Balkans 1940–41 (2), The: Hitler's Blitzkrieg against Yugoslavia and Greece (Campaign) 9781472842619, 9781472842626, 9781472842596, 1472842618

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THE BALKANS 1940–41 (2) Hitler’s Blitzkrieg against Yugoslavia and Greece

PIER PAOLO BATTISTELLI

ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK

CAMPAIGN 365

THE BALKANS 1940–41 (2) Hitler’s Blitzkrieg against Yugoslavia and Greece

PIER PAOLO BATTISTELLI

ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK

Series editor Nikolai Bogdanovic

CONTENTS ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

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CHRONOLOGY 6 OPPOSING COMMANDERS

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Axis n Allied

OPPOSING FORCES

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Axis n Allied n Order of battle, Yugoslavia–Albania, 6 April 1941 n Order of battle, Greek campaign

OPPOSING PLANS

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German n Allied

THE CAMPAIGN

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The collapse of Yugoslavia n The battle for the Metaxas Line n The Aliakmon Line The Olympus Line and the Allied withdrawal n Last stand at Thermopylae Operation Demon: the Allied evacuation

AFTERMATH 89 THE BATTLEFIELDS TODAY

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BIBLIOGRAPHY 94 INDEX 95

ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN From the German point of view, the 1941 Balkan campaign was accidental. In July 1940, Hitler had suggested the seizure of Cyprus and Crete to the Italians, but, facing their lack of interest, the matter was dropped until after the Italian attack against Greece on 28 October 1940. In its immediate aftermath, on 4 November 1940, Hitler ordered plans to be developed in conjunction with Bulgaria for the seizure of the Salonika area, mostly to deprive Britain of the possibility of attacking the Romanian oilfields from the air. This aim was sanctioned in Führer Directive No. 18 of 12 November 1940, its content being discussed in the following days. When meeting the Italian foreign minister Count Galeazzo Ciano on the 18th, Hitler made it clear that any German intervention against Greece would not be possible before spring, and, given Italy’s insistence on an intervention, he suggested an alternative: exploiting Yugoslavia’s keen interest in maintaining its communication links to the port of Salonika, which required an agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Italian reluctance towards such an agreement and the uncertain political situation in the Balkans led to a change of plan. The attack against Greece became part of Germany’s Mediterranean strategy, which now required the seizure of the whole country, including Athens. Orders had already been given to that effect on 19 November 1940 by the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKH – High Command), later sanctioned on 13 December 1940 with Führer Directive No. 21 on Operation Marita (the codename for the invasion). The operation presented several issues. Poor communications and the seasonal weather suggested that the attack could not take place before March 1941, via Bulgaria. Greece was to be seized in three to four weeks, the necessary forces (including 12.Armee and Panzergruppe 1) having being sent to Romania already. The build-up was to be completed by late January 1941. Meanwhile, a political offensive was initiated. Between 20 and 23 November 1940, Hungary and Romania joined the Axis alliance (formally the ‘Tripartite Pact’ between Germany, Italy and Japan). Bulgaria’s reluctance was eventually overcome, and it secretly joined the alliance on 13 January 1941. Around the same time, Germany informed Greece of proposals for a negotiated peace with Italy, which would also require the removal of any British forces from the country. Whether this was just an expedient move to buy time or a serious proposal aimed at avoiding an unnecessary war is hard to say. In the end, Italy’s stubbornness prevented 4

any possible agreement. Mussolini made it clear that peace was not possible until after Greek forces had been defeated in battle. On 1 March 1941, Bulgaria’s decision to join the Axis was made public, just as German troops were crossing the Danube. On the 18th, Yugoslavia announced its decision to join the Axis alliance, a decision reached after months of negotiations and a meeting between Hitler and Yugoslavia’s Prince Regent Paul on 4 March. Paul’s reluctance towards a military alliance with Germany was set aside, and on 25 March 1941 Yugoslavia formally joined the Axis. During the night of 26/27 March, a military coup in Yugoslavia led to the dismissal of the government, Prince Regent Paul’s replacement with 17-year-old King Peter II, and to the informal withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the Axis alliance. A raging Hitler ordered plans to be prepared immediately for the annihilation of Yugoslavia as a state, issuing Führer Directive No. 25 on 27 March. The plans were prepared in just two days, so quickly that no codename was ever given to the operation (it remained known as Operation 25). The attack on Yugoslavia and Greece was set to start on 6 April 1941 with an air offensive, followed two days later by Panzergruppe 1’s attack against southern Yugoslavia. This would be followed by a main attack in the north on 10 April. This necessitated a delay to the attack on Greece, even though it paved the way for the decisive move against the Florina Gap, the area in Yugoslav/ Greek Macedonia linking Albania and Thrace. The Germans were well aware that speed was even more of the essence, given the area that had to be seized and the size of the forces involved.

Hitler and Mussolini in Florence, 28 October 1940, with German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in the right background. Mussolini’s illfated Greek campaign was the reason behind Hitler’s decision to intervene in the Balkans in 1941. (NARA)

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CHRONOLOGY 1940 28 October

Italy attacks Greece.

3 November

First RAF units arrive in Greece.

23 November

Romania joins the Tripartite Pact.

5 December

The German Army staff submits the plans for an attack on Greece to Hitler.

9 December

Start of Operation Compass in North Africa; Italian forces there collapse.

13 December

Hitler issues Führer Directive No. 20 for Operation Marita.

1941 11 January

Hitler issues Führer Directive No. 22 for the deployment of a German Army corps in Albania.

13–17 January

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore and the CiC Middle East General Archibald Wavell arrive in Athens to meet the Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas and the Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant-General Alexandros Papagos.

29 January

Greek Prime Minister Metaxas dies; new government led by Alexandros Koryzis.

8 February

Koryzis asks for British help.

22 February

Lieutenant-General Sir Maitland Wilson takes command of Operation Lustre.

22–23 February

British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Chief of Imperial General Staff Sir John Dill and General Wavell meet King George II, Prime Minister Koryzis and Lieutenant-General Papagos in Athens.

1 March

German troops start flowing into Bulgaria, which has joined the Tripartite Pact.

2–4 March

Lieutenant-General Wilson arrives in Athens; new round of negotiations between British commanders and Greek political leaders and commanders.

7 March

First batch of British and ANZAC troops from Operation Lustre arrive at port of Piraeus, near Athens.

9–26 March

Italian Spring Offensive in Albania.

20 March

Deployment of Greek and British/ANZAC troops on the Aliakmon Line.

25 March

Yugoslavia joins the Tripartite Pact.

26–27 March

Coup d’état in Yugoslavia; new government led by General Dušan Simović, Chief of the General Staff of the Royal Yugoslav Army.

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27 March

Hitler issues Führer Directive No. 25 for the attack on Yugoslavia.

28–29 March

Naval Battle of Cape Matapan.

29 March

The German military leaders hold a conference in Vienna to discuss the attack plans against Yugoslavia and Greece. German–Italian meeting to discuss the attack plan against Yugoslavia.

1 April

General Erwin Rommel starts his advance into Cyrenaica. British Chief of Imperial General Staff Sir John Dill travels to Belgrade to develop a concerted plan of action.

3 April

Lieutenant-generals Papagos and Wilson, British Air Vice Marshal John H. D’Albiac and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Royal Yugoslav Army General Radivoje Janković meet near Florina, Greece.

4 April

Lieutenant-General Wilson formally takes command of ‘W’ Force.

6 April

Germany attacks Yugoslavia and Greece. Bombing of Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital.

12 April

German capture of Belgrade.

17 April

Yugoslavia surrenders. Churchill authorizes the withdrawal of ‘W’ Force from Greece.

18 April

British/ANZAC forces withdraw to the Thermopylae Line. Greek Prime Minister Koryzis commits suicide.

20 April

Lieutenant-General Georgios Tsolakoglou surrenders the Greek Epirus Field Army Section (EFAS).

22 April

Start of the evacuation of British/ANZAC forces from Greece.

23 April

Greek King George II and his government flee to Egypt.

26 April

German airborne assault on the Corinth Canal bridge.

27 April

German troops enter Athens.

29 April

End of the Allied evacuation and of the Greek campaign.

22 May

German airborne assault on Crete.

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OPPOSING COMMANDERS AXIS

Generaloberst Maximilian von Weichs (centre foreground) and Italian General Vittorio Ambrosio (left foreground) at the end of the Yugoslav campaign in Belgrade, on 7 May 1941. (NARA)

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The main burden of the war against Yugoslavia fell upon 2.Armee, led by Generaloberst Freiherr Maximilian von Weichs. Born into an aristocratic family, von Weichs joined the army in 1900 at the age of 19. He fought on the Western Front and in the Balkans in 1914 before becoming a staff officer in 1915. He joined the Reichswehr after the war, and in 1935 was given command of 1.Panzer-Division. Promoted full general in 1936, he was given a corps command before taking over 2.Armee in October 1939. Promoted Generaloberst in July 1940 at the end of the campaign in the West, he led the army in the 1941 Balkan campaign before taking up command of the Heeresgruppe (Army Group) B on the Eastern Front in July 1942. On 1 February 1943, he was promoted Generalfeldmarschall and, after being put in reserve in July, in August he was appointed Commander-in-Chief South-East and commander of Heeresgruppe F, a position he held until March 1945. Once again moved to the reserve in March 1945, von Weichs was arrested at the end of the war but was not tried for his alleged role in war crimes. Released in 1948, he died in 1954. Panzergruppe 1 provided the armoured support to the invasion of Yugoslavia. Its commander was Generaloberst Paul Ewald von Kleist who, like von Weichs, came from a noble family and joined the army in 1900 aged 19. He fought in World War I as a cavalry officer on the Eastern Front before becoming a staff officer. In 1920, von Kleist joined the Reichswehr and rose to become a Generalmajor in 1932 before retiring in 1938 for political reasons. Recalled to duty in 1939, he was given command of XXII.Armee-Korps (mot.) (equivalent to a Panzer-Korps) during the invasion of Poland, before taking over the newly formed Panzergruppe Kleist in May 1940. At the conclusion of the campaign in the West in July 1940, von Kleist was promoted to full General, and his command was reorganized as Panzergruppe 1 (later Panzer-Armee) in November 1940. He took command of Heeresgruppe A in November 1942, and was promoted Generalfeldmarschall on 1 January 1943. Von Kleist was replaced as commander

Generaloberst Paul Ewald von Kleist (right) in discussion with a Feldgendarm in Serbia in 1941, while in command of Panzergruppe 1 – the main unit responsible for the defeat of Yugoslavia. (Narodowe Archiwum Cyfrowe, public domain)

of Heeresgruppe A in March 1944 by General Ferdinand Schörner. Having retired from active duty, von Kleist was arrested following the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler, eventually being released without trial given the lack of evidence. Von Kleist was arrested by the Americans in April 1945, who handed him over to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs then extradited him to the Soviet Union, where he was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. He died in 1954. General Vittorio Ambrosio was the commander of the Italian Second Army, which attacked Yugoslavia from the west. A cavalry officer who joined the army in 1898 aged 19, Ambrosio fought in the Italian war against Turkey in 1911–12 and served during World War I as a staff officer. Promoted brigadier-general in 1926, he was in charge of the Cavalry School before taking over command of a cavalry division in 1932. Promoted full general in 1938, he was given command of the Second Army deployed on Italy’s eastern border, facing Yugoslavia. In January 1942, Ambrosio was appointed Chief of Army Staff, then Chief of General Staff in February 1943 when Mussolini chose him to replace General Ugo Cavallero. Ambrosio retired from active duty in July 1944. He died in 1958. Lieutenant-General Elemér Gorondy-Novák, born 1885, served with the Hungarian Red Army after the end of World War I before joining Miklós Horthy’s conservative National Army. A general since 1934, Gorondy-Novák commanded the 2nd Cavalry Brigade before being promoted lieutenant-general in 1938 and taking over the duties of Inspector of Cavalry. In March 1940, he was appointed to command the Hungarian Third Army. After the war with Yugoslavia, Gorondy-

Lieutenant-General Elemér Gorondy-Novák addressing a crowd in September 1940. In April 1941, he commanded the Hungarian Third Army that invaded Yugoslavia. (Fortepan, public domain)

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Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List inspecting troops before the start of Operation Marita. (Narodowe Archiwum Cyfrowe, public domain)

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Novák was promoted full general in May 1941, and then retired from active duty in February 1942. Briefly active as a royal councillor, in 1945 Gorondy-Novák fled to Argentina, where he died in 1954. The task of invading Greece was assigned to 12.Armee under Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List. He joined the army in 1898 aged 18, fought during World War I as a staff officer and then joined the post-war Reichswehr in 1927. In charge of the army training detachment from 1927, List was promoted Generalmajor in 1930, and took over command of the Infantry School at Dresden. Following the 1938 German annexation of Austria, List was given command of the army in the area, with the task of integrating it into the Wehrmacht. Promoted full General in 1939, List commanded 14.Armee and 12.Armee in the campaigns against Poland and France, at the end of which he was promoted Generalfeldmarschall. In 1941, List negotiated with the Bulgarian government the entry of German troops into the country for Operation Marita. After commanding the German occupation forces in the Balkans as Commander-in-Chief South-East, in October 1941 List was put into the reserve before being recalled in July 1942 to take command of Heeresgruppe A to lead the offensive into the Caucasus. Removed from command in September that year, List retired from active duty. Sentenced to life imprisonment in 1948 for his role in the anti-partisan reprisals in Yugoslavia, List was released in 1952 on grounds of ill health. He died in 1971. List’s Italian counterpart was the Italian General Ugo Cavallero, a brilliant organizer who spent most of his career working for private industries. Appointed Chief of General Staff by Mussolini in December 1940, Cavallero was actively involved in commanding Italian forces in Albania from that date, and eventually took over from General Ubaldo Soddu on 30 December 1940. Promoted field marshal in July 1942, in January 1943 he was removed and replaced by General Ambrosio as Chief of General Staff. Cavallero died in unclear circumstances on 14 September 1943. The main command involved in the invasion of Greece was XVIII. Gebirgs-Korps, commanded by Generalleutnant Franz Böhme. Born in 1885 in Austria, Böhme fought in World War I as a staff officer, and then in 1920 joined the Austrian Army. Appointed Chief of Army Staff on 2 March 1938, following the Anschluss Böhme joined the Wehrmacht and led 32.InfanterieDivision during the Polish and French campaigns. Commander of XVIII. Gebirgs-Korps from 15 June 1940 to 10 December 1943, Böhme briefly commanded 2.Panzer-Armee between June and July 1944, and was then given command of 20.Armee in Norway in January 1945. He committed suicide on 29 May 1947 while in Allied captivity. Three names stand out amongst those who served under Böhme’s command during Operation Marita. Generalmajor Rudolf Veiel, a German cavalry officer veteran of World War I, had commanded 2.Panzer-Division since February 1938, holding this until February 1942 when he took over command of XXXXVIII.Armee-Korps on the Eastern Front. Promoted General der Panzertruppe in April 1942, from September 1943 Veiel was

a commander in the Territorialheer (Territorial Army) until his retirement on 21 July 1944. He died in 1956. Generalmajor Ferdinand Schörner, commander of 6.Gebirgs-Division, was born in 1892 and joined the army as a non-commissioned officer, eventually acquiring his commission at the end of 1914 while fighting on the Western Front. Awarded the Pour le Mérite in 1917 for bravery, Schörner was wounded more than once during the war. In 1919, he joined the Reichswehr rising to the rank of Oberst in 1939, when he was given command of a mountain infantry regiment. In May 1940, he was appointed commander of the newly formed 6.GebirgsDivision, which he led until January 1942 when he took over command of Gebirgs-Korps Norwegen (later renamed XIX.Gebirgs-Korps). In March 1944, he was given command of 17.Armee, soon taking over command of Heeresgruppe A. Promoted full General in April 1944, Schörner rose to the rank of Generalfeldmarschall in April 1945. Usually described as a Nazi fanatic, Schörner was in fact a talented but ruthless commander who did not hesitate to contradict Hitler’s orders. Sentenced after the war to 25 years’ imprisonment by a Soviet tribunal, he was released in 1952. He died in 1973. Generalleutnant Alfred Ritter von Hubicki, born in Hungary in 1887, joined the army in 1905 and fought on the Italian Front during World War I. He became a general in the Austrian Army in 1935, being given command in 1938 of 4.Leichte-Division (which later became 9.Panzer-Division) in the Wehrmacht after the Anschluss. He retired from active duty in April 1942, but returned to briefly lead LXXXIX.Armee-Korps in 1942–43 before being appointed Chief of the German Military Mission to Slovakia. He retired from the military in March 1945, and died in 1971.

Generalmajor Ferdinand Schörner (right), commander of 6.Gebirgs-Division, pauses for refreshments with members of his staff at Lamia, Greece, 23 April 1941. (NARA)

The Yugoslav commander-inchief General Dušan Simović, here wearing the uniform of commander of the Yugoslav Air Force. (CC-BY-SA-4.0)

ALLIED Following the 27 March 1941 Yugoslav putsch, General Dušan Simović became Minister President and Chief of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, a position he had already held in 1938–40. Born in 1882 in Kragujevac, he joined the army in 1900. He proved himself during the 1912–13 Balkan War and during World War I, when he commanded a regiment on the Salonika Front. Keen on aviation matters, after representing Serbia at the 1918 National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs he developed this interest, and in 1936 became the Yugoslav Chief of the Air Staff. In 1938, he replaced General Milutin Nedić as Chief of the Army General Staff until April 1940. After leading the coup, Simović attempted to pursue neutrality politics with the aim of preventing the dissolution 11

The Greek commander-inchief, and technically also commander of ‘W’ Force, Lieutenant-General Alexandros Papagos, pictured in a pre-war photo. (KEYSTONEFRANCE/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images)

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, photographed in April 1941. Churchill was the main force behind Operation Lustre. (Library of Congress)

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of Yugoslavia. After the German invasion, he fled to Greece with the king, and led Yugoslavia’s government in exile until 1942. Having retired from active duty, he died in Belgrade in 1952. The most senior Allied commander in the Balkans was Lieutenant-General Alexandros Papagos, Greece’s commander-in-chief since the October 1940 Italian attack. Born in 1883 into a military family, Papagos excelled during the 1912–13 Balkan War and in the 1919–22 GrecoTurkish War, but his career suffered because of the troubled political situation in Greece, given his ardent monarchist attitude. Promoted general in 1930, the following year he was Deputy Chief of the Army Staff and, following the return of the king, Minister for War Affairs. Following a dispute with King George II, Papagos was removed from the office in 1936, but later that same year became Chief of the Army Staff. As such, on 28 October 1940, he was appointed commander-in-chief. In early March 1941, a major reshuffle of the Greek commanders took place. Command in Albania was taken over by Lieutenant-General Georgios Tsolakoglou, who served as an officer in the Balkan War, the Greco-Turkish War and World War I. In command of C Army Corps in 1938, Tsolakoglou fought against the Italians from the outbreak of the war; his command was reorganized on 6 March 1941 to become the Western Macedonia Field Army Section (WMFAS). Tsolakoglou’s role in the surrender of Greek forces withdrawing from Albania and his subsequent collaboration with the Germans (on 30 April 1941, he became Minister President of the Greek puppet government) transformed him into the Greek Quisling. Tsolakoglou resigned from the post on 2 December 1942 and, immediately after the German withdrawal from Greece, was arrested and put on trial in 1945. Although sentenced to death, this was commuted to life imprisonment. However, Tsolakoglou died of leukaemia in 1948. Lieutenant-General Konstantinos Bakopoulos is considered Tsolakoglou’s nemesis. After fighting in the Balkan War, Bakopoulos became Military Commander of Athens before being appointed as the governor of Crete in December 1935. The Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1936, Bakopoulos resigned following Metaxas’ rise to power. Back in the army, in October 1940 he was in charge of E Army Corps, then, from January 1941, D Army Corps in Thrace and Eastern Macedonia. Following a leadership reorganization, on 8 February 1941 Bakopoulos took command of the Eastern Macedonia Field Army Section (EMFAS) controlling the units deployed on the Metaxas Line. In the face of the German attack, Bakopoulos negotiated the surrender of his men when German troops reached Salonika, with Metaxas’ approval. Arrested by the Germans in July 1943 along with Papagos, Bakopoulos was sent to Dachau, from which he was liberated by the Americans in 1945. He died in Paris in 1950. Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, commander of ‘W’ Force, was educated at Eton and Sandhurst, and was commissioned in the Rifle Brigade in 1900. After World War I, during which he served in France, Wilson held positions at Sandhurst and Camberley until 1933,

with a spell of command in India in 1927–30. After 9 months on half pay, in 1934 he took charge of the 6th Brigade and, after another period of service on half-pay, in 1937 he became commander of the 2nd Division. Wilson was commander of the British troops in Egypt from June 1939, where he was nicknamed ‘Jumbo’ because of his size, and was then appointed to lead the expeditionary force to Greece. He failed to prove himself in this role, as witnessed by his decision to establish a forward command post that effectively cut him off from Papagos, officially his superior. In 1941, Wilson commanded British forces in Palestine and Transjordan, successfully facing the insurgencies in Iraq and Syria. Commander of the Tenth Army in Iraq and Persia in 1942, in February 1943 he became Commander-in-Chief Middle East and, in January 1944, Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean. Promoted field marshal in 1944, he served as head of the British mission to Washington until 1947. He died in 1964. Major-General Michael Denman Gambier-Parry served in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia during World War I, just three years after his commission. A major-general in 1940, he commanded the Malaya Infantry Brigade, and then headed the military mission to Greece before being given command of the 2nd Armoured Division in February 1941. Captured in April 1941, he escaped back to Britain in the summer of 1944 and retired later that same year. He died in 1976. As commander of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) Corps in Greece, Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Albert Blamey performed poorly during the Greek campaign. After entering the Australian Army in 1906, in 1914 Blamey joined the Australian 1st Division and took part in the Gallipoli campaign before serving on the Western Front, where he was promoted brigadier. At the end of the war, he became Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and was instrumental in the creation of the Australian Air Force.

The British Chief of Imperial Staff General Sir John Dill visiting Maadi Camp in Egypt before the start of Operation Lustre. From the left: brigadiers R. Miles and E. Puttick, generals Freyberg and Dill, and brigadiers J. Hargest and H.E. Barrowclough. (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand, DA-01141-F)

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The staff of the Australian 6th Division in Egypt in December 1940. From the left, front row: Brigadier Arthur S. Allen, Major-General Sir Iven Mackay, Brigadier Horace C.H. Robertson. Back row: Colonel Frank Berryman, Brigadier Stanley G. Savige and Colonel George Vasey. (Australian War Memorial, public domain)

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Having retired in 1925, Blamey was recalled to active duty in 1939, taking over command of the 6th Australian Division, and then the Australian Corps. After the Greek campaign he became Deputy Commander-in-Chief of British forces in the Middle East before returning to Australia in 1942 and becoming Commander of Allied Land Forces in the South-West Pacific. Blamey was made field marshal in 1950, having retired in January 1946. He died in 1951. Sir Iven Giffard Mackay was appointed commander of the Australian 6th Division in April 1940. Mackay was commissioned as a lieutenant in 1911 while teaching at university. After taking part in the Gallipoli campaign and fighting on the Western Front, Mackay went back to university (earning him the nickname ‘Mr Chips’), whilst simultaneously holding brigade commands in the militia. This enabled his promotion to major-general in July 1937 after taking command of the Australian 2nd Division. After the successful 1940–41 campaign against the Italians in North Africa and leading the Australian 6th Division in the Greek campaign, in August 1941 Mackay returned to Australia to become the GOC Home Forces. In 1943 he fought in New Guinea, and withdrew from active command duties in January 1944. He retired from the army in 1946, and died in 1966. Undoubtedly New Zealand’s most famous commander, General Lord Bernard Cyril ‘Tiny’ Freyberg was born in London in 1889 but moved to New Zealand aged two. A prominent athlete, he set off for England from America to join the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve at the outbreak of World War I. After fighting on the Western Front in 1914, Freyberg participated in the Gallipoli campaign before returning to the Western Front, where in 1916 he won the Victoria Cross. He was given command of a Territorial brigade in February 1917, becoming the youngest commander of that rank in the British Army. Severely wounded in September 1917, he returned to the front in January 1918 and distinguished himself again. After earning a regular commission in 1919, Freyberg served with the British Army, being promoted major-general in 1934. Forced to retire in 1937 for health reasons, in November 1939 he was given the opportunity of leading the New Zealand 2nd Division by Prime Minister Peter Fraser. Having assumed command in January 1940, Major-General Freyberg led the division in Greece, on Crete, during the North African Campaign (during which he was promoted lieutenantgeneral in 1942) and subsequently in Italy, where he became a provisional corps commander in 1944. In 1946, Freyberg became Governor General of New Zealand, effectively retiring from duty shortly after taking up the position. He returned to Great Britain in 1952, where he obtained a peerage. Freyberg died in 1963.

OPPOSING FORCES AXIS A key factor in the German planning for operations Marita and 25 was the need to ensure any units employed in the Balkans would be available quickly for the redeployment against the Soviet Union. First and foremost were the six Panzer divisions employed in the Balkans, which (including 16.PanzerDivision facing Turkey) comprised more than a third of the actual number of Panzer divisions that would be deployed against the Soviet Union. Of those six divisions, only two (11. and 14.) belonged to the new Panzer divisions established during the summer and autumn of 1940 following the reorganization of the Panzer troops. The first was formed from elements of 5.Panzer-Division and 11.Schützen-Brigade (mot.), both veterans of the 1940 campaign in the West. The second was formed from

A German column passing through Bulgaria. The lack of suitable roads hampered the German build-up before the start of the Balkan campaign. (NARA)

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A 2.Panzer-Division camp in a valley behind the Pirin Mountains in Bulgaria, just before the division attacked Greece via Bulgaria. (NARA)

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elements of 4.Panzer-Division and 4.Infanterie-Division, both of which also took part in the 1940 campaign. The other Panzer divisions had also participated in the campaign, and as such were made up of experienced veterans. The 1940 reorganization reducted the number of Panzer regiments in each division down to a single one, even though 8.Panzer-Division had three Panzer battalions. The overall number of tanks available for the Balkan campaign stood at 843, 278 of which were light tanks (PzKpfw I and II), 43 were command tanks (Panzerbefehlswagen) and 400 were medium tanks. The latter figure was the most important one, as it included the bulk of the combat tanks, including 109 older PzKpfw IIIs armed with the 37mm gun, 166 newer ones armed with the 50mm gun and 125 Panzer 38(t) tanks of Czech vintage. There were 122 ‘heavy’ PzKpfw IV tanks, armed with the short-barrelled 75mm gun. The Wehrmacht units engaged in the Greek campaign were amongst the strongest it possessed. In 2.Panzer-Division, Panzer-Regiment 3 had 45 PzKpfw IIs, 27 (37mm gun) PzKpfw IIIs, 44 (50mm gun) PzKpfw IIIs, 20 PzKpfw IVs and six command tanks. In 9.Panzer-Division, PanzerRegiment 33 had nine PzKpfw Is, 36 PzKpfw IIs, 22 (37mm gun) PzKpfw IIIs, 29 (50mm gun) PzKpfw IIIs, 20 PzKpfw IVs and ten command tanks. In 5.Panzer-Division, which fought continuously from the Aliakmon Line, there were nine PzKpfw Is, 40 PzKpfw IIs, 19 (37mm gun) PzKpfw IIIs, 32 (50mm gun) PzKpfw IIIs, 16 PzKpfw IVs and five command tanks. Several units were newly formed as part of 12.Armee. The 5.GebirgsDivision had been formed in late 1940, and 6.Gebirgs-Division had briefly seen action in the West before being employed on garrisoning duties in Poland. The same applied to 72.Infanterie-Division, a second-rate unit that only fought briefly in the West on the Maginot Line, while 164.InfanterieDivision did not see action until April 1941. The elite Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) regiment, expanded to brigade size just before the attack, had not proven itself during the 1940 campaign, suffering heavy losses. The improvised field organization imposed by the decision to attack Yugoslavia led Panzergruppe 1 to become almost independent, and (with the exception of 5.Panzer-Division) it was officially subordinated to 2.Armee on 12 April 1941. Its XXXXI.Panzer-Korps – its actual designation at the time being XXXXI.Armee-Korps (mot.) – was relatively weak, 2.SSPanzer-Division Das Reich having just been formed with elements from SS-Verfügungs-Division (a veteran of the 1940 campaign); on Hitler’s order, it would participate in the campaign. The elite Infanterie-Regiment Grossdeutschland was the real crack unit of the corps.

The 4.Gebirgs-Division from XIV.Panzer-Korps was the only unit that lacked combat experience, the 60.Infanterie-Division (mot.) – the future Panzergrenadier-Division Feldherrnhalle – having just been converted into a motorized unit after fighting in France. The 294.Infanterie-Division was also a Western Front veteran. The 2.Armee’s divisions also included a mixture of veteran and new ones. The latter included 16.Infanterie-Division (mot.), converted in the summer of 1940, and the newly formed 101.LeichteInfanterie-Division. This was a new kind of infantry division that only had two, instead of three, infantry regiments. Both the Italian and Hungarian armies provided little support during the Balkan campaign. As far as the Italians were concerned, most of the units in Albania, under command of the Albania Armed Forces High Command (Comando Superiore Forze Armate Albania), were worn out after five months of war with Greece. The few, recently arrived units lacked the required combat effectiveness to be of much use against Yugoslavia, as did their counterparts stationed along the Italian–Yugoslav border. The Italian Second Army, although it had been preparing for an attack on Yugoslavia since 1940, had been seriously depleted since several of its units had been sent either to Albania or Libya. Its crack units were reduced to two truckborne infantry divisions and the 133rd Armoured Division Littorio, equipped with light tanks. The Hungarian Third Army consisted of three army corps, like all its armies. Each corps generally included three infantry brigades each around 9,500 strong, and with seven field gun batteries. The Mobile Army Corps was formed in March 1940 and consisted of two cavalry and two motorized brigades each around 9,000 strong. The only armour available comprised around 60 39M Csaba armoured cars along with a few 38M Toldi and Italian L3/35 tanks, which were located in the reconnaissance units of the cavalry brigades and in the motorized brigades. In terms of aerial support, the Luftwaffe supported the attack on Greece mainly through VIII.Flieger-Korps. The latter had 414 aircraft at its disposal, reinforced with some of the 576 aircraft of Luftflotte IV deployed for the conquest of Yugoslavia. The Italian Air Force deployed 474 aircraft against Greece and 192 against Yugoslavia.

ALLIED On paper, the Royal Yugoslav Army appeared to be an impressive force with a total strength at full mobilization of 1.7 million, 500,000 of which were in the reserves. In reality, the opposite was true. By 20 March 1941, its total mobilized strength amounted to 600,000, a figure greatly in excess of the peacetime strength of 100,000. As a result, the majority of the Royal Yugoslav Army’s troops lacked training and cohesion, the latter exacerbated by the different ethnic groups in the country. Full mobilization, to be carried out in secret, was ordered on 30–31 March 1941, to commence on 1 April. Unsurprisingly, only around 50 per cent of the recruits were able to join their units before the German attack. With a total strength of 700,000, the Royal Yugoslav Army relied on Fourth Army in the north and Third Army facing Bulgaria; these two were the only ones at full strength. This was not the only problem. As a whole, 17

the army lacked motor transport, relying instead on pack animals and oxen, which hampered its manoeuvrability, as did the country’s poor road and railway networks. Unit organization added another burden. The three-regiment infantry divisions had an establishment of some 26,000–27,000 troops each (6,000–7,000 for each cavalry division), which made them cumbersome and difficult to handle. Furthermore, field fortifications (mostly semi-permanent) existed only in the northern part of the country, mostly facing Italy, while there were none facing Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Royal Yugoslav Army was not as poorly equipped as often described. Some 4,000 of its 6,700 artillery pieces were modern, including some 800 anti-tank guns. Around 250 modern antiaircraft guns were also available, along with c. 1,900 mortars. The only hindrance was the lack of ammunition, with stocks available for no more than 75 days of combat. The army also possessed 54 French-built Renault R35 tanks in the 1st Tank Battalion formed in April 1940, along with 48 World War I-vintage Renault FT light tanks (plus about a dozen RenaultKegresse M.28 and Škoda Š-I-d tankettes) in the 2nd Tank Battalion. Here, too, the lack of training greatly hampered the fighting power of these small tank units.1 After more than five months of war against an enemy superior in numbers and resources, the Greek Army was at the end of its tether. Its overall strength in early 1941 is given as either 450,000 or 540,000, the latter probably including some 90,000 reservists and young recruits incorporated that year. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Greek Army (14 infantry divisions plus one cavalry division and a brigade) was tied up in Albania fighting the Italians, and the lack of motorization and the country’s poor road network greatly hampered troop movements. The Metaxas Line, a defensive system built in the style of the Maginot Line with 21 independent forts along the Bulgarian border and along the Nestos River, presented a formidable obstacle to any attacking force. Unfortunately, not only could it be bypassed from Yugoslavia, but its fortifications were also garrisoned only by c. 70,000 men instead of the 200,000 planned. These included the XVIII, XIV and VII Infantry divisions, each with three infantry regiments, and the Nestos and Evros infantry brigades. Since these units lacked motor transport and artillery, their fighting strength mostly relied on the Metaxas Line forts, armed with German 37mm anti-tank guns amongst other weapons. The XIX Motorized Division, formed in January 1941 from the Mechanized Cavalry Regiment, was the only mechanized unit of the Greek Army.2 Greatly understrength (its 192nd Regiment had an effective strength of 295), its inventory included at least 27 (out of the 45 captured) Italian L3/35 tankettes, 77 Bren Gun Carriers and at least 100 Austin machine gun-armed armoured cars. It was deployed north of Salonika mostly for anti-parachute defence. Deployed alongside ‘W’ Force was the Central Macedonia Field Army Section (CMFAS), which included the newly formed XX and (October 1940) XII Infantry divisions. Although the former had three and the latter four 1 The Royal Yugoslav Army also developed guerrilla units and tactics, with the clear aim of using them to delay the enemy advance while withdrawing. 2 Although officially a truck-borne ‘mechanized’ unit, it is usually referred to as a motorized division in English.

18

infantry regiments, their actual strength was no more than two regiments each. Given the serious shortages the Greek Army was facing, Britain supplied, mostly from Middle Eastern stocks, 120 Boys anti-tank rifles, 3,500 Vickers machine guns, 300,000 uniforms and large numbers of weapons and ammunitions captured from the Italians in North Africa, amongst other items. ‘W’ Force (the British Army contingent of which was 21,880 strong) was not the force that had been promised, nor what the Greeks expected.3 The British 1st Armoured Brigade had 52 Mk VIB light tanks with the 4th Queen’s Own Hussars and 52 A10 plus seven A13 Cruiser tanks with the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment (RTR). The Mk VIB was roughly equivalent to the German PzKpfw I, but the A10 and A13 Cruisers were markedly inferior to the PzKpfw III. The New Zealand 2nd Division, which had its baptism of fire in Greece, was well trained and well equipped. It was 16,720 strong, each battalion having a total strength of 776 men (434 of whom were fighting troops). The divisional Cavalry Regiment, its three squadrons equipped with Marmon-Herrington Mk I armoured cars and Bren Gun Carriers, swapped two armoured car companies for two Cruiser tank troops (equipped with seven A10s) from the 3rd RTR. The problem was that even though the New Zealand 2nd Division, like the Australian 6th, was fully motorized, it struggled to exploit this advantage given the terrain and the lack of roads. Furthermore, the initial divisional frontage, at 25.6km, was too wide to be properly manned. The Australian 6th Division (with an overall strength of 17,125) had replaced the Indian 4th Division in December 1940 during General Richard O’Connor’s offensive against the Italians in North Africa. Chosen because of its combat experience, the division was dispersed over a wide area and its 17th Brigade was still yet to set sail for Greece on 6 April 1941. This contributed to the lack of forces required to face the German attacks. It is worth noting that the Australian Imperial Force was officially known as Australian I Corps until 12 April 1941, when it was renamed Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) following World War I tradition. The Yugoslav Royal Air Force, still undergoing modernization, had 340 modern fighter and bomber aircraft, plus 120 obsolete ones used for army reconnaissance. The Greek Royal Air Force was left with some 20 operational aircraft, supported by five British fighter (two Hurricane, one Gladiator, one Blenheim and one Fleet Air Arm with Fulmars and Sea Gladiators) and five bomber (three Blenheim, one Wellington and one Fleet Air Arm Swordfish) squadrons.

Soldiers of the New Zealand 6th Infantry Brigade arriving in Greece. From this point, the road ahead would be a bloody one. (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand, DA-01003-F)

3 The contingent also included 2,217 RAF personnel and 4,670 non-combatant Palestinians and Cypriots.

19

ORDER OF BATTLE, YUGOSLAVIA–ALBANIA, 6 APRIL 1941 AXIS ITALIAN NORTH-EAST ITALY Second Army (General Vittorio Ambrosio) V Army Corps (Major-General Riccardo Balocco) 15th Infantry Division Bergamo 57th Infantry Division Lombardia VI Army Corps (Lieutenant-General Lorenzo Dalmazzo) 12th Infantry Division Sassari 20th Infantry Division Friuli 26th Infantry Division Assietta XI Army Corps (Major-General Mario Robotti) 3rd Infantry Division Ravenna 13th Infantry Division Re 14th Infantry Division Isonzo Celere (Cavalry) Army Corps (Major-General Federico Ferrari Orsi) 1st Cavalry Division Eugenio di Savoia 2nd Cavalry Division Emanuele Filiberto 3rd Cavalry Division Principe Amedeo Autotrasportabile (truck-borne) Army Corps (Lieutenant-General Francesco Zingales) 9th Infantry Division Pasubio 52nd Infantry Division Torino 133rd Armoured Division Littorio ALBANIA Albania Armed Forces High Command (General Ugo Cavallero) XIV Army Corps (Major-General Giovanni Vecchi) 4th Alpini Division Cuneense 38th Infantry Division Puglie XVII Army Corps (Lieutenant-General Giuseppe Pafundi) 18th Infantry Division Messina 32nd Infantry Division Marche 131st Armoured Division Centauro Diamanti Blackshirt Group Eleventh Army (General Carlo Geloso) Special Army Corps (Major-General Giovanni Messe) 6th Infantry Division Cuneo 33rd Infantry Division Acqui XXV Army Corps (Lieutenant-General Silvio Rossi) 3rd Alpini Division Julia 2nd Infantry Division Sforzesca 7th Infantry Division Lupi di Toscana 11th Infantry Division Brennero 23rd Infantry Division Ferrara 37th Infantry Division Modena 56th Infantry Division Casale 58th Infantry Division Legnano VIII Army Corps (Major-General Gastone Gambara) 47th Infantry Division Bari 51st Infantry Division Siena 59th Infantry Division Cagliari IV Army Corps (Lieutenant-General Camillo Mercalli) 5th Alpini Division Pusteria 22nd Infantry Division Cacciatori delle Alpi Ninth Army (General Alessandro Pirzio Biroli) XXVI Army Corps (Lieutenant-General Gabriele Nasci) 2nd Alpini Division Tridentina 29th Infantry Division Piemonte 49th Infantry Division Parma III Army Corps (Major-General Mario Arisio) 19th Infantry Division Venezia 36th Infantry Division Forlì 48th Infantry Division Taro

20

Librazhd Sector (Lieutenant-General Gabriele Nasci) 24th Infantry Division Pinerolo 41st Infantry Division Firenze 53rd Infantry Division Arezzo Biscaccianti Blackshirt Group

HUNGARIAN Third Army (Lieutenant-General Elemér Gorondy-Novák) I Corps (Major-General Zoltán Decleva) 1st Brigade 13th Brigade 15th Brigade IV Corps (Major-General László Horvát) 2nd Brigade 10th Brigade 12th Brigade V Corps (Major-General Antal Silley) 14th Brigade 19th Brigade Mobile Army Corps (Major-General Béla Miklós) 1st Motorized Infantry Brigade 2nd Motorized Infantry Brigade 1st Cavalry Brigade 2nd Cavalry Brigade Reserves VII Corps (Major-General Gyula Szotyori Nagy) 20th Infantry Brigade 21st Infantry Brigade III Corps (Major-General László Belásfalvi Kiss) 3rd Infantry Brigade 11th Infantry Brigade

GERMAN 2.Armee (Generaloberst Maximilian von Weichs) XXXXVI.Armee-Korps (mot.) (Generalleutnant Heinrich von Vietinghoff, in Hungary) 8.Panzer-Division 14.Panzer-Division (from 10 April 1941 directly subordinated to 2.Armee HQ) 16.Infanterie-Division (mot.) LI.Armee-Korps (Generalleutnant Hans-Wolfgang Reinhard, in Austria) 132.Infanterie-Division 183.Infanterie-Division 101.Leichte-Infanterie-Division XXXXIX.Gebirgs-Korps (Generalleutnant Ludwig Kübler, in Austria) 1.Gebirgs-Division 79.Infanterie-Division (not employed) LII.Armee-Korps (Generalleutnant Kurt von Briesen, in Austria – activated 15 April 1941) 125.Infanterie-Division Panzer-Gruppe 1 (Generaloberst Ewald von Kleist, in Bulgaria, practically independent) XIV.Armee-Korps (mot.) (Generalleutnant Gustav von Wietersheim) 5.Panzer-Division (Generalleutnant Gustav Fehn) Panzer-Regiment 31 Schützen-Regiment 13 Schützen-Regiment 14 Artillerie-Regiment 116 Aufklärungs-Abteilung 8 Panzerjäger-Abteilung 53 11.Panzer-Division 4.Gebirgs-Division 294.Infanterie-Division 60.Infanterie-Division (mot.)

XXXXI.Armee-Korps (mot.) (Generalleutnant Georg-Hans Reinhardt, in Romania – practically independent) 2.SS-Panzer-Division Das Reich Infanterie-Regiment Grossdeutschland XXXX.Armee-Korps (mot.) (see Greek Campaign below)

ALLIED YUGOSLAV Chief of the General Staff of the Royal Yugoslav Army: General Dušan Simović First Army Group (General Milorad Petrović) Seventh Army (Major-General Dušan Trifunović) 32nd Infantry Division Triglavski 38th Infantry Division Dravska Triglavski, Rišnjački, Lički brigades Fourth Army (General Petar Nedeljković) 27th Infantry Division Savska 40th Infantry Division Slavonska 42nd Infantry Division Murska 1st Cavalry Division Ormuški Brigade Second Army Group (General Milutin Nedić) Second Army (General Dragoslav Miljković) 10th Infantry Division Bosanska 17th Infantry Division Vrbaska 30th Infantry Division Osječka 33rd Infantry Division Lička First Army (General Milan Rađenković) 7th Infantry Division Potiska 44th Infantry Division Unska 3rd Cavalry Division Senćanski, Somborski brigades Sixth Army (General Dimitrije Živković) 1st Infantry Division Cerska 3rd Infantry Division Dunavska 40th Infantry Division Sremska 2nd Cavalry Division Banatski, Savski, Smederevski, Braničevski, Požarevački brigades Fifth Army (General Vladimir Cukavac) 8th Infantry Division Krajinska 9th Infantry Division Timočka 34th Infantry Division Toplička 50th Infantry Division Drinska Vlasinski, Kalinski brigades

Third Army Group (General Milan Nedić) Third Territorial Army (General Jovan Naumović) 5th Infantry Division Šumadiska 20th Infantry Division Bregalnička 22nd Infantry Division Ibarska 46th Infantry Division Moravska Strumički Brigade Third Army (General Ilija Brašić) 13th Infantry Division Hercegovačka 15th Infantry Division Zetska 25th Infantry Division Vardaska 31st Infantry Division Kosovska Komski Brigade Coastal Defence Command (General Živko Stanisaviljević) 12th Infantry Division Jadranska 47th Infantry Division Dinarska Komando Boka Kotorska Komando Šibenika Čaplijnski Brigade

GREEK ARMY Epirus Field Army Section (Lieutenant-General Ioannis Pitsikas; from 20 April Lieutenant-General Georgios Tsolakoglou) A Army Corps (Lieutenant-General Panagiotis Demestihas) II Infantry Division III Infantry Division VIII Infantry Division B Army Corps (Major-General Georgios Bakos) I Infantry Division IV Infantry Division V Infantry Division VI Infantry Division XI Infantry Division XV Infantry Division XVII Infantry Division Western Macedonia Field Army Section (Lieutenant-General Georgios Tsolakoglou)4 IX Infantry Division X Infantry Division XIII Infantry Division XVI Infantry Division XXI Infantry Brigade Cavalry Division 4 On 10 April 1941, renamed C Army Corps and subordinated to EFAS.

ORDER OF BATTLE, GREEK CAMPAIGN GERMAN 12.ARMEE Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List (in Bulgaria) XXX.Armee-Korps (Generalleutnant Otto Hartmann) 164.Infanterie-Division (Generalmajor Johannes Folttmann) Infanterie-Regiment 382 Infanterie-Regiment 433 Infanterie-Regiment 440 Artillerie-Regiment 220 Panzerjäger-Abteilung 220 50.Infanterie-Division (Generalmajor Karl-Adolf Hollidt) Infanterie-Regiment 121 Infanterie-Regiment 122 Infanterie-Regiment 123 Artillerie-Regiment 150 Panzerjäger-Abteilung 150

XVIII.Gebirgs-Korps (Generalleutnant Franz Böhme) 2.Panzer-Division (Generalmajor Rudolf Veiel) Panzer-Regiment 3 Schützen-Regiment 2 Schützen-Regiment 304 Artillerie-Regiment 74 Aufklärungs-Abteilung 5 Panzerjäger-Abteilung 38 5.Gebirgs-Division (Generalmajor Julius Ringel) Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 85 Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 100 Gebirgs-Artillerie-Regiment 95 Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 95 Gebirgs-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 95 6.Gebirgs-Division (Generalmajor Ferdinand Schörner) Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 141 Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 143 Gebirgs-Artillerie-Regiment 118

21

Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112 Gebirgs-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 47 72.Infanterie-Division (Generalmajor Franz Mattenklott) Infanterie-Regiment 105 Infanterie-Regiment 124 Infanterie-Regiment 266 Artillerie-Regiment 706 Panzerjäger-Abteilung 72 Infanterie-Regiment 125 XXXX.Armee-Korps (mot.) (Generalleutnant Georg Stumme) 9.Panzer-Division (Generalleutnant Alfred Ritter von Hubicki) Panzer-Regiment 33 Schützen-Regiment 10 Schützen-Regiment 11 Artillerie-Regiment 102 Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 Panzerjäger-Abteilung 50 73.Infanterie-Division (General Bruno Bieler) Infanterie-Regiment 170 Infanterie-Regiment 186 Infanterie-Regiment 213 Artillerie-Regiment 173 Aufklärungs-Abteilung 173 Panzerjäger-Abteilung 173 Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (SS-Obergruppenführer Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich) I.Bataillon II.Bataillon III.Bataillon IV.Bataillon SS-Artillerie-Regiment SS-Aufklärungs-Abteilung XI.Armee-Korps (Generalleutnant Joachim von Kortzfleisch) 198.Infanterie-Division 76.Infanterie-Division L.Armee-Korps (Generalleutnant Georg Lindemann) 46.Infanterie-Division 16.Panzer-Division XIV.Armee-Korps (mot.) See under Yugoslavia; subordinated to 12.Armee on 12 April 1941. XXXXI.Armee-Korps (mot.) See under Yugoslavia; subordinated to 12.Armee on 12 April 1941.

ALLIED GREEK ARMY/BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE Commander-in-chief: Lieutenant-General Alexandros Papagos Epirus Field Army Section (Lieutenant-General Ioannis Pitsikas) See under Yugoslavia–Albania. Western Macedonia Field Army Section (Lieutenant-General Georgios Tsolakoglou) See under Yugoslavia–Albania. Eastern Macedonia Field Army Section (Lieutenant-General Konstantinos Bakopoulos) 2nd Cavalry Regiment XIX Motorized Division (Major-General Nikolaos Lioubas) 191st Motorized Infantry Regiment 192nd Motorized Infantry Regiment 193rd Motorized Infantry Regiment EMFAS Divisions Group (Lieutenant-General Panagiotis Dedes) XVIII Infantry Division (Major-General Leonidas Stergiopoulos) 70th Infantry Regiment 81st Infantry Regiment 91st Infantry Regiment XIV Infantry Division (Major-General Konstantinos Papakonstantinou) 41st Infantry Regiment 73rd Infantry Regiment VII Infantry Division (Major-General Christos Zoiopoulos; from 8 April

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1941, Colonel Evangelos Papas) 26th Infantry Regiment 71st Infantry Regiment 92nd Infantry Regiment Nestos Brigade (Colonel Anastasios Kalis) 37th Infantry Regiment 93rd Infantry Regiment Evros Brigade (Major-General Ioannis Zissis) three infantry battalions Central Macedonia Field Army Section (Lieutenant-General Ioannis Kotoulas; from 8 April 1941, Major-General Christos Karassos) XII Infantry Division (Colonel Georgios Karambatos) 82nd Infantry Regiment 84th Infantry Regiment 86th Infantry Regiment 12th Artillery Regiment XX Infantry Division (Major-General Kristos Karassos; from 8 April 1941, Colonel Miltiadis Papakonstantinou) 35th Infantry Regiment 80th Infantry Regiment 87th Infantry Regiment 20th Artillery Regiment ‘W’ Force (Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson) (directly subordinated to Papagos) Australian Imperial Force (Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Blamey) Australian 6th Division (Major-General Sir Iven Mackay) 16th Infantry Brigade 17th Infantry Brigade 19th Infantry Brigade three artillery battalions 6th Reconnaissance Battalion 2/1st Machine-Gun Battalion New Zealand 2nd Division (Major-General Bernard Freyberg) 4th Infantry Brigade 5th Infantry Brigade 6th Infantry Brigade 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion (Divisional Cavalry) 27th Machine-Gun Battalion British 1st Armoured Brigade (Brigadier Harold V.S. Charrington) 3rd Royal Tank Regiment 4th Queen’s Own Hussars 1st Battalion, The Rangers

OPPOSING PLANS GERMAN In December 1940, the German advance parties entered Bulgaria to pave the way for the arrival of List’s 12.Armee. The plan was for List’s force, which totalled five army corps and 18 divisions, to deploy along the Greek border in three echelons. At the end of January 1941, the headquarters of 12.Armee, Panzergruppe 1, XIV.Panzer-Korps and XXX.Armee-Korps, along with 5.Panzer and 11.Panzer-Division plus 72.Infanterie and 164.InfanterieDivision, were all deployed to Romania. At the end of the month, Bulgaria agreed to join the Axis, clearly aiming at gaining access to the Aegean Sea. Bridging on the Danube started on 28 February 1941, the German troops having entered Bulgaria on 1 March. The appalling conditions of the country’s infrastructure, lacking roads and associated facilities, slowed the progress of the German troops, and it was not until the end of March that they reached their assigned deployment areas. The initial German plan aimed at breaking through the Greek defences and reaching Salonika. A further possible advance to the Athens–Corinth Canal area was considered, but not planned yet. Since Yugoslavia had denied free passage to German troops, the attack plan was extremely simple. The infantry were to attack on both sides of the Rupel Pass, with the aim of breaking through the Greek defences and paving the way for the armoured and mechanized troops that were to advance to Salonika. At the same time, another thrust would break through the Greek defences in Thrace to reach and cross the Nestos River defence line, aiming for the city of Kavala. Facing a natural, strongly fortified defence line, the Germans relied on sheer pressure to collapse the Greek defences. In the light of future events, one may raise the question whether stronger defences (including the presence of ‘W’ Force) might have successfully halted the German attack, should Yugoslavia remain neutral. The German commanders were aware of this fact, and right after Hitler ordered the attack on Yugoslavia, they changed their plans, but not without difficulty. On 28 March, 12.Armee was ordered to redeploy Panzergruppe 1 to the north-west of Sofia with two Panzer divisions, leaving three army corps on the border facing Greece. The third echelon was also cut back, with only three divisions redeployed to Bulgaria. These included XVIII.GebirgsKorps with three divisions, and XXX.Armee-Korps with two divisions. The 16.Panzer-Division was deployed to face a possible Turkish move. Given the 23

ITALY

COASTAL

XXXX

Danube

1 Yu

Shkodër

Drin

11 It

Vlorë

së XXXX

Gr

Kastoria XXXX

Bitola

XXXX

GREECE

EFAS Ioannina

Karditsa

Pinio

s

Larissa

XXXX

1

EMFAS

XXXX

Salonika

Gr

Volos

XXXX

Maritsa

Aegean Sea

Gallipoli

Alexandroupolis

Xanthi

BULGARIA

ROMANIA

Kavala

12

Danu be

XXXX

Sofia

Aliakmon Line

Polykastro

XXXX

Kozani W Grevena Br

WMFAS

Gr

Korçë

XXXX

Leskovik

Vjo

9 It

3 Yu

Kumanovo Skopje

Prizren

Priština

Leskovac

5 Yu

Tamiš

ar

XXXX

Elbasan

Tirana

ALBANIA

Podgorica

XXXX

Kragujevac

Peć

XXX

Timișoara

XXXXI

Belgrade

6 Yu

XXXX

YUGOSLAVIA

Sarajevo

Tuzla

XXXX

XXXX

rd Va

Ionian Sea

Dubrovnik

Mostar

2 Yu

3 Hu

a

100 miles

Banja Luka

Sava

XXX

Strum

100km

Šibenik

Prije

Split

Zagreb

XXXX

as

Adriatic Sea

XXXX

4 Yu

Vrb

sto

Axis planned movements Yugoslav, Greek and Allied units

Fiume

Trieste

7 Yu

Ljubljana

XXXXVI

HUNGARY

va Mora

Ne

0

0

2 It

XXXX

Maribor

Una

XXXX

a

a sn

av Bo

2

a

24 Dr

Drin

OSTMARK (AUSTRIA)

TURKEY

N

The German plan and Allied dispositions

s

A convoy, possibly from the New Zealand 21st Battalion, moving north by rail from the port of arrival in Greece – a luxury not enjoyed by many ‘W’ Force units. (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand, DA-01006-F)

precarious state of communications, List reckoned that the redeployment could not be completed in time before the attack was launched, and therefore ordered that units should commence operations without waiting for its completion. Although considered in depth beforehand, the German plan to attack Yugoslavia (Operation 25) was a masterpiece of improvisation. Matching Hitler’s directive, the plan called for a three-pronged attack: one from the north (Austria–Hungary) and one from the south (Bulgaria), both converging on Belgrade, while the third axis of attack from Bulgaria would cut off the retreat of Yugoslav forces towards Greece. Meanwhile, 12.Armee’s units in Bulgaria were to outflank the Metaxas Line defences, and move towards Salonika. The redeployment of 2.Armee’s units, which was tasked with attacking Yugoslavia from the north with XXXXVI.Panzer-Korps, was also slowed down by difficulties in communication, and it was reckoned that only preliminary attacks could be started on 6 April 1941, X-Day.5 The bulk of the forces from the north and the south were to attack in force from 10 April. Panzergruppe 1 would play a key role. Split into three groups, it was tasked with advancing from the south towards the Yugoslav capital Belgrade; it would be supported by XXXXI.Panzer-Korps, which was to move from Timisoara in Romania towards Belgrade – the third axis of the advance 5 At this date, the official designation of XXXXVI.Panzer-Korps was still XXXXVI.Armee-Korps (mot.), but the former is used here for simplicity.

25

on the capital. The second axis comprised Panzergruppe 1’s attack west towards Skopje, cutting the path of the Royal Yugoslav Army’s retreat towards Greece. It was then to move south, towards Greece and the Florina Gap (which provided access to Greece from Yugoslavia). The third axis of advance was along the Vardar River, outflanking the Metaxas Line before moving on to Salonika. Air attacks were timed to coincide with the start of the offensive, in particular a massive bombing of Belgrade intended (amongst other things) to disrupt the government and take out key military command centres at the outset. The XXXXIX.Gebirgs and the L.Armee and LI.Armee-Korps were to support the main attack, moving from Austria towards Ljubljana and Zagreb. There was no planned coordination between these German attacks and the movements of the Italian Army, which was itself preparing to move on the city of Zagreb with Second Army.

ALLIED In order to understand the 1941 Balkan campaign, it is necessary to put the Allied planning in context. The decision to send troops to Greece was a political one, made by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in December 1940 and subsequently enforced in spite of the repeated warnings to the contrary. Thus, on 8 January 1941, the British chiefs of staff concluded that no effective defence was possible in the event of a German invasion of Greece, adding that any formations sent would only delay the unavoidable outcome. On 24 February, British military intelligence painted an even gloomier picture, predicting that such formations would probably be lost. Not surprisingly, the Allied commanders made half-hearted decisions, all of which relied on how Yugoslavia would react, which resulted in a fatal misunderstanding. This was the exact contrary of the sort of joint planning and coordination that was necessary. The basic aim shared by all the Allied parties involved was to attempt to recreate the 1916–18 Salonika Front, but this failed to take into account two factors: first, that in 1941 Germany could unleash far greater forces in the Balkans than in 1916–18; and second, that the Yugoslav plans were poorly suited to this outcome. Yugoslavia’s Plan S, issued in September 1938 following the German annexation of Austria, contemplated a German and Hungarian attack against Yugoslavia, and support being offered by France and Britain. The aim was to defend the north of the country (S stood for severni, north) using 60 per cent of the available forces, in order to allow the remaining reserves to withdraw south-east to Salonika. The Italian invasion of Albania led to a new plan called R-40 early in 1940; this was a modified version of Plan S that envisaged war against Germany, Hungary, Italy and Bulgaria. While R-40 still followed the strategic guidelines laid down in Plan S, it increased the proportion of forces allocated to the defence of the borders, which included the Adriatic Sea coastline, to 70 per cent. All in all, the aim was to defend a c. 3,000km front. The Yugoslav Plan R-41, drafted in February 1941, drastically emphasized the defence of the borders, allocating as much as 80 per cent of the available forces to this task, and leaving little for a strategic withdrawal. It would 26

Yugoslav anti-tank obstacles along a section of border. (NARA)

be revised and implemented on 31 March 1941; the revisions allowed for the deployment of forces against Albania. Both this plan and Plan R-40 considered it essential that the supply route leading to Salonika was kept under Allied control. This was a crucial factor that the Greek commander Lieutenant-General Alexandros Papagos understood well. The British commanders were also well aware of this, but took a different approach. The diverging opinions first came to light during the 13 to 17 January 1941 visit to Greece of General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East. Faced with Papagos’ requests for nine divisions, he replied that only two or three would be available. Both agreed that Yugoslavia played a crucial role. The defence of the Greek border, especially facing Bulgaria, was only possible if Yugoslavia became an ally. Should Yugoslavia either remain neutral or join the Axis, no defence of the Bulgarian frontier fortified line – the Metaxas Line – would be possible. The meetings, although inconclusive, outlined the different approaches taken by the two commanders. Papagos not only aimed to defend Greek territory, but also to provide Yugoslavia with what it needed in order to withdraw its army south and join the Allies. Only by defending the Metaxas Line could the vital port of Salonika be maintained, otherwise Yugoslavia would have no means of withdrawing into Greece. Wavell agreed in principle, but thought that the Metaxas Line should only be defended once certain of Yugoslavia’s position. Otherwise, a line west of Salonika, known as the Aliakmon Line, was to be defended with the aim of withdrawing to a line running from Mt Olympus to the Venetikos River down to the GrecoAlbanian border and the Adriatic coast. The Albanian front was another issue. The bulk of the Greek Army, which had been fighting the Italians there since October 1940, had remained on the offensive until early March 1941, just before the Italians began their own ‘Spring Offensive’. This, along with the lack of motorization and inadequate roads, made a Greek withdrawal difficult. Furthermore, Papagos was relying on some simple strategic concepts. The presence of 27

the Greek Army in Albania offered the chance of a joint Greek–Yugoslav attack, which could pave the way to an alliance with Yugoslavia and the withdrawal of her army. Should the Greek Army withdraw, the Royal Yugoslav Army would be forced to pass through the narrow Skopje– Monastir corridor in order to reach Salonika, which would add a further hindrance to a potential collaboration. The meetings held during Sir Anthony Eden and Sir John Dill’s mission to the Middle East failed to resolve the issue. The British position was outlined during a 22 February 1941 meeting; the available forces had to be deployed on the Aliakmon Line while Yugoslavia’s position remained uncertain. The aim was to buy time and allow the withdrawal of Greek forces from Albania. If Yugoslavia adopted a pro-Allied stance, the Metaxas Line could be defended. Papagos accepted the principle of defending the Aliakmon Line, which led to a misunderstanding with the British commanders: Papagos still refused to give up the Metaxas Line unless Yugoslavia and Turkey overtly decided against entering the war. The British delegation offered 100,000 troops, convinced that Papagos had agreed to the defence of the Aliakmon Line. The meetings held on 2–4 March 1941, just after Bulgaria joined the Axis alliance, revealed the misunderstanding, and led to a compromise solution. Given that the entry of German troops into Bulgaria made a withdrawal from the Metaxas Line impossible (as a German attack might catch the Greek troops in the open), Papagos agreed to leave three divisions, one brigade and the fort garrisons on the Metaxas Line, and to deploy three Greek divisions on the Aliakmon Line alongside ‘W’ Force, whose first units arrived in Greece on 7 March. Now it was the turn of the British to face difficulties: the arrival of German troops in North Africa meant that the promise to dispatch 100,000 troops to Greece could not be fulfilled, and several units had to be left in the Middle East. In the end, only around 58,000 men arrived in Greece, to find that the Aliakmon Line existed on paper only. On 26 March 1941, the precarious situation led Lieutenant-General Bakopoulos to suggest to Papagos a withdrawal from the Metaxas Line, which Papagos refused to order. The coup in Yugoslavia the following day suggested that Papagos had made the right decision. This explains not only the 27 March redeployment of the Greek XIX Motorized Division from the Aliakmon Line to north of Salonika, but also Papagos’ good mood during the 28 March meeting with Eden and Dill. This should have been an occasion for joint planning, but Yugoslavia refused to participate. The 31 March and 1 April meetings with the Yugoslav army leadership were only preparatory meetings prior to the 3 April meeting held at Kanali Station, near Florina, on the Greco-Yugolsav border. During the latter, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Royal Yugoslav Army General Radivoje Janković made it clear to lieutenantgenerals Papagos and Wilson that Yugoslavia deemed the defence of Salonika essential. He only agreed in general terms to joint operations against the Italians in Albania. Yugoslavia’s real concern was to try to prevent a German attack on itself. The result of this chaotic planning led to four separate groups of forces: the Royal Yugoslav Army, defending the national borders; the Metaxas Line units; ‘W’ Force and two Greek divisions on the Aliakmon Line; and the bulk of the Greek Army in Albania. This division of forces suited the Germans perfectly. 28

THE CAMPAIGN THE COLLAPSE OF YUGOSLAVIA The German attack, foreseen to start on 31 March 1941, was postponed to 6 April. The Yugoslav High Command was informed of the date on 2 April, but ignored the warning. On 6 April, the onslaught began with massive air raids on Belgrade, Yugoslavia’s airfields and installations of the Yugoslav Air Force. The air attack on Belgrade, lasting for 1½ hours, not only destroyed the city centre and killed several thousand people, but also severed communications between the government/high command and the rest of the country. The fact that 2.Armee’s units were still moving to their deployment areas, particularly LI.Gebirgs-Korps in Austria and XXXXI.Panzer-Korps in Hungary, did not prevent the Wehrmacht from launching its attack. By 6 April, the Karavanken Pass north of Ljubljana had already been seized along with several intact bridges across the Danube, Drava and Sava rivers. The 14.Panzer-Division notably seized the Barcs Bridge on the Danube, and established a bridgehead south of Djurdjevac. Other bridgeheads were established on the Danube and the Drava between 6 and 7 April, the Germans facing no reaction from the Yugoslav side. Given these developments, the OKH decided not to wait for the planned jump-off date and began the attack at once, without waiting for units to regroup. Soon the Yugoslav situation became critical, as Croatian soldiers in the northerly Royal Yugoslav Army units demonstrated insubordinance and even refused to obey orders. On 8 and 9 April, the German advance began; in the north, 132.InfanterieDivision seized Maribor, crossing the Drava, and 183.Infanterie-Division started to advance to Zagreb, as 8.Panzer-Division approached the Drava River. Meanwhile, 14.PanzerDivision consolidated its bridgehead now running from the confluence of the Drava and the Danube to Vitrovica.

Yugoslav soldiers surrender to men from 1.Gebirgs-Division in Slovenia. The rapid collapse of the Yugoslav Army brought the Wehrmacht a sizeable booty of materiel. (NARA)

29

XI It

10 Apr

XXX

47

Split

XX

XX

183

47

Čap

Makarska X

14

33

XX

XX

XX

III Hu

XXX

Metković

XX

Tuzla

a

Sav

7

YUGOSLAVIA

XX

Sombor

X

Rogatica 8

Brčko

Vinkovci

XX

Som

I Hu

XXX

3

Šabac

XX

XXX

X

1

adn a

Zap

XX

Sau

11

XX

Belgrade

SS R

XX

X

Kikino Ban

XX

Infantry brigades Ban Banatski Bra Braničevski Čap Čapljinski Lič Lički Orm Ormuški Pož Požarevački Sau Sauski Sen Senćanski Som Somborski Sme Smederevski

XX

X

ube

2

X

Pož XX

Petrovac

Bra

Dan

XX

11

5

8

X

Leskovac

11 Apr

Niš

XX

XX

9 Apr XX

Prokuplje

Kruševac

60

Kragujevac

3

Sme

XX

Vršac

ROMANIA

SS R (+) 11 Apr Timișoara

Mo rav a

XX

49

(+)

Petrovgrad

X

Szeged

Bijelo Polje

Užice

44

XX

Senta

Sen

Subotica

V Hu

HUNGARY XXX

Mohács

11 Apr

XXX

II Hu

Danube

Osijek

XX

IV Hu

Sarajevo

16

Doboj

Bo

sna

10

30

11 Apr

Mostar

Konijca

Zenica

Banja Luka

as

Imotski

XX

Pakrac

Vrb

50km

Šibenik

Knin

Grahovo

Prijedor

40

Djurdjevac

Grubišno Polija

XX

XX

11 Apr

va

50 miles

132

Bihać

Šibenika

XX

Bos Novi

27

Una

Sisak

Dugoselo

125

XX

XX

14

16

ret

Axis movements 10–12 April 1941 Axis movements 13–16 April 1941

XX

XX

Karlovac

Slunj

XX

Zagreb

1

X

Varaždin 42

Orm

XX

XX

Lake Balaton

Ne

Axis movements 6–9 April 1941

Axis positions 16 April 1941

12

Zadar

Gospič

Brlog

Ogulin

Kupa

XX

38

8

XX

a

Axis positions 6 April 1941

X

va

101 le

Sa

Rogatec

Maribor

Drava

XX

Mountain brigades Riš Rišnajački Tri Triglasvki

rav

0

Lič

Fiume

XX

Royal Yugoslav Army

10 Apr

X

1

Ljubljana

Riš

XX

XX

183

Mo

0

N

V It

32

XXX

Trieste 10 Apr

It

XXX

Tri

X

132

Klagenfurt

1

XX

Korana

OSTMARK (AUSTRIA)

Graz

a

iš

30 Tam

Tisza

Drin

Royal Yugoslav Army

The Axis attack on Yugoslavia, 6–16 April 1941

Facing this situation, the Yugoslav First Army Group gave the order to withdraw south; the Seventh Army started to retreat to the Adriatic Coast, while the Fourth Army withdrew to the Sava River, its right wing protected by the stiff resistance put up by the 17th Division Vrbaska. The Yugoslav Air Force, which had already lost around 60 per cent of its aircraft, could provide no support. In Panzergruppe 1’s sector, 9.Panzer-Division crossed the border into Yugoslavia on 6 April, advancing to Skopje in the face of determined resistance from units of the Yugoslav Third Army. Only on the next day was the resistance overcome, with 9.Panzer-Division seizing Skopje and flagging the end of the Yugoslav plan for a withdrawal towards Greece. As 2.PanzerDivision attacked east towards the Vardar River, other German units were slowed by congestion on the roads. Nevertheless, like in the north, in the south the Yugoslav Third Army Group opted for a withdrawal and ordered the Third Army to make for the eastern bank of the Morava River. The German advance made a Yugoslav withdrawal impossible. On 8 April, as 2.Panzer-Division entered Greece after advancing south along the Vardar River valley, 11.Panzer-Division crossed the border and started to advance towards Niš. In spite of the fierce resistance put up by the 5th Division Šumadiska, Niš was seized in the early hours of the following day, with around 5,000 prisoners taken. That same day, the division began an advance north along the Vardar, forming the southern axis of the pincer move on Belgrade, the northern one being executed by the 8.Panzer and 14.Panzer-Division. Between 9 and 10 April, the OKH began to realize that it had overestimated the Royal Yugoslav Army, and, while still focusing on the capture of Belgrade, reacted to the current situation viz. the possible creation of a national redoubt in the south. On 10 April, the Croat Ustaša leader Ante Pavelić proclaimed the creation of the Independent State of Croatia, sanctioning the collapse of Yugoslavia as the armoured pincer started to close in on Belgrade. To the north of the city, XXXXI.Panzer-Korps, after completing its deployment, was unable to cross the Danube because of resistance from the Yugoslav Sixth Army. Nevertheless, XXXXVI.PanzerKorps started its advance from the Djurdjevac bridgehead with 8.Panzer-Division moving on the stretch between the Danube and the Sava rivers against the Yugoslav Second Army. At the same time, 14.Panzer-Division turned west towards Zagreb. Within a couple of days, the bulk of the Royal Yugoslav Army in the north had dissolved. From Austria, 132.Infanterie and 182.Infanterie-Division, having taken Maribor on 8 April, advanced south, followed on the 10th by 1.Gebirgs-Division. On the evening of that same day,

A prime mover pulls a truck out of the mud. The poor conditions of the Yugoslav roads were one of the main hindrances to the German advance. (NARA)

31

32

33

1

3

2

OPERATION RETRIBUTION: THE BOMBING OF BELGRADE, 6 APRIL 1941 (PP. 32–33) In the wake of the 27 March 1941 Yugoslav coup d’état, on 31 March Hitler ordered Operation Retribution: the mass bombing of Belgrade, at the beginning of the hostilities. On 4 April, the Yugoslav government declared Belgrade an open city; according to the German embassy report, the city had no anti-aircraft defences. Nevertheless, on 5 April, Operation Retribution was confirmed, and at 0645hrs on 6 April, a first wave of 160 Heinkel 111 and Dornier 17 bombers from II.Staffel of Kampfgeschwader 4, and from Kampfgeschwader 2 and 3, based in Austria, attacked the Yugoslav capital Belgrade. They were supported by Stuka dive-bombers from Stukageschwader 77, based in Romania. These aircraft both targetted the War Ministry (1) and the adjacent areas. Belgrade’s only defence was provided by the 51st Group of the Yugoslav Air Force, which attempted to defend the city from the German air attacks during the day, albeit without much success. The second wave of German bombers arrived at about 1000hrs, with 57 Stukas of Stukageschwader 77 (2 – ‘S2’ being

34

its distinctive identifier) attacking Belgrade once again. This time they were opposed by the aircraft of the Yugoslav 32nd and 51st groups. Apart from the city centre, the area most heavily hit was the city’s railway station and marshalling yards (3). In spite of the German claim that the attack was a purely military operation, the percentage of incendiary devices dropped (75 per cent explosive and 25 per cent incendiary bombs in the first wave, 40 per cent explosive and 60 per cent incendiary bombs in the second) suggests that the real aim of Operation Retribution was to intimidate the civilian population. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that not all the Yugoslav military installations had vacated Belgrade (e.g. the military staffs remained), making the declaration of Belgrade as an open city inappropriate, as the Germans would do with Rome in 1943. Estimates of the casualties caused by the bombing, mostly from the post-war period, vary widely, from as low as 1,500 up to 30,000.

14.Panzer-Division captured Zagreb; the next day, it reached Karlovac and established a bridgehead on the Kupa River. At this point, the Yugoslav Fourth Army stopped fighting, while the remnants of the Seventh Army withdrew south along the coast, with large numbers of men in its units mutinying. Italy declared war on Yugoslavia on 6 April, and the Italian Second Army engaged in several minor clashes with Yugoslav units on the ItaloYugoslav border. The Italians crossed the border on the 11th, and began their offensive after having been informed of the situation by the Germans. With the Luftwaffe harassing the remnants of the Yugoslav units, the Italians faced little resistance, and by the evening of 11 April they had already taken Ljubljana and captured some 30,000 prisoners who were waiting near Delnice to surrender. That same day, the Italian Bergamo Division linked up with 14.Panzer-Division, which had advanced west to Delnice. Facing favourable developments, 2.Armee commander Generaloberst Weichs halted the advance of the LI.Gebirgs-Korps units at Zagreb while keeping 14.Panzer-Division ready to advance south to Bos Novi and Banja Luka. He also assigned a stretch of territory some 30–60km from the Adriatic Coast to the Italian Second Army, which the Italians exploited with the Littorio armoured and the Torino infantry divisions. On 15 April, the latter seized Šibenik, while Dubrovnik fell to both divisions on 17 April as the pincers of 14.Panzer and 8.Panzer-Division closed in on and captured Mostar. The next day, Italian troops from the north linked up with those from Albania at Dubrovnik. On 11 April, the northern axis of advance on Belgrade, now formed by 8.Panzer-Division followed by 16.Infanterie-Division (mot.), reached the Danube and took Vukovar (10km east of Vinkovici), while the leading elements of 8.Panzer-Division also seized Sremska Mitrovica on the Sava River. Also on the 11th, Hungary began its war against Yugoslavia, with Hungarian III Corps crossing the Danube north of Osijek. Having been warned by the Germans, who were concerned that Romania might also declare war on Yugoslavia, the Hungarians advanced into Yugoslavia but without crossing the Tisza River. The following day, the Hungarian IV and I corps seized the triangle of land between the Tisza and the Danube, as 16.Infanterie-Division (mot.) established a bridgehead on the Danube and 8.Panzer-Division’s leading elements approached Belgrade. Also on 12 April, the Luftwaffe carried out massive air attacks on Bijeljina (100km west of Belgrade), destroying what was left of the Yugoslav Air Force. On 12 April, as Panzergruppe 1 was placed under command of 2.Armee, the latter now being responsible for operations across the whole of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav High Command ordered the withdrawal of the

Two destroyed French-built Renault FT-17 Royal Yugoslav Army tanks. The small Yugoslav tank force was no match for the Wehrmacht’s armour. (NARA)

35

German motorcycle (Kradschützen) troops pause for rest during the invasion of Yugoslavia. The muddy state of their motorbikes is revealing of the conditions in which they had to operate. (NARA)

36

First and Sixth armies from the area north of Belgrade. The aim was to defend a line running from Belgrade to Kruševac and the Shkodër area in northern Albania; this would form one side of the triangle that, using the natural defences offered by the mountainous terrain in the area, created the national redoubt. The Germans reacted by using speed to prevent the Yugoslav withdrawal. On the night of 12/13 April, 8.Panzer-Division headed south from Sremska Mitrovica and began advancing along the Drina River, seeking to prevent a Yugoslav move south. Bad weather, which made secondary roads unusable and created even longer columns stretching to the Bulgarian border, slowed the advance of Panzergruppe 1’s units to Belgrade. By 10 April, 5.Panzer-Division approached the Morava followed by 4.Gebirgs-Division, which seized Pirot, and by 294.Infanterie-Division and 60.Infanterie-Division (mot.). Facing determined resistance from the Yugoslav Sixth Army, General von Kleist opted not to release 5.Panzer-Division, which was meant to proceed south into Greece, but instead to use it against the Yugoslav forces east of Paraćin, north of Niš, which were threatening the communication lines and rear areas of 10.Panzer-Division. In the meantime, 9.Panzer-Division advanced to the Albanian border. As the division reached Prizren on 9 April, any effective Yugoslav resistance in the area (now assigned to 12.Armee) ceased to exist. On 11 April, 5.Panzer-Division crossed the Morava at Niš, then turned south and marched towards Skopje. In the meantime, 10.Panzer-Division, which on the 10th had crossed the Morava north of Kruševac, continued its

Southern Yugoslavia, 6–16 April 1941 XX

ava

SS R

12 Apr

Belgrade

8

S

Brčko Drin a

12 Apr

Obrenovac

Šabac

Sme

49

Tuzla XX

12 Apr

1

Pož

XX

Axis movements and attacks 13–16 April 1941

rav a

Užice

XX

Kragujevac

Guca

Zap

8

Kraljevo

Paraćin

adn

aM

ora

16 Apr

Ćićevac

va

Kruševac

Raška

11

r

X

294 XX

16 Apr

Kom

Peć

8 Apr 8 Apr 16 Apr

7 Apr

Lake 9 Ohrid

0

50 miles 50km

Tepelenë

XX

Korçë Kastoria

XXXX

Gr EFAS Përmet

Ersekë

XII Gr

GREECE Kozani Grevena

XX

XVIII Gr Kilkis XIX Gr

XXX

XXX

XX

Edessa X 1 Br

Florina

WMFAS

6

XXX

XX Gr

X

LSSAH

Gr m

së

Bitola Lake Prespa

XXXX

Osu Vjo

a

in

Vlorë

ios

Dr

11 It

X

Str

XX

3, 8 Apr Berat

5

Prilep

10 Apr

XXXX

5

XX

73

25

bin

XXXX

XX

6 XX

m hku

3 It

2

20

Štip

XX

6 Apr

S

XX

XX

Ax

Drenovo Veles

XX

Tirana

Division BK Boke Kotorske command Brigades Bra Braničevski Kal Klanski Kom Komski Pož Požarevački Sau Sauski Sme Smederevski Str Strumiči Vla Vlasinski

46

ar/

ALBANIA XIV It 10 Apr

Royal Yugoslav Army

73

Skopje

Tetovo

XXX

XX

XX

22

9 Apr

XXX

XVII It 16 Apr

Kumanovo

XX

XX

9

Kriva Palanka

rd Va

N

31 Prizren

Shkodër

LSSAH

X

Kal

Strum

Bar

Bujanovac

XX

2 Salonika Veria

n

Lake Skadar

60

X

5

Podgorica

15

XX

11

50

XX

Sofia

ak mo

13

XX

Priština

5

XX

Ali

XX

Petrovac

XX

Leskovac

Mitrovica

60

Nikšić

0

34 XX

XX

4

XX

a

Bileća

XX

Pirot

rav

Novi Pazar

Bijelo Polje

X

Vla

Mo

Iba

16 Apr

Goransko

Niš

Prokuplje

BULGARIA

Knjazevac

ac XX

Pljevlja

Cetinje

XX

9

Soko Banja

Uv

YUGOSLAVIA

BK

Axis movements and attacks 10–12 April 1941

XX

8

Mo

Preljina

XXX

Allied attacks 3–9 April 1941

XX

3

Rogačica

Rogatica

Axis movements and attacks 6–9 April 1941

Petrovac

Velika Plana 2

XX

16 Apr

TTurnu Severin X

11

Mladenovac

16

Axis positions 11–16 April 1941

X

Bra

Požarevac XX

Sav

Axis positions 6 April 1941

ROMANIA

e

ub Dan X

XX

X

Sarajevo

Allied units

(+)

XX

37

drive on Belgrade. After seizing Kragujevac on the 11th, the following day its leading elements approached Belgrade from the south just as the leading elements of 8.Panzer-Division arrived from the west. Meanwhile, back on 3 April, the units of the Greek WMFAS had begun their offensive against the Italian Venezia and Taro divisions in the southern area of Lake Ohrid. The ill-timed offensive achieved some local successes, and after a pause was restarted on the 7th, but was soon halted by the Italians and by the lack of success on the Yugoslav side. The day before, the Yugoslav 25th Division Vardaska had attacked the Italian Firenze Division north of Ohrid, at Debar. On the 8th, it was the turn of the Yugoslav 31st Division Kosovska, which launched an attack on the Italian Puglie Division moving from the Prizren area, while on the 7th the Yugoslav 15th Division Zetska attacked the Centauro armoured and Marche infantry divisions near Shkodër. Yugoslav forces managed to penetrate into Albania, close to Shkodër in the north, but soon had to face the Italian reaction, while on 9 April the leading elements of 9.Panzer-Division reached Lake Ohrid, linking up with the Italian Arezzo Division. On 11 April, the Italian Cuneense and Firenze divisions counter-attacked at Debar, and a major offensive developed in the north on the 15th. The Italian Centauro and Marche divisions crossed the border aiming for Podgorica, while the Messina Division moved along the coast to Kotor and Dubrovnik. On 17 April, the Centauro armoured division seized Dubrovnik, before linking up with the Italian Second Army elements advancing from the north. Thus ended the joint operation against Albania. On 13 April, Belgrade was captured without a fight. The 2.SS-PanzerDivision Das Reich was halted at the Danube before it could cross the river, but a small group (unaware of the order to halt) led by Hauptsturmführer Fritz Klingenberg made its way to the city centre and reached the German embassy. There, Klingenberg summoned the city mayor, and gave him

A German motorized column crossing a river using an emergency bridge. The crude anti-tank obstacles visible here did little to delay the swift German advance. (NARA)

38

an ultimatum. Unaware that Klingenberg only had ten men with him, the mayor surrendered the city hours before the vanguard of 11.Panzer-Division entered the city. On that same day, Yugoslav Minister President General Simović transferred his powers as Chief of Staff of the Royal Yugoslav Army to General Danilo Kalafatović with instructions to seek an armistice. The Yugoslav collapse was already a reality, and on the previous day the OKH had started transferring 2.Armee’s reserves to the East. Four days later, Hitler ordered that only three divisions were to be left in Yugoslav territory, with all other units to begin redeploying at the end of April. What followed was mostly a mop-up operation, mainly focused on the ‘national redoubt’ area. From the north, 14.Panzer-Division continued its advance towards Banja Luka, while in the east 16.Infanterie-Division (mot.) crossed the Sava aiming for Tuzla. Panzergruppe 1 also contributed, with 60.Infanterie-Division (mot.) crossing the Morava and seizing Kruševac. On 14 April, while Croat nationalist units began fighting against Serbian ones along the Adriatic coast, the vanguard of 14.Panzer-Division crossed the Bosna River. Simultaneously, 16.Infanterie-Division and 8.Panzer-Division advanced south parallel to the Drina River, forming the northern pincer of a movement completed from the south by 60.Infanterie-Division’s advance along the Zapadna Morava River. Yugoslav units now offered only sporadic resistance, even though on occasion 8.Panzer-Division faced stiff opposition to its advance. Also on 14 April, the Yugoslav government and the members of the royal household began their race to reach Greece by air from Sarajevo. Yugoslav units surrendered, while national representatives made contact with the Germans to try to negotiate an armistice. These approaches were all rejected, on the grounds that the emissaries did not possess the necessary authority. Late on that day, the vanguard of 16.Infanterie-Division (mot.) seized Sarajevo and captured what was left of the Yugoslav High Command. On 15 April, as 18,000 Yugoslav soldiers surrendered to 8.PanzerDivision south of Užice, a ceasefire agreement was finally achieved, though an armistice still lay out of reach due to the lack of appropriate representatives. It was only a matter of time, however, as another large portion of what was left of the Royal Yugoslav Army was trapped west of the Morova River by a pincer movement executed by 60.Infanterie-Division (mot.) and 294. Infanterie-Division. By 16 April, a handful of units stationed along the lower Adriatic coast represented all that was left of the Royal Yugoslav Army. On the 17th, they, too, surrendered, squeezed between 14.Panzer-Division approaching from the north and linking up with the Italians at Dubrovnik, 8.Panzer-Division coming from the east and 60.Infanterie-Division (mot.) heading towards them from the south.

A group of high-ranking Serbian officers after their surrender to the Germans. Almost every general in the Royal Yugoslav Army came from Serbia, which contributed to the lack of cohesion between different ethnic groups within Yugoslavia. (NARA)

39

Also on 17 April, the Yugoslav Deputy Chief of General Staff General Radivoje Janković and the former foreign minister Aleksandar CincarMarković signed Yugoslavia’s unconditional surrender, which became effective at noon, 18 April. The war against Yugoslavia had inflicted light losses on the Wehrmacht of 558 men, and Hungarian casualties amounted to around 350. Italian losses in April 1941, mostly suffered in this phase, amounted to around 3,300 men. Yugoslav losses are unknown, and it is not known how many Yugoslav soldiers were killed during the war. The only figures available relate to the c. 254,000 (or 345,000, according to some sources) prisoners taken by the Germans. The 8.Panzer, 9.Panzer and 14.Panzer-Division lost a total of 24 tanks, all of which were complete write-offs.

THE BATTLE FOR THE METAXAS LINE Two Sturmgeschütz Abteilungen, 190 and 191, took part in Operation Marita. The former, attached first to 50.Infanterie-Division then to 2.Panzer-Division, advanced to Elassona and is probably the unit to which the vehicle shown here belongs. The latter was attached to InfanterieRegiment 125. (NARA)

40

At 0530hrs on 6 April, the German ambassador in Athens informed the Greek government that Germany ‘had been compelled’ to invade Greece because of the presence of British troops. This was a mere formality, for the German attack had already begun, and the reality of war was by now clear to Athens. At 0300hrs on 7 April, the Luftwaffe bombed the port of Piraeus, setting fire to the cargo ship Clan Fraser with explosives still aboard, amongst other vessels. The subsequent explosion wrecked the harbour, which remained closed for the following two days, and left it with only five out of 12 berths still operational.

0

Koronia

91 Kerkinitis 81 III 2

III

25km

25 miles

III

III

8

III

III

III

73

124

72

XX

Polygyros

Lake Volvi

9

Stry m on

III

III

III

itis

VII

III

Karisopoulis

X

122

Amvrosia

III

13

III

s Lisso

Komotini

123

Momchilgrad

Sapai

Evros

Arda

III Bu

Ferrai Alexandroupoulis

X

Ivailovgrad

Kastanies

Maritsa

XX

Nakri

16

Khaskovo

XXX

itsa

Mar

XX

IV Bu

50

Porto Lagos

III

Aegean Sea

Ziloti

93

Xanthi

12

III

XX

382

164

Kionistra Nestos

III

XXX

Thasos

Nea Karya

37

III

II Bu

440

Lekani

III

Kavala

Doxaton

71

46

Elevtheroupolis

XX

Drama

92

tos

Nes

BULGARIA

g An Rodolivos

26

III

10 11

105

Nevokop

XX

Serrai

GREECE

XIV

191

Sidirokastron

41

4 6 7 3 5

Petrich

125

Sandanski

XX

1 2

Salonika

III

5

100

III

III

III

XX

Axis movements and attacks Allied movements and attacks

Axios

0

XX

Kilkis

192

XX

30

III

85

141

143

6

2

XX

Souflion

Ipsala

N

Didimotikon

Edirne

Forts of the Metaxas Line 1. Kongur 2. Popolivista 3. Istibei 4. Kelkaja 5. Dimidi and Arpalouki 6. Paljurjones 7. Usita 8. Karatas 9. Malianga 10. Lisse 11. Pyramidoides 12. Echinos 13. Nymfea

XXX

Evr

Katerini

n

kmo

Yannitsa

Alia

III

XIX

193

XVIII

Lake Doiran

YUGOSLAVIA

eg Br

ica aln

a u

os

um Kur

llik

Str

os

Ga

XX

The Metaxas Line, 6–10 April 1941

41

A forward observer radio team helps direct artillery fire during 1.Kompanie, InfanterieRegiment 125’s assault on the Greek fortifications at Kulata, on the Greco-Bulgarian border, 6 April 1941. (NARA)

42

Under the cover of a violent Stuka attack, Infanterie-Regiment 125 crossed the border and headed for the forts defending the Rupel Pass. This was the key to the German plan, and expressly for this purpose InfanterieRegiment 125 had the following units attached: I./100.Gebirgs-Regiment, two Sturmgeschütz companies and two 88mm Flak battalions. At 1100hrs, Infanterie-Regiment 125 approached Fort Usita, which defended the eastern side of the Struma River, and attacked it front on with the support of artillery and Stukas – but without success. Only one company of its II.Bataillon managed to infiltrate between Fort Usita and Fort Karatas, to the south-east, reaching the village of Klidi; the two other companies that followed became caught in crossfire, and suffered heavy casualties. Klidi was seized by 1600hrs, but the three companies that had made it through were now isolated. To the west of the Struma River, I./100.Gebirgs-Regiment attacked Fort Paljurjones, with artillery and air support and accompanied by Sturmgeschütz, but ground to a halt in the face of Greek fire. By the end of the day, it was clear that the attack on the Rupel positions had been a costly failure. The renewed attempts made by I. and III./Infanterie-Regiment 125 against Fort Usita and by I./100.Gebirgs-Regiment against Fort Paljurjones on the 7th also failed to achieve any success. Even II./Infanterie-Regiment 125, which had moved on from Klidi and secured Mt Goliana to the south, enjoyed little lasting success, for a Greek counter-attack left the battalion isolated and short of ammunition on the heights, despite it being unable to dislodge the Germans from their positions. On 8 April, forts Paljurjones and Usita were both attacked once again, without success, before a pause was ordered. There would be no further attacks against the Rupel positions, and on 9 April, Infanterie-Regiment 125 was withdrawn to reorganize and refit after suffering heavy losses. To the east, 72.Infanterie-Division’s attacks also stalled. In an attempt to reach the Kalapiti Pass, Infanterie-Regiment 105 attacked Fort Lisse, suffering heavy losses, while Infanterie-Regiment 124’s attack on Fort Malianga to the west failed. The II. and III./Infanterie-Regiment 105 managed to infiltrate the Greek positions and reach Mt Kresti to the south, but the stubborn resistance of forts Malianga, Lisse and Pyramidoides (to the south-east) prevented any reinforcements from reaching the two battalions at Mt Kresti. As a result, any attempt to attack the forts from the rear was halted when, on 8 April, the two German battalions faced a Greek counterattack. Such was the determination of the Greek soldiers that they continued to fight on 9 April, even after they had been informed of the local surrender.

Men of 1.Kompanie, InfanterieRegiment 125 wait for a Stuka attack before moving against Fort Usita on the Metaxas Line. (NARA)

The only German success was enjoyed by 5.Gebirgs-Division west of the Struma River. On 6 April, Gebirgs-Regiment 85 attacked forts Kongur, Popolivista and Istibei from the west supported by heavy artillery and Stukas. The determined Greek resistance prevented any German success; only under the cover of darkness were the German troops able to reach the heights occupied by Fort Popolivista, with Fort Istibei following by 0800hrs the next morning. However, Greek artillery fire and a counter-attack before noon drove off the Germans, with heavy losses incurred by both sides. To the east, Gebirgs-Regiment 100 attacked Fort Kelkaja and occupied its summit at 1300hrs, but in spite of the support available, it made no further progress that day and also suffered heavy losses. The next day, Fort Kelkaja was finally taken at 1130hrs, leading the Germans to attack Fort Dimidi to the south-east. After bitter fighting, Infanterie-Regiment 85 captured Fort Istibei at 1600hrs, allowing II./Infanterie-Regiment 85 to exploit the gap and advance south to the village of Neo Petritsi, while Fort Popolivista was attacked again. Given the situation, the 200-strong garrison of Fort Arpalouki withdrew during the night, abandoning the fort. However, on 8 April, II./Infanterie-Regiment 85 faced a heavy Greek counter-attack and, while joined by II./Infanterie-Regiment 100, was unable to move forward partly because the Greeks had blown all the bridges on the Strymon River. After heavy fighting, at 1900hrs Fort Popolivista surrendered, but in the light of the heavy losses it had suffered (155 killed, 457 wounded), that same evening the 5.Gebirgs-Division commander called off any further attacks. The determined Greek resistance had thwarted the original German plan to break through the Rupel Pass defences and open a way for the advance of armoured forces. After three days of fighting, the pass was still blocked, and had the Greeks been able to bring in reinforcements, the fight for Salonika would have been a tough one. To the east, a similar situation had developed, 43

Preceded by an MG 38 team, the men of 1.Kompanie, Infanterie-Regiment 125 move towards their objective: Fort Usita. (NARA)

44

where, according to plans, Greek forces had delayed the German advance in preparation for a withdrawal to the Nestos River Line. On 6 April, 164.Infanterie-Division approached Fort Echinos, but was unable to attack it and to move forward. To the east, 50.Infanterie-Division easily overwhelmed the screening forces of the Evros Brigade but was unable to seize Fort Nymfea, and could advance towards Komotini and Sostis during the night. Following orders, the 200 officers and 2,000 men of the Evros Brigade made for the Turkish border, where they were interned. Nevertheless, it took until 1900hrs on 7 April for Fort Nymfea to fall, paving the way for the capture of Komotini. The 164.Infanterie-Division postponed its attack on Fort Echinos until the next day. The withdrawal of the Nestos Brigade facilitated the German advance, and on the 8th, 164. Infanterie-Division attacked Fort Echinos, capturing it after a bitter struggle at 2100hrs. Meanwhile, 50.Infanterie-Division approached Xanthi, and Infanterie-Regiment 440 from 164.Infanterie-Division started to advance towards Stavropouli. However, the attempts on 8 and 9 April to cross the Nestos River north of Stavropouli failed, just as 50.Infanterie-Division entered Xanthi and faced up to the Nestos Line defences. What the Germans had experienced on the Metaxas Line was unexpected. To date, no other opponent they faced had proved so determined, bold and courageous as the Greek soldier. Not even the Maginot Line, which inspired the fortifications of the Metaxas Line, had proved so hard to break through. But, as with the Maginot Line, the Germans could rely on outflanking it.

There were no forts defending the area between the Rupel Pass and the Yugoslav border, as the Greeks relied on the natural barrier presented by the high, steep, road-less mountains in this area. On 6 April, 6.Gebirgs-Division started its advance through this area, reaching Platanaki, east of Lake Doiran, by 1100hrs. During that night, the Greek forces present withdrew to the defence line running south of the main road to Rhodopolis, while the Germans brought in supplies across the mountains. On 7 April, 6.GebirgsDivision prepared to launch an attack, deploying between Platanaki and Rhodopolis, while Lieutenant-General Bakopoulos, the EMFAS commander, prepared the XIX Motorized Division (minus its 191st Regiment) to link up with the XVIII Division and plug the gap in the Rhodopolis Valley. On 8 April, the German attack began, and managed to break through the Greek defences east of Lake Doiran. The next day, 6.Gebirgs-Division advanced south, towards Alexia and Kilkis. By the afternoon of 8 April, LieutenantGeneral Bakopoulos had already realized that the Metaxas Line positions could no longer be held, and ordered a general withdrawal to the coast and the ports, with the aim of saving as many units as possible and shipping them south. At 1630hrs, Lieutenant-General Bakopoulos informed Papagos of his decision, who agreed with it. A few minutes later, Papagos’ headquarters contacted Bakopoulos once again, with the shocking news that he was authorized to begin negotiations with the Germans for the surrender of the entire EMFAS force. Two factors led to this decision: first, it would be impossible, in practical terms, to stage a large-scale evacuation of troops from Salonika and Thrace. Second, the unexpectedly rapid advance of 2.Panzer-Division that day was already threatening Salonika itself. The German XXXX.Panzer-Korps had crossed the Yugoslav frontier at 0530hrs on 6 April, split into three different columns: to the north was 9.Panzer-Division followed by the LSSAH; in the centre was 73.InfanterieDivision; and in the south was 2.Panzer-Division. The advance of the northern and central columns was slowed by the stiff resistance of the Yugoslav Moravska and Bregalnička divisions, while the Luftwaffe struck the approaching Yugoslav reinforcement columns hard, as they made slow progress with their pack-animal carts and wagons. After dealing with the weak resistance it encountered, 2.Panzer-Division pushed towards Sušica, moving along the Strumica River valley. On 8 April, 9.Panzer-Division entered Skopje unopposed, and as the LSSAH and 73.Infanterie-Division approached the Vardar River, 2.PanzerDivision reached the Strumica River at Strumica itself. No longer encountering any Yugoslav resistance, both 9.Panzer-Division and 73.Infanterie-Division crossed the Vardar the following day. The 2.Panzer-Division was ordered to advance north towards Štip, but the divisional commander, Generalmajor Rudolf Veiel, realized there was an opportunity here not to be missed.

One of the machine-gun bunkers of Fort Usita on the Metaxas Line, knocked out by Stuka bombing and German artillery fire. The fort surrendered on 9 April 1941. (NARA)

45

A PzKpfw III of 2.PanzerDivision attempting to cross a heavily damaged bridge near Kilkis, 45km north of Salonika, on 9 April 1941. (NARA)

A battle group was created led by Oberst Gustav von Vaerst (an infantry brigade commander), with I.Abteilung from Panzer-Regiment 3, II.Bataillon from Schützen-Regiment 304, two artillery battalions and elements from the anti-tank and engineers battalions. The group began to move south. During the night of 7/8 April, the battle group, moving along the Axios River valley, crossed the border, saw off the Greek frontier troops present and captured the Kosturino Pass. That same night, the spearhead elements had already pushed south of Lake Doiran, even further than the lead elements of 6.Gebirgs-Division. Both the Yugoslav and Greek army leadership requested the intervention of the British 1st Armoured Brigade, but to no avail. In any case, the Germans had already broken through. After entering Polykastro unopposed, the 2.Panzer-Division spearheads continued their drive south, crossing the bridge over the Gallikos River at 2000hrs. They were now at the gates of Salonika. At 2100hrs on 8 April, Lieutenant-General Bakopoulos contacted Generalmajor Veiel to open negotiations. An hour and a half later, the Germans responded: Salonika was to surrender unconditionally. This was agreed to, and at 0700hrs on the 9th, 2.Panzer-Division entered the city. Three hours later, Lieutenant-General Bakopoulos concluded a ceasefire agreement, and then at 1400hrs signed the agreement that surrendered the EMFAS units. The only Greek request was to prevent Bulgarian units from entering Greece, but Bulgaria (which had not declared war on Greece) was preparing already to occupy the portion of the country it considered belonged to it. The fight for the Metaxas Line, albeit short-lived, was very costly. The Greek Army lost between 1,000 and 1,200 killed and wounded. The Wehrmacht lost 555 (720 according to other sources) killed and 2,134 wounded – around half the entire losses suffered during the Battle of Greece. The German commanders, from the divisional leaders up to Hitler, acknowledged the valour and determination shown by the Greek soldiers, and eventually Hitler would order the release of the Greek prisoners of war. 46

THE ALIAKMON LINE The unexpected and swift Yugoslav collapse led to rapid developments in the Greek campaign, to which each side reacted differently. Up until 8 April, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List kept a concerned eye on the situation in Yugoslavia, fearing a counter-attack against the XXXX.Panzer-Korps spearheads. The seizure that same day of Prilep by the LSSAH, which effectively cut the main road and railway communication links between Serbia and Greece along the Monastir–Florina axis, created a sense of relief and resulted in changes to 12.Armee’s strategy. On 9 April, as Generalleutnant Georg Stumme deployed the bulk of XXXX.Panzer-Korps in the Monastir area, List ordered two attack columns to be formed with the aim of breaking through the Allied defences and driving into central Greece and on southwards to the Aliakmon River. The right hook was to be provided by XXXX.Panzer-Korps with the LSSAH and 73.Infanterie-Division, with 9.Panzer-Division and later 5.Panzer-Division as back-up; it was tasked with breaking through the Florina Gap and aiming for Kozani. The left hook was to be provided by XVIII.Gebirgs-Korps with 2.Panzer-Division spearheading the advance, followed by 72.InfanterieDivision and 5.Gebirgs-Division and 6.Gebirgs-Division. The left hook’s orders were to advance west of Salonika on two axes (one towards Edessa in the north, and the other towards Veria in the south), break through the enemy defences and then link up with XXXX.Panzer-Korps at Kozani. It must be stressed, however, that the challenge facing the Wehrmacht’s forces was not an easy one. The XXXX.Panzer-Korps relied on a handful of suitable roads and long supply lines stretching all the way back to Bulgaria, and 9.Panzer-Division also had to comply with Hitler’s request to head to Albania in order to link up with the Italians. Since Generalfeldmarschall List believed that the Kleidi Pass south of Florina would be heavily defended, on 9 April he requested that 5.Panzer-Division be detached from XIV.PanzerKorps and instead assigned to XXXX.Panzer-Korps. Generaloberst Kleist’s

A destroyed Universal Carrier in the Kleidi Pass area, most likely from the British 1st Armoured Brigade. The Universal Carrier proved to be a reliable and resilient armoured vehicle. (NARA)

47

Kalpaki

XXX

XXXX

Ioannina

WMFAS

Gr

Korçë

Allied withdrawal 12–15 April 1941 Allied withdrawal 16–20 April 1941 Allied withdrawal 19–20 April 1941 Axis advance 9–16 April 1941 Axis advance 17–20 April 1941

Axis positions 20 April 1941

Allied positions 17 April 1941

Metsovo

LSSAH

XX

Klisoura Pass

21 Gr

X

s

25km

X

1 Br V

9

19 M Au

kos

Vevi

XX

19 M Au

25 miles

XX

17 S Kalabaka Au

Elevtokori

5

XX

Siatista

5

X

XX Gr

X

Trikkala

X

9

17 S Au

6 NZ

Servia

Karditsa

X

XX

16 A Au

XX

X

X

X

X

so

2

X

XX

II

KG B

XX

N

Voivis

Mt Ossa

Pandeleimon

X

Katerini

Larissa

2

Agrinion

XX

III

16 A Au

Gonnos

21 NZ

NZ

6

Yannitsa

Mt Olympus

X

Elassona

KG K

5 NZ

Veria

Skidra

Edessa

XII Gr

XX

4 NZ

Vegoritis

Kozani

X

Kleidi

1 Br

Ptolemais

X

XX

Grevena

XII Gr

XX Gr Argos Orestikon

Kastoria

Gr

Akelo

0

0

htos

Axis positions 9–12 April 1941

Lake Ioannina

GREECE

LSSAH

X

XX

X

Florina

LSSAH

YUGOSLAVIA Lake Prespa

Arak

Allied positions 14 April 1941

Igoumen Igoumenitsa umenits umenit n a

mas

Kala

ino

Allied positions 12 April 1941

A Gr

XXX

B Gr

ALBANIA

Këlcyrë

Dr

Front line 12 April 1941 Front line 14 April 1941 Front line 16 April 1941 Front line 17 April 1941

Tepelenë

ë

Vjos

Berat

ll

vo

De

Pogradec

Bitola

r

Lake Ohrid

n mo

German Kampfgruppen K Kampfgruppe Koelitz B Kampfgruppe Balck

um

e ne ti

Os

Ap

tsas

16

leni ak

48 n

Mog Ali

Axios

Ae

Allied forces M Mackay Force S Savige Force A Allen Force

The invasion of Greece, 9–20 April 1941

Pinio s

refusal to comply with this order, together with the fact that 5.PanzerDivision had reached the Yugoslav city of Niš on 11 April, led to a delay. The next day, 5.Panzer-Division began to head south and reached Priština, with vanguard elements pushing on to Skopje. On 13 April, 5.Panzer-Division was assigned to XXXX.Panzer-Korps, and it would eventually reach Florina on 15 April. The delay to 5.Panzer-Division’s progress was only one of the problems facing Generalfeldmarschall List. The XVIII.Gebirgs-Korps, which itself had to force open blocked roads in order to secure its supply lines, needed time to reorganize. The bulk of 2.Panzer-Division was still moving south to reach Oberst von Vaerst’s battle group, while its other three divisions, particularly 5.Gebirgs-Division and 72.Infanterie-Division, needed time to rest and refit. However, these difficulties failed to offer any advantage to ‘W’ Force and to the rest of the Greek Army, both of which were now facing a rearguard battle. The Aliakmon Line had turned out to be practically useless in defensive terms, and on 8 April Lieutenant-General Wilson also had to take on board the Yugoslav collapse. That meant not only that the Metaxas Line could be enveloped from the west along the Axios River, as in fact it had been, but also that the Monastir–Florina gap was now highly vulnerable. Without informing Lieutenant-General Papagos, to whom he was formally subordinated, Lieutenant-General Wilson called for a meeting at Lieutenant-General Blamey’s Australian I Corps headquarters to discuss the situation. There were few options to choose from. Wilson decided to abandon the forward positions on the Aliakmon Line in order to occupy an ‘intermediate’ line, the main purpose of which was to enable the withdrawal of Greek forces from Albania in order to establish a more permanent defence. The line, running from Mt Olympus to the southern course of the Aliakmon River, stretched to the west, where Greek forces were supposed to be offering a defence. From there it was to link with the Venetikos, the Aoos and the Kalamas rivers to Albania and the Adriatic coast – essentially the same positions occupied by the Greek Army in October 1940. The redeployment, which Papagos agreed to with full awareness of the situation, had some consequences. Shifting most of the New Zealand 2nd Division from the area north of Katerini to the south and west of it not only meant abandoning all the groundworks done, but also huge quantities of barbed wire and mines. In addition, the still-arriving Australian 19th Brigade, forming the bulk of Mackay Force, made heavy going on the poor Greek roads, resulting in exhaustion and fatigue among many of the soldiers. The redeployment ordered by Wilson, enacted on 9–11 April, required a strengthening of the Kleidi Pass where Mackay Force was deployed. It included the Australian 19th Brigade with two battalions (2/4th still en route and 2/8th redeploying from Veria – the 2/11th was still at sea), plus the 1st

Soldiers from the Australian 2/2nd Battalion, 16th Brigade, on their route of withdrawal after crossing the Aliakmon River. (Australian War Memorial, public domain)

49

AXIS A. Kampfgruppe Witt, LSSAH Regiment (I.Bataillon, LSSAH; 7. and 8.Kompanie, II.Bataillon, LSSAH; Sturmgeschütz battery and Panzerjäger I self-propelled gun company from V.Bataillon, LSSAH) B. Kampfgruppe Weidenhaupt, LSSAH Regiment (III.Bataillon, LSSAH – reinforced) C. Voraus-Abteilung Appell, 9.PanzerDivision (HQ of Schützen-Brigade 9 with I.Bataillon, Schützen-Regiment 11, Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9 and II.Bataillon, Artillerie-Regiment 11) D. Kampfgruppe Borowietz, 9.PanzerDivision (Kradschützen-Bataillon 59 and II./Panzer-Regiment 33)

X

SS

DIETRICH

LAKE VEGORITIS

XX

9

VON HUBICKI

3

KELLI

5 1 2

7

1

LAKE PETRON PETRAIS

4 VEVI

SITARIA

4

5

B

KLEIDI 

AMINDAION  10

9

11

6 A

7

3

10

2

SOTIR 11

XINON NERON

8

12

C 8 PEDHINON 6

9 AETHOS

FLAMBOURON

LAKE LAZARI

STARA REMA RIVER

EVENTS 1. At 0900hrs on 12 April, Kampfgruppe Witt attacks Hill 997, defended by the Australian 2/8th Battalion, and captures it at 1100hrs. 2. At 1100hrs, 7.Kompanie of Kampfgruppe Witt attacks Hill 917. 3. Believing that the Australian 2/8th Battalion is withdrawing, the 1st Rangers abandon their positions while Hill 917 is under attack. 4. At 1400hrs, 2. and 3.Kompanie of Kampfgruppe Witt, with support, attack along the main road while 1. and 7.Kompanie advance towards Kleidi. After a brief fight, the German troops break through the pass, reaching the crossroads between Xinon Neron and Amindaion at 2100hrs. 5. During the day, III.Bataillon of LSSAH (Kampfgruppe Weidenhaupt) reaches Kelli, turning south against the positions of I Battalion, Greek Dodecanese Regiment. 6. Early in the afternoon, the advance party of Voraus-Abteilung Appell reaches Flambouro before attacking the positions held by I Battalion, Greek 88th Regiment. 7. After breaking through the German defences at 2000hrs, III.Bataillon LSSAH takes Petrais. 8. At 2230hrs, Voraus-Abteilung Appell breaks through the Greek defences at Hill 966, and approaches Xinon Neron during the night. 9. At 0730hrs on 13 April, one hour after being attacked by 12 Cruiser tanks of the 3rd RTR, which then withdraw behind the first rearguard positions, Kampfgruppe Witt approaches Sotir and then halts. 10. Facing the German breakthrough and the withdrawal of the Australian 2/4th Battalion at 1700hrs on 12 April, the British 1st Armoured Brigade commander Brigadier Charrington forms a delaying, or rearguard, position south of the line Amindaion–Sotir with elements from the Australian 2/4th Battalion, a company from the 1st Rangers and two squadrons from the 3rd RTR and 4th Hussars.

50

11. At 0855hrs, Brigadier Charrington orders a withdrawal to the second rearguard position south of Ptolemais, just after the troops of Kampfgruppe Witt have crossed the river. 12. Kampfgruppe Borowietz, including Kradschützen-Bataillon 59 and PanzerRegiment 33, pursues the withdrawing forces to Ptolemais on 14 April. 13. At 1515hrs on the 14th, Panzer-Regiment 33 outflanks the positions defended by the 1st Rangers, approaching the headquarters of British 1st Armoured Brigade at Mavropiye. 14. The New Zealand 27th Machine-Gun Battalion rushes to defend the British headquarters at Mavropiye. 15. Two squadrons from the 3rd RTR and one from the 4th Hussars counter-attack around 30 Panzers at Mavropiye, now supported by elements from KradschützenBataillon 59. After an hour and a half of fighting, they are unable to prevent the German breakthrough and are forced to withdraw.

13

BREAKING THROUGH THE KLEIDI PASS, 12–14 APRIL 1941 The Mackay Force positions at the Kleidi Pass faced the German troops moving south from Florina. The pass was vital as it gave access to the Florina valley and Kozani, dominating the Aliakmon River. The seizure of the pass by the LSSAH Regiment marked the beginning of the German breakthrough in Greece. X

1 Br

CHARRINGTON X

19 Aus

LAKKIA

MACKAY

ANATOLIKON 12 PERDHIKA 18

KOMANOS

17 14

PTOLEMAIS

PROASTION

D

19

16

MAVROPIYI

15

GALATIA

14 LAKE KHIMADITIS

15

TSIRONGA DERESI RIVER

13

ASVESTOPETRA

ALLIED 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

I Battalion, Greek Dodecanese Regiment III Battalion, Greek Dodecanese Regiment II Battalion, Greek Dodecanese Regiment Australian 2/8th Battalion Elements of New Zealand 27th MachineGun Battalion 6. 1st Battalion, The Rangers/King’s Royal Rifle Corps 7. Australian 2/4th Battalion 8. I Battalion, Greek 88th Regiment, XXI Brigade 9. British 1st Armoured Brigade 10. Two companies, Australian 2/4th Battalion 11. One company, 1st Battalion, The Rangers 12. Two squadrons, 3rd RTR and 4th Hussars 13. Remnants of 1st Battalion, The Rangers 14. Two companies, New Zealand 27th Machine-Gun Battalion 15. Squadron, 4th Hussars 16. 4th Hussars (less two squadrons), squadron from 3rd RTR 17. Squadron, 3rd RTR 18. HQ British 1st Armoured Brigade

ARDHASSA

Note: gridlines are shown at intervals of 5km (3.1 miles)

51

A German PzKpfw II crossing the Aliakmon River by means of a pontoon bridge. Natural obstacles like rivers represented the main hindrance to German armour in Greece. (NARA)

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Armoured Brigade with the 3rd RTR, 2nd Royal Horse Artillery (RHA) and 1st Battalion, The Rangers. Elements from New Zealand’s 27th MachineGun Battalion and the 64th Artillery Regiment provided support, and the Dodecanese Regiment from the Greek XX Infantry Division protected the right flank. The Greek Cavalry Division, reinforced by the XXI Infantry Brigade, held the left flank. To the right, in the Vermion Mountains west of Edessa to Veria, were deployed the Greek XX and XII divisions, and the Australian 16th Brigade was at Veria. The New Zealand 4th Brigade was shifted from north of Katerini to the south, at Servia. At the same time, the New Zealand 5th and 6th brigades deployed south of Katerini on what would become the Olympus Line. All in all, the ‘intermediate’ line was some 170km long, with the Kleidi Pass positions extending for some 6.5km. At 1700hrs on 9 April, the New Zealand Cavalry Regiment, screening the Aliakmon River line between Veria and the coast, made contact with the German units advancing from Salonika. The same day, the reconnaissance battalion of the LSSAH entered Monastir, and one of its companies pushed forward to Florina and the Kleidi Pass. The brigade was in fact spread out over a wide area, with part of it still at Bitola and probing west, which is why on the 10th, 1.Kompanie by itself and unopposed seized Hill 757 some 5km north of Kleidi. With 2.Kompanie still at Florina, 3.Kompanie approached the Kleidi Pass only to withdraw at 2230hrs when it came under enemy fire. Probing the defence lines, 1.Kompanie attacked the Vevi defences, only to leave 24 prisoners in the hands of the 1st Rangers. That night, II./LSSAH, probing west of Florina into the Vermion Mountains, clashed with the Greek Cavalry Division. At 0600hrs on 11 April, the LSSAH headquarters, which reached Hill 757 that same morning, received the order to seize the Kleidi Pass and advance 50km to Kozani in order to prevent the enemy from establishing a front line. Speed was preferred to strength, and with the III.Bataillon still in the Vermion Mountains, Kampfgruppe Witt (comprising I./LSSAH, plus 7. and 8.Kompanie from II.Bataillon and elements from V./LSSAH) was dispatched on its own to Kleidi, the II.Bataillon still being at Florina. During the night, 7.Kompanie seized Hill 917, and at 0900hrs on the 12th Kampfgruppe Witt attacked Hill 997 (the Golemo height, dominating the mountain road between Vevi and Kleidi) defended by the Australian 2/8th Battalion. After a fierce fight, the ridge was taken by Witt’s men at 1100hrs, leading 7.Kompanie to attack the nearby Hill 917, overlooking the pass; it was taken at 1330hrs. After this, the 1st Rangers withdrew, thinking that the 2/8th Battalion had done the same. At 1400hrs, Kampfgruppe Witt attacked en masse, with 2. and 3.Kompanie moving along the road and 1. and 7.Kompanie moving from the ridge towards Kleidi. At the same time, Voraus-Abteilung

(advance guard formation) Appell from 9.Panzer-Division attacked to the west, towards Flambouro. Facing Mackay Force’s artillery and the New Zealand 27th Battalion, the German troops broke through after a brief fight, while on their left flank, at dusk, III./LSSAH attacked the positions held by the Dodecanese Regiment from Kelli, seizing Petrais at about 2000hrs. At 1900hrs, Witt sent 2. and 3.Kompanie forward along the road, and by 2100hrs they were approaching Amindaion. After reaching Flambouro at 1900hrs, Voraus-Abteilung Appell outflanked the positions held by the Australian 2/4th Battalion, and attacked the 1st Battalion of the Greek 88th Regiment at 2230hrs. It approached Xinon Neron during the night. At 1700hrs on 12 April, the Australian 2/4th Battalion withdrew, leaving Brigadier Harold Charrington with no other choice than reinforcing the Sotir delaying position with elements from the 2/8th Battalion and two squadrons from the 3rd RTR and one from the 4th Hussars. The intended delay resulted, as Kampfgruppe Witt, having approached Sotir during the morning of the 13th, was forced to halt its advance. At 0630hrs, 12 Cruiser tanks from Lakkia attacked the LSSAH’s 2.Kompanie, but the latter was able to repulse the attack using its organic anti-tank guns, as well as those from 9.Panzer-Division. Witt decided to postpone the attack until the following morning. Soon after the Germans had crossed the stream at 0730hrs on the 14th, Brigadier Charrington ordered a withdrawal to the Ptolemais delaying position further south. Around the same time, Panzer-Regiment 33 from 9.Panzer-Division reached the town of Kleidi. The seizure of the Kleidi Pass cost the LSSAH regiment 37 killed, 98 wounded and two missing. Most importantly, the German advance did not stop. In the meantime, the LSSAH’s Aufklärungs-Abteilung (reconnaissance battalion, redesignated Kampfgruppe Meyer) advanced towards Klisura, only to be halted by a destroyed bridge. On 14 April, after fighting with elements from the Greek Cavalry and XX Infantry Division, and losing nine killed and 18 wounded while at the same time taking some 600 prisoners, the Klisura Pass was seized. By 1200hrs, the way to Lake Kastoria lay open. Meanwhile, south of Ptolemais, the 1st Rangers and the New Zealand 27th Battalion held the line, supported by the 3rd RTR and the 4th Hussars. After passing through Ptolemais at 1515hrs on the 14th, Oberstleutnant Hans Joachim von Köppen, commander of Panzer-Regiment 33, decided to dispatch around 30 Panzers to outflank the enemy positions to the west. These tanks reached Charrington’s headquarters at Mavropiye. Two squadrons from the 3rd RTR and one from the 4th Hussars counter-attacked at once, leading to a 90-minute fight, which eventually ended with a breakthrough of the positions on the main road by Panzer-Regiment 33, which was now supported by Kradschützen-Bataillon 59’s motorcycle infantry. Darkness, and the fact that the German columns had run out of fuel, enabled the defenders to withdraw. The final victory cost Panzer-Regiment

New Zealand soldiers in a Morris truck make their way to the positions at the foot of Mt Olympus. (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand, DA-01591-F)

53

Bill Crawley and Phil Tritt from the New Zealand 27th Machine-Gun Battalion stand in front of their truck, which has been damaged in a German aircraft attack. (Alexander Turnbull Library, New Zealand, DA-14389-F)

33 a few wounded men and heavy damage to two PzKpfw IVs, one PzKpfw II and one PzKpfw I. The British 1st Armoured Brigade lost 33 tanks, mostly Cruisers, 21 of which were abandoned by their crews due to mechanical failure. At 1145hrs on 15 April, the vanguard elements of 9.Panzer-Division were nearing Kozani. Earlier that day, at 0530hrs, Kampfgruppe Meyer had reached Hill 800 south-east of Lake Kastoria; that evening, around 1800hrs, it took the crossroads leading towards the town after another clash with the Greek Cavalry Division units plus elements from the Greek XIII Infantry Division. That same day, SS-Sturmbannführer Kurt Meyer was informed that the seizure of Klisura Pass had earned him the Knight’s Cross. At 0200hrs on the 16th, the LSSAH was ordered to advance to Grevena; its III.Bataillon set off, but ran out of fuel once it reached Grevena on the 18th. Nevertheless, the battalion continued its advance towards Ioannina on foot. From 9 April, following the German seizure of Monastir, the Greek GHQ had been considering withdrawing all forces from Albania. Actual preparations began two days later, with the order to do so issued on the 12th. That same night, the WMFAS units, comprising four infantry divisions plus the Cavalry Division, broke contact with the Italians and started to move back across the border. Seven divisions from B Army Corps, EFAS followed suit on 13–14 April, with A Army Corps’ three divisions the last to get going on 16–17 April. Even though the Italians pursued the withdrawing Greek troops without any real aggressive intent, morale dropped among the Greek troops, and as the WMFAS troops reached the Greco-Albanian border on 15 April, around 280 officers and men surrendered to the Germans. In the evening of the 15th, the Greek Cavalry Division and elements from XIII Infantry Division (which was nearing collapse) clashed with the LSSAH Regiment at Kastoria and Argos Orestiko. Acknowledging that his units were surrounded, Lieutenant-General Tsolakoglou ordered his men to break contact in order to avoid the Italians. On 17 April, his command was disbanded, with WMFAS redesignated C Army Corps, under EFAS command. 54

The step, clearly aimed at avoiding a separate surrender, came too late. The same day, the crisis that engulfed the Cretan V Infantry Division marked the beginning of the Greek collapse, with cases of insubordination spreading through the withdrawing units. Lieutenant-General Ioannis Pitsikas, the EFAS commander, had a clear grasp of the situation, and on the 16th, after meeting with his corps commanders, he informed the GHQ at Athens that it was no longer possible to resist. Yet, the GHQ refused to grant permission to surrender, even though the previous day it had started sending men on leave, practically disbanding the army. On the 18th, Pitsikas met with the Greek Minister President Alexandros Koryzis; the latter committed suicide that same day, without leaving further instructions. At the same time, the corps commanders began to press for a truce. Having finally been authorized by the GHQ to begin negotiations with the Germans if all the other commanders agreed, at 0545hrs on 20 April Lieutenant-General Tsolakoglou took control of the situation, and, as Lieutenant-General Pitsikas departed for Athens, sent emissaries for parley. The latter met with German representatives at 0900hrs at Zygos Pass, and handed over a letter from Lieutenant-General Tsolakoglou offering EFAS’ surrender. The LSSAH’s commanding officer SS-Obergruppenführer Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich arrived at the pass at 1600hrs, having contacted Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm List at once. Two hours later, a truce agreement was signed, which required the LSSAH to position itself between the Greek and Italian troops. Mussolini, feeling scorned, refused to accept this. The following day, he asked that the Greek Army formally surrender to the Italians as well, losing time with such formalities. A horrified General Alfred Jodl (head of OKW operations) dispatched a message to List’s headquarters at Salonika stating that there was no other option than to comply with the Italian request. Eventually, much to Mussolini’s pleasure, a further formal surrender was signed on the 23rd, bringing to a close the Greco-Italian War that had begun on 28 October 1940. Still, the Germans took care to add a demarcation running along the Kalamas Line that separated the Italian and German troops, adding that only the Greek troops north of it would become Italian prisoners of war. Most of the Greek soldiers taken prisoner by the Germans would be released soon after.

LSSAH Regiment’s commander Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich negotiates the terms of the Greek surrender in Epirus with Lieutenant-General Georgios Tsolakoglou. (Public domain)

THE OLYMPUS LINE AND THE ALLIED WITHDRAWAL Even though ‘W’ Force had been sent to support the Greek Army, there was little cooperation between them in the field. On 12 April, Lieutenant-General Papagos wanted the British 1st Armoured Brigade to hold the Kleidi Pass area 55

A column from 2.PanzerDivision en route to crossing the Aliakmon River before the advance to Katerini. (NARA)

BELOW LEFT A German motorized column, probably from Kampfgruppe Koelitz, pauses at the foot of Mt Olympus. (NARA) BELOW RIGHT New Zealand troops enjoy a moment of rest under the cover of some trees. (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand, DA-01109-F)

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in order to enable Greek forces to withdraw from Albania. But LieutenantGeneral Wilson had no intention of complying with this, and used it to protect the withdrawal of Mackay Force and the western flank of ‘W’ Force. Concerned by the news of the German advance to Ioannina and Grevena, and dubious about the ability of the Greeks to deal with the situation, plus using the Australian 17th Brigade to plug the gap on his western flank, Lieutenant-General Wilson made a crucial decision. After meeting with General Wavell, Wilson decided on yet another withdrawal. ‘W’ Force was to pull back some 160km to the south of the Thermopylae Line, the last line of defence. This effectively meant abandoning any idea of cooperating with the Greek Army, which was moving too slowly to follow the withdrawal, and marked the first step towards the evacuation of Allied forces from Greece – a move that was already being discussed in Cairo by this point. Lieutenant-General Wilson issued his orders for the withdrawal at 0950hrs on 15 April. It would be conducted in two stages. The first move

was to disengage any units in contact with the enemy during the night of 17/18 April. Wilson only informed General Papagos the following day, who realized how dire things were and concurred with the evacuation of Allied forces in order to prevent his country from becoming a battlefield. With hindsight, one cannot but agree with Wilson, yet the fact remains that ‘W’ Force had done very little to prevent the Greek expedition from turning into another Gallipoli. The situation was deteriorating rapidly on the Allied side in all areas. On 13 April, 6.Gebirgs-Division crossed the Aliakmon River south-east of Veria, while 2.PanzerDivision’s river crossing south-east of Nicelion was held up by the New Zealand Cavalry Regiment, before it withdrew to join the New Zealand 5th Brigade at Katerini. ‘W’ Force’s deployment along what was now the Mt Olympus–Aliakmon Line extended from the Aegean coast at Katerini and the eastern Mt Olympus passes (held by New Zealand 5th Brigade) to Servia Pass on the Aliakmon River (held by the New Zealand 4th Brigade). Between the two was the Australian 16th Brigade, due to withdraw on 15 April, while the Australian 19th Brigade (also due to pull back on the 15th) was deployed west of the New Zealand 4th Brigade, south of Siatista. The British 1st Armoured Brigade, now a spent force with only six tanks left, was already withdrawing to Grevena. The Australian 17th Brigade (also known as Savige Force, after brigade commander Brigadier Stanley Savige) was kept as a rearguard at Kalabaka, as was the New Zealand 6th Brigade being deployed south of Elassona. Both were to cover the withdrawal of the other brigades, keeping the road to Larissa open. On 15 April, both the Australian 16th and 19th brigades started to withdraw, just as the New Zealand 5th Brigade took up position on two sides of Mt Olympus. Although the German propaganda machine was already boasting that Allied forces had begun their evacuation from Greece, Generalfeldmarschall List knew the situation was not so positive. The seizure of the Kleidi Pass, and the subsequent capture of Klisura, represented a significant step, but what really mattered was pushing south to the Trikala–Laria line across the Pinios River. The enemy forces still held the passes to the south, and now speed was of the essence to prevent them from establishing a solid line of defence. This required List’s forces to keep pushing forward, even though most of his units were still scattered over a wide area with both lead elements and rear supplies struggling on poor, narrow, easily congested roads that prevented the latter from moving forward. The lead elements XXXX.PanzerKorps were to advance to Servia with 9.Panzer-Division, and then from there to Elassona with the newly arrived 5.Panzer-Division following along the same road. To the east, XVIII.Gebirgs-Korps was to advance on both sides of Mt Olympus to Larissa with 2.Panzer-Division supported by 6.GebirgsDivision. In the meantime, 164.Infanterie-Division secured the Aegean coast

Soldiers from the New Zealand 21st Battalion, 5th Brigade load up a donkey with supplies. (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand, DA-11862)

57

58

59

1 4

3

2

5

NEW ZEALAND 4TH BRIGADE AT SERVIA, 14–15 APRIL 1941 (PP. 58–59) On 9 April 1941, the New Zealand 4th Brigade moved from its positions on the Aliakmon Line to new positions on the Mt Olympus–Aliakmon Line, where it was ordered to defend the river crossing and the pass at Servia (1). At 1700hrs on 14 April, the vanguard of Kampfgruppe Sponeck approached the Aliakmon River bridge, and, after a brief fight, the bridge was blown but not completely destroyed. The German infantry (comprising elements from Schützen-Regiment 11 and KradschützenBataillon 59) crossed the river using the still-standing bridge pillars and established a bridgehead. In the early morning of 15 April, the motorcycle infantry of 6. and 8.Kompanie, Kradschützen-Bataillon 59, which had crossed the river in the course of the previous evening, moved through Servia to the mountain pass beyond, and began attacking the positions held by the New Zealand 19th Battalion. At dawn, the German soldiers were caught under fire and, after a fierce exchange, realized that their position was untenable. The New Zealand 19th Battalion

60

took 70 prisoners, and retained control of the pass. By this time, 1. and 3.Kompanie of Kradschützen-Bataillon 59 had also crossed the river and were now in Servia, to be joined by the lead elements of Schützen-Regiment 11. Soon, the men of the New Zealand 18th Battalion opened fire on the Germans in Servia, forcing them into desperate measures: the attempt to move north of the town. The German advance (2) began late in the morning, was blocked by the New Zealand 18th Battalion and eventually was called to a halt at dusk, when the Germans decided to withdraw from Servia. There would be no further attempt to seize the pass, whose defences were abandoned by the New Zealand 4th Brigade during the night of 17/18 April. The New Zealand troops shown here are firing a Vickers .303 machine gun (3), which was the standard heavy machine gun employed by the New Zealand Army. The New Zealanders’ distinctive appearance features are the shoulder strap tab (4) and the rare ‘lemon squeezer’ hat of World War I vintage (5).

and prepared to seize the islands, which it began doing on 16–19 April. On 14 April, 9.Panzer-Division sent forward Kampfgruppe Sponeck (built around Schützen-Regiment 11, under Oberst Theodor Graf von Sponeck) from Ptolemais; it took Kozani while the Luftwaffe bombed Servia. Kampfgruppe Sponeck approached Servia at dusk, its advance halted by New Zealand artillery fire. On the 15th, Kampfgruppe Sponeck was unable to bridge the Aliakmon River, lacking the necessary pontoon equipment, which had been left behind, and with its every attempt to do so harassed by New Zealand artillery. Nevertheless, a small bridgehead was created by elements of Schützen-Regiment 11 and KradschützenBataillon 59, whose 6. and 8.Kompanie moved forward during the morning of the 15th, reaching Servia and advancing into the New Zealand 19th Battalion’s positions. Caught in the crossfire, most of the German soldiers eventually surrendered in the morning after intense fighting. The advance into Servia of two other companies from KradschützenBataillon 59 and of the leading elements of I.Bataillon of Schützen-Regiment 11 served no purpose, and, facing heavy enemy fire, they, too, withdrew at dusk. The attack through Servia having been repulsed with heavy losses, the Germans realized that the New Zealanders’ defences and heavy fire would require much more preparation and better coordination to overcome. Thus,

A German PzKpfw IV has been hit by New Zealand 21st Battalion fire from Platamon. The nearby PzKpfw III also appears to be damaged. (NARA)

A German light 75mm field gun prepares to fire on the New Zealand positions at Platamon Ridge. (NARA)

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A 105mm heavy infantry gun on a PzKpfw I mount fires on the New Zealand 21st Battalion positions at Platamon. (NARA)

Kampfgruppe Sponeck began planning an attack in force to commence on the 17th, but this was first postponed, and then abandoned. Faced with Kampfgruppe Sponeck’s clear failure, XXXX.Panzer-Korps commander Generalleutnant Stumme ordered 5.Panzer-Division to bypass the Servia positions, and advance along the Kozani–Grevena–Kalabaka road, taking advantage of the LSSAH break-through. The main problem was a lack of roads south of Grevena, barely adequate for the passage of an armoured unit, and indeed 5.Panzer-Division’s advance was halted on 17 April by the demolished bridge over the Venetikos River south of Grevena. As the advance of 9.Panzer-Division was stalled at Servia, 2.PanzerDivision split in two to advance on two sides of Mt Olympus. From Katerini, Kampfgruppe Koelitz (under Oberst Hans Koelitz, and formed around Schützen-Regiment 2, with II.Abteilung of Panzer-Regiment 3) advanced to the west alongside the Mavroneri River against the positions held by the bulk of the New Zealand 5th Brigade, with the 28th, 22nd and 23rd battalions. During the morning of 15 April, the leading units of Kampfgruppe Koelitz approached the New Zealand positions east of Mt Olympus, and soon came under fire from the 28th and 22nd battalions supported by artillery. A minor German attack was repulsed, and the inaccurate German fire (due to their positions) proved ineffective. No major attack was launched against the New Zealand 5th Brigade’s positions, and for that day the Germans could only enjoy a solitary success: a series of large air raids against airfields in Greece destroyed 16 Blenheims and 14 Hurricanes on the ground, greatly reducing the RAF’s capabilities. On 16 April, while 9.Panzer-Division made no further attempts to take Servia, Kampfgruppe Koelitz (now reinforced with elements from 72.Infanterie-Division) attacked the positions held by the New Zealand 22nd Battalion, but were repulsed. The Kampfgruppe was reinforced with armour, the Panzers acting as mobile pillboxes, firing against the New Zealanders’ positions. Facing determined resistance, an attempt was made to outflank the Allied positions, with II.Bataillon of Schützen-Regiment 2 moving to the 62

A German 50mm anti-tank gun towed by a Demag D7 halftrack prime mover advances in the Platamon Ridge area. (NARA)

west and units from 72.Infanterie-Division crossing the mountain ridge in the east. While the New Zealand 28th Battalion was managing to hold off the German attack, the 23rd Battalion’s positions to the east were infiltrated. At dusk, the brigade commander, Brigadier James Hargest, decided to bring forward the planned withdrawal by two hours, and during the night of 16/17 April, the pass was left to fall into German hands. To the east, along the coastal road, the New Zealand 21st Battalion, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Neil Macky, took up positions at the Platamon tunnel. The latter had been destroyed as soon as the lead elements of Kampfgruppe Balck (under Oberst Hermann Balck) approached at 0630hrs on 14 April. Realizing this was a key position, Oberst Balck moved his units forwards (comprising Schützen-Regiment 304, I.Abteilung of Panzer-Regiment 3 and with Kradschützen-Bataillon 2 in the lead) and ordered them to prepare to attack the next day. While German artillery pounded the 21st Battalion’s positions, infantry supported by armour made a frontal attack against the New Zealand positions at Platamon, while KradschützenBataillon 2 attempted to outflank them to the west. During the night, this led to a New Zealand counterattack and a fierce fight developed on the heights overlooking Platamon, making Lieutenant-Colonel Macky more and more uncertain about his unit’s predicament. In the morning of 16 April, 21st Battalion’s situation did indeed seem desperate; the Panzers attacked to their front, Kradschützen-Bataillon 2 threatened to outflank its positions

A German Befehlspanzer III command tank leads an armoured column as it attempts to outflank the Platamon position. (NARA)

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AXIS Kampfgruppe Balck A. I.Bataillon, Panzer-Regiment 3, with 8.Kompanie, Lehr-Regiment ‘Brandenburg’ z.b.V. 800 B. Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112 C. 7.Kompanie, II.Bataillon, SchützenRegiment 304 6.Gebirgs-Division D. I.Bataillon, Gebirgs-Regiment 143 E. III.Bataillon, Gebirgs-Regiment 143 F. Gebirgs-Regiment 141

XX

6

SCHÖRNER XX

2

VEIEL

GONNOS 1 E

F

6

D

ITIA 3

PARAPOTAMOS 5 4 6

TEMBI BAMBA

7 5 8

10 12

7

11 MAKRIKHORI

EVANGELISMOS

EVENTS 17 April 1. At midday, elements of 6.Gebirgs-Division arrive at Gonnos, with III./GebirgsRegiment 143 in the vanguard. 2. I./Panzer-Regiment 3 advances along the railway line, but in the early afternoon its progress is halted by a blown tunnel. 3. At 1600hrs, Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112, the reconnaissance element of 6.Gebirgs-Division, moves forward beyond the blown tunnel and is soon engaged by fire from the New Zealand positions on the opposite river bank. In the end, it withdraws back to the tunnel. 4. Also at 1600hrs, the first Panzers, supported by Lehr-Regiment ‘Brandenburg’ z.b.V. 800 troops, cross the Pinios River and engage the positions held by the New Zealand 21st Battalion, whose leading elements are eventually forced to withdraw. 18 April 5. At 0700hrs, I./Gebirgs-Regiment 143 feigns an attack against the Australian positions; its movement is soon halted by Australian fire and by the lack of fording equipment. 6. At 0730hrs, III./Gebirgs-Regiment 143 attacks to the west of Gonnos, supported on its right wing by 2.Kompanie of I./Gebirgs-Regiment 143. They also cross the Pinios at 0745hrs using a captured boat, with the aim of breaking through to the rear of the Australian positions. 7. By midday, I./Gebirgs-Regiment 143 is ordered to attack for real, and it eventually crosses the Pinios, reaching Evangelismos at 1730hrs.

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8. Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112 begins advancing along the railway line in the early morning, facing weaker opposition than it did on the previous day. 9. Reinforced by 7.Kompanie’s motorized infantry from II./Schützen-Regiment 304, the six Panzers of I./Panzer-Regiment 3 that have crossed the river start to advance west at 1215hrs, and soon push back the New Zealand units and spread chaos amongst the Australian 2/2nd Battalion. 10. At 1500hrs, I./Panzer-Regiment 3 seizes Tembe, which is reached half an hour later by Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112. 11. While I./Panzer-Regiment 3 advances to Evangelismos, at 1400hrs, III./GebirgsRegiment 143 breaks through the Australian defences and pushes on to the west of Makrikhorion, while Gebirgs-Regiment 141 also crosses the Pinios River, moving south to the east of Makrikhorion before making contact with I./Panzer-Regiment 3 at 1800hrs. 12. At 1600hrs, a company from the Australian 2/2nd Battalion withdraws to Makrikhorion, almost by accident, but soon the rest of the battalion follows suit. The order is soon given to the Australian and New Zealand troops to break contact and withdraw at dusk.

THE PINIOS GORGE, 17–18 APRIL 1941 At the Pinios Gorge, ANZAC troops fought a rearguard action against two advancing German divisions. In a day of hard fighting, the ANZAC troops suffered heavy casualties and were forced back, but their stand allowed other Allied forces to withdraw south through Larissa and on to a new defensive position at Thermopylae. X

16 Aus

ALLEN PIRYETOS 8

B 3

2

A

9

C PINIOS RIVER

4 2 AMBELAKIA

1

OMOLION

5a AEGEAN SEA

ALLIED

Note: gridlines are shown at intervals of 5km (3.1 miles)

1. B Company, New Zealand 21st Battalion 2. D Company, New Zealand 21st Battalion 3. C Company, Australian 2/2nd Battalion 4. A Company, Australian 2/2nd Battalion 5. D Company, Australian 2/2nd Battalion 5a. Two platoons, Australian 2/2nd Battalion 6. C Company, Australian 2/3rd Battalion 7. B Company, Australian 2/1st Battalion 8. B Company, Australian 2/3rd Battalion 9. D Company, Australian 2/3rd Battalion

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A PzKpfw III fires on New Zealander positions at Platamon. (NARA)

A German artillery observer team reports back on enemy positions by radio at Platamon. (NARA)

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and now I.Bataillon of Schützen-Regiment 304 had also joined the fight. In the end, Macky decided to withdraw, and, following the Pinios River, the New Zealand 21st Battalion reached the western approaches to the Pinios Gorge at dusk, just as Allen Force (led by Brigadier Arthur Allen) started to assemble in the area. The next day in particular saw the entire front in motion. As the intermediate defence line was organized, the British 1st Armoured Brigade withdrew from Grevena, Savige Force (Australian 17th Brigade) deployed at Kalabaka and the New Zealand 6th Brigade deployed at Elassona, while Allen Force (Australian 16th Brigade) set up positions at the Pinios Gorge. Meanwhile, the forward units made ready for their own withdrawal. Between 17 and 18 April, the New Zealand 4th and 5th brigades started moving south, heading for Larissa. From there, two separate roads (the western one for Australian units and the eastern one for the New Zealand ones) would lead to the Thermopylae Line. Realizing that the Allied forces would defend the passes, 6.Gebirgs-Division commander Generalmajor Schörner opted for a different approach. After reaching Katerini in the afternoon of 14 April, he sent forward Gebirgs-Regiment 143 to cross Mt Olympus, outflanking the passes and heading directly for the Pinios Gorge. Allen Force, which in addition to the New Zealand 21st Battalion included elements from the Australian 16th Brigade (mostly the 2/1st and 2/3rd battalions), was defending the gorge – the last of the passes leading directly to Larissa. Allen’s forces did not constitute an unbroken line; to the west of the Australian 2/3rd Battalion, deployed between the Pinios River and 16th Brigade headquarters at Makrikhorion, there was a 2,700m gap between units.

Between the 2/3rd Battalion positions and those of 2/2nd (supported by B Company, 2/1st Battalion) the line was patrolled by one platoon with Bren Gun Carriers. To the east, at Ambelakia town and on the ridges, the New Zealand 21st Battalion was deployed with three platoons positioned forward towards the river. Around midday on 17 April, the lead elements of III.Bataillon of GebirgsRegiment 143 arrived at the town of Gonnos, north of the Pinios River, and found no trace of the enemy. Generalmajor Schörner arrived there at 1600hrs, and by 2130hrs, had prepared a plan to cross the river. The I.Batallion of Gebirgs-Regiment 143 was to carry out a feint to the south of Gonnos, while to the west of Parapotamos the III.Bataillon was to cross the river and advance to the village of Makrikhorion. This was in coordination with 2.Panzer-Division’s lead elements, which were approaching from the east. Early in the afternoon of 17 April, the vanguard of Kampfgruppe Balck, I.Abteilung of Panzer-Regiment 3 with elements from Gebirgs-AufklärungsAbteilung 112, entered the gorge and began moving along the railway track.

ABOVE LEFT The submerged turrets of two Panzer IIIs that sank attempting to cross the Pinios River. (NARA) ABOVE RIGHT One of the few Panzer IIIs that succeeded in fording the Pinios reaches the southern bank of the river on 18 April 1941, ready to approach the New Zealand positions. (NARA)

A SdKfz 251 half-track towing a 105mm leichte FH 18 howitzer pauses as it advances along the railway track, heading for the Pinios Gorge, on 17 April 1941. (NARA)

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ABOVE LEFT A column from 2.PanzerDivision descends a mountain road from Katerini to Elassona. (NARA) ABOVE RIGHT The original caption to this photo claims that the soldier sitting on the rear of Oberst Hermann Balck’s Befehlspanzer III was the first New Zealand soldier to be taken prisoner. (NARA) A Fieseler Storch reconnaissance aircraft flies over German infantry waiting to cross the Pinios River near Tembi, on 18 April 1941. (NARA)

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The advance of the German tanks was halted some 4km east of Tempe by a blown tunnel. At 1600hrs, while the men of Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112 attempted to bypass the tunnel, the tanks of I.Abteilung, PanzerRegiment 3 tried to ford the wide river. One PzKpfw III and three PzKpfw IIs were swept away by the current, but six tanks managed to make it across. The reaction from the New Zealand 21st Battalion was immediate; the infantry attempting to bypass the tunnel were taken under heavy fire and forced to pull back, while the German attack on a roadblock on the main road was unsuccessful. An attempt to send an Australian platoon to reinforce 21st Battalion’s position failed when it became stuck on the road and was unable to move forward. At 0700hrs on 18 April, I.Bataillon of Gebirgs-Regiment 143 started its feint, eliciting a fierce reaction from the Australian defenders, even though it was impossible for it to even attempt to cross the river given the lack of fording equipment. Half an hour later, III.Bataillon managed to cross the Pinios using some civilian boats found nearby, only to be immediately engaged by the Australian 2/2nd Battalion. At 0745hrs, 2.Kompanie from

Gebirgs-Regiment 143 also made it across the river, moving to the west of the Australian positions. At 1000hrs, Generalmajor Schörner ordered the divisional artillery, which had arrived at Gonnos, to fire on the enemy positions. At midday, I.Bataillon of Gebirgs-Regiment 143 was ordered to cross the river – this time for real. Kampfgruppe Balck’s troops also got on the move. In the morning, Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112 units bypassed the destroyed tunnel once again, this time facing less resistance. At 1215hrs, six more Panzers crossed the river, reinforced by 7.Kompanie of Schützen-Regiment 304 and 8.Kompanie of Lehr-Regiment ‘Brandenburg’ z.b.V. 800 (special troops), and began rolling forwards, soon overrunning the New Zealand anti-tank gun positions. In a matter of hours, the Allen Force positions at the Pinios Gorge were in German hands. While Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112 and the mixed Panzer and infantry unit advanced on both banks of the Pinios River, at 1300hrs I.Bataillon of Gebirgs-Regiment 143 started crossing the Pinios north-west of Evangelismos, completing the task by 1430hrs. Around this time, the New Zealand 21st Battalion started to withdraw, the arrival of its stray soldiers at the Australian 2/2nd Battalion positions soon spreading chaos and confusion. At 1400hrs, III.Bataillon of Gebirgs-Regiment 143 broke through the Australian 2/3rd Battalion positions, heading for Makrikhorion. At 1500hrs, the Panzer column reached Tembi, and soon linked up with the lead elements of Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112 on the opposite bank of the river. The Panzers reached Evangelismos shortly before the arrival of I.Bataillon, Gebirgs-Regiment 143 at 1730hrs, just as the newly arrived Gebirgs-Regiment 141 started to cross the Pinios River. After a chaotic struggle, Evangelismos was taken, but the fate of Allen Force had already been sealed. One company from the Australian 2/2nd Battalion withdrew to Makrikhorion at 1600hrs, opening a gap in the left flank of Allen Force’s deployment; this spread chaos, and led to a general withdrawal being ordered. As the Australians and the New Zealanders attempted to make their way south, some of whom (mostly from the New Zealand 21st and Australian 2/2nd battalions) headed across the mountains, at 1800hrs the German armour and mountain troops linked up north of Makrikhorion. The town was in German hands half an hour later. The German units pushed on towards the southern end of the Pinios Gorge, their vanguards eventually

BELOW LEFT A mixed column of German PzKpfw II light tanks and motorcycle infantry on the road to Tembi, 18 April 1941. (NARA) BELOW RIGHT A PzKpfw II from the regimental HQ (note the R03 numbering) of Panzer-Regiment 3 passes an SdKfz 10 (left) and ammunition truck (right) on its approach to the Pinios Gorge. (NARA)

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being halted that night by B Squadron of the New Zealand Cavalry Regiment. The breakthrough had cost the Germans some 140 men plus (in addition to the three tanks lost while fording the river) three PzKpfw IIIs and 10 PzKpfw IIs written off.

LAST STAND AT THERMOPYLAE As it withdrew from the western Olympus Pass positions early in the morning of 17 April, the New Zealand 5th Brigade was taken by surprise by elements from Kampfgruppe Koelitz, and attacked. After a fierce fight, the New Zealanders managed to continue their withdrawal; the German troops were unable to follow because of fatigue and the need to regroup. That night, the brigade had reached Elassona, followed the next day by the New Zealand 4th Brigade, which had carried out its planned withdrawal from Servia, avoiding Panzer-Regiment 3’s spearheads thanks to the intervention of the divisional cavalry and demolition teams. By 18 April, all that was left north of Larissa, apart from the New Zealand 6th Brigade and the remnants of Allen Force, were Savige Force (HQ Australian 17th Brigade) withdrawing from Kalabaka to Trikala, and the remnants of the British 1st Armoured Brigade. It is revealing that, in spite of Brigadier Savige’s request, the commander of the British 1st Armoured Brigade, Brigadier Charrington, refused to act as a rearguard and only left a small detachment of gun carriers, anti-tank guns and machine gunners, plus a reduced New Zealand Cavalry Squadron, with the Australian 17th Brigade. The British 1st Armoured Brigade was in fact no longer an effective fighting force, and what was left of it made its way to Kalabaka, and from there to Athens. The brigade ended up with one Cruiser and seven light tanks, in addition to the remnants of the 1st Rangers and the New Zealand Cavalry Squadron. Brigadier Charrington only left five tanks from the 3rd

The New Zealand divisional HQ at the Thermopylae Line. Hidden under the camouflage netting is a 3-ton truck. (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand, DA-01124-F)

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RTR to support the Lee Force rearguard (under Major Lee) at Domokos. All other tanks had been lost, mostly to mechanical problems. The German breakthrough at the Pinios Gorge threatened the withdrawal of the New Zealand 6th Brigade, which was holding the positions south of Elassona with its left flank screened by the rest of the New Zealand cavalry. By noon on 18 April, the lead elements of 9.Panzer-Division (the only ones that managed to cross the Aliakmon River on a new pontoon bridge) pushed south of Elassona, attacking the New Zealand 24th Battalion positions at night, before their advance was halted by demolitions. The brigade started its withdrawal under cover of darkness, unaware that a company of mountain troops from Gebirgs-Regiment 143 was approaching from the east. Nevertheless, the New Zealanders carried out their withdrawal unhindered. During the night, the rearguards of the New Zealand 6th Brigade, Allen Force (Australian 16th Brigade) and Savige Force made their way to Larissa, and managed to clear the bottleneck before it was sealed. By the early hours of 19 April, both the New Zealand 6th Brigade and the bulk of Savige Force had passed through Larissa to the south. It was a close call. The German mountain troops, after a long forced march across the mountains and along the Pinios River, had succeeded in bringing 2.Kompanie of Gebirgs-Regiment 143 by dusk on 18 April to the road just north of Larissa, and there they established a roadblock. The demolition work carried out, and the mines laid on the road from the Pinios Gorge, meant that disaster was avoided, as these slowed the advance of 2.Panzer-Division’s vanguard. Only units from Allen Force found their way blocked, and had to make their way along secondary roads towards Volos in scattered groups. At 0700hrs on 19 April, I.Abteilung of Panzer-Regiment 3 entered Larissa just as the withdrawal of ‘W’ Force was being concluded. While these units made their way to the Thermopylae Line, a composite force (Lee Force with the Australian 2/7th, 2/4th, 2/8th and 2/6th battalions) took up position north of Lamia to cover the ANZAC withdrawal. Moving the bulk of two entire divisions along the single road from Larissa to Farsala and Lamia, albeit a necessity, was a huge risk. From 0930hrs on 18 April, the Luftwaffe had begun to attack the ‘W’ Force columns: one hit on a truck loaded with explosives destroyed a large part of the road and stopped traffic until repairs could be made. Yet, in spite of the constant threat of aerial attack along the 110km road, the Luftwaffe proved ineffective against the 20km-long convoys for several reasons. Its resources had been split

A New Zealand machinegun post at Elassona, the rearguard of the New Zealand 4th Brigade. These men are from the New Zealand 27th Machine-Gun Battalion. The hard work needed to dig a position in this terrain is evident. (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand, DA-13609-F) An abandoned Quad gun tractor from the New Zealand 2nd Division on the road between Tembi Pass and Larissa, 19 April 1941. Note the divisional symbol on the front left mudguard. (NARA)

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A group of German officers study the situation near Tirnavos, north-west of Larissa, on 19 April 1941. (NARA)

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(with elements targeting the supposed embarkation beaches), its attacks were intermittent and the terrain forced the planes to bomb from high altitude, which on the other hand made strafing more effective. There was a lack of anti-aircraft guns on the Allied side and the RAF had almost completely disappeared from the skies above Greece. On 21 April, practically all the RAF aircraft still in Greece departed for Crete, leaving behind only ten Hurricane fighters. By 20 April, the rearguards of Lee Force, having been checked by the lead elements of 5.Panzer-Division’s Aufklärungs-Abteilung 8, withdrew from their positions at Lamia while still in contact with the approaching German units. At this point, the ANZAC units were deploying to the Thermopylae Pass positions between Molos and the Brallos Pass with the Australian 19th Brigade (reinforced with elements from the Australian 17th Brigade) and the New Zealand Division. The real problem was how long they would be required to hold this line. On 18 April, Lieutenant-General Wilson met with the Greek king and Lieutenant-General Papagos in Athens to discuss the situation. Even though no decision to do so was taken during the meeting, ‘W’ Force was already preparing to evacuate, this time with Prime Minister Churchill’s blessing. A tentative date to commence embarkation was set for the 28th, and the chaotic situation developing in Greece following Minister President Koryzis’ suicide suggested there was no alternative. As he arrived at Athens on the 19th to discuss the evacuation, General Wavell encountered chaos and confusion, and uncertainty as to whether the Thermopylae Line should be held or not. Eventually, it was agreed to begin evacuation on the night of 28/29 April; it was estimated that no more than 30 per cent of the Allied force could be embarked. If the Allied situation was chaotic and precarious, the German one was not much better. On 19 April, the headquarters of XVIII.Gebirgs-Korps ordered both 2.Panzer-Division and 6.Gebirgs-Division not to move from Larissa, given the precarious supply situation. Only reconnaissance was to be carried out in the direction of Farsala and Lamia. On that same day, 2.Panzer-Division was subordinated to XXXX.Panzer-Korps. The German situation was also critical. Most of the supply troops were still at Katerini and the poor road conditions, made worse by the demolition work carried out by withdrawing Allied troops, hampered communications, with the result that units were short on supplies – even though some relief was given by the captured supply dumps and by air resupply. The congested state of the roads, with units scattered all along their lengths making slow progress to the south, made things worse. Only on 19 April did the vanguard of 5.Gebirgs-Division reach Platamon, 9.Panzer-Division being unable to cross the Aliakmon River until the afternoon of the 18th, when it was ordered to leave the bulk of its units north of the river. Only on 20 April

did its lead elements reach Elassona. The 5.Panzer-Division, having carried out an impressive but at the same time exhausting and hugely demanding march from Grevena to Kalabaka on non-existent roads, was ordered to avoid congesting Larissa, and on the 19th was diverted to the Trikala– Karditsa–Lamia road. At this point, it was clear to Generalfeldmarschall List that the aim was no longer merely to pursue the enemy, but rather to seek to destroy it by preventing the evacuation. For this purpose, the paratroopers of Detachment Süssmann (part of 7.Flieger-Division, under Generalleutnant Wilhelm Süssmann) were kept in readiness to carry out an airborne assault to block the enemy withdrawal. Only at 2145hrs on 21 April did XXXX.Panzer-Korps issue its orders to attack the Thermopylae Line. This required 5.Panzer-Division to break through the enemy defences, along with 6.Gebirgs-Division with the support of battalion-sized Voraus-Abteilung Baake from 72.Infanterie-Division. The decision was made in spite of the chaotic situation on the roads that, other than hampering supply, also hindered the regrouping of units. For that reason, XVIII.Gebirgs-Korps was tactically subordinated to XXXX.PanzerKorps, and eventually Generalleutnant Stumme had to take personal control of the situation. He then issued his own orders to 5.Panzer-Division to prepare the attack, while ordering 2.Panzer-Division to follow up by moving from Larissa to Lamia along the coastal roads via Volos. On 23 April, as the German units were preparing for the attack, Generalmajor Schörner visited 5.Panzer-Division headquarters. It was decided that the plan would extend the Persian attack of 480 bc against the Spartans with a pincer movement to the north and to the south of the pass. That same day, XXXX.Panzer-Korps issued its own orders sanctioning the plan; the mountain troops, supported by elements from 5.Panzer-Division, were to move south along the railway while 5.Panzer-Division’s reconnaissance and tank units were to attack the enemy positions at Molos head on. After they had been broken through, 2.Panzer-Division (deployed east of Lamia at Stylis) was to exploit the gap and advance, possibly all the way to Athens. Time was of the essence. On 22 April, Lieutenant-General Wilson and his staff drew up the evacuation plan. It required the New Zealand 4th Brigade to act as a rearguard south of Thebes, denying the Germans access to the road to Athens until early on the 26th. One brigade group from each division was to reach the concealed assembly areas for pre-evacuation from Megara and Marathon on the night of 23/24 April, ready to embark the following night. For this purpose, the Australian 6th Division was to reorganize itself into two brigade groups while the New Zealand Division was to form the corps’ rearguard. The second wave of the evacuation was to take place on the night of 24/25 April, with the New Zealand 5th Brigade departing first, followed by the 6th Brigade and the 4th Brigade at the rear. Allen Group (Australian 16th Brigade plus the remnants of Australian 17th Brigade)

A column from 2.PanzerDivision led by a PzKpfw II moves at high speed on the road from the Tembi Pass to Larissa on 19 April 1941. (NARA)

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GERMAN Kampfgruppe Jais, 6.Gebirgs-Division A. I. and II./Gebirgs-Regiment 141 supported by Pionier-Bataillon 91, Gebirgs-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 47 and 8.Kompanie, Lehr-Regiment ‘Brandenburg’ z.b.V. 800 5.Panzer-Division B. Kradschützen-Bataillon 55 C. Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112, 1.Kompanie of Panzer-Regiment 31 supported by 1.Batterie of FlakRegiment 61, Voraus-Abteilung Baake of 72.Infanterie-Division

XX

6

SCHÖRNER XX

5 A

FEHN

B 1 C

DHELFINON 2

7

4

3 13

OITI

SKAMNOS

6

POURNARAKI

BRALLOS KASTELLI

5

15 PALAIOKHORION GRAVIA

16

MARYIOLATA 6

ANO KALIVIA

AMFIKLIA

EVENTS 1. Kampfgruppe Jais and Aufklärungs-Abteilung 55 move to attack the Australian positions at 0730hrs, only to discover that the Australian troops have withdrawn already. 2. The 2. and 3.Kompanie of I./Gebirgs-Regiment 141 are sent to cut the road south of Brallos. 3. Auflärungs-Abteilung 55 advances towards Brallos, closing in on the Australian 2/1st Battalion positions at Skamnos at 1130hrs. 4. Australian artillery fire checks the advance of Kampfgruppe Jais’ elements. The Kampfgruppe is reorganized and split into two columns: one containing the 8. and 9.Kompanie of II./Gebirgs-Regiment 141 with orders to advance to Gravia, and the other with 7.Kompanie to the east of it. 5. At 1600hrs, 8. and 9.Kompanie of II./Gebirgs-Regiment 141 approach the positions held by the Australian 2/1st Battalion north of Gravia, and after a fierce struggle they manage to secure the area by 1830hrs as the Australian troops withdraw. 6. Meanwhile, the German advance continues. At 2330hrs, I./Gebirgs-Regiment 141 reaches the area north of Brallos, while 9.Kompanie reaches the junction on the Brallos–Amfiklia road.

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7. Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112 and 1.Kompanie of Panzer-Regiment 31 cross the Sperkios River on a temporary bridge and turn to attack the New Zealand positions east of the Thermopylae Pass. 8. At 1400hrs, 1.Kompanie of Panzer-Regiment 31 and the supporting units attack the New Zealand 25th Battalion positions along the road, while at 1615hrs, Kampfgruppe Baake follows the road to the hills. 9. 1.Kompanie of Panzer-Regiment 31 follows the road to Molos advancing in a single column. In spite of the intense enemy fire and the loss of five tanks, by 1715hrs it is approaching the positions held by the New Zealand 24th Battalion, whose fire decimates the Panzers. 10. Following a Stuka dive-bomber attack against the New Zealand artillery at 1730hrs, Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112 links up with Kampfgruppe Baake and, along with 1.Kompanie of Panzer-Regiment 31, they renew their attack on the New Zealand positions – but make little progress. A fierce struggle ensues, which will last until dusk, when the Germans call off the attack to regroup.

HOLDING THE THERMOPYLAE PASS, 24 APRIL 1941 With the evacuation of Allied forces from mainland Greece already under way, the New Zealand 6th Brigade and the composite Australian 19th Brigade were ordered to hold the Thermopylae Line in order to buy time and stall the German advance.

X

ANTHILI

19 Aus

VASEY X

6 NZ

SPERKHIOS RIVER

BARROWCLOUGH THERMOPYLAE PASS

8 1

9

2

5 7

6 3 10

8

4

9 10

11 12

MOLOS SKARFIA

MENDENITSA 14 DHRIMAIA

ALLIED

KIFISSOS VOIOTIKOS RIVER 

New Zealand 6th Brigade 1. C Company, New Zealand 25th Battalion 2. A Company, New Zealand 25th Battalion 3. B Company, New Zealand 25th Battalion 4. D Company, New Zealand 25th Battalion 5. B Company, New Zealand 24th Battalion 6. C Company, New Zealand 24th Battalion 7. A Company, New Zealand 24th Battalion 8. D Company, New Zealand 24th Battalion 9. B Company, New Zealand 26th Battalion 10. A Company, New Zealand 26th Battalion 11. D Company, New Zealand 26th Battalion 12. C Company, New Zealand 26th Battalion Australian 19th Brigade 13. Australian 2/11th Battalion 14. Australian 2/1st Battalion 15. One company, Australian 2/1st Battalion 16. Australian 2/4th Battalion

Note: gridlines are shown at intervals of 5km (3.1 miles)

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Generalleutnant Georg Stumme (right, with sunglasses) personally oversees a crossing of the Pinios River north of Larissa on 22 April 1941. (NARA)

would be followed by the Australian 19th Brigade. Major-General Mackay and General Freyberg began at once to issue their orders. The bringing forward of the evacuation from 27–28 April to the 24th was not the only problem Vice Admiral Sir Henry Pridham-Wippell, in charge of Operation Demon, had to face. Just as the evacuation beaches were selected (Rafina, Porto Rafti, Megara, Nafplio), on 22 April news arrived that the Luftwaffe had sunk 23 Greek and Allied vessels. To make things worse, the following day the Luftwaffe attacked Argos airfield, into which Hurricanes had just flown from Crete, destroying 13 of these aircraft on the ground and shooting one down. On the 24th, what was left of the RAF in Greece departed for Crete. King George II, the Crown Prince and most of the Greek government had left the previous day. It is worth noting that Greek troops were still fighting for their country at this point. On his own initiative, Lieutenant-General Wilson decided to switch some of the evacuation beaches to the southern Peloponnese in order to shorten the distance travelled by sea, adding even more confusion. It was not until 24 April that Lieutenant-General Papagos, who refused to leave the country, resigned his post and disbanded the GHQ to prevent any separate negotiations, having just ordered his troops to move off the roads to facilitate the Allied evacuation. As the German propaganda machine was at great pains to note, this was just a day before ANZAC Day – the anniversary of the 1915 Gallipoli expedition. As German forces concentrated south of Lamia on 22 April, an artillery duel started, followed by a Stuka attack on the Australian positions at Brallos Pass. Also that day, the New Zealand 4th Brigade moved through the Thermopylae Pass to the vicinity of Thebes followed by elements of the 5th Brigade, leaving the 6th Brigade as a rearguard. To the south, at Brallos Pass, Brigadier George Vasey’s Australian 19th Brigade (now a composite force with the 2/4th, 2/11th and 2/1st battalions) acted as a rearguard as the Australian 17th Brigade Group (Allen Force) retreated. 76

At 0730hrs on 24 April, the German attack against the Thermopylae Line began with Stukas pounding the Australian positions at Brallos Pass. Then Kradschützen-Bataillon 55 moved from Lamia parallel to the railway line down to Delfinon and Kouvela, only to discover that the Australian troops had vacated their forward positions. At 1130hrs, KradschützenBataillon 55 approached the positions of Australian 2/11th Battalion at Skamnos, but soon came under heavy shellfire from the Australian 2/2nd Field Regiment positioned north-east of Brallos. Even though the Germans did not suffer heavy losses, their advance was checked and the main burden of the attack fell on Kampfgruppe Jais (led by Oberst Maximilian Jais), made up of two battalions from Gebirgs-Regiment 141. After advancing across the mountains through Koumaritsi and Kouvela, Kampfgruppe Jais approached Kradschützen-Bataillon 55’s positions north-west of Skamnos, where it too came under fire from the Australian artillery. With Kradschützen-Bataillon 55 pinned down, Kampfgruppe Jais was split in two, with 8. and 9.Kompanie moving directly south to Gravia and 7.Kompanie switching east following the railway line, moving to the junction 2km south of Brallos. The terrain, the hot weather, the constant shellfire and the tiredness of the German soldiers slowed the advance of the three companies, and the first two neared Gravia only at 1600hrs. The town, defended by a company of the Australian 2/1st Battalion, was attacked and eventually captured at 1830hrs after the Australian troops were ordered to pull back, while the German 7.Kompanie continued its advance south of Brallos. Facing the German advance, Brigadier Vasey decided not to take risks, and at 2000hrs ordered the withdrawal of the other company of the 2/1st

A German column passes two British Vickers Mk VI light tanks from the British 1st Armoured Brigade, destroyed by an air attack, near Larissa on 22 April 1941. (NARA)

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A heavy, eight-wheeled SdKfz 232 reconnaissance armoured car enters an apparently abandoned Lamia on 23 April 1941. (NARA)

Battalion and of the 2/4th Battalion south-east of Brallos. An hour later, the 2/11th Battalion at Skamnos was also ordered to withdraw, which it did by 2015hrs. At 2330hrs, I.Bataillon of Gebirgs-Regiment 141 approached Skamnos, outflanking it 20 minutes later, while another company of mountain troops reached the road/rail junction north of Amfiklia. As the Australian 19th Brigade moved to reach the divisional rearguards at Thebes and then proceed to the embarkation point, the exhausted German troops proved unable either to block their withdrawal or to pursue them. That same morning, 1.Kompanie of Panzer-Regiment 31 from 5.PanzerDivision, along with elements from Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112 from 6.Gebirgs-Division and Voraus-Abteilung Baake from 72.Infanterie-Division, crossed the Sperkhios River on a temporary bridge heading for the Brallos Pass, following the path of Kampfgruppe Jais. However, the commander of XXXX.Panzer-Korps, Generalleutnant Stumme, personally intervened in the attack at the Thermopylae Line, and decided to reroute them to Molos in an attempt to seek another breakthrough. The New Zealand positions at the Thermopylae Pass were stronger and deeper than those of the Australian 19th Brigade at Brallos Pass. The four companies of the New Zealand 25th Battalion were deployed in line along the road between the stream and the marshes to the north and the hills to the south. Behind them, at Ayia Trias, was the 24th Battalion, with the 26th Battalion near Molos close to the supporting artillery, which included one medium, four field and two anti-tank regiments. The 1.Kompanie of Panzer-Regiment 31, greatly understrength with only five PzKpfw IIIs and 11 PzKpfw IIs, advanced along the road in a single line at 1400hrs, and soon faced the New Zealanders’ prompt reaction and fire, as a result of which two PzKpfw IIs were destroyed. An hour later, at Alamanas Bridge, it linked up with Voraus-Abteilung Baake, but facing the heavy fire from the New Zealand 25th Battalion positions its leading tank was halted, and at 1615hrs, Voraus Abteilung Baake took the road that led to the hill south of the enemy positions. 78

The attempted coordinated attack against the New Zealand 25th Battalion’s positions ended in failure; the Panzers, advancing in single file along the road, charged at speed in spite of the intense enemy fire, and immediately lost five tanks. Even Voraus Abteilung Baake was unable to move forward. By 1715hrs, 1.Panzer-Kompanie, now down to two PzKpfw IIIs and three PzKpfw IIs but joined in the meantime by three PzKpfw IVs, eventually pushed through the 25th Battalion positions and headed for the 24th Battalion ones at Ayia Trias. There they faced an even fiercer reaction, which destroyed four more tanks. With 12 out of 19 tanks written off, the German advance had all but stalled, even in spite of a Stuka attack delivered at 1730hrs against the New Zealand artillery positions, and of the arrival of Gebirgs-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 112. Nevertheless, the Germans renewed their attacks against the New Zealand 25th and 24th battalions at 1800hrs. Once again, they were halted by enemy artillery fire and by the Kiwis’ resistance; the intervention of a heavy infantry gun company half an hour later made little difference. Eventually, the fierce struggle came to an end around 2000hrs as the Germans neared the heights east of Ayia Trias and decided to call off the attack to rest and regroup. Two other companies from I.Abteilung of Panzer-Regiment 31 relieved what was left of 1.Panzer-Kompanie an hour later. At 0230hrs on 25 April, the Panzers, supported by KradschützenBataillon 72 and III.Bataillon of Infanterie-Regiment 124, attacked again, only to find that the New Zealanders had gone. The New Zealand 6th Brigade withdrawal had begun at 2115hrs the previous evening and, after clearing Molos by midnight, in the early hours of the 25th the New Zealanders were already on their way to the area north of Athens to act as a rearguard until 26–27 April. At 0330hrs on 25 April, Voraus Abteilung Baake entered Molos, but once again was neither able to prevent the enemy withdrawal nor to pursue it.

A column of Gebirgsjäger mountain infantry marching through Lamia on 24 April 1941. The achievements of the men of 5.Gebirgs-Division in Greece were impressive. (NARA)

OPERATION DEMON: THE ALLIED EVACUATION The evacuation began just as the Australian and New Zealand troops were withdrawing from the Thermopylae Line. According to the plans, during the night of 24/25 April the New Zealand 5th Brigade and the bulk of the ANZAC HQ and rear-area troops were to be embarked respectively at Porto Rafti and Nafplio – a total of some 9,000 men. Having remained under cover during the day, at 2100hrs on the 24th the men of the New Zealand 5th Brigade marched to the Porto Rafti beaches and were embarked that night. At 0340hrs on the 25th, the ships sailed for Crete, where they arrived 79

A camouflaged New Zealand army truck waiting to reach the evacuation beaches. The New Zealand troops spent the time before being evacuated concealed from the Luftwaffe and the advancing German troops. (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand, DA-12353)

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at 1600hrs carrying some 4,000 men, but also having left 500 or so behind, who would be picked up later. At Nafplio, the troops reached the harbour at 2230hrs, but the Ulster Prince had run aground in the harbour entrance, meaning embarkation was delayed and the harbour rendered temporarily unusable. By 0300hrs, some 6,500 men had sailed, bringing the total of those already evacuated above the number foreseen in the plans. At Piraeus near Athens, there was a major incident when the luxury yacht Hellas attempted to embark 500 Greek civilians and 800 wounded. At 1900hrs, German aircraft attacked the yacht, setting it ablaze and sinking it with the loss of between 500 and 750 souls. It is possible that the delaying action at the Thermopylae Line had succeeded in its aims, while at the same time the Luftwaffe failed to achieve significant results other than spreading mass hysteria amongst soldiers and civilians. Part of this hysteria, which was also linked to the capture of General Richard O’Connor in Libya, related to the order to immediately evacuate the Allied commanders from Greece. Both Mackay and Freiberg were ordered to leave, Major-General Mackay departing on the 25th while General Freyberg decided to disregard the order and remained in place. On 25 April, the vanguards of 5.Panzer-Division and 6.Gebirgs-Division were at Atalanti en route to Thebes, and Kampfgruppe Jais was nearing Gravia on its way to Athens. In the attempt to outflank the withdrawing enemy forces, Kradschützen-Bataillon 2 landed on Euboea, marched to Chalcis and then proceeded to the mainland, where it arrived too late on 25 April. The LSSAH was sent to Agrinion, and from there to the coast in the Messolonghi area, with the aim of crossing the sea using local boats and landing east of Patras. Its aim was to march to the Corinth Canal, where an airborne assault was to take place. The importance of the Corinth Canal was clear to the Allied leadership, and in order to secure the bridge across it, on the 24th Isthmus Force was

ron

Akhe

N

Preveza

Arta

tos

25 Apr

elo

s

LSSAH 28 Apr

X

Alfios

Patras

Lake Trichonida Remnants of Greek troops

Agrinion

Ak

Arakh

Louro

s

LSSAH

X

26 Apr

s ino Ev

Karpenissi

16 Au

X

s

X

To Kalamata 26–27 April

17 Au

Allen

X

Delfi

X

sso s

Amfiklia Kifi

6 NZ

6 NZ

Argos

X

Arakova

5

(-)

III

26 Apr

Volos

To Monemvasia 28–29 April

Nafplio

28 Apr

XX

2

Corinth

Levadia

Breakthrough, 26 April

Agia Marina

Mt Parnassos

r Ap 24 19 Au

XX

22 Apr

XX

6

24 Apr

Lamia

5

21 Apr

XX

Mt Giona

Mt Oiti

Sperkio

Makri

Lake Xynias

os Morn

GREECE

Karditsa

5

5

X

Megara

26 Apr

27 Apr

5

XX

X

5

Asopsos

5

X

XX

28 Apr

Port Rafti

X

27 April

25 April

5 NZ

25 miles

Rafina

25km

1 Br ATHENS

26 Apr

II

Thebes

Allen 25–26 Apr

19 Au

4 NZ

XX

55

0

0

Axis movements 21–25 April 1941 Axis movements 26–28 April 1941

Axis positions 26–28 April 1941

Axis positions 21–26 April 1941

The Allied evacuation of Greece, 20–29 April 1941

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Akelos

created from the New Zealand 19th Battalion and the remnants of the 4th Hussars (including 12 light tanks, six gun carriers and one armoured car). Brigadier Lee, appointed area commander of the Peloponnese, was given the task of defending the peninsula during the evacuation and preparing the destruction of the Corinth Canal Bridge to prevent its seizure by the Germans. On the 25th, General Freyberg met Lieutenant-General Wilson, resulting in further changes to the evacuation plan. While the main rearguard was deployed at Erithri, south of Thebes, the New Zealand 4th Brigade would remain in its positions until 26 April, at which point it would withdraw south of Corinth. This would coincide with the New Zealand 6th Brigade’s move to Tripolis in the Peloponnese, and the Australian 19th Brigade Group’s evacuation from Megara (not Porto Rafti, as previously planned). To ensure a smooth evacuation, the ultimate deadline for its completion was delayed until 29 April, with Freyberg taking command in the Peloponnese while some 6,000 troops were to move across the Corinth Canal. The Australian 2/6th Battalion, which was meant to reinforce Isthmus Force, was halted en route. As a prelude of things to come, at 2030hrs the Luftwaffe began a massive bombardment of the Corinth Canal Bridge area, following which the New Zealand 6th Brigade made its way into the Peloponnese. That same night, Lieutenant-General Wilson left Athens for Myloi, south of Argos, leaving the Allied troops without either coordination or command, a situation made worse by the lack of communications. The second wave of the evacuation proceeded from Megara, rather than from Porto Rafti, where the Australian 19th Brigade Group and the remnants of the British 1st Armoured Brigade were embarked on 26 April by 0230hrs. Some 5,900 men were evacuated (again, more than the 5,500 planned), with around 500 left behind once more. The situation would change just a few hours later. On 26 April, Aufklärungs-Abteilung 8 and Gebirgs-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 47 marched towards Athens and Piraeus while Kampfgruppe Baake moved to Marathon, and the vanguard of 5.Panzer-Division advanced to Corinth and Tripolis in the Peloponnese. From the north, the LSSAH AufkärungsAbteilung marched into Patras, where it dispersed a small detachment from the 4th Hussars and from the Greek Officers’ Reserve Battalion. The same day, III.Bataillon of the LSSAH crossed into the Peloponnese. At 0700hrs, the Luftwaffe launched massive air attacks against the Allied anti-aircraft positions at the Corinth Canal, followed at 0730–0745hrs by the arrival of some 400 Junkers Ju 52 transport planes recently transferred to Larissa from Bulgaria. The Junkers carried some 800 men from Group Pietzonka (II.Bataillon, Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2), which landed west of the canal, and Group Kroh (I.Bataillon, Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2), which landed to the east of it. The assault group, under the command of Oberst Alfred Sturm, also included a sub-group made up of the regimental staff (kept in reserve) and two platoons in DFS 230 gliders: one from 6.Kompanie of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2, and the other assault engineers platoon. Their gliders landed close to the bridge, with the aim of seizing it intact. The operation did not proceed without hiccups. A good many of the paratroopers were dropped from a very low altitude, some 90m, with the result that some were killed when their parachutes failed to open fully. Since their weapons were landed separately in canisters, others were killed unarmed. Nevertheless, the operation succeeded save for one particular: 82

Off to fight another battle: British, Australian and New Zealand troops disembark at Souda Bay, Crete, after their evacuation from the Greek mainland. (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand, DA-01611-F)

although the glider-borne assault troops succeeded in seizing the canal bridge intact, it was blown up shortly after apparently by accident (there are various versions as to what did happen). This proved not to be a major hindrance to the Germans, as a pontoon bridge was built later that same day. The Allied troops defending the Corinth Canal area, including three companies from the New Zealand 19th Battalion, the Australian 2/6th Battalion and the 4th Hussars detachment along with elements from the New Zealand divisional cavalry and from the 22nd and 28th (Maori) battalions, were caught by surprise. A company from 2/6th Battalion north of the bridge was overrun, while a New Zealand company attempting a counter-attack from the south was beaten back, and lost most of its men. Apart from the New Zealand cavalry unit, itself overwhelmed, all other units withdrew south of the bridge, while the 4th Hussars was unable to intervene. The German success, in spite of the loss of the bridge, was achieved at a cost of 63 (or 65) killed, 158 (or 212) wounded and 16 (or 17) missing in action (the figures were updated at a later point). A total of 21 officers and 900 Allied men were taken prisoner, along with some 1,450 Greeks. The German operation had immediate consequences. The New Zealand 4th Brigade and the remnants of the British 1st Armoured Brigade were effectively cut off at Thebes, as were the c. 500 men awaiting embarkation at Megara, most of whom were taken prisoner. General Freyberg reacted by sending the New Zealand 26th Battalion to Corinth, but it was halted some 8km south of the bridge by the Germans, and eventually withdrew. Freyberg ordered the New Zealand 24th Battalion to remain at Tripolis while ordering the New Zealand 25th Battalion to cover the Nafplio embarkation until the 27th, before moving to Monemvasia for embarkation. The situation facing the New Zealand 4th Brigade, which was meant to embark that night from Megara, soon became critical. At about 1100hrs 83

84

85

1

2

4

3

FALLSCHIRMJÄGER ATTACK AT THE CORINTH CANAL, 26 APRIL 1941 (PP. 84–85) At 0700hrs on 26 April, nine DFS 230 gliders (1) landed close to the bridge over the Corinth Canal, carrying about 70 Fallschirmjäger (paratroopers) selected from both Leutnant Häffner’s Pionier-Zug (engineer platoon) and 6.Kompanie of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2, led by Leutnant Teusen (2). Although one of the gliders crashed against the bridge’s pier, within about ten minutes they had silenced the Allied anti-aircraft guns near the bridge, which was seized intact. The glider landing caught the men of Isthmus Force by surprise; this unit was mainly composed of men from the New Zealand 19th Battalion and from C Squadron of the Divisional Cavalry, along with the 40mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns (3) deployed to defend the bridge. These troops were swiftly overwhelmed by the Fallschirmjäger, their crews only able to use their personal weapons (4). At 0720hrs, the first waves of I. and II.Bataillon of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2 were dropped respectively east and

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west of the canal. As they landed, the bridge blew up, apparently a random hit causing the emplaced Allied charges (which had not been removed) to explode. As the Allied anti-aircraft fire failed to hit any of the Ju 52 transports, the Fallschirmjägers’ only casualty occurred when a group landed too far east and one aircraft dropped the paratroopers into the sea, where one Fallschirmjäger drowned. East of the canal, 5. and 6.Kompanie of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 2 attacked Major Gordon’s two platoons from the New Zealand 19th Battalion, overwhelming them. To the west, the Fallschirmjäger quickly destroyed eight to ten armoured vehicles of the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry and HQ Squadron, 4th Hussars. A counter-attack by the New Zealand 26th Battalion was called off following news of the destruction of the bridge. The German losses totalled 65 killed, 89 severely wounded, 123 lightly wounded and 17 missing; some 900 Allied prisoners were captured.

that morning, it was approached by the spearheads of I.Abteilung, PanzerRegiment 31, upon which it opened fire until being attacked by air and being threatened on the flank by Aufklärungs-Abteilung 8. At 1830hrs, the brigade was ordered to embark at Porto Rafti, the men marching off to the beaches at 2100hrs without any interference from the Germans. At 2200hrs, the embarkation of the bulk of the Australian and New Zealand troops, including the artillery and the New Zealand 27th Machine-Gun Battalion, began at Porto Rafti and Rafina. Some 8,200 men were evacuated, but around 800 others were left behind, mostly from the British 1st Armoured Brigade. At the same time, a further 5,200 (4,500 according to other sources) men were evacuated from Nafplio out of the 8,000 planned. The morning after, three ships of the convoy – the Dutch troopship Slamat and the British destroyers HMS Diamond and HMS Wryneck – were attacked and sunk by the Luftwaffe, with the loss of 983 souls. The evacuation during the night of 26/27 April came to an end with the embarkation of some 8,600 men out of the 16,000–18,000 that had assembled at Kalamata, mostly from the Australian 16th and 17th Brigade Group. This made a grand total of some 22,000 men, the bulk of ‘W’ Force. Many others remained in Greece. That same night, Lieutenant-General Wilson also departed, leaving General Freyberg in command, facing a constantly deteriorating situation due to the lack of communications and absence of control. The German troops were also facing difficulties. Their advance was being slowed by the many obstacles on the already poor Greek roads, and also by a lack of supplies and heavy congestion in the rear areas, with the result that lack of fuel and spare parts hampered their movements. At 0800hrs on 27 April, the lead elements of 5.Panzer-Division and 6.Gebirgs-Division entered Athens. The former raced to raise the Swastika flag on the Acropolis, while the latter negotiated the surrender of the city with the mayor and the garrison commander, Major-General Christos Kavrakos. The fact that at this point the Germans were more interested in prestige and propaganda than in defeating the remnants of ‘W’ Force proved decisive. Uncertain whether they were waiting for the Germans or the evacuation, the men of the New Zealand 4th Brigade prepared their defences at Porto

The Corinth Canal showing the area where the bridge was destroyed. The graves of four Fallschirmjäger who died in the attempt to seize it are visible to the right. (NARA)

87

An 88mm anti-aircraft gun is towed by its prime mover across the Corinth Canal on the pontoon bridge constructed by German engineers in the evening of 26 April 1941. (NARA)

Rafti. A column from Kradschützen-Bataillon 2, which left Athens at 1500hrs, made contact with them one hour later, but decided not to press on and prepared to attack the next morning. At 2100hrs, the New Zealanders withdrew to the beach, where some 3,800 of them were embarked along with a further 800 men from the British 1st Armoured Brigade. This still left some 2,000 men in the Nafplio area, 4,300 at Monemvasia and more than 8,000 at Kalamata. They would suffer a different fate. On 28 April, the vanguard of 5.Panzer-Division reached the Corinth Canal, and swarmed across into the Peloponnese. At 1700hrs, the 2,000 or so Allied troops at Nafplio were taken prisoner. The approximate 4,320 men from the New Zealand 6th Brigade waiting at Monemvasia were relieved to see the ships arriving at 2230hrs. This proved to be the last large group to be evacuated. At Kalamata, the composite force under the command of Brigadier Les Parrington, commander of the 81st Sub Base Area, included some 800 men from the New Zealand Reinforcement Battalion, 380 Australians, 6,000 men from administrative units and some 2,000 Palestinians, Cypriots and even Yugoslav stragglers. At 1800hrs, a German column entered Kalamata, reached the harbour and took the naval commander in charge prisoner. The New Zealanders and the Australians counter-attacked at night, retaking the harbour and capturing the German soldiers at 2130hrs. The evacuation began at 2211hrs, but only saw 332 men taken aboard and the ships leaving soon after. Only a further 820 men were embarked that night at Kithira Island. At 0630hrs on 29 April, Brigadier Parrington surrendered some 7,500 men to the Germans, only to become a scapegoat for the disaster. With the 250 stragglers embarked at Kalamata and the other 700 lifted from the island of Milos during the nights of 29/30 April and 30 April/1 May, Operation Demon was drawn to a close. It was undoubtedly successful, with a total of 50,732 men evacuated from Greece by sea, plus a further 940 flown out. Many of them would disembark on the island of Crete, where they would face a further battle. 88

AFTERMATH There is one thing that historians do agree on with regard to the 1941 Balkan campaign: it is extremely difficult to place it in history, let alone make some sort of sense of it. Even the losses involved are uncertain. For April 1941, the Germans reported losses of 5,244 Heer men (including 279 officers) plus 170 (including ten officers) from Luftwaffe ground and airborne troops. These figures were subsequently updated. These losses were broken down into 1,107 Heer (plus 71 Luftwaffe) killed, 3,752 (plus 99 Luftwaffe) wounded and 385 missing. Of these, only 558 (151 killed, 392 wounded and 15 missing) were lost in Yugoslavia, the rest (including some 1,000 killed) in Greece and mostly during the fighting at the Metaxas Line. The actual losses suffered by the Royal Yugoslav Army are unknown, but the Germans captured around 254,000 prisoners (most of whom were Serbs). Likewise, Greek Army losses are unknown, and the 220,000 prisoners taken by the Germans would soon be released. Losses for ‘W’ Force are also uncertain. Its 58,051 men represented the bulk of the 62,612 men sent to Greece. Losses are given at 903 killed (including 146 British, 320 Australians and 291 New Zealanders plus 110

A decidedly mixed German column advances towards Athens on 25 April 1941. Directly behind the motorcycle from 5.Panzer-Division (identified by the ‘X’ symbol) is a captured Morris truck, moving alongside mule-pulled carts. (NARA)

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Greek Major-General Christos Kavrakos negotiating the surrender of Athens with German officers from Aufklärungs-Abteilung 8 on 27 April 1941. (NARA)

A German motorcycle speeds past two SdKfz 232 armoured cars in front of the Hotel Grande Bretagne in Athens, formerly the headquarters of ‘W’ Force in Greece, 27 April 1941. (NARA)

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RAF personnel and 36 Palestinian and Cypriots), 1,275 wounded (including 87 British, 494 Australians and 599 New Zealanders plus 45 RAF and 25 Palestinian and Cypriots) and 13,958 prisoners (including 6,480 British, 2,030 Australians and 1,614 New Zealanders plus 28 RAF and 3,806 Palestinian and Cypriots). The roughly 50,000 men evacuated (including some 13,400 British, 14,500 Australian, 14,700 New Zealanders plus an unknown number of Greeks) also included non-combat personnel such as Palestinians and Cypriots. The body count defines the Greek campaign as a German victory – even more so if we add the huge quantities of vehicles, materiel and weapons lost, including 200 aircraft, 100 tanks, three naval cruisers and six destroyers sunk. One may wonder how the outcome of the Battle for Crete may have changed if only the defenders had most, if not all, the weapons and equipment lost in Greece. Figures apart, the campaign is best remembered for its absurdity and lack of sense. In his 4 May 1941 speech, Hitler said that the campaign was fought in order to prevent the Allies from creating a Balkan front, but he did not mention the true reason: the need to come to Italy’s aid. Hitler would have preferred a diplomatic solution, but Greek resolve, Italian pigheadedness and Yugoslav madness made this impossible to achieve. There are a multitude of interpretations of the Allied involvement, relating either to the 1940–41 campaign in the Western Desert or to Operation

Barbarossa. All agree that the Allied intervention in Greece was a political necessity more than anything else, a gesture made necessary after the Italian defeat and by the German threat. From the purely strategic point of view, the Greek campaign was doomed to failure from the outset, its fate sealed by Yugoslav incapacity and by Greek faulty planning. Yet, as highlighted in more recent studies, few mention ‘W’ Force’s inability to react, or to do anything else other than fight while withdrawing. The struggle to make any sense out of the 1941 Balkan campaign has created a wartime myth that endures to this day: the campaign delayed the start of Operation Barbarossa long enough to make it spill into the winter of late 1941 and enable the Soviet counter-offensive. This myth, created during the war, is easily discounted by the fact that heavy late-spring rain, flooding and other factors were what lay behind the delay to the start of Barbarossa, as Hitler admitted himself to Joseph Goebbels. The eventual outcome of the campaign had most relevance to the bitter partisan warfare that started in Yugoslavia, then spread to Greece. Not until 1943 did the Balkans hold any strategic relevance, and even then, this was mostly on paper given the Allied landing so feared by the Germans never materialized. Taking into account the Battle of Crete that followed the Greek campaign, it is also possible to state that the influence these events had on the war in the Western Desert was negligible. All things considered, the 1941 Balkan campaign was yet another German Blitzkrieg victory that could have been avoided, as it brought no real advantage to Germany. It is worth noting that at its conclusion, Hitler handed over most of Yugoslavia and Greece to Italy, leaving only a handful of German divisions in the Balkans. For the Allies, the campaign can be seen as a lost opportunity at best, the reasons behind its failure being equally shared between the various alliance partners. If anybody should be blamed at all for a campaign that made no sense, cost many lives and eventually brought Greece to the point of starvation and civil war, that would be the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini.

A mixed group of Allied prisoners captured at Kalamata after the failed attempt to evacuate the city, 30 April 1941. (NARA)

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THE BATTLEFIELDS TODAY

The monument at the Rupel Pass today, marking an unfortunate page in Greek history. (Athanasios Gioumpasis/Getty Images)

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The fact that, following the end of World War II, Yugoslavia became a dictatorship ruled by Josip ‘Tito’ Broz, and that shortly after his death it fell victim to a vicious civil war, accounts for the paucity of monuments dedicated to the 1941 campaign. For Tito, history focused on the German occupation, on the Yugoslav partisans and on the 1941–45 war of liberation, making the 1941 campaign simply an accessory. It is revealing that only on April 1997 was a monument unveiled in New Belgrade, Serbia in remembrance of the Yugoslav pilots killed during the 1941 bombing of the city. The ruins of the National Library of Serbia, destroyed on 6 April 1941, were transformed into a public memorial park. Few memories of the 1941 campaign remain in Greece, too, mostly because no major battle was fought long enough in one place to render it a worthy memorial site. Unsurprisingly, the principle and most interesting

relics of the campaign are to be found at the former Metaxas Line, which was extensively reused in the post-war years as a fortification. Rupel Pass, one of the key positions the Germans bitterly fought for, is partly open to visitors and includes a small museum and some good recreations of the life inside the fort during the fighting. Re-enacting takes place during commemorations. There are two main war museums in Greece: in Thessaloniki (the War Museum of Thessaloniki), and in Athens (the Athens War Museum). Both hold amongst their vast collections exhibits relating to the 1940–41 Greek war against Italy and Germany. In 1945 at Xinon Neron, a memorial in honour of the Australian and New Zealand soldiers that fought in Greece, and particularly at Kleidi Pass, was erected. It partly matches a smaller but similar memorial erected in the centre of the town of Vevi and dedicated to the men of the Australian 6th Division. It is worth noting that the soil from the Vevi (or Kleidi) Pass and the Tempe (or Pinios) Gorge form part of the oculus in the Hall of Service of the ANZAC War Memorial at Hyde Park, Sydney. In more rural areas, apart from the obvious development of villages, towns and roads, the terrain remains not much different to that fought over in 1941 – for example at the Pinios Gorge, Servia and Platamon. This also applies, obviously to a lesser extent, to the Thermopylae Pass, which is best remembered for the ancient battle fought in the vicinity. Built originally for the Commonwealth casualties of the 1944–45 Greek Civil War, the Phaleron War Cemetery just to the south of Athens was subsequently turned into a cemetery for all the servicemen who died during World War II. Inside the Phaleron War Cemetery is the Athens Memorial, commemorating nearly 3,000 men from the Commonwealth countries who died in Greece and Crete in 1941, and in the 1943–45 battles and campaigns fought in Greece, in the Dodecanese Islands and in Yugoslavia. Particularly in summertime, it would be hard to recognize the holidaymaker-crammed beaches as the same ones that were used during the April 1941 Allied evacuation from Greece. Even if it is hard to imagine how those soldiers felt while waiting for the ships intended to take them to safety, or to grasp the drama of the moment, you can still enjoy the sun, the food, the sea and the friendly hospitality of Greece.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Athanassiou, Phoebus, Armies of the Greek–Italian War 1940–1941 (Osprey Publishing Ltd., Oxford, 2017) Barefield, Michael R., Overwhelming Force, Indecisive Victory: The German Invasion of Yugoslavia, 1941 (School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993) Bitzes, John G., Greece in World War II to April 1941 (Sunflower University Press, Manhattan, KS, 1982) Blau, George E., The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941) (Center of Military History, US Army, Washington DC, 1984) Buchner, Alex, Der deutsche Griechenland Feldzug (Vowinckel, Heidelberg, 1957) Buckley, Christopher, Greece and Crete 1941 (HMSO, London, 1952) Carr, John C., The Defence and Fall of Greece 1940–41 (Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2013) Ewer, Peter, Forgotten ANZACs: The Campaign in Greece 1941 (Scribe, Brunswick, Victoria, 2008) Genikon Epiteleion Stratou, O Ellinikos Stratos kata ton Defteron Pankosmion Polemon: Agones eis ten Anatoliken Makedonian kai ten Ditiken Thraken (1941) (Diefthinsis Istorias Stratou, Athens, 1956) Golla, Karl-Heinz, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941 (Mittler, Hamburg–Berlin–Bonn, 2007) Johnston, Mark, ANZACs in the Middle East (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) Loi, Salvatore, Le operazioni delle unità italiane in Jugoslavia (1941–1943) (Stato Maggiore Esercito, Rome, 1978) Long, Gavin, Australia in the War of 1939–1945: Greece, Crete and Syria (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1953) McClimont, William Graham, To Greece (War History Branch, Wellington, New Zealand, 1959) Papagos, Alexandros, The Battle of Greece 1940–1941 (Alpha Editions, Athens, 1949) Playfair, Ian Stanley Ord, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol. 2: The Germans Come to the Help of their Ally (1941) (HMSO, London, 1956) Pugsley, Christopher, A Bloody Road Home: World War Two and New Zealand’s Heroic Second Division (Penguin, Auckland, New Zealand, 2014) Richter, Heinz A., Griechenland im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Syndikat, Frankfurt am Main, 1997) Schreiber, Gerhard, Stegemann, Bernd and Vogel, Detlef, The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1940–1941 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) Stockings, Craig and Hancock, Eleanor, Swastika Over the Acropolis. Re-interpreting the Nazi Invasion of Greece in World War II (Brill, Leiden–Boston, 2013) Terzić, Velimir, Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941 (Narodna Kriga, Belgrade, 1982) Thies, Klaus-Jürgen, Der Balkanfeldzug und die Eroberung von Kreta 1941 (Biblio, Osnabrück, 1996) Tomasevich, Jozo, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: The Chetniks (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1975) Willingham, Matthew, Perilous Commitments: Britain’s Involvement in Greece and Crete 1940– 41 (Spellmount, Staplehurst, 2005) Zajac, Daniel L., The German Invasion of Yugoslavia: Insights for Crisis Action Planning and Operational Art in a Combined Environment (School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993)

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INDEX Figures in bold refer to illustrations. Albania 26, 27–28, 38, 54 Aliakmon Line, the 28, 47, 47, 48 (map), 49, 49, 50–51 (map), 52–55, 52 Allied plan 26–28, 91 Ambrosio, General Vittorio 8, 9 anti-tank obstacles 27, 38 Athens 87, 89, 90, 93 Australian forces 13–14, 22, 49, 49, 52, 53, 56, 57, 66, 66–70, 70, 72, 76–78, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 93 6th Division 14, 14, 19, 73 Allen Force 66–70, 71 Mackay Force 49, 52–53 Bakopoulos, Lieutenant-General Konstantinos 12, 28, 45, 46 Belgrade 25–26, 31, 35, 36, 38, 38–39 air attack on 29, 32–34 Blamey, Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Albert 13–14, 49 Böhme, Generalleutnant Franz 10 British and Commonwealth forces 12–14, 12, 13, 14, 19, 19 1st Armoured Brigade 22, 46, 47, 53–54, 55–56, 66, 70–71, 77, 82, 87 4th Hussars 82, 83, 84–86 casualties 83, 89–90 deployment 25 order of battle 22 plan 27, 28 tanks 19, 77 build-up of forces 4 Bulgaria 4, 5, 23, 25, 46 campaign the Aliakmon Line 47, 48 (map), 49, 50–51 (map), 52–55 Allied evacuation 79–80, 80, 81 (map), 82–83, 83, 84–86, 87–88, 87, 88 Allied last stand 70–73, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74–75 (map), 76–79, 76, 77, 78, 79 Allied withdrawal 55–57 battle for the Metaxas Line 40, 40, 41 (map), 42–46, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 collapse of Yugoslavia 29, 29, 30 (map), 31, 31, 32–34, 35–36, 35, 36, 37 (map), 38–40 German advance 29, 31, 31, 35–36, 36, 37 (map), 38 launch 29

the Olympus Line 57, 58–60, 61–63, 64–65 (map), 66–70, 66, 67, 68, 69 origins 4–5 relevance 90–91 Cavallero, General Ugo 10 chronology 6–7 Churchill, Winston 12, 26, 72 civilian casualties 32–34, 80 Corinth Canal 80, 82–83, 84–86, 87, 88, 88 Dietrich, SS-Obergruppenführer Josef ‘Sepp’ 55, 55 Dill, Sir John 13, 28 dispositions, Allied 24 (map) Dubrovnik 35, 38 Eden, Anthony 28 Fleet Air Arm 19 Florina Gap 26, 47 Freyberg, General Lord Bernard Cyril ‘Tiny’ 14, 80, 82, 83, 87 Gambier-Parry, Major-General Michael Denman 13 German Army 15–17, 16 artillery 61, 62, 63, 88 casualties 40, 42, 46, 53, 70, 84–86, 89 commanders 8–9, 8, 9, 10, 10–11, 10, 11 deployment 23 order of battle 20–21, 21–22 Panzer divisions 15–16 strength 15 tanks 16, 40, 52, 53–54, 61, 67, 69 German Army formations 45 1.Gebirgs-Division 29 2.Armee 8, 20, 25, 29, 35, 39 2.Panzer-Division 10, 16, 16, 31, 45, 46, 46, 47, 49, 56, 57, 62, 68, 72, 73 2.SS-Panzer-Division Das Reich 16, 38–39 4.Gebirgs-Division 17, 36 5.Gebirgs-Division 16, 43, 47, 72, 79 5.Panzer-Division 16, 36, 38, 47, 49, 57, 62, 72, 73, 78, 80, 82, 87, 88, 89 6.Gebirgs-Division 11, 16, 45, 47, 57, 72, 73, 78, 80 8.Panzer-Division 29, 31, 35, 35–36, 39, 40 9.Panzer-Division 16, 31, 36, 38, 40, 45, 47, 53, 57, 62, 71, 72

10.Panzer-Division 36 XI.Armee-Korps 22 11.Panzer-Division 31, 39 12.Armee 4, 10, 16, 23, 25 14.Panzer-Division 29, 31, 35, 39, 40 16.Infanterie-Division (mot.) 17, 35, 39 XVIII.Gebirgs-Korps 10, 21–22, 23, 47, 49, 57 L.Armee-Korps 26 LI.Armee-Korps 26 LI.Gebirgs-Korps 29, 35 50.Infanterie-Division 44 60.Infanterie-Division (mot.) 17, 36, 39 72.Infanterie-Division 16, 42, 47, 78 73.Infanterie-Division 45, 47 83.Infanterie-Division 29 100.Gebirgs-Regiment 42, 43 101.Leichte-Infanterie-Division 17 132.Infanterie-Division 29 164.Infanterie-Division 44, 57, 61 294.Infanterie-Division 17, 36 XXX.Armee-Korps 21, 23 XXXX.Armee-Korps (mot.) 21, 22 XXXX.Panzer-Korps 45, 47, 49, 57, 62, 72, 73 XXXXI.Armee-Korps (mot.) 21, 22 XXXXI.Panzer-Korps 16, 25–26, 29, 31 XXXXVI.Panzer-Korps 25, 31 XXXXIX.Gebirgs-Korps 26 Detachment Süssmann 73 Gebirgs-Regiment 85 43 Gebirgs-Regiment 143 71 Infanterie-Regiment 105 42 Infanterie-Regiment 124 42 Infanterie-Regiment 125 40, 42, 42, 43, 44 Infanterie-Regiment Grossdeutschland 16 Kampfgruppe Baake 82 Kampfgruppe Balck 61, 62, 63, 63, 66, 66, 67–70, 67 Kampfgruppe Koelitz 62–63, 70 Kampfgruppe Meyer 54 Kampfgruppe Sponeck 58–60, 61–62 Kampfgruppe Witt 52, 53 Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler 16, 45, 47, 52–53, 54, 54–55, 62, 80, 82 Panzergruppe 1 4, 5, 8, 16, 20, 23, 25–26, 31, 35, 39 Panzer-Regiment 33 16, 53–54 Voraus Abteilung Baake 79

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German plan 23, 24 (map), 25–26 Gorondy-Novák, Lieutenant-General Elemér 9–10, 9 Greece 4, 4–5, 31, 39, 40, 91 invasion of 47, 48 (map), 49, 50–51 (map), 52–55 memorials 92–93, 92 surrender 55, 90 Greek Army XIII Infantry Division 54, 54–55 XVIII Infantry Division 45 XIX Motorized Division 18, 28, 45 XX Infantry Division 52 armoured cars 18 casualties 46, 89 Central Macedonia Field Army Section 18–19, 22 commanders 12, 12 Eastern Macedonia Field Army Section 22, 42–45, 46 Epirus Field Army Section 21, 22 Greek Cavalry Division 54–55 order of battle 21, 22 strength 18 surrender 55, 55 Western Macedonia Field Army Section 21, 22, 38, 54–55 Greek Royal Air Force 19 Hitler, Adolf 4, 5, 5, 9, 23, 39, 90, 91 Hubicki, Generalleutnant Alfred Ritter von 11 Hungarian Third Army 9–10, 9, 17, 20, 35 Hungary 4 Independent State of Croatia 31 Italian Air Force 17 Italian forces 17, 20, 27–28, 35, 38, 54 commanders 8, 9, 10 Italy 4, 4–5, 35 Janković, General Radivoje 28, 40 Jodl, General Alfred 55 Kleidi Pass 47, 93 seizure of 49, 50–51 (map), 52–53 Kleist, Generaloberst Paul Ewald von 8–9, 9, 36, 47, 49 Klingenberg, Hauptsturmführer Fritz 38–39 List, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm 10, 10, 23, 25, 47, 55, 57, 73 Luftwaffe 17, 32–34, 35, 40, 42, 45, 68, 76, 80, 82, 87, 89 Mackay, Sir Iven Giffard 14, 14 Macky, Lieutenant-Colonel Neil 63

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Mediterranean strategy 4 memorials 92–93, 92 Metaxas Line, the 18, 25, 26, 27, 28 battle for 40, 40, 41 (map), 42– 46, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 Fort Paljurjones 42 Fort Usita 42, 43, 45 Monastir 54 Mostar 35 Mussolini, Benito 5, 5, 55, 91 Nestos River Line 23, 44 New Zealand forces 2nd Division 14, 19, 19, 22, 49, 53, 56, 57, 71, 72, 80, 82, 89, 93 4th Brigade 52, 57, 58–60, 61–62, 66, 70, 73, 76, 82, 83, 87–88 5th Brigade 57, 57, 62–63, 66, 70, 73, 79–80 6th Brigade 70, 71, 73, 76, 79, 82, 88 19th Battalion 83 21st Battalion 25, 63, 66, 67, 68 24th Battalion 71, 78–79 25th Battalion 78–79, 83 26th Battalion 78–79, 83, 84–86 27th Battalion 53 27th Machine-Gun Battalion 52, 54, 71, 87 64th Artillery Regiment 52 New Zealand Cavalry Regiment 52, 57, 70, 84–86 New Zealand Cavalry Squadron 70 North Africa 28 Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 4 Olympus Line, the 57, 61–63 Operation 25 5, 25 Operation Barbarossa 91 Operation Demon 76, 79–80, 80, 81 (map), 82–83, 83, 84–86, 87–88, 87, 88 Operation Marita 4 Operation Retribution 32–34 orders of battle 20–22 Papagos, Lieutenant-General Alexandros 12, 12, 27, 28, 45, 49, 55–56, 57, 72, 76 Parrington, Brigadier Les 88 Pavelić, Ante 31 Pinios Gorge 58–60, 64–65 (map), 66–70, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 93 Piraeus 40, 80 Pitsikas, Lieutenant-General Ioannis 55 Platamon Ridge 61, 62, 63, 63, 66, 66, 93 political offensive 4–5 Pridham-Wippell, Vice Admiral Sir Henry 76

prisoners of war 29, 35, 40, 46, 68, 84–86, 89, 91 roads 15, 31, 36, 72 Romania 4, 23 Royal Air Force 19, 62, 72, 90 Royal Yugoslav Army 28, 29, 36, 45 First Army Group 21, 31 Second Army 31 Third Army 17, 31 Third Army Group 21, 31 Fourth Army 17, 31, 35 Sixth Army 21, 31, 36 Seventh Army 31, 35 artillery 18 casualties 40, 89 commanders 11–12, 11 order of battle 21 organization 18 strength 17 surrender 29, 39–40 tanks 18, 35 Salonika 4, 18, 23, 25, 27, 43, 45, 46 Schörner, Generalmajor Ferdinand 11, 11, 66, 67, 73 Servia 57, 58–60, 61–62 Simović, General Dušan 11–12, 11 Stumme, Generalleutnant Georg 47, 62, 76, 78 terrain 15, 16, 31, 71 theatre of operations 24 (map) Thermopylae Line, the 56, 66, 70– 73, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74–75 (map), 76–79, 76, 77, 78, 79, 79, 80 Tsolakoglou, Lieutenant-General Georgios 12, 55 Vaerst, Oberst Gustav von 46, 49 Veiel, Generalmajor Rudolf 10–11, 45, 46 Wavell, General Sir Archibald 27, 72 Weichs, Generaloberst Freiherr Maximilian von 8, 8, 35 Wilson, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Maitland 12–13, 49, 56– 57, 72, 73, 82, 87 Yugoslav Royal Air Force 19, 29, 31, 32–34 Yugoslavia 4, 5, 92 collapse of 29, 29, 30 (map), 31, 31, 32–34, 35–36, 35, 36, 37 (map), 38–40 Zagreb 26, 31, 35

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Author’s acknowledgements The author gratefully acknowledges the help and support provided by Lieutenant-Colonel (ret.) Dr Christopher Pugsley (Wakanae, New Zealand), Dr Klaus Schmider (Sandhurst), Minas Laggaris (Thessaloniki), Phoebus Athanassiou (Frankfurt), Filippo Cappellano (Rome), Piero Crociani (Rome) and Paolo Formiconi (Lanuvio). A big thank you goes to Nikolai Bogdanovic, the series editor, and to Marc Romanych of Digital History Archive, whose help with documents and photographs proved invaluable.

OSPREY is a trademark of Osprey Publishing Ltd First published in Great Britain in 2021 © Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2021 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: PB 9781472842619; eBook 9781472842626; ePDF 9781472842596; XML 9781472842602 Maps by Bounford.com 3D BEVs by Paul Kime Index by Alan Rutter Typeset by PDQ Digital Media Solutions, Bungay, UK

Artist’s note

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Dedication In memory of Raymond ‘Ray’ Frank Grover (1931–2019)

Acronyms and abbreviations AIF ANZAC CMFAS EFAS EMFAS GOC LSSAH mot. OKH RAF RHA RTR WMFAS

Australian Imperial Force Australian and New Zealand Army Corps Central Macedonia Field Army Section Epirus Field Army Section Eastern Macedonia Field Army Section General Officer Commanding Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler motorisiert (motorized) Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command) Royal Air Force Royal Horse Artillery Royal Tank Regiment Western Macedonia Field Army Section

Unit names In order to avoid confusion and improve readability, standard English denominations are used throughout this work for Italian, Greek and Yugolsav units. For reference, the following are the actual denominations of the field commands: UK/ Commonwealth

Italy

Greece

Yugoslavia

(Higher commands)

Comando Superiore Forze Armate Albania

Γενικόν Στρατηγειον (Genikon Stratigeion)

Grupa armija (Army Group)

Army

Armata

Στρατιά (Stratia)

Armija

Army Corps

Corpo d’Armata

Σωμα Στρατου (Soma Stratou)

Division

Divisione

Μεραρχια (Merarkia)

Divizija

Brigade

Brigata

Ταξιαρχια (Taxiarkia)

Odred

Regiment

Reggimento

Σύνταγμα (Sintagma)

Pukov

Battalion

Battaglione

Τάγμα (Tagma)

Batalijon

Key to military symbols

Army Group

Army

Corps

Division

Brigade

Regiment

Battalion

Company/Battery

Platoon

Section

Squad

Infantry

Artillery

Cavalry

Air defence

Air Force

Air mobile

Air transportable

Amphibious

Headquarters

Maintenance

Airborne

Unit HQ

Anti-tank

Armour

Air aviation

Bridging

Engineer

Medical

Missile

Mountain

Navy

Nuclear, biological, Ordnance chemical

Reconnaissance

Signal

Supply

Transport movement

Rocket artillery

Parachute

Air defence artillery

Key to unit identification Unit identifier

Parent unit Commander

(+) with added elements (–) less elements

TITLE PAGE Yugoslav soldiers surrender to 1.Gebirgs-Division troops in Slovenia. (NARA)