there in language which you cannot surpass, the sacrifice, the real significance of the flag not for one State, not for this portion of the people or that part of India, but the entire people of India, and for the matter of that, for the free nation itself. So that is a question where the Government of India should deal with the matter very firmly. The National Conference can have a flag. I have no objection to that flag. I have no objection to that. Sheikh Abdullah’s argument is that we had shed so much blood there has been so much suffering behind this flag. We do not want Kashmir to be divided. On the other hand, we want that the lost territory within Jammu and Kashmir the territory which is now in the hands of Pakistan. But if Sheikh Abdullah is completely intransigent, and if he says, ‘I shall not come within India except in respect of the three subjects,’ then at any rate let us devise a scheme by which the people of Jammu and Ladakh may have the full liberty to decide whether they will integrate fully with India. Let him have a loose integration only with regard to Kashmir valley. I do not want partition, and I have repeatedly said that. If Panditji can exercise his influence, his goodwill, his power of persuasiveness and whatever he possess and thereby persuade Sheikh Abdullah and others to remain with India as a constituent unit in accordance with the sacred principles which have been repeatedly declared and which are contained in this White Book, then I have no objection. If not, do not drag large numbers of people of these other provinces who are desirous of remaining within India – do not drag them to the same fate as Sheikh Abdullah would like to drag them to. . . . 56

Nehru was always touchy and sensitive on Kashmir, not surprisingly debates on issues related to Kashmir always brought out the best in him:



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

209

. . . The hon. Member who has just spoken (Mookerjee) has appealed to me to exercise such influence as I might posses in this matter of Kashmir. May I reply to that and say that not only will I exercise my influence to the best of my ability and according to the light as I see it but that I have done so in the past. But my difficulty has been and it is a serious difficulty which has come in the way of a solution of this problem – a difficulty that speeches like the one which the hon. Member has delivered are delivered. . . . . . . The hon. Member started off in his speech today reasonably. There are important matters to be considered to be weighed by us, to be decided by us. Not only to be decided by us, sovereign Parliament as we are, but there are some matters which are outside our scope. We cannot decide the shape of the world, for instance, however much we would like to do it. For instance, we cannot stop the fight in Korea. Yesterday, when an hon. Member wanted to move an adjournment motion regarding the bombing on Yalu river, it was not discussed. But I am quite sure every member here dislikes it, and was aghast at it – that this should be done at this moment, when peace was being talked about. But we cannot stop it. But we could have discussed it, but we can certainly not stop it. There are many things beyond the power of this Parliament. Therefore, we have to proceed about these matters with wisdom with caution, with restraint and with firmness. And during all this period there has been much-much wrong we may have committed and the hon. Member may have committed. I am no paragon of virtue nor is our Government paragons of virtue. I do not say that. But I do humbly submit to this House and to the hon. Member who has just spoken that there are certain approaches which lead to right result, and there are certain approaches which lead to wrong result however eloquently they are put forward. And the approach which has been made often enough not so much by the hon. Member, but by the hon. Member’s companions – I regret, he keeps such amazing company nowadays. . . .

Syama Prasad Mookerjee was hardly the one to take it lying down: ‘. . . I was in your company for 2.5 years. . . .’ Nehru continued: . . . And during all that period when the hon. Member was in our company, he, if I may say so functioned with remarkable clarity of mind. And it is an amazing thing that much that he criticizes or dislikes today was done when he was in our company. There was nothing to criticize then. But gradually he drifted away into evil courses with the result that we see today. As I listened to his speech, as I listened to the first part of hon. Member’s speech

210

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

I did not agree with everything, but it was an able, cogently argued speech on constitutional and other problems which we have to decide in this House. But then he drifted off. The influence of his earlier career in this Government apparently passed away and his later associations came to the front, and he brought out all kinds of amazing things 57. . . .

The Prime Minister explained at length why the issue was taken to the United Nations. For the first time perhaps he also indicated that the decision was taken in consultation with Mahatma Gandhi: . . . Later we referred the matter to the United Nations. It is very well for hon. Members to be wise after the events or for us to realize what we should have done four years ago. But the position as we saw it then it seemed to us a wise thing to do and in those days we had also the high advantage of taking counsel from the Father of the Nation and in this matter too I do not wish to drag his name because it is not fair to do so. But I do wish to say that I took counsel with him because we were in a state of great difficulty and perplexity. We did not want wars all over just at the beginning of our career as an independent nation. And yet we had to defend Kashmir and there was a possibility to that war spreading and becoming a major one. Now regardless of a question as to who was right and who was wrong, there is no doubt about it that if that war had spread, it would have been disastrous for us more so for others but disastrous for us also – and would have stopped all our ideas of progress, development, etc. So we decided - to stop the war spreading - to refer this matter to the United Nations. May I say that hon. Members sometimes ask us to withdraw this question from the United Nations ? I do not understand that. I do not now know how it can be done. Of course we can break with the United Nations when we want to and we can say to them and tell them ‘We leave you, we go away from you and take the consequences.’ If you are prepared for that well, I do not think that will be a right step. That will be a wrong step from many points of view – either broader ground of policy or narrower opportunist grounds, call them what you will. Therefore the question of withdrawing something does not arise in that way. We have made it perfectly clear to the Security Council and the United Nations that we went there with the particular appeal. We did not go there to seek their arbitration or to be ordered about. Our original request to them was a very simple one and that was: ‘Please ask the Pakistan Government not to aid the raiders’. That was our sole request that we made. So since then several resolutions have been passed by the United Nations or the Security Council with or without our agreement. One at least and major one has been passed without our agreement and we have not accepted



A M M U P ot ’ ‘A ccession S till in the M elting

211

that . And we have made it perfectly clear that we cannot accept it or a large part of it. There the matter stands. So that there is no question of our submitting to any direction which we consider wrong. But apart from that we have made it clear that we will in our desire for peace accept any advice or mediation if you like. And even though it is awful enough rather distressing and disheartening to carry on these interminable talks without end when often enough the major issues are put aside long arguments take place over trivial details. . . .58 NEHRU RECORDS HIS ASSESSMENT OF KASHMIR: AGAIN SUPPORTS SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR JAMMU & KASHMIR

A few days after the important debate in parliament Nehru recorded as he usually did his impression of the conditions in Kashmir and what were then the major issues of concern. Infact he recorded these points immediately after a meeting on Kashmir in New Delhi. This ‘Secret’ note was marked to the core ‘Kashmir team’, Dr. K.N. Katju, Maulana Azad and Gopalaswami Ayyangar. This note appears to be a kind of basic document. When the Prime Minister made a major statement in Parliament on 24 July, this note was clearly the basis. The title to the note is ‘Kashmir’: . . . Kashmir, like other States, acceded to India on three subject in October 1947 under rather peculiar circumstances. Later, other States became more integrated in regard to additional subjects and they accepted the Constitution of India in the entirety. . . . . . . This development did not take place in regard to Kashmir because of those special reasons of war with Pakistan, reference to U.N.O. etc. and therefore Kahsmir’s accession was continued to be limited to those three subjects. This was a fluid condition, which could not be finalized then. When our constitution was taking its final shape, something had to be said about Kashmir and, therefore, some transitional provisions relating to Kashmir were added to it. The position remained fluid. . . . . . . The Dominion of Indian became the Republic of India. That made no difference to Kashmir and its accession to the Republic of India was also in regard to those three subjects only. . . . . . . In the normal courses, more definite shape would have been given to the position of Kashmir in the Union of India and the transitory provisions

212

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

would have been replaced by a more permanent arrangement. But chiefly because of the reference to the U.N., we did not take this matter up and allowed things to continue in that transitional and rather vague state. Even in the transitional clauses of our Constitution, reference was made to a future Constituent Assembly of Kashmir State, which was to draw up a Constitution for Kashmir. . . . . . . Now that this Constituent Assembly of J & K State has started functioning, we can no longer delay taking decisions in regard to some of these matters affecting the relation of Kashmir to India. This has been brought to a head by the desire of the Kashmir leaders to change the nature of the Headship of the State. In considering this particular matter, we cannot isolate it from other matters. Therefore, we have to define with some precision though not necessarily with detail, the nature of this relationship. . . . . . . The first question that arises is this: must all constituent units of the Republic of India have exactly the same relation to the Union, as embodied in our Constitution and various lists of subjects, or can there be a variation? . . . If they must stand on exactly the same footing, then there is not much room for argument and Kashmir must line up with the others. . . . . . . This is not a practical proposition and even from the larger point of view, it is desirable to have a certain flexibility in our Constitution. Therefore we must proceed on the basis of some special treatment of J & K State in this connection. . . . . . . Whatever special treatment we may accord to that State, if the State is a constituent unit of the Union of India, then certain inevitable results flow from it. . . . . . . We proceed on the assumption that J&K State is a constituent unit of the Union of India. For the present, the major central subjects in regard to the State are three only, namely, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. We accept that limitation for the present, but it must be made clear that these subjects can be added to. Even now certain additions will have to be made to bring out the inevitable consequences of J & K State being a part of India. These would not be major subjects, but rather corollaries of accession. . . . . . . Accepting that J & K State is constituent unit of the Union of India, it follows that there can only be one common nationality or citizenship, namely that of the Republic of India. There cannot be any kind of separate citizenship for Kashmir or dual citizenship. . . . . . . The authority of the President as given in our Constitution must be acknowledged. (The President has certain overriding powers of suspending the Constitution in a State) It will have to be considered whether this power should remain in regard to J & K State. . . .



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

213

. . . Any Head of the J & K State must be recognized by the President. . . . . . . The Supreme Court must function in the State in regard to anything connected with the subjects of accession as well as Fundamental Rights and other important clauses. The Fundamental Rights may be varied, with our consent, by the Constituent Assembly for Kashmir. There may be other variations too in the Kashmir Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, should be the final authority to interpret the Kashmir Constitution, as it does our own. . . . . . . The question to be considered is whether the Supreme Court should be the highest appellate tribunal for Kashmir also. . . . . . . The National Flag must be the symbol of authority in Kashmir. The new State Flag might continue, but not as a rival of the National Flag. . . . . . . There is to be financial integration. It does not necessarily follow that integration should be exactly of the kind we have got with other States. In any event, it is to be remembered that customs revenue is the main source of income from Kashmir and if we take it, the whole State finances will collapse. It has to remain with the State for a number of years which may be at least 10 and which might be 15.59. . . .

It is clear from this long note that in the Prime Minister’s mind, Kashmir was not be equated with other states. This was the basic difference and it is this view of the situation that he would have to defend with all his intellectual ability at every forum in the years that followed. JAMMU & KASHMIR: ANOTHER HISTORIC DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT

The Bhartiya Jan Sangh organized the Kashmir Day in New Delhi on 30 June 1952. Dr. Mookerjee in his address had once again raised the issue of Abdullah seeking a separate flag in addition to the Union flag. He said it was not something that can be taken casually particularly when we keep in mind the context in which the separate flag question has been raised. He also said: ‘. . . Mohamad Abdullah today preaches a strange doctrine of independence in all matters except only in those spheres where he broadly needs the material support of India in order to keep this independence going. . . .’60 In this speech he also raised the issue of: ‘. . . can we have a Republic within a Republic, can a country have two parliaments, can there be two Presidents within a Union. . . .’ This is also something that he

214

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

raised on several occasions, and was also something that had begun to make a lot of sense to ordinary citizens. 7 August (1952) witnessed an all important debate in Parliament on Jammu & Kashmir. The House was to discuss a statement issued earlier by the Prime Minister (24 July) with regard to the then position of the problem in the state. The proceedings witnessed a cross party criticism of the government’s handling of the issue. In particular the Prime Minister was specially targeted for having sought the United Nation’s intervention. Speaker after speaker also took up the issue of how a third of the state was now under the occupation of Pakistan. Prime Minister Nehru was an outstanding and diligent parlia­ mentarian. He took parliamentary work with great seriousness. Smallest of issues sometimes drew lengthy untiring answers. He rarely fell sick but as his luck would have it he was taken unwell a few days before this important debate which was infact scheduled to discuss Nehru’s statement made in the House on 24 July 1952. A day before the Debate he wrote to Abdullah: . . . I have had the unusual experience of having to retire to bed. After my little accident to my foot a little over a week ago, I have been having too much doctoring. Having personally had little to do with doctors or with drugs throughout my life, this has been a disagreeable experience. To begin with I was given an anti-tetanus injection. Then I was forced almost to swallow some penicillin pills. I had thus far not taken penicillin at all. After a few days, the anti-tetanus injection produced a powerful reaction on me and my body became full of rashes and eruptions. Itching violently all the time. As I had heavy work in Parliament, I continued to go there in spite of all this trouble. Then the swelling eruptions affected my face and head. This was too much and I had to retire to bed. Other injections followed to counteract the previous ones . . . I have felt a little better today after a long rest. . . . . . . I have just received your letter of August 3rd, which apparently D.P. Dhar has brought with him. I have not met him. Tomorrow I shall try to go to Parliament because we have the Kashmir resolution before the House of the people and there is going to be a full day’s debate. . . . I confess that I am, to some extent, in a slight difficulty because of this debate. As I wrote to you, one has to be a little precise in a debate when questions are asked and have to be answered. That precision I cannot give to my answers and I have to be rather vague. In regard to some matters,



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

215

such as Fundamental Right etc., it is difficult to be precise at this stage. But it might have been possible to be more definite in regard to other matters. . . .61

In his opening remarks while moving the motion for the House to consider (7 August) his statement made in the House on 24 July, Nehru made yet another reference to the issue of the ‘will of the people: So while the accession was complete in law and infact, the other fact which has nothing to do with law also remains, namely our pledge to the people of the Kashmir-if you like, to the people of the world –that this matter can be reaffirmed or cancelled or cut out by the people of Kashmir if they so wish. We do not want to win people against their will and with the help of armed force, and if the people of Jammu and Kashmir State so wish it, to part company from us, they can go their way, and we shall go our way. We want no forced marriages, no forced unions like this. I hope this great Republic of India is a free, voluntary friendly and affectionate union of the States of India. I do believe that the people of Jammu and Kashmir State not only came to us as they did, but indeed it was at their request that we took them. It was not under pressure, but it was at their request that we took them in to our large family of States, and I believe that they have those friendly feelings which the other States have towards us. I believe that on repeated occasions they have shown this fact and even in the election of this Constituent Assembly that took place nearly a year ago, they exhibited that feeling of friendship and union with India. And I am personally convinced that if at any time there is any other method of ascertaining their feeling they will decide in the same way. But that is my personal opinion, it may be your opinion or the House’s opinion but the fact remains that we said openly to them and to the world that we will give them a chance to decide, and we will stand by their decision in this matter. Therefore we must honor that pledge. . . . 62

The Prime Minster got good support from his party and even others. Most speakers who supported the Prime Minster did so to keep the pledge with regard to seeking the will of the people. Some like Dr. Lanka Sundaram (Vishakapatnam) felt the Supreme Court’s writ must run in Kashmir. Dr. A.K. Chandra emphasized on how ‘Unity and Uniformity’ are not synonymous and that: . . . We should not indulge in carping criticism of the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir who is but in a very difficult position there from time

216

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

to time. If we want the full integration of Jammu and Kashmir, it is not the time now to talk about the complete integration of Ladakh and Jammu. Such a proposal will lead to a partition of Kashmir on communal lines and ensure the loss of Kashmir to India. The hon. Members of the Opposition in opposing the Prime Minister’s motion have, I fear, unknowingly but nonetheless surely played the very game of Pakistan. Kashmir has been unique in the history of India’s struggle for freedom. It is in Kashmir that we fought the tyrant on the one hand and communalism on the other. In the rest of India we failed because we could not carry the Muslim masses with us all along the line. But if we had a resounding victory any where It was only in Kashmir. Even in the worst days of communal frenzy, not one hair of a Hindu was touched. Are you now going to sacrifice that atmosphere because for the time being discussions with Kashmir have not met with full satisfaction from some of us? In Kashmir, ours has been a winning battle. India showed in Kashmir that Indians could rise above communalism. Even during the battle on the Kashmir front we always fought on the political and not on the communal plane, the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir is setting an example to the rest of India. It has already passed certain very progressive reforms, the abolition of landlordism, abolition of hereditary monarchy and the acceptance of the secular character of the State. . . . . . . The question of a State flag has created an amount of misunderstanding in the minds of many of us. But we have to remember the emotional value that the Kashmir people attach to this flag, the flag under which they have faced tyranny and they have faced death. We have a similar parallel in our attachment to the ‘Vande Mataram’ song, the words of which are in the lips of many of us. Therefore because of the sentimental value we attach to the Vande Mataram we have given it the importance and status of a national song. Similarly also, our Kashmiri friends, because of the sentimental value of the flag, want that the flag should also be recognized as the flag of the State, subject of course to the supremacy of the national flag of India, I do not think it is very generous on our part to object to that.63

Among those who spoke in favour of the motion were Vijaya Lakshmi (Lucknow): . . . The condition of the world is very delicate today, but conditions in Asia are even more so. It is not my purpose to take up the time of the House by entering into the reasons for this. Hon. Members are constantly reading about the situation in newspapers and books. But I wish to remind the House that there is a tide in the affairs of nations as of men which taken at the flood leads on to fortune. Such a tide has arisen in Asia. The situation



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

217

in Kashmir is a sort of symbol of that tide, and if we can resolve all differences that may exist with Kashmir in an amicable manner as is now being done: if an honorable and permanent settlement can find acceptance of this House, then I submit that many of our problems vis-a-vis the international world will be equally solved and India will have vindicated her pledge of peace and the enlargement of human freedom. 64

The general and overall spirit and feeling in the House however was that much had gone wrong in Kashmir. N.B. Khare led the attack on the Prime Minister and the government: . . . I think, in that drama, Kashmir played the part of the hero and India played the part of the heroine. Nobody looked at the faults, foibles and blemishes of the object, of love. After all love is blind, India gracefully abandoned herself into the loving arms of Kashmir. What is the result of the proposed agreement? It is a voluntary abdication of the power over Kashmir by the Government of India. It is also a sort of violation of our Constitution. It also lowers the prestige of the august personage, the President of our Republic. All this had been done to placate the intransigent Chief Minister of Kashmir. That person is an adept in the art of making the best of both the worlds. He has mastered the Hindus through our Prime Minister because the Hindus are pusillanimous and they will not at all oppose or be irritated whatever harm is done to them and he has mastered the Muslims in Kashmir by catering to their fanatical demands. For the last three years he has been criticising the Indian Press, the Indian leaders and even the Indian army. His lip sympathy to Gandhian ideals and secularism and his allegiance to our Prime Minister and the superficial castigation of the leadership of the late Mr. Jinnah could not hide his desire for a separate status for Kashmir and he has got it. Now our Prime Minister to hide his political debacle regaled this House with the geography of Kashmir. He tried to make a point that Kashmir is more akin to Central Asia than India. . . . . . . He was at great pains, I mean he indulged in the special pleading indulged in by a lawyer who has got a weak case. Let me tell the House that howsoever north Kashmir may be, it lies on the Indian slopes of the Himalayas which is the northern boundary of India. You cannot escape this geographical fact. Besides, an old book called Rajtarangini and also other historical facts of recent occurrence will confirm that culturally India and Kashmir have been indissolubly bound together for ages. There is no use saying that Kashmir is more akin to Central Asia than India. . . . . . . He told us with great gusto that Kashmir has become a part of India by this agreement that it is a heart-to-heart union. Kashmir has always been

218

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

a part of India. Where is the question of its becoming a part of India hereafter? And he has said that Pakistan has no position in Kashmir either legally, constitutionally or otherwise. Let me tell you that even now Pakistan occupies one third of Kashmir.65

Sucheta Kriplani (New Delhi) too was critical of the Prime Minister: . . . The Kashmir issue is such a complicated subject that we all-at least I-stand up to speak with a great deal of hesitation. You may say one thing and it may be interpreted in another way. Therefore, one has to be very careful as to what one has to say. I do not wish to cover the subject very widely but will confine my remarks to the recent occurrences which have given rise to a good deal of heart-searching and criticism in India. . . . . . . The first point that our Prime Minister gives in his speech is the point regarding a category of special citizenship for Kashmir. Under the Maharaja’s rule, there were four types of citizens by reading the Prime Minister’s speech, I do not understand whether it is proposed to continue those four cataegories of Kashmiri citizenship. The point is not clear. In any case it is sought to give Kashmir a special type of citizenship right. Why? The argument given in favour of this is that they do not want people from outside Kashmir to go there and rob the Kashmiris of their land. Now, I am sure the people of India are not anxious to go there and settle there. (An Hon, Member: They are) Excuse me, I am not of that view. I am quite sure there is sufficient provincial feeling in this country and sufficient provincial patriotism that a Bengali would like to live in Bengal, a Punjabi would like to live in Punjab, and a Sindi would like to go back to Sind if possible. Suppose there is an emergency, the Kashmir government can I am sure, enact a suitable law by which they can prevent this. There is no need to make a change in our Constitution for this purpose. There is already a provision in the Constitution about citizenship and why should a special category of citizenship be created for the sake of Kashmir? I do not understand it and I am not convinced about it. Suppose a progressive State puts certain restrictions on the transfer of land as between a certain class of citizens and another for the sake of national economy and for protecting the weaker section of the people; suppose it enacts a law that a certain section cannot keep more than a specified quantum of land; there is a social objective in it. But what is the social objective behind this step? There is no social objective behind this. Because under this measure you can even prevent a tiller of the soil from owning the land, and we want the tillers of the soil to own the land. Suppose a peasant wants to acquire a little land in Kashmir, can you give him the land or not?



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

219

. . . Suppose each State brings in this kind of measure. For instance, I who am living in Delhi cannot go and acquire land in Meerut, or somebody living in Calcutta cannot acquire land in Bihar. Then, will India remain a nation, if we allow this I cannot take this as a progressive measure; I take it as a retrograde measure, it is neither a social or economic measure – it is a political measure.66

Maulana Masoodi spoke at length in favour of the motion, explaining how the case of Kashmir was different from other states. Speaking after Kriplani he obviously countered her point of view: . . . I do not want to go into those petty questions that have been raised here during the last few days and about which there have been sufficient discussions in the other House. But I would submit one thing. I admit it is an extraordinary thing to allow Kashmir to have a separate flag under the aegis of the National Flag of India. Some privileges have been given to Kashmir with regard to citizenship rights; that is also an extraordinary thing. There would be some difference in regard to the fundamental rights and Kashmir would have an elected Head of the State; these things too are extraordinary. The State Assembly will have jurisdiction in regard to the residuary subjects and would be the final authority in all these matters; that is also an extraordinary thing. But of all these extraordinary things is it not the most extraordinary thing that you yourselves i.e. this Parliament, gave the right to the Kashmir State to frame its Constitution Assembly? When you did that extraordinary thing and my revered friend Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerji did that, it was not without a reason. There were strong reasons for allowing Kashmir to have a Constituent Assembly and to frame its own Constitution. When you did such an extraordinary thing, it is natural that a number of extraordinary things should arise from that. To raise objections to these extraordinary things at this juncture is, to my mind of no avail; it may only create a confusion in the minds of the people. . . .67

It was Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee who once again led the main charge against the motion. He started by responding to the Prime Minister’s statement that he (Mookerjee) had been a part of the government when major decisions were taken on Kashmir. ‘I do not wish to disclose the extraordinary circumstances under which the decisions were taken’.68 Mookerjee also drew the House’s attention to a statement made by Abdullah in the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir:

220

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

. . . He spoke in the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir about three or four months ago, words which have not been withdrawn, but words which created a good deal of misgivings in the minds of all Indians irrespective of party affiliations. I do not know whether the Prime Minister saw this: ‘. . . We are a hundred per cent sovereign body. No country can put spokes in the wheel of our progress. Neither the Indian Parliament nor any other Parliament outside the State has any jurisdiction over our State. . . .’ . . . It is an ominous statement. I shall make an offer to the Prime Minister and to Sheikh Abdullah. I shall give my full, whole-hearted support to the scheme as an interim measure. The Prime Minister said today that nothing is final. It cannot be final, because things have to be discussed in their various details. But even then I am prepared to give my support. Let two conditions be fulfilled. . . . . . . Let Shekih Abdullah declare that he accepts the Sovereignty of this Parliament. There cannot be two Sovereign Parliaments in India. You talk of Kashmir being a part of India, and Sheikh Abdullah talks of a Sovereign Parliament for Kashmir. It is inconsistent. It is contradictory. This Parliament does not mean a few of us here who are opposing this. This Parliament includes a majority of people who will not be swayed by any small considerations. And why should he be afraid of accepting the Sovereignty of this Parliament of Free India?69. . . . He wanted to call himself the Prime Minister. That is how he first started. Some of us did not like it. We know one Prime Minister of India including Kashmir, that is the Prime Minister who is sitting here. How can you have two Prime Ministers. One Prime Minister in Delhi and another Prime Minister in Srinagar, who will not call himself the Chief Minister, but a Prime Minister. At first I thought it was a small matter and we should not look at it but see how the process is developing – some sort of special treatment at every step and he must be treated in a very different way. Look at the citizenship in a different way. Look at the citizenship rights and fundamental rights. What is it that we are doing? Has the House considered it? Has the House discussed the pros and cons of the recommendations which have been made. You are changing without giving much thought to the provisions of the Constitution regarding citizenship. It was said that rich people are rushing to Kashmir and purchasing property. As the Prime Minister mentioned in his statement, in article 19 (5) there is a provision. We discussed this article threadbare when we framed the Constitution. There were attempts made by various provinces and they wanted to have some special protection against unauthorized purchases of land on a large scale. What is it that we have said? We have said that any State legislature may pass a law imposing reasonable restrictions regarding



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

221

acquisition of property or movement from one part to another in the public interest or in the interest of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. If Sheikh Abdullah feels that in Kashmir some special restriction should be done, the clause is there. I would like to ask the Prime Minister categorically about this. He has not mentioned it. He has skipped over it. Is it intended that the restrictions which the Kashmir Assembly will impose will be in accordance with this exception or is it proposed to give it something more? There are four classes of citizens. I have got the details, but I have not the time to go through them. But those were done in the time of the much cursed Maharaja. Are they to be maintained or are they going to abolish the four different categories of citizenship? I am reminded of a story which was written by Lord Curzon in a book. A distinguished nobleman from England went to the court of Shah of Persia 50 or 60 years ago accompanied by his wife. Both of them were presented, and the Shah was a bit inattentive and the secretary asked: ‘What should be the honour done to the lady?’ There were three different categories of Order of Chastity and the award was made ‘Order of Chastity-class three’. That is how the order came out and then it was realized that something had been done which was of a staggering character and of course amends were made after the damage was done. Four classes of citizenship in Jammu and Kashmir – what for? They should be abolished. There should be only one class of citizenship. Would Indians take all your property ? It was not suggested that Indians should go and purchase property as they liked. Supposing some Indian comes and purchases some property, you may have legislative measures. We have accepted it. What is the fear? We have a Kashmiri Prime Minister of India. We have a Kashmiri Home Minister of India. We are happy in India. We do not mind it. We welcome them. What is the fear? Is it feared that Indians will go and invade Kashmír and one of them will become the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir? We are not going to raid Jammu and Kashmir. I have never visited this beautiful part. I would like to go and stay there for sometime. I have not got the money to purchase a house. In any case, I would like to go there. This is what you have in regard to fundamental rights. You are having new changes there which are very difficult to justify. The Prime Minister mentioned 2 or 3 things – scholarships and services etc. What is this ‘etc.’? And why Services? In services, do you want to make a difference between one citizen and another. Even there as you know in our Constitution, Parliament and Parliament alone has the right to make special provision regarding entrance to services for those who have to be protected. Now there are similar demands made in the South. I have been going through their demands during the last few weeks. They also feel perturbed by the strict operation of some of

222

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

these provisions. When you throw open the doors to them. They also will want similar protection. . . . 70 THE PRAJA PARISHAD GAINS SUPPORT

On 9 August (1952) a convention of the Praja Parishad was organized in Jammu. Prem Nath Dogra was the main speaker. He made two important points. First he made it very clear that the people of Jammu and Ladakh would never approve Abdullah’s stand of a separate flag and the idea of a limited accession of India. The second point he made was that Abdullah was against the Praja Parishad simply because it demanded the State’s complete and unconditional accession. Abdullah’s charging the Parishad with being communal was only an afterthought. Jammu witnessed what was perhaps its largest ever public meeting on 10 August 1952. It was organized by the Praja Parishad. Dr. Mookerjee was the main speaker. He reminded the mammoth meeting of how ‘Jammu Kashmir had been an integral part of India from time immemorial’. What he said next was the key to the address. Dr. Mookerjee appreciated Sheikh Abdullah’s role in securing the general support of the majority people – the Muslims but he also said: ‘It would be fatal to proceed on the basis of Muslim appeasement’.71 The Tribune reported: . . . He paid tributes to Mohamad Abdullah and said that inspite of Pakistan having based its propaganda on religious lines Kashmiri Muslims had stood with India. He appealed to the audience to support Abdullah and said that nothing should be done which would raise any doubt in the minds of the Muslims. . . .72

Dr. Mookerjee infact even appealed to all parties to join hands and support the government and Prime Minister Nehru: ‘because if Kashmir was lost to India it would be because of a weak government’. Some days later Dr. Mookerjee was in Bombay (Mumbai) here too he said that even though he admired Abdullah and ‘had been avoiding any criticism of him’ . . . we can not concede demands which will create a wedge within the component parts of our Union. . .’.73 Prem Nath Dogra was in Bombay in the first week of October, 1952. Refuting the allegations of the Praja Parishad being communal



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

223

he said there were thousands of Muslims who were members of the Parishad. The Parishad was being attacked only because it was the only organization that ‘had opposed the policy of an independent Kashmir that was being followed by Abdullah. . . .’74 Towards the end of 1952 people had openly begun to question the Prime Minister’s soft corner for Abdullah even though Abdullah had begun to appear more and more distanced from the Indian point of view with regard to the State’s accession. Prem Nath Dogra, noted: ‘. . . Pt. Nehru has always emphasized that only the people of the state themselves have a right to decide its future but I will humbly enquire from him whether this right is vested in Muhammad Abdullah and his few associates or in other people also.’75 The Praja Parishad launched a Satyagraha in Jammu on 23 November 1952. The statement issued at the time said: ‘. . . all our protest representations have been utterly disregarded during the last five years. . . .’76 Several leaders from Kashmir attacked the Parishad, charging it with communalizing the situation. This included Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, the man who would replace Abdullah a few months later.77 Even as the Abdullah government clamped down with full force including implementing strict press control and censorship, Dr. Mookerjee said in a statement that the: ‘. . . movement started in Jammu for the full integration of Jammu & Kashmir was not directed against any individual or party but was only for the vindication of a vital principle. . . .’78 Interestingly by the end of 1952 divergent political stands had developed even among the leaders of the National Conference. We have already seen how Abdullah was sustaining his campaign to put pressure on the government of India with regard to limited accession. On the other hand Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed had noted: ‘. . . There is complete identity of views between the state and the government of India. The accession of the state to India is hundred percent complete so far as we are concerned.’79 The Praja Parishad which had been earlier charged by Bakshi for spoiling the atmosphere, followed up by asking him to prove that the accession was complete and that the Union flag enjoyed the highest place in the state.80

224

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Joginder Nath Kaul was Secretary of an organization known as Kashmir Welfare Association. Like Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, he too appealed to the Praja Parishad to end its movement as it was likely to weaken the case of the state’s complete accession. He also drew attention to the role of the Communist Party cadres in Jammu & Kashmir: . . . Another deplorable aspect of the present situation is the part played by the notorious enemies of India – the Communists . . . the Communists stand for an independent Kashmir that is the valley. The Parishad leaders should have the wisdom and foresight to understand that they are playing in the hands of the Communists. . . .81

It is also important to note that several Muslims and Sikhs were participating in the Parishad movement.82 Master Tara Singh the firebrand Akali leader termed the Praja Parishad Satyagraha as a ‘freedom movement’. He condemned the repression of Abdullah and appealed to the Government of India to understand ground realities in the state. He even appealed to the Punjab government to withdraw its police force which had been loaned to the Kashmir government.83 Prime Minister Nehru’s relations with Master Tara Singh were already strained. Nehru spoke on the issue in Parliament the very next day and drew attention to the ‘provocative’ statements made by Tara Singh and others with regard to the Praja Parishad.84 The Congress in particular charged the Praja Parishad for complicating the process of the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India. The paradox is that on the one hand the Congress continuously supported Abdullah even after he was defying the government of India and at the same time on the other hand if we observe closely Abdullah was already on the way out. This ambiguous approach of handling both Abdullah and the Parishad is quite typical of several decisions taken at the time. Karan Singh has written on the issue in a comprehensive and masterly manner: . . . The Sheikh for his part not only made no effort to mollify the feelings of the Jammu people but continued his hostile and aggressive attitude. An example was the question of the flag to be flown on the Jammu Secretariat. . . . I had suggested to the government that along with the new flag the national flag should also be hoisted. This was sharply turned down by the Sheikh . . . I began assessing the situation and soon realized the Praja Parishad agitation



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

225

had spread deep and wide throughout the Jammu region. Even though I knew Jawaharlal’s aversion to the Parishad . . . I prepared a detailed note . . . As I put it . . . the situation is that whereas Jammu & Ladakh strongly desire complete integration with India, Sheikh Saheb and his colleagues are extremely insistent upon the ‘limited’ nature of the Accession and are not prepared to agree to complete integration . . . an overwhelming number of people of the Jammu province seem to be emphatically in sympathy with the agitation. Fundamentally responsible for this I feel are several deep seated and genuine economic and psychological reasons and I do not think it will be a correct appraisal to dismiss the whole affair as merely the creation of a reactionary clique. . . .85

On 29 December, 1952 Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee addressed a big conference of the Bharatiya Jan Sangh at Kanpur. He spoke at length on Jammu & Kashmir: ‘. . . our party has made it abundantly clear that the entire state of Jammu & Kashmir is an integral part of India . . . the Constituent Assembly of Jammu & Kashmir should be requested to decide the question of accession to India irrevocably. . . .’ He said that if the people of the valley want special provisions that are separatist, let them have it, but those like Jammu & Ladakh that seek complete unconditional accession can not be denied the right.86 Dr. Mookerjee also said with great emphasis how the Praja Parishad movement was consciously misrepresented and projected as a communal organization simply to strength the hands of Abdullah and to project him as a secular leader. Nehru he said was the one man who initiated this anti-Parishad movement.87 Speaking again at the session, Dr. Mookerjee said that our (Govt. of India’s) policy in Kashmir meant that people could be allowed to hold extra territorial loyalty even as they called themselves citizens of India.88 The next day Dr. Mookerjee addressed a press conference in New Delhi. He said the simplest way to resolve the issue and also withdraw the reference from the U.N. was that the Constituent Assembly should be asked to pass a resolution in favour of complete accession. He also said that when he made this suggestion, namely the proposal for the accession being resolved by the Assembly, Mohammad Abdullah was willing to do it immediately, but it was Prime Minister Nehru who was against it.89 Dr. Rammanohar Lohia was among those who also commented on the Praja Parishad agitation. He said it had been started with

226

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

purely nationalistic ends, but its ‘consequences were otherwise’. But it is the second point he raised in this connection that said far more: ‘It appears the Praja Parishad was infact being targeted also as part of a plan to cover up the errors’ of the government.’90 The Tribune published a long letter on the manner in which the issues was being handled. This letter is important because in a way it represents the common perception of the problem: . . . we entirely agree that Kashmir is not a party question and should always be dealt with on a National level . . . Mohamad Abdullah has complicated the whole issue. A problem which should have been dealt with in a statesman like manner is being mishandled and cover is being taken behind cheap slogans. To dub anybody as communal who differs from you is evidence of a fascist tendency . . . we refuse to believe that nationalism is the monopoly of Pt. Nehru . . . nationalism is not a preserve of only a party or a set of individuals . . . it has been admitted by Pt. Nehru that some of the grievances of the people of Jammu are genuine . . . Mohamad Abdullah has alienated the sympathies of the people . . . the halting and half hearted manner in shich he has acceded fearing that his power might decrease is responsible for all this . . . it is ridiculous to confuse and confound the people . . . we are firmly of the opinions that the government of India with its weak kneed policy is responsible for this deplorable state . . . after the death of Sardar Patel the Central government has been denuded of a strong administrator. . . .91 NEHRU ANNOYED WITH THE TRIBUNE

The Tribune was easily the most widely read daily in the region. Prior to 1947 it stood by the nationalist cause without an exception. After 1947 it became increasingly critical of the government. Nehru who was very sensitive to criticism in the press rarely let things go without response. Often the response was angry and threatening. On another report of The Tribune he once sent off a typical note to Sardar Patel: . . . I wonder if you have seen a Tribune cutting. The fact that ‘Tribune’ writes in this way, or rather its correspondent from Jammu is rather significant. Whatever the fact may be, this public discussion of these problems is obviously injurious. The Jammu Praja Parishad is, I believe, exploiting the names of the Maharaja and the Maharani for their own purposes and thus injuring their cause. These Praja Parishad people are extraordinarily narrow minded and lacking in vision. . . .



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

227

. . . I find that the Dawn is continually giving extracts from Jammu papers to show that people in Kashmir State have given up all hope of winning the plebiscite and are infact sure of losing it, also to show that they condemn Sheikh Abdullah.92

Nehru also wrote to Gopalaswami Ayyangar: ‘. . . I wonder if you have seen a news letter in the Tribune. I enclose a cutting from it. Whatever truth there may in these allegations, the fact that public talk about them and write about them is itself bad enough. . . .’93 The letter of Yogin Chand had also demanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, only one flag and several other issues that were representative of complete integration of the state with India. This kind of sentiment was widely prevalent not just at the district and small town level but even among senior national leaders. Vigil was a political weekly founded by the senior Congress leader and a former National President of the party Acharaya Kriplani. Kriplani was unhappy with the manner in which the Union Government and the Jammu and Kashmir Government had tackled the Praja Parishad agitation. Kriplani wrote in the issue of 27 June (1953) that it was political fanaticism to believe that the Kashmir question could be viewed only from the official point of view and every other viewpoint was inimical to the best interests of the country. Presiding over the first national convention of the Praja Socialist Party at Betul on 14 June (1953) Kriplani had said: ‘. . . It will be presumptuous to say that the people of Jammu and even of Ladakh have no genuine fear about their future . . . I believe lots of people in India, including Congressmen, do not consider their demands as communal. . . .’ He added that merely dubbing the opponents as: ‘the most reactionary and communal elements’ could not solve the problem.’ 94 I have earlier quoted at some length Balraj Puri. He responded to the letter of the two Praja Socialist Party leaders from Ambala, cited above. This letter of Puri further places things in more clearer perspective: . . . The trouble has arisen due to the fact that local patriotism of different regions of the state has been taking aggressive forms. Mohamad Abdullah has been essentially a hero of the Kashmir Valley. Unfortunately he could not reconcile himself to his new role of leading the entire state. He was more

228

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

particular to retaining his base in the valley and depended upon the local narrow nationalism of the area. It had a reaction in Jammu where a similar sentiment of local patriotism developed. The real problem is to adjust the relationship of the people of the valley, Jammu & Ladakh . . . sentiments are being excited on trivial points probably Mohamad Abdullah had in his mind to satisfy Kashmiri nationalism when he refused to accede fully. . . .95

On 8 February (1953) Dr. Mookerjee addressed a meeting of over 50,000 people in New Delhi. Once again he said the tendency of letting Abdullah believe that he could have a ‘republic within a republic’ was very dangerous and had huge consequences. He also said: ‘ . . . it had become a habit of Nehru and Mohamad Abdullah to dub their critics as communal and anti national.’ Among others who spoke were Master Tara Singh and the Hindu Mahasabha leader N.C. Chatterjee. Interestingly Prime Minister Nehru had developed the practice of responding to anything that was said about him in the press particularly if it concerned Jammu & Kashmir and was sourced to Dr. Mookerjee. He responded to Dr. Mookerjee this time in Parliament while participating in the debate on the President’s address. He called the Praja Parishad movement ‘completely communal’ and that it was ‘a cloak for larger things’. Several Congressmen as was the usual practice took up the line from the Prime Minister and even called the Satyagraha a ‘treasonable’ exercise. B.K. Sinha called upon ‘India’ to support Abdullah ‘in his crusade in Kashmir’. The Prime Minister even mocked the Praja Parishad and the Bhartiya Jan Sangh for raising the issue of the flag.96 NEHRU AND DR. MOOKERJEE – YET ANOTHER CLASH

Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee like Nehru rarely left any major charge against his party particularly if it came from the Prime Minister go unanswered. The Lok Sabha witnessed a major clash between the two, when Dr. Mookerjee spoke on the President’s address. He taunted the Prime Minister by saying that even though India’s foreign policy is said to have been applauded but when we require support India’s ‘friends seem to be running away’. Coming to the Praja Parishad he said: ‘. . . We have been abused, maligned and all kinds of motives



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

229

have been (attributed) to us.’ While refuting the charge of communalism, he asked the government to let it be openly debated. He went on: ‘. . . We want to see here develop a society where people belonging to diverse faiths and religions will be able to live together and enjoy common right . . . if the Indian Constitution was good for 4 crores of Muslims of India it was good enough for the people of Jammu Kashmir’.97 Dr. Mookerjee especially drew the attention of the House to the Customs barriers between the rest of India and Jammu & Kashmir: ‘How could there be financial integration’. He said that the agitation in Jammu was virtually forced as both the Prime Minister and Mohamad Abdullah refused even to meet the Praja Parishad: ‘. . . you have removed social untouchability but are creating political untouchability. . . .’ He said, that assuming the agitations were wrong, what right had any leader to say: ‘we will not talk to them, they are traitors, they are guilty of communalism. . . .’ He also said if communalism was fanned in Jammu, it was done so by Abdullah who had let loose his militia on ordinary citizens.98 NEHRU, MOOKERJEE AND ABDULLAH EXCHANGE LETTERS ON JAMMU & KASHMIR

In January and February 1953 there took place between Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, Prime Minister Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah an exchange of letters. These letters have been in discourse for quite some time yet some issues raised by Mookerjee as also the response of the Prime Minister need a revisit in our present times. In a way this exchange of letters was also an extension of the often heated exchanges that had taken place in Parliament between the Prime Minister and Dr. Mookerjee throughout 1952. While Nehru and Abdullah charged the Jan Sangh and the Praja Parishad for having communalized the issue, Dr. Mookerjee insisted that his stand was in consonance with the national sentiment and was based on his conviction. In the first letter dated 9 January 1953 to the Prime Minister, Dr. Mookerjee noted: . . . The provision for a separate flag has to be looked at from the point of

230

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

view of those who honestly feel that this may be destructive of the political unity of India. If similar demands were made by other states it would give momentum to dangerous tendencies of separatism . . . Kashmir valley and Jammu represent different types of people their language, their outlook, their environment, their habits and modes of life. Historically and politically they came to be united which naturally we should not like to disrupt or destroy. . . .99

A few days later Prime Minister Nehru wrote back to Mookerjee. He disagreed with the views of Dr. Mookerjee and said: ‘. . . It (was) perfectly clear that the Jammu agitation if it succeeded would ruin our entire case relating to the state . . . the Praja Parishad agitation is (was) encouraging separatism in Kashmir.’ In his reply to the Prime Minister’s letter Dr. Mookerjee wrote: ‘. . . The Praja Parishad . . . wants the entire state of Jammu & Kashmir should be governed in accordance with the same Constitution that applies to the rest of India. Is there anything communal or reactionary or anti-national about it?’ At the time it was well known that both the Prime Minister and Dr. Mookerjee held each other in high esteem notwithstanding their serious political differences. Be it in Parliament, in public meetings or in such correspondences it was clear that these were men of very high intellectual abilities, yet unsparing when it came to taking stands based on their convictions. An angry Nehru replied on 5 February 1953. He insisted that the Praja Parishad agitation was communal and was supported by communal elements. A few more letters were exchanged. Nehru refused to relent on the issue. This correspondence apart, Nehru continued to retain the view that the Praja Parishad had ‘rocked the Kashmir boat’ so to say. At one stage he did admit that perhaps by not fulfilling the terms of the Delhi Agreement, Abdullah had added to the problem.100 The exchange of letters with Sheikh Abdullah was on similar lines. Just like Nehru, Abdullah insisted that the Praja Parishad was determined to communalize the issue. Abdullah termed the Praja Parisahd agitation and its key slogan of ‘ek Pradhan, ek nishan, ek vidhan’ as a device to befool people. On 13 February (1953) Dr. Mookerjee wrote to Sheikh Abdullah: . . . You have shown tendencies of creating a separate status for yourself and



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

231

your state. If each state starts having its own flag according to the wishes of the party in power then it will be a blow on India’s national political unity. And that is what you have sought to be done . . . if the bogey of Muslims ceasing to trust India and going away to Pakistan continues unchecked it will create the same complications as Mr. Jinnah’s stand did. . . . Secular democracy can not develop by following the methods of the market place. Hindus, Muslims and others will realize that the division of the country on religious basis has not helped any community and that it has only pushed the country back. . . .

The Sheikh replied to this letter on the 18 February. The reply was equally hard hitting, but like always he charged Dr. Mookerjee and his party with communalizing the conditions: ‘. . . The state of Jammu & Kashmir seeks to forge ahead towards progress and democracy and in this task we consider communalism of any type a great danger. . . .’ The rest dwelled on how the Praja Parishad was ‘rocking the boat’. With all his brilliance, the Sheikh clearly appears in the correspondence to have been on a weaker wicket. Indeed Abdullah seems to have sidestepped the issue and was unable to defend convincingly as to why he was against an unconditional merger of Kashmir with the rest of India. Dr. Mookerjee addressed a Press Conference in Mumbai on 20 March 1953. He said it was libelous to suggest that the Praja Parishad had any communal motives in mind. All that was being sought was finalizing of the complete accession and enforcement of India’s constitution: ‘. . . But our opponents instead of dealing with the real issues are raising communal or sectional bogeys to mislead people. . . .’101 He went on:’. . . We do not want another Pakistan in Bharat – there can not be two governments of India . . . the people of Jammu are only seeking accession yet they have been dubbed by Pt. Nehru as communalists while Sheikh Abdullah who keeps Kashmir away from India is a patriot. He also said he opposed the plebiscite for the simple reason that Jammu & Kashmir already had an elected Constituent Assembly and it was empowered to complete the accession process. Most importantly he added that when he raised this point with Sheikh Abdullah: ‘. . . he told me that he was not against the idea but that it was not acceptable to Pt. Nehru. . . .’102

232

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

NEHRU HITS OUT AT THE PRAJA PARISHAD: MOOKERJEE COMES OUT IN DEFENCE

Parliament witnessed yet another clash between the Prime Minister and Dr. Mookerjee on 25 March. The Prime Minister described the Parishad movement as ‘mischievous, pernicious, malignant and disruptive’. He also said: ‘. . . we have to face it and we shall face it because if that movement by any mischance had any element of success in it, it means a black night for the future’. These were harsh words that did not however win much support in the House. Dr. Mookerjee responded: ‘. . . Mr. Nehru leveled such charges whenever he has to hide his inefficiency and incapacity. . . .’ when Hiren Mukherjee too came out in support of Nehru, Dr. Mookerjee said: ‘. . . he was amazed at the unholy alliance of the Congress and the Communists. . . .’103 Reacting to the Prime Minsiter’s charge that the Praja Parishad had indulged in violence, Dr. Mookerjee called for an immediate inquiry. He told the House that he was: ‘. . . definitely and sincerely anxcious for sitting around a table and finding a way out. . . .’ He went on: ‘. . . recently the Prime Minister made a terrific speech in Merrut in which he probed our intentions and said a lot of things, but a day later when I wanted to go to Merrut I was informed that I could go provided I did not speak on Jammu & Kashmir, you (Prime Minister) talk of democracy, your democracy is that all those who support government’s policies will be allowed to make speeches but any one who opposes will not be permitted to open his mouth. . . .’104 MOOKERJEE SPEAKS ON JAMMU & KASHMIR ACROSS INDIA

The war of words between the two great parliamentarians further intensified in April (1953). Throughout April Dr. Mookerjee addressed well attended meetings. In Gwalior he explained the purpose of the Praja Parishad movement and also said: ‘. . . it is amazing that a demand for full integration with free India and the application of its Constitution should be dubbed as reactionary’.105 In Indore Dr. Mookerjee said:



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

233

‘. . . any weakness or surrender on vital issues concerning the unity of India would be fatal for our future national existence. . . .’ He added that: ‘. . . Pt. Nehru refused to appreciate how his Kashmir policy had failed and that if such a policy continued in the future it would harm Jammu Kashmir . . . Mohamad Abdullah was advocating a spirit of separation’. He further charged the Prime Minister for ‘not even putting pressure on Abdullah’ with regard to the July (1952) Agreement and for accepting atleast some basic provisions of the Constitution of India. He said the ‘time had come to know the intentions of Mohamad Abdullah’. With regard to the Praja Parishad he stated that it was seeking to make India vigilant and aware of what was happening in Jammu Kashmir and the mistakes of the government.106 At a press conference in Patiala Dr. Mookerjee, referred to how India had already spent over Rs.200 crores in Kashmir and her brave soldiers had sacrificed their lives. It was not for a foreign territory, nor was it to carve out a semi-independent state for the rule of Mohamad Abdullah: ‘. . . it is Nehru’s weak and mistaken policy that has caused much suffering and dishonor . . . it is bound to bring disaster to our country. . . .’107 He also referred to some of Abdullah’s recent remarks, which he said clearly indicate a serious situation. A few days later Dr. Mookerjee was in Calcutta (Kolkata) He charged Sheikh Abdullah with: ‘carrying on un-Indian activities without caring for the consequences’. He also expressed his shock at Abdullah’s recent statement that Jammu & Kashmir would not integrate with India like other states. He also said that it is such statements of Abdullah that: ‘. . . clearly establish that the whole issue has been misjudged and mishandled. Pt. Nehru’s policy has only helped to create a semi-independent territory for Abdullah. . . .’108 Dr. Mookerjee was in Ambala on 8 May 1953. While addressing workers of the Bhartiya Jan Sangh, he reminded the gathering of how when the Nizam of Hyderbad had shown reluctance with regard to acceding to the Union, firm handling had made the Nizam change his mind. The same was the situation in Travancore. Dr. Mookerjee then said that if a similar approach had been adopted in Kashmir, the problem would not have been of such proportions. He once again

234

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

raised the issue of huge amounts being spent in Kashmir. He said he had no problem with spending the money: ‘. . . but the issue was, is it yielding the desired result – are we thinking of the future or not’.109 At Phagwara (Punjab) on 9 May Dr. Mookerjee said that he was repeatedly being denied permission to enter Jammu & Kashmir and that both Abdullah and Pt. Nehru were against his visit to the state: ‘. . . I have decided to enter without a permit’. As Dr. Mookerjee travelled through Punjab, at every stop he raised the issue of how Abdullah or a few of his supporters did not have the right to delink the future of the state with India. He said those who did not wish to join India were free to leave, but they had no right to question the issue of accession. At Jullundur he also questioned Abdullah and sought to know under: ‘. . . what norm he was denying to him the right to enter what was already a part of free India.’ THE ARREST OF DR. MOOKERJEE – DETENTION AND DEATH

Dr. Mookerjee was arrested at Lakhimpur two miles from the Pathankot-Jammu border at 4:45 p.m. on 11 May 1953.110 Two inter­ esting and important developments need a mention with regard to the arrest. When the Deputy Commissioner of Gurdaspur met Dr. Mookerjee at Pathankot he is reported to have told him that he had orders from the Government of India to not prevent him (Dr. Mookerjee) from entering Jammu & Kashmir. The report that emerged from Srinagar the next day however stated that: ‘. . . well informed sources stated that the action (of prevent­ ing Dr. Mookerjee) had been taken with the full knowledge and sup­ port of the government of India’. The reason cited for stopping Dr. Mookerjee’s entry was: ‘. . . if people could enter Jammu Kashmir under the present circumstances when Pakistan and Indian armies are facing each other, without any check or scrutiny, it would be easy for fifth columnists and enemies of India to enter. . . .’111 What is even more interesting is that the government of Jammu & Kashmir actually washed its hands of the issue. It said the provision that required a permit to enter Kashmir was introduced by the government of India. 112 The provision of requiring a permit to enter



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

235

the state also made Jammu & Kashmir the only such state in the country. Dr. Mookerjee was detained in a guest house in Nishat Bagh in Srinagar. He refused to discuss details of his case with his attorney U.M. Trivedi in the presence of an officer of the state government.113 The case went to the High Court with Dr. Mookerjee’s attorney seeking a directive to allow him to meet Dr. Mookerjee without the presence of a state government representative. Justice Jilal Khan allowed the petition. One of the key arguments was that the order of restricting free movement was tantamount to giving extra territorial jurisdiction to the government of Jammu & Kashmir. Just as Dr. Mookerjee was fighting to establish that the Jammu & Kashmir government did not have the jurisdiction to restrict free movement of an Indian citizen he fell sick on the evening of 21 June 1953. As per the government of Kashmir’s statement, his death took place at 2:40 a.m., i.e. the early morning of 22 June 1953. GOVERNMENT CHARGED WITH NEGLIGENCE

As was bound to happen the government issued several statements explaining the nature of the medical problem and the course of the medical treatment that was given and also that all possible effort were made to save Dr. Mookerjee’s life. On the other hand there were charges that proper treatment and care had not been given. Prem Nath Dogra, the leader of the Praja Parishad was probably the last of the senior leaders to have met Dr. Mookerjee in the last few days before his death. Dogra was released from a jail in Srinagar after Dr. Mookerjee’s death. He addressed a big public meeting in Jullundur on 24 June to condole the death of Dr. Mookerjee. Dogra said that Dr. Mookerjee was deeply worried particularly following a speech delievered recently by Abdullah in which Abdullah had said that Kashmiris will have to make a choice between India and Pakistan and Independence.114 The death of Dr. Mookerjee had shocked the country. Several important leaders raised doubts and questioned the circumstances of Dr. Mookerjee’s death. Among them was Jayaprakash Narayan. He called it one of ‘criminal neglect’. He rejected Prime Minister Nehru’s

236

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

statement that there had been no negligence. Narayan said that he learnt of the facts from Justice Ram Parshad Mukherjee when he (JP) had gone to Dr. Mookerjee’s home in Calcutta to offer his condolence.115 Dr. Rammanohar Lohia said that Dr. Mookerjee’s death was yet another grievous episode in the general bungling and mishandling of Kashmir.116 Even though governments both in Srinagar and New Delhi laid great emphasis that Dr. Mookerjee had been given the best medical care, it was only natural that doubts continued to linger under the circumstances. For some reason, an impression seems also to have developed that the government was hiding facts. Then there were others who thought that the government had not shown due respect to the memory of Dr. Mookerjee. In this case one Amlo Banerjee wrote to The Tribune: . . . The passing away of Dr. Mookerjee has stirred deeply people of all walks of life in India. In the days of its bondage many of India’s leaders died in detention it is a tragic irony that when the country is free from foreign yoke one of its great leaders had to die in detention for entering a territory which is claimed to be an integral part of the country. . . . The All India Radio did not carry the news in its (morning) news bulletin . . . it gave the incident no importance and treated it just as an ordinary event. . . .’117

The writer of this letter shared a belief of a large number of people. The soreness was all the more because the impression was that the All India Radio had orders to downplay the news. On its part the Praja Parishad had suspended its movement for the duration of the mourning period of Dr. Mookerjee’s death. A decision infact was to be taken to finally withdraw it it on 5 July (1953) in New Delhi, but the decision got delayed as Prem Nath Dogra was unable to reach New Delhi in time. Apart from the situation that had emerged following the tragedy, Prime Minister Nehru too had appealed to the Praja Parishad to withdraw the movement.118 MOOKERJEE WAS GIVEN ALL CARE: NEHRU

Before we move on from the tragic circumstances of Dr. Mookerjee’s death there is one important aspect that needs our attention, which is the manner in which the Prime Minister reacted to the arrest and



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

237

detention of Dr. Mookerjee and later to the tragedy itself. Two letters on the issue are available in the Selected Works of Nehru. Read separately they appear of little significance but when read in conjunction the picture that emerges is rather interesting. Soon after Dr. Mookerjee had been arrested a report appeared in a section of the press that Sheikh Abdullah had gone to meet Dr. Mookerjee at the place of his detention. Nehru too had read the report. This is how he reacted: ‘. . . My dear Sheikh Sahib, I was surprised to see in the newspapers that you had gone to visit Dr. Mookerjee at Nishat Bagh. I find however that this report is not true. I suggest that you contradict it’.119 What we must not forget is that this letter was written in May 1953, that is less than two months before Abdullah would be dismissed and arrested. And here is the Prime Minister of India still in close bond with a person who would be removed from office on grounds that his continuance in office was beginning to emerge as a threat to the country. It is difficult to understand what could have prompted such a reaction from Nehru. The only reason that comes to mind is that he probably did not want an impression to go round that Abdullah was sympathetic to Dr. Mookerjee and that the arrest was more on the initiative of New Delhi rather than the government of Jammu & Kashmir. Prime Minister Nehru had also written to Jayaprakash Narayan on the issue. Narayan had gathered an opinion after a visit to Calcutta that Dr. Mookerjee had not been given proper medical care. He shared this view with the press. Nehru reacted to one of these reports. The report was carried by the Times of India. It is surprising in this letter to note the emphasis Nehru gives to Dr. Mookerjee’s having been very comfortable in detention, and the beauty of the house in which he was imprisoned etc: . . . I do not know of anyone in prison having been given more comfortable quarters to live in than Dr. Mookerjee. The place was an ideal one climatically . . . he was permitted to go for long walks in the Nishat Bagh, which is one of the loveliest gardens – he did so once . . . the food . . . was very satisfactory. . . .

What Nehru had obviously overlooked in this long letter in which he also made out a strong case in favour of the Kashmir government

238

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

was the fact that Dr. Mookerjee had been arrested and imprisoned not by the British but in free India. And what was the law he violated. He entered a princely state, that in the first place had no business to close its borders to citizens of India.120 In this letter the Prime Minister also referred to how the Jammu & Kashmir government had allowed Trivedi, Dr. Mookerjee’s lawyer to meet him. The fact is, this permission was given only after a special appeal was actually allowed by the High Court. Nehru had on 2 July 1953 appealed to the Praja Parishad to withdraw the agitation: ‘. . . I feel that if Dr. Mookerjee had been with us he would have recommended this (withdrawing the movement). . . .’ Here too he referred to the place of his imprisonment: ‘. . . It was a lovely villa by the side of the Dal lake . . . the villa had a little garden with flowers and fruit . . . was living in healthy and agreeable conditions. . .’.121 The Prime Minister had always stood up in support of democratic values and rights, it is naturally surprising that he should have given importance to the physical comfort of Dr. Mookerjee and ignored the fact that his detention was grossly irregular and was bound to have serious consequences. Nehru had spent long terms in British prisons but he was never just an ordinary prisoner – there was always extra care. Nehru welcomed the withdrawal of the Parishad’s agitation but did not spare the organizers: ‘ . . . The sponsors of the agitation behaved in a manner which amounted to cutting the very branch of the tree on which they were sitting . . . this is what I call narrow mindedness. . . .’122 Interestingly Abdullah took the same line as the Prime Minister with regard to the Parishad’s agitation. He said that the agitation may have been withdrawn but the atmosphere created by the Praja Parishad continued to exist. It was clear that Abdullah was not much concerned with the Praja Parishad or what it was doing. Abdullah now added another issue. He went to great lengths to explain that the Parishad’s agitation and only added to mistrust and he too had developed doubts on the unconditional merger with India. Abdullah complained that suspicions and doubts were being raised by important leaders, referring obviously to Jayprakash Narayan, with regard to how the government of Jammu & Kashmir had handled the medical care of Dr. Mookerjee: ‘. . . It was impossible to proceed



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

239

a step further without mutual trust. . . .’123 Abdullah of course knew very well that the death of Dr. Mookerjee was being doubted not because people doubted any complicity on Abdullah’s part but more because of suspected negligence. H.V. Kamath had called it ‘medical murder’.124 Dr. Mookerjee’s death was certainly a case of negligent handling. With a cardiac medical history that went back many years, virtually no precaution was taken. That is what the general charge against Abdullah was at the time. B.C. Roy, an important leader of West Bengal too had written to Nehru with regard to how there was a widespread perception that Dr. Mookerjee’s death was due to negligence. Nehru replied in two letters both on the same day. He explained how Dr. Mookerjee had received care and was properly looked after.125 What actually happened in the Nishat Bagh guest house in the intervening night of 21-2 June (1953) remains a mystery. Dr Mookerjee did have a long medical history but questions remain and there is little doubt that Dr. Mookerjee’s untimely demise was a major turning point in the eventful history of the state. Ramchandra Guha has incisively suggested: ‘. . . The popular movement led by Dr. Mookerjee planted the seed of independence in Sheikh Abdullah’s mind, the outcry following his death seems only to have nurtured it. . . .’126 One may or may not agree with Guha’s refined assessment, but Kashmir and its issues were now a different game. Abdullah as we have seen had rapidly lost goodwill and would have continued to do so had he remained in office. His removal and detention came to him like a blessing from the heavens – he would remain relevant and emerge stronger. Making the story even more complex. Dr. Rammanohar Lohia like Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee was a public figure who matched quite evenly the brilliance and intellect of Prime Minister Nehru. Lohia was very critical of how things had been handled in regard to Kashmir. DR. RAMMANOHAR LOHIA ON THE HANDLING OF JAMMU KASHMIR BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

Dr. Lohia’s political rivalry with Jawaharlal Nehru as we know went back a long time. Lohia wrote extensively on several key issues that

240

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

confronted the country at the time. Like the Prime Minister he too was a man of great intellect, widely travelled and was well conversant with the Western world and its ways. His Will to Power and Other Writings is in the context of views on the crisis in Jammu & Kashmir very important. In the Collected Works of Dr. Lohia too we find several letters written to Nehru. One goes like this: . . . the Indian government has lived from hand to mouth in relation to Kashmir . . . the people of Kashmir possess the ultimate decision and nobody can quarrel with the Sheikh for saying so, the quarrel arises when the Sheikh claims for himself the right to change and to indecision and to give an advise to his people different from what he has been giving them for the past five years . . . communal encumbrances on the part of a small section of Hindus may have irritated him . . . the Muslims of Kashmir as much as the people of India must learn to destroy the cult of one man leadership and to replace it with democratic leadership. . . .127

An unsparing observer and critic of the Prime Minister in particular, Lohia also said: . . . The sinister forebodings concerning Kashmir uttered by the Prime Minister (Nehru) at the last meeting of the AICC are so rapidly coming true . . . The New York Times has forecast the constitution of the Kashmir Valley into an independent state . . . the Prime Minister has made the clever attempt to shift responsibility to cover his doings with the silver mantle of peace . . . for five long years he has been incharge . . . he may now pass the blame to Hindu Muslim communalism. An honest person will admit that no policy to develop a legal accession was devised. . . . In the ultimate instance India belongs to Pakistan as much as Pakistan belongs to India . . . it is a tragic failure of statesmanship that foreign powers will be able to intrigue in an independent Kashmir very much more may be the impact on Hindu Muslim relationship. . . .128

In an address (14 July 1953) in Bombay (Mumbai) Lohia had drawn attention to how it was wrong on the part of the Prime Minister to insist that the problems in Kashmir had gone out of control because of Hindu-Muslim relations alone. Lohia said that: ‘. . . Kashmir was a tragic failure of India Pakistan statesmanship. . . .’ He also said that the prime responsibility was that of Prime Minister Nehru. ‘. . . A main cause has been the cult of one man leadership. In India as well as in Kashmir this cult has led to helpless reliance on the varying



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

241

moods of a single person and these can never rear the wisdom that steers the ship of state through storms. . . .’129 Many people normally resident in Jammu & Kashmir as just mentioned had written letters to Dr. Lohia. Many such people shared views on the unfolding of developments particularly the working of Abdullah. One letter cited by Dr. Lohia said that Abdullah considered every Hindu except Nehru a communalist. Another letter said: Sheikh Abdullah is no worse than Pandit Nehru. When varying moods of an individual become the rudder of state policy doom is threatened. Through constant build up the individual acquires such a heroic status with the people that to check him even when he is wrong becomes difficult. The Muslims of Kashmir as much as the people of India must learn to destroy this cult of one man leadership. . . .130

The idea to end this chapter by a reference to the most critical of Prime Minister Nehru’s political contemporaries is not to support the view or suggest that much of what had gone wrong was due to the Prime Minister’s handling of the crisis alone. The issues raised by Dr. Lohia himself as well as views that emerge in the letters written to him all tend however to point in the same direction, that it was convenient for the Prime Minister and his close advisors to blame everything on ‘communal mindsets’. The second and equally important point is the tendency of building and worshipping individuals to such levels that when they go wrong and cause misjudgements, not many are ready to stand up and question them. What happened in Jammu & Kashmir is in this sense a story that repeatedly reflects on how a slightly more dispassionate and decisive approach could have made a difference, perhaps a historic difference. NOTES 1. SPC, vol. I., p. 12. 2. JN(SG), File 270, MSS, NMML. Several times the Prime Minister discussed with Sardar Patel the need to associate some good officers with the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir. At one stage H.M. Patel then Defence Secretary was also considered. See SPC, vol. I, p. 258. 3. SPC, vol. I, Patel to Ayyangar, 22 December 1947, pp. 118-19. 4. Ibid., Ayyangar to Patel, 22 December 1947, pp. 119-20.

242

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

5. Ibid., Patel to Ayyangar, 23 December 1947, pp. 120-1. 6. Ibid., Nehru to Patel, 23 December 1947, pp. 121-2. 7. Ibid., Copy of draft letter from Patel to Nehru, 23 December 1947, p. 122. 8. SPC, vol. VI, p. 511. 9. The Tribune, 13 January 1948. 10. Y.D. Gundevia, The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah (Dehradun, 1974). 11. B.N. Mullick, My Years with Nehru (Delhi, 1971). 12. The Tribune, 25 January 1953. 13. Hori Lal Saxena, Sheikh Abdullah and the Kashmir Muddle: Being a Story of Kashmir and all that Happened Since 1931 (Srinagar, 1949). 14. Ibid., p. 2. 15. Ibid., p. 4. For reports on Abdullah’s communalised handling of recruitment to government employment also see The Tribune, 11 January 1948. 16. Ibid., p. 5. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid., p. 19. 19. Ibid., p. 22. 20. Ibid., p. 19. 21. Ibid., p. 30. 22. Swami Bhaskaranand, The Kashmir Cauldron (Simla, 1956), p. 31. 23. Ibid., p. 5. 24. Ibid., p. 10. 25. Ibid., p. 11. 26. Madhu Limaye and Sadiq Ali, Report on Kashmir (Socialist Party, 1954), p. 5. 27. Conspiracy in Kashmir by the Social & Political Study Group (Amirakadal Srinagar, 1954). 28. JN(SG), File 137 II, Note dated 3 July 1952 MSS, NMML. 29. Sumanth S. Bankeshwar, Conspiracy in Kashmir (Bangalore, 1955). 30. Kashmir in Crisis (Srinagar, 1955). 31. D.N. Kalhan, Report on Kashmir (1955). 32. SPC, vol. Ayyangar to Patel, 15 October 1949. 33. Ibid., pp. 307-8. 34. Ibid., Ayyangar to Abdullah, 18 October 1949, pp. 308-10. 35. Ibid., Patel to Ayyangar, 16 October 1949, p. 305. 36. SPC, vol. I, Patel to Nehru, 3 July 1950, p. 317. 37. JN(SG), 22-II, MSS. NMML, Note by Nehru for Patel 17 April 1949. 38. JN(SG), 159-I, MSS. NMML, Katju Top Secret/Personal 4 January 1953. 39. JN(SG), File 159-II, MSS, NMML, IB Report. 40. JN(SG), File 159-I, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Abdullah, 5 January 1953 with copy to Home Minister Katju.



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

243

41. Balraj Puri, ‘Origin & Growth of the Praja Parishad’, Kashmir Affairs, no. 3, Delhi, January-February 1960. 42. ‘Explosive Potentialities of Jammu Problem’, Kashmir Affairs, no. 10, MarchApril 1961. This article of Bhatia was quoted by Puri from an issue of Janta (1953). 43. Ranbir (Urdu), 7 June 1947. 44. SPC, vol. I, M.C. Mahajan to Patel, 11 December 1947, pp. 113-14. 45. Ibid., p. 128. 46. Ibid., Patel to Nehru, pp. 227-8. 47. Ibid., Patel to Abdullah, 30 September 1948, pp. 228-9. 48. JN(SG), File 128 II, MSS, NMML. Internal note by M.O. Mathai for the Prime Minister, 13 May 1952. 49. SPC, vol. 1, Patel to Abdullah, 30 September 1948, pp. 228-9. 50. SW (Second Series), vol. 13, p. 211, Nehru to Abdullah, 17 August 1949. 51. Tribune, 20 June 1952. 52. Ibid. 53. Parliamentary Debates, House of the People, vol. II, no. 10, 26 June 1952. Para 2573 to 2590. Also see The Tribune, 27 June 1952. 54. Parliamentary Debates House of the People, vol. II, Book 10, Para 2529-30, 26 June 1952. 55. Ibid., para 2581. 56. Ibid., para 2571-73, 2583. 57. Ibid., para 2583-6, 26 June 1952. 58. Ibid., para 2588-9, 26 June 1952. 59. JN(SG), File 137-1, MSS, NMML, Nehru’s note, 3 July 1952. 60. Ibid., 1 July 1952. 61. JN(SG), MSS, NMML, 6 August 1952. 62. Parliamentary Debates House of the People, vol. IV, no. 8, para 5783-4, 1 August 1952. 63. Ibid., para 580-1, 7 August 1952. 64. Ibid., para 5821, 7 August 1952. 65. Ibid., para 5808-9, 7 August 1952 66. Ibid., para 5823-4, 7 August 1952 67. Ibid., para 5849, 7 August 1952. 68. Ibid., para 5885. 69. Ibid., para 5890-1. 70. Ibid., para 5893-4, 7 August 1952. 71. The Tribune, 11 August 1952. 72. Ibid., 11 August 1952. 73. Ibid., 29 August 1952. 74. Ibid., 5 October 1952.

244

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

75. Ibid., 8 November 1952. 76. Ibid., 24 November 1952. 77. Ibid., 28 November 1952. 78. Ibid., 30 November 1952. 79. Ibid. 80. The Tribune, 3 December 1952. 81. Ibid., 8 December 1952. 82. Ibid., 10 December 1952. 83. Ibid., 12 December 1952. 84. Ibid., 13 December 1952. 85. Karan Singh, Autobiography, pp. 149-50. 86. Ibid., 30 December, 1952. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid., 1 January 1953. 89. Ibid., 3 January 1953. 90. Ibid., 9 January 1953. Also see Collected Works of Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, vol. IV, p. 65. 91. Letter to Editor by Yogin Chand, Labour Secretary, Praja Socialist Party and Jawaharlal Kapur, Advocate, Ambala, The Tribune, 25 January 1953. 92. JN(SG), File 23-I, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Patel, 13 May 1949. 93. Ibid. 94. SW (Second Series), vol. 23, p. 299. 95. Ibid., 1 February 1953, letter to The Tribune, ed. Balraj Puri. 96. The Tribune, 17 February 1953. 97. Ibid., 18 February 1953. 98. Ibid. 99. Nehru–Mookerjee Correspondence Part I (Accession Kashmir University, Alma Iqbal Library, Srinagar). 100. SW, vol. 22 (Second Series), p. 204. Nehru to B.C. Roy, 29 June 1953. 101. The Tribune, 21 March 1953. 102. Ibid. 103. Ibid., 26 March 1953. 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid., 12 March 1953. 106. Ibid., 15 April 1953. 107. Ibid., 20 April 1953. 108. Ibid., 27 April 1953. 109. Ibid., 9 May 1953. 110. Ibid., 11 May 1953. 111. Ibid., 13 May 1953. 112. Ibid. 113. Ibid., 14 June 1953.



‘A ccession S till in the M elting A M M U P ot ’

245

1 14. Ibid., 25 June 1953. 115. Ibid., 8 July 1953. 116. Ibid., 26 June 1953. 117. Ibid., 7 July 1953. Letter to Editor. 118. Ibid., 6 July 1953. 119. SW (Second Series), vol. 22, p. 187. Letter to Abdullah, 17 May 1953. 120. SW (Second Series), vol. 23, pp. 297-9. Letter to Jayaprakash Narayan, 8 July 1953. 121. National Herald, 3 July 1953. 122. Ibid. 123. Ibid., 13 July 1953. 124. Ibid., 21 July 1953. 125. SW (Second Series), vol. 22, pp. 202-4. 126. Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi, p. 254. 127. Mastram Kapoor (ed.), Collected Works of Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, vol. IV (New Delhi, 2011), pp. 82-3. 128. Rammanohar Lohia, Will to Power and Other Writings (Bombay, 1956). p. 170. 129. Collected Works of Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, vol. IV, p. 69. 130. Ibid., p. 83.

CHAPTER SIX

The Dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah Pakistan Prime Minister Meets Nehru: Talk of Plebiscite and Partition of Kashmir

T

      he dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah and his subsequent arrest

   (August 1953) was a dramatic development, even more so coming    as it did only a couple of months after the death in detention of Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee. As Nehru put it: ‘. . . the situation is (was) explosive. . . .’ The centres of power that monitored Jammu & Kashmir in New Delhi were taken by surprise or so it was claimed. No one was ready to take the administrative responsibility for the decision. It was left to the young and erudite Sadr-e-Riyasat Karan Singh to take the onus. Is it possible that a decision of such magnitude could have been taken bypassing New Delhi? Karan Singh went on to gain acclaim and recognition for his learning and scholarship but in August 1953 when he ordered the dismissal of Abdullah he was merely 22 years of age. We have taken note of how Abdullah had taken to holding the ‘communal forces’ responsible for everything that went against him, it was no doubt the easiest thing to do. A few months before his removal he had given reasons for his increasing bitterness: ‘. . . it was impossible for the Muslim landlords to seek the support of Muslim communal organizations in India. But since the Jammu landlords are predominantly Hindu, an opportunity has been provided to the Hindu communal organizations. . . .’1



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah AMMU

247

Referring to the disturbed conditions in Jammu and the role of the Praja Parishad in particular the booklet noted: . . . The Praja Parishad started a vicious campaign in order to force a decision in regard to the Kashmir dispute on communal lines . . . (they) are opposed to secularism and would like to see India converted into a Hindu Rashtra completely rid of Muslims (This) can not but create apprehensions of a serious and grave character in the minds of the Muslims of Kashmir. . . .2

Gundevia, a close friend of Abdullah, took a line very similar to Abdullah in that the ‘reactionary anti-reform and communal’ elements had access to centres of power in Delhi, not to Nehru’s ears but elsewhere: ‘. . . my contention is that it was not a Volte-face on the part of Sheikh Abdullah. It was an about-face on the part of the government, with the Home Minisry winning all along the line and Nehru gradually succumbing. . . .’3 B.N. Mullick, the Intellegence Bureau Chief, the man who infact only months earlier had written a long note in support of Abdullah, now played a major role in his removal. But he still maintained: ‘If anything accelerated the final break between Sheikh Abdullah and India it was the Praja Parishad agitation in the winter of 1952. . . .’4 In a dedicated editorial The Tribune noted: ‘It is apparent that Sheikh Abdullah had been greatly perturbed by the support given to the Praja Parishad in Jammu from certain elements in India.’ This editorial did not however give much weight to the ‘foreign support theory’. 5 The Praja Parishad’s side of the story was published in a booklet that charged Sheikh Abdullah with closing the Sanskrit Institute in Srinagar; dividing Udhampur, a Hindu majority district by joining some Muslim areas, etc. It also said: ‘. . . while our gallant troops were laying down their lives . . . Nehru in his wisdom announced that the question . . . be finally decided by the people. . . .’ 6 It also said that Article 370 was the creation of Nehru and Gopalswamy Ayyangar.7 The basic and most important issue that the Praja Parishad stood for was – there could not be a ‘Republic within a Republic’ and that it was a cardinal error to have given Jammu & Kashmir, a distinctive status. In the bigger scheme of things Abdullah was only a ‘cunning’ political player, playing his own shrewd game.

248

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

EVEN NEHRU AND KATJU DISENCHANTED WITH ABDULLAH

For some reason Nehru had believed until the last weeks that he could bring Abdullah around. The first signs that even the Prime Minister had had enough appear in two short letters. Abdullah wrote a warm letter to Nehru on 28 April 1953: My dear Panditji, I received your letter of 21 April. Earlier I also got your letter regarding the proposed visit of Shri Karan Singh to U.K. and about MRA. The offices have closed down at Jammu and they are reopening here on 4 May. We have moved up to this place. The weather here is glorious and naturally our thoughts turn to your next visit. I do hope that before you leave for United Kingdom, you will pay a visit to Kashmir. I know that you have a crowded time but it may be possible to spare a week-end for a bit of rest here.8

In normal circumstances Nehru would have replied the same day, at most the next. It seems he did not reply to this and instead wrote to Home Minister Dr. Katju: My dear Kailas Nath, I enclose a copy of a letter from Sheikh Abdullah. Much as I would like to go to Kashmir, I rather doubt if I can find the time for it before I go to England. Also I am reluctant to go there till the situation is politically clearer.9

Katju had not been in Kashmir for 17 years. He was in Srinagar in May (1953). This is what he reported to Nehru in a letter of 24 May 1953: My dear Jawaharlal, Situation here is, as you said, both grave and confusing. . . . . . . Right from the start we have said that we are not so much interested in a hereditary rule as in the other questions, e.g. common citizenship, Supreme Court, etc. . . . . . . It is pretty clear that the Indian Government has not been dealt with by J & K Government either frankly or fairly. . . . . . . If you are quite clear in your mind that Sheikh Sahib is the sole authoritative speaker on behalf of Kashmir then dealing with one man and giving effect to what he may say after discussion with us may not prove a difficult proposition, provided his word can be trusted, and confidence



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah A M M U

249

reposed in him. That may lead to our acquiescence in his getting rid of those who place faith in us. That does not look nor is nice and therefore we must make up our mind after careful consideration. It is quite right that the matter should stand over till your return from England. . . . . . . Speaking for myself, I would have had no objection to considering J & K on a footing of its own with accession on three vital subjects but unfortunately matters have now gone too far, and the July Agreement may bar such consideration. . . . . . . One thing is quite clear Indian opinion will not tolerate handing over of Jammu to a Kashmir which is not part of India. . . . . . . I have come here after17 years, and first impressions have been mixed. Poverty from the looks and the apparel of the people appeared greater. That is not to be wondered at of but there is discontent caused by the alleged corruption of Government at all levels. . . .’10

To gauge how serious the dismissal of Abdullah was thought to be in the close circles of the Prime Minister one only needs to go through the correspondence in which he broke the news to the President of India. A letter written to Nehru by Indira Gandhi who was then in Zurich also reflects on how shocked the power centres of New Delhi were with the turn that events had taken place in Kashmir. Let us first take the reactions of the Prime Minister. The Selected Works of Nehru edited in this case by the eminent historian S. Gopal contain a small footnote that explains the sequence of events that led to the removal of Abdullah:11 . . . Following the differences in his Cabinet of five members Sheikh Abdullah insisted on 7 August (1953) that Shamlal Saraf should resign for serious lapses in the departments under him, but Saraf refused. In a memorandum on the next day the majority in the Cabinet charged Abdullah with not only delaying the implementation of the Delhi Agreement but denouncing it ‘purposefully and openly’. They also criticized his economic policies, his ‘corrupt and inefficient’ administration and his support to communal minded colleagues like M.A. Beg. They stated that the Cabinet lacked unity and had lost the confidence of the people. On receiving a copy of the memorandum Karan Singh the Sadar-i-Riyasat called an immediate meeting of the Cabinet, but Abdullah did not attend, thereupon he was replaced by Bakshi.12

Since Gopal had edited this version and this version forms a part of the Selected Works (SW), one could possibly proceed on the

250

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

assumption that the dismissal and arrest were as simple and straightforward as this summarized version appears to suggest. The Urdu press in Srinagar also highlighted the proceedings of the Cabinet meeting as one of the causes for the removal of Abdullah but also added an important twist. Roshni had mostly taken sides against Abdullah, but this time it appeared firmly on his side. It quoted a statement that Abdullah had made on 8 August (1953) that is a day before his removal. Abdullah was quoted to have said: ‘. . . the future of Kashmir is to be decided by the people of Kashmir . . . whenever we take it up we are asked to choose between India and Pakistan . . . may be the people of Kashmir want good relations with both India and Pakistan and want to be left alone. . . .’13 Importantly the paper also quoted the senior National Conference leader Maulana Masoodi who is reported to have said on 7 August (1953) that Abdullah would not be replaced.14 This statement was obviously the result of a possible move that had begun with regard to removing Abdullah. Just two days before Abdullah was dismissed, Roshni prominently published a story that tried to draw attention to the plight of the Muslims in India ‘which should serve as warning to Kashmir’s Muslims’. Much of the story of course was without any basis. It said that Muslim government employees were replaced after 1947 with non-Muslims and that the Muslims were greatly discriminated and so on. The point really is that a planned effort was being made to create in the minds of Kashmir’s Muslims that their future lay with Pakistan. The report did not refer in specific to the possibility of Abdullah’s removal but clearly a post dismissal scenario was being worked upon.15 Prime Minister Nehru too appeared to follow the same simple conclusion as suggested by Gopal in the Selected Works. On 9 August 1953 he wrote to President Dr. Rajendra Prasad: . . . Yesterday, late night we were informed of certain developments which indicated that probably the Sadar-i-Riyasat would dissolve the existing government . . . we did not wish in any way to interface with these internal happenings . . . early this morning we heard of the step the Sadar-i-Riyasat had taken in dissolving the Cabinet and appointing Bakshi Ghulam



AMMU T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah

251

Mohammed as the new Prime Minister . . . about midday we were informed that Sheikh Abdullah and Beg had been arrested. . . . The Sadar-i-Riyasat has acted on his own responsibility in this matter . . . he did not ask us for any intervention. . . .’16

S. Mulgaokar, then an upcoming star correspondent, did a story ‘Kashmir in Crisis’ for his paper the Times of India. He made out a strong case of how New Delhi appears to have had no role in the dramatic happenings in Srinagar and possibly New Delhi learnt of it all only after the ‘deed’ had been done. He also noted that even the anti-National Conference activists were not happy with Abdullah’s removal. Mulgaokar also referred in this report to some anti-India elements having formed some kind of ‘war council’ to take charge of things after Abdullah.17 Abdullah was actually arrested early morning on 9 August. He was charged under sections of the Public Security Act. The charges included apart from corruption, nepotism, etc. also for ‘establishing foreign contacts of a kind dangerous to the peace and prosperity of the state’.18 What is interesting in this note of the Prime Minister to the President is the impression it conveys and rather consciously so, that Karan Singh, the Sadar-i-Riyasat had acted on his own and perhaps Nehru himself was not involved. Indira Gandhi was then in Switzerland. On the same day that the Prime Minister informed the President he also informed Indira Gandhi of the developments in Srinagar: ‘. . . Sheikh Saheb carried on a bitter campaign against India and to some extent against me . . . last night the Sadar-i-Riyasat dismissed his ministry . . . we have no further detail. . . .’19 ‘FILLED WITH DEEPLY PENETRATING SADNESS’: INDIRA GANDHI

On 10 August Indira Gandhi wrote to Nehru. She had heard of the Kashmir developments from a newspaper and had not by then received Nehru’s letter of 9 August. . . . it is a heart breaking thing to happen I do realize that everyone concerned must have thought and thought before taking this grave step. And it must

252

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

be justified and right. And it wasn’t a shock, for I was dreading such a thing . . . I am filled with a terrible and deeply penetrating sadness . . . it is like cutting a part of oneself.20

The letter that Nehru had written to Indira Gandhi on Kashmir also said: ‘. . . my real headache is Kashmir where Sheikh Saheb has turned many somersaults and is bitter against India and me. The situation there is explosive and anything can happen. . . .’21 I am not quite clear as to what should be the relevance and the significance of a telegram that was dispatched by India’s Deputy High Commission in Dacca (Dhaka). The date is important, a few days before the dismissal of Abdullah. It reports on the headlines of a newspaper in Dacca: It appears that we have lost Kashmir – Nehru. Dacca Press splashes APP dispatch from New Delhi detailed 6 th August which says ‘Unofficial competent’ source said that when a member of the (Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Advisory) Committee invited Pandit Nehru’s views on the present situation obtaining in India, the Prime Minister remarked ‘it appears we have lost Kashmir’. Morning News adds sub-headings ‘Rajendra too perturbed, Bharat to launch full scale anti Abdullah campaign’.22

This is how Guha records the development: . . . ‘Who is the sadr-i-riyasat to dismiss me?’ he shouted. ‘I made that chit of a boy the sadr-i-riyasat’ . . . Karan Singh later recalled that this was done because ‘Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed made it quite clear that he could not undertake to run the government if the Sheikh and Beg were left free to propogate their views. . . .’ Did Jawaharlal Nehru himself sanction the arrest of his friend Sheikh Abdullah? Nehru’s biographer thinks he did not know before hand, where as his Chief of intelligence suggests he did. One thing is clear however: once the deed was done he did nothing to countermand it. . . .’ 23

Two important contemporary versions suggest that Nehru was not in the loop with regard to the dismissal, however unimaginable it may appear. Gundevia noted. . . . Nehru was not a part to Abdullah’s arrest and he had certainly not authorized it; he had been poisoned and silenced into acquiescence . . . no matter who says it now, it is extremely difficult to believe that Nehru was ever convinced at any stage that Abdullah was a communalist and was



A M M U T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah

253

conspiring against India in league with Pakistan and the pro-Pakistani elements in Kashmir . . . he (Nehru) never said one cross word against him. . . .24

Birg. Hiralal Atal was an emissary of Nehru to Kashmir. He has recorded in the context: ‘. . . I heard later that Pandit Nehru was furious and greatly perturbed hearing the news (of Abdullah’s arrest) but was helpless in the matter, he evidently did not consider that such drastic action could (would) be taken. . . .’25 Among later studies, M.J. Akbar holds that Abdullah was removed as the result of a conspiracy that was set in motion sometimes in March 1953. While Karan Singh wanted Abdullah to begin a dialogue with the Praja Parishad, Nehru completely ruled it out – saying they had ‘committed treason.’ Akbar also notes that the Home Minister was clearly against Abdullah and several anti-Abdullah forces had garnered support in the Home Ministry. Since some found it difficult to hit out at Nehru, they instead targeted, Akbar suggests his close friend Abdullah. 26 KARAN SINGH’S VERSION

This is how the man, the Sadr-i-Riyasat Karan Singh who took the decision remembers the tumultuous day (and indeed night): The Sheikh was still a popular figure in the valley despite the fact that corruption and maladministration had to some extent eroded his stature. If we gave him an opportunity to take his case to the streets he would easily arouse acute communal and chauvinistic sentiments . . . Anti national elements and agents were active in the valley and if given the chance would not hesitate to plunge the state into utter turmoil, we therefore decided that the Sheikh would have to be dismissed. While I was reluctant that he should be arrested Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed made it clear that he could not undertake to run the government if the Sheikh and Beg were left free to propagate their views. . . . 27

Along with the dismissal order Karan Singh had also sent a covering letter. In the covering letter Karan Singh told Abdullah that his dismissal was necessitated by the differences in the Cabinet and that Abdullah had lost support and confidence of his colleagues. Karan Singh did of course also convey his ‘deep distress’: ‘. . . divergence

254

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

within your cabinet has reached proportions in which the unity, prosperity and stability of the state are gravely jeopardized.’28 AN UNHAPPY NEHRU

Nehru as we have just noted, was warmly invited by Abdullah to visit Kashmir with the onset of summer (May 1953). Initially as the letter shows he was reluctant but he did go. On his return and after some gap of time he wrote a long letter to Abdullah (on 28 June). It is a pleasure to read. Conveying a mixture of feelings – emotions, a feeling of being betrayed and being let down. Obviously by now the Prime Minister had received IB inputs and formed an opinion that did not augur well for the future. He also referred to how the National Conference was beginning to create instability: . . . You know that the question of Kashmir has had not only a logical appeal for me but also a strong emotional one. But I can suppress my emotion, if necessary, if logic demands that. Thus far, I have proceeded on a basis of friendship and confidence in you and have been vain enough to expect the same approach from you. Whether that is justified now or not, it is for you to say. Individual relations should not count in national affairs and yet they do count and make a difference. . . . 29 . . . Your strength in Kashmir was ultimately based on the great organization you built up, the National Conference. Of course, you had your personal popularity and appeal also which were considerable. But essentially it is the organization that gives strength and not the individual. Indeed the individual acts through the organization if results are to be achieved. . . . . . . What I have felt lately has been that your Government is very far from harmony and in fact pulls in a number of different directions, that your organization is also disintegrating in the same way. If this process continues, I have little doubt that Kashmir would relapse into utter backwardness, so far as political life is concerned. It takes much time to build up organizations and discipline the people. Gandhiji for over a quarter of century slowly built up our organization and taught it discipline, cooperative working and the capacity for sacrifice. He attached little value to public demonstrations but always laid stress on the discipline of an organization. The people of Kashmir have been trained, to same extent by you and your organization but not nearly enough and a disruptive tendency is always dangerous. If these tendencies towards disruption and disintegration



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah AMMU

255

of the organization continue, then politically Kashmir will count for very little, regardless of other questions, and regardless of its relationship to India or its autonomous position or its relationship with Pakistan. It will then become a mere pawn for others to play with. That would be a tragedy. . . . . . . I am therefore gravely disturbed, not so much about the political future of Kashmir but rather about the internal conditions that tend to disrupt Kashmir, both politically, and what is more important, organizationally and internally. This kind of thing used to lead to something in the nature of civil war. That will not happen to Kashmir because of various circumstances but a psychological civil war is as bad from the point of view of bringing about disintegration. No one wins in that and everyone loses. . . . . . . My Government has stood, as you have so consistently stood, for a secular democracy. I do not know what your feelings are on this subject now. But I fear the tendency in Kashmir is away from it. Unfortunately that will have its reactions in India as such tendencies in India have their reactions in Kashmir. On my part I am pledged to that ideal and I shall adhere to it to the bitter end, if necessary, and if my people throw me out. It will grieve me that anything is done in Kashmir which tarnishes that ideal and weakens those who stand for it. Whatever we might do, it is the least that we owe each other that we should try to understand each other and then decide on such courses of action as we might deem proper. It is always painful to part company after long years of comradeship, but if our conscience so tells us, or in our view, an overriding national interest so requires, then there is no help for it. Even so we must do it with full understanding and full explanation to each other and not casually. . . . . . . I have written rather a long letter to you. This was not meant to be argumentative for I think that the time for lengthy argument is over. Such argument only confuses the mind. The time for clear understanding has come. It is for this reason that I would beg of you to come here at an early date with as many of your colleagues as possible. . . .’ 30 ABDULLAH’S FAREWELL TO NEHRU

Abdullah’s reply left little to doubt. He was matter of fact and to the point. He did not allow emotions to prevail. He had smartly passed the blame for the developing crisis to the government of India if not to Nehru directly. Abdullah wrote: . . . I agree that personal relationship between individuals should not be a consideration where larger national interests are involved. Friendship and

256

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

sentiments are worthy of respect but they should not come in the way of dispassionate appraisals of one another’s difficulties. . . . 31 . . . I have not been able to understand your reference to disruptive tendencies both in the administration and in the organization. All I can say is that it is baseless and probably the result of incorrect information given to you. I may, however, assure you that so far as the basic-principles are concerned, there is no difference of opinion among us in Kashmir.32 . . . Muslims may rightly feel that in spite of you and many others, the ideals of secular democracy are not much in evidence in so far treatment to Kashmiri Muslims is concerned. I derived my strength from what I supposed was an assurance that the State’s accession with India would result in a fair deal to all sections of the people. But unfortunately that goal has not been achieved. . . .’

Abdullah’s reply ended with a virtual ‘good bye’ to the Prime Minister: ‘. . . I may, however, assure you that whatever lot may be in store for us, never can you expect me to abandon my respect and affection for you. . . .’33 The Prime Minister was obviously a worried man. He shared his worry with Maulana Azad: ‘Abdullah’s long letter is a confused document which mirrors his confused mind.’ 34 Along with Nehru, Azad was the other key leader of the Congress closely associated with handling of Kashmir affairs. The level to which the leadership was willing to appease Abdullah comes out clearly in Azad’s reply to Abdullah. Abdullah had sent a copy of the letter he wrote to Nehru, to Azad as well. Azad sought to assure Abdullah that the government of India was willing to make a declaration to the effect that the special position of Kashmir was of a permanent nature. He virtually pleaded with Abdullah and emphasized that if the independence of the valley was recognized, Kashmir was bound to fall into Pakistan’s hands and that the best option for Abdullah was to ‘hold steadfast to the existing relations with India.’35 Even as the two leading stalwarts of the Congress were trying to persuade Abdullah onto a conciliatory path he obviously was in no such mood. On 10 July (1953) Abdullah had addressed workers of the National Conference. Kashmir he said ‘would have to guard its internal autonomy at all costs and also that justice had not been done to the Muslims of Kashmir.’36



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah A M M U

257

NEHRU HAD DEFENDED ABDULLAH IN PARLIAMENT EXACTLY A YEAR EARLIER

There is an element of great irony in all these developments. Exactly one year before the dismissal and arrest of Abdullah, and only a few days after the historic so called Delhi Agreement Nehru summing up the debate on the Delhi Agreement in Parliament (7 August 1952) delivered a speech that should count as one of his best. This speech was dramatic: ‘. . . We have fought this fight in the hearts of men and woman of that state of Jammu & Kashmir because ultimately I say . . . the decision will be made in the hearts and minds of the men & women of Kashmir neither in this Parliament nor in the United Nations. . . .’ A major part of speech was directed at Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee’s address: . . . My honourable friend Dr. Mookerjee had said a great deal about this clause as also stated elsewhere, he focused on how the Delhi Agreement had virtually created two sovereign parliaments, two Prime Ministers, two classes of citizens, two systems of Heads of State and the issue of Fundamental Rights and the Flag. . . .37

The Prime Minister had come out in full defence of Abdullah even though Abdullah had received much flak by several speakers in the debate that had preceded the Prime Minister’s reply in the house. . . . You can criticize Sheikh Abdullah, Sheikh Abdullah is no God – he commits many errors, he will commit many more, he is a brave man and a great leader of his people. That is a big enough thing. He has led his people through weal and woe, he has led them when they were facing grave disaster. He did not shrink from leadership at that time – that is a big enough thing to be said about a man. If he has failings, if he has made a mistake here or there, if he has delivered a speech which we do not like, what of that? Bigness is bigness inspite of a hundred mistakes. . . .38

Within exactly a year of this defence, Abdullah went on to be dismissed and was arrested. The correspondence that followed these developments in Kashmir, between the Prime Minister and several others – Mridula Sarabhai, Bakshi Ghulam Mohamad, etc., infact also reflects on how the issue

258

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

had simply slipped out of hand. If there was a policy involved it was clearly uncertain and unclear. Let us look at some of the notes and letters of the time, as also reactions of the press. REACTIONS TO ABDULLAH’S DISMISSAL

In Pakistan, one of its leading opinion makers Dawn led the charge that Abdullah was removed essentially because he had raised questions about Kashmir’s accession.39 Karan Singh’s letter to Nehru that explained the sequence of events of Abdullah’s dismissal and arrest (9 August) also adds: ‘. . . On my part I strongly urged them to desist from arresting him . . . but they were most apprehensive . . . of the situation getting out of hand and even resulting in violence, i.e., if he was allowed to move around in the valley.’40 It is interesting to note that everyone who could have been involved in the decision seemed keen to distance himself from the orders for the arrest of Abdullah. Prime Minister Nehru even considered it important enough to write to the Commonwealth Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs with regard to Abdullah’s comfort while in detention: ‘. . . Sheikh Abdullah is kept in a government guest house in Udhampur. One of his relatives and one or two others have been sent to keep him company and is well looked after.’41 When the Prime Minister read a report in the Nagpur Times that some people had burnt Abdullah’s effigy he wrote an angry letter to the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, Ravi Shankar Shukla: ‘. . . he (Abdullah) has been our colleague for many years even though we may have parted company. . . .’42 That Nehru was distressed by the developments in Kashmir comes out repeatedly in these days. In the first letter that he wrote to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed after he had replaced Abdullah the Prime Minister shared the concern of Maulana Masoodi as well. Strangely the Prime Minister also points out or rather suggests that the crisis, meaning the dismissed of Abdullah is perhaps the creation of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed: ‘Maulana Masoodi was anxious that all references to Sheikh Abdullah should be friendly and courteous. That of course is right, but the step you have taken puts an almost impassable



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah AMMU

259

barrier between him and you and others. Indeed, this is going to be a problem in many ways.’ 43 MRIDULA SARABHAI STANDS IN SUPPORT OF ABDULLAH-NEHRU ANNOYED

Mridula Sarabhai was a close associate of the Prime Minister and during the peak of the partition violence in the Punjab she had played a stalwart role in rescuing and recovering abducted women. She was usually treated as an emissary of the Prime Minister. She was also among the important supporters of Abdullah. When Abdullah was dismissed, she became the main and most vocal opponent of the decision. Prime Minister Nehru did not approve of the manner in which Sarabhai had come out in Abdullah’s support. The way in which he distanced himself from her perhaps also shows that he was deeply hurt and unhappy by the whole set of developments that had surrounded the removal of Abdullah. Other reports apart, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed too had written to Nehru (7 July) against Sarabhai, saying that her statements were building support for Abdullah. She had said as reported by Bakshi that Sheikh Abdullah was misunderstood by the ‘bourgeois’ press and that even in the government of India there were communal and reactionary elements. This letter even said that Sarabhai had attacked even Nehru, saying that ‘he (Nehru) was controlled by D.P. Dhar’.44 Nehru supported Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed’s reading of Sarabhai, in a letter (10 August) he said: . . . Mridula Sarabhai (in letters Nehru used to address her as Mridu) behaved rather wildly when she heard of these happenings in Kashmir and she cursed everyone you of course, but also the Govt. of India . . . she was angry with me also . . . she wanted to go to Kashmir, but we were not prepared to issue a permit to her . . . she is likely to behave irresponsibly. . . .45

It is possible that Nehru’s anger was also because of the very successful manner in which Sarabhai had drawn both national and international attention to the cause of the women who were abducted in the anarchic months in which the partition of India plan had unfolded. It is well known that Nehru virtually refused to listen to any reference to the violence, the killings that took place during the

260

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

partition riots. On the contrary an effort was made to understate the tragedy. Several leading historians who took the line of the Prime Minister too have virtually side stepped the tragic events. Sarabhai’s work in the context of recovering and resettling the women drew attention to something that the government of India wished people to forget. . . . our office must completely be aloof from Mridula Sarabhai . . . I am returning any letters that she sends to me unopened, and I refuse to discuss any matters with her. Her good intentions may be accepted but she has done more harm to India during the last about two years than almost anybody I know of . . . she should have nothing to do with the organization for recovery of abducted persons. . . .46

There is possibly another reason for Nehru’s having all of a sudden taken to such dislike for some one who had worked with him for long. On 8 August 1953, the Prime Minister’s powerful Private Secretary M.O. Mathai put up a Note to the Prime Minister with the instructions ‘Personal Not For Record on Any File’. This was the highest category of secrecy and possibly intrigue and rivalry. The note clearly suggests that Sarabhai had lost her place in Nehru’s circle of friends. . . . It appears that Mridula has got a definite Foreign Policy in addition to the onerous responsibilities of conducting the internal affairs in this country and Kashmir Policy . . . That Mridula gives certain impressions to all kinds of people is well-known. It is commonly believed that Brahm Parkash was selected for Chief Ministership because of Mridula’s pull with PM. . . . . . . Recently Mridula invited Feroze to Dinner. Feroze reported at the Constitution House at 8:30. Mridula was addressing a Workers Meeting. Feroze could overhear her telling the workers that they should all wait there so that she could go and consult Jawaharlalji on some points. She got out. She saw Feroze and asked him to wait for a few minutes because she wanted to go out. Mridula evidently came to the Prime Minister’s House, walked in the corridors for a minute, saw Hari and returned to the Constitution House and told the workers, ‘Jawaharlal’s message is: communalism must be fought’. The workers were impressed with her influence with PM, but Feroze had to wait for his dinner. . . . . . . Mridula defies all definition. May God preserve her to take up the position of the first Prime Minister of World Government when it is established. That seems to be the only fulfilment she can have.47



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah A M M U

261

Mridula Sarabhai may have fallen out of favour in the Prime Minister’s scheme of things, particularly the personal office led by Mathai but she retained her close bond with Abdullah. In 1956 it was she who released a draft copy of a speech that Abdulah had planned to give if he had not been arrested: . . . Added to the agitation, statements of certain Indian leaders were quoted to work up feeling amongst the Muslims. These statements said in effect that in the event of refusal by Muslims to accept the Indian Constitution in its entirety they had no right to be the nationals of Indian territory – by which they meant Jammu and Kashmir State. . . . The pro-merger agitation had, therefore, one effect: it weakened our position among the Muslims and literally poured cold water on the efforts of the National Conference to rally Muslim support for India all these years . . . the Muslim middle class in Kashmir has been greatly perturbed to see that while the present relationship of the State with India has opened new opportunities for their Hindu and Sikh brothers to ameliorate their lot, they have been assigned the position of a frog in the well. . . .What the Muslim intelligentsia in Kashmir is tying to look for is a definite and concrete stake in India. So the minds of the people in Kashmir have moved from fear to frustration and from frustration to near-disillusionment. . . .While the National Conference stands committed to the support that it gave to the Instrument of Accession and the Delhi Agreement, the fact remains, will public opinion in India, more particularly overwhelming majorities of the people of Jammu and Ladakh, accept the present relationship.48

Apart from the pro-Abdullah factions that had taken to the streets in Srinagar immediately following his dismissal another problem that confronted Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was the proactiveness of several members of the United Nations who were then in Srinagar. In a long telegram Bakshi reported the matter to the Prime Minister: . . . I am writing to bring to your notice difficulties caused in our work yesterday by the activities of certain foreigners who have been active in the city throughout the day. The U.N.O. team consisting of 18 men has been active throughout the day going about in the city. They held a meeting at their headquarters for half an hour and then they went to the various parts of the city taking photographs and talking to various people. Then they held a second meeting and the whole group continued their activities for the rest of the day. Dean of the U.N.O. Headquarters was particularly active in his office. Along with his contact, Edna Bella Fontane, who calls herself Belgian

262

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

citizen but is presumably an American, he went to the Juma Masjid and took statements from a number of persons. They then went towards Lal Chowk where she took photographs of the demonstrations. . . .49 PAKISTAN’S REACTION TO ABDULLAH’S DISMISSAL: PRIME MINISTER MOHAMMED ALI INSISTS FOR A MEETING

A day after the dismissal of Abdullah, Pakistan’s High Commissioner conveyed a message to Prime Minister Nehru from his Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali: ‘Pakistan had been gravely disburbed by the developments in Kashmir. Mohammed Ali sought an immediate meeting with Nehru to resolve the Kashmir problem’. Most newspapers of Pakistan devoted extensive space to how India was repressing the situation that had resulted from Abdullah’s dismissal: ‘Bharati troops are shooting and killing Muslims in the streets of Srinagar’. Another report said: ‘Indian troops had mowed down Muslims in Srinagar’. Prime Minister Nehru wrote back the next day (11 August) saying how it was the police that was controlling the demonstrations. And that the number that were killed was three – two Muslims and one Sikh. Nehru also explained that such a visit or an emergent meeting could have no important result. But for some reason Mohmmed Ali again insisted for a meeting. Late night on the 12 August Nehru again received a request for a meeting. He shared this with President Dr. Rajendra Prasad: ‘. . . inspite of what I said to him he is extremely anxious to come to Delhi tomorrow. Our High Commissioner did his best to dissuade him but he did not succeed . . . .’50 PAKISTAN PRIME MINISTER IN NEW DELHI

The meeting finally did take place on 17 August. Mohammed Ali had arrived in Delhi on 16 August evening. A large crowd had gathered at the airport and on the way from the airport. He was warmly welcomed, the slogans included ‘Pakistan Zindabad’. On 19 August a public reception was organized in his honour at the Red Fort. Over 10,000 people had gathered inspite of heavy rain to listen to him. He went on record to say that he had never ever received such a warm welcome. 51



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah AMMU

263

There is another interesting, rather confusing side to Mohammed Ali’s visit to New Delhi. We have just taken note of Nehru’s letter to the President conveying that he (Nehru) was not keen for Mohammed Ali to visit Delhi. But in the Jawaharlal Nehru papers (JN) which are unpublished there appears a letter addressed by Nehru to Mohammed Ali. This letter of 8 August (1953) is a warm invitation: . . . Soon after my return from Karachi. I sent you a letter, or rather two or three letters. I hope you received them. . . . We have now to fix up a date for your visit to New Delhi. We have already indicated that this will be early in September. I suggest that you might come here on the 5th or 6th of September. Our Parliament will be meeting then, but that cannot be helped. If you will kindly let me know what date suits you, we shall draw a programme accordingly. . . . We all hope that Begum Mohammed Ali will accompany you on your visit to Delhi. . . . Apart from the talks and discussions we shall hope there will inevitably be a number of more or less social engagements. We are being approached already by various organizations. Among these I might mention the Delhi Municipality and a number of women’s organizations who wish to welcome Begum Mohammed Ali. . . . You might perhaps like to visit some of our refugee settlements round about Delhi, as also to see some of the new institutes, scientific and other, that have been built up . . . I do not know if you would care to go out of Delhi, such as to Agra. If you wish to go to Agra, it would be possible to arrange a brief trip by air which would take about half a day. . . . . . . Perhaps you will be good enough to discuss these matters with our High Commissioner who will indicate your wishes to us, and we can then draw up the programme. . . .52

The only thing of some great significance that has happened in between 8 August and 12 August that is when Nehru wrote to the President, is the dismissal of Abdullah. The papers also contain two ‘top secret’ telegrams from India’s High Commission in Karachi. The first is of 10 August, this reports on the reaction of Abdullah’s dismissal in Pakistan: No. 361, Top Secret Latest developments in Kashmir specially Abdullah’s dismissal and arrest reported intervention of Indian Army in dealing with demonstration at Srinagar have produced bitter reactions and anti-Indian comments in press and political circles, holding our Government responsible for those actions. We have given out informally that latest events due to internal differences.

264

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

I was at Delhi and none knew anything about them till Saturday evening last. Doubtless events and decisions must have been reported to Delhi afterwards. Less informed public rejoice in the rift in Kashmir Cabinet hoping that Kashmir’s coming over to Pakistan would now be easier. Prime Minister of Pakistan seriously worried about the situation and would like to meet our Prime Minister immediately. Watching further reactions writing tomorrow.53

The Second telegram is of considerable significance. It is from M.S. Mehta, India’s High Commissioner for the Prime Minister dated 11 August. No. 363 Top Secret Prime Minster from Mehta Met Prime Minister Mohammed Ali again. He has not yet received your reply and is anxiously expecting it every moment. Governor General has also advised him to meet you. Mohammed Ali thinks if he cannot meet you the situation would take very serious turn and he himself would be discredited. Governor General plans to go on Haj on 15th August but would only go if you agree to receive Mohammed Ali. In case you do not Governor General’s intention is to abandon idea of leaving the country. I again advised Mohammed Ali not to go to Delhi at this time. But this idea has been strongly supported by his Cabinet. . . . . . . Mohammed Ali clearly understands that there is no question of his discussing internal situation of Kashmir with you and told me that whoever might be Chief Minister of Kashmir at the present time was not their concern. He eagerly expects favourable and considerate answer from you to agree to resume talks with him. He said to me that he was only asking for advancing the date of his meeting you in order to tide over this crisis. . . . . . . It would be a good thing from our stand point of view to issue a statement as to how and to what extent our army was used to quell disturbances in Srinagar and what its present position is. This would clear up misunderstanding. Not only in the minds of Pakistanis but also outside world. 54

This makes it reasonably clear that the visit was insisted upon as a sequel to Abdullah’s dismissal even though the Pakistan authorities gave to the Indian High Commission the impression that Abdullah’s dismissal was of no concern to Pakistan. Now what is even more interesting is that even though India’s High Commissioner was given



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah AMMU

265

the impression or at least he conveyed so to New Delhi that Abdullah’s dismissal had nothing to do with Mohammed Ali seeking to visit Delhi a letter of Prime Minister Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed tells another story: . . . As was to be expected, the reactions in Pakistan have been strong. Pakistan Radio announced tonight that the Pakistan Prime Minister is going to ask for an immediate meeting with me to discuss Kashmir. This is their Cabinet decision. I have not yet received any formal message to this effect, but no doubt this will come by tomorrow morning. We shall consider it in our Cabinet Committee. If he wants to come here, I can hardly refuse such a meeting. I shall let you know what message we send him.55 NEHRU ASSESSES KASHMIR POST ABDULLAH: POSSIBILITY OF PARTITION

But before we take up the meeting a reference to another important letter addressed by Prime Minister Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed is required. This letter was dictated on 15 August (1953) that is just a few days after the dismissal of Abdullah.56 One can imagine how the Prime Minister must have pulled out time on the Independence Day. But then this was Nehru: . . . I have not written to you or spoken to you on the telephone during the past critical days. I have, of course, been getting full information from various sources about happenings in Kashmir. All these developments were inevitable and yet they have been very painful, and I have felt some strain during these days. Your strain, of course, was much greater. . . . . . . When events moved in this way to this crisis, it was clear that whatever steps might be taken, we were entering into an entirely new phase. Not to take any steps was to court disaster. To take them, was also to invite a break with all its difficult and unknown consequences. I am sorry for the manner in which much has happened. I do not like things done in the dark and in the middle of the night.57 I have insisted right from the beginning that constitutional procedure should be followed. Technically this was done. I confess that it left a bad taste in my mouth. However, it is difficult to judge from here and you and others on the spot acted according to your judgement of the situation. . . . . . . That is over, but that itself has led to numerous problems and events

266

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

now will move at a faster pace. Previously, one could say that a certain portion of the people of the Valley were pro-Pakistani, another part pro-India and the bulk probably neutral and not caring very much except for their immediate needs and difficulties. Sheikh Sahib’s position and his popular appeal were strong. The sudden removal of Sheikh Sahib, and the manner this was done, obviously must have given a shock to many people. His adherents as well as many others who looked up to him will naturally swing away towards Pakistan. . . . . . . Mohammed Ali is coming here tomorrow. I shall not discuss recent events with him in Srinagar, but I should like to give him my viewpoint even about those and to express myself strongly about the hysterical and highly objectionable reactions in Pakistan to what has happened in Kashmir. In the main, however, we shall have to discuss the future. What is that future going to be? We are committed to the plebiscite. If so, the questions to be considered are: (1) The conditions which should precede the plebiscite, (2) The manner of the plebiscite and the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator, etc., and (3) The timing of the plebiscite. . . . We need not, of course, come to any final decisions at this stage. But something has to be said about these various matters. We have discussed the conditions and chiefly the question of armed forces for two or three years. We shall no doubt discuss them again. But I think other matters are beginning to take precedence. . . . . . . Should the plebiscite be for the entire State or part of it? I am quite clear that it should be for the entire State including the ‘Azad’ areas, etc. But it should be rather on a regional basis. That is, we have voting in all over the State and that voting guides us about the wishes of the people in various areas. It is then for the Governments concerned to decide how to give effect to the desires of the people. It is obvious that some parts of the State will plump for India; other parts for Pakistan. It is no good any longer to talk of the whole State going this way or that way. If the whole State was pushed to one side or the other, that would result in an impossible situation in some parts of it and considerable migrations. That has to be avoided. Therefore, inevitably one has to keep partition in view, though we need not talk about it directly. If it is a question of partition, then the views of the people naturally have a great say but not a final say about every area. Such a partition will mean the fixation of an international boundary, and, for this



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah A M M U

267

purpose, all kinds of other considerations will have to be borne in mind. We cannot have a boundary which has no geographical features or which is in the middle of a hill-side. It must be a clear and defensible boundary for both parties. This is a ticklish matter, but it has to be borne in mind. There cannot be islands of territory here and there. . . . . . . Perhaps, instead of a plebiscite, one might have a new election for a Constituent Assembly all over the State. I am not clear about this, but the idea came into my head as worth considering. This Assembly could then tackle the question of partition or something like it. . . . . . . In any event, I rule out the idea of independence. At any time this was not practicable; now it is not possible and it can only create all kinds of difficulties and conflicts. . . . . . . I am merely putting some ideas before you so that I can have your reaction to them. . . . . . . Then comes the question of a Plebiscite Administrator. If we think in terms of a plebiscite, we shall have to accept such an Administrator. I am clear in my mind that we should not have such an Administrator from the USA or any big country. He should come from the smaller and more neutral countries of Europe or from some Asian country. Most of his principal lieutenants should also come from these countries. . . . . . . When can a plebiscite be held? It is impossible to say now, because all kinds of things will have to be done previously, including the preparation of the electoral roll and that will take time. This question can really only be decided after the Plebiscite Administrator has started functioning and has made some investigation and presented a report and recommendations. At the earliest I suppose it will have to be some time next summer. It may be later. . . . . . . These are vague and general ideas which will have to be given more definite approach soon, although an element of uncertainty will naturally remain.58

This letter needs a very careful reading. Among other things it is perhaps the first time that Nehru has referred to the possibility of even partitioning Kashmir if such an eventuality was to arise as a result of the plebiscite. The letter makes it abundantly clear that Nehru has not been able to get over the removal of Abdullah. In Bakshi a replacement had no doubt been found, but obviously in the Prime Minister’s mind and process of thought there was hardly a comparison between Abdullah and Bakshi.

268

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

NEHRU-MOHAMMED ALI MEETING: MINUTES

Prime Minister Nehru and Mohammed Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan had a two hour meeting in New Delhi on 17 August (1953). Nehru recorded the minutes. The meeting was held in the background of anti-India protests and a extremely one sided press coverage in Pakistan. Feroze Khan Noon, the Chief Minister of Punjab was cited as having said that India was divided because the Congress had accepted the two nation theory. The Governor of East Pakistan Khaliquz-Zaman had exhorted the people ‘to keep their swords shinning and horses ready. . . .’ Several meetings in Pakistan had called for jihad and to ‘join their Kashmiri brethren in their cause.’59 Nehru’s minutes: . . . I had a two-hour talk with Mr Mohammed Ali this afternoon. I began by saying that I was greatly distressed at the hysteria exhibited by the Press and others in Pakistan during the last few days over the Kashmir occurrences. I could understand a certain excitement, even some resentment, but what had actually taken place had amazed me and distressed me. . . . . . . With this background of hate and denouncement, it was not particularly easy to create the atmosphere for a friendly settlement which we all desired. . . . . . . I referred to recent events in Kashmir and said that I felt unhappy about many things that had happened. Sheikh Abdullah was an old colleague, and to have to take action against him by detaining him hurt me. . . . . . . Some days later, events followed each other in quick succession and resulted in Sheikh Sahib’s arrest. I regretted this, but it was difficult for me to stop the course of events. There were disturbances later and these had to be dealt with by the Government there. Otherwise, there would have been chaos and no Government could function in that way. . . . . . . In Srinagar and the Valley, there were obviously two sets of people, one pro-India and the other pro-Pakistan. Most people, of course, were hardly political and only cared for their economic betterment. Then there were many people who looked up to Sheikh Abdullah particularly, and, as a consequence of his arrest, they naturally began to side with the anti-India elements, accusing India for what had happened. It was obvious that nobody wishing well to India could have deliberately liked these developments. But circumstances and events could not be governed and one step led to another. . . . . . . I then came to the problem of Kashmir and said that I was convinced that we must deal with this firmly and arrive at a settlement. How was this



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah AMMU

269

to be done? The easy way would be for us to come to some settlement by ourselves and thus end the dispute. I had once or twice mentioned this to Liaquat Ali Khan some years ago, but my proposal was not accepted. Although this was an easy way, I thought that this was no longer open to us. Any such ad hoc settlement would anger people both in India and Pakistan. The only way left was to cast the responsibility for the settlement on the people of Kashmir themselves. We, therefore, came back to the plebiscite. Let us work therefore for a plebiscite. We had talked about this for a long time and had got stuck over certain preliminary question, namely, the quantum of forces on either side. This question was not only one of numbers but of principle also, because we had claimed that there should be no Pakistan forces of any kind in ‘Azad Kashmir’. Normally speaking, after these preliminaries had been decided, the decisions would have to be implemented. When that had been done, the UN Representative was supposed to declare that the work had been carried out and suitable conditions prevailed. At that stage, the Plebiscite Administrator came into the picture and he would take all necessary steps for the plebiscite and present a report as to what should be done. Actual preparations for the plebiscite would take a considerable time. No plebiscite could be held in Kashmir during the four or five winter months. . . . . . . We had talked of a plebiscite for the whole State. Dixon suggested another way. 60 That was a much more logical approach, but, in the way he had suggested it, it was objectionable. We were not prepared to consider this question on the basis of Muslim areas and Hindu areas. But it was clear that the whole State could not be considered as a unit which should go this way or that way. There were some parts of the State which could not be absorbed by either India or Pakistan. Therefore, inevitably we had to come to the conclusion that some kind of a division of the State had to be made. . . . . . . But this should only be done after a plebiscite of the entire State. The plebiscite should not automatically decide the question but should give the necessary data for this decision, and this decision would be largely governed by the result of the plebiscite. There were, however, other important questions. A division of the State would involve the fixation of an international boundary. This boundary should be related to geographical factors. It should avoid islands of territory and should be on the whole a clear physical line, which, as far as possible, gave effect to the wishes of the inhabitants. It would not be able to do so wholly, for that might produce an artificial and difficult frontier line. Therefore, after the result of the plebiscite was known, the two Governments should consider the question afresh and finally decide where the frontier should be. In this matter, we might have to consult others, including our Military Advisers on both sides. If we proceeded in the old

270

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

way and tried to deal with the preliminary conditions for a plebiscite, we might be hung up again now. Besides, that was rather a technical question and military advice was needed. Could we postpone this question and say that, after a certain period, say six or seven months, the Plebiscite Administrator should be nominated? Before that we should undertake to set the other preliminaries. After the Plebiscite Administrator comes in, he would take charge of the arrangements with our cooperation. . . . . . . The Plebiscite Administrator would be appointed formally by the Kashmir Government. That had been agreed to previously, but, of course, it would have to be with the approval of India and Pakistan. I was quite clear that the Plebiscite Administrator should not come from any of the major powers. This would create difficulties and rivalries among the great powers because of the strategic position of Kashmir. Therefore, the Plebiscite Administrator should be chosen from the small and more or less neutral countries in Europe or Asia. led to the following conclusions: (1) A decision that a plebiscite must be taken and the result of the plebiscite should be the major factor in coming to further decisions about the future of the State. (2) The Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by a certain date, say, six months or so from now. He should come from the small and neutral countries of Europe or Asia and the staff should also be largely recruited from such countries. (3) During this interval of six months or so, not only must the Plebiscite Administrator be chosen by consent, but the other pending questions about forces, etc., in Kashmir and civil administration and local authorities of ‘Azad Kashmir’, should be settled between India and Pakistan in consultation with the Government of Kashmir. (4) The Plebiscite Administrator, after his induction, should take charge of that work and make his plans with our cooperation. The UN would be formally associated with his work. The date, etc., for the plebiscite would depend on his judgment and the progress of his work. That work is likely to take at least a year if not more. (5) The question of the refugees returning should be left out, as this was wholly impracticable, and, in any event, would delay matters tremendously. (6) It should be kept in mind that the final decision about the State was likely to be one of division. Where exactly the line of division might be drawn would depend primarily on the result of the plebiscite, but there were other important factors also to be considered in drawing



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah A M M U

271

up that international frontier line. It will be for the two Governments to consider the results of the plebiscite as well as all these factors, in coming to a decision about a practical and feasible frontier. (7) All these decisions should be governed by our desire to upset things as little as possible, that is, our decision should not lead to migrations and the like as far as possible. Mohammed Ali generally agreed with what I said, though I cannot say that he committed himself to everything fully. He agreed about the Plebiscite Administrator not coming from the great powers. On the whole, he thought that refugees should be left out so as to save time. He also said that our decisions will have to take other matters into consideration such as I had mentioned. Our interview ended then. We meet again tomorrow afternoon. ADDITIONAL NOTE TO THE NEHRUMOHAMMED ALI MEETING MINUTES I might add that I discussed briefly with Mohammed Ali the question of an independent Kashmir. I told him how this had gradually arisen in Sheikh Abdullah’s mind and taken shape. At first he vaguely talked of the whole State being more or less independent. Lately, having come to realize that some parts of the State would not agree to this, for instance Jammu, he had developed the thesis of a so-called independent Kashmir State for the Valley and some surrounding areas only, that is, what are considered the Kashmiri language speaking areas. This would be a very small State, neither politically nor economically viable. Apart from this, it would be an arena of conflict between India and Pakistan and possibly other countries also. Either of these countries would try to gain more influence there and in fact to make it a sphere of influence for itself and later enlarging its contacts with it. There would thus be no normality and in fact this independent Kashmir, far from bringing peace between India and Pakistan, would be a source of discord. Mr. Mohammed Ali agreed with this wholly. 61 POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION: PARTITION OF JAMMU & KASHMIR: AN OPTION It is likely that different regions of the State might vote differently. To compel a region to be attached to a country against its manifest will, would be improper and could only lead to continuing difficulties. Therefore, it must be borne in mind that as a result of the plebiscite there might be a partition of the State, so that the wishes of the people might be given effect to in the

272

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

largest measure. Such partition, however, cannot be automatic. The partition will lead to a new border which will be an international frontier. That international frontier has to be carefully decided upon to avoid artificial border lines and to fit in with geographical conditions and a proper and easily demarcated defensible line in so far as this is possible. Pockets of territories will also have to be avoided. The Governments concerned will, therefore, take all these matters into consideration, including principally, the result of the plebiscite, to determine finally what the frontier line should be. It is only possible to go through these complicated procedures if there is peace and order in Kashmir and a cooperative approach on the part of India and Pakistan. It will not be possible to make any progress if the atmosphere is vitiated by attacks, denunciations and threats of war. Therefore, it is essential that all attacks on each other and the kind of denunciations and threats of war that have been going on in the Pakistan Press, in public statements and even, to some extent, in the Pakistan Radio, should stop. Unless this is done, there will be no peaceful atmosphere and no satisfactory, fair and impartial plebiscite can be held unless these conditions prevail.62 JOINT STATEMENT EMPHASIZES ON PLEBISCITE

The two Prime Ministers met again and finalized the joint statement that was issued on the 20 August 1953. The statement was a typical diplomatic construct. Several of such statements went on to be issued in the following years indeed decades. Some important points were: The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India held several meetings on August 17, 18, 19 and 20 in New Delhi. These talks were in continuation of the talks they had had in Karachi three weeks earlier. Kashmir and other problems outstanding between the two countries were discussed fully and frankly. Both the Prime Ministers were actuated by a firm resolve to settle these problems as early as possible, peacefully and cooperatively to the mutual advantage of both countries. The Kashmir dispute was especially discussed at some length. It was their firm opinion that this should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State, with a view to promoting their well-being and causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah AMMU

273

impartial plebiscite. Such a plebiscite had been proposed and agreed to some years ago. Progress, however, could not be made because of lack of agreement in regard to certain preliminary issues. The Prime Ministers agree that these preliminary issues should be considered by them directly in order to arrive at agreements in regard to them. These agreements would have to be given effect to and the next step would be the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator. In order to fix some kind of a provisional time-table, it was decided that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April, 1954. Previous to that date, the preliminary issues referred to above should be decided and action in implementation thereof should be taken. With this purpose in view, committees of military and other experts should be appointed to advise the Prime Ministers. On the Plebiscite Administrator’s formal appointment and induction into office by the Jammu and Kashmir Government, he will examine the situation and report upon it. He will then make such proposals as he thinks proper for preparations to be made for the holding of a fair and impartial plebiscite in the entire State, and take such other steps as may be considered necessary therefore. The Prime Ministers are happy to record this large measure of agreement on vital matters affecting their two countries and they trust and believe that further success will attend their efforts so that all the problems which have unfortunately come in the way of good relations between the two countries should be solved satisfactorily. But progress can only be made in this direction if there is an atmosphere of peace and cooperation between the two countries. This has, therefore, to be actively encouraged. The Prime Ministers deprecate any propaganda or attacks on one country by the other in the Press, by Radio, or by speeches and statements made by responsible men and women of either country. They trust, therefore, that all organs and responsible leaders of public opinion will direct themselves to this great task of promoting goodwill between the two countries and thus help in solving all problems and disputes that might exist between them. The Prime Ministers attach the greatest importance to this friendly approach and to the avoidance of words and actions which promote discord between the two countries. The Prime Ministers intend to keep in close touch with each other so as to expedite progress in the directions indicated above.63

A reading of the minutes recorded by Nehru once again show that the Prime Minister was toying with the idea of a partition of Kashmir. The Pakistan Prime Minister too was not averse to such a possibility. Having said this however the other side is such joint statements and

274

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

long meetings appear to make so little sense. Could the Prime Minister ever have succeeded in selling the idea of a partition of Kashmir in India. Let us even take the issue of the plebiscite to which such a serious reference was made by both the Prime Ministers. Just two days before the joint statements on behalf of both the Prime Ministers was issued Prime Minister Nehru as we have just seen had written to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed. One paragraph of this letter in particular clearly shows that even though the Prime Minister was moving himself and the Pakistan Prime Minister in the directon of a plebiscite he still retained serious doubts: . . . It is true that the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator will somewhat create a disturbance in peoples’ minds. On the other hand, not to say that we will take such a step next year will itself create a further disturbance and conditions will remain abnormal and difficult. In the balance, therefore, it seems to us desirable that we should accept this position and take this step and thus lessen tension all round and then work to the best of our ability. . .64

The importance of the meeting between the two Prime Ministers lies in the fact that it took place at a juncture which is in many ways a major milestone in the post 1947 history of Jammu & Kashmir. The meeting took place a few days after the dismissal and detention of Sheikh Abdullah. Abdullah had been at the helm of affairs in Jammu & Kashmir for over five years. His rule was no nominal rule. Every decision, every action of the government had his approval and imprint. The circumstances in which Mohammed Ali insisted on meeting Nehru are infact very peculiar. Abdullah’s dismissal had been widely condemned in Pakistan. Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee had been dead (in detention) for just about two months. It is fairly obvious that Mohammed Ali insisted on the meeting only to give the impression in Pakistan that he had taken the removal of Sheikh Abdullah very seriously. But interestingly the joint statement made no reference of it, infact even the minutes recorded by Prime Minister Nehru made no significant reference of Abdullah’s dismissal. That the joint statement made an important reference to the issue of the plebiscite is quite important. It is well known as clear from most other sources that by mid 1953 Prime Minister Nehru had lost interest in the plebiscite. He knew it was neither feasible nor politically



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah A M M U

275

desirable. Yet both the Prime Ministers referred to the need of a plebiscite and even suggested that a schedule should be prepared. Were they really serious about it ? The man who had just replaced Abdullah in Kashmir and was considered now the most pro-India man in Kashmir, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was so angry when he learnt that the joint statement had indicated that India was willing for the plebiscite, even wrote an emotional letter of resignation65 Bakshi’s point was as Karan Singh put it: ‘. . . He felt with some justification that if India was really going ahead with the plebiscite his helping to oust Sheikh Abdullah had placed him in an absolutely false position vis-à-vis the people of the state. . . .’66 There is indeed an element of comic in this whole scene. We have taken note of how Prime Minister Nehru tried his very best to dissuade the Pakistan Prime Minister from coming to New Delhi. However Mohammed Ali insisted on coming. Once he landed in Delhi, Nehru went overboard and extended a huge welcome. Both sides even issued a joint statement, giving the impression that the meeting had been planned and both sides were taking the issues involved seriously. S. Mulgaokar had managed a one to one meeting with Mohammed Ali in New Delhi. He noted how the Pakistan Prime Minister was elated with the welcome and outcome of the visit: ‘things are looking up. . . .’ Mohammed Ali had told Mulgaokar.67 The idea of making an extended reference to this meeting is to stress on the argument that both sides were infact ‘beating around the bush’ knowing very well that much of what they were discussing was important no doubt, but was unlikely to go beyond the stage of a discussion. Several such joint statements followed in the years that followed. The fundamental issue was and remains, was Pakistan willing or inclined even in the distant future to dilute its stand on the Instrument of Accession and acknowledge that the merger of Jammu & Kashmir with the Union of India was in line and in accordance of the provisions of law that were provided for the purpose. On India’s part the essence truly lay in whether India was earnestly ready to organise a plebiscite and allow the reopening of something that appears to have been settled. Is it conceivable that the political leaders of the time could have agreed to yet another partition – this time of Kashmir?

276

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

NOTES 1. Jammu Situation: An Objective Analysis (New Delhi, 1952), pp. 4-6. 2. Ibid., p. 9. 3. Y.D. Gundevia, The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah, p. 109. Also his Outside the Archives. 4. B.N. Mullick, My Years with Nehru (Delhi, 1971), p. 29. 5. The Tribune, 12 August 1953. 6. Kashmir Problem & The Jammu in Satyagraha: An Objective Study, by Bhartiya Jan Sangh (Lucknow, n.d.), p. 9. 7. Mullick, My Years with Nehru, p. 29. 8. JN(SG), File 178-I, MSS, NMML (in between Nehru had written an unusually tough letter to Abdullah, it is obvious Abdullah had not by then seen this letter). 9. Ibid., Nehru did of course later decide to visit Kashmir. 10. JN(SG), File 101-II, Home Minister Katju to Nehru, 24 May 1953. 11. SW (Second Series), vol. 23, p. 309. 12. Ibid. 13. Roshni, 17 August 1953. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., 7 August 1953. 16. SW (Second Series), vol. 23, pp. 390-10. 17. Times of India, 17 August 1953. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., p. 311. 21. Ibid. 22. JN(SG), File 193, MSS, NMML. 23. Guha, India After Gandhi, p. 256. 24. Gundevia, Testament of Sheikh Abdullah, p. 116. 25. Maj. Gen. Hiralal Atal, Nehru’s Emissary to Kashmir (New Delhi, 1972), p. 178. 26. M.J. Akbar, India: The Siege Withen, pp. 245-6. 27. Karan Singh, Autobiography, p. 161. 28. Ibid., p. 162. 29. SW (2nd Series), vol. 22, p. 196. 30. Ibid., for the full text, pp. 193-9. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid., p. 198, the editors of the volume have also added a note to these exchanges in which several charges were noted against Abdullah. For example:   ‘. . . was widely rumoured that in early May Adlai Stevenson and Chester Bowles met Abdullah and encouraged him for an independent Kashmir.



T he D ismissal of S heikh A bdullah A M M U

277

Further, in a Working Committee meeting of the National Conference, on 18 May 1953 Abdullah put forward his views about an independent valley, which was opposed vehemently by G.M. Sadiq and G.L. Dogra. Also that on 12 and 15 April 1953 at Jammu and on 18 April at Srinagar, Sheikh Abdullah hinted that he was being forced to reassess the Delhi Agreement due to the growing incidents of communal activities in Jammu and India. He openly criticized the Central Government for not being able to quell the spread of communal activities and insisted that the State had acceded on only three subjects and had complete autonomy in all other matters.’ 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid., vol. 23 (2nd Series), pp. 286-7. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. p. 294. 37. Ibid. p. 296. 38. Ibid. p. 298. 39. Dawn, 10 August 1953. 40. SW, vol. 23 (2nd Series), p. 319. 41. SW, vol. 23 (2nd Series), p. 326. 42. Ibid., 11 September 1953, p. 376. 43. JN(SG), File 193, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed 10 August 1953. 44. SW (2nd Series), vol. 23, p. 291, fn. 2. 45. Ibid. 46. SW (2nd Series), vol. 34, p. 220. 47. JN(SW ), File 193, MSS, NMML, Note of Mathai for the PM. 48. Balraj Puri, Jammu & Kashmir, pp. 226-32. 49. JN(SW ), File 193, MSS, NMML, Telegram Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed to Nehru, 10 August 1953. 50. SW (Second Series), vol. 23, pp. 322-5. 51. Ibid., p. 340, fn. 3. 52. JN(SG), File 193, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Mohammed Ali, 8 August 1953. 53. JN(SG), File 193, MSS, NMML. 54. JN(SG), File 193, MSS, NMML. 55. JN(SG), File 193, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed 10 August 1953. 56. Ibid., Nehru to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, 15 August 1953. 57. An aide-de-camp of the Sadar-i-Riyasat was deputed late in the evening of 8 August to deliver the letter of dismissal to Sheikh Abdullah. Delayed by torrential rains, the ADC along with a police contingent reached Gulmarg, 51 kms from Srinagar, late at night when Abdullah and his wife were ‘fast asleep’. Karan Singh recorded in his Autobiography, ‘With some difficulty and much knocking he was awoken and handed the letter as well as a warrant

278

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

of arrest. . . . He was given two hours to say his namaz and pack. . . . In the early hours of the 9th morning they were. . . . driven out of the Valley to the Tara Niwas guest house in Udhampur.’ Around the same time Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was sworn in Srinagar as the new Prime Minister of the State. 58. Ibid. (2nd Series), vol. 23, pp. 327-30. 59. SW (2nd Series), vol. 23, fns. 2, 3, 4. 60. In 1950, Owen Dixon, the UN mediator, had sought to arrange zonal plebiscites. 61. Ibid. (2nd Series), vol. 23, pp. 331-6. Nehru’s minutes of the meeting with Mohammed Ali. 62. Ibid., p. 330. 63. Ibid., pp. 344-6. 64. Ibid., p. 341. 65. Karan Singh, Autobiography, p. 167. 66. Ibid. 67. Times of India, 18 August 1953.

Conclusion

T

he essence of what we know today as the ‘Kashmir Problem’    has rested in its most basic form in that in 1947 Kashmir, was     not only a Muslim majority state but also had a contiguous border with Muslim majority Pakistan as a result therefore a Hindu ruler did not enjoy the right to decide the future of his Muslim subjects. This is how Pakistan has followed the issue. This belief has generally also revolved around the understanding that all Muslims of Jammu & Kashmir if given a choice in 1947 would have chosen to merge with Pakistan and if this did not happen it was because, India perhaps conspired if not bullied the ‘Hindu’ Maharaja to side with India. A very basic question in the normal course should be, how did the ordinary Kashmiri who formed the mass of public opinion visualize the developing crisis. Was he in line and in agreement with those who claimed to represent the common Kashmiri ? A considerable amount has been published by those who were immediate contemporaries. These were people who saw things first hand, met people on the ground, many of them were especially deputed to gauge public opinion. What are the impressions they formed ? These are some of the issues that this book deals with. The book is sourced basically to contemporary points of view that appeared in varying forms and for some reason have mostly been overlooked in the studies that appeared in subsequent years. It has been argued here that for a vast majority of Indians the little

280

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

they may have ever understood of the issue, the rationale to divide the country on the basis of religion had remained a matter of doubt. For most people, the ordinary Indian, who has always been of little relevance when it came to such consequential decisions Kashmir had always been accepted as an integral part of the region commonly known through the centuries as ‘Hindustan’ and so on. As Maulana Mohammad Masoodi had put it: ‘the history of Kashmir shows us that it has been a part of India since antiquity. . . .’1 In Kashmir this study suggests, the issues involved were never in the early stages a question of Hindu and Muslim, such an understanding indeed the perception itself was infact a much later implant and interpretation: . . . In Kashmir one may not be astonished to witness the Hindus and Muslims equally holding in reverence the Hindu shrines and the Khanqahs closely or on the same premises . . . conversions took place in Kashmir as in other parts of India yet no one can deny that Muslims adopted Hindu customs giving in return some of their own. . . .2

Dr. Rammanohar Lohia has also put it: ‘. . . strangely there were several Muslims who favoured the state’s accession to India (1947) while on the other hand there were several Hindus who favoured its accession to Pakistan. . . .’3 As another study noted: ‘. . . Kashmir always remained uniquely related to India, the racial, social, commercial and religions relationship between the two only rarely became exploit­ ative . . . men and ideas travelled across opening new vistas. . . .’4 The Imperial Gazetteer (1909) too contains several references that underline how Kashmir had age old links with the rest of India: ‘. . . The valley of Kashmir is holy land and everywhere one finds remains of ancient temples. . . .’5 It goes on: ‘. . .history records that Kashmiris became Musalmans. But close observers of the country see that the so called Musalmans are still Hindu at heart. . . .’6 In this context this book brings out that most of those who had recorded views on the social and political fabric of the region have drawn attention to how co-existence was a way of life. Many have said and this includes Mahatma Gandhi, that it was impossible to distinguish a Kashmiri Muslim from a Kashmiri Hindu. It is not therefore surprising to note that even as efforts were made to generate animosity and differences between communities indeed even as late

C onclusion AMMU

281

as in the days leading to the partition of India (1947) at best this effort resulted in a divide that was only skin deep and very often the issues involved had little to do with religion. As Hori Lal Saxena wrote: ‘. . . Every one of the communal demands put forward by any communal group is in the final analysis (was) a demand for jobs. . . .’7 It is further argued that while the differences between the two major communities were superficial, the tendency of harmonious coexistence was deeper and more basic. Based extensively on contemporary reports, attention is drawn to how one of the most revealing results of the Pakistan sponsored and supported invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 was the manner in which the majority and minority communities of Kashmir fought the invaders unitedly. Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference went on to claim the credit for organising the united resistance. This was something that Prime Minister Nehru accepted on face value but the fact remains, the united resistance was a spontaneous natural response of ordinary people. Even if there had been no Abdullah on the scene the residents of Srinagar would have challenged the invaders in the same manner that they did. The Indian troops that engaged the invaders were welcomed as saviours and were commonly addressed as ‘bachao fauj’ (saviour army): ‘. . . The Indian army mercilessly chasing back the raiders over 70 miles . . . it is a story of relief and returning of joy for the people of Kashmir . . . is the key to understanding the present psychology of Kashmir’s people and of the complete trust and loyalty which they cherish for India and also of the utter hatred which they entertain for Pakistan. . . .’8 Reports show how Pakistani commanders were unable to believe the level to which the Hindus and Muslims had stood together in their opposition to the invasion. The invaders had marched into Kashmir with the impression and the confidence that the local population would come out in their support. This did not happen. As any one who has read the so called mainstream writings or lets call it popular and known writings on the problem will easily note that this important aspect has not received the attention it required.’ Towards the end of 1947 Sheikh Abdullah had very tactfully positioned himself into being seen and also accepted as the one man

282

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

who held the key to the resolving of the developing crisis. Like Prime Minister Nehru several good studies too have suggested that Abdullah was the one man who could ensure that Kashmir’s populace was ‘at heart’ with India. This study however argues that the decision to trust Abdullah with this important responsibility was the first big mistake that the government of India made. Infact it is suggested that from the moment that Abdullah was brought to centre stage the crisis in Kashmir began to take on added complications and issues. It is true that Abdullah was the most popular leader in Kashmir at the time and in this sense the Prime Minister had picked the right man. By deciding to project Abdullah and seeking to ensure that Abdullah led the demand for the merger the Prime Minister was clearly seeking a process of merger that appeared credible and convincing. Sadly Nehru’s idealism led to a decision that was perhaps the first big mistake. The counter view is why should Jammu & Kashmir have been treated and handled in a way that was different from the manner in which the other princely states had merged. There was no legal or technical requirement. Once the Maharaja had signed the document it should have been a closed chapter. Yogi Chand an activist of the Praja Socialist Party commented on the politics of Abdullah in a letter to The Tribune a few months before Abdullah was removed: . . . the halting and half hearted manner in which he (Abdullah) has acceded (reference to the Maharaja’s signing of the Instrument of Accession) fearing that his power might decrease is responsible for all this . . . it is ridiculous to confuse and confound the people . . . we are firmly of the opinion that the government of India with its weak kneed policy is responsible for this deplorable state. . . .9

The choice of Abdullah and the fact that Prime Minister Nehru considered the support of Abdullah more important than the Maharaja’s decision to come out in support of India were clear indicators it is suggested of how the Prime Minister was overwhelmed with the demographic character of Kashmir. Repeated examples are on record that establish how Nehru was keen to tell the world that India was not imposing itself on Muslim majority Kashmir. This study attempts also in this context to resurrect the administrative approach and unfolding of events that began to impact Kashmir and

C onclusion AMMU

283

the developing problem in a manner that was suggestive of handling it in terms of Hindu and Muslim. The moment this happened, India simply walked and talked itself into a corner. To this can also be added a common understanding of the time that the political and administrative approach with regard to the developing crisis too was tentative and disconnected with conditions on the ground. The policy was considered so ‘soft’ and appeasing that even the senior Congress leader Acharya Kriplani could not help noting: ‘If we do not take a firm stand and prepare against the menace we shall like Chamberlain’s (British Prime Minister’s handling of the Nazis) England realize our folly. . . .’10 The issue of the ‘plebiscite’ has been a major part of the narrative on Kashmir. The list of those who have said that Prime Minister Nehru had made a serious error of policy in making a reference to this is long. Likewise there are a large number of studies that have maintained that by not seeing the idea through, India had caused a serious breach of trust. This book examines how and in what circumstances the idea itself first emerged. Some important letters and notes of Prime Minister Nehru that for some reason were not included in the published version of the Selected Works refer to how it was Lord Mountbatten who put Nehru on this track. This is also one issue on which Nehru was clearly unable to make up his mind. As this set of unpublished notes show, the Prime Minister is usually taking a stand in favour of the plebiscite when the reference was for public consumption. But in reality the Prime Minister has serious reservations, his heart was not in it. Coming from a man of Nehru’s intellect this element of ‘unclarity’ is quite surprising. This double mindedness runs through the entire period starting 1947 to 1953. For example in a letter to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed (August 1953) who had just replaced Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru referred to the ‘unfeasibility’ of a plebiscite. A few days later in a historic meeting with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mohammed Ali (18 August 1953) Nehru appears all for the plebiscite. Following his return from Kashmir (early August 1947) Mahatma Gandhi had begun to emphasize on resolving the issue ‘by the will of the people’. Prime Minister Nehru spoke on the issue at length in an address over All India Radio on 4 November 1947: ‘. . . we are prepared to have a referendum under international auspices. . . .’11

284

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Nehru spoke at greater length in Parliament a few days later (25 November 1947). Surprisingly the Prime Minister did not dilute his stand on the issue inspite of the fact that his AIR address had resulted in widespread jubilation in Pakistan: ‘. . . we do not want a mere accession from the top . . . we wanted an accession in accordance with the will of the people. . . .’12 Most observers and commentators who travelled through the region have noted that the mass of Kashmiri population was generally happy with the merger of the state with India. That things began to move in a different direction suggested that the very man (Abdullah) who was trusted to guide the crisis into an acceptable resolution was the one who sowed the first seeds of doubt with regard to the Instrument of Accession and the future of the State. The idea of a limited merger with a list of conditions was the opinion of only a few leaders. It was not what the ordinary Kashmiri wanted. The study examines and explains how the idea of a plebiscite was not an issue that concerned the common man. There is no credible reference that relates the question to mass opinion. Sheikh Abdullah and a handful of his associates alone are the ones who are referring to such a possibility, but they too are doing so in a rather hesitating manner. Infact many years later (1958) in an interview Abdullah went on record saying that he had never asked for a plebiscite or any such exercise. The enthusiasm for the plebiscite is one sided. In this case it is Prime Minister Nehru and he stands on the issue supported mainly by Mountbatten and to an extent Gandhi. Otherwise the Prime Minister does not enjoy much meaningful support on the issue. Sylhet was a Muslim majority district in the otherwise Hindu majority state of Assam. On 6 July 1947 the people of the district were given a chance to decide their future. 56 per cent voted in favour of East Pakistan. Interestingly and as this study has argued the people of Kashmir hardly took note of the Sylhet plebiscite. On the other hand Junagadh whose ruler had decided in favour of merging with Pakistan saw his people voting against his decision in the plebiscite that was conducted in February 1948. About 91 per cent had voted in favour of India. There were thus two important precedents that could have enabled the demand for a plebiscite but as we have seen there was hardly any enthusiasm for such a course among the masses in Kashmir.

C onclusion AMMU

285

A few days before the invasion of Kashmir, (October 1947) Abdullah had met Home Minister Sardar Patel. Abdullah was reported to have said: ‘. . . Accession to one or another is not our concern . . . our priority is attainment of responsible government. . .Kashmir cannot decide immediately. . . .’13 What transpired in this meeting made Sardar Patel probably the first to flag doubts with regard to the manner in which Abdullah had begun to talk increasingly against the basic spirit of the Instrument of Accession. Sheikh Abdullah took charge of Kashmir at a time when he appeared the best option, indeed there was no other option. He naturally started off by standing in support of the accession. But even in these early days he supported the merger but always with a rider. Several statements in this regard have been cited in this study. Step by step but by rapid strides’ as one account put it ‘Abdullah rose to be the virtual dictator of Kashmir.’ 14 The same account notes: ‘. . . As Abdullah’s nationalism gradually began to wear thin . . . the hedious form of a communal fanatic began to emerge. . . .’ 15 Madhu Limaye and Sadiq Ali in a report that sought to assess the situation in Kashmir noted: ‘. . . to regain his popularity he raised the alluring cry of independence and diverted the attention of the people. . . .’16 Another contemporary report said virtually the same: ‘. . . he turned the clock back by mobilizing popular fervor through appeals to communal and religious sentiments. . . .’17 It is argued that the trust reposed by Prime Minister Nehru had now become a dangerously long and tricky rope that Abdullah used with great cunning to make himself even more indispensable in the eyes of the Prime Minister than he already was. Abdullah got his great opportunity when the Praja Parishad sought to draw the country’s attention to how the conditional accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India had created a whole new set of problems. By charging the Praja Parishad movement of being inspired by communal motives and as such a threat to the Muslim majority of Kashmir, Abdullah gave the whole issue a new and unique twist. The problem now became one of a Hindu Jammu against a Muslim Kashmir. Both Prime Minister Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah as well as several studies have said that the Praja Parishad movement was responsible to a considerable extent for complicating the issue and

286

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

giving it a communal colour. It is argued here however that at best this point of view can be accepted only as partly correct. A large number of contemporary writings have been examined to study the impact of the Praja Parishad movement. Did Abdullah’s claim that it had scared the ‘Muslims’ of Kashmir have merit ? Did the movement have a communal objective of putting the Hindu minority in a position of dominance ? It may come as surprise that most contemporary opinions suggest that Sheikh Abdullah is the one who created the first impression that the movement was communal in nature. The Prime Minister was in complete agreement with him on this inspite of the fact that most close observers at the time suggested that this was not the case. Balraj Puri was no friend of the Bhartiya Jan Sangh, the RSS or even the Praja Parishad. He clearly suggests that the origin and growth of the Parishad was only a reaction to the politics of Abdullah. It was Abdullah who initiated the game of aggressive local nationalism that pitted the Muslim majority Kashmir against the Hindu majority Jammu. To Abdullah the response of the people of Jammu to his policies came as a relief. He could now raise his voice and perhaps say that look ‘what I have been saying all along – that we may have problems in Hindu India, has now come true. . . .’ Talking of the Praja Parishad, its point of view is explained at length. Attention is drawn to how the Praja Parishad notwithstanding the charges against it had actually raised some basic issues. Could there be a Republic within a Republic ? In a letter to The Tribune Balraj Puri explained how Abdullah saw himself as a hero of the Kashmir valley alone. He fanned local nationalism to retain his base but failed in the process to see the reaction his policy was having in other parts of the state. Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Prime Minister Nehru both had greatly different understandings of the emerging crisis. Both undoubtedly were men of great intellect and brilliance. They were key rivals in Parliament as well as outside. For Nehru the Praja Parishad by raising the issues it did, had ‘rocked the Kashmir boat.’ While Mookerjee on the other hand insisted that Jammu & Kashmir should be governed by the same Constitution that applied to the rest of India. With regard to Abdullah, Dr. Mookerjee had warned that

C onclusion A M M U

287

Abdullah ‘was trying to create for himself and his state a separate status.’ This was a dangerous new trend that was bound to have huge implications in the future. This view was common and infact widely held at the time. For the Prime Minister, however Abdullah held the key to the heart of the Kashmiri Muslims. He was indispensable. As time would show the Prime Minister with all his good intentions had misread the man and the situation. Abdullah was finally removed from office (August 1953) and put under detention in dramatic circumstances. He would be in and out of detention in the years that followed. For Prime Minister Nehru it was naturally a moment of great embarrassment. Whether or not his approval had been taken for the arrest of his politically trusted and close friend is now only of academic interest. It is however difficult to imagine that a decision of such magnitude could have been taken by the young Sadr-i-Riyasat, Karan Singh. Singh though has rather large heartedly taken the onus on himself.18 The Prime Minister did not as historian Ramchandra Guha points out, intervene. He was of course shocked and sad. And so was his daughter Indira Gandhi who learnt of the developments of Srinagar from a newspaper in Switzerland: ‘. . . it is a heart breaking thing to happen . . . I am filled with a terrible and deeply penetrating sadness. It is like cutting a part of oneself ’.19 The shock of the Prime Minister is not difficult to understand particularly when we see the speed with which things spiralled out of control. But it is also fairly clear that even if the Prime Minister had not forseen such an eventuality Indira Gandhi does not seem to have been surprised: ‘And it wasn’t a shock . . . for I was dreading such a thing’.20 The removal of Abdullah in a sense this book suggests was only a natural sequel of a chain of events initiated by him. We have earlier noted how starting about November 1952 Abdullah was continuously charged by sections of the press and also several contemporary observers for dividing Hindus and Muslims, spreading communalism, breaking up Hindu majority districts so as to minimize the chances of Hindus being elected, of filling up key posts with Muslims and also making Urdu compulsory in the state government’s work, the schools and colleges. Abdullah’s insistence on a separate flag, a separate Constitution and his open reluctance to comply with the Delhi

288

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Agreement (1952) were all pointed out as clear signs of his seeking an independent Kashmir. And yet the Prime Minister continued to trust Abdullah virtually till the end. On 25 August 1952, Nehru wrote a long ‘top secret’ note meant exclusively for ‘Sheikh Sahib’. This is a typical Nehru note in which he explains his own reading of the situation. Interestingly the Prime Minister still thought of Abdullah as: ‘. . . the one who represented to me what the people of Kashmir wanted to be done. . . .’21 While discussing the reference of the dispute to the United Nation’s Security Council Nehru also noted: ‘. . . Whether the reference to the UN was a right step or not is now an academic question. . . .22 From the contents of this and other notes one gets the impression that Nehru had been in two minds with regard even to this important issue. Nehru also referred in this note to the acceptance of the ceasefire: ‘. . . we could have got the ceasefire on a somewhat better line if we had given more thought to it. However that is a past mistake. . . .’ There have been several major points of reference that have added to the problem. But three issues that have been in common discourse and have attracted most attention are – referring of the dispute to the Security Council of the United Nations; declaring that India would be in favour of a plebiscite; and acceptance of the ceasefire even as Indian forces were in a position of strategic advantage. In all three cases it is argued that the decisions were not only hurried, but it also appears that there were also serious errors of judgement. There was extensive opposition to the Prime Minister’s stand in the case of all these three issues that were very important in their own way. It is also important to note that the opposition came from within the Prime Minister’s own party, within parliament and of course from the political opponents of the Prime Minister. The key argument that is thus put forth here is that the government of India was unsure of its stand as also the policy to be adopted in the context of all three major issues – the plebiscite which by this time had become the issue of most concern; seeking intervention of the United Nations and finally accepting the ceasefire just as things had begun to improve. On 25 November 1947 Prime Minister Nehru was quoted as having said: ‘. . . in order to establish our bonafides we have suggested . . .

C onclusion AMMU

289

plebiscite . . . it should be done under an international tribunal such as the UNO, our policy is above board. . . .’23 The idealistic approach based on the ‘will of the people’ had a few years later changed to being ‘a symbol of many things.’ In a letter to Bhimsen Sachar (31 July 1953) (a Congress leader of the Punjab) Nehru said: ‘. . . you know that we have considered the problem of Kashmir as symbolic of many things including our secular policy in India. . . .’24 In the same letter Nehru also said: ‘. . . the internal situation in Kashmir is progressively deteriorating. There is a good deal of confusion, members of the government pull in different directions. . . .’ Any observer of Kashmir would know that until his dismissal Abdullah alone was ‘the government in Kashmir’. Most biographers of Nehru have drawn attention to how emotions, intuitive impulses often guided him and influenced even major decisions. Nehru was usually trusting of those who were not a political threat and also almost always very considerate in his interactions and correspondence. He rarely chose to bite the ‘bullet’ so to say and mostly chose to select a path of least confrontation. Abdullah on the other hand was different. He was not only pragmatic and tough, but observed closely and it is easy to notice that he did not lose track or sight of his basic goal even as he carried on a close bonding with Nehru. This book shows that Abdullah was very careful in dealing with Nehru, always giving to the Prime Minister an impression that their goals were common, which of course was not the case. The Prime Minister saw through the game only by the time when things had clearly slipped out of hand. Had the Prime Minister made a serious error in judging Abdullah? Perhaps yes. For how else did New Delhi land up in handing Kashmir to Abdullah, retaining for itself the duty to maintain his finances. Interestingly the Prime Minister’s obsessive support and liking for Abdullah was comparable for his dislike for some of his and Abdullah’s political opponents. Much of the evil he saw for example in the Praja Parishad was the result of his innate dislike for the Jan Sangh and the RSS and the politics and policies, he believed that they stood for. In this context one must also note that at that particular turn in India’s history there was no possibility of either of these organizations posing a threat of any kind to the Indian National Congress. Gandhi and

290

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

Patel were long gone. Nehru alone remained and not for a moment was his unquestioned leadership in doubt. In sum the main issues that emerge from contemporary views and observations are and perhaps most importantly – however hard some prominent leaders of Kashmir of the time tried, to their dismay the masses were unable to see their future in terms of just Hindu and Muslim. Kashmir had always been different. It is this fundamental character of Jammu & Kashmir that is all important. It held the key to many issues of contention then (1947) and perhaps does so even today (2019). The other point and as happens so often is that key leaders particularly in Kashmir were clearly seeking to walk a path which made no sense to most ordinary Kashmiris. However little the Kashmiri masses may have understood the political nuances and complexities of the time, for most Kashmiris, the state’s accession with the Union of India was a natural historical process and it was generally accepted that the merger carried far greater potential in terms of the future, growth and prosperity. Issues like merging with conditions, seeking to remain beyond the ambit of India’s laws and even having a separate Constitution were ideas with which the common Kashmiri was unable to associate and in any case it made no sense. When it is argued that most Kashmiris appear to have been in support of the state’s merger with India, was it a mistake to have delayed the plebiscite particularly after India had allowed it in Sylhet and Junagadh? The answer could be both yes and no. But more importantly one must take note of the fact and as discussed at length in this volume, from the very first day that Prime Minister Nehru talked of a plebiscite he appears to have soon fallen in two minds. The idealist democrat in him was inclined to seek public opinion. Mahatma Gandhi’s advise that Kashmir must go the way its people decided as well as the support of Viceroy Lord Mountbatten all added to convincing the Prime Minister of his policy in the matter. The wavering stand of Abdullah which appeared, however, increasingly unassuring weakened the Prime Minister’s resolve. We must also note that there was opposition to the plebiscite even within the party. Political opponents of Nehru were also mostly against the idea of a plebiscite.

C onclusion A M M U

291

It has also been emphasised that a vast majority of the common Kashmiri peasantry in particular had no idea or direct involvement in much of what was happening. As Nehru said in a letter to Abdullah: ‘ . . . I was surprised to learn from Brig. Usman that he (Usman) had come across some peasants who still thought that you (Abdullah) were in prison. . . .’ 25 This letter was dated 3 April 1948, that is almost six months after Abdullah had been released and he was head of the government in the state. This small incident is reflective of how little interest the ordinary Kashmiri took in political developments. This perhaps also serves to substantiate the basic thesis of this book that the whole crisis if that is what we must term it, was hyped in a manner that suited political ambitions of a small group of leaders who very tactfully succeeded in projecting themselves as representatives of Kashmir and Kashmiri public opinion. What also needs added emphasis is that for a vast majority of the state’s people the idea of a Kashmir independent of both India and Pakistan did not exist. We have already seen that but for a handful of people a merger with Pakistan was not an option. The talk of ‘Azadi’ was an idea that was tactfully planted and as such it was limited as a discourse among the influential elite who saw in the idea their own future. In a way it was not too different from how the Muslim League’s leadership had initially ‘sold’ the concept of Pakistan itself. In 1909 the Kashmir and Jammu Imperial Gazetteer reflected on the nature of the Kashmiri Muslim. The author editor Laurence could hardly have known what the future held for the wonderful people of this beautiful land: . . . the Kashmiri is unchanged, warriors and statesman came and went . . . Islam came in a strong wave on which rode a fanatical king and a missionary saint and history records that Kashmiris became Musalmans. But close observers of the country see that the so called Musalmans are still Hindus at heart. . . .26

What this book illustrates is not that the Kashmiri Muslim was a ‘lesser Muslim’ but yes it does focus on how the Kashmir Muslim was different. It is no chance or coincidence that even as the neighbouring Punjab saw unprecedented communal violence both in what became Pakistan as also in what remained with India, in

292

‘ B E C L E A R , K A S H M I R W I L L VOT E F O R I N D I A’

1947, Kashmir saw virtually no violence related to partition but for some stray incidents in the Jammu border region. In the plains of the Punjab the Hindus and Sikhs took one side, the Muslims the other, we know the result. In Kashmir Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs stood and fought shoulder to shoulder and against whom – the invaders from Pakistan who were without exception all Muslim. It should not be difficult to appreciate the pattern in this. Very little obviously had changed between 1909 when Laurence took note of the peculiar nature of the Kashmiri Muslim and say 1947 when desperate efforts were made in an organized manner by both Pakistan as well as select leaders in Kashmir to influence the innocent Kashmiri peasant on to a path of which they had no idea or understanding. Why was Kashmir so emotionally bonded with India ? The answer was there in 1947 for all to see, provided of course we did so without our biases and pre-suppositions. The strength of contemporary writings written not as history or for history is that even as they are written at a time when biases are strong and anger all prevalent they do bring out dimensions that a traditional historian would otherwise overlook. In the final analysis this study has argued that by approaching the events in Kashmir in the initial years of the dispute as a Muslim and Hindu issue, a serious error of judgement had occurred. It was a game of political chess – all about, capturing and retaining power. As time would show Sheikh Abdullah easily outplayed and outwitted Prime Minister Nehru. There is an element of serious irony in this because it was the Prime Minister who brought Abdullah to centre stage. One can not easily imagine Abdullah’s place in history if the task of handling him had been assigned to Sardar Patel. On the day (and night) that Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed Indira Gandhi was in Switzerland. Nehru wrote to her on the developments. By the time the letter was delivered to her she had already read of it in the local papers: ‘. . . Sheikh Sahib carried on a bitter campaign against India and to some extent against me . . . last night the Sadri-Riyast dismissed his ministry. . . .’27 Indira Gandhi replied: ‘. . . it is a heartbreaking thing to happen . . . I am filled with a terrible and deeply penetrating sadness . . . it is like cutting a part of one self. . . .’28 The Kashmir story in the years 1947 to 1953, we could perhaps call it the first phase this book argues was a dramatic story of

AMMU C onclusion

293

misjudgements, misdiagnosis and even betrayal. In a more broader perspective the Kashmir problem as we know of it today had only just begun. NOTES 1. Kashmir Through Public Eyes (Srinagar, 1953). 2. Krishan Lal, ‘The Culture of Kashmir’, Jammu & Kashmir State Research Biannual, vol. 1, no. 2, 1976 (Acc. Alma Iqbal Library, Kashmir University). 3. Collected Works of Dr. Rammanohar Lohia, vol. IV, p. 37. 4. Mir Bashir Ahmad Sultan, ‘Kashmir’s Socio Political Heritage’, in Khawaja and Majeed (eds.), Approaches to Kashmir Studies, p. 147. 5. Walter R. Laurence, Kashmir & Jammu Imperial Gazetteer (1909), rpt., p. 31. 6. Ibid., p. 38. 7. Hori Lal Saxena, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and the Kashmir Muddle: Being a True Story of Kashmir and all that Happened Since 1931. 8. N.S. Phadke, Birth Pangs of New Kashmir (Bombay, 1948). 9. The Tribune, 25 January 1953. 10. The Tribune, 23 November 1947. 11. The Tribune, 5 November 1947. 12. Statesman, 26 November 1947. 13. The Tribune, 19 October 1947. 14. Bhaskaranand, The Kashmir Cauldron, p. 31. 15. Ibid., p. 38. 16. Madhu Limaye and Sadiq Ali, Report on Kashmir, p. 5. 17. Conspiracy in Kashmir. 18. Karan Singh, Autobiography (revd. edn., Oxford, 1994), pp. 159-61. 19. SW (2nd Series), vol. 23, p. 311. 20. Ibid. 21. JN(SG), File 143-I, MSS, NMML. 22. Ibid. 23. Statesman, 26 November 1947. 24. SW (2nd Series), vol. 23, pp. 305-6. 25. JN(SG), File 8, MSS, NMML, Nehru to Abdullah, 3 April 1948. 26. Lawrence, Kashmir & Jammu Gazetteer (1909), p. 38. 27. SW (2nd Series), vol. 23, pp. 309-10. 28. Ibid., p. 311.

Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group http://taylorandfrancis.com

Bibliography

OFFICIAL REPORTS/PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, GOVERNMENT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND POLITICAL PARTIES

ABC of the Kashmir Question (Information Service, Govt. of India, n.d.). Basta No. 95, File 148/57 SN 2323, J & K State Archives Jammu. Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Kashmir Problem & Satyagraha: An Objective Study (Delhi: Bharatiya Jan Sangh, n.d.). DM Report Filed to Dy. Chief Secretary Basta 147 serval 360 1.9.45 J & K State Archives, Jammu. Democratic Research Service, For a Democratic Foreign Policy (speeches – Parliament) (Bombay: Democratic Records Service, 1951). Hussain, Zakir, Indian Muslim Leaders Memorandum on Kashmir (signed by 14 Muslim leaders and submitted to Frank P. Graham, UN Representative, 14 August 1951) (no publishers – NMML Acc. V241 ‘N51J11). Integration of Kashmir (n.d.). Jammu & Kashmir – 1947-1950: An Account of the Activities of the First Three Years of Sheikh Abdullah’s Government (J&K State Information Bureau, 1951). Jammu Situation: An Objective Analysis (New Delhi: Kashmir Bureau of Information, 1952). Kashmir Calling (New Delhi: Kashmir Bureau of Information, Rajagopalacharia Papers V, Instalment Serial 74, NMML). Kashmir Problem and the Jammu Satyagraha: An Objective Study (Lucknow: Bharatiya Jan Sangh, n.d.). Kashmir Through Public Eyes (Srinagar: J&K National Conference Publication, 1953). Kashmir Imbroglio (Delhi: Kashmir Democratic Union, 1951). Lawrence, Walter R., Kashmir & Jammu Imperial Gazetteer (1909) (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, rpt. 2012).

296 B I B L I O G R A P H Y Limaye, Madhu and Sadiq Ali, Report on Kashmir (New Delhi: Praja Socialist Party, 1954). Mookerjee, Syama Prasad, Integrate Kashmir (Delhi: Bharatiya Jan Sangh, n.d.). Report ASP Annantnag, 6 September 1945, Basta 147, Serial 3601, File PR 128/1/45 J & K State Archives, Jammu. Report of the Riot Enquiry Committee 1931 (Srinagar: Partap Singh Library). Report on Press, Basta 95, File No. 148/57 No. 2323, J&K State Archives, Jammu. The Kashmir Story (Publication Division G.O.I.) Weekly Report ending 3 September 1945, Basta N. 147, Serial 3601, File PR 128/1/45 J&K State Archives Jammu. NEWSPAPERS

Civil & Military Gazette Hindustan Times National Herald Organizer Pakistan Times Ranbir (Urdu) Roshni (Urdu) Statesman The Tribune, Lahore, Simla Times (London) Times of India PUBLISHED BOOKS/ARTICLES IN BOOKS AND JOURNALS – PRE 1955

Abbas, Khawaja Ahmad, Current, vol. I, no. 5, 16 October 1949. Banerji, J.K., I Report on Kashmir (Calcutta: Republic Publications, 1948). Bazaz, Prem Nath, Azad Kashmir (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1951). ———, Inside Kashmir (Srinagar: Kashmir Publishing, 1941). Brecher, Michael, The Struggle for Kashmir (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953). Bunkeshwar, S.S., Conspiracy in Kashmir (Banglore: Society for Defence of Democracy, 1955). Cohen, Maurice, Thunder Over Kashmir (London: Orient Longmans, 1955). Conspiracy in Kashmir (Srinagar: Social & Political Study Group, 1954). Denys, F.W., Our Summer in the Vale of Kashmir (Washington: Brayman, 1915). Dugsal, ‘Letters from India & Kashmir’ 1874, in M.L. Kapur, Kashmir Sold & Snatched (Jammu: Privately Published by Author, 1968).

BIBLIOGRAPHY 297

Fergusson, James P., Kashmir: An Historical Introduction (London: Centaur Press, 1955). Gauba, K.L., Inside Pakistan (Delhi: Rajkamal, 1948). Invasion of Kashmir (Bombay: Dhirubhai Dalal, n.d. but probably 1949). Kalhan, D.N., Report on Kashmir (Srinagar: Lala Rukh, 1955). Knight, E.F., Where Three Empires Meet: A Narrative of a Recent Travels in Kashmir Western Tibet (London: Longman Green, 1905). Korbel, Joseph, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954). Krishna, Rajbans, Kashmir and the Conspiracy Against Peace (Bombay: People’s Publishing House, 1951). Kumar, Vijay, Anglo American Plot Against Kashmir (Bombay: People’s Publishing House, 1954). Madhok, Balraj, Kashmir Divided (Lucknow: Rashtra Dharma Prakashan Ltd., 1949). Masoodi, Maulana Saeed, Kashmir Through Muslim Eyes (Urdu-translated, Srinagar: J&K National Conference, n.d.) Mehta, Krishna, Chaos in Kashmir (Calcutta: Signet Press, 1954). Menon, K.N., Facts About Kashmir (New Delhi: Coxton Press, 1953). Messervy, Frank, ‘Kashmir’, Asiatic Review, January 1949. Miles, Pat, They Came to a Mountain (London: Chapmen, 1951). Mookerjee, R.K., ‘Cultural Links Between India and Kashmir’, Kashmir, vol. 3, no. 5, May 1953 (Acc. Research Section, Allama Iqbal Library, Kashmir University Srinagar). Mohammad, Bakshi Ghulam, Crisis in Kashmir Explained (Srinagar: Lala Rukh Publication, 1953). ———, Kashmir Today Through Many Eyes (Bombay: Bombay Congress, 1946). Nagar, Parshuram, Abdullah Sarkar Hindu ke Virudh Hai (Jammu: National Publishing House, n.d.) (NMML Acc. V241: 48(Q2) N47 152 H7). Parmeswaran, C., The Kashmir Plebiscite (New Delhi: Press Information Bureau, 1953). Phadke, N.S., Birth Pangs of New Kashmir (Bombay: Hind Kitab, 1948). Prakash, Dewan Ram, Fight for Kashmir (New Delhi: Tagore Memorial Publications, 1948). Raghvan, G.S., The Warning of Kashmir (Allahabad: Pioneer Press, 1931). Sahu, Jagan Nath, Behind the Iron Curtain in Kashmir (Delhi: Kashmir Democratic Union, 1952). Saxena, Hori Lal, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and the Kashmir Muddle: A True Story of Kashmir & All that Happened Since 1931 (Srinagar: Nationalist Office, 1949). Shivpuri, S.N., The Grim Saga (Calcutta: Dasgupta, 1953). Social & Political Study Group, Conspiracy in Kashmir (Srinagar: Amirakadal, 1954).

298 B I B L I O G R A P H Y Sodhbans, P.S., Genisis of the Kashmir Problem (Delhi: Deepak Publications, 1952). Thorp, Robert, Cashmere Misgovernance, ed. F.M. Hassnain (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, rpt. 2011). Wakefield, G.E.C., Recollections: 50 Years in the Service of India (Lahore: Civil & Military Press, 1942). Wakefield, W., The Happy Valley: Sketches of Kashmir and the Kashmiris (London: Samson Low, 1879). PUBLISHED BOOKS/ARTICLES IN BOOKS & JOURNALS – POST 1955

Abdullah, Sheikh Mohammed, Atish-i-Chinar (Flames of the Chinar): An Autobiography (New Delhi: Viking, 1986, tr. 1993). Akbar, M.J., India: The Siege Withen (New Delhi: Viking, 1995). ———, Kashmir Behind the Vale (New Delhi: Viking, 1991). Ankit, Rakesh, The Origins of the Kashmir Dispute and Pakistan (New Delhi: Monograph Jamia Millia, 2013). Ashraf, Mohammad, ‘How Old is the Kashmir Problem’, Kashmir First: The Kashmir Story, vol. I (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2008). Atal, Maj. Gen. Hiralal, Nehru Emmissary to Kashmir (New Delhi: Army Educational Stores, 1972). Bamzai, P.N.K., Culture & Political History of Kashmir, 3 vols. (New Delhi: M.D. Publications, 1994). ———, Kashmir & Power Politics: Lake Success to Tashkent (New Delhi: Metropolitan Books, 1967). Bangroo, Virendra, ‘Indigenous Architectural Heritage of Kashmir’, in G.M. Khawaja and Gulshan Majeed (eds.), Approaches to Kashmir Studies (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2011). Bazaz, Prem Nath, Kashmir in Crucible (New Delhi: Pamposh, 1967). Beg, Aziz, Captive Kashmir: Story of a Betrayed and Enslaved People (Lahore: Allied Business Corporation, 1957). Bhaskaranand, Offering to the Spirit of Martyradom, for Humanism (Simla, 1956) (no publisher – NMML Acc. 954.6042 J61). Behera, Navnita C., Demystifying Kashmir (Delhi: Dorling Kinderslay Publishing, 2007). Birdwood, C.B., Two Nations & Kashmir (London: Robert Hale, 1956). Bose, Sumantra, Kashmir Roots of Conflict: Path of Peace (New Delhi: Vistaar, 2003). Chagla, M.C., Kashmir 1945-1965 (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1965). Coupland, I., ‘The Abdullah Factor: Kashmir Muslims and the Crisis of 1947’,

BIBLIOGRAPHY 299

in D.A. Low (ed.), The Political Inheritence of Pakistan (London: Macmillan, 1991). Das, Durga, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence (Ahmadabad: Navjivan Press, 1971). Das, Suranjan, Kashmir & Sindh: Nation Building & Regional Politics in South Asia (Kolkatta: K.P. Bagchi, 2001). Dasgupta, C., War & Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-1948 (New Delhi: Sage, 2002). Deora, M.S. and R. Grover, Documents on Kashmir Problem (New Delhi: Discovery Publishing House, 1991). Free Kashmir Centre, India vs India on Kashmir (New York, 1962). Ganguly, Sumit (ed.), The Kashmir Question (London, 2003). Ganguly, Sumit, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War Hopes of Peace (Cambridge, 1998). Gani, Shaokat Ahmad, Kashmir Accession and its Manipulation (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2009). Gauher, G.N. and S. Gauher (eds.), Kashmir Papers (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2011). Gopal, S. (ed.), Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (New Delhi: Oxford, 1998). Guha, Ramchandra, India After Gandhi: A History of the Worlds Largest Democracy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2007). Gundevia, Y.D., The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah (Dehradun: Palit & Palit, 1974). Hassnain, Fida Mohammad, ‘The Impact of Muslim Rule on the Kashmir Society during the 14th & 15th Centuries’, The Journal of Kashmir Studies, III(I), 2009. ———, British Policy Towards Kashmir in Anglo Russian Politics 1846-1921 (New Delhi: Sterling, 1974). ———, Freedom Struggle in Kashmir (New Delhi: Rima, 1988). Information Service of India, The Kashmir Question 1947-1956 (New Delhi: Govt. of India, 1957). ———, Kashmir a Factual Survey (New Delhi: Govt. of India, 1956). Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulance in Kashmir (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2017, 1st pub. 1992). Jamal, Arif, Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir (New Delhi: Viz Books, 2009). Jha, Prem Shankar, The Origins of a Dispute: Kashmir 1947 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003). Kapoor, Mastram (ed.), Collected Works of Dr. Rammanohar Lohia (New Delhi: Anamika, 2011). Kapur, M.L., Kashmir Sold and Snatched (Jammu: Author, 1968). Kashmir, vol. VII, no. 8, 1957, vol. VIII, no. 5, 1958, vol. VIII, no. 6, 1958 (Acc. Allama Iqbal Library, Kashmir University).

300 B I B L I O G R A P H Y Kaul, G.L., Kashmir Then & Now (Srinagar: Chronicle, 1967). Kaw, R.N., ‘Contribution of Kashmir to Sanskrit Literature’, Jammu & Kashmir University Review, vol. 5, no. 2, December 1962 (Acc. Allama Iqbal Library, Kashmir University). Khan, Akbar, Raiders in Kashmir: Story of the Kashmir War 1947-1948 (Karachi: Pakistan Publishers, 1970). Khan, Muhammad Ishaq, Kashmir’s Transition to Islam: The Role of Muslim Rishis (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994). Khawaja, G.M. and Gulshan Majeed (eds.), Approaches to Kashmir Studies (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2011). Kulkarni, S.R., The Truth & Kashmir (New Delhi: Krishna Publications, 1957). Lal, Krishan, ‘The Culture of Kashmir’, in Jammu & Kashmir State Research Biannual, vol. I, no. 2, 1976 (Acc. Allama Iqbal Library Kashmir University). Lamb, Alastair, Kashmir a Disputed Legacy 1846-1990 (Hertfordshire: Roxford Books, 1991). ———, Birth of a Tragedy (London: Herts, 1994). ———, Crisis in Kashmir: 1947-1966 (London: Routledge, 1966). Lohia, Rammanohar, Will to Power & Other Writings (Bombay: Nav Hind Prakashan, 1956). Madan, T.N., ‘Religious Ideology & Social Structure: The Hindus & Muslims of Kashmir’, in Imtiaz Ahmad (ed.), Rituals and Religion Among Muslims in India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1984). Madhok, Balraj, Kashmir: Centre for New Alignments (Delhi: Deepak, 1963). Mahajan, M.C., Accession of Kashmir to India (Delhi: Sulakhni Devi Mahajan Trust, 1969). ———, Looking Back (Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1963). Mohammed, Jigar, ‘Mughal Perception of Kashmir 1586-1707’, in G.M. Khawaja and G. Majeed (eds.), Approaches to Kashmir Studies (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2011). Mullick, B.N., My Years with Nehru (Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1971). Nehru, Jawaharlal, ‘Forward’, in P.N.K. Bamzai, A History of Kashmir – Political Social, Cultural: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day (Delhi: Metropolitan Books, 1962). Noorani, A.G., The Kashmir Question (Bombay: P.C. Manaktala & Sons, 1964). ———, The Kashmir Dispute 1947-2012, 2 vols. (New Delhi: Tulika, 2013). Patel, Baburao, Footprints of Treachery (Bombay: The Liberation Social Institute, 1958). Puri, Balraj, ‘Explosive Potentialities of Jammu Problem’, Kashmir Affairs, no. 10, March-April 1961. ———, ‘Origin & Growth of the Praja Parishad’, Kashmir Affairs, no. 3, January-February 1960 (Delhi). ———, Jammu: A Clue to the Kashmir Tangle (Delhi: Author, 1966).

BIBLIOGRAPHY 301

Rai, Mridu, Hindu Rulers Muslim Subjects (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004). Rajan, Radha, Jammu & Kashmir: Dilemma of Accession (New Delhi: Voice of India, 2017). Raju, V.B., Illegalities of the Security Council (Ahmadabad: Bharat Sewak Samaj, 1965). Rao, Aparna (ed.), The Valley of Kashmir: The Making & Unmaking of a Composite Culture (New Delhi: Manohar, 2009). Rao, H.S. Gururaja, Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1967). Raza, Maroof, War and No Peace Over Kashmir (New Delhi: Lancer, 1996). Recardo, Longono, Democratic Kashmir (Srinagar: Lala Rukh Publishers, 1957). Safaya, R.N., ‘Ancient Kashmir a Centre of Sanskrit Learning’, Kashmir, vol. 8, nos. 7 & 8, July-August 1958 (Acc. Research Library, Kashmir University, Srinagar). Sarabhai, Mridula, Call for Impartial Inquiry (Delhi: Roop Bharti, 1958). ———, Popular Demand of Jammu & Kashmir (New Delhi: n.d.). Schofield, Victoria, Kashmir in Conflict: India Pakistan & The Unending War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003). ———, Kashmir in Crossfire (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996). Singh, Karan, Autobiography (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994). ———, Sadr-i-Riyasat: An Autobiography 1953-1967 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983). Singh, Khushwant, Flames of the Chinar: An Autobiography (New Delhi: Viking, 1993). Singh, Tavleen, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors (New Delhi: Viking, 1995). Stephens, Ian, Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). Sufi, Ghulam Mohiuddin, Kashmir: Being a History of Kashmir from the Earliest to Our Own (Lahore: University Press, 1958). Sultan, Mir Bashir Ahmad, ‘Kashmir’s Socio Political Heritage’, in G.M. Khawaja and Gulshan Majeed (eds.), Approaches to Kashmir Studies (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2011). Surjit, Harkishan Singh, Kashmir & Its Future (Delhi: People’s Publication, 1955). Thomas, Raju, Perspective on Kashmir (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992). Whitehead, Andrew, A Mission in Kashmir (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007). Wilson, Horace Hayman, The Hindu History of Kashmir (Calcutta: Susil Gupta, 1960). Wirsing, Robert G., India Pakistan & The Kashmir Dispute: Regional Conflict and Its Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1994). Zutshi, Chitralekha, Kashmir’s Contested Pasts: Narratives, Sacred Geographies & the Historical Imagination (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Taylor & Francis Taylor & Francis Group http://taylorandfrancis.com

Index

Abbas, Khawaja Ahmad and Kashmir Muslims in favour of India 36, 147 Abdali, Ahmad Shah 49 Abdullah, Sheikh Muhammad 13, 22, 32, 170, 226-9, 238-40, 246-59, 266-9, 274-5; agent of ‘Hindu’ Congress 123-4; and ‘independent Kashmir’ 40, 129, 222; and campaign against Maharaja Hari Singh 64-5; and Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee 230-1, 233-4, 286-7; and education 63; and importance in Jammu & Kashmir 38, 58-60; and land reforms 29; and nature of administration 42, 73-4, 282, 284-5; and regional biases 201-2, 204; and role in defence of Srinagar October 1947 99, 281; and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel 103, 113, 285, 292; and the Constitution of India 192-4; and the Praja Parishad 183-5, 189, 191, 202-3, 285-7; and the RSS 188; bonding with Jawaharlal Nehru 59, 64, 282; claims credit for communal harmony 103; conditional accession and plebiscite 127-9, 145-6, 282-5, 290; early politics and political opportunity 63-5; gets support of

Jawaharlal Nehru 114, 116, 118-25, 180 Ahmad, Mazbool 39 Ahmad, Sultan Mir Bashir 293n Afghans in Kashmir 49 Ali, Liaquat 159, 161 Ali, Mohammed 262-6, 268, 271-5 Ali, Sadiq 189, 285 Akbar (Mughal Emperor) 48 Akbar, M.J. 28-9, 69n, 253 Amarnath Shrine 9 Ankit, Rakesh 106n Asoka (Emperor) and Srinagar 47 Ashraf, Mohammad 48 Atal, Brig. Hiralal 117 Aurangzeb (Mughal Emperor) 48 Ayyangar, Gopalaswami N. 181-2, 192-3, 211 Azad Kashmir 142-4 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam 181, 211, 256 Bamzai, P.N.K. 27; and two nation theory 27 Bandhu, Pandit Keshav 94 Banerji, J.K. 40 Bangroo, Virender 57 Bankeshwar, Sumanth S. 37, 191 Barton, William 38

304 I N D E X Batra, R.L. 81 Bazaz, Prem Nath 26 Bhaskarananda, Swami 40, 187-88 Beg, Mirza Afzal 178, 190, 191, 199, 249, 251, 252, 253 Behera, Navnita C. 27 Birdwood, C.B. 24 Bose, Sumantra 29-30 Brecher, Michael 87-8, 150-1 Brinckman, Arthur 52 ceasefire 168, 171-2, 183 Chandra, A.K. 215 Chatterjee, D.C. 55 Chatterjee, N.C. 205, 228 Cohen, Maurice 41 Communist Party 61-2 Congress, Indian National 60, 114, 223-4, 227 Das, Durga 43 Dasgupta, C. 30 Denys, F.W. 38 Dogras 38, 49-51, 60, 197-200 Dogra, Girdhari Lal 178 Dogra, Prem Nath 203, 222, 235-6 Dixon, Owen 269 Dulacha (Mongal) 48 Dykes, Lt. Col. 91-2 Faiz, Faiz Ahmad 37; and invasion of Kashmir a mistake 45n Gandhi, Feroze 260 Gandhi, Indira 249, 251-2 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma) 66, 77, 100, 104, 280, 283; and Kashmir culture 55, 77, 280 Ganguly, Sumit 32 Gauba, K.L. 41 Gopal. S. 249-50 Guha, Ramchandra 34, 239, 252 Gundevia, Y.D. 32, 184, 247; and dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah 252-3

Hardinge, Lord 50 Hassanain, F.M. 29 Henderson, W. 53 Hindu Mahasabha 142 Imam, Shah Mohammad Mazhar 39 industry and railway in Kashmir 52 invasion (of Jammu & Kashmir 1947) first reports 78-81; and Baramullah 92; and evidence of Pakistan’s involvement 78, 85-91; and Indian troops as ‘Bachao Fauj’ 93-4; and Jawaharlal Nehru’s report to Parliament 138-9; and support for India in Kashmir 39; and unity among Hindus-Muslims 99-100; and use of released prisoners 90; first hand reports of killings and brutality 94, 98-9; invaders captured by villagers 100; invaders chased out 99-100; Islam in Kashmir 12, 26-7, 56-8; Ismail, Mohammad 39; refugee camps 94 Jagmohan 34, 50, 111-12 Jamal, Arif 31 Jha, Prem Shankar 131 Jinnah, Mohammed Ali 24, 25, 28, 30-1, 89, 112, 115, 134, 146, 147, 217, 231; and a residence in Srinagar 90; and serious illness 161 John, Oliver St. (first British Resident in Jammu & Kashmir) 51 Junagarh 112 Kachru, Dwarkanath 124 Kak, Ramchandra 32-3, 58, 66-7, 114, 144; and dismissal 82; and Mountbatten and Jawaharlal Nehru seek Kak’s release 82-5 Kalhan, D.N. 36, 152, 192 Kamath, H.V. 239 Karanjia, R.K. 73 Kashmir & Jammu: age old bonding

INDEX 305

with India 54-6; and common Kashmiri view 143, 145-54; and communal co-existence 36, 56-8, 77, 95, 99-105; and economic blockade by Pakistan 72, 78; and Hindu pilgrimage 54-6, 58; and India, Pakistan joint statement (August 1953) 272-5; and international interest 52-4; and Islam was different 27, 291; and jewel in the crown 52; and Pakistan as a danger 146, 152; and possibility of its partition 271-2; and poverty 76-7; and restriction on press and journalists 72-5; and special treatment 176-9; as home of Sanskrit 69n32; idea of azadi 143-4, 146, 154; proving a drain on resources 140-2; sold to Maharaja Gulab Singh 49-52; Kashmiri, Akhtar and Pakistan’s economic issues 147 Katju, K.N. 189-91, 248-9 Kaul, Jawahar Lal 14 Khan, Akbar 31 Khan, Abdul Latif 35 Khan, Ayub 89 Khare, N.B. 217-18 Knight, E.F. 52 Kriplani, Acharaya 67; critical of government’s handling of Kashmir 114-15, 227, 283 Kriplani, Sucheta 218 Krishan, Rajbans 41 Kulkarni, S.R. 40 Kumar, Vijay 37 Lamb, Alastair 23-4, 35 Laurence, Walter R. 38, 291, 293n; and Kashmir’s bonding with India 57-8 Lalitaditya, Maharaja 47 Lal, Krishan 56-7 Limaye, Madhu 188-9, 285 Lohia, Rammanohar 41; and Kashmir

a part of India 56, 280; and Kashmir policy a ‘tragic failure’ 239-40; and Praja Parishad 225-6 Madhok, Balraj 40, 152 Malik, Iftikar 31 Masoodi, Maulana Sayeed Mohammad 54, 219, 250, 258-9; and Kashmir a part of India 280 Mathai, M.O. 75, 202, 260-1; and Mridula Sarabhai 261 Meher Chand Mahajan 33, 81, 201-2 Mehta, Krishna 95-4, 104 Menon, V.K. Krishna 90, 129 Messervy, Gen. Frank 111, 116 Miles, Pat 38 Mir Shah 48 Mohammed, Bakshi Ghulam 39, 101-2, 178, 223, 224, 250-1, 259, 261, 265, 283; and dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah 253, 258; and opposition to plebiscite – threatens resignation 275; and support for merger of Kashmir with India 39, 190-1 Mohammed, Jigar 57 Mookerjee, Syama Prasad 40, 43, 205-10, 213, 219-23, 225, 228, 233-4, 286-7; and arrest, detention and death 234-9; and exchange of letters with Nehru 229-30; and letters to Sheikh Abdullah 230-1; tours India to explain the Kashmir issue 232-4; Mountbatten, Lord Louis 18, 67, 83, 134, 159-61, 283 Mughals 48 Mukerjee, R.K. 40 Mullick, B.N. 184, 196-8, 247 Mulgaokar, S. 251, 275 Muslim League 60 Narayan, Jayaprakash and death of Syama Prasad Mookerjee 235-6

306 I N D E X National Conference 58-9, 64-5, 119, 135, 281 Nehru, Jawaharlal 22, 25-8, 32, 34, 70n, 112, 120, 149, 165, 168, 173-6, 180, 202, 217-18, 220, 223, 232-4, 240-1, 247, 259, 265-7, 275; advises to delay accession 79, 114; and cease fire 168, 172; and Communist Party 61-2; and conflict a drain on resources 140-1; and death of Syama Prasad Mookerjee 236-9; and dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah 246, 248-53, 258, 262-3, 273, 287, 292-3; and Dogras and Rajputs 199-200; and encourage people to travel to Kashmir and subsidized travel 148-50; and importance of Sheikh Abdullah 59, 65, 67, 81, 103, 116, 121-3, 131, 141, 163, 191, 257, 288-9; and influence of Lord Mountbatten with regard to plebiscite 134; and Kashmiri Pandits 61; and National Conference 80; and plebiscite 130, 132-40, 142-3, 145, 169, 266-7, 269-70, 273-4, 282-3, 289-90; and Praja Parishad 195, 203, 205, 224, 229-30, 238, 285-6, 289-90; and release of Ramchandra Kak 83-4; and response to ‘invasion of Kashmir (Oct. 1947) 90, 92; and role of Maharaja Hari Singh 118, 170; and Sardar Patel 181-3; and secret funding of Sheikh Abdullah 118; and suggestion that Kashmiris should not be encouraged to seek employment outside Kashmir 148-9; and United Nations 159-62, 164-7, 171, 211; and why in favour of special status for Jammu & Kashmir 176-8, 212; debates with Syama Prasad Mookerjee in Parliament 209-11, 214-15; directs

Indian army to take orders from Sheikh Abdullah 118; guides Sheikh Abdullah 124-5; informs Rajendra Prasad of Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal 250-1; letter to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed 265-7; meets Mohammed Ali 262-4, 268-73; mentions the possibility of the partition of Kashmir 267-8, 271-4; seeks to avoid meeting with Pakistan Prime Minister following Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal 262; sensitive to press 73-4, 226-8; shares concern with Maulana Azad 256; unhappy with M.C. Mahajan 119; unhappy with Mridula Sarabhai 259-61; unhappy with Sheikh Abdullah 126, 129-30, 248, 254-6; writes to Indira Gandhi on Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal 251-2 Noorani, A.G. 32 Noon, Feroze Khan 268 Pakistan 19, 20, 22-3, 93, 96, 98, 216, 272, 291; and planning for the invasion 35, 71, 85, 88; and reaction to Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal 262-5; and Reserve Bank Cash Reserve 183 Palta, K.R. 85-7 Pandits (Kashmir) 60-1 Pandit, Vijay Lakshmi 216-17 Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai 33, 43, 61, 92, 113, 119, 124, 131, 184, 189, 192, 202, 205, 226, 285, 290; and concern with regard to ‘infiltration of Communists’ into Kashmir 194; and disapproval of cash balance transfer to Pakistan 183; and Jawaharlal Nehru 181-3; shares doubts with regard to Sheikh Abdullah’s commitment 103, 113-14, 285, 292; unhappy with Sheikh Abdullah 125-6; unhappy

INDEX 307

with Sheikh Abdullah’s stand on the Constitution of India 193 Patwardhan, Achyut 147 Patwardhan, R.S. 99 Phadke, N.S. 41-2, 72; and how common Kashmiris were against Pakistan 147-8; and graphic account of violence 123; and that Indian army saved Kashmiris 148 Praja Parishad 194, 223, 247; petition to President of India 203-5; and demand for unconditional merger of Jammu & Kashmir with India 222; and Intelligence Bureau report 196-8; and issue of the flag 223; and withdrawal of agitation following death of Syma Prasad Mookerjee 238 Prakasa, Sri 140 Prasad, Dr. Rajendra 250-1 Puri, Balraj 13; and Abdullah and Praja Parishad 228-9, 286; and Abdullah ignored Jammu 30, 41; and Praja Parishad movement a reaction to aggressive nationalism in Kashmir 200-1 Rai, Col. D.N. 91 Rai, Mridu 33-4 Rao, H.S. Gururaj 31 Raghvan, G.S. 38 Rajan, Radha 33, 66, 67 Raju, V.B. 41 Russia 51 Raza, Maroof 29 Recardo, Longono 36, 152; and communal harmony in Kashmir 152 Safaya, R.N. 69n32 Sahni, Ruchi Ram 147 Santdev, Swami 114 Sarabhai, Mridula 38-9; and support for Sheikh Abdullah 259

falls out with Nehru 259-61 Sathu, Jagan Nath 42 Saxena, Hori Lal 41, 76, 281; and Sheikh Abdullah 186-7 Schofield, Victoria 25-6, 35 Shankaracharya temple 10, 57 Shashtri, Lal Bahadur 150 Sherwani, Maqbool 97-8 Sikandar, Sultan 48, 58 Singh, Maharaja Gulab 49-51 Singh, Dr. Karan 32, 249, 251, 275, 287; and problems of Jammu region ignored 224-5; dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah 246, 258, 292 Singh, Maharaja Hari 18-19, 23, 37, 51, 59, 64, 67, 140-1, 146; and the Instrument of Accession 18, 23-4, 113-14 Singh, Kanwar Dalip 120 Singh, Maharaja Pratap 38, 51 Singh, Brig. Rajender 96 Singh, Maharaja Ranbir 49, 51 Singh, Maharaja Ranjit 50 Singh, Tavleen 29 Singh, Master Tara 224, 228 Sodhbans, P.S. 37 Surjit, Harikishan Singh 37 Thorp, Robert 50 Ullah, Sannah 57n United Nations 89, 123, 135, 137, 140, 159-68, 171, 206, 210, 270, 288 Wakefield, G.E.C. 38, 52 Whitehead, Andrew 30 Wharton, Charles 96; and poem in memory of Maqbool Sherwani 97-8 Wirsing, Robert G. 23 Zaman, Khaliq-uz- 268 Zutshi, Chitralekha 28